Title: People v. Klaeren II

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90537-Agenda 29-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. ROBERT J. KLAEREN II et al.,
								Appellees, v. VILLAGE OF LISLE et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether a
landowner whose property abuts a parcel subject to a proposed
annexation, special use, and rezoning petition can be wholly
denied the right to cross-examine witnesses at a public hearing
regarding the petition. Plaintiffs, residents of the Village of Lisle
(village) who reside next to a parcel where defendant Meijer, Inc.
(Meijer), plans to build a retail store, sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent the continuation of site preparation for
construction of the store, alleging that procedural defects occurred
in the public hearing for the annexation and rezoning of the
property. The circuit court of Du Page County granted the
preliminary injunction. Defendants, Meijer, the village, and Saint
Procopious Abbey (the Abbey), brought an interlocutory appeal
under Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)). The
appellate court held that the complete denial of the right of
interested parties to cross-examine witnesses at the village's joint
public hearing was improper. 316 Ill. App. 3d 770. We agree and
hold that, because the joint hearing included a special use petition,
due process required that interested parties be afforded the right to
cross-examine witnesses.
I. BACKGROUND
	The following facts were adduced at the preliminary
injunction hearing.
	Meijer sought to open a new store in the village, entering into
a contract with the Abbey to purchase a 60-acre parcel of land. As
part of the development plan for the store, Meijer requested that
the village pass ordinances: (1) annexing the parcel; (2) rezoning
the parcel from R-1 (residential) to B-2 (commercial business
district); and (3) granting special uses for a planned unit
development and for a gasoline service station. Throughout the
municipal zoning process, Meijer was opposed by plaintiffs, who
alleged that the increased traffic, noise and lighting around the
new store would diminish their property values and quality of life.
Plaintiffs' challenge to the annexation, rezoning and special use
focuses on alleged procedural irregularities that occurred at a joint
public hearing that took place on July 9, 1998. On that date, the
village board of trustees (village board), the village plan
commission (plan commission), and the village zoning board of
appeals (zoning board) each convened a separate public hearing
regarding the Meijer proposal at the village hall. Each body then
independently moved to recess its hearing and reconvene in a joint
hearing at a local junior high school auditorium.(1) The record
reveals that the joint hearing attracted a large audience. The
auditorium seats 500 people. On the night of the hearing, audience
members were standing in the aisles and in the hall outside, as
well as sitting on the stairs leading up to the stage and on the stage
itself.
	When the hearing reconvened, the village mayor, Ronald
Ghilardi, who presided over the proceeding, stated:
			"This is a public hearing. It is not a debate. There will
be no attempt at tonight's hearing to answer any question
raised by the audience.
* * *
			To the extent possible the speaker will address
questions and concerned [sic] raised by the combined
boards this evening.
* * *
			The petitioner will be first subject to any questions by
the assembled boards. We will attempt to deal with each
individual aspect of the presentation as it's made.
			People in the audience speaking in favor of the proposal
will then be heard. People in the audience speaking in
opposition of the proposal will then be heard. The
petitioner will then be allowed to make closing
comments.
			After closing comments by the petitioner, the public
hearing will be adjourned.
			Public records will remain open for written comments
by interested parties. Any written comments must be
received at the Village offices by 4:30 p.m. Friday, July
31st.
* * *
			To be fair to everyone in the audience, I ask that you
limit your comments to two minutes each. I will be the
time keeper and will let you know when 15 seconds
remain.
* * *
			No one will be allowed to speak a second time until
everyone has an opportunity to speak once. That
requirement will also be applicable to members of the
assembled boards."
	Witnesses then spoke on behalf of Meijer. Those witnesses
included an architect, a land planner, a traffic consultant, and a
hydraulic engineer. During the presentations of each of these
witnesses, several members of the village board, the plan
commission, and the zoning board asked questions.
	Following Meijer's witnesses, the mayor invited those
audience members in favor of the project to speak. Two audience
members spoke in favor of the development and over 40
individuals spoke in opposition to the proposed project. In
response to a question from an opponent of the project, Mayor
Ghilardi relayed that only a single representative would be allowed
to speak on behalf of any group or organization and that the
two-minute time limit would be enforced. Mayor Ghilardi further
explained:
			"Rather than try and debate with you the procedure we
are going to try and follow, I tried to explain at the
beginning of the meeting. My instructions would give
everyone who wants to speak or had a written comment
an opportunity to be heard. I think that is fair.
			No matter what we do it is going to be characterized as
being unfair. That being the case, we are going to proceed
with the suggestion I made."
	Various opponents raised individual concerns related to the
project. Among these concerns, opponents questioned: (1) whether
the proposed development would have a greater impact on traffic
than the Meijer representatives predicted; (2) whether the
development was inappropriate for the neighborhood and would
decrease the quality of life; and (3) whether parking lot traffic,
snow removal operations, and garbage compactors would create
unpredicted noise pollution in the area.
	A real estate appraiser also testified on behalf of the
opponents. He stated that he was familiar with Meijer stores and
had conducted economic-impact analyses on similar, unrelated
projects. While the appraiser stated that he had not inspected the
neighborhood itself, he opined that homes in the blocks
surrounding the development would be adversely impacted not
less than 15% and those homes within a one-mile radius would be
adversely impacted 5% to 7%.
	 Many speakers made only general comments, but several
identified questions they wanted the assembled bodies to present
to the Meijer representatives. On several occasions, Mayor
Ghilardi warned individuals that their time had expired or was
about to expire.
	Following the joint public hearing, plaintiffs filed a
complaint, seeking, among other relief, an injunction to prevent a
vote approving the annexation, rezoning, and special use. The trial
court denied the injunction, reasoning that plaintiffs had failed to
join all necessary parties. The village board subsequently adopted
ordinances and approved resolutions annexing, rezoning, and
granting a special use for the parcel. Plaintiffs then amended their
complaint to add Meijer and the Abbey as defendants and added
a claim sounding in quo warranto. At plaintiffs' request, the trial
court entered a temporary restraining order, halting site
preparation, and held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction.
	During the hearing, plaintiff Robert Klaeren testified that he
owned a home abutting the proposed development. Klaeren
testified that he was concerned about the increased noise, light
pollution, and storm water runoff that would be generated by the
Meijer development. He also stated that his property value would
decrease because of the development and that he feared village
services such as snow removal and police protection would
diminish in the remaining portions of the village because the
village would be required to provide these services to a larger area
as a result of the annexation.
	According to Klaeren, he met with other village citizens prior
to the joint public hearing and prepared a presentation. Klaeren
stated that Mayor Ghilardi interrupted him before he could finish
his presentation and that he would have asked questions of
Meijer's witnesses had he been allowed to do so by Mayor
Ghilardi.
	Plaintiff Carle Wunderlich similarly testified concerning
diminished property values and increased noise and traffic.
Wunderlich further testified that he had prepared an exhibit of
photographs of a Meijer store that he was prevented from bringing
into the joint public hearing. According to Wunderlich, he built his
home across the street from the proposed Meijer development after
his investigation of the parcel's zoning lead him to believe that the
Abbey would use the parcel for institutional purposes.
	Ann Duker, a village trustee and former chair of the plan
commission, testified on behalf of the plaintiffs. According to
Duker, she was unaware of an ordinance authorizing joint hearings
for the village board, the zoning board, and the plan commission,
but that such hearings were held as a matter of custom and
convenience. Duker testified that the plan commission made
recommendations to the village board regarding subdivision plans
and planned unit developments. Regarding the Meijer
development, the plan commission had voted five to one to deny
the recommendations and had adopted negative findings of fact.
On cross-examination, Duker revealed that she had been elected
to the position of village trustee, campaigning as an opponent of
the Meijer development.
	Steven Stroh, the chair of the zoning board, likewise testified
that the zoning board had voted to deny Meijer a special use
permit to operate a gas station on the development.
	Thomas Ewers, the village director of community
development and the village building and zoning commissioner,
testified on behalf of plaintiffs. Ewers detailed the procedures used
to process the Meijer application, the proposal presented to the
village, the modifications of the proposal, and the ultimate
approval of a modified agreement for annexation and rezoning.
	Plaintiffs also introduced the testimony of Paul Davis, a real
estate appraiser, via a videotaped deposition. Davis testified that
he reviewed the proposed Meijer development to determine
whether it would affect the value of surrounding properties. Davis
further testified that he researched the sales of homes in several
subdivisions adjacent to commercial developments. According to
Davis, houses on the interior of such subdivisions sold for higher
average prices than those that abutted the commercial
development. Accordingly, Davis opined that the Meijer
development would have a negative impact on the value of
properties in the surrounding area. On cross-examination, Davis
admitted that he had not prepared a written report and that he
could not quantify the diminution in value.
	Thomas McCabe, an engineer, testified on behalf of the
Abbey. McCabe concluded that the site-preparation work that was
being performed by Meijer would not have an adverse effect on
the adjoining property owners. He recommended that the Abbey
allow site-preparation work during the pendency of the
transaction.
	Jacques Gourguechon, a city planning consultant, testified for
the village and Meijer. He described the land uses surrounding the
Meijer development. Gourguechon also described the site plan for
the proposed development, the open space required for storm
water collection and wetlands mitigation, and the use of
landscaping as buffering for the adjoining parcels. Gourguechon
further produced an artist's rendering of the completed
development and testified that it adequately depicted how the
development would appear when viewed from the residential area
behind the store. According to Gourguechon, the development
would have an impact on the neighboring parcels but the impact
would be the same no matter how the Meijer parcel was
developed.
	Mark Norton, Meijer's manager for new store construction,
testified that soil had to be removed from the site and be replaced
with suitable fill as part of the construction process. Before the
temporary restraining order was entered by the trial court, such fill
was available from an unrelated excavation on another Abbey
parcel. According to Norton, alternative fill would cost
approximately $40,000. In addition, Meijer had been required to
furnish the village with letters of credit at a monthly cost of
$1,900. Norton concluded that Meijer would be forced to spend an
additional $1.5 to $2.5 million due to the additional expenses
generated by the delay in site preparation in order to complete
construction of the new store by the originally contemplated date.
	Mayor Ghilardi testified that the purpose of the public hearing
in the zoning and development context was to provide an
opportunity for input on a legislative process that results in a
policy decision. Mayor Ghilardi testified that he believed the joint
public hearing procedure used by the village was practical and
efficient. Regarding cross-examination, Mayor Ghilardi stated that
the hearing was not designed to be "a debate between the
petitioner and the proponents or opponents of the development."
He further stated:
			"[S]o what we wanted to do is *** if you have a
comment that you would like to make, please make your
comment. If there are questions that you as one of the
members of the public have, raise the question, and some
time during the course of what is oftentimes a very
lengthy process, those questions are addressed throughout
the process.
			Part of those questions are addressed also not only by
the board members in their representative capacity, but
also by the various consultants that the Village retains to
review the materials submitted by the *** petitioner."
	When asked whether anyone in the public requested the right
to cross-examine witnesses at the joint public hearing, Mayor
Ghilardi responded:
			"I don't remember the use of the word cross-examine
***. People asked their questions. If they had a question,
they would phrase their question and go on. Some were
questions that were capable of being answered. Some
were questions that were rhetorical. Some were questions
that were of a negative parlance. There were a series of
types of questions. But cross-examination as we would
know it in this room was not part of the process."
	Mayor Ghilardi further testified that the village board voted
to approve the Meijer development and that an extraordinary
majority was needed for the various approvals because the plan
commission and the zoning board each recommended denial.
	Following the preliminary injunction hearing, the trial court
issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the preliminary
injunction. The trial court principally relied on E&E Hauling, Inc.
v. County of Du Page, 77 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (1979), holding that,
although Mayor Ghilardi, as chair of the July 1998 hearing, had a
right to impose reasonable conditions on the participation of the
public, he could not totally deny plaintiffs the right to question the
witnesses for Meijer. The trial court further concluded that
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that
the public hearing was rendered illusory by the total denial of the
right to examine Meijer's witnesses. The trial court also concluded
that irreparable injury could be presumed because the village
board acted in violation of state law. The trial court ordered that
no further action be taken on the Meijer site until further order of
the court or until the village held a proper public hearing on the
matter. Defendants appealed.
	The majority of the appellate panel affirmed. The appellate
majority reasoned:
		"[W]hen a local legislative body no longer crafts rules of
general application but instead acts to grant permits, make
special exceptions, or decide particular cases, it functions
less like a legislative body and its actions are better
described as administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial in
character. Bossman v. Village of Riverton, 291 Ill. App.
3d 769, 772-73 (1997), citing Ward v. Village of Skokie,
26 Ill. 2d 415, 424 (Klingbiel, J., specially concurring).
Placing such functions in the hands of legislative bodies
creates an obvious opportunity for the extension of special
privileges to those well-connected politically and presents
a challenge to the basic concepts of due process embodied
in our legal system. See Ward, 26 Ill. 2d  at 424 (Klingbiel,
J., specially concurring)." 316 Ill. App. 3d at 779.
	Justice Rapp dissented, contending that municipal annexation
and zoning are purely legislative functions. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 787
(Rapp, J., dissenting). Therefore, according to Justice Rapp, a
municipal board need only allow interested parties to present their
cases, rather than holding an adversarial proceeding with cross-examination. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 788 (Rapp, J., dissenting).
	We granted defendants leave to appeal and further granted
leave to a group of other municipalities to submit an amicus curiae
brief in support of defendants.(2) See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standing
	As a threshold matter, defendants allege that plaintiffs lack
standing to bring the present action. According to defendants,
plaintiffs failed to establish any special injuries different from
those of the general public. In an unpublished portion of its
opinion, the appellate court disagreed, holding that plaintiffs had
established standing as a result of their proximity to the proposed
development.
	In support of this holding the court cited Yusuf v. Village of
Villa Park, 120 Ill. App. 3d 533 (1983). The court in Yusuf held
that a diminution in value and a loss in the quiet enjoyment of
one's property caused by additional traffic and noise created by a
proposed special use was adequate to confer standing on adjoining
property owners. Yusuf, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 538. The appellate
majority in this case likewise held that any increase in noise,
traffic or light pollution created by the development would affect
the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' properties in a manner distinct
in both quantity and quality from any injury suffered by the public
as a whole. We agree with this conclusion.
	Allegations identical to those raised by the plaintiffs in Yusuf
were raised by plaintiffs in this case. Those allegations were
supported by the testimony of plaintiffs as well as the testimony of
Paul Davis, a real estate appraiser, at the preliminary injunction
hearing. Thus, this showing was sufficient to confer plaintiffs with
standing to pursue injunctive relief.
	Concerning their quo warranto claims, however, the appellate
majority found that plaintiffs had failed to establish standing.
According to the appellate majority, plaintiffs' contentions that a
diminution in municipal services would result from the proposed
development were speculative. Specifically, the majority held that
plaintiffs did not prove that the additional tax revenue generated
by the development would not offset the cost of providing
additional municipal services. Plaintiffs have not appealed this
holding. Accordingly, we will not address the issue.
B. Preliminary Injunction
	The primary focus of our review is whether the circuit court
properly granted injunctive relief to plaintiffs. A preliminary
injunction is intended to preserve the status quo pending a decision
on the merits of a case. Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 156 (1992). A preliminary injunction is an extreme remedy
that should be employed only in situations when an emergency
exists and serious harm would result if the injunction is not issued.
Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2001).
	A party requesting a preliminary injunction must demonstrate:
(1) a clearly ascertained right in need of protection; (2) irreparable
harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) no adequate remedy at
law for the injury; and (4) the likelihood of success on the merits.
Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d  at 156. On appeal, we examine only whether
the party seeking the injunction has demonstrated a prima facie
case that there is a fair question concerning the existence of the
claimed rights. Callis, 195 Ill. 2d  at 366. The decision to grant or
deny a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court and on review the decision will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. Desnick v. Department of
Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 516 (1996).
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
	The thrust of the parties' arguments before this court centers
on the fourth prong of injunctive relief: whether plaintiffs enjoy a
likelihood of success on the merits. Success on the merits in this
case would be a declaration by the trial court that any of the village
ordinances annexing, rezoning, and granting a special use for the
subject parcel are void due to the alleged procedural flaws of the
joint public hearing. Defendants maintain that there is no
likelihood of success on the merits because no right to cross-examination exists; plaintiffs and the courts below disagreed.
Having distilled their arguments to focus mainly on this particular
issue, we will similarly tailor our discussion.
a. Waiver
	Before we engage in this discussion, we must, however,
address defendants' contention that plaintiffs waived any objection
to the lack of cross-examination by failing to object to the joint
hearing procedures. As we stated in Balmoral Racing Club, Inc.
v. Illinois Racing Board, 151 Ill. 2d 367, 397 (1992), formal
objections go hand in hand with formal proceedings. It is
disingenuous for defendants to maintain on the one hand that the
municipal boards properly used informal proceedings at the joint
hearing while, on the other hand, arguing that a formal objection
was necessary to preserve plaintiffs' claim of error.
	More importantly, we agree with the appellate court that there
is no need to object when it is apparent that an objection would be
futile. See Bianchi v. Mikhail, 266 Ill. App. 3d 767, 776 (1994).
Mayor Ghilardi's preliminary statements regarding the procedures
to be employed at the hearing were unequivocal. He made clear
that "there [would] be no attempt at [the] hearing to answer any
question raised by the audience [members]" and that he would not
consider any procedural objections raised by the public. In such a
situation, we believe a formal objection is not required to preserve
allegations of error. We therefore hold that plaintiffs did not waive
any error resulting from the denial of their right to
cross-examination.
b. Merits
	Turning to the merits of the parties' arguments, defendants
maintain that the plain language of the applicable provisions of the
Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code or Code) (65 ILCS
5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 1998)) grants only notice and an opportunity
to be heard at a public hearing concerning a special use in
municipalities with a population of less than 500,000. See 65 ILCS
5/11-13-7, 11-13-1.1 (West 1998). Defendants contend that the
lower courts improperly grafted provisions of the Municipal Code
that only apply to larger cities onto the provisions of the Code
applicable to the village in this case. See 65 ILCS 5/11-13-7,
11-13-7a (West 1998).(3)
	Plaintiffs counter that the right to cross-examine witnesses is
implied in the legislature's requirement of a "public hearing" in
zoning matters because a public hearing is meaningless if the
audience is not allowed to participate. Plaintiffs further contend
that decisions interpreting "public hearing" to include the right to
cross-examine witnesses (see, e.g., E&E Hauling, Inc. v. County
of Du Page, 77 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021 (1979); Braden v. Much,
403 Ill. 507, 513 (1949)) predate amendments to the applicable
sections of the Code. According to plaintiffs, the legislature's
decision not to define further the term in light of controlling
authority clearly shows that the legislature intended that public
hearings include the right to cross-examine.
	The appellate majority agreed with plaintiffs, determining that
a right of cross-examination was implicit in the applicable
Municipal Code sections. Recognizing that the court in E&E
Hauling defined the term "public hearing" in relation to the
Counties Code then in effect (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 34, par. 3158
(now codified, as amended, at 55 ILCS 5/5-12014 (West 1998))),
the appellate majority also noted the E&E Hauling court's
statement that " '[t]he general rule is well established that a
" 'public hearing' before any tribunal or body" means "the right
to appear and give evidence and also the right to hear and examine
the witnesses whose testimony is presented by opposing
parties." ' " (Emphasis added.) 316 Ill. App. 3d at 780, quoting
E&E Hauling, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, quoting Braden, 403 Ill.  at
513. Turning directly to the tribunals at issue in this case, the
appellate majority specifically observed that zoning boards
		" ' "often deal[ ] with important property interests; and a
denial of a right to cross-examine may easily lead to the
acceptance of testimony at its face value when its lack of
credibility or the necessity for accepting it only with
qualifications can be shown by cross-examination." ' "
316 Ill. App. 3d at 780, quoting E&E Hauling, 77 Ill.
App. 3d at 1022, quoting Wadell v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 136 Conn. 1, 8, 68 A.2d 152, 155 (1949).
Therefore, the appellate majority concluded that the sections of the
Municipal Code that specifically grant a right of cross-examination to those property owners within 250 feet of a special
use in a municipality of more than 500,000 persons (see 65 ILCS
5/11-13-7, 11-13-7a (West 1998)) may be impliedly read into the
remaining sections of the Code that cover the municipality at bar
(see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1 (West 1998)). 316 Ill. App. 3d at 781-82. According to the appellate majority, the legislature's provision
of more specific guidelines for the largest municipalities shows an
intent to have more flexibility in the remaining municipalities. 316
Ill. App. 3d at 781. Moreover, the appellate majority observed that
it would be absurd to grant the right of cross-examination to
adjoining landowners in larger municipalities, while providing
only an illusory right to landowners in smaller municipalities. 316
Ill. App. 3d at 781.
	We are unwilling to adopt the appellate majority's blanket
endorsement of the E&E Hauling determination that a " ' " 'public
hearing' before any tribunal or body" ' " includes the full panoply
of due process rights. (Emphasis added.) 316 Ill. App. 3d at 780,
quoting E&E Hauling, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, quoting Braden v.
Much, 403 Ill. 507, 513 (1949). To construe so broadly the phrase
"public hearing" may be inappropriate in some instances. Thus,
the appellate majority too strictly relied on the Municipal Code for
its resolution of this cause. The resolution of this cause instead
depends upon the distinction between legislative hearings and
administrative hearings before municipal bodies.
	Illinois courts have long held that municipal bodies act in a
legislative capacity when they conduct zoning hearings. For
example, the oft-cited decision in La Salle National Bank of
Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40 (1957), articulated:
			"It is well established that it is primarily the province of
the municipal body to determine the use and purpose to
which property may be devoted, and it is neither the
province nor the duty of the courts to interfere with the
discretion with which such bodies are vested unless the
legislative action of the municipality is shown to be
arbitrary, capricious or unrelated to the public health,
safety and morals." La Salle National Bank, 12 Ill. 2d  at
46.
We recently raised the question of whether to classify special use
permit hearings as legislative matters or administrative matters in
the context of whether a municipality's decision is subject to
administrative review in City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word
Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1
(2001). 	In Living Word, we recognized that "the clear weight of
authority in the United States holds that a legislative body acts
administratively when it rules on applications for special use
permits." Living Word, 196 Ill. 2d  at 14. We further noted:
			"[T]here is considerable force to the view that the
decision of a legislative body to grant or deny an
application for a special use permit, whether made by a
county or municipality, should be viewed as an
administrative act. The decisions from this court which
have held to the contrary have been criticized. [Citation.]
Further, our appellate court has suggested that, in light of
amendments made to the Illinois Municipal Code
governing special uses, the General Assembly has
indicated a desire to treat the application process for a
special use permit as an administrative function, at least
with respect to municipalities. [Citations.]" Living Word,
196 Ill. 2d  at 15-16.
Thus, in Living Word, we implicitly posed the question of whether
we would continue to hold that zoning hearings on special use
applications are legislative matters. The resolution of Living Word,
however, did not depend upon an answer to that question because
the municipality's decision regarding the special use permit in
Living Word could not be sustained whether viewed as an
administrative decision or a legislative one. See Living Word, 196 Ill. 2d  at 16-26.
	Having been freshly and squarely presented with the question
by the cause at hand, we now answer it by holding that municipal
bodies act in administrative or quasi-judicial capacities when those
bodies conduct zoning hearings concerning a special use petition.
As we stated in Living Word, the "clear weight of authority" so
holds. Living Word, 196 Ill. 2d  at 14. To the extent any prior
decisions of this court hold the contrary to be true, we now
expressly overrule those decisions.
	The reasons for classifying zoning hearings that deal with
special use applications as administrative or quasi-judicial are
manifest. In these hearings, the property rights of the interested
parties are at issue. The municipal body acts in a fact-finding
capacity to decide disputed adjudicative facts based upon evidence
adduced at the hearing and ultimately determines the relative
rights of the interested parties. As a result, those parties must be
afforded the due process rights normally granted to individuals
whose property rights are at stake. See Balmoral Racing Club, 151 Ill. 2d  at 405 (the starting point, in any due process analysis, is a
determination of whether one of these protectable interests-life,
liberty or property-is present); Brown v. Air Pollution Control
Board, 37 Ill. 2d 450, 454 (1967) ("a proceeding *** which could
affect one's property rights *** [is] governed by the fundamental
principles and requirements of due process of law").
	To what extent the full panoply of due process rights
commonly associated with quasi-judicial proceedings must be
afforded interested parties depends upon the purpose of the
hearing. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1307, 80 S. Ct. 1502 (1960),
			" 'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact
boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies
according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when
governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of
individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the
procedures which have traditionally been associated with
the judicial process. On the other hand, when
governmental action does not partake of an adjudication,
as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation
is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full
panoply of judicial procedures be used. Therefore, as a
generalization, it can be said that due process embodies
the differing rules of fair play, which through the years,
have become associated with differing types of
proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a
particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends
upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged
right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the
possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations
which must be taken into account." Hannah, 363 U.S.  at
442, 4 L. Ed. 2d  at 1321, 80 S. Ct.  at 1514-15.
See also Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 92 (1992) (due process is a flexible
concept and requires only such procedural protections as
fundamental principles of justice and the particular situation
demand); accord Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community
Affairs, 84 Ill. 2d 42, 51 (1981); compare Petersen v. Plan
Comm'n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 461, 468 (1998) (all aspects of due
process protection need not be afforded at a fact-gathering hearing
conducted before a plan commission), with E&E Hauling, 77 Ill.
App. 3d at 1022 (failure to permit cross-examination at a zoning
board hearing violates due process).
	According to the testimony at the preliminary injunction
hearing, the joint hearing in the cause at hand served several
purposes. The village board was gathering facts to evaluate the
proposed annexation. The plan commission was considering
Meijer's proposed development plan and determining whether to
recommend that plan to the village board. The zoning board was,
likewise, assessing the special use and rezoning requests with an
eye toward whether to recommend that the village board grant the
requests. Since the joint procedure used by the village involved a
special use request, it would be a denial of due process not to
afford interested parties the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses. See Living Word, 196 Ill. 2d at 21-22; see also
Balmoral Racing Club, 151 Ill. 2d  at 410-11 (cross examination
is " 'the most efficacious test for the discovery of the truth' ").
Plaintiffs have shown a reasonable likelihood that the court will
conclude they were entitled to this right of cross-examination. We
recognize that the right is not unlimited and may be tailored by the
municipal body to the circumstances specifically before it. See
Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217 A.2d 578, 586 (1966) (the relevance of cross-examination varies with
the nature of the evidence presented and requires a similar exercise
of discretion by the body conducting the hearing).
	The appellate majority offered some particularly instructive
comments concerning limitations to the right of cross-examination
that may be instituted by a municipal body in order to ease its
administrative burdens:
		"[A] municipality could adopt rules limiting the class of
individual allowed to exercise a right of
cross-examination. A municipality could, within
reasonable limits, require those wishing to exercise the
right of cross-examination to register in advance of the
public hearing. Those wishing to exercise their right of
cross-examination could also be required to allege some
special interest beyond that of the general public. A
municipality could ease the administrative burden of
identifying those with a special interest by adopting a rule
creating a presumption of the right to cross-examination
in favor of an identified class. The legislature made a
similar classification when it adopted the 250-foot notice
requirement contained in section 11-13-7. [Citation.] The
desires of neighboring property owners alone cannot
justify a zoning restriction, but the preservation of
property values is one purpose of zoning ordinances, and
the diminution of property values in a neighborhood is
one factor that should be considered before a change in
zoning. [Citations.] A municipality should be free to
adopt reasonable limitations on the right of
cross-examination uniquely suited to local conditions, but
the reasonableness of any limitation on the rights of
adjoining property owners must be judged in light of the
potential impact on property values in the neighborhood.
			Similarly, a municipality may reasonably restrict the
right of cross-examination based on subject matter. The
presiding officer at a public hearing may identify those
witnesses whose testimony will or will not be subject to
cross-examination. The factors to be considered include,
but are not limited to, the complexity of the issue, whether
the witness possesses special expertise, whether the
testimony reflects a matter of taste or personal opinion or
concerns a disputed issue of fact, and the degree to which
the witness's testimony relates to the factors to be
considered in approving the proposal. Such a
determination may be made either immediately after the
witness's testimony or may be made in advance based on
the anticipated testimony. Additionally, the hearing
officer could adopt rules specifying which factual issues
are considered relevant to the decision and limiting
cross-examination to witnesses addressing those issues.
Such a procedure would have the additional benefit of
identifying for interested parties those factual issues
considered relevant by the decision maker." 316 Ill. App.
3d at 783-84.
	While an interested party's right of cross-examination may be
tailored by guidelines such as these, that right may not be wholly
contravened by the procedures used at the joint hearing at issue
here.
	As we have noted, the joint hearing in this case involved
multiple decisions by three separate intra-municipal bodies.
Viewed independently based on the individual purposes of each
municipal body, whether and to what extent interested parties
should be afforded the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses
varies depending upon the type of hearing at issue. When a
municipal body acts legislatively, its decision is subject only to
review for arbitrariness as a matter of substantive due process.
Living Word, 196 Ill. 2d  at 14. The joint hearing in this case,
however, involved a quasi-judicial proceeding in that a special use
application was heard and interested parties were not afforded the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. In light of this
deficiency, we agree with the trial court's and appellate court's
ultimate conclusion that plaintiffs enjoy a likelihood of success on
the merits of their claim that their constitutional right to due
process was infringed. Therefore, the trial court properly issued a
preliminary injunction in this case.
2. Remaining Issues	 
	We are also asked by the parties to comment upon the
procedures used by the village as a whole. The advantages of a
joint hearing among several intra-municipal bodies addressing the
same general issues are clear. Efficiency, convenience, and cost-effectiveness are plainly served by an omnibus procedure. For
example, under that system there is no need for parties to produce
the same evidence at multiple hearings. Moreover, interested
members of the public may attend a single hearing and assure
themselves that their concerns are expressed to each relevant
municipal body.
	We must admonish public bodies, however, that the
disadvantages of a joint hearing are similarly apparent. As
evidenced by this case, the size of the public audience provided
little flexibility in conducting the hearing. While time limits may
be necessary in certain circumstances, the two-minute time limit
imposed here would have been clearly improper had the
proceedings complied with the due process requisite of cross-examination for interested parties. In addition, the need for an
appropriate officer to lead such an omnibus procedure is evident,
but allowing the chief executive officer of the village to oversee a
hearing of several of its boards is of questionable propriety at best.
	Each of these concerns should be taken into account when
municipalities craft procedures for joint hearings among those
bodies involved in considering special use applications. The
overarching objective should be to create a procedure that provides
for and safeguards the due process rights of the interested parties
but does not interfere with the independent evaluations by the
individual municipal bodies.
III. CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, we hold that plaintiffs have
shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. A
landowner whose parcel adjoins a tract of land subject to a special
use application cannot be entirely denied the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at a public hearing regarding the
special use application. The complete denial of such a right to
interested landowners runs afoul of due process.
	Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's affirmance of the
circuit court's preliminary injunction.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
1.      1The underlying facts of the joint public hearing are fully set forth in
the opinion of the appellate court. 316 Ill. App. 3d 770. We need only
summarize those facts necessary to address this appeal.

2.      2The amicus curiae brief was submitted by the villages of
Bannockburn, Grayslake, Hinsdale, Lake Bluff, Lake Zurich, and
Northbrook and the cities of Highland Park and Lake Forest.

3.      3The relevant text of section 7a of the Municipal Code,
distinguishing the enumerated rights of property owners in
municipalities with a population of more than 500,000 from those of
property owners in municipalities of less than 500,000, is as follows:
			"Zoning variation and special use applicants and property
owners, as set forth in Section 11-13-7 of this Act, shall have
the following rights, in addition to any others they may possess
in law, at any hearing before a board of appeals:
			(a) to have subpoenas issued for persons to appear at board
of appeals' hearings and for examination of documents by the
person requesting the subpoena either before or at board of
appeals hearings subject to the limitations in this Section. ***
			(b) To cross examine all witnesses testifying.
			(c) To present witnesses on their behalf.
			Property owners within the terms of Section 11-13-7 who
object to the zoning application or special use application may,
upon request, be granted 1 continuance for the purpose of
presenting evidence to rebut testimony given by the applicant.
The date of such continued hearing shall be in the discretion of
the board of appeals.
			This amendatory act of 1973 is not a limit upon any
municipality which is a home rule unit." (Emphasis added.) 65
ILCS 5/11-13-7a (West 1998).