Title: People v. Gaultney

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after 
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions 
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime 
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. 
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it 
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The 
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the 
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
               Docket No. 80172--Agenda 9--September 1996. 
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. KATHY GAULTNEY, 
                               Appellant. 
                    Opinion filed December 19, 1996. 
 
     JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court: 
     This case arises from the dismissal of a petition brought 
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122--1 et seq. 
(West 1992)). In 1990, defendant, Kathy Gaultney, was convicted of 
the first degree murder of her husband and was sentenced to 45 
years in prison. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the 
appellate court on direct appeal in 1992. No. 5--90--0583 
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant filed a 
petition for leave to appeal to this court, which was denied. 
People v. Gaultney, 148 Ill. 2d 647 (1993). 
     On August 6, 1993, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction 
petition in the circuit court of Madison County. On August 11, 
1993, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The circuit 
court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without 
merit on November 1, 1993. The appellate court affirmed the 
dismissal of the petition. No. 5--93--0816 (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's petition for leave 
to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315. We affirm. 
 
                                BACKGROUND 
     We will summarize the evidence presented at trial only as 
needed to address the issues raised in this appeal. On September 
22, 1989, defendant's husband, Keith Gaultney, was killed after 
being shot twice in the head at the residence he shared with 
defendant. Defendant called the police around 10 p.m. to report a 
burglary at her home. When the police arrived, they found the 
victim lying face down in his bed, shot twice and apparently killed 
during the burglary. A drawer had been removed from a dresser in 
the room and was resting partially on the victim's legs. Some of 
the contents of the drawer had spilled onto the bed. 
     The police interviewed defendant. She told them that she left 
the residence about 10 minutes before 7 p.m. She said that, when 
she left, she saw the victim in the bedroom, asleep on the bed with 
the television on. She returned around 10 p.m. to find the victim 
dead. Defendant also told the police that the victim had probably 
eaten between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. A pathologist estimated, in an 
autopsy report, that the victim had died roughly within an hour 
after eating a meal, based on the contents of the victim's stomach. 
     The State called Rachel Lauer, defendant's daughter, to 
testify at trial. Rachel was also the victim's stepdaughter. At the 
time of the murder, she was in seventh grade and lived with her 
mother and stepfather. Rachel testified that she was at the house 
around 7 p.m. with her friend, Misty Robards. At that time, her 
mother was getting ready to leave and said that she wanted to lock 
the doors. Rachel's mother told her to leave and to be back at 12 
a.m. 
     Rachel and Misty remained in the neighborhood to wait for 
Rachel's mother to leave. According to Rachel, they wanted to 
return to the house after defendant left to get some money from the 
victim. They were going to take the money out of the victim's 
wallet while he slept. Rachel and Misty watched the house for 15 to 
20 minutes until defendant left. At some point, they encountered 
Jodie White, another friend. After Rachel's mother left, Rachel and 
Misty returned and entered the house. Jodie remained outside. While 
in the house, Rachel went by the bedroom door. She did not enter 
the bedroom. Rachel saw a dresser drawer and its contents scattered 
around the bedroom. She saw some of her mother's jewelry lying on 
the bed. The bedroom light was off but the television was on and 
blaring loudly. Rachel saw the victim's feet but the rest of the 
victim was "covered up." Rachel thought that her mother and the 
victim had been involved in a fight and that the victim was 
sleeping. In response to a question from trial counsel, Rachel 
testified that she did not hear any noise emanating from the 
bedroom other than the television. Rachel's testimony suggested 
that the victim was already dead when her mother left the house. 
     Misty Robards also testified. Her testimony was similar to 
Rachel's. Misty, however, testified that she and Rachel returned to 
the house twice after Rachel's mother left. First, they returned 
with Jodie White. Misty testified that Rachel went into the house 
by herself but came back outside after a short time. Rachel could 
not find the victim's wallet. Rachel and Misty returned to the 
house a second time. When they returned, both went into the house 
this time. Rachel and Misty entered the house through the back 
door, which was unlocked. Misty testified that she and Rachel 
walked past the bedroom. Her testimony regarding the condition of 
the bedroom and the victim was essentially the same as Rachel's. 
     In the post-conviction petition, defendant claimed that she 
was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, 
defendant alleged that her trial counsel failed to ask Rachel 
whether she heard the victim snoring in the bedroom on the night of 
the murder. According to defendant, Rachel told trial counsel 
before trial that she heard the victim snoring when she entered the 
house the first time. Trial counsel did not ask her about this 
snoring at trial. Defendant alleged that this testimony would have 
shown that defendant had not killed the victim before she left the 
house and that another individual must have killed the victim. 
     In support of the petition, defendant submitted five 
affidavits from herself and from relatives. Rachel allegedly told 
these individuals that she heard the victim snoring when she first 
entered the house. Defendant also submitted an affidavit from trial 
counsel, who stated that Rachel told him before trial that she had 
heard the victim snoring. Defendant submitted an affidavit from 
another attorney, who talked to someone over the phone claiming to 
be Rachel Lauer. Defendant, however, did not submit an affidavit 
from Rachel, the individual who was critical to defendant's claim. 
     The State filed a motion to dismiss the post-conviction 
petition on August 11, 1993. The State sought dismissal on four 
general grounds: (1) the petition was untimely; (2) the petition 
failed to present a substantial showing of a violation of 
defendant's constitutional rights; (3) defendant was merely trying 
to relitigate the jury trial proceedings; and (4) the claims in the 
petition were barred by res judicata or were waived. The motion was 
short and contained "boilerplate" language. The State did not 
discuss any of the facts of the case in the motion. The State cited 
no case law in support of the motion. The State asked that the 
petition be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. 
     The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and 
patently without merit. The dismissal order stated: 
               "This cause comes before the court on Defendant's 
          Petition for Post Conviction Relief pursuant to 725 ILCS 
          5/122--2.1. The Court having reviewed the Petition and 
          affidavits attached thereto, the trial transcript, and 
          the opinion of the 5th District Appellate Court finds as 
          follows: 
               Defendant was convicted of the offense of Murder in 
          the death of her husband after a jury trial. She was 
          sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections for 
          a term of 45 years. On the 26th day of August, 1992, 
          Defendant's direct appeal was denied by the 5th District 
          Appellate Court. On appeal, Defendant raised six issues, 
          one of those being whether the circumstantial evidence 
          was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a 
          reasonable doubt. 
               Defendant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is 
          raising the issue of the sufficiency of the 
          circumstantial evidence presented at trial. Also raised 
          is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because 
          counsel did not ask a question of Rachel Lauer concerning 
          what she heard when she went into the house on the night 
          of the murder. There are several affidavits attached to 
          the Petition, however there are no affidavits of Rachel 
          Lauer or Misty Robards, who were the two witnesses in the 
          house. 
               The question of sufficiency of the circumstantial 
          evidence is res judicata, having already been determined 
          by the Appellate Court. The issue of incompetency of 
          counsel is waived, being an issue that should have or 
          could have been raised on direct appeal. This is an issue 
          that Defendant was aware of at time of sentencing. Thus 
          Defendant was aware of such issue at time of her appeal. 
          Even if such issue is not waived, it is apparent from the 
          trial transcript, which includes the testimony of Rachel 
          Lauer and Misty Robards, and the lack of affidavits from 
          these individuals, that Defendant's Petition fails to 
          present a substantial showing of violation of Defendant's 
          constitutional rights. 
               The Court determines that the Petition is frivolous 
          and patently without merit, and is therefore dismissed 
          without an evidentiary hearing." 
     The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. 
The court noted that the State filed a motion to dismiss before the 
trial judge ruled on whether the post-conviction petition was 
frivolous and patently without merit. The court stated that a trial 
judge should not rely on a motion to dismiss when determining 
whether a petition is frivolous. The appellate court then examined 
the record and found that the trial judge had not relied on the 
motion to dismiss in making his determination. Because the trial 
judge did not rely on the State's motion, the court upheld the 
dismissal. Justice Chapman dissented. He believed that the record 
showed that the trial judge was influenced by the State's motion 
and that the dismissal was improper. 
 
                                 ANALYSIS 
     Defendant argues that the State is not allowed any input when 
the circuit court determines whether a post-conviction petition is 
frivolous or patently without merit. Here, the State filed a motion 
to dismiss before the circuit court determined that the petition 
was frivolous. Defendant argues that the State's motion to dismiss 
influenced the circuit court and tainted the circuit court's 
determination. According to defendant, this cause should be 
remanded for the appointment of counsel and further consideration 
of defendant's petition. 
     Section 122--2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) 
provides: 
               "(a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing 
          of each petition the court shall examine such petition 
          and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. 
               *** 
               (2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment 
          and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is 
          patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in 
          a written order, specifying the findings of fact and 
          conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such 
          order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be 
          served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 
          days of its entry. 
               (b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to 
          this Section, the court shall order the petition to be 
          docketed for further consideration in accordance with 
          Sections 122--4 through 122--6. 
               (c) In considering a petition pursuant to this 
          Section, the court may examine the court file of the 
          proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any 
          action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and 
          any transcripts of such proceeding." (Emphasis added.) 
          725 ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1992). 
     If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to section 122--2.1, 
section 122--4 provides for the appointment of counsel to indigent 
defendants. 725 ILCS 5/122--4 (West 1992). Section 122--5 of the 
Act provides: 
               "Within 30 days after the making of an order 
          pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 122--2.1, or within 
          such further time as the court may set, the State shall 
          answer or move to dismiss. In the event that a motion to 
          dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an 
          answer within 20 days after such denial. No other or 
          further pleadings shall be filed except as the court may 
          order on its own motion or on that of either party." 
          (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 1992). 
Section 122--6 allows the circuit court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122--6 (West 1992). 
     Pursuant to the Act, a post-conviction proceeding that does 
not involve the death penalty has three distinct stages. In the 
first stage, the defendant files a petition and the circuit court 
determines whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. At 
this stage, the Act does not permit any further pleadings from the 
defendant or any motions or responsive pleadings from the State. 
Instead, the circuit court considers the petition independently, 
without any input from either side. To survive dismissal at this 
stage, a petition need only present the gist of a constitutional 
claim. People v. Porter,  122 Ill. 2d 64 , 74 (1988). This is a low 
threshold and a defendant need only present a limited amount of 
detail in the petition. At this stage, a defendant need not make 
legal arguments or cite to legal authority. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 
74. The Act provides that the petition must be supported by 
"affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations" 
or the petition "shall state why the same are not attached." 725 
ILCS 5/122--2 (West 1992). If the circuit court does not dismiss 
the petition pursuant to section 122--2.1, it is then docketed for 
further consideration. 
     The proceeding then advances to the second stage. At the 
second stage, the circuit court appoints counsel to represent an 
indigent defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122--4 (West 1992). Counsel may file 
an amended post-conviction petition. Also, at this second stage, 
the Act expressly provides that the State may file a motion to 
dismiss or answer to the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 1992). 
Section 122--5 specifically contemplates that the State will file 
a motion to dismiss or answer after the circuit court has evaluated 
the petition to determine if it is frivolous. If the circuit court 
does not dismiss or deny the petition, the proceeding advances to 
the third stage. At this final stage, the circuit court conducts an 
evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122--6 (West 1992). If the circuit 
court dismisses the petition or denies post-conviction relief at 
any stage, the defendant may appeal. 
     Several appellate decisions have considered the situation 
where the State files a motion before the circuit court has decided 
whether the petition is frivolous. See, e.g., People v. Merritte, 
225 Ill. App. 3d 986 (1992); People v. Mitchell, 218 Ill. App. 3d 
401 (1991). These courts have consistently found that the filing of 
a motion at this stage is premature and improper under the Act. 
See, e.g., People v. Oury, 259 Ill. App. 3d 663, 668 (1994). The 
sections of the Act, when considered collectively, do not authorize 
the filing of a motion to dismiss at the first stage. 
     The mere early filing of a motion or responsive pleading by 
the State, however, does not per se contaminate the circuit court's 
determination pursuant to section 122--2.1. See, e.g., Mitchell, 
218 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03. The premature filing of a motion to 
dismiss does not prevent the circuit court from independently 
evaluating whether a post-conviction petition is frivolous or 
patently without merit, as required by the Act. Rather, reversal is 
required where the record shows that the circuit court sought or 
relied on input from the State when determining whether the 
petition is frivolous. Compare People v. Barker, 258 Ill. App. 3d 
323 (1994) (reversal required where the trial judge requested 
argument from both parties); Merritte, 225 Ill. App. 3d 986 
(reversal required where the State orally argued its motion to 
dismiss at length to the trial judge and where the judge stated 
that dismissal was based, in part, on the reasons given by the 
State at oral argument); People v. Clark, 239 Ill. App. 3d 546 
(1992) (reversal required where the State presented oral argument, 
the State used case law to support its oral argument, and the trial 
judge said that he had relied on the State's arguments); People v. 
Rutkowski, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1065 (1992) (reversal required where 
the trial judge heard argument from the State on its oral motion to 
strike); People v. Novak, 200 Ill. App. 3d 189 (1990) (reversal 
required where the trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion to 
dismiss and expressly indicated that he was granting the State's 
motion); People v. Magdaleno, 188 Ill. App. 3d 384 (1989) (reversal 
required where the trial judge addressed the merits of the State's 
motion to strike); with People v. Woods, 239 Ill. App. 3d 559 
(1992) (no reversal where the motion was short and cited only one 
case, the trial judge did not hear any argument on the motion, and 
the order showed an independent analysis); Mitchell, 218 Ill. App. 
3d 401 (no reversal where the motion was terse, the trial judge did 
not hear any argument from the State, and the dismissal order 
showed a detailed analysis). 
     We agree with the approach of these appellate decisions. 
Section 122--2.1 of the Act authorizes the trial judge to make an 
initial independent evaluation of a post-conviction petition. 725 
ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1992). We ordinarily presume that the trial 
judge knows and follows the law unless the record indicates 
otherwise. See People v. Terrell,  132 Ill. 2d 178 , 219 (1989). 
Where the record gives no indication that the trial judge sought 
input from the State or relied on the motion to dismiss, we presume 
that the judge acted properly. 
     In this case, defendant acknowledges that reversal is required 
only if the record shows that the circuit court relied on or was 
influenced by the motion to dismiss. Defendant argues, however, 
that the order shows that the circuit court did rely on the motion 
to dismiss. Defendant emphasizes four purported similarities 
between the motion to dismiss and the dismissal order to show this 
reliance. 
     First, defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously 
relied on the principle of res judicata, which was raised in the 
State's motion, to bar any attack on the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented at trial. Defendant contends that she did not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in her post-conviction 
petition. Second, defendant argues that the circuit court 
erroneously relied on waiver in connection with her ineffective- 
assistance claim. According to defendant, waiver is inappropriate 
here because the same counsel represented defendant both at trial 
and on appeal. Defendant contends that the trial judge would not 
have mentioned waiver if that argument had not been contained in 
the motion to dismiss. Third, defendant argues that the circuit 
court dismissed the petition "without an evidentiary hearing," 
which is what the State sought in its motion. Defendant argues that 
the circuit court should not consider whether she is entitled to a 
hearing at this stage of the proceeding. Fourth, defendant argues 
that the circuit court found that the petition failed to "present 
a substantial showing of violation of Defendant's constitutional 
rights," which is similar to language used by the State in its 
motion. Again, defendant argues that this language is used when 
considering whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing and that this language would not have been used absent the 
motion. 
     The purported similarities identified by defendant are too 
tenuous to show reliance on the motion to dismiss. First, with 
respect to res judicata, an examination of the post-conviction 
petition shows that the allegations in the petition do generally 
attack the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented at 
trial. Second, with respect to waiver, defendant may be correct 
that the circuit court overlooked counsel's representation at trial 
and on appeal. Waiver aside, however, the circuit court 
specifically found that the ineffective-assistance claim was 
frivolous because defendant failed to submit affidavits from either 
Rachel Lauer or Misty Robards, which was not suggested by the 
State. With respect to defendant's third and fourth arguments, some 
of the language in the order is similar to the language in the 
motion, but, as the appellate court noted, the similar language 
involves general terminology that is common in post-conviction 
proceedings. The circuit court denied the petition "without an 
evidentiary hearing" because defendant requested a hearing in her 
petition. 
      Most significantly, the trial judge specifically identified 
the materials on which he relied in making his determination. He 
stated that he had reviewed the post-conviction petition, the 
affidavits, the trial transcript, and the decision of the appellate 
court on direct appeal. No mention was made of the State's motion 
to dismiss. No hearing was held. The analysis in the dismissal 
order recited the facts of the case and was more detailed than the 
reasons presented in the motion to dismiss. In the order, the trial 
judge specifically found that the petition was "frivolous and 
patently without merit," which is the proper statutory standard for 
dismissal. Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument. 
     Defendant also argues that the circuit court erred in 
substantively finding the petition frivolous or patently without 
merit. Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing 
the petition based on defendant's failure to include an affidavit 
from either Rachel Lauer or Misty Robards. Defendant concedes that 
she failed to raise this argument in the appellate court and in the 
petition for leave to appeal to this court. We find the issue 
waived. See People v. Schott,  145 Ill. 2d 188 , 201 (1991); Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O'Malley,  163 Ill. 2d 130 , 154 (1994). 
     Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor made certain 
improper comments during closing argument. Defendant argues that 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to them and that 
the comments violated due process. Essentially, the prosecutor told 
the jury that it had to accept certain statements of witnesses as 
true because they were unrebutted. This argument was not raised in 
the post-conviction petition. Section 122--3 of the Act provides 
that "[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights 
not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived." 725 
ILCS 5/122--3 (West 1992). In addition, this issue also was not 
raised on appeal to the appellate court or in the petition for 
leave to appeal to this court. Again, we find the issue waived. 
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court 
is affirmed. 
 
                                                                  Affirmed. 
 
     JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: 
     The record here clearly indicates that the trial judge was 
influenced by and improperly relied on the State's premature motion 
in deciding to dismiss defendant's pro se post-conviction petition. 
For this reason, I cannot join the majority's affirmance. I agree 
with dissenting Justice Chapman of the appellate court. See No. 5-- 
93--0816 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The trial 
judge here was influenced by and relied on the State's motion and, 
thus, dismissal of defendant's pro se petition was improper. 
     On August 6, 1993, defendant filed her pro se post-conviction 
petition, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The 
petition was supported by seven affidavits from herself, her 
relatives, and two attorneys, attesting to the fact that a witness 
had made exculpatory statements. To be sufficient at this initial 
stage of the post-conviction process, defendant's pro se petition 
only needed to clear a low threshold by presenting the gist of a 
constitutional claim. People v. Porter,  122 Ill. 2d 64 , 74 (1988). 
In ruling on the petition at this stage, the trial court only 
needed to determine that the petition was not frivolous or patently 
without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1992). No evidentiary 
hearing was authorized at this stage. See 725 ILCS 5/122--6 (West 
1992). 
     Five days later, the State prematurely filed a motion to 
dismiss, utilizing boilerplate language and terminology suited for 
requesting dismissal at a later stage in the post-conviction 
process. Because the defendant's right to counsel had not yet 
attached at this stage of the process, the State was not permitted 
to be actively represented. See People v. Rutkowski, 225 Ill. App. 
3d 1065 (1992); People v. Merritte, 225 Ill. App. 3d 986 (1992). 
The State's motion claimed that the petition failed to meet a 
higher standard than that required at that particular stage of the 
process. Thus, the motion stated "defendant's petition fails to 
present a substantial showing of a violation of the petitioner's 
constitutional rights." The motion also requested that the petition 
be dismissed "without an evidentiary hearing." Presumably, the 
trial judge, knowing the law, would not consider the motion. 
     On November 1, 1993, the trial court issued an order 
dismissing the petition, concluding that it was frivolous and 
patently without merit. Interestingly, the order, like the State's 
motion, referred to a standard of sufficiency appropriate to a 
later stage of post-conviction process. Interestingly, also, the 
order referred to this standard by means of a statement nearly 
identical to the State's statement of the standard in its motion. 
Thus, the order stated "defendant's petition fails to present a 
substantial showing of violation of defendant's constitutional 
rights." The order's statement of the standard was also more 
similar to the motion's statement of the standard than to the 
statutory standard, itself. See 725 ILCS 5/122--1 (West 1992) 
(referring to "a substantial denial of his rights under the 
Constitution"). The majority explains that this similarity involves 
merely "general terminology that is common in post-conviction 
proceedings." Slip op. at 10. I strenuously disagree. The 
similarity involves practically a word-for-word statement of an 
untimely procedural standard in terms more closely parallel to 
those in the State's motion than to those in the statute. 
     In addition to this similarity, the order also inappropriately 
stated, just like the State's motion inappropriately requested, 
that dismissal of the petition was "without an evidentiary 
hearing." The majority explains the curious appearance of this 
inappropriate language within the order as no more than the 
response to the petitioner's request for a hearing. Slip op. at 10. 
The problem, however, is that the court need not have responded to 
the request. Even if the court had not dismissed the petition, 
petitioner's request for a hearing could not have been granted at 
this stage in the proceedings (see 725 ILCS 5/122--5, 122--6 (West 
1992)), so the court's statement was surplusage. 
     To accept the majority's explanations would mean that it was 
simply coincidental that the State's motion was similar to the 
trial judge's order. I find that hard to believe. These two 
language and untimely procedural reference similarities clearly 
suggest to me that the trial judge was influenced by the State's 
motion. That being the case, I am not persuaded that the other two 
similarities noted by petitioner are tenuous as the majority 
believes. The remaining similarities, rather, strengthen the 
petitioner's case. 
     The State's motion stated that "the Post-Conviction Hearing 
Act is not designed to relitigate the defendant's guilt or 
innocence established in the jury trial proceedings" and that "the 
defendant's petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata in 
that all claims which were raised or which could have been raised 
on appeal are waived and cannot be raised in a post-conviction 
proceeding." The order stated that "[t]he question of sufficiency 
of the circumstantial evidence is res judicata, having already been 
determined by the Appellate Court. The issue of incompetency of 
counsel is waived, being an issue that should have or could have 
been raised on direct appeal." The finding that the issue of 
incompetency of counsel was waived was legally incorrect, however, 
because a waiver exception applied in this case. 
     The majority explains that the order drew its statement 
regarding evidentiary sufficiency being res judicata, not from the 
State's motion, but from the petition's allegations, in general. 
Slip op. at 9. The petition, however, specifically raised only the 
issue of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The majority does 
not explain at all the similarity between the order's incorrect 
legal finding of waiver and the State's motion urging waiver. The 
majority simply sidesteps the matter, reasoning that the trial 
court's frivolous finding stated a basis other than that suggested 
by the State's motion. Slip op. at 10. To say that the order had an 
indication of some independent basis, however, does not explain the 
similarity. 
     I believe the State prematurely filed a somewhat generic 
motion to dismiss, which was likely designed to attack a post- 
conviction petition which had survived this first stage of post- 
conviction proceedings. The motion's influence is shown by the 
trial court's use of the same language, referring to a 
determination more properly made at a later stage in post- 
conviction proceedings; and of nearly verbatim language, referring 
to a statutory standard more properly applied at a later stage. The 
similar language, the similar untimely procedural references, and 
the similarly inappropriate reliance on waiver convince me that the 
trial judge was influenced by and relied on the State's motion. 
Accordingly, dismissal of defendant's pro se petition was improper.