Title: Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.1992 WY 16826 P.2d 229Case Number: 91-130Decided: 02/03/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Warren L. GOOKIN and 
Marjorie E. Gookin, for themselves and All Other Similarly Situated State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Policyholders, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

STATE FARM FIRE AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Harold Joffe, J.

Jack Gage and 
Robert T. Moxley of Gage and Moxley, Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

George E. 
Powers, Jr. of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, and MACY, JJ., BROWN, Ret. J., and LANGDON, District 
Judge.

LANGDON, District 
Judge.

[¶1]      This action came 
before the court to determine if appellants pleaded a cause of action for 
consumer fraud and undisclosed substitution of inferior product sufficiently to 
withstand a motion to dismiss; however, the bulwark issue is whether the 
appellants' substituted service of process under Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122 (1983) 
was sufficient to provide jurisdiction for this action. We shall reverse, 
holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to ineffective service 
of process and failure to comply with due process.

I. FACTS

[¶2]      On August 1, 
1985, an intense hail and rain storm struck the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming. The 
storm, four tornadoes it spawned and the effects of the unusually large 
accumulations of water and hail produced heavy damage to many residences. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (State Farm), an Illinois corporation, 
provided insurance coverage to a number of homeowners who suffered damage 
including Warren and Marjorie Gookin (Gookins).

[¶3]      Exactly four 
years later, on August 1, 1989, appellants filed a complaint in the First 
Judicial District Court instituting a class action proceeding under W.R.C.P. 
23.1 The Gookins were the named 
representatives of the class.2 The complaint alleged State Farm 
acted in bad faith and failed to properly investigate claims resulting from the 
storm. At the same time, appellants filed a jury demand and a motion to 
disqualify the district court judge. The complaint and a summons issued on 
August 1, 1989 were never served. Instead, appellants prepared an amended 
complaint which was filed and served on September 29, 1989.

[¶4]      The amended 
complaint contained three counts: bad faith failure to investigate claims; 
promissory estoppel; and consumer fraud and undisclosed substitution of an 
inferior product. The amended complaint and an alias summons issued on September 
29, 1989 were delivered along with the jury demand and the disqualification 
motion from the August 1, 1989 filing. Also included was a motion to certify a 
class, interrogatories and document production requests. The package was 
delivered en masse on September 29, 1989 to the Wyoming State Insurance 
Commissioner as substituted service under Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122.

[¶5]      State Farm moved 
to quash service on October 19, 1989 contending that appellants failed to effect 
proper service under the statute. State Farm argued the statute required an 
additional notice and a copy of process be sent by registered mail to the 
company within ten days of the substituted service. Additionally, State Farm 
said appellants must file an affidavit to show compliance with the notice 
provision.

[¶6]      The next day, 
appellants responded with a document styled as a "Notice of Service." This 
document asserted that service of process had been completed "by receipt of a 
return receipt by the Wyoming State Insurance Commissioner on October 12, 1989." 
Appellants filed additional documents on October 23, 1989, including an 
affidavit and a notice to State Farm that the affidavit required by Wyo. Stat. § 
26-3-122(d)(iii) had been filed. This affidavit, by one of appellants' 
attorneys, stated the attorney was advised that the Wyoming State Insurance 
Commissioner mailed service of process to State Farm, and the Wyoming State 
Insurance Commissioner received a return receipt on October 12, 1989. On 
November 27, 1989, appellants filed a United States Postal Service Express Mail 
label addressed to State Farm in Bloomington, Illinois. Appellants' stated 
notice of service and "copies of pleadings" were mailed to State Farm on October 
20, 1989 and received on October 23, 1989.

[¶7]      A hearing was 
held on the motion to quash service on December 19, 1989. The hearing was not 
recorded. After supplemental briefing, the motion to quash service was denied 
without elaboration in a decision letter by the district court.

[¶8]      After the motion 
to quash was denied, State Farm filed an answer to the action which again stated 
that service of process had been improper and no personal jurisdiction had been 
obtained. After resisting discovery attempts, State Farm moved to dismiss the 
promissory estoppel and consumer fraud and undisclosed substitution of inferior 
product counts. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the promissory 
estoppel count, which is not at issue in this appeal, and found that the fraud 
count had not been pleaded with particularity as required by W.R.C.P. 9(b). The 
district court granted the Gookins leave to amend the complaint to restate the 
fraud complaint.

[¶9]      Appellants filed 
a second amended complaint on September 12, 1990. The complaint contained two 
counts: bad faith failure to investigate and pay claims; and consumer fraud and 
undisclosed substitution of inferior product. State Farm responded by 
simultaneously filing an answer and a motion to dismiss the fraud count. The 
answer reaffirmed that service of process was insufficient and personal 
jurisdiction was lacking. A hearing, again not recorded, on the motion to 
dismiss was conducted on October 17, 1990. The fraud count was ordered dismissed 
again for failure to comply with W.R.C.P. 9(b). Appellants were allowed to file 
yet another amended complaint to attempt to restate the fraud allegation with 
particularity.

[¶10]   Appellants filed their third 
amended complaint on November 1, 1990. This complaint alleged two counts: bad 
faith failure to investigate and pay claims; and consumer fraud and undisclosed 
substitution of inferior product. State Farm's answer restated the challenge to 
jurisdiction and personal service it maintained throughout these proceedings. 
State Farm also moved to dismiss the fraud count challenging that it was barred 
by the statute of limitations applicable to the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act 
and failed to state the fraud claim with particularity. Appellants responded 
that their claim only incorporated fraud provisions of the Consumer Protection 
Act as a subset of a common law fraud claim. The district court heard arguments 
on the motion in another apparently unrecorded proceeding. The fraud claim was 
ordered dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with W.R.C.P. 9(b). The 
district court also found that action under the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act 
was barred by both the nature of the insurance contract and the statute of 
limitations. The action comes before this court under a W.R.C.P. 54(b) entry of 
final judgment. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. The bad faith claim 
remains at issue in the district court.

II. 
DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Our standard of review for 
jurisdictional issues, including sufficiency of process, should be familiar to 
every litigant. The Wyoming Supreme Court "has the inherent power, and the duty, 
to address jurisdictional defects on appeal even though they have not been 
called to our attention by a litigant." Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water and 
Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wyo. 1990). "The first and fundamental 
question on every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this question cannot be 
waived; it is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is 
raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of its own motion." 
Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598, 599 (Wyo. 1962). When a lower court acts 
without jurisdiction, this court will notice the defect and have jurisdiction on 
appeal, not on the merits, but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of 
the lower court in maintaining the suit. United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 
440, 56 S. Ct. 829, 832, 80 L. Ed. 1263, reh'g denied 298 U.S. 692, 56 S. Ct. 951, 
80 L. Ed. 1410 (1936).

[¶12]   The proper service of process is 
necessary to acquire jurisdiction under the due process provisions of both the 
federal and Wyoming constitutions. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1. The federal constitution restrains state court actions against 
non-resident defendants.

The Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state 
courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident 
defendants. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198-200, [97 S. Ct. 2569, 2577, 
53 L. Ed. 2d 683] (1977). It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing 
a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a 
court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. [(5 Otto)] 714, 732-733, [24 L. Ed. 565] (1878); International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S., at 316, [66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)]. The 
existence of personal jurisdiction, in turn, depends upon the presence of 
reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought, Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-314, [70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865] (1950), and a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum 
State to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum. Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-464, [61 S. Ct. 339, 343, 85 L. Ed. 278] 
(1940).

Kulko v. 
Superior Court of California In and For City and County of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, reh'g denied 438 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 3127, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1150 (1978). While a court may have subject matter 
jurisdiction, it is clear that without adequate notice to the defendant and 
opportunity to be heard, jurisdiction does not exist for the proceeding. Goss v. 
Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 310 (Wyo. 1989); see 62B Am.Jur.2d, Process § 4 (1990). 
Courts allow infringement on the fundamental due process rights to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard only to the extent permitted by legislative or 
judicially promulgated rules of procedure. Goss, 780 P.2d  at 310. The general 
rule requires strict compliance with statutes or rules setting forth the 
requirements for service of process. Id.; Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339, 342 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶13]   The original complaint in this 
action was filed on August 1, 1989. This complaint was never served. The summons 
issued on August 1, 1989 by the Clerk of the First Judicial District Court was 
placed in the court files on September 29, 1989 without evidence of a return of 
service or affidavit of service. The blank form fails to show this summons was 
served in any manner authorized by law in Wyoming. Vanover v. Vanover, 77 Wyo. 
55, 61, 307 P.2d 117, 119 (1957).

[¶14]   Appellants did attempt to serve 
process, in this case an alias summons and the amended complaint, on September 
29, 1989. The documents were delivered to the Wyoming State Insurance 
Commissioner's office, as substituted service, under authority of Wyo. Stat. § 
26-3-122.3 The statute provides for 
substituted service of process to the Insurance Commissioner and requires that 
notice of such service, along with a copy of the process, be served upon the 
insurer by registered mail. The plaintiff or his attorney is then required to 
file an affidavit of compliance with the clerk of court. Personal jurisdiction 
over State Farm was not achieved by this action since the initial service was 
ineffective and subsequent actions by appellants failed to comply with statutory 
mandates.

[¶15]   According to the affidavit of 
service on the alias summons, filed with the court on October 2, 1989, a private 
investigator delivered the amended complaint to the office of the Wyoming State 
Insurance Commissioner at "1340 hours" on September 29, 1989. The investigator's 
affidavit of service is signed by her and sworn before a notary. However, the 
investigator was not specifically appointed by the clerk of court to serve 
process in this case as required by procedural rules.

[¶16]   W.R.C.P. 4 governs the service of 
process. That rule specifies: "Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall 
forthwith issue a summons and deliver it for service to the sheriff or to a 
person specially appointed to serve it." W.R.C.P. 4(a) (emphasis added). 
Process may be served "within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the 
service is made, or by his undersheriff or deputy, or, at the request of the 
party causing same to be issued, by any other person over the age of 21 
years, not a party to the action, appointed for such purpose by the clerk." 
W.R.C.P. 4(c)(1) (emphasis added). The alias summons form used in this action 
includes a specific place for the clerk of court to appoint, under authority of 
W.R.C.P. 4(c)(1), an individual to serve process. The appointment was never 
signed by the clerk or sealed as required. The investigator's firm name was 
typed into the unsigned block, but, without the clerk's signature and seal, no 
appointment existed that was evidenced by the record. For jurisdiction to exist, 
it is settled law that the record must reflect the necessary facts. Galpin v. 
Page, 18 Wall. 350, 85 U.S. 350, 371, 21 L. Ed. 959 (1873).

[¶17]   The failure to properly appoint a 
person to deliver process means the service is without effect. Townsend v. 
Williams, 170 Ga. App. 766, 318 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1984). See also Denny v. Croft, 
195 Ga. App. 871, 395 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1990); Mendoza v. ACME Transfer & 
Storage Co., 66 N.M. 32, 340 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1959). In Townsend, the chief of 
police served process in a civil action. The court held that under Georgia's 
version of Rule 4, the service was ineffective since the chief of police was not 
a sheriff or a person appointed to serve process. Townsend, 318 S.E.2d  at 511. 
The failure to properly appoint a process server was one factor preventing the 
court from acquiring jurisdiction in Space Coast Credit Union v. The First, 
F.A., 467 So. 2d 737, 740 (Fla.App. 1985). The court held jurisdiction over a 
defendant in a garnishment proceeding required service of process by the 
sheriff, or a special process server appointed by the sheriff or the court. Id. 
at 739. Delivery of process by an agent of the judgment creditor's counsel was 
invalid. Id.

[¶18]   Under the Wyoming standard of 
strict compliance with statutes and rules regarding service of process, the 
substituted service attempt by the investigator was without proper appointment 
and therefore ineffective. The affidavit of service the investigator completed 
did not alter the lack of appointment. Without the clerk of court's appointment, 
the service had no more legal validity than if a person walking through the 
neighborhood delivered process. It is undisputed that State Farm received the 
alias summons and the amended complaint forwarded by the Wyoming State Insurance 
Commissioner; however, actual notice does not mean that provisions of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure or a substituted service statute may be ignored. Tart v. 
Hudgins, 58 F.R.D. 116, 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Townsend, 318 S.E.2d  at 511; Baker 
v. Foy, 310 Or. 221, 797 P.2d 349, 355 (1990).

[¶19]   Appellants' subsequent actions also 
failed to comply with the substituted service provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 
26-3-122. The statute's meaning is an issue of first impression before this 
court; however, previous decisions on similar statutes point a clear path. 
Nonresident service of process statutes are in derogation of the common law and 
are given a strict construction; therefore, each step is jurisdictional and a 
condition precedent to completion of service of process upon a nonresident 
defendant. In re Lonquest's Estate, 526 P.2d 994, 998 (Wyo. 1974); National 
Supply Co. v. Chittim, 387 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Wyo. 1964); Martin v. Meier, 111 Wn.2d 471, 760 P.2d 925, 929 (1988). The duty to show compliance with a 
substituted service statute rests with the plaintiff attempting such service. 
Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d  at 343. The attorney for a litigant is responsible 
for strict compliance with the rules and statutes authorizing substituted 
service. National Supply Co., 387 P.2d  at 1012. The court's inquiry must be as 
to whether the requisites of the controlling statute have been complied with and 
such compliance appears on record. Napoleon B. Broward Drainage Dist. v. Certain 
Lands Upon Which Taxes Were Due, 160 Fla. 120, 33 So. 2d 716, 718 
(1948).

[¶20]   In Wyoming, the Insurance 
Commissioner must be appointed as the attorney for the service of process 
directed at foreign insurers. Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-121(a) (1983). Service of 
process to the Insurance Commissioner is the only way to serve a foreign 
insurer. Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-121(c). Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122(a) directs that service 
of process against an insurer for whom the Insurance Commissioner is the 
attorney shall be made only to the Commissioner, or deputy or person in charge. 
The Insurance Commissioner then forwards the process by registered mail to the 
"person currently designated by the insurer to receive the process." Wyo. Stat. 
§ 26-3-122(c). Both appellants and State Farm agree that the Insurance 
Commissioner complied with his duties. The ineffective service delivered by 
appellants' investigator to the Insurance Commissioner was forwarded to Mr. 
Edward B. Rust, Jr., as President of State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company in Bloomington, Illinois.4

[¶21]   The controversy between the parties 
centered on the requirement that for the substituted service of process to have 
been sufficient, a copy of process should have been sent to State Farm by the 
appellants within ten days of service to the Insurance Commissioner. Wyo. Stat. 
§ 26-3-122. The appellants did not meet the statutory requirements. It is 
undisputed that during the ten-day period following the September 29, 1989 
delivery of process to the Insurance Commissioner, the appellants did not 
forward a copy of the process and a notice of service to State Farm.

[¶22]   The delivery of process to the 
Insurance Commissioner on September 29, 1989 commenced timing on State Farm's 
need to answer under W.R.C.P. 12, and appellants' need to file the affidavit of 
compliance required by Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122(d)(iii). Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d  
at 345. Considerable confusion on this subject appears on the record. The 
confusion was hastened by the use of a printed summons form which contained the 
same language regarding in-state and out-of-state service that this court 
recognized as creating a potential jurisdictional defect in Midway Oil Corp.5 Id. at 344-45. The alias summons 
required an answer to the complaint within twenty days after service. The alias 
summons noted parenthetically that if service is made outside the state you have 
thirty days to file and serve your answer.

[¶23]   State Farm responded with the 
motion to quash service on October 19, 1989, exactly twenty days after delivery 
of process to the Insurance Commissioner. Consequently, State Farm argued that 
appellants failed to file an affidavit of compliance in a timely fashion for 
in-state service. Appellants choose not to brief this subject on appeal; 
however, they argued in district court that State Farm had thirty days to 
respond and entered into the record a supporting affidavit from the First 
Judicial District Clerk of Court. 

[¶24]   The substituted service statute is 
silent on the proper time for response. Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122. It is clear that 
the Insurance Commissioner is an in-state agent for the service of process. 
Normally, in-state service must be responded to within twenty days. W.R.C.P. 
12(a). However, this court has recognized an exception when substituted service 
is made on a state official as an agent for process. Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d  
at 344. The court recognized that the additional time allows the state official 
to forward process. In addition, W.R.C.P. 12 allows thirty days to answer when 
service is made outside the state, or by publication. W.R.C.P. 12(a). The court 
held, therefore, that when substituted service is made on a corporation by 
serving the Secretary of State, the corporation should have thirty days to 
answer. Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d  at 344. The logic of the rule in Midway Oil 
Corp. is persuasive. We hold that under the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122, 
a defendant shall serve his answer within thirty days after substituted service 
of the summons and complaint on the Insurance Commissioner.

[¶25]   Only after State Farm challenged 
jurisdiction, on October 19, 1989, did appellants react. Initially, appellants 
filed documents purporting to meet the statutory mandate, including the styled 
"Notice of Service" document filed on October 20, 1989 and the affidavit filed 
on October 23, 1989. The defective notice of service attempted to rely on the 
ineffective service to the Insurance Commissioner to fulfill appellants' 
statutory obligation of providing notice within ten days of service to the 
Insurance Commissioner. The Insurance Commissioner's adherence to his duty could 
not save the appellants from their duty to strictly comply with the 
statute.

[¶26]   The affidavit filed by appellants' 
attorney was similarity ineffective to show compliance. The affidavit does not 
state that appellants sent a notice of service and copy of process to State Farm 
within the time required. Instead, the affidavit relies on hearsay statements of 
the "Wyoming State Insurance Commissioner" to repeat that service was delivered 
by the Insurance Commissioner. Appellants belatedly attempted to comply with the 
statute by sending a notice of service and "copies of pleadings" to State Farm 
on October 20, 1989. A notice of this mailing was not filed until November 27, 
1989. None of these actions conformed to the mandate of the statute to provide a 
notice of service and copy of process to State Farm within ten days of service 
to the Insurance Commissioner.

[¶27]   Appellants also challenged that the 
statute could be read in the alternative to allow two methods of service: 
service by the Insurance Commissioner alone or service by the Insurance 
Commissioner and the plaintiff. The appellants' theory rested on an incomplete 
reading of the statute and is in error. The statute clearly outlines three steps 
to follow after service to the Insurance Commissioner. First, a "notice of that 
service and a copy of the process" must be sent "within ten (10) days from the 
date of service by registered mail by plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant 
insurer at its last known principal place of business in the United States." 
Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122(d)(i). Second, either the defendant receives this notice 
and copy of process or the post office issues a receipt with the sender's name 
and the name and address to which the letter is addressed. Wyo. Stat. § 
26-3-122(d)(ii). And third, an affidavit by the plaintiff or his attorney is 
filed with the clerk of court showing compliance. The affidavit is to be filed 
on or before the date the defendant is required to appear. Wyo. Stat. § 
26-3-122(d)(iii). The three divisions of subsection (d) are obviously to be read 
in their entirety. The first division ends with a semicolon denoting statements 
that are too closely related to be written as separate sentences. The second 
division ends with another semicolon followed by "and" to emphasize that it 
should be read together with the third division. Every subsection of the statute 
must also be read together to ascertain the meaning of the whole. Story v. 
State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988). This view is emphasized by the final 
sentence of the statute: "Process served upon the commissioner with a copy 
forwarded as in this section provided constitutes valid and binding 
personal service upon the insurer." Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122(f) (emphasis added). 
The sentence plainly means that personal service must be accomplished by serving 
the Insurance Commissioner and providing a notice of service with a copy of the 
service to the insurer. One or the other is simply insufficient to satisfy due 
process. United Equitable Ins. Co. v. Karber, 243 Ark. 631, 421 S.W.2d 338, 339 
(1967). The Insurance Commissioner forwards the service to the "person currently 
designated by the insurer to receive the process." Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122(c). The 
plaintiff sends notice of service and copy of the process to the "last known 
principal place of business" of the insurer. Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122(d)(i). This 
is not duplicative service. See Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1991), 
Urbigkit, C.J., concurring. The destination of each copy is not necessarily the 
same. The person designated to receive service may not be located at the 
principal place of business. Rather, the service necessary under the substituted 
service provision of the insurance code is a classic example of compliance with 
due process by providing "notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865 
(1950).

[¶28]   Appellants contend State Farm's 
jurisdictional challenge has been waived by making a "general" appearance. The 
argument is in error. The distinction between general and special appearances 
has been eliminated by the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Colley, 821 P.2d 565; State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., In 
and For Johnson County, 426 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wyo. 1967). State Farm first moved 
to quash service for lack of jurisdiction. After the motion to quash was denied, 
State Farm had a right to defend against the action on the merits while 
continuing to preserve its objections. Vanover, 307 P.2d  at 121; United Mine 
Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283 (Wyo. 
1989); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 1352 
(1990). State Farm maintained its objections to personal jurisdiction and 
sufficiency of service in each of its responsive pleadings.

III. 
CONCLUSION

[¶29]   Appellants' attempt to secure 
personal jurisdiction over State Farm failed. The private investigator's initial 
substituted service delivery to the Insurance Commissioner was ineffective. From 
the record, there was no evidence that the investigator was appointed to serve 
process. In addition, appellants' unsuccessful attempts at substituted service 
under the Wyoming Insurance Code, Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122, did not show strict 
compliance. State Farm's due process right to notice required that appellants 
perform the tasks assigned by law. While the dismissal of an action is a harsh 
remedy, it is necessary when the court lacks personal jurisdiction.

[¶30]   Reversed with orders to the 
district court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES

1           
In Wyoming, a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court. W.R.C.P. 3(a). For purposes of the statute of limitation, the action is 
deemed commenced on the date of filing the complaint if service of process is 
made to the defendant within sixty days. W.R.C.P. 3(b). If service is not made 
within sixty days, the action is deemed commenced on the date when service is 
made. Id.

2           
Although appellants' discovery produced a potential class of 3,500 
similarly affected policyholders, the record does not disclose that a class has 
ever been certified or notice given. W.R.C.P. 23.

3           
As part of the Insurance Code Wyo. Stat. § 26-3-122 (1983) 
reads:

(a) Service of process 
against an insurer for whom the commissioner is attorney shall be made by 
delivering to and leaving with the commissioner, his deputy or a person in 
apparent charge of his office during the commissioner's absence, two (2) copies 
of the process together with a fee of two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50), 
taxable as costs in the action.

(b) In case the process 
is issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior court, it may be directed 
to and served in duplicate by an officer authorized to serve process in the city 
or county of the commissioner's office, at least fifteen (15) days before the 
return day thereof, and that service confers jurisdiction.

(c) Upon service the 
commissioner shall immediately mail by registered mail one (1) of the copies of 
the process to the person currently designated by the insurer to receive the 
process as provided in W.S. 26-3-121(d).

(d) Service of process is 
sufficient if:

(i)         
Notice of that service and a copy of the process are sent within ten (10) 
days from the date of service by registered mail by plaintiff or his attorney to 
the defendant insurer at its last known principal place of business in the 
United States;

(ii)        The 
defendant receives or the post office with which the letter is registered issues 
a receipt, showing the name of the sender of the letter and the name and address 
of the person to whom the letter is addressed; and

(iii)       The affidavit of 
the plaintiff or his attorney showing compliance with this section are filed 
with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, on or before the 
date the defendant is required to appear, or within such further time as the 
court allows.

(e)       The commissioner 
shall keep a record of the day of service upon him of all legal 
process.

(f)         
Process served upon the commissioner with a copy forwarded as in this 
section provided constitutes valid and binding personal service upon the 
insurer.

The 1983 Replacement 
governs this case; however, the 1991 codification is identical.

4           
The Wyoming State Insurance Commissioner had no obligation to determine 
that the service delivered to him was ineffective. The Insurance Commissioner's 
obligation was only to forward the process he received in accord with the terms 
of the law.

5           
The Midway Oil Corp. court wisely counseled: "Obviously, careful 
attorneys should modify the printed-form summons to accommodate the proper 
answer time." Midway Oil Corp., 714 P.2d  at 344.