Title: Caruthers v. Myers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: June 19, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JERRY CARUTHERS
& LARRY WOLF,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S055745)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title filed
February 25, 2008; considered and under advisement on April 30, 2008.
Margaret S. Olney, of Smith, Diamond &
Olney, Portland, filed the petition for review.
Stacy RJ Guise, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, filed the answering memorandum for respondent.  With her on the
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
KISTLER, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General
for modification.
KISTLER, J.
Petitioners seek review of the
Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 27 (2010).  See
ORS 250.085(2) (specifying requirements for seeking review of certified ballot
title).  This court reviews the certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2).  See ORS 250.085(5) (stating
standard of review).  For the reasons explained below, we refer the ballot
title to the Attorney General for modification.
Initiative Petition 27, if enacted,
would add the following text to the Oregon Revised Statutes:
"No employee shall be
required to pay dues or other monies to a union and no union shall be required
to represent or bargain for an employee who chooses not to be a member of the
union.
"(a) If an employee has
not expressly agreed in writing to be a member of or be represented by a union,
then no money shall be deducted from the employee's paycheck for the benefit of
a union.  Any employee of a collective bargaining unit may withdraw from union
membership and/or representation at any time by delivering a signed, dated,
written notice to his or her employer stating that the employee does not wish
to be represented by the union.
"(b) This section shall
not be implemented in a manner impairing the obligations of an existing
contract, but shall affect new contracts and extensions to existing contracts. 
If this section is invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction in regard
to any person or group of persons, it shall remain in full force and effect for
all persons and groups for which it has not been invalidated."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for
Initiative Petition 27:
"PROHIBITS
REQUIRING EMPLOYEES TO SHARE COSTS OF UNION REPRESENTATION;
UNION NOT REQUIRED
TO REPRESENT NONMEMBERS
"RESULT OF
'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote prohibits requiring employees within bargaining unit to
share costs of union representation; union is not required to represent or
bargain for nonmember employees.
"RESULT OF
'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote retains current law authorizing agreements requiring
employees to contribute to representation costs, requiring union to represent
all bargaining unit employees regardless of membership.
"SUMMARY:  Currently, employees may
elect to be represented in collective bargaining by union they choose.  An
employee may decline to join union.  Selected union must bargain for and fairly
represent all bargaining unit employees, regardless of union membership. 
Collective bargaining agreement may require employees to contribute to representation
costs and may authorize payment through payroll deduction.  Measure prohibits
agreements requiring employees to contribute to representation costs.  Provides
that unions shall not be required to represent or bargain for employees who are
nonmembers.  Prohibits deductions from an employee's paycheck for benefit of a
union unless the employee has expressly agreed in writing to become a member of
or be represented by the union.  Allows employee to withdraw from union at any
time with written notice.  Other provisions."
Petitioners challenge the caption, the "yes" vote
result statement, and the summary.  Petitioners' challenges to the various
parts of the ballot title turn on the degree to which, in drafting a ballot
title, the Attorney General must describe the effect of a measure in its
statutory context, and we begin with that issue.
The proposed measure would change
state law to provide, among other things, that "no union shall be required
to represent or bargain for an employee who chooses not to be a member of the
union."  Petitioners argue that settled federal law requires a private
sector union to represent all the employees in a bargaining unit and that that
federal requirement will continue to apply notwithstanding any changes that the
proposed measure might make to state law.  See Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 431 US 209, 224, 97 S Ct 1782, 52 L Ed 2d 261 (1977) (unions
subject to National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 USC §§ 151-169, must
represent all employees within the bargaining unit); Brown v. Hotel Employees,
468 US 491, 503, 104 S Ct 3179, 82 L Ed 2d 373 (1984) (federal labor law
preempts inconsistent state law).  Petitioners also argue that current state
law would continue to impose similar obligations on public sector unions even
if the measure is enacted.  See Sizemore v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 229, 236
n 4, 905 P2d 1146 (1995) (public employee unions must represent all employees,
union and nonunion).  Petitioners conclude that, considered in the context of
those statutes, the effect of the proposed measure is more limited than the
ballot title states.
The Attorney General recognizes that
the premise of petitioners' argument "may well be correct."  That is,
the Attorney General does not dispute that, if the measure were adopted, its
effect would be limited.  The Attorney General observes, however, that petitioners'
argument rests in part on a determination that federal law would preempt part
of the proposed measure -- a determination that he asserts "is beyond the
scope of the ballot title process."  Accordingly, he reasons that the
ballot title properly describes the terms of the ballot measure without regard
to its actual effect (or lack of effect) on existing law. 
ORS 250.035 requires the Attorney
General to draft a 15-word caption that "identifies the subject matter of
the state measure," a 25-word "yes" vote result statement that
"describes the result if the * * * measure is approved," and a
125-word summary of the "measure and its major effect."  ORS
250.035(2)(a), (b), and (d).  The purpose of those requirements is to ensure
that voters have accurate information about the subject and effect of a
proposed measure.  This court has held that, to comply with those statutory
requirements, the Attorney General may have to go beyond the words of a measure
in order to give the voters accurate and neutral information about a proposed
measure.  See Wolf v. Myers, 343 Or 494, 500-01, 173 P3d 812
(2007) (ballot title preparation requires some level of interpretation of the
measure); Pelikan/Tauman v. Myers, 342 Or 383, 389, 153 P3d 117 (2007)
("[W]hen the effects of a measure are not reasonably subject to dispute,
the Attorney General may (and sometimes must) go beyond the terms of the
measure and mention those effects in the ballot title"); Kain/Waller v.
Myers, 337 Or 36, 40-41, 93 P3d 62 (2004) (explaining that determining the
subject matter of a measure requires, among other things, examining the changes
that a measure would make "in the context of existing law" and
requiring that the caption neither understate nor overstate those changes). 
In this case, petitioners argue that
the ballot title fails to put the proposed measure "in the context of
existing law."  See Kain/Waller, 337 Or at 41 (describing that requirement). 
We agree with petitioners' argument.  As petitioners have argued and as the
Attorney General has not disputed, settled federal law requires private sector
unions to represent all employees in a bargaining unit without regard to
whether they are union members.  Abood, 431 US at 224.  Although the
proposed measure purports to excuse private sector unions from that obligation
as a matter of state law, state law cannot excuse what federal law requires.  Brown,
468 US at 503.  Not only is the law settled but its application here is clear. 
Under settled law, the proposed measure would have no effect on a private
sector union's federal obligation to represent all the employees in a
bargaining unit.
In responding to petitioners'
objections to the ballot title, the Attorney General does not address this
court's decision in Kain/Waller, which requires that the Attorney
General examine the words of a measure in the context of existing law.  Rather,
he argues:
"Petitioners' real objection appears to be that the
measure cannot do what it purports to do:  eliminate a union's requirement to
represent nonmembers.  Petitioners may well be correct.  But the validity of
the measure itself is beyond the scope of the ballot title process."
The Attorney General does not cite any authority in support
of that argument.  He did, however, cite Sizemore v. Myers, 326 Or 220,
953 P2d 360 (1997), in support of that proposition before the Secretary of
State.  In Sizemore, this court held that the ballot title in that case
need not discuss the effect that a proposed constitutional amendment to
prohibit regional governments would have on Oregon's constitutional home rule
provisions.  326 Or at 231.  The court reasoned that discussion of that issue
"would require extensive legal interpretation, not only of the proposed
initiative measure, but also of the interaction of the initiative measure with
other constitutional provisions."  Id.
This aspect of the case does not
present the same problem that concerned the court in Sizemore.  In Sizemore,
the relationship between the proposed measure and existing law was complex and
unresolved.  Here, the relationship between the proposed measure and existing
federal law is straightforward and settled.  When petitioners objected to the
Attorney General's proposed ballot title on the ground that, under settled
federal law, the effect of the measure would be more limited than the ballot
title explained, Sizemore provided no basis for avoiding the Attorney
General's obligation to describe the proposed measure accurately.
Even though the proposed measure
would not affect a private sector union's federal obligation to represent all
the employees within a bargaining unit, federal labor law does not apply to state
public sector unions.  Regarding state public sector unions, petitioners argue
that "the practical effect of the measure's provision allowing a union to
refuse 'to represent' a non-member is unclear."  They note that existing
state statutes impose interrelated obligations on public sector unions to
represent all members of a bargaining unit, that a union's failure to represent
all the members of the bargaining unit could constitute a violation of those
statutes, and that the extent to which the measure would change those
obligations is not certain.  As noted, the Attorney General acknowledges that
petitioners "may well be correct."
Either the legislature or the people
acting through the initiative may repeal or amend existing state statutes.  The
interpretive issue posed by the proposed measure is the extent to which the
proposed measure, if adopted, would alter existing state law governing the
relations between public sector unions and the workers they represent.  The
answer to that interpretative issue is, as petitioners acknowledge, complex. 
Unlike the effect on private sector unions, the effect of the proposed measure
on public sector unions cannot be described as clear.  It follows that, in this
case, the issue becomes how should the Attorney General draft a ballot title
when faced with such an ambiguity.
On that issue, this court explained in
Wolf that, when there are two or more plausible interpretations of a
proposed measure, "we ordinarily have declined to choose (or to permit the
Attorney General to choose) one of those interpretations for purposes of the
ballot title."  343 Or at 501; see also Sizemore, 326 Or at 231
(declining to require Attorney General to resolve ambiguity).  Rather, the
court explained that, in drafting the ballot title, the Attorney General should
communicate the ambiguity to the voters, and it identified various ways in
which the Attorney General could accomplish that task.  343 Or at 501-02.  In
some cases, it may be appropriate to use the terms from the measure.  Id.  
The court cautioned, however, that "merely using terms taken from the
measure itself does not necessarily meet the statutory requirements for a
ballot title, and the Attorney General is required to draft a ballot title that
accurately describes the subject matter of the proposed measure, the result if
the measure were to pass, and the major effect of the measure."  Id.
at 502.  
With that background in mind, we turn
to petitioners' objections to the caption, the "yes" vote result
statement, and the summary.  As noted, ORS 250.035(2)(a) requires the Attorney
General to draft a 15-word caption that "reasonably identifies the subject
matter of the state measure."  In this case, the Attorney General sought
to identify the subject matter of the measure by describing its two purported major
effects.  See Kain v. Myers, 336 Or 116, 120-21, 79 P2d 864 (2003)
(noting that method as one way of identifying a measure's subject matter). 
Specifically, the Attorney General certified the following caption:
"PROHIBITS
REQUIRING EMPLOYEES TO SHARE COSTS OF UNION REPRESENTATION;
UNION NOT REQUIRED
TO REPRESENT NONMEMBERS."
The difficulty with Attorney General's caption is that the
second effect that he identifies is not an accurate description of one of the
measure's effects and thus does not substantially comply with ORS
250.035(2)(a).  See Kain/Waller, 337 Or at 40 (caption should not
"understate or overstate the scope of the legal changes that the proposed
measure would enact").  As explained above, the proposed measure would not
relieve a private sector union of its federal obligation to represent all the
members of the bargaining unit, and the measure's effect on a public sector
union's state obligation to represent all the members of a bargaining unit is
unclear.  In this context, merely repeating the words of the proposed measure
does not communicate the measure's more limited effect.  See Wolf, 343
Or at 502 (recognizing that proposition). (1) 
The caption must be modified.
Petitioners also challenge the
"yes" vote result statement, arguing that it is deficient for the
same reason that the caption is:  It tells the voters, without qualification and
thus inaccurately, that one effect of a "yes" vote is that a
"union is not required to represent or bargain for nonmember
employees."  The "yes" vote result statement should reflect the
measure's more limited effect.  See Novick/Crew v. Myers, 337 Or 568,
574, 100 P3d 1064 (2004) ("yes" vote result statement should reflect
a proposed measure's "most significant and immediate" consequences);
Pelikan/Tauman, 342 Or at 390-91 (concluding that "yes" vote
result statement should reflect effect on plaintiff's lawyers of a general
limitation on contingent fees).  Like the caption, the "yes" vote
result statement must be modified.
Finally, petitioners challenge the
summary.  ORS 250.035(2)(d) requires "[a] concise and impartial statement
of not more than 125 words summarizing the state measure and its major
effect."  Petitioners argue that the summary, like the caption and
"yes" vote result statement, must inform voters that the measure's
actual effect would be more limited than the face of the measure would suggest. 
For the reasons stated above, we agree.  See Pelikan/Tauman, 342 Or at
390-91 (concluding that summary should reflect effect on plaintiff's lawyers of
a general limitation on contingent fees).  Accordingly, we refer the caption,
"yes" vote result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General
for modification.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney
General for modification.
1. We recognize that, if the Attorney General seeks to describe the
subject matter of the measure by listing its major effects, the task of
drafting a 15-word caption that accurately describes those effects while also
distinguishing between private and public unions could present difficulties. 
As this court has observed, however, the Attorney General can sometimes avoid
those difficulties by describing the subject matter of the measure more
generically.  See Kain, 336 Or at 121 (discussing that issue).