Title: State v. Oren

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_OREN.92-113; 160 Vt. 245; 627 A.2d 337


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-113


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

 Wanita Oren                                  September Term, 1992




 Alan W. Cheever, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David E. Tartter, Assistant
 Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, P.C., for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   This interlocutory appeal presents the question of
 whether a person may be found guilty of hindering a law enforcement officer,
 where the officer's commission has expired at the time of the offense.  We
 agree with the trial court that the technically unqualified officer was an
 officer de facto.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of
 defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case.
      Defendant was charged with hindering a law enforcement officer in
 violation of 13 V.S.A. { 3001.  The situation arose out of a deputy
 sheriff's attempt to serve civil process upon defendant at her home on
 February 8, 1989.  Defendant was tried and convicted by a jury.  A judgment
 of guilty was entered, and defendant was sentenced.  After these events,
 defendant discovered that the deputy sheriff's commission had expired on
 February 1, 1989, seven days before the incident with which defendant was
 charged.  Defendant moved for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered
 evidence, contending that the deputy sheriff had ceased to be a law enforce-
 ment officer as of February 1, 1989, and that this "new" evidence would
 change the result of the trial.  Despite the fact that the error in the
 commission was easily discoverable prior to trial, the motion was granted
 because the trial court viewed the issue of de facto officer status as a
 question for the jury.
      Defendant then moved to dismiss the charges because the State would be
 unable to prove that the deputy sheriff was a law enforcement officer, an
 element of the offense.  This motion was denied by a different judge, who
 made findings of fact using the testimony from the hearing on the motion for
 new trial.  The trial court found that the deputy sheriff, Jackie Cholewa,
 had been appointed a Washington County Deputy Sheriff by Sheriff Edson on
 August 11, 1988, with a commission to expire on February 1, 1989; that
 Sheriff Edson intended to have the commission expire on February 1, 1991;
 that the 1989 date was a mistake; and that Cholewa had been continuously
 working as a deputy sheriff since 1988 and was reappointed in 1991.  The
 court concluded, as a matter of law, that Cholewa was a de facto officer at
 the time of the incident involving defendant.  It denied defendant's motion
 to dismiss, and defendant took an interlocutory appeal to this court.
      We conclude that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.  "Under the
 de facto officer doctrine, long recognized by this Court, an officer coming
 into possession of his office under the forms of law and assuming to act
 under a proper commission is a de facto officer whose acts are binding as to
 third persons, despite some infirmity in the qualifications of the officer."
 In re G.V., 136 Vt. 499, 501-02,