Title: Claude Bryan Oakley v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM SEPTEMBER 21, 2000 CR 99-324 CLAUDE BRYAN OAKLEY AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT APPELLANT COURT OF DESHA COUNTY, NO. CR 95-85-1 VS. STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DON E. GLOVER, CIRCUIT JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED Appellant, Claude Bryan Oakley, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, kidnapping, burglary, first-degree false imprisonment, and first-degree terroristic threatening. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The court of appeals affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. See Oakley v. State, CACR 96-1411 (Ark. App. December 10, 1997). Subsequently, appellant filed a Rule 37 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied appellant's petition. On appeal, appellant argues that he was denied due process and a fair trial because the trial court allowed sentencing to proceed into the early morning hours and that counsel was ineffective for failing to voir dire the jurors individually to determine their ability to continue the trial into the early morning hours. We affirm. The record indicates that the jury returned a guilty verdict against appellant at approximately 11:40 p.m. on June 27, 1996. The trial court instructed the jury that the next phase of the trial was the penalty phase. The court asked the jury if it wished to recess until a later date or if it wished to proceed. The court allowed the jurors to take a recess. Because of the late hour, appellant's counsel moved for a continuance so that he could be adequately prepared to represent appellant during the penalty phase of the trial. Counsel also objected to the continuance of the trial into the early morning hours because of the condition of the jury. The trial court found: Okay, I think the jury understands that they may take recesses as required or as necessary. The jury has indicated its desire to complete this trial. The Court feels that the jury is alert and up to the challenge of concluding this trial. And I see no reason why we should not go forward. The jury retired to the jury room at 2:08 a.m. and returned with a sentence at 3:27 a.m. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the jury to continue the trial into the early morning hours. We have previously held that even constitutional issues must be raised in the trial court and on direct appeal, rather than in Rule 37 proceedings. Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988). Rule 37 is a postconviction remedy, and as such, does not provide a method for the review of mere error in the conduct of the trial or to serve as a substitute for appeal. Hulsey v. State, 268 Ark. 312, 595 S.W.2d 934 (1980). We have made an exception, however, for errors that are so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack. Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322, 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996). In Collins, for example,we held that the right to trial by a twelve-member jury is a fundamental right that fell within the exception. Here, however, appellant was tried by a twelve-member jury and there is no showing that the jury was impaired due to the late hour. Thus, appellant's argument is not cognizable in a Rule 37 proceeding. Next, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to deliberate into the morning hours of June 28, 1996. Appellant argues that trial counsel should have conducted voir dire on each juror to determine their attitudes and abilities toward continuing. The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of counsel were enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), which provides that when a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel he must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel's errors the result of the trial would have been different. Id. We have adopted the rationale of Strickland and held that: To prevail on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show first that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Secondly, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 954 S.W.2d 255 (1997). At the end of the guilt phase of appellant's trial, counsel objected to the trial continuing, and he requested a continuance. In denying counsel's request, the trial court noted that the juryhad indicated its desire to complete the trial. The court also found that the jury was alert and up to the challenge of concluding the trial. At the Rule 37 hearing, appellant argued that counsel had failed to voir dire the jurors to establish if they were able to proceed with the penalty phase of the trial. The trial court found that there was a lack of evidence to show what the jury would have answered to questions concerning their attitudes toward continuing the penalty phase. The trial court also noted that appellant had failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to voir dire the jury. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Farmer v. State, 321 Ark. 283, 902 S.W.2d 209 (1995). Where the evidence is sufficient to support a ruling either way, it cannot be said that the trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the credibility of a witness is a question for the trier of fact in Rule 37 proceedings. Atchison v. State, 298 Ark. 344, 767 S.W.2d 312 (1989). In addition, it is the duty of the court to determine credibility of evidence presented at a Rule 37 hearing. Stephens v. State, 293 Ark. 231, 737 S.W.2d 147 (1987). Appellant has failed to establish that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different had his counsel conducted voir dire of the jurors. See Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985). Therefore, appellant has failed to meet his burden under Strickland. After a thorough review of the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court's denial of appellant's Rule 37 petition is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Affirmed.