Title: Bash v. Hade

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

55 N.W.2d 278 (1952) BASH v. HADE et al. No. 48117. Supreme Court of Iowa. October 14, 1952. Rehearing Denied January 16, 1953. Lambach, Kopf & Berger, A. Fred Berger, and Daniel A. Whalen, Davenport, for appellant. Johnson & Phelan, J. Francis Phelan and Joseph L. Phelan, Fort Madison, for appellee. WENNERSTRUM, Justice. The plaintiff, Ruth Bash, brought an action for damages against H. E. Hade d/b/a Hade Motor Company and also against Kermit P. Hanaphy as the result of an automobile collision between a car in which she was a passenger and a car then operated by Hanaphy. Prior to the time of the trial the plaintiff dismissed her action against Hanaphy. The circumstances of the automobile collision by which the plaintiff claims she was injured are not herein involved. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, Hade, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence. Subsequently a motion for new trial was presented by the plaintiff and the trial court dismissed and overruled it on grounds which will be hereinafter commented upon. The plaintiff has appealed. The issues involved as presented in the trial court and now submitted to us pertain to (1) the nature of the allegations in the plaintiff's petition, the facts pleaded in defendant's answer, and the claimed necessity of a reply to the allegations set forth in defendant's answer; and (2) the question of the liability of the defendant, Hade, on account of his original ownership of the car driven by Kermit P. Hanaphy and the claim of Hade of ownership by Hanaphy by reason of a claimed oral agreement to purchase. In plaintiff's original petition it was alleged that at all times material to the issues involved the said H. E. Hade d/b/a Hade Motor Company was the owner of a 1942 Packard and that at the time of the accident Kermit P. Hanaphy was operating this automobile with the knowledge, consent and permission of the defendant, H. E. Hade, and without any objection on his part. In an amendment to his answer the defendant added as as additional paragraph to the one in the original answer wherein *279 he denied ownership of the automobile a further statement wherein he alleged that he had sold the 1942 Packard referred to in plaintiff's petition to the defendant, Kermit P. Hanaphy, on May 12, 1949 and on the same day delivered the automobile to him; that the sale price was $1,400 plus sales tax of $28 and that on said date said Hanaphy gave the defendant his check in the amount of $200 as a part payment therefor and agreed to pay the balance at the rate of $100 per month until the full price was paid; that subsequently further amounts were paid which totaled $355 on the balance due on the purchase price and that from and after May 12, 1949 the defendant, Hade had neither exercised any control nor domination over the custody, possession and operation of the Packard car and that from and after the claimed date of the purchase the defendant had no right to give nor withhold his consent to the operation of said automobile. No reply was filed by the plaintiff to the defendant's original answer or amended answer. Kermit P. Hanaphy as a witness for the plaintiff testified in part as follows: On the cross-examination of Hanaphy he testified in part as follows: I. 58 I.C.A. Rule 102, R.C.P. provides, "Every fact pleaded and not denied in a subsequent pleading, as permitted by these rules, shall be deemed admitted, except allegations of value or amount of damage. Allegations of a reply shall be deemed denied by operation of law." It has been definitely shown that the plaintiff in her petition pleaded ownership of the automobile by the defendant, Hade. It is our conclusion that the statements set forth in the answer merely controverted the allegations in the plaintiff's petition. For the defendant to allege that he did not own the car and to state that Hanaphy owned the car is merely a negative pleading. Consequently we see no necessity of a reply denying the allegations made in the defendant's answer which went only to the question of ownership which had been alleged in plaintiff's petition. In the case of Shalla v. Shalla, 237 Iowa 752, 763, 764, 23 N.W.2d 814, 820, we held that Rule 102 and Rule 73 and other rules pertaining to a reply and pleading should be considered together. Rule 73 provides: "There shall be a reply to a counterclaim, and to new matter in an answer, responding thereto in the same manner that an answer responds to a petition, but not inconsistent with the petition." In the cited case it was pointed out that in a situation similar to the instant case a reply was not necessary. Similar holdings are found in Verlinden v. Godberson, 238 Iowa 161, 164, 25 N.W.2d 347; State ex rel. Kuble v. Capitol Benefit Ass'n, 237 Iowa 363, 365, 21 N.W.2d 890; Stacy & Thomas v. Stichton & Co., 9 Iowa 399, 401; Ford v. Wescott, 3 Clarke 286-287, 3 Iowa 286-287. II. Section 554.19, 1946 Code, I. C.A., Sec. 18 Uniform Sales Act, is as follows: "Property in specific goods passes when parties so intend Inasmuch as there is a conflict in the pleading relative to the ownership of the automobile, we are concerned with whether or not it was the intention of Hade and Hanaphy to have the ownership pass at the time of the completion of their negotiations. In the case of Rudy-Patrick Seed Co. v. Roseman, 234 Iowa 597, 604, 13 N.W.2d 347, 350 we said: "* * * Where there is a dispute as to the terms and the material circumstances of the agreement, it becomes a question for the jury. * * *" See also Sempel v. Northern Hardwood Lumber Co., 142 Iowa 586, 590, 121 N.W. 23; Bishop v. Starrett, 201 Iowa 493, 495, 207 N.W. 561. In Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 1078, 300 N.W. 260 this court held that if the parties intended title to pass immediately such intention would govern. As bearing upon the question of the intention of the parties we refer further to Moats v. Strange Bros. Hide Co., 185 Iowa 356, 367, 170 N.W. 456. III. The defendant has referred us to several code sections and cases pertaining to the question of ownership as affected by the Motor Vehicle Act. Section 321.1(36), 1946 Code, I.C.A., Owner; Section 321.51, 1946 Code, I.C.A., Liability *281 of Former Owner. Particular attention is called by the defendant to the case of Craddock v. Bickelhaupt, 227 Iowa 202, 210, 211, 288 N.W. 109, 113, 135 A.L.R. 474. However, in that case we observe this statement. It was also stated in this last cited case: "The passing of ownership must be determined by the intention of the parties at the time of the transaction. The terms of the contract and all the parties did and said manifested an intention to transfer ownership to the purchaser, reserving the naked, legal title in defendant as security. * * *" However, we do not find the same fact situation in the present case. In the cited case there was a written conditional contract, the giving of a note, and a mutual intention of passing immediate ownership. This was not the situation in the present case. The cited case is not applicable. IV. Where ownership is the paramount issue the matter of the car registration in the defendant is a fact that can be considered by the jury. Tigue Sales Co. v. Reliance Motor Co., 207 Iowa 567, 572, 221 N.W. 514. The fact that there had not been a compliance as shown by the record with the Federal Reserve Bank Regulation "W", which pertains to the limitation of extension of credit, is another circumstance that could be considered by the jury. Another fact that could be considered by a jury is that at the time of the claimed sale the defendant then had a mortgage on the car in question. This information was not disclosed to Hanaphy as shown by the record. Even though there might appear to be contradictory statements in Hanaphy's testimony, that fact, if it is a fact, bears upon his credibility and is a matter for the consideration of a jury. 58 Am.Jur., Sec. 862, p. 491. Under all the circumstances shown we hold that the trial court was in error in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant and that the fact question pertaining to ownership should have been submitted to a jury. Reversed and remanded. All Justices concur.