Title: Sprenger v. Sprenger

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

146 N.W.2d 36 (1966) Ludwig SPRENGER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frederick H. SPRENGER, Defendant and Appellant. No. 8259. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 20, 1966. *38 Drey & Tuntland, Garrison, and Vogel, Ulmer & Bair, Mandan, for appellant. Waldron & Kenner, Minot, for respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge (on reassignment). The amended notice of appeal filed by the defendant, Frederick H. Sprenger, asserts that this appeal is taken from "the judgment herein and from the whole thereof" and from "an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial." In specifications of error attached to and served with the amended notice of appeal the defendant specified the following as error: As the defendant appealed not only from the judgment but also from the order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, we shall first direct our attention to this phase of his appeal. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict calls for a review of the grounds assigned in support of the motion for a directed verdict. Erhardt v. Gold Seal Chinchillas, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 744 (N.D.1966). When both sides had rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict "for the reasons and on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof and has not proved an implied trust in this matter." Had objection been made in this court by the plaintiff-respondent that the motion for a directed verdict was defective because it failed to specify with particularity wherein error was made or wherein the evidence was insufficient, we would be required to terminate further consideration of this motion at this point. As this objection was not made, we deem it waived. The judgment in this case was based upon the verdict of a jury which read as follows' Although neither side to this lawsuit has placed any significance on the fact that this is an equitable action (to impose a trust in favor of the plaintiff upon two quarter-sections of land held in the plaintiff's father's name and to require an accounting by the father for the income from said land), which normally would be a matter for the court to determine, we believe this should be considered. Rule 39(c), N.D.R.Civ.P., becomes pertinent at this juncture. It reads as follows: Before we attempt to construe this rule or consider its application in this case, we believe it is important to note that before the adoption of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure this court in an 1899 decision, discussing the significance of the verdict of a jury in an equity case, held that the "Newman Law" applied only in common law actions wherein a trial by jury had been waived and in equity actions which were tried by the court without a jury. In other words, it held that in an equity action in which an advisory jury was called and a verdict was rendered by the jury, this court, on appeal, would not try the case anew. Peckham v. Van Bergen, 8 N.D. 595, 80 N.W. 759. In that case the Court discussed the weight to be given the verdict of the jury as follows: In the instant case there is no intimation anywhere in the record or in the briefs of the attorneys that the jury was merely an advisory jury. The stipulation entered into by the attorneys for the respective parties, after reciting that the defendant was so ill that he could not appear on the date set for the trial of the case and that his appearance was necessary for the trial, concluded with an agreement to the effect that the case should be continued and that the term of the court should be held open until the case could be tried before a jury. Having no precedent in our State to aid us in the interpretation of Rule 39(c) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, we have resorted to a study of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which our Rule 39(c) is derived. *40 Concerning this matter, Barron & Holtzoff has this to say: The demand for jury trial contained in the plaintiff's complaint in the instant case read as follows: The trial court, as well as both parties apparently determined that this was a demand for jury trial of the trust issue but not of the accounting issue. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., sets forth when it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact. It reads as follows: No objection has been made in the instant case to the fact that the trial court failed to make findings of fact. The trial court merely ordered judgment on the verdict. This is consistent with our determination that the jury trial in this case was with the consent of both parties, and that therefore the verdict has the same effect as if the trial by jury had been a matter of right. *41 Treating the verdict of the jury the same as if the trial by jury had been a matter of right in considering the issues raised by the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, the trial court said that it must review the record in the light of certain well-established rules of law as follows: Reviewing the evidence in the light of those rules, the trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. In the instructions to the jury the trial court said that the sole issue for the jury to determine was whether at the time the land in question was purchased by the defendant, Frederick H. Sprenger, there was an implied trust which arose by operation of law for the benefit of the plaintiff, Ludwig Sprenger. The court said that an implied trust is one which is created by operation of law and arises in the following cases: He further said in the instructions: In explaining the proof necessary to establish an implied trust, the court said: The defendant did not object to these instructions at the time they were given, nor has he specified the instructions as error on appeal. He merely emphasizes the rule which was quoted with approval by this court in Johnson v. Larson, 79 N.D. 409, 56 N.W.2d 750, 756, as follows: He contends that the evidence in this case does not meet that standard. Before discussing that issue at length, however, he argues that the proof required to establish an implied trust changes the general rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the verdict of a jury when there is credible or substantial evidence to support it. He would have us adopt the rule that would require this court to find that there is at least a preponderance of the evidence in favor of the verdict before we could sustain a verdict which imposes an implied trust. In support of his contention he refers us to a court case, not a jury case, decided in the State of South Dakota, the pertinent part of which reads as follows: He also directs our attention to the earlier South Dakota case of Bruns v. Light, in which, incidentally, the Supreme Court of South Dakota refused to upset trial court findings which were consistent with the findings of an advisory jury. In that case the court quoted Medin v. Brookfield, 66 S.D. 209, 281 N.W. 97, (which was also quoted in Brown) as follows: His analysis of the South Dakota rule is that the appellate court must reverse the lower court (whether its decision is based upon its own findings or upon findings made in conjunction with an advisory jury) unless the appellate court finds as a matter of law that a preponderance of the evidence supports the verdict. The jury in the instant case is not an advisory jury but is a jury with the consent of the parties, and thus its verdict, under Rule 39(c), N.D.R.Civ.P., has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. We have previously stated the rule which applies in such a case. In In re Hendricks' Estate, a decision rendered by this court in 1961, the trial court submitted to a jury the issue of whether a confidential relationship existed between a testator and a beneficiary. The jury found that a confidential relationship did exist. Judgment was entered pursuant to this verdict, and upon appeal this court said: This is the rule which we shall apply in the instant case in considering the next contention made by the appellant, that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict. No useful purpose would be served in the instant case by setting forth in detail the evidence submitted by the parties and by indicating in what respects it is in conflict. It is sufficient to say that a review of the evidence discloses that there is substantial evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we believe that the jury could reasonably have found: that the plaintiff, Ludwig Sprenger, lived at home with his father, the defendant, Frederick H. Sprenger, his stepmother, and their children, until he was 26 years of age; that while he lived with his father he helped with the farm and ranch work while the father farmed 560 acres of land which he owned, another 160 acres of land which he rented from a private party, and another 5½ quarter-sections of land which he rented from the State of North Dakota; that the father had about 80 head of cattle at that time; that Ludwig received little or no salary for these services; that in 1941 when he was 26 years of age he married and moved from the father's home; that in 1942 he quit a job paying $65 per month to return to his father's home to help him build a new house; that while he was living in Minot shortly prior to July 20, 1946, his father and stepmother came to visit him and his wife on two or three occasions, during which occasions the father suggested that the State land which they had been leasing could now be purchased and that he would buy two quarter-sections of the land for Ludwig and let Ludwig use his machinery to farm it if Ludwig so desired; that Ludwig discussed this with his wife and that they together decided that this should be done if the land could be purchased reasonably and that they so informed the father; that Ludwig offered to go to the auction sale with his father but his father said that would not be necessary; that subsequently, on July 20, 1946, the father bought at the State auction sale 5¾ quarter-sections of land on a contract which required a down payment of 20% of the purchase price; that the purchase price of the West Half of Section 5, Township 149, Range 88, McLean County, came to $8,500; that the father had previously told Ludwig that it would be necessary to make *44 a down payment of 20% of the purchase price; that five days following the bidding in of the property Ludwig gave to his father a check for $2,000 to cover the down payment on the West Half of Section 5; that the father accepted this check and deposited it to his checking account; that in the spring of 1947 Ludwig helped to break the sod on 100 acres in the Southwest Quarter of Section 5 and 100 acres in the Southeast Quarter of Section 5; that he gave a check to his father in the sum of $600 for flax seed in the year 1947; that an excellent flax crop was produced on the land in 1947; that at the request of his father he reported an income from the flax crop of $6,000, although he did not receive the income but assumed his father would apply the income toward the payment of the contract; that his father gave him a check for $500 to help pay the income tax required as the result of reporting the $6,000 income from the flax crop; that Ludwig also paid a state income tax on the flax crop; that Ludwig assisted his father at different times during the years 1948 and 1949, although he resided in Minot and was otherwise regularly employed; that Ludwig received none of the income from the crops raised in 1947, 1948, and 1949; that Ludwig started farming the land alone in 1950 and that he farmed 65 of the 100 tillable acres of the Southwest Quarter of Section 5 until 1964 (the pasture land being retained by the father for his cattle); that during the years 1950 through 1961 the crop was shared roughly on a ¾-¼ basis, with ¾ to Ludwig and ¼ to the father, Ludwig assuming that the father's share was being applied to pay the taxes and to make payments on the contract; that in 1962 and 1963 Ludwig retained all of the income from the 100 tillable acres; that in 1964 the father acted to prevent the son from further farming the land; that over the years Ludwig asked his father for an accounting but that his father did not give him one; that Ludwig did check on two occasions to see whether the payments were being made on the contract by his father and that he discovered that the payments were being made; that the contract covering the West Half of Section 5 has now been paid in full and patents have been issued thereto to the father. We believe that the jury could have concluded from these findings that a confidential relationship did exist between the father and the son at the time the arrangements for the purchase of the land were made, and that under this relationship the son provided the down payment for the purchase of the two quarter-sections of land and assumed thereafter that the father was paying the balance of the contract from the income from the land on behalf of the son. We are further convinced that there is no other reasonable explanation for the transaction and that therefore the jury could reasonably have found that an implied trust was imposed upon the land for the benefit of the son. The last issue briefed by the appellant is that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to the admission of Exhibit M into evidence. Exhibit M is the official farm record card used in the operation of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service office. The card was based on information received through the Register of Deeds. In offering the exhibit the attorney for the appellant stated that it tended to show that the land was owned by the father and that nothing was done by the son to dispute that ownership. Counsel for the son objected to the admission of the exhibit on the ground that it was not the best evidence of ownership, and the court sustained this objection. The appellant points out that prior to this point in the trial the son had introduced marketing cards issued to him by the same office, and that, having opened the door, he should not have been allowed to shut it in the face of the defendant father, who wished merely to show the full record of the office which had issued the exhibits put into evidence by the son. We agree that under the circumstances the trial court should have received this exhibit *45 into evidence but do not believe that the failure to do so constitutes prejudicial error, as the jury was fully cognizant of the fact that the father had purchased the land in his own name, and as the information upon which Exhibit M was made was derived from records in the office of the Register of Deeds based upon the legal contract entered into by the father and the State of North Dakota. For reasons stated herein the judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed. TEIGEN, C.J., and STRUTZ and KNUDSON, JJ., concur. MURRAY, J., not being a member of the Court at the time of submission of this case, did not participate.