Title: Chilson v. Allstate Insurance Company

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTOINETTE A. CHILSON, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 605, 2008 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, § 
C.A. No. 04C-12-066 
an Illinois corporation,  
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  May 13, 2009 
       Decided:  August 11, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Bernard A. Van Ogtrop, Esquire (argued) and Jared T. Green, Esquire, of Seitz 
Van Ogtrop & Green P.A., Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Michael A. Pedicone, Esquire (argued), Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Plaintiff-Appellant Antoinette A. Chilson appeals from the Superior Court’s 
grant of a new trial in her lawsuit against her insurer, Defendant-Appellee Allstate 
Insurance Company (“Allstate”), for underinsured motorist benefits arising out of 
an automobile accident with Joseph W. Lloyd, Sr.  This case has been tried twice.  
At the first trial, held before a jury, the jury found in Chilson’s favor and awarded 
$2 million in damages.  Following the grant of a new trial, the parties waived trial 
by jury.  At the second trial, held before a Superior Court judge, judgment was 
entered in favor of Allstate.  Chilson makes two arguments on appeal.  First, she 
contends that the court abused its discretion in the first trial by granting a new trial 
on the issues of liability and damages, because the issue of liability had been 
properly and definitively determined by the jury.  Second, she contends that the 
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in the second trial were clearly 
erroneous and that justice requires that they be overturned.  We find no merit to 
Chilson’s arguments and affirm. 
I. Facts and Procedural History1 
On February 10, 2003, Chilson was involved in two automobile accidents, 
both taking place on Lorewood Grove Drive in Middletown, Delaware.  The first 
accident occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m. when Chilson was driving her car on 
the two-lane country road she described as “pretty hilly and curvy.”  Chilson 
                                          
 
1 The facts are summarized from the Superior Court’s Opinion.  Chilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
2007 WL 4576006, at *1-3 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Order Granting New Trial]. 
 
3
testified that it was “really cold outside,” and that her car slid on ice, ran off the 
road, struck a tree, and then became stuck in a snow bank.  As a result of the 
impact, the airbag in the car deployed and Chilson testified that, after the accident, 
she felt “tingling on the right side of [her] face and on [her] right inner arm near 
[her] shoulder.”  Chilson called her husband, who quickly arrived with his pick-up 
truck, and was able to tow his wife’s car out of the snow bank.  Because the car 
was still operable and Chilson felt comfortable driving, the Chilsons decided that 
they would drive the vehicles to their nearby home.  They made it safely back to 
their home, but soon decided that Chilson should go to the hospital. 
The second accident occurred at approximately 9:00 p.m., while Chilson’s 
husband was driving her to the hospital in his truck.  As the Chilsons neared a 
curve in the road, a pick-up truck driven by Joseph W. Lloyd, Sr. approached from 
the opposite direction.  Lloyd’s truck slid on “black ice”2 and struck the Chilsons’ 
truck head-on.  In his deposition, Lloyd testified that as he “slowed down to make 
the turn, [he] hit the gas again, [and] that’s when [he] started sliding.”  Lloyd 
testified that there had been a “mist” that night, but that he was unaware of any 
black ice until he got out of his truck immediately after the accident and realized 
that the road was covered with black ice.  That fact was corroborated by Corporal 
Erik Lochstoer, the Delaware State Trooper investigating the accident.  Lloyd 
                                          
 
2 “Black ice” is a “thin, nearly invisible coating of ice” that forms on paved surfaces.”  
WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 115 (3d ed. 2001). 
 
4
testified that he had hit this black ice while going around the curve, crossed the 
middle line, and fishtailed into the Chilsons’ truck.  The collision caused the 
Chilsons’ truck to run off the road and hit a tree.  The truck was “totaled” in the 
accident and Chilson was taken to the hospital in an ambulance.3 
Immediately after the second accident, Chilson complained of right 
shoulder, right hip, and right knee pain, as well as chest, neck, and back pain.  
When she arrived in the emergency room, medical staff performed a “Glasgow 
Coma Scale,” a test designed to determine whether she had a concussion.  The test 
returned a “normal score,” indicating that she did not have a concussion.  
However, an MRI of Chilson’s neck showed a “minute central protrusion” of one 
of her disks.  Chilson later complained to her neurologist, Dr. Alan Fink, of neck 
and back pain that “waxed and waned,” and also of a greater frequency and 
severity of the migraine headaches she had suffered before the accidents.  As a 
result, Chilson made a claim for compensation against Lloyd’s insurance carrier, 
Dairyland Insurance Company, for the injuries she suffered in the second accident. 
That claim was resolved upon Dairyland’s payment of $15,000, the policy 
coverage limit available to Lloyd. 
At the time of the accident, Chilson had an insurance policy with Allstate, 
which included underinsured motorist coverage for up to $100,000.  After the 
                                          
 
3 Mr. Chilson apparently suffered no physical injuries as a result of the accident.  He originally 
filed a claim for loss of consortium, but abandoned it before the case was submitted to the jury. 
 
5
settlement with Lloyd’s insurance carrier, Chilson presented an uninsured motorist 
claim to Allstate, claiming that the $15,000 paid by Lloyd’s insurance carrier was 
inadequate to compensate her for her damages.  Allstate rejected the claim.  In 
December 2004, Chilson filed a suit against Allstate seeking payment of the 
underinsured motorist claim in an amount sufficient to compensate her for her 
damages, together with interest and costs. 
A two day trial began on May 29, 2007.  At the close of Chilson’s case, 
Allstate moved for judgment as a matter of law as to liability, asserting that Lloyd 
had not been negligent because he was unaware of the black ice, and that there had 
been otherwise no negligent conduct on his part.  In opposition, Chilson noted that 
it was a cold February night and that it had rained earlier that day.  She asserted 
that weather conditions should have put Lloyd on notice that the roads were likely 
to be icy that night.  As additional evidence of his negligence, Chilson pointed to 
Lloyd's testimony that he “hit the gas again” as he rounded the curve.  In 
considering Allstate’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court was 
required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.4  The trial 
court denied Allstate’s motion, stating that, while there was “not the strongest 
amount of evidence in the world of negligence in this case,” the negligence issue 
nevertheless was for the jury to determine. 
                                          
 
4 SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 50; Rumble v. Lingo, 147 A.2d 511, 513 (1958). 
 
6
The case was submitted to the jury with special interrogatories which 
isolated the issues of liability and damages.  The jury deliberated for just seventy-
five minutes, and then returned a verdict in favor of Chilson for $2,000,000.  The 
size of the award stunned counsel for both sides.  Allstate filed a renewed motion 
for judgment as a matter of law and an alternative motion for a new trial on 
damages and liability.  In response to Allstate’s motion for a new trial, Chilson 
requested that if the trial court found the verdict excessive, it should reduce the 
award and grant a remittitur to the amount of $100,000—the policy limit. 
The trial court denied Allstate’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, 
again finding that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of negligence.  But, the trial 
court again noted that while the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s 
finding of negligence, that evidence was not particularly strong.5  The trial court 
also found that the jury’s award of $2,000,000 “shock[ed] the conscience” of the 
court and that the issues of damages and liability were “inexorably intertwined.”  
The trial court also stated that the brief jury deliberation and the large size of the 
award “creates some uncertainty in the Court’s mind as to the diligence undertaken 
                                          
 
5 Order Granting New Trial, at *4. 
 
7
by the jury in considering the negligence issues in this case.”6  Therefore, the trial 
court granted a new trial on all issues, rather than the requested remittitur.7 
Rather than retry the entire case, the parties agreed to submit the case to the 
trial judge for a decision on the record developed at the first trial, over which that 
trial judge had presided.  The trial judge ultimately concluded: “[a]fter carefully 
weighing all the evidence … that Plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Mr. Lloyd was negligent, and thus Plaintiff cannot recover from 
Defendant.”8  This appeal followed. 
II. The Order Granting a New Trial. 
Chilson claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it granted 
a new trial on the issues of liability and damages.  She argues that the issue of 
liability was properly and definitively determined by the jury and was not 
“inexorably intertwined” with the issue of damages.  She further argues that the 
sanctity of jury verdicts, as recognized by the Delaware Constitution and in 
Delaware case law, militates against retrying the issue of liability. 
A. 
Chilson’s appeal was timely. 
Initially, Allstate responds that Chilson’s appeal from the Superior Court’s 
grant of a new trial is untimely.  Allstate argues that a judgment is final for the 
                                          
 
6 Order Granting New Trial, at *4-5. 
7 Order Granting New Trial, at *5. 
8 Chilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2008 WL 5206777, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2008.) 
[hereinafter Order on the Merits]. 
 
8
purpose of appeal when a timely motion for reargument has been decided and 
Chilson did not file her appeal within thirty days after the court denied her motion 
for reargument on the new trial issue.9  This argument is without merit.  Although a 
motion for reargument following the denial of a motion for a new trial is a final 
judgment;10 it is well-established that an order granting a new trial is an 
interlocutory order.11  Supreme Court Rule 42(f) governs a party’s failure to seek 
review of an interlocutory order.  It states: “[t]he failure to seek review of or the 
refusal of the Court to accept an appeal from an interlocutory order under this rule 
shall not bar a party from seeking review of such interlocutory order on appeal 
from the final order, judgment or decree.”12  The final judgment of the Superior 
Court was entered on December 3, 2008.  Chilson filed this appeal on December 
16, 2008.  Therefore, her appeal of the order granting a new trial was timely, and 
will be considered on the merits. 
B. 
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial on 
both liability and damages. 
We review the grant or denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion.13  In 
general, great deference is given to jury verdicts.14  “As long as there is a sufficient 
                                          
 
9 See SUPR. CT. R. 6(a)(i). 
10 See Trowell v. Diamond Supply Co., 91 A.2d 797, 799 (Del. 1952). 
11 See, e.g. Freeman v. Balderson, 2007 WL 4463597 (Del. 2007); Connell Ltd P’ship v. Citisteel 
USA, Inc. 676 A.2d 901 (Del. 1996); Kappel v. Parker, 588 A.2d 1152 (Del. 1991); Miller v. 
Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 565 A.2d 913, 914 (Del. 1989). 
12 SUPR. CT. R. 42(f). 
13 Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1997); Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 466 (Del. 
1979); accord Himes v. Gabriel, 972 A.2d 312, 2009 WL 1090061, at *1 (Del. 2009) (Table). 
 
9
evidentiary basis for the amount of the award, the jury’s verdict should not be 
disturbed by a grant of … a new trial as to damages.”  “A court’s assessment of 
whether a jury’s award of damages is within the range supported by the evidence 
must necessarily be based on the evidence presented to the jury.”15  To determine 
whether this threshold has been met, we examine the record “from the perspective 
most favorable to the jury’s verdict.”16  A decision to set aside a jury verdict 
warrants appellate deference due to the trial judge's “presence at trial and his [or 
her] duty to see that there is no miscarriage of justice.”17 
Superior Court Civil Rule 59(a) provides that a “new trial may be granted as 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action in which 
there has been a trial for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore 
been granted in the Superior Court.”18  Although the Rule permits partial retrials, 
the application of that procedure “is by no means automatic.”19  It is applied in the 
interest of justice and two conditions must be satisfied: (1) “[t]he issue to be retried 
                                                                                                                                        
14 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(1)(a). 
15 Frase, 702 A.2d as 1237-38. 
16 Storey, 401 A.2d at 465-66 (citing Love v. Sessions, 568 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
17 Walker v. Shoprite Supermarket, Inc., 864 A.2d 929 (Del. 2004) (Table) (citing Storey, 401 
A.2d at 465). 
18 SUPER. CT. CIVIL R. 59(a).  The Rule was based on the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931), which held that 
the Seventh Amendment did not “require that an issue once correctly determined, in accordance 
with the constitutional command, be tried a second time, even though justice demands that 
another distinct issue, because erroneously determined, must again be passed on by a jury.”  See 
11 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2814  (3d ed. 1998). 
19 Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123, 137 (Del. 1958). 
 
10
must be clearly severable from the other issues”; and (2) “it must appear that no 
injustice will result from limiting the issue on retrial.”20  Even so, a full retrial is 
ordinarily required only where the issues of liability and damages are interwoven.21 
Assuming the correctness of Chilson’s argument that the issues of liability 
and damages were not “inexorably intertwined,” we conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on both issues, because remittitur 
would have been an inadequate remedy.  “Rule 59 was intended to prevent the 
retrial of any issue already properly decided and to limit any new trial only to those 
issues which were incorrectly decided.  Where the issue of liability may be severed 
from the issue of damages, a new trial on the latter issue alone is proper if it can 
reasonably be said that the liability issue has been determined by the jury.”22  Here, 
the trial judge found that the extraordinary size of the damages award coupled with 
the brevity of the deliberations, raised a significant concern as to the jury’s 
diligence in deciding both issues.  The disproportionality of the award also raised 
the trial judge’s concern about jury bias, passion, prejudice, or other improper 
                                          
 
20 Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 524 (Del. 1991); Chrysler, 144 A.2d at 137; accord 
Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 500-01; 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2814. 
21 Furek, 594 A.2d at 524. 
22 Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass’n of Del., 176 A.2d 362, 371 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961); 
accord Yates v. Dann, 11 F.R.D. 386, 392-93 (D. Del. 1951); 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2814 (“The court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining 
realistically whether all issues need to be retried….”). 
 
11
motive.23  These significant concerns implicate the propriety of the jury’s findings 
both as to negligence and damages. 
In support of its grant of a new trial, the trial court relied upon two United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals cases: Wells v. Dallas Independent School 
District24 and Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co.25  In Wells, the Fifth Circuit 
addressed the issue of when remittitur is an inadequate remedy.  There, a jury 
awarded a school superintendent $1.9 million after finding his due process rights 
had been violated when he was terminated.26  Through remittitur, the district court 
reduced the award to $250,000.  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and 
remanded for a new trial, opining that “at some point on the scale an excessive 
award becomes so large that it can no longer be considered merely excessive.  At 
that point, when an award is ‘so exaggerated as to indicate bias, passion, prejudice, 
corruption, or other improper motive,’ … remittitur is inadequate and the only 
proper remedy is a new trial.”27 
In Kearns, the First Circuit addressed a case where the jury deliberated for 
approximately eighty minutes before awarding the plaintiff $99,000 in back pay 
for age discrimination.  The district court granted a new trial, explaining that the 
                                          
 
23 Order Granting New Trial, at *4-5. 
24 793 F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1986). 
25 863 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1988). 
26 Wells, 793 F.2d at 681. 
27 Id. at 684 (quoting Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 
12
jury acted in a “casual and non-deliberative manner” and that its decision was 
“clearly against the weight of the evidence.”28  The First Circuit affirmed, opining 
that while “brief jury deliberation is not, in itself, sufficient basis to support a new 
trial motion[,] … [w]hen brief jury deliberation is coupled with a verdict that is 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence … it creates a situation where the [] 
court has an affirmative duty to set aside the verdict.”29 
Here, whether or not the issues of liability and damages were “inexorably 
intertwined,” the jury awarded Chilson, in minutes, a surprising $2 million verdict 
that shocked the trial court’s conscience.  As a result, the Superior Court properly 
became concerned about the jury’s diligence in considering the negligence issues.  
The court recognized that an excessive award after only brief jury deliberations 
may indicate jury bias, passion, prejudice, or some other improper motive.  
Remittitur in these circumstances would have provided an inadequate remedy.  On 
the record of this case we find no abuse of discretion by the Superior Court in 
granting a new trial on all issues. 
III. The Superior Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Chilson next contends that the Superior Court decision following the second 
trial should be reversed because it is not supported by the evidence.  Importantly, 
                                          
 
28 Kearns, 863 F.2d at 181-82. 
29 Id. at 182. 
 
13
in the second trial, the court was sitting as the trier of fact.30  We review the trial 
court’s findings of fact to ensure they are the result of a logical and orderly 
reasoning process.31 
As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court decided in the first trial 
that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Lloyd was 
negligent.  That decision, however, was not legally inconsistent with the court’s 
conclusion in the second trial that Chilson had not established by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Lloyd was negligent.  There is no inconsistency, because in the 
first trial the trial court was called upon to determine whether Chilson had carried 
her burden of producing some evidence of negligence, while in the second trial the 
case turned on whether Chilson carried her burden of persuading the trier of fact by  
a preponderance of evidence that Lloyd was negligent.32 
                                          
 
30 See DAVID L. FINGER & LOUIS J. FINGER, DELAWARE TRIAL HANDBOOK § 3:9 (1999) (“In 
circumstances where there is no right to trial by jury or where the parties waive their right to trial 
by jury, the judge sits as the trier of fact.  In such cases the judge is not bound to accept as fact 
all evidence admitted with or without objection.  Rather, the judge retains the power to examine 
the demeanor of witnesses and other evidence and draw conclusions about their credibility, 
consistency and factual relevance.  In so doing, the court will consider the means of knowledge, 
strength of memory and opportunity for observation of each witness; the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the testimony; the motives actuating the witness; the fact, if it is a fact, that 
the testimony has been contradicted; any bias, prejudice or interest of the witness; the manner or 
demeanor of the witness while testifying; and all other facts and circumstances shown by the 
evidence which affect the credibility of the testimony. If the court finds the testimony conflicting 
by reason of inconsistencies, the court must reconcile the testimony as reasonably as possible so 
as to make one harmonious story of it all.  If the court cannot do that, the court must give credit 
to that portion of the testimony which, in its judgment, is most worthy of credit and disregard 
any portion of the testimony which, in its judgment, is unworthy of credit.”) (citing cases). 
31 Motorola, Inc. v. Amkor Tech, Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 861 (Del. 2008). 
32 See Quaker Hill Place v. Saville, 523 A.2d 947, 954 n.7 (Del. 1987) (quoting EDWARD W. 
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972)).  The term “burden of proof” actually 
 
14
In the first trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that Lloyd was negligent in ruling on Allstate’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  Such a motion required the trial judge to determine 
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was 
“a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on 
that issue….”33  Thus, this ruling determined only whether Chilson had satisfied 
her burden of producing evidence of Lloyd’s negligence.34   
In the second trial, the trial court was sitting as the trier-of-fact.  Thus, unlike 
the first trial, the trial judge was required to weigh the evidence presented and 
determine whether Chilson had satisfied her burden of persuasion.  That is a higher 
standard, requiring that Chilson not only produce evidence sufficient to allow a 
reasonable trier of fact to decide in her favor, but also requiring her to actually 
persuade the trial judge (sitting as fact finder) that Lloyd was negligent by a 
preponderance of the evidence.35  This latter burden is what the trial court decided 
                                                                                                                                        
encompasses two separate burdens.  Id.  “One burden is that of producing evidence, satisfactory 
to the judge, of a particular fact in issue.  The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact 
that the alleged fact is true.”  KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (6th ed. 
2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; accord Quaker Hill Place, 523 A.2d at 954 n.7. 
33 SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 50; Rumble v. Lingo, 147 A.2d 511, 513 (1958). 
34 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338 (stating the test as more than a “scintilla” of evidence, but 
only such evidence “that a reasonable man could draw from it the inference of the existence of 
the particular fact to be proved…”). 
35 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339. 
 
15
Chilson failed to satisfy in the second trial.36  It is that judgment, based upon that 
latter decision, which is under review in this appeal. 
Chilson argues that the court erred when it stated that “the only evidence of 
breach of duty of care was Mr. Lloyd’s testimony that as he ‘slowed down to make 
the turn [he] hit the gas again, [and] that’s when [he] started sliding,’ combined 
with the fact that there were inclement weather conditions.”37  She asserts, as 
additional facts supporting negligence, that Lloyd lost control of his vehicle on a 
road “successfully navigated” by both Chilson, shortly before the second accident, 
and by her husband, at the time of the second accident.  This argument lacks merit, 
because Chilson did not successfully navigate Lorewood Grove Drive shortly 
before the second accident.  Less than an hour before, she was involved in a single-
car accident on Lorewood Grove Drive.  Additionally, whether or not either Mr. or 
Mrs. Chilson successfully navigated the road in their earlier driving does not 
demonstrate a breach of the duty of care on the part of Lloyd. 
Chilson next argues that the trial court’s statement that “[i]t is undisputed 
that there was ‘black ice’ on Lorewood Grove Drive at or near the location of the 
second accident,”38 is irrelevant to its decision whether Lloyd was negligent, 
because the existence of black ice on the road does not automatically relieve a 
                                          
 
36 Order on the Merits, at *4 (“After carefully weighing all the evidence the Court finds … that 
Plaintiff ahs not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Lloyd was negligent ….”). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
 
16
driver from liability for negligence.  We agree that the presence of black ice is not 
dispositive on the issue of negligence.39  But this fact is relevant to that issue, like 
any other road condition.  The trial judge did not treat the presence of black ice as 
dispositive, but included it in a careful weighing of all the evidence. 
Finally, Chilson argues that the trial court improperly referenced the fact that 
Lloyd did not receive a ticket from Cpl. Lochstoer, the responding state trooper.  
Chilson asserts that this fact is not in the record, but was stated by Lloyd at his 
deposition and redacted by counsel prior to trial.  Still, Cpl. Lochstoer testified 
without objection that he determined that neither party was at fault because of road 
conditions.  Cpl. Lochstoer also explained that there was no indication that Lloyd 
was speeding.  While the statement that Lloyd did not receive a ticket may not 
have been admitted verbatim, a reasonable inference could be drawn from the 
testimony of Cpl. Lochstoer that Lloyd did not receive a ticket because the 
officer’s investigation revealed no evidence of fault or of speeding.  The trial 
court’s decision that Chilson had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
                                          
 
39 Compare Monahan v. Devaul, 706 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that the defendant 
motorist’s skidding on ice did not, in and of itself, require a finding of negligence, and upholding 
a verdict in favor of defendant) with George v. Graham, 561 A.2d 1361 (Vt. 1989) (affirming 
trial court’s holding that there was sufficient (though not abundant) evidence to find driver 
negligent despite the fact that the defendant motorist was not speeding.  The evidence showed 
that it had rained the previous day in the area of the accident, that temperatures had been below 
freezing at the time of the accident, and that the defendant had entered into another motorist’s 
lane and had caused the accident). 
 
17
that Lloyd was negligent is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.  
Accordingly, we must affirm.40 
IV. Conclusion. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
                                          
 
40 Motorola, 958 A.2d at 861.