Title: Burcham v. City of Van Buren

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Michael BURCHAM v. CITY OF VAN BUREN, Civil
Service Commission of the City of Van Buren,
and Chief of Police Mason Childers 
In His Official Capacity

97-410                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 6, 1997


1.   Statutes -- interpretation -- rules of construction. -- In interpreting
     a statute, the supreme court will give the words in the
     statute their ordinary meaning and common usage; if the
     language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the analysis
     need go no farther.

2.   Statutes -- appellees correctly interpreted Ark. Code Ann.  14-51-301 --
     one-year requirement applied to promotion eligibility list in toto. --
     Where it was clear from the structure of Ark. Code Ann.  14-
     51-301 (Supp. 1995) that the one-year requirement concerning
     the list certified by appellee civil service commission
     applied to the promotion eligibility list in toto and not just
     to the names of the three standing highest that were certified
     by the commission to appellee police chief, the supreme court
     held that appellees correctly interpreted the statute; each
     time a position becomes available within appellee city's
     police department, appellee commission is required to submit
     the names of the three applicants with the highest examination
     scores to appellee police chief; the supreme court concluded
     that because one of the three would be selected, the next time
     a position would become available, the three names submitted
     would have changed; to read the statute otherwise would
     eventually deprive department heads of any discretion in
     choosing the best candidate.

3.   Statutes -- legislative intent -- factors considered. -- In interpreting
     a statute and attempting to construe legislative intent, the
     supreme court looks to the language of the statute, the
     subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to
     be served, the remedy provided, legislative history, and other
     appropriate means that throw light on the subject.

4.   Statutes -- interpretation -- publication requirement applied only to
     appointments. -- The supreme court, agreeing with the trial
     judge's finding that the publication requirement set forth in
     Ark. Code Ann.  14-51-301(b)(3)(a) applied only to
     appointments and not to promotions, concluded that the more
     reasonable interpretation entailed looking to the context of
     the statute and to the fact that in subsections (b)(1)(A),
     (b)(1)(B)(i), and (b)(1)(B)(ii) of section 14-51-301, the sole
     focus was on appointments; the publication requirement then
     followed in subsection (b)(3)(B); precise reference in the
     statute to advancement within the ranks or promotions was not
     made until subsection (b)(4)(A), after the publication
     requirement; at that point, the statute shifted its focus from
     appointments to requirements for promotions.

5.   Statutes -- interpretation -- common sense used. -- The supreme court
     will not give a statute an interpretation that is at odds with
     common sense.


     Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; Don Langston, Judge;
affirmed.
     Pryor, Barry, Smith, Karber & Alford, PLC, by:  Gregory T.
Karber, for appellant.
     Steven G. Peer, for appellees.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Michael Burcham, a patrolman in the Van Buren Police
Department, was passed over for promotion to corporal during the
one-year span from March 1995 and to March 1996.  He filed a
complaint against appellees City of Van Buren, the Civil Service
Commission for the City (Commission), and Chief of Police Mason
Childers and alleged that he was entitled to be promoted in 1995
and 1996 because he was on the three-person eligibility list for
promotion certified by the Commission to the Police Chief for this
period.  He further alleged that he ranked second on the three-
person eligibility list during this time frame and that three
patrolmen other than himself were promoted to corporal.  Burcham
also asserted, as a separate count, that the appellees failed to
advertise the competitive examination for promotion to corporal in
August 1996.  The 1996 competitive examination determined the
eligibility list for the next year which ultimately was the list
used for promotions.  He contended that state law requires
publication in a local newspaper that the examination relating to
promotions is to take place.  Because of the Department's failure
to advertise, he contended that he was foreclosed from taking the
examination.  Thus, he contended that the 1996 eligibility list
should be declared invalid which presumably would invalidate all
promotions made based on that eligibility list.  Burcham prayed for
back pay from the date he was not promoted, any other lost
benefits, and attorneys fees, interest, and costs.
     The appellees moved for summary judgment on both claims, and
the trial court granted summary judgment.  On appeal, Burcham urges
that the trial court erred.  We affirm.

                       I. Eligibility List
     Burcham's first point of appeal brings into play the civil
service statute governing how police officers and firefighters are
selected for promotion within their departments.  See Ark. Code
Ann.  14-51-301 (Supp. 1995).  That statute requires that cities
adopt rules governing the departments and continues in pertinent
part as follows:
          (b)  These rules shall provide for:
                              ....
          (4)(A)(i)  The creation and maintenance of current
     eligibles lists for each rank of employment in the
     departments, in which shall be entered the names of the
     successful candidates in the order of their standing in the
     examination.  However, for ranks in each department where
     there may not be openings during an annual period, the board
     may establish rules to create the eligibles list on an as-
     needed basis.
                              ....
             (B)(i)  All lists for appointments or promotions as
     certified by the board shall be and remain in force and effect
     for the period of one (1) year from date thereof.
                              ....
          (6)  Certification to the department head of the three
     (3) standing highest on the eligibility list for that rank of
     service, and for the department head to select for appointment
     or promotion one (1) of the three (3) certified to him and
     notify the commission thereof;
Ark. Code Ann.  14-51-301(b)(4)(A)(i), (B)(i), (6) (Supp. 1995).
     Burcham argues that it is a mathematical impossibility for
three promotions to be made in one year without all three people
who were originally named as the three standing highest being
selected.  He claims that the one-year duration for "lists" in 
14-51-301(b)(4)(B)(i) also applies to the certified names by the
Commission of the three standing highest.  Under his
interpretation, the second time a position became available, only
two names would be submitted, and the third time, only the third
name would be submitted.  This would assure that the third person
would be selected for the position.  As a consequence, he concludes
that he should been selected for one of the three positions that
became available between March of 1995 and March of 1996.
     The appellees, on the other hand, read  14-51-301 to require
the Commission to adopt the following procedure.  The Commission
creates and maintains a list of eligible applicants for promotion
for each rank of employment within the Department.  The eligibility
lists remain in effect for one year from the time the Commission
certifies them.  Each time a position becomes available within a
Police Department, for example, the Commission certifies and
submits to the Department head (here, the police chief) the three
most qualified applicants based on their examination scores.  This
short list is referred to as the "three standing highest."  The
Police Chief then selects one of the three for promotion.  If
another position for promotion becomes available within that same
year, the eligibility list is examined and the Commission certifies
the names of the three standing highest at that time and submits
those names to the Police Chief.  This second time, the three names
would include the two that were on the previous list of three
standing highest as well as one new name from the eligibility list
based on examination scores.  If a third position comes open in
that year, the same procedure for selection from the names of the
three standing highest is followed.  We subscribe to the appellees'
reading of the statute.
     In support of his interpretation, Burcham cites this court to
three cases.  Cross v. Bruce, 284 Ark. 230, 681 S.W.2d 339 (1984);
Orrell & Abernathy v. City of Hot Springs, 265 Ark. 267, 578 S.W.2d 18 (1979); Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm., 214 Ark. 765,
218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).  Prior to 1987, the civil service statute
contained language suggesting that promotion be afforded to the one
standing highest on the eligibility list.  Ark. Code Ann.  19-1603
(1980).  That language was amended in 1987 to provide that the
department head would select for appointment or promotion from the
certified list of the three standing highest.  See Act 657 of 1987,
now codified at Ark. Code Ann.  14-51-301(b)(6) (Supp. 1995). 
These cases decided prior to the change in the statute have little
or no precedential value.
     In interpreting a statute, this court will give the words in
the statute their ordinary meaning and common usage.  Rush v.
State, 324 Ark. 147, 919 S.W.2d. 933 (1996); McCoy v. Walker, 317
Ark. 86,