Title: Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2888   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Village of Elm Grove, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Richard K. Brefka, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 343 Wis. 2d 680, 819 N.W.2d 563 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark D. Gundrum   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Andrew Mishlove and Lauren Stuckert, and Law Offices of 
Andrew Mishlove, Glendale, and oral argument by Andrew Mishlove.    
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Douglas 
Hoffer, and de la Mora & de la Mora, Elm Grove, and oral 
argument by Douglas Hoffer. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 54
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2888 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV2837) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village of Elm Grove, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard K. Brefka, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    The petitioner, Richard K. 
Brefka (Brefka), seeks review of an unpublished opinion of the 
court of appeals affirming a decision of the circuit court, 
denying Brefka's request for an extension of time.1  Brefka was 
arrested 
for 
operating 
a 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
and 
apparently refused a chemical test to ascertain his blood 
                                                 
1 Village 
of 
Elm 
Grove 
v. 
Brefka, 
No. 
2011AP2888, 
unpublished slip op, (Ct. App. Jun. 19, 2012), affirming the 
circuit court for Waukesha County, Mark D. Gundrum, J., 
presiding. 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
2 
 
alcohol concentration. He subsequently filed a request for a 
refusal hearing, but did not file his request within ten days 
after he was served with a notice of intent to revoke his 
operating 
privileges 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) (2009-10).  He sought to extend 
the time period in which he was allowed to file a request for a 
refusal hearing due to excusable neglect. 
 
¶2 
The circuit court concluded that because Brefka did 
not file a request for a refusal hearing within the required 
ten-day time limit, it lacked competency to hear his request to 
extend that time limit.  It therefore denied Brefka's motion to 
extend the ten-day time limit and dismissed his request for a 
refusal hearing, remanding the case to the Village of Elm Grove 
municipal court (the municipal court) for disposition. 
 
¶3 
The Village of Elm Grove (the Village) argues that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) set forth a mandatory 
requirement to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day time 
limit that may not be extended due to excusable neglect.  It 
asserts that because the statute does not allow the circuit 
court to extend the ten-day time limit, the circuit court lacked 
competency to hear Brefka's request.   
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
is 
without 
competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time 
limit set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a).  
The ten-day time limit is a mandatory requirement that may not 
be extended due to excusable neglect.  Because the mandatory 
ten-day time limit is central to the statutory scheme, the 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
3 
 
circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to 
extend it.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶5 
The facts of this case are undisputed. 
 
¶6 
On December 12, 2010, law enforcement officers from 
the Village arrested Brefka and issued him a "Notice of Intent 
to Revoke Operating Privilege" (the Notice of Intent).  The 
Notice of Intent stated that Brefka had refused a chemical test 
and identified the date of refusal as December 12, 2010.  It 
also notified Brefka that he had ten days from the date of the 
notice to file a request for a refusal hearing: 
You refused a request to submit to a test or tests 
under 343.305(3) Wis. Stats.  Because of this refusal, 
your operating privilege may be revoked. 
You have 10 days from the date of this notice to file 
a request for a hearing on the revocation with the 
court named below. . . . If you do not request a 
hearing, 
the 
court 
must 
revoke 
your 
operating 
privileges 30 days from the date of this notice.   
 
¶7 
Brefka filed a request for a refusal hearing on 
December 28, 2010.  The municipal court scheduled a refusal 
hearing, but the Village filed a motion to strike Brefka's 
request for the refusal hearing because Brefka had not submitted 
his request within the required ten days under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a).2   
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-
10 
version 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)4. provides as follows, in relevant part: 
(9) Refusals; notice and court hearing. (a) If a 
person refuses to take a test under sub. (3)(a), the 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Although Brefka conceded that his request for a 
refusal hearing was untimely, he requested that the municipal 
court extend the ten-day time limit.  He alleged that "judgment 
was entered due to . . . excusable neglect."   
¶9 
At a hearing, the municipal court concluded that 
Brefka's failure to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day 
time limit meant that it lacked competency to hear Brefka's 
request to extend the time limit: 
                                                                                                                                                             
law enforcement officer shall immediately prepare a 
notice of intent to revoke, by court order under sub. 
(10), the person's operating privilege. . . .  The 
notice of intent to revoke the person's operating 
privilege shall contain substantially all of the 
following information: 
. . . . 
4. That the person may request a hearing on the 
revocation within 10 days by mailing or delivering a 
written 
request 
to 
the 
court 
whose 
address 
is 
specified in the notice. If no request for a hearing 
is received within the 10-day period, the revocation 
period commences 30 days after the notice is issued. 
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) provides as 
follows, in relevant part: 
(10) Refusals; court-ordered revocation. (a) If the 
court determines under sub. (9)(d) that a person 
improperly refused to take a test or if the person 
does not request a hearing within 10 days after the 
person has been served with the notice of intent to 
revoke the person's operating privilege, the court 
shall proceed under this subsection. If no hearing was 
requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 days 
after the date of the refusal. If a hearing was 
requested, the revocation period shall commence 30 
days after the date of refusal or immediately upon a 
final determination that the refusal was improper, 
whichever is later. 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
5 
 
I can't even hear this matter because the refusal 
wasn't requested within the 10 day time frame under 
343.305(9).  It wasn't requested within 10 days. . . . 
Counsel for the defense . . . I would like to hear 
from you...I know you're making the request that I 
extend the time limit but when we're talking about 
competency of the court I can't even hear the Motion.  
I don't have competency to do anything on this matter 
and it's my position that I can do nothing. 
The municipal court therefore denied Brefka's request to extend 
the ten-day time limit and dismissed his request for a refusal 
hearing.3   
¶10 Brefka appealed to the Waukesha County Circuit Court.  
The Village filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit 
court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the 
ten-day time limit.   
¶11 At a motion hearing, the circuit court determined that 
it lacked competency.  Examining the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)4., the circuit court reasoned that the statute 
is "very clear, very specific" and that it "clearly says ten 
days 
without 
question." 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded that it was "without competency to really address the 
appeal," and granted the Village's motion to dismiss, remanding 
the case to the municipal court for disposition.   
                                                 
3 The municipal court hearing transcript is incomplete 
because the recording device used at the hearing stopped 
recording partway through the hearing without the knowledge of 
court personnel.  The municipal court's ultimate disposition of 
the case is not in the transcript of the hearing, but the 
parties agree that the municipal court denied Brefka's request 
to extend the ten-day time limit on the ground of competency and 
ultimately dismissed his untimely request for a refusal hearing. 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
6 
 
¶12 Brefka appealed to the court of appeals following the 
circuit court's determinations.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court, concluding that "[t]he plain language of the 
statute is abundantly clear."  Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 
No. 2011AP2888, unpublished slip op, ¶6 (Ct. App. Jun. 19, 
2012).  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) "impose a 
mandatory obligation on the circuit court to revoke a person's 
operating privilege if he or she does not file a request for a 
refusal hearing within ten days of the notice of intent to 
revoke."  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals noted that the ten-day 
time limit is a "different procedure" from the general rules of 
civil procedure, and that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2), 
the rules of civil procedure that allow for relief due to 
excusable neglect do not apply.4  Id.  Ultimately, it concluded 
that the circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's 
request to extend the ten-day time limit, stating that "failure 
to 
observe 
statutory 
time 
limits 
deprives 
a 
court 
of 
competency."  Id., ¶13. 
II 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.01(2) states the following: 
(2) Scope. Chapters 801 to 847 govern procedure and 
practice in circuit courts of this state in all civil 
actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as 
cases at law, in equity or of statutory origin except 
where different procedure is prescribed by statute or 
rule. Chapters 801 to 847 shall be construed to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding. 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
7 
 
¶13 In this case, we are called upon to review whether the 
circuit court has competency to hear Brefka's motion to extend 
the ten-day time limit for requesting a refusal hearing set 
forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) due to 
excusable neglect.  Whether a court has competency presents a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶7, 273 Wis. 2d 
76, 681 N.W.2d 190.   
¶14 In order to determine whether the circuit court has 
competency, we must interpret Wis. Stat. § 343.305, also known 
as the implied consent law.  The interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law, which we also review independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶16, 253 Wis. 
2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341. 
III 
 
¶15 The Village argues that the circuit court does not 
have competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day 
time limit set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and 
(10)(a).  It advances that the ten-day time limit to request a 
refusal hearing and the subsequent requirement that operating 
privileges be revoked commencing 30 days after refusal if no 
hearing is requested are mandatory requirements.  Finally, it 
contends that the mandatory nature of the statutory requirements 
demonstrates that the legislative purpose of the statutory 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
8 
 
scheme can be fulfilled only if the ten-day time limit cannot be 
extended due to excusable neglect.   
¶16 The circuit court's determination of competency refers 
to its "ability to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction 
vested in it" by Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶9.  That section of the 
constitution states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, 
the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal within this state."  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 8.  Although the circuit court may not be deprived of 
jurisdiction "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law," it may 
lack competency to render a valid order or judgment in a civil 
or criminal matter when the parties fail to meet certain 
statutory requirements.5  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶9.   
¶17 A statutory time limit is one type of statutory 
requirement that may result in a loss of the circuit court's 
competency, if a party fails to satisfy it.  Id., ¶13.  However, 
noncompliance with a mandatory statute does not always translate 
into a loss of competency.  State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 
566, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Kywanda F., 
200 Wis. 2d 26, 33, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996)).  Sometimes the 
                                                 
5 However, this court has urged that "the critical focus is 
not . . . on the terminology used to describe the court's power 
to proceed in a particular case.  The focus is on the effect of 
non-compliance with a statutory requirement on the circuit 
court's power to proceed."  Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC, 173 
Wis. 2d 700, 705 n.1, 495 N.W.2d 660 (1993) (describing the 
differences between subject matter jurisdiction and competency).   
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
9 
 
"legislative purpose of the statutory scheme [can] be fulfilled, 
without strictly following the statutory directive."  Id. at 
567-68.    
¶18 To 
determine 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
lacked 
competency to hear Brefka's motion to extend the ten-day time 
limit set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a), we 
must evaluate "the effect of noncompliance on the court's power 
to proceed in the particular case before the court."  Mikrut, 
273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶10.  Failures to abide by statutory mandates 
that are "central to the statutory scheme" of which they are a 
part will deprive the circuit court of competency.  Id.   
¶19 We therefore look to the requirements imposed by the 
relevant statutory scheme to evaluate whether the circuit court 
has competency to hear Brefka's motion that the ten-day time 
limit be extended due to excusable neglect.  The ten-day time 
limit is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305, also known as the 
implied consent law.  This court recently summarized the general 
procedures contained in the implied consent law as follows: 
Wisconsin Statute § 343.305, known as the implied 
consent law, provides that any person who drives on 
the public highways of this state is deemed to have 
consented to chemical testing upon request by a law 
enforcement officer. Upon arrest of a person for 
violation of an OWI-related statute, a law enforcement 
officer may request the person to provide a blood, 
breath, or urine sample for chemical testing. Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(3)(a). At the time of the request for 
a sample, the officer must read to the person certain 
information set forth in § 343.305(4), referred to as 
the Informing the Accused form. 
If the person submits to chemical testing and the test 
reveals the presence of a detectable amount of a 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
10 
 
restricted 
controlled 
substance 
or 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol concentration, the person is subjected to an 
administrative suspension of his operating privileges. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7)(a). The person has the right 
to an administrative hearing and to judicial review. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8). The administrative hearing is 
limited to certain issues that are set forth by 
statute. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8)(b)2. 
If, on the other hand, the person refuses to submit to 
chemical testing, he is informed of the State's intent 
to immediately revoke his operating privileges.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a). The person is also informed 
that he may request a refusal hearing in court. Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. 
State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶¶22-24, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 
N.W.2d 675.  This case concerns a single, narrow aspect of the 
procedures set forth in the implied consent law——the required 
time period in which a person must request a refusal hearing 
after refusing to submit to chemical testing.6   
¶20 A person must file a request for a refusal hearing 
within ten days after the service of the Notice of Intent in 
order to proceed to a refusal hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)4.  A person "may request a hearing on the 
revocation within 10 days by mailing or delivering a written 
request to the court whose address is specified in the notice," 
but "[i]f no request for a hearing is received within the 10-day 
period, the revocation period commences 30 days after the notice 
is issued."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4.   
                                                 
6 As indicated, this case concerns only a single, narrow 
aspect of the statutory refusal procedures set forth in the 
implied consent law.  Brefka raises no constitutional challenges 
in this case.  But see Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013).   
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
11 
 
¶21 Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) states that "if 
the person does not request a hearing within 10 days after the 
person has been served with the notice of intent to revoke the 
person's operating privilege, the court shall proceed under this 
subsection," and "[i]f no hearing was requested, the revocation 
period shall begin 30 days after the date of the refusal."  Id.  
Different revocation periods are set forth that take into 
account the person's previous suspensions, revocations, or 
convictions.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(b).  
¶22 In this case, it is undisputed that Brefka was 
informed in the Notice of Intent that he may request a refusal 
hearing within ten days of the date it was served upon him.  
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4.  Additionally, all agree that 
Brefka did not file a request for a refusal hearing within the 
required ten-day time limit.7  Thus, according to the text of the 
implied consent law, the next step in the statutory procedures 
is that the circuit court "shall" proceed to order revocation of 
his operating privileges, which is to commence 30 days after the 
date of refusal.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a).  The parties, 
however, dispute whether the word "shall" is mandatory or 
directory in nature, and whether it ultimately deprives the 
                                                 
7 Brefka directly states in his briefing to this court that 
he "did not [file a request for a refusal hearing] within the 
ten-day statutory time limit."   
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
12 
 
circuit court of competency to hear Brefka's request to extend 
the ten-day time limit.8 
¶23 The 
word 
"shall" 
is 
ordinarily 
presumed 
to 
be 
mandatory when it appears in a statute, but may be construed as 
directory if necessary to carry out the legislature's clear 
intent.  Karow v. Milwaukee Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 
565, 570-71, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978).9  In Karow, this court 
interpreted a statute that set forth a time limit to hold an 
administrative hearing before the Milwaukee County Civil Service 
Commission.  Id. at 568.  Karow, a deputy sheriff in Milwaukee 
County, was suspended without pay after a complaint was filed 
against him by the Milwaukee County Sheriff.  Id. at 566-67.  A 
hearing before the Civil Service Commission was scheduled, but 
the assistant corporation counsel assigned to the case became 
ill and a substitution of counsel was made.  Id. at 567.  The 
                                                 
8 Construing the word "shall" as merely directory arguably 
allows the circuit court discretion to extend the ten-day time 
limit due to excusable neglect.  See Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 
75, 79, 83, 450 N.w.2d 249 (1990) (a directory time limit "d[id] 
not necessarily deprive the [circuit] court of competency to 
exercise its jurisdiction" and did not "mandate dismissal of the 
case."). 
9 See also Eby, 153 Wis. 2d at 79 ("Under general principles 
of statutory construction, the word 'shall' in a statute setting 
a time limit is ordinarily presumed to be mandatory."); GMAC 
Mortg. Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 477, 572 N.W.2d 466 
(1998); Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331, 340, 288 N.W.2d 779 
(1980); City of Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee Cnty., 22 Wis. 2d 184, 
191, 125 N.W.2d 386 (1963) ("Generally in construing statutes, 
'may' is construed as permissive and 'shall' is construed as 
mandatory unless a different construction is demanded by the 
statute in order to carry out the intent of the legislature."). 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
13 
 
new assistant corporation counsel requested that the Civil 
Service Commission postpone the hearing because he had not had 
time to prepare the case.  Id. at 567-68.   
¶24 Karow objected to the delay, but the hearing was 
postponed.  Id. at 568.  He later argued that the Civil Service 
Commission was statutorily required to hold the hearing within 
three weeks of the date the charges were filed against him, and 
because that did not happen, he was entitled to a reinstatement.  
Id.  The statute that set forth the time limit, Wis. Stat. 
§ 63.10(2), provided that the Civil Service Commission "shall" 
appoint a time and place for the hearing within three weeks 
after the complaint was filed.  Id. 
¶25 The Karow court took note of the statute's use of the 
word "shall" and considered whether it was mandatory or 
directory.  Id. at 570.  It ultimately set forth several factors 
for use in evaluating whether a statute's use of the term 
"shall" is mandatory or directory.  The factors to be considered 
are: the inclusion or omission of a "prohibition or a penalty" 
in 
the 
statute, 
"the 
consequences 
resulting 
from 
one 
construction or the other," "the nature of the statute," "the 
evil to be remedied," and "the general object sought to be 
accomplished" by the legislature.  Id. at 572.    
¶26 A review of the factors set forth in Karow indicate 
that the ten-day time limit in this case is mandatory rather 
than directory.  Most significantly, the implied consent law 
sets forth a penalty for noncompliance with the ten-day time 
limit.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) directs that revocation 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
14 
 
is to commence 30 days after the date of refusal if no hearing 
is requested.  The inclusion of a penalty for noncompliance 
suggests that the term "shall" is mandatory. 
¶27 Additionally, construing the word "shall" as directory 
under these circumstances could have profound consequences for 
the penalties that the legislature has set forth for improper 
refusals.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(10) sets forth a penalty 
structure for improper refusals that depends upon whether a 
person requests a refusal hearing within ten days of service of 
the Notice of Intent.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a).  If 
additional litigation over extension of the ten-day time limit 
occurs, the other penalty requirements set forth in the implied 
consent law that depend upon timely revocation may be thrown 
into question.10   
¶28 Significantly, when a person is penalized for his 
first improper refusal, the court "shall revoke the person's 
operating 
privilege 
for 
one 
year." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(10)(b)2.  The revocation period is to begin 30 days 
from the date of the refusal when no hearing was requested 
within ten days of service of the Notice of Intent.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(10)(a).  Yet, the implied consent law provides no 
mechanism to reclaim the time lost to litigation if that penalty 
                                                 
10 For example, a person may be eligible for an occupational 
license after the first 30 days of the revocation period.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(b)2.  If it is unclear when the 
revocation period is to commence, then the time in which a 
person may seek an occupational license is also uncertain.  Id. 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
15 
 
is required because no timely request for a refusal hearing was 
ultimately filed.   
¶29 Therefore, the revocation period might not extend a 
full year if more than 30 days is spent litigating whether there 
was excusable neglect for not timely filing the request.  The 
statute requires that the revocation period must commence 30 
days after refusal, but simultaneously requires that the 
revocation period end one year after it is to commence.  The 
penalty structure could be subject to ambiguity in determining 
how long a penalty must last.   
¶30 To inject such ambiguity into an otherwise precise 
penalty structure appears to be at odds with the nature of the 
implied consent law and its legislative purposes.  This court 
has stated the legislative purposes of the implied consent law 
in prior cases.  It is meant to "obtain the blood-alcohol 
content in order to obtain evidence to prosecute drunk drivers," 
which is "to be used to secure convictions" for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence.  State v. Brooks, 113 
Wis. 2d 347, 355-56, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983).   
¶31 Thus, 
the 
"clear 
policy 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
to 
facilitate the identification of drunken drivers and their 
removal from the highways."  State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 
193, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980).  More pointedly, its purpose is "to 
get drunk drivers off the road as expeditiously as possible and 
with as little possible disruption of the court's calendar."  
Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 359; see also State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 
2d 30, 46, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996) (concluding that the purposes 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
16 
 
stated in Brooks "speak to the overarching goal of all drunk 
driving laws in this state.").   
¶32 Nothing enumerated in those legislative purposes is 
consistent with the concept of extending the ten-day time limit 
due to excusable neglect.  The promise of prompt revocation 
following an improper refusal is a powerful incentive to submit 
to chemical testing, the result of which is likely to be key 
evidence in any case where a driver is charged with operating a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.63 
(criminalizing 
the 
operation 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated 
and 
setting 
forth 
prohibited 
blood 
alcohol 
concentrations).  Eroding the precise penalty structure set 
forth in the implied consent law and allowing for the delay of 
refusal hearings diminishes any incentive to immediately consent 
to a chemical test.   
¶33 Extensions of the ten-day time limit also work to keep 
suspected drunk drivers on the highways despite their refusal to 
provide key evidence in their identification as drunk drivers.  
A delayed refusal hearing likely entails a delay in any 
revocation which might later occur, even assuming excusable 
neglect exists in a given case.  That delay is inconsistent with 
the "clear policy" of the implied consent law, which is to 
"facilitate the identification of drunk drivers and their 
removal from the highways."  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 193.   
¶34 Furthermore, extensions of the ten-day time limit fail 
to "get drunk drivers off the road as expeditiously as possible 
and with as little possible disruption of the court's calendar."  
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
17 
 
Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 359.  Additional litigation to extend an 
otherwise precise ten-day time limit is a source of disruption 
to the court's calendar where no such disruption exists if the 
ten-day time limit is construed as mandatory.  Accordingly, the 
Karow factors counsel that the use of the term "shall" in Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) should be construed as mandatory, not 
directory.11   
¶35 Despite the legislative mandate that the required time 
limit is ten days after service of the Notice of Intent, Brefka 
maintains that the statutory scheme allows for its extension due 
to excusable neglect because the rules of civil procedure 
generally allow for relief from judgments or orders on that 
ground.12  No provision authorizing an extension of the ten-day 
time limit due to excusable neglect is found in the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) 
likewise makes no provision for its extension on that ground.   
                                                 
11 The mandatory nature of the revocation that follows a 
failure to request a refusal hearing is reinforced by this 
court's analysis in State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶35, 241 
Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, which characterized the revocation 
as "automatic."  In that case, this court noted that "an accused 
driver could challenge automatic revocation of his or her 
license for refusing to submit to a chemical test under Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)."  Id.   
12 Excusable neglect has been defined as "that neglect which 
might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the 
same circumstances," but which is not "synonymous with neglect, 
carelessness or inattentiveness."  Casper v. American Int'l 
South Ins. Co., 2011 WI 81, ¶37, 336 Wis. 2d 267, 800 N.W.2d 
880. 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
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¶36 Procedures that arguably allow for an extension on the 
ground of excusable neglect are, however, found in three other 
procedural statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 800.115,13 801.15(2)(a),14 and 
806.07.15  Because Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2) applies the rules of 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 800.115, a municipal court procedure 
statute, states as follows, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant may within 6 months after the judgment 
is entered move for relief from the judgment because 
of 
mistake, 
inadvertence, 
surprise, 
or 
excusable 
neglect. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.15(2)(a), a general civil procedure 
statute, states as follows, in relevant part: 
(2)(a) When an act is required to be done at or within 
a specified time, the court may order the period 
enlarged but only on motion for cause shown and upon 
just terms. The 90 day period under s. 801.02 may not 
be 
enlarged. 
If 
the 
motion 
is 
made 
after 
the 
expiration of the specified time, it shall not be 
granted unless the court finds that the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect. The order of 
enlargement shall recite by its terms or by reference 
to an affidavit in the record the grounds for granting 
the motion. 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07, a general civil procedure 
statute, states as follows, in relevant part: 
(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court, subject to subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a 
party or legal representative from a judgment, order 
or stipulation for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; 
. . . . 
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, 
and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more than one 
year after the judgment was entered or the order or 
stipulation was made. A motion based on sub. (1)(b) 
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2011AP2888   
 
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civil procedure to special proceedings and a refusal hearing is 
a special proceeding, Brefka contends that the ten-day time 
limit set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) may 
be extended by the operation of Wis. Stat. §§ 801.01(2), 
800.115, 801.15(2)(a), and 806.07, relying on State v. Schoepp, 
204 Wis. 2d 266, 554 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1996).     
¶37 In Schoepp, the court of appeals applied Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.01(2) to refusal hearings.  Id. at 271.  The defendant was 
arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of an intoxicant.  Id. at 269.  After he refused to submit to a 
chemical test and was issued a notice of intent to revoke his 
operating privilege, he filed a request for a refusal hearing.  
Id.  Before the refusal hearing was held, the defendant issued 
subpoenas for the deposition of the arresting officer and other 
law enforcement officials who were involved in his arrest and 
the events leading up to his alleged refusal.  Id.   
¶38 Interpreting Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2), the Schoepp court 
determined that because Wis. Stat. § 343.305 does not provide a 
different procedure for a defendant to obtain discovery, the 
civil procedure statutes relating to discovery applied to the 
refusal hearing.  Id. at 272.  The "plain language" of Wis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall be made within the time provided in s. 805.16. A 
motion under this section does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This section 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from judgment, 
order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud on the court. 
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2011AP2888   
 
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Stat. § 801.01(2) required that the general discovery rules 
apply in refusal hearings "except where different procedure is 
prescribed by statute or rule."16  Id.     
¶39 Unlike Schoepp, here the legislature has set forth a 
"different procedure" from the general rules of civil procedure.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 343.305(9)(a)4. 
and 
(10)(a) 
impose 
a 
mandatory requirement that the refusal hearing must be requested 
within ten days of service of the Notice of Intent.  The penalty 
for a refusal followed by a failure to request a refusal hearing 
within ten days is also mandatory in requiring that "[i]f no 
hearing was requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 days 
after the date of the refusal."  Id. at (10)(a).     
¶40 Because the legislature has set forth a mandatory ten-
day time limit with precise penalties that rely on whether the 
                                                 
16 In 
2006, 
the 
legislature 
amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a) to limit discovery in refusal hearings.  It 
presently states as follows, in relevant part: 
(9) Refusals; notice and court hearing. (a) 
. . . . 
Neither party is entitled to pretrial discovery in any 
refusal hearing, except that, if the defendant moves 
within 30 days after the initial appearance in person 
or by an attorney and shows cause therefor, the court 
may order that the defendant be allowed to inspect 
documents, including lists of names and addresses of 
witnesses, if available, and to test under s. 804.09, 
under such conditions as the court prescribes, any 
devices used by the plaintiff to determine whether a 
violation has been committed. 
See 2005 Wisconsin Act 332, § 4.   
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
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time limit is met, the legislature has provided a "different 
procedure" that governs pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2).  
Accordingly, Wis. Stat. §§ 800.115, 801.15(2)(a), and 806.07 do 
not allow for the extension of the ten-day time limit due to 
excusable neglect.  Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2); see Schoepp, 204 
Wis. 2d at 272.   
¶41 Having determined that the implied consent law sets 
forth a mandatory ten-day time limit to request a refusal 
hearing that may not be extended due to excusable neglect, we 
turn to evaluate the effect of noncompliance on the court's 
competency to hear Brefka's request that it be extended.  
Although the mere fact that a statutory time limit is mandatory 
does not always result in a loss of competency, in this case the 
mandatory ten-day time limit is "central to the statutory 
scheme."  Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d at 566; Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 
¶10.  The central role that the ten-day time limit plays within 
the statutory scheme is revealed when it is placed in the 
context of the legislative purposes of the implied consent law. 
¶42 The mandatory obligation on the circuit court to 
revoke a person's operating privilege if he does not file a 
request for a refusal hearing within ten days of service of the 
Notice of Intent furthers the legislative purposes of the 
implied consent law.  As discussed above, it assists with 
"obtain[ing] the blood-alcohol content in order to obtain 
evidence to prosecute drunk drivers," which is then "to be used 
to secure convictions" for operating while under the influence.  
Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 355-56.  Additionally, it "facilitate[s] 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
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the identification of drunken drivers and their removal from the 
highways."  State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193, 289 N.W.2d 
828 (1980).  Finally, it "get[s] drunk drivers off the road as 
expeditiously as possible and with as little possible disruption 
of the court's calendar."  Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 359.   
¶43 On the other hand, extensions of the ten-day time 
limit due to excusable neglect arguably change the precise 
penalty structure set forth in the implied consent law, and 
those changes appear contrary to its legislative purposes.  See 
supra, ¶¶31-35.  Therefore, those legislative purposes cannot be 
fulfilled without strictly following the statutory mandate that 
a refusal hearing must be requested within ten days of service 
of the Notice of Intent.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶11 (quoting 
Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d at 568-69).  Given the necessity of a 
mandatory ten-day time limit to accomplish the legislative 
purposes of the implied consent law under these circumstances, 
we conclude that it is "central to the statutory scheme" and 
accordingly, the circuit court lacks competency to hear Brefka's 
request to extend it due to excusable neglect.  Id., ¶10. 
IV 
¶44 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court is without 
competency to hear Brefka's request to extend the ten-day time 
limit set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a).  
The ten-day time limit is a mandatory requirement that may not 
be extended due to excusable neglect.  Because the mandatory 
ten-day time limit is central to the statutory scheme, the 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
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circuit court lacked competency to hear Brefka's request to 
extend it.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2011AP2888   
 
 
 
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