Title: Coray v. Ariyoshi

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

506 P.2d 13 (1973) Carla CORAY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George R. ARIYOSHI, Lt. Governor and Chief Election Officer, State of Hawaii, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5373. Supreme Court of Hawaii. January 30, 1973. *14 Robert P. Jaress, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu (George Pai, Atty. Gen., Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellant. Tobias C. Tolzmann, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellees. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ. KOBAYASHI, Justice. Carla Coray, et al. (hereinafter appellees), filed a complaint in the court below against George R. Ariyoshi, Lieutenant Governor and Chief Election Officer (hereinafter appellant), seeking a restraining order to enjoin appellant from issuing a directive prohibiting "poll watchers" from keeping or maintaining any record of registered voters who have or have not voted. The trial court, after a hearing on the merits, permanently enjoined the appellant "from promulgating and enforcing or attempting to enforce the prohibition upon watchers." The election involved herein was the general election of November 7, 1972. The poll watchers were given the following instructions by the appellees, which stated inter alia, as follows: The poll watchers are appointed pursuant to HRS § 11-77 which provides: The appellant informed the appellees that he would promulgate, pursuant to HRS §§ 11-132 and 19-6(7), a certain memorandum to candidates and precinct chairmen of election inspectors entitled "Guidelines for electioneering," which, among other provisions not material herein, stated as follows: HRS § 11-2 provides: HRS § 11-4 provides: HRS § 11-132 provides: HRS §§ 19-6(6) and 19-6(7) provide: HRS § 19-7 provides: Appellant alleges that the trial court erred: We are of the opinion that where a violation is legislated as a criminal offense the statute must be strictly construed. Territory v. Shinohara, 42 Haw. 29, 36 (1957). HRS § 19-6 is entitled "Misdemeanors. The following persons shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." HRS § 19-6(7) makes specific provisions for various forms of conduct that are proscribed. However, nowhere is the conduct of the poll watchers as instructed by the appellees proscribed and considered as a misdemeanor. We are of the opinion that, regardless of the fact that the information obtained by the poll watchers can be used and is used for the stated purpose in the instructions to poll watchers issued by appellees, where a criminal statute as HRS § 19-6 fails to proscribe specifically the alleged offense, it cannot be said that appellees are in violation of the statute. Furthermore, appellant's argument that appellees are in violation of HRS §§ 11-132 and 19-6(6) is without merit. Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, will be construed with reference to each other. State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). Where the poll watcher is a person authorized to be in the precinct in question and where his action therein, as in the instant case, is not specifically proscribed, it cannot be said that he is in violation of any of the statutes in question. Under HRS § 11-77(c) and (d) the appointed watchers are authorized: and in addition thereto: Thus, it is clear to the court that the poll watchers are not only authorized to call the attention of the chairman to any violations of the election laws which they observe, but are also "permitted to observe the conduct of the election in the precinct." We believe that, under the authorization "to observe the conduct of the election in the precinct", the poll watchers can record the names of those who have voted. If the clause "to observe the conduct of the election" in HRS § 11-77(c) is strictly construed, then a poll watcher would not be able even to eat his lunch, go to the washroom or engage in any conduct that is not specifically authorized. The absurdity of such a strict construction is manifest. See Territory v. Wong, 40 Haw. 257, 260 (1953). Such a construction *18 of the statute would criminalize conduct that is not specifically proscribed in the penal statute. HRS § 19-6(7) states: The above is too broad in its implication. What is a "campaign activity"? Are we to leave that determination to the appellant? That raises grave constitutional questions. The appellant permitted, in several previous elections, the conduct of the poll watchers which conduct he now tries to prohibit. It certainly is a dangerous precedent to allow the enforcer of the law to decide what is criminal conduct and what is not. A resolution of the question of constitutionality of HRS § 19-6 would have been possible if the parties had properly appealed on said question and briefed the court on the matter. On the posture of the instant case legislative reconsideration is appropriate. In the absence of constitutional objections, what is done beyond the 1000 feet perimeter with the information recorded by the poll watchers is a matter strictly for the legislature. Judgment affirmed. ABE, Justice (dissenting). The officials of the Republican Party acknowledged that the job of its official watchers at the polls was as follows: *19 Under HRS § 19-6(7), it is a misdemeanor for any person, including candidates, to carry on "any campaign activities within the area described in section 11-132[1] on the day on which an election is being held for the purpose of influencing votes." It also provides that "[c]ampaign activities shall include but not be restricted to the following" and specifies four different activities. In my opinion, paragraphs c to g, inclusive, of the duties assigned to the Republican watchers at the polls most explicitly require the watchers to carry on campaign activities in violation of section 19-6(7). This court states that "the poll watchers are not only authorized to call the attention of the chairman to any violations of the election laws which they observe, but are also `authorized to observe the conduct of the election in the precinct.' We believe that, under the authorization `to observe the conduct of the election in the precinct,' the poll watchers can record the names of those who have voted." As to the foregoing statement of this court, I have no quarrel. However, the duties of the watchers do not end there. The watchers are required to mark the names of Republican voters and other voters friendly to the Republicans and transmit this information to official runners at appointed places without the polling area at the two predetermined times. The very obvious purpose of the arrangement was to permit people at the Republican headquarters, or other appointed places, to call Republican and "friendly" voters, who had not voted in order to persuade them to go to the polls to vote for Republicans. Of course, the entire transaction of the activity to influence votes does not occur within 1,000 feet of the polling area; however, a substantial portion of the activity is initiated within 1,000 feet of the polling area. In my opinion, the actions required of the watchers by the directive come within the term "campaign activities" to influence votes and therefore are prohibited by the statute. I dissent and would reverse. [1] Sec. 11-132 restricts activities within a radius of one thousand feet around the polling place.