Title: Pisano v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pisano v. State1992 WY 36828 P.2d 666Case Number: 91-220Decided: 04/06/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Paul 
PISANO,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, David Gosar, Appellate Counsel, and Erin A. 
McIntyre, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Paul 
Pisano appeals from his conviction for delivery of 
cocaine.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant's sole 
issue on appeal is: "Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the 
Appellant of delivery of cocaine."

[¶4]      The case against 
Appellant arose from a series of three undercover narcotics operations conducted 
by the Cheyenne Police Department's Special Enforcement Unit (the Unit). The 
first operation took place on March 12, 1990, after a confidential informant 
advised the Unit's Detective Farmer that an "eight ball" (three and one-half 
grams) of cocaine could be purchased through Patrick Pacheco. As part of the 
operation, the informant contacted Pacheco about purchasing an eight ball and 
was informed that Daniel Abeyta could supply the cocaine. Subsequently, 
Detective Farmer, posing as a buyer, went with the informant to Abeyta's 
residence, the informant provided Abeyta with the "buy money," and the pair was 
told to return for the cocaine after Abeyta turned on his porch 
light.

[¶5]      Detective Farmer, 
anticipating that Abeyta might leave to purchase the cocaine, arranged for a 
surveillance team to monitor Abeyta's residence at 815 East 10th Street and for 
a second team to watch the residence of Abeyta's suspected supplier, Ricky 
Bustos. As anticipated, Abeyta left to purchase the cocaine but traveled on 
foot, making surveillance difficult. The surveillance team lost sight of Abeyta 
in the vicinity of 7th Street or 8th Street and Morrie Avenue, less than a block 
from Appellant's residence at 922 East 7th Street. The second team, observing 
Bustos, was able to maintain surveillance and determined that Bustos and Abeyta 
did not meet.

[¶6]      After the 
surveillance team lost sight of Abeyta, Detective Farmer had them return to the 
800 block of East 10th Street to wait for Abeyta to return. Approximately 
fifteen minutes after Abeyta originally left his house, the team spotted him 
running up to his front door. The team notified Detective Farmer of Abeyta's 
return, whereupon the detective and the informant drove back to Abeyta's house, 
found that the porch light had been turned on, and obtained the cocaine from 
Abeyta.

[¶7]      Although 
Detective Farmer purchased the cocaine on March 12, 1990, he did not arrest 
Abeyta until July 1990. In an interview following his arrest, Abeyta informed 
Detective Farmer that on March 12, 1990, he had walked to Appellant's house to 
purchase the cocaine which he subsequently sold to Detective Farmer. At trial, 
Abeyta repeated this statement.

[¶8]      On October 29, 
1990, the Unit conducted its second operation after another informant, Frank 
"Rusty" Deck, told Detective Spencer that he worked with a man named Pisano who 
was involved in drug dealings. Deck agreed to assist the police by acting as an 
informant and, in a recorded telephone call that same day, arranged to purchase 
marijuana from Appellant. Detective Spencer provided Deck with a wireless 
transmitter and $300 in prerecorded buy money which Deck used to purchase one 
and one-half ounces of marijuana from Appellant.

[¶9]      In the Unit's 
third operation, Deck again arranged to purchase marijuana from Appellant. On 
November 15, 1990, Deck, with $1,100 in buy money and a wireless transmitter, 
contacted Appellant at his house. A surveillance team, monitoring the 
transaction, waited until the exchange had been made. Then, without a warrant, 
they broke into Appellant's house and arrested him. Following his arrest, the 
Unit's officers interviewed Appellant at the county jail. In his interview, 
Appellant admitted selling cocaine to Abeyta, but he claimed he had not done so 
for at least six months.

[¶10]   As a result of the three 
operations, Appellant was charged with four counts: Count I alleged that 
Appellant conspired to deliver marijuana; Count II alleged that Appellant 
delivered marijuana on October 29, 1990; Count III alleged that Appellant 
delivered marijuana on November 15, 1990; and Count IV alleged that Appellant 
delivered cocaine on March 12, 1990.

[¶11]   Appellant waived his right to a 
jury trial, and on June 26, 1991, the district court found Appellant guilty of 
Count II, delivery of marijuana in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
and 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) (1988) and of Count IV, delivery of cocaine in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1016(b)(iv) (1988). The district court 
found, "The circumstances surrounding the November 15, 1990 transaction in which 
[Appellant] sold marijuana to Deck did not constitute exigent circumstances 
justifying warrantless arrest." Because the district court found the November 
15, 1990, arrest was invalid, the court suppressed all evidence resulting from 
that arrest, including Appellant's statement that he previously sold cocaine to 
Abeyta.

[¶12]   Appellant appeals only from his 
conviction for the March 12, 1990, delivery of cocaine, claiming sufficient 
evidence did not exist to support a conviction. Our frequently stated standard 
of review for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence question "`is not whether the 
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether 
it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State.'" Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 
1985) (quoting Harvey v. State, 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Wyo. 
1979)).

[¶13]   Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031 
(1988),1 the State had the burden of proving 
that Appellant delivered a controlled substance, cocaine, to Abeyta.2 To meet its burden of proof, the 
State relied in large part upon Abeyta's testimony. Abeyta testified as 
follows:

     Q. Do you remember a 
person that you know as [the informant], Pat Pacheco and Detective Farmer coming 
to your house on [March 12, 1990]?

     A. 
Yes.

    Q. You didn't know that 
Detective Farmer was a police officer at that time, did 
you?

     A. No, 
ma'am.

     Q. Did they come - for 
what reason did they come to your house?

     A. They wanted to buy 
some cocaine.

     Q. Who contacted you 
about that?

     A. Pat Pacheco 
did.

     Q. And when they came 
to your house, did [the informant] give you some money?

     A. 
Yes.

     Q. Do you remember how 
much it was?

     A. 
$280.

     Q. Did you ask them to 
leave?

     A. 
Yes.

     Q. And why did you ask 
them to leave?

     A. So I can get the 
cocaine.

     Q. Did you have it at 
your house at that time?

     A. No, 
ma'am.

     Q. Did you tell them 
to come back later?

     A. Yes. 

     Q. Do you have a 
signal for them when they were supposed to come back?

     A. I told them when I 
was back home, that my light would be on outside.

     Q. And did they 
leave?

     A. Yes, 
ma'am.

     Q. And then what did 
you do?

     A. I left my 
house.

     Q. Were you on foot or 
were you in a car?

     A. I 
walked.

     . . . 
.

      Q. Whose house 
did you go to to pick this up?

     A. 
Paul's.

     Q. 
Paul?

     A. 
Pisano.

[¶14]   Abeyta's testimony was corroborated 
by the surveillance teams' testimony that Abeyta only left his house for 
approximately fifteen minutes (meaning he must have purchased the cocaine from a 
source relatively nearby); that they lost visual contact with him less than a 
block from Appellant's residence; and that Bustos, originally suspected of being 
Appellant's supplier, did not meet with Abeyta.

[¶15]   When viewed in isolation, the 
surveillance teams' observations are insufficient to convict Appellant of 
delivering cocaine to Abeyta. However, when we consider the surveillance teams' 
testimony in conjunction with Abeyta's testimony and view the testimony in the 
light most favorable to the State, the testimony constitutes sufficient evidence 
to form the basis for a reasonable inference that Appellant was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of delivering cocaine.

[¶16]   Appellant argues that no one 
witnessed Abeyta entering or leaving Appellant's residence, nor did anyone 
witness Abeyta meeting with Appellant. Appellant also contends that Abeyta's 
testimony was not credible because Abeyta may have had a motive for falsely 
accusing Appellant. Appellant supports this last argument by listing several 
potential reasons why Abeyta may have falsely accused him.3

[¶17]   The difficulty with Appellant's 
arguments is that they fail to recognize this Court's function in determining 
whether sufficient evidence exists to support a verdict. Our role is to 
determine whether the record evidence is sufficient to form the basis for a 
reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not to reweigh the 
evidence or reexamine the credibility of a witness. Broom, 695 P.2d at 642-43; 
Rathbun v. State, 802 P.2d 881, 882 (Wyo. 1990). By arguing that no one 
witnessed Abeyta entering or leaving Appellant's residence and that Abeyta may 
have had a motive to testify falsely, Appellant is asking us to reweigh the 
evidence and to reexamine the credibility of a witness. This is not our 
task.

[¶18]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 
35-7-1031 provides in pertinent part:

     (a) Except as 
authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, 
or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any 
person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

     (i) A controlled 
substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) 
years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both[.]

2 Appellant 
does not dispute the fact that the substance in question was 
cocaine.

3

     1) Abeyta was an 
admitted and convicted drug dealer;

     2) According to the 
police, Abeyta was known to have sold cocaine to minors at least 
once;

3) Although 
Abeyta testified that he did not "cut a deal" with the District Attorney, he 
pled guilty to the same March 12, 1990 Delivery of cocaine charge and received 
no jail time;

4) Abeyta's 
accusation of [Appellant] occurred four months after the charged 
transaction;

     5) Abeyta would not 
want to implicate his real supplier because that would be cutting off his 
nose to spite his face; and,

     6) Abeyta might bear a 
grudge against [Appellant] for any number of 
reasons.

(Emphasis in original).