Title: In Re: Adoption CCJ14746

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. CCJ14746
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 134
September Term, 1999
IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP NO.
CCJ14746
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Filed:   September 13, 2000
Throughout this opinion, the child will be referred to as “Shannon” and the Petitioner
1
will be referred to as “Ms. P.” or “Petitioner.”
Intensive Family Services is a service provided by the Department of Social Services
2
to a family that is at risk of an out-of-home placement of a child.  See COMAR 07.02.01.
The question presented in this case is whether the Circuit Court for Washington County
erred in permitting a licensed clinical social worker to testify as an expert witness and to
provide diagnostic expert testimony.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the Circuit Court, holding that the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion in
receiving the opinions.  We shall affirm.
Petitioner Shannon P. is the mother of a minor child, also named Shannon P.,  born
1
August 20, 1993.  Shannon first came to the attention of the Washington County Department
of Social Services (WCDSS) when she was placed into foster care for three days in November,
1994.  Intensive Family Services  were provided to the family until February, 1995.  In July,
2
1995, Ms. P. asked WCDSS to provide assistance and WCDSS again provided time-limited
intervention services.  The case was closed in October, 1995, due to Ms. P.’s non-compliance.
In December, 1996, Ms. P. again requested help with parenting and the case was again
closed for non-compliance.  Around February, 1997, WCDSS received a physical abuse report
concerning a cigarette burn on Shannon’s forehead, and bruises on her head.  This prompted
WCDSS to open a Child Protective Services case.  Following an investigation by WCDSS, Ms.
P. agreed to a voluntary placement of Shannon with a family friend.  During this placement, Ms.
P. was incarcerated for one month for a violation of probation.  In November, 1997, Ms. P. was
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  When a petition for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption or long-term
3
care short of adoption is granted, the court terminates the parental rights of the parents.  See
Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 5-317 (f) of the Family Law Article (“A
decree of guardianship . . . terminates the natural parents’ rights, duties, and obligations toward
the child.”).
admitted to a hospital following a drug overdose.  At the same time, Child Protective Services
determined that Shannon was neglected.  On January 15, 1998, Ms. P. was convicted of the
criminal offenses of theft and possession of controlled dangerous substances and sentenced
to three years at the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women.  On the same day, Shannon
was placed in foster care, where she has remained ever since.  Since March, 1999, Shannon has
lived in a prospective adoptive foster home.  The foster parents wish to adopt Shannon, and
WCDSS plans to consent to the adoption should it obtain guardianship with the right to
consent.
After a hearing on March 19, 1998,  Shannon was adjudicated a child in need of
assistance by the Circuit Court for Washington County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1973,
1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 3-812 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and
committed to the custody of WCDSS.  On July 30, 1998, WCDSS filed in the Circuit Court
for Washington County a petition for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption or
long-term care short of adoption.   The court entered an Order of Default against Shannon’s
3
father, Donald P., whose whereabouts were unknown, after he failed to respond within the
prescribed time to a posted notice of the petition.  Ms. P. appeared with counsel at the hearing
on the petition on March 25, 1999, and contested the petition. 
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  Unless noted otherwise, all subsequent statutory references shall be to Maryland
4
Code (1981, 1994 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) Health Occupations Article.
Dr. Carlton Munson testified for WCDSS at the March 25, 1999 hearing; his testimony
is the subject of this appeal.  Dr. Munson is a Licensed Certified Social Worker-Clinical,
holding a license issued pursuant to Maryland Code (1981, 1994 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 19-
302(d)(2) of the Health Occupations Article (the Act).   He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree,
4
a Masters of Social Work and a Ph.D. in clinical social work from the University of Maryland
School of Social Work.  He has been certified by the American Board of Examiners in clinical
social work as a Board Certified Diplomate, and has been employed as a professor and director
of the doctoral program at the University of Maryland School of Social Work.  
With reference to his experience, Dr. Munson testified that he had performed
approximately four to five evaluations per month, two-thirds of these on children and one-third
on adults.  He further testified that over the previous ten years, he had performed three to four
hundred evaluations and that he was familiar with the components and various tools to diagnose
mental disorders.  WCDSS offered him as an expert in clinical social work to testify to his
evaluation of the mental disorders of Petitioner and Shannon.  Petitioner objected on the
ground that Dr. Munson was not trained as a psychiatrist or psychologist.  The court overruled
the objection and permitted Dr. Munson to testify as an expert in clinical social work.
Dr. Munson then testified that he met with Shannon for two hours on February 23,
1999, and after administering certain tests, he concluded that, based on the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.
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1994) (hereinafter DSM-IV), Shannon suffered from “attention deficit hyper-activity disorder,
combined type, moderate” and from “borderline intellectual functioning.”
Dr. Munson testified that he had met with Ms. P. for about two hours, administered a
series of tests to her, and reviewed her medical records.  On the basis of the DSM-IV, he
diagnosed her with schizophrenia, disorganized type and dissociative disorder.  During the
interview, Ms. P. told Dr. Munson that she was an abuser of alcohol and a user of PCP, crack
cocaine and marijuana, that she had been physically abused and neglected as a child, that she
had a history of mental illness and treatment, including five psychiatric hospitalizations, and
that she had been a victim of domestic violence in her relationships with her estranged husband
and other men.  He testified that at the time he saw her, she was taking Doxepin, Prozac,
Vistaril and  Haldol, medications for depression and psychotic related disorders.
Dr. Munson testified that, based on his diagnosis, it was his opinion that Petitioner’s
ability to manage and parent Shannon was impaired because of her own chronic mental illness.
He further opined that it would be between three and five years before she would be in a
condition to support and care for a child and meanwhile, Shannon’s safety and well-being would
be at risk.  Petitioner objected to Dr. Munson’s testimony, on the ground that he was not
qualified to diagnose and give expert opinions regarding Ms. P.’s and Shannon’s conditions.
On March 25, 1999, the Circuit Court granted the petition and terminated parental
rights.  Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported
opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding
that the court did not err in admitting the testimony of the licensed certified social worker-
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clinical, Dr. Munson.  We granted Ms. P.’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Each party before this Court has argued that a proper interpretation of the Act, which
governs the practice of social work in Maryland, leads to opposite results.  Petitioner argues
that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Munson because the opinion he
expressed was a medical diagnosis constituting the “practice of medicine” as that term is
defined in § 14-101 of the Act, and as such, is prohibited by § 19-103(b).  Section 19-103(b)
states that “[t]his title may not be construed to authorize any person licensed as a social worker
to engage in the practice of medicine.”  Alternatively, Petitioner argues that if Dr. Munson is
qualified to render a diagnosis, he may do so only after a referral from a physician, and in any
case, he may not give expert testimony of that diagnosis in court.  
WCDSS argues that
based on the plain language of § 19-101(f), a licensed certified social worker-clinical is
permitted to diagnose mental and emotional disorders and to rely on that diagnosis in forming
an opinion as to the likelihood of reunification of parent and child in a guardianship
proceeding.
In order to resolve these issues, we must determine the intent of the Legislature.  We
invoke the cardinal rule of statutory construction---to ascertain and give effect to the true
legislative intent that lies behind the statutory enactment itself.  See Sacchet v. Blan, 353 Md.
87, 92, 724 A.2d 667, 669 (1999).  The primary indication of legislative intent is found in the
plain language of the statute, with the words given their ordinary and natural meanings.  See
Cooper v. Sacco, 357 Md. 622, 629, 745 A.2d 1074, 1077 (2000);  Sacchet, 353 Md. at 92,
724 A.2d at 669 (1999).  In addition,  we often consider the general purpose or policy behind
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the statute, as well as the development of a statute to discern legislative intent that may not be
as clear upon initial examination of the current language of the statute.  See Cooper, 357 Md.
at 629, 745 A.2d at 1077.
  The Act defines a social worker in § 19-101(g) as one “who practices  social work,”
which is further defined in Section 19-101(e) as follows: 
(1) Helping individuals, groups, or communities to enhance or
restore their capacity for social functioning;
(2) Seeking to create societal conditions favorable to this goal;
and
(3) By the application of social work values, principles, and   
techniques:
(i)  Helping people obtain tangible services;
(ii)  Helping persons, communities, and groups provide or
improve social and health services; and
(iii)  Counseling with individuals, families, and groups.
By contrast, Section 19-101(f) defines the practice of clinical social work as follows:
(1) “Practice clinical social work” means to engage
professionally and for compensation in the application of social
work principles and methods for the alleviation of social, mental,
and emotional conditions through treatment designed to provide
psychotherapy for a mental disorder.  
(2) “Practice clinical social work” includes rendering a diagnosis
based on a recognized manual of mental and emotional disorders.
From the plain language of the Act, it is clear that Petitioner’s argument is misguided.
Petitioner’s description of Dr. Munson as a  “social worker” ignores a significant distinction
drawn by the Act.  Dr. Munson is not a “social worker” as that term is defined in § 19-101(g);
rather he is a licensed clinical social worker.  The Act draws a critical distinction between the
licensed social worker and the licensed clinical social worker.  See § 19-101(f)(2).  Unlike
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The parties do not dispute that DSM-IV is a recognized manual of mental and emotional
5
disorders.
 Section 19-302 sets forth the qualifications of applicants for social work licenses.
6
To qualify for a license, an applicant must be of good moral character and meet the following
requirements:
(b) An applicant for a social work associate license shall have a baccalaureate
degree:
(1) From an accredited college or university; and
(2) Based on a social work program accredited by the Council on         
        Social Work Education.
(c) An applicant for a graduate social worker license shall have:
(1) A master's degree from an accredited college or university and       
         based on a graduate social work program accredited by the Council on    
      Social  Work Education; or
(2) A doctorate degree in social work from an accredited college or    
         university.
(d)(1) An applicant for a certified social worker license shall have:
(i) A master's degree from an accredited college or university and based
            on a graduate social work program accredited by the Council on Social
          Work Education; and
(ii) 2 years of social work experience as a social worker where             
        face-to-face supervision is part of the employment contract and the         
     supervisor is a licensed certified social worker and is provided by and        
(continued...)
a licensed social worker, Dr. Munson, as a licensed clinical social worker, is specifically
authorized by the Legislature to render diagnoses based on a recognized manual of mental and
emotional disorders.  It is plain from the statutory language that the Legislature deems licensed
clinical social workers capable of rendering diagnoses such as those made by Dr. Munson
based on DSM-IV.5
The advanced educational standards adopted for the clinical social work license further
support our conclusion that the General Assembly intended to permit licensed clinical social
workers 
to 
render 
diagnoses. 
 
See 
§ 
19-302.  
 
These 
educational
6
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(...continued)
6
   accountable to the employer after receiving the master's degree.
     (2) An applicant for a certified social worker-clinical license shall have:
(i) A master's degree in social work and documentation of clinical       
        course work from an accredited college or university and based on a        
    graduate social work program accredited by the Council on Social               
Work Education;  and
(ii) 2 years of supervised clinical social work experience of at least     
         3,000 hours after receiving the master's degree with a minimum of         
     144 hours of periodic direct face-to-face supervision provided in not         
   less than 2 consecutive years and not more than 6 consecutive years             
and where the supervision is part of the employment contract and the             
supervisor is a licensed certified social worker-clinical and is provided           
by and accountable to the employer.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the applicant shall pass an
appropriate examination given by the Board under this subtitle. 
           (emphasis added)
requirements are more stringent than those required for the non-clinical license, which does
not include a similar grant to diagnose mental and emotional disorders.  This disparity in
education and training standards is consistent with a legislative grant that allows the clinical
social worker to render diagnoses based on a manual of mental and emotional disorders.
Significantly, § 19-307(b), which sets out restrictions on the scope of social work licenses,
expressly denies the authority to diagnose mental or emotional disorders or to engage in
psychotherapy to those practitioners holding a social work associate license.  Section 19-
307(b) states that “[a] licensed social work associate may not make a clinical diagnosis of
mental and emotional disorders or engage in the practice of psychotherapy.” 
Petitioner’s interpretation also ignores provisions of the Act that must be read in
conjunction with the provisions that Petitioner chooses to relies upon.  Thus, there is no merit
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to Petitioner’s argument that Dr. Munson’s testimony was inadmissible as a medical diagnosis
that may be made only by a physician.  To be sure, a diagnosis rendered on the basis of a
recognized manual of mental and emotional disorders is within the statutory definition of the
term “practice medicine.”  See § 14-101 (k)(1)(i), (k)(2)(i).  Nonetheless, § 14-102 provides,
in pertinent part:
(a)  Individuals exempt — In general.— This title does not limit
the right of:  
(1) An individual to practice a health occupation that the
individual is authorized to practice under this article . . . .
When these sections are read together, it is clear that Title 14 of the Act does not preclude a
licensed clinical social worker from rendering a diagnosis based on a recognized manual of
mental and emotional disorders, as it is specifically authorized by § 19-101(f).
The legislative history of the Act further supports our conclusion.  As first promulgated
in 1957, the Act did not include a separate license for clinical social workers.  See Maryland
Code (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.) Art. 43, § 860.  In 1992, the General Assembly enacted House
Bill 1087 (1992 Md. Laws, ch. 388) which amended the Act and created a separate license for
clinical social workers.  A Bill Analysis of House Bill 1087 indicates that, inter alia, the bill
was intended to create and specify requirements for a new clinical social worker license and
authorize the licensees to “provide psychotherapy for a mental disorder and render a diagnosis
based on [a recognized manual of mental and emotional disorders].”  Senate Economic and
Environmental Affairs Committee, Bill Analysis of House Bill 1087 (available at the Maryland
Department of Legislative Reference Library, Bill File for H.B. 1087 (1992)).  At the same
time, Chapter 388 eliminated the provision requiring licensed social workers to refer persons
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  The Insurance Code provided “[e]very health insurance policy...which provides for
7
reimbursement for any service which is within the lawful scope of practice of a licensed
certified social worker shall provide such benefit whether the service is performed by a doctor
of medicine or by a licensed certified social worker...if the insured or the person covered by
the policy was referred to the social worker by a physician.”  Maryland Code (1957, 1991
Repl. Vol.) Art. 48A, § 470K.  The current section, as amended by 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 388,
provides for reimbursement to a social worker for services as follows:
If a policy for certificate subject to this section provides for reimbursement for
a service that is within the lawful scope of practice of a licensed certified social
worker, the insured or any other person covered by the policy is entitled to
reimbursement for the service regardless of whether the service is performed
by a physician or licensed certified social worker-clinical.”  (Emphasis
added).
to qualified medical practitioners under certain circumstances.  Furthermore, the General
Assembly removed the Insurance Code provision limiting reimbursement for social worker
services for diagnosis and treatment to those circumstances where there was a physician
referral.  See 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 388,  Maryland Code (1997, 1999 Supp.) Insurance Art., §
15-707(b).   Petitioner’s reliance upon  73 Op. Att’y Gen. 208 (1988) expressing the view that
7
a social worker may not render a diagnosis unless the patient has been seen first by a physician
and then referred to the social worker provides no support for her argument now that the
statute has been amended to eliminate the referral requirement.  The opinion letter is simply
out-dated.  Removing the physician referral requirement for diagnosis by social workers and
at the same time creating a new clinical social work license is strong evidence of the
Legislative intent.  The legislative history thus reflects the General Assembly’s understanding
of the increasing importance of the social worker’s role and supports the view that the
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The importance of the treatment provided by social workers was recognized by the
8
United States Supreme Court in Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed  2d.
337 (1996).  The Court, in recognizing a privilege protecting confidential communications to
social workers, stated:
Today, social workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment.
Their clients often include the poor and those of modest means who could not
afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist, but whose counseling
sessions serve the same public goals.  We therefore agree with the Court of
Appeals that ‘[d]rawing a distinction between the counseling provided by costly
psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social
workers serves no discernible public purpose.”  
Id. at 16-17, 116 S. Ct. at 1931-32, 135 L.Ed. 2d 337 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
See ALASKA STAT. § 08.95.990(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-3251(7); COLO. REV. STAT.
9
§ 12-43-403; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-195m ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3902 ; D.C. CODE
ANN. § 2-3301.2(18); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-10A-3 (13); HAW. STAT. REV. § 467D-2 ; 224 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 20/3; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6319; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2708 ; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 112, § 130; MINN. STAT. § 148B.18(11); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-53-3 ; MO. REV.
STAT. § 337.600; NEV. REV. STAT. § 641B.030; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:2, N. M. STAT.
ANN. § 61-31-6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90B-3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4757.01; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.510; 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-26-45; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 63-23-103; UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-60-202; VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3700; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 18.19.110; W. VA. CODE § 30-30-2; WIS. STAT. § 457.01; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-102.
Legislature intended clinical social workers to diagnose mental and emotional disorders.8
 In permitting licensed clinical social workers to render diagnoses of mental disorders,
Maryland is in accord with most other states.  At least thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia have statutes defining social work or clinical social work as including diagnoses or
evaluations of mental disorders.   
9
The Maryland Code does not address specifically the admissibility of expert testimony
by clinical social workers, and there is nothing in the Act that bars a clinical social worker
from expressing an opinion as to the existence of a mental disorder based on a recognized
manual.  Therefore, the general rule that qualifications of expert witnesses are to be
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determined within the sound discretion of the court is applicable.  Maryland Rule 5-702,
governing the admissibility of expert testimony, provides:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine
(1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness
of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether
a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony.  See Sippio v. State, 350 Md. 633, 648, 714 A.2d 864, 872 (1998).  Rule
5-702 vests trial judges with wide latitude in deciding whether to qualify a witness as an expert
and does not limit the discretion of the trial court.  See Massie v. State, 349 Md. 834, 850,
709 A.2d 1316, 1324 (1998).  The trial court is free to consider any aspect of a witness’s
background in determining whether the witness is sufficiently familiar with the subject to
render an expert opinion, including the witness’s formal education, professional training,
personal observations, and actual experience.  See id. at 851, 709 A.2d at 1324.  Absent a
statute to the contrary, even the lack of particular formal credentials does not disqualify an
expert witness, so long as the witness is sufficiently qualified that the witness’s testimony
would be helpful to the fact finder.  See Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 659, 612 A.2d 258, 274
(1992); State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 95, 581 A.2d 9, 14 (1990); Consol. Mech. Contractors
v. Ball, 263 Md. 328, 338, 283 A.2d 154, 159 (1971); LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF
EVIDENCE § 2.702.4, at 191 (1994).  See also, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637,
645 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc); Tank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 270 F.2d 477,
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486 (6th Cir. 1959).  The trial court’s action in the area of admission of expert testimony
seldom provides a basis for reversal.  See Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173, 367 A.2d
472, 476 (1977); see also JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1403,
at 540 (3d ed. 1999).  
As outlined previously, Dr. Munson has extensive education and experience in the field
of clinical social work, from which the trial court could properly conclude that he is qualified
to testify as an expert.  The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in allowing  Dr.
Munson to testify as an expert witness and admitting his opinion testimony regarding the
Respondent’s mental disorders.
Several other courts have held that social workers or clinical social workers are not
disqualified from testifying to a diagnosis of a mental disorder.  In In re Detention of A. S.,
982 P.2d 1156 (Wash. 1999), detainees appealed from fourteen-day involuntary civil
commitment orders.  They argued that the state’s expert should not have been permitted to give
his expert opinion as to their mental conditions because he was not a medical doctor or a
psychologist.  See id. at 1165.  The Supreme Court of Washington rejected this argument,
observing that the Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 18.19.110, provides that
“[c]ertified social work practice . . . includes, but is not limited to, evaluation, assessment,
[and] treatment of psychopathology.”  Id. at 1169.  In light of this provision, the court held that
[i]n the absence of legislative direction limiting a social worker’s
scope of practice, or defining “mental disorder” . . . as a condition
only a physician may diagnose, we decline to formulate a
categorical evidentiary rule.  Rather, we continue to allow trial
courts to exercise their sound discretion as to a social worker’s
qualifications to opine about mental disorders.
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Id.  See also State v. Bordelon, 597 So.2d 147, 150 (La. 1992) (holding that trial court erred
when it excluded testimony of a social worker offered by defendant to give expert opinion as
to defendant’s mental condition at the time of his confession; exclusion was based on trial
judge’s belief that board-certified psychiatric social worker was not qualified to make a
diagnosis); America West Airlines v. Tope, 935 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)
(rejecting argument that trial court erred in permitting licensed clinical social worker to give
expert testimony of her diagnosis of plaintiff’s mental condition because she did not have a
medical degree or a Ph.D. in psychology). 
Finally, Petitioner points to the provision in the Maryland Code that expressly
authorizes psychologists licensed under the Maryland Psychologists Act to testify as experts
on ultimate issues, see Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Art., § 9-120, and argues that the lack of a similar provision for social workers is evidence of
the Legislature’s intent to deny them that ability.  This argument lacks merit.  A legislative act
specifically decreeing that a class of persons is qualified to give expert testimony on a given
subject merely limits the court’s discretion to deny a person in that class expert status for the
purpose of testifying.  See Bricker, 321 Md. at 95, 587 A.2d at 13 (noting that when a statute
sets out the requirements for a person to be qualified as an expert, courts have limited
discretion and must adhere to the statute).  When no such statute exists with regard to a person
offered as an expert, however, the court has broad discretion to determine whether that person
will be qualified as an expert or not.  Id.  The absence of a statute in this case specifically
qualifying clinical social workers as experts qualified to diagnose and testify to their opinions
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is, therefore, of no consequence.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion  in
finding Dr. Munson qualified as an expert and admitting his opinion on the mental disorders.
Dr. Munson met the statutory definition of a certified social worker-clinical license as set
forth in § 19-302 and was appropriately qualified as an expert.
J U D G M E N T  
A F F I R M E D .
PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.