Title: NUHOME INVESTMENTS, LLC. v. WELLER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NUHOME INVESTMENTS, LLC. v. WELLER2003 WY 17181 P.3d 940Case Number: 02-254Decided: 12/31/2003
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 
 

 

NUHOME 
INVESTMENTS, LLC, a South

Dakota 
Limited Liability Company,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

RUSSELL 
E. WELLER, JR. and

ELIZABETH 
C. WELLER, husband and wife,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Colin 
M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, Cody, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Simpson.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Thomas 
C. Bancroft, Worland, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Bancroft.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      NuHome 
Investments, LLC (NuHome) appeals the district court order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Russell E. and Elizabeth C. Weller (the Wellers).  The district court granted the Wellers' 
motion for summary judgment finding that the contract on which NuHome sued 
provided for a one-year period of limitation.  The complaint was not filed within one 
year of the alleged breach, thus the action was time barred.  The district court additionally found 
that NuHome could not assert an unjust enrichment claim because it did not 
provide the Wellers with any goods or services and it had not been assigned the 
right to an unjust enrichment claim.  
We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      NuHome asserts 
four issues on appeal:

 

1.  The 
one-year statute of limitations contained in Paragraph 14 of the Parties' 
contract is not enforceable in the State of Wyoming, or any other governing 
jurisdiction.[1]

 

2.  If 
the provisions of Paragraph 14 of the Parties' contract are controlling, [the 
Wellers] did not establish that no material facts exist as to the date of the 
breach of the contract.

 

3.  [The 
Wellers] reaffirmed the contract in 2001 which began the statute of limitations 
anew.  

 

4.  Unjust 
enrichment was an available remedy for [NuHome] under the undisputed facts in 
this case.  

 

The 
Wellers present two issues:

 

1.  Did 
the district court commit error when it concluded that a    one year statute of 
limitations, which was written into a modular home purchase contract by the 
seller, is enforceable against Nuhome, the assignee of the 
seller?

 

2.  Did 
the district court commit error when it concluded that Nuhome, which provided no 
services or materials to the Wellers, had no right to pursue an unjust 
enrichment claim against the Wellers?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The Wellers 
entered into a contract with Trails West Builders (Trails West) on January 26, 
1999.  Bruce Massey (Massey) signed 
the contract on behalf of Trails West.   The contract provided for the 
purchase, delivery, and setup of a manufactured home on the Wellers' property in 
Park County, Wyoming.  Additionally 
included in the contract was an agreement for the construction of a crawl space, 
two covered decks, and a garage.  
Under the contract the Wellers were to make a down payment, with the 
balance of the purchase price to be paid to Trails West no later than fourteen 
days after "notice of completion" of the home.  The contract consisted of a pre-printed 
form and three addendums and contained the following 
language:

 

14.  ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF LIMITATION.  I understand and agree thatif either of 
us should breach this contractthe other of us shall have only one year, after 
the occurrence of that breach, in which to commence an action for a breach of 
this contract.
 

[¶4]      
The home was delivered to the Weller site on March 12, 1999.  Many problems arose with the completion 
of the home.  After delivery, the 
home was not promptly assembled, which allowed rain and snow to enter the home 
and cause considerable damage.  
Foundation problems resulted in a low corner of the house.  Additionally, there were buckled siding, 
defects in the oven, incorrectly installed water pipes, the roof leaked, and 
various other problems.  In addition 
to the problems with the home, Massey had problems with his financing which 
increased the time of construction.  
These problems eventually resulted in the Wellers and Massey agreeing to 
a fourth addendum to the contract.  
Under this change, the Wellers agreed that they, instead of Massey, would 
pay all the subcontractors for the services rendered and also pay for the 
materials as the job progressed.  
These amounts would then be credited to the final contract at 
closing.  The Wellers paid the down 
payment and various other amounts to Massey but, because of the fourth addendum, 
paid him nothing after February 2, 1999.  

 

[¶5]      
NuHome became involved in this situation in June of 1999.  NuHome had loaned money to Massey so 
that he could purchase the manufactured home he sold to the Wellers.  On June 4, 1999, Massey assigned to 
NuHome all proceeds under the contract.  
Accordingly, in June of 1999, NuHome's attorney contacted the Wellers' 
attorney and demanded that the Wellers pay any money that they owed to Massey 
directly to NuHome.  On June 23, 
1999, the Wellers sent a letter indicating that a new contractor had been found 
and that work was still to be done but that an accounting would be provided when 
finished. 
 

[¶6]      
Additional correspondence was exchanged between the Wellers and NuHome 
during the summer of 1999, some of it questioning the assignment.  Eventually, Massey provided another 
assignment to NuHome entitled an "assignment of rights," which was dated October 
7, 1999.  This second assignment 
assigned to NuHome "all right, title and interest of the undersigned in and to 
that certain contract and agreement."  
In a letter dated November 11, 1999, the Wellers stated that they would 
not provide an accounting and that NuHome had no recourse against them.  The Wellers' home was completed on 
November 30, 1999, and the Wellers never provided an accounting to NuHome.  Communications between NuHome and the 
Wellers ceased following the November 11, 1999 letter until August of 2001 at 
which time NuHome sent a letter threatening litigation.  NuHome then filed its complaint on 
September 21, 2001.  
 

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      Our standard of 
review for summary judgment is well known.  

 

            
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material 
fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter 
of law. Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, 
¶10 (Wyo. 2001); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
that has been asserted by the parties. Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. 
v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2001). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the 
same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Scherer Constr., 
LLC v. Hedquist Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2001). We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on 
issues of law. Id.  

 

Trabing 
v. Kinko's, Inc., 
2002 WY 171, ¶8, 57 P.3d 1248, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      First, NuHome 
argues that the one-year period of limitation set forth by the contract is 
unenforceable in Wyoming or any other governing state as a matter of public 
policy.2  We begin by noting that in Wyoming we 
"recognize the basic right of persons, real and artificial, to freely enter into 
contracts."  Roussalis v. Wyoming 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 245 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. 
v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1984)).  We therefore generally must be cautious 
in resolving issues involving agreed upon contract provisions and arguments that 
these provisions violate public policy.  Roussalis, 4 P.3d  at 245.  

 

Our 
reluctance to redraw or nullify the provisions of a contract made by competent 
parties draws strength from the eloquent statement from the United States 
Supreme Court which we favorably quoted in Sinclair Oil 
Corp.:

 

The 
right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and 
that the usual and most important function of courts of justice is rather to 
maintain and enforce contracts, than to enable parties thereto to escape from 
their obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it clearly appear that 
they contravene public right or the public welfare. It was well said by Sir 
George Jessel, M.R., in Printing & Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 465:  "It must not be forgotten that you are 
not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as 
being against public policy, because if there is one thing which more than 
another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and 
shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount 
public policy to considerthat you are not lightly to interfere with this 
freedom of contract."

 

[Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d 975, 978-79 (Wyo. 1984)] (quoting 
Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 
505, 20 S. Ct. 385, 387, 44 L. Ed. 560, 565 (1900)).

 

Roussalis, 
4 P.3d  at 245.

 

[¶9]      This court has 
often showed its commitment to uphold the right of competent parties to freely 
contract for various provisions.  
For instance, under appropriate circumstances we allow parties the 
freedom to contract for forum selection clauses, choices of law clauses, and we 
rarely get involved in the adequacy of consideration.  See Durdahl v. Nat'l Safety Assocs., 
Inc., 988 P.2d 525, 527-28 (Wyo. 1999); Resource Technology Corp. v. 
Fisher Scientific Co., 924 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1996); Brodie v. General 
Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Wyo. 1997).  In particular, when considering forum 
selection clauses, after discussing how most courts today approach such clauses, 
we adopted a similar approach and held that forum selection clauses are prima 
facie valid and will be enforced absent a demonstration by the party opposing 
enforcement that the clause is unreasonable or based upon fraud or unequal 
bargaining positions.  
Durdahl, 988 P.2d  at 527. 

 

[¶10]   The recognized rationale of 
enforcing forum selection clauses is that it enhances contractual predictability 
and comports with traditional concepts of freedom of contract.  Id. at 527 (citing Voicelink 
Data Servs., Inc. v. Datapulse, Inc., 937 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Wash.App. 
1997)).  In adopting such a rule, we 
found that it was consistent with our commitment to enforce the provisions of 
the contract between the parties as long as the provisions are not contrary to 
Wyoming law, public policy, or the general interests of Wyoming's citizens.  Id. A contractual period of 
limitation similarly enhances predictability, and enforcing it would similarly 
comport with the concept of freedom of contract.  It therefore seems that a similar 
approach should apply when evaluating contractual period of limitation 
clauses.    

 

[¶11]   In making this determination, we 
consider the purpose of statutes of limitation.  Statutes of limitation have existed in 
the jurisprudence of the United States and the State of Wyoming for some 
time.  Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979).  "They 
are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation and spare 
citizens from having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are 
unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost."  Id.  See also Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of 
Pub. Utilities, 2001 WY 6, ¶9, 17 P.3d 13, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  The very purpose of a statute of 
limitations is to require diligence and prevent parties from sleeping on their 
rights.  A shorter period of 
limitation promotes this purpose.  

 

[¶12]   We also consider the Wyoming 
statutes providing for statutes of limitation.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 (LexisNexis 
2003) states:  "Civil actions can 
only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause 
of action accrues, but where a different limitation is prescribed by statute, 
that shall govern."  NuHome argues 
that this statute establishes the public policy of the legislature that 
limitations of actions are to be governed by statute and not by the agreement of 
the parties.  NuHome also contends 
that by setting out comprehensive limitation periods the legislature has 
mandated these specific periods.  We 
certainly agree that the legislature can declare public policy through statute, 
but nothing in these sections forbids the shortening of the limitation period by 
contract.  The plain language shows 
that the legislature's concern is setting a cutoff for the ability to bring an 
action.  The language of the statute 
uses the word "within."  The word 
"within" generally means not beyond.  
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1347 (1977).  Clearly, contractually created shorter 
periods are not beyond and are within the limitation period.  

 

[¶13]   NuHome then points to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-3-111 and 1-3-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003) as providing ten-year 
statutes of limitation and thus the action was clearly timely.  Section 1-3-111 states:  "Unless the parties to the contract 
agree otherwise, no action to recover damages, whether in tort, contract, 
indemnity or otherwise, shall be brought more than ten (10) years after 
substantial completion of an improvement to real property."  Section 1-3-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides:  "Civil actions other than 
for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following 
periods after the cause of action accrues: (i) Within ten (10) years, an action 
upon a specialty or any contract, agreement or promise in writing."   We find nothing in the language of 
either of these statutes to stand for the proposition that the legislature has 
declared that parties cannot contract for a shorter limitation period.  Indeed, if anything, § 1-3-111 
specifically identifies the legislature's willingness to allow the parties to 
contract for a different period of limitation.  We therefore do not believe that shorter 
contractually agreed upon period of limitation clauses violate public 
policy.      

 

[¶14]   Other states considering 
contractual period of limitation clauses have come to similar conclusions.  Important to our discussion, Oregon has 
embraced the notion of allowing contracting parties to select a shorter period 
of limitation.  Oregon allows 
parties to a contract to stipulate that an action for a breach of contract must 
be brought within a certain period shorter than the applicable statute of 
limitations and, as long as the limitation is reasonable, it will be 
upheld.  Ausplund v. Aetna 
Indemnity Co., 81 P. 577, 581 (Or. 1905); Beck v. General Ins. Co., 
18 P.2d 579 (Or. 1933).  See also 
Biomass One, L.P. v. S-P Constr., 799 P.2d 152, 154-55 (Or.App. 1990) 
(applying a shorter contractual period of limitation).  Several of our sister states have 
similarly allowed contracting parties to shorten the period for bringing an 
action, provided the shorter period is reasonable.  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sand Lake 
Lounge, 514 P.2d 223, 226 (Alaska 1973); Hambrecht & Quist Venture 
Partners v. American Med. Int'l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (Cal.App. 1995); 
Hepp v. United Airlines, Inc., 540 P.2d 1141 (Colo.App. 1975); 
Silverhorn v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Haw. 160 (Haw. Terr. 1916); 
Medrano v. Prod. Eng'g Co., 774 N.E.2d 371, 375-376 (Ill.App. 2002); 
Clark v. Lund, 184 P. 821 (Utah 1919); Syrett v. Reisner McEwin & 
Assocs., 24 P.3d 1070 (Wash.App. 2001).    

 

[¶15]   The United States Supreme Court has 
also addressed the matter.  In 
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 
672-73, 33 S. Ct. 397, 57 L.Ed 690 (1913), the Court upheld a provision in a 
shipping contract which required a suit for damage to be brought within ninety 
days "any statute or limitation to the contrary notwithstanding."  The Court remarked 
that:

 

            
The policy of statutes of limitation is to encourage promptness in the 
bringing of actions, that the parties shall not suffer by loss of evidence from 
death or disappearance of witnesses, destruction of documents or failure of 
memory.  But there is nothing in the 
policy or object of such statutes which forbids the parties to an agreement to 
provide a shorter period, provided the time is not unreasonably short.   

 

Id.

 

[¶16]   Alaska allows for the parties to 
contract for a shorter period of limitation than that provided by the 
legislature and provided the following excellent explanation:   

 

Although 
the parties can not at the time of contracting effectively bargain not to plead 
the statute or that the time for suit shall be longer than that allowed by 
statute, it is not against the public interest that they shall then agree upon a 
shorter time limit than that fixed by statute if the time agreed upon is not so 
short as to be unreasonable in the light of the provisions of the contract and 
the circumstances of its performance and enforcement.  Such time limits in 
insurance policies have often been held valid. These agreements are not at all 
inconsistent with the purposes underlying the statute of limitations. Those 
purposes are to prevent the bringing and enforcement of stale claims, involving 
extra danger of fraud and mistake, unless the debtor has expressed a voluntary 
assent within the statutory period.  
An express provision fixing a shorter limit merely hastens the 
enforcement; and it is not made invalid by being included from the beginning in 
the contract to be enforced. If held invalid, it must be on the ground that the 
terms are unconscionable and that unfair advantage has been taken of a claimant 
whose bargaining position was inferior.

 

Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., 
514 P.2d  at 226 (quoting 1A Corbin, Contracts § 218 at 311-312 (1963)).  We agree with the reasoning of these 
courts. Considering the purpose of statutes of limitation and the language of 
our statutes, we find that an approach similar to that used when evaluating 
forum selection clauses should be used when considering contractual periods of 
limitation.  We hold that 
contractual periods of limitation are prima facie valid and will be enforced 
absent a demonstration by the party opposing enforcement that the clause is 
unreasonable or based upon fraud or unequal bargaining positions.  See Durdahl, 988 P.2d  at 527-28. 

 

[¶17]   We must now determine if the period 
of limitation before us is unreasonable or based upon fraud or unequal 
bargaining positions.  NuHome does 
not present an argument of how a one-year period of limitation is unreasonable 
in this circumstance, and we do not find a one-year period to be per se 
unreasonable.  In fact, in some 
instances Wyoming statute specifically allows parties to a contract to shorten 
the applicable period of limitation to one year.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34.1-2-725(a).  Similarly, 
NuHome has not alleged fraud or unequal bargaining position.  Indeed, it should be noted that in this 
case Massey supplied the contract including the one-year provision.  NuHome, having stepped into Massey's 
shoes, would thus be considered the drafter of this particular contract and is 
consequently not in a position to assert unequal bargaining position 
arguments.  We hence hold that the 
one-year period of limitation set forth in this contract is valid.   

 

[¶18]   NuHome next argues that even if the 
one-year period of limitation is valid, the Wellers failed to establish the date 
from which to measure the breach.  
In making this argument, NuHome asserts that the last addendum to the 
contract essentially switched the responsibilities of Massey and the 
Wellers.  NuHome contends that the 
Wellers became the general contractor under the contract, and they were then 
obligated to give Massey notice of completion of the home because the Wellers' 
payment for the home was due fourteen days after notice of completion.  NuHome therefore argues that the period 
of limitation never began running because the Wellers never gave notice of 
completion.  We disagree. 

 

[¶19]   The performance promised by the 
Wellers was payment.  In the fourth 
addendum, the Wellers never agreed to give notice of completion of the 
house.  They only agreed to pay the 
subcontractors for services rendered and materials supplied.  In fact, that addendum specifically 
provided that "[t]his Addendum shall not affect any provisions of the January 
26, 1999 Purchase Agreement, and Addendums A,' B' and C.'"  Furthermore, it is not the buyer of a 
house that gives notice of completion; it is the contractor.  It would make little sense to allow a 
buyer to withhold payment until he gives notice of completion because he could 
then withhold payment indefinitely by simply refusing to give notice of 
completion.  

 

[¶20]   The Wellers' affidavit asserts that 
the home was complete on November 30, 1999.  NuHome has never disputed this date and 
never indicated that it was waiting for notice of completion.   NuHome apparently thought the home 
was complete in June of 1999 because it demanded payment at that time.  Furthermore, NuHome had an indication 
that there was a breach when the Wellers refused to provide an accounting on 
November 11, 1999. Certainly no one has claimed that the house was complete 
later than September 21, 2000, which is one year prior to the September 21, 2001 
filing date.  Although there was 
some question of whether the breach was when the Wellers refused to provide an 
accounting or fourteen days after the house was complete, under any view of the 
facts, this was more than one year before the filing date.  Hence, we see that there is no 
material question of fact.

 

[¶21]   NuHome next contends that a letter 
written by the Wellers' attorney reaffirmed the contract on August 14, 
2002.  The text of that letter 
is:

 

            
Re:      
Ron Kiefer

 

Dear 
Colin:

 

            
I am in receipt of your letter concerning your client NuHome Investments, 
LLC.  I forwarded your letter to my 
clients and to date have not heard from Russ Weller.  However, I have been in contact with Ron 
and Jan Kiefer and yesterday received an accounting in rough form.  I will be meeting with the Kiefers later 
this week and once that meeting is concluded we will make the decision of how we 
will proceed.  I ask that you hold 
off filing any complaints until I have had the opportunity to review the 
accounting and go over my clients' legal positions later this week.   

 

This 
letter references a different client, not the Wellers.  Although the Wellers are mentioned, it 
is only to say that they have not been heard from.  This writing does not clearly identify 
and acknowledge the Wellers' obligation.  
See Longstaff v. Mills, 773 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo. 1989); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 1-3-119 (LexisNexis 2003).  
Generally, for an obligation to be reaffirmed there must be a clear 
written acknowledgement of the other party's claim.  Longstaff, at 152.  NuHome is correct that letters that make 
excuses for non-payment and do not deny the obligation nor regard the 
indebtedness as non-existent are sufficient to acknowledge and revive the 
debt.  However, the letter provided 
above does not even meet these criteria.  
All that this letter acknowledged was that the Wellers had received the 
letter from NuHome's attorney.  For 
that reason, we do not agree that the Wellers reaffirmed the contract.   

 

[¶22]   Lastly, NuHome argues that it 
should be allowed to pursue an unjust enrichment claim.   One who seeks relief based on 
unjust enrichment must prove all of the following four elements:  (1)  Valuable services were 
rendered, or materials furnished, (2)  to the party to be charged, 
(3)  which services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by 
the party to be charged, and (4)  that the services or materials were 
furnished under such circumstances as would reasonably notify the party to be 
charged that the plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such 
materials, expected to be paid by the party to be charged.  Without such payment, the party would be 
unjustly enriched.  Amoco Prod. 
v. EM Nominee Partnership, 2 P.3d 534, 541 (Wyo. 2000).  Obviously, NuHome does not meet these 
criteria because it did not provide any materials or services to the 
Wellers.  Accordingly, NuHome claims 
that it should be able to bring this unjust enrichment claim by virtue of the 
assignment of rights that it received from Massey.

 

[¶23]   The assignment from Massey to 
NuHome provided for an assignment of "all right, title and interest of the 
undersigned in and to that certain contract and agreement by and between Trails 
West Builders and Russ Weller."  
Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy which generally implies a 
contract where none exists.  An 
unjust enrichment claim is not a right under the contract.  See Silver Dollar Motel, Inc. v. 
Taylor Elec. Co., 761 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 1988).  The plain language of the assignment 
contract uses the words "in and to that certain contract."   Had Massey wished to assign rights 
other than his contract rights, he simply could have assigned all his rights, 
claims, or causes against the Wellers.  
However, he did not do so.  
Rather, Massey limited the assignment to rights under the contract.  Therefore, we find that the right to 
make an unjust enrichment claim, if one existed, was not assigned to 
NuHome.  Accordingly, NuHome has no 
right to make an unjust enrichment claim in this case.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   For the reasons stated above, we 
affirm the district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Wellers.    

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The 
parties refer to the one-year period contained in the contract as a statute of 
limitations.  Contractually, the 
provision is identified as a period of limitation.  We similarly find it appropriate to 
refer to the provision as a period of limitation because the one-year time 
period is set by contract rather than statute, and we will do so throughout the 
body of our discussion.

 

2The 
contract provided that the law of the state in which the Wellers signed the 
contract would govern.  There is 
some indication that the Wellers signed the contract in Oregon.  The district court did not decide this 
matter finding that the result would be the same regardless of the law applied. 
Both parties seem to agree with the district court on this point, and thus 
neither expressly argues for the application of a particular state's law.  We agree that the result will be the 
same regardless of the law applied, and we will therefore apply Wyoming 
law.