Title: Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Anthony M. Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd., f/k/a Crystal Ford Izusu, Ltd.
No. 93, September Term 2011
Civil Procedure – Class Actions – Certification of Class Action – Mootness.  In an action
filed as a class action, the defendant’s tender of individual damages to the prospective class
representative shortly after the complaint was filed does not require denial of certification
of the case as a class action on the ground that the prospective class representative’s
individual claim has been rendered moot.  Tender of individual relief to the putative class
representative does not moot a class action if that plaintiff has not had a reasonable time to
seek class certification, including any necessary discovery.
Punitive Damages – Effect of Defendant’s Pre-Trial Tender of Compensatory Relief.
A defendant’s offer of compensatory monetary relief to a plaintiff following the filing of a
complaint does not automatically render moot whatever claim the plaintiff may have for
punitive damages.
Consumer Protection Act - Award of Attorney’s Fees.  In awarding attorney’s fees to a
plaintiff in a law suit brought as a class action under the Consumer Protection Act, a circuit
court may take into account the extent to which the efforts of plaintiff’s counsel obtained
beneficial results in correcting practices that may have affected others, even if some of
counsel’s efforts occurred after a tender of individual compensatory relief to the plaintiff.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 93
September Term, 2011
ANTHONY M. FRAZIER
v.
CASTLE FORD, LTD., F/K/A 
CRYSTAL FORD IZUSU, LTD.
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Opinion by McDonald, J.
Harrell and Battaglia, JJ., dissent.
Filed:  January 24, 2013
Maryland Rule 2-231 allows a plaintiff to prosecute a civil action on behalf of a class
of similarly situated persons.  In order to do so, the prospective “class representative” must
demonstrate that the class members and the claims asserted on their behalf satisfy certain
criteria set forth in the rule and that the prospective class representative will “fairly and
adequately” represent the class.  The circuit court in which the complaint is filed is to
determine whether those criteria are met and whether to “certify” the case as a class action
“as soon as practicable after commencement of the action.”
In this case, we are asked to decide the consequences when a plaintiff seeks to
prosecute a case as a class action and the defendant tenders individual compensatory relief
to the plaintiff – prior to any determination whether the case may appropriately be brought
as a class action.  In particular, the following three questions are before us:
1 - Does the tender require the court to deny class certification?
2 - Is an award of punitive damages foreclosed by the tender of individual
compensatory damages?
3 - Is an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff under a fee-shifting provision
of the Consumer Protection Act limited to fees incurred before the tender?
For the reasons that follow, we answer each of these questions “no.”
1 Subsequent to the events that led to this litigation, Crystal Ford operated under the
name “Castle Ford Ltd.”  For the sake of simplicity, we adopt the same convention as the
parties and will refer to the Respondent as “Crystal Ford.”
2 Crystal Ford concedes that it erred in explaining the warranty to Mr. Frazier.
According to Crystal Ford, due to the number of miles recorded on his car’s odometer, Mr.
Frazier received a new car warranty that ran from the “in-service” date of the vehicle rather
than a used car warranty that would have run from the date of purchase of the warranty. 
2
Background
Class Action Complaint
Petitioner Anthony Frazier commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County on July 27, 2007, naming Respondent Crystal Ford Isuzu,
Ltd. (“Crystal Ford”) as defendant.1  The complaint alleged that Crystal Ford sold Mr. Frazier
an extended warranty for his 2003 Ford Explorer on or about December 23, 2004.  According
to the complaint, the salesperson told Mr. Frazier that the extended warranty would last for
48 months from the date of purchase or 100,000 miles, whichever occurred first.  In fact, the
duration of the type of extended warranty sold to Mr. Frazier was calculated from the “build
date” of the automobile.2  As a result, the extended warranty actually expired on October 30,
2006, more than 2 years earlier than Mr. Frazier had been led to believe.  
The complaint alleged that, because the warranty expired earlier than promised, Mr.
Frazier incurred unanticipated repair expenses when he had his car serviced within the four-
year period following purchase of the warranty.  According to the complaint, when Mr.
Frazier complained to Crystal Ford, the salesperson advised that there was nothing she could
do, as the actual terms of the warranty contract measured the four years from the “build date”
3 Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article (“CL”), §§13-301, 13-408.
4 Attorney’s fees are available in a private action brought under the Consumer
Protection Act.  CL §13-408(b).
3
of the car even though the application for the warranty stated a longer duration.  According
to the complaint, the salesperson told Mr. Frazier she had sold other extended warranties with
the same discrepancy.
Following the discussion with the salesperson, Mr. Frazier retained counsel, who
wrote a letter to Crystal Ford seeking compensation for the unexpected repair expenses as
well as other repairs anticipated within the four-year period.  No response was received from
Crystal Ford, and Mr. Frazier filed his complaint two weeks later.
The complaint asserted two causes of action – one for unfair and deceptive trade
practices, in violation of the Consumer Protection Act,3 and the other for common law fraud.
The complaint sought compensatory damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief,
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.4  Mr. Frazier purported to bring his action “on behalf
of the entire class of persons similarly situated” – described in the complaint as residents of
Maryland who had purchased Ford extended warranties from Crystal Ford during the
previous four years.  The complaint requested, among other things, that the court certify the
action as a class action.
Mr. Frazier did not immediately file a motion for class certification, but sought
discovery from Crystal Ford concerning warranties Crystal Ford had sold to other customers.
5 The Circuit Court also denied Mr. Frazier’s motion to compel discovery, and denied
Crystal Ford’s motion for a protective order on the grounds that it was moot.  Mr. Frazier
appealed the ruling on his motion to compel.  The Court of Special Appeals did not reach that
issue on the basis that it was moot given its ruling on the other issues on appeal.  Neither
discovery motion is before us.  
4
Tender of Individual Relief
After the filing of the complaint, Crystal Ford paid to extend Mr. Frazier’s warranty
through December 31, 2008, approximately four years from the date it had sold him the
extended warranty.  As a result, Ford ESP North America sent Mr. Frazier a check for the
amounts he had paid for the repairs (minus a $100 deductible) during the period that his car
would have been covered by the warranty that he had intended to purchase.  Mr. Frazier did
not cash the check.
Dispositive Motions
Crystal Ford filed an answer to the complaint and subsequently filed a motion for
summary judgment, a motion to deny class certification, and a motion for a protective order
seeking to limit discovery.  Mr. Frazier filed a motion to compel discovery.  As of the date
of the hearing on those motions, Mr. Frazier had not filed his own motion to certify the class.
On February 20, 2008, the Circuit Court issued an oral opinion from the bench in
which it granted Crystal Ford’s motion to deny class certification; and granted in part Crystal
Ford’s motion for summary judgment, leaving open the issue of attorney’s fees for a
subsequent hearing.5  In explaining its decision to deny class certification, the court stated:
[Mr. Frazier] clearly is no longer a member of any class
because he’s been made whole, so really, he has no interest as
5
far as this court can see to put forward, and to indicate that he is
acting on behalf of a class. 
I also agree with the defendant’s position that the, there’s
not a uniformity in regards to what the individual claimants
would have to put forward.  I don’t think at all, having reviewed
Rule 2-231, having reviewed the case law, and having reviewed
this individual case, that a class action certification would be
appropriate.
I really don’t see that Anthony Frazier is a class plaintiff.
And as I said earlier, I do think that he has been made whole.
So I don’t think that he is, has really any interest in common
with the other yet to be identified prospective claimants.
As to the motion for summary judgment, the court said:
Now, in regards to the motion for summary judgment,
and as an alternative, I believe that the defendants were arguing
that the claim was moot.  And certainly, I think I would agree
with the fact that the claim is somewhat moot, because what was
being asked for really pertains to the class motion.  And it says,
“Demand judgment for the class plaintiffs, members of his
class,” and then it goes on, the prayers for relief say
“compensatory damages in an amount equal to the cost of all of
the Ford extended service plans.”  Well that’s been worked out
already. That has been provided to this individual plaintiff.
“Appropriate injunction to declaratory relief to protect
this class.”  That’s really not appropriate because I’ve denied the
motion – actually, I granted the motion to deny the class
certification.
“Punitive damages,” that’s clearly not appropriate.
On September 3, 2008, a hearing was held as to the appropriate award for attorney’s
fees before another judge of the Circuit Court.  At this hearing, the court was informed that
Crystal Ford had contacted other customers who had purchased warranties to ensure that the
6
warranties conformed to the representations made at the time they were sold.  (According to
Crystal Ford’s counsel, this process was half completed at the time of the February hearing
on the motion for summary judgment).  The Circuit Court determined that the efforts of
counsel for Mr. Frazier to obtain class certification had helped motivate Crystal Ford to
correct the warranties of other members of the putative class.  The court decided that, even
though class certification had ultimately been denied, those efforts should be given weight
in the award of attorney’s fees.  The court therefore granted Mr. Frazier attorney’s fees for
all of the work done by his counsel both before and after Crystal Ford had tendered him
individual relief. 
Appeal
Both parties appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court, in a published
opinion, affirmed the Circuit Court rulings.  Frazier v. Crystal Ford, Ltd., 200 Md. App. 285,
27 A.3d 583 (2011).  Both parties then sought review by this Court, which we granted.
Discussion
Whether a Tender of Relief to a Prospective Class Representative Prior to Class
Certification Requires Denial of Class Certification
Class Actions
The Maryland Rules allow for an action to be litigated as a class action when there are
questions of law or fact common to a group of potential litigants who are too numerous to
6 The Maryland rule is based on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
the latter was significantly revised in 1966.
7 The rule sets forth certain criteria to be met as a prerequisite to certification:
(b)
Unless justice requires otherwise, an action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of section (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(1)
the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(continued...)
7
be joined as parties to the action.  Maryland Rule 2-231(a).6  One important purpose of this
procedural mechanism is to allow a remedy for modest individual claims.  “The aggregation
of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.  Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of
small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress
unless they may employ the class-action device.”  Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).  
Not anyone can prosecute a class action, however.  Under the rule, a plaintiff who
seeks to prosecute a class action – to act as the “class representative” – must satisfy certain
prerequisites.  See Maryland Rule 2-231(a) (requiring that the representative’s claim be
“typical” of the class and that the representative “fairly and adequately” protect the interests
of the class).  The case may only proceed as a class action if certified by the court.  Maryland
Rule 2-231(c).7  And the prosecution of the action is subject to significant oversight by the
7 (...continued)
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2)
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding a declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole, or 
(3)
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.  The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions,
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class,
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, 
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Maryland Rule 2-231(b).
8 One may be wary of class action settlements that generate a pot of money for
attorneys, provide only minuscule damages to class members, and otherwise absolve a
(continued...)
8
court.8  Maryland Rule 2-231(f).
8 (...continued)
defendant of liability to injured parties.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Equifax Payment Services,
Inc., 201 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2000).  The rules require judicial vigilance to avoid such abuses.
See Maryland Rule 2-213(h) (dismissal or compromise of class action subject to court
approval).  In any event, this case concerns the circumstances under which a class action may
be prosecuted, not those under which it may be settled.
9 The court also referred to a lack of “uniformity” – presumably referring to whether
there existed questions of law or fact common to class members.  Crystal Ford had argued
that common issues did not predominate; however, the trial court appeared to be focused on
the fact that Mr. Frazier’s had been “made whole” and therefore had no “interest in common”
with the other members of the class.  At the same time, the court denied Mr. Frazier’s motion
for discovery related to class certification issues.  The Court of Special Appeals did not
address the “uniformity”question.  200 Md. App. at 298 n.4.
9
“Picking off” the Prospective Class Representative
In this case, the complaint alleges that Crystal Ford, an automobile dealer,
misrepresented the term of an extended manufacturer’s warranty that Mr. Frazier purchased
from the dealer for his car.  According to the complaint, Mr. Frazier brought the problem to
the attention of Crystal Ford both personally and through counsel, but the dealer took no
action to remedy the problem.  If Mr. Frazier’s experience reflected the dealer’s practice with
respect to extended warranties, that practice would have a significant impact on other
purchasers for whom recourse to legal remedy would not be economically feasible.  It is
undisputed that, once Mr. Frazier filed a class action complaint, the dealer took the offensive,
tendered individual damages to Mr. Frazier and, based on that tender (which apparently was
declined by Mr. Frazier), argued that Mr. Frazier could not prosecute a class action.  The
Circuit Court accepted that reasoning and denied class certification on the ground that the
tender of individual damages disqualified Mr. Frazier from representing the class.9 
10
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed that decision and essentially held that, in
certain circumstances, a defendant may abort a class action prior to class certification by
tendering individual damages to the plaintiff who initiates the case – even if that tender is
declined and regardless of whether the claims are amenable to class litigation or the
individual plaintiff would otherwise qualify as a class representative.  This allows a
defendant in such a case to moot a meritorious class action by “picking off” the putative class
representative.
Standard of Review of Certification Decision
A circuit court’s order to grant or deny class certification is to state “findings and
reasons” for the determination, presumably to facilitate later review.  Maryland Rule 2-
231(c).  Such a decision is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion based upon the
“recognition that the basis of the certification inquiry is essentially a factual one, and thus,
deference is due.”  Creveling v. GEICO, 376 Md. 72, 90, 828 A.2d 229 (2003).  A less
deferential standard of review applies when there is a question whether the court applied the
proper legal standard for certification.  Id. (“whether the trial court used a correct legal
standard ... is a question that we review de novo”); see also Phillip Morris v. Angeletti, 358
Md. 689, 726, 752 A.2d 200 (2000).  
In this case, the Circuit Court did not articulate its decision on certification as an
application of the criteria of Rule 2-231 to the claims of potential class members.  The only
operative fact mentioned in the Circuit Court’s decision was Crystal Ford’s tender of
individual relief to Mr. Frazier.  The legal issue before us is thus whether that tender
10 The Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that there was a lack of
commonality among the claims of the individual members of the putative class – a key factor
under Maryland Rule 2-231 in whether a class should be certified. 
11 E.g., Cruz v. Farquharson, 252 F.3d 530, 533 (1st Cir. 2001); DeCoteau v. Nodak
Mut. Ins. Co., 636 N.W.2d 432, 437 (N.D. 2001)
12 E.g., Yu v. IBM, 732 N.E.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Ill. App. 2000).
13 E.g., Encarnacion v. Barnhart, 180 F.Supp.2d 492, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Liles v.
Am. Corrective Counseling Servs., 201 F.R.D. 452, 455 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
11
precluded certification of this action as a class action with Mr. Frazier as the representative
plaintiff. 
Creveling
This Court previously discussed, but did not decide, this issue in Creveling, supra.
Although the Court affirmed a denial of class certification in that case for other reasons,10 it
noted that mootness is a “more flexible” concept in the context of class action litigation.  376
Md. at 83-87 n.3.  The Court outlined, in a lengthy footnote, the disparate approaches that
courts in other jurisdictions had taken when a defendant, at various stages of the case,
attempts to moot a class action by tendering individual damages to the plaintiff who seeks
to represent the class.  Id.  It described four different holdings reflected in the case law:  (1)
the entire action should be dismissed if the individual plaintiff’s claims are satisfied before
class certification;11 (2) the entire action should be dismissed if individual relief is tendered
to the named plaintiff before the filing of a motion for class certification;12 (3) the mootness
of a named plaintiff’s claim does not automatically moot the class action13 – i.e., the entire
action should not necessarily be dismissed; and (4) satisfaction of the named plaintiff’s claim
14 E.g., United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). 
12
after a denial of class certification does not bar appeal of that denial14 – and presumably
would not bar prosecution of the class action if the denial is overturned on appeal. 
In its opinion in Creveling, this Court explicitly did not choose among these
approaches, but emphasized that “our restraint under the circumstances of this case does not
constitute an endorsement of tendering payment to named plaintiffs with the goal of
annulling class action litigation. ... ‘[T]he notion that a defendant may short-circuit a class
action by paying off the class representatives either with their acquiescence or ... against their
will, deserves short shrift.  Indeed, were it so easy to end class actions, few would survive.’”
Creveling, 376 Md. at 83-87 n.3 (quoting Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th
Cir. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)).
Assessing the Consequences of a Tender of Individual Relief
While a rule that a defendant may moot a putative class action by tendering individual
damages prior to certification of the class is a bright line rule, it is not a wise one.  The
circumstances of this case may illustrate why.  If we accept the facts as alleged in the
complaint, the automobile dealer made no effort to rectify the situation until the class action
complaint was filed, but then immediately took action to moot it by tendering individual
damages to the plaintiff shortly after the complaint was filed and before the plaintiff had any
reasonable opportunity to seek class certification or to conduct discovery addressed to the
15 In many situations, the information critical to merits of class certification will be
solely in the possession of the defendant. 
16 Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”). 
13
merits of class certification.15  If all a defendant need do to defeat a class action is to satisfy
the class representative’s claim immediately after suit is filed, many meritorious class actions
will never get off the ground.  It will be particularly tempting to “pick off” a putative class
representative in cases where the underlying conduct affected many people but each claim,
including the class representative’s, is small or moderate in size – a type of case for which
the class action procedure was devised.16 
Perhaps for that reason, in recent years courts in other jurisdictions have held that,
even prior to the filing of a motion for class certification, an offer of judgment for the full
amount of the putative representative’s individual claim does not automatically moot the
class claims.  E.g., Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011); Lucero v.
Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2011); Weiss v. Regal
Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Southern Auto Finance, 988 So.2d 721
(Fla. Ct. App. 2008); cf. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2008)
(offer of judgment to representative plaintiff does not moot proposed “collective action”
under federal Fair Labor Standards Act); but see Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 948
N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (Ill. 2011) (tender of individual relief to prospective class representative
17 The offer was made  pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which encourages settlements by shifting costs in certain circumstances to a party who
declines a pre-trial settlement offer.  Under the rule, a defendant may make a pre-trial offer
of judgment to a plaintiff.  If the plaintiff does not accept the offer and does not obtain a
more favorable result at trial, the plaintiff is liable for post-offer costs.  There is no equivalent
cost-shifting provision in the Maryland rules.
18 The court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Article III
of the federal Constitution, under which the federal judicial power extends to “cases or
controversies.”  Relying on several Supreme Court decisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the “case or controversy” requirement could be satisfied by the “relation back” of class
certification to the filing of the complaint in appropriate circumstances.  See Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393 (1975), Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
We, of course, need not address this issue. 
14
prior to filing of motion for class certification required dismissal of complaint).
Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, supra, is illustrative.  In that case, Pitts filed a class action
lawsuit against his employer, Terrible Herbst, alleging violations of state and federal labor
laws and breach of contract.  Pitts then sought discovery of information concerning potential
class members, Terrible Herbst refused to comply, and Pitts filed a motion to compel
discovery.  While that motion to compel was pending, Terrible Herbst tendered Pitts an offer
of judgment of individual damages and attorney’s fees17 – which Pitts declined – and then
moved to dismiss the case.  Although the district court held that a tender of individual
damages does not necessarily moot a class action, it found that Pitts had failed to file a
motion to certify a class in a timely manner.  It held that the failure to do so rendered the case
moot18 and ordered the defendant to pay the tendered settlement. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that a court should not dismiss a class action as moot
15
when a defendant attempts to pick off a prospective class representative before a motion for
certification can reasonably be filed:
If the named plaintiff can still file a timely motion for class
certification, the named plaintiff may continue to represent the
class until the district court decides the class certification issue.
Then, if the district court certifies the class, ... the case may
continue despite full satisfaction of the named plaintiff's
individual claim because an offer of judgment to the named
plaintiff fails to satisfy the demands of the class.  Conversely, if
the district court denies class certification, ... the plaintiff may
still pursue a limited appeal of the class certification issue.  Only
once the denial of class certification is final does the defendant’s
offer – if still available – moot the merits of the case because the
plaintiff has been offered all that he can possibly recover
through litigation.
653 F.3d at 1092 (citations omitted).  
The Ninth Circuit next considered whether Pitts had waited too long to file a motion
for class certification.  It noted that Pitts had sought discovery which the defendant had
refused to answer and that, at the time the case was dismissed, “the court had not yet ruled
on his motion to compel the production of certain documents that, in his view, were crucial
to the class certification decision.  Pitts repeatedly and timely informed the court – in his
motion to compel, at the hearing held for this motion, and in his motion to extend the initial
discovery deadline – that he was awaiting the court’s ruling prior to filing a motion for class
certification.  The court, however, never ruled on the motion to compel.”  653 F.3d at 1092-
93.  The appellate court reasoned that, in the absence of a ruling on the motion to compel or
notice to the plaintiff that he would be expected to file a motion for class certification by a
certain date without such a ruling, he could not be faulted for failing to file a timely
19 See Lucero, supra, 639 F.3d at 1250 (in the absence of undue delay in filing a
motion for class certification, “a named plaintiff in a proposed class action for monetary
relief may proceed to seek timely class certification where an unaccepted offer of judgment
is tendered in satisfaction of the plaintiff’s individual claim before the court can reasonably
be expected to rule on the class certification motion”); Weiss, supra, 385 F.3d at 347-49
(stating that “reference to the bright line event of the filing of the class certification may not
always be well-founded” and holding that a class action is not mooted by an offer of
individual judgment in the absence of undue delay in filing the certification motion).
16
certification motion.  Id.  The court summarized:
Under these circumstances—where the court had extended the
initial discovery deadline at the time of its ruling, where a
motion to compel the production of documents allegedly crucial
to the class certification decision had been filed well in advance
of the initial discovery deadline and was still pending, where
neither the local rules nor the court’s own scheduling order
imposed a deadline for seeking class certification, and where the
scheduling order actually suggested that a motion for class
certification could be filed even after the end of discovery—the
district court abused its discretion in finding that Pitts could no
longer file a timely motion to certify a class.
Id.
In our view, the better rule is to adopt the approach reflected in Pitts and the other
cases cited above and hold that a tender of individual relief to the putative class
representative does not moot a class action if the individual plaintiff has not had a reasonable
opportunity to seek class certification, including any necessary discovery.19  That
determination will require a careful assessment by a trial court.  Because the Circuit Court
in this case apparently believed that the tender of individual relief prior to class certification,
by itself, mooted the class action, we will remand the case for reconsideration by the Circuit
Court.  On remand, the Circuit Court can determine whether Mr. Frazier has had an adequate
20 Punitive damages are not available in a private cause of action  under the Consumer
Protection Act.  Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 49, 867 A.2d 276 (2005).
17
opportunity to file a timely motion for class certification and, if it permits him to file such
a motion, articulate “findings and reasons” related to the criteria of Rule 2-231 as to whether
or not a class should be certified.
Whether Punitive Damages May be Awarded if a Defendant Has Tendered Compensatory
Damages
In his complaint Mr. Frazier sought an award of punitive damages on behalf of
himself and other prospective class members with respect to the fraud count of his
complaint.20  After Crystal Ford tendered compensatory relief to Mr. Frazier, it argued that,
as a result, his claims for additional individual relief were moot.  The Circuit Court awarded
summary judgment with respect to the remainder of his claim for punitive damages.  
An award of punitive damages may be made in a case of fraud when the defendant
acts with “actual malice” – that is, makes a misrepresentation with intent to deceive and
“actual knowledge” of the falsity of the representation.  See Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md.
1, 41-43, 867 A.2d 276 (2005) (distinguishing “actual knowledge,” including a “wilful
refusal to know,” from the lesser standard of “reckless indifference to the truth”).  In general,
there must be an underlying compensatory damages award with respect to a particular injury
in order for a fact-finder to award punitive damages for that injury.   Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden,
330 Md. 632, 662, 625 A.2d 959 (1993).  In Caldor, this Court held that there must be a
compensatory damages foundation for each count with respect to which punitive damages
18
are awarded; the Court rejected an argument that an award of compensatory damages on one
count of a multi-count complaint could support an award of  punitive damages as to other
counts.  Id.  As the Court noted, “one of the purposes of punitive damages is to punish the
wrongs of the defendant.  The requirement of a compensatory damages foundation protects
defendants from being punished for acts that the trial court determines the defendant did not
commit.”   Id. at 663.
In this case, the Circuit Court concluded that punitive damages were “clearly not
appropriate,” though that court did not explain its conclusion.  On appeal, the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed that conclusion on the basis that no further compensatory damages
could be awarded, as Mr. Frazier had already been tendered the full amount of his actual
damages.  Citing Caldor and similar cases, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that the
tender eliminated the foundation of compensatory damages that is a prerequisite to an award
of punitive damages.  That extrapolation of the rationale of Caldor, however, is unwarranted.
An issue is moot if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing
controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy that the court
can provide.  Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass’n., 286
Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749 (1979) (dismissing an appeal as moot).  Courts generally decide
whether a matter is moot as a result of a tender of relief by examining whether the tender
encompasses all of the relief to which a party may be entitled.  Compare Holstein v. City of
Chicago, 29 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 1994) (defendant’s offer to pay all costs incurred by
plaintiffs as a result of admittedly illegal towing of plaintiffs’ vehicles meant that “there is
21 Crystal Ford argued that the facts pled in the complaint could not support a finding
of malice.  The practices alleged could be the result of negligence or intentional wrongdoing.
The complaint alleges that Crystal Ford’s actions were done “knowingly and with intent to
defraud.”  Whether the requisite intent for punitive damages existed would ordinarily be a
matter for trial, at which intent may be proven circumstantially.  Henderson v. Maryland
Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 520, 366 A.2d 1 (1976).
19
no dispute over which to litigate”) with Greisz v. Household Bank, 176 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir.
1999) (where a tender only relates to one claim in the complaint, dismissal is improper).  In
this case, the question is whether Mr. Frazier may have been entitled to punitive damages.
If a circuit court determines that a plaintiff has satisfactorily pled facts that would
support a finding of fraud accompanied by actual malice, then a tender equal to the
demanded compensatory damages falls short of the maximum award that a plaintiff could
expect to receive at a trial.  While it may be that the plaintiff’s injury has been remedied, the
plaintiff’s claim has not necessarily been fully satisfied.  Moreover, as punitive damages are
designed to deter future misbehavior by the wrongdoer or others, see Caldor, 330 Md. at 663,
a tender of compensatory damages alone may not achieve the deterrent effect for which
punitive damages are intended.  Where punitive damages are appropriately demanded, a pre-
trial tender of compensatory damages does not fully satisfy the claim and does not preclude
an award of punitive damages.  Such a tender is merely an offer of settlement.
An award of punitive damages in this case may well be, as the Circuit Court stated,
inappropriate.  That determination, however, must rest on the facts of this case measured
against the law of punitive damages.21  An award of punitive damages is not foreclosed by
a post-complaint tender of compensatory damages.
22 In Blaylock, the intermediate appellate court addressed the issue of whether a
consumer’s settlement with a credit union, without adjudication of the credit union’s fault,
rendered the consumer the prevailing party for the purpose of attorney’s fees.  Rejecting the
credit union’s appeal of the award of attorney’s fees, the Court of Special Appeals concluded
that the prerequisite of §13-408(b) – that the party who brings an action under the Consumer
Protection Act be “awarded damages” – should not be narrowly read to require a judgment;
rather, the party may “achieve victory” by a court-approved settlement.
20
Whether an Award of Attorney’s Fees May Encompass Efforts Subsequent to Tender
As the Court of Special Appeals correctly indicated, a trial court has a significant
degree of discretion in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee award under a fee-shifting
statute such as the Consumer Protection Act.  In this case, the Circuit Court relied upon a
decision of the Court of Special Appeals in a case concerning an award of attorney’s fees
under the Consumer Protection Act and identified the following factors, derived from Rule
1.5(a) of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, to assess the reasonableness
of the requested award:
•the time and labor involved or required; 
•the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; 
•the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; 
•the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
•the amount involved and the results obtained; 
•the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
•the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
•the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer performing the services;
•whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
See Blaylock v. Johns Hopkins Federal Credit Union, 152 Md. App. 338, 353-54, 831 A.2d
1120 (2003).22  Applying those factors, the Circuit Court awarded Mr. Frazier $20,950.52 in
attorney’s fees.  
23 Before the Circuit Court, Crystal Ford also contended that Mr. Frazier was not
entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because the dealership had not acted with scienter.  On
appeal, Crystal Ford conceded that attorney’s fees could be awarded, in light of the fact that
it had not tendered relief to Mr. Frazier until after suit had been filed.
24 Although this Court granted a writ of certiorari in Friolo v. Frankel, a subsequent
bankruptcy filing stayed further litigation of that case.
21
As it did in the Circuit Court, Crystal Ford appears not to contest that Mr. Frazier was
entitled to some award of attorney’s fees under the Consumer Protection Act, CL §13-
408(b).23  Nor has Crystal Ford appeared to contest the reasonableness of the fees with
respect to the services provided.  Rather, it disputes only the degree to which Mr. Frazier’s
attorney’s fees should be reimbursed.  Crystal Ford asserts that its liability should be capped
at $3,204 – the amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Mr. Frazier up to the time of tender.
Following the tender, the dealership argues, Mr. Frazier pursued “fruitless” claims through
“excessive lawyering” by his attorney.  It asserts that the trial court committed an error of law
in taking into account the efforts of Mr. Frazier’s attorney after the tender of individual relief.
It relies on a recent case in which the Court of Special Appeals reduced the amount of an
attorney’s fee award to account for the prevailing party’s “relative contribution to causing
unnecessary litigation.”  Friolo v. Frankel, 201 Md. App. 79, 122, 28 A.3d 79, 778, cert.
granted, 424 Md. 54, 33 A.3d 981 (2011).24
  
Crystal Ford relies on its post-suit tender of compensatory damages to Mr. Frazier as
necessarily limiting Mr. Frazier’s entitlement to attorney’s fees for any subsequent actions.
However, as Crystal Ford has conceded, in response to the filing of Mr. Frazier’s complaint,
25 Crystal Ford directs us to several federal cases in which the court considered
whether an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing plaintiff should be reduced because the
plaintiff did not succeed in all respects.  See Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 478
F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2006); DeJesus v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 918 F.2d 232, 235 (1st
Cir. 1990); Roger E. Herst Revocable Trust v. Blinds to Go (U.S.) Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147032 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2011).  None of these cases persuades us that the Circuit
Court should have disregarded the prevailing “practical results” conceded by Crystal Ford.
22
it undertook significant measures to identify other customers who had received warranties
with shorter terms than promised and to provide those customers with revised warranties.
While those efforts might well someday form the basis of an argument against an award of
punitive damages, they also support the Circuit Court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to
Mr. Frazier for the efforts of his counsel throughout the litigation. 
As the Circuit Court reasoned, under the circumstances of this case, Crystal Ford’s
concessions illustrate that Mr. Frazier lost a battle – in that the Circuit Court granted Crystal
Ford’s motions for summary judgment and to deny class certification – but ultimately won
the war, as it is undisputed that his litigation resulted in the revision of warranty contracts by
Crystal Ford to match its representations and the expectations of its customers.25  We agree
with the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court acted within its discretion when it
considered Crystal Ford’s correction of extended warranties purchased by other customers
as within “the results obtained” by the efforts of Mr. Frazier’s attorney.  This seems
26 The General Assembly enacted the Consumer Protection Act in order to establish
“minimum statewide standards for the protection of consumers across the State.”  CL §§13-
102(b)(1), 13-103(a).  The 1986 amendment of the Act to include a private cause of action
was designed “to improve the enforcement” of the Act for the benefit of those consumers.
See Report of Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee concerning Senate Bill 551 (March 7,
1986).
27 As noted above we are remanding this case for further proceedings that may or may
not result in the continuation of the class action Mr. Frazier seeks to prosecute.  If Mr. Frazier
should seek an additional award of attorney’s fees in the future, the Circuit Court’s
consideration of such a request should take into account the factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a)
and this Court’s prior decisions concerning the award of attorney’s fees.  E.g., Hoffman v.
Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 867 A.2d 276 (2005) (award of attorney’s fees permissible with respect
to Consumer Protection Act count, but not fraud count); Friolo v. Frankel, 373 Md. 501, 819
A.2d 354(2003) (method for determining reasonable fee).
23
particularly appropriate in a case under the Consumer Protection Act.26  Accordingly, the
attorney’s fee award was appropriate under §13-408(b) of the Consumer Protection Act.27
24
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.
THIS CASE IS REMANDED TO THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 93
September Term, 2011
ANTHONY M. FRAZIER
v.
CASTLE FORD, LTD., f/k/a CRYSTAL
FORD ISUZU, LTD.
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J.,
which Harrell, J., joins.
Filed:   January 24, 2013
The majority has developed a paradigm that will contribute to confusion among trial
courts regarding class certification, tender of damages, and the appropriateness of punitive
damages when compensatory damages cannot be awarded, so I respectfully dissent.  The
better approach to resolving the issues in this case is to determine whether Mr. Frazier was
entitled to punitive damages, and then, whether the class action should have been dismissed,
because the appropriate focus is whether the entire relief sought by Mr. Frazier had been
tendered by Crystal Ford.
The parties disagree as to whether Crystal Ford’s tender was sufficient to moot the
claims, focusing on the tender’s effect on Mr. Frazier’s demand for punitive damages under
his common law fraud count.
Mr. Frazier contends before us that the tender of only the compensatory damages
demanded did not provide him with the full relief to which he was entitled, and so, it was not
sufficient to render his causes of action moot.  He argues that punitive damages were not
rendered unavailable by the lack of an award of compensatory damages in this case, because
Crystal Ford’s admission that it had committed the alleged wrongs by tendering the requested
compensatory damages obviated the need for a formal award.   
Crystal Ford responds by arguing that Mr. Frazier was afforded all of the
compensatory damages he sought in his complaint, such that he could not be awarded any
more compensatory damages by a trier of fact, rendering punitive damages unavailable as
a matter of law.  Crystal Ford asserts that, because of the unavailibilty of punitive damages,
it tendered to Mr. Frazier all the relief to which he was entitled and “tender of payment by
a defendant of the amount sought as damages in litigation entitles the defendant to dismissal,
2
as the plaintiff’s claim has been rendered moot by the tender,” relying on A. A. Allen
Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).  
Resolution in cases involving the issue of whether the tender of relief after suit is filed
renders a complaining party’s claims moot depends on whether the tender is of all or less
than all of the relief to which the complaining party is entitled.  Cases are legion that post-
suit tender of all the relief a party is entitled to in a complaint is sufficient to moot the case.
E.g. Holstein v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 1994); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v.
Campbell, 353 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Yu v. International Business Machines
Corp., 732 N.E. 2d 1173 (Ill. App. 2000).  In Holstein v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1145 (7th
Cir. 1994), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit consolidated two
appeals, one by Brian Grove and the other by Robert Holstein, from dismissals of claims for
costs associated with allegedly improper towing by the City of Chicago.  Id. at 1146.  Mr.
Grove’s car was towed on two successive evenings while he was attending baseball games;
he contested the validity of the tows at an administrative hearing, pursuant to a local
ordinance, but lost.  Id.  Thereafter, Mr. Grove filed a class action complaint seeking to have
the towing statute and the post-tow hearing procedures declared unconstitutional and for the
return of the fees paid for the towing and storage.  Id. at 1146-47.  After Mr. Grove filed suit,
the City informed him that it had determined that the tows were inappropriate and tendered
to him all the costs he paid as a result of the improper tows; Mr. Grove, however, rejected
the tender.  Id.  The federal district court judge granted summary judgment to the City then,
based on mootness.  Id. at 1147.
3
The Seventh Circuit agreed.  In so holding, the Court stated, “Grove may not spurn
this offer of all the damages he is owed and proceed to trial.  See Alliance to End Repression
v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1978).  ‘Once the defendant offers to satisfy
the plaintiff’s entire demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate, and a plaintiff who
refuses to acknowledge this loses outright, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), because he has no
remaining stake.’” Id. at 1147, quoting Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir.
1991).  
In A. A. Allen Revivals v. Campbell, A. A. Allen Revivals filed a complaint against
the United States to recover taxes erroneously collected, seeking a refund of the taxes paid
with interest.  353 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).  After the complaint had been
filed, the Government tendered to A. A. Allen Revivals the full amount of the taxes collected
with interest, which A. A. Allen Revivals did not accept.  Id.  The trial judge then dismissed
the complaint as moot because A. A. Allen had received the relief it sought in its complaint.
Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the tender of the full
amount sought in the complaint was sufficient to justify dismissal of the action.  Id.
In Yu v. International Business Machines Corp., 732 N.E. 2d 1173 (Ill. App. 2000),
the Illinois intermediate appellate court considered the dismissal of a complaint of a health
care practitioner who had purchased a medical device in 1996 believing that it was “year
2000 (Y2K) compliant,” when, in fact, it was not.  Id. at 1175.  After being notified that the
upgrade to make the device “year 2000 (Y2K) compliant” would cost him more than $2,000,
Dr. Yu filed a class action suit against the manufacturer for compensatory damages for
4
breach of warranty and violations of the Illinois consumer protection statute.  Id.  After suit
was filed, the manufacturer tendered Dr. Yu a free copy of the software upgrade, which he
accepted.  Id. at 1176.  The suit was then dismissed as moot, id. at 1177, and the Illinois
intermediate appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Dr. Yu could not point to any damages
caused by the alleged problem other than the money he would have had to spend to upgrade
his software, thereby rendering moot his case.  Id. at 1178-79.
  
Conversely, it is also well-established that tender made following the filing of a
lawsuit, which is less than the full relief to which a complaining party is entitled, is not
sufficient to render the case moot.  In Greisz v. Household Bank, the plaintiff purchased a
furnace-air conditioner using a credit card issued by Household Bank.  176 F.3d 1012 (7th
Cir. 1999).  When Ms. Greisz received her statement, it listed the purchase price of the unit
as $1,070 more than she believed it should have been.  Id. at 1035.  Ms. Greisz refused to pay
any part of the charge and filed suit, alleging various violations of federal and state law on
behalf of herself and a putative class.  Id.  The United States District Court dismissed all of
her claims except part of one count under the Truth in Lending Act, Section 1632(a) of Title
15, United States Code, that entitled her to $1,000 in damages if she could prove a violation
of the Act.  Id. at 1039-40.  Thereafter, the bank tendered to her $1,200 and reasonable costs
and attorneys’ fees.  Ms. Greisz spurned this offer, and the District Court granted summary
judgment to the bank and dismissed the action on the ground that its tender eliminated the
case or controversy.  Id. at 1014. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that, because Ms. Greisz did not allege any
5
injury related to the alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act, she was entitled to only
statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 and reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, and the
bank’s tender of more than Ms. Greisz could have recovered even were she to have been
completely successful eliminated any actual controversy for the court to adjudicate.  The
Court noted, however, that the Bank’s tender only related to the relief for one claim in the
complaint, and so the dismissal was not actually proper because it was not “an offer to settle
Greisz’s entire case against the bank,” but affirmed the trial court’s ruling because the
plaintiff waived that argument by not raising it.  Id. at 1016 (emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, the question before us is whether Crystal Ford’s tender of
compensatory damages rendered punitive damages under Mr. Frazier’s fraud claim
unavailable as a matter of law.  The Court of Special Appeals answered this question in the
affirmative, relying on our jurisprudence that punitive damages must have a foundation in
an award of compensatory damages and on the fact that, because it was undisputed that Mr.
Frazier received all of the compensatory damages that he sought in his complaint, “there
were no further compensatory damages that Frazier could recover at a trial in the instant
case.”  Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd., 200 Md. App. 285, 296, 27 A.3d 583, 589 (2011).  
Punitive damages, under the Count of common law fraud, are governed by various
basic principles.  Their purpose is to punish a defendant for certain tortious conduct
committed with actual malice, Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 241-42, 652
A.2d 1117, 1129-30 (1995), and they are not available, absent an award of compensatory
damages.  Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 661, 625 A.2d 959 (1993); see also Phillip
1
Crystal Ford relies on Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simpson,
372 Md. 434, 813 A.2d 260 (2002) to support its argument that Mr. Frazier was not
awarded compensatory damages at trial as a result of its tender.  In Consolidated
Construction Services, we were confronted with an attorney who purported to have an
attorneys’ lien on settlement funds held in an escrow account.  We held that the plain
meaning of the statutory language, at the relevant time, of “a judgment or award that a
client receives as a result of legal services that the attorney at law performs,” did not
include settlement funds as property to which an attorneys’ lien could attach. 
2
The effect of reducing a tender to judgment is explored in ABN Amro
Verzekeringen BV v. Geologistics Americas, Inc., 485 F.3d 85 (2nd Cir. 2007), and may
be an avenue to avoid the consequence of mootness. 
6
Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 773, 752 A.2d 200, 246 (2000); Shabazz v. Bob Evans
Farms, Inc., 163 Md. App. 602, 639, 881 A.2d 1212, 1233-34 (2005).  Clearly, the tender
in the present case was not an “award” as a result of a court approved settlement,1 nor was
any  judgment regarding the compensatory damages ever entered in favor of Mr. Frazier at
any time, by any court.2 Each party agrees that Crystal Ford paid Ford Warranty an amount
of money sufficient to extend Mr. Frazier’s warranty to the date alleged to be the end date,
resulting in Ford sending Mr. Frazier a check for the costs of his car repair except for the
agreed-upon deductible.  At the motions’ hearing in this case, Mr. Frazier’s attorney
conceded that the tender represented all of the compensatory damages sought:
THE COURT: What damages is your client alleging at the
present time?  Because my understanding is that he has been,
everything that he asked for in the complaint, other than
attorneys’ fees, have been addressed, because he received his
extended warranty, the repair bill that he had incurred when he
didn’t have the extended warranty coverage was paid, minus the
$100 deductible.
FRAZIER’S COUNSEL: Yes.
7
In analyzing the impact of a defending party’s tender of compensatory damages on
a demand for punitive damages, I find persuasive the reasoning of the Illinois intermediate
appellate court in a series of cases regarding tender, to include: Hayman v. Autohaus on
Edens, Inc., 734 N.E. 2d 1012 (Ill. App. 2000), Jones v. William Buick, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 910
(Ill. App. 2003), and Bates v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 53 (Ill. App. 2003).
In Hayman, Mr. Hayman leased a car from Autohaus with the option to purchase the
car at the end of the lease term for a fixed price; when he exercised the option to purchase,
the price was $299 more than the figure on the lease contract.  734 N.E. 2d at 1013.  Mr.
Hayman entered into the purchase contract without noticing the discrepancy but upon
returning home and comparing the contracts, he immediately demanded a refund of the $299.
Id.  Autohaus informed him that the additional money was a service fee and he could either
keep the car and get no refund or return it for a full refund.  Id.  Mr. Hayman immediately
began preparations to file suit; Autohaus, however, reversed its position two days after Mr.
Hayman made the demand and tendered the $299 fee in refund while permitting him to keep
the car.  Mr. Hayman spurned this offer and filed a class action complaint against the
dealership in which he alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act and common-law fraudulent misrepresentation and demanded
attorneys’ fees and punitive damages, id., but the trial judge granted Autohaus’s motion to
dismiss, reasoning that Mr. Hayman lacked compensatory damages and, therefore, could not
state a cause of action.  Id. at 1013-14.
On appeal, Mr. Hayman argued that the tender was not sufficient to moot his claims,
8
because he had also demanded attorneys’ fees, interest, and punitive damages, all of which
could have been supported by the causes of action he plead.  Id. at 1014.  The court first
noted that Mr. Hayman was only appealing the dismissal of his common-law fraud and
conversion counts, not his counts under the  Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, under which he was not entitled to attorneys’ fees.  Id. 
With respect to Mr. Hayman’s demand for punitive damages, the court first noted that
Autohaus’s tender was a complete refund for the entire amount demanded and, therefore,
“there was no controversy.”  Id.  The court then reasoned that “[b]ecause full payment, not
a compromise, was offered to Hayman, thus mooting the controversy, the plaintiff had no
right to recover compensatory damages in the trial court” and “[p]unitve damages ‘are in
addition to compensatory damages and cannot be allowed unless actual damage is shown.’”
Id. at 1015.  Thus, the court held that punitive damages were not available to Mr. Hayman.
The court’s analysis regarding the effect of tender on punitive damages, however, is
quite different than that employed when it has considered the effect of tender on attorneys’
fees.  In Bates v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 53 (Ill. App. 2003) and Jones v.
William Buick, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 910 (Ill. App. 2003), cases in which the Illinois intermediate
appellate court held that dismissal was not proper because the tender of only compensatory
damages was not sufficient to render moot the entire case, because of the pending demand
for attorneys’ fees.  In Jones, Ms. Jones purchased a car from William Buick with a down
payment of $500, the balance to be financed by a lender found by William Buick; Ms. Jones
was able to take immediate possession of the car.  785 N.E. 2d at 911.  Shortly after entering
9
into the contract, Ms. Jones lost her job, and the lender found by William Buick withdrew
its offer to finance the car.  Id.  Ms. Jones returned the car and demanded the return of the
down payment via a demand letter from her attorney.  Id.
William Buick refunded the $500, but Ms. Jones had already initiated the process of
filing suit under the Illinois consumer protection act and for common law fraud, and did so
shortly after receiving the check.  Id. at 912.  The trial court dismissed her claims as moot,
given William Buick’s tender of the down payment.  Id.  On appeal, William Buick relied
upon Hayman v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 734 N.E. 2d 1012 (Ill. App. 2000), for the
principle that once William Buick tendered the down payment, Ms. Jones had no injury and
the claim was moot.  785 N.E. 2d at 912.  The Illinois intermediate appellate court disagreed
and held that, because Ms. Jones had filed her claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, she was entitled to attorneys’ fees if she were to prevail
at trial, and William Buick did not tender the full amount of relief requested by Ms. Jones,
such that summary judgment was not appropriate.  Id. at 913.
Likewise, in Bates v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 53 (Ill. App. 2003),
the same court again considered a tender that did not include attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 62.  In
that case, Ms. Bates had filed suit alleging common law fraud and a violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act related to her purchase and financing
of a car, id. at 62, and the defending party, William Chevrolet, allegedly tendered to her a
check for all the compensatory damages she requested, but it was returned unopened.  Id. at
62.  After trial, the jury awarded Ms. Bates compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. at 55.
3
While I need not write on the issue of attorneys’ fees, I would note that,
under my analysis, it would be appropriate to award attorneys’ fees to Mr. Frazier,
because he achieved a definite result, including for members of the putative class: Crystal
Ford reformed their warranties.  The majority, however, purports to remand this case to
the Circuit Court for further proceedings, while at the same time awarding counsel fees. 
The award is without foundation, because the case is not concluded.  It is at the
conclusion of those proceedings that attorneys’ fees should be awarded, not after the
majority determines the case should continue.  When we have permitted attorneys’ fees
when a remand has occurred, the attorneys fees have been awarded for claims that have
had finality.  Hoffmann v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 48-49, 867 A.2d 276, 304-05 (2005)
(upholding an award of attorneys’ fees, despite remanding the case, because the only
claims that survived on remand did not allow for an award of attorneys’ fees).
10
On appeal, William Chevrolet asserted that it had tendered the compensatory damages to
plaintiff’s counsel, but “counsel perhaps failed to inform the plaintiff of the offer.”  Id. at 62.
It argued that since the alleged tender of compensatory damages was an offer of the “‘full
amount’ owed to plaintiff, there remained no actual controversy and the suit was rendered
moot.”  Id.  The court disagreed, holding that, because the suit was filed under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the plaintiff was entitled to
attorneys’ fees, so the alleged tender was not for the full amount of relief to which she was
entitled and the case should not have been dismissed as moot.  Id.
The distinction drawn by the intermediate appellate court of Illinois between punitive
damages and attorneys’ fees – that attorneys’ fees can accrue after the filing of a suit, while
punitive damages do not – is meaningful.3  Once post-filing of suit tender of compensatory
damages is accomplished, attorneys’ fees can accrue continuously until the matter is fully
resolved, thus presenting a cognizable harm sufficient to prevent a case from having been
rendered moot by post-suit tender of compensatory damages, unlike punitive damages.  See,
4
While I am cognizant of the fact that punitive damages are intended to
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongful conduct, a defendant that acknowledges
its wrong ways and chooses to pay compensatory damages without an adjudication of
liability does not require further retribution.
11
e.g., Bates, 785 N.E. 2d at 62 (“Defendant failed to tender the attorney fees recoverable
under section 10a(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act, and thus, failed to tender the ‘full amount’
owed to plaintiff.”). Punitive damages, thus, should not be available as a matter of law as a
result of the pre-trial tender in the present case.4 
The next step in my analysis is Mr. Frazier’s challenge to the denial of class
certification.  Crystal Ford’s Motion to Deny Class Certification was granted primarily on
the ground that the mootness of Mr. Frazier’s individual claim required the dismissal of the
class claims.
Courts are split as to whether a motion to certify a class is sufficient to prevent the
entire action from becoming moot when the named representative’s claims become moot or
whether actual certification of a class is necessary, although the latter, in my estimation,
clearly provides the better foundation for identifying class members and their interests.  See,
e.g., Wheatley v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 459 N.E. 2d
1364 (Ill. 1984) (holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims
were dismissed, the class action was properly dismissed); Hayman v. Autohaus on Edens,
Inc., 734 N.E. 2d 1012, 1015 (Ill. App. 2000) (holding that because no class was certified at
the time tender rendered moot Hayman’s claims, dismissal of the entire suit was warranted);
DeCoteau v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Company, 636 N.W. 2d 432, 437 (N.D. 2001) (“When
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a named plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot before a class has been properly certified
or certification has been denied, courts generally hold dismissal of the action is required.”).
The rationale for this rule is that the interests of the putative class are not actually before the
court until a motion for certification has been granted. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399,
95 S.Ct. 553, 557, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 540 (1975) (“When the District Court certified the
propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the certification
acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by appellant.”).  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether a
representative plaintiff’s claims being rendered moot prior to certification being granted also
rendered the entire class action suit moot, in Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775 (2nd Cir. 1994).
In that case, Jessie Comer and three others filed a class action suit alleging that the public
housing and assistance programs in Buffalo, New York were discriminatory.  In addressing
the question of whether the class action was rendered moot by the defending parties’
voluntary cessation of the alleged discriminatory activity prior to certification of the class,
the court stated that, “in general, if the claims of the named plaintiffs become moot prior to
class certification, the entire class action becomes moot.  In contrast, class certification will
preserve an otherwise moot claim.”  Id. at 798 (citations omitted).  
The Second Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court identified two
instances in which this general rule does not apply: when an intervenor steps in and when the
claims are “so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule
on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest
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expires.”  Id. at 799 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The court went on to
hold that the claims were not actually moot because the alleged harm was “capable of
repetition but evading review,” id. at 800-01, but the general rule of law holds true:  where
a representative plaintiff’s claim has been rendered moot before certification is granted,
dismissal of the entire action is warranted unless the claims fall into either of the enunciated
exceptions.  See also Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In a class
action, the claim of the named plaintiff, who seeks to represent the class, must be live both
at the time he brings suit and when the district court determines whether to certify the
putative class.  If the claim is not live, the Court lacks a justiciable controversy and must
dismiss the claim as moot.”); Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247, 1252 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that the dismissal of a class action suit after the representative plaintiff’s claims
became moot was proper, noting that, “‘[b]ecause the class action was never properly
certified nor the class properly identified by the District Court,’ the decision that the claims
of the purported representative were moot dictated the dismissal of the uncertified ‘class’
action as well,” quoting Bd. of School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130, 95 S.Ct. 848,
850, 43 L.Ed. 2d 74, 78 (1975) (per curiam)).  
In the present case, no class had been certified prior to the tender of compensatory
damages, so that the class claims were, in my view, properly dismissed.  
The more appropriate line to draw in the sand with respect to the tender of relief to
the named plaintiff in a class action suit is that dismissal of the action is appropriate, if the
class has not been certified before the claim has been rendered moot.  Essential to my view
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is that, from a jurisdictional standpoint, the interests of the putative class are only before the
court once certification has been granted; thus, allowing a named plaintiff to continue a suit
when he or she has no personal interest before the court, and the class’s interests are also not
before the court, leads to the absurd result of allowing a court to continue to adjudicate a case
that presents no actual controversy.  I dissent. 
Judge Harrell has authorized me to state that he joins this dissenting opinion.