Title: State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-
5228.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BRINDA v. LORAIN COUNTY 
BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228.] 
Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to place name of 
candidate for board of education on the November 6, 2007 election ballot 
— Writ granted. 
(No. 2007-1697 — Submitted September 27, 2007 — Decided October 2, 2007.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to 
compel a board of elections to accept a nominating petition from a candidate for a 
seat on a board of education.  Because the board abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded the plain language of R.C. 3513.254 by refusing to accept the 
nominating petition, we grant the writ. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Holly C. Brinda, is a resident of the city of Elyria and is a 
member of the Board of Education of the Elyria School District.  Brinda filed a 
declaration of candidacy for her party’s nomination to run for mayor of Elyria in 
the May 2007 primary election.  She lost the primary election and therefore did 
not obtain the party nomination to run in the November 6, 2007 general election 
as a candidate for mayor. 
{¶ 3} On August 22, 2007, Brinda attempted to file her nominating 
petition to run for reelection as a member of the Board of Education of the Elyria 
School District in the November 6, 2007 general election. Respondent, Lorain 
County Board of Elections, refused to accept Brinda’s nominating petition for 
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filing.  Brinda has not filed to run for any state or local office in 2007 other than 
for the offices of mayor and school board member. 
{¶ 4} The board of elections determined that Brinda could not be a 
candidate for the school board at the November 6, 2007 general election because 
she had unsuccessfully sought the party nomination for mayor at the May 2007 
primary election.  Before making its determination, the elections board sought and 
received an opinion from the secretary of state of Ohio, who concluded that an 
unsuccessful candidate for municipal office in the primary election could not file 
a nominating petition to be a school board candidate at the succeeding general 
election. 
{¶ 5} At an August 30, 2007 meeting, the board of elections affirmed its 
decision to refuse to accept Brinda’s nominating petition for reelection to the 
school board.  The board did not certify her as a candidate for school board at its 
August 30 meeting. 
{¶ 6} On September 12, Brinda filed this expedited election action for a 
writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to accept her nominating 
petition to become a candidate for member of the school board, and if her petition 
meets the requirements, to place her name on the November 6, 2007 general 
election ballot.  The board of elections submitted an answer, and the parties filed 
briefs and evidence pursuant to the accelerated schedule provided by S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9). 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before us on the merits. 
Laches 
{¶ 8} The elections board asserts that this election case is barred by 
laches because Brinda delayed in filing this mandamus action 21 days after the 
board refused to file her nominating petition to be a candidate for school board 
member. 
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3 
{¶ 9} “We have consistently required relators in election cases to act 
with the utmost diligence.”  Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-
Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 19.  “If relators do not exercise the required 
diligence, laches may bar the action for extraordinary relief in an election-related 
matter.”  State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 20.  “The elements of laches 
are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an 
excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or 
wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277. 
{¶ 10} Brinda knew about the elections board’s refusal to file her 
nominating petition on August 22 but waited 21 days to file this expedited 
election case challenging the board’s decision.  Although some of this delay 
might be reasonably attributable to Brinda’s attempts to persuade the board to 
reconsider its decision and her attempts to secure legal counsel, she still delayed 
12 days from the date the board refused to certify her school board candidacy 
before filing this case.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Landis v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 187, 189, 724 N.E.2d 775, citing Paschal v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 141, 656 N.E.2d 1276 (“we 
have held that a delay as brief as nine days can preclude our consideration of the 
merits of an expedited election case” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, we generally require a showing of prejudice before 
we apply laches to bar a consideration of the merits of an election case.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 493, 
700 N.E.2d 1234.  “Normally, this prejudice in expedited election cases occurs 
because relators’ delay prejudices respondents by making the case an expedited 
election case under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), which restricts respondents’ time to 
prepare and defend against relators’ claims, or impairs boards of elections’ ability 
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to prepare, print, and distribute appropriate ballots because of the expiration of the 
time for providing absentee ballots.”  State ex rel. Willke v. Taft, 107 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2005-Ohio-5303, 836 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 12} Any filing delay by Brinda did not result in this matter becoming 
an expedited election case under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), which provides an accelerated 
schedule for a response, evidence, and briefs when the original action relating to a 
pending election is filed within 90 days before the election.  Even if Brinda had 
filed this action within a week of the board’s first rejecting her nominating 
petition in late August, this case would still have been an expedited election case 
under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  Therefore, the elections board’s ability to prepare and 
defend against Brinda’s mandamus claim has not been compromised.  In fact, the 
board does not assert any prejudice to its ability to defend here. 
{¶ 13} Nor did Brinda’s purported delay cause the absentee-ballot 
deadline to pass before this case was filed and fully briefed.  State ex rel. Steele v. 
Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 14 (holding 
that laches did not bar consideration of the merits of expedited election case when 
briefing had been completed in the case before the passage of the absentee-ballot 
deadline); R.C. 3509.01 (absentee ballots “shall be printed and ready for use on 
the thirty-fifth day before the day of the election”).  By contrast, the majority of 
the cases in which we have held that laches barred an election claim have 
involved the passage of the statutory absentee-ballot deadline.  See, generally, 
Mason City School Dist. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 107 Ohio St.3d 373, 
2005-Ohio-5363, 840 N.E.2d 147, ¶ 20, and cases cited therein.  Although the 
absentee-ballot deadline will have passed by the time that our decision in this case 
is announced, that date would have likely passed even if Brinda had filed this case 
within a week of the date that the board of elections reaffirmed its decision not to 
accept her nominating petition.  “This is thus a case in which the statutory time 
limits would have expired even ‘under the best of circumstances.’ ”  Choices for 
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5 
South-Western City Schools, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, 
¶ 28, quoting State ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 
N.E.2d 883. 
{¶ 14} Finally, there is no evidence that Brinda’s delay in filing was 
intentionally done to obtain a strategic advantage.  Cf. State ex rel. Ryant Commt. 
v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 712 N.E.2d 696 
(writ in expedited election case barred by laches because of relators’ delay and 
acts of gamesmanship). 
{¶ 15} Therefore, under these circumstances, we hold that laches does not 
bar our consideration of the merits of this expedited election case.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505, 756 N.E.2d 1228 (“the 
fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio is that courts should decide cases on 
their merits”). 
Mandamus 
{¶ 16} To be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, Brinda must 
establish a clear legal right to have the board of elections accept her nominating 
petition for filing, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the board to file 
her nominating petition, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 
Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507, ¶ 8.  As the board of elections 
concedes, given the proximity of the November 6 election, Brinda lacks an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Gemienhardt v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 212, 2006-Ohio-1666, 846 
N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 17} For the remaining requirements, Brinda “must prove that the board 
of elections engaged in fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of 
statutes or other pertinent law.”  Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 8. 
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{¶ 18} Brinda asserts that the board of elections abused its discretion and 
clearly disregarded applicable law by refusing to accept her nominating petition 
for filing even though she satisfied all of the applicable statutory requirements. 
{¶ 19} R.C. 3513.254, which governs nominations of candidates for local 
boards of education, prohibits a board of elections from accepting a nominating 
petition of a person seeking to be a candidate for a city, local, or exempted village 
board of education if that person has already filed a declaration of candidacy to be 
a candidate for a municipal or township office at the same election: 
{¶ 20} “(B) Nominating petitions shall be filed with the board of elections 
not later than four p.m. of the seventy-fifth day before the day of the general 
election * * *.  A board of elections shall not accept for filing a nominating 
petition of a person if that person, for the same election, has already filed a 
declaration of candidacy, a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, or a 
nominating petition, or has become a candidate through party nomination at a 
primary election or by the filling of a vacancy under section 3513.30 or 3513.31 
of the Revised Code for any other position as a member of a city, local, or 
exempted village board of education or position as a member of a governing 
board of an educational service center, or for a municipal or township office.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} The board’s refusal to accept Brinda’s nominating petition was 
based on its interpretation, as well as the secretary of state’s interpretation, of 
R.C. 3513.254 and 3513.261, which contains comparable language.  See R.C. 
3513.261 (“The secretary of state or a board of elections shall not accept for filing 
a nominating petition of a person seeking to become a candidate if that person, for 
the same election, has already filed a declaration of candidacy”).  Insofar as R.C. 
3513.261 might conflict with R.C. 3513.254 for the pertinent language, R.C. 
3513.254 ─ the more specific provision applicable here ─ controls.  “Where 
statutes conflict, the more specific provision controls over the more general 
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7 
provision”  State ex rel. Wellington v. Kobly, 112 Ohio St.3d 195, 2006-Ohio-
6571, 858 N.E.2d 798, ¶ 25, citing R.C. 1.51. 
{¶ 22} In construing R.C. 3513.254, “our paramount concern is the 
legislative intent in enacting the statute.”  Steele, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-
4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, at ¶ 21.  “To discern this intent, we first consider the 
statutory language, reading words and phrases in context and construing them in 
accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  Choices for South-
Western City Schools, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, at ¶ 
40. 
{¶ 23} The plain language of R.C. 3513.254 does not justify the elections 
board’s refusal to accept Brinda’s timely-filed nominating petition to be a 
candidate for the city school board at the November 6, 2007 general election.  The 
statute bars a candidate who has filed a declaration of candidacy “for the same 
election.”  Brinda filed a declaration of candidacy for mayor for the May 2007 
primary election, which is different from the November 6, 2007 general election 
for which she filed her nominating petition to be reelected to the school board. 
{¶ 24} The board of elections claims that although the General Assembly 
used the phrase “for the same election” in R.C. 3513.254, it actually intended the 
phrase to mean “for the same election year” or “for the same election cycle.”  But 
we cannot add words to the statute.  State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 
559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Hughes (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 N.E.2d 540 (“ ‘In construing a statute, we may not add 
or delete words’ ”). 
{¶ 25} Because R.C. 3513.254 is unambiguous, we must apply it rather 
than construe it.  State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 
Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 28; see, also, BedRoc Ltd., 
L.L.C. v. United States (2004), 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 
338 (“our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text 
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is unambiguous”).  “[N]o resort to * * * an examination of the legislative history 
is warranted.”  Canales-Flores, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 
757, at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 26} In fact, if the General Assembly had intended to bar persons who 
had unsuccessfully sought party nomination for a municipal office at a primary 
election from being candidates for another office at the succeeding general 
election, it would have done so with appropriate language.  Id. at ¶ 34.  The 
General Assembly has used appropriate language in R.C. 3513.04, the so-called 
sore-loser provision, which generally bars a person losing in a partisan primary 
election from participating as a candidate for another office in the succeeding 
general election, except for certain candidates ─  like Brinda ─ who run for a 
board of education at the general election: 
{¶ 27} “No person who seeks party nomination for an office or position at 
a primary election by declaration of candidacy * * * shall be permitted to become 
a candidate by nominating petition * * * at the following general election for any 
office other than the office of member of the state board of education, office of 
member of a city, local, or exempted village board of education, office of member 
of a governing board of an educational service center, or office of township 
trustee.”  (Emphasis added.)  Cf. State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 673 N.E.2d 1351, in which we construed a 
previous, broader version of R.C. 3513.04. 
{¶ 28} Notwithstanding the board’s argument, there is nothing in the 
legislative history of R.C. 3513.04, 3513.254, or 3513.261 that indicates, either 
expressly or impliedly, that the General Assembly has repealed that portion of 
R.C. 3513.04 permitting an unsuccessful primary election candidate for a 
different office from being a candidate for a board of education at the succeeding 
general election.  In fact, the General Assembly last amended R.C. 3513.04 in 
May 2006, which is after it last amended R.C. 3513.254.  Cf. R.C. 1.52(A) (“If 
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statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are 
irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails”).  More important, 
these provisions are reconcilable: R.C. 3513.254 and 3513.261 bar certain 
candidacies at the same election, and R.C. 3513.04 bars certain candidacies at a 
succeeding general election. 
{¶ 29} Moreover, as Brinda contends, the board’s construction of R.C. 
3513.254, in addition to ignoring plain language, would render superfluous the 
statute’s prohibition against someone who “has become a candidate through party 
nomination at a primary election” from being a candidate for a school board at the 
same election. 
{¶ 30} We need not defer to the secretary of state’s interpretation because 
it is unreasonable and fails to apply the plain language of R.C. 3513.254.  Cf. 
Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 
778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 22 (acknowledging this court’s “duty to defer to the Secretary of 
State’s interpretation of election law if it is subject to two different, but equally 
reasonable, interpretations”).  Adopting the secretary of state’s interpretation of 
R.C. 3513.254 would result “ ‘not [in] a construction of [the] statute, but, in 
effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted * * * may be 
included within its scope.’ ”  Lamie v. United States Trustee (2004), 540 U.S. 526, 
538, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024, quoting Iselin v. United States (1926), 
270 U.S. 245, 251, 46 S.Ct. 248, 70 L.Ed. 566. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable law by refusing to accept Brinda’s nominating petition for 
filing. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, Brinda has established her entitlement to 
the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Therefore, we grant a writ of 
mandamus to compel the board of elections to accept her nominating petition to 
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be a candidate for member of the Elyria School District Board of Education and, 
if her petition meets other applicable requirements, to place her name on the 
November 6, 2007 general election ballot. 
{¶ 33} This result is “also consistent with our duty to liberally construe 
words limiting the right of a person to hold office in favor of those seeking to hold 
office so that the public may have the benefit of choice from all qualified 
persons.”  Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-
Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 34. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Michael R. Gareau & Associates Co., L.P.A., David M. Gareau, Michael 
R. Gareau, Michael R. Gareau Jr., and Elizabeth Stehlik, for relator. 
 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerald A. Innes 
and Matthew A. Mishak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent. 
______________________