Title: In Interest of AJ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of AJ1987 WY 54736 P.2d 721Case Number: C-86-3Decided: 05/01/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Interest of AJ, a Minor; The STATE of Wyoming, Appellant 
(Petitioner)

 
 

Before 
C. 
Stuart Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit and Macy, JJ. Urbigkit, J., 
dissents.  

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
ORDER 
DISMISSING APPEAL

 
 
[¶1.]     This case came on 
before the Court as an appeal regularly filed, docketed, briefed and argued, and 
the Court having considered the file and record of the court, the briefs of the 
parties and the amicus curiae, and the arguments of counsel for the parties and 
the amicus curiae, finds that the substantive question presented by the appeal 
has become moot because of the occurrence of an event which makes a 
determination of the issues unnecessary; any judgment of the court could not be 
carried into effect; any opinion of the court would be advisory only; and the 
case should be dismissed for the following reasons:

 
 
[¶2.]     AJ, a minor child, was 
presented to the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Wyoming in and for Albany County by a petition filed pursuant to § 14-6-212,1 W.S.1977 (July 1986 Rev.), alleging 
that the child was a "child in need of supervision" as defined in § 14-6-201, 
W.S.1977 (July 1986 Rev.). In the regular course of proceedings, AJ appeared 
with her attorney and guardian ad litem, admitted the truth of the allegations 
contained in the petition and her temporary legal custody was transferred to the 
Albany County Office of Public Assistance and Social Services. A formal 
evaluation was ordered pursuant to the provisions of § 14-6-219 (a), W.S.1977 
(July 1986 Rev.), and the court also required that a predisposition study and 
report be furnished by the Albany County Office of Public Assistance and Social 
Services pursuant to § 14-6-227 (a)(i), W.S.1977 (July 1986 Rev.). Following 
interim proceedings and modifications of the court's order, an order of final 
disposition was entered on February 3, 1986. Disposition was made pursuant to 
the provisions of § 14-6-229 (a), W.S.1977 (July 1986 Rev.), and the court made 
appropriate findings pursuant to § 21-13-315, W.S.1977 (July 1986 Rev.). It 
ordered that AJ be placed at the Excelsior Youth Center, Denver, Colorado, for 
such period as the staff psychiatrist at that institution deemed necessary to 
complete a treatment program for the child; that the Albany County Office of 
Public Assistance and Social Services continue as the legal custodian of AJ; and 
that the State Department of Public Assistance and Social Services certify 
funding for the program at Excelsior Youth Center.

 
 
[¶3.]     The State of Wyoming 
processed an appeal from that order which is the case before the Court. The 
issue as articulated by the State in its brief of appellant 
is:

 

   "DO JUVENILE COURTS HAVE THE POWER 
TO ORDER THE STATE OF WYOMING TO PAY FOR PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN PRIVATE 
RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITIES AND HOMES IN A MANNER OTHER THAN THAT PROVIDED 
BY W.S. 21-13-315?"

 
 
In 
the brief of the appellee, a more elaborate statement of the issue, which also 
is adopted in the amicus curiae brief, is set forth:

 
 
"WHETHER 
JUVENILE COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER A DISPOSITION IN A JUVENILE CASE 
PURSUANT TO WYOMING STATUTE § 14-6-229 OR WHETHER WYOMING STATUTE § 21-13-315 
AFFECTS THE JUVENILE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE A 
DISPOSITION.

 
 
"A. 
Wyoming Statute § 21-13-315 provides a mechanism whereby state agencies 
responsible for placement of juveniles in private child -caring facilities or 
homes may apportion the cost, and said statute does not affect the Juvenile 
Court's authority to make a disposition.

 
 
"B. 
The Juvenile Court's disposition did not overreach statutory nor constitutional 
boundaries."

 
 
[¶4.]     The crux of the 
position of the parties evolves from the fact that, at the time the order of the 
district court was entered, the State Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services informed the court that the funding for the private placement could not 
be certified, as required in § 21-13-315, W.S.1977 (July, 1986 Rev.). The 
district court ordered the private placement in any event, and stated in a most 
positive manner that it expected that the bills would be paid. We are invited to 
consider the inherent power of the district court to order the payment of such 
bills even though the funding could not be certified pursuant to the statute. 
These questions indeed are intriguing, and their significance in an appropriate 
instance could not be denied.

 
 
[¶5.]     In this case, however, 
the freeze which had been placed on funding for placement of children such as AJ 
on January 6, 1986, by Julia Robinson, Director of the State Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, was released the day following the 
hearing on the disposition of AJ. This was the result of an emergency 
supplemental appropriation made available by the legislature of the State of 
Wyoming on the evening of January 23, 1986. The effect was to make the issues in 
this case moot.

 
 
[¶6.]     We are committed to the 
rule that an appellate court will dismiss a case if, pending appeal, an event 
occurs which makes the determination of the issues presented unnecessary and 
thus renders the case moot. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas 
Conservation Commission, Wyo., 693 P.2d 227, 233 (1985); Northern 
Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139, 
140 (1980). That happened in this case. The disposition of AJ and the efficacy 
of the order entered by the district court will continue without change 
regardless of the determination of the issues by this court. The case is moot 
and will not be considered because the judgment rendered cannot be carried into 
effect. Walker v. Board of County Commissioners, Albany County, Wyo., 644 P.2d 772, 773-774 (1982); Belondon v. State ex rel. Leimback, Wyo., 379 P.2d 828, 829 (1963).

 
 
[¶7.]     Recognizing the 
potential of a conclusion of mootness, the State of Wyoming has requested that 
we decide this case on the merits because the circumstances will arise in the 
future. In State ex rel. Schwartz v. Jones, 61 Wyo. 350, 157 P.2d 993, 
995 (1945), this Court adopted the following language from the Supreme Court of 
Texas and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky:

 

   "* * * 'Courts do not sit for the 
purpose of expounding the law upon abstract questions, but to determine the 
rights of litigants by the rendition of effective judgment. Ex parte 
Steele (D.C.) 162 F. 694.'" McNeill v. Hubert, 119 Tex. 18, 23 S.W.2d 331, 333 (1930).

 

"* 
* * * 'As falling within that category [moot cases] it is well established that 
where, pending an appeal, an event occurs which makes a determination of the 
question unnecessary or which would render the judgment that might be pronounced 
ineffectual, the appeal should be dismissed.'" Hudspeth v. Commonwealth, 
204 Ky. 606, 265 S.W. 18, 19 (1924).

 
 
 [¶8.]    Appropriate judicial 
restraint should be exercised when a controversy has been resolved and thus 
become moot at the time the case is presented to this court. Advisory opinions 
generally are to be avoided because the adversary system does not function as 
contemplated in the absence of a case or controversy. We also know that the 
docket of this Court has expanded to the point at which the investment of time 
and effort in cases in which no controversy exists, or the controversy is simply 
one which it is assumed will arise in the future, is not 
prudent.

 
 
[¶9.]     IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED 
that this appeal be, and it hereby is, dismissed because it has become moot by 
virtue of events which occurred subsequent to the entry of the order appealed 
from.

Urbigkit, 
J., dissents.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The record reflects that 
the parties referred to this statute and those that follow as existing in the 
1985 Cumulative Supplement. Subsequently, each provision was removed from the 
supplement and put in the general revisions of Titles 14 and 21 without change 
and now exist in the July 1986 revision of those 
titles.