Title: People v. Steskal

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MAURICE GERALD STESKAL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S122611 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
99ZF0023 
 
 
April 29, 2021 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
S122611 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Maurice Gerald Steskal of the 
first degree murder of Orange County Deputy Sheriff Bradley J. 
Riches.  (Pen. Code, § 187.)  The jury found true a special 
circumstance allegation that Steskal intentionally killed a peace 
officer engaged in the performance of his duties (id., § 190.2, 
subd. (a)(7)), as well as an allegation that Steskal personally 
used a firearm in the commission of the offense (id., former 
§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)).  The trial court 
declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a penalty 
verdict.  After a penalty retrial, the jury returned a verdict of 
death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, 
subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment.   
I. 
 BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution evidence 
On the night of June 11, 1999, Steskal was seen near the 
residence of his wife, Nannette Steskal, from whom he was then 
separated.1  Close to midnight, a neighbor of Nannette’s heard 
a commotion in their apartment complex.  The neighbor then 
saw Steskal outside smashing a piece of furniture against the 
 
1  
Given 
Nannette 
and 
Maurice 
Steskal’s 
identical 
surnames, we will refer to Nannette by her first name for clarity.  
No disrespect is intended. 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
wall and heard him slam a gate while cursing at the world and 
screaming that he hated everyone.  The neighbor heard a 
woman trying to calm him.  Steskal responded, “Fuck that, I 
have guns, I have ammunition.”     
Shortly after midnight, Steskal went into a 7-Eleven 
convenience store carrying a semiautomatic rifle.  As he 
purchased cigarettes, he asked the clerk if she was afraid of his 
gun and told her it was to protect himself from the “fucking law.”  
An Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) deputy, 
Bradley Riches, drove by the 7-Eleven in his patrol car while 
Steskal was inside.  Apparently seeing Steskal’s rifle through 
the glass front of the store, Deputy Riches doubled back while 
issuing a radio alert for other deputies to stand by.  As Steskal 
completed his purchase, Deputy Riches pulled into the 7-Eleven 
parking lot with his overhead lights flashing.  The clerk watched 
as Steskal walked out of the store and immediately began firing 
his rifle.  Steskal shot Deputy Riches at close range, firing 30 
rounds in total, then returned to his car and drove away.  When 
first responders arrived on the scene, they found Deputy Riches 
still seated in his car.  It appeared he had unsnapped his holster 
but had been unable to pull his revolver before succumbing to 
his wounds.  
A criminalist testified about the bullet casings and other 
evidence found at the crime scene, identified photographs 
showing damage to the patrol car, and explained her efforts to 
determine the trajectory of the shots fired.  The criminalist 
identified a photograph of Deputy Riches’s body at the hospital 
and a pathologist described Deputy Riches’s numerous injuries.  
An OCSD sergeant testified that the 7-Eleven where Deputy 
Riches had been killed was one of the few convenience stores 
open 24 hours a day and was therefore a regular meeting place 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
 
for patrol deputies.   
OCSD deputies apprehended Steskal a few hours after the 
crime as he and Nannette drove away from her apartment.  In 
Steskal’s car, deputies found over one hundred rounds of 
ammunition and a disassembled rifle later identified as the 
weapon used in the shooting.  A blood screen found no drugs or 
alcohol in Steskal’s system.   
Steskal had other encounters with law enforcement in the 
months before Deputy Riches was killed.  Approximately two 
and one-half months before the crime, a different OCSD deputy, 
Andre Spencer, stopped Steskal for a traffic violation and 
arrested him for possession of a small amount of marijuana and 
resisting an officer in the performance of official duties.  During 
the stop, Deputy Spencer saw Steskal pound his hands on his 
steering wheel and became alarmed when Steskal exited his 
vehicle.  Deputy Spencer drew his gun on Steskal, summoned 
additional deputies, and searched Steskal’s pants and shoes for 
contraband.  Deputy Spencer stopped Steskal for another traffic 
violation one month later.  Deputy Spencer reminded Steskal to 
take care of his prior tickets and ended the stop without 
incident.   
2. Defense evidence 
Steskal did not deny shooting Deputy Riches, but 
presented evidence intended to show that he was acting under a 
delusional fear when it occurred.  Steskal’s sister and a variety 
of acquaintances testified that Steskal had been paranoid for 
many years and was particularly occupied by thoughts that law 
enforcement and government actors were following him and 
wished him harm.  He had long kept an assault rifle that he 
slept with and carried with him everywhere.  For most of his 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
adult life, Steskal lived apart from others — on the roof of a shop 
where he worked, in a van, and in a small concrete bunker on 
an abandoned mining site owned by his brother-in-law.  Even 
when living far from others, Steskal believed bad actors were 
seeking him out:  He worked on an escape route from his bunker, 
wearing down a pickaxe as he tried to make a tunnel through 
granite, and ran through the woods looking for pursuers with 
blackberry juice rubbed on his skin to provide camouflage.  In 
the months before the crime, Steskal spent much of his time 
living in a remote mountain camp.  Although he was separated 
from his wife, he sometimes stayed with her.  He believed her 
apartment was wiretapped and felt he was being monitored 
through her television.  He was depressed and often talked 
about suicide.   
The lay witnesses observed that Steskal’s mental health 
deteriorated significantly after the two traffic stops conducted 
by Deputy Spencer:  Steskal became even more consumed with 
thoughts that he was under surveillance and in danger; believed 
OCSD deputies were going to kill him; and made serious 
attempts at suicide.  He also grew more distraught about his 
failed marriage.   
Four 
defense 
experts 
detailed 
Steskal’s 
family 
dysfunction, physical abuse from his parents and siblings, 
difficulties in school, drug use, and history of suicidal thinking, 
suspiciousness, and peculiar ideas.  The defense psychiatrist, 
Dr. Roderick Pettis, concluded that Steskal suffered from 
chronic paranoia that had progressed to full-blown psychosis 
after the traffic stops by Deputy Spencer — Steskal went from 
feeling the police were following him to fearing they would kill 
him.  Dr. Pettis testified that at the time of the crime, Steskal 
was in a psychotic state and suffering from a delusional 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
 
disorder.  
B. Penalty Phase 
The prosecution presented evidence of an incident that 
occurred 19 years before the crime, in which Steskal 
intentionally drove his motorcycle at high speed toward a police 
officer who had stopped him for speeding.  Steskal nearly hit the 
officer.  Deputy Riches’s parents, Bruce and Meriel Riches, 
testified about their son’s hard work, his desire to help others, 
and how they responded to his death.   
The defense presented witnesses who described Steskal’s 
kindness to others and an additional expert who summarized 
Steskal’s background and testified that Steskal suffered from a 
delusional disorder, chronic depression, and schizotypal 
personality disorder, a personality disorder on a continuum with 
schizophrenia. 
The trial court declared a mistrial after the jury 
deadlocked 11 to one in favor of life without the possibility of 
parole. 
C. Penalty Retrial 
During the penalty retrial, the prosecution introduced 
much of the same evidence that was presented at the guilt 
phase.  Witnesses described Steskal’s behavior just before the 
crime, at the 7-Eleven, and during his arrest.  The prosecution 
presented new evidence to show that Steskal attempted to 
destroy the T-shirt he was wearing during the crime, as well as 
evidence that Steskal shaved his moustache immediately after 
the shooting.  In addition to the first responders and criminalists 
from the sheriff’s department who had testified in the guilt 
phase, a paramedic testified for the first time about his efforts 
to save Deputy Riches’s life and the moment of his death.  The 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
pathologist described Deputy Riches’s injuries with the 
assistance of a life-sized mannequin that was pierced with rods 
to show the bullet wounds.   
The prosecution again introduced as aggravating evidence 
Steskal’s behavior during the motorcycle stop, as well as new 
evidence of his attempted escape from jail before the penalty 
retrial.  The prosecution presented evidence that Steskal had 
accumulated contraband metal clippers and scraped away a 
portion of his cell wall that abutted a ventilation system leading 
to the roof of the jail.  Steskal had also hidden strips of bedsheets 
in his mattress that were long enough to lower him from the roof 
of the jail to the street.  
The prosecution again introduced victim impact evidence 
from Deputy Riches’s parents, as well as testimony from Deputy 
Riches’s best friend and three colleagues from the sheriff’s 
department who described his positive outlook and loyalty.  The 
witnesses conveyed the loss they and their families experienced 
when Deputy Riches was murdered.  
The defense also largely mirrored the guilt phase, with 
identical 
evidence 
depicting 
Steskal’s 
background, 
his 
deteriorating mental health, and expert opinions regarding his 
condition.  Steskal’s brother and sister testified in greater detail 
about the physical and emotional abuse Steskal experienced in 
childhood and his suicide attempt at age 13.  Acquaintances 
described his kindness; Steskal’s niece described him as a father 
figure who provided regular encouragement and support 
through correspondence from jail.   
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony from 
three officers who interacted with Steskal while he was in jail 
awaiting the penalty retrial and who found no indication he 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
experienced mental health problems.  The prosecution also 
introduced evidence of an incident that took place 11 years 
before the crime, in which Steskal was driving erratically and 
dropping clear plastic bags out of his vehicle before an OCSD 
deputy stopped him.  During the stop, Steskal appeared to be 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, would not provide his 
name, and repeatedly yelled that he wanted the deputy to shoot 
him. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter  
Steskal raises numerous claims of error.  He first claims 
the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury 
on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-
defense — that is, a theory that Steskal actually, though 
unreasonably, believed his life was in danger when he shot 
Deputy Riches.  The trial court denied the request because the 
evidence did not support giving the instruction.  We find no error 
in the court’s ruling. 
a. Background 
At trial, Steskal called several witnesses who described 
Steskal’s attitudes toward law enforcement and their causes, 
including, primarily, Steskal’s experiences during the two traffic 
stops conducted by Deputy Spencer.  A retired Los Angeles 
Police Department tactics officer testified that Deputy Spencer’s 
arrest of Steskal after a traffic stop some months before the 
crime was highly unprofessional.  During the stop, Deputy 
Spencer drew his gun on Steskal, cursed at and disparaged him, 
called additional officers to the scene, unfastened Steskal’s 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
pants, and searched inside his underwear.  Deputies wrestled 
Steskal to the ground when he began to protest the treatment.  
The second stop by Deputy Spencer occurred when Steskal 
allegedly failed to signal a turn, though there was some factual 
dispute as to whether the stop was justified on that ground; one 
witness claimed that Steskal had, in fact, signaled.  
Three witnesses saw Steskal in April 1999, soon after the 
second traffic stop.  One testified that Steskal was nervous about 
being stopped by the police again; another found Steskal was 
very fearful of the police and convinced he was under 
surveillance; and the third recounted Steskal’s belief the police 
would kill him.  A witness who saw Steskal in June, just before 
the crime, testified that Steskal was distraught about his failing 
marriage and continued to believe the police were following him.   
Dr. Roderick Pettis, the defense psychiatrist, testified that 
after the traffic stops, Steskal experienced psychotic delusions 
about being killed by law enforcement officers and withdrew to 
a camp in the mountains.  Steskal was suicidal the day before 
the crime, when he had to return to town for legal proceedings 
related to his traffic stop.  Dr. Pettis explained that Steskal’s 
screaming and banging at the apartment complex was evidence 
that his despair and stress had reached extreme levels.  On 
cross-examination, 
Dr. Pettis 
acknowledged 
a 
report 
of 
statements from Steskal’s wife, who told investigators that 
immediately after the crime, Steskal exclaimed to her, “ ‘Oh, my 
God, what did I do, why did I do that?’ ”  He confessed to shooting 
Deputy Riches, saying, “ ‘I don’t know why I shot him.’ ”  
Dr. Pettis testified that the report did not alter his opinion that 
Steskal was experiencing significant fear and distress before the 
shooting.   
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
 
A police psychologist described a “fight or flight” response, 
an automatic and sometimes unconscious reaction to danger.  
He explained such a response was more likely to occur in 
individuals who experience paranoia and could account for 
responses to fear that involved excessive violence.   
Based on this evidence, defense counsel requested that the 
trial court instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, as well 
as imperfect self-defense, on a theory that Steskal actually but 
unreasonably believed he had to shoot Deputy Riches in order 
to defend himself.  The trial court denied the request on the 
ground that the evidence did not support giving the instruction.  
The court concluded that Steskal’s outburst at the apartment 
complex just before the shooting and his comments to the store 
clerk reflected anger rather than fear.  Although there was 
evidence Steskal feared OCSD deputies generally, the court 
found no evidence he harbored a specific belief, real or imagined, 
that Deputy Riches posed an imminent threat at the time of the 
shooting, as would be required to establish imperfect self-
defense.  The court also found that by carrying a semiautomatic 
weapon into the 7-Eleven, Steskal himself created the 
circumstances of the shooting and was not entitled to invoke the 
doctrine of imperfect self-defense in any event.   
b. Discussion 
“A trial court must instruct on all lesser included offenses 
supported by substantial evidence.”  (People v. Duff (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 527, 561.)  Although instruction on a lesser included 
offense “is not required when the evidence supporting such an 
instruction is weak” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 827) 
or based on speculation (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 
632, 718), it is required when the lesser included offense is 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
 
supported by “ ‘evidence that a reasonable jury could find 
persuasive’ ” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645).  
“ ‘Doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant 
instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused.’ ”  (People 
v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 685; see also People v. Turner 
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690.)  We review independently whether 
the trial court erred in rejecting an instruction on a lesser 
included offense.  (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 181.) 
Voluntary manslaughter — an unlawful killing without 
malice — is a lesser included offense of murder, an unlawful 
killing with malice aforethought.  (People v. Booker, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 181.)  “Imperfect self-defense, which reduces 
murder to voluntary manslaughter, arises when a defendant 
acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he is in imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury.”  (People v. Duff, supra, 
58 Cal.4th at p. 561.)  “To satisfy the imminence requirement, 
‘[f]ear of future harm — no matter how great the fear and no 
matter how great the likelihood of the harm — will not suffice.  
The defendant’s fear must be of imminent danger to life or great 
bodily injury.’ ”  (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270.)     
Steskal argues that evidence of his delusional fear of 
OCSD deputies supported an inference that he perceived 
imminent danger when Deputy Riches arrived at the 7-Eleven.  
The Attorney General asserts that this claim is precluded by 
People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, in which we held that 
“purely delusional perceptions of threats to personal safety 
cannot be relied upon to claim unreasonable self-defense,” as 
opposed to claiming legal insanity.  (Id. at pp. 138–139; see id. 
at p. 141.)  Steskal counters that his perception was not “ ‘purely 
delusional’ ” (id. at p. 138) because he did accurately perceive 
that Deputy Riches was a law enforcement officer, though his 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
reaction to that fact was distorted by mental illness.  We need 
not resolve this debate because, as the trial court correctly 
concluded, the evidence provided no substantial support for a 
claim that Steskal acted out of any fear of imminent peril, 
whether delusional or not.  
Steskal did present evidence of his ongoing fear of law 
enforcement and the possibility he experienced a “fight or flight” 
response to seeing Deputy Riches in his vehicle.  But while the 
jury could have inferred from this evidence that Steskal believed 
he was in some danger at the time of the killing, this evidence 
alone did not constitute substantial evidence that Steskal 
opened fire on the officer because he perceived him as posing “a 
risk of imminent peril” that could be met only through use of 
deadly force.  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133; see 
People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 582 [evidence that 
the “defendant may have harbored some fear of future harm” 
from the victim is insufficient to support an imperfect self-
defense theory].)  While “[t]he testimony of a single witness, 
including the defendant, can constitute substantial evidence” to 
support a voluntary manslaughter instruction (People v. Lewis, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 646), none of the evidence here lent 
substantial support to a theory of imperfect self-defense; Steskal 
himself “did not testify, and there is no evidence he ever told 
anyone that he had acted out of fear” (Simon, at p. 134).  His 
remarks immediately after the shooting offered no indication 
that he feared Deputy Riches at all, much less that he feared 
imminent harm, and he did not present other evidence to show 
what had motivated his actions.   
The circumstances of the crime indicated that Steskal 
“was the aggressor in the[] confrontation” with Deputy Riches, 
not the other way around.  (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
p. 133.)  Shortly before Steskal shot Deputy Riches, a witness 
heard him loudly cursing the world and, in response to an effort 
to calm him, proclaiming, “Fuck that, I have guns, I have 
ammunition.”  Armed with a high-powered assault rifle, Steskal 
went to a nearby 7-Eleven that was a regular meeting place for 
OCSD deputies.  Inside the store, Steskal flaunted the gun, 
asking the store clerk if she was afraid of it, and told her he 
carried it for protection against the “fucking law.”  When Deputy 
Riches arrived, the clerk watched as Steskal strode without 
hesitation toward the patrol car and opened fire while Deputy 
Riches was still seated and before he had the opportunity to 
access his weapon.  Steskal concedes there was no evidence 
Deputy Riches threatened him in any way.   
Without evidence that Steskal “possessed an actual but 
unreasonable belief of imminent danger of death or great bodily 
injury,” the trial court did not err as a matter of state law when 
it refused to give voluntary manslaughter instructions.  (People 
v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 649.)  Nor was there 
federal 
constitutional 
error, 
since 
“the 
constitutional 
requirement that capital juries be instructed on lesser included 
offenses extends only to those lesser included offenses supported 
by substantial evidence.”  (People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 562.)   
2. Scope of expert testimony 
Steskal claims the trial court abused its discretion and 
violated his right to present a defense by sustaining the 
prosecution’s objections to three questions defense counsel posed 
to Dr. Pettis about events leading up to the crime.  Steskal 
argues that he was entitled to present the excluded testimony 
as a basis for Dr. Pettis’s opinion under Evidence Code section 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
802, which says a witness may provide “the reasons for his 
opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is based, unless he is 
precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis 
for his opinion.”  Steskal’s claim lacks merit.   
The first two questions defense counsel posed to Dr. Pettis 
asked him to relate (1) what Steskal said about having a 
“psychotic” reaction to messages on the radio the morning before 
the crime and (2) how Steskal described his behavior that day.  
The trial court sustained hearsay objections to both questions.  
We find no error in the court’s ruling. 
As we have recently explained, “[w]hen any expert relates 
to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and treats the 
content of those statements as true and accurate to support the 
expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay.”  (People v. 
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686.)  Dr. Pettis’s responses to 
the questions were inadmissible unless Steskal’s statements 
came within a hearsay exception.  (Ibid.)  Steskal did not invoke 
any such exception in the trial court, nor does he now invoke 
such an exception on appeal. 
Steskal instead asserts that Sanchez is inapplicable 
because the testimony concerned delusional beliefs rather than 
statements offered as “true and accurate.”  (People v. Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.)  We reject this contention.  The 
hearsay in question was not the content of the messages Steskal 
purportedly heard from the radio, but Steskal’s report that he 
heard such messages at all and experienced a “psychotic” 
reaction as a result.  The defense sought to present this out-of-
court description of Steskal’s distorted thinking, on which 
Dr. Pettis’s opinion had relied, as true and accurate.  Such 
reliance on out-of-court statements, introduced through the 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
medium of expert testimony, is precisely what Sanchez 
prohibits. 
Steskal also claims the trial court erred in sustaining 
objections to a third question:  whether anything about Steskal’s 
behavior at the apartment complex in the “early morning hours” 
on the day of the crime caused Dr. Pettis to doubt that Steskal 
was experiencing a mental breakdown.  The prosecutor objected 
that the question called for hearsay and referred to facts not in 
evidence.  The trial court sustained the objection without 
comment.   
The neighbor who testified about Steskal’s behavior 
witnessed it at approximately midnight and the crime occurred 
just before 1:00 a.m.  The question about Steskal’s behavior in 
the “early morning hours” therefore seemed to address behavior 
after the crime that was not in evidence and the related 
implication that Dr. Pettis had learned of it through out-of-court 
statements, proper bases for excluding the testimony.  In 
subsequent questioning, it appeared that the defense simply 
misstated the timing and had been referring to the commotion 
Steskal caused at the apartment complex before the shooting.  
Defense counsel could have, but did not, offer any clarification 
in response to the prosecution’s objection. 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by sustaining prosecution objections to the three 
questions — particularly when Steskal “made no offer of proof 
at trial explaining why the witness should have been permitted 
to answer” them (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 727) 
— and that the application of ordinary rules of evidence did not 
impermissibly interfere with Steskal’s constitutional right to 
present a defense (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
995).  Furthermore, if there had been error, we would conclude 
that it was harmless. 
Although Dr. Pettis was not allowed to detail Steskal’s 
description of having a “psychotic” reaction to the radio on the 
day of the crime, based on numerous other sources and 
anecdotes and Steskal’s lengthy history of mental illness 
Dr. Pettis testified at length about what he regarded as 
Steskal’s profound mental health crisis in the weeks, days, 
hours, and minutes before the shooting.  Among other 
conclusions, Dr. Pettis testified that Steskal was extremely 
paranoid and unable to process information properly; that he 
was terrified that he was going to be killed; and that he acted on 
bizarre delusions that he was being monitored.  Although the 
trial court sustained one objection to testimony about Steskal’s 
behavior at the apartment complex, the defense was nonetheless 
able to question Dr. Pettis about it, eliciting Dr. Pettis’s opinion 
that it showed Steskal to be in “extreme despair,” delusional, 
and “very decompensated” just before the shooting.  Under these 
circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that an outcome 
more favorable to Steskal would have resulted had the jury 
learned about one or two of Steskal’s postarrest statements that 
Dr. Pettis considered (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836), and any federal constitutional error would have been 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24). 
3. Prosecutorial misconduct 
Steskal contends the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during his guilt phase closing argument by invoking sympathy 
for the victim, inviting the jury to draw an adverse inference 
from Steskal’s failure to call his wife as a witness, and arousing 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
prejudice against Steskal.  Steskal claims the argument violated 
both state law and his federal constitutional right to a fair trial.  
We conclude that no prejudicial misconduct occurred.  
a. Background 
During his guilt phase closing, the prosecutor argued that 
Deputy Riches saw Steskal in the 7-Eleven with a gun and was 
“a hero cop” for pulling up to the store with his lights flashing to 
respond to a potentially dangerous situation.  A visual aid also 
listed “hero cop” in the overview of evidence for the jury.  After 
the defense objected, the prosecutor explained his theory:  
Deputy Riches tried to draw Steskal out of the store by 
announcing his arrival, thus risking his life to ensure Steskal 
did not harm the store clerk.  The trial court concluded the 
“hero” reference was not improper but ordered the prosecutor to 
explain that he was not seeking sympathy for Deputy Riches 
and to remove the visual aid as soon as he finished his 
presentation.   
The prosecutor prefaced his remaining remarks about 
Deputy Riches’s concern for the store clerk by stating:  “This is 
about whether the defendant committed this crime.  We are not 
talking about sympathy for Brad Riches.  That’s not what this 
is about.”  Instructions to the jury included CALJIC No. 1.00, 
which informed jurors they must not be influenced by sympathy, 
a point the defense highlighted in closing.   
The prosecutor also argued that Steskal drove off “like a 
coward” after shooting Deputy Riches.  The defense objected to 
the characterization, arguing that the prosecutor had gone “over 
the top” arguing that Deputy Riches was a hero and had “just 
swung the pendulum down to the lower ends of the scale” by 
calling Steskal a coward.  The court admonished the jury to 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
 
disregard the term “coward” but rejected counsel’s request to 
advise the jury that the prosecutor had committed misconduct.   
During his rebuttal, the prosecutor commented on 
Steskal’s allegedly long history of paranoia and questioned why, 
when he had carried an assault rifle for protection for over a 
decade, he had not used it until the night he shot Deputy Riches.  
The prosecutor observed that the defense had not explained “the 
trigger of why that day, out of the 14 years, all of a sudden the 
defendant decided to act out.”  Addressing this evidentiary gap, 
the prosecutor argued:  “Now, the person that was perhaps the 
best witness to talk about the defendant before the murder and 
after the murder, who I can’t call because of the marital 
privilege, they don’t call.  They don’t call Nannette Steskal.”   
Evidence established that Nannette and Steskal were 
married but separated and that she was dating other men.  
During the cross-examination of Dr. Pettis, the prosecutor 
highlighted some of the records Dr. Pettis considered, including 
those that showed Steskal confessed the crime to his wife, she 
was driving him to the mountains when OCSD deputies stopped 
them and arrested Steskal, and she later lied to investigating 
officers when questioned about the circumstances surrounding 
the crime.   
The defense objected to the prosecutor’s comment as 
“improper,” arguing that Nannette could assert a Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid 
testifying.  The prosecutor noted that Nannette was on Steskal’s 
witness list and countered that, because the statute of 
limitations on any charges against her had run, she had no 
privilege to assert.  The trial court observed that the question of 
privilege could raise “other considerations,” notwithstanding 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
any statute of limitations.  The court explained:  “I just don’t 
want to go into all this explanation with the jury as to the 
various possibilities, and I think that is fair because it is . . . a 
give or take, and there is [sic] some legal considerations the 
court is not prepared to make at this point in time.”  The trial 
court then sustained the defense objection to any further 
comments about Nannette’s testimony but rejected a defense 
motion to strike the prosecutor’s remarks about the defense’s 
failure to call her as a witness. 
b. Discussion 
Under state law, “ ‘[a] prosecutor who uses deceptive or 
reprehensible 
methods 
to 
persuade 
the 
jury 
commits 
misconduct . . . .’ ”  (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.)  
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the federal Constitution when 
it results in a fundamentally unfair trial.  (Ibid.)  When a claim 
of misconduct is based on remarks to the jury, we consider 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the 
remarks in an improper fashion.  (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 1234, 1275.)   
Steskal claims the prosecutor’s reference to Deputy Riches 
as a “hero” was “a blatant appeal for sympathy” that constituted 
misconduct.  Our cases make clear that “[a]lthough a prosecutor 
may vigorously argue the case, appeals to sympathy for the 
victim during an objective determination of guilt fall outside the 
bounds of vigorous argument.”  (People v. Amezcua and Flores 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 920.)  The prosecutor’s argument did not 
cross this line, however.  The prosecutor’s description of Deputy 
Riches was based on evidence of the conduct that led to his fatal 
confrontation with Steskal; it was “fair comment on the evidence 
and did not suggest ‘that emotion may reign over reason’ or 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
invite ‘an irrational, purely subjective response.’ ”  (People v. 
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1343.)  In any event, there is 
no reasonable likelihood the characterization improperly 
inflamed the jury when the reference was brief, the prosecution 
and defense both informed the jury that sympathy for Deputy 
Riches was not relevant, and the trial court instructed the jury 
that sympathy was an inappropriate consideration.  (People v. 
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 857.)  
Steskal 
also 
contends 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
misconduct by commenting on the defense’s failure to call 
Nannette as a witness.  He asserts that any comment that 
invites a jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s 
failure to call a witness violates federal due process protections 
because it undermines the presumption of innocence and 
ignores the variety of reasons a party may have for not calling a 
witness despite his or her ability to provide favorable testimony.  
He further claims that it was misconduct to comment on the 
failure to call Nannette because she could have refused to testify 
by invoking a marital communications privilege under Evidence 
Code section 980.  Steskal did not raise these arguments in the 
trial court, and he has not established it would have been futile 
to do so.  He has therefore forfeited them.  We find no grounds 
for reversal in any event. 
We have long held that a prosecutor may make 
“ ‘comments based upon the state of the evidence or upon the 
failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call 
anticipated witnesses.’ ”  (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 
299; see, e.g., People v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1275 
[“it is neither unusual nor improper to comment on the failure 
to call logical witnesses”]; People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 
34.)  Steskal acknowledges this authority but urges us to follow 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
what he characterizes as “the trend of the law . . . to 
substantially narrow the circumstances under which a 
prosecutor can comment on a defendant’s failure to call a 
particular witness.”  
Steskal points to various out-of-state cases, which he 
argues stand for two primary propositions.  First, a jury should 
not be invited to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s 
failure to call particular witnesses when that inference “would 
favor the State in a factual dispute over an element of the crime 
on which the State clearly bears the burden of proof.”  (State v. 
Hill (2009) 199 N.J. 545, 565 [974 A.2d 403, 416] [prohibiting 
jury instruction]; Jackson v. State (Fla. 1991) 575 So.2d 181, 188 
[error to allow reference in closing argument].)  Second, an 
inference regarding the content of testimony that has not been 
offered presents “dangers of speculation and conjecture” (State 
v. Brewer (Me. 1985) 505 A.2d 774, 776), particularly 
considering that “ ‘questions of demeanor and credibility, 
hostility, and the like may influence the [party] not to produce a 
witness whose testimony might be entirely harmful to the [other 
party]’ ” (State v. Tahair (2001) 172 Vt. 101, 108 [772 A.2d 1079, 
1085]).   
Our cases have acknowledged the same concerns.  We 
have explained that “a rule permitting comment on a 
defendant’s failure to call witnesses is subject to criticism if 
applied when the reason for his failure to do so is ambiguous, or 
if the defendant is simply standing on his right to have the state 
prove his guilt,” and that a trial court may disallow such 
comment for these reasons.  (People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 
447.)  Our cases also recognize that “[a] distinction clearly exists 
between the permissible comment that a defendant has not 
produced any evidence, and . . . an improper statement that a 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a duty 
or burden to prove his or her innocence.”  (People v. Bradford 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340; see People v. Bennett (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 577, 596 [comments do not impermissibly shift the 
burden of proof when the prosecutor does not “state or imply 
that defendant had a duty to produce evidence”].) 
To the extent Steskal asks us to further delineate the 
bounds of proper comment on the defendant’s failure to present 
certain witnesses, this case does not present an appropriate 
occasion to do so.  Steskal largely secured at trial the limitation 
he now seeks on appeal.  Once the prosecutor made reference to 
Nannette’s absence from trial, the trial court sustained Steskal’s 
objection and prevented the prosecutor from making any further 
references.  The court did so before the prosecutor could argue 
that the omission of Nannette’s testimony justified an adverse 
inference. 
Furthermore, even if the prosecutor’s solitary reference to 
Nannette’s absence from trial was improper — whether due to 
general concerns about such comments or the possibility 
Nannette could have invoked marital privilege to avoid 
testifying — there is no reasonable likelihood the jury construed 
the reference in an objectionable fashion.  (People v. Gonzales, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1275.)  We consider the remarks in the 
context of the argument as a whole and “ ‘ “do not lightly infer” 
that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least 
damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ”  (People 
v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 894.)  Although the jury 
could have understood the prosecutor’s comment to imply that 
Nannette would undermine Steskal’s mental state defense, the 
jury was aware of “equally plausible” reasons for her failure to 
testify (People v. Ford, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 445):  She had been 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
separated from Steskal, involved in his efforts to evade law 
enforcement after the shooting, and dishonest when questioned 
about Steskal’s actions before and after the crime.  Under these 
circumstances, jurors could conclude that estrangement, 
credibility issues, or Nannette’s own legal troubles explained 
her absence from trial.  “Despite the prosecutor’s brief remark, 
the jury was capable of deciding, as a matter of common sense, 
whether [she] was a logical or reliable witness.”  (People v. 
Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1216.) 
Moreover, however the jury may have understood it, the 
prosecutor’s reference to Nannette’s absence “was tangential in 
any event.”  (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1216.)  
The prosecution did not dispute the key elements of Steskal’s 
defense — that he suffered from mental illness that caused him 
to fear law enforcement officers.  Instead, the prosecution 
argued that any fear Steskal experienced did not negate 
premeditation and deliberation:  “[I]n fact, if you think about 
someone who is fearing a situation and wants to prepare to meet 
that fear, wants to protect themselves, if that’s truly what they 
are feeling[,] . . . that person is going to premeditate and 
deliberate more than anybody else.”  The prosecution pointed to 
evidence that Steskal was cursing and yelling just before leaving 
for the 7-Eleven, took an assault rifle with him to the store, told 
the store clerk seconds before the shooting that he intended to 
use his gun to protect himself against the “fucking law,” and 
launched an attack on Deputy Riches the moment he arrived.  
As the prosecutor argued, fearful or not, Steskal appeared to be 
“a man who has a plan to do something.  To provoke, or if 
provoked, to respond.”  This evidence was far more damaging 
than any inference the jury might have drawn about the 
likelihood that Nannette’s testimony would be unhelpful to 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
Steskal’s mental state defense.  Thus, even if the prosecutor’s 
observation about Nannette’s failure to testify were considered 
misconduct, we would find no prejudice, particularly when the 
comment was brief, “defendant’s objection was immediately 
sustained . . . and the prosecutor did not return to the subject.”  
(People v. Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 613; see People v. 
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 289.) 
Finally, Steskal contends the prosecutor appealed to the 
passion and prejudice of the jury when he referred to Steskal 
driving off “like a coward.”  Steskal asserts that this comment, 
when combined with the description of Deputy Riches as a hero 
and comment on Nannette’s failure to testify, established a 
pattern of misconduct that violated his federal constitutional 
rights and deprived him of a fair trial.  We are not persuaded.  
“[T]he use of derogatory epithets to describe a defendant is not 
necessarily misconduct” where, as here, “[t]he prosecutor’s 
remarks . . . were founded on evidence in the record and fell 
within the permissible bounds of argument.”  (People v. Friend, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 32.)  In any event, the trial court 
admonished the jury to disregard the “coward” reference and we 
“presume the jury heeded the admonition and that any error 
was cured.”  (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 914.)  Given 
this resolution, we find no prejudicial misconduct, nor do we 
discern any pattern of misconduct that could have affected the 
fairness of Steskal’s trial or otherwise violate his federal 
constitutional rights. 
4. Jury view of Deputy Riches’s patrol car  
Steskal contends the trial court erred by allowing a jury 
view of Deputy Riches’s patrol car and asserts the evidence was 
so inflammatory it denied him a fair trial.  We find no error.   
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
a. Background 
Before trial, the prosecution moved to allow the jury to 
view the patrol car and to have the car transported to the 
courthouse for this purpose.  The defense opposed the motion, 
arguing that allowing the jury to view the patrol car, which was 
riddled with bullet holes, was more prejudicial than probative 
under Evidence Code section 352.  Defense counsel stated, “I 
can’t imagine anyone viewing that patrol car not gasping and 
not being overwhelmed with a whole variety of emotions.  It is 
really a horrible sight.”  Steskal did not dispute the facts a jury 
view would highlight:  He fired 30 rounds into the patrol car 
from close range as Deputy Riches sat trapped inside.  The 
prosecution added that seeing the vehicle would allow the jury 
to appreciate where the bullets struck in relation to Deputy 
Riches’s position.  Overruling the defense objection, the trial 
court concluded that when defendant was the person who “blew 
up the car,” there was no reason the jury should not see it; “[i]t 
is not like looking at Deputy Riches’ body.  We are keeping out 
most of those photographs.”   
Steskal moved for reconsideration.  After viewing the 
patrol car, the trial court denied the motion, stating:  “I think it 
is extremely probative.  Certainly, probative value outweighs 
any prejudicial effect. . . .  I think [it does] nothing but assists 
the trier of fact as far as the position of the defendant and the 
position of the victim.”   
At trial, after the prosecutor marked a number of 
photographs of the patrol car he intended to introduce, the 
defense renewed its objection to the jury view of the car as 
cumulative of the photographs.  The trial court again overruled 
the objection, observing that most of the photographs only 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
showed a portion of the vehicle and those showing the entire car 
were from a higher angle than a person would get standing in 
front of the car — “seeing the car is not only more probative than 
cumulative, but very beneficial to the trier of fact, because it 
gives you the perspective of the shooter and the victim that you 
don’t get looking at the photographs.”  The jury later viewed the 
patrol car for six minutes on court premises. 
The prosecution also introduced photographs of the patrol 
car showing some of the bullet holes in the hood and windshield, 
the shattered driver’s window, closeup images of damage to the 
interior, and a view of the vehicle from a distance.  In addition, 
the prosecution played surveillance videotapes that recorded 
events from inside the 7-Eleven, capturing the sound of 
gunshots after Steskal left the store and a distant glimpse of the 
shooting.  The prosecution also presented the testimony of 
witnesses including a 7-Eleven employee who saw Steskal 
walking close to the patrol car as he fired his rifle; first 
responders who described finding Deputy Riches; a criminalist 
who collected evidence and attempted to determine the 
trajectory of shots; and a pathologist who described Deputy 
Riches’s wounds.  A photograph showing Deputy Riches’s body 
at the hospital further revealed the extent of some of his 
injuries.   
b. Discussion 
“The trial court may allow the jury to ‘view the place in 
which the offense is charged to have been committed, or in which 
any other material fact occurred.’  ([Pen. Code, ]§ 1119.)  We 
review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a party’s 
motion for a jury view.”  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 
610.) 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
Evidence Code section 352 “permits the court to exclude 
otherwise 
relevant 
evidence 
if its 
probative 
value 
is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.”  (People v. 
Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 961.)  “During the guilt phase, there 
is a legitimate concern that crime scene [evidence] can produce 
a visceral response that unfairly tempts jurors to find the 
defendant guilty of the charged crimes.”  (People v. Box (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201, disapproved on another ground in People 
v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948, fn. 10.)  However, “[s]o 
long as the probative value of graphic or disturbing material is 
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effects, a 
prosecutor is entitled to use such evidence to ‘present a 
persuasive and forceful case.’ ”  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 1, 80; see People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 196 
[prosecution entitled to present “ ‘ “grim” ’ ” evidence of violent 
crime]; People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 171 [prosecution 
“is not required to sanitize its evidence”].)  
Steskal claims the patrol car did not have substantial 
probative value because it did not address disputed issues.  A 
defendant, however, “cannot prevent the admission of relevant 
evidence by claiming not to dispute a fact the prosecution is 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury was 
entitled to learn that the physical evidence . . . supports the 
prosecution’s theory of the case.”  (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 823, 852; see People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 476 
[“defendant’s not guilty plea put in issue all of the elements of 
the charged offenses, including the elements he conceded”].)   
As evidence of the volume and aim of shots directed at 
Deputy Riches from close range, the patrol car was “highly 
relevant to show the manner in which the [victim was] killed” 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 453; see People v. 
Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1054), to “illustrate and 
corroborate the testimony given by [witnesses] regarding the 
circumstances of the crime” (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
1, 18), and to support the conclusion that the killing was 
deliberate (People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 171; People 
v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 304; cf. People v. Salazar (2016) 
63 Cal.4th 214, 245 [multiple gunshots at close range supported 
theory of premeditation and deliberation]; People v. Gonzales 
and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295 [same]).   
Steskal contends the patrol car also lacked probative value 
because it was cumulative of the photographs, videotapes, and 
witness testimony before the jury.  But as the trial court 
observed, viewing the patrol car in person afforded a perspective 
not evident in the photographs, which showed only portions of 
the vehicle.  The same is true of the videotapes and eyewitness 
testimony.  The prosecutor was not required to rely solely on 
those pieces of evidence when viewing the vehicle “would 
enhance the jury’s understanding of the issues.”  (People v. 
Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 476; see People v. Brasure, supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 1054.)   
Steskal claims the jury view was unduly prejudicial 
because it had the emotional impact of “a death scene” strewn 
with bullet holes, shattered glass, and torn, blood-soaked fabric.  
The prejudice with which Evidence Code section 352 is 
concerned, however, is not damage to a defense that is caused 
by relevant, noncumulative, and highly probative evidence.  
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439.)  Graphic evidence 
in a murder case is always disturbing (People v. Thomas (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 771, 807) but it is not inadmissible simply because it 
is unpleasant to view (see, e.g., People v. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
at p. 196 [victim’s blood-soaked shirt and pants]; Thomas, at 
p. 805 [victims’ clothing stained with blood and tissue]; People v. 
Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 303 [crime scene and autopsy 
photographs of victim]; People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1053–1054 [photographs of victim’s decomposing and 
tortured body]; People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 642 
[photographs and videotape showing victims in blood-splattered 
surroundings]).  “ ‘The jury can, and must, be shielded from 
depictions that sensationalize an alleged crime, or are 
unnecessarily gruesome, but the jury cannot be shielded from 
an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that does not 
unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the jurors.’ ”  (People v. 
Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 238.)   
Steskal does not claim that viewing the patrol car exposed 
the jury to any “sensationalized illustrations of a crime” (People 
v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1150) or “gratuitous 
details” unrelated to his actions (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
463, 503).  “ ‘We will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of 
discretion under Evidence Code section 352 “ ‘except on a 
showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Mora and Rangel 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480.)  The trial court’s reasoned decision 
to allow a jury view of the patrol car was not an abuse of this 
discretion.  (See People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 681 [trial 
court is better able to assess prejudice from the display of 
physical evidence].)  
Steskal also claims that the jury view of the patrol car 
violated his federal due process rights, arguing that it was 
inherently 
inflammatory 
and 
had 
no 
substantial, 
noncumulative probative value.  Although the Attorney General 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
argues that Steskal forfeited his due process argument by 
failing to object on that basis at trial, we have reached an 
asserted due process violation when it was based on the same 
theory of exclusion set forth under Evidence Code section 352.  
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 438–439.)  But 
Steskal’s claim fails on the merits.  “ ‘The admission of relevant 
evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so 
prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally 
unfair.’ ”  (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 805.)  The 
jury view of the patrol car did not have such an effect on 
Steskal’s trial.  
5. Cumulative error 
Steskal argues that even if harmless in isolation, the guilt 
phase errors he asserts were cumulatively prejudicial.  
Discussing the prosecutor’s reference to Nannette’s absence 
from trial, we explained that even if prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred it was not prejudicial.  As we have found no other 
errors, there is no cumulative prejudice that could have denied 
Steskal a fair trial.   
B. Penalty Retrial Issues 
1. Admission of impeachment testimony 
Steskal contends the trial court abused its discretion when 
it allowed the prosecution to reference the facts of other death 
penalty cases during the cross-examination of defense 
psychiatrist Dr. Pettis at the penalty retrial.  We reject this 
claim. 
In cross-examining Dr. Pettis, the prosecutor asked him 
about two prior death penalty cases in which he had testified for 
the defense.  Dr. Pettis testified that his role in the first case had 
been to evaluate whether the defendant was competent to be 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
executed.  When the prosecutor referenced the fact that the 
defendant in that case had been convicted of raping and 
murdering two women, Dr. Pettis indicated that he did not 
recall the crime but confirmed he had concluded the defendant 
lacked mental competence to be executed.  When the prosecutor 
asked whether he was biased against the death penalty, 
Dr. Pettis responded that he was not.  The prosecutor then 
observed that the defendant in the second case was convicted of 
raping a woman and setting her on fire.  Dr. Pettis testified 
regarding his conclusion that the second defendant suffered 
from mental illness at the time of his crimes.   
The defense objected to the first exchange on relevance 
grounds.  Later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel 
argued that allowing the jury to hear about the crimes in 
Dr. Pettis’s prior cases served no purpose but to suggest that 
“this guy will get on the stand in any horrific case and testify for 
the defense.”  The trial court overruled defense objections based 
on relevance and Evidence Code section 352.  But it advised the 
prosecution to keep any similar questioning brief because “the 
weighing process leans more towards prejudicial.”  Steskal 
contends it was error for the trial court to permit the questioning 
at all. 
“It is settled that the trial court is given wide discretion in 
controlling the scope of relevant cross-examination.”  (People v. 
Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 187.)  “ ‘[T]he scope of cross-
examination of an expert witness is especially broad . . . .’ ”  
(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 123; see Evid. Code, 
§ 721, subd. (a).)  “The prosecutor may properly cross-examine a 
witness to show bias, prejudice, interest, hostility or friendship 
toward a party that would bear on the question of the credibility 
of the witness.  [Citations.]  An expert’s testimony in prior cases 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
involving similar issues is a legitimate subject of cross-
examination when it is relevant to the bias of the witness.”  
(DeHoyos, at p. 123.)  A “witness’s personal philosophical 
opposition to the death penalty is relevant to his credibility.”  
(People v. Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 606.)  
A prosecutor may refresh an expert’s recollection of prior 
matters “by providing a brief recitation of their salient facts,” to 
allow the expert an opportunity to defend past conclusions.  
(People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 137.)  In Shazier, we 
concluded that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by 
reciting potentially inflammatory facts from prior cases 
involving sexually violent predators when it was an “effort to 
attack the validity of [the expert’s] opinions in the other cases.”  
(Id. at p. 139.)  Similarly, in People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 
Cal.4th 1082, we observed that it was permissible for the 
prosecutor to challenge an expert on prison adjustment by 
referencing the facts of a prior case in which the expert found 
the defendant posed no safety risk in prison though convicted of 
four murders and six attempted murders.  (Id. at pp. 1164–
1165.)  There, we noted that “[t]he prosecutor was entitled to 
expose bias in the witness by showing his propensity to advocate 
for criminal defendants even in extreme cases.”  (Id. at p. 1165.)   
Here, by contrast, the prosecution inquiry was limited to 
showing that Dr. Pettis made mental health findings favorable 
to the defense in two prior death penalty cases involving 
particularly horrifying crimes.  The facts of the prior cases were 
relevant neither to the validity of Dr. Pettis’s conclusions in 
those matters, as was the case in Shazier, nor to any potential 
bias in his findings, as in Zambrano.  Instead, the prosecutor’s 
questioning tended to imply that Dr. Pettis’s willingness to 
testify for the defense in cases involving such crimes, without 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
more, reflected a bias against the death penalty.   
Assuming for the sake of argument that the questions 
were improper, we conclude that they were harmless.  The 
prosecutor’s reference to other case facts was brief, Dr. Pettis 
testified that he was not biased against the death penalty, and 
the impact of the questioning was minimal given the 
prosecutor’s extensive and detailed cross-examination of 
Dr. Pettis’s findings, which spanned four days.  
2. Prosecutorial misconduct 
Steskal contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
his closing argument at the penalty retrial, violating state law 
and federal due process protections.  We conclude that no 
misconduct occurred. 
Steskal first claims there were two instances in which the 
prosecutor argued that Dr. Pettis’s testimony concerning 
mitigating factors was in fact aggravating.  Citing evidence 
admitted under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), that Steskal 
had a weapon in his jail cell, the prosecutor remarked on 
Steskal’s dangerousness in custody:  “Do you think for a moment 
that the defendant wouldn’t use that?  Look back at Dr. Pettis’[s] 
testimony . . . .  He said the defendant is very mild and meek . . . 
except when he is into this delusion thing, and then he just goes 
all out of control . . . .  [¶]  So if you tend to believe this . . . you 
have a person right now that is capable and willing to kill 
someone in authority.”  Later, when discussing mitigating 
factors, the prosecutor noted that “a lack of mitigation in those 
factors does not mean aggravation.  But there are things that 
you can consider in mitigation that would reduce mitigation.”  
The prosecutor argued that “if Dr. Pettis has some credibility 
with you, you may want to look at this part of his testimony, 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
where he is saying that the defendant . . . when he gets 
confronted with authority figures, you see what happens.  [¶]  
That would be less than mitigating, if that is in fact true.”   
Preliminarily, the Attorney General asserts that Steskal 
failed to preserve his claim.  Defense counsel raised his 
objections in a motion for mistrial the day after the prosecutor’s 
argument and before the defense had completed its closing 
remarks.  “ ‘ “It is now well settled that an appellate court will 
not consider a claim as to the misconduct of counsel in argument 
unless objection is so made.”  [Citation.]  “The reason for this 
rule, of course, is that ‘the trial court should be given an 
opportunity to correct the abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by 
suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the 
jury.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 801.)  We 
have explained that when a defendant’s objections to 
prosecution statements in a motion for mistrial are “specific 
enough for the trial court to craft suitable corrective 
instructions” and are made before the end of closing argument, 
“thus providing the trial court with an opportunity to admonish 
the jury prior to the start of deliberations,” the challenge may 
be preserved.  (Ibid.)  Though the form and timing of Steskal’s 
objection may not have been “ideal” (ibid.), Steskal’s motion for 
mistrial was sufficient to preserve the claim.  
Turning to the merits, we first consider Steskal’s claim 
that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to consider 
mitigating evidence as aggravating when he discussed Steskal’s 
possession of weapons in jail, saying that Dr. Pettis’s testimony, 
if believed, tended to show Steskal would be “capable and willing 
to kill someone” while incarcerated.  In People v. Edelbacher 
(1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, we held that evidence of a defendant’s 
character and background is admissible under Penal Code 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
section 190.3, factor (k), “only to extenuate the gravity of the 
crime; it cannot be used as a factor in aggravation.”  
(Edelbacher, at p. 1033.)  We later explained that a prosecutor 
may present “evidence of mental illness” in aggravation if it 
“relates to an aggravating factor listed in section 190.3”; that is 
so “even if it also bears upon a mitigating factor listed in that 
section.”  (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 356.)  Thus, 
although “general evidence regarding a defendant’s mental 
state” may not be characterized as aggravating, mental state 
evidence may be considered in aggravation if, for example, it 
represents “specific evidence of the motivation behind the 
killing” and therefore is “relevant as a circumstance of the 
crime.”  (Id. at p. 355; see People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 
224 [“ ‘[e]vidence that reflects directly on the defendant’s state 
of mind contemporaneous with the capital murder is relevant 
under section 190.3, factor (a)’ ”].)  It is not improper for a jury 
to consider evidence of the defendant’s mental disorder in 
aggravation when it is not “strictly mitigating,” but instead 
relates to the circumstances of the crime or another factor in 
aggravation.  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 349.) 
Here, the prosecutor highlighted a circumstance of the 
crime — Steskal’s asserted reason for killing Deputy Riches — 
as relevant to his future dangerousness toward correctional 
staff.  We have observed that state of mind evidence 
“ ‘demonstrating [the defendant’s] attitude toward his victims 
[is] highly probative’ on the issue of future dangerousness.”  
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 477; see People v. Rich 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1123 [future dangerousness argument 
may be based on circumstances of the crime].)  And “ ‘[w]e have 
repeatedly declined to find error or misconduct where argument 
concerning a defendant’s future dangerousness in custody is 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
based on evidence of his past violent crimes admitted under one 
of the specific aggravating categories of [Penal Code] section 
190.3.’ ”  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1046.)  The 
prosecutor did not commit misconduct by urging the jury to 
consider the potential danger Steskal posed to correctional staff 
in light of his possession of weapons admitted under Penal Code 
section 190.3, factor (b) and the delusional mistrust of authority 
he had asserted to explain the circumstances of his crime.   
Steskal’s objection to the prosecutor’s argument that 
Steskal’s asserted delusional overreaction to authority was “less 
than mitigating” also lacks merit.  This was not an argument 
that the jury should consider mitigating defense evidence in 
aggravation, but that Steskal’s mitigating evidence did not carry 
weight.  “ ‘ “ ‘A prosecutor does not mischaracterize such 
evidence [offered in mitigation] by arguing it should not carry 
any extenuating weight when evaluated in a broader factual 
context.  We have consistently declined to criticize advocacy of 
this nature.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 
1087.)   
Steskal also claims the prosecutor committed misconduct 
in the course of arguing that the jury should discount defense 
expert testimony.  When cross-examining Dr. Pettis, the 
prosecutor referenced a report in which Nannette claimed that 
Steskal told her what to say if she were questioned by the police.  
Dr. Pettis acknowledged that Nannette later lied when she was 
interviewed by investigating officers.  She falsely said that she 
did not see Steskal take his gun to the 7-Eleven or come back 
with it, gave an excuse for Steskal deciding to shave his 
mustache immediately after the shooting, claimed that Steskal 
did not tell her what had happened, and denied knowing that 
Steskal put a gun in her car before she drove him away from the 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
apartment.  Dr. Pettis testified that it was “conceivable” that 
Steskal and his wife had made an agreement to lie to the police.   
In closing, the prosecutor argued that defense expert 
opinions were based on unreliable information.  Overruling a 
defense objection to one such characterization, the trial court 
informed the jury:  “[T]he lawyers are arguing what they 
perceive to be the facts.  They are probably also going to argue 
inferences from these facts as they perceive them.  You get to 
decide the facts, not the lawyers.  So if they say something that 
may appear to be inconsistent with your recollection, it is your 
recollection that, obviously, you rely on and is important.”  
Moments later, the prosecutor argued that Dr. Pettis had relied 
on Nannette’s OCSD interviews even though they were 
“[r]eplete with lies” that she and Steskal had concocted to cover 
up the crime.  The defense objected on the ground that the 
argument was based on a fact not in evidence, but the trial court 
overruled the objection.  Steskal now contends the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by arguing that Nannette and Steskal 
had entered an agreement to cover up the crime. 
The Attorney General argues that Steskal forfeited his 
claim by failing to specifically cite misconduct and request an 
admonition.  We will assume, for the sake of argument, that 
Steskal’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for 
appeal.  (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 434.)  We 
find no misconduct.  “ ‘The prosecution is given wide latitude 
during closing argument to make fair comment on the evidence, 
including reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn from 
it.’ ”  (People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1363.)  Given 
Dr. Pettis’s testimony acknowledging the possibility of planned 
deception, the prosecutor could ask the jury to infer that Steskal 
and his wife agreed on her fabrications to the sheriff’s 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
department.  “It was a matter for the jury to decide whether the 
inference was faulty or illogical and . . . the court repeatedly 
reminded the jurors that argument was not evidence.”  (People 
v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1044.) 
3. Admission of evidence depicting the victim and 
crime scene 
Steskal contends that prosecution evidence illustrating 
the circumstances of the crime — a mannequin depicting 
Deputy Riches, photographs and a jury view of Deputy Riches’s 
patrol car, and autopsy photographs — was unduly prejudicial, 
and therefore should have been excluded under Evidence Code 
section 352.  He further contends that the admission of this 
evidence violated his federal constitutional rights to due process 
and a reliable penalty trial.  We conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence and that no 
federal constitutional violation occurred. 
Again, “ ‘[p]rejudice’ in the context of Evidence Code 
section 352 is not synonymous with ‘damaging’:  it refers to 
evidence that poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the 
proceedings or reliability of the outcome.”  (People v. Booker, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 188.)  “[T]he court’s discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence showing 
circumstances of the crime ‘is much narrower at the penalty 
phase than at the guilt phase.  This is so because the prosecution 
has the right to establish the circumstances of the crime, 
including its gruesome consequences ([Pen. Code, ]§ 190.3, 
factor (a)), and because the risk of an improper guilt finding 
based on visceral reactions is no longer present.’  [Citations.]  At 
the penalty phase, the jury ‘is expected to subjectively weigh the 
evidence, and the prosecution is entitled to place the capital 
offense and the offender in a morally bad light.’ ”  (People v. Bell 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 105–106.)  The trial court retains “its 
traditional discretion to exclude ‘particular items of evidence’ by 
which the prosecution seeks to demonstrate either the 
circumstances of the crime (factor (a)), or violent criminal 
activity (factor (b)), in a ‘manner’ that is misleading, cumulative, 
or unduly inflammatory.”  (People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 1201.)  
a. Mannequin depicting Deputy Riches  
At the penalty retrial, Steskal objected to the introduction 
of a life-sized mannequin dressed in Deputy Riches’s bloody 
uniform.  There was vomit on the front shirt pocket and the 
dried blood blended in with the color of the uniform, which was 
dark green.  Rods placed in the mannequin reflected the location 
and trajectory of bullet wounds.  Ruling that the mannequin was 
admissible, the trial court observed that it was not going to 
“shock anybody’s sensibilities.”  The prosecutor referred to the 
mannequin during the pathologist’s testimony to show the 
location of each wound as he described them.  During his closing 
argument, the prosecutor brought the mannequin out to show 
the concentration of shots directed to the upper left chest area, 
highlighting the aggravated nature of the crime.  When not in 
use during the testimony and closing argument, the mannequin 
was stored outside of the jury’s view and was not placed in the 
jury room during deliberations. 
Steskal asserts there was little probative value to the 
mannequin, given that the circumstances of the crime were not 
contested, and that the mannequin was prejudicial because it 
was “startlingly life-like” and the condition of the uniform was 
“shocking.”  This argument is not persuasive; this court has 
repeatedly held that otherwise relevant evidence is not 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
inadmissible simply because it is graphic or because it depicts 
uncontested facts.  (People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 806.)  In Thomas, for instance, although the cause and 
circumstances of death were not in dispute, we upheld the guilt 
phase introduction of life-sized mannequins representing slain 
officers, as well as their blood- and tissue-stained clothing.  (Id. 
at pp. 805–806.)  The trial court in this case did not err when it 
admitted similar evidence in Steskal’s penalty retrial, a 
juncture in the proceedings when the constraints on its 
discretion to exclude the evidence were greater than they would 
have been in the guilt phase.  (People v. Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
pp. 105–106.)  We have long recognized that “[m]annequins may 
be used as illustrative evidence to assist the jury in 
understanding the testimony of witnesses or to clarify the 
circumstances of a crime” (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
1233, 1291) and have “rejected challenges to the prosecution’s 
use of mannequins to represent victims during the presentation 
of aggravating evidence” (People v. Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 753).  We have similarly upheld the admission of a victim’s 
stained clothing to show the circumstances of the crime (People 
v. Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 680), as well as the admission 
of photographs and videotape portraying actual victims in death 
(see, e.g., People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 40 
[photographs]; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 668 
[photographs and videotape]).  “[A]s unpleasant as these 
[depictions] may be, they demonstrate the real-life consequences 
of defendant’s actions.  The prosecution was entitled to have the 
penalty 
phase 
jury 
consider 
those 
consequences.”  
(Cunningham, at p. 668.)   
We also reject Steskal’s claim that the mannequin was 
cumulative of other evidence such as the patrol car and 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
testimony by the pathologist and first responders.  When used 
to illustrate the pathologist’s testimony, as the mannequin did 
here, the “demonstrative evidence provides noncumulative 
value over the testimony itself by encapsulating what may 
otherwise be . . . confusing.”  (People v. Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 510.)  “[A] prosecutor is not required to rely solely on oral 
testimony when a visual image would enhance the jury’s 
understanding of the issues.”  (People v. Cowan, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 476.) 
We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in 
finding that the probative value of the mannequin was not 
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.  
“Consistent with our holding in People v. Medina (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 870, 898–899 [274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282] — a case 
where the prosecution entered into evidence a mannequin 
wearing a victim’s bloodstained shirt — we find that ‘[t]he trial 
court was in a far better position than we to assess the potential 
prejudice arising from the display of such physical evidence.’  
Upon the record before us, we see no basis to upset its decision” 
(People v. Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 681) and conclude there 
was no violation of Steskal’s federal constitutional rights (People 
v. Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 29).   
b. Jury view of Deputy Riches’s patrol car 
As in the guilt phase, during the penalty retrial the trial 
court permitted the jury to view Deputy Riches’s patrol car, over 
the defense’s renewed objections.  Steskal contends this ruling 
was error, asserting that the patrol car was inflammatory, was 
not relevant to any contested issue, and was cumulative of other 
evidence, including the mannequin, photographs of the patrol 
car, and witness testimony.  We find no abuse of discretion.   
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
Again, evidence may be admissible though undisputed 
(People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 806; People v. D’Arcy 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 299), and it is not unduly prejudicial for 
“ ‘accurately portray[ing] the shocking nature of the crime[]’ ” 
(People 
v. 
Zambrano, 
supra, 
41 
Cal.4th 
at 
p. 1150).  
Furthermore, in the penalty retrial, the prosecution was entitled 
greater leeway “ ‘to establish the circumstances of the crime, 
including its gruesome consequences,’ ” and “to demonstrate the 
full extent of the suffering defendant inflicted on his victim.”  
(People v. Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 106.)  “ ‘[T]he penalty phase 
is an especially appropriate time to introduce [evidence] 
showing exactly what the defendant did.’ ”  (People v. Johnson 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 767–768.)   
We reject Steskal’s assertion that a jury view of the patrol 
car was cumulative of other evidence in the penalty retrial.  In 
our review of Steskal’s similar guilt phase claim, we concluded 
that the vehicle was not cumulative of photographs and 
testimony.  The same is true for the penalty retrial, where the 
prosecution introduced nearly identical evidence.  Although the 
mannequin provided an additional depiction of the crime and 
Deputy Riches’s wounds, the destruction of the patrol car 
uniquely illustrated the firepower Steskal wielded, the number 
and pattern of shots, and the vulnerability of Deputy Riches as 
he sat defenseless in the driver’s seat — circumstances of the 
crime the prosecutor highlighted in closing. 
We therefore conclude that in the penalty retrial, the 
patrol car evidence was “neither cumulative nor misleading and 
[was] highly probative of the penalty issues, demonstrating the 
deliberate and brutal nature of the crime.”  (People v. Staten 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 463.)  The trial court’s decision to admit 
the evidence was not an abuse of discretion or constitutional 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
error. 
c. Admission of autopsy and patrol car 
photographs 
Steskal claims the trial court erred in admitting 
photographs that were unduly prejudicial.  At issue were three 
autopsy photographs and 13 photographs of the patrol car and 
other property damaged in the shooting.  We find no error.   
The pathologist described 30 major wounds Deputy Riches 
sustained to his head, neck, chest, shoulder, and arms.  Three 
autopsy photos admitted into evidence showed severe wounds to 
Deputy Riches’s right hand and forearm.  The prosecution later 
emphasized that Deputy Riches’s right hand and weapon were 
struck by gunfire, leaving him defenseless.   
A criminalist testified regarding her collection and 
analysis of bullet casings and other evidence at the scene.  She 
explained how she attempted to recreate the position of the 
shooter by examining gunshot damage to the patrol car and 
nearby businesses.  Photographs referenced during the 
criminalist’s testimony and introduced into evidence depicted a 
view of the patrol car from a distance as it was found at the 
scene; bullet holes in the nearby businesses; the shattered 
driver’s window taped in place to preserve bullet hole evidence; 
the interior of the vehicle, including closeup views of damage 
and Deputy Riches’s revolver and radio found on the driver’s 
seat and floor; trajectory rods placed in some of the bullet holes; 
and exterior views of bullet holes in the hood and windshield 
without the trajectory rods.   
Steskal asserts that the photographs lacked probative 
value because they addressed matters that were not in dispute 
and were cumulative of other evidence.  We are not persuaded.  
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
Photographs that depict the crime scene and the victim’s 
wounds are relevant to the penalty determination as evidence of 
the circumstances of the crime (People v. Booker, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 187) “ ‘ “and the prosecution is ‘not obliged to prove 
these details solely from the testimony of live witnesses,’ ” even 
in the absence of a defense challenge to particular aspects of the 
prosecution’s case’ ” (People v. D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
p. 299).  As we have explained, “[p]hotographs and other graphic 
evidence are not rendered ‘irrelevant or inadmissible simply 
because they duplicate testimony[ or] depict uncontested 
facts . . . .’ ”  (People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 806.)  
Furthermore, most of the photographs illustrated circumstances 
of the crime that were not conveyed by the mannequin and an 
external view of the patrol car:  incapacitating injury to Deputy 
Riches’s hand, damage to nearby businesses, the position of the 
patrol car at the scene, items as they were found in the driver’s 
seat area, and closeup details of damage viewed from the 
interior of the vehicle.  
Steskal points to empirical studies regarding the dramatic 
effect gruesome photographs may have on jury decisionmaking 
and contends the photographs admitted in his trial were likely 
to have had an improper impact on the penalty verdict.  
“Defendant did not raise that objection at trial, and the studies 
in question are not part of the trial record.  Thus, the trial court 
was not provided an opportunity to consider the relevance of the 
studies in weighing the potential for undue prejudice against 
the probative value of the photographs.”  (People v. Sattiewhite 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 472.) 
We have viewed the photographs and conclude the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them.  “ ‘ “A trial 
court’s decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect 
of such photographs clearly outweighs their probative value.” ’ ”  
(People v. Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 40.)  The autopsy 
photographs were “tightly cropped” to show only Deputy 
Riches’s hand and arm and photographs of the patrol car were 
“neither gory nor particularly disturbing.”  (People v. Jackson 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 757.)  The evidence was “ ‘neither unduly 
gruesome nor inflammatory’ ” (ibid.), would not have interfered 
with the jury’s rational decisionmaking, and did not represent 
an abuse of discretion or a violation of Steskal’s constitutional 
rights.   
4. Admission of victim impact testimony 
Steskal claims that victim impact testimony rendered his 
penalty retrial fundamentally unfair because it was more 
extensive and emotional than the federal Constitution allows.  
We reject this claim. 
a. Background 
As previously indicated, Deputy Riches’s parents, best 
friend, and three coworkers testified for part of an afternoon.  
Their testimony spans 45 pages of transcript.  
Deputy Riches’s father, Bruce Riches, testified only briefly 
to describe his depression following the murder and visits to his 
son’s gravesite.  He identified a photograph of Deputy Riches 
taken a few years before his death. 
Deputy Riches’s mother, Meriel Riches, testified about 
brain trauma at birth that caused Deputy Riches to have a 
learning disability and problems with coordination.  He 
succeeded in school through “sheer determination.”  He also 
loved participating in the marching band, although he almost 
quit out of concern his disability would hold the group back.  
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
Even as a teenager, Deputy Riches helped others — building a 
chicken coop for one elderly couple and a mountainside stairway 
for another.  She testified that he was “brimming over with love 
and generosity.”  
James Henery, a captain with the Santa Ana Fire 
Department, testified that Deputy Riches had been his best 
friend since high school.  Recalling times when they were 
volunteer firefighters together, Henery described arriving at the 
scene of a man’s death and Deputy Riches’s compassion in 
comforting the man’s wife.  When they worked together at a 
home for the disabled, Deputy Riches learned sign language so 
that he could speak to a resident who was deaf.  Deputy Riches 
was close to Henery’s children and wanted a family of his own.  
He was a loyal friend who would listen to Henery’s problems 
without judgment and someone who was always willing to help 
others.  Henery identified photographs of Deputy Riches as a 
teenager, of a trip they took together two years before his death, 
and of Deputy Riches in uniform when he was staffing a booth 
at the county fair.   
Scott Vanover, an OCSD deputy, testified about the strong 
friendship he developed with Deputy Riches even though they 
worked together for less than a year.  Vanover’s brother died 
during their childhood and the impact of Deputy Riches’s death 
was similar to the experience of losing his brother.  Vanover 
described a trip to London with Deputy Riches, and Deputy 
Riches’s willingness to talk to strangers — Riches was positive 
almost to the point of being naïve.  Vanover identified a 
photograph of Deputy Riches on their London trip. 
Eric Hendry was an OCSD deputy and Deputy Riches’s 
training officer.  He described the bond of training officer to 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
trainee — “almost like brothers” — and the profound effect of 
Deputy Riches’s murder on his marriage, relationship with his 
children, attitude about his job, and connection to God.   
Joseph Hoskins met Deputy Riches when they were both 
new OCSD deputies working in the jail.  He described providing 
aid to an inmate who was having a seizure and Deputy Riches’s 
encouragement and support through the experience.  He 
testified that Deputy Riches was a “comforting force” and 
someone on whom he could rely.   
b. Discussion 
Steskal argues that “highly emotional” testimony from 
these six witnesses violated his constitutional rights.   
“Unless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence of 
the effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim and 
the community is relevant and admissible under [Penal Code] 
section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime.  
[Citation.]  The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence 
only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial 
fundamentally unfair.”  (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 
574.)  We have repeatedly held that “ ‘[a]dmission of testimony 
presented by a few close friends or relatives of each victim, as 
well as images of the victim while he or she was alive,’ ” is 
constitutionally permissible.  (People v. Murtishaw (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 574, 595.) 
In Brady, for example, where the victim was also a law 
enforcement officer, we upheld testimony by a physician, three 
law enforcement officers, and five family members who 
discussed the victim’s “childhood hardships, his lifelong desire 
to be a police officer, his achievements, his engagement and 
future plans, his death, his funeral service, and the aftereffects 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
of his death.”  (People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 573; see 
also People v. Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 678 [seven 
witnesses for one victim]; People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 140 [six witnesses and 59 pages of testimony].)  We decline 
Steskal’s invitation to overrule this precedent, which dictates 
our conclusion that the nature and amount of victim impact 
evidence in Steskal’s penalty retrial was constitutionally 
acceptable. 
Steskal does not point to specific testimony or evidence 
when he claims that witnesses conveyed information in a 
“highly emotional manner” that was particularly inflammatory 
when considered in the context of other evidence, such as the 
mannequin and patrol car.  “The question is not simply whether 
victim impact evidence was emotional or demonstrated the 
devastating effect of the crime; rather, it is whether the 
testimony invited an irrational response from the jury.”  (People 
v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 140.)  Here, Steskal “provides no 
persuasive basis for us to conclude that the testimony presented 
in this case triggered such a response.  And our review of the 
record indicates the testimony was not so emotional that the 
trial court’s failure to exclude it amounted to an abuse of 
discretion or rendered [defendant’s] trial fundamentally unfair.”  
(Ibid.) 
Finally, Steskal argues that testimony by nonfamily 
members should have been excluded.  This is an argument we 
have previously rejected.  “Neither the United States Supreme 
Court nor this court has ever identified a constitutional or 
statutory basis for so constraining the permissible scope of 
victim impact testimony (see Payne v. Tennessee [(1991)] 501 
U.S. [808,] 822–823 [prosecution may be permitted to show the 
loss to the community as a whole]; id. at p. 830 (conc. opn. of 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
O’Connor, J.) [same]; People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
pp. 466–467; People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 507–508 
[121 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 247 P.3d 886]; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 745, 792–793 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820]), and 
because [defendant] offers no persuasive reasons that would 
render these authorities inapposite, we again decline to do so 
here.”  (People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 246.)   
5. Admission of evidence and instruction on the 
attempted jail escape  
Steskal claims the trial court erred when it admitted 
evidence of his attempted escape from jail and instructed the 
jury to consider this incident as aggravating.  We conclude no 
error occurred. 
a. Background 
While Steskal was in jail awaiting the penalty retrial, 
correctional staff discovered a small portion of his cell wall 
scraped away, found strips of bed sheet hidden in his mattress, 
and confiscated portions of metal blades and clippers in his 
possession, some fashioned into hand-held instruments.  The 
defense conceded that the question of whether the metal 
instruments were weapons or scraping tools was one for the jury 
but argued there was insufficient evidence of a threat of force or 
violence to support admission of the escape attempt.  The trial 
court found evidence of multiple crimes admissible pursuant to 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b):  attempted escape (Pen. 
Code, §§ 4532, subd. (b), 664); possession of sharp instruments 
(id., § 4502); and possession of at least two deadly weapons (id., 
§ 4574).  
During the penalty retrial, the prosecution presented 
evidence that Steskal possessed contraband metal items in jail:  
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
a hair clipper blade attached to a paper handle; portions of nail 
clippers; and a “shank,” a handheld weapon made with metal 
from a large toenail clipper.  A correctional expert testified that 
the shank and hair clipper blade could be used to stab and slash 
and were potentially dangerous weapons.   
The prosecution also presented evidence that Steskal had 
been chipping at the wall between his cell and an adjoining 
mechanical room that contained a ventilator shaft.  He had 
managed to scrape away a patch in the 24-inch-thick concrete 
wall that was a third of an inch deep.  While the mechanical 
room was locked from the outside, there was no barrier to 
exiting it once inside; a person could also move through the 
ventilation system to the roof of the jail, though access to the 
roof was blocked by metal bars.  The strips of bed sheets Steskal 
saved were long enough to enable his descent from the roof of 
the jail to the street.  Because the jail was in a building that also 
housed the city police department, correctional and other law 
enforcement personnel were often present on the street on their 
way to and from work.   
b. Discussion 
“Evidence of actual or threatened violent criminal activity 
‘that would allow a rational trier of fact to find the existence of 
such activity beyond a reasonable doubt’ is admissible under 
[Penal Code section 190.3,] factor (b).  [Citation.]  Such evidence 
must involve actual, attempted, or threatened force or violence 
against a person, and not merely to property.”  (People v. Wallace 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1079.)  Factor (b) encompasses 
“attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 
threat to use force or violence.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b).)  
“A trial court’s decision to admit, at the penalty phase, evidence 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
of a defendant’s prior criminal activity is reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard.”  (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 1082, 1127.) 
When considering evidence of escape in the context of 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), “we must review the factual 
setting of each particular escape to determine whether it 
involved actual or threatened violence and not presume that the 
escape was violent because of the possibility of violence in 
reapprehension.”  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 
1257, fn. 2; see People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776–777.)  
Thus, “[a]lthough evidence of attempted escape alone is not 
admissible under section 190.3, factor (b),” we have found escape 
evidence sufficient in a variety of circumstances indicating a 
threat of violence:  when the defendant possessed a weapon and 
had a plan to use it (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
1, 49); when the defendant attempted to obtain a shank as “ ‘a 
ticket out’ ” and possessed torn mattress covers (People v. 
Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 155; see id. at p. 196); when the 
defendant planned to use a weapon if necessary but had not yet 
obtained one (People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 250); and 
when the defendant did not possess a weapon, but the escape 
plan would have required him to confront a guard (People v. 
Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 955–956).  In contrast, we have 
concluded that evidence of escape was not admissible when 
there was “no evidence that violence was being planned or even 
prepared for.”  (Jackson, at p. 1256.) 
Steskal argues on appeal, as he did at trial, that there was 
insufficient evidence his attempted escape involved a threat of 
force or violence.  He claims the contraband metal clippers were 
for digging out of his cell and no evidence established his intent 
to use them as weapons.  Our cases establish, however, that 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
“possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody ‘is 
unlawful and involves an implied threat of violence even where 
there is no evidence defendant used or displayed it in a 
provocative or threatening manner.’ ”  (People v. Delgado (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 544, 586.)  “ ‘The trier of fact is free to consider any 
“innocent explanation” for defendant’s possession of the item, 
but such inferences do not render the evidence inadmissible per 
se.’ ”  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 139–140.)   
The jury could infer from evidence presented that Steskal 
planned to escape by scraping a hole in his cell wall and exiting 
the jail with the aid of a rope made of bedsheets.  Testimony that 
a shank and other metal items in his possession could be used 
as dangerous weapons supported an implied threat of violence.  
The trial court’s decision that this was sufficient evidence of 
attempted escape for admission pursuant to Penal Code section 
190.3, factor (b) was not an abuse of discretion.  (People v. 
Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 196.)   
Even if evidence of the attempted escape fell short of that 
sufficient to establish threatened violent criminal activity 
beyond a reasonable doubt, its admission was harmless.  Steskal 
does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that his 
possession of multiple sharp instruments (Pen. Code, § 4502) 
and deadly weapons (id., § 4574) was admissible under Penal 
Code section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 
52, 118; People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)  
Addressing the issue in closing argument, the prosecution 
highlighted Steskal’s manufacture of weapons and argued that 
he would pose a danger to correctional staff in any setting; this 
argument did not depend on the conclusion that Steskal 
specifically intended to use the weapons to commit violence in 
an escape.  And Steskal himself relied on evidence of the escape 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
to counter the suggestion he was dangerous, arguing that he did 
not intend to use the contraband clippers and blades as weapons 
but as tools to scrape the wall.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that excluding evidence of Steskal’s escape efforts — 
scraping away a small patch of cell wall and concealing strips of 
bedsheets — would not have affected the jury’s verdict.   
Steskal contends the trial court’s error in admitting Penal 
Code section 190.3, factor (b) evidence was exacerbated by 
instructing the jury to consider it.  Finding no error in the 
admission of the evidence, we reject this claim.  
6. Instructional error regarding unadjudicated 
offenses 
Steskal contends that a pattern instruction regarding 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) evidence, CALJIC No. 8.87, 
improperly removed from the jury the task of determining 
whether alleged criminal activities involved an actual or implied 
threat of violence.  He asserts the instruction also improperly 
defined the requisite criminal acts as requiring the “implied use” 
rather than “implied threat” of force or violence, and explains 
that a threat involves an intention to use force or violence but 
does not necessarily lead to violence.  As we have observed, 
“these claims are common objections, previously rejected.”  
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 
451.)   
First, the question whether there was an actual or implied 
threat of violence was not for the jury to decide.  “Although the 
question of whether the acts occurred is a factual matter for the 
jury, the characterization of those acts as involving an express 
or implied use of force or violence, or the threat thereof, is a legal 
matter for the court to decide.”  (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
Cal.4th 40, 96.)   
Steskal’s second assertion regarding improperly defined 
terms is “neither the only nor most reasonable understanding of 
the instruction.”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 452.)  “[E]ven if the instruction did not clearly 
define the types of possible threats, it did not explicitly tell the 
jury that a threat to use force or violence necessarily was an 
actual threat, rather than an implied one.  Defendant[] w[as] not 
precluded from arguing that [his] offenses involved only implied 
threats and that the jury should give less aggravating weight to 
that evidence.”  (Ibid.) 
7. Constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally 
ill defendants  
Steskal claims the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution categorically prohibits the death penalty for 
individuals with severe mental illness.  He further contends 
that, given his delusional disorder, a death sentence is 
constitutionally disproportionate to his personal culpability.  We 
have rejected similar claims on several occasions.  (E.g., People 
v. Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 275–276; People v. Mendoza 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 908–909.)  Consistent with our precedent, 
we reject Steskal’s claim as well. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments is interpreted by referring to “ ‘evolving 
standards of decency . . .’ to determine which punishments are 
so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”  (Roper v. 
Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 561 (Roper).)  This inquiry begins 
with “a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in 
particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed 
the question.”  (Id. at p. 564; see Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
U.S. 304, 312 (Atkins).)  We have observed that “while Atkins 
and Roper had relied on the emergence of a national consensus 
against the imposition of the death penalty in cases of 
intellectual disability2 and in cases involving juvenile offenders, 
there exists no similar evidence that a national consensus has 
formed against the imposition of the death penalty against the 
class of persons with mental illness.”  (People v. Ghobrial, supra, 
5 Cal.5th at p. 275; see also People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th 
at p. 909; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 722.) 
Steskal asks us to reexamine this conclusion, contending 
that a national consensus is evident in a type of insanity defense 
— “volitional incapacity” — available in seven states that 
impose the death penalty and in decisions from states that have 
prohibited capital punishment for particular mentally ill 
offenders through individual proportionality review.  The 
insanity defense Steskal cites, however, is a traditional defense 
to criminal liability that “surfaced over two centuries ago” 
(Clark v. Arizona (2006) 548 U.S. 735, 749) and is unrelated to 
sentencing.  Furthermore, the most recent of the state laws 
reflecting the defense have been in place for decades.  Similarly, 
of the handful of individual proportionality cases Steskal cites, 
only one was decided in this century.  Neither these historical 
decisions nor the existence of an age-old insanity defense 
reflects a “trend toward abolition” of the death penalty for 
persons with mental illness.  (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 566.)   
Steskal and his amici curiae claim that additional sources 
reflect community and international consensus in support of his 
 
2  
We use the term “intellectual disability” in accordance 
with current terminology except when quoting from other 
sources.  (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 737, fn. 5.) 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
claim, including opinion polls, positions taken by mental health 
organizations and the American Bar Association (ABA), and 
United Nations resolutions.  (See, e.g., ABA Section on 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Report of the Task Force 
on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty (2005) (ABA Task 
Force Report)  [as of Apr. 29, 2021].)  (All 
Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
.)  These materials are, 
however, identical or substantially similar to materials we have 
already held “insufficient to demonstrate emerging standards 
that warrant reexamination of our precedent.”  (People v. 
Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 276, citing People v. Mendoza, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 910.)   
As evidence of a national consensus, Steskal also 
highlights legislation recently enacted in Ohio that allows 
defendants to establish ineligibility for the death penalty if they 
have been diagnosed with one of four serious mental illnesses, 
including delusional disorder.  But while our Legislature may 
consider following Ohio’s lead in approaching this issue (People 
v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1252; People v. 
Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 909), the recent Ohio 
legislation is not, at this point, sufficient to establish a national 
consensus for purposes of the Eighth Amendment analysis.  
(Compare Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 314.) 
In rejecting claims similar to Steskal’s, our cases have 
emphasized the inherent difficulty of defining mental illness for 
categorical Eighth Amendment exemption and explained that 
the Legislature is in the best position to address the issue if it 
so chooses:  “ ‘There are a number of different conditions 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
recognized as mental illnesses, and the degree and manner of 
impairment in a particular individual is often the subject of 
expert dispute.  Thus, while it may be that mentally ill offenders 
who are utterly unable to control their behavior lack the 
extreme culpability associated with capital punishment, there is 
likely little consensus on which individuals fall within that 
category or precisely where the line of impairment should be 
drawn. . . .  We leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, to 
determine exactly the type and level of mental impairment that 
must be shown to warrant a categorical exemption from the 
death penalty.’ ”  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 909.)   
Steskal acknowledges this definitional difficulty but 
argues 
it 
does 
not 
defeat 
his 
claim. 
 
Referencing 
recommendations from the ABA Task Force Report, Steskal 
proposes a definition of severe mental illness that includes 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, which, in their 
acute state, are associated with significant disruptions in 
thinking and perception.  Because the effects of such conditions 
may not be constant, however — for example, persons with a 
delusional disorder may not experience such disruptions all or 
most of the time — Steskal adds the consideration of case-
specific factors to his definition of severe mental illness, 
explaining that it is intended to signify a “class of offenders who 
are not just severely mentally ill, but whose severe mental 
illness was causally related to the offense itself.”  
By these descriptions it is apparent that Steskal’s is not a 
categorical approach to defining a class of offenders with mental 
illness; instead, it raises the question whether “the penalty was 
unwarranted under the facts of [a] particular case,” an inquiry 
into individual culpability that must be conducted on a case-by-
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
case basis.  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 911.)  The 
ABA Task Force Report on which Steskal relies confirms the 
point, explaining that although Atkins “dispensed with a case-
by-case assessment of responsibility” for a class defined by 
intellectual disability, in matters involving severely mentally ill 
offenders “preclusion of a death sentence based on diagnosis 
alone would not be sensible, because the symptoms of these 
disorders are much more variable than those associated with 
retardation . . . .”  (ABA Task Force Rep., supra, at p. 4; see also 
Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental 
Illness (2003) 33 N.M. L.Rev. 293, 309 [defendants should 
demonstrate their symptoms during the relevant time period to 
account for variability associated with mental illness].)  These 
observations are consistent with our prior conclusion that there 
is “ ‘likely little consensus’ ” on “ ‘where the line of impairment 
should be drawn’ ” as a categorical matter or “ ‘which 
individuals fall within that category.’ ”  (Mendoza, at p. 909.) 
Steskal argues that offenders with severe mental illness 
are in pertinent respects similarly situated to intellectually 
disabled and juvenile offenders, and therefore should also be 
categorically exempt from capital punishment.  He notes that in 
reaching its holding in Atkins, the high court explained that 
recognized justifications for the death penalty — retribution and 
deterrence — did not apply to intellectually disabled offenders, 
whose impairments render them both less morally culpable and 
“make it less likely that they can . . . control their conduct based 
upon” a threat of execution.  (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 320.)  
In Roper, the high court reached similar conclusions with 
respect to offenders under the age of 18.  (Roper, supra, 543 U.S. 
at p. 571.)  Steskal argues that capital punishment similarly 
fails to serve as a deterrent or proper retribution for those with 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
severe mental illness.  He also argues that, as with intellectually 
disabled and juvenile offenders, individuals with severe mental 
illness may have impairments that hinder their relationship 
with counsel, limit their ability to competently navigate other 
aspects of the criminal justice system, and enhance the 
likelihood a jury would attribute future dangerousness to them.  
(See Atkins, at p. 320.)  Again, precedent forecloses Steskal’s 
arguments.  We have previously explained that the application 
of the death penalty to individuals with mental illness presents 
different considerations than its application to intellectually 
disabled and juvenile offenders.  As Steskal and amici curiae 
acknowledge, mental illness affects different individuals 
differently, may wax and wane in severity over time, and even 
those with severe mental illness may have periods of functioning 
adequately.  Although some mentally ill offenders may “lack the 
extreme culpability associated with capital punishment” (People 
v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 909), Steskal has not 
demonstrated that such impairment “is so widespread among all 
types of serious mental illnesses that all those so diagnosed 
must be spared the death penalty” (id. at p. 911) because the 
penalty “would not serve societal goals of retribution and 
deterrence” (id. at p. 909).   
As for Steskal’s argument regarding reduced capacity to 
assist counsel, “to the extent that Atkins and Roper were 
concerned with the risk of ‘unjustified or mistaken execution’ in 
the case of persons with intellectual disabilities and juvenile 
offenders, significant variations in the forms and nature of 
mental illness make it difficult to say that impaired competence 
is a feature common to the class.”  (People v. Ghobrial, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 275.)  That is to say, we are unable to attribute to 
all severely mentally ill defendants a degree of impairment that 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
necessarily threatens the exercise of rights or undermines the 
ability to present a compelling case in mitigation, though of 
course “[a]ll defendants, including this one, have the 
opportunity to establish that they are not competent to stand 
trial.”  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 911.)  Nor 
does the risk that mental illness may be wrongfully associated 
with future dangerousness in some cases establish a categorical 
basis for excluding all those who experience such a condition 
from capital punishment — though we emphasize that in every 
case a defendant is entitled to the benefit of established limits 
on arguments and evidence concerning future dangerousness.  
(See People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1185–1186.)   
These acknowledged differences between the groups of 
offenders answer Steskal’s argument that it violates equal 
protection to treat individuals with mental illness differently 
from intellectually disabled and juvenile offenders:  Given the 
variation among offenders affected by mental illness, we have 
held that the class of persons with mental illness are not 
similarly situated to those who are minors or intellectually 
disabled for purposes of equal protection.  (People v. Mendoza, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 912; People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 723.)  These conclusions do not prevent an individual from 
arguing that “the penalty was unwarranted under the facts of 
[a] particular case . . . .”  (Mendoza, at p. 911.)  But they do 
foreclose the categorical approach Steskal urges us to adopt. 
In 
the 
alternative, 
Steskal 
requests 
intracase 
proportionality review, contending that his death sentence is 
disproportionate to his individual culpability.  The Eighth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits the imposition 
of a penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s “personal 
responsibility and moral guilt.”  (Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
U.S. 782, 801.)  California’s Constitution establishes the same 
prohibition.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)  Thus, to determine 
whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, we examine the 
circumstances of the offense and consider the defendant’s 
personal characteristics, including age, prior criminality, and 
mental capabilities.  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 911; see also People v. Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 125 
[intracase proportionality review conducted upon request].)  A 
sentence is unconstitutional when the penalty is “grossly 
disproportionate to the offense” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 441, 450) so that it “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends 
fundamental notions of human dignity’ ” (People v. Frierson 
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 183; see Mendoza, at pp. 911–912). 
Evidence at trial indicated that Steskal was extremely 
agitated after leaving his remote camp and returning to town 
for legal matters related to a prior traffic stop.  Shortly before 
the crime, he could be heard loudly slamming objects and 
repeatedly yelling that he hated the world.  When he went to a 
7-Eleven for cigarettes, Steskal carried a semiautomatic rifle he 
claimed was for protection against the “fucking law.”  As Deputy 
Riches arrived at the store, Steskal fired 30 rounds directly at 
him from close range, with no provocation, and before Deputy 
Riches could exit his patrol car or draw his gun.  The prosecution 
presented additional evidence that Steskal threatened a police 
officer many years earlier by racing toward him on a motorcycle.  
Before his penalty retrial, correctional staff found Steskal 
preparing for an escape and accumulating contraband metal 
blades and clippers to chip away at his wall and/or use as 
weapons.  
In his defense, Steskal presented considerable lay and 
expert testimony regarding his difficult childhood and long-
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
standing mental health problems.  As an adult, he was isolated, 
tormented by irrational and severe paranoia, and frequently 
suicidal.  There was evidence that following a traffic stop in 
which he was mistreated by sheriff’s deputies, Steskal’s mental 
health deteriorated significantly — at the time of the crime, he 
held the delusional belief that law enforcement officers wanted 
to kill him.  Despite this evidence, the jury rejected defense 
arguments for lesser culpability.  The jury reached its penalty 
verdict after considering evidence of Steskal’s childhood abuse 
and family dysfunction, chronic mental illness, persistent 
developmental problems, lack of a criminal record, and kindness 
toward others.   
Much as in prior cases, we cannot say that evidence of 
Steskal’s mental illness or other characteristics renders his 
capital sentence grossly disproportionate to his crime.  (See 
People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 911; People v. Boyce, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 721 [citing cases]; People v. Lawley (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 102, 171.)  Having given careful consideration to this 
evidence, the jury determined both that Steskal’s murder of 
Deputy Riches was premeditated and deliberate and that death 
was the appropriate penalty.  Given the circumstances of the 
murder and “in light of the careful consideration already 
accorded to defendant’s evidence of mental illness at the trial 
level” (Mendoza, at p. 912), we cannot say the penalty is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate. 
8. Constitutionality of the death penalty statute 
Steskal presents a number of challenges to California’s 
death sentencing scheme, acknowledging that we have 
previously rejected them.  We decline to revisit our precedent 
and hold as follows:  
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
There is no merit to Steskal’s claim that the special 
circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 190.2 fail to 
perform their constitutionally required narrowing function, or 
that Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury 
to consider the “circumstances of the crime” when making a 
penalty determination, results in the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty.  (People v. Ghobrial, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 291; People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1214–
1215.)  
We also reject Steskal’s claims that additional procedural 
safeguards are required to ensure constitutionally reliable 
sentencing.  “[T]his court has repeatedly rejected arguments 
that the federal Constitution requires the penalty phase jury to 
make unanimous written findings beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh the 
factors in mitigation, and that death is the appropriate penalty.”  
(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 115; see People v. Johnson 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 655–656.)  “The United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial 
guarantee 
[citations] 
do 
not 
call 
into 
question 
these 
conclusions.”  (Johnson, at p. 655.)  There is likewise no violation 
of due process or Sixth Amendment jury trial rights in allowing 
the jury to consider prior unadjudicated crimes aggravating 
under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), and to do so without 
unanimously finding Steskal guilty of those crimes.  (Johnson, 
at p. 656.)  Finally, “there is no Eighth Amendment requirement 
that California’s death penalty scheme provide for intercase 
proportionality review” (Johnson, at p. 656) and “the failure to 
afford capital defendants at the penalty phase some of the 
procedural safeguards guaranteed to noncapital defendants . . . 
does not violate the equal protection clause” (id. at p. 657). 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
Contrary to Steskal’s claim, “ ‘the statutory instruction to 
the jury to consider “whether or not” certain mitigating factors 
were present [does] not unconstitutionally suggest that the 
absence of such factors amounted to aggravation.’ ”  (People v. 
Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 87.)   
Steskal contends evolving standards of decency have 
rendered the death penalty unconstitutional.  He claims the 
increasing number of states that have abolished the death 
penalty and its declining use in states that retain it reflect a 
national consensus against capital punishment.  Steskal asserts 
that additional factors — the rising number of exonerations, 
race and gender disparities, and delay — further justify a 
conclusion that the death penalty is unreliable, arbitrary, and 
cruel and unusual in violation of Eighth Amendment 
protections.   
We are not prepared to say that the trends Steskal cites 
reflect rejection of the death penalty “in the majority of States” 
(Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 567), or that the record before us 
establishes arbitrariness violative of the Eighth Amendment 
(see People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1374).  We thus 
decline to revisit the conclusion we have repeatedly reached, 
that “California’s use of the death penalty does not violate 
international law, the federal Constitution, or the Eighth 
Amendment’s 
prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment in light of ‘evolving standards of decency.’ ”  (People 
v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 590.)  
 
 
PEOPLE v. STESKAL 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in the Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Steskal 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S122611  
Date Filed:  April 29, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior       
County:  Orange       
Judge:  Frank F. Fasel         
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Gilbert Gaynor, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Crowell & Moring, Michelle Gillette, Mina Nasseri-Asghar, Nicole 
Ambrosetti and Tiffanie McDowell for Mental Health America and 
National Alliance on Mental Illness as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General,  Julie L. Garland, Assistant 
Attorney General, Ronald A. Jakob, Holly D. Wilkens, Robin Urbanski, 
Christine Y. Friedman  and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Gilbert Gaynor  
Law Office of Gilbert Gaynor 
8383 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 510 
Beverly Hills, CA 90211 
(805) 636-6209  
 
Christine Y. Friedman 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 W. Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9050