Title: State v. Bunch

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Bunch, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4723.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4723 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BUNCH, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Bunch, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4723.] 
Criminal 
law—R.C. 
2953.21—Postconviction-relief 
petitions—Evidentiary 
hearing—Ineffective assistance of counsel—Eyewitness-identification 
expert testimony—When core of a defendant’s claim or defense turns on 
evidence that cannot be properly provided to jury without use of expert 
testimony, failure to engage experts can constitute deficient performance—
Petitioner’s affidavit from eyewitness-identification expert provided 
sufficient operative facts to warrant evidentiary hearing regarding  
petitioner’s claim that he was prejudiced as a result of trial counsel’s 
deficient performance—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause 
remanded to trial court for evidentiary hearing. 
(No. 2021-0579—Submitted April 12, 2022—Decided December 29, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, 
No. 18 MA 0022, 2021-Ohio-1244. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} In 2002, appellant, Chaz Bunch, was convicted of three counts of 
rape, three counts of complicity to rape, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, 
aggravated menacing, and several related firearm specifications.  The key issue for 
Bunch at trial was whether he was the person who committed these crimes.  Bunch 
maintained that he had been misidentified as the perpetrator. 
{¶ 2} Bunch filed a petition for postconviction relief in 2003, which he later 
amended in 2017.  Among his claims, Bunch asserted that his trial counsel had been 
ineffective for failing to present expert testimony to help the jury understand the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification, particularly under the circumstances in 
which the victim, M.K., identified Bunch.  The trial court rejected the claim without 
holding a hearing, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment. 
{¶ 3} We conclude that Bunch’s ineffective-assistance claim presented an 
issue that the trial court needed to examine at an evidentiary hearing before reaching 
its decision.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the 
cause to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the eyewitness-
identification claim in Bunch’s petition for postconviction relief. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 4} On August 21, 2001, at 10:23 p.m., M.K. was about to go into her 
workplace in Youngstown when she was kidnapped from off the street, robbed, and 
repeatedly raped by a group of strangers.  M.K. reported the crime immediately 
afterward and provided the police with the license-plate number of the attackers’ 
car.  At 11:30 p.m., a Youngstown police officer saw a car at a gas station with a 
license-plate number that was nearly identical to the number reported.  Video-
surveillance footage from the gas station showed that a young man with Bunch’s 
features—a stocky build and dark complexion—was at the gas station at the same 
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time as the suspicious car.  Once the car exited the gas station, the officer began 
following it and then awaited backup after the car parked in a residential driveway.  
Police then apprehended three young men who were in the car: 15-year-old 
Brandon Moore, 18-year-old Andre Bundy, and 21-year-old Jamar Callier.  A 
fourth person fled the vehicle on foot.  Moore and Callier identified that person as 
“Shorty Mack.” 
{¶ 5} Shortly before midnight, a police officer spotted a young man 
hurrying down a nearby street, and the officer stopped the young man to speak with 
him.  The person gave the name “Chaz Bunch,” and he untruthfully claimed that he 
was in the area because he had just stopped by his uncle’s house and was now on 
his way to visit his cousin.  The officer did not detain the young man and did not 
write up any report that day regarding the interaction.  Three days later, the officer 
was informed that Chaz Bunch was suspected of being the person who had fled 
from the police the night of the attack.  The officer wrote a belated report about 
their previous interaction.  The officer confirmed the young man’s identity 
approximately one week later, when a detective showed him a picture of Bunch.  
Bunch was arrested on August 27. 
{¶ 6} M.K. reviewed photo lineups of potential suspects on August 28.  She 
quickly and confidently identified Moore, Bundy, and Callier, but not the fourth 
suspect.  When reviewing the lineup that included Bunch’s picture, M.K. stated that 
the photo of Bunch might be the fourth attacker, but she was not sure.  She said that 
she wanted to see a full-body photo, explaining that this attacker was in the backseat 
and she “needed to see like his hands and roundness of his body.”  Police did not, 
however, provide M.K. with any additional photo lineups.  On September 7, M.K.’s 
boyfriend showed her a newspaper article that identified Bunch as a suspect.  When 
M.K. saw the picture of Bunch in the newspaper, she was certain that he was the 
fourth attacker. 
{¶ 7} Of all the testing of fingerprints and DNA samples collected from 
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M.K., the car, and other items, none of the results were attributable to Bunch.  Tests 
of samples from a rape kit and M.K.’s clothing detected Moore’s DNA. 
{¶ 8} The state’s case against Bunch started in the juvenile court, as Bunch 
was 16 years old at the time of the offenses.  Because of Bunch’s age and the nature 
of the offenses, he was subject to mandatory bindover to adult court without an 
amenability hearing after the juvenile court made its probable-cause determination.  
Bunch, Bundy, and Moore were tried jointly over their objections.  Callier pleaded 
guilty prior to trial and agreed to testify against his codefendants. 
{¶ 9} Bunch’s first attorney vigorously contested the validity of M.K.’s 
identification of Bunch during the juvenile court’s probable-cause proceedings as 
well as in a motion to suppress identification testimony and subsequent hearing at 
the trial court.  The first attorney also filed a motion for funds to hire an expert 
witness regarding eyewitness identification; the trial court granted the motion.  
However, that attorney withdrew from representation shortly after Bunch’s 
suppression hearing because of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.  
The trial court denied the suppression motion on April 17, 2002. 
{¶ 10} Despite the first attorney’s setting up the opportunity, the second 
attorney appointed to defend Bunch did not engage any experts for trial.  The 
second attorney also trod lightly around the issue of Bunch’s identification at trial.  
During defense counsel’s cross-examination of M.K., he hinted that by the time of 
trial, her memory about the entire event might have faded similarly to the attorney’s 
memory of vocabulary from Spanish class in high school.  He pointed out that M.K. 
had been uncertain at points about details such as the color and size of the guns that 
some of the defendants had carried.  He vaguely suggested that perhaps those 
uncertainties arose because of the trauma she had suffered.  He then asked M.K. to 
confirm her observations about the fourth attacker’s physical attributes and 
clothing.  He asked her to confirm her process of identifying Bunch, her initial 
uncertainty with the photo array, and her later certainty after seeing Bunch’s photo 
January Term, 2022 
 
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in the newspaper. 
{¶ 11} Callier confirmed Bunch’s identity in his testimony as a witness for 
the state.  Callier indicated that he knew who Bunch was because he had “seen 
[him] around” for a few months.  Callier acknowledged that he faced up to a 76-
year sentence for his participation in the offenses against M.K. and that he had 
agreed to testify in exchange for the state’s reduction of charges and 
recommendation of a seven-year prison term.  The state also promised that it would 
not prosecute Callier for additional crimes, including a robbery that occurred 
approximately 30 minutes before M.K. was kidnapped. 
{¶ 12} In October 2002, a jury found Bunch guilty on most counts, and the 
trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 115 years.  After the Seventh 
District reversed and remanded Bunch’s sentence due to the failure to properly 
merge the firearm specifications, the trial court resentenced Bunch to an aggregate 
prison term of 89 years.  In June 2003, Bunch filed a petition for postconviction 
relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  The state did not 
respond to the petition, and it remained unresolved on the court’s docket for over a 
decade.  Bunch made additional attempts to challenge his sentence and reopen his 
appeal, which proved unsuccessful.                                                                                                                
{¶ 13} In 2014, with the help of the Ohio Innocence Project, Bunch applied 
for DNA testing on the rape kit and other items, including a blue cap that Bunch 
allegedly wore that night, that had been preserved from the August 21, 2001 
offenses.  Bunch argued that current, more sophisticated DNA testing procedures 
might achieve better results from the samples.  Because Bunch was the only one 
among the four codefendants who claimed that he was innocent based on 
misidentification, he contended that the detection of a fifth, unidentified male DNA 
profile would be exculpatory evidence that would have changed the outcome of his 
trial.  The trial court denied Bunch’s application, holding that DNA testing could 
not be exculpatory because the DNA evidence at trial did not identify Bunch.  The 
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Seventh District affirmed, State v. Bunch, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 168, 
2015-Ohio-4151, ¶ 101, noting that there was other evidence to support Bunch’s 
convictions and hypothesizing that a fifth profile could end up matching M.K.’s 
boyfriend, id. at ¶ 78. 
{¶ 14} In 2017, Bunch filed an amended postconviction petition.1  The 
amended petition asserted that Bunch had a right to be resentenced pursuant to a 
recent decision of this court regarding one of his codefendants, see State v. Moore, 
149 Ohio St.3d 557, 2016-Ohio-8288, 76 N.E.3d 1127.  It also claimed that Bunch’s 
bindover proceedings were invalid under another recent decision, State v. Aalim, 
150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862 (“Aalim I”), vacated on 
reconsideration, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883 (“Aalim II”).  
And lastly, Bunch’s amended petition asserted that trial counsel had been 
ineffective for failing to procure an eyewitness-identification expert to analyze 
Bunch’s case and testify at trial.  Bunch stated during briefing that his trial counsel 
had since received a stayed suspension from the practice of law for neglecting a 
criminal matter in 2003 and 2004—shortly after the attorney had represented Bunch 
at trial.  After being disciplined multiple times for neglecting cases and other 
matters, the attorney was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in 2016.  
To support his ineffective-assistance claim, Bunch attached an affidavit from Dr. 
Scott Gronlund, an expert in the field of eyewitness identification. 
{¶ 15} Gronlund averred that M.K.’s identification of Bunch was not likely 
to be accurate.  Gronlund explained that when a witness is first asked to identify a 
perpetrator among a group of suspects, a high-confidence identification at that 
initial test of memory is very likely to be accurate.  But when a witness is not 
confident about identification, any selection made at that time is far less likely to 
 
1.  Because the state did not file an answer or motion in response to Bunch’s 2003 petition, Bunch 
was permitted by statute to “amend the petition with or without leave or prejudice to the 
proceedings.”  R.C. 2953.21(G)(2). 
January Term, 2022 
 
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be accurate.  Gronlund also explained that it has been well known for decades that 
any identification of a perpetrator after an initial attempt tends to be unreliable:   
 
The very act of remembering changes memory, which is one reason 
why it is not possible to get an uncontaminated memory report from 
an eyewitness more than once.  * * *  Our memory system is not 
good at keeping track of WHY something is familiar.  We typically 
only weakly encode the source of a memory (did I read about this 
event, see it myself, or did you tell me about it?) because the source 
is seldom important.  Consequently, witnesses can have difficulty 
determining why a person or a photograph looks familiar.  
Eyewitnesses may not realize that an individual can look familiar 
due to a previous exposure (from a photo in the newspaper) rather 
than from having seen the individual commit the crime.  This 
phenomenon is called unconscious transference * * *.  The “flash of 
recognition” that occurred to the victim upon seeing the suspect’s 
photo in the newspaper did not represent an independent test of her 
memory for the rapist.  Instead, it is likely that the victim matched 
her memory for the lineup photo of Bunch to the photo of Bunch in 
the newspaper, and not to her memory for the rapist.  There is no 
doubt that the lineup photo and the newspaper photo are the same 
person; but, of course, that is not the relevant question.  The relevant 
question is, was Bunch one of the rapists?  As a result of the initial 
test, the lineup photo of Bunch has become the face of the rapist. 
 
Gronlund concluded that M.K.’s inability to provide a confident identification of 
the fourth perpetrator rendered her choice more likely to be inaccurate.  He further 
concluded that M.K.’s later identification of Bunch was “likely a product of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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suggestion and inference, and therefore more prejudicial than probative.”  Gronlund 
explained that “[t]he identification of the suspect from the newspaper photo does 
not represent an independent test of the victim’s memory, but rather likely arose 
from unconscious transference.  Research shows that the confidence reported in a 
subsequent identification attempt is poorly diagnostic of accuracy.” 
{¶ 16} The state conceded that Bunch was entitled to a new sentencing 
hearing under Moore but contested the remainder of Bunch’s petition.  The state 
filed what it styled a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 
12(C), in which it requested dismissal under the standards governing 
postconviction petitions in R.C. 2953.21.  The state filed a proposed judgment entry 
for its own motion, which the trial court adopted verbatim in an entry issued the 
next business day. 
{¶ 17} The entry held that Bunch’s bindover claim under Aalim I was no 
longer viable, as Aalim I had since been reconsidered and vacated in Aalim II, 150 
Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883.  The entry rejected Bunch’s 
ineffective-assistance claim, holding that “an eyewitness identification expert 
would not have altered the trial’s outcome,” because Callier’s testimony 
corroborated M.K.’s identification of Bunch.  The entry also held that an attorney’s 
failure to use an expert witness and instead rely on cross-examination does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. 
{¶ 18} Bunch filed a notice of appeal in the Seventh District, which 
remanded the case in part for resentencing.  A new trial judge presided over 
Bunch’s third sentencing hearing and ultimately imposed an aggregate prison term 
of 49 years.  The trial court also classified Bunch as a sexual predator under the 
standards of Megan’s Law.  Bunch then amended his appeal to the Seventh District 
to include arguments regarding the sentencing and sex-offender-classification 
decisions.  The Seventh District affirmed the trial court’s judgments in full.  2021-
Ohio-1244. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 19} In rejecting the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the 
appellate court held Bunch to the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  The Seventh District 
held that the decision to rebut eyewitness testimony through cross-examination 
rather than an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy and does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  2021-Ohio-1244 at ¶ 24.  The court further held 
that Bunch’s ineffectiveness claim failed because M.K.’s testimony was not the 
sole evidence of Bunch’s identity.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 20} Bunch sought our discretionary review of the Seventh District’s 
decision.  We accepted the appeal on the following propositions of law: 
 
I.  Trial courts should not deny a hearing on a postconviction 
petition based on a blanket rule that it is automatically a reasonable 
strategic decision to rely on cross-examination alone instead of 
consulting with and calling an expert witness. 
II.  A child cannot be transferred to adult court without a 
finding that they are not amenable to treatment in juvenile court. 
III.  When making a sexual predator finding, it is reversible 
error for the trial court to fail to state that it is holding the hearing 
pursuant to R.C. 2950.09(B). 
IV.  The trial court erred when it sentenced Chaz Bunch 
because the findings supporting consecutive sentences are clearly 
and convincingly not supported by the record and the sentence is 
contrary to law. 
 
See 163 Ohio St.3d 1501, 2021-Ohio-2307, 170 N.E.3d 889.  Amici curiae 
Innocence Project, Inc., and Ohio Innocence Project filed a brief in support of 
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Bunch’s first proposition of law.  Numerous other amici curiae filed briefs in 
support of or in opposition to Bunch’s second proposition of law. 
{¶ 21} We find merit to Bunch’s first proposition of law, and we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals on those grounds.  Based on our disposition, we 
find it premature to address Bunch’s third and fourth propositions of law at this 
time.  If the arguments in the third and fourth propositions of law remain relevant 
after the proceedings on remand, the parties may present those arguments to us in 
any ensuing appeal.  Finally, given the unique and protracted procedural history in 
this case, we conclude that Bunch’s appeal is not a suitable vehicle for reviewing 
procedures related to juvenile amenability.  We therefore decline to address 
Bunch’s second proposition of law, and we dismiss the proposition as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 22} We begin by emphasizing that Bunch’s first proposition of law 
focuses on the standard for holding a hearing on a postconviction petition, not the 
standard for ultimately granting relief on the petition.  We are also mindful that 
although the proceedings on Bunch’s amended postconviction petition took place 
long after his conviction, his filing of the petition in 2003 was timely and therefore 
subject to the standards of R.C. 2953.21 rather than to the stringent standards of 
R.C. 2953.23 for untimely or successive petitions. 
Legal Standards 
{¶ 23} In order to grant a hearing on a timely postconviction petition, the 
trial court must “determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief.”  R.C. 
2953.21(D).  If the petition “is sufficient on its face to raise an issue that the 
petitioner’s conviction is void or voidable on constitutional grounds, and the claim 
is one which depends upon factual allegations that cannot be determined by 
examination of the files and records of the case, the petition states a substantive 
ground for relief.”  State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 325 N.E.2d 540 (1975), 
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paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 24} In determining whether the petition states a substantive ground for 
relief, the trial court must consider the entirety of the record from the trial 
proceedings as well as any evidence filed by the parties in postconviction 
proceedings.  R.C. 2953.21(D).  If the record on its face demonstrates that the 
petitioner is not entitled to relief, then the trial court must dismiss the petition.  R.C. 
2953.21(D) and (E).  If the record does not on its face disprove the petitioner’s 
claim, then the court is required to “proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues.”  
R.C. 2953.21(F); see also State v. Hatton, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-3991, 
___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 28 (“The defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when 
the allegations in the motion demonstrate substantive grounds for relief”). 
{¶ 25} A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction 
relief after an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12, 2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 45.  Applying the 
wrong legal standard in a postconviction proceeding is also reversible error under 
an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Hatton at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 26} To establish that trial counsel was ineffective, a defendant must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Regarding the prejudice prong, the defendant must prove that there is a 
“reasonable probability” that counsel’s deficiency affected the outcome of the 
defendant’s proceedings.  Id. at 694.  “A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  “When a defendant 
challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting 
guilt.”  Id. at 695. 
{¶ 27} In this matter, we examine Bunch’s ineffective-assistance claim as 
it relates to a decision whether to grant a hearing on a postconviction petition rather 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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than as it affects a decision on the merits of an appeal or on the merits of the 
postconviction petition.  Thus, Bunch’s postconviction petition need not 
definitively establish counsel’s deficiency or whether Bunch was prejudiced by it.  
Instead, the petition must be sufficient on its face to raise an issue whether Bunch 
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, and Bunch’s claim depends on 
factual allegations that cannot be determined by examining the record from his trial, 
see Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 325 N.E.2d 540, at paragraph one of the syllabus; 
see also State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982) (to merit a 
hearing on a postconviction ineffective-assistance claim, a petitioner must proffer 
evidence outside the record that if true, would show that counsel was ineffective). 
The Courts Below Employed Incorrect Standards 
{¶ 28} The trial court’s entry dismissing Bunch’s postconviction petition 
made no mention of Bunch’s allegation that his trial counsel’s failure to use an 
expert witness was unreasonable in the specific context of his case.2  Instead, it 
concluded that counsel’s actions were not subject to a finding of ineffective 
assistance according to this court’s reasoning in State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 
431, 613 N.E.2d 225 (1993) and State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 754 N.E.2d 
1150 (2001).  It further concluded that because Callier identified Bunch in his 
testimony, the expert testimony “would not have altered the trial’s outcome.”  The 
appellate court, citing Nicholas, State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 514 N.E.2d 
407 (1987), and State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 
836, likewise presumed that trial counsel’s decisions were strategic and not subject 
 
2. The trial court’s verbatim adoption of the state’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, in an entry journalized the next business day after the state’s filing, is not in and of itself 
erroneous.  The timing and form of the entry does, however, make it appear less likely that the court 
actually considered the entirety of the trial record and the matters filed by the parties pursuant to 
R.C. 2953.21(D).  The United States Supreme Court has criticized the practice of adopting a 
prevailing party’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim, and it has implied that 
the practice might be suspect in certain postconviction scenarios.  Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284, 
294, 130 S.Ct. 2217, 176 L.Ed.2d 1032 (2010). 
January Term, 2022 
 
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to a finding of ineffective assistance.  The appellate court held Bunch to the 
standard of proving that “the outcome of the proceedings would have been different 
but for counsel’s deficient performance.”  2021-Ohio-1244 at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 29} Both courts failed to apply the proper standard for reviewing whether 
a hearing was required on Bunch’s postconviction ineffective-assistance claim and 
instead treated Bunch’s claim as one on the merits in a direct appeal.  Both courts 
also erroneously relied on the standard regarding the presumption of sound trial 
strategy articulated in Nicholas, Thompson, Hartman, and Foust.  The factual 
context and the procedural posture of each of these four decisions render them 
inapposite, and thus they do not control the resolution of Bunch’s claim. 
{¶ 30} The defendant in Nicholas argued on direct appeal that his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to have a DNA expert testify and failing to object to the 
admission of DNA evidence at Nicholas’s rape trial.  Trial counsel had hired a DNA 
expert, but with Nicholas’s consent, counsel did not have the expert testify and 
instead cross-examined the state’s DNA experts.  This court noted its recent 
decision holding that DNA evidence is scientifically reliable and therefore 
admissible.  Nicholas at 436-437, citing State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 501, 
597 N.E.2d 107 (1992).  It was clear from the record that trial counsel chose not to 
call the DNA expert to testify as a matter of trial strategy.  This court therefore held 
that it could not second guess such strategy. 
{¶ 31} In the direct appeal following a conviction for aggravated murder 
with a rape specification in a death-penalty proceeding, the defendant in Thompson 
argued that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to have an expert witness 
testify to rebut the state’s expert testimony regarding the physical evidence of rape.  
This court held that in light of the circumstances of the trial, Thompson did not 
overcome the presumption that counsel used sound trial strategy and that he did not 
identify any errors that were so serious that the result of his trial was rendered 
unreliable.  Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d at 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 32} The defendant in Hartman argued in his direct appeal from a death-
penalty conviction that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to engage a DNA 
expert to test semen samples taken from the victim.  The state did not test the semen 
because Hartman had admitted to having sex with the victim on the same day that 
she was killed.  This court held that counsel’s decision not to engage an expert 
could be considered strategy because the potential results of separate DNA testing 
were speculative and could have been inculpatory.  Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 299, 
754 N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 33} The defendant in Foust argued in his direct appeal from a death-
penalty conviction that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a DNA 
expert to refute the reliability of the state’s DNA evidence.  This court held that 
defense counsel’s decision to cross-examine the state’s DNA expert instead of 
calling his own expert was a legitimate tactical decision because the potential 
results of separate testing were speculative and could have been inculpatory.  Foust, 
105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, at ¶ 97-98.  Foust’s 
argument also appeared meritless on its face.  Foust asserted that expert testimony 
was crucial to his claim that he did not hit the victim with a hammer, but he had 
confessed to picking up “something” and hitting the victim with it, and the circular 
fracture on the victim’s skull was consistent with being hit with a hammer.  Id. at  
¶ 95-96. 
{¶ 34} Each one of these cases involves a trial counsel’s choice between 
eliciting expert testimony through the cross-examination of the state’s expert 
witness or eliciting expert testimony by presenting a defense expert.  Such a choice 
was not available in Bunch’s case.  The only way for Bunch’s counsel to present 
expert testimony to the jury regarding the psychology behind eyewitness 
identification would have been through an expert for the defense.  Counsel’s cross-
examination of M.K. could not have elicited the kind of evidence that would come 
from the direct or cross-examination of an expert witness. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 35} Moreover, each of the above four cases involved a direct appeal.  We 
have repeatedly held that direct appeals are not the appropriate place to consider 
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that turn on information that is 
outside the record.  See Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 299, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. 
Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 391, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000); State v. Keith, 79 Ohio 
St.3d 514, 536, 684 N.E.2d 47 (1997); State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-
Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 75.  Because we cannot consider information outside 
the record in a direct appeal, we must often conclude that a defendant’s claims are 
speculative.  Hartman at 299; Foust at ¶ 98.  And speculation alone cannot 
overcome “the ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s performance constituted 
reasonable assistance.”  Foust at ¶ 89, quoting State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
144, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). 
{¶ 36} The inability to consider evidence outside the record in a direct 
appeal is what led to our holding that “the failure to call an expert and instead rely 
on cross-examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,” 
Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d at 436, 613 N.E.2d 225; see also Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 
137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, at ¶ 97; Hartman at 299.  Our holding in 
Nicholas and its ilk, though broadly worded, is not applicable to postconviction 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where courts have the ability to consider 
evidence outside the record and are not limited to mere speculation.  In the present 
context of postconviction litigation, it is possible and appropriate to question 
whether a trial counsel’s decisions were in fact deliberate and strategic and whether 
strategic decisions were reasonable ones.  Trial strategy is usually within the “wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, but strategy is not synonymous with reasonableness. 
Bunch’s Claim Must Be Tested at a Hearing 
{¶ 37} Under the ineffective-assistance standard in Strickland and the 
postconviction-hearing standard articulated in Milanovich, Bunch was required to 
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raise in his petition a triable issue of fact, supported by evidence outside the record, 
whether his trial counsel was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced him.  
Bunch’s evidence, if true, must show that trial counsel’s actions were not 
reasonable “under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland at 688, and that “there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt,” id. at 695; see also Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 
263, 275, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 188 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014). 
{¶ 38} Bunch asserts that because eyewitness identification was the core of 
the state’s case against him, the use of an expert regarding eyewitness identification 
was the only reasonable strategy to support his defense.  He argues that Dr. 
Gronlund’s proposed expert testimony regarding the shortcomings of human 
memory in the context of suspect-identification processes, as well as his opinion 
that M.K.’s identification of Bunch was unreliable and not likely to be accurate, is 
adequate to establish a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a 
reasonable doubt that Bunch was the fourth individual who participated in M.K.’s 
kidnapping, robbery, and rape. 
{¶ 39} If counsel makes a strategic choice “after less than complete 
investigation,” counsel’s choice is “reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.  In 
other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Although rare, there are 
some instances in criminal cases when “the only reasonable and available defense 
strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence.”  
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). 
{¶ 40} When the core of the state’s case against a defendant involves 
evidence that the jury cannot properly understand without the assistance of expert 
testimony, the failure to engage a competent expert can constitute deficient 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
performance.  Hinton, 571 U.S. at 273, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 188 L.Ed.2d 1.  And when 
the core of a defendant’s claim or defense turns on evidence that cannot be properly 
provided to a jury without the use of expert testimony, the failure to engage experts 
can also constitute deficient performance.  State v. Herring, 142 Ohio St.3d 165, 
2014-Ohio-5228, 28 N.E.3d 1217. 
{¶ 41} The defendant in Hinton was arrested in 1985 in connection with 
robberies at three restaurants.  During two of the robberies, a manager was killed, 
while a manager survived being shot at the third restaurant.  Two .38 caliber bullets 
were found at each restaurant.  The surviving victim identified Hinton in a photo 
lineup.  When Hinton was arrested, a .38 caliber gun was found in the house where 
he was living.  Hinton was tried on two capital-murder charges.  The state’s case 
relied on expert testimony that the bullets found at the crime scenes were fired from 
the gun found at Hinton’s house.  Defense counsel hired the only firearm and 
toolmark expert that he could afford with the funds provided by the court.  That 
expert was easily discredited by cross-examination at trial. 
{¶ 42} Hinton argued in a postconviction petition that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to seek additional funds to hire a competent expert.  He 
proffered the testimony of different experts who indicated that the state’s experts 
were likely incorrect in their assessments.  Because the forensic evidence of the 
bullets was “the core of the prosecution’s case,” Hinton at 273, and because it was 
revealed at a hearing on the postconviction petition that trial counsel had failed to 
understand that he could request additional funds for an expert, the court concluded 
that counsel’s performance had been deficient.  After a remand, the state ultimately 
dismissed the case against Hinton.  Hinton v. State, 172 So.3d 355, 362 
(Ala.Crim.App.2014), Reporter’s Note. 
{¶ 43} In Herring, the defendant was convicted of complicity to commit 
aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and course-of-conduct death-
penalty specifications.  All that defense counsel offered in mitigation was that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
Herring had a good relationship with his mother and siblings, and that some of 
Herring’s codefendants did not receive the death penalty.  The state rebutted the 
latter point with evidence that the codefendants were juveniles or otherwise 
dissimilarly situated. 
{¶ 44} In a postconviction petition that included affidavits from two 
psychologists, Herring argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide 
adequate mitigation evidence to help the jury understand the psychological and 
intellectual factors behind the petitioner’s actions that led to the death-penalty 
conviction.  The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, but the appellate court 
reversed, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether 
counsel’s failure to act was due to ignorance or due to a conscious strategic choice.  
Herring, 142 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-5228, 28 N.E.3d 1217, at ¶ 43.  After 
further proceedings and appeals, this court determined that Herring’s trial counsel’s 
failure to gather adequate evidence, particularly the testimony of competent 
specialists in mitigation, was a result of inattention rather than strategy.  Id. at  
¶ 104.  Accordingly, we held that counsel’s performance was deficient.  Id. at  
¶ 111.  This court further concluded that the evidence regarding Herring’s social, 
psychological, and neurological history was significant enough that there was a 
reasonable probability that the result of his proceedings would have been different 
had the evidence been properly presented.  Id. at ¶ 133-134. 
{¶ 45} We conclude that Bunch’s postconviction petition stated a 
substantive ground for relief.  Bunch provided evidence that, if true, set out a prima 
facie case that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel. 
{¶ 46} If Bunch’s allegations are true, counsel’s failure to procure expert 
testimony, even though Bunch’s previous counsel had obtained funds to do so, was 
unreasonable.  According to the expert-witness testimony proffered in Bunch’s 
petition, it has long been well known in the field of eyewitness identification that 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
any identification of a perpetrator after an initial attempt tends to be unreliable 
because it often involves unconscious transference.  In order for the jury to properly 
understand the science and psychology behind eyewitness identification, including 
the concept of unconscious transference, the jury would need the assistance of 
expert testimony. 
{¶ 47} The state did not present an expert to testify regarding eyewitness 
identification.  Bunch’s trial counsel therefore could not use cross-examination to 
elicit any relevant expert information about the subject.  Nor could counsel cross-
examine M.K. to elicit such testimony, and thus cross-examination in this context 
was not a reasonable substitute for presenting expert testimony during Bunch’s case 
in chief.  It was also a questionable choice for counsel to forgo using an unbiased 
expert to present a neutral perspective on the inherent fallibility of the human mind 
to rebut M.K.’s identification of Bunch and to instead attempt to delegitimize 
M.K.’s account of her own horrifying experience through cross-examination.  
Counsel’s efforts did not prove successful in undermining M.K.’s memory; in fact, 
counsel’s efforts significantly weakened Bunch’s defense by giving M.K. the 
opportunity to reiterate how certain she was about her identification of Bunch. 
{¶ 48} The only information that appears on the face of the record regarding 
counsel’s decision-making process is that counsel failed to use an expert witness 
even though prior counsel’s request for funds to pay for an expert had been granted. 
That information does not disprove Bunch’s claim that counsel’s actions were 
unreasonable.  Considering the circumstances that led to evidentiary hearings on 
the postconviction petitions in Hinton and Herring, we conclude that an evidentiary 
hearing is necessary in this case to reach the merits regarding whether counsel’s 
performance was deficient. 
{¶ 49} Next, the expert-witness testimony proffered in Bunch’s petition, if 
true, would establish that M.K.’s identification of Bunch was likely inaccurate.  Use 
of the expert would have provided a reasonable opportunity to impeach the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
eyewitness-identification testimony of M.K. and to offer a viable reason why, 
despite M.K.’s honest and sincere belief, the identification was incorrect.  Because 
identity was the central issue to the state’s case against Bunch, and because M.K.’s 
identification of Bunch was central to the identity issue, impeachment of her 
testimony would give rise to a reasonable probability that a factfinder would have 
a reasonable doubt about Bunch’s guilt.  See Hinton, 571 U.S. at 275, 134 S.Ct. 
1081, 188 L.Ed.2d 1. 
{¶ 50} Callier’s testimony against Bunch in exchange for a significantly 
reduced sentence is relevant to the assessment of whether Bunch was prejudiced by 
his counsel’s alleged deficient performance, but it does not detract from the fact 
that M.K.’s identification of Bunch was the core of the case against him.  Callier’s 
testimony does not disprove Bunch’s claim that he was prejudiced by the failure to 
discredit M.K.’s eyewitness-identification testimony with expert-witness 
testimony.  We conclude that Bunch provided sufficient operative facts to warrant 
an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim that he was prejudiced as a result of 
counsel’s deficient performance. 
{¶ 51} We express no opinion on whether Bunch’s claims might have merit 
once they are aired out in an evidentiary hearing.  Our focus in this decision is not 
on the merits of Bunch’s claim; instead, it is on the adequacy of the process leading 
up to a decision on Bunch’s claim.  “[A]ssurance that the public is protected 
because the actual offender is behind bars depends on the confidence of the 
conviction,” State v. Scott, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4277, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
¶ 22, and thus the state should be just as interested as petitioners are in having 
hearings on legitimate challenges.  The postconviction-petition process ensures the 
integrity of convictions that were correctly entered in addition to ferreting out 
wrongful convictions.  A wrongful conviction achieves justice for no one, and a 
confirmation that a petitioner was rightfully convicted only adds to our confidence 
in the system. 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 52} The trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before 
ruling on the ineffective-assistance claim in Bunch’s postconviction petition, and 
the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment in that respect.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals on 
Bunch’s first proposition of law, and we remand the cause to the trial court to 
proceed to an evidentiary hearing on Bunch’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  As stated above, we decline to address Bunch’s third and fourth 
propositions of law at this time, and we dismiss Bunch’s second proposition of law 
as having been improvidently accepted. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded to the trial court. 
STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
BEATTY BLUNT, J., concurs and would adopt proposition of law No. II as 
well as proposition of law No. I. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
LAUREL BEATTY BLUNT, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting 
for FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 53} Appellant, Chaz Bunch, seeks postconviction relief.  In the first stage 
of a postconviction-relief case, the trial court must decide whether a defendant will 
receive a hearing.  In this gatekeeping role, a trial court can deny a petition for 
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing when the record does not 
demonstrate that the defendant has set forth “sufficient operative facts to establish 
substantive grounds for relief.”  State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 
905 (1999), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 54} Bunch alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel as his 
substantive grounds for relief.  To prove ineffectiveness, Bunch must demonstrate 
that the deficient performance of his defense counsel prejudiced him.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  To prove 
prejudice, Bunch must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. 
at 694. 
{¶ 55} Based on the record in this case, I would hold that the trial court did 
not err in determining that Bunch is not entitled to a hearing with respect to his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Therefore, I dissent. 
The supporting affidavit: Expert-eyewitness-identification testimony 
{¶ 56} Bunch argues that his counsel was ineffective because counsel 
should have hired an expert on eyewitness identification to test the reliability of the 
victim’s identification of him.  In support of his petition for postconviction relief, 
Bunch filed an affidavit from an expert on eyewitness identification, Dr. Scott D. 
Gronlund. 
{¶ 57} Gronlund offers two premises regarding the quality of eyewitness 
testimony.  First, a low-confidence initial identification by a witness signals 
increased likelihood of an inaccurate identification.  Second, tests of memory that 
follow an initial test may be distorted by suggestion and inference and are therefore 
far more prejudicial than they are probative. 
{¶ 58} In his evaluation of this case, Gronlund reviewed 5 pages of victim 
testimony from the trial, 81 pages of the transcript from a suppression hearing, and 
a document he referred to as “Report to the Ohio Court of Appeals.”  Gronlund 
concluded that M.K.’s initial identification of Bunch was a low-confidence 
identification, which is more likely to be inaccurate than a high-confidence 
identification.  He also concluded that her second identification of Bunch, when she 
saw his picture in the newspaper, was “likely a product of suggestion and inference, 
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
and therefore more prejudicial than probative.”  Gronlund opined that the second 
identification likely arose from unconscious transference.  Therefore, in his 
opinion, M.K.’s identification of Bunch was not reliable.  “Research shows that the 
confidence reported in a subsequent identification attempt is poorly diagnostic of 
accuracy,” Gronlund wrote. 
{¶ 59} Despite Gronlund’s statement that research suggests that M.K.’s 
confidence in her second identification of Bunch by the newspaper photo is a poor 
metric of accuracy, his report does not demonstrate that the trial court erred in 
denying Bunch’s petition for postconviction relief without a hearing.  The trial court 
can dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing “where the 
petition, the supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, the files, and the 
records do not demonstrate that [the] petitioner set forth sufficient operative facts 
to establish substantive grounds for relief.”  Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 
N.E.2d 279, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Therefore, the trial court was required 
to consider the record, which includes M.K.’s eyewitness testimony, other 
corroborating evidence, and the testimony of one of Bunch’s codefendants, Jamar 
Callier. 
M.K.’s eyewitness testimony 
{¶ 60} At trial, M.K. testified that when she looked at a police photo lineup 
that included Bunch and five other individuals, she identified Bunch’s picture as 
the one she was “drawn to.”  She told the detective that “if I had to sign this one, I 
would,” but she did not fully commit to the identification because, in her words, “I 
wanted a body shot.  I needed a body shot because he was in the back seat of the 
car, and he was shorter, and he was like rounder, and I needed to see like his hands 
and roundness of his body.”  In other words, M.K. wanted to see a photo lineup 
with fuller pictures.  Police, however, were unable to put together a lineup with full-
body shots for M.K.’s review, because they could not find enough people with the 
right body type. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
{¶ 61} Several days later, however, M.K. saw a fuller picture of Bunch in 
the Youngstown Vindicator newspaper.  She testified that she knew immediately 
that he was the assailant.  M.K. explained, “And I wouldn’t have been satisfied, and 
that’s all—I kept asking Detective Shuster, ‘Can I please see a body shot?  Can I 
see a body shot?’  And then when I saw it, I knew.  And you just—you never forget 
a body when it’s on top of you and you are forced.” 
{¶ 62} The contact between M.K. and Bunch during the kidnapping and 
rape was not brief.  Bunch and one of his codefendants, Brandon Moore, got into 
her car with her,  and they rode to the location of the rape.  During that time, Bunch 
was issuing orders and threats to her.  Upon arrival at the empty parking lot, Bunch 
and Moore raped M.K. repeatedly, orally and vaginally, and Bunch stuck his gun 
in her face and held it on her face near her mouth and threatened to kill her. 
{¶ 63} Despite all the trauma she endured, M.K. was able to memorize the 
license-plate number of the other car involved in the attack and reported it to police.  
That led to the quick arrest of three of the assailants.  In my view, the quality of 
M.K.’s testimony diminishes Gronlund’s conclusions.  And confidence in the 
accuracy of her identification increases significantly in light of the other 
corroborating evidence and testimony. 
Corroborating evidence and testimony 
{¶ 64} Roughly half an hour after the kidnapping and rape of M.K., a police 
officer spotted a vehicle at a gas station in town with a license plate that closely 
matched the number M.K. had provided.  Bunch and one of his codefendants were 
captured on video surveillance inside the gas station.  The officer pursued the car 
from the gas station until it stopped in the driveway of a house a short time later.  
Within minutes, Bunch was seen by another police officer “trotting” in the 
neighborhood where the driver had just parked the car and fled on foot, leaving the 
other three assailants behind.  Bunch then knocked on the door of a stranger and 
asked the stranger to pretend that he was Bunch’s uncle because police were after 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
him—supposedly for a curfew violation.  Bunch then paid the man to use his phone 
to call a girlfriend and to drive Bunch to another neighborhood. 
{¶ 65} M.K. testified that during the rape, Bunch argued with his 
codefendants that they should kill her.  But Callier argued against it.  Callier ended 
the attack when he pushed Bunch off M.K.  Callier’s testimony corroborated 
M.K.’s testimony, and Callier identified Bunch as one of the perpetrators who 
kidnapped and raped M.K. that night.  Therefore, there was a second eyewitness 
who identified Bunch as the fourth assailant. 
{¶ 66} In addition to M.K.’s testimony, then, the trial court could consider 
the eyewitness testimony of Callier, the evidence that Bunch was with the 
codefendants at the gas station soon after the attack, and the testimony of the 
stranger whom Bunch asked to lie to police, putting him in the neighborhood where 
the assailants were found and taken into custody. 
No proof of prejudice 
{¶ 67} In Calhoun, this court stated that “we have held that it is not 
unreasonable to require the defendant to show in his petition for postconviction 
relief that such errors resulted in prejudice before a hearing is scheduled.”  86 Ohio 
St.3d at 283, 714 N.E.2d 905.  As stated above, to satisfy the prejudice prong of an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Bunch must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel’s alleged errors—here, the failure to hire an 
eyewitness-identification expert—the proceeding’s result would have been 
different.  See State v. Tench, 156 Ohio St.3d 85, 2018-Ohio-5205, 123 N.E.3d 955, 
¶ 118.  In my view, in light of all the evidence of Bunch’s involvement in the 
kidnapping and rape of M.K., the trial court did not err in rejecting Bunch’s 
ineffective-assistance argument.  There is not a reasonable probability that Bunch’s 
trial would have ended differently had his attorney hired an eyewitness-
identification expert.  And “[a] defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the 
Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.”  State v. Madrigal, 87 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 68} The petition, the supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, 
the files, and the records do not demonstrate that Bunch set forth sufficient 
operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.  Gronlund’s affidavit 
effectively sets forth his theories about eyewitness testimony, but those theories do 
not overcome the evidence before the trial court in this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 69} Bunch claims that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
because of counsel’s failure to hire an expert on eyewitness identification to cast 
doubt upon M.K.’s identification of Bunch as one of the two assailants who raped 
her in August 2001.  In my view, the trial court did not err in not holding a hearing 
on his petition for postconviction relief.  The victim’s testimony, the corroborating 
evidence, the testimony of one of Bunch’s codefendants, and the record as a whole, 
including the affidavit signed by Bunch’s expert, demonstrate that Bunch did not 
support his petition with sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds 
for relief. 
{¶ 70} Furthermore, since the first proposition of law is not dispositive, I 
would address the remaining propositions of law.  Therefore, I dissent. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ralph M. 
Rivera and Edward A. Czopur, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick and 
Charlyn Bohland, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor 
General, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
Anton Robinson and Lauren Gottesman, urging reversal on behalf of 
amicus curiae Innocence Project, Inc. 
Mark A. Godsey and Donald Caster, urging reversal on behalf of amicus 
curiae Ohio Innocence Project. 
Marsha L. Levick, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center. 
Leah R. Winsberg, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amici curiae Children’s Law Center and Rutgers Center on Criminal Justice, Youth 
Rights, and Race. 
Kristina Kersey and Amanda J. Powell, in support of appellant’s second 
proposition of law, for amicus curiae National Juvenile Defender Center. 
 Yeura Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Timothy E. Pierce, 
Appellate Division Chief, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amicus curiae Franklin County Public Defender. 
H. Louis Sirkin, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amicus curiae Association for Public Defense. 
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. Cunliffe, 
Assistant Public Defender, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender. 
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, 
Juvenile Appellate Trial Counsel, in support of appellant’s second proposition of 
law, for amicus curiae Hamilton County Public Defender. 
Theresa Haire, Montgomery County Public Defender, and Kay Locke, 
Assistant Public Defender, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amicus curiae Montgomery County Public Defender. 
Kimberly P. Jordan, in support of appellant’s second proposition of law, for 
amicus curiae Justice for Children Project. 
_________________