Title: Olde Severna Park v. Gunby

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Olde Severna Park Improvement Association, Inc., et al. v. Paul Gunby, Jr., et al.
No. 37, September Term 2007
Headnote: Where a recorded Plat specifically reserves the riparian rights to a Developer,
when that Developer later conveys waterfront property recorded on that same Plat, it is
presumed that riparian rights appurtenant to that waterfront property are also conveyed,
absent a clear intention to exclude those rights.
 
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Civil Case Nos. C-05-100243 & C-05-104092 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 37
September Term, 2007
Olde Severna Park Improvement
Association, Inc., et al.
v.
Paul Gunby, Jr., et al.
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C.
                      (retired, specially assigned)
Wilner, Alan M.
(retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(retired, specially assigned),
                      JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: December 3, 2007
1 The license from MDE was issued only to Mr. Gunby and some pleadings were filed
solely by or against Mr. Gunby.  At the motion hearing in March 2005, however, Mr. Gunby
orally amended his motion to add Mrs. Gunby.  Therefore, we refer to the Gunbys as
respondents.
This case requires us to consider whether a deed, which incorporates by reference a
Plat recorded in 1931, should be strictly construed against the severance of riparian rights.
We shall hold that the 1931 Plat specifically reserved to the Developer riparian rights in order
that the notation of certain areas on the plat that appeared to be waterfront property would
not be considered an offer to dedicate such areas to the local governing authority, but that
when the Developer subsequently conveyed waterfront land recorded on that Plat in fee
simple to an individual owner, the riparian rights were conveyed with the waterfront property
and consequently were severed from the Developer at the time of that conveyance.
In 1931, the Severna Company subdivided a tract of land owned by it in fee simple,
and recorded a Plat displaying the subdivision in the Land of Records in Anne Arundel
County.  In 1963, the Severna Company conveyed to a Mr. Christian E. Rossee, in fee
simple, waterfront property that included the riparian rights at issue in this case. In 1972, Mr.
Rossee conveyed .70 acres of waterfront property to Mr. John M. Jones and his wife, Carol
R. Jones.  The Joneses in turn conveyed that waterfront property, along with a landlocked
parcel of land, to Paul Gunby and his wife, Joan Gunby in 1991.
In July 2004, the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) issued a license
to Paul Gunby (“respondents”)1 to construct a foot bridge and pier across a tidal pond that
bisected his property.  On September 2, 2004, the Olde Severna Park Improvement
2 The petitioners were descried in the petition as “Olde Severna Park Improvement
Association (the ‘Association’), et al.”  For ease of reference we shall refer to them
(continued...)
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Association filed a petition for judicial review and a motion for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, claiming that it owned the riparian rights required for the
issuance of that license.  Additionally, on February 25, 2005, petitioner filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment seeking resolution of the disputed ownership of the riparian rights at
issue in the case at bar.  On September 13, 2004, a consent order barring construction until
the resolution of the petition was granted.
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County heard oral arguments on cross-motions
for summary judgment on the complaint for declaratory judgment on May 23, 2005, and on
June 3, 2005, the Circuit Court held that the deed conveying the land (originally to Mr.
Rossee, and through chain of title, to respondents) did not convey the riparian rights to Mr.
Rossee.  On June 28, 2005, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County held that the MDE
had improperly issued the original license, based on its determination in the declaratory
judgment case that respondents did not possess the requisite riparian rights.  
Respondents filed a notice of appeal and subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari
in both the declaratory judgment and the petition for judicial review cases.  The Court of
Special Appeals issued an opinion on April 27, 2007, vacating the petition for judicial review
judgment of the Circuit Court, and reversing the declaratory judgment.  Gunby v. Olde
Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 174 Md. App. 189, 921 A.2d 292 (2007).  Petitioner2
2(...continued)
collectively as petitioner.  
3
 “An owner’s ‘chain of title’ is simply the preceding recorded
deeds (or other instruments of transfer, such as a will) going
back in time, in order, i.e., the last recorded to first recorded
instrument. . . .  A subsequent owner, therefore, has notice of
what is contained in his or her actual chain of title even if he or
she has never seen it, heard it, or even imagined that it existed.”
Bright v. Lake Linganore Ass’n, Inc., 104 Md.App. 394, 424-25, 656 A.2d 377, 393 (1995).
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then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, which we granted.  Old Severna Park v.
Gunby, 399 Md. 595, 925 A.2d 634 (2007).  Petitioner presents two questions for our review:
“1.  DO WILLIAMS V. SKYLINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
265 MD. 130 [,288 A.2d 333] (1972), MARYLAND ANN. CODE REAL
PROPERTY § 2-101, OR ANY OTHER AUTHORITY REQUIRE THAT A
FIFTY-FIVE YEAR OLD DEED INCORPORATING BY REFERENCE A
1931 PLAT BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE SEVERANCE
OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS?
“2.  IN DETERMINING THE INTENT AND MEANING OF A 1931
PLAT WITH REGARD TO RIPARIAN RIGHTS, IS IT APPROPRIATE
FOR A COURT TO APPLY A LEGAL CONTEXT DEVELOPED BY AN
APPELLATE DECISION NEARLY SEVENTY YEARS AFTER 1931?”
We hold that the reservation in the 1931 Plat only had the effect of not dedicating the riparian
rights to Anne Arundel County, but instead insured that those rights were retained by the
Severna Company.  Therefore, in 1963, when the Severna Company conveyed to Mr. Rossee
the waterfront land in fee simple, it had the effect of conveying to Mr. Rossee (and
consequently to respondents through chain of title3) the riparian rights as well.  In light of this
holding, it is unnecessary to resolve the second question of the petition.
4 For a more thorough and extensive explanation of the facts in this case, reference is
made to Judge Hollander’s excellent opinion in Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement
Ass’n, Inc., 174 Md. App. 189, 921 A.2d 292 (2007).
5 When referencing the “waterfront property at issue”, we do not imply that the
ownership of the land is disputed, but refer only to the riparian rights that accompany the
waterfront property. 
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I.  Facts
The facts relevant to our holding4 begin in 1931, when the Severna Company recorded
a Plat in the Land Records of Anne Arundel County.  The waterfront property at issue in the
case before us5 is indicated on that Plat.  In the upper left hand corner of the Plat appears the
following handwritten notation:
“NOTE
IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE SEVERNA COMPANY NOT TO DEDICATE TO THE
PUBLIC, THE STREETS, ALLEYS, ROADS, DRIVES, AND OTHER PASSAGE WAYS AND
PARKS SHOWN ON THIS PLAT, EXCEPT THAT THE SAME MAY BE USED IN COMMON
BY LOT OWNERS AND RESIDENTS OF SEVERNA PARK PLAT 2.  ALL RIPARIAN
RIGHTS BEING RETAINED BY THE SAID THE SEVERNA COMPANY.”
In 1963, the Severna Company conveyed to Christian Rossee (the “Rossee Deed”),
in fee simple, several parcels of land, including the waterfront property at issue in the instant
case.  That property in the Rossee Deed was described as running “with the water[’]s edge
. . . ” and granted to Rossee “all privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same
belonging or anywise appertaining.”  Additionally, the habendum clause stated:
“TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said parcels of ground above
described and mentioned and hereby intended to be conveyed 
together with the
rights, privileges, appurtenances and advantages thereto belonging or
appertaining unto and to the proper use and benefit of the said CHRISTIAN
E. ROSSEE, his executor, administrator, heirs and assigns, in fee simple.
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“AND the party of the first part [Severna Company] hereby warrants
that it has not done or suffered to be done, any act, matter or thing whatsoever
to encumber the property hereby conveyed and will warrant specially the
property hereby granted and that it will execute such further assurances of the
same as may be requisite, but nothing herein granted is to apply to restrictions,
dedications, easements or ways.”  (Emphasis added.)
According to the testimony of Mr. Rossee’s daughter, Debra Shepley, Mr. Rossee and
Ms. Shepley, shortly after the conveyance to Mr. Rossee, constructed approximately four
jetties from the shoreline into the water to prevent erosion.  Those jetties were built and
maintained by Mr. Rossee until the early 1970’s without any objection.  
In 1972, Mr. Rossee conveyed in fee simple approximately .70 acres of waterfront
property–the waterfront property at issue in the instant case–to Mr. and Mrs. Jones (the
“Jones Deed”).  That deed described the property as: “part of . . . the . . . conveyance from
the Severna Company to Christian E. Rossee . . .” and described the property as extending
to a point “located on the shoreline of the Severn River . . . .”  The habendum clause in the
deed to Jones stated in relevant part:
“To Have And To Hold the said lot of ground and premises, described
and mentioned, and hereby intended to be conveyed; together with the rights,
privileges, appurtenances and advantages thereto belonging or appertaining
unto and to the proper use and benefit of the said JOHN M. JONES, JR. and
CAROL R. JONES, his wife, as tenants by the entireties, their assigns, the
survivor of them, the survivor’s heirs and assigns, in fee simple.”
(Emphasis added.)
In 1977, the Severna Company transferred all of its remaining property rights, to the
Olde Severna Park Improvement Association in a quit claim deed that states, in relevant part:
“WHEREAS, The Severna Company now desires to convey the
6 The remainder of the property originally conveyed to Rossee from the Severna
Company, except that .70 acre of waterfront property at issue in the present case.
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hereinafter described property and riparian rights thereto to The Anne Arundel
County Planning and Zoning Officer, in trust, to be immediately conveyed to
the Olde Severna Park Improvement Association, Inc.[,] the community
association representing the lot owners of Severna Park.
“NOW, THEREFORE, THIS DEED WITNESSETH:
“That for and in consideration of the premises and the sum of One
Dollar, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Party of the First Part
[the Severna Company] does hereby grant, convey, and assign, release, and
quit claim unto the said Party of the Second Part [the Anne Arundel County
Planning and Zoning Officer], in trust, nevertheless, to be immediately
reconveyed to the Olde Severna Park Improvement Association, Inc., all its
right, title, interest and estate whatsoever in law or in equity in, to, or over the
property . . . .”
Then in October 1991, the Severna Company conveyed to Olde Severna Park Improvement
Association via quit claim deed “any property interest remaining in the Severna Company,
Inc.[,] on the herein described four plats that was not previously conveyed to the Grantee or
to any third party.”  In sum, the two deeds conveyed any interests, including whatever
riparian rights, that the Severna Company may have had in 1977 and 1991 to petitioner.  
Following her father’s death in July 1980, Ms. Shepley obtained title to the remaining
Rossee property.6  In 1989, she constructed, with the Joneses permission, several more jetties
into the water from both her property and that of the Joneses, which did include the property
at issue in the instant case.  This was done, again, without objection.  With regard to the
ownership of riparian rights, her testimony states, in relevant part:  “My father and I both
installed and maintained our jetties . . . because we believed, and I continue to believe, that
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we owned the riparian rights associated with our ownership [of the property] . . . .” 
Finally, by deed dated February 27, 1991, the Joneses conveyed in fee simple to
respondents, two contiguous and adjoining parcels of land, which included the waterfront
property at issue in this case.  There, the parcel of land that included the waterfront property
was described as being “located on the shoreline of the Severn River” and as being “the same
parcel of land which by Deed dated January 17, 1972 . . . was granted and conveyed from
Christian E. Rossee unto John M. Jones and Carol R. Jones, his wife.”  The habendum clause
states:
“TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said described lot of ground and
premises, above described and mentioned, and hereby intended to be
conveyed; together with the rights, privileges, appurtenances and advantages
thereto belonging or appertaining unto and to the proper use and benefit of the
said parties of the second part [John M. Jones and Carol R. Jones], as Tenants
by the Entireties and not as Tenants in Common[,] personal representatives and
assigns, in fee simple.”  (Emphasis added.)
In November 2003, respondents filed a “JOINT FEDERAL/STATE APPLICATION
FOR THE ALTERATION OF ANY TIDAL WETLAND IN MARYLAND” with MDE for
a license to construct a 410 foot walkway over a tidal pond that bisected their property, and
a 200 foot pier.  Petitioner noted its objection in a letter dated February 26, 2007, where it
claimed to MDE that riparian rights had never been conveyed to Mr. Rossee, and
consequently, respondents could not have obtained those riparian rights through chain of
title.  Petitioner claimed that those riparian rights belonged to it.  MDE, nevertheless, issued
the license in July 2004.
7 In its description of the land, the Rossee Deed stated, in relevant part:  “TOGETHER
with the right to use in common with the seller and others, all of the streets, roads, parks, and
avenues as shown on Plat #2, Severna Park . . . surveyed . . . April, 1931, recorded among
the Plat Records of Anne Arundel County.”
-8-
As stated above, in September 2004, petitioner filed a petition for judicial review
regarding the issuance of the license by MDE, and complaint for declaratory judgment as to
the ownership of the riparian rights.  While the petition was pending, the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County heard cross-motions for summary judgment in June 2005, and
ultimately issued a written opinion and separate order granting petitioner’s motion.  There,
the Circuit Court found that the Severna Company had expressly reserved to itself the
riparian rights via the notation on the 1931 Plat, and determined that the Rossee Deed did not
convey riparian rights.  In support of this conclusion, the Circuit Court reasoned that
Maryland law under Williams v. Skyline, 265 Md. 130, 288 A.2d 333 (1972), provided that
a plat is incorporated into a deed if the deed contains a reference to the plat, which the
Rossee deed did.7  Additionally, it observed that when interpreting deeds, the entire deed
must be interpreted as a contract, no part of which may be disregarded unless violative of
some principle of law.  Finally, the Circuit Court found the 1931 Plat to be ambiguous, based
on the different conclusions of two different attorneys.  It therefore looked to the language
of other deeds from the Severna Company to determine the intent of the grantor, which the
Circuit Court ultimately determined to be an intention to reserve riparian rights free from the
claims of subsequent individual property owners.
8 The trial court declared judgment as to the complaint for declaratory judgment by
the granting of a motion for summary judgment with an opinion declaring the rights of the
parties.
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In June 2005, the Circuit Court also heard arguments on the petition for judicial
review challenging the issuance of the MDE license.  Taking judicial notice of its decision
in the declaratory proceeding, the Circuit Court concluded that because respondents did not
possess riparian rights, respondents were not entitled to a license to construct the walkway
or pier, and consequently reversed MDE’s decision.
The Gunbys, respondents, then filed a notice of appeal and subsequent petition for a
writ of certiorari from both the Circuit Court’s declaratory judgment and its resolution in
respect to the petition for judicial review of the MDE license.  The Court of Special Appeals
issued a reported opinion on April 27, 2007, where it vacated the judgment of the Circuit
Court regarding the petition for judicial review, and reversed the decision regarding the
declaratory judgment.  Gunby v. Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 174 Md. App.
189, 921 A.2d 292 (2007).  Observing that riparian rights usually accompany waterfront
property, the Court of Special Appeals held that to sever riparian rights, a more express and
definitive statement of reservation would normally be required than existed in the instant
case.  We agree with that court.
II.  Standard of Review
Maryland Rule 2-501 authorizes a motion for summary judgment8 where:  “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law.”  This Court has stated:  “‘When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for
summary judgment we must determine whether a material factual issue exists, and all
inferences are resolved against the moving party.’”  Miller v. Bay City Property Owners
Ass’n, Inc., 393 Md. 620, 631, 903 A.2d 938, 945 (2006) (quoting King v. Bankerd, 303 Md.
98, 110-11, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985)); e.g., Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc., 273 Md.
1, 7-8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974).  “That, as a general rule, the construction or interpretation
of all written instruments is a question of law for the court is a principle of law that does not
admit of doubt.” Gordy v. Ocean Park, Inc., 218 Md. 52, 60, 145 A.2d 273, 277 (1958)
(citing Roberts v. Bonaparte, 73 Md. 191, 20 A. 918 (1890)); Sperling v. Terry, 214 Md. 367,
135 A.2d 309 (1957), Strickler Engineering Corp. v. Seminar, 210 Md. 93, 100, 122 A.2d
563 (1956), Hartsock v. Mort, 76 Md. 281, 291, 25 A. 303 (1892).   “Our standard of review
of [a] [] declaratory judgment entered as the result of the grant of a motion for summary
judgment is whether that declaration was correct as a matter of law.”  South Easton
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468, 487, 876 A.2d 58, 70 (2005) (citing
Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 476, 860 A.2d 871, 879 (2004)).
III.  Discussion
Petitioner argues that the notation on the 1931 Plat served to sever the riparian rights
from the land, and that the 1963 Rossee Deed, from which respondents derive their title,
specifically incorporated the 1931 Plat, resulting in no conveyance of riparian rights to
Rossee, respondent’s predecessor in title.  It further argues in its brief that the intention of
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the Severna Company was to reserve the riparian rights “for itself and later the community.”
We disagree.  The notation on the 1931 Plat served only to ensure that the riparian rights
were not dedicated to the public or a governing body thereof, e.g., Anne Arundel County.
At the time of the filing of the Plat, the notation served as a reservation of the riparian rights
to the Severna Company, free of any offer to dedicate such rights to the County.  When the
Severna Company subsequently conveyed to Rossee the waterfront property in fee simple,
it conveyed exactly what it then had; i.e., both the land and the riparian rights that went with
the land.  It no longer reserved any riparian rights appurtenant to that land then being
conveyed.  As Judge Hollander correctly noted for the Court of Special Appeals: 
“[T]he Note on the 1931 Plat did not retain riparian rights in the developer
with respect to the waterfront lot purchased by Rossee or his successors.  To
accomplish that objective with respect to a waterfront community, more would
have been required than the one sentence we have here. . . . [O]ne who buys
waterfront property in a development usually expects to acquire riparian rights,
unless those rights are clearly and expressly excluded.”
Gunby, 174 Md. App. at 257-58, 921 A.2d at 333.
Generally, when a plat is recorded, it is presumed that there is an intent to dedicate
particular types of land interests to public use, such as roads, parks, etc., and when that offer
of dedication is accepted, the dedication is complete and the local government will generally
have jurisdiction over that land.  We explained the concept of common-law dedication in 
City
of Annapolis v. Waterman:
“Generally, common-law dedications are voluntary offers to dedicate
land to public use, and the subsequent acceptance, in an appropriate fashion,
by a public entity.  Common-law dedications are not mandated by statute.  The
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offers [to dedicate] are generally, although not exclusively, made by showing
roads, parks or similar facilities on plats without any limitations on dedication,
and the recording of those plats.”  
357 Md. 484, 503-04, 745 A.2d 1000, 1010 (2000).  The offer of dedication of land and the
acceptance of that offer by a public body generally has the effect of imposing on the local
governing entity the responsibility of maintenance and repair.  Id. 357 Md. 504, 745 A.2d at
1010.  Further, dedications of the nature alleged here must be made to the public at large, and
normally are not intended for sole use of the individual landowners.   “‘[T]here is no such
thing as a dedication between owner and individuals.  The public must be a party to every
dedication.’”  Id. 357 at 506, 745 at 1011(quoting Jackson v. Gastonia, 246 N.C. 404 409,
98 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1957)).  Where a reservation in a dedication is present, it will overcome
the presumption of dedication:  
“[W]hen an owner of land makes a plat of his property ‘on which streets or
alleys are laid down and then conveys it in lots as bounding on the streets and
alleys by reference to their numbers on the plat from which it appears that they
do in fact bound on the streets or alleys, an intention to dedicate the land lying
in the bed of the streets and alleys to public use will be presumed, in the
absence of language showing that no dedication was intended.’” (Emphasis
added.)
Mauck v. Bailey, 247 Md. 434, 442-43, 231 A.2d 685, 690 (1967) (quoting Atlantic
Construction Corp. v. Shadburn, 216 Md. 44, 51, 139 A.2d 339, 343 (1958)).  The
reservation language on the Plat at issue here is just that type of language used to show that
no offer to dedicate riparian rights was made by the filing of the 1931 Plat.
A riparian landowner is defined as “‘one who owns land bordering upon, bounded by,
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fronting upon, abutting or adjacent and contiguous to and in contact with a body of water,
such as a river, bay, or running stream.’” (citation omitted).  Kirby v. Hook, 347 Md. 380,
389, 701 A.2d 397, 402 (1997) (quoting People’s Counsel v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 316
Md. 491, 493 n. 1, 560 A.2d 32, 33 n. 1 (1989)).  When waterfront property is conveyed,
there exists a presumption that the property is accompanied by the riparian rights to those
waters.  See Williams v. Skyline Development Corp., 265 Md. 130, 162, 288 A.2d 333, 351-
52 (1972) (“a conveyance of land bordering on navigable water presumptively carries with
it the grantor’s riparian rights”); Conrad/Dommel, LLC v. West Development Company, 149
Md.App. 239, 277, 815 A.2d 828, 850 (2003) (“Absent an express reservation, it is presumed
as a matter of law that the riparian rights [are] [] conveyed in the deeds”).
In the instant case, when the 1931 Plat was recorded, the notation had only the effect
of showing the Severna Company’s intent not to dedicate to the public, i.e., the County, the
riparian rights. Indeed, the notation begins “It is the intention of the Severna Company not
to dedicate . . .” (emphasis added).  By using this language at that particular time, it protected
those streets, alleys, roads, drives, other passage ways, parks and riparian rights from
becoming the property of Anne Arundel County.  There could not have been an intent to
dedicate the riparian rights to the community at large when they were reserved in a notation
restricting the dedication offer, because, as previously noted, the very nature of the type of
dedication that might apply here usually requires that the public be the beneficiary of a
9 Both the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals examined other conveyances
of waterfront property from the Severna Company to individual landowners.  As we have
found no ambiguity, however, consideration of extrinsic documents is unnecessary.
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dedication.9  The notation on the Plat contains no ambiguity of language that would require
this Court to look beyond the plain language of the 1931 Plat and the relevant deeds to the
waterfront property at issue if the notation on the Plat is read in its proper context, which is
governed by the law of dedication.  Accordingly, when the waterfront property was later
conveyed to Rossee in 1963 in fee simple, Rossee received whatever the Severna Company
then possessed, which included the riparian rights appurtenant to the land conveyed. That
deed, by operation of law, contained an unrebutted presumption of a conveyance of the land
and riparian rights.  In the subsequent conveyances to the Joneses and the Gunbys, no
reservation of riparian rights was ever made.  Riparian rights accordingly went with the
waterfront property at issue here.  Consequently, respondents derived their riparian rights
through chain of title from the original deed to Rossee.
IV.  Conclusion
The trial court erred in the instant case in construing the notation on the 1931 Plat as
an intent on the part of Severna Company to reserve the entire platted area for the reciprocal
use of future owners of the private land within the development.  That court clearly assumed
that the notation was intended for prospective landowners as a dedication to the landowners
as a whole for reciprocal use, when in fact, it was merely a notice to Anne Arundel County
that no dedication was intended.  The law of dedication, as stated above, clearly shows that
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the effect of such a notation reserved the riparian rights to the Severna Company.  When the
waterfront property was conveyed to Rossee, prior to any conveyance to the Olde Severna
Park Improvement Association, the Severna Company conveyed exactly what it then
possessed; i.e., the land and the riparian rights.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
O F  
S P E C I A L  
A PP E A LS
AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.