Title: Hilton v. Martin

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
FRED HILTON, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF COURTNEY 
LEIGHANN HILTON RHOTON, DECEASED 
           
             OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 070091 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
          January 11, 2008 
JOSHUA PHILLIP MARTIN, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RUSSELL COUNTY 
Michael L. Moore, Judge 
 
 
This action to recover damages for personal injury and 
resulting death arose from an assault on the victim by a 
fellow employee "in the course of" their mutual employment.  
The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court erred 
in dismissing the plaintiff’s case on the ground that it 
involved an "injury arising out of" her employment and 
therefore that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code 
§§ 65.2-100 et seq. (the Act), provided the exclusive remedy 
for the plaintiff’s claims. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  On June 1, 2005, 
Courtney Leighann Hilton Rhoton (Courtney), an emergency 
medical services provider, was seated on the passenger side of 
the front seat of an ambulance owned by Highlands Ambulance 
Service, Inc. (Highlands) while it was traveling on the 
highway.  Seated beside her was the driver, Michael V. 
 
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Coleman.  Joshua Philip Martin was riding in the rear of the 
ambulance.  Coleman and Martin were both emergency medical 
technicians and all three occupants of the ambulance were 
employees of Highlands.  At the time in question, they were 
returning in the ambulance to Highlands’ office after lunch. 
 
The plaintiff alleged that Martin had a reputation as a 
“kid in an adult’s body,” that he had a tendency to “harass 
his female co-workers” and that he “exhibited childish and 
immature behavior.”  As the ambulance neared Highlands’ 
office, Martin turned on the power to a manual cardiac 
defibrillator that was in the rear of the ambulance, adjusted 
its energy to 150 joules, and picked up the defibrillator 
paddles.  With the paddles in his hands, he turned toward the 
front of the ambulance and told Courtney, “I’m going to get 
you.”  Courtney screamed, “Get those away from me,” and pushed 
Martin back.  He turned away from her and appeared to be 
replacing the paddles in the unit.  Suddenly, he again came 
toward her, striking Courtney with the paddles on the left 
shoulder and left breast, while simultaneously activating 
them.  Courtney screamed, “[h]e shocked me,” and appeared to 
be having a seizure. 
 
Coleman called his office to have emergency treatment 
available and drove directly there.  Greta Caudill, a licensed 
paramedic employed by Highlands, transferred Courtney to 
 
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another ambulance and transported her to a hospital, assessing 
Courtney’s condition as “altered state of consciousness, 
cardiac arrest, respiratory arrest and electrocution.”  
Courtney never regained consciousness and died on June 4, 2005 
of “electrocution and cardiac arrest caused by being hit with 
a charged defibrillator.”  Burn marks were present at the 
points where the defibrillator paddles had made contact with 
her body. 
 
Fred Hilton, Courtney’s father, qualified as 
administrator of her estate and brought this action against 
Martin, Highlands and Greta Caudill.  The complaint included 
counts for assault and battery against Martin and Highlands, 
medical malpractice against Greta Caudill and Highlands, and 
negligent hiring and negligent retention against Highlands. 
The defendants filed pleas in bar, asserting that the 
plaintiff’s sole remedy was provided by the Act.  The parties 
submitted the case to the trial court on the pleadings, 
depositions and arguments of counsel.  The court, by letter 
opinion, ruled that the “accident” arose out of and in the 
course of the employment and that the plaintiff’s exclusive 
remedy was as provided by the Act.  The court then entered an 
order sustaining the pleas in bar as to all counts1 and 
                     
1 The Administrator argued that the medical malpractice 
claim was not covered by the Act, citing our decision in 
 
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dismissed the complaint.  We awarded the Administrator an 
appeal. 
Analysis 
 
A plea in bar presents a distinct issue of fact which, if 
proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery. 
The moving party has the burden of proof on that issue. 
Weichert Co. of Virginia v. First Commercial Bank, 246 Va. 
108, 109 n.*, 431 S.E.2d 308, 309 n.* (1993).  In this appeal, 
we are presented solely with a question of law concerning the 
trial court’s application of the law to essentially undisputed 
facts.  Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review.  
Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 363, 634 S.E.2d 754, 759 
(2006). 
 
An “injury” falls within the scope of the Act only if it 
results from an “accident” and arises out of and in the course 
of the injured person’s employment.  Code § 65.2-101.  If the 
injury meets those tests, the rights provided by the Act are 
the sole remedies for the injury, to the exclusion of any 
other rights and remedies “at common law or otherwise, on 
account of such injury, loss of service or death.”  Code 
                                                                
Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951).  The trial 
court held that case inapplicable because the party charged 
with malpractice here was a co-worker.  Because of the view we 
take of the applicability of the Act under the facts of this 
case, we do not reach that question. 
 
 
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§ 65.2-307.  To the extent that an employee’s injury does not 
meet the statutory tests for coverage under the Act, the 
employee’s common-law remedies are preserved unimpaired.  
Butler v. Southern States Cooperative, Inc., 270 Va. 459, 465, 
620 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2005). 
 
Here, it is undisputed that Courtney’s fatal injury arose 
in the course of her employment.  Therefore, the sole question 
before us on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in 
finding from the undisputed facts that her injury also was one 
“arising out of” her employment.  In considering the “arising 
out of” prong, we do not apply the “positional risk” test, 
whereby simply sustaining an injury at work is sufficient to 
establish compensability.  Rather, we adhere to the “actual 
risk” test, under which the injury comes within the Act only 
if there is a causal connection between the employee’s injury 
and the conditions under which the employer requires the work 
to be done.  Id.   
 
We have considered a number of cases involving assaults 
upon employees2 and it is unnecessary to revisit them in 
                     
2 See e.g., Reamer v. National Service Industries, 237 Va. 
466, 471, 377 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1989); Metcalf v. A. M. Express 
Moving Systems, Inc., 230 Va. 464, 470, 339 S.E.2d 177, 181 
(1986); City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 165, 335 
S.E.2d 259, 262 (1985); see also Hopson v. Hungerford Coal 
Co., 187 Va. 299, 305-06, 46 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1948); A. N. 
Campbell & Co. v. Messenger, 171 Va. 374, 377-78, 199 S.E. 
 
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detail.  All adhere to a common principle:  “If the assault is 
personal to the employee and not directed against him as an 
employee or because of his employment, the [resulting] injury 
does not arise out of the employment.”  Richmond Newspapers v. 
Hazelwood, 249 Va. 369, 373, 457 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1995) 
(citations omitted).  That principle controls the present 
case. 
 
It is immaterial whether the assailant’s subjective 
motivation is playful, amorous, vindictive, or hostile.  An 
injury resulting from an assault arises out of the injured 
person's employment when it is directed at the victim as an 
employee. 
 
Such an injury also arises out of the employment when the 
conditions under which the employer requires the work to be 
done are a contributing cause of the injury.  Therefore, the 
assailant’s unauthorized use of a tool that happened to be 
available at the workplace is immaterial.  Unauthorized use of 
the employer's equipment is not probative on the question 
whether the employer's workplace requirements were a 
contributing cause of the injury. 
 
The evidence in the present case clearly establishes that 
Martin’s assault had no relationship with Courtney’s status as 
                                                                
511, 513 (1938); Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Gough, 161 Va. 
755, 759-60, 172 S.E. 264, 266 (1934). 
 
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an employee.  Whether intended as flirtatious, merely playful, 
or as harassment, it was purely personal.  Further, the 
employer’s workplace requirements had no causal connection 
with the risk of injury by assault.  Martin's decision to use 
the employer's equipment in assaulting a fellow employee was 
entirely his own and unconnected with the conditions of the 
employment.  Therefore, the injury resulting from the assault 
did not arise out of the employment. 
Conclusion 
 
Because the circuit court erred in sustaining the plea in 
bar, we will reverse the judgment and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.