Title: Professional Nurses v. Dimensions Health

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Professional Staff Nurses Association v. Dimensions Health
Corporation et al., No. 83, September Term, 1996.
[Torts - Complaint by nurses union, filed in anticipation of a
strike that never materialized, attempted to allege malicious
interference with advantageous economic relationship between the
union and employer.  Complaint alleged that defendant, a nurses
employment service, furnished (but it never did furnish)
replacement workers alleged to be "professional strikebreakers" in
violation of state statute.  Held:  Claim as alleged not ripe; any
amended claim based on the actual facts would not state a cause of
action.]
Circuit Court for Prince
GeorgeUs County Case # CAL95-6647
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 83
September Term, 1996
____________________________________
PROFESSIONAL STAFF 
NURSES ASSOCIATION
v.
DIMENSIONS HEALTH 
CORPORATION et al.
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner, 
JJ. 
____________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
____________________________________
Filed:  June 18, 1997
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 through 160
(1994), preempted the Maryland anti-strikebreakers statute,
Maryland Code (1991), § 4-403 of the Labor and Employment Article
(LE).  The Court of Special Appeals held that the Maryland statute
was preempted.  Professional Staff Nurses AssUn v. Dimensions Health
Corp., 110 Md. App. 270, 677 A.2d 87 (1996).  We conclude that the
constitutional issue should not have been reached.  
The petitioner, Professional Staff Nurses Association (the
Association), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince
GeorgeUs County against the respondent, Favorite Nurses, Inc.
(Favorite), in which four other organizations were also named as
defendants.  In its complaint the Association described itself as
an unincorporated labor organization, representing employees in the
nursing industry throughout Maryland.  These included approximately
700 registered nurses working at four health care facilities in
Prince GeorgeUs County, all four of which were owned by the other
respondent in this Court, Dimensions Health Corporation (DHC).  The
single count complaint alleged that Favorite had maliciously
interfered with an advantageous economic relationship that the
Association had with DHC.  
The complaint was filed on April 11, 1995.  Before writs of
summons were prepared for the defendants, Favorite, on April 13,
1995, voluntarily appeared in the action and moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
-2-
granted.  At the same time DHC moved to intervene as a defendant,
and 
it 
anticipatorily 
joined 
in 
the 
motion 
to 
dismiss.
Intervention was allowed by the circuit court.  Process was never
issued against the defendants originally named in the complaint,
and none of those defendants, other than Favorite, appeared in the
action.  
The circuit court granted the respondentsU motion to dismiss.
Consequently, our statement of facts is limited to the allegations
of the complaint.  Since 1986 the Association, as representative of
the 700 registered nurses (RNs) working at DHCUs four health care
facilities in Prince GeorgeUs CoHC.  A contract that was to expire
on November 30, 1993, had been extended to November 30, 1994.
Negotiations for a new contract, however, had broken down in the
fall of 1994, and on December 14, 1994, the Association had sent to
DHC the ten-day notice of a strike against a health care facility
required by 29 U.S.C. § 158(g).  On the tenth day of the notice
period, during a federal mediation, the Association and DHC agreed
to extend the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement
to February 28, 1995.  When the latter date arrived, DHC "agreed
not to take any unilateral action concerning the contractual wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment until March 10,
1995."  Complaint, ¶ 6.  DHC notified the Association on March 10
that DHC would no longer deduct union dues, but the parties
continued to negotiate.  Then, on April 4, the Association notified
-3-
DHC that its 700 registered nurse members would begin their strike
and picketing on April 14, 1995. 
Paragraph 12 of the complaint, in relevant part, alleges that
Favorite "has provided and does provide replacement RNs for
striking RNs during strikes at health care facilities located in
the State of Maryland (including the four facilities owned and
operated by DHC ...) and other states."  
Paragraph 17 of the complaint avers:
"At all times mentioned herein, including, but not
limited to the two ten (10) day strike notice periods
(from December 14 to December 24, 1994, and from April 4
to April 14, 1995), Defendant[] ... Favorite  ... ha[s]
intentionally and without legal justification interfered
with the continuing economic/business relationship
between Plaintiff [Association] and DHC by providing,
obtaining, recruiting, or referring for employment in the
place of the striking 700 RN [Association] members,
individuals (i.e., RN strikebreakers) who customarily and
repeatedly offer to be employed in the place of striking
RNs."
(Emphasis added).  
The language of ¶ 17 tracks the language of the Maryland anti-
strikebreakers statute, LE § 4-403.  That statute in relevant part
reads:
"(a) Recruitment restricted. -- A person who is not
directly interested in a strike may not provide, obtain,
recruit, or refer, for employment in place of a striker,
an individual who customarily and repeatedly offers to be
employed in place of strikers.
....
"(c) Penalty. -- A person who violates any provision
of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on
-4-
conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or both."
Inasmuch as there was no contract between the Association and
DHC, the complaint necessarily seeks to plead that version of the
tort 
that 
remedies 
"wrongfully 
interfering 
with 
economic
relationships."  Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47, 69,
485 A.2d 663, 674 (1984).  "To establish tortious interference with
prospective contractual relations, it is necessary to prove both a
tortious intent and improper or wrongful conduct."  Macklin v.
Robert Logan Assocs., 334 Md. 287, 301, 639 A.2d 112, 119 (1994).
One way in which to prove wrongful conduct is to show that the
defendant "violated the criminal law."  Id.  The respondents have
consistently argued, inter alia, that, in an attempt to satisfy the
tortUs elements, the complaint relies on FavoriteUs alleged violation
of LE § 4-403(a).  Thus, if a violation of § 4-403 is the only
improper conduct by Favorite alleged in the complaint, and if § 4-
403 is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the NLRA and
thereby violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, Favorite has not tortiously interfered with the
relationship between the Association and DHC.  
The circuit court in a written opinion granted the motion to
dismiss on two grounds.  Finding persuasive a line of cases led by
Lodge 76, IntUl AssUn of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
CommUn, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S. Ct. 2548, 49 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1976), the
trial court concluded that Congress intended "that certain economic
-5-
self help measures not be regulated" and that the intent
"encompasses [DHCUs] hiring replacement nurses from temporary
nursing service agencies ...."  
The circuit court also held that, even if § 4-403(a) were not
preempted, the Association had failed sufficiently to plead a cause
of action.  The circuit court quoted from Natural Design the
following elements of the broader form of the tort:
"(1) [I]ntentional and wilful acts; (2) calculated to
cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business;
(3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage
and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part
of the defendants (which constitutes malice); and (4)
actual damage and loss resulting."
Natural Design, 302 Md. at 71, 485 A.2d at 675 (interior quotations
omitted).  With respect to the first two elements listed above, the
circuit court held that "[i]t is impossible for [the Association]
to proffer that Favorite willfully and intentionally interfered
with [the AssociationUs] and [DHCUs] economic and business
relations."  Further, there were "no allegations of an unlawful
purpose" in the view of the circuit court.  Finally, the court did
not reach the damages element "because the factual predicate, the
strike, has not taken place."  Nevertheless, the court observed
that substantial damages would be "problematical at best."  This
was because "loss due to the current lack ... of a collective
bargaining agreement ... cannot be assigned to Favorite ...."
The Association appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  As
that court read the complaint, "[t]he conduct at issue ... is
-6-
     The question presented for certiorari review by the
1
Association reads as follows:
"Whether the Court of Special Appeals Erred in
Holding that the Tortious Interference Claim Against
Favorite ... Is Preempted by Machinists NLRA Preemption
Where [Favorite] Is Not in an Employer-Employee or
Employer-Union Relationship with either [the Association]
(continued...)
FavoriteUs Uproviding, obtaining, recruiting, or referring for
employment in the place of the striking 700 RN [Association]
members, individuals (i.e., RN strikebreakers) who customarily and
repeatedly offer to be employed in the place of striking RNUs.U"
Professional Staff Nurses AssUn, 110 Md. App. at 287, 677 A.2d at
95.  These allegations described a violation of LE § 4-403, said
the court, and "satisfied the unlawful or improper conduct element
of the tort claim."  Id. at 291, 677 A.2d at 97.  The Court of
Special Appeals, based on the foregoing determination, concluded
that it was "compelled to address the question of federal
preemption," id., and the court held that the Maryland statute was
preempted.  The Court of Special Appeals noted the alternative
ground of decision by the circuit court, id. at 275, 677 A.2d at
89, but the opinion of the intermediate appellate court does not
discuss that non-constitutional ground of decision.
We granted the AssociationUs petition for certiorari.  The
petition raises the single issue of preemption and relies only on
violation of the anti-strikebreakers statute for the improper
conduct element of the interference tort.1
-7-
(...continued)
or DHC, and Where the Narrow Regulatory Range of the Tort
and the Strikebreaker Act as to [Favorite] Place the
Claim Squarely within Preemption Exceptions for Matters
Deeply Rooted in Local Feeling and Responsibility and for
Matters of only Peripheral Concern to the Federal Labor
Relations Scheme?"
Oral argument in this Court took place almost two full years
after April 14, 1995, the date on which the Association gave notice
that the strike would start.  We were advised at argument by
counsel for the Association that no strike has ever taken place and
that the members of the Association have continuously worked at DHC
without a contract.  Thus, nurses furnished by or through Favorite
have not replaced striking nurses at the DHC facilities.
I
We first address whether, assuming the constitutionality of LE
§ 4-403(a), the Association has stated a cause of action under
Maryland non-constitutional tort law.  "[T]his Court has regularly
adhered to the principle that we will not reach a constitutional
issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-
constitutional ground."  State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 404 n.13,
631 A.2d 453, 463 n.13 (1993) (citing numerous cases).  The
appellate policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional
issues gives rise to one of "a very limited number of circumstances
[that] have been treated as UextraordinaryU and thus within the
exceptions to the requirement that an issue be raised in a
-8-
certiorari petition, cross-petition, or order by the Court."  State
v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544, 573, 677 A.2d 602, 616 (1996) (Eldridge,
J., dissenting with Murphy, C.J. and Bell, J.).
State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 478, 404 A.2d 264 (1979),
illustrates the exception.  The issue presented was whether an
accusedUs silence at a prior suppression hearing could be used to
impeach the accusedUs credibility at a second suppression hearing.
The Court of Special Appeals had held that the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination prevented use of the accusedUs
silence.  Raithel v. State, 40 Md. App. 107, 388 A.2d 161 (1978).
In granting the stateUs petition for certiorari, this Court excluded
an issue concerning preservation, thereby limiting certiorari
review to the merits of the trial courtUs action.  285 Md. at 482,
404 A.2d at 266.  "The StateUs entire argument [focused] upon the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."  Id. at 483,
404 A.2d at 267.  This Court nevertheless decided the case on non-
constitutional grounds, under the Maryland law of evidence.  We
said:
"[N]othing is better settled than the principle that
courts 
should 
not 
decide 
constitutional 
issues
unnecessarily.  In the instant case, the Fifth Amendment
issue only arises if the defendantUs silence at the first
suppression hearing was proper impeaching evidence as a
matter of Maryland evidence law.  In our view, under the
circumstances of this case, the defendantUs silence
should not have been considered by the trial court
regardless of any Fifth Amendment considerations.
Consequently, we resolve the question presented in this
case on that non-constitutional ground, and we do not
-9-
     Apparently counsel who signed the complaint and filed it on
2
April 11, 1995, anticipated that the strike would take effect at
the expiration of the second notice period on April 14, 1995.  The
complaint was signed by counsel other than those who later appeared
for the Association in the circuit and appellate courts.
reach any of the constitutional issues dealt with by the
Court of Special Appeals and the State in its argument."
Id. at 484, 404 A.2d at 267.  
To the same effect is Insurance CommUr v. Equitable Life
Assurance SocUy of the United States, 339 Md. 596, 664 A.2d 862
(1995).  Before the administrative agency and on judicial review by
a circuit court and by this Court the parties had argued whether
certain statutes authorizing differentials in insurance rates based
on gender, if actuarially justified, were violative of the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  We held
that the statutes on which the parties had focused were
inapplicable, and we remanded to the agency without deciding the
constitutional issues.  Id. at 635, 664 A.2d at 881-82.
II
The complaint alleges that Favorite provided strikebreakers
"in the place of the striking 700 RN [Association] members ....,"
but we are now told that there was no strike and there were no
"strikebreakers" who replaced striking DHC nurses.   If we read the
2
present participle, "striking," to indicate present time, then the
Association bases its claim upon a state of facts that has not
accrued, thereby raising justiciability concerns.  "UA controversy
-10-
     This Court may remand a case to a lower court if it
3
"concludes that the substantial merits of a case will not be
determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment, or
that justice will be served by permitting further proceedings."
(continued...)
is justiciable when there are interested parties asserting adverse
claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a
legal decision is sought or demanded.U"  Reyes v. Prince GeorgeUs
County, 281 Md. 279, 288, 380 A.2d 12, 17 (1977).  "To be
justiciable the issue must present more than a mere difference of
opinion."  Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 46, 464 A.2d 1076, 1078
(1983).  "Indeed, the addressing of non-justiciable issues would
place courts in the position of rendering purely advisory opinions,
a long forbidden practice in this State."  Id.  See also Hamilton
v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976).  
Were we to interpret the AssociationUs complaint to allege that
FavoriteUs tortious interference was the actual replacement of
striking nurses at DHC facilities, the case would not be ripe for
adjudication and the ordinary disposition of the case would be
dismissal.  See Hatt, 297 Md. at 47, 464 A.2d at 1079 (trial court
judgment vacated and case remanded with instructions to dismiss for
a lack of a justiciable issue).
At oral argument the Association submitted that the complaint
should not be construed so narrowly, and the Association
alternatively asked for a remand for the purpose of permitting
amendment to the complaint.   In the statement of facts section of
3
-11-
(...continued)
Maryland Rule 8-604(d)(1).
its brief to this Court, the Association, referring to ¶¶ 12 and 17
of its complaint, construes those paragraphs to allege the
following:  "[Favorite] had offered to contract with DHC on the
basis that it would recruit and provide professional strikebreaker,
temporary nurses for DHC at times when a strike by [Association]-
represented registered nurses was threatened or in progress."
Brief for Appellant PSNA at 10.  In the instant matter, whether we
construe the complaint to conform to the AssociationUs statement of
facts in its brief, or whether we consider that statement as a
proffer of the amendment that would be made on remand, the result
is the same.  As explained in Part III, infra, an allegation that
Favorite offered to contract to provide professional strikebreakers
when a strike was threatened does not state a cause of action for
malicious interference with an advantageous economic relationship.
III
It is clear that LE § 4-403(a) does not make wrongful the
conduct attributed to Favorite in the AssociationUs statement of
facts.  Accepting as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss the
AssociationUs allegation that nurses provided by Favorite are
professional strikebreakers, Favorite could "not provide, obtain,
recruit, or refer [those nurses] for employment in place of a
striker" when there has been no strike.  In order for § 4-403(a) to
make wrongful FavoriteUs offer to provide nurses in anticipation of
-12-
a strike, one would be required to read the statute as if it said
that a person who was not directly interested in a threatened
strike was prohibited from referring workers for potential
employment in place of possible strikers.  But violation of
§ 4-403(a) is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding three years and by a fine not exceeding $1,000.  LE
§ 4-403(c).  A criminal statute may not be read so expansively.  To
do so violates the fundamental rule that criminal statutes must be
strictly construed.  See Gardiner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 651-52,
689 A.2d 610, 614-15 (1997); Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654,
684 A.2d 439, 441 (1996); Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 260-61, 647
A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435-36,
639 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1994).
Although the Association protests that its theory of the case
is not limited to wrongful conduct by Favorite based on a violation
of LE § 4-403(a), we are unable to find any alternative theory
alleged in the complaint.  Neither could the Court of Special
Appeals.  110 Md. App. at 290, 677 A.2d at 97 ("Additionally, there
is no allegation that Favorite engaged in an activity otherwise
lawful in a manner that made it unlawful, e.g., threatening or
causing violence.").  Nor did the circuit court find any such
allegation.  In addition, the question presented on certiorari
rests the tort exclusively on a violation of LE § 4-403(a).
-13-
In addition, it would not be in the interest of justice to
remand for further amendment in the instant matter.  When pressed
to explain in what way the Association had been damaged by conduct
on the part of Favorite, counsel for the Association advised that
the AssociationUs dues had declined because of the absence of a
check-off.  From the standpoint of proximate causation, the
reduction in the AssociationUs dues income cannot be attributed to
Favorite.  The reduction results from the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement between the Association and DHC.
DHCUs having discontinued deducting union dues from its nursesU wages
following expiration of the collective bargaining agreement is not
wrongful, even if it were in part motivated by the knowledge that
Favorite offered to contract to furnish alleged "professional
strikebreakers."
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
THE
PETITIONER, PROFESSIONAL STAFF
NURSES ASSOCIATION.