Title: Zignego v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2397 & 2020AP112 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Timothy Zignego, 
David W. Opitz and Frederick G. Luehrs, III, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann, Julie Glancey, Ann Jacobs, Dean 
Knudsen and Mark Thomsen, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 391 Wis. 2d 441,941 N.W.2d 284 
PDC No:2020 WI App 17 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 9, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 29, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Lucas T. Vebber, Richard M. Esenberg, Brian 
McGrath, Anthony LoCoco, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & 
Liberty, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard M. 
Esenberg. 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Karla Z. Keckhaver, Steven C. Kilpatrick, and Colin T. Roth, 
 
 
2 
assistant attorneys general; with whom on the brief was Joshua 
L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Joshua 
L. Kaul. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Felicia 
Ellzey, Marangelly Quintana Feliciano, Jennifer Hagen & SEIU 
Wisconsin State Council by Jeffrey A. Mandell, Kurt M. Simatic, 
and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; with whom on the brief was 
Stacie H. Rosenzweig and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Women Voters of Wisconsin by Douglas M. Poland and Rathje 
Woodward LLC, Madison; with whom on the brief was Jon Sherman 
and Fair Elections Center, Washington, District of Columbia.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Public 
Interest Legal Foundation by Eric J. Hatchell and Foley & 
Lardner LLP, Madison; with whom on the brief was Kaylan Phillips 
and Public Interest Legal Foundation, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
 
 
2021 WI 32 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2019AP2397 & 2020AP112 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV449) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Timothy Zignego, 
David W. Opitz and Frederick G. Luehrs, III, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann, Julie Glancey, Ann Jacobs, Dean 
Knudsen and Mark Thomsen, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 9, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified, 
and as modified, affirmed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   Wisconsin law requires that its 
statewide voter registration list be updated regularly.  Before 
us is a dispute over one kind of voter-registration cleanup 
prescribed by law:  a statute requiring that the registration 
status of eligible voters ("electors" in the words of the 
statute) be changed when officials receive reliable information 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
2 
 
that the elector moved out of their municipality.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.50(3) (2017-18).1  This case does not concern the validity of 
this law or whether it should be complied with.  Instead, the 
question we address today is whether § 6.50(3) places a positive 
and plain duty on the Wisconsin Elections Commission (the 
"Commission") to do what the law requires.  We conclude it does 
not. 
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. § 6.50(3) directs "the municipal clerk 
or board of election commissioners" to act when they receive 
"reliable information that a registered elector has changed his 
or her residence to a location outside of the municipality."  In 
particular, 
"the 
municipal 
clerk 
or 
board 
of 
election 
commissioners" must send a letter regarding the move to the 
elector, and if the registered elector does not respond within 
30 days, the "clerk or board of election commissioners shall 
change the elector's registration from eligible to ineligible 
status."  § 6.50(3). 
¶3 
With 
limited 
exceptions, 
the 
judicial 
branch 
ordinarily does not order the executive branch to do its job.  
One limited vehicle by which it may do so is what is called a 
writ of mandamus.  This is a remedy whereby a court may order a 
specific actor to take a certain action; but a court may do this 
only when the duty is positive and plain.  The petitioners2 in 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The petitioners in this case are Timothy Zignego, David W. 
Opitz, and Frederick G. Luehrs, III, all of whom are registered 
electors and taxpayers in Wisconsin. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
3 
 
this case (collectively, "Zignego") sought a writ of mandamus 
against the Commission and its commissioners3 to carry out the 
commands of Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) and change the registration of 
electors who may have moved.  The circuit court4 granted the 
writ, and later found the Commission and several commissioners 
in contempt after the Commission failed to comply. 
¶4 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding the writ of 
mandamus was granted in error, and we agree.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.50(3), the responsibility to change the registration of 
electors who may have moved out of their municipality is given 
to "the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners."  
Zignego argues that the Commission is a "board of election 
commissioners."  This is plainly incorrect.  Our election laws 
tell us how they will refer to the Commission:  by use of the 
term "commission" (or occasionally "elections commission").  
Wis. Stat. § 5.025.  The "board of election commissioners" 
refers to a different kind of entity under our laws, one whose 
province is local.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 7.20, 7.21, 7.22.  In 
short, Zignego's argument that the Commission is required to 
carry out the mandates of § 6.50(3) is contrary to what the 
                                                 
3 The respondents are the Wisconsin Elections Commission and 
Marge Bostelmann, Julie Glancey, Ann Jacobs, Dean Knudsen, and 
Mark Thomsen, five of the six commissioners sued solely in their 
official capacities.  The sixth commissioner at the time of 
these events was Jodi Jensen, but she resigned prior to the 
initiation of this suit and her successor is not named as a 
party to this case. 
4 The Honorable Paul V. Malloy, Ozaukee County Circuit 
Court, presiding. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
4 
 
statute says because the statute assigns its duties to municipal 
election officials.  The Commission has no statutory obligation, 
and therefore no positive and plain duty, to carry out the 
requirements of § 6.50(3).  The circuit court therefore erred by 
issuing a writ of mandamus ordering it to do so. 
¶5 
The 
circuit 
court's 
contempt 
order 
against 
the 
Commission and several of its commissioners likewise must be 
reversed.  The contempt order imposed remedial sanctions aimed 
at present and future compliance with the writ——a daily 
forfeiture beginning the date the contempt order was signed.  
But remedial sanctions cannot remain for failure to obey what we 
have determined was an unlawful writ of mandamus.  That said, 
while we reverse the contempt order, we remind the Commission 
that waiting for an appellate court to grant a stay or reverse a 
circuit court order it disagrees with does not justify ignoring 
that order. 
¶6 
In sum, while Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) requires that the 
registration status be changed for those who move out of their 
municipality, it gives this responsibility to municipal election 
officials, not to the Commission.  Therefore, we affirm5 the 
decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's 
writ of mandamus and contempt orders.   
 
                                                 
5 While we affirm the underlying decision of the court of 
appeals to reverse both orders issued by the circuit court, we 
withdraw portions of the court of appeals decision, as explained 
below.  
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
5 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The issues in this case arose when the Commission 
received a "movers report" from the Electronic Registration 
Information Center, Inc. (ERIC), a multi-state consortium 
created to improve the accuracy of voter registration systems.  
This report identifies currently registered voters who may no 
longer be eligible to vote at their registered address because 
they either died or moved.  After receiving the report, the 
Commission conducted internal vetting and, in October 2019, sent 
notices to approximately 230,000 Wisconsin voters who the report 
suggested may no longer reside at their registered address.  
These notices informed the recipients that they could affirm 
their address by:  (1) doing so at myvote.wi.gov; (2) returning 
the attached postcard to their municipal clerk; or (3) voting at 
the next election. 
¶8 
Less than two weeks after the notices were mailed, 
Zignego filed a verified complaint with the Commission pleading 
that the Commission deactivate non-responsive electors pursuant 
to the 30-day timeframe outlined in Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3).  The 
Commission 
dismissed 
this 
complaint 
without 
prejudice 
as 
untimely filed, in part because the Commission considered and 
discussed the mailings at its meetings in March and June of 
2019. 
¶9 
Zignego then filed suit against the Commission and 
five of its commissioners seeking a declaration and temporary 
and permanent injunctive relief, or in the alternative, a writ 
of mandamus.  The circuit court conducted a hearing on December 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
6 
 
13, 2019, and orally ruled that a writ of mandamus would issue 
ordering the Commission to comply with Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3).  
The 
written 
mandamus 
order 
followed 
shortly 
thereafter 
compelling the Commission to "deactivate the registration of 
those electors who have failed to apply for continuation of 
their registration within 30 days of the date the notice was 
mailed." 
¶10 The issuance of the writ of mandamus triggered a 
flurry of filings appealing the order to the court of appeals, 
petitioning for bypass to this court, and seeking a stay.  The 
Commission, however, took no action to comply with the writ.  
Zignego followed with a motion asking the circuit court to hold 
the Commission and its commissioners in contempt.  On January 
13, 2020, the circuit court conducted a hearing and found the 
Commission and several commissioners in contempt.  The court 
imposed, as a remedial sanction, a forfeiture of $50 per day 
against the Commission and a forfeiture of $250 per day against 
each of the three commissioners who voted to take no action to 
comply with the writ.6   
¶11 That same day, the Commission filed a notice of appeal 
with respect to the contempt order and moved for a stay.  Also 
on the same day, this court denied Zignego's petition for 
bypass.  The next morning, the court of appeals stayed both the 
                                                 
6 The Commission met on December 16, 2019, and considered a 
motion to comply with the circuit court's mandamus order, but 
that motion failed in a 3-3 vote.  The Commission met again on 
December 30, 2019, and once more took no action to comply with 
the mandamus order. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
7 
 
contempt order and the writ of mandamus, explaining that the 
court's reasoning would be set forth in a subsequent order.  A 
week later, the court of appeals issued its opinion and reversed 
the circuit court's writ of mandamus and contempt orders.  State 
ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 2020 WI App 17, 391 Wis. 2d 441, 941 
N.W.2d 284.  Zignego petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶12 The dispositive question in this case is whether the 
Commission can be ordered to carry out the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 6.50(3).7  This is a question of statutory interpretation 
we review de novo.  Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, ¶11, 390 
Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566.  When interpreting statutes, we 
focus primarily on the language of the statute, looking as well 
to its statutory context and structure.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Dane 
Cnty., 
2004 
WI 58, 
¶¶45-46, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We begin with the broader 
                                                 
7 The Commission argues Zignego does not have standing or a 
statutory right to bring this challenge.  Because we reverse the 
mandamus and contempt orders on other grounds, we need not reach 
these questions.  
Additionally, the Commission asserts that whether the 
movers report constituted sufficiently "reliable" information 
under Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) involves a matter of judgment and 
discretion, meaning action based on this data cannot be 
compelled by a writ of mandamus.  We also need not reach this 
question, and because we need not reach this question, we 
withdraw any language in the court of appeals decision deciding 
this issue.  
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
8 
 
statutory framework, and then apply these principles to the two 
orders in this case. 
 
A.  Relevant Election Statutes  
1.  The Actors 
¶13 Unlike many places around the country, Wisconsin has a 
highly 
decentralized 
system 
for 
election 
administration.  
Jefferson v. Dane County, 2020 WI 90, ¶24 n.5, 394 Wis. 2d 602, 
951 N.W.2d 556.  Rather than a top-down arrangement with a 
central state entity or official controlling local actors, 
Wisconsin gives some power to its state election agency (the 
Commission) and places significant responsibility on a small 
army 
of 
local 
election 
officials. 
 
Id.; 
see 
also 
https://elections.wi.gov/index.php/clerks 
(explaining 
that 
Wisconsin's 1,850 municipal clerks and 72 county clerks are each 
"a partner in the process of carrying out open, fair and 
transparent elections").  
¶14 We begin in the same way the election statutes begin——
by defining who the main actors are in this delicate democratic 
dance.  The statutes regularly refer to and largely define three 
primary actors for our purposes here:  (1) a "municipal clerk"; 
(2) 
a 
"board 
of 
election 
commissioners"; 
and 
(3) 
"the 
commission." 
¶15 "Municipality" under the election statutes (chapters 5 
through 12) refers to cities, towns, or villages.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.02(11).  Consistent with this local focus, a "municipal 
clerk" is also a defined term in our election laws, and it 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
9 
 
"means the city clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the 
executive director of the city election commission and their 
authorized representatives."  § 5.02(10).  Municipal clerks are 
the officials primarily responsible for election administration 
in Wisconsin.  As an instructional manual the Commission 
provides to municipal clerks explains: 
Elections in the State of Wisconsin are conducted at 
the local level.  As a municipal clerk you are 
entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring fair, 
accessible, and transparent elections.  Our job at the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) is to provide you 
with a range of resources to support you in carrying 
out your duties.[8] 
Our election laws give municipal clerks a vast array of duties 
and responsibilities consistent with their primary role in 
running Wisconsin elections. 
¶16 The second main entity is a "board of election 
commissioners," whose powers, duties, and composition the 
statutes separately delineate in Wis. Stat. §§ 7.20, 7.21, and 
7.22. 
 
Under 
§ 7.20, 
"A 
municipal 
board 
of 
election 
commissioners shall be established in every city over 500,000 
population," and a "county board of election commissioners shall 
be established in every county over 750,000 population."  
§ 7.20(1).  The statutes go on to describe their makeup and 
operation, including how many members a board of election 
commissioners shall have, how they are selected, and how long 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Elections Commission, Election Administration 
Manual 
for 
Wisconsin 
Municipal 
Clerks 
5 
(2020), 
https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-
10/Election%20Administration%20Manual%20%282020-09%29.pdf. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
10 
 
commissioners will serve.  § 7.20(2)-(7).  Under § 7.21, "All 
powers and duties assigned to the municipal or county clerk or 
the municipal or county board of canvassers under chs. 5 to 12 
shall be carried out by the municipal or county board of 
election 
commissioners 
or 
its 
executive 
director" 
unless 
otherwise specified.  And § 7.22 gives further duties and 
responsibilities to a municipal board of election commissioners.9 
¶17 To translate, a board of election commissioners is 
established in our high population cities and counties——at this 
point, only in the City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County——to 
carry out the duties otherwise accomplished by municipal and 
county clerks everywhere else.10  It should therefore come as no 
surprise that the phrase "municipal clerk or board of election 
commissioners" appears in tandem all over our election statutes 
because this describes the duties of local election officials.  
                                                 
9 Zignego argues that the phrase "board of election 
commissioners" is not a technical or specially-defined word or 
phrase.  Therefore, Zignego maintains, it must be given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, which is broad enough to 
include the Commission.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  As we have explained, however, a "board of election 
commissioners" is most certainly a technical term under our 
statutes.  See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) ("[T]echnical words and 
phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall 
be construed according to such meaning."). 
10 "'County clerk' includes the executive director of the 
county board of election commissioners and their authorized 
representatives."  Wis. Stat. § 5.02(2).  County clerks have 
distinct 
duties 
and 
responsibilities 
in 
administering 
Wisconsin's elections, several of which are provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 7.10. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
11 
 
In fact, this conjoined phrasing appears dozens of times in 
chapter 6 alone.11 
¶18 The final entity relevant for our purposes is the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission.  It has a separate defined 
nomenclature located in Wis. Stat. § 5.025.  In chapters five 
through ten and 12 of the statutes, "'commission' means the 
elections commission."  § 5.025.12  Hundreds of times in the 
chapters following, the legislature uses either "commission" or 
occasionally, "elections commission," to denote the Commission.  
Immediately 
following 
this 
definition, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 5.05 
extensively lays out various powers and duties of the Commission 
(other statutes add to this list).  Among them, the Commission 
has general responsibility for administering chapters five 
through ten and 12, the power to investigate and prosecute 
violations of election laws, the duty and power to issue 
guidance and formal advisory opinions, and the charge to conduct 
voter education programs.  § 5.05(1), (2m), (2w), (5t), (6a), 
(12).  
Of some relevance here, the Commission is also 
                                                 
11 The administrative rules also tie these two together, 
showing that a board of election commissioners refers to a local 
body.  In the Commission's administrative rules chapter on voter 
registration, "'Municipal clerk' has the meaning given in 
[§] 5.02(10), Stats., and includes the Milwaukee city board of 
election commissioners."  Wis. Admin. Code § EL 3.01(8) (Feb. 
2017). 
12 This definition of "commission" in Wis. Stat. § 5.025 was 
cited and relied on extensively by the court of appeals in its 
decision, yet it was not cited even once in Zignego's principal 
brief, and received only one isolated mention in its reply 
brief. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
12 
 
"responsible for the design and maintenance of the official 
registration list" and "shall require all municipalities to use 
the list in every election."  § 5.05(15). 
 
2.  The Actors' Roles 
¶19 With these three primary actors in mind, the statutes 
establish various duties and responsibilities for each election 
entity 
and 
official, 
often 
prescribing 
which 
actor 
is 
responsible for which action.  We see this on full display in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 6.27-6.57, 
the 
subchapter 
concerning 
voter 
registration.  A sampling of these statutes illustrates this 
delegation of responsibilities. 
¶20 After elections, for example, "the municipal clerk or 
board of election commissioners shall submit electronically a 
report to the commission" and county election officials with 
information 
on 
who 
voted, 
absentee 
voting, 
and 
various 
statistics on voter registration.  Wis. Stat. § 6.275(1).  All 
three of our primary actors have a role under this statute.  The 
two local entities, the municipal clerk and the board of 
elections commissioners, are directed to submit their report to 
the Commission. 
¶21 Under Wis. Stat. § 6.36(1)(a), the Commission "shall 
compile and maintain electronically an official registration 
list."  But editing the list is a different matter.  The laws 
specify that the list must "be designed in such a way that the 
municipal clerk or board of election commissioners of any 
municipality . . . may, by electronic transmission, add entries 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
13 
 
to or change entries on the list for any elector who resides in, 
or who the list identifies as residing in, that municipality and 
no other municipality."  § 6.36(1)(c).  Again, all three 
entities are mentioned.  The Commission maintains the statewide 
list, but the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners 
must be able to change the registration status for individuals 
within their municipality. 
¶22 We see this same pattern in the statutory section at 
issue in this case, Wis. Stat. § 6.50, which generally governs 
revisions to the voter registration list. 
¶23 Subsections (1), (2), and (2g) outline a procedure 
whereby those who have not voted in the previous four years are 
changed to an ineligible status on the statewide registration 
list.  Wis. Stat. § 6.50(1), (2), (2g).  After a general 
election, 
the 
"commission" 
is 
required 
to 
examine 
the 
registration 
records 
and 
identify 
non-voting 
electors.  
§ 6.50(1).  The Commission then must mail a notice that tells 
the elector that their registration will be suspended unless the 
elector applies for continuation within 30 days.  Id.  If 
continuation of registration is not applied for within 30 days, 
"the commission shall change the registration status of that 
elector from eligible to ineligible."  § 6.50(2).  However, the 
"commission" may delegate changing of registration statuses "to 
a municipal clerk or board of election commissioners of a 
municipality." 
 
§ 6.50(2g). 
 
Ultimately, 
the 
statutory 
responsibility to change the registration status for non-voting 
electors is squarely placed on the Commission. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
14 
 
¶24 Subsection (4) defines the process for removing 
deceased electors.  Wis. Stat. § 6.50(4).  This responsibility 
is given to the "municipal clerk or board of election 
commissioners."  Id.  Deceased electors are identified "by means 
of checking vital statistics reports," and "[n]o notice need be 
sent" before making these registration changes.  Id. 
¶25 Subsection (5) requires a change of registration 
status when a building is condemned, following an investigation 
"by the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners."  
Wis. Stat. § 6.50(5).  Once again, it is "the clerk or board of 
election 
commissioners 
[that] 
shall 
change 
the 
elector's 
registration status."  Id. 
¶26 As these provisions make clear, Wis. Stat. § 6.50 
sometimes directs the Commission to act, and other times it 
directs municipal officials to do so.  And pursuant to 
subsection (7), "the commission, municipal clerk, or board of 
election commissioners shall make an entry on the registration 
list" "[w]hen an elector's registration is changed from eligible 
to ineligible status" and must "giv[e] the date and reason for 
the change."  § 6.50(7). 
¶27 While additional statutory context could be considered 
to reinforce the same themes, it is time we turn our attention 
to the subsection at issue here, Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3), which 
provides in full: 
Upon receipt of reliable information that a registered 
elector has changed his or her residence to a location 
outside of the municipality, the municipal clerk or 
board of election commissioners shall notify the 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
15 
 
elector by mailing a notice by 1st class mail to the 
elector's registration address stating the source of 
the information.  All municipal departments and 
agencies 
receiving 
information 
that 
a 
registered 
elector has changed his or her residence shall notify 
the clerk or board of election commissioners.  If the 
elector no longer resides in the municipality or fails 
to apply for continuation of registration within 30 
days of the date the notice is mailed, the clerk or 
board of election commissioners shall change the 
elector's registration from eligible to ineligible 
status.  Upon receipt of reliable information that a 
registered elector has changed his or her residence 
within the municipality, the municipal clerk or board 
of election commissioners shall change the elector's 
registration and mail the elector a notice of the 
change.  This subsection does not restrict the right 
of an elector to challenge any registration under 
[Wis. Stat. §§] 6.325, 6.48, 6.925, 6.93, or 7.52(5). 
(Emphasis added.)  Zignego's primary argument in this case is 
that the Commission is a "board of election commissioners" under 
§ 6.50(3).  This argument disregards nearly every foundational 
principle of statutory interpretation.  
¶28 The subsection begins by focusing its attention on 
electors who have changed their "residence to a location outside 
of the municipality."  Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) (emphasis added).  
Thus, this subsection is not an instruction to update the 
registration statuses of all movers; it is only directed to 
those 
who 
have 
moved 
outside 
their 
municipality. 
 
This 
demonstrates 
the 
local, 
rather 
than 
statewide, 
focus 
of 
§ 6.50(3). 
¶29 In four places, Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) provides that the 
obligations imposed by this subsection apply to the municipal 
clerk or the board of election commissioners.  Not once does it 
refer to the Commission, despite references to the "commission" 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
16 
 
seven times alone in the remainder of § 6.50.13  As the 
surrounding context, definitions, and text make clear, these 
duties are the responsibility of municipal clerks and a 
municipal board of election commissioners.  The Commission has 
no mandatory duties under § 6.50(3), and therefore cannot be 
compelled to act under this subsection. 
 
3.  Zignego's Counter-Arguments 
¶30 Zignego responds with three additional arguments, none 
of which override or even challenge the plain reading of the 
law. 
¶31 First, Zignego contends that Wisconsin's relationship 
with ERIC suggests the Commission is required to deactivate 
movers pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3).  Under Wisconsin law, 
Wisconsin's 
"chief 
election 
officer"——the 
"commission 
                                                 
13 The Commission was created in 2015.  See 2015 Wis. Act 
118.  Previously, the responsibility to change the registration 
status of non-voting electors in Wis. Stat. § 6.50(1) and (2) 
was given to the Government Accountability Board (GAB), the 
Commission's predecessor.  Wis. Stat. § 6.50(1), (2) (2013-14); 
2015 Wis. Act 118, § 266(10).  The legislature amended § 6.50 
and gave the responsibility to remove non-voting electors to the 
Commission, but conspicuously did not change the responsible 
governmental actor under subsection (3).  2015 Wis. Act 118, 
§ 266(10); see also 2015 Wis. Act 118, §§ 76, 77 (amending 
§ 6.50(2g) and (7) to replace "board" with "commission"); 2015 
Wis. Act 261, § 63 (amending § 6.50(3) and making no change to 
the 
entities 
delegated 
authority). 
 
This 
suggests 
the 
legislature intended to leave this power with the municipalities 
as it had during the life of the GAB.  The legislature's choice 
to amend only part, but not all, of § 6.50 illustrates the 
legislature understood the "commission" to be distinct from a 
"board of election commissioners." 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
17 
 
administrator"——is 
required 
to 
"enter 
into 
a 
membership 
agreement with [ERIC]."  Wis. Stat. § 5.05(3g), § 6.36(1)(ae)1.  
And the chief election officer must "comply with the terms of 
the [ERIC] agreement."  § 6.36(1)(ae)2.  The ERIC membership 
agreement, in turn, requires the Commission to initiate contact 
with electors whose "record is deemed to be inaccurate or out-
of-date."  This obligation, however, is different from the one 
tasked 
to 
"the 
municipal 
clerk 
or 
board 
of 
election 
commissioners" under § 6.50(3).  To comply with the ERIC 
agreement, the Commission need only contact the electors.  
Section 6.50(3), on the other hand, requires much more than 
simply 
notifying 
the 
elector. 
 
These 
two 
moving-related 
requirements do not contradict each other.  The Commission's 
compliance with Wisconsin's ERIC agreement and its statutory 
responsibilities under § 6.36 do not require or authorize 
judicial rewriting of § 6.50(3) to impose extratextual mandates 
on the Commission. 
¶32 Second, 
Zignego points to 
the Commission's past 
practice as support for its interpretation.  Although it is 
unclear from the record whether the Commission thought it was 
bound by Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3), it is true that the Commission 
cited that subsection when it sent out notices in 2017 and 
changed the registration of thousands of electors in 2018.  
Before us, the Commission refused to state whether it thought 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
18 
 
its actions in 2018 were lawful.14  However, even if those 
actions 
were 
unlawful, 
the 
remedy 
for 
alleged 
executive 
overreach is not a court order to continue acting unlawfully.  
Simply because an agency took action in the past does not mean 
its actions were legal, nor would it provide authority for this 
court to mandate agency action that the law itself does not 
sanction.  It is the statutory text, not agency practice, that 
determines what the law requires an agency to do.15 
¶33 Finally, Zignego raises a new argument not raised 
below——namely, 
that 
reading 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 6.50(3) 
as 
the 
Commission frames it puts Wisconsin's election laws in violation 
of federal election law, specifically the Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 (HAVA).  We normally do not consider arguments not 
raised in the lower courts.  See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 
v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  Even 
so, this is a nonstarter. 
                                                 
14 The court of appeals concluded the Commission's actions 
in 2017 and 2018 were unlawful.  State ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 
2020 WI App 17, ¶90, 391 Wis. 2d 441, 941 N.W.2d 284.  However, 
it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to undertake 
the duties in Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) on municipalities' behalf 
based on some other statutory provision; the parties did not 
brief this question.  Therefore, we do not opine on whether any 
other statutory sections may prove relevant in determining what 
the Commission may do.  The question before us is simply what it 
must do under § 6.50(3).  Accordingly, we withdraw the language 
from 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
opinion 
which 
concludes 
the 
Commission's actions in 2017 and 2018 were unlawful. 
15 Moreover, we do not defer to an agency's conclusion of 
law.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶¶3, 108, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
19 
 
¶34 As an initial matter, to the extent the assertion is 
that federal law conflicts with state law, that raises a 
different kind of analysis, possibly implicating preemption.  
See Town of Delafield v. Cent. Transp. Kriewaldt, 2020 WI 61, 
¶¶5-7, 392 Wis. 2d 427, 944 N.W.2d 819 (setting out preemption 
principles).  No such arguments have been made here.   
¶35 And on the merits, Zignego's argument lacks any sound 
basis.  HAVA requires each state to implement "a single, 
uniform, 
official, 
centralized, 
interactive 
computerized 
statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and 
administered at the State level."  52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A).  
Wisconsin has done so; the Commission created and maintains the 
voter registration list.  See Wis. Stat. § 5.05(15).  Nothing 
about this arrangement precludes assigning local officials 
responsibility to make certain changes to the list.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 6.36(1)(c).  Not only does Wisconsin law require that 
local officials be allowed to make changes to the list, HAVA 
does too.  52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A)(v)-(vii) (explaining that 
local election officials must be able to access and update the 
list). 
¶36 Additionally, under HAVA, states not subject to the 
National Voter Registration Act——and Wisconsin is not16——"shall 
remove the names of ineligible voters from the computerized list 
in accordance with State law."  52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
                                                 
16 Wisconsin is not subject to National Voter Registration 
Act of 1993 (NVRA) because it has election-day registration.  52 
U.S.C. § 20503(b)(2); Wis. Stat. § 6.55(2). 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
20 
 
Thus, HAVA provides that Wisconsin is to look to its own state 
law to ascertain how ineligible voters are removed from the 
statewide computerized list.  In other words, HAVA simply points 
us back to Wisconsin law, which, as we have explained, is clear.  
Nothing in HAVA mandates the atextual reading Zignego advocates. 
¶37 In short, according to the plain meaning supported by 
its statutory context, "board of election commissioners" under 
Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) does not include the Commission.  The 
Commission has no mandatory duties under this provision.  We now 
apply this understanding to the two orders before us. 
 
B.  Writ of Mandamus  
¶38 The circuit court granted a writ of mandamus based on 
its interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) gave mandatory 
duties to the Commission.  This court has previously described 
the basic principles of mandamus as follows:   
Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy, available 
only to parties that can show that the writ is based 
on a clear, specific legal right which is free from 
substantial doubt.  A party seeking mandamus must also 
show that the duty sought to be enforced is positive 
and plain; that substantial damage will result if the 
duty is not performed; and that no other adequate 
remedy at law exists.  
This court will uphold a trial court's granting or 
denying 
a 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
unless 
the 
judge 
erroneously 
exercised 
discretion. 
 
A 
judge's 
discretion 
in 
issuing 
a 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
erroneously 
exercised 
if 
based 
on 
an 
erroneous 
understanding of the law.  
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
21 
 
Lake Bluff Hous. Partners v. City of South Milwaukee, 197 
Wis. 2d 157, 
170, 
540 
N.W.2d 189 
(1995) 
(citations 
and 
quotations omitted).   
¶39 As the preceding analysis makes clear, Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.50(3) does not give any duty to the Commission, much less a 
positive and plain duty.  Therefore, the writ of mandamus 
compelling 
the 
Commission 
to 
comply 
with 
§ 6.50(3) 
was 
erroneously granted and must be reversed.17   
 
C.  Contempt 
¶40 The circuit court also found the Commission and 
several commissioners in contempt for failing to comply with the 
writ of mandamus.  The "purpose of contempt is to uphold the 
authority and dignity of the court."  Carney v. CNH Health & 
Welfare Plan, 2007 WI App 205, ¶20, 305 Wis. 2d 443, 740 
                                                 
17 The dissent agrees that the argument presented to us by 
Zignego is incorrect; Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) does not impose a 
duty on the Commission.  See dissent, ¶52.  Instead, the dissent 
crafts a new argument on Zignego's behalf.  In essence, the 
dissent argues that the statutory duty of the Commission to 
create, maintain, and administer Wisconsin's voter registration 
list means the Commission is responsible to ensure every law 
related to that list is carried out——whether the Commission is 
statutorily assigned the responsibility or not.  Taking this 
argument further, the dissent concludes a court can order the 
Commission to carry out these duties through a writ of mandamus 
whenever a municipal clerk or board of election commissioners 
fails to fulfill a statutory duty assigned to these local 
election officials.  This would be a rather remarkable expansion 
of the Commission's powers and responsibilities.  More to the 
point, it bears no resemblance to our election administration 
laws that give the Commission more limited duties, as we have 
explained at length.   
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
22 
 
N.W.2d 625.  A party may be found in contempt for, among other 
things, 
"intentional . . . [d]isobedience, 
resistance 
or 
obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court."  
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(1)(b); see also Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & 
Bishop, Ltd., 2010 WI 44, ¶78, 324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294 
("A party's unwillingness to obey a court order is the very 
definition of contempt.").   
¶41 When a party is found in contempt the court may impose 
either punitive or remedial sanctions.  Wis. Stat. § 785.02; 
Carney, 305 Wis. 2d 443, ¶24.  A punitive sanction is "imposed 
to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of upholding 
the authority of the court," while a remedial sanction is 
"imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of 
court."  § 785.01(2)-(3).   
¶42 Here, the circuit court imposed remedial sanctions.  
That 
is, 
the 
court 
ordered 
the 
Commission 
and 
certain 
commissioners who voted to take no action to comply with the 
writ to pay a prospective daily forfeiture to force compliance.  
The very next morning, the court of appeals stayed both the 
mandamus and contempt orders, and issued its decision reversing 
both orders promptly thereafter.  Because we agree with the 
court of appeals that the writ of mandamus must be reversed, we 
must necessarily reverse the contempt order on which it was 
based as well.  Remedial sanctions may not be imposed when a 
party is no longer in contempt of court.  See Christensen v. 
Sullivan, 2009 WI 87, ¶¶54-55, 320 Wis. 2d 76, 768 N.W.2d 798.  
Zignego does not argue otherwise. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
23 
 
¶43 That said, we remind the Commission that its duty to 
comply with the circuit court's writ of mandamus was not 
relieved simply by seeking a stay before an appellate court.18  
See Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 2009 WI 77, ¶41, 319 Wis. 2d 329, 768 
N.W.2d 641 ("If a person to whom a court directs an order 
believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, 
absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending 
appeal." (quoted source omitted)).  Nevertheless, because the 
writ of mandamus was issued in error, we must affirm the court 
of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's contempt order. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.50(3) does not apply to the 
Commission; there is no credible argument that it does.  
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in granting a writ of 
mandamus based on an improper interpretation of § 6.50(3), and 
its contempt order cannot survive the reversal of the writ of 
                                                 
18 We observe the Commission promptly sought a stay of the 
writ of mandamus and, upon receiving no response, renewed its 
motion to stay with the court of appeals immediately following 
Zignego's motion for contempt.  The court of appeals held the 
motion to stay in abeyance pending a decision from this court on 
the petition for bypass.  We denied the petition for bypass on 
the same day the circuit court issued its contempt order.  The 
court of appeals then stayed both the mandamus and contempt 
orders the next morning. 
Nos. 2019AP2397 & 2020AP112   
 
24 
 
mandamus.  We affirm as modified19 the decision of the court of 
appeals, and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
dismissal.20  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified, and affirmed as modified, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court for dismissal. 
                                                 
19 Specifically, we withdraw language from the court of 
appeals opinion deciding the legality of the Commission's 
conduct in 2017 and 2018 and the reliability of the ERIC data 
because these issues are not necessary to adjudicate this case.  
See supra ¶12 n.7; ¶32 n.14. 
20 Both causes of action the Petitioners advanced in their 
underlying complaint relied on the erroneous proposition that 
the "board of election commissioners" in Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) 
includes the Commission.  Because we conclude § 6.50(3) does not 
apply to the Commission, the Petitioners' complaint must be 
dismissed. 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶45 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
To be free is to live under a government by law 
. . . .  Miserable is the condition of individuals, 
danger is the condition of the state, if there is no 
certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain 
administration of the law[.]   
Judgment in Rex vs. Shipley, 21 St Tr 847 (K.B. 1784) (Lord 
Mansfield presiding) (emphasis added).  For years, the Wisconsin 
Elections 
Commission 
(WEC) 
undertook 
responsibility 
for 
notifying voters of WEC's receipt of information indicating they 
had moved and therefore may need to register to vote using their 
new addresses.  If a voter failed to confirm the validity of the 
registered address, WEC removed that voter from the rolls, in 
accordance with state law.  In 2019, WEC decided to disregard 
the law and instead delay deactivation of ineligible voters for 
up to two years.  The majority relieves WEC of its statutory 
obligations, determining that these duties actually belong to 
local election officials and not WEC.  The majority's decision 
leaves the administration of Wisconsin's election law in flux, 
at least with respect to ensuring the accuracy of the voter 
rolls. 
 
¶46 The majority is correct that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.50(3), 
"municipal 
clerk[s] 
or 
board[s] 
of 
election 
commissioners" 
have 
a 
statutory 
obligation 
to 
change 
an 
elector's registration from eligible to ineligible status if an 
elector has moved.  In reading the election statutes in 
isolation, however, the majority misses the broader picture:  
under the full statutory scheme of Wisconsin's election laws, 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
2 
 
WEC——the state's chief election commission——also has a statutory 
obligation to change the status of ineligible voters on the 
statewide voter registration list.   
¶47 Wisconsin Stat. § 5.05(15) makes WEC "responsible for 
the design and maintenance of the official registration list" 
statewide and § 5.05(2w) gives WEC "responsibility for the 
administration of chs. 5 to 10 and 12."  Recognizing WEC's 
responsibility to ensure the accuracy of the voter rolls ensures 
the state's compliance with the federal Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA), which Wisconsin is bound to follow.  Reading these 
statutes as a whole reveals WEC's "positive and plain duty" to 
fulfill its statutory responsibility to change the status of 
ineligible voters; therefore, the circuit court properly issued 
a writ of mandamus——a conclusion that should come as no surprise 
to WEC considering it has routinely complied with this duty for 
years.  The majority's circumscribed statutory interpretation 
leaves WEC off the hook for its violations of Wisconsin's 
election laws.  I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶48 Wisconsin, along with 29 other states and the District 
of Columbia, participates in a multi-state consortium designed 
to improve the accuracy of voter registration data, called the 
Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC).  As a member, 
Wisconsin provides ERIC with information concerning current 
driver's licenses and State ID cards issued by the Division of 
Motor Vehicles, as well as a list of currently registered voters 
in WEC's records.  ERIC then compares this data to state and 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
3 
 
national sources, including the Social Security Administration's 
Death Master List and the United States Postal Services' 
National Change of Address service.  The data compiled in these 
sources is based upon information personally sent to these 
services by individual voters.  ERIC then sends WEC a 
maintenance report indicating those registered voters who may no 
longer be eligible to vote at their registered addresses because 
they have either moved or died.  
¶49 As documented in the record in this case, in 2017 ERIC 
sent WEC a maintenance report showing a list of registered 
voters for whom ERIC received data indicating they had moved and 
were no longer eligible to vote at their listed addresses.  
After reviewing this list to ensure its accuracy, WEC sent 
notices to those voters asking them to confirm whether they 
still lived at their registered addresses.  With respect to 
voters who failed to confirm their addresses, WEC marked their 
registration 
records 
as 
ineligible 
and 
required 
those 
individuals to re-register before voting again.  These actions 
demonstrate that WEC understood and embraced its duty under 
Wisconsin's election laws to maintain the voter rolls.  
¶50 In 2019, ERIC sent WEC another maintenance report with 
a list of registered voters who ostensibly had moved.  Again, 
WEC 
vetted 
this 
information 
to 
ensure 
its 
accuracy 
and 
subsequently sent notices to the affected voters.  This time, 
however, for voters who did not confirm whether they still lived 
at their registered addresses, WEC did not promptly change its 
records to reflect these voters' ineligibility.  Instead, WEC 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
4 
 
decided to delay deactivation of these voters' registrations for 
up to two years, thereby knowingly permitting voters to cast 
ballots in multiple elections with invalid registrations.  
Wisconsin's applicable election laws had not changed.   
¶51 Petitioners 
sued 
WEC 
and 
its 
members 
seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a writ a mandamus 
in order to compel WEC to comply with Wisconsin's election laws.  
In response, WEC alleged that "municipal clerk[s] and local 
board[s] of election commissioners" have the sole responsibility 
to change the eligibility of voters who have moved.  The circuit 
court rejected this argument, issued a writ of mandamus, and 
ordered WEC to deactivate the registrations of electors who had 
moved.  After a long and winding procedural road, the court of 
appeals reversed this decision, and we in turn granted review of 
this case.1 
                                                 
 
1 Rather than resolving this issue of first impression 
promptly when presented to us, on January 13, 2020, this court 
rejected a petition to bypass the court of appeals, leaving 
"voter rights and election integrity in flux, with no final 
resolution of the uncertainty in the law likely until after four 
statewide elections and one special congressional election."  
State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elec. Comm'n, 2020AP123-W (S. Ct. 
Order issued January 13, 2020 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
dissenting)).  After the case returned to this court on March 
11, 2020, the court refused to hear oral arguments until 
September 29, 2020, denying Zignego's motion to expedite oral 
argument.  As predicted, "the people of Wisconsin" were denied 
"a decision in this case until after every single one of 
Wisconsin's 2020 elections" came and went "including the 
presidential election in November" and more than "an entire year 
after petitioners' commencement of this time-sensitive appellate 
litigation."  Zignego v. Wis. Elec. Comm'n, 2020AP123-W (S. Ct. 
Order 
issued 
June 
1, 
2020 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting)).  
 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶52 The majority correctly concludes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.50(3) requires "municipal clerk[s] and board[s] of election 
commissioners" to "change the elector's registration from 
eligible to ineligible status" "[u]pon receipt of reliable 
information that a registered elector has changed his or her 
residence to a location outside of the municipality."  The 
majority stops there, ignoring WEC's duties under Wisconsin's 
election laws.  See majority op., ¶32 n.14 (refusing to discuss 
WEC's general duties because "the parties did not brief this 
question"). 
 
Under 
the 
whole-text 
canon 
of 
statutory 
construction, however, "[t]he text must be construed as a 
whole."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012); State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory language is interpreted . . . not 
in isolation but as part of a whole.").  
¶53 As a general matter, Wis. Stat. § 6.36(1)(a) requires 
WEC 
"to 
compile 
and 
maintain 
electronically 
an 
official 
registration 
list." 
 
(Emphasis 
added). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 5.05(15) expressly mandates that WEC "is responsible for the 
design and maintenance of the official registration list under 
s. 6.36."  (Emphasis added).  Although Wisconsin courts have 
never directly interpreted this statute, its interpretation is 
dispositive in this case.  Indeed, "to maintain" is more than 
just an obligation to create a registration list or to 
electronically insert data; it is a duty to "maintain" its 
accuracy.  The ordinary meaning of "to maintain" is to "to keep 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
6 
 
in a condition of good repair or efficiency."  Maintain, The 
American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011); see also Maintain, 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ("acts of repairs and 
other acts to prevent decline"); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶53 
(instructing courts to turn to dictionary definitions to 
understand the "common and accepted meaning" of statutory 
language).  
¶54 Applying 
the 
legislature's 
plain 
language, 
to 
"maintain" the official registration list means WEC must ensure 
its accuracy.  An interpretation that permits WEC to escape its 
statutory obligation to ensure the accuracy of the voter rolls 
would be absurd.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (stating that 
statutory language should be construed "reasonably, to avoid 
absurd or unreasonable results").  Among the express mandates of 
Wis. Stat. § 6.36, WEC must include in its list "the name and 
address of each registered elector in the state."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.36(1)(a)1. (emphasis added).  If WEC receives reliable 
information from ERIC that a voter's address information is 
invalid (e.g., the voter has moved away from a municipality or 
from the state entirely, as ERIC informs), and in response WEC 
does nothing, WEC thereby fails to "maintain" this list in any 
substantive regard.  WEC's neglect of the state's voter list 
threatens not only the rule of law but the integrity of 
Wisconsin's elections.   
¶55 In addition to assigning WEC the responsibility for 
maintaining the voter registration list under Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.05(15), the legislature also required WEC to accurately 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
7 
 
maintain this list at the time it instructed WEC to join ERIC.  
In particular, Wisconsin's election laws require WEC "to enter 
into 
a 
membership 
agreement 
with 
Electronic 
Registration 
Information Center, Inc. [ERIC], for the purpose of maintaining 
the official registration list."  Wis. Stat. § 6.36(ae)1 
(emphasis added).  The purpose of ERIC is "[to] assist state and 
local government units in making their voter registration lists 
and processes more accurate, more complete, and fully compliant 
with federal, state and local laws."  Accordingly, by requiring 
WEC to enter into an agreement with ERIC, the legislature 
ensured that WEC would bear responsibility for maintaining an 
accurate registration list.   
¶56 The membership agreement between WEC and ERIC reflects 
this obligation.  In relevant part, the membership agreement 
states:  "When the Member [WEC] receives credible ERIC Data 
(meaning the state has validated the data) indicating that 
information in an existing voter's record is deemed to be 
inaccurate or out-of-date, the Member [WEC] shall, at minimum, 
initiate contact with that voter in order to correct the 
inaccuracy or obtain information sufficient to inactivate or 
update the voter's record."  (Emphasis added).  The agreement 
defines "Member" as the chief election body in Wisconsin——not 
the municipal clerks or the municipal election commissions.2  
                                                 
2 At 
the 
time 
of 
this 
agreement, 
the 
Government 
Accountability Board (GAB) administered Wisconsin's election 
laws.  Accordingly, under the agreement, "Member" refers to the 
GAB.  However, in 2015 Wisconsin dissolved the GAB, replacing it 
with WEC, which assumed the GAB's responsibilities under the 
agreement with ERIC. 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
8 
 
Under the agreement, ERIC provides such data to WEC to enable 
WEC to reach out to voters, correct inaccurate information, and 
inactivate voter registrations in accordance with the law.3  The 
agreement does not impose any responsibilities on municipal 
clerks or local boards of election commissioners.  Instead, the 
legislature expressly tasked WEC with maintaining the list, and 
the ERIC agreement reflects this.  
¶57 Both Wis. Stat. § 5.05(15) and the ERIC Agreement 
instruct WEC to inactivate ineligible voters, and Wis. Stat. 
§ 5.05(2w) reinforces this responsibility.  In full, § 5.05(2w) 
states that WEC "has the responsibility for the administration 
of chs. 5 to 10 and 12."  (Emphasis added).  This statute 
requires WEC to administer the mandates of Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3)—
—the statute requiring local entities to deactivate voters 
pursuant to ERIC's data.  "Administration" does not mean WEC may 
stand idly by when it receives information indicating the 
ineligibility of voters to cast ballots using addresses where 
they no longer reside; rather, WEC must "carry on or execute" 
the legislature's explicit statutory directives.  Administer, 
Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed. 2007); see Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶53.  While municipal clerks and local boards of election 
commissioners have a duty under § 6.50(3), it is incumbent upon 
WEC to administer this law, which means WEC must execute it.   
                                                 
3 The very fact that ERIC sends the data to WEC signals 
WEC's obligation to ensure the accuracy of voter rolls.  If WEC 
does not share this data with local entities, the municipal 
clerks and boards of election commissioners could not possibly 
fulfill their statutory duties under Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3).  
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
9 
 
¶58 WEC understood this, at one point in time.  For 
example, in 2017 WEC itself "follow[ed] the statutory process 
related to voters for whom there is reliable information that 
they no longer reside at their registration address (Wis. Stat. 
§ 6.50(3))" as documented in a March 11, 2019 WEC memorandum to 
its members from Megan Wolfe, then interim administrator of WEC.  
The memorandum goes on to detail how "Commission staff vetted 
the [ERIC] list" and "WEC mailed a postcard to flagged voters 
directing them to reregister if they had moved or to sign and 
return the card to keep their registration current."  The 
registrations of any voters "who did not return the postcard or 
update their registrations were deactivated" by WEC in January 
2018, as were the registrations of voters "whose postcards were 
returned to the clerk as undeliverable."  Notwithstanding Wis. 
Stat. § 6.50(3)'s applicability to municipal clerks and board of 
election commissioners, WEC once recognized its own, independent 
obligation under state and federal law to ensure the accuracy of 
Wisconsin's voter rolls. 
¶59 In 
restricting 
its 
review 
of 
WEC's 
statutory 
obligations to Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3) alone, the majority commits 
a common but consequential error:   
Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the 
failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on 
the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, 
in view of its structure and of the physical and 
logical relation of its many parts.  Sir Edward Coke 
explained the canon in 1628: "[I]t is the most natural 
and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one 
part of the statute by another part of the same 
statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the 
makers."   
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
10 
 
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167 (quoting 1 Edward Coke, The First 
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 728, at 381a 
(1628; 14th ed. 1791)).  This canon of statutory construction 
has endured for centuries, and it counsels against reading a 
single statutory section in isolation.  "In ascertaining the 
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the 
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language 
and design of the statute as a whole."  Id.  Application of the 
canon in this case reveals WEC's statutory duty to maintain an 
accurate voter list statewide, and to execute the legislature's 
directives to remove ineligible voters from that list. 
¶60 By 
establishing 
a 
centralized 
body 
tasked 
with 
maintaining and administering the statewide voter list, the 
legislature can "ensure that citizens are only registered in one 
place."  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 
193 (2008) (quoted source omitted).  Imposing such "safeguards" 
"inspires 
public 
confidence" 
in 
the 
election 
system 
and 
"confirms the identity of voters" in our state.  League of Women 
Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 
¶52, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302 (quoted source omitted).  
"Increased confidence in the elector system, in turn, encourages 
citizen participation in the democratic process."  Id. (quoted 
source 
and 
internal 
marks 
omitted). 
 
For 
this 
reason, 
"[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is 
essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy."  
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).  When WEC neglects 
its duty to properly administer the mandates of Wis. Stat. 
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§ 6.50(3), it jeopardizes the functioning of our participatory 
democracy.  While WEC only now identifies municipal clerks and 
boards of election commissioners as the entities responsible for 
changing 
ineligible 
voters' 
registrations, 
WEC 
(and 
the 
majority) disregard WEC's role as the centralized election body 
in the state, which means the buck stops there.4  See Scott v. 
Schedler, 771 F.3d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 2014).   
¶61 This reading of Wis. Stat. §§ 5.05(15) and (2w) is 
buttressed by Wisconsin's obligations under HAVA.  Although 
federal law does not dictate our interpretation of state law, it 
can nonetheless confirm our analysis.  Cf. Wisconsin's Envtl. 
Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 409, 416-24, 256 
N.W.2d 149 (1977) (confirming this court's interpretation of the 
Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, which is "substantially 
patterned" after federal regulation).  HAVA imposes on states a 
mandatory duty to deactivate ineligible voters, independent of 
state law.   
¶62 "For many years, Congress left it up to the States to 
maintain accurate [voting] lists," until Congress shifted 
                                                 
4 WEC also has a duty to investigate local entities' 
statutory violations.  In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m) 
states that "[t]he commission shall investigate violations of 
laws administered by the commission[.]"  As explained, WEC has 
an affirmative duty to "administer" Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3); 
therefore, 
if 
local 
entities 
failed 
to 
fulfill 
their 
responsibilities under this provision, WEC had a duty to 
investigate.  Of course, the record reflects that WEC usurped 
the 
duties 
statutorily 
assigned 
to 
municipal 
clerks 
and 
municipal boards of election commissioners under § 6.50(3), 
thereby ostensibly partaking in the violation of the laws WEC 
was entrusted to administer.   
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course.  Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 
1838 (2018).  In 2002, Congress enacted HAVA, which in part was 
created in order "to ensure that voter registration records in 
the State are accurate and updated regularly."  52 U.S.C. 
§ 21083(a)(4).  Toward this end, HAVA requires "each State, 
acting 
through 
the 
chief 
State 
election 
official, 
[to] 
implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, 
uniform, 
official, 
centralized, 
interactive 
computerized 
statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and 
administered at the State level."  52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, when WEC receives information 
from ERIC indicating that certain voters have moved and are 
therefore ineligible to vote at their registered addresses, WEC 
cannot simply sit on its hands.  To the contrary, WEC has an 
obligation under federal law to maintain and administer the 
voter list, ensuring the accuracy of its content.  Only WEC can 
comply with federal mandates to maintain Wisconsin's voter 
registration list "at the State level" and "in a uniform" 
manner, something 1,850 municipal clerks and boards of elections 
commissioners cannot possibly do separately and at the local 
level. 
¶63 Congress 
enacted 
HAVA 
"to 
plac[e] 
primary 
responsibility [for voter registration lists] at the state level 
of government."  Arthur L. Burris & Eric A. Fisher, The Help 
America Vote Act and Election Administration: Overview and 
Selected Issues for the 2016 Election, Cong. Research Serv. 7 
(Oct. 18, 2016).  While "[e]arly U.S. elections were conducted 
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almost entirely locally," HAVA changed the game, "shift[ing] 
some responsibility for conducting elections to the state 
level."  Karen K. Shanton, The State and Local Role in Election 
Administration: Duties and Structures, Cong. Research Serv. 7 
(March 4, 2019).  As the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized, Congress requires "[the] State to create and 
maintain a computerized list of all registered voters" and to 
"verify 
voter 
information 
contained 
in 
registration 
applications."  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added).   
¶64 The purpose of these mandates is straightforward:  "to 
improve our country's election system."  H.R. Rep. No. 107-329, 
at 31 (2001).  As the "chief State election official" in 
Wisconsin, WEC has an essential role to play in this mission.  
See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A).  In particular, removing 
ineligible voters from the registration list is critical to 
"prevent[ing] voter fraud."  Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia 
Office of the City Commissioners Voter Registration Div., 28 
F.3d 306, 314 (3d Cir. 1994).  A "State's interest in preserving 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
electoral 
process 
is 
undoubtedly 
important," John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010), 
and it has a "strong interest in ensuring that its elections are 
run fairly and honestly."  Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts 
v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson v. 
Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).  Indeed, retaining 
thousands 
of 
potentially 
illegitimate 
registrations 
on 
Wisconsin's voter lists substantially harms the integrity of 
elections 
and 
dilutes 
or 
even 
cancels 
votes 
of 
validly 
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14 
 
registered citizens.  Removing ineligible voters from this 
state's registration list is paramount if Wisconsin takes 
seriously its obligation to ensure fair and honest elections. 
¶65 Even though Wisconsin's election statutes and HAVA 
require WEC to maintain the integrity and accuracy of the 
statewide voter registration list, WEC flagrantly violated both.  
Instead of making sure voter registrations were promptly 
deactivated 
"[i]f 
the 
elector 
no 
longer 
resides 
in 
the 
municipality or fails to apply for continuation of registration 
within 30 days of the date the notice is mailed" WEC decided to 
rewrite the law to give such voters "between 12 months and 24 
months" after the notification was sent.  Failing to follow the 
legislature's mandate——as WEC did in this very case——opens the 
door to voter fraud, erodes "[c]onfidence in the integrity of 
our electoral processes, . . . drive[s] honest citizens out of 
the 
democratic 
process, 
and 
breed[s] 
distrust 
of 
our 
government."  Purcell, 549 U.S. at 8; see also Milwaukee Branch 
of NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, ¶72, 357 Wis. 2d 469, 851 N.W.2d 
262 ("Protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral 
process, maintaining public confidence in election results, and 
preventing voter fraud [are] significant and compelling [state] 
interests.") 
(internal 
quotations 
omitted). 
 
Maintaining 
accurate voter rolls is integral to the "functioning of our 
participatory 
democracy," 
and 
WEC 
failed 
to 
fulfill 
its 
statutory obligation to do so as the chief election body in this 
state.  See id.  
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¶66  Reading Wis. Stat. §§ 5.05(15) and (2w) in harmony 
with HAVA and the ERIC Agreement, WEC had a "positive and plain 
duty" to change an elector's registration from eligible to 
ineligible status if the elector had moved, according to ERIC's 
data.5  WEC fully understood its duty and acted on it in prior 
years.  For example, in 2017 ERIC sent WEC a maintenance report 
showing a list of registered voters who apparently had moved and 
were no longer eligible to vote at their registered address.  
WEC reviewed the accuracy of this list, sent notices to the 
applicable voters, and changed the status of voters who did not 
respond.  In contrast, in 2019 and 2020 WEC refused to undertake 
these mandatory updates, despite no intervening changes in 
applicable law.   
¶67 During oral argument, when Attorney General Josh Kaul 
was asked whether WEC had a duty to deactivate voters regardless 
of the duties of local entities, he equivocated.  In particular, 
he was asked:  "The Commission still thinks it has the authority 
                                                 
5 The majority misconstrues my analysis to mean that "a 
court can order the Commission to carry out" the statutory 
duties of a municipal clerk or board of election commissioners.  
Majority op., ¶39 n.17.  Refusing to read Wisconsin's election 
laws as a whole, the majority entirely ignores WEC's own 
independent statutory duties.  There is nothing "remarkable" in 
concluding that a court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering 
WEC to fulfill its obligations under the law.  The majority 
characterizes this analysis as "craft[ing] a new argument on 
Zignego's behalf."  Id.  Construing the election statutes as a 
whole is not making an argument for any party; it is fulfilling 
this court's duty to interpret the law.  "Statutes cannot be 
read intelligently if the eye is closed to considerations 
evidenced in affiliated statutes[.]"  Felix Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 
539 (1947). 
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16 
 
[to 
deactivate 
voters]; 
does 
it 
rely 
on 
[its] 
general 
maintenance language in chapter 5?"   Attorney General Kaul 
dodged the question, merely noting that this issue "raised a 
different question than the question here" and gave no answer 
one way or the other.  Attorney General Kaul was later asked to 
clarify what duties WEC possesses under Wisconsin's election 
laws:  "Do you agree or disagree with memorandum for the March 
11, 2019 commission meeting prepared [by WEC's chief official] 
that . . . outlines 
the 
legal 
authority 
related 
to 
the 
recommended 
process 
[for 
WEC 
deactivating 
voters]?"  
Importantly, this memo acknowledged that "Wis. Stat. § 5.05(15) 
provides a broader source of statutory authority to the 
Commission for ensuring the integrity and maintenance of the 
statewide voter registration list, which supports the process 
[of deactivating voters] recommended by staff."  Again, Attorney 
General Kaul evaded the issue, stating that the memo does "point 
to [WEC's] general maintenance obligation," but "how far this 
extends is not at issue." 
¶68 As these exchanges and WEC's briefing to this court 
illustrate, we have been asked to disregard WEC's obligations 
under Wisconsin election law, merely because local entities have 
some role to play in deactivating voters.  WEC's position is not 
only disingenuous, it also upends the statutory hierarchy of 
responsibilities.  Both Wis. Stat. §§ 5.05(15) and (2w) require 
WEC, as the state's chief election body, to inactivate voters 
identified as ineligible by ERIC.  Both HAVA as well as the ERIC 
Agreement impose this requirement on WEC and no other entity.  
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"How far [these duties] extend" is precisely the issue in this 
case.  The law imposes a "positive and plain duty" on WEC to 
deactivate certain ineligible voters——and WEC most assuredly 
understood this, as its own conduct confirms, until its position 
changed in order to avoid accountability in this litigation. 
¶69 Because WEC had a "positive and plain" duty under 
Wisconsin election laws, the circuit court properly issued a 
writ of mandamus.6  "Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy" 
that is issued "to compel performance by a public officer of a 
duty which he is bound by law to perform."  Eisenberg v. 
Estowski, 59 Wis. 2d 98, 102, 207 N.W.2d 874 (1973) (citation 
omitted).  It was WEC's extraordinary dereliction of duty that 
warranted this extraordinary remedy.  Certainly, Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
6 Although the circuit court issued the writ of mandamus 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 6.50(3), WEC was nevertheless compelled 
to act pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 5.05(15) and (2w).  It is well-
settled law that even "[i]f a trial court reaches the proper 
result for the wrong reason it will be affirmed."  State v. 
King, 120 Wis. 2d 285, 292, 354 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1984).  "An 
appellate court is concerned with whether the decision . . . is 
correct, not whether . . . the circuit court's reasoning is.  If 
the holding is correct, it should be sustained and this court 
may do so on a theory or on reasoning not presented to the lower 
court."  Liberty Trucking Co. v. Dep't of Indus., Lab & Hum. 
Rels., 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973); see also 
Mueller v. Mizia, 33 Wis. 2d 311, 318, 147 N.W.2d 269 (1967).  
This general rule applies with equal force when circuit courts 
grant or deny writs of mandamus.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Morke 
v. Record Custodian, Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., 154 
Wis. 2d 727, 454 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the trial 
court's decision to deny a writ of mandamus because, even though 
the trial court relied on an erroneous interpretation of the 
"substantial damages requirement," the petitioner nonetheless 
did not have a "positive and plain duty" to act).  Accordingly, 
because WEC was compelled to act pursuant to §§ 5.05(15) and 
(2w), even though the writ referenced § 6.50(3), the circuit 
court's decision must be upheld. 
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§§ 5.05(15) and (2w) instruct WEC to perform its "positive, 
plain, and unequivocal" responsibility to deactivate these 
voters——a duty it abandoned.  State ex rel. Althouse v. City of 
Madison, 
79 
Wis. 
2d 
97, 
106, 
255 
N.W.2d 
449 
(1977).  
Accordingly, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it issued the writ of mandamus.  Lake Bluff 
Hous. Partners v. City of S. Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 170, 
540 N.W.2d 189 (1995). 
II 
¶70 As the majority notes, the circuit court found WEC in 
contempt when it failed to comply with the writ of mandamus and 
imposed remedial sanctions.  Despite WEC's willful defiance of 
the circuit court's order, the majority relieves WEC of those 
sanctions and merely "remind[s]" WEC that just because a party 
disagrees with a court order, it nevertheless must comply with 
it.  Majority op., ¶5.  Astonishingly, the majority is not the 
least bit troubled by WEC's refusal to obey a court order.  The 
majority's 
feckless 
response 
dangerously 
signals 
to 
all 
litigants that they may defy circuit court orders without 
penalty, so long as they prevail on appeal.    
¶71 In December 2019, the Ozaukee County Circuit Court 
issued a writ of mandamus ordering WEC "to comply with the 
provisions of § 6.50(3) and deactivate the registrations of 
those electors who have failed to apply for continuation of 
their registration within 30 days of the date the notice was 
mailed under that provision."  The circuit court issued this 
ruling orally from the bench on December 13, 2019, and signed a 
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written order on December 17, 2019.  Although this was 
indisputably an order of the court, WEC quite publicly refused 
to comply with it, thereby undermining the authority of the 
entire judicial branch.  
¶72 Time was of the essence for WEC to comply with the 
circuit court's order because of the elections scheduled for 
February 18, 2020 and April 7, 2020——the first two of five 
elections in Wisconsin last year.  Although WEC appealed the 
circuit court's order, a stay of the mandamus order was not in 
effect and therefore WEC was bound to obey the circuit court's 
order.  See Wis. Stat. § 808.07(1) ("An appeal does not stay the 
execution or enforcement of the judgment or order appealed from 
except as provided in this section or as otherwise expressly 
provided by law.").  WEC did not obey the order; it openly 
defied it.     
¶73 As a result, petitioners returned to the circuit court 
to force WEC to comply with the mandamus order via a contempt 
motion.  After a hearing on January 13, 2020, the circuit court 
found WEC and three of its commissioners——Julie Glancey, Anne 
Jacobs, and Mark Thomsen——in contempt for disobeying the writ of 
mandamus.  The circuit court imposed remedial sanctions ordering 
each of those commissioners to pay a forfeiture of $250 and WEC 
to pay $50 per day until WEC complied with the writ of mandamus.  
The day after the circuit court issued the contempt order, on 
January 14, 2020, the court of appeals stayed both the mandamus 
order and the contempt order, without stating any reasons for 
doing so, much less any legal basis.   
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¶74 In addition to contaminating Wisconsin's elections, 
WEC's refusal to obey the circuit court's order harmed the 
integrity of Wisconsin's justice system.  The court of appeals' 
stays in this case excused WEC's allegedly contemptuous conduct 
and signaled to the public that no one is bound by a circuit 
court order.  Defiance of court orders, permitted by the court 
of appeals and now condoned by this court, threatens the 
integrity of our entire judicial system.  "[T]he public interest 
in the enforcement of court orders . . . is essential to the 
effective functioning of our judicial process[.]"  Valdez v. 
City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1989).  
An 
orderly 
society 
depends 
upon 
citizens 
and 
government 
officials following the law.  "If it is within the power of a 
party to an action . . . to flout the judgments of a court and 
act in contravention thereto, then our system of government is 
wholly ineffectual to protect the rights of parties to actions 
who have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of its courts; 
hence the duty of a citizen who is a litigant to obey the order 
of the court."  John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 208 Wis. 650, 662-63, 
242 N.W. 576 (1932).   
¶75 By imposing a stay on the contempt order before 
deciding the merits as to WEC's contempt, the court of appeals 
made a mockery of the rule of law in Wisconsin.  While the court 
of appeals stayed the contempt order one day after the circuit 
court made it, WEC blatantly flouted the circuit court's writ 
for 32 days before an appellate court relieved it of its 
obligation to comply with it.  "If a party can make himself a 
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judge of the validity of orders which have been issued, and by 
his own act of disobedience set them aside, then are the courts 
impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls the 
'judicial power of the United States' would be a mere mockery."  
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).  
The circuit court's contempt order should have remained in 
effect until an appellate court decided the merits of the 
circuit court's decision, and the sanctions should have been 
upheld regardless of the outcome.  Instead, the majority 
effectively condones WEC's scorn for the judiciary by failing to 
even admonish WEC's brazen disrespect for the authority of our 
courts.   
* * * 
 
¶76 "This 
great 
source 
of 
free 
government, 
popular 
election, should be perfectly pure."  Alexander Hamilton, Speech 
at New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), in Debates on 
the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876).  Our 
elections will not be perfectly pure until WEC is compelled to 
comply with Wisconsin's election laws and held to account when 
it fails to do so.   
"Elections are 'of the most fundamental significance 
under our constitutional structure.'  Through them, we 
exercise self-government.  But elections enable self-
governance only when they include processes that 
'giv[e] citizens (including the losing candidates and 
their supporters) confidence in the fairness of the 
election.'"   
Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid, ___ U.S. ___, 
141 S. Ct. 732, 734 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
Nos.  2019AP2397 & 2020AP112.rgb 
 
22 
 
of certiorari) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) and Democratic National 
Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. 
Ct. 28, 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application 
to vacate stay)).   
¶77 Wisconsin citizens expect more from their chief 
election body, and Wisconsin's election laws assuredly demand 
more.  "It should be beyond question that the State has a 
significant and compelling interest in protecting the integrity 
and reliability of the electoral process, as well as promoting 
the public's confidence in elections."  Milwaukee Branch of 
NAACP, 357 Wis. 2d 469, ¶73.  In this case, WEC shirked its 
duty, flouted the circuit court's orders without consequences, 
and knowingly left ineligible voters on Wisconsin's voter rolls.  
WEC has a duty to maintain and administer Wisconsin's voter 
registration list under both state and federal law.  Because the 
majority fails to recognize this or penalize WEC's contempt for 
the judicial system, I respectfully dissent. 
¶78 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
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