Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. McElroy

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. McElroy, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3774.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3774 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. MCELROY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. McElroy,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3774.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Dishonest conduct and statements in criminal case and 
disciplinary proceeding—Failure to report disciplinary violation—
Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2013-1626—Submitted December 11, 2013—Decided September 4, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-058. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kenneth Kelly McElroy of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0070478, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999.  
On October 13, 2011, we suspended McElroy’s license to practice law on an 
interim basis following our learning of his September 20, 2005 conviction of 
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forgery and tampering with records.  In re McElroy, 129 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2011-
Ohio-5244, 954 N.E.2d 1211. 
{¶ 2} On August 6, 2012, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association, filed a 13-count complaint with the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline charging McElroy with violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from 
the conduct that led to his felony convictions.1  The parties submitted stipulations 
of facts and violations and jointly recommended that McElroy be suspended from 
the practice of law for 18 months, with 6 months of the suspension stayed on the 
condition that he engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 3} The parties jointly moved to waive the formal hearing, but a panel 
of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline denied the motion.  
The panel conducted a hearing and adopted the parties’ stipulations of fact and 
misconduct, but recommended a two-year suspension with no reinstatement “until 
Respondent can demonstrate that he has broken this pattern of lying” that was of 
specific concern to the panel.  The board recommended an indefinite suspension.  
No objections have been filed. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and we find 
that an indefinite suspension is appropriate, with no credit for time served under 
the interim felony suspension. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} The record demonstrates that McElroy has a disposition for not 
telling the truth.  Many of his ethics violations arose from a relationship with a 
woman who, in May 2004, attempted to run over him with her automobile.  
Because he did not want her to be prosecuted for felony assault, McElroy testified 
                                                          
 
1 Relator charged McElroy with misconduct under the applicable Disciplinary Rules for acts 
occurring before February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
superseded the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.   
 
January Term, 2014 
 
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in an affidavit that “the whole situation was an unfortunate accident,” even though 
he later admitted in court and under oath that hers was an intentional act. 
{¶ 6} McElroy had purchased the automobile for this girlfriend, and 
then, after a disagreement with her, he took the vehicle. She wanted the car back, 
made attempts to get it back, and ultimately called the police, reported it stolen, 
and notified McElroy that she had filed a report with the police.  McElroy later 
notarized her alleged signature on a motor vehicle title without administering the 
oath and without actually witnessing her sign it, transferring in that process the 
ownership of the vehicle from his girlfriend to an acquaintance. 
{¶ 7} After a four-day bench trial and based on these facts, the trial court 
found McElroy guilty of forgery and tampering with evidence, a fifth-degree and 
third-degree felony respectively.  The court found that there was a “large gap of 
credibility” with respect to McElroy’s testimony.  “In fact,” the judge continued, 
“the Court notes from the observations here of all of the circumstances that were 
testified to the fairly evasive manner that this Defendant answered questions, 
especially on cross-examination, and that his credibility is lacking.” 
{¶ 8} During closing arguments at McElroy’s trial, and also at the 
sentencing hearing, his counsel stated that McElroy “has no prior criminal 
convictions” and “no prior criminal record.”  In fact, McElroy had been convicted 
of assault in 1993, and at the time of his trial, another charge of assault was 
pending in South Euclid Municipal Court, on which he was found guilty on 
October 18, 2005.  In the first instance, McElroy did not correct his counsel’s 
representations to the judge, and in the second instance, McElroy did not report 
the ultimate outcome to the judge or his probation officer, notwithstanding the 
court’s order for just such an update.  McElroy also did not report his felony 
convictions for forgery and tampering with evidence to any disciplinary authority. 
{¶ 9} On September 1, 2005, perhaps attempting to avoid the inevitable, 
McElroy took inactive status with respect to his license to practice law.  
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Following our imposition of an interim suspension of his license, he represented 
to this court, in his “Motion to Dissolve and/or Modify Suspension (Expedited 
Review Requested)” that he had “formally resigned his license to practice law 
some time before the entry of his felony conviction on September 20, 2005.”  
(Emphasis added.)  He claimed in that same filing that he “willingly left the legal 
profession before his conviction, for at least four years.”  (Emphasis sic.)  He 
became active again on February 18, 2009, three years and five months after he 
went inactive. 
{¶ 10} On June 10, 2010, McElroy filed in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas a “Motion for Sealing of Record of First Offense,” attempting by 
this motion to expunge the criminal convictions he received in 2005.2  Yet that 
conviction was not his first offense; instead, it was the second of three criminal 
convictions. 
{¶ 11} McElroy told much of his version of these events in a November 
19, 2011 response to a written inquiry from relator regarding his felony 
convictions.  Relator’s investigator on March 15, 2012, interviewed McElroy, and 
while explaining his conduct, McElroy stated that the trial had lasted only one 
day, that he “never in any way shape or form ha[d] attempted to practice law for 
approximately four years.”  When asked by the investigator whether any court 
actions occurred other than his trial and the prosecution of his girlfriend for 
assaulting him with a car, McElroy said no.  But McElroy had been charged in 
2004 with domestic violence and child endangering in Cleveland Municipal 
Court.  These charges had been dismissed in June 2005, when his girlfriend failed 
to appear to testify. 
                                                          
 
2 McElroy cites in his motion R.C. 2953.31 through 2953.36 as authority for the court to seal.  
R.C. 2953.31(A) defines “first offender” as “anyone who has been convicted of an offense in this 
state or any other jurisdiction and who previously or subsequently has not been convicted of the 
same or a different offense in this state or any other jurisdiction.” 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 12} McElroy, during the disciplinary investigation, also made the 
following statements: (1) that his last conversation with his ex-girlfriend had been 
in July 2004, (2) that the judge in his trial during the sentencing hearing had asked 
the case’s detective for his opinion regarding sentencing and the detective had 
said “no jail time,” (3) that during that sentencing hearing, the judge stated that he 
was imposing alcohol and drug testing as part of McElroy’s probation because 
McElroy “probably or likely” had a substance- or alcohol-abuse problem because 
he let himself get into the negative situation with his ex-girlfriend.  All of these 
statements were contradicted by his trial testimony and the trial transcript. 
{¶ 13} To summarize, McElroy was convicted of forgery and tampering 
with evidence, made false statements in an affidavit, made false statements to a 
disciplinary investigator, made false statements to the trial court in his filings, 
allowed false statements to be made to the trial court without correction, made 
false statements to this court in his filing, notarized a signature without observing 
the person sign or administering the oath, and failed to report his felony 
convictions to a disciplinary body. 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated, and the panel and board found, that 
McElroy’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 
in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), (4) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), (5) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), and (6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and 1-103(A) 
(requiring a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-
102 to report the knowledge to a tribunal or other legal authority empowered to 
investigate or act upon the violation) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) (prohibiting 
knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a 
disciplinary matter), 8.3(a) (requiring an attorney to self-report his violations of 
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the Rules of Professional Conduct that raise a question about his honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), and 8.4(c) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation), (d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and (h) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law). 
Sanction 
{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  We also weigh evidence of 
the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 16} As mitigating factors, the parties stipulated that McElroy does not 
have any prior disciplinary record, has paid the criminal penalty for his 
convictions, and has acknowledged his wrongful conduct.  They further stipulate 
that McElroy placed himself on a “self-imposed break” from the practice of law 
from 2005 to 2009, has not engaged in a lengthy pattern of ongoing misconduct or 
caused grave harm to others as a result of his misconduct, and has not realized any 
actual personal gain or profit from his misconduct.  Finally, they stipulate that 
McElroy paid for the vehicle formerly belonging to his girlfriend and returned it 
to her and that he maintains that he relied upon his counsel’s erroneous advice in 
not reporting his conviction to the Supreme Court.  No aggravating factors were 
submitted by the parties. 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 17} The parties recommend a sanction of an 18-month suspension with 
6 months stayed on the condition that McElroy engage in no further misconduct 
and request that he be credited with his time under the interim felony suspension. 
{¶ 18} The panel disagreed with many of the mitigating factors, however, 
and added aggravating factors.  The panel found it difficult to believe that 
McElroy was not aware of his obligation to report his disciplinary infractions.  It 
noted that “[h]is numerous falsifications and misrepresentations of fact create a 
pattern of dishonesty, much more serious than Relator suggests.”  The panel 
found that McElroy was motivated by a dishonest and selfish motive in his 
handling of the motor vehicle transfer and in his misleading of the court in his 
attempt at expungement.  The panel also found that McElroy attempted to realize 
personal gain in the transfer of the vehicle to his friend.  The panel thus 
recommended a two-year suspension. 
{¶ 19} Most disconcerting to both the panel and board was McElroy’s 
pattern of lying: 
 
Viewed individually, no single misrepresentation of his would 
warrant an indefinite suspension.  Even in the aggregate, it is 
possible to view his misrepresentations as not especially harmful to 
others.  But the practice of law demands from every attorney, at a 
minimum, absolute candor before any court or disciplinary 
authority.  Respondent repeatedly has demonstrated a disturbing 
tendency to misrepresent and conceal the truth about his past 
behavior.  If an attorney cannot be trusted to reveal candidly 
unfavorable facts about his own behavior, we as a panel cannot be 
sanguine about whether he will be candid in his representations to 
courts or clients in other contexts.  Until Respondent can 
demonstrate that he has broken this pattern of lying, his license to 
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practice law although subject to a definite suspension should not be 
reinstated. 
 
The board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing panel 
but did not adopt the panel’s recommendation.  Instead, based on the panel’s 
concerns, the board recommends that McElroy be suspended indefinitely, with no 
credit for time served under his felony suspension imposed in October 2011. 
{¶ 20} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Insley, 104 Ohio St.3d 424, 2004-Ohio-
6564, 819 N.E.2d 1109, we found that the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 
(5), and (6), 6-101(A)(3), and 7-101(A)(1) and (2) for conduct involving 
temporary-custody papers.  The respondent sent school officials copies of an 
executed petition for temporary custody and a consent judgment entry that she 
represented would be filed in court that same day.  Not following through, and the 
parent being apprised by the school’s officials several months later that they had 
not received a court order, the respondent fabricated a court document that 
included forged signatures of both a magistrate and judge in an attempt to cover 
up her failure to file.  She then faxed the falsified document to the school along 
with a cover letter that falsely advised school officials that all the necessary 
papers had been filed in court and the child’s custody had been changed. 
{¶ 21} In mitigation, we found that the respondent had no prior 
disciplinary record.  As an aggravating factor, we found that although the 
respondent cooperated initially in the disciplinary investigation, she did not 
answer the relator’s complaint and did not further participate in the disciplinary 
process.  The respondent’s lies to the court and her client and her fabrication of 
the judicial officers’ signatures warranted an indefinite suspension.  Id., ¶ 12. 
{¶ 22} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Woods, 28 Ohio St.3d 245, 503 N.E.2d 
746 (1986), the respondent gained the confidence of an elderly woman by helping 
her with matters that did not involve attorney-client matters.  He handled certain 
January Term, 2014 
 
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financial matters for her, occasionally signing her name even though he did not 
have a power of attorney for those purposes.  When the woman’s $70,000 money-
market certificate of deposit matured, the respondent, without authority, redeemed 
it, forged her signature on the cashier’s check, and deposited that endorsed check 
into his personal account.  The respondent was convicted of theft, forgery, and 
uttering in violation of R.C. 2913.02 and 2913.31 and sentenced to a one-year 
term of imprisonment.  We found that his misconduct violated DR 1-102(A)(1), 
(3), (4), and (6), and we imposed an indefinite suspension from the practice of 
law.  Id. at 247. 
{¶ 23} And in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Nienaber, 80 Ohio St.3d 534, 687 
N.E.2d 678 (1997), the respondent attempted to finesse to his client’s advantage 
by his silence the timing of hearings, charges, and convictions on two DUI-related 
prosecutions, which led two different judges to unwarranted inferences in their 
respective circumstances.  The respondent also made affirmatively false 
statements to one of the judges.  “We require complete candor with courts. * * * 
We are particularly concerned that the instant matter arose on the criminal docket 
of one of our municipal courts which handles an extremely heavy caseload.  
Judges, especially those who must process heavy caseloads, must be able to rely 
on the representations of the attorneys who appear before them.”  Id. at 537.  In 
light of the respondent’s violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5) and 7-102(A)(5) 
and (7), and considering that we had previously suspended that lawyer for 6 
months, we indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law. 
{¶ 24} Because we find that Kenneth Kelly McElroy’s conduct was 
similar to the conduct in the above cases, we indefinitely suspend him from the 
practice of law in Ohio, with no credit for time served under the interim felony 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to McElroy. 
Judgment accordingly. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association and Heather M. Zirke; Thompson 
Hine, L.L.P., Jennifer S. Roach, and Holly H. Little, for relator. 
Kenneth Kelly McElroy, pro se. 
_________________________