Title: ESTATE OF BROWN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12091 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA I n The Matter of The Estate Of: GERTRUDE BROWN, Deceased. H A Z E L WAGY , MARILYN GRIFFITHS , R O G E R BOULTER , D O R S E Y ENGMAN, DAVID C. BOULTER, and ROBERT W. BOULTER, grandnieces and grandnephews of G E R T R U D E BROWN, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, GEORGE W. McKEAN, Administrator of t h e Estate of GERTRUDE BROWN, deceased, DARE B. BOULTER, GEORGE W. BOULTER, and G R E T T A G. HALLECK, nephews and nieces of said deceased, GERTRUDE BROlm, deceased. Defendants and ~ e s ~ o n d h n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Victor H. F a l l , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : George P. S a r s f i e l d argued, Butte, Montana. Holland, Holland and Maxby, Butte, Montana. D. L. Holland appeared, Butte, Montana. For Respondents: Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana. G. Page Wellcome argued, Bozeman, Montana. Submitted: November 30, 1971 Decided : 2 <B 1 1 . 1 9 z M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from an order and decree determining h e i r s h i p entered i n t h e estate of Gertrude Brown, deceased, by t h e d i s t r i c t court of G a l l a t i n County. Gertrude Brown died i n t e s t a t e i n Bozeman, Montana on January 10, 1970, leaving an e s t a t e consisting of r e a l and per- sonal property, and a t t h e time of h e r death she l e f t no survi- ving husband, c h i l d r e n , mother, f a t h e r , brothers o r sisters. The deceased, however, had one sister who predeceased her. This sister had f i v e children, t h r e e surviving and two predeceasing Gertrude Brown. The claimants t o t h e e s t a t e c o n s i s t of t h e surviving niece and nephews of t h e decedent, and t h e surviving children of two deceased nephews of Gertrude Brown. David C. Boulter, a s an individual and a s a member of a class, t h e children of deceased nephews and nieces, f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r determination of h e i r s h i p a l l e g i n g , among o t h e r things, t h a t he and h i s class w e r e h e i r s of t h e decedent, and a s such w e r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r s t a t u t o r y share i n t h e d i s t r i - bution of t h e e s t a t e . The appellant f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t of d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n . This a f f i d a v i t was accepted by t h e d i s t r i c t judge who had been earlier c a l l e d i n t o preside, and another d i s t r i c t judge was then c a l l e d i n , An a f f i d a v i t of d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , a l l e g i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y grounds, w a s timely f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e new judge by t h e appellant. The public administrator of G a l l a t i n County, George W. McKealtin his capacity as appointed administrator and on behalf of the niece and nephews of the decedent, moved the court to strike and quash the affidavit and also moved for judgment on the pleadings. Thereafter the matter was heard by the district court and subsequent to the argument by the parties the court granted the public administrator's motion to strike and quash the affi- davit of disqualification, and further granted the administra- tor's motion for judgment on the pleadings ordering and decree- ing that the sole heirs-at-law of Gertrude Brown, deceased, to be the niece and nephews of the deceased who would take to the exclusion of appellant and his class, the grandnieces and grand- nephews of the decedent. This appeal alleges error in failure of the district court judge to accept the affidavit of disqualification executed by David C. Boulter, a grandnephew of the decedent, and as such a member of a class who claimed, and still claims, to be an heir-at-law, and errors in the district court's order and decree naming the sole heirs-at-law of the estate of Gertrude Brown to be Gretta G. Halleck, Dare B. Boulter and George Boulter, the surviving niece and nephews of the deceased. Appellants first assignment of error has merit. Section 93-901, R.C.M. 1947 provides as follows: "Any justice, judge, or justice of the peace must not sit or act as such in any action or proceeding: "4. When either party makes and files an affi- davit as hereinafter provided, that he has reason to believe, and does believe, he cannot have a fair and impartial hearing or trial before a district judge by reason of the bias or preju- dice of such judge. Such affidavit may be made by any party to an action, motion, or proceeding, personally, or by his attorney or agent, and shall be filed with the clerk of the district court in which the same may be pending. * * *" The appellant, who had previously filed a petition for determination of heirship and subsequently a timely affidavit of disqualification, had met all the statutory requirements for effecting this disqualification and the district court erred in failing to honor the affidavit. The basis for granting respondents' motion to strike and quash was the district court's conclusion of law that under the provision of section 91-403, R.C.M. 1947, the niece and nephews of the decedent were her sole heirs at law; and there- fore the contesting parties were not proper parties. This con- clusion of the court was likewise erroneous. An examination of section 91-403, R.C.M. 1947, the law of succession and distribution, reveals that the legislature has constructed a comprehensive, natural and orderly scheme. Section 91-403, R.C.M. 1947 states: "Succession to and distribution of estates. When any person having title to any estate not limited by marriage contract dies without disposing of the estate by will, it is succeeded to and must be distributed, unless otherwise expressly provided by the laws of Montana, sub- ject to the payment of his debts, in the follow- ing manner: "1. If the decedent leaves a surviving husband or wife, and only one (1) child, or the lawful issue of one (1) child in equal shares to the surviving husband, or wife and child, or issue of such child. If the decedent leaves a sur- viving husband or wife, and more than one (1) child living, or one (1) child living and the lawful i s s u e of one (1) o r more deceased child- r e n , one-third (1/3) t o t h e surviving husband o r wife, and t h e remainder i n equal shares t o h i s children, and t o t h e lawful i s s u e of any deceased c h i l d , by r i g h t of representation; b u t i f t h e r e be no c h i l d of t h e decedent l i v i n g a t h i s death, t h e remainder goes t o a l l h i s l i n e a l descendants; and i f a l l t h e descendants a r e i n t h e same degree of kindred t o t h e decedent, they share equally, otherwise they take accord- ing t o t h e r i g h t of representation. I f t h e decedent leaves no surviving hnsband o r w i f e , b u t leaves i s s u e , t h e whole estate goes t o such i s s u e ; and i f such i s s u e c o n s i s t s of more than one (1) c h i l d l i v i n g , o r one (1) c h i l d l i v i n g , and t h e lawful i s s u e of one (1) o r more deceased children, then t h e estate goes i n equal shares t o t h e children l i v i n g , o r t o t h e c h i l d l i v i n g , and t h e i s s u e of t h e deceased c h i l d o r children by r i g h t of representation. "2. I f t h e decedent leaves no i s s u e , t h e whole of t h e estate s h a l l go t o t h e surviving husband o r wife. I f t h e decedent leaves no i s s u e , nor husband nor wife, t h e e s t a t e must go t o t h e f a t h e r and mother i n equal shares, o r i f e i t h e r be dead then t o t h e other. "3. I f t h e r e be n e i t h e r i s s u e , husband, wife, f a t h e r , nor mother, then i n equal shares t o t h e brothers and sisters of t h e decedent, and t o t h e children of any deceased brother o r sister, by r i g h t of representation. "4. I f t h e decedent leaves n e i t h e r i s s u e , hus- band, wife, f a t h e r , mother, brother, nor sister, t h e e s t a t e goes t o t h e next of k i n , i n equal degree, excepting t h a t where t h e r e a r e two ( 2 ) o r more c o l l a t e r a l kindred, i n equal degree, b u t claiming through d i f f e r e n t ancestors, those who claimed through t h e nearest ancestors must be preferred t o those claiming through an ancestor more remote. "5. I f t h e decedent leaves s e v e r a l children, o r one (1) c h i l d , and t h e i s s u e of one (1) or more children, and any such surviving c h i l d d i e s under age, and not having been married, a l l t h e estate t h a t came t o the deceased c h i l d by i n h e r i - tance from such decedent descends i n equal shares t o t h e o t h e r children of t h e same parent, and t o t h e i s s u e of any such other children who a r e dead, by r i g h t of representation. "6. I f , a t t h e death of such c h i l d , who d i e s under age, not having been married, a l l t h e o t h e r children of h i s parents are a l s o dead, and any of them have l e f t i s s u e , t h e e s t a t e t h a t came t o such c h i l d by inheritance from h i s parent descends t o t h e i s s u e of a l l o t h e r child- ren of t h e same parent; and i f a l l t h e i s s u e are i n t h e same degree of kindred to t h e c h i l d , they share t h e estate equally, otherwise they take ac- cording t o t h e r i g h t of representation. "7. I f t h e decedent leaves no husband, wife, o r kindred, t h e e s t a t e escheats t o t h e state." I t is t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e application and e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 3 which is a t i s s u e here. The appellant argues t h a t t h i s Court's r u l i n g i n I n re Bronson's Estate, 1 4 1 Mont. 548, 382 P.2d 818, wherein w e held t h a t when t h e i n t e s t a t e l e f t n e i t h e r i s s u e , wife, f a t h e r , mother, brother o r sister surviving him b u t l e f t nieces and nephews they i n h e r i t e d p e r c a p i t a r a t h e r than per s t i r p e s under s e c t i o n 4 of 91-403, R.C.M. 1947, a s next of k i n r a t h e r than as represen- t a t i v e s of t h e i r deceased parents under s e c t i o n 3. This r u l i n g is not relevant i n t h e i n s t a n t case because i n Bronson a l l claimants were of an equal degree, t h a t i s , nephews and nieces of t h e decedent, and t h e r i g h t s of grandnephews and grandnieces were not a t i s s u e . The doctrine of representation is one of n e c e s s i t y and is only resorted t o when t h e next of k i n a r e i n unequal degree t o prevent t h e exclusion of those i n a more remote degree. 19 ALR2d 1 9 4 . I n Bronson our holding recognized t h a t no n e c e s s i t y e x i s t e d f o r t h e application of t h e doctrine. It is conceded by t h e appellant t h a t i f he and members of h i s c l a s s are t o take a t a l l it w i l l be under s e c t i o n 91- 403(3) , R.C.M. 1947. Where the right of representation is applicable it raises the corollary issue of the level of distribution to those who take by representation. We focus on this corollary issue as we deem it essential to an understanding of the descent and distribution provided for under section 3 of 91-403, R . C . M . 1947. The statute which defines the right of representation is section 91-417, R.C.M. 1947, and reads: "Inheritance or succession 'by right of rep- resentation' takes place when the descendants of any deceased heir take the same share or right in the estate of another person that their parents would have taken if living. Posthumous children are considered as living at the death of their parents." Thus we see the statute provides for representation by any descendant of a designated heir without designating the level of distribution contemplated. "When all the heirs or distributees of an estate are his children or his parents--persons who are in the first degree of kinship to him--such persons clearly inherit in their own right, and not as representing other persons who would have taken had they survived the intestate. These heirs take per capita. Similarly, brothers and sisters, all being descendants of the same parent or parents, do not raise a question of per stirpes distribution; they take per capita. When other heirs of an intestate, such as grandchildren, great grandchildren, nephews and nieces or cousins, take per capita or per stirpes is a question so complex as to be not easily susceptible of general- ization. * * *" 23 Am Jur 2d, Descent and Distri- bution S 64. This problem was met head-on in Maud v. Catherwood, 67 C.A.2d 636, 155 P.2d 111, where all seven of a decedent's children were predeceased at the time as of which the heirs were to be determined and four left surviving descendants. It was held that one great grandchild, the sole descendant of one c h i l d received one-quarter of the e s t a t e ; one grandchild, t h e s o l e descendant of another, received one-quarter; two grand- children, only descendants of a t h i r d c h i l d , received one-eighth each; and one grandchild and one g r e a t grandchild, t h e only descendants of a fourth c h i l d , received one-eighth each, t h e children of the decedent having been determined a s t h e l e v e l of d i s t r i b u t i o n by representation. The court i n reaching its holding pointed o u t t h a t "Death and b i r t h i n varying numbers may change t h e amount of t h e share t o which a r e l a t i v e may succeed t o an e s t a t e . I n view of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a seeming unfairness, under any r u l e t h e r e should be less claim of i n j u s t i c e i f there is followed t h e requirement t h a t t h e r i g h t of inheritance of a representative descendant should be fixed by reference t o t h e f i r s t generation common to each as t h e c r i t e r i o n t o determine t h e degree of r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e subsequent r e l a t i v e s i n t h e descending l i n e . " Maud v. Catherwood, supra. Here we note t h e applicable s t a t u t e does j u s t t h a t . It c l a s s i f i e s t h e common ancestor a s t h e brother o r sister of t h e descendant and t h e l e v e l of d i s t r i b u t i o n by representation t o be t h e children of such deceased brother and sister. Thus i n t h i s case t h e descendants of t h e deceased h e i r , t h e sister of Gertrude Brown, take t h e share t h e i r parent would have taken i f l i v i n g . This would be a p e r c a p i t a share t o t h e children of t h e deceased sister and per s t i r p e s t o t h e children of predeceased children of t h e sister. The presiding district judge in this matter having retired, the cause is reversed and remanded to the court of the eighteenth consistent judicial district for entry of an order and decree with this hol ~ s s o c i a u Justices