Title: Thomasson v. Thomasson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Thomasson v. Thomasson, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2417.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2417 
THOMASSON, APPELLANT, v. THOMASSON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Thomasson v. Thomasson, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2417.] 
Divorce—A trial court’s order appointing a guardian ad litem to represent an adult 
in a divorce case is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) 
when adult has not been adjudicated incompetent subsequent to providing 
parties with notice and opportunity to be heard on issue of adult’s 
competency—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed, trial court’s order 
appointing guardian ad litem vacated, and cause remanded to trial court. 
(No. 2016-1629—Submitted November 21, 2017—Decided June 27, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 104579. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Carol J. Thomasson (“Carol”), has asked us to reverse a 
judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court’s order 
appointing a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to act on her behalf in her divorce case is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).  Carol has also asked us to 
conclude that the order violates her due-process rights and that it should be vacated 
as a result. 
{¶ 2} In the case at bar, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 
Domestic Relations Division, issued an order appointing a GAL to represent Carol 
without providing her with prior notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue.  
The order was issued during a special proceeding and affects a substantial right, 
and Carol will not be provided adequate relief if she is not permitted to immediately 
appeal the order.  Therefore, the order is a final, appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2), and we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  Further, the 
lack of proper process violated Carol’s due-process rights, and we therefore vacate 
the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Carol and appellee, Charles W. Thomasson (“Charles”), were married 
in 1985.  On January 15, 2015, Charles filed for divorce in the Cuyahoga County 
domestic-relations court.  On June 7, 2016, the court issued an order sua sponte 
appointing a GAL on behalf of Carol pursuant to Civ.R. 75(B)(2) and requiring 
Charles and Carol to deposit $1,000 each with the clerk of courts as security for the 
payment of the GAL’s fee. 
{¶ 4} Carol appealed and argued that Civ.R. 75(B)(2) does not provide 
authority to a trial court to appoint a GAL for an adult and that the appointment of 
a GAL to act on behalf of an adult is proper only after a hearing and a finding that 
the adult is incompetent.  Charles filed a single-page brief in which he “join[ed] in” 
Carol’s brief. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the appeal, concluding that 
an order appointing a GAL for an adult is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02(B). 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 6} Carol filed a jurisdictional appeal in this court presenting three 
propositions of law.1  We accepted jurisdiction over the appeal.  149 Ohio St.3d 
1417, 2017-Ohio-4038, 75 N.E.3d 236. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} In her third proposition of law, Carol presents arguments related to 
the threshold question whether the trial court’s order appointing a GAL to represent 
her is a final, appealable order.  In her first and second propositions of law, Carol 
presents arguments challenging the order on its merits.  Accordingly, we address 
the third proposition of law first. 
A.  Civ.R. 75(B)(2) and 17(B) 
{¶ 8} The trial court’s order cites Civ.R. 75(B)(2) as authority for 
appointing a GAL to represent Carol.  Courts of appeals have found that an order 
issued pursuant to Civ.R. 75(B)(2) is not a final, appealable order.  See, e.g., Davis 
v. Lewis, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 98AP-661 and 98AP-1284, 1999 WL 77221, *2 
(Feb. 18, 1999).  But Civ.R. 75(B)(2) does not apply to adults; instead, the rule 
permits the trial judge presiding over a divorce proceeding to join a “child” of the 
divorcing parties as a party defendant and permits the trial court to appoint a GAL 
“for the child.”  Therefore, Civ.R. 75(B)(2) does not apply to this case, and caselaw 
on the appealability of orders properly relying on that rule is not relevant to this 
appeal. 
{¶ 9} Neither the lower courts nor the parties have cited any rule that 
permits a trial court to appoint a GAL for a competent adult.  However, under 
Civ.R. 17(B), “[w]hen a minor or incompetent person is not otherwise represented 
in an action the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem or shall make such other 
                                                 
1 Notably, in her brief, Carol renumbered the three propositions of law accepted by this court and 
added a fourth proposition.  The additional proposition of law is stricken, and no arguments raised 
in support of it will be considered.  (For ease of analysis, our numbering of the propositions of law 
reflects Carol’s jurisdictional memorandum, not her brief.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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order as it deems proper for the protection of such minor or incompetent person.”  
Carol is not a minor child; thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the trial court’s 
order is that the court found it necessary to appoint a GAL for Carol because the 
court determined that she is an incompetent person who does not otherwise have an 
appropriate representative. 
B.  Final, Appealable Order 
{¶ 10} Ohio’s courts of appeals have jurisdiction “to review and affirm, 
modify, or reverse judgments or final orders.”  Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio 
Constitution.  R.C. 2505.02(B) sets forth several types of final, appealable orders.  
The present appeal involves the category defined in R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), which 
provides that an “order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding” 
is a final, appealable order.  This court has held that an order affects a substantial 
right for purposes of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) only if “in the absence of immediate 
review of the order [the appellant] will be denied effective relief in the future.”  Bell 
v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993). 
{¶ 11} Thus, to demonstrate that the trial court’s order appointing a GAL 
for her is a final, appealable order, Carol must show (1) that the order was made in 
a special proceeding, (2) that the order affects a substantial right, and (3) that she 
would not be able to effectively protect her substantial right without immediate 
review. 
1.  Special Proceeding 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2505.02(A)(2) defines “special proceeding” as “an action or 
proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted 
as an action at law or a suit in equity.”  As we have previously stated, divorce, a 
statutory matter that did not exist at common law, qualifies as a special proceeding.  
Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 
516, ¶ 6.  Carol was provided a GAL for her divorce proceeding; the order 
appointing the GAL was, therefore, made during a special proceeding. 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
2.  Substantial Right 
{¶ 13} In 1998, the legislature amended R.C. 2505.02 and provided a 
definition of “substantial right.”  Sub.H.B. No. 394, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3277.  
R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States 
Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of 
procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  Carol argues that the trial court’s 
order violates her “right to procedural due process” and that “due process is a 
substantial right that the United States Constitution entitles a person to enforce 
and/or protect.” 
{¶ 14} In support of this argument, Carol asserts that before appointing the 
GAL, the trial court did not provide the parties with notice or the chance to be heard 
regarding the appointment.  These assertions are supported by the record.  The 
record does not reflect that the parties were notified that the court was considering 
appointing a GAL for Carol, and the record includes no evidence from which we 
could conclude that Carol was provided any opportunity to be heard prior to the 
appointment of the GAL. 
{¶ 15} Ohio courts have not previously addressed whether an order 
appointing a GAL to represent an adult without an adjudication that the adult is 
incompetent—that is, without a hearing on the matter and prior to any notice to the 
adult—violates the adult’s right to due process.  Several other state courts have 
addressed similar situations.  Those courts have concluded that such an 
appointment is improper, many specifically holding that the improper appointment 
violates due-process protections. 
{¶ 16} In In re Joann E., 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (2002), 
the California Court of Appeal reviewed a lower court’s order appointing a GAL to 
act on behalf of a grandmother who was attempting to retain custody of her minor 
grandchild.  The reviewing court found that the lower court’s order violated the 
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grandmother’s right to due process because the court had failed to provide prior 
notice and hold a competency hearing.  Id. at 349. 
{¶ 17} In State v. Ladd, 139 Vt. 642, 644, 433 A.2d 294 (1981), the 
Supreme Court of Vermont held that a lower court’s decision not to remove a GAL 
for an adult defendant who was determined to be competent “seriously impinge[d] 
upon the defendant’s rights to due process guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.” 
{¶ 18} In J.H. v. Ada S. McKinley Community Servs., Inc., 369 Ill.App.3d 
803, 861 N.E.2d 320 (2006), an Illinois Court of Appeals cited the federal Due 
Process Clause when determining that two former foster children should not have 
been appointed a GAL after they had become adults because they had not been 
adjudicated incompetent.  Id. at 816, citing Ladd at 644. 
{¶ 19} And in Graham v. Graham, 40 Wash.2d 64, 240 P.2d 564 (1952), 
the Supreme Court of Washington issued a writ of prohibition to prevent a lower 
court from appointing a GAL for an adult without providing the adult a hearing and 
the opportunity to be heard.  The supreme court did not cite the Due Process Clause, 
but the court’s reasoning clearly expresses due-process concerns: 
 
The interposition of a guardian ad litem could very well substitute 
his judgment, inclinations and intelligence for an alleged 
incompetent’s; furthermore, the retention of legal counsel or the 
employment of a different attorney could be determined solely by 
the guardian ad litem, subject, of course, to some direction and 
control by the court, and the latter might be open to some question.  
In any event the changes which might result from the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem are of such significance as to be permitted 
only after a full, fair hearing and an opportunity to be heard is 
accorded to an alleged incompetent. 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
 
Id. at 68. 
{¶ 20} We agree with the determinations and reasoning of these several 
courts.  When a GAL is appointed by a court to represent an adult, that adult loses 
some autonomy in directing the litigation.  It violates an adult’s right to due process 
to treat the adult as an incompetent and to deprive that adult of his or her autonomy 
without an adjudication that the adult is incompetent and without prior notice and 
an opportunity to be heard on the issue of his or her competency. 
{¶ 21} The trial court’s order treated Carol as though she had been 
adjudicated incompetent and appointed a GAL to represent her interests, but the 
order was not preceded by an adjudication of incompetency, prior notice, and any 
opportunity to be heard on the issue.  This lack of process violates Carol’s right to 
due process and, therefore, implicates a “substantial right” as defined in R.C. 
2505.02(A)(1). 
3.  Effective Protection Requires Immediate Review 
{¶ 22} In Bell, 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 616 N.E.2d 181, which preceded the 1998 
amendments to R.C. 2505.02 that provided a statutory definition of “substantial 
right,” this court decided that an “order which affects a substantial right has been 
perceived to be one which, if not immediately appealable, would foreclose 
appropriate relief in the future.”  Id. at 63, citing Union Camp Corp., Harchem Div. 
v. Whitman, 54 Ohio St.2d 159, 162, 375 N.E.2d 417 (1978); State v. Collins, 24 
Ohio St.2d 107, 110, 265 N.E.2d 261 (1970); Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
6 Ohio St.2d 185, 189, 217 N.E.2d 202 (1966); and In re Estate of Wyckoff, 166 
Ohio St. 354, 359, 142 N.E.2d 660 (1957).  In Bell, the court held that an order 
directing a party to submit materials requested in discovery for in camera inspection 
was not a final, appealable order.  Bell at 65.  The court noted, however, that if the 
trial court ordered, after in camera inspection, that some documents that were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
alleged to have been privileged should be disclosed, that order would be appealable.  
Id. at 64. 
{¶ 23} Subsequent to the 1998 amendments to R.C. 2505.02, this court has 
continued to cite Bell for the proposition that an order affects a substantial right 
only if an immediate appeal is necessary to protect the interests of the appealing 
party.  See, e.g., Wilhelm-Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 
N.E.2d 516, at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 24} In Wilhelm-Kissinger, this court determined that an order denying a 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a divorce proceeding was not a final, 
appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).  Id. at ¶ 12.  The court distinguished an 
order denying a motion to disqualify counsel from an order granting such a motion.  
The court noted that “an order granting disqualification immediately and definitely 
affects the party it deprives of chosen counsel; the purpose of appealing such an 
order is to prevent the removal itself.”  Id. at ¶ 9.  The court also noted that the 
granting of a motion to disqualify counsel has a permanent effect because it is 
unlikely to be revisited by the trial court.  Id. at ¶ 10.  Similarly, in State ex rel. 
McGinty v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 142 Ohio St.3d 100, 2015-Ohio-937, 28 
N.E.3d 88, ¶ 27, this court held that an order denying a criminal defendant’s motion 
to disqualify the prosecuting attorney was not a final, appealable order.  The court 
noted that allowing an interlocutory appeal in such circumstances would enable a 
criminal defendant to get “an automatic, months-long delay in his or her 
prosecution by moving to disqualify the prosecutor and then appealing the resulting 
denial.”  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 25} In Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-
Ohio-6197, 898 N.E.2d 589, ¶ 13, this court held that the Board of Tax Appeals’ 
decision to deny a motion for a protective order, creating the possibility that 
confidential information could be provided to an opposing party and introduced as 
evidence, was a final, appealable order because an appeal in the ordinary course 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
would not adequately remedy the irretrievable loss of confidentiality.  Similarly, in 
State v. Sahady, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83247, 2004-Ohio-3481, ¶ 18-19, the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals determined that the granting of a criminal 
defendant’s motion for interrogatories was a final, appealable order because the 
information revealed from those interrogatories could be privileged and could not 
be clawed back once revealed.  The court noted that a successful appeal after final 
judgment would not provide an effective remedy to the state. 
{¶ 26} Finally, in Blackburn v. Ward, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 05CA3014, 
2006-Ohio-406, ¶ 13, the Fourth District held that a probate court’s determination 
that certain assets belonged to one party and not another was a final, appealable 
order, despite other issues in the case remaining before the court.  The Fourth 
District reasoned that the assets, which included a farm and personal property, 
could be liquidated easily and that the appellants, even if successful in a future 
appeal, would not be able to recover assets that were previously liquidated. 
{¶ 27} These cases are instructive.  In the case at bar, similar to the situation 
described by this court in Wilhelm-Kissinger regarding disqualification of chosen 
counsel, the trial court’s order appointing a GAL to represent Carol, if left 
undisturbed, would have an immediate effect; Carol’s autonomy would be 
immediately diminished because she would be treated as though she had been 
adjudicated incompetent and as a result, her judgment, inclinations, and intelligence 
would be replaced, at least to some extent, by those of the GAL.  Additionally, and 
again analogous to this court’s reasoning in Wilhelm-Kissinger, since Carol was not 
actually adjudicated to be incompetent, it is hard to understand how the trial court 
could revisit a nonexistent adjudication. 
{¶ 28} The concerns this court expressed in McGinty are not raised here 
because there is no reason to believe that Carol is intentionally delaying the 
progress of the litigation.  A criminal defendant’s motion to disqualify the 
prosecutor and subsequent appeal of a denial of that motion are entirely within the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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control of the defendant.  Here, the court’s order sua sponte appointing a GAL to 
represent Carol without prior notice and an adjudication of incompetency was 
entirely beyond Carol’s control.  In such circumstances, any delay caused by an 
immediate appeal should not be attributed to Carol. 
{¶ 29} Divorce settlements often involve negotiation and agreement 
regarding the distribution of marital assets.  If left undisturbed, the trial court’s 
order treating Carol as though she had been adjudicated incompetent would deprive 
her of autonomy during negotiations.  Indeed, a settlement could be negotiated 
without Carol’s independent agreement.  Moreover, settlements can include a 
waiver of the right to appeal.  See, e.g., Shareholders of Paul-Ann Corp. v. 
Dissolution of Paul-Ann, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-828, 2000 WL 726790, *3 
(June 6, 2000). 
{¶ 30} In addition, negotiation often involves tactics and a careful and 
selective exchange of information.  The tactics used and information revealed by 
Carol’s GAL could not be clawed back—much in the same way that the revelation 
of confidential information cannot be undone.  Thus, as in Cleveland Clinic Found. 
and Sahady, confidential information could be exchanged during negotiations and 
Carol would not have full control over the dissemination of that information.  An 
appeal after final judgment could not undo the damage that she would suffer in such 
a situation. 
{¶ 31} Finally, during divorce proceedings, there are ongoing financial 
concerns; the level of spousal support may change and some marital assets may be 
liquidated by agreement.  As the Fourth District noted in Blackburn, liquidated 
assets generally cannot be recovered.  The preferences of former spouses dividing 
the assets accumulated during a 30-year marriage could be extremely peculiar to 
those parties, and there will almost certainly be marital property that has particular 
value to one or both parties for sentimental or personal reasons.  Should Carol’s 
GAL focus on monetary value alone, ignoring other considerations that might form 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
part of Carol’s decision-making process, a future appeal would not protect Carol’s 
interests because previously liquidated assets could never be “un-liquidated.” 
{¶ 32} While some of the consequences that Carol could suffer as a result 
of the unavailability of immediate review are potential rather than certain injuries, 
the immediate effect of, or lack of remedy for, these injuries dictates the need for 
immediate review.  Further, this court has previously held that potential injuries 
that cannot be remedied are sufficient to meet even the Bell standard.  Cleveland 
Clinic Found., 120 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-6197, 898 N.E.2d 589, at ¶ 13 
(interim order immediately appealable in light of “possibility that confidentiality 
may be irretrievably lost”); see also Blackburn, 2006-Ohio-406, at ¶ 13 (order 
immediately appealable because administrator “could easily liquidate” assets). 
{¶ 33} Moreover, as this court stated in Russell v. Mercy Hosp., 15 Ohio 
St.3d 37, 42, 472 N.E.2d 695 (1984), there are occasions on which judicial economy 
tips the balance in favor of immediate review.  Requiring Carol to wait to appeal 
until after the divorce proceedings have concluded would require the appellate court 
to construct a hypothetical proceeding to determine prejudice based on speculation 
as to how Carol’s decisions might have differed from the decisions made by the 
GAL.  In this case, however, the lack of process is readily apparent on the face of 
the record.  Under these unique facts, immediate review requires minimal 
expenditure of resources by the appellate court. 
{¶ 34} For these reasons, we set forth the narrow and limited holding that 
under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), a trial court’s order appointing a GAL to represent an 
adult in a divorce case is a final, appealable order when that adult has not been 
adjudicated incompetent subsequent to providing the parties with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on the issue of the adult’s competency.  In this unique case, 
the order appointing a GAL to represent Carol is a final, appealable order. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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C.  Merits of the Order 
{¶ 35} Our determination that the trial court’s order appointing a GAL to 
represent Carol is immediately appealable necessarily required the determination 
that the lack of process violated Carol’s right to due process.  Because we have 
made this determination, it is unnecessary to remand the case to the court of appeals 
for that court to re-examine this same issue. 
{¶ 36} As noted above, Civ.R. 75(B)(2) does not provide the trial court with 
the authority to appoint a GAL to represent Carol.  And Civ.R. 17(B) permits the 
trial court to appoint a GAL to represent an adult only when the court has 
adjudicated the adult to be incompetent.  As Carol argues in her first and second 
propositions of law, it violates her right to due process for a court to appoint a GAL 
to represent an adult without an incompetency adjudication made subsequent to 
providing that adult proper notice and the opportunity to be heard on the issue. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 37} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order is a final, appealable 
order and the order is vacated.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’DONNELL, FRENCH, and PIETRYKOWSKI, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
MARK L. PIETRYKOWSKI, J., of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting 
for O’NEILL, J. 
_________________ 
 
 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 38} I concur in the court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals and in the majority’s holding that the trial court’s order appointing a 
guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent appellant, Carol Thomasson, is a final, 
appealable order.  I write separately to respond to the dissenting opinion. 
{¶ 39} The dissent suggests that the majority has stepped outside the 
constitutional limits on our authority.  I disagree.  The appointment of a GAL for a 
competent adult in this divorce proceeding—when neither party requested it—is 
clearly without basis in the law.  The trial court’s order immediately deprived 
Thomasson of her autonomy and presumes that she cannot represent her own best 
interests.  Delaying her right to appeal until after final judgment would deny her 
effective relief.  Because the order affects Thomasson’s substantial right to due 
process in this divorce proceeding, it is a final order pursuant to the definition 
codified by the General Assembly in R.C. 2505.02(B)(2)2 and is subject to 
immediate appellate review. 
{¶ 40} This is not a routine case in which the trial court properly held a 
competency hearing, determined that a party was incompetent, and appointed a 
GAL.  Here, two days before the scheduled trial, the court sua sponte appointed a 
GAL on behalf of Thomasson without a demonstrated basis for doing so.  The 
dissent ignores the practical reality of this strange scenario.  This case does not 
present a law-school hypothetical devoid of consequence.  The decision to appoint 
a GAL when one has not been shown to be necessary has both personal and social 
                                                 
2 The General Assembly has classified seven types of orders as final orders.  R.C. 2505.02(B).  Much 
of the dissent’s focus is on a different standard for a final order—that set forth in R.C. 
2505.02(B)(4)—rather than the standard that is at issue here.  R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) states that an order 
is a final order if it grants or denies a provisional remedy and (a) in effect determines the action and 
prevents judgment in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy and (b) 
precludes a meaningful or effective remedy for the appealing party by an appeal following final 
judgment.  The only question before us is whether the order here meets the standard set forth in R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2) in that the order affects a substantial right and was made in a special proceeding. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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consequences, not to mention the legal ramifications.  The task before us requires 
that we understand the impact on Thomasson should she be unable to immediately 
appeal. 
{¶ 41} In this proceeding, the mere appointment of the GAL fundamentally 
affects Thomasson’s due-process rights, and having to bear this burden through the 
divorce proceeding to final judgment and then on appeal would preclude effective 
relief.  The GAL would not necessarily represent Thomasson’s interests as she 
perceives them.  For example, when a court appoints a GAL for a child, the GAL 
must represent the child’s best interest even when the representation is inconsistent 
with the child’s wishes.  Sup.R. 48(D)(1).  If the trial court’s order were left 
undisturbed, then throughout the proceeding, Thomasson would have a burden that 
no competent adult in a divorce proceeding has—she would have to advocate for 
her interests in opposition to not just her spouse but also her GAL whenever the 
GAL’s perceptions of her best interests diverged from her own. 
{¶ 42} Not important, says the dissent, because “[t]he appointment of the 
GAL could be revisited if he acted inimically to Thomasson’s interests,” dissenting 
opinion at ¶ 78.  But Thomasson’s interests in whose eyes?  Thomasson’s autonomy 
to represent her interests as she defines them should be respected because she has 
not been determined to be incompetent.  The inquiry on appeal would be whether 
the GAL acted adversely to her best interests as the GAL perceived them, not 
whether Thomasson could prove that the GAL acted inimically to her interests as 
she perceives them. 
{¶ 43} Even if her own perception of her best interests aligned with the 
GAL’s perception of her best interests, Thomasson would be denied effective relief 
by having to wait to appeal until after final judgment.  Through the divorce 
proceeding and through appeal, Thomasson would bear partial responsibility for 
compensating the GAL for his services in addition to total responsibility for 
compensating her lawyer for his services, including the lawyer’s efforts ensuring 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
that the GAL does not take a position that Thomasson believed was adverse to her 
interests.  There is no guarantee that if successful on appeal after final judgment, 
Thomasson would be refunded, or would be permitted to withhold, her portion of 
the GAL’s expenses even though there was no basis for the GAL’s appointment. 
{¶ 44} And what a remarkable waste of judicial resources that would be.  
After final judgment, should an appellate court conclude that the GAL’s 
appointment was not proper as we do here, the entire proceeding would have to 
start anew.  As the dissent recognizes, the case would commence again at the point 
when the GAL was appointed. 
{¶ 45} If the law were as rigid as the dissent suggests, the role of the courts 
would be extraneous.  Judicial restraint is a constant guiding principle in the 
exercise of our duty as jurists.  But using judicial restraint as an excuse for refusing 
to act when it is necessary is just as dangerous to the role of the judiciary as is 
judicial activism.  Here, quite frankly, we should do our jobs.  The majority has 
recognized the unique facts of this case and applied the law fairly, and narrowly, to 
those facts.  Given the responsibility of this court to interpret and apply the law, the 
majority today correctly determines that the trial court’s order appointing a GAL 
for Thomasson is a final, appealable order that should be vacated. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 46} I agree with the majority that the trial court’s order appointing a 
guardian ad litem to represent appellant, Carol Thomasson, is a final, appealable 
order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).  I write separately, however, because we 
need not determine whether the trial court’s order affects Carol’s constitutional 
right to due process in order to resolve this case.  See State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 
177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 9 (this court considers constitutional 
issues only when absolutely necessary).  Instead, R.C. 3109.01 provides Carol a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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substantial right that is affected by the trial court’s order appointing a guardian ad 
litem in the divorce action.  Therefore, I concur in judgment only. 
{¶ 47} The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the 
legislature’s intent.  Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-
Ohio-7432, 71 N.E.3d 974, ¶ 20.  To determine the intent of the legislature, we first 
look to the plain language of the statute.  State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 78 
Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 676 N.E.2d 519 (1997).  “When the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what 
the General Assembly has said.”  Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio 
St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of 
Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).  “Where a 
statute defines terms used therein, such definition controls in the application of the 
statute * * *.”  Good Samaritan Hosp. of Dayton v. Porterfield, 29 Ohio St.2d 25, 
30, 278 N.E.2d 26 (1972), citing Terteling Bros. v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 236, 85 
N.E.2d 379 (1949), and Woman’s Internatl. Bowling Congress, Inc. v. Porterfield, 
25 Ohio St.2d 271, 267 N.E.2d 781 (1971).  When the statute does not define the 
words used in the statute, we give them their usual and ordinary meaning.  
Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). 
{¶ 48} To determine whether the trial court’s order appointing a guardian 
ad litem to represent Carol is a final, appealable order, we must begin with R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2), which provides that a final order is “[a]n order that affects a 
substantial right made in a special proceeding.”  The definition of “substantial 
right” originated at common law.  See Armstrong v. Herancourt Brewing Co., 53 
Ohio St. 467, 42 N.E. 425 (1895), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus (a 
“substantial right” is a legal right protected and enforced by law); State v. Collins, 
24 Ohio St.2d 107, 110, 265 N.E.2d 261 (1970) (a pretrial order suppressing 
evidence affects the “substantial right to the diligent prosecution of those accused 
of crime”).  However, the General Assembly displaced this body of common law 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
by enacting a statutory definition of “substantial right” in 1998.  See Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 394, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3277; Morris v. Morris, 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-
Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 51.  “Substantial right” is defined as “a right that the 
United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a 
rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). 
{¶ 49} We have stated previously that an “order which affects a substantial 
right has been perceived to be one which, if not immediately appealable, would 
foreclose appropriate relief in the future.”  Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio 
St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993), citing Union Camp Corp., Harchem Div. v. 
Whitman, 54 Ohio St.2d 159, 162, 375 N.E.2d 417 (1978), State v. Collins, 24 Ohio 
St.2d 107, 110, 265 N.E.2d 261 (1970), Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 6 
Ohio St.2d 185, 189, 217 N.E.2d 202 (1966), and In re Estate of Wyckoff, 166 Ohio 
St. 354, 359, 142 N.E.2d 660 (1957).  However, neither Bell nor the decisions cited 
in it discuss the plain and ordinary meaning of “affect,” which should be the starting 
point of our construction of the statute.  See Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d at 56, 661 N.E.2d 
706.  In the absence of a statutory definition, we rely on the dictionary definition to 
accord a term its common, everyday meaning.  Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 
574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 25-26. 
{¶ 50} Collins highlights the problem that results from failing to begin 
statutory interpretation with the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms.  In 
Collins, the issue presented was whether the state, in a criminal case, may appeal a 
trial court’s pretrial order sustaining the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.  
Collins at 107.  To resolve the issue, the Collins court had to consider whether the 
order was “ ‘an order affecting a substantial right.’ ”  Id. at 109, quoting R.C. 
2505.02.  In determining that it was, the court noted: 
 
The [state] represented in oral argument that the deprivation of the 
use of the evidence suppressed below rendered it virtually 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
impossible for the state to obtain a conviction, and that without that 
evidence the prosecution would be terminated.  Society has a most 
substantial right to the diligent prosecution of those accused of 
crime, and where prosecution is irretrievably foreclosed through the 
suppression of evidence, that right is clearly and adversely affected. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 109-110. 
{¶ 51} The Bell court latched onto the “foreclosed” language in Collins 
without consideration of its context and imposed as a requirement of R.C. 
2505.02(B) that “if not immediately appealable, [the order] would foreclose 
appropriate relief in the future.”  Bell at 63.  In other words, the Collins court’s 
reference to the decisive effect of a suppression order in a criminal case—the 
potential denial of societal justice—has been allowed in Bell and Bell’s progeny to 
expand beyond its original context in Collins. 
{¶ 52} Therefore, I believe that we should reexamine our holding in Bell 
and I diverge from applying it here.  Applying our traditional rules of statutory 
construction, the word “affect” is not defined in the statute.  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary defines “affect” as “to produce a material influence upon 
or alteration in” or “to have a detrimental influence on.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 35 (2002).  Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“affect” as “[t]o act upon; influence; change; enlarge or abridge; often used in the 
sense of acting injuriously upon persons and things.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 57 
(6th Ed.1990).  Therefore, an order that is issued in a special proceeding and that 
materially or detrimentally influences a substantial right is a final, appealable order 
pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). 
{¶ 53} Relevant here is R.C. 3109.01, which provides that “[a]ll persons of 
the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no legal disability, are capable of 
contracting and are of full age for all purposes.”  Therefore, absent a legal disability, 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
a person 18 years old or older is to be treated as a responsible adult in all respects.  
See Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 86 Ohio St.3d 419, 423, 715 N.E.2d 536 
(1999), citing Winters v. Silver Fox Bar, 71 Haw. 524, 531-532, 797 P.2d 51 (1990). 
{¶ 54} The legislature has not defined “legal disability” for purposes of 
R.C. Chapter 3109, but it has provided a definition in R.C. 2131.02; while that 
definition is not controlling here, it does provide guidance.  R.C. 2313.02(B) states 
that “[l]egal disability” includes “[p]ersons of unsound mind.”  “ ‘Of unsound 
mind’ includes all forms of derangement or intellectual disability.”  R.C. 1.02(C).  
While the legislature has not defined the phrase “all purposes” used in R.C. 
3109.01, “all” is defined as “every” or “any whatever,” Webster’s at 54, and we 
have stated that the term “any” in a phrase envelopes “every” example of the subject 
described, State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, 
¶ 33; accord Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 240, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948).  
Therefore, as used in R.C. 3109.01, the word “all” is expansive, not limiting.  
“Purpose” is defined as “something that one sets before himself as an object to be 
attained.”  Webster’s at 1847.  Consequently, the General Assembly’s use of the 
phrase “for all purposes” in R.C. 3109.01 is broad and encompasses the right of a 
person to direct her personal affairs, including being the decision-maker during the 
course of her divorce proceedings. 
  
{¶ 55} A guardian ad litem has the duty to represent the best interest of the 
ward, which may be inconsistent with the wishes of the ward.  Sup.R. 48(D)(1).  
However, the legal right to adult status provided by R.C. 3109.01 is enforced and 
protected by law.  See, e.g., Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 473 N.E.2d 
803 (1984) (termination of parental support); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio 
St.3d 270, 275, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986) (ability to sue); Muller v. CES Credit Union, 
161 Ohio App.3d 771, 2005-Ohio-3251, 832 N.E.2d 80, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.) (ability to 
void contracts upon reaching majority).  Therefore, R.C. 3109.01 creates a 
substantial right.  In appointing the guardian ad litem for Carol without a finding of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
legal disability, the trial court stripped Carol of her ability to direct her legal affairs 
according to her wishes, a right guaranteed by R.C. 3109.01.   
  
{¶ 56} Further, the trial court’s order detrimentally influenced this 
substantial right.  Carol’s legal right to be the decision-maker in her own divorce 
proceedings—extremely personal litigation, see Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878, 879 
(Fla.1950) (recognizing “strictly personal and volitional nature” of right to maintain 
divorce action)—has been denied her, see In re Irvine’s Guardianship, 72 Ohio 
App. 329, 331, 51 N.E.2d 907 (5th Dist.1943) (order refusing to remove guardian 
is final, appealable order because otherwise, ward would be denied ability to 
exercise substantial right).  This is especially true given that the General Assembly 
has allowed the parties in a divorce proceeding the ability to jointly direct the 
division of assets and decide parenting matters, see R.C. 3015.171(F)(8) and 
3105.10(B)(1); see also R.C. 3105.10(B)(2) (providing for judicial enforcement of 
parties’ separation agreement); Greiner v. Greiner, 61 Ohio App.2d 88, 95, 399 
N.E.2d 571 (8th Dist.1979) (separation agreement entered into by parties in divorce 
proceeding is valid and enforceable), and has provided that the parties may convert 
a divorce action into an action for dissolution of marriage, see R.C. 3105.08. 
{¶ 57} The dissent contends that for an immediate appeal to be available to 
Carol, she “needs to show that any damage done by the [guardian ad litem]’s acts 
could not be rectified”—that is, that she would “be foreclosed from remedying 
potential harm after final judgment.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 82.  However, this 
analysis focuses on whether there are prejudicial effects of the order.  The focus of 
the statutory language is on the prejudice to the substantial right resulting from the 
trial court’s order—whether the right is affected by the order—not the effect of the 
order on the outcome of the divorce action.  It is beyond question that Carol’s legal 
autonomy is prejudiced by the order, and being able to relitigate the action after 
final judgment and the decree of divorce is entered would never rectify this 
prejudice.  See Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 6 Ohio St.2d 185, 188-89, 217 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
N.E.2d 202 (1966) (trial court’s order according litigant whose property rights were 
being litigated a status less than that of a party was an order affecting a substantial 
right).    
{¶ 58} The dissent also contends that this interpretation of R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2) would eviscerate the constitutional “final order” requirement and 
postulates as to various orders in a divorce proceeding that may fall within this 
interpretation: “an interim custody order, a temporary support order, an order 
requiring the production of documents, or an order requiring that a child be 
interviewed by the judge in chambers.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 84.  This 
postulating, however, is unwarranted. 
{¶ 59} To begin with, as explained above, the plain-language definition of 
“affect” requires that an order materially or detrimentally influence a substantial 
right of the appellant, not that the order merely influence a right.  The dissent fails 
to identify any substantial right that may be affected by an order to produce 
documents (different from what has already been recognized, see Burnham v. 
Cleveland Clinic, 151 Ohio St.3d 356, 2016-Ohio-8000, 89 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 30 (lead 
opinion)).  It is difficult to conceive of a substantial right that may be affected by 
an order requiring a child to be interviewed in camera given that the legislature has 
statutorily provided domestic-relations courts with the discretionary power to 
interview a child in camera to assist in “determining the child’s best interest for 
purposes of making its allocation of the parental rights and responsibilities,” R.C. 
3109.04(B)(1). 
{¶ 60} And while a substantial right may be at issue with respect to child-
custody and child- and spousal-support orders, the dissent fails to demonstrate how 
temporary orders—orders that by their very nature remain subject to a final ruling 
by the court—affect a substantial right.  Temporary orders merely preserve the 
status quo in order to facilitate the needs of the family.  Alteno v. Alteno, 11th Dist. 
Trumbull No. 2000-T-0078, 2002 WL 99538, *6 (Jan. 25, 2002); Ward v. Ward, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-66, 2000 WL 552186, *5 (May 4, 2000).  The 
General Assembly has crafted a statutory framework to actualize the specialized 
work of domestic-relations courts and has prescribed or authorized that temporary 
orders be issued and that those orders remain in effect only until final orders are 
issued.  See R.C. 3125.59 (temporary support orders); R.C. 3105.18(B) (temporary 
spousal support); R.C. 3109.043 and 3109.04(A) (temporary allocation of parental 
rights and responsibilities until final award).  The Rules of Civil Procedure were 
enacted in accord with these statutes and aid in the administration of justice in 
domestic-relations courts.  To that end, the rules authorize the issuance of 
temporary orders, see Civ.R. 75(N), and prohibit domestic-relations courts from 
entering a final judgment until all custody and support issues are “finally 
determined,” Civ.R. 75(F)(2).  Therefore, the General Assembly has mandated, and 
this court has recognized, that temporary orders issued during the pendency of a 
domestic-relations action are, by their very nature, not final.  The order to appoint 
a guardian ad litem for Carol in this case stands in stark contrast as the order is 
neither authorized by the Revised Code or the Rules of Civil Procedure, nor is it of 
a temporary nature. 
{¶ 61} R.C. 3109.01 guarantees all persons 18 years old or older who are 
under no legal disability the right to direct all their personal affairs, including their 
own divorce litigation.  It is a statutory right that a person is entitled to enforce or 
protect.  A trial court’s order appointing a guardian ad litem to represent a spouse 
in a divorce proceeding without a finding of legal disability prejudices the spouse’s 
legal autonomy guaranteed by R.C. 3109.01 and is a final, appealable order 
pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). 
{¶ 62} Therefore, I concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
23 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 63} The majority is eager to decide this case now.  I understand that.  If 
we had jurisdiction to do so, I would like to decide it today as well.  But under our 
Constitution and precedent, we lack jurisdiction.  Though it may be temporarily 
inconvenient, I would adhere to the bounds placed on our authority rather than 
succumb to the temptation to expand those boundaries for the expediency of 
immediately deciding this one case. 
Our Constitution Allows Review of Only Final Orders 
{¶ 64} Our Constitution provides that courts of appeals “shall have such 
jurisdiction as may be provided by law” to review “final orders” issued by inferior 
courts.  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). 
{¶ 65} The “provided by law” part of the constitutional grant is 
accomplished  primarily through R.C. 2505.02(B), which defines “final order” by 
identifying seven categories of orders as final.  Relevant here is R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), 
which includes as a “final order” “[a]n order that affects a substantial right made in 
a special proceeding.” 
{¶ 66} The majority is correct that a divorce action is a special proceeding.  
The question is whether the trial court’s order appointing a guardian ad litem 
(“GAL”) for Carol Thomasson “affects a substantial right.” 
An Order Affects a Substantial Right Only If an Immediate Appeal Is 
Necessary to Protect that Right 
{¶ 67} In Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 
(1993), we held that “[a]n order which affects a substantial right has been perceived 
to be one which, if not immediately appealable, would foreclose appropriate relief 
in the future.”  In other words, as we later explained in Wilhelm-Kissinger v. 
Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 10, the effect of 
the order is “irreversible.”  The critical question in determining whether an order 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
affects a “substantial right” is whether “an immediate appeal is necessary to protect 
the right effectively.”  Id. at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 68} The definition we adopted in Bell is consistent with longstanding 
principles that generally limit appellate review to final decisions in order to avoid 
“the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appellate 
disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy,” Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.E.2d 732 (1974).  We 
have found such considerations central to determining whether the special-
proceeding prong of the Constitution’s final-order requirement has been met.  Prior 
to Bell, we furthered these interests through a test that defined “special proceeding” 
by balancing “the harm to the ‘prompt and orderly disposition of litigation,’ and the 
consequent waste of judicial resources, resulting from the allowance of an appeal, 
with the need for immediate review because appeal after final judgment is not 
practicable.”   Amato v. Gen. Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St.2d 253, 258, 423 N.E.2d 
452 (1981), quoting State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 258, 400 N.E.2d 897 
(1980).  We overruled Amato and adopted a bright-line definition of “special 
proceeding” in Polikoff v. Adam, 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 616 N.E.2d 213 (1993), 
syllabus (now embodied in R.C. 2505.02(A)(2)).  While we scuttled Amato’s test 
in Polikoff, in Bell—decided the same day as Polikoff—we made clear that an order 
affects a substantial right only if the unavailability of immediate appeal would 
preclude effective relief in the future. 
The Limited Need for Immediate Appeal 
{¶ 69} Only in the most limited circumstances have we found an immediate 
interlocutory appeal to be necessary to protect a substantial right.  Thus, in Wilhelm-
Kissinger at ¶ 11, we determined that the denial of a husband’s motion to disqualify 
his wife’s counsel in divorce proceedings was not a final order.  We explained that 
there was no substantial right to disqualify opposing counsel and, germane to our 
discussion here, that the trial court’s order “lacks a * * * permanent effect,” id. at  
January Term, 2018 
 
25 
¶ 10.  In other words, the effect of the court’s order was not irreversible.  Nor is the 
denial of an agency’s motion to modify temporary custody of a child to permanent 
custody irreversible: “While the agency must wait longer for the final outcome of 
the neglect and dependency action, the continuation of temporary custody does not 
foreclose appropriate relief in the future.”  In re Adams, 115 Ohio St.3d 86, 2007-
Ohio-4840, 873 N.E.2d 886, ¶ 44.  Such an order, therefore, is not a final order 
under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). 
{¶ 70} On the other hand, we have concluded that the denial of a protective 
order in a tax-appeal case was a final order because, we reasoned, the release of 
confidential information would have “no remedy.”  Cleveland Clinic Found. v. 
Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-6197, 898 N.E.2d 589, ¶ 12.  Once 
disclosed, the confidentiality of the information would be “irretrievably lost.”  Id. 
at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 71} Further guidance is provided by cases decided under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(4), which includes as final orders certain provisional remedies.  As with 
an order in a special proceeding, an order granting or denying a provisional remedy 
is not a final order unless “[t]he appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful 
or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment.”  R.C. 
2505.02(B)(4)(b). 
{¶ 72} We recently explained that when “determining whether appeal after 
final judgment would afford a meaningful or effective remedy, we consider whether 
there is a harm such that appeal after final judgment would not ‘ “rectify the 
damage.” ’ ”  In re D.H., 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 18, 
quoting State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 451, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (2001), quoting 
Gibson-Myers & Assocs., Inc. v. Pearce, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19358, 1999 WL 
980562, *2 (Oct. 27, 1999). 
{¶ 73} In In re D.H., we applied the rule to determine that a juvenile court’s 
order transferring jurisdiction of a case to adult court was not final.  The effect of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
the order, if wrong, could be rectified or reversed following final judgment.  Id. at 
¶ 19.  Our decision in In re D.H. can be contrasted with that in Muncie, in which 
we concluded that an order compelling the medication of a defendant to restore 
competency was a final order, Muncie at 452.  The effects of the medication, once 
administered, could not be reversed.  “ ‘[T]he proverbial bell cannot be unrung.’ ”  
Id. at 451, quoting Gibson-Myers & Assocs. at *2. 
{¶ 74} Other decisions under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) accentuate the limited 
circumstances in which a party would be foreclosed from effective relief by having 
to wait to appeal until final judgment.  The passage of time will not render a future 
appeal ineffective.  In re D.H. at ¶ 19.  Nor will the potential for high litigation 
costs.  Gardner v. Ford, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150018, 2015-Ohio-4242, ¶ 8.  
But “an order enforcing a grand-jury subpoena and ordering production of allegedly 
privileged information is a final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).”  In re 
Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 150 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8001, 82 
N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 23. 
The Unavailability of Immediate Appeal Here Would Not Foreclose 
Appropriate Relief 
{¶ 75} Thomasson does not suggest why she would be foreclosed from 
relief from any harm visited upon her by the court’s appointment of a GAL if she 
must wait until final judgment before she may appeal.  Her analysis stops with the 
identification of the substantial right involved—her right to due process.  But there 
is no reason that any harm could not be remedied on appeal in the ordinary course.  
The general rule is that upon reversal and remand to the trial court, proceedings 
commence at the point when the error occurred.  Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 
32 Ohio St.3d 397, 418, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987); accord Montgomery Cty. Commrs. 
v. Carey, 1 Ohio St. 463 (1853), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Thus, if Thomasson 
were ultimately successful on appeal from final judgment in challenging the 
January Term, 2018 
 
27 
appointment of the GAL, the matter would be returned to the trial court for 
proceedings that would commence at the point when the GAL was appointed. 
{¶ 76} Nor does the majority present a compelling explanation of why any 
harm could not be corrected on appeal after final judgment.  Indeed, the majority 
cites four cases to support its conclusion that a procedurally improper appointment 
of a guardian violates constitutional due-process guarantees.  But in each of these 
cases, the harm was remedied without resort to an interlocutory appeal—in three, 
by way of an appeal after final judgment, see In re Joann E., 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 
128 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 (2002); State v. Ladd, 139 Vt. 642, 644, 433 A.2d 294 (1981); 
J.H. v. Ada S. McKinley Community Servs., Inc., 369 Ill.App.3d 803, 861 N.E.2d 
320 (2006). 
{¶ 77} Instead of explaining why any harm could not be corrected on appeal 
after final judgment, the majority offers only conjecture and a few out-of-context 
lines cherry-picked from our caselaw.  For instance, the majority cites Wilhelm-
Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, in support of its 
position that the order appointing a GAL for Thomasson is final because it “would 
have an immediate effect.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 27.  Of course it would.  But the 
question here isn’t whether the order has an immediate effect.  Rather, we must 
determine whether that immediate effect would be irreversible.  Moreover, our 
discussion in Wilhelm-Kissinger about the immediacy of the order’s effect was not 
in regard to whether the order affected a substantial right but whether there was a 
substantial right involved at all: 
 
[A]n order granting disqualification immediately and definitely 
affects the party it deprives of chosen counsel; the purpose of 
appealing such an order is to prevent the removal itself.  By contrast, 
an order denying disqualification, standing alone, affects no right 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
held by the unsuccessful movant because there is no substantial right 
to disqualify opposing counsel. 
 
Wilhelm-Kissinger at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 78} The majority also cites Wilhelm-Kissinger to suggest that the trial 
court’s order appointing a GAL must be immediately appealable because the order 
could not be revisited in the midst of proceedings.  But a closer reading of the 
decision results in the opposite conclusion.  In Wilhelm-Kissinger, we distinguished 
between an order granting a motion to disqualify counsel (a final order) and one 
denying such a motion (not a final order).  In the former case, we reasoned, the 
decision would not likely be revisited, presumably because counsel, once 
disqualified, would no longer be participating.  In contrast, the denial of a motion 
to disqualify could be reconsidered during the proceedings and counsel could be 
removed.  Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the court’s order appointing a 
GAL in this case is closer in kind to the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel.  
The appointment of the GAL could be revisited if he acted inimically to 
Thomasson’s interests. 
{¶ 79} The majority speculates about other problems that could arise due to 
the appointment of a GAL for Thomasson.  It frets, “[A] settlement could be 
negotiated without Carol’s independent agreement.  Moreover, settlements can 
include a waiver of the right to appeal.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 29.  Left unexplained 
by the majority is why, if Thomasson successfully challenged the appointment of 
the GAL following final judgment, any actions taken by the GAL against her 
interest would not also be subject to reversal. 
{¶ 80} Continuing its litany of potential problems brought on by the 
appointment of a GAL, the majority suggests that “[t]he tactics used and 
information revealed by Carol’s GAL could not be clawed back—much in the same 
way that the revelation of confidential information cannot be undone.”  Id. at ¶ 30.  
January Term, 2018 
 
29 
Exactly what tactics used and information revealed is not explained.  Presumably, 
any “tactics used” by the GAL could be replaced by different tactics upon remand 
following a successful appeal upon final judgment.  And any confidential 
information would be subject to the same rules that apply to confidential 
information in other cases. 
{¶ 81} Anticipating criticism about the speculative nature of its concerns, 
the majority points to language in Cleveland Clinic, 120 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-
Ohio-6197, 898 N.E.2d 589, at ¶ 13, in which we discussed “the possibility that 
confidentiality may be irretrievably lost” and concluded that the possibility made 
future appeal ineffective.  But there we were confronted with actual confidential 
information that was the subject of a protective order.  Here, we are left with little 
more than concerns imagined by the majority. 
{¶ 82} In short, the majority fails to consider the real question—if 
Thomasson were made to wait to appeal, would she be foreclosed from an 
appropriate remedy?  In the context of the provisional-remedy exception found in 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), we have distinguished between the order itself and the harm 
caused by the order: “[T]he irreversible nature of the order alone does not satisfy 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), which requires consideration of whether an appeal after 
judgment can rectify the damage of an erroneous trial court ruling.”  Burnham v. 
Cleveland Clinic, 151 Ohio St.3d 356, 2016-Ohio-8000, 89 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 21 (lead 
opinion).  Likewise, Thomasson needs to show that any damage done by the GAL’s 
acts could not be rectified.  In none of the scenarios suggested by the majority would 
Thomasson be foreclosed from remedying potential harm after final judgment. 
{¶ 83} The two concurring opinions fare no better in their attempt to justify 
the court’s action today.  While the majority opinion at least makes an effort to 
distinguish Bell, the first concurring opinion chooses to pretend that line of 
precedent doesn’t exist.  Instead, that opinion offers a full-throated policy argument 
for why this case MUST be decided now.  The opinion says that if the decision 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
were reversed on appeal after final judgment, there would be a “waste of judicial 
resources,” concurring opinion of O’Connor, C.J., at ¶ 44; never mind that that 
argument can be made in every case in which an immediate appeal is sought.  (One 
must question whether judicial resources are being conserved here: presumably on 
remand, the domestic-relations court could simply hold a hearing and again appoint 
a GAL, likely starting another round of appeals.)  The opinion implores that this is 
not a “routine case” or a “law-school hypothetical devoid of consequence,” id. at  
¶ 40, criticizes this dissent for ignoring the “practical reality,” id., and demands that 
we “do our jobs,” id. at ¶ 45.  I agree with that last part.  We should do our jobs.  
And fundamental to doing our jobs is following the law.  Even in hard cases. 
{¶ 84} The opinion concurring in judgment only is similarly unpersuasive.  
Tacitly acknowledging that the majority’s result cannot be reconciled with our 
holdings in Bell and its progeny, the opinion would have us “reexamine” and 
“diverge” from our holding in Bell.  Concurring opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 52. 
The opinion maintains that R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) does not require determining 
whether an adequate remedy would exist after final judgment.  Instead, any “order 
that is issued in a special proceeding and that materially or detrimentally influences 
a substantial right is a final, appealable order.” Concurring opinion of Kennedy, J., 
at ¶ 52.  But if such a view were to carry the day, the constitutional “final order” 
requirement would be eviscerated in any action that constituted a “special 
proceeding.”  Think about the various orders that might be issued in a divorce 
proceeding: an interim custody order, a temporary support order, an order requiring 
the production of documents, or an order requiring that a child be interviewed by 
the judge in chambers—to name just a few.  Under the opinion, it does not matter 
whether the harm done could be rectified upon appeal at the end of the case; all of 
these orders would be immediately appealable.  Talk about a recipe for a never-
ending divorce.  What would be most special about special proceedings is that they 
could drag on forever. 
January Term, 2018 
 
31 
{¶ 85} The opinion downplays the impact its new rule would have on our 
final-order requirement by attempting to distinguish an order appointing a GAL 
from other domestic-relations orders.  But its effort falls short.  Any number of 
domestic-relations orders made contrary to a party’s interest could be said to 
“detrimentally influence” a right that falls within the broad definition of 
“substantial right”—that is, “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio 
Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to 
enforce or protect,” R.C. 2505.02(A)(1).  For example, our civil rules provide the 
procedure for the production of a party’s documents.  See Civ.R. 26.  An order to 
produce financial statements in a divorce proceeding could be detrimental—that is, 
harmful—to the rights protected by the civil rules.  Likewise, an order involving a 
child could detrimentally affect a parent’s right to raise her child—a right we have 
recognized as “ ‘essential’ ” and as a “ ‘basic civil right,’ ” In re Murray, 52 Ohio 
St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.E.2d 551 (1972). 
{¶ 86} That our civil rules and statutes provide that some domestic-relations 
orders are temporary does not change the analysis.  Our rules also provide for the 
appointment of a GAL in domestic-relations cases, see Civ.R. 17(B).  And like 
temporary custody, see R.C. 3109.043, or temporary spousal support, see R.C. 
3105.18(B), a GAL’s appointment is only for the duration of the case, see State ex 
rel. Robinson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 75 Ohio St.3d 431, 662 
N.E.2d 798 (1996).  Just because we may conclude that the trial court did not follow 
the proper procedures in appointing the GAL does not render the order immediately 
appealable. 
{¶ 87} Rather than meaningfully distinguishing other domestic-relations 
orders from the one here, the opinion concurring in judgment only lays bare the 
problem common to the paths suggested by the majority and concurring opinions: 
the desired result drives the analysis at the expense of our final-order jurisprudence.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
The paths are tempting: gloss over the Constitution’s final-order requirement so we 
can immediately fix what happened below.  But to bite that apple does more damage 
than good.  As Judge Adams explained in a passage quoted by the United States 
Supreme Court:    
 
 “[I]t would seem to us to be a disservice to the Court, to litigants in 
general and to the idea of speedy justice if we were to succumb to 
enticing suggestions to abandon the deeply-held distaste for 
piecemeal litigation in every instance of temptation.  Moreover, to 
find appealability in those close cases where the merits of the dispute 
may attract the deep interest of the court would lead, eventually, to 
a lack of principled adjudication or perhaps the ultimate 
devitalization of the finality rule * * *.” 
 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 
340 (1985), quoting Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 373-374 (3d Cir.1976).  
That this may be a hard case does not make it one in which we should abandon the 
constitutional limits on our authority. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 88} Because Thomasson can demonstrate no irreversible harm 
occasioned by the appointment of a GAL, we should require that her appeal await 
final judgment.  I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A. Cruz, for 
appellant. 
_________________