Title: H. Ray Harrison v. The Board of Professional Discipline Timely service

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.

Docket No. 33862

H. RAY HARRISON and JULIE )
HARRISON, husband and wife,

Plaintifs-Appellants,

THE BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL )
DISCIPLINE of the IDAHO STATE )
BOARD OF MEDICINE, a subdivision of the )
State of Idaho, Department of Self )
Regulating Agencies, )
)

‘Defendant-Respondent. )

 

 

Boise, January 2008 Term
2008 Opinion No. 16

Filed:

  

january 29, 2008

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal trom the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen, District udge.
District court order dismissing complain, affirmed.

Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for appellants. Chad Matthew Nicholson

argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey General, Boise, for respondent. James

Delund Carlson, Deputy Attomey General argued,

BURDICK, Justice

‘This appeal arises from the district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to effect

timely service. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellants H. Ray Harrison and Julie Harrison (the Harrisons) filed a complaint against
Respondent Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine (the Board).
‘The complaint alleged the Board was negligent for allowing Dr. Jeflrey Hartford to retain his
‘medical license in light of his history of drug and alcohol abuse and violation of the Board's
requirement that he refrain from use of drugs or alcohol. This complaint was filed with the court
‘on November 14, 2005. The Attomey General was served with the complaint on May 10, 2006.
The Secretary of State was served with the complaint on June 2, 2006.

‘On May 26, 2006, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the Harrisons’ complaint. The
‘Board argued it was immune from suit and that the Harrisons had failed to serve process within
six months of filing their complaint as required by LR.CP. 4(a)(2). After a hearing, the district
court concluded the Harrisons failed to timely complete service of process and dismissed their
complaint. The Harrisons appealed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘When this Court reviews a district cout’s order granting a motion to dismiss, we employ
‘the same standard used when reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Gibson v,
Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). “The standard of review on
appeal from an order granting summary judgment isthe same standard that is used by the district
‘court in ruling on the motion.” Id.

IIL. ANALYSIS

‘The Harrisons argue the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require service upon the
Secretary of State wit
required they have shown “good cause” for the failure to effect service. The Board argues the
Harrisons did not comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and that in the altemative itis
‘entitled to absolute immunity and immunity pursuant to LC. § 39-1392c, We will first address
the service requirement and then good cause, Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary
to consider the Board’s immunity arguments.

A. The complaint was untimely served.

‘The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is @ matter of law over which
this Court exercises free review. Canyon County Bd. of Equalization v, Amalgamated Sugar Co,
143 Idaho 58, 60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” LR.CP. I(a); Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 878, 136 P.3d 338, 349 (2006).

‘The Board argues it was necessary for the Harrisons to comply with the portion of the
aho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) requiring tha “jn all actions under this act against the state or its
‘employee the summons and complaint shall be served on the secretary of state. ..." LC, § 6

 

‘months after filing their complaint and that if such service was

916. The Harrisons argue this statutory requirement does not contain any specific time limit, and
thus, thei claim isnot bared by their failure to serve the Secretary of State within six months
‘The Board argues the timeliness requirement in LR.CLP. 4(a\2) applies.

“That rule provides that absent showing of good cause, service of the summons and
complaint must be made upon a defendant within six months after filing the complaint. IRCP.
4(2)2). Our rules of civil procedure then provide that service upon the state of Idaho is made by
delivering two copies of the summons and complaint to the atlomey general, and in addition,
“{iJn all actions brought under specific statutes requiting service to be made upon specific
individuals or officals, service shall be made pursuant to the statute..." IRCP. 4(4)S).
“Thus, reading the rules together, when the State i a defendant, the attomey general and officals
‘who require service pursuant to statutes under which an action is brought must be served and that
service of the summons and complaint must be made within six months afer filing. the
complaint

‘The Harrisons first argue that LR.CP. 4(@)(S) only requires service be made upon the
Attomey General and that service upon individuals for ations brought under a specifi statute is
only “in addition” to that requirement. ‘This argument is without merit. The rule covers service
upon the State and it requires (1) that service always be made upon the atomey general and (2)
that service be made upon other officials when required by statue. Service upon the persons
designated in LR.C.P. 4(8(S) must be made within six months aftr filing the complaint andthe
failure todo so without good cause result in dismissal ofthe action, ER.CP. 4@)(2).

‘The Harrisons next argue their negligence action was not “brought under” the ITCA.
‘within the meaning of LR.CP. 4((5). The Harisons base this argument on their assertion that
TCA does not grant any substantive rights to sue the state—instead, the substantive right to sue
is based on common law negligence. However, this argument is without merit,

TCA provides that unless otherwise provided in the act, “every governmental entity is
subject to lability for money damages arising out of its negligent or olhervise wrongful acts or
‘omissions ... where the governmental entity if private person or entity would be liable for

 

‘money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho... .” LC. § 6-903(a). This statutory
provision makes clear thet ITCA is not merely procedural and that it provides a substantive right
of recovery. ds; see also Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 ldaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334
(1994) (ITCA “renders a govemmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts
Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 375, 659 P.24 111, 129 (1983) (“The right

 
to recover from the State is statutory and is analogous to [a} statutory cause of action... . The
ITCA providels] a right of recovery. ...”)

‘The Harrisons’ right to sue the State arises from ITCA which is a statutory creation,
‘Consequently, we hold the Harrisons” action was “brought under” the statutory guidelines of the
TTCA, and thus, pursuant to LR.CP. 4(@\2), LRCP, 4(€)(5), and LC. § 6-916, the Harrisons
should have served the summons and complaint upon the Secretary of State as well as the
‘Attomey General within six months after filing the complaint
B. The Harrisons have not shown good cause for the untimely service.

‘The Harrisons argue dismissal was inappropriate in this case because good cause exists
for their failure to serve the summons and complaint upon the Secretary of State within six
‘months after filing the complaint. They assert there was no basis to believe it was necessary to
serve the Secretary of State and their misunderstanding was based on a reasonable interpretation
ofthe rules.

If the summons and complaint are not served upon the defendant within six months after
filing the complaint “and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good
‘cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that
defendant without prejudice RCP. 4(a)2). Whether good cause exists is a factual
determination. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc, 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P-2d 314, 318 (1997). As
such, the Court uses the same standard of review as that used to review an order granting
summary judgment. 1d, When reviewing atrial court's decision that a party failed to establish
‘good cause, we “must liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Id. The party who filed to
effect timely service has the burden to demonstrate good cause. 1d

There is no bright-line test in determining whether good cause exists. Martin v. Hoblit,
133 Idaho 372, 375, 987 P.2d 284, 287 (1999). “{W]hether legal excuse has been shown is a
matter for judicial determination based upon the facts and circumstances in each ease.” Id. The

 

focus of the good cause inquiry is on the six-month time period following the filing of the
complaint. fd, “Ifa plaintiff fails to make any attempt at service within the time period of the
rule, i is likely that @ cout will find no showing of good cause.” Id. at 377, 987 P-2d at 289; see
also Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, _, 159 P.34 891, 894 (2007). Courts look to factors
outside of the plaintif?'s control including sudden illness, natural catastrophe, or evasion of
service of process. Martin, 133 Idaho at 377, 987 P.2d at 289. Lack of prejudice is irelevant to
the good cause analysis. 1d at 375, 987 P.2d at 287.

In this case, the Harrisons have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate good cause.
‘They made no attempt at any service upon the Secretary of State within the six month time
period. Considering the circumstances ofthis case, ignorance or misintepretaion of the rules’
requirements based on a mistaken and narrow reading of the “brought under” clause in LR.C.
4(4)(5) is not good cause. Therefore, we hold the Harrisons failed to show good cause for their
{ailure to comply with the timely service requirement of LR.CP. 4(3)2).

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the dismissal ofthe Harrisons’ complaint pursuant to LCP. 4(@)(2). Costs

 

to Respondent
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.