Title: WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION v. ARMIJO

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION v. ARMIJO2004 WY 11699 P.3d 445Case Number: 03-170Decided: 10/20/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
   

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF JERRY

ARMIJO, 
AN EMPLOYEE OF TP

ENTERPRISES, 
INC.:

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

JERRY 
ARMIJO,

 

Appellee(Respondent) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

J. 
C. DeMers, Special Assistant Attorney General

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Michael 
K. Kelly, Laramie, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      The Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division), challenges an order of the 
district court that affirmed a decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH) awarding benefits to an injured worker, Jerry Armijo (Armijo).  The Division contends Armijo did not 
meet his burden of showing that he was injured in the course and scope of his 
employment, and/or that his injury was a preexisting condition.  We will affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The Division 
provides this statement of the issues:

 

            
Did the hearing examiner commit an error of law by failing to require 
[Armijo] to meet his clearly established burden of proof that the alleged work 
injury was a result of a work incident on April 11, 2002, and not the result of 
a pre-existing condition?

            
Is the decision of the hearing examiner arbitrary, capricious or an abuse 
of discretion?

            
Did the hearing examiner commit an error of law by failing to apply the 
proper burden of proof by not requiring [Armijo] to prove the cause of his 
herniated discs within a reasonable degree of medical 
probability?

            
Is the decision of the hearing examiner supported by substantial 
evidence?

 

Armijo 
summarizes the issue thus:

Whether 
the hearing examiner's determination that [Armijo] met his burden of proof 
regarding the cause and compensability of his injury was supported by 
substantial evidence and was not otherwise arbitrary, capricious or not in 
accordance with Wyoming law.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Armijo reported 
to his foreman at work that he injured his neck while on the job on April 11, 
2002.  TP Enterprises in Laramie 
employed Armijo.  Tony Peters owned 
TP Enterprises, and his wife Alicia Peters also worked in that business.  Armijo's foreman informed Tony Peters of 
that injury, and his response was "so what?"  Armijo filed an employee's report of 
injury on April 15, 2002, indicating that he was injured while on the job on 
April 11, 2002.1  Alicia Peters signed the report for the 
employer and indicated that the injury occurred on the job.  Armijo sought worker's compensation 
benefits for what he claimed was an on-the-job injury to his 
neck.

 

[¶4]      By letter dated 
May 2, 2002, the Division informed Armijo of the status of his claim for 
benefits:

 

The 
Workers' Compensation Division has reviewed your case file and has determined 
that we cannot approve payment of benefits.

 

The 
preponderance of evidence supports that the symptoms occurred at home while 
raking leaves, and not at work.  
Wyoming Statute 27-14-102(a)(xi).2

 

[¶5]      Armijo asked for 
a hearing on his claim for benefits and one was scheduled for August 27, 
2002.  In its pre-hearing disclosure 
statement, the Division alleged both that the injury did not occur at work and 
that Armijo had a preexisting condition (injury to his neck of 
long-standing).

 

[¶6]      Wendy Romero 
testified that she was Armijo's girlfriend, that they had three children 
together, and they shared a common household.  They had been together for 14 
years.  She further related that 
Armijo came home from work on April 11, 2002, complaining about neck pain.  Armijo did not go to work the following 
day and spent that day resting on the couch.  On April 13, 2002, Armijo was using a 
hose with a nozzle attached to clean off his driveway when he got a spasm in his 
neck that was so intense that he dropped the hose.  He drove himself to the emergency room 
at Ivinson Hospital for treatment.  
Armijo also testified that although he had problems with his lower back, 
he had never before had problems with his neck.  Exactly how Armijo injured his neck and 
the nature of that injury were contested at the hearing.  Much of the relevant evidence was 
submitted to the hearing officer in the form of exhibits.  Both parties submitted exhibits and both 
parties stipulated that all exhibits could be admitted.  There was no medical testimony offered 
at the hearing, though many of the exhibits were from medical 
personnel.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      Our standard of 
review when reviewing administrative agency action was clarified and refined in 
the case of Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶¶ 7-26, 49 P.3d 163, ¶¶ 7-26 
(Wyo.2002).  That case held that 
"the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review ... when 
factual findings are involved and both parties submit evidence." Id., 
¶ 22.  In appeals where both 
parties submitted evidence at the hearing below and the dispute is over the 
soundness of the factual findings of the agency, Newman mandates the 
appellate review be limited to application of the substantial evidence 
test.  This is true regardless of 
which party appeals from the agency decision.  The substantial evidence test 
provides:  "In reviewing findings of 
fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support an agency's findings.  
If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot 
properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the 
findings on appeal.  Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions.  It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence."  
Id., ¶ 12 (citing State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 
¶ 10 (Wyo. 2001)).

 

            
When factual findings are challenged, we will affirm those findings if 
they are supported by substantial evidence.

 

In 
contested cases conducted before administrative agencies, the deference that 
normally is accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and we do not adjust the decision of the agency unless it 
is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record.  Mekss [v. Wyoming Girls' School, 
State of Wyoming, 813 P.2d 185 (Wyo.1991)];  State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830 (Wyo.1991).  This is so because, in such an instance, 
the administrative body is the trier of fact and has the duty to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.  Gilmore v. Oil and Gas Conservation 
Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773 (Wyo.1982).

 

Wyoming 
Steel & Fab, Inc., 
882 P.2d  at 875.

 

Newman, 
¶ 26, also see Ludwig v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 2004 WY 34, ¶¶ 5-7, 86 P.3d 875, ¶¶ 5-7 (Wyo. 2004); and 
Loomer v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2004 WY 47, 
¶ 15, 88 P.3d 1036, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 2004).

 

[¶8]      This additional 
refinement of our standard of review is pertinent in this matter:

 

We 
also need to premise our discussion with an acknowledgment that all of the 
witnesses who testified, and all other evidence introduced at the hearing, 
clearly established that there were no "eye-witnesses" to Ikenberry's 
accident.  At no time in his reports 
of the accident, in his narration of the accident to his treating physician, nor 
in his own live testimony at the hearing, did he make a claim that anyone saw 
the accident occur.  The testimony 
of an injured worker alone is sufficient to prove an accident if there is 
nothing to impeach or discredit the worker's testimony and the worker's 
statements are corroborated by surrounding circumstances.  Duncan v. Hardware Mutual Casualty 
Company, 275 So. 2d 462, 463 (La.App.1973).  Moreover, the occurrence of injuries 
resulting from accidents to which there are no eye-witnesses does not prevent 
fair inferences from being drawn and findings of facts from being made.  Bohan v. Lord & Keenan, Inc., 
98 N.H. 144, 95 A.2d 786, 788 (1953).

 

Ikenberry 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
5 P.3d 799, 803 (Wyo. 2000).  
Moreover, demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the record does not 
establish the irrationality of the ruling, but we do examine conflicting 
evidence to determine if the agency reasonably could have made its finding and 
order based upon all of the evidence before it.  Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 6 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 2000).  Also see Pino v. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, 996 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo. 2000) ("Testimony 
by the medical expert to the effect that the injury "most likely," "contributed 
to," or "probably" is the product of the workplace suffices under our 
established standard."); and Thornberg v. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 913 P.2d 863, 867 (Wyo. 1996) ("Generally, when a single incident 
is alleged to have caused an injury, medical testimony is not required if it is 
not essential to establish a causal connection between the occurrence and the 
injury.").

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The evidence in 
this case was, indeed, very much in conflict, if not downright 
contradictory.  The hearing officer 
was called upon to resolve several very significant contradictions.  The Division characterizes many of these 
contradictions as "fabrications" and "lies," but under the applicable standard 
of review that is a role played by the hearing officer and not by the district 
court nor by this Court.  We also 
take note at the outset that the record is fairly short.  There were no physician witnesses at the 
hearing; only Armijo's treating physician provided evidence (in the form of 
responses to written questions propounded by Armijo) that was directly related 
to the injury at issue.  The only 
witness who testified on behalf of the Division at the hearing was the 
bookkeeper for Armijo's employer, Alicia Peters. 

 

[¶10]   The status of Armijo's medical 
condition was not disputed.  The 
Division's claims are that the neck injury either did not occur in the course 
and scope of Armijo's employment, or that it was a preexisting condition and 
Armijo failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to an injury suffered in 
light of a preexisting condition.  
It is not disputed that there was no eyewitness to Armijo's injury.  Armijo claimed that he injured his neck 
while carrying a heavy scaffold plank when he was at work, and Armijo informed 
both his foreman and his employer's bookkeeper that he had suffered such an 
injury.  Armijo's foreman reported 
the injury to their employer at the time Armijo reported it to him.  Both Armijo and the foreman testified at 
the hearing to these facts.

 

[¶11]   Armijo also presented this piece of 
evidence in support of his claim (questions propounded in writing to Lawrence A. 
Jenkins, M.D., Armijo's treating physician):

 

Question 
1  Could you briefly state the nature of the injury to Mr. Armijo's 
neck?

            
Large cervical disc herniation  surgery recommended but declined by 
patient.

 

Question 
2  Mr. Armijo has claimed that he injured his neck while lifting and carrying 
planks for scaffolding while on his job site.  This injury is claimed to have occurred 
on a Thursday.  He will testify he 
rested on Friday, and, while doing yard work on Saturday, had such pain that he 
was forced to go to the Emergency Room for treatment.  It is anticipated that the Workers' 
Compensation Division will claim that Mr. Armijo actually injured his neck while 
raking leaves that Saturday morning.  
Given the nature of this injury, in your medical opinion, what do you 
feel is the more likely cause of this injury?

 

            
Large herniation typically seen when lifting heavy objects especially 
overhead.  Not usually seen due to 
activities such as raking but anything is possible.

 

[¶12]   This is important because the 
employer contends Armijo told others that the onset of his pain occurred while 
he was raking leaves in his yard.  
Armijo testified that he could not explain why others would say he was 
raking leaves because he lived in a double-wide trailer, had no trees or bushes 
in his yard, there were no leaves to rake at his home, and he did not own a 
rake.  Armijo's girlfriend confirmed 
those facts.

 

[¶13]   Armijo testified that he had 
experienced back pains during his 20-22 year career working in construction, but 
had never had problems with his neck.  
Armijo's girlfriend testified that she could not recall her boyfriend 
having trouble with his neck.  The 
Division produced notes taken during Armijo's visit to the emergency room on 
April 13, 2002, and they provided this information:  "neck stuck since this AM when raking 
leaves feels cramps [with] any movement has seen doctors in past who say this is 
a pinched nerve;" and "6 months of neck problems."  A follow-up visit to the hospital on 
April 14, 2002, produced these notes:

 

The 
patient was seen in the emergency department yesterday with the acute onset of 
neck pain involving the left posterior neck and trapezius area, which is 
incapacitating and causes radiation of pain to his arm.  He has some chronic neck problems on and 
off for the last year but has never had pain to this degree.  The pain was incapacitating and required 
an injection of Demerol.  Since then 
he has had no real relief in spite of taking approximately 16-20 Percocet over 
the past 24 hours.  He presents for 
further evaluation and care.  He is 
obviously quite uncomfortable.  He 
does do construction work but has no specific injury that he can 
recall.

 

A 
follow-up visit to the hospital on April 16, 2002, had similar 
results:

 

The 
patient has been seen in the emergency department twice in recent days with 
complaints of severe, incapacitating neck pain radiating to his shoulders.  This has been going on for several 
months.  He has finally gotten an 
MRI today, which reveals a significant disc injury with thecal impingement at 
the C5-6 level.  He has been on 
Percocet and has run out of pain medication.  He is now having intractable pain.  He notes moderate relief with a soft 
cervical collar when he uses it.  He 
has been unable to work for the last two months on and off due to this pain and 
has been quite resistant about having it adequately 
treated.

 

. 
. . .

 

Past 
medical history is significant for recurrent neck pain with no known 
injury.

 

[¶14]   Armijo was referred to Dr. Jenkins 
but declined surgical intervention.  
Dr. Jenkins' clinical notes included this 
information:

 

HISTORY:  Jerry Armijo comes in today for 
evaluation, he is referred by the Ivinson Memorial Hospital Emergency Room.  He has been followed there since 
reporting there on 04/13 complaining of severe neck pain and arm pain.  He was lifting a large plank at work 
when he had the severe onset of pain in his neck, radiating down the arms.  He has had intermittent symptoms of arm 
pain for quite some time.  He was 
seen by Dr. Bienz a couple of months ago, in this office, with a trigger finger, 
and he was having arm pain at that time too.  He has been receiving PERCOCET through 
the emergency room, and he acknowledges that he takes upwards of 12-14 a 
day.  He was just recently started 
on a MEDROL DOSEPAK, which he has just started today, he is off 
work.

 

PAST 
MEDICAL HISTORY:  History of back 
and neck problems as before.

 

. 
. . .

 

DIAGNOSTICS:  X-rays: X-rays are not available.  Those taken actually in January reveal 
just some degenerative changes at 6-7.  
MRI scan:  A MRI scan of the 
cervical spine taken 2 days ago, reveals a large extruded C5-6 disc with 
significant thecal sac impingement.  
He has a smaller disc protrusion at 6-7 as well.

 

Dr. 
Jenkins' plan of treatment recommended surgery, but "if he wants to continue on 
conservative management that is absolutely fine."  Dr. Jenkins also determined that Armijo 
was temporarily totally disabled.

 

The 
Hearing Officer's Order Awarding Benefits

 

[¶15]   The Division comprehensively 
challenges the inadequacy and incompleteness of the hearing officer's findings 
and conclusions.  We set them out in 
their entirety here:

 

FINDINGS 
OF FACT

 

            
1.  The issue before this Office is whether Armijo suffered a 
compensable injury.  Armijo alleged 
he suffered an injury to his neck carrying a scaffold plank while working for TP 
on April 11, 2002.  The Division 
alleged Armijo's neck problems were the result of raking leaves at home and not 
the result of his work at TP.

            
2.  Armijo has worked in construction for 20 to 22 years and 
has worked for TP off an on for the last four years.  While working at TP Armijo performed 
various job duties including scaffolding and mixing mud 
[stucco].

            
3.  Near the end of his work shift on April 11, 2002 Armijo was 
carrying scaffolding planks.  While 
walking to the truck with a 12-foot long, 50-pound plank balanced on his left 
shoulder, Armijo began having neck pain.  
Armijo testified he reported the neck pain to his foreman Milo Sisneros 
(Sisneros).  According to Armijo, 
Sisneros said he would let the owner, Tony Peters (Peters) know about the pain 
Armijo was experiencing in his neck.

            
4.  Sisneros submitted a letter dated July 17, 2002 stating he 
was Armijo's foreman on April 11, 2002 and that Armijo stated his neck hurt from 
lifting planks.  The letter 
indicated Sisneros called Peters, advised Peters of Armijo's neck pain and 
Peters responded:  "So what."  Exhibit 4.

            
5.  At hearing, Sisneros testified he worked for TP for almost 
four years and was a foreman for the last two years.  Sisneros stated he did not see any 
injury to Armijo but confirmed Armijo did tell him about neck pain from loading 
scaffolding into the truck.  
Sisneros confirmed he called Peters, advised Peters of Armijo's neck pain 
and was told "so what."  Sisneros 
stated he wrote the July 17, 2002 letter three months after Armijo's neck pain 
and one month after leaving employment with TP.  Sisneros did not witness Armijo suffer 
an injury to his neck but told Armijo to notify Tony or Alicia Peters (Alicia) 
within 72 hours of seeking medical treatment.

            
6.  Armijo testified he woke up on April 12, 2002 with neck 
pain, called Peters and told Peters he would not be in to work because of his 
neck pain.  Armijo spent the day at 
home resting and denied taking his family to Cheyenne on April 12, 
2002.

            
7.  On April 13, 2002 Armijo was spraying mud off his driveway 
with a hose when he experienced neck spasms.  Armijo dropped the hose and drove 
himself to the hospital.  According 
to Armijo, Lance Talbot (Talbot) was present when Armijo experienced the neck 
spasms.  Talbot wrote a statement 
dated May 10, 2002 indicating he saw Armijo on April 13, 2002 watering the 
lawn.  Talbot stopped to check on 
Armijo at which time Armijo complained of neck pain.  Talbot indicated Armijo looked like he 
was in pain and that Armijo left to go the hospital.  Exhibit 13.

            
8.  After experiencing severe neck spasms, Armijo drove to the 
Ivinson Memorial Hospital emergency room in Laramie, Wyoming and sought medical 
treatment.  The April 13, 2002 note 
from the emergency room nurse reflected Armijo gave a history of his neck being 
immobile that morning while raking leaves.  
Armijo stated he had been having neck pain for six months and that the 
doctors he had seen in the past told him he had a pinched nerve.  Exhibit S-B, p.1 and Exhibit 9, 
p.1.  Dr. Ty Battershell, M.D., saw 
Armijo in the emergency room on April 13, 2002.  Dr. Battershell's note indicated Armijo 
had neck pain, which worsened that morning while raking leaves, and that Armijo 
had experienced prior neck problems.  
Exhibit S-B, p.9 and Exhibit 9, p.4.

            
9.  Wendy Romero (Romero) is Armijo's girlfriend and mother of 
their three children.  According to 
Romero, their trailer home does not have any trees or bushes and that they do 
not own a rake.  Romero stated 
Armijo came home from work on April 11, 2002 complaining of neck pain and that 
Armijo stayed home on April 12, 2002 and rested.  Romero denied Armijo drove the family to 
Cheyenne on April 12, 2002.  Romero 
did not recall Armijo having any neck pain prior to April 11 , 2002 or that 
Armijo had x-rays of his neck taken in January 2001.  Romero stated Armijo did not have any 
real medical problems but that Armijo may have complained of back pain in the 
past.

            
10.  Armijo returned to Ivinson Memorial Hospital's emergency 
room on April 14, 2002 and was treated by Dr. Donald Cantway, M.D.  Dr. Cantway's treatment notes reflected 
Armijo had been seen the previous day for an acute onset of neck pain with pain 
radiating into the arm.  The notes 
also indicated Armijo had a history of prior neck pain and that Armijo had 
chronic neck problems off and on for the last year.  Exhibit S-C.

            
11.  On April 15, 2002 Armijo signed a report of injury that 
had been filed out by Romero.  The 
report stated Armijo was hauling a 12-foot plank to the truck on his left 
shoulder when he hurt his neck.  The 
report indicated the employer was notified on April 13, 2002 when Armijo called 
Peters.  Alicia signed the report on 
April 16, 2002 and indicated the injury was work-related.  Exhibit S-A, p. 2 and Exhibit 1, p. 
2.  Alicia confirmed she signed the 
report when Romero brought it to her house on April 16, 
2002.

            
12.  On April 16 2002, an MRI of Armijo's neck was 
performed.  The MRI revealed 
herniated discs at C5/6 and C6/7.  
Exhibit 7.  On April 16, 
2002, Dr. Cantway again saw Armijo and the treatment notes of that date 
reflected incapacitating neck pain radiating into the shoulder which has been on 
going for several months.  The notes 
also reflected that Armijo stated he was unable to work off and on the last two 
months due to neck pain.  Exhibit 
S-D, p.1.

            
13.  On April 18, 2002 Armijo was seen by Dr. Lawrence A. 
Jenkins.  The office note of that 
date reflected a history of Armijo lifting a plank and severe onset of neck pain 
and that Armijo had intermittent symptoms of arm pain for some time.  The note indicated Armijo had been seen 
by Dr. Bienz a couple of months earlier for another problem and was having arm 
pain at that time.  Dr. Jenkins 
noted Armijo had a history of prior back and neck problems and that x-rays in 
January 2001 revealed degenerative changes at C-7.  Exhibits S-E and 
8.

            
14.  Alicia signed a second report of injury on April 24, 
2002.  Alicia described an injury to 
Armijo on April 11, 2002 as tweaked neck while carrying a plank.  On this report Alicia put a question 
mark after the question asking if the injury was work-related.  Exhibit 2.

            
15.  Alicia also sent a letter to the Division dated April 23, 
2002.  The letter stated Armijo did 
not tell anyone on the job site about an injury, that Armijo drove his family to 
Cheyenne on April 12, 2002 and that Armijo was raking his yard on April 13, 2002 
when his neck became sore.  Exhibits 
S-F and 5.  Alicia testified the 
information about Armijo driving to Cheyenne and raking came from a phone call 
with Armijo on the morning of April 16, 2002.

            
16.  In an April 26, 2002 letter, Dr. Jenkins indicated Armijo 
had two herniated discs, that surgery was needed and that Armijo declined the 
surgery.  Dr. Jenkins prescribed 
pain medication.  Exhibit 6.  In a May 2, 2002 letter Dr. Jenkins 
stated he last saw Armijo on April 26, 2002 and that Armijo was given pain 
medication.  On May 2, 2002 Dr. 
Jenkins indicated he would not give Armijo any more pain medication because 
Armijo has a significant history of obtaining pain medications from different 
doctors.  Exhibit S-G.

            
17.  Armijo 
testified Dr. Jenkins advised of the need for surgery and that Armijo did not 
want surgery.  Armijo sought 
treatment with Dr. Ribnik in Cheyenne for pain management.  According to Armijo he is still in pain 
but Dr. Ribnik's treatment is helping with the pain.

            
18.  Armijo admitted having back problems a few years ago but 
denied having any neck pain prior to April 11, 2002.  Armijo stated he was not aware of any 
prior treatment to his neck and did not know why the report from Dr. Jenkins on 
April 18, 2002 indicated prior x-rays of the neck revealed degenerative changes 
or why the report contained a history of prior back and neck problems.  Armijo did not know why the emergency 
room nurse's note on April 13, 2002 stated he was raking leaves or why it said 
he had seen a doctor in the past who said the pain was from a pinched 
nerve.  Armijo denied telling Dr. 
Cantway about neck problems on and off for the last year and does not know why 
the notes from Dr. Cantway do not mention any work injury.

            
19.  On August 23, 2002 counsel for Armijo sent a letter to Dr. 
Jenkins asking the doctor to respond to a couple of questions.  Dr. Jenkins stated Armijo's injury to 
the neck was the result of herniated discs, that surgery was recommended and 
that Armijo declined surgery.  Dr. 
Jenkins stated the large herniations were typically seen after lifting heavy 
objects and especially with lifting overhead.  Dr. Jenkins also stated herniations are 
not usually seen as a result of outside activities like raking but anything is 
possible.

            
20.  The evidence in this case is somewhat conflicting as the 
medical records from the emergency room indicated Armijo's neck pain occurred 
when raking at home while Armijo and Romero denied having a rake or having 
anything to rake at their home.  
Despite this conflict the evidence established Armijo reported neck pain 
from lifting a plank on April 11, 200[2], while at work for TP.  The medical records from Dr. Jenkins 
reflected the history of lifting a plank at work and resulting in neck 
pain.  Additionally, Dr. Jenkins 
stated the large herniations found in the MRI are typically seen after lifting 
heavy objects and especially overhead lifting.  Benefits should be 
awarded.

 

CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW

 

            
1.  Armijo has the burden of proving all the statutory elements 
which comprise a "compensable injury."  
Matter of Workers' Compensation Claim of Thornburg, 913 P.2d 863 
(Wyo. 1996) and Workers' Compensation Claim of Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982 (Wyo. 
1996).  This burden includes 
establishing the cause of the condition for which compensation is claimed and 
that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(LEXIS 2001).  State ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 1996) citing 
Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 892 (Wyo. 1984).  In this case Armijo must establish his 
neck pain is the result of his work effort for TP.

            
2.  Armijo has the burden of establishing each and every 
statutory element by a preponderance of the evidence.  Thornberg, 913 P.2d  at 866 and 
Jacobs, 924 P.2d  at 984.

            
A "preponderance of the evidence" is defined as "proof" which leads the 
trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable 
than its non-existence."  
Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 
1979).

Thornberg, 
913 P.2d 866.  The evidence 
presented is not to be liberally construed in a claimant's favor when 
determining if an injured worker has met that burden of proof.  Matter of Fansler, 914 P.2d 156 
(Wyo. 1996).

3.  Armijo 
has met his burden.  The evidence in 
this case established Armijo was working for TP on April 11, 200[2], when he 
began experiencing neck pain.  
Armijo reported the neck pain to his supervisor and the supervisor 
reported it to Peters.  An MRI found 
two herniated discs and Dr. Jenkins stated the large herniations found in the 
MRI are typically seen after lifting heavy objects and especially with overhead 
lifting.  Benefits are therefore 
awarded.

 

[¶16]   On October 25, 2002, the Division 
filed a petition for review in the district court.  That petition contained this statement 
of "Specific Issues of Law:"

 

            
Did the Hearing Examiner commit an error of law by failing to apply the 
proper burden of proof by not requiring the Employee to prove the cause of his 
herniated discs within a reasonable degree of medical 
probability?

            
Did the Hearing Examiner commit an error of law by failing to require the 
Employee to meet his clearly established burden of proof that the alleged work 
injury was a result of a work incident on April 11, 2002, and not the result of 
a pre-existing condition?

            
Did the Hearing Examiner violate the Administrative Procedures Act by 
failing to make specific findings of fact necessary to support his ultimate 
conclusions?

            
Did the Hearing Examiner abdicate his responsibilities as a fact finder 
by failing to make any credibility determinations and failing to set forth in 
detail how he resolved directly contradictory evidence so as to allow reasonable 
review by a Court?

            
Is the decision of the Hearing Examiner supported by substantial 
evidence?

            
Is the decision of the Hearing Examiner arbitrary, capricious or an abuse 
of discretion?3

 

[¶17]   On November 13, 2002, the Division 
sought an order from the district court staying the payment of any further 
worker's compensation benefits to Armijo.  
Finding that Armijo would be irreparably harmed by the grant of such a 
motion, the district court denied the motion.

 

[¶18]   On June 18, 2003, the district 
court issued a decision letter4 affirming the order entered by the 
hearing examiner.  The district 
court summarized the evidence that it viewed as the "substantial evidence" that 
supported the hearing examiner's findings.  
The district court concluded:

 

            
Medical testimony is not required to establish a causal connection 
between the occurrence and the injury when it is not essential.  Thornberg v. State of Wyoming 
Worker's Comp. Div., 913 P.2d 863, 867 (Wyo. 1996).  The hearing examiner had the 
responsibility of determining relevancy, assigning probative value, and 
ascribing weight to be given to any of the doctor's testimonies.  Id.  The hearing examiner made certain 
findings of fact after listening and weighing all of the evidence.  Though there may be evidence within the 
record supporting the Division's position, the Court must view all evidence in a 
light most favorable to [Armijo], the prevailing party.  The Court finds the record contains 
substantial evidence to support the findings made by the hearing examiner, and 
there is no indication he was arbitrary or capricious or abused his discretion 
in any way.  "It is the burden of 
the party who appeals from an administrative determination to show a lack of 
substantial evidence supporting that determination."  Corman, 909 P.2d  at 972.  The Division has failed to meet its 
burden.  The decision of the OAH and 
the Order Awarding Benefits is thereby affirmed.

 

[¶19]   On July 7, 2003, the Division filed 
a motion asking the district court to reconsider its decision.  The Division asserted that the district 
court's decision was contrary to a decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court issued 
on June 26, 2003, Salas v. General Chemical, 2003 WY 79, 71 P.3d 708 
(Wyo. 2003), and that a mistake in footnote 2 of the decision letter indicated 
the district court may have misconstrued Dr. Jenkins' opinion that the injury 
was likely the result of heavy lifting.

 

[¶20]   The district court issued a second 
decision letter on July 28, 2003.  
In that letter, the district court reassured the Division that it had not 
misunderstood the purport of Dr. Jenkins' letter.  The district court also concluded that 
this Court's decision in Salas did not render his original decision to be 
wrong.  For purposes of clarity, we 
recite our holding in Salas, as it is applicable to this 
case:

 

A 
claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the 
essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
contested case hearing.  In Re 
Worker's Comp. Claim of Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 7, 23 P.3d 32, ¶ 7 
(Wyo.2001).  We recently held that 
the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals 
from Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act contested case proceedings when 
factual findings are involved and both parties submit evidence.  Newman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 22, 49 P.3d 163, ¶ 22 (Wyo.2002).... 
Because both parties presented cases-in-chief, we apply the substantial evidence 
standard.  We afford respect and 
deference to a hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence.  Haagensen 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Comp. Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo.1997).  Our task is to examine the entire record 
to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
findings.  State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Comp. Div. v. Waggener, 946 P.2d 808, 814 (Wyo.1997).  We  
will  not  substitute  our  judgment  for that of the hearing examiner 
when substantial evidence supports his decision.  Id. Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions.  Id. A 
hearing examiner's conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will 
be affirmed only if truly in accord with law.  State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Wyo.1999).

 

Hermosillo 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
2002 WY 175, ¶ 6, 58 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo.2002).

 

            
An "injury" does not include a "condition preexisting at the time of 
employment with the employer against whom a claim is made[.]"  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (Michie 
1997).  The

 

burden 
is upon the claimant to prove that his work accident, not his preexisting 
condition, caused the necessity for the surgery.  Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 
970 (Wyo.1996); Matter of Claim of Fortier, 910 P.2d 1356, 1358 
(Wyo.1996).  While aggravation of a 
preexisting condition is a compensable injury, Matter of Injury to 
Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 312 (Wyo.1987), claimant must prove that his 
employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to 
produce the disability for which compensation is sought.  Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo.1993); Lindbloom v. Teton Int'l, 684 P.2d 1388, 1390 
(Wyo.1984).

 

State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Roggenbuck, 
938 P.2d 851, 853 (Wyo.1997).  "To 
prove aggravation of a preexisting injury, the claimant must demonstrate that 
the 'work effort contributed to a material degree to the ... aggravation ... of 
the existing condition of the employee.' "  
Frazier v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 997 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Lindbloom v. Teton 
Intern. 684 P.2d 1388, 1389-90 (Wyo.1984)) (emphasis omitted).

 

"[T]he 
causal connection between an accident or condition at the workplace is satisfied 
if the medical expert testifies that it is more probable than not that the work 
contributed in a material fashion to the ... aggravation ... of the injury.  We do not invoke a standard of 
reasonable medical certainty with respect to such causal connection.  Testimony by the medical expert to the 
effect that the injury 'most likely,' 'contributed to,' or 'probably' is the 
product of the workplace suffices under our established 
standard....

 

      [U]nder either 
the 'reasonable medical probability' or more probable than not' standard, [a 
claimant succeeds] in demonstrating the causal connection by a preponderance of 
the evidence."

 

Hall 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
2001 WY 136, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 373, 378 (Wyo.2001) (quoting In re Pino, 
996 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo.2000)).

 

Whether 
the employment " 'aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the internal 
weakness or disease to produce the disability is a question of fact.' "  Brees v. Gulley Enterprises, 
Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 131 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Lindbloom, 684 P.2d at 
1390).

 

Salas, 
¶¶ 9-11.

 

[¶21]   The Division's position with 
respect to a "preexisting condition" was correctly assessed by the district 
court:

 

            
The Hearing Examiner stated [Armijo] had met his burden of demonstrating 
the injury was compensable.  
Id. at ¶¶ 1-3.  
The Division here assumes there was a preexisting condition, then 
argues [Armijo] failed to meet his burden [Emphasis in original.].  In fact, the Hearing Examiner made no 
finding as to the existence of a pre-existing condition.  The Division simply assumes as true that 
which was never shown to the Hearing Examiner's satisfaction.  Clearly, the Hearing Examiner considered 
the evidence relating to the cause of the injury, including the possibility that 
it could have been the result of a pre-existing condition.  Even so, he determined [Armijo] had 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the injury was  caused by the work incident.  The Hearing Examiner properly considered 
the testimony and the evidence to make such a determination.  This court will not simply re-weigh this 
evidence to reach a contrary conclusion.  
To do as the  Division  suggests,  that  is  
find  the greater weight of 
the 

evidence 
leans toward disallowing benefits, would be inappropriate.  See Salas, 2003 WY 79 at ¶ 9.  The Court reiterates its findings and 
conclusions in its Decision Letter that substantial evidence is contained 
within the record to support the Hearing Examiner's finding that [Armijo's] neck 
injury occurred in and as a result of the course of his employment with TP.  The Hearing Examiner neither acted 
arbitrarily nor capriciously.  The 
OAH's Order Awarding Benefits is affirmed and the Motion for 
Reconsideration is denied.

 

[¶22]   In its brief, the Division argues 
that the evidence that Armijo had a preexisting condition is "compelling" and 
"overwhelming."  It argues that 
Armijo's (and his other witnesses's) rendition of the facts is "staggeringly 
improbable."  We will tarry only 
briefly with these challenges to the fact finding process that is in place to 
resolve worker's compensation claims.  
It is unlikely that Armijo fluently speaks either the argot of the 
Division's claims analysts or that of the medical profession.  However, his testimony was plain and 
clear that he hurt his neck at work.  
At least two witnesses, his foreman and his girlfriend, corroborated 
this.  All three testified at the 
hearing, so the hearing examiner could readily assess their credibility.  Alicia Peters initially confirmed that 
Armijo was injured at work.  It is 
not improbable that Armijo's communications with emergency room and other 
hospital personnel were garbled, unclear, misunderstood, misinterpreted, or just 
simply noted in the wrong chart.  It 
is not improbable that an initial misstatement or misunderstanding was simply 
repeated three or four times until it came to be viewed as the "gospel 
truth."

 

[¶23]   We hold that the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that Armijo proved his claim by a preponderance of the evidence is 
supported by the evidentiary record and that the district court did not err in 
concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record that Armijo 
suffered a compensable, work-related, on-the-job injury.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   The order of the district court, 
which affirmed the order of the hearing examiner, is affirmed.  This matter is remanded to the district 
court with directions that it be further remanded to OAH in accordance with the 
district court's opinion letters.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1No issues were 
raised in these proceedings as to the timeliness of Armijo's reporting of his 
injury.  In an amendment to its 
pre-hearing disclosure statement, the Division indicated that Tony Peters would 
testify that Armijo did not inform him of the injury, but ultimately Peters did 
not testify at the hearing.

 

   2Although the 
Division was not specific, the context of the letter indicates only sub-section 
27-14-102(a)(xi) of that statute was applicable to Armijo's claim, and not 
sub-sub-section 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F).

 

            
(xi) "Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than 
normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and 
death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or 
about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred 
while at work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's 
presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to 
the business.  "Injury" does not 
include:

(A) 
Any illness or communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the illness 
or disease is increased by the nature of the 
employment;

            
(B) Injury caused by:

(I) 
The fact the employee is intoxicated or under the influence of a controlled 
substance, or both, except any prescribed drug taken as directed by an 
authorized health care provider;  
or

(II) The employee's willful intention to injure or kill himself or 
another.

            
(C) Injury due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured 
employee;

            
(D) Any injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the 
employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer;

(E) 
Any injury sustained by the prisoner during or any harm resulting from any 
illegal activity engaged in by prisoners held under 
custody;

(F) 
Any injury or condition preexisting at the time of employment with the 
employer against whom a claim is made;

(G) 
Any injury resulting primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal 
activities of day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by 
objective findings;

(H) 
Any injury sustained while engaged in recreational or social events under 
circumstances where an employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury 
did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee's normal 
job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by the employer;  or

(J) 
Any mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, it 
occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by 
a licensed psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meeting criteria 
established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual 
of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association.  In no event shall benefits for a 
compensable mental injury be paid for more than six (6) months after an injured 
employee's physical injury has healed to the point that it is not reasonably 
expected to substantially improve.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

   3In its brief, 
the Division refined its statement of the issues so as to be identical to the 
statement of issues raised in this appeal.

 

   4The district 
court issued two decision letters in this case, though neither was attached to 
the Division's brief.