Title: Anthony Key v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Anthony KEY v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-121                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 17, 1996


1.   Evidence -- sufficiency of -- factors on review. -- In
     reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is
     considered in a light most favorable to appellee and affirmed
     if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict;
     evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and
     character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and
     pass beyond suspicion and conjecture; only the evidence that
     supports the conviction is considered, without weighing it
     against other evidence favorable to the accused;
     circumstantial evidence alone may constitute substantial
     evidence when every other reasonable hypothesis consistent
     with innocence is excluded; once the evidence is determined to
     be sufficient to go to the jury, the question of whether the
     circumstantial evidence excludes any other hypothesis
     consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide.

2.   Criminal law -- capital murder -- premeditation & deliberation
     discussed. -- Premeditation and deliberation are not required
     to exist for any particular length of time and may be formed
     in an instant; in capital murder cases, premeditation and
     deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances of the
     case, which include the type and character of the weapon used,
     the manner in which the weapon was used, the nature, extent,
     and location of the wounds inflicted, and the conduct of the
     accused.

3.   Evidence -- substantial evidence from which jury could
     conclude appellant acted with premeditated and deliberated
     purpose -- appellant's argument without merit. -- There was
     substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude, without
     speculating, that appellant acted with a premeditated and
     deliberated purpose to cause the death of the victim where
     appellant used a sawed-off, 12-gauge shotgun loaded with
     double-00 buckshot; the shots were fired into the trailer at
     head-level; and the shots appeared to have been aimed at a
     certain target as they followed the victim when she moved from
     the doorway of her home to the bedroom; the jury determined
     that the evidence excluded every other hypothesis consistent
     with appellant's innocence, and they were not persuaded by
     appellant's evidence; the credibility determination by the
     jury was affirmed upon substantial evidence. 

4.   Trial -- competency to stand trial -- test for determining
     competency. -- A criminal defendant is presumed to be mentally
     competent to stand trial, and the burden of proving
     incompetence is on that defendant; the test for determining an
     accused's competency to stand trial is whether he is aware of
     the nature of the proceedings against him and is capable of
     cooperating effectively with his attorney in the preparation
     of his defense; on appellate review of a finding of fitness to
     stand trial, the court will affirm if there is substantial
     evidence to support the trial court's finding.  

5.   Trial -- appellant knew he had been charged with murder --
     substantial evidence existed that appellant was competent to
     stand trial. -- An accused need not identify with specificity
     the charges filed against him; rather, he must have the
     capacity to "understand the proceedings against him"; here,
     both doctors from the state hospital testified that appellant
     knew he had been charged with murder, that appellant was aware
     of the nature of the charges against him, that appellant
     cooperated in their examinations and with others at the state
     hospital, and that appellant could assist in his defense;
     their testimony constituted substantial evidence to support
     the trial court's conclusion that appellant was competent to
     stand trial.  

6.   Criminal law -- voluntariness of confession -- factors on
     review. -- When the voluntariness of a confession is in issue,
     an independent determination of voluntariness is made based
     upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
     confession; the trial court's finding of voluntariness is not
     reversed unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence; some of the factors considered are the age,
     education, and intelligence of the accused; the advice or lack
     thereof on constitutional rights; the length of the detention;
     the repeated or prolonged nature of the questioning; and the
     use of physical punishment; a custodial confession is presumed
     involuntary, and the burden is on the State to show that the
     confession was voluntarily made.

7.   Criminal law -- when confession is invalid -- appellant
     clearly understood his rights. -- A confession obtained
     through a false promise of reward or leniency is invalid;
     where, however, the only evidence that appellant's custodial
     statement was obtained through a false promise of reward came
     from appellant's testimony at the suppression hearing, and
     where in his statement he clearly stated that the detective
     had advised him of his Miranda rights in a manner that he
     understood, that no one had made any threats or promises in
     exchange for the statement, and that he was giving the
     statement "of [his] own free will," the issue was one of
     credibility that the trial court assessed in favor of the
     State. 

8.   Criminal law -- determining voluntariness of confession --
     trial court's finding of voluntariness not clearly against
     preponderance of evidence. -- While age and mental capacity
     are factors to consider in determining the voluntariness of a
     confession, these factors alone are not sufficient to require
     suppression; in addition, a low score on an intelligence
     quotient test does not render an accused incapable of
     voluntarily giving a confession; where appellant was age
     eighteen when he was interrogated, had an IQ of 72, and read
     at the third-grade level, the trial court's finding of
     voluntariness was not clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Fourth Division; John W.
Langston, Judge; affirmed.
     Didi H. Sallings, Executive Director, by:  Teri Chambers, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.


     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 6-17-96   *ADVREP*SC3*





ANTHONY KEY,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,



CR 96-121



APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION,
NO. CR 94-1368,
HON. JOHN W. LANGSTON, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED.






     Appellant, Anthony Key, appeals a judgment of the Pulaski
County Circuit Court convicting him of capital murder and
sentencing him to life imprisonment without parole.  Jurisdiction
of this appeal is properly in this court.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(2).  Appellant presents three arguments for reversal of the
judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict.  We find no merit to
the arguments and affirm.
     Appellant's first argument for reversal is that the trial
court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict.  At trial,
appellant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the state's
case, contending the state had not proven that appellant acted with
the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing a person's
death.  Appellant presented defense witnesses and then renewed the
motion for directed verdict at the close of his evidence, adding as
additional grounds that he was incapable of forming the requisite
mental state.  Appellant then renewed the motion at the close of
the state's rebuttal evidence and again at the close of his
surrebuttal evidence.
     Appellant's initial motions were sufficiently specific to
apprise the trial court of the particular evidence he claimed was
lacking.  The renewal motions were likewise sufficient to preserve
the argument for our review.  Heard v. State, 322 Ark. 553,