Title: Lee v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Ledell LEE v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-590                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 11, 1996


1.   Trial -- closing arguments -- when reversal may be required. -
     - The trial court is given broad discretion to control counsel
     in closing arguments, and the court does not interfere with
     that discretion absent a manifest abuse of it; closing remarks
     that require reversal are rare and require an appeal to the
     jurors' passions.  

2.   Trial -- appellee's closing argument merely rebutted
     appellant's closing -- no error in trial court's refusal to
     grant mistrial. -- Where appellant's counsel devoted his
     entire closing argument to the impact of appellant's death
     sentence in an unrelated case on his sentence in this case,
     the deputy prosecutor's remark was seen as a rebuttal of
     appellant's own closing remarks; because appellant opened the
     door to the prosecutor's closing remarks, the trial court did
     not err in refusing to grant a mistrial.

3.   Criminal law -- rape and kidnapping charges -- factors
     considered in determining whether a separate kidnapping
     conviction is supportable. -- It is only when the restraint
     exceeds that normally incidental to the crime that the rapist
     or robber should also be subject to prosecution for
     kidnapping; the kind of restraint that is considered necessary
     to consummate rape is that which is necessary to consummate
     the act; any additional restraint will support a conviction
     for kidnapping ; included among the factors that have been
     considered by courts in determining whether a separate
     kidnapping conviction is supportable are whether the movement
     or confinement (1) prevented the victim from summoning
     assistance; (2) lessened the defendant's risk of detection; or
     (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim's
     risk of harm.    

4.   Criminal law -- restraint employed by appellant not merely
     incidental to his rape of victim -- evidence supported
     appellant's separate conviction for kidnapping. -- Where
     appellant dragged the victim for approximately one city block
     from a lighted city street to a dark area behind a school,
     thus preventing the victim from summoning assistance and
     lessening his risk of detection, and where the restraint
     itself posed a substantial risk of harm to the victim, who
     suffered both a bruised face and swollen neck from having been
     dragged and strangled to the point that she nearly lost
     consciousness, the evidence supported the conclusion that the
     restraint employed exceeded that which was necessary to
     effectuate the crime of rape and thus supported appellant's
     separate conviction for kidnapping.
 
5.   Civil procedure -- motion for continuance -- when trial
     court's ruling will be overturned. -- To obtain a continuance,
     the appellant must make a showing of good cause; he must also
     demonstrate prejudice from the denial of the continuance; when
     a motion for continuance is based on a lack of time to
     prepare, the court will consider the totality of the
     circumstances; the burden of showing prejudice is on the
     appellant; the trial court's ruling will not be overturned
     unless the appellant has demonstrated an abuse of discretion. 
      

6.   Civil procedure -- no prejudice shown in trial court's denial
     of continuance motion -- no abuse of discretion found. --
     Where the evidence that appellant claimed he would have
     introduced had he been granted a continuance was stipulated to
     by the State, appellant's argument that he lacked time to
     prepare because the trial was his third in four weeks was
     meritless; appellant failed to meet his burden of
     demonstrating prejudice.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Marion
Humphrey, Judge; affirmed.
     Montgomery, Adams, & Wyatt, by:  Dale E. Adams, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice.
     The appellant, Ledell Lee, was convicted of the rape,
kidnapping, and robbery of a Jacksonville woman and was sentenced
to consecutive terms of life, fifty years, and forty years,
respectively.  He raises three issues of appeal, none of which has
merit.  We affirm.
     On the evening of March 7, 1991, the fifty-year-old victim was
returning home from Knight's Grocery Store on Main Street in
Jacksonville.  As she was walking in front of Jacksonville
Elementary School, she noticed that a tall, black male was
following her.  When she stepped off the sidewalk to allow the man
to pass her, he grabbed her around the neck and began strangling
her, causing her to drop her groceries.  The man began rummaging
through her purse in an attempt to find money.  Warning the victim
to stay quiet if she wanted to live, the man then dragged her
approximately one city block to the back of the school building
where there was no light.  When she attempted to cry out for help,
the man would strangle her until she thought she would pass out. 
At one point, the victim thought she was going to die.          
     Once behind the school building, the man removed the victim's
belt and bound her hands with it.  Dumping the contents of her
purse, he discovered an apron that he used to cover her face. 
After removing the victim's tennis shoes, jeans, girdle, and
panties, he demanded oral sex.  When the victim refused, the man
vaginally raped her.  The man then left the victim, her hands still
bound and her face blindfolded.  
     Following a rape-kit examination that was performed on the
victim, semen samples were submitted to the State Crime Lab for
analysis.  Appellant and another man became suspects in the case. 
Their blood samples as well as the victim's blood were submitted
for testing.  The State's expert who performed the DNA analysis
testified that the probability of the perpetrator being someone
other than appellant was one in eighty-five million from the black
population.  The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and he
appeals.      
                       I. Closing argument
     Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for mistrial, which he made after the State presented
its rebuttal argument during the penalty phase.  During appellant's
closing argument, his counsel posed to the jurors that the State
had wasted two days of their time to try appellant when it had
already obtained a death sentence against him in an unrelated
capital-murder case.  Urging that appellant's death sentence was
"going to be carried out," his counsel asked the jury to recommend
that appellant receive the minimum sentences for his convictions. 
During rebuttal, the deputy prosecutor responded:
          Ladies and gentlemen, [defense counsel] argues to
     you that you know that the death penalty will be carried
     out.  Do you know that?  

Appellant moved for mistrial on the basis that the State was
improperly minimizing the jury's responsibility.  In response to
the motion, the trial court admonished the jury as follows:
          I will instruct the jury.  The defendant has
     received the death penalty, so that is the sentence of
     the Court of the Second Division of Pulaski County
     Circuit Court. 
          You may now pass to the jury room to deliberate on
     sentencing.    

     The trial court is given broad discretion to control counsel
in closing arguments, and we do not interfere with that discretion
absent a manifest abuse of it.  Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647,