Title: Application of Harper

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

84 So. 2d 700 (1956)
Application of Carlos E. HARPER to Withdraw and Separate Himself from the Practice of Law and to Withdraw from the Florida Bar.

Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
January 11, 1956.
*701 DREW, Chief Justice.
Carlos E. Harper is an attorney at law, duly admitted and authorized to practice law in the State of Florida and a member of The Florida Bar. With the consent of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, he has filed in this Court a petition in which he alleges that there are three charges of professional misconduct presently pending before the Board of Governors, which proceedings are in progress under the applicable provisions of the integration rule; that he does not desire to present further defenses against said charges but wishes to withdraw and separate himself from the practice of law henceforth. He prays this Court to enter an order striking his name from the rolls of The Florida Bar and withdrawing from him the privilege of practicing law without leave for reinstatement.
The Florida Bar has responded to the petition. It admits that it was filed with its consent and that such charges are pending against the petitioner. It is averred that the Grievance Committee of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida has exhaustively investigated the charges against petitioner and, based upon such investigation, has arrived at the conclusion that there is reasonable and probable cause shown that petitioner had been guilty of professional misconduct, and so reported to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar. It is further averred that after consideration, and pursuant to notice to the petitioner and hearings before it, it found that ground existed to believe the petitioner guilty of professional misconduct. It is then averred:
"In the private hearing upon the third of said charges, the petitioner stated that he did not desire to present further defenses to any of the charges against him and requested leave to file petition to this Court to withdraw and separate himself from the practice of law and have his name stricken from the rolls of The Florida Bar, which leave was granted by the Board of Governors upon the condition that said petition recite that there were charges pending against petitioner and that petitioner did not desire to present defenses thereto.
"The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar has given careful consideration to the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges against petitioner and has also carefully considered the request of petitioner for leave to file his petition herein, and has arrived at the conclusion that when serious charges of professional misconduct are pending against an attorney, and the Board of Governors after consideration *702 thereof and private hearing thereon, has determined that there is reasonable ground to believe the charges are true, that the Board of Governors may properly give leave to such accused attorney, at his instance and request, to file petition to this Court, therein waiving defenses to such charges and praying that the privilege of practicing law be withdrawn from him and his name stricken from the rolls of The Florida Bar, without leave for reinstatement, provided, of course, that the public interest does not render necessary or advisable a further investigation and public prosecution of the pending charges, and provided, further, that the nature of the charges are such that no restitution on the part of the petitioner is called for.
"After careful consideration of this matter, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar has reached the conclusion that the public interest does not render necessary or advisable a further investigation and prosecution of the pending charges against petitioner, and recommends to this Court that the petition be granted."
The disposition of this matter necessarily involves a consideration of the nature of proceedings of the kind here under consideration. This we shall first discuss.
Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are instituted in the public interest and to preserve the purity of the courts. No private rights except those of the accused attorney are involved. A judgment in such proceedings does not affect the rights of any injured person to maintain a civil action against the attorney nor prevent the public authorities from the institution of criminal proceedings, if justified by the nature of the charges.
More than fifty years ago, this Court, in the case of State ex rel. Kehoe v. McRae, 49 Fla. 389, 38 So. 605, 606, approved the general principles relating to proceedings of this kind. In that case we said:
The views expressed by this Court on this subject in 1905 are summarized in the following observation appearing in 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, Sec. 249:
On the same subject, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Re Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65, 68, 96 A.L.R. 679, text 682, 683, said:
The question, however, of whether an attorney at law has the right to resign and have his name stricken from the roll of attorneys at his own instance is a subject which has received little attention of the courts. There was little American precedent on the subject when this Court had before it the case of In re Clifton, 1934, 115 Fla. 168, 155 So. 324. It cannot be doubted, however, that the right of an attorney to voluntarily resign was recognized by the English courts long before the American Revolution. Anon. 1 Chit. 557, n; Ex parte Gray, 9 D.P.C. 336; Ex parte Owen, 6 Ves. Jr. 11; Ex parte Foley, 8 Ves. Jr. 33.
In the Clifton case, supra, a petition was filed in this Court on January 13, 1934, in which the petitioner alleged that he was an attorney at law practicing in West Palm Beach, Florida having been duly admitted to the practice of law on November 14, 1927. He further alleged that at the time of the filing of the petition there were no proceedings pending against him under any of the statutes of the State of Florida for his disbarment or suspension and that he desired to "withdraw from the practice of the law and to resign as an attorney and surrender up for cancellation and revocation his certificate admitting him to practice in all and singular the courts of Florida." Upon the filing of this petition in this Court, an order was issued to the Attorney General and the Chairman of the State Board of Law Examiners requiring them to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted. Returns thereto were made by the Attorney General and by the Chairman of the State Board of Law Examiners and there appears in the records of said cause a statement of Circuit Judge C.E. Chillingworth to the effect that prior to the filing of the petition in this Court he had taken certain sworn testimony before him with reference to alleged misconduct of Clifton and had under consideration at the time the petition was filed the question of whether or not he should, pursuant to the statutes, direct the State's Attorney to institute disbarment proceedings against the petitioner. The nature of the charges against the petitioner were set forth in the statement from the Circuit Judge.
The return of the State Board of Law Examiners strenuously resisted the granting of the petition of Clifton, not only on the ground that the petition itself was insufficient *704 because of its failure to allege that the petitioner had closed out his law practice and had no outstanding obligations or unfinished business as an attorney at law, but that the petition contained no recital or affidavit that he had no apprehension of any proceedings being brought for his disbarment or suspension as an attorney at law. Moreover, the response of the Attorney General and Chairman of the Board of Law Examiners attached as an exhibit an order of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida directing the State's Attorney to institute disbarment proceedings against the said Clifton and a copy of the motion for disbarment filed pursuant to said order, all of which events took place subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition in this Court. In an opinion by the late Justice Ellis, filed June 4, 1934, supra [115 Fla. 168, 155 So. 326], we said:
In a case decided in this Court in 1868 or 1869, State ex rel. Wolfe v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278, the power of the courts over those who practiced before them was discussed at length. We quote from that case, text 283:
The statute referred to in the above quotation was passed in the year 1275. The quotation in the opinion is incomplete in that it did not contain the provision which appeared in the original statute that such "sergeant, (countor) or others, * * * shall be imprisoned for a year and a day." The statute actually read as follows:
Weeks on Attorneys at Law, page 19. See also 6 C.J. 581, Note 58(b); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 18.
That the statute, as quoted immediately above, is correct and that that portion with reference to imprisonment was actually considered by this Court in the Kirke case is sure because it is said in that case:
The authorities relied on by Justice Ellis in the Clifton case for the holding which we are discussing were Ex parte Owen, 6 Vesey, Jr. 11, and Ex parte Foley, 8 Vesey, Jr. 33. These cases are short and we quote them at length.
In view of the fact that when Ex parte Owen and Ex parte Foley were decided in 1801 and 1802 respectively the English Courts had the power in disciplinary proceedings concerning those who practice before them to imprison as well as disbar, reprimand or suspend we think the language of the Lord Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls in those cases and the results which they reached were based on the premise that by allowing such attorney to resign without the affidavit would deprive the court of its power to punish by imprisonment. We, therefore, conclude that inasmuch as the courts of this Country *706 have never recognized the right to imprison attorneys as well as to disbar them in summary proceedings for disbarment, suspension or reprimand, the English rule has no place in our system, particularly if it is to be construed strictly. To put it another way, there was a valid reason for the rule set forth in Ex parte Owen and Ex parte Foley, supra. The reason for the rule not being present under the American system of jurisprudence, the rule itself can find no support in logic or reason. So we hold that, under certain conditions, an attorney may resign in the absence of the affidavit discussed in the Clifton case, supra.
The judgment in the Clifton case does not do violence to these principles. While it was said in that case that an attorney would not be allowed to resign in the absence of the affidavit referred to, it clearly appeared that not only the circuit judge below but the Circuit Court commission of Palm Beach County had vigorously opposed the granting of such petition to resign. In that case the discretion of this Court could not be said to have been unwisely exercised.
This question has been considered by a few courts, among which are those of Oregon, Washington, Kentucky and Indiana. We point out that in Washington the court has considered the matter to be one involving the exercise of judicial discretion. In some instances, an attorney proposing to resign has been allowed to do so even after conviction upon criminal charges, Application of Lonergan, 23 Wash. 2d 767, 162 P.2d 289, while in other cases, under other circumstances, the same court has rejected such application. In re Evers, 41 Wash. 2d 942, 247 P.2d 890. In Oregon it is held that the resignation of an attorney without consent of the court is not effectual to preclude his disbarment when proceedings therefor were pending at the time of his resignation. Ex parte Thompson, 32 Or. 499, 52 P. 570, 40 L.R.A. 194, 195; In re King, 165 Or. 103, 105 P.2d 870. In Kentucky, the right of an attorney to resign is recognized but the granting of such request is there a matter to be determined by the court. In re May, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 95. And in Indiana, an attorney at law is allowed to resign but such resignation will not operate to stay proceedings for the disbarment of such attorney, particularly where proceedings have been concluded by a commissioner appointed to hear evidence in disbarment proceedings and disbarment has been recommended. In re Lucas, 230 Ind. 254, 102 N.E.2d 909.
Disciplinary proceedings by The Florida Bar are essentially a function of this Court. While the local committees and the Board of Governors are not technically judicial tribunals, their findings and recommendations should be considered as those of an intermediate agency of this Court. They are in fact an arm of this Court dealing with a vital function of the Court and under its exclusive jurisdiction. See Velkov v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25, 35 A.L.R.2d 1348. While the power to render the ultimate judgment in these cases is vested in this Court, the findings and recommendations of the constituted officers of The Florida Bar are entitled to receive due consideration and are of persuasive force. Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833, 173 A.L.R. 284.
The same general principles laid down here with reference to proceedings conducted by The Florida Bar are equally applicable to disbarment proceedings instituted and prosecuted under the applicable statutes of this State. Section 454.23 et seq., Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A. The power of circuit judges in disciplinary proceedings under these statutes are specifically reserved under Article XI of the integration rule, F.S.A., with the added requirement for filing two copies of the final judgment in this Court and furnishing one copy to the Executive Director of The Florida Bar.
We, therefore, conclude that an attorney at law duly admitted to practice in *707 this State may resign and surrender up and have cancelled his franchise to engage in the practice of the profession but that the acceptance or rejection of such resignation or the terms and conditions which will be imposed on an acceptance, are matters resting within the discretion of this Court to be exercised in accordance with the general principles herein discussed. Before accepting such a resignation, it should be made to appear in a proper and competent manner not only that the public interest will not be adversely affected by such acceptance but also that the acceptance thereof will not adversely affect the purity of the courts nor hinder the administration of justice. When these facts are made to appear in a satisfactory manner, after competent investigation by this Court or its officers, there is no reasonable basis on which the refusal to accept such a resignation could be justified.
The instant case is accompanied by a complete record consisting of evidence and exhibits resulting from an investigation over a long period of time. At the local level, those conducting the inquiries were members of the Bar having intimate knowledge of the individual dealt with. We are satisfied from the record presented that the unqualified resignation of Mr. Harper should be accepted.
It is, thereupon, the order of this Court that the name of Carlos E. Harper be stricken from the rolls of The Florida Bar and the privilege heretofore enjoyed by the said Carlos E. Harper of practicing law in the State of Florida is hereby terminated and withdrawn without leave for reinstatement.
TERRELL, THOMAS, HOBSON, ROBERTS, THORNAL and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur.