Title: Richards v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  August 18, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DICKEY A. RICHARDS,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A124095; SC S51773)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 21, 2005.
Walter J. Ledesma, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs were
Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Stacey RJ Guise, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings.

*Appeal from Court of Appeals Order of Dismissal dated       
 September 9, 2004. Mary J. Diets, Chief Judge.
This case requires this court to determine whether
petitioner, an inmate, was "adversely affected or aggrieved" by
an order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
(board).  Petitioner initially sought administrative review of a
board order that delayed his release date for two years and
required that he undergo a psychological evaluation before
release.  In response, the board entered a new order that changed
petitioner's projected release date to one year, but retained the
requirement that petitioner undergo a psychological evaluation. 
Petitioner again sought administrative review, arguing that he
should not have to undergo a psychological evaluation and that
the board should release him in a year without such an
evaluation.  The board rejected that argument.  Petitioner then
sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals.  The board moved
to dismiss, arguing that the board's order did not adversely
affected or aggrieved petitioner in the manner necessary to
establish appellate jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals agreed
with the board and dismissed the petition for judicial review by
order for lack of jurisdiction.   We allowed petitioner's
petition for review and now conclude that the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing petitioner's petition.
The pertinent procedural facts are undisputed. 
Petitioner is imprisoned for crimes that he committed in 1980. 
In early 2003, petitioner underwent a psychological examination. 
Following that examination, the board concluded in Board Action
Form (BAF) 10 that petitioner suffered from a present severe
emotional disturbance that constitutes a danger to the health or
safety of the community.  The board, acting in that instance
through two of its members, deferred petitioner's release date
for 24 months. 
Petitioner requested administrative review of BAF 10
and advanced six arguments, one of which was that a board panel
made up of only two members could only postpone petitioner's
release date for one year.  See former OAR 255-60-010(2)
(1980). (1)  In particular, petitioner stated that "[t]he Board
postponed me (2) years, but could only postpone me (1) year as I
seen [sic] a panel."
The board responded with Administration Review Response
(ARR) 6 and BAF 11.  In ARR 6, the board conceded that, applying
the administrative rule that was in effect when petitioner
committed his crimes, petitioner was correct in his understanding
of former OAR 255-60-101(2) (1980) that a two-member panel could
not extend a release date more than 12 months.  In BAF 11, the
board stated that petitioner's projected parole release date
would be deferred 12 months, rather than 24 months, until October
3, 2004.  
Petitioner sought administrative review of BAF 11, 
arguing that the board had failed to comply with OAR 255-60-010(2) (1980) in BAF 11.  As petitioner stated his argument:
"The Rule that applies to my case, (Division 60,
specifically [former OAR] 255-060-010(2) (1980)) states
that the Board members I appeared before, constituting
a panel, may order postponement of the scheduled
release date (if a finding of present emotional
disturbance etc.) "Not to exceed one year."  This
language is "specific" and mandates that my release
date of 10/3/04 be a fixed date -- no additional
postponements or extensions shall be administered.  My
prison term should expire on 10/3/04."
The board responded in the aforementioned ARR 6,
discussing petitioner's argument at some length:
"You allege that [former OAR 255-60-010 (1980)]
indicates that the board is limited to postponing your
scheduled parole release date for 12 months and
afterwards, [and] it is required to release you onto
parole supervision.  You further allege that the board
cannot require that you participate in a psychological
evaluation after it has postponed your scheduled parole
release date for 12 months.  You are incorrect on both
points.  Pursuant to ORS 144.125, in effect at the time
you committed your crimes, the board, after finding
that an offender suffered from a present severe
emotional disturbance such as to constitute a danger to
the health or safety of the community could defer the
offender's scheduled parole release date to a specified
future date. * * * There is nothing in either the
statute or the rule that indicates an offender is to be
released onto parole supervision after a 24-month
postponement or a 12-month postponement of the
scheduled parole release date.  Furthermore, pursuant
to ORS 144.223, in effect at the time you committed
your crimes, the board could require any prisoner being
considered for parole to participate in a psychological
evaluation.  Finally, the board found that you were
suffering from a present severe emotional disturbance
such as to constitute a danger to the health or safety
of the community after conducting an exit interview
with you.  After making this finding, the board is
authorized to postpone the scheduled parole release
date of an offender.  Pursuant to rule and statute, the
board must make this finding in order to defer an
offender's scheduled parole release date.  Only in the
absence of such a finding is an offender entitled to
release onto parole supervision after an exit
interview.  Your interpretation of [former] OAR 255-60-010 [(1980)] is illogical and if true would render the
entire parole process superfluous as well as being
unconstitutional.  Therefore, your allegation has no
merit.  The board did not violate any rules, policies,
statutes, or constitutions when it made its decision in
your case."
Petitioner filed a timely petition for review of BAF
11, stating that he had exhausted his administrative remedies via
ARR 6.  He also asserted that he was adversely affected or
aggrieved by BAF 11.
The board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because petitioner was not
"adversely affected or aggrieved" under ORS 144.335 because BAF
11 had granted petitioner the relief that he had requested in
changing his projected release date to 12 months from 24 months. 
Petitioner responded that, while the board indeed had granted him
partial relief, it had not granted him all the relief that he had
sought.  He argued:
"The unambiguous text of the rule states that the
board was authorized to perform only one action[:]
defer a release date for up to one year.  The text does
not support a reading that the board was authorized to
set another hearing with a new invasive psychological
report from a psychologist hired by the board with the
possibility of another deferral.  Under petitioner's
reading of the rule, any time in prison after one year
adversely affects petitioner."
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
judicial review by order, stating simply that "petitioner is not
adversely affected or aggrieved by the challenged order."  As
noted, we allowed petitioner's ensuing petition for review.
Legislation, rather than common law, defines appellate
jurisdiction in Oregon.  See State v. Snyder, 337 Or 410, 416, 97
P3d 1181 (2004) (right to appeal is statutory); Benton County v.
Friends of Benton County, 294 Or 79, 82, 653 P2d 1249 (1982)
(common law does not provide jurisdictional authority).  We begin
with the pertinent statute describing the requirements for
appellate jurisdiction over board orders.  ORS 144.335 (1)
provides:
"A person over whom the State Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision exercises its jurisdiction may
seek judicial review of a final order of the board as
provided in this section if:
"(a) The person is adversely affected or aggrieved
by a final order of the board; and
"(b) The person has exhausted administrative
review as provided by board rule."
Although this court has not scrutinized the meaning of
"adversely affected or aggrieved" as that phrase is used in ORS
144.335, the term is one of art when used in connection with
judicial review of a final order. (2)  This court's most
comprehensive discussion of the meaning of the phrase appears in
People for Ethical Treatment v. Inst. Animal Care, 312 Or 95, 817
P2d 1299 (1991) ("PETA"), a case on which both parties in this
dispute rely:
"From the legislative history and from our prior
interpretations of 'aggrieved' person, we conclude that
a person is 'aggrieved' under ORS 183.480(1) if the
person shows one or more of the following factors: (1)
the person has suffered an injury to a substantial
interest resulting directly from the challenged
governmental action; (2) the person seeks to further an
interest that the legislature expressly wished to have
considered; or (3) the person has such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete
adverseness to the proceeding.  The legislature has not
granted standing under ORS 183.480(1) to those persons
who merely are 'dissatisfied with the agency's order,'
or who have only an 'abstract interest * * * in the
question presented,' or who are mere bystanders."
PETA involved a third party that wished to object to
the treatment of animals in a university laboratory setting. 
Accordingly, the court established a broad theoretical
understanding of how third parties might be "aggrieved" for
purposes of seeking appellate review.  
Here, unlike in PETA, petitioner argues that he did not
obtain the relief that he had sought, and that he was entitled to
receive, in the administrative review proceeding.  That is the
ordinary circumstance of most parties who seek judicial review. 
In such an instance, it is not difficult to determine whether a
party is either "adversely affected" or "aggrieved."  Nothing is
remarkable about the observation that, if a party did not obtain
the relief that it had sought before an administrative tribunal,
such a party is either "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" by the
denial of that relief.  See Snyder, 337 Or at 417-18 (party
aggrieved by Court of Appeals decision in which party did not
prevail in the manner in which it had sought to prevail).
Here, petitioner sought judicial review of BAF 11.  A
BAF is an appealable final order of the board under ORS
144.335(1)(a).  Norris v. Board of Parole,  331 Or 194, 197 & n
2, 13 P3d 104 (2000).  Petitioner exhausted administrative review
by seeking the reassessment that resulted in ARR 6.  See OAR 255-080-0005(1) (inmate may request administrative review by sending
Administrative Review Request Form to board, explaining how case
fits criteria for review listed in OAR 255-080-0010).  The
remaining issue under ORS 144.335(1) is whether BAF 11 adversely
affected or aggrieved petitioner.
In seeking judicial review, petitioner maintained that
the board had acted outside its rules and authority in postponing
review of petitioner's release date by more than one year and
thereby (according to petitioner) had violated former OAR 255-60-010(2) (1980).  The board granted relief by scheduling review for
one year in the future.  Petitioner then objected that his OAR
255-60-010(2) argument was broader than merely resetting an
earlier date for parole consideration.  He clarified his argument
that the board had violated former OAR 255-60-010(2) (1980) by
conditioning future consideration for release on a psychological
examination.  Although petitioner could have made a clearer
argument earlier, perhaps even when he challenged BAF 10, he
clarified his argument to the board after it issued BAF 11. 
Afterwards, the board considered and rejected petitioner's
argument in ARR 6.  Whatever the merits of petitioner's argument,
he did not receive all the relief that he had sought under former
OAR 255-60-010(2) (1980) when the board entered BAF 11 including
the requirement that petitioner undergo another psychological
evaluation.  We therefore conclude that petitioner was "adversely
affected or aggrieved" by BAF 11 for purposes of ORS
144.335(1)(a), and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
otherwise.  
The board offers several arguments in support of its
position that petitioner was not adversely affected or aggrieved
by BAF 11.  First, the board argues that, because the board had
granted petitioner the specific relief that he had requested,
petitioner was not adversely affected or aggrieved by BAF 11.  As
we explained previously, however, petitioner advanced an argument
regarding the board's statutory authority to postpone his
projected release date.  The board understood petitioner's
objection to be that the board had no authority to postpone such
a date more than 12 months and granted relief.  In fact, as
petitioner made clear in his subsequent review request, he was
making a broader argument about the board's statutory authority
under former OAR 255-60-010(2) (1980).  The board rejected that
argument in ARR 6 and, in doing so, adversely affected or
aggrieved petitioner by denying him the relief that he had
sought.
Second, the board argues that a statement in BAF 11
that did nothing more than "express the board's expectation that
it will take certain actions at some point in the future" did not
adversely affect or aggrieve petitioner.  In other words, the
board argues that petitioner's claim will not be ripe until the
board takes action -- specifically, until it conduct another
psychological examination of petitioner.  The board, however, did
take action when it denied petitioner the relief that he had
sought.  Petitioner, moreover, was required to challenge the
board's order, under the board's own rules, within 45 days of the
mailing date on the board's final action on the reviewed issue. 
OAR 255-080-0005(2).  He then was required to file a timely
petition for review.  ORS 144.355(4) (60-day time limit to file
petition for review).  The board denied future relief to
petitioner after evaluating his arguments.  In light of the
board's refusal to grant relief, petitioner was required to act
pursuant to the pertinent administrative and statutory
requirements to preserve appellate review of his grievance. 
Under the statutory time constraints, petitioner could not wait
for the board to subject him to another psychological evaluation
before challenging the board's order.
Third, the board argues that petitioner should have
made his argument challenging the board's authority in response
to BAF 10, rather than BAF 11, and that, because he challenged
the later order, he is not adversely affected or aggrieved.  The
board's argument (and, by inference from the wording of its
decision, the Court of Appeals' acceptance of it) reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of the triage function performed by
ORS 144.335(1)(a).  That provisions's requirement that, to obtain
judicial review, the person seeking review be "adversely affected
or aggrieved" is a requirement of standing -- it has nothing to
do with the legal merits of petitioner's case.  That is, the
requirement serves only to separate those who are entitled to
have their arguments considered on the merits from those who are
not so entitled.
Properly understood, the board's argument respecting
BAF 10 and BAF 11 is not about whether petitioner met that
threshold requirement of ORS 144.335(1)(a).  Rather, it is about
whether petitioner is entitled to review on the merits in light
of his alleged failure to challenge the proper BAF and, having
failed to do so, whether the doctrine of issue preclusion bars
petitioner from asserting successfully the legal theory that he
now wishes to assert.  
The board's argument may or may not be correct; we
express no opinion concerning it in this case.  It is clear,
however, that the argument is not about whether petitioner is
adversely affected or aggrieved by BAF 11.  Patently, he is
adversely affected:  BAF 11 placed him under a disability, that, 
he asserts, legally cannot be imposed on him.  Petitioner's legal
theory supporting his claim may or may not succeed, but he has
established that he is entitled to have it addressed either
directly on the merits or, if the doctrine applies, as a matter
of issue preclusion.  We hold here only that the Court of Appeals
is not excused from addressing petitioner's theory by virtue of
the threshold requirement -- "adversely affected or aggrieved" -- 
of ORS 144.335(1)(a).  Its contrary holding was error and must be
reversed.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings.
1. Former OAR 255-60-010(2) (1980) provided:
"Following the hearing, a panel may order
postponement of the scheduled release of a prisoner
found to have a present emotional disturbance which the
Board finds poses a threat to the health or safety of
the community until after a specified future date not
to exceed one year or until the prisoner or institution
presents evidence that the emotional disturbance is
over or in remission."
2. ORS 183.480(1), a part of the Oregon Administrative
Procedure Act, provides:
"Except as provided in ORS 183.415(5)(b)
[regarding an informal disposition of a contested
case], any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an
order or any party to an agency proceeding is entitled
to judicial review of a final order, whether such order
is affirmative or negative in form."