Title: Schwenke v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Schwenke v. State1989 WY 33768 P.2d 1031Case Number: 87-273Decided: 02/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
KEITH 
MARTIN SCHWENKE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, CarbonCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
Steven E. 
Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, and 
Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Attys. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     A jury convicted 
appellant Keith Schwenke of taking indecent liberties with his thirteen-year-old 
son. He now challenges the process by which that jury was selected and asserts 
as error a number of the trial court's evidentiary 
decisions.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will affirm. 

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant states the 
issues on appeal as follows:

 
 
I.

 
 
The trial 
court improperly conducted voir dire by pressuring jurors to ignore their biases 
and prejudices and erroneously refused, on three occasions, to excuse jurors for 
cause after they expressed bias or prejudice against the accused or against 
serving in a case of this nature.

 
 
II.

 
 
The trial 
court committed plain error by allowing a witness to testify for the sole 
purpose of prejudicing appellant's right to a fair trial.

 
 
III.

 
 
The trial 
court erred by allowing state's Exhibit No. 1 to go to the jury 
room.

 
 
IV.

 
 
The trial 
court erred by allowing uncharged evidence of prior sexual contact to reach the 
jury.

 
 

[¶4.]     Keith Schwenke and his 
son shared an apartment at the Pioneer Apartments in Rawlins, Wyoming. At about 8:00 p.m. on March 16, 1987, 
fourteen-year-old Larry Lascano entered a storage area adjacent to the Schwenke 
apartment. Lascano testified that, while gathering some cleaning supplies from 
the storage room, he heard moaning and groaning noises which prompted him to 
look through a partially blocked window into appellant's bedroom. There, he 
claimed, he saw appellant laying face down on his son's back. Both the Schwenkes 
were naked, and appellant was repeatedly raising and lowering his hips over the 
child's buttocks. Lascano then ran out of the storage room, encountering his 
sixteen-year-old sister, Lucy, and her twelve-year-old companion, Nicole 
Trujillo. When the girls expressed disbelief at his description of what he had 
just witnessed, they went to the storage room so they could look through the 
window themselves. Both girls testified that they did so, and independently 
corroborated the boy's story. The children then alerted Lascano's sister-in-law. 
Although she never visually confirmed their allegations, she testified that she 
heard moaning noises coming from the storage area and relayed the story to the 
children's mother, Lucille Lascano, who called the police.

 
 

[¶5.]     Officers Omen and 
Dixon of the Rawlins City Police responded to the 
call and, on the basis of their interview with the Lascano and Trujillo children, took 
appellant's son into protective custody. Two days later a criminal complaint was 
issued, charging appellant with incest, a violation of W.S. 6-4-402 (June 1983 
Repl.). Subsequently, the state dropped that charge, electing to prosecute 
appellant under W.S. 14-3-105 (July 1986 Repl.), taking indecent liberties with 
a minor. A jury found him guilty of that offense, and on October 15, 1987, the 
trial court sentenced appellant to a term of seven to nine years in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary.

 
 
I. VOIR 
DIRE

 
 

[¶6.]     A primary purpose of 
the voir dire inquiry is to determine whether prospective jurors have such 
prejudices or biases as would interfere with a fair and impartial decision. 
Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 488 (Wyo. 1983). Because the trial court can more 
clearly observe the demeanor and responses of the panel during that inquiry, we 
defer to its judgment as to whether such prejudices or biases exist. Summers v. 
State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Wyo. 1986). See also Smethurst v. State, 756 P.2d 196 (1987). Appellant asks us to depart from our usual deference, 
contending that the trial court manipulated three jurors so as to camouflage 
prejudices which would subject them to a successful challenge for cause. The 
record indicates appellant challenged those jurors for cause, but it also 
reveals he accepted the jury as finally empaneled. Lee v. State, 743 P.2d 296, 
298 (Wyo. 
1987). Accordingly, we must review any improprieties found in the jury selection 
process according to a plain error standard. Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49, 55 (Wyo. 1985). 

 
 

[¶7.]     To determine whether 
the plain error standard has been met, we apply a three-part test. First, this 
court must be able to discern unequivocally from the record what occurred at 
trial without resort to speculation. Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
what occurred constitutes a clear and obvious violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law. Finally, that violation must have adversely affected 
some substantial right of appellant. Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 
(Wyo. 
1988).

 
 

[¶8.]     The transcript here is 
clear with regard to the voir dire of three of the panel members of which 
appellant now complains. Prospective juror Martinez initially indicated that her strong 
feelings about child molestation might adversely affect her ability to judge the 
facts. She believed that children would not lie about such things. The trial 
court advised her that strong feelings would not disqualify her as a juror, 
provided she could impartially hear and weigh the evidence. In response, Ms. 
Martinez revealed that she would not, in every instance, presume a child's 
testimony to be true. She later suggested that her decision in favor of either 
appellant or the state would be based upon the amount of factual and testimonial 
substantiation offered to support their respective stories. The trial court 
denied appellant's challenge for cause.

 
 

[¶9.]     Prospective juror 
Conway suggested that she might improperly infer appellant's guilt from the fact 
that he was being tried. The trial court explained that, despite the jury's 
strong feelings about child abuse, it must presume appellant innocent until the 
state has proved all the elements of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When 
Mrs. Conway stated that she could hold the state to its burden of proof, the 
trial court refused to excuse her for cause.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant's challenge of prospective 
juror Gerstner arose after a confusing dialogue which seemed to indicate her 
intention to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to the 
state's case. Noting that appellant's questions may have caused her confusion, 
the trial court attempted to clarify the reasonable doubt standard for Ms. 
Gerstner. Then, upon her assurance that she could follow the appropriate 
standard, the trial court denied appellant's motion to disqualify her for 
cause.

 
 

[¶11.]  The record is clear concerning the trial 
court's conduct during the voir dire of these three panel members. However, 
appellant must establish that this conduct constitutes a clear and obvious 
transgression of an unequivocal rule of law. The scope of the voir dire 
examination lies within the discretion of the trial court, and a challenge for 
cause permits the rejection of prospective jurors only on "a narrowly specified, 
provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality * * *." Engberg v. State, 
686 P.2d 541, 548, 549 n. 6 (Wyo. 1984). The limited grounds which will 
support a successful challenge for cause are set out in W.S. 7-11-105 (June 1987 
Repl.) and W.S. 1-11-203 (1977).1 Those statutes provide, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
W.S. 
7-11-105

 
 
(a)(ii) 
That he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, or is biased or prejudiced for or against the 
accused.

 
 
W.S. 
1-11-203

 
 
(a)(vi) 
Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits or 
the main question of the action. The reading of newspaper accounts of the 
subject matter before the court shall not disqualify the juror either for bias 
or opinion;

 
 
(a)(vii) 
The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias for either 
party.

 
 

[¶12.]  To determine whether a prospective juror 
exhibited such bias or prejudice as would require the trial court to dismiss him 
for cause, we must examine the prospective juror's voir dire testimony as a 
whole, without placing undue emphasis on any single response. Patterson v. 
State, 691 P.2d 253, 255 (Wyo. 1984), cert. 
denied, sub nom. Spoon v. Wyoming, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S. Ct. 2048, 85 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1985). A speculative bias will not result in a successful challenge if the 
trial court determines that the prospective juror is able to decide the case 
solely on the evidence presented and according to the trial court's instructions 
on the law. Summers, 725 P.2d  at 1039. The trial court's determination in this 
regard is an exercise of discretion, and we will not disturb that discretion 
unless appellant demonstrates that it was abused. Gresham, 708 P.2d at 55-56; see also Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 896-97 (Wyo. 1986) (defining judicial 
discretion).

 
 

[¶13.]  In the present case, none of the three 
panel members can be said to have formed or expressed an opinion concerning 
appellant's guilt. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the three 
prospective jurors would execute their duties as jurors in accordance with the 
law and the evidence before them. We hold, therefore, that appellant has failed 
to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's 
challenges for cause. There was no plain error.

 
 

[¶14.]  That is not to say, however, that this 
court is entirely comfortable with such a deferential standard of review; nor is 
it to say that the trial court in this case should escape criticism. Both the 
decisions of this court and the statutory pronouncements of our legislature have 
recognized the vital role of voir dire in the fact-finding process. The validity 
of any factual determination depends on whether the fact-finder is, in truth, 
impartial. We fear, however, that all too often the dialogue of voir dire is 
less a search for this impartiality than it is a series of coached responses. In 
this case we perceive that problem arises not out of the trial court's 
intention, but out of its resort to an ineffective method of 
inquiry.

 
 

[¶15.]  We envision the duty of the trial court 
to be two-fold with respect to its supervision of voir dire. It has the "duty to 
ascertain whether or not an expressed position by a prospective juror - bias or 
prejudice or otherwise - was made with full understanding of the context of the 
position in the scenario of a jury trial." Gresham, 708 P.2d  at 56. (emphasis added.) That 
is, it must inform the panel regarding the application of the appropriate legal 
standards for impartial decision-making, and it must determine whether the 
prospective juror is capable of conforming to those standards. We take no issue 
in this case with the trial court's efforts to clarify the law for prospective 
jurors. However, its less than neutral exploration of those personal feelings 
that might betray a prospective juror's inability to function impartially treads 
dangerously close to prompting and suggesting the answers finally received. The 
right to an impartial jury is meaningless if guaranteed only by a ritual 
response.

 
 

[¶16.]  The district court's examination of the 
prospective jurors, following appellant's challenges, consisted largely of 
leading questions. It is well known by judges and trial practitioners that such 
questions function both rhetorically and psychologically to impose the 
questioner's control over the response. See 3 F. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury 
Trials § 372 at 549 (1960); 1 A. Ginger, Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal 
Trials § 8.80 at 481 (2d ed. 1984) (affidavit of psychologist Dr. Craig Haney 
regarding voir dire procedures); J. Jeans, Trial Advocacy § 13.23 at 315-16 
(1975); 1 S. Schwitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice § 194 at 520 (3d ed. 1970); 
1 Am.Jur.Trials § 11 at 14 (1964). They are the tool of advocacy, not 
neutrality. They are particularly destructive to the effective communication so 
crucial to voir dire when they are repeated to a series of challenged 
prospective jurors. At the very least, the panel learns it may avoid airing its 
partiality by resort to a pat response; at worst, the panel may assume that the 
trial court and our system of justice expects it to do so.

 
 

[¶17.]  When Ms. Martinez indicated her tendency 
to accept any child's testimony relating to molestation, the trial court asked 
if she would similarly believe any child's claim "that the sky was falling." She 
responded that she would not, but noted that a case alleging child abuse was a 
different matter which made her doubt her ability to remain impartial. The 
following exchange then took place:

 
 
THE COURT: 
* * * Are you telling me that if a kid said he was hurt, you would immediately 
criticize the person he pointed the finger at * * *.

 
 
MS. 
MARTINEZ: No.

 
 
THE COURT: 
So?

 
 
MS. 
MARTINEZ: I will try to listen to the other person's side of the 
story.

 
 

[¶18.]  Voicing her concern that the emotionally 
charged nature of the offense might affect her performance as a juror, Mrs. 
Conway revealed an additional tendency to convict based upon the state's having 
seen fit to bring appellant to trial. Instead of inquiring further, the trial 
court lectured her on her duty to presume appellant innocent until proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite her continued expressions of doubt as to 
whether she could fulfill that duty, the trial court suggested that a juror 
should not "feel so harsh that we'll just decide somebody did it, without 
proof." In response, she indicated that she could follow the law regarding the 
state's burden of proof.

 
 

[¶19.]  In its voir dire of both Ms. Martinez and 
Mrs. Conway, the trial court appeared to be more concerned with eliciting a 
particular response than it was with determining the potential effects their 
feelings might have on the fact-finding process. The comments of prospective 
juror Gerstner suggest that the other prospective jurors perceived this to be 
the case. When asked if she would acquit appellant if the state could not prove 
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Ms. Gerstner expressed some hesitancy about 
offering her qualified, though affirmative, response. Later, after appellant's 
rephrasing of that question, she answered, "Well, I know what I should say, but 
what the truth is, is that I would probably have to go the other 
way."

 
 

[¶20.]  We cannot say that every prospective 
juror would exhibit the same inclination, courage or forthrightness to 
distinguish their true feelings from what might be perceived as the trial 
court's desired response. Neither can we say that the trial court was arbitrary 
and capricious in its determination that these prospective jurors were fully 
informed of their duties under the law, and that they could actually overcome 
any partiality in the exercise of that duty. Nowhere are we as frustrated by our 
inability to see beyond the lifeless pages of the trial transcript as we are 
when the fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial is at issue. 
Consequently, although under the controlling standard of review the record 
evidences no error, we encourage our trial courts to adopt a method of inquiry 
which will in the future promote, not tend to inhibit, the full expression of 
human emotions and assure the neutral exploration of honestly expressed feelings 
of prospective jurors during the jury selection process.

 
 
II. 
TESTIMONY AS PLAIN ERROR

 
 

[¶21.]  Robert Johnson was the principal of the 
elementary school attended by appellant's son. Johnson testified that he had 
been notified by an employee of the Wyoming Division of Public Assistance and 
Social Services (D-PASS) that the child had been taken into protective custody. 
Apparently, D-PASS feared that appellant would attempt to contact his son and 
remove him from school. Johnson testified further that on March 17, 1987, 
appellant came to the school and asked to see his son. When denied that 
opportunity, appellant allegedly stated, "There's a nigger in the wood pile 
someplace, and if I find the son-of-a-bitch, I'll blow him away. I've got 
nothing to lose." With regard to Johnson's testimony, appellant takes issue only 
with the introduction of that alleged statement. Because appellant failed to 
raise a timely objection to the introduction of this testimony, we must employ 
the plain error analysis set forth above.

 
 

[¶22.]  The record is clear as to what occurred 
at trial. Appellant contends, however, that the contested portion of Johnson's 
testimony was totally lacking in relevancy and so prejudicial that it was 
inadmissible under any theory. The state asserts that the evidence was relevant 
to show the crime was committed and that appellant committed the crime. Such is 
the case, the state argues, because the conduct and demeanor of the accused 
after the crime tend to show a guilty mind. We disagree. Nothing in appellant's 
alleged outburst to Johnson is probative of any fact material to this 
prosecution. The admission of such testimony, therefore, violates a clear and 
unambiguous rule of law. See also W.R.E. 402 (irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible).

 
 

[¶23.]  Such a violation does not require 
reversal, however, unless the violation seriously affects the fairness and 
integrity of the judicial proceedings. Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1153 
(Wyo. 1978). 
To warrant reversal under the plain error standard explained above there must be 
a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of the error, a defendant would 
receive a more favorable verdict. Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 395 (Wyo. 1979); and Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 351 
(Wyo. 1976), 
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1977). Appellant put 
forth no evidence in his behalf. When balancing appellant's case against the 
unimpeached testimony of the prosecution's three eyewitnesses, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that the jury could have concluded otherwise. There was 
no plain error.

 
 
III. 
PERMITTING TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE TO GO TO THE JURY ROOM

 
 

[¶24.]  On the cross-examination of Larry 
Lascano, defense counsel asked whether he had "gone over" his testimony with the 
police and the prosecuting attorney. He later questioned the boy about some 
discrepancies between his testimony on direct examination and his testimony at 
appellant's preliminary hearing. In order to rehabilitate his witness, the 
prosecutor offered the written statement that Lascano had given the police on 
the evening of the alleged crime. The trial court properly admitted that 
statement over appellant's objection as a "prior consistent statement offered to 
rebut an implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence," as 
permitted by W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Rather than letting the jury examine the 
exhibit at the time, however, the trial court indicated it would permit them to 
view it in the jury room.

 
 

[¶25.]  Appellant's failure to object when the 
trial court announced that plan demands that we again apply the plain error 
standard of review described above. Appellant has failed to meet the threshhold 
requirement of that standard. The record does not show that Lascano's statement 
was taken to the jury room. Even were we to assume that happened, appellant has 
not shown that the trial court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law. 
This court's decision in Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986), expresses our 
concern that such a practice effectively allows for the repetition of testimony 
which might cause a jury to unduly overemphasize that evidence. In Schmunk, 
however, we were faced not only with the peculiar dangers posed by the repeated 
viewing of videotaped testimony, but with a videotape containing inadmissible 
material. Id. 
at 732-33, 744. Although we have ruled upon the propriety of taking videotaped 
testimony to the jury room, we have never expressly prohibited that practice 
with regard to written statements. As an alternative to presenting the evidence 
in open court, videotaped testimony has been permitted to go to the jury room 
upon stipulation of the parties and where the trial court supervises the playing 
of those tapes. Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1275-76 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

[¶26.]  Where the exhibit is merely a brief and 
undetailed summary of testimony properly admitted in open court, as here, it is 
not necessarily plain error to permit that exhibit to go to the jury room. As a 
general rule, such matters are left to the discretion of the trial court. See 
Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1349-50 (Wyo. 1987). Additionally, appellant is not 
prejudiced where the exhibit is otherwise admissible and where the state has 
presented a significant amount of other evidence to support the guilty verdict. 
Id. Here, 
Lascano's more detailed and vivid testimony on the witness stand was 
corroborated by two additional eyewitnesses. The rather sketchy statement that 
purportedly went to the jury room could have had only a negligible additional 
impact upon the verdict. No plain error occurred with respect to that 
statement.

 
 
IV. 
EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS

 
 

[¶27.]  On his direct examination of appellant's 
son, the prosecuting attorney attempted to elicit testimony that appellant had 
touched the child's genitals on March 15, 1987. Appellant objected, noting that 
he had been charged concerning his conduct on March 16. He asserted that the 
introduction of evidence concerning his prior conduct would be improper and 
prejudicial. The trial court initially overruled that objection on the ground 
that the two acts constituted a continuing course of conduct. After some 
discussion, however, the trial court suggested an alternative basis for 
admitting the evidence, and appellant directed a specific objection to that 
suggested basis. The trial court overruled that objection on the ground that the 
evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) to prove motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. Appellant premises error on that ruling.

 
 

[¶28.]  Earlier in the trial appellant had 
advanced his explanation for the acts observed by the Lascano and Trujillo children on March 
16. Appellant suggested, during his cross-examination of Larry Lascano, that he 
and his son were merely wrestling prior to bathing. By such means he denied 
having the requisite state of mind to constitute the offense charged. Under such 
circumstances testimony regarding his acts on March 15 was both relevant and 
necessary to the state's case, tending to establish that he knowingly took 
indecent liberties with his son.2 The state did not offer any other 
evidence relating to this element of the crime; hence, the son's testimony about 
the March 15 incident was not merely cumulative. Consequently, it was not 
unfairly prejudicial to appellant, and the trial court properly overruled his 
objection. Although the record would perhaps benefit from a brief explanation of 
how the court weighed the probative value of this evidence against 
countervailing factors, it is sufficient in this instance to say we find no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's permitting this testimony. See 
generally Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 104-05 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

[¶29.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 W.S. 7-11-105(b) 
(June 1987 Repl.), provides that the challenges for cause which are available to 
a civil litigant shall also be available in criminal cases. W.S. 1-11-203 (1977) 
sets forth the challenges for cause in civil litigation.

 
 

2 W.S. 14-3-105 (July 
1986 Repl.), provides in part:

 
 
     Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit 
with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony. . . 
.