Title: In re N.E.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 123,599 
 
In the Interest of N.E., a Minor Child. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Appellate courts have only the jurisdiction provided by law. That means appellate 
courts lack jurisdiction to review a district court's decision unless a party has appealed in 
the time and manner specified by law. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law 
subject to unlimited review. 
 
2. 
K.S.A. 38-2273(a) governs appellate jurisdiction under the Revised Kansas Code 
for the Care of Children, K.S.A. 38-2201 et seq. That statute limits appealable orders to 
any order of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, finding of unfitness, or 
termination of parental rights. An order that does not fit within these five categories is 
not appealable. 
 
3. 
Appeals under K.S.A. 38-2273(a) must be brought within 30 days of the district 
court entering judgment. 
 
4. 
 
The Revised Kansas Code for the Care of Children distinguishes between 
"custody" and "placement." Orders that address the custody of a child during the 
dispositional phase of a child-in-need-of-care proceeding are dispositional orders, 
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which are appealable under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). Orders during the dispositional phase that 
address only the placement of the child are not appealable under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). 
 
5. 
The Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children establishes a framework of 
sequential steps towards permanency in the child's placement. An order terminating 
parental rights is the last appealable order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). Post-termination 
orders that address custody are not dispositional orders and are not subject to appellate 
review. 
 
6. 
 
Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. 
But this preservation rule is prudential, and appellate courts have recognized three 
notable exceptions to the rule. To satisfy the preservation rule, a party must either provide 
a pinpoint reference to the location in the record on appeal where the issue was raised and 
ruled on in the district court, or if the issue was not raised below, there must be an 
explanation why the issue is properly before the court. A party who ignores this 
requirement is considered to have waived and abandoned the issue on appeal.  
 
7. 
The doctrine of stare decisis provides that points of law established by a court 
are generally followed by the same court and courts of lower rank in later cases in which 
the same legal issue is raised. The application of stare decisis ensures stability and 
continuity—showing a continuing legitimacy of judicial review. Thus, courts do not 
lightly disapprove of precedent. While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, this 
court endeavors to adhere to the principle unless clearly convinced that a rule of law 
established in its earlier cases was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent.  
3 
 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 5, 
2021. Appeal from Reno District Court; PATRICIA MACKE DICK, judge. Opinion filed September 9, 2022. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed.  
 
Mitchell F. Engel, pro hac vice, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, 
argued the cause, and Vanessa Dittman, pro hac vice, and Abilgail Lawson, pro hac vice, of the same 
firm, and Travis J. Ternes, of Watkins Calcara, Chtd., of Great Bend, were with him on the briefs for 
appellant maternal grandmother.  
 
Jennifer L. Harper, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Thomas Stanton, district 
attorney, was with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  N.E. was four months old when the State took her into protective 
custody and placed her with a foster family. We refer to her by initials in this opinion 
because she is a minor. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.043 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
at 50). Over the next year and a half, the district court held child-in-need-of-care (CINC) 
proceedings under the Revised Kansas Code for the Care of Children (Revised Code), 
K.S.A. 38-2201 et seq. During those proceedings, N.E.'s grandmother sought custody of 
N.E. When the district court denied Grandmother's request, she appealed to a panel of the 
Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
We granted Grandmother's petition to review the panel's jurisdictional holding. 
The Revised Code's appellate jurisdiction statute, K.S.A. 38-2273(a), limits which district 
court decisions may be appealed in a CINC proceeding. That jurisdictional statute, as 
construed under our precedent in In re N.A.C., 299 Kan. 1100, 329 P.3d 458 (2014), bars 
appellate review of each of the district court orders from which Grandmother has  
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appealed. The doctrine of stare decisis warrants our continued adherence to In re N.A.C. 
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
The circumstances that led to the Department for Children and Families (DCF) 
taking custody of N.E. are tragic, but they are not the focus of this appeal. To answer 
the jurisdictional question, we concentrate on the district court proceedings under the 
Revised Code, which the Legislature enacted in 2006 to address the custody and care of a 
minor. See L. 2006, ch. 200, § 1. Specifically, we focus on those facts relevant to, and 
proceedings conducted under, the portion of the Revised Code that applies when a young 
child is taken into protective custody—the CINC proceedings.  
 
We do not ordinarily discuss the legal framework in this section of the opinion. 
But here, a general understanding of the statutory scheme governing CINC proceedings is 
important to place the facts and district court proceedings in their proper context and to 
fully appreciate their significance to the jurisdictional question raised in this appeal.  
 
CINC proceedings unfold in a specific, temporal order. See 299 Kan. at 1110-15. 
First, during the temporary-custody phase, a district court decides whether it should 
temporarily place the child in the custody of specific persons or entities listed by statute, 
such as the Secretary of DCF. See K.S.A. 38-2243(f), (g)(1). Second, during the 
adjudication phase, the district court determines whether the child meets one or more 
statutory definitions of a "child in need of care." See K.S.A. 38-2202(d)(1)-(14) (defining 
a child in need of care); K.S.A. 38-2251 (providing for adjudication). Third, during the 
dispositional phase, the district court enters orders that address the custody and case 
planning of a child adjudicated as a "child in need of care." K.S.A. 38-2253(a). Fourth, 
during the termination phase, the district court decides whether a parent is "unfit" under 
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several statutory factors and whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate 
parental rights. See K.S.A. 38-2269(a)-(g)(1). Finally, if the court decides to terminate 
parental rights, then during the post-termination phase, the district court facilitates 
placement of the child in a permanent family setting, whether through adoption or the 
appointment of a permanent custodian. See K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(2) (providing options for 
district court after termination of parental rights). 
  
 
With one important exception noted below, N.E.'s case followed the typical 
progression of CINC proceedings under the statutory framework described above. Those 
proceedings began in August 2019, when the State took protective custody of N.E., and 
they ended in January 2021, when Grandmother appealed and N.E. was adopted by her 
foster family.  
 
Temporary Custody Phase 
 
During the temporary-custody phase in August 2019, the district court temporarily 
placed N.E. in the custody of DCF, which immediately placed N.E. with a foster family. 
For reasons that will become important later, we note that the temporary custody order 
placed conditions on DCF's ability to make a "kinship care placement." Under the 
Revised Code, a "placement" is the decision by the individual or agency having custody 
of the child about "where and with whom the child will live." K.S.A. 38-2202(z). A 
"kinship care placement," then, is a placement "in the home of an adult with whom the 
child or the child's parent already has close emotional ties." K.S.A. 38-2202(q). The 
district court imposed two conditions on such placements. First, it ordered that DCF 
could make no short-term kinship placements without the approval of the guardian ad 
litem, the court-appointed attorney who represents the child's interests in a CINC 
proceeding. See K.S.A. 38-2205(a) (providing for appointment of attorney for the child 
in a CINC proceeding). Second, the court ordered that DCF could make no long-term 
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kinship placements unless a "kinship assessment" had been completed and the court had 
scheduled a review hearing.  
 
Grandmother appeared in person at the temporary custody hearing. And the 
district court provided "the parents, grandparents and/or interested parties, who were 
present at [the] hearing . . . with informational materials pertaining to their respective 
rights and responsibilities in connection with the proceedings." But nothing in the record 
suggests that Grandmother objected to the placement limitations in the temporary custody 
order at that time. Nor did Grandmother appeal from the temporary custody order. See 
K.S.A. 38-2273(a) (permitting the appeal of "any order of temporary custody").  
 
Adjudication Phase 
 
During the adjudication phase in September 2019, the district court adjudicated 
N.E. as a child in need of care. In its September 19th Journal Entry and Orders of 
Adjudication and Disposition, the district court found that N.E. met three of the statutory 
definitions of a child in need of care. The district court also specified that its previous 
findings and orders would remain in effect. Neither parent contested the district court's 
adjudication of N.E. as a child in need of care. Grandmother did not appear at the 
adjudication hearing. And nothing in the record suggests that she objected at that time to 
the adjudication of N.E. as a child in need of care or to the district court's continuation of 
its previous findings and orders. As with the temporary custody order, Grandmother did 
not appeal the order of adjudication. See K.S.A. 38-2273(a) (permitting the appeal of an 
adjudication order). 
 
Dispositional Phase 
 
The dispositional phase began when the district court ordered N.E. to remain in 
the custody of DCF as part of its September 19, 2019 Orders of Adjudication and 
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Disposition. As noted, DCF had exercised its custodial authority by placing N.E. with a 
foster family. But six to nine months into the dispositional phase, two events added 
complexity to these CINC proceedings. First, in March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic 
impacted the way courts could safely conduct judicial proceedings in Kansas courtrooms. 
In response, our court entered administrative orders suspending "statutory time standards 
or deadlines applying to the conduct or processing of judicial proceedings." See, e.g., 
Administrative Order 2020-PR-016 (imposing statewide restrictions on judiciary 
operations effective March 18, 2020). Second, in May 2020, Grandmother engaged 
counsel and became significantly more involved in the proceedings.  
 
Grandmother Requests Placement 
 
The order and timing of the later proceedings is important to our jurisdictional 
analysis. In March 2020, a supervisor at St. Francis Ministries, the social-service agency 
managing N.E.'s case on behalf of DCF, informed the district court that Grandmother 
wanted DCF to place N.E. in Grandmother's home, rather than with the foster family. 
After gathering input from the parties, the district court issued an April 30th email ruling 
finding that placement with Grandmother was not in N.E.'s best interests.  
 
Grandmother Moves for Custody and Other Procedural Developments 
 
On May 22, 2020, Grandmother's counsel filed a motion for interested party status 
and custody of N.E. In the motion, Grandmother noted that a permanency hearing had 
been scheduled for June 4, and that neither permanent placement, termination of parental 
rights, nor adoption had yet been completed. Thus, Grandmother argued that she had 
a right to be heard as an interested party seeking custody and placement of N.E. 
Grandmother did not request a stay of, or otherwise object to, the court's setting of the 
permanency hearing for June 4.  
 
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While Grandmother's custody motion was pending, the district court conducted a 
hearing on June 4, 2020, to evaluate progress towards a permanent placement of N.E. 
Grandmother appeared by counsel at the permanency hearing. After the hearing, the 
district court entered its June 15th Permanency Hearing Journal Entry and Order. There, 
the district court found that reintegration with N.E.'s parents was not a viable permanency 
objective and adoption might be in N.E.'s best interests. Thus, the district court ordered 
the State to file a pleading to terminate parental rights, and it determined that a new 
permanency plan should be submitted to achieve the goal of adoption. The district court 
also found that N.E.'s needs were being adequately met in her current placement with the 
foster parents and such placement continued to be in N.E.'s best interests. Based on these 
findings, on June 17, the State moved to find N.E.'s parents unfit and to terminate their 
parental rights. See K.S.A. 38-2264(i) (directing the State to move to terminate parental 
rights within 30 days of district court's finding on reintegration).  
 
Meanwhile, two other significant developments occurred. First, the district court 
entered an order on June 11, 2020, memorializing the finding from its April 30th email 
ruling that placement with Grandmother would not be in N.E.'s best interests. 
Grandmother would later appeal from this June 11th placement order. Second, on June 
19, the district court entered a scheduling order setting Grandmother's custody motion for 
an evidentiary hearing on August 4. And three days later, on June 22, the district court set 
the State's motion to terminate parental rights for hearing on August 20.  
 
But things did not go as scheduled. The day before the hearing on Grandmother's 
custody motion, the State's attorney asked for a continuance because she was quarantined 
pending the results of a COVID-19 test. The district court reluctantly rescheduled the 
hearing for September 8, 2020. Nothing in the record suggests Grandmother objected to 
this continuance or the new date set for the evidentiary hearing on her custody motion.  
 
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Termination Phase 
 
Though Grandmother's custody motion remained pending, the court moved on to 
the termination phase of the CINC proceedings and conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
the State's motion to terminate parental rights on August 20, 2020. At the hearing, N.E.'s 
father relinquished his parental rights, and after making the statutorily required findings, 
the district court terminated the parental rights of N.E.'s mother. The district court 
findings and conclusions were memorialized in the August 28th Finding of Unfitness 
and Order Terminating Parental Rights. There, the district court terminated parental 
rights and ordered N.E. to remain in DCF custody for adoption proceedings. See K.S.A. 
38-2270(a)(1) (permitting district court to place child with DCF for adoption if adoption 
is viable after the termination of parental rights).  
 
Grandmother appeared in person and through counsel at the August 20th 
termination hearing. But the transcript of this hearing is not included in the record. Thus, 
there is no evidence to suggest Grandmother objected to the district court's decision to 
proceed with the termination hearing on August 20 while her custody motion was still 
pending. Nor did she move to continue the August 20th termination hearing. Likewise, 
there is no evidence to suggest Grandmother objected in district court to the State's 
motion to terminate parental rights or to any of the findings, conclusions, or orders 
memorialized in the August 28th Findings of Unfitness and Order Terminating Parental 
Rights. Even so, Grandmother would later appeal from this order.  
 
Post-Termination Phase 
 
After the district court terminated parental rights, N.E.'s CINC proceedings moved 
to the post-termination phase. At the end of the termination hearing on August 20, 2020, 
the district court scheduled a permanency hearing for September 3. But on August 27, 
Grandmother moved to continue that permanency hearing to September 8, the date set for 
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the evidentiary hearing on her custody motion. By scheduling "the matters to be heard at 
the same time," Grandmother argued the continuance would promote judicial economy. 
Grandmother also argued that if the district court made a permanency decision before 
ruling on her custody motion, it could render her motion moot, depriving Grandmother 
"of her day in Court" and the opportunity to be given "substantial consideration as a 
placement option" for N.E. The district court agreed to continue the permanency hearing 
and to conduct a consolidated hearing on permanency and Grandmother's custody motion 
on September 8.  
 
But the COVID-19 pandemic continued to impact the post-termination phase 
of the CINC proceedings. On September 4, 2020, the State moved to continue the 
consolidated hearing on permanency and Grandmother's custody motion because one of 
the State's witnesses was in quarantine. In its motion, the State confirmed that neither the 
guardian ad litem nor Grandmother objected to the requested continuance. The district 
court granted the State's motion and reset the consolidated hearing for October 9.  
 
On October 9, 2020, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
Grandmother's custody motion. But the district court did not hear from all interested 
parties because counsel for the foster parents was in quarantine and unable to attend. 
Thus, the district court took Grandmother's custody motion under advisement and 
continued the permanency hearing to November 13. But as the November hearing 
approached, foster parents moved for a continuance because their expert witness was 
unavailable and out of state. Counsel for foster parents explained that her recent COVID-
19-related illness had prevented her from securing the witness' availability and attendance 
for the November 13th hearing. The district court found good cause to continue the 
consolidated hearing both because "grandmother's attorney is ill and a witness for the 
foster parents is unavailable." The district court reset the hearing for December 18.  
 
11 
 
 
 
Grandmother filed a letter to the district court on December 3, 2020, requesting a 
ruling on her motion for interested party status and custody of N.E. On December 10, the 
district court ruled on that request in its journal entry clarifying findings. There, the 
district court determined that Grandmother had interested party status by law and that no 
order was needed to memorialize this status. The district court then found that it had 
rejected Grandmother's request for placement of N.E. in its June 11th order. The district 
court had agreed to hear more evidence at the October 9th hearing on Grandmother's 
custody motion. But after the October 9th hearing, the district court had taken 
Grandmother's custody motion under advisement, rather than ruling on the merits, 
because counsel for foster parents could not attend because of COVID-19. The district 
court found that it was appropriate to take Grandmother's motion under advisement until 
all parties had the chance to be heard and "a complete ruling can be made." And it 
concluded that any timelines governing the adjudication of motions taken under 
advisement had been suspended by our court's COVID-19 orders.  
 
The district court conducted the evidentiary hearing on permanency and custody 
on December 18, 2020, as scheduled. All parties and interested parties, including foster 
parents and Grandmother, appeared in person or through counsel. On December 22, the 
district court entered its Journal Entry of Permanency Hearing for Child in Need of Care 
Post-Termination. In this journal entry, the district court found that adequate progress 
toward the permanency goal of adoption had not occurred and that placement with foster 
parents was in the best interests of N.E. The district court terminated DCF custody and 
placed N.E. in the custody of foster parents for adoption. Grandmother would later appeal 
this order.  
 
The district court entered its journal entry addressing findings under advisement 
on January 6, 2021. There, the district court again found that Grandmother had "filed a 
motion for interested party status and a request for change in custody" on May 22, 2020. 
And while the court had denied Grandmother's request for placement in its June 11th 
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order, it had agreed to hear more evidence on the custody request at the hearing on 
Grandmother's custody motion in October. But because "counsel for the foster parents 
was quarantined and unable to be present" at the October evidentiary hearing, the court 
decided to take the motion under advisement and "not enter further orders until after the 
permanency hearing scheduled for December 18, 2020[,] at which time the foster parents 
would have an opportunity to express their intentions and desires to the court." Based on 
these findings, the district court ruled that all matters taken under advisement had been 
resolved in the December 22, 2020 journal entry finding that reasonable efforts toward 
permanency had not been achieved and that changing custody from DCF to foster parents 
was in N.E.'s best interests. Given this journal entry, the district court found that all 
matters taken under advisement were moot. Grandmother would later appeal this order.  
 
On the day the district court filed its January 6, 2021 journal entry, the foster 
parents adopted N.E. in a separate court action in Reno County District Court. It is 
unclear from the record whether the same district court judge presided over that action. 
Two days later, on January 8, the district court entered a final order terminating its 
jurisdiction over the case under K.S.A. 38-2270(c) ("the court's jurisdiction over the child 
shall cease" when an adoption decree is filed). So ended the district court proceedings in 
this case. 
 
Grandmother Appeals 
 
Five days after the district court terminated jurisdiction, Grandmother appealed to 
a panel of the Court of Appeals, asking it to vacate N.E.'s adoption, remand the matter 
for assignment of a new district court judge, and transfer custody of N.E. back to DCF. 
Grandmother alleged that the district court had committed four errors:  (1) it disregarded 
this state's "familial preference doctrine" and the "substantial consideration" statutorily 
afforded to grandparents in CINC proceedings; (2) it lacked authority under the Revised 
Code to limit kinship placements; (3) it rejected Grandmother's petition for custody based 
13 
 
 
 
on improper, inadmissible, and inaccurate information; and (4) it had not adequately 
considered what was in N.E.'s best interests, as the Revised Code required.  
 
Perhaps anticipating questions about appellate jurisdiction, Grandmother opened 
her appellate brief by identifying the four court orders from which she appealed and 
arguing why the Revised Code granted appellate courts subject matter jurisdiction over 
each of these orders. As noted, those four orders included:  (1) the June 2020 order 
memorializing the placement findings set forth in the district court's April 2020 email 
ruling; (2) the August 2020 order terminating parental rights; (3) the December 2020 
journal entry memorializing its post-termination permanency findings and conclusions; 
and (4) the January 2021 journal entry clarifying that the December 2020 journal entry 
had resolved all matters the district court had taken under advisement.  
 
The panel was not convinced. It dismissed Grandmother's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction after holding that none of the orders were appealable under K.S.A. 38-
2273(a). In re N.E., No. 123,599, 2021 WL 5144521, at *9 (Kan. App. 2021) 
(unpublished opinion). Given that outcome, the panel refrained from addressing the 
merits of Grandmother's appeal. See In re Estate of Lentz, 312 Kan. 490, 504, 476 P.3d 
1151 (2020) (a court that dismisses for lack of jurisdiction should not opine on the 
merits). 
 
Grandmother then petitioned our court for review. We granted review of the 
panel's jurisdictional holding.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The task before us is narrow:  we must decide whether the panel erred in 
concluding that Kansas appellate courts lack jurisdiction over Grandmother's appeal. 
14 
 
 
 
Given that limited scope, we will not address Grandmother's substantive critiques of the 
district court's decisions. 
 
I. 
Legal Framework and Standard of Review 
 
Appellate courts have only the jurisdiction provided by law. Williams v. Lawton, 
288 Kan. 768, 778, 207 P.3d 1027 (2009). CINC proceedings are civil, and appellate 
jurisdiction in civil cases is mainly defined by statute. See K.S.A. 38-2201(a); Wiechman 
v. Huddleston, 304 Kan. 80, Syl. ¶ 1, 370 P.3d 1194 (2016). That means appellate courts 
lack jurisdiction to review a district court order unless a party has appealed in the time 
and manner specified by law. 304 Kan. 80, Syl. ¶ 1. The existence of jurisdiction is a 
question of law subject to unlimited appellate review. Friends of Bethany Place v. City 
of Topeka, 297 Kan. 1112, 1121, 307 P.3d 1255 (2013). Questions involving statutory 
interpretation are also questions of law subject to unlimited review. Nationwide Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 298 Kan. 873, 875, 317 P.3d 770 (2014). 
 
Typically, in civil actions, a party may appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter 
of right from "[a] final decision in any action." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-2102(a)(4). But the 
Revised Code contains its own appellate jurisdiction statute, K.S.A. 38-2273(a). This 
statute grants appellate courts jurisdiction to review only five types of orders in CINC 
cases:  "An appeal may be taken by any party or interested party from any order of 
temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, finding of unfitness or termination of 
parental rights." K.S.A. 38-2273(a). The parties agree that Grandmother is an "interested 
party" to the CINC proceedings because she is N.E.'s grandparent. See K.S.A. 38-
2202(m).  
 
We have recognized the history of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) confirms that the 
"[L]egislature intended to limit appellate jurisdiction to particular categories of orders 
and to permit interlocutory review of them instead of requiring litigants to wait for final 
15 
 
 
 
orders." In re N.A.C., 299 Kan. at 1108. And because K.S.A. 38-2273(a) is the more 
specific statute, it controls over K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-2102(a)(4). 299 Kan. at 1108-09. 
Thus, K.S.A. 38-2273(a) is the controlling statute that defines the scope of an appellate 
court's jurisdiction to review CINC orders, and if an order does not fit within the five 
categories of appealable orders under that statute, "it is not appealable." See 299 Kan. 
1100, Syl. ¶ 3.  
 
In In re N.A.C., we held that the Legislature's deliberate sequencing of the stages 
of CINC proceedings under the Revised Code showed that an order terminating parental 
rights is the last appealable order in a CINC case. See 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6. Orders 
entered after termination of parental rights, including orders finding that the state agency 
has not made reasonable efforts or progress toward adoptive placement and orders 
removing children from state agency custody and placing them directly with their foster 
parents, are not appealable under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6.  
 
Appellate jurisdiction to review CINC orders is also limited temporally. To secure 
appellate jurisdiction, parties must file a notice of appeal from each appealable order 
specified in K.S.A. 38-2273(a) within 30 days of the district court's judgment. See K.S.A. 
38-2273(c) (providing that K.S.A. chapter 60, article 21 governs procedure for appeals 
under the Revised Code); see K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-2103(a) (specifying that the time 
within which an appeal may be taken must be 30 days from entry of judgment). Failure 
to timely appeal typically deprives the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction. See 
State v. Hooks, 312 Kan. 604, 606, 478 P.3d 773 (2021). But in response to the COVID-
19 pandemic, our court issued administrative orders on March 18, 2020, suspending all 
"statutory time standards or deadlines applying to the conduct or processing of judicial 
proceedings." See Administrative Order 2020-PR-016; see also L. 2020, ch. 4, § 1 
(authorizing the Kansas Supreme Court to issue order extending or suspending any 
deadlines or time limitations established by statute during any state of disaster 
16 
 
 
 
emergency). Thus, any order the district court entered after March 18, 2020, is not subject 
to the 30-day statutory deadline for appeal. 
 
Given this legal framework, the controlling question on appeal is whether the 
orders that Grandmother has appealed fit within any of the five categories of appealable 
orders specified in the statute, and if applicable, whether Grandmother timely appealed 
from these orders.  
 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction to Review the Challenged Orders 
 
Having extensively reviewed the Revised Code's statutory scheme and our caselaw 
interpreting it, we conclude that the orders that Grandmother has challenged are not 
appealable under K.S.A. 38-2273(a) for three reasons, which we will summarize here and 
expand upon below.  
 
First, the June 2020 order was not a dispositional order because it concerned a 
placement decision, not a custody decision, and placement decisions are not appealable 
under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). Second, despite her assertions to the contrary, Grandmother 
preserved no claim of error related to the August 2020 order terminating parental rights. 
Instead, Grandmother challenges the conditions the district court imposed on kinship care 
placements. But the district court imposed those conditions in its September 2019 
temporary custody order. Grandmother failed to appeal the temporary custody order at 
all, let alone within the statutory deadline in effect at that time. Finally, the December 
2020 and January 2021 journal entries were entered during the post-termination phase of 
the CINC proceedings, months after the district court terminated parental rights. In In re 
N.A.C., we held that post-termination orders are not appealable under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), 
and we reaffirm that holding today under the doctrine of stare decisis. 299 Kan. 1100, 
Syl. ¶ 6. We now discuss these three conclusions in turn. 
 
17 
 
 
 
A.  The District Court's June 2020 Order Is Not an Appealable Dispositional 
Order Under K.S.A. 38-2273(a) 
 
The first order in the CINC proceedings that Grandmother challenges is the June 
2020 placement order. The timeline of events is important here because it confirms the 
June 2020 order was a placement order, not a dispositional custody order. And K.S.A. 
38-2273(a) does not authorize appellate court review of placement orders.  
 
On March 25, 2020, a supervisor at St. Francis Ministries informed the district 
court that Grandmother wanted "placement" of N.E. The district court did not hold an in-
person hearing on that request because, to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, our court 
had limited district court functions to emergency operations only. Under those orders, a 
hearing on a placement decision was not classified as an emergency operation. See 
Administrative Order 2020-PR-016 (enumerating emergency operations in CINC cases).  
 
After reviewing documents submitted to the court in response to Grandmother's 
placement request and hearing from the parties by email, the district court denied 
Grandmother's request in an April 30, 2020 email. Then on May 22, Grandmother moved 
for custody of N.E. And on June 11, 2020, the district court entered the placement order 
that Grandmother has challenged on appeal. It explained the purpose of the June 2020 
order was to "further memorialize findings made by the court and stated in an email on 
April 30, 2020," and it concluded that placement with Grandmother was not in N.E.'s best 
interests.  
 
The panel held that the June 2020 order was not a dispositional order subject to 
appeal under K.S.A. 38-2273(a) because it was not a ruling on Grandmother's custody 
motion. In re N.E., 2021 WL 5144521, at *8-9. Instead, the panel found that the order 
was "a summary of the email exchanges between the parties leading to the district court's 
18 
 
 
 
initial rejection" of Grandmother's request for placement. 2021 WL 5144521, at *9. The 
law and the record support the panel's conclusion. 
 
The Revised Code distinguishes between the "placement" and the "custody" of 
a child. Custody is "the status . . . that vests in a custodian . . . the right to physical 
possession of the child and the right to determine placement of the child, subject to 
restrictions placed by the court." K.S.A. 38-2202(h). In contrast, placement is "the 
designation by the individual or agency having custody of where and with whom the 
child will live." K.S.A. 38-2202(z).  
 
Orders addressing the custody of a child that are entered during the dispositional 
phase of a CINC proceeding are dispositional orders—one of the five types of appealable 
orders under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). See In re N.A.C., 299 Kan. at 1119. But orders 
addressing the placement of a child are not dispositional orders, and K.S.A. 38-2273(a) 
does not vest appellate courts with jurisdiction to review such orders. See In re D.M.M., 
38 Kan. App. 2d 394, 399, 166 P.3d 431 (2007) ("If the legislature had intended to allow 
an order regarding a change in placement to be appealable, the legislature could have 
easily listed this as an appealable order under the statute."). 
 
The record before us makes clear that the June order was not a ruling on 
Grandmother's May 22, 2020 custody motion. Grandmother did not move for custody of 
N.E. until May, after the district court had issued its April 30th email ruling denying 
Grandmother's placement request. And the district court expressly stated that the purpose 
of the June 11th order was to memorialize the findings from this April email ruling. The 
June order did not address or modify DCF's custody of N.E. Instead, the court found that 
moving the minor child to Grandmother's home was not in the child's best interests and 
ordered that the child remain in foster care where DCF had placed N.E. See K.S.A. 38-
2202(z) (defining placement as "the designation . . . of where and with whom the child 
will live"). 
19 
 
 
 
 
The developments following the June 2020 order confirm this conclusion. 
Roughly one week after issuing the June order, the district court issued a scheduling 
order setting Grandmother's custody motion for an evidentiary hearing on August 4. This 
setting would have been unnecessary if the district court had ruled on Grandmother's 
custody motion in its June order. The August setting was later continued to October, 
when the district court received evidence on the custody motion. The district court took 
the custody motion under advisement after the October hearing, rather than issuing a 
ruling. On December 3, Grandmother requested a ruling on her custody motion. Again, 
Grandmother's request would have been unnecessary if the district court had ruled on her 
custody motion in the June order. The district court resolved Grandmother's custody 
motion in its December 2020 post-termination journal entry on permanency and its 
January 2021 journal entry ruling on matters taken under advisement.  
 
This record, coupled with the Revised Code's definition of "custody" and 
"placement," confirm that the district court's June 2020 order addressed only 
Grandmother's March 2020 request for placement of N.E., not the custody of the child. 
Orders addressing the district court's placement decisions are not appealable under 
K.S.A. 38-2273(a). Thus, the appellate courts have no jurisdiction to review this order.  
 
B. Traditional Rules of Issue Preservation and the Controlling Appellate 
Jurisdiction Statutes Preclude Grandmother from Using the August 2020 
Order Terminating Parental Rights as a Vehicle to Challenge the Placement 
Limitations Set Forth in the District Court's 2019 Temporary Custody Order 
 
The second order in the CINC proceedings that Grandmother purports to challenge 
is the August 2020 order terminating the parental rights of N.E.'s mother and father. In 
that order, the district court made the requisite findings for a termination of parental 
rights under K.S.A. 38-2269 (a) and (g)(1) and ordered N.E. to remain in DCF custody 
for adoption proceedings.  
20 
 
 
 
 
We say that Grandmother has only "purported" to appeal from the August 2020 
order terminating parental rights because she does not challenge any of the findings, 
conclusions, or ancillary rulings set forth in that order. Grandmother has not challenged 
the statutory findings of unfitness, the termination decision itself, or the directive to 
continue custody with DCF for adoption. In short, Grandmother has challenged nothing 
in the termination order on appeal. 
 
But even if she had raised a challenge to the termination order on appeal, her 
arguments would not be properly before this court. Grandmother appeared at the 
termination hearing in person and by her attorney. But the record on appeal does not 
include the transcript of the termination hearing, any exhibits introduced at that hearing, 
or any other submissions Grandmother may have filed in response to the State's motion 
for findings of unfitness and to terminate parental rights. Thus, there is no evidence to 
suggest that Grandmother raised any issue or lodged any objection in district court to the 
State's motion or to the findings and conclusions in the August 2020 termination order.  
 
 
Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. 
State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 696, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). But this preservation rule is 
prudential, and appellate courts have recognized three notable exceptions to the rule, 
including when:   
 
"(1) the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or 
admitted facts and is determinative; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve 
the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the trial court 
may be affirmed because it was right for the wrong reason." State v. Perkins, 310 Kan. 
764, 768, 449 P.3d 756 (2019).  
 
21 
 
 
 
To satisfy the preservation rule, a party must either provide a "pinpoint reference 
to the location in the record on appeal where the issue was raised and ruled on" in the 
district court, or "[i]f the issue was not raised below, there must be an explanation why 
the issue is properly before the court." See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2022 
Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). A party who ignores this requirement is considered to have waived 
and abandoned any exception to the preservation rule. See State v. Meredith, 306 Kan. 
906, 909, 399 P.3d 859 (2017). 
 
Grandmother provides no citation to the record where she challenged or objected 
to the State's motion to terminate parental rights or the district court's termination order. 
And she has briefed no exception to the preservation rule on appeal. See State v. Godfrey, 
301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015) ("[A]n exception must be invoked by the 
party asserting the claim for the first time on appeal."). Thus, even if subject matter 
jurisdiction were proper, Grandmother waived and abandoned any challenge to the 
termination order. See State v. Farmer, 312 Kan. 761, 766, 480 P.3d 155 (2021) (issue 
treated as waived and abandoned where appellant disregarded Supreme Court Rule 6.02).  
 
Rather than challenging the findings and conclusions in the August 2020 
termination order, Grandmother objects to the limitations the district court imposed on 
short-term and long-term kinship care placements. On appeal, Grandmother contends that 
the district court lacked statutory authority to impose those placement limitations. She 
asks the appellate courts to return N.E. to DCF custody so that the agency can make 
placement decisions free from the extra-statutory constraints. 
 
But the district court imposed these limitations in the temporary-custody order 
entered at the outset of the CINC proceedings, not in the order terminating parental 
rights. In the September 2019 temporary custody order, the district court ordered that no 
short-term kinship care placement will be made without approval of the guardian ad 
litem. And no long-term kinship care placement could be made until a kinship assessment 
22 
 
 
 
had been completed and forwarded to the court and a review hearing set. The August 
2020 termination order, entered almost one year after the temporary custody order, does 
not mention these limitations on kinship placement at all. Nor does the termination order 
continue prior orders of the district court.  
 
Whatever the merits of Grandmother's substantive challenge to the district court's 
limitations on kinship care placement, the appellate courts have no jurisdiction to 
evaluate them under the circumstances presented here. K.S.A. 38-2273(a) permits a party 
or interested party to appeal from "any order of temporary custody." As an interested 
party, Grandmother could have challenged the kinship care placement limitations by 
timely appealing from the temporary custody order. Grandmother appeared in person 
at the temporary custody hearing in August 2019, and the district court advised 
Grandmother of her rights as an interested party at that hearing. But Grandmother did not 
appeal that order. 
 
The district court entered the temporary custody order at least six months before 
our administrative order suspended statutory deadlines in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Thus, any appeal of the temporary custody order (and the placement 
limitations in it) had to be filed within the 30-day statutory deadline for appeal. See 
K.S.A. 38-2273(c) (providing that K.S.A. chapter 60, article 21 governs procedure for 
appeals under the Revised Code); K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-2103(a) (a party must appeal 
within 30 days of the district court entering judgment). Grandmother's failure to timely 
appeal from the temporary custody order deprives the appellate courts of jurisdiction to 
review the kinship care limitations established in that order. See Wiechman, 304 Kan. 80, 
Syl. ¶ 1 (Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to entertain a civil appeal that is not taken 
within the time limitations prescribed by the applicable statutes.).  
 
Grandmother asserts that the kinship placement limitations in the temporary 
custody order continued to constrain DCF's placement decisions nearly one year later 
23 
 
 
 
when the district court terminated parental rights. Thus, Grandmother contends that she 
may legitimately challenge those limitations by appealing from the August 2020 
termination order. And she notes that her January 2021 notice of appeal is timely, even 
though filed more than 30 days after the termination order, because the termination order 
was entered after our court had suspended statutory timelines because of COVID-19. 
 
Grandmother's argument fails for at least two reasons. First, there is no evidence in 
the record to suggest that the kinship care placement limitations in the temporary custody 
order remained in force one year later when the district court terminated parental rights. 
The August 2020 termination order neither references these limitations nor continues the 
effectiveness of the district court's prior orders. And by law, temporary custody orders are 
short lived. These orders "remain in effect until modified or rescinded by the court or an 
adjudication order is entered but not exceeding 60 days, unless good cause is shown and 
stated on the record." K.S.A. 38-2243(g)(2). The record does not reflect that any party 
established good cause to extend the temporary custody orders beyond this 60-day 
statutory period. 
 
Second, Grandmother's argument would circumvent the applicable appellate 
jurisdiction statutes and render them meaningless. As noted, the August 2020 termination 
order did not address, incorporate, or continue the kinship care placement limitations in 
the 2019 temporary custody order. And the applicable statutes required Grandmother to 
challenge those limitations by appealing the temporary custody order within 30 days. See 
K.S.A. 38-2273(c) (providing that K.S.A. chapter 60, article 21 governs procedure for 
appeals under the Revised Code); K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-2103(a) (a party must appeal 
within 30 days of the district court entering judgment). Grandmother failed to do so. 
Permitting Grandmother to challenge the limitations in the 2019 temporary custody order 
through an appeal from the 2020 termination order would circumvent the requirements of 
K.S.A. 38-2273(c) and K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-2103(a). Thus, Grandmother cannot  
24 
 
 
 
manufacture or bootstrap appellate jurisdiction by using the August 2020 termination 
order as a vehicle to appeal the kinship care placement limitations in the September 2019 
temporary custody order. 
 
The panel also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over this portion of 
Grandmother's appeal. We agree with that conclusion but depart from the panel's 
reasoning. We hold that Grandmother has raised an untimely challenge to the temporary-
custody order, and her failure to timely appeal from that order deprives appellate courts 
of jurisdiction over these claims. In contrast, the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction 
because "only the parents have standing to appeal" a termination order. In re N.E., 2021 
WL 5144521, at *8. We are skeptical of the panel's sweeping pronouncement.  
 
To satisfy the Kansas Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement, 
Grandmother needed to establish both statutory and common law standing to appeal 
this order. See In re T.M.M.H., 307 Kan. 902, 908, 416 P.3d 999 (2018). But K.S.A. 38-
2273(a) expressly allows an "interested party," including a grandparent, to appeal a 
termination order. Thus, Grandmother seemingly had statutory standing to appeal. And, 
under the present showing, we are unwilling to foreclose the possibility that a 
grandparent could establish common-law standing to challenge orders terminating 
parental rights or other ancillary rulings made in such orders. See Baker v. Hayden, 313 
Kan. 667, 674, 490 P.3d 1164 (2021) (establishing common-law standing requires 
showing "'a personal interest in a court's decision'" and that the person "'personally 
suffers some actual or threatened injury as a result of the challenged conduct'"). In any 
event, because we hold that Grandmother has raised an untimely challenge to the 
temporary-custody order, and her failure to timely appeal from that order deprives 
appellate courts of jurisdiction over these claims, we need not decide the standing issue 
here.  
 
25 
 
 
 
C. K.S.A. 38-2273(a) Precludes Appellate Review of the District Court's 
December 2020 and January 2021 Post-termination Orders  
 
 
The final two orders that Grandmother has challenged are the December 2020 
journal entry and the January 2021 journal entry. The December 2020 journal entry 
reflects the district court's post-termination permanency rulings, including its finding that 
DCF had failed to make reasonable efforts or progress toward adoptive placement, and its 
attendant orders terminating DCF custody and placing N.E. in the custody of foster 
parents for adoption. In the January 2021 journal entry, the district court first explained 
why it had taken Grandmother's custody motion under advisement after the October 2020 
evidentiary hearing and through the conclusion of the post-termination permanency 
hearing on December 18, 2020. Then, it ruled that all matters it had taken under 
advisement were resolved by the custody orders in the December 2020 journal entry. 
 
The panel concluded that our holding in In re N.A.C. foreclosed appellate 
jurisdiction over these two orders. In re N.E., 2021 WL 5144521, at *7-8. In In re N.A.C., 
we held that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review post-termination orders in CINC 
proceedings because they are not an "order of temporary custody, adjudication, 
disposition, finding of unfitness or termination of parental rights" under K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 38-2273(a). 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6. Acknowledging as much, Grandmother asks 
us to reconsider In re N.A.C.'s holding.  
 
To resolve the jurisdictional question, we first examine the holding in In re N.A.C. 
and conclude that the doctrine of stare decisis warrants our continued adherence to this 
precedent. Then, we analyze both of the challenged orders under In re N.A.C.'s holding 
and conclude that this precedent forecloses appellate review of the December 2020 and 
January 2021 journal entries.  
 
26 
 
 
 
1. Stare Decisis Analysis of In re N.A.C. 
 
Grandmother's appeal from these two post-termination orders requires us to 
address a threshold inquiry:  whether the doctrine of stare decisis warrants our continued 
adherence to In re N.A.C. "The doctrine of stare decisis provides that 'points of law 
established by a court are generally followed by the same court and courts of lower rank 
in later cases in which the same legal issue is raised.'" State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556, 565, 
486 P.3d 591 (2021) (quoting Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358, 362-63, 361 P.3d 504 
[2015]). "'"The application of stare decisis ensures stability and continuity—
demonstrating a continuing legitimacy of judicial review."'" State v. Davidson, 314 Kan. 
88, 93, 495 P.3d 9 (2021). Thus, "we do not lightly disapprove of precedent." State v. 
Spencer Gifts, 304 Kan. 755, 766, 374 P.3d 680 (2016).  
 
"'While "stare decisis is not an inexorable command," this court endeavors to adhere to 
the principle unless clearly convinced a rule of law established in its earlier cases "'"was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent."'" [Citations omitted.]'" Clark, 
313 Kan. at 565. 
 
In In re N.A.C., we determined that the Legislature had structured CINC 
proceedings as a sequence of steps and that the appealable orders listed in K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 38-2273(a)—orders of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, unfitness, and 
termination of parental rights—corresponded to those steps. 299 Kan. at 1115-16. As a 
result, we held that an order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order in a 
CINC proceeding under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), and orders entered post-termination are not 
appealable. 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6.  
 
Grandmother contends that In re N.A.C.'s holding was erroneous. She claims that 
some post-termination orders (like the one that denied her custody motion) are properly 
classified as dispositional orders because they address custody and are entered after the 
27 
 
 
 
child has been adjudicated as a child in need of care. See 299 Kan. at 1119 (defining 
dispositional orders). Because K.S.A. 38-2273(a) allows an appeal from "any . . . 
disposition," Grandmother reasons In re N.A.C. wrongly concluded that the statute 
precludes appellate review of post-termination orders addressing custody. The dissent in 
In re N.A.C. raised the same point, but the majority rejected this construction of the 
Revised Code's jurisdiction statute. See 299 Kan. at 1123 (Johnson, J., dissenting).  
 
We are not "clearly convinced" In re N.A.C.'s holding was originally erroneous. 
First, In re N.A.C.'s interpretation of the appellate jurisdiction statute is logical and better 
harmonizes this statute with other provisions in the Revised Code when read in pari 
materia. See State v. Mora, 315 Kan. 537, 543, 509 P.3d 1201 (2022) ("[S]tatutes relating 
to the same subject should be considered in pari materia to achieve consistent, 
harmonious, and sensible results whenever possible."). As noted, K.S.A. 38-2273(a) 
identifies five categories of appealable orders under the Revised Code:  "An appeal may 
be taken by any party or interested party from any order of temporary custody, 
adjudication, disposition, finding of unfitness or termination of parental rights." But 
"[n]one of the appealable orders listed in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2273(a) are defined in 
the Revised Code's definitional statute, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2202." In re N.A.C., 299 
Kan. at 1110. Even so, In re N.A.C. reasoned that "each [type of appealable order] is 
given context by its own statutory provisions that establish deadlines, notice 
requirements, and required underlying findings or legal conclusions. So, while the 
appealable orders are not explicitly defined, the governing statutes for each give 
description and meaning to the terms." 299 Kan. at 1110-11.  
 
Focusing on dispositional orders specifically, In re N.A.C. acknowledged that 
"[t]here is more complexity to the statutory scheme governing dispositional orders than 
the other [appealable] orders." 299 Kan. at 1113. But again, the statutory scheme gives 
context and meaning to the phrase "order of . . . disposition" as used in K.S.A. 38-
28 
 
 
 
2273(a). A summary of the statutory framework governing the dispositional and 
termination phases of a CINC proceeding helps illustrate this point.  
 
The timing for dispositional orders is dictated by K.S.A. 38-2253(b), which states 
"[a]n order of disposition may be entered at the time of the adjudication if notice has been 
provided . . . but shall be entered within 30 days following adjudication, unless delayed 
for good cause shown." (Emphasis added.) The substance of the dispositional hearing and 
attendant order are addressed by K.S.A. 38-2253: 
 
"(a) At a dispositional hearing, the court shall receive testimony and other relevant 
information with regard to the safety and well being of the child and may enter orders 
regarding: 
 
(1) Case planning which sets forth the responsibilities and timelines necessary to 
achieve permanency for the child; and 
(2) custody of the child." 
 
K.S.A. 38-2255(b) and (c) create two paths for custody during the dispositional 
phase—"either the court places the child in the parent's custody or it removes the child 
from parental custody." 299 Kan. at 1113. If the district court chooses the latter option, 
In re N.A.C. identified the various findings and orders that the district court must make 
under the Revised Code:   
 
"For example, it must find probable cause that certain conditions exist, such as 'allowing 
the child to remain in [the] home is contrary to the welfare of the child.' K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 38-2255(c)(1)(B). And if the court makes the required findings and removes the 
child from the parent's custody, it may award custody to:  (1) a child's relative; (2) a 
person with whom the child has close emotional ties; (3) any other suitable person; (4) a 
shelter facility; (5) a youth residential facility; or (6) the Secretary. This custody order 
'shall continue until further order of the court.' K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2255(d). In 
addition, if the person to whom custody is awarded is not a parent, a permanency plan 
29 
 
 
 
that conforms to the requirements of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2264 (permanency hearing:  
purpose, procedure, time for hearing, and authorized orders) must be prepared. K.S.A. 
2012 Supp. 38-2255(e). 
 
"Once a dispositional order is entered, the court may rehear the matter on its own 
motion or the motion of a party or interested party. And if there is a rehearing, the court 
may enter any dispositional order authorized by the Revised Code, except modification of 
a registered child support order." 299 Kan. at 1113-14.  
 
See K.S.A. 38-2256. 
 
In re N.A.C. reasoned that the statutory requirements and timelines governing each 
phase of a CINC proceeding provide meaning to the types of appealable orders identified 
in K.S.A. 38-2273(a).  
 
"The terms 'order of temporary custody,' 'adjudication,' and 'disposition' must be seen as 
terms of art, each with a particular meaning within the Revised Code that clearly 
establishes a sequence of court-supervised events all marching toward permanency. This 
is evidenced by the time limitations within the Revised Code for each phase's duration, 
which ensure progress toward permanency is achieved; the differences at each phase in 
factual findings and legal conclusions; and in the options available to the district court in 
each phase." 299 Kan. at 1116. 
 
And under this sequencing, dispositional orders are limited temporally. Reading 
the CINC provisions together, an order of disposition is defined as those orders 
"concerning child custody entered after the child is adjudicated a child in need of care. 
But this dispositional phase ends once an order terminating parental rights is entered, 
precluding appellate review of any later orders because post-termination orders are not 
considered 'dispositional orders.' [Citations omitted.]" 299 Kan. at 1119. This is true, in 
part, because the termination of parental rights statute limits the actions the court can take 
once parental rights have been terminated—"the court can authorize an adoption, appoint 
30 
 
 
 
a permanent custodian, or order continued permanency planning." 299 Kan. at 1120; see 
K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(2). "Notably absent is the authority to enter a dispositional order" 
under K.S.A. 38-2255. 299 Kan. at 1120. "This, of course, makes sense because when 
parental rights have been terminated, it is necessarily true that the district court is no 
longer doing what the disposition phase requires:  weighing whether the parent should 
have custody and, if not, whether reintegration is possible. That ship has sailed." 299 
Kan. at 1120-21. 
 
In re N.A.C.'s construction of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) is thus "consistent with the 
statutes governing dispositions and termination of parental rights. It is also consistent 
with the Legislature's decision to limit the appealable issues under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-
2273(a)." 299 Kan. at 1119-20.  
 
The dispositional rehearing statute, K.S.A. 38-2256, does not undermine In re 
N.A.C.'s holding or its supporting rationale. K.S.A. 38-2256 permits the court to "rehear 
the matter" after it has entered a dispositional order. The statute does not expressly limit 
rehearing to those motions entered before the termination of parental rights. Thus, one 
might argue the rehearing statute supports a broader definition of the phrase "order of 
disposition" in K.S.A. 38-2273(a)—one that includes post-termination orders affecting 
the child's custody. 
 
But as we explained in In re N.A.C., construing an "order of disposition" to be 
limited temporally to those disposition orders entered after adjudication but before 
termination of parental rights gives meaning to the rehearing statute and K.S.A. 38-
2273(a):   
 
"But this reasoning [that the rehearing statute allows for post-termination orders 
of disposition] oversimplifies and wrongly dispenses with the prior caselaw, which does 
not necessarily deny an appeal of a dispositional order issued after a rehearing. After all, 
31 
 
 
 
the time period between a first order of disposition and a termination of parental rights 
may be significant, and more than one order of disposition might be required, especially 
if the goal is to first attempt parental reintegration. Nothing in the jurisdictional statute 
prevents an appeal from any dispositional orders entered after rehearing. But the cutoff 
under the Revised Code's structure . . . is the order terminating parental rights . . . . 
[Citations omitted.]" 299 Kan. at 1120. 
 
And In re N.A.C.'s construction better harmonizes the rehearing statute and K.S.A. 
38-2273(a) with the termination of parental rights statutes. As noted, those statutes 
limit the district court's authority to enter orders of disposition post-termination 
because at that stage of the CINC proceeding the district court is no longer 
considering whether the parent should have custody or whether reintegration is 
possible. 299 Kan. at 1120-21.  
 
In re N.A.C.'s construction not only brings the various provisions of the Revised 
Code into harmony, but it "is also consistent with the legislature's obvious intent to limit 
the types of appealable issues so there is timely closure in these cases. Otherwise, it is 
easy to see how these cases could turn into back-and-forth campaigns of endless litigation 
and appeals by persons other than the child's parents." 299 Kan. at 1121. Grandmother's 
proposed construction fails to read the statutory provisions in pari materia and conflicts 
with the Legislature's intent to promote timely resolution of CINC proceedings. In fact, 
Grandmother's interpretation of a disposition order "could leave children exposed to an 
endless circle of appellate custody battles." 299 Kan. at 1120. 
 
Granted, In re N.A.C.'s holding insulates detrimental placement decisions from 
appellate review. But "our district court judges who are tasked with presiding over these 
difficult CINC cases are well aware of the stakes." 299 Kan. at 1122. And this concern is 
simply part of the cost-benefit analysis the Legislature employed when it adopted the 
Revised Code and chose to limit the scope of appealable orders in CINC proceedings to 
ensure timely progression towards permanency. The separation-of-powers doctrine 
32 
 
 
 
prevents us from second-guessing the Legislature's judgment on this public policy matter, 
as another Court of Appeals panel observed: 
 
"We simply cannot create a new category of appeals so that appeals like this one 
may be heard. Nor should we. The legislature has worked hard to create a comprehensive 
Code for Care of Children. It has attempted to balance the protection of the rights of 
children, parents, and other interested parties against the need for speed sufficient to 
ultimately allow children to move on and live their lives. We respect the choice the 
legislature has made here." In re A.F., 38 Kan. App. 2d 742, 746, 172 P.3d 63 (2007). 
 
See Double M Constr. v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 288 Kan. 268, 274, 202 P.3d 7 
(2009) ("It is not the function of the courts to substitute their social and economic beliefs 
for the judgment of the legislature or to determine whether a statute is wise or 
necessary.").  
 
In sum, In re N.A.C.'s holding is logical, and its construction of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) 
is preferable when reading the various provisions of the Revised Code in pari materia. 
And In re N.A.C.'s holding was not groundbreaking. Several panels of the Court of 
Appeals had adopted the same construction of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) long before In re 
N.A.C. See 299 Kan. at 1115 ("The vast majority of appeals under the Revised Code and 
its predecessor have been decided by our Court of Appeals with little review from this 
court. Over time, numerous Court of Appeals panels have developed caselaw consistently 
viewing both the Revised Code and its predecessor as creating a statutory framework of 
sequential steps or phases."). For these reasons, we are not clearly convinced that the 
holding in In re N.A.C. was originally erroneous. 
 
Nor are we "clearly convinced" In re N.A.C.'s holding is no longer sound because 
of changing conditions. In the eight years since In re N.A.C., the Legislature has 
expressed no disagreement, through statutory amendment, with our interpretation of 
K.S.A. 38-2273(a). See State v. Quested, 302 Kan. 262, 278, 352 P.3d 553 (2015) ("The 
33 
 
 
 
doctrine of stare decisis is particularly compelling in cases where, as here, the legislature 
is free to alter a statute in response to court precedent with which it disagrees but declines 
to do so."). Perhaps the most significant development to occur since In re N.A.C. is that 
the composition of our court has changed. But "we should be highly skeptical of 
reversing an earlier decision where nothing has changed except the composition of the 
court." State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 577, 102 P.3d 445 (2004) (McFarland, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Davidson, 314 Kan. at 95 (Standridge J., concurring) (A "change in 
the membership of this court cannot, in and of itself, justify a departure from the basic 
principle of stare decisis."). 
 
We therefore reaffirm the holding in In re N.A.C.:  an order terminating parental 
rights is the last appealable order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), and post-termination orders 
are not appealable, even if they address custody. See 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6.  
 
2. Application of In re N.A.C. to Challenged Orders 
 
Having reaffirmed In re N.A.C., we next apply this precedent to the December 
2020 and January 2021 journal entries from which Grandmother has appealed.  
 
As noted, the December 2020 journal entry memorialized the district court's post-
termination permanency decisions. This journal entry included the district court's finding 
that DCF had failed to make reasonable efforts or progress toward adoptive placement 
and its attendant orders terminating DCF custody and placing N.E. in the custody of 
foster parents for adoption.  
 
In In re N.A.C., the appellant challenged nearly identical orders. We found 
appellate jurisdiction lacking over the district court's post-termination decisions, 
including:   
 
34 
 
 
 
"(1) the district court's finding that the responsible state agency failed to make reasonable 
efforts or progress toward adoptive placement; and (2) its attendant orders, which were 
contingent under the statute upon that first finding, removing the child from state agency 
custody and placing her directly with her foster parents with permission to adopt." 299 
Kan. at 1101.  
 
Grandmother has challenged the December 2020 journal entry, which made the 
same findings and entered the same attendant custody orders at issue in In re N.A.C. 
Thus, In re N.A.C. is apposite and controls the jurisdictional question presented here. 
Thus, K.S.A. 38-2273(a) does not provide appellate courts with jurisdiction to review the 
December 2020 journal entry.  
 
Grandmother also appeals from the January 2021 journal entry. There, the district 
court found that various pandemic-related issues had required it to take Grandmother's 
custody motion under advisement (after the October 2020 evidentiary hearing on the 
motion and until all parties could be heard at the December 2020 post-termination 
permanency hearing). Then, the district court ruled that all matters it had taken under 
advisement, which necessarily included Grandmother's custody motion, were resolved by 
the custody orders in the December 2020 post-termination journal entry on permanency. 
Under In re N.A.C., K.S.A. 38-2273(a) likewise forecloses appellate review of the 
January 2021 journal entry because this order was entered months after the district court 
terminated parental rights.  
 
But we recognize that the timeline of events and procedural history here could 
raise more complicated questions of equity and fairness. On May 22, 2020, prior to the 
termination of parental rights, Grandmother moved for custody of N.E. The district court 
set that motion for evidentiary hearing on August 4, during the dispositional phase of 
N.E.'s CINC proceedings. In the meantime, on June 17, the State moved for findings of 
unfitness and termination of parental rights. The district court set that motion for 
evidentiary hearing on August 20.  
35 
 
 
 
 
Had matters progressed as scheduled, the district court would have ruled on 
Grandmother's custody motion during the dispositional phase before it terminated 
parental rights. And if the district court had ruled on the motion during the dispositional 
phase, we see no reason why Grandmother could not have pursued a timely appeal of the 
decision as a dispositional order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a).  
 
But disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the scheduling and 
progression of the proceedings. The district court continued the August 4 evidentiary 
hearing on Grandmother's custody motion because the State's attorney was in quarantine. 
That evidentiary hearing was reset to September 8, 2020. In the meantime, no party 
moved to continue the hearing on the State's motion to terminate parental rights. And the 
district court conducted that hearing as scheduled on August 20, where it terminated 
parental rights and set the matter for a permanency hearing on September 3. The district 
court memorialized these findings and conclusions in the August 28th journal entry, thus 
terminating the dispositional and termination phases of N.E.'s CINC proceedings.  
 
After the district court entered its termination orders, Grandmother expressed 
concern that conducting a permanency hearing before the evidentiary hearing on her 
custody motion could render the latter moot. Thus, Grandmother moved to continue the 
September 3rd post-termination permanency hearing to September 8—the date set for the 
hearing on the custody motion. The district court granted Grandmother's request.  
 
But the State moved to continue the September 8, 2020 consolidated hearings on 
permanency and custody because one of its key witnesses was in COVID-19 quarantine. 
The district court rescheduled the hearing for October 9. On that date, the district court 
took evidence on the custody motion. But not all interested parties were present—counsel 
for foster parents could not attend because of illness related to COVID-19. The district 
court took evidence from the available parties on the custody motion and continued the 
36 
 
 
 
rest of the consolidated hearing to November 13. It took Grandmother's custody motion 
under advisement until all parties could be heard at the November permanency hearing. 
But again, the November 13th hearing was continued because Grandmother's attorney 
was ill and foster parents' expert witness was unavailable. The district court conducted 
the consolidated hearing on December 18, where it terminated DCF custody and placed 
N.E. in the custody of foster parents for adoption, as memorialized in the December 2020 
journal entry. And, in its January 2021 journal entry, the district court confirmed that its 
December post-termination permanency decisions had resolved Grandmother's custody 
motion. 
 
These facts reveal that the district court's ruling on Grandmother's custody motion 
did not follow the same progressive sequencing of CINC phases contemplated in the 
Revised Code. This may prompt concerns that the district court violated Grandmother's 
due-process rights or otherwise erred by ruling on Grandmother's custody motion (filed 
before termination of parental rights) only after the dispositional and termination phases 
had ended and the matter had progressed to the post-termination phase. 
 
But appellate courts cannot create equitable exceptions to statutory jurisdictional 
requirements. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 369, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). And even if the 
district court's sequencing of the CINC proceedings and the timing of its orders could 
constitute error, Grandmother did not raise those concerns in the district court or on 
appeal. See Bussman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 298 Kan. 700, 729, 317 P.3d 70 
(2014) ("[C]onstitutional grounds for reversal cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal."); see also State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021) ("Issues not 
briefed are deemed waived or abandoned."). Thus, Grandmother waived or abandoned 
any claim of error based on the timing or sequencing of the CINC phases. 
 
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Grandmother objected to the 
State's request to continue the August 4, 2020 evidentiary hearing on her custody motion. 
37 
 
 
 
Nor is there any evidence that Grandmother objected to the August 20th setting for the 
hearing on the State's motion to terminate parental rights. Grandmother did not move to 
continue the August 20th termination hearing to ensure that the district court ruled on her 
custody motion during the dispositional phase before it terminated parental rights. In fact, 
Grandmother appeared in person and by counsel at the August 20th termination hearing 
and there is no evidence in the record that Grandmother objected to moving forward with 
the hearing as scheduled. Quite simply, Grandmother allowed the termination hearing to 
proceed on August 20 and allowed the district court to enter orders terminating parental 
rights on August 28 without objection.  
 
And nothing in the record suggests that the district court scheduled or rescheduled 
these matters intentionally to deprive Grandmother of her right to appeal the ruling on her 
custody motion. To the contrary, the record confirms that the district court's schedule was 
impacted most significantly by complications related to the pandemic.  
 
In short, Grandmother preserved no objection at the district court and waived any 
objection on appeal to the timing or progression of the CINC proceedings—specifically, 
the district court's decision to proceed to the post-termination phase before ruling on the 
custody motion filed during the dispositional phase. Thus, we reserve for another day 
whether a district court errs by proceeding in such a manner.  
 
We hold that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review the district court's 
December 2020 and January 2021 post-termination journal entries. Because we also hold 
that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review the June 2020 placement order and the 
August 2020 termination order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), we dismiss this appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction.  
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed.  
 
38 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
STANDRIDGE, J., dissenting:  I dissent from the majority's interpretation of K.S.A. 
38-2273(a), based on its continued adherence to In re N.A.C., 299 Kan. 1100, 329 P.3d 
458 (2014), to bar appellate review of the district court's December 2020 and January 
2021 orders. I would find these orders qualify as orders of disposition that constitute 
appealable orders under K.S.A. 38-2273(a).  
 
 
K.S.A. 38-2273(a) provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken by any party or 
interested party from any order of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, finding 
of unfitness or termination of parental rights." Although the term "disposition" is not 
defined in the general definitional section of the Revised Kansas Code for Care of 
Children (Code), "dispositional orders have been interpreted to be those concerning child 
custody entered after the child is adjudicated a child in need of care." In re N.A.C., 299 
Kan. at 1119. 
 
 
The majority reaffirms In re N.A.C.'s holding that dispositional orders are limited 
temporally, construing the Code's statutory requirements and timelines governing each 
phase of a child in need of care proceeding to mean that the dispositional phase ends once 
an order terminating parental rights is entered. But this reading of the Code ignores the 
basic rules of statutory construction. An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain 
legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their 
ordinary meanings. Nauheim v. City of Topeka, 309 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019). 
If we find the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not speculate about the 
legislative intent behind that clear language and should refrain from reading something 
into the statute that is not readily found in its words. Ullery v. Othick, 304 Kan. 405, 409, 
372 P.3d 1135 (2016). The majority's holding is inconsistent with the plain and 
unambiguous language of K.S.A. 38-2273(a), which provides that "[a]n appeal may be 
39 
 
 
 
taken by any party or interested party from any order of . . . disposition." (Emphasis 
added.) If the Legislature had intended for the term "disposition" to refer solely to those 
orders entered before termination, it could have said as much, i.e., "any order of . . . 
disposition entered prior to termination." The majority reads a pre-termination 
requirement into the statute where there is none.  
 
 
The Legislature intentionally left open the possibility for the court to enter 
multiple orders of disposition. K.S.A. 38-2256 authorizes the court to rehear any order of 
disposition on its own motion or the motion of any party or interested party, after which 
the court may enter any dispositional order authorized by the Code. Again, the 
Legislature, through its plain and unambiguous language, did not limit rehearing to those 
orders entered before the termination of parental rights.  
 
 
I am also unpersuaded by the argument that the Legislature failed to provide 
courts with express authority to enter a post-termination dispositional order under K.S.A. 
38-2255. The court's authority under the termination of parental rights statute includes the 
ability to authorize an adoption and appoint a permanent custodian, both of which 
concern the custody of a child adjudicated a child in need of care and therefore meet the 
definition of a dispositional order. To construe the statutory scheme otherwise results in 
unreasonable and arbitrary results. See Garcia v. Ball, 303 Kan. 560, 569, 363 P.3d 399 
(2015) (courts interpret statutes to avoid absurd or unreasonable results). As the 
following chronology shows, the resulting inconsistency is particularly conspicuous in 
this case.  
 
 
Grandmother filed a motion for custody of N.E. on May 20, 2020. A month later, 
the district court found reintegration with N.E.'s parents was not a viable permanency 
objective and adoption might be in N.E.'s best interests. Around this time, the district 
court scheduled a hearing on Grandmother's custody motion for August 4, 2020, and a 
hearing on the State's motion to terminate parental rights for August 20, 2020.  
40 
 
 
 
 
 
But on August 3, 2020, the State filed a motion to continue Grandmother's custody 
hearing because the State's attorney was quarantined pending the results of a COVID-19 
test. The court granted the motion and reset the custody hearing for September 8, 2020. 
The court did not, however, move the hearing on the State's motion to terminate parental 
rights. After hearing the evidence on August 20, the court granted the State's motion to 
terminate parental rights and ordered N.E. to remain in the custody of the Department for 
Children and Families (DCF).  
 
 
The court did not hear evidence related to Grandmother's motion for custody until 
October 9, 2020. And even then, the court took the matter under advisement. The court 
finally ruled on Grandmother's motion in an order dated January 6, 2021, denying it as 
moot. The ruling came almost eight months after it was filed and, ironically, on the same 
day the court granted foster parents' petition for adoption.  
 
 
Based on this chronology, the majority holds we do not have jurisdiction to 
consider an appeal from the district court's decision to deny Grandmother's motion for 
custody because the dispositional decision was made after the court terminated parental 
rights. But the majority's interpretation of the statute also compels a different conclusion: 
we would have had jurisdiction to review the appeal if the State's attorney had not been 
exposed to COVID-19 requiring quarantine and the district court had denied 
Grandmother's motion at the scheduled hearing on August 4. The Legislature could not 
have intended the statutory scheme to lead to such an unreasonable and inconsistent 
result. This is especially true here, where Grandmother filed a timely motion and 
requested a timely hearing but was deprived of her ability to appeal simply because she 
had no control over the court's docket.  
 
 
Finally, the majority's interpretation of the Code to limit appellate review of a 
dispositional order to those entered before termination does little to further the objective 
41 
 
 
 
of protecting the child's welfare and serving the best interests of the State. See K.S.A. 38-
2201(b)(2) ("The code shall be liberally construed to carry out the policies of the state" 
which include "provid[ing] that each child who comes within the provisions of the code 
shall receive the care, custody, guidance control and discipline that will best serve the 
child's welfare and the interests of the state."). Indeed, the majority acknowledges that 
"In re N.A.C.'s holding insulates detrimental placement decisions from appellate review." 
In re N.E., 316 Kan. __, __P.3d __ (2022), slip op. at 31.  
 
 
Considering the specific language set forth within K.S.A. 38-2273(a), the statutory 
scheme as a whole, and the Code's underlying purpose of protecting the child's welfare 
and serving the best interests of the State, I would hold a dispositional order subject to 
appeal under K.S.A. 38-2273(a) includes any dispositional order authorized by the Code, 
including post-termination orders. Here, the district court's December 2020 order 
removed N.E. from the legal custody of DCF and placed her in the custody of foster 
parents for adoption. In the January 2021 order, the court ruled that all matters taken 
under advisement, including Grandmother's custody motion, were resolved by the 
December 2020 order. Because these orders both impacted the legal custody of N.E., I 
would find they constitute appealable orders of disposition under K.S.A. 38-2273(a).