Title: CRANFORD v. BARTLETT

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

CRANFORD v. BARTLETT  CRANFORD v. BARTLETT 2001 OK 47 25 P.3d 918 72 OBJ 1792 Case Number: 93002 Decided: 06/05/2001 Mandate Issued: 06/27/2001 SONYA CRANFORD and RICHARD CRANFORD, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Counter-Appellees v. ROBERT BARTLETT, Defendant/Appellee/Counter-Appellant CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE P. THOMAS THORNBRUGH, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Appellants owned a sitter/employment service (company). They entered into a written contract with appellee's wife for the sale of company. Part of the purchase price was to be paid by the terms of a note signed by wife in favor of appellants. Wife did not pay the note, she filed for bankruptcy and any liability she had on the note was discharged in bankruptcy. Appellants sued appellee, one theory of liability being that, unbeknownst to them, he acquired a joint interest in the company along with his wife, i.e. he and his wife were actually joint purchasers of the company. The trial judge gave summary judgment to appellee, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and appellants sought certiorari. Held: Summary judgment was improper. Evidentiary materials in the summary judgment record, at a minimum, raise the reasonable inference that appellee was a joint purchaser of company with his wife and, thus, might have some liability for the purchase price. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND MATTER REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Donald R. Bradford, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Appellants/Counter-Appellees. James R. Hicks of Morrel, West, Saffa, Craige & Hicks, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma for Appellee/Counter-Appellant. LAVENDER, J. [25 P.3d 919] ¶1 The question we answer in this case is: did the trial judge err in granting summary judgment to appellee, Robert Bartlett (Robert) in a suit brought against him by appellants, Sonya and Richard Cranford? We hold the trial judge erred and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) mistakenly affirmed. Summary judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 1 ¶2 A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo because the ultimate decision turns on a purely legal [25 P.3d 920] determination, i.e. whether a party to the litigation is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fehring v. State Insurance Fund, 2001 OK 11, ¶ 3, 19 P.3d 276 ; Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, 914 P.2d 1051 , 1053. De novo review is a plenary, independent and non-deferential re-examination of the trial court's ruling. Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22 f. n. 30, 989 P.2d 448 . Like a trial court, an appellate court examines the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact [Fehring v. State Insurance Fund, 2001 OK 11 at ¶ 3] and, as in the trial court, all inferences and conclusions arising from the evidentiary materials are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. ¶3 If the summary judgment record discloses either controverted material facts, or, even if the material facts are undisputed reasonable minds might reach different conclusions from those facts, summary judgment should be denied [Prudential Ins. Co. v. Glass, 1998 OK 52, ¶ 3, 959 P.2d 586 ] because in neither situation can it rightfully be concluded one side or the other to the lawsuit is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It must be remembered, neither a trial court nor this Court weighs the evidence on a motion for summary judgment. Id.; Stuckey v. Young Exploration Co., 1978 OK 128, 586 P.2d 726 , 730. Evidence weighing is a function for the jury, and in a non-jury case for the trial judge, after an appropriate trial of the issues. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Glass, 1998 OK 52 at ¶ 3. As explained below, the summary judgment record, when subjected to de novo review, is unable to support the conclusion that appellee, Robert Bartlett was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. PART II. FACTS. ¶5 The total agreed purchase price was $25,000. ¶6 One clause of the agreement allowed Colleen to rescind the entire transaction if she was unable to obtain any necessary license or permit to conduct the business of company. ¶7 Appellants, in this case, sued Robert to recover (among other relief) the remainder of the purchase price they asserted was due. In addition to raising claims based on fraud, estoppel by silence and guaranty, appellants' amended petition alleged that Robert, unbeknownst to them, was to receive a joint interest in the stock of company to be purchased and that he did receive an interest in the stock purchased from them. ¶8 After the filing of the amended petition Robert moved for summary judgment, appellants responded to the motion and Robert filed a reply to appellants' response. The record is undisputed that Robert was present at the closing. Although it is also undisputed he said nothing at the closing until the agreement and note were signed, evidentiary materials are in the record to raise, at a minimum, a reasonable inference that Robert, at the closing, heard statements made by Colleen and/or her attorney, to the effect that he would be providing his wife with the funds necessary to pay the note from an inheritance he was anticipating imminently receiving from his father's estate. There are also evidentiary materials to raise, at least, a reasonable inference that after the agreement was signed by appellants and Colleen and the note by Colleen, that Robert, immediately after the closing, in effect, verified to appellants the above mentioned statements made during the closing by Colleen and/or the attorney. ¶9 In fact, there is really no dispute in the record that both appellants and Robert understood that the funds to pay off the note, i. e. the remaining purchase price, were to come from the inheritance funds. Robert's own deposition testimony reveals he had an understanding with his wife that he would provide her with the funds to pay off the note, said funds to emanate from the inheritance. There is also little question that the summary judgment record contains evidentiary materials to support the reasonable inference that Robert understood that appellants agreed to accept the note for the remainder of the purchase price based on their understanding it would be paid by the [25 P.3d 922] inheritance funds. In substance, Robert freely admitted in his deposition testimony that he understood appellants agreed to accept the sixty (60) day note in reliance upon the availability of the inheritance money to pay it. ¶10 Copies of the two stock certificates of 2,500 shares each (i.e. the stock of company being purchased) are also contained in the summary judgment record. The certificates were executed by appellants in blank as to the purchaser(s) and turned over to Colleen and her legal representative in such blank condition, but at a later time were filled in as having been sold, assigned and transferred to both Robert and Colleen in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The Cranfords' endorsements on the two certificates are dated the day of closing (i.e. March 13 For Value Received, I, hereby sell, assign and transfer unto Robert E. Bartlett and Colleen A. Bartlett as joint tenants with Right of Survivorship and not as tenants in common [2500] Shares of the Capital Stock represented by the within Certificate . . . . PART III. LEGAL ANALYSIS. ¶12 On summary judgment Robert, in part, argued appellants were merely suing him as a guarantor and because there was no guaranty in writing signed by him, the statute of frauds provided him with a complete defense. ¶13 A guaranty, in its common acceptation, is understood to mean an undertaking to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, of another, in the case of a failure of such other to pay or perform. Gravelle v. Pollock Stores Co., 1928 OK 229, 267 P. 473 , 474-475. ¶14 The case of Waldock v. First Nat. Bank of Idabel, 1914 OK 424, 143 P. 53 makes plain that a joint obligation or debt is not a guaranty and it is not subject to the statute of frauds requirement of a writing. In the Syllabus by the Court in Waldock three potential scenarios and the [ 25 P.3d 924 ] applicability or inapplicability of a statute of frauds defense are set forth. Waldock states: Where money is loaned to R. solely upon a verbal promise of W. and credit is extended solely to W. and no credit is extended to R., the promise of W. is original, and does not come within the statute of frauds. Where money is loaned or goods sold to R. and W. jointly, and credit is extended to both, and both promise to pay the same, although such money is borrowed or goods purchased for the sole benefit of R., the promise of R. and W. is original, and they are codebtors, and such promise need not be in writing, and either or both will be liable for the debt. Where money is loaned or goods sold to R. for his use and benefit, and credit is extended to R. and W. jointly, or if any credit is extended to R., W.'s promise to pay is collateral, and comes within the statute of frauds, unless it be in writing. The following facts contained in the summary judgment record are plainly sufficient to warrant, at least, the reasonable inference that Robert and Colleen were joint purchasers of the company and, if they were, the second scenario spelled out in Waldock cannot be ruled out at the summary judgment stage. Robert's name appears on the two stock certificates as a joint transferee along with Colleen; he was the person that would be funding the purchase of company or, at least, the remainder of the purchase price; and Colleen would apparently be the person that would handle running the company had the sale gone through. If Robert and Colleen were joint purchasers, the statute of frauds would provide no defense because Robert's liability would be original, not collateral. Further, if they were joint purchasers Robert might have some liability for the remaining purchase price and summary judgment should not have been granted in his favor. PART IV. SUMMARY. ¶15 Even though Robert is not named as a purchaser in the agreement and he did not sign it or the note, the summary judgment record - taking the evidentiary materials in the light most favorable to appellants - plainly supports a reasonable inference that Robert and Colleen were joint purchasers of the company. If such was the case the statute of frauds would provide Robert with no viable defense and he might have some liability for the remaining purchase price. It was, therefore, improper for the trial judge to grant summary judgment to Robert and it was error for the COCA to have affirmed the grant of summary judgment. ¶16 THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS REVERSED AND THE MATTER IS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. ¶17 HARGRAVE, C.J., LAVENDER, OPALA, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur. ¶18 WATT, V.C.J., HODGES and KAUGER, JJ., dissent. FOOT