Title: Mair v. Mair

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mair v. Mair1992 WY 2823 P.2d 538Case Number: 91-193Decided: 01/08/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lauretta June 
MAIR,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Ernest Floyd MAIR, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Lee Karavitis, 
Casper, for appellant.

Harry G. Bondi 
of Harry G. Bondi, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
Lauretta June Mair (the wife) asserts the district court abused its discretion 
in dividing marital property as required by Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1987). She 
contends Appellant Ernest Floyd Mair (the husband) received a disproportionate 
share of the marital estate.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The parties lived 
together in the wife's home for more than a year prior to their marriage on 
November 25, 1982. They separated in March of 1990. The husband and the wife 
settled some of the property division issues, and the district court held a 
hearing for the purpose of settling those matters which were still in dispute. 
At the commencement of the hearing, the wife indicated that some disputes about 
personal property items existed; however, she also indicated that they were not 
"real substantial disputes." The real dispute was over a second car, a motor 
home, and $50,000.

[¶4]      The divorce 
decree demonstrates that the wife received many of the home furnishings and the 
motor home. The parties owned two cars, and the wife wanted both of them. The 
wife received the 1987 Camaro, and the husband received the 1986 Mercury Cougar. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving one car to the wife 
and one car to the husband.

[¶5]      The only 
remaining question which was presented to the district court is whether the wife 
should have received $50,000 in addition to the other property she 
received.

[¶6]      This issue arises 
primarily because, in 1988, the husband received an inheritance from his 
father's estate which had an appraised value of $319,000. At the time of the 
divorce, the husband had a considerable amount of this money left, including 
portions of the money he had invested in a small business operated by him and 
owned in his name. The wife conceded that the inheritance was her husband's 
separate property. Her assertions were that she was leaving an eight-year 
marriage with less than she had when she entered it, despite the fact she had 
contributed significantly to the martial property pool with money she received 
from her employment. She also claimed that she had medical problems which she 
had to neglect because she could no longer afford 
treatment.

[¶7]      The wife received 
the home she owned prior to their marriage (it had been sold under a contract 
for deed, and she was receiving the proceeds of that sale), as well as the home 
the parties acquired during their marriage (it was encumbered with a mortgage of 
approximately $32,000). She also received a car worth about $12,000 which the 
husband purchased for her out of his inheritance. The district court awarded her 
many, if not most, of the home furnishings. The home furnishings she did not 
receive were those the husband received as part of his father's estate. The 
husband was required to pay all the wife's outstanding medical bills. The wife 
was employed on a part-time basis and was apparently capable of working full 
time.

[¶8]      We have 
repeatedly held that the division of marital property is within the discretion 
of the trial court, and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, we will not 
disturb the result. Williams v. Williams, 817 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 1991); Blanchard v. 
Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1989). Because the wife did not claim a portion of 
the husband's inheritance, we cannot attempt to establish a bright line rule on 
whether she was entitled to a portion of that inheritance in this case. See Chew 
v. Chew, 821 P.2d 582, 583 n. 2 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶9]      We are unable to 
perceive any abuse of discretion by the district court in the division of the 
marital property in this case.

[¶10]   Affirmed.