Title: State v. Tommie L. Cole

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 59 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0681-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tommie L. Cole,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION FILED: 
June 19, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 30, 2003   
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument 
by 
Suzanne 
L. 
Hagopian, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 59 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0681-CR  
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 130) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tommie L. Cole,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL 
from 
an 
order 
denying 
postconviction 
relief.  
Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   This is an 
appeal from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
Richard 
J. 
Sankovitz, 
Judge, 
denying 
Tommie 
L. 
Cole's 
postconviction motion for resentencing or sentence modification.  
The case comes before this court on certification from the court 
of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  
¶2 
On May 2, 2001, Cole, the defendant, pled guilty to 
being a party to the crime of delivering more than 15 grams but 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
2 
 
not more than 40 grams of cocaine.2  The offense occurred on 
January 5, 2001. 
¶3 
Delivering more than 15 grams but not more than 40 
grams of cocaine was an unclassified felony at the time the 
defendant committed the crime, and Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
provided that a person convicted "shall be fined not more than 
$500,000 and shall be imprisoned for not less than 3 years nor 
more than 30 years."3  Furthermore, when the defendant committed 
the crime his sentence was subject to the provisions in the 
first phase of Wisconsin's Truth in Sentencing legislation (TIS-
I).  Specifically, the defendant's sentence was subject to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01, a statute enacted through TIS-I, requiring 
that the sentence be bifurcated such that a portion of the 
sentence include a term of confinement and a portion of the 
sentence include a term of extended supervision.4   
¶4 
Wisconsin adopted Truth-in-Sentencing legislation in 
two phases.  The first phase, TIS-I, was enacted in June 1998.5  
The second phase, TIS-II, was enacted in July 2002.6  TIS-I 
applied to offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999.  
                                                 
2 See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.16(2)(b)(1), 
961.41(1)(cm)3., 
939.05. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. (emphasis added). 
4 See 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 419. 
5 See 1997 Wis. Act 283.   
6 See 2001 Wis. Act 109. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
3 
 
TIS-II became effective February 1, 2003.  TIS-I thus lasted for 
just over three years and has now been modified by TIS-II.7     
¶5 
Both parties agree, and so do we, that the circuit 
court intended to sentence the defendant in the present case to 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3., 
expressed 
in 
the 
statutory 
language "shall be imprisoned for not less than 3 years."  At 
sentencing, the circuit court stated: 
I do believe that it's appropriate to follow the 
presumptive minimum the Legislature has told us, and 
that is the law that the community has adopted that 
for somebody who is a drug dealer in this weight 
range, three years in prison is appropriate unless we 
believe that the public would be served or at least 
not harmed by departing from that minimum.8  
¶6 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
and 
973.01, 
the 
confinement 
portion of the three-year presumptive minimum sentence must be 
"no less than the presumptive minimum for the offense, which in 
[this case] is three (3) years."9  The circuit court thus 
sentenced the defendant to a bifurcated sentence including a 
term of confinement of three years followed by a three-year 
period of extended supervision, and fined him $1,000. 
¶7 
The defendant concedes that the sentence imposed by 
the circuit court is valid under Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
                                                 
7 See 2001 Wis. Act 109 (effective February 1, 2003). 
8 Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 27, lines 12-18. 
9 Post-Conviction Order (dated Feb. 18, 2002) (Sankovitz, 
Judge). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
4 
 
and 973.01 (TIS-I).  The dispute in this case arises only 
because the circuit court announced its intention to sentence 
the defendant to the presumptive minimum sentence prescribed by 
the statute.  The defendant rejects the circuit court's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
six-year 
bifurcated 
sentence 
is 
the 
presumptive minimum sentence.  
¶8 
The defendant asserts that the presumptive minimum 
sentence of three years in Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. means, 
under § 973.01, that confinement in prison plus extended 
supervision cannot total more than three years.  Thus the 
defendant seeks resentencing on the ground that the circuit 
court erroneously believed that the presumptive minimum term of 
confinement for the crime was three years. 
¶9 
The court of appeals asks that we determine what 
combination of confinement in prison and extended supervision 
constitutes the presumptive minimum sentence when a statute 
provides that an offender "shall be imprisoned for not less than 
3 years."10  In other words, the sole issue presented to this 
court 
is 
whether 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence 
under 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals, in State v. Cole, No. 02-0681-CR, 
unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. November 5, 2002), 
certified the issue to this court as follows: 
Whether a presumptive minimum sentence for a felony 
conviction that is subject to bifurcated sentencing, 
under the Truth in Sentencing revisions to the 
criminal code, defines the minimum amount of time an 
individual must spend in prison or whether the 
presumptive minimum applies to both time spent in 
prison and on extended supervision.  
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. and 973.01 is a term of three 
years of confinement plus an additional term of extended 
supervision or a term of confinement plus extended supervision 
totaling three years. 
¶10 We hold that the circuit court erred when it construed 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. and 973.01 (TIS-I) to be three 
years of confinement in prison.11  We conclude that the three-
                                                 
11 Our holding in this case has limited application and is 
of limited precedential value.  As best we can tell, the 
resolution of the Truth in Sentencing issue posed by the present 
case will affect only those sentencing decisions having all 
three of the following characteristics: (1) the crime for which 
an accused is being sentenced was committed on or after December 
31, 1999, but before February 1, 2003; (2) the crime for which 
the accused is being sentenced is an unclassified felony for 
which a minimum sentence was specified in the statute, namely 
that the offender "shall be imprisoned for not less than [x] 
years" where x is one or more years; and (3) the sentencing 
court expressly states its intent to impose the minimum sentence 
specified in the statute. 
The State's brief notes that the issue presented in the 
instant case may arise collaterally in cases in which the 
sentencing court departs from the prescribed minimum sentence 
and therefore must state its reasons for such departure on the 
record.  See Wis. Stat. § 961.438. 
Both the State and the defendant comment that, although not 
at 
issue 
in 
the 
present 
case, 
whether 
"imprisoned" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. means "confinement" or "confinement 
and extended supervision" may bear on the validity of an 
accused's guilty plea or no-contest plea because the answer 
might affect the accused's understanding of the meaning of the 
presumptive minimum sentence that the accused faces.  See State 
v. Mohr, 201 Wis. 2d 693, 700, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996) (a 
defendant pleading guilty is entitled to know that the law 
presumes he or she will be sentenced to "at least two years in 
prison" under a penalty provision with a two-year presumptive 
minimum sentence).    
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
6 
 
year presumptive minimum sentence under §§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. and 
973.01 is a total sentence of three years, consisting of a term 
of 27 months of confinement and nine months of extended 
supervision.  We therefore reverse the order of the circuit 
court denying the defendant's postconviction motion and remand 
the case for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
I 
¶11 In order to determine the presumptive minimum sentence 
in the present case we must interpret two statutes: 
(1) 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3.: 
prescribing 
a 
sentence of "imprisoned for not less than 3 years," 
the presumptive minimum sentence for the crime in 
issue; and  
(2) 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01 
(TIS-I): 
establishing 
bifurcated felony sentences of imprisonment.   
¶12 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that this court determines independently, but benefiting from 
the analysis of the circuit court.  
¶13 The principle objective of statutory interpretation is 
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.12    
The court must ascertain the legislature's intent from the 
language of the statute in relation to its context, scope, 
history, and the objective intended to be accomplished.13  
Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read 
                                                 
12 State 
v. 
Szulczewski, 
216 
Wis. 2d 495, 
504, 
574 
N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
13 State v. Davis, 2001 WI 136, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 
N.W.2d 62.  
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
7 
 
together and harmonized when possible.14  Furthermore, when there 
is doubt as to the meaning of a criminal statute, a court should 
apply the rule of lenity and interpret the statute in favor of 
the accused.15 
¶14 When 
the 
defendant 
committed 
the 
crime, 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
provided 
that 
a 
person 
who 
manufactures, distributes, or delivers more than 15 grams but 
not more than 40 grams of cocaine or cocaine base "shall be 
imprisoned for not less than 3 years nor more than 30 years."16  
Section 961.41 read in relevant part: 
961.41. Prohibited acts A——penalties. (1) Manufacture, 
distribution or delivery.  Except as authorized by 
this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, 
distribute 
or 
deliver 
a 
controlled 
substance or controlled substance analog.  Any person 
who violates this subsection with respect to: 
. . . . 
(cm) 
Cocaine 
or 
cocaine 
base, 
or 
a 
controlled 
substance analog of cocaine or cocaine base, is 
subject to the following penalties if the amount 
manufactured, distributed, or delivered is: 
. . . . 
                                                 
14 State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶30, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341. 
15 State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 322 N.W.2d 264 
(1982); State v. Wilson, 77 Wis. 2d 15, 28, 252 N.W.2d 64 
(1977). 
16 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
 
Again, 
all 
statutory 
references in our discussion are to the statutes as they read 
after TIS-I went into effect and before TIS-II went into effect, 
unless otherwise indicated.    
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
8 
 
3. More than 15 grams but not more than 40 grams, the 
person shall be fined not more than $500,000 and shall 
be imprisoned for not less than 3 years nor more than 
30 years.17 
¶15 The phrase "imprisoned for not less than 3 years" 
established 
a 
three-year 
minimum 
sentence 
known 
as 
a 
"presumptive minimum" sentence.  A sentencing court could impose 
a sentence of less than three years only if it found that the 
best interests of the community would be served and that the 
public would not be harmed by a lesser sentence and if the 
sentencing 
court 
placed 
its 
reasons 
on 
the 
record.18  
Furthermore, 
the 
sentence 
provision 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. made the offense of manufacturing, 
delivering, 
or 
distributing 
this 
amount 
of 
cocaine 
an 
"unclassified felony."  Unlike other felony offenses, which were 
classified as Class A, B, BC, D, or E felonies, with the maximum 
                                                 
17 Wis. Stat. § 961.41 (emphasis added).  Section 961.41 was 
later amended to provide that a person convicted of delivering 
more than 5 grams but not more than 15 grams of cocaine is 
guilty of a Class F felony.  See Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
(2001-02).  
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.438 provided as follows: 
961.438. Minimum sentence.  Any minimum sentence under 
this chapter is a presumptive minimum sentence. . . . 
[T]he court may impose a sentence that is less than 
the presumptive minimum sentence or may place the 
person on probation only if it finds that the best 
interests of the community will be served and the 
public will not be harmed and if it places its reasons 
on the record. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
9 
 
penalty for each class set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 973.0119 and 
961.41(1)(cm)3. established its own sentencing range independent 
of the felony classification system.  
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(1), TIS-I, adopted in 1998 
and in effect when the defendant committed the crime, created 
and established a unique definition of the word "imprisonment" 
in Wisconsin's sentencing statutes.20  Section 973.01 used the 
word 
"imprisonment" 
to 
refer 
to 
a 
"bifurcated 
sentence" 
consisting of "a term of confinement in prison followed by a 
term of extended supervision."21  Under § 973.01(1) a circuit 
court was required to impose a bifurcated sentence consisting of 
a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended 
supervision whenever it sentences a person to "imprisonment in 
the Wisconsin state prisons."22   
¶17 Section 973.01(1) read as follows: 
                                                 
19 For example, the penalty for a Class A felony was life 
imprisonment; for a Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 
60 years; for a Class E felony, a fine not to exceed $10,000 or 
imprisonment 
not 
to 
exceed 
five 
years, 
or 
both. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50. 
Most felony penalties that provided for presumptive minimum 
sentences were repealed effective February 1, 2003.  The 
unclassified felonies, including the offense in the present 
case, 
were 
made 
classified 
felonies. 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. (2001-2002). 
20 See 1997 Wis. Act 283. 
21 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1). 
22 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
10 
 
(1) Bifurcated sentence required.  Except as provided 
in sub. (3), whenever a court sentences a person to 
imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons for a 
felony committed on or after December 31, 1999, the 
court shall impose a bifurcated sentence that consists 
of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term 
of extended supervision under s. 302.113.23 
¶18   Subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. § 973.01 established 
the term of confinement and period of extended supervision for 
each 
bifurcated 
sentence. 
 
Paragraph 
(2)(a) 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01 provided that "the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum period of 
imprisonment for the felony."24  Paragraph (2)(b) established 
that the term of confinement in prison in a bifurcated sentence 
could "not be less than one year, subject to any minimum 
sentence prescribed for the felony."25  Moreover, for an 
unclassified felony such as the one at issue in this case, the 
term of confinement may not exceed "75% of the total length of 
the bifurcated sentence."26  Paragraph (2)(d) then established 
that the term of extended supervision following a term of 
confinement in a bifurcated sentence "may not be less than 25% 
of the length of the term of confinement in prison."27   
                                                 
23 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1) (emphasis added).  Subsection (1) 
of § 973.01 was amended by TIS-II.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1) 
(2001-02). 
24 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(a). 
25 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b). 
26 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6. 
27 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
11 
 
¶19 The relevant parts of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2) provided: 
(2) Structure of Bifurcated Sentences.  The court 
shall ensure that a bifurcated sentence imposed under 
sub. (1) complies with all of the following: 
(a) Total length of bifurcated sentence.  Except as 
provided in par. (c), the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum period 
of imprisonment for the felony. 
(b) Confinement portion of bifurcated sentence.  The 
portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term 
of confinement in prison may not be less than one 
year, subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for 
the felony, and, except as provided in par. (c), may 
not exceed whichever of the following is applicable: 
1. For a Class B felony, the term of confinement may 
not exceed 40 years. 
2. For a Class BC felony, the term of confinement may 
not exceed 20 years. 
3. For a Class C felony, the term of confinement may 
not exceed 10 years. 
4. For a Class D felony, the term of confinement may 
not exceed 5 years. 
5. For a Class E felony, the term of confinement may 
not exceed 2 years. 
6. For any felony other than a felony specified in 
subds. 1. to 5., the term of confinement in prison may 
not exceed 75 % of the total length of the bifurcated 
sentence. 
. . . . 
(d) Minimum term of extended supervision.  The term of 
extended 
supervision 
that 
follows 
the 
term 
of 
confinement in prison may not be less than 25% of the 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
12 
 
length of the term of confinement in prison imposed 
under par. (b).28 
¶20 Our task in the present case involves as much algebra 
as it does statutory interpretation.  All parties agree that the 
defendant's sentence had to be bifurcated.  Therefore, the 
following equation governs our discussion:  
Sentence (S) = Confinement (C) + Extended Supervision (ES) 
¶21 The defendant argues that the three-year presumptive 
minimum sentence should be interpreted so that (S), the 
sentence, equals three years, composed of confinement (C) plus 
extended supervision (ES).  Moreover, says the defendant, 
because the term of confinement for an unclassified felony may 
not exceed 75% of the total length of the sentence (S), 
confinement (C) in this case is 27 months (75% of three years).  
Therefore, 
under 
the 
defendant's 
calculation, 
extended 
supervision (ES) must be nine months.  
¶22 The State, on the other hand, argues that the three-
year presumptive minimum sentence must be read so that (C), 
confinement, equals three years.  Moreover, asserts the State, 
the extended supervision (ES) for the three-year presumptive 
minimum sentence in this case may be any term the circuit court 
imposes up to 27 years.  The State apparently reasons that the 
circuit court may impose any term of extended supervision not 
less than 25% of the term of confinement (nine months), as long 
as the term of confinement (C) plus the term of extended 
                                                 
28 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2) (emphasis added).  Subsection (2) 
of § 973.01 was amended by TIS-II.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2) 
(2001-02). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
13 
 
supervision (ES) does not exceed the maximum statutory sentence 
of 30 years.  The State also concedes that it is arguable that 
the presumptive minimum sentence calls for a term of extended 
supervision of exactly nine months (25% of three years), the 
minimum allowable period of extended supervision for a three-
year term of confinement    
¶23 As the court of appeals noted in its certification, 
both sides present reasonable arguments in support of their 
respective interpretations.  On the other hand, however, neither 
party's interpretations and arguments are without flaws.  Each 
party's position is vulnerable to criticism and might create 
unwelcome anomalies.  The truth of the matter is that TIS-I 
applies 
awkwardly 
to 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentences 
in 
unclassified felony statutes and it is impossible to cleanly and 
neatly reconcile the two statutes at issue in this case.   
II 
¶24 We first explore how to calculate the term of 
confinement under the statutes.     
¶25 Both 
parties 
rely 
on 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3., 
setting 
forth 
the 
presumptive 
minimum sentence, and Wis. Stat. §  973.01 (TIS-I), creating 
bifurcated sentences, to support their respective calculations 
of the term of confinement.  Both parties also rely on 
legislative history and legislative purpose.  We shall examine 
each in turn. 
A 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
14 
 
¶26 The phrase "shall be imprisoned for not less than 3 
years 
nor 
more 
than 
30 
years" 
appearing 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. predates TIS-I.29  Prior to TIS-I, 
the legislature did not define the word "imprisoned," and 
Wisconsin courts interpreted the word in a common-sense fashion 
to mean incarcerated or confined in a jail or prison.30 
¶27 As previously explained, however, when the legislature 
enacted TIS-I it gave a unique statutory explanation of the word 
"imprisonment." 
 
Specifically, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01 
defined 
sentences of "imprisonment" as bifurcated sentences including a 
term of confinement and a term of extended supervision.31 
¶28 The State argues that while TIS-I creates a new 
statutory definition for sentences of imprisonment, it is not 
clear that every reference in the statutes to "imprisonment" or 
"imprisoned" is consequently a reference to a bifurcated 
sentence as opposed to confinement alone. 
¶29 Indeed, the legislature has not been consistent in its 
use of the word "imprisonment" in TIS-I to mean a total of the 
                                                 
29 See Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1)(cm)3. (1989-90) (a defendant 
convicted of delivering more than 10 grams but not more than 40 
grams of cocaine "shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years 
nor more than 30 years.").  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 161 was 
renumbered ch. 961 in the 1995-96 Wisconsin Statutes. 
30 See 
State 
v. 
Meddaugh, 
148 
Wis. 2d 204, 
210, 
435 
N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing to dictionary definition of 
"imprison" as "to put in prison: confine in a jail" for guidance 
when interpreting the word "imprisoned" within drunk driving 
statute). 
31 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
15 
 
term of confinement and the term of extended supervision as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 973.01.  
Section 973.01 
is 
titled 
"bifurcated sentence of imprisonment and extended supervision," 
implying that "imprisonment" means the term of confinement 
within a bifurcated sentence.  Subsection (2)(a), however, then 
explains that the total length of a bifurcated sentence of 
confinement and extended supervision may not exceed "the maximum 
period 
of 
imprisonment 
for 
the 
felony," 
implying 
that 
"imprisonment" means the total sentence, including both a term 
of confinement and a term of extended supervision.32 
¶30 The State acknowledges that the word "imprisoned" in 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
means 
a 
bifurcated 
sentence 
totaling 30 years of confinement plus extended supervision when 
referring to the 30-year maximum sentence.  However, the State 
argues that the legislature intended the word "imprisoned" in 
§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. to mean only a term of confinement for 
purposes of the three-year presumptive minimum sentence.     
¶31 The State points out that the only express discussion 
of presumptive minimum sentences in Wis. Stat. § 973.01 is in 
reference to terms of confinement in a bifurcated sentence.  
Section 973.01(2)(b), titled "Confinement portion of bifurcated 
sentence," provides that the "portion of the bifurcated sentence 
that imposes a term of confinement in prison may not be less 
than one year, subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for 
                                                 
32 See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01 
("Bifurcated 
sentence 
of 
imprisonment 
and 
extended 
supervision"); 
973.01(2)(b) 
("Imprisonment portion of bifurcated sentence"). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
16 
 
the felony."  The State argues that the phrase "subject to any 
minimum sentence" modifies "term of confinement," not the total 
bifurcated sentence, and thus TIS-I must be construed as 
equating the presumptive minimum sentence with a "term of 
confinement."   
¶32 The State acknowledges that its interpretation of the 
statutes would require substantial judicial modification of the 
statutory language in Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. to reconcile 
its proposed outcome.  Specifically, the State argues that the 
penalty provision at issue is properly read as "shall be 
imprisoned [confined in prison] for not less than 3 years [on a 
bifurcated sentence of not] nor more than 30 years."  The State 
suggests 
that 
such 
modification 
is 
permissible 
when 
the 
legislative intent is clear.33   
¶33 The defendant responds, however, that even if it is 
true that the word "imprisoned" can mean either a term of 
confinement or a term of confinement plus a term of extended 
supervision, as the State argues, Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. 
uses the word "imprisoned" only once to refer to both the 
minimum sentence and the maximum sentence and therefore the word 
must have the same meaning for both kinds of sentences.  
                                                 
33 The 
State 
cites 
to 
2A 
A. 
Sutherland, 
Statutory 
Construction § 47:36, at 379-80 (6th ed. 2000) and State v. 
Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 534, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996) (a 
reviewing court "may insert words into a statute that are 
necessary or reasonably inferable" to avoid an unintended 
result). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
17 
 
¶34 The 
defendant 
reasons 
that 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(a) expressly provides that the maximum 
sentence for the crime, "imprisoned . . . [not] more than 30 
years," must be calculated by the term of confinement plus the 
term of extended supervision,34 "imprisoned for not less than 3 
years" must similarly mean that the presumptive minimum sentence 
of three years is calculated by totaling the term of confinement 
plus the term of extended supervision.  The defendant concludes 
that the term of confinement must therefore be less than three 
years. 
¶35 The State's interpretation, argues the defendant, 
reading the word "imprisoned" for purposes of the three-year 
presumptive minimum sentence as three years in confinement, but 
reading the word "imprisoned" for purposes of the 30-year 
statutory maximum sentence as the expression of a bifurcated 
sentence in which the total term of confinement and term of 
extended service cannot exceed 30 years, is contrary to both 
common sense and general rules of statutory interpretation.35   
                                                 
34 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(a) ("[T]he total length of the 
bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum period of 
imprisonment for the felony."). 
35 See, 
e.g., 
Gen. 
Castings 
Corp. 
v. 
Winstead, 
156 
Wis. 2d 752, 759, 457 N.W.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1990) ("We reject an 
interpretation which ascribes different meanings to the same 
word as it variously appears in a statute unless the context 
clearly requires such an approach.  This is all the more true 
where, as here, the word reappears in the same sentence of the 
statute at issue.  Such an interpretation borders on the 
unreasonable.  We must avoid such interpretations."). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
18 
 
¶36 The 
defendant 
further 
asserts 
that 
under 
his 
interpretation, because the term of confinement calculated under 
a TIS-I bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total 
length of the bifurcated sentence, the term of confinement to be 
imposed in this case in calculating the presumptive three-year 
minimum sentence should be 27 months——75% of three years.36 
¶37 We conclude that the language of both statutes, 
standing alone, creates more confusion than clarity; neither the 
State's position nor the defendant's position on the statutory 
language is sufficient.  The State demands that the language be 
substantially rewritten.  Yet even assuming arguendo that 
substantial revisions to the language of a statute can be 
justified when the intent of the legislature clearly requires 
those revisions, as will be discussed below, the intent of the 
legislature is not clear in the present case.  The defendant, on 
the other hand, looks too simply at the statutory language and 
asserts that consistency alone dictates his construction.  Yet 
his construction conflicts with the common-sense reading of the 
word "imprisoned" as confinement in prison and the working 
definition of "imprisonment" in Wisconsin case law prior to TIS-
I.  Moreover, as was made clear above, even under TIS-I the 
legislature sometimes used "imprisonment" to mean confinement 
                                                 
36 See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
19 
 
alone.37  Thus, we turn our attention to legislative history and 
legislative purpose. 
B 
¶38 The legislative history of TIS-I is equally wooly in 
providing insight into the appropriate calculation of the term 
of 
confinement 
for 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence 
of 
"imprisoned for not less than 3 years."  The legislative history 
of TIS-I is noticeably silent about the impact of TIS-I on 
presumptive minimum sentences.    
¶39 The State argues that the legislative drafting history 
supports its calculation.  The State explains that amendments 
were made to Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) (addressing statutory 
minimum 
sentences) 
and 
§ 973.01(2)(c) 
(addressing 
the 
calculation of penalty enhancers in a bifurcated sentence)38 by 
                                                 
37 Further proof of the statute's lack of clarity can be 
found in the parties' dispute over how a one-year prison 
sentence is to be interpreted.  The statutory phrase in issue is 
a "term of confinement in prison may not be less than one year, 
subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for the felony" in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b).  The State argues that this phrase 
sets an absolute floor of one year for a term of confinement in 
a bifurcated sentence and that the floor must be raised where 
(i.e., subject to) the minimum sentence for a given felony is 
greater than one year.  The defendant, on the other hand, argues 
that this phrase sets a one-year floor for a term of confinement 
where a minimum sentence is greater than one year but that the 
one-year floor can be lowered where (i.e., subject to) the 
minimum sentence allows.  The parties then dispute whether a 
one-year minimum sentence can be bifurcated to include a nine-
month term of confinement and remain a sentence to a "state 
prison" under Wis. Stat. § 973.02 (a sentence of less than one 
year cannot be to a state prison).  
38 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(2)(c) provided as follows:   
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
20 
 
the Legislative Reference Bureau in response to a request from 
the Governor's legal counsel.  The Governor's legal counsel 
wanted the legislation clarified to reflect that penalty 
enhancers apply to the confinement portion of a bifurcated 
sentence, not the total sentence,39 and the Drafter's Note 
indicates that in response to legal counsel's request, the TIS-I 
bill was modified to include both the penalty enhancers and 
statutory 
minimum 
sentences 
within 
subsection 
(2)(b) 
establishing the confinement portion of the bifurcated sentence.  
The Drafter's Note reads: 
6. 
This 
draft 
modifies 
proposed 
s. 
973.01(2)(b)(intro.) to make the general statement of 
the 
term 
of 
imprisonment 
[later 
changed 
to 
"confinement in prison"] subject both to minimums for 
specific crimes and to extension with applicable 
penalty enhancers.40   
The State concludes that the most reasonable inference from this 
drafting history is that presumptive minimum sentences, like 
                                                                                                                                                             
Penalty enhancement. The maximum term of confinement 
in prison specified in par. (b) may be increased by 
any applicable penalty enhancement.  If the maximum 
term of confinement in prison specified in par. (b) is 
increased under this paragraph, the total length of 
the bifurcated sentence that may be imposed is 
increased by the same amount. 
39  Memorandum from Stewart Simonson, Legal Counsel to the 
Governor, to Jefren Olsen, Legislative Reference Bureau, and 
accompanying Drafter's Note (January 22, 1997). 
40 Jefren E. Olsen, Drafter's Note from the LRB, LRB-
1128/1dn, LRB drafting file to 1997 Wis. Act 27.  The draft bill 
used the word "imprisonment" at the time the modification was 
made.  It was later changed to "confinement in prison." 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
21 
 
penalty enhancers, dictate the confinement portion of the 
bifurcated sentence, not the total sentence. 
¶40 The 
defendant, 
for 
his 
part, 
makes 
an 
equally 
compelling argument that the complete history of truth-in-
sentencing legislation in Wisconsin, which also includes 2001 
Wis. Act 109 (TIS-II), demonstrates the legislature's intent to 
eliminate most minimum sentences and treat those that remain as 
establishing the total length of a bifurcated sentence, not the 
term of confinement.  Although TIS-II does not govern the 
present case, the history and provisions of TIS-II may be 
accorded weight to aid us in determining what the legislature 
intended in TIS-I inasmuch as TIS-II was viewed as supplemental 
legislation necessary to implement the infrastructure created by 
TIS-I.41 
¶41 The Wisconsin legislature enacted TIS-I in June 1998, 
abandoning the state's indeterminate sentencing system and 
adopting a truth-in-sentencing regime in its stead.42  The law 
enacted in 1998 was just the first piece of the new regime.  The 
legislature established an 18-month window between the date TIS-
I was passed and the date it was to go into effect in order to 
give the newly established Criminal Penalties Study Committee 
(CPSC) 
time 
to 
supplement 
and 
complete 
the 
existing 
                                                 
41 See McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 104 Wis. 2d 414, 
427, 312 N.W.2d 37 (1981). 
42 Michael B. Brennan et al., Fully Implementing Truth-in-
Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 11. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
22 
 
legislation.43  While the CPSC timely completed its task, 
producing a lengthy report and statutory proposals for full 
implementation of truth-in-sentencing, the legislature failed to 
enact the proposals before TIS-I went into effect.44  
¶42 The legislature finally enacted a second truth-in-
sentencing law in July 2002.  TIS-II adopted many of the 
recommendations 
made 
in 
the 
CPSC 
report, 
including 
the 
recommendation 
that 
"provisions 
in 
criminal 
statutes 
establishing 
minimum 
sentences 
(presumptive 
or 
otherwise) . . . be repealed."45  Indeed, after TIS-II, all but 
two minimum sentences were repealed.  The crime for which the 
defendant was convicted in the present case, for example, is now 
a Class D felony subject to a "fine not to exceed $100,000 or 
imprisonment not to exceed 25 years, or both."46  The reason for 
the change, according to the CPSC, is to allow courts "maximum 
sentencing discretion to deal with the multitude of offenders 
                                                 
43 Id.; see also Wisconsin Legislative Council Information 
Memorandum 98-11, LRB-3154/1 (June 24, 1998). 
44 Brennan, supra note 42, at 12. 
45 State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee, 
Final 
Report, 
August 
31, 
1999, 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/secy/index.asp.  
46 See Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. (2001-02). 
Minimum sentences for all drug crimes were eliminated by 
repeal of Wis. Stat. § 961.432.  See 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1077. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
23 
 
who commit crimes and the multitude of ways in which they do 
so."47 
¶43 In addition to eliminating almost all presumptive 
minimum sentences, TIS-II expressly established the confinement 
portion of the remaining two presumptive minimum sentences at 
roughly 75% of the length of the TIS-I presumptive minimum 
sentence.  Repeat sex offenders and repeat serious violent 
offenders remain subject to presumptive minimum sentences under 
TIS-II.48  Under TIS-I, both types of repeat offenders were 
subject to sentences of "not less than 5 years' imprisonment," 
but under TIS-II they are now subject to a bifurcated minimum 
sentence with a term of confinement of not less than three years 
and six months.49  That is, the TIS-I (and pre-TIS-I) five-year 
presumptive minimum prison sentence was converted under TIS-II 
to a term of confinement of not less than three years and six 
months. 
¶44 According to the defendant, consideration of this 
entire 
history 
of 
TIS 
legislation 
makes 
clear 
that 
the 
legislature intended to increase sentencing discretion at the 
lower end of the sentencing range, not rigidly set minimum terms 
of confinement, and also intended that the remaining presumptive 
minimum sentences be interpreted as bifurcated sentences with 
                                                 
47 State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee, 
Final 
Report, 
August 
31, 
1999, 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/secy/index.asp. 
48 See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.623-24 (2001-02). 
49 Id. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
24 
 
the term of confinement at 75% of the minimum number of years 
set forth in the statute.  The TIS-I (and pre-TIS-I) three-year 
presumptive minimum sentence, argues the defendant, should 
similarly be converted under TIS-I to 27 months. 
¶45 In short, as was true of the statutory language, the 
legislative 
history 
is 
inconclusive 
in 
determining 
the 
correctness of the State's or defendant's calculations.  The 
drafting 
history 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6. 
properly 
supports the State's interpretation.  On the other hand, 
consideration of the entire history of Truth-in-Sentencing 
legislation in Wisconsin, including both TIS-I and TIS-II, 
suggests the defendant's position was what the legislature 
envisioned.    
C 
¶46 Meanwhile, both parties argue that the legislature's 
purpose of linking the TIS-I "term of confinement" with 
indeterminate 
sentencing 
lengths 
supports 
their 
respective 
positions.   
¶47 TIS-I 
expressly 
increased 
the 
maximum 
period of 
imprisonment for felony offenses.  With regard to unclassified 
felonies, maximum penalties were increased by 50% or one year, 
whichever was greater.50  The drafting history for TIS-I suggests 
that the reason for the increase in the maximum penalties for 
unclassified 
felonies 
was 
to 
keep 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
                                                 
50 Memorandum from Stewart Simonson, Legal Counsel to the 
Governor, to Jefren Olsen, Legislative Reference Bureau, at 2 
(January 22, 1997). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
25 
 
confinement roughly equal to the maximum sentence under the now-
abrogated indeterminate sentencing scheme.51   
¶48 For example, the maximum penalty for the defendant's 
crime in this case was 20 years under indeterminate sentencing 
and was raised by 50% to 30 years under TIS-I.  The maximum term 
of confinement under TIS-I on a 30-year maximum sentence for an 
unclassified felony would then have been 22.5 years (75% of the 
maximum penalty), which represents a slight increase though 
roughly the same length as the 20-year maximum indeterminate 
sentence. 
¶49 The State argues that the defendant's position that a 
27-month term of confinement be imposed is unreasonable in light 
of the legislature's goal of increasing TIS-I maximum sentences 
so that the maximum term of confinement is equal to or greater 
than the total indeterminate maximum penalty.  The State reasons 
that if the correct term of confinement here is 27 months, the 
TIS-I term of confinement would be less than the three-year 
presumptive minimum indeterminate sentence for the same crime.  
The State contends that the legislature would not have increased 
the maximum sentence under TIS-I while simultaneously decreasing 
the presumptive minimum sentence without clearly expressing 
these inconsistent goals.   
¶50 A difficulty with the State's position, however, is 
that it ignores the realities of indeterminate sentencing.  
                                                 
51 Id. ("The maximum term of imprisonment would equal the 
pre-increase maximum sentence."). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
26 
 
Under indeterminate sentencing, offenders rarely served their 
entire prison sentence confined in prison; offenders were 
required to be released after serving 2/3 of their sentences 
(barring any additional time imposed for misconduct) and 
offenders were eligible for even earlier release through parole 
(which generally became available after an offender served the 
greater of 25% of a court-imposed sentence or six months.)52  In 
the present case, for example, a three-year sentence under 
indeterminate sentencing would have meant that the offender 
could be released from prison after two years. 
¶51 Interpreting 
a 
three-year 
presumptive 
minimum 
to 
require only 27 months of confinement, as the defendant asserts, 
better fits the legislative goal of rough equality with the 
"term of confinement" served under an indeterminate sentence.   
¶52 Moreover, the defendant's calculation of a 27-month 
term 
of 
confinement 
is 
supported 
by 
TIS-II. 
 
At 
the 
recommendation of the CPSC, the legislature accounted for the 
impact of mandatory release on indeterminate sentencing in TIS-
II by making the maximum initial term of confinement for each 
crime under TIS-II roughly parallel to the maximum the offender 
would have served in prison before reaching his mandatory 
release 
date 
under 
the 
indeterminate 
sentencing 
system.53  
Furthermore, the legislature's amendment of the remaining two 
                                                 
52 See Wisconsin Legislative Council Information Memorandum 
98-11, LRB-3154/1, at 5 (June 24, 1998). 
53 Brennan, supra note 42, at 12. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
27 
 
presumptive minimum sentences in TIS-II, from "not less than 5 
years' imprisonment" to a term of confinement of not less than 
three 
years 
and 
six 
months, 
parallels 
the 
defendant's 
calculation of 27 months for the presumptive minimum sentence of 
not less than three years. 
¶53 Even accounting for mandatory release, the State 
contends that its position is correct.  According to the State, 
by leaving presumptive minimum sentences alone under TIS-I, 
confinement time for presumptive minimums increased in the same 
proportion 
that 
confinement 
time 
for 
maximum 
sentences 
increased.  That is, accounting for mandatory release dates, a 
three-year presumptive minimum sentence increased from two years 
in prison to three years in prison, an increase roughly parallel 
to the jump from a 20-year indeterminate maximum sentence for 
the present offense to a 22.5-year maximum term of confinement 
for the present offense under TIS-I. 
¶54 According to the State, the legislature apparently 
intended to increase the confinement time for both presumptive 
minimum sentences and maximum sentences under TIS-I.  Yet the 
legislature increased the maximum sentence at issue here and at 
the same time left the minimum sentence untouched.  It simply 
does not make sense that the legislature would intend to 
increase both maximum and minimum sentences by changing the 
former and not the latter.  If the legislature's goal was to 
increase confinement time at both ends of the sentencing range, 
it would have increased the presumptive minimum penalty by the 
same proportion it increased the maximum penalty. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
28 
 
¶55 Although both parties assert that their respective 
positions support the legislature's purpose in linking TIS-I 
term of confinement with indeterminate sentencing lengths, the 
defendant seems to have the stronger argument. 
III 
¶56 We next explore how to compute the term of extended 
supervision. 
Section 973.01(2)(d) 
provides 
that 
for 
all 
felonies, "the term of extended supervision that follows a term 
of confinement may not be less than 25% of the length of the 
term of confinement."  When calculating a presumptive minimum 
sentence, one would presume that the shortest term of extended 
supervision——25% of the length of the term of confinement——would 
be 
adopted. 
 
Importantly, 
however, 
it 
is 
mathematically 
impossible to minimize the term of extended supervision for an 
unclassified felony.  As will become clear below, a bifurcated 
sentence for an unclassified felony cannot include a term of 
confinement that does not exceed 75% of the total sentence and 
also include a period of extended supervision that is only 25% 
of the term of confinement. 
¶57 The importance of this statutory mathematical formula 
is that it further complicates the coherence of both the State's 
and the defendant's calculations of the three-year presumptive 
minimum sentence in the present case.  In their briefs and at 
oral argument, both parties presented positions on the actual 
breakdown of confinement time and extended supervision in a 
presumptive minimum sentence, should their interpretation of the 
phrase "imprisoned for not less than 3 years" prevail.   
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
29 
 
¶58 The defendant argues that the term of confinement for 
a three-year presumptive minimum sentence is 27 months, or 75% 
of the total length of incarceration.  Therefore, extended 
supervision would have to be nine months in order for the 
bifurcated sentence to total three years.  This calculation is 
odd, however, because the minimum term of extended supervision 
for 
a 
27-month 
term 
of 
confinement 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d) would be 6.75 months, or 25% of the 
term of confinement.  Yet a term of extended supervision of 6.75 
months would lead to a sentence of less than three years.    
¶59 The State, on the other hand, argues that the 
presumptive minimum sentence in the present case is 36 months 
(three years) of confinement and nine months of extended 
supervision, since nine months is exactly 25% of the length of 
the term of confinement, the lowest possible term of extended 
supervision allowed under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d).  Again, 
however, as mentioned above, the State's favored sentence is 
contrary to the requirement in § 973.01(2)(b)6. that the term of 
confinement not exceed 75% of the total length of the bifurcated 
sentence.  Thirty-six months is 80% of the total 45-month 
sentence suggested by the State.  In order to comply with the 
maximum term of confinement and still minimize the term of 
extended 
supervision 
allowed 
under 
§ 973.01 
(TIS-I), 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence 
according 
to 
the 
State's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3. is a term of 
confinement for three years and a term of extended supervision 
of one year——33% of the length of the term of confinement. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
30 
 
¶60 Once on this path of expanding the term of extended 
supervision beyond the statutory minimum, however, it is hard to 
determine the proper ending point for the State's argument.  The 
State's argument merely establishes a cap on the term of 
confinement for a presumptive minimum sentence, leaving wide 
open the length of extended supervision a circuit court may 
impose.  The only limit on total sentence length would be the 
maximum period of imprisonment for the felony, which, in this 
case, is 30 years.  Thus, under the State's view, sentences of 
three years of confinement plus nine months of extended 
supervision, three years of confinement plus three years of 
extended supervision, and three years of confinement plus 27 
years of extended supervision are all presumptive minimum 
sentences.  It is difficult to imagine that the legislature 
intended the only difference between the presumptive minimum 
sentence and the statutory maximum sentence to be the number of 
years of confinement imposed, not the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence. 
IV 
¶61 Wisconsin's 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
legislation 
was 
enacted 
in 
response 
to 
calls 
for 
greater 
certainty 
and 
uniformity regarding periods of incarceration for offenders.54  
It was designed to create a more determinate sentencing 
structure for all felons.55  Yet as the instant case makes clear, 
                                                 
54 Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau 
Brief 
02-7, 
Truth-in-
Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision, at 1 (August 2002). 
55 Id. 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
31 
 
the truth of the sentence is hard to discern, and the term of 
confinement and term of extended supervision for a presumptive 
minimum 
sentence 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.01 
(TIS-I) 
are 
uncertain.  The language of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1)(cm)3. and 
973.01 (TIS-I) can be read to support multiple calculations of a 
presumptive minimum sentence, and the legislative history and 
purpose point in several directions. 
¶62 Still, come to a conclusion we must, and when we 
consider all the arguments set forth above by both parties, we 
conclude that more factors point to the conclusion that the 
legislature intended for 
a 
three-year 
presumptive minimum 
sentence for an unclassified felony to be a bifurcated sentence 
totaling three years and including a term of confinement of 27 
months and a period of extended supervision of nine months.     
¶63 We reach this conclusion for five different reasons.  
First, it is difficult to conclude that the single word 
"imprisoned," used once in Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3., has two 
different meanings, one for a presumptive minimum sentence and 
another for the maximum penalty.   
¶64 Second, 
it 
is 
unreasonable 
to 
assume 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
increase 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence in the present case to a term of confinement for three 
years in the face of its decision in TIS-II to repeal all but 
two presumptive minimum sentences and to reduce the term of 
confinement of those two offenses to less than the prior 
presumptive minimum sentence.  The unreasonableness of this 
interpretation 
in 
the face 
of the 
full 
history of TIS 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
32 
 
legislation outweighs the fact that the only mention of minimum 
sentences under Wis. Stat. § 973.01 is in subsection (2)(b) 
establishing the term of confinement and the drafting record 
indicating that this language was placed there intentionally.  
¶65 Third, 
it 
is 
unreasonable 
to 
assume 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
increase 
the 
presumptive 
minimum 
sentence in the present case to a full three-year term of 
confinement by leaving the minimum sentence the same as it was 
pre-TIS-I in the face of its decision to increase the maximum 
period of confinement under TIS-I by clearly and expressly 
increasing maximum sentences from their pre-TIS-I levels.    
¶66 Finally, it is unreasonable to construe a bifurcated 
presumptive minimum sentence of "not less than 3 years nor more 
than 30 years" to be capable of lasting a total of 30 years.  
Even though the defendant's calculation of nine months of 
extended supervision for a 27-month term of confinement fails to 
minimize the period of extended supervision, the alternative 
interpretation offered by the State suggests no reasonable 
stopping point for extended supervision short of the 30-year 
maximum 
sentence 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3.  
While TIS-I clearly permits sentences with as much range as the 
State suggests, a bifurcated presumptive minimum sentence must 
somehow minimize both the term of confinement and period of 
extended supervision.  
¶67 In addition, even if one believes that the arguments 
on both sides are equally weighted, Wisconsin law provides that 
a court must favor a milder penalty over a harsher penalty when 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
33 
 
there is doubt concerning the severity of the penalty prescribed 
by statute.56  This rule of lenity provides generally that 
ambiguous penal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the 
defendant.57  More specifically, the rule of lenity comes into 
play after two conditions are met: (1) the penal statute is 
ambiguous; and (2) we are unable to clarify the intent of the 
legislature by resort to legislative history.58 
¶68 In the present case, if the conclusion is that the 
statutes are indeed confusing, and the true intent of the 
legislature cannot be discerned from the legislative history and 
the legislative purpose, we must adopt the construction that 
results in imposition of the less severe sentence.  Here, that 
is the construction offered by the defendant. 
¶69 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that a term of 
confinement of 27 months and a term of extended supervision of 
nine months is the presumptive minimum sentence for confinement 
under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(cm)3.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
                                                 
56 Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 289. 
57 See State v. Kittilstad, 231 Wis. 2d 245, 267, 603 
N.W.2d 732 (1999) ("The rule of lenity was developed in the 
federal courts and holds that where a criminal statute is 
ambiguous, it should be interpreted in a defendant's favor.  The 
rule of lenity is 'echoed in the familiar Wisconsin rule that 
'penal statutes are generally construed strictly to safeguard a 
defendant's rights.'") (internal citations omitted). 
58 State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 415, 565 N.W.2d 506 
(1997) (citing Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 289; Wilson, 77 Wis. 2d at 
28). 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
34 
 
order of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit 
court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
02-0681-CR   
 
 
 
1