Title: Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, Inc.

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36601 
 
HARRIS, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
 
       Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
FOXHOLLOW CONSTRUCTION & 
TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
L.N. JOHNSON PAVING, LLC, a limited 
liability company,  
 
       Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
DAVID EGAN, an individual, FERGUSON 
FARMS, d/b/a FERGUSON TRUCKING, D. 
KYM FERGUSON, an individual, and 
MICHAEL FERGUSON, an individual, 
 
       Defendants-Counterclaimants-     
       Respondents. 
_______________________________________ 
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Idaho Falls, August 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No. 109 
 
Filed: November 2, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Jefferson County.  Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
 
Norman G. Reece, Jr., P.C., Chubbuck, argued for appellant.  
 
Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Idaho Falls, for respondent L.N. Johnson Paving, 
LLC.  John M. Ohman argued.   
 
William H. Mulberry, Ririe, argued for respondent Fergusons.   
 
David Egan, Idaho Falls, respondent pro se.  
_______________________ 
 
 
2  
 
J. JONES, Justice. 
 
This case involves an action for breach of contract and attendant claims of breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud, and indemnification. After a 
bench trial, Harris, Inc. (Harris), the plaintiff, lost on all claims. We affirm the district court’s 
judgment, except for its attorney fee awards, which we vacate.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In early 2002, David Egan, a business manager for Foxhollow Construction and Trucking, 
Inc.1 (Foxhollow),  met with Wayne Johnson (Wayne) of L.N. Johnson Paving, LLC (Johnson) to 
discuss a bid for excavation and paving work for a new public high school in Fremont County (the 
Fremont Project). Egan wanted to bid on the Fremont Project on behalf of Foxhollow, but 
Foxhollow lacked the requisite public works license. Johnson had a public works license for 
contracts up to $500,000.00.  Wayne thought Johnson’s license could cover Foxhollow if Johnson 
and Foxhollow submitted a single bid in Johnson’s name.  So, Egan submitted a subcontract bid in 
Johnson’s name to Harris, a general contractor, for the Fremont Project’s excavation, filling, 
grading, culvert, and asphalt paving work.  Wayne and Egan planned for Johnson to handle the 
paving work and for Foxhollow to do the excavation, filling, grading, and culvert work.   
Foxhollow and Johnson had a relationship with Harris before the Fremont Project.  Both 
companies worked on the Midway Middle School project in Rigby under an arrangement similar to 
the one they planned for the Fremont Project.  Foxhollow also was working independently for 
Harris on a separate contract for a water and sewer project in Jefferson County (the Jefferson 
Project).  Johnson had worked independently on the Jefferson Project as well.   
Johnson was the successful bidder for Harris’ paving and excavation subcontract on the 
Fremont Project.  Egan, Wayne, and Scott Harris (Scott), acting for Harris, met at Harris’ offices in 
Chubbuck to discuss the bid and the subcontract.  Egan and Wayne, despite placing a single bid, 
asked Scott to write out separate contracts for Foxhollow and Johnson—the “site work portion” in 
Johnson’s name, and the “structural excavation of the building” in Foxhollow’s name.  In mid-June 
2003, Fremont County Joint School District awarded Harris the construction contract for the 
                                                 
1 Foxhollow Construction and Trucking, Inc. is a now-defunct Idaho corporation.  The district court dismissed 
Foxhollow from the case for lack of notice because there was no indication it was served.   
 
3  
 
Fremont Project.  Harris started work on the Fremont Project soon thereafter.  In late June 2003, 
Egan, acting on Johnson’s behalf, signed a contract with Harris for excavation, filling, grading, 
culvert, and paving work on the Fremont Project.  Under that contract, Harris agreed to pay 
Johnson $409,363.00, much of which was earmarked for Foxhollow’s excavation, filling, grading, 
and culvert work.  Demian Egan, as Foxhollow’s president, signed a separate contract with Harris 
in July 2003 for $245,705.00 for excavation, filling, grading, and culvert work.  The ultimate 
contractual arrangement and division of work between Foxhollow and Johnson is unclear because 
both companies had written agreements describing much of the same work.2  But, it is clear that 
Harris paid Johnson for work on the Fremont Project and Johnson forwarded those payments to 
Foxhollow.  In addition, Harris paid some of Foxhollow’s payroll to avoid Foxhollow’s potential 
mismanagement of its cashflows.3  Egan was one of the Foxhollow employees that Harris paid 
directly. 
Egan requested progress payments for billing, payroll, and other incurred expenses, near 
the end of each month while Foxhollow and Johnson were involved with the Fremont Project.  
Melvin Voss, a Foxhollow employee, kept track of the rented equipment Foxhollow used on the 
Fremont Project.  Foxhollow’s equipment suppliers sent invoices to Voss.  In turn, Voss submitted 
the invoices to Tony Robles, a Harris employee.  Harris would not make progress payments until 
all materialmen and equipment suppliers were paid.  Harris issued payments based on 
communications with Egan and Voss. 
In early August 2002, Harris agreed to a change order, which added $16,500.00 to 
Johnson’s subcontract.  With this change, Johnson’s subcontract totaled $425,863.00.  Then, in 
September 2002, Harris agreed to a second change order, which added $41,983.20 to Johnson’s 
                                                 
2 Scott knew Foxhollow did not have a public works license.  And as the district court pointed out, “subcontracting 
more than eighty percent (80%) of the work under any contract to be performed by him” as a public works 
contractor was illegal.  I.C. § 54-1902(2).  Furthermore, it is “unlawful for any public works contractor to: (a) 
Accept a bid from any person who at that time does not possess the appropriate license for the project involved; or 
(b) Accept bids to sublet any part of any contract for specialty construction from a specialty contractor who at that 
time does not possess the appropriate license.”  I.C. § 54-1902(3).  This latter requirement, that a contractor have a 
license before bidding, is waived, in part, for contracts funded by federal funds, but any successful contractor must 
ultimately obtain a license.  I.C. § 54-1902(4).  
 
3 The district court found that Harris claimed Egan and Melvin Voss, another Foxhollow employee, on Harris’ tax 
returns in order to derive an unjust tax benefit.  The court concluded that Egan and Voss were never employed by 
Harris. 
 
4  
 
subcontract, for a new total of $467,846.20.  Shortly after the second change order, in mid-
September 2002, Scott received letters from two equipment suppliers demanding payment for 
rental equipment Foxhollow used on the Fremont Project.  Pro-Rentals & Sales, Inc. demanded 
$7,781.014 and Western States, Inc. demanded $51,000.00.  At the same time, Foxhollow owed 
Ferguson Farms, in which Kym Ferguson (Kym) was a partner,5 about $75,000.00 for leased 
equipment.   
Neither Johnson nor Foxhollow notified Harris of any accounts owing for any rental 
equipment.  In late September 2002, Scott did receive a letter from Foxhollow’s lawyers stating 
that Foxhollow had paid all equipment suppliers except Western States and that Foxhollow was not 
in default on its obligations on the Fremont Project.  Harris, relying on this letter, sent no payment 
to Pro-Rentals.  Rather, Harris issued another round of payroll checks to Foxhollow employees for 
work on the Fremont Project.  Then, just one week later, on September 27, 2002, Scott sent a letter 
to Wayne notifying him that Johnson and Foxhollow were in default on the Fremont Project.  Scott 
apparently proposed a schedule to cure the default.  Johnson never responded to Scott’s letter.  In 
late September 2002, Ferguson Farms took its equipment off the Fremont Project.  The trial court 
was unable to discern which party, Foxhollow or Johnson, defaulted on specific aspects of the 
agreement because the contracts with Harris had no clear division of work.  Johnson itself did not 
perform any work on the Fremont Project.  In early October 2002, Scott and Kym agreed that 
Ferguson Farms would return Ferguson’s equipment to the Fremont Project and Harris would pay 
Ferguson Farms directly, rather than through Foxhollow.  Ferguson Farms worked on the Fremont 
Project for the most part in October 2002.  Harris paid Ferguson Farms for work in March 2004, 
after Ferguson Farms threatened Harris with a lawsuit.   
In mid-December 2002, despite the apparent default, Harris sent Johnson a check, payable 
to Johnson and L&M leveling, for $8,000.00 for some of Foxhollow’s work on the Fremont 
Project.  Johnson’s lawyer returned the check with a letter denying that Johnson ever had a contract 
                                                 
4 This amount was for equipment Foxhollow used on the Fremont Project and the Jefferson Project.  
5 D. Kym Ferguson and Michael Ferguson were partners in Ferguson Farms.  Ferguson Farms, doing business as 
Ferguson Trucking, was one of Foxhollow’s equipment suppliers.  Kym and Michael Ferguson were also officers of 
Foxhollow until late September 2002, when they resigned from the Foxhollow board and sold their Foxhollow 
stock.   
 
5  
 
with Harris for the Fremont Project and denying any knowledge of L&M Landleveling.6  
Harris subsequently brought this action, alleging that (1) Foxhollow, Johnson, and the 
Fergusons (Kym, Michael and Ferguson Farms) breached their subcontracts with Harris; (2) the 
defendants were unjustly enriched as a result of their unsatisfied obligations; (3) the defendants 
breached duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to Harris under the contracts; (4) the 
defendants made fraudulent representations to Harris; and (5) Harris is entitled to indemnification 
from Foxhollow and Johnson for an earlier judgment entered against Harris.  Egan filed a 
counterclaim for indemnification from Harris.  The Fergusons filed a counterclaim alleging that 
Harris breached an equipment rental contract that Harris had with them.   
The district court dismissed Foxhollow as a party for lack of proof of notice because there 
was no indication that Foxhollow was ever served.  After a bench trial, the court held that Harris 
had abandoned its claims against the Fergusons for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and indemnification.  The court granted Harris’ motion for “directed 
verdict” as to Egan’s counterclaim, and it granted Harris summary judgment as to the Fergusons’ 
counterclaim.  Finally, the court concluded that Harris failed to prove any of its remaining claims 
against any of the defendants and therefore was not entitled to relief.  The court denied Harris’ 
motion for a new trial.  The court also awarded fees and costs to Johnson and the Fergusons.  
Harris timely appealed.  
 
Harris now argues that the district court: (1) erred in concluding Harris failed to prove 
contract damages; (2) erred in concluding that no defendant was unjustly enriched; (3) erred in 
concluding that no defendant is liable for fraud; (4) erred in concluding that Harris was not entitled 
to indemnity; (5) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion to amend findings and 
conclusion; (6) abused its discretion in granting fees and costs to Johnson and the Fergusons; and 
(7) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion for a new trial. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Although Harris asserts numerous claims of error, the main thrust of its argument is that the 
district court erred in concluding the evidence it submitted regarding damages was insufficient. 
The district court observed that Harris was likely entitled to damages against Johnson for breach of 
                                                 
6 It is unclear from the record who L&M Landleveling is. 
 
6  
 
contract but that Harris had failed to adequately establish any specific amount of damages 
attributable to Johnson’s breach. We find no error in the district court’s conclusion.  
A. 
Standard of Review. 
 
We review a district court’s bench trial decisions to determine “whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.”  
Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409, 413 (2006).  
This Court will set aside findings of fact only when clearly erroneous.  Id.  We will not disturb 
findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, “even if the evidence is conflicting.”  
Id.  “It is the province of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses.”  Thorn Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 137 Idaho 480, 484, 
50 P.3d 975, 979 (2002).  We, therefore, liberally construe a trial court’s findings “in favor of the 
judgment entered.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  When it comes to matters of law, 
however, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions; this Court is free to “draw its own 
conclusions from the facts presented.”  Id. 
B. 
The district court did not err in concluding that Harris failed to prove contract 
damages. 
1. 
Harris failed to prove contract damages against Johnson. 
The district court concluded that Harris and Johnson had a contract for the Fremont 
Project and that the contract included an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The 
court determined that Johnson failed to finish its work under its contract and therefore breached.  
The court also determined that Johnson breached the implied duty of good faith because Johnson 
claimed that no contract for the Fremont Project ever existed. At trial, it was undisputed that 
Harris suffered damages as a result of Johnson’s failure to perform.  But the court found Harris’ 
evidence too speculative to attribute any amount of damages to Johnson.   
Scott testified that Harris incurred a cost of “around $147,000.00” to finish the Fremont 
Project paving after Johnson breached.  Harris also supported its damage claim with a document 
entitled “Job Cost Ledger – Financial Analysis.”  The district court found that even though the 
ledger does list payments to Johnson, Foxhollow, and Egan, there are no dates to indicate when 
payments were made.  The court also noted that the ledger shows the Johnson subcontract as 
being only 63% complete, “despite the fact that the ‘data date’ was December 31, 2003.” The 
 
7  
 
court acknowledged that Harris submitted a “Continuation Sheet,” which Harris claimed 
evidenced its damages, but the court observed that the Continuation Sheet was for work 
completed through August 31, 2002.  Thus, the court concluded that Harris did not prove how 
much it spent to complete Johnson’s work.  The court noted also that Harris did not offer any 
“third-party invoices of labor, supplies or materials needed to finish the Jo[h]nson subcontract.” 
Accordingly, the court held that Harris failed to prove any damages suffered because of 
Johnson’s breach and therefore was not entitled to recover.  
On appeal, Harris argues that its evidence did prove damages. First, Harris contends that 
the Continuation Sheets, when coupled with Scott’s testimony, imply that Harris paid Johnson 
for work that Johnson never performed. Harris also asserts that a number of documents it 
introduced in evidence, when viewed together, prove damages.  Harris further attributes the 
settlement payment it made to the Fergusons in March 2004 to Johnson’s breach.  Harris also 
argues that a money judgment it paid Pro Rentals because of unpaid rental equipment was due to 
Johnson’s breach.  Finally, Harris contends that Scott’s testimony as to Harris’ damages was not 
speculative because it was based on his personal knowledge.  All of this evidence, according to 
Harris, “clearly show[s] several examples of damages [Harris] incurred.”  At oral argument, 
counsel for Harris stated that in a motion in the district court he attempted to “step the court 
through what  . . . the evidence showed as to the precise amounts of damages.”  And Harris’ 
counsel tried to explain to the Court just how each of those documents added up to prove 
damages.   
 
At trial, Johnson denied ever making a contract with Harris, but in this Court Johnson 
apparently concedes that a contract existed or, at least, did not dispute the district court’s 
conclusion in that regard.  Johnson only argues that Harris failed to prove damages with any sort 
of accuracy.  Johnson focuses on the imprecise language Scott used to describe Harris’ damages 
after Johnson’s breach.  Johnson also reiterates the district court’s finding that Harris failed to 
produce any invoices or receipts from third parties that tend to prove damages. 
 
Harris’ arguments are unavailing because Harris simply asks this Court to retry the facts.  
Our deferential review requires a liberal construction of the evidence in favor of the judgment 
entered.  Even if Harris’ evidence could support other findings—which does not appear to be the 
case—this Court will not disturb the trial court’s findings that are supported by substantial and 
 
8  
 
competent evidence. The district court’s analysis of the documents submitted in evidence was 
succinct and accurate. The evidence does not indicate when payments were issued to Johnson, 
nor is there any evidence of payments to third parties made because of Johnson’s breach.  In its 
opinion denying Harris’ motion to amend, the court pointed out that it was not even clear from 
the evidence when Johnson defaulted on its subcontract.  Furthermore, the district court 
concluded that testimony about damages was speculative.  That court had the opportunity to, and 
based on its detailed findings did, weigh all the evidence before it.  The court’s findings were 
consistent with that evidence and thus not clearly erroneous. 
The facts in the record support only one conclusion: Harris’ contract action against 
Johnson fails because Harris failed to prove up its claim for damages.  “The burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured but that its injury was the result of the defendant’s 
breach; both amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty.”  Griffith v. Clear 
Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007).  “Reasonable certainty” 
does not mean that damages need to be proven with “mathematical exactitude,” but it does 
require a plaintiff to prove that damages are not merely speculative.  Id.  Here, the facts indicate 
that Harris had to hire a third-party to finish work under Johnson’s contract.  But there is no 
evidence to prove, with reasonable certainty, the amount Harris paid that third party.  Scott’s 
testimony that Harris spent “around $147,000.00” to “finish” Johnson’s work does not prove 
damages with reasonable certainty.  There are no invoices from, or evidence of payments to, 
another subcontractor that Harris hired to fulfill Johnson’s obligations. Because there was an  
overlap between the Johnson subcontract and the Foxhollow contract and no clear explanation in 
documentary evidence or trial testimony as to which entity failed to complete what work, it 
would not be possible to determine the allocation of damages between the two entities even if 
Harris’ documents did contain accurate damage information. Accordingly, Harris’ breach of 
contract claim against Johnson fails for lack of proper proof of damages.  
Harris’ claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Johnson 
also fails.  Because the covenant is implied in contract, it results in contract damages.  Bybee v. 
Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 260, 178 P.3d 616, 625 (2008).  As discussed, Harris failed to prove its 
contractual damages arising from Johnson’s breach.  So, Harris’ claim for breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing against Johnson cannot succeed.   
 
9  
 
2. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit 
Harris’ Exhibits 55 and 55-A. 
Harris also argues that the district court erred in refusing to admit Harris’ Exhibits 55 and 
55-A, which Harris contends are supportive of its claim for damages.  We review a trial court’s 
decision whether to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.  Slack v. 
Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 924, 104 P.3d 958, 966 (2004).  Whether there is a proper foundation 
upon which to admit evidence is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.  Id. at 921, 104 P.3d 
at 963. 
Exhibit 55 was apparently a printed “job cost journal” that had some hand-written 
annotations on it. Upon objection by Johnson and the Fergusons, the trial judge declined to admit 
Exhibit 55 because of concerns about its authenticity.  While attempting to authenticate Exhibit 
55, Harris’ counsel asked Scott who had written on the document.  Scott testified, “I may have.  
I’m not a hundred percent sure.”  When asked whether a Harris employee made the annotation, 
Scott said, “It, it [sic] probably was either me or Cindy.”  Harris contends Scott’s testimony that 
“the handwriting on the exhibit was probably his own or that of a Harris employee—and not 
anyone outside of Harris, Inc.,” should have satisfied any authenticity concerns the trial judge 
had. 
Harris’ argument is unavailing. The trial judge declined to admit Exhibit 55 because 
Harris was unable to identify with certainty who altered the document with the handwriting. 
According to the judge, “we don’t know who added the handwriting or where they got their 
information.” The judge sustained the objection to admission of Exhibit 55 because of his 
concern about the “reliability of the accuracy of that document and the information that’s 
handwritten on there, which alters the original document.” Authentication or identification of 
documentary evidence is a condition precedent to its admissibility. I.R.E. 901. The district court 
was not satisfied with the testimony Harris presented in support of admission of the document.  
This was a matter squarely within the judge’s discretion and there is no indication he abused that 
discretion.  Thus, the court’s refusal to admit Exhibit 55 was not error. 
Harris also offered Exhibit 55-A, which was a version of Exhibit 55 that did not contain 
the handwritten annotations.  The trial judge declined to admit Exhibit 55-A because Harris had 
not disclosed it to opposing counsel before trial, as required by the court’s Scheduling Order.  
 
10  
 
The court recognized that Exhibit 55-A probably was a business record, but was concerned that 
the defendants did not have time to conduct discovery in light of information contained in the 
exhibit.   
Harris argues that it “indicated to the court that most, if not all, the documents” that 
supported the figures and calculations of Exhibit 55-A had been disclosed during discovery.  
Harris also contends that it made all the files in Scott’s possession available to each defendant 
during Scott’s deposition.  And, Harris argues that it did include a version of Exhibit 55-A in its 
pre-trial exhibit disclosures—namely, Exhibit 55—in accordance with the court’s Scheduling 
Order, and therefore Exhibit 55-A should have been admitted.  Finally, Harris states that Exhibit 
55 should have been admitted because the court admitted another exhibit that defense counsel 
also objected to as late or violative of the court’s Scheduling Order.  Johnson counters by simply 
reiterating that Harris failed to comply with the Scheduling Order and so the court was correct to 
exclude Exhibit 55-A. 
Harris’ argument is again of no avail.  Harris did not show how the district court abused 
its discretion in declining to admit Exhibit 55-A.  Moreover, a trial judge may impose sanctions 
on parties for failing to follow the judge’s scheduling orders. I.R.C.P. 16(i). Among the available 
sanctions is an order “prohibiting [a] party from introducing designated matters in evidence.”  Id. 
at 37(b)(2)(B).  Thus, the trial judge here had authority to exclude Exhibit 55-A as a procedural 
matter, irrespective of evidentiary considerations, once he determined that Harris failed to 
comply with his Scheduling Order.  Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to admit Exhibit 55-A.   
C. 
The district court did not err in concluding that Harris failed to prove that any 
of the defendants was unjustly enriched. 
In the district court, Harris alleged that Johnson, Egan, and Kym Ferguson were all 
unjustly enriched as a result of Foxhollow and Johnson’s breach of contract.  “The elements of 
unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the 
defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the 
benefit without payment of the value of the benefit.”  Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 
Idaho 394, 398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2008).  Because this is an equitable claim, we note: “The 
maxim, ‘He who comes into equity must come with clean hands,’ imposes itself alike upon him 
 
11  
 
who defends, and upon him who prosecutes, a suit in equity.”  Witthoft v. Commercial Dev. & 
Inv. Co., 46 Idaho 313, 324, 268 P. 31, 34 (1928).   
The district court concluded that each unjust enrichment claim failed.  On appeal, Harris 
does not expressly dispute the trial court’s rulings that none of the defendants was unjustly 
enriched.  But Harris does argue that its alleged damages may support unjust enrichment claims.   
1. 
Harris failed to prove that Johnson was unjustly enriched. 
Three times, Harris sent checks to Johnson for work on the Fremont Project.  The first 
was in June 2002, just before Harris and Johnson had a written agreement.  That time, Harris sent 
Johnson a check for $7,467.44, which Johnson deposited.  Johnson then paid Foxhollow the full 
amount of the check. Then, in August 2002, Harris sent Johnson a check for $21,904.00, which 
Johnson deposited.  Again, Johnson paid Foxhollow the full amount of the check.  Finally, in 
December 2002, Harris sent Johnson a check for $8,000.00.7  Johnson returned this check with a 
letter from Johnson’s lawyer disavowing any contract with Harris.  “It was undisputed that 
Johnson never had ‘so much as a shovel’ on the Fremont Project construction site.”  The court 
found that Foxhollow defaulted before it was time for Johnson to perform its paving work so 
Johnson’s paving “never came to fruition.”  But the court also found the checks Harris sent to 
Johnson were progress payments for Foxhollow’s work on the Fremont Project.  So the court 
concluded that Harris failed to prove that Foxhollow received an unearned benefit in the progress 
payments from Harris.  The court also determined that Harris did not confer any direct benefit on 
Johnson. 
There is no real dispute as to the trial court’s factual findings on Harris’ claim for unjust 
enrichment. Harris just disagrees with the court’s conclusions.  Harris argues that it made the 
progress payments in reliance on Egan’s misrepresentations that all outstanding invoices from 
materialmen for project equipment had been paid.  Harris contends that payments to Foxhollow 
via Johnson were not validly earned because of Egan’s representations.  According to Harris, 
Foxhollow did not validly earn the progress payments it accepted because there were outstanding 
invoices when Harris made the progress payments.  Harris therefore reasons that even though 
Johnson forwarded the payments to Foxhollow, Johnson still received some unearned benefit 
                                                 
7 As noted above, that check was also made out to L&M Landleveling.  It is unclear from the record who L&M is. 
 
12  
 
when it deposited the progress payments in Johnson’s account. Harris also contends that 
Foxhollow was an agent of Johnson, at least for part of the Harris-Johnson-Foxhollow 
agreement, and therefore a benefit conferred on Foxhollow was a benefit conferred on Johnson.  
Johnson’s only rebuttal is to again echo the trial court, noting that Johnson retained none of the 
progress payment money. 
Harris has not shown that it conferred any benefit on Johnson, much less a benefit that 
equity should reappropriate.  As discussed above, the Harris-Johnson-Foxhollow arrangement 
was convoluted and most likely illegal.8  Johnson apparently forwarded all progress payments to 
Foxhollow, except the last one, which Johnson returned to Harris.  Thus, Harris’ progress 
payments were a benefit conferred on Foxhollow, not Johnson.  Harris has failed to prove that 
Johnson received any ancillary benefit from Foxhollow’s progress payments.  And even if 
Johnson benefited in some insignificant way, Harris was complicit in the Johnson-Foxhollow 
ruse.  Harris therefore will not be heard to complain of unjust results flowing from the 
agreement.  The district court did not err in concluding that Harris failed to prove that Johnson 
was unjustly enriched. 
2. 
Harris failed to prove Egan was unjustly enriched. 
Egan was Foxhollow’s on-site manager for the Fremont Project.  Harris paid Egan’s 
salary for the Fremont Project directly because Harris was concerned about Foxhollow managing 
its own cash flows.  Between November 2001 and March 2002, Harris issued checks directly to 
Foxhollow for work on the Jefferson Project.  Between May and December 2002, Harris issued 
checks to Foxhollow for work on the Fremont Project—some of these payments were made via 
Johnson and some were made jointly to materialmen.  In September 2002, both Pro-Rentals and 
Western States contacted Scott regarding outstanding invoices for the Jefferson and Fremont 
Projects.  In 2003, Pro-Rentals obtained a $4,757.90 judgment against Harris, Foxhollow, and 
Egan for unpaid invoices from the Fremont Project and for another $3,023.11 from the Jefferson 
Project.9  The district court held that Harris did not prove that it conferred a benefit upon Egan 
because all payments Harris made to Egan were made on behalf of Foxhollow.  Further, the 
                                                 
8 See supra note 2. 
9 It is unclear from the record which party paid the judgment. 
 
13  
 
district court determined that any damages Harris paid to Pro-Rentals or Western States for rental 
equipment did not support an unjust enrichment claim against Egan because Egan himself did 
not benefit from using the equipment. 
Again, Harris apparently does not take issue with the district court’s findings of fact.  
Rather, Harris argues that it made progress payments to Foxhollow based on Egan’s 
representations that all materialmen had been paid.  According to Harris, once it learned of the 
outstanding invoices, it was too late to make Foxhollow pay.  Harris also asserts that it spent a 
great deal of money on the Pro-Rentals litigation that resulted from the unpaid rental invoices.  
Harris argues that this supports an unjust enrichment claim.  Egan appeared pro se and did not 
file a response. 
All of Harris’ payments to Egan were on behalf of Foxhollow.  This arrangement was for 
accounting purposes.  Harris simply paid Egan’s wages that he earned as a Foxhollow employee.  
Egan would have recognized the same benefit if Harris had paid Foxhollow the entire contract 
amount and Foxhollow had paid Egan’s wages. Thus, none of Harris’ payments to Egan conferred 
a benefit on Egan.  Second, Egan did not personally benefit from using the rental equipment on the 
Jefferson and Fremont Projects. Egan used the equipment as a Foxhollow employee, so any benefit 
of the equipment went to Johnson or Foxhollow under their subcontracts.  Thus, even if Harris 
spent money in the Pro-Rentals litigation because Egan withheld invoices, that expenditure did not 
benefit Egan, nor did the underlying equipment rental.  Accordingly, Harris has not shown that it 
conferred a benefit on Egan sufficient to support its unjust enrichment claim.  The district court 
therefore did not err when it concluded that Harris’ unjust enrichment claim against Egan fails.    
3. 
Harris failed to prove Kym Ferguson was unjustly enriched. 
Kym Ferguson was an employee and shareholder in Foxhollow when Foxhollow was 
working on the Jefferson and Fremont Projects.  Kym resigned from Foxhollow in late September 
2002, around the time of Foxhollow’s default on the Fremont Project.  Kym then worked on the 
Fremont Project under an agreement between Harris and Ferguson Farms.  Harris ultimately paid 
Ferguson Farms for its work in a settlement agreement after threats of litigation.  The district court 
found that Harris premised its unjust enrichment claim against Kym “solely upon Foxhollow’s 
alleged failure to submit the Pro-Rentals and Western States invoices . . . in a timely manner,” and 
because of “the settlement money Harris, Inc. paid to Ferguson Farms.”  As with Egan, the court 
 
14  
 
held that Kym was not unjustly enriched because Harris did not confer a benefit on Kym, 
personally.  The court also concluded that Harris “failed to sustain its burden to pierce the 
corporate veil of Foxhollow and attribute [Foxhollow’s] debts to Kym Ferguson personally.” 
Once again, Harris apparently does not dispute the trial court’s findings, but does argue that 
the unpaid equipment supplier invoices, the Pro-Rental litigation, and the settlement with Ferguson 
Farms resulted in expenses that support its unjust enrichment claim.  Harris fails to explain exactly 
how any of those expenses amounts to a benefit conferred upon Kym.  In response, Kym adopts 
Johnson’s general argument that Harris failed to prove any damages and focuses his own argument 
on rebutting Harris’ fraud claim. 
Harris did not convince the district court it conferred a benefit upon Kym, and has not 
given this Court reason to disagree. Kym was an owner and employee of Foxhollow, but Harris 
never paid Kym directly. Harris has not shown that Kym was personally responsible for the unpaid 
equipment supplier invoices. And, as the district court determined, Harris has presented no grounds 
for holding Kym personally liable for Foxhollow’s contracts.  Moreover, Harris has not explained 
how the settlement with Ferguson Farms amounts to unjust enrichment. In short, Harris did not 
prove facts that support its unjust enrichment claim against Kym.  The district court, therefore, 
correctly held that Kym was not unjustly enriched. 
D. 
The district court did not err in concluding that no defendant is liable for 
fraud. 
Harris originally alleged claims of fraud against each of the defendants.  “A party must 
establish nine elements to prove fraud: 1) a statement or a representation of fact; 2) its falsity; 3) its 
materiality; 4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; 5) the speaker’s intent that there be reliance; 
6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 7) reliance by the hearer; 8) justifiable 
reliance; and 9) resultant injury.”  Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 833, 172 P.3d 1104, 1108 
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The district court found that Harris premised its fraud claims against Johnson, Egan, and 
the Fergusons on representations by Egan or Melvin Voss, a Foxhollow employee, that all 
equipment suppliers had been paid.  Harris also based its fraud claims against Johnson and the 
Fergusons on representations from Foxhollow’s lawyer that all equipment suppliers had been paid 
and that Foxhollow was not in default on the Fremont Project.  Egan was Voss’s supervisor, an 
 
15  
 
employee of Foxhollow, and Johnson’s agent on the Fremont Project.  The court found that 
because of Egan’s various roles on the Fremont Project, he was responsible for relaying supplier 
and equipment invoices to Harris. 
Harris received letters from Western States and Pro-Rentals in mid-September 2002, 
notifying Harris of outstanding invoices.  Egan had apparently negotiated the Western States 
equipment rental for use on the Fremont Project.  The district court found that Harris put on no 
evidence to show whether the Western States equipment was used in the Johnson contract, the 
Foxhollow contract, or both.  The Pro-Rentals invoices were for both the Fremont and Jefferson 
Projects, but the court found no indication as to whether the Pro-Rentals equipment was used under 
the Johnson contract, the Foxhollow contract, or both.  Harris paid Johnson for Johnson’s work on 
the Jefferson Project over a year before Foxhollow rented the unpaid-for Pro-Rentals equipment.  
Harris did, however, make two progress payments to Johnson in June and August, just before 
receiving notice of the unpaid invoices. 
1. 
Harris failed to prove Johnson was liable for fraud. 
The district court held that Harris’ fraud claim against Johnson failed for lack of proof of 
causation and because Harris knew or should have known that any assurances were false.  The 
court determined that Egan and Voss either failed to alert Harris about the unpaid equipment 
suppliers, or that they gave inaccurate assurances that the suppliers had been paid.  The court 
concluded that Egan or Voss knew or should have known that their silence or misrepresentations 
amounted to false assurances, upon which Harris would rely.  According to the court, Harris had 
no notice of the unpaid invoices until it received the letters from Pro-Rentals and Western States, 
so Harris justifiably relied on Egan’s or Voss’s silence or assurances and suffered damage by 
issuing the June and August progress payments.  But the court ultimately found that because the 
equipment at issue could have been involved with either the Johnson contract or the Foxhollow 
contract, or both, there was insufficient evidence to hold Johnson liable. 
With regard to Foxhollow’s lawyer’s letter indicating that all equipment suppliers had been 
paid, the court concluded that the letter was a misrepresentation intended to induce Harris’ 
reliance.  But the court held that Harris was already on notice of the unpaid invoices when it 
received the letter and therefore could not reasonably rely on it. 
 
16  
 
On appeal, Harris argues that any distinction between Foxhollow and Johnson is 
immaterial.  Harris points out that Foxhollow worked on the Fremont Project on behalf of Johnson 
and that Egan acted as Johnson’s agent when it signed Johnson’s contract with Harris, both of 
which were facts the district court found.  Harris thus maintains that the court also should have 
found that Foxhollow was Johnson’s agent, “especially since the entirety of Foxhollow’s work was 
done under Johnson’s public works license.”  Harris’ argument implies that because there is no 
distinction between Johnson and Foxhollow, it makes no difference to whom the unpaid invoices 
are attributed.  So Harris apparently contends it is entitled to recover simply because it relied on 
Egan’s or Voss’s representations, or lack thereof, that equipment suppliers were paid.  It is unclear 
whether Harris disputes the district court’s holding that Harris could not, and did not, reasonably 
rely on the letter from Foxhollow’s lawyers. 
Johnson does not directly refute any of Harris’ arguments about the fraud claim.  Johnson 
only contends that Harris failed to prove damages and so cannot support any of its claims. 
The facts indicate that all the requirements for fraud were met.  But the facts do not 
establish that Johnson is liable. As the district court concluded, Egan or Voss made false, 
material representations—or remained silent—regarding unpaid equipment suppliers. Egan or 
Voss made the representations with the intent that Harris make additional progress payments. 
Harris reasonably relied on the representations and made payments, but could have withheld 
payment if it knew of Egan’s or Voss’s misrepresentations. Yet, because there is no proof that 
the unpaid invoices were attributable to Johnson’s contract, it has not been established that 
Egan’s or Voss’s misrepresentations were made on behalf of Johnson. Harris’ contention—that 
Johnson is liable because Foxhollow operated under Johnson’s public works license—is 
misleading and misstates the facts.10 Harris contracted with both Johnson and Foxhollow. And 
                                                 
10 Harris made the same argument in the district court in a motion to amend the findings and conclusions.  That court 
also found the argument “disingenuous.”  In denying Harris’ motion, the court observed:  
What became apparent to the Court . . . was that Harris, Inc.’s, Johnson’s and 
Foxhollow’s agreement to subvert the requirement of a public works license to their mutual 
benefit.  When Foxhollow defaulted, due to apparent underbidding and a rainy spring season, 
Harris, Inc. sought to look to the firm with a stable financial base for recompense: Johnson.  
Johnson, on the other hand, attempted to disavow any knowledge of the subcontract altogether.   
   
For these reasons, this Court finds that Harris, Inc. cannot use an illegal ruse to squeeze 
damages from one of the co-conspirators. 
 
17  
 
even if Foxhollow performed some of Johnson’s work, it is unclear that the unpaid invoices can 
be attributed to Johnson. Harris never proved the division of work between Johnson and 
Foxhollow. Egan and Voss could have been operating under the Johnson contract or the 
Foxhollow contract when they made the representations. Harris cannot pin the fraud on Johnson 
just because Foxhollow is insolvent. Thus, despite Egan’s or Voss’s apparent misrepresentations, 
the district court did not err in holding that Johnson was not liable for fraud.   
2. 
Harris failed to prove Egan is liable for fraud. 
The district court concluded that Harris’ fraud claim against Egan failed because Harris did 
not rely on Egan’s representations in its dealings with him.  Harris continued paying Egan and 
Voss, even after Harris got notice of the unpaid invoices.  The district court found that Harris “paid 
Egan $392.50 for reasons unknown, $503.73 for twenty (20) hours of work, and $230.22 for 
reasons unknown,” four days after receiving such notice from Pro-Rentals, and two days after 
notice from Western States. It also found, Harris “paid Voss $469.43 for thirty (30) hours of work” 
for the Fremont Project on the same day—after receiving notice of the unpaid invoices.  The court 
thus concluded that Harris continued paying Foxhollow’s payroll after it got notice of the unpaid 
invoices.  Accordingly, the court determined that with respect to its dealings with Egan, Harris did 
not rely on any misrepresentations because it continued paying Egan.  So, the court held that Egan 
was not personally liable for any damages for fraud. 
Indeed, Harris did get notice of the unpaid invoices several days before issuing Egan a 
number of checks.  So, as the district court found, despite learning of Egan’s alleged fraud, Harris 
continued paying Egan. Obviously, then, Harris was not relying on Egan’s alleged 
misrepresentations at that time.  Harris may have reasonably relied on Egan’s representations 
before getting notice from Pro-Rentals and Western States, as it did in issuing the June and August 
progress payments.  But once Harris learned of the outstanding invoices, any claimed reliance on 
Egan’s representations would have been unreasonable.  Therefore, the district court did not err in 
concluding that Harris had failed to establish its fraud claim against Egan. 
3. 
Harris failed to prove the Fergusons were liable for fraud. 
The district court had previously granted summary judgment on all claims against Ferguson 
Farms and Mike Ferguson. The court thus considered the fraud claim against the Fergusons only as 
to Kym Ferguson. The court determined that Foxhollow might be liable for fraudulent 
 
18  
 
misrepresentations. Nonetheless, the court held that Harris did not rely on Foxhollow’s 
representations regarding unpaid invoices, because Harris paid Foxhollow’s payroll after learning 
of the alleged fraud. 
The court also held that Harris’ fraud claim against Kym failed because Kym, as a director 
and shareholder in Foxhollow, was protected by Foxhollow’s corporate limited liability.  The court 
pointed out that Kym could be liable if he personally participated in the alleged fraud, but 
concluded he did not. At trial, there was some evidence that Kym told Tony Robles, a Harris 
employee, that Foxhollow planned to withhold all equipment supplier invoices until the Fremont 
Project was complete. The court concluded that even if Kym made such a statement, it did not 
constitute fraud because “it was a straightforward comment upon which Harris, Inc. was at liberty 
to act.” In other words, even if Kym made that statement, it did not qualify as a fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
Harris now argues that Kym’s alleged conversation with Robles happened after Harris 
incurred damages in reliance on Foxhollow’s alleged misrepresentations.  This, according to 
Harris, establishes that Kym acquiesced in Foxhollow’s corporate wrongdoing and is therefore 
personally liable.  Harris argues that the court erred because it did not definitively find that the 
conversation between Kym and Robles occurred.  Kym responds by reiterating the district court’s 
conclusions. 
 
We are again unpersuaded to set aside the district court’s decision.  The district court was 
not convinced that Kym’s alleged statements to Robles even took place.  Harris asks this Court 
to revisit the district court’s findings.  Yet, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous 
and therefore will not be set aside.  And assuming, as the district court did, that Kym’s alleged 
conversation with Robles occurred, the district court was correct that it does not amount to fraud.  
If Kym made the statement, it was not a misrepresentation.  Rather, it was a comment on a 
matter that Harris was free to take up with Foxhollow or ignore.  Harris has also failed to explain 
how Kym acquiesced in Foxhollow’s alleged fraud. Moreover, Harris has failed to prove 
Foxhollow is liable for fraud at all. Harris continued paying Foxhollow after learning of the 
alleged fraud.  Thus, as with the claim against Egan, Harris’ fraud claim against Foxhollow 
would likely have failed because it does not appear that Harris reasonably relied on Foxhollow’s  
 
19  
 
alleged misrepresentations. So, the district court did not err in holding that Harris’ fraud claim 
against Kym fails. 
E. 
The district court did not err in concluding that Harris is not entitled to 
indemnity from Johnson. 
Harris argued at trial that it was entitled to indemnification from Johnson and Foxhollow 
based on a clause in a document called “General Conditions to Contract.”  The district court 
concluded that the “General Conditions to Contract” was not part of the agreement between Harris 
and Johnson.  The court found that Harris submitted in evidence a document entitled “General 
Conditions to Contract,” which was dated three months after Egan, on Johnson’s behalf, signed the 
contract with Harris.  The court also noted that the October 9, 2002 date on the document post-
dated the initial communications between the parties about Johnson’s default on the Fremont 
Project.  Furthermore, the “General Conditions to Contract” was not signed by either party.  The 
court, relying on the law of contract formation, determined the “record does not contain sufficient 
evidence to show a meeting of the minds of Johnson and Harris, Inc. with regard to the General 
Conditions of Contract.”  The court therefore held that the additional terms were not part of the 
agreement between Johnson and Harris, so Harris was not entitled to indemnity under the 
additional terms.   
 In this Court, Harris contends that the “General Conditions of Contract” document was 
admitted in evidence without objection and therefore cannot be disregarded.  Harris maintains that 
trial testimony proved that the document existed as of 2002 and a copy was attached to each 
contract Harris made in 2002.  Harris also argues that the district court made findings consistent 
with duties outlined in the General Conditions document so therefore must have considered it part 
of the contract.  In response, Johnson cites the district court’s finding that the General Conditions 
document post-dated the signed agreement by three months.  Johnson also contends that the district 
court correctly discounted the General Conditions exhibit but, interestingly, Johnson argues it was 
because the document was not an original, as required by the Best Evidence Rule. 
 
The district court reached the right result for the wrong reasons.  A signed agreement may 
incorporate by reference to another agreement, which is not signed by the parties, if the terms to be 
incorporated are adequately identified and readily available for inspection by the parties.  
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 320, 246 P.3d 961, 973 (2010).  Here, 
 
20  
 
the district court found that the “General Conditions of Contract” post-dated the original agreement 
by three months.  There is no evidence that the General Conditions were available to Johnson when 
Egan signed the agreement.  Testimony that Harris used the General Conditions throughout 2002 is 
insufficient to prove that Johnson actually had access to the additional terms.  Thus, the “General 
Conditions of Contract” was not established to have become a part of the agreement between 
Harris and Johnson.  Harris cannot, therefore, maintain an indemnity claim founded on those 
Conditions.  Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that Harris’ indemnity claim fails. 
F. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Harris’ Motion to 
Amend Findings and Conclusions. 
After trial, Harris filed with the district court a Motion to Amend Findings and 
Conclusions, and to Make Additional Findings and Conclusions.  As a result, the court made a 
“single clarification” to its original findings, which it published in its First Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law.  Otherwise, the court denied the motion, but only after considering 
Harris’ brief in support of the motion and responses in opposition. 
Harris contends that the district court erred when it denied Harris’ Motion to Amend.  
Harris argues that there was ample evidence for the district court to make additional findings, 
which Harris maintains would have been beneficial to its case.  In response, Johnson only opines 
that the district court did not err in its original findings and conclusions.  The Fergusons’ 
response simply adopts by reference Johnson’s “argument.” 
 
“This Court reviews a denial of a motion to alter or amend under an abuse of discretion 
standard.”  Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 61, 44 P.3d 1108, 1116 (2002).  Here, Harris has not 
demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.  The court 
considered Harris’ arguments, as well as opposition arguments, at length in a written opinion.  
Harris’ assertion that the court could have made additional findings is unavailing.  Thus, the 
district court did not err in denying Harris’ motion to amend. 
G. 
The district court abused its discretion by awarding fees and costs to Johnson 
and by awarding fees to the Fergusons. 
The district court concluded that Johnson and the Fergusons were each entitled to some 
fees and costs because Harris’ action was based on a commercial transaction and because each was 
a prevailing party.  I.C. § 12-120(3) provides for reasonable attorney fees in any action to recover 
on a contract for services or in any commercial transaction.  A commercial transaction is any 
 
21  
 
transaction made for other than personal or household purposes.  I.C. § 12-120(3).  In order to 
recover fees under the commercial transaction prong of I.C. § 12-120(3), one party must allege that 
a commercial transaction occurred or a commercial transaction must be the actual basis of the 
lawsuit.  Garner v. Povey, 2011 WL 3332258, at *6–*7 (Idaho Aug. 4, 2011).  Whether an action 
is based on a commercial transaction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review.  Id. at *6.  When the transaction at issue in a lawsuit is an illegal commercial transaction, 
however, no party to the transaction is entitled to fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).  Trees v. Kersey, 138 
Idaho 3, 12, 56 P.3d 765, 774 (2002).  “[C]osts shall be allowed as a matter or right to the 
prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.”  I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C). 
Here, Johnson cannot claim the benefit of I.C. § 12-120(3).  The record is replete with 
evidence that Harris, Johnson, and Foxhollow structured their agreement to circumvent Idaho’s 
public works license requirement.11  The district court found that Johnson’s public works license 
was good for contracts up to $500,000.00.  The court also determined, based on signed agreements, 
that the value of Johnson and Foxhollow’s combined subcontracts—which Johnson bid for, and 
which were supposed to be “covered by” Johnson’s license—was $655,068.00.  Johnson thus 
agreed to oversee public works construction valued at 31% more than its license limitation.  
Moreover, Johnson intended for Foxhollow to perform much of Johnson’s contracted-for work.  
The district court focused on Harris’ knowing subversion of the public works licensure 
requirement, but the record—and the court’s findings—equally show Johnson’s flagrant disregard 
of the law.  Assuming there was a commercial transaction between Harris and Johnson, it smacks 
of illegality.  Johnson cannot claim ignorance or point the finger at Harris for the problematic 
arrangement; Johnson was, as the district court said, a “co-conspirator” in the “illegal ruse,” and 
therefore cannot recover fees.  Furthermore, even if Johnson prevailed in its defense, its flouting of 
the law impels us to disallow costs.  We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion 
in awarding fees and costs to Johnson.   
The Fergusons are not entitled to fees, either.  At oral argument, when asked to identify the 
commercial transaction between the Fergusons and Harris, counsel for the Fergusons said, “There 
was no commercial transaction between Ferguson [sic] and Harris.”  Because there was no 
                                                 
11 See supra note 2. 
 
22  
 
commercial transaction between those two parties, the Fergusons cannot rely on the commercial 
transaction prong of I.C. § 12-120(3) to claim fees. See Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 
256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011) (fees are available under the commercial transaction prong of I.C. § 12-
120(3) “so long as a commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing party and the party 
from whom that party seeks fees.”) Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding fees to the Fergusons.  But, because the Fergusons were successful in their 
defense, we do not disturb the district court’s decision to allow costs. 
H. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Harris’ Motion 
for a New Trial. 
Harris argues that the district court erred in denying its Motion for a New Trial.  When it 
denied Harris’ motion, the district court released an accompanying opinion.  In that opinion, the 
court referenced the considerable amount of time this lawsuit has taken. The court also 
acknowledged the extensive discovery the parties undertook and the opportunity all parties had to 
organize their evidence and present their case. The court further pointed out the dearth of new, 
important evidence that Harris proffered.   
“This Court has been consistent in recognizing the district court’s important function in 
passing on motions for new trial, and upholding the district court’s grant or denial of such a 
motion, unless the district court has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it.”  Phillips v. 
Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 109, 254 P.3d 1, 10 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the 
district court considered Harris’ motion and denied it for good reason.  It therefore did not abuse its 
discretion. 
I. 
Neither Johnson nor the Fergusons are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Johnson and the Fergusons both request fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3).  For the 
same reasons discussed in Part II.G above, neither party is entitled to fees.   
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the district court, except that we vacate the award of fees and 
costs to Johnson, and the award of fees to the Fergusons.  No costs or fees to any party on 
appeal. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.