Title: Gray v. Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Gray v. Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A.1999 WY 114984 P.2d 1088Case Number: 98-208Decided: 08/04/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JAN 
CHARLES GRAY, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

NORWEST BANK WYOMING, 
N.A., Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge.

Jerry A. Yaap of 
Bishop, Bishop & Yaap, Casper, Wyoming, representing 
appellant.

Bruce N. 
Willoughby of Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, Wyoming, 
representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
presents the issue whether an easement by implication can be created by conduct 
contrary to an express agreement to discontinue use of a tunnel system beneath 
property. In a conveyance of part of its property to Peter W. Hacker, Appellee 
Norwest Bank agreed to close the tunnels at the property line but did not do so 
for some years. Appellant Jan Charles Gray subsequently purchased from Hacker 
and attempted to use the tunnels. After Norwest Bank closed the tunnels, Gray 
filed this action, claiming an implied easement to the tunnels. The district 
court granted summary judgment to Norwest Bank, and Gray 
appeals.

[¶2]      As a matter of 
law, an easement will not be implied where, at severance of unified ownership, 
the owner and the purchaser expressly agree to discontinue use of that property 
claimed as an easement. We affirm the order granting summary 
judgment.

ISSUES

Gray presents 
these issues:

[¶3]      A. Did the trial 
court err in finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, as a 
matter of law, and that a summary judgment was proper in favor of appellee 
(hereinafter referred to as "Norwest Bank") concerning whether the existence and 
usage of the tunnels created an implied easement. This issue needs to be 
considered in evaluating the action and inaction of Norwest Bank for more than 
four years in using the easement, allowing others to use it, and not sealing the 
tunnels. Norwest Bank asserts that the legal right to close the tunnels after 
the subsequent purchase by Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Gray") is 
derived from a minor "conditional" provision, which they alleged created an 
abandonment, in a previous purchase and sale agreement, even though nothing was 
recorded, and during negotiations with Gray for other less onerous means of 
resolving the dispute. 

[¶4]      B. Did the trial 
court err in finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, as a 
matter of law, and that a summary judgment was proper for Norwest Bank regarding 
whether the easement was abandoned by the Norwest-Hacker purchase and sale 
agreement, to which Gray was not a party and which was never acted upon by 
Norwest Bank until after the property was sold to Gray. The Court should 
consider the alleged abandonment, which was a minor footnote to an unrecorded 
purchase and sale agreement and the subsequent negotiations seeking to define 
the "closing" of the tunnel and several less onerous alternatives, such as an 
access door or a division of the tunnel.

Norwest Bank 
rephrases the issues as:

[¶5]      A. Was the trial 
court correct in its decision that there were no genuine issues of fact as a 
matter of law as to the existence of an implied easement in the tunnels running 
under the parties' respective properties, as there was no testimony to 
contradict the unequivocal and unambiguous intention of the parties to abandon 
any easement to the tunnels, as expressed in the offer, acceptance and receipt 
executed by both appellee ("Norwest Bank") and the Hackers, Appellant's ("Gray") 
predecessors in interest, on October 2, 1992?

[¶6]      B. Was the trial 
court correct in granting summary judgment to Norwest Bank as a matter of law, 
for the reason there was no implied easement created in the tunnels at the time 
of conveyance by Norwest Bank to Hackers, because the intent of the parties at 
the time of the Norwest Bank conveyance to Hackers, to abandon any easement 
existing in the tunnels, was unequivocal and unambiguous?

FACTS

[¶7]      Norwest Bank was 
the owner of real properties at 152 and 153 North Durbin Street, Casper, 
Wyoming. These properties, Lots 12, 13, and 14 of Block 11, Lots 1 and 2 of 
Block 12, and the West 40 feet of Lots 11 and 12 of Block 57, were known as the 
Norwest Bank Office Building and the Durbin Street Drive-Up. Norwest Bank also 
was, and continues to be, the owner of real property adjoining 152 North Durbin 
Street to the south. During the time that Norwest Bank owned all of these 
properties, it built an underground tunnel system connecting the properties. The 
tunnel system served the purpose of allowing travel between the properties and 
underneath North Durbin Street in order to access the drive-up banking facility 
and to connect utilities between the properties. The tunnel from the property at 
152 North Durbin Street proceeds generally south, and the tunnel from the 
property at 153 North Durbin Street proceeds generally southwest underneath the 
street, and the tunnels from those two properties connect at a point on the 
property retained by Norwest Bank underneath its parking lot where they were 
connected also to underground access to the building located on Norwest Bank's 
parcel.

[¶8]      On October 2, 
1992, Norwest Bank, as Seller, and Peter W. Hacker, as Purchaser, entered into 
an Offer, Acceptance and Receipt Specific Performance Contract for the purchase 
and sale of the said real properties at 152 and 153 North Durbin Street, and in 
that contract they agreed "Seller at Seller's expense agrees to close off 
tunnels at the property line of properties being purchased." On December 3, 
1992, Norwest Bank conveyed to Peter W. Hacker and Sarah J. Hacker the real 
properties at 152 and 153 North Durbin Street, together with all improvements, 
and subject to reservations of record. Four years later, Gray acquired ownership 
of the real properties at 152 and 153 North Durbin Street from the Hackers. Gray 
had meetings with a representative of Norwest Bank, and wrote a letter to 
Norwest Bank to request and demand use of the subject tunnel system, but such 
use was rejected, and Norwest Bank closed off and denied Gray access to the 
tunnels beneath Norwest Bank's adjoining property. Gray filed suit, requesting 
that the Court declare he had an implied easement, and requesting damages for 
Norwest Bank's interference with that implied easement.

[¶9]      In his complaint, 
Gray contended that Norwest Bank continued to allow use of the tunnels after the 
sale; however, Norwest Bank denies this allegation. Gray also contended that he 
informed Norwest Bank that he intended to actively seek a banking business as a 
tenant for the property and intended to utilize the tunnel system for that 
purpose, and, upon learning of this intent, Norwest Bank erected barriers within 
the tunnel system. Norwest Bank denied these allegations and moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that the contract provision requiring it to close off the 
tunnels proved it had no intent of creating an easement, and had abandoned any 
existing easement.

[¶10]   The district court granted summary 
judgment, agreeing that the contract provision did disprove any intent to create 
an easement and the contract provision proved that if an easement had existed, 
the express intent and agreement of the parties at the time of severance was to 
abandon any such easement and discontinue the use of the tunnels on the property 
required by the Hackers. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶11]   Summary judgment is proper only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994); W.R.C.P. 56(c). We review a summary judgment in the 
same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the 
same standards. "We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record." Four Nines 
Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991). Summary judgment 
serves the purpose of eliminating formal trials where only questions of law are 
involved. Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997); 
England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Wyo. 1986). We review a grant of 
summary judgment by deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference 
to the district court's ruling on that question. Sammons v. American Auto. 
Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996); Blagrove, 934 P.2d  at 
1275.

Creation of an 
Implied Easement

[¶12]   Both parties agree that Beaudoin v. 
Kibbie, 905 P.2d 939 (Wyo. 1995), sets forth the factors to be considered in 
determining whether an implied easement exists:

(1) Common 
ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) before 
severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of the 
other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the 
claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel 
previously benefitted.

Id. at 941-42. 
In granting summary judgment, the district court found that the second and third 
factors do not exist in this case as evidenced by Norwest Bank's and Hacker's 
contrary agreement. Gray contends that Norwest Bank's continued use of the 
tunnels four years after signing the contract with the Hackers establishes both 
factors.

[¶13]   The creation of easements by 
implication is an attempt to infer the intention of the parties to a conveyance 
of land. This inference drawn from the circumstances surrounding the conveyance 
alone represents an attempt to determine the intention of parties who had not 
thought or had not bothered to put the intention into words, or perhaps more 
often, to parties who actually had formed no intention conscious to themselves. 
Corbett v. Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1979) (citing United States v. 
O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329, 1332 (2nd Cir. 1974); Restatement of Property, § 476, 
cmt. a, at 2978 (1944)). The doctrine of implied easements was created for 
courts to examine the particular facts suggesting the intent on the part of the 
parties to a conveyance and determine if the parties omitted granting an 
easement reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the property. Granite 
Properties Ltd. v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ill. 1987). The implied 
easement does not arise where the parties to the conveyance expressly agree 
otherwise or where proof of its elements is not established. Id. at 1236. 

[¶14]   In applying the doctrine of implied 
easements, we must determine the parties' intent at the time that the unified 
property was severed from a single possessory interest by conveyance from the 
common owner to a grantee. In this particular case, Norwest Bank, the common 
owner, severed the property by conveying part of it to the Hackers. That 
conveyance included an express agreement between the parties to discontinue use 
of the tunnels and required Norwest Bank to close them. The express contrary 
intent of these parties controls and prohibits the creation of an implied 
easement based upon previous use. There is no need to examine whether proof of 
the elements of an implied easement is established. That Norwest Bank did not 
close the tunnels may have been a breach of its contract with Hackers but does 
not create an implied easement for the benefit of Gray. Gray provides no 
evidence that an easement previously existed; and because the existence of an 
easement will not be implied before severance of a single possessory interest, 
an abandonment issue is not presented and need not be 
addressed.

[¶15]   The district court's order granting 
summary judgment is affirmed.