Title: State ex rel. Carr v. Akron

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] CARR ET AL. v. CITY OF AKRON. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714.] 
Public records—Federal Freedom of Information Act inapplicable to records of 
city—R.C. 149.43—Prior request as prerequisite to mandamus action—
Immateriality of pending civil suit in which requested records might be 
useful or available through discovery—Records related to promotional 
examinations 
within 
fire 
department—Trade-secret 
exemption—
Exemption for records identifying persons as firefighters. 
(No. 2006-0168 ─ Submitted December 14, 2006 ─ Decided 
December 28, 2006.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel a city 
to provide access to certain records relating to a fire-captain promotional 
examination.  Because one of the relators never requested the records, because the 
federal Freedom of Information Act does not apply to the city, and because the 
remaining requested records either have been provided, do not exist, or are 
excepted from disclosure under the Public Records Act, we deny the writ. 
Promotional Examinations and the Consulting Contract 
{¶ 2} Respondent, the city of Akron, Ohio, promotes firefighters within 
the Akron Division of Fire on the basis of competitive examinations.  In 
December 2004, the city administered promotional examinations for the positions 
of fire lieutenant and fire captain.  The city retained E.B. Jacobs, L.L.C., a 
consulting firm specializing in psychological testing and assessment, to prepare 
and score the promotional examinations. 
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{¶ 3} Under the agreement between Akron and E.B. Jacobs, E.B. Jacobs 
agreed to prepare the written and oral portions of the promotional examinations, 
hire assessors to evaluate and score the candidates’ performance on the oral 
exercises, and prepare a final written report including an outline of the process for 
the development and scoring of the promotional examinations and their relation to 
the lieutenant and captain positions.  E.B. Jacobs further agreed to “[t]ransfer any 
and all records, documents, data, data analyses, and compilations, including but 
not limited to all examinations, answer sheets, answer keys, assessment exercises 
and assessor scoring sheets related to this AGREEMENT to the City of Akron 
Personnel Director upon completion of services.  The CITY will pay for the 
shipment of all said materials from the CONSULTANT to the CITY.  Further, all 
said materials shall be available to the CITY at any time.” 
{¶ 4} In Section 5 of the contract, the parties agreed that “all data, 
documents and materials are subject to all applicable public records law.”  In 
Section 16, the parties specified that E.B. Jacobs “is an independent contractor 
and not an agent or employee” of Akron and that the city had no “right to control 
the mode or manner in which”  E.B. Jacobs performed under the contract. 
Records Requests 
{¶ 5} Relators, Bradley Carr and William Howe, are firefighter/medics 
holding the rank of lieutenant in the Akron Division of Fire.  Both relators took 
the promotional examination for captain.  In April 2005, the promotional list was 
certified and the examination scores were mailed to the candidates.  Based on the 
promotional examinations, the city promoted several firefighters to lieutenant and 
captain. 
{¶ 6} In May 2005, Carr requested that the city provide him with certain 
records relating to the fire-captain promotional examination.  Carr specified that 
his request was being made pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”).  In September 2005, Carr again requested that the city provide him 
January Term, 2006 
3 
certain records relating to the fire-captain promotional examination and again 
specified that his request was being made under the FOIA.  In response to these 
two requests, the city provided relators with over 600 pages of the requested 
records. 
{¶ 7} In October 2005, Carr requested the following records under R.C. 
149.43, the Ohio Public Records Act: 
{¶ 8} “1.  The names and scores for the written exam. 
{¶ 9} “2.  The names and scores for each days [sic] oral exam. 
{¶ 10} “3.  The scoring sheets, with the scores, of each answer for every 
candidate on the oral exam. 
{¶ 11} “4. Any other written or other types of information that the 
assessors made. 
{¶ 12} “5.  The name of every candidate and which assessor panel they 
saw on each day. 
{¶ 13} “6.  All documentation on the pilot testing. 
{¶ 14} “7.  All documentation on how the test weighting was done. 
{¶ 15} “8.  All documentation on the job analysis. 
{¶ 16} “9.  All documentation on the reliability statistics. 
{¶ 17} “10. All documentation on the subject matter experts. 
{¶ 18} “11. All documentation on the test validity. 
{¶ 19} “12. All documentation on Cronbach Alpha. 
{¶ 20} “13. All documentation on the final report including the 
confidential matter. 
{¶ 21} “14. All data on the oral assessors. 
{¶ 22} “15. All the [E]xcel files sent to the City of Akron reference [sic] 
the memo dated March 21 from Joe Hinish to Ruth Miller. 
{¶ 23} “16. All information on the scoring templates reference [sic] the 
February 18 memo from Joe Hinish to Ruth Miller. 
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{¶ 24} “17. The name, address, phone number, their rank, and what fire 
department they are from for each of the assessors. 
{¶ 25} “18. The non-Z scored oral tests [sic] results on every candidate 
(per my request by phone on 10/25/05).”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 26} The city did not provide relators with additional documents in 
response to Carr’s third request, because it considered it to be a duplicative 
request. 
Mandamus Case 
{¶ 27} On January 26, 2006, Carr and Howe filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus to compel Akron to provide the records requested by Carr in May, 
September, and October 2005.  According to Howe, he worked with Carr to 
obtain all the records related to the fire-captain promotional examination.  The 
city filed an answer, and the parties stipulated that the city had provided 
additional documents in response to Carr’s public-records requests, including raw 
scores on the oral and written portions of the fire-captain promotional 
examination, adverse-impact analyses, and “Fire-Captain Examination Project 
Schedule, and Supplies and Resources and Project Timeline.”  Firefighter names 
and Social Security numbers had been redacted by the city from the raw scores 
and the adverse-impact analyses. 
{¶ 28} We granted an alternative writ, and the parties submitted evidence 
and briefs.  110 Ohio St.3d 1435, 2006-Ohio-3862, 852 N.E.2d 185.  The Ohio 
Municipal League and the cities of Euclid, North Ridgeville, Dublin, Upper 
Arlington, Parma, and Lakewood filed an amicus curiae brief urging denial of the 
writ.  Relators did not submit a timely reply brief.  This cause is now before the 
court for our consideration of the merits. 
Standard for Public-Records Mandamus Cases 
{¶ 29} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
January Term, 2006 
5 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C).  In assessing a public-
records mandamus claim, “R.C. 149.43 is construed liberally in favor of broad 
access, and any doubt is resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.”  State 
ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 
N.E.2d 334. 
{¶ 30} Insofar as Akron asserts that some of the requested records fall 
within certain exceptions to disclosure under R.C. 149.43, “we strictly construe 
exceptions against the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden 
to establish the applicability of an exception.”  State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, 
¶ 23. 
Howe’s Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 31} Howe requests a writ of mandamus to compel the release of the 
requested promotional-examination records.  But Howe never requested these 
records.  The three requests that are the basis of relators’ mandamus claim were 
all made by Carr.  “R.C. 149.43(C) requires a prior request as a prerequisite to a 
mandamus action.”  State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 385, 390, 715 N.E.2d 179.  Therefore, because Howe never requested 
the records that are the subject of relators’ mandamus claim, he is not entitled to 
the writ.  State ex rel. Hammons v. Chisholm, 99 Ohio St.3d 405, 2003-Ohio-
4125, 792 N.E.2d 1120, ¶ 15. 
Carr’s Mandamus Claim: May and September 2005 Requests: FOIA 
{¶ 32} Carr bases his claim for a writ of mandamus on his three requests 
for records relating to the fire-captain promotional examination, which Carr made 
in May, September, and October 2005. 
{¶ 33} Regarding his requests in May and September 2005, however, Carr 
specified that these requests were made pursuant to the FOIA.  Carr’s mandamus 
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claim based on these two requests lacks merit because the FOIA does not apply to 
nonfederal entities like Akron.  Sections 551(1) and 552(f), Title 5, U.S.Code; 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 
781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 32.  Therefore, Carr’s only potentially viable mandamus claim 
concerns his October 2005 records request, which was properly based on R.C. 
149.43 rather than the FOIA. 
The Effect of the Pending Civil Action on Carr’s Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 34} Carr and Howe are two of 29 plaintiffs in a civil case they filed 
against Akron in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.  Howe v. Akron, 
Summit C.P. case No. 2006-04-2310.  The plaintiffs in that case allege that the 
promotional examinations for lieutenant and captain illegally discriminated 
against certain firefighters based on their age and race. 
{¶ 35} The mere fact that Carr may be entitled to obtain the same records 
he requests by way of discovery in his pending civil discrimination case does not 
preclude his entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel their disclosure under 
R.C. 149.43.  We have specifically rejected applying to parties in civil cases our 
precedent limiting defendants to discovery in pending criminal cases as set forth 
in State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83.  
Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 
11 (“That the public records [relator] seeks are potentially useful to him in a 
lawsuit is fortuitous, not illegal”). 
The City’s Employment of an Independent Contractor 
{¶ 36} “R.C. 149.43(C) permits a mandamus action against either ‘a 
public office or the person responsible for the public record’ to compel 
compliance with the Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Bur. 
of Workers’ Comp., 106 Ohio St.3d 113, 2005-Ohio-6549, 832 N.E.2d 711, ¶ 20.  
“R.C. 149.43(C) manifests an intent to afford access to public records, even when 
a private entity is responsible for the records.”  State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson 
January Term, 2006 
7 
(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 550 N.E.2d 464.  Therefore, “where (1) a private 
entity prepares records in order to carry out a public office’s responsibilities, (2) 
the public office is able to monitor the private entity’s performance, and (3) the 
public office has access to the records for this purpose, a relator in an R.C. 
149.43(C) mandamus action is entitled to relief regardless of whether he also 
shows that the private entity is acting as the public office’s agent.”  Id.; State ex 
rel. Cincinnati Enquirer  v. Krings (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 654, 657, 758 N.E.2d 
1135. 
{¶ 37} The mere fact that, under the contract, E.B. Jacobs is an 
independent contractor rather than an employee or agent of the city does not 
prevent the disclosure of the records under R.C. 149.43.  See State ex rel. Gannett 
Satellite Information Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 403, 678 
N.E.2d 557 (“even assuming that [relator] did not establish that [the private 
consultant] acted as the city’s agent or that the relationship between the city and 
[the consultant] satisfied the tripartite test in [Mazzaro, 49 Ohio St.3d at 39, 550 
N.E.2d 464], it is evident that * * * a public official contracted with a private 
entity for a public purpose:  to assist in the filling of an important municipal 
position”).  Under the contract, once E.B. Jacobs’s duties regarding the 
promotional examinations ended, the city had possession of all of that company’s 
records relating to the examinations.  In fact, the city also had access to the 
records at any time during the performance of the contract.  Therefore, the city 
has physical custody of the pertinent records and is the appropriate respondent in 
this case.  Thus, we need not consider the city’s contention that E.B. Jacobs is not 
a public office for purposes of R.C. 149.43. 
The Contract Does Not Estop the City from  
Claiming that Requested Records Are Exempt 
{¶ 38} The city is not estopped from claiming that any of the requested 
records are exempt from disclosure under R.C. 149.43 because of the city’s 
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contract with E.B. Jacobs.  Section 5 of the contract specifies that “all data, 
documents and materials are subject to applicable public records law.” 
{¶ 39} The contractual language providing that the records “are subject to 
applicable public records law” does not mean that the city and E.B. Jacobs agree 
that all of the requested records are public and thus subject to disclosure.  At best, 
this language means that these records are subject to disclosure only insofar as 
R.C. 149.43 is applicable to these records. 
Names and Other Identifying Information of 
Candidates, Assessors, and Subject-Matter Experts 
{¶ 40} In his October 2005 request, Carr requested the names of all 
candidates for the fire-captain promotional examination, the names, ranks, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of the firefighters employed as assessors of the 
oral portion of the fire-captain promotional examination, and all documentation 
on the subject-matter experts─firefighters who assisted E.B. Jacobs in 
determining which tasks were important to the promotional ranks being tested.  
The city has not provided the names and certain other identifying information 
concerning the examination candidates, assessors, and subject-matter experts. 
{¶ 41} The city’s refusal to disclose these requested records is justified by 
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p), which excepts “[p]eace officer, firefighter, or EMT 
[emergency medical technician] residential and familial information” from the 
definition of “[p]ublic record.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(7)(b) defines “[p]eace officer, 
firefighter, or EMT residential and familial information” to include “[a]ny record 
that identifies a person’s occupation as a peace officer, firefighter, or EMT.” 
{¶ 42} Construed in accordance with the rules of grammar and common 
usage, R.C. 149.43(A)(7)(b) manifestly includes the requested records, which 
identify the candidates, assessors, and subject-matter experts as firefighters.  See 
State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St.3d 70, 2005-
Ohio-3807, 831 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 36 (R.C. 149.43(A)(7)(b) exception encompasses 
January Term, 2006 
9 
police-officer photographs).  Notably, reading R.C. 149.43(A)(7)(b) consistently 
with its plain language here does not affect the court’s existing precedent 
regarding police, firefighter, and EMT records.  Cf. id. at ¶ 55.  That is, this case 
does not involve resumes and supporting materials submitted by applicants for 
public office or promotional and tenure records maintained by a state-supported 
university.  Cf. State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 31, 661 N.E.2d 187 (writ of mandamus granted to compel disclosure 
of resumes of police-chief applicants because the disclosure would not violate 
either the constitutional right of privacy or the separation of powers); State ex rel. 
James v. Ohio State Univ. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 637 N.E.2d 911 (writ of 
mandamus granted to compel disclosure of promotion and tenure records 
maintained by a state-supported university because these records are not 
confidential law-enforcement investigatory records and they do not infringe upon 
the university’s constitutionally protected right to academic freedom). 
{¶ 43} Thus, Carr is not entitled to these records, because they are 
excepted from disclosure under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) and (A)(7)(b).  In fact, 
when the city claimed this exception in its merit brief, Carr failed to file any reply 
brief to rebut the claim. 
Remaining Records 
{¶ 44} As for the other records requested by Carr, he is not entitled to the 
records to the extent that they have now been provided to him or they do not exist.  
State ex rel. Warren v. Warner (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 432, 433, 704 N.E.2d 1228 
(public-records mandamus claim was moot for records that had already been 
provided to relator); Norris v. Budgake (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 208, 209, 729 
N.E.2d 758 (public-records custodian had no duty to create new records to satisfy 
relator’s request). 
{¶ 45} The remaining requested records that have not been disclosed are 
exempt from disclosure as trade secrets.  Trade secrets are exempt from disclosure 
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under the exemption of R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) for disclosures prohibited by state or 
federal law.  State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 
540, 721 N.E.2d 1044.  R.C. 1333.61(D) defines “trade secret”: 
{¶ 46} “ ‘Trade secret’ means any information, including the whole or any 
portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, 
procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
improvement, or any business information or plans, financial information, or 
listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers, that satisfies both of the 
following: 
{¶ 47} “(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use. 
{¶ 48} “(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 
{¶ 49} “An entity claiming trade secret status bears the burden to identify 
and demonstrate that the material is included in categories or protected 
information under the statute and additionally must take some active steps to 
maintain its secrecy.”  State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ. (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 396, 400, 732 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 50} The city has introduced sufficient evidence to establish that the 
remaining requested records constitute trade secrets, which are exempt from 
disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  For example, Rick Jacobs, an industrial 
psychologist and president of E.B. Jacobs, stated in an affidavit submitted by the 
city: 
{¶ 51} “11. Our continued success, the success of other organizations 
offering similar testing services, as well as the success of cities, counties, states 
and other governmental agencies that build and administer their own tests will be 
January Term, 2006 
11 
severely compromised if the materials requested are made available to the general 
public.  * * *  
{¶ 52} “* * * 
{¶ 53} “17.  Release of all the information requested by the Relators 
severely impacts EB Jacobs as a privately held business.  We have worked for 
more than 20 years on the development and refinement of our tools of job 
analysis, test construction and test administration.  Many of the tools are 
considered trade secrets and we do not want our competitors to have access to our 
work.  * * *  
{¶ 54} “18.  Our work products and processes are the result of EB Jacobs’ 
research and application since 1982.  * * * The testing materials and processes 
described in this affidavit derive independent economic value from not being 
generally known to or readily ascertainable by other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use.  Without access to our testing 
processes and materials, a competitor would be required to expend a similar 
amount of time, effort and expense as that expended by EB Jacobs and described 
in this affidavit in order to duplicate the work of E.B. Jacobs in the development 
and delivery of safety force promotional exams.” 
{¶ 55} In addition, these records have not been “publicly released, 
published or patented.”  E.B. Jacobs and the city implemented numerous security 
measures to prevent public disclosure of these records, including requiring 
personnel in test development to sign a confidentiality agreement, prohibiting 
candidates from removing or copying the contents of the examination, and storing 
the examinations in a locked and secure facility. 
{¶ 56} Moreover, the assessors’ personal notes are not public records.  
See State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 
814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 21-22. 
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{¶ 57} Therefore, Carr is not entitled to disclosure of these records.  
Because of the applicability of the trade-secret exemption, we do not address the 
city’s additional arguments that these records are also exempt from disclosure 
under federal copyright law and the state constitution.  See State ex rel. Asti v. 
Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 
658, ¶ 34 (no need to address relator-appellant’s alternate argument because it 
was rendered moot by court’s disposition of his initial claim); Smith v. Leis, 106 
Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, 835 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 54 (“courts decide 
constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary”).1 
Conclusion 
{¶ 58} Based on the foregoing, relators are not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel disclosure of the requested records 
relating to the fire-captain promotional examination administered by Akron.  
Therefore, we deny the writ.  Relators are also not entitled to an award of attorney 
fees, because their mandamus claim lacks merit.  State ex rel. Musial v. N. 
Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 38. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would dismiss the cause. 
__________________ 
 
Thompson & Bishop, Dennis R. Thompson, and Christy B. Bishop, for 
relators. 
                                                 
1.  We deny the parties’ requests for oral argument.  The briefs are sufficient to resolve this case, 
and the constitutional issue raised by the city need not be addressed. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
 
Keith McNamara; and Max Rothal, Akron Law Director, and Patricia 
Ambrose Rubright and Deborah M. Forfia, Assistant Directors of Law, for 
respondent. 
 
Byron & Byron Co., L.P.A., Barry M. Byron, and Stephen L. Byron; and 
John Gotherman, urging denial of the writ for amici curiae the Ohio Municipal 
League and the cities of Euclid, North Ridgeville, Dublin, Upper Arlington, 
Parma, and Lakewood. 
______________________