Title: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP355 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Charles 
E. Carlson, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 293, 895 N.W.2d 57 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 24 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Julia S. Arnold, Laura A. Lindner, Casey M. Kaiser, and 
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument 
by Laura A. Linder. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, there was a brief filed by Jeffrey J. Shampo, John 
L. Brown, and Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
Madison.  There was an oral argument by John L. Brown and 
Jeffrey J. Shampo. 
 
 
 
2 
For the respondent-respondent, Charles E. Carlson, There 
was a brief filed by Robert M. Mihelich and Law Offices of 
Robert M. Mihelich, New Berlin.  There was an oral argument by 
Robert M. Mihelich. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce by Timothy G. Costello, Mark 
A. Johnson, and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., 
Milwaukee.  
 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 
Disability Rights Wisconsin and the Survival Coalition of 
Wisconsin by Monica Murphy and Disability Rights Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee.  
 
There was an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of 
Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association by Rebecca L. Salawdeh 
and Salawdeh Law Office, LLC, Wauwatosa, with whom on the brief 
was Caitlin M. Madden and Hawks Quindel, S.C., Madison. 
 
 
2018 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP355 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV2133) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and 
Charles E. Carlson, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.    Charles E. Carlson says Wisconsin 
Bell, Inc. intentionally discriminated against him when it 
terminated his employment because of his disability.  Using the 
"inference method" of finding discriminatory intent, LIRC agreed 
and concluded that Wisconsin Bell violated the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act ("WFEA").  See Wis. Stat. ch. 111, subchapter II 
(2015-16).1   
                                                 
1  Because the relevant statutes have not changed during the 
pendency of this matter, all subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We granted Wisconsin Bell's petition for review to 
determine whether LIRC's version of the "inference method" 
impermissibly allows imposition of WFEA liability without proof 
of discriminatory intent, and if so, whether that is consistent 
with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1).2  Because 
resolving that issue implicates the authoritativeness of an 
administrative agency's interpretation and application of a 
statute, we asked the parties to also address this issue:  "Does 
the practice of deferring to agency interpretations of statutes 
comport 
with 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
2 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, which vests the judicial power in the unified 
court system?"  
¶3 
We conclude that LIRC's version of the "inference 
method" is inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1) because it 
excuses the employee from his burden of proving discriminatory 
intent.  We also conclude that the record lacks any substantial 
evidence that Wisconsin Bell terminated Mr. Carlson's employment 
because of his disability.   
¶4 
We heard arguments in this case on the same day we 
heard Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___.  There, we decided to end our practice of 
deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law.  Id., 
                                                 
2 This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion, 
Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. LIRC, 2017 WI App 24, 375 Wis. 2d 293, 
895 N.W.2d 57, which reversed the Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz, presiding, and 
remanded with instructions. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
3 
 
¶3. However, we also said that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(10), we will give "due weight" to an administrative 
agency's 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized 
knowledge as we consider its arguments.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶3.   Our Tetra Tech EC, Inc. opinion contains 
our analysis of the issue, which we incorporate and apply here. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
Mr. Carlson's Disability 
¶5 
Mr. Carlson suffers from bipolar I disorder, a mental 
illness that can affect an individual physically, socially, and 
intellectually.3  Symptoms of bipolar disorder include, but are 
not limited to, irritability, racing thoughts, and impulsive 
behaviors.  Bipolar symptoms can ebb and flow, and both internal 
and external conditions such as stress, changes in environment, 
and conversations can trigger symptoms.  Bipolar disorder is 
primarily treated with medication and psychotherapy, and during 
the relevant time period, Mr. Carlson was receiving treatment 
from psychotherapist Edward L. Cohen, LCSW, who began treating 
him in 1997, and psychiatrist Mark Siegel, M.D., who began 
treating him in 2002. 
                                                 
3 Mr. Carlson has also been diagnosed with dysthymic 
disorder and major depressive disorder, which are also mental 
impairments. 
 
However, 
because 
the 
disability 
primarily 
referenced throughout the record and briefing in regard to Mr. 
Carlson's termination is Mr. Carlson's bipolar disorder, we, 
too, focus on that disability. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Mr. Carlson can recognize when he is having what he 
refers to as a "bipolar episode" or "breakthrough episode."  
According to Mr. Cohen, Mr. Carlson's reference to having one of 
these "episodes" refers to a short time period in which he 
experiences 
symptoms 
of 
mania, 
which 
can 
include 
racing 
thoughts, impulsive behaviors, disregard for consequences, or 
symptoms of depression.  Through the course of his treatment, 
Mr. Carlson has learned various coping techniques he can use to 
address his symptoms when they arise.  These coping techniques 
include going to a separate room without distractions, using 
deep breathing exercises, and communicating with others for 
support. 
B. Mr. Carlson's Wisconsin Bell Employment History 
¶7 
Mr. 
Carlson 
was 
a 
Wisconsin 
Bell 
employee 
for 
approximately 25 years prior to his termination in May 2011.4  In 
his last position with the company he served as a Technical 
Support Representative II ("TSR") at the U-verse Tier II call 
center.  The terms of Mr. Carlson's position were governed by a 
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Wisconsin Bell 
and the Communication Workers of America Local 4603 (the 
"Union"). 
¶8 
As a TSR, Mr. Carlson worked with customers and field 
technicians to resolve technical issues related to Wisconsin 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Bell first employed Mr. Carlson in 1980 and at 
some point he left Wisconsin Bell for approximately five or six 
years prior to returning. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
5 
 
Bell's "U-verse" telephone, internet, and television services.  
TSRs generally received calls based on their availability and 
could control receipt of calls by making themselves unavailable 
by entering certain call-blocking codes——such as for meal and 
rest breaks, short health breaks (such as for using the 
restroom), and for approved training and staff meetings——into an 
automated phone system.  When call volume was high, the call 
center would declare a "Code Red" status, which meant that all 
TSRs were expected to be available to take calls.  Wisconsin 
Bell's Office Rules stated that inappropriate use of call-
blocking codes to avoid taking customer calls could result in 
immediate termination. 
¶9 
TSRs also had access to an internal instant messaging 
system 
referred 
to 
as 
"Q-chat," 
which 
allowed 
TSRs 
to 
communicate with technicians and co-workers.  Although Q-chat 
was primarily meant to be used for business purposes, TSRs 
occasionally used it for personal reasons such as making lunch 
plans with other employees; however, TSRs were subject to 
discipline 
if 
personal 
use 
of 
Q-chat 
became 
disruptive, 
excessive, or interfered with customer service. 
1. Mr. Carlson's 2010 Suspension 
¶10 On February 18, 2010, Jeannette Weber, a Wisconsin 
Bell Operations Manager, was remotely reviewing TSRs, including 
Mr. Carlson, for quality assurance purposes.  While doing so, 
she noticed Mr. Carlson had been in the "call wrap" status——a 
post-call code that allowed a TSR to briefly make himself 
unavailable for incoming calls in order to document interactions 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
6 
 
from the prior call——for approximately 20 minutes.  After 
questioning Mr. Carlson about the length of his "call wrap" 
status, Mr. Carlson opened his line for incoming calls.  
Unbeknownst to him, Ms. Weber continued to observe him remotely, 
and over the next ten minutes, she observed Mr. Carlson 
deliberately hang up on at least eight customer calls.5  Ms. 
Weber informed Jason Carl, the call center's top manager, about 
Mr. Carlson's actions, and Mr. Carl thereafter suspended Mr. 
Carlson pending termination for customer mistreatment and call 
avoidance.   
¶11 Mr. Carlson's Union representative requested a review 
board hearing to challenge the suspension.  At the hearing on 
March 4, 2010, Mr. Carlson explained that he disconnected the 
calls because he was upset that Ms. Weber had questioned the 
length of his "call wrap" status.  He also presented letters 
from Mr. Cohen and Dr. Siegel, which described his disability 
and its symptoms in general terms.  Dr. Siegel's letter (dated 
March 1, 2010) indicated that it was prepared at Mr. Carlson's 
request and explained that Mr. Carlson suffered from "bipolar 
disorder-depressed 
type," 
that 
"[b]ipolar 
disorder 
is 
a 
condition characterized by extremes of mood that could manifest 
                                                 
5 There are conflicting references in the record as to 
whether Mr. Carlson hung up on eight calls or twelve calls 
during that time period.  It appears the discrepancy is related 
to 
the 
number 
of 
calls 
Mr. 
Carlson 
actually 
terminated 
improperly versus the number of calls Ms. Weber personally 
observed him improperly terminate.  For the purposes of this 
opinion, we need not resolve this discrepancy. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
7 
 
in a significant depression with or without problems associated 
with 
anxiety 
and 
irritability[,]" 
and 
that 
with 
bipolar 
disorder, "[e]xtremes of moods can occur rather quickly and 
[are] often triggered by relatively minor frustrations."  Mr. 
Cohen's letter (dated February 24, 2010) likewise indicated it 
had been prepared for the review board hearing and stated that 
Mr. Cohen was seeing Mr. Carlson for individual psychotherapy 
services for dysthymia,6 major depressive disorder-recurrent, and 
bipolar disorder.  Neither letter drew a connection between Mr. 
Carlson's bipolar disorder and his actions on February 18, 2010.  
Prior to receiving these letters at the hearing, Mr. Carl, the 
ultimate decision-maker as to whether to terminate Mr. Carlson's 
employment, was unaware that Mr. Carlson suffered from bipolar 
disorder. 
¶12 Ultimately, Mr. Carlson received a 50-day suspension 
without pay.  Wisconsin Bell informed Mr. Carlson that if he 
needed an accommodation for his condition in the future, he 
should request one.  As a condition of his return to work, Mr. 
Carlson was required to sign a "last chance agreement."  This 
agreement was in effect from May 1, 2010, through April 30, 
2011, and it detailed specific circumstances in which Wisconsin 
Bell 
would 
have 
just 
cause 
to 
terminate 
Mr. 
Carlson's 
employment, including the following: 
                                                 
6  Dysthymia has been defined as "despondency" and "morbid 
anxiety and depression accompanied by obsession."  Dysthymia, 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 712 (1986). 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
8 
 
Mr. Carlson understands that in the future, if it 
is deemed that he has another Customer Care Issue be 
it Customer Care, Customer Mistreat, disconnection of 
any 
incoming 
or 
outgoing 
customer 
call 
or 
any 
underlying issue that directly impacts the care of one 
of our customers for any reason, the Company will have 
just cause to terminate his employment.  The Company 
may consider mitigating circumstances in making its 
dismissal decision but retains sole-discretion [sic] 
to 
determine 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
dismissal 
is 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Mr. Carlson understands that if it is determined 
that he has lied or otherwise committed a breach of 
integrity 
as 
demonstrated 
by 
violation 
of 
Tech 
Expectations/work 
rules, 
Company 
policy, 
Code 
of 
Conduct, or has falsified reasons for absences or 
tardies, the Company will have just cause to terminate 
his employment.  The Company may consider mitigating 
circumstances in making its dismissal decision but 
retains sole-discretion [sic] to determine whether or 
not 
the 
dismissal 
is 
appropriate 
under 
the 
circumstances.   
Mr. Carlson was eligible to return to work on May 1, 2010, and 
he signed the last chance agreement on May 3, 2010.   
2. Mr. Carlson's 2011 Termination 
¶13 On April 20, 2011——ten days before the last chance 
agreement expired——Mr. Carlson informed Wisconsin Bell shortly 
before 12:00 p.m. that he was leaving work early due to illness.  
About an hour earlier, he learned he had not passed a test that 
would have made him eligible for a position in Wisconsin Bell's 
collections department.  Mr. Carlson became upset, tearful, 
unfocused, and depressive.  Within a few minutes, he entered the 
call-blocking "health code" so he would not receive incoming 
customer calls. 
¶14 Mr. Carlson then approached his supervisor, Operations 
Manager Kristi Reidy, to determine whether he would face 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
9 
 
disciplinary action if he left work early due to illness.  Ms. 
Reidy told him he should do what he needed to do and advised him 
the absence would be treated as an "occurrence" based on the 
amount of time he would be absent.7  Although Mr. Carlson 
informed her that he "wasn't doing well," he did not otherwise 
explain his symptoms or mention his bipolar disorder. 
¶15 After speaking with Ms. Reidy, Mr. Carlson returned to 
his desk and, while remaining in the health code call-blocking 
status, engaged in Q-chats with approximately 15 co-workers——the 
majority of which he initiated——over the ensuing 30 minutes.8  
The Q-chats primarily related to the collections department 
position for which he did not qualify and inquiries as to 
whether others who had applied for the position had passed the 
exam.  In one instance, Mr. Carlson encouraged a co-worker to 
enter the health status call-blocking code for the purpose of 
checking her test results, saying that doing so was "worth a 
                                                 
7 At the time, Wisconsin Bell counted work absences greater 
than two hours and less than two hours differently.  An absence 
greater than two hours was considered an "occurrence," whereas 
an absence less than two hours was considered a "partial 
absence."  The previous day, April 19, 2011, Mr. Carlson 
received a written warning for his eighth partial absence in the 
previous twelve months.  If the absence Mr. Carlson was 
contemplating were to be treated as a partial absence rather 
than an occurrence, he could have been subjected to a one-day 
suspension without pay. 
8 After reviewing Mr. Carlson's Q-chats, Wisconsin Bell 
determined that unlike Mr. Carlson, his co-workers had been 
performing their job duties and had not been in call-blocking 
status during the course of the chats. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
10 
 
health break for."  In addition to discussing test results with 
numerous co-workers, Mr. Carlson also reached out to his Union 
steward via Q-chat to confirm that his absence would qualify as 
an "occurrence."  When his Union steward confirmed that was 
correct, Mr. Carlson responded "oh good I'm outta here I didn't 
pass the interview for collections."  Mr. Carlson suggested in 
some of the Q-chat messages that he was upset about not 
qualifying for the transfer and that he felt like crying, but he 
never mentioned his bipolar disorder. 
¶16 Shortly before 12:00 p.m., LaDonna Sneed-Brown, an 
Operations Manager, was reviewing TSR availability because the 
Tier II Call Center was in Code Red at the time and noticed that 
Mr. Carlson had been in health break status——rendering him 
unavailable for incoming customer calls——for 38 minutes.  After 
reaching out to Mr. Carlson via Q-chat to question his status, 
Mr. Carlson responded that he "forgot" and that he was "leaving 
ill."  He then responded "ttyl [talk to you later] and thanks 
for being there as one of my lesbian friends."  When Ms. Sneed-
Brown questioned his response, Mr. Carlson stated "sorry wrong 
window."  Afterwards, he notified the help-desk he was leaving 
for the day. 
¶17 Because of Mr. Carlson's reference to the "wrong 
window," Ms. Sneed-Brown suspected he had been engaged in 
additional Q-chats while in health code status and reported the 
interaction and her suspicion to Ms. Reidy.  When asked about 
the Q-chats upon returning to work the following day, Mr. 
Carlson made no reference to having been ill, using the Q-chats 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
11 
 
as a coping mechanism, or to his absence having been related to 
his bipolar disorder. 
¶18 After reviewing Mr. Carlson's Q-chats, 
Mr. Carl 
concluded that, based on their tone and content, Mr. Carlson had 
not really been ill and that he had simply been "chitchatting" 
with his co-workers while in a call-blocking code status.  Mr. 
Carlson thereafter received a notice of Suspension Pending 
Termination dated April 21, 2011, for violating Wisconsin Bell's 
zero tolerance policy for inappropriate use of call-blocking 
codes to avoid taking customer calls. 
¶19 Mr. Carlson again requested a review board hearing, 
which occurred on May 26, 2011.  At that hearing, Mr. Carlson 
said he had used the health code on April 20th because he was 
upset after learning he had not qualified for the collections 
department position and that he reached out to co-workers via Q-
chat as a coping mechanism.  Mr. Carlson's union representative 
also explained that Mr. Carlson "doesn't react to things like 
everybody else."  As he had done at the 2010 review board 
hearing, Mr. Carlson presented a letter from Dr. Siegel, this 
one dated May 9, 2011, regarding his bipolar disorder.  The 
letter indicated that Mr. Carlson's "diagnosis remains bipolar 
disorder-depressed type" and briefly described increases in some 
of Mr. Carlson's medications.  After Mr. Carlson presented the 
letter, Mr. Carl indicated that they had "seen this before."  
Nothing in Dr. Siegel's 2011 letter connected Mr. Carlson's 
bipolar disorder to his actions on April 20, 2011.   
No. 
2016AP355   
 
12 
 
¶20 Following the review board hearing, Mr. Carl concluded 
that Mr. Carlson had violated the last chance agreement and 
Wisconsin Bell's zero tolerance policy when he used the health 
code to make himself unavailable for customer calls for 38 
minutes.  Specifically, he concluded that Mr. Carlson had 
engaged in "call avoidance" and committed an integrity violation 
when he left work early because he did not believe Mr. Carlson 
was being truthful about having been ill.  Wisconsin Bell 
formally terminated Mr. Carlson's employment on June 7, 2011. 
C. 
Procedural Background 
¶21 Mr. Carlson filed two complaints with the ERD.  In the 
first, ERD Case No. CR201102363, Mr. Carlson alleged his 2010 
suspension was because of his disability.  In the second, ERD 
Case No. CR201200428, Mr. Carlson alleged that Wisconsin Bell 
terminated his employment because of his disability and as 
retaliation for having filed the first ERD complaint.  The two 
complaints were consolidated for a multi-day hearing before 
Administrative Law Judge James A. Schacht ("ALJ") in 2013.  
Prior to beginning the hearing, the ALJ confirmed that Mr. 
Carlson was withdrawing his retaliation claim.9 
                                                 
9 Although 
the 
ALJ 
confirmed 
that 
Mr. 
Carlson 
was 
withdrawing his retaliation claim, the ALJ (and later LIRC), for 
whatever reason, included a finding in his decision that Mr. 
Carlson had failed to establish that Wisconsin Bell had violated 
the WFEA by terminating him in retaliation for his having 
previously filed a complaint. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
13 
 
¶22 In an April 25, 2014 decision, the ALJ concluded that 
Wisconsin Bell violated the WFEA when it suspended Mr. Carlson 
in 2010 and when it terminated Mr. Carlson's employment in 2011.  
The ALJ also concluded that Wisconsin Bell could have, but did 
not, accommodate Mr. Carlson's disability with respect to his 
February 2010 conduct.  Accordingly, the ALJ ordered that 
Wisconsin Bell reinstate Mr. Carlson with back pay, reasonably 
accommodate his disability, and pay Mr. Carlson's attorney's 
fees and costs. 
¶23 Wisconsin Bell appealed the ALJ's decision to LIRC.  
LIRC reversed the ALJ's decision as to Mr. Carlson's suspension 
and accommodation claims.  It found that although Mr. Carlson's 
bipolar disorder caused his conduct (repeatedly hanging up on 
customers) and that the suspension was therefore because of his 
disability, the conduct violated a uniform rule prohibiting 
customer mistreatment and that excusing him for his behavior 
would not have been a reasonable accommodation.  LIRC further 
explained that its conclusion was based on its finding that at 
the time Mr. Carlson engaged in the February 2010 conduct, his 
supervisor and manager had no knowledge of his disability.  
Thus, LIRC dismissed Mr. Carlson's 2011 ERD complaint. 
¶24 With respect to the termination claim, however, LIRC 
concluded that Wisconsin Bell violated the WFEA.  It found that 
Mr. Carlson's supervisors and managers were aware of his bipolar 
disorder at the time of the April 20th incident, his disability 
caused his conduct on that day, he did nothing more than take 
"advantage of two benefits of his employment"——use of the health 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
14 
 
code and taking a partial sick day——that "were available to any 
other sick employee," and therefore he "did not violate any 
attendance or performance requirement."  But it also found that 
Mr. Carl did not believe Mr. Carlson's claim on April 20th that 
he used the health code and left for the day because he was 
sick:  "Based on their own interpretation of Carlson's Q-chats, 
they [Mr. Carlson's supervisors] concluded that Carlson was not 
sick, and they terminated his employment for faking an illness 
to get out of work."  Accordingly, LIRC affirmed the ALJ's order 
that Wisconsin Bell reinstate Mr. Carlson with back pay and pay 
Mr. Carlson's attorney's fees and costs. 
¶25 In the memorandum opinion accompanying its decision, 
LIRC explained the rationale it used to conclude Wisconsin Bell 
violated the WFEA.  It said that "if an employer discharges a 
disabled employee for some unsatisfactory conduct, and the 
employee is able to show that his or her conduct was caused by a 
disability, the discharge was 'in legal effect' because of the 
employee's disability."  LIRC said this analytical device allows 
the decision-maker to shift his focus "from whether the 
disability caused the discharge to whether the disability caused 
the unsatisfactory conduct." 
¶26 Wisconsin Bell petitioned the circuit court for review 
of LIRC's decision regarding the termination of Mr. Carlson's 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
15 
 
employment.10  In a very thoughtful written decision, the circuit 
court concluded that it is reasonable to infer intent from 
surrounding circumstances, but decided LIRC's findings and 
analysis were incomplete because it had failed to address 
whether Wisconsin Bell knew at the time it terminated Mr. 
Carlson that his conduct was caused by his bipolar disorder.  So 
it remanded the matter to LIRC for further proceedings. 
¶27 Wisconsin Bell appealed the circuit court's order.  
The court of appeals determined that great weight deference to 
LIRC's interpretation was appropriate11 and concluded that LIRC's 
use of the "inference method" was reasonable, but that the 
employer must know of the causal link between the disability and 
the conduct on which the employer based its employment action.  
Wis. 
Bell, 
Inc. 
v. 
LIRC, 
2017 
WI App 24, 
¶¶45-46, 
375 
Wis. 2d 293, 895 N.W.2d 57.  The court of appeals concluded, 
contrary to the circuit court, that there was sufficient 
evidence known to Wisconsin Bell at the time it terminated Mr. 
Carlson's employment that his behavior on April 20th was caused 
                                                 
10 Mr. Carlson did not seek review of LIRC's denial of his 
claim related to Wisconsin Bell's suspension decision (ERD Case 
No. CR201102363).  Therefore, the only matter before the court 
is ERD Case No. CR201200428, which addresses Wisconsin Bell's 
termination of Mr. Carlson's employment. 
11 See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 661, 
539 N.W.2d 98 (1995) ("Once it is determined . . . that great 
weight deference is appropriate, we have repeatedly held that an 
agency's interpretation must then merely be reasonable for it to 
be sustained."), overruled by Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 
WI 75, ¶¶82-84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
16 
 
by his disability.  Id., ¶¶54-59.  Accordingly, it reversed the 
circuit court and directed it to enter an order affirming LIRC's 
decision.  Id., ¶64.  We granted Wisconsin Bell's petition for 
review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶28 In cases involving administrative agencies we review 
the decision of the agency, not the decision of the court of 
appeals or circuit court.  Estate of Szleszinski v. LIRC, 2007 
WI 106, ¶22, 304 Wis. 2d 258, 736 N.W.2d 111.  Judicial review 
of LIRC's decisions is governed by Wis. Stat. § 111.395, which 
provides that "[f]indings and orders of the commission under 
this subchapter are subject to review under ch. 227."   
¶29 We review an administrative agency's interpretation 
and application of statutes de novo.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc., ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶84 ("[W]e will review an administrative agency's 
conclusions of law under the same standard we apply to a circuit 
court's conclusions of law——de novo.").  Consequent upon that 
review, "[t]he court shall set aside or modify the agency action 
if it finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a 
provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a 
particular action, or it shall remand the case to the agency for 
further action under a correct interpretation of the provision 
of law."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5). 
¶30 Our review of LIRC's findings of fact is limited:  "If 
the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a 
contested case proceeding, the court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
17 
 
on any disputed finding of fact."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).  We 
will set aside or remand a matter to the agency based on a 
factual deficiency only if "the agency's action depends on any 
finding of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record."  Id.; see also Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 
2003 WI 106, ¶27, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651.  "Substantial 
evidence does not mean a preponderance of evidence.  It means 
whether, 
after 
considering 
all 
the 
evidence 
of 
record, 
reasonable minds could arrive at the conclusion reached by the 
trier of fact."  Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. DOR, 2010 
WI 33, ¶31, 324 Wis. 2d 68, 781 N.W.2d 674. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Employment Discrimination Under the WFEA 
¶31 An employer engages in employment discrimination if it 
terminates a person from employment "because of any basis 
enumerated in s. 111.321."  Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1).  As 
applicable here, Wis. Stat. § 111.321 prohibits an employer from 
engaging in employment discrimination on the basis of a 
"disability."  Id.  However, an employer may nonetheless 
terminate a person's employment if "the disability is reasonably 
related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the 
job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment."  
See Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a). 
¶32 Mr. Carlson's claim of employment discrimination under 
Wis. Stat. § 111.321 can succeed only if the following three 
propositions are true:  (1) he has a disability; (2) Wisconsin 
Bell terminated his employment "because of" that disability; and 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
18 
 
(3) Wisconsin Bell had no justification under Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.34 for terminating his employment.  See Crystal Lake 
Cheese Factory, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶67 (citing Target Stores v. 
LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998)); see 
also Brown Cty. v. LIRC, 124 Wis. 2d 560, 572-73, 369 N.W.2d 735 
(1985).12  The parties agree that Mr. Carlson has a disability 
cognizable by § 111.321.  Therefore, our analysis begins with 
the second proposition. 
¶33 Under the disparate treatment theory, an employer 
engages in employment discrimination contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.321 if it "treats some people less favorably than others 
because they belong to a protected class."  Racine Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. LIRC, 164 Wis. 2d 567, 595, 476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 
1991).  To be actionable, the employer must have acted with 
discriminatory intent.  Id.  ("[A] complainant asserting a 
disparate treatment theory must prove discriminatory intent to 
prevail, . . . ."). 
B. LIRC's Intentional Discrimination Analysis   
¶34 LIRC says it may use either of two methods in 
determining whether Wisconsin Bell intentionally terminated Mr. 
Carlson's employment "because of" his disability.  The first 
                                                 
12 Mr. Carlson bears the burden of proof with respect to the 
first two propositions; with respect to the third proposition, 
Wisconsin Bell bears the burden of proving it had a legally-
cognizable justification for the adverse employment action.  See 
Brown Cty. v. LIRC, 124 Wis. 2d 560, 572-73, 369 N.W.2d 735 
(1985); see also  Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 
WI 106, ¶67, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
19 
 
method asks whether the employer held "actual discriminatory 
animus against an employee because that employee was an 
individual with a disability[.]"  Maeder v. Univ. of Wisconsin-
Madison, ERD Case No. CR200501824 (LIRC June 28, 2013).  The 
alternative method, known as the "inference method," finds 
intent to discriminate when an employer bases its adverse action 
on "a problem with that employee's behavior or performance which 
is caused by the employee's disability."  See id. ("If an 
employee is discharged because of unsatisfactory behavior which 
was a direct result of a disability, the discharge is, in legal 
effect, because of that disability.").   
¶35 LIRC used the inference method in Mr. Carlson's case, 
and described it as follows: 
[T]he commission determines the employer's intent by 
inference based on the surrounding circumstances.  Its 
analysis 
begins 
by 
stating 
a 
logical 
chain 
of 
causation:  1) if an employee's disability causes 
certain behavior, and 2) the employer takes action 
against the employee on the basis of that behavior, 
then 3) the employer has taken action against the 
employee because of the disability. 
Inferring discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence is, 
of course, quite common.  See, e.g., Stern v. Thompson & Coates, 
Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 236-37, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (stating 
that a person's state of mind "must be inferred from the acts 
and statements of the person, in view of the surrounding 
circumstances." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).  The 
question, therefore, is whether LIRC's version of the "inference 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
20 
 
method" preserves the employee's burden of proving an employer's 
intent to discriminate against him because of his disability. 
¶36 LIRC assures us it has always required "proof of an 
employer's discriminatory state of mind . . . before liability 
could attach," and cites several of its cases to illustrate its 
commitment to this principle.  The citations, however, do not 
support the proposition.  In Conley v. DHSS, Case No. 84-0067-
PC-ER (Wis. Personnel Comm'n June 29, 1987), the Personnel 
Commission13 said the employer cannot defeat the "because of" 
element of the employee's claim "simply by stating that its 
motivation for discharging the complainant was his inability to 
perform his duties where any such inability has resulted 
directly from the handicapping condition."  Although the causal 
link between Conley's disability and his inability to perform 
his duties was obvious to all concerned, nothing in the 
Personnel Commission's analysis actually required the employee 
to prove the employer was aware of the link.  That is, the 
Personnel Commission's analysis would allow an employee to prove 
discrimination simply by demonstrating he had a disability and 
he was terminated because of behavior caused by that disability.  
The 
same 
is 
true 
of 
Bell-Merz 
v. 
Univ. 
of 
Wis. 
Sys. 
(Whitewater), Case. No. 90-0138-PC-ER (Wis. Personnel Comm'n 
Mar. 19, 1993), where the employer knew of the causal connection 
between disability and conduct resulting in termination, but 
                                                 
13 LIRC inherited part of the Personnel Commission's duties 
after it was abolished in 2003. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
21 
 
nothing 
in 
the 
analysis 
required 
that 
it 
know 
of 
the 
connection.14  And Stroik v. Worzalla Publishing Co., ERD Case 
No. CR200002461 (LIRC July 16, 2004), did not even attempt to 
address whether discriminatory intent requires an employer to 
know the connection between an employee's disability and the 
conduct for which his employment is terminated.  In fact, LIRC 
did not cite a single case in which it required proof that the 
employer knew the employee's disability caused his conduct. 
¶37  LIRC approached the proposition most closely when it 
cited Volkmann, in which it found no discriminatory intent 
because the employer had never been informed that the employee 
had a disability.  Volkmann v. Colonial Mgmt. Grp. LP, ERD Case 
No. CR201102513 (LIRC Jan. 30, 2015).  That is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, step in showing that it always requires proof of 
intent before finding liability.  Ignorance of the employee's 
disability must certainly foreclose a finding of intentional 
discrimination.  But that still leaves the question of whether 
LIRC would require the employee to prove the employer knew of 
the connection between a disability and the conduct for which it 
terminated employment.  That is the question before the court, 
and Volkmann provides no answer.  Similarly, in Wester v. 
                                                 
14 See also Stelloh v. Wauwatosa Sav. Bank, ERD Case No. 
CR200700340 (LIRC June 19, 2012) (same); Crivello v. Target 
Stores, ERD Case No. 9252123 (LIRC Aug. 14, 1996), aff'd sub nom 
Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 
1998) (same); Staats v. Ctys. of Sawyer and Bayfield, ERD Case 
No. 9500906 (LIRC Oct. 27, 1997) (same). 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
22 
 
Charter Media/Communications, LIRC said an employee may prove 
intentional 
discrimination 
by 
showing 
"the 
alleged 
discriminators would have had reason to be aware that she was 
disabled, or perceived her to be disabled, at the time the 
allegedly discriminatory actions were taken."  ERD Case No. 
CF200003872 (LIRC Oct. 15, 2004).  But it said nothing about any 
requirement that the employer know of the connection between the 
disability and the employee's conduct.   
¶38 LIRC has been cautioned before about the significance 
of the causal relationship between an employee's disability and 
his conduct when establishing discriminatory intent under the 
inference method.  Almost two decades ago, the court of appeals 
reviewed a case in which LIRC "declared, without further 
discussion, that a firing for misconduct equates to a firing 
because of the underlying causal disability."  Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 272, ¶28, 240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 
N.W.2d 633.  The court of appeals delicately questioned whether 
this rationale was sufficient for a finding of intentional 
discrimination: 
The question of whether a firing for misconduct caused 
by a disability equates, as a matter of law, to a 
firing because of disability, is of some importance, 
and it involves significant policy implications.  We 
therefore invite the commission on remand to expand on 
the rationale for its adoption of the Personnel 
Commission's interpretation, which is the subject of 
some disagreement among federal courts. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
23 
 
See id.  The Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. matter settled before the 
agency could address it on remand, so there was no occasion to 
explore the question further. 
¶39 We pick up where Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. left off.  We 
agree 
that 
the 
transitive 
nature 
of 
LIRC's 
inferential 
methodology is an important matter.  In fact, the methodology 
cannot function without it.  LIRC says this is where its 
analysis of discriminatory intent begins, but it also appears to 
be where it ends.  And it is a very premature end.  Because it 
goes no further, LIRC's methodology actually requires a double 
inference to reach its goal, and only one of them is 
justifiable.  The first is that, when an employer observes 
conduct caused by an employee's disability, the employer knows 
of the causal connection.  The other is that, in terminating 
employment because of the employee's conduct, the employer is 
actually terminating him because of his disability.   
¶40 The first inference presents an insuperable problem 
for LIRC's methodology.  In the search for discriminatory intent 
via the inferential method, there is, quite literally, no 
evidence more important than the employer's knowledge of the 
causal 
connection 
between 
conduct 
and 
disability. 
 
This 
knowledge is what allows us to logically transfer the employer's 
intent from the former to the latter.  If Wisconsin Bell did not 
know of this connection, the most that could be said of its 
state of mind would be that it intended to terminate Mr. 
Carlson's employment because of his conduct.  The WFEA does not 
forbid this.  It forbids Wisconsin Bell from terminating his 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
24 
 
employment because of his disability.  Excusing the employee 
from proving the employer's knowledge of the causal connection 
allows LIRC to find intentional discrimination where there is no 
proof of it. 
¶41 For these reasons, LIRC's double-inference methodology 
is structurally flawed.  We conclude that an employer does not 
engage in intentional discrimination when it bases an adverse 
employment action on the employee's conduct unless the employee 
proves the employer knew his disability caused his conduct.15   
¶42 As we considered LIRC's arguments concerning its 
double-inference methodology, we gave "due weight" to its 
"experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge."  
See Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10); see also Tetra Tech EC, Inc., ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶77-79, 84.  The factors informing how much weight 
is due include the considerations we previously used in deciding 
whether we would defer to an administrative agency's conclusions 
                                                 
15 Justice 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley 
endorses 
LIRC's 
double-
inference methodology because without it, she says, the WFEA 
loses its "teeth."  Dissent, ¶¶55, 63.  She says this approach 
"reasonably equates discrimination against the symptoms of a 
disability with discrimination against a person who has a 
disability."  Id., ¶66.  The WFEA protects individuals against 
discrimination because of a disability; Justice Bradley wants to 
protect 
disabilities 
against 
discrimination 
because 
of 
a 
symptom.  The two are not the same, and only the former may be 
found in our statutes.  Allowing one to stand in for the other 
could make an employer liable for intentionally discriminating 
against a person because of his disability without even knowing 
he has one.  There is quite certainly nothing reasonable about 
that.  And that is why we cannot countenance LIRC's double-
inference methodology.   
No. 
2016AP355   
 
25 
 
of law, such as:  "(1) whether the legislature made the agency 
responsible for administering the statute in question; (2) the 
length of time the administrative agency's interpretation has 
stood; (3) the extent to which the agency used its expertise or 
specialized knowledge in developing its position; and (4) 
whether the agency's perspective would enhance uniformity and 
consistency of the law."  Tetra Tech EC, Inc., ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
¶79. 
¶43 We recognize that the legislature charged LIRC with 
deciding contested cases under the WFEA, and it certainly 
handles many such cases every year.16  Additionally, we recognize 
the 
importance 
of 
"uniformity 
and 
consistency" 
in 
the 
application of the WFEA.  Employers and employees alike need a 
stable 
framework 
within 
which 
they 
can 
manage 
their 
relationships.  However, the need for stability and LIRC's long-
standing practice do not persuade us that its double-inference 
methodology is consistent with the WFEA. 
C. 
Wisconsin Bell's Knowledge 
¶44 The 
inferential 
method 
of 
proving 
discriminatory 
intent, properly formulated, requires that we now address what 
Wisconsin Bell knew about the causal link between Mr. Carlson's 
behavior and his disability.  Specifically, we are interested in 
                                                 
16 Statistics regarding the number of appeals LIRC receives 
and the number of decisions issued per year can be found at 
http://lirc.wisconsin.gov/lirc_stats.htm (last visited June 5, 
2018).  Over the past five years (2013-2017), LIRC has issued an 
average of 87 equal rights decisions per year. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
26 
 
what Wisconsin Bell knew about that subject at the time it 
terminated Mr. Carlson's employment.  This is the necessary 
temporal point of reference, of course, because our project here 
is to discover the intent behind Wisconsin Bell's termination 
decision.  One cannot retroactively intend something, so the 
intent must precede or accompany the act.17  Therefore, what 
Wisconsin Bell (or the ALJ or LIRC, for that matter) learned 
about the causal connection after the termination is of no 
import because only contemporaneous knowledge can account for 
the intent that motivates an action.   
¶45 When 
Wisconsin 
Bell 
terminated 
Mr. 
Carlson's 
employment, here is what it knew: 
 At the review hearing related to the incident of 
February 18, 2010, Mr. Carlson claimed that his 
disability caused him to hang up on customer 
calls. 
 Dr. Siegel's letter of March 1, 2010, said Mr. 
Carlson suffers from "bipolar disorder-depressed 
type," which is "characterized by extremes of 
mood 
that 
could 
manifest 
in 
a 
significant 
depression with or without problems associated 
with anxiety and irritability[,]" and that with 
bipolar disorder, "[e]xtremes of moods can occur 
                                                 
17 Black's Law Dictionary defines "intent" as "[t]he state 
of mind accompanying an act, esp[ecially] a forbidden act."  
Intent, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Likewise, 
Webster's definition of "intent" includes "the state of mind or 
mental attitude with which an act is done" and "the design or 
purpose to commit any wrongful . . . act that is the natural and 
probable consequence of other voluntary acts or conduct."  
Intent, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1176 
(1986). 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
27 
 
rather quickly and [are] often triggered by 
relatively minor frustrations." 
 Mr. Cohen's letter, also prepared for the review 
board hearing, said he was seeing Mr. Carlson for 
individual psychotherapy services for dysthymia, 
major depressive disorder-recurrent, and bipolar 
disorder.   
 At the review hearing related to the incident on 
April 20, 2011, Mr. Carlson maintained that he 
had become upset when he learned he had failed 
the collections test and put himself in health 
code because he was too upset to take calls.  He 
said that he Q-chatted as a way to get support 
from his co-employees.  As with the prior 
incident, Mr. Carlson said his disability caused 
his conduct. 
 Mr. Carlson offered a new letter from Dr. Siegel 
to support his claim.  The letter said that Mr. 
Carlson continued to be diagnosed as bipolar, 
depressed 
type, 
and 
it 
summarized 
recent 
medication changes.   
¶46 The sum total of information at Wisconsin Bell's 
disposal consisted of Mr. Carlson's claim of causation and three 
letters confirming his bipolarism——none of which mentioned any 
causal 
nexus 
between 
his 
disability 
and 
conduct. 
 
The 
consequences of bipolarism are not matters of common knowledge.  
No. 
2016AP355   
 
28 
 
Because of the amorphous nature of this disability,18 an 
employee's bare assertion of causality cannot be credited as 
authoritative.  To conclude otherwise would allow Mr. Carlson to 
unilaterally bring any of his misbehavior under the protective 
cloak of the WFEA.  As LIRC has previously recognized, this is 
neither practical nor rational.  See, e.g., Maeder, ERD Case No. 
CR200501824 (LIRC June 28, 2013) ("[I]t is clear that it cannot 
simply be presumed that every act of bad behavior engaged in by 
a person with a mental disorder is caused by that mental 
disorder.").  And as the circuit court aptly observed, "[i]f an 
employer isn't aware that certain behavioral or performance 
problems are symptomatic of a given disability, it hardly seems 
reasonable to accuse the employer of being motivated by the 
underlying disability." 
¶47 The letters Mr. Carlson presented do not even purport 
to put Wisconsin Bell on notice of the connection between Mr. 
Carlson's disability and his behavior at work.  Doctor Siegel's 
letter of March 1, 2010, says "I am writing this letter at your 
                                                 
18 Dr. Siegel said "[b]ipolar disorder is a condition 
characterized by extremes of mood that could manifest in a 
significant depression with or without problems associated with 
anxiety and irritability[,]" and that with bipolar disorder, 
"[e]xtremes of moods can occur rather quickly and [are] often 
triggered by relatively minor frustrations."  The amorphousness 
of this description is why expert testimony is needed to 
determine whether "an individual's bad behavior is caused by a 
mental disorder from which the individual suffers."  Maeder v. 
Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison, ERD Case No. CR200501824 (LIRC June 
28, 
2013) 
(citing 
Wal-Mart 
Stores, 
Inc. 
v. 
LIRC, 
2000 
WI App 272, ¶16, 240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 N.W.2d 633). 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
29 
 
request to identify your current diagnosis."  So not only does 
the letter not describe a causal connection regarding the events 
of February 18, 2010, Mr. Carlson apparently did not ask him to 
say anything about that subject.  This omission is especially 
significant because Dr. Siegel knew how Mr. Carlson was going to 
use the letter.  He wrote:  "I understand you will be passing 
this letter along to your employer in a current work-related 
problem."  And yet the letter says not a word about any 
causative link.   
¶48 Mr. Cohen's four-sentence letter of February 24, 2010, 
is no more enlightening than Dr. Siegel's missive.  It, too, 
identified several diagnoses and acknowledged that Mr. Carlson 
had requested the letter for use in the upcoming review board 
hearing.  As with Dr. Siegel's letter, it says nothing about any 
connection between Mr. Carlson's disability and his conduct on 
February 18, 2010 and April 20, 2011. 
¶49 Doctor Siegel provided his second letter after the 
events of April 20, 2011.  He said he was "writing to update you 
[Mr. Carlson] on your treatment, condition and diagnosis and 
following up on my previous letter to you on 03/01/2010."  The 
update was that his diagnosis remained as it was before.19 
                                                 
19 Notwithstanding 
the 
letters' 
enigmatic 
generalities, 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley claims "these letters precisely 
describe 
the 
actions 
that 
ultimately 
led 
to 
Carlson's 
termination."  Dissent, ¶73.  There was, quite literally, 
nothing precise about these letters, and she offers no quote to 
suggest otherwise. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
30 
 
¶50 Therefore, 
when 
Wisconsin 
Bell 
terminated 
Mr. 
Carlson's employment, it knew nothing more than that its 
employee claimed his bipolarism caused his conduct.  LIRC's 
memorandum 
opinion 
persuasively 
(albeit 
unintentionally) 
demonstrates that this sparse evidence could not have informed 
Wisconsin Bell that Mr. Carlson's conduct was the result of his 
bipolarism.  LIRC conceded that spotting such a connection is 
beyond the ken of laymen when it acknowledged that the evidence 
"is technical and scientific and calls for expert testimony."  
And even with the benefit of hindsight, expert testimony, and a 
three-day hearing, the causal connection can best be described 
as questionable.  LIRC admits that "neither Cohen nor Dr. Siegel 
gave unequivocal opinions that Carlson's behavior on February 
18, 2010 was caused by his mental illness."  The most it could 
say was that "his behavior was outside his normal pattern of 
behavior, and was consistent with several of the symptoms of his 
illness."  "Consistent with" is the language of correlation, not 
causation.  Nonetheless, LIRC found causality in both incidents. 
¶51 With all the benefit of hindsight, LIRC's belief that 
there is substantial evidence of a causal connection between Mr. 
Carlson's disability and his conduct may be reasonable.  But 
that is not the issue we must address.  Our task here is to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record 
that 
Wisconsin 
Bell, 
not 
LIRC, 
knew 
that 
Mr. 
Carlson's 
bipolarism caused his conduct.  And we must answer that inquiry 
as 
of 
the 
date 
Wisconsin 
Bell 
terminated 
Mr. 
Carlson's 
employment, not retrospectively with the benefit of a three-day 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
31 
 
hearing and the testimony of two experts.  Based on the record 
before us, and for the reasons described above, we conclude 
there is no substantial evidence that Wisconsin Bell knew Mr. 
Carlson's disability caused his conduct on April 20, 2011.20 
¶52 For the sake of completeness, we note that LIRC 
addressed the state of Wisconsin Bell's knowledge as of April 
20, 2011, but cryptically, and not for the purpose of 
discovering discriminatory intent.  After an employee proves the 
employer intentionally discriminated against him because of his 
disability, the employer may nonetheless avoid liability by 
proving the disability prevented the employee from adequately 
undertaking his job-related responsibilities.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.34(2)(a).21  The inquiry under § 111.34(2)(a), however, 
does not commence until after there is a conclusion that the 
                                                 
20 This does not require us to set aside any of LIRC's 
factual findings because, in determining whether Mr. Carlson 
established that Wisconsin Bell intentionally discriminated 
against him because of his disability, it made no findings at 
all about whether Wisconsin Bell knew of the causal connection 
between the disability and his conduct. 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.34(2)(a) provides: 
Notwithstanding s. 111.322, it is not employment 
discrimination because of disability to refuse to 
hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar 
or terminate from employment, membership or licensure 
any 
individual, 
or 
to 
discriminate 
against 
any 
individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, 
conditions 
or 
privileges 
of 
employment 
if 
the 
disability is reasonably related to the individual's 
ability 
to 
adequately 
undertake 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities 
of 
that 
individual's 
employment, 
membership or licensure. 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
32 
 
employer engaged in intentional discrimination pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 111.322.  See Target Stores, 217 Wis. 2d 1 at 9-10.  At 
that stage of the analysis, the employer has the burden of 
proving it satisfied the terms of § 111.34(2)(a).  Target 
Stores, 217 Wis. 2d 1 at 9-10.  LIRC said Wisconsin Bell could 
not have had a good-faith belief in its need to terminate Mr. 
Carlson's employment under this provision because the evidence 
available to it demonstrated his disability caused his conduct:  
"[I]t was not an act of good faith for [Wisconsin Bell] to 
proceed with termination on the assumption that Carlson was 
lying about his ability to work on April 20th, in the face of 
the information that Carlson had presented to them from his 
doctor and therapist about his bipolar disorder as a cause for 
his conduct."  Even if LIRC had included this in the "intent to 
discriminate" part of its analysis, it would not change our 
conclusion.  The information provided by Mr. Carlson's doctor 
and therapist did not mention "his bipolar disorder as a cause 
for his conduct."  It said nothing about his conduct at all, 
much less provide a link between it and his disability. 
¶53 Wisconsin Bell terminated Mr. Carlson's employment 
because he violated the "last chance agreement" when he used the 
health code to avoid taking customer calls, engaged in personal 
conversations with his co-workers on the Q-Chat system, and left 
work before he finished his shift.  There is no substantial 
evidence that Wisconsin Bell knew that Mr. Carlson's disability 
caused this conduct.  Therefore, Wisconsin Bell did not 
No. 
2016AP355   
 
33 
 
discriminate against Mr. Carlson "because of" his disability in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 111.322.  The case must be dismissed.22 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶54 We hold that LIRC may not conclude that a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1) occurred by using the inference method 
of proving intentional discrimination unless the employee proves 
the employer knew his disability caused the conduct on which the 
employer based an adverse employment decision.  And the employer 
must have had this knowledge at the time it made the decision.  
Because the record lacks substantial evidence that Wisconsin 
Bell knew Mr. Carlson's disability caused his conduct on April 
20, 2011, we reverse the court of appeals and dismiss Mr. 
Carlson's complaint. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the case is dismissed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 We need not reach the parties' discussion of whether 
Wisconsin Bell failed to reasonably accommodate Mr. Carlson's 
disability under Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b).  That issue does not 
arise until the employee establishes his employer intentionally 
discriminated against him because of his disability in violation 
of § 111.322.  Mr. Carlson has not made that showing, and so 
this issue is moot.  See Target Stores, 217 Wis. 2d at 9-10; see 
also Hutchinson Tech, Inc. v. LIRC, 2004 WI 90, ¶32, 273 
Wis. 2d 394, 682 N.W.2d 343; Crivello, ERD Case No. 9252123 
(LIRC Aug. 14, 1996) ("Obviously, an employer is not required to 
raise the issue of accommodation if the employer is unaware of 
an employe[e]'s handicap . . . ."). 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
upholds Charles Carlson's termination, concluding the record 
lacks substantial evidence that the termination was "because of" 
Carlson's disability.  In doing so, it removes the teeth from 
the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act's protections and creates an 
unworkable standard.  By tossing out the long established 
inference method of proof in employment discrimination cases, 
the majority places an untenable burden on all employees with 
disabilities, and those with mental health disabilities in 
particular. 
¶56 Thus, the majority becomes the only entity reviewing 
this matter that discards the inference method and concludes 
that the termination is lawful.  It alone declines to heed the 
warning that "if the law fails to protect the manifestations of 
[a] disability, there is no real protection in the law because 
it would protect the disabled in name only."  Gambini v. Total 
Renal Care, Inc., 486 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007). 
¶57 I would heed that warning.  Because I agree with the 
administrative law judge who upheld the use of the inference 
method and determined that Carlson was wrongfully terminated; 
and with a unanimous LIRC that applied the inference method, 
determining that Wisconsin Bell wrongfully terminated Carlson; 
and with the circuit court that concluded that use of the 
inference method was reasonable; and with the unanimous court of 
appeals that embraced the long standing use of the inference 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
2 
 
method and agreed with LIRC that Carlson was wrongfully 
terminated, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶58 Prior to his termination, Carlson worked for Wisconsin 
Bell for approximately 25 years.  Majority op., ¶7.  During this 
time, Carlson made his employer aware of his bipolar disorder, 
providing letters from his doctors.  Id., ¶11. 
¶59 The letters identified Carlson's diagnosis as "bipolar 
disorder-depressed type."  Id.  They also indicated that 
"[b]ipolar disorder is a condition characterized by extremes of 
mood that could manifest in a significant depression with or 
without problems associated with anxiety and irritability" and 
that "[e]xtremes of moods can occur rather quickly and [are] 
often triggered by relatively minor frustrations."  Id. 
¶60 At the time of the events giving rise to his claim, 
Carlson worked in a Wisconsin Bell call center as a Technical 
Service Representative.  Wisconsin Bell terminated Carlson's 
employment after Carlson entered a call-blocking health code1 
subsequent to learning that he had not passed a test required 
for a position in another department.  Id., ¶¶15-20.  While he 
                                                 
1 As the majority opinion explains, Technical Service 
Representatives 
generally 
receive 
calls 
based 
on 
their 
availability.  Majority op., ¶8.  They can, however, control 
receipt of calls by making themselves unavailable by entering 
certain call-blocking codes, such as for meal and rest breaks, 
short health breaks, and training and staff meetings.  Id.  
Improper use of call blocking codes to avoid taking calls could 
result in immediate termination.  Id. 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
3 
 
was in the health code status, Carlson "Q-chatted"2 with co-
workers.  Id., ¶¶15-16.  Carlson asserted that he entered the 
health code because he was upset after learning of his test 
result and that he reached out to co-workers as a coping 
mechanism.  Id., ¶19. 
¶61 Carlson brought an employment discrimination claim on 
the basis of disability.  An administrative law judge reinstated 
Carlson and LIRC upheld that decision.  Id., ¶24.  In doing so, 
LIRC 
applied 
the 
"inference 
method" 
of 
determining 
discriminatory intent.  Pursuant to this method, "if an employer 
discharges a disabled employee for some unsatisfactory conduct, 
and the employee is able to show that his or her conduct was 
caused by a disability, the discharge was 'in legal effect' 
because of the employee's disability."  Id., ¶25. 
¶62 The majority concludes that LIRC's "inference method" 
is inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1)3 because it excuses 
the employee from the burden of proving discriminatory intent.  
Majority op., ¶3.  It further determines that the record lacks 
substantial evidence that Wisconsin Bell terminated Carlson's 
employment because of his bipolar disorder.  Id. 
                                                 
2 "Q-chat" is an internal instant messaging program used by 
Wisconsin Bell. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 111.322(1) provides in relevant part:  "[I]t 
is an act of employment discrimination to . . . terminate from 
employment . . . any 
individual . . . because 
of 
any 
basis 
enumerated in s. 111.321."  Among the bases enumerated in 
§ 111.321 is "disability." 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
4 
 
II 
¶63 The majority removes the teeth from the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act's protections.  To succeed on his disability 
discrimination claim, Carlson must demonstrate that he has a 
disability, that he received an adverse action from his 
employer, and that the adverse action was "because of" his 
disability.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 272, ¶9, 
240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 N.W.2d 633; Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 
Wis. 2d 1, 9, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998).  Additionally, the 
employer must have acted with discriminatory intent.  Racine 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. LIRC, 164 Wis. 2d 567, 595, 476 N.W.2d 707 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
¶64 LIRC's 
inference 
method 
of 
demonstrating 
discriminatory intent is based on the premise that the symptoms 
of a disability are inseparable from the disability itself.  If 
the employee is intentionally discriminated against because of a 
symptom of a disability, that is the same as intentional 
discrimination on the basis of the disability. 
¶65 This premise is reasonable and correct.  As amicus 
Disability Rights Wisconsin and the Survival Coalition of 
Wisconsin persuasively explain by way of analogy, "[e]pilepsy 
and seizure go hand-in-hand."  If an employer terminates an 
employee with epilepsy for having a seizure, that employee is in 
effect being terminated "because of" having epilepsy.  Likewise 
here, Carlson was terminated because of his reaction to learning 
he did not pass a test and the steps he took to reach out to 
coworkers for support as a means of coping with his bipolar 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
5 
 
disorder.  The termination was "because of" his bipolar 
disorder.4 
¶66 Contrary to the majority's assertion, the inference 
method does not relieve the employee of the burden to prove 
intent.  Rather, it reasonably equates discrimination against 
the symptoms of a disability with discrimination against a 
person who has a disability.  See Gambini, 486 F.3d at 1093.  
The employee still must show a causal link between the 
manifested symptoms and the adverse action. 
¶67 The inference method is not overly restrictive on 
employers.  An employer can still terminate the employee if he 
"cannot 
'adequately 
undertake 
the 
job-related 
responsibilities.'"  Target Stores, 217 Wis. 2d at 10 (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a)).  The majority, however, errs in the 
other direction.  Its restriction on the use of the inference 
method gives an employer carte blanche to fire an employee 
                                                 
4 LIRC's finding of fact number 24 aptly describes this 
causal link: 
Carlson's mood and his inability to work on April 20, 
2011 upon learning that he failed the collections test 
were caused by his bipolar disorder.  The Q-chats he 
engaged in were reflective of his mood disorder, and 
were 
consistent 
with 
his 
psychotherapist's 
recommendation that he reach out to others for support 
as a means of coping with his mood.  The fact that he 
used slang, including some humor, and checked on the 
consequences of his taking a medical leave, were not 
inconsistent with the conclusion that his mood and 
inability to work were a manifestation of his mental 
illness.  He was unable to work because of symptoms of 
his mental illness, and appropriately used the health 
code and sick leave just as it was available to any 
sick employee. 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
6 
 
because of a symptom of a disability, as long as the employer 
does not overtly state that the disability is the reason for the 
dismissal. 
¶68 Gambini forewarned:  "[I]f the law fails to protect 
the 
manifestations 
of 
[a] 
disability, 
there 
is 
no 
real 
protection in the law because it would protect the disabled in 
name only."  486 F.3d at 1095.  Similarly, over four decades 
ago, the United States Supreme Court cautioned that disability 
discrimination laws are necessary not only to protect against 
prejudice, but to combat "the fact that the American people are 
simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties 
confront[ing] people with [disabilities]."  School Bd. of Nassau 
Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (citation 
omitted). 
¶69 The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act is to be "broadly 
interpreted to resolve the problem it was designed to address."  
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, ¶46, 264 
Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651 (quoting McMullen v. LIRC, 148 
Wis. 2d 270, 275, 434 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1988)).  The purpose 
of the law is "to encourage and foster to the fullest extent 
practicable the employment of all properly qualified individuals 
regardless of any [disabilities]."  McMullen, 148 Wis. 2d at 
275.  The majority's restrictive interpretation undermines this 
purpose and provides no protections at all to employees with 
disabilities. 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
7 
 
III 
¶70 Further, the majority's approach is unworkable.  By 
decoupling the disability from its symptoms and requiring an 
employer's knowledge of a disability prior to the adverse 
action, the majority places an impossible burden on an employee 
with a disability.  This burden falls particularly heavily on 
those with mental health conditions that are not always 
immediately apparent to a layperson or employer. 
¶71 The majority states that "[e]xcusing the employee from 
proving the employer's knowledge of the causal connection allows 
LIRC to find intentional discrimination where there is no proof 
of it."  Majority op., ¶40.  Yet it concedes that "[t]he 
consequences of bipolarism are not matters of common knowledge."  
Id., ¶46.  It then concludes that "[b]ecause of the amorphous 
nature of this disability, an employee's bare assertion of 
causality cannot be credited as authoritative."  Id.  Thus, the 
majority examines what Wisconsin Bell knew at the time it 
terminated Carlson's employment.  Id., ¶47. 
¶72 So what did Wisconsin Bell know at the time it 
terminated Carlson's employment?  As the majority details, 
Wisconsin Bell knew a full year before the incident that led to 
his dismissal that Carlson had bipolar disorder that could 
manifest in significant depression.  Id., ¶11.  It knew that 
bipolar disorder may include "[e]xtremes of moods" that "can 
occur rather quickly and [are] often triggered by relatively 
minor frustrations."  Id.  It knew that Carlson was receiving 
psychotherapy.  Id. 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
8 
 
¶73 Yet despite the fact that these letters precisely 
describe 
the 
actions 
that 
ultimately 
led 
to 
Carlson's 
termination, the majority discounts the letters because they do 
not mention any "causal nexus" between bipolar disorder and 
Carlson's conduct.  See id., ¶¶46-47.  With Wisconsin Bell's 
knowledge of Carlson's condition and its manifestations, one 
wonders what kind of nexus would satisfy the majority. 
¶74 The majority's requirement that the employer have 
knowledge of the disability prior to the adverse action 
encourages rash and uninformed decision-making on the part of 
employers.  Under the majority's approach, an employee must 
provide immediate medical proof that an action was caused by a 
disability or face termination.  This is a nearly impossible 
hurdle. 
¶75 What are Carlson and others similarly situated to do?  
Should they notify their employers of their mental health 
conditions and all of their possible manifestations immediately 
upon being hired in order to protect their employment if 
symptoms manifest themselves at a later date?  But it is often 
impossible to predict in advance all of the ways that a 
disability may manifest itself in a workplace.  Symptoms as well 
as work environments may change and disabilities may progress 
and regress.  This burden falls particularly severely on those 
with mental health disabilities, which are less apparent to the 
layperson. 
¶76 If employees do not present a sufficient medical 
report prior to an adverse action, how are they going to meet 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
9 
 
the majority's apparent requirement that medical proof be 
immediately available in order to thwart termination?  Such a 
requirement seems divorced from the reality of medical treatment 
and workplace relations. 
¶77 Often a medical professional will want to have an 
appointment with the employee to discuss what happened before 
issuing a report on causation.  Scheduling medical appointments 
and receiving subsequent reports opining on causation will 
likely take weeks, if not longer, to accomplish. 
¶78 Further, the specter of providing a disclosure of all 
possible manifestations, even if they may never happen, puts an 
employee in a very difficult position.  It forces an employee to 
disclose 
a 
mental 
health 
disability 
and 
its 
potential 
manifestations just in case.  Aside from being an unnecessary 
invasion of privacy and potentially embarrassing, it also may 
discourage people with disabilities from applying for employment 
in the first place.  Far from advancing the purpose of the WFEA, 
the majority's unworkable approach runs completely counter to 
its objectives. 
¶79 On the other hand, application of the inference method 
of determining discriminatory intent avoids placing an undue 
burden on people with disabilities.  Further, it gives meaning 
to the protections of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act and 
avoids rendering those protections merely illusory.   
¶80 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
No.  2016AP355.awb 
 
 
 
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