Title: State v. Richard L. Kittilstad

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Richard L. Kittilstad,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 204, 585 N.W.2d 925 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 17, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Benjamin D. Proctor 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Richard L. Wachowski and Wachowski & Johnson, S.C., Eau 
Claire and oral argument by Richard L. Wachowski. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1456-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard L. Kittilstad,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   The 
defendant, 
Richard 
L. 
Kittilstad, seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, State v. Kittilstad, 222 Wis. 2d 204, 585 N.W.2d 925 
(Ct. App. 1998), which affirmed, on interlocutory appeal, the 
circuit court’s denial of his motion challenging the bindover 
and the charges in the information.   
¶2 
The State has charged the defendant with four counts 
of soliciting prostitution under Wis. Stat. § 944.32 (1995-96)1 
and one count of extortion under Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1).  The 
charges are based on the testimony of five Panamanian students 
whom the defendant sponsored to come to the United States.  At 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version unless otherwise noted.   
FILED 
 
DEC 17, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
2 
the preliminary examination, the students testified that the 
defendant repeatedly offered to pay them if they would bring 
women back to his house where they were staying, have sex with 
them, and allow him to watch.  One student testified that the 
defendant threatened to throw him out of his home and interfere 
with his study program if the student refused his requests.  The 
defendant argues that this evidence, even if true, cannot 
establish solicitation of prostitution or extortion as those 
offenses are defined in the Wisconsin Statutes.  
¶3 
Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
conclude that the statutes the defendant is charged with 
violating encompass the conduct alleged at the preliminary 
examination.  We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I. 
¶4 
In 
November 
1997 
police 
investigated 
allegations 
against the defendant, Richard L. Kittilstad, a Lutheran 
minister who had sponsored several young Panamanian men in their 
studies at Chippewa Valley Technical College.  A criminal 
complaint was filed charging him with six counts of soliciting 
prostitution contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.32.  Before the 
preliminary examination, the defendant moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the grounds that it was defective because the facts 
stated in it failed to support the charges.  Judge Eric J. Wahl 
reserved his decision on the motion until after the preliminary 
hearing. 
¶5 
The preliminary hearing took place on January 20, 
1998.  The State presented the testimony of five students. 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
3 
¶6 
The first witness testified that he arranged to come 
to the United States as a student and live with the defendant in 
Augusta, Wisconsin, arriving on May 9, 1996.  The day after he 
arrived, the defendant began talking to him about sex.  After a 
couple of months, the defendant began offering the witness money 
if he would bring a woman to the home, have sex with her, and 
let him watch.  The defendant offered to pay him different 
amounts of money, between thirty and eighty dollars, depending 
on the particular sex acts involved.  Once, after the witness 
ran up a large phone bill, the defendant said that the only way 
to pay it off would be to bring fourteen different women to the 
house during the next month, have sex with each of them, and let 
the defendant watch.  According to the witness, the defendant 
made these requests repeatedly, once a week or so, over an 
eighteen-month period.  The witness moved out of the defendant’s 
home in November 1997. 
¶7 
The second witness gave similar testimony.  He 
testified about one particular incident in which he wanted to 
take a martial arts course.  He said that the defendant offered 
to pay for the course if the witness would bring a woman home 
and have sex with her in the room above the defendant’s room.  
At other times, the defendant offered to reduce the witness’s 
phone bill in exchange for allowing the defendant to watch him 
have sex with women.  The witness reported that the defendant 
made more than ten similar requests.  The witness complained to 
a counselor at his school about the requests sometime in 1997.  
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
4 
Since moving out of the defendant’s home in November 1997 he has 
been supported by the defendant’s church. 
¶8 
The next witness also gave similar testimony.  A few 
months after his arrival at the defendant’s home in May 1995, 
the defendant began offering him money, clothes, or favors, such 
as the use of the defendant’s car, if the witness would bring 
women to the house and have sex with them.  He testified that 
“anytime I go out with a different woman he wanted me to bring 
that woman home.”  He estimated that the defendant made more 
than five such requests, until the time he moved out of the home 
in the spring of 1997. 
¶9 
The fourth witness, who arrived at the defendant’s 
home in May 1996, gave substantially the same testimony.  He 
reported that a few weeks after his arrival the defendant 
offered to pay him twenty to forty dollars if he would bring a 
woman home and have sex with her in the room above the 
defendant’s room.  The defendant made many similar requests over 
the course of the next year, about twice a month on average.  
The witness moved out of the defendant’s home in May 1997. 
¶10 The last student to testify arrived in the United 
States in May 1996.  He stated that about a week and a half 
after his arrival, the defendant told him that if he did not 
have sex with a woman at the house, the defendant would throw 
him out of the house and try to force him to leave school and 
return to Panama.  The witness stated that over the course of 
the year, the defendant repeated this threat more than twenty-
five times.  The witness moved out in the spring of 1997.   
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
5 
¶11 The preliminary examination testimony is somewhat 
unclear as to whether this witness ultimately moved out of the 
defendant’s home by his own choice or was kicked out.  In 
response to the question “Why did you move out?” he answered, 
“Because I wasn’t living comfortable hearing everytime about sex 
and accusing me and treating me like a deer in the woods in the 
hunting season.”  However, he later testified as follows: 
 
Q. 
(Continuing) Mr. Kittilstad didn’t kick you out? 
 
A. 
He did. 
 
Q. 
He did or didn’t? 
 
A. 
He did. 
 
Q. 
He did? 
 
A. 
Yeah.   
Finally, in response to the question, “And do you know if he 
ever did anything to get you to go back to Panama?” he gave this 
response: 
 
A: . . . I don’t remember and I can’t tell you 
anything because when I move out of the house I did it 
because 
he 
always 
keep 
pressuring 
me 
like 
this . . . he’d say, you got to move out and your last 
days, I don’t remember whatever day that, in the past. 
Taken as a whole, the witness’s testimony could support findings 
that the defendant repeatedly threatened to expel him from his 
home, to interfere with his study program, and to try to have 
him removed from the United States if he refused to have sex 
with women in the defendant’s house.  The witness testified that 
he finally left the house as a result of these pressures. 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
6 
¶12 After 
hearing this 
evidence 
and 
considering the 
attorneys’ arguments, Judge Wahl denied the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the complaint.  The defendant promptly raised an 
identical challenge to the bindover.  The judge indicated that 
he would come to the same conclusion, but because the district 
attorney had informed the court that he intended to amend the 
charges to include a count of extortion, the court delayed 
decision on the bindover until after the filing of the 
information.   
¶13 On January 27, 1998, the district attorney filed an 
information 
charging 
the 
defendant 
with 
four 
counts 
of 
soliciting prostitution contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.32 and one 
count of extortion contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1).   
¶14 The defendant filed a motion challenging the bindover 
and the information.  He argued that even if true, the facts 
alleged do not constitute solicitation of prostitution or 
extortion, and that therefore (1) the evidence offered at the 
preliminary examination was insufficient to bind him over for 
trial because it did not support a finding that he had probably 
committed a felony, and (2) the charges in the information were 
not supported by the evidence.   
¶15 Judge Benjamin D. Proctor2 denied the motion, holding 
that under a reasonable interpretation of the statutes, the case 
law, 
and 
application 
of 
standard 
rules 
of 
statutory 
                     
2 The defendant requested substitution of a judge under Wis. 
Stat. § 971.20.  Judge Benjamin D. Proctor was substituted for 
Judge Eric J. Wahl on January 30, 1998.   
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
7 
construction, the solicitation of prostitution statute and the 
extortion 
statute 
encompassed 
the 
alleged 
conduct.  
Specifically, 
Judge 
Proctor 
concluded 
that 
the 
state’s 
allegations, if proven, would constitute a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 944.32 because the defendant intentionally solicited the 
students to engage in sex for money or other things of value.  
The court concluded that the contrary result urged by the 
defendant is absurd and should be avoided.   
¶16 Similarly, the court concluded that the extortion 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1), applied to the defendant’s 
alleged threats against one of the students.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 943.30(1) prohibits anyone from threatening to injure the 
person, property, or business of another with the intent to 
compel the person to do some act against the person’s will.  
“Property or person of another” has been interpreted broadly to 
include, among other things, an interest in a lawsuit.  The 
court therefore decided that the statute extends to threats to 
withhold room and board or the opportunity for education. 
¶17 The defendant requested permission to appeal Judge 
Proctor’s nonfinal order rejecting his challenge to the bindover 
and the information.  The court of appeals granted permission 
and, on appeal, affirmed the circuit court.  With regard to the 
solicitation of prostitution charges, the court of appeals 
concluded that the defendant’s alleged actions fell within the 
plain and broad meaning of the statute, and that the evidence 
was sufficient to establish that the defendant solicited the 
students to the “ongoing” practice of prostitution.  Kittilstad, 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
8 
222 Wis. 2d at 213.  Likewise, the court concluded that the 
alleged threats fell under the extortion statute.  Since 
education is a prerequisite for a profession, the court decided 
that a threat to a person’s education is a threat to his or her 
“profession” under the statute.  The defendant petitions this 
court for review of these decisions. 
II. 
¶18 The defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against 
him arises as a challenge to the bindover decision and the 
information.  In general, our review of a bindover determination 
is limited; we will affirm a decision to bind a defendant over 
for trial if the record contains any substantial ground based on 
competent evidence to support it.  State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 
684, 704, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  Similarly, our review of the 
charges in an information is limited to the narrow question of 
“whether the district attorney abused his discretion in issuing 
a charge not within the confines of and ‘wholly unrelated’ to 
the testimony received at the preliminary examination.”  State 
v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 537, 305 N.W.2d 100 (1981).   
¶19 However, in this case, the defendant’s challenges to 
both the bindover and the information turn on questions of 
statutory construction.  The defendant argues that, under proper 
interpretations of the solicitation of prostitution statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 944.32, and the extortion statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.30, the evidence produced at the preliminary examination 
simply cannot support the charges.  
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
9 
¶20 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
review independently.  State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 
516, 538, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998).  Our goal in statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine 
and 
give 
effect 
to 
the 
legislature’s intent.  Id.  To determine the legislature’s 
intent, we begin by looking at the plain language of the 
statute.  Id.  If the plain language is unambiguous, we apply 
the ordinary and accepted meaning of the language to the facts 
before us.  Id. 
III. 
¶21 The first issue is whether the facts alleged at the 
preliminary examination constituted solicitation of prostitution 
under Wis. Stat. § 944.32.  The statute states in relevant part: 
“whoever intentionally solicits or causes any person to practice 
prostitution 
or 
establishes 
any 
person 
in 
a 
place 
of 
prostitution is guilty of a Class D felony.”  There is no 
allegation that the defendant actually caused any person to 
practice prostitution, or that he attempted to establish any 
person in a place of prostitution.  Thus, the language that must 
be interpreted is “whoever intentionally solicits . . . any 
person to practice prostitution . . . is guilty of a Class D 
felony.”  Wis. Stat. § 944.32. 
¶22 The court of appeals has interpreted this language in 
State v. Johnson, 108 Wis. 2d 703, 324 N.W.2d 447 (Ct. App. 
1982), and State v. Huff, 123 Wis. 2d 397, 367 N.W.2d 226 (Ct. 
App. 1985).  The defendants in those cases, like the defendant 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
10
in the case at hand, argued that their alleged conduct did not 
constitute solicitation of prostitution under the statute. 
¶23 In State v. Johnson, the defendant challenged his 
conviction on constitutional grounds as well as on the ground 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  
Johnson, 108 Wis. 2d at 706.  The defendant had informed a 
female acquaintance that he could help train her for a modeling 
career and asked her to accompany him to an interview.  Id. at 
706-07.  The interview turned into a photography session in 
which he requested that she pose for nude photographs.  Id.  He 
then told her that although she could make $100 an hour as a 
model, she could make $200 an hour by performing sex acts with 
photographers.  Id.  When the woman expressed disinterest in 
such activity, he attempted to overcome her objections by 
explaining that he “was not asking her to stand on the corner,” 
and that “the clients did not need to know her real name.”  Id. 
 The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s constitutional 
arguments and also determined that the evidence supported the 
defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 710-12.  The court specifically 
determined that the testimony “that [the defendant] urged [his 
acquaintance] to use her body for profit by engaging in sexual 
acts with men at $200 a session” covered every element of 
§ 944.32.  Id. at 712. 
¶24 In Huff, the defendant was charged with several counts 
of solicitation of prostitution under Wis. Stat. § 944.32, based 
on allegations that he had asked women to have sex with him for 
money.  Huff, 123 Wis. 2d at 400.  The state conceded that most 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
11
of these counts should have been charged as misdemeanor 
prostitution, but argued that with regard to one of the counts 
there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant 
solicited a woman to engage in prostitution on an ongoing basis. 
 Id. at 407.  The court agreed and sustained that count.  Id.  
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
Wis. Stat. § 944.32 does not apply when “the solicitor is also 
the person benefiting from the prostitute’s services” because 
the court concluded that the statute focuses on whether 
solicitation occurred and not on whether the solicitation was 
for an act to be performed with a third party.  Id. at 404.  The 
court also rejected the argument that the statute does not apply 
if the solicitor does not receive any commercial gain, because 
“monetary gain is not an element of the crime.”  Id. at 405.   
¶25 We now must apply the language of Wis. Stat. § 944.32 
to the case at hand.  The defendant concedes that the evidence 
presented at the preliminary examination was sufficient to 
establish that he “solicited” the students.  Kittilstad, 222 
Wis. 2d at 209.  His argument is that this solicitation, even if 
true, 
does 
not 
constitute 
solicitation 
“to 
practice 
prostitution.”  He contends that interpreting § 944.32 so as to 
encompass the alleged conduct does not serve the statute’s 
purpose “to curtail the recruitment of males and females into 
the practice of providing sex for a fee,” Huff, 123 Wis. 2d at 
405, because the evidence establishes only that the defendant 
was attempting to facilitate voyeurism, not the providing of sex 
for a fee.  He also argues that the statutory definition of 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
12
“prostitution” is not broad enough to extend to the alleged 
facts because one of the people engaged in the sex act would not 
be aware of the commercial nature of the transaction and would 
not be exchanging sex for payment.  
¶26 We start by examining whether the acts the defendant 
allegedly 
solicited 
were 
“prostitution.”  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 944.30 is entitled “Prostitution” but does not explicitly 
define the term, rather the statute sets forth a list of conduct 
as constituting prostitution.  The statute provides: 
 
Any person who intentionally does any of the following 
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor: 
 
(1)  Has or offers to have or requests to have 
nonmarital sexual intercourse for anything of value. 
 
(2)  Commits or offers to commit or requests to 
commit an act of sexual gratification, in public or in 
private, involving the sex organ of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another for anything of value. 
 
(3)  Is an inmate in a place of prostitution. 
 
(4)  Masturbates a person or offers to masturbate 
a person or requests to be masturbated by a person for 
anything of value. 
 
(5)  Commits or offers to commit or requests to 
commit an act of sexual contact for anything of value. 
If the activity that the defendant allegedly solicited from the 
students meets any of these definitions, then he was soliciting 
“prostitution” in violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.32. 
¶27 The first four witnesses all testified that the 
defendant asked them to “have sex with” women in his house in 
exchange for money, reduction in their phone bills, or other 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
13
things of value.  It is reasonable to infer that to “have sex” 
would involve having nonmarital sexual intercourse as prohibited 
in Wis. Stat. § 944.30(1), or committing an act of sexual 
contact as prohibited in § 944.30(5).  Thus, had any of the 
students complied with the defendant’s requests, the student 
would have intentionally committed acts prohibited by § 944.30 
in exchange for payment from the defendant and therefore would 
have engaged in prostitution under the plain language of 
§ 944.30. 
¶28 The defendant’s contrary interpretation of the statute 
would exclude not only the admittedly unusual situation alleged 
in this case but also other, more typical situations.  For 
example, a pimp who solicits someone to engage in sex acts with 
individuals who then pay the pimp could not be prosecuted for 
solicitation of prostitution.  Similarly, as the court of 
appeals pointed out, under the defendant’s interpretation Wis. 
Stat. § 944.32 would not apply to a situation in which a father 
pays someone to have sex with his son or a businessman pays 
someone to have sex with his client.  Kittilstad, 222 Wis. 2d at 
211 n.1. 
¶29 The exclusion of these situations from the reach of 
the broad language of Wis. Stat. § 944.32 would be unreasonable. 
 This 
court 
seeks 
to 
avoid 
interpretations 
that 
produce 
unreasonable results.  DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 372, 
366 N.W.2d 891 (1985).  The defendant contends that these 
examples are distinguishable because the father or businessman 
would 
be 
engaging 
in 
a 
commercial 
transaction 
with 
a 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
14
“prostitute,” someone knowingly engaged in prostitution and 
aware that the contemplated sexual activity is part of a 
commercial transaction.  
¶30 The defendant’s argument disregards the fact that Wis. 
Stat. § 944.30 does not define prostitution in terms of whether 
or not someone is a “prostitute.”  The statute prohibits, among 
other things, having, offering to have, or requesting to have 
sex in exchange for anything of value.  It looks to the 
individual mental state of the particular person who is alleged 
to have engaged in acts constituting prostitution and not to 
whether the acts were a “commercial transaction.”  Thus, any 
student who acquiesced to the defendant’s alleged requests would 
have been engaged in prostitution within the meaning of the 
statute.  Whether the woman involved in the contemplated sexual 
activity would be aware of the underlying commercial transaction 
is 
irrelevant 
to 
whether 
the 
student 
was 
engaged 
in 
prostitution, 
or 
whether 
the 
solicitor 
was 
engaged 
in 
solicitation.  Likewise, in the father-son or businessman-client 
examples, whether or not the son or client is aware that the 
person with whom he is engaging in sexual contact is doing so 
for payment, the person who receives payment in exchange for sex 
is engaged in prostitution, and the father or businessman has 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
15
solicited prostitution.3  These situations therefore are not 
distinguishable. 
¶31 The defendant in Huff argued essentially the reverse 
of the defendant’s argument in this case.  He contended that 
Wis. Stat. § 944.32 only applies to situations in which the 
recruiter solicits someone to have sex with a third party.  
Huff, 123 Wis.2d at 403-04.  Huff’s reasoning in rejecting that 
argument also applies here.  Because the statute’s goal is to 
stop the recruitment of people into the practice of providing 
sex in exchange for something of value, “the focus is on the 
recruiter or solicitor and does not hinge on whether the 
solicitor wants the recruit to have sex with some third party.” 
 Id. at 405. 
¶32 The defendant’s argument that our interpretation does 
not serve the purpose of the solicitation of prostitution 
statute also fails to follow the language of the statute itself. 
 The solicitation statute explicitly prohibits the recruitment 
of people into the practice of “prostitution.”  Although it may 
be true that the crime of prostitution more typically involves 
the direct and knowing exchange of money by one person in return 
for sex from the other person, the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.30 extends to other situations.  The solicitation statute 
is intended to prohibit the recruitment of people into the 
                     
3 Of course, the son, the businessman, or a woman with whom 
a student had sex would have also engaged in prostitution under 
Wis. Stat. § 944.30 if he or she had intentionally had sex, 
offered to have sex, or requested to have sex in exchange for 
anything of value.   
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
16
practice of any of the activities prohibited by the prostitution 
statute.   
¶33 Citing State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 291 N.W.2d 809 
(1980), the defendant also contends that we should construe the 
definition of prostitution strictly because Wis. Stat. § 944.30 
is a penal statute.  The rule of strict construction of penal 
statutes does not apply when the legislature’s intent is 
unambiguous, or when strict construction goes against the 
legislature’s purpose.  Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 70.  We agree that 
the unusual facts of this case approach the outer reaches of the 
conduct contemplated by the statute.  However, we have long 
recognized that the rule of strict construction of penal 
statutes 
is 
not 
a 
“rule 
of 
general 
or 
universal 
application; . . . .  Sometimes a strict and sometimes a liberal 
construction is required, even in respect to a penal law, 
because the dominating purpose of all construction is to carry 
out the legislative purpose.”  State v. Boliski, 156 Wis. 78, 
81, 145 N.W. 368 (1914).  In interpreting a statute, our 
ultimate aim is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, and 
rules of statutory interpretation cannot be used when they 
defeat the purpose of the statute.  State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 
2d 802, 814-15, 484 N.W.2d 549 (1992).  
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 944.30 is not ambiguous as applied 
to the facts alleged in this case.  We conclude that the 
definition of prostitution in § 944.30 plainly encompasses the 
conduct the defendant is accused of soliciting from the 
students. 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
17
¶35 Having concluded 
that the 
conduct 
the 
defendant 
allegedly solicited from the students would have constituted 
“prostitution,” we next must determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to establish that he solicited the students to 
“practice” prostitution, as Wis. Stat. § 944.32 requires.  To 
“practice” prostitution means to engage in repeated, ongoing 
acts of prostitution.  Johnson, 108 Wis. 2d at 712; Huff, 123 
Wis. 2d at 407.   
¶36 None of the testimony at the preliminary examination 
suggested that the defendant asked each student to engage in 
only a single act of sex.  To the contrary, each witness 
testified that over the course of many months the defendant 
repeatedly requested that he commit acts of prostitution.  
Furthermore, each witness clearly claimed that the requests were 
not for a single act of prostitution, but for multiple acts of 
prostitution. 
¶37 The first witness testified in part that the defendant 
asked him to have sex with fourteen different women in the house 
over the course of a month.  The second witness testified: 
 
A. 
I had the telephone bill.  And he told me that 
each time I bring a girl at the house and have sex 
with her he was going to discount from the telephone 
bill. 
 
Q. 
He would reduce it somewhat? 
 
A. 
Yeah, reduce the amount each time. 
 
Q. 
Okay.  So would it take bringing one girl over to 
get rid of the phone bill or more than one? 
 
A. 
No, sir, more than one. 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
18
Similarly, the third witness gave this testimony: 
 
Q. 
All right.  When he was doing it, did he give 
you, did he ever say how many women he wanted you to 
do this with? 
 
A. 
Different womens . . . . 
 
Q. 
What did he say about that? 
 
A. 
Well, he wants, he want me to go out with 
different womens so anytime I go out with a different 
woman he wanted me to bring that woman home. 
Finally, the fourth witness testified “he ask, you know, about 
girls.  You know,  . . . if I can bring girls over to the 
house . . . .”  (Emphasis added). 
¶38 For purposes of a bindover or the filing of a charge 
in an information, this testimony is a sufficient basis to 
support the conclusion that the defendant was requesting that 
the students engage in an ongoing practice of prostitution. 
¶39 In sum, we hold that the defendant’s alleged conduct 
falls within the definition of solicitation of prostitution 
under Wis. Stat. § 944.32.   
IV. 
¶40 The second issue is whether the facts alleged by the 
final 
witness 
at 
the 
preliminary 
examination 
constitute 
extortion under Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1).  The statute provides: 
 
Whoever, either verbally or by any written or printed 
communication, maliciously threatens to accuse or 
accuses another of any crime or offense, or threatens 
or commits any injury to the person, property, 
business, profession, calling or trade, or the profits 
and income of any business, profession, calling or 
trade of another, with intent thereby to extort money 
or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
19
compel the person so threatened to do any act against 
the person’s will or omit to do any lawful act, is 
guilty of a Class D felony. 
The information charges the defendant with extortion on the 
basis that he verbally threatened to commit injury to the 
person, property, or calling of another person with intent to 
compel that person to act against his will, in violation of this 
statute. 
¶41 The charge is based on testimony given by the last 
witness at the preliminary examination.  He gave the following 
testimony about the defendant’s alleged threats against him: 
 
Q. 
And what was it that happened during that 
conversation or what did he say to you? 
 
A. 
He said something like if you don’t have sex with 
anyone in this house that I can see, prove that you’re 
having a sexual life, you got to, you got to go to 
Panama.  You got to go back to Panama. 
 
Q. 
Is this something you wanted to do? 
 
A. 
Which one, go to Panama or have sex with somebody 
else and somebody can see me? 
 
Q. 
Let’s start with going back to Panama.  Did you 
want that? 
 
A. 
I came for one, one reason, to study.  And I 
didn’t know that that was the surprise that I would 
have. 
 
Q. 
Okay.  Did you want to bring people to the house 
to have sex? 
 
A. 
No, sir. . . .  
 
Q. 
How many times [did he make such a request]? 
 
A. 
Well, I remember . . . as far as in my house more 
than twenty-five times. 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
20
 
Q. 
And what would he say or ask or tell you during 
the more than twenty-five times? 
 
A. 
You got to bring girls over to my house.  Another 
way you got to come back to Panama. . . .  
 
Q. 
And what did he tell you would happen if you did 
not do that? 
 
A. 
Kick me out the house.  And he do, he will do 
whatever he can do by himself to send me back to 
Panama and break my futures. 
 
Q. 
If you didn’t do what? 
 
A. 
Have sex in his house and let him see. . . .  
¶42 This testimony, if proven, provides probable cause to 
believe that the defendant made threats with intent to compel 
the witness to do acts against his will, and the defendant does 
not challenge the charge on these grounds.  He argues only that 
the threats, even if proven, do not constitute any of the types 
of threats enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1). 
¶43 In an argument similar to the one addressed above with 
regard to the solicitation charges, the defendant cites Rabe for 
the contention that under the “rule of lenity,” penal statutes 
are generally strictly construed.  Under this rule of strict 
construction, he argues, the allegations do not show that he 
threatened “any injury to the person, property, business, 
profession, calling or trade, or the profits or income of any 
business, profession, calling or trade of another” under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.30(1). 
¶44 Case law clarifies that the defendant is actually 
referring to two separate rules, the “rule of lenity” and the 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
21
general rule subjecting penal statutes to strict construction so 
as to safeguard a defendant’s rights.  The rule of lenity was 
developed in the federal courts and holds that where a criminal 
statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in a defendant’s 
favor.  Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 69.  The rule of lenity is “echoed 
in the familiar Wisconsin rule that ‘penal statutes are 
generally 
construed 
strictly 
to 
safeguard 
a 
defendant’s 
rights.’”  Id. at 70 (citing Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213, 
223, 271 N.W.2d 668 (1978)).   
¶45 As explained above, the rule of strict construction of 
penal statutes does not apply unless a statute is ambiguous, and 
it cannot be used to circumvent the purpose of the statute.  
Moreover, the rule “‘is not violated by taking the commonsense 
view of the statute as a whole and giving effect to the object 
of the legislature, if a reasonable construction of the words 
permits it.’”  Austin, 86 Wis. 2d at 223 (quoting Zarnott v. 
Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 244 Wis. 596, 600, 13 N.W.2d 53 
(1944)). 
¶46 By enacting the language in question, “any injury to 
the person, property, business, profession, calling or trade, or 
the profits and income of any business, profession, calling or 
trade of another,” the legislature enumerated the specific types 
of interests that it intended to protect against extortive 
threats.  While the legislature set forth specific interests, it 
began the list with the expansive phrase “any injury to,” 
indicating that the protection of these interests should extend 
broadly to all injuries.   
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
22
¶47 Courts have interpreted these interests in keeping 
with the legislature’s broad intent.  Thus, under a previous 
version of the extortion statute, this court determined that a 
threat to do injury to the “business” of another included a 
threat to call a strike.  Mayer v. State, 222 Wis. 34, 37, 267 
N.W. 290 (1936).  More recently, the court of appeals determined 
that “the term property as it is used in sec. 943.30(1), is 
broad enough to encompass an interest in a lawsuit.”  State v. 
Manthey, 169 Wis. 2d 673, 689, 487 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1992).  
¶48 Like the court of appeals and the circuit court, we 
conclude that the language of Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1) is broad 
enough to encompass the threats alleged in this case.  
¶49 According to the testimony, the defendant threatened 
to do everything he could to ensure that the student would have 
to end his studies in the United States and return to Panama if 
the student refused to have sex with women in his home.  The 
court of appeals concluded that these were threats to the 
witness’s “profession” under Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1).  Looking to 
the dictionary definition of “profession,” the court noted that 
an education is a prerequisite for a profession.  Kittilstad, 
222 Wis. 2d at 214-15.  Because an education is therefore 
“inextricably connected to obtaining a profession,” a threat to 
a person’s education is a threat to his or her profession.  Id. 
at 215.   
¶50 Although we agree with this reasoning in principle, we 
conclude that it is even clearer that the alleged threats 
constitute threats to the witness’s “calling or trade.”  A 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
23
“calling” is defined as “[a]n occupation, a profession, or a 
career.”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 273 (3d ed. 1992).  A “trade” is “[a]n occupation, 
especially one requiring skilled labor.”  Id. at 1897.  Whatever 
his course of study, it is reasonable to infer that this witness 
was attending school to prepare for some sort of occupation or 
career.  Proper education or training is necessary to any 
occupation.  We therefore conclude that the alleged threats to 
terminate the student’s studies were threats to injure his 
“profession, calling or trade” within the scope of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.30(1). 
¶51 In 
addition 
to 
these 
threats 
to 
terminate 
the 
student’s studies, we conclude that the threats to end financial 
support may also have been threats to injure the student’s 
“person, property, business, profession, calling or trade” under 
the unique circumstances of this case.   
¶52 We base this conclusion in part on the testimony of 
the other students regarding the terms of their agreements to 
stay with the defendant.  The second witness testified in some 
detail about his agreement with the defendant.  He stated that 
the defendant agreed to bring him to the United States, pay for 
his schooling, and provide him with financial support.  In 
return, he agreed to work for the defendant.   
¶53 In light of this information from the second witness, 
it is reasonable to infer from the final witness’s testimony 
that he was also working in exchange for at least part of his 
financial support.  He stated, “I don’t even know if he did 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
24
something good for me because everything that I did in his house 
 . . . was my hard work in his farm.”  (Emphasis added).  He 
also testified “[w]ell, he, if he buy me clothes I remember that 
was just one time.  And he say that is your money . . . .,” and 
“the clothes that he buy me he buy that clothes for the money 
that I work for him.”  (Emphasis added). 
¶54 This testimony suggests that the witness may not have 
been completely dependent upon the defendant’s charity, but may 
actually have been paying for at least part of his expenses by 
working for the defendant.  The court could reasonably conclude 
that the witness had a property interest in the continuation of 
that support that may have been recognizable in a lawsuit.  At 
the least, the alleged threats were threats to interrupt his 
current occupation and means of supporting himself.   
¶55 Moreover, since he was a foreign student without other 
connections in the United States, this student may have had 
nowhere else to go.  Had these alleged threats actually been 
carried out, he might have been abandoned in the United States 
without any means of financial support.  While this might not 
have resulted in a physical injury to his person, we conclude 
that it would constitute “any injury to the person” within the 
meaning of the statute.  See People v. Igaz, 326 N.W.2d 420, 428 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 341 N.W.2d 467 
(Mich. 1982) (determining that “any injury to the person” in 
Michigan’s 
similar 
extortion 
statute 
encompassed 
emotional 
injury). 
No. 
98-1456-CR 
 
 
25
¶56 We therefore conclude that the alleged threats to 
terminate financial support, if proven, could constitute threats 
to injure the “person, property, business, profession, calling 
or trade” of another person, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.30(1). 
¶57 In 
sum, 
we 
hold 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.30(1) 
encompasses both the threats to interfere with the student’s 
education and the threats to end his financial support in the 
United States.   
V. 
¶58 We determine that the evidence presented at the 
preliminary examination, if true, could establish that the 
defendant committed the crime of solicitation of prostitution as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 944.32.  We also determine that the 
evidence, if true, could establish that the defendant committed 
the crime of extortion as defined in Wis. Stat. § 943.30(1).  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.