Title: Hack v. Gillespie

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Hack et al., Appellants, v. Gillespie, Appellee, et al. 
[Cite as Hack v. Gillespie (1995), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Torts -- Negligence -- Real property -- Owner or occupier of private 
property can be liable to a fire fighter or police officer who enters 
premises and is injured in the performance of his or her official 
job duties, when. 
 
--- 
An owner or occupier of private property can be liable to a fire fighter or police 
officer who enters premises and is injured in the performance of his or 
her official job duties if (1) the injury was caused by the owner’s or 
occupier’s willful or wanton misconduct or affirmative act of negligence; 
(2) the injury was a result of a hidden trap on the premises; (3) the injury 
was caused by the owner’s or occupier’s violation of a duty imposed by 
statute or ordinance enacted for the benefit of fire fighters or police 
officers; or (4) the owner or occupier was aware of the fire fighter’s or 
police officer’s presence on the premises, but failed to warn them of any 
known, hidden danger thereon.  (Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible 
 
2 
Church [1963], 175 Ohio St. 163, 23 O.O.2d 453, 192 N.E.2d 38, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, followed.)  
--- 
 
(No. 94-1780 -- Submitted November 8, 1995 -- Decided January 24, 
1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 65673. 
 
Appellant Stephen Hack was a fire fighter for the city of Lakewood, 
Ohio.  On March 1, 1989, Hack responded to a fire at 1589 Larchmont Avenue.  
He gained access to the residence by entering a porch located on the second 
floor.  While on the porch, Hack leaned over a decorative railing to retrieve 
some equipment.  The railing, however, gave way, causing Hack to fall to the 
ground.  As a result, Hack suffered a broken hip and elbow. 
 
At the time of the fire, it appears that there were no occupants in the 
house.  On December 2, 1988, the owner of the premises, Kevin Gillespie, 
appellee, had entered into an agreement with Patrick T. Cullen and Thom 
Rodgers III, whereby Cullen and Rodgers were given an option to purchase the 
 
3 
property.  It appears that Cullen and Rodgers entered into the agreement for the 
purpose of renovating the residence and, pursuant to the agreement, they were 
to have exclusive possession and control of the premises for the term of the 
option.  However, Gillespie remained the owner of the premises.  He retained a 
key to the house and, additionally, furniture and other items apparently owned 
by Gillespie were kept on the premises. 
 
Following the accident, Jack L. Henderson, Fire Marshal for the 
Lakewood Fire Department, investigated the cause of Hack’s fall.  Henderson 
determined that the railing on the porch had not been properly secured to the 
roof of the house.  Henderson informed the city building inspector about the 
railing and, according to Henderson, the inspector cited Gillespie for violating 
the Lakewood Building Code. 
 
On October 13, 1992, Hack and his wife, Melanie Hack, also an 
appellant herein, filed suit against Gillespie, Cullen, and Rodgers.  In the 
complaint, which included Melanie’s claim for loss of services and consortium, 
appellants sought damages against the defendants for constructing and/or 
 
4 
maintaining the railing in a defective condition, for failing to warn Hack of the 
loose railing, and for violating the building code. 
 
Thereafter, Gillespie filed a motion for summary judgment.  In his 
affidavit in support of his motion, Gillespie testified that he had not been aware 
of the condition of the railing, that he had not installed it, and that from winter 
1978 until Cullen and Rodgers retained possession and control of the premises, 
the doors leading from inside the house to the porch from which Hack fell had 
been nailed shut and plastic sheeting had been secured over the inside of the 
doorways. 
 
Cullen and Rodgers also moved for summary judgment.  In their motion, 
Cullen and Rodgers claimed that they were not at the residence at the time of 
the fire, that they were not aware of the alleged defective condition of the 
decorative railing, and that the porch where Hack fell had been used 
infrequently or not at all.   
 
On May 19, 1993, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment.  Specifically, the trial court stated that its decision was 
 
5 
based on the reasoning and holdings in Herdman v. Weiss (1988), 55 Ohio 
App.3d 150, 563 N.E.2d 40, and Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church 
(1963), 175 Ohio St. 163, 23 O.O.2d 453, 192 N.E.2d 38. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court.  The court of appeals, also relying on Scheurer and 
Herdman, supra, held (1) that the porch railing was not a hidden trap, (2) that 
Gillespie, Cullen, and Rodgers were not aware of Hack’s presence on the 
premises and did not have the opportunity to warn him, (3) that there was no 
evidence of any willful or wanton misconduct or affirmative act of negligence 
on the part of Gillespie, Cullen or Rodgers, and (4) that Lakewood Building 
Code 1305.29(e), providing that porches be constructed and maintained in a 
safe condition, was not “intended to include firefighters in the class of 
protected individuals when it prescribed the safe installation and ongoing 
maintenance of residential appurtenances.”   
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal.1 
 
6 
 
Donald E. Caravona & Associates and Mark J. Obral, for appellants. 
 
Rhoa, Follen & Rawlin Co., L.P.A., and Ronald V. Rawlin, for appellee. 
 
Scanlon & Henretta Co., L.P.A., Lawrence J. Scanlon and Ann Marie 
O’Brien, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. 
and Bradric T. Bryan, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Northern Ohio 
Fire Fighters Association. 
 
Arter & Hadden and Kristen L. Mayer, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
DOUGLAS, J.     The issue presented for our consideration concerns the 
liability of an owner of private property to a fire fighter who enters the 
premises and, while performing his official duties, suffers harm as a result of 
the condition of the premises.  Specifically, we are asked to reexamine the rule 
in Ohio regarding a landowner’s liability to police officers and fire fighters, set 
forth in Scheurer, supra, and generally referred to as Ohio’s “Fireman’s Rule.” 
 
7 
 
The term “Fireman’s Rule,” which is used to include fire fighters and 
police officers, refers to a common-law doctrine originally formulated in 
Gibson v. Leonard (1892), 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182.  See Strauss, Where 
There’s Smoke, There’s The Firefighter’s Rule:  Containing The Conflagration 
After One Hundred Years 1992 Wis.L.Rev. 2031.  Gibson classified fire 
fighters as licensees entering upon property for their own purposes and with the 
consent of the property owner or occupant.2  Id. at 2034.  Thus, the landowner 
or occupant owed no duty to the fire fighter unless the fire fighter’s injury was 
caused by the owner’s or occupier’s willful or wanton misconduct.  Id. at 2031, 
fn. 2. 
 
The rule was originally created to apply to fire fighters, but it has 
evolved and has been extended to include police officers.  Id. at 2032.  See, 
also, Brady v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 161, 163, 519 N.E.2d 
387, 388-389, citing Scheurer, supra.  It appears that a vast majority of our 
sister states have adopted or have retained some form of the Fireman’s Rule.  
The rule, however, is by no means a uniform rule.  Rather, those jurisdictions 
 
8 
which have adopted or retained some vestige of the rule have done so by 
applying various legal theories and principles, resulting in several different 
versions.  See, generally, Strauss, supra, 1992 Wis.L.Rev. 2031.  See, also, 
Pottebaum v. Hinds (Iowa 1984), 347 N.W.2d 642, 643; and Calvert v. Garvey 
Elevators, Inc. (1985), 236 Kan. 570, 572, 694 P.2d 433, 436. 
 
The rule in Ohio, like many of our sister jurisdictions, contains 
exceptions to the “no duty” approach as originally established in Gibson, 
supra.  In Scheurer, supra, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, this court 
held: 
 
“1.  A policeman entering upon privately owned premises in the 
performance of his official duty without an express or implied invitation enters 
under authority of law and is a licensee. 
 
“2.  Where a policeman enters upon private premises in the performance 
of his official duties under authority of law and is injured, there is no liability, 
where the owner of the premises was not guilty of any willful or wanton 
misconduct or affirmative act of negligence; there was no hidden trap or 
 
9 
violation of a duty prescribed by statute or ordinance (for the benefit of the 
policeman) concerning the condition of the premises; and the owner did not 
know of the policeman’s presence on the premises and had no opportunity to 
warn him of the danger.” 
 
In the case at bar, appellants ask this court to reexamine and, 
specifically, overrule Scheurer and hold that a landowner owes a duty of 
reasonable care, in all instances, to fire fighters who enter upon the private 
premises in the exercise of their official duties.  In this regard, appellants 
suggest that fire fighters who enter upon private premises should be classified 
as invitees and, accordingly, may recover for personal injuries suffered as a 
result of the possessor’s ordinary acts of negligence.  Alternatively, appellants 
contend that Scheurer should be limited so that a fire fighter can recover 
against a negligent landowner where, as here, the dangerous condition that 
caused the injury was in no way associated with the emergency to which the 
fire fighter responded. 
 
10 
 
The contentions posed by appellants, however, miss the fundamental 
purpose upon which the holding in Scheurer is based.  We concede that this 
court has, previously, determined that the duty of care owed by a landowner to 
a fire fighter (or police officer) stems from common-law entrant classifications, 
i.e., licensees or invitees.3  However, Ohio’s Fireman’s Rule is more properly 
grounded on policy considerations, not artificially imputed common-law 
entrant classifications.  Indeed, persons such as fire fighters or police officers 
who enter land pursuant to a legal privilege or in the performance of their 
public duty do not fit neatly, if ever, into common-law entrant classifications.4  
See, e.g., Note, Equal Protection and the Fireman’s Rule in Ohio (1987-1988), 
38 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 123, 124 (“Because firemen and policemen acquire the 
right to enter property by virtue of authority granted by the state, they ought to 
fall between the classifications of licensee and invitee.”); Strauss, supra, 1992 
Wis.L.Rev. at 2034-2035; Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., Inc. (1986), 
232 Va. 177, 183, 349 S.E.2d 106, 110 (“Policemen and firemen, however, do 
not fit into any of these categories; they enter premises as of right, under a 
 
11 
privilege based on a public purpose.  They clearly are not trespassers.  Nor can 
they be classified as licensees or invitees, who enter with consent or invitation 
of the occupant, as consent and invitation are irrelevant to a policeman’s or 
fireman’s privileged entry.”); and Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc. (Ky. 1964), 
380 S.W.2d 96, 98. 
 
In Scheurer, supra, a police officer responded to investigate that “kids” 
were attempting to break into a church.  After arriving at the church, the officer 
proceeded, on foot, down the church’s driveway toward the church’s side 
entrance.  While proceeding down the driveway in absolute darkness, the 
officer fell into a large unguarded excavation site, sustaining serious injuries.  
The side entrance light of the church was not working and there was nothing in 
the area to alert the officer to the excavation.  In determining that the injured 
police officer could not recover against the church, we concluded that: 
 
“Policemen and firemen come on the premises at any hour of the day or 
night and usually because of an emergency, and they go to parts of the premises 
where people ordinarily would not go.  Their presence can not reasonably be 
 
12 
anticipated by the owner, since there is no regularity as to their appearance and 
in most instances their appearance is highly improbable. 
 
“Reasoning and experience support the public policy that the duty of an 
owner of private premises toward policemen and firemen who come upon his 
premises by authority of law in the performance of their official duties and 
suffer injury should be only that duty owed to a licensee, and that the owner 
should only be liable where such injury is inflicted by willful or wanton 
misconduct, or an active act of negligence, or by a violation of a duty created 
by statute or ordinance (for the benefit of policemen or firemen), or where a 
hidden trap caused the injury or where the owner had knowledge of the 
presence of the policeman or fireman on the premises and the opportunity to 
warn him of the danger and failed to do so.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 175 Ohio 
St. at 171-172, 23 O.O.2d at 458, 192 N.E.2d at 43. 
 
As can be gleaned, this court’s holding in Scheurer is based on certain 
legal theories and various public policy concerns.  First, fire fighters and police 
officers can enter the premises of a private property owner or occupant under 
 
13 
authority of law.  Hence, fire fighters and police officers can be distinguished 
from ordinary invitees.  Id., 175 Ohio St. at 168-169, 23 O.O.2d at 456, 192 
N.E.2d at 41-42.  Second, because a landowner or occupier can rarely 
anticipate the presence of safety officers on the premises, the burdens placed on 
possessors of property would be too great if fire fighters and police officers 
were classified, in all instances, as invitees to whom a duty of reasonable care 
was owed.  Id., 175 Ohio St. at 170, 23 O.O.2d at 457-458, 192 N.E.2d at 43.  
Third, the rule has been deemed to be justified based on a cost-spreading 
rationale through Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws.  In this regard, this court 
has recognized that all citizens share the benefits provided by fire fighters and 
police officers and, therefore, citizens should also share the burden if a fire 
fighter or police officer is injured on the job.  Id., 175 Ohio St. at 170-171, 23 
O.O.2d at 457, 192 N.E.2d at 43. 
 
We believe that many of the reasons supporting the rule in Scheurer are 
well founded and are still sound and valid in our society today.  Fire fighters 
and police officers assume risks by the very nature of their chosen profession.  
 
14 
The risks encountered are not always directly connected with arresting 
criminals or fighting fires.  Members of our safety forces are trained to expect 
the unexpected.  Such is the nature of their business.     
 
The risks they encounter are of various types.  A fire fighter, fighting a 
fire, might be attacked by the family dog.  He or she might slip on an object in 
the middle of a yard or on a living room floor.  An unguarded excavation may 
lie on the other side of a closed doorway, or the fire fighter might be required 
to climb upon a roof not realizing that it has been weakened by a fire in the 
attic.  Fortunately, Ohio has statutory compensation schemes which can temper 
the admittedly harsh reality if one of our public servants is injured in the line of 
duty. 
 
Further, appellants argue that fire fighters and police officers are treated 
unfairly in Ohio because they are not entitled to the same protection as other 
individuals/employees who enter a landowner’s or occupier’s premises.5  
However, unlike  water, electric and gas meter readers, postal workers and 
others, fire fighters can enter a homeowner’s or occupier’s premises at any 
 
15 
time, day or night.  They respond to emergencies, and emergencies are virtually 
impossible to predict.  They enter locations where entry could not be 
reasonably anticipated, and fire fighters often enter premises when the owner or 
occupier is not present.  We believe that under these circumstances abrogation 
of Ohio’s Fireman’s Rule, as suggested by appellants, would impose too great a 
burden on Ohio landowners and occupiers and their insurers. 
 
Moreover, Scheurer does not stand for the proposition that a possessor of 
land owes no duty to a fire fighter or police officer.  Rather, this court in 
Scheurer has cogently set forth several exceptions to the “no duty” rule. 
 
We are aware that a few jurisdictions have abolished or modified their 
original rule.  See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard (1973), 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 
43; Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881; and Christensen v. 
Murphy (1984), 296 Ore. 610, 678 P.2d 1210.  We are also cognizant that the 
Fireman’s Rule has been the subject of considerable commentary.  See, e.g., 
Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Fireman Coming 
Thereon in Discharge of His Duty (1982), 11 A.L.R.4d 597, 601-602; Prosser 
 
16 
& Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed. 1984) 430-432, Section 61; Strauss, supra, 1992 
Wis.L.Rev. 2031; Note, supra, 38 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 123; Stern, Firemen’s 
Recovery from Negligent Landowners (1967), 16 Cleve. Mar.L.Rev. 231; 
Riley, The Fireman’s Rule:  Defining its Scope Using the Cost-Spreading 
Rationale (1983), 71 Cal.L.Rev. 218; and Note, Assumption of the Risk and the 
Fireman’s Rule (1981), 7 Wm. MitchellL.Rev. 749.  However, we believe that 
the principles set forth in Scheurer, supra, strike an appropriate balance 
between the interests of a possessor of land and the right of a fire fighter or 
police officer to avoid exposure to unlimited or unreasonable risks of injury. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that an owner or occupier of private property can 
be liable to a fire fighter or police officer who enters premises and is injured in 
the performance of his or her official job duties if (1) the injury was caused by 
the owner’s or occupier’s willful or wanton misconduct or affirmative act of 
negligence; (2) the injury was the result of a hidden trap on the premises; (3) 
the injury was caused by the owner’s or occupier’s violation of a duty imposed 
by statute or ordinance enacted for the benefit of fire fighters or police officers; 
 
17 
or (4) the owner or occupier was aware of the fire fighter’s or police officer’s 
presence on the premises, but failed to warn them of any known, hidden danger 
thereon.   
 
Applying these principles, we find that summary judgment was properly 
granted in favor of Gillespie.  The court of appeals held, and we agree, that the 
record does not contain any evidence of willful or wanton misconduct or 
affirmative act of negligence on the part of Gillespie.  Moreover, there is no 
evidence in the record supporting appellants’ allegation that the unsecured 
railing was a hidden trap.  Further, even assuming that Gillespie had actual 
knowledge of the condition of the railing, Gillespie apparently was not at the 
residence at the time of the fire and was not aware of Hack’s presence on the 
premises and, thus, did not breach a duty to warn Hack of the loose railing. 
 
In addition, we also agree with the court of appeals that appellants have 
failed to show that Lakewood Building Code 1305.29(e) was intended to 
include fire fighters “in the class of protected individuals when it prescribed the 
 
18 
safe installation and ongoing maintenance of residential appurtenances.”  
Section 1305.29(e) provides that: 
 
“No owner, operator or agent shall occupy, maintain or lease or offer for 
rental or lease any dwelling or dwelling unit or any part thereof which does not 
comply with the following minimum requirements: 
 
“* * * 
 
“(e)  Every inside and outside stair and every porch and every 
appurtenance thereto shall be so constructed as to be safe to use and capable of 
supporting the load that normal use may cause to be placed thereon and shall be 
maintained in sound condition and good repair.” 
 
Clearly, the ordinance at issue was designed for the protection of the 
general public and was not enacted specifically for the benefit of fire fighters or 
police officers.  Section 1305.29(e) is only incidentally beneficial to fire 
fighters or police officers.  See, generally, Held v. Rocky River (1986), 34 Ohio 
App.3d 35, 37, 516 N.E.2d 1272, 1275.   
 
19 
 
Based on the foregoing, we hold that summary judgment was properly 
granted in favor of Gillespie.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT, RESNICK, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, not participating. 
 
 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1 
Gillespie is the only appearing appellee in this case. 
2 
Gibson v. Leonard (1892), 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182, is no longer the law 
in Illinois.  In Dini v. Naiditch  (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406, 416, 170 N.E.2d 881, 
885, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that “the common-law rule 
labelling firemen as licensees is but an illogical anachronism, originating in a 
vastly different social order, and pock-marked by judicial refinements, it should 
not be perpetuated in the name of ‘stare decisis.’”  See, also, Stern, Firemen’s 
Recovery from Negligent Landowners (1967), 16 Cleve. Mar.L.Rev. 231, 248. 
3 
In Brady v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 161, 519 N.E.2d 
387, we held that the Fireman’s Rule does not encompass injuries to police 
officers and fire fighters in areas that are held open to the general public.  
Police officers and fire fighters who are injured in areas held open to the 
general public are, according to Brady, classified as invitees and not licensees.  
Id., paragraph one of the syllabus.  The accident in the case at bar did not occur 
in an area that was “held open to the public.”  Thus, Brady is not applicable to 
 
21 
the situation here.  Further, although we perpetuated common-law entrant 
classifications in Brady, we decline, at this juncture, to comment on the 
propriety of classifying the police officer in that case as an invitee.     
4 
For a scholarly discussion contrasting the various common-law entrant 
classifications, see Ferrell, Emerging Trends in Premises Liability Law:  Ohio’s 
Latest Modification Continues to Chip Away at Bedrock Principles (1995), 21 
Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 1121. 
5 
Appellants and amicus Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers also raise a 
number of constitutional challenges to Ohio’s Fireman’s Rule.  However, these 
issues were not raised in the trial court and, accordingly, have been waived.  In 
any event, appellants’ contentions lack merit.