Title: American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Smith

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 593 (1974) 521 P.2d 1139 AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a California corporation; and Honda Motor Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation, Appellants, v. Ken D. SMITH, Appellee. No. 11510-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. May 8, 1974. *594 O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, by Thomas A. McGuire, Jr., Phoenix, for appellants. Hughes, Hughes & Conlan, by Coit I. Hughes and John C. Hughes, Phoenix, for appellee. HOLOHAN, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff Ken D. Smith against the defendants for damages arising out of a motorcycle accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in 21 Ariz. App. 255, 518 P.2d 131 (1974). We granted review. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The plaintiff was seriously injured in an accident while riding his recently purchased motorcycle. It was plaintiff's contention that there was a defect in the manufacture of the motorcycle, and the defect caused the accident. The action was tried on theories of tort and breach of warranty. The jury found for the plaintiff and assessed damages in the sum of $112,000. In their appeal the defendants raised several issues, but our decision makes it necessary to consider only one issue, namely, whether the trial court erred in allowing certain evidence to be admitted over the objection of defendants. The injuries received by the plaintiff in the accident caused him to be unable to remember any of the events immediately preceding or following the accident. There were no witnesses to the accident. The plaintiff sought to reconstruct the facts from the physical evidence at the accident. Plaintiff employed an expert to examine the motorcycle and to reconstruct the facts of the accident. Plaintiff's expert in his examination of the motorcycle found that a "retainer flange" a small metal strip which is normally bent against a nut to prevent it from turning had been bent away from the nut on the rear wheel sprocket, and the nut was missing from its proper place. From certain marks on the motorcycle the expert concluded that the nut had worked loose because the retainer flange did not hold it properly, and the nut had come out of its place, been carried by the chain, and finally wedged against a portion of the body and chain with sufficient force to stop the chain from moving. It was, of course, plaintiff's theory that the flange bent the wrong way was a factory defect. In addition to showing the defect it was necessary for plaintiff to establish that the defect was the cause of the accident. To establish causation the plaintiff relied upon his expert. In part, the expert testified as follows: The defendants urge that the testimony of the expert was not admissible because it was based on hearsay and matters which had not been received in evidence. We agree. An expert is not limited to giving an opinion on matters he personally observed, but, before he may express an opinion on matters observed by others, such observations must have been received in evidence through the testimony of the observers. Gilbert v. Quinet, 91 Ariz. 29, 369 P.2d 267 (1962). Hypothetical questions to experts are a proper method of securing his opinion, but the hypothetical question must be based on facts in evidence. Schmidt v. Gibbons, 101 Ariz. 222, 418 P.2d 378 (1966). An expert may not give an opinion based in part upon statements made to him outside of the courtroom and not received in evidence. Security Benefit Association v. Small, 34 Ariz. 458, 272 P. 647 (1928); Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220 (1958). The purpose of this rule is to prevent the expert from basing his testimony on assumptions which are unknown to the jury and unsupported by the evidence. Gillespie Land and Irrigation Company v. Gonzalez, 93 Ariz. 152, 379 P.2d 135 (1963). The plaintiff argues that the objections made by defendants were insufficient to raise the issue, and therefore cannot be argued on appeal, and that one objection, whether proper or not, was not ruled upon, and the witness was permitted to answer. We believe that the objections were sufficiently clear and specific to raise the issue and that they were ruled on, and that the rulings permitting answers to the questions were reversible error. *596 In addition the issue was raised again by defendants at the close of the plaintiff's evidence when they moved to strike those parts of the expert's testimony which contained opinions as to causation, because there was no factual predicate for them and they were based on hearsay. The defense stated to the court that although the court had ruled on the question, it renewed its objection and made a motion to strike. The court denied the motions. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. Reversed. HAYS, C.J., CAMERON, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.