Title: State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 113, 1999-Ohio-249.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BLABAC, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 113.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claimant cannot receive temporary total disability 
compensation when he or she is unable to return to the job at which he or 
she was injured, but continues to work as a scuba instructor — Industrial 
Commission does not abuse its discretion in denying application for wage-
loss compensation, when. 
(No. 97-780 — Submitted July 28, 1999 — Decided October 20, 1999.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
95APD11-1415. 
 
Appellant-claimant, John C. Blabac, injured his back in an industrial 
accident on January 6, 1993 and began receiving temporary total disability 
compensation (“TTC”).  Two months later, it was discovered that claimant was 
also earning wages as a scuba diving instructor.  Claimant’s participation was 
summarized in a surveillance report: 
 
“John [claimant] arrived at 8:25 p.m. wearing gray swimming trunks and 
carrying a clipboard.  It should be noted that during this class, John was observed 
with a very distinct limp, favoring his left leg.  We maintained surveillance until 
10:00 p.m., during which time John instructed four males and four females; his 
partner was also present, doing most of the work.  John spent most of his time 
sitting at the side of the pool with a clipboard, seemingly grading the students.  It 
should also be noted that at no time during the surveillance did we observe John 
carrying anything heavy. 
 
“As this investigative report indicates, it is obvious that John is currently an 
instructor in the scuba diving courses and was actively involved.” 
 
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Later, an undercover investigator spoke to claimant: 
 
“During this conversation, John stated that he is the scuba diving instructor; 
he did indicate that he does have a partner.  He stated that he teaches several 
different courses, basic scuba, advanced courses and underwater 2.  He indicated 
that he is an independent instructor and has been diving since 1971, and in 1975 he 
was an assistant teacher and was certified in 1978. 
 
“The present class that he was teaching had three students and the fee for his 
first instructional class is $250.00 per person, lasting ten weeks; the class was held 
on Tuesday nights between 6:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.  He also stated that he usually 
takes every class to South or Central America for their open dive exams; he talked 
about several different places where he has been diving.  John also talked about 
starting a weekend class this summer, hopefully on Saturdays and Sundays.  He did 
state that his fee may be paid in cash or by check and should be made payable to 
him.  When asked if was going to be putting on tanks and [getting] in the water 
tonight, he said no, that he had messed up his back and would not be getting in the 
water on this date.” 
 
The 
investigation 
prompted 
appellee-employer, 
Titanium 
Metals 
Corporation, to seek permission to terminate TTC.  A district hearing officer for 
appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio ruled: 
 
“Pursuant to the employer’s surveillance report, claimant’s testimony, and 
State ex rel. Johnson v. Rawac Plating Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 599 [575 N.E.2d 
837], the District Hearing Officer finds that claimant has been employed as a scuba 
instructor for the period 1/6/93 to 8/18/93.  As such, the District Hearing Officer 
finds that claimant has returned to work and was not entitled to temporary total 
compensation for the period 1/6/93 to 8/18/93.  An overpayment is declared for 
this period.” 
 
After protracted administrative proceedings, the commission affirmed the 
 
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order of the district hearing officer, writing: 
 
“In addition to the evidence and findings of the DHO, the Commission finds 
that claimant received temporary total compensation benefits from 1/6/93 through 
8/18/93 while he was gainfully employed as a scuba instructor.  Although claimant 
received only a nominal amount of income from his association with PJ’s Dive 
Shop, he was a partner in the scuba instructor end of the business. Therefore, the 
Commission finds that claimant’s work as a scuba instructor is gainful 
employment.  Pursuant to State ex rel. Johnson v. Rawac Plating Co. (1991), 61 
[Ohio St.]3d 599 [575 N.E.2d 837], the claimant can not receive temporary total 
disability compensation when he is unable to return to the job at which he was 
injured, but, he continues to work at his other job. 
 
“It is the order of the Commission that temporary total disability 
compensation for the period 1/6/93 through 8/18/93 is denied and an overpayment 
is declared for this period. 
 
“This order is based on the Johnson case and claimant’s testimony.” 
 
On May 3, 1995, claimant moved the commission for wage-loss 
compensation from January 6, 1993 through August 18, 1993 — the period over 
which TTC was deemed improperly paid.  The commission denied wage loss from 
January 6, 1993 through May 2, 1993, based on R.C. 4123.52’s two-year statute of 
limitations.  It awarded wage-loss compensation for the remainder of the requested 
period. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in terminating 
TTC.  The court of appeals disagreed but did issue a limited writ returning the 
cause to the commission to consider claimant’s wage-loss-compensation eligibility 
“for any period from two years prior to May 3, 1995.” 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
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__________________ 
 
Marchese & Monast, Joseph A. Marchese and Thomas J. Marchese, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and C. Bradley Howenstein, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease and Bradley K. Sinnott, for appellee 
Titanium Metals Corporation. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Temporary total disability compensation compensates for loss 
of earnings.  State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 
O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586.  Accordingly, TTC is unavailable to one who has 
returned to work, i.e., is earning wages.  Claimant contends that not just any 
“work” bars TTC but only that which is “substantially gainful employment.”  
Arguing that his labor was neither “substantial” nor “gainful,” claimant asserts an 
entitlement to TTC.  We find otherwise. 
 
Ramirez, the preeminent TTC case, refers simply to a “return to work,” 
without any qualification to the word “work.”  R.C. 4123.56(A) mirrors this 
language.  Two cases, however, do employ the phrases “sustained gainful 
employment” or “substantially gainful employment.” Upon review, we find these 
cases not dispositive. 
 
The first case, State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 
Ohio St.3d 639, 614 N.E.2d 1044, cites Ramirez and Vulcan Materials Co. v. 
Indus. Comm. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 25 OBR 26, 494 N.E.2d 1125, as 
supporting “sustained gainful employment” as the standard for TTC termination.  
Neither Ramirez nor Vulcan Materials, however, uses that language, destroying 
Peabody’s legal foundation. 
 
Claimant also cites State ex rel. Johnson v. Rawac Plating Co. (1991), 61 
 
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Ohio St.3d 599, 575 N.E.2d 837, focusing on the following language: 
 
“In State ex rel. Nye v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 75, 22 OBR 91, 
488 N.E.2d 867, we held that ‘work’ as used in Ramirez referred to any 
‘substantially gainful employment,’ not merely the former position of 
employment.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 600, 575 N.E.2d at 839. 
 
Claimant’s interpretation of Johnson is too broad as an examination of Nye 
will illustrate.  Critical to an understanding of Nye is that in that case there was 
never a question as to the character of claimant’s work.  Nye was clearly engaged 
in substantially gainful work as a full-time reupholsterer.  The issue was whether 
substantially gainful work other than the former position of employment could be 
used to terminate TTC. 
 
We held in the affirmative, reasoning that: 
 
“[A contrary decision] would permit the payment of temporary total 
disability benefits to a claimant who has chosen to return to full-time work at a job 
other than his former employment.  In such a case, the claimant is no longer 
suffering the loss of earnings for which temporary total disability benefits are 
intended to compensate. * * * 
 
“In the case at bar, the commission determined that appellee had returned to 
‘substantially gainful remunerative employment,’ i.e., full-time work.”  22 Ohio 
St.3d at 77-78, 22 OBR at 93, 488 N.E.2d at 870. 
 
Nye merely confirmed that substantially gainful employment barred TTC.  It 
did not, as claimant represents, create two categories of employment whereby only 
substantially gainful employment terminated TTC and more sporadic employment 
did not.  Again, Ramirez states that a “return to work” bars TTC.  In this case, 
claimant does not dispute that his paid scuba diving instruction constitutes “work.” 
 
The more appropriate method of compensating claimants who are  unable to 
return to their former position of employment and are earning less elsewhere is 
 
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through wage-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B). Claimant appears to be 
seeking payment of wage-loss compensation from January 6, 1993 through May 2, 
1993.  R.C. 4123.52, however, forbids the payment of benefits more than two years 
prior to the request for compensation.  Here, wage-loss compensation was 
requested on May 3, 1995.  The commission did not, therefore, abuse its discretion 
in denying wage-loss compensation prior to May 3, 1993. 
 
We note finally that the court of appeals returned the cause to the 
commission to consider claimant’s wage-loss-compensation eligibility “for any 
period from two years prior to May 3, 1995.”  Claimant, however, neither 
requested, nor alleged an entitlement to, wage-loss compensation after August 18, 
1993.  Since the commission already awarded wage-loss compensation from May 
3, 1993 through August 18, 1993, we find it unnecessary to return the cause for 
further consideration of wage-loss-compensation eligibility. 
 
Accordingly, claimant’s request for a writ of mandamus is denied.  The 
judgment of the court of appeals denying claimant’s request for TTC is affirmed, 
and the remainder of the judgment is reversed. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals in toto. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.