Title: Daniel v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Daniel v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 467, 2003-Ohio-1916.] 
 
 
DANIEL, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Daniel v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 467, 2003-Ohio-1916.] 
Habeas corpus filed by relator not currently incarcerated or currently in the 
custody of a state officer or institution challenging trial court’s 
jurisdiction in his case almost six years after the expiration of his 
sentence — Court of appeals’ dismissal of petition affirmed. 
(No. 2002-1881 — Submitted March 26, 2003 — Decided April 30, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-449, 2002-
Ohio-4780. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On February 1, 1988, Joseph Daniel, appellant, was indicted for 
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, and for felonious sexual 
penetration in violation of R.C. 2907.12.  Police arrested Daniel for these offenses 
on January 18, 1995.  Following a jury trial, Daniel was convicted of aggravated 
assault, a fourth-degree felony, and sentenced in May 1995 to an 18-month prison 
term.  Daniel is not currently incarcerated or in the custody of a state officer or 
institution. 
{¶2} 
On April 23, 2002, Daniel filed a petition in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the trial court’s 
jurisdiction in his criminal case to enter judgment and impose sentence and 
seeking a hearing during which he could present evidence of his allegedly illegal 
conviction.  Daniel claimed that prosecution of his criminal case was not begun 
within the six-year statute of limitations for felony offenses as set forth in R.C. 
2901.13(A)(1) because the state had failed to exercise reasonable diligence 
pursuant to R.C. 2901.13(E) in executing the warrant for his arrest and service on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the indictment.1  Consequently, Daniel argued that the statute of limitations had 
expired and his judgment of conviction was null and void.  The court of appeals 
dismissed Daniel’s petition. 
{¶3} 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶4} 
Daniel asserts that a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate 
remedy to challenge the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction to enter the 
judgment of conviction.  Daniel concedes that he is no longer physically in state 
custody or otherwise illegally detained.  He nevertheless contends that he is being 
“unlawfully restrained of his liberty” pursuant to the habeas corpus statute, R.C. 
2725.01, because his felony conviction prevents him from exercising various 
rights and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry.  For the reasons that 
follow, we deny Daniel’s requested relief and affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
{¶5} 
First, in State ex rel. Smirnoff v. Greene (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 165, 
167, 702 N.E.2d 423, we recognized that “habeas corpus in Ohio is generally 
appropriate in the criminal context only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate 
release from prison or some other type of physical confinement.”  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Carrion v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 637, 638, 687 
N.E.2d 759; State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 652 
                                                 
1. 
{¶a} The applicable version of R.C. 2901.13 provided: 
 
{¶b} “(A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution shall be barred 
unless it is commenced within the following periods after an offense is committed: 
 
{¶c} “(1) For a felony other than aggravated murder or murder, six years; 
 
{¶d} “ * * * 
 
{¶e} “(E) A prosecution is commenced on the date an indictment is returned or an 
information filed, or on the date a lawful arrest without a warrant is made, or on the date a warrant, 
summons, citation, or other process is issued, whichever occurs first.  A prosecution is not 
commenced by the return of an indictment or the filing of an information unless reasonable 
diligence is exercised to issue and execute process on the same.  A prosecution is not commenced 
upon issuance of a warrant, summons, citation, or other process, unless reasonable diligence is 
exercised to execute the same.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1896. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
N.E.2d 746.  See, also, R.C. 2725.04(B), (C), and (D).  Daniel is not currently in 
custody or otherwise physically confined. 
{¶6} 
Second, Daniel cites no Ohio case law to support his proposition 
that his inability to exercise his federal constitutional right to possess a firearm 
and other claimed legal disabilities constitute unlawful restraint for purposes of 
state habeas corpus.  Further, his reliance on authority involving the federal writ 
of habeas corpus is misplaced.  As we have previously noted, “the state writ of 
habeas corpus is not coextensive with the federal writ.”  Smirnoff, 84 Ohio St.3d 
at 168, 702 N.E.2d 423, citing Rodgers v. Capots (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 435, 436, 
619 N.E.2d 685. 
{¶7} 
Third, a violation of R.C. 2901.13 does not divest the trial court of 
jurisdiction and is thus not cognizable in habeas corpus.  R.C. 2901.13 is a statute 
of limitations.  See, e.g., State v. Selvage (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 465, 468, 687 
N.E.2d 433.  We have held “that the expiration of a statute of limitations is not a 
jurisdictional defect.”  State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 
70, 76, 701 N.E.2d 1002.  See, also, State v. Brown (1988), 43 Ohio App.3d 39, 
43, 539 N.E.2d 1159 (because R.C. 2901.13 is a statute of limitations rather than a 
statute of repose, violation of the statute does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial 
court). 
{¶8} 
Fourth, habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or 
postconviction relief.  In re Piazza (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 102, 103, 36 O.O.2d 84, 
218 N.E.2d 459; Bellman v. Jago (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 55, 56, 526 N.E.2d 308.  
Claims such as statute-of-limitations violations “must be raised on appeal rather 
than by extraordinary writ.”  State ex rel. Tubbs Jones, 84 Ohio St.3d at 76, 701 
N.E.2d 1002; Travis v. Bagley (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 322, 323, 750 N.E.2d 166.  
Daniel could have raised the statute-of-limitations issue at trial and on direct 
appeal.  Thus, Daniel has or had a plain and adequate remedy at law for the 
allegations that he now raises.  Cornell v. Schotten (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 466, 
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467, 633 N.E.2d 1111.  See, also, Freeman v. Maxwell (1965), 4 Ohio St.2d 4, 33 
O.O.2d 2, 210 N.E.2d 885. 
{¶9} 
Finally, Daniel’s alleged deprivation of liberty is not of sufficient 
severity to warrant extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.  See, e.g., Smirnoff, 84 
Ohio St.3d at 168-169, 702 N.E.2d 423.  R.C. 2725.01 provides, “Whoever is 
unlawfully restrained of his liberty, or entitled to the custody of another, of which 
custody such person is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute a writ of habeas 
corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment, restraint, or deprivation.”  
Additionally, “[s]ince habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy whose operation 
is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of finality * * *, its use has 
been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for 
cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Hensley v. Mun. Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist. Santa 
Clara Cty. (1973), 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294.  Daniel can 
hardly contend now that any deprivation of liberty must be remedied immediately, 
having waited almost six years after the expiration of his sentence before bringing 
this action. 
{¶10} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK, LUNDBERG 
STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Kura & Wilford Co., L.P.A., and Barry W. Wilford, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Stuart A. Cole, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
__________________