Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Honorable Scott C. Woldt

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 73
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1028-J 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of the Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Scott C. Woldt: 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
The Honorable Scott C. Woldt, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WOLDT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., concurs in part and 
dissents in part, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGGEDORN, J.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
2021 WI 73 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2020AP1028-J 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Scott C. Woldt:  
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Scott C. Woldt, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding.  Judge suspended from 
office.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.91 (2019-20),1 a Judicial Conduct Panel's2 (the Panel) 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 757.91 provides: 
The supreme court shall review the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommendations under 
s. 757.89 and determine appropriate discipline in 
cases of misconduct and appropriate action in cases of 
permanent disability.  The rules of the supreme court 
applicable to civil cases in the supreme court govern 
the review proceedings under this section. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
2 
 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation for 
discipline for the Honorable Scott C. Woldt, a judge for the 
Winnebago County circuit court.  In a Joint Stipulation as to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the Joint Stipulation), 
Judge Woldt admitted to all of the facts in the Wisconsin 
Judicial Commission's (the Commission) complaint and agreed 
that, based on those facts, he had violated the Code of Judicial 
Conduct (the Code).  Based on the Joint Stipulation, the Panel 
found that the facts alleged in the complaint were established 
as true and determined that those facts supported the legal 
conclusion that Judge Woldt had willfully violated several rules 
of the Code, which constituted judicial misconduct under Wis. 
Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).3  After receiving memoranda from the 
parties regarding the appropriate level of discipline, the Panel 
recommended that this court suspend Judge Woldt without pay for 
a period of not less than seven nor more than 21 days.   
¶2 
After carefully reviewing this matter, we adopt the 
Panel's findings of fact, and we agree that those facts 
demonstrate that Judge Woldt committed judicial misconduct.  We 
conclude that as discipline for that misconduct, Judge Woldt 
                                                                  
2 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.87(3), Judges JoAnne F. 
Kloppenburg, Thomas M. Hruz, and Mark A. Seidl of the court of 
appeals were appointed to serve as the Judicial Conduct Panel, 
with Judge Kloppenburg acting as the presiding judge. 
3 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 757.81(4)(a) 
states 
that 
judicial 
misconduct includes "[w]illful violation of a rule of the code 
of judicial ethics." 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
3 
 
should be suspended without pay for a period of seven days, 
commencing August 2, 2021.   
¶3 
Judge Woldt has been a circuit court judge since his 
appointment to the bench in 2004.  He was subsequently elected 
to six-year terms in 2005, 2011, and 2017.  He has never before 
been the subject of public or private judicial discipline. 
¶4 
On June 17, 2020, the Commission filed a complaint in 
this court against Judge Woldt alleging that he had willfully 
violated 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
(SCRs) 
60.02, 
60.03(1), 
60.04(1)(d), and 60.04(1)(hm) in connection with six separate 
incidents.  At the same time that it filed its complaint, the 
Commission also filed the Joint Stipulation, in which Judge 
Woldt not only agreed that  the factual allegations in the 
Commission's complaint were true, but also that those facts 
demonstrated that his conduct in each of the six incidents 
described in the complaint "violated the Code of Judicial 
Conduct" with respect to the particular provisions of the Code 
set forth in the complaint.  Joint Stipulation ¶¶3 and 15.  The 
parties jointly requested that they be permitted to submit 
memoranda to the Panel with respect to the issue of the proper 
level of discipline. 
¶5 
After the appointment of its members, the Panel 
established a briefing schedule for the submission of memoranda 
regarding the appropriate level of discipline.  Judge Woldt 
subsequently requested that the Panel hear oral argument in this 
matter, which the Commission opposed.  The Panel denied Judge 
Woldt's request, concluding that oral argument was unnecessary 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
4 
 
in this matter in light of the stipulated nature of the facts 
and the legal conclusions of violations of the Code. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
¶6 
We now turn to the facts and legal conclusions as 
stipulated by the parties and as found by the Panel.  Both the 
complaint and the Panel's report numbered and addressed the six 
incidents at issue in this proceeding in reverse chronological 
order.  We maintain the numbering system used by the complaint 
and the Panel's report to avoid confusion, but we address them 
in chronological order to demonstrate the continuity of Judge 
Woldt's behavior over an extended period of time. 
Incident Six (February 27, 2009) 
¶7 
The first incident at issue in this proceeding 
occurred during a sentencing hearing that took place on February 
27, 2009, in State v. Williams, Winnebago County Case No. 
2008CM1517.  The criminal charges in that case resulted from an 
altercation between Williams and his girlfriend.  Williams pled 
guilty to one count of disorderly conduct as an act of domestic 
abuse.  A second charge that also related to domestic abuse was 
dismissed and read in for sentencing purposes.     
¶8 
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the victim 
made the following statement:  "I was just hoping that he could 
get a fine and community service instead of 18 months' probation 
because we are trying to work things out and things have been a 
lot better."  During the hearing Judge Woldt asked questions of 
the defendant that clearly conveyed he did not believe the 
defendant.  He then stated that "[t]he answers to my questions 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
5 
 
clearly tell me that you need counseling, plain and simple."  
Judge Woldt then imposed and stayed a 30-day jail sentence and 
placed Williams on probation for one year with a number of 
conditions.  After concluding his sentence of Williams, Judge 
Woldt addressed the following comments to the victim: 
And ma'am, if you come in here and tell me that you 
just want a fine, everything's fine, then don't pick 
up the phone and dial 911, don't call the cops.  I 
mean if you think you want to handle it, then you 
handle it; but if you want to pick up the phone and 
call the police, we're going to get involved and we're 
going to make him get the counseling which he needs.  
I'm just sick and tired of victims coming in here and 
they call the cops when they need 'em but then later 
on they come and say:  Oh, no, this person's an angel.  
I'm sick and tired of hearing it.   
¶9 
The Commission's complaint alleged that Judge Woldt's 
comments to the victim had violated the Code.  The Panel agreed 
that Judge Woldt's statement to the victim had constituted 
willful violations of three SCRs:  SCR 60.02,4 SCR 60.03(1),5 and 
SCR 60.04(1)(d).6   
                     
4 SCR 60.02 provides: 
An 
independent 
and 
honorable 
judiciary 
is 
indispensable to justice in our society.  A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining and 
enforcing 
high 
standards 
of 
conduct 
and 
shall 
personally 
observe 
those 
standards 
so 
that 
the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 
preserved.  This chapter applies to every aspect of 
judicial behavior except purely legal decisions. Legal 
decisions made in the course of judicial duty on the 
record are subject solely to judicial review. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
6 
 
Incident Five (May 29, 2015) 
¶10 Judge Woldt presided over a sentencing hearing in 
State v. Krebs, Winnebago County Case No. 2014CF466.  Krebs, who 
was 18 years old at the time of the crime, pled no-contest to 
one count of second-degree sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.  
Krebs was asked by another young man to take him to a small 
gathering to see the young man's girlfriend.  There were a 
couple of other younger girls also present at this outdoor 
gathering.  According to the criminal complaint, Krebs and one 
of the younger girls were kissing.  Krebs then put his hand into 
the girl's shorts, penetrated her vagina with his finger, and 
tried to push her head down toward his penis.   
¶11 During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel tried 
to explain Krebs' state of mind and to portray him as a young 
                                                                  
5 SCR 60.03(1) provides:  "A judge shall respect and comply 
with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary." 
6 SCR 60.04(1)(d) provides: 
A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous 
to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others 
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity and 
shall require similar conduct of lawyers, staff, court 
officials and others subject to the judge's direction 
and control.  During trials and hearings, a judge 
shall act so that the judge's attitude, manner or tone 
toward counsel or witnesses does not prevent the 
proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment 
of the truth.  A judge may properly intervene if the 
judge considers it necessary to clarify a point or 
expedite the proceedings. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
7 
 
man who was confused and afraid due to the situation (kissing a 
girl), didn't really know what he should do, and got caught up 
in the moment, as opposed to an experienced man who sought out a 
young victim in a predatory fashion.  Judge Woldt interrupted 
defense counsel with the following exchange: 
The Court:  I know when I'm paralyzed by fear the 
first thing I want to do is stick my "dick" in some 
girl's mouth. 
Mr. Edelstein:  Well – 
The 
Court:  Everyone 
else 
the 
same 
way? 
 
(No 
response.) 
The Court:  I mean that's a stupid argument. 
. . . 
Mr. Edelstein:  I'm not saying it wasn't a two-way 
street, but it's not as if we have an individual who 
set out in a predatory fashion to meet up with someone 
knowing that his friend was going to a party with 
these young girls here.  That's not what happened.   
¶12 Later in the hearing, after telling defense counsel to 
"jump to the chase," Judge Woldt asked Krebs if he had anything 
to say (in allocution).  Krebs paused, and before he could get 
any words out, Judge Woldt jumped back in with the following 
exchange: 
The Court:  Here's the deal.  People who practice in 
front of me a lot know that I don't like being late.  
That's why all these signs around here say, "Don't be 
sorry, be on time."  I don't like being late.  And 
attorneys that practice in front of me a lot know, 
that when things are getting behind, they know the 
best thing they can do is to shut their "pie holes" 
and get to the point, and Mr. Edelstein doesn't get 
that.  But I understand he has – feels that he has to 
say what he has to say on behalf of his client and get 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
8 
 
the best deal.  So what I always say to people is, "Is 
there anything you want to do to mess this deal up?  
Is there anything you want to say?" 
The Defendant:  No. 
The Court:  You're a very smart man.  You would be 
amazed at the amount of defendants that come in and 
say, "Yeah, there is," and then they continue to go 
on. 
I don't think for a minute that you're the type of kid 
that's going to come back here.  You're a low risk to 
reoffend.  Everything in the PSI says you're a low 
risk to reoffend.  I think you got into a situation 
where you were taken advantage of and you returned the 
favor by taking advantage of someone else.  What tells 
me a lot is the fact that the victims in this case had 
no contact whatsoever with return phone calls to the 
agent.  That tells me that there's something with this 
so-called victim in this case.   
¶13 The Commission alleged, and the Panel found, that 
Judge Woldt's comments and behavior during this sentencing 
hearing had constituted willful violations of the following four 
provisions 
of 
the 
Code: 
 
SCR 
60.02, 
SCR 60.03(1), 
SCR 60.04(1)(d), and SCR 60.04(1)(hm).7   
 
                     
7 Judge Woldt's comment to the defendant discouraging him 
from exercising his right of allocution violated this rule.  
SCR 60.04(1)(hm) provides: 
A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall 
perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 
impartially. A judge shall also afford to every person 
who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or to that 
person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to 
the law.  A judge may make reasonable efforts, 
consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate 
the 
ability 
of 
all 
litigants, 
including 
self-
represented litigants, to be fairly heard. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
9 
 
Incident Four (June 4, 2015) 
¶14 This incident occurred during a postconviction motion 
hearing in State v. Grant, Winnebago County Case No. 2014CT413, 
in which the defendant argued that his trial counsel had 
provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to 
suppress evidence.  After hearing testimony from trial counsel, 
Judge Woldt denied the motion.  He then added the following 
comments: 
The Court:  . . . I would have denied the motion in 
the first place if Mr. Szilagyi would have followed – 
filed it and I probably would have done so forcefully, 
not that I wouldn't like to grant this motion because 
I really would.  I would love to grant this motion, I 
would love to have a trial on this issue, I'd love 
that he get found guilty, and I'd love to give him a 
year in jail for wasting my time today.  I would love 
to do that, but unfortunately I can't. . . .   
¶15 The Panel found that this comment had constituted a 
willful violation of the following provisions of the Code:  
SCR 60.02, SCR 60.03(1), and SCR 60.04(1)(d). 
Incident Three (June 5, 2015) 
¶16 This incident occurred during a sentencing hearing in 
State v. Shaffer, Winnebago County Case No. 2014CF509.  In that 
case the defendant was charged with burglary of a neighbor 
family's house and with stalking (with a previous conviction for 
a violent crime).  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant 
pled no contest to the stalking charge, and the burglary charge 
was dismissed and read in. 
¶17 The defendant, who was then in his mid-20s and 
suffered from substantial cognitive deficiencies, removed the 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
10 
 
garage door opener from the neighbors' car and used the opener 
on a subsequent date to enter the neighbors' house.  He took 
some of the wife's underwear, which he later returned, along 
with the opener.  The defendant had a previous conviction in 
2009 for sexual contact with two seven-year-old girls who were 
in his mother's daycare business. 
¶18 At the sentencing hearing, the husband victim spoke 
about how the defendant's actions had undermined the family's 
sense of safety in their home, especially in light of the fact 
that they had two young children. 
¶19 During his subsequent sentencing comments, Judge Woldt 
told the husband and wife victims that he understood their fear 
as a result of the defendant's actions.  He then proceeded to 
give a rather lengthy soliloquy about his views on courthouse 
security before returning to what an appropriate sentence should 
be.  We include an extended excerpt of Judge Woldt's comments 
below because it is important to understand the full context: 
By the same token, I understand the fear of the 
victims in this case.  When I judge people and I make 
decisions, the people of this county elected me, and 
when they elected me they elected me and my beliefs, 
my thoughts, and they reelected me because they agree 
with my beliefs and my thoughts and my experiences.  
Just an example is I've been trying to get security 
into this courthouse.  There is none.  Any one of you 
could have walked in today with a gun.  None of us 
would ever know.  Because I sit here and I – this 
isn't the most safest place in the world, I don't deal 
with the upper echelon of the community, a lot of 
people I meet do pretty bad things, I send people to 
prison – or I should say they send themselves to 
prison but they think I do – so I have a concern with 
that.  So I have that fear too.  So what can I tell 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
11 
 
you to do with that fear?  I have tried the County 
Board, I have tried everything to get people to do 
something to keep guns out of this courthouse, and 
nothing happens, so you know, you got to protect 
yourself.  I can tell you what I do now.  This is what 
I do – (the court holds up a gun.)  That I keep up 
here on the bench just because I want to protect 
myself.  Now, I'm not saying you should do that but if 
I was in your – if I was in your situation, I'd have 
it on my side all the time.  With today's laws with 
the Castle Doctrine, you're lucky you're not dead 
because, if you would have come into my house, I keep 
my gun with me and you'd be dead, plain and simple, 
but that's what makes this so scary.  So – 
And everyone says I can't believe this happened, it's 
not like him, that's not like him.  I get one letter 
from Attorney Reff, and I'm reading the letter, and it 
just boggles my mind.  He's a nice kid.  He won't do 
this.  Don't put him on probation because he doesn't 
do well on probation because he doesn't like telling – 
people telling him what to do and it's just not going 
to do him any good.  Don't put him in prison because 
prison is for bad people, [and] he's not a bad person, 
it's not going to do him any good.  Well, then what 
the hell am I supposed to do?  Just say – (the court 
swishes hands together) – I give up, nothing, because 
probation's not going to work, he doesn't listen to 
anybody, prison's not going to work because that's 
only for bad people, he's not a bad person.   
So I agree, what do you do?  Everyone today was saying 
who knows, who knows what to do.  I think even the 
people that were talking on [the defendant's] behalf, 
who knows, said it twice, who knows, who knows.  Who 
knows what to do with him?  If no one knows what to do 
with him, the only thing I can do is judge his past, 
what he's done in the past, the fact that we tried to 
help him and he continues to do that, so that I have 
to take as the Gospel, that's the way it's done, so 
the only thing I can do at this point is look at one 
thing, and that's protection of the public, so what 
can I do to protect the public from him because he's 
not going to change, and that's incarceration.  That's 
the only thing I can do is take him out of society by 
doing it, but I can also do some things also to 
hopefully make the victims feel more at ease 'cuz I 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
12 
 
agree with you with respect – I agree – I agree with 
you, partly because I am an idealist also.  Damn it, 
it's my house.  It's my first house, and I don't want 
to move.  Why should I have to move if I haven't done 
anything wrong?  I understand that, but I also 
understand 
that 
I 
don't 
give 
a 
shit 
about 
my 
idealistic beliefs, if it comes down to my family's 
safety I'm moving my ass out of there.  It goes both 
ways.   
¶20 This excerpt indicates that at one point during his 
lengthy statement, Judge Woldt held up a handgun.  The 
Commission's complaint alleged, and the Panel found, that during 
the hearing, Judge Woldt had a Glock Model 43 handgun in a 
holster on his right hip concealed under his judicial robe.  The 
gun was loaded with a round in the chamber and a full magazine.  
The Panel found that Judge Woldt was legally carrying the 
concealed gun pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.60(16)(b)(2).  The 
complaint further alleged and the Panel found that, when the 
transcript indicates that Judge Woldt "[held] up a gun," he (a) 
removed the handgun from its holster beneath his robe, (b) 
ejected the loaded magazine, (c) racked the handgun's slide to 
eject the bullet from the gun's chamber, and then briefly 
displayed the gun "as a 'prop'" to those present in the court.  
Although the Commission stipulated that the gun was not loaded 
when Judge Woldt held it up for those in the courtroom to see, 
he did not state that fact to those individuals.  In addition, 
the parties stipulated that no one asked Judge Woldt whether he 
carried a firearm or whether he would display his gun and that 
Judge Woldt was not in fear for his safety.  Based on the Joint 
Stipulation, the Panel's findings also contained a paragraph 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
13 
 
that stated that when Judge Woldt displayed his handgun during 
this hearing, he (a) did not have his finger on the trigger or 
inside the trigger guard and (b) did not point the gun at any 
person in the courtroom.   
¶21 Given these facts, the Panel concluded that during 
this sentencing hearing Judge Woldt had willfully violated the 
following provisions of the Code:  SCR 60.02, SCR 60.03(1), and 
SCR 60.04(1)(d). 
Incident Two (January 25, 2016) 
¶22 This incident did not occur during a hearing in a 
case.  Instead, this incident occurred when a group of high 
school students visited Judge Woldt's courtroom during a 
Government Day event.  Consequently, there is no transcript for 
this incident. 
¶23 As with Judge Woldt's display of his Glock handgun 
during the Shaffer sentencing hearing described in Incident 
Three above, he also displayed his handgun to the students.  The 
Commission's complaint alleged, and the Panel found, the same 
facts as in Incident Three regarding the holstering of the fully 
loaded and concealed gun, the removal of the magazine and the 
round in the chamber, and then the brief display of the gun to 
those present in the courtroom.  According to the Panel's 
finding, Judge Woldt displayed the gun "as a 'prop'" when 
responding to a student question about courthouse security 
generally.  The question did not ask him whether he carried a 
firearm, and no one asked him to display a gun.  Further, as was 
the case with Incident Three, Judge Woldt had no fear for his 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
14 
 
safety at the time he displayed the gun to the high school 
students. 
¶24 The Commission alleged, and the Panel concluded, that 
Judge Woldt's conduct at the Government Day event, including the 
display of the handgun, had willfully violated SCR 60.02 and 
SCR 60.03(1). 
Incident One (April 18, 2016) 
¶25 This 
incident 
arose 
out 
of 
a 
custody/placement 
modification hearing in Wadleigh v. Wadleigh, Winnebago County 
Case No. 2009FA594.  During the hearing counsel for the 
petitioner, 
Attorney 
Gordon 
Stillings, 
cross-examined 
the 
director of the Winnebago County Family Court Services.  Judge 
Woldt did not care for a line of Attorney Stillings' questions.  
He had not expressed his displeasure previously and no objection 
had been made, but Judge Woldt interrupted the cross-examination 
with the following exchange: 
The Court:  Counsel, there's a thin line between being 
an advocate and being a "dick" – thin line – and 
you're blurring it. 
Mr. Stillings:  Can you be more specific?  I'm not 
understanding – 
The Court:  I'm not going to play your games with you, 
okay?  I'm not going to play your games with you.  
You're being very argumentative with this witness, and 
you're playing games.   
¶26 Shortly thereafter, Judge Woldt again interrupted 
counsel and stated that counsel's question was not relevant.  
During the following exchange, when the attorney began to state 
that he was trying to figure out something, Judge Woldt 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
15 
 
interrupted again and said that counsel was "trying to go back 
to the way I said you were a couple minutes ago."  Judge Woldt 
then threatened to find a woman in the courtroom in contempt if 
she gave him "that look one more time."   
¶27 In the discussion section of its report, the Panel 
found that Judge Woldt had "impliedly labelled" counsel a 
"dick."  It concluded that, even if Judge Woldt had been 
frustrated with the attorney, as he argued in his sanction 
memorandum, Judge Woldt's comments at the hearing, including his 
use of the profanity directed at Attorney Stillings, had 
willfully violated SCR 60.02 and SCR 60.04(1)(d).   
¶28 The Panel's final legal conclusion was that Judge 
Woldt's conduct in the six incidents, as described in the 
preceding paragraphs, constituted willful violations of the 
specified SCRs, which therefore constituted judicial misconduct 
under Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a). 
II. 
RECOMMENDATION AS TO DISCIPLINE 
¶29 Although 
the 
parties 
had 
entered 
into 
a 
Joint 
Stipulation that the facts set forth above were true and that 
Judge Woldt's conduct in the six incidents had violated the 
specified provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the 
sanction memoranda that the parties filed with the Panel showed 
that they strongly disagreed with the way these six incidents 
should be characterized.  Judge Woldt's sanction memorandum 
generally alleged that the Commission's descriptions of the 
incidents were incorrect and failed to acknowledge the context 
in which the incidents occurred.  For example, Judge Woldt 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
16 
 
denied the Commission's statement that he had called Attorney 
Stillings a "dick" in Incident One, saying that he had said only 
that Attorney Stillings was getting close to crossing that line 
and that his statement was an attempt to exercise his discretion 
to control the mode of interrogation and protect the witness 
from undue harassment or embarrassment.  As another example, 
Judge Woldt disputed the Commission's statement that in Incident 
Three his crude language had been directed toward the victims 
and that his display of his gun had been intended to instill 
fear in the defendant.  He claimed that he was simply trying to 
show empathy with the victims and that his display of the gun 
occurred while he was showing empathy to the victims—not when he 
was addressing the defendant.  With respect to Incident Five, 
Judge Woldt argued that his comment about the defendant was an 
"impulsive reaction" to a meritless argument by defense counsel 
and that his use of the phrase "so-called victim" was not 
directed toward the victim, as the Commission alleged, because 
she was not in the courtroom that day. 
¶30 The 
Panel's 
discussion 
regarding 
the 
level 
of 
discipline to be recommended focused, in large degree, on 
factors that this court has indicated may be considered in 
determining the appropriate level of discipline.  See In re 
Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ziegler, 2008 WI 47, 
¶43, 309 Wis. 2d 253, 750 N.W.2d 710.  Those factors include: 
(1) 
Whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or 
evidenced a pattern of misconduct; 
(2) 
The nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of 
the acts of misconduct; 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
17 
 
(3) 
Whether the misconduct occurred inside or outside 
the courtroom or courthouse; 
(4) 
Whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's 
official capacity or in his or her private life;  
(5) 
Whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized 
that the acts occurred;  
(6) 
Whether the judge has demonstrated an effort to 
change or modify his or her conduct; 
(7) 
The extent to which the judge exploited his or 
her position to satisfy personal desires; 
(8) 
The length of the judge's service on the bench; 
(9) 
Whether prior complaints were filed against the 
judge; and 
(10) The effect the misconduct has upon the integrity 
of and respect for the judiciary. 
Id. (citing In re Inquiry Concerning Patrick C. McCormick, 639 
N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 2002)).   
¶31 The Panel found that in this case these factors 
weighed in both directions.  It concluded that some factors were 
mitigating considerations, including Judge Woldt's admission 
that he had engaged in judicial misconduct, the lack of any 
personal benefit from his misconduct, his history of service on 
the bench, and the lack of prior formal complaints against him.  
The Panel also noted later in its discussion that three of the 
incidents had occurred within a one-week period of time, which 
Judge Woldt had described as a tumultuous time in his family 
circumstances.   
¶32 On the other hand, a number of these factors were 
aggravating and called for a more severe sanction.  These 
aggravating factors included that Judge Woldt's misconduct was 
far removed from any judicial purpose; that his misconduct 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
18 
 
occurred in the courtroom and, with one exception, in the middle 
of court proceedings; that his misconduct occurred in his 
official capacity as a representative of the judicial system; 
and that his misconduct had a substantial impact on the 
integrity of and respect for the judiciary.   
¶33 The Panel also discussed separately whether Judge 
Woldt's six instances of misconduct constituted an aggravating 
pattern.  Ultimately, the Panel believed that the 2009 incident 
was not part of a pattern because of the period of time between 
that incident and the other five incidents, but it determined 
that the five incidents that occurred in just under a year (May 
2015-April 2016) did constitute an aggravating pattern of 
misconduct, rather than a number of isolated incidents.  In 
addition to the closeness in time, the Panel emphasized that all 
of the incidents of misconduct involved inappropriate demeanor 
in the courtroom.   
¶34 The Panel considered two other judicial disciplinary 
proceedings where the misconduct had similarly stemmed from 
improper judicial demeanor:  In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 
(1989), and In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Breitenbach, 167 Wis. 2d 102, 482 N.W.2d 52 (1992).  In both of 
those proceedings, the respondent judge no longer held office at 
the time of the court's disciplinary proceeding.  In each 
proceeding, the judge was found to have demonstrated over a 
period of five years a pattern of insensitivity and disrespect 
to litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and others.  This court 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
19 
 
determined that each judge's pattern of sarcastic, demeaning, 
and intemperate behavior was serious enough to warrant imposing 
a two-year suspension during which the judge was prohibited from 
serving as a judge of any court, including serving as a reserve 
judge. 
¶35 The Panel stated that the decisions in Gorenstein and 
Breitenbach confirmed that incidents of improper judicial 
demeanor can warrant serious discipline.  It concluded that 
Judge Woldt's violation of four different sections of the Code 
and the multiple occasions on which the violations occurred 
required the imposition of a suspension in order to foster 
"public confidence in the sanctity of a fair and impartial 
judiciary."  Noting that Judge Woldt's incidents of misconduct 
were less numerous than those committed by Judges Gorenstein and 
Breitenbach and weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
the Panel recommended that Judge Woldt be suspended without pay 
for a period of not less than seven days nor more than 21 days.   
III. REVIEW OF PANEL REPORT AND ANALYSIS 
¶36 Neither party has sought to appeal from any portion of 
the 
Panel's 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
or 
recommendation for discipline.  Nonetheless, we must review the 
Panel's findings of fact to determine if they are clearly 
erroneous, and we must review de novo the Panel's conclusions of 
law 
regarding 
whether 
those 
facts 
demonstrate 
judicial 
misconduct.  Wis. Stat. § 757.91; see also In re Judicial 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 2001 WI 96, ¶10 n.5, 
245 Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1; In re Judicial Disciplinary 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
20 
 
Proceedings Against Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d 57, 69, 429 N.W.2d 759 
(1988).  As this court holds the constitutional responsibility 
for maintaining the proper administration of justice in the 
courts of this state, we independently determine the appropriate 
level of discipline to be imposed in light of the particular 
misconduct and the other facts of each case, benefitting from 
the Panel's analysis and recommendation.8 
¶37 Given the parties' stipulation regarding the facts of 
the six incidents, we do not find clear error regarding any of 
the specific factual findings set forth by the Panel.  We also 
do not find any of the inferences drawn from those facts in the 
discussion section of the Panel's report to be unreasonable. 
¶38 We agree with the Panel that the stipulated facts and 
the reasonable inferences from those facts show that Judge Woldt 
willfully violated the Code of Judicial Conduct as alleged in 
the complaint, and therefore committed judicial misconduct under 
Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).   
¶39 Although they concur in the other conclusions of 
misconduct and in the imposition of a seven-day suspension, two 
                     
8 That the decision regarding whether and at what level to 
impose discipline is committed solely to this court is also 
supported by the fact that the statute acknowledges that a 
judicial conduct panel makes only "recommendations regarding 
appropriate discipline for misconduct."  Wis. Stat. § 757.91 
(emphasis added).  A recommendation is not a judicial act that 
carries any legal effect.  It is this court in which judicial 
disciplinary proceedings are filed, and it is this court that 
enters an order specifying the discipline to be imposed on a 
judge who has committed judicial misconduct. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
21 
 
justices of this court, Justice Roggensack and Justice Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, conclude that Judge Woldt's display of his 
handgun in his courtroom does not constitute a violation of the 
Code.  It is true that there is an exemption to the statutory 
ban on carrying concealed weapons in a courthouse for judges who 
are 
licensed 
to 
carry 
concealed 
weapons. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 175.60(16)(a)6 and (b)2.  Judge Woldt held a concealed weapon 
permit during the incidents at issue in this proceeding.  The 
authorization for a judge to carry a concealed weapon in a 
courthouse, however, does not resolve the question of whether 
Judge Woldt's conduct in the two relevant incidents ran afoul of 
the Code.  The law also does not forbid individuals from 
engaging in impatient, undignified, and disrespectful conduct.  
Indeed, in most circumstances, the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects from governmental sanction speech 
that is impatient, undignified, and disrespectful.  That fact, 
however, does not mean that a judge cannot be disciplined for 
impatient, undignified, and disrespectful speech when the judge 
directs that speech to participants in a court proceeding over 
which the judge is presiding.  Indeed, all participating 
justices in this proceeding agree that Judge Woldt can be and 
should be disciplined for his impatient, undignified, and 
disrespectful speech in the incidents at issue here.  
¶40 It is important to remember what the Commission's 
complaint alleged, which is what the Panel found based on the 
Joint Stipulation.  In Incident Three, the Shaffer sentencing 
hearing, the Panel's conclusions of law state that it was "Judge 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
22 
 
Woldt's display of his gun and comments" (emphasis added) that 
constituted 
the 
violations 
of 
SCRs 
60.02, 
60.03(1) 
and 
60.04(1)(d).  It was not the simple display of a gun; it was the 
display of the gun "as a 'prop'" in connection with the 
comments.  First, Judge Woldt used undignified, discourteous, 
and disrespectful language that demeaned the solemnity of the 
court proceeding and his role as the person imposing a just 
sentence on behalf of society.9  In addition, although that case 
did not involve any firearm charges or even the use or threat of 
any firearm, Judge Woldt essentially used his sentencing 
comments to encourage the victims to take matters into their own 
hands and use a gun, as he would do.  It was at that point that 
he brought out the handgun from under his robe to display it for 
dramatic emphasis.  As the Panel noted, it was not necessary for 
any valid judicial purpose to display the gun and introduce an 
element of force into the sentencing hearing.  Most importantly, 
it was immediately after displaying the gun that Judge Woldt 
turned to addressing the defendant, who was a young man with 
substantial cognitive limitations.  Just two sentences after 
holding up the gun, Judge Woldt told this young man that he was 
                     
9 Judge Woldt's comments included the following: 
Damn it, it's my house.  It's my first house, and I 
don't want to move.  Why should I have to move if I 
haven't done anything wrong?  I understand that, but I 
also understand that I don't give a shit about my 
idealistic beliefs, if it comes down to my family's 
safety, I'm moving my ass out of there.   
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
23 
 
lucky that he had not entered Judge Woldt's house because Judge 
Woldt would have shot him dead on the spot with the gun that he 
always keeps with him (and had just displayed).  That comment in 
connection with the display of the gun served no purpose other 
than to menace and frighten the young man.  Finally, as the 
Panel also noted, "Judge Woldt's comments about his own personal 
fear and the display of the handgun served only to personalize 
the proceeding and detract from his role as an impartial and 
fair decision maker."    
¶41 We have no hesitation in concluding that Judge Woldt's 
comments, when combined with the unnecessary display of his 
personal handgun during the sentencing proceeding, constituted a 
failure to observe "high standards of conduct" "so that the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved."  
SCR 60.02.  A judge who displays a personal gun as a "prop" 
during a court proceeding and then immediately threatens to use 
it to kill the defendant if he ever broke into the judge's 
residence is not demonstrating the integrity of the judiciary, 
SCR 60.02, and is not "promot[ing] public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."  SCR 60.03(1).  
Such conduct does not show that the judge is conducting himself 
or herself as a respected judicial officer applying the law in a 
dispassionate and reasoned manner, as the public expects judges 
to do.  Judge Woldt's conduct during the Shaffer sentencing 
hearing also cannot be described as "patient, dignified and 
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others 
with 
whom 
the 
judge 
deals 
in 
an 
official 
capacity."  
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
24 
 
SCR 60.04(1)(d).  The facts of the Shaffer sentencing hearing 
adequately prove the three Judicial Code violations alleged in 
the Commission's complaint. 
¶42 Similarly, Judge Woldt's conduct during the Government 
Day event must be considered in context.  He was meeting with a 
group of high school students.  When asked a general question 
about courthouse security, he responded by displaying his gun 
again as a "prop," apparently to make dramatic his ongoing 
courthouse security complaints.10  No one asked him whether he 
carried a gun, and no one asked to see the gun.  There was no 
reason to pull out a gun in response to a question from a high 
school student.  Although the Joint Stipulation indicates that 
the gun was not loaded at the time it was displayed, Judge Woldt 
did not disclose that fact to the students.  All they knew was 
that an adult judge in a black robe sitting on a judicial bench 
in a courtroom suddenly pulled out a gun, which for all they 
knew could have been loaded.  As was the case with the Shaffer 
sentencing, Judge Woldt's dramatic introduction of the use of 
force in the form of his personal handgun unnecessarily 
personalized what should have been an educational discussion 
about a topic of civic interest.  Drawing a gun in front of a 
                     
10 The Panel explicitly found that Judge Woldt had used his 
gun "as a 'prop'" when stating his views on courthouse security 
in response to the student's question and that he did so to give 
dramatic effect to his response.  Judicial Conduct Panel's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation ¶11 and 
p. 19. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
25 
 
group of teenage high school students when on the bench in one's 
capacity as a representative of the judicial branch and when 
there is no judicial purpose for doing so does not promote 
confidence in the judge as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter 
of the law or in the judiciary as a whole.  Moreover, Judge 
Woldt 
expressly 
"accept[ed] 
that 
displaying 
the 
gun 
was 
unnecessary and ill-advised, and stipulate[d] that it violated 
SCR 60.03(1) and 60.02."  Respondent's Brief Regarding Sanctions 
at 9.  We therefore conclude that the Panel was correct to 
conclude that Judge Woldt's conduct in the context of the 
Government Day event violated both SCR 60.02 and SCR 60.03(1). 
¶43 Having concluded that Judge Woldt committed misconduct 
in all six incidents, we now turn to the appropriate level of 
discipline.   
¶44 The purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish 
the judge, In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d 57, 77, 429 N.W.2d 579 (1988), but "to 
protect the court system and the public it serves from 
unacceptable judicial behavior."  In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 
Wis. 2d 861, 873, 434 
N.W.2d 603 (1989); see also Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d at 77.  The level 
of discipline, therefore, should be determined by the amount of 
protection that is needed, given the seriousness of the judge's 
misconduct and the likelihood that it would recur.  Gorenstein, 
147 Wis. 2d at 873.  Discipline "commensurate with the conduct" 
also is necessary to maintain the integrity of the judicial 
process and to demonstrate that integrity to the public so that 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
26 
 
the public retains confidence in the courts of this state.  
Crawford, 2001 WI 96, ¶39;11 see also Aulik, 146 Wis. 2d at 77. 
¶45 In his sanction brief to the Panel, Judge Woldt 
contended that this court imposes a suspension rather than a 
reprimand only when the respondent judge's conduct has involved 
some degree of "moral culpability."  We acknowledge that we have 
previously stated that we consider suspension and removal from 
office to be "drastic measures" that are generally reserved for 
serious, repeated or persistent violations of the Code.  In re 
Judicial 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Seraphim, 
97 
Wis. 2d 485, 513, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980).  We have not, however, 
made "moral culpability" a bright-line test for the imposition 
of a suspension.  To the contrary, we have expressly stated that 
we do not use bright-line standards when determining the 
appropriate level of discipline: 
                     
11 The 
court 
in 
Crawford 
explained 
this 
purpose 
of 
discipline as follows: 
The sanction that we impose must convey to the public 
the gravity with which this court views judicial 
misconduct.  Those who sit in judgment in both civil 
and 
criminal 
matters, 
in 
which 
the 
lives 
and 
livelihoods 
of 
the 
citizens 
of 
this 
state 
are 
involved, must be above reproach.  When a judge fails 
to live up to the demanding, but necessary, standards 
that are imposed upon the elected judiciary, the 
integrity of the entire judicial process can be only 
reaffirmed 
by 
a 
sanction 
commensurate 
with 
the 
conduct. 
In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 2001 
WI 96, ¶39, 245 Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
27 
 
We have not established, nor will we here, a "bright-
line" 
standard 
when, 
for 
example, 
reprimand 
or 
suspension is warranted as opposed to suspension.  
Each case is different, and is considered on the basis 
of its own facts. 
Crawford, 245 Wis. 2d 373, ¶40.  We will, therefore, determine 
the appropriate level of discipline for Judge Woldt's judicial 
misconduct based on the particular facts of this case. 
¶46 In general, we agree with the Panel's view of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case, 
although we depart from the Panel on a couple of points. 
¶47 We begin with the nature of Judge Woldt's misconduct, 
which we view to be serious and to have a significant 
detrimental impact on the public's view of the judiciary.  We 
have already discussed how Judge Woldt used undignified, 
discourteous, and disrespectful language unbecoming a judge and 
essentially 
threatened 
a 
young 
defendant 
with 
cognitive 
impairments in the Shaffer sentencing.  In the Krebs sentencing, 
he again used profane language and imagery to demean what he 
believed defense counsel's argument to be.  He displayed 
irritation with counsel's attempt simply to make arguments on 
behalf of his client and made clear that he wanted Krebs' 
counsel, as well as all other attorneys who appear in his court, 
to "get to the point" or "jump to the chase" because he does not 
wish to hear extended arguments.  Indeed, he said that when 
proceedings are taking longer than he would like, attorneys 
should know that the best thing they can do is to "shut their 
pie holes."  A highly distressing part of Judge Woldt's conduct 
during the Krebs hearing was his fairly blatant attempt to 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
28 
 
intimidate the defendant into waiving his right to speak in 
allocution.  Equally distressing, he referred to the 13-year-old 
victim in the case as a "so-called victim," thereby questioning 
in open court whether the young girl had really suffered a 
second-degree sexual assault despite the fact that he had 
accepted the defendant's plea to that crime.12  Finally, in the 
first incident at issue here, the 2009 sentencing in the 
Williams 
case, 
Judge 
Woldt 
mischaracterized 
the 
in-court 
statement of the victim in a domestic violence case13 and then 
castigated her for having the temerity to express her opinion of 
her 
current 
relationship 
with 
the 
defendant, 
essentially 
                     
12 Judge Woldt's sanction memorandum to the Panel noted that 
the victim was not in the courtroom for the sentencing hearing.  
The fact that the victim was not in the courtroom to hear Judge 
Woldt's demeaning comment in person matters little.  The 
important thing for purposes of the Code and this proceeding is 
the fact that Judge Woldt made the comment.  In addition, Judge 
Woldt made the comment on the record in open court.  Even though 
the victim did not hear the comment as it was uttered, there is 
a strong possibility that she learned of the comment at some 
later time. 
13 Judge Woldt said to the victim that he was "sick and 
tired of victims coming in here and they call the cops when they 
need 'em but then later on they come and say:  Oh, no, this 
person's an angel."  His statement clearly implied that this 
victim had also stated in court that the defendant was an 
"angel."  That was not what the victim had said.  What she said 
was that she hoped the court would impose a fine and community 
service rather than an extended period of probation "because we 
are trying to work things out and things have been a lot 
better."  Judge Woldt was free not to credit her statement, if 
he had a basis for doing so, and he was also free to impose 
probation and counseling despite her statement.  What he was not 
free to do was to mischaracterize her statement and treat her 
without dignity, respect, and sensitivity. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
29 
 
discouraging her from calling the police in any future domestic 
violence situations.  These are all serious violations of a 
judge's ethical duties and show an open and callous disregard of 
Judge Woldt's obligation to serve the public in a fair, 
reasoned, impartial, and courteous way. 
¶48 We part ways to a limited extent with the Panel's 
conclusion about whether there was a pattern to Judge Woldt's 
misconduct.  The Panel thought that there was a pattern with 
respect to the five incidents that occurred between May 2015 and 
April 2016, but it believed that the February 2009 incident was 
not part of a pattern of misconduct because of the length of 
time that passed between that incident and the next one.  We 
acknowledge that there was a substantial period of intervening 
time between the first two incidents at issue, but that passage 
of time, by itself, does not eliminate the pattern that has 
existed from 2009 to 2016.  The 2009 incident in the Williams 
sentencing, in which Judge Woldt mistreated the domestic 
violence 
victim 
using 
undignified, 
discourteous, 
and 
disrespectful language, was no different in type from the 
undignified, discourteous, and disrespectful manner in which 
Judge Woldt treated people in his courtroom in 2015 and 2016.  
Unfortunately, the fact that Judge Woldt acted the same way in 
his courtroom back in 2009 indicates that this was not an 
isolated instance.  That makes the misconduct even more serious 
and the need for a sanction that will deter Judge Woldt from 
continuing to act in that manner all the more pressing. 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
30 
 
¶49 In addition, all of the incidents of misconduct 
occurred in the courthouse where Judge Woldt was acting in his 
official capacity as a circuit court judge.  Five of the six 
incidents occurred during case proceedings in open court.  All 
of the incidents have certainly had a negative effect on the 
public's respect for the integrity, fairness, and competency of 
the judiciary.   
¶50 On the mitigating side of the ledger, we acknowledge 
that Judge Woldt has acknowledged that he committed judicial 
misconduct by entering into a stipulation to that effect, 
although his sanction brief to the Panel did attempt to minimize 
the nature and extent of his wrongdoing.  We also acknowledge 
Judge Woldt's assertion that he has attempted to modify his 
conduct.  In addition, Judge Woldt does have an extended period 
of service as a circuit court judge, and there have not been any 
prior formal complaints filed with this court by the Commission 
regarding his judicial performance.  All of these factors lessen 
the sanction that would otherwise be appropriate for the 
misconduct in this case. 
¶51 Although each case is unique, prior disciplinary 
proceedings may inform our consideration of the proper level of 
discipline to impose.  In this case we believe that three prior 
judicial disciplinary proceedings are relevant.  We agree with 
the 
Panel 
that 
Judge 
Woldt's 
sarcastic, 
demeaning, 
and 
disrespectful comments to people in his courtroom are similar in 
nature to the judicial misconduct committed by Judges Gorenstein 
and Breitenbach.  Judge Woldt's misconduct, however, is neither 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
31 
 
as egregious nor as persistent as their misconduct.  The third 
disciplinary proceeding that has a similar type of misconduct 
was In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michelson, 
225 Wis. 2d 221, 591 N.W.2d 843 (1999).  In that case, we 
imposed a public reprimand on Judge Michelson for a single 
incident in which he called the daughter of a litigant a "slut" 
for having a child out of wedlock.  Judge Woldt's conduct is 
more serious than that committed by Judge Michelson, and it 
occurred on multiple occasions rather than on just one occasion. 
¶52 Having considered all of the facts of this proceeding, 
including all of the appropriate aggravating and mitigating 
factors, we conclude that a short suspension is necessary in 
this situation to assure the members of the public that judges 
will treat them with dignity, fairness, and respect when they 
enter the courtrooms of this state, and to impress upon Judge 
Woldt the seriousness of his misconduct and the need for him to 
change how he treats the jurors, lawyers, litigants, witnesses, 
victims, and staff with whom he interacts.  Given Judge Woldt's 
lengthy history of service on the bench, the fact that he has 
not previously been the subject of a disciplinary complaint, and 
the fact that five years have passed since the last incident at 
issue here, we conclude that a seven-day suspension will be 
sufficient to ensure that there will not be a repetition of this 
No. 
2020AP1028-J   
 
32 
 
misconduct by Judge Woldt.14  We remind him and the other judges 
in this state that how justice is dispensed is often just as 
important as the substance of the legal ruling. 
¶53 IT IS ORDERED that Scott C. Woldt is suspended from 
the office of circuit judge without compensation and prohibited 
from exercising any of the powers or duties of a circuit judge 
in Wisconsin for a period of seven days, commencing August 2, 
2021. 
¶54 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. and BRIAN HAGEDORN, 
J., did not participate. 
 
                     
14 Although there are differences among the participating 
justices regarding the presence of violations of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct due to Judge Woldt's displays of his handgun in 
his courtroom, the participating justices are unanimous that a 
seven-day suspension is the proper level of discipline to impose 
in this proceeding. 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶55 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  The Judicial Code of Conduct's (the 
"Code") Preamble states:  "Care must be taken that the Code's 
necessarily general rules do not constitute a trap for the 
unwary judge or a weapon to be wielded unscrupulously against a 
judge."  SCR 60 pmbl.  Three members of this court disregard 
this prefatory admonition and weaponize the Code, brandishing it 
as a "blunderbuss" that may be used by "any lawyer or any 
pundit" with a political agenda.1  See Ronald D. Rotunda, 
Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed 
New ABA Judicial Code, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1337, 1341 (2006).  
The majority conjures Code violations from provisions that do 
not encompass the charged conduct, even under the most generous 
construction of the language.  Overly broad constructions of the 
Code risk "demean[ing] the seriousness of the charge of an 
ethics 
violation[.]" 
 
Id. 
at 
1377. 
 
Even 
worse, 
such 
manipulations of the Code unjustly "besmirch and tarnish" the 
reputation of individual judges and the judiciary as a whole.  
See id. at 1341.  They also undermine the public's confidence in 
the justice system, which is contrary to the Code's purpose.  
SCR 60.02 cmt.; cf. State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 84, ¶141, 364 
Wis. 2d 336, 
867 
N.W.2d 772 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring) 
(discussing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 
                     
1 Political attacks on the judiciary have been a significant 
problem in Wisconsin.  See generally Patience Drake Roggensack, 
Tough Talk and the Institutional Legitimacy of Our Courts, 
Hallows Lecture (Mar. 7, 2017), in Marq. Law., Fall 2017, at 47. 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
2 
 
(2009)) ("If a judge were required to recuse whenever a person 
could conjure a reason to question a judge's impartiality, a 
judge could be attacked without a standard on which to evaluate 
the attack.  We have rejected a loose and standardless test, as 
the Supreme Court in Caperton did, in no small part because it 
would invite mischief and judge shopping."). 
¶56 In this matter, a three-justice majority2 ignores the 
Code's Preamble and distorts the text of the Code provisions it 
invokes to justify a legally unsupportable finding of misconduct 
premised on a judge's display of a handgun he lawfully carried.  
In doing so, three justices establish a precedent that may be 
wielded unscrupulously against other judges in the future.  The 
majority unearths three dormant traps buried within the Code's 
general rules for one unwary judge, the Honorable Scott C. Woldt 
of Winnebago County.  After misstating the facts——and with 
almost no textual analysis of the Code——the majority concludes 
that Judge Woldt violated three separate rules by briefly 
                     
2 Two Justices did not participate, leaving only five 
Justices to decide this matter.  See State v. Hermann, 2015 WI 
84, 
¶154, 
364 
Wis. 2d 336, 
867 
N.W.2d 772 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring) ("Citizens of the state deserve to have the entire 
supreme court decide all cases unless extreme circumstances 
require otherwise.  Unlike the circuit court or the court of 
appeals, the supreme court serves a law development purpose; 
therefore, cases before the supreme court impact more than 
parties before the court."); William H. Rehnquist, Sense and 
Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 694, 
707 
(1973) 
("Where 
we 
deal 
with 
appellate 
courts 
which 
customarily sit en banc, it seems to me scarcely debatable that 
decisions of important questions of statutory or constitutional 
law by less than a full court are, other things being equal, 
undesirable.").   
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
3 
 
displaying a firearm while making innocuous statements in his 
courtroom on two occasions.   
¶57 The 
majority's 
analysis 
suggests 
that 
it 
is 
disciplining Judge Woldt at least in part because it considers 
the display of a firearm offensive.  This court should be wary 
of suspending a judge elected by the people, thereby temporarily 
subverting the will of the people, particularly when part of the 
basis for such discipline rests on three Justices regarding his 
conduct as politically incorrect.  See In re Seraphim, 97 
Wis. 2d 
485, 
513, 
294 
N.W.2d 485 
(1980) 
(per 
curiam) 
("Suspension and removal, to be sure, are drastic measures."); 
cf. In re Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct's Rules on 
Recusal, 2010 WI 73, ¶11 (Roggensack, J., statement in support), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=
pdf&seqNo=51874 ("We elect judges in Wisconsin; therefore, 
judicial recusal rules have the potential to impact the 
effectiveness of citizens' votes cast for judges.").  While I 
concur with the court's decision that a one week suspension 
without pay is appropriate discipline for other conduct, I 
dissent from the majority's decision that Judge Woldt's displays 
of a firearm constitute misconduct. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶58 Judge Woldt was appointed to the bench in 2004 and the 
voters of Winnebago County elected and re-elected him to three 
terms of service since his appointment.  He has presided over 
27,096 cases through disposition.3  Based on statistics provided 
                     
3 Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶34. 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
4 
 
by the District Court Administrator, he had a below average 
judicial substitution rate from 2014 to 2018.4  Other than the 
present matter, he has not been the subject of any public or 
private judicial discipline.5  While he was an attorney in 
private practice from 1987 to 2004, Judge Woldt was not subject 
to any public or private attorney discipline.6  The Judicial 
Conduct Panel found that he cooperated with the Judicial 
Commission's investigation.7  
¶59 The Judicial Commission filed a complaint against 
Judge Woldt for six "incidents."  Only the second and third 
incidents involved Judge Woldt's display of a firearm.  During 
the third incident, Judge Woldt used profanity, and in so doing, 
violated the Code.  I agree with the majority on this point.  I 
part ways with the majority because it characterizes the brief 
display of the firearm as misconduct.  No provision of the Code 
supports that conclusion.  I also part ways with the majority 
because it misconstrues several innocuous statements made during 
the second and third incidents. 
¶60 Importantly, 
the 
Judicial 
Commission's 
complaint 
acknowledges that Judge Woldt had a license to carry a handgun.  
It also acknowledges that properly licensed judges, including 
Judge Woldt, are expressly permitted by statute to carry a 
                     
4 Id., ¶35. 
5 Id., ¶31. 
6 Id. 
7 Id., ¶32. 
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firearm in a courthouse——either openly or concealed.8  Judge 
Woldt has not been accused of violating any statutory laws 
regulating the possession or use of firearms.  Accordingly, the 
court's review on this issue is limited to whether Judge Woldt's 
display of the firearm, on one or both occasions, violated the 
Code. 
A.  The Second Incident – "Government Day" 
¶61 In early 2016, Judge Woldt participated in an event 
known as "Government Day," which was sponsored by the local 
chamber of commerce.  Judge Woldt met with high school students 
in the courtroom, and the students were scheduled to later 
participate in a debate before the County Board on "courthouse 
security."9  When the students met with Judge Woldt, one student 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 175.60(16)(a)6 (2019–20) provides, in 
relevant part: 
(a) Except as provided in par. (b), neither a licensee 
nor an out-of-state licensee may knowingly carry a 
concealed weapon, a weapon that is not concealed, or a 
firearm that is not a weapon in any of the following 
places: . . .  
6. Any portion of a building that is a county, 
state, or federal courthouse. 
Paragraph (b) provides: 
The prohibitions of para. (a) do not apply to any of 
the following: . . .  
2. A weapon in a courthouse or courtroom if a 
judge who is a licensee is carrying the weapon or 
if another licensee or out-of-state licensee, 
whom a judge has permitted in writing to carry a 
weapon, is carrying the weapon. 
9 The Judicial Conduct Panel did not mention this debate in 
(continued) 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
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asked him for his thoughts on the debate topic.  Judge Woldt 
proceeded to un-holster a handgun from beneath his robe.10  He 
then removed the handgun's magazine and ejected the round in the 
chamber.11  Next, he briefly raised the handgun, without pointing 
it at anyone and without his finger near the trigger guard,12 and 
explained that he had the handgun for his protection. 
B.  The Third Incident – Sentencing in State v. Shaffer 
¶62 A similar incident occurred in the summer of 2015.  
Judge Woldt was presiding over a sentencing hearing in State v. 
Shaffer.13  The defendant was charged with stalking and 
residential burglary.14  He pled no contest to the stalking 
charge, and the burglary charge was dismissed and read in.  Two 
victims were present at the sentencing hearing, and one victim 
explained that the defendant's conduct made him feel that he 
could not assure his wife of her safety in their home.15  The 
                                                                  
its findings of fact, but the Judicial Commission acknowledged 
the debate in its reply brief.  Judicial Commission's Reply Br., 
at 5 ("Even though Judge Woldt knew that the high school 
students were debating the issue of courthouse security, it is 
entirely reasonable to infer that Judge Woldt intentionally 
involved these students in his dispute with the County Board 
(albeit in a minor way).  After all, Judge Woldt knew when he 
displayed his firearm to them, that they would be debating 
courthouse security in front of the County Board[.]"). 
10 Complaint, ¶¶14–15. 
11 Id., ¶15. 
12 Id. 
13 Winnebago County Case No. 2014CF509. 
14 Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶13. 
15 Id., ¶15.  
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
7 
 
transcript reflects that Judge Woldt responded to the victim's 
concerns as follows: 
I 
understand 
the 
fear 
of 
the 
victims 
in 
this 
case. . . .  I've been trying to get security into 
this courthouse.  There is none.  Any one of you could 
have walked in today with a gun. . . .  So I have that 
fear too.  So what can I tell you to do with that 
fear?  I have tried the County Board, I have tried 
everything to get people to do something to keep guns 
out of this courthouse, and nothing happens, so you 
know, you got to take it -- you gotta do what you need 
to do to protect yourself.  I can tell you what I do 
now.  This is what I do -- (the court holds up a gun).  
That I keep up here on the bench just because I want 
to protect myself.  Now, I'm not saying you should do 
that but if I was in your -- if I was in your 
situation, I'd have it on my side all the time.16 
The Judicial Conduct Panel found the transcript's notation that 
"(the court holds up a gun)," means that Judge Woldt proceeded 
in much the same way that he did on Government Day.  Judge Woldt 
un-holstered a handgun from beneath his robe.  He then removed 
the handgun's magazine and ejected the round in the chamber.  He 
did not point the handgun at anyone and his finger was not near 
the trigger guard.17  According to Judge Woldt, his intent was to 
"express[] his understandings of the victims' fear" and "show 
the victims 'what he does' for personal safety."18 
¶63 The parties seem to dispute whether Judge Woldt then 
lowered the handgun before telling the defendant, "[w]ith 
today's laws with the Castle Doctrine, you're lucky you're not 
                     
16 Id., ¶16. 
17 Id., ¶¶17–18. 
18 Judge Woldt's Br., at 10–11. 
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8 
 
dead because, if you would have came into my house, I keep my 
gun with me and you'd be dead, plain and simple but that's what 
makes this so scary."19  Notably, the complaint says that Judge 
Woldt "raised and briefly displayed the handgun to those present 
in the court," but it does not indicate when he lowered the 
handgun.20  Judge Woldt has explained his intent in making this 
statement was to "caution the defendant of the dangers of 
invading private homes."21 
¶64 Shortly after Judge Woldt made this statement, he 
spoke directly to the victims present at the sentencing hearing.  
He told them: 
[W]hat can I do to protect the public from [the 
defendant] because he's not going to change, and 
that's incarceration.  That's the only thing I can do 
is take him out of society by doing it, but I can also 
do some things also to hopefully make the victims more 
at ease 'cuz I agree with you with respect -– I agree 
-– I agree with you, partly because I am an idealist 
also.  Damn it, it's my house.  It's my first house, I 
don't want to move.  Why should I have to move if I 
haven't done anything wrong?  I understand that, but I 
also understand that I don't give a shit about my 
idealistic beliefs, if it comes down to my family's 
safety I'm moving my ass out of there.22 
                     
19 Compare id., at 11, with Judicial Commission's Reply Br., 
at 6. 
20 Complaint, ¶22 (emphasis added). 
21 Judge Woldt's Br., at 11. 
22 Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶20. 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
9 
 
Notwithstanding his profane language, the Judicial Conduct Panel 
noted, "[t]here is no indication that any of the cases at issue 
were improperly influenced by Judge Woldt's misconduct."23 
C.  Procedural History 
¶65 For the second incident, the Judicial Commission 
charged Judge Woldt with violating SCR 60.02 and 60.03(1).  For 
the third incident, it charged him with violating the same two 
rules, along with a third, SCR 60.04(1)(d).  Judge Woldt 
answered the Judicial Commission's complaint by admitting the 
complaint's factual allegations and conceding the conclusions of 
law; however, he noted that "the Commission's argument for 
suspension omits facts, ignores context, and, at times, unfairly 
portrays the selected facts on which it does rely."24  So, while 
the parties agree on the facts, they strongly disagree on their 
characterization and the inferences that can be reasonably drawn 
from them.  A Judicial Conduct Panel convened to recommend 
appropriate discipline.  The Panel accepted the stipulated facts 
and conclusions of law and recommended Judge Woldt be suspended 
for one to three weeks without pay. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶66 We accept the findings of fact of a Judicial Conduct 
Panel unless they are clearly erroneous.  In re Crawford, 2001 
WI 96, ¶10 n.5, 245 Wis. 2d 373, 629 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam).  We 
                     
23 Id., ¶37. 
24 Judge Woldt's Br., at 1–2. 
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decide questions of law, including the proper interpretation and 
application of the Code, independently.25  See Filppula-McArthur 
ex rel. Angus v. Halloin, 2001 WI 8, ¶32, 241 Wis. 2d 110, 622 
N.W.2d 436 (citing City of West Allis v. Sheedy, 211 Wis. 2d 92, 
96, 564 N.W.2d 708 (1997)); see also Gabler v. Crime Victims 
Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶47, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384.  
We are not bound by a party's concession of law.  State v. 
Anderson, 2014 WI 93, ¶19, 357 Wis. 2d 337, 851 N.W.2d 760 
(citing Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 
(1997)); St. Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶102, __ 
Wis. 2d __, 
__ 
N.W.2d __ 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (quoting Ross v. Bd. of Outagamie Cnty. Supervisors, 
12 Wis. 26, 44 (1860) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting)) ("We sit here 
to decide the law as we find it, and not as the parties or 
others may have supposed it to be.").  Therefore, we are not 
obligated to accept Judge Woldt's concession that he violated 
the Code by displaying a firearm. 
¶67 The Judicial Commission, as the prosecutor, bears the 
burdens of proof and persuasion.  See Wis. Stat. § 757.85(6) 
(2019–20).26  It can prosecute only "misconduct" or "permanent 
                     
25 A Judicial Conduct Panel has the statutory authority to 
make 
"recommendations 
regarding 
appropriate 
discipline 
for 
misconduct."  Wis. Stat. § 757.91.  As the majority explains, 
"[a] recommendation is not a judicial act that carries any legal 
effect.  It is this court in which judicial disciplinary 
proceedings are filed, and it is this court that enters an order 
specifying the discipline to be imposed on a judge who has 
committed judicial misconduct."  Majority op., ¶36 n.8. 
26 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2019-20 version. 
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disability," which are both statutorily-defined terms.  Id.; 
§ 757.81(4), 
(6). 
 
This 
matter 
involves 
allegations 
of 
misconduct, not permanent disability.  Notably, not every 
violation of the Code constitutes misconduct.  Something more is 
required.  § 757.81(4); In re Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d 708, 728, 580 
N.W.2d 307 (1998).  In the context of this matter, the alleged 
violations 
must 
be 
willful 
to 
constitute 
misconduct.  
§ 757.81(4)(a).  A violation of the Code is willful if, 
according to our controlling precedent, "the judge's conduct was 
not the result of duress or coercion and . . . the judge knew or 
should have known that the conduct was prohibited by the 
Code[.]"  Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d at 729. 
B.  Establishing the Facts 
¶68 In the Judicial Commission's brief, it asserted that 
Judge Woldt was involved in an ongoing political dispute with 
the County Board regarding courthouse security.27  The Commission 
inferred from the alleged existence of this dispute that when 
Judge Woldt displayed his handgun, his intent was to hijack 
Government Day to make a political statement that served no 
                     
27 Judicial 
Commission's 
Br., 
at 
24–25 
("Judge 
Woldt 
seemingly had one motive for using his handgun as a 'prop' in 
both circumstances:  expressing his dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which courthouse security was being addressed by the 
board. . . .  Judge Woldt knew that the students who were in his 
courtroom for Government Day were also going to be meeting with 
the 
County 
Board 
that 
same 
day 
and, 
by 
his 
actions, 
unnecessarily 
involved 
the 
students 
in 
their 
ongoing 
dispute.").  
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legitimate judicial purpose.28  Importantly, the Commission's 
complaint does not mention this alleged political dispute.  
Neither does the Judicial Conduct Panel's finding of facts. 
¶69 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
blithely 
adopts 
the 
Judicial Commission's portrayal of Judge Woldt as a gun-toting 
cowboy who misused his office to advance his stance in an 
ongoing political battle.  The majority writes, for example, 
"[w]hen asked a general question about courthouse security, 
[Judge Woldt] responded by displaying his gun . . . as a 'prop,' 
apparently to make dramatic his ongoing courthouse security 
complaints."29 
¶70 The majority errs by failing to apply the proper 
standard of review and by essentially shifting the burdens of 
proof and persuasion to Judge Woldt.  We review the Judicial 
Conduct 
Panel's 
finding 
of 
facts; 
we 
do 
not 
consider 
unsubstantiated 
assertions 
of 
the 
Judicial 
Commission.  
Crawford, 245 Wis. 2d 373, ¶10 n.5.  The Panel's findings do not 
mention an ongoing political dispute, likely because the 
Judicial 
Commission's 
complaint 
does 
not 
allege 
one.  
Admittedly, Judge Woldt said at the sentencing hearing in 
Shaffer, "I've tried the County Board, I have tried everything 
to get people to do something to keep guns out of this 
                     
28 Id. at 26 ("It appears that Judge Woldt had an 
alternative plan for the students when he used the event as his 
opportunity to complain about his dispute with the County 
Board[.]"). 
29 Majority op., ¶42. 
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13 
 
courthouse, and nothing happens, so you know, you got to take it 
–- you gotta do what you need to do to protect yourself."30  The 
majority mischaracterizes this judge's concerns about courthouse 
security as a political battle with the County Board.  The 
stipulated facts do not support the majority's narrative.  On 
Government Day, Judge Woldt was responding to a high school 
student's question, not advancing a political agenda.  If the 
debate topic was politically sensitive, that is not Judge 
Woldt's fault; there is no evidence that he picked the debate 
topic or was involved with organizing or planning Government 
Day.   
¶71 The majority seemingly attributes its own firearm 
phobias to the high school students, suggesting they were 
frightened, scared, or otherwise discomforted by Judge Woldt's 
conduct.  There is no evidence of this either.  The majority 
states, "[a]lthough the Joint Stipulation indicates that the gun 
was not loaded at the time it was displayed, Judge Woldt did not 
disclose 
that 
fact 
to 
the 
students."31 
 
Continuing 
its 
speculation regarding the mindset of the students, the majority 
proclaims, "[a]ll [the students] knew was that an adult judge 
sitting in a black robe on a judicial bench in a courtroom 
suddenly pulled out a gun, which for all they knew could have 
been loaded."32  The majority's apprehensions are belied by its 
                     
30 Complaint, ¶21. 
31 Majority op., ¶42. 
32 Id. 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
14 
 
own emphasis of Judge Woldt's safe handling of the handgun.  The 
majority explains that he:  "(a) removed the handgun from its 
holster beneath his robe, (b) ejected the loaded magazine, [and] 
(c) racked the handgun's slide to eject the bullet from the 
gun's 
chamber . . . ."33 
 
Any 
reasonable 
observer 
would 
understand that Judge Woldt unloaded the handgun.  Why the 
majority suggests he should have verbally stated that the 
handgun was unloaded is unclear. 
¶72 While condemning Judge Woldt for using the handgun as 
a "dramatic" rhetorical device, the majority engages in a 
dramatic display of its own in its discussion of the Shaffer 
sentencing hearing.  According to the majority, "Judge Woldt 
essentially used his sentencing comments to encourage the 
victims to take matters into their own hands and use a gun, as 
he would do."34  This statement implies that Judge Woldt 
encouraged a sort of vigilantism.  He did no such thing.  He 
said:  
I can tell you what I do now.  This is what I do -- 
(the court holds up a gun).  That I keep up here on 
the bench just because I want to protect myself.  Now, 
I'm not saying you should do that but if I was in your 
–- if I was in your situation, I'd have it on my side 
all the time. 
(emphasis added).  Judge Woldt told the victims what he would do 
"if [he] was in [their] situation."  He explained that he would 
exercise his natural right to self-defense by carrying a 
                     
33 Id., ¶¶20, 23. 
34 Id., ¶40. 
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15 
 
firearm——a right that is protected by the United States 
Constitution as well as the Wisconsin Constitution.  U.S. Const. 
amend. II; Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 25.  Telling victims that 
others in their situation may consider exercising a fundamental 
right for defense of hearth and home is qualitatively different 
from telling them to "take matters into their own hands." 
¶73 The majority expands its hyperbole when it moralizes, 
"it was not necessary for any valid judicial purpose to display 
the gun and introduce an element of force into the sentencing 
hearing."35  The majority then misstates that Judge Woldt 
"threaten[ed]" to "kill" the defendant if he ever broke into the 
judge's home.36  Judge Woldt issued no threat.  He said, "[w]ith 
today's laws with the Castle Doctrine, you're lucky you're not 
dead because, if you would have came into my house, I keep my 
gun with me and you'd be dead, plain and simple but that's what 
makes this so scary."  The last part of his statement, "but 
that's what makes this so scary," is telling.  It evidences an 
intent to convey to the defendant the danger to which he exposes 
himself through his criminal conduct.  Judge Woldt explained to 
the defendant that he is "lucky" that he did not get shot.  In 
                     
35 Id. 
36 Id., ¶41.  
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other words, Judge Woldt merely told the defendant that he could 
have gotten hurt or killed during his criminal activity.37   
¶74 A summary of a principle in the recent best seller, 
The Coddling of the American Mind, hits at the very heart of the 
problem with the majority's hyperbolic statements:  "There is a 
principle in philosophy and rhetoric called the principle of 
charity, which says that one should interpret other people's 
statements in their best, most reasonable form, not in the worst 
or most offensive way possible."  Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan 
Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind 55 (2018).  The 
majority assumes the worst of Judge Woldt, so it reads into his 
statements an insidious intent that is not facially or impliedly 
present.  When this court exercises its extraordinary power to 
discipline elected judges, it should apply the principle of 
charity, resolving doubts about the intended meaning of a 
judge's statement in favor of the judge.  After all, the 
Judicial Commission bears the burdens of proof and persuasion.  
See Wis. Stat. § 757.85(6); see also Republican Party of Minn. 
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941)) ("We 
                     
37 The 
majority 
says 
the 
defendant 
had 
"substantial 
cognitive deficiencies" and "substantial cognitive limitations."  
Id., ¶¶17, 40.  The Judicial Conduct Panel's finding of facts, 
however, state the defendant had "cognitive disabilities"——the 
word "substantial" is noticeably missing.  Judicial Conduct 
Panel, ¶13.  The record contains nothing about the nature and 
extent 
of 
the 
defendant's 
cognitive 
impairment, 
and 
the 
majority's suggestion that it is particularly severe is just 
another example of it playing fast and loose with the facts. 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
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should not, even by inadvertence, 'impute to judges a lack of 
firmness, wisdom, or honor.'"). 
C.  The Rules 
¶75 Compounding its failure to fairly characterize the 
facts, the majority fails to follow long-established principles 
of interpretation under which the text of the relevant law 
controls the analysis of its meaning.  The majority does not 
engage with the text of the Code, instead consigning it to 
footnotes and declaring violations of the Code nowhere to be 
found in the text.  
¶76 Unlike most statutes, which are enacted by the 
legislature, this court promulgates the Code, but the Code's 
rules are functionally equivalent to statutes because they 
provide notice of established public policy to a regulated 
entity, i.e., judges.  See Calvert v. Mayberry, 440 P.3d 424, 
430 (Colo. 2019) (quoting Rocky Mountains Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. 
Mariani, 916 P.2d 516, 525 (Colo. 1996)) ("Although '[s]tatutes 
by their nature are the most reasonable and common sources for 
defining public policy,' professional ethical codes may also be 
expressions of public policy."); Rich v. Simoni, 772 S.E.2d 327, 
328 (W. Va. 2015) (explaining that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct "are statements of public policy with the equivalent 
legal force and effect as statutes").  Similar to our approach 
when interpreting statutes, the Preamble of the Code instructs 
us to apply its rules "through a reasonable and reasoned 
application of the text."  SCR 60 pmbl.; see Milwaukee Dist. 
Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
18 
 
924 N.W.2d 153 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). 
¶77 The majority asserts that each incident constitutes a 
violation of SCR 60.02, which states:   
A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary. 
An 
independent 
and 
honorable 
judiciary 
is 
indispensable to justice in our society.  A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining and 
enforcing 
high 
standards 
of 
conduct 
and 
shall 
personally 
observe 
those 
standards 
so 
that 
the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 
preserved.  This chapter applies to every aspect of 
judicial 
behavior 
except 
purely 
legal 
decisions.  
Legal decisions made in the course of judicial duty on 
the record are subject solely to judicial review. 
The text of SCR 60.02 concerns conduct inconsistent with 
judicial integrity and judicial independence.  Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "integrity" as "[f]reedom from corruption or 
impurity; soundness; purity; [m]oral soundness; the quality, 
state or condition of being honest and upright."  Integrity, 
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  It defines "judicial 
independence" as "[t]he structural separation of the judiciary 
from the political branches of government so that judges remain 
free from improper influences, partisan interests, and the 
pressures of interest groups."  Id. at Judicial independence. 
¶78 The comment to SCR 60.02 similarly emphasizes judicial 
integrity and judicial independence.  It states, in relevant 
part:  "Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends 
upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of the 
judges.  The integrity and independence of judges depends in 
turn upon their acting without fear or favor."  SCR 60.02 cmt.; 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
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see also Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Rev., 2018 WI 75, 
¶64 n.37, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (lead opinion) ("Our 
Code of Judicial Conduct reflects the foundational importance of 
keeping core judicial power in the hands of an independent 
judiciary[.]"); Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶8 ("When structuring 
the federal judiciary, the Framers knew from experience the 
perils of adopting a separation of powers in name without paying 
appropriate attention to the incentives affecting individual 
judges."); Patience Drake Roggensack, To Begin a Conversation on 
Judicial Independence, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 535, 535 (2007) ("It has 
been said that most of the respect the public accords judicial 
decisions emanates from public perception that a court's 
decision is an independent determination of what the rule of law 
requires."). 
¶79 The 
majority 
also 
asserts 
that 
each 
incident 
constitutes a violation of SCR 60.03(1), which states:  "A judge 
shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times 
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary."  This rule is quite similar to 
SCR 60.02, but it requires judges to act in accordance with the 
law and to promote public confidence in judicial impartiality.  
While judicial independence resists external pressures that 
threaten 
a 
judge's 
autonomous 
decision-making, 
judicial 
impartiality precludes personal bias in the exercise of judicial 
judgment.  Black's Law Dictionary defines "impartiality" as 
"[t]he quality, state, or condition of being free from bias and 
of 
exercising 
judgment 
unswayed 
by 
personal 
interest; 
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20 
 
disinterestedness."  Impartiality, Black's Law Dictionary.  As 
one Australian judge explained:  "Impartiality refers to what 
goes on, and appears to go on, in the mind of the decision 
maker.  Independence concerns the relationship of the decision 
maker to government, the parties and external influences."  
Michael 
Kirby, 
Judicial 
Recusal: 
Differentiating 
Judicial 
Impartiality and Judicial Independence, 4 Brit. J. Am. Legal 
Studs. 1, 1 (2015). 
¶80 The Commission adds a third charge for the third 
incident, citing SCR 60.04(1)(d), which states:  
A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with 
whom the judge deals in an official capacity and shall 
require similar conduct of lawyers, staff, court 
officials and others subject to the judge's direction 
and control.  During trials and hearings, a judge 
shall act so that the judge's attitude, manner or tone 
toward counsel or witnesses does not prevent the 
proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment 
of the truth.  A judge may properly intervene if the 
judge considers it necessary to clarify a point or 
expedite the proceedings. 
¶81 Crucially, the text of SCR 60.04(1)(d) is decidedly 
different than one of its predecessors, which provided:  "[a] 
judge should not seek to be extreme, peculiar, spectacular or 
sensational in his or her judgment or in his or her conduct of 
the court."  SCR 60.01(12) (1992).  We often consult previous 
versions of a law to understand the current law's plain meaning.  
Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571 (quoting Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 
52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581); see also Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9 (quoting Cass R. Sustein, Interpreting 
No.  2020AP1028-J.rgb 
 
21 
 
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 430 
(1989)) ("Although it is proper to look at a statute's 
background in the form of actually enacted and repealed 
provisions, the legislative history, which was never enacted, 
should rarely be permitted to supplant the statutory words as 
they are ordinarily understood.").  The history of the Code's 
language 
reveals 
that 
"extreme, 
peculiar, 
spectacular 
or 
sensational" behavior means something different than behavior 
exhibiting a lack of patience, dignity, or courtesy.   
D.  Application 
¶82 The majority perfunctorily declares that Judge Woldt's 
displays of a firearm "constituted a failure to observe 'high 
standards of conduct' 'so that the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary will be preserved.'"38  The entirety of the 
majority's analysis, however, centers on Judge Woldt's comments 
accompanying the display of the gun.  Judge Woldt's conduct on 
the two occasions in question did not violate any statutory 
laws, nor does it indicate a lack of honesty or demonstrate the 
influence of external pressures on his decision-making so as to 
call into question his judicial independence.  In conclusory 
fashion, the majority next pronounces that displaying a gun "is 
not 
'promot[ing] 
public 
confidence 
in 
the 
integrity 
and 
impartiality of the judiciary'"39 and "cannot be described as 
                     
38 Majority op., ¶41 (quoting SCR 60.02). 
39 Id. (quoting SCR 60.03(1)). 
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'patient, dignified and courteous[.]'"40  Again, the majority 
neglects to explain how displaying a gun exhibits a lack of 
integrity, patience, dignity, or courtesy, nor does the majority 
demonstrate how displaying a gun reveals any internal bias 
impairing the judge's impartiality.  At best, Judge Woldt's 
conduct 
could 
be 
characterized 
as 
"extreme, 
peculiar, 
spectacular or sensational" but that rule is no longer in 
effect, having been replaced decades ago by one that requires 
judges to be patient, dignified and courteous.  The majority is 
bound to apply the rules as they are currently written and not 
as they may wish them to be.  
¶83 Perhaps recognizing the utter absence of any textual 
basis for its conclusions, the majority insists that "it was 
'Judge Woldt's display of his gun and comments' that constituted 
the 
violations[.]"41 
 
As 
explained 
earlier, 
the 
comments 
accompanying 
Judge 
Woldt's 
display 
of 
a 
firearm——whether 
considered in isolation or in conjunction with the gun——do not 
give rise to a Code violation (other than the profanity).  Judge 
Woldt did not threaten anyone or "introduce an element of force" 
during the Shaffer sentencing hearing.  Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "force," when used as a noun, as "[p]ower, violence, or 
pressure directed against a person or thing."  Force, Black's 
Law Dictionary.  Judge Woldt did not use power or violence 
against the defendant, nor did he pressure him in any way.  The 
                     
40 Id. (quoting SCR 60.04(1)(d)). 
41 Id., ¶40 (quoting Judicial Conduct Panel, ¶¶44–46). 
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majority's characterization of Judge Woldt's display of his 
firearm 
during 
the 
Government 
Day 
event 
as 
a 
"dramatic 
introduction of the use of force"42 represents yet another 
hyperbolic distortion of the facts.  No one other than the 
majority contends that Judge Woldt used any force whatsoever and 
the record disproves the majority's assertion.   
¶84 In one more attempt to bolster its feeble conclusions, 
the majority contends that Judge Woldt violated the Code by 
"unnecessarily personaliz[ing]" his statements.43  The gist of 
the majority's theory seems to be that this is somehow 
inconsistent with the judge's role "as a dispassionate and 
impartial arbiter of the law."44  With respect to his actions on 
Government Day, the majority maintains: 
Judge Woldt's dramatic introduction of the use of 
force 
in 
the 
form 
of 
his 
personal 
handgun 
unnecessarily personalized what should have been an 
educational 
discussion 
about 
a 
topic 
of 
civic 
interest.  Drawing a gun in front of a group of 
teenage high school students when on the bench in 
one's capacity as a representative of the judicial 
branch and when there is no judicial purpose for doing 
so does not promote confidence in the judge as a 
dispassionate and impartial arbiter of the law or in 
the judiciary as a whole.[45] 
Regarding the Shaffer sentencing hearing, the majority quotes 
the Judicial Conduct Panel, which stated, "Judge Woldt's 
                     
42 Id., ¶42. 
43 Id., ¶42; see also id., ¶40 (quoting Judicial Conduct 
Panel, discussion). 
44 Id., ¶42. 
45 Id. 
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comments about his own personal fear and the display of the 
handgun served only to personalize the proceeding and detract 
from his role as an impartial and fair decision maker."46  The 
majority does not explain how Judge Woldt's "unnecessary" 
personalization 
demonstrated 
any 
impartiality 
during 
a 
sentencing hearing, much less during a conversation with high 
school 
students 
detached 
from 
any 
judicial 
proceeding 
whatsoever.  While displaying a gun may have been "unnecessary," 
it did not run afoul of any ethics provision. 
¶85 The majority appears to abrogate our decision in State 
v. Hermann, which expressly held that circuit court judges are 
entitled to personalize statements made in their judicial 
capacity, even at sentencing.  364 Wis. 2d 336.  The defendant 
in that case was convicted of several serious crimes stemming 
from his decision to drink and drive, including homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle.  Id., ¶7 (lead opinion).  At 
sentencing, the judge shared that her sister was killed by a 
drunk driver.  Id., ¶10.  She even stated, "I probably more than 
anyone else who would be able to sit on this bench in this 
county understand the pain that these victims are feeling[.]"  
Id., ¶17.  At one point, she said she was "shocked by the 
seeming blasé faire attitude that this community has about 
alcohol use[.]"  Id., ¶13.  A three-justice lead opinion, 
written by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, concluded that when the 
                     
46 Id., ¶40 (quoting Judicial Conduct Panel, discussion). 
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remarks were viewed in context, they did not "appear" to be an 
"expression of bias."47  Id., ¶60. 
¶86 Hermann expressly permits a judge to personalize a 
statement at sentencing.  Judges are human beings, and they are 
allowed——perhaps even encouraged——to convey to victims that they 
sympathize with them.  Id., ¶58; Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶58 
(quoting Schilling v. State Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2005 WI 
17, ¶26, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623) ("[W]e believe that 
justice requires that all who are engaged in the prosecution of 
crimes make every effort to minimize further suffering by crime 
victims.").  Hermann even notes that these kinds of statements 
are common.  Hermann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶22 (citing State v. 
Hermann, unpublished slip op. No. 2013AP197-CR, ¶9 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Feb. 13, 2014)).  Judges are also permitted to convey to 
defendants the gravity of their actions and the dangers they 
pose, as Judge Woldt did when he explained to the defendant at 
the Shaffer sentencing hearing that many people carry firearms.  
A criminal never knows who has a gun, and it serves an important 
judicial purpose to warn defendants of this fact, if nothing 
else as a deterrent to recidivist behavior. 
¶87 When viewed in light of Hermann, neither Judge Woldt's 
display of the handgun on Government Day nor his display at the 
Shaffer sentencing hearing establish a rule violation.  On 
                     
47 The other justices concurred but wrote or joined separate 
writings to express their concern about an appearance-based 
recusal standard. Hermann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶71 (Prosser, J., 
concurring); id., ¶112 (Ziegler, J., concurring). 
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Government Day, Judge Woldt was not even presiding over a court 
proceeding.  He merely responded to a student's question 
regarding his thoughts on courthouse security.  If he was not 
permitted to "personalize" his response, he effectively was not 
permitted to respond at all. 
¶88 Another theory of the majority seems to be that on one 
or both occasions, Judge Woldt's actions may have made people 
uncomfortable.  For example, the majority notes that Judge Woldt 
did not mention that the handgun was unloaded.  Sometimes, 
judges' personalized statements make people uncomfortable, but 
that does not render the statements professional misconduct.  A 
judge does not demonstrate a lack of patience, dignity, or 
courtesy, let alone a lack of integrity, independence, or 
impartiality, by making people uncomfortable. 
¶89 Even if the majority's theories had abstract merit, 
the majority's inability to explain how Judge Woldt willfully 
violated the Code by displaying a handgun precludes a misconduct 
finding.  The Judicial Commission bears the burden of proving 
not only a violation but a willful one.  To be willful, Judge 
Woldt had to have actual or constructive knowledge that his 
conduct violated the Code.  Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d at 729.  The 
majority announces a novel rule of law, so Judge Woldt cannot be 
held to have had actual or constructive knowledge of it.  Id. at 
731–32 ("[W]e conclude that Judge Tesmer's violation of SCR 
60.20 was not wilful . . . .  [T]he only reported cases in which 
a judge was disciplined for having engaged in ex parte 
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communications concerned communications with one of the parties 
to a pending proceeding."). 
¶90 On a final note, the majority raises a red herring by 
insinuating that my conclusions are grounded in the statutory 
right to concealed carry and the constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms.48  They aren't.  It is the text of the Code that 
governs this matter and nothing in the actual text of the Code 
prohibits the display of a firearm.  While the comment to SCR 
60.03 counsels against reading the Code in a manner that permits 
"onerous" depravations of judges' "fundamental freedoms," the 
majority errs because it declines to undertake any textual 
analysis of the Code and utterly fails to connect a judge's 
display of a handgun to the text of any of its provisions.  
Judge Woldt's display of a firearm offends the sensibilities of 
three justices of this court, so they deem it unethical.  
Allowing subjective feelings to color the construction of the 
Code subjects Wisconsin's judges to sanctions based on the 
personal ideals of three or four justices rather than actual 
breaches of written rules.  Unreasonably broad and unexplained 
constructions of the Code's rules are "antithetical to the rule 
of law" because "[s]uch rules place ipse dixit powers . . . in 
the hands of disciplinary boards and courts applying such 
rules."  In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 580–81 (Pa. 1992) (per 
                     
48 The majority argues that the Code may prohibit speech 
that the First Amendment otherwise protects.  While that may be 
true, the Code explicitly requires judges to be "patient, 
dignified and courteous" to others but has absolutely nothing to 
say about carrying or displaying a firearm.  Majority op., ¶39. 
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curiam), overruled on other grounds by In re Roca, 173 A.3d 
1176, 1184 (Pa. 2017).  Beyond judicial commission proceedings, 
"[i]ll-defined and fuzzy ethics rules give detractors a green 
light to hurl too easily the accusation of ethics violations[.]"  
Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the 
Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, at 1377.   
¶91 The 
majority 
replaces 
our 
customary 
method 
of 
interpretation with its personal policy preferences, which 
appear to be grounded in "hoplophobia," i.e., an irrational fear 
of guns.  In so doing, the majority dangerously exercises this 
court's powers based on dogma, not law.  See Robert J. 
Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Nonofficial Conduct: A Survey 
and Critique of the Law, 10 U. Balt. L. Rev. 225, 245 (1981) 
("It sometimes appears as if particular courts have merely 
imposed their own moral standards of what is or is not proper 
conduct.  Those who administer judicial discipline should keep 
in mind that they are not empowered to enforce their personal 
views of proper conduct for judges[.]").  Adherence to the 
judicial obligation to apply the text of the law as written 
ensures neutral and apolitical decision-making, based on the 
rule of law rather than individual predilection.  See James v. 
Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶23 n.12, __ Wis. 2d __, ___ N.W.2d ___  
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 61 (2012)) ("Contrary to . . . [a] 
policy-focused approach, the canons [of construction] serve as 
'helpful, neutral guides' and are 'grounded in experience 
developed by reason and tend to be a better administration of 
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justice than leaving interpretation in each case to feelings of 
policy on the part of the tribunal.'").  In cases involving 
political controversy, our obligation to focus on the text is 
even more compelling.  Departures from the text risk the court 
being viewed as little more than a political institution——a 
kangaroo court. 
¶92 As Justice Louis Brandeis cautioned, "we must be ever 
on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal 
principles."  New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  By recognizing that "a law 
is the best expositor of itself," courts can faithfully fulfill 
their function as neutral arbiters.  Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804).  While textualism cannot prevent the 
incursion of policy preferences into legal analysis——indeed, 
sometimes the word is invoked as cover for policy-based 
decision-making——the 
majority's 
opinion 
demonstrates 
that 
without textualism, such encroachment is certain. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶93 In its opinion, a three-justice majority untethers 
judicial ethics violations from the text of the Code.  While the 
majority's decision imposes immediate and unjust consequences on 
Judge Woldt, it inflicts broader and more insidious damage on 
the institution of the judiciary.  If left uncorrected, it will 
weaponize the Code as a tool for illegitimate attacks on the 
judiciary.  I dissent from the majority insofar as it 
disciplines Judge Woldt for his displays of a firearm and 
innocuous statements, which may have offended the sensibilities 
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of three justices but undoubtedly did not violate the Wisconsin 
Judicial Code of Conduct. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
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