Title: NIELSEN v BEAVER POND INC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 8 2 - 3 8 2 IN THE SUPREME COUXT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 KENNETH M. NIELSEN, Claimant and Appellant, -vs- BEAVER POND, INC., Employer, and FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court, The Ijonorable Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: R. P. Ryan, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Earl J. Hanson, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: February 10, 1983 Decided: April 7, 1983 a p ~ - 1983 Filed: . --- Clerk M r . J u s t i c e L . C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s case arises o u t of t h e i n s u r a n c e carriers t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c l a i m a n t s temporary total d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s . These bene- f i t s stemmed from two i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t s t h a t took p l a c e i n 1975 and 1976 w h i l e t h e c l a i m a n t was an employee of a Bozeman s p o r t i n g goods store. When t h e carrier terminated t h e temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , it placed t h e c l a i m a n t on permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s . A f t e r a h e a r i n g b e f o r e Judge Hunt, who was t h e r e a f t e r r e p l a c e d as Workers Compensation J u d g e , t h e temporary total b e n e f i t s were t e m p o r a r i l y r e i n s t a t e d . However, Judge Hunt w a s r e p l a c e d by t h e p r e s e n t Judge b e f o r e a f i n a l o r d e r was e n t e r e d . To avoid a d d i t i o n a l t i m e and expense, t h e p a r t i e s , r a t h e r t h a n conduct a new t r i a l , s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e new Judge d e c i d e t h e case on t h e r e c o r d . A f t e r t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , t h e Workerst Compensation Court r e f u s e d to allow new e v i d e n c e to be added and r u l e d i n f a v o r of t h e c a r r i e r . Claimant was employed by t h e Beaver Pond, a s p o r t i n g goods store i n Bozeman. Beaver Pond was e n r o l l e d under P l a n 2 o f t h e Montana Workers Compensation A c t , w i t h Fireman's Fund I n s u r a n c e Company as t h e i r carrier. On O c t o b e r 18, 1975, a customer brought a .270 c a l i b e r r i f l e i n t o t h e Beaver Pond f o r r e p a i r s . While one of t h e s t o r e employees was h a n d l i n g t h e r i f l e , i n t h e shop area, it d i s c h a r g e d . The b u l l e t s t r u c k t h e c o n c r e t e floor and s h a t t e r e d i n t o f r a g m e n t s of v a r i o u s s i z e s . These fragments, along w i t h o t h e r d e b r i s , set i n motion by t h e b u l l e t ' s impact, s t r u c k t h e c l a i m a n t i n t h e r i g h t p e l v i c r e g i o n , g r o i n , p e n i s , r i g h t t h i g h and c h e s t . Claimant underwent s e v e r a l s u r g e r i e s to remove fragmen ts i n a n a t t e m p t to a l l e v i a t e p a i n . Although t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s d i d n o t c o m p l e t e l y e l i m i n a t e t h e p a i n , t h e c l a i m a n t r e t u r n e d to work. On September 1 0 , 1976, t h e c l a i m a n t r e c e i v e d a lower back i n j u r y by f a l l i n g w h i l e he and a n o t h e r employee were moving a g r i n d i n g machine i n t h e shop a r e a . A t t h e t i m e of t h e second i n j u r y , he w a s making a p p r o x i m a t e l y $120 p e r week. H e r e c e i v e d temporary total d i s a b i l i t y of $80 p e r week from September 29, 1976, u n t i l November 28, 1976, a t which t i m e he was r e l e a s e d and r e t u r n e d to work. Claimant t h e n worked u n t i l A p r i l 25, 1977. H e had a problem working d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d due to p a i n from b o t h i n j u r i e s . On A p r i l 25, he was r e s t o r e d to temporary total d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , and r e c e i v e d $80 p e r week u n t i l November 25, 1979, when t h e carrier reduced t h e c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s to permanent p a r t i a l b e n e f i t s of $73.50 p e r week. Based on t h e carrier's a c t i o n , t h e c l a i m a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e Workers Compensation Court t o have h i s b e n e f i t s r e s t o r e d a t t h e temporary total l e v e l . The carrier counter-claimed f o r f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e case. The Workers Compensation Court found t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t was permanently p a r t i a l l y d i s a b l e d and r e f u s e d a r e q u e s t f o r r e h e a r i n g o r t o reopen t h e c a s e . From t h e s e d e c i - s i o n s , c l a i m a n t a p p e a l s . Two i s s u e s have been r a i s e d on a p p e a l . 1. Whether it was e r r o r f o r t h e Workers' Compensation Court t o f i n d t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s e n t i t l e m e n t to temporary total d i s a - b i l i t y b e n e f i t s t e r m i n a t e d on o r b e f o r e October 1 0 , 1979? 2. Whether it was error f o r t h e Workers' Compensation Court t o r e f u s e to g r a n t a r e h e a r i n g or to reopen t h e c a s e so t h a t new e v i d e n c e concerning t h e c l a i m a n t ' s d i s a b i l i t y c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d ? I n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e f i r s t i s s u e of whether t h e c l a i m a n t ' s temporary total d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s should have been t e r m i n a t e d , w e must l o o k to t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e . "'Our f u n c t i o n i n reviewing a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers Compensation Court is to d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o sup- p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s of t h a t c o u r t . W e cannot s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s to t h e weight of e v i d e n c e on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . Where t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t , t h i s Court c a n n o t o v e r t u r n t h e d e c i s i o n . S t e f f e s v. 9 3 Leasing Co., I n c . ( U . S . F . & G . ) ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 83, 8 6 , 8 7 , 580 P.2d 440, 452.' 619 P.2d a t 168." Novagk v. Montgomery Ward and Co. ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 638 P.2d 390, 392, 38 St.Rep. 1803 V i e t s v. Sweet Grass County ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 337, 583 P.2d 1070, 1071, 1072. Although t h e c l a i m a n t t r i e d to supplement t h e r e c o r d w i t h material t h a t may .have changed t h e outcome, we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e Workers Compensation C o u r t a c t e d p r o p e r l y i n r e f using it. T h e r e was no chance f o r t h e carrier to cross-examine t h e d o c t o r on t h e proposed new r e p o r t s and it was n o t p a r t of t h e s t i p u l a t e d e r e c o r d . I n o u r c a s e of H x r t v. J. J. Newberry C o . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 160, 587 P.2d 11, we made it clear t h a t s t a t e m e n t s i n m e d i c a l r e p o r t s not s t i p u l a t e d to o r introduced i n t o e v i d e n c e may n o t be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e Workers ' Compensation Court i n r e n d e r i n g its d e c i s i o n . The r e a s o n t h a t t h e s e documents must be i n e v i - dence is t h a t documents which are n o t e n t i t l e d to j u d i c i a l n o t i c e must be p u t i n t o e v i d e n c e as t h i s is t h e o n l y method by which t h e opposing p a r t i e s can make t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s known to t h e Compensation C o u r t , and p r e s e r v e t h e i r grounds f o r a p p e a l . ~Frt v . J. J. Newberry Co., s u p r a . Based on t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d , as it was s t i p u l a t e d to by t h e p a r t i e s , we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e Workers Compensation C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t : "The preponderance of medical e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t reached maximum h e a l i n g and ceased to q u a l i f y f o r temporary total d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s on or b e f o r e O c t o b e r 1 0 , 1979." None of t h e d o c t o r ' s r e p o r t s i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e r e c e n t im- provement i n t h e c l a i m a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n ; t h e y seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t it w a s s t a b l e , and t h e Missoula e v a l u a t i o n panel gave t h e c l a i m a n t an impairment r a t i n g of 6 p e r c e n t of t h e whole p e r s o n . D e s p i t e some p a r t s of t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g t h e c l a i m a n t ' s posi- t i o n , w e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e s t i p u - l a t e d r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t t h e Workers ' Compensation C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . On t h e second c o n t e n t i o n , t h e Workers ' Compensat i o n Court committed no e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g to g r a n t a new t r i a l and r e h e a r i n g . Rule 1 9 o f t h e Workers' Compensation Court r u l e s r e q u i r e s t h a t a motion f o r r e h e a r i n g be f i l e d w i t h i n twenty days a f t e r a p a r t y r e c e i v e s a copy of t h e o r d e r . T h i s is t h e same t i m e l i m i t c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 92-829, R.C.M., 1947, ( p r e v i o u s l y s e c t i o n 2955, R.C.M., 1 9 2 1 ) r which p r e v i o u s to its r e p e a l i n 1975, governed r e h e a r i n g s b e f o r e t h e I n d u s t r i a l A c c i d e n t Board, t h e p r e d e c e s s o r t o t h e Workers Compensation C o u r t . I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h a t s e c t i o n , t h i s Court h e l d t h a t ". . . t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y was i n t h e same p o s i t i o n as one moving f o r a new t r i a l i n a n o r d i n a r y case, . . . " Shugg v. Anaconda Copper Mining C o . ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 100 Mont. 159, 166, 167, 46 P.2d 435, and under t h e p r e s e n t system t h i s h a s not changed. The c l a i m a n t h e r e f a i l e d to comply w i t h t h e twenty-day d e a d l i n e , as t h e f i n d i n g s and judgment were e n t e r e d and mailed on August 11, 1982, and t h e motion f o r r e h e a r i n g was n o t f i l e d u n t i l September 7 , 1982, and no e x t e n s i o n was s o u g h t from t h e c o u r t . Regarding t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e Workers Compensation C o u r t should have reopened t h e c a s e f o r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of new m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e showing t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s back i n j u r y was i n a s t a t e of f l u x , s e c t i o n 39-71-2909 MCA, governs t h e p r o c e d u r e . I t r e a d s as f o l l o w s : " A u t h o r i t y to r e v i e w , d i m i n i s h , or i n c r e a s e - - - - - awards -- l i m i t a t i o n . The judge may, upon the - - p e t i t i o n of a c l a i m a n t o r an i n s u r e r t h a t t h e d i s a b i l i t y of t h e c l a i m a n t h a s changed, r e v i e w , d i m i n i s h , or i n c r e a s e , i n accordance w i t h t h e l a w on b e n e f i t s as set f o r t h i n c h a p t e r 7 1 o f t h i s t i t l e , any b e n e f i t s pre- v i o u s l y awarded by t h e judge o r b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d by a c l a i m a n t through s e t t l e m e n t agreements. However, t h e judge may n o t change a n y f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t or award of compensation more t h a n 4 y e a r s a f t e r t h e s e t t l e m e n t h a s been approved by t h e d i v i s i o n o r any o r d e r approving a f u l l and f i n a l compromise settle- ment of compensation." The appearance of a new and more s e r i o u s f e a t u r e of a n i n j u r y j u s t i f i e s reopening of t h e case, Larson, Workers Compensation Law, V o l . 3 , §81:31, 15-489 - 15-495, under t h i s s e c t i o n . Where s u c h a f e a t u r e is a l l e g e d by t h e c l a i m a n t and t h e Workerst Compensation Court d e n i e s h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e o p e n i n g , it s h o u l d e n t e r f i n d i n g s s e t t i n g o u t t h e r e a s o n s f o r its r e f u s a l to reopen. Such f i n d i n g s are n e c e s s a r y so t h a t t h i s Court may see whether o r n o t t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s o r d e r is s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . Here, c l a i m a n t submitted a motion to t h e Workers' Compensa- t i o n C o u r t a f t e r f i n a l judgment had been e n t e r e d , e n t i t l e d motion to amend f i n d i n g s ; motion f o r r e h e a r i n g ; motion to reopen case to add e v i d e n c e of s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s showing temporary total d i s a b i l i t y ; motion f o r new t r i a l , or r e h e a r i n g to add e v i d e n c e of s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s showing c l a i m a n t t e m p o r a r i l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d . W e h o l d t h a t such motion is s u f f i c i e n t to c o n s t i t u t e a p e t i t i o n t o reopen, based on Novack v. Montgonery Ward and C o . , s u p r a , where w e s t a t e d t h a t under s e c t i o n 39-71-2909, MCA, ". . . when a worker makes a g e n e r a l claim f o r review of h i s s t a t u s , t h e Workers' Compensation Court h a s t h e power to review a c l a i m a n t ' s s t a t u s and d e t e r m i n e a p r o p e r and f a i r s o l u t i o n . " 638 P.2d a t 392. T h i s case is a f f i r m e d i n p a r t and remanded f o r f u r t h e r f i n - d i n g s on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t o a change i n t h e c l a i m a n t ' s W e concur: / I Chief ~ u s t i c e