Title: Cubbage v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JARID L. CUBBAGE, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 168, 2005 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below--Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County in IS02-02- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
0611, 0612 & 0613; IS02-03- 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
0268. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
Def. ID No. 0202007080 
 
Submitted: August 23, 2005 
Decided: 
September 20, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 20th day of September 2005, upon consideration of the 
appellant's opening brief, the State's motion to affirm, the appellant's 
response to the motion to affirm, the State's reply to the appellant's response1 
and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Jarid L. Cubbage, has filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61").  The appellee, State of 
Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the 
                                          
 
1 The Court permitted the appellant to file the response to the motion to affirm.  See Supr. 
Ct. R. 25(a) (providing that there shall be no response to the motion to affirm unless 
requested by the Court). 
 
2
ground that it is manifest on the face of Cubbage's opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.2  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Cubbage was 
convicted of Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon 
During the Commission of a Felony, Conspiracy in the Second Degree and 
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony.  The Superior 
Court sentenced Cubbage to eight years at Level V followed by decreasing 
levels of supervision. 
(3) 
On direct appeal, Cubbage argued that the Superior Court erred 
when denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.  This Court concluded 
that Cubbage's arguments were without merit and affirmed the Superior 
Court's judgment.3 
(4) 
In April 2004, Cubbage filed a motion for postconviction relief.  
Cubbage alleged that (a) he was denied due process when the State failed to 
disclose alleged notes or a detailed summary of a co-defendant's oral 
statement; (b) he was denied due process when the State introduced 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; (c) his confrontation rights were violated 
when the Superior Court limited cross-examination of a co-defendant; and 
(d) the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him on his post-arrest silence.  
                                          
 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 Cubbage v. State, 2003 WL 21488129 (Del. Supr.). 
 
3
In related claims, Cubbage alleged that his defense counsel was ineffective 
when he failed to (a) file for discovery, (b) obtain the criminal record of a 
co-defendant for impeachment purposes, (c) file a motion for return of 
property, (d) object to inadmissible evidence, e) impeach a detective's trial 
testimony, and (f) raise the State's alleged discovery violation and alleged 
Doyle violation on direct appeal.4 
(5) 
The Superior Court directed that defense counsel file an 
affidavit in response to Cubbage's allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.5  Cubbage then filed a reply to defense counsel's affidavit.   
(6) 
The Superior Court referred Cubbage's postconviction motion 
to a Commissioner for proposed findings of fact and recommendations.6  In 
a thoughtful and thorough twenty-four page report dated March 15, 2005, 
the 
Commissioner 
addressed 
each 
of 
Cubbage's 
claims 
before 
recommending to the Superior Court that the postconviction motion should 
be denied.  The Commissioner concluded that, as to each claim, Cubbage 
                                          
 
4See Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 648 (Del. 2001) (discussing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
610, 619 (1976) holding that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
impeachment on the basis of a defendant's silence following Miranda warnings)). 
5 See Horne v. State, ___ A.2d ___ , 2005 WL 1949967 at *2 (Del. Supr.) (concluding 
that the Superior Court should obtain trial counsel's affidavit in response to a first 
postconviction motion that raises ineffective assistance of counsel).   
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 512(b)(1)b; Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5). 
 
4
failed to overcome the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3).7  Where Cubbage 
raised a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Commissioner 
concluded that Cubbage failed to establish that he was prejudiced as a result 
of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.8 
(7) 
Cubbage 
filed 
extensive 
written 
objections 
to 
the 
Commissioner's report and recommendation.  Following its de novo 
determination of Cubbage's objections, the Superior Court, by order dated 
April 14, 2005, adopted the Commissioner's findings and recommendation 
and denied Cubbage's motion for postconviction relief.9  This appeal 
followed. 
(8) 
We have carefully considered Cubbage's appellate claims as set 
forth in the opening brief, as well as the State's motion to affirm and the 
Superior Court record.  We conclude that the judgment of the Superior Court 
should be affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court's order dated April 14, 
2005, that adopted the Commissioner's well-reasoned report and 
recommendation dated March 15, 2005.  We agree that Cubbage's claims, 
                                          
 
7 Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not previously raised is 
procedurally barred unless the defendant demonstrates "cause for relief from the 
procedural default" and "prejudice" stemming from the alleged grievance. 
8 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate 
that defense counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
case would have been different.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 
(1984). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(iv). 
 
5
none of which were raised in his direct appeal, do not meet the cause and 
prejudice standard of Rule 61(i)(3), nor do they qualify for the exception to 
the Rule 61(i)(3) procedural bar that is found in Rule 61(i)(5).10  Moreover, 
to the extent that Cubbage alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, we 
agree that Cubbage has not demonstrated that any claimed error on the part 
of his counsel resulted in prejudice to him. 
(9) 
It is manifest on the face of Cubbage's opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit.  The issues raised on appeal are clearly controlled 
by settled principles of law, and there was no error of law in the Superior 
Court.  To the extent the appeal presents issues of judicial discretion, clearly 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
10 Rule 61(i)(5) provides in pertinent part that the procedural bar in Rule 61(i)(3) shall not 
apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or 
fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.