Title: Majorana v. Crown Central Petroleum

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
LAURA MAJORANA 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 992179 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 3, 2000 
CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 
H. Selwyn Smith, Judge Designate 
 
In this appeal, we consider issues relating to the doctrine 
of respondeat superior, sanctions imposed by the trial court 
related to the late identification of witnesses, the bifurcation 
of a civil trial, and jury instructions on the tort of negligent 
hiring.  Because these issues relate to discrete rulings made by 
the trial court in a voluminous record, we will address each in 
turn, stating the relevant facts and proceedings within the 
discussion. 
DISCUSSION 
Respondeat Superior 
On January 30, 1997, Laura Majorana filed a motion for 
judgment against Crown Central Petroleum Corporation (Crown) and 
Kuldip Singh Bains.  Majorana alleged in her motion for judgment 
that on March 11, 1996, Bains was working as a station attendant 
at Crown’s retail gas station in Warrenton.  The gas station has 
self-service gasoline pumps and a payment booth where soft 
drinks are also displayed for sale.  Inside this booth, a 
payment counter separates customers from employees of the gas 
station. 
Majorana alleged that she stopped at this gas station, 
where she was a regular customer, to purchase gasoline.  When 
she attempted to pay for her purchase with a credit card, Bains 
produced a small black notebook and refused to complete the 
transaction unless she provided him with her telephone number.  
Bains told Majorana that “I tell my friends I am going to marry 
you.”  When Majorana refused to give Bains her telephone number, 
Bains became angry, refused to return her credit card, told her 
to get some sodas, and “take a break” while he attended to 
purchases of other customers. 
Majorana further alleged that when the other customers had 
paid and left, Bains moved from behind the counter, lunged at 
her, and attempted to kiss her.  He then grabbed her breasts, 
rubbed his body against hers, “and made an animal-like 
conquering scream.”  Bains then returned to the attendant’s side 
of the payment counter and told Majorana that he would pay for 
her gas.  Majorana demanded her credit card and receipt and 
Bains complied. 
Seeking $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 
in punitive damages, Majorana’s motion for judgment asserted 
various theories of liability including assault and battery and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Bains and 
 
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Crown, gross negligence and simple negligence against Crown for 
failing to maintain a safe environment for a business invitee, 
and negligent hiring, training, and retention of Bains against 
Crown.  In her assertions of assault and battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, Majorana included a claim that 
Crown was vicariously liable for Bains’ acts performed within 
the scope of his employment with Crown. 
Although Bains initially was represented by counsel, early 
in the proceedings he ceased cooperating with his counsel, who 
sought and was granted permission to withdraw from the case.  
After Bains failed to appear in further proceedings, Majorana 
filed a motion for default judgment against Bains, which the 
trial court granted. 
Crown filed a demurrer to the motion for judgment 
challenging the legal sufficiency under Virginia law of claims 
for negligent training or retention, and claiming that an 
employer’s duty of care does not go beyond the initial hiring 
decision.  A subsequent separate motion filed by Crown sought 
summary judgment on the theory that Bains was not, as a matter 
of law, acting within the scope of his employment in the conduct 
which is the subject of Majorana’s claims of assault and battery 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Crown 
asserted that when Bains moved from behind the payment counter, 
he was acting thereafter outside the scope of his employment and 
 
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against the interests of Crown.  By order dated February 9, 
1999, the trial court overruled the demurrer and the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Crown filed a motion for reconsideration, addressing only 
the respondeat superior issue raised in the motion for summary 
judgment.  Majorana, who had not previously filed any written 
statement of her position on this issue, filed a responding 
brief citing Plummer v. Center Psychiatrists, Ltd., 252 Va. 233, 
476 S.E.2d 172 (1996).  She contended that Plummer supported the 
trial court’s initial finding that her motion for judgment 
sufficiently stated a cause of action against Crown by raising a 
material question of fact as to whether Bains was acting within 
the scope of his employment when he assaulted her.  By order 
dated April 9, 1999, the trial court granted Crown’s motion for 
reconsideration and entered summary judgment for Crown on the 
claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  Majorana assigns error to this ruling and 
the subsequent denial of her post-trial motion for 
reconsideration of this issue.1
                     
1Crown contends that Majorana failed to state her objection 
with reasonable certainty to the trial court’s ruling and, thus, 
is barred from asserting this issue on appeal.  We disagree.  We 
have stated that when a plaintiff assigns error to the 
sustaining of a demurrer, recitation of her position on the 
issue, combined with her objection to the trial court’s ruling 
noted on the order, these actions are sufficient to preserve the 
 
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Although Crown sought summary judgment on this issue, it 
relied exclusively on the allegations of the motion for judgment 
to support its argument that Bains was acting outside the scope 
of his employment.  Although Rule 3:18 permits a trial court to 
enter summary judgment on the pleadings, judgment “shall not be 
entered if any material fact is genuinely in dispute.”  This 
“assures that parties’ rights are determined upon a full 
development of the facts, not just upon pleadings.”  Commercial 
Business Systems, Inc. v. Halifax Corp., 253 Va. 292, 297, 484 
S.E.2d 892, 894 (1997).  In this procedural posture, the issue 
presented in this case is whether the facts alleged in the 
motion for judgment are sufficient to support the plaintiff’s 
legal conclusion that the employee acted within the scope of his 
employment when he committed the wrongful acts against the 
plaintiff and, thus, raise a material question of fact not 
amenable to resolution by summary judgment.2
                                                                  
issue for appeal.  Luckett v. Jennings, 246 Va. 303, 306, 435 
S.E.2d 400, 401 (1993).  This rationale is equally applicable 
here to Majorana’s objection to the trial court’s ruling on 
Crown’s motion for summary judgment on the pleadings.  Moreover, 
having briefed the issue in a post-trial motion for 
reconsideration, Majorana adequately preserved the issue for 
review in this appeal. 
 
2While Crown’s motion was labeled one for summary judgment, 
it is apparent from the record that the trial court’s ruling 
reflected the trial court’s conclusion that Majorana’s motion 
for judgment failed to state a legal claim, and hence treated 
Crown’s motion as a demurrer.  The distinction between summary 
 
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In Plummer, we held that an allegation that the employee, a 
therapist, had engaged in an improper sexual relationship with a 
patient stated a cause of action against his employer under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.  252 Va. at 237, 476 S.E.2d at 
174.  Majorana asserts on appeal, as she did below, that the 
rationale of Plummer applies with equal force to the allegations 
in her motion for judgment with respect to Crown’s liability for 
Bains’ acts.  Crown notes that in Plummer there was an 
allegation that the therapist’s “education, experience, and 
knowledge of the plaintiff” facilitated his seduction of the 
patient.  Id. at 237, 476 S.E.2d at 174-75.  Crown contends that 
the absence of similar allegations in Majorana’s motion for 
judgment of circumstances in the employment facilitating Bains’ 
assault materially distinguishes her pleading from the pleading 
in Plummer.  We disagree with Crown. 
In Gina Chin & Associates, Inc. v. First Union Bank, 260 
Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2000), also decided today, we have 
discussed in detail the necessary elements of a cause of action 
for liability against an employer for the willful and wrongful 
acts of its employee premised upon the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  Accordingly, we need not reiterate that discussion 
                                                                  
judgment and demurrer is significant and well settled.  However, 
in this case we reach the same result upon the record presented 
for our consideration. 
 
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here.  It is sufficient to say that in such cases, while the 
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the issue whether 
the employee was within the scope of the employment when the act 
which caused the injury was committed, the plaintiff’s burden of 
production on that issue is met by establishing the employer-
employee relationship at that time.  When the plaintiff presents 
evidence sufficient to show the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, she has established a prima facie case 
triggering a presumption of liability.  McNeill v. Spindler, 191 
Va. 685, 694-95, 62 S.E.2d 13, 17-18 (1950).  The burden of 
production then shifts to the employer, who may rebut that 
presumption by proving that the employee had departed from the 
scope of the employment relationship at the time the injurious 
act was committed.  Kensington Associates v. West, 234 Va. 430, 
432-33, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987).  If the evidence leaves in 
doubt the question whether the employee acted within the scope 
of the employment, the issue is to be decided by the jury and 
not as a matter of law by the trial court.  Id.; see also 
Plummer, 252 Va. at 235, 476 S.E.2d at 174. 
While we noted in Plummer that the motion for judgment in 
that case contained specific allegations of circumstances that 
facilitated the wrongful act which caused the plaintiff’s 
injury, these allegations were not dispositive to our decision.  
The sole issue in that case was whether the trial court erred by 
 
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holding, as a matter of law, that the motion for judgment did 
not state the necessary elements of respondeat superior within 
its factual allegations.  Clearly, the motion for judgment here 
contains an allegation of an injury caused by the willful and 
wrongful act an employee committed in the course of the 
employer-employee relationship and within the scope of his 
employment.  It alleges that Bains was Crown’s employee, that he 
assaulted Majorana at his regular place of employment, and that 
he did so while he was performing the business of his employer 
for which she was the employer’s customer. 
Thus, as we said in Plummer, “at this stage of the 
proceedings, there simply are not sufficient facts which would 
permit us to hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant has 
met its burden of showing that its employee was not acting 
within the scope of his employment.”  252 Va. at 237, 476 S.E.2d 
at 175.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in 
entering summary judgment for Crown on the allegations in 
Majorana’s motion for judgment asserting Crown’s liability for 
assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress by respondeat superior. 
Discovery Sanctions 
The trial court set a discovery cutoff date of thirty days 
prior to December 16, 1998, the original date set for trial.  On 
December 9, 1998, Majorana’s counsel placed an advertisement in 
 
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a local newspaper seeking witnesses or information concerning 
any other known sexual assaults or similar behavior by Bains.  
The advertisement resembled a “wanted poster,” made allegations 
that Bains was a sexual predator, offered a “[r]eward based on 
useful information provided for the current lawsuit against 
Crown Central Petroleum and Kuldip Singh Baines (sic),” and 
directed persons with information to “Call: Attorney” at two 
phone numbers. 
Two days later, Crown filed a motion asserting that the 
advertisement had tainted the jury pool.  Crown sought, among 
other things, dismissal of the case with prejudice or a change 
of venue.  In the alternative, Crown sought a continuance of the 
trial date. 
By order entered on December 16, 1998, the trial court held 
that there was a “substantial probability that this 
advertisement might taint the jury pool summoned” for the trial 
date.  The trial court denied the motions for dismissal and 
change of venue, alternatively granting the motion for a 
continuance and setting a new trial date beginning on March 3, 
1999.  The trial court ordered that Majorana produce all notes 
relating to the responses to the advertisement along with the 
names and phone numbers of the respondents.  The trial court 
deferred for further consideration a request by Crown that it be 
 
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allowed to depose the witnesses discovered through the 
advertisement. 
Crown filed a subsequent motion to depose the witnesses 
found as a result of the advertisement, to exclude the testimony 
of any witnesses found as a result of the advertisement, and to 
exclude any evidence of wrongful acts by Bains which occurred 
after his assault on Majorana.  The trial court granted this 
motion in its entirety and directed that Majorana bear the cost 
of the proposed depositions.  In ruling that the testimony of 
witnesses discovered through the advertisement would be 
excluded, the trial court stated that its ruling was limited 
only to the witnesses being called for direct testimony, and 
that there was no limitation on their use as rebuttal witnesses.  
In a subsequent order, however, the trial court reversed its 
decision to exclude the testimony of these witnesses, but 
limited their testimony to evidence of incidents occurring 
before the assault on Majorana. 
Majorana assigns error to the trial court’s “excluding the 
testimony of witnesses discovered by means of the newspaper 
advertisement placed by plaintiff’s counsel.”  On brief, 
Majorana addresses this assignment of error in a single 
paragraph without citation to authority and without reference to 
the trial court’s ultimate ruling permitting the witnesses to 
testify, but limiting the scope of that testimony.  Assuming 
 
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this assignment of error was intended to address the trial 
court’s ultimate ruling, the failure to present argument on that 
ruling constitutes a waiver and, accordingly, we do not consider 
the merits of this assignment of error.  See Atkisson v. Wexford 
Associates, 254 Va. 449, 454 n. *, 493 S.E.2d 524, 527 n. * 
(1997). 
Majorana also assigns error to the trial court’s assessing 
against her the cost of Crown’s deposing the witnesses 
discovered through the advertisement.  Majorana contends that 
the trial court lacked the authority to impose a monetary 
sanction in the form of discovery cost unless there was an 
express finding of contempt. 
On brief, Crown contends that the trial court offered 
Majorana the option of bearing the cost of the depositions as a 
condition for permitting the witnesses to testify and that 
Majorana acquiesced to this condition.  While this may be a 
logical inference from the trial court’s reversal of its 
decision to exclude the witnesses entirely, the record and, 
specifically, the trial court’s orders do not reflect this 
rationale for imposing the cost of the depositions against 
Majorana.  However, neither does the record reflect, as Majorana 
appears to contend, that the trial court imposed the cost as a 
contempt sanction for placing the ethically questionable 
advertisement, disrupting the proceedings by the late 
 
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identification of witnesses, and creating a need for further 
discovery following the cutoff date.  Indeed, the record is 
mostly silent as to the rationale for the trial court’s action. 
Nonetheless, because our decision to reverse the trial 
court’s ruling concerning respondeat superior will require a 
remand for further proceedings, we recognize that the 
circumstances of the further proceedings may lead the trial 
court to reconsider the imposition of the cost of these 
depositions on Majorana.  See Lake v. Northern Virginia Women’s 
Medical Center, 253 Va. 255, 263, 483 S.E.2d 220, 224 (1997).  
At the very least, the trial court will have the opportunity to 
amplify the record as to the basis for imposing the cost of the 
depositions against Majorana.  Accordingly, we express no 
opinion on this issue at this time, but will leave the trial 
court’s action undisturbed pending further proceedings.  Id.
Bifurcation of Civil Trial 
After the trial court sustained Crown’s demurrer to the 
claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, Crown filed a motion to bifurcate the trial 
into liability and damages phases.  Crown contended that 
bifurcation of the trial “would be in the interests of judicial 
economy . . . and would streamline the proceeding.”  The trial 
court’s order granting Crown’s motion was endorsed by Majorana’s 
counsel as “objected to for the reasons noted in open court.” 
 
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Majorana failed to provide a transcript or authorized 
statement of fact summarizing the argument made against Crown’s 
motion.  In the absence of a record reflecting the reason for 
the objection made in the trial court, we are unable to discern 
whether the objection raised on appeal was properly preserved 
below.  Accordingly, we will not consider Majorana’s assignment 
of error to the trial court’s granting of the motion to 
bifurcate the trial.  Rule 5:25. 
Jury Instructions on Negligent Hiring 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Majorana proffered two 
instructions concerning the failure of Crown to present evidence 
of any background investigation of Bains at the time he was 
first employed.  The first instruction read: 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, by the 
failure of Crown to produce as a witness their current 
employee Vatos—who was the manager of Crown in 
Warrenton on 3/11/96—where the Bains station records 
were supposed to be maintained (job application etc.), 
to explain the absence of that record (after a request 
to produce has been made by Laura Majorana) you may 
presume that the witness would have produced testimony 
adverse to Crown as to the job application, or other 
matters. 
 
The second instruction read: 
 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, by the 
failure of Crown to produce any written job 
application of their former employee Bains, you may 
presume that it was never provided by Bains, or if 
provided it contained adverse information about Bains, 
(no references). 
 
 
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The trial court refused both of these instructions.  Crown 
proffered two instructions on negligent hiring.  The first 
stated the elements of that cause of action.  The second 
addressed the issue of “imputed knowledge” and stated that 
Majorana had the burden to show “[t]hat the investigation Crown 
should have conducted is one that Crown is obligated to do in 
the exercise of reasonable care considering both Crown’s 
business and Bains’ position as a gas station attendant.”  This 
instruction further stated that Majorana must show “[t]hat such 
investigation would have put Crown on notice that its hiring of 
Mr. Bains might reasonably lead to an assault on the plaintiff.”  
The trial court granted both these instructions. 
The jury, which was given interrogatories, returned its 
verdict for Crown, and Crown was dismissed from the case.  The 
jury then considered damages against Bains and awarded Majorana 
$70,140 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. 
In her third assignment of error, Majorana asserts that 
“[t]he trial court improperly instructed the jury on the issue 
of negligent hire.”  In her fourth assignment of error, Majorana 
asserts, in part, that “[t]he trial court erred in denying 
plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the court’s decisions on the 
issue[] of . . . the legal standard for proving negligent hire.”  
The “motion for reconsideration” referenced by this latter 
 
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assignment of error was essentially a motion to set aside the 
jury’s verdict.  These assignments of error are without merit. 
Majorana, relying on Southeast Apartments Management v. 
Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 513 S.E.2d 395 (1999), asserts that an 
employer is required to conduct a reasonable background 
investigation of a prospective employee and that the failure to 
do so establishes the employer’s liability.  Because Crown 
failed to produce evidence of what background investigation, if 
any, it undertook prior to hiring Bains, Majorana contends that 
she was entitled to have the jury instructed that the failure to 
produce such evidence raised a presumption that Crown had either 
failed to investigate Bains’ background or had done so and 
discovered adverse information. 
Majorana misconstrues the holding in Southeast Apartments.  
In that case, we held that an employer’s liability for negligent 
hiring “is predicated on the negligence . . . in placing a 
person with known propensities, or propensities which should 
have been discovered by reasonable investigation, in an 
employment position in which, because of the circumstances of 
the employment, it should have been foreseeable that the hired 
individual posed a threat of injury to others.”  257 Va. at 260, 
513 S.E.2d at 397.  We did not thereby hold that the absence of 
proof by the employer of a “reasonable investigation” of the 
employee raises a presumption that either no investigation was 
 
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conducted or that if conducted, it would have revealed that the 
employee posed a threat of injury to others. 
To the contrary, it is a paradigm of civil trials that the 
burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff.  In the case of a 
claim of negligent hiring, proof of the failure to investigate a 
potential employee’s background is not sufficient to establish 
the employer’s liability.  Rather, the plaintiff must show that 
an employee’s propensity to cause injury to others was either 
known or should have been discovered by reasonable 
investigation.  This was the substance of the instructions 
proffered by Crown and given by the trial court. 
The record shows that Majorana produced no evidence of what 
form of reasonable investigation of Bains’ background Crown 
should have undertaken.  Nor does any evidence in the record 
support the proposition that a reasonable investigation would 
have revealed that Bains had a propensity to commit assaults 
and, thus, posed a threat to others in his employment with 
Crown.  Accordingly, we hold that Majorana’s instructions were 
not correct statements of law and were properly refused by the 
trial court.  Similarly, the trial court did not err in denying 
Majorana’s motion to set aside the jury verdict on the ground 
that it had not properly instructed the jury on this issue. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court’s entry 
of summary judgment for Crown on Majorana’s claims of liability 
under respondeat superior for assault and battery and 
intentional infliction of emotion distress, affirm the judgment 
in favor of Crown on the claims of negligence, gross negligence, 
and negligent hiring and retention, and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this 
opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
              and remanded. 
 
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