Title: GUZMAN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GUZMAN v. STATE2003 WY 11876 P.3d 825Case Number: 02-178Decided: 09/18/2003
April 
Term, A.D. 2003

 
 

FRANK 
GUZMAN,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Nicholas 
Carter and Carol Seeger of Carter Law Office, Gillette, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Carter.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Laura J. Jackson and Deborah R. Hochhalter, Student Interns.  Argument by Ms. 
Hochhalter.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Frank Guzman entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  35-7-1031(c) (LexisNexis 
2003). Guzman now asserts on appeal that evidence derived from a search of his 
vehicle should have been suppressed.  
Finding that the search of Guzman's vehicle was proper, we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Guzman states the 
issues on appeal as follows:

 

A.  Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion 
to suppress evidence based on its finding that the search of the Appellant's 
automobile was consensual?
 

B.  Was 
the search and seizure of the automobile reasonable under the constitutions of 
the United States and State of Wyoming?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 

I.  Did 
the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence on the 
ground that Appellant consented to the search of the red Chevrolet 
Tahoe?

 

II.  Apart 
from the question of consent, was the warrantless search of the red Chevrolet 
Tahoe unreasonable under the constitutions of the United States and the State of 
Wyoming?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      During the week 
of the Sturgis motorcycle rally, on August 8, 2001, State Troopers Clements and 
Tortorici were traveling westbound when they observed Guzman traveling eastbound 
on his motorcycle without the headlight illuminated.  Noticing another patrol car following 
the motorcycle at some distance, Troopers Clements and Tortorici requested by 
radio that these officers handle the matter.  

 

[¶4]      Troopers Minard 
and Mann, in the second patrol car, stopped the motorcycle driven by 
Guzman.  When Guzman was pulled 
over, a red Chevrolet Tahoe pulling a trailer and another motorcycle stopped to 
wait for him.  Guzman was asked to 
produce his driver's license, registration, and insurance documentation.  He was noticed to be wearing a t-shirt 
that had numerous marijuana leaves pictured on it with a related sayings.  Guzman reached into his jacket, 
apparently to produce some of the documentation, but accidentally pulled out 
rolling papers which he quickly returned to his pocket.  He then advised the troopers that the 
requested documentation was in the Tahoe. 

 

[¶5]      After looking in 
the Tahoe, Guzman was only able to produce an identification card.  Upon running Guzman's information 
through the dispatch center, Trooper Mann learned that Guzman's driver's license 
was suspended.  In addition, he 
learned that the motorcycle was not titled in Guzman's name.  Guzman explained that the motorcycle 
belonged to his uncle and that he was going to sell it at the rally.  In addition, Trooper Mann observed that 
the title to the motorcycle was improperly filled out, and the motorcycle had 
license plates that had been issued to a prior owner, not Guzman's uncle.  Guzman also advised the troopers that 
the Tahoe belonged to his sister.  

 

[¶6]      Meanwhile, 
Troopers Clements and Tortorici pulled up behind the first patrol car to assist 
with the stop.  They spoke with 
Orlando Garcia, the driver of the second motorcycle, and Michael Daniels, a 
hitchhiker and driver of the Tahoe.  
Both stated that they were traveling with Guzman to the rally.  Daniels did not have a valid driver's 
license.  Guzman and Daniels were 
then issued citations.  Guzman 
stated that he would post a cash bond for both citations so that formal 
detention of Daniels and himself would be unnecessary.  Each of the men were advised that 
neither Guzman nor Daniels could drive a vehicle.  Garcia, the only one of the three that 
possessed a valid driver's license, agreed to place the motorcycles on the 
trailer and drive the Tahoe.  To do 
so, Garcia pushed his motorcycle near the trailer.  He then took off his vest and placed it 
on the rear seat of the Tahoe.

 

[¶7]      During these 
events, Trooper Chatfield and his drug-sniffing dog also arrived at the 
scene.  Trooper Clements told 
Trooper Chatfield to stick around, as they may need the dog's assistance because 
some suspicious things had been noticed.  
Trooper Chatfield then walked his dog around the motorcycle driven by 
Garcia and asked everyone to move back from the motorcycle for safety 
reasons.  The dog alerted at the 
back end of Garcia's motorcycle and when asked if the officers could search his 
motorcycle, Garcia agreed, denying that any illegal drugs were on the 
motorcycle. Trooper Chatfield searched the motorcycle and found methamphetamine 
in two locations.  

 

[¶8]      After Garcia was 
arrested, the officers felt that they had probable cause to search the Tahoe 
because Garcia had, in their presence, left personal belongings in the 
vehicle.  Guzman and Daniels 
confirmed that Garcia had previously been in the vehicle, and Garcia had other 
possessions in the Tahoe.  When 
asked if the officers could search the vehicle, Guzman and Daniels gave 
permission and advised that no illegal drugs were in the vehicle unless there 
were drugs belonging to Garcia.  

 

[¶9]      The search of the 
Tahoe began with the officers removing items from the vehicle and placing them 
in piles depending on whose possessions they were.  The drug-sniffing dog then sniffed these 
possessions and moved to the Tahoe.  
While in the Tahoe near the driver's seat, the dog again alerted.  Trooper Chatfield searched the area and 
discovered methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana hidden under the 
dashboard.  Guzman was then 
arrested.  

 

[¶10]   After being charged, Guzman filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence found in the Tahoe.  Upon hearing, the district court denied 
the motion.  Guzman then entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, reserving the right 
to appeal the district court's ruling on his motion to suppress.  This appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶11]   We recently recognized in Hughes 
v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶10, 65 P.3d 378, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2003):

            
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply 
the following standard:

 

We generally 
do not disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the trial court 
abused its discretion.  Wilson v. 
State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 
do not interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Gehnert v. 
State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo. 1998).  
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination because the trial court has an oppor­tunity at the evidentiary 
hearing to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
make the necessary infer­ences, deductions, and conclusions."  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Id.; Jones v. 
State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1995).  

 

Martindale 
v. State, 2001 WY 
52, ¶9, 24 P.3d 1138, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 2000)).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Consent to 
Search

 

[¶12]   Guzman challenges the search of his 
vehicle claiming that the district court's finding that the search was 
consensual was clearly erroneous based on the evidence presented.  Specifically, Guzman argues that based 
on the testimony of three troopers given during his motion to suppress hearing, 
it is unclear that consent was given.  

 

[¶13]   We noted in Hughes v. State, 
at ¶11:

 

Both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of 
the Wyoming Constitution provide citizens with protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  However, 
"[n]either the federal nor the state constitution forbids all 
searches and seizures; rather, they prohibit unreasonable searches 
and seizures."  Lancaster v. 
State, 2002 WY 45, ¶61, 43 P.3d 80, ¶61 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Guerra v. 
State, 897 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo. 1995)).  
We have stated that under both constitutions, warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable, with a few specifi­cally established 
exceptions.  Morris v. State, 
908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 1995).  
These specific exceptions include:

 

1) search of 
an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search conducted while 
in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of an automobile 
upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is 
inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they 
have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure con­ducted pursuant to 
consent; and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to 
prevent loss of life or prop­erty.

 

Andrews v. 
State, 2002 WY 
28, ¶18, 40 P.3d 708, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo. 1992)).  

 

[¶14]   At the suppression hearing, the 
district court heard testimony from Guzman and three of the five troopers who 
were on the scene.  In doing so, the 
district court assessed the credibility of the witnesses, weighed the evidence, 
and found that consent was given to search the automobile.  Specifically, the district court 
indicated in its decision letter: "Essentially, Mr. Guzman's statement to the 
troopers was that if there were any drugs in the Tahoe, they belonged to Mr. 
Garcia and the troopers could search it if they wanted to." 

 

[¶15]   Not surprisingly, Guzman denied 
ever giving his consent for the vehicle to be searched.  The record indicates that Trooper 
Chatfield did not have any discussions with Guzman.  Therefore, he could not have obtained 
Guzman's consent to search the automobile.  
When questioned about what he had heard concerning Guzman's alleged 
consent to search his vehicle, Trooper Clements indicated that he did not recall 
any conversations regarding this topic.  
Nevertheless, Trooper Clements also explained that even though he was 
present during this time frame, he was in charge of taking care of Garcia.  

 

[¶16]   Trooper Mann, however, testified 
that upon becoming aware that the officers intended to search the vehicle 
because Garcia had possessions within the vehicle, Guzman clearly indicated that 
a search would be fine because there were no drugs in the vehicle.  Upon further questioning by counsel and 
by the district court, Officer Mann reiterated that Guzman authorized the search 
of the vehicle and stated that there were no drugs in the vehicle unless they 
were in Garcia's possessions.  The 
district court found such testimony to support a finding of consent to search 
the vehicle and, therefore, denied Guzman's motion to 
suppress.

 

[¶17]   Upon our review of the record, we 
hold the district court's decision is supported by the evidence received at the 
hearing.  As indicated previously, 
when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 1) we will not 
interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous, and 2) we must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's determination because the trial court has an 
oppor­tunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary infer­ences, 
deductions, and conclusions.  
Hughes, at ¶10.

 

[¶18]   Guzman argues that the testimony of 
Trooper Mann, standing by itself, does not support a finding that Guzman 
consented to the search of his vehicle.  
We do not agree.  Such 
positive testimony can and, in this instance, did provide a sufficient basis for 
a finding of consent to search.  
Moreover, we do not agree with Guzman's inference that each and every 
officer who was at the scene must be shown to have heard the authorization to 
search before it can be concluded that consent was given.  The only requirement is that consent is 
established by reliable and sufficient evidence.  It is the district court's function to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions.  In denying Guzman's motion to suppress, 
the district court found Trooper Mann's testimony more reliable and 
credible.  Simply stated, Guzman has 
failed to show that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous.   

 

[¶19]   Guzman would also have us believe 
that the totality of the circumstances shows that any consent obtained cannot be 
considered voluntary and would, therefore, not be legal consent.  In particular, Guzman argues that there 
were between four to five officers present at the scene, with three patrol cars 
and two police dogs.1  He then posits that such a showing of 
force weighs against the conclusion that Guzman voluntarily gave his consent but 
was rather forced to "submit" or "acquiesce" to the search.  This argument is refuted by the fact 
that Trooper Mann's testimony makes it clear that Guzman affirmatively gave his 
consent to search the vehicle because, according to him, there were no drugs in 
the vehicle unless they belonged to Garcia.  Guzman's response was not a mere 
submission to the will of the officers, as he did not merely shrug or give an 
indefinite response.  Rather, Guzman 
affirmatively consented to the search of the Tahoe.  In addition, the troopers did not at any 
time threaten Guzman or all "gang up" on him in any way.  As indicated earlier, the additional 
officers were primarily responsible for the other persons at the scene.  

 

[¶20]   Furthermore, given the fact that 
there were two motorcycles, an automobile, and three citizens somewhat spread 
out at the scene, the use of five troopers and a drug-sniffing dog is not, in 
itself, unreasonable to assure officer safety.  Moreover, the fact that the officers had 
earlier concluded that they had probable cause to search the Tahoe does not 
establish that the consent given by Guzman before the search was involuntary. 

 

[¶21]   Finally, Guzman argues that if he 
gave voluntary consent, that consent was limited to the officers searching 
Garcia's possessions not the entire vehicle.  The verbal communication of Guzman, 
however, demonstrates that consent was given to search the Tahoe itself, and not 
just Garcia's possessions which were in the vehicle.  Again, Trooper Mann affirmatively 
testified that when one of the officers indicated that they would need to search 
the vehicle since Garcia had possessions in that vehicle and had earlier been in 
the vehicle, Guzman positively indicated that the search of the vehicle could be 
conducted because there were no drugs in the vehicle unless they belonged to 
Garcia.

 

Probable 
Cause

 

[¶22]   In his last issue on appeal, Guzman 
argues that the troopers did not have probable cause to search his vehicle and, 
therefore, the search was unreasonable.  
Having concluded that sufficient evidence existed for the district court 
to conclude that voluntary consent was given by Guzman to search the Tahoe, this 
issue is rendered moot and we, therefore, do not address it. 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   As indicated above, we find no 
error in the proceedings.  We, 
therefore, affirm the judgment and sentence of the district 
court.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The 
latter portion of the videotape of the occurrence apparently shows the presence 
of a second dog.  However, testimony 
at the suppression hearing indicates that only one drug-sniffing police dog was 
present.