Title: Frederick Lee Pharm v. Bryan Bartow

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP583 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Frederick Lee Pharm, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Byran Bartow, Director and Wisconsin Resource 
Center, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 215 
Reported at: 287 Wis. 2d 663, 706 N.W.2d 693 
(Ct. App. 2005—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 25, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce Schmidt 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Jon G. Furlow, Roisin H. Bell, Nia Enemuoh-Trammell, and 
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Jon 
G. Furlow. 
 
For the respondents-respondents the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP583  
(L.C. No. 
2004IP1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Frederick Lee Pharm, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Bryan Bartow, Director, and Wisconsin Resource 
Center, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 25, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the circuit 
court's order1 denying Frederick Lee Pharm's (Pharm) petition for 
habeas corpus discharge from his commitment pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 (2003-04).2  Pharm asserts that due to the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and his waivers of 
extradition for criminal proceedings, Wisconsin was precluded 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Bruce Schmidt, Circuit Court Judge for 
Winnebago County, presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
2 
 
from commencing commitment under ch. 980 following the term of 
incarceration imposed for crimes committed in Wisconsin. 
¶2 
We conclude that neither the IAD nor Pharm's waivers 
of 
extradition 
under 
the 
IAD 
for 
his 
prosecution 
and 
incarceration by Wisconsin precluded Wisconsin from commencing a 
ch. 980 commitment proceeding.  Pharm's rights under the IAD and 
its extradition waivers were fully accorded upon his return to 
Wisconsin to serve his outstanding criminal sentence.  At that 
point, the IAD had no further application to Pharm.  In 
addition, any obligations Wisconsin had to Nevada under the IAD 
were concluded when Pharm was returned to Nevada to complete his 
term of incarceration for his Nevada convictions.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  In 1975, Pharm 
committed sexual acts that led to criminal charges in Milwaukee 
County.  Pharm left Wisconsin prior to his arrest on those 
charges.  In 1977, Pharm was convicted of murder in Nevada and 
sentenced to life in prison.  In October 1987, the Nevada 
Department of Prisons informed Pharm that Wisconsin had filed a 
detainer against him based on pending charges in Milwaukee 
County.   
¶4 
In response, Pharm executed a "Request for Disposition 
of Indictments, Informations or Complaints," pursuant to IAD 
Article III, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3).  Pharm's Request for 
Disposition 
asked 
for 
"final 
disposition 
of 
all 
untried 
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
3 
 
detainers have been lodged."  As part of his Article III 
request, he agreed that in asking for prompt final disposition,  
I also agree that this request shall be deemed to be 
my waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or 
proceeding contemplated hereby or included herein, and 
a waiver of extradition to your state to serve any 
sentence there imposed upon me, after completion of my 
term of imprisonment in this state. 
Pharm further consented to be produced in any court necessary to 
effectuate the purposes of the IAD and to be voluntarily 
returned to Nevada to complete his term of incarceration there. 
¶5 
Based on Pharm's Request for Disposition, Nevada 
submitted an "Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody" to Wisconsin, 
"in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had of 
the indictment, information or complaint . . . ."  Wisconsin 
then sent a document entitled "Prosecutor's Acceptance of 
Temporary Custody Offered in Connection with an Inmate's Request 
for Disposition of a Detainer."  It was signed by the Milwaukee 
County Assistant District Attorney and stated, "I propose to 
bring this person to trial on the complaint named in the offer 
within the time specified in Article III(a) of the Agreement on 
Detainers."  Wisconsin also agreed to return Pharm to Nevada, or 
any jurisdiction Nevada designated to take temporary custody, 
immediately 
after 
a 
trial 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
charges 
was 
completed.  Thereafter, Pharm was transported to Wisconsin to 
face criminal charges.  
¶6 
A jury found Pharm guilty of both indecent behavior 
with a child and sexual perversion.  The circuit court imposed 
consecutive indeterminate sentences, not to exceed a total of 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
4 
 
fifteen 
years, 
and 
ordered 
the 
sentences 
to 
be 
served 
consecutively to Pharm's life sentence in Nevada.  Pharm was 
then returned to Nevada to continue incarceration there.   
¶7 
In October 1990, Pharm was paroled by Nevada.  The 
Parole Agreement stated as a condition, "Parole to Wisconsin 
Detainer."  Nevada authorities sent a letter to Wisconsin 
authorities regarding the terms of Pharm's custody, which 
stated: 
The above named subject has been paroled to your 
"HOLD" 
and 
will 
remain 
under 
Nevada's 
parole 
supervision until Life.   
To assist us in fulfilling our responsibility in 
this matter we request that you notify us immediately 
should the subject escape from your custody, or of the 
final disposition of any pending charges. 
Please accept this letter as a request for sixty 
(60) days notification prior to the subject's release 
or transfer within your system. 
¶8 
In contrast to what occurred before Pharm's Wisconsin 
trial on outstanding charges, Nevada executed no Offer to 
Deliver Temporary Custody prior to Pharm's return to Wisconsin 
to begin his term of incarceration.  Wisconsin then took custody 
of Pharm and brought him to Wisconsin for confinement in a 
Wisconsin prison.   
¶9 
Pharm's mandatory release date from a Wisconsin prison 
was scheduled for October 28, 1997.  Prior to his release, 
Nevada wrote Pharm advising him to contact the Nevada Division 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
5 
 
of Parole and Probation upon his release.3  However, on the date 
of his scheduled release, Wisconsin initiated a ch. 980 
proceeding to commit Pharm as a sexually violent person.  
Following a jury trial, Pharm was found to be a sexually violent 
person, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court committed him to 
a secure mental health facility.  Pharm's commitment was upheld 
on direct appeal.  State v. Pharm, 2000 WI App 167, 238 Wis. 2d 
97, 617 N.W.2d 163. 
¶10 Pharm moved, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), to 
vacate the judgment on the grounds that his commitment violated 
the 
Uniform 
Criminal 
Extradition 
Act 
(UCEA), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 976.03.  The circuit court denied the motion and the court of 
appeals summarily affirmed.  State v. Pharm, No. 2001AP2835, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 8, 2003).  Next, Pharm 
filed a federal habeas corpus petition claiming a violation of 
the IAD, which was dismissed by the district court for failure 
to exhaust state remedies.   
                                                 
3 It appears that Pharm intended to remain in Wisconsin 
after his release from confinement.  The Nevada Division of 
Parole and Probation had requested in a letter dated August 26, 
1997, that upon his release, Pharm was to immediately contact 
the Division of Parole and Probation when he arrived at his 
mother's residence.  The letter does not indicate where his 
mother resided; however, the criminal complaint filed with the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court states that at that time Pharm's 
mother lived in the city of Milwaukee. 
There is no letter in the record indicating whether 
Wisconsin notified Nevada 60 days prior to the conclusion of 
Pharm's sentence, as Nevada requested.  However, based on 
Nevada's correspondence to Pharm that is referred to above, it 
appears that Nevada was notified of Pharm's pending release. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
6 
 
¶11 Pharm then filed this habeas corpus action, alleging 
his ch. 980 commitment violated the IAD.  The circuit court 
denied Pharm's habeas petition, which decision was affirmed by 
the court of appeals.  State ex rel. Pharm v. Bartow, 2005 WI 
App 215, 287 Wis. 2d 663, 706 N.W.2d 693.  In so concluding, the 
court of appeals held that Pharm had no right to be returned to 
Nevada or to expect immunization from potential commitment 
proceedings under ch. 980.  Id., ¶25.  Pharm petitioned for 
review, which we granted. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶12 The review of an order denying habeas corpus relief is 
a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 
279, ¶6, 258 Wis. 2d 796, 654 N.W.2d 12.   We will not reverse 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
However, the circuit court made no factual findings in this 
case.  Therefore, whether habeas corpus relief is available is a 
question of law that we review independently.  Id. (citing State 
ex rel. Woods v. Morgan, 224 Wis. 2d 534, 537, 591 N.W.2d 922 
(Ct. App. 1999)); see also State ex rel. Hager v. Marten, 226 
Wis. 2d 687, 693-94, 594 N.W.2d 791 (1999) (citation omitted). 
¶13 To review the order that denied habeas corpus relief 
in light of the arguments Pharm raises, we interpret the IAD, 
codified at Wis. Stat. § 976.05.  The interpretation and 
application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts are 
questions of law that this court reviews independently.  State 
v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996) (citing 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
7 
 
Ynocencio v. Fesko, 114 Wis. 2d 391, 396, 338 N.W.2d 461 
(1983)).   
B. 
The IAD 
¶14 The IAD is an interstate compact that prescribes 
"procedures by which a member State may obtain for trial a 
prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by 
which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain 
charges pending against him in another jurisdiction."  State v. 
Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d 248, 254, 591 N.W.2d 846 (1999) (quoting 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978)).  Both 
Wisconsin and Nevada are party states to the IAD.  The IAD is 
set out in Wis. Stat. § 976.05 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.620 
(2005).  The IAD aids in efficient prosecution of crimes and it 
removes 
uncertainties 
that 
obstruct 
programs 
of 
prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation by clarifying prisoner status.  
§ 976.05(1).   
¶15 The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate 
compact within the meaning of the Compact Clause of the United 
States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, "and thus is a federal 
law subject to federal construction."  Carchman v. Nash, 473 
U.S. 716, 719 (1985) (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-
442 (1981)).  Therefore, in order to accord more consistency 
with the IAD interpretations of other federal and state courts, 
we may employ federal rules of construction in interpreting Wis. 
Stat. § 976.05.   
¶16 We begin by "determin[ing] whether the language at 
issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning . . . .  Our inquiry 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
8 
 
[will] cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and 'the 
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.'"  Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States 
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).  To 
determine whether statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
we look to the "language itself, the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
a whole."  Id. at 341 (citations omitted).  "A fundamental canon 
of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, 
words 
will 
be 
interpreted 
as 
taking 
their 
ordinary, 
contemporary, meaning."  Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 
42 (1979) (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975)).  
If a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, the 
legislative history is not ordinarily used as a guide to its 
meaning.4  Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 
(1978) (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949)).5  
¶17 The provisions of the IAD are triggered when a 
detainer is filed or "lodged" for an untried criminal charge by 
any party state that seeks custody with a party state that has 
custody.  Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343-44.  There are two IAD 
                                                 
4 This approach to statutory construction is consistent with 
Wisconsin's principles of statutory construction.  See State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-
48, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
5 We do note that the legislative history, which is detailed 
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mauro, 
436 U.S. 340 (1978), is completely consistent with a statutory 
interpretation that utilizes a plain meaning approach. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
9 
 
provisions by which a receiving state may obtain transfer of 
temporary custody of a prisoner and cause him or her to appear 
for trial, Article III or Article IV.6  Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 443-
45; Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3)-(4).   
¶18 Article III of the IAD, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3), comes 
into play when the prisoner is notified that a detainer has been 
lodged and he or she initiates a request for final disposition 
of outstanding indictments, informations or complaints.  Cuyler, 
449 U.S. at 444; § 976.05(3)(a).7  An IAD Article III Request for 
Disposition by a prisoner includes a waiver of extradition to 
stand trial and a waiver of extradition to serve any sentence 
that is imposed subsequent to conviction.  § 976.05(3)(e).8  
                                                 
6 A "receiving state" under the IAD is that state seeking 
custody, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(2)(a), and a "sending state" is the 
state 
that 
has 
custody 
when 
the 
detainer 
is 
lodged, 
§ 976.05(2)(b). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(3)(a) provides in relevant part: 
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of 
a party state, and whenever during the continuance of 
the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been 
lodged against the prisoner, the prisoner shall be 
brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner 
has caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer 
and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction written notice of . . . his or her 
request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information or complaint . . . . 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(3)(e) provides in relevant part: 
Any request for final disposition made by a 
prisoner under par. (a) shall also be deemed to be a 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
10 
 
¶19 Article IV of the IAD, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(4), effects 
prisoner transfer when the prisoner is notified that a detainer 
has been filed, but he or she does not make an affirmative 
request under Article III.  Instead, the prosecuting attorney of 
the receiving state that filed the detainer initiates transfer 
by filing a written notice of the custody request with the 
proper authorities in the sending state.  Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 
444; § 976.05(4)(a).9  The prisoner effects no waiver of 
extradition in an Article IV proceeding so that a hearing on the 
prisoner's right to resist extradition may be held under the 
                                                                                                                                                             
waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or 
proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by 
reason of par. (d), and a waiver of extradition to the 
receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed 
upon the prisoner after completion of the prisoner's 
term of imprisonment in the sending state.  The 
request for final disposition shall also constitute a 
consent by the prisoner to the production of the 
prisoner's body in any court where the prisoner's 
presence may be required in order to effectuate the 
purposes of this agreement and a further consent 
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of 
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this 
agreement. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(4)(a) provides in relevant part: 
The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in 
which an untried indictment, information or complaint 
is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner 
against whom the officer has lodged a detainer and who 
is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state 
made available in accordance with sub. (5)(a) upon 
presentation of a written request for temporary 
custody or availability to the appropriate authorities 
of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated 
. . . . 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
11 
 
UCEA, in those states that have enacted the UCEA.  Cuyler, 449 
U.S. at 448; § 976.05(4)(d).10   
¶20 Pharm made a Request for Disposition under Article 
III, Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3).  An Article III Request for 
Disposition requires waivers of extradition to face pending 
charges 
and 
to 
serve 
any 
sentence 
subsequently 
imposed.  
§ 976.05(3)(e).  Therefore, under the IAD no hearing pursuant to 
the UCEA is available to him in regard to extradition for either 
his trial or service of any term of incarceration imposed by 
Wisconsin under the IAD detainer it filed.  Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 
445.  
¶21 Pharm contends that Wisconsin had only temporary 
custody of him while he was in a Wisconsin prison.  Therefore, 
he argues, when he was paroled by Wisconsin, Wisconsin was 
required by the IAD to return him to Nevada.  Pharm misperceives 
the scope of temporary custody under the IAD. 
¶22 In an Article III case, such as Pharm's, when final 
disposition of the charges has been requested by the prisoner, 
the sending state offers to deliver temporary custody of the 
prisoner "in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(4)(d) provides: 
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be 
construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which 
the prisoner may have to contest the legality of the 
prisoner's delivery under par. (a), but such delivery 
may not be opposed or denied on the grounds that the 
executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
12 
 
had."  Wis. Stat. § 976.05(5)(a).  The temporary custody 
referred to for this transfer is "only for the purpose of 
permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one 
or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which 
form the basis of the detainer . . . ."  § 976.05(5)(d) 
(emphasis added).  Then, "[a]t the earliest practicable time 
consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner 
shall be returned to the sending state."  § 976.05(5)(e).  "For 
all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be 
deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the sending state . . . ."  § 976.05(5)(g).   
¶23 Under the plain language of the statute, temporary 
custody does not include custody for the purpose of subsequent 
incarceration in a receiving state.  State of New York by 
Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (E.D. Okla. 1993) 
(stating that temporary custody "does not expressly, or by 
implication, indicate custody for the purpose of service or 
execution 
of 
sentence 
in 
the 
receiving 
State"). 
 
This 
interpretation is supported by the record before us in regard to 
Nevada's actions prior to each time Pharm was taken to 
Wisconsin.  For example, Nevada executed an "Offer to Deliver 
Temporary Custody" prior to Pharm's being transported to 
Wisconsin to face untried charges, but it executed no such 
document when it released Pharm to be transported to Wisconsin 
to begin to serve his term of incarceration.  In addition, when 
Pharm 
was 
returned 
to 
Wisconsin 
to 
begin 
his 
term 
of 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
13 
 
incarceration, Wisconsin executed no document that evidenced an 
acceptance of temporary custody as it had when Pharm was sent to 
Wisconsin for trial. 
¶24 Furthermore, the language of the IAD is clear and 
unambiguous.  The IAD applies to detainers lodged against 
prisoners that are based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints.  As its purpose set out in Article I explains:  
"this agreement [is] to encourage the expeditious and orderly 
disposition of such charges and determination of the proper 
status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, 
informations or complaints."  Wis. Stat. § 976.05(1).  The 
reference to "untried" or "pending" charges is repeated in 
§ 976.05(3)-(5).  There is nothing in the IAD that indicates 
that the rights accorded to prisoners under it attach when there 
are no untried charges outstanding.  Therefore, we conclude that 
under the plain language of the statute, a prisoner has the 
following rights after he or she files a Request for Disposition 
under Article III (§ 976.05(3)):  (1) transportation to a 
receiving state to answer pending charges; (2) commencement of a 
trial within 180 days in the receiving state; (3) return to the 
sending state to complete the prisoner's term of incarceration; 
and (4) upon completion of the prisoner's term of incarceration 
in the sending state, return to the receiving state to serve any 
term of incarceration that has been imposed there. 
¶25 Pharm 
also 
argues 
that 
his 
Nevada 
parole 
is 
"imprisonment," as that term is used in the IAD.  Imprisonment 
is not defined in the IAD.  Therefore, it is defined according 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
14 
 
to its common meaning.  Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42 (stating that 
unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 
their common meaning) (citation omitted)).  Federal courts have 
defined imprisonment as "that definable period of time during 
which a prisoner must be confined in order to complete or 
satisfy the prison term or sentence which has been ordered."  
United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55, 58-59 (3rd Cir. 1978) 
(emphasis in original); see also United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 
709, 711 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding a person on parole is not 
imprisoned under the IAD).  
¶26 We note that under truth-in-sentencing in Wisconsin, 
"imprisonment" is defined as a bifurcated sentence comprised of 
initial confinement and extended supervision.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700.  This definition is in contrast to the definition 
that was commonly used in Wisconsin prior to the enactment of 
§ 973.01.  At that time, Wisconsin defined imprisonment as 
"incarcerated or confined in a jail or prison."  Id., ¶26.  
However, state law does not drive the interpretation of the IAD, 
which is a federal compact subject to federal construction.  
Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719 (citing Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438-442).  
¶27 In addition, if the definition of imprisonment under 
the IAD were interpreted to include both actual confinement and 
extended supervision or parole, a prisoner sentenced to parole 
for life in a sending state would remain indefinitely in the 
sending state and would never be eligible to serve his or her 
sentence in the receiving state.  This result is not in accord 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
15 
 
with the plain language of the IAD.  State ex rel. Otterstetter 
v. McManus, 243 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn. 1976).11   
¶28 The issue in Otterstetter was whether a penal sentence 
imposed by a foreign state, running concurrently with a 
Minnesota sentence, required the return of the prisoner to the 
foreign state upon his release on parole in Minnesota.  Id. at 
731.  The court noted that "term of imprisonment" was not 
defined in the IAD, but concluded that "it is clear that the 
phrase is used in this section [Article III] to refer to the 
period of actual physical confinement of the prisoner."  Id. at 
732.   
¶29 Pharm also contends that his status as a Nevada 
parolee keeps him within the IAD.  We do not agree.  The United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decision 
in 
Carchman 
supports 
our 
conclusion.  In Carchman, the Court stated that Article III 
applies only to a detainer based on an "untried indictment, 
information or complaint," which refers to "criminal charges 
pending against a prisoner."  Carchman, 473 U.S. at 725.  
Respondent Nash sought to invoke his rights under the IAD 
                                                 
11 See also United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55, 58-59 (3rd 
Cir. 1978) (defining "term of imprisonment" as the "definable 
period of time during which a prisoner must be confined in order 
to complete or satisfy the prison term or sentence") (emphasis 
in original); United States v. Carnes, 41 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 
(E.D. 
Mich. 
1999) 
(stating 
that 
"[a]lthough 
a 
parolee 
technically continues to serve the sentence imposed by the 
court, he is not actually serving a term of imprisonment as 
required under the express provisions of the IAD"); People v. 
Brown, 854 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating "[a] 
parolee is not a 'prisoner' who is 'serving a term of 
imprisonment'"). 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
16 
 
because his probation-revocation charges were not brought to 
hearing within 180 days.  Id. at 722.  The United States Supreme 
Court held that Article III did not apply to probation-violation 
detainers because a probation-violation charge is not a criminal 
charge pending against a prisoner.  Id. at 734.   
¶30 Like Carchman, Pharm does not have any criminal 
charges pending against him in Nevada; he has been paroled by 
Nevada.  Furthermore, no detainers have been lodged in Wisconsin 
by Nevada against Pharm to trigger the IAD.  While probation and 
parole are not the same, Carchman is instructive because Pharm 
has no outstanding criminal charges pending against him that 
could trigger an IAD detainer and that fact was significant in 
the Court's decision in Carchman.  Id.  Stated otherwise, 
Carchman concluded that all detainers do not trigger the IAD; 
only those detainers for untried criminal charges trigger the 
IAD.  Id. 
¶31 Other courts have also recognized that the IAD does 
not apply to parolees who are not incarcerated or who are 
confined while awaiting a parole revocation hearing.  See Hopper 
v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1983)  
(holding that an adjudicated parole violator warrant is not a 
"complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged" 
within the meaning of Article III); United States v. Black, 609 
F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that when a prisoner 
was released on parole and transferred to federal custody to 
serve an outstanding sentence, he was no longer covered by the 
IAD); Dobson, 585 F.2d at 59 (holding that a parole violator 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
17 
 
held in custody pursuant only to a parole violation does not 
come within the provisions of the IAD because he or she is not 
"serving a term of imprisonment"); State v. Bellino, 557 A.2d 
963, 964 (Me. 1989) (holding that the IAD does not apply to 
parolees because they are not "prisoners serving a sentence in 
prison"); Bush v. Canary, 286 N.W.2d 536, 538 n.1 (S.D. 1979) 
(stating the IAD "is not applicable to detainers lodged for 
parole violations").   
¶32 Pharm argues that Snyder v. Sumner, 960 F.2d 1448 (9th 
Cir. 1992), supports his assertion that the IAD applied to him 
after he was placed on parole by Nevada and transported to 
Wisconsin to begin his Wisconsin incarceration.  However, we 
conclude that Snyder is not applicable.  In Snyder, Nevada filed 
a detainer for pending felony charges under the IAD while Snyder 
was incarcerated in Iowa.  Id. at 1450.  Snyder was then 
transported to Nevada for trial, which did not commence for 426 
days.  Id.  While Snyder was awaiting trial in Nevada, Iowa 
paroled him.  Id.  On appeal subsequent to his convictions of 
the Nevada charges, Snyder argued that Nevada had violated his 
right to be brought to trial within 120 days as required by the 
IAD, and therefore, his convictions should be overturned.  Id.  
Nevada contended that once he was paroled, the IAD no longer 
applied.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Snyder, 
reasoning that once the IAD's guarantees for a speedy trial 
attached to Snyder, which they did when he was first transferred 
to Nevada to stand trial, that guarantee was not changed by 
Snyder's subsequent parole by Iowa.  Id. at 1453.   
No. 
2004AP583   
 
18 
 
¶33 Pharm's argument that Snyder means the IAD continues 
to apply to him even after he was sent to Wisconsin to complete 
his sentence is not applicable because none of the IAD's 
guarantees to Pharm were changed by his Nevada parole.  He had 
already been given a speedy trial in Wisconsin; he had been 
returned to Nevada to complete the term of incarceration Nevada 
sought to impose and then returned to Wisconsin for confinement.  
At the time of Pharm's return to Wisconsin, he had no further 
rights under the IAD that had not been provided.  Accordingly, 
Snyder is not helpful in resolving the issues presented by 
Pharm's circumstances. 
¶34 Pharm was accorded all his rights under Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05, which he triggered by his Request for Disposition.  He 
was given notice that a detainer had been lodged in Nevada and 
he responded with a Request for Disposition.  In order to meet 
his request, he was transported to Wisconsin to face trial for 
the outstanding Wisconsin charges; he was accorded a speedy 
trial; he was returned to Nevada until parole and he was 
returned to Wisconsin after parole by Nevada.  All occurrences 
were in accord with the IAD.  Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d at 255 n.2. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
19 
 
¶35 Pharm also contends that Nevada had a right to his 
return that Wisconsin did not honor.12  Again, we disagree.  
Nevada did not have any IAD right remaining after Pharm was 
returned to Nevada to complete his term of incarceration there.  
When Pharm was incarcerated in Wisconsin, Nevada could have 
triggered additional rights under the IAD if it had lodged a 
detainer in Wisconsin based on untried indictments, informations 
or complaints that were open in Nevada.  However, Nevada has not 
done so.  In fact, Nevada has never made any type of request 
that Pharm be returned to it.13  Nevada did send periodic letters 
to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections while Pharm was 
incarcerated, but the letters requested only that Wisconsin 
authorities notify Nevada authorities prior to Pharm's release.  
                                                 
12 The dissent echos this claim and cites Pitsonbarger v. 
Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1996) to imply that such a 
right exists unless Nevada waives it.  Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting, ¶65 n.11.  Pitsonbarger (vacated and remanded, 
Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 522 U.S. 802 (1997); aff’d on reh’g, 
Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 141 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1998)) does not 
support such an inference.  In Pitsonbarger, Nevada had 
convicted Pitsonbarger of attempted homicide and other crimes of 
violence.  Id. at 1296.  Pitsonbarger's Nevada term of 
incarceration had begun, but was not completed, when he was 
convicted of homicide in Illinois, and Illinois imposed the 
death penalty.  Id.  It was at that point that the governor of 
Nevada waived the IAD right to the return of Pitsonbarger.  Id. 
at 1300-02. In Pharm's case, there was no Nevada term of 
incarceration yet to be served, so there was nothing for Nevada 
to waive.    
13 Pharm may not have standing to assert that Nevada's 
rights have been violated since Nevada has not requested that 
Pharm be returned.  However, we do not address the standing 
question because we conclude that Wisconsin honored all Nevada's 
rights under the IAD. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
20 
 
Because the record shows that Nevada was aware of Pharm's 
pending release, we conclude Wisconsin complied with that 
request.    
C. 
Chapter 980 Proceeding 
¶36 As part of his objections to the ch. 980 proceeding, 
Pharm argues that he did not knowingly waive extradition for a 
ch. 980 proceeding.  He asserts his waivers contemplated only 
criminal proceedings, and therefore, the UCEA, Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.03, was violated.14  The UCEA details procedures to be 
followed when a request for extradition has been made.  No state 
has made a request to extradite Pharm.  Such a request is a 
condition precedent to application of the UCEA.  § 976.03(3). 
¶37 In addition, Pharm exercised his rights under Article 
III of the IAD when he requested final disposition of his 
untried Wisconsin charges.  As we explained above, Article IV is 
not at issue here.  An Article III request for final disposition 
requires "a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or 
proceeding contemplated thereby . . ., and a waiver of 
extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there 
                                                 
14 We note that the statutory extradition process is a right 
conferred upon the state "to protect its own citizens or persons 
within its boundaries from unjust criminal actions that may be 
brought by a sister sovereign state."  State ex rel. Niederer v. 
Cady, 72 Wis. 2d 311, 317, 240 N.W.2d 626 (1976).  A prisoner 
has no right to complain if a sovereign state waives its 
extradition rights.  Id. at 318.  Therefore, it may be that 
Pharm does not have standing to assert a deprivation of rights 
under the UCEA; however, we do not need to reach this issue 
since we conclude that the waiver of extradition Pharm executed 
is not relevant to the ch. 980 proceedings. 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
21 
 
imposed upon the prisoner after completion of the prisoner's 
term of imprisonment in the sending state."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05(3)(e).  Pharm's request for final disposition of his 
untried charges, using language directly from Article III, 
stated: 
I hereby agree that this request will operate as 
a request for final disposition of all untried 
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis 
of which detainers have been lodged against me from 
your state.  I also agree that this request shall be 
deemed to be my waiver of extradition with respect to 
any 
charge or 
proceeding contemplated hereby or 
included herein, and a waiver of extradition to your 
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon me, 
after completion of my term of imprisonment in this 
state. 
 
I 
also 
agree 
that 
this 
request 
shall 
constitute a consent by me to the production of my 
body in any court where my presence may be required in 
order to effectuate the purposes of the Agreement on 
Detainers and a further consent voluntarily to be 
returned to the institution to which I am now 
confined. 
Accordingly, the UCEA has no relevance to the ch. 980 
proceeding.   
¶38 However, we agree that Pharm's waivers of extradition 
did not extend to the ch. 980 proceeding.  Chapter 980 
proceedings are civil in nature and Pharm's waiver was in 
relation to criminal charges.  Nevertheless, it does not follow 
that Pharm's rights under the IAD preclude a ch. 980 prosecution 
at the conclusion of Pharm's term of incarceration.  As we 
explained above, the IAD, including Pharm's Article III waivers, 
had no further application once Pharm was transported to 
Wisconsin to begin serving his term of incarceration.  At his 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
22 
 
mandatory release date, Pharm was in no different position than 
any other person incarcerated in Wisconsin for a sexually 
violent crime that was committed in Wisconsin.  That is, he 
could be subjected to a ch. 980 commitment proceeding if the 
State chose to file a ch. 980 petition.  Our conclusion in this 
regard is no different than if Pharm had suffered another type 
of mental health condition during incarceration in Wisconsin 
that required a ch. 51 proceeding to protect him or others.  The 
IAD waivers would not prevent those proceedings from going 
forward.  
¶39 Furthermore, 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
Wisconsin 
had 
jurisdiction to conduct the ch. 980 proceedings.  Chapter 980 
may be applied to any person who has committed sexually violent 
offenses in Wisconsin and who is incarcerated in this state.  
See State v. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶¶11-21, 262 Wis. 2d 354, 665 
N.W.2d 124.  In Burgess, we held that the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to hold a ch. 980 commitment proceeding for an 
enrolled tribal member incarcerated in Wisconsin for a sexually 
violent offense, even where the predicate criminal offense was 
committed on the Lac du Flambeau Reservation.  Id.  Our analysis 
in Burgess was based on Public Law (PL) 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 
which granted Wisconsin concurrent jurisdiction over criminal 
offenses and certain civil claims arising on tribal land.  While 
not directly applicable here, Burgess is evidence of the broad 
scope 
of 
Wisconsin's 
jurisdiction 
to 
prosecute 
ch. 
980 
proceedings.  Id., ¶¶17-19 (citations omitted).  
 
No. 
2004AP583   
 
23 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 We conclude that neither the IAD nor Pharm's waivers 
of 
extradition 
under 
the 
IAD 
for 
his 
prosecution 
and 
incarceration by Wisconsin precluded Wisconsin from commencing a 
ch. 980 commitment proceeding.  Pharm's rights under the IAD and 
its extradition waivers were fully accorded upon his return to 
Wisconsin to serve his outstanding criminal sentence.  At that 
point, the IAD had no further application to Pharm.  In 
addition, any obligations Wisconsin had to Nevada under the IAD 
were concluded when Pharm was returned to Nevada to complete his 
term of incarceration for his Nevada convictions.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Wisconsin 
may very well have personal jurisdiction to commence Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980 proceedings against Pharm, who is physically present in 
Wisconsin.  The traditional rule that physical presence confers 
personal jurisdiction is not, however, without exception in 
civil cases.1  Because the majority opinion does not fully 
address the jurisdictional issue, I will not comment further.     
¶42 Although it is not pertinent to a decision in this 
case, I feel compelled to express surprise that the State of 
Wisconsin wants to keep Pharm in Wisconsin as a chapter 980 sex 
offender 
when 
Nevada 
would 
otherwise 
exercise 
lifetime 
supervision and custody over Pharm.  Wisconsin will have to pay 
                                                 
1 Manitowoc Western Co., Inc. v. Montonen, 2002 WI 21, ¶¶8, 
10, 250 Wis. 2d 452, 639 N.W.2d 726. 
Case law suggests that a state may engage in all kinds of 
nefarious behavior to obtain personal jurisdiction over an 
individual to exercise criminal jurisdiction.  
Under what is known as the "Ker-Frisbie Doctrine," courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court, have held that people 
who had been forcibly removed from a foreign jurisdiction cannot 
challenge an indictment or conviction on the basis that 
jurisdiction was obtained in violation of the constitution.  In 
short, a state might lawfully conduct criminal proceedings 
against a person who was kidnapped and forcefully dragged within 
the state's boundaries.  This doctrine is so named for the two 
leading United States Supreme Court decisions establishing this 
principle:  Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and Frisbie v. 
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
This court adopted this principle in State v. Monje, 109 
Wis. 2d 138, 143-44, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982), holding that even an 
illegal 
arrest 
does 
not 
bar 
the 
state 
from 
exercising 
jurisdiction to try a pending criminal charge.   
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
2 
 
costs in excess of $100,000 per year for Pharm's inpatient 
treatment 
as 
a 
committed 
sex 
offender.2 
 
The 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau reports the total expenditure of the 
state for services under chapter 980 as $30,371,600 for fiscal 
years 2003-2004.3  Furthermore a chapter 980 commitment is in all 
probability a lifetime commitment for Pharm, and thus the State 
is committing itself to pay Pharm's institutional expenses for a 
long time.4  Pharm is now about 55 years old.  
¶43 The majority opinion, ¶9 n.3, obviously is concerned  
that Nevada and Pharm intend Pharm to spend his Nevada parole in 
Wisconsin.  Nevada and Wisconsin are signatories to the Uniform 
Act (Compact) for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.13.5  It is not clear from the record that Pharm qualifies 
                                                 
2 Jane Pribek, Chapter 980: Part I, Finding a Home Remains a 
Hot 
Topic, 
Wis. 
L.J., 
available 
at 
http://www.wislawjournal.com/archive/2005/0622/980.html. 
3 See Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Civil Commitment 
of 
Sexually 
Violent 
Persons, 
Jan. 
2005, 
available 
at 
www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/Informationalpapers/52.pdf. 
4 Very few chapter 980 sex offenders in the years since the 
enactment of chapter 980 have been released outright or released 
under supervision.  From 1996, when chapter 980 proceedings 
first became an option, to 2004, approximately 280 individuals 
were civilly committed as sexually violent predators.  Only 
approximately 40 were granted supervised release, and of those, 
approximately 
15 
had 
their 
supervised 
release 
revoked.  
Approximately 15 individuals were ultimately discharged from 
state custody.  See Steve Watters, Wisconsin's Sexually Violent 
Persons Law Chapter 980: Presentation to the Special Committee 
on Sexually Violent Commitments (Sept. 28, 2004), available at 
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/sandridge/Informational%20Papers/LegCo
uncil-Power%20Point.pdf.     
5 Wis. Stat. 2003-04, vol. 5, at 919 (Appendix: Wisconsin 
Interstate Compacts (Active)). 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
3 
 
under the Act for Wisconsin supervision.  Moreover, the 
provisions of the Compact contemplate preapproval by Wisconsin 
of the transfer of an out-of-state parolee to Wisconsin.  State 
v. Martinez, 198 Wis. 2d 222, 230, 542 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 
1995).  No such preapproval or discussion of Pharm's parole 
under Wisconsin supervision is part of the record.      
¶44 In any event, I disagree with the majority opinion 
that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) (Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05 (2003-2004))6 and Pharm's waiver of extradition for 
criminal 
proceedings 
are 
not 
applicable 
to 
Wisconsin's 
prosecuting a ch. 980 action against Pharm.  
¶45 Under the IAD and the waiver, a sending state (here 
Nevada) may send a prisoner to a receiving state (here 
Wisconsin) for a criminal trial.  When the prisoner makes a 
request for final disposition under the IAD, "the appropriate 
authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary 
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the 
state where such indictment, information or complaint is 
pending . . . in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may 
be had."  Wis. Stat. § 976.05(5)(a) (emphasis added). 
¶46 After the criminal trial in the receiving state 
(Wisconsin) in which conviction is entered and a prison term is 
imposed, the prisoner is returned to the sending state (Nevada) 
to finish serving the original prison sentence.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05(3)(e).  After completing the original prison term in 
                                                 
6 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2003-
2004 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
4 
 
the sending state (Nevada), the prisoner is then returned to the 
receiving state (Wisconsin) to serve the prison term imposed in 
the receiving state.  Wis. Stat. § 976.05(3)(e).7   
¶47 The prisoner apparently remains in the "custody" of 
the sending state (Nevada) even when serving the prison sentence 
in 
the 
receiving 
state 
(Wisconsin). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 976.05(5)(g) states:  "For all purposes other than that for 
which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is 
exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody 
of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state 
[Nevada] . . . ."  
¶48 The question posed in the present case is whether at 
the end of the prison term in the receiving state (Wisconsin), 
the receiving state (Wisconsin) must return the prisoner to the 
sending state (Nevada) to complete parole there, or whether the 
receiving state (Wisconsin) may maintain custody of the prisoner 
solely for civil commitment.       
¶49 With myopic vision, the majority opinion cannot locate 
a provision commanding Wisconsin to return Pharm to Nevada to 
serve a lifetime parole following Pharm's term of imprisonment 
in Wisconsin.  The majority opinion misses the mark.  There is 
ample evidence that the IAD and Pharm's waiver of extradition do 
not imbue Wisconsin with the authority to commit Pharm civilly 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 976.05(3)(e) 
requires 
that 
"[a]ny 
request for final disposition made by a prisoner under par. (a) 
shall also be deemed . . . a waiver of extradition to the 
receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon the 
prisoner after completion of the prisoner's term of imprisonment 
in the sending state" (emphasis added). 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
5 
 
after he completed his Wisconsin prison sentence, when he had an 
outstanding lifetime parole term in Nevada that Nevada did not 
waive.  
¶50 Moreover, the purposes of the IAD expressed in the 
statute are undermined by the majority's interpretation.  As a 
result of the majority opinion, the IAD becomes a device 
undermining certainty in a prisoner's future and a threat to the 
spirit of cooperation between the states that the IAD was 
intended to foster. 
¶51 Finally, Wisconsin's decision to institute ch. 980 
proceedings 
against 
Pharm 
contravenes 
Pharm's 
reasonable 
expectations under the waiver of extradition and the IAD.   
¶52 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that Pharm 
should be returned to the Nevada authorities for lifetime parole 
supervision, 
not 
kept 
in 
a 
Wisconsin 
institution 
under 
indefinite ch. 980 civil commitment. 
I 
¶53 Under Pharm's extradition waiver under Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05(3)(e), Pharm expressly agreed (1) to waive extradition 
to Wisconsin with respect to any charge or proceeding, (2) to 
serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of 
his term of imprisonment in Nevada, and (3) to consent 
voluntarily 
to 
be 
returned 
to 
the 
original 
place 
of 
imprisonment.  
¶54 The waiver is limited.  The majority opinion fails to 
give meaning to the limitations. 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶55 The first part of the waiver is limited to a criminal 
proceeding in Wisconsin.  No question is presented here about 
this provision. 
¶56 The second part of the waiver is limited to serving a 
sentence in Wisconsin.  There is no waiver for any subsequent 
civil proceeding.  No question is presented here about this 
provision.   
¶57 Under the third part of the waiver, Pharm gave consent 
to be returned to the "original place of imprisonment."  I 
conclude that "original place of imprisonment" should be read to 
refer to Nevada under the two circumstances involved in the 
present case: (1) return to Nevada to continue imprisonment in 
Nevada after trial, conviction, and sentencing in Wisconsin, and 
(2) 
return 
to 
Nevada 
to 
serve 
parole 
in 
Nevada 
after 
imprisonment in Wisconsin.  The statutory drafting could have 
been better but the meaning is clear. 
¶58 Regardless of the interpretation of the third part of 
the waiver, under the IAD the prisoner remains in Nevada's 
custody.  Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(5)(g) provides that for "all 
purposes other than . . . temporary custody [defined as the 
period during which the receiving state tries the prisoner on 
criminal charges]8 . . . the prisoner shall be deemed to remain 
                                                 
8 Temporary 
custody 
is 
defined 
in 
the 
IAD, 
Wis. Stat. § 976.05(5)(d), as follows:   
The temporary custody referred to in this agreement 
shall 
be 
only 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
permitting 
prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one 
or 
more 
untried 
indictments, 
informations 
or 
complaints which form the basis of the detainer or for 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
7 
 
in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending 
state . . . ."  Furthermore, § 976.05(5)(e) provides that "at 
the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of 
this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending 
state."  I read these provisions as barring Wisconsin's decision 
to commit Pharm civilly. 
¶59 Nevada statutes9 and case law10 support the view that 
Nevada has continuing custody and jurisdiction of its parolees 
even when they are imprisoned in another state.   
                                                                                                                                                             
prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out 
of the same transaction.  
9 Nevada Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.1099(3) reads in relevant 
part:  "When a person is convicted of a felony and is punished 
by a sentence of imprisonment, he remains subject to the 
jurisdiction of the board from the time he is released on 
parole . . . until the expiration of the maximum term of 
imprisonment imposed by the court . . . ." 
Moreover, Nevada's custody interest in a parolee is not 
diminished when Nevada allows the parolee to go to another 
state.  Nevada, for permissible reasons, may revoke parole and 
seek return of the parolee, even while the parolee is located in 
a prison in another state.  See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 179.231 
(expressing policy that transfer of prisoners to another state 
is not deemed a waiver of the right to demand their return).  
10 The Nevada Supreme Court has described parole as "not 
set[ting] aside or affect[ing] the sentence; the convict remains 
in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its 
agents, subject at any time, for breach of condition, to be 
returned to the penal institution."  Garnick v. Miller, 403 P.2d 
850, 852 (Nev. 1965) (citation omitted). 
The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized a State's power to 
revoke a parolee's parole even when the parolee is serving a 
prison sentence out of state.  See Kelch v. Sumner, 822 P.2d 
1094 (Nev. 1991). 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶60 Nevada's conduct in the case at bar also reveals that 
it understands the IAD and Pharm's waiver of extradition the 
same way as I do.  While Pharm was serving his 15-year sentence 
in Wisconsin, Nevada continued to assert its custody over Pharm.   
¶61 Shortly after paroling Pharm to Wisconsin, in October 
1990 Nevada sent a letter informing the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections that Nevada had lifetime supervision over Pharm upon 
his release or transfer.  The letter stated in part, "[Pharm] 
has been paroled to your [Wisconsin's] 'HOLD' and will remain 
under 
Nevada's 
parole 
supervision 
until 
Life. . . . Please 
accept this letter as a request for sixty (60) days notification 
prior to the subject's release or transfer. . . ." 
¶62 Again 
in 
February 
1991, 
Nevada 
reiterated 
its 
continued 
right 
to 
custody 
over 
Pharm 
through 
written 
correspondence to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 
¶63 On July 23, 1997, about three months before Pharm's 
October mandatory release date, Nevada's written communication 
to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, entitled "Hold 
Notify Letter," advised the Department that Pharm "has been 
paroled to your hold and will remain under Nevada's parole 
supervision for Life" and noted "it is imperative that we are 
notified prior to his release . . . ."   
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin seems to adhere to the same principle.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 304.06(3) provides in relevant part: "Every paroled 
prisoner remains in the legal custody of the department unless 
otherwise provided by the department.  If the department alleges 
that any condition or rule of parole has been violated by the 
prisoner, the department may take physical custody of the 
prisoner . . . ." 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶64 On August 26, 1997, Nevada corresponded directly with 
Pharm, advising him of his obligations to Nevada on his release 
from the Wisconsin prison. 
¶65 These communications exhibit Nevada's understanding 
that it continued to maintain a custody interest in Pharm 
despite the fact that Pharm was paroled to a Wisconsin prison.  
In addition, the communications from Nevada demonstrate that, 
upon Pharm's release from prison in Wisconsin, Nevada expected 
to exercise primary supervisory power over Pharm.  Never did 
Nevada relinquish complete control over Pharm to Wisconsin.11   
¶66 Unfortunately, the majority opinion fails to recognize 
Nevada's continued interest in its parolees.  Consequently, the 
majority opinion never even considers that the IAD and the 
extradition waiver should be read in light of the sending 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. §§ 976.05(3)(d), 976.05(3)(e), 976.05(5)(g).  
A state can waive its interest in a prisoner.  In Pitsonbarger 
v. Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and 
remanded, 522 U.S. 802 (1997), aff'd on reh'g, 141 F.3d 728 (7th 
Cir. 1998), the Governor of Nevada specifically and explicitly 
waived the right to have the Nevada prisoner, Pitsonbarger, 
returned to Nevada.  The Executive Agreement executed in 
accordance with the IAD stated: "IT IS ALSO AGREED that if Jimmy 
Pitsonbarger receives any sentence providing less than death in 
Missouri and the death sentence in Illinois is vacated, 
commuted, or otherwise permanently eliminated, he will be 
returned to Nevada to serve his life without possibility of 
parole.  If one death sentence remains in effect, Jimmy 
Pitsonbarger will be housed in whatever state has said sentence 
in effect."  Id. at 1300.  In the instant case Nevada did not 
waive its rights for return, not after Pharm's trial in 
Wisconsin and not after Pharm completed his Wisconsin sentence.  
Nevada regularly asserted its continuing custody interest in 
Pharm. 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
10 
 
state's 
continued 
interest, 
and 
the 
receiving 
state’s 
subordinate interest, in the prisoner.     
II 
¶67 My interpretation of the waiver of extradition and the 
IAD is supported by the purposes of the IAD and the policies 
informing it.  Wisconsin Stat. § 976.05(9) states that the IAD 
"shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes."  
The United States Supreme Court has stated that when "the 
purposes of the Agreement and the reasons for its adoption" are 
implicated, there is simply "no reason to give an unduly 
restrictive meaning" to the Agreement's terms.12  The majority 
opinion has not liberally construed the IAD to effectuate its 
purposes. 
¶68 Moreover, the majority opinion has failed to look 
beyond a single purpose of the IAD, namely providing resolution 
of pending detainers, to consider what other policy interests 
inform the IAD and its proper interpretation.  By ignoring the 
purposes of the IAD, the majority opinion fails to give full 
meaning to the text of the IAD. 
¶69 As United States Supreme Court Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. explained, "Three distinct goals generated the 
drafting 
and 
enactment 
of 
the 
Agreement: 
(1) 
definitive 
resolution of potential terms of incarceration so that prisoners 
                                                 
12 United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1978).  
"Since the [IAD] is remedial in character, it should be 
construed liberally in favor of the prisoner."  Carchman v. 
Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 735 n.1 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citing Council of State Governments, Handbook on Interstate 
Crime Control 134 (1978 ed.)). 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
11 
 
and prison administrators can know with certainty when a 
prisoner is likely to be released, (2) speedy disposition of 
detainers to ensure that those filed for frivolous reasons do 
not linger, and (3) reciprocal ease for signatory States to 
obtain 
persons 
incarcerated 
in 
other 
jurisdictions 
for 
disposition of charges of wrongdoing, thereby superseding more 
cumbersome extradition procedures."13  
¶70 These goals are codified in the text of the IAD: 
Wis. Stat. § 976.05(1). ARTICLE I.  The party states 
find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations 
or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy 
trial 
of 
persons 
already 
incarcerated 
in 
other 
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct 
programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.  
                                                 
13 Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 737 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359-64 
(1978); 
Council 
of 
State 
Governments, 
Suggested 
State 
Legislation, Program for 1957, 74-79 (1956)). 
This court has previously discussed these three goals as 
only two goals.  In State v. Eesley, 225 Wis. 2d 248, 261, 591 
N.W.2d 846 (1999), for instance, this court announced that: 
The IAD serves two express purposes. The first is to 
protect prisoners by "encourag[ing] the expeditious 
and orderly disposition of such [outstanding] charges 
[against a prisoner] and determination of the proper 
status of any and all detainers based on untried 
indictments, informations or complaints."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 976.05(1).  The second purpose is to provide 
"cooperative procedures" to effectuate a more uniform 
and 
efficient 
system 
of 
interstate 
rendition.  
(Citations omitted.)  
Whether the purposes are discussed in terms of two goals or 
three, the point remains that the majority opinion fails to look 
beyond the single goal of providing resolution of pending 
detainers to consider how the other policy interests inform the 
IAD and its proper interpretation. 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
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Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and 
the purpose of this agreement to encourage the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges 
and determination of the proper status of any and all 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations 
or complaints.  The party states also find that 
proceedings 
with 
reference 
to 
such 
charges 
and 
detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative 
procedures.  It is the further purpose of this 
agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.  
¶71 The first goal of the IAD, to promote certainty for 
the prisoner, is undermined by the majority opinion.  A prison 
sentence of a definite length imposed by the receiving state 
can, as a result of the majority opinion, be turned into an 
indefinite civil commitment.  By allowing Wisconsin to pursue 
indefinite 
civil 
commitments 
of 
out-of-state 
prisoners 
physically present in the state only under the IAD, the majority 
opinion allows the IAD to become a tool for injecting new 
uncertainties into a prisoner's life. 
¶72 The third goal of the IAD, to increase cooperation 
between states and allow for smoother transfer of custody of 
out-of-state prisoners, is also undermined by the majority 
opinion.  The majority opinion permits Wisconsin to obstruct 
unilaterally the return of Pharm to Nevada, impairing the spirit 
of cooperation among the states that the IAD intended to foster. 
¶73 I conclude that the majority opinion's interpretation 
of the IAD is not a liberal interpretation and contravenes the 
express purposes of the IAD and the policies informing it.     
III 
¶74 Further, Wisconsin's decision to institute ch. 980 
proceedings 
against 
Pharm 
contravenes 
Pharm's 
reasonable 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
13 
 
expectations under the waiver of extradition and the IAD.14  
Wisconsin's sexual predator law was not in existence when the 
waiver was executed and the IAD was adopted.  In fact, chapter 
980 was not enacted until 1994, seven years after Pharm first 
requested disposition of the pending Wisconsin detainer.  There 
was no predecessor statute that would have provided legal 
authority for Pharm's indefinite civil commitment when Pharm 
effectuated his waiver.15   
¶75 When Pharm requested final disposition of any pending 
charges in Wisconsin, he effectuated a waiver of extradition for 
the sole purpose of disposing with Wisconsin's detainer and 
Wisconsin's criminal charge, nothing more.  He stated that his 
request "shall be deemed to be my waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated hereby or 
included herein, and a waiver of extradition to your state to 
                                                 
14 In a colloquy with the circuit court, Pharm stated his 
expectations relating to the transfer and waiver of extradition.  
"What I'm trying to understand, what I'm trying to get everybody 
else to understand is I'm a Las Vegas prisoner.  I was 
extradited here to serve out a sexual assault charge . . . .  
I'm supposed to be returned to my home state.  You're all 
charging me with 980 [sic] didn't have any bearing on my 
intrastate [sic] compact agreement.  I only agreed to come here 
to serve out a sexual assault charge."  R. 5:6-15. 
15 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 975 did permit Wisconsin to seek a 
civil commitment for persons convicted of certain enumerated 
sexual offenses, including sexual assault of a child.  However, 
the provisions of ch. 975 were restricted to proceedings 
commenced prior to 1980.  The State did not have authority under 
this provision to civilly commit Pharm. 
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
14 
 
serve any sentence there imposed upon me, after completion of my 
term of imprisonment in this state [Nevada]."16 
¶76 Pharm's 
waiver 
did 
not 
contemplate 
chapter 
980 
proceedings or anything akin to them after Pharm served his 
prison term in Wisconsin. 
¶77 In sum, Wisconsin's decision to institute ch. 980 
proceedings 
against 
Pharm 
contravenes 
Pharm's 
reasonable 
expectations under the waiver of extradition and the IAD.   
¶78 For all the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
16 Inmate's Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for 
Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints.  This 
form was signed by Pharm on October 10, 1987, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 976.05(3)(e).  
No.  2004AP583.ssa 
 
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