Title: Harrison-Solomon v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Aaron Harrison-Solomon v. State of Maryland 
No. 40, September Term, 2014 
 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – NOT CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE – CONDITIONAL 
RELEASE FROM INPATIENT TREATMENT – CONTINUATION OF CONDITIONS 
– DUE PROCESS – Court of Appeals held that a trial court retained jurisdiction to 
extend the duration of an order of conditional release, pursuant to Maryland Code (2001, 
2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Art., § 3-122, after the term of a previous order of 
conditional release expired, where the application for the extension was filed before the 
expiration occurred. There is no indication that the General Assembly intended, under 
such circumstances, to limit the jurisdiction of courts over persons previously found 
guilty, but not criminally responsible, for crimes. A court must rule, however, on the 
State’s timely filed request within a reasonable time, as required by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. In the present case, the court ruled timely on the application to extend the 
patient’s conditional release. 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CT980287X & CT011671X 
Argued: 9 January 2015 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
No. 40 
 
September Term, 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AARON HARRISON-SOLOMON 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (Retired, 
  
 
 
Specially Assigned), 
  
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, 
  
 
 
Specially Assigned), 
 
  
 
JJ. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  March 30, 2015 
 
 
 
Having been found not criminally responsible for certain crimes, Aaron Harrison-
Solomon (“Petitioner”) seeks review of the denial by the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County of his motion to alter or amend its order extending the conditions of his 
release from inpatient commitment for psychiatric care. The Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed. We granted Harrison-Solomon’s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider his 
single question: 
Where Petitioner was committed to the Department of Health 
& Mental Hygiene pursuant to a finding that he was not 
criminally responsible, was subsequently conditionally 
released, and did not violate any of the conditions of his 
release, did the circuit court have jurisdiction, after the 
expiration of the order of conditional release (OCR), to grant 
a motion to “extend” the OCR filed five days prior to its 
expiration? 
 
For reasons we shall explain, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On 15 June 1999, Harrison-Solomon pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County to two counts of second degree assault. The Court found him not 
criminally responsible, pursuant to Maryland Code (1982, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Health 
General Article, § 12-108, and committed him to the Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene (the “Department” or the “State”) for inpatient treatment.1  
                                              
1 Maryland Code (1982, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Health General Article § 12-108 (“HG”) was 
repealed and replaced by 2001 Maryland Laws Ch. 10 (S.B. 1) as part of a recodification 
initiative. No substantive changes were made. The statute is codified currently as 
Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Art., § 3-109 (“CP”). The 
statute provides: “A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
2 
 
Harrison-Solomon was released conditionally by the Circuit Court’s order of 23 
March 2000. The Order of Conditional Release required, among other things, that 
Harrison-Solomon: (1) reside with his mother; (2) receive and follow the treatment 
advice of a specified psychiatrist; (3) attend a semester of high school and thereafter 
remain involved with meaningful daytime activities approved by his therapist; (4) refrain 
from using illegal drugs or alcohol and submit to urine testing; and (5) notify and receive 
approval of his therapist before taking certain actions, such as changing his place of 
residence, employment, or marital status. The duration, on its face, of this Order of 
Conditional Release was three years. 
On 21 December 2001, Harrison-Solomon was indicted for attempted murder, 
robbery with a deadly weapon, and use of a handgun in commission of a felony or of a 
crime of violence. As a result, the Circuit Court rescinded the 2000 Order of Conditional 
Release and recommitted Harrison-Solomon to impatient treatment. A jury found him 
guilty on 12 December 2002, but again not criminally responsible, of robbery and use of 
a handgun in commission of a felony or of a crime of violence. 
Upon the recommendation of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Maryland 
Office of Administrative Hearings, the Circuit Court again released conditionally 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, 
lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) 
conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” CP § 3-109(a). 
3 
 
Harrison-Solomon on 3 July 2006.2 The facial duration of this order was through 3 July 
2011. Among the changes in conditions from those in the 2000 Order of Conditional 
Release were requirements that Harrison-Solomon participate in a residential program 
and that he may visit his parents only if authorized by those treating his mental illness. 
When Harrison-Solomon’s family became no longer able to support financially execution 
of some of the terms of his conditional release, the Circuit Court excused those 
requirements, such as electronic monitoring and some portions of the outpatient care 
regimen. 
 In November of 2009, the State petitioned the Circuit Court to revoke Harrison-
Solomon’s conditional release. According to the State, he violated the terms of the 2006 
Order of Conditional Release by not following the directions of his housing provider, 
missing a medication injection, and visiting his mother without receiving the proper prior 
approval. Harrison-Solomon was re-committed to impatient medical treatment on 17 
November 2009. 
An ALJ found, on 13 May 2010, that, although Harrison-Solomon violated the 
2006 Conditional Release Order, he would not be a danger to himself or others if released 
subject to conditions substantially similar to those in the 2006 order. Therefore, the ALJ 
recommended that he be released conditionally for the remaining duration of the 2006 
                                              
2 Harrison-Solomon had sought previously from the Circuit Court conditional release on 
4 February 2003 and 4 February 2005, but both petitions were denied.  
4 
 
Order. On June 15, the Circuit Court released Harrison-Solomon in accordance with the 
ALJ’s recommendations. 
On 28 June 2011, five days before Harrison-Solomon’s conditional release was to 
expire, according to the extant Order, the Department filed with the Circuit Court an 
Application for Extension of Conditional Release seeking to extend the terms of the 
Order for an additional four years, pursuant to Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), 
Criminal Procedure Art., § 3-122 (“CP”). Supporting the requested extension was an 
attached evaluation from a physician. Although the evaluation noted Harrison-Solomon’s 
perfect attendance at treatment sessions, compliance with his medication regime to that 
time, and “pleasant” demeanor, it stated also that he “announced his intention to abandon 
psychiatric treatment so that his mind can be free to think.” The evaluation continued that 
Harrison-Solomon “ha[d] not developed any insight into [the] role of medication [in] 
maintaining psychiatric stability.” A copy of the Application was mailed to Harrison-
Solomon’s attorney on 23 June 2011. On 31 August 2011, approximately two months 
after the facial last day of the Order of Conditional Release (3 July 2011), the Circuit 
Court granted, without a hearing (none was requested by either party), the Department’s 
Application, extending the conditions of release for an additional four years. Harrison-
Solomon did not file an opposition to the Application. 
Harrison-Solomon, through counsel, filed on 13 September 2011 a Motion to Alter 
or Amend under Maryland Rule 2-534. He asserted that the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction 
over him ended on 3 July 2011, at the expiration of the 2006 Order of Conditional 
Release, and therefore the order entered on August 31 extending his conditional release 
5 
 
was invalid. The Department answered that it filed the Application for Extension of 
Conditional Release before the 2006 Order expired, so the Court retained jurisdiction to 
rule on the Application. 
After holding a hearing on November 10, the Circuit Court held that CP § 3-1223 
did not impose upon the court a mandatory or fixed deadline by which it had to decide a 
                                              
3 CP § 3-122 provides: 
(a) In general. — (1) An application to the court for a change 
in conditional release of a committed person may be made by: 
(i) the Health Department or the State’s Attorney at 
any time; or 
(ii) the committed person not earlier than 6 months 
after the court ordered the conditional release, unless 
the court for good cause permits an earlier application. 
(2) The applicant for a change in conditional release shall 
notify the court and other parties, in writing, of the 
application and the reasons for the requested change. 
(b) Burden of proof. — The burden of proof of any issue 
raised by the application for change in conditional release 
rests with the applicant. 
(c) Court action. — After the court considers the application 
for change in conditional release and the evidence, in 
accordance with § 3-114 of this title, the court shall: 
(1) change the conditions; 
(2) impose appropriate additional conditions; 
(3) revoke the conditional release; 
(4) continue the present conditions of release; or 
(5) extend the conditional release by an additional term of  
5 years. 
(d) Reapplication. — (1) Not earlier than 1 year after the 
court action on the application for change filed by the 
committed person, and not more than once a year thereafter, a 
committed person may reapply for a change in conditional 
release. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
6 
 
timely-filed application to extend a conditional release. Rather, the court retained 
jurisdiction in Harrison-Solomon’s case. The fact that the court did not rule on the 
Application until after the end date of the facial duration of the 2006 Order of 
Conditional Release was “of no consequence.” The court denied Harrison-Solomon’s 
Motion to Alter or Amend.4  
Harrison-Solomon appealed to the Court of Special Appeals the Circuit Court’s 
denial of his Motion to Alter or Amend. According to him, by granting the Department’s 
Application, the Circuit Court did not “extend” the duration of the Order of Conditional 
Release as contemplated by CP § 3-122, but rather “revived” the conditional release after 
it had expired. This was not authorized by the statute, as Petitioner’s argument continued, 
and was beyond the court’s jurisdiction. The State retorted that CP § 3-122 did not 
impose any deadlines by which the Department was required to file an application to 
extend an order of conditional release or by which the Court was required to rule on such 
an application. 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
(2) Notwithstanding the time restrictions in paragraph (1) 
of this subsection, a committed person may apply for a 
change in conditional release at any time if the application 
is accompanied by an affidavit of a physician or licensed 
psychologist that states an improvement in the mental 
condition of the committed person. 
 
4 There is no evidence that the Circuit Court displayed any lack of diligence in deciding 
the Application. 
7 
 
The Court of Special Appeals reviewed the denial of Harrison-Solomon’s Motion 
to Alter or Amend for abuse of discretion, noting “‘that trial judges do not have discretion 
to apply inappropriate legal standards, even when making decisions that are regarded as 
discretionary in nature.’” Harrison-Solomon v. State, 216 Md. App. 138, 146, 85 A.3d 
310, 316 (2014) (quoting Wilson–X v. Dep't of Human Res., 403 Md. 667, 675, 944 A.2d 
509 (2008)). After considering the legislative intent of CP § 3-122 and particularly a 
decision of the Illinois intermediate appellate court in a similar case, the intermediate 
appellate court panel held that a circuit court retains jurisdiction over such a case “as long 
as an application for a change in conditional release is filed before the expiration of the 
conditional release term . . . even if the order is issued after the [Order of Conditional 
Release] otherwise would have expired.”  
Harrison-Solomon sought a writ of certiorari from this Court. We granted his 
petition. Harrison-Solomon v. State, 438 Md. 739, 93 A.3d 288 (2014).5  
II. ANALYSIS 
 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we consider de novo. 
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 181, 909 
A.2d 694, 699 (2006). Denial of a revisory motion under Md. Rule 2-534 is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 438, 52 A.3d 53, 64 (2012) (citing 
                                              
5 The Maryland Disability Law Center, On Our Own of Maryland, Mental Health 
Association of Maryland, and The Public Justice Center joined to submit a brief as amici 
curiae in support of Harrison-Solomon’s interpretation of CP § 3-122. 
8 
 
RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Maryland, Inc., 413 Md. 638, 673, 994 A.2d 430, 451 
(2010)). 
A. Intent of the Legislature 
When interpreting statutes, we seek to ascertain and implement the will of the 
Legislature. Williams v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 580, 103 A.3d 658, 663 
(2014); Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874 A.2d 
439, 445 (2005); Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). Our first 
step toward that goal is to examine the text. “If the language of the statute is 
unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, our inquiry as to 
legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to 
other rules of construction.” Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275, 987 A.2d 18, 28-29 
(2010).6 If ambiguities are found, other indicia of legislative intent are consulted, 
including the relevant statute’s legislative history, the context of the statute within the 
                                              
6 In certain of our cases, we stated that an investigation of the apparent purpose of the 
statute should accompany the textual analysis, even if the language is unambiguous. See 
Williams v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 581, 103 A.3d 658, 663 (2014); 
Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275–76, 987 A.2d 18, 28–29 (2010); Drew v. First 
Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003). In other cases, we stated 
that our analysis ends if we find the language unambiguous. Haile v. State, 431 Md. 448, 
467, 66 A.3d 600, 611 (2013); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250 
(2006). Keeping in mind the ultimate end of divining the will of the Legislature, 
however, it is clear that looking to other evidence of legislative intent is appropriate, even 
if merely to ratify that our conclusion of the unambiguous meaning of the statute is 
correct. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 214, 973 A.2d 
233, 241 (2009) (“we may resort to legislative history to ensure that our plain language 
interpretation is correct”). 
9 
 
broader legislative scheme, and the relative rationality of competing constructions. Witte, 
369 Md. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165. 
1. Text of CP § 3-122 
The text of CP § 3-122 supports the conclusion that the Circuit Court retained 
jurisdiction to decide the Department’s application to continue the conditions of 
Harrison-Solomon’s release.7 CP § 3-122 provides (and provided at all times during 
Harrison-Solomon’s latest conditional release): 
(a) In general. — (1) An application to the court for a change 
in conditional release of a committed person may be made by: 
(i) the Health Department or the State’s Attorney at 
any time; or 
(ii) the committed person not earlier than 6 months 
after the court ordered the conditional release, unless 
the court for good cause permits an earlier application. 
(2) The applicant for a change in conditional release shall 
notify the court and other parties, in writing, of the 
application and the reasons for the requested change. 
                                              
7 As the State signals, even if CP § 3-122 could be read to impose a deadline upon the 
Circuit Court to act on the Application to extend the Order of Conditional Release before 
it expires, the Court would not lack necessarily jurisdiction to rule on the timely-filed 
Application. Statutory deadlines may be either mandatory or directory. Woodfield v. W. 
River Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 395 Md. 377, 388, 910 A.2d 452, 459 (2006). When a 
deadline is directory, non-compliance may result in “no penalty at all.” Id. (quoting 
Tucker v. State, 89 Md. App. 295, 297–98, 598 A.2d 479, 481 (1991)). Further, we have 
been reluctant to find a loss of jurisdiction for a court’s failure to meet even a mandatory 
deadline, if such a consequence is not required by the statute. See Motor Vehicle Admin. 
v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 467, 597 A.2d 939, 945 (1991); In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 
103-04, 527 A.2d 35, 37 (1987); State v. One 1980 Harley Davidson Motorcycle VIN No. 
9G3593950, 303 Md. 154, 160, 492 A.2d 896, 899 (1985) (“the State should not suffer 
ordinarily the sanction of dismissal because of an error on the part of the [courts]”).  
 
10 
 
(b) Burden of proof. — The burden of proof of any issue 
raised by the application for change in conditional release 
rests with the applicant. 
(c) Court action. — After the court considers the application 
for change in conditional release and the evidence, in 
accordance with § 3-114[8] of this title, the court shall: 
(1) change the conditions; 
(2) impose appropriate additional conditions; 
(3) revoke the conditional release; 
(4) continue the present conditions of release; or 
(5) extend the conditional release by an additional term of  
5 years. 
(d) Reapplication. — (1) Not earlier than 1 year after the 
court action on the application for change filed by the 
committed person, and not more than once a year thereafter, a 
committed person may reapply for a change in conditional 
release. 
(2) Notwithstanding the time restrictions in paragraph (1) 
of this subsection, a committed person may apply for a 
change in conditional release at any time if the application 
is accompanied by an affidavit of a physician or licensed 
psychologist that states an improvement in the mental 
condition of the committed person. 
 
Whether CP § 3-122 authorizes the extension of the conditions of a release after the 
expiration of the immediately previous order depends on the legislative intent underlying 
the choice to use in the statute the terms—“any time” in (a)(1)(i), “shall” in (c), and 
“extend” in (c)(5). 
 
Harrison-Solomon, pondering the use of “extend” in CP § 3-122(c)(5), argues that 
its plain meaning is that the General Assembly intended for extensions of a patient’s 
                                              
8 CP § 3-114(b) allows “for discharge from commitment only if that person would not be 
a danger, as a result of a mental disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or 
property of others if discharged.” CP § 3-114(c) allows for conditional release if the 
patient would not be dangerous because of conditions imposed by the court. 
11 
 
conditional release to be valid only if the current conditional release order was in effect at 
the time the extension is granted. According to him, the conditions may not be 
“extended” where, as here, the order of conditional release expired before the Circuit 
Court acted.9 Indeed, “extend” has been defined as “to continue; to prolong.” Webster’s 
New Universal Unabridged 645 (1983).10 For something to be continuous, a stop-and-
start scenario would be inconsistent.  
 
It is not uncommon, however, for courts to extend or prolong a deadline or time 
period retrospectively (often referred to still by reference to the Latin phrase “nunc pro 
tunc”—“then as now”). Opportunities for retrospective extensions are recognized in 
Maryland and Federal courts. See Md. Rule 1-204(a) (allowing courts to extend a 
deadline before its expiration and, if the failure to act to seek timely an extension was the 
result of excusable neglect, after its expiration); Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. 
Neal, 160 Md. App. 496, 509, 864 A.2d 287, 294 (2004) (“Rule 7-204 expressly grants 
                                              
9 The nature of this dispute does not require us to determine the vitality of the conditions 
placed previously on Harrison-Solomon’s release between the expiration of the 2006 
Order of Conditional Release on 3 July 2011 and its extension on 31 August 2011. It is 
not alleged that any conditions were violated during that period. 
 
10 It is the sounder practice, when looking to the meaning of words used in a statute, for a 
court to “resort to a dictionary, legal or otherwise, [which] should logically include 
consultation of those editions (in addition to current editions) of dictionaries that were 
extant at the time of the pertinent legislative enactments.” Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 
243, 260 n.11, 884 A.2d 1171, 1181 n.11 (2005). The language of CP § 3-122 had its 
genesis in 1984, see 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501 (S.B. 645). Other dictionaries did not 
include the “to continue” definition of “extend,” see Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 439 (1989); Extend, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=extend. Other 
alternative definitions attributed to “extend” in Webster’s New Universal Unabridged did 
not contain any sense of continuance. 
12 
 
the court discretion to extend the time for filing a response to the petition; and the 
language of Rule 7-204 does not preclude the court from exercising that discretion to 
extend the filing deadline retroactively, after it has passed”);  Birt v. Surface Transp. Bd., 
90 F.3d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
had authority to extend retrospectively a Certificate of Interim Trail Use eight days after 
the Certificate had expired); In re Minh Vu Hoang, 484 B.R. 87 (D. Md. 2012) 
(retrospectively granting a motion for extension of time to file motions). These 
circumstances do not support Harrison-Solomon’s interpretation of “extend” in CP § 3-
122(c)(5), even if the dictionary definition tends to support his reading and might suggest 
ambiguity. 
 
The other key statutory terms tend to support the State’s reading. Criminal 
Procedure § 3-122(a)(1)(i) states that “[a]n application to the court for a change in 
conditional release of a committed person may be made by the Health Department or the 
State’s Attorney at any time . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Further, CP § 3-122(c) states 
that “[a]fter the court considers the application for change in conditional release and the 
evidence, in accordance with § 3-114 of this title, the court shall” either change the set of 
conditions, revoke the release, continue the present conditions, or extend the conditional 
release. Id. (emphasis added).  
 
The term “any time” is not ambiguous. We have considered frequently the 
meaning of “shall” as used in statutes. “As this Court and the intermediate appellate court 
have reiterated on numerous occasions, the word ‘shall’ indicates the intent that a 
provision is mandatory.” Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57, 63, 21 A.3d 1048, 1052 (2011) 
13 
 
(citing State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 82, 785 A.2d 1275, 1287 (2001)). Combining the 
terms, it appears that the Legislature intended here that the State or the Department may 
propose a change in the conditional release whenever it feels justified to do so (as long as 
it files the request during the “life” of an extant order), and the court is required to rule on 
the application (as long as it does so within a reasonable time, as we shall discuss infra 
Part II.B). The statute provides no specific time parameters for filing the application or 
ruling by the court. Because a court is required to take one of the specified actions once 
the application has been filed, it retains jurisdiction to rule on the request. We conclude 
that the text of the statute, as a whole, tends to support the State’s position that the Circuit 
Court retained jurisdiction to rule on the Department’s application after the facial 
expiration date of the 2006 Order of Conditional Release.  
Although the Court of Special Appeals found that the plain meaning of the text 
was unambiguous, the reading offered by Harrison-Solomon is not entirely irreconcilable 
with the text. Thus, it does not follow necessarily that the meaning of CP § 3-122 is 
unambiguous. As noted, the text of the statute allows on its face for an application to 
change the conditions to be filed at any time. No time limits are set specifically for the 
filing of the application by the State or Department or the ruling by the court. The 
intermediate appellate court noted, however, that “[i]n a situation where an application is 
not filed within the term of conditional release, however, once the [Order of Conditional 
Release] expires, the court no longer would have jurisdiction to extend it.” Harrison-
Solomon, 216 Md. App. at 151 n.10, 85 A.3d at 319 n.10. Thus, an aroma of ambiguity 
14 
 
lingers in the air.11 Against that whiff of ambiguity, we shall look, in an abundance of 
caution, to other signposts to discern the direction of legislative intent.12 
2. CP § 3-122 Viewed in the Context of the Relevant Title of the Maryland Code 
Other provisions of Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article point in the direction 
of the interpretation of the text of CP § 3-122 urged by the Department. The General 
Assembly demonstrated elsewhere in Title 3 that it understood how to impose 
unambiguously temporal deadlines for various actions in other contexts. See, e.g., CP § 3-
115(a) (“Within 50 days after commitment to the Health Department under § 3-112 of 
this title, a hearing officer of the Health Department shall hold a hearing . . . .”); CP § 3-
115(c) (“[A]t least 7 days before the release hearing is scheduled, the Health Department 
shall complete an examination and evaluation of the committed person.”); CP § 3-116(a) 
                                              
11 The State argues that the expiration of an order of conditional release (presumably 
without an application to extend filed before expiration) results only in termination of the 
conditions, but does not discharge the patient from the jurisdiction of the court under the 
statute. Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article contains no provision for releasing a 
patient without conditions (as distinct from discharging the patient). Discharge is 
governed, however, by CP § 3-114, which requires that the committed person prove that 
he or she would not be a danger if discharged. Because a person who is released 
conditionally has not demonstrated that he or she would not be a danger if discharged, it 
is conceivable, as the State argues, that the expiration of the conditions of release is not 
equivalent to a full and unqualified discharge. 
 
We need not to decide in the present case whether persons released conditionally 
need to seek discharge to end the jurisdiction of the court to place conditions on them. 
Neither of the parties briefed nor argued significantly this point. 
 
12 The Court of Special Appeals considered also the purpose of the statute, its legislative 
history, policy considerations, and the interpretation of analogous statutes by the 
appellate courts of other states, finding ratification for its plain meaning reading of the 
text of CP § 3-122. Harrison-Solomon v. State, 216 Md. App. 138, 148 n.8, 151-54, 85 
A.3d 310, 317 n.8, 319-320 (2014). 
15 
 
(“Within 10 days after the hearing ends, the Office shall prepare a report of 
recommendations to the court . . . .”); CP § 3-116(d) (“ The committed person, the State’s 
Attorney, or the Health Department may file exceptions to the report of the Office within 
10 days after receiving the report.”); CP § 3-117 (“Within 30 days after the court receives 
the report of recommendations from the office: (1) the court on its own initiative may 
hold a hearing; or (2) if timely exceptions are filed, or if the court requires more 
information, the court shall hold a hearing . . . .”); CP § 3-118 (“Within 15 days after a 
judicial hearing ends or is waived, the court shall determine whether the evidence 
indicates that the committed person proved by a preponderance of the evidence eligibility 
for release, with our without conditions . . . and enter an appropriate order . . . .”); CP § 3-
121(i) (“After the court considers the report of the Office, the evidence, and any 
exceptions filed, within 10 days after the court receives the report, the court shall” 
revoke, modify, continue, or extend the conditional release.).  
When CP § 3-122 is considered against the clear deadlines in other provisions of 
Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article, whether directory or mandatory, it seems 
obvious that the Legislature did not intend to impose a strict or finite deadline 
(jurisdiction stripping or otherwise) on courts deciding timely-filed applications to extend 
the conditions of a patient’s conditional release. There is no obvious reason why the 
Legislature, if it intended to limit the jurisdiction of courts, would do so by forced 
inference (from a dictionary definition of “extend” as used in CP § 3-122, as argued by 
16 
 
Petitioner), instead of using unambiguous language as it used elsewhere in the same 
title.13 The context of CP § 3-122 within Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article 
suggests that the Legislature did not intend to strip the courts of jurisdiction to consider 
and act upon a timely filed application to extend a patient’s conditional release after the 
expiration of the previous conditional release order, although we shall interject a judicial 
gloss to be discussed infra Part II.B. 
3. Legislative History 
The legislative history of CP § 3-122 points in a similar direction. The genesis of 
the current scheme of commitment and conditional release of defendants in criminal 
cases who are found not criminally responsible was the “Task Force to Review the 
Defense of Insanity” created by Governor Harry Hughes in 1982. See Anderson v. Dep’t 
of Health & Mental Hyg., 310 Md. 217, 220, 528 A.2d 904, 906 (1987).14 As a result of 
the report of the Task Force, Senate Bill 645 of 1984 was enacted by the General 
Assembly, altering significantly Maryland’s insanity defense in criminal cases. See id.; 
1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501. 
The Task Force was created and submitted its recommendations in the wake of the 
verdict that John Hinckley was not guilty, by reason of insanity, of any crimes for his 
                                              
13 The explicit deadlines of Title 3 had their genesis in the same legislative bill as CP § 3-
122. See 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501 (S.B. 645). 
 
14 Title 12 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland Code primarily contained the 
regulatory scheme later re-codified as Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article. 2001 
Maryland Laws Ch. 10 (S.B. 1). CP § 3-122 was previously HG § 12-121. 
17 
 
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan. Governor’s Task Force to Review 
the Defense of Insanity, Report to the Governor at 3 (1984) (hereinafter Report of 
Governor’s Task Force). Ultimately, the Task Force found that, although the insanity 
defense was an appropriate and integral part of Maryland’s criminal justice system, 
problems existed with the commitment and release of insane defendants. Id. at 8-9. 
According to the Task Force, it had become increasingly difficult to commit involuntarily 
individuals, even where treatment was in their best interest and would prevent future 
dangerous behavior. Id. at 9. The Task Force found also that many chronically mentally 
ill people found guilty of misdemeanors had become “‘street people’ in numbers that 
represent[ed] a real contemporary problem.” Id. These concerns motivated a legislative 
response. 
Prior to Senate Bill 645, a plea of insanity and the introduction of prima facie 
evidence of insanity by a defendant necessitated that the State, in order to obtain a 
conviction, prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was sane when he or she 
committed the crime. Anderson, 310 Md. at 220, 528 A.2d at 906. If the State failed to 
prove the defendant’s sanity, the statute in existence before 1984 required the trial court 
to commit immediately the defendant for evaluation. Anderson, 310 Md. at 221, 528 A.2d 
at 906. To continue commitment beyond the evaluation phase, the State was required to 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant met the requirements for 
indefinite civil commitment. Id. 
Meanwhile, a committed defendant could travel any of several avenues to secure 
release from commitment. He or she could pursue a direct judicial release proceeding 
18 
 
provided for in the relevant statute, at which he or she had the burden of proving, by 
preponderance of evidence, fitness for release. Id. A habeas corpus petition provided also 
for judicial scrutiny of the confinement. Id. Finally, the defendant could seek an 
administrative release hearing at which the State had to prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that continued confinement was appropriate. Id. 
Senate Bill 645 reconfigured the allocation of the burdens of proof and made 
continued confinement and supervision of defendants found previously not criminally 
responsible somewhat easier to achieve by the State. During a criminal trial, the burden 
was shifted to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she 
was not criminally responsible. Id. The initial commitment examination and hearing were 
discarded and, in their place, the defendant became automatically committed indefinitely.  
Id. Finally, the defendant, rather than the State, was charged with demonstrating 
eligibility for discharge, conditional release, or the necessity of changes in the conditions 
of release. Id. An aim of Senate Bill 645 was to make more difficult raising successfully 
an insanity defense and easier for the State to maintain restrictions on those found not 
criminally responsible. 
The tenth “major” recommendation of the Governor’s Task Force concerned 
exclusively the status of conditional release. Report of Governor’s Task Force at 31. The 
Task Force recommended that the General Assembly enact legislation to “[p]rovide more 
efficient procedures for revocation of conditional release and permit the court to extend a 
conditional release for an additional term of 5 years.” Id. The Task Force proposed 
language similar to the current CP § 3-122 for changes resulting from a violation of the 
19 
 
conditional release and for applications to change conditional release in the absence of a 
violation. 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501 (HG §§ 12-120 and 12-121).15 When the change 
of conditional release was the result of a violation of the existing conditions of release, 
however, the Task Force recommended that the court, “within 10 days after the court 
receives the report [from a hearing officer from the Department], the court shall” make its 
                                              
15 The language proposed for HG §12-220 for modifying conditional release where a 
violation of the conditions of release existed stated in pertinent part: 
 
After the court considers the hearing officer’s report, the 
evidence, and any exceptions filed, within 10 days after the 
court receives the report, the court shall: 
(1) revoke the conditional release and order the committed 
individual to return to the facility designated by the 
department; 
(2) modify the conditional release as required by the 
evidence; 
(3) continue the present conditions of release; or 
(4) extend the conditional release by an additional term of 5 
years.  
 
1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501. The language proposed for HG §12-221 for modifying 
conditional release in the absence of a violation of the conditions of release stated in 
pertinent part: 
 
After the court considers the application for change in 
conditional release and the evidence, in accordance with §12-
113 of this title, the court shall: 
(1) change the conditions; 
(2) impose appropriate additional conditions; 
(3) revoke the conditional release; 
(4) continue the present conditions of release; 
(5) extend the conditional release by an additional term of 5 
years.  
 
Id. The terms of §12-221 are identical to those now codified in CP § 3-122. 
20 
 
ruling. Report of Governor’s Task Force at 31. No such requirement was thought 
necessary for applications to change or extend conditional release in the absence of a 
violation. 
The General Assembly accepted the Task Force’s recommendations and did not 
include in the final version of Senate Bill 645 a deadline for changes in conditional 
release when there was no violation of the pre-existing conditions of release. 1984 
Maryland Laws Ch. 501. The provisions for modifying a patient’s conditional release in 
either instance appeared sequentially in the final Bill, so the Legislature would have been 
aware of the option of imposing a deadline. See id. 
The comments of the Task Force (which were included by the Legislature in the 
Session Laws of the Bill) demonstrate also that our interpretation of “shall” in this statute 
was intended. About the section of Senate Bill 645 that would be codified as HG § 12-
121 (and eventually re-codified as CP § 3-122), the Session Laws reported favorably the 
Task Force’s comment that “[i]n subsection (c) of this section, the phrase ‘court shall’ is 
substituted for ‘court may’ to clarify that the court is required to take one of the 5 
specified actions if an application is appropriately made.” 
The Task Force and the Legislature were guided by a desire to strengthen 
protection of the public from the inappropriate release and discharge of defendants in 
criminal cases who are found not criminally responsible.16 The Legislature made it more 
                                              
16 The Committee Report  prepared on Senate Bill 645 for the Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee stated that “[t]he purpose of the bill is to implement the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
21 
 
difficult for defendants to avoid punishment by claiming mental non-culpability and 
increased the State’s ability to confine not criminally responsible defendants and require 
conditions for their release. There is no evidence that the Legislature intended to limit the 
jurisdiction of courts deciding an application for an extension of conditional release. On 
the contrary, the Legislature chose to refrain from imposing a finite deadline. 
4. Policy Considerations 
When “confronted with ambiguity regarding legislative intent, it is our duty to 
announce a rule that we are convinced is best supported by sound jurisprudential policy 
germane to the pursuit of legislative intent.” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 
469, 493, 914 A.2d 735, 749 (2007). In rare instances, considering the practical 
consequences of competing interpretations may outweigh other principles of statutory 
construction. Id. 
As Harrison-Solomon and the amici curiae point out, a Court reinstating 
conditions after a long period of time, during which they may have been unenforced or 
unenforceable, could raise some fairness and due process concerns. See infra Part II.B. In 
many situations the conditions of release, although deemed necessary by the court and 
authorized by the General Assembly, limit severely the patient’s autonomy. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
recommendations of the Task Force in an effort to streamline and strengthen, where 
necessary, the procedures for the defense of not criminally ‘responsible’ in Maryland.” 
Department of Legislative Reference, Committee Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings 
Committee at 3. 
 
22 
 
Harrison-Solomon was required by the 2006 Order of Conditional Release, among other 
things, to live in an outpatient facility, comply with all treatment and medication ordered 
by his doctors, and receive permission before visiting his parents. He was required even 
to consult with his therapists, and presumably comply with their decisions, if he sought to 
marry or to father children. It would be jarring understandably for someone who had been 
living without these conditions for a lengthy period of time, while awaiting a court’s 
decision whether to reinstate them, to have them re-imposed.17 Indeed, it is possible that 
some of the conditions ordered previously, such as participation in a specific outpatient or 
residential program, may become unavailable during the interlude if the patient became 
unenrolled, thereby perhaps defaulting to institutional confinement for inpatient 
treatment. 
The State contends that these concerns may be addressed through means other 
than limiting the jurisdiction of courts. A patient awaiting a court’s ruling could seek a 
writ of mandamus or seek proactively a discharge or termination of the conditions. If the 
circumstances of a delay and reinstatement were to amount arguably to a viable claim of 
a violation of the patient’s right to due process, he or she would be able to challenge the 
                                              
17 We presume, for the purpose of this analysis (without deciding), that a timely-filed 
application for extending an order of conditional release would not continue 
automatically the conditions during the period between facial expiration of the extant 
order and when the court ruled on the application. The present case does not require us to 
confront this question, and we decline to consider it in dicta. If such a circumstance in a 
future case were to come properly before us, other policy and due process concerns might 
arise. 
23 
 
order on those grounds, without the need to impose a uniform and time-definite 
jurisdictional limit. 
Although patients would have some avenues of recourse, the State’s open-ended 
interpretation of CP § 3-122 might impose an additional burden and uncertainty on some. 
People suffering from a mental disorder, even if they were not a danger to themselves or 
others, might be less able than an unimpaired person to mount a legal challenge. 
Harrison-Solomon and the amici curiae highlight negative effects on patients released 
conditionally if the State’s major premise is adopted without limitation. 
That notwithstanding, the State presents persuasive considerations as well in 
support of its reading of CP § 3-122. For a court to order the extension of a patient’s 
conditional release, the State or the Department must demonstrate, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the conditions of release are appropriate or the patient must fail to 
establish that he or she would not be a danger if discharged or released without 
conditions. See CP § 3-122(b); CP §3-114.18, 19  For the application to be granted, the 
                                              
18 CP § 3-122(b) provides that “[t]he burden of proof of any issue raised by the 
application for change in conditional release rests with the applicant.” Yet CP § 3-122(c) 
indicates that the Court must make the determination of whether to change the conditions, 
impose additional conditions, revoke the conditional release, continue the present 
conditions, or extend the conditional release, in accordance with CP § 3-114. In turn, CP 
§ 3-114(d) states that a committed person has the burden to establish that he or she either 
be discharged or released conditionally. 
 
19 Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article contains no provision for releasing a patient 
without conditions (as distinct from discharging the patient). This may be arguably 
possible, however, if the court retains jurisdiction until a patient obtains discharge under 
CP § 3-114. If such were the case, at the expiration of the order of conditional release the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
24 
 
court would have to find that it was more likely than not that the patient was a danger to 
himself, herself or others.20 If a court would have ruled otherwise to extend the order of 
conditional release (but for having lost jurisdiction), the public safety would be 
jeopardized and the patient would be released from the therapeutic environment required 
for his or her possible recovery and protection. 
The State’s concerns are mitigated by Maryland’s civil commitment regime. If a 
patient only avoided being a danger to himself/herself or the public while following the 
conditions of release, failing to follow them could be grounds for commitment. Even 
though the State would have to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, 
rather than demonstrate that it was merely more likely so than not, Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 432, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (1979) (holding that civil commitment required 
clear and convincing proof), indisputably dangerous patients would not be released 
without conditions, according to Harrison-Solomon’s interpretation. It is clear from the 
legislative history of Senate Bill 645 of 1984, however, that the Legislature wanted to 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
patient would be free from conditions, but not discharged, as the State argued in the 
alternative at oral argument as a sort of fall-back position. But see infra note 24. 
 
20 Although multiple reasonable interpretations of the intersection of CP § 3-122 and CP 
§ 3-114 are possible, the relevant standard requires proof by a preponderance of 
evidence. Whichever party bears the initial burden, the court determines whether it is 
more likely than not that the patient would be a danger if released with conditions or 
without conditions, as the case may be. See Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Police Dep't, 
369 Md. 108, 125, 797 A.2d 770, 781 (2002). The court is making the same finding of 
dangerousness if, for example, the State failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a patient would be a danger without conditions as it would be if the patient 
failed to show that he or she would not be a danger to be released without conditions. 
25 
 
remove from the State the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the need 
for continued supervision of defendants found not criminally responsible. 
We have long held that we “cannot disregard the mandate of the Legislature and 
insert an exception, where none has been made by the Legislature, for the sake of 
relieving against hardship or injustice[,]” except in extreme circumstances.21 Schmeizl v. 
Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946); c.f. State v. Fleming, 173 Md. 192, 
196, 195 A. 392, 393 (1937); Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 485 (1854). The 
policy concerns raised by Harrison-Solomon and the amici curiae do not tip ultimately 
the scale in his favor, so as to overcome the evidence of the Legislature’s intent for courts 
to retain jurisdiction to rule on timely-filed applications to extend an order of conditional 
release.  
5. Decisions by Courts of Other Jurisdictions 
                                              
21 The United States Supreme Court summarized the standard thusly, analogizing the 
interpretation of a contract to that of a constitution:  
 
But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not 
contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is 
to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that 
instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in 
which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to 
the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, 
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. 
 
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819). Although we express the principle 
differently, we agree with the relative rarity of adopting a construction contrary to the 
apparent intent of the Legislature. 
26 
 
The appellate courts of other states have held that their trial courts retain 
jurisdiction to extend conditional release or inpatient confinement for patients found not 
criminally responsible (or the respective jurisdiction’s equivalent) after the term of their 
conditional release or inpatient confinement has expired, provided the application was 
filed before the expiration.  
In People v. Maglio, 923 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), the Illinois intermediate 
appellate court considered a case on all fours with the question presented here. Maglio 
was found not guilty, following a bench trial, of two counts of first degree murder by 
reason of insanity and was eventually released conditionally for a period of five years.22 
Id. at 328. Two weeks before his conditional release expired, Illinois filed a petition to 
extend conditions for an additional period of five years and requested an evidentiary 
hearing. Id. The matter came before the court after expiration of the facial duration of the 
immediate prior order. The trial court denied the State’s petition and subsequent requests 
for reconsideration, stating that it lacked jurisdiction over the patient after the expiration 
                                              
22 Finding a defendant not criminally responsible under Maryland Law is not an acquittal, 
but rather operates as a release from punishment. Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 676, 547 
A.2d 1054, 1059 (1988). For purposes of commitment for mental disorder and 
subsequent conditional release, however, acquitting a defendant by reason of insanity 
under the law of Illinois is the functional equivalent of finding a defendant guilty, but not 
criminally responsible, under Maryland’s scheme. Like states that acquit defendants for 
mental disorders negating criminal responsibility, commitment is not deemed ordinarily a 
punishment in Maryland. 
27 
 
of the term of conditional release. Id. The Illinois appellate court reversed the trial court 
and remanded the case for further consideration.23 Id.  
The reasoning in Maglio is similar to the State’s argument and the reasoning of the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals in the present case. According to the Illinois appellate 
court: 
                                              
23 The relevant Illinois statute and CP § 3-122 are analogous. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
5/5-2-4 provided: 
 
‘Conditional Release’ means: the release from either the 
custody of the Department of Human Services or the custody 
of the Court of a person who has been found not guilty by 
reason of insanity under such conditions as the Court may 
impose which reasonably assure the defendant's satisfactory 
progress in treatment or habilitation and the safety of the 
defendant and others.  
* * * 
Such conditional release shall be for a period of five years. 
However, the defendant, the person or facility rendering the 
treatment, 
therapy, 
program 
or 
outpatient 
care, 
the 
Department, or the State's Attorney may petition the Court for 
an extension of the conditional release period for an 
additional 5 years. Upon receipt of such a petition, the Court 
shall hold a hearing consistent with the provisions of 
paragraph (a), this paragraph (a–1), and paragraph (f) of this 
Section, shall determine whether the defendant should 
continue to be subject to the terms of conditional release, and 
shall enter an order either extending the defendant's period of 
conditional release for an additional 5–year period or 
discharging the defendant. Additional 5–year periods of 
conditional release may be ordered following a hearing as 
provided in this Section. 
 
Maglio, 923 N.E.2d at 869. 
28 
 
[T]he trial court could retain jurisdiction over defendant until 
the 
State's 
petition 
and 
supplemental 
motion 
were 
adjudicated. Pursuant to section 5–2–4(a–1)(D), after a 
petition for an extension is filed, the court “shall” hold a 
hearing regarding defendant's mental health. Here, the trial 
court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding 
defendant's mental health, which it did not do. It appears from 
the record the trial court was mistaken that first, the State's 
petition had to allege a basis for extending defendant's 
conditional release, and second, that the court lost jurisdiction 
over defendant after his term of conditional release expired 
even though the State's petition and supplemental motion had 
been filed prior to the term expiring. 
 
Id. at 331-31. As in the Maryland statute, the use of “shall” in the Illinois statute indicates 
the legislature’s intent to grant continuing jurisdiction until the trial court rules on the 
motion. CP § 3-122 contains additional language allowing the State or Department to 
apply for an extension at “any time,” a strong indication that Maryland courts retain 
jurisdiction to rule on applications after the expiration of the order of conditional release.  
 
The Illinois court noted also another Illinois intermediate appellate court decision 
of potentially collateral consequence to the present case. In People v. Marshall, 652 
N.E.2d 1294 (1995), the term of conditional release for a patient found not guilty by 
reason of insanity expired without action by the State. Id. at 1296. Later, a report 
recommending an extension of the conditions of release was sent to the court, but the 
State and the patient agreed (initially) that the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to 
extend the conditional release. Id. The State requested ultimately that the hearing be 
placed back on the docket, however, arguing that the court retained jurisdiction. Id. The 
trial court held that it retained jurisdiction to extend the patient’s conditional release and 
committed the patient, who was no longer taking medication, to inpatient treatment. Id. at 
29 
 
1297. The intermediate appellate court reversed, reasoning that the specified term of the 
order of conditional release provided for discharge at the termination date, absent a 
motion filed by Illinois before the termination date.24 See id. at 1299-1300. 
 
A New York court, in Matter of Ramon M., 294 A.D.2d 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), 
held that an order of conditional release could be extended even if it expired before the 
State filed a motion to extend. The case involved appeals from two patients found not 
responsible for crimes by reason of mental disease. Id. at 60-61. The relevant New York 
authorities requested an extension for each patient’s conditional release after their 
respective conditional release orders had expired. Id. at 61-62. The trial court denied both 
applications for extensions, holding in one case that extensions “‘must be made within 
the time period in which such order remains in effect, and not after it has expired[,]’” and 
in the other simply that the State’s application was untimely for missing the deadline in 
the other. Id. The Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health appealed 
both cases. Id. 
 
The New York intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded 
the cases for further consideration. Id. at 68. Central to the appellate court’s reasoning 
was that the New York legislature “did not include any language limiting the ability of a 
                                              
24 The Court of Special Appeals approved seemingly of this in dicta. See Harrison-
Solomon, 216 Md. App. at 151 n. 10, 85 A.3d at 319 n. 10 (“In a situation where an 
application is not filed within the term of conditional release, however, once the OCR 
expires, the court no longer would have jurisdiction to extend it.”). We neither approve 
nor disapprove that view. As we discuss infra Part II.B, however, the application must be 
determined within a reasonable time so that due process is not violated. 
30 
 
court to extend an order of conditions after expiration.” Noting the absence of clear 
legislative intent to limit the court’s jurisdiction, the appellate court held that the purpose 
of the statute, to protect the public, required that the trial court retain jurisdiction to 
consider and act on the application.25 See id. at 62, 65. 
 
In State v. Roland, 973 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam), the Supreme Court 
of Texas dealt with an analogous situation to the case at hand. Roland was found not 
guilty by reason of insanity of attempted murder and committed to inpatient treatment for 
one year beginning on 16 June 1994. Id. at 666. His commitment was extended on 13 
June 1995 for an additional year. Id. On 31 July 1996, forty-seven days after the previous 
order expired on its face, the trial court extended the commitment for a second time. Id. 
The intermediate appellate court held that the trial court’s failure to hold the hearing 
before the commitment order expired compelled Roland’s release. Id. The Supreme Court 
of Texas reversed. Id. 
                                              
25 The patients in Matter of Ramon M., 294 A.D.2d 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), did not 
argue that it was a violation of due process for the court to act on an application to extend 
an  order of conditional release that was filed after the expiration of the previous order. 
They did challenge, however, the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that, 
under the interpretation adopted by the court, orders of conditional release could 
potentially be interminable. Id. at 65. According the New York intermediate appellate 
court, the availability to seek a writ of mandamus or of habeas corpus was sufficient to 
overcome the patients’ constitutional challenge. Id. 
 
31 
 
 
Texas’s statutory regime, at the time of Roland, provided two options at the 
expiration of a commitment.26 Id.  The trial court either could discharge the patient or 
hold a hearing to determine if commitment should be continued, modified, or terminated. 
Id. If the trial court chose to hold a hearing, “it must be held ‘prior to the expiration of the 
commitment order.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Crim. Proc. Code art. 46.03, § 4(d)(5)). The Texas 
Supreme Court noted, however, that the statute did not specify any consequence for a 
court’s failure to act timely.27 Ultimately, the Texas Supreme Court held that although the 
deadline was framed in mandatory language, failing to hold a timely hearing did not strip 
the court of jurisdiction. Id. at 667. 
 
As noted previously in this opinion, CP § 3-122 does not impose a finite deadline 
by which a circuit court must act on a timely-filed application for extension. Roland is 
informative because, even in a jurisdiction with a clear, mandatory deadline, a trial 
court’s delay in deciding a motion to extend mandatory treatment until some presumably 
reasonable time after the expiration of the previous treatment term did not strip the court 
                                              
26 In 2005, the Texas legislature overhauled its insanity defense and related commitment 
statutory regime. See 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 831 (S.B. 837). Tex. Crim. Proc. 
Code Ann. art. 46C.261 governs currently the extension of inpatient or outpatient 
treatment for defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
 
27 The current Texas statute also contains similar language stating that “[t]he court shall 
act on the request for renewal before the order expires,” but still does not indicate that the 
court will lose jurisdiction absent timely action. See Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 
46C.261. 
 
32 
 
of jurisdiction.28 Harrison-Solomon has not identified for us (nor have we found) any 
jurisdiction in which a court becomes unable to extend commitment to inpatient treatment 
or conditional release because the court did not rule on a timely-filed motion to extend 
the mandatory treatment before the previous order mandating treatment expired. 
6. Analogy to Probation 
Harrison-Solomon analogizes conditional release from inpatient mental health 
treatment to probation in a criminal case context, arguing that we should treat the end 
date of conditional release the same as the end date of a probation order for purposes of 
determining ongoing court supervision. Presumably, as the argument goes, the 
Legislature would not intend similar situations to have different outcomes. Although 
conditional release and probation are similar superficially, Petitioner’s attempt at 
constructing this analogy crumbles because of the disparate foundational purposes of 
probation and conditional release. 
Petitioner relies on Carter v. State, 193 Md. App. 193, 996 A.2d 948 (2010), as his 
main support for this argument. Carter was granted probation before judgment in 
connection with a charge of second degree assault. Carter, 193 Md. App. at 197, 996 
A.2d at 950. As a condition of probation, Carter was required to pay restitution to the 
                                              
28 In California, the deadlines imposed on the treatment personnel and prosecuting 
attorney seeking to extend commitment or outpatient treatment are directory merely, but 
the courts retain jurisdiction to rule on a motion to extend conditional release after the 
date passes for termination of compulsory treatment. See People v. Lara, 226 P.3d 322, 
327 (Cal. 2010) (upholding a trial court’s ruling for an extension of a patient’s 
commitment that was made seven months after the commitment was scheduled to 
terminate).  
33 
 
victim spread over his two year period of probation. Carter, 193 Md. App. at 197-98, 996 
A.2d at 951. Although Carter paid the restitution as ordered, the trial court (nearly a 
month after his probation expired) extended his probation, subject to additional restitution 
for the victim’s ongoing therapy expenses. Carter, 193 Md. App. at 202, 996 A.2d at 953. 
Carter appealed. Carter, 193 Md. App. at 203, 996 A.2d at 953. 
The Court of Special Appeals vacated the order of the trial court. Carter, 193 Md. 
App. at 214, 996 A.2d at 960. According to our appellate brethren, “in the absence of a 
probation violation, a court does not have jurisdiction to extend the term of probation 
after the original term of probation has expired.” Id. The panel reasoned that the 
extension of probation was an illegal sentence that was not authorized by the relevant 
probation statute. Id. From this, Harrison-Solomon synthetizes an equivalent rule for 
orders of conditional release: in the absence of a violation of the conditions of release, a 
court does not have continuing jurisdiction to extend the term of the conditions after the 
facial term of conditional release expires. The attempted syllogism fails to recognize the 
essential differences between probation and conditional release of those found not 
criminally responsible.29 
                                              
29 Even disregarding the fundamental differences between probation and conditional 
release from inpatient treatment of those found not criminally responsible, there is no 
reason the General Assembly could not treat them differently for less obvious reasons. 
For example, different treatment of similar schemes could be the result of changing 
legislative or societal attitudes or a response to specific stimuli from governmental 
agencies, special interest groups, or the public-at-large. The Legislature could treat 
schemes differently also for no discernable reason at all. The judicial preference for 
consistency will not supplant usually the Legislature’s will. 
34 
 
Probation is a punishment. See Donaldson v. State, 305 Md. 522, 530, 505 A.2d 
527, 532 (1986). Although we have called probation “a matter of grace” and effectively 
clemency, Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575, 580 (1965), its fundamental 
nature is different from the treatment of people found not criminally responsible. 
Commitment of those found not criminally responsible and the restrictions of 
conditional release are not designed to punish, but rather to protect the public from the 
patient and the patient from himself or herself. If the patient is unlikely to represent a risk 
to others or himself/herself, CP § 3-114 mandates that the patient be discharged if a court 
renders affirmatively such a holding. Although the State supervision could be indefinite 
potentially, it could also be relatively brief. Unlike someone subject to probation, there is 
no longer a determined time for which the patient will be subject to judicial oversight, 
absent an outright discharge. 
B. Due Process 
Whatever the intention of the Legislature with regard to CP § 3-122, it must 
comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its counterpart 
provision in Maryland, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.30 Under what 
the United States Supreme Court termed “the canon of constitutional avoidance,” we will 
                                              
30 The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: “No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned 
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any 
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his 
peers, or by the Law of the land.”  
35 
 
construe a statute to avoid conflict with the Constitution whenever it is reasonably 
possible to do so, even to the extent of applying a judicial gloss to interpretation that 
skirts a constitutional confrontation. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 425-26, 921 A.2d 
171, 183 (2007) (citing In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 327, 455 A.2d 966, 972 (1983)). 
We do not presume that the Legislature intended to enact unconstitutional legislation and, 
if it did so intend, we would limit a statute to only those situations in which it would pass 
constitutional muster. See Burruss v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Frederick Cnty., 427 
Md. 231, 263-64, 46 A.3d 1182, 1201 (2012) (citing Koshko, 398 Md. at 426, 921 A.2d 
at 184) (stating that a challenge to the facial validity of a statute must establish that there 
is no set of circumstances under which the act would be constitutional).  
All Maryland “proceedings are to be tested by fundamental fairness—the 
touchstone of due process.” State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 159 n.6, 395 A.2d 475, 479 n.6 
(1978) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973)). Similarly, 
the State has generally an obligation to apply for extensions in a reasonably diligent and 
prompt manner. See State v. Berry, 287 Md. 491, 499, 413 A.2d 557, 562 (1980) (stating 
that probation revocation proceedings must be brought within reasonable time to satisfy 
due process).31 Therefore, a circuit court must rule on a timely-filed application within a 
reasonable time. 
                                              
31 Although revocation of probation proceedings are not illustrative here of the intent of 
the Legislature because of the different purposes of conditional release and probation, 
due process considerations are analogous to both. 
36 
 
The State filed its application while Petitioner was subject clearly to the 2006 
Order of Conditional Release and the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Harrison-
Solomon, through counsel, was aware of the pending application. The Circuit Court ruled 
on the application sixty-four days after the State filed its application, after making 
attempts to reach the parties and expedite its ruling. There is no indication in the record 
that either the State, the Department, or the Circuit Court failed to act with diligence or 
delayed the process to a point amounting to undue prejudice to or denying Harrison-
Solomon due process.32 Hence, the trial court acted within a reasonable time. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction for a reasonable time to decide 
the timely-filed application to extend the 2006 Order of Conditional Release, pursuant to 
CP § 3-122. All roads seeking interpretation of the statute lead to the conclusion that the 
General Assembly did not intend to place a finite deadline by which courts must rule on 
timely-filed applications to extend conditional release pursuant to CP § 3-122. Further, a 
decision on a timely-filed extension request rendered after the expiration of an order of 
conditional release does not ipso facto violate due process, when decided within a 
reasonable time and where no undue prejudice is shown to have been worked on the 
patient during the time it took to decide the application. In the instant case, there is no 
indication of undue prejudice or that the Circuit Court delayed for an unreasonable time 
                                              
32 The trial judge attempted to contact the parties in order to expedite his ruling on the 
Application, but he was unable to reach the parties’ attorneys and decide the matter 
before taking a scheduled absence from his chambers. 
37 
 
before ruling on the State’s application for an extension on Harrison-Solomon’s 
conditional release. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court Special Appeals.  
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.