Title: Maes v. People

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

418 P.2d 891 (1966) Fred MAES, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 21870. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. September 26, 1966. Rehearing Denied October 31, 1966. *892 Albert Cohen, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Asst. Atty Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Justice. Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was accused of the crime of larceny from the person. It was alleged in the information that on September 25, 1964, the defendant, Following trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty, upon which judgment was entered sentencing the defendant to a term of not less than one nor more than ten years in the state penitentiary. As grounds for reversal of the judgment it is argued: The facts upon which this contention is made are not in dispute. Officer Russell C. Stewart testified that he was a Denver police officer, but that at the time in question he was employed by the King of Clubs. He personally saw defendant take the billfold from Kessler's pocket. After describing his observations of the transaction he then stated that he placed defendant "under arrest," and called for a police car. Stewart was then asked the following questions to which he replied as follows: In addition to the testimony set forth above, Officer Jack Southard testified as follows: It is the position of the Attorney General that the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, is inapplicable to the instant case, for the reason that no interrogation is found in the case at bar which is comparable to that present in Escobedo. The Attorney General asserts: We are thoroughly familiar with the opinion in the case of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, supra, which is strenuously relied on by counsel for the defendant. In what seems to be an endless procession, persons convicted of crime are giving twisted interpretations of that opinion as a basis for proceedings in this court. Wherever the rule of the Escobedo case is applicable we will be governed by it. A comparison of the facts upon which Escobedo is based and those present in the case at bar will show no similarity whatever. Escobedo holds that where an investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but is focused on a particular suspect who is in custody, and where the police carry out a "process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements" the accused has been denied a constitutional right to counsel unless specific precautions are taken. The concept of police interrogation which falls within the ambit of the Escobedo opinion is a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. The record before this court contains no such process. The pertinent statements of the accused were not made in response to any question directed to him. They were wholly unsolicited. There is no duty on a police officer to seal the lips of persons in custody by resort to adhesive tape or gag to prevent them from making any statement which might be incriminating. Ballay v. People, Colo., 419 P.2d 446, decided August 2, 1966. We direct attention to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Treloar, 64 A.C. 145, 49 Cal. Rptr. 100, 410 P.2d 620. In that case, as in the case at bar, the defendant was placed under arrest and on the way to the police station he volunteered incriminating statements without any "process of interrogations" on the part of the officers. The California Supreme Court held that these comments of the accused were admissible. We quote from that opinion the following: The court did not err in permitting the defendant's statements to go to the jury. There is no merit to the contention of counsel that the trial court erred in refusing to give instruction on intoxication of the defendant as bearing upon his ability to form specific intent. The judgment is affirmed. DAY and FRANTZ, JJ., not participating.