Title: In Re Trust Estate of Rivas

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

233 Kan. 898 (1983)
666 P.2d 691
IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST ESTATE OF RICHARD JOSEPH RIVAS, Deceased. TRUSTEE, JOHNSON COUNTY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY.
No. 55,082

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 15, 1983.
Murray E. Anderson, of Wolf, Longan & Anderson, of Stanley, argued the cause and S.W. Longan, III, of the same firm, was on the brief for the appellants, Carol and Staci Rivas.
Dale K. Irwin, of Wells, Slough, Connealy & Irwin, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause and Cathleen Connealy, of the same firm, and Ernest L. Johnson of Kansas City, Kansas, were with him on the brief for the appellee Joan Rivas.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HERD, J.:
This is an appeal from the trial court's order terminating a trust and ordering distribution of the trust property.
Richard Joseph Rivas (Richard) was originally married to Joan Rivas. Joan had a daughter, Sandra Hill, by a previous marriage. During their marriage Richard and Joan had a son, Richard Michael Rivas (Michael). Richard and Joan were subsequently divorced and a property settlement agreement was entered into on July 14, 1964. In paragraph 4 of the agreement Richard agreed to provide seven years of post-secondary education for Michael. This obligation, however, was not to extend past August 31, 1986. Paragraph 5 established an "Insurance Trust" for the benefit of Michael. The trust property consisted of two life insurance policies. The primary beneficiary of the policies was the Johnson County National Bank & Trust Company of Prairie *899 Village, as trustee for the "care, support, maintenance and education" of Michael. Operation of the trust was contingent upon the death of Richard prior to the termination of the obligation set out in paragraph 4. The terms of the trust were fairly standard, calling for liberal exercise of the power of invasion where necessary and stating the trustee's word would be final and binding on Michael.
Paragraph 5(e) of the agreement provided that upon the termination of the obligation undertaken by Richard "the trustee shall reassign title ownership to the aforesaid insurance policies to the husband (Richard) if he is then living." In case Richard died prior to the time for reassignment, paragraph 5(f) stated:
In February of 1965 the property settlement agreement between Richard and Joan was amended. All the amendments concerned the insurance trust and, according to the document, were "of a technical nature." Indeed, a quick perusal of the amended agreement reveals no substantive changes. Again, the purpose of the trust was to insure that the obligation of Richard to provide for Michael's education was fulfilled. Paragraph 5(g) of the amended agreement dealt with reassignment of the trust property to Richard. It stated:
Paragraph 5(h), in turn, provided:
Finally, paragraph 5(i) stated the provisions of the trust were to be construed and administered in accordance with the laws of the State of Kansas.
In March of 1965 Richard executed his will. Article II of that document stated:
In August of 1968, Richard Rivas remarried. He and his second wife, Carol, had a daughter, Staci Marie. Approximately one year later, on September 16, 1969, Richard Rivas died, a resident of Missouri. On January 5, 1970, the "Notice of Appointment of Trustee" was filed, along with an inventory affidavit and trustee's bond. Over the next twelve years the Johnson County National Bank administered the trust, making periodic payments to Michael Rivas. However, since Michael never made a serious attempt to further his education, no large disbursements were made and the trust property grew from the initial $35,000 from Richard's life insurance policy to $48,143.07 on final accounting.
On February 26, 1982, Michael Rivas died intestate, a resident of Missouri. On July 14, 1982, the trustee filed a "Petition for Determination of Distribution and Termination" in Johnson County District Court asking the court to terminate the trust and distribute its assets. The administrator of Michael's estate, Joan Rivas, claimed the trust property, as did Richard's widow, Carol Rivas, and his daughter Staci.
After a hearing and consideration of trial briefs, the trial court ruled in favor of Michael's estate, holding:
Carol Rivas and her daughter Staci have appealed.
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in terminating *901 the trust and ordering the trust property to be distributed to the administrator of Michael Rivas' estate.
Richard Rivas owned the property. As owner he created the trust for the use and benefit of his son, Michael Rivas. In the trust instrument Richard retained the power through a "lifetime conveyance or by will" to designate the persons to receive the balance of proceeds remaining in the trust after the termination of the trust obligation. Richard Rivas chose to execute a will in 1965 wherein he appointed his son, Richard Michael Rivas, to receive the trust property, if Michael survived Richard. Richard died in 1969 with Michael surviving him. If Richard Rivas' will is valid the trust property passed by will to Michael Rivas. The trial court so held.
Appellants offer two arguments in favor of reversing the trial court's order. First, they claim Richard Rivas' will was revoked by his subsequent remarriage and birth of a child. They reason if there was no will Richard did not exercise the power he reserved in paragraph 5(h) of the trust instrument thus leaving the trust property to be distributed to Richard's heirs at law "as they then exist and as if the husband had died intestate at that time, a resident of the State of Kansas." This might be a good argument if the laws of Kansas applied in determining the validity of the will. See, e.g., K.S.A. 59-610. Absent a statute to the contrary, however, the validity of a will of personal property depends on the law of the testator's domicile at the time of his or her death. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws § 55, p. 93; 6 Page on Wills § 60.7, 60.16, pp. 458, 474 (rev. ed. 1962). In this case that state is Missouri.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.400 (1978) provides:
Richard Rivas' will was not revoked pursuant to this statute. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.420 (1978) states:
*902 Since Richard's will was made after his divorce from Joan, this section is inapplicable.
Appellants rely mainly on Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.240 (1982 Supp.) which states:
It appears this statute may apply. Staci Marie Rivas was indeed born after the execution of Richard's will, which made no provision for her. Even if it is applicable, however, it does not act to revoke the will. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to such a statute, the testator is deemed to have died intestate with regard only to the "pretermitted heir." The will itself is otherwise valid. See Gibson v. Johnson, 331 Mo. 1198, 1204, 56 S.W.2d 783 (1932). Accordingly, appellants' argument should have been made at the time Richard Rivas' will was probated. The only question here is the validity of Article II of the will, which merely exercises the power of appointment reserved to Richard under the trust. Pursuant to Missouri law, the will was not revoked and Article II is effective.
Appellants also argue the trial court was in error because the power of appointment in Richard's will was not effective unless Michael survived Richard's reversionary interest in the trust. They claim Richard's interest in the trust did not end until the termination of the trust obligation, which would occur when Michael had received seven years of post-secondary education or August 31, 1986, whichever came first. Since Michael did not *903 survive either of these occurrences, they argue, he did not survive Richard's reversionary interest in the trust and the appointment of Michael to receive the trust property was ineffective. We reject this rationale.
The primary consideration in construing a will is, of course, to determine the intent of the testator. Where that intent is clearly expressed in the will, the court need go no further in making the determination. McClary v. Harbaugh, 231 Kan. 564, 567, 646 P.2d 498 (1982). Here the plain and unambiguous language of Richard's will stated his intention to appoint Michael to receive the trust property subject only to the condition that Michael survive him. This condition was obviously met. Michael Rivas was then entitled to have the trust property assigned to him upon the termination of the obligation undertaken in the trust. Although neither of the two methods of termination envisioned by Richard occurred, the trust obligation terminated with the death of Michael. The trust property was properly awarded to his estate.
The judgment is affirmed.