Title: Dreiman v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dreiman v. State1992 WY 14825 P.2d 758Case Number: 91-80Decided: 01/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Karl William 
DREIMAN,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, David Gosar, Appellate Counsel, and Deborah 
Gabriel, Legal Intern, argued, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jennifer L. Gimbel, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Karl 
Dreiman was convicted of burglary and sentenced to three to five years in 
prison. The sentence was suspended, and he was placed on three years probation. 
Appellant appeals the judgment and sentence claiming insufficient evidence of 
intent to steal at the time of entry necessary for a burglary 
conviction.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
conviction and remand the sentencing orders for corrections.

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our determination:

"I.         Was 
the evidence sufficient to convict Appellant of burglary or did the evidence 
merely support criminal entry?

"II.        Was the 
Appellant denied his right to a fair trial when the court below gave an improper 
jury instruction?

"III.       Was the Appellant 
denied his right to a fair trial by improper comments made by the prosecution 
during closing arguments?

"IV.      Were restitution and 
victims compensation assessments ordered in violation of the law?"

The Wyoming 
burglary statute, W.S. 6-3-301 (1988), provides: 

"(a) A person is guilty 
of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein." (emphasis 
added)

The larceny 
statute provides:

"A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny." W.S. 
6-3-402(a).

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant and 
Jayne Goit began dating during October 1989. Eight months later, Ms. Goit 
informed appellant that she no longer wished to see him. Appellant refused to 
accept the end of the relationship. He telephoned, contacted, and just would not 
stay away from Ms. Goit. She changed to an unlisted phone number to prevent 
appellant from calling her. Still, appellant continued the harassment. He came 
to her trailer uninvited and became violent on at least two occasions. Ms. Goit 
called the sheriff on one of those occasions. Appellant's obsession for Ms. Goit 
culminated on September 7, 1990.

[¶5]      On that night 
appellant entered her dwelling through an unlocked window after checking to make 
sure she was not home. While he was in the dwelling, he copied down her unlisted 
phone number, her social security number and her insurance policy numbers. 
Appellant took a photograph of Ms. Goit's new boyfriend, photos of her children, 
and some letters that appellant had written to her, a personal calendar, and her 
house and automobile keys. Appellant made copies of the calendar and keys and 
thereafter returned the original car and house keys and calendar to Goit's 
dwelling. Before leaving, Dreiman crawled underneath Goit's trailer and cut a 
phone wire.

[¶6]      Appellant's 
roommate discovered the stolen and copied items and advised Ms. Goit about them. 
Ms. Goit informed the police of the situation.

[¶7]      On October 2, 
1990, appellant was arrested and charged with burglary for violating W.S. 
6-3-301(a). He was tried before a jury and found guilty. Appellant timely filed 
this appeal from his conviction.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶8]      Appellant first 
challenges his conviction on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of burglary. We examine his claim using this court's standard of 
review for sufficiency of the evidence:

"`[T]his court must 
determine whether, after viewing the evidence and appropriate inferences in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting 
Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 1989)).

[¶9]      In order for a 
defendant to be found guilty of burglary, the State must prove that a person 1) 
entered a building without authority, 2) with the intent to commit larceny or a 
felony. It is this second statutory element which is at the center of 
disagreement in this case. It is also the element which distinguishes burglary 
from criminal entry and makes burglary a specific intent crime. Mirich v. State, 
593 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶10]   Appellant testified under oath that 
he entered Ms. Goit's dwelling without authority. Therefore, the crucial issue 
to resolve is whether appellant had the specific intent to commit larceny when 
he entered and was therefore guilty of burglary. Accordingly, we must determine 
whether appellant had the intent to deprive Ms. Goit of her "property" when he 
unlawfully entered her dwelling. We note that "direct evidence is not necessary 
to prove intent to steal since `[p]roof of intent is not a precise process.'" 
Jennings, at 1303 (quoting Mirich, at 593). In addition, the amount of proof 
from which "a jury is permitted to draw the required inference of intent to 
steal is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances." Jennings, at 1303. 

[¶11]   Appellant argues that he did not 
have the "[s]pecific intent to commit larceny for stealing her keys" or her 
calendar because he returned the keys and the calendar after he copied them. 
Thus, Ms. Goit's keys and calendar were not stolen, they were borrowed and 
returned. Ms. Goit still had her keys and calendar. Appellant, however, now also 
had them. Appellant knew she would not have wanted him to have the keys or 
calendar. Copying those keys, therefore, was taking something from her and 
depriving her of her right to have exclusive access to her trailer house and 
automobile.

[¶12]   Unauthorized copies of a person's 
keys diminish the value of the original keys - keeping unwanted persons out of 
the trailer. In other contexts it has been said that "`[p]roperty in a thing 
consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted 
right of use, enjoyment, and disposal. Anything which destroys one or more of 
these elements of property to that extent destroys the property itself.'" 
Labberton v. General Casualty Co., 53 Wn.2d 180, 332 P.2d 250, 255 (1958) 
(quoting Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873 
(1940)).

[¶13]   In People v. Parker, 217 Cal. App. 2d 422, 31 Cal. Rptr. 716, 717 (1963), a person was convicted of attempting to 
receive stolen property when he arranged a scheme to copy an advance telephone 
directory supplement. The appellant argued that since he was merely photocopying 
the supplements he "did not have the intent to deprive the telephone company of 
property, either temporarily or permanently, and therefore there was no 
theft[.]" Id., 31 Cal. Rptr.  at 719. The court held that the supplements were 
property and were properly the subject of theft even though they were being 
returned after they were copied. See also Williams v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, 81 Cal. App. 3d 330, 146 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1978); People v. Dolbeer, 
214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1963). In Williams, 146 Cal. Rptr.  at 317, 
the court held "[t]he original documents comprising the June Walker file and any 
photocopies thereof * * * were property subject to theft." (emphasis 
added) Thus, although the owner may retain possession of the original property, 
there has been nevertheless a deprivation of property when a copy is made and 
retained by another. The copies of the car and house keys and the personal 
calendar constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that 
appellant had the specific intent to steal when he unlawfully entered Ms. Goit's 
dwelling.

[¶14]   When appellant entered Ms. Goit's 
home he also, without removing physical property from the trailer, copied down 
her unlisted phone number, her social security number and her insurance policy 
number. Appellant argues that this type of information is not "property" of 
which appellant was permanently deprived and, therefore, is not the proper 
subject of a burglary charge. As defined, "deprive" is "[t]o withhold property 
of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major 
portion of its economic value * * *." W.S. 6-3-401(a)(ii)(A) (1988).

[¶15]   Appellant contends that the 
definition of "deprive" in the larceny statute does not reach this case where 
only information is taken because that definition requires that it have economic 
value. Appellant argues, without citation, that this information - a phone 
number, information from a calendar, social security and insurance numbers - has 
no economic value and, therefore, is not property which can be 
taken.

[¶16]   Information has been held to be 
property and a subject of theft in several criminal contexts. For example, names 
of DEA agents in secured files were held to represent a property interest. 
United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979). In Girard, defendants 
challenged their conviction under a federal statute which prohibited the 
unauthorized sale of government property by arguing that the statute applied 
only to tangible property or documents. The Second Circuit held that the statute 
was violated by the sale of information. Id.

[¶17]   Clear legislative intent does not 
permit burglary and larceny statutes to be construed so narrowly as to preclude 
conviction for theft of information. Were it so, conduct such as that in Girard 
would go unprosecuted. See also People v. Kunkin, 9 Cal. 3d 245, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184, 507 P.2d 1392, 57 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1973) (the court assumed without deciding 
that copies of a list of undercover narcotics agents was property); Williams v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 146 Cal. Rptr. 311, 317 n. 6 (App. 1978); 
United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (information as the 
"property" taken in mail fraud prosecution (citing Carpenter v. United States, 
484 U.S. 19, 108 S. Ct. 316, 98 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1987)).

[¶18]   Phone numbers have been recognized 
in different contexts as property, and a person's interest in keeping their 
unlisted number private has also been recognized. See In re Fontainebleau Hotel 
Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975) (in bankruptcy proceeding, a phone 
number was held to be "property"); Washington v. Stone, 56 Wn. App. 153, 782 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1989) (in the context of review of a search warrant, "[a]n 
individual's privacy interest in his unpublished telephone listing is 
constitutionally protected because his expectation of privacy is demonstrated by 
his specific request that the information not be published.").

[¶19]   This interest in keeping 
information confidential and private is especially apparent in this case. Ms. 
Goit obtained an unlisted phone number because she did not want appellant to 
call her and bother her. Appellant admits that the reason he unlawfully entered 
her dwelling was to obtain her unlisted phone number. Since her unlisted phone 
number was property and he intended to take it from the very moment he began to 
enter her dwelling, there was sufficient evidence of his intent to commit 
larceny, and the jury could properly convict appellant of burglary.

[¶20]   Finally, glossed over by appellant 
and not emphasized by the State is that appellant actually did steal and 
keep some of Ms. Goit's property. Appellant stole and kept a photo of Ms. 
Goit's new boyfriend, photos of her children, and letters belonging to Ms. Goit 
which appellant had written to her. This court has recognized that "`[t]he most 
significant and material evidence of defendant's guilt is his possession of the 
stolen property. Possession is a strong circumstance tending to show guilt and 
only slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances is 
required.'" Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610, 615 (Wyo. 1978) (quoting Newell v. 
State, 548 P.2d 8, 13 (Wyo. 1976)). See also Jennings, at 1303. Appellant having 
taken and kept the pictures and letters supports our conclusion that the intent 
to take and carry away property existed at the time of entry, and therefore 
appellant was lawfully convicted.

[¶21]   In sum, there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to have convicted appellant of burglary. The tangible 
property, the information, and the copies of the keys and calendar were all 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant had the specific intent 
to deprive Ms. Goit of her property and commit a larceny when he unlawfully 
entered her home.

LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE

[¶22]   In Eagan v. State, this court ruled 
that "if the evidence is as consistent with guilt of a lesser crime as it is 
with the guilt of a higher, the conviction should be of the lesser." Eagan, 58 
Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 225 (1942). The rule applies where the prosecution 
relies on a statement of the defendant to establish one of the necessary 
elements of the crime charged. Eagan, 128 P.2d  at 225. Appellant claims that 
there is an Eagan problem because his testimony as to his intent was 
uncontroverted and, therefore, he should have been convicted of criminal entry 
rather than burglary. As discussed, entering at night, together with the items 
copied, the information taken, and the items actually stolen, all support the 
inference that appellant possessed the specific intent to deprive Ms. Goit of 
her property required for burglary. Appellant's testimony was not uncontradicted 
as claimed, and Eagan, therefore, does not apply. 

IMPROPER JURY 
INSTRUCTION

[¶23]   The district court instructed the 
jury as follows:

"You are instructed that 
when a person breaks into the property of another in the nighttime when he has 
knowledge of its contents, you may infer that he did so with the intent to 
commit a larceny."

Appellant 
contends that instruction number seven was improper because the information was 
not property. We have heretofore discussed this claim. Our holding that this 
property was covered under the burglary and larceny statutes resolves the claim. 
There was no error in this instruction.

[¶24]   Appellant also argues that 
instruction number seven was improper because it attempted to rule on intent as 
a matter of law and confused the jurors because they could not tell the 
difference between a presumption and an inference. Appellant is incorrect. The 
instruction provides only that the jury "may infer." It is not mandatory. It 
provides no presumption. See United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1092 (10th 
Cir. 1986); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 2454, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979). The instruction is a correct statement of law as found in 
Mirich. Mirich, at 593.

[¶25]   When instruction number seven is 
viewed in conjunction with the entire charge, it did not shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant since other instructions covered the burden of proof, 
proof of intent and the lesser-included offense. Instruction number seven was 
proper and, in context with the other instructions, did not deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial.

IMPROPER REMARKS IN 
CLOSING

[¶26]   Appellant argues that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was unfair. Since appellant made no objection to 
this argument at trial, it must be reviewed under the "plain error" standard. 
Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 895 (Wyo. 1982). In order to prove plain error, 
three elements must be established:

"First, the record must 
clearly show what occurred at the trial without resort to speculation. Second, 
the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been violated in 
an obvious way. And finally, this violation must have adversely affected some 
substantial right of the accused." Id. at 895; see also McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 971 (Wyo. 1989).

In addition, 
when we review an allegation of plain error, we must view the facts of the case 
and the trial record as a whole and not any one single incident standing alone. 
Browder, at 895.

[¶27]   Appellant claims that the 
prosecutor misstated the law when he argued about intent relative to entering a 
hardware store. The prosecutor argued as follows:

"And you just can't 
decide one day, I think I'll walk into this hardware store, no, I don't intend 
to steal anything, and you go in there and you clean the place out. And you say, 
oh, I didn't have the intent to steal when I went in, but you clean them out, 
strip them clean. That's not going to sell. Common sense tells us that's no 
good."

We do not find a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, nor any error in this comment. 
It was argument, pure and simple, to refute the defendant's explanation of his 
intent. Appellant also claims that the prosecutor misstated the law because the 
items taken did not fall within the burglary or larceny statute. This argument 
has been previously addressed in this opinion. We did not find it helpful to 
appellant on the first issue, nor do we find it helpful to him here.

[¶28]   Appellant also contends that the 
prosecutor made an improper attack on defense counsel by characterizing a 
defense argument as a "technicality." The prosecutor made the following remark 
in his closing argument:

"Now, it's only when we 
get to court and counsel gets bogged down in the technicalities of, was it a 
burglary here or not. * * * So this is something that comes up later on in this 
case when we find a nice little technicality * * *."

 

Appellant draws 
more meaning from the use of the word "technicality" than the jurors likely did. 
This remark did not steer the jury from its proper course and does not satisfy 
the plain error requirement that "a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have 
been violated in an obvious way" and the violation "adversely affected some 
substantial right of the accused." Browder, at 895, see also Johnson v. Lynaugh, 
821 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1987). In sum, the prosecutor's closing argument did 
not deprive appellant of a fair trial.

RESTITUTION AND VICTIMS 
COMPENSATION ASSESSMENTS

[¶29]   Appellant's sentence was suspended 
in favor of probation and the following conditions were placed on his 
probation:

"10.     Karl Dreiman shall make 
complete restitution in the amount of $273.52 for any items not returned or 
damage done as a result of this offense, according to a plan to be prepared by 
the Department of Probation and Parole and submitted to the Court for 
approval;

"11.     Karl Dreiman shall pay to the 
Victim's Compensation Fund, as required by W.S. 1-40-119(a), 1977 Republished 
Edition, the sum of $500.00 by cash, certified check or money order payable to 
the Clerk of the District Court, Third Floor, County Building, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming; Karl Dreiman shall be required to pay the amount of $50.00 within ten 
(10) days from the date of this hearing. The remaining balance of $450.00 shall 
be paid within his probationary period, according to a plan to be prepared by 
the Department of Probation and Parole[.]"

RESTITUTION

[¶30]   A scheme for computation of the 
proper restitution is found in W.S. 7-9-103 (1987). Restitution is to be paid 
for "damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity[.]" W.S. 7-9-103(a) 
(1987). For purposes of restitution, "criminal activity" is defined as "any 
crime for which there is a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or verdict of guilty 
upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and includes any other crime 
which is admitted by the defendant, whether or not prosecuted[.]" W.S. 
7-9-101(a)(i) (1987).1

[¶31]   Appellant contends that the 
restitution assessment did not satisfy the statutory requirement that it be 
based on "criminal activity." First, he argues that he did not cause the damage 
to Ms. Goit's heat duct and, therefore, should not have to pay for the repairs 
to the heat duct and the heat tape. The State concedes that the damage to the 
heat duct was not due to appellant's criminal activity. Therefore, the 
restitution amount of $273.52 was in error. The cost of repairing the heat duct, 
including the heat tape, should be subtracted from the restitution 
order.

[¶32]   Appellant argues that it was 
improper for the district court to order restitution without a reasoned inquiry 
into the defendant's ability to pay. We addressed this same issue in Seaton v. 
State, 811 P.2d 276 (Wyo. 1991). The inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay 
was found to be sufficient in Seaton in part because there is no statutory 
requirement that the district court determine ability to pay at the time of 
sentencing. Seaton, at 281. Therefore, although the district court's inquiry 
into the defendant's ability to pay was minimal, we find it sufficient because 
there is no statutory requirement that ability to pay be inquired into at the 
time of sentencing. Seaton, at 281.

[¶33]   Appellant also contends that he 
should not have to pay for Ms. Goit having her locks changed in June because his 
criminal activity of September 7, 1990, did not necessitate having her locks 
changed in June of 1990. However, restitution for changing the locks was proper. 
Ms. Goit had her locks changed in June also as a result of appellant's criminal 
activity. This was "criminal activity" that he admitted to under oath and, 
therefore, the restitution amount for having her locks changed in June and 
October was proper. 

[¶34]   Appellant also contests the ordered 
Victims Compensation Assessment of $500.00. He argues that the district court 
exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the payment of $50.00 within ten 
days of the sentencing hearing and then ordering the balance to be paid over the 
probationary period. The State concedes that this order is indeed beyond the 
authority of the district court because of this court's holding in Seaton, at 
281-82. The Victims Compensation statute "contains no provision vesting 
discretion in the sentencing court with respect to extending the time for 
payment of this surcharge." Seaton, at 282. Therefore, the district court order 
should be modified to a Victims Compensation surcharge of $50.00. The appellant 
should be reimbursed for payments in excess, if any. The order of judgment and 
sentence from the district court should also be corrected to reflect that 
appellant was convicted by a jury.

CONCLUSION

[¶35]   In short, this is a case of first 
impression and may also be a case of last impression. It is indeed rare for 
property to be copied and returned in the course of a burglary. However, the 
unique facts do not avoid application of the burglary statute nor do any of the 
issues raised by appellant avoid his conviction.

[¶36]   Conviction affirmed, and case 
remanded for corrections in sentencing provisions consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTE

1 Wyoming Statutes 7-9-103 
and 7-9-101 were amended, effective July 1, 1991.