Title: State ex rel. Hubbard v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Hubbard v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d 336, 2002-Ohio-4795.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. HUBBARD, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hubbard v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d 336, 2002-Ohio-
4795.] 
Workers’ compensation — Workers’ compensation claim abated by Industrial 
Commission of Ohio when claimant dies before award is made — 
Mandamus sought ordering Industrial Commission to vacate its order of 
abatement and to reactivate relator’s claim for further proceedings to 
determine the amount of benefits owed to the widow claimant — Writ 
granted, when. 
(No. 2001-0201 — Submitted June 4, 2002 — Decided September 25, 2002.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On April 23, 1999, decedent Thomas H. Hubbard filed a workers’ 
compensation application, asserting that he had contracted malignant 
mesothelioma from years of heavy exposure to asbestos in the workplace.  At his 
September 23, 1999 hearing, he submitted medical evidence corroborating his 
allegation.  No contrary evidence was presented. 
{¶2} 
Despite the absence of rebuttal, a hearing officer for respondent 
Industrial Commission of Ohio referred decedent for a commission exam, citing 
commission resolution No. R96-1-01.  On January 7, 2000, decedent was 
transported from his home to an examination in another county.  He was 
presented for evaluation on a stretcher, unable to walk or stand.  Examining 
physician Dr. Marc J. Dinga confirmed the diagnosis of industrial mesothelioma 
and sadly noted that decedent was literally “wasting away.”  One week later, 
Hubbard died. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
As a result of decedent’s death, the commission ordered that all 
action on the application be abated.  Relator, widow-claimant Mary C. Hubbard, 
has now commenced an original action in mandamus before this court. 
{¶4} 
The parties agree and the evidence confirms that decedent expired 
from industrially induced mesothelioma.  All agree that decedent timely sought 
workers’ compensation benefits.  They disagree on the widow-claimant’s 
retention of them. 
{¶5} 
Widow-claimant does not dispute that unaccrued benefits generally 
abate when a claimant dies.  State ex rel. Johnston v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ 
Comp. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 463, 751 N.E.2d 974.  She relies, however, on an 
exception to the rule carved by Johnston. 
{¶6} 
Johnston involved an application for a sizeable lump sum 
settlement in an allowed claim that the bureau did not process for eight months.  
The claimant died in the interim from a nonwork-related cause, prompting the 
bureau to assert abatement.  The widow countered with the accusation that the 
delay was unreasonable and proposed that an exception to the general abatement 
principles be made. 
{¶7} 
We agreed.  Reviewing prior cases on the inheritability of workers’ 
compensation benefits, we concluded that “the provision of prompt and certain 
compensation to deserving claimants [is] no less fundamental to Ohio workers’ 
compensation law than the principle that workers’ compensation benefits are 
generally uninheritable.”  Id. at 473, 751 N.E.2d 974. 
{¶8} 
Therefore, “albeit slowly and unevenly, we have come to 
recognize the inherent injustice of requiring a claimant, whether he or she be a 
dependent seeking death benefits or an injured employee seeking disability 
compensation, to outlive delays in the administrative process.  Regardless of the 
status of the claim at the time of death, the claimant’s estate may recover the 
January Term, 2002 
3 
compensation that the claimant would have received, but for administrative 
delays, during his or her lifetime.” Id. 
{¶9} 
The widow-claimant in this case argues that the processing of 
decedent’s application was unreasonably delayed by, for example, the 
commission’s insistence on a commission/bureau medical exam.  The commission 
relied on resolution No. R96-1-01, which provides: 
{¶10} “Whereas pursuant to the provisions of Section 4123.68 of the 
Ohio Revised Code, before awarding compensation for disability or death due to 
silicosis, asbestosis, coal miners pneumoconiosis, or any other occupational 
disease of the respiratory tract resulting from injurious exposure to dust, the 
Administrator is to refer the claim to a qualified medical specialist for 
examination and recommendation with regard to diagnosis, extent of disability, or 
other medical questions connected with the claim.” 
{¶11} Widow-claimant argues that the resolution was inapplicable and 
the examination unnecessary because decedent had mesothelioma, not asbestosis.  
The commission declares that the latter encompasses the former under the 
definition set forth in R.C. 4123.68(AA): 
{¶12} “Asbestosis means a disease caused by inhalation or ingestion of 
asbestos, demonstrated by x-ray examination, biopsy, autopsy, or other objective 
medical or clinical tests.” 
{¶13} This contention is rejected.  The above specifies “a disease” 
contracted through asbestos inhalation, not “any disease” contracted from same.  
Asbestosis is “a disease” caused by asbestos and it should be presumed that 
asbestosis was the condition addressed by the definition and not mesothelioma.  
The two are distinct.  Asbestosis is a pneumoconiosis, an “[i]nflammation 
commonly leading to fibrosis of the lungs.”  Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (26th 
Ed.1995) 153 and 1391.  Mesothelioma, on the other hand, is a cancer, “[a] rare 
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neoplasm derived from the lining cells of the pleura and peritoneum which grows 
as a thick sheet covering the viscera * * *.” Id. at 1096. 
{¶14} The commission, therefore, erred in effectively treating the two 
conditions interchangeably. 
{¶15} The commission also offers this provision from R.C. 4123.68(AA): 
{¶16} “All conditions, restrictions, limitations, and other provisions of 
this section, with reference to the payment of compensation or benefits on account 
of silicosis or coal miners’ pneumoconiosis apply to * * * any other occupational 
disease of the respiratory tract resulting from injurious exposures to dust.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶17} The commission mistakenly emphasizes the word “any” when the 
operative word is “dust.”  Decedent’s mesothelioma was caused by exposure to 
asbestos, and asbestos is a fiber, not a dust.  This provision is, therefore, 
inapplicable here. 
{¶18} The commission additionally cites R.C. 4123.53(A), which allows 
the bureau to order “any employee * * * to submit to a medical examination * * * 
as provided by the rules of the commission or the administrator of workers’ 
compensation.”  This provision does not advance the commission’s cause, 
because the relevant “rules of the commission” have already been found 
inapplicable. 
{¶19} Finally, the commission alleges a failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, citing R.C. 4123.60, which states: 
{¶20} “If the decedent would have been lawfully entitled to have applied 
for an award at the time of his death the administrator may, after satisfactory 
proof to warrant an award and payment, award and pay an amount, not exceeding 
the compensation which the decedent might have received, but for his death, for 
the period prior to the date of his death.” 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶21} This statute clearly empowers the commission to make an award to 
the widow-claimant.  The commission asserts that because widow-claimant did 
not specifically cite this section and apply for benefits thereunder, she has not 
exhausted all administrative avenues.  We disagree. 
{¶22} A writ of mandamus is hereby granted, ordering the commission to 
vacate its order of abatement and to reactivate the claim for further proceedings to 
determine the amount of benefits owed to the widow-claimant for the period of 
April 23, 1999 through January 14, 2000. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P., Thomas M. Wilson and Corey W. Frost, for 
relator. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, 
Assistant Attorney General, for respondents. 
__________________