Title: State v. Pendergraft

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA14-490 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  16 December 2014 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
New Hanover County 
Nos. 10 CRS 61706, 62183 
 
 
BO ANDERSON TAYLOR 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 16 September 
2011 by Judge Charles H. Henry in New Hanover County Superior 
Court.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 October 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General 
Melody Hairston, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Nicholas C. Woomer-Deters, for Defendant. 
 
 
ERVIN, Judge. 
 
 
 
Defendant Bo Anderson Taylor appeals from judgments entered 
based upon his convictions for misdemeanor larceny, felonious 
breaking or entering a trailer, and five counts of obtaining 
property by false pretenses.  On appeal, Defendant contends that 
the trial court erred by allowing the admission of evidence 
affirming the truthfulness of the alleged victim and by allowing 
the State to elicit extensive testimony that Defendant had 
exercised his right to remain silent as part of its case in 
-2- 
chief.  After careful consideration of Defendant’s challenges to 
the trial court’s judgments in light of the record and the 
applicable law, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to a new 
trial. 
I. Factual Background 
A. Substantive Facts 
1. State’s Evidence 
 
In October 2010, Defendant and his girlfriend, Gail 
Lacroix, were living with Defendant’s sister, Crystal Medina.  
In view of the fact that Ms. Lacroix was Defendant and Ms. 
Medina’s  step-mother, no one in the family was happy about the  
relationship between Defendant and Ms. Lacroix. 
Because she did not have any room in her house to 
accommodate Defendant and Ms. Lacroix, Ms. Medina allowed them 
to stay in a shop located in her backyard.  At the time that 
Defendant and Ms. Lacroix moved in, the Medinas were planning to 
separate and Ms. Medina’s husband was in jail. 
 
The Medinas had formerly owned and operated a residential 
and commercial concrete business and had purchased several tools 
for use in the business, including two lasers that had been 
purchased for $1,495 each.  The tools in question were stored in 
locked trailers located in Ms. Medina’s backyard.  Defendant had 
access to the keys to these trailers.  As part of the divorce 
-3- 
settlement, Ms. Medina planned to let her husband keep the tools 
while she would keep the house.  In view of the fact that she 
“didn’t 
trust 
[her 
husband’s] 
family,” 
Ms. 
Medina 
had 
photographed all of the tools and recorded their serial numbers. 
 
On 2 October 2010, Defendant pawned a hammer drill at 
Picasso Pawn for $50.  On 4 October 2010, Defendant pawned two 
generators at Pawn USA for $300.  Defendant returned to Picasso 
Pawn on 13 October 2010 and pawned an air compressor for $35.  
On 6 November 2010, Defendant pawned two lasers at National Pawn 
for $200.  On each of these occasions, Defendant signed a 
statement indicating that he owned the items that were being 
pawned. 
 
In November 2010, Ms. Medina found a pawnshop ticket on the 
floor of her truck indicating that Defendant had pawned the 
lasers.  Upon making this discovery, Ms. Medina called Defendant 
to ask about the ticket.  However, Defendant hung up on her.  
Although Ms. Medina subsequently confronted Defendant at her 
home, he denied knowing anything about the ticket.  At that 
point, Ms. Medina left to go to an appointment.  Upon her  
return, Defendant and Ms. Lacroix had packed up their belongings 
and left.  After Defendant and Ms. Lacroix departed, Ms. Medina 
discovered another pawnshop ticket in the shop in which 
Defendant and Ms. Lacroix had been staying. 
-4- 
Ms. Medina did not immediately call the police because she 
did not want Defendant to get in trouble.  Instead, Ms. Medina 
just wanted to recover the tools.  After having failed to get 
Defendant, who knew that he did not have permission to pawn the 
tools, to return the items in question, Ms. Medina contacted the 
New Hanover County Sheriff’s office and reported that Defendant 
had stolen two lasers, three generators, an air compressor, and 
a hammer drill from the trailers in her backyard. 
 
The investigation into the allegations that Ms. Medina had 
made against Defendant was conducted by Detective Angie Tindall 
of the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Department.  Although 
Detective Tindall left messages for Defendant with numerous 
family members, she never reached him.  As part of her 
investigation, Detective Tindall checked into the validity of 
Ms. Medina’s claims after being told by a family member that 
Defendant had been asked to pawn the items for Ms. Medina 
because Ms. Medina had stolen $500 from her employer.  However, 
Detective Tindall was unable to find any support for this 
accusation.  As a result of the fact that Ms. Medina was in a 
position to provide the serial numbers for the items that had 
been pawned, Detective Tindall was able to locate the missing 
tools and obtain the return of most of the missing property to 
Ms. Medina.  In spite of her recognition that this matter was 
-5- 
replete with family drama, Detective Tindall proceeded with the 
investigation because Ms. Medina “seemed to be telling [her] the 
truth.” 
2. Defendant’s Evidence 
Defendant traveled to South Carolina in order to turn 
himself in on unrelated criminal charges on 1 October 2010.  Ms. 
Medina wired $200 to Defendant in order to enable him to post 
bond.  However, Ms. Medina told Defendant that she needed him to 
repay the money that she had loaned him for the purpose of 
making bond promptly because she had taken $500 from the safe at 
Friendly Check Cashing, where she was employed, in order to 
secure Defendant’s release and to pay for a party that she 
planned to host.  More specifically, Ms. Medina told Defendant 
that she needed to replace all of the money that she had taken 
from the safe before an audit that was going to be conducted on 
the following Monday.  As part of the repayment process, Ms. 
Medina gave Defendant two broken generators and told him that he 
could have them if he could get them running. 
On 2 October 2010, Defendant, with Ms. Medina’s permission, 
pawned a drill that he had received from Ms. Medina, gave half 
of the money that he received as a result of this transaction to 
Ms. Medina, and used the other half to purchase gas which he 
used to drive to Leland as part of an attempt to get the broken 
-6- 
generators running.  Ms. Medina’s fiancé, Juan, helped Defendant 
load the generators into a truck since they were too heavy for 
Defendant to lift on his own. 
At some point, Defendant was able to pawn the two 
generators for $300 and handed the proceeds to Ms. Medina 
outside Friendly Check Cashing.  After the transfer had been 
completed, Defendant and Ms. Medina entered Friendly Check 
Cashing, where Ms. Medina put the cash in a rolled up newspaper, 
slipped the newspaper to Defendant from behind the glass, and 
told Defendant to give the cash to her manager, who was working 
beside her.  Upon receiving these instructions, Defendant took 
$250 from the newspaper and gave it to the manager, who took the 
cash and then swiped her ATM card for the apparent purpose of 
replacing the remaining $250 that Ms. Medina had taken from the 
store’s safe. 
 
 On 6 November 2011, Defendant pawned two lasers that he 
had received from Ms. Medina at National Pawn for $200 and took 
the proceeds directly to Picasso Pawn for the purpose of making 
a payment relating to certain items of jewelry that Ms. Medina 
had pawned there.  While at Picasso Pawn, Defendant pawned an 
air compressor that Ms. Medina had thrown away for $35.  
Defendant left the pawn ticket for the lasers in Ms. Medina’s 
-7- 
truck, along with the receipt for the payment that he had made 
to assist in the process of redeeming her jewelry. 
Defendant denied having stolen anything from Ms. Medina, 
asserted that Ms. Medina was aware that he was pawning the 
tools, and testified that “she was basically hand in hand with 
everything I did.”  Similarly, Ms. Lacroix testified that she 
knew that Defendant was pawning certain items, that Defendant 
and Ms. Medina had discussed the transactions in which Defendant 
had engaged and the manner in which the resulting proceeds would 
be used, and that she and Defendant had moved away from Ms. 
Medina’s property because they were fighting about the pawn 
tickets and Defendant’s relationship with Ms. Lacroix. 
According 
to 
Defendant, 
the 
members 
of 
his 
family 
frequently called the police about each other’s activities.  
Although Ms. Medina denied that she was referring to Defendant, 
Defendant pointed out that Ms. Medina had written a Facebook 
message calling upon people to “Bring That White Trash Down” by 
helping her get “dirt” on Defendant, who was known by the 
nickname of “White Trash.” 
B. Procedural History 
 
On 7 November 2010, a warrant for arrest was issued 
charging Defendant with obtaining property by false pretenses.  
On 18 November 2010, a warrant for arrest was issued charging 
-8- 
Defendant with felonious larceny and two additional counts of 
obtaining property by false pretenses.  On 21 February 2011, the 
New Hanover County grand jury returned bills of indictment 
charging Defendant with felonious larceny, felonious breaking or 
entering into a trailer, and five counts of obtaining property 
by false pretenses.  The charges against Defendant came on for 
trial before the trial court and a jury at the 12 September 2011 
criminal session of New Hanover County Superior Court.  On 15 
September 2011, the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant 
guilty of misdemeanor larceny, felonious breaking or entering a 
trailer, and five counts of obtaining property by false 
pretenses.  At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing hearing, 
the trial court entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term 
of 8 to 10 months imprisonment based upon his consolidated 
convictions for misdemeanor larceny and felonious breaking or 
entering a trailer and to two consecutive terms of 11 to 14 
months imprisonment based upon his consolidated convictions for 
obtaining property by false pretenses.  On 15 October 2013, 
Defendant filed a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of 
certiorari by this Court.  This Court granted Defendant’s 
certiorari petition on 31 October 2013. 
II. Substantive Legal Analysis 
-9- 
In his initial challenge to the trial court’s judgments, 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by 
permitting Detective Tindall to testify that she moved forward 
with her investigation into the allegations that Ms. Medina had 
made against Defendant because she believed that Ms. Medina was 
telling her the truth.  More specifically, Defendant contends 
that the challenged testimony constituted an impermissible 
vouching for Ms. Medina’s credibility in a case in which the 
only contested issue was the relative credibility of Ms. Medina 
and Defendant.  Defendant’s argument has merit. 
A. Standard of Review 
 
As he candidly concedes in his brief, Defendant did not 
object to the admission of the challenged portion of Detective 
Tindall’s testimony at trial.  For that reason, our evaluation 
of the validity of Defendant’s contention is limited to 
determining whether the admission of the challenged portion of 
Detective Tindall’s testimony constituted plain error.  A plain 
error is an error that is “so fundamental that it undermines the 
fairness of the trial, or [has] a probable impact on the guilty 
verdict.”  State v. Floyd, 148 N.C. App. 290, 295, 558 S.E.2d 
237, 240 (2002).  In order to obtain relief on plain error 
grounds, “[D]efendant must convince this Court not only that 
there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably 
-10- 
would have reached a different result.”  State v. Jordan, 333 
N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993). 
B. Relevant Legal Principles 
 
“It is fundamental to a fair trial that the credibility of 
the witnesses be determined by the jury.”  State v. Hannon, 118 
N.C. App. 448, 451, 455 S.E.2d 494, 496 (1995) (citing State v. 
Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 587, 347 S.E.2d 72, 73-74 (1986)).  
“The jury is the lie detector in the courtroom and is the only 
proper entity to perform the ultimate function of every trial—
determination of the truth.”  State v. Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 621, 
350 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1986).  For that reason, it is well 
established that “a witness may not vouch for the credibility of 
a victim,” State v. Giddens, 199 N.C. App. 115, 121, 681 S.E.2d 
504, 508 (2009), aff’d, 363 N.C. 826, 689 S.E.2d 858-59 (2010), 
with this rule being applicable regardless of whether the 
improper vouching for the credibility of another witness occurs 
during the testimony of an expert, State v. Dixon, 150 N.C. App. 
46, 52, 563 S.E.2d 594, 598 (2002) (stating that “[e]xpert 
opinion testimony is not admissible to establish the credibility 
of the victim as a witness”), aff’d 356 N.C. 428, 571 S.E.2d 584 
(2002), or a lay witness.  State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 16-
17, 340 S.E.2d 35, 36-37 (1986) (holding that the trial court 
-11- 
erred by allowing the alleged victim’s mother to testify that 
her daughter tells the truth). 
C. Plain Error Analysis 
 
In the course of Detective Tindall’s testimony on direct 
examination, the State and Detective Tindall engaged in the 
following colloquy: 
[Prosecutor]:  At any point did you ever 
question this case, this has a lot of family 
drama? 
 
[Det. Tindall]:  Yes 
 
[Prosecutor]:  What made you go forward? 
 
[Det. Tindall]:  [Ms. Medina] seemed to be 
telling me the truth, she gave me all the 
information possible that she had and we are 
required to investigate everything to the 
fullest. 
 
By testifying that Ms. Medina seemed to be telling her the 
truth, Detective Tindall vouched for Ms. Medina’s credibility,1 a 
result that is clearly forbidden by basic principles of North 
Carolina evidence law.  Giddens, 199 N.C. App. at 121, 681 
S.E.2d at 508.  As a result of the fact that testimony of the 
type given by Detective Tindall is clearly inadmissible, the 
                     
1Although our dissenting colleague argues that Detective 
Tindall’s testimony did not vouch for the credibility of a 
witness, the record reflects that Ms. Medina testified at trial 
and that Detective Tindall’s explanation for her decision to 
continue the investigation stemmed from her belief that Ms. 
Medina was telling the truth.  Under that set of circumstances, 
we have no hesitation in concluding that Detective Tindall 
vouched for Ms. Medina’s credibility. 
-12- 
only remaining question for our consideration is whether the 
jury would have probably reached a different outcome had it not 
been allowed to hear the challenged portion of Detective 
Tindall’s testimony. 
The importance of Ms. Medina’s testimony to the State’s 
case against Defendant should be apparent from even a cursory 
examination of the record.  Simply put, the State’s case hinged 
almost entirely on Ms. Medina’s credibility.  As a result of the 
fact that Defendant freely admitted that he had pawned the tools 
that Ms. Medina accused him of converting to his own use, the 
extent to which the jury convicted or acquitted Defendant 
necessarily depended on whether the jury believed Defendant’s 
claim to have been authorized to pawn the tools in question by 
Ms. Medina or whether the jury believed the State’s assertion 
that Defendant took the tools from the storage trailers and 
pawned them without obtaining Ms. Medina’s permission. 
The only evidence presented at trial to the effect that 
Defendant lacked permission to pawn the Medinas’ tools consisted 
of Ms. Medina’s testimony to that effect, which Defendant 
directly disputed when he took the witness stand.  As a result 
of 
the 
fact 
that 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
have 
the 
responsibility 
of 
conducting 
a 
fair 
investigation 
before 
initiating criminal charges against anyone, the jury “most 
-13- 
likely gave [Detective Tindall’s] opinion more weight than a lay 
opinion.”  Giddens, 199 N.C. App. at 122, 681 S.E.2d at 508.  As 
a result, given the importance that the jury probably gave to 
Detective Tindall’s assessment of the relative credibility of 
the positions taken by Ms. Medina and Defendant and the fact 
that the outcome in this case depended largely on Ms. Medina’s 
credibility, we have no hesitation in holding that the admission 
of the challenged portion of Detective Tindall’s testimony 
constituted plain error.  Hannon, 118 N.C. App. 448, 451, 455 
S.E.2d 494, 496 (stating that “the admission of such an opinion 
is plain error when the State’s case depends largely on the 
prosecuting witness’s credibility”); see also Giddens, 199 N.C. 
App. at 122, 681 S.E.2d at 508 (holding that the trial court 
committed plain error by allowing the admission of non-expert 
testimony 
that 
the 
Department 
of 
Social 
Services 
had 
substantiated a claim of sexual abuse given that the only 
evidence to that effect in the record was the children’s 
testimony and their prior consistent statements). 
 
In attempting to persuade us to reach a different result, 
the State relies upon our decision in State v. O’Hanlan, 153 
N.C. App. 546, 570 S.E.2d 751 (2002), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 
158, 593 S.E.2d 397-98 (2004), in which a law enforcement 
officer testified that he had refrained from conducting a more 
-14- 
thorough investigation of the available physical evidence in a 
sexual assault case because the victim of the sexual assault was 
able to positively identify her assailant.  In upholding the 
defendant’s conviction, we rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the officer had impermissibly vouched for the witness’ 
credibility, holding that, instead of expressing an opinion that 
the victim had, in fact, been assaulted, the officer had merely 
explained why he did not request more thorough testing of the 
physical evidence during the course of his investigation and 
stated that the officer’s testimony was “helpful to the fact-
finder in presenting a clear understanding of his investigative 
process.”  O’Hanlan, 153 N.C. App. at 563, 570 S.E.2d at 762.   
Although the State asserts that the challenged portion of 
Detective Tindall’s testimony was admissible on the basis of the 
same logic that we deemed persuasive in O’Hanlan, we do not 
believe that O’Hanlan is controlling here given that, in 
O’Hanlan, the defendant specifically challenged the officer’s 
failure to conduct additional testing of the physical evidence 
on cross-examination while Defendant never questioned Detective 
Tindall’s decision to proceed to have charges taken out against 
Defendant.2  In view of the fact that Defendant did not directly 
                     
2Similarly, 
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
suggest 
that 
Detective 
Tindall’s testimony was admissible, our dissenting colleague 
relies upon our decision in State v. Westall, 116 N.C. App. 534, 
-15- 
challenge Detective Tindall’s decision to proceed against him, 
there was no need for the State to explain why she did so.3  As a 
result, O’Hanlan provides no basis for a decision in the State’s 
favor.4 
III. Conclusion 
                                                                  
546-47, 449 S.E.2d 24, 31-32 (1994), in which we held that the 
trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of an 
investigating officer to the effect that he had not taken notes 
during the interview of a particular witness because he believed 
that the witness was lying given that the officer had been 
questioned on cross-examination about his failure to take notes 
during his interview of the witness.  We do not believe that 
Westall is relevant to this case given that Detective Tindall 
made the statement that is discussed in the text on direct 
examination and had never been subject to cross-examination 
concerning 
the 
reason 
that 
she 
decided 
to 
pursue 
the 
investigation. 
 
3Admittedly, Defendant questioned Ms. Medina on cross-
examination in such a manner as to challenge her credibility.  
Although the State argues that Defendant’s decision to question 
Ms. Medina in this manner authorized the admission of the 
challenged portion of Detective Tindall’s testimony pursuant to 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(a) (providing that “[t]he 
credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence . . . in 
the form of reputation or opinion as provided in [N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 8C-1,] Rule 405(a),” subject to the limitation that “(1) 
such evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness” and that “(2) evidence of truthful character is 
admissible only after the character of the witness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise”), we do 
not find this argument persuasive given that Detective Tindall’s 
testimony was not focused on Ms. Medina’s “character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness” and given that Ms. Medina’s 
character, as compared to her credibility, had not been 
attacked. 
 
4As a result of our determination that Defendant is entitled 
to a new trial for the reason discussed in the text, we need not 
address Defendant’s remaining challenge to the trial court’s 
judgments. 
-16- 
 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
trial court committed plain error by permitting Detective 
Tindall to improperly vouch for Ms. Medina’s credibility.  As a 
result, Defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
 
NEW TRIAL. 
 
Judges ELMORE concurs. 
Judge BRYANT dissents in separate opinion.
NO. COA14-490 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  16 December 2014 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
New Hanover County 
Nos. 10 CRS 61706, 62183 
 
 
BO ANDERSON TAYLOR 
 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge, dissenting. 
 
The majority remands for a new trial based on their 
determination that the trial court committed plain error in 
allowing Detective Tindall’s testimony that “[Ms. Medina] seemed 
to be telling me the truth[.]”  Because I do not believe the 
admission of that testimony meets the threshold needed for plain 
error, I respectfully dissent. 
 
As 
acknowledged 
in 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
“[i]t 
is 
fundamental to a fair trial that the credibility of the 
witnesses be determined by the jury.” Hannon, 118 N.C. App. at 
451, 455 S.E.2d at 496 (citation omitted).  And, I would hold 
that in this case, the jury’s ability to make such a credibility 
determination about Ms. Medina—a woman thirty-one years old and 
mother of four—who testified before them, was unimpeded. 
-18- 
 
Detective Tindall testified that she investigated the 
claims made by Ms. Medina, and the detective was aware of the 
“family drama” surrounding defendant and Ms. Medina. 
A family member advised me that [defendant] 
was asked to pawn the items for [Ms. 
Medina], that [Ms. Medina] had stolen Five 
Hundred 
Dollars 
from 
her 
employer. 
I 
investigated that and learned that there was 
no evidence of this occurring so, therefore, 
[Ms. Medina] was never charged and I had no 
evidence. 
 
When asked what made her move forward, Detective Tindall 
testified, “[Ms. Medina] seemed to be telling me the truth, she 
gave me all the information possible that she had and we are 
required to investigate everything to the fullest.”  Detective 
Tindall expressed a lay opinion in response to a proper question 
regarding why she moved forward with her investigation and 
charges.5  Furthermore, Detective Tindall provided the basis for 
her opinion: “she gave me all the information possible that she 
had . . . .”  See State v. Westall, 116 N.C. App. 534, 546—47, 
449 S.E.2d 24, 31—32 (1994) (holding no error where the 
detective expressed his lay opinion that the defendant was not 
                     
5  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2013) (“If the witness is 
not testifying as an expert, [her] testimony in the form of 
opinions 
or 
inferences 
is 
limited 
to 
those 
opinions 
or 
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of 
the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.”). 
-19- 
 
being truthful during an interview as a basis for the 
detective’s failure to take any notes during the interview). 
For error to rise to the level that it requires a new 
trial, when no objection was made at trial and the alleged error 
is brought forth for the first time on appeal, such error must 
be 
fundamental error, something so basic, so 
prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that  
justice cannot have been done, or where the 
error is grave error which amounts to a 
denial 
of 
a 
fundamental 
right 
of 
the 
accused, or the error has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice or in the denial to 
appellant of a fair trial . . . . 
 
Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516—17, 723 S.E.2d at 333 (citation 
omitted).  We apply the plain error rule cautiously and only in 
exceptional 
cases 
where 
the 
defendant 
can 
show 
extreme 
prejudice.  Such is not the case on this record.  Defendant 
challenges the detective’s response to a question regarding the 
investigation.  The response was not one in which the detective 
was vouching for the credibility of a trial witness.  Such a 
response cannot be deemed a fundamental error resulting in the 
denial of a fair trial to defendant.  Therefore, because 
defendant cannot meet his burden and show plain error, defendant 
is not entitled to a new trial.  Accordingly, I would overrule 
-20- 
 
defendant’s argument, acknowledge the verdict of the jury, and 
affirm the judgment of the trial court.