Title: DeCoals, Inc. v. BD. OF ZONING APPEALS, ETC.

State: west-virginia

Issuer: West Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

284 S.E.2d 856 (1981) DeCOALS, INC. v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF CITY OF WESTOVER Francis Teter, etc., et al. No. 14568. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. December 2, 1981. *857 Steptoe & Johnson, Susan S. Brewer and Robert M. Steptoe, Jr., Clarksburg, Haden & Heiskell and Charles H. Haden, Morgantown, for appellant. Solomon & Solomon and David L. Solomon, Morgantown, for appellees. HARSHBARGER, Chief Justice: DeCoals, Inc. asked us to reinstate its building permit that was rescinded by the Board of Zoning Appeals of Westover, Monongalia County. In 1976, Westover's mayor approved DeCoals' application for a permit to construct a coal tipple on its "industrial" zoned Monongahela riverside property, in which zone another tipple has operated for many years. DeCoals had previously received permits from the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources, West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commission, Department of the Army Corps of Engineers, and the City of Morgantown (Morgantown is across the river from DeCoals' property). Citizens' from a neighboring residential area appealed their mayor's action to the board, claiming they would be adversely affected by dust, noise and property devaluation; and by a 3-2 decision, after a hearing, that board rescinded the permit. DeCoals' writ of certiorari to Monongalia County's circuit court was granted, but that court affirmed the board's decision that DeCoals could not meet Westover zoning ordinance performance standards. West Virginia Code, 8-24-55, empowers a board of zoning appeals to "(1) [h]ear and determine appeals from and review any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an administrative official or board charged with the enforcement of any ordinance or rule and regulation adopted pursuant to sections thirty-nine through forty-nine [§§ 8-24-39 to 8-24-49] of this article". Westover's zoning ordinance authorizes its mayor to enforce this law, Westover Zoning Ordinance, § 20, and "[a]ny decision of the Mayor in enforcement of this ordinance may be appealed by any person claiming to be adversely affected by such decision," Westover Zoning Ordinance, § 22(D). Subsection (F) of § 22, following Code, 8-24-55, provides: Therefore, the board had authority and jurisdiction to rescind a permit. A decision by a board of zoning appeals may be reviewed by certiorari in a circuit court, Code, 8-24-59, and the scope of review is defined at Code, 8-24-64: Judge Starcher supplemented certiorari evidence with additional testimony as specifically authorized by Code, 8-24-64, supra. We have delineated grounds for reversal of board of zoning appeals decisions in Wolfe v. Forbes, W.Va., 217 S.E.2d 899 (1975). The presumption that a board's ruling is correct can be overcome by proof of lack of jurisdiction, plainly wrong factual findings or erroneous application of law; but here disputed acts justified this board to decide either way, and we cannot say its factual findings were plainly wrong. Section 16 of Westover's zoning ordinance regulates performance standards for industrial uses. In relevant part it requires: A. An Industrial Use is one which requires both buildings and open area for manufacturing, fabrication, processing, extraction, heavy repairing, dismantling, storage or disposal of equipment, raw materials, manufactured products or wastes, and provided the use conforms to the following performance standards: ..... ..... The board decided that DeCoals would be unable to comply with § 16(A)(3) and § 16(A)(8), and noncompliance would adversely affect the safety and general welfare of the citizenry. See generally, Housatonic Terminal Corp. v. Planning and Zoning Board of Milford, 168 Conn. 304, 362 A.2d 1375 (1975), wherein a permit was denied to an asphalt manufacturing plant on property zoned for heavy industrial uses because of failure to meet dust, noise and traffic standards. Local governments have a right to zone as an exercise of police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926). "[A] municipality may enact a zoning ordinance which restricts the use of property in designated districts within the municipality if the restrictions imposed by the ordinance are not arbitrary or unreasonable and bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the municipality." Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W.Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1949), Syllabus Point 7. Substantive due process considerations require legislation to be reasonable to be substantially related to a legitimate goal. One of government's primary purposes is protecting its constituency. "Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power." Huron Portland Cement Company v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442, 80 S. Ct. 813, 815, 4 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1960). If the end is legitimate, our inquiry is limited to whether the means are substantially related to that end. It is not ours to judge the wisdom or efficacy of those chosen means. Whether a no-dust standard is the best way to protect public health, welfare, safety and morals is a legislative judgment.[1] Annot., Zoning Laws Prescribing Conditions of Business or Manufacturing Designed to Avoid Nuisance or Annoyance, 173 A.L.R. 271 (1948 and later case service); Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d ed.), Volume 2, § 9.41. Zoning by pollution performance standards is reasonable. Is it, then, reasonable to prohibit escape of any dust? Are private property rights unreasonably sacrificed for public good? A community's sensible decisions protecting its health and welfare must prevail over any individual property rights; but is prohibition of any dust production sensible? If people jointly resolve that no more dust or noise inspired by industry in their community is acceptable, we should not interfere. They live there; they breathe the air; their lifestyles are affected by the noise and traffic; and they suffer whatever economic loss that results from regulations that eliminate certain potential industries that might there be put but for strict performance zoning rules. Any city is entitled to that choice. Alleged technical infeasibility or economic hardship need not be considered. Commonwealth Department of Environmental Resources v. Locust Point Quarries, Inc., 483 Pa. 350, 396 A.2d 1205 (1979); Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa.Cmwlth. 441, 279 A.2d 338 (1971), affirmed after remand, 7 Pa.Cmwlth. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). "Technology-forcing" pollution regulations have been approved, Union Electric Company v. Environmental Pollution Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 96 S. Ct. 2518, 49 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1976). It is a fairly debatable issue whether an absolute prohibition against dust is unreasonable or arbitrary, and "[c]ourts are not disposed to declare an ordinance invalid in whole or in part where it is fairly debatable as to whether the action of the municipality is arbitrary or unreasonable." Town of Stonewood v. Bell, W.Va., 270 S.E.2d 787, 790 (1980). This "fairly debatable" device for decision has been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions.[2] Courts have written that a no-dust standard does not preclude development of any industry in an industrial zone. If it did, there might be a different issue.[3] We find that this ordinance does not deny due process rights under federal or state constitutions. Economic regulation is subject to minimum equal protection scrutiny, but we are taught that grandfather clauses in zoning laws do not deny equal protection. As to the attack upon the ordinance because of arbitrary classification, this question has been so often discussed that nothing further need be said. The ordinance applies equally to all coming within its terms, and the fact that other businesses might have been included does not make such arbitrary classification as annuls the legislation. Nor does it make classification illegal because certain cities are included and others omitted in the *861 statute. Eckerson v. Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452, 115 N.W. 177. Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 36 S. Ct. 206 supra, at 210, 60 L. Ed. 396. We recognize a substantial problem caused by grandfather performance standard zoning clauses. Nonetheless, Westover is entitled to determine that "enough is enough", choosing not to interfere with property uses in existence when its zoning ordinance was enacted, but to prevent further intrusion upon air and noise quality by yet to be developed industries. The United States Supreme Court recently wrote about whether a zoning restriction such as this was a "taking of property requiring just compensation" in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106, 112-113: ..... We find that federal and state law support this trial court in all respects. Affirmed. [1] Dust has been declared a nuisance in many cases. See Annot., Dust as Nuisance, 24 A.L. R.2d 194 (1952 and later case service). [2] 82 Am.Jur.2d, Zoning and Planning, § 29; 48 A.L.R.3d 1210 (1973); 101A C.J.S., Zoning and Land Planning, § 269, Footnote 6. [3] Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967). This scriviner must confess to serious reservations about this blanket "no dust of any kind" restriction.