Title: Cosner v. Ridinger

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cosner v. Ridinger1994 WY 110882 P.2d 1243Case Number: 93-220Decided: 10/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Harlan B. 
COSNER,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Shari L. RIDINGER, f/k/a 
Shari L. Cosner, f/k/a Shari L. Espy; Alan Claire Zimmerman; Scott P. Espy; John 
H. Bluher; Kathleen A. Hunt; Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Attorneys at Law; and 
Michael M. Hoch,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Albany County, Larry L. Lehman, J.

 

Mrg Simon of 
Morrill, Brown & Thomas, Rapid City, SD, for appellant

Cary R. Alburn, 
III, Laramie, for appellee Ridinger.

Glenn A. Duncan, 
Laramie, for appellee Zimmerman.

University of 
Wyoming Legal Services Program, John M. Burman, Faculty Advisor, Paula J. 
MacMurdo and Susan L. Sellers, Student Interns, Laramie, for appellee Scott 
P. Espy.

Bruce A. 
Salzburg of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellee Bluher.

J. Patrick Hand 
of Hand & Campbell, P.C., Douglas, for appellees Hunt and Smith, 
Stanfield & Scott.

Michael M. Hoch, 
Laramie, for appellee Hoch.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE*, MACY 
and TAYLOR, JJ.

* Retired July 6, 
1994.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The problems 
presented in this case arise out of a claim of wrongful interference with 
parental rights. After his complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, 
this appeal was taken by Harlan B. Cosner (Cosner) who is the natural father of 
the child. The other parties include the mother (Ridinger), the maternal 
grandmother (Zimmerman), a second husband (Espy), and several attorneys, 
including the firm of one attorney, who represented the parties in proceedings 
relating to the custody and guardianship of the child. The primary issue is 
whether the complaint states sufficient facts to allege a claim for interference 
with parental rights. Dependent claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, negligence, and abuse of legal process were dismissed. In addition, 
Cosner resists the application of the statute of limitations to the claim 
against the attorneys who are named as defendants. We are satisfied the trial 
court ruled correctly in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, and there were no other errors found in the 
record. The order of dismissal with prejudice is affirmed.

[¶2]      Cosner, in his 
Appellant's Brief, presents the following issues for review:

I. Is the Complaint 
sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against Defendants Mother, Grandmother, and Second Husband?

II. Is the Complaint 
sufficient to state a cause of action for interference with parental 
rights?

III. Does Appellant's 
claim for interference with parental rights against the Attorney-Defendants fall 
within the statute of limitations?

IV. Is the Complaint 
sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence against the 
Attorney-Defendants?

A. Is the duty to provide 
notice imposed by constitutional law?

B. Is the duty to provide 
notice imposed by statute?

C. Do the 
Attorney-Defendants owe the duty to provide notice to Father?

V. Is the Complaint 
sufficient to state a cause of action for abuse of legal process against the 
Defendants?

[¶3]      In the Brief of 
Appellee Shari L. Ridinger, the issues are described in this way:

For purposes of this 
Appellee's Brief, it is not necessary for us to address issues III and IV, 
listed in Appellant's Brief, as they do not apply to this Appellee. We have no 
quarrel with Appellant's description of the issues presented, with regard to 
issues I, II, and V. They are the only issues applicable to this 
Appellee.

In the Brief for 
Appellee Zimmerman, this statement of the issues is incorporated:

Does the Appellant's 
Complaint state a recognizable cause of action against the Defendant Grandmother 
under Wyoming law? The issues being whether or not the grandmother owed a duty 
to hunt down and notify the Appellant of her Wyoming guardianship proceeding to 
the extent that the breach of that duty would constitute negligence, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process or interference with parental 
rights on her part.

In the Brief of 
Appellee Scott P. Espy, the issues are stated to be:

A. Should this Court 
recognize the proposed tort of interference with the non-custodial parent's 
visitation rights?

B. Did the Plaintiff 
allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for abuse of 
process?

C. Did the Plaintiff 
allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress?

[¶4]      Briefs also have 
been submitted by the attorneys who are named as parties in this case. In the 
Brief of Appellee John H. Bluher, the issues are stated in this way:

Whether Appellee Bluher 
owed any duty to Appellant, the breach of which constitutes negligence, to 
notify him of a petition for guardianship filed in December of 1984, when the 
statute governing such actions required no such notice?

Whether, on the facts of 
this case, a claim exists sounding in abuse of process?

Whether this court should 
recognize the tort of interference with parental rights, and if so, whether the 
court should make counsel for a tortfeasor personally liable for the conduct of 
his client?

The issues 
articulated in the Brief of Appellees, Kathleen A. Hunt, and Smith, Stanfield 
& Scott, Attorneys at Law, are:

A. Should Appellant's 
Appeal be dismissed for substantial non-compliance with Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure?

B. Should Appellant's 
Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Appellee's (Hunt and Smith Stanfield & 
Scott) Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Non-Involvement?

C. Should the Trial 
Court's Decision and Order of Dismissal be upheld on any of several 
grounds?

In the Brief of 
Appellee - Michael M. Hoch, this statement of the issues appears:

Did Attorney Hoch have a 
legal duty to notify Cosner of the Habeas Corpus Proceedings as filed on 
Ridinger's behalf?

Did Attorney Hoch have a 
legal duty to notify Cosner of the guardianship proceedings as filed on 
Zimmerman's behalf?

Did Attorney Hoch's 
conduct result in "abuse of process"?

Is the tort "interference 
with parental rights" cognizable in Wyoming in light of the facts 
herein?

In Cosner's 
Appellant's Reply Brief, additional issues are encompassed which are stated to 
be:

I. Have the parties 
complied with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure?

A. Has Appellant complied 
with the Rules?

B. Have the Appellees 
Bluher, Hunt, Smith, Stanfield & Scott, and Hoch failed to comply with 
substantive provisions of the Rules?

* * * * * *

(II. through VI. are 
identical to issues in Cosner's Appellant's Brief.)

VII. Did the trial court 
properly deny the motion to dismiss based on the affidavit of non-involvement of 
Hunt and the Law Firm? (Issues II through VI are repetitions of the issues 
incorporated in Cosner's Appellant's Brief.)

[¶5]      The facts in this 
case cover a period of more than ten years. Cosner and Ridinger are the parents 
of April Lynn Cosner (April) who was born on April 6, 1980. The couple were 
married in Oregon and, not long after the marriage, the family moved to Lowry 
Air Force Base near Aurora, Colorado, where Cosner was stationed. In 1981, 
Ridinger returned to Oregon, with April, where Ridinger filed for divorce. That 
divorce was granted in late May or early June of 1982. Under the decree, 
Ridinger was awarded physical custody of April, and Cosner received visitation 
rights. Sometime in July of 1982 Cosner remarried. Ridinger also remarried. Espy 
was Ridinger's new husband, and they moved to Laramie with April. 

[¶6]      Ridinger and Espy 
then were divorced in December of 1984. Bluher represented Espy in the divorce 
proceedings. In accordance with an agreement with Ridinger, Espy assumed the 
care and custody of April in Wyoming. Espy then filed a petition for 
guardianship of April, still represented by Bluher. On the same day, Ridinger 
filed a petition for guardianship in the district court of Albany County, in 
which she requested that Espy be appointed the legal guardian of April. Espy's 
request for guardianship was never disposed of by court order, but he maintained 
custody of April for about the next six years.

[¶7]      A dispute then 
arose between Ridinger and Espy, and Ridinger filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in Albany County, in which she sought to have April returned to 
her custody. The petition was filed by Ridinger's attorney, Hoch. In the habeas 
proceeding, Espy was represented by Hunt of the firm of Smith, Stanfield & 
Scott. A little more than four months later, Zimmerman filed her petition for 
guardianship of April, also in Albany County. Zimmerman was represented by Hoch 
in connection with her petition for guardianship. Ultimately, Espy consented to 
Zimmerman's guardianship of April, and he withdrew his petition. A final order 
was entered appointing Zimmerman as April's guardian, with Espy appointed as 
successor guardian. April then moved to Oregon to live with Zimmerman. Cosner 
and Ridinger now reside in Oregon as well.

[¶8]      On March 25, 1993 
Cosner filed his complaint, in which all the appellees were named as defendants, 
in the district court for the Second Judicial District in Albany County. In his 
complaint, Cosner alleged that Ridinger, Zimmerman, and Espy intentionally 
interfered with his parental rights, and he also alleged they had committed 
negligent interference with his parental rights. He alleged Ridinger removed 
April from Oregon and hid her from him for nine years, assisted by Espy and 
Zimmerman. He also charged Ridinger, Zimmerman, and Espy with intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in concealing his daughter and preventing his 
visitation with her. As to the attorneys, Cosner alleged negligence in failing 
to use due diligence to locate him and provide him with notice of the 
guardianship and habeas corpus proceedings involving April. He also charged 
abuse of legal process as a tort committed by all the defendants.

[¶9]      All defendants 
filed motions to dismiss the complaint. On October 6, 1993, the district court 
entered its final order, dismissing Cosner's complaint with prejudice as to all 
parties, on the ground that it failed to state a claim or cause of action. 
Cosner appeals from that order.

[¶10]   In treating with the primary issue, 
Cosner urges this court to recognize the tort of intentional interference with 
parental rights as a valid claim in Wyoming. He contends his complaint 
adequately alleged the commission of this tort by Ridinger, Zimmerman, and Espy, 
and the commission of the tort of negligent interference with his parental 
rights by the attorneys. After citing a line of cases in which the tort has been 
recognized in a number of jurisdictions, Cosner lists the elements for a claim 
of interference with parental rights as follows:

First, the plaintiff must 
claim a parental right, either in terms of the right to custody or 
visitation, to contact with the child. Second, it must be alleged the 
plaintiff was deprived of such contact with the child. Third, it must also be 
claimed such deprivation was a result of a negligent or intentional act of the 
defendant(s). Some courts have also held the plaintiff must allege the existence 
of a prior positive relationship with the child. (Emphasis added, citation 
omitted.)

[¶11]   Cosner's statement of the first 
element, in which he alludes to a parent's right to custody or visitation 
as a prerequisite to stating a claim, is misleading. The jurisdictions 
recognizing this tort have limited the cause of action to the custodial parent 
and have not extended it to a non-custodial parent who is somehow deprived of 
visitation privileges. See Hinton v. Hinton, 436 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 943, 93 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1971); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 
61 N.W.2d 656 (1953); Oversmith v. Lake, 295 Mich. 627, 295 N.W. 339 
(1940); Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930); Lisker v. 
City of New York, 72 Misc.2d 85, 338 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1972); McBride v. 
Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 578 P.2d 1259 (1978); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 
Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977).

[¶12]   Many of these jurisdictions have 
recognized the claim for interference with parental rights based upon this 
language from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977):

One who, with knowledge 
that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a 
minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return 
to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the 
parent.

Comment c. to 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 explains:

When both parents 
entitled to custody and earnings. When the parents are by 
law jointly entitled to the custody and earnings of the child, no action can be 
brought against one of the parents who abducts or induces the child to leave the 
other. When by law only one parent is entitled to the custody and earnings of 
the child, only that parent can maintain an action under the rule stated in this 
Section. One parent may be liable to the other parent for the abduction of his 
own child if by judicial decree the sole custody of the child has been awarded 
to the other parent.

[¶13]   We are satisfied neither the 
pertinent authority from other jurisdictions, nor the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 700 supports the cause of action for interference with parental rights 
in this case. Cosner is not the custodial parent. We agree with the rationale 
set forth in Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). The 
Missouri Court of Appeals articulated the proposition that the visitation rights 
of a parent are not sufficiently significant to be protected by this 
court.

[¶14]   Furthermore, several jurisdictions 
have refused to adopt this cause of action, even in the case of the custodial 
parent, based upon the overriding public policy of what is in the best interests 
of the child. Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1992); Larson 
v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990). This public policy rationale was stated 
by the Minnesota court as follows:

Evidence is piling up 
that children can be devastated by divorce, and their continuing development can 
be detrimentally affected by subsequent events. * * *

For the good of our 
children, the law should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families 
fractured by the dissolution process. At a minimum, the law should not provide a 
means of escalating intrafamily warfare. * * *

It is clear that this 
tort would be used as a new weapon in such disputes. * * * The interest in 
compensation should not outweigh the effects of bitter accusations on young 
children. * * *

Creating this tort would 
create a new wrong. It would place innocent children in the middle of a 
vigorous, probably vicious, lawsuit between their parents.

Larson, 460 N.W.2d  at 45-46 
(citations omitted).

[¶15]   Wyoming has adopted as its public 
policy a paramount concern for the best interests of the child in connection 
with child support, custody, and visitation. That policy is articulated in WYO. 
STAT. § 20-2-113 (Cum.Supp. 1993), which states in pertinent part:

(a) In granting a divorce 
or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children 
as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the 
children. * * * If the court finds that both parents have shown the ability 
to act in the best interest of the child, the court may order any 
arrangement that encourages parents to share in the rights and responsibilities 
of rearing their children * * * The court which entered the decree has 
continuing subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the 
decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children 
as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires. * * * The court shall consider evidence of spouse abuse or child 
abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the child. (Emphasis 
added.)

Our cases echo 
this overriding interest in the best interests of the child in connection with 
child support and custody determinations. See e.g., Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993); Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321 (Wyo. 1990); 
Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶16]   We are satisfied no other 
jurisdiction would recognize this tort of intentional or negligent interference 
with parental rights in an instance in which it is asserted by a non-custodial 
parent. We decline to depart from that view and recognize the tort in this case. 
As to that claim, Cosner's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. The Order of Dismissal With Prejudice is affirmed as to these 
asserted causes of action.

[¶17]   Turning to the claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, we see no justification for 
recognizing Cosner's claim against Ridinger, Zimmerman, and Espy. In Leithead 
v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986), we adopted the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977) as the definition for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress:

(1) One who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

Comment d. to 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 defines outrageous conduct as that which 
goes "beyond all bounds of decency, and [is] to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Comment j. to the same section 
defines severe emotional distress as that which "is so severe that no reasonable 
man could be expected to endure it." In Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1067, we 
gave this example of what was not intentional infliction of emotional 
distress:

The ordinary person who 
is fired from his job might worry about his future and his ability to pay his 
bills. He might also lose sleep over it. But this is the kind of distress with 
which the ordinary person must be expected to cope. Appellant's allegations of 
distress are insufficient to create a jury question on the severity issue. We 
can safely say, as a matter of law, that his distress is not so severe as to be 
compensable.

See Wilder v. 
Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 235 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶18]   It is against this background that 
Cosner's complaint against Ridinger, Zimmerman, and Espy must be analyzed. The 
complaint essentially alleges extreme and outrageous conduct based on either 
knowingly and intentionally concealing April or, in the alternative, preventing 
Cosner from any contact or visitation with her.1 The essence of the special damages 
alleged in the complaint arising from intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is "expenses for legal and psychological counseling."

[¶19]   This second cause of action in the 
complaint alleges the identical conduct asserted as the basis for intentional 
interference with the parental rights claim. We have held that conduct does not 
suffice to state a tort claim for intentional interference with parental rights, 
and there are no facts alleged in the complaint supporting the intentional 
concealment of April or any prevention of Cosner from visiting with her. The 
conclusional allegations by Cosner do not suffice as factual allegations. 
Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1984); Champion Well Serv., 
Inc. v. NL Indus., 769 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1989). Consequently, there is nothing 
in the record to suggest any conduct by Ridinger, Zimmerman, or Espy was 
purposely directed against Cosner. As we have stated, "it is not our 
responsibility to search the record and ferret out material to support 
allegations of appellants." May v. Southeast Wyoming Mental Health 
Center, 866 P.2d 732, 740 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶20]   In his petition for guardianship, 
Espy asserted, "[t]here is no other known living relative in Albany County or 
the State of Wyoming except the mother." The allegation in Ridinger's petition 
was "[t]hat minor [April] has no other relative or family member in Albany 
County or the State of Wyoming." In Zimmerman's petition, the statement is, 
"[t]hat there are no blood relatives or natural parents in Laramie able to 
properly care for my granddaughter [April]." These statements are correct 
because Cosner was residing either in Oregon or Colorado during the guardianship 
and habeas corpus proceedings. Furthermore, the statements by Espy and Ridinger 
were made in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 3-2-101 (1977), which states in 
pertinent part:

Before making such 
[guardianship] appointment, the court or judge must cause notice to be given to 
any person having the care of such minor, incompetent or insane person, and to 
the relatives residing within the county. (Emphasis added.)

[¶21]   Zimmerman's petition was filed in 
accordance with the current version of WYO. STAT. § 3-2-102 (1985), which has 
been amended to state:

[N]otice of the filing of 
the petition shall be served upon the proposed ward and his custodian, if any, 
and his parent, child, or spouse who are known or who can be known with due 
diligence.

We can find no 
basis in the record for the proposition that Zimmerman had any knowledge of 
Cosner's whereabouts at the time she filed her petition. It was filed at least 
seven years after Cosner and Ridinger were divorced in 1982.

[¶22]   There is no factual allegation in 
the complaint that would demonstrate the lack of notice to Cosner of the 
guardianship proceedings was due to intentional or reckless acts of Ridinger, 
Zimmerman, or Espy which would overstep "all bounds of decency." The conduct of 
the appellees was not alleged in such a fashion as to cause it to fall within 
the ambit of "outrageousness" sufficient to state a tort claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. 
We do not choose to enlarge upon the definition in that section to extend it to 
apply to the facts of this case.

[¶23]   As to Cosner's abuse of process 
claim against all of the appellees, we perceive it to be sophistic. We have 
defined the elements for a claim of abuse of process as "(1) an ulterior 
purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process which is not proper in 
the regular conduct of the legal proceeding." Mummery v. Polk, 770 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo. 1989); Bosler v. Shuck, 714 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Wyo. 1986). 
See Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 
1986). Cosner alleges the filing of the various guardianship and habeas corpus 
proceedings without notice to him constitutes abuse of process. He asserts 
concealment of April or denial of visitation is the ulterior purpose. The 
allegations of the complaint do not suffice for this claim. Other than 
conclusional statements, there are no factual allegations of ulterior purpose. 
Nothing improper or willful is alleged with respect to the filing of the various 
actions out of concern for April's livelihood and well-being.

[¶24]   We have resolved Cosner's claims 
against the attorneys for abuse of process and for negligent interference with 
parental rights. The abuse of process claim is specious, and we are not willing 
to recognize a claim for interference with parental rights, either intentional 
or negligent in this case. Those two issues can be disposed of as well by our 
holding addressing the allegation of negligence against the 
attorneys.

[¶25]   In deciding Cosner's allegations of 
negligence against the attorneys for failing to use due diligence to locate him 
or to provide him with notice of the guardianship or habeas corpus proceedings, 
we return to our ruling in Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196 (Wyo. 1990). In 
Zebre, the trial court ruled that a real estate lease prepared by an 
attorney, with the assistance of the clients he represented, was unconscionable 
as to Brooks. The court ordered rescission of the contract and appropriate 
restitution. Zebre subsequently was granted a summary judgment with respect to 
Brooks' claims against him for negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. We 
affirmed the lower court's summary judgment, stating:

In order to recover for 
negligence or gross negligence, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate all 
necessary elements of the tort including the element of a legal duty owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff. The issue of whether a duty is owed is strictly a 
question of law. * * * When we determine, however, that no legal duty exists 
from a defendant to the plaintiff, a summary judgment with respect to claims of 
negligence is appropriate and must be affirmed.

Zebre, 792 P.2d  at 200 
(citations omitted). In Zebre, 792 P.2d  at 201, we agreed with the 
district court that "an attorney owes no actionable duty to an adverse party 
emanating from the zealous representation of his own client."

[¶26]   The situation in this case is 
analogous. Cosner alleges negligence against attorneys who at no time 
represented him in any way. Bluher represented Espy; Hoch represented Ridinger 
and Zimmerman; and Hunt and her firm of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, 
represented Espy. Cosner's interests are certainly adverse to those of all of 
the appellees. Following Zebre, 792 P.2d  at 201, we hold "no cause of 
action for negligence exists against an attorney for an adversary." Since there 
was no claim available against the attorneys, we do not address the question of 
whether the statute of limitations has run against the attorney 
appellees.

[¶27]   The district court's Order of 
Dismissal With Prejudice is affirmed in all respects.

Footnotes

1 The complaint alleges in 
Count III, Paragraph 44:

Ridinger's conduct in 
knowingly and intentionally concealing April and preventing Plaintiff [Cosner] 
from any contact with April has been extreme and outrageous and has caused 
Plaintiff severe emotional distress to the extent that no reasonable man could 
be expected to endure said conduct in that Plaintiff has been denied the 
opportunity to establish any relationship with April.

The 
complaint alleges in Count IV, Paragraph 49:

Zimmerman's conduct in 
knowingly and intentionally preventing Plaintiff from visiting April has been 
extreme and outrageous and has caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress to the 
extent that no reasonable man could be expected to endure said 
conduct.

The 
complaint alleges in Count V, Paragraph 54:

Espy's conduct in 
knowingly and intentionally concealing April and preventing Plaintiff from any 
contact with April has been extreme and outrageous and has caused Plaintiff 
severe emotional distress to the extent that no reasonable man could be expected 
to endure said conduct in that Plaintiff has been denied the opportunity to 
establish any relationship with April.