Title: Barbara A. Schultz v. Roger D. Natwick, M.D.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 125 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0361 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Barbara A. Schultz, individually and as Special 
Administrator for the Estate of Lindsey Schultz, 
and Roger Schultz, individually, Mitchell 
Schultz, individually, Russell Schultz, 
individually, and 3M Medical Plan,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Roger D. Natwick, M.D., ORCC, Inc., f/k/a Red 
Cedar Clinic, S.C., d/b/a Red Cedar Clinic, Red 
Cedar Clinic-Mayo Health System, Ltd., and 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc.,  
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 281 
Reported at:  249 Wis. 2d 317, 638 N.W.2d 319 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 19, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn   
 
JUDGE: 
Rod W. Smeltzer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Terry L. Wade and Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi LLP, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and oral argument by Terry L. Wade. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by Michael 
B. Van Sicklen and Foley & Lardner, Madison, and oral argument 
by Michael B. Van Sicklen. 
 
 
2
 
For the defendant-co-appellant there was a brief by Mark E. 
Larson and Gutglass, Erickson, Bonville, Seibel & Falkner, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mark E. Larson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy J. Aiken, David 
M. Skoglind, and Williams C. Gleisner, III, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2002 WI 125 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 00-0361   
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 108) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Barbara A. Schultz, individually and as  
Special Administrator for the Estate of  
Lindsey Schultz, and Roger Schultz,  
individually, Mitchell Schultz,  
individually, Russell Schultz,  
individually, and 3M Medical Plan,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Roger D. Natwick, M.D., ORCC, Inc., f/k/a  
Red Cedar Clinic, S.C., d/b/a Red Cedar  
Clinic, Red Cedar Clinic-Mayo Health  
System, Ltd., and Physicians Insurance  
Company of Wisconsin, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 19, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals decision, Schultz v. Natwick, 2001 WI 
App 281, 249 Wis. 2d 317, 638 N.W.2d 319. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Dunn County, Rod W. Smeltzer, Judge.  The 
circuit court entered judgment for the plaintiffs.1  The circuit 
court concluded that the legislature's retroactive increase of 
the cap on damages for loss of society and companionship in 
wrongful 
death 
cases, 
from 
$150,000 
to 
$500,000, 
was 
constitutional.2  The circuit court judgment preceded Neiman v. 
American National Property & Casualty Co., 2000 WI 83, 236 
Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160.  In Neiman this court applied the 
balancing test set forth in Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 
531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), and declared the retroactive increase of 
the cap on these damages unconstitutional. 
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  Relying on Neiman, the court of appeals held 
that the $150,000 cap, not the $500,000 cap, applies in the 
present case, because the retroactive increase of the cap on 
damages recoverable for loss of society and companionship in 
wrongful death actions violates the due process rights of the 
defendants in the present case.3  We affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
                                                 
1 The plaintiffs are Barbara A. Schultz, individually and as 
Special Administrator for the Estate of Lindsey Schultz; Roger 
Schultz, individually; Mitchell Schultz, individually; Russell 
Schultz, individually; and 3M Medical Plan. 
2 See 1997 Wis. Act 89, § 4. 
3 The defendants are Roger D. Natwick, M.D.; ORCC, Inc., 
f/k/a Red Cedar Clinic, S.C., d/b/a Red Cedar Clinic; Red Cedar 
Clinic-Mayo Health System, Ltd.; Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin, Inc.; and Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The 
issue 
presented 
is 
whether 
the 
retroactive 
increase of the cap for damages for loss of society and 
companionship in wrongful death actions enacted by 1997 Wis. Act 
89 violates a tortfeasor's constitutional right to due process.4  
More specifically, the issue presented is the applicability of 
the Neiman decision to the present case. 
¶5 
We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
Neiman decision governs this case.  The retroactive increase of 
the cap on damages for the loss of society and companionship in 
wrongful 
death 
cases 
enacted 
by 
1997 
Wis. 
Act 
89 
is 
unconstitutional.  It is unnecessary for courts to apply the 
Martin balancing test anew to the particular facts of every case 
challenging the constitutionality of the retroactive increase of 
the cap. 
¶6 
The facts of this case are tragic.  Lindsey Schultz 
died on December 1, 1995, at the age of thirteen, from 
complications arising out of an appendectomy performed by Dr. 
Roger Natwick, an employee or agent of Red Cedar Clinic.  
Lindsey's parents, Barbara and Roger Schultz, and her minor 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides in pertinent part: "No person shall . . . be deprived 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law . . . ." 
Article 
I, 
Section 
1 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides:  "All people are born equally free and independent, 
and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty 
and 
the 
pursuit 
of 
happiness; 
to 
secure 
these 
rights, 
governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed." 
No. 
00-0361   
 
4 
 
siblings, brought suit against defendants Dr. Natwick, Red Cedar 
Clinic, and their insurer, Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin (PIC).  The Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund 
(Fund) 
was 
joined 
as 
a 
defendant 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 655.27(5) (1995-96).5 
¶7 
The parties agree that the plaintiffs' cause of action 
for wrongful death accrued on December 1, 1995, the date of the 
alleged malpractice and the injury.  The parties further 
stipulated that if the case were tried to a jury, the defendants 
would not contest liability and the plaintiffs would be awarded 
damages for loss of society and companionship of no less than 
the $500,000 cap. 
¶8 
At 
the 
time 
of 
Lindsey 
Schultz's 
death, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) (1995-96) placed a cap on damages in 
wrongful death actions for loss of society and companionship at 
$150,000.6  On April 13, 1998, the legislature adopted 1997 Wis. 
Act 89 at the urging of Lindsey Schultz's mother and others to 
enable families to pursue fair compensation for their losses.  
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 (1995-96) states:  
Plaintiff in wrongful death action . . . (4) Judgment 
for damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful death 
may be awarded to any person entitled to bring a 
wrongful death action.  Additional damages not to 
exceed $150,000 for loss of society and companionship 
may be awarded to the spouse, children or parents of 
the deceased. 
 
No. 
00-0361   
 
5 
 
The Schultz family was instrumental in attaining the passage of 
the new Act.  Then-Governor Tommy Thompson called the Act the 
"Justin-Lindsey Bill" in memory of Lindsey Schultz and Justin 
Sky Millar, who had also died tragically during a medical 
procedure.7 
¶9 
The Act increased the cap on damages in wrongful death 
cases involving a minor for loss of society and companionship 
from $150,000 to $500,000.8  The Act increasing the cap on 
damages expressly states that it applies to actions "commenced 
on the effective date" of the amendment, namely April 28, 1998.9  
                                                 
7 See Record 27, Ex. E. 
8 The Act also increased the cap on damages in wrongful 
death cases involving an adult from $150,000 to $350,000.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4) (1995-96) was amended by 1997 Wis. 
Act 89, § 3 to read as follows:  
Judgment 
for 
damages 
for 
pecuniary 
injury 
from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
death. 
In addition to increasing the cap on damages, 1997 Wis. Act 
89 added minor siblings of the deceased to the class of persons 
who are permitted to bring a wrongful death claim and recover 
damages for loss of society and companionship.  The issue of 
whether Lindsey's siblings are proper parties in this action is 
not before the court. 
9 1997 Wis. Act 89, § 4 states: "Initial Applicability: (1) 
This act first applies to actions commenced on the effective 
date of this subsection."  The effective date of the act was, as 
stated previously, April 28, 1998. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
6 
 
This 
provision 
results 
in 
the 
increased 
cap 
applying 
retroactively to causes of action that accrued prior to April 
28, 1998, if the lawsuit is commenced on or after April 28, 
1998. 
¶10 The plaintiffs filed their suit on May 11, 1998.  
Thus, under the express terms of the Act, the plaintiffs would 
receive the benefit of the retroactive increase of the cap and 
their maximum recovery would be set at $500,000. 
¶11 The plaintiffs urge this court to hold that the 
retroactive increase of the cap is constitutional as to them.  
The plaintiffs argue that the Neiman decision is limited to its 
facts.  They argue that Neiman renders the retroactive increase 
of the cap unconstitutional only as to the specific claim of the 
Neimans.  They further argue that the Neiman decision requires a 
court to conduct the Martin balancing test on a case-by-case 
basis to each claim for damages for loss of society and 
companionship that accrued before the effective date of the Act, 
but that was made in a suit brought on or after the effective 
date of the Act.  The defendants argue that the Neiman decision 
renders the retroactive increase of the cap on these damages 
unconstitutional for every claim for damages that accrued before 
the effective date of the amendment. 
¶12 The interpretation and application of the Neiman 
decision and the constitutional challenge to the retroactive 
application of a statute present questions of law that this 
court determines independent of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, but benefiting from their analyses. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
7 
 
¶13 The facts of the Neiman case are substantially similar 
to those in the present case.  Steve and Kristine Neiman lost a 
child as a result of an automobile accident on September 5, 
1995, when the cap on damages for loss of society and 
companionship was $150,000.  The Neimans' claim for underinsured 
motorist coverage was filed in August 1998, after the effective 
date of the Act increased the cap to $500,000.  The automobile 
liability insurance company, American National Property and 
Casualty Company (ANPAC), argued that the retroactive increase 
of the cap on damages violated its due process rights.10 
¶14 The Neiman court assessed the constitutionality of the 
retroactive cap increase by applying the Martin balancing test.11  
Pursuant to Martin, the Neiman court weighed the public interest 
served by retroactive application of the Act against the private 
interests that are overturned by retroactive application of the 
                                                 
10 We note, as did the court of appeals, that Neiman 
involved 
a 
first-party 
claim 
against 
the 
plaintiffs' 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage. 
 
The 
tortfeasor 
and 
the 
tortfeasor's liability insurer were not before the court.  As a 
result, the Neiman court often refers to the private interests 
of the plaintiffs' insurer.  In this case, the alleged 
tortfeasor is a party to the action.  The tortfeasor's insurers 
are also parties.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4) determines the 
extent of a tortfeasor's liability and does not differentiate 
between insured and uninsured tortfeasors.  See Schultz v. 
Natwick, 2001 WI App 281, ¶12 n.5, 249 Wis. 2d 317, 638 
N.W.2d 319. 
11 Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 201, 531 N.W.2d 70 
(1995)("To determine whether a retroactive statute comports with 
due process we must weigh the public interest served by the 
retroactive statute against the private interests that are 
overturned by it."). 
No. 
00-0361   
 
8 
 
Act, including an assessment of any unfairness inherent in such 
application.12  The court concluded in Neiman that a tortfeasor's 
exposure to liability for damages accrues on the date of injury13 
and that a retroactive increase of the cap on damages unfairly 
alters a tortfeasor's accrued right to fixed damages on that 
date.14  In addition, the court determined, over a two-justice 
dissent, that the public interest served by a retroactive 
increase of the cap on damages did not outweigh the harm caused 
by the unsettling of a tortfeasor's expectations.15  Thus, the 
Neiman court held that the retroactive application of the 
increase of the cap on damages to a claim that accrued before 
the effective date of the Act was unconstitutional. 
¶15 The Neiman decision did not expressly state whether 
the court was considering a challenge to the retroactive 
increase of the cap on the particular facts of that case alone.  
The language and logic of the Neiman decision, however, plainly 
extend to all cases affected by the retroactive increase of the 
cap enacted by 1997 Wis. Act 89 and are not limited to the facts 
of the Neiman case. 
                                                 
12 Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶15, 
236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160. 
13 Id., ¶20. 
14 Id., ¶¶21-22. 
15 Id., ¶¶24-31.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (joined by the 
author of this opinion) dissented, asserting that the public 
interests in full compensation to injured parties and access to 
the courts and legal counsel outweigh the private interests.  
Id., ¶¶45-49. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
9 
 
¶16 The language of the Neiman decision specifically 
extends to parties beyond the Neimans and ANPAC.  The Neiman 
decision expressly held that "a retroactive increase in damages 
available pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) unfairly alters 
settled property rights without achieving a broad public 
benefit.  As a result, the retroactive element of the statute is 
unconstitutional under our test set forth in Martin v. Richards 
(citation omitted)."16 
¶17 Furthermore, the Neiman decision explained: 
Defendants such as ANPAC, as well as individuals who 
have purchased a specific level of insurance, would 
reasonably rely upon the law as set forth by the 
courts 
and 
the 
legislature. 
 
The 
retroactive 
application of 1997 Wis. Act 89 deprived ANPAC, as 
well as other defendants in tort actions, of a 
meaningful 
notice 
of 
the 
potential 
increase 
in 
exposure to claims or an opportunity to increase 
premiums 
to 
pay 
the 
expense 
of 
this 
increased 
exposure.  
. . . The result for ANPAC, and other insurers 
and insureds, is that the retroactive change in law 
unfairly overturns settled expectations.17 
¶18 The plaintiffs rightly point out that in contrast to 
the language just quoted, some of the language in Neiman can be 
narrowly construed as limiting the holding to Neiman and ANPAC 
alone.  For example, the plaintiffs refer to the following 
passage framing the issue in the Neiman decision:  "The sole 
issue presented for review is whether retroactive application of 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶2. 
17 Id., ¶¶21-22. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
10 
 
the increase in wrongful death damages as provided in 1997 Wis. 
Act 89 violates ANPAC's due process rights . . . ."18 
¶19 In addition, the plaintiffs point to Martin, 192 
Wis. 2d 156, and Matthies v. Positive Safety Manufacturing Co., 
2001 WI 82, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842 (applying the Martin 
balancing test), arguing that the language this court uses when 
applying the Martin balancing test indicates a focus on the 
unfairness to the specific party challenging the retroactive 
statute. 
¶20 We agree with the plaintiffs that some of the language 
in these cases refers to particular litigants and particular 
facts.  One would expect, however, such particularized language.  
All cases involve particular litigants and particular facts, 
regardless of the breadth of the holding of the decision.  No 
determination regarding the invalidity of a statute can occur 
without applying the statute to particular litigants on a 
specific set of facts.19 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶8. 
19 Determining when an "as applied" challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute is appropriate and when a 
"facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
appropriate has long troubled courts and scholars alike.  See, 
e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1328 (2000); Alfred Hill, Some Realism About 
Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 647 (2002); 
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:  Facial Challenges and 
the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 359, 421-56 (1998). 
No. 
00-0361   
 
11 
 
¶21 Accordingly, we must focus not on the passages in 
Neiman referring specifically to Neiman and ANPAC but on the 
conclusions reached by the Neiman court. 
¶22 The plaintiffs take the position that the Neiman 
decision is intended to govern only those persons and entities 
similarly situated to the Neimans and ANPAC.  The plaintiffs 
urge that nothing in the Neiman decision suggests that its 
holding extends to all possible litigants.  The plaintiffs 
further contend that the Martin balancing test requires that a 
court 
make 
an 
individualized 
balancing 
of 
the 
parties' 
particular private interests against the public interest in 
every case.  We do not agree with the plaintiffs that Martin and 
Neiman require an individualized balancing of interests in every 
case. 
¶23 Martin created a two-prong balancing test.  Under the 
first 
prong, 
the 
court 
considers 
the 
private 
interests 
overturned by the retroactive legislation in question.20 
¶24 The plaintiffs argue that in Neiman, the private 
interests of the automobile liability insurance company (ANPAC) 
were unsettled by the retroactive increase of the cap because 
ANPAC had set its premiums based upon the earlier $150,000 
damages cap.  According to the plaintiffs, the defendants in the 
present case, by contrast, especially Dr. Natwick and PIC, 
neither ordered their affairs nor calculated their coverage 
based upon the $150,000 cap.  PIC issued its insurance policy to 
                                                 
20 Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶18. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
12 
 
Dr. Natwick and Red Cedar Clinic in 1995, when no cap on damages 
for loss of society and companionship existed in Wisconsin.  The 
plaintiffs therefore assert that the premiums were based upon 
the possibility of a judgment against either Dr. Natwick or Red 
Cedar Clinic far in excess of either $150,000 or $500,000.  
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that Dr. Natwick is covered 
through his policies and excess coverage provided by the Fund, 
regardless of the amount of the cap imposed, and that the Fund 
has 
never 
identified 
harm 
to 
any 
of 
its 
interests.21  
Consequently, the plaintiffs urge that the defendants' private 
interests in this case are different from the private interests 
of ANPAC and other insurers who adjusted their premiums to 
account for the imposition of the original $150,000 cap on 
damages. 
¶25 We disagree with the plaintiffs' characterization of 
the private interests in the Neiman decision.  The Neiman 
decision did not limit its holding to insurers who set premiums 
based upon the $150,000 cap for damages or to insureds who 
bought policies with particular coverage.  There was no specific 
inquiry in Neiman, as the dissent in Neiman points out, into the 
actual, particular harm suffered by ANPAC or any insureds.22  The 
                                                 
21 Because we hold that Neiman is dispositive of this case 
and that no re-balancing of interests is required on these 
facts, we need not address whether any potential harm to the 
Fund should be considered when weighing the private interests 
affected by retroactive application of 1997 Wis. Act 89. 
22 Neiman, 
236 
Wis. 2d 411, 
¶¶40-44 
(Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
00-0361   
 
13 
 
Neiman court engaged in a general discussion of meaningful 
notice to insureds of a potential increase in exposure to claims 
and an opportunity to insurers to increase premiums. 
¶26 While the plaintiffs would have the court focus on the 
premiums, fees, and assessments charged by PIC and the Fund, the 
Neiman decision assessed private interests by focusing on the 
fact that insurers and insureds had a right to have their 
maximum damages fixed at the date the cause of action accrued 
and concluded that the retroactive increase of the maximum 
damages unsettled these private interests.23  Dr. Natwick, PIC, 
and the Fund in the present case similarly had a right to have 
their liability fixed on the date of injury and their private 
interests were unsettled by the retroactive increase of the cap.   
¶27 The court of appeals correctly noted that the Neiman 
decision assessed private interests "universal to all tort 
defendants:  the substantive right, in cases where damages are 
specified by statute, to have the amount of liability fixed as 
of the date of injury."24 
¶28 Under the second prong of the Martin balancing test, 
the court examines the public interest served by the retroactive 
increase of the cap to determine whether the public interest 
outweighs the private interest it overturns.  In Neiman, the 
court identified the public interests purportedly served by the 
retroactive increase of the cap as "full compensation for loss 
                                                 
23 Id., ¶20. 
24 Schultz, 249 Wis. 2d 317, ¶18. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
14 
 
of society and companionship, deterrence of negligent conduct, 
and [ensuring] adequate legal representation" for victims.25  
These public interests do not change from litigant to litigant; 
they remain constant regardless of the particular parties 
affected. 
¶29 The 
Neiman 
court 
rejected 
the 
argument 
that 
a 
retroactive increase of the cap on damages was necessary to 
fulfill 
the 
public 
policy 
goal 
of 
"full 
compensation," 
concluding that the statutory cap on damages in force on the 
date of injury defined full compensation.26  The Neiman court 
also concluded that a retroactive increase of the cap on damages 
was not necessary to deter negligent conduct.27  Finally, the 
Neiman court also concluded that a retroactive increase of the 
cap on damages was not necessary to ensure access to the courts 
and legal counsel for those who have been injured by another's 
negligence.28 
¶30 The whole tenor and logic of the Neiman decision is 
that "the public interests identified would arguably support 
prospective application of an increase in damages for loss of 
society and companionship; however, these reasons provide weak 
support for retroactive increases in damages."29  Without a 
                                                 
25 Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶24. 
26 Id., ¶¶25-26. 
27 Id., ¶27. 
28 Id., ¶¶28-29. 
29 Id., ¶30. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
15 
 
stronger public interest underlying the retroactive increase of 
the cap, it remains unfair, according to Neiman, to unsettle 
tortfeasors' rights to have their liability fixed as of the date 
the cause of action accrued.  The reasoning and conclusions of 
the Neiman decision apply with equal force in the present case. 
¶31 In addition to the language and logic of the Neiman 
decision, the procedural history of the case provides further 
evidence that the Neiman decision held the retroactive increase 
of 
the 
cap 
on 
damages 
enacted 
by 
1997 
Wis. 
Act 
89 
unconstitutional in all cases.  This court accepted review of 
Neiman on bypass, aware that there were pending cases throughout 
Wisconsin presenting the issue of the constitutionality of the 
retroactive feature of the Act.30  In fact, this court was 
specifically aware of the claim of the plaintiffs in the present 
case.31  At the time the Neiman case was being considered by this 
                                                 
30 Id., ¶31. 
At the time briefs were submitted in Neiman, twelve 
different trial courts had issued decisions on whether the 
retroactive increase of the cap enacted by 1997 Wis. Act 89 was 
constitutional. 
 
See 
Brief 
and 
Appendix 
of 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents at 1 n.1, Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2000 
WI 83, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160. 
31 The plaintiffs in the present case filed an amicus brief 
in Neiman, as did the defendants, PIC and the Fund.  The 
plaintiffs originally filed their amicus brief in Timm v. YMCA, 
Case No. 99-0195.  Timm presented the same issue for review as 
Neiman and certification was accepted by this court in September 
1999.  The parties in Timm, however, reached a settlement, and 
the case was voluntarily dismissed in February 2000.  The 
plaintiffs' 
amicus 
brief, 
along 
with 
others, 
was 
then 
transferred to Neiman after that case was subsequently granted 
review. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
16 
 
court, nobody, including the plaintiffs in this case, asked that 
a ruling on retroactivity be limited to the facts presented in 
the Neiman case.  Indeed, in their amicus brief in Neiman, the 
plaintiffs in the present case argued that the facts of their 
own case "provide additional reasons and context for why this 
Court should uphold the Act in [Neiman] and in all other cases 
to which the Act applies."32 
¶32 The plaintiffs contend that our knowledge of other 
pending cases presenting the same issue does not compel the 
conclusion that Neiman declared the retroactive increase of the 
cap invalid in all cases.  While a case accepted on bypass will 
not always resolve every pending case presenting the same legal 
issue, the court of appeals correctly surmised that Neiman's 
broad language was intended to encompass all parties affected by 
the retroactive increase of the cap adopted by 1997 Wis. Act 
89.33  It would confuse our role as a court of last resort for 
                                                 
32 Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Barbara, Roger, 
Mitchell and Russell Schultz at 13, Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & 
Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160; see supra 
note 31. 
33 The court of appeals said in its decision in the present 
case: 
We doubt that the supreme court accepted the case [on 
bypass] solely to determine the rights of litigants 
who had one particular type of insurance coverage.  
Instead, we conclude that the court's references to 
"other 
defendants 
in 
tort 
actions," 
and 
"other 
insurers and insureds," and the court's balancing of 
broadly applicable private interests demonstrate that 
the court viewed the case as a facial challenge to the 
statute.  
Schultz, 249 Wis. 2d 317, ¶19 (citations omitted). 
No. 
00-0361   
 
17 
 
this court not to encompass all parties affected by the 
retroactive increase of the cap on damages when the decision 
does not expressly delineate the limits of the holding.34 
¶33 Finally, 
the 
plaintiffs 
argue 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11) requires a contrary result.  Section 
990.001(11) is a legislatively adopted canon of statutory 
interpretation relating to severability.  The canon provides 
that 
an 
unconstitutional 
provision 
or 
an 
unconstitutional 
application of a statute may be severed from the constitutional 
provisions or constitutional applications.  Section 990.001(11) 
reads as follows: 
The provisions of the statutes are severable.  The 
provisions of any session law are severable.  If any 
provision of the statutes or of a session law is 
invalid, or if the application of either to any person 
or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions or applications which can be 
given 
effect 
without 
the 
invalid 
provision 
or 
application. 
¶34 The plaintiffs argue that instead of severing the 
retroactive increase of the cap on damages, we should sever only 
those retroactive applications for which the Martin balancing 
test concludes that due process is violated.  The plaintiffs' 
                                                 
34 Because Neiman addressed an injury stemming from an 
automobile accident, the plaintiffs also argue that the court 
should not extend Neiman to medical malpractice cases, where 
greater deference is due to legislative enactments.  This claim 
is without merit.  Neiman struck down the retroactive increase 
in the damage cap in all wrongful death cases regardless of the 
underlying cause of death.  Moreover, nothing in the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) distinguishes medical malpractice cases 
from other types of wrongful death claims. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
18 
 
argument rests on a flawed premise.  The plaintiffs assume that 
Neiman invalidated the retroactive increase of the cap on 
damages only on the facts of that case.  Yet as discussed above, 
Neiman invalidated the retroactive increase of the cap on 
damages enacted in 1997 Wis. Act 89 in all cases. 
¶35 Thus, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
properly 
followed 
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11) 
by 
striking 
only 
the 
retroactive 
provision of 1997 Wis. Act 89 and leaving in place prospective 
increases of the cap on damages for the loss of society and 
companionship claims in wrongful death cases. 
¶36 We conclude that the court of appeals properly held 
that Neiman invalidated the retroactive increase of the cap on 
damages adopted by 1997 Wis. Act 89 for loss of society and 
companionship in a wrongful death suit generally, including the 
present case.  The only question remaining is whether there is 
any reason to overturn Neiman. 
¶37 Ordinarily, of course, we adhere to the principle of 
stare decisis.35  Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law 
will not be abandoned lightly.36  When existing law "is open to 
revision in every case, 'deciding cases becomes a mere exercise 
of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'"37  
                                                 
35 State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 
¶29, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.   
36 State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 441, 511 N.W.2d 591 
(1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1102 
(1995).   
No. 
00-0361   
 
19 
 
Consequently, this court has held that "any departure from the 
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification."38 
¶38 Although the result in Neiman is harsh for families of 
victims 
and 
contrary 
to 
the 
express 
direction 
of 
the 
legislature, the plaintiffs do not provide any justification, in 
this case, for overturning the Neiman decision.  Their case does 
not introduce evidence of any changes in the law that might 
undermine the rationale behind the Neiman decision; it does not 
show how Neiman renders the law incoherent or inconsistent.39  
Plaintiffs merely present a variation of the facts expressly 
discussed in Neiman and suggest that the court improperly 
weighed the public and private interests under the Martin 
balancing test.  However, no change in the law is justified 
simply by a "case with more egregious facts."40  Furthermore, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
37 Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶29 
(quoting Citizens Util. Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484, 513, 
534 N.W.2d 608 (1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)). 
38 State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 504, 579 N.W.2d 654 
(1998) (quoting Ariz. v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
39 See 
State 
v. 
Stevens, 
181 
Wis. 2d 410, 
442, 
511 
N.W.2d 591 (1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
515 
U.S. 
1102 
(1995) 
("Justification 
for 
departure 
from 
precedent could include changes or developments in the law that 
undermine the rationale behind a decision; the need to make a 
decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; or a showing 
that the precedent has become detrimental to coherence and 
consistency in the law."). 
40 Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 443 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) 
(quoting 
Welch 
v. 
State 
Farm 
Mut. 
Auto. 
Ins. 
Co., 122 
Wis. 2d 172, 
182, 
361 
N.W.2d 680 
(1985) 
(Steinmetz, 
J., 
dissenting)). 
No. 
00-0361   
 
20 
 
discussed above, these facts were already before the court when 
it decided Neiman. 
¶39 In sum, the court affirms the decision of the court of 
appeals.  We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
Neiman decision governs this case.  The retroactive increase of 
the cap on damages for the loss of society and companionship in 
wrongful 
death 
cases 
enacted 
by 
1997 
Wis. 
Act 
89 
is 
unconstitutional.  It is unnecessary to apply the Martin 
balancing test anew to the particular facts of every case 
challenging the constitutionality of the retroactive increase of 
the cap. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
00-0361   
 
 
 
1