Title: New Jersey v. Maisonet

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                      State v. Luis A. Maisonet (A-28-19) (083066)

Argued September 15, 2020 -- Decided March 23, 2021

RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court.

       The Court considers whether defendant Luis Maisonet was denied his
constitutional right to counsel when, on the day his murder trial was set to begin, he
sought an adjournment to see if he could hire a private attorney and his request was
denied.

       Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses in connection
with a September 2016 shooting. After learning that his ex-girlfriend and her new
boyfriend, Christopher Romero, were expecting a child, defendant went to the store in the
outlet mall where Romero worked, pulled out a handgun, and fatally shot Romero.
Defendant then walked to the nearby store where his ex-girlfriend worked and pointed
the gun at her before shooting himself in the chest area. Defendant was treated at the
hospital and was arrested days later. He requested that a public defender represent him.

        Trial was scheduled to start on December 4, 2017. By then, defendant had been
represented by the same assistant deputy public defender for fifteen months. Right before
jury selection was to begin, defendant asked the court for an adjournment. He stated that,
although he would have stayed with his attorney “all the way to the end” if he had taken a
plea, “I cannot go to trial with [appointed counsel]” because she had tried only two cases
in her career, neither of which were murder trials.

        The trial judge offered defendant two choices -- to hire his own attorney or to
represent himself -- and stated, “I don’t decide who represents you.” When defendant
interjected, the trial judge told defendant to stop talking and stated, “I have no reason to
believe that [appointed counsel] cannot represent you fairly and to the best of her ability.
She is an experienced lawyer.” The judge denied the adjournment request and indicated
that appointed counsel would represent defendant through trial.

       Defendant then repeated his request for a postponement to “go back and call
family . . . to see if they can get some money together” to hire a private lawyer. The
judge noted that they were “here for trial” and that defendant had known about the trial,
his plea offer, and who his attorney was “for a long period of time.” The judge again

                                             1
denied the adjournment request; when defendant pressed on, the judge asked defendant to
take a seat so she could bring the jury in.

        The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted defendant on all counts
presented. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions. The Court granted
certification limited to this question: “whether defendant’s constitutional right to counsel
of his choice was violated.”  240 N.J. 159 (2019).

HELD: The Court affirms settled principles of law that require trial judges to conduct a
“reasoned, thoughtful analysis” of certain factors when they consider a request for an
adjournment to hire new counsel. See State v. Kates,  216 N.J. 393, 396-97 (2014); State
v. Furguson,  198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 1985). If a trial judge does not conduct
the proper analysis, it may be necessary to reverse a conviction. But defendants are not
automatically entitled to a new trial. When a reviewing court can glean or infer the
relevant considerations from the record, it may evaluate the appropriate factors. The
Court does not find an actual deprivation of the right to counsel of choice here, so the
doctrine of structural error does not apply.

1. The trial court must strike a balance between (a) its right to control its own calendar
and the public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice and (b) a defendant’s
constitutional right to obtain counsel of his choice. To do so, New Jersey courts use eight
factors from United States v. Burton,  584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Kates
and Furguson. The Court reaffirms the use of those factors and reminds trial judges to
analyze them when defendants request an adjournment to obtain counsel. (pp. 11-13)

2. Trial courts have broad discretion in weighing the factors. An arbitrary or erroneous
ruling that amounts to an actual deprivation of the right to counsel of one’s choice
implicates structural error, and prejudice is presumed. But courts cannot presume
structural error from a trial court’s failure to ask questions or make explicit findings about
the Furguson factors if the record otherwise reveals that an adjournment to seek to hire
new counsel was not appropriate. If an appellate court can glean or infer the relevant
considerations from the record, it can analyze the factors to determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying an adjournment. (pp. 13-14)

3. The Court reviews in detail case law from the D.C. Circuit and other jurisdictions
which assess relevant factors on appeal in light of the record if the trial court neglected to
analyze them. That approach sensibly protects both the constitutional rights of
defendants and the public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice. (pp. 14-17)

4. The Court evaluates the Furguson factors on the record here; though thin, the record
allows consideration of nearly all of the factors. First, as to the length of the requested
delay, defendant’s request was open-ended, and he acknowledged he had not yet
approached either his family, to see if they could provide funds, or a private attorney.

                                              2
One can infer the delay would have been considerable. Second, the Court cannot tell
whether other continuances had been requested and granted. The Court measures the
third factor -- the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants and the court --
in part by the timing of the request. Here, the jurors were summoned, witnesses were
prepared, and the trial court’s schedule was cleared prior to defendant’s last-minute
request. (pp. 17-18)

5. As to the fourth factor, defendant’s sole reason for the request was that his lawyer
lacked sufficient experience. The trial court made an express finding there was no reason
to believe the experienced counsel could not represent defendant fairly. This implied the
trial court’s view that denying the continuance would not result in identifiable prejudice
to defendant, the seventh factor. Fifth, defendant alone contributed to the circumstance
that gave rise to the motion by waiting until the day of trial to ask for an adjournment and
failing to act with reasonable diligence. Sixth, no other competent counsel was prepared
to try the case: defendant had not yet approached his family or private counsel. As to the
complexity of the case, the eighth factor, no defendant can be expected to stand trial for
murder with an attorney who has not begun to prepare the case. (pp. 18-19)

6. The Court disapproves of what happened at the abbreviated hearing and directs that
trial courts analyze requests for continuances to hire counsel of choice in accordance with
settled case law. To accomplish that, trial judges should ask defendants questions
designed to elicit information relevant to the Furguson factors. That inquiry does not
have to be lengthy to facilitate a reasoned analysis of the applicable factors. (pp. 19-20)

       The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

        JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS, dissenting, writes that the trial court summarily
denied defendant’s request without conducting the level of analysis required, which is an
abuse of discretion. The trial court did not address the Furguson factors and also failed to
elicit any facts from defendant or conduct any inquiry regarding his request. Further, the
trial court’s assessment of counsel’s abilities cannot cure defendant’s own concerns
regarding his attorney’s abilities. Justice Pierre-Louis agrees that on an adequate factual
record, an appellate court can glean the relevant considerations and determine whether
the trial court appropriately denied an adjournment request, but not here. This case
involved a thin record of a brief proceeding during which defendant was not allowed to
speak to explain his request or take advantage of one of the two options the trial court
offered him before denying his request. In Justice Pierre-Louis’s view, this amounts to
structural error.

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON
join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS filed a
dissent, in which JUSTICE ALBIN joins.

                                             3
          SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                A-
28 September Term 2019
                          083066

                    State of New Jersey,

                   Plaintiff-Respondent,

                             v.

                     Luis A. Maisonet,

                   Defendant-Appellant.

           On certification to the Superior Court,
                     Appellate Division .

          Argued                      Decided
     September 15, 2020            March 23, 2021

   Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
   Defender, attorney; Margaret McLane, on the brief).

   Nicole L. Campellone, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
   cause for respondent (Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County
   Prosecutor, attorney; Nicole L. Campellone, of counsel
   and on the brief).

   Joe Johnson argued the cause for amicus curiae American
   Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil
   Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Joe
   Johnson, Jeanne LoCicero, and Alexander Shalom, on the
   brief).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

                             1
      In this case, defendant asked for an adjournment of his murder trial on

the day it was set to begin. He had been represented by an assistant deputy

public defender since his arrest. Fifteen months later, and a full year after his

indictment, he told the judge for the first time that he wanted to call family

members “to see if they can get some money together” so that he could hire “a

private lawyer.” After a brief exchange with defendant, the trial judge denied

the request. Defendant later challenged his conviction on the ground that he

was denied his constitutional right to counsel.

      Like the Appellate Division, we reject defendant’s claim. We also

affirm settled principles of law that require trial judges to conduct a “reasoned,

thoughtful analysis” of certain factors when they consider a request for an

adjournment to hire new counsel. See State v. Kates,  216 N.J. 393, 396-97

(2014) (discussing factors outlined in State v. Furguson,  198 N.J. Super. 395,

402 (App. Div. 1985)).

      If a trial judge does not conduct the proper analysis, as happened in this

case, it may be necessary to reverse a conviction and start anew. But

defendants are not automatically entitled to a new trial. When a reviewing

court can glean or infer the relevant considerations from the record, it may

evaluate the appropriate factors, as the Appellate Division did here.

                                        2
      The Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion under the

circumstances. We agree and affirm defendant’s conviction.

                                       I.

                                       A.

      The facts relating to the offense are not central to defendant’s argument

on appeal. For that reason, we summarize them briefly.

      Defendant Luis Maisonet and Jennifer Villanueva had a long-term

relationship that ended in 2015 or 2016. Defendant wanted to resume the

relationship afterward and texted Villanueva often. Over time, he also texted,

confronted, and threatened Christopher Romero, Villanueva’s new boyfriend.

      Villanueva and Romero worked at different retail stores in an outlet mall

in Atlantic City. On September 1, 2016, they drove to work together. Several

months earlier, Villanueva had told defendant that she and Romero were

expecting a child.

      Around noon on September 1, defendant entered the store where Romero

worked, pulled out a handgun, and shot Romero. Romero fell to the ground ,

and defendant shot him two more times. Several witnesses in the store saw

defendant shoot Romero, who died from the gunshot wounds.

      Defendant then walked over to the store where Villanueva worked,

pointed the gun at her, and said “bye-bye baby.” He fired a round into the

                                       3
store’s ceiling and then shot himself in the chest area. An off-duty police

officer who was shopping in the store heard defendant fire the gun and saw

him fall. The officer wrestled the gun away from defendant.

      After the shooting, defendant was treated at the hospital. According to

the court’s intake form, defendant was arrested days later and requested that a

public defender represent him.

                                       B.

      On November 30, 2016, a grand jury in Atlantic County charged

defendant in an indictment with first-degree murder,  N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)

and (2); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,

 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree possession of a handgun without a

permit,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); fourth-degree aggravated assault (pointing a

firearm),  N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); and second-degree possession of a handgun

after having been convicted of a crime,  N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The State

dismissed an additional charge before trial.

      Trial was scheduled to start one year later, on December 4, 2017. By

then, defendant had been represented by an assistant deputy public defender

for fifteen months. Defendant does not dispute the State’s representation that

the same public defender represented him the entire time.

                                       4
     Right before jury selection was to begin, defendant asked the court for

an adjournment. The following exchange took place:

           DEFENDANT: Well, good morning, Judge -- Judge [].
           Your reputation and your word -- the word of the
           county is you’re a very fair judge, a very fair judge, and
           I want to appeal to your fairness. When I got together
           with Ms. Weigel -- she’s a very nice lady. I have a lot
           of respect for her. I told her if she could get me a deal,
           I’d go with her all the way to the end. Ms. Weigel has
           never been in murder trials before. She’s only had two
           murder -- two trials in her practice, none of this
           magnitude. And I feel it’s not fair to me for her to
           represent me in a case of this magnitude.

                  If I’m going to -- anything that’s going to happen
           to me in this trial, as long as I’m defended by a lawyer
           that has experience in murder trials and a trial of this
           magnitude, I’m okay with it, but she has no experience
           whatsoever in this type of case and the magnitude of
           this case. So I don’t feel that I’m being represented
           right.

                  When I got together with her in the beginning, I
           said if she could get me the right deal, I was okay with
           that. But to go to murder -- to go through a trial for
           murder and be represented by an attorney that has no
           experience, only two trial experience and lost one of
           them, minor trials, how do you see that’s fair?

                  So I’m going to appeal to your fairness, because
           in the county the word is that you’re fair, you’re a very
           fair judge. And I cannot go to trial -- I cannot go to trial
           with Ms. Weigel. I respect her. I admire her very
           much, but I cannot go to trial with Ms. Weigel.

           THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Maisonet, you have a couple
           of choices. You can either hire your own attorney or

                                        5
you can represent yourself.        I don’t decide who
represents you. I have no --

DEFENDANT: Well, then --

THE COURT: Don’t -- stop talking.

DEFENDANT: I’m sorry.

THE COURT: I have no reason to believe that Ms.
Weigel cannot represent you fairly and to the best of
her ability. She is an experienced lawyer. I have no
reason to doubt that she’s unable to represent you. So
at this time we haven’t even started the trial, and you’ve
already asked for a new attorney, claiming that she
can’t represent you. I have no evidence of that. I have
no reason to believe she cannot.

DEFENDANT: In my -- in my opinion --

THE COURT: So you’re shaking your head, but that’s
my decision. She is your attorney, and she’ll be
representing you through this trial.

DEFENDANT: Then I ask for a postponement so I can
go back and call family members so they -- they can get
some -- to see if they can get some money together and
I can get me a private lawyer.

THE COURT: Okay.

DEFENDANT: Because I will not go to trial with Ms.
Weigel.

THE COURT: Okay. How --

DEFENDANT: I respect her. I admire her very much.
I have nothing against her, but I cannot go to trial with
Ms. Weigel.

                            6
THE COURT: I heard -- and you said all those things
already. Your request is denied. We’re here for trial.
So you’ve known about this trial for a long period of
time.

DEFENDANT: But --

THE COURT: You’ve known about your offer.
You’ve known who your attorney is.

DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: So we’re going to proceed with trial
today. So your request is denied.

DEFENDANT: That’s -- you don’t think that’s unfair
to me to go to trial with Ms. Weigel?

THE COURT: I’ve made my ruling. I’ve made my
ruling.

DEFENDANT: I’m actually -- no disrespect, Your
Honor, to the Court.

THE COURT: Well, right now you are disrespecting
me, because I’ve made a ruling.

DEFENDANT: I’m sorry.

THE COURT: So I’m not going to hear anything else
about that. So you can take a seat, because I’m going
to bring the jury in after we have some preliminary
discussions about some other matters.

DEFENDANT: I just want it to be on record that it’s
unfair to me --

THE COURT: You’re on record. You’re certainly on
record.

                          7
            DEFENDANT: -- to go to trial with an inexperienced
            lawyer --

            THE COURT: You’re saying the same things over --

            DEFENDANT: -- who never been to a trial of this
            magnitude.

            THE COURT: You’re saying the same things over
            again. It’s on record. Okay.

      The case proceeded to trial on all but the last count of the indictment,

possession of a handgun after having been convicted of a crime. The jury

convicted defendant on all four counts. In a separate trial afterward, the jury

also convicted defendant of the additional handgun possession count.

      The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison for murder, subject

to the No Early Release Act,  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court also imposed a

consecutive sentence of eighteen months for aggravated assault. One

additional count was merged, and the sentences on the two remaining counts

were to run concurrently.

                                        C.

      Defendant appealed. Among other arguments, he claimed that he was

deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when the trial court arbitrarily

denied his request for a continuance to retain private counsel. The Appellate

Division rejected the argument and affirmed defendant’s convictions and

sentence.
                                         8
      Citing prior precedent, the appellate court initially identified factors that

trial courts should consider to assess a request for an adjournment:

            the length of the requested delay; whether other
            continuances have been requested and granted; the
            balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants,
            witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested
            delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory,
            purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant
            contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the
            request for a continuance; whether the defendant has
            other competent counsel prepared to try the case,
            including the consideration of whether the other
            counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel;
            whether denying the continuance will result in
            identifiable prejudice to defendant’s case, and if so,
            whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial
            nature; the complexity of the case; and other relevant
            factors which may appear in the context of any
            particular case.

            [Furguson,  198 N.J. Super. at 402 (quoting United
            States v. Burton,  584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir.
            1978).]

We refer to those factors as the Furguson or Burton factors.

      Alluding to some of the factors, the Appellate Division highlighted the

trial court’s statements that there was no reason to believe defendant’s attorney

could not represent defendant fairly; that she was an experienced lawyer; and

that defendant had known about the trial, the plea offer, and who his attorney

was for a long period of time. The appellate court also observed that

defendant offered no explanation for why he waited until the first day of trial

                                         9
to seek a continuance and had no concrete financial plan or timetable to secure

a private lawyer. As a result, the court reasoned, any continuance would have

been for an indefinite period with no assurance defendant could retain private

counsel.

      Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division found no mistaken

exercise of discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s belated

adjournment request.

      We granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to this question:

“whether defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice was

violated.”  240 N.J. 159 (2019). We also granted leave to the American Civil

Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) to appear as amicus curiae.

                                        II.

      As he did before the Appellate Division, defendant contends the trial

court arbitrarily denied his request for a continuance to hire private counsel.

By doing so, defendant argues, the trial court deprived him of his

constitutional right to counsel. He claims the error was structural and requires

the reversal of his convictions.

      At the core of his argument, defendant stresses that the trial court

“simply did not consider the Furguson factors at all.” As a result, defendant

submits, the court’s decision cannot amount to an exercise of discretion.

                                        10
       The ACLU likewise contends the trial court failed to engage in

meaningful analysis before rejecting defendant’s request for an adjournment.

Because the record was sparse, the Appellate Division had little to review to

determine if the court’s ruling was appropriate, according to the ACLU. The

ACLU also argues the Appellate Division failed to analyze the denial of

defendant’s adjournment request for structural error, which calls for automatic

reversal.

      The State submits defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was not

violated when the trial court denied his late request for a postponement to

retain private counsel. The State maintains that the colloquy between

defendant and the court provided the judge with the essential information to

make the proper decision -- and enough information to deny defendant’s

request. According to the State, a more detailed factual inquiry was not

required because the trial court listened to defendant’s reasons and did not

need additional information.

                                      III.

      Both the Federal and State Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants

the right to counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. As

part of that guarantee, defendants who do not need appointed counsel have the

                                       11
right “to choose who will represent” them. Kates,  216 N.J. at 395 (quoting

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,