Title: Keslar v. Police Civil Service Com'n, City of Rock Springs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Keslar v. Police Civil Service Com'n, City of Rock Springs1983 WY 74665 P.2d 937Case Number: 5846Case Number: 5846Decided: 06/29/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
Matthew KESLAR, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

POLICE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CITY OF ROCK SPRINGS,Wyoming; Thomas L. Tufford and Lawrence 
Levitt, individually and as officers of the Rock Springs Police Department, 
Appellees (Respondents). No. 5846

Appeal from District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Robert H. 
Johnson of Johnson & Werner, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellant.

Jeffrey A. 
Schalow, City Atty., Rock 
Springs, for 
appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The only question in 
this appeal is whether the district court has jurisdiction to review the 
disciplinary suspension of a police officer of the City of Rock 
Springs. The officer 
was suspended for a period of four days without pay, and after a hearing which 
was granted by the Rock Springs Police Civil Service Commission the suspension 
was reduced from four days to two days. The police officer then sought to appeal 
the action of the Commission to the district court. The Rock Springs Police 
Civil Service Commission filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The district 
court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the action of the 
Commission, and the appeal to the district court was dismissed. We disagree with 
the conclusion of the district court, and we shall reverse, holding that in this 
instance the district court did have jurisdiction to review the action of the 
Rock Springs Police Civil Service Commission.

[¶2.]     In this case the 
parties could not agree upon an articulation of the issues. Appellant, Matthew 
Keslar, the disciplined police officer, states the issues in his brief in this 
way:

"I. In cases in which the 
City's personnel rules provide a right of appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission, is the action of the Commission reviewable by the 
Courts?

"II. Does Section 
15-5-113, W.S. 1977, deprive the Court of jurisdiction over disciplinary action 
involving police officers in the following cases:

"(a) In cases in which 
constitutional issues of due process of law and violation of civil rights are 
alleged and shown?

"(b) In cases in which 
arbitrary actions and findings by the Civil Service Commission unsupported by 
substantial evidence, are alleged and shown?

"(c) In cases in which it 
is alleged and the evidence shows the City's own personnel rules were not 
followed in imposition of discipline?"

Appellee, the 
Rock Springs Police Civil Service Commission, in making its statement of the 
issues involved in this appeal, sets them forth as 
follows:

"First Issue. Does there exist in Wyoming 
any specific statutory basis upon which appellant may seek judicial review of 
this matter or are there statutory and common law provisions that preclude 
judicial review of a matter involving a two-day disciplinary suspension without 
pay of a police officer?

"Second Issue. Has there been in this 
matter an impairment of or constitutionally impermissable [sic] interference 
with any of appellant's rights or even a showing by appellant of a failure to 
comply with basic constitutional guarantees which would allow him to seek 
judicial review of his two-day disciplinary suspensions?"

The essence of 
the dispute is the statutory justification for review of administrative 
proceedings in Wyoming.

[¶3.]     For purposes of this 
appeal the operative facts are not complicated. On the night of July 10, 1982, 
the appellant was driving a police vehicle, owned by the City of Rock Springs, 
Wyoming, on patrol. While conducting a routine spotlight check of a warehouse in 
Rock Springs he 
ran into one of four fixed posts which were implanted to protect a fire hydrant 
in the vicinity of the warehouse. Considerable damage resulted to the vehicle. 
An investigation was conducted, and appellant's immediate supervisor, Lieutenant 
Tufford, with the approval of the ranking officer in the Rock Springs Police 
Department, Commander Levitt,1 issued a letter reprimanding the 
appellant and ordering him to be suspended for four ten-hour work days. This 
letter was issued on July 14, 1982, and it stated that "The conclusion of the 
investigation showed me that you were negligent in this situation, and the 
situation should never have happened." Appellant appealed the four-day 
suspension to the Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission on 
July 26, 1982, and he requested a hearing on the matter.

[¶4.]     Commander Levitt was 
informed that the appellant intended to appeal his suspension, and on July 29, 
1982, he wrote a letter to the appellant which stated that he had delegated the 
authority to administer disciplinary corrections to his subordinate officers. 
Commander Levitt further stated that he had discussed the matter with Lieutenant 
Tufford and he had concurred with the lieutenant's findings and his planned 
disciplinary action. Commander Levitt concluded in his letter that, after 
reviewing the data gathered during the investigation a second time, he remained 
in concurrence with the action taken, and he stated that he did "therefore, 
ratify and confirm the action taken by Lieutenant Tufford in this 
matter."

[¶5.]     On July 30, 1982, the 
Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission granted the appellant's 
request for an appeal, and the matter was set for hearing on August 10, 1982. In 
Chapter IV, Section 4, of the Rules and Regulations of Rock Springs Police 
Department Civil Service Commission, it is provided that hearing procedures 
shall abide by the Administrative Procedure Act with specific reference to §§ 
9-4-101 to 9-4-115, W.S. 1977 (Cum. Supp. 1982), and specifically § 9-4-107. 
These provisions have now been readopted and renumbered as §§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115, W.S. 1977 (Oct. 1982 Rev.), and § 16-3-107 now contains the procedures 
for the contested cases alluded to in the Rules and Regulations of the Rock 
Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission. The effect of these rules 
and regulations was that the hearing expressly was required to be conducted 
under the contested-case procedures provided in the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the hearing, when held, was so conducted. Upon the motion of 
the appellant, a continuance was granted, and the hearing rescheduled for August 
16, 1982.

[¶6.]     The hearing was 
lengthy, and the evidence presented was free ranging. It was largely concerned 
with the contentions of the appellant that there existed a disparity in 
disciplinary actions taken against other police officers involved in traffic 
accidents, and that which was imposed upon him. There was other testimony 
concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the specific incident in 
which the appellant was involved, the results of the investigation of the 
accident which was conducted by the department, the procedure which ultimately 
led to appellant's suspension, and past accidents in which the appellant was 
involved. It appears from the record that the Rock Springs Police Civil Service 
Commission even examined the scene of the accident themselves at the request of 
the attorney for the City of Rock Springs.

[¶7.]     After the hearing a 
final order affirming the suspension of the appellant, but modifying the 
suspension in part, was entered by the Commission on August 18, 1982. In that 
order the Commission concluded that:

"Officer Keslar 
negligently operated his assigned Police Unit # 27 on July 10, 1982 in violation 
of or contrary to promoting the efficiency and service of the police department 
of the City of Rock Springs."

It is 
significant that this conclusion paraphrased the language in Chapter III, 
Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations of the Rock Springs Police Department 
Civil Service Commission which set forth the grounds for discharge from the 
department or a reduction in rank or compensation. The order of the Commission 
did reduce the period for which appellant was to be suspended from four ten-hour 
work days to two such days. The Commission also found that appellant was 
suspended by Commander Levitt, who was acting head of the 
department.

[¶8.]     Because the district 
court concluded it had no jurisdiction to review, the merits of this proceeding 
are not before the court. We simply note in passing that the finding that 
appellant was suspended by Commander Levitt is not supported by substantial 
evidence, and in fact is contrary to the testimony of both Commander Levitt and 
Lieutenant Tufford. Instead the evidence and testimony introduced during the 
hearing consistently lead to the conclusion that appellant was suspended by 
Lieutenant Tufford. Lieutenant Tufford clearly was not a department head. 
Commander Levitt testified that he was not the department head either. Yet the 
Personnel Policies and Procedures, City of Rock Springs, provide for suspension 
only by a department head. Article IX, Section 9-5, Personnel Policies and 
Procedures, City of Rock Springs, May 1980.

[¶9.]     On September 15, 1982, 
the appellant filed a Petition for Review of the order of the Rock Springs 
Police Department Civil Service Commission in the district court in accordance 
with Rule 12.03, W.R.A.P. On October 8, 1982, a Motion to Dismiss Petition for 
Review for Lack of Jurisdiction was presented on behalf of the Commission. After 
briefs had been submitted on that issue by the parties, the district court 
entered its order dismissing the Petition for Review on November 15, 1980. That 
order provided in pertinent part as follows:

"THE COURT HEREBY FINDS 
that the Petitioner, Matthew Keslar, petitioned the Court for review of a `Final 
Order on Appeal Hearing on Suspension' made and entered on August 18, 1982, by 
the Police Civil Service Commission of the City of Rock Springs Police 
Department. He sought review by the Court of that order which upheld his 
suspension from duty without pay because of alleged negligence in driving a 
police car while on duty on July 10, 1982; but, which reduced the suspension 
from four 10 hour days to two 10 hour days; and

"THE COURT FURTHER FINDS 
that there was no discharge from service nor reduction in rank or pay of the 
Petitioner;

"THE COURT FURTHER FINDS 
that by virtue of Sections 9-4-114(a) and 15-5-113, as amended of the Wyoming 
Statutes (1977 Republished Edition), the District Courts are limited in their 
review of adminstrative [sic] proceedings before the respective Civil Service 
Commissions to those matters involving discharge or reduction in rank or pay; 
and

"THE COURT FURTHER FINDS 
that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the within matter 
for the reason that there exists a statute limiting review of actions taken by 
the Civil Service Commission to cases involving a discharge or a reduction in 
rank or pay; and, that this case, not involving a discharge or reduction in rank 
or pay, is not reviewable by this Court.

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 
that the Petition for Review filed herein be, and it is hereby 
dismissed."

[¶10.]  By their arguments in this appeal the 
parties present a dichotomy of views as to the appropriate policy in this 
jurisdiction with respect to the availability of judicial review of 
administrative decisions. The Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service 
Commission relies upon the case of Bowen 
v. City of Sheridan, Wyo., 459 P.2d 204 (1969). It also relies upon § 
15-5-113, W.S. 1977, which provides:

"The decision of the 
commission discharging or reducing any person in rank or pay may be reviewed by 
the district court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure."

The Commission's 
argument is that the thrust of Bowen v. 
City of Sheridan, supra, in the light of § 15-5-113, W.S. 1977, is that 
there is a circumscription of the right to judicial review which limits that 
right to decisions of police civil service commissions which discharge a person 
or reduce him in rank or pay. The Commission argues that this court previously 
has determined that the right to judicial review of administrative decisions is 
entirely statutory. Walker v. Board of 
County Commissioners, Albany County, Wyo., 644 P.2d 772 (1982); United States Steel Corporation v. Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Council, Wyo., 575 P.2d 749 (1978). In the absence of 
a statute specifically authorizing review of disciplinary suspensions, the 
Commission argues that we can discern the intention of the legislature to limit 
the right of judicial review of its decisions exclusively to orders discharging 
or reducing police officers in rank or pay.

[¶11.]  Keslar, however, also draws comfort from 
United States Steel Corporation v. 
Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, supra. He points to the following 
language quoted by this court from Klein v. Fair Employment Practices 
Commission, 31 Ill. App.3d 473, 334 N.E.2d 370, 374 (1975), as 
follows:

"`Each statute must be 
carefully examined to discover the legislature's intent to restrict judicial 
review of administrative action. (Heikkila v. Barber (1953), 345 U.S. 229, 
73 S. Ct. 603, 97 L. Ed. 972.) While it is often said that barring constitutional 
impediments the legislature can preclude judicial review (See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood 
(1970), 26 N.Y.2d 493, 511, 518-519, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 260 N.E.2d 508 (Fuld, 
C.J., Concurring)), such intent must be made specifically manifest, and 
persuasive reason must exist to believe such was the legislative purpose. (Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967), 
387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681.) Only upon a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict 
access to judicial review. Rusk v. Cort (1962), 369 U.S. 367, 82 S. Ct. 787, 7 L. Ed. 2d 809.'" United States Steel 
Corporation v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, supra, at 
750.

Keslar urges 
that by virtue of the provisions of § 16-3-114(a), W.S. 1977, a right of 
judicial review of administrative action is provided in Wyoming. Section 
16-3-114(a), W.S. 1977, provides as follows:

"Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected 
in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency 
action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an 
agency, is entitled to judicial review in the district court for the county 
in which the administrative action or inaction was taken, or in which any real 
property affected by the administrative action or inaction is located, or if no 
real property is involved, in the district court for the county in which the 
party aggrieved or adversely affected by the administrative action or inaction 
resides or has its principal place of business. The procedure to be followed in 
the proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with rules 
heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme court." (Emphasis 
added.)

Keslar then 
urges the proposition in this case that the action of the Rock Springs Police 
Civil Service Commission has been made reviewable by statute, and restrictions 
on the right of review are strictly construed.

[¶12.]  So far as policy considerations are 
concerned, it is our view that the interests of the State of Wyoming are best 
served by a policy which leads to reviewability in most instances. In Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 831, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 
(1970), the Supreme Court of the United States quoted the following language 
from a House Report on the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act:

"* * * To preclude 
judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such 
review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to 
withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial 
review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold 
review."

Then in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S. Ct. 832, 837-838, 25 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1970), the Supreme Court of the United 
States expounded on this concept in this language:

"* * * As we said in Data Processing Service, preclusion of 
judicial review of administrative action adjudicating private rights is not 
lightly to be inferred. [Citations.] Indeed, judicial review of such 
administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must 
be demonstrated. * * *"

In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967), the Supreme Court of the United 
States was confronted with argument that parallels the argument here. The Court 
concluded that in accordance with its prior holdings "the Administrative 
Procedure Act's `generous review provisions' must be given a `hospitable' 
interpretation." The Court then held at 87 S.Ct. 
1511-1512:

"* * * `The mere fact 
that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication 
of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded 
on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.' Jaffe, supra 
[Judicial Control of Administrative Action 336-359 (1965)], at 
357."

[¶13.]  This view is consistent with the language 
that was adopted by this court in United 
States Steel Corporation v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, supra. 
The conclusion to be drawn that the language of § 15-5-113, W.S. 1977, 
specifically making some acts reviewable, does not exclude review of other acts 
might well dispose of the question of jurisdiction to review in this case. We do 
not find in the language from Bowen v. 
City of Sheridan, supra, which actually dealt with an issue arising under § 
15-5-112(b), W.S. 1977, an articulation of a specific intent on the part of the 
legislature to preclude judicial review of instances involving a lesser sanction 
than discharge or reduction of any person in rank or pay.

[¶14.]  There is more to this particular case, 
however. Bowen v. City of Sheridan, 
supra, can be said to support the proposition that the appellant was not 
entitled to a review of his suspension by the Rock Springs Police Department 
Civil Service Commission because of the provisions in § 15-5-112(b), W.S. 1977. 
Bowen v. City of Sheridan, supra, 
held that a two-day disciplinary suspension of a police officer was not a 
discharge or reduction in pay within the meaning and intent of that statute. Bowen v. City of Sheridan, supra, 
however, did not involve an issue as to whether any action by a commission in 
affirming the disciplinary suspension of a police officer would be subject to 
judicial review.

[¶15.]  It seems to us that the position of the 
appellant is analogous to that of the petitioner in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S. Ct. 968, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1959). Vitarelli was dismissed from a position that 
he held as an employee of the Department of the Interior of the United States of 
America. The Supreme Court of the United States noted there that Vitarelli could 
have been summarily discharged without any reason being given, but it held that 
he initially was informed that his discharge was for national security reasons, 
and the Secretary of the Interior then was obligated to comply with procedural 
standards which had been formulated by Executive Order for such discharges. The 
Court there said:

"* * * Having chosen to 
proceed against petitioner on security grounds, the Secretary here, as in Service [v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S. Ct. 1152, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1957)], was bound by the regulations which he 
himself had promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though without such 
regulations he could have discharged petitioner summarily." Vitarelli v. Seaton, supra, 79 S. Ct.  at 
973.

[¶16.]  In this case we must consider the Rules 
and Regulations of the Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission 
and the Personnel Policies and Procedures of the City of Rock Springs in making 
a determination as to the appellant's right of review by the Commission. See Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., Wyo., 652 P.2d 400 (1982). In 
Article IX, Section 9-5, Personnel Policies and Procedures, City of Rock 
Springs, provision is made for department heads to suspend city employees for up 
to ten calendar days as discipline for cause upon notice. It then is provided in 
Section 9-8 that city employees have the right to appeal disciplinary actions to 
the appropriate hearing body. While employees of the police and the fire 
departments specifically are excluded from Article X, Personnel Policies and 
Procedures, City of Rock Springs, relating to employee grievances and appeals, 
Chapter 3 of the Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission Rules 
and Regulations relates to discharge, reduction in classification or 
compensation of police officers. In Section 2 of Chapter 3 provision is made for 
a police officer to petition the Civil Service Commission for a hearing in 
accordance with law upon discharge, or reduction of classification or 
compensation. The appellant did that, and the hearing was granted. At that 
juncture, as distinguished from Bowen v. 
City of Sheridan, supra, it became the law of this case that the four-day 
disciplinary suspension in effect was a reduction in compensation. We can reach 
no other conclusion than that the Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service 
Commission agreed. In Chapter 4, Section 4, the contested-case proceedings of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act then are invoked by specific statutory 
reference. Those proceedings were followed in this case.

[¶17.]  All this leads to an ineluctable 
conclusion that a statutory right of review was available to Keslar in this 
case. The Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission, in the 
exercise of its discretion, had adopted the procedure provided in the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. First 
National Bank of Thermopolis v. Bonham, Wyo., 559 P.2d 42, 48 (1977). Having 
made the choice to afford the appellant an administrative right of review, the 
Commission also agreed to extend to the appellant the full panoply of protection 
provided in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, including the right to 
judicial review. See Diefenderfer v. 
Budd, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1355 (1977); Johnson v. Schrader, Wyo., 502 P.2d 371 
(1972), reh. denied 507 P.2d 814 (1973).

[¶18.]  The foregoing makes inapposite the 
Commission's contention that review should be denied because there is a strong 
common-law posture barring judicial review of police disciplinary suspensions. 
The Commission relies principally upon cases from Texas which it asserts hold 
there is no right of appeal from a temporary disciplinary suspension. Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service 
Commission of City of Fort Worth v. Blanchard, Tex., 582 S.W.2d 778 (1979); 
Fox v. Carr, Tex.Civ.App., 552 S.W.2d 885 (1977); and City of Wichita Falls v. 
Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 532 S.W.2d 653 (1975). We again note that these cases 
might have more significance had the Rock Springs Police Department Civil 
Service Commission not itself reviewed the appellant's suspension. As we read 
those cases, however, we conclude that their holdings evolve from a dissimilar 
treatment given indefinite suspensions and disciplinary suspensions by the Texas 
legislature, and that they are not particularly helpful with respect to the 
statutory posture of this case.

[¶19.]  We similarly find distinguishable Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission of Salt 
Lake City, 106 Utah 83, 145 P.2d 792 (1944); Miller v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 353 P.2d 705 (1960); and Nason v. New Hampshire 
Personnel Commission, 117 N.H. 140, 370 A.2d 634 (1977). The thrust of those 
cases would be of significance had the Rock Springs Police Department Civil 
Service Commission denied review of the appellant's suspension under § 
15-5-112(b), W.S. 1977. As we noted previously, that did not happen. We also 
note that even given the holding in Nason 
v. New Hampshire Personnel Commission, supra, that a suspended officer did 
not have a property interest in continued employment without suspension which 
would give him a right under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution to a pre-suspension hearing, the court did review his claim of 
improper commission action. In Yantsin v. 
City of Aberdeen, 54 Wn.2d 787, 345 P.2d 178 (1959), the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that a police official has no property interest in public 
employment which is subject to protection by the Due Process Clause provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions. The court there said, at 345 P.2d 
180:

"* * * Notice and hearing 
are not prerequisites to a suspension unless required by the applicable 
ordinance or statute. * * *"

We augment that 
proposition by noting that in this case notice and hearing are not prerequisites 
to a suspension except for the fact that notice and hearing both were required 
by the rules and regulations as they were applied by the Rock Springs Police 
Department Civil Service Commission.

[¶20.]  We hold, then, in summary that the Rock 
Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission granted a hearing to the 
appellant as though he had been reduced in compensation. This suffices to 
distinguish appellant's situation from that found in Bowen v. City of Sheridan, supra. We do 
not reach any constitutional premises of the appellant because the provisions of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act specifically invoked by the Rules and 
Regulations of the Rock Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission 
suffice to afford to the appellant a right of judicial review. Because the only 
question before us is jurisdictional, we do not address other arguments of the 
parties which, while designed to persuade us of the correctness of their 
position on the jurisdictional question, really involve the merits of this 
controversy.

[¶21.]  The order of the district court 
dismissing the Petition for Review is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings in accordance with 
law.

FOOTNOTES

1 On the date in question 
there was a vacancy in the office of the police chief in the City of Rock 
Springs. Commander Levitt, as Senior Commander, was charged with the performance 
of the duties of the Chief in his absence. Rules and Regulations of the Rock 
Springs Police Department Civil Service Commission, Chapter I, Section 
1(a).

BROWN, Justice, dissenting, 
joined by RAPER, J., 
Ret.

[¶22.]  I again find myself disagreeing with a 
majority of my brethren.

[¶23.]  It is black letter law that orders of an 
administrative agency are not reviewable unless made so by statute. United States Steel Corporation v. Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Council, Wyo., 575 P.2d 749 (1978). Accordingly, the 
majority opinion discusses two different statutes in reaching its conclusion 
that judicial review of the order of the Rock Springs Civil Service Commission 
is authorized in this case.

[¶24.]  First the majority cites § 16-3-114(a), 
W.S. 1977, as authorizing review of a local agency's decision in a contested 
case. However, I would note that § 16-3-114(a) lists as a prerequisite for 
review "the absence of any statutory or common-law provision precluding or 
limiting" it. The common-law rule is not to allow appeals from the decisions of 
statutory boards, civil service departments, or administrative agencies. Town of Windsor v. Windsor Police Department 
Employees Association, Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 227 A.2d 65 (1967); Wilkins v. State, Department of Public 
Aid, 51 Ill. 2d 88, 280 N.E.2d 706 (1972); Brinson v. School District # 431, 223 
Kan. 465, 576 P.2d 602 (1978); Lydick v. 
Johns, 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970); Board of Education of Cleveland City School 
Dist. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, 34 Ohio St.2d 231, 63 Op.2d 380, 
298 N.E.2d 125 (1973); Firemen's and 
Policemen's Civil Service Commission of the City of Fort Worth v. Blanchard, 
Tex., 582 S.W.2d 778 (1979); Pasch v. 
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 58 Wis.2d 346, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973). 
Accordingly, the seemingly inescapable conclusion is that § 16-3-114(a), supra, 
does not authorize judicial review of a police department's suspension of one of 
its officers regardless of whether the proceedings before the agency constituted 
a contested case.

[¶25.]  Second, the majority finds support for 
judicial review in this case from §§ 15-5-112 and 15-5-113, W.S. 1977. However, 
§ 15-5-113 only authorizes review in district court of a police department civil 
service commission's decision to discharge a police officer or reduce his rank 
or pay. In Bowen v. City of Sheridan, 
Wyo., 459 P.2d 204 (1969), this court held that a suspension without pay was not 
a reduction in pay under § 15-5-112. Since § 15-5-113 is part of the same 
article, it only makes sense that reduction in pay be given the same meaning. 
Accordingly, § 15-5-113 cannot be said to authorize review of the suspension of 
appellant in this case.

[¶26.]  The majority opinion discusses the above 
statutes, but really says that for policy reasons judicial review is proper. The 
majority states that "the interests of the State of Wyoming are best served by a 
policy which leads to reviewability in most instances." This is where I strongly 
disagree with the majority; such a policy is unwise.

[¶27.]  Reason dictates that some minor 
disciplinary matters need not be subject to review. The courts of this state 
should not be burdened with a complaint by a police officer about his 
department's reprimand or a disciplinary job assignment to a half day monitoring 
the dog pound. There is no reason to believe that the floodgates are being 
opened only to police officers. Every petty disciplinary problem occurring in 
all the state or local governmental agencies could conceivably be aired in 
district court. Clearly such an outcome is undesirable.1

[¶28.]  Even if the majority is limiting this 
case only to those instances where an agency has treated the proceedings as a 
contested case, in the future agencies will refuse to give employees any chance 
to be heard. Thus, by giving more in this case, the majority will be insuring 
employees get less from now on.

[¶29.]  Finally, although the majority does not 
reach the constitutional question appellant raises, I believe it meritless. The 
two-day suspension without pay clearly did not constitute an unconstitutional 
deprivation of a property interest. Fox 
v. Carr, Tex.Civ. App., 552 S.W.2d 885 (1977).

[¶30.]  Justice Stevens, while writing for the 
court in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-350, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684, 693 (1976), 
said:

"The federal court is not 
the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions 
that are made daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that 
numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of 
our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to 
require federal judicial review for every such error. In the absence of any 
claim that the public employer was motivated by a desire to curtail or to 
penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights, we 
must presume that official action was regular and, if erroneous, can best be 
corrected in other ways. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions." (Footnote 
omitted.)

I would agree 
with his views and hold them applicable to state court as 
well.

[¶31.]  For these reasons I would have 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 For many years baseball 
was thought to be the national pastime. I now believe it to be litigation. Some 
play golf or collect stamps for recreation or as a hobby; others litigate. We 
have an obsession about rights and litigation that tends to strangle the courts 
with minutiae.