Title: Anderson v. R.A. Midway Towing

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROLAND C. ANDERSON, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
R.A. MIDWAY TOWING, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 626, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 05A-05-004 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 26, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 14, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of July 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the record below,1 it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Roland C. Anderson, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s December 5, 2005 order dismissing his appeal 
from an adverse decision of the Court of Common Pleas.  Because 
Anderson’s appeal was interlocutory and the Superior Court lacked 
jurisdiction to decide it, we hereby VACATE the Superior Court’s order 
dismissing the appeal and REMAND this matter to the Superior Court so 
                                                 
1 On April 20, 2006, counsel for the defendant filed a letter in the Court stating that he 
would not be filing an answering brief.  On April 24, 2006, this Court ordered that the 
appeal would be decided on the basis of the opening brief and the record.  
 
2
that it may, in turn, remand the matter to the Court of Common Pleas for 
trial and entry of a final judgment.   
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in May 2004, Anderson filed a replevin 
action in the Justice of the Peace Court against R.A. Midway Towing 
(“Midway”).  In his complaint, Anderson claimed that Midway had 
mistakenly towed his car, a 1989 Audi 5000, to an auto body shop called 
Station Auto Body and that, as a result, the car had been lost.  Anderson 
sought compensation for the value of the car.  The case was scheduled for 
trial in the Justice of the Peace Court on July 12, 2004.  On that date, the 
Justice of the Peace entered judgment against Anderson and in favor of 
Midway.      
 
(3) 
On July 26, 2004, Anderson filed an appeal in the Court of 
Common Pleas.  In its answer, Midway denied Anderson’s allegations and 
further stated that Midway had been specifically instructed to deliver the car 
to Station Auto Body and that thereafter the car was sold at auction because 
the rental charges had not been paid.  Anderson filed a motion for summary 
judgment and, on November 19, 2004, the Court of Common Pleas entered a 
default judgment against Midway due to its attorney’s failure to appear for 
the hearing.   
 
3
 
(4) 
Midway obtained new counsel, who filed a motion to set aside 
the default judgment.  On January 14, 2005, the Court of Common Pleas 
granted the motion.  On April 26, 2005, the Court of Common Pleas denied 
several motions filed by Anderson, including a motion for reargument and a 
motion for reconsideration of the order setting aside the default judgment.  
The Superior Court docket sheet reflects that Anderson filed an appeal in the 
Superior Court on May 17, 2005.  The Court of Common Pleas docket sheet 
reflects that a motion to quash a non-party subpoena was re-scheduled for 
July 15, 20052 and that trial was scheduled for August 29, 2005.  The motion 
to quash and the trial were subsequently postponed pending the outcome of 
Anderson’s appeal to the Superior Court.   
 
(5) 
On July 14, 2005, the Court of Common Pleas record was 
received in the Superior Court.  The docket sheet notes that there was “no 
transcript.”  On November 9, 2005, the Superior Court judge assigned to 
Anderson’s case informed him by letter that the transcript of the Court of 
Common Pleas trial, which it erroneously assumed had taken place on 
March 18, 2005, had to be received in the Superior Court within fifteen days 
or the case would be dismissed.  By order dated December 5, 2005, the 
                                                 
2 The Court of Common Pleas had mistakenly granted the motion to quash on March 18, 
2005 and then rescheduled the motion for a later date. 
 
4
Superior Court dismissed Anderson’s appeal for failure to provide the 
transcript of the trial.3         
 
(6) 
In this appeal, Anderson claims that the Superior Court erred 
and abused its discretion by dismissing his case.  He contends that the 
Superior Court mistakenly believed he was appealing from the Court of 
Common Pleas’ March 18, 2005 decision to grant a non-party’s motion to 
quash a subpoena whereas he actually was appealing from the Court of 
Common Pleas’ April 26, 2005 orders, which, among other things, denied 
his motions for reargument and for reconsideration of the order setting aside 
the default judgment.      
 
(7) 
The April 26, 2005 orders of the Court of Common Pleas were 
interlocutory, and not final, orders.4  While the Delaware Constitution 
confers jurisdiction upon this Court to decide interlocutory appeals,5 it does 
not confer such jurisdiction upon the Superior Court.  The Superior Court 
has statutory authority to decide appeals from decisions of the Court of 
Common Pleas.6  However, such statutory authority is limited to “ any final 
                                                 
3 Following his appeal to this Court, Anderson filed two motions for reargument in the 
Superior Court.  We remanded the matter to the Superior Court for consideration of those 
motions, both of which were denied. 
4 Showell Poultry v. Delmarva Poultry Corp., 146 A.2d 794, 795-96 (Del. 1958). 
5 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1) (a). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1326. 
 
5
order, ruling, decision or judgment” of the Court of Common Pleas.7  
Because the Court of Common Pleas had not yet entered a final judgment in 
this matter, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to enter an order 
dismissing the case.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s 
December 5, 2005 order dismissing Anderson’s appeal is hereby 
VACATED.  This matter is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court for 
remand, in turn, to the Court of Common Pleas for trial and entry of final 
judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
7 Id.  See also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72(b), providing that the notice of appeal to the Superior 
Court shall be “filed within 15 days from entry of the final judgment, order or disposition 
from which an appeal is permitted by law.”