Title: Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm'n v. Shull

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

1
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 
and Carrico and Stephenson, S.JJ. 
 
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW  
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.   Record No. 071014    
 
        OPINION BY  
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                          November 2, 2007 
 
JAMES MICHAEL SHULL, JUDGE OF 
THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
 
 
 
The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (the Commission) 
filed the present complaint against James Michael Shull, Judge 
of the Thirtieth Judicial District, pursuant to the original 
jurisdiction of this Court set forth in Article VI, § 10 of the 
Constitution of Virginia and Code § 17.1-902.  The Commission 
alleged that its charges against Judge Shull for allegedly 
violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct (the Canons) are well 
founded in fact, and that the violations are of sufficient 
gravity to require that this Court censure or remove him from 
office. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On December 20, 2006, the Commission issued an order 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-911(A) and (C), suspending Judge Shull 
from the exercise of his judicial powers.  The suspension 
initially arose from two incidents that occurred at a custody 
and visitation hearing over which Judge Shull presided in the 
 
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Wise County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the 
juvenile and domestic relations court). 
After receiving the order of suspension, Judge Shull 
requested that the Commission conduct a hearing allowed by Code 
§ 17.1-911(B) to review whether “justice would be served” by 
continuing his suspension from office pending resolution of the 
charges.1  See id.  Judge Shull asserted that due process 
required that the Commission present evidence supporting its 
decision to suspend him, and maintained that the Commission 
should bear the burden of proving that “justice would be served” 
by continuing his suspension.  Judge Shull further asserted that 
he should be permitted at the hearing to cross-examine any 
witnesses who had provided evidence supporting the Commission’s 
decision temporarily suspending him from office.2 
On January 9, 2007, the Commission conducted the requested 
hearing (the suspension hearing), at which the Commission 
entered into evidence a two-page written summary stating the 
Commission’s factual basis for temporarily suspending Judge 
Shull (the statement of facts).  In the statement of facts, the 
                     
1 Code § 17.1-911(B) states that “[t]he Commission shall 
give the judge reasonable notice of such suspension as 
prescribed by the rules of the Commission and, if requested by 
the judge or his attorney, shall schedule a hearing during the 
first fifteen days of the suspension in order to determine 
whether justice would be served for the suspension to continue 
until the completion of the investigation or formal hearing.” 
2 The Commission did not issue formal charges against Judge 
Shull at the time it suspended him. 
 
3
Commission alleged that in December 2006, Tammy L. H. Giza 
(Giza) obtained a temporary protective order against her 
husband, Joseph A. K. Giza (Keith Giza), based on her allegation 
that he had assaulted her.  The Commission alleged that on 
December 12, 2006, in a hearing in the juvenile and domestic 
relations court, Judge Elizabeth S. Wills granted Giza’s request 
for a continuance, extended the protective order for a three-day 
period until December 15, 2006, and directed Giza to notify the 
juvenile and domestic relations court when she retained counsel.  
The Commission further alleged that during a hearing in the 
juvenile and domestic relations court on December 15, 2006, in 
which Judge Shull presided, Giza sought to extend the protective 
order against her husband and to secure custody of her two 
children (the Giza custody hearing).  Judge Shull denied Giza’s 
request for a continuance to obtain counsel. 
According to the Commission, during the Giza custody 
hearing, Giza claimed that Keith Giza had inflicted a wound on 
her thigh.  Keith Giza disputed the nature and existence of the 
wound.  The Commission alleged that when Giza told Judge Shull 
she could not exhibit the wound without lowering her pants, 
Judge Shull indicated that he would not extend the protective 
order without first viewing the wound.  The Commission alleged 
that Judge Shull twice directed Giza to lower her pants in the 
courtroom so that he could inspect the wound.  The Commission 
 
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further alleged that during a recess in the Giza custody 
hearing, Judge Shull initiated an ex parte telephone call to a 
hospital where Giza stated she had been treated for the wound. 
At the suspension hearing, Judge Shull presented two 
witnesses who testified about the events that took place at the 
Giza custody hearing.  Those witnesses were Daniel W. Fast, who 
represented Keith Giza at the Giza custody hearing, and Amy 
Johnson, a probation officer who also was present at the Giza 
custody hearing. 
Fast and Johnson both testified that Giza offered to show 
her wounds to Judge Shull before he first directed her to do so.  
Fast also stated that before viewing the wound on the second 
occasion, Judge Shull “told [Giza] he wanted to see the stitch 
wounds,” left his seat on the bench, and directed Giza to lower 
her pants.  At the conclusion of the suspension hearing, the 
Commission determined that justice would be served by continuing 
Judge Shull’s suspension. 
On February 9, 2007, the Commission issued three formal 
charges against Judge Shull for alleged violations of Canons 1, 
2, 2(A), 3(B)(2), 3(B)(3), 3(B)(4), and 3(B)(7).  The Commission 
alleged that Judge Shull initiated an improper ex parte 
telephone call during a recess in the Giza custody hearing and 
treated Giza in an undignified, discourteous, and uncivil manner 
when he twice directed her to lower her pants in the courtroom.  
 
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In addition, the Commission alleged that during a different 
hearing involving visitation over which Judge Shull presided, 
when the two parents could not agree upon which parent would 
receive the preferred share of a divided holiday visitation 
period, Judge Shull directed that the issue would be determined 
by the toss of a coin, and twice tossed a coin in the courtroom 
while court was in session to resolve the dispute. 
Judge Shull responded to the charges by asserting that he 
had not violated the Canons.  While Judge Shull admitted that he 
had determined a contested legal matter by twice flipping a coin 
during a courtroom proceeding, he argued that his action was 
intended to encourage the litigants to resolve the custody 
issues by themselves and to “demonstrate . . . that his award of 
custody . . . would be as random as a coin toss.”  Judge Shull 
also maintained that neither parent had objected to resolving 
the custody dispute by a coin toss. 
Judge Shull admitted in his response to the Commission that 
during the Giza custody hearing, Giza twice lowered her pants in 
the courtroom to allow him to inspect her thigh wound, but 
asserted that Giza volunteered to lower her pants and that he 
merely permitted her to do so.  According to Judge Shull, he 
directed the bailiff to close “privacy curtains” before allowing 
Giza to lower her pants, and the only people present in the 
courtroom who could see Giza exposed were officially involved in 
 
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the Giza proceedings.  Judge Shull admitted that he could have 
“handled” the Giza custody hearing “in a more sensitive manner,” 
but maintained that his conduct was not a violation of the 
Canons. 
Judge Shull admitted that he initiated an ex parte 
telephone call to the hospital where Giza alleged she was 
treated, but asserted that before he placed the call, he 
informed everyone in the courtroom that he planned to do so.  
Judge Shull maintained that “it is not uncommon” for judges in 
the juvenile and domestic relations court to place telephone 
calls to ascertain the truth when resolving a factual dispute. 
On April 10 and 11, 2007, the Commission conducted an 
evidentiary hearing (the April hearing) on the charges.  At the 
April hearing, Judge Shull conceded that he had tossed a coin to 
decide a visitation issue, and that this action was “wrong.”  
Judge Shull also admitted that the ex parte telephone call he 
made during the Giza custody hearing was a violation of Canon 
3(B)(7).  Judge Shull further stipulated at the April hearing 
that he “admitted to violations” of “Canons 2 and 3.” 
Most of the essential facts concerning the Giza custody 
hearing were undisputed at the April hearing.  Judge Shull 
testified that he denied Giza’s request for a continuance to 
obtain counsel because she had failed to keep an earlier 
appointment with an attorney she wished to retain, and Judge 
 
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Shull was concerned about continuing the case further given the 
nature of the proceedings. 
Judge Shull admitted that Giza twice lowered her pants in 
the courtroom during the Giza custody hearing, and that he 
“initiated” both incidents.  Judge Shull also conceded that at 
the time Giza lowered her pants, he was aware that Giza had a 
history of mental illness. 
Judge Shull testified that during the Giza custody hearing, 
he learned that Giza had been committed to the Southwestern 
Virginia Mental Health Institute at Marion (the Marion mental 
health facility) in March 2006.  Judge Shull stated that before 
he conducted his viewings of Giza’s thigh wound, he had reviewed 
a March 2006 police report stating that Giza had admitted 
engaging in self-mutilation “to get attention.”  Judge Shull 
further conceded that “there had been some statements to the 
effect that maybe [Giza] was a person of diminished capacity,” 
but maintained that he observed “no apparent diminished 
capacity” at the time of the Giza custody hearing.   
Several other witnesses at the April hearing testified 
regarding additional information provided to Judge Shull at the 
Giza custody hearing concerning Giza’s mental condition.  
According to Giza, Daniel Fast informed Judge Shull at the “very 
first part of the hearing” that Giza had been committed to a 
mental health facility.  Teresa Castle, the clerk present in the 
 
8
courtroom at the Giza custody hearing, testified that Fast 
argued “right off the bat” that Giza had engaged in self-
mutilation on an earlier occasion. 
Edward Gardner, the bailiff in the courtroom during the 
Giza custody hearing, stated that before Judge Shull viewed the 
wound on Giza’s thigh, Giza admitted that she had previously cut 
herself and that she had later sought “help.”  Nicky Fleenor, a 
court-appointed Special Advocate for Wise County, testified that 
Giza informed Judge Shull of Giza’s commitment to a mental 
health facility in March 2006.  Finally, Keith Giza testified 
that the police report introduced into evidence and considered 
by Judge Shull indicated that Giza was committed to the Marion 
mental health facility as a result of her self-mutilation. 
It was undisputed that Giza initially offered to show her 
wound by raising the leg of her pants but was unable to expose 
her wound in this manner.  According to Judge Shull, Giza began 
to unbutton her pants although he did not direct her to do so.  
Keith Giza testified that when Giza could not raise the leg of 
her pants enough to reveal her wound, she nonetheless offered to 
show her injury.  Castle testified that when Giza could not 
raise her pants leg sufficiently to reveal the wound, Giza said 
that she would have to “pull [her] britches down” to show the 
wound. 
 
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Castle and two other witnesses, Edward Gardner and Jewell 
Morgan, the guardian ad litem for the Giza children, all 
testified that after it became apparent that Giza could not 
reveal the wound by raising her pants leg, Judge Shull told Giza 
she would have to show the wound.  Castle testified that, in 
response, Giza asked, “[Y]ou want me to pull my britches down in 
here?”  Gardner testified that Giza said, “[M]ust I pull my 
pants down here in the courtroom?” 
According to Castle, Judge Shull replied that if Giza 
wanted the protective order to remain in place, she would have 
to show her wound.  Judge Shull testified that he believed it 
was necessary to view the wound because he was “faced with a 
prospect of sending the children either to a cutter or a 
stabber.” 
The testimony differed concerning the amount of time that 
Giza’s pants remained lowered during the first viewing.  The 
witnesses reported variously that the incident lasted for 
periods of time between a few seconds and five minutes.  The 
testimony also was conflicting concerning how far Giza lowered 
her pants and how much of her anatomy was exposed at the time of 
the first viewing.  Judge Shull and Keith Giza testified that 
Giza held the left side of her pants next to her body and pulled 
the right side down to expose her wound, but that she never 
lowered her pants.  Judge Shull further stated that he did not 
 
10
observe any of Giza’s anatomy other than the part of her thigh 
where her wound was located, and that he did not see Giza’s 
undergarments. 
Several other witnesses, however, testified that Giza 
lowered her pants to her knees after Judge Shull directed her to 
show her wound.  These witnesses included Fleenor, Castle, 
Gardner, and Morgan.  Giza further stated that she was rendered 
“in shock” over Judge Shull’s request that she lower her pants, 
and that she “didn’t think that a court could order anybody to 
remove clothing.” 
Fleenor testified that she observed Giza’s “back side” and 
her buttocks.  Morgan stated that she saw Giza’s “[c]heeks.”  
Gardner testified that he was standing behind Giza when she 
lowered her pants, and that he saw Giza’s “rear end part” and 
her buttocks.  Castle testified that she did not see Giza from 
the rear, but saw the “front of her and up to her thigh.”  When 
Giza lowered her pants in the courtroom, Fleenor, Gardner, and 
Morgan each observed that Giza was wearing black or dark-colored 
“thong” or “g-string” underwear. 
It was undisputed at the April hearing that Judge Shull 
“initiated” a second viewing of Giza’s wound during the Giza 
custody hearing.  Judge Shull testified that he stated to those 
present in the courtroom that it might be possible for him to 
determine if Giza had received stitches, because his “father had 
 
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been a surgeon.”  According to the witnesses who testified at 
the April hearing, Judge Shull left his seat on the bench, sat 
in the witness’ chair, and directed Giza to stand about an 
“arm’s length” from him and lower her pants a second time. 
Giza stated that the second viewing lasted “a little bit 
longer” than the first.  Other witnesses reported that the 
second viewing lasted for periods of time between a few seconds 
and “less than a minute.” 
Judge Shull testified that during the second viewing, Giza 
held “one side of her pant leg up at the hem and let[] it . . . 
drop, just to her knee,” and that he did not see Giza’s 
undergarments.  Keith Giza testified that the second time Judge 
Shull asked to see Giza’s wound, Giza “pulled down the right 
side of her pants to the wound and kept everything else 
guarded.”  However, according to Fleenor, Giza lowered her pants 
to her knees during the second viewing.  Giza testified that 
when she lowered her pants, her buttocks were exposed to 
everyone who was behind her in the courtroom.  Gardner testified 
that when Giza lowered her pants a second time, he “turned again 
and looked at the curtain” because he “didn’t want to see 
again.”  Morgan testified that she turned her back to Giza and 
Judge Shull during the second viewing because “[i]t [was] kind 
of embarrassing.”   
 
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Judge Shull further stated that after the second viewing, 
he concluded that Giza, in fact, had received stitches.  Judge 
Shull testified that at the hearing he “felt less in control 
than [usual],” and admitted that he “probably . . . lost 
sensitivity to the overall situation” and “handled it poorly” 
and “indecorous[ly],” and “wrong.”  Castle testified that during 
the proceeding, Giza “looked upset.”  Fleenor, Morgan, Castle, 
and Keith Giza testified that Giza cried at the end of the Giza 
custody hearing. 
Gardner testified that when he encountered Judge Shull 
outside the courtroom after the Giza custody hearing, Gardner 
asked Judge Shull, “[D]id you see what that lady had on[?]”  
According to Gardner, Judge Shull replied, “[Y]eah, a black lacy 
thong . . . it looked good, didn’t it[?]”  Judge Shull denied 
that he made any comments to Gardner concerning Giza’s 
undergarments.  Judge Shull testified that he only said to 
Gardner, “[T]hat was a rough case, wasn’t it?”  Judge Shull 
further testified that Gardner replied, “I think she came 
prepared to do what she did.” 
At the April hearing, Judge Shull admitted that he had 
appeared before the Commission in 2004 (the 2004 hearing).  The 
Commission placed in evidence a letter the Commission sent to 
Judge Shull in 2004 explaining certain concerns the Commission 
had regarding Judge Shull’s alleged conduct, and a transcript 
 
13
from the 2004 hearing.  The letter made several allegations 
involving Judge Shull’s courtroom conduct, including that he had 
repeatedly referred to a 14-year-old boy as a “mama’s boy,” a 
“wuss” and a “pussy,” and stated that he understood why other 
boys would pick on the boy.  The letter also alleged that Judge 
Shull had told a female litigant who likely had been abused by 
her boyfriend that the litigant “should marry the boyfriend and 
that would put an end to the abuse.” 
In the 2004 hearing, Judge Shull admitted making some of 
the alleged statements but denied that he had told the 14-year 
old boy that he was a “pussy.”  When asked, however, whether he 
had told the female litigant that she should marry the person 
whom she said had inflicted the bruises on her, Judge Shull 
stated, “Probably . . . I probably did say something to the 
effect, well, if you married this guy, it would remove an 
impediment [regarding custody of your children].”  At the 
conclusion of the 2004 hearing, Judge Shull stated, “Well, I 
apologize for forcing you-all to bring me up here, and I 
acknowledge fully that it is my fault. . . . I hope that you 
will never see me again in this context.”  Following these 
statements, the Commission voted to dismiss the proceedings 
against Judge Shull. 
After the April hearing, the Commission determined that the 
February 2007 charges were “well-founded and of sufficient 
 
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gravity to constitute the basis for retirement, censure or 
removal.”  The Commission observed that the facts were 
undisputed that Judge Shull had twice tossed a coin in the 
courtroom to decide an issue before him and had initiated an ex 
parte telephone call.  The Commission further noted that Judge 
Shull had admitted that these actions violated the Canons.  
Additionally, the Commission found by clear and convincing 
evidence that Judge Shull twice directed Giza to lower her pants 
in the courtroom, and that he made a statement to the bailiff 
that demonstrated that Judge Shull had seen Giza’s underwear.  
As a result, the Commission decided to file the present formal 
complaint in this Court pursuant to Article VI, § 10 of the 
Constitution of Virginia and Code § 17.1-902. 
II. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
The relevant portions of the Canons at issue in this case 
are: 
Canon 1 
 
A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of 
the Judiciary. 
 
A. An independent and honorable judiciary is 
indispensable to justice in our society.  A judge should 
participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high 
standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those 
standards so that the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary will be preserved.  The provisions of these 
Canons are to be construed and applied to further that 
objective. 
 
. . . . 
 
15
 
 
 
Canon 2 
 
A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities. 
 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and 
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
Canon 3 
 
A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office 
Impartially and Diligently. 
 
. . . . 
 
B.(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law and 
maintain professional competence in it. . . . 
 
B.(3) A judge shall require order, decorum, and 
civility in proceedings before the judge. 
 
B.(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and 
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and 
others with whom the judge deals in an official 
capacity. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
B.(7) . . . A judge shall not initiate, permit, or 
consider ex parte communications, or consider other 
communications made to the judge outside the presence of 
the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding 
. . . . 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
We first state the Constitutional and statutory authority 
on which our consideration of these charges is based.  When the 
Commission files a formal complaint in this Court against a 
 
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judge, we are charged with the duty to conduct a hearing in open 
court to determine whether the judge has “engaged in misconduct 
while in office, or . . . has persistently failed to perform the 
duties of [the] office, or . . . has engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.”  Va. 
Const. art. VI, § 10.  We make this determination by considering 
the evidence and making factual determinations de novo.  
Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 443, 
611 S.E.2d 392, 400 (2005); Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. 
Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 405, 568 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2002). 
We do not accord any particular weight to the Commission’s 
findings or to their credibility determinations.  Instead, we 
give the Commission’s findings only such weight as we consider 
appropriate in the individual case before us.  Peatross, 269 Va. 
at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 400.  We employ this approach because the 
Commission’s function is limited to determining whether “the 
charges [are] well-founded, and sufficient to constitute the 
basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge,” thereby 
resulting in a complaint being filed in this Court.  Code 
§ 17.1-902; see also Va. Const. art. VI, § 10; Peatross, 269 Va. 
at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 400. 
Because this type of case invokes the original jurisdiction 
of this Court, see Va. Const. art. VI, § 1, we conduct an 
independent review of the record created by the Commission to 
 
17
determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
violation of the Canons as charged in the Commission’s 
complaint.  Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 S.E.2d 400; see Lewis, 
264 Va. at 405, 568 S.E.2d at 689.  If we find clear and 
convincing evidence in the record before us, we are required to 
censure the judge or to remove the judge from office.  Va. 
Const. art. VI, § 10; Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 
400.  Those are the only sanctions that we may impose.  Va. 
Const. art. VI, § 10; Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 
400. 
The term “clear and convincing evidence” is defined as 
“that degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the 
trier of facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be 
established.  Such measure of proof is intermediate, more than a 
mere preponderance but less than is required for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt; it does not mean clear and unequivocal.”  
Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Middleton 
v. Johnston, 221 Va. 797, 803, 273 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1981) 
(emphasis in original)); see also Lewis, 264 Va. at 405, 568 
S.E.2d at 689.  The Commission bears the burden of proving its 
charges by clear and convincing evidence.  Peatross, 269 Va. at 
444, 611 S.E.2d at 400; Lewis, 264 Va. at 405, 568 S.E.2d at 
689. 
A. Suspension Hearing 
 
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As a preliminary matter, Judge Shull raises certain due 
process arguments concerning the manner in which the Commission 
conducted the suspension hearing.  Judge Shull asserts that the 
Commission violated his due process rights by effectively 
shifting the burden of proof and requiring him to present 
evidence at the suspension hearing, and by refusing his request 
to cross-examine adverse witnesses whose accounts appeared in 
the Commission’s statement of fact. 
We do not reach the merits of these arguments.  Our 
jurisdiction over the formal charges filed in this Court is 
purely original in nature.  See Va. Const. art. VI, § 1; 
Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 400.  The Commission, 
not this Court, is vested with the statutory authority to 
determine whether a judge should be suspended with pay until 
resolution of a pending investigation.  See Code § 17.1-911.  
Moreover, neither the Constitution nor the Code has given this 
Court authority to review the Commission’s suspension hearing 
procedures or the Commission’s decision to suspend a judge with 
pay until final resolution of pending charges.  In the absence 
of constitutional or statutory authority to do so, we are not at 
liberty to presume such authority.  See Board of Supervisors of 
Fairfax County v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County, 271 
Va. 336, 344, 626 S.E.2d 374, 379 (2006); America Online, Inc. 
v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 358, 542 S.E.2d 
 
19
377, 381 (2001); Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772-73, 
43 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1947); Shelton v. Sydnor, 126 Va. 625, 629, 
102 S.E. 83, 85 (1920). 
We disagree with Judge Shull that our decision in Judicial 
Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 630 S.E.2d 485 
(2006), requires a different result here.  In Elliott, we 
determined that the Commission and a judge charged with 
misconduct had reached a supervision agreement under the 
Commission’s Rule 15(A)(4) that, if honored by the judge, would 
foreclose the Commission from filing charges against the judge 
in this Court.  Id. at 121-22, 630 S.E.2d at 497-98.  Upon 
consideration of the record, we further held that because the 
judge had not violated the agreement, the Commission was 
foreclosed from bringing a complaint to this Court.  Id. at 123, 
630 S.E.2d at 498-99.  Thus, in Elliott, our determination 
centered on the question whether the substantive charges filed 
by the Commission in this Court had already been resolved by the 
parties’ prior agreement. 
Judge Shull, however, does not ask us to determine whether 
the substantive charges filed against him in this Court have 
already been resolved by proceedings before the Commission.  
Instead, Judge Shull asks, in the form of a due process 
challenge, that we address matters over which we have not been 
given constitutional or statutory authority.  In the absence of 
 
20
such authority, Judge Shull’s due process challenge effectively 
requests an advisory opinion concerning matters not subject to 
our review.  See Riverside Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 
518, 526 n.2, 636 S.E.2d 416, 420 n.2 (2006); Commonwealth v. 
Harley, 256 Va. 216, 219-20, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998). 
B. 
Formal Charges 
Judge Shull has admitted many of the facts alleged in the 
formal charges.  He concedes that his actions tossing a coin in 
the courtroom to resolve a visitation dispute were a violation 
of the Canons.  He also concedes that he violated Canon 3(B)(7) 
by placing an ex parte telephone call to a hospital during the 
Giza custody hearing in an attempt to resolve a disputed factual 
matter. 
Judge Shull further has admitted many of the alleged facts 
concerning the Giza custody hearing, in which Giza was 
unrepresented by counsel.  Judge Shull admitted at the April 
hearing that before he conducted the two viewings of Giza’s 
thigh, he knew that Giza had been committed to the Marion mental 
health facility several months earlier as a result of her self-
mutilation.  Judge Shull also admitted at the April hearing he 
“initiated” both incidents in which Giza lowered her pants in 
the courtroom.  Finally, Judge Shull conceded at the April 
hearing that his conduct at the Giza custody hearing violated 
Canons 2 and 3. 
 
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The main factual disputes before us concern the sequence of 
events that culminated in Giza twice lowering her pants in front 
of Judge Shull.  As stated above, Judge Shull testified that, 
without any direction from him, Giza began to unbutton her pants 
after it became apparent that she could not reveal her wound by 
lifting her pants leg.  In addition, Keith Giza stated that Giza 
offered to show her wound before Judge Shull directed her to do 
so.  However, other witnesses, including Castle, Morgan, and 
Gardner, testified that Giza lowered her pants only after Judge 
Shull told her she was required to show her wound even though 
she could do not so by raising her pants leg.  Additionally, 
Castle testified that Giza asked Judge Shull whether she was 
required to pull her pants down in the courtroom, and that Judge 
Shull replied that she would have to show the wound if she 
wanted the protective order to remain in effect. 
Several witnesses, including Fleenor, Castle, Gardner, and 
Morgan, testified that Giza lowered her pants to her knees after 
Judge Shull first directed her to show her wound.  These 
witnesses also gave graphic testimony concerning the parts of 
Giza’s anatomy that were clearly visible when Giza lowered her 
pants.  Judge Shull and Keith Giza disputed these facts, and 
maintained that Giza never lowered her pants but merely dropped 
one side of her open trousers, exposing the wound above her 
knee. 
 
22
Judge Shull does not dispute that he initiated the second 
viewing and thought that he could use knowledge gleaned from his 
father’s work as a surgeon to determine at closer range whether 
Giza had received stitches.  Judge Shull also does not dispute 
that he moved from the bench to the witness’ chair to conduct 
this closer examination of Giza’s wound.  However, both Judge 
Shull and Keith Giza contradicted Fleenor’s testimony that Giza 
lowered her pants to her knees after Judge Shull directed her to 
display her wound again. 
Upon our review of these conflicts in the evidence, we find 
that the version of courtroom events described by Fleenor, 
Castle, Gardner, and Morgan is persuasive and is more credible 
than the contrary testimony given by Judge Shull and Keith Giza.  
The record lacks any plausible explanation why those four 
witnesses, who had no discernable interest in the outcome of the 
controversy, would not have been accurate in their description 
of the courtroom events.  Moreover, the degree to which their 
testimony varied from that of Judge Shull and Keith Giza on 
these disputed factual issues was substantial and, therefore, 
cannot be explained as merely differing recollections of the 
same events. 
Accordingly, we find as a matter of fact that Giza lowered 
her pants in the courtroom because Judge Shull directed her to 
display her wound after she was unable to expose it by lifting 
 
23
her pants leg.  We also find as a matter of fact that Giza 
lowered her pants to her knees on both occasions after being 
directed by Judge Shull to display her wound, and that, as a 
result, her buttocks were exposed. 
Based on the testimony of Fleenor, Castle, Gardner, and 
Morgan, and the admissions of Judge Shull, we conclude the 
Commission has met its burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that Judge Shull committed the three violations of the 
Canons charged in the Notice of the Commission dated February 9, 
2007.  In sum, the three proved violations were: 1) that Judge 
Shull twice tossed a coin in the courtroom to resolve a 
visitation dispute; 2) that Judge Shull made an improper ex 
parte telephone call during a recess in the Giza custody hearing 
to obtain information on a disputed factual matter; and 3) that 
Judge Shull twice required Giza to lower her pants in the 
courtroom during the same custody hearing.3 
Judge Shull violated the Canons by his conduct because his 
actions failed to uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary, and tended to impair public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  See Canons of 
Judicial Conduct 1 & 2.  Judge Shull also violated the Canons by 
                     
3 We conclude that it is unnecessary for us to consider the 
disputed testimony that Judge Shull made certain statements 
after the Giza custody hearing indicating that he had seen 
Giza’s underwear. 
 
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failing to maintain and exhibit professional competence in the 
law, by failing to require decorum and civility in the 
courtroom, and by failing to be patient, dignified, and 
courteous to a litigant.  See Canons of Judicial Conduct 
3(B)(2), (3) & (4).  Finally, Judge Shull’s action initiating an 
improper ex parte telephone call also violated the Canons 
because that action precluded the parties from participating in 
a disputed matter material to their proceeding.  See Canons of 
Judicial Conduct 3(B)(7). 
We further conclude that Judge Shull’s violations of the 
Canons were grave and substantial.  A judge’s act of tossing a 
coin in a courtroom to decide a legal issue pending before the 
court suggests that courts do not decide cases on their merits 
but instead subject litigants to games of chance in serious 
matters without regard to the evidence or applicable law.  Such 
conduct may have a profoundly negative impact, not only on the 
parties’ ability to accept the “rule of law” imposed in their 
particular case, but also on the public’s confidence in and 
respect for the judiciary.  In order for our justice system to 
maintain the confidence and respect of the public, judicial 
decisions must be based on the evidence and pertinent law.  The 
contrary actions of Judge Shull, reduced to their essence, were 
actions that denigrated the litigants whose case he decided and 
subjected our justice system to ridicule. 
 
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Judge Shull’s actions during the Giza custody hearing were 
even more egregious.  Knowing that Giza had been committed to a 
mental health facility because she previously had mutilated 
herself, and in the absence of Giza being afforded the advice of 
counsel, Judge Shull directed Giza to display her wound when it 
was apparent that she could not do so without lowering her pants 
in the courtroom.  The “privacy” room divider employed to reduce 
the size of the courtroom did not prevent anyone involved in the 
Giza custody hearing from observing Giza’s exposed body.  
Judge Shull also required Giza to display her wound a 
second time, fully aware that Giza would again be lowering her 
pants in the courtroom, with an obvious lack of concern for 
Giza’s personal dignity or the dignity of the judicial 
proceedings.  Judge Shull’s initiation of an improper ex parte 
telephone call during the Giza custody hearing further eroded 
the integrity of the proceedings by removing the parties, one of 
whom was not represented by counsel, from participation in a 
significantly disputed aspect of the case. 
We hold that Judge Shull’s actions in the two cases, as 
established by clear and convincing evidence, constitute 
“misconduct while in office” and “conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice.”  See Va. Const. art. VI, 
§ 10.  Thus, we are required either to censure Judge Shull or to 
 
26
remove him from office.  Id.; see Peatross, 269 Va. at 444, 611 
S.E.2d at 400.  
C. Disposition 
Initially, we note that the record before us contains many 
letters from attorneys, court personnel, and local citizens, who 
have written in support of Judge Shull’s professional reputation 
and service to his community.  We have reviewed those 
submissions as part of our consideration of the proper 
disposition of this case. 
Addressing the issue of disposition, Judge Shull correctly 
observes that since the Commission was enacted in 1971, only one 
judge has been removed from office.  In that case, Judicial 
Inquiry & Review Commission v. Maurice, Record No. 770472 (Sept. 
1, 1977), this Court found that a judge misappropriated certain 
confiscated items, including firearms and alcohol, and consumed 
confiscated beer with others in the judge’s office.  Judge Shull 
argues that “[i]n light of this authority, it is abundantly 
clear that Judge Shull’s conduct does not rise to the level of a 
removable offense.” 
We disagree that the matter can so easily be resolved.  
While the conduct of Judge Maurice was completely deplorable, 
and likely involved criminal activity, his conduct did not 
affect any litigants or the administration of justice in a 
courtroom of this Commonwealth. 
 
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In contrast, the essence of Judge Shull’s judicial 
misconduct has been his disregard for the dignity of litigants 
appearing before him and for the dignity of the judicial 
process.  Judge Shull’s actions involved two separate cases.  In 
tossing a coin to resolve a matter before him, he denigrated 
both the litigants and our justice system.  By directing Giza to 
lower her pants twice in the courtroom, Judge Shull ignored the 
dignity of a litigant who was not represented by counsel and who 
had a clear history of mental instability.  Such actions on the 
part of a judge necessarily impair public confidence in the 
integrity of our justice system.  Unless our citizens can trust 
that judges will fairly resolve the disputes brought before our 
courts, and treat all litigants with dignity, our courts will 
lose the public’s respect and confidence upon which our legal 
system depends. 
Although Judge Shull’s improper ex parte communication 
during the Giza custody hearing, standing alone, would not merit 
additional discussion, we must consider it in the larger context 
of the courtroom proceedings.  In that context, the ex parte 
communication serves to illustrate again Judge Shull’s lack of 
concern for litigants appearing before him. 
We also must observe that, in May 2004, Judge Shull 
appeared before the Commission in an informal proceeding in 
which several allegations were considered, including that he did 
 
28
not treat some litigants in his courtroom with respect.  We are 
particularly concerned with Judge Shull’s admission at the 2004 
hearing that he “probably” advised a female litigant, who 
alleged that her boyfriend had inflicted bruises on her, that 
“if you married this guy, it would remove an impediment 
[regarding custody of your children].”  We also are concerned 
about Judge Shull’s statement at the 2004 hearing that in a case 
involving a 14-year old boy, he “may have said the evidence does 
show that you are a bit of a mama’s boy, and this is part of the 
problem here.” 
At the time the Commission dismissed these allegations, the 
Commission’s chairman stated, “You haven’t been a full-time 
judge for very long, and the Commission is hopeful that this is 
the initial learning process that is going to help you sort 
everything out.”  By its action, the Commission plainly gave 
Judge Shull the opportunity to change his future conduct and to 
treat litigants with due respect. 
We are forced to observe that Judge Shull did not heed the 
Commission’s advice but has continued to demean litigants 
appearing before him.  The misconduct before us in the present 
charges indicates that Judge Shull’s courtroom conduct has 
become far worse than it was when he first appeared before the 
Commission in 2004.  Therefore, to ensure that all citizens will 
be able to have full confidence they will be treated fairly and 
 
29
accorded their rightful dignity in all future legal proceedings 
in the Thirtieth Judicial District, this Court will order that 
James Michael Shull be removed immediately from the office of 
Judge of the Thirtieth Judicial District, pursuant to Article 
VI, § 10, of the Constitution of Virginia. 
Removal ordered.