Title: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12318 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CRISTIAN RODRIGUEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 10, 2019. - May 19, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Insanity.  Evidence, Hearsay, Medical record, Expert 
opinion.  Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Hearsay, 
Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 19, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Christopher J. Muse, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Kathryn E. Leary, Assistant District Attorney (Ian 
Polumbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Cristian 
Rodriguez, of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty for the beating death of his 
roommate, Roosevelt Harris.  The defendant admitted that he had 
committed the killing but asserted a lack of criminal 
2 
 
responsibility defense.  The defendant argues that the trial 
judge improperly ruled that the statements he made before and 
after the murder to his doctors regarding his mental health were 
not admissible for the truth of the matter.  He also urges this 
court to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce his conviction to manslaughter, or, alternatively grant a 
new trial.  We affirm the defendant's conviction.  After a 
thorough review of the record, we also decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or 
reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
Background.  1.  The Commonwealth's evidence.  We summarize 
the facts that the jury could have found at trial, reserving 
certain details for our discussion of the legal issues.  The 
victim and the defendant and three others were residents of a 
rooming house in Boston.  During the time they lived in the 
apartment they shared, the defendant and the victim got along at 
times but also got into multiple arguments.  In the months 
before the murder, the defendant claimed that the victim owed 
him money for a stereo he had sold to the victim.  He took the 
stereo out of the victim's room.  When the victim's brother 
spoke to the defendant on the telephone, offering to give the 
defendant the money and telling the defendant to stay away from 
the victim, the defendant hung up.  In addition, the defendant 
3 
 
punched the victim in the face three times after the victim 
accused him of stealing food out of their refrigerator. 
 
Two of the victim's roommates testified to the noises they 
had heard coming from the victim's room on February 9, 2012, at 
approximately 9 P.M., including the sound of someone falling, 
and eight to ten banging noises similar to someone beating a rug 
on a clothesline.  One of them heard the victim grunt.  Both 
roommates then heard someone run out of the apartment; one of 
them saw a person wearing a black shirt or jacket. 1  They 
discovered the victim lying on the floor of his room, face up, 
suffering from head trauma and "breathing slightly" with his 
shirt "saturated with blood." 
 
At approximately the same time, a woman was parking her car 
and saw the defendant, whom she recognized from the neighborhood 
and from a scar that was on his face, holding a baseball bat 
while running toward her.  He put the bat inside a trash can, 
looked at her, and then continued down the street.  The woman 
got out of her car; when the defendant reached the street 
corner, he turned and looked at her again, and then kept 
running.  The witness returned to the trash can the next 
                     
 
1 Surveillance video from an apartment building across the 
street from the defendant's building showed a person wearing a 
black top leaving the defendant's building and running away at 
9:24 P.M. 
4 
 
morning, looked inside it, and saw a metal bat with blood on it.2  
She was later able to pick the defendant out of a photographic 
array. 
 
The defendant's jacket, shirt, shoe laces, and shoes all 
preliminarily tested positive for the presence of blood.  A 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample from the defendant's jeans 
was sent for testing, and the DNA sample matched the victim's 
DNA profile. 
 
The defendant admitted that he used a baseball bat to kill 
the victim.  At trial, the chief medical examiner testified that 
the victim suffered multiple lacerations and fractures, 
including four lacerations to the left side of his forehead, 
multiple fractures of the facial bones on the left side of his 
face, abrasions and a laceration on his left forearm, a 
displaced pinky joint, and lacerations on the webbing of his 
left hand.  The victim's left upper chest had a large bruise 
caused by blunt force, and his right upper chest had two 
parallel bruises.  Four of his teeth on his lower jaw had 
loosened, and he sustained additional blunt force trauma to the 
side and back of his head.  The medical examiner testified that 
the injuries were inflicted with a significant amount of force 
                     
 
2 Police did not recover the bat because the trash was 
collected later the same day.  However, the trash collector 
testified that when he removed the cover from the trash can, he 
saw a metal baseball bat with something brown on its head. 
5 
 
and caused significant injury to the frontal lobe of the brain, 
which controls breathing, and that the victim had aspirated 
blood in his lungs as a result of the injuries.  The medical 
examiner further testified that seconds to minutes could have 
passed from the time of the victim's most severe head injuries 
to his loss of consciousness and death.  The cause of death was 
blunt trauma to the head with skull fractures and brain 
injuries. 
2.  The defendant's evidence.  At trial, the defendant 
argued that he lacked criminal responsibility for the victim's 
murder.  In support of his defense, he called several witnesses, 
including two experts. 
In the early morning hours after the murder, the defendant 
was arrested after attempting to steal a vehicle.  A probation 
officer testified that, while she was conducting an indigency 
assessment of the defendant prior to his arraignment in court 
later that morning, she found the defendant washing his hair in 
what appeared to be urine, and the cell floor smeared with 
feces.  The defendant also put his head in the toilet.  When she 
instructed the defendant to stop, he stopped and did not act up 
again. 
 
Dr. Rosemary Klein, a State forensic psychologist, was 
called in to evaluate the defendant's competency pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  When she arrived at the defendant's 
6 
 
cell, she "could see that he was dripping brown liquid from his 
face.  His hair was wet.  There was a puddle of brown liquid 
coming from under the door," and there was a bad smell.  She 
testified that the defendant "wasn't still.  He was agitated.  
He was moving rapidly, speaking rapidly, his eyes were looking 
around," and it appeared he may have been having an "internal 
dialogue or internal thought processes."  In response to Klein's 
questions about his mental health, the defendant informed her 
that at eight years old he had been diagnosed with bipolar 
illness and had been treated since that time, but that he 
stopped taking all but one of his medications; he added that he 
had had a head injury.  The defendant also informed her that he 
was hearing voices in his head, that these voices commanded him 
to do things, "sometimes dangerous things," and that on the 
night before he had heard "voices commanding him to do things."  
After the evaluation, Klein made provisional diagnoses that the 
defendant was psychotic at the time of the evaluation, i.e., the 
day after the murder, and that he had schizoaffective disorder.  
The defendant was transported from the court to Bridgewater 
State Hospital. 
 
A woman with whom the defendant had had two children 
testified that in the three to four years before the murder, the 
defendant's behavior had changed.  He "seem[ed] paranoid most of 
the time," "[h]e was always thinking that people were chasing 
7 
 
him or going to get him," and when her telephone rang he would 
ask her if it were the "enemy" calling.  She testified that he 
would hear the voice of his mother and the devil in his head. 
 
The defendant called Dr. David Rosmarin as an expert 
witness.  Rosmarin had interviewed the defendant in June 2012 
and had diagnosed him with schizoaffected disorder.3  He opined 
that the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time he 
killed the victim.  At trial, Rosmarin testified to what the 
defendant told him in the interview, namely, that the defendant 
hears voices, which are sometimes "overwhelming," and that the 
voices sometimes command him to fight and to commit suicide. 
 
Regarding the evening of the murder, the defendant told 
Rosmarin that he remembered using heroin, "crack" cocaine, and 
marijuana about thirty minutes to an hour before the victim 
knocked on the defendant's door requesting to purchase drugs for 
a friend.  The defendant was not hearing voices before the 
victim knocked on the defendant's door.  The defendant said, "I 
was just using drugs.  The drugs made me happy."  The defendant 
said that when he went to the victim's room, the victim was 
alone and did not have the money to pay for the drugs.  When the 
                     
 
3 Dr. David Rosmarin also diagnosed the defendant with poly 
substance use disorder, neurocognitive disorder from traumatic 
childhood injury, as well as possibly from fetal distress and 
interuterine drug exposure, posttraumatic stress disorder from 
childhood "secondary to rape and physical abuse, and partial 
remission." 
8 
 
defendant turned to leave, the victim hit him with a baseball 
bat.  The defendant said, "I tried to get the bat away from him.  
Then I hit him with the bat, not to hurt him but more I was 
afraid for my own life."  The defendant said that he remembered 
wresting the baseball bat from the victim, that the voices told 
the defendant that he should hit the victim because he was one 
of the enemy, and that the defendant's next memory was of 
opening the door and leaving. 
 
The defendant also told Rosmarin about his personal and 
family history.  The defendant said that he had moved to the 
United States from the Dominican Republic at age seventeen, that 
two of his sisters have psychotic disorders, and that one of his 
brothers committed suicide because of a psychotic disorder.4  The 
defendant said that after he fell out of a tree at age thirteen, 
he was in a coma, suffered broken ribs, had a cast on his leg, 
                     
 
4 Rosmarin testified that he was able to review independent 
records to confirm that one of the defendant's sisters had major 
depressive disorder with auditory hallucinations and another of 
his sisters had "a longstanding depressive disorder as part of a 
bipolar disorder with visual hallucinations, panic disorder, and 
is on Social Security disability."  Rosmarin opined that the 
independent records supporting the fact that the defendant's 
family members have mental health diagnoses "supports the idea 
that he, too, has a psychotic disorder because there's a shared 
genetic risk among siblings." 
 
9 
 
and had tubes placed in his ears.5  Rosmarin could not obtain 
medical records from the Dominican Republic. 
 
Rosmarin testified that, in addition to the information 
provided by the defendant, he reviewed the defendant's medical 
records.  He testified regarding the contents of the records 
from Bridgewater State Hospital and opined, inter alia, that 
there was no indication in those records that any treatment 
provider, psychiatrist or psychologist, determined that the 
defendant was malingering or feigning his symptoms. 
 
Rosmarin next testified about the medical records from a 
facility where the defendant received addiction and psychiatric 
care from May 2010 to January 12, 2012.  Those records showed 
that the defendant reported to his providers that he had tried 
to kill himself in 1997 with a knife, and that he had tried to 
kill himself in 2006 or 2007 by overdosing.  He also reported 
that he had auditory hallucinations.  The records also contained 
entries from group therapy attended by the defendant, during 
which he reported hearing voices and thinking people were 
watching him. 
 
Rosmarin also testified that records from the house of 
correction showed that the defendant attempted to hang himself 
                     
 
5 Rosmarin testified that having tubes placed in his ears 
meant that the defendant had "a tear or . . . a temporal bone 
fracture." 
10 
 
in jail in May 2012, but Rosmarin acknowledged on cross-
examination that the report indicated that the defendant may 
have done so in order to get a different bed.  The defendant 
told Rosmarin that the "voices had instructed him to kill 
himself." 
 
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Dr. Martin Kelly, a 
psychiatrist.  Kelly also interviewed the defendant and reviewed 
the defendant's medical and other records relating to the case.  
Kelly testified that he disagreed with Rosmarin's diagnosis.  
Kelly opined that the defendant did not "show true symptoms of a 
psychotic disorder," and that at the time surrounding and 
including the homicide, the defendant had antisocial personality 
disorder and suffered from substance abuse. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first 
degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Judge's ruling and jury instructions on 
the defendant's statements.  At trial, the judge ruled, and 
instructed the jury, that the defendant's statements to Klein 
and Rosmarin were not admissible for their truth and could be 
considered only as information on which the experts relied in 
reaching their opinions.  The defendant argues first that the 
judge improperly ruled that the defendant's statements to Klein 
and Rosmarin about his mental health were not admissible 
substantively and that the judge's instruction to the jury that 
11 
 
they could not consider such statements for the truth of the 
matter was incorrect as a matter of law.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth that the judge correctly ruled that the defendant's 
statements to Klein, Rosmarin, and Kelly could be considered 
only "for how they may have affected the opinions and 
conclusions of those medical witnesses," as these statements 
were made for purely legal purposes and not for diagnosis or 
treatment. 
The defendant contends that his argument is supported by 
the holding in Commonwealth v. Comtois, 399 Mass. 668 (1987), 
and Mass. G. Evid. § 803(4) (2020).  In Comtois, we stated that 
"[i]t has long been the rule in the Commonwealth that physicians 
may testify as to statements of past pain, symptoms, and 
conditions made to them when they were consulted by a declarant 
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment."  Id. at 675, citing 
Barber v. Merriam, 11 Allen 322, 324-325 (1865).  Section 
803(4), a proposed version of which was cited in Comtois, supra, 
provides an exception to the hearsay rule, regardless of the 
declarant's availability, for "[s]tatements made for the purpose 
of medical diagnosis or treatment describing medical history, 
pain, symptoms, condition, or cause, but not as to the identity 
of the person responsible or legal significance of such symptoms 
or injury."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(4), supra. 
12 
 
In Commonwealth v. Piantedosi, 478 Mass. 536, 542 (2017), 
however, we addressed "the admissibility of testimony by an 
expert witness, on direct examination, concerning facts upon 
which the expert's opinion is based, and that are independently 
admissible, but that have not been introduced in evidence."  We 
reaffirmed that "[a]lthough an expert may formulate an opinion 
based on facts or data not admitted in evidence, but that would 
be admissible with the proper witness or foundation, 'the expert 
may not testify to the substance or contents of that information 
on direct examination.'"  Id. at 543, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 203 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. 
Goddard, 476 Mass. 443, 448 (2017).  The defendant requests that 
we reconsider our decision in Piantedosi in light of Comtois, 
399 Mass. at 675, and Mass. G. Evid. § 803(4), and hold that 
Rosmarin "should have been permitted to recite the defendant's 
statements of 'past pain, symptoms, and conditions' that were 
made to him and other doctors" during the course of their 
diagnosis of the defendant and that the statements should have 
been admitted for the truth of the matter. 
 
In the present case, before Rosmarin testified, the judge 
ruled that the defendant's statements to Rosmarin during the 
interview would be admissible on direct examination, but subject 
to a limiting instruction.  Before Rosmarin began his testimony 
regarding the defendant's personal history, the judge instructed 
13 
 
the jury, in part, that they may hear statements that the 
defendant made during the course of his psychiatric interviews 
and that "[i]f you believe that the statements were made, you 
may not consider them as proof of what [the defendant] said 
. . . you may consider those statements only for how they might 
have affected the opinions and conclusions of the various 
medical witnesses."  Then, when Rosmarin began testifying about 
the defendant's version of events in relation to the murder, the 
judge instructed the jury, in part, that "I'm going to remind 
you that just because the defendant says something to Dr. 
Rosmarin, doesn't mean that that, in fact happened . . . .  If 
you believe that the statements were made . . . you may not 
consider it as proof of whatever [the defendant] said.  You may 
consider those statements only for how they might have affected 
the opinions and conclusions of this medical expert . . . ." 
 
In the final instructions, the judge instructed the jury, 
in part, that, "During the trial you heard testimony that this 
defendant made certain statements during interviews with Dr. 
Klein, Dr. Rosmarin, and Dr. Kelly.  If you believe that the 
statements were made, you may not consider them as proof of 
whatever [the defendant] said.  You may consider those 
statements only for how they may have affected the opinions and 
conclusions of those medical witnesses.  For example, if [the 
defendant] told a doctor that X happened, this is not evidence 
14 
 
that X indeed did in fact occur.  It is only evidence that [the 
defendant] made the statement which the doctor may have 
considered in his or her evaluation."  The defendant did not 
object to the judge's ruling or to the judge's jury 
instructions. 
 
The judge did not err in ruling that the statements the 
defendant made to the doctors during the forensic interviews 
were not admissible for the truth of the matter or in 
instructing the jury to that effect.  Piantedosi, 478 Mass. at 
543.  See Commonwealth v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 578 n.1 (2001).  
We clarify here that the hearsay exception for statements made 
for "purpose[s] of medical diagnosis or treatment" does not 
apply where a defendant made his or her statements in the course 
of a court-ordered forensic interview or a forensic interview to 
determine criminal responsibility.   Mass. G. Evid. § 803(4).  
See Comtois, 399 Mass. at 675.  The reason for these forensic 
interviews is to assess the defendant for a legal purpose:  to 
determine whether the defendant meets the legal definition of a 
"mental illness or mental defect" and therefore cannot be held 
criminally responsible for the crime charged.  See G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (a).  Therefore, the statements made during the course of 
these assessments do not carry the same inherent reliability as 
statements made to a professional for purposes of medical 
treatment or diagnosis.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(4). 
15 
 
 
The defendant also argues that the judge erred in 
instructing the jury that the statements of the defendant 
contained in his medical records from the facility where he had 
received treatment for addiction and psychiatric care before the 
murder could not be considered for the truth.  The Commonwealth 
stipulated to the admission of these records under G. L. c. 233, 
§ 79.  We conclude that no error occurred where the medical 
records were admitted for their full substantive value. 
 
The defendant bases his argument on an exchange that 
occurred when Rosmarin began his testimony about the records 
from that facility.  Defense counsel asked, "within those 
records did you review independent references by healthcare 
professionals who received information that [the defendant] had 
attempted suicide?"  The prosecutor objected based on the source 
of the information and the judge asked, "What's the source of 
the information?  Was it personal history or was it some other 
reference?"  Rosmarin answered, "These are what [the defendant] 
told social workers in 2010 and 2011."  The judge then stated, 
"I'm trying to stay as far away from the question as possible, 
but I just want to make sure that you direct the questions in 
consideration of the limiting instruction I gave.  So if it's 
clear that this was something that people saw, a suicide 
attempt, that's one thing.  If it's something that he says he 
did, that's another.  And I think it's important that you direct 
16 
 
[the witness] so we don't have the problem with the limiting 
instruction." 
 
This exchange did not serve either to instruct Rosmarin or 
the jury that they had to limit their consideration of the 
defendant's statements in the medical records.  It merely 
reminded the defense attorney to direct her questions in a way 
that would reduce the risk of running afoul of his limiting 
instruction.  In addition, as discussed supra, in the final jury 
instructions, after the instruction to the jury about the use of 
the defendant's statements during his forensic interviews, the 
judge explained, "This limiting instruction applies only to [the 
defendant's] statements during interviews with [Rosmarin, Kelly, 
and Klein].  If you find that he made statements to other 
persons, you can consider those statements as you would any 
other evidence."  This instruction served to clarify any 
misunderstanding the jury may have had regarding their use of 
the defendant's statements in the facility records.  We discern 
no error in the judge's ruling or the judge's instructions to 
the jury regarding the evidentiary value of the defendant's 
statements.6 
                     
 
6 The defendant argues that it appeared that the judge 
instructed Rosmarin about what Rosmarin could consider for the 
truth of the matter in reaching his expert opinion, and that the 
judge should not have done so.  We agree with the Commonwealth 
that the judge was seeking to clarify Rosmarin's testimony.  
After the prosecutor asked Rosmarin whether a certain factor 
17 
 
 
2.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a thorough 
review of the record, we find no reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or 
either to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first 
degree.7 
                     
would affect how much Rosmarin would "buy into" the defendant's 
account of the victim and the defendant struggling over the 
baseball bat, the judge interjected to ask, inter alia, "Are you 
quote unquote buying into the claim of it or are you simply 
reporting what he says? . . .  Are you taking a position on the 
. . . truthfulness or the accuracy of that statement or any 
other statement that's not otherwise verifiable?"  The judge 
then referenced his limiting instruction to the jury regarding 
the use of the defendant's statements to Rosmarin, and asked 
Rosmarin, "[M]y question to you is, are you for purposes of your 
. . . analysis, accepting [the defendant's] statement to be 
true?"  Rosmarin stated:  "I accept it as more likely than not."  
In this exchange, the judge appeared to be clarifying Rosmarin's 
statements and the prosecutor's question about "buy[ing] into" 
the defendant's statements.  Contrary to the defendant's 
assertions, the judge was not "scold[ing]" Rosmarin and he was 
not instructing Rosmarin as to what he could consider in 
reaching his opinion. 
 
 
7 As required at the time of the defendant's trial, the 
judge instructed the jury on the inference of sanity:  "with 
regard to criminal responsibility, you may consider the fact 
that a great majority of persons are sane and the probability 
that any particular person is sane.  It is for you, the jury, to 
decide whether to draw that inference."  See Commonwealth v. 
Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 846 (1999).  After the defendant's trial, 
we held in Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 815 n.8 
(2016), that the presumption of sanity instruction should not be 
given.  The defendant is entitled to the benefit of Lawson 
because his appeal was pending on direct appeal when the case 
was released.  See Commonwealth v. Waweru, 480 Mass. 173, 187 
(2018).  Defense counsel did not object at trial to this 
instruction, and we discern no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The judge instructed the jury multiple 
times that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving criminal 
responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.  See Commonwealth 
v. Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 431 (2017); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
475 Mass. 848, 863 (2016).