Title: State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-932.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-932 
THE STATE EX REL. ROUSH, APPELLANT, v. MONTGOMERY, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No.  
2019-Ohio-932.] 
Mandamus and prohibition—Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing complaint 
affirmed. 
(No. 2018-0905—Submitted January 29, 2019—Decided March 20, 2019.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 17AP-791,  
2018-Ohio-2098 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals dismissing the complaint of appellant, Robert B. Roush, for a writ of 
prohibition or mandamus.  Roush, an inmate at the Ross Correctional Institution, 
seeks a writ requiring dismissal of an adoption proceeding concerning his biological 
child.  That case was brought in the probate division of the Franklin County Court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of Common Pleas, and the appellee in this action, Judge Robert G. Montgomery, is 
the judge of that court.  In his brief to this court, Roush notes that Judge 
Montgomery has already granted the adoption.  Under settled law, the issuance of 
a judgment in the adoption case does not moot the prohibition claim.  State ex rel. 
Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 8 
(prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction 
and to correct a previous jurisdictionally unauthorized action); State ex rel. 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 
809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 2} Roush’s main contention is that because an adoption cannot be 
granted under R.C. 3107.06 without the biological father’s consent, he deprived the 
probate court of jurisdiction by withholding his consent to the adoption.  
Additionally, Roush contends that his incarceration and the biological mother’s 
cease-and-desist-contact order against him negated the probate court’s jurisdiction 
to grant the adoption based on a finding under R.C. 3107.07(A) that he had failed 
to maintain more than de minimis contact with the child over a period of one year 
or more. 
{¶ 3} The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition claim, holding that the 
probate court had jurisdiction to render a determination under R.C. 3107.07(A) as 
to “whether [Roush] has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de 
minimis contact with the minor for a period of at least one year.”  2018-Ohio-2098, 
¶ 5, 7.  Additionally, the court held that in case of an adverse ruling by the probate 
court, Roush had an adequate remedy at law though appeal.  As for the mandamus 
claim, the court of appeals dismissed on the grounds that that writ was not available 
to control Judge Montgomery’s exercise of judicial discretion in making 
determinations in the adoption case.  Roush has appealed, and for the following 
reasons, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 4} We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.  State ex 
rel. McKinney v. Schmenk, 152 Ohio St.3d 70, 2017-Ohio-9183, 92 N.E.3d 871, 
¶ 8.  Thus, in reviewing the court of appeals’ judgment in this case, we presume the 
truth of the factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the nonmoving party, and we will affirm the judgment only if there is 
no set of facts under which the nonmoving party could recover.  Id. 
{¶ 5} The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from 
exceeding their jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 
73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998).  To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, 
Roush has the burden to show (1) that Judge Montgomery has exercised or is about 
to exercise judicial power, (2) that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by 
law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate 
remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 
Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  As for his mandamus claim, 
Roush has the burden to establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) 
a clear legal duty on the part of Judge Montgomery to provide that relief, and (3) a 
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. Waters 
v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 6} Roush has sufficiently alleged that Judge Montgomery exercised 
judicial power by presiding over the adoption proceedings.  Next, Roush must show 
that the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law.  As a general matter, 
probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.  In re 
Adoption of M.G.B.-E., 154 Ohio St.3d 17, 2018-Ohio-1787, 110 N.E.3d 1236,  
¶ 27; see R.C. 3107.01(D) (defining “court” for purposes of adoption laws as 
“probate courts of this state”) and 3107.02(C) (prescribing what “the court shall 
require” when proceedings to adopt have been initiated by the filing of a petition). 
{¶ 7} For support of his argument that Judge Montgomery was 
unauthorized to rule on the adoption, Roush points to R.C. 3107.06, which states 
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that an adoption petition “may be granted only if” written consent has been 
executed by certain people, including “[t]he father of the minor.”  But that statute 
sets forth a substantive criterion for the probate court to apply; it is not a 
jurisdictional limitation on the probate court’s authority. 
{¶ 8} The consent requirement is subject to exceptions set forth in R.C. 
3107.07.  Notable here is R.C. 3107.07(A), which abrogates the requirement that a 
parent consent when the parent has “failed without justifiable cause to provide more 
than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the maintenance and 
support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least 
one year.”  Roush contends that this provision was invoked against him in the 
adoption proceeding and that because of his imprisonment and a no-contact order 
against him, that exception does not apply to him. 
{¶ 9} Like R.C. 3107.06, R.C. 3107.07(A) does nothing more than 
prescribe a substantive criterion to be applied in adoption cases.  Because the 
probate court clearly possessed jurisdiction to determine whether Roush’s consent 
was required and because Roush could appeal any adverse judgment,1 the court of 
appeals correctly concluded that the prohibition claim should be dismissed. 
{¶ 10} We now turn to the mandamus claim.  In essence, that claim consists 
of little more than applying a different label to the claim Roush already made for a 
writ of prohibition.  The complaint states that “the writs [of prohibition and 
mandamus] should issue to compel dismissal of the underlying Probate case as set 
forth herein”; in other words, the mandamus claim seeks an order requiring Judge 
Montgomery to dismiss the adoption case on the grounds that his court lacks 
jurisdiction.  For the reasons already stated, Roush has no legal right to such a 
dismissal, nor does Judge Montgomery have any legal duty to grant it.  Moreover, 
                                                 
1 Roush’s brief to this court mentions an affidavit that he filed in the probate court that Judge 
Montgomery allegedly erred in rejecting.  To the extent that that claim has any merit, it too can be 
asserted on appeal. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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mandamus will not lie to control a judge’s discretion to determine the legal and 
factual issues properly raised in the case before him.  State ex rel. Fontanella v. 
Kontos, 117 Ohio St.3d 514, 2008-Ohio-1431, 885 N.E.2d 220, ¶ 7.  It follows that 
the court of appeals properly dismissed the mandamus claim. 
{¶ 11} In his brief, Roush questions the adequacy of appeal as a remedy, 
given that the court of appeals could affirm the trial court’s judgment.  Roush argues 
that “adequate remedy” “means more than merely making a remedy available”; it 
“requires that actual relief occur.  Otherwise a writ may lie.” 
{¶ 12} But the likelihood of success of an appeal is not the measure of a 
remedy’s adequacy.  To be adequate, an alternative remedy such as appeal “must 
be complete, beneficial, and speedy.”  State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civ. 
Rights Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 441, 2008-Ohio-1261, 884 N.E.2d 589, ¶ 18.  We 
have stated that “[a]bsent special circumstances or a ‘dramatic fact pattern,’ 
postjudgment appeal constitutes a complete, beneficial, and speedy remedy.”  State 
ex rel. Toledo Metro Fed. Credit Union v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 
529, 531, 678 N.E.2d 1396 (1997).  Here, the alternative remedy of appeal would 
be adequate: if Roush prevailed, he would get all the relief he seeks through reversal 
of the judgment granting the adoption.  See State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers, 153 
Ohio St.3d 103, 2018-Ohio-256, 101 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 11-13.  Nor does the mere fact 
that the appeal itself takes time establish its inadequacy.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 13} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Robert B. Roush, pro se. 
_________________