Title: SHON ANDERSON v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHON ANDERSON v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2010 WY 157Case Number: S-10-0086Decided: 12/03/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
SHON 
ANDERSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
D. Newman, Hampton & Newman, LC, Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; James 
Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristen J. Hanna, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Shon Anderson, challenges an order from the Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH) denying his claim for additional Workers' Compensation Permanent Partial 
Impairment (PPI) benefits.  The OAH 
rated his PPI using the 6th edition of the American Medical Association Guides 
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, which was the most recent edition 
available in 2008 when Mr. Anderson reached maximum medical improvement.  Mr. Anderson contends that his PPI 
should have been rated using the 5th edition of the AMA Guides, which was the 
most recent edition available in 2003 when he incurred his original injury.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. 
Anderson presents two issues: 

 
 

1.    
Was the 
Office of Administrative Hearings' decision holding that Mr. Anderson's 
impairment should be calculated according to the 6th edition of the American 
Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law?

 
 

2.    
Does 
the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division's interpretation and 
application of W.S. § 27-14-405(g) result in an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority that is contrary to Article 10 Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Anderson suffered a compensable lower back injury in 2003.  In December 2004, he underwent the first 
of two surgeries on his lower back.  
He subsequently reached maximum medical improvement and the Division 
referred Mr. Anderson to Dr. Michael Kaplan for a PPI rating.  Dr. Kaplan concluded that Mr. Anderson 
had a 10% PPI.  He performed his 
evaluation using the 5th edition of the American Medical Association Guides to 
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.  
The Division subsequently awarded Mr. Anderson PPI benefits based upon 
Dr. Kaplan's rating.  

 
 

[¶4]        
In 
December 2007, Mr. Anderson underwent a second surgery on his lower back.  The surgery was performed by Dr. Brent 
Clyde.  After reaching maximum 
medical improvement, Mr. Anderson sought additional PPI benefits.  He was referred to Dr. Clyde for an 
evaluation.  Using the 6th edition 
of the American Medical Association Guides, Dr. Clyde calculated Mr. Anderson's 
PPI at 7%.  Mr. Anderson disagreed 
with this rating and requested a second evaluation.  He was referred to his original surgeon, 
Dr. Kaplan, for another evaluation.  
Dr. Kaplan also used the 6th edition and assigned a PPI rating to Mr. 
Anderson of 8%.

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
Division issued a Final Determination of Permanent Partial Impairment Benefit on 
October 6, 2008 and denied Mr. Anderson's claim explaining:  

 
 
The 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division has received the second opinion 
regarding your permanent impairment rating.  Dr. Kaplan assigned [an] 8 percent 
impairment to your body as a whole, related to your 4/6/2003 injury to your 
lumbar spine.  The Division has 
reviewed this rating along with the original rating of 7 percent performed by 
Dr. Clyde on June 30, 2008 and has determined that you are entitled to a 0 
percent impairment as you received a 10 percent impairment May 1, 2005.  You may continue to submit claims 
related solely to the original injury.  

 
 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Anderson objected to the determination on the basis that his PPI should have 
been calculated using the 5th edition of the AMA Guides.  The matter was referred to the OAH.  Both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment, agreeing that there were no issues of material fact and the only 
question was which edition of the AMA Guides should be used to rate Mr. 
Anderson's PPI.  The OAH issued an 
order in May 2009 concluding that the 6th edition was proper and granting the 
Division's motion for summary judgment.  
Mr. Anderson appealed to the district court and the OAH decision was 
affirmed.  Mr. Anderson timely 
appealed to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶7]        
Our 
review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2009):

 
 
(c)   To the extent necessary to make a 
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
(i)    Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

 
 
(ii)   Hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings and conclusions found to be:

 
 
(A)    Arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
(B)    Contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
(C)    In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)    Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E)    Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 
 
"We 
review an agency's conclusions of law de novo, and will affirm only if the 
agency's conclusions are in accordance with the law."  Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 
11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010); Dale v. S 
& S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, 
¶ 26, 188 P.3d 554, 561-62 (Wyo. 2008).  When we consider an appeal from a 
district court's review of an administrative agency's decision, we give no 
deference to the district court's decision.  We review the case as if it had come 
directly from the administrative agency.  
Dutcher v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 10, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 559, 561 (Wyo. 
2010); Dale, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d  at 557. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]        
In 
this case, there is no factual dispute.  Mr. Anderson claims that the OAH 
incorrectly applied the law to the undisputed facts.  He contends that under the applicable 
statutes, a PPI must be rated using the most recent edition of the AMA Guides at 
the time of the original injury.  
The Division contends that a PPI rating must be made based on the most 
recent edition of the AMA Guides at the time Mr. Anderson reached maximum 
medical improvement.  We agree with 
the Division.  

 
 

[¶9]        
Our 
rules of statutory interpretation are well 
established.

 
 

First, 
we determine if the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous.  A statute is unambiguous if its wording 
is such that reasonable persons 
are 
able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Unless another meaning is clearly 
intended, words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense. 
 Conversely, a statute is ambiguous 
only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations.

 
 

Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Dep't of Revenue, 2010 
WY 122, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 568, 570-71 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting BP America 
Production Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2006 
WY 27, ¶ 20, 130 P.3d 438, 464 (Wyo. 2006)).  In determining whether a statute is 
ambiguous

 
 
[w]e 
begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  

 
 

Ball 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2010 WY 128, ¶ 29, 239 P.3d 621, 629 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 

[¶10]     
Mr. 
Anderson was awarded workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-405 (LexisNexis 2007), which stated, in relevant 
part:

 
 
(f)  An injured employee suffering an ascertainable loss may apply for a 
permanent partial impairment award as provided in this 
section.

 
 
(g) An injured employee's impairment shall be rated 
by a licensed physician using the most 
recent edition of the American Medical Association's guide to the evaluation of 
permanent impairment. The award shall be paid as provided by W.S. 27-14-403 
for the number of months determined by multiplying the percentage of impairment 
by forty-four (44) months.1

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(ii) defines "ascertainable loss" 
as:

 
 
(ii)  "Ascertainable loss" means that point in time in which it is apparent 
that permanent physical impairment has resulted from a compensable injury, 
the extent of the physical impairment due to the injury can be determined and 
the physical impairment will not substantially improve or deteriorate because of 
the injury. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶11]     
The 
hearing officer reached the following conclusion:  

 
 
Reading 
the statute as a whole, and reviewing the definition of "ascertainable loss", 
leads this Hearing Examiner to believe that the AMA Guidelines in effect at the 
"point in time" when the employee/claimant is deemed to have suffered an 
ascertainable loss apply.  
Ascertainable loss is defined as "that point in time in which it is 
apparent that permanent physical impairment has resulted from a compensable 
injury, the extent of the physical impairment due [to] the injury can be 
determined and the physical impairment will not substantially improve or 
deteriorate because of the injury", Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
Mr. 
Anderson contends that this conclusion was in error and the statute is ambiguous 
because it does not specify whether the rating should be determined using the 
most recent edition at the time of the injury, or at the time of the 
ascertainable loss. 

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
statute requires that an injured employee's impairment rating be determined 
using the most recent edition of the AMA Guides.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(g).  Subsection (g) does not explicitly state 
when the impairment rating should occur.  
However, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(f) states that an employee is 
eligible for a PPI award when he has suffered an ascertainable loss.  An ascertainable loss means "that point 
in time in which it is apparent that permanent physical impairment has resulted 
from a compensable injury."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(ii).  We 
have said "[a]n ascertainable loss' is commonly measured at the point of 
maximum medical improvement.'"  Phillips v. TIC-The Industrial Co. of 
Wyo., Inc., 2005 WY 40, ¶ 33, 109 P.3d 520, 534 (Wyo. 2005).  
In this case, it is undisputed that "maximum medical improvement" 
occurred in June 2008, after Mr. Anderson's second surgery.  At that time, the 6th edition was the 
"most recent edition." 

 
 

[¶13]     
Mr. 
Anderson contends that the statute should be interpreted by applying the general 
rule that an employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits is governed by 
the law in effect when the injury occurred.  See Loberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2004 WY 48, ¶ 3 n.1, 88 P.3d 1045, 1047 n.1 (Wyo. 
2004).  The use of the 6th edition, 
however, is consistent with the general rule.  As explained by the district court in 
its well-reasoned decision letter: 

 
 
The 
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405 has not changed since the time of [Mr. 
Anderson's] work injury.  Then, as 
now, the statute requires the most recent edition of the AMA guides to be 
used.  When [Mr. Anderson] was 
assigned his first PPI rating in 2005, the 5th edition was the "most 
recent".  At the time of his second 
PPI rating in 2008, the 6th edition was [the] "most recent".  Although the AMA guides have changed, 
the requirements under the statute are the same.

 
 


 
 
[T]he 
applicable statutory language must be read in pari materia.  If one were to read Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(g) alone, it may be ambiguous.  
However, when subsection (g) is read along with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
27-14-405(f) and 27-14-102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007), the language is clear and 
unambiguous.  The fact that the 
Legislature did not use the words "at the time of the injury" or something 
similar in subsection (g) merely demonstrates the clear meaning of the statutory 
language and the legislative intent.

 
 
It is 
clear from the plain language of the statutes in question that they are 
unambiguous.  After an 
employee/claimant suffers an "ascertainable loss", as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007), he may apply for a PPI award.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-405(f).

 
 

[¶14]     
The 
analysis is consistent with our precedent.  In the case of In re Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1991), 
the issue presented was whether a totally disabled employee should be 
compensated at rates set on the date of his accident, in 1963, or on the date it 
was medically determined that he was totally disabled, in 1988.  We held 
the employee/claimant's "injury" occurred in 1988 and that he should be "paid at 
the rates applicable in 1988 when the medical decision was made from which 
appellant became aware that he was 100% disabled."  Id. at 298.

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. 
Anderson asserts that In re Nielsen 
is distinguishable because it involves a claim for total disability benefits 
rather than impairment benefits.  He 
maintains that a person, in most cases, can still work if he has an 
impairment.  He also notes that our 
decision in that case resulted in the employee receiving additional 
benefits.

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
district court rejected this argument and we agree with its 
analysis:

 
 
While 
it is true that Nielsen is not 
directly on point and that "impairment" and "disability" are not the same thing, 
Nielsen is nevertheless persuasive 
authority and its reasoning is applicable to [Mr. Anderson's] case.  [Mr. Anderson] mischaracterizes the 
issue facing the Nielsen court.  The underlying issue facing the Nielsen court is the same as that facing 
this Courtthe correct interpretation of a statute.  Id. at 298.  In Nielsen, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
searched for "the most prudent and accurate construction of W.S. 
27-14-403(c)."  Although the Nielsen court did discuss the 
significant impact of its decision in terms of benefits received in the body of 
its decision, this was not the sole reason for its decision.  See Id. at 300.  Rather, this was one of many factors the 
Nielsen court considered in its 
application of the statute.  Id. at 299.  In Nielsen, the statute in question was 
ambiguous, so the court had to employ the principles of statutory construction 
to determine its meaning.  In [Mr. 
Anderson's] case, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.  In addition, the OAH's decision is 
consistent not only with the clear and unambiguous statutory language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-102(a)(ii) and 27-14-405(f) and (g), but also with the 
reasoning of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Nielsen.

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. 
Anderson essentially asserts that the 6th edition does not provide the most 
reliable guidance in determining a PPI rating.  He supports his assertion with excerpts 
from a letter from Dr. Clyde which describes the 6th edition as "ambiguous" and 
"difficult to interpret."2  Mr. Anderson also contends that several 
states have discredited or rejected the 6th edition in determining impairment, 
but provides no authority for this assertion.  We note that Dr. Kaplan also performed a 
PPI rating after Mr. Anderson had reached maximum medical improvement following 
the second surgery and did not indicate that the 6th edition was unworkable or 
unreliable.  More significantly, 
this Court is not in a position to decide which edition provides the most 
reliable guidance.  The legislature 
clearly intended that the PPI be rated using the most recent edition at the time 
of the ascertainable loss.  The 6th 
edition of the AMA Guides was the most recent edition when Mr. Anderson reached 
maximum medical improvement following his second surgery.  The OAH's determination that Mr. 
Anderson's PPI was properly rated according to the 6th edition was in accordance 
with the law.

 
 

[¶18]     
In 
his second argument, Mr. Anderson challenges the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-405(g).  He appears to 
assert that the statute is unconstitutional per se because it is vague and 
ambiguous.  He also appears to 
contend that the Division's application of the statute violates the 
constitutional provision which prohibits laws limiting the amount of damages to 
be recovered in workers' compensation cases. See Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4.  

 
 

[¶19]     
We 
must decline to address Mr. Anderson's constitutional questions.  In an administrative agency appeal, 
neither the district court nor this Court has the authority to address the 
constitutionality of a statute.  Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp Div., 2004 WY 92, ¶ 6, 95 P.3d 794, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  "This prohibition exists regardless of 
whether the question concerns the constitutionality of the statute per se or the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied."  Williams v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 57, ¶ 18, 205 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Wyo. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The proper avenue for challenging the constitutionality of a statute is 
an independent action for declaratory judgment.  Id., see also In re Billings, 2001 WY 81, ¶ 41, 30 P.3d 557, 572 
(Wyo. 2001).

 
 

[¶20]     
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
2009, subsection (g) was amended to 
change the number of months used in the permanent impairment calculation from 
"forty-four (44) months" to 
"sixty 
(60) months."

 
 

2In the same letter, 
Dr. Clyde indicated that Mr. Anderson's PPI would have been between 20-23% if 
the 5th edition had been used for the rating.