Title: Allen v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CURTIS ALLEN,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 699, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0304014526B 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  May 28, 2010 
Decided:  August 12, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of August 2010, upon careful consideration of the briefs 
on appeal and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Curtis Allen, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s November 18, 2009 denial of his motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  We conclude that 
there is no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Allen was tried in May 2004 on 
multiple charges of rape, attempted rape and robbery.  The charges involved 
three women and arose from three separate incidents occurring in 2002 and 
 
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2003 in the vicinity of the Wilmington bus and train stations.1  Allen’s 
defense at trial was that he had consensual sex with each of the women after 
buying and/or consuming drugs with them. 
 
(3) 
The evidence at trial included expert testimony that Allen’s 
DNA profile matched the profile of sperm obtained from vaginal swabs 
collected from each of the women.  In two of the women, identified herein 
as Victim A and Victim B, the only DNA found, other than their own, 
belonged to Allen.2  In the case of the third woman, Victim C, sperm from 
another contributor was collected from her underwear. 
 
(4) 
Allen’s jury trial resulted in guilty verdicts with respect to 
Victim A and Victim B.  Allen was acquitted with respect to Victim C.  On 
direct appeal, this Court affirmed Allen’s convictions.3 
 
(5) 
On October 14, 2009, Allen filed a pro se motion for 
postconviction relief.4  Allen argued that his defense counsel had a 
disqualifying conflict of interest and was otherwise ineffective. 
                                          
 
1 Charges arising from a fourth incident involving a juvenile male were severed by the 
Superior Court and resolved by a plea agreement. 
2 In this decision, the Court has referred to the three women as Victim A, Victim B, and 
Victim C, consistent with the pseudonyms assigned by the Court in its decision on 
Allen’s direct appeal. 
3 Allen v. State, 953 A.2d 699 (Del. 2005).  On direct appeal, Allen challenged only the 
sufficiency of the jury instructions. 
4 Allen filed related motions for transcripts, “to compel,” and for expansion of the record. 
 
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(6) 
The Superior Court referred Allen’s postconviction motion to a 
commissioner for proposed findings and recommendations.  Finding that 
Allen’s assertions were “based upon conjecture and innuendo,” the 
commissioner did not reach the merit of Allen’s claims.  By report dated 
November 3, 2009, the commissioner recommended that Allen’s motion 
should be summarily dismissed as procedurally barred.   
 
(7) 
By order dated November 18, 2010, having received no 
objection to the commissioner’s report and after reviewing the record de 
novo, the Superior Court denied Allen’s postconviction motion “for reasons 
stated in the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.”  This appeal 
followed. 
 
(8) 
In a postconviction proceeding, the Superior Court must first 
consider whether the procedural requirements of Rule 61(i)5 have been met 
before addressing the merits of the movant’s claims.6  In this case, as 
determined by the Superior Court, Allen’s claims are both time-barred under 
Rule 61(i)(1)7 and procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3).8  Allen 
                                          
 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to relief). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring postconviction motion filed more than 
three years after judgment of conviction is final) (amended 2005 to reduce limitations 
period to one year for conviction final after July 1, 2005).  Allen’s conviction became 
final in March 2005.  His postconviction motion was filed in October 2009. 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (barring any ground for relief that could have been 
raised in a prior proceeding but was not). 
 
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argues, however, that his claims should be considered under Rule 61(i)(5), 
which renders the procedural bars inapplicable to colorable claims of a 
miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation.9 
 
(9) 
In his conflict of interest claim, Allen argues that his counsel, 
an assistant public defender, was disqualified from representing him because 
the Office of Public Defender previously represented another suspect who 
was initially charged in the rape of Victim C.10  According to Allen, this 
dual representation impeded his defense at trial because his counsel could 
not argue the other suspect’s guilt to the jury. 
 
(10) In his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Allen argues that 
his counsel was ineffective when he failed to impeach the police officers’ 
handling and processing of certain forensic evidence and when he failed to 
retain a defense expert to conduct additional testing.  According to Allen, 
“the methods the police used to collect evidence created a severe risk of 
evidence contamination.” 
 
(11) An application for postconviction relief alleging a successful 
conflict of interest claim must specifically identify the nature of the alleged 
                                          
 
9 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (excepting application of procedural bar to a 
colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 
violation that undermined the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction).  
10 The charge against that suspect, Calvin Munce, was dismissed by the State on March 
18, 2003.  State v. Munce, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 0209004470.  
 
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conflict and make a concrete showing of actual prejudice, i.e., that “an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer’s performance”11  
Similarly, an application for postconviction relief alleging a successful claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that the attorney’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, 
but for the deficient representation, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different, i.e., that the deficient representation prejudiced the defense.12 
 
(12) Under the circumstances of this case, Allen cannot show that he 
was prejudiced by the Office of Public Defender’s prior representation of the 
other suspect initially charged in the rape of Victim C.  Allen was acquitted 
in the rape of Victim C, and there is no basis in the record to suggest that the 
other suspect committed any of the offenses against Victim A and Victim 
B.13  Moreover, with nothing more than speculation to support his claim that 
the police mishandled forensic evidence, and in view of the other evidence 
corroborating his guilt, Allen cannot show that he was prejudiced as a result 
                                          
 
11 Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 718 (Del. 2000) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).  Accord Hitchens v. State, 2007 WL 2229020 (Del. Supr.); State v. 
Ward, 1991 WL 302635 (Del. Super.), aff’d, 1992 WL 115185 (Del. Supr.). 
12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
13 But cf. Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709 (Del. 2000) (holding that there was an actual 
conflict of interest in the dual representation of defendant and codefendant at trial by the 
same assistant public defender when the strength of the state’s case against the 
codefendant undermined the jury’s assessment of the defendant’s alibi defense).    
 
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of his counsel’s failure to impeach the police officers and to retain a defense 
expert. 
 
(13) The Court concludes that Allen’s motion for postconviction 
relief was properly denied as time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and 
procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3).  Allen’s claims are based on 
unsupported factual assertions that do not entitle him to relief under Rule 
61(i)(5). 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice