Title: Thorkildsen v. Belden

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN THORKILDSEN v. MARGOT BELDEN, and FISH CREEK DESIGN, LLC2012 WY 8Case Number: S-11-0146Decided: 01/20/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011

JOHN 
THORKILDSEN,Appellant (Defendant),v.MARGOT BELDEN, and FISH 
CREEK DESIGN, LLC,Appellees (Plaintiffs).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
David 
G. Lewis, Attorney at Law, Jackson, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Richard 
J. Mulligan, Mulligan Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming; Heather Nobel, Jackson, 
Wyoming 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      In the fourth 
appeal of this matter, this Court took it upon itself to end this litigation, 
and in a specific remand, we directed the district court to enter an order 
awarding John Thorkildsen (Thorkildsen) attorney fees in the amount of 
$77,475.00.  Now, in the fifth 
appeal of this matter, Thorkildsen challenges the district court’s entry of the 
order we directed, claiming he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the fee 
award.  We affirm the district 
court’s Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees. 
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Thorkildsen 
presents the following issues on appeal:
 
            
1.         
Did the District Court erroneously decide that the Defendant Thorkildsen 
was not entitled to have prejudgment interest assessed on the attorney fees 
awarded him by the Wyoming Supreme Court in its decision Thorkildsen v. Belden, et al., 2011 WY 26, ¶ 27, 247 P.3d 60, 67 (Wyo. 2011)?
 
            
2.         
Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the decision in Thorkildsen v. Belden, et al., 2011 WY 26, ¶ 27, 247 P.3d 60, 67 (Wyo. 2011) to foreclose the defendant from seeking an award of prejudgment 
interest in any event. 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      This case began 
in 2004, when Margot Belden and Fish Creek Designs, LLC (Fish Creek) filed suit 
against Thorkildsen claiming a breach of the LLC agreement and that Thorkildsen 
and his wife owed Fish Creek for payments it made on a loan.  After a bench trial, the district court 
ruled in favor of the Thorkildsens.  
Belden and Fish Creek appealed, and this Court ruled that the district 
court erred when it did not consider parol evidence of a separate agreement 
regarding the loan repayment.  Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2007 WY 68, 156 P.3d 320 (Wyo. 2007) (Belden I).  On remand, after consideration of the 
additional evidence, the district court again ruled in favor of 
Thorkildsen.  It also ruled that 
Thorkildsen was entitled to reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred as a 
result of defending against the complaint.  
Belden and Fish Creek again appealed, and this Court affirmed.  Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2008 WY 145, 197 P.3d 148 (Wyo. 2008) (Belden 
II).
 
[¶4]      In January of 
2009, Thorkildsen filed a motion seeking $79,545.09 in attorney fees and 
costs.  The district court awarded 
costs of $2,070.90, but it did not rule on attorney fees.  Thorkildsen appealed, and this Court 
affirmed the award of costs and remanded the matter to the district court for 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the claim for attorney fees.  Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2010 WY 17, 223 P.3d 1291 (Wyo. 2010) (Thorkildsen 
I).
 
[¶5]      On remand, the 
district court denied the attorney fees motion on the ground that Thorkildsen 
failed to segregate his fees.  
Thorkildsen appealed again, and this Court held that the district court 
erred in requiring the fee segregation.  
Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2011 WY 
26, 247 P.3d 60 (Wyo. 2011) (Thorkildsen 
II).  We also decided, given the 
protracted litigation in this case, that we would not remand for fact 
findings.  Instead, this Court, 
noting that “it is time for this matter to come to an end,” took the unusual 
step of making a factual determination that the attorney fees Thorkildsen 
requested were reasonable.   Id., ¶¶ 23-25, 247 P.3d  at 66.  We then ordered:
 
            
We reverse and remand this matter to the district court for entry of an 
order awarding Mr. Thorkildsen attorney fees in the amount of $77,475.00 as 
requested in his January 2009 motion.
 
Id., 
¶ 27, 247 P.3d  at 67.
 
[¶6]      On remand, 
Thorkildsen modified his attorney fee motion to also request a seven-percent 
prejudgment interest on the fee award.  
The district court, this time with a new judge presiding, entered an 
order awarding the directed $77,475.00 in attorney fees and denying the 
requested prejudgment interest.  In 
so ordering, the district court stated that Thorkildsen “seeks to amend the 
award by claiming an additional seven per cent prejudgment interest on the 
attorney’s fees.  The Court finds 
that this addition would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
mandate.”
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶7]      Unless otherwise 
specified by statute, the decision whether to award prejudgment interest on a 
judgment or award is a question of law that we review de novo.  Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Tilden, 
2008 WY 46, ¶ 21, 181 P.3d 94, 102 (Wyo. 2008); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25, 34 (Wyo. 1977).
 
DISCUSSION
 
Prejudgment 
Interest
 
[¶8]      Prejudgment interest is an accepted form of relief where a 
claim is “liquidated.” Pennant Service 
Co., Inc. v. True Oil Co., LLC, 2011 WY 40, ¶ 36, 249 P.3d 698, 711 (Wyo. 
2011).  A liquidated claim is one 
that is readily computable by basic mathematical calculation.  Id.; Stewart Title, ¶ 26, 181 P.3d  at 
103.  
Prejudgment 
interest is allowed on the theory that an injured party should be fully 
compensated for his or her loss. It is the compensation allowed by law as 
additional damages for lost use of money due as damages during the lapse of time 
between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment. It is appropriate 
when the underlying recovery is compensatory in nature and when the amount at 
issue is easily ascertainable and one upon which interest can be easily 
computed.
 
Pennant, 
¶ 36, 249 P.3d  at 711 (quoting Stewart 
Title, ¶ 28, 181 P.3d at 103-04).  
“An unliquidated claim can be converted into a liquidated claim if the 
amount claimed can be determined, inter alia, 'without reliance on 
opinion or discretion.’”  Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 
891 P.2d 57, 66 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Rissler & McMurry, 559 P.2d at 
33).
 
[¶9]      Thorkildsen 
contends that his attorney fees claim is a liquidated claim.  He points to the three affidavits 
attached to his attorney fees motion, describing the legal services provided by 
his attorney and the amounts billed for those services, and argues that from 
those affidavits, the amount claimed can be calculated as a sum certain.  We reject this argument because it fails 
to consider the analysis and discretion a court brings to an award of attorney 
fees.
 
[¶10]   Wyoming generally subscribes to the 
American rule regarding the recovery of attorney fees, under which rule each 
party pays his or her own fees.  A 
prevailing party may, however, be reimbursed for attorney fees when provided for 
by contract or statute.  Weiss v. Weiss, 2009 WY 124, ¶ 8, 217 P.3d 408, 410 (Wyo. 2009); Forshee 
v. Delaney, 
2005 WY 103, ¶ 7, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  In determining the reasonableness of the 
fees requested, a trial court must follow the federal lodestar test, which 
requires a determination of “(1) whether the fee charged represents the product 
of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and (2) whether other factors of 
discretionary application should be considered to adjust the fee either upward 
or downward.”  Weiss, ¶ 8, 217 P.3d  at 410-411 (quoting 
Forshee, ¶ 7, 118 P.3d at 448).  Additionally, even if fees are provided 
by a valid contractual provision, “a trial court has the discretion to exercise 
its equitable control to allow only such sum as is reasonable or the court may 
properly disallow attorney’s fees altogether on the basis that such recovery 
would be inequitable.”  Dewey v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶ 50, 38 P.3d 402, 420 (Wyo. 2002).
 
[¶11]   As our decisions illustrate, under 
Wyoming law, an award of attorney fees is generally not the result of a 
mathematical computation.  The fees 
described by affidavit are merely the starting point of the analysis, and it is 
through a court’s exercise of discretion that it determines what portion of the 
amount requested is reasonable and equitable under the particular circumstances 
of a given case.  The analysis this 
Court itself undertook in determining the fees that should be awarded 
Thorkildsen illustrates the discretionary nature of the 
determination:
 
Ordinarily, 
a determination by this Court that a party is entitled to attorney fees in 
accordance with the terms of a written agreement would require remand to the 
district court for determination of the fee amount. This, however, is not an 
ordinary case. What began in 2004 with the filing of Ms. Belden’s and the LLC’s 
complaint evolved into an unnecessarily complicated and protracted legal battle. 
We are disinclined to send this back yet again for the district court to 
resolve. Compare Lieberman 
v. Mossbrook, 
[2009 WY 65,] ¶ 48, 208 P.3d 1296, 1310 (Wyo. 2009), 
in which this Court declined to remand for determination of damages after 
reversing the district court’s judgment on liability.
 
The 
factors to be considered in awarding fees are set forth in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1–14–126(b) 
(LexisNexis 2009):
 
(b)       In civil 
actions for which an award of attorney’s fees is authorized, the court in its 
discretion may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party without 
requiring expert testimony. In exercising its discretion the court may consider 
the following factors:
 
(i)         
The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly;
 
(ii) 
       The 
likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other 
employment by the lawyer;
 
(iii) 
      The fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;
 
(iv) 
      The amount 
involved and the results obtained;
 
(v) 
       The 
time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;
 
(vi) 
      The nature 
and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;
 
(vii) 
     The experience, 
reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
and
 
(viii) 
    Whether the fee is 
fixed or contingent.
 
Mr. 
Thorkildsen’s attorney fee request included the affidavit of counsel, which 
contained six pages itemizing the time he spent in representing his client 
between May of 2002, when the dispute arose, and June of 2008, when he appeared 
before this Court. It does not include the time spent preparing for and 
appearing at the two subsequent district court hearings, one in which the court 
awarded costs and no fees, and a second in which the district court denied the 
motion for fees. It also does not include the time counsel spent preparing and 
appearing for argument in this Court in two subsequent appeals. Although Ms. 
Belden and the LLC complain the fee is unreasonable because it includes travel 
time charged at counsel’s usual hourly rate for the first two appeals and more 
time for research and brief writing than their counsel spent on those 
activities, we conclude any excess is more than balanced out by the time spent 
on later proceedings that is not included in Mr. Thorkildsen’s counsel’s billing 
statement. We also note that Ms. Belden and the LLC supported their claim that 
the fees were unreasonable not with the affidavit of an uninvolved third party 
but only with their own attorney’s self-serving affidavit. Finally, it is worth 
repeating that Ms. Belden’s and the LLC’s attorney sought fees in the amount of 
$25,000 even before this matter went to trial or was appealed. By comparison, 
Mr. Thorkildsen’s counsel’s request for $77,470.00 after a trial, three 
evidentiary hearings and four appeals seems reasonable.
 
Thorkildsen 
II, 
¶¶ 23-25, 247 P.3d  at 66.
 
[¶12]   Plainly, this Court’s analysis was 
not a mere mathematical calculation based on the billing figures contained in 
the affidavits of Thorkildsen’s attorney.  
We reviewed the fee request and decided the amount to award based not on 
a mathematical calculation but rather on the basis of what was reasonable and 
equitable under the circumstances of this case.  We therefore cannot agree with 
Thorkildsen that the attorney fees award was a liquidated 
claim.
 
[¶13]   Our decision in Stewart Title does not change our 
analysis or this result.  Stewart Title was decided under a 
provision of the Insurance Code that specifically provided that in an action 
against an insurance company, a court may award “a reasonable sum as an 
attorney’s fee and interest at ten percent (10%) per year.”  See Stewart Title, ¶ 22, 181 P.3d  at 102 
(quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-15-124(c)).  
In that case, we first considered whether the statute authorized an award 
of prejudgment or post-judgment interest on an attorney fees award.  Id.  We concluded that because post-judgment 
interest was already provided for statutorily, the Insurance Code meant to 
provide for prejudgment interest.  
Id.  We then turned to the question whether 
the prejudgment interest applied to attorney fees awards.   This Court concluded that in light 
of the statutory purpose of encouraging claims settlement and discouraging the 
unreasonable rejection of claims, the prejudgment interest did apply to awards 
of attorney fees.  Id., ¶¶ 24, 26-28, 181 P.3d  at 
103-04.  From there, the only 
remaining question was whether the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding prejudgment interest under the particular circumstances of that 
case.  We concluded it did not.  Id., ¶ 28, 181 P.3d  at 
104.
 
[¶14]   Since this case does not arise 
under the Insurance Code or any other statute authorizing prejudgment interest 
on an attorney fees award, the Stewart 
Title analysis and policy considerations do not apply 
here.
 
Sanctions
 
[¶15]   Belden argues there was no 
reasonable cause for Thorkildsen’s appeal in this matter and has requested that 
this Court thus enter an order of sanctions against Thorkildsen pursuant to Rule 
10.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.  With regard to sanctions, we have 
said:
 
“Generally, 
this Court is reluctant to impose sanctions, but we will make such an award in 
those rare circumstances where an appellate brief lacks cogent argument, is 
devoid of pertinent authority to support the claims of error, and/or fails to 
make adequate references to the record.”
 
Veile 
v. Bryant, 
2005 WY 150, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 562, 565 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Gray 
v. Stratton Real Estate, 
2001 WY 125, ¶ 11, 36 P.3d 1127, 1129-30 (Wyo. 2001)).
 
[¶16]   We felt we had made it clear in our 
fourth decision in this case that it was time for this litigation to end, and we 
thus understand Belden’s frustration with this additional and perhaps 
inadvisable appeal.  Nonetheless, we 
do not find Thorkildsen’s appeal to be so utterly without basis as to be one of 
those rare cases where sanctions are warranted, and we therefore deny Belden’s 
request for sanctions.
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶17]   The award of Thorkildsen’s attorney 
fees was not a liquidated claim, and Thorkildsen was therefore not entitled to 
prejudgment interest on the award.  
We affirm the order of the district court.