Title: Kosor v. Olympia Companies, LLC

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

4136 Nev, Advance Opinion 03
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MICHAEL KOSOR, JR., A NEVADA. No. 75669
RESIDENT,

Appellant,

vs. :

OLYMPIA COMPANIES, LLC, A FI L E D
NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY; AND GARRY V. GOETT, A DEC 31 aim
NEVADA RESIDENT, n scorele,
Respondents. ty. a

 

Appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP
District

 

special motion to dismiss in a defamation action. Eighth Judici
Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.

Barron & Pruitt, LLP, and William H. Pruitt and Joseph R. Meservy, North
Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and J. Randall Jones and Nathanael R.

Rulis, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

BEFORE PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and CADISH, JJ.1

"The Honorable Ron Parraguirre, Justice, voluntarily recused himself
and took no part in the consideration of this appeal. The Honorable Kristina
Pickering, Chief Justice, sits in his place.

20-4498

 

 
OPINION

 

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.

‘This case arises in the context of Nevada's anti-SLAPP
protections, which appellant Michael Kosor says apply to his vociferous
criticisms of the homeowners’ association and developers/managers of the
residential community of Southern Highlands in Clark County.
Respondents, Olympia Companies, LLC, and its president and CEO, Garry
V. Goett (collectively, Olympia)—said developers/managers—bore the brunt
of those criticisms, which Kosor voiced at open meetings of the homeowners’
association, distributed in a pamphlet and letter supporting his campaign
for a seat on the homeowners’ association board, and posted online;
accordingly, Olympia sued Kosor for defamation. Because we conclude that
‘each of Kosor’s statements was “made in direct connection with an issue of
public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum,” see NRS
41.637(4), we reverse the district court’s decision to the contrary and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

L
After purchasing a home in Southern Highlands, Kosor became

 

an avid and outspoken participant at meetings for the community, serving
as board member of a homeowners’ sub-association and ultimately
mounting several campaigns for election to the overarching Southern
Highlands Community Association (the HOA). During the course of his
activism, Kosor criticized the HOA for its decision to continue Southern
Highlands’ contracts with its developer, turned manager and operator,
Olympia. Kosor claimed that these contracts financially benefited Olympia
and the HOA at the expense of the community's individual homeowners.

 
‘The defamation complaint claims that Kosor made the first set
of allegedly defamatory statements at an HOA sub-association board
‘meeting: specifically, it claims that Kosor stated that Olympia met with
Clark County Commissioners in a “dark room” and coerced them to act or
vote in a particular manner, and that Olympia was “lining its pockets” at
the homeowners’ expense. Though Olympia says it subsequently sent Kosor
a cease-and-desist letter, the complaint claims he continued to speak at
meetings, including about how Olympia and the HOA had allegedly violated
the law and breached their fiduciary duties to the homeowners. Kosor also
posted a statement on the social media platform Nextdoor.com, in which he
stated that Olympia obtained a “lucrative agreement” with Clark County
by agreeing to shift expenses for the maintenance of public parks to the
Southern Highlands homeowners.

Kosor made additional statements in connection with his first
campaign for election to the HOA board of directors. His campaign website
compared Olympia to a sort of foreign dictatorship and further raised the
same allegations of supposed “sweetheart deals” between Olympia and
Clark County officials to shift the costs of park maintenance from the county
to Southern Highlands homeowners, statutory violations, breaches of
fiduciary duty, and improper cost shifting. Kosor also distributed a
pamphlet and letter to the Southern Highlands community echoing
statements made on his website and further claiming that Olympia's
actions have “already cost the homeowners millions.”

Olympia sued Kosor for defamation and defamation per se.
After filing an answer, Kosor moved to dismiss under NRS 41.660, Nevada's
anti-SLAPP statute. The district court held that Kosor had failed to
establish a prima facie case under NRS 41.660 and entered an order

 
denying the motion. Kosor appealed. See NRS 41.670(4) (providing a right
of interlocutory appeal from a district court order denying a special motion
to dismiss under NRS 41.660). The district court subsequently denied
Kosor’s motion for reconsideration in an order filed while this appeal was
pending.

IL

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes deter lawsuits targeting good-

faith speech on important public matters. See Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev.
8, 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748 (2019). If a party to a defamation lawsuit files a
special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes and prevails,
then that party is entitled to a speedy resolution of the case in its favor and
recovery of attorney fees incurred in defending the action. See NRS 41.660
(rights); NRS 41.670 (remedies). We review a district court's decision
refusing to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statutes de novo. Abrams v.
Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 86, 458 P.3d 1062, 1065-66 (2020). And, “li]n making
such a determination, we conduct an independent review of the record.”
Taylor v. Colon, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 50, 468 P.3d 820, 825 (2020).

A

 

To establish a prima facie case for anti-SLAPP protection, a
movant needs to demonstrate “by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the
underlying defamation] claim is based upon a good faith communication in
furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct
connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3Xa); NRS 41.637
(defining qualifying communications). Because the district court does not
appear to have considered in depth whether Kosor made his
‘communications in “good faith,” we leave it to the district court to evaluate

on remand whether Kosor can so demonstrate. Our analysis here addresses

 

 
om

 

only whether Kosor’s statements fall within the specific statutory category
of speech protected, for anti-SLAPP purposes, by NRS 41.637(4):
“any {clommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public
interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum.”
L

To judge whether Kosor’s statements addressed an issue of
public interest, we apply five guiding principles. Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev.
35, 39, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017) (adopting five-factor test for “public
interest” from Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Associates, Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff'd, 609 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir.
2015)). First, we cautioned in Shapiro that a “public interest’ does not
equate with mere curiosity,” id. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268; but here, each of
Kosor’s criticisms of Olympia fundamentally related back to his strident

 

support for democratic participation in and governance over the large
residential community where he resided, which undoubtedly goes beyond
the airing of some trivial private dispute between private parties. Cf. Rivero
v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 130 Cal. Rptr. 24 81,
90 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the manner of a janitorial supervisor's
“supervision of... eight individuals is hardly a matter of public interest”)
Second, and relatedly, we stated in Shapiro that a matter of public interest
is one of concern “to a substantial number of people,” 133 Nev. at 39, 389
P.3d at 268, which Kosor’s statements on matters pertinent to the
“democratic subsociety” governing the nearly 8,000 Southern Highlands
residences were. See Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr.
2d 205, 209, 212 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo.
Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 1994)) (citing Macias v. Hartwell, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 222, 225 (Ct. App. 1997)) (concluding that statements were about

 
one

Gearon.

public issues because they were about an HOA’s decisions regarding
governance, including whether the manager was competent to continue
‘managing the community of 3,000 community members).

‘Third, in keeping with Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268,
Kosor’s statements were also directly tied to the public interest asserted
above; that is, the appropriate governance of Southern Highlands. Kosor’s
‘questions and criticisms of Olympia and the HOA board were made in the
context of his attempts to encourage homeowner participation in and
oversight of the governance of their community. Finally, the subject matter
of Kosor’s statements makes evident that his “focus” in making them was
not to prosecute any private grievance against Olympia, whether by
“gatherling] ammunition” or publicly communicating private matters, as
prohibited by Shapiro's fourth and fifth factors. 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at
268. Rather, his statements “concerned the very manner in which this
group...would be governed—an inherently political question of vital
importance to each individual and to the community as a whole.” Damon,
102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212-13. Thus, we easily conclude that all of the
complained-of statements concerned matters of public interest under NRS
41.6374).

2

With regard to whether Kosor’s statements were made “in a
place open to the public or in a public forum,” NRS 41.637(4), this court has
not yet adopted a test to determine that answer. Nor is the plain language
of the statute alone sufficient to guide our inquiry. See Delucchi v. Songer,
133 Nev. 290, 299, 396 P.3d 826, 833 (2017) (looking to the language of the
anti-SLAPP statutes first), But we are not without recourse. For one, as
we have previously indicated, California's anti-SLAPP law includes a

6

   

 
—

similarly phrased category of speech subject to anti-SLAPP protections, and
the case law of our sister state can therefore appropriately inform our
analysis. See Patin v. Lee, 134 Nev. 722, 724, 429 P.3d 1248, 1250 (2018)
(noting that in the anti-SLAPP context, where “no Nevada precedent is
instructive on this issue, we [may] look to California precedent for
guidance”); compare NRS 41.637(4) (providing that anti-SLAPP protection
applies to “any . .. [communication made in direct connection with an issue
of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum”), with
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e}3) (West 2016) (protecting “any written or
oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest”). And, where further
guidance might still be necessary, federal First Amendment precedent can
also be instructive. See Abrams v. Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 87, 458 P.3d 1062,
1066 (2020) (interpreting anti-SLAPP provision, in part, with reference to
federal case law); Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268 (adopting federal
case law that collected and summarized California anti-SLAPP cases); cf.
Damon, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209, 211 (defining “public forum” for anti-
SLAPP purposes by reference to a First Amendment case, Clark v. Burleigh,
841 P.2d 975 (Cal. 1992), and concluding that a publication was a “public
forum” for anti-SLAPP purposes because it had “a purpose analogous to
[that ofl a [traditional] public forum”),

With regard to the allegedly defamatory statements Kosor
made at HOA open meetings, the California case, Damon, is directly on
point. In Damon, several homeowners in a large residential community
made critical statements about the homeowners’ association manager, who
brought suit for defamation; the defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit
under California's anti-SLAPP statutes. 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209-10.

 

 

 
Several of the statements at issue were made at homeowners’ association
board meetings, which the California court of appeal held were “public
forums” for the purposes of the state’s anti-SLAPP statutes. Jd. at 210. In
reaching this conclusion, the Damon court reasoned that the homeowners’
association “played a critical role in making and enforcing rules affecting
the daily lives of [community] residents” and further recognized that
“{blecause of a homeowners’ association's] broad powers and the number of
individuals potentially affected by {a homeowners’ associations'] actions,
the Legislature has mandated [they] hold open meetings and allow the
members to speak publicly at the meetings.” Id. The HOA here is no less
of “a quasi-government entity” than that in Damon, “paralleling in almost
every case the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal
government.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr.
209, 214 (Ct. App. 1983)). Accordingly, the meetings at which Kosor made
his statements here were likewise open, by legislative mandate, to all
community members. NRS 116.31085 (creating a right of homeowners to
attend HOA sessions, with several exceptions). We therefore conclude,
consistent with the reasoning and holding of the California court of appeal
in Damon, that the HOA meetings at which Kosor made certain of the
statements at issue were “public forums” for the purposes of our anti-
SLAPP statutes, because the meetings were “open to all interested parties,
and ...a place where members could communicate their ideas. Further,
the . .. meetings served a function similar to that of a governmental body.”
102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209.

‘The anti-SLAPP motion in Damon also dealt with allegedly

defamatory statements made by homeowners’ association members in

printed materials, there a newsletter called the Village Voice that

 

 

 
4

functioned as “a mouthpiece for a small group of homeowners who generally
would not permit contrary viewpoints to be published.” Jd. at 210. Despite
the alleged editorial limitations on the opinions expressed in the Village
Voice, the Damon court determined that the newsletter was a “public
forum.” Id. at 211. As a threshold matter, we agree with the Damon court
that “[ulnder its plain meaning, a public forum is not limited to a physical

 

setting, but also includes other forms of public communication.” Id. at 210;
see also Abrams, 136 Nev. at 88-89, 458 P.3d at 1067 (holding that an “email
listserv may constitute a public forum for purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statutes”). And we likewise agree that even a publication with a tightly
controlled message—whether a community newsletter or, as in this case, an
HOA election pamphlet and direct letter to Southern Highlands’
homeowners—may qualify as a public forum where “it [is] a vehicle for
communicating a message about public matters to a large and interested
”. See Damon, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. Here, the printed
materials in question were another part of Kosor’s efforts to drive civic

 

engagement among community members and to affect management
changes via democratic pressure—“If democracy is to work in Southern
Highlands it requires your participation. ...[¥]ou must vote. Do not
assume others will.” And inasmuch as the materials were distributed
directly to the very members of the 8,000-home community that Kosor
sought to mobilize, there could hardly be a more “interested” group of people
with whom he could engage. Accordingly, we hold that the allegedly
defamatory statements Kosor made in his election pamphlets and letter to
homeowners were likewise made in a public forum for the purposes of NRS
41.637(4).

 

aaa

 

ca

 

 
Finally, there are statements Kosor made online, whether on
his personal campaign website or on the social media platform
Nextdoor.com. On this question—that is, precisely when a privately
established website qualifies as a public forum for the purposes of an anti-
SLAPP defense—again, we have no clear precedent. We have firmly held
that a government watch group's Facebook page qualifies as a public forum
under anti-SLAPP laws, see Stark v. Lackey, 136 Nev. 38, 41 n.2, 458 P.3d
342, 345 n.2 (2020), but we have not yet elaborated on the limits of that
reasoning. And, while it is well-settled in California law that all “[wleb sites

 

accessible to the public... are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-
SLAPP statute,” Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (Cal. 2006), we
are not prepared to paint with such bold strokes here.

For one, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
we should take “extreme caution” in this context—

While . . . the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic
Proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full
dimensions and vast potential to alter how we
think, express ourselves, and define who we want
tobe. The forces and directions of the Internet are
‘50 new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts
must be conscious that what they say today might
be obsolete tomorrow.

Packingham v. North Carolina, __ U.S. _, _, 137 8. Ct. 1730, 1736
(2017). And we are loath that our anti-SLAPP “cure [could] become the
disease.” Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 714 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J.,
dissenting); cf. Xiang Li, Hacktivism and the First Amendment: Drawing

  

 

2While we cited Barrett, 146 P.3d at 514 n.4, in a footnote in Lackey
to support our agreement with the parties that the Nevada Department of
Wildlife Facebook page was a public forum, we did not purport to endorse
Barrett in its entirety.

on

er,

 

 

 

En
the Line Between Cyber Protests and Crime, 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 301, 316
(2013) (suggesting that cyberattacks on private websites could qualify for
constitutional protection if those sites were deemed “public forums”); Micah
Telegen, You Can't Say That: Public Forum Doctrine and Viewpoint
Discrimination in the Social Media Era, 52. U. Mich. J.L. Reform 235, 248
(2018) (noting that various private social networking sites’ hate speech
limitations would be constitutionally questionable if government-created
pages on the site were deemed “public forums”).

Moreover, California courts’ broad holding regarding the public
character of the internet comports with the particular legislative
instruction it has been given, that the state's anti-SLAPP provision “be
construed broadly.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a) (emphasis added). But
Nevada's anti-SLAPP provisions contain no such mandate. And where
Nevada's statutory language differs from that of an otherwise similar
statute, foreign precedent applying that language—by which we are not
bound in any case—becomes even less persuasive. See Intl Game Tech.,
Inc, v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 132, 164, 127 P.3d 1088, 1103-
04 (2006) (noting that “the presumption that the Legislature, in enacting a
state statute similar to a federal statute, intended to adopt the federal
courts’ construction of that statute, is rebutted when the state statute
clearly reflects a contrary legislative intent”)?

Additionally, perhaps as a result of the legislatively mandated
breadth of California's anti-SLAPP statutes, Barrett's blanket holding and
the progeny that extends therefrom leapfrog what is traditionally a critical

SNRS 41,665(2) endorses California anti-SLAPP law with respect to
the burden of proof, but this does not apply more broadly to the statutory
interpretation issues addressed in the text.

 

 

 
initial step in public forum analysis. To wit: when examining statements
made online, the California cases at issue broadly discuss the entire
internet as the “public forum” in question. See Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 497, 505 (Ct. App. 2004) (analogizing “the Web, as a whole” to a
public bulletin board that “does not lose its character as a public forum
simply because each statement posted there expresses only the views of the
person writing that statement”), But, given that the Legislature has not
demanded the same breadth in our application of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP
statutes, we look to Supreme Court precedent on this point, which, in the
First Amendment context, suggests that the scope of the relevant forum
should be more closely tailored to the specific circumstances at issue. See
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800-02
(1985) (narrowing scope of relevant forum from the physical site of a federal
workplace to the intangible site of a charitable campaign for workers at the
site, and collecting cases); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass'n,
460 US. 37, 44 (1983) (defining school’s internal mail system and the
teachers’ mailboxes as forum rather than school property as a whole and
stating that “the First Amendment [does not] require{ ] equivalent access to
all parts of a school building in which some form of communicative activity
occurs”); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-02 (1974),
(treating the advertising space on buses, rather than city-owned public
transportation more generally, as the forum). Simply put, we are not
prepared to say that nearly every website is a “public forum” simply because
“folthers can create their own Web sites or publish letters or articles
through the same medium [i.e., the internet], making their information and
beliefs accessible to anyone interested in the topics discussed,” Wilbanks,
17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 505; in our view, the question is, more limitedly, whether

 

 

ash ete

 

 
on

 

the particular post or website at issue “bear(s] the hallmarks of a public
forum.” Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2019).

We have previously looked toward related federal precedent in
applying our anti-SLAPP laws. See Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at

 

268 (adopting the principles enunciated in Piping Rock Partners, 946 F.
Supp. 2d at 968). And federal courts’ application of First Amendment
“public forum” concepts to electronic mediums offers a reasoned, limited
departure from the sweeping holding that California's requirement for a
“broad reading” of anti-SLAPP statutes demands. For instance, in
determining whether a government official's Facebook page was a public
forum within the context of First Amendment restrictions, the Fourth
Cireuit analyzed according to traditional characteristics of public forums,
specifically: whether the site was “compatibile] with expressive activity”
and the extent to which the site allowed free interaction between the poster
and constituent commentators. Davison, 912 F.3d at 682 (quoting
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).4 And, in a decision that was subsequently
affirmed by the Second Circuit, the Southern District of New York seemed
to tailor the scope of the public forum in question even more narrowly, using
the same traditional public forum principles to hold that the “interactive
space of a tweet sent by [Donald Trump]” qualified as a public forum. Knight
First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
574 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis added), aff'd, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019),
‘The question then, in federal courts, is whether the limited page, or as

‘Importantly, the Fourth Circuit also rejected arguments that
traditional public forum analysis did not apply because the Facebook page
was not government property, noting that the United States Supreme Court
“never has circumscribed forum analysis solely to government-owned
property.” Davison, 912 F.3d at 682-83.

13

 
one

appropriate, post, at issue creates a forum for citizen involvement. See City
of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm'n, 429 US.

167, 175 (1976); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284-85
(4th Cir. 2008) (applying traditional public forum analysis before holding
that a school district's website was not a public forum because there was no
interactive space).

Looking toward this federal guidance, we believe that Kosor’s
Nextdoor.com post qualifies as a public forum for the purposes of anti-
SLAPP protections. The appellate record includes a printout of Kosor’s post
and the responses thereto, from which it appears that Kosor’s post, like his
HOA meeting commentary, campaign flyer, and printed letter, sought to
‘open conversation among Southern Highlands community members and
enlist their participation in the community's decision-making process:
“{Wirite/emaiVeall our Commissioners and... {then join us at
Wednesday's Clark County Commission meeting...” And Kosor’s post
opened up an opportunity for other community members to publicly respond
to its content, which they di
you think, neighbors? .... [t]his is an opportunity for all of us to be heard
and to decide as a COMMUNITY ....”. Other responses simply thanked
Kosor for his “yeoman service and doggedness. Without [which] ... none of
this detail would have bubbled up to the knowledge of the residents.”
Accordingly, Kosor’s post sought and ultimately facilitated an exchange of
views on what we have already deemed to be subject matter of public

 

for example, one respondent asked “What do

interest. Davison, 912 F.3d at 682 (reasoning that Facebook page was a
public forum because “[aJn ‘exchange of views’ is precisely what [the page
creator] sought—and what in fact transpired—when she expressly invited
‘ANY Loudoun citizen’ to visit the page and comment ‘on ANY issues,’ and

 

 

 
received numerous such posts and comments”); see also Packingham, __
Us
important place{ | (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views"); Page, 531
F.3d at 284 (holding that a school district website was not a public forum,
but that if there was a “chat room’ or ‘bulletin board’ in which private

 

at __, 187 S. Ct. at 1735 (describing the internet as “the most

viewers could express opinions or post information, the issue would, of
course, be different”). And while printouts of certain Nextdoor.com pages
in the record suggest that parties must enter their name and address in
order to view website posts—that is, that Kosor's post might not have been
entirely, freely accessible to every member of the public without any
limitation—these steps do not seem to differ significantly from that which
might be required to view posts on Facebook; that is, a post on Nextdoor.com
is as compatible with expressive activity as one on the other platform, which
we have already held can support a public forum. See Stark, 136 Nev. at 41
n.2, 458 P.3d at 345 n.2 (agreeing that a government watch group's
Facebook page was a public forum), Kosor's statements in his Nextdoor.com
post were therefore made in a public forum under the federal standards
discussed above and our anti-SLAPP statute

With regard to statements on Kosor's personal website, the
main, related, interactive space appears to be a “Contact Me” form included
at the bottom of each page. But the printouts from his website also
demonstrate some additional interactivity, given that Kosor seems to have
posted on the site responses to “Frequently Asked Questions,” as well as

Note that, in keeping with Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574, we do not
hold that every Nextdoor.com post creates a public forum; the content of any
particular post could affect whether the forum is, in fact, one for citizen
engagement.

 

 

io

 

 
links to Las Vegas Review-Journal articles discussing topies relevant to the
Southern Highland community. Moreover, the overall thrust of subject
matter on Kosor’s site is consistent with the purpose discussed above, that
is, to promote civic engagement; his site is replete with attempted calls of
Southern Highlands to action—“Our community must engage on the
political front as others are doing”; “Unless we intervene as a community
the Sports Park we were originally promised will never happen”; “The

collective owners in (Southern Highlands) have a much larger investment

 

in the community than does the Developer. We deserve a fair share vote”;
“We have a large political block as a community capable of insisting on
quality maintenance.” Kosor’s site also appears to include a copy of the
letter discussed above, which urges homeowner “participation” in the
Southern Highlands community and promotes voting in the HOA board
election as a way to make “democracy work in Southern Highlands.” In
light of the site's interactive components, content, and purpose, we believe
Kosor’s site qualifies as a public forum within the meaning of our anti-
SLAPP statutes.
mm.

Accordingly, we conclude that Kosor met his prima facie burden
to demonstrate that the statements in question were all made in public
forums on a matter of public interest. We therefore reverse the district
court and remand with direction that it consider whether Kosor made his,
communications in “good faith,” in light of all the supporting evidence
provided by Kosor. See Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436, 439, 453 P.3d

16

 

 

 

 
on
RITE

 

 

1220, 1223 (2019) (examining all submitted evidence in an anti-SLAPP case

even where the moving party had failed to attach an affidavit).

oe ca.
Pickering

‘We concur:
An. 3

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