Title: State v. Schell

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

248 Ind. 183 (1967)
224 N.E.2d 49
STATE OF INDIANA
v.
SCHELL.
No. 30,946.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 10, 1967.
Rehearing denied April 18, 1967.
*185 John J. Dillon, Attorney General, Raymond I. Klagiss, and Douglas B. McFadden, Deputy Attorney Generals, for appellant.
Harry Schell, pro se, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, C.J.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Lake Criminal Court which sustained appellee's motion to quash the State's indictment for violation of the Public Purchase Act. The indictment was in one count and read as follows:
Three persons, members of the Board of Public Works of the City of Gary, were charged in the indictment, including the appellant. The other two pleaded guilty and were sentenced accordingly.
Appellee has made a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the same was not timely filed.
*187 It appears that on September 29, 1965, the trial court sustained appellee's motion to quash the indictment. However, the appellee was not discharged nor were the surities released from their bond. Thereafter the State filed a motion to reconsider the ruling of the court and the court, after another hearing on February 2, 1966, denied the State's motion to reconsider and at that time ordered that appellee be discharged and the sureties on the recognizance bond be released.
It is contended by the appellee that the judgment appealed from was that of September 29, 1965, and not that of February 2, 1966, and therefore the appeal was not filed within time. With this we do not agree. In our opinion, the final judgment was entered on February 2, 1966, when the court, by its order in discharging the appellee and his sureties, indicated a finality in its actions.
Appellee cites State v. McCarthy (1962), 243 Ind. 361, 185 N.E.2d 732 for authority that the sustaining of a motion to quash is a final judgment. In that case we said:
In this case something remained to be done, namely, the discharge of the appellee and the release of his sureties. The State was entitled to be given a reasonable time to file an amended affidavit or seek a second indictment. The court saw fit also to accept the motion to reconsider and thus the case, as to final determination, was stayed until the final action of the court. We hold, therefore, that the appeal was filed within time.
It is further contended that this appeal should be dismissed for the reason that appellant's petition for extension of time *188 to file a brief did not comply with the rules of this Court. Rule 2-16 provides that such a petition must be filed at least five days prior to the expiration of the time within which to file briefs and that notice of such request, together with a copy of the petition, shall be served upon the opposite party at any time prior to such filing.
Rule 2-15A provides:
It is contended that although appellant's brief was filed on April 27, 1966, a copy of such notice and petition was not filed until April 28, 1966, as shown by the post mark on the envelope in which the appellee received such notice and copy of the petition. The due date for appellant's brief was May 1, 1966. However, the appellant filed an affidavit that such notice and copy of petition were deposited in the United States mail on April 27, 1966, although it did not receive a post mark until the next day (April 28, 1966). Rule 2-15A provides that proof of service of a copy of the petition upon the opposing party is complied with by an affidavit showing that the same was deposited in the United *189 States mail upon a certain date. It is our opinion that the appellant has made proper proof of complying with Rule 2-15A. Therefore the motion to dismiss this appeal is overruled.
We come now to the questions raised by the motion to quash upon which this appeal is sought. It is contended that the indictment is defective for the reason that the words "A true bill" must be written in the handwriting of the foreman, as well as his signature. In this case it is claimed that the words "A true bill" were printed, with a line for the signature of the foreman of the grand jury with such words below it.
The statutes in this respect, Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. §§ 9-901, 902, provide:
We are not impressed with this very technical contention of the appellee. It is a well recognized part of the law that a "signing" may be in a number of different fashions. There is a great deal of common law developed in the interpretation of the Statutes of Fraud and the Statutes of Wills as to what a signing or a signature is. We all know that originally, when few people could write, a seal or stamp was used as a signature, or even a cross for a mark, and in some cases it has been held that initials are sufficient as a signature. There have been cases in which a typewritten name has been held by courts of law as a signature. The principle *190 running through all these cases is that if the person intended the mark or the name, printed or written, when it is imprinted upon the document, to be his signature and he so adopts it as his act and intends to be bound thereby, it meets the requirements of the law. The same principle is applicable to the words "A true bill," which the statute requires must be endorsed by the foreman with his signature. Hamilton v. State (1885), 103 Ind. 96; 80 C.J.S., Signature, § 1 (1953); 49 Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds § 377 (1943).
It is next contended that the appellee was not subject to the statute upon which the indictment is based. Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 48-1215 provides for the appointment of a Board of Works and Safety by the mayor of the City of Gary. Burns' § 48-1902 provides for the duties of the Board of Works, including the power:
for a city may only purchase in the open market when the amount of the purchase is less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000); otherwise the purchase must be made in accordance with specifications and advertisement.
Burns' § 53-503 provides for the use of State Board of Accounts forms, and finally, Burns' § 53-506 provides for the penalty for non-compliance, with the buying procedure outlined *191 by the statute. The appellee cites Burns' § 48-1602, which fixes the duty of the city controller and provides that he shall make payment out of monies appropriated for city purposes. The appellee contends that in reality the city controller is the only one who must comply with the statute relative to purchasing, and that he alone can be liable for such violation, since he alone is the "purchaser." Appellee says:
It is argued that "there is no legal authority for stating in the indictment that the Board of Public Works and Safety was duly authorized and empowered by law delegated and constituted with the authority to make purchase of material and materials." It is difficult for us to follow appellee's reasons, since Burns' § 48-1902 specifically gives the Board of Public Works of a city the power to purchase, and Burns' § 48-501 specifically says that any such officer or "purchasing agent" must comply with the requirements of the statute set forth. In our opinion, the statute is plainly applicable to members of the Board of Works of a city.
It is next contended that the indictment is indefinite, vague and uncertain. The memorandum to the motion to quash points out that the time and place of the purchases are not specific. We have held numerous times that an allegation that a crime takes place in a county is sufficiently specific, as well as an allegation of a time fixed within the period of the Statutes of Limitation. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 192, p. 584, being Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-1127 provides that no indictment shall be quashed:
It is next contended that the "amount" of fuel oil which was purchased is not set forth. Whether the appellee means the number of barrels, gallons or the amount of its value in money is not pointed out. The indictment does fix the amount of value as $18,545.00. A valuation fixed in an indictment for larceny is sufficiently specific and we think in this case the violation fixed here is sufficiently specific.
It is next contended that the indictment sets forth more than one violation of separate and distinct statutes. The statutes involved must be read together, since Burns' § 53-506 fixes the penalty for violation of Burns' § 53-503. We have held two or more violations of the same statute, joined in the same count, are not necessarily improper. In Brogan v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 203, 156 N.E. 515, we stated:
The true test of an indictment is whether the material averments thereof are stated with sufficient certainty to apprise the defendant of the nature and character of the charge against him so that he cannot be charged again with the same offense and so that he may plead former jeopardy if he is so charged again. Kennedy v. State (1935), 209 Ind. 287, 196 N.E. 316; Lodyga and Mantych v. State (1931), 203 Ind. 494, 179 N.E. 542.
The State cannot be compelled and should not be forced to set out evidence in a criminal charge, but the ultimate facts *193 only are to be alleged, with sufficient certainty to meet the requirements stated above. Sherer v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 14, 121 N.E. 369.
In our opinion, the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash the indictment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to set aside the order sustaining the motion to quash and enter an order overruling the motion to quash.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 224 N.E.2d 49.