Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. McCorkle

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. McCorkle, 105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005-Ohio-2588.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. MCCORKLE. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. McCorkle,  
105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005-Ohio-2588.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Neglect of entrusted 
legal matter — Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — 
Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice — Withdrawal from 
representation without approval of tribunal and without taking action to 
avoid prejudicing client — Failure to maintain records and render 
accounts — Failure to remit funds to which client is entitled — Failure to 
cooperate. 
(No. 2004-1822 — Submitted January 19, 2005 — Decided June 8, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-030. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, James McCorkle, formerly of Plain City, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0019801, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1976.  On April 14, 2003, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged respondent 
with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause, including the 
parties’ stipulations, and made findings of misconduct and a recommendation, all 
of which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶2} 
Respondent has not been registered as an attorney under Gov.Bar 
R. VI since September 1, 2003, and he no longer maintains an office at the 
registration address on file with the Attorney Registration Section of the Supreme 
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Court of Ohio or lives at his former residence.  Divorced in 2003, respondent now 
stays in motels or with friends, some of whom he knows through Alcoholics 
Anonymous. 
{¶3} 
Respondent was a sole practitioner, sharing office space with 
several other lawyers and maintaining a high-volume personal-injury practice.  In 
August 2002, however, respondent stopped working at his law office during 
business hours, coming by at night.  He stopped communicating with his secretary 
and clients, attending scheduled court dates, and meeting statutes of limitations 
and other deadlines.  He stopped responding to business mail, e-mail, and voice 
mail.  Respondent also failed to maintain contact with courts in which clients’ 
cases were pending or to properly withdraw from cases that he was unwilling or 
unable to manage.  He further failed to conscientiously account for funds in his 
client trust account, to remit client’s funds and files on request, and to otherwise 
protect his clients’ legal interests. 
{¶4} 
Richard D. Topper, an attorney with whom respondent shared 
office space, became concerned that respondent had abandoned his practice, and 
as required by DR 1-103(A), he reported the problem to relator. 
{¶5} 
With respondent’s permission and relator’s approval, Topper 
contacted over 100 of respondent’s clients, assuring them that their interests 
would be protected despite respondent’s unavailability.  Topper and another 
attorney in their office suite then arranged for the clients’ files to be redistributed, 
with the clients’ consent, to lawyers willing and able to handle the responsibility. 
{¶6} 
By the end of 2002, the two attorneys managing respondent’s 
caseload had satisfactorily handled some situations requiring prompt legal action 
to settle or save the claim.  In an earlier personal-injury case, however, respondent 
had allowed a statute of limitations to run on a claim that he was actively 
attempting to settle on his client’s behalf.  That client, Patricia Marachi, 
January Term, 2005 
3 
ultimately sued respondent in a malpractice action and secured a default judgment 
against him. 
{¶7} 
In overseeing respondent’s practice, Topper also discovered that 
respondent had been appropriating client funds for his own use as well as 
advancing to clients funds that he was supposed to be holding in trust for other 
clients.  The trust account from which these funds were drawn was largely a 
depository for sums received in settlement from insurance companies.  By the 
time of Topper’s discovery, respondent had depleted the entire account, over 
$50,000. 
{¶8} 
Respondent has since replenished his trust account from money 
received in legal fees and inheritance, and all funds have now been distributed to 
the clients entitled to the money.  Topper testified that none of these clients, with 
the exception of the client who sued for malpractice, have been prejudiced 
financially by respondent’s withdrawals or his neglect. 
{¶9} 
Respondent stipulated to the misconduct found by the board 
relative to the abandonment of his practice.  The board found that respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to administration of 
justice) and (6) (prohibiting conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice 
law); 2-110(A)(1) (prohibiting the withdrawal from representation without a 
tribunal’s required permission) and (2) (prohibiting withdrawal from 
representation without taking steps to avoid prejudice to a client); 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter); and 9-102(B)(3) (the board 
cited section (B)(1) but obviously intended (B)(3)) (requiring a lawyer to maintain 
records of funds and property of clients and render appropriate accounts) and (4) 
(requiring a lawyer to remit funds to which a client is entitled). 
{¶10} Respondent also stipulated to violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) 
and Gov.Bar R.V(4)(G), conceding that he had failed to cooperate in the 
investigation of his misconduct.  The board thus also found this misconduct. 
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Sanction 
{¶11} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the aggravating 
and mitigating features of respondent’s case.  See Section 10 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Finding 
from a medical report and his testimony that respondent suffers from alcoholism 
and depression, the board weighed the mitigating effect of these factors under 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  These regulations recognize 
alcohol dependence and mental disability as mitigating when (1) a lawyer has 
been professionally diagnosed as alcohol-dependent or as having a mental 
disability, (2) the dependency or disability contributed to the misconduct, (3) the 
lawyer has successfully completed a dependency treatment program or has a 
sustained period of successful treatment for the disability, and (4) the lawyer is 
able, according to professional prognosis, to return to the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law notwithstanding these conditions. 
{¶12} The board found that respondent’s depression and alcoholism 
compromised his professional competence during the underlying events.  
According to a psychologist’s evaluation conducted in January 2004, respondent 
was an alcoholic and had experienced a severe major depressive disorder.  
Although he had no psychotic symptoms that impaired his cognitive capacity, the 
condition grossly impaired his professional judgment.  At the time of his 
examination, the psychologist reported that respondent was significantly at risk of 
relapse.  In fact, the psychologist concluded that respondent was not then a 
candidate for the treatment program that recovery from his diseases required. 
{¶13} At the panel hearing, respondent, who has no record of prior 
discipline in 26 years of practice, testified that he had been seeing a psychiatrist 
monthly since December 2002.  He had also entered several rehabilitation 
programs since September 2000 but had not been being able to sustain recovery.  
January Term, 2005 
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Respondent now attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and takes the 
antialcoholism prescription drug Antabuse, along with other medication for his 
depression.  Respondent testified that he has been sober since spring 2003. 
{¶14} The board did not find respondent’s disability and dependence 
mitigating because no expert prognosis established his ability to return to the 
competent and ethical practice of law.  The board found that although respondent 
had admitted appropriating clients’ money from his trust account for his own use, 
he had promptly replenished the money and paid his clients within months after 
realizing the arrearages.  Thus, the board also found mitigating that respondent 
had made timely efforts to rectify the consequences of his misconduct.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c).  Finally, the board found mitigating respondent’s remorse, 
his willingness to address his psychological and substance-abuse problems, and 
his reputation for competence and good character prior to engaging in his 
misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e). 
{¶15} In aggravation, the board considered that respondent, who has 
apparently not taken on a new client since August 2002, had failed to update his 
attorney registration records or take required continuing legal education courses.  
The board also found that respondent had not cooperated in relator’s investigation 
and that  he had demonstrated a pattern of misconduct and had committed 
multiple offenses.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), and (e).  The board also 
considered the harm caused by respondent’s malpractice, for which he had not yet 
compensated his client.  The board further accepted respondent’s representation 
that he owed interest to former clients, the Clarks, relative to a $25,000 sum that 
he withdrew from his trust account. 
{¶16} Relator recommended an indefinite suspension, with any 
reinstatement to be subject to conditions designed to ensure respondent’s 
sustained recovery.  Respondent agreed to this sanction.  The board 
recommended, consistent with the panel’s report, that respondent be suspended 
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indefinitely for his misconduct and that any application he files for reinstatement, 
in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(10), include proof of his 
compliance with the following three conditions.  First, the application for 
reinstatement must show that respondent entered a contract with the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program and that he has successfully fulfilled all terms of 
that contract, including but not limited to maintaining complete sobriety.  Second, 
the application must show that respondent obtained adequate and appropriate 
mental health treatment during the suspension period and that either the 
examining psychologist in this case or a psychiatrist of his choice has found him 
able to competently and ethically resume his law practice.  Finally, the application 
must show that he has made full restitution to Marachi for his malpractice, and he 
must pay the Clarks for owed interest.1   
{¶17} The parties do not object to the board’s findings or 
recommendation.  We thus find that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), 
2-110(A)(1) and (2), 6-101(A)(3), 9-102(B)(3) and (4), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
as found by the board.  We also agree that an indefinite suspension, with 
supplemental conditions for reinstatement, is appropriate. 
{¶18} Accordingly, respondent is hereby indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Upon any application for his reinstatement to the bar, 
respondent shall show, in addition to Gov.Bar R. V(10) requirements, that (1) he 
entered a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program and has 
successfully fulfilled all terms of that contract, including but not limited to 
maintaining complete sobriety, (2) he obtained adequate and appropriate mental 
health treatment during the suspension period and either the examining 
psychologist in this case or a psychiatrist of his choice has found him able to 
                                                 
1.  A board condition suggesting that respondent should help another client negotiate with medical 
providers, “if appropriate and necessary,” has been omitted.   The board found no misconduct in 
respondent’s representation of this client, and the condition was completely optional. 
January Term, 2005 
7 
competently and ethically resume his law practice, and (3) he has made full 
restitution to Marachi for his malpractice and has paid the Clarks the interest 
owed.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, Jill M. Snitcher McQuain, Assistant Bar 
Counsel, Mary Jo Cusak, and Kathleen McManus Trafford, for relator. 
 
James McCorkle, pro se. 
______________________