Title: Commonwealth v. Snow

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12938 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DONDRE SNOW. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 11, 2020. - January 11, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Cellular Telephone.  Constitutional Law, 
Search and seizure, Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Practice, Criminal, 
Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 26, 2016. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Maureen 
B. Hogan, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gants, C.J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (David D. 
McGowan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
Jennifer Lynch, Andrew Crocker, & Mark Rumold, of 
California, Hannah Zhao, of New York, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie 
J. Rossman, & Jessica J. Lewis, for American Civil Liberties 
Union of Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On the night of December 5, 2015, the defendant, 
Dondre Snow, and two other men were arrested in connection with 
a fatal shooting that had occurred earlier that evening in 
Boston.  Police officers seized the defendant's cell phone, and 
a police detective later applied for and received a search 
warrant to search it for evidence related to the crime.  Before 
trial, the Commonwealth moved to introduce certain evidence 
found on the defendant's cell phone.  The defendant moved to 
suppress the cell phone evidence.  The judge allowed the 
defendant's motion, ruling that the warrant had issued without 
probable cause because it lacked a sufficient nexus between the 
murder and the defendant's cell phone.  Although the judge did 
not explicitly rule on whether the search authorized by the 
warrant was sufficiently particular, she apparently factored it 
into her analysis, noting at the hearing that the search was not 
limited in time. 
 
The Commonwealth filed an application for interlocutory 
review in the county court, which a single justice of this court 
allowed and reported to the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court, 
in a divided opinion, reversed the judge's decision and remanded 
3 
 
 
for a determination whether the warrant was properly limited in 
scope.  The matter was entered in this court following our grant 
of further appellate review. 
 
We consider, first, whether there was probable cause to 
search the defendant's cell phone and, second, whether the 
search exceeded the permissible scope of the warrant.  We 
conclude there was probable cause to search the defendant's cell 
phone, based on the defendant's cell phone call shortly after 
the crime had been committed to the person who had rented the 
getaway car, as well as on the inference that the joint venture 
crime was planned ahead of time.  We also conclude that the 
search of the phone was not sufficiently particular because it 
lacked any temporal limit.  The order allowing the defendant's 
motion to suppress is vacated, and we remand to the Superior 
Court for further rulings regarding partial suppression.2 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are taken from the 
search warrant affidavit.  On the evening of December 5, 2015, 
Maurice Scott was shot several times as he stood on a Boston 
street.  He later died from gunshot wounds.  One eyewitness 
heard a number of shots fired and then saw a "heavy set black 
male" standing over the victim as he lay on the ground. 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation. 
4 
 
 
 
The shooter fled the scene in a light-colored car with out-
of-State license plates driven by another party.  During the 
shooting, the getaway car had been parked up the street.  The 
car then headed toward the Dorchester neighborhood of Boston.  
Several minutes later, a second witness saw a light gray sedan 
being driven quickly down a street in Dorchester.  The driver of 
the car slammed on its brakes, backed up, and took a left turn 
onto a dead-end street before coming to a stop.  The witness 
noticed the occupants of the car moving about, as if they were 
changing their clothes.  A large man climbed out of the 
passenger's seat, pulled his sweatshirt down, and returned to 
the car.  The witness telephoned the police. 
 
When police arrived, they noticed a light gray 2016 Nissan 
Altima with a New Hampshire license plate parked near the dead 
end of the street.  Three men were sitting in the car:  the 
defendant in the driver's seat, Dwayne Diggs in the front 
passenger's seat, and Daquan Peters in the back seat.  Officers 
noted that Diggs had a heavy build and fit the eyewitness's 
description of the shooter.  Based on the matching witness 
descriptions of the car used in the shooting and Diggs as the 
shooter, the officers removed all three men from the car.  The 
defendant was talking on his cell phone as officers removed him 
from the car. 
5 
 
 
 
Officers discovered a .40 caliber firearm near the car and, 
by using thermal imaging, found that the heat signature 
indicated that the firearm recently had been discarded.  
Officers also discovered nine .40 caliber spent shell casings at 
the scene of the shooting.  A fingerprint from the magazine of 
the gun matched Diggs's fingerprint.  Both the defendant and 
Diggs were wearing global positioning system (GPS) monitors, 
which placed each of them at the crime scene at the time of the 
shooting.  Police seized the defendant's cell phone, Peters's 
cell phone, and a third cell phone from the Nissan's center 
console with Diggs's partial fingerprint on it. 
 
The defendant told officers that the car was rented to his 
girlfriend, and asked repeatedly during the booking process how 
she could get it back.  The next day, police interviewed the 
defendant's girlfriend.  She told officers that although she had 
a car, she had rented the Nissan to assist her with a move to 
Fall River.  She also noted that she had rented a different car 
earlier in the week, but switched it for the Nissan on December 
5.  Finally, she told officers that the defendant had called her 
from his cell phone to let her know he was about to be arrested. 
 
Officers also recovered the victim's cell phone, and a 
search revealed violent and threatening text messages exchanged 
with a contact named "Slime Buttah."  Interviews with the 
victim's acquaintances revealed that the victim and Diggs had 
6 
 
 
been arguing via text message and social media in the days 
before the murder.  Diggs's street names included "Butta" and 
"Butta Bear."  Based on both of these pieces of information, 
detectives believed "Slime Buttah" to be Diggs. 
 
On February 23, 2016, a detective applied for and received 
a warrant to search the defendant's cell phone for the following 
information: 
"Cellular telephone number; electronic serial number, 
international mobile equipment identity, mobile equipment 
identifier or other similar identification number; address 
book; contact list; personal calendar, date book entries, 
and to-do lists; saved, opened, unopened, draft, sent, and 
deleted electronic mail; incoming, outgoing, draft, and 
deleted text messages and video messages; history of calls 
sent, received, and missed; any voicemail messages, 
including those that are opened, unopened, saved, or 
deleted; GPS information; mobile instant message chat logs, 
data and contact information; internet browser history; and 
any and all of the fruits or instrumentalities of the crime 
of Murder." 
 
The detective requested and received permission to search 
unfettered by date restriction because, he said, it was unknown 
"when the weapon used was acquired and when any related 
conspiracy may have been formed." 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Probable cause.  On appeal, the 
Commonwealth challenges the judge's ruling that the contents of 
the warrant affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the 
crime and the defendant's cell phone sufficient support a 
finding of probable cause to search it.  The Commonwealth 
contends that a sufficient nexus may be derived from the 
7 
 
 
affidavit's allegations concerning the defendant's call to his 
girlfriend, who had rented the getaway car, the reasonable 
inferences of planning and coordination that may be drawn from 
the change of clothing, and Diggs's violent text messages to the 
victim.  For the reasons explained infra, we agree and thus 
vacate the judge's order suppressing the evidence recovered from 
the search of the defendant's cell phone. 
 
"Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights 'require a magistrate to determine that probable cause 
exists before issuing a search warrant.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 626 (2011).  Probable cause requires a 
"'substantial basis' to conclude that 'the items sought are 
related to the criminal activity under investigation, and that 
they reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched at the time the search warrant issues.'"  Holley, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Kaupp, 453 Mass. 102, 110 (2009).  
In other words, the government must show not only that there is 
probable cause that the individual committed a crime but also 
that there is a "nexus" between the alleged crime and the 
article to be searched or seized.  Commonwealth v. White, 475 
Mass. 583, 588 (2016).  The nexus does not need to be based on 
direct observation; it can be found in "'the type of crime, the 
8 
 
 
nature of the [evidence] sought, and normal inferences as to 
where such' evidence may be found" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
589.  "While 'definitive proof' is not necessary to meet this 
standard, the warrant application may not be based on mere 
speculation," Holley, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
472 Mass. 448, 455 (2015), or a "[s]trong reason to suspect," 
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 (1985). 
 
Probable cause is a "fact-intensive inquiry and must be 
resolved based on the particular facts of each case."  
Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 426 (2017).  With respect 
to cell phone searches, "police may not rely on the general 
ubiquitous presence of cellular telephones in daily life, or an 
inference that friends or associates most often communicate by 
cellular telephone, as a substitute for particularized 
information that a specific device contains evidence of a 
crime."  Id. at 426. 
 
"When considering the sufficiency of a search warrant 
application, our review begins and ends with the four corners of 
the affidavit" (quotation and citation omitted).  Holley, 478 
Mass. at 521.  The affidavit is to be "considered as a whole and 
in a commonsense and realistic fashion" and should not be 
"parsed, severed, and subjected to hypercritical analysis."  
Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 501 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  "All 
9 
 
 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the information in 
the affidavit may also be considered as to whether probable 
cause has been established."  Holley, supra 521-522, quoting 
Donahue, supra. 
 
Here, the affidavit provided a substantial basis to 
conclude both that the defendant had committed the homicide as 
Diggs's coventurer and that it was reasonable to expect that his 
cell phone would contain evidence related to that specific 
crime.3  Not only was the defendant apparently calling his 
girlfriend to ask her to retrieve the car soon after the crime, 
but his girlfriend had an improbable explanation for having 
rented a car at all, given that she already owned one.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Winters, 782 F.3d 289, 299-301 (6th Cir. 
2015) (implausible explanation for renting car was one factor 
giving rise to reasonable suspicion).  When she was later 
interviewed by police, the defendant's girlfriend asserted that, 
although she had a car, she had rented an extra car to assist in 
her move to Fall River.  The rental car was a Nissan Altima -- a 
sedan -- not the typical truck or van one might rent for moving.  
Moreover, she noted that she had rented a different vehicle 
earlier in the week and had exchanged it for the Nissan on that 
day, but did not provide a reason for the change. 
                     
 
3 The defendant does not dispute that the warrant contained 
probable cause that he committed a crime. 
10 
 
 
 
Additionally, when he was being booked, the defendant asked 
officers how his girlfriend could get her car back, and stated 
that he did want not to have a bill for a late fee.  Given that 
the defendant was about to be arrested for murder, it seems 
unlikely that he was calling his girlfriend merely to ensure 
that she could pick up the rental car and avoid a charge for a 
late rental return.  The rental car contained evidence related 
to the shooting:  a T-shirt and a third cell phone, both of 
which presumably belonged to Diggs.4  Given the context, it seems 
probable that the defendant's call was motivated by a concern 
that evidence could be discovered in the car, not by a possible 
late fee. 
 
Finally, there was some evidence that the crime had been 
planned ahead of time.  The search warrant affidavit noted that 
a witness saw "people moving around in the car leaving the 
impression on him that they might be changing their clothes."  
This leads to an inference that the crime had involved, at a 
minimum, enough prior planning and coordination for the parties 
to bring a change of clothes.5  Further, the evidence that Diggs 
                     
 
4 Diggs's cell phone likely would have contained evidence of 
communications between him and the victim, given that the 
victim's cell phone contained threatening text messages from 
"Slime Buttah," believed to be Diggs. 
 
5 A black T-shirt, size 6X, and a black sweatshirt, size 
large, were recovered from inside the Nissan.  Given the 
disparity in sizes, it is likely that these items did not belong 
to the same person.  The affidavit permits an inference that the 
11 
 
 
had been communicating with the victim via cell phone leading up 
to the murder gave rise to an inference that the coventurers 
also communicated about the crime via cell phone, particularly 
where the theory of the crime required a shared mental state.  
See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 455 (2009) (joint 
venture theory requires that coventurers have shared mental 
state).  Given these facts, one could infer from the affidavit 
that the call was related to the crime, that the crime was 
preplanned, and that some of that planning may have utilized 
cell phones, including the defendant's. 
 
Although in isolation none of these facts would be 
sufficient to support a nexus between the crime and the 
defendant's cell phone, in determining whether an affidavit 
                     
T-shirt belonged to Diggs, and that he changed out of it after 
the shooting:  a witness to the shooting stated that the shooter 
had a heavy build, and indicated in a showup identification that 
Diggs's body type matched that of the shooter.  The witness 
stated that what Diggs was wearing during the identification was 
not what the shooter had worn at the time of the shooting; the 
shooter had been wearing a "dark top."  Thus, it is likely Diggs 
shed the T-shirt after the shooting.  Further, we infer that the 
size large sweatshirt belonged to either the defendant or 
Peters, who each had a thin build.  Moreover, the attenuated 
connection between the parties and the defendant's girlfriend's 
rental car makes it unlikely that the extra clothing was there 
by happenstance.  Thus, given our "considerable latitude . . . 
for the drawing of inferences," it is reasonable to infer that 
multiple parties changed their clothes ( citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 452 Mass. 573, 576 (2008).  See 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 387 (2018) 
("Inferences drawn from the affidavit must be reasonable and 
possible, but no showing that the inferences are correct or more 
likely true than not true is required"). 
12 
 
 
supports a finding of probable cause we must take it as a whole, 
and not "parse[], sever[], [or] subject[] [it] to hypercritical 
analysis" (quotation and citation omitted).  Dorelas, 473 Mass. 
at 501.  Here, the facts add up to a nexus between the 
defendant's cell phone and the crime. 
 
That equation does not, however, accord significant weight 
to a factor that the Commonwealth stresses.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the defendant's use of a cell phone soon after the 
crime automatically implicates the phone "in an active cover up 
of the crime," irrespective of the additional context.  See 
Holley, 478 Mass. at 526 (fact that codefendant was sending text 
messages as he was fleeing scene of crime was factor supporting 
nexus between crime and his cell phone).  Although the defendant 
was using his cell phone close in time to the murder, it is 
unclear whether he was doing so before he saw police approaching 
and understood that he was about to be arrested.  Even though 
using a cell phone while fleeing the scene of a crime may lend 
support to an inference that the communication is about the 
crime, using a cell phone just prior to or during arrest, in and 
of itself, does not.  One might even expect that an arrestee 
would use a cell phone when about to be arrested.  Whether it be 
to call one's attorney, to ask a friend or family member to post 
bail, or to arrange child care, using a cell phone when one is 
13 
 
 
about to be apprehended by police cannot, without more, justify 
a nexus to search one's cell phone. 
 
Nothing in our decision today disturbs the holding in 
White, 475 Mass. 583.  There, we held that to support a nexus 
between a crime and a cell phone, the Commonwealth needed more 
than evidence of a joint venture crime and the opinion of 
investigating officers that coventurers often use cell phones to 
communicate.  Id. at 590.  The only evidence supporting a 
seizure of the defendant's cell phone was that a crime had been 
committed by several people, that the defendant was likely one 
of those people, and that he owned a cell phone.  Id.  The 
detectives had no specific evidence that any cell phone had been 
used in the crime, or that any particular piece of evidence was 
likely to be found on the defendant's cell phone.  Id.  In 
short, White did not contain sufficient facts to add up to a 
nexus.  See id. 
 
Here, in contrast, there is more than a joint venture crime 
in which the participants all owned cell phones:  there is 
evidence that the defendant made a cell phone call soon after 
the shooting to the person who rented the car used in the 
murder, there is a reasonable inference that the crime was 
preplanned, and there are records of threatening cell phone 
communications between Diggs and the victim.  Thus, given these 
additional facts, it was reasonable to infer that the 
14 
 
 
defendant's cell phone would contain evidence related to the 
crime. 
 
b.  Particularity.  In response to the Commonwealth's 
appeal, the defendant argues that the warrant was not 
sufficiently limited in scope.6  Because the lack of 
particularity of the warrant may have factored into the judge's 
ruling, and because we are vacating the order granting the 
motion to suppress, we take this opportunity to provide 
additional guidance on the proper scope of cell phone search 
warrants.  We hold that (1) the correct remedy for the warrant 
lacking particularity in this case is partial suppression; (2) 
the search of text messages, call logs, and Snapchat video 
recordings was proper;7 yet (3) the lack of time restriction 
rendered the warrant impermissibly broad, and we must remand to 
determine whether the proffered evidence fell outside what would 
have been a reasonable temporal limit. 
 
To determine whether a search warrant was proper in scope, 
we ask whether it "describe[d] with particularity the places to 
                     
 
6 The defendant also argues that the eighty-day delay in 
seeking the warrant to search his cell phone was an additional 
art. 14 violation.  Because this argument was not raised in the 
trial court, we do not consider it here.  See Commonwealth v. 
Yasin, 483 Mass. 343, 349 (2019). 
 
 
7 "Snapchat is a social media website on which a member may 
share information with a network of 'friends.'"  F.K. v. S.C., 
481 Mass. 325, 327 (2019). 
15 
 
 
be searched and the items to be seized."  Holley, 478 Mass. at 
524, quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 106 (2017).  
The dual purposes of the particularity requirement are "(1) to 
protect individuals from general searches and (2) to provide the 
Commonwealth the opportunity to demonstrate, to a reviewing 
court, that the scope of the officers' authority to search was 
properly limited" (citation omitted).  Holley, supra.  The 
particularity requirement acts as "a safeguard against general 
exploratory rummaging by the police through a person's 
belongings."  Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 298, 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989). 
 
Although "[i]n the physical world, police need not 
particularize a warrant application to search a property beyond 
providing a specific address, . . . in the virtual world it is 
not enough to simply permit a search to extend anywhere the 
targeted electronic objects possibly could be found."  Dorelas, 
473 Mass. at 501-502.  For a cell phone search, such a limit is 
akin to no limit at all.  See Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New 
Criminal Procedure, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 279, 303 (2005) 
("limiting a search to a particular computer is something 
like . . . limiting a search to the entire city").  "[G]iven the 
properties that render [a modern cell phone] distinct from the 
closed containers regularly seen in the physical world, a search 
of its many files must be done with special care and satisfy a 
16 
 
 
more narrow and demanding standard."  Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 502.  
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (noting that 
searches of physical items are to cell phone searches as "a ride 
on horseback" is to "a flight to the moon").  We have noted 
that, at a minimum, the standard for the proper scope of a cell 
phone search must be restricted to whether the evidence "might 
reasonably be found in the electronic files searched."  Dorelas, 
supra at 503 n.13. 
 
i.  Partial suppression.  The Commonwealth argues that if 
the warrant was not properly limited in scope, the correct 
remedy is partial suppression only of the evidence that fell 
outside what would have been a reasonable scope.  We agree. 
 
The search warrant here allowed officers to search 
virtually every area on the cell phone, including the address 
book, contact list, personal calendar, date book entries, to-do 
lists, e-mail messages, text and video messages, photographs, 
video recordings, Internet browser history, and more.  The 
officer requested permission to search "for all data described 
without any date restriction" because, he claimed, it was 
unknown "when the weapon used was acquired and when any related 
conspiracy may have formed."  We are hard pressed to imagine 
what content on the cell phone might have been excluded from the 
broad scope that this warrant allowed.  But because the 
Commonwealth seeks to introduce specific categories of data 
17 
 
 
only, we do not opine on the precise parameters of what would 
have been a reasonable search of the defendant's cell phone. 
 
Our decision turns on whether the Commonwealth's proffered 
evidence would have fallen within a reasonable scope.8  The 
defendant is not prejudiced by an overbroad warrant if the 
Commonwealth does not seek to exploit the lack of particularity 
in the warrant.  Holley, 478 Mass. at 525.  For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 550-551 (2019), we held 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by an overbroad warrant 
for three and one-half months of his cell site location 
information (CSLI), because the Commonwealth only introduced 
CSLI from the date of the crime itself.  We noted that an 
overbroad warrant generally requires only partial suppression of 
the information for which there was not the requisite nexus, as 
long as the Commonwealth had not "relied on or otherwise 
                     
 
8 Whether this determination is made on interlocutory appeal 
or after trial is immaterial.  The concurring opinion in the 
Appeals Court erroneously relied on Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 
Mass. 850, 867 (2019), for the proposition that the 
determination hinges on whether review is before or after trial.  
See Commonwealth v. Snow, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 686 (2019) 
(Henry, J., concurring).  In Vasquez, supra at 867-868, we 
suppressed all thirty-two days of cell site location information 
(CSLI) data because the Commonwealth never met its burden to 
establish probable cause to search the CSLI data at all, not 
because the warrant was overbroad.  Although we commented that 
the search for thirty-two days of CSLI was likely overbroad, 
that was not the basis for suppression.  Id. at 867.  Full 
suppression was required because there was no probable cause.  
Id. at 868. 
18 
 
 
exploited" it at trial.  Id. at 550.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 168-169 (2020).  Here, too, we believe 
partial suppression is the correct remedy.9  Thus, we decide only 
whether the Commonwealth is seeking to exploit what is likely an 
overbroad warrant.  In order to further this determination, we 
must analyze the specific evidence that the Commonwealth seeks 
to introduce from the cell phone. 
 
ii.  Content on the cell phone.  After the motion to 
suppress had been allowed, the Commonwealth moved for permission 
to supplement the record with a summary of the cell phone 
evidence it sought to introduce.  The judge agreed that such a 
list would provide context on appeal, and thus stated for the 
record what items the Commonwealth had proposed to introduce in 
                     
 
9 This is not to say that partial suppression is always the 
correct remedy.  See Wilkerson, 486 Mass. at 168 ("severance 
doctrine is not without limits").  In Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 
Mass. 141, 145-146 (1984), we noted that "all evidence seized 
pursuant to a general warrant must be suppressed.  The cost to 
society of sanctioning the use of general warrants -- abhorrence 
for which gave birth to the Fourth Amendment -- is intolerable 
by any measure" (citation omitted).  See Aday v. Superior Court 
of Alameda County, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 797 (1961).  ("We recognize 
the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially 
general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement 
of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made 
under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any 
event be upheld as to the property specified.  Such an abuse of 
the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated").  The 
warrant here was not a general warrant, because it contained a 
description of the places to be searched and thus did not vest 
the officers with unbridled discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rutkowski, 406 Mass. 673, 675-676 (1990); United States v. Fleet 
Mgt. Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
19 
 
 
evidence.  That list included various call logs, text messages, 
and Snapchat video recordings.10 
 
As discussed supra, police had probable cause to search the 
defendant's cell phone for evidence of the joint venture.  Based 
on the defendant's cell phone call to his girlfriend and the 
inference that the coventurers could have planned some or all of 
the night's events beforehand, there was a substantial basis for 
police to search areas of the cell phone that contain 
communications.  See, e.g., Holley, 478 Mass. at 525, 528 
(search of defendants' text message communications would have 
been sufficiently limited in content and scope). 
 
Communications are not limited to words.  In Commonwealth 
v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 505, we noted that communications can 
also come in the form of photographs.  There, we analyzed 
whether a permissible search for photographic communications 
included only photographs attached to text messages -- which 
                     
 
10 The full list consisted of (1) text messages between the 
defendant and Diggs; (2) call logs between the defendant and 
Diggs; (3) text messages between the defendant and Peters; (4) 
call logs between the defendant and Peters; (5) text messages 
between the defendant and someone named "Sista" that referenced 
"Snapchatting with guns"; (6) text messages between the 
defendant and someone named "Staxx," which the Commonwealth 
interpreted as the defendant's attempt to buy a gun; and (7) 
three Snapchat videos -- one from November 30, 2015, that 
depicted the defendant with both a gun that resembled the murder 
weapon as well as one that did not, and two that depicted the 
defendant holding a gun that resembled the murder weapon.  The 
dates of the latter two videos are unclear from the record, as 
are the dates of the calls and text messages. 
20 
 
 
were clearly communications -- or whether it could extend to the 
photograph application stored locally on the cell phone as well.  
Id. at 500.  Because it was reasonable that communications in 
the form of photographs could be found there, we concluded that 
the search could extend to the photograph files as well.  Id. at 
503. 
 
The evidence that the Commonwealth seeks to introduce here 
falls squarely within the realm of communications:  text 
messages, call logs, and Snapchat video recordings.  Text 
messages and calls are methods of communication from one party 
to another.  Snapchat is a social media application that allows 
users to send or post still images or video recordings.  Video 
recordings stored on the application have been sent, or are 
drafts that can be sent, from one party to another.  The 
Snapchat video recordings are thus communications analogous to 
the photographs attached to text messages discussed in Dorelas, 
473 Mass. at 500.  Consequently, when looking for evidence 
related to the planning and coordination of a joint venture, it 
was proper here for the officers to search call logs, text 
messages, and Snapchat video recordings. 
 
iii.  Temporal limit.  Finally, the defendant argues that 
the lack of any temporal limits to the search of the cell phone 
rendered it not sufficiently particular.  We agree. 
21 
 
 
 
The magnitude of the privacy invasion of a cell phone 
search utterly lacking in temporal limits cannot be overstated.  
In Riley, 573 U.S. at 394, the United States Supreme Court noted 
that a cell phone's large storage capacity means that a search 
for "even just one type of information [can] convey far more 
than previously possible" because "the data on a phone can date 
back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier."  The Court 
noted that the "sum of an individual's private life" could be 
reconstructed from the contents of one's cell phone.  Id. 
 
Consequently, to be sufficiently particular, a warrant for 
a cell phone search presumptively must contain some temporal 
limit.  See United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 921 (S.D. 
Ill. 2015).  See also United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 
2d 438, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting temporal restriction is 
"indic[ium] of particularity" [citation omitted]).  Because of 
the privacy interests at stake, the temporal restriction in an 
initial search warrant for a cell phone should err on the side 
of narrowness.  If, during that initial search, officers uncover 
information giving rise to probable cause to broaden their 
search of the cell phone, nothing precludes them from returning 
to the judge and requesting a broader warrant.  As one 
commentator notes, this is possible because, under Riley, 
officers are free to seize and hold cell phones, leaving little 
need to carry out a search quickly.  Gershowitz, The Post-Riley 
22 
 
 
Search Warrant:  Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell 
Phone Searches, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 585, 627 (2016). 
 
Determining the permissible parameters for a cell phone 
search is a "fact-intensive inquiry and must be resolved based 
on the particular facts of each case."  Morin, 478 Mass. at 426. 
Similar to the nexus analysis, the inquiry can be based on "the 
type of crime, the nature of the [evidence] sought, and normal 
inferences" about how far back in time the evidence could be 
found (citation omitted).  White, 475 Mass. at 589.  For 
example, in a case involving the sale of stolen firearms where 
there is evidence that such sales usually take place quickly, 
the warrant should not reach back far in time.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Roberts, 430 F. Supp. 3d 693, 717 (D. Nev. 
2019) (cell phone warrant extending back four days before theft 
of firearms was not reasonable where sales were unlikely to have 
taken place until after theft).  In contrast, in an insider 
trading case where the tenor of the parties' relationship is 
critical to the claim, it could be reasonable to look back 
further in time.  See, e.g., United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 
F. Supp. 3d. 287, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (warrant without temporal 
restriction authorizing search of digital devices for 
information regarding relationship between parties upheld 
because general tenor of relationship was relevant to tipper-
tippee theory and could not be confined to specific time frame).  
23 
 
 
In Holley, 478 Mass. at 525, 527-528, we noted that, although a 
warrant for seventeen days of text messages lacked 
particularity, messages exchanged two to four days before the 
shooting were within a reasonable temporal scope.11  That 
determination was based on the particular facts of the case and 
did not amount to a general rule as to the temporal scope of 
cell phone searches.  Such cases stand on their own facts and 
analysis.  See id. 
 
Here, the detective sought permission to search all of the 
defendant's data without any date restriction because, he 
claimed, "it [was] unknown as to when the weapon used was 
acquired and when any related conspiracy may have been formed."  
The affidavit did, however, contain a statement from a witness 
who asserted that Diggs and the victim had had a dispute "in the 
days leading up to the murder," as well as a statement from the 
defendant that he had borrowed the car earlier that day.  A feud 
beginning mere days before, and a car borrowed earlier that day, 
do not support a reasonable inference that evidence related to 
the crime could be found in the defendant's cell phone data from 
years, months, or even weeks before the murder. 
                     
 
11 In Holley, 478 Mass. at 510,there were two codefendants:  
Holley and Pritchett.  We found that the Commonwealth did not 
exploit an insufficiently particular warrant when it introduced 
Holley's text messages from a period beginning two days before 
the shooting and Pritchett's text messages from a period 
beginning four days before the shooting.  Id. at 525, 528. 
24 
 
 
 
Because the record is largely silent with respect to the 
dates of the Commonwealth's proposed evidence, we remand to the 
Superior Court for determination whether each piece of proffered 
evidence would have fallen within a reasonable temporal limit.12 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's motion 
to suppress is vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, including to determine whether the search exceeded the 
permissible scope of the warrant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
12 Without knowing what search protocol was used in this 
case, we do not know whether any of the proffered evidence could 
be admissible under the plain view exception.  We have noted in 
the past that application of the plain view doctrine to digital 
searches must, at least, be "limited," and we have declined 
squarely to decide whether the plain view doctrine applies in 
searches of electronic records.  See Dorelas, 473 Mass. at 505 
n.16; Preventive Med. Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810, 
832 (2013).  Here, there is no argument that any of the 
proffered evidence could be admissible under the plain view 
doctrine, and no showing that officers came across any of the 
data inadvertently.  Thus, we do not address whether the plain 
view exception is applicable in this case, or in cell phone 
cases more generally.