Title: Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne1992 WY 132838 P.2d 1182Case Number: 91-269Decided: 10/13/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
REIMAN 
CORPORATION, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

CITY OF 
CHEYENNE, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 E. James 
Burke of Burke, Woodard & Bishop, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Alexander 
K. Davison and S. Gregory Thomas, City Attorney's Office, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Reiman Corporation 
(Reiman) filed a declaratory judgment action against the City of Cheyenne (City) after the 
City had awarded Reiman a construction contract on an allegedly "mistaken bid." 
Reiman requested the district court to declare that Reiman was entitled to 
withdraw/rescind its bid without forfeiture of the bid bond, or, in the 
alternative, to declare that Reiman was entitled to reform its bid to correct 
the alleged error. Following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the district court issued an order which dismissed Reiman's 
withdrawal/rescission claim for want of jurisdiction and granted summary 
judgment to the City on the reformation claim. Reiman appeals from only that 
portion of the district court's order which dismissed its withdrawal/rescission 
claim. We will reverse and remand.

ISSUES

 [¶2.]     The only issue properly 
before this court is: Whether the district court erred in dismissing Reiman's 
withdrawal/rescission claim on the basis that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

FACTS

 [¶3.]     The City published an 
invitation for bids for the construction of a new fire station headquarters 
building on October 16 and 23, 1990. The invitation for bids informed all 
prospective bidders that bids would be accepted until bid opening at 2:00 p.m. 
on November 6, 1990. Reiman submitted its bid to the City at approximately 1:50 
p.m. on November 6, 1990. Reiman's bid of $1,910,000, secured by a five percent 
bid bond, was low bid for the project.

 [¶4.]     Approximately an hour 
after the bid opening, Tom Reiman (Mr. Reiman), Vice President of Reiman, 
allegedly discovered a clerical error of $71,000 in the computation of Reiman's 
bid. Mr. Reiman promptly called Marian Black, the City's Director of Purchasing, 
and Steve Elliott, the Project Architect, to inform them of the alleged error. 
Mr. Reiman also wrote a letter to the City Council, in which he 
explained:

I made 
an error in adding up my subcontractor bid column. I was adding up my 
subcontractor bids at approximately 1:35 p.m. when I received a return call from 
Bob Strasheim of Mechanical Systems concerning his bid and alternate # 3. * * * 
The last item I added in my "Total Sub Bid" column was line item # 12 precast 
for $4,000.00. When I went back to adding the column after the interruption I 
started at line item # 21 skylight which was below item # 20 for $4,000.00. As a 
result I le[f]t out the following:

Line 
      Item # 14[***]

$34,300.00 
      

Line 
      Item # 15[***]

 
 
1,500.00 
      

Line 
      Item # 16[***]

 
 
25,200.00 
      

Line 
      Item # 19[***]

 
 
6,000.00 
      

Line 
      Item # 20[***]

 
 
4,000.00 
      

TOTAL

$71,000.00

Concluding 
this letter, Mr. Reiman requested that Reiman be allowed to withdraw its bid 
without forfeiture of the bid bond and that the contract be awarded to the next 
lowest bidder.

 [¶5.]     Mr. Reiman appeared 
before the City Finance Committee on November 21, 1990 and before the City 
Council on November 26, 1990. At these meetings, Mr. Reiman reiterated the 
circumstances leading to the allegedly "mistaken bid" and renewed Reiman's 
request to withdraw its bid without forfeiture of the bid bond. Both the City 
Finance Committee and the City Council voted to accept Reiman's bid as 
originally submitted. Accordingly, the City delivered to Reiman a Notice of 
Award and a Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor on November 
28, 1990. The Notice of Award required Reiman to, among other things, execute 
the contract with the City within ten days. Reiman was advised that failure to 
execute the contract within the ten-day period would result in a forfeiture of 
the bid bond. The City issued an amendment to the Notice of Award on December 4, 
1990, thereby extending Reiman's time for compliance to December 26, 
1990.

 [¶6.]     Reiman filed a petition 
for declaratory judgment and a motion for preliminary injunction against the 
City on December 14, 1990. Reiman requested the district court to declare that 
Reiman was entitled to withdraw/rescind its bid without forfeiture of the bid 
bond or, in the alternative, to declare that Reiman was entitled to reform its 
bid to correct the alleged error. Reiman also requested that the district court 
issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from either requiring Reiman 
to execute the contract or from taking action to forfeit the bid bond during the 
pendency of the declaratory judgment action. A hearing on Reiman's motion for 
preliminary injunction was set for December 20, 1990.

 [¶7.]     On December 20, 1990, 
Reiman and the City entered into an agreement which provided, among other 
things, that Reiman would withdraw its pending motion for a preliminary 
injunction, that the declaratory judgment action would remain pending, and that 
Reiman would sign the contract and proceed with construction. The agreement 
provided that the contract price would be determined as 
follows:

d. If 
the parties cannot agree in writing as to a contract price, the price shall be 
determined as set forth in this Agreement based upon the decision of the 
District Court in the action currently pending in Laramie County District 
Court.

* * * * 
* *

f. If 
Reiman prevails, and the District Court finds that Reiman is entitled to rescind 
its bid, Reiman shall be entitled to a contract price of 
$1,981,000.00.

g. If 
the City of Cheyenne prevails in such litigation, and the 
District Court finds that Reiman is not entitled to rescind its bid, the City 
shall be entitled to a contract price as stated in Reiman's original bid, 
$1,910,000.00.

 [¶8.]     Following discovery 
proceedings, the City filed a motion for summary judgment in the underlying 
declaratory judgment action on October 7, 1991. Reiman responded with a 
cross-motion for summary judgment on October 17, 1991. A hearing was then held 
after which the district court issued an order on October 24, 1991. The district 
court dismissed Reiman's withdrawal/rescission claim for want of jurisdiction 
and granted summary judgment to the City on Reiman's reformation claim. The 
district court specifically determined that the withdrawal/rescission issue was 
rendered moot by the parties' agreement of December 20, 1990 and that 
reformation was available only in instances of mutual mistake. This appeal 
ensued.

DISCUSSION

 [¶9.]     On appeal, Reiman 
challenges only that portion of the district court's order which dismissed its 
withdrawal/rescission claim. Reiman contends that the district court erred in 
determining that the withdrawal/rescission claim failed to present a justiciable 
controversy within the meaning of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Reiman 
concedes that withdrawal/rescission of its bid is no longer an option, but 
contends that a justiciable controversy remains in that resolution of the 
withdrawal/rescission claim will have the collateral effect of establishing the 
contract price. Thus, the crux of the instant case concerns whether, as a 
jurisprudential matter, the district court erred in dismissing Reiman's 
rescission/withdrawal claim on the ground that the parties' December 20, 1990 
agreement had rendered the issue moot. Resolution of this issue requires that we 
examine the policies underlying both the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and 
the doctrine of justiciability to determine if this is a proper case for 
judicial action.

 [¶10.]  The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 
dispelled the myth that the judicial arm of government could be extended only to 
redress prior wrongdoings (corrective justice). Edwin M. Borchard, The 
Declaratory Judgment - A Needed Procedural Reform (Part I), 28 Yale L.J. 1, 2 
(1918). The Act is founded upon the premise that society is disturbed not only 
when legal rights are violated, but also when they are placed in serious doubt 
or uncertainty. Id. Consequently, the Act establishes a 
procedural vehicle whereby litigants may approach the court for a declaration of 
their "rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is 
or could be claimed" (preventive or corrective justice). Wyo. Stat. § 1-37-102 
(1988). Edson R. Sunderland captured the essence of the effect of the 
declaratory judgment on the administration of justice by explaining that, before 
the advent of the declaratory judgment, "courts were employed only as repair 
shops; since that time they have operated as service stations." Edson R. 
Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights, - The Declaratory Judgment, 
16 Mich.L.Rev. 71, 77 (1917).

 [¶11.]  The stated purpose of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act is "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty 
and insecurity with respect to legal relations * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 1-37-114 
(1988). The Act is to be liberally construed to this end. Id.; Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 (Wyo. 1974) (begrudging 
availability of declaratory judgment is inconsistent with its purpose). 
Expounding upon the purpose underlying the Act, Professor Borchard has 
succinctly stated:

As a 
measure of preventive justice, the declaratory judgment probably has its 
greatest efficacy. It is designed to enable parties to ascertain and establish 
their legal relations, so as to conduct themselves accordingly, and thus avoid 
the necessity of future litigation.

Edwin 
M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment - A Needed Procedural Reform (Part II), 28 
Yale L.J. 105, 110 (1918).

 [¶12.]  Although the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act is to be liberally construed to the end that courts may declare 
"rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or 
could be claimed," the Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the courts. The 
right to seek a declaratory judgment is open only to those persons "* * * interested under a deed, will, written 
contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or 
other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 1-37-103 
(1988). The "interest" requirement is but an expression of the basic doctrine 
that the judiciary will not invoke its remedial powers unless presented with a 
justifiable controversy. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark 
Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1977).

 [¶13.]  A justiciable controversy is defined 
generically as a controversy fit for judicial resolution. Numerous doctrines 
have evolved under the justiciability umbrella which are aimed at isolating 
those circumstances in which courts should withhold decision, either from 
deference to the particular authority and competence of another branch of 
government, or from recognition of the functional limitations of the adversary 
system. The doctrines include the political question doctrine, the 
administrative questions doctrine, the advisory opinions doctrine, the feigned 
and collusive cases doctrine, the doctrine of standing, the doctrine of 
ripeness, and the doctrine of mootness. 13A Charles A. Wright Et Al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3529 (1984).

 [¶14.]  Of particular importance to the instant 
case are the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness. These doctrines are 
premised upon jurisprudential principles which are designed to promote judicial 
economy and the wise exercise of judicial power. To these ends, the standing 
doctrine requires that the litigants have a tangible interest at stake in the 
subject matter before the court; the ripeness doctrine requires that the issue 
presented to the court be sufficiently mature for judicial resolution; and the 
mootness doctrine requires that a justiciable issue remain before the court 
throughout the duration of the suit. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie Co. v. Dept. of 
Rev. & Tax., 770 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1989) and 
Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) (standing); 
Indus. Siting Council v. Chic. & N.W. Transp., 660 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1983) (ripeness); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. 
Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1989) (mootness).

 [¶15.]  The jurisprudential principles underlying 
the standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrines are embodied in the definition of 
a justiciable controversy adopted in Brimmer. The Brimmer court identified the 
following four elements as being necessary to establish a justiciable 
controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act:

1. The 
parties must have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, 
rights or interests.

2. The 
controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively 
operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.

3. It 
must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force 
and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, 
status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in 
interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding public 
moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.

4. The 
proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, 
but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and 
analysis of the major issues.

Brimmer, 
521 P.2d  at 578.

 [¶16.]  There is no question but that a 
justiciable controversy existed between Reiman and the City at the time the 
petition for a declaratory judgment was filed with the district court. The 
district court, however, determined that the parties' December 20, 1990 
agreement rendered the withdrawal/rescission issue moot. Specifically, the 
district court reasoned:

What 
was once a very real and actual controversy over whether or not Reiman could 
withdraw its bid without bond forfeiture, is now moot. Assuming the court were 
to grant Reiman rescission, the contract would no longer stand; the City would 
have to award the con[s]truction project to the next lowest bidder. This is no 
longer possible, and thus what the parties ask of this court simply does not 
make sense.

Hence, 
the rationale for the district court's determination that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was because a 
ruling on the withdrawal/rescission issue could no longer "effectively operate," 
i.e., that withdrawal/rescission of bid could not presently be 
ordered.

 [¶17.]  The district court erred in determining 
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act because the parties' December 20, 1990 agreement had rendered the 
withdrawal/rescission issue moot. The doctrine of mootness encompasses those 
circumstances which destroy a previously justiciable controversy. Wright, supra, 
§ 3533.1. This doctrine represents the time element of standing by requiring 
that the interests of the parties which were originally sufficient to confer 
standing persist throughout the duration of the suit. Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). 
Thus, the central question in a mootness case is "whether decision of a once 
living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the 
decision will have an impact on the parties." Wright & Miller § 
3533.

 [¶18.]  The district court did not focus upon 
whether resolution of the withdrawal/rescission issue continued to be justified, 
following the December 20, 1990 agreement, by the impact it would have upon the 
parties. Rather, the district court centered attention upon whether a ruling on 
the withdrawal/rescission could "effectively operate." The district court's 
hyper-technical application of the requirement that its judgment "effectively 
operate" is inconsistent with the liberal construction that is to be applied to 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., 
708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1985). The requirement that the judgment 
of the court "effectively operate" means only that a court's decision must have 
some practical effect upon the litigants, i.e., that a court may not issue a 
purely advisory opinion. Justice Blume has expressed this concept by stating 
that action under the Act is justified when "some useful purpose" will be 
accomplished thereby. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 463, 296 P. 206, 210 (1931); accord Beatty v. C.B. & Q.R. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 37, 52 P.2d 404, 408 (1935).

 [¶19.]  We believe that Reiman's 
withdrawal/rescission claim yet presents a justiciable controversy and that 
consideration of the matter will serve the useful purpose of settling the 
parties' on-going dispute over contract price. The December 20, 1990 agreement 
merely changed the impact that resolution of the withdrawal/rescission issue 
would have upon the parties' rights; it did not render the issue legally 
insignificant. Jurisprudential concerns for judicial economy and concrete 
adverseness are not implicated. The parties have a "tangible interest at stake" 
in that $71,000 hinges upon resolution of the withdrawal/rescission issue. See 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1982) (financial interest in resolution of Presidential immunity issue 
sufficient to defeat mootness claim arising under similar circumstances). We 
harbor no misgiving but that the parties will thoroughly research the relevant 
issues and militantly present them to the court for resolution. Moreover, this 
is not a hypothetical or abstract case. The facts relevant to the 
withdrawal/rescission issue developed in their natural course and exist to guide 
judicial decision. See Wright, supra, § 3533.1. Finally, judicial resolution of 
the withdrawal/rescission issue is not merely an academic exercise. As 
previously stated, a decision on this issue will have the practical impact of 
determining the construction price for the headquarters fire station 
building.

 [¶20.]  Contract principles also support judicial 
resolution of the withdrawal/rescission issue. Mootness questions, as with other 
questions arising from settlement agreements, should be answered according to 
the intent of the parties. Wright, supra, § 3533.2. In the instant case, the 
parties' intent to be bound by judicial resolution of the withdrawal/rescission 
issue is manifest in their agreement of December 20, 1990. Given that we find no 
jurisprudential impediment to entertaining this suit, we feel that it would be 
patently unjust not to hold the City to its end of the bargain, thereby leaving 
Reiman in a quandary as to how to resolve the continued dispute over contract 
price.

 [¶21.]  In summary, affirmation of the present 
case would place this court in the illogical position of invoking the 
jurisprudential doctrine of mootness, which is founded in large part upon the 
principle of judicial economy, to thwart the parties' effort under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act to expeditiously settle their controversy over 
contract price in an attempt to avoid future litigation. Under the circumstances 
of the instant case, this is what does not make sense. Consequently, we hold 
that the district court erred as a jurisprudential matter in dismissing Reiman's 
withdrawal/rescission claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

DISPOSITION

 [¶22.]  The order of the district court which 
dismissed Reiman's withdrawal/rescission claim for want of jurisdiction is 
reversed. This case is remanded to the district court for a declaration as to 
whether a public bid may be withdrawn/rescinded, under the circumstances of this 
case, without forfeiture of the bid bond.

CARDINE, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

THOMAS, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

 [¶23.]  This declaratory judgment suit as 
originally filed was to determine whether Reiman could withdraw or rescind its 
bid. When the parties made a new agreement to award the construction contract to 
Reiman and pay or not pay an additional $71,000 over the bid price depending 
upon the determination of the right to withdraw or rescind, a different case was 
presented to the court. It is true that having entered into the construction 
contract the parties could no longer rescind or withdraw the bid. Therefore, 
that question was moot. But the $71,000 obligation under the new agreement still 
exists. Whether that should be resolved in the declaratory judgment action or in 
a separate action is the question here presented. Judicial economy would be 
served by resolving the question in the declaratory judgment action; and, 
therefore, I will concur.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶24.]  I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion in this case. In my view, the dismissal by the trial court was correct 
and, since it was correct, the trial court had a right to have its judgment 
sustained. Seventy-one Thousand Dollars may indeed be a high price to pay for 
careless addition in preparation of a contract bid. On the other hand, a 
reversal of a district court, in an instance in which it entered a correct 
judgment, is a high price for the court to pay.

 [¶25.]  Perhaps the process of fossilization is 
an early affliction for me. I am satisfied, however, that this is an instance in 
which a modicum of judicial conservatism is appropriate. While I probably would 
have agreed to sustain a district court that entertained jurisdiction in a case 
such as this, I cannot fault the district court for denying jurisdiction. Here 
the liberal construction concept as applied to declaratory judgments has been 
strained beyond the breaking point. The reach of the statute no longer is 
confined to the statutory language. Judicial expediency and the appropriate 
construct of a solid body of law are not always compatible, and they are not in 
this case.

 [¶26.]  The majority opinion can be described as 
a holding that, since the differences between the parties must somehow be 
settled at some point, it is appropriate to have those differences determined in 
this case. That result has superficial appeal. That appeal begins to diminish 
when it is recognized Reiman came before the court asking to have a declaratory 
judgment of its right to withdraw, without penalty, a bid submitted on a 
municipal construction project or, alternatively, the right to reform its bid at 
a time when the City of Cheyenne had accepted Reiman's bid and had submitted a 
contract to Reiman for execution. The only documents that were pleaded to the 
court in Reiman's Petition for Declaratory Judgment do not constitute a contract 
and, obviously, there was not a written contract for the court to 
construe.

 [¶27.]  It may be overkill to quote the pertinent 
statute, but it states:

Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations 
are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-37-103 (1988) (emphasis added).

At this 
juncture, my point is that what was presented to the court by Reiman's pleading 
does not qualify as a "written contract" nor does it qualify as "other writings 
constituting a contract." It was a bid and, while the City had accepted the bid 
by official action, the only relief prayed for by Reiman was a declaration of 
its right to withdraw or to reform its bid. I do not believe even a liberal 
construction of § 1-37-103 justifies a declaratory judgment as to "rights, 
status or other legal relations" under a bid. In effect, the court's decision 
amends the statute to include the word "bid."

 [¶28.]  The matter is exacerbated by the fact 
that, after presenting its complaint, Reiman made an arrangement with the City 
of Cheyenne to 
execute the contract, in effect reserving the right to claim an additional 
$71,000 as a part of the contract price. That agreement has some potential for 
cognizance under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-37-101 
to -115 (1988), but Reiman did not ask to have rights under the new agreement declared by the 
court. The effect of this court's decision is to achieve exactly that, however. 
The case is remanded so the trial court can articulate a declaration of rights 
under the collateral agreement pursuant to which the contract let by the city 
was executed. In the exercise of an extreme degree of caution, however, the 
parties in their collateral agreement provided:

     e. Although this 
Agreement will be binding between the parties, such litigation [the case before this 
court] shall be determined without reference to this Agreement [emphasis 
added], i.e., the parties agree that this Agreement shall not be relevant 
evidence in determining whether Reiman was entitled to rescind its 
bid.

Our 
decision simply ignores the agreement of the parties and sends this case back 
for the trial court to consider the rights of the parties under the collateral 
agreement despite their stipulation it not be referred to or considered as 
evidence. It may be the trial court will be as creative as our court and will 
find a way to declare rights under an agreement it cannot consider in evidence, 
but I would be nonplussed if I were the district court.

 [¶29.]  There is another reason to affirm the 
trial court that is even more compelling. In directing the trial court, in 
effect, to consider the pleadings to have been amended to encompass the 
collateral agreement, the majority says, "[a]s previously stated, a decision on 
this issue will have the practical impact of determining the construction price 
for the headquarters fire station building." Op. at 1187. The result in truth 
and fact is that the majority opinion assumes the bid of Reiman can be reformed, 
thus increasing it by $71,000. Yet, the majority recognizes the trial court 
entered a summary judgment in favor of the City of Cheyenne on the issue of 
reformation. The question the majority assumes will be resolved upon remand has 
been finally decided. Since that judgment was not appealed, it stands as res 
judicata on the right to have the bid reformed. The trial court will have little 
difficulty in finally disposing of the case on remand.

 [¶30.]  I also have a concern about the wisdom of 
this decision in the context of public policy. It is clear from the record 
Reiman did not seek, in any way, to have any determination made with respect to 
Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-113(f), which provides in pertinent 
part:

     (f) In advertising for 
any bid, the forms of guarantee required under this section and approved by the 
city or town shall be specified. In addition, bidders shall be required to 
accompany each bid with a bid bond or if the bid is one hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000.00) or less, any other form of bid guarantee approved by the city or 
town, equal to at least five percent (5%) of the total bid amount, with 
sufficient surety and payable to the city or town. The bid guarantee shall be forfeited as 
liquidated damages if the bidder, upon the letting of the contract to him, fails 
to enter into the contract within thirty (30) days after it is presented to him 
for that purpose or fails to proceed with the performance of the contract 
[emphasis added].

There 
certainly is nothing within the language of this statute that could possibly be 
construed to rescue Reiman from the situation of a mistake in submitting its 
bid. The language is clear, and the invocation of the concept of liquidated 
damages by the legislature had to be by design.

 [¶31.]  The practical effect of this decision, 
however, will be that, anytime anyone submits a bid on a public construction 
project and suffers bidders' remorse, a declaratory judgment suit will be filed 
to have determined the right of the bidder to not perform its bid. The pragmatic 
consequence in every instance has to be that, if the disparity between the 
contested bid and the next higher bid is approximately the amount required to 
litigate the declaratory judgment action, the successful bidder will be 
permitted to withdraw the bid it now finds to be unsatisfactory. The purpose of 
the statute will be frustrated in such instances. I find this to be an 
undesirable burden to foist upon the competitive bidding process for public 
construction projects.

 [¶32.]  In my view, the district court was 
precisely correct when it ruled that, by signing the contract, the parties 
mooted the issues that purportedly were presented in their declaratory judgment 
claim. The trial court perhaps went further than it needed to when it 
contemplated reformation of the contract to change the price, but I cannot 
perceive how its disposition of that issue on the merits by granting summary 
judgment to the City of Cheyenne can be refuted. I know of no precedent 
from this court that would justify reformation upon a unilateral mistake, 
although by this remand we may be suggesting such a rule.

 [¶33.]  While I might, at least for myself, 
develop a response to the majority position that is more sound than that of the 
trial court, I think this circumstance is one in which the trial court's views 
deserve to be heard. Consequently, I have attached as Appendix A to this opinion 
the entire pertinent order of the district court which, as I have said, 
correctly disposes of the case.

 [¶34.]  I would affirm the district 
court.

APPENDIX 
A

IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE 
OF WYOMING, COUNTY OF LARAMIE

DOCKET 
NO. 125-421

REIMAN 
CORP., Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF 
CHEYENNE, 
Defendant.

Filed 
October 24, 1991

ORDER 
GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART AND ORDER DISMISSING FOR LACK      OF SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION IN PART

 [¶35.]  This case originated with a petition for 
declaratory judgment filed by Reiman Corp., Plaintiff, against the City of 
Cheyenne, 
Defendant. This petition is the basis for the motion for summary judgment filed 
by the City and the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by 
Reiman.

 [¶36.]  The petition sought a declaratory 
judgment allowing Reiman to withdraw its bid in the amount of $1,910,000.00, 
submitted pursuant to the City's invitation for bids for the construction of a 
new Headquarters Fire Station, or, in the alternative, to allow a reformation of 
the bid to correct an error made in calculating the bid price, which should have 
been $71,000.00 more, or a price of $1,981,000.00. Additionally, the petition 
requested that a bid bond, submitted with the bid, in the amount of five percent 
(5%) of Reiman's total bid, be returned to Reiman. The City refused to allow 
Reiman to withdraw its bid unless Reiman forfeited its bond, relying on the 
competitive bidding statute at W.S. § 15-1-113 (1991 
Cum.Supp.):

(f) . . 
. The bid guarantee shall be forfeited as liquidated damages if the bidder, upon 
the letting of the contract to him, fails to enter into the contract within 
thirty (30) days after it is presented to him. . . .

 [¶37.]  Pending the resolution of the petition 
for declaratory judgment, Reiman moved to have the City temporarily enjoined 
from taking any action to cause a forfeiture of its bid bond and also enjoined 
from requiring Reiman to sign a construction contract. Prior to the hearing 
seeking temporary relief, Reiman entered into a stipulated agreement with the 
City. The parties agreed to the following relevant 
provisions:

b. The 
Declaratory Judgment action currently pending in Laramie County District Court 
will remain pending.

c. 
Reiman will execute the contract presented by the City and will perform the work 
specified in the contract. The price Reiman Corp. will be paid for the work will 
be either the original bid price of $1,910,000.00 or the amended bid price of 
$1,981,000.00 or such other price as the parties agree upon in 
writing.

d. If 
the parties cannot agree in writing as to a contract price, the price shall be 
determined as set forth in this Agreement based upon the decision of the 
District Court in the action currently pending in Laramie County District 
Court.

e. 
Although this Agreement will be binding between the parties, such litigation 
shall be determined without reference to this Agreement, i.e., the parties agree 
that this Agreement shall not be relevant evidence in determining whether Reiman 
was entitled to rescind its bid.

f. If 
Reiman prevails, and the District Court finds that Reiman is entitled to rescind 
its bid, Reiman shall be entitled to a contract price of 
$1,981,000.00.

g. If 
the City of Cheyenne prevails in such litigation, and the 
District Court finds that Reiman is not entitled to rescind its bid, the City 
shall be entitled to a contract price as stated in Reiman's original bid, 
$1,910,000.00.

 [¶38.]  This agreement allowed Reiman to commence 
work under the contract, while at the same time seeking to reserve for judicial 
determination the question of whether Reiman would be entitled to receive the 
additional amount of $71,000.00 due to its mistake in preparing the bid. By 
their respective motions for summary judgment, both the City and Reiman now seek 
to have the court resolve the question of additional 
compensation.

 [¶39.]  This court is concerned about whether a 
"justiciable controversy" now exists within the meaning of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, W.S. § 1-37-101 through § 1-37-115. The elements of a 
justiciable controversy under the Act are as follows:

* * * 
First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, 
as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy 
must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as 
distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a 
controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect 
of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other 
legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting 
these qualities be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute 
the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely 
adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient 
militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues. Any 
controversy lacking these elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not 
properly before the courts for solution. * * *

Brimmer 
v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Hallmark Insurance Co., 561 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 
1977).

 [¶40.]  If the court were to determine that the 
bid could be rescinded, it could not order its rescission because Reiman is 
performing under that bid. Any order which would issue from this court would not 
serve to allow Reiman to withdraw its bid. Thus, a judgment regarding rescission 
would not effectively operate.

 [¶41.]  The method by which the parties seek to 
resolve their dispute presents an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. (See, 
Mountain West, at 710. A justiciable controversy is a jurisdictional 
requirement.) The court is not being asked to rescind the bid. Rather it is 
being asked to decide whether the bid could have been rescinded. The parties 
have agreed that if the court rules that the bid could have been rescinded,1 then Reiman by agreement gets the 
additional $71,000.00. If the court determines that the bid could not have been 
rescinded, Reiman is paid the original bid quoted.

 [¶42.]  The actions of the City and Reiman, 
subsequent to Reiman's petition for declaratory judgment, have rendered the 
issue of rescission moot. This is not to say that a controversy does not exist 
as to the contract price. Indeed a very real controversy regarding the price 
does exist. But as to the specific question of rescission, subsequent conduct by 
the City and Reiman have rendered the issue moot. Reiman has executed the 
contract presented to it by the City and Reiman has proceeded to perform under 
the contract. What was once a very real and actual controversy over whether or 
not Reiman could withdraw its bid without bond forfeiture, is now moot. Assuming 
the court were to grant Reiman rescission, the contract would no longer stand; 
the City would have to award the construction project to the next lowest bidder. 
This is no longer possible, and thus what the parties ask of this court simply 
does not make sense.

 [¶43.]  Undoubtedly, a dispute does still remain 
between the City and Reiman over the contract price amount. However, this 
dispute is not properly decided based upon a determination regarding rescission. 
A decision regarding rescission cannot determine the price except only as the 
parties have agreed. "The court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment 
where the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving 
rise to the proceeding." W.S. § 1-37-108. Moreover, the issue presented seeks an 
advisory opinion. It is advisory because it seeks a declaration of what could have been had the parties 
proceeded with the temporary relief sought, not what is. (See, Brimmer, at 579. 
"It is axiomatic that the Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be relied upon to 
secure an advisory opinion. * * * An advisory opinion is one which adjudicates 
nothing and binds no one [citations omitted].")

 [¶44.]  Even though this court has determined 
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the prayer seeking 
rescission, it may yet exercise subject matter jurisdiction over that portion of 
the prayer seeking reformation. The issue of reformation is based on the 
substantive and real controversy over the price amount which constitutes a 
justiciable controversy needing resolution.

 [¶45.]  The law on reformation, however, applies 
only to those matters which involve a mutual mistake. This is not a case of 
mutual mistake. A unilateral mistake does not provide grounds for reformation. 
See, Svalina v. Big Horn National Life Insurance Co., 466 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1970); 
City of Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Construction Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 
(1956); Department of Transportation v. Ronlee, Inc., 518 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, to order reformation would be incompatible with the 
statutory scheme concerning public contracts.

 [¶46.]  Accordingly, as to reformation, partial 
summary judgment is granted in favor of the City. As to rescission, the court 
determines that it has not been presented a justiciable issue within the meaning 
of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

DATED 
this 24 day of October, 1991.

/s/ 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis NICHOLAS G. KALOKATHIS DISTRICT 
JUDGE

cc: 
Alexander Davison James Burke

FOOTNOTES

 1 The parties have 
stipulated that the agreement on file herein cannot be considered as evidence. 
This court is not bound by this agreement. Indeed to ignore it would be 
tantamount to allowing the parties to confer subject matter jurisdiction by 
stipulation, an impossible prospect. See, White v. Board of Land Commissioners, 
595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 1979). "Parties cannot confer 
jurisdiction by consent. [Citations omitted] and jurisdiction of subject matter 
cannot be waived. [Citation omitted.]