Title: Foxworth v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

267 So. 2d 647 (1972)
William FOXWORTH, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 42012.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 20, 1972.
Rehearing Denied November 9, 1972.
*648 Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr., of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
*649 ADKINS, Justice.
By mandate of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, we are required to review the conviction of William Foxworth which occurred on December 5, 1944, more than 27 years ago. Habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for a full appellate review under the circumstances here presented.
A writ of habeas corpus has been issued and a return made by the Attorney General.
Petitioner, William Foxworth, hereinafter referred to as "Foxworth," was fourteen years of age at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of murder in the first degree. He and three other teen-age negro defendants (Charles Bevels, Robert Farmer and Floyd Alexander) were charged by indictment with the premeditated murder of Earl Wilson while all were incarcerated in a cell in a correctional institution for young offenders. Foxworth, Bevels and Farmer were represented by a court-appointed attorney, while the remaining defendant, Alexander, had other counsel, seemingly of his selection.
All of the defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree with recommendation of mercy. The conviction was affirmed on motion of the Attorney General by this Court on September 11, 1945. (Bevels et al. v. State, 156 Fla. 159, 23 So.2d 156). There was no brief filed on behalf of Foxworth, nor was the appeal orally argued on the merits.
In February 1964, Foxworth sought post-conviction relief and, upon summary denial of his petition by the Circuit Court, instituted habeas corpus proceeding in this Court. The petition was found to be without merit. Foxworth v. Wainwright, 167 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1964).
On July 22, 1969, Foxworth filed a motion to vacate and set aside judgment and sentence in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, pursuant to Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A. This motion was denied and Foxworth appealed to the District Court of Appeal, First District. The order of the trial court was affirmed in Foxworth v. State, 231 So. 2d 229 (Fla.App.1st, 1970). A further petition for writ of habeas corpus to this Court was thereafter denied without opinion on July 16, 1970. Foxworth v. Wainwright (Case No. 39,933).
On September 21, 1970, Foxworth filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Following response by the Attorney General, and without hearing, the petition was denied on November 19, 1970. Foxworth v. Wainwright, 319 F. Supp. 593. Foxworth then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Counsel was appointed to represent him, and after oral argument the Court of Appeals filed its opinion in Foxworth v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1971), saying, inter alia:
These proceedings resulted and we now consider the case in the posture of a direct appeal by Foxworth.
The first question is whether "the conviction of appellant is totally devoid of evidentiary support." Nine boys had been placed in a small cell for running away and had been there for periods ranging from a few days to a few weeks. Foxworth had been there three weeks at the time of the death of the victim. An escape plot was hatched during the week preceding the death of Earl Wilson. A stick, variously likened to a shovel or broom handle, found its way into the cottage to be used in the escape.
The indictment charged that Foxworth, together with Bevels, Farmer and Alexander, murdered Earl Wilson "by striking him with some blunt instrument." A physician testified that Earl Wilson died as a result of a blow upon his head by a blunt instrument. He found no bruise on the neck muscles.
There were eight eyewitnesses to the homicide and they related two separate episodes, a striking of the head of Earl Wilson with the stick by Bevels and a later pressing of the stick against the neck of Earl Wilson, a happening in which Foxworth admittedly was involved. One witness testified that he saw Bevels hit Earl Wilson as Farmer and Alexander were holding Wilson's legs and Foxworth was holding Wilson's hands. This was corroborated by two other witnesses. We agree with the conclusion of the District Judge of the United States District Court when he said:
When persons combine to commit unlawful acts, each person is criminally responsible for the acts of his associates. If Foxworth rendered assistance in the commission of the crime, he is equally guilty as a principal in the first degree. See In re Vann, 136 Fla. 113, 186 So. 424 (1939); 6 F.L.P., Criminal Law, § 133, Fla. Stat. (1941) § 776.01. The following appears in Henry v. State, 81 Fla. 763, 89 So. 136 (1921):
*651 See also Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1923). The evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Foxworth also says he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney was denied adequate time to prepare for trial, his attorney was appointed to represent codefendants in the cause, and his attorney failed to prosecute the original appeal in this Court in 1945.
A term of court began in Jackson County on the second Monday in November, 1944. Fla. Stat. (1941) § 26.35, F.S.A. The crime was discovered on September 1, 1944, and an indictment returned on November 15, 1944, the attorney was appointed on November 22, 1944 and the case was tried seven days later. The trial lasted one day. The following principles discussed in Roberts v. Dutton, 368 F.2d 465 (5th Cir., 1966), are applicable in considering the nature of Foxworth's trial:
A criminal prosecution in 1944 was not as complicated as it is today, as there were no discovery proceedings available to the defendants. No question of search and seizure was involved in the case and there was no confession by any of the defendants. There were numerous eyewitnesses to the offense, all of whom were confined and were easily accessible. It does not appear that Foxworth's attorney was denied adequate time to prepare for trial.
As to the alleged denial of effective assistance of counsel, based upon the fact that Foxworth's attorney also represented joint or codefendants, Foxworth has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice caused thereby. The record shows that Wilson, Washington and Gordon accused Bevels, Farmer, Foxworth and Alexander as the perpetrators of the crime. The latter (including Alexander who was represented by independent counsel) countered with the defense that Wilson, Washington, Gordon and McCall committed the crime and not the defendants who were indicted. In other words, court-appointed counsel, as well as Alexander's independent counsel, applied the basic principle, "United we stand, divided we fall." This was a matter of strategy, concurred in by independently-retained counsel, and it appears that Foxworth's attorney did, in fact, render reasonably effective assistance. We recognize that a heavier burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel would rest on Foxworth in habeas corpus proceedings than upon a direct appeal, and although Foxworth v. Wainwright, 319 F. Supp. 593 (Fla.N.D., 1970) was a proceeding in habeas corpus, the principles enunciated by Judge Middlebrooks are applicable on appellate review. The opinion contains the following:
It is interesting to note that in Foxworth v. Wainwright, 167 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1964), Foxworth claimed
This Court disposed of his petition with this comment:
Viewing this record in the light of the standards applicable to a claim of incompetency of counsel, Foxworth has failed to demonstrate the allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel.
The failure of Foxworth's attorney to file a brief and prosecute the original appeal in this Court in 1945 has no bearing upon the effectiveness of counsel during the course of the trial. This omission on appeal is cured by the granting of this review by the Court. In other words, this appellate review cures any error resulting from the failure of Foxworth's attorney to prosecute the original appeal.
Foxworth next contends there was a systematic exclusion of negroes from the grand and petit juries in question. In discussing this contention, Judge Middlebrooks in Foxworth v. Wainwright, supra, said:
This Court in State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972), held that it was unconstitutional in the selection of jury panels to employ a quota system to either exclude or include a certain fixed percentage of black citizens of the county who are registered voters. This decision followed Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 839 (1950), and Shepherd v. State, 341 U.S. 50, 71 S. Ct. 549, 95 L. Ed. 740 (1951). This Court said:
It necessarily follows that the mere showing of a certain percentage of eligible negro jurors is insufficient to show that the particular jury panel was improperly selected. Such a showing may be considered in determining whether a systematic and intentional exclusion existed, but this is by no means conclusive.
The jury panel of Jackson County was attacked in Hayes v. Wainwright, 302 F. *654 Supp. 716 (Fla.N.D., 1969). Hayes was convicted in 1942 of a capital offense and the Federal District Court held there was no systematic exclusion of negroes from jury panels in the Jackson County Circuit Court in 1942. The case sub judice was tried in 1944.
Foxworth relies upon a statement in Hayes v. Wainwright, supra, from the minutes of the Circuit Court, to the effect that it appeared the grand jury was called from the voter registration list in open court. He then relies upon a comparative analysis of the population of whites and negroes and the registration of democrats and republicans. Foxworth says that membership in the democrat party in 1944 was restricted to persons of the white race; that the jury panel was taken from the list of registered voters; that in 1944 there were 12,010 democrats and 200 republicans registered to vote in Jackson County; that the registered voters' list from which jurors were taken was not less than 94.4% white and not more than 1.6% negro. He points out that the population percentages in 1940 were 64% white and 36% negro, and in 1950, 66.7% and 33.3%, respectively.
The fallacy in this argument is the assumption that the jury list was limited to the list of registered voters. It is fundamental that every officer is presumed to perform his duty in accordance with law.
Fla. Stat. (1941) § 40.01, F.S.A., required that jurors be taken from the male persons over the age of 21 years who are citizens of this State and who have resided in this State for one year and in their respective counties for six months. Fla. Stat. (1941) § 40.02, F.S.A., required that the county commissioners shall select the jury list and describes the procedure. No reference to the voters' registration list is made in the statute.
In order to reverse, we would be required to surmise that the county commissioners of Jackson County, Florida, in 1944, limited the selection of the prospective jurors to the voter registration list, and, further, that no negroes were on the jury panel. The burden is upon Foxworth to show a systematic and intentional exclusion of negroes and to further show that the jurors were not selected at random. This he has failed to do.
Also, of paramount importance is the fact that no objection to the jury panel appears to have been made.
Fla. Stat. (1941) § 913.01, F.S.A., required that a challenge to the panel must be made and decided "before any individual juror is examined, unless ordered by the court." By virtue of the terms of this statute, the failure to object constituted a waiver.
Foxworth says, however, that he was saddled with court-appointed counsel and should not be bound by this principle of law. Further, he says, the failure to challenge the panel is further evidence of incompetency of counsel.
It should be noted that in all of his previous efforts for post-conviction relief Foxworth never questioned the legality of the jury panel. So, we have a waiver not only by court-appointed counsel but also by the defendant himself, who has consistently and diligently pursued every remedy in criminal procedure.
When we consider the question of waiver by court-appointed counsel, it is interesting to note the decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, in Bustillo v. United States, 421 F.2d 131 (1970). Bustillo was indicted by a grand jury and represented by court-appointed counsel. Upon a plea of guilty he received a sentence of 15 years. Then Bustillo moved to vacate his sentence claiming that the grand jury which indicted him was defectively constituted. The trial court denied the motion and, in affirming this order, the United States Circuit Court of Appeal said:
Just as in Bustillo v. United States, supra, the failure of Foxworth to make an objection constituted a waiver and he may not now for the first time assert such an objection.
Foxworth finally says that when all of the points he has raised are considered collectively they establish that a conviction was rendered without the essential ingredients of fairness. The locality and the time of this particular trial should raise no presumption of illegality or unfairness. The enlightened progress of the judicial system in safeguarding the rights of defendants raises no presumption that all trials in the past were illegal. Whether Foxworth's trial is gauged by ancient or modern standards, his conviction of murder in the first degree, with a recommendation of mercy, was justified. Foxworth received a fair and impartial trial in accordance with the law as it existed in 1944.
We find no reversible error and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. The writ of habeas corpus is accordingly discharged.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C.J., ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN, and DEKLE, JJ., and MASON, Circuit Judge, concur.