Title: GRISWOLD v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Griswold v. State1999 WY 187994 P.2d 920Case Number: 99-45Decided: 12/30/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
HOMER GRISWOLD, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County, Honorable Dan R. Price, II, 
Judge.

Thomas T. 
Zollinger, Gillette, Wyoming, representing 
appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Pauling, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Homer 
Griswold (Griswold) appeals his conviction for ten counts of second degree 
sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303 and two counts of 
indecent liberties in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105. Griswold's main 
issues focus on the merger of his sentences with respect to the indecent 
liberties and second degree sexual assault charges and the admission of expert 
testimony he claims went to the ultimate issue of whether the children were 
victims and their credibility as witnesses.

[¶2]      After reviewing 
the ten issues Griswold raises, we affirm the judgment and 
sentence.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Griswold presents 
ten issues on appeal: 

1. Was defendant 
entitled to judgment of acquittal as to Counts VI and XII as a matter of law for 
allegations occurring after July 1, 1997. For any such allegation in Counts VI 
and XII prior to July 1, 1997, should defendant's sentences merge with those 
imposed for Counts I and VII [?]

2. Did the court 
abuse its discretion and commit error in its admission of the testimony of vague 
and remote "prior bad acts"[?]

3. Did the court 
err in permitting the state's expert to testify as to statements made to his 
associate by the children when such statements were made for purposes of 
litigation and not for purposes of medical diagnosis and 
treatment[?]

4. Did the court 
err in permitting Dr. Sirotnak to render an opinion that AO was a victim of 
sexual abuse[?]

5. Was there 
sufficient evidence upon which a verdict of guilt as to Count V could be 
returned or sustained[?]

6. Did the court 
err in permitting testimony that vouched for the credibility of the children, TM 
and AO[?]

7. Did the court 
err in allowing improper rebuttal testimony[?]

8. Did the court 
err in failing to grant defendant a continuance[?]

9. Did the State 
engage in willful unethical and oppressive misconduct to distract defendant's 
trial attorney from devoting needed attention to the defense of appellant and, 
by such misconduct, cause, in part, appellant to receive ineffective assistance 
of counsel[?]

10. Was 
defendant denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
and Article I, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution, to the effective assistance of 
counsel[?]

As Appellee, the 
State phrases the issues:

I. Whether 
appellant's convictions as to Counts VI and XII should be vacated, or the 
sentences on those counts be merged with the sentences on Counts I and 
VII.

II. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged "prior bad acts" 
evidence?

III. Was the 
testimony of Dr. Sirotnak regarding Michelle Kelly's report properly 
admitted?

IV. Did the 
trial court properly admit Dr. Sirotnak's opinion testimony that AO was a victim 
of sexual abuse?

V. Was the 
evidence presented as to Count V sufficient to sustain appellant's 
conviction?

VI. Did the 
challenged testimony of Dr. Sirotnak and John Noteboom impermissibly vouch for 
the credibility of AO and TM?

VII. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in allowing the challenged testimony of Dr. 
David Corwin during the State's rebuttal case?

VIII. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in denying appellant a 
continuance?

IX. Should 
appellant's ninth and tenth appellate claims be summarily rejected by this 
Court?

FACTS

[¶4]      On December 18, 
1997, approximately two weeks after seven-year old AO returned home from a ten 
month stay as a foster child with Beth and Homer Griswold, AO's fifteen-year old 
brother picked her up from the babysitter. Later that evening when her brother 
told her to go to bed, AO refused and began crying uncontrollably. Eventually, 
AO disclosed that Griswold had forced her to perform fellatio on him while TM, 
her foster sibling, was in the room. The brother left his mother a note 
describing what AO told him. After briefly speaking with AO, the mother reported 
the matter to the Department of Family Services (DFS).

[¶5]      Investigating the 
report, DFS employees interviewed AO and TM individually. Using her own 
terminology, TM told DFS during the interview, and later testified at trial, 
that Griswold anally and vaginally penetrated both her and AO, forced both of 
them to perform fellatio on him, and performed cunnilingus on both of the girls. 
After the interviews, DFS referred the girls to a local pediatrician and a local 
mental health counselor for diagnosis and treatment. Both girls were examined by 
the pediatrician on December 26, 1997. Shortly thereafter, the 
multi-disciplinary Kempe Child Protection Team at Denver Children's Hospital 
also conducted psychological, anal, and genital exams.

[¶6]      Following the 
examinations, the Kempe Child Protection Team diagnosed the girls as victims of 
sexual abuse. Dr. Sirotnak, the director of the program, concluded the evidence 
indicated repeated, traumatic anal penetration of TM, and, to a lesser degree, 
of AO. This conclusion was further supported by the girls' accounts of what 
occurred during their stay with the Griswolds. Both AO and TM vividly described 
frequent instances of oral, digital, and penile intrusion and numerous occasions 
on which Griswold forced them to perform fellatio. They reported, with graphic 
details, that this abuse sometimes occurred when he was alone with one of them 
and sometimes when they were both present. TM resided with the Griswolds from 
March of 1996 to November of 1997, and AO resided with them from late January to 
early December of 1997.

[¶7]      On April 16, 
1998, Griswold was charged with ten counts of second degree sexual assault, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-303(a) (v), 6-2-306, and 6-10-102, and two 
counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation of § 14-3-105. 
Counts I through V alleged sexual assault of AO by fellatio, penile intrusion of 
the anus, cunnilingus, digital intrusion of the vaginal area, and penile 
intrusion of the vaginal area. Count VI alleged indecent liberties with AO. The 
dates for these charges were January 31 through December 2, 1997. Counts VII 
through XII mirrored those allegations with respect to TM, and alleged dates of 
March 23, 1996, through November 21, 1997. Griswold was ultimately bound over on 
all charges, and a jury found him guilty on all twelve counts. The district 
court sentenced him to five concurrent terms of life imprisonment to run 
consecutively with another five concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the 
ten counts of sexual assault. In addition, he was sentenced to two nine to 
ten-year terms of imprisonment for the two indecent liberties counts to run 
consecutive with the other terms. Griswold appealed to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

Argument One: 
Convictions Should be Vacated or Merged

[¶8]      Griswold's main 
contention is that under the amended version of the indecent liberties statute, 
he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal for allegations of indecent liberties 
that occurred after July 1, 1997. As of July 1, 1997, the new language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105, denoted by italics, provides:

(a) Except under 
circumstances constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third degree 
as defined by W.S. § 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony. * * *.

As we recently 
stated in Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1999):

Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo. . . . 
If the conclusion of law is in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is 
not, we correct it. We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the 
Legislature's intent. We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and 
obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, 
clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia.

Id. at 946 
(citations and quotations omitted).

[¶9]      Griswold 
maintains it was error to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of a 
violation of § 14-3-105 for indecent liberties after July 1, 1997, because every 
time he exposed his genitals to the children, fellatio did, in fact, occur. He 
contends the fellatio constituted second degree sexual assault, making a charge 
of indecent liberties improper under the amended statute. He argues the State 
failed to differentiate between acts before and after the effective date of the 
amendment and, therefore, the district court erred when it did not grant a 
judgment of acquittal with respect to the indecent liberties charges in Counts 
VI and XII. Griswold, however, overlooks that there were two victims in each 
instance of fellatio.

[¶10]   The record reflects that on 
occasion, Griswold exposed himself to both children, but forced only one to 
perform fellatio, while the other child watched. It was therefore appropriate to 
charge Griswold with indecent liberties upon the child who was forced to watch, 
but suffered no sexual contact or intrusion and, thus, did not fall within the 
exclusionary language of § 14-3-105. Finding sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's conclusion that Griswold committed two separate crimes, the district 
court correctly denied Griswold's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to 
Counts VI and XII.

[¶11]   Relying on Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1995), Griswold argues that for sentencing purposes, the indecent 
liberties convictions merged into the second-degree sexual assault convictions. 
In Owen, penetration could not have been accomplished without removing the 
victim's panties; therefore, we held that the removal of the panties was 
necessary to the accomplishment of second-degree sexual assault, and merged the 
indecent liberties charges with the sexual assault charges. Id. at 194-95. For 
the purpose of punishment, where the commission of one offense logically 
requires the commission of those acts which are alleged to constitute the other 
offense, the two merge. Id. This case is distinguishable from Owen. In this 
case, we have two victims and evidence of numerous instances in which Griswold 
took indecent liberties with AO because she was forced to watch Griswold 
sexually assault TM. Similarly, the indecent liberties he took with TM by 
forcing her to watch were independent of the sexual assault of AO. Because the 
acts constituting indecent liberties were independent and not an integral part 
of the acts constituting sexual assault, the charges do not merge for sentencing 
purposes.

Argument Two: 
Prior Bad Acts Evidence

[¶12]   Griswold maintains the district 
court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony from his prior foster 
children alleging sexual misconduct. "A trial court's decisions regarding . . . 
evidence are entitled to great deference on appeal. If a legitimate rationale 
can be shown for the admission of such evidence, we will not find abuse of 
discretion." Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 737 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶13]   In Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 
245 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219 (1985), we 
wrote:

For evidence to 
be admissible at trial under Rule 404,1 W.R.E., it must also be relevant 
under Rule 402,2 W.R.E. Relevant evidence is defined 
in Rule 401, W.R.E., as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Once it is determined 
that the evidence is relevant, it must then be determined if the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time as defined in Rule 403, W.R.E. If there is evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts, then it may only be admissible under Rule 404(b), 
W.R.E., and cannot be used to show the character of the accused or that the 
accused has a propensity to commit crimes such as those with which he is 
charged. Rule 404, W.R.E.

[¶14]   In Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 
(Wyo. 1996), we adopted the four-part standard for the admissibility of Rule 
404(b) evidence articulated in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988):

Such evidence is 
admissible if: (1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; (2) the 
evidence is relevent; (3) the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon 
request, the trial court instructs the jury that the similar acts evidence is to 
be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 
admitted.

Vigil, 926 P.2d  
at 357 (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S.  at 691-92, 108 S.Ct. at 
1502).

[¶15]   Griswold's main contention is that 
the prior bad acts and allegations that were the subject of the challenged 
testimony were so remote that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed 
by its potential for unfair prejudice. In particular, he objects to testimony by 
two of his former foster children, BK and AN, sisters who lived with him in 1981 
and 1982. He claims testimony by AN should have been excluded because she was 
unable to remember whether he had vaginal intercourse with her. He argues that 
testimony from BK was unreliable because she could not recall filing charges 
against Griswold's wife; having seen a counselor; having retracted accusations; 
or reporting his wrongs when she testified that an uncle molested her years 
later. His argument, in essence, is that the prosecution could not plainly, 
clearly, and convincingly prove these allegations because the victims had 
considerable difficulty in recalling the events surrounding the allegations they 
testified about, thus the evidence is unreliable and therefore inadmissible. See 
Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 606 (Wyo. 1993); Britton v. State, 845 P.2d 1374, 
1375 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Bishop, 687 P.2d at 246).

[¶16]   We note that our decision in Vigil 
effectively established new factors we must consider when determining the 
admissibility of 404(b) evidence, replacing the five factor test we previously 
relied upon in Bishop. Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 357; Bishop, 687 P.2d  at 246. As a 
result, the prosecutor no longer has to clearly prove the prior bad acts, and 
Griswold's argument is misplaced. Instead, we now consider whether the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs the potential for unfair 
prejudice.

[¶17]   Seeking to limit the admissibility 
of remote evidence in this case, Griswold invites this Court to set an arbitrary 
time limit at ten years for the admissibility of prior bad act evidence. The 
remoteness of the acts does not automatically make the testimony inadmissible; 
that is a discretionary decision for the trial judge. However, remoteness may 
affect the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Lonquest v. 
State, 495 P.2d 575, 583 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972); State 
v. Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 184-86, 189 P.2d 162, 164-65 (Wyo. 1948. Griswold fails to 
acknowledge our ruling in Britton, where we stated "[t]he test for remoteness 
cannot be a mechanical process based only on the amount of time that elapsed 
between the prior act and the present offense. . . . Questions concerning 
remoteness of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and 
are subject to challenge only for clear abuse of discretion." Britton, 845 P.2d  
at 1376 (citations omitted). We therefore refused "to impose an arbitrary year 
or month limitation of evidence admissible under W.R.E. 404(b)." Id. In fact, in 
Britton we recognized that evidence of conduct eight and thirteen years before 
the act charged may be admissible and not too remote. Id. Given our discussion 
in Britton, it is clear that we do not determine questions of remoteness solely 
by reference to the time the bad act occurred. We reject Griswold's invitation 
to impose an arbitrary time limit on the admissibility of evidence and, given 
our prior rulings in cases involving child sexual abuse, we find the district 
court did not act unreasonably in admitting the allegations of sexual assault 
and indecent liberties made by Griswold's former foster 
children.

Argument Three: 
Hearsay Testimony of Dr. Sirotnak

[¶18]   Griswold challenges portions of the 
testimony of the State's expert witness, Dr. Sirotnak, the director of the Kempe 
Child Protection Team at Denver Children's Hospital. As noted above, questions 
related to the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Wyo. 1997) (citing James 
v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 204 (Wyo. 1994)). We give considerable deference to the 
trial court's rulings and will not disturb them absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 957 (Wyo. 1996); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 801 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶19]   As part of diagnosing and 
developing a treatment plan for AO and TM, the Kempe Child Protection Team 
performed both physical and psychological examinations. The team psychologist, 
Dr. Michelle Kelly, interviewed and evaluated the children and prepared a 
written report of her findings. However, before the written report was complete, 
Dr. Kelly discussed its contents with Dr. Sirotnak and told him that AO and TM 
were victims of sexual assault.

[¶20]   Griswold objects to Dr. Sirotnak's 
testimony based on Dr. Kelly's verbal conclusion that AO and TM were victims of 
sexual abuse. Because Dr. Sirotnak did not participate in the interview process 
of either victim and was never in a position to observe their demeanor, Griswold 
argues his testimony should have been excluded as hearsay. Griswold further 
claims that Dr. Sirotnak's statements regarding TM were not based or dependent 
in any way upon physical evidence or physical observations, and therefore were 
inadmissible for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. W.R.E. 803(4).3 Finally, Griswold contends that Dr. 
Sirotnak's testimony improperly attributed fault, causation or guilt to him. We 
disagree.

[¶21]   Dr. Sirotnak's testimony is 
admissible under W.R.E. 703, which states:

The facts or 
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence.  We 
recognized in Hayes v. State, 935 P.2d 700 (Wyo. 1997), that out-of-court 
statements by a third party ordinarily are inadmissible to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted, but may be admissible to show the basis of an expert's 
opinion. Id. at 703 (citing McGinn v. State, 928 P.2d 1157, 1162-63 (Wyo. 
1996)). In Hayes the evidence the treating physician learned from the victim's 
mother was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but was relevant 
because it established a basis for the doctor's expert opinion, and the doctor's 
testimony was her own opinion, not that of others. Hayes, 935 P.2d  at 704; 
McGinn, 928 P.2d  at 1163. See also Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67 (Wyo. 
1989) (error to allow expert to opine as to who the perpetrator was or his 
guilt.) Out-of-court statements may be allowed for the limited purpose of 
showing the basis of an expert's opinion, so long as other experts in the field 
would rely on similar evidence. Hayes, 935 P.2d  at 703. Dr. Sirotnak's testimony 
concerning Dr. Kelly's statements about TM and AO was not offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted, but was relevant because it established a basis for his 
expert opinion that AO and TM were victims of sexual abuse. Dr. Sirotnak 
testified that it was routine practice for members of the multi-disciplinary 
team to rely on each other's information. Based on the purpose and use of the 
testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Dr. 
Sirotnak's testimony into evidence.

Argument Four: 
Expert Testimony

[¶22]   The fourth issue Griswold raises is 
that the district court erred in permitting Dr. Sirotnak to render an opinion 
that AO was a victim of sexual abuse. The basis for his argument is that Dr. 
Sirotnak's opinion testimony was tantamount to vouching for the child's 
credibility and therefore inadmissible. Griswold contends Dr. Sirotnak's opinion 
rested solely upon the substance of AO's statements and was no more than an 
unfounded belief in the child's veracity. While Griswold is correct that it is 
error to permit a psychotherapist to vouch for the credibility of a victim, "we 
have permitted an expert witness to testify that the behavior of a victim was 
consistent with that generally displayed by victims of sexual assaults, even 
though such testimony does, in some way, validate the credibility of the 
victim." Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 68.

[¶23]   Griswold's argument that Dr. 
Sirotnak's opinion was based on the children's statements and little else is not 
supported by the record. In addition to psychological observations and questions 
Dr. Kelly asked while interviewing the girls, Dr. Sirotnak did, in fact, have 
some physical basis, the abnormality in AO's anal exam, upon which he based his 
opinion. Dr. Sirotnak also testified that his opinion did not rest solely on the 
substance of AO's statements, but a number of other factors. He reflected on the 
language used to describe the reported events, the relative sophistication of 
AO's expressed knowledge of sexual matters, the extent to which her descriptions 
of sexual acts were graphically detailed, the consistency of her statements in 
those respects, and behavior indicating effects of abuse Dr. Kelly noted. See 
also Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 740; Punches, 944 P.2d  at 1136; Hayes, 935 P.2d  at 703 
(no error to introduce opinion testimony that individual was victim of sexual 
abuse.)

Argument Five: 
Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶24]   Griswold argues there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for Count V, vaginal intrusion of 
AO with his penis. We review sufficiency of the evidence claims by examining the 
record in the light most favorable to the State. We examine the evidence only to 
the extent that permits us to determine whether a panel of reasonable 
individuals could reach the result based upon the evidence before them, and we 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203, 208 (Wyo. 1999). Griswold failed to move for a judgment of acquittal 
on Count V at trial; therefore, we review his claim under the plain error 
standard. See Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 603-04 (Wyo. 1993). Under plain 
error, Griswold must demonstrate: (1) the record must be clear as to the 
incident which is alleged error; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated; and (3) a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has 
been materially prejudiced. Warhawk v. State, 849 P.2d 1326, 1327 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 
1981)).

[¶25]   According to Griswold, Eagan v. 
State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942), mandates reversal and a remand to 
the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. "[T]he 
Eagan rule applies only if three conditions are fulfilled: 1 defendant is the 
sole witness, 2 defendant's testimony is accepted if not improbable or 
inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, and 3 defendant's 
credibility has not been impeached." Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 
1992). We find Eagan inapplicable for two reasons: AO was not the defendant, and 
AO, TM and Griswold testified and therefore he was not the sole witness. 
Instead, we turn our attention to what actually occurred during the 
trial.

[¶26]   When first asked whether Griswold 
touched her vagina with his penis, AO said no. However, Griswold overlooks that 
moments later the prosecutor clarified that response, and AO testified that 
Griswold did, in fact, try to place his penis in her vagina. TM also testified 
that Griswold placed his penis in both her and AO's vaginas. Although AO 
answered "no" to one question about sexual intrusion of her vagina with his 
penis, there was sufficient testimony from AO and TM for a reasonable jury to 
conclude sexual intrusion occurred. Therefore, we find sufficient evidence to 
support the conviction.

Argument Six: 
Credibility Testimony

[¶27]   Griswold's sixth argument is that 
the district court erred in permitting testimony which he claims in essence 
vouched for the credibility of the victims. Absent a timely objection at trial, 
our review of an evidentiary issue is limited to a search for plain error. 
Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶28]   The majority of this argument 
concerns testimony from John Noteboom, the lead investigator for the Department 
of Family Services (DFS). Noteboom's testimony focused on his experience and 
expertise and the protocol DFS followed in interviewing the children. Griswold 
maintains that the use of "alternative hypotheses" or "multiple hypotheses" and 
Noteboom's rejection of many of those hypotheses effectively vouched for the 
credibility of AO and TM. In Rigler, a case involving child sexual abuse, we 
stated "that testimony which may help the jury in understanding another aspect 
of the case is admissible even though it incidentally supports another witness's 
credibility." Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 739. Griswold's expert witness, Dr. Marcus 
Einhorn, testified that it was crucial for an examiner to remain open to 
"alternative hypotheses" regarding why a child is telling a story and noted 
several reasons for such a story.

[¶29]   During rebuttal, Noteboom testified 
that from the outset he remained alert to four alternative possibilities for AO 
and TM's stories. First, he said the girls could have spent time together and 
conspired to tell the stories they had reported; second, they had been abused, 
but by someone other than Griswold; third, they had fabricated their stories due 
to mental and emotional problems; and fourth, their parents had forced them to 
make false reports. He indicated that he eliminated the third possibility after 
conferring with the girls' mental health counselor and eliminated the second 
possibility after learning that no other males besides Griswold had unsupervised 
access to the girls. Although he had not completely ruled out the first 
possibility, he did not find it particularly plausible given the consistency of 
their accounts for their age and the fact that AO and TM were not together after 
leaving the Griswold home. Nowhere in Noteboom's testimony did he conclude or 
even state that he found AO and TM credible or reliable. Noteboom's testimony 
was about his evaluation techniques and the precautions he took to protect 
against a tainted report resulting from interviews conducted by DFS personnel. 
Moreover, as in Rigler, Noteboom's testimony only incidentally supported the 
girls' credibility; therefore, the district court did not err in admitting 
Noteboom's testimony.

Argument Seven: 
Rebuttal Testimony

[¶30]   Griswold's seventh argument is 
based on his claim that, at a minimum, the district court should have provided 
him the opportunity to present surrebuttal evidence to the State's expert, Dr. 
David Corwin. As with other evidentiary rulings, a trial court's decision to 
exclude evidence will not be upset absent a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion. English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶31]   In Cook v. State, 929 P.2d 518 
(Wyo. 1996), we addressed the issue of surrebuttal testimony, 
stating

"While it is 
true . . . that new facts brought out on rebuttal may properly be met by 
surrebuttal evidence, that rule does not permit surrebuttal merely to supply 
evidence which could have been given in chief or to cumulate additional evidence 
or to fortify evidence already given, or to supplement such evidence because it 
has been impeached upon rebuttal."

Id. at 520 
(citing Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1040-41 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, (1986) (quoting Janski [v. State], 538 P.2d [271] at 279 [Wyo. 1975], and 
State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831, 839 (1958), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850 (1960)).

[¶32]   During his case-in-chief, Griswold 
questioned several witnesses about whether AO or TM reported any sexual abuse or 
showed signs indicating sexual abuse. Much of that testimony resulted in the 
witnesses concluding that nothing indicated on-going sexual abuse at the 
Griswolds. The final testimony regarding this issue came from Griswold's expert, 
Dr. Einhorn, who suggested that the children's accusations were products of 
DFS's improperly suggestive interviewing techniques and the children's 
susceptibility to those techniques. Given such testimony, the rebuttal testimony 
of the State's expert, Dr. David Corwin, was appropriate. The one question 
challenged in this portion of the trial was whether "it was unusual for a child 
not to disclose her sexual abuse until she is out of the home of the 
perpetrator?" Although during its case-in-chief the State explored the girls' 
failure to report Griswold's abuse, the State did not need to explain the 
disparity between the girls' earlier silence while living with Griswold and 
their trial testimony that they were scared to tell anyone about the abuse 
because they thought they would get in trouble. We hold the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion.

Argument Eight: 
Continuance

[¶33]   Following the motions hearing and 
pre-trial conference, twenty-three days before his trial was set to commence, 
Griswold moved for a continuance so he could investigate the State's proposed 
prior bad act evidence. That motion was denied, and Griswold now claims error. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the discretion 
of the trial court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. 
Cardenas v. State, 811 P.2d 989, 994 (Wyo. 1991). Absent a clear showing of 
manifest injustice, an abuse of discretion will not be found when a court 
refuses to grant a continuance requested solely on the basis of insufficient 
preparation time. Tagaent v. State, 683 P.2d 667, 669 (Wyo. 
1984).

[¶34]   A review of the course of 
proceedings reveals that Griswold had sufficient time to prepare, investigate, 
and defend against the prior bad act evidence. On June 11, 1998, the district 
court set Griswold's trial for September 23, 1998. On July 15, Griswold filed a 
"Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Act Evidence" indicating that the W.R.E. 404(b) 
prior bad act evidence the State intended to introduce was greatly remote in 
time. On August 24, 1998, the State filed a memorandum supporting W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence, indicating it planned to introduce testimony from Griswold's former 
foster children. See Argument 2 infra. During the pretrial conference on August 
28, Griswold indicated he needed more time to prepare against the prior bad act 
evidence, and he was trying to contact expert witnesses to testify as to the 
tainting of those witnesses as well as AO and TM. The State objected, claiming 
that Griswold could have obtained an expert earlier. On August 31, Griswold 
moved for a continuance, claiming that he needed more time to prepare against 
the prior bad act evidence.

[¶35]   Within the motion to continue, 
Griswold, who had stated during the pretrial conference that he had not intended 
to seek an expert or a continuance, claimed he needed both. He also indicated in 
his motion to continue that he had obtained an expert witness to testify about 
the possibility that AO and TM's allegations were tainted. During the hearing on 
the motion to continue, Griswold failed to identify the witnesses he might call 
or specify the substance of their testimony. Moreover, he failed to assert that 
any witness could confirm or deny the official reports concerning the other 
allegations of abuse upon his former foster children. In fact, the State 
observed that Griswold apparently had long possessed information regarding these 
alleged bad acts but failed to investigate those matters further in the nearly 
full month between the pretrial hearing and trial date.

[¶36]   The district court did not err in 
denying a continuance, especially given that Griswold waited nearly forty-seven 
days after filing his motion to exclude the State's bad acts evidence before 
seeking to investigate. In addition, between the time Griswold sought to exclude 
the State's bad act evidence and the beginning of trial, he had seventy days to 
investigate and procure rebuttal witnesses, including thirty days from the date 
the State specifically identified that evidence. Moreover, testimony from his 
expert, Dr. Einhorn, provided an alternate attack on this evidence during the 
trial. Therefore, we do not find Griswold was materially prejudiced by the 
district court's decision.

Argument IX and 
X: Prosecutorial Misconduct and Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel

[¶37]   We address Griswold's final 
arguments together. The crux of his final two claims is that the State engaged 
in misconduct designed to distract Griswold's trial counsel from his duties, 
which directly resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. Relying on Calene 
v. State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993), Griswold argues only that "appellate counsel 
is filing a Motion for Partial Remand and Affidavit in Support Thereof for the 
purpose of having the matter remanded to the District Court for the taking of 
evidence on this issue." We denied his Motion for Partial Remand, finding that 
Griswold failed to provide a substantial factual basis for his claim. Moreover, 
in his appellate brief, Griswold provides no facts or arguments in support of 
this assertion. We have consistently held that we will not consider claims 
unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent authority. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶38]   Even if we were to analyze the 
ineffectiveness claims Griswold asserts, he is unable to satisfy his burden and 
demonstrate two things: that his counsel's performance was deficient and that 
the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Smith v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 
1998); Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Wyo. 1997). There is a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance, making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment. Hornecker, 977 P.2d  at 1291 (citing Mapp v. State, 953 P.2d 140, 143 (Wyo. 1998); Jackson v. 
State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995)).

[¶39]   The only evidence Griswold points 
us to is trial counsel's failure to obtain evidence relating to suggestions as 
to the character for truthfulness of the State's two witnesses regarding 
Griswold's prior bad acts in another state, hardly the type of information that 
would have resulted in his acquittal. There is no reasonable probability that, 
but for the failure to introduce this evidence, the result would have been 
different. Therefore, we do not find ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

CONCLUSION

[¶40]   Griswold fails to demonstrate how 
the district court abused its discretion during his trial in admitting expert 
testimony and prior bad acts evidence. There was sufficient evidence to convict 
Griswold of both second degree sexual assault and indecent liberties. We affirm 
the judgment and sentence.

Footnotes

1 W.R.E. 
404(b) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

2 W.R.E. 402 
states:

All 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by 
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible.

3 Statements 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. - Statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of 
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment[.]