Title: JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT CORPORATION V. PHILLIP ROHRMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT CORPORATION V. PHILLIP ROHRMAN2006 WY 156150 P.3d 167Case Number: 05-290Decided: 12/19/2006Modified: 12/27/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JACKSON 
HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT CORPORATION,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
PHILLIP 
ROHRMAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
11 Certified Question

from the 
United 
States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming

The 
Honorable William F. Downes, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Mikel L. 
Moore of Christensen, Moore, Cockrell, Cummings & Axelberg, P.C., Kalispell, 
MT; and James K. Lubing and Carter Wilkinson of Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

W. Keith 
Goody of Alpine, Wyoming; and Robert E. Schroth 
of Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

 
 

HILL, 
J., delivered 
the opinion of the Court.  BURKE, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion with which KAUTZ, D.J., 
joined.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      By notice entered 
on December 20, 2005, this Court agreed to answer questions certified to us in 
accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-13-106 (LexisNexis 2005) and W.R.A.P. 11, by 
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the Honorable 
William F. Downes presiding.  In our 
notice we designated Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (JHMR) as the Appellant.  Phillip Rohrman is the 
Appellee.

 
 
THE 
CERTIFIED QUESTION

 
 
[¶2]      The question 
certified to us is this:

 
 
When 
faced with motions for summary judgment in which there are no genuine issues of 
material fact, how should a court differentiate, as a matter of law, between 
"inherent risks" as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i) and employed in § 
1-1-123(a) and (b), and non-inherent risks in order to determine whether a 
recreational provider has a duty to eliminate, alter or control the risk at 
issue?

 
 
[¶3]      Our general 
answer to the question is that if such a motion is filed, the trial court must 
scrutinize the facts brought forward by the parties with great care.  If the court can say that, given that 
evidence, this is an "inherent risk" and reasonable minds cannot differ about 
that, then summary judgment is appropriate.  If the risk is an inherent one, then the 
provider has no duty to eliminate, alter, or control it.  On the other hand, if reasonable minds 
could differ as to whether or not the risk was one inherent to the recreational 
activity, then summary judgment is not appropriate and the answer to the 
question must be assigned to the jury (or other fact 
finder).

 
 
STATEMENT 
OF ALLEGED FACTS RELEVANT TO

THE 
QUESTION CERTIFIED

 
 
[¶4]      The federal 
district court set out these facts as relevant to the question 
posed:

 
 
            
This case arises out of a ski injury that Plaintiff, Phillip Rohrman, 
suffered on March 2, 2000 at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (JHMR).  Mr. Rohrman is a resident of Colorado and [JHMR] is a 
Wyoming Corporation.  The case comes 
to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity jurisdiction.  At the time of his injury, Mr. Rohrman 
was 24 years old and, by his own definition, an experienced skier.  He attempted to jump a "table top" jump 
in the JHMR terrain park.  He 
alleges that the jump was icier than he could have known from looking at it, and 
that because of the ice, he lost control and could not land the jump.  He suffered several breaks in his left 
arm and injuries to his thoracic spine.

            
Two days before this accident, another young man, Adam Harshman, died of 
injuries sustained after taking off from the other side of the same jump.  Plaintiff alleges that JHMR had a duty 
to close the jump or warn of the dangers because they were not inherent risks of 
the sport.  Defendant JHMR asserts 
that losing control on a table top jump is a risk inherent in skiing terrain 
parks and therefore, JHMR owed Rohrman no duty.

 
 
[¶5]      In addition to 
this brief sketch of the facts, the parties have designated approximately 500 
pages of depositions and other record materials as an appendix to the briefs to 
aid us in the analysis of this case.  
However, we take note that we are not placed in the role of fact finder 
here.  We perused the appendix 
materials with interest but we do not detail those facts here because they are 
not immediately pertinent to the question asked or the answer we 
give.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      We set out the 
pertinent provisions of the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act (RSA) for 
convenience of reference:

 
 
§ 
1-1-122.  Definitions. 

 
 
(a)  As 
used in this act:

            
(i)  "Inherent risk" with regard to any sport or recreational 
opportunity means those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, 
intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational 
opportunity;

            
(ii)  "Provider" means any person or governmental entity which 
for profit or otherwise, offers or conducts a sport or recreational 
opportunity.  This act does not 
apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or 
recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or 
required by the sport or recreational opportunity;

            
(iii)  "Sport or recreational opportunity" means commonly 
understood sporting activities including baseball, softball, football, soccer, 
basketball, swimming, hockey, dude ranching, nordic or alpine skiing, mountain 
climbing, river floating, hunting, fishing, backcountry trips, horseback riding 
and any other equine activity, snowmobiling and similar recreational 
opportunities;

            

§ 
1-1-123. Assumption of risk.

 
 
            
(a)  Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational 
opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally 
responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons 
or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational 
opportunity.

            
(b)  A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not 
required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular 
sport or recreational opportunity.

            
(c)  Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the 
damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or 
recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 
1-1-109.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-1-122 and 1-1-123 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
[¶7]      We recently 
decided a case that posed related issues, and we direct our readers' attention 
to it as background for this case.  
Muller v. Jackson HoleMtn. Resort, 2006 WY 100, ¶ 14, 
139 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Wyo. 2006).  In 
Muller we said:

 
 

Under 
Wyoming's statutory construct, which is much 
broader than that of Colorado, such items as 
those included in Colorado's statute may, as a matter of law, be 
inherent risks of the recreational activity of skiing (in such cases a trial 
court may grant a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment based on 
the RSA).  Other items included in 
the list, and others that are not listed, and including the use or operation of 
ski lifts may, as a matter of fact, be "inherent risks" although those questions 
must be decided by the fact finder based on the evidence presented.  See generally James H. Chalat, Liability of Ski Area Operator for Skiing 
Accident, 45 Am.Jur. POF3d 115, 150-51, § 17 (Broad judicial interpretation 
of inherent danger ski statutes as primary assumption of risk) (1998 and Supp. 
2005); also see Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: 
Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act  An Update, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 
249 (1998); also see Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 (head note [9]) (Wyo. 1995); Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 
392 F.3d 1145, 1148-53 (10th Cir. 2004) (injuries suffered by skier 
in a terrain park that offered the most difficult skiing opportunities, which 
instant skier wished to avoid and asked a Resort employee for direction in order 
to avoid it, not an "inherent risk" as a matter of law but, rather, a question 
for the jury); and Cooperman v. 
David, 214 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2000) (loose saddle cinch an 
inherent risk of horseback riding as a matter of law).  [Footnote omitted.] [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

Muller, at 
¶ 14, 139 P.3d 1167.

 
 
[¶8]      The general 
standard applied to the granting of a motion for summary judgment or a directed 
verdict in a negligence case is well known:

 
 
We are 
reminded of what was stated in Loney v. 
Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 354, 255 P. 350, 354, 53 A.L.R. 73, 
that:  "The issue of negligence or 
contributory negligence is ordinarily one to be determined by the jury.  20 R.C.L. 109, 166.  That is true, even in a case where the 
testimony, as in the case at bar, is undisputed, if different minds may fairly arrive at 
different conclusions, and where the inferences from the facts are not so 
certain that all reasonable men,1 in the 
exercise of fair and impartial judgment, must agree upon them."  And in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 252, p. 
1129, it is stated that:  "The 
question whether the conduct of defendant measured up to the standard of 
'ordinary care,' 'reasonable prudence,' 'due diligence,' 'reasonable care,' or 
the like is usually to be determined by the jury under proper 
instructions."  In Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 
Colo. 458, 128 P. 460, 462, Ann.Cas.1914B, 29, the court in stating the rule as 
to the determination of negligence said:  
"It is only in the clearest of cases, when the facts are undisputed and 
it is plain that all intelligent men1 can 
draw but one inference from them, that the question is ever one of law for the 
court." [Emphasis added.]

 
 

Templar 
v. Tongate, 71 
Wyo. 148, 255 P.2d 223, 230 (Wyo. 1953); McMakin v. Johnson County Healthcare, 
2003 WY 91, ¶ 8, 73 P.3d 1094, 1097 (Wyo. 2003) ("If the evidence leads to 
conflicting interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, summary 
judgment is improper (citing Wyoming Game 
and Fish v. Mills Company, 701 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1985)) (emphasis added); 
and see 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 21 
(2004).

 
 
[¶9]      By this reference 
we do not intend to equate "inherent risk" with "negligence."  However, the concept of "reasonableness" 
that is central to that time-honored test also functions well in this 
context.  As we noted at the outset 
of this opinion, if reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether or not a given 
set of factual circumstances involve an "inherent risk" of skiing (in this 
particular instance we are concerned with skiing, or fill in the blank as the 
case might be), then the protections of the RSA apply, and the litigation of 
that controversy must come to an end.  
However, we do not expect that all reasonable persons will carry around a 
complete knowledge of what the "inherent risks" of skiing are.  We set out below several statutory 
sources that may assist in understanding what is intended by the phrase.  We do not make reference to these 
statutes in an effort to construe Wyoming's statute under the traditional rules 
of statutory construction.  Rather, 
we view them as a source of evidence to ascertain what the "inherent risks of 
skiing" are.  The central concern 
here is what "reasonable persons" will view as inherent risks.  Definitions of the "inherent risks of 
skiing" enacted by the legislators of states similarly situated to Wyoming are a potential 
source of guidance for both trial courts in acting on motions to dismiss/summary 
judgment, as well as for juries in their deliberations as to what is reasonable 
under the circumstances of any given case.  
These statutes are just one of many sources of such evidence, including 
safety experts and experienced skiers. 

 
 
[¶10]   We note as well that there are a 
significant number of cases that have as their central concern the meaning of 
"the inherent risks of skiing" (or fill in the blank, e.g., golf, judo, boxing, 
horseback riding).  See, e.g., Yoneda v. Tom, 110 Hawai'i 367, 133 P.3d 796, 801-08 (Hawai'i 2006) (inherent risks of golf, but also collecting cases on 
a variety of recreational activities); Maddocks v. Whitcomb, 2006 ME 47, 
¶¶ 4-10, 896 A.2d 265, 267-8 (Me. 2006) (inherent risks of snow tubing); Barrett v. Mount Brighton, Inc., 474 
Mich. 1087, 712 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 2006) (snowboard rail an inherent risk of 
skiing as a matter of law); Dunbar v. 
Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort Corp., 392 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 
2004) ("[W]e conclude that the district court erred when it found that the risk 
of falling twelve feet into a snowboard half-pipe was an inherent risk of 
Dunbar's alpine skiing when she had stopped and observed double diamond terrain 
features and had chosen not to take' those features[,]" but was unable to avoid 
them nonetheless.); Gwyn v. Loon Mountain 
Corp., 350 F.3d 212, 215-17 (1st Cir. 2003) (falls on icy slope 
that killed two and seriously injured a third, in one incident, were an inherent 
risk of skiing and not contributed to or caused by actions or inactions of 
operator; also noting that, with respect to "inherent risks," New Hampshire case 
law is slowly filling in the gaps but uncertainties 
remain).

 
 
[¶11]   In Muller we made reference to the 
applicable Colorado statute and we set it out in detail 
here:

 
 
            
(3.5)  "Inherent dangers and risks of skiing" means those 
dangers or conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including changing 
weather conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, such as ice, 
hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, 
and machine-made snow; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, 
forest growth, rocks, stumps, stream beds, cliffs, extreme terrain, and trees, 
or other natural objects, and collisions with such natural objects; impact with 
lift towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, or other 
man-made structures and their components; variations in steepness or terrain, 
whether natural or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or grooming 
operations, including but not limited to roads, freestyle terrain, jumps, and 
catwalks or other terrain modifications; collisions with other skiers; and the 
failure of skiers to ski within their own abilities.  The term "inherent dangers and risks of 
skiing" does not include the negligence of a ski area as set forth in section 
33-44-104(2).  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to limit the liability of the ski area operator for 
injury caused by the use or operation of ski lifts.

 
 
Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-44-103 (3.5) (West 2006).  In sections (3.1) and (3.3) of that same 
statute, "extreme terrain" and "freestyle terrain" are 
defined:

 
 
            
(3.1)  "Extreme terrain" means any place within the ski area 
boundary that contains cliffs with a minimum twenty-foot rise over a 
fifteen-foot run, and slopes with a minimum fifty-degree average pitch over a 
one-hundred-foot run.

            
(3.3)  "Freestyle terrain" includes, but is not limited to, 
terrain parks and terrain park features such as jumps, rails, fun boxes, and all 
other constructed and natural features, half-pipes, quarter-pipes, and 
freestyle-bump terrain.

 
 
[¶12]   A similar statute from New Mexico, N.M. Stat. § 
24-15-10 (2006), provides:

                        
24-15-10.  Duties of the 
skiers.

                        
. . . .

                        
B.  A person who takes part in the sport of skiing accepts as a 
matter of law the dangers inherent in that sport insofar as they are obvious and 
necessary.  Each skier expressly 
assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to person or 
property which results from participation in the sport of skiing, in the skiing 
area, including any injury caused by the following:  variations in terrain; surface or 
subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, or other forms of 
forest growth or debris; lift towers and components thereof, pole lines and 
snow-making equipment which are plainly visible or are plainly marked in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 24-15-7 NMSA 1978; except for any 
injuries to persons or property resulting from any breach of duty imposed upon 
ski area operators under the provisions of Sections 24-15-7 and 24-15-8 NMSA 
1978.  Therefore, each skier shall 
have the sole individual responsibility for knowing the range of his own ability 
to negotiate any slope or trail, and it shall be the duty of each skier to ski 
within the limits of the skier's own ability, to maintain reasonable control of 
speed and course at all times while skiing, to heed all posted warnings, to ski 
only on a skiing area designated by the ski area operator and to refrain from 
acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of 
anyone.

 
 
Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-52 (2006 Supp.) provides this 
definition:

 
 
As used 
in this act:

                        
(1)  "inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or 
conditions which are an integral part of the sport of recreational, competitive, 
or professional skiing, including, but not limited to:

                                    
(a)  changing weather conditions;

                        
(b)  snow or ice conditions as they exist or may change, such 
as hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, 
or machine-made snow;

(c)  surface 
or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, 
streambeds, cliffs, trees, and other natural objects;

(d)  variations 
or steepness in terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, 
snowmaking or grooming operations, and other terrain modifications such as 
terrain parks, and terrain features such as jumps, rails, fun boxes, and all 
other constructed and natural features such as half pipes, quarter pipes, or 
freestyle-bump terrain;

(e)  impact 
with lift towers and other structures and their components such as signs, posts, 
fences or enclosures, hydrants, or water pipes;

                                    
(f)  collisions with other skiers;

                        
(g)  participation in, or practicing or training for, 
competitions or special events; and

(h)  the 
failure of a skier to ski within the skier's own ability. 

 
 
[¶13]   
The statutes set out above are a meaningful source of guidance in 
explaining the "inherent risks of skiing" to any fact finder.  Wyoming does not have any meaningful sources 
of legislative history and so we cannot ascertain with certainty what exactly 
was in our legislators' minds.  
However, we are comfortable that the definitions set out above are a 
source of reliable guidance in this regard and that the legislature would 
quickly respond if it concluded that our reference to the above-cited statutes 
was inaccurate.  Of course, those 
statutes are not the exclusive source of guidance and the factual variations 
are, in some senses, infinite. 

 
 
[¶14]   We conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
34-19-101 through 34-19-107 (LexisNexis 2005) are not applicable to this 
analysis and find no purpose for further discussion of them.  Rohrman contends that Chapter 19, of 
Title 34, Liability of Owners of Land Used for Recreation Purposes, "imposes a 
duty of ordinary care upon landowners, regardless of the aforementioned 
recreational use exception."  See Addaki v. Witt, 2001 WY 85, 
¶¶ 17-26, 31 P.3d 70, 73-75 (Wyo. 2001).  However, this contention is beyond the 
scope of the question we agreed to answer in this matter.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   We conclude that if the facts are 
such that they are undisputed, and it is plain that all reasonable persons can 
draw but one inference from them (in light of the definitions and case 
interpretations set out above), then the trial court should either grant a 
properly filed motion for summary judgment or for directed verdict.  However, if the facts do not reach that 
lofty bar, then the question is properly one for the jury to decide with the 
guidance of appropriate instructions (or for the trial court to decide, if trial 
is to the court).

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, specially concurring, with whom KAUTZ, District Judge, 
joins.

 
 
[¶16]   I agree with the primary 
conclusion reached by the majority capsulized in the third paragraph of the 
opinion.  I write separately because 
of concerns regarding the majority's conclusion that statutes defining "inherent 
risks of skiing" in Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah are a "potential source of guidance for 
both trial courts in acting on motions to dismiss/summary judgment, as well as 
for juries in their deliberations."  
The majority states that decisions regarding summary judgment must be 
determined "in light of the definitions" provided in statutes from those 
states.  I am unaware of any tenet 
of statutory construction which justifies this approach.  In determining whether a specific fact 
situation involves an inherent risk of a recreational activity under Wyoming 
law, we must apply the definition enacted by the Wyoming legislature as set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i), not the definition deemed appropriate 
by legislatures of other states.

 
 

[¶17]   The majority's reference to the 
Colorado 
statute as a source of guidance is particularly problematic.  In Muller, we acknowledged that "Wyoming's statutory construct . . . is much broader than 
that of Colorado" and recognized that ski lift 
operation is not an inherent risk of skiing as defined by the Colorado statutes.  Muller v. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort, 2006 
WY 100, ¶¶ 13-14, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166-1167 (Wyo. 2006).  We applied the Wyoming definition and held that the issue of whether ski 
lift operation was an inherent risk of skiing in Wyoming presented a fact question to be 
answered by the jury.  Muller, ¶¶ 14, 19, 139 P.3d  at 1167, 
1168.  In light of our holding in Muller that the Wyoming statute 
allows for the consideration of a wider assortment of facts in determining 
whether an inherent risk exists, the majority's reliance upon the Colorado statute is 
difficult to understand.  

 
 

[¶18]   If the 
Wyoming 
legislature deems it appropriate to revise its definition, the statutory 
definitions of inherent risk enacted by other states may be of interest and 
provide guidance to our legislature.  
Those statutes are not, however, a proper source of guidance for courts 
attempting to determine the meaning of inherent risk as stated in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 
1-1-122(a)(i).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although the 
phrase "reasonable man" has been used for decades, if not centuries, as a phrase 
of art in the law, it has in more recent times evolved into "reasonable 
person."  See reasonable person," 
Black's Law Dictionary 1294 
(8th ed. 2004).  We will 
use the later convention except in those instances where "man" appears in quoted 
material.