Title: State ex rel. Tempesta v. Warren

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Tempesta v. Warren, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1525.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-1525 
THE STATE EX REL. TEMPESTA v. CITY OF WARREN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Tempesta v. Warren,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-1525.] 
Mandamus — Classified employee — R.C. 124.327 — Right to reinstatement 
following layoff — Collective-bargaining agreement — Back pay — Writ 
granted in part and denied in part. 
(No. 2010-1150 — Submitted February 15, 2011 — Decided April 6, 2011.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, 
city of Warren, Ohio, to reinstate relator, Frank M. Tempesta, to the city’s 
Operations Department in the position of Operations Superintendent, and to 
award him back pay.  Because Tempesta has shown that he is entitled to the 
position, we grant the writ and order the city to appoint him to the Operations 
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Superintendent position.  We deny the request for an award of back pay because 
Tempesta has not established the amount due with certainty. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Tempesta was a classified employee for the city of Warren.  His 
job classification was “Director of Service Operations,” within the “Director of 
Service Operations, Operations Superintendent, and Parks and Streets Supervisor” 
classification series.  The classified positions in this series are listed from the 
highest-ranking classification to the lowest-ranking classification, and Tempesta 
was in the highest-ranking classification as the director of service operations. 
{¶ 3} In early June 2009, because the city was experiencing financial 
difficulties, city officials notified the Warren Municipal Civil Service 
Commission of the need to lay off city employees due to a lack of funds.  There 
were only three supervisory employees in the city’s Operations Department – 
Director of Service Operations Tempesta, Operations Superintendent David 
Mazzochi, and Parks and Streets Supervisor Leann O’Brien.  Each of these 
employees was a full-time, permanent classified employee of the city in June 
2009; of the three, Tempesta had the least amount of continuous service with the 
city.  By letter dated June 25, 2009, the city’s Director of Public Service and 
Safety notified the civil service commission that Tempesta would be laid off 
because of the lack of funds. 
{¶ 4} The city notified Tempesta on July 8, 2009, that he would be laid 
off from his employment with Warren, effective July 26, 2009, for lack of funds 
and advised him that he had the right to appeal the layoff to the municipal civil 
service commission as well as the “right to reinstatement for one (1) year from the 
effective date of this layoff.”  Consistent with the city’s notice, Tempesta was laid 
off effective July 26, 2009.  Tempesta appealed the civil service commission’s 
verification of retention points for the supervisory employees in the Operations 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
Department to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, but he did not 
institute any other appeals in the common pleas court. 
{¶ 5} In November 2008, the city had temporarily transferred O’Brien 
from her position as parks and streets supervisor in the city’s Operations 
Department to the position of computer programmer in the city’s data-processing 
department.  In September 2009, the city reassigned O’Brien to the position of 
urban design and grants coordinator in the city’s community-development 
department.  At the same time, the city advised her that if and when funds became 
available, she would be reassigned to her position as parks and streets supervisor 
in the Operations Department. 
{¶ 6} For 2010, the city was a party to a collective-bargaining agreement 
with the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees 
(“AFSCME”) Local 2501 and AFSCME Ohio Council 8, AFL-CIO.  Neither 
Tempesta nor the director of service operations position that he held at the time of 
his layoff were covered by the agreement.  The other positions in his classification 
series–operations superintendent and parks and streets supervisor–were covered 
by the agreement. 
{¶ 7} Article 19 of the collective-bargaining agreement outlines a 
grievance procedure concluding in arbitration, and Article 21 addresses 
promotions.  Article 21 provides that the senior bargaining-unit member will be 
promoted when a job opening in the bargaining unit is posted: 
{¶ 8} “The City agrees to post any job openings, on all Union bulletin 
boards, occurring within the bargaining unit for a period of ten (10) working days 
after the City determines there is a vacancy.  The qualified senior bargaining unit 
member shall be promoted.  If no qualified bargaining unit member bids, the 
Director of Public Service and Safety may fill the position at his/her discretion.” 
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{¶ 9} Neither Article 21 nor any other provision in the collective-
bargaining agreement specifically negated the statutory rights of a civil service 
employee to reinstatement following layoff. 
{¶ 10} Effective July 1, 2010, the position of operations superintendent 
became vacant because Mazzochi retired.  On June 10, 2010, the city posted a 
notice of the upcoming job opening.  Around mid-June, Tempesta asked to fill the 
operations superintendent position.  But based on its interpretation of Article 21 
of the collective-bargaining agreement, the city appointed Pat Calvey to the 
position effective July 1, 2010.  Calvey has served in that position since the 
appointment. 
{¶ 11} On July 1, 2010, Tempesta filed this action for a writ of mandamus 
to compel Warren to reinstate him to the position of operations superintendent.  
Tempesta also requested damages, which he later clarified to mean back pay.  
Following an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the city filed an answer, and we 
granted an alternative writ.  State ex rel. Tempesta v. Warren, 126 Ohio St.3d 
1614, 2010-Ohio-5101, 935 N.E.2d 853.  The parties have submitted evidence 
and briefs, and Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has submitted an amicus 
curiae brief in support of the city. 
{¶ 12} This cause is now before this court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to the writ, Tempesta must establish a clear legal 
right to be appointed to the position of operations superintendent in the Warren 
Operations Department, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the city to 
appoint him, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  
See State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 
931 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 7. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
Legal Right and Legal Duty 
{¶ 14} Under R.C. 124.327(B), an employee who is laid off retains 
reinstatement rights for one year following the date of layoff.  “During this one-
year period, in any layoff jurisdiction in which an appointing authority has an 
employee on a layoff list, the appointing authority shall not hire or promote 
anyone into a position within that classification until all laid-off persons on a 
layoff list for that classification who are qualified to perform the duties of the 
position are reinstated or decline the position when it is offered.”  R.C. 
124.327(B). 
{¶ 15} Within a year after Warren laid off Tempesta as the director of 
service operations of its Operations Department, the city had a vacancy for the 
position of operations superintendent in the same classification series as 
Tempesta’s former position in its Operations Department, but it hired someone 
else without first offering the position to Tempesta. 
{¶ 16} The city and the union argue that because the collective-bargaining 
agreement justified the city’s promotion of bargaining-unit member Calvey to the 
position of operations superintendent, the agreement preempted Tempesta’s right 
to the position under the reinstatement provisions under R.C. 124.327. 
{¶ 17} “In order to negate statutory rights of public employees, a 
collective bargaining agreement must use language with such specificity as to 
explicitly demonstrate that the intent of the parties was to preempt statutory 
rights.”  State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps./AFSCME, Local 4, AFL-
CIO v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 729 
N.E.2d 743, syllabus; State ex rel. Couch v. Trimble Local School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 75, 2008-Ohio-4910, 896 N.E.2d 690, ¶ 23.  Nothing in 
Article 21 of the collective-bargaining agreement, which contains general 
provisions concerning promotions, or any other provision of the agreement, 
specifically negates the statutory rights of bargaining-unit employees to 
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reinstatement following layoff, much less the statutory rights of city employees 
like Tempesta who were not  members of the bargaining unit at the time they 
were laid off.  Therefore, as precedent requires, the collective-bargaining 
agreement did not preempt Tempesta’s right to reinstatement in the Warren 
Operations Department under R.C. 124.327.1 
{¶ 18} The city next argues that Tempesta’s statutory right to employment 
in the operations superintendent position is inferior to O’Brien’s right under the 
same statute because O’Brien had more seniority in the “Director of Service 
Operations, Operations Superintendent, and Parks and Streets Supervisor” 
classification series than Tempesta. 
{¶ 19} The city’s argument lacks merit.  Under R.C. 124.327(A), “[l]aid-
off employees shall be placed on layoff lists for each classification in the 
classification series equal to or lower than the classification in which the 
employee was employed at the time of layoff.”  If O’Brien’s reassignment from 
her position as parks and streets supervisor to a new position constituted a layoff 
from her position as parks and streets supervisor in the Operations Department of 
Warren, she would have been entitled to have been placed on the layoff list for 
only the parks-and-streets-supervisor classification, because the other two 
classifications in the series–director of service operations and operations 
superintendent–were higher than her classification.  Conversely, because 
Tempesta had been laid off from the highest classification in the series–director of 
service operations–he was entitled to be placed on the layoff lists for all three 
classifications, including operations superintendent.  R.C. 124.327(A). 
                                                 
1  R.C. 124.327(B) provides that “[f]or an exempt employee, as defined in section 124.152 of the 
Revised Code, who has reinstatement rights into a bargaining unit classification, the exempt 
employee’s recall jurisdiction shall be the counties in which the exempt employee indicates 
willingness to accept reinstatement as determined by the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement.”  Because none of the parties argues that this provision is applicable to his mandamus 
claim, we need not address it. 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
{¶ 20} Therefore, Tempesta has established a clear legal right to be 
employed in the position of operations superintendent with Warren and a clear 
legal duty on the part of the city to so employ him. 
Lack of Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law 
{¶ 21} “Mandamus will not issue if there is a plain and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. McClaran v. Ontario, 119 Ohio St.3d 
105, 2008-Ohio-3867, 892 N.E.2d 440, ¶ 15; R.C. 2731.05. 
{¶ 22} The city claims that Tempesta is not entitled to the requested writ 
of mandamus because he has or had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
law by way of the grievance and arbitration procedure in the collective-bargaining 
agreement.  “A grievance and arbitration procedure in a collective bargaining 
agreement generally provides an adequate legal remedy, which precludes 
extraordinary relief in mandamus, when violations of the agreement are alleged 
by a person who is a member of the bargaining unit covered by the agreement.”  
State ex rel. Walker v. Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 216, 218, 680 N.E.2d 993. 
{¶ 23} Tempesta does not have an adequate legal remedy by way of the 
grievance and arbitration procedure in the collective-bargaining agreement 
because his claim is based on statute rather than the agreement and he was not a 
member of the bargaining unit covered by the agreement. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, although R.C. 124.34 authorizes an appeal to the 
municipal civil service commission from certain adverse employment decisions, 
the decisions that can be appealed do not include the wrongful failure to recall a 
laid-off employee.  See R.C. 124.34(B). 
{¶ 25} Therefore, Tempesta has established that he lacks an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
Back Pay 
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{¶ 26} Tempesta also requests an award of back pay.  “A wrongfully 
excluded public employee may obtain back pay and related benefits in a 
mandamus action following reinstatement or, in some cases, may obtain 
reinstatement and back pay and related benefits in the same mandamus action.”  
State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 558, 563, 757 N.E.2d 339.  Here, Tempesta requests an award of back pay 
in the same mandamus case in which he seeks reinstatement to employment with 
the city. 
{¶ 27} To be entitled to recover compensation for the period of wrongful 
exclusion from employment, however, Tempesta is required to establish the 
amount of back pay “with certainty.”  Monaghan v. Richley (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 
190, 61 O.O.2d 425, 291 N.E.2d 462, syllabus; State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 105 Ohio St.3d 476, 2005-Ohio-2974, 829 N.E.2d 
298, ¶ 28.  The term “with certainty” generally refers to “whether a particular 
amount has been precisely determined as to its value in dollars and cents” and at 
times “also refer[s] to the quality of proof, in order for an employee to 
demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the relief for which he prays.”  State 
ex rel. Hamlin v. Collins (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 117, 120, 9 OBR 342, 459 N.E.2d 
520.  Tempesta has introduced no evidence here that would satisfy the requisite 
standard of proof. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, Tempesta is not entitled to an award of back pay. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, Tempesta has established his right to a 
writ of mandamus to compel the city of Warren to appoint him to the position of 
operations superintendent in the city’s Operations Department.  Therefore, we 
grant the writ.  We deny the writ insofar as Tempesta seeks an award of back pay 
for which he has failed to satisfy his burden of proof. 
Judgment accordingly. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in granting the writ but 
would also award back pay to relator. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I respectfully dissent and would deny the writ of mandamus 
because relator, Frank M. Tempesta, has not established either a clear legal right 
to appointment to the position of operations superintendent in the city of Warren’s 
Operations Department or the city’s clear duty to appoint him to that position.  
State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 931 
N.E.2d 110, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 31} In failing to focus on the collective bargaining agreement that the 
city has entered into with Ohio Council 8, American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (“the union”), I believe the majority has 
gone astray.  It is well settled that when a collective bargaining agreement 
contains language related to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of 
employment that is sufficiently specific to explicitly demonstrate that the intent of 
the parties was to preempt statutory rights, the contract language controls over the 
language of the conflicting statute. E.g., State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School 
Emps./AFSCME, Local 4, AFL-CIO v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 729 N.E.2d 743, syllabus. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 4117.10(A) provides: “An agreement between a public 
employer and an exclusive representative entered into pursuant to this chapter 
governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public employment 
covered by the agreement. * * * Where no agreement exists or where an 
agreement makes no specification about a matter, the public employer and public 
employees are subject to all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining 
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to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for public 
employees.” R.C. 4117.10(A). 
{¶ 33} Pursuant to R.C. 4117.08, matters affecting promotions are 
appropriate subjects of collective bargaining between a municipal corporation and 
an exclusive representative employee organization.  See DeVennish v. Columbus 
(1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 163, 566 N.E.2d 668, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Article 21 of the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the union 
addresses promotions: “The City agrees to post any job openings, on all Union 
bulletin boards, occurring within the bargaining unit for a period of ten (10) 
working days after the City determines there is a vacancy.  The qualified senior 
bargaining unit member shall be promoted.  If no qualified bargaining unit 
member bids, the Director of Public Service and Safety may fill the position at 
his/her discretion.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 34} The collective bargaining agreement in this case thus has made a 
“specification about a matter,” that is, about promotions. Article 21 explicitly 
controlled how vacancies within the bargaining unit, which includes the position 
of operations superintendent, were to be filled.  If a bargaining unit member bid 
for a vacant position, that member was to be promoted.  Tempesta was never a 
member of the bargaining unit.  He had no legal right to be placed into a vacant 
position unit for which a qualified bargaining unit member had applied.  
Nevertheless, Tempesta asserts that the city was legally obligated to appoint him 
because of R.C. 124.327, which requires the reinstatement of classified employees 
laid off within the previous year before a promotion or new hire is made in the 
relevant classification series. 
{¶ 35} The position of operations superintendent became vacant upon 
David Mazzochi’s retirement on July 1, 2010.  On June 10, the city posted a 
notice of the upcoming job opening and eventually appointed bargaining unit 
member Pat Calvey to the position, effective July 1, 2010.  Tempesta argues that 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
because on July 1 he was in layoff status with the city, he was entitled to be 
reinstated and appointed as operations superintendent pursuant to R.C. 124.327, 
because the operations superintendent position was in the same classification 
series as his former position. 
{¶ 36} His proposition of law rests on the statement that “[i]n order to 
negate statutory rights of public employees, a collective bargaining agreement 
must use language with such specificity as to explicitly demonstrate that the intent 
of the parties was to preempt statutory rights.”  Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps., 
89 Ohio St.3d 191, 729 N.E.2d 743, at syllabus.  He argues that Article 21 of the 
collective bargaining agreement between the city and the union does not 
specifically negate the statutory rights of bargaining unit employees to 
reinstatement following layoff, much less the statutory rights of nonunion city 
employees like him. 
{¶ 37} But the case on which he relies is distinguishable.  In Ohio Assn. of 
Pub. School Emps., this court held that a school board did not have authority 
under a collective bargaining agreement to abolish bus driver positions and then 
transfer the obligation to provide transportation to a private company.  Id. at 195.  
Under those circumstances, the drivers, members of the union, retained their 
statutory protections under R.C. 3319.081, the statute that governs contracts for 
nonteaching school-district employees.  R.C. 124.327 was not at issue.  Unlike 
Tempesta’s situation, the apparent conflict lay between the contractual and 
statutory rights of the members of the collective bargaining unit.  Tempesta is not 
a member of the bargaining unit and the union itself has not filed any grievance 
under the collective bargaining agreement.  In fact, here the union has filed a brief 
as amicus for the respondent city. 
{¶ 38} I would hold that the city, in following its collective bargaining 
agreement, appropriately promoted Pat Calvey to the position of operations 
superintendent.  Without establishing his own legal right to the appointment or a 
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legal duty to appoint on the part of the city of Warren, relator, Frank Tempesta, 
has failed to show that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and MCGEE BROWN, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L., and Michael D. Rossi, for relator. 
 
Gregory V. Hicks, Warren Law Director, and James R. Ries, Deputy Law 
Director, for respondent. 
 
Bethany E. Sanders, Associate General Counsel, urging denial of the writ 
for amicus curiae, Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
____________________