Title: State v. Lee

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Lee (2002-512)178 Vt. 420; 886 A.2d 378

2005 VT 99

[Filed 19-Aug-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT 99

                                No. 2002-512

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit

  Lamont Lee	                                 October Term, 2004

  David A. Howard, J.

  William D. Wright, Bennington County State's Attorney, and Brian K.
    Marthage, Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
    General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned 

       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals his convictions on two counts
  of felony sale of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and attempting to elude
  a police officer.  He argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the
  admission of photographic evidence of two guns the police found during
  searches of defendant's home and vehicle.  Defendant also challenges the
  court's jury instructions.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  In August 2000, defendant was living in Pownal with his
  girlfriend and her mother, Beverly Washington.  Beverly became concerned
  that defendant was dealing drugs, and she contacted law enforcement
  authorities.  Eventually, Beverly spoke with a trooper assigned to the
  Southern Vermont Drug Task Force (SVDTF) and agreed to assist him in an
  investigation of defendant's activities.  Thereafter, Beverly purchased
  cocaine from defendant on two occasions while wearing a hidden recording
  device.  The investigation ended when Beverly informed her contact at SVDTF
  that defendant had acquired two guns.  The information prompted the trooper
  to arrest defendant.
         
       ¶  3.  On August 30, 2000, the police were watching defendant's
  residence when they saw defendant drive towards Route 7.  The officers
  signaled for defendant to pull over, but he drove away.  After some
  pursuit, defendant pulled his vehicle over to the side of the road, jumped
  out of the still moving vehicle, and ran.  The police eventually caught up
  with defendant, arrested him, and searched his home and vehicle pursuant to
  a search warrant.  During the search of defendant's car, the police found
  an unloaded .410 caliber gun on the driver's side floor.  Another gun,
  along with marijuana, was found in a closet off of the bedroom defendant
  shared with his girlfriend.  
   
       ¶  4.  On August 31, 2000, the State filed informations in district
  court charging defendant with attempting to elude a police officer,
  possession of marijuana, and two counts of felony sale of cocaine.  In May
  2002, defendant filed notice with the court that he intended to raise
  entrapment as an affirmative defense.  Defendant also filed motions in
  limine to exclude certain evidence, two of which are relevant to this
  appeal.  The first sought to exclude photographic evidence of the gun found
  in defendant's car and the gun found in the bedroom where defendant was
  staying.  Defendant argued that the gun evidence would unfairly prejudice
  him because it lacked any probative value.  Defendant's motion noted that
  because he was a previously-convicted felon, possession of the guns was a
  federal offense, and he had already been convicted and sentenced for this
  offense in federal court. 

       ¶  5.  The second motion in limine related to evidence of a nighttime
  intrusion into defendant's residence by two men sometime between August 24
  and August 28, 2000.  The intruders ransacked defendant's room, assaulted
  him, and tied-up him and his girlfriend.  The intruders shouted references
  to crack cocaine during the break-in and assault.  Defendant argued that
  evidence of the home invasion was overly prejudicial and irrelevant to the
  charges against him.  

       ¶  6.  The court excluded evidence of defendant's federal gun
  conviction and the intrusion into defendant's home, and admitted the
  photographs of the guns.  The court found that the gun evidence was
  probative of three issues.  First, the presence of a gun in defendant's car
  could explain why he ran away from the police.  Second, the guns were tools
  of the drug-trade.  Third, the fact that he possessed two firearms could
  rebut an inference that Beverly and the police entrapped him into selling
  cocaine-defendant's primary defense to the drug-sale charges. 

       ¶  7.  Before the second day of trial began, defendant's attorney
  announced that he wanted to present evidence about the break-in.  He argued
  that the gun evidence was so prejudicial to defendant that he was compelled
  to rebut it by introducing the break-in to support defendant's claim that
  he obtained the guns for protection.  Noting that defendant's decision was
  a strategic one, the court ruled that it would permit him to introduce
  limited evidence about the break-in.  The jury eventually convicted
  defendant of all the charges against him, and this appeal followed.
   
       ¶  8.  We first address defendant's claim that the trial court erred
  in admitting the gun evidence.  In deciding whether to admit evidence, the
  court must make an initial determination that the evidence is relevant. 
  V.R.E. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as limited by
  constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by statute . . . .
  Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").  Relevant evidence
  encompasses any evidence that makes the existence of a fact that is "of
  consequence to the determination of the action" more probable than not. 
  V.R.E. 401.  If relevant, the court may still exclude the evidence "if its
  probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
  prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
  considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
  cumulative evidence."  V.R.E. 403.  

       ¶  9.  Defendant argues that evidence of his gun possession was
  irrelevant to the crimes for which he was charged, and, even if relevant,
  its probative value was so limited and its prejudicial impact so great that
  it had to be excluded under Rule 403.  The State responds that evidence of
  the gun found in the closet was relevant to show he possessed the marijuana
  also found in the closet, and evidence of the gun found in the car was
  relevant to show his motive to elude the police when they attempted to
  arrest him.

       ¶  10.  The decisions from other jurisdictions, particularly from the
  federal courts, overwhelmingly support the main ground on which the court
  relied-that the guns are relevant to show defendant is a drug dealer. (FN1)  
  Thus, in a leading case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
  Circuit held: "Experience on the trial and appellate benches has taught
  that substantial dealers in narcotics keep firearms on their premises as
  tools of the trade almost to the same extent as they keep scales, glassine
  bags, cutting equipment and other narcotics equipment."  United States v.
  Wiener, 534 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1976).  Other circuits have affirmed
  admission of gun evidence on the same rationale.  See United States v.
  Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1082-83 (10th Cir. 1991) (admitting evidence of
  semi-automatic submachine gun found in house defendant entered during drug
  transaction as "tools of the trade") (collecting cases); see also United
  States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Guns are tools of the
  drug trade and are commonly recognized articles of narcotics
  paraphernalia."); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir. 1994)
  (recognizing that evidence of gun possession was highly probative of drug
  conspiracy); United States v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 1993)
  (affirming admission of evidence of a gun and ammunition found in residence
  of defendant charged with possession and distribution of cocaine). 
  Defendant argues that this relevancy theory does not apply in this case
  because the drug sales occurred before defendant acquired the guns.  The
  relevancy theory does not depend on the use of the guns in the drug sale.
  (FN2)  See Martinez, 938 F.2d  at 1083 (explaining that it is "basically
  immaterial to the admissibility inquiry" whether defendant has been charged
  with an offense involving use of the gun); State v. Smith, 1992 WL 61363,
  No. CA-8715, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1992).  The dissent emphasizes
  that defendant obtained possession of the guns after the date of the drug
  sales for which he is charged.  While the time gap between the drug sales
  and the possession of the guns may go to the weight of the evidence, we do
  not believe that it makes the gun evidence irrelevant, as the dissent
  argues. (FN3)  In fact, defendant had owned the guns before the drug
  sales, but had left them with a friend, apparently because it was a federal
  offense for defendant to possess a gun.
       
       ¶  11.  In addition to challenging relevancy, defendant makes the
  stronger argument that the gun evidence should have been excluded under
  Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial.  Here, however, defendant must overcome a
  very deferential standard of review.  Rule 403 rulings are "highly
  discretionary," State v. Gibney, 2003 VT 26, ¶ 23, 175 Vt. 180,