Title: Drouet v. Super. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/11/03 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JOEL DROUET, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S096161 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. A092016 1/1 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY    ) 
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
) 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 5181 
                                                                       ) 
JIM BROUSTIS et al.,                                   ) 
                                                                       ) 
                      Real Parties in Interest.            )            
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.) provides that no statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or administrative action “shall . . . compel the owner of any 
residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the 
property for rent or lease.”  (Gov. Code, § 7060, subd. (a).)  A landlord who 
complies with the Ellis Act may therefore go out of the residential rental business 
by withdrawing the rental property from the market.  (Los Angeles Lincoln Place 
Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 61.)  If necessary, 
the landlord may institute an action for unlawful detainer to evict the tenants and 
recover possession of the property.  (Gov. Code, § 7060.6.)   
 
 
2
In unlawful detainer actions, tenants generally may assert legal or equitable 
defenses that “directly relate to the issue of possession and which, if established, 
would result in the tenant’s retention of the premises.”  (Green v. Superior Court 
(1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 633.)  The defense of retaliatory eviction, codified at Civil 
Code section 1942.5 (section 1942.5), is one such defense.  This defense bars a 
landlord from recovering possession of the dwelling in an unlawful detainer action 
where recovery is “for the purpose of retaliating” against the tenant because of his 
or her lawful and peaceable exercise of any rights under the law (§ 1942.5, subd. 
(c)) or “because of” his or her complaints regarding tenantability (id., subd. (a)).    
In this case, the tenants have asserted the statutory defense of retaliatory 
eviction in an unlawful detainer proceeding instituted by the landlord under the 
Ellis Act.  In their view, section 1942.5 can force a landlord to continue to offer 
the property for rent or lease if the landlord’s decision to withdraw the property is 
motivated by a desire to retaliate against the tenants in the ways prohibited by 
subdivisions (a) and (c).  The landlord, on the other hand, counters that he is 
entitled to exit the rental business, notwithstanding an allegation of retaliation for 
tenant conduct, under section 1942.5, subdivision (d), which provides that 
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by 
the lessor of his rights under . . . any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his 
right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause.”              
We find that the Ellis Act qualifies as a “law pertaining to the hiring of 
property” under section 1942.5, subdivision (d), and that a landlord’s withdrawal 
of the property from the market is an exercise of “ ‘the right to go out of the rental 
business’ ” (First Presbyterian Church v. City of Berkeley (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 
1241, 1253) under that law.  We further conclude, in accordance with subdivisions 
(d) and (e) of section 1942.5, that a landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the 
property from the rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the statutory 
 
 
3
defense of retaliatory eviction.  Because the trial court did not consider the 
landlord’s motion for summary adjudication under this standard, we reverse the 
Court of Appeal, which had issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court 
to grant the landlord’s motion for summary adjudication, with directions to 
remand the matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.      
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Joel Drouet (Landlord) owns a two-unit apartment building at 
378-380 San Carlos Street in San Francisco.  Real parties Jim Broustis and Ivy 
McClelland (Tenants) occupy the unit at 378 San Carlos Street on a month-to-
month basis.  Broustis has lived in the unit since 1988; McClelland joined him in 
early 1999.  Over the years, Landlord and Broustis have had several conflicts 
involving the tenancy.  Tenants have alleged, for example, that Landlord illegally 
attempted to raise the rent, overcharged for utilities, refused to pay interest on 
security deposits, and violated the lease by refusing to permit Broustis to have a 
roommate.  In April 1999, when Tenants discovered Landlord had failed to pay his 
share of the garbage bill, they informed him they planned to deduct this amount 
from their rent.  Around the same time, they notified Landlord of a leaking sewage 
drain and shower wall.   
Landlord did not make the requested repairs.  Instead, on August 5, 1999, 
Landlord commenced Ellis Act proceedings on the San Carlos Street units by 
filing a “Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market” 
with the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board.  
(Gov. Code, § 7060.4; S.F. Admin. Code, § 37.9A, subd. (f).)  That same day, 
Landlord served Tenants with written notice terminating the tenancy (Civ. Code, § 
1946) and requiring them to quit the premises and deliver up possession within 60 
 
 
4
days.  The notice of intent and a memorandum regarding withdrawal of the units 
from rent were attached to the notice.    
The parties do not dispute that Landlord complied with all Ellis Act 
procedures.  Nonetheless, Tenants did not quit the premises.     
Consequently, on October 6, 1999, Landlord filed a complaint for unlawful 
detainer in the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco.  Tenants 
answered the complaint and alleged four affirmative defenses, including 
retaliatory eviction.  Landlord moved for summary adjudication on each of the 
defenses.  The superior court granted the motion in part but, without considering 
whether Landlord’s invocation of the Ellis Act was bona fide, denied it with 
respect to the defense of retaliatory eviction.     
Landlord sought a writ of mandate in the appellate division of the superior 
court to compel the trial court to set aside the denial of summary adjudication, 
alleging that the defense of retaliatory eviction is unavailable as a matter of law in 
unlawful detainer proceedings under the Ellis Act.  After briefing and oral 
argument, the appellate division agreed with Landlord and granted the petition for 
writ of mandate.  It said:  “When a landlord has complied with all procedures for 
withdrawing his rental units from the rental market, his motive for withdrawing 
the units is irrelevant.”  The Court of Appeal ordered the case transferred on its 
own motion (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 62(a)) and, in a published opinion, agreed 
with the appellate division:  “[I]n unlawful detainer proceedings properly 
commenced under the Ellis Act, a tenant may not raise an affirmative defense of 
retaliatory eviction to prevent displacement.”     
DISCUSSION 
In a writ proceeding challenging the denial of summary adjudication, we 
review the trial court’s ruling de novo.  (Buss v. Superior Court (2001) 16 Cal.4th 
35, 60.)  Since there are no disputed issues of fact, we consider only the legal 
 
 
5
effect of Civil Code section 1942.5 in an unlawful detainer proceeding under the 
Ellis Act.  We examine each statutory scheme in turn.       
  A.  The Ellis Act 
The Ellis Act (Act) sets forth the procedure by which a landlord may go out 
of business by removing rental units from the market.  Its intent is “to supersede 
any holding or portion of any holding” in Nash v. City of Santa Monica (1984) 37 
Cal.3d 97 (Nash) “to the extent that the holding, or portion of the holding, 
conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of business.”  (Gov. 
Code, § 7060.7.)   
Nash involved a section of the Santa Monica City Charter that prohibited 
landlords from withdrawing rental units from the market absent a removal permit 
from the Santa Monica Rent Control Board.  To obtain a removal permit, a 
landlord had to show that removal would not and could not displace low- or 
moderate-income persons, that removal would not adversely affect the city’s 
supply of housing, and that the landlord could not make a fair return on investment 
by retaining the unit.  (Nash, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 100-101, fn. 3.)  In Nash, we 
rejected a due process challenge to this procedure (id. at p. 103), even though (as 
the dissent observed) it compelled a landlord “to remain in business against his 
will” and gave him “only the alternative of a forced sale.”  (Id. at p. 111 (dis. opn. 
of Mosk, J.).)   
In contrast to Nash, the Act provides that no statute, ordinance, regulation, 
or administrative action shall “compel the owner of any residential real property to 
offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease” 
(Gov. Code, § 7060, subd. (a)), even if the landlord could make a fair return, the 
property is habitable, and the landlord lacks approval for future use of the land.  
(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 54 
Cal.App.4th at p. 61.)  
 
 
6
The right articulated in the Act, however, is expressly made subject to 
certain other laws.  For example, the Act is not intended to interfere with local 
authority over land use, including regulation of the conversion to condominiums 
or nonresidential use (Gov. Code, § 7060.7, subd. (a)), or to preempt local 
environmental or land use regulations governing the demolition or redevelopment 
of the property (id., subd. (b)).  Nor does the Act permit a landlord to withdraw 
from rent or lease less than all of the accommodations in a building. (Id., subd. 
(d).)  
The Act further states that if the units withdrawn from the market are 
subsequently offered again for rent, local governments may require landlords to 
offer the units at the lawful rent in effect at the time the notice of intent to 
withdraw was filed.  (Gov. Code, § 7060.2, subd. (a)(1).)  Local governments may 
also require landlords who intend to re-rent the units within 10 years after their 
withdrawal from the market to offer the units first to the displaced tenants.  (Id., 
subd. (c).) 
The Act also specifies the means by which local governments may require 
landlords to provide notice of their intention to withdraw the units from the rental 
market.  (Gov. Code, § 7060.4.)  The accommodations can be withdrawn from rent 
or lease 120 days after delivery in person or by first class mail of the notice to the 
appropriate public entity.  (Id., subd. (b).)1   
If (as here) the tenants do not quit the premises by the date the 
accommodations have been withdrawn from the market, the landlord may institute 
an action for unlawful detainer.  The Act provides that the tenant in such a 
                                             
 
1  
At the time pertinent to these proceedings, the statute permitted 
accommodations to be withdrawn 60 days from the date of notice.  (Gov. Code, 
§ 7060.4, former subd. (a), added by Stats. 1985, ch. 1509, § 1, p. 5564.)    
 
 
7
proceeding “may assert by way of defense that the owner has not complied with 
the applicable provisions of this chapter . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 7060.6.)  The Act 
also states that it does not supersede “any provision of . . . Title 5 (commencing 
with Section 1925) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 
7060.1, subd. (d).)  Title 5 includes Civil Code section 1942.5, which (as stated) 
contains a prohibition against retaliatory evictions.  And, while permitting the 
landlord to go out of business, the Act is not “otherwise” intended to “[o]verride 
procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.”  
(Gov. Code, § 7060.7, subd. (c).)     
B.  Civil Code Section 1942.5 
Section 1942.5 was added by Statutes of 1970, chapter 1280, section 5, 
pages 2316-2317.  After its enactment but before its effective date, we recognized 
the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction as a defense in unlawful detainer 
proceedings.  (Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507 (Schweiger).)  At 
that time, few appellate courts had considered the availability of the defense.  (Id. 
at p. 512.)  We therefore examined closely the leading authority in the area, 
Edwards v. Habib (D.C. Cir. 1968) 397 F.2d 687, in which the tenant’s complaints 
of sanitation and housing code violations in her apartment were met by the 
landlord’s notice to vacate the premises.  Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion in 
Edwards observed that “ ‘[e]ffective implementation and enforcement of the codes 
obviously depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of violations. . . .  To 
permit retaliatory evictions . . . would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the 
housing code as a means of upgrading the quality of housing.’ ”  (Schweiger, 
supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 512, quoting Edwards v. Habib, supra, 397 F.2d at pp. 700-
701.)  An eviction under such circumstances, Judge Wright reasoned, would not 
only punish the tenant for a complaint that she had a constitutional right to make 
“ ‘but also would stand as a warning to others that they dare not be so bold, a 
 
 
8
result which, from the authorization of the housing code, we think Congress 
affirmatively sought to avoid.’ ”  (Schweiger, supra, at p. 512, quoting Edwards v. 
Habib, supra, 397 F.2d at p. 701.)   
Applying this “persuasive reasoning” to our own state (Schweiger, supra, 3 
Cal.3d at p. 513), we chose “to recognize in unlawful detainer actions a defense 
that the eviction is sought in retaliation for the exercise of statutory rights by the 
tenant.”  (Id. at p. 517.)  We later commented that the substance of this common-
law defense was codified in section 1942.5 (Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 
Cal.3d 244, 249), which had been enacted prior to Schweiger but did not become 
effective until the following year.  (Schweiger, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 516, fn. 4.) 
In 1979, the Legislature repealed section 1942.5 and reenacted it with 
provisions that extended the time period during which a tenant is protected from 
retaliatory eviction and that enlarged the prohibited forms of retaliation.  (Stats. 
1979, ch. 652, § 2, p. 2005; Barela v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 250.)  
In pertinent part, section 1942.5 now provides:  “(a) If the lessor retaliates against 
the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter or 
because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, 
and if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his rent, the 
lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding, cause 
the lessee to quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services within 
180 days:  (1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has given notice 
pursuant to Section 1942, or has made an oral complaint to the lessor regarding 
tenantability; [¶] . . . . [¶] (c) It shall be unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, 
decrease services, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover 
possession, or threaten to do any of such acts, for the purpose of retaliating against 
the lessee because he or she has . . . lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights 
under the law.  In an action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this 
 
 
9
subdivision, the lessee shall bear the burden of producing evidence that the 
lessor’s conduct was, in fact, retaliatory.  [¶] (d) Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the lessor of his rights under any 
lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his right to do 
any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause. . . . [¶] (e) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, a lessor may 
recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other acts described in 
subdivision (a) within the period or periods prescribed therein, or within 
subdivision (c), if the notice of termination, rent increase, or other act . . . states 
the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to recover possession, 
increase rent, or do any of the other acts described in subdivision (a) or (c).  If 
such statement be controverted, the lessor shall establish its truth at the trial or 
other hearing.”   
 
           C. Harmonizing Landlord’s Right to Withdraw the Property from 
 
the Rental Market Under the Ellis Act with Tenants’ Defense of 
 
Retaliatory Eviction Under Civil Code Section 1942.5   
Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), provides that nothing in 
the Ellis Act “[s]upersedes any provision of  . . . Title 5 (commencing with Section 
1925) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code . . . .”  The Court of Appeal 
wrestled with the meaning of this subdivision, deciding ultimately that “[i]n the 
Ellis Act context it would be a superficial act of interpretation to conclude that the 
use of the term ‘supersede,’ in reference to a broad and detailed statutory scheme 
of the Civil Code, necessarily meant that a particular eviction defense—found in a 
single statute—remained applicable.  The Legislature did not single out section 
1942.5, but broadly referenced title 5, which includes sections 1925 through 
1997.270 [of the Civil Code].”  After weighing the competing policies of the two 
statutes, the Court of Appeal deemed it “unreasonable to conclude that in the 
 
 
10
process of making broad references to entire systems of statutes in the Ellis Act, 
the Legislature intended the defense of retaliatory eviction to apply to unlawful 
detainer proceedings under the Act.”  Landlord asks us to embrace this reasoning 
and find that the Ellis Act superseded section 1942.5. 
To the extent Landlord invites us to ignore the language of Government 
Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), and instead reweigh allegedly competing 
public policies as they relate to section 1942.5, we must decline the invitation.  
The judicial branch “ ‘ “has no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it 
conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed.” ’ ” (Equilon Enterprises 
v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 59.)  We therefore apply the plain 
language of Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), and conclude the 
Act did not supersede section 1942.5.   
It does not follow, however, that section 1942.5 should be read to supersede 
the Act.  When the Legislature provides that one law does not supersede another, 
the two are to be construed together.  (San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public 
Employment Relations Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 864-865 [Education Code 
section 3540, which says that “[n]othing contained herein shall be deemed to 
supersede other provisions of the Education Code,” should be construed “in 
harmony with . . . existing sections of the Education Code”]; Taylor v. Albion 
Lumber Co. (1917) 176 Cal. 347, 350-351 [“ ‘Section 1970 of the Civil Code is to 
be construed with [Code of Civil Procedure] section 377, not as superseding it’ ”]; 
Masonite Corp. v. County of Mendocino Air Quality Management Dist. (1996) 42 
Cal.App.4th 436, 451, fn. 11.)  The parties therefore agree that our task is to 
harmonize the two schemes, provided that in doing so section 1942.5 is not 
“ ‘replaced, set aside or anulled by’ ” the Ellis Act.  (San Mateo City School Dist. 
v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 864; accord, Black’s 
Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 1452 [defining “supersede” as “annul, make void, or 
 
 
11
repeal by taking the place of”].)  For the reasons set forth below, we do not find 
that permitting a landlord to invoke in good faith his or her right to withdraw the 
property from the rental market would replace, set aside, or annul section 1942.5.   
Our analysis must begin with the language of section 1942.5 itself. 
Tenants claim they are protected under section 1942.5, subdivision (a)(1), 
which bars a landlord from retaliating against a tenant within 180 days of the 
tenant’s oral complaint regarding tenantability, as well as subdivision (c), which 
bars a landlord from retaliating against a tenant for the lawful and peaceable 
exercise of any rights under the law.  In this proceeding, Landlord does not dispute 
that Tenants made an oral complaint or otherwise lawfully and peaceably 
exercised their rights under the law—nor does Landlord deny that he seeks to 
recover possession “because of” the oral complaint (§ 1942.5, subd. (a)) or “for 
the purpose of retaliating” against Tenants’ exercise of their rights (id., subd. (c)).  
Landlord claims instead that the defense of retaliatory eviction can be defeated by 
proof that he has in good faith invoked his rights under the Ellis Act to withdraw 
the subject property from the rental market.  His claim is based not on the theory 
that the Act has replaced, set aside, or annulled section 1942.5, but on the 
language of section 1942.5 itself and, in particular, on subdivision (d), which 
states in relevant part that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as limiting 
in any way the exercise by the lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or 
any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his right to do any of the acts 
described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause.”  Landlord reasons that 
subdivision (d) constitutes an exception to the prohibitions set forth in subdivision 
(a) and (c).     
Landlord’s interpretation is consistent with the language of the statute.  
Section 1942.5, subdivision (d), provides that, in specified circumstances, a 
landlord may “do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c)” and that, in 
 
 
12
those circumstances, “[n]othing” in section 1942.5 “shall be construed” as limiting 
the landlord “in any way.”  Subdivision (d) then describes these circumstances:  
when the landlord exercises his or her rights “under any lease or agreement or any 
law pertaining to the hiring of property” or acts “for any lawful cause.”   
Landlord’s interpretation is also consistent with the case law.  “Subdivision 
(c) of the statute [now reenacted with only conforming changes as subd. (d)] 
provided that the landlord, even if he had retaliation in mind, could nevertheless 
prevail if the tenant violated ‘any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the 
hiring of property  . . . .’  For example, if the tenant was in default in payment of 
the agreed rent, or if he violated a covenant in a lease, or if he committed waste or 
maintained a nuisance, the landlord could move to evict him even though the 
tenant had complained about the habitability of the premises.”  (Western Land 
Office, Inc. v. Cervantes (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 733 (Cervantes), italics 
added.)  We therefore agree with Landlord that section 1942.5, subdivision (d), 
constitutes an exception to the limitations on landlord conduct set forth in 
subdivisions (a) and (c).  (Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 733.)     
But does a landlord’s withdrawal of property from the rental market under 
the Ellis Act constitute an exercise of rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of 
property?  Both Landlord and Tenants agree that the Act, which is designed “to 
permit landlords to go out of business” (Gov. Code, § 7060.7), is such a law.  We 
therefore conclude that a landlord’s withdrawal of rental property from the market 
under the Act constitutes the exercise of a right under a law pertaining to the 
hiring of property under section 1942.5, subdivision (d).     
The parties disagree vigorously over the significance of this conclusion.  
Landlord and some of his amici curiae contend that this is the end of the 
analysis—i.e., that once the landlord has complied with the Act’s procedural 
requirements, the exception set forth in section 1942.5, subdivision (d), has been 
 
 
13
satisfied, and the statutory defense of retaliatory eviction has been overcome.  
Tenants and their amici curiae, on the other hand, contend that even those 
landlords who seek refuge under subdivision (d) must nonetheless demonstrate an 
absence of retaliatory motive in order to prevail in the unlawful detainer action.   
Neither party’s construction is consistent with the statute.  We instead find 
guidance in section 1942.5, subdivision (e), which states that “[n]otwithstanding 
the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, a lessor may recover possession 
of a dwelling and do any of the other acts described in subdivision (a) within the 
period or periods prescribed therein, or within subdivision (c), . . . if the notice of 
termination . . . states the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to 
recover possession . . . .  If such statement be controverted, the lessor shall 
establish its truth at the trial or other hearing.”  (Italics added.)  Landlord thus errs 
in terminating the analysis at subdivision (d), since subdivision (e) expressly 
applies notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (d) inclusive.  
Accordingly, landlords must assert their invocation of the Ellis Act “in good 
faith.”  (§ 1942.5, subd. (e).)  Tenants, on the other hand, err in assuming that a 
landlord who has invoked the Ellis Act, a law pertaining to the hiring of property 
under subdivision (d), must prove not only that the Act has been invoked in good 
faith but also that the Act has not been invoked for a retaliatory purpose.  Such a 
requirement would nullify the language in subdivision (d) that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the lessor of his 
rights under . . . any law pertaining to the hiring of property.”  In our view, the 
proper way to construe the statute when a landlord seeks to evict a tenant under 
the Ellis Act, and the tenant answers by invoking the retaliatory eviction defense 
under section 1942.5, is to hold that the landlord may nonetheless prevail by 
asserting a good faith—i.e., a bona fide—intent to withdraw the property from the 
rental market.  If the tenant controverts the landlord’s good faith, the landlord 
 
 
14
must establish the existence of the bona fide intent at a trial or hearing by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (See Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 
742.)2  This construction best harmonizes the Act with the text of the retaliatory 
eviction statute.   
We therefore find no statutory basis for Tenants’ contention that Landlord 
should be compelled to prove not merely that he has a bona fide intent to go out of 
business but also that this bona fide intent was not motivated by the tenant’s 
exercise of rights under subdivisions (a) and (c) of section 1942.5.  Indeed, neither 
Tenants nor the dissent has identified a single jurisdiction in this country that has 
sustained a retaliatory eviction defense—or what might more accurately be termed 
a retaliatory withdrawal defense—where a landlord seeks to take a building off the 
market.  (Cf. California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin (1985) 165 
Cal.App.3d 136, 143 [claim of retaliation is not a defense in unlawful detainer 
action based on foreclosure of property]; Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law 
(N.M.Ct.App. 2002) 54 P.3d 91, 97-98 [claim of retaliation is not a defense in 
unlawful detainer action based on landlord’s decision not to remain in the federal 
government’s former Section 8 housing program]; see generally Robinson v. 
Diamond Housing Corporation (D.C. Cir. 1972) 463 F.2d 853, 867.)  Although 
we have at times analogized a tenant’s defense of retaliatory eviction to an 
employee’s defense of retaliatory termination (e.g., Barela v. Superior Court, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 253-254, fn. 8; Schweiger, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 515-516), 
neither Tenants nor the dissent has identified a single jurisdiction that has 
                                             
 
2  
The dissent cites Cervantes for the proposition that proof of a bona fide 
intent may not necessarily establish good faith when the landlord seeks to evict the 
tenant for a reason not specified in section 1942.5, subdivision (d).  (See dis. opn., 
post, at p. 10.)  Since this case does involve subdivision (d), the dissent’s analysis 
is not pertinent here.       
 
 
15
sustained a retaliatory termination defense where the employer was going out of 
business.  (Cf. Textile Workers v. Darlington Co. (1965) 380 U.S. 263, 271 [“ ‘But 
none of this can be taken to mean that an employer does not have the absolute 
right, at all times, to permanently close and go out of business . . . for whatever 
reason he may choose, whether union animosity or anything else’ ”].)  In sum, 
neither Tenants nor the dissent has identified anything in the Act or in section 
1942.5 to suggest the Legislature intended California to be the first to endorse a 
“retaliatory withdrawal defense” when a landlord seeks to go out of business.     
The mere fact the statutory defense is defeated when the landlord, in 
conformance with section 1942.5, subdivisions (d) and (e), establishes a bona fide 
intent to go out of business does not mean that section 1942.5 has been superseded 
by the Act.  To supersede section 1942.5, the Ellis Act would have to replace, set 
aside, or annul section 1942.5.  As demonstrated above, our analysis relies on a 
close reading and application of the precise provisions Tenants fear have been 
superseded.  Far from allowing the Act to supersede section 1942.5, our 
construction has given effect to the plain language of that provision, including 
subdivisions (d) and (e), which permit a landlord to go out of business and evict 
the tenants—even if the landlord  has a retaliatory motive—so long as the landlord 
also has the bona fide intent to go out of business.  This is what the Cervantes 
court understood those provisions to mean when it construed subdivision (d) to 
allow a landlord to evict the tenant “even if he had retaliation in mind . . . .”  
(Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 733.)  If, on the other hand, the landlord 
cannot establish a bona fide intent to go out of business, the tenants may rely on 
subdivisions (a) and (c) to resist the eviction.3   
                                             
 
3  
The dissent’s fear that landlords will threaten to invoke the Ellis Act in 
order to deter tenants from exercising their legal rights is unfounded.  A “threat” to 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
16
Tenants respond that the retaliatory eviction defense is “the only method 
available to protect one’s home from an alleged phony Ellis [Act] eviction.”  We 
disagree.  As explained above, a tenant who believes the landlord’s invocation of 
the Act is phony and that the landlord actually intends to offer the vacated units to 
new tenants may controvert the landlord’s statement of intent.  The landlord will 
then have the burden to establish his or her bona fide intent to withdraw the 
property from the market by a preponderance of the evidence.  It is that 
requirement, and not the retaliatory eviction defense itself, that will prevent or 
deter phony evictions.  Moreover, a defense of retaliatory eviction is of no help 
where the landlord’s intention to withdraw units from the market is a sham but the 
tenant has not engaged in conduct protected under subdivision (a) or (c) of section 
1942.5.  (Cf. Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (f).)      
Tenants worry next that a landlord may invoke the Act but secretly intend 
to re-rent the units once the existing tenants have been displaced.  This fear, of 
course, presupposes that although the tenant controverted the landlord’s intent, the 
landlord committed perjury at the hearing, the tenant was unable to uncover the 
perjury by cross-examination or by other evidence, and the factfinder was unable 
to detect the perjury.  The likelihood of an erroneous outcome is further 
diminished by the landlord’s awareness that an Ellis Act eviction followed closely 
in time by a re-renting of the premises to new tenants would be persuasive 
evidence of the landlord’s bad faith in any future Ellis Act proceeding.  (Civ. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
remove the building from the rental market is not a right granted by the Ellis Act, 
which addresses only actual and full withdrawals of the property from the rental 
market.  Hence, nothing in our decision limits the protections available to a tenant 
in such a situation.  (See § 1942.5, subd. (c) [prohibiting threats of retaliation].)     
 
 
17
Code, § 1942.5, subd. (e); Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)  Finally, we note that 
perjury concerns do not arise in this case, inasmuch as San Francisco has 
eliminated the incentive for sham Ellis Act evictions by adopting ordinances 
strictly limiting the landlord’s right to re-rent the withdrawn property to others, to 
raise the rent, or to sell the property unencumbered by these limitations.  (S.F. 
Admin. Code, § 37.9A, subds. (a), (c), (d), (g); see Gov. Code, §§ 7060.2, 7060.3.) 
Unable to find support in the statutory text, Tenants urge us instead to rely 
on isolated fragments of the Act’s legislative history.  They point us in particular 
to a single paragraph in a Senate committee analysis discussing proposed 
Government Code section 7060.1.  The paragraph reads:  “This provision would 
limit a landlord’s right to go out of business if the exercise of that right would 
jeopardize a tenant’s rights under state law.  For example, this provision would 
probably prohibit a landlord from going out of business if the tenant had requested 
repairs or reported housing code violations.  An eviction of the tenant under such 
circumstances could be deemed a prohibited retaliatory eviction.”  (Sen. Rules 
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (1985-1986 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Sept. 10, 1985, p. 3.)  Yet the use of the words “probably” and 
“could” are sufficiently tentative and equivocal to caution us against relying too 
heavily on this snippet.  (See Folsom v. Butte County (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 682; 
In re Ramon A. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 935, 939.)4     
                                             
 
4  
Tenants also relied below on a letter by the bill’s author to Governor 
Deukmejian in which Senator Ellis recalled the “large number of amendments,” 
which dealt with situations such as when “a landlord were to go temporarily out of 
business and then again offered his units for rental” and which declared “that the 
bill only extended to the right to go out of business and not any further right which 
the owner did not already possess (in other words—the bill does not convey a right 
to rezoning, to condominium conversion, etc.).  [¶]  Despite the many 
amendments,” Senator Ellis explained, “the original thrust has been maintained:  
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
18
A contrary holding would also be inconsistent with other laws and lead to 
absurd results.  The Legislature has made it clear that a landlord who seeks to 
withdraw rental property under the Ellis Act has no obligation to maintain the 
tenantability or habitability of the premises.  (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (f); Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1174.2, subd. (d).)  If the substandard conditions themselves cannot 
be used by tenants to resist an unlawful detainer action when the landlord invokes 
the Ellis Act, it would be bizarre to say that tenants could nonetheless force the 
landlord to remain in business by complaining about those same conditions.  In 
such a scenario, the landlord would either be forced to make repairs, in violation 
of the above provisions, or would be compelled to continue to offer the property 
for rent, in violation of the Ellis Act.  
In addition, a contrary holding could permit tenants to force the landlord to 
remain in business indefinitely when, as here, the tenants have invoked section 
1942.5, subdivision (c).  This provision, which we have “denominated a 
‘boilerplate’ provision because of its broad prohibition against retaliation by a 
landlord when a tenant has exercised valid legal rights” (Barela v. Superior Court, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 251), is “ongoing and not subject to the 180 day grace 
period or the limitation that it may only be invoked once a year, as are the other 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
the good faith right to make a personal decision to go out of business for whatever 
reason, including potential liability, frustration with a personal service aspect of 
this business, psychological demands, or investment decisions.”  (Sen. Ellis, 
sponsor of Sen. Bill 505 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.), letter to Governor, Sept. 13, 
1985, italics added.)  Although this letter is of “very little value” to the extent it 
merely recounts the views of the bill’s author (Bermudez v. Municipal Court 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 855, 863, fn. 6), we nonetheless note that it in no way bolsters 
Tenants’ interpretation of the statute.     
 
 
19
sanctions.”  (Review of Selected 1979 California Legislation (1979) 11 Pacific L.J. 
601, 602.)  As the dissent concedes, the landlord could thus be compelled to 
remain in business indefinitely or, at the least, until a trier of fact determined that 
the retaliatory motive had dissipated.  We are not persuaded the Legislature 
envisioned such a cribbed interpretation of the Ellis Act.5 
We therefore hold that where a landlord has complied with the Ellis Act 
and has instituted an action for unlawful detainer, and the tenant has asserted the 
statutory defense of retaliatory eviction, the landlord may overcome the defense by 
demonstrating a bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the market.  If the 
tenant controverts the landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the property, the 
landlord has the burden to establish its truth at the hearing by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  (§ 1942.5, subd. (e).)           
In this case, the superior court denied Landlord’s motion for summary 
adjudication without first considering whether Landlord had asserted a bona fide 
intent to withdraw the property and, if so, whether Tenants had controverted that 
intent.  The Court of Appeal granted the writ of mandate and directed the superior 
                                             
 
5  
Unlike Tenants, the dissent argues that the retaliatory eviction defense is 
preserved by Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (c), which states that 
the Ellis Act is not intended to “[o]verride procedural protections designed to 
prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.”  (Italics added.)  The defense of 
retaliatory eviction, however, is “a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights 
under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful 
detainer proceedings.”  (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 149, 
italics added; id. at p. 151, fn. 22.)  Indeed, numerous courts have characterized 
the retaliatory eviction defense as substantive.  (E.g., Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 
Cal.App.4th 803, 810; Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 737; Glaser v. 
Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 775; Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 
278, 281.)  We may therefore infer that the Legislature relied on contemporaneous 
judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding to preserve only 
procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c).  (Bailey v. Superior 
Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10.)      
 
 
20
court to enter an order granting Landlord’s motion for summary adjudication, 
again without considering those facts.  Under the circumstances, we will reverse 
the Court of Appeal with directions to remand the matter for the superior court to 
analyze the motion for summary adjudication under the proper standard. 
In the future, courts in similar circumstances may find it useful to consider 
first whether the landlord’s intent to withdraw the property is bona fide.  If it is, 
the statutory defense of retaliatory eviction has been overcome.  If the landlord’s 
intent is contested, the landlord has the burden to establish its truth.  (§ 1942.5, 
subd. (e).)  Only when the landlord has been unable to establish a bona fide intent 
need the factfinder proceed to determine whether the eviction is for the purpose of 
retaliating against the tenant under subdivisions (a) or (c) of section 1942.5.  
Accordingly, evidence that the landlord has, in good faith, exited the rental 
business because of tenant conduct specified in subdivisions (a) or (c) of section 
1942.5 does not itself constitute an affirmative defense in an unlawful detainer 
proceeding under the Ellis Act.       
 
 
21
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with directions to remand 
the matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J.
 
 1
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court.  I write separately in 
order to express my understanding on three points the superior court will, upon 
remand, have to consider in ruling upon the landlord’s motion for summary 
judgment:  (1) The landlord’s filing of a notice of intent to withdraw his property 
from the rental market, as required by the San Francisco Municipal Code (S.F. 
Admin. Code, § 37.9A, subd. (f)), creates a nonstatutory rebuttable presumption 
that the landlord’s intent is bona fide.1  (2) The tenant will, therefore, bear the 
burden of producing evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, i.e., 
sufficient to establish that the landlord intends to re-rent the property.  (3) The 
landlord’s motive in withdrawing his property from the rental market is irrelevant.  
 
Under the Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.), a local government with 
rent control may require a landlord to provide notice to the local government of 
the landlord’s intention to withdraw a property from the rental market, and the 
local government may require that the notice contain statements, made under 
penalty of perjury, relating to the number and address of the accommodations, the 
                                             
 
1 
The power of California appellate courts to create presumptions is 
expressly recognized by the Evidence Code.  (In re Daniel Z. (1992) 10 
Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evid. (4th ed. 2000) Burden of Proof and 
Presumptions, § 103, p. 235.)  That the Evidence Code recognizes the power of 
appellate courts to create presumptions becomes clear when sections 600 and 160 
are read together.  Evidence Code section 600 provides that a presumption is an 
assumption of fact “the law requires” to be made from another fact or group of 
facts established in the action, and Evidence Code section 160 provides that “law” 
includes “decisional law.”  
 
 2
rent charged for the residential units, and the names of the tenants or lessees.  
(Gov. Code, § 7060.4, subd. (a).)  San Francisco has enacted such a notice 
requirement (S.F. Admin. Code, § 37.9A, subd. (f)), and it is undisputed that the 
landlord here complied with it.  
 
Under the Ellis Act, a local government with rent control may also provide 
significant disincentives for re-renting a property once a notice of withdrawal has 
been filed.  Subject to certain conditions, including the length of time that has 
passed since the notice of withdrawal was filed, the disincentives include: 
permitting the displaced tenants to rent the property again for no more than the 
rent in effect at the time of withdrawal, plus allowable annual increases; 
permitting the displaced tenants to sue the landlord for actual and exemplary 
damages; and permitting the local government to sue the landlord for exemplary 
damages.  (Gov. Code, § 7060.2, subds. (a)(1), (b).)  San Francisco has enacted 
these disincentives for re-renting withdrawn properties.  (S.F. Admin. Code, 
§ 37.9A, subds. (a), (c), (d).) 
 
Because San Francisco’s disincentives for re-renting withdrawn properties 
are so significant, a landlord who, like the landlord here, has given notice of his 
intent to withdraw his property from the rental market is entitled to a presumption 
that he has a bona fide intent to do so.  He should not, in the absence of any 
contrary evidence, be saddled with proving a negative, i.e., that he does not intend 
to re-rent the property in the future. 
 
To overcome the presumption that the landlord has a bona fide intent to 
withdraw his property from the rental market, the tenant will have to produce 
admissible evidence, evidence sufficient to justify a judgment for the tenant, that 
the landlord intends to re-rent the property.  (Cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248, 254-255 [Once a prima facie showing of 
discrimination has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the 
presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to justify a judgment for 
 
 3
the defendant, that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason].) 
 
Finally, the landlord’s motive in withdrawing his property from the rental 
market is, as the majority opinion points out, irrelevant.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
13-14.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the judgment of the Court of Appeal must be 
reversed.  The Court of Appeal erroneously held that “in unlawful detainer 
proceedings properly commenced under the Ellis Act, a tenant may not raise an 
affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction.”  The Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et 
seq.) expressly provides that it does not supersede Civil Code section 1942.5, 
which offers tenants protection against retaliatory eviction.  The Ellis Act 
underscores this point by further stating that it is not intended to “[o]verride 
procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.”  
(Gov. Code, § 7060.7, subd. (c).)  It is clear, as the majority recognizes, that a 
tenant may raise the defense of retaliatory eviction in unlawful detainer 
proceedings brought under the Ellis Act. 
I disagree, however, with the majority’s holding that, on remand, the trial 
court should reconsider the landlord’s motion for summary adjudication under the 
standard that “a landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the 
rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the statutory defense of retaliatory 
eviction.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  As I will explain, I find nothing in the 
language of the Ellis Act or the statutes governing the defense of retaliatory 
eviction that permits a landlord to evict tenants under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory 
purpose. 
 
 2
The Ellis Act was intended to supercede our decision in Nash v. City of 
Santa Monica (1984) 37 Cal.3d 97, which upheld a city charter provision that 
prohibited removal of rental units from the housing market absent a permit from 
the city rent control board.  (First Presbyterian Church v. City of Berkeley (1997) 
59 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.)  The Ellis Acts begins by stating:  “No public entity 
. . . shall . . . compel the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to 
continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease.”  (Gov. Code, 
§ 7060, subd. (a).) 
The Legislature thus prohibited municipalities from preventing a landlord 
from removing an entire residential building from the rental market, but the 
Legislature took considerable pains to limit the reach of the Ellis Act.  As 
particularly relevant here, Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision (d), 
provides that nothing in the Ellis Act supersedes numerous provisions of several 
codes, including “Title 5 (commencing with Section 1925) of Part 4 of Division 3 
of the Civil Code.”  Title 5 includes Civil Code section 1942.5 (hereafter section 
1942.5), which protects tenants against retaliatory evictions. 
Underscoring the limitations placed on the scope of the Ellis Act, 
Government Code section 7060.7 states:  “It is the intent of the Legislature in 
enacting this chapter to supersede any holding or portion of any holding in Nash v. 
City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d 97 to the extent that the holding, or portion of the 
holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of business.  
However, this act is not otherwise intended to do any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] 
(c) Override procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict 
tenants.” 
The majority reasons that Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision 
(c), does not apply because it refers to “ ‘procedural’ ” protections designed to 
prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants, and the prohibition against retaliatory 
 
 3
eviction is “ ‘substantive.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19, fn. 5, italics omitted.)  In 
support of this contention, the majority quotes Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley 
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 149, for the proposition that the defense of retaliatory 
eviction is “a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police 
power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer 
proceedings.”  (Italics added.)  But the quoted portion of Birkenfeld does not refer 
to the defense of retaliatory eviction, or to section 1942.5, but to the Berkeley rent 
control law that required landlords to obtain a certificate of eviction from the city 
to recover possession of a rent-controlled unit.  This is clear when the partial 
quotation relied upon by the majority is considered in context:  “The purpose of 
the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural.  The statutes implement the landlord’s 
property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis 
for the tenant’s occupancy is at an end.  In contrast the charter amendment’s 
elimination of particular grounds for eviction is a limitation upon the landlord’s 
property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of 
defense in unlawful detainer proceedings.”  (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, supra, 
17 Cal.3d at p.149, italics added.) 
The majority also cites the decision in Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 
Cal.App.3d 278, 281, which, without any analysis or explanation, describes the 
common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction established in Schweiger v. Superior 
Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507, as a “substantive defense.”  The majority further cites 
three Court of Appeal decisions that quote this language in Aweeka without 
discussion.  From this, the majority infers that “the Legislature relied on 
contemporaneous judicial classification of the defense as substantive in deciding 
to preserve only procedural protections in section 7060.7, subdivision (c).”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 19, fn. 5.)  I disagree.  The fact that some courts have described in 
passing the common law doctrine of retaliatory eviction as “substantive” does not 
 
 4
support the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature considered the protections 
set forth in section 1942.5 to be “substantive” rather than “procedural.”  
Subdivision (a) of section 1942.5, for example, provides that a landlord may not 
retaliate against a tenant by recovering possession of a dwelling in any action or 
proceeding within 180 days of certain actions by the tenant.  This certainly appears 
to be one of the “procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to 
evict tenants” to which Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (c) refers.  
In my view, the statement in Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (c), 
that the Ellis Act was not intended to “[o]verride procedural protections designed 
to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants” means that the protections against 
retaliatory eviction afforded by section 1942.5 apply to landlords proceeding 
under the Ellis Act. 
In the present case, the landlord of a two-unit apartment building in San 
Francisco filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the tenants in one of the 
units, alleging that he had filed with the rent control board a notice of intention to 
withdraw the building from the rental market under the Ellis Act and had served 
the tenants with notice to quit the premises, but the tenants had failed to do so.  
The tenants answered, raising several affirmative defenses, including retaliatory 
eviction. 
The landlord moved for summary adjudication arguing, in part, that 
retaliatory eviction may not be raised as a defense to an unlawful detainer action 
based upon the Ellis Act.  The Superior Court granted the motion for summary 
adjudication in part, but denied summary adjudication of the defense of retaliatory 
eviction. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “in unlawful detainer 
proceedings properly commenced under the Ellis Act, a tenant may not raise an 
 
 5
affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction to prevent displacement, but retains the 
right to an independent action for damages under the retaliatory eviction statute.” 
As the majority recognizes, the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that 
the defense of retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5 may not be raised in 
unlawful detainer proceedings based upon the Ellis Act.  As noted above, the Ellis 
Act clearly states that it does not supersede section 1942.5 and was not intended to 
“[o]verride procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict 
tenants.”  (Gov. Code, § 7060.7, subd. (c); see id., § 7060.1, subd. (d).)  The 
language of the Ellis Act clearly permits a tenant to raise the defense of retaliatory 
eviction in an unlawful detainer action. 
The majority goes on to hold, however, that a landlord will defeat the 
defense of retaliatory eviction under section 1942.5 if the landlord can 
demonstrate “a bona fide intent to withdraw the property from the [rental] market” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 19), even if the landlord’s purpose is to retaliate against the 
tenant for the tenant’s exercise of rights protected by section 1942.5.  I am not 
convinced by the majority’s reasoning. 
The majority bases its holding that a landlord may invoke the Ellis Act to 
evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose not upon the language of the Ellis Act, but 
upon the language of the statute that provides protection against retaliatory 
evictions.  Section 1942.5, subdivision (a), provides that a landlord may not 
recover possession of a leased dwelling within 180 days of the tenant’s exercise of 
certain rights, including making a complaint about the tenantability of the 
premises, if the tenant is not in default as to payment of rent and the landlord is 
“retaliat[ing] against the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights 
under this chapter or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to 
tenantability of a dwelling.”  The tenant may not invoke the protection of 
subdivision (a) “more than once in any 12-month period.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  
 
 6
Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 prohibits a landlord from bringing an action to 
recover possession of a dwelling “for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee 
because he or she has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees’ association 
or an organization advocating lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably 
exercised any rights under the law.”1 
                                             
 
1  
Section 1942.5 provides, in pertinent part:  “(a) If the lessor retaliates 
against the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this 
chapter or because of his complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of 
a dwelling, and if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his 
rent, the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or 
proceeding . . . within 180 days: [¶]  (1) After the date upon which the lessee, in 
good faith, has given notice pursuant to Section 1942, or has made an oral 
complaint to the lessor regarding tenantability; or [¶]  (2) After the date upon 
which the lessee, in good faith, has filed a written complaint, or an oral complaint 
which is registered or otherwise recorded in writing, with an appropriate agency, 
of which the lessor has notice, for the purpose of obtaining correction of a 
condition relating to tenantability . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  (b) A lessee may not invoke the 
provisions of subdivision (a) more than once in any 12-month period. [¶]  (c) It 
shall be unlawful for a lessor to . . . bring an action to recover possession . . . for 
the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully 
organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advocating 
lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.  
In an action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the 
lessee shall bear the burden of producing evidence that the lessor’s conduct was, in 
fact, retaliatory. [¶]  (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in 
any way the exercise by the lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or 
any law pertaining to the hiring of property or his right to do any of the acts 
described in subdivision (a) or (c) for any lawful cause. . . . [¶]  (e) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, a lessor may 
recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other acts described in 
subdivision (a) within the period or periods prescribed therein, or within 
subdivision (c), if the notice of termination, rent increase, or other act, and any 
pleading or statement of issues in an arbitration, if any, states the ground upon 
which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to recover possession, increase rent, or do 
any of the other acts described in subdivision (a) or (c).  If such statement be 
controverted, the lessor shall establish its truth at the trial or other hearing.” 
 
 7
In concluding that, despite this language, a landlord may recover possession 
of a dwelling under the Ellis Act even if the landlord acts for a retaliatory purpose, 
the majority relies upon subdivision (d) of section 1942.5, which states:  “Nothing 
in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exercise by the lessor 
of his rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the hiring of 
property or his right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (c) for 
any lawful cause.”  The majority reasons that a landlord’s withdrawal of a 
dwelling from the rental market falls under section 1942.5, subdivision (d)’s 
exception to the proscription against retaliatory eviction because it constitutes “an 
exercise of rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of property[.]”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 12.) 
The majority’s reasoning fails because even assuming that withdrawing a 
property from the rental market under the Ellis Act constitutes “an exercise of 
rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of property” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12) 
permitting a tenant to raise a defense of retaliatory eviction does not “limit[] in any 
way” the landlord’s exercise of rights under the Ellis Act.  (§ 1942.5, subd. (d).)  
The Ellis Act expressly states that it is subject to the proscription against 
retaliatory eviction set forth in section 1942.5.  As noted above, Government Code 
section 7060.1, subdivision (d), states that nothing in the Ellis Act supersedes 
numerous statutory provisions, including section 1942.5’s proscription against 
retaliatory eviction.  Government Code section 7060.7 declares the Legislature’s 
intent that the Ellis Act not “[o]verride procedural protection designed to prevent 
abuse of the right to evict tenants.”  The procedures for removing a dwelling from 
the rental market provided by the Ellis Act, therefore, are subject to the 
proscription against retaliatory eviction set forth in section 1942.5.  The Ellis Act 
does not give landlords the right to evict tenants for a retaliatory purpose.  
Prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory 
 
 8
purpose, therefore, does not limit the landlord’s exercise of rights under the Ellis 
Act.  The majority mistakenly limits its analysis to whether “a landlord’s 
withdrawal of property from the rental market under the Ellis Act constitute[s] an 
exercise of rights under a law pertaining to the hiring of property” (maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 12), without further considering whether a tenant’s assertion of the defense of 
retaliatory eviction limits the landlord’s exercise of rights under the Ellis Act. 
It is difficult to imagine why the Legislature would have specifically stated 
in the Ellis Act that it did not supersede the protections against retaliatory eviction 
in section 1942.5 if it simply intended, as the majority holds, that a landlord may 
evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose under the Ellis Act as long as the landlord 
actually intends to withdraw the building from the rental market. 
The legislative history of Government Code section 7060.1, subdivision 
(d), supports the conclusion that a landlord may not evict a tenant under the Ellis 
Act for a retaliatory purpose.  As the majority recognizes, a Senate committee 
analysis of the legislation that enacted Government Code section 7060.1, 
subdivision (d), states that “ ‘this provision would probably prohibit a landlord 
from going out of business if the tenant had requested repairs or reported housing 
code violations.  An eviction of the tenant under such circumstances could be 
deemed a prohibited retaliatory eviction.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  The 
majority dismisses this compelling evidence of the intent of the Legislature, citing 
our decision in Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 
668, to support its conclusion that “the use of the words ‘probably’ and ‘could’ are 
sufficiently tentative and equivocal to caution us against relying too heavily on 
this snippet.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  Our decision in Folsom v. Butte County 
Assn. of Governments does not support the majority’s conclusion. 
Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, supra, 32 Cal.3d 668, 681-
682, concluded that legislative history showing that the word “private” had been 
 
 9
included in the original version of a bill, deleted by the Assembly, and then 
reinserted by the Senate was “at best equivocal.”  By contrast, the committee 
analysis relied upon by tenants in the present case could hardly be more clear.  It 
demonstrates that the Legislature specifically contemplated that the Ellis Act 
would not allow a landlord to go out of business for a retaliatory purpose.  The use 
of the words “probably” and “could” do not affect this conclusion.  Those words 
acknowledge that a notice to quit under the Ellis Act that followed a tenant’s 
report of housing code violations “would probably” or “could” be deemed 
retaliatory, but would not necessarily be deemed so.  The committee analysis is 
clear and unequivocal, however, that a “retaliatory eviction,” if established, would 
be “prohibited.”  (Sen. Rules com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 505 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10, 1985, p. 3.)  This is 
compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend the Ellis Act to empower a 
landlord to evict a tenant for a retaliatory purpose. 
The majority states that, notwithstanding subdivision (d) of section 1942.5, 
“landlords must assert their invocation of the Ellis Act ‘in good faith’ ” under 
subdivision (e) of section 1942.5.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)2  The majority 
interprets the term “good faith” in this context to mean a bona fide intent to 
withdraw the property from the rental market.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  I do not 
agree that a bona fide intent to withdraw a dwelling from the rental market 
necessarily establishes that a landlord acts in good faith in attempting to evict a 
tenant. 
                                             
 
2  
I question the majority’s premise that subdivision (e) of section 1942.5 
imposes additional requirements to those set forth in subdivision (d) of the statute.  
Rather, it appears that subdivision (e) provides a separate and distinct exception to 
the proscription against retaliatory eviction.  (See Western Land Office, Inc. v. 
Cervantes (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 733-734.) 
 
 10
In Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 733, 
the Court of Appeal examined the predecessor to subdivision (e) of section 1942.5 
and observed that it “covered the situation where the complaining tenant was not 
in violation of any law or agreement, but the landlord nevertheless wished to take 
action in good faith for a valid reason.”  (Italics added.)  The court offered 
examples of such valid reasons:  “[A] landlord might have wanted (1) to raise the 
tenant’s rent because taxes on the property had increased; (2) to recover 
possession of the tenant’s dwelling for the purpose of remodeling or demolishing; 
or (3) to sell the premises to someone who had another tenant in mind.”  (Ibid.) 
Contrary to the majority’s holding, the Court of Appeal in Cervantes made 
clear that a landlord who was acting for a retaliatory purpose was not acting in 
good faith:  “Proof of a valid ground may undermine evidence of a retaliatory 
motive.  But proof of a valid ground is not equivalent to proof of good faith.  In a 
given instance, a valid ground might exist but the landlord might nevertheless act 
with a retaliatory motive. A property tax increase of five dollars does not 
necessarily justify an increase in rent of one hundred dollars.  Therefore, under 
subdivision (a) of the statute, a trier of fact confronted with substantial evidence of 
a valid ground nevertheless had to decide whether the landlord’s ‘dominant 
purpose’ was retaliation.”  (Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 
Cal.App.3d 724, 734.)3  In my view, therefore, a landlord who is acting for a 
retaliatory purpose is not acting in “good faith” within the meaning of subdivision 
(e) of section 1942.5. 
                                             
 
3  
The requirement in section 1942.5, subdivision (a) as originally enacted, 
that the landlord “ ‘has as his dominant purpose retaliation against the lessee’ ” 
(Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 732, fn. 5) is 
replaced in the current statute with the requirement that the landlord “retaliates 
against the lessee.”  (§  1942.5, subd. (a).) 
 
 11
The majority observes that neither the tenants nor the author of this opinion 
“has identified a single jurisdiction in this country that has sustained a retaliatory 
eviction defense — or what might more accurately be termed a retaliatory 
withdrawal defense — where a landlord seeks to take a building off the market.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  The significance of this fact escapes me.  It is equally 
true that the majority has not identified any jurisdiction that has upheld a 
retaliatory eviction on the grounds that the landlord intends to remove the dwelling 
from the rental market. 
In support of its observation that no jurisdiction has sustained a “retaliatory 
withdrawal defense,” the majority relies upon two opinions that are inapposite.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  The majority cites the decision in California Livestock 
Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 136, for the proposition 
that a “claim of retaliation is not a defense in [an] unlawful detainer action based 
on foreclosure of property.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  The decision in California 
Livestock held that retaliatory eviction is not a defense to eviction following a 
valid foreclosure sale because “there is no antecedent landlord-tenant relationship 
between the trustor and the purchaser.  There is no lease or rental agreement 
entitling the trustor to remain in possession of the premises; the trustor’s only right 
to possession is based on his title to the premises, which has been lost at a valid 
foreclosure sale.  Thus, even if the purchaser were precluded from using an 
‘invalid reason’ for eviction, the trustor would still have no lawful claim to 
continued possession.”  (California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin, 
supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 143.)  This reasoning has no application in the present 
case. 
The majority also cites Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law (N.M.Ct.App. 
2002) 54 P.3d 91, for the proposition that a “claim of retaliation is not a defense in 
[an] unlawful detainer action based on [a] landlord’s decision not to remain in the 
 
 12
federal government’s Section 8 housing program.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  
The decision in Carol Rickert clearly is distinguishable.  The New Mexico statute 
at issue in Carol Rickert prohibited retaliatory eviction, but included an exception 
that permitted a landlord to increase rent or alter services “if the owner can 
establish that the increased rent or changes in services are consistent with those 
imposed on other residents of similar rental units and are not directed at the 
particular resident, but are uniform.”  (Carol Rickert & Associates v. Law, supra, 
54 P.3d at p. 98.)  Carol Rickert held that the tenant’s claim of retaliatory eviction 
was prohibited by this statutory language because the landlord’s action was 
uniform:  “[T]he parties do not dispute that Owner’s decision to discontinue 
participation in the Section 8 housing program was to be uniformly applied to all 
Section 8 tenants as their leases expired.  Accordingly, Tenant cannot base her 
retaliation defense on Owner’s decision to discontinue the Section 8 program.”  
(Ibid.)  Carol Rickert thus has no bearing on the issues in the present case. 
The majority states that prohibiting landlords from engaging in retaliatory 
evictions under the Ellis Act would be inconsistent with other laws and lead to 
absurd results.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  The majority cites Civil Code section 
1942.4, which prohibits a landlord from collecting rent for a dwelling that is 
deemed untenantable, but expressly provides that a landlord who is withdrawing 
the building from the rental market under the Ellis Act need not comply with this 
statute.  The majority also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 1174.2, 
subdivision (d), which permits a tenant to assert that the premises are 
uninhabitable as a defense in an unlawful detainer action following default in the 
payment of rent, but expressly provides that nothing in the statute “shall limit or 
supersede any provision” of the Ellis Act.  Neither of these statutes is inconsistent 
with prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant under the Ellis Act for a 
retaliatory purpose.  Further, these statutes demonstrate that the Legislature knew 
 
 13
how to exempt landlords who are proceeding under the Ellis Act from the 
requirements of certain statutes.  The Legislature chose not to exempt landlords 
from the prohibition against retaliatory evictions set forth in section 1942.5.  “ 
‘We must assume that the Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished 
to do so . . . .’ [Citation.]”  (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los 
Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349; see County of San Diego v. State of 
California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 94-95; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court 
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 88.) 
The majority also observes that a contrary holding “could permit tenants to 
force the landlord to remain in business indefinitely” “or, at the least, until a trier 
of fact determined that the retaliatory motive had dissipated.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 18-19.)  As the majority recognizes, however, this concern does not apply if 
the tenant proceeds under subdivision (a) of section 1942.5, which only prohibits 
the landlord from evicting the tenant within 180 days of the tenant’s exercise of 
the specified rights and which can be invoked by the tenant only once in any 12-
month period.  The majority’s concern applies only if the tenant proceeds under 
subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 and is able to prove that the landlord is acting 
“for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because he or she has lawfully 
organized or participated in a lessees’ association or an organization advocating 
lessees’ rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law.” 
We confronted the same concern in recognizing the common law doctrine 
of retaliatory eviction, stating:  “Of course, we do not imply that a tenant who 
proves a retaliatory purpose is entitled to remain in possession in perpetuity.  As 
the court stated in Edwards:  ‘If this illegal purpose is dissipated, the landlord can 
. . . evict his tenants or raise their rents for economic or other legitimate reasons, or 
even for no reason at all.  The question of permissible or impermissible purpose is 
one of fact for the court or jury. . . .’ (Fns. omitted.) [Citation.]”  (Schweiger v. 
 
 14
Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 507, 517.)  Even when a tenant proceeds under 
subdivision (c) of section 1942.5, a landlord is prohibited from removing a 
building from the rental market only as long as the landlord is acting for a 
retaliatory purpose.  This means only that landlords may not wrongfully use the 
Ellis Act to engage in retaliatory evictions.  Nothing in section 1942.5 prevents a 
landlord who is not acting for a retaliatory purpose from withdrawing a dwelling 
from the rental market. 
“Section 1942.5 is a remedial statute aimed at protecting tenants from 
certain types of abuses.  It is to be ‘liberally construed to effect its objectives and 
to suppress, not encourage, the mischief at which it was directed.  [Citation.]’  
[Citation.]”  (Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 251.)  In Schweiger 
v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 507, 513, we quoted at length the “persuasive 
reasoning” in Edwards v. Habib (D.C. Cir., 1968) 397 F.2d 687, that “ ‘while the 
landlord may evict for any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not, we hold, 
free to evict in retaliation for his tenant’s report of housing code violations to the 
authorities.  As a matter of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy, 
such an eviction cannot be permitted.’ ”  (Schweiger v. Superior Court, supra, 3 
Cal.3d at p. 512.)  We recognized that protection against retaliatory eviction was 
necessary to protect a tenant’s ability to demand clean and safe housing:  “ ‘The 
housing and sanitary codes . . . indicate a strong and pervasive congressional 
concern to secure for the city’s slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, 
places to live.  Effective implementation and enforcement of the codes obviously 
depend in part on private initiative in the reporting of violations. . . .  To permit 
retaliatory evictions . . . would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the housing 
code as a means of upgrading the quality of housing in Washington. . . .  There can 
be no doubt that the slum dweller, even though his home be marred by housing 
code violations, will pause long before he complains of them if he fears eviction as 
 
 15
a consequence.  Hence an eviction under the circumstances of this case would not 
only punish appellant for making a complaint which she had a constitutional right 
to make, . . . but also would stand as a warning to others that they dare not be so 
bold . . . .’ ”  (Ibid.) 
As one commentator observed:  “In large measure, the scope and effectiveness 
of tenant remedies for substandard housing will be determined by the degree of 
protection given tenants against retaliatory actions by landlords.  If a landlord is free 
to evict or otherwise harass a tenant who exercises his right to secure better housing 
conditions, few tenants will use the remedies for fear of being put out on the street.”  
(Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-
Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia (1971) 59 Geo.L.J. 909, 943.) 
The majority’s holding will permit landlords to threaten tenants that if they 
complain about the condition of their residence or exercise their rights under Civil 
Code section 1942 to make necessary repairs and deduct the cost from their rent, 
the landlord may remove the building from the rental market under the Ellis Act 
and evict them.  Such a threat might be especially effective in discouraging the 
formation of tenant associations, which are specifically protected under section 
1942.5, subdivision (c).  The majority opinion thus violates the public policy of 
this state by encouraging retaliatory eviction. 
Like the majority, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but 
I would not hold, as does the majority, “that a landlord’s bona fide intent to 
withdraw the property from the rental market under the Ellis Act will defeat the 
statutory defense of retaliatory eviction.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  In my view, 
the Ellis Act was not intended to permit a landlord to evict a tenant for a 
retaliatory purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J.
 
 1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Drouet v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 86 Cal.App.4th 1237 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S096161 
Date Filed: August 11, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Ronald Evans Quidachay 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Andrew M. Zacks, Andrew M. Zacks and James B. Kraus for Petitioner. 
 
Brad Seligman and Jennifer Cynn for The Impact Fund, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Legal Aid 
Foundation of Los Angeles, Public Interest Law Project, East Bay Community Law Center, Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area and the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Northern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
R. S. Radford for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Law Offices of Paul F. Utrecht and Paul F. Utrecht for Small Property Owners of San Francisco as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Wiegel & Fried and Clifford E. Fried for San Francisco Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Petitioner. 
 
Law Offices of Rosario Perry and Rosario Perry for Action Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of William M. Simpich, William M. Simpich; Law Offices of Philip D. Rapier, Philip D. 
Rapier; Law Offices of Marc S. Janowitz and Marc S. Janowitz for Real Parties in Interest. 
 
Gen Fujioka; Tom Weathered, Robert Capistrano; Roderick T. Field; and Dara Schur for Asian Law 
Caucus, Bay Area Legal Aid, The Los Angeles Housing Law Project and The Western Center on Law & 
Poverty as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
Daniel Berko as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrew M. Zachs 
Law Offices of Andrew M. Zachs 
235 Montgomery Street, Suite 1130 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 956-8100 
 
Brad Seligman 
The Impact Fund 
125 University Avenue 
Berkeley, CA  94710 
(510) 845-3473 
 
William M. Simpich 
Law Offices of William M. Simpich 
1736 Franklin Street, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 444-0226