Title: Ex parte Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc. and McNeilus Truck and Manufacturing, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Marcy Johnson, as personal representative of the estate of James Johnson, deceased v. McNeilus Truck and Manufacturing, Inc., et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:12/5/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070229
____________________
Ex parte Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., and McNeilus
Truck and Manufacturing, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Marcy Johnson, as personal representative of the
estate of James Johnson, deceased
v.
McNeilus Truck and Manufacturing, Inc., et al.)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-06-139)
SMITH, Justice.
Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc. ("IMMI"), and
McNeilus 
Truck 
and 
Manufacturing, 
Inc. 
("McNeilus")
1070229
2
(collectively "the petitioners"), petition for a writ of
mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to transfer this
action to the Lee Circuit Court on the basis of forum non
conveniens.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.  
Facts and Procedural History
James 
Johnson 
worked 
for 
Sunflower 
Waste, 
LLC
("Sunflower"), 
a 
waste-disposal 
company 
whose 
principal 
office
is located in Tallapoosa County.  On March 7, 2006, James was
driving a garbage truck owned by his employer.  While James
was traveling on Marvyn Parkway in Lee County, the raised rear
door of the truck struck an overhead railroad trestle.  The
truck crashed, and James was killed when he was ejected
through the front windshield.
The Opelika police and fire departments responded to the
scene of the accident.  James's body was transported to the
East Alabama Medical Center, and his death was investigated by
the Lee County coroner.  The garbage truck was towed to a
Sunflower facility located in Lee County.
Subsequently, Marcy Johnson, James's widow, on behalf of
James's estate, sued 
McNeilus, the manufacturer 
of 
the garbage
truck, and IMMI, the manufacturer of the seat belts in the
1070229
3
garbage truck, alleging, among other things, that the truck
and its seat belts were defective.  Additionally, Marcy sued
three individuals who were employees of Sunflower at the time
of the accident: Jack Conner, a maintenance manager; Russell
Davis, an operations manager; and Van Forrester, a district
manager, alleging that these individual defendants willfully
breached a duty to provide James with a safe work environment
and that they willfully removed, failed to install, or failed
to maintain certain safety devices on the garbage truck and,
in doing so, contributed to James's death.  See Ala. Code
1975, § 25-5-11.  
The petitioners, joined by Conner, Davis, and Forrester,
filed motions to transfer the case to the Lee Circuit Court
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court
denied the motion, and IMMI and McNeilus petition for mandamus
relief. 
Standard of Review
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789
(Ala. 1998).  A writ of mandamus is appropriate when
the petitioner can demonstrate '(1) a clear legal
right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a
1070229
4
refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court.'  Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).  Additionally, this Court
reviews mandamus petitions challenging a ruling on
venue on the basis of forum non conveniens by asking
whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.  Ex
parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte
Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d 395
(Ala. 2006).  Our review is limited to only those
facts that were before the trial court.  Ex parte
Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.
2002)."
Ex parte Kane, 989 So. 2d 529, 511 (Ala. 2008).
Discussion
Alabama Code 1975, § 6-3-21.1(a), provides when a civil
action must be transferred under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens:
"With respect to civil actions filed in an
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action or any claim in any civil action to any court
of general jurisdiction in which the action might
have been properly filed and the case shall proceed
as though originally filed therein. ..."
(Emphasis added.)  A party moving for a transfer under §
6-3-21.1 has the initial burden of showing, among other
things, one of two factors: (1) that the transfer is justified
based on the convenience of either the parties or the
witnesses, or (2) that the transfer is justified "in the
1070229
Again, a transfer under 6-3-21.1 is appropriate based on
1
either the convenience of the parties and witnesses or in the
interest of justice.  Chief Justice Cobb, in her dissent,
faults this Court for not analyzing the convenience-of-the-
parties-and-witnesses factor, which she argues would not
require a transfer in this case.  If this were true, however,
then a discussion of that issue--given this Court's resolution
of the case--would be dicta.  Additionally, Chief Justice
Cobb's analysis seems to elevate the convenience-of-the-
parties-and-witnesses factor of § 6-3-21.1 over the interest-
of-justice factor, which she criticizes as requiring the
consideration 
of 
"subjective" 
elements. 
 
However, by including
the "interest of justice" in § 6-3-21.1, the legislature has
deemed this factor as one of two that may be considered when
determining if a transfer under that statute is required.
5
interest of justice."  Ex parte Masonite Corp., 789 So. 2d
830, 831 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.
2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998).  A party may show that either or both
of these factors require a transfer.
There is no dispute that venue in this case is proper in
both Macon County and Lee County.  However, the petitioners
argued in their motion for a change of venue and in their
mandamus petition both that the convenience of the parties and
witnesses required that the case be transferred to Lee County
and that it was in the interest of justice to do so.  We need
not analyze the convenience of the parties and witnesses in
this case, because we hold that the interest of justice
requires a transfer.  
1
1070229
Nothing in the plain language of the statute implies that one
factor is less worthy of consideration or that it should be
ignored altogether.
6
The "interest of justice" prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires
"the transfer of the action from a county with little, if any,
connection to the action, to the county with a strong
connection to the action."  Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co.,
727 
So. 
2d 
at 
790. 
 
Therefore, 
"in 
analyzing 
the
interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1, this Court focuses on
whether the 'nexus' or 'connection' between the plaintiff's
action and the original forum is strong enough to warrant
burdening the plaintiff's forum with the action."  Ex parte
First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, [Ms. 1061392, April 11,
2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008).  Additionally, this
Court has held that "litigation should be handled in the forum
where the injury occurred."  Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414,
416 (Ala. 2006).  Further, in examining whether it is in the
interest of justice to transfer a case, we consider "the
burden of piling court services and resources upon the people
of a county that is not affected by the case and ... the
interest of the people of a county to have a case that arises
in their county tried close to public view in their county."
1070229
Chief Justice Cobb also asserts that this Court's
2
decision to order the case transferred to Lee County moves
this case from a county with an average caseload to a county
with a higher caseload.  However, no argument or evidence on
this issue was presented to this Court by the parties;
therefore, we may not consider it.  In any event, an argument
that a case should not be transferred to a circuit court with
a higher caseload than the circuit court from which the case
is being transferred is negated by the fact that the court
services and resources of a county should not be burdened with
a case that is only remotely connected with that county.  Ex
7
Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala.
2007).  The petitioners in this case are thus required to
demonstrate "'that having the case heard in [Lee] County would
more serve the interest of justice'" than having the case
heard in Macon County.  Ex parte First Tennessee Bank, ___ So.
2d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414, 416 (Ala.
2006)).
Marcy argues that the interest of justice does not
require a transfer in this case to Lee County because none of
the 
parties 
reside 
or 
are 
located 
in 
Lee 
County.
Additionally, she notes that neither IMMI or McNeilus "have
business relationships" in Lee County, whereas Sunflower
conducts business in Macon County and Conner resides there.
Finally, litigating the case in Lee County, Marcy contends,
would be less convenient for the parties.   
2
1070229
parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., supra.  Additionally,
citizens should not be required to suspend their lives and
jobs to serve on a jury in a case with only a tenuous
connection to their county merely because their local court
has a lighter caseload.  See Ex parte First Family Fin.
Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 661 (Ala. 1998) ("'"Jury duty is
a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation."'" (quoting
Ex parte Gauntt, 677 So. 2d 204, 221 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J.,
dissenting), quoting in turn Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947))).
8
We agree that this case certainly has a connection with
Macon County--as Marcy notes, Conner resides there and
Sunflower conducts business there.  Additionally, it is true
that none of the parties in this case actually resides in Lee
County.  However, we nevertheless hold that the overall
connection between Macon County and this case is weak and that
the connection between the case and Lee County is strong.
First and foremost, the accident occurred in Lee County.
Lee County police and emergency personnel--the Opelika Police
Department and the Opelika Fire Department--responded to the
scene and investigated the accident.  Additionally, Gene
Manning, the chief deputy coroner of Lee County, investigated
James's death.  He testified in an affidavit that all the work
he performed in connection with the investigation took place
in Lee County.  Additionally Danny Cotney, the assistant fire
1070229
The petitioners also contend that numerous witnesses in
3
this case reside in Lee County.  Although the petitioners
present affidavits from some of these witnesses, they fail to
present affidavits for many others.  See Ex parte ADT Sec.
Servs., Inc., 933 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. 2006) (noting that, in
considering a mandamus petition, this Court looks only to
those facts presented to the trial court, and those facts
"must be based upon 'evidentiary material,' which does not
include statements of counsel in motions, briefs, and
arguments").  
The Johnsons lived in Montgomery County at the time of
4
the accident; Marcy has since moved to Florida.  IMMI is an
Indiana corporation, and McNeilus is located in Minnesota.
Sunflower is located in Tallapoosa County.  Davis and
Forrester live in Elmore County.
9
chief of the Opelika Fire Department, testified that the
various records and documents generated by the department are
located in Lee County.   
3
On the other hand, the "connection" or "nexus" with Macon
County in this case is weak.   No party but Conner resides or
is located there.   Additionally, none of the relevant facts
4
in this case actually involve Macon County.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Cobb suggests that this
Court should defer to the trial court's decision.  In Ex parte
First Family Financial Services, Inc., 718 So. 2d 658 (Ala.
1998), the plaintiff maintained that a transfer was not
required "upon the proposition that '[t]ransfers under §
6-3-21.1 are within the discretion of the trial judge ... [and
1070229
10
that a] trial court [should] give deference to the plaintiff's
choice of venue."  Under the venue system established by the
Alabama Legislature, "the plaintiff has the initial choice of
venue."  718 So. 2d at 659.  This "choice" exists because, in
many situations, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-7, would allow proper
venue to exist in more than one county.  "Reading [§ 6-3-7] in
isolation, one would not discern that the Legislature intended
to limit the plaintiff's choice of forum. However, § 6-3-7
must be read in pari materia with other Code sections dealing
with the same subject, i.e., venue. ... Accordingly, we must
read § 6-3-7 in pari materia with § 6-3-21.1."  718 So. 2d at
659-60. 
We held in First Family that the adoption of § 6-3-21.1
"substantially modified the law relating to the venue of civil
actions."  718 So. 2d at 660.  Formerly, "'[t]he ability to
transfer cases within Alabama for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and in the interest of justice was denied
Alabama courts ....'" 718 So. 2d at 660 (quoting Robert D.
Hunter, Alabama's 1987 Tort Reform Legislation, 18 Cumb. L.
Rev. 281, 289-90 (1988)).  We concluded, however, "that the
Legislature, in adopting § 6-3-21.1, intended to vest in the
1070229
11
trial courts, the Court of Civil Appeals, and this Court the
power and the duty to transfer a cause when 'the interest of
justice' requires a transfer." 718 So. 2d at 660 (emphasis
added). 
The plaintiff in First Family argued "that a trial judge
has almost unlimited discretion in such matters."  We noted
that although the trial court "has a degree of discretion in
determining whether the factors listed in the statute ... are
in favor of transferring the action," this degree of
discretion is not unlimited and "must be considered in light
of the fact that the Legislature used the word 'shall' instead
of the word 'may' in § 6-3-21.1."  718 So. 2d at 660 (emphasis
added).  This statute, we have subsequently noted, is
"compulsory," Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 905 n.9 (Ala.
2004), and the use of the word "shall" is "imperative and
mandatory."  Ex parte Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 721 So.
2d 1135, 1138 (Ala. 1998) (comparing the use of the word
"shall" in Alabama's interstate forum non conveniens statute,
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-430, with its use in § 6-3-21.1).
The accident made the basis of this case occurred in Lee
County, and the accident was investigated by Lee County
1070229
Chief Justice Cobb, citing caselaw prior to the enactment
5
of § 6-3-21.1, suggests that our review of this ruling risks
"expanding this Court's 'piecemeal' appellate jurisdiction."
However, this Court has consistently reviewed rulings on
motions to transfer filed pursuant to § 6-3-21.1 since that
Code section was enacted in 1987.  Additionally, this Court
has reviewed rulings on motions to transfer under the common-
law doctrine of forum non conveniens since at least 1957.  See
Ex parte Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 Ala. 139, 99 So.
2d 118 (1957).  Given the clear mandate of § 6-3-21.1 and this
Court's historic practice, we decline to abandon our review of
rulings on § 6-3-21.1 motions.
12
authorities.  We see no need for Macon County, with its weak
connection with this case, to be burdened with an action that
arose in Lee County simply because one of several defendants
resides there.  Instead, Lee County clearly has a strong
connection with this case.  See Ex parte Verbena United
Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d 395, 400 (Ala. 2006) (holding
that the "weak nexus" with the county in which an action was
filed did not "justify burdening" that county with the trial
of that action; thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
required the case be transferred to a county that had "a much
stronger nexus").   We thus conclude that having the case
heard in Lee County would "more serve the interest of
justice." Ex parte First Tennessee Bank, ___ So. 2d at ___.
The trial court therefore exceeded its discretion in refusing
to transfer the case to Lee County.   
5
1070229
Additionally, review by petitions for the writ of
mandamus does not offend the maxim that "justice delayed is
justice denied."  Alabama law specifically provides that a
party may move for a transfer under § 6-3-21.1, and § 6-3-21.1
was specifically designed to end prior abuse of the legal
process.  Justice is not denied when a party successfully
exercises the rights provided it by law--in this case, seeking
the correct disposition of a transfer under § 6-3-21.1.
King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1992), involves
6
claims that were filed in an improper venue; the court cited
Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515, 1523
(9th Cir. 1983), in which the appellant claimed that the trial
court should have transferred the case to a proper forum
instead of dismissing it outright.  The court noted in Wood
that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the trial court had the
option of dismissing the case or transferring it "in the
interest of justice."  In determining whether a transfer,
instead of a dismissal, was "in the interest of justice," the
court held that "justice would not have been served" by
transferring a case "to a jurisdiction that [the plaintiff]
purposefully sought to avoid through blatant forum shopping."
13
Chief Justice Cobb in her dissent urges this Court to
adopt a rule requiring parties to demonstrate a significant
likelihood of injustice in order to warrant a change of venue
based on the interest-of-justice factor of § 6-3-21.1.
Although acknowledging that Alabama law does not require such
a showing, Chief Justice Cobb cites several cases in support
of the idea that a party should show a "significant likelihood
of injustice in the absence of the transfer of the case."
However, the decisions cited in her dissent do not appear to
support this assertion.   Additionally, it  is unclear how the
6
1070229
Neither King nor Wood discussed whether a party, to show that
a transfer is in the interest of justice, must show a
"significant likelihood of injustice" in the absence of the
transfer.
Kawamoto v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1209,
1212 (D. Haw. 2002), addressed a federal forum non conveniens
statute and held that the convenience of the parties and
witnesses required a transfer because most of the parties and
witnesses lived in California and hearing the case in Hawaii
was thus inconvenient.  The court did not look to whether
there would be a significant likelihood of injustice if the
case were not transferred.
  
Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. 2004), involves a
Texas statute that specifically requires a determination of
whether a transfer or the refusal to transfer would "work an
injustice" on either the movant or any other party.  See Tex.
Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.002(b).  Our legislature,
in enacting § 6-3-21.1, chose not to include a similar
explicit rule.
 
Finally, In re Trust Created Under Agreement Dated
September 19, 1983, 469 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984),
involves the interpretation of Indiana's interstate forum non
conveniens statute by the courts of that state, which require
a showing that a "substantial injustice is likely to result"
if a case is tried in that state.  However, this decision
contains no analysis as to why Indiana's caselaw requires such
a consideration.
14
new analysis proposed by Chief Justice Cobb would require any
less consideration of "subjective" elements, to which Chief
Justice Cobb objects.  Moreover, this proposed limitation to
the interest-of-justice factor has no support in the text of
§ 6-3-21.1; no persuasive authority urges its adoption; and
1070229
15
neither party in this case has discussed this proposed
limitation.  We thus see no need to engraft such an analysis
to restrict the application of § 6-3-21.1. 
Conclusion 
The trial court is directed to transfer the case to the
Lee Circuit Court.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.  
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1070229
16
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  I write first to note my
continued concern with this Court's inclination to intrude
into areas properly reserved to the trial court's discretion,
with the added detriment of unduly expanding this Court's
"piecemeal" appellate jurisdiction.  Previously, this Court
sought to avoid reviewing cases in such a fashion and quoted
with approval the federal plan of constraining the use of
extraordinary writs:
"'In strictly circumscribing piecemeal appeal,
Congress must have realized that in the course of
judicial decision some interlocutory orders might be
erroneous. The supplementary review power conferred
on the courts by Congress in the All Writs Act is
meant to be used only in the exceptional case where
there is clear abuse of discretion or "usurpation of
judicial power."'"
Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 280 Ala. 586, 589, 196 So. 2d 702,
705 (1967) (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346
U.S. 379, 383-84 (1953)(emphasis added)).  See also Ex parte
Textile Workers Union of America, 249 Ala. 136, 30 So. 2d 247
(1947).  
With respect to the circumstances presented by this case,
it is apparent that the main opinion avoids any conclusion
that under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Ala. Code
1070229
17
1975, § 6-3-21.1, the trial court exceeded its discretion in
refusing to transfer the case because the facts show that
there is little difference between the forums in convenience
to the parties.  That is, the facts do not support the
issuance of the instant writ under the doctrine of  forum non
conveniens.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens requires the
proponents of a change in venue to show that the proposed
location -- here Lee County -- would be "significantly more
convenient" than the current location -- here Macon County --
a showing that the instant facts do not support.  Moreover, in
this situation, the trial court would be well within its
discretion in deferring to the plaintiff's choice of the forum
in which to try the cause.  See, e.g., Ex parte Bloodsaw, 648
So. 2d 553 (Ala. 1994); Ex parte Johnson, 638 So. 2d 772 (Ala.
1994); and Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d 711 (Ala. 1991).
Thus, the main opinion shifts its emphasis to whether the
change in venue is warranted in the "interest of justice."
Under Ex parte First Tennessee Bank National Ass'n, [Ms.
1061392, April 11, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008), and
Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414, 416 (Ala. 2006), the Court
would then simply weigh factors concerning "justice," such as
1070229
See Bloodsaw, Johnson, and Townsend, supra.  See also Ex
7
parte Nichols, 757 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 1999).
18
the connection between the case and the county in which venue
is sought, to decide, entirely subjectively, whether justice
is better served by trying the case in one county than in
another.  Unlike the standard articulated in the main opinion,
in which the Court lists such factors as the facts that none
of the parties reside in Lee County and that some of the
parties do conduct business in Macon County before concluding
that, nevertheless, the case must be transferred to Lee County
because the "connection" with that county is stronger than the
"connection" with Macon County, primarily because the accident
and the subsequent investigation of the accident occurred in
Lee County.   
In my view, this sort of analysis flies in the face of
the deference this Court once paid to a plaintiff's right to
choose among appropriate forums for the prosecution of his or
her cause,  and it further permits this Court to substitute
7
its discretion for that of the trial court.  Moreover, the
simple weighing of factors to determine the strength of a
particular forum's connection or the extent that a transfer
would serve justice invites parties to petition this Court for
1070229
19
a writ of mandamus to change between two equally "convenient"
venues  in most situations where there are two or more
acceptable venues.  I believe that a proper evaluation of the
interest-of-justice factor in § 6-3-21.1 would require the
movant to show a significant likelihood of injustice if the
transfer does not occur before this Court invalidates the
plaintiff's choice of forum and displaces the trial court's
discretion with its own.  Accordingly, in order to warrant a
change of venue based on the interest of justice, the movant
should be required to present facts showing a significant
likelihood of injustice in the absence of the transfer of the
case.  Although this requirement has not been adopted in this
State, it underlies the rationale of the transfer of, or the
refusal to transfer, a case in numerous decisions in other
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301,
1304 (9th Cir. 1992)(approving the federal district court's
dismissal of a cause based on improper venue in part because
the plaintiff had been unsuccessful in filing the same claims
in another venue -- "it would not be in the interests of
justice to transfer this case because, among other reasons,
King herself expressed no interest in transfer and because 'of
1070229
20
the fact that the action smacks of harassment and bad faith on
the plaintiff's part in that it appears that she filed it here
after repeatedly losing on at least some similar claims in
California.'"); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705
F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir. 1983)(approving the federal district
court's refusal to transfer a cause to a venue where personal
jurisdiction did exist because "[j]ustice would not have been
served by transferring Wood's claims back to a jurisdiction
that he purposefully sought to avoid through blatant forum
shopping"); Kawamoto v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 225 F. Supp.
2d 1209, 1212 (D. Haw. 2002)(holding generally that a showing
of the relative injustice to the parties was a factor to be
considered in transferring a case under federal law); Garza v.
Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. 2004)(applying the Texas statutory
requirement that "the transfer of the action would not work an
injustice to any other party"); and In re Trust Created Under
Agreement Dated September 19, 1983, 469 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984)(noting that a change of venue in the interest of
justice must be based upon a showing that the litigation of
the cause in the state is so inconvenient that substantial
injustice is likely to result).  See, generally, C.P. Jhong
1070229
21
Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Statute
(28 U.S.C.A. § 1406) Providing for Dismissal or Transfer of
Cases for Improper Venue, §§ 22-31, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 467 (1970,
Supp. 2008-2009).  
I recognize that none of these cases is precisely on
point with the venue scheme set out in § 6-3-21.1.  They do,
however, give examples of what factors might be considered as
a basis for venue decided on the "interest of justice."  The
point is that the distinction between a change of venue for
the convenience of the parties and a change of venue in the
interest of justice should be more significant than simply
assessing the relative travel times.  A change of venue based
on the "interest of justice" should meet a higher standard,
one that can be plainly and specifically articulated.  It is
this Court's responsibility to enunciate such a standard,
based on the statute, which can then be understood and applied
by the trial courts and all practitioners.  I believe that the
connection test as employed by the majority here falls short
of the appropriate analysis for changing venue "in the
interest of justice."  Although "connectedness" might be one
consideration, the Court should also consider factors such as
1070229
22
the ability of the parties to obtain a fair and timely trial
in the respective venues, the selection of venue for purposes
of harassment or fraud on the court, and the judicial
resources that are available in a particular venue to
adjudicate the cause.  That is, the party seeking a change of
venue "in the interest of justice" should be prepared to show
that the denial of the motion for a change of venue will
result in a significant likelihood of injustice.
It is a long-settled maxim of American jurisprudence that
"justice delayed is justice denied."  Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So.
2d 890, 898 (Ala. 1993)("This Court recognizes that implicit
in the Judiciary's constitutional requirement to render
services is the requirement that those services be delivered
in a timely manner.").  See also Chism v. Jefferson County,
954 So. 2d 1058 (Ala. 2006), and Willis v. State ex rel. Flynt
Oil Co., 290 Ala. 227, 275 So. 2d 657 (1973). The ever
increasing tendency of parties to seek mandamus relief, thus
adding many more months to the adjudicative process, must be
reexamined.  In this case, the counties in which this case
would properly be adjudicated are equally convenient to the
parties.  Although the courts' relative caseloads were not a
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factor argued in the context of this case, this Court's
decision moves a case from a county with an average caseload
to a county with one of the highest caseloads in the State, a
decision that will almost certainly add increased delay to the
resolution of this case.  In the future, this factor should
also be considered when this Court acts in "the interest of
justice" to examine a transfer or a refusal to transfer under
§ 6-3-21.1.