Title: Vann v. Daniels

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ASHLEY L. VANN,1 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES E. DANIELS, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 202, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  File No. CS10-02409 
§  Petition No. 10-25853 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 6, 2012 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: May 21, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 21st day of May 2012, upon consideration of the Family Court’s 
decision on remand, the parties’ supplemental briefing, and the record below, it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Ashley Vann (“Mother”), filed this appeal pro se from 
an order of the Family Court dated March 24, 2011.  The Family Court’s order 
awarded the parties joint custody of their minor daughter but granted Father’s 
petition for primary residential placement of the child “for the reasons set forth in 
open court at the conclusion of the hearing.”  Upon initial review, we concluded 
that the matter should be remanded to the Family Court to provide a fuller, written 
                                                 
1 The Court assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
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decision setting forth the rationale for its conclusion that primary residential 
placement with Father is in the child’s best interests.  The Family Court issued its 
written decision on remand on February 13, 2012, and the parties submitted 
supplemental briefing.  After careful consideration, we find no error or abuse of 
discretion in the Family Court’s decision on remand.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that the parties’ daughter was born in 2006.  The 
parties, who were living in Milford, separated in December 2009 and agreed to a 
shared custody arrangement with the child moving between their respective 
households from week to week.  In the spring of 2010, Mother moved to Elkton, 
Maryland to be closer to her job.  The daughter moved with Mother, and Father’s 
contact was reduced to visitation every weekend from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. 
on Sunday.  In August 2010, Father filed a petition seeking joint custody and 
residential placement of his daughter with him.  At a mediation conference held in 
October 2010, the parties agreed that their daughter was happy and had adjusted to 
her new circumstances.  Accordingly, the Family Court entered an interim 
visitation order, which maintained the child’s current living arrangements with 
Mother and granted Father visitation three weekends out of every month and any 
other additional contact agreed to by the parties. 
 
(3) 
In March 2011, the Family Court held a hearing on Father’s custody 
petition.  Father and his fiancé testified at the hearing, as well as Mother and the 
 
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maternal grandmother.  Neither party was represented by counsel.  The judge 
granted Father’s petition at the conclusion of the hearing.   
 
(4) 
Thereafter, following this Court’s remand, the Family Court entered a 
written decision fully explaining its rationale for granting Father’s petition.    
In her 
supplemental opening brief on appeal, Mother does not allege that the Family 
Court committed any legal error.  Rather, she takes issue with some of the Family 
Court’s factual findings and the weight given to those findings. 
(5) 
The scope of this Court’s review of a Family Court judgment includes 
a review of both law and facts.2  If the Family Court correctly applied the law, we 
review under an abuse of discretion standard.3  The Family Court’s factual findings 
will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record and are the 
product of an orderly and logical deductive process.4  When the determination of 
facts turns on the credibility of the witnesses who testified under oath before the 
trial judge, this Court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge.5 
(6) 
The record in this case reflects that the Family Court reviewed all of 
the factors relevant to performing a best interest analysis under 13 Del. C. § 722(a) 
and included substantial citation to evidence in the record bearing on each factor. 
The Family Court found that both parties were good parents to their daughter and 
                                                 
2 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
3 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 186-87 (Del. 1991). 
4 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
5 Wife (J.F.V) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
 
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both were capable of providing her with a stable home.  Nonetheless, after 
considering the relevant evidence and analyzing the § 722(a) factors, the Family 
Court granted primary residential custody to Father because:  (i) Mother had 
moved far enough away from where the parties’ daughter was born and raised in 
Milford, Delaware to make a shared residential arrangement unworkable; (ii) 
Father had played a more active role in caring for the child during the course of the 
parties’ relationship because of Mother’s work schedule; (iii) Father remained in 
Milford where the child could continue to attend the same daycare and have access 
to extended family; and (iv) Father had since remarried and moved into a five-
bedroom home, which provided his daughter with more stability.  
(7) 
Mother disputes the Family Court’s finding that Father was more 
active as a caregiver during the course of their relationship.  She also disputes the 
trial judge’s conclusion that Father’s remarriage provides their daughter with more 
stability.  Mother does not dispute, however, that she made a unilateral decision to 
move to Elkton, Maryland from her former home in Milford.  This decision made 
the parties’ previous shared residential custody arrangement untenable because of 
the distance.  Mother had worked in Newark, Delaware during the course of the 
marriage.  Her move to Elkton, thus, was not prompted by a new job. Father, on 
the other hand, remained in Milford where the child has extended family and can 
attend the same daycare.   
 
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(8) 
Under the circumstances, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the 
Family Court’s ruling.  The Family Court correctly applied the law and considered 
all of the best interest factors.  Moreover, the trial judge’s factual findings are 
supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive 
process.  Accordingly, we affirm the Family Court’s decision that primary 
residential placement with Father is in the child’s best interests. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice