Title: Annayeva v. SAB of the TSD of the City of St. Louis

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MARAL ANNAYEVA, 
   
) 
Opinion issued March 17, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC98122   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Consolidated with  
SAB OF THE TSD OF THE CITY  
     
) 
No. SC98124 
OF ST. LOUIS, 
 
 
 
 
) 
) 
 
and                                                               
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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TREASURER OF MISSOURI AS            
) 
CUSTODIAN OF THE SECOND             
) 
INJURY FUND, 
 
 
 
  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
) 
 
 
 
Respondents.  
  
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 
 
Maral Annayeva appeals a decision from the Labor and Industrial Relations 
Commission ("Commission") denying her claim for workers' compensation benefits for 
injuries sustained when she fell while entering her place of work.  Annayeva failed to prove 
her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment; therefore, the Commission's 
denial of workers' compensation benefits is affirmed.   
 
 
2 
 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
Maral Annayeva worked as an English as a second language teacher at Roosevelt 
High School in St. Louis.  On January 8, 2013, Annayeva drove to Roosevelt, parked in 
the school parking lot, and walked into the school carrying a bag containing various folders, 
student papers, and lesson plans.  Annayeva entered the school through a set of double 
doors, passed a security guard station, and headed toward the room where she clocked-in.  
At some time during the walk, Annayeva slipped on Roosevelt's linoleum floor, causing 
her to fall forward and land on her hands and knees.  Annayeva was taken for treatment to 
the school nurse's office, where she filled out an accident report noting she could not 
determine what had caused her to slip and fall.   
 
Annayeva then went to the emergency room at St. Mary's Hospital complaining of 
back and knee pain.  She returned to the emergency room the next day due to the pain she 
was experiencing.  After missing a few days of work due to the accident, Annayeva 
returned to work for several days but stopped after having difficulties teaching.  She did 
not work again until August 2013, when the new school year began.  She worked for two 
days but again stopped after experiencing too much pain.  Annayeva testified she 
experienced pain in her legs, back, head, right thigh, right hip, neck, arms, right shoulder 
and fingers.  Additionally, Annayeva complained of breathing problems, stomach 
problems, liver problems, anxiety, depression, dizziness, nausea, face drooping, and cysts 
on her fingers.  For her ailments, Annayeva sought and received an extensive list of medical 
3 
 
treatments1 including: injections, x-rays, physical therapy, spinal adjustments, an MRI, and 
water therapy, as well as several other doctor's visits, medical tests, and medications.   
 
In addition to her testimony, Annayeva presented evidence of her medical records, 
transcripts of doctors' depositions, and medical bills.  The Special Administrative Board of 
the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis ("SAB") presented deposition 
testimony of three other doctors who evaluated Annayeva and one other doctor's medical 
records.  The ALJ denied Annayeva any workers' compensation benefits, noting: 
[Annayeva] has failed to provide credible testimony to this Court.  It is clear 
[Annayeva's] description of her injuries and their subsequent effects verge 
on the point of malingering.  As all, if not most, of [Annayeva's] medical 
expert testimony relies . . . on [Annayeva's] own subjective description of her 
maladies[.]  There is little or no objective medical finding to support any of 
[Annayeva's] anomalies.  [Annayeva] has not met her burden of showing the 
incident of January 8, 2013 was the prevailing factor causing the 
physiological and/or psychological complaints. 
 
 
Annayeva appealed the ALJ's denial of benefits to the Commission, which affirmed 
the ALJ's decision with a supplemental opinion.2  In its supplemental opinion, the 
Commission  held Annayeva failed to establish that her injury arose out of her employment.  
The Commission determined any evidence, including Annayeva's testimony,3 regarding 
the soiled condition of the floor on the day of her accident was not credible and held, 
                                              
1 SAB referred Annayeva to Concentra for medical treatment.  After evaluation, Concentra 
provided her with a knee brace and ordered physical therapy, which Annayeva attended twice.  
The remaining medical treatments were sought by Annayeva individually.   
2 When the Commission adopts the findings of the ALJ, appellate courts review those findings as 
if originally made by the Commission.  § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000.  
3 Annayeva testified the condition of the linoleum floor on the day of the accident was "normal" 
but, after being repeatedly questioned by her attorney, she recanted this answer and testified the 
floor was covered by particles of dirt, ice, dust, and moisture.     
4 
 
"[w]ithout additional support in the record for the alleged hazardous condition of the 
hallway floor, we find that the only risk source in this matter was that of walking, one to 
which [Annayeva] would have been equally exposed in normal non-employment life."  
After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, 
§ 10.  
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews all final decisions, findings, rules, and orders of the Commission 
to determine "whether the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon 
the whole record."  Mo. Const. art. V, § 18.  The Commission's decision will be affirmed 
unless: "(1) the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the award was 
procured by fraud; (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or 
(4) there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the 
award."  White v. ConAgra Packaged Foods, LLC, 535 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Mo. banc 2017); 
§ 287.495.1, RSMo 2000.4  "Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and, in the 
absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the [C]ommission within its powers shall be 
conclusive and binding."  § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000.  In addition to findings of fact, this 
Court also defers to the Commission's determinations as to credibility of witnesses and the 
weight given to conflicting evidence.  Greer v. SYSCO Food Servs., 475 S.W.3d 655, 664 
(Mo. banc 2015).  
 
                                              
4 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2008, unless otherwise provided.   
5 
 
Analysis 
 
Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law ("Act") was amended in 2005 "to provide 
that its provisions are to be construed strictly and to require the evidence to be weighed 
impartially without giving any party the benefit of the doubt."  Miller v. Mo. Highway and 
Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. banc 2009)5; § 287.800.  Under the Act, an 
injury is compensable only when the claimant demonstrates the injury has arisen out of and 
in the course of employment.  § 287.020.3(1); Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 
S.W.3d 504, 509 (Mo. banc 2012) ("[T]he workers' compensation claimant[] bears the 
burden of proof to show that her injury was compensable in workers' compensation.").   
An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment 
only if: 
 
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that 
the accident is the prevailing factor6 in causing the injury; and  
 
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to 
which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to 
the employment in normal nonemployment life. 
 
§ 287.020.3(2)(a)-(b).  "For an injury to be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the 
employment under section 287.020.3(2)(b), the claimant employee must show a causal 
connection between the injury at issue and the employee's work activity."  Johme, 366 
S.W.3d at 510.   
                                              
5 "Prior to the 2005 amendments, the [A]ct's provisions were required to be construed liberally in 
favor of compensation."  Id. at 673.   
6 "'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing 
both the resulting medical condition and disability."  § 287.020.3(1) (emphasis omitted).   
6 
 
 
This Court recognized in Miller and Johme that failure to prove the hazard or risk 
causing the employee injury was related to employment to which the employee would not 
have been equally exposed outside of work is fatal to an employee's workers' compensation 
claim.  
 
In Miller, a road crew worker was repairing a section of road on Route N in Pike 
County.  Miller, 287 S.W.3d at 672.  While walking on the flat road back to a truck 
containing repair material, Miller felt his knee pop.  Id.  Miller required surgery to repair 
an impinging medial shelf plica.  Id.  Miller sought workers' compensation benefits, which 
the Commission denied.  Id.  This Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding 
Miller failed to prove his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment because 
nothing about his work transformed his walk to the truck into a hazard or risk he was not 
equally exposed to in normal, nonemployment life.  Id. at 674.  Said differently, an injury 
occurring at work does not automatically make such an injury compensable; some 
condition of employment must create a hazard or risk the employee would not be equally 
exposed to in normal, nonemployment life.  Id.7    
 
In Johme, a billing representative at a hospital tripped and fell after making a pot of 
coffee in the workplace kitchen.  366 S.W.3d at 505-06.  Johme sought workers' 
compensation benefits, which the Commission awarded.  Id. at 507.  This Court reversed, 
holding Johme failed to prove her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment 
because no evidence demonstrated her injury was caused by a risk related to her 
                                              
7 "An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor."  
§ 287.020.2. 
7 
 
employment activity as opposed to a risk she was equally exposed to in normal life.  Id. at 
512. 
 
Annayeva attempts to distinguish her situation from those cases by arguing the 
condition of Roosevelt's linoleum floor on the day of the accident was a hazard or risk she 
was not exposed to in her normal, nonemployment life.  The Commission found the only 
evidence presented regarding the floor's condition was Annayeva's testimony that the floor 
was covered with particles of dirt, ice, dust, and moisture.  The Commission, however, 
determined this testimony was not credible.8  Because this Court is bound by the 
                                              
8 Annayeva contends the Commission's determination that her testimony was not credible was not 
supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record.  This contention 
misunderstands the nature of that requirement.  Only factual findings that are necessary to make 
an award for the employee must be supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole 
record.  See Mo. Const. art. V, § 18; § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000; White, 535 S.W.3d at 338.  
Credibility determinations, on the other hand, do not and – once expressed by the Commission – 
are binding on this Court.  Greer, 475 S.W.3d at 664.  Annayeva's overall burden of proof is made 
up of two separate burdens, the burden of persuasion and the burden of production.  Krispy Kreme 
Doughnut Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 488 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Mo. banc 2016).  "The burden of 
[production] is a party's duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided 
by the fact fact-finder[.]"  Kinzenbaw v. Dir. of Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 49, 53 n.6 (Mo. banc 2001) 
(internal quotations omitted).  In a workers' compensation case, an employee meets this burden 
when she introduces competent and substantial evidence on the whole record sufficient to support 
a finding on each of the facts necessary to that award.  The burden of persuasion, on the other 
hand, requires the employee actually "to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that 
favors [her]."  Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 488 S.W.3d at 67.  Assuming arguendo that 
Annayeva carried her burden of production as to the condition of the linoleum floor through her 
testimony, it is clear Annayeva failed to meet her burden of persuasion.  In its findings, the 
Commission analyzed why it was not persuaded by Annayeva's description of the floor.  First, 
Annayeva originally testified the floor was "normal" and only changed her answer upon repeated 
questioning by her attorney.  Second, the Commission reviewed the accident report Annayeva 
filled out in the nurse's office immediately after her fall; it explicitly provided she did not know 
what the cause of her accident was.  Third, the Commission reviewed Annayeva's medical records, 
none of which mentioned the condition of the linoleum floor at the time of the accident.  Because 
it did not believe Annayeva's testimony, the Commission concluded she had failed to carry her 
burden of convincing the Commission that her injury arose out of or in the course of her 
employment.   
8 
 
Commission's credibility determinations when they are expressed in the award or denial of 
benefits and the weight the Commission gives to conflicting evidence, it must treat 
Annayeva's testimony regarding the condition of the floor as not persuasive.  Greer, 475 
S.W.3d at 664.  Because Annayeva has failed to produce any credible evidence regarding 
the soiled condition of the floor, her walk into school was no different from any other walk 
taken in her normal, nonemployment life.  Under § 287.020.3(b), Annayeva's workers' 
compensation claim is not compensable.   
Conclusion 
 
Just like the claimants in Miller and Johme, Annayeva failed to prove her injury 
arose out of and in the course of her employment because the hazard or risk involved was 
one Annayeva was equally exposed to in her normal, nonemployment life.  Therefore, she 
has failed to carry her burden of proof, and the Commission's denial of benefits is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur.