Title: In re Palmer

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re WILLIAM M. PALMER II 
 on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S256149 
 
First Appellate District, Division Two 
A154269 
 
 
January 28, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Groban, and Grover* concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
In re PALMER  
S256149 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
Judgments about the proper punishment for a crime are 
generally entrusted to the people’s democratically elected 
representatives (see Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 175–
176 (plur. opn. of Stewart, J.)) — and, in California, to the people 
themselves.  (See, e.g., Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, pp. 70–74; see generally Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 8.)  Yet neither the Legislature nor the people 
have the final word.  Both the state and federal Constitutions 
bar the infliction of punishment that is grossly disproportionate 
to the offender’s individual culpability.  (U.S. Const., 8th 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)  So when a claim of 
constitutionally excessive punishment is properly presented, it 
is for the courts, “as coequal guardian[s] of the Constitution, to 
condemn any violation of that prohibition.”  (In re Lynch (1972)  
8 Cal.3d 410, 414 (Lynch).)  How courts should fulfill that 
responsibility when an inmate claims a sentence is excessive 
because of one or more parole denials is the question at the heart 
of this case. 
 
William M. Palmer II first sought release on parole from 
the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) in 1995.  The Board denied 
parole, but Palmer persisted.  Following the Board’s 10th denial, 
Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  His petition 
alleged that the 30 years he had already served on a life 
sentence for an aggravated kidnapping committed when he was 
a juvenile was constitutionally excessive.  Before the Court of 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
Appeal could adjudicate the habeas petition, the Board found 
him suitable for parole and ordered him released.  (In re Palmer 
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1202–1203 (Palmer).)  The Court of 
Appeal subsequently agreed with Palmer that his now-
completed term of imprisonment had become unconstitutional.  
(Id. at pp. 1207–1222.)  Because that term had already been 
served, however, the Court of Appeal focused its order of relief 
on a different target.  The court reasoned that Palmer was 
“entitled to release from all forms of custody, including parole 
supervision.”  (Id. at p. 1224.)   
We agree with the Court of Appeal that habeas corpus 
relief is available to inmates whose continued incarceration has 
become constitutionally excessive, but who have been denied 
release by the Board.  To the extent Palmer’s continued 
incarceration at some point became constitutionally excessive, 
though, that alone did not justify ending his parole under the 
current statutory scheme.  We therefore reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal. 
I. 
A. 
In 1988, when Palmer was 17 years old, he pleaded guilty 
to kidnapping for robbery.  (Pen. Code, § 209, former subd. (b); 
all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  For this 
offense Palmer was sentenced to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole, consecutive to a two-year term for use of a 
firearm (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)).  (Palmer, supra, 33 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1202.)   
His offense began in a parking garage at a Riverside 
apartment complex.  Wearing a ski mask, Palmer waited there, 
intending to find someone to rob.  He picked that location 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
because he had previously burglarized homes in the same area.  
When off-duty police officer Randy Compton exited his car, 
Palmer confronted him with an unloaded gun stolen in a 
previous burglary.  Palmer demanded Compton’s wallet.  
Compton claimed not to have one.  Palmer asked Compton if he 
had a bank card; Compton said he did.  Palmer then ordered 
Compton to drive to an automated teller machine (ATM) and 
withdraw $200.  While Compton drove, Palmer sat in the 
backseat, pointing the unloaded gun at Compton.  When they 
arrived at the ATM, Compton retrieved his service weapon from 
his backpack and fired 15 rounds at Palmer, hitting him in the 
knee.  Palmer fled but was soon apprehended by the police.  
Shortly thereafter, he waived his Miranda rights and confessed.  
(Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1207–1208; see Miranda 
v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.)   
Palmer’s juvenile record included driving without a license 
as well as lewd acts with three younger minors.  While on 
probation for the latter offense, Palmer admitted committing 
several burglaries.      
B. 
Palmer filed the current habeas petition in the Court of 
Appeal.  (Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 1199.)  This petition 
asserted that his continued incarceration for a crime committed 
in 1988 when he was 17 years old had become grossly 
disproportionate under the state and federal Constitutions.  
(See U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)  Palmer 
complained that although there were 10 parole suitability 
hearings between 1996 and 2015, the Board denied him parole 
each time.  Before the Court of Appeal could adjudicate the 
current habeas corpus petition, however, the Board found 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
Palmer suitable for release on parole — and then released him 
on parole for a five-year period.  (Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 1202–1203; see Pen. Code, former § 3000, subd. (b).)     
The Court of Appeal retained the petition for adjudication 
and granted habeas corpus relief.1  The court determined first 
that because Palmer remained constructively in custody while 
on parole, the petition was not moot.  (Palmer, supra, 33 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1203, citing In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 
265.)  The court then concluded that “in light of Palmer’s age at 
the time of the offense and attendant diminishment of his 
culpability,” the Board’s repeated denials of parole rendered the 
30 years he had served “so disproportionate to his individual 
culpability as to be ‘constitutionally excessive’ ” within the 
meaning of the state and federal Constitutions.  (Palmer, at p. 
1214; see id. at p. 1221.)  Because Palmer’s prison sentence “had 
become constitutionally excessive” before his release on parole, 
the court reasoned, he was “ ‘entitled to be freed from all 
custody, actual or constructive.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1223.)  The court 
therefore ordered Palmer released from parole supervision.  (Id. 
at p. 1224.)   
On our own motion, we granted review to decide whether 
inmates may challenge their continued incarceration as 
constitutionally excessive when the Board repeatedly denies 
parole, and what remedy is available when continued 
incarceration becomes constitutionally excessive.   
 
1  
Its opinion details the winding course of Palmer’s prior 
habeas proceeding (Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1202–
1203 & fn. 1; see In re Palmer (S252145, Supreme Ct. Mins., 
review dism., Apr. 30, 2020), but that history is not relevant 
here. 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
II. 
In general, fixing appropriate penalties for crimes is a 
distinctly legislative determination (e.g., People v. Ward (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 186, 218; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 
(Dillon)), implicating sensitive questions of policy and values 
that “are in the first instance for the judgment of the Legislature 
[or the people] alone.”  (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 414.)  But 
the legislative power to craft punishments is subject to 
constraints rooted in both the state and federal Constitutions.  
In limited circumstances, one or both provisions may relieve a 
defendant from a sentence that was otherwise lawfully imposed.  
(See Hutto v. Davis (1982) 454 U.S. 370, 374 (per curiam); In re 
Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071 (Dannenberg).)  
Palmer contends he has properly presented a claim that 
his punishment was cruel or unusual within the meaning of the 
state Constitution.2  His habeas corpus petition alleges that his 
continued incarceration for more than 30 years — based on a 
crime he committed as a juvenile, in which no victim suffered 
injury — became “shocking and offensive.”   
Amicus curiae California District Attorneys Association 
(CDAA) disagrees.  In CDAA’s view, inmates should not be 
allowed to argue their continued incarceration has become 
constitutionally excessive unless a Board panel first finds “that 
he or she no longer represents a current threat to public safety.”  
 
2  
We analyze Palmer’s claims exclusively under the 
California Constitution.  Because he doesn’t contend that the 
federal Constitution offers him any additional protection beyond 
that afforded by the state Constitution, no separate analysis of 
his federal claim is necessary.  (Cf. People v. Brooks (2017) 3 
Cal.5th 1, 43, fn. 4.)      
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
In the absence of that predicate finding, CDAA warns, the Court 
of Appeal decision will authorize “a back-door challenge to 
lawful parole denials by the Board of Parole Hearings and new 
ad hoc challenges to the length of time served in all life-top 
sentences.”   
What we conclude is that the Board’s denial of parole does 
not prevent inmates serving indeterminate terms, like Palmer, 
from challenging their continued incarceration as cruel or 
unusual under the California Constitution.  Such challenges are 
neither novel nor improper, especially where (as here) the Board 
is not ever required, when making its parole decisions, to 
consider whether an inmate’s punishment has become 
constitutionally excessive.   
A trip through history shows why.  Consider In re 
Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639 (Rodriguez), where this court 
sustained an inmate’s challenge to his continued incarceration 
as cruel or unusual.  Rodriguez had been sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of one year to life for lewd conduct with a 
child and, after serving 22 years in prison, filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  (Id. at p. 642.)  The petition included two 
distinct claims under the California Constitution:  first, that the 
statutory life maximum term was disproportionate to the lewd 
conduct offense; and second, that the 22 years he had already 
served constituted excessive punishment.  (Rodriguez, at p. 
642.)  After rejecting his claim that the statutory maximum life 
term was excessive “on its face” (id. at p. 648), we proceeded to 
consider whether the Adult Authority, the entity then charged 
with determining an inmate’s actual period of incarceration, had 
imposed a disproportionate punishment by failing to fix 
Rodriguez’s term at less than the maximum and by keeping him 
incarcerated for 22 years.  It was our duty and obligation, we 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
explained, to ensure that the Adult Authority’s term-fixing 
practices “comport with” the ban on cruel or unusual 
punishment set forth in article I, section 17 of the California 
Constitution.  (Rodriguez, at p. 649.)  To that end, we construed 
the indeterminate sentencing law (ISL) as requiring the Adult 
Authority to “fix terms within the statutory range that are not 
disproportionate to the culpability of the individual offender,” 
since an inmate’s maximum term “may not be disproportionate 
to the individual prisoner’s offense.”  (Id. at p. 652.)  Because 
Rodriguez had already served a term that was constitutionally 
disproportionate to his offense, we ordered him “discharged from 
the term under which he [was] imprisoned.”  (Id. at p. 656.)   
After the adoption of the determinate sentencing law, the 
Board of Prison Terms (BPT) replaced the Adult Authority in 
deciding when indeterminate term prisoners could be released.  
(See § 5078, subd. (a).)  We subsequently revisited the role that 
parole decisions play in fixing an inmate’s actual term of 
incarceration.  (See Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1061.)  
Under the version of section 3041 then in effect, the BPT was 
directed to fix firm parole release dates for eligible life prisoners.  
(Former § 3041, subd. (a); see Dannenberg, at p. 1090.)  But 
subdivision (b) of that statute “made clear that the parole 
authority would have the express power and duty, in an 
individual case, to postpone the fixing of a firm release date, and 
thus to continue the inmate’s indeterminate status within his or 
her life-maximum sentence, if it found that the circumstances of 
the prisoner’s crime or criminal history presented a continuing 
risk to public safety.”  (Dannenberg, at p. 1090.)  We recognized 
that the BPT’s “paramount concern” for public safety under this 
scheme could end up imposing constitutionally disproportionate 
punishment in individual cases.  (Id. at p. 1091; see id. at p. 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
1097.)  What we also emphasized was that an inmate facing 
such punishment would have a judicial remedy:  “those 
indeterminate life prisoners who have been denied parole dates, 
and who believe, because of the particular circumstances of their 
crimes, that their confinements have become constitutionally 
excessive as a result, may bring their claims directly to court by 
petitions for habeas corpus.”  (Id. at p. 1098.)  Indeed, 
courthouse doors had to remain open to such challenges.  Under 
the law as it then existed, the BPT was not required to set 
release dates for life-top prisoners who presented public safety 
risks.  (Ibid.)   
We revisited the scheme’s operation a few years later 
under the BPT’s successor, the Board of Parole Hearings.  (Pen. 
Code, § 5075, subd. (a).)  The Board’s “paramount consideration” 
in making release determinations remained “whether the 
inmate currently poses a threat to public safety.”  (In re 
Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1210.)  If the inmate remains 
a danger, the Board “can, and must, decline to set a parole date.”  
(Id. at p. 1227; see Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2281, subd. (a) 
[“Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be 
found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the 
panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to 
society if released from prison”].)      
Finally, when we decided In re Butler (2018) 4 Cal.5th 728, 
744 (Butler), we reaffirmed the judiciary’s critical role in 
ensuring that “an inmate sentenced to an indeterminate term 
[]not be held for a period grossly disproportionate to his or her 
individual culpability.”  Inmates vindicate that constitutional 
right by bringing “their claims directly to court through 
petitions for habeas corpus” (id. at p. 745) — precisely as Palmer 
has done here. 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
We meant what we said in Rodriguez — and in 
Dannenberg and Butler, too.  For well over four decades, we have 
consistently recognized that life-top inmates denied release on 
parole may bring their constitutional challenges directly to 
court.  And when inmates do bring such claims, they are not 
limited to challenging only the statutory life maximum, as the 
Attorney General suggests.  Nor does allowing inmates to 
challenge their continued incarceration in court represent “a 
radical break in the law governing life-top sentences,” as CDAA 
contends.  We allowed life-top inmates to challenge their years 
served under the ISL, and we have continued to allow such 
inmates to challenge their years served under the determinate 
sentencing law — regardless of whether the entity charged with 
setting a parole release date is the Adult Authority, the BPT, or 
the Board.  In Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d 639, we sustained a 
challenge based on the actual number of years the petitioner had 
served.  And in Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1061, we cited 
Rodriguez with approval on this point.  (Dannenberg, at p. 1096.)  
Indeed, we reiterated that life prisoners who have been denied 
parole but “who believe, because of the particular circumstances 
of their crimes, that their confinements have become 
constitutionally excessive as a result, may bring their claims 
directly to court by petitions for habeas corpus” (id. at p. 1098), 
while noting that Dannenberg himself had made “no direct 
claim that the approximately 18 years he has spent behind bars 
is constitutionally disproportionate to his second degree 
murder.”  (Ibid.)   
A life-top inmate remains free, of course, to challenge “the 
maximum term of imprisonment permitted by the statute,” 
notwithstanding the possibility of securing parole at some 
earlier date.  (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 419.)  Likewise, an 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
inmate may challenge the minimum term established by a 
statute, “without regard to the constitutionality vel non of the 
maximum.”  (Id. at p. 419, fn. 9; see In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 
910, 919 (Foss).)  But those are not the only cognizable objections 
to a prison sentence.  Our precedent also demonstrates that an 
inmate may elect to challenge the constitutionality of the long 
years of imprisonment the inmate has served.  In light of that 
precedent, Palmer’s claim that he suffered cruel or unusual 
punishment cannot fairly be characterized as a “new” means of 
challenging his continued incarceration, nor did it depend on 
opening any “back-door.”  To the contrary:  because the Board is 
not required to consider whether an inmate’s life term has 
become constitutionally excessive if the inmate has not first 
been found suitable for parole, Palmer’s claim can readily enter 
through the courthouse front door.  Life-top inmates may test, 
in court, whether their continued punishment violates the 
Constitution. 
III. 
The Attorney General claims that the Court of Appeal 
erred in sustaining Palmer’s constitutional claim for yet another 
threshold reason.  In his view, the Court of Appeal was wrong 
when it suggested, in this case, that “deference to the 
legislatively prescribed penalty is no longer a relevant factor, as 
the actual term of years served is a function of the Board’s parole 
decisions, not the Legislature’s determination of the appropriate 
penalty in this particular case.”  (Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1206.)  We agree with the Attorney General, to an extent:  
when a court assesses the constitutionality of a prison term, it 
must be mindful of the Legislature’s broad discretion over the 
types and limits of punishment, regardless of whether the 
sentence being challenged is a specific term fixed by statute or 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
an indeterminate term where the Board has authority to order 
release within statutory parameters.  It remains the judiciary’s 
responsibility to decide whether a prison term has become 
excessive, and a court properly respects the Legislature’s 
prerogative not by performing some ritualistic deference, but by 
analyzing the challenged punishment under the traditional, 
lenient legal standard we set forth in Foss, supra, 10 Cal.3d 910 
and Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410.      
In the discussion preceding its merits analysis, the Court 
of Appeal posited two categories of constitutionally excessive 
punishment claims, each governed by different rules.  “Most 
claims,” the court began, “challenge sentences when first 
imposed, looking prospectively at the time the offender will 
serve.”  (Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1202.)  These types 
of claims “rarely succeed,” because courts “generally defer” to 
the legislatively defined punishment.  (Ibid.)  For those 
sentenced to indeterminate terms, on the other hand, the length 
of incarceration actually suffered “is determined not by the 
Legislature but by the Board’s decision whether to grant or deny 
release on parole.”  (Id. at p. 1205.)  So, the Court of Appeal 
suggested, “deference to the legislatively prescribed penalty is 
no longer a relevant factor” for this second category of claims.  
(Id. at p. 1206.)   
As our cases underscore, however, deference is an 
important 
element 
in 
any 
disproportionality 
analysis.  
Regardless of whether an inmate challenges a sentence when 
first imposed or after repeated parole denials, the court’s inquiry 
properly focuses on whether the punishment is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the offense and the offender or, stated 
another way, whether the punishment is so excessive that it 
“ ‘shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
human dignity.’ ”  (Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 478, quoting 
Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424; see Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 744 [“an inmate sentenced to an indeterminate term cannot 
be held for a period grossly disproportionate to his or her 
individual culpability”]; id. at p. 746 [“A sentence violates the 
prohibition 
against 
unconstitutionally 
disproportionate 
sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it ‘shocks the 
conscience’ ”].)   
Such an inquiry grants the Legislature considerable 
latitude in matching punishments to offenses.  This latitude 
derives in part from the premise that a statute specifying 
punishment, like any other statute, is presumed valid unless its 
unconstitutionality “ ‘ “clearly, positively and unmistakably 
appears.” ’ ”  (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 415.)  But it also 
accounts for a very particular context, one in which “[t]he choice 
of fitting and proper penalties is not an exact science, but a 
legislative skill involving an appraisal of the evils to be 
corrected, the weighing of practical alternatives, consideration 
of relevant policy factors, and responsiveness to the public will; 
in appropriate cases, some leeway for experimentation may also 
be permissible.”  (Id. at p. 423.)  A claim of excessive punishment 
must overcome a “considerable burden” (People v. Wingo (1975) 
14 Cal.3d 169, 174), and courts should give “ ‘the broadest 
discretion possible’ ” (Lynch, at p. 414) to the legislative 
judgment respecting appropriate punishment.  (See also In re 
Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 540; accord, Solem v. Helm (1983) 
463 U.S. 277, 290 [“Reviewing courts, of course, should grant 
substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures 
necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial 
courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals”].)  A 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
punishment does not qualify as constitutionally excessive unless 
it is “ ‘out of all proportion to the offense.’ ”  (Lynch, supra, at p. 
424.)    
We’ve distilled three analytical techniques to aid our 
deferential review of excessiveness claims:  (1) an examination 
of the nature of the offense and the offender, with particular 
attention to the degree of danger both pose to society; (2) a 
comparison of the punishment with the punishment California 
imposes for more serious offenses; and (3) a comparison of the 
punishment with that prescribed in other jurisdictions for the 
same offense.  (See Foss, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 919–920; Lynch, 
supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425–428.)  Our courts have invoked these 
techniques broadly across a variety of excessive punishment 
claims:  when a defendant challenges the maximum term of 
imprisonment permitted by a statute (see Lynch, at p. 419), the 
minimum parole eligibility term (see Foss, at p. 919), 
ineligibility for probation (see People v. Main (1984) 152 
Cal.App.3d 686, 691–697) — even the death penalty (see People 
v. Bunyan (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1240–1241).  
The same core principles apply when an inmate challenges 
the years served on an indeterminate sentence.  The Legislature 
has a continuing prerogative over the narrowed category of 
offenses that still warrant indeterminate sentences.  (See 
Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1097–1098.)  For this 
category of offenses, the Legislature has not abandoned its 
policymaking role.  It has simply delegated to the Board the 
authority to fix a precise term within a statutory range the 
Legislature has identified, and under criteria the Legislature 
has articulated.  (See § 3041; cf. In re Larsen (1955) 44 Cal.2d 
642, 646–647; In re Stanley (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1030, 1038.)   
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
Indeed, Rodriguez applied the traditional, deferential test 
in assessing whether the 22 years the habeas corpus petitioner 
had served under an indeterminate life sentence was 
constitutionally excessive.  (Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 
653 [“We reach the conclusion that the 22 years of imprisonment 
served by petitioner are excessive and disproportionate 
punishment by application of the Lynch-Foss analysis”].)  And 
our reliance on that test in this distinct context was intentional:  
“these techniques are appropriate not only to the examination 
of statutes challenged on their face, but also to terms as fixed by 
the [Adult] Authority in individual cases.”  (Id. at p. 654.)  The 
Court of Appeal similarly applied our traditional factors in In re 
Wells (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 592, 596–603 (Wells) to determine 
whether the 20 years already served by the life-top inmate there 
was “grossly disproportionate” such that it “ ‘shocks the 
conscience.’ ”  (Id. at p. 604.)   
The Court of Appeal therefore erred in suggesting that 
deference to the legislative scheme is not a relevant 
consideration when inmates, such as Palmer, challenge their 
continued incarceration caused by the Board’s repeated denial 
of parole.  (Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1206.)  But the 
Attorney General hasn’t identified any specific way in which the 
Court of Appeal’s dictum might have affected its analysis of 
Palmer’s sentence.  Indeed, despite its insistence that Palmer 
was presenting a claim that was “different” in kind (id. at p. 
1205) from “[m]ost claims of constitutionally excessive 
punishment” (id. at p. 1202), the Court of Appeal ended up 
testing the lawfulness of his punishment by using the 
traditional test required by our cases and undertaking an 
extensive analysis of each of the three Lynch-Foss techniques.  
(Id. at pp. 1207–1221.)  
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
Whether the Court of Appeal correctly decided that 
Palmer’s punishment was disproportionate is a question we 
need not resolve.  While this petition was pending in the Court 
of Appeal, the Board found Palmer suitable for release and 
thereafter released him on parole.  (Palmer, supra, 33 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1203.)  Consequently, Palmer would remain 
on parole even if we were to find that his continued incarceration 
had not become constitutionally excessive. 
In light of these circumstances, we don’t need to take up 
the “fact-specific inquiry” about whether Palmer’s continued 
incarceration became cruel or unusual.  (Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at p. 746; accord, U.S. v. Rigas (2d Cir. 2009) 583 F.3d 108, 123 
[the shocks-the-conscience standard is “highly contextual and 
do[es] not permit easy repetition in successive cases”]; cf. People 
v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 592.)  Even assuming his 
incarceration became disproportionate, that finding alone would 
not have automatically justified termination of his parole.  
IV. 
In March 2019, the Board released Palmer to a five-year 
parole period.  Palmer contends that the parole period should 
never have been imposed and asks this court to affirm the Court 
of Appeal’s termination of it.  In his view, once his prison term 
was determined to be constitutionally excessive, every 
additional day of custody — including the constructive custody 
of parole — is a constitutional violation.  He relies on three cases 
where, construing the former ISL, a court ordered the successful 
habeas petitioner released from any and all custody.  (See 
Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 656; Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 
p. 439; Wells, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 604.)  Although these 
cases bear some factual similarities to the circumstances here, 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
the Legislature has since modified the applicable parole statutes 
and their relationship to an inmate’s term of imprisonment.  We 
therefore examine these cases and subsequent developments in 
the law.    
Rodriguez filed a habeas corpus petition like Palmer’s.  
What Rodriguez claimed was that his prolonged confinement 
under 
an 
indeterminate 
life 
sentence 
qualified 
as 
constitutionally disproportionate punishment.  After concluding 
that Rodriguez’s claim had merit and that he should “therefore 
. . . be discharged from the term under which he is imprisoned,” 
we went on to direct — without explanation or citation to 
authority — that he be “discharge[d] . . . from custody.”  
(Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 656; see Lynch, supra, 8 
Cal.3d at p. 439 [stating, without elaboration, that having 
served a constitutionally excessive term, the petitioner “is 
therefore entitled to his freedom”].)  Similarly, in Wells, the 
petitioner successfully argued that his continued incarceration 
was constitutionally disproportionate.  The Court of Appeal 
declared — again without explanation or authority — that he “is 
entitled to be freed from all custody, actual or constructive.”  
(Wells, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 604.)   
Cutting across these cases was an implicit rationale — one 
we can readily discern from the sentencing scheme in place at 
the time.  All of these cases were decided under the former ISL.  
(See People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 (Jefferson) 
[“Before July 1, 1977, California law provided for indeterminate 
sentencing”].)  Under that scheme, the trial court sentenced a 
defendant to prison for “ ‘the term prescribed by law.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
This unitary “term” represented “ ‘the total time the state had 
jurisdiction over the prisoner,’ ” whether in actual custody or 
constructive custody.  (Id. at p. 95.)  The Adult Authority had 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
the power to decide when an inmate could be released on parole 
(id. at p. 94) — as well as the power to select a term within the 
statutory maximum and minimum (ibid.) — but the time spent 
in prison and the time spent on parole together comprised a 
single term.  (Id. at p. 95 [“ ‘The parole date was the date of 
release from actual custody, but the balance of the “term” was 
to be served on parole’ ”].)   
So when we decided in Rodriguez, for example, that the 
habeas corpus petitioner should be discharged from his “term,” 
it necessarily followed that he would be discharged “from 
custody,” including the constructive custody of parole.  
(Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 656; see Wells, supra, 46 
Cal.App.3d at p. 604.)  Once the “term” was found to be 
excessive, the legal basis for continuing custody — whether 
actual or constructive — necessarily evaporated. 
Not so under the current sentencing scheme.  Under post-
1977 law, “ ‘Parole is no longer service of the term.’ ”  (Jefferson, 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 95.)  It is instead a separate period 
following completion of the term.  (Ibid.)  “ ‘ “Term” now means 
the period of actual confinement prior to release on parole.’ ”  
(Ibid., italics in Jefferson.)  Accordingly, a finding that an 
inmate’s prison term is constitutionally excessive no longer has 
any inherent effect, by itself, on the validity of the separate 
parole term.  Cases decided under the ISL — where the unitary 
“term” might have been served either in prison or on parole, in 
the discretion of the Adult Authority — have no application to 
parole as envisioned in the current sentencing scheme.  Whether 
service of an excessive prison term should affect a parole term 
under current law is not an issue our courts have resolved. 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
A court considering a petition for writ of habeas corpus has 
broad authority to craft a remedy “as the justice of the case may 
require.”  (§ 1484; see In re Lira (2014) 58 Cal.4th 573, 584 
(Lira).)  Invoking that power, Palmer contends that “[b]ecause 
parole is punishment, the only remedy that cures the ongoing 
violation of [his] constitutional rights is discharge from parole.”  
We agree that parole is punishment.  (People v. Nuckles (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 601, 608–609 (Nuckles).)  What’s missing from 
Palmer’s argument, though, is any authority or argument to 
support the proposition that when one kind of punishment is 
constitutionally excessive, other forms of punishment must also 
be invalidated.  Monetary fines and orders of restitution, for 
example, may constitute punishment.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357; People v. Zito (1992) 8 
Cal.App.4th 736, 741; § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3); accord, U.S. v. 
Dubose (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141, 1144–1145.)  Still, it 
seems quite unlikely that the payment of an excessive fine or 
order of restitution would automatically relieve a defendant 
from serving an otherwise lawful prison term.  Nothing in our 
grant of relief in Rodriguez or in the other cases above purported 
to invalidate any distinct kind of punishment.  To the contrary:  
Under the applicable scheme at the time those cases were 
decided, parole and imprisonment were complementary parts of 
a unitary “term.”  By invalidating the term as constitutionally 
disproportionate, we necessarily relieved the habeas petitioner 
from serving any part of the term.   
True:  imprisonment and parole both involve custodial 
forms of punishment, and each “constitutes part of the 
punishment for the underlying crime.”  (Nuckles, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 608.)  Though parole and imprisonment are often 
tethered, they are not so entangled that a defect in one form of 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
custody necessarily and fatally infects all forms of custody.  
Imprisonment, for example, may become cruel or unusual 
because of substandard conditions of confinement.  (See, e.g., In 
re Coca (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 493, 501–503.)  Yet never have we 
held that inmates who successfully challenge their conditions of 
confinement — and secure an amelioration of those conditions 
— would be entitled to their freedom before their sentences have 
ended.  (Cf. People v. Jackson (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 113, 120 
[“Just as the release of inmates from custody is not an 
appropriate remedy to established unconstitutional conditions 
of confinement [citations], we do not believe the proper remedy 
is judicial reduction of sentence terms”]; Coca, at p. 503 [“we 
agree that the court could not on these facts require 
respondent’s release”].)  A constitutional error involving one 
aspect of punishment does not inevitably and fatally infect all 
other aspects.   
Nor are we persuaded that “the justice of the case” (§ 1484) 
requires termination of Palmer’s parole.  Parole is a “distinct 
phase” from a term of imprisonment and serves different 
objectives.  (Nuckles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 609.)  Unlike a 
prison sentence, whose objective is to protect society, punish 
offenders, and deter future crime, parole’s primary objective 
“ ‘is, through the provision of supervision and counseling, to 
assist in the parolee’s transition from imprisonment to 
discharge and reintegration into society.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 608–609.)  
At least when parole works as intended, it is a sufficiently vital 
part of the rehabilitation process that ought not be categorically 
discarded simply because an inmate establishes that the 
preceding period of incarceration became constitutionally 
disproportionate.  (See generally Foss, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 923 
[“also relevant to determining whether a sentence is 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
disproportionate to the offense and offender, is a consideration 
of the penological purposes of the punishment imposed in light 
of the particular offense”].)   
The 
Legislature 
has 
long 
acknowledged 
parole’s 
importance.  By statute, the Legislature has found “the period 
immediately following incarceration is critical to successful 
reintegration of the offender into society and to positive 
citizenship.  It is in the interest of public safety for the state to 
provide for the supervision of and surveillance of parolees and 
to provide educational, vocational, family and personal 
counseling necessary to assist parolees in the transition 
between imprisonment and discharge.”  (Former § 3000, as 
amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 1406, § 2, p. 5361; see § 3000, subd. 
(a)(1); see generally Lira, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 579.)  These 
services include medical and psychological treatment, drug and 
alcohol dependency services, job counseling, and programs that 
enable the parolee to obtain a general equivalency certificate.  
(See In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1030.)  For someone 
like Palmer, who was convicted at age 17 and remained behind 
bars for the next 30 years, it is difficult to see how justice would 
be advanced by releasing him into the community to live as an 
adult — for the first time — without any supervision or 
supportive services. 
Palmer complains that certain parole conditions “can be 
extremely punitive in a specific individual’s case” in that they 
“bear no relation to his underlying offense, severely inhibit his 
ability to successfully reintegrate, and deny him fundamental 
freedoms enjoyed by non-parolees.”  Amici curiae The Prison 
Law Office et al. argue generally that parole, as practiced in this 
country, undermines rehabilitation and is ineffective in 
reducing recidivism.  Neither point justifies termination of 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
Palmer’s parole in this proceeding, however.  Palmer’s current 
habeas corpus petition challenges parole categorically, not 
particular parole conditions as unduly punitive “in [his] specific 
. . . case.”  (Cf. In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1231, 
1233–1239.)  Nor has he developed a record to show that parole, 
in itself, is so fatally and unduly punitive as to violate article I, 
section 17 of the state Constitution — or that parole, following 
30 years of incarceration, would necessarily be cruel or unusual.  
Our opinion should not be read to foreclose such claims.   
Palmer argues next that his parole must be terminated to 
avoid an “absurd” scenario:  a violation of parole “may” in theory 
cause a parolee to be returned to custody, yet he could never 
actually be reincarcerated in light of the Court of Appeal’s 
finding that he had already served a constitutionally 
disproportionate term.  This claim, too, fails to persuade.  
Nothing in the statutory scheme requires incarceration of a 
parolee who’s been found to have violated one or more parole 
conditions.  The parole agency may instead impose additional 
conditions 
of 
supervision, 
including 
rehabilitation 
and 
treatment services with appropriate incentives for compliance, 
as well as intermediate sanctions short of incarceration.  
(§ 3000.08, subd. (d); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.541(e).)  
Even when these options prove inadequate, a court may 
nonetheless refer the parolee to a reentry court or another 
evidence-based program.  (§ 3000.08, subd. (f)(3).)  So Palmer is 
mistaken in asserting that there could be “no constitutional 
consequence for any violation of a parole condition by Mr. 
Palmer.”  In any event, the current petition does not challenge 
any period of reincarceration arising from Palmer’s violation of 
parole.  (Cf. U.S. v. Bridges (7th Cir. 1985) 760 F.2d 151, 154 
[“Any imprisonment that might result from parole revocation 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
some time in the future is . . . only speculative at this point and 
does not present an appropriate question for decision”].)  
Consequently, we need not decide whether reincarceration of a 
parolee would run afoul of the state Constitution, where, as 
here, the parolee claims that continued incarceration has 
become excessive. 
Finally, we part company with the Court of Appeal’s 
reading of Lira.  The Court of Appeal purported to distinguish 
Lira, where we similarly refused to reduce the habeas corpus 
petitioner’s parole period, on the ground that “the prisoner in 
Lira was never serving an unlawful sentence.”  (Palmer, supra, 
33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1223.)  A close reading of our decision 
renders that characterization questionable.   
Lira, a life prisoner, was found suitable for parole and 
given a release date, but the Governor reversed the Board’s 
decision.  Lira filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the 
reversal as unsupported by the evidence.  (Lira, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at p. 577.)  While the petition was pending, the Board 
again found Lira suitable for parole.  The Governor did not 
disturb this second suitability finding, and Lira was released on 
parole.  (Ibid.)  In ruling on the habeas corpus petition, the Court 
of Appeal agreed with Lira that the Governor’s reversal of the 
Board’s earlier grant of parole was unlawful and ordered that 
Lira be given credit against his maximum five-year parole term 
for the time he had spent in prison between the Governor’s 
erroneous reversal and his eventual release.  (Id. at p. 578.)  We 
granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, which 
challenged only the award of credits, and reversed.  (Id. at p. 578 
& fn. 2.)  We reasoned that the Governor had independent 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
review 
parole 
suitability 
determinations and rejected, in particular, Lira’s argument that 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
“the Governor’s reversal, later judicially determined to be 
unsupported, somehow retroactively rendered unlawful the 
period of his continued incarceration during the pendency of 
these processes.”  (Id. at p. 582.)  Because Lira “was lawfully 
imprisoned during this period until the day he was released” — 
and “received credit against his term of life imprisonment for all 
such days” — he was “not entitled to any credit against his 
parole term.”  (Ibid.)   
But our analysis did not stop there.  Lira declined to award 
relief even if one assumed “the asserted unlawfulness of the 
portion of his term of imprisonment that followed the Governor’s 
2009 reversal.”  (Lira, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 582.)  Because 
parole is a distinct phase of punishment — which begins “only 
after release from prison” (ibid.) — a reduction in the parole 
term, even if limited to a showing of unlawful confinement, 
“would undermine the Legislature’s intent in requiring the 
service of three continuous years of parole after release from 
confinement and therefore must be rejected.”  (Id. at p. 583.)  We 
also rejected Lira’s claims that “fundamental fairness” and 
“substantive due process” entitled him to a reduction in his 
parole term, even assuming his confinement had been rendered 
“retroactively unlawful” and he thereby suffered “a temporary 
infringement of his right to a factually supported suitability 
decision by the executive branch.”  (Id. at pp. 584–585.)   
We find Lira instructive on the question whether Palmer’s 
parole should automatically have been modified or eliminated 
as soon as his continued incarceration became unlawful.  Palmer 
remains free — as the Attorney General concedes — to challenge 
his parole term as cruel or unusual, either on its own terms or 
because continued parole, when combined with a prolonged 
period of excessive imprisonment, would be constitutionally 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
cruel or unusual.  But we reject his current claim that he was 
automatically entitled to “an end to all custody and punishment” 
at the moment his continued incarceration became excessive.     
V. 
The California Constitution prohibits punishment that is 
cruel or unusual.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)  Because courts play 
a pivotal role in giving these words effect, a life-top inmate 
whose imprisonment has become excessive — but who has been 
denied parole by the Board — must be able to obtain relief in 
court by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  When a court 
adjudicates such a petition, it applies our long-standing test to 
discern whether punishment is cruel or unusual.  If a court then 
finds the inmate’s continued confinement has become excessive, 
it may order the inmate’s release from prison.   
What such release does not guarantee is automatic 
termination of the inmate’s statutory parole period.  Under a 
statutory scheme that treats parole as a distinct phase of 
punishment, and in the absence of any persuasive argument 
from Palmer that his parole term has separately or in 
combination 
with 
his 
years 
of 
imprisonment 
become 
constitutionally excessive, his parole remains valid.  Because 
the Court of Appeal erred in ending Palmer’s parole, we reverse 
the judgment.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
In re PALMER  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GROVER, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
In re PALMER 
S256149 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
I join Parts I, II, and III of today’s opinion.  I agree that 
“habeas corpus relief is available to inmates whose continued 
incarceration has become constitutionally excessive, but who 
have been denied release by the Board [of Parole Hearings].”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  And I agree that although the Court of 
Appeal erred in suggesting that deference to the Legislature “is 
not a relevant consideration when inmates, such as [petitioner 
William] Palmer, challenge their continued incarceration 
caused by the Board’s repeated denial of parole,” the error did 
not impact its proportionality analysis.  (Id. at p. 14.)  I cannot 
discern any meaningful difference between the Court of Appeal’s 
analytical approach and the approach taken in In re Rodriguez 
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 653–656 and In re Wells (1975) 
46 Cal.App.3d 592, 597–604.  
In addition, I agree with the court’s holding in Part IV that 
a finding of excessiveness with regard to incarceration does not 
“automatically” rule out imposition of parole.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 24.)  But I write separately to make two points. 
First, today’s opinion declines to “decide whether 
reincarceration of a parolee would run afoul of the state 
Constitution, where, as here, the parolee claims that continued 
incarceration has become excessive.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  
I would make clear that a finding of excessiveness as to 
incarceration necessarily entails that a parolee may not be 
reincarcerated for violating parole.  The court says the prospect 
In re PALMER  
Liu, J., concurring 
 
2 
of Palmer’s reincarceration for violating parole is “ ‘only 
speculative at this point.’ ”  (Ibid.)  But I see no reason why we 
should not settle this issue and afford Palmer some peace of 
mind.  As a matter of logic, it ineluctably follows from the Court 
of Appeal’s excessiveness finding that Palmer may not be 
lawfully reincarcerated for his 1988 crime. 
Parole “is a form of punishment accruing directly from the 
underlying conviction” and “is a direct consequence of a felony 
conviction and prison term.”  (People v. Nuckles (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 601, 609.)  Ordinarily, if a parolee violates a parole 
condition, 
the 
state 
may 
“ ‘return 
the 
individual 
to 
imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal 
trial.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The court today holds that because parole is “a 
distinct phase of punishment,” a finding of excessive 
incarceration does not automatically entitle the defendant to 
termination of all custody, including parole.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 23–24.) 
While accepting this holding, I would take the analysis one 
step further.  The Court of Appeal ruled that Palmer’s period of 
incarceration was “so disproportionate to his individual 
culpability for the offense he committed, that it must be deemed 
constitutionally excessive.”  (In re Palmer (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 
1199, 1202.)  Assuming, as today’s opinion does, that Palmer 
“has already served a prison term grossly disproportionate to his 
offense” (id. at p. 1224), I do not see how it could be lawful to 
reincarcerate Palmer if he violates parole.  Reincarcerating 
Palmer in this manner would be a resumption of precisely the 
same imprisonment that the Court of Appeal has adjudged 
unconstitutional.  Palmer simply cannot be returned to prison 
as further punishment for his 1988 crime. 
In re PALMER  
Liu, J., concurring 
 
3 
As to what parole conditions are permissible for an 
individual in Palmer’s circumstances, today’s opinion properly 
emphasizes conditions that serve a rehabilitative function.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  Parole conditions in a case like 
Palmer’s must be careful to avoid incremental incursions on 
liberty that exacerbate the disproportionality of punishment 
resulting from an excessive period of incarceration.  And parole 
terms may be backed up only by incentives, sanctions, or 
alternatives “short of incarceration.”  (Id. at p. 21.) 
Second, today’s opinion notes that although the 
excessiveness of Palmer’s incarceration does not automatically 
entitle him to be free of custody, “Palmer remains free . . . to 
challenge his parole term as cruel or unusual, either on its own 
terms or because continued parole, when combined with a 
prolonged period of excessive imprisonment, would be 
constitutionally cruel or unusual.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23–
24.)  The premise of this invitation is that the Court of Appeal’s 
termination of Palmer’s parole was erroneous because it relied 
on a rule of automatic entitlement that today’s opinion rejects.  
(See In re Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1223 [“[H]is 
continued imprisonment was unlawful.  He is, therefore, 
‘entitled to be freed from all custody, actual or constructive.’ ”].) 
But that is not the only reading or the most plausible 
reading of the Court of Appeal’s opinion.  Instead of holding that 
a finding of excessive incarceration automatically entitles a 
defendant to be free of all custody, the Court of Appeal arguably 
concluded, on the facts here, that Palmer’s 30 years of 
incarceration for his 1988 crime was so disproportionate that it 
left no room for any further restraint or punishment in his case.  
(See In re Palmer, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1207–1214 
[finding Palmer’s 30 years of imprisonment to be “grossly 
In re PALMER  
Liu, J., concurring 
 
4 
disproportionate” based on a detailed examination of his 1988 
crime and his relative youth and mitigating background]; id. at 
p. 1224 [examining specific restrictions in Palmer’s parole term 
and finding it “difficult to comprehend how his release under 
such conditions can be seen as anything other than continued 
restraint and punishment for his crime”].)  In other words, the 
Court of Appeal appears to have reached an individualized 
conclusion as to the unlawfulness of the parole term in Palmer’s 
case.  If that is so, then Palmer’s litigation of this very point in 
further proceedings will be redundant. 
The latter strikes me as the more natural reading of the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion as a whole.  But the issue will likely 
be clarified soon enough in further proceedings. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Palmer 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted  XXX 33 Cal.App.5th 1199  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S256149  
Date Filed:  January 28, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:    
County:     
Judge:    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel:    
 
O'Melveny & Myers, Geoffrey Yost, Anna Pletcher, Melody Drummond Hansen, Megan Havstad, Cara L. 
Gagliano, Micah Chavin, Michael J. Pierce, Anna Schneider and Mehwish Shaukat for Petitioner William 
M. Palmer II. 
 
Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Marisol Orihuela and Miriam Gohara for The Prison Law 
Office, Vincent Schiraldi and David Muhammad as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. 
Palmer II. 
 
Keker, Van Nest & Peters, Sharif E. Jacob and Taylor Reeves for Professor Vincent Schiraldi, Columbia 
University School of Social Work, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, William D. Temko, Sara A. McDermott and Michele C. Nielsen for Human 
Rights Watch and The Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William 
M. Palmer II. 
 
Kristen Bell for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II. 
 
William Vogel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II. 
 
Elbert Lee Vaught IV as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, 
Assistant Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Amanda J. Murray and Denise A. Yates, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondent Board of Parole Hearings. 
 
Mark Zahner and Richard J. Sachs for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents Board of Parole Hearings and California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Megan Havstad 
O’Melveny & Myers, LLP 
Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94111-3823 
(415) 984-8700 
 
Amanda J. Murray 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9084