Title: Minchew v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Minchew v. State1984 WY 81685 P.2d 30Case Number: 83-255Decided: 08/06/1984WALLACE EDWARD MINCHEW, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
WALLACE EDWARD MINCHEW, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Kevin Martin, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant words the 
single issue on appeal as follows:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to consider alternatives to probation 
revocation."

[¶2.]     We affirm inasmuch as 
we not only fail to find an abuse of discretion but we find a definite 
consideration of alternatives to revocation of probation.

[¶3.]     After pleading guilty 
to a charge of unlawful delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance 
(marijuana), appellant was sentenced to two to four years in the penitentiary, 
with the execution of the sentence suspended and with appellant being placed on 
probation for a period of four years. Less than ten months later, he pleaded 
guilty in municipal court to violations of ordinances defining offenses of 
malicious destruction of property and engaging in disorderly conduct under the 
public intoxication statutes. He was sentenced by the municipal court to serve 
eighteen days in the county jail and to make restitution for the damage 
caused.

[¶4.]     The county and 
prosecuting attorney filed a motion in the district court for revocation of 
probation on the grounds that the acts for which appellant pleaded guilty in 
municipal court were violations of the conditions of probation. After a hearing 
in the district court, appellant's probation was revoked with direction that the 
previously imposed sentence be executed.

[¶5.]     A probation revocation 
hearing is not a trial on a new criminal charge. It is simply an extension of 
the sentencing procedure resulting from conviction of the basic charge, coupled 
with the requirement that the probationer be afforded due process of law before 
being deprived of the conditional right to liberty granted by 
probation.

"We cannot write a code 
of procedure; that is the responsibility of each State. Most States have done so 
by legislation, others by judicial decision usually on due process grounds. Our 
task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements of due process. They 
include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure 
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person 
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds 
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing 
body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the 
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no 
thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal 
prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible 
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material 
that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-489, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) re paroles with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) extending the same to probationers.

[¶6.]     At the risk of being 
unduly repetitious, we repeat that said in Ketcham v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356, 
1359-1360 (1980):

"* * * [I]t is 
appropriate to review the law as it relates to probation 
revocation.

"`The imposition of 
probation and, therefore, the revocation, lie in the sound discretion of the 
district court.'

"`"* * * All that is 
essential is the court's conscientious judgment after hearing the facts that the 
violation has occurred. This should not be an arbitrary action and should 
include a consideration of both the reasons underlying the original imposition 
of conditions, the violation of these, and the reasons leading to such 
violation. * * *" State v. Reisch, Wyo., 
491 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1971). See Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130 
(1979).' Buck v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 878, 879 
(1979). "`The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an order revoking probation 
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will 
be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. The court cannot 
act arbitrarily, however, or according to whim or caprice.' 21 Am.Jur.2d 
Criminal Law § 568, p. 536 (1965).

"The evidence need not 
establish the violation beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 
1572(4), p. 505 (1961); State v. 
Fortier, 20 Or. App. 613, 533 P.2d 187, 188 (1975).

"A probationer or parolee is not entitled to 
the `full panoply of rights' that attend a criminal prosecution. Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
480, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); United 
States v. Strada, 8 Cir. 1974, 503 F.2d 1081.

"`In such final hearing, 
the usual rules of evidence need not be applied, United States v. Cates, C.A.4th (1968), 
402 F.2d 473, 474[5], and it is not required that the evidence have shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mills violated the conditions of his probation, Manning v. United States, C.A.5th 
(1947), 161 F.2d 827, 829[7], certiorari denied (1947), 332 U.S. 792, 68 S. Ct. 102, 92 L. Ed. 374. If the evidence satisfies the presiding judge that the 
conduct of the probationer has not measured-up to the terms and conditions of 
his probation, in its discretion, the Court will revoke the probation. See Burns v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 216, 221, 
53 S. Ct. 154 [156], 77 L. Ed. 266, 269. * * *' United 
States v. Mills, E.D.Tenn., 444 F. Supp. 26, 27 (1977).

"Revocation of probation 
because of a violation of law is not precluded although the probationer is 
acquitted in a criminal proceeding predicated on such violation. Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124, 235 S.E.2d 550 (1977); Jones v. State, 142 Ga. App. 274, 235 S.E.2d 681 (1977); Bernal-Zazueta v. United 
States, 9 Cir. 1955, 225 F.2d 64. A few 
jurisdictions have taken a contrary position as to this point. See Annotation, 
Probation Revocation - Following Acquittal, 76 A.L.R.3d 564 (1977). Probation 
may be revoked on the basis of conduct which falls short of criminal conduct. 
United 
States v. Chambers, 3 Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 410; 
State v. Reisch, 
supra.

"In general, it can be 
said that the determination of whether or not a probationer has violated the 
terms and conditions of his probation is within the sound discretion of the 
court and is not subject to reversal on appeal unless the discretion is abused. 
State v. Reisch, 
supra.

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *' Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980)." (Emphasis added.)

[¶7.]     Turning then to the 
procedure and facts relative to this matter, appellant was advised at the time 
he was placed on probation of the consequences of his conviction. The court went 
into detail to ascertain the factual basis for the guilty plea. After the plea 
and the grant of probation, the judge gave appellant a detailed explanation of 
the probation terms. He emphasized the duty of appellant to obey the laws of the 
United 
States, the state and any municipality as well 
as the rules and regulations of the Department of Probation and Parole, pointing 
out that many others so warned by him had their probation revoked when they 
disregarded the warning. Appellant said he understood that he would be 
imprisoned if he violated any terms of his probation.

[¶8.]     At the probation 
revocation hearing, a certified copy of the municipal court proceedings was 
introduced into evidence. Appellant's counsel acknowledged that appellant had 
pleaded guilty to the charges in municipal court. The following then 
occurred:

"THE COURT: Mr. Minchew, 
you understand that your counsel has said you are admitting that you did plead 
guilty to those two charges; is that correct?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 
sir.

"THE COURT: And you admit 
that you did commit those offenses?

"THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes."

[¶9.]     Thus, the violation of 
the release agreement was definitely established. In an effort to ascertain 
whether or not the facts were such as to require the revocation of probation, 
and over defendant's objection, the court ordered the State to bring the 
arresting officer before it. The court said:

"* * * [L]et me say to 
you that the Court would rule that there has been a sufficient showing that 
there was a violation of municipal ordinances and those violations in the 
Court's mind constitute a violation of the terms of probation. The Court, however, in an effort to make 
sure that it understands what the defendant's position is wants to have some 
additional testimony to find out if there is an excuse for the violation or 
something which would go towards the defendant's benefit rather than anything to 
be used against the defendant." (Emphasis added.)

[¶10.]  The arresting officer testified that he 
was called to investigate a bomb threat at Coffeen School and found appellant in 
the teachers' lounge in a very intoxicated condition. Appellant attempted to 
hide a broken 18-inch chrome water spigot to a stainless steel sink. Appellant 
was arrested on the two charges to which he pleaded guilty in municipal 
court.

[¶11.]  Although appellant had advised that he 
was guilty of the two municipal charges, he testified at the hearing that he 
could not recall what had happened at the school, and that he was an epileptic 
and subject to blackouts. He recalled drinking two beers and a pitcher of beer. 
He said he could not recall the municipal court proceedings very 
well.

[¶12.]  Appellant had been afforded a hearing 
before the district judge, he had received written notice of the alleged 
violations and the evidence against him was disclosed. He had an opportunity to 
be heard, and he was heard. He had an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and 
present his own witnesses. Written reasons were given for the exercise of 
discretion by the court in revoking his probation. The requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, were 
met.

[¶13.]  The granting of probation is addressed to 
the discretion of the trial court and is an act of grace, of clemency. Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130, 
1137 (1979).

[¶14.]  Appellant was given every opportunity to 
present mitigating circumstances. It was not beyond the bounds of reason for the 
court to conclude that appellant had violated the terms of his probation and 
that the court could reasonably conclude the existence of sufficient grounds to 
revoke his probation. It cannot be said that an error of law existed under the 
circumstances. There was no abuse of discretion.

[¶15.]  Appellant argues that the probation 
hearing procedure was not in accordance with that of a criminal trial - that the 
court asked for additional sentencing information after the State "rested." We 
have already noted the nature of a probation revocation hearing and that it is 
not a criminal trial.

[¶16.]  Appellant also argues that appellant's 
guilty pleas to the municipal charges should not be considered inasmuch as he 
was not there represented by counsel. Inasmuch as appellant confirmed his guilt 
on the municipal charges at the probation revocation hearing, independently of 
the certified copies of the municipal court proceedings, we need not explore the 
question of whether or not appellant's waiver of appointment of counsel was 
knowingly and intelligently made, and that such was adequately established at 
the revocation hearing.

[¶17.]  Affirmed.