Title: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Central Point

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 28, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
CITY OF CENTRAL POINT,
CENTRAL POINT FIRST, INC.,
BECCA CROFT, JOSEPH R. THOMAS,
DAVID M. PAINTER, and CAROL PUTNAM,
Respondents on Review.
(LUBA 2004-075; CA A129094; SC S52736)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 4, 2006.
Thomas W. Sondag, Lane Powell PC, Portland, argued the cause
for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs were Gregory S.
Hathaway and E. Michael Connors, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP,
Portland.
William K. Kabeiseman, Garvey Schubert Barer, Portland,
argued the cause for respondents on review.  With him on the
joint brief for respondents on review were Edward J. Sullivan and
Carrie A. Richter, Garvey Schubert Barer, Portland, and Christine
M. Cook, Portland.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
*Appeal from Court of Appeals Order of Dismissal dated       
 August 4, 2005.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Any party who is dissatisfied with an order of the Land
Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) may seek judicial review of that
order in the Court of Appeals pursuant to ORS 197.850.  That
statute sets forth the filing and service requirements that a
petitioner must satisfy to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals.  In this case, the Court of Appeals dismissed a
petition for judicial review by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(petitioner), because it concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction under ORS 197.850.  We allowed petitioner's petition
for review and now, for the reasons stated below, affirm the
order of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals order sets forth the pertinent
facts:
"LUBA issued its Final Opinion and Order in this
case on June 9, 2005, by mailing it to the parties. 
Petitioner Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., filed, by certified
mail, a petition for judicial review seeking review of
that order on June 30, 2005, which was the 21st day
after the LUBA decision was mailed.  Petitioner served
the petition on the respondents by first class, regular
mail, rather than certified or registered mail, on June
30, 2005, as well."
Respondents Central Point First, Inc., Becca Croft, Joseph H.
Thomas, David M. Painter, and Carol Putnam (respondents) did not
receive the petition until July 1, 2005 -- 22 days after the LUBA
order.  Respondents moved to dismiss judicial review in the Court
of Appeals because they neither received the petition for
judicial review nor had actual notice of it within 21 days of
LUBA's order. (1)  As noted, the Court of Appeals agreed with
respondents and dismissed the petition for judicial review. 
ORS 197.850(1) to (4) provide:
"(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Land Use
Board of Appeals under ORS 197.830 to 197.845 may seek
judicial review of a final order issued in those
proceedings.
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 183.480
to 183.540, judicial review of orders issued under ORS
197.830 to 197.845 shall be solely as provided in this
section.
"(3)(a) Jurisdiction for judicial review of
proceedings under ORS 197.830 to 197.845 is conferred
upon the Court of Appeals.  Proceedings for judicial
review shall be instituted by filing a petition in the
Court of Appeals.  The petition shall be filed within
21 days following the date the board delivered or
mailed the order upon which the petition is based.
"(b) Filing of the petition, as set forth in
paragraph (a) of this subsection, and service of a
petition on all persons identified in the petition as
adverse parties of record in the board proceeding is
jurisdictional and may not be waived or extended.
"(4) The petition shall state the nature of the
order the petitioner desires reviewed.  Copies of the
petition shall be served by registered or certified
mail upon the board, and all other parties of record in
the board proceeding."
Petitioner requests that this court reinstate its
petition for judicial review and offers two arguments to support
that request.  First, petitioner contends that the requirement
contained in ORS 197.850(4), that a petitioner serve other
parties by registered or certified mail, is not a jurisdictional
requirement.  Petitioner asserts that, in ORS 197.850(3)(b), the
legislature set forth only two requirements for the Court of
Appeals to obtain jurisdiction: (1) filing of the petition as set
forth in ORS 197.850(3)(a); and (2) service of the petition on
adverse parties.  Petitioner notes that the legislature did not
incorporate or cross-reference the requirements of subsection (4)
in setting forth the jurisdictional requirements.  Second,
petitioner asserts that neither subsection (3) nor subsection (4)
contain any statutory deadline for service; instead, petitioner
asserts, ORS 197.850(3)(a) imposes a 21-day deadline only for
filing the petition for judicial review.  Therefore, petitioner
contends, respondents' failure to receive the service copy of the
petition for judicial review until the twenty-second day
following the LUBA order does not defeat jurisdiction. 
To determine whether petitioner's arguments are well-founded, we employ the familiar methodology set out in PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993), to determine the legislature's intent. (2)  Under that
methodology, we first consider the text and context of the
statute.  Id. at 610-11.  We give words of common usage their
"plain, natural, and ordinary meaning."  Id. at 611.  Where words
used in a statute have a well-defined legal meaning, however,
they will be given that meaning.  Gaston v.  Parsons, 318 Or 247,
253, 864 P2d 1319 (1994).  Our analysis of the context includes
other provisions of the same statute or related statutes, PGE,
317 Or at 611, as well as prior opinions of this court
interpreting the same statutory wording, Robinson v. Nabisco,
Inc., 331 Or 178, 184, 11 P3d 1286 (2000).    
We begin with ORS 197.850(2), which provides,
"Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 183.480 to 183.540,
judicial review of orders issued under ORS 197.830 to 197.845
shall be solely as provided in this section." (3)  (Emphasis
added.)  In that subsection, the legislature made clear its
intent that the procedures set forth in ORS 197.850, and only
those procedures, govern judicial review of LUBA orders.  
ORS 197.850(3)(b) states that certain procedures for
obtaining judicial review are "jurisdictional and may not be
waived or extended."  As petitioner notes, ORS 197.850(3)(b) sets
forth two requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals:  (1) filing a petition for judicial review with the
Court of Appeals within 21 days of the LUBA order; and (2)
service of the petition for judicial review on all adverse
parties.  The latter provision, however, is silent as to how
petitioner must accomplish service.
The word "service" is a term of art with a specific,
legal meaning.  See Ester v.  City of Monmouth, 322 Or 1, 9-10,
903 P2d 344 (1995) (analyzing "local improvements" and "special
benefits" as terms of art with meanings derived from established
law).  Service is "[t]he formal delivery of a writ, summons, or
other legal process" or "[t]he formal delivery of some other
legal notice, such as a pleading."  Black's Law Dictionary 1399
(8th ed 2004).  In other words, service is the delivery of some
sort of legal notice in some formal manner.  ORS 197.850(4)
directs that the petition for judicial review be "served" by
certified or registered mail.  To serve is "[t]o make legal
delivery of (a notice or process)" or "[t]o present (a person)
with a notice or process as required by law."  Id.  Implicit in
that definition is the assumption of legal requirements as to how
the delivery is to take place.  
In McCall v. Kulongoski, 339 Or 186, 192-96, 118 P3d
256 (2005), this court construed the jurisdictional requirements
for service of the notice of appeal under ORS chapter 19, which
governs civil appeals.  Like ORS 197.850(3)(b), ORS 19.270(2)(a)
provides that service of the notice of appeal on all adverse
parties is jurisdictional and may not be waived or
extended. (4)  ORS 19.270(2)(a) incorporates by reference
certain other requirements set forth in ORS chapter 19, but does
not refer to the section that describes how service is
accomplished.  Nevertheless, in McCall, this court held that the
section describing the procedure for accomplishing service, ORS
19.500, also set forth a jurisdictional requirement. (5) 
McCall, 339 Or at 195.  The court explained that "the statutory
text that controls how such service must be accomplished is
framed, for the most part, in mandatory terms."  Id.  The court
therefore concluded  that, under ORS 19.500, to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, an appellant "shall" serve
a notice of appeal in the manner provided by ORCP 9.  Id. (6)  
We follow the same approach here.  Subsection (4) of
ORS 197.850 provides, in mandatory terms, "Copies of the petition
shall be served by registered or certified mail upon the board,
and all other parties of record in the board proceeding."  ORS
197.850(4) (emphasis added).  That requirement existed before the
legislature's addition of the text in paragraph (3)(b).  "[A]
presumption exists that amendatory acts do not change the meaning
of preexisting language further than is expressly declared or
necessarily implied."  Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282
Or 591, 597-98, 581 P2d 50 (1978). (7)  Nothing in paragraph
(3)(b) indicates that the legislature intended service of the
petition to mean anything other than the manner of service
prescribed by subsection (4). (8)  When read together,
paragraph (3)(b) and subsection (4) of ORS 197.850 mandate that a
party wanting to obtain judicial review of a LUBA order serve a
petition for review, by certified or registered mail, on all
adverse parties identified in the petition.
Petitioner concedes that it served respondents by
first-class mail, not certified or registered mail.  Because
petitioners failed to comply with what we now have concluded is a
jurisdictional requirement, we affirm the Court of Appeals order
of dismissal.  Because our conclusion respecting petitioner's
first argument disposes of this case, we do not reach 
petitioner's second argument regarding whether ORS 197.850
imposes a jurisdictional deadline for service.
The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
1. Respondent City of Central Point did not move to
dismiss in the Court of Appeals.  The City of Central Point is,
however, a party to this appeal.  Therefore, our use of
"respondents" includes the City of Central Point.
2. This court has not construed previously the
jurisdictional requirements of the current version of ORS
197.850.  In Ludwick v. Yamhill County, 298 Or 302, 304, 691 P2d
906 (1984), this court construed the former version of ORS
197.850, which required petitioners to file a notice of intent to
appeal in addition to a petition for judicial review.  In that
case, the court held that, where a petitioner filed a timely
petition for judicial review but did not include in the caption
of that petition the words "notice of intent to appeal,"
dismissal was inappropriate.  Id. at 305.  Because the two
requirements appeared to be redundant, the court noted that ORS
197.850 "may deserve legislative examination."  Id. at 305-06 n
1.  The legislature took up that examination in 1989 and
eliminated the notice of intent to appeal requirement.  Or Laws
1989, ch 515, § 1.  Notably, the version of ORS 197.850 extant
when Ludwick was decided contained a subsection (4) that is
virtually identical to the current version.  Although the main
focus of the 1989 amendment was to add, in paragraph (3)(b),
jurisdictional consequences to certain requirements in the
statute, the legislature was aware of the existence of subsection
(4), as it changed the word "notice" -- a reference to the notice
of intent to appeal -- to "petition," instead. 
3. ORS 183.480 to 183.540 are within the Administrative
Procedures Act.  Those sections generally govern judicial review
of agency orders.
4. ORS 19.270(2) provides, in part:
"The following requirements of ORS 19.240, 19.250
and 19.255 are jurisdictional and may not be waived or
extended: 
"(a) Service of the notice of appeal on all
parties identified in the notice of appeal as adverse
parties or, if the notice of appeal does not identify
adverse parties, on all parties who have appeared in
the action, suit or proceeding, as provided in ORS
19.240(2)(a), within the time limits prescribed by ORS
19.255."
5. ORS 19.500 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
when any provision of this chapter requires that a
paper be served and filed, the paper shall be served in
the manner provided in ORCP 9 B on all other parties
who have appeared in the action, suit or proceeding and
who are not represented by the same counsel as the
party serving the paper, and shall be filed, with proof
of service indorsed thereon, with the trial court
administrator."
6. Similarly, in Sizemore v. Myers, 327 Or 71, 74-75, 957
P2d 577 (1998), this court construed the requirements for
obtaining review of a ballot title.  The court concluded that,
although the applicable statutes did not set forth
"jurisdictional" requirements in the usual sense, a petitioner
nevertheless must comply with the statute's requirements to
obtain review of a ballot title, or face dismissal of the ballot
title review proceeding, because the requirements effectively
imposed limits on the court's authority  -- created by the
statutory scheme itself -- to review ballot titles.  Id. 
7. Although that generally is a legally correct statement,
as noted in Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 414 n 6,
939 P2d 608 (1997), use of the word "presumption" is misleading
to the extent that it suggests application of a presumption
favoring or disfavoring a change in meaning as opposed to
ascertaining the substance of the legislative enactment.
8. Indeed, given the well-established legal meaning of
"service," which encompasses delivery of a legal document in a
specific manner, if the legislature intended to refer to the
"fact" of service alone (assuming that the "fact" of service
could be divorced from the "manner" of service), it would need to
do so explicitly, as such a meaning is not necessarily implied by
an unaccompanied reference to "service."