Title: Ex parte Kimberly P. Kilgore. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Robert Kilgore, Jr. v. Kimberly P. Kilgore) (Limestone Circuit Court: DR-09-396.01; Civil Appeals : 2100951). Writ Denied. No Opinion.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:06/29/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
____________________
1110977
____________________
Ex parte Kimberly P. Kilgore
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Robert Kilgore, Jr.
v.
Kimberly P. Kilgore)
(Limestone Circuit Court, DR-09-396.01;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2100951)
BOLIN, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
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2
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Parker, Shaw, and
Main, JJ., concur.
Murdock and Wise, JJ., dissent.
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3
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I am concerned that the Court of Civil Appeals may have
substituted its judgment for that of the trial court in this
case.  As the Court of Civil Appeals observed: 
"'"'[T]he trial court is in the better position
to consider all of the evidence, as well as the many
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, and
to decide the issue of custody.'"  Ex parte
Patronas, 693 So. 2d 473, 475 (Ala. 1997) (quoting
Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d [1322] at 1326 [(Ala.
1996)]).  "Thus, appellate review of a judgment
modifying custody when the evidence was presented
ore tenus is limited to determining whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
judgment."  Cheek v. Dyess, 1 So. 3d 1025, 1029
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (citing Ex parte Patronas)
(emphasis added).  Under the ore tenus rule, where
the conclusion of the trial court is so opposed to
the weight of the evidence that the variable factors
of a witness's demeanor and credibility and the
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, even
after 
considering 
those factors, "'"could not
reasonably substantiate it, then the conclusion is
clearly erroneous and must be reversed."'"  Cheek,
1 So. 3d at 1029 (quoting B.J.N. v. P.D., 742 So. 2d
1270, 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), quoting in turn
Jacoby v. Bell, 370 So. 2d 278, 280 (Ala. 1979)
(emphasis added)).'" 
Kilgore v. Kilgore, [Ms. 2100951, Jan. 20, 2012] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (quoting Ex parte Blackstock,
47 So. 3d 801, 805-06 (Ala. 2009)).  
As the Court of Civil Appeals correctly notes, when there
is a preexisting judgment awarding joint physical custody (as
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4
there was here) a parent seeking a change of custody must
prove (1) "'a material change of circumstances since that
judgment was entered'" and (2) "'"'that it [is] in the
[child's] best interests that the [judgment] be modified'" in
the manner requested.'"  __ So. 3d at __ (quoting Ex parte
Blackstock, 47 So. 3d at 805, quoting, in turn, other cases).
The purpose of the first prong, a material change of
circumstances, is to overcome the res judicata effect, i.e.,
the finality, of the prior judgment.  See Self v. Fugard, 518
So. 2d 727, 730 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (explaining that child-
custody determinations are "final with respect to the
particular set of circumstances currently before the court"
but that a court "may modify its original decree upon a
showing of a material change in circumstances"); Ford v. Ford,
293 Ala. 743, 744, 310 So. 2d 234, 235 (1975) ("A prior decree
of custody is assumed correct and in the absence of proof of
changed conditions or other substantial reason for its
modification it should not be disturbed.").  With the bar of
res judicata removed, the touchstone for the court considering
the custody-modification request becomes simply what is in the
child's "best interests" at that juncture in the child's life.
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5
We are presented in this case with an order in which the
trial court did not include an express determination that
there had been a material change of circumstances.  The words
"material change of circumstances" appear nowhere in the trial
court's order.  
By the same token, it does not appear to me that the
trial court undertook to include in its order all the
circumstances that contributed to its implied determination
that there had been a material change of circumstances.  The
fact that it did not do so, however, led the Court of Civil
Appeals to search among those statements the trial court did
include in its order in an effort to discern the grounds for
the trial court's decision.   It is true that the trial court
does state in its order that "the child is now six years of
age" and "is experiencing some difficulties with regard to the
shared custody whereby the parties exchange the child week to
week."  Based on the facts before us and the structure of the
trial court's order, it is not clear that this was intended as
an exhaustive statement of the grounds upon which the trial
court determined that there was a material change of
circumstances.  Indeed, for all that appears, the trial
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court's statement that the child was now six years of age and
was having difficulty with the shared-custody arrangement was
intended to explain the court's decision as to the best-
interests prong that follows this statement, which, apart from
this statement, would itself be accompanied by no explanation:
"It is ORDERED by the court that the best interests of the
parties minor child is hereby determined to be ... sole
physical custody to the [mother]."
Can we conclude that the trial court did not factor into
its implied material-change-of-circumstances decision "the
grandmother issue"?  That is, can we conclude from the way the
order is worded that the trial court did not make an implied
finding (the law requires us to impute to the trial court
those findings necessary to support its judgment unless the
court's order or the record indicates otherwise) that the
grandmother's coming to live with the father and child four
months before the trial and taking over virtually full-time
caregiving responsibility was not a material change of
circumstances? 
 
What 
about 
the 
evidence 
(apparently
undisputed) that, since the divorce, the mother has attained
a college degree, is employed by a defense contractor and
1110977
I believe we can assume that the trial court could have
1
drawn negative inferences from much of the foregoing.
Moreover, the law is clear that one need not prove that a
child has been adversely affected by the material change of
7
makes over $48,000 per year, and has a "flexible" work
schedule?
Apparently, the trial court had before it substantial
evidence from which it could have found (and some of these
facts are undisputed) the following regarding the grandmother:
that she was a veritable stranger to the child before moving
in with the father; that she had been witnessed screaming at
another young grandchild; that she did not finish high school;
that she was to some extent disabled; that she takes the
prescription medication Xanax; that, in the past, she had
illegally 
purchased 
prescription drugs from her son's
girlfriend; that, during the parties' marriage, the father had
expressed reservations about his mother being around the
child; that, when they were married, the mother and father
agreed that they would never permit the grandmother to babysit
the child; that the grandmother had been married and divorced
five times; and that the grandmother was now physically with
and responsible for the child most of the day, including
transporting the child to various activities.1
1110977
circumstances.  See Watters v. Watters, 918 So. 2d 913, 916
(Ala. Civ. App. 2005). 
8
In apparent satisfaction of the material-change-of-
circumstances prong, we have before us, in addition to the
foregoing, the facts that the child is now six years of age,
that she is attending school, and that the continuation of the
week-to-week alternating custody arrangement is now causing
the child some difficulties that it did not cause before. The
father himself alleged in his petition for a modification of
custody that initiated this action "that the joint custody
arrangement was not working."  Does not all the foregoing
amount to "substantial evidence" from which the trial court
reasonably 
could 
have 
found 
a 
material 
change 
of
circumstances?
Because I find a probability of merit in the mother's
petition, I would grant that petition in order to further
consider this case.