Title: City of Burlington v. Davis

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

CITY_OF_BURLINGTON_V_DAVIS.92-190; 160 Vt. 183; 624 A.2d 872


[Filed 26-Mar-1993]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 92-190


City of Burlington                           Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

Donald D. Davis                              December Term, 1992



Matthew I. Katz, J.

Lawrence Miller, Sarah M.Powell, and Andrew Morse of Miller & Faignant,
   P.C., Rutland, for plaintiff-appellee

Keith J. Kasper of McNamara, Fitzpatrick, McCormick & Mertz, P.C.,
   Burlington, for defendant-appellant



PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.) and Martin,
          Supr. J., Specially Assigned



     MORSE, J.    Claimant, a former police officer for the City of
Burlington, appeals from a superior court ruling that he did not suffer a
compensable injury pursuant to Vermont Worker's Compensation Act.  The sole
issue is whether the court's finding on causation is clearly erroneous.  We
affirm.
     In the early 1980's, claimant suffered several seizures as a mani-
festation of a brain tumor.  One of these seizures occurred on September 19,
1984, after claimant testified at an executive session of the Burlington
Police Commission about a series of charges made against him.  Thereafter he
was unable to continue in his employment.  Hearing was held on his claim in
1988, where the Commissioner of Labor and Industry ruled in claimant's
favor.  In 1989, claimant died as a result of the brain tumor.
     The City appealed to the superior court for de novo review.  The court,
relying on the testimony of claimant's physician, found that claimant
suffered no ongoing injury as a result of the 1984 seizure and that
claimant "probably would be in a similar condition" even if he had not
experienced work-related stress.  Claimant's expert testified that the
seizures did not affect the underlying brain tumor.  According to the court,
although "the work-related incident led to a new treatment regime, with
higher dosages, in turn barring return to work, this was not caused by the
work-related incident.  That incident must be characterized as evanescent.
It is the brain tumor which required the new dosages, not the particular
seizure or any after-effects of the seizure."  Because the court decided the
case as the trier of fact, findings shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.  V.R.C.P. 52.  The court's conclusions, which addressed mixed
questions of law and fact, will be upheld if supported by the findings.
Cameron v. Double A. Services, Inc., 156 Vt. 577, 581, 595 A.2d 259, 261-62
(1991).
     If claimant's condition was aggravated or accelerated by the stressful
work situation, he would have been entitled to benefits.  Jackson v. True
Temper Corp., 151 Vt. 592, 595, 563 A.2d 621, 623 (1989).  The proper
inquiry is whether "'the disability came upon the claimant earlier than
otherwise would have occurred.'"  Id. at 596, 563 A.2d  at 623, (quoting
Gillespie v. Vermont Hosiery & Machinery Co., 109 Vt. 409, 415, 199 A. 564,
566 (1938)).
     In Jackson, the jury found causation sufficient where the employee's
underlying condition, alcoholism, worsened after the employee was injured by
a rip saw at work.  Id. at 597, 563 A.2d  at 624.  Thereafter, he developed
seizures as a result of the resurgence of his drinking and was unable to
retain his employment.
     Here, however, the evidence was that claimant suffered seizures as
early as 1980 as a result of a brain tumor, and again suffered a stress-
related seizure in 1984, after which he was unable to work.  Contrary to
Jackson, the fact finder here found no acceleration of a preexisting
condition entitling claimant to benefits.  His seizure at work did not
cause him to have the seizures that followed.  The symptoms did not cause
more symptoms; the abnormal physical condition caused the symptoms.
Contrary to the dissent's view, the only "coincidence" was that the seizure
that marked the beginning of the debilitating treatment regime occurred at
work instead of somewhere else.
     The evidence amply supported the court's view that claimant would have
been just as disabled had he not gone to work that day.  Claimant's expert
testified that it was "a reasonable assumption" that without the stressful
situation at work in 1984, claimant would still have had seizures, and that
"reasoned judgment" would put claimant "in a similar condition" regardless
of whether or not the stressful situation had occurred.  Moreover, although
stress might hasten the occurrence of seizures, "the progression of the
underlying condition" made it reasonable that more seizures would occur.  In
other words, the incident when the seizure occurred merely "led to," in the
sense of "was followed by," the disability.  The court made clear that it
was the brain tumor that caused the disability, "not the particular seizure
or any after-effects of the seizure."        
     Having found, based on the evidence before it, that the required nexus
was lacking, the court concluded that claimant was not entitled to benefits
under the Workers' Compensation statute.  The dissent's quarrel is that the
standard of review does not permit the result it would prefer.  The
superior court's findings, not being clearly erroneous, must stand
regardless of how we might have viewed the evidence.  Hurwitz v. Camp Derry,
Inc., 134 Vt. 306, 307,