Title: Walls v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTOPHER WALLS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 102, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN01-05-0600 
§                   IN01-05-0602 
§                   IN01-05-0605 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 30, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:   October 10, 2002 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of October 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Christopher Walls, was found guilty 
by a Superior Court jury of Offensive Touching, Disorderly Conduct and 
Resisting Arrest.  On each of the convictions for offensive touching and 
disorderly conduct, Walls was sentenced to 30 days incarceration at Level V, 
to be suspended for 30 days at Level III.  On the conviction for resisting 
 
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arrest, he was sentenced to 6 months incarceration at Level V, to be 
suspended for 6 months at Level III.  This is Walls’ direct appeal.1 
   
(2) 
Walls’ trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2 
 
(3) 
Walls’ counsel asserts that: a) based upon a careful and 
complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues; 
b) he informed Walls of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with 
a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete 
hearing transcript; and c) he informed Walls of his right to supplement 
counsel’s presentation.  Walls responded with a brief that raises several 
                                                          
 
1This appeal relates solely to Walls’ conviction for resisting arrest.  His sentences on the 
other charges fall below this Court’s jurisdictional threshold.  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 
11(1) (b); Marker v. State, 450 A.2d 397, 399 (Del. 1982).   
2Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3
issues for this Court’s consideration.3  The State has responded to the 
position taken by Walls’ counsel as well as the issue raised by Walls and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(4) 
Walls raises several issues for this Court’s consideration, which 
may fairly be summarized as follows.  He claims that: a) the Superior Court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that an individual has a statutory right to 
refuse medical treatment; b) it was a violation of his constitutional rights for 
the police to detain him in the hospital emergency room and permit him to 
be medicated; and c) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because he was 
never arraigned. 
 
(5) 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Sergeant Michael 
DiOssi, a constable employed by Christiana Care Health Systems.  Sergeant 
DiOssi testified that on the evening of April 22, 2001 he was called to the 
Christiana Hospital Emergency Department, Trauma Room D, to assist with 
a disorderly patient.  He was accompanied by two other constables, Sergeant 
Edward Davis and Corporal David Melvin.  When they arrived at the trauma 
room, Officer David Cajuste of the New Castle County Police Department 
was already there.  Sergeant DiOssi saw Walls standing in a corner of the 
                                                          
 
3In light of Walls’ contention that he did not receive counsel’s letter, motion to withdraw 
or draft Rule 26(c) brief, we afforded Walls additional time to supplement his points for 
consideration by this Court.  Walls’ supplemental points were filed on September 6, 
2002.  The State’s supplemental response was filed on September 30, 2002. 
 
4
room in a fighting posture, with clenched fists, and yelling obscenities.  
Walls had bloodshot eyes, was slurring his speech and appeared to be 
intoxicated.  
 
(6) 
The officers conferred with each other and decided that, for his 
own safety and the safety of others, Walls should be placed on a stretcher.  
As they attempted to escort Walls over to a stretcher about four to five feet 
away, Walls became increasingly agitated and started kicking and throwing 
punches.  Officer Cajuste was struck.  The officers then handcuffed Walls to 
the stretcher so no one else would be injured.  During the altercation, 
Sergeant DiOssi suffered abrasions to his right arm.  Walls then spat blood 
on the constables and damaged the stretcher by kicking at it.  Sergeant 
DiOssi testified that it is hospital policy not to release an intoxicated person 
from treatment until they are no longer a danger to themselves or others.   
 
(7) 
Officer David Cajuste testified next for the State.  On the 
evening of April 22, 2001, he was called to the scene of a motor vehicle 
accident.  He saw Walls being transported from the scene on a stretcher and 
then saw him again in the trauma room at the hospital.  Officer Cajuste 
attempted to interview Walls about the accident, but Walls refused to answer 
his questions.  He appeared to be intoxicated.  Walls became increasingly 
belligerent and screamed obscenities, at which point Officer Cajuste warned 
 
5
him that he could be arrested for disorderly conduct.  Walls continued to act 
belligerently and threatened to throw a nearby vial of blood at him.   
 
(8) 
Officer Cajuste realized at that point that the situation was 
getting out of hand and called the constables for assistance.  Together they 
managed to control Walls’ upper body and handcuff him to the stretcher.  
Walls kicked Sergeant DiOssi and tried to bite him.  He spat blood upon 
Sergeant DiOssi and another constable and damaged the stretcher.  Finally, a 
doctor arrived and administered a drug to Walls to calm him down.  Later, 
after Walls was treated, Officer Cajuste took him into custody.  In refusing 
to answer questions about the accident, Walls told Officer Cajuste to talk to 
his lawyer.  
 
(9) 
Following trial, defense counsel requested that the jury be 
instructed that there is a statutory right to refuse medical treatment.  The 
Superior Court judge refused to give such an instruction, stating that such a 
right would not provide a defense to the crimes with which Walls had been 
charged and would not excuse any alleged criminal conduct.  Following the 
judge’s ruling, defense counsel stated, “I have no argument in that regard, 
Your Honor.” 
 
(10) Walls’ first claim that the Superior Court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury that there is a statutory right to refuse medical treatment is 
 
6
without merit.  The statute upon which Walls relies4 clearly does not govern 
situations in which an individual brought to a hospital emergency room for 
treatment becomes violent and threatens to injure himself and hospital 
personnel.  It was, therefore, proper for the Superior Court to refuse to 
instruct the jury regarding that statute. 
 
(11) Walls’ claim that it was improper for the police to detain him 
and permit him to be medicated is equally without merit.  Walls improperly 
characterizes what occurred in the emergency room as a “detention” by the 
police.  Rather, Walls was injured in an auto accident, was taken to the 
emergency room and, while in the emergency room, committed several 
criminal offenses.  There is no evidence in this record that either the police 
or medical personnel acted unreasonably or illegally in response to Walls’ 
conduct.  
 
(12) Finally, Walls claims that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction 
because he was never arraigned.  There is no documentation in the Superior 
Court record reflecting that Walls was arraigned.  However, the record 
reflects that Walls was represented by counsel prior to his indictment and 
                                                          
 
4DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1995), which is part of the Delaware Death With 
Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2518 (1995). 
 
7
that his case proceeded to trial with no objection concerning the absence of 
an arraignment.  There is, moreover, neither a claim, nor any evidence, of 
any  prejudice to Walls due to the absence of an arraignment.  Under such 
circumstances, there is no merit to Walls’ claim.5 
 
(13) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Walls’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We are also satisfied that Walls’ counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Walls could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice          
                                                          
 
5Ray v. State, 262 A.2d 643, 644-45 (Del. 1970).