Title: Commonwealth v. Buth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11126 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PHAP BUTH. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 9, 2018. - July 17, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Armed Home Invasion.  Joint 
Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 7, 2005. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J., and 
a motion for a new trial, filed on June 17, 2015, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
John H. Cunha, Jr. (Charles Allan Hope also present) for 
the defendant. 
 
Catherine L. Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  A jury in the Superior Court convicted the 
defendant, Phap Buth, on two indictments charging murder in the 
first degree for the shooting deaths of Amy Dumas and her 
father, Robert Finnerty.  Both murder indictments were based on 
a theory of joint venture felony-murder, with armed home 
2 
 
 
invasion as the predicate offense.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues that, because there was insufficient evidence to show 
that he knew that his companions were armed, his convictions 
must be overturned.  He also claims that the merger doctrine 
prevents his convictions and that the felony-murder doctrine 
should be abolished.1  We affirm and decline to grant 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for discussion of the issues. 
 
1.  The crime.  Robert and Judith Finnerty lived with their 
sixteen year old daughter, Amy Dumas, in Lynn.  After suffering 
a stroke, Robert was partially paralyzed and unable to work.2  
Judith left her full-time job to care for Robert, and began 
selling marijuana to family, friends, and "people that [she] 
knew" to earn money. 
 
Shortly after 11 P.M. on May 16, 2005, the defendant 
knocked at the Finnertys' door, seeking to purchase marijuana.  
Although Judith had sold marijuana to the defendant on other 
occasions, she informed him that she no longer sold it, but 
                     
 
1 Although the defendant also appeals from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, his appellate brief states that he is no 
longer pursuing the argument he raised in that motion. 
 
 
2 Because Robert and Judith Finnerty share a last name, we 
refer to them by their first names. 
3 
 
 
would "do it this one time."  The defendant entered the 
apartment, purchased a bag of marijuana, and left. 
 
Within seconds, the defendant returned to the Finnertys' 
door and knocked again.  Judith opened the door partway to speak 
to the defendant, who asked to purchase additional marijuana.  
When she refused, he swung open her door and stepped back out of 
the way, making room for two other individuals wearing black 
clothes, black gloves, and ski masks to enter.  As Judith ran 
toward her husband to protect him, she fell to the floor.  When 
she looked up, she saw the assailants standing with guns in 
their hands.  She began screaming for help.  Robert raised his 
walker to defend himself and was shot once in the chest.  Dumas 
came running out of her bedroom and was shot twice in the back. 
 
The intruders fled after shooting the victims, and Judith 
ran to the door to yell for help.  She saw the defendant 
standing at the end of the driveway, looking back and forth.  
When the defendant saw Judith, he "smirk[ed]."  Law enforcement 
soon arrived at the scene; Robert and Dumas were pronounced dead 
a short time later. 
 
2.  The investigation.  A neighbor telephoned 911, alerting 
law enforcement to the crimes.  Based on the information that 
Judith related to one of the officers, other officers canvassed 
the neighborhood, looking for an individual matching the 
defendant's description, as well as the two assailants in black. 
4 
 
 
 
Within fifteen minutes of a broadcast description of the 
defendant, police located him approximately one-quarter mile 
from the Finnertys' apartment, and Judith identified him as the 
unmasked perpetrator.  Nearby, police also located Pytou Heang 
and Chon Son, the two individuals who were identified as the 
armed assailants.3  Pytou Heang was outside an apartment building 
blocks away from the crime scene, and Chon Son was in the 
stairwell of that building.  On the building's third-floor 
landing, police recovered a baseball hat, two firearms, gloves, 
and a bandana. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant raises three claims of error:  
first, that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions; second, that the merger doctrine precludes his 
convictions; and third, that the felony-murder doctrine is 
unconstitutional.  We address each in turn. 
 
1.  Sufficiency of evidence.  In order for a jury to find a 
defendant guilty of joint venture felony-murder with armed home 
invasion as the predicate felony, the Commonwealth is required 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
                     
 
3 Pytou Heang was convicted on two indictments charging 
murder in the first degree and one indictment each charging 
armed home invasion and unlawfully carrying a firearm.  
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 828 (2011).  Chon 
Son pleaded guilty on two indictments charging murder in the 
second degree and one indictment each charging armed home 
invasion and carrying a firearm without a license.  Id. at 830 
n.8. 
5 
 
 
participated in committing armed home invasion as a joint 
venturer and that the victims were killed in furtherance of that 
crime.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 272-
273 (2015).  To prove a joint venture, the Commonwealth is 
required to show that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the commission of the crime charged with the intent required for 
the offense.4  Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 34 (1997). 
 
The defendant focuses our attention on the sufficiency of 
the evidence of his participation in the armed home invasion as 
a joint venturer.5  To succeed in a claim of insufficient 
evidence, the defendant must show that, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, no rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
                     
 
4 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that to prove a 
defendant guilty of a joint venture, the Commonwealth had to 
show that the defendant (1) was "physically present at the scene 
of the crime," (2) had "knowledge that another intended to 
commit the crime," and (3) had "agreed to participate in the 
crime."  In Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 455 (2009), 
we articulated a modified test for joint venture intended to 
provide clearer guidance.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 474 
Mass. 1008, 1008-1009 (2016). 
 
 
5 This specific claim was raised during the charge 
conference rather than in connection with his motions for a 
required finding of not guilty.  We have said that a generally 
phrased motion for a required finding of not guilty in a murder 
case is inadequate to preserve a claim for insufficiency of the 
evidence where enough evidence supports the conviction under an 
alternate theory.  See Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 331 
(2000).  Here, however, the defendant identified his motion as 
one focusing on the joint venture theory, and no other theory 
supported a conviction of murder.  Thus, we conclude that the 
claim of error was preserved. 
6 
 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 
Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  Where, as here, an element of the 
offense is that the perpetrator is armed, the Commonwealth must 
prove that the defendant knew that at least one coventurer was 
armed.  See G. L. c. 265, § 18C; Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 280.  The 
defendant contends that evidence that he was aware that his 
coventurers were armed before they entered the apartment is 
impermissibly thin.  We disagree. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the 
defendant knew his coventurers had access to firearms.  One 
witness testified that, during a visit to the witness's 
apartment on the weekend prior to the shooting, Pytou Heang 
spoke of robbing a drug dealer in the defendant's presence.  The 
witness further testified that Pytou Heang made a gesture with 
his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun, prompting the witness 
to respond, "[I]f you got a gun, get out of my house."6 
                     
6 The witness testified with the assistance of an 
interpreter, and his testimony was, at times, difficult to 
follow.  He appeared to contradict himself about whether the 
defendant was in the living room for the exchange about the gun.  
He began by testifying that the defendant was in the room, 
before saying that "[the defendant] was in and out of my room.  
I don't know whether he's in the living room or not."  When the 
prosecutor followed up by asking again whether the defendant was 
in the room, the witness said, "Yes.  [The defendant] there 
too." 
 
When we review convictions for sufficiency of the evidence, 
"[i]t does not matter that some of the evidence could be 
characterized as equivocal or contradictory."  Commonwealth v. 
7 
 
 
 
In addition, the jury heard testimony that the defendant 
knew the victims were drug dealers.  Thus, the jury were 
permitted to infer that the defendant knew his coventurers would 
need weapons to "overcome victim resistance."7  Commonwealth v. 
Quinones, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 219 (2010).  Accord 
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 33 (2017) (sufficient 
evidence of defendant's knowledge of coventurers' weapons 
existed where, inter alia, defendant knew victims were drug 
dealers). 
 
Finally, even assuming that the defendant was initially 
unaware that his coventurers had firearms, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence that the defendant continued to participate 
in the joint venture even after shots were fired by acting as a 
lookout.  When Judith opened her door to call for help, she saw 
                                                                  
Cove, 427 Mass. 474, 475 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. James, 
424 Mass. 770, 785 (1997).  We have specifically held that 
"[t]he fact that [a witness's] testimony was inconsistent and 
contradictory does not render the evidence insufficient."  
Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 376 Mass. 402, 410 (1978).  Here, as 
the witness testified that the defendant was in the room to hear 
the statement about the gun, the jury heard evidence that 
allowed them to conclude that the defendant knew his coventurer 
likely had access to a firearm. 
 
7 The defendant argues that, as the intended victims were a 
teenaged girl, her incapacitated father, and her unarmed mother, 
this is not a situation in which the jury could infer that the 
defendant would expect that his coventurers would be armed based 
on an anticipated need to overcome victim resistance.  However, 
the victims' physical characteristics equally support an 
inference that they themselves would be armed.  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 703 (2003). 
8 
 
 
the defendant standing at the end of her driveway, looking back 
and forth; when the defendant saw Judith, he "smirk[ed]."  Where 
a defendant continues to act in furtherance of the joint venture 
even after learning of a coventurer's weapon, we have allowed an 
inference that the coventurer had the requisite intent for the 
joint venture.  See, e.g., Rakes, 478 Mass. at 33 ("Even if the 
defendant had been unaware that [his coventurer] possessed a 
weapon in advance, it would be reasonable to conclude that he 
became aware over the course of the robbery and continued to 
participate, implicating him in the joint venture"); 
Commonwealth v. Semedo, 422 Mass. 716, 719 (1996). 
 
Although this is a close case, and, separately, each piece 
of evidence might not have been sufficient, taken as a whole the 
evidence supports the convictions.  Rakes, 478 Mass. at 32 (when 
reviewing sufficiency of evidence, we "view[] the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution" and "draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"). 
 
2.  Merger.  The defendant claims that the judge erred by 
failing to instruct the jury on the merger doctrine of felony-
murder.  According to the merger doctrine, a defendant can only 
be convicted of felony-murder if he or she committed or 
attempted to commit a felony that is independent of the conduct 
necessary to cause the victim's death, because the felony that 
caused the death "merges" with the killing and cannot be the 
9 
 
 
predicate offense.  Commonwealth v. Fredette, 480 Mass.    ,   
(2018), citing Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 519 
(2017). 
 
To prove that the defendant was guilty of armed home 
invasion, the Commonwealth's burden was to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
"(1) entered the dwelling of another, (2) knowing, or 
having reason to know, that one or more persons were 
present within the dwelling house when he entered or 
remained in it; (3) was armed with a dangerous weapon at 
the time of entry; and (4) used force or threatened the 
imminent use of force on any person within the dwelling 
house, or intentionally caused injury to any such person." 
 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 373-374 (2017).  As 
armed home invasion includes as an element the use of force, the 
threatened imminent use of force, or causing injury to a person 
within a dwelling, Commonwealth v. Doucette, 430 Mass. 461, 465-
466 (1999), the offense merges with a death that occurs as a 
result unless the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
crime consisted of conduct "separate and distinct from the 
conduct necessary to kill the victim."  Fredette, 480 Mass. 
at    .  Accord Commonwealth v. Stokes, 460 Mass. 311, 314 n.8, 
315 (2011); Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 300-301 (2011). 
 
It was error for the judge not to instruct the jury on this 
point, because the jury were unaware that they were required to 
find the defendant guilty of a felony distinct from the killing 
violence.  As the defendant did not object at trial, we look to 
10 
 
 
whether that error caused a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.8  See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 
430, 436-437 (2015).  We therefore consider the impact of the 
error on the trial.  See Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 
274 (1998). 
 
In cases where the defendant challenges the lack of merger 
instructions, if the "jury could have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that the defendant, through his or her coventurers, 
committed at least one unmerged life felony, then the error did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Gunter, 427 Mass. at 274.  See Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 438 
Mass. 356, 360 (2003).  We therefore consider whether the 
Commonwealth presented evidence of an unmerged life felony, 
i.e., a felony that could have served as a predicate felony for 
the defendant's convictions of felony-murder in the first 
degree.9  See Kilburn, supra at 359; Gunter, supra at 273-274.  
                     
 
8 The defendant did not object to the lack of a merger 
instruction, or even engage with the judge on the issue when the 
judge raised it sua sponte.  The judge did not have the benefit 
of Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 300 (2011), in which we 
held that claims of merger where the predicate felony is armed 
home invasion depend upon the specific facts of the case. 
 
 
9 We reject the defendant's assertion that the judge told 
the jury that the Commonwealth was not alleging any felony 
beyond the use of force that killed the two victims.  The judge 
actually instructed that "the Commonwealth is claiming that 
there was the exercise of force against Robert Finnerty and Amy 
Dumas."  The judge did not instruct the jury not to consider any 
other acts of violence.  Indeed he repeatedly instructed the 
11 
 
 
See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 Mass. 24, 38 (2014) (for 
felony-murder in first degree, predicate felony must be 
punishable by life imprisonment). 
 
Here, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed an act of armed home invasion 
against Judith, even though there was no separate indictment for 
that crime naming her as a victim:10  "the felony on which a 
charge of felony-murder is premised may be uncharged, so long as 
the evidence supports it."  Stokes, 460 Mass. at 315.  See 
Gunter, 427 Mass. at 274 (irrelevant that defendant was not 
separately indicted for unmerged felonies).  Because the armed 
home invasion statute includes as an element the use of force or 
threat of force, see Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 373-374, the threat 
of force against an occupant of the premises satisfies that 
element of the crime.  Accordingly, an armed home invasion 
against Judith is a separate, distinct, and unmerged felony for 
purposes of the felony-murder doctrine.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 247 (2000) ("an assault may be 
accomplished . . . by putting another in fear of an immediately 
threatened battery"). 
                                                                  
jury on alternate elements of armed home invasion:  use or 
threat of force. 
 
 
10 The indictment did not name a victim. 
12 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of an act 
of armed home invasion against Judith.  When Judith opened her 
door, two masked assailants armed with guns pushed their way 
into her home.  She tried to flee, falling over in the process, 
before beginning to scream.  She later realized that she had 
involuntarily urinated during the attack.  Given this evidence 
of a separate felony against Judith, the judge's failure to 
instruct the jury concerning the merger doctrine did not give 
rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Gunter, 427 Mass. at 274. 
 
3.  Constitutionality of felony-murder.  The defendant also 
argues that we should abolish the doctrine of felony-murder 
entirely.  In other words, the defendant seeks the benefit of 
our holding in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 825 (2017) 
(Gants, C.J., concurring), in which we limited felony-murder to 
its statutory role as an aggravating element by holding that "a 
defendant may not be convicted of murder without proof of one of 
the three prongs of malice."  Id. at 807-808.  In Brown, 
however, we also held that the new rule was prospective only.  
Id. at 807.  We decline to depart from that holding. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary power under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After reviewing the briefs and the entire 
record, we discern no reason to exercise our power under § 33E. 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.