Title: David v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13096 
 
JOAQUIN DAVID  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
January 26, 2022. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Pretrial Detention.  District Court, Probable cause 
hearing. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Joaquin David, appeals from a judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  David has been charged in a complaint (first 
case) with assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (b), and strangulation, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15D (b); and, in a separate 
complaint (second case), with malicious destruction of property, 
in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 127, and malicious damage to a 
motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).  He was 
arraigned on July 23, 2020, on both complaints, and after a 
hearing, a judge in the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) ordered 
that he be held on a finding of dangerousness pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A.  David thereafter filed a petition for review of 
that determination in the Superior Court, which was denied.   
 
Then, in December 2020, the Commonwealth, anticipating that 
David would seek release from pretrial detention on the basis 
that he had been detained for 120 days, requested that David's 
detention remain in effect.1  The Commonwealth argued that 
 
 
1 General Laws c. 276, § 58A (3), provides that "[a] person 
detained under this subsection shall be brought to a trial as 
soon as reasonably possible, but in absence of good cause, the 
person so held shall not be detained for a period exceeding 120 
 
2 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 70, 72 (2020), the 
entire period of David's detention up to that point was 
excludable, in large part due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  After a 
hearing, in January 2021, a judge in the BMC maintained David's 
detention and orally indicated that he was doing so on the basis 
of Lougee.  
 
Separately, David had moved, in the BMC, for a probable 
cause hearing.  At a hearing on October 22, 2020, a judge 
considered David's motion, discussed in detail with the parties 
whether David was entitled to a probable cause hearing, and 
indicated that he was taking the motion under advisement.  At a 
subsequent hearing on November 23, 2020, the judge denied the 
motion. 
 
The continued detention and lack of a probable cause 
hearing led to David's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, in which he 
sought review of the extension of his pretrial detention and the 
denial of his motion for a probable cause hearing.  David argued 
in his petition, among other things, that the court should 
revisit its decision in Lougee and the issue of pretrial 
detention pursuant to § 58A in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic.  A single justice denied the petition without a 
hearing.2   
 
 
days by the district court . . . excluding any period of delay 
as defined in [Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2)]." 
 
 
2 After David's appeal was entered in this court, we decided 
Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 627 (2021), in which we 
did just what David asked for in his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition 
-- that is, we revisited our holding in Lougee in light of the 
passage of time since Lougee was decided.  Although jury trials 
had resumed during that period, we recognized "the possibility 
of continued unforeseen delays, as well as the fact that in some 
cases the length of pretrial detention may have approached or 
exceeded the limits of constitutional due process."  Id. at 628.  
On the basis of those concerns, we concluded that "certain 
defendants are entitled to hearings on motions for 
reconsideration of § 58A orders to determine whether the length 
of detention violates due process."  Id. at 632-633.  With the 
benefit of our decision in Mushwaalakbar, David filed a motion 
in the Superior Court to reconsider the order of pretrial 
detention.  A judge denied the motion after a hearing.  David 
did not petition the county court for review of that ruling. 
 
 
3 
Discussion.  1.  Pretrial detention.  In his appeal from 
the denial of his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, David now argues 
that the initial finding of dangerousness was erroneous; that 
his motions to reconsider the initial detention order, on the 
basis of changed circumstances, were erroneously denied; and 
that the Commonwealth's request to extend his detention should 
not have been allowed.  The only relief that he actually sought 
in his petition before the single justice, however, as to 
pretrial detention, was reversal of the BMC's January 2021 order 
allowing the Commonwealth's request to extend his detention.  On 
that limited issue, and applying the law that was in effect at 
the time, including our holding in Lougee, the single justice 
did not err or abuse his discretion in denying the requested 
relief.  To the extent that David now argues on appeal that the 
initial finding of dangerousness was erroneous, he did not raise 
that issue before the single justice, and we therefore need not 
consider it.3  See Carvalho v. Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 1014, 1014 
(2011), and cases cited. 
 
Furthermore, although we decided Mushwaalakbar v. 
Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 627 (2021), after the single justice's 
denial of David's petition, see note 2, supra, David has already 
received the relief that he is entitled to pursuant to that 
decision, i.e., a hearing in the trial court on his motion to 
reconsider the pretrial detention order on the ground that the 
length of his detention violates due process.4,5  
 
 
3 David specifically stated in a footnote in his petition 
that he was "not directly seeking review of the underlying 
dangerousness finding," although, in a conclusory fashion, he 
"maintain[ed] the position that the order [was] not legally 
supported by clear and convincing evidence."  He also noted in a 
conclusory fashion that the single justice had authority to 
review the pretrial detention order de novo, but he did not make 
any specific argument toward that end.   
 
 
4 The limited matter before us in this appeal is the single 
justice's denial of David's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.  
Because the petition and the single justice's ruling predated 
the decision in Mushwaalakbar, they did not concern 
Mushwaalakbar or the Superior Court's subsequent ruling in light 
of Mushwaalakbar.  Nor did David seek review of the Superior 
Court's ruling in the county court.  That ruling is therefore 
not before us in this appeal, and we do not consider David's 
argument concerning it. 
 
 
5 In any event, according to David, the trial court "has now 
 
4 
 
2.  Probable cause hearing.  As with the issue of pretrial 
detention, on the record that was before him and in the 
circumstances of the case at the time, the single justice did 
not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief on the issue 
of the lack of a probable cause hearing.  We recognize, however, 
that an additional ten months have passed since then, and that 
David has still not had a probable cause hearing; nor has he 
been indicted.  And although it does appear that the cases are 
proceeding toward trial in the BMC, no trial date has yet been 
set. 
 
The parties agree that the charges against David fall 
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the BMC and the Superior 
Court.  They disagree as to whether David is entitled to a 
probable cause hearing.  Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (f), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 (2004), "defendants charged in a 
District Court with an offense within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the District and Superior Courts for which the 
District Court will not retain jurisdiction, have the right to a 
probable cause hearing, unless an indictment has been returned 
for the same offense."6  In the Commonwealth's view, it follows 
that if the District Court is going to retain jurisdiction, no 
probable cause hearing (the point of which is to determine 
whether to bind a defendant over to the Superior Court for 
trial) is required.   
   
Here, the Commonwealth states that the BMC "has never 
suggested that it will not retain jurisdiction" over David's 
case.  See Commonwealth v. Clemmons, 370 Mass. 288, 291 & n.2 
(1976) (where there was no indication that District Court judge 
was considering declining jurisdiction, inference existed that 
judge intended to exercise jurisdiction and that proceeding that 
had taken place in that court was trial on merits, not probable 
cause hearing); Corey v. Commonwealth, 364 Mass. 137, 141 n.7 
 
acknowledged" that he is entitled to conditions of release, and 
he has stated that he is preparing a proposal, in the trial 
court, for release with conditions.  If David is dissatisfied 
with the conditions ultimately imposed, he can seek review from 
that ruling. 
 
 
6 Although it appears that the Commonwealth may have, at 
least initially, intended to seek indictments against David, it 
has not yet presented David's case to a grand jury; nor is there 
any indication that it currently intends to do so. 
 
 
5 
(1973) ("[A] District Court judge should announce, before the 
hearing commences, whether he is conducting a probable cause 
hearing or a full trial on the merits").  The inference then, is 
that the BMC will retain jurisdiction, that David will be tried 
in that court, and that, therefore, no probable cause hearing is 
necessary.   
 
It does appear that the BMC intends to retain jurisdiction 
and that the cases are moving toward trial in that court.  The 
BMC dockets indicate that a hearing on "discovery compliance and 
jury election" took place as recently as December 22, 2021.7  If 
a trial is to occur in the BMC, any remaining claims that David 
might have regarding his due process rights, regarding the delay 
in the proceedings, or otherwise can be raised in an appeal in 
the event he is convicted and can adequately be addressed at 
that time.  If, however, the BMC does not intend to retain 
jurisdiction, then David is entitled to a prompt probable cause 
hearing. 
 
 
Conclusion.  On the basis of the record that was before 
him, and in the context of the law in effect at the time, the 
single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying 
relief, and his judgment is affirmed.  If the BMC does not 
intend to retain jurisdiction of the case, the BMC must set a 
date for a probable cause hearing to take place within the next 
thirty days.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
Tracy N. Firicano for the petitioner. 
Andrew S. Doherty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
7 Additionally, as far back as October 22, 2020, the 
Commonwealth stated, at the hearing at which a BMC judge 
considered David's motion for a probable cause hearing, that if 
David wanted a trial on the merits, the case should be 
"put . . . on track for a trial on the merits" in the BMC.