Title: Craft v. McCoy et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 5, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180820
____________________
Justin Craft and Jason Craft
v.
James E. McCoy et al.
Appeal from Lee Circuit Court
(CV-17-900477)
BOLIN, Justice.
Justin Craft and Jason Craft appeal the summary judgment
entered by the Lee Circuit Court for the members of the Lee
County Board of Education ("the Board") and the Superintendent
of the Lee County Schools, Dr. James E. McCoy. We affirm.
1180820
Facts and Procedural History
During July, August, and September 2016, the Board hired
S&A Landscaping to perform three projects of overdue lawn
maintenance at Lee County schools.  S&A Landscaping was owned
by an aunt by marriage of Marcus Fuller, the Assistant
Superintendent of the Lee County Schools.  The Crafts, who at
that time were employed as HVAC technicians by the Board,
questioned the propriety of hiring S&A Landscaping for those
projects.1  The Crafts expressed their concerns with various
current and former Board members and individuals at the State
Ethics Commission ("the Commission") and at the Alabama
Department of Examiners of Public Accounts.  Although an
individual at the Commission instructed Jason Craft on how to
file a complaint with the Commission, neither of the Crafts
did so.  
Also, during this time, McCoy, Fuller, and others
suspected 
various 
maintenance 
employees, 
including 
the 
Crafts,
1Although at that time the Crafts believed that the hiring
of S&A Landscaping violated the Code of Ethics for Public
Officials, Employees, Etc., § 36-25-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
because of the affiliation of the owners of S&A Landscaping
with Fuller, see § 36-25-5, Ala. Code 1975, they later agreed
that, because the work was not performed by a member of
Fuller's household, no violation had occurred.  
2
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of misusing their Board-owned vehicles and misrepresenting
their work hours.  To investigate their suspicions, the Board
had GPS data-tracking devices installed in Board-owned
vehicles being used by employees to monitor their use and the
employees' activities.  
In January 2017, a review of the GPS data indicated that
certain employees, including the Crafts, had violated Board
policy by inappropriately using the Board-owned vehicles and
by inaccurately reporting their work time.  On January 26,
2017, McCoy sent letters to the Crafts and two other
employees, advising them that he had recommended to the Board 
the termination of their employment on the grounds of
incompetency, neglect of duty, failure to perform duties in a
satisfactory manner, and other "good and just cause."  The
letters detailed dates, times, and locations of specific
incidents of alleged misconduct.  The Crafts were placed on
administrative leave.  The Crafts contested the proposed
termination, pursuant to the Students First Act, § 16-24C-1 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975.  
The record indicates that McCoy recommended terminating
the Crafts' employment shortly after he had sent an e-mail to
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Fuller and the Board's Director of Human Resources, expressing
his frustration with the Crafts for communications and
complaints made to Board members and suggesting that Fuller
and the human-resources director review the GPS data on the
vehicles assigned to the Crafts.
  
On March 14, 2017, the Board conducted a hearing to
address McCoy's recommendations for terminating the Crafts'
employment.  The Board found the Crafts guilty of violations
relating to the reporting of their time and their use of
Board-owned vehicles assigned to them.  The Board suspended
the Crafts for 20 days and, upon their return to work,
transferred the Crafts to custodial positions with the same
pay and benefits that did not require them to use Board-owned
vehicles.2 
The Crafts appealed the job transfers, arguing that they
were not afforded due process, i.e., a hearing, before the job
transfers were imposed.  The administrative-law judge who
considered the appeal held that the Student First Act did not
2The dismissal of one other employee, whose employment
McCoy had recommended be terminated for the same or similar
reasons, was considered at the hearing, and the Board found
him guilty of the same or similar violations and ordered the
same suspension and a similar job relocation for him.
4
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provide the opportunity for a hearing before the imposition of
a job transfer.
The Crafts sued the Board members and McCoy, requesting
declaratory relief based on alleged violations of the anti-
retaliation provision in § 36-25-24, Ala. Code 1975, arguing
that they were being punished in retaliation for contacting
the Commission.  After conducting some discovery, the Board
members and McCoy moved for a summary judgment.  The trial
court conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment motion and,
after considering arguments and supplemental briefs, entered
a summary judgment for the Board members and McCoy.  The
written order states:
"This 
case 
primarily 
turns 
on 
the 
interpretation
of Ala. Code 1975, § 36-25-24, and the definition of
'reporting a violation' under Ala. Code 1975, § 36-
25-24(a) and (b).  The [Crafts] argued that the
communications between [them] and public officials
... constitute 'reporting a violation.'  However,
[the Board members and McCoy] argue that unless a
reporter follows the formal procedures set forth for
reporting a violation, the statute doesn't apply. 
The court and both parties have noted that this
appears to be a case of first impression in the
State of Alabama.
"Ala. Code 1975 § 36-25-1(5) defines complaint
as a 'written allegation or allegations that a
violation of this chapter has occurred.'  It is an
undisputed fact that the Crafts never filed a
written 
complaint 
with 
the 
Alabama 
Ethics
5
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Commission.  Instead, they made verbal contact with
someone at the Alabama Ethics Commission and Alabama
Examiners of Public Accounts Office.  The only
written communication was some Facebook messages
exchanged between the Crafts and members or former
members of the [Board].  The [Crafts] contend this
was sufficient notice to the [Board members and
McCoy] 
of 
a 
complaint 
for 
the 
statute's
whistleblower protections to apply.  The [Board
members and McCoy] argue for a more narrow reading
of the definition of complaint.  As this is a case
of first impression, the court proceeds with caution
in its interpretation of the statute. The [Crafts]
note a similar case from Minnesota regarding that
state's whistleblower statute.[3]  In Hayes v.
Dapper, [No. A07-1878] (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23,
2008) [a case designated as unpublished and not
reported in North Western Reporter], the trial court
held that the plaintiff had not made a 'report' as
required by the State's statute.  However, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed this and found
that while the notification was not formalized, it
was sufficient for the requirements of the statute.
"In attempting to interpret the meaning of
'report' within the statute, the court notes that
Ala. Code 1975, § 36-25-4(d), states:
"'Prior to commencing any investigation,
the commission shall:  receive a written
and signed complaint which sets forth in
detail the specific charges against a
respondent, and the factual allegations
which support such charges.'
3Minn. Stat. § 181.932 subd. 1(a) (2004) provided at the
time the Minnesota case was decided that "an employer shall
not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate
against, or penalize an employee" who "in good faith, reports
a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law
or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any
governmental body or law enforcement official."
6
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"While this text does not define a 'report' for the
statute, it does show what the statute intends for
such a report to contain.  While respectful of the
analogous nature of the Minnesota case to the facts
and law in this case, the court notes that it was
the Minnesota Court of Appeals that expanded the
definition of 'report' within the statute, rather
than the trial court.  The language of the statute
and the first impression nature of this case, leave
the court to find that the actions taken by the
[Crafts] in this matter do not constitute a report
under the statute.
"....
"As 
the 
[Crafts'] 
claim 
regarding 
the
whistleblower statute fails, there is no genuine
issue of material fact to be resolved by this court.
The [Board members and McCoy's] motion for summary
judgment is hereby granted."
The Crafts appeal. 
Standard of Review
"'A summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3),
Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. In determining whether the
movant has carried that burden, the court
is to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party. To defeat a properly supported
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving
party must present "substantial evidence"
creating a genuine issue of material fact
7
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–- "evidence of such weight and quality
that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved." 
Ala. Code 1975, § 12–21–12; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547
So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough–Clean, Inc.,
639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994).  Questions of law
are reviewed de novo.  Alabama Republican Party v.
McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004)."
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, (Ala.
2006).
Discussion
This case requires this Court to interpret § 36-25-24, a
Code section within the Code of Ethics for Public Officials,
Employees, Etc., see § 36-25-1 seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Code
of Ethics").  In § 36-25-2(a), the legislature set forth its
findings, declarations, and purpose with regard to the Code of
Ethics, stating:
"(1) It is essential to the proper operation of
democratic government that public officials be
independent and impartial.
"(2) 
Governmental 
decisions 
and 
policy 
should 
be
made in the proper channels of the governmental
structure.
"(3) No public office should be used for private
gain other than the remuneration provided by law.
8
1180820
"(4) It is important that there be public
confidence in the integrity of government. 
"(5) The attainment of one or more of the ends
set forth in this subsection is impaired whenever
there exists a conflict of interest between the
private interests of a public official or a public
employee and the duties of the public official or
public employee. 
"(6) The public interest requires that the law
protect against such conflicts of interest and
establish appropriate ethical standards with respect
to the conduct of public officials and public
employees in situations where conflicts exist."  
To further this purpose, the legislature specifically created
the Commission, see § 36-25-3, Ala. Code 1975; defined a
"complaint" for reporting suspected violations of the Code of
Ethics, see § 36-25-1(5), Ala. Code 1975; provided parameters
for the filing of a complaint with the Commission, see § 36-
25-4(c), Ala. Code 1975; provided the Commission with the
authority 
to 
investigate complaints, see 
§ 
36–25–4(a)(7), Ala.
Code 1975; and provided the Commission with the duty to report
suspected violations of the Code of Ethics to the appropriate
law-enforcement authorities, § 36–25–4(a)(8), Ala. Code 1975. 
Being mindful of  the purpose of the Code of Ethics, the
process for filing a complaint alleging a violation of the
Code of Ethics, and the duty of the Commission to investigate
9
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and report a violation to law-enforcement authorities, we now
examine § 36-25-24, Ala. Code 1975, and interpret § 36-25-
24(a), the subsection at issue in this appeal, in light of the
facts presented in this case.
"'"In determining the meaning of a
statute, this Court looks to the plain
meaning of the words as written by the
legislature."  DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v.
Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275
(Ala. 1998).
"'"'Words used in a statute must
be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language
is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says. If the
language 
of 
the 
statute 
is
unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction
and the clearly expressed intent
of the legislature must be given
effect.'"
"'Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.
v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala.
1998)(quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g
Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala.
1992)).'
"City of Prattville v. Corley, 892 So. 2d [845,] 848
[(Ala. 2003)].
"'In Archer v. Estate of Archer, 45 So. 3d
1259, 
1263 
(Ala. 
2010), 
this 
Court
described 
its 
responsibilities 
when
construing a statute:
10
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"'"'"[I]t 
is 
this
Court's responsibility
in 
a 
case 
involving
statutory construction
to give effect to the
legislature's intent in
enacting a statute when
t h a t  
intent 
is
manifested 
in 
the
wording 
o f 
t h e
statute.... 
'"'"[I]f
the 
language 
of 
the
statute is unambiguous,
then there is no room
f o r  
j u d i c i a l
construction 
and 
the
clearly 
expressed
i n t e n t  
o f  
t h e
legislature 
must 
be
given effect."'"' ...
In 
determining 
the
i n t e n t  
o f  
t h e
legislature, 
we 
must
examine the statute as
a 
whole 
and, 
if
possible, give effect
to each section."
"'"'Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp.,
926 So. 2d 303, 309 (Ala. 2005).
Further,
"'"'"when 
determining
legislative intent from
the language used in a
statute, a court may
explain the language,
but it may not detract
from or add to the
statute.... 
When 
the
language 
is 
clear,
there is no room for
11
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j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
construction...."
"'"'Water Works & Sewer Bd. of
Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d
604, 607 (Ala. 2002).'"
"'(Quoting Ex parte Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 45 So. 3d 764, 767 (Ala. 2009).)
Similarly, in Lambert v. Wilcox County
Commission, 623 So. 2d 727, 729 (Ala.
1993), the Court stated:
"'"'The fundamental rule of
statutory construction is that
this Court is to ascertain and
effectuate the legislative intent
as expressed in the statute....
In this ascertainment, we must
look to the entire Act instead of
isolated phrases or clauses ...
and words are given their plain
and usual meaning.... Moreover,
just as statutes dealing with the
same subject are in pari materia
and should be construed together,
... parts of the same statute are
in pari materia and each part is
entitled to equal weight.'"
"'(Quoting Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama
Dairy Comm'n, 367 So. 2d 1378, 1380–81
(Ala. 1979).)'
"First Union Nat'l Bank of Florida v. Lee Cty.
Comm'n, 75 So. 3d 105, 111–12 (Ala. 2011)."
Cockrell v. Pruitt, 214 So. 3d 324, 331–32 (Ala. 2016).
12
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Section 36-25-24, entitled "Supervisor prohibited from
discharging or discriminating against employee where employee
reports violation," provides:
"(a) A supervisor shall not discharge, demote,
transfer, or otherwise discriminate against a public
employee regarding such employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based
on the employee's reporting a violation, or what he
or she believes in good faith to be a violation, of
this chapter or giving truthful statements or
truthful testimony concerning an alleged ethics
violation.
"(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
in any manner to prevent or prohibit or otherwise
limit a supervisor from disciplining, discharging,
transferring, or otherwise affecting the terms and
conditions of a public employee's employment so long
as the disciplinary action does not result from or
is in no other manner connected with the public
employee's filing a complaint with the commission,
giving 
truthful 
statements, 
and 
truthfully
testifying.
"(c)  No public employee shall file a complaint
or otherwise initiate action against a public
official or other public employee without a good
faith basis for believing the complaint to be true
and accurate.
"(d) A supervisor who is alleged to have
violated this section shall be subject to civil
action in the circuit courts of this state pursuant
to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure as
promulgated by the Alabama Supreme Court.
"(e) A public employee who without a good faith
belief in the truthfulness and accuracy of a
complaint filed against a supervisor, shall be
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subject to a civil action in the circuit courts in
the State of Alabama pursuant to the Alabama Rules
of Civil Procedure as promulgated by the Supreme
Court. Additionally, a public employee who without
a good faith belief in the truthfulness and accuracy
of a complaint as filed against a supervisor shall
be subject to appropriate and applicable personnel
action.
"(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to allow a public employee to file a complaint to
prevent, 
mitigate, 
lessen, 
or 
otherwise 
to
extinguish existing or anticipated personnel action
by a supervisor. A public employee who willfully
files such a complaint against a supervisor shall,
upon conviction, be guilty of the crime of false
reporting."
(Emphasis added.)
The Crafts contend that the plain meaning of 36-25-24(a)
is that an employee who in good faith reports a perceived
violation of the Code of Ethics or gives a truthful statement
about a suspected violation is protected from a supervisor's
retaliation, regardless of whether the employee files a
complaint with the Commission.  They maintain that the trial
court's holding that the word "reporting" as used in § 36-25-
24(a) encompasses only the employee's act of completing and
filing a formal complaint with the Commission is too limiting.
To support their contention that "reporting" includes not
only the filing of a complaint with the Commission, but also
14
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other means of notifying public officials of a suspected
violation of the Code of Ethics, the Crafts note that § 36-25-
24(a) provides public employees with protection for "giving
truthful statements or truthful testimony concerning an
alleged ethics violation," which, they say, is an oral form of
"reporting," in addition to filing a complaint, which is a
written form of "reporting."  They also direct this Court to
§ 36-25-24(c), which provides:  "No public employee shall file
a complaint or otherwise initiate action against a public
official or other public employee ...." (Emphasis added.) 
They argue that, by including the language "otherwise initiate
action," the legislature acknowledged that the filing of a
complaint with the Commission is not the only means of
"reporting" a suspected  violation of the Code of Ethics.  The
Crafts reason that, when subsections (a) and (c) are read in
pari materia, the protection provided in subsection (a) is
triggered not only when an employee files a formal complaint
with the Commission, but also when an employee in good faith
makes an oral report of a suspected violation to the attorney
general or a district attorney, for example, who also have the
authority to investigate violations of the Code of Ethics. 
15
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To bolster their position, they also direct this Court to
§ 36-25-27(e), Ala. Code 1975,4  which states that officials
of every public employer have the power and the duty to take
appropriate action when a suspected violation of the Code of
Ethics is brought to their attention, and § 35-25-17(a), Ala.
Code 1975,5 which requires the head of a government agency to
file a report with the Commission within 10 days of learning
of a suspected violation. They argue that, because public
officials are required to enforce the Code of Ethics and
because employees should be encouraged to inform their
employers of alleged violations so the violations can be
addressed quickly, the protections from retaliation, provided
in § 36-25-24(a), for employees alleging violations of the
Code of Ethics must encompass more than when an employee files 
a complaint with the Commission, i.e., it must also encompass
4Section 36-25-27(e) provides: "The penalties prescribed
in this chapter do not in any manner limit the power of a
legislative body to discipline its own members or to impeach 
public officials and do not limit the powers of agencies,
departments, boards, or commissions to discipline their
respective officials, members, or employees." 
5Section 35-25-17(a) provides: "Every governmental agency
head shall within 10 days file reports with the commission on
any matters that come to his or her attention in his or her
official capacity which constitute a violation of this
chapter."
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reporting alleged violations internally to a supervisor or
employer.  See Marques v. Fitzgerald, 99 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1996)("We see no significant policy served by extending
whistleblower protection only to those who carry a complaint
beyond the institutional wall, denying it to the employee who
seeks to improve operations from within the organization.  The
latter course appears to us more likely to lead to prompt
resolution of issues related to suspected violations of laws
and regulations.").
Although the Crafts' arguments asking this Court to
interpret "reporting" an alleged violation of the Code of
Ethics as that term is used in § 36-25-24(a) to encompass not
only the filing of a complaint with the Commission, but also
notifying employers and other public officials by 
other means,
merit consideration, we conclude, after reading § 36-25-24(a)
in conjunction with the other subsections of § 36-25-24 and
with the Code of Ethics in its entirety, that the protections
from retaliation provided in § 36-25-24(a) are 
applicable only
when a public employee reports alleged violations of the Code
of Ethics to the Commission in the form of a complaint.
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First, we observe that immediately after providing an
employee with protection from retaliation when reporting a
suspected violation of the Code of Ethics in § 36-25-24(a),
the legislature stated in subsection (b):  
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed in any
manner to prevent or prohibit or otherwise limit a
supervisor 
from 
disciplining, 
discharging,
transferring, or otherwise affecting the terms and
conditions of a public employee's employment so long
as the disciplinary action does not result from or
is in no other manner connected with the public
employee's filing a complaint with the commission,
giving 
truthful 
statements, 
and 
truthfully
testifying."
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Unequivocally, subsection 
(b) 
provides 
that
nothing in the Code of Ethics should be construed to limit the
disciplining of a public employee so long as the discipline is
unrelated to the filing of a complaint with the Commission. 
This limitation on an employee's protection provides specific
direction to a supervisor so as not to impose unreasonable
restrictions on an employer's ability to discipline its
employees when that discipline is not connected to the filing
of a complaint with the Commission.  By following the anti-
retaliation provision in subsection (a) with the provision in
subsection (b) that permits a supervisor to discipline an
employee, provided that the discipline is not a consequence of
18
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the employee's filing a complaint with the Commission, giving
truthful 
statements, 
or 
truthfully 
testifying, 
the 
legislature
clarified its intent in subsection (a) that the action to be
protected from retaliation is the filing of a complaint with
the Commission. The opening clause in subsection (b) –-
"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed in any manner to
prevent or prohibit" –- does not override subsection (a);
rather, it gives effect to  the protection from anti-
retaliation.  Reading subsections (a) and (b) in harmony
militates against the interpretation of the word "reporting"
that the Crafts urge.   Thus, when subsections (a) and (b) are
read in para materia, giving effect to both subsections, the
meaning of "reporting" as used in subsection (a) can refer
only to the filing of a written complaint with the Commission.
Additionally, a harmonious reading of subsections (a) and
(b) requires the conclusion that the language "giving truthful
statements, 
or 
truthfully 
testifying" in 
subsection (b) 
refers
to statements made  in connection with filing a complaint with
the Commission.  Considering the provision in subsection (a)
for anti-retaliation protection against an employee who gives
"truthful statements or truthful testimony concerning an
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alleged ethics violation" and the following provision in
subsection (b) explaining that a supervisor's discipline of 
an
employee cannot be related to "the public employee's filing a
complaint 
with 
the 
commission, 
giving 
truthful 
statements, and
truthfully testifying," the only harmonization of the two
provisions that gives effect to both is to conclude that the
giving 
of 
truthful 
statements 
or 
truthful 
testimony 
referenced 
in subsection (a) must be in reference to "reporting a
violation ... of this chapter."  Bringing the two in accord
requires holding that "giving truthful statements" in
subsection (a) can refer only to giving truthful statements in
connection with a complaint filed with the Commission.  
Moreover, recognizing that we must strive to interpret a
statute as a harmonious whole, see City of Montgomery v. Town
of Pike Road, 789 So. 3d 575, 580 (Ala. 2009), we observe that
subsections (b), (c), (e), and (f) of  § 36-25-24 each focus
on acts involving or resulting from the filing of a complaint
with the Commission.  Admittedly, subsection (c) recognizes
that other means exist to "initiate action" regarding an
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics.  However, a
harmonious reading of all the subsections in § 36-25-24
20
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requires the conclusion that the legislature's intent in § 36-
25-24(a) was to prevent retaliation by an employer against a
public employee when the employee files a complaint with the
Commission.
Furthermore, § 36-25-24(a) is part of the Code of Ethics,
which requires the Court to harmonize subsection (a) with not
only the other subsections of § 36-25-24, but also the entire
Code of Ethics.  The primary purpose of the Code of Ethics is
to protect "the integrity of all governmental units of this
state and ... facilitat[e] the service of qualified personnel
by prescribing essential restrictions against conflicts of
interest in public service." § 36-25-2(d), Ala. Code 1975.  To
further that purpose, the Code of Ethics sets out conduct that
constitutes violations of the Code of Ethics, creates the
Commission, provides specific methods of acceptable and
unacceptable reporting of a suspected violation to the
Commission, establishes the manner in which the 
Commission can
investigate 
complaints, 
 
and 
includes 
provisions that 
prohibit
false or bad-faith reporting of ethics violations.  By placing
§ 36-25-24(a) in the Code of Ethics, which as a whole focuses
on to whom disclosures of suspected violations of the Code of
21
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Ethics are made, how alleged violations are brought to the
attention of the Commission to trigger an investigation, and
how the Commission is to investigate alleged violations, the
protections from retaliation for reporting a suspected 
violation can be triggered only by compliance with proper
reporting to the Commission.  Indeed, reading "reporting" in
§ 36-25-24(a) to require the filing of a written complaint
with the Commission furthers the legislature's purpose of
enabling the Commission to conduct investigations of formal
complaints filed with it, by assuring that public employees
who file complaints are protected from retaliation and that
the integrity of public officials is not improperly tarnished
by unauthorized investigations.   
Lastly, 
because 
the 
protections from retaliation provided
in § 36-25-24(a) are included within the Code of Ethics, the
protections provided by subsection (a) are distinguishable
from 
general 
whistleblower 
protections, 
which 
provide 
informal
means of reporting suspected violations of the law.  The
Crafts cite Gillispie v. Regionalcare Hospital Partners, 892
F.3d 585, 593 (3d Cir. 2018)(defining the word "report" as
used in a whistleblower provision to mean an "account brought
22
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by one person to another" and "nothing more than the
transmission of information"), and Roche v. La Cie, Ltd. (No.
CV-08-1180-MO, Dec. 4, 2009) (D. Or. 2009) (not selected for
publication in Fed. Supp.)(observing that the common meaning
of "to report" includes "to give an account of," "to make
known to the proper authorities," or "to make charge of
misconduct against" and did not require that the recipient of
the report be an external entity). The whistleblower statutes
being considered in Gillespie and Roche were designed to
protect public or private employees from adverse employment
action based on the informal reporting of alleged violations
of state and/or federal law generally.  The Alabama
Legislature recognized the need for a general whistleblower
statute when it enacted § 36-26A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
entitled "the State Employees Protection Act."  Section 36-
26A-3, Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
"A supervisor shall not discharge, demote,
transfer, or otherwise discriminate against a state
employee 
regarding 
the 
state 
employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment if the state employee[] reports, under
oath or in the form of an affidavit, a violation of
a law, a regulation, or a rule promulgated pursuant
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to the laws of this state, or a political
subdivision of this state, to a public body."6
Thus, State employees, provided they make a sworn statement,
are protected from employer retaliation when they "blow the
whistle" or "report" an employer's violation of laws,
regulations, or rules.  
Because 
the 
legislature provided certain public employees
general whistleblower protection in § 36-26A-3, it is
significant that the protections provided in  § 36-25-24(a)
are within a chapter of the Code that focuses on providing a
mechanism for complainants, including public employees, to
bring complaints to the attention of the Commission for
investigation and possible criminal action.  Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended for the
protection from retaliation provided in § 36-25-24(a) to apply
only when an employee files with the Commission a complaint
alleging suspected violations of the Code of Ethics or gives
truthful statements regarding such a complaint. 
6Even if the Crafts had made their complaint under oath
or in the form of an affidavit, this statute would not provide
them protection because employees of county boards of
education are not considered "state employees" within this
statute.  See § 36-26A-2(2) and § 36-26-2(10), Ala. Code 1975.
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We hold, with regard to the facts of this case, that the
word "reporting" as that word is used in § 36-25-24(a) refers
only to the filing of a complaint with the Commission and,
accordingly, 
that 
the 
anti-retaliation 
protection 
in
subsection (a) is triggered only when an employee files a
complaint with the Commission.  It is undisputed that the
Crafts did not file a complaint with the Commission;
consequently, they are not entitled to the protections
afforded by § 36-25-24(a).  Therefore, the summary judgment is
affirmed.7 
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., dissents.
7We 
pretermit 
discussion 
of 
other 
issues 
presented 
because
they are now moot in view of this decision. 
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The broad purpose of Alabama's Code of Ethics for Public
Officials, Employees, Etc., § 36-25-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
is to protect the integrity of government and the public's
confidence in it.  I respectfully submit that the main opinion
fails to fully appreciate this purpose in its narrow
construction of a statute designed to protect those who
protect the public interest. 
This case requires this Court to resolve two ambiguities
in the anti-retaliation statute, § 36-25-24, Ala. Code 1975. 
The statute provides, in part: 
"(a) A supervisor shall not discharge, demote,
transfer, or otherwise discriminate against a public
employee regarding such employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based
on the employee's reporting a violation, or what he
or she believes in good faith to be a violation, of
this chapter or giving truthful statements or
truthful testimony concerning an alleged ethics
violation.
"(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
in any manner to prevent or prohibit or otherwise
limit a supervisor from disciplining, discharging,
transferring, or otherwise affecting the terms and
conditions of a public employee's employment so long
as the disciplinary action does not result from or
is in no other manner connected with the public
employee's filing a complaint with the commission,
giving 
truthful 
statements, 
and 
truthfully
testifying."
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(Emphasis added.)
First, the emphasized "ors" in subsection (a) conflict
with the emphasized "and" in subsection (b). The use of the
disjunctive "or" in subsection (a) means that subsection (a)
protects an employee who reports a violation or gives truthful
statements about a 
violation or gives truthful testimony about
a violation.  However, the use in subsection (b) of the
conjunctive "and" removes protection from an employee unless
the employee files a complaint with the State Ethics
Commission ("the Commission") and gives truthful statements
and testifies truthfully.  Thus, read literally, the "and"
would render subsection (a)'s broad protection practically
meaningless in all cases in which the employee does not engage
in all three types of protected conduct.  What (a) giveth, (b)
taketh away.
Yet an interpretation of a statutory provision that
renders another provision meaningless is not preferred.  See
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167
(2004) ("[W]e must, if possible, construe a statute to give
every word some operative effect."); 2A Norman J. Singer and
J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §
27
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46:6 (7th ed. 2014) ("Courts construe a statute to give effect
to all its provisions, so that no part is inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section
does not destroy another ...."), Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: Interpretation of Legal Texts 176
(Thomson/West 2012) ("If a provision is susceptible of (1) a
meaning that ... deprives another provision of 
all 
independent
effect[] and (2) another meaning that leaves both provisions
with some independent operation, the latter should be
preferred.").  To avoid this result and render the subsections
consistent with each other, subsection (b)'s "and" must be
read as an "or."  See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 147 (2012)
("[T]he courts have the power to change and will change 'and'
to 'or' and vice versa, whenever such conversion is required
by the context ...."), 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 442 (2009) ("The
words 'or'  and 'and' may be construed as interchangeable ...
where the failure to adopt such a construction would render
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
statute 
ambiguous 
or 
result 
in
absurdities.").  So read, subsections (a) and (b) together
protect an employee who reports a violation by filing a
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complaint with the Commission or gives truthful statements or
testifies truthfully. 
Once the protected acts listed in subsection (b) are
decoupled in this manner, the possibility arises that "giving
truthful statements" about an ethics violation may be an
independent basis for protection.  Therein lies the second
ambiguity.  Must the truthful statement be made in connection
with a complaint to the Commission?  How broadly or narrowly
ought we interpret the word "statements"?  I believe that the
answer is found in Legislature's express purpose in enacting
the Code of Ethics.  The Legislature declared:
"(1) It is essential to the proper operation of
democratic government that public officials be
independent and impartial.
"(2) 
Governmental 
decisions 
and 
policy 
should 
be
made in the proper channels of the governmental
structure.
"(3) No public office should be used for private
gain other than the remuneration provided by law.
"(4) It is important that there be public
confidence in the integrity of government.
"(5) The attainment of one or more of the ends
set forth in this subsection is impaired whenever
there exists a conflict of interest between the
private interests of a public official or a public
employee and the duties of the public official or
public employee.
29
9
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"(6) The public interest requires that the law
protect against such conflicts of interest and
establish appropriate ethical standards with respect
to the conduct of public officials and public
employees in situations where conflicts exist.
"....
"(d) It is the policy and purpose of this [Code
of Ethics] to implement these objectives of
protecting the integrity of all governmental units
of this state and of facilitating the service of
qualified 
personnel 
by 
prescribing 
essential
restrictions against conflicts of interest in public
service 
without 
creating 
unnecessary 
barriers
thereto."
§ 36-25-2(a), Ala. Code 1975.  In summary, the broad,
fundamental purpose of the Code of Ethics, including the anti-
retaliation statute, is 
to 
protect the integrity of government
and the public's confidence in it.  To serve that purpose, the
anti-retaliation statute 
protects 
those 
who 
attempt 
to 
protect
the public interest.  Therefore, that protection should be
interpreted broadly.
Applying this interpretive lens to subsection (b),
"giving truthful statements" cannot be limited to statements
made in connection with a formal complaint to the Commission.
Rather, the protected "statements" must include all truthful
statements about an ethics violation or, to use the language
of subsection (a), "concerning an alleged ethics violation." 
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0
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Those statements may be formal or informal, written or
unwritten, to the Commission or to others.
The main opinion recognizes the protective purpose of the
anti-retaliation statute but fails to recognize the above
interpretive implications of that purpose.  In addition, the
main 
opinion 
posits 
that 
another, 
apparently 
counterbalancing,
purpose of the statute is to  "assur[e] ... that the integrity
of 
public 
officials 
is 
not 
improperly 
tarnished 
by
unauthorized investigations."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  It is not
clear what the main opinion means by "unauthorized" or from
what statutory language that purpose is divined.  For these
reasons, I am not persuaded that the main opinion's discussion
of legislative purpose justifies a narrow construction of the
statute's protection.  
Moreover, the main opinion's interpretation would render
superfluous subsections (a) and (b)'s inclusion of truthful
statements and truthful testimony as additional protected
conduct.  Under the main opinion's interpretation, statements
and testimony are irrelevant; all that matters is the filing
of a complaint with the Commission.  Again, an interpretation
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1
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that treats such important statutory language as surplusage
should be carefully avoided. See Cooper, supra. 
Applying my interpretation of subsections (a) and (b) to
this case, and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Justin Craft and Jason Craft, the nonmovants
below, as we must, see Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF
Architects, P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2000),  I conclude
that their communications to school-board members and the
Commission were "truthful statements" protected by the anti-
retaliation statute.  Accordingly, I would reverse the 
summary
judgment.         
32
2