Title: Allen v. Lucero

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Allen v. Lucero1996 WY 126925 P.2d 228Case Number: 95-315Decided: 10/01/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Mark 
ALLEN,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Joe LUCERO, individually, 
and in his official capacity as Sheriff in and for Fremont County, Wyoming; and 
the Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County, Wyoming, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Joel M. Vincent 
of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, for appellant.

Jeffrey A. 
Donnell of Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for 
appellees Fremont County and Joe Lucero, in his official 
capacity.

Hugh Kenny, Sr. 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for appellee Joe Lucero, 
individually.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice effective 
July 1, 1996.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Mark 
Allen filed suit for declaratory relief and damages against Fremont County, 
Wyoming, and former sheriff Joe Lucero after he was terminated from employment 
as a deputy sheriff for Fremont County. The trial court granted the defendants' 
summary judgment motions and Allen appeals.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Allen presents 
these issues:

A.        Whether the 
governmental claims act by its terms applies to private actions for breach of § 
18-3-611, W.S. 1977.

B.        Whether the 
trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion in setting aside the 
entry of default as against defendant county commissioners.

[¶4]      Fremont County 
and Joe Lucero, in his official capacity, present these issues: 

1.         Are 
the immunity and procedural provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
W.S. § 1-39-101, et seq., applicable in all actions against governmental 
entities for damages based on tort or contract theory?

2.         
Did the district court lack subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff 
failed to allege compliance with the governmental claims act in his action for 
damages?

3.         Did 
the district court err when it ruled that Plaintiff's cause of action was 
time-barred?

4.         Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion in setting aside Appellant's entry of 
default against the Fremont County Commissioners?

[¶5]      Lucero, 
individually, presents these issues:

1.         Does 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101 et seq., apply to Plaintiff's 
claims and if so does his failure to timely comply with the act deprive the 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction over his claims?

2.         Does 
Plaintiff's failure to address the trial court's rulings regarding Plaintiff's 
failure to state a claim against Lucero as an individual and Lucero's qualified 
immunity render this appeal moot?

3.         
Should the trial court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims be upheld 
on additional theories supported in the record?

FACTS

[¶6]      Deputy Sheriff 
Allen was accused of striking a handcuffed prisoner and then failing to report 
the incident as required by department regulations. There was a witness to the 
assault who, at the request of the sheriff's office, confirmed the incident had 
occurred. When Allen denied the allegation, a disciplinary review board was 
convened to consider the charges and make a recommendation. At the hearing, 
Allen delivered a version of events very different from the eyewitness' version. 
In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the board ordered lie detector tests for 
each. A second hearing was held to review the results. Allen's results were 
inconclusive while the witness' results showed she was truthful. At the request 
of an undersheriff, the prisoner then provided a statement which corroborated 
the witness' allegation. The board determined Allen had struck the handcuffed 
prisoner and recommended he either resign his employment or be terminated. Allen 
was not notified of the second hearing and did not attend. Allen was notified in 
writing of his right to contest the recommendation and on October 14, 1991, he 
requested a hearing before a Disciplinary Hearing Board. That hearing was 
scheduled for October 30, 1991. At Allen's request, the hearing was continued 
while negotiations over his resignation progressed. Negotiations over his 
resignation broke down and the hearing was rescheduled for January 7, 1992. 
Allen notified the board in writing that he would not attend the hearing. 
Following receipt of testimony from the undersheriff, the board recommended that 
Allen be terminated; however, the record of the hearing indicates that the 
sheriff's office viewed Allen's employment as having been terminated as of 
October 10, 1991.

[¶7]      Allen filed suit 
in district court contending his dismissal did not comply with WYO. STAT. § 
18-3-611 which sets out statutory requirements for dismissal of a sheriff's 
deputy. His amended complaint requested a declaratory judgment that this statute 
permitted a private cause of action for breach of its requirements and asserted 
claims in tort and contract for breach of WYO. STAT. § 18-3-611's 
requirements.

[¶8]      Allen named 
Fremont County and Sheriff Lucero, in his official capacity and in his 
individual capacity, as defendants in the suit. Sheriff Lucero, individually, 
filed a motion for summary judgment and received a ruling from the district 
court that he had no individual liability and had qualified immunity. The 
district court determined that WYO. STAT. § 18-3-611 did permit private 
enforcement of its provisions, but such claims required compliance with the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (claims act). Allen had failed to comply with 
the notice provision of the claims act and the statute of limitations had run, 
barring his suit. On this basis, the district court granted Lucero's summary 
judgment motion. Fremont County and Sheriff Lucero, officially, moved for 
summary judgment and the district court granted that motion for the reason that 
Allen had failed to comply with the claims act and was now time barred from 
doing so.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

[¶9]      The dispositive 
issue is whether Allen's failure to comply with the notice provision of the 
claims act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over this 
action.

[¶10]   Wyoming adheres to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity which immunizes a sovereign from suit without its express 
consent. Ruppenthal v. State, 849 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Wyo. 1993). We have long held 
that WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8 requires explicit legislative authorization before 
a suit can be maintained against the state. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 
524 (Wyo. 1994). The claims act upholds sovereign immunity except in certain 
enumerated instances. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104 (1988). A prerequisite in pursuing a 
claim against the state or its officers is compliance with the notice 
requirement of the claims act. Ruppenthal, 849 P.2d  at 1320. The claims act's 
provisions apply to contract or tort claims brought against a sheriff and a 
board of county commissioners. Weston County Hosp. v. Westates Const. Co., 841 P.2d 841, 848 (Wyo. 1992); Vigil, 887 P.2d  at 524; Veile v. Bd. of County 
Commissioners of Washakie Cty., 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶11]   Although Allen seeks tort and 
contract damages, he contends they arise from violations of WYO. STAT. § 
18-3-611 and that that statute gives rise to an independent right of action. 
Asserting that WYO. STAT. § 1-39-119 of the claims act excludes 
employment-related disputes from the reach of the claims act, he concludes that 
he is not required to comply with the notice provisions set out in WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-113. Section 119 states:

The provisions of this 
act shall not affect any provision of law, regulation or agreement governing 
employer-employee relationships.

WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-119 (1988). In his view, this section permits actions against the state 
which do not activate the claims act and, therefore, do not trigger the claims 
act's notice provisions.

[¶12]   In Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of 
Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1983), this Court held that WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-119 "does not serve to except claims which have their genesis in tort even 
though they arise out of an employment relationship." Bell, 662 P.2d  at 414. "If 
the tort action is brought, and it does arise out of the employment 
relationship, we conclude that the claims procedure of this statute must be 
followed." Bell, 662 P.2d  at 415. When Bell was decided, the language of the act 
referred only to tort, and Bell did not extend this rule to contract claims. 
Bell, 662 P.2d  at 414. Since then, the legislature changed the claims act's 
language by adding the sentence, "The claims procedures of W.S. 1-39-113 apply 
to contractual claims against governmental entities." 1988 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 
45 § 1.

[¶13]   Accordingly, we augment Bell's rule 
to also include contract actions brought that arise out of the employment 
relationship and hold that a claim for damages based either in contract or tort 
against the state must proceed, if at all, in accordance with Wyoming's 
Governmental Claims Act. Allen's amended complaint requested a declaratory 
judgment that WYO. STAT. § 18-3-611 provided for a private cause of action 
sounding in either contract or tort and requested money damages for five claims 
sounding in either tort or contract. Under our rule just announced, the action 
required compliance with the notice provision of the claims act.

[¶14]   Allen did not comply with the 
claims act's notice requirements. "[T]he failure to file a claim under [the 
claims act] results in a district court having no jurisdiction over an action 
which is brought if the complaint fails to allege the filing of the claim 
pursuant to statute." Bell, 662 P.2d  at 415. In Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 
851 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1993), this Court expanded upon the Bell rule and held that, 
in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, the complaint must 
contain an allegation stating the date the claim was filed to demonstrate the 
filing of the claim within two years of the date of the alleged act, error or 
omission or, alternatively, the statutory ground for the late discovery of the 
alleged act, error or omission. Amrein, 851 P.2d  at 771. The plaintiff's failure 
to state the jurisdiction of the court with specificity will result in dismissal 
without prejudice. Amrein, 851 P.2d  at 771. Allen was discharged in 1991 and 
cannot possibly present a claim within the requisite two-year statute of 
limitations. We, therefore, affirm the order granting summary judgment on this 
basis as to all appellees on all claims. Boyd v. Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 326 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶15]   Affirmed.