Title: PENNY HOFLUND V. AIRPORT GOLF CLUB and AMOS MIDGELY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PENNY HOFLUND V. AIRPORT GOLF CLUB and AMOS MIDGELY2005 WY 17105 P.3d 1079Case Number:  04-12Decided: 02/10/2005
October Term, A.D. 2004

 
 
PENNY 
HOFLUND,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
AIRPORT GOLF CLUB, aWyoming

non-profit 
corporation, and AMOS

MIDGELY,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Loretta 
R. Green and Curtis B. Buchhammer of Buchhammer & Kehl, PC, Cheyenne, WY.  
Argument by Ms. Green.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Gay 
Woodhouse and Lori L. Brand of Gay Woodhouse Law Office, PC, Cheyenne, WY.  
Argument by Ms. Woodhouse.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and 
STEBNER, D.J.

 
 
 
 
            
STEBNER, District Judge, Retired.

 
 

[¶1]      This is 
an appeal from summary judgment granted against appellant Penny Hoflund and in 
favor of appelleeAirport Golf Club 
(AGC).  In her complaint against 
AGC, Hoflund alleged causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and defamation.1  We affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Hoflund phrases 
the issues on appeal as:

 
 

I.  [Hoflund] properly asserted a claim for 
retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy within the trial 
court.

 
 
a.  The 
Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965, Wyo. Stat. § 27-9-101 et seq. does not provide a remedy for 
sexual harassment.

 
 
b.  Sexual 
harassment violates theories of public policy and [Hoflund] had no other remedy 
than civil litigation.

 
 
c.  A 
material question of fact exists as to [Hoflund's] allegation of retaliatory 
discharge.

 
 
II.  The covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is breached when a special relationship exists between an employer and 
employee and the employee is discharged to avoid compliance with a specified 
duty of the employer.

 
 
III.  Intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is available to an employee where a hostile 
work environment has been fostered if that employee can demonstrate severe 
emotional distress due to the employment relationship 
itself.

 
 

 
 

I.  [Hoflund] did not properly assert a claim 
for retaliatory discharge in her complaint and raises related issues for the 
first time on appeal.

 
 
A.  The 
Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965, Wyo. Stat. § 27-9-101 et seq. provides an adequate remedy for 
sexual discrimination as held in Allen v. Safeway Stores, 699 P.2d 277 
(Wyo. 1985) precluding an action for retaliatory 
discharge.

 
 
B.  [Hoflund] 
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies promulgated by the Wyoming 
Department of Labor pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-9-104(a)(ii) thus barring any 
claim of retaliatory discharge.

 
 
II.  As a matter of law, no "special 
relationship of trust and reliance" existed between [Hoflund] and [AGC] 
sufficient to support a claim of violation of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.

 
 
A.  [Hoflund] provided no separate consideration 
to her employer [AGC] to establish the necessary special relationship of trust 
and reliance.
 
 
B.  [Hoflund's] at-will employment status was not 
modified by [AGC's] voluntary adoption of a sexual harassment policy.

 
 
III.  [AGC's] lawful termination of [Hoflund] 
cannot support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
it as a matter of law, and [Hoflund] presented no other facts to support such a 
claim to the District Court.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      AGC is a nonprofit 
corporation that operates a private membership club including a restaurant and 
bar at the clubhouse of the Cheyenne Airport Municipal Golf Course.  Hoflund began 
employment with AGC as a bartender in approximately 1993.  Between 1996 and 
1998 Hoflund acted as manager for AGC.  In 1998, Hoflund returned to the position of 
bartender at her request until March of 2001. Hoflund then left the employ of 
AGC until June of 2001 when she was rehired by AGC serving in the capacity as 
manager until March of 2002.  Thereafter, Hoflund again left the employ of 
AGC to take another job, but filled in at the club when requested to do so.  Hoflund was once 
more rehired full time by AGC in the position of bartender in June of 2002.

 
 
[¶4]      When Hoflund returned 
to employment with AGC in June of 2002, Midgely was employed as a cook.  Hoflund knew 
Midgely prior to his employment with AGC because Midgely had been an active 
member of the club for several years.  While Midgely was a patron and Hoflund's 
co-worker at AGC, Hoflund and Midgely engaged in banter and verbal sparring.

 
 
[¶5]      Hoflund, however, 
alleges that from June through August of 2002, Midgely made various 
inappropriate sexually explicit comments and gestures towards her, to which 
Hoflund objected.  
Hoflund reported some of these incidents to AGC.  Hoflund then 
alleges that on August 23, 2002, when Hoflund was retrieving items from the 
kitchen, Midgely inappropriately touched her with a fly swatter.  Hoflund again 
objected, but did not immediately report this incident to AGC.  Later that same 
afternoon, Hoflund returned to the kitchen to retrieve something for a patron, 
where Midgely allegedly positioned himself behind Hoflund and when she turned 
around, grabbed her and made a sexually explicit statement.

 
 
[¶6]      At the end of her 
shift, Hoflund informed AGC of the alleged encounters.  Ultimately, Hoflund 
was asked to submit a written statement to AGC and AGC approached Midgely about 
the alleged occurrences, which he denied.  Hoflund also discussed the alleged incidents 
with the Cheyenne Police Department but chose not to file an official 
complaint.

 
 
[¶7]      On August 28, 2002, 
Hoflund appeared before the AGC board of directors and was advised that AGC had 
hired an independent investigator to look into the matter.  At this time, 
Hoflund informed AGC that she was uncomfortable working if Midgely was present 
in the building.  
AGC then placed Midgely on administrative leave to facilitate a change in 
the work schedule.  
These changes resulted in Hoflund and Midgely working at different 
times.  Both 
parties were advised that they could not make any changes to their assigned 
schedule without authorization.

 
 
[¶8]      Ultimately, the 
results of the investigation were deemed inconclusive by AGC.  However, AGC 
decided to adopt a written sexual harassment policy.  This policy 
included a clause preventing retaliation against an individual reporting an 
allegation of sexual harassment.  All AGC employees, including Hoflund and 
Midgely, were presented with the policy.  Hoflund and Midgely were also instructed that 
if the other was working or already at the club for social purposes prior to 
their arrival, they were to leave the premises immediately.

 
 
[¶9]      On September 12, 
2002, and on a number of additional occasions thereafter, Midgely entered the 
restaurant of the club when Hoflund was working.  AGC was informed of these occurrences.  Hoflund decided to 
file a formal complaint with the Cheyenne Police Department concerning her 
alleged second encounter of August 23, 2002, with Midgely.  On September 18, 
2002, the Cheyenne Police Department served Midgely with a citation for rude and 
indecent behavior.

 
 
[¶10]   At the end of her shift on September 
20, 2002, Hoflund prepared her cash drawer statement as required.  When doing so, she 
inaccurately stated that she had $200.00 worth of twenty-dollar bills when she 
actually had only one twenty-dollar bill in her cash drawer.  The following day, 
Hoflund was questioned about this discrepancy by AGC.  Eventually, 
Hoflund's mistake was realized and Hoflund was warned that errors of this nature 
were unacceptable to AGC.  Hoflund had experienced previous similar 
issues concerning the balancing of her cash drawer and had been admonished by 
AGC.  
Confrontational and angry words were exchanged during the meeting, with 
Hoflund repeatedly asking if she was being fired.  AGC then informed Hoflund that she was, in 
fact, being terminated.

 
 
[¶11]   On December 10, 2002, Hoflund filed her 
complaint.  
Substantial discovery was completed and AGC filed its motion for summary 
judgment, which Hoflund opposed.  After the hearing, the district court granted 
summary judgment for AGC finding that Hoflund failed to provide any 
bargained-for consideration with respect to the enactment of the sexual 
harassment policy, thus her employment with AGC remained "at-will." 
Additionally, the district court determined that Hoflund failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies with respect to any implied retaliatory discharge claim 
asserted in her first cause of action.  The district court also found that no special 
relationship existed between Hoflund and AGC and, therefore, Hoflund could not 
assert a valid breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of 
action.  
Finally, the district court ruled that because Hoflund's termination was 
lawful, she had no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
that Hoflund presented no facts to support her claim of defamation.2  This appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   In Markstein v. 
Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 WY 
122, ¶11, 77 P.3d 389, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2003), we again set out our well-established standard for review of summary 
judgment cases.  
Therein, we stated:  

 
 
            
Summary judgment motions are determined under the following language from 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
 
 
            
The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of suits before trial that 
present no genuine issue of material fact.  Moore v. 
Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 207 
(Wyo. 1979).  Summary judgment is 
a drastic remedy designed to pierce the formal alle­gations and reach the 
merits of the controversy, but only where no genuine issue of material fact is 
present.  Weaver v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984, 986 
(Wyo. 1980).  A fact is material 
if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of 
the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties.  Schuler v. Commu­nity First Nat. Bank, 999 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 
2000).  The 
summary judgment movant has the initial burden of establishing by admissible 
evidence a prima facie case; once this is accom­plished, the burden shifts 
and the opposing party must present specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact.  Boehm v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987); Gennings v. First Nat. Bank of Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 156 
(Wyo. 1982).

 
 
            
This Court reviews a summary judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same materials and following the same standards.  Unicorn Drilling, Inc. v. HeartMountain Irr. Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo. 
2000) (quoting Gray v. Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 
(Wyo. 1999)).  The record is 
reviewed, however, from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and this Court will give that party the benefit of all 
favorable infer­ences that may fairly be drawn from the record.  Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 
(Wyo. 1996). 

 
 

McGee v. Caballo Coal Co., 2003 WY 68, ¶6, 69 P.3d 908, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Garnett v. Coyle, 2001 WY 94, ¶¶3-5, 33 P.3d 114, ¶¶3-5 (Wyo. 
2001)).  We 
also recognized in Mize v. North Big Horn Hosp. 
Dist., 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 
1997) that little mystery remains concerning our willingness to dispose of cases 
via summary judgment, provided there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the law clearly entitles the party to prevail.

 
 

 
 
Retaliatory Discharge

 
 

[¶13]   As indicated previously, the district 
court found, in part, that Hoflund failed to provide any bargained-for 
consideration with respect to the implementation of the sexual harassment 
policy, thus her employment with AGC remained "at-will."  Hoflund disputes 
this holding and states that she did not mean to imply that a "for-cause" 
relationship was created by the enactment of the sexual harassment policy.  Hoflund then 
asserts that the district court erred when it found that she failed to exhaust 
her administrative remedies with respect to her retaliatory discharge 
claim.  In particular, Hoflund 
argues that she had no administrative remedy to exhaust.  We do not agree. 

 
 
[¶14]   In Allen v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985), this Court made it clear that if another remedy for 
violation of a social policy which resulted in the discharge of an employee 
exists, no separate court action will lie.  Therein, we stated:

 
 
            
A tort action premised on violation of public policy results from a 
recognition that allowing a discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable 
social policy to go unvindicated.  If there exists another remedy for violation 
of the social policy which resulted in the discharge of the employee, there is 
no need for a court-imposed separate tort action premised on public policy. Viestenz v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 972, 103 S. Ct. 303, 
74 L. Ed. 2d 284; Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 
571 F. Supp. 287, (D.C.Cal. 1983).  As said in Wehr v. 
Burroughs Corporation, 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (D.C.Pa. 1977):

 
 
"It is clear then that the whole rationale undergirding the 
public policy exception is the vindication or the protection of certain strong 
policies of the community.  If these policies or goals are preserved by 
other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently served.  Therefore, 
application of the public policy exception requires two factors:  (1) that the 
discharge violate some well-established public policy;  and (2) that there 
be no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or society."  (Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 
The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965, § 
27-9-101 et seq., W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et 
seq. (1982) provide appellants with a remedy for discharge based on sex 
discrimination.

 
 
            
As noted in Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, 
Inc., [685 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1984),] we restricted our 
holding to the parameters of that case.  We do likewise here.  Counsel cite cases 
in which tort actions premised on violations of public policies have been 
upheld;  e.g., 
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), discharge for serving on a jury;  Hansen v. 
Harrah's, Nev., 675 P.2d 394 (1984);  Frampton v. Central 
Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 63 A.L.R.3d 973 (1973), 
and Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Department 
of Labor Services, 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981), discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation 
claims.  Such 
cases are not similar to this case.  The complaint in this case does not state a 
tort claim upon which relief could be granted against Safeway and Rock based on 
appellants' discharges from employment.

 
 

Allen, 
699 P.2d  at 284.  
In Allen, the Allens argued that even 
though their employment was "at will," their discharge was in violation of 
public policy and, therefore, they could assert a tort claim for damages.  We concluded that 
both the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-9-101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C.A. 2000e et seq., provided the Allens with 
a remedy for discrimination on the basis of sex.  Thus, because these administrative processes 
set forth a specific procedure for processing the Allens' complaints and the 
Allens had not followed these procedures, the Allens could not recover through 
the courts.  
The same situation exists here.

 
 
[¶15]   While it is unclear from the record if 
Hoflund could avail herself of the administrative process established by Title 
VII, Hoflund was able to seek administrative review through FEPA.3   Indeed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-9-104(iii) (LexisNexis 2003) requires the State of Wyoming, Department of 
Employment "to receive, investigate, and determine the validity of complaints 
alleging discrimination in employment or the existence of a discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice."  Further, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added) defines an employer's discharge of an 
employee because of age, sex, race, creed, color, 
national origin or ancestry as a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice.  
Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106 (LexisNexis 2003) provides that any 
person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice may personally or through his/her attorney file a verified complaint. 

 
 

[¶16]   We also find unpersuasive Hoflund's 
argument that there exists a clear distinction between discrimination based on 
"sex," i.e., "gender," and sexual harassment and she therefore has no FEPA-based 
administrative claim.  
Initially, we note that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of gender and the EEOC has issued guidelines which provide that 
sexual harassment, as defined therein, is a form of sexual discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(A)(1) (2003 and Supp. 2004) 
and 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(a) (2004).  
Under these guidelines, sexual harassment falls into two categories: 
first, quid 
pro quo cases 
where the employee suffers a tangible job detriment as a result of the sexual 
harassment, and second, where the harassment creates an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive work environment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004).  Since the 
guidelines were issued, federal courts have uniformly held that sexual 
harassment is a violation of Title VII.  See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2403-06, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49, 57-60 (1986) and cases cited therein.  Moreover, the 
United States Supreme Court has stated that the guidelines of the EEOC "while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance."  General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42, 97 
S.Ct 401, 411, 50 L. Ed. 2d 343, 357-58 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & 
Company, 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 164, 89 L. Ed. 124, 129 (1944)).  Chapter III, Section 4(e) of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Labor & Statistics Program of the State of Wyoming, Department of Employment, 
Fair Employment Rules (2001) specifically provides that the Division may give 
substantial weight to the current guidelines of the EEOC.

 
 

[¶17]   Many state courts have further 
determined that discrimination based on "sex" or "gender" includes sexual 
harassment.  
Ritchie v. 
Department. of State Police, 805 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Mass.App. 2004); Chambers v. 
Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Mich. 2000); Cummings v. 
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 420-21 (Minn. 1997);  Sabella v. 
Manor Care, Inc., 915 P.2d 901, 902 n.1 (N.M. 1996); Vincent v. West 
Texas State University, 895 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1995); Accardi v. 
Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 296 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1993); 
 Lehmann v. Toys "R" 
Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993);  Hammond v. 
Medical Arts Group, Inc., 574 So. 2d 521, 523 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991);  Harrison v. 
Chance, 797 P.2d  200, 203 (Mont. 1990); Old Ben Coal 
Company v. Illinois Human Rights Commission, 501 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ill.App. 1986).  Upon our review of 
FEPA, we reach the same conclusion.  Indeed, common sense dictates that sexual 
harassment must be included as a subset of sexual discrimination to best promote 
the clear purpose of FEPAto ensure equality and decency in the workplace.

 
 

[¶18]   Hoflund, however, argues that in 
Allen this Court recognized a distinction between sexual 
discrimination and sexual harassment when we referenced Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Company, 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).  As Hoflund admits, the reference to Monge 
within Allen, 699 P.2d  at 283, 
constitutes dicta.  In Allen, this Court recognized that Monge 
was the only case cited by Ms. Allen to support her claims 
that her discharge was contrary to public policy against sex discrimination and 
public policy favoring the status of marriage.  We then concluded that Monge 
was inapplicable because Monge dealt with a situation where an employee alleged that she 
was terminated for refusing to date and have sexual relations with her 
supervisor, or quid pro quo sexual harassment, which was much different than the 
circumstances presented by Ms. Allen's claims.  This recognition does not negate our 
substantive holding in Allen that when there exists another remedy to address an alleged 
social policy violation, that remedy must be pursued rather than a tort 
action.  
Allen, 699 P.2d  at 283-84.  We have consistently held that the exhaustion 
of available administrative remedies must occur before judicial relief may be 
available.  
Bender v. 
Greer, 996 P.2d 671, 673 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. 
Baker v. Strange, 960 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 1998); Routh v. State 
ex rel. Workers' Compensation Division, 952 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Wyo. 1998), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 814, 119 S. Ct. 49, 142 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1998); 
Wagoner v. 
State, Department of Administration & Information, 924 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo.1996); State ex rel. 
Epp v. Mayor, 894 P.2d 590 (Wyo. 1995).  In Wyoming, judicial action is 
withheld until the administrative process has run its course.  Bender, 
996 P.2d  at 673; Routh, 952 P.2d  at 1115 (both citing Wagoner, 924 P.2d at 91).  Finally, insofar as Allen can be read to make a distinction between sexual 
discrimination and sexual harassment for purposes of investigation under FEPA, 
we abrogate any such holding.

 
 

[¶19]   Hoflund also contends that the 
legislature's failure to specify that sexual harassment is within the purview of 
FEPA, while making numerous modifications to FEPA to include other topics such 
as age, disability, and tobacco usage, shows that the legislature does not 
intend sexual harassment to be covered under FEPA.  We do not 
agree.  As 
pointed out above, many courts, both federal and state, have conclusively 
determined over the years that discrimination based upon sex, i.e., gender, 
includes sexual harassment.  Therefore, the modifications Hoflund suggests 
are not needed.  
It is presumed that the legislature is knowledgeable about the current 
state of the law with reference to other statutes and decisions of the 
courts.  
Olsen v. 
State, 2003 WY 46, ¶160, 67 P.3d 536, ¶160 (Wyo. 
2003); Bertagnolli v. 
Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶15, 67 P.3d 627, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2003); Keats v. 
State, 2003 WY 19, ¶32, 64 P.3d 104, ¶32 (Wyo. 
2003).  
Moreover, as noted above, common sense belies the conclusion that FEPA 
was enacted to combat discrimination on the basis of age, sex, race, creed, 
color, national origin, or ancestry as discriminatory or unfair employment 
practices while excepting sexual harassment.

 
 
Breach of the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

 
 
[¶20]   Hoflund contends that a material 
question of fact remains regarding whether a special relationship existed 
between her and AGC.  
Hence, Hoflund asserts that the district court improperly concluded that 
no special relationship existed and, therefore, no valid breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing could be asserted by Hoflund.  Essentially, 
Hoflund asserts that her long-term employment with AGC establishes her special 
relationship.  
Further, Hoflund argues that this relationship, coupled with AGC's 
motivation to terminate her from employment in order to avoid its 
responsibilities to comply with its own sexual harassment policy and additional 
assurances to her that sexual harassment in the work place would be addressed, 
establishes a valid cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.  
Again, we do not agree.

 
 
[¶21]   This Court has established that only in 
limited circumstances will a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in an employment context become an actionable tort.  Under Wyoming law, an employee must 
demonstrate a special relationship of trust and reliance before that employee 
can recover on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.  VanLente v. University of Wyoming Research Corporation, 
975 P.2d 594, 598 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 222 
(Wyo. 1994)).  These situations 
are rare.  VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598; Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Company, Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 624 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Wilder, 868 P.2d at 221).  Usually, such a 
special relationship can be found only in a long-term employment relationship, 
coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the 
employee.  VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598 (citing Wilder, 868 P.2d at 221-22; and Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 
(Wyo. 1996)).  We have also stated 
that the trust and reliance necessary to give rise to a tort cause of action for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment situation 
may be found by the existence of separate consideration, common law, statutory 
rights, or the existence of rights accruing with longevity of service.  VanLente, 957 P.2d  at 598 (citing Loughry v. Unicover Corporation, 927 P.2d 706, 712 
(Wyo. 1996); and Worley, 1 P.3d at 625)).  We have further acknowledged that whether a 
special relationship exists between an employer and an employee seeking recovery 
is normally "a question of fact, not a question of law, to be decided by the 
trier of fact unless reasonable 
minds could not differ."  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 624 (emphasis added) (citing Jewell v. North Big Horn Hospital District, 953 P.2d 135, 139 
(Wyo. 1998)).

 
 
[¶22]   The record evidences that Hoflund was 
employed with AGC over a seven-year period.  However, such employment was intermittent, 
and Hoflund left full-time employment with AGC twice during this time 
frame.  Most 
recently, Hoflund was employed with AGC for only a few months prior to her 
termination.  
In previous cases we have held that such a time period was insufficient 
to establish sufficient longevity.   In Trabing v. 
Kinko's, Inc., 2002 WY 
171, ¶¶24-27, 57 P.3d 1248, ¶¶24-27 (Wyo. 2002), affirming summary judgment, we stated:

 
 
            
Trabing next asserts that her eight years of dedicated service to Kinko's 
along with the separate consideration of her dedication to outstanding customer 
service that went above and beyond the call of duty created a special 
relationship of trust and reliance between herself and Kinko's and that Kinko's 
breached its duty to act in good faith and fair dealing when it terminated her 
employment.  
Kinko's replies that Trabing has failed to establish the requisite 
special relationship of trust and reliance for her breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing claim.  

 
 
            
Kinko's is correct in its assertion that a special relationship of trust 
and reliance must be demonstrated before an employee can recover on an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.  VanLente v. 
University of Wyoming Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594, 598 
(Wyo. 1999).  Previous Wyoming cases have indicated the 
type of factors that will give rise to a special relationship:  separate 
consideration, common law, statutory rights, or the existence of rights accruing 
with longevity of service.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 
624.

 
 
            
With regard to longevity of service, this court has stated that the mere 
longevity of service is not sufficient to create the special relationship 
leading to tort remedy.  VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598.  
"Usually, the special relationship . . . stems from a long term 
employment relationship coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer 
responsibilities to the employee, e.g., benefits or commissions."  Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 
(Wyo. 1996).  Trabing does not 
allege, nor does the evidence suggest, that Kinko's terminated her employment in 
order to avoid giving her any benefits that she earned during her 
employment.  
We, therefore, are not moved to find that Trabing's eight years of 
service to Kinko's created the special relationship necessary to sustain this 
type of claim.

 
 
            
Trabing's assertion that her dedication to outstanding customer service 
constitutes additional consideration also fails to establish the special 
relationship requirement.  Being dedicated to outstanding customer 
service was simply a part of her job as branch manager.  Kinko's company 
policy states:  
"Our primary objective is to take care of our customer."  To establish 
separate consideration, Trabing would have to show that she provided something 
other than "merely performing the duties of the job."  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 626.  Indeed, this court 
has specifically stated that "[l]ongevity, coupled with performance of job 
duties, is not sufficient to structure the special relationship required by Wilder."  VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598.  
We hold that the facts of this case do not create a special relationship 
of trust and confidence necessary for Trabing to pursue a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.  Kinko's was, therefore, entitled to a summary 
judgment on this issue.

 
 
Likewise, in VanLente we held 
that an employee's performance of his duties during a nine-year term of 
employment was insufficient to constitute a special relationship.  Therein, we 
stated:

 
 
VanLente contends that the relationship was one of "trust 
and reciprocal confidence with regard to extremely sensitive human resource 
policy and employment matters . . . ."   The relationship articulated by 
VanLente is simply one that is inherent in the duties of a human resources 
manager.  It, 
therefore, was no more than one of the functions with which he was tasked, and 
did not arise from any special relationship as we have defined it.  Longevity, coupled 
with performance of job duties, is not sufficient to structure the special 
relationship required by Wilder.   Further, the 
record does not disclose any effort on the part of VanLente to demonstrate that 
the termination was driven by some motive to deprive him of the potential 
benefits.  In 
light of this record, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in 
favor of the Institute and Speight on the alleged tort remedy of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

 
 

VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598.  Therefore, Hoflund is unable to show that she 
had been employed with AGC to meet any necessary longevity requirement.

 
 
[¶23]   Even if the district court found that 
Hoflund had established longevity of service, longevity along with performance 
of duties, alone, is insufficient to find that a special relationship exists as 
a matter of law.  
Trabing, ¶27.  The record discloses that Hoflund did not 
present any evidence that she was terminated in violation of common law, 
statutory rights, or rights accruing with longevity of service.  Hoflund did claim 
that separate consideration existed, and that AGC terminated her employment in 
order to avoid enforcing AGC's sexual harassment policy and AGC's additional 
assurances to her that the alleged sexual harassment in the work place would be 
addressed.  
However, Hoflund admitted at deposition that she provided no 
bargained-for consideration to AGC in exchange for its implementation of the 
sexual harassment policy.  The record further supports the fact that 
Hoflund never expressed her intention to quit employment if AGC did not promise 
to limit her contact with Midgely.  By the same token, the accusations asserted 
by Hoflund that she was terminated by AGC so that AGC could deprive her of 
potential benefits is not supported by any substantiated facts. 

 
 

 
 
[¶24]   In her last argument, Hoflund asserts 
that material questions of fact exist concerning the cause of her emotional 
distress.  In 
particular, she contends that material questions of fact exist as to whether her 
emotional distress was caused by the entirety of events that occurred 
surrounding the alleged interactions with Midgely and AGC's response. She 
further argues that a material question of fact exists concerning whether her 
termination may be characterized as a "legal termination."  Thus, she concludes 
that the district court erred when it dismissed her cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on its ruling that her 
distress was solely caused and directly related to her lawful termination.

 
 
[¶25]   Hoflund testified at deposition that 
the alleged intentional outrageous conduct committed by AGC was principally its 
termination of her from its employment.  Similarly, Dr. Sherry Welch stated that 
Hoflund generally attributed her distress to her termination.  In Trabing, ¶¶28-30 (emphasis added), this Court rejected 
a similar claim stating as follows:

 
 
Trabing finally alleges that Kinko's termination of her 
employment based solely on the basis of her employees' anonymous and 
unsubstantiated comments during a time in which she was grieving over the recent 
loss of her mother caused her severe emotional distress.  Kinko's responds 
that it was simply exercising its legal rights when it terminated Trabing's 
employment. 

 
 
            
Wyoming has acknowledged that 
certain conduct in employment situations may be outrageous enough to provide the 
terminated employee with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 628.  We have adopted the tort as it is defined in 
the Restatement, Second, Torts § 46(1) (1965):

 
 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability 
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, 
for such bodily harm.

 
 

Worley, 1 P.3d  at 628.  However, if an employee's mental distress is caused solely by a 
termination that was permitted by the contract, then the employer has a complete 
defense even if the employer knows that the termination will cause the employee 
emotional distress.  
Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 278 
(Wyo. 1997).

 
 
            
In light of our holding that Trabing's employment with Kinko's was at 
will, we find that Kinko's did nothing more than act within its legal rights 
when it terminated Trabing's employment.  Accordingly, Kinko's has a complete defense 
to this claim, and summary judgment was appropriate.

 
 
[¶26]   When Dr. Welch was questioned further, 
she stated that Hoflund's distress was principally caused by the combination of 
events that occurred while Hoflund was employed by AGC, namely, the alleged 
harassment incidents, her termination, and the subsequent litigation.  Hoflund also argues 
that her distress was caused by the alleged sexual harassment.  Midgely's alleged 
intentionally outrageous acts cannot be properly attributed to AGC in making a 
valid actionable claim against AGC for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  
Rather, such claims may only be asserted directly against Midgely, 
himself.  
Likewise, any distress caused by the litigation, itself, is 
non-actionable.

 
 
[¶27]   This Court has clearly established that 
liability may be found only where the actions of a particular defendant may be 
characterized as extreme and outrageous conduct.

 
 
            
To recover under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted in an extreme and 
outrageous manner and that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the 
plaintiff severe emotional harm.  Kanzler v. 
Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341 (Wyo. 1997) (citing R.D. 
v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 
(Wyo. 1994)).  Comment d of the Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, which we have cited on 
numerous occasions, attempts to clarify the parameters of outrageous 
behavior.  See Hatch v. State Farm Fire 
and Cas. Co., 930 P.2d 382, 396 (Wyo. 1997); 
Spurlock v. Ely, 707 P.2d 188, 192 
(Wyo. 1985); Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1168 
(Wyo. 1996) (Thomas, J., concurring 
specially); Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d  at 
1341.  We quote 
from that comment:

 
 
            
Extreme and outrageous conduct.  The cases thus far 
decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme 
and outrageous.  
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which 
is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional 
distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a 
degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for 
another tort.  
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.  
Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, 
and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"  

 
 
            
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indigni­ties, 
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.  The rough edges of 
our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime 
plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain 
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely 
inconsiderate and unkind.  There is no occasion for the law to intervene 
in every case where some one's feelings are hurt.  There must still be freedom to express an 
unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible 
tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.  

 
 
            
Both the court and the jury play a role in assessing the validity of a 
claim of outrageousness.   

 
 
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, 
whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and 
outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.  Where reasonable 
men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to 
determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous to result in liability.

 
 

Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d  at 1341 (quoting Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, cmt. h); Leithead [v. American Colloid 
Co.], 721 P.2d [1059,] at 1066 [(Wyo. 1986)].

 
 

Worley, 1 P.3d  at 628.

 
 
[¶28]   Further, the at-will employment 
doctrine is well recognized in Wyoming.  This doctrine 
allows an employee or an employer to end the employment relationship at any time 
for any reason or for no reason.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 620.  AGC provided evidence that Hoflund was 
terminated because she was unable to balance her cash drawer over a period of 
time and because of insubordinate actions when questioned about her last 
submitted cash drawer statement accounting.  Although Hoflund contends that AGC unlawfully 
terminated her from employment as an act of retaliation for reporting Midgely's 
sexual harassment, she did not come forward with any competent evidence 
sufficient to pose a genuine issue of material fact in that regard.  A careful review of 
the pleadings filed by Hoflund reveals that contention to be purely 
speculative.

 
 
[¶29]   If the party moving for summary 
judgment has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to 
the opposing party who then is obliged to marshal admissible evidence, as 
opposed to general or conclusory allegations, establishing continuing viability 
of an issue of material fact.  The evidence must be competent and 
admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated 
by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful 
speculation.  
Campbell ex. 
rel Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Company, 939 P.2d 233, 236 (Wyo. 
1997)); also see Mize v. North Big Horn 
Hospital District, 931 P.2d 229, 233-34 (Wyo.1997); Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 
1987); Gennings v. 
First National Bank of Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 156 
(Wyo. 1982); and Harris v. Grizzle, 
625 P.2d 747, 751 and 
753-54 (Wyo. 1981).  Therefore, we 
conclude that the district court was correct when it ruled that Hoflund's lawful 
termination by AGC could not support her claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   We hold that the district court 
properly determined that summary judgment should be granted in favor of 
AGC.  The 
record before us presents no material issues of fact.  AGC was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
[¶31]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The district court later allowed Hoflund to imply a cause 
of action for retaliatory discharge through her first cause of action against 
AGC.  Hoflund 
also asserted causes of action against Amos Midgely, an AGC employee, for 
assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Default was entered 
against Midgely and he is not involved in this appeal.  Hoflund does not 
appeal from the district court's ruling in favor of AGC concerning her asserted 
cause of action for defamation.

2Again, Hoflund does not appeal the district court's ruling 
concerning her claim of defamation against AGC.

 
 

3Title VII requires that an employer employ at least 15 
employees each day for a period of 20 weeks or more before a discriminatory 
charge may be investigated under that title through the United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§2000e-1 (2002 and Supp. 2004).  In this case, the record does not disclose if 
AGC qualified as an employer as defined under Title VII.  However, AGC did 
meet the necessary requirements set forth by FEPA that defines an "employer" as 
an entity that employs two or more individuals within the State of Wyoming because AGC, at minimum, 
employed both Hoflund and Midgely during the applicable time frame.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-102(b) 
(LexisNexis 2003).