Title: Matter of Estate of Loomis

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Loomis1991 WY 64810 P.2d 126Case Number: 90-231Decided: 05/03/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
ESTATE OF Zona R. LOOMIS, Deceased. Gerald James WHITING, Ray Whiting, Jack 
Wallis Whiting, Merrel Deremo, Bonnie J. Lutterman, and Hugh K. Loomis, 
Appellants (Petitioners),

v.

William H. VINES, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Zona R. Loomis, Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

Affirmed. 

Fred W. Phifer, 
Wheatland, for appellants.

Frank J. Jones, 
Wheatland, for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

OPINION

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants Gerald James 
Whiting, Ray Whiting, Jack Wallis Whiting, Merrel Deremo, Bonnie J. Lutterman, 
and Hugh K. Loomis allege that Appellee William H. Vines unduly influenced Zona 
R. Loomis when she made her Last Will and Testament. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Vines.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellants raise the 
following issues for our review:

     1. The Court erred in 
finding that there was no presumption of undue influence.

     2. The Court erred in 
failing to consider the ethical matters involved.

     3. The Court erred in 
denying that W.H. Vines was not a beneficiary under this 
Will.

     4. The Court erred in 
even considering testamentary capacity.

     5. The Court erred in 
failing to find that the Affidavits of Appellants raised material questions of 
fact.

     6. The issue to be 
decided is whether there was undue influence on the part of Wm. H. Vines in the 
preparation of Zona Loomis' Will.

     7. The Court erred in 
granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In addition, Vines 
questions whether Merrel Deremo, Bonnie J. Lutterman, and Hugh K. Loomis have 
standing to contest the will.

[¶4.]     Although Appellants 
identify seven issues on appeal, the substance of the issues presented is simply 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Appellants' claim of undue 
influence. It is unnecessary to decide Appellants' second issue because the 
issue here is one of undue influence in a will contest and not an action against 
an attorney for violating the rules of professional conduct. First Security Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Christianson, 430 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1988). Also, because our resolution of 
Appellants' claim of undue influence is dispositive in this case, we do not 
consider the question of standing raised by Vines.

[¶5.]     For most of her life, 
Zona R. Loomis was a Wyoming resident who lived 
on a ranch five miles northeast of Wheatland, Wyoming. Following the death of her husband in 
1980, Mrs. Loomis engaged Vines, a practicing attorney in Wheatland, to prepare 
a new will to replace an earlier will which had been drafted by Vines and 
executed by Mrs. Loomis in 1974. Mrs. Loomis executed the new will on August 31, 
1981.

[¶6.]     In December 1985, Mrs. 
Loomis' personal physician diagnosed her as suffering from alzheimer's disease. 
In October 1986, she was admitted to a health care facility in Colorado where she spent 
the last three years of her life. Mrs. Loomis died without issue on October 16, 
1989. Her 1981 will, which expressly revoked all former wills, was admitted to 
probate. Vines was appointed as the personal representative pursuant to a 
provision in the will.

[¶7.]     Mrs. Loomis' estate was 
appraised at slightly over one million dollars. Her will gave specific cash 
bequests totalling $26,500 to nine of her nieces and nephews, including each of 
the Appellants. In addition, the will made specific bequests of $5,000 each to 
two friends and $5,000 to a local museum. The balance of the estate was divided 
into two trusts - a scholarship trust to provide college scholarships for 
Platte County, Wyoming, high school graduates and a residuary 
trust for the benefit of ten charitable organizations. The will appointed Vines 
and one of Vines' law partners as trustees.

[¶8.]     Alleging that Vines 
exercised undue influence over Mrs. Loomis in the preparation of her will, 
Appellants petitioned the district court to set aside the will. Vines moved for 
summary judgment, and the parties submitted materials in support of and in 
opposition to the motion. The district court granted Vines' motion for summary 
judgment on August 15, 1990, and this appeal followed.

[¶9.]     We apply the standards 
which govern appellate review of summary judgments as set forth by this Court on 
many previous occasions. Keabler v. City of Riverton, 808 P.2d 205 (Wyo. 1991). In Wyoming, a will deliberately made by a person 
of sound mind is not to be lightly set aside. Brosius v. Gardner, 683 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1984); Cook v. Bolduc, 24 Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580 
(1916). The burden of proving undue influence rests upon the will contestant. 
Merrill v. Van Etten, 80 Wyo. 276, 341 P.2d 506 (1959). "Clear proof of 
undue influence is required to render a will voidable." Macaraeg v. Wilson, 749 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1988). Evidence must be shown that free 
agency was destroyed and that the volition of another was substituted for that 
of the testatrix. Brosius, 683 P.2d 663.

[¶10.]  Appellants allege that the will should be 
set aside because Vines exercised undue influence over Mrs. Loomis so as to 
secure for himself and others in his law firm the rights to executor and 
long-term trustee fees. Appellants argue that Vines had a conflict of interest, 
that Mrs. Loomis did not receive the benefit of outside or disinterested counsel 
prior to executing her will, and that Vines made himself a beneficiary under the 
will.

[¶11.]  In support of his motion for summary 
judgment, Vines submitted an affidavit stating that he was not named as a 
beneficiary under the will and that he drafted the will at Mrs. Loomis' request 
and according to her desires. He contends that he did not exert undue influence 
over Mrs. Loomis in the preparation and execution of her will, and he denies 
exerting control over whom Mrs. Loomis included or excluded in her will as a 
beneficiary, executor, or trustee. Vines stated that Mrs. Loomis read and 
understood her will at the time of execution and that at no time after August 
31, 1981, did he exert any influence or take any action which would have 
prevented Mrs. Loomis from revising her will.

[¶12.]  In addition, Vines submitted affidavits 
from the two witnesses to the execution of the will which indicated that Mrs. 
Loomis was of sound mind and was not influenced in any way when she read and 
signed her will. Affidavits from two of Mrs. Loomis' close friends indicate that 
Mrs. Loomis did not exhibit any unusual behavior in August of 1981 and that she 
did not appear to suffer from any mental or physical 
incompetency.

[¶13.]  Taken as a whole, this evidence satisfied 
the threshold requirement of establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue 
of material fact of Vines' undue influence. The burden then shifts to the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment to present specific facts showing the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Leonard v. Converse County School 
District No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶14.]  In Peterson v. McMicken, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238 
(1954), this Court adopted a four-part test for proving undue influence in a 
will contest. We held that the party asserting the exercise of undue influence 
must present competent evidence which establishes 

"(1) the relations 
between the one charged with exercising the undue influence and the decedent 
affording the former an opportunity to control the testamentary act; (2) that 
the decedent's condition was such as to permit * * * subversion of h[er] freedom 
of will; (3) that there was activity on the part of the person charged with 
exercising undue influence; and (4) that such person unduly profited as 
beneficiary under the will."

Id. at 480, 266 P.2d  at 252 
(quoting Llewellyn v. Cheesewright, 83 Cal. App. 2d 534, 189 P.2d 822, 839 
(1948)). See also Brosius, 683 P.2d 663; and Pence v. Lush, 374 P.2d 425 
(Wyo. 
1962).

[¶15.]  The evidence is uncontroverted that, as 
Mrs. Loomis' attorney, Vines shared a confidential and fiduciary relationship 
with his client. Thus, under the first prong of the undue influence test, it is 
arguable that Vines had the opportunity to control Mrs. Loomis' testamentary 
disposition. However, the mere existence of a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship is insufficient to give rise to a presumption of undue influence. 
Leseberg v. Lane, 369 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1962). Similarly, in Macaraeg, 749 P.2d 272, we held that simply having the opportunity to control, without more, does 
not prove undue influence.

[¶16.]  The bulk of the evidence submitted by 
Appellants in this case goes to the second element of the undue influence test - 
showing Mrs. Loomis' susceptibility to undue influence. The affidavits submitted 
by Appellants attempted to question Mrs. Loomis' testamentary capacity which, in 
turn, raised the issue of susceptibility to undue influence. The district court 
found, and we agree, that the assertions made by Appellants as to Mrs. Loomis' 
testamentary incapacity at the time she executed her will in 1981 failed to 
satisfy the competency requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e). The evidence does not 
give rise to a genuine issue of material fact. Evidence of Mrs. Loomis' 
declining mental and physical health in the years after she executed her will is 
irrelevant to the issue of testamentary capacity and susceptibility to undue 
influence at the time of execution.

[¶17.]  Under the third prong of the undue 
influence test, the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
Appellants, is devoid of any evidence of deliberate activity by Vines to 
exercise undue influence over Mrs. Loomis in the drafting and execution of her 
will. See Brosius, 683 P.2d 663; Carey v. Smith, 504 P.2d 793 (Wyo. 1972); and Conrad v. Meyer, 399 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 
1965).

[¶18.]  Considering the fourth element of the 
undue influence test, Appellants fail to present any evidence that Vines was a 
beneficiary under specific terms of Mrs. Loomis' will. Appellants contend, 
however, that a presumption of undue influence arises because Vines' extensive 
powers as trustee under the terms of the testamentary trust agreement created a 
significant beneficial interest.

[¶19.]  We have reviewed the terms of the trust 
agreement and determine, as did the district court, that Vines' powers as 
trustee are consistent with the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
4-8-101 to -110 (1982). We hold that, under the facts of this case, Vines' 
designation as trustee does not give rise to a presumption of undue influence 
and does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1955); Shelton v. McHaney, 338 Mo. 749, 92 S.W.2d 173 (1936); 
and Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 108 N.E. 5 (1915) (holding that an 
attorney who drafted an instrument in which he was designated as an executor or 
trustee did not derive a beneficial interest which created a presumption of 
undue influence).

[¶20.]  After reviewing the affidavits and other 
materials presented by the parties, we conclude that Appellants failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact which would 
preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. The materials supporting 
Appellants' contention that Vines exercised undue influence over Mrs. Loomis in 
the preparation and execution of her will are merely speculative and conclusory. 
Appellants failed to present any competent evidence to prove the last three 
elements of the undue influence test - that Mrs. Loomis was susceptible to undue 
influence at the time she executed her will in 1981, that Vines actually 
influenced Mrs. Loomis, and that Vines unduly profited as a beneficiary under 
Mrs. Loomis' will. We hold that Vines is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law.

[¶21.]  Affirmed.