Title: Maldonado v. American Airlines

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

George Maldonado v. American Airlines, et. al., No. 135, September Term 2007.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Workers’ Compensation Commission determined that George Maldonado sustained a
permanent partial disability of “50% under ‘Other Cases’ industrial loss of the body as a
result of the injury to the back and psychiatric (serious disability).”  Subsequently, a jury, in
a judicial review proceeding, reduced the percentage of loss to 35%.  Maldonado argued
before both the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals that any party who
disputes a Commission decision under “Other cases” industrial loss must present the
testimony of a vocational expert during a judicial review proceeding in order to rebut the
presumption of correctness of a Commission award.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the reduction in award.  The Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that the testimony of
a vocational expert is not a sine quo non requirement to rebut the presumption of correctness
of a Workers’ Compensation Commission award under “Other cases” industrial loss and that
expert vocational testimony was not required in this case, where the jury was presented with
sufficient evidence from which to determine industrial loss.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 135
September Term, 2007
GEORGE MALDONADO
v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, et. al.
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge (Retired, Specially 
Assigned)
Raker (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   July 25, 2008
1
Industrial loss is “the percentage by which the industrial use of the covered
employee’s body was impaired as a result of the accidental personal injury or occupational
disease.”  Md. Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 9-627 (k) of the Labor and Employment
Article.  
Statutory references throughout are to the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland
Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), unless otherwise noted.
2
Section 9-737 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code (1991,
1999 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) provides for judicial review of Commission decisions:  
An employer, covered employee, dependent of a covered
employee, or any other interested person aggrieved by a decision
of the Commission, including the Subsequent Injury Fund and
the Uninsured Employers’ Fund, may appeal from the decision
of the Commission provided the appeal is filed within 30 days
after the date of the mailing of the Commission’s order by:
(1) filing a petition for judicial review in accordance with Title
(continued...)
In this workers’ compensation case, the following question is presented:
Is expert medical testimony on the issue of physical impairment
alone, sufficient to overcome the Workers’ Compensation
Commission’s finding on the issue of “industrial loss[?]”
Phrased in another way, the issue is whether in a judicial review proceeding of a permanent
partial disability award by the Workers’ Compensation Commission, must the disputant
provide the testimony of a vocational expert regarding industrial loss,1 in order to rebut the
presumption of correctness of the award? 
In the present case, the Workers’ Compensation Commission determined that George
Maldonado, Petitioner, sustained a permanent partial disability of “50% under ‘Other Cases’
industrial loss of the body as a result of the injury to the back and psychiatric (serious
disability).”  Subsequently, a jury, in a judicial review proceeding,2 reduced the percentage
2(...continued)
7 of the Maryland Rules;
(2) attaching to or including in the petition a certificate of
service verifying that on the date of the filing a copy of the
petition has been sent by first class mail to the Commission and
to each other party of record; and
(3) on the date of the filing, serving copies of the petition by
first class mail on the Commission and each other party of
record.
2
of loss to 35%, and the trial judge denied Maldonado’s Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.
During the trial, the employer, American Airlines, and its insurer, Insurance Company
of the State of Pennsylvania (hereinafter collectively referred to as “American Airlines”),
Respondents, called Maldonado to the stand; he testified that he was forty-three years old and
that at the time of his injury he was working as an American Airlines fleet service clerk, a
position he occupied for fourteen and a half years, which consisted of “loading, offloading,
deicing an aircraft, pushing the aircraft back when it was ready for departure, [and] giv[ing]
hand signals to the aircraft when it was approaching the gate.”  Maldonado further testified
that in the process of loading luggage into an aircraft, he cut his hand on an aircraft door;
thereafter he proceeded to load baggage into an aircraft with one hand, at which point he felt
a tear in his lower back.  He testified that the back injury prohibited him from returning to
work since the accident, but that after his injury he also obtained a bachelor’s degree in
theology in 2002, was able to drive a car, walk between 30 to 40 minutes without taking a
break and do “light work” around the house.  He indicated, nevertheless, that, because he
3
Permanent impairment evaluations do not involve treatment but are designed
to quantify and qualify the physical and psychological changes that have occurred based upon
the injury.  See Steven Babitsky, James J. Mangraviti, Jr., Christopher R. Brigham, M.D. &
Christopher J. Todd, Understanding the AMA Guides in Workers’ Compensation § 2.2 (3d
ed. 2002) (describing the process of evaluating impairment).  In Maryland the evaluation
process is governed by Section 9-721 of the Labor and Employment Article, Maryland Code
(1991, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.), which states:  
(a) In general. – Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section, a physician shall evaluate a permanent impairment and
report the evaluation to the Commission in accordance with the
regulations of the Commission.
(b) Contents of evaluation. – A medical evaluation of a
permanent impairment shall include information about:
(1) atrophy;
(2) pain;
(3) weakness; and
(4) loss of endurance, function, and range of motion.
(c) Impairments involving behavioral or mental disorders. – If
a permanent impairment involves a behavioral or mental
disorder, a licensed psychologist or qualified physician shall:
(1) perform an evaluation of only the mental or behavioral
portion of the permanent impairment; and
(2) report the evaluation to the Commission in accordance with
the regulations of the Commission.
Atrophy refers to “[a] wasting of tissues, organs, or the entire body.” Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary 178 (28th ed. 2006). 
(continued...)
3
could only sit for a certain period of time before needing to lay down, “no job is going to hire
me.” 
American Airlines also presented the videotaped depositions of two medical experts,
Dr. Stephen W. Siebert, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Edward R. Cohen, an orthopedic surgeon,
who both testified as to their evaluation of Maldonado’s permanent impairment.3  See Section
3(...continued)
COMAR 14.09.04.02 states:
A. As evidence of permanent impairment, a party may submit a
written evaluation of permanent impairment prepared by a
physician.
B. When preparing an evaluation of permanent impairment, a
physician shall:
(1) Generally conform the evaluation with the format set forth
in § 2.2 (“Reports”) of the American M edical Association’s
“Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment”;
(2) Use the numerical ratings for the impairment set forth in the
American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment”, provided that a physician is not
required to use the inclinometer evaluation technique specified
in § 3.3, but instead may use the goniometer technique specified
in the “Addendum to Chapter 3”;
(3) Include the items listed under the heading “Comparison of
the results of analysis with the impairment criteria . . .” in § 2.2
(“Reports”) of the American Medical Association’s “Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment”; and
(4) Include information on the items required by Labor and
Employment Article, § 9-721, Annotated Code of Maryland,
which include:
(a) Loss of function, endurance, and range of motion, and
(b) Pain, weakness, and atrophy.
C. A physician preparing an evaluation of permanent
impairment may include numerical ratings not set forth in the
American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment” for the items listed in § B(4) of this
regulation.  If the physician does so, the physician shall include
in the evaluation the detailed findings that support those
numerical ratings.
D. When reviewing an evaluation for permanent impairment, the
Commission shall consider all the items listed in § B of this
regulation.
(continued...)
4
3(...continued)
E. The Commission may not approve payment of a physician’s
fee for an evaluation that does not comply with this regulation.
F. This regulation shall apply to all evaluations prepared on or
after July 1, 1990.
4
Radiculopathy is defined as a “[d]isorder of the spinal nerve roots.”  Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary at 1622. 
5
Maryland Rule 2-519, the Rule governing motions for directed verdict, states
in pertinent part:
(a) Generally. A party may move for judgment on any or all of
the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an
opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.
The moving party shall state with particularity all reasons why
the motion should be granted. No objection to the motion for
(continued...)
5
9-721.  Dr. Siebert testified that “based on impairments in [Maldonado’s] daily activities, in
[Maldonado’s] social functioning, in [Maldonado’s] task completion and in what I feel would
be [Maldonado’s] likelihood to deteriorate or decompensate in a work situation, I assessed
[Maldonado] to have a mild overall impairment of about 10 percent,” and attributed 5% of
the impairment to be directly related to the accident and 5% to other factors.  Dr. Cohen
testified that Maldonado had a 10% impairment to his lower back because he believed half
of the degenerative changes were preexisting and half were attributable to the accident; he
further stated that his examination and Maldonado’s complaints revealed “that [Maldonado]
did not have any findings consistent with what we call a radiculopathy”4 and that “there was
no evidence of instability in [Maldonado’s] spine.” 
After the denial of his motion for a directed verdict,5 Maldonado offered the
5(...continued)
judgment shall be necessary.  A party does not waive the right
to make the motion by introducing evidence during the
presentation of an opposing party’s case.
(b) Disposition. When a defendant moves for judgment at the
close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried
by the court, the court may proceed, as the trier of fact, to
determine the facts and to render judgment against the plaintiff
or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the
evidence. When a motion for judgment is made under any other
circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and
inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the motion is made.
6
A 15% reduction equates to a diminution in the number of weeks for which
Maldonado could recover for his injury based upon a cap of 500 weeks.  A 50% permanent
partial disability determination would equate to 250 weeks, while a 35% determination would
translate to 175 weeks, a 75 week difference.  See Section 9-627 (k).  See also Del Marr v.
Montgomery County, 397 Md. 308, 311, 916 A.2d 1002, 1003 (2007) (“[T]he Workers’
Compensation Commission, using criteria set forth in § 9-627 (k), must first determine the
percentage by which the industrial use of the employee’s body was impaired as a result of
the accidental injury.  It then must award compensation based on the proportion that the
determined loss bears to 500 weeks, subject to an enhancement for serious disability under
(continued...)
6
videotaped depositions of two experts, a psychologist, Dr. Morris Lasson, Ph.D, who testified
that Maldonado suffered a 60% impairment, due to psychological problems arising from the
injury, including depression, and Dr. Jeffrey D. Gaber, M.D., an internist who testified that
he estimated Maldonado to have a 45% impairment due to a disk injury to his back as well
as an additional 15% impairment from other problems associated with the accident.
Maldonado again moved for a directed verdict at the close of all testimony, and the Judge
reserved ruling.  After being instructed and having deliberated, the jury reduced Maldonado’s
Commission award by 15%.6  His Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
6(...continued)
§ 9-630, at the weekly rates set forth in §§ 9-628 through 9-630.”).
7
Maryland Rule 2-532 (a) provides for filing a Motion for JNOV “only on the
grounds advanced in support” of the motion for directed verdict.
7
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-532,7 based upon the absence of a vocational expert testifying
on behalf of American Airlines, was denied.  
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and similarly before us, Maldonado
requests a holding that any party who disputes a Commission decision under “Other cases”
industrial loss must present the testimony of a vocational expert during a judicial review
proceeding in order to rebut the presumption of correctness of a Commission award.  After
the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, declined to so hold, we granted
Maldonado’s petition for certiorari, Maldonado v. American Airlines, 403 Md. 612, 943 A.2d
1244 (2008).
In his argument, Maldonado relies on Jewel Tea Co. v. Blamble, 227 Md. 1, 174 A.2d
764 (1961), and Bullis School v. Justus, 37 Md. App. 423, 377 A.2d 876 (1977), for the
proposition that expert testimony is required to overturn a decision of the Commission when
a complex issue, such as industrial loss, is involved. American Airlines counters
Maldonado’s assertion that vocational testimony is required by distinguishing Jewel Tea Co.,
227 Md. at 1, 174 A.2d at 764, and offering the reasoning in Terumo Medical Corp. v.
Greenway, 171 Md. App. 617, 911 A.2d 888 (2006), to undermine Maldonado’s
interpretation of the earlier Bullis School Case from the intermediate appellate court.
8
A permanent partial disability is one that is “‘partial in character but permanent
in quality.’” Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Worker’s
Compensation Handbook § 9.03[3] (3d ed. 2007).   
9
Compensation for scheduled injuries is set forth in Section 9-627 (b)-(j):
(b) Loss of a thumb, finger, or great toe. – Compensation shall
be paid for the period listed for the loss of the following:
(1) a thumb, 100 weeks;
(2) a 1st finger, commonly called the index finger, 40 weeks;
(3) a 2nd finger, 35 weeks;
(4) a 3rd finger, 30 weeks;
(5) a 4th finger, commonly called the little finger, 25 weeks; and
(6) a great toe, 40 weeks.
(c) Loss and loss of use of phalanxes and digits. – (1)
Compensation for the loss of more than 1 phalanx of a digit of
a hand or foot shall be the same as the compensation for the loss
of the entire digit.
(2) Compensation for the loss of the 1st phalanx of a digit shall
be 50% of the compensation for the loss of the entire digit.
(3) Compensation for the loss or loss of use of 2 or more digits
or 1 or more phalanxes of 2 or more digits of a hand or foot:
(i) may be apportioned to the loss of use of the hand or foot
caused by the loss or loss of use of the digits or phalanxes; but
(ii) may not exceed the compensation for the loss of a hand or
(continued...)
8
American Airlines also contends that the evidence in the present case was sufficient for the
jury to determine the degree of disability, relying on Getson v. WM Bancorp, 346 Md. 48,
694 A.2d 961 (1997), and that additional evidence need not be introduced, citing General
Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md. App. 68, 555 A.2d 542 (1989). 
The Workers’ Compensation Commission is empowered to grant awards of
compensation for various levels of disability, including permanent partial disability.8
Permanent partial disability awards are divided into two categories, scheduled injuries9 and
9(...continued)
foot.
(d) Loss of other toes, hand, arm, foot, leg, eye, hearing, or
septum. – (1) Compensation shall be paid for the period listed
for the loss of the following:
(i) 1 of the toes other than the great toe, 10 weeks;
(ii) a hand, 250 weeks;
(iii) an arm, 300 weeks;
(iv) a foot, 250 weeks;
(v) a leg, 300 weeks; and
(vi) an eye, 250 weeks.
(2) Compensation shall be paid for the period listed for:
(i) the total loss of hearing of 1 ear, 125 weeks; and
(ii) the total loss of hearing of both ears, 250 weeks.
(3) Compensation shall be paid for a perforated nasal septum for
20 weeks.
(e) Permanent loss of use of hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye. – The
permanent loss of use of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye shall be
considered equivalent to the loss of the hand, arm, foot, leg, or
eye.
(f) Partial loss of vision. – (1) When a covered employee has a
partial loss of vision in 1 or both eyes, compensation shall be
paid that bears the same ratio to compensation for a total loss of
vision that the partial loss of vision bears to the total loss of
vision.
(2) In determining the percentage of vision lost, consideration
may not be given to the effect that a correcting lens may have on
the eye.
(g) Amputation. – (1) An amputation at or above the wrist or
ankle may be apportioned to the loss of the use of the arm or leg,
but may not be less than the compensation for the loss or loss of
use of a hand or foot.
(2) Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered the
loss of an arm.
(3) Amputation at or above the knee shall be considered the loss
of a leg.
(h) Amputation or loss of use of part of member of body. – When
(continued...)
9
9(...continued)
there has been an amputation or the loss of use of a part of any
member of the body listed in this section for which
compensation is not specifically provided in this section, the
Commission shall award compensation for the proportion of the
total number of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss of use
of the entire member that the amputated or affected portion
bears to the entire member.
(i) Mutilations and disfigurements. – (1) For mutilations and
disfigurements not provided for in this section, the Commission
may award compensation for up to 156 weeks.
(2) In making an award under paragraph (1) of this subsection,
the Commission shall consider the character of the mutilation or
disfigurement as compared with mutilation and disfigurement
specifically provided for in this section.
(j) Industrial loss. – Compensation for less than 75 weeks. – (1)
When compensation is awarded for less than 75 weeks for a
disability listed in subsection (b) of this section, the Commission
may determine that the disability results in an industrial loss by
considering factors including:
(i) the nature of the physical disability; and
(ii) the age, experience, occupation, and training of the
employee when the accidental personal injury or occupational
disease occurred.
(2) If the Commission determines that the accidental personal
injury or occupational disease results in industrial loss, the
Commission may award the covered employee additional weeks
of compensation not to exceed a total disability of 75 weeks.
10
To assess industrial loss, the finder of fact looks to “the extent of the loss of
use by considering how the injury has affected the employee’s ability to do his or her job.”
Getson v. WM Bancorp, 346 Md. 48, 62, 694 A.2d 961, 968 (1997).  See also Giant Food
Inc. v. Coffey, 52 Md. App. 572, 578, 451 A.2d 151, 155 (1982) (stating that a finding of
industrial loss “is equivalent to a finding of loss of earning capacity”).   
10
unscheduled “Other cases,” under which compensation for industrial loss10 is determined by
the tenets of Section 9-627 (k):
(k) Other cases. – (1) In all cases of permanent partial disability
11
not listed in subsections (a) through (j) of this section, the
Commission shall determine the percentage by which the
industrial use of the covered employee’s body was impaired as
a result of the accidental personal injury or occupational disease.
(2) In making a determination under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, the Commission shall consider factors including:
(i) the nature of the physical disability; and
(ii) the age, experience, occupation, and training of the disabled
covered employee when the accidental personal injury or
occupational disease occurred.
(3) The Commission shall award compensation to the covered
employee in the proportion that the determined loss bears to 500
weeks.
(4) Compensation shall be paid to the covered employee at the
rates listed for the period in §§ 9-628 through 9-630 of this Part
IV of this subtitle.
Both Maldonado and American Airlines agree that the essence of the issue before us
is whether expert vocational testimony on industrial loss is necessary to rebut the
presumption of correctness of a workers’ compensation award under Section 9-745 (b),
which states that in judicial review proceedings:
(1) the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima
facie correct; and
(2) the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof.
See Baltimore County v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64, 75-76, 891 A.2d 1103, 1109-10 (2006);
Ackerhalt v. Hanline Bros., Inc., 253 Md. 13, 20, 252 A.2d 1, 5 (1969); Krell v. Md. Drydock
Co., 184 Md. 428, 435, 41 A.2d 502, 505 (1945).  
Section 9-745 does not require nor suggest any quantum or type of evidence to
overcome the presumption of correctness of a workers’ compensation award.  This Court in
addressing the burden of proof in a judicial review proceeding of such awards often has
12
iterated that a party challenging the decision need not provide evidence additional to that
provided before the Commission to satisfy the burden of proof.  Ackerhalt, 253 Md. at 21,
252 A.2d at 5; Abell v. Albert F. Goetze, Inc., 245 Md. 433, 437, 226 A.2d 253, 256 (1967);
Greenwalt v. Brauns Bldg. Specialties Corp., 203 Md. 313, 317-18, 100 A.2d 804, 806-07
(1953).  Rather, as Judge Thomas B. Finan, writing for this Court in Abell, 245 Md. at 437,
226 A.2d at 256, explained, a party challenging the decision can overcome the presumption
of correctness of a Commission decision “by submitting new evidence, by relying on all or
a part of the record before the Commission, by argument as to the probative value of the
evidence and by argument as to the credibility of witnesses.”  See also Ackerhalt, 253 Md.
at 21, 252 A.2d at 5, and Williams Constr. Co. v. Bohlen, 189 Md. 576, 580, 56 A.2d 694,
696 (1948), in which we said:
[W]here the Commission has considered conflicting evidence of
essential facts, and has drawn one of two different permissible
inferences, there may be imposed upon the party attacking the
decision of the Commission merely a burden of persuasion, and
not necessarily a burden of additional proof. . . . The provision
of the Act placing the burden of proof upon the appellant means
only that he must prove in the trial Court what he asserts.  His
burden is to convince the Court or the jury that the Commission
decided incorrectly in interpreting the facts, or deducing the
inference from the facts, or construing the law applicable to the
facts.
The gravamen of Maldonado’s argument is that there is a per se requirement for
expert vocational testimony in a judicial review proceeding in order to rebut the presumption
of correctness of a Commission decision on industrial loss, because industrial loss is such an
13
inherently complicated issue, citing Jewel Tea Co., 227 Md. at 1, 174 A.2d at 764.  In Jewel
Tea Co., both parties sought judicial review of a Workmen’s Compensation Commission
decision that determined the employee was permanently totally disabled, with 60% of the
disability being attributed to a work injury and 40% being the result of a pre-existing
condition.  The lay testimony provided by the employee supported the conclusion that she
was permanently totally disabled; all medical testimony presented, including the testimony
of the employee’s own medical expert, conflicted with a finding of permanent total disability.
We held, with respect to the lay testimony, that “lay testimony alone is not justified when the
medical question involved is a complicated one, involving fact finding which properly falls
within the province of medical experts,” but clearly posited that such a statement “should not
be taken as indicating that we conclude that all awards in cases of injuries of a subjective
nature can stand only if accompanied by definitive medical testimony.”  Id. at 7, 174 A.2d
at 767 (emphasis added).  We, therefore, explicitly stated that we were not establishing a per
se requirement for expert testimony when a medical question was involved.  Id. 
So, we note, has the Court of Special Appeals in Terumo Medical Corp. v. Greenway,
171 Md. App. at 617, 911 A.2d at 888, when addressing whether in Bullis School, 37 Md.
App. at 423, 377 A.2d at 876, that court had embraced a per se requirement for vocational
expert testimony.  Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., writing for the intermediate appellate court
in Terumo Medical Corp., specifically repudiated any notion that vocational expert testimony
was required under Bullis School:
14
In Bullis School, of course, we said no such thing.  We held that
testimony from a vocational expert was admissible.  That was it.
We did not have before us and we did not discuss any minimal
requirements for taking a case of permanent total disability to
the jury.  We did not elevate vocational analysis to a sine qua
non for a finding of permanent total disability.
Terumo Med. Corp., 171 Md. App. at 639, 911 A.2d at 900.
The notion, delineated in Jewel Tea Co. and Terumo Medical Corp., that expert
testimony may be admitted to assist the fact-finder, is reflected in Maryland Rule 5-702,
which states: 
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.  In making that determination, the court shall determine
(1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness
of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether
a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
(emphasis added).  Obviously, the fact that expert testimony may be admissible, however,
is not dispositive of the issue regarding whether it is required.
Whether, as Maldonado asserts, expert vocational testimony is 
per se required in every
case depends upon whether the factors identified in Section 9-627 (k)(2) are so complicated
that no jury in any case, regardless of the other evidence presented, would have sufficient
evidence upon which to alter a Commission decision without the expert testimony.  The
factors in Section 9-627 (k)(2) include:  “(i) the nature of the physical disability; and (ii) the
age, experience, occupation, and training of the disabled covered employee when the
15
accidental personal injury or occupational disease occurred.”  We have acknowledged that
the first factor, “the nature of the physical disability,” with respect to impairment only, in
some cases may necessitate medical testimony of impairment to assist the finder of fact, see
Getson, 346 Md. at 62, 694 A.2d at 968 (noting that often evaluating physicians provide “an
assessment of medical impairment” to assist the finder of fact in determining the degree of
disability), while never mandating a sine qua non requirement.  The other factors to be
considered under Section 9-627 (k)(2), “the age, experience, occupation, and training” of the
employee when the accident occurred, moreover, are not so complicated as to require in
every case expert vocational testimony to assist the jury in its fact-finding, for as Judge Sally
D. Adkins, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in this case, aptly noted, “jurors are
generally acquainted with matters involving work, vocation, age, experience, training,
abilities, salary, and job prospects.”
Our conclusion that expert vocational testimony is not per se required to determine
industrial loss is consistent with cases in our sister jurisdictions in which their courts have
had occasion to review workers’ compensation awards.  In those cases, no court has
determined that expert vocational testimony was a sine qua non for determining industrial
loss.  See Ex parte Northam, 689 So.2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1996) (holding that “while medical
testimony as to an employee’s degree of impairment is probative, as is the testimony of a
vocational expert, it is well settled that neither is required” to make a finding of 60%
permanent partial disability); Bennett v. Clark Hereford Ranch, 680 P.2d 539, 543 (Idaho
16
1984) (iterating that while “‘an expert in the area of employment’” often testifies to prove
that the percentage of disability exceeds the percentage of medical impairment, such expert
testimony is not required); Copeland v. Johnson Group, Inc., 944 P.2d 179, 187 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1997) (rejecting the contention that the “extent of permanent partial general disability
should be made by a vocational rehabilitation expert”); Haney v. Aaron Ferer & Sons, Co.,
521 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (declaring that the trial court “did not need the
expert testimony of a vocational rehabilitation counselor to determine earning capacity loss”
of 25%); Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 295 N.W.2d
183, 187 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the prediction of loss of earning capacity “need
not be presented by an employment expert; a qualified physician and even the department
itself can determine the percentage of such disability”).  Significantly, even states that
purport to require expert vocational testimony do not have a per se rule that requires such
testimony in every case.  See Brown v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Knight Ridder,
Inc./Phila. Newspapers, Inc.), 856 A.2d 302, 305-06 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (stating that
although the statute dictates that earning power “shall be based upon expert opinion
evidence,” “[e]xpert reports are not necessary in situations . . . to prove earning power in an
amount shown by credible evidence to have been received”); Caldwell v. John Morrell &
Co., 489 N.W.2d 353, 362 (S.D. 1992) (acknowledging that while there is a “general rule”
that testimony of a vocational expert is required, “there may be cases where an expert’s
testimony on loss of use, over and above a medical impairment, may be only advisable rather
17
than essential”). 
We, therefore, conclude that the testimony of a vocational expert is not a sine qua non
requirement to rebut the presumption of correctness of a Workers’ Compensation
Commission award of permanent partial disability under “Other cases” industrial loss, nor
is expert vocational testimony required in this case, where the jury was presented with
sufficient evidence from which to determine industrial loss.  Specifically, in terms of the
statutory factors listed in Section 9-627 (k)(ii), the age, experience, occupation and training
of the employee when the accident occurred, Maldonado testified that he was forty-three
years old, that at the time of the accident he had been working for American Airlines as a
fleet service clerk for fourteen and a half years, that the position required loading, offloading
and deicing the plane as well as “pushing the aircraft back when it was ready for departure,
[and] giv[ing] hand signals to the aircraft when it was approaching the gate.”  
There was also adequate evidence upon which the jury could gauge the nature of the
physical disability pursuant to Section 9-627 (k)(i).  The jury heard conflicting testimony
from the doctors for each party as to the extent of the Maldonado’s back injury as well as
psychological functioning related to the accident.   Maldonado himself also provided the jury
with evidence relevant to this factor; he testified that after sustaining his injuries, he obtained
a bachelor’s degree in 2002 and that he was able to drive a car, walk between 30 to 40
minutes without taking a break and engage in “light work” around the house, but that because
he could only sit for a certain period of time before needing to lay down “no job is going to
18
hire me.”  Based on the testimony of the witnesses, including Maldonado, there was
sufficient evidence provided on each statutory factor to allow the jury to “assess the extent
of the loss of use by considering how the injury has affected the employee’s ability to do his
or her job.”  Getson, 346 Md. at 62, 694 A.2d at 968.      
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID
BY PETITIONER.