Title: HOFF v. CITY OF CASPER-NATRONA COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HOFF v. CITY OF CASPER-NATRONA COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT2001 WY 9733 P.3d 99Case Number: 00-54Decided: 10/17/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                  
KENNETH 
L. HOFF,                                                 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

CITY 
OF CASPER-NATRONA

COUNTY 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Rex O. 
Arney and B. J. Baker of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Arney.

  Representing 
Appellee:

Judith 
Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 * 
This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on September 22, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
The case was reassigned to Justice Golden on February 5, 
2001.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
In this 
appeal a terminated public employee asks this Court to reverse the district 
court's summary judgment which ruled that (1) his tort claims of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and retaliatory termination in 
violation of public policy do not escape the immunity bar of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act; and (2) a written document signed by him which 
acknowledges that his public employer's personnel rules are not a contract is a 
legally sufficient disclaimer.  We 
affirm.

 

 

 

[¶2]           
Hoff 
presents the following issues for our review:

1.  Does public policy prevent a public 
agency from firing a competent dedicated public employee because the employee 
was properly performing his duties to protect the public, in order to placate 
influential interests who did not want the employee to properly perform his 
duties?

2.  Is it error for a district court to 
grant summary judgment on behalf of an employer holding that an employee 
handbook did not create an implied contract of employment, in a situation where 
the employee handbook is ambiguous, the handbook contains clear provisions for 
the protection of employees, and there is testimony from both parties that a 
contract of employment was intended to be and was created?

3. Is a 
public agency immune from a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing asserted by a discharged employee if there is evidence 
that there was a special relationship of trust and reliance between the employee 
and the agency?

 

The 
Health Department presents this statement of the issues:

1.  Does a public agency have a right to 
replace a director in a policy making position at the start of a new term of the 
board?

2.  Although hired without benefit of any 
employment manual, was there an implied contract of employment that prohibited 
the termination of the Director of Environmental Health?

 

3.  Does Appellant fail to state a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing and violation of public policy as 
a matter of law?

4.  Can a plaintiff overcome a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment with his own affidavit containing 
inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony?

 

 

 

[¶3]           
At 
summary judgment, the parties had stipulated to the following facts.  Under our summary judgment standard, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment drawing all inferences favorable to it.

 

[¶4]           
In 1985, 
the Health Officer of the Health Department hired Hoff as the Director of the 
Environmental Health Division.  A 
Board of Directors consisting of five persons governs the Health 
Department.  Two board members are 
appointed by the City of Casper, two board members by the Board of County 
Commissioners of Natrona County (Commissioners); and the city and county 
recommend the fifth member's appointment.  
Each board member serves one five-year term.  The terms are staggered.  Therefore, a new term of the board 
begins July 1st of each year with the addition of a new member following the 
expiration of a prior board member's term.   

 

[¶5]           
At the 
time Hoff was hired, the Board had not adopted a written personnel manual; 
however, Hoff believed that he worked under the Natrona County personnel manual 
in effect at the time.  In December 
of 1988, the Board adopted the county's personnel policy manual and modified it 
from time to time.  In 1989, Hoff 
was appointed the interim administrator for the Health Department and served 
until 1990.   

 

[¶6]           
In 1991, 
a Health Department committee, of which Hoff was chairman, was formed to propose 
a new personnel manual.  The 
committee reviewed personnel manuals from other agencies and compiled provisions 
for consideration by the Board.  
After the city and county attorney reviewed the proposed manual, the 
Board adopted it at a regularly scheduled meeting on April 10, 1991.  The manual is dated June 12, 1991.  Thereafter, the Board modified various 
policies contained in the manual.  
The manual contained provisions regarding an assistant director.  In addition, the manual contained 
language regarding at-will employment.  
However, this language was not separate or conspicuous.  The manual contained language making a 
distinction between a permanent and a probationary employee.  It contained a progressive step 
discipline system.  

 

[¶7]           
In July 
1991 Hoff signed a separate acknowledgement that the personnel rules and 
regulations in the manual were intended to give guidance and to establish fair 
and consistent personnel practices affecting employees but were not a contract 
of employment.  The committee did 
not prepare this document.  After 
the adoption of the 1991 manual, Hoff acted as Assistant Director of the Health 
Department while remaining Director of the Environmental Health Division.  

 

[¶8]           
In 1996 
the Commissioners made a significant cut in the funding of the Health Department 
for fiscal year 1996-1997.  The cut 
in funding was followed by a subsequent reduction in funding the following 
fiscal year.  The Commissioners 
appointed P. J. Gulley to the Board.  
Gulley is a restaurant owner in Casper, and in November, 1995, his 
restaurant received a low health inspection score, and the score was printed in 
the local newspaper.  In January 
1997 another business owner who had been required to make adjustments in her 
business following a health inspection by Hoff worked with one commissioner and 
arranged a meeting with city officials, county officials, members of the Board 
and restaurant owners.  At the 
meeting, complaints were aired regarding the Environmental Health Division.  Employees of the Environmental Health 
Division were not invited to attend.

 

[¶9]           
The 
Board performed a self-audit to consider various options it believed were 
available to remedy the apparent conflict between the Health Department and 
the  Commissioners.  This document was distributed to the 
Health Department employees for their input.  On March 12, 1997, the Board proposed 
the adoption of resolutions to modify personnel rules and regulations and 
adopted them on May 14, 1997.  The 
modifications applied only to new hires.  
At the meeting, the Board also indicated its intent to make the rules and 
regulations applicable to existing employees upon the new term of the 
Board.

 

[¶10]       
On July 
23, 1997, at the first regularly scheduled meeting of the new Board, the Board 
adopted the new personnel policies to apply to both new and existing employees 
effective September 10, 1997.  The 
Board determined to give each employee $500 as consideration for accepting the 
new policies.  The Board determined 
that any employee who did not accept the $500 would be advised he or she would 
be terminated and paid two weeks severance pay.  On September 30, 1997, Hoff was issued 
and later cashed the check for $500.

 

[¶11]       
In 
November 1997 the Board did not renew the Health Officer's contract and hired a 
new director to oversee all departments.  
On June 19, 1998, the new director recommended that the Board terminate 
Hoff's employment because differences with philosophy and approach to 
environmental health did not match well with future developments.  On July 21, 1998, Hoff and his attorney 
attended a board hearing.  The Board 
requested comments from the director, Hoff, and his attorney.  On July 22, 1998, at the first regularly 
scheduled board meeting for the new term, the Board decided to end Hoff's 
employment effective October 31, 1998.  
Hoff was placed on administrative leave with full pay and benefits.  The Board stated that the termination 
was not for disciplinary reasons but was part of the Board's desire to take the 
department in a new direction.

 

[¶12]       
On December 31, 
1998, Hoff filed suit alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of public policy.  In summary judgment proceedings, the 
district court granted the Health Department's motion for summary judgment on 
all claims, ruling that (1) the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act immunizes the 
Health Department against those tort claims asserted by Hoff because the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act does not expressly recognize them, and (2) the written 
document signed by Hoff which acknowledges that the Health Department's 
personnel rules are not a contract is a legally sufficient disclaimer.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

 

 

[¶13]       
Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, reveals that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997);  
W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A fact is 
material if it establishes or refutes an essential element of a claim or 
defense.  Worley v. Wyoming 
Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo. 2000).   In evaluating summary judgment, we 
apply the same standards as the trial court, without affording any deference to 
the trial court's decisions on issues of law.  Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

 

 

 

[¶14]       
Hoff 
stipulates that he was an at-will employee before 1991 but claims that the 1991 
manual is an implied contract permitting discharge only for cause, and further 
argues that the disclaimer he signed in 1991 was ineffective because it was 
ambiguous.  He argues that 
modifications of the manual adopted by the Board in 1997 cannot be applied to 
him because they constitute modifications from for-cause discharge to at-will 
employment that were not supported by proper consideration.  Finally, he argues that the new board 
cannot terminate an implied for-cause employment contract created by agency 
personnel rules and regulations under Mariano & Associates v. Sublette 
County Comm'rs, 737 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo. 1987),1 and its 
progeny.

 

[¶15]       
The 
Health Department responds with several arguments in addition to its contention 
that the disclaimer is effective.  
It first claims that the Health Department, as a public entity, is free 
to change directors in policy-making positions with the new term of a board; 
secondly, the board is free to adopt new contracts at a new term, and, 
therefore, it was entitled to adopt a manual of new personnel rules and 
regulations in 1997 that undisputedly created an at-will employment contract; 
and finally, in the alternative to these arguments, contends that Hoff's 
acceptance of the $500 check suffices as sufficient consideration to bind him to 
the 1997 manual.

 

[¶16]       
Our 
review indicates that the separate acknowledgement signed by Hoff in 1991 
effectively established his employment status as at-will, and we need not 
consider any issues arising from the 1997 Board actions.  The disclaimer signed by Hoff 
stated, in pertinent part:

 

I, 
Kenneth L. Hoff, understand that the City of Casper-Natrona County Health 
Department Personnel Rules and Regulations is NOT a contract of 
employment, but is intended to give guidance and to establish fair and 
consistent personnel practices affecting employees.

 

While 
conceding that the separately signed disclaimer is legally conspicuous, Hoff 
contends that a declaration that the rules are not a contract but  "establish fair and consistent personnel 
practices" is ambiguous and, therefore, legally insufficient.  "Normally, the construction and 
interpretation of a contract is for the court as a matter of law.  If the meaning of a contract is 
ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the 
parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes 
a mixed question of law and fact."  
Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1257 
(Wyo. 1993).            

 

[¶17]       
Hoff 
contends that the wording of this disclaimer is most similar to the disclaimer 
in Sanchez.  We recently 
discussed Sanchez and noted:

 

Notably 
missing from the disclaimer language . . . was a statement that the employer 
retained the power to fire an employee with or without good cause. Id. at 
1259. Because this was a straightforward termination case involving the basic 
question of whether or not the employer could terminate with or without cause, 
the court determined that the disclaimer language "does not tell the employee 
what he needs to know."  
Id.

 

Bouwens 
v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 945 (Wyo. 1999).   
Like this case, the issue in Bouwens was the clarity of a 
disclaimer, and there we adopted a contract formation analysis to decide if a 
contract had been formed by mutual assent.  
Id. at 946-47.  Of 
concern here is whether Hoff could reasonably believe that the Health Department 
intended to make it legally bound to the provisions in the manual.  Bouwens stated that the easiest 
way for a party to make clear an intention not to be legally bound is to say 
so.  Id. at 947.  The Health Department made clear its 
intention not to be legally bound by stating in a separately acknowledged 
disclaimer that the personnel rules and regulations were not a 
contract.

 

 

 

[¶18]       
Generally 
in Wyoming, in the context of private employment termination litigation, only 
contract remedies are available to provide relief for wrongful employment 
terminations, and tort remedies are rarely available.  For an at-will employee, a breach of 
contract action is not available, and the only tort actions available to date 
are breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which was 
recognized in Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221; intentional infliction of 
emotional distress recognized in Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065-66 (Wyo. 1986); and, as recognized in Griess v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 754 (Wyo. 1989), and Allen v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985), retaliatory termination which 
violates the State's public policy when no other remedy is available.  Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky 
Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo. 1997).  

 

[¶19]       
Hoff, a 
public employee, seeks trial on the torts of retaliatory termination and breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The Health Department, a governmental 
entity, seeks affirmance of summary judgment either on grounds of immunity under 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act or on the merits of the claims.  In reply, Hoff asserts that immunity was 
not a bar to a remand for trial on this tort issue in Jewell v. North Big 
Horn Hosp. Dist., 953 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Wyo. 1998).

  

[¶20]       
Jewell 
reversed summary judgment in favor of the employer hospital district and 
permitted a hospital employee to proceed to trial to determine whether her 
employment contract was at-will and whether her employer was liable for the tort 
of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Although Jewell's hospital employer was 
a governmental agency generally entitled to tort immunity unless specifically 
excepted under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the parties did not raise 
the immunity issue on this particular claim, and this Court did not address 
it.  Pickle v. Board of County 
Comm'rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 264 (Wyo. 1988) (immunity under 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is an affirmative defense and not 
jurisdictional, and must be raised by answer or it is waived.).  Similarly, in Anderson v. South 
Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist., 972 P.2d 136 (Wyo. 1999), and Dubrowski 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n 1 P.3d 631 (Wyo. 2000), we resolved 
the issue on the merits without addressing the issue of immunity.  Although the Health Department did not 
assert immunity as an affirmative defense in either its answer to Hoff's 
complaint or its summary judgment motion, it apparently was raised at some point 
because the issue was addressed in the district court's decision letter. 
Pickle, 764 P.2d  at 264 (finding no prejudice in raising the affirmative 
defense by summary judgment). We now address the immunity 
issue.

 

[¶21]       
Hoff 
asserts that the district court erred on two fronts in granting summary judgment 
on his two tort claims.  On the 
first front, he contends that the district court erred in its conclusion of law 
that sovereign immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act bars the 
claims.  On the second front, he 
contends the district court erred when it ruled that, even if immunity does not 
bar the claims, no genuine issues of material fact exist about the factual basis 
for his termination.  If we affirm 
the district court on the first front, we need not address the 
second.

 

[¶22]       
We have 
carefully considered the district court's straightforward analysis of and the 
parties' thoughtful presentations on the sovereign immunity question.  For the reasons that follow, we hold 
that Hoff's tort claims are barred by the pertinent provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 through 121 (LexisNexis 
2001).  We note first that which 
Hoff does not contend.  He does not 
contend that the Health Department is not a governmental entity covered by the 
Act; a provision of the Act expressly waives immunity for the subject torts; or 
the Act is infirm.  Instead, he asks 
this Court to create judicially an exception to the legislature's declaration 
that "[a] governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the 
scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any 
tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 . . . 
."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).

 

[¶23]       
Hoff 
relies on Leonard v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 
(Wyo. 1990), but that case is of no help.  
As we understand that case, Leonard performed counseling duties as an 
initial contract teacher, as that position is defined by state law.  When the school board did not offer her 
a contract as a continuing contract teacher, as that position is defined by 
state law, she filed an action against the school district, a governmental 
entity, in which she sought reinstatement, money damages, and attorney's fees 
based upon several different legal theories, including the tort theories of 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of 
public policy.  On appeal from a 
summary judgment against her on all legal theories, she asked this Court to 
adopt and apply the two tort theories to her situation.  In that regard, she maintained that the 
school district's decision not to offer her a contract as a continuing contract 
teacher was based upon her devoting substantial amounts of time reporting 
suspected child abuse and neglect incidents and cooperating with law enforcement 
authorities and child protection agencies in such matters.  Id. at 1123.  This Court rejected Leonard's invitation 
to adopt and apply these two tort theories in the initial contract teacher 
context.  Id. at 1122.  This Court 
reasoned:

 

The 
adoption of these theories would alter the tenure status of initial contract 
teachers defined in Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-109 (1977) . . . .  The power to modify that status belongs 
to the legislature.

 

Id.  

 

[¶24]       
Leonard 
had also sought relief under federal law, namely, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), 
alleging that her termination was based upon the constitutionally impermissible 
grounds of her marital status, her residency, her personal life, and her 
reporting of incest cases to government agencies.  Id. at 1123.  This Court upheld summary judgment on 
the § 1983 theory because Leonard's summary judgment materials were "merely 
speculative and conclusory."  
Id.

 

[¶25]       
Neither 
Leonard nor the school district raised governmental immunity, and this Court did 
not discuss it.  More importantly, 
nothing this Court said in Leonard suggests, let alone stands for the 
proposition, that a governmental entity's termination of a public employee in 
breach of the implied good faith covenant or public policy implicates that 
employee's constitutional rights.  
Hoff's contention to the contrary is not 
well-founded.

 

[¶26]       
Hoff 
also seeks support for his position in VanLente v. University of Wyoming 
Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1999), but it, too, is of no help.  Although the employer's name suggests 
otherwise, VanLente's employer was a private, not governmental, entity; and 
VanLente was a private employee.  An 
at-will employee, VanLente was terminated from his employment when his employer 
implemented a reduction-in-force because of budgetary constraints.  Id. at 596.  After VanLente's efforts at recourse 
failed before a federal agency and a federal court, he sought relief in state 
court, asserting both tort and contract claims for breach of the implied good 
faith covenant.  Id. at 
596-97.  The district court granted 
the employer's motion for summary judgment, and this Court affirmed.  Id. at 598-99.  Importantly for our purposes here, 
VanLente "specifically disavowed" a public policy tort claim.  Id. at 597.  Obviously, VanLente is 
inapposite.

 

[¶27]       
The Claims Act 
creates statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) provides:

 

(a) A 
governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of 
duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by 
W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 
1-39-121

 

Under the Act, the Health Department 
is a governmental entity.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103 (LexisNexis 2001).   Accordingly, sovereign immunity 
bars recovery unless the tort is one of those enumerated exceptions in the Act 
or the board members acted outside the scope of their duties.  Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Washakie County, 
860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993).  A tort claim not specifically authorized 
under the Act is barred.  Id. (citing Worden v. Village 
Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo. 1991)).  The 
enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity permit actions premised on negligent 
operation of certain governmental vehicles, § 1-39-105; negligent operation 
or maintenance of certain governmental facilities, § 1-39-106; negligent 
operation of airports, § 1-39-107; negligent operation of public utilities and 
services, § 1-39-108; negligent operation of public hospitals, § 1-39-109; 
negligent performance of health care providers employed by governmental 
entities, § 1-39-110; and tortious acts of peace officers, § 
1-39-112.

 

[¶28]       
The 
torts of retaliatory termination in violation of public policy and breach of the 
implied good faith covenant are not specifically enumerated in the Act.  Insofar as Hoff has alleged that the 
Health Department terminated his employment in violation of public policy, it is 
arguable whether he has alleged that the Board members were acting beyond the 
scope of their duties; however, he does not argue the point.  Because he has limited his argument to 
whether torts arising from a public employment relationship are barred under the 
Act, we too limit our review to that point.

 

[¶29]       
Of 
relevance is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-119 (LexisNexis 2001), which 
states:

 

The 
provisions of this act shall not affect any provision of law, regulation or 
agreement governing employer-employee relationships.

 

We have 
previously interpreted this language and held that it "does not serve to except 
claims which have their genesis in tort even though they arise out of an 
employment relationship.  Instead 
this section indicates that the provisions of the statute are supplementary to 
others that may be provided by law, regulation or other agreement relating to 
employer-employee relationships.  If 
the tort action is brought, and it does arise out of the employment 
relationship, we conclude that the claims procedure of this statute must be 
followed." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 
414-15 (Wyo. 1983).   We 
extended Bell's holding to contract claims in Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1996).   

 

[¶30]       
Hoff 
contends that certain language in § 1-39-104(a), following the declaration of 
immunity from liability for any tort except those expressly enumerated in 
sections 105 through 112, is sufficiently broad that it can be interpreted to 
waive immunity for purposes of the implied covenant tort arising from an 
employment relationship to which a governmental entity is a party.  In pertinent part that statutory 
language reads "[a]ny immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a 
governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract . . 
. ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Conceding that 
the implied covenant action is treated as a tort action in Wyoming, Hoff 
observes it is based on an employment contract.  Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 220-21.  The Health Department counters that Hoff 
provides no support for his conclusion that this statutory language does not bar 
the implied covenant tort action.  
Inexplicably, neither party invokes this Court's well-known and 
frequently applied rules of statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Jones v. State of Wyoming 
Dep't of Health, 2001 WY 28, ¶¶12-15, 18 P.3d 1189, ¶¶12-15 (Wyo. 
2001).  Be that as it may, this 
Court is not persuaded by Hoff's abbreviated and perfunctory argument.  For one thing, the subject language 
relied on by Hoff was added in 1980.  
1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 46, § 1.  
At that time, this Court had not recognized the implied covenant tort; 
indeed, it did not until 1994 in Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 220.  This Court presumes "that the 
legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with 
reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.  Such legislation should, therefore, be 
construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing 
law."  Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wyo. 1984).  
Because the implied covenant tort did not exist in Wyoming in 1980, and 
the legislature is presumed to have known that, we can only conclude that when 
the legislature added the subject language in 1980, it did not have in mind the 
implied covenant tort as an action "based on a contract."  For another thing, the legislature has 
used plain language in subsection 104(a) to deal with tort actions in the first 
sentence and contract actions in the next.  
Those are commonly understood terms, each having distinct elements and 
remedies.  Although the employment 
relationship is based on contract and provides the setting within which the 
parties interact with each other, it is that interaction which truly forms the 
basis of the tort claim on which the employee seeks a remedy.  It is more accurate to say that the tort 
claim arises from the employment contract setting, but it is based on alleged 
tortious conduct, not on the contract.

 

[¶31]       
We also 
note one more consideration.  At the 
time the legislature enacted the Act in 1979, neither of the subject torts had 
been recognized in the private employment relationship context.  Allen in 1985 and Griess 
in 1989 recognized the public policy tort in limited circumstances.   Wilder in 1994 recognized the implied 
covenant tort if certain requirements were satisfied.  The legislature has not moved to add 
these torts to the list of statutorily enumerated exceptions to immunity.  It is not as if the legislature is 
unaware of these kinds of employment-related tort claims.  Although neither the district court nor 
the parties directed our attention to it, from our own research we know that the 
legislature has enacted the State Government Fraud Reduction Act, effective July 
1, 1996, but not after July 1, 2002.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-11-101 through 104 (LexisNexis 2001).  This Act expressly authorizes a state 
employee, as defined in the Act, to bring a civil action and pursue a limited 
recovery if he or she has been discharged, disciplined, or retaliated against by 
a state employer, as defined in the Act, because of (1) reporting fraud, waste, 
or gross management in a state government office; (2) reporting a violation of a 
state or federal law, regulation, code, or rule; (3) reporting a condition or 
practice that would put at risk the health or safety of any individual; (4) 
participating in any investigation, hearing, or inquiry concerning an issue 
under this Act; (5) refusing to carry out a directive beyond the terms and scope 
of his or her employment which would expose any individual to a condition likely 
to cause serious injury or death, after being unsuccessful in obtaining the 
employer's correction of the dangerous condition.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-11-101 through 104 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Given the 
statutory definitions of "employee," "State," and "political subdivision" 
contained in the Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-11-102(a)(i), (ii), and (iii), this 
Act does not apply to Hoff and the Health Department.  But the important point is, the 
legislature could have made it applicable to them, but chose not 
to.

 

[¶32]       
Because 
these issues relate directly to matters concerning governmental liability and 
governmental employees as to which the legislature has been particularly active, 
we must leave the debate about and resolution of the difficult policy issues to 
the democratic process which is the domain of the people and their 
representatives in the legislative department.2  The contract exclusion language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) is inapplicable as it applies only to a governmental 
entity's contractual agreement to pay and not to a tort action.  Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-119 
does not enumerate these two subject torts and cannot serve as an exception to 
immunity.  The legislature has 
clearly stated in plain language in the Act the public policy that a covered 
governmental entity is liable for only those torts expressly recognized in that 
Act.  Any invitation to add a 
particular tort to the statutory list must be addressed to that body.  

 

[¶33]       
The 
district court's summary judgment order is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Subject to several qualifications, 
Mariano ruled that public policy required establishing the rule 
that:

 

[A]ny contract with a unit of 
government of the state of Wyoming which extends beyond the term of office of 
the governmental decisionmakers, e.g. generally the first Monday of January of 
odd numbered years, can be subject to challenge if, in consideration of the 
facts and circumstances, the necessity and benefit to the governmental unit did 
not justify the extended term when the agreement was made. In reasoning, we 
generally follow the principal case, Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 
214 N.C. 518, 199 S.E. 712 (1938), involving a contract to remove sludge where 
the court stated:

            
"It is not to be supposed that because the general subject may belong to 
the field of governmental powers no detail of administration may be carried out 
by contract, or that such contract must be completed within the term of the 
contracting council.  The true test 
is whether the contract itself deprives a governing body, or its successor, of a 
discretion which public policy demands should be left unimpaired.  It is obvious that a too rigid adherence 
to the principle would leave the town council nursing a mere theory,--in the 
possession of an important governmental power without practical means for its 
exercise, and unable to take any important public work, since no concern would 
equip itself and undertake the project when the incoming administration, the 
product perhaps of political accident, might repudiate the contract at will 
during its performance."  Id. 
at 714.    

 

2Courts in other jurisdictions have also 
exercised restraint in this area of the law.  See, e.g., Koch v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm'rs of Costilla Cty., Colorado, 774 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Colo. 1991); 
Faust v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep't of Revenue, 592 A.2d 835 
(Pa. Commw. 1991), allocatur denied, 607 A.2d 257 (Pa. 1992); Burgess 
v. Lewis & Clark City-County Bd. of Health, 796 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 
1990).