Title: CLS v. CLJ, JME, AND CJE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CLS v. CLJ, JME, AND CJE1985 WY 6693 P.2d 774Case Number: C-84-1Decided: 01/18/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
CLS, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

CLJ, JME, AND CJE, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Rodney P. Lang 
of Gardzelewski & Lang, Laramie, for appellant.

James W. Gusea 
of Vines, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from an 
Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of a second action to establish the existence 
of a father-child relationship between appellant and CJE and to rebut the 
presumed paternity of JME. We affirm.

[¶2.]     CJE was born in October 
1980 during the marriage of CLJ and JME. In April 1981, appellant filed suit to 
establish his paternity with CJE and rebut the presumed paternity of JME. A 
trial was set for December 9, 1981. On January 13, 1982, appellant's suit was 
dismissed with prejudice because of his failure to appear at the trial. 
Thereafter appellant petitioned the court for an order to vacate the judgment of 
dismissal. The petition was denied on March 8, 1983. Appellant then filed a 
second suit on October 13, 1983, again seeking to establish his paternity of 
CJE. This suit was dismissed because it involved issues already adjudicated and 
because appellant lacked standing.

[¶3.]     The only question we 
need address is whether res judicata operates to prevent appellant from further 
litigating the issue of paternity.

[¶4.]     Res judicata is a facet 
of the Anglo-American system of unified adjudication.

"A court does not face a 
legal problem as a new, pristine blackboard `never writ upon.' Decisions are 
mirrors of past decisions and in turn are reflected in the decisions of the 
future. The continuum can no more be broken than can reflecting mirrors be 
interrupted." A. Vestal, Res 
Judicata/Preclusion at V-3 (1969).

The doctrine of 
res judicata is that a judgment, decided upon the merits by a court with 
jurisdiction, is conclusive of that cause of action and facts or issues 
litigated, both to the parties and their privies in any other action in the same 
or different court of concurrent jurisdiction on the same issues. 46 Am.Jur.2d 
Judgments § 394.

"Res judicata is the term 
applied to the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and 
their privies; and, as to them, it constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent 
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action." Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, 
Wyo., 652 P.2d 395, 398 
(1982).

Res judicata is 
a rule of universal law which pervades every well-regulated system of 
jurisprudence. Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 
406 P.2d 283 (1965). A final, valid determination on the merits of a case is 
conclusive on the parties and those matters adjudicated. Roush v. 
Roush, Wyo., 
589 P.2d 841 (1979).

[¶5.]     In cases involving 
identical parties, capacity of parties, cause of actions, and subject matter, a 
decision in the first case bars relief in the second case. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic 
Co., 98 N.M. 633, 651 P.2d 1277 (1982). The 
criteria involved in res judicata are: (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in 
subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; 
(4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the subject 
matter and the issues between them. Fox 
v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., Mont., 645 P.2d 929 (1982). See, Kumberg v. Kumberg, 232 Kan. 692, 659 P.2d 823 
(1983). A policy reason for res judicata is that each litigant shall be limited 
to one opportunity to try his case on the merits. Santos v. State, Dept. of Transp., Kauai Division, 64 Haw. 648, 646 P.2d 962 
(1982).

"The principle of res 
judicata fosters reliance on judicial action, and tends to eliminate vexation 
and expense to the parties, wasted use of judicial machinery and the possibility 
of inconsistent results." Developments in the Law, Res Judicata, 65 Harvard 
L.Rev. 820 (1952). See also, Delgue v. 
Curutchet, Wyo., 677 P.2d 208 
(1984).

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
the doctrine of res judicata does not apply because the facts, parties, claims, 
and issues in the two actions are different because of the divorce of CLJ and 
JME. According to the pleadings in his first complaint, appellant sought to 
establish his paternity by overcoming the statutory presumption provided under § 
14-2-102(a)(i), W.S. 1977, which states:

"(a) A man is presumed to 
be the natural father of a child if:

"(i) He and the child's 
natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born 
during the marriage, or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is 
terminated by death, annulment or divorce or after a decree of separation is 
entered by a court * * *."

Appellant 
contends that the complaint in the second suit raises different issues because 
he added to his pleading § 14-2-102(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"(a) A man is presumed to 
be the natural father of a child if:

"(iv) While the child is 
under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child."

[¶7.]     It is questionable 
whether § 14-2-102(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, supra, applies to the facts of this case. 
However, if it is applicable, it could have been raised in the first suit filed 
by appellant for at that time appellee JME had received the minor child CJE into 
his home and openly held out CJE as his natural child. A party cannot relitigate 
issues which could have been presented in the previous suit. Davis v. Davis, 56 Wyo. 524, 111 P.2d 124, 
138 A.L.R. 336 (1941). The second suit is identical in substance and in form to 
the first action. The expectations of appellant are the same, i.e., to establish 
his own paternity and to rebut the presumed paternity of appellee. The 
underlying facts are the same; the basis of the suit is the same. The fact that 
the defendants are now divorced does not alter the identity of the parties nor 
does it provide a basis for a different claim.

[¶8.]     Appellant also contends 
that res judicata should not apply because the first case was not decided on the 
merits. Rule 6, Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, 
states:

"Failure to appear at the 
time any trial or hearing is set will be grounds for dismissal or other 
appropriate action."

Rule 41(b), 
W.R.C.P., states in pertinent part:

"(1) By Defendant. - For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order 
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. * * * Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for 
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper 
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits." (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     It is true that the 
first suit filed by appellant did not result in a trial on the merits, yet res 
judicata applies since appellant was afforded the opportunity for a trial on the 
merits and his day in court. In Jefferson 
v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, Alaska, 451 P.2d 730 (1969), the court, 
after noting appellant's claim that the dismissal without an actual trial on the 
merits of the issues raised deprived him of his day in court and penalized him 
for the misconduct of his counsel, stated:

"`The effect of his 
argument is that he has been deprived of his right to a hearing, because he was 
not granted permission to present his case at a later day than that set for 
hearing. However, the right to a day in court means not the actual presentation 
of the case, but the right to be duly cited to appear and to be afforded an 
opportunity to be heard. Galpin v. 
Page, 18 Wall. 350, 360, 21 L. Ed. 959. Appellants' contention that no 
judgment was rendered on the merits also is not tenable. A judgment on the 
merits does not require a determination of the controversy after a trial or 
hearing on controverted facts. It is sufficient if the record shows that the 
parties might have had their controversies determined according to their 
respective rights if they had presented all their evidence and the court had 
applied the law. Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. II §§ 723-725. Such an 
opportunity was afforded the appellant who did not avail himself of the right.'" 
451 P.2d  at 732 (quoting Olsen v. 
Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 117 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 
1941)).

An involuntary 
dismissal under Rule 41(b), operates as an adjudication on the merits. Phillips v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 596, 601 P.2d 596 (1979); Hook v. Horner, 95 Idaho 657, 517 P.2d 554 
(1973). Most of the cases which appellant cites as authority for the proposition 
that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction are not applicable. Those 
cases involve appeals from the original dismissal and not appeals from an order 
dismissing a second case seeking to present the same facts and issues raised in 
a prior case.

[¶10.]  A dismissal with prejudice is a final 
order and, therefore, subject to appeal in a timely manner. Bush v. U.S. Postal 
Service, 496 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1974). See Davis v. Operation Amigo, Inc., 378 F.2d 101 
(10th Cir. 1967). A timely appeal was not filed from the dismissal with 
prejudice of the first case, nor was the denial of the petition to vacate 
judgment appealed. The order of dismissal became final. The decision in the 
first suit, therefore, was as an adjudication on the merits and as such is res 
judicata as to all issues raised or that could have been raised. The effect is 
to bar the appellant's second suit seeking a determination of the same question 
presented in his first suit.

[¶11.]  The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.