Title: Ohio Manufacturers' Ass’n v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio 
Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5377.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5377 
OHIO MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. OHIOANS FOR DRUG PRICE 
RELIEF ACT ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ohio Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief 
Act, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5377.] 
Elections—Initiative-proposal petition—Challenge under Article II, Section 1g, 
Ohio 
Constitution—Part-petition 
signature 
deletions—Part-petition 
circulator addresses—Part-petition signature overcounting—Challenge 
sustained in part. 
(No. 2016-0313—Submitted August 8, 2016—Decided August 15, 2016.) 
CHALLENGE under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action pursuant to Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio 
Constitution, challenging the petition signatures submitted in support of the “Ohio 
Drug Price Relief Act” by respondents Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, William 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
S. Booth, Daniel L. Darland, Tracy L. Jones, and Latonya D. Thurman 
(collectively, “the committee”).  The challengers are the Ohio Manufacturers’ 
Association, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America, Keith A. Lake, and Ryan R. Augsburger (collectively, 
“OMA”). 
{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth below, we sustain the challenge in part.  We 
hold that 10,303 signatures, including the signatures on all part-petitions circulated 
by Roy Jackson and Kacey Veliquette, were erroneously validated. 
Background 
{¶ 3} On December 22, 2015, the committee submitted approximately 
10,029 part-petitions, purportedly containing 171,205 signatures, to the office of 
Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted in support of an initiative to enact “The Ohio 
Drug Price Relief Act” as Section 194.01 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Husted 
transmitted the part-petitions to the county boards of elections for verification of 
the signatures pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(K).  He also sent Directive 2015-40, dated 
December 23, 2015, which instructed the county boards how to review, examine, 
and verify the petition signatures.  In the directive, Husted ordered the county 
boards to return their certification forms to his office no later than 12:00 p.m. on 
December 30, 2015. 
{¶ 4} To qualify an initiative for the ballot, supporters must submit petitions 
that satisfy two criteria.  First, the petitions must contain a number of valid 
signatures that is equal to at least 3 percent of the total number of electors.  Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1b.  Evidence in the record establishes that at 
present, the minimum number of valid signatures is 91,677.  Second, the petition 
must contain valid signatures equal to at least one-half of the 3-percent threshold 
number (that is, 1.5 percent of the total number of electors) from at least 44 of 
Ohio’s 88 counties.  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1g.  As of the December 
30, 2015 deadline, the county boards had reported a sufficient total number of valid 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
signatures and a sufficient number of valid signatures in enough counties to meet 
both constitutional requirements. 
{¶ 5} Upon verifying a sufficient number of signatures, the secretary of 
state is required to transmit the proposed statute and initiative petitions to the 
General Assembly, as soon as it convenes, for consideration.  Ohio Constitution, 
Article II, Section 1b.  The first day of the General Assembly’s 2016 session 
occurred on Monday, January 5.  But despite having received sufficient 
verifications, Husted did not transmit the petitions to the legislature at the start of 
the session. 
{¶ 6} Instead, on January 4, 2016, he issued Directive 2016-01, returning 
the part-petitions to the county boards with instructions to re-review two aspects of 
them.  First, the directive ordered the boards to determine whether petition 
signatures were improperly removed (i.e., crossed out) by unauthorized persons.  
And second, the directive ordered the boards to investigate whether circulator 
statements were invalid due to systematic signature overreporting (i.e., preaffixing 
the number of signatures purportedly witnessed by the petition circulators to part-
petitions containing fewer actual signatures).  Husted ordered the boards to 
complete this review and recertify their results by January 29, 2016. 
{¶ 7} On February 4, 2016, Husted advised the committee that the petition 
contained 96,936 valid signatures, more than the 91,677 required.  He also advised 
the committee that signatures from 47 counties met the constitutional threshold 
(more than the required 44) and that the constitutional requirements were “fully 
satisfied.”  He transmitted the initiative and petition to the General Assembly. 
 
 
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Procedural History 
{¶ 8} On February 29, 2016, OMA commenced this original protest action.  
The protest complaint identified three defects1 in the part-petitions which, OMA 
alleged, should cause them to be discounted in their entirety: 
1. 
Contractors crossed out signatures on part-petitions, in 
violation of R.C. 3519.06(C). 
2. 
Some petition circulators listed nonresidential addresses as 
their 
permanent 
addresses, 
in 
violation 
of 
R.C. 
3501.38(E)(1). 
3. 
More than 1,400 part-petitions contain false circulator 
statements because they contain fewer signatures than the 
circulator attested to witnessing, in violation of R.C. 
3501.38(E) and 3519.06(D). 
OMA requested an “order and/or judgment declaring” the part-petitions and 
signatures thereon invalid, and an “order and/or judgment” that the petition failed 
to meet the requirements of Article II, Section 1b. 
{¶ 9} We issued an opinion denying the committee’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-3038, ___ N.E.3d ___, and on 
June 1, 2016, OMA made an equivocal request for an evidentiary hearing, stating 
that the challengers “will not know for certain whether they need an evidentiary 
hearing until outstanding discovery is completed.”  OMA never renewed this 
request, and on August 15, 2016, withdrew the request. 
{¶ 10} On May 13, 2016, OMA filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment.  We deny that motion as moot.  The parties have submitted merit briefs 
and evidence, and the case is ripe for adjudication on the merits. 
                                                 
1 OMA also alleged that five circulators of part-petitions were felons and were therefore incompetent 
to circulate or witness the signing of petitions under R.C. 2961.01(B).  OMA has indicated that it is 
no longer pursuing that allegation. 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
Analysis of the Alleged Petition Defects 
First Allegation: Signature Deletions 
{¶ 11} Ashland County part-petition no. 000007 is a typical example of a 
signature deletion.  The statement of circulator Larry Boyce indicates that he 
witnessed 28 signatures.  And indeed, Ashland County part-petition no. 000007 has 
a signature on each of its 28 lines.  However, one signature, on line 2, has been 
blacked out with a marker.  In its review, the board of elections determined that two 
signatures—those on lines 4 and 21—were invalid.  The board therefore certified 
25 valid signatures.  The principal claim in this protest is that Ashland County part-
petition no. 00007, and thousands of similar part-petitions, should be invalidated in 
their entirety, based on the theory that someone other than the circulator or signer 
blacked out at least one signature. 
{¶ 12} We reject this aspect of the challenge. 
{¶ 13} The Revised Code affirmatively permits three persons to delete a 
signature from a petition, so long as the deletion occurs before the petition is filed: 
(1) the circulator, (2) the signer, or (3) the “attorney in fact” for any signer.  R.C. 
3501.38(G) and (H).  OMA contends that the blacking out of signatures on Ashland 
County part-petition no. 00007 and other part-petitions was done by unauthorized 
persons and that this defect renders all of those part-petitions invalid. 
{¶ 14} OMA’s merit brief relies primarily on the testimony of Pamela 
Lauter, who coordinated some of the petition circulators.  Lauter described a 
process that she called “purging the deck,” which involved persons other than the 
circulators reviewing the part-petitions after the circulators had turned them in and 
removing invalid signatures by highlighting them with a black, washable magic 
marker, not crossing them out.  But she insisted that the signatures remained visible 
after the highlighting and denied ever using a black “Sharpie” marker that would 
have made the signatures unreadable.  Unfortunately, the specific “highlighted” 
part-petitions she discussed were not identified for the record. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 15} Other evidence confirms that the circulators were not responsible for 
the deletions of this type.  Four petition circulators, Vikki Moore, Marquita 
Barnhouse, Gloria Torrence, and Rebecca Douglas, denied crossing names off the 
part-petitions they circulated.  And Angelo Paparella, president and owner of PCI 
Consultants, Inc., the head contractor for the petition drive, testified that PCI 
operates an out-of-state processing center at which validators review the part-
petitions and strike out invalid signatures before returning the part-petitions to the 
client. 
{¶ 16} The evidence therefore shows that signature deletions occurred that 
were not authorized by R.C. 3501.38(G) and (H).  But OMA is mistaken in its belief 
that the remedy for such a violation is to invalidate the entire part-petition. 
{¶ 17} The limited grant of authority to remove a signature serves two 
purposes: it protects the ability of petition signers to change their minds and remove 
their signatures, so long as they do so in a timely manner.  And it protects circulators 
from the potential Hobson’s choice that would arise if they discover that a petition 
signature is invalid: either (1) submit a false R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) circulator 
statement attesting that all the petition signatures are, to the best of the circulator’s 
knowledge and belief, valid or (2) forego the entire part-petition with all its valid 
signatures.  R.C. 3501.38(G) permits the circulator to avoid this dilemma by 
striking the invalid signature and adjusting the signature count accordingly.  See 
Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 139, 2005-Ohio-5795, 841 
N.E.2d 766, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 18} By implication, R.C. 3501.38(G) and (H) give notice that only 
circulators, signers, and authorized representative may strike signatures.  This tacit 
limitation guards an even more fundamental interest: it protects electors who sign 
petitions from having their signatures surreptitiously deleted, as Husted 
acknowledged in Directive 2016-01 when he ordered the boards to investigate the 
deletions: 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
 
Most importantly, [these statutes] serve to protect the registered 
Ohio voters exercising their right under the state constitution to 
petition state government (in this case, to propose a state law for 
consideration by the General Assembly) from having their signature 
improperly removed from a part-petition. 
 
To return to the example of Ashland County part-petition no. 00007, the logical 
remedy for an unauthorized deletion would be to count the crossed-out signature 
(assuming it is otherwise valid), not to invalidate the 25 indisputably valid 
signatures from eligible voters.  Adopting OMA’s position would have the perverse 
effect of rewarding a petition opponent when a part-petition has been unlawfully 
altered. 
{¶ 19} Petition proponents, who want to submit as many valid signatures as 
possible, have no incentive to delete signatures improperly.  Certainly OMA has 
identified no theory as to how petition advocates would benefit from making 
unauthorized cross-outs or how such a practice jeopardizes the interests discussed 
above.  According to Lauter, circulation coordinators highlighted signatures for 
“payroll purposes,” that is, to avoid paying circulators for invalid signatures on the 
front end, rather than having to “charge-back” the expense.  Indeed, the Butler 
County Board of Elections reported after the re-review that 79.59 percent of the 
marked-out signatures were facially invalid and would have been declared invalid 
by the board if they had not already been stricken. 
{¶ 20} Invalidating the entire part-petition because of an unauthorized 
deletion would serve no public interest and would turn the implicit protection 
afforded by R.C. 3501.38(G) and (H) on its head.  For this reason, we also reject 
OMA’s claim that the part-petitions should be invalidated under R.C. 
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8
3501.39(A)(3) on the grounds that they violate the requirements of R.C. Chapter 
3501. 
{¶ 21} R.C. 3501.38(G) and (H) do not expressly state that a part-petition 
containing an unauthorized deletion is invalid.  So for legal authority, OMA turns 
to R.C. 3519.06, which provides: 
 
No initiative or referendum part-petition is properly verified 
if it appears on the face thereof, or is made to appear by satisfactory 
evidence: 
(A) 
That the statement required by section 3519.05 of the 
Revised Code is not properly filled out; 
(B) 
That the statement is not properly signed; 
(C) 
That 
the 
statement 
is 
altered 
by 
erasure, 
interlineation, or otherwise; 
(D) 
That the statement is false in any respect; 
(E) 
That any one person has affixed more than one 
signature thereto. 
 
OMA asserts that the deletion of signatures violated R.C. 3519.06(C), rendering 
any part-petition containing deleted signatures invalid in toto. 
{¶ 22} The flaw in this argument is that the phrase “the statement,” as used 
throughout the election code, is a term of art: it refers specifically to the circulator’s 
attestation as to the number and validity of signatures on the part-petition.  And the 
signature pages are not part of the attestation statement. 
{¶ 23} The term “statement” first appears in Article II, Section 1g of the 
Ohio Constitution, which mandates that “[t]o each part of such petition shall be 
attached the statement of the circulator, as may be required by law, that he 
witnessed the affixing of every signature.”  It also appears in R.C. 3501.38(E)(1): 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
“On each petition paper, the circulator * * * shall sign a statement,” under penalty 
of election falsification, that (1) the circulator witnessed the affixing of every 
signature, (2) all signers were to the best of the circulator’s knowledge and belief 
qualified to sign, and (3) every signature is to the best of the circulator’s knowledge 
and belief the signature of the person whose signature it purports to be or of the 
person’s attorney in fact.  R.C. 3519.06(C), which prohibits alterations to “the 
statement,” plainly does not apply to the signature pages because those pages are 
not part of the circulator statement described in Article II, Section 1g and R.C. 
3501.38(E)(1). 
{¶ 24} OMA would have us hold that R.C. 3519.06(C) prohibits alterations 
to any portion of the petition, not just the circulator’s statement.  OMA’s argument 
is as follows: R.C. 3519.06(A) provides that a petition is invalid if “the statement 
required by section 3519.05 of the Revised Code is not properly filled out”; R.C. 
3519.05 offers model language for a complete part-petition, including the signature 
pages as well as the circulator’s statement; and by using the phrase “the statement 
required by section 3519.05 of the Revised Code,” the General Assembly meant to 
prohibit alterations to any portion of the part-petition. 
{¶ 25} But OMA’s statutory construction would create redundancies and 
contradictions in the Revised Code.  If R.C. 3519.06(A) means that a part-petition 
is invalid if any portion of the petition is improperly filled out, then R.C. 
3519.06(E), making a petition invalid if it contains two signatures from the same 
person, is redundant.  And if R.C. 3519.06(C) imposes a blanket prohibition on 
alterations to the signature pages, then it conflicts with R.C. 3501.38(G) and (H), 
discussed above, which expressly authorize alterations to the signature pages. 
{¶ 26} It is generally our obligation to defer to the secretary of state’s 
reasonable interpretation of an election statute.  State ex rel. Cornerstone 
Developers, Ltd. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections, 145 Ohio St.3d 290, 2016-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
313, 49 N.E.3d 273, ¶ 16.  However, Husted has vacillated on his interpretation of 
this statute. 
{¶ 27} When first confronted with the deletions, he did not invalidate the 
part-petitions, even though under OMA’s theory, they were defective on their faces.  
Consider, for example, Madison County part-petition no. 000024.  The circulator 
attested to witnessing four signatures, and indeed lines one through four contain 
signatures.  But someone ran a black line through the signatures on lines one and 
three, and the board of elections validated the other two signatures.  So either 
someone other than the circulator struck two signatures or the circulator crossed 
them out and then misreported the number of signatures in his statement.  Either 
way, if Husted had agreed with OMA’s legal position, then he should have declared 
part-petitions of this type to be invalid.  But he did not do so. 
{¶ 28} Instead, he ordered the boards to conduct their re-review, but, of 
critical importance, he did not instruct the boards to disqualify petitions containing 
unauthorized deletions.  In fact, he gave no clear guidance on that point.  The 
guidance that he did provide, in Directive 2016-01, quoted above, strongly 
suggested that unauthorized deletions pose a problem because they potentially 
remove valid signatures that should be counted—not because they invalidate the 
entire part-petitions that contain them. 
{¶ 29} But then, at the conclusion of the re-review, Husted appears to have 
changed his position.  He took the extraordinary step, based on Lauter’s testimony 
about “purging the deck,” of unilaterally invalidating every part-petition circulated 
in Cuyahoga County by DRW Campaigns, L.L.C., and Ohio Petitioning Partners, 
L.L.C.  And he explained his decision by using the legal reasoning urged by OMA.  
He also endorsed OMA’s statutory construction in his memorandum in response to 
the committee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Given this history, we hold 
that the secretary of state has not announced a definitive statutory interpretation that 
warrants our deference. 
January Term, 2016 
 
11 
{¶ 30} In addition, this aspect of OMA’s challenge fails for lack of 
evidence.  OMA’s complaint asserts that there are signature strike-throughs on 
approximately 5,598 part-petitions.  The strike-through problem regarding 4,579 of 
those part-petitions allegedly invalidates 63,759 signatures, according to a 
spreadsheet prepared by a litigation-support manager of the law firm representing 
OMA.  But OMA has not submitted evidence regarding who deleted those 
signatures.  This evidence would not be difficult to compile: if the number of 
signatures reported by the circulator in the statement includes the lines blacked out, 
then the logical inference is that someone else deleted the signatures after the part-
petition left the circulator’s hands.  But OMA has not done such an analysis.  
Rather, it merely asks the court to create a conclusive presumption of invalidity, 
one that would discard tens of thousands of valid signatures affixed by Ohio voters.  
We decline to do so. 
{¶ 31} This decision is consistent with Husted’s own actions at the end of 
the re-review.  He invalidated signatures only from Cuyahoga County because he 
concluded that he “lack[ed] sufficient evidence to invalidate part-petitions beyond 
those in Cuyahoga County where the testimony was actually presented.”  The 
evidence in the record before us is no stronger than the evidence available to the 
secretary of state, at least with respect to signatures collected in Franklin County, 
Hamilton County, and throughout the state.  For example, when Paparella, the head 
contractor for the petition drive, was shown copies of sample part-petitions during 
his deposition, he was unable to tell just from the ink used whether the strike-outs 
were done by employees at the processing center or were done by the circulators in 
the field or by field managers. 
{¶ 32} We reject OMA’s first signature challenge. 
Second Allegation: False Circulator Addresses 
{¶ 33} OMA also challenges the number of valid signatures on the ground 
that four circulators allegedly submitted false information in their circulator 
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statements.  R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) requires petition circulators to execute a statement 
on each part-petition containing, among other information, “the circulator’s name, 
the address of the circulator’s permanent residence, and the name and address of 
the person employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  According to OMA, circulators Fifi Harper, Kelvin Moore, Roy Jackson, 
and Kacey Veliquette violated this provision by providing addresses that were not 
“permanent residences,” and as a result, the part-petitions they circulated should be 
invalidated in their entirety.  We agree as to two of the four circulators. 
Fifi Harper 
{¶ 34} Harper was hired in 2015 to circulate part-petitions for the 
committee.  On these part-petitions, she listed her address as “4022 East Greenway 
Road, #11312 Phoenix, Arizona 85032” (“the Greenway address”).  According to 
evidence submitted by OMA, the Greenway address is for “Pack Ship and Print 
Center,” a business in a “strip plaza.”  Harper concedes in an affidavit that the 
Greenway address is a business facility that hosts mailboxes.  The affidavit of the 
owner of the business at the Greenway address confirms that the building is not 
residential, that Harper does not live there, and that she rented mailbox no. 312 in 
August 2015. 
{¶ 35} The requirement that a circulator provide a permanent address serves 
the important function of ensuring that a board of elections can contact the 
circulator in the event that complications arise during the verification process.  See 
In re Protest of Brooks, 155 Ohio App.3d 370, 382, 2003-Ohio-6348, 801 N.E.2d 
503 (3d Dist.2003) (stating that one reason petition circulators are required to state 
the address of the person or entity compensating them is so that the payor can be 
contacted if complications arise in the verification process).  The evidence in the 
record demonstrates that Harper met this requirement.  The mailbox at the 
Greenway address is, according to Harper, “the only location at which I can be 
contacted that is of a permanent, on-going nature” and “the only place from which 
January Term, 2016 
 
13 
when I am absent I have a specific present intention to return.”  We therefore 
decline to invalidate the part-petitions that Harper circulated. 
Kelvin Moore 
{¶ 36} Moore’s declared address on part-petitions he circulated was 3143 
West 33rd Street, Cleveland, Ohio.  OMA submitted an affidavit from a private 
investigator, who states that “Dave” told him that he (Dave) owns the property, that 
only businesses are located there, and that no one named Kelvin Moore resides 
there.  In a second affidavit, a process server states that he rang the buzzer for a 
suite in the secured building and a woman told him over the intercom that there was 
no Kelvin Moore in the building.  Both affidavits constitute inadmissible hearsay.  
Because there is no admissible evidence in the record to impugn the address Moore 
gave, we decline to invalidate the part-petitions he circulated. 
Roy Jackson and Kacey Veliquette 
{¶ 37} Jackson listed his address on part-petitions he circulated as 2100 
Brice Road, Reynoldsburg, Ohio.  That address is the location of a Days Inn and 
Suites.  Records from the Days Inn and Suites show that Jackson was a guest there 
in October 2015.  The address Veliquette stated on the part-petitions she circulated 
was 1900 S. Ocean Blvd., Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, 29577.  That address is 
the location of the Shady Rest Motel, which has no record of a person named Kacey 
Veliquette staying at the motel in 2015 or 2016 or being a permanent resident there.  
Therefore, the evidence establishes that Jackson and Veliquette listed 
nonpermanent, nonresidential addresses on their circulator statements. 
{¶ 38} Rather than dispute this conclusion, the committee challenges the 
constitutionality of R.C. 3501.38(E)(1).2  According to the committee’s evidence, 
                                                 
2 We deny OMA’s motion to strike the committee’s constitutional challenge on the grounds of 
waiver.  Generally, the question of a statute’s constitutionality must be raised at the first opportunity.  
State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 15.  However, OMA 
has identified no decisional support for the proposition that in a civil case, an opposing party who 
does not plead the unconstitutionality of a statute as an affirmative defense waives the argument. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
professional petition circulators often do not maintain a permanent residence, due 
to the nomadic nature of their work.  For example, Harper attests that she has no 
permanent address due in large part to the constant travel associated with her 
employment as a professional petition circulator.  Based on this evidence, the 
committee asserts that R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) is unconstitutional because it prevents 
transients from circulating petitions. 
{¶ 39} But while the record contains evidence establishing Harper’s lack of 
a permanent residence and her establishment of a permanent mailing address, it 
contains no comparable evidence of Jackson’s residential status.  Thus, a factual 
predicate for an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute has not been 
established. 
{¶ 40} The record contains an affidavit from Veliquette explaining that she, 
too is a transient circulator.  And her affidavit explains why she chose to put the 
address of the Shady Rest Motel on her circulator statement.  But it does not 
establish that she could actually be contacted at that location.  Therefore, her part-
petitions could be deemed valid only if we were to rule that it is unconstitutional to 
require circulators to provide some means of locating them.  To the contrary, we 
hold that such a requirement is a sufficient state interest to justify the statute under 
any level of scrutiny. 
{¶ 41} We therefore hold that the part-petitions circulated by Jackson and 
Veliquette should not have been validated, and we invalidate all of the signatures 
contained on those part-petitions. 
Third Allegation: Signature Overcounting 
{¶ 42} R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) requires petition circulators to indicate the 
number of signatures on each petition paper and to sign an attestation that they 
personally witnessed each signature.  A part-petition is not “properly verified” if 
“it is made to appear by satisfactory evidence * * * [t]hat the statement is false in 
any respect.”  R.C. 3519.06(D). 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
{¶ 43} The evidence establishes a substantial problem of overcounting.  As 
an example, Allen County part-petition no. 000005 contains six signatures, five of 
which the board of elections counted as valid.  The remaining 22 signature lines are 
blank.  But the circulator statement indicates that the circulator witnessed 28 
signatures.  In addition, multiple circulators during hearings before boards of 
elections looked at part-petitions that they themselves had circulated and testified 
that the stated number of witnessed signatures—in those situations, as in this 
example, 28—was not in their handwriting. 
{¶ 44} The requirement that a circulator state the number of signatures 
personally witnessed “is a protection against signatures being added later.”  State 
ex rel. Loss v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 29 Ohio St.2d 233, 234, 281 N.E.2d 186 
(1972) (invalidating a candidate part-petition when the line indicating the total 
number of signatures witnessed was left blank).  We are not dealing here with a 
case of minor or negligent miscounts.  Systemic overcounts of the magnitude seen 
in this case are an open invitation to fraud and make this case different from all 
previous cases cited by the parties.  Because a board of elections has no way to 
know how many signatures the circulators actually witnessed, there is no guarantee 
that someone did not later add the signatures of legitimate electors who did not 
choose to sign (or did not even know that their names were being placed on the 
petition).  And of course, a part-petition of this type is invalid because, on its face, 
the attestation of the circulator is false: he or she did not witness the number of 
signatures indicated. 
{¶ 45} We therefore invalidate the part-petitions with overcounts, as 
specified in the next section. 
Remedy 
{¶ 46} For the reasons stated above, we deny OMA’s motion to strike and 
deny OMA’s motion for partial summary judgment as moot.  Consistent with our 
opinion, we invalidate 297 signatures on the part-petitions submitted by Roy 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
Jackson.  We invalidate 632 signatures on the part-petitions submitted by Kacey 
Veliquette.  And as to the part-petitions with overcounts, we invalidate 9,374 
signatures.3  In total, OMA has demonstrated that 10,303 signatures that were 
counted as valid should not have been counted.  The petition therefore contained 
86,633 valid signatures, which means that it was short of the 91,677 signatures 
required by 5,044 signatures. 
{¶ 47} Pursuant to Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, the 
committee has until Thursday, August 25, 2016 (ten days from the date of this 
order), to submit a sufficient number of valid signatures to the secretary of state.  If 
the secretary of state certifies enough valid signatures, then he shall resubmit the 
initiative to the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1b. 
Motions denied  
and challenge sustained in part. 
FRENCH, J., concurs, and concurs with an opinion. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion that 
KENNEDY, J., joins. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and would sustain the 
relators’ first allegation and sustain the relators’ second allegation as to all four 
circulators. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This number does not include the invalidated signatures on the part-petitions submitted by Jackson 
and Veliquette, so as to avoid double-counting. 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
FRENCH, J., concurring. 
{¶ 48} I agree with the court’s resolution in this case.  I write separately, 
however, to raise a concern regarding the Ohio Constitution’s provisions for 
initiative petitions to enact laws. 
{¶ 49} The Ohio Constitution reserves to the people of Ohio “the power to 
propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to 
adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote as hereinafter provided.”   
Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1.  But neither the people nor the public 
officials elected to accommodate them can effectively exercise that constitutional 
power under deadlines and timelines that no longer make sense. 
{¶ 50} This case highlights the unworkable timeline that Article II, Sections 
1b and 1g impose and the need to amend it.  Considering the complexity of the 
initiative-and-referendum process for enacting laws and the large number of 
signatures that must be collected and verified, getting an initiative on the first 
general-election ballot following its submission to the secretary of state becomes 
nearly impossible when the process spawns litigation, as it so often does. 
{¶ 51} As an illustration, consider the ten-day time period that Article II, 
Section 1b gives the secretary of state to review the signatures and submit the 
petition to the General Assembly—a timeline that is obviously insufficient for a 
meaningful review of the approximately 171,000 signatures the committee 
submitted in this case.  Here, the secretary took the reasonable action of requiring 
additional review by the boards of elections, and by doing so, he missed the 
deadline for submission to the General Assembly and pushed all subsequent 
deadlines closer to the November election.  That delay, combined with the delay 
resulting from the current litigation, doomed any chance of the initiative appearing 
on the November 2016 ballot. 
{¶ 52} The system is broken and calls for modern amendments to fix it.  I 
respectfully ask the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission and the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
General Assembly to address these issues and prevent another situation like this 
from arising. 
_________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 53} I agree with the majority’s decision to validate the signatures on the 
part-petitions circulated by Fifi Harper and Kelvin Moore and to invalidate the 
signatures on the petitions circulated by Roy Jackson and Kacey Veliquette. 
{¶ 54} But in the absence of any showing of fraud, I dissent from the 
majority’s decision to sustain the allegation of signature “overcounting.”   Going 
forward, the majority’s decision to strike valid signatures in this case based on 
“overcounting,” with no showing of fraud, will have unintended consequences for 
every prospective candidate for any elected office in Ohio. 
{¶ 55} Finally, I dissent from the majority’s decision to require the secretary 
of state to return the initiative to the General Assembly.  If the signatures are 
sufficient, “the amendment, proposed law, or law shall be placed on the ballot as 
required by law.”  R.C. 3519.16(F). 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 56} R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) requires petition circulators to execute a 
statement on each part-petition containing “the circulator’s name, the address of 
the circulator’s permanent residence, and the name and address of the person 
employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 57} Clearly, Fifi Harper did not do that.  The address she provided on the 
part-petitions she circulated is, in fact, a private mail box at “Pack Ship and Print 
Center,” a business in a commercial strip mall.  It is not a residential address, and 
Harper never lived there.  Rather, at the time she obtained that mail box, she lived 
at 4802 N. 12th Street, Apt. 2102, Phoenix AZ 85014-4094, the address that is 
apparently still listed on her Arizona driver’s license.  It may be true, as Harper 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
claims, that she no longer lives at that address and that she did not have any 
permanent residence at the time that she circulated the part-petitions at issue in this 
case, but that does not permit her to disregard Ohio’s election law by making the 
untrue representation in her circulator’s statement that a nonresidential address is a 
residential address.  If she truly lacked a permanent residential address, then she 
should not have provided one, rather than knowingly listing a nonresidential 
address in violation of R.C. 3501.38(E)(1). 
{¶ 58} Thus, in my view, the part-petitions she circulated containing a false 
residential address are invalid and should be stricken in all respects.  R.C. 
3519.06(D); see also Kyser v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 36 Ohio St.2d 17, 
23, 303 N.E.2d 77 (1973) (a post office box is not an elector’s “residence” for 
purposes of Ohio elections law).  Without these part-petitions, the Committee for 
Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act did not obtain the requisite number of valid 
signatures from 44 of 88 Ohio counties as required by Article II, Section 1g of the 
Ohio Constitution, and the matter should not have been submitted to the General 
Assembly in the first instance. 
{¶ 59} For these reasons, I would declare that the committee must cure the 
petition deficiency by submitting a sufficient number of valid signatures to the 
secretary of state within the ten-day period provided by Article II, Section 1g of the 
Ohio Constitution and R.C. 3519.16(F).  Only then may the petition be lawfully 
transmitted to the General Assembly for consideration. 
{¶ 60} Accordingly, to that extent, I respectfully dissent. 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 61} I concur in all aspects of the court’s opinion except for the remedy.  
R.C. 3519.16(F) clearly anticipates a signature shortage.  The statute gives 
respondents ten days to cure their shortage and gives the secretary of state until 65 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
days prior to the election to determine the sufficiency of the additional signatures.  
R.C. 3519.16(F).  “If they are sufficient, the amendment, proposed law, or law shall 
be placed on the ballot as required by law.”  Id. 
{¶ 62} We are currently 85 days before the election.  Implementation of the 
remedy is not our job.  Interpretation of the law is. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 63} As I stated in my dissent in Ohio Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Ohioans 
for Drug Price Relief Act, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-3038, ___ N.E.3d ___ 
(“OMA I”), I would dismiss this case because this courts lacks jurisdiction.  It lacks 
jurisdiction because the challenge procedure set forth in Article II, Section 1g of 
the Ohio Constitution does not apply to proposal petitions filed pursuant to Article 
II, Section 1b.  This court has taken on the wrong job and has done the job wrong, 
to the long-term detriment of Ohio election law. 
Jurisdiction 
{¶ 64} Article II, Section 1g was amended through an Article II, Section 1a 
initiative in 2008.  2008 Am.H.J.R. No. 3 (adopted by Ohio voters in the November 
4, 2008 general election).  The amendment created an important role for this court 
in resolving challenges to petitions for statewide ballot measures: “The Ohio 
supreme court shall have original, exclusive jurisdiction over all challenges made 
to petitions and signatures upon such petitions under this section.”  Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1g.  But since the passage of the constitutional 
amendment, this court has never been called upon to resolve a challenge to an 
Article II, Section 1b proposal petition.  The hands-on practicalities of dealing with 
this case—including the absurd timelines discussed below in the “Remedy” section 
of this opinion—demonstrate that the challenge procedures outlined in Article II, 
Section 1g are inapplicable to Article II, Section 1b proposal petitions.  Instead, 
those procedures apply to petitions for initiatives for constitutional amendments 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
(Article II, Section 1a), petitions for referendums (Article II, Section 1c), and 
supplementary petitions for initiatives to enact laws (Article II, Section 1b).  All of 
those petitions share the same filing deadline of 125 days before the election.  And 
all of those petitions, properly signed and filed, directly result in an initiative or 
referendum appearing on the ballot; in contrast, a properly signed and filed Article 
II, Section 1b proposal petition results only in the proposed law receiving 
consideration by the General Assembly. 
{¶ 65} This court’s jurisdiction under Article II, Section 1g does not begin 
until the filing that determines the election at which the initiative or referendum 
will be voted upon by the electorate.  Article I, Section 1g states that “[a]ny 
challenge to a petition or signature on a petition shall be filed not later than ninety-
five days before the day of the election.” (Emphasis added.) At this point in this 
case, there is no “day of the election” from which to measure this jurisdictional 
timeline.  An Article II, Section 1b proposal petition with sufficient signatures does 
not result in getting an initiative on the ballot; it merely allows citizens to force the 
General Assembly to consider the proposed law.  It is the supplementary petition 
that results in the initiative getting on the ballot.  Under Article II, Section 1b, the 
election concerning the initiative is “the next regular or general election occurring 
subsequent to one hundred twenty-five days after the supplementary petition is 
filed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the election day from which deadlines for a 
challenge under Article II, Section 1g are calculated is not even set until after the 
filing of the supplementary petition.  There is no challenge process available before 
this court until the supplementary petition is filed—and that has not yet happened.  
This case does not belong here. 
Overcounts 
{¶ 66} Twice, the part-petitions in this case have been sent out to county 
boards of elections for verification.  The county boards have painstakingly 
reviewed each signature on each part-petition and have verified that they are the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
signatures of registered voters.  The professionals have done their jobs, determining 
that registered Ohio voters have signed the part-petitions calling for the Ohio Drug 
Price Relief Act to be submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration.  The 
secretary of state has certified that there were sufficient petition signatures to merit 
the submission of the proposed law to the General Assembly.  It was submitted to 
the General Assembly.  More than six months later, this court, somehow, 
determines that that never happened. 
{¶ 67} How the court gets to the conclusion has profound implications for 
future election cases.  Most notably, this court invalidates around 9,000 
signatures—which nobody disputes were genuine—because the circulators 
overstated the number of signatures contained on individual part-petitions.  The 
term of art is “overcounting.”  In a practical sense, overcounting is corrected at the 
county level—workers for the boards of elections review every signature and count 
only the ones belonging to and matching with registered voters in the particular 
county.  The Ohio Secretary of State’s 2015 Election Official Manual, Chapter 11, 
Section 
1.03(D), 
at 
11-9, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/ 
EOResources/general/2015EOM.pdf (accessed Aug. 11, 2016), discusses how 
election officials should handle overcounts: 
 
If the number of signatures reported in the statement is 
equal to or greater than the total number of signatures not crossed 
out on the part-petition, then the board does not reject the part-
petition because of the inconsistent signature numbers.  [Citing State 
ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Taxation v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 167, 602 N.E.2d 615 (1992).]  Instead, the 
board must review the validity of each signature as usual. 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
Example: The circulator’s statement indicates that the 
circulator witnessed 22 signatures, but there are only 20 signatures 
on the petition. 
Note: In determining whether the number of signatures 
reported by a circulator of a non-statewide candidate’s petition 
matches the number of signatures on that part petition, particularly 
with regard to crossed out signatures, board of elections should take 
care so as to not make a determination that is “too technical, 
unreasonable, and arbitrary” given the unique fact set of that petition 
and information available to the board, if any.  [Citing State ex rel. 
Schwarz v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 173 Ohio St. 321, 181 
N.E.2d 888 (1962); State ex rel. Curtis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3787.] 
 
(Boldface sic.) 
{¶ 68} On the other hand, the same source states that when the circulator 
attests to having witnessed a lesser number of signatures than those that appear on 
the part-petition, the secretary of state’s policy is to strike the entire part-petition.  
Id.  This difference in treatment at least makes intuitive sense: if a circulator states 
that he or she witnessed 20 signatures and there are 22 signatures on the part-
petition, that means that there are two that he or she did not witness.  How can the 
reviewing board of elections be expected to tell which signatures the circulator 
didn’t witness?  On the other hand, if there are 22 signatures and the circulator 
states that he or she witnessed 28, the circulator has attested to having witnessed at 
least 22. 
{¶ 69} When the secretary of state returned the part-petitions for re-review, 
he instructed the county boards of elections to carefully review overcounts: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
The Ohio Supreme Court has accorded flexibility to 
circulators, providing that “… arithmetic errors will be tolerated, but 
only if the error does not promote fraud.”  [Quoting State ex rel. 
Citizens for Responsible Taxation, 65 Ohio St.3d at 172, 602 N.E.2d 
615.]  The relevant example in the Election Official Manual 
recognizes that “arithmetic errors” may occur. 
* * * 
By their nature, however, “arithmetic errors” should be 
isolated, unintentional oversights. 
The “over-reporting of signatures” (e.g., a circulator 
statement purporting to witness 28 signatures on a part-petition 
bearing only two signatures) is so strikingly prevalent in this 
submission that the suggestion that unintentional “arithmetic errors” 
are to blame strains credulity.  This cannot be the result envisioned 
by case law; otherwise the exception would swallow the rule. 
 
Secretary of State Directive 2016-01, at 2-3, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/ 
SOS/Upload/elections/directives/2016/Dir2016-01.pdf (accessed Aug. 14, 2016). 
{¶ 70} After that guidance, the part-petitions were reviewed again and 
ultimately certified by the secretary of state.  Now those part-petitions are before 
this court. 
{¶ 71} The secretary of state relied on this court’s decisions in explaining 
his policy on overcounts.  We should follow our decisions, too.  In State ex rel. 
Citizens for Responsible Taxation v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 
167, 602 N.E.2d 615 (1992), this court held that the board of elections had 
improperly rejected five part-petitions for overcounting; in each instance the 
circulator statements “indicated one more signature than each part-petition actually 
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
contained.”  Id. at 171.  The court held that incorrectness in the signature count is 
not fatal to an entire part-petition: 
 
R.C. 3501.38(E), however, does not expressly mandate a correct 
signature total, and [State ex rel.] Loss [v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 29 Ohio St.2d 233, 233, 281 N.E.2d 186 (1972)] implies 
that arithmetic error will be tolerated, but only if the error does not 
promote fraud.  Indeed, Loss may explain why the Secretary of State 
instructed respondents here to reject an entire part-petition only 
where the circulator states a number “less than the total number of 
uncrossed out signatures” (emphasis sic ) and to, in effect, overlook 
discrepancies in the number of signatures “in all other instances.” 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Taxation at 172. 
{¶ 72} This court “accept[ed] the Secretary of State’s reading of the 
signature-total requirement, see State ex rel. Beck v. Casey (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 
79, 81, 554 N.E.2d 1284, 1286, and conclude[d] that respondents improperly 
rejected the instant five part-petitions for noncompliance with R.C. 3501.38(E).”  
Id. at 173. 
{¶ 73} A few months ago in OMA I, this court dealt with respondents’ 
argument that as a matter of law, part-petitions can never be rejected on the basis 
of an overcount.  Respondents relied on Citizens for Responsible Taxation, but this 
court’s opinion stated that “Citizens for Responsible Taxation did not hold that an 
overcount can never promote fraud.”  OMA I, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-3038, 
___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 20.  At that time, this court recognized that whether an 
overcount promotes fraud should determine whether the overcount should result in 
the disqualification of an entire part-petition.  Today, any overcount results in 
complete disqualification. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 74} In OMA I, the court reviewed this court’s jurisprudence on how to 
treat undercounts; again, the presence of fraud is a determining factor: 
 
In cases in which the circulator’s statement slightly 
undercounts the signatures, this court has ordered the entire part-
petition counted, so long as there is no indication of fraud or material 
misrepresentation.  State ex rel. Curtis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 405, 2015-Ohio-3787, 44 N.E.3d 261,  
¶ 8; State ex rel. Schwarz v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 173 
Ohio St. 321, 323, 181 N.E.2d 888 (1962).  Only when the circulator 
knowingly submits an undercount has the court invalidated the entire 
part-petition.  See, e.g., Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 13–14. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  OMA I at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 75} Has the longstanding practice of disqualifying undercounts and 
allowing overcounts been completely reversed?  At the very least, shouldn’t the 
majority employ the “indication of fraud or material misrepresentation” test on the 
overcounts in his case?  
{¶ 76} Instead, this court decides for the first time in this case that any 
overcount invalidates an entire part-petition.  This court makes no attempt to 
determine whether fraud occurred in any instance or whether an error may have 
been one of arithmetic or a simple oversight.  As an example, consider Lucas 
County part-petition no. 000285.  The part-petition contains 27 signatures (19 
ultimately were determined to be good by the board of elections), but the circulator 
attested to witnessing 28 signatures.  The signatures of all 19 registered voters who 
signed that part-petition do not count.  What about Ashland County part-petition 
no. 000015?  It contains at least 27 signatures (20 of which were ultimately 
January Term, 2016 
 
27 
determined to be valid by the board), with what is perhaps the start of a 28th 
signature marked out.  The circulator attested to 28 signatures, and this court has 
invalidated the entire part-petition.  Franklin County part-petition no. 000230 has 
26 signatures (21 were determined to be valid) and two other signature spaces with 
an “X” through them.  The circulator attested to 28 signatures; all 21 valid 
signatures are now discounted.  Carroll County part-petition no. 000001 contains 
27 signatures and has three “X”s placed on signature line 14.  The circulator attested 
to 28 signatures; the 25 found valid by the board of elections have now been 
disqualified by this court.  Warren County part-petition no. 000066 contains 25 
signatures, and a large “X” fills the last three signature lines on the part-petition.  
The circulator attested to 28 signatures; the 16 deemed valid by the board of 
elections have been disqualified by this court.  This quick, nonexhaustive count of 
just these part-petitions involves over 100 different registered voters whose 
signatures were collected by five different circulators in five different counties.  
Those signers’ desire to place the proposal petition in front of their elected 
representatives has been thwarted by this court’s one-size-fits-all mandate on 
overcounts. 
{¶ 77} Instead of reviewing the individual part-petitions, this court has 
relied on an exhibit submitted as evidence by relators.  That exhibit, according to a 
supporting affidavit, is a spreadsheet created by the “Litigation Support Manager” 
at Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P. (“Bricker”), relators’ counsel, “based upon Bricker’s 
review of the part-petitions.”  The spreadsheet notes the instances in which Bricker 
has determined that a circulator attested that he or she witnessed 28 signatures when 
the part-petition did not contain 28 signatures.  The spreadsheet also includes the 
number of valid signatures contained on each of those part-petitions, to make this 
court’s invalidation of signatures of registered voters easy. 
{¶ 78} There are also a large number of part-petitions in this case containing 
just one signature, when the circulator has attested to witnessing 28.  If the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
requirement that a circulator state the number of signatures personally witnessed 
“ ‘is a protection against signatures being added later.’  State ex rel. Loss v. Lucas 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 29 Ohio St.2d 233, 234, 281 N.E.2d 186 (1972),” majority 
opinion at ¶ 44, why is the majority disqualifying all the part-petitions that contain 
only one signature.  Where are the signatures that could have been added later?  
They are not on the part-petitions. 
{¶ 79} The majority decision is “too technical, unreasonable and arbitrary,” 
a mistake this court has warned boards of elections against.  See State ex rel. 
Schwarz v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 173 Ohio St. 321, 323, 181 N.E.2d 888 
(1962).  The majority decision has implications at every level: every person running 
for offices—from school board member to governor to coroner, and those who 
support them—should live in fear that small mistakes will lead to the invalidation 
of entire part-petitions and the end to candidacies. 
Circulator Addresses 
{¶ 80} The majority disqualifies 632 signatures on the part-petitions 
submitted by Kacey Veliquette, a transient circulator.  The majority, paying 
extreme short shrift to respondents’ argument that the permanent-address 
requirement violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, writes 
that “her part-petitions could be deemed valid only if we were to rule that it is 
unconstitutional to require circulators to provide some means of locating them.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Majority opinion at ¶ 40.  But Veliquette has provided a way to 
locate her: paid circulators must provide “the name and address of the person 
employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any.”  R.C. 3501.38(E)(1).  She 
provided that address.  And her affidavit has been filed in this case, so she has been 
located.  Only the 632 verified signatures that she collected from registered voters 
are missing. 
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
29 
Remedy 
{¶ 81} The majority gives respondents ten days to gather additional 
signatures in support of their proposal petition, but to what end?  First, we must 
overcome the absurdity of the majority’s continued belief that the processes under 
Article II, Section 1g apply to proposal petitions.  Pursuant to Article II, Section 
1g, the secretary of state must determine the sufficiency of the additional petitions 
“not later than sixty-five days before the election.”  When is “the day of the 
election?”  It is unknowable at this point, because the election date is measured 
from the date of the filing of the supplemental petition—pursuant to Article II, 
Section 1b, the proposal shall be submitted to the electorate at the “next regular or 
general election occurring subsequent to one hundred twenty-five days after the 
supplementary petition is filed.”  There has been no supplementary petition filed.  
So by what date must the secretary of state make his sufficiency determination 
regarding the additional signatures?  How does one count 65 days from never?  
Under Article II, Section 1g, any challenge to the additional signatures must be 
made “not later than fifty-five days before the day of the election.”  Again, it is 
unknowable what that date is, other than that it is probably ten days closer to never. 
{¶ 82} But let us assume, as the majority does, that the Article II, Section 
1g challenge process does apply to proposal petitions.  That section grants initiative 
proponents ten additional days to file additional signatures “if the petition or 
signatures are determined to be insufficient.”  The majority gives respondents that 
extra ten days, but then what?  The majority says that if, after respondent’s 
submission of additional signatures, the secretary of state determines that there are 
a sufficient number of valid signatures, “then he shall resubmit the initiative to the 
General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of Ohio Constitution, Article II, 
Section 1b.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 47.  I assume that this directive means that the 
secretary of state will transmit the part-petitions to the General Assembly as soon 
as any challenge to the additional signatures has run its course—though measured 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
by a timeline with benchmarks related to the “day of the election,” (which will have 
to be ignored) the collection, review, and challenge process can consume up to 40 
days—likely sometime in September 2016.  But in the meantime, respondents have 
been seriously prejudiced. 
{¶ 83} Respondents have given up trying to get their initiative on the 
November 2016 ballot; they wrote in their “Notice of continued circulation of 
supplemental petition,” filed in this court on July 13, 2016: 
 
Although Respondent Secretary’s actions adversely affected 
Petition Respondents’ ability to submit their Supplementary Petition 
before the deadline to appear on the November 2016 ballot, Petition 
Respondents have until September 2, 2016 to collect a sufficient 
number of signatures to place the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act on the 
2017 general election ballot, which they plan to do. 
 
{¶ 84} The four-month period for consideration of their proposal initiative 
by the General Assembly under Article II, Section 1b did not end until June 4.  
Respondents could not begin to collect signatures on supplementary part-petitions 
until that date.  Pursuant to Article II, Section 1b, they had 90 days to collect 
signatures from an additional 3 percent of the electorate.  However, because of the 
month-long delay in transmitting the proposal petition to the General Assembly at 
the front end, respondents had just over 30 days to obtain their supplementary 
signatures if they wanted to get their initiative petition on the November 2016 
ballot.  This is because the initiative goes on the ballot at the next scheduled election 
“occurring subsequent to one hundred twenty-five days after the supplementary 
petition is filed.”  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1b.  The 125-day deadline 
for the 2016 ballot was July 6, 2016.  Despite the fact that they now are not going 
to seek to reach the ballot until 2017, respondents have another deadline looming.  
January Term, 2016 
 
31 
Their supplementary petition—with its attendant signatures from an additional 3 
percent of the electorate—has to be submitted to the secretary of state within 90 
days of the expiration of the General Assembly’s four-month consideration period, 
which ended on June 4, 2016.  That 90-day deadline expires September 2, 2016.  
Without knowing how this court was going to respond to relators’ challenge, 
respondents had to keep collecting signatures.  If this court had announced a 
decision rejecting all of relators’ challenges today, respondents would have had 
only 18 days to collect an additional 91,000 plus valid signatures.  Now, all the 
work that respondents have done since June 4, 2016, has been wasted.  They have 
been told by this court that the curative period to collect additional signatures 
required for the proposal petition can actually cure very little.  They have to 
resubmit the proposal petition and then gather another additional 91,000 signatures 
on the supplementary petition.  This is fundamentally unfair and the wrong 
interpretation of Article II, Section 1g. 
{¶ 85} The majority opinion’s remedy runs contrary to the curative process 
of Article II, Section 1g, which exists to allow for deficiencies in petitions to be 
corrected.  The cure relates back to the time of the deficiency.  For instance, a 
supplemental petition must be filed within 125 days of the next election.  Article II, 
Section 1g provides that “[i]f the petitions or signatures are determined to be 
insufficient, ten additional days shall be allowed for the filing of additional 
signatures to such petition.”  This gives initiative supporters ten days to cure their 
deficiency by gathering additional signatures.  Under Article II, Section 1g, the 
appeal-and-review process can last until 45 days before the election.  Once that is 
complete and the additional signatures are judged sufficient to make up the 
deficiency, the initiative goes on the ballot.  That is, despite the fact that the 
deficiency is corrected inside of 125 days before the election, it is as if the 
supplementary petition had sufficient signatures before the 125-day deadline.  The 
curative fix relates back to the original filing of signatures. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
{¶ 86} Likewise, the additional signatures in this case, if certified by the 
secretary of state, should relate back to the secretary of state’s February 4, 2016, 
transmission of the proposal petition to the General Assembly.  The fix would 
establish that the proposal was indeed properly before the General Assembly for its 
four-month review.  The four-month review did happen, and it ended on June 4.  
The rest of the timetable should continue forward from that—leaving respondents 
until September 2, 2016, to file their supplementary petition to get on the 2017 
ballot. 
{¶ 87} But no, the majority writes, the proposal petition is fixed only as of 
the date the additional signatures are verified.  But what if we were to apply that 
logic to a case in which a supplemental petition did not contain sufficient signatures 
125 days before the election but the initiative supporters corrected that in the ten-
day curative period?  According to the majority, the supplemental petition would 
not meet the signature threshold until the curative additional signatures were added, 
measured from the date that they were added.  The initiative would fail to qualify 
for the ballot at the next election, because the 125-day deadline would have been 
missed.  We know that is not the case because under Article II, Section 1g, the 
challenge process continues, measured from the date established as the election day 
by the originally defective supplemental petition. 
{¶ 88} The curative nature of the additional signatures relates back to the 
deficiency in the petition that they are curing.  So respondents should have ten days 
to fix any deficiency, and that fix should relate back to the proposal submission to 
the General Assembly of February 4, 2016. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 89} The majority says, “It is generally our obligation to defer to the 
secretary of state’s reasonable interpretation of an election statute.  State ex rel. 
Cornerstone Developers, Ltd. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections, 145 Ohio St.3d 290, 
2016-Ohio-313, 49 N.E.3d 273, ¶ 16.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 26.  The secretary of 
January Term, 2016 
 
33 
state has determined that there were sufficient registered voters from the requisite 
number of counties who actually signed the part-petitions that were timely filed and 
twice checked by local, properly trained election officials to assure that the 
signatures matched the voter-registration cards.  We should defer to that judgment. 
{¶ 90} The sweeping reach of this per curium opinion—handed down 
without parentage and without oral argument—marks a sea change for the Ohio 
Supreme Court.  In ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St. 3d 520, 2014-
Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, this court made it clear that Ohio citizens have little 
hope to meet the requirements to challenge enactments of the General Assembly in 
the courts of Ohio.  Now, the court chooses to make it extremely difficult for Ohio 
citizens to even politely exercise their fundamental constitutional right to petition 
the General Assembly to take action on important matters affecting millions of 
Ohio citizens.  The fallout from today’s decision will undoubtedly multiply the 
challenges to both state and local citizen petitions of all types as well as to the 
efforts of any citizen seeking to stand for election to public office.  Any suggestion 
that our court’s decision is protecting Ohio citizens from election fraud is a 
complete fiction.  What we have is a government protecting itself from its people.  
Today, the walls got higher. 
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Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Anne Marie Sferra, Nelson M. 
Reid, and James P. Schuck, for relators. 
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, and 
Derek S. Clinger, for respondents William S. Booth, Daniel L. Darland, Tracy L. 
Jones, and Latonya D. Thurman. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Steven T. Voigt, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, and Brodi J. Conover, Assistant Attorney General, for 
respondent Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted. 
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