Title: Hobbs v. Nevada

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

7

427 Nev. Advance Opinion |&
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TIMOTHY LEE HOBBS, No.54933
Appellant, Fi L E D
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent. HAY 192011

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of domestic battery and injury to other property. Fifth Judicial

 

District Court, Nye County; John P. Davis, Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded,

Gibson & Kuehn, LLP, and Harold Kuehn, Pahrump,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Brian Kunzi,
District Attorney, and Wesley 8. White, Deputy District Attorney, Nye
County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE CHERRY, SAITTA and GIBBONS, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, SAITTA, J.

In this appeal, we consider two primary issues. We first
address whether spitting on another constitutes a battery under NRS
200.481. We hold that it does, Next, we consider whether the State
sufficiently established the requisite prior domestic battery misdemeanor
convictions to enhance appellant Timothy Lee Hobbs’ current offense to a
felony. We hold that it did not. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in

W-14- 752.

 

 
part the judgment of conviction, and we remand to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
EACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Patricia McClain was at a nail salon having her nails done
when Hobbs, her ex-boyfriend, entered and became angry. He was upset
that she was spending money to have her nails done. After a relatively
short public argument between the two, Hobbs briefly left the salon, only

to return a short time later. Hobbs again became angry with McClain for

 

having her nails done. He then spit in her face, She immediately broke
down into tears, feeling embarrassed and humiliated. Hobbs then left the
salon and subsequently returned with a rock in his hand, approached
‘McClain’s vehicle, and threw the rock through the vehicle's windshield.
Respondent State of Nevada charged Hobbs by criminal
complaint with domestic battery, injury to other property, and a habitual
criminal enhancement. In particular, the complaint alleged that because
Hobbs had two prior domestic battery misdemeanor convietions, the State
would seek to elevate the current offense to a felony under NRS 200.485,
‘Nevada's domestic battery statute, if it obtained a conviction. The
complaint also alleged that the State would seek a habitual criminal
enhancement under NRS 207.010, Nevada's habitual criminal statute, due
to Hobbs’ prior felony convictions. A preliminary hearing was held in
justice court, at which time the State offered Hobbs’ two prior domestic
battery convictions into evidence. Hobbs stipulated to their admission.
He was then bound over on the charges, and a criminal information was
filed in the district court. The evidence from the preliminary hearing—
specifically, the certified copies of the two prior domestic battery

misdemeanor convictions—was transferred to the district court.

 

 
—

Subsequently, Hobbs filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which was opposed by the State, arguing that spitting did not
constitute the use of force or violence required for a battery under NRS
200.481. The district court held a hearing on the matter, found that
spitting did amount to the use of force or violence as contemplated by NRS
200.481, and dismissed the petition. ‘The case then proceeded to trial,
where the jury found Hobbs guilty of domestic battery and injury to other
property.

At sentencing, the State sought to sentence Hobbs as a
habitual felon and offered the presentence investigation report (PSI) and
six certified copies of Hobbs’ prior felony convictions in support. The
district court inquired whether there were any errors of a factual nature in
the PSI, which
convictions. Hobbs’ counsel responded in the negative. Notably, although
the State submitted evidence of Hobbs’ prior felony convictions, it did not,

 

sscribed the two prior domestic battery misdemeanor

at the sentencing hearing, present any evidence of or mention Hobbs’ prior
domestic battery misdemeanor convictions, nor did it attempt to
demonstrate the constitutional validity of those convictions. The district
court also did not indicate that it had reviewed the certified prior
convictions that were transmitted from the justice court or that it had
determined that they were constitutionally valid. Ultimately, the district
court enhanced Hobbs’ current domestic battery convietion to a felony and
determined that he should be sentenced as a habitual criminal, sentencing
him to 10 to 25 years in prison for domestic battery and 1 year for injury
to other property, both sentences to run concurrently. Hobbs now appeals.

 

 
os

 

DISCUSSI

Spitting on another constitutes the “use of force or violence” required for a
battery under NRS 200.481,

Hobbs argues that the act of spitting on another does not

 

amount to a battery. In particular, he asserts that spitting does not
constitute the “use of force or violence” required for a battery under NRS
200.481 and contends, based on the cases he relies on, that a battery
must be violent or result in physical harm or pain. Hobbs’ argument
presents us with an issue of first impression, as we have not previously
addressed this question or the scope and meaning of the phrase “use of
force or violence” in NRS 200.481.

Statutory interpretation is an issue of law subject to de novo
review. Firestone v. State, 120 Nev. 13, 16, 83 P.3d 279, 281 (2004). Our
objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's intent.
State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004).
‘Traditional rules of statutory interpretation are employed to accomplish
that result. Id. Our initial inquiry focuses on the language of the statute,
and we avoid statutory interpretation that renders language meaningless
or superfluous. Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 892-93, 102 P.3d 71, 81
(2004). If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the
statute as written. Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 122 Nev. 1056, 1061, 145 P.3d
1002, 1005 (2006). Only when the statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, do we “look beyond the

1Although Hobbs was convicted of domestic battery pursuant to NRS
200.485, the statute uses the term “battery” as it is defined in NRS
200.481, Nevada's criminal battery statute. NRS 200.485(9)(b). As such,
our inquiry focuses on NRS 200.481.

 
language [of the statute] to consider its meaning in light of its spirit,
subject matter, and public policy.” Butler, 120 Nev. at 893, 102 P.8d at 81.

‘The statutory definition of battery is “any willful and unlawful
use of force or violence upon the person of another.” NRS 200.481(1)(a).
At iret blush, NRS 200.481 might appear to include physical harm or pain
as an element of the offense of battery, given that it requires the use of
force or violence. ‘The presence or absence of “substantial bodily harm”
does affect punishment (NRS 200.481(2)(a)-(g)); however, it is not included
as an element of simple battery. See NRS 200.481(1)(a). Instead,
Nevada's battery statute requires the “use of force or violence.” Id. A
common definition of “force” is “[plower, violence, or pressure directed
against a person or thing.” Black's Law Dictionary 717 (9th ed. 2009),
Thus, the language of NRS 200.481 indicates that nonharmful and
nonviolent force suffices, given the Legislature's use of the phrase “force or
violence"; otherwise, the use of the word “or” is rendered meaningle:
NRS 200.481(1)(a) (emphasis added). In sum, under NRS 200.481, the

 

“willful and unlawful use of... force... upon the person of another”

amounts to criminal battery; that force need not be violent or severe and

 

need not cause bodily pain or bodily harm. Our construction comports
with the common law definition of battery. 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's
Criminal Law § 177, at 414-15 (15th ed. 1994) (“At common law, the
contact need not result in physical harm or pain; it is enough that the
contact be offensive.”).

Moreover, California's caselaw interpreting its battery statute,
California Penal Code section 242, supports our interpretation. In 1925,
when the Nevada Legislature adopted the current definition of battery, it

replicated California's battery statute, which remains the same today.

 

 
0 mn

1925 Nev. Stat., ch. 31, § 149, at $4; Nev. Compiled Laws § 10096 (1929)
(specifically referencing California Penal Code section 242); see also Cal.
Penal Code § 242 (West 2008) (“A battery is any willful and unlawful use
California's

 

of force or violence upon the person of another.
jurisprudence addressing the meaning and scope of California Penal Code
section 242 therefore serves as persuasive authority for our examination of
NRS 200.481.

A California court of appeal recently noted that, “elven
though the statutory definition of battery requires ‘force or violence,’ this
hhas the special legal meaning of a harmful or offensive touching.” People
v. Page, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857, 863 n.1 (Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).
‘That interpretation of California Penal Code section 242 has significant
support in California's caselaw. As the California Supreme Court has
explained:

“It has long been established, both in tort and
criminal law, that ‘the least touching’ may
constitute battery. In other words, force against,
the person is enough, it need not be violent or
severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain,
and it need not leave any mark.”

People v, Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 709 n.4 (Cal. 1994) (quoting People v.
Rocha, 479 P.2d 372, 87 n.12 (Cal. 1971). Thus, “folnly a slight
unprivileged touching is needed to satisfy the force requirement of a
criminal battery.” People v. Ausbie, 20 Cal. Rptr. 34 371, 975 n.2 (Ct. App.
2004), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Reed, 137 P.3d 184
(Cal. 2006). Because “the least touching” may constitute battery,
California courts have even observed that in section 242, “[tJhe word
‘violence’ has no real significance.” People v. Mansfield, 245 Cal. Rptr.
800, 802-03 (Ct. App. 1988). In accordance with this general

 

 

 
os

 

interpretation of the phrase “force or violence” in section 242, the
California Supreme Court has held that spitting on another is a battery,
People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 953-54 (Cal. 2009), and that conduct
such as “throwing a cup of urine in @ person's face” constitutes battery,
People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 622 (Cal. 1992), disapproved of on
other grounds by People v. Williams, 233 P.3d 1000 (Cal. 2010). In
holding that spitting on another constitutes battery, California is in accord
with courts from other jurisdictions and a variety of treatises. See, e.g.
US. v. Lewellyn, 481 F.3d 695, 697-99 (9th Cir. 2007); State v. Lachney,
621 So. 2d 846, 847-48 (La, Ct, App. 1993); Com. v. Cohen, 71 N.E.2d

"It is worth noting that the relevant California jury instruction
comports with this caselaw. The jury instruction defining “force and
violence” states:

 

As used in the foregoing instruction, the
words “force” and “violence” are synonymous and
mean any [unlawful] application of physical force
against the person of another, even though it
‘causes no pain or bodily harm or leaves no mark
and even though only the feelings of such person
are injured by the act. The slightest [unlawful]
touching, if done in an insolent, rude, or an angry
manner, is sufficient.

It is not necessary that the touching be done
in actual anger or with actual malice; it
sufficient if it was unwarranted and unjustifiable.

The touching essential to a battery may be a
touching of the person, of the person's clothing, or
of something attached to or closely connected with
the person.

California Jury Instructions, Criminal 16.141 (pring 2010
ed.) (alterations in original).

 

 
cnn ie

 

176, 177-78 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law §
16.2, at 860 (5th ed. 2010); 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law §
177, at 415 (15th ed. 1994).

In conclusion, the language and meaning of NRS 200.481 is
clear; at a minimum, battery is the intentional and unwanted exertion of
force upon another, however slight. Because the record clearly

demonstrates that Hobbs intentionally spat on McClain and because

 

spitting on another amounts to the use of force or violence as contemplated
by NRS 200.481, we conclude that Hobbs was properly convicted of
domestic battery pursuant to NRS 200.485 and that the district court
properly dismissed Hobbs’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.*

SHobbs cites to a variety of cases from other jurisdictions in support
of his argument that spitting does not amount to the use of force or
violence required for a battery under NRS 200.481; however, none of the
cases he relies on are based on that jurisdiction’s battery statute. See U.S.
¥.Maldonado-Lopez, 517 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (10th Cir, 2008) (examining
whether Colorado's harassment statute involves a crime of violence for
federal sentencing enhancement purposes); Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516
F.3d 635, 536 (7th Cir. 2008) (considering whether an aggravated battery
of a police officer, consisting of grabbing the officer's fingers and twisting
them, amounted to a crime of moral turpitude for deportation purposes);
US. v, Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining whether
a Wyoming domestic battery conviction is a predicate offense for a felony
federal firearm conviction); Johnson v. State, 858 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla.
Dist. Ct, App. 2003) (examining whether battery conviction for spitting on
a law enforcement officer was a qualifying offense for sentencing as a
violent career criminal and, interestingly, taking no issue with the
underlying battery conviction); State v, Mack, 12 8.W.3d 349, 352-53 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2000) (considering whether spitting constitutes “the commission
of violence against an employee of the department of corrections,” a
statutory offense separate and distinct from battery).

 

 
on

 

‘The State failed_to_establish_ the requisite _prior_domestic_batterv
misdemeanor convictions to enhance Hobbs’ current offense to a felony

Hobbs argues that the State failed to prove, at the sentencing
hearing, that he had two prior domestic battery misdemeanor convictions.
He asserts that because the State failed to do so, the district court
erroneously enhanced his current domestic battery offense, for spitting on
‘McClain, to a felony under NRS 200.485.¢

Nevada's domestic battery statute, NRS 200.485, provides
that a defendant's third domestic violence battery conviction within seven
years must be enhanced to a felony and punished as such under NRS
193.130. NRS 200.485(1)(@). It further states that

An offense that occurred within 7 years
immediately preceding the date of the principal
offense or after the principal offense constitutes a

 

prior offense ....The facts concerning a_prior
offense must 4 time of

sentencing and, if the principal offense is alleged
to be a felony, must also be shown at the
preliminary examination

RS 200.485(4) (emphasis added).

 

“The Stato makes a brief contention that Hobbs failed to raise this
issue below. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Hobbs
neglected to object to the State's lack of proof, his failure to do so would
not divest the State of its due process burden to prove each element of the
sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt or to make an
affirmative showing of the constitutional validity of the prior misdemeanor
convictions, see Phipps v. State, 111 Nev. 1276, 1280, 903 P.2d 820, 823
(1995); Dressler v. State, 107 Nev. 686, 697, 819 P.2d 1288, 1295 (1991),
absent a clear stipulation to or waiver of proof of the prior convictions.
Krauss v, State, 116 Nev. 307, 310, 998 P.2d 163, 165 (2000).

 
Broadly speaking, “[d]ue process requires the prosecution to
shoulder the burden of proving each element of a sentence enhancement
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Phipps v. State, 111 Nev. 1276, 1280, 903
P.2d 820, 828 (1995) (quoting People v. Tenner, 862 P.2d 840, 845 (Cal,
1993)). If the State seeks to use prior misdemeanor convictions to enhance
a current offense to a felony, it must also make an affirmative showing of
the constitutional validity of the prior convictions. Dressler v. State, 107
Nev. 686, 697, 819 P.2d 1288, 1295 (1991). ‘This includes demonstrating

 

“either that counsel was present [during the prior misdemeanor

proceedings] or that the right to counsel was validly waived, and that the

 

spirit of constitutional principles wé
proceedings.” Id,

‘The State's complaint alleged that Hobbs had two prior
domestic battery misdemeanor convictions and that the State would seek

respected in the prior misdemeanor

 

to elevate the current offense to a felony if Hobbs was convicted. ‘The
Stato then presented evidence of the prior convictions at the preliminary
hearing, and that evidence was transferred to the district court. Crucially,
though, once the case was bound over to the district court, the State did
not present evidence of the prior misdemeanor convictions, nor did it
demonstrate the constitutional validity of the misdemeanor offenses. In
particular, at sentencing, the record is devoid of any mention of the prior
misdemeanor convictions, either by the district court or the State.

Even though the prior offenses were presented to the justice
court, its role was limited and confined to a probable cause determination.
See NRS 4.370; NRS 171.206. In fact, we have expressly held that while
the State must substantiate the existence of the offenses at the

preliminary examination, the constitutional validity of the prior

 

 
convictions is not for the justice court to determine. Parsons v, State, 116
Nev. 928, 936, 10 P.3d 836, 841 (2000). Rather, that issue “is for the trial
court to determine at, or anytime before, sentencing.” Id.; see also Hudson
vy. Warden, 117 Nev. 387, 394-95, 22 P.3d 1154, 1169 (2001); Ronning v.
State, 116 Nev. 82, 33-84, 992 P.2d 260, 261 (2000); NRS 200.485(4). In
sum, the State failed to establish the existence and constitutional validity

 

of the prior domestic battery misdemeanor convictions; mere transmission
of the exhibits used at the preliminary hearing from the justice court to
the district court was insufficient. We therefore conclude that Hobbs’

current offense was erroneously enhanced to a felony under NRS 200.486.

 

Because the current offense was improperly enhanced to a felony, Hobbs’
habitual criminal adjudication is likewise invalid. See NRS 207.010(1)(b)
(current offense must be a felony for purposes of habitual criminal
statute). As a result, we reverse the felony conviction and habitual
criminal adjudication and remand the case to the district court to sentence
Hobbs for a misdemeanor offense. See Phipps, 111 Nev. at 1279, 903 P.2d
at 822 (reversing and remanding to resentence for a misdemeanor offense
where the State failed to comply with the statutory requirements for
enhancement); Robertson v, State, 109 Nev. 1086, 1089, 863 P.2d 1040,
1042 (1993) (remanding with instructions to resentence defendant for a
misdemeanor offense because “[tJhere is no statutory mechanism which

permits the district court to conduct @ second sentencing hearing for the

purpose of receiving evidence which the state neglected to present during
the first sentencing hearing”), overruled on other grounds by Krauss v,
State, 116 Nev. 307, 998 P.2d 163 (2000); Pettipas v. State, 106 Nev. 377,
380, 794 P.2d 705, 707 (1990) (remanding to resentence the defendant for

 

 
non >

‘a misdemeanor offense where there was an insufficient showing that the
prior misdemeanor conviction was constitutionally valid).
CONCLUSION

We conclude that spitting amounts to the “use of force or
violence” as contemplated by NRS 200.481 and therefore constitutes
battery under that statute. We further conclude that the State failed to
prove the existence and constitutional validity of Hobbs’ prior domestic
battery misdemeanor convictions and therefore that the enhancement of
the domestic battery to a felony and the subsequent adjudication of Hobbs
as a habitual criminal were erroneous. We therefore affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Saitta

 

Gibbons

8We note for the purpose of clarity that our holding is not based on
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (requiring that facts that
increase the maximum penalty for an offense, other than the existence of
prior convictions, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), and
should not be confused with Apprendi and its progeny.

“Given our resolution, we need not reach Hobbs’ remaining
contentions.

12