Title: Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission v. Lewis

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW 
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 020696  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   SEPTEMBER 13, 2002 
WOODROW LEWIS, JR., JUDGE 
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 
 
This case arises from a complaint filed by the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission of Virginia against 
Woodrow Lewis, Jr., judge of the Second Judicial District.  
In the complaint, the Commission alleges that there are 
well-founded grounds of sufficient gravity to warrant the 
censure of Judge Lewis in that Judge Lewis enforced an 
order that he knew had been stayed by the Circuit Court of 
the City of Virginia Beach. 
The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission was created 
to investigate charges that, if true, would warrant the 
retirement, removal, or censure of a judge.  Va. Const. 
art. VI, § 10; Code § 17.1-902.  When the Commission 
concludes, after investigation, that such a charge is well-
founded, it may file a formal complaint, resulting in a 
hearing before this Court.  Id.  If this Court “finds that 
the judge has engaged in misconduct while in office, or . . 
. has persistently failed to perform the duties of [the] 
office, or . . . has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice, it shall censure [the 
judge] or shall remove [the judge] from office.”  Va. 
Const. art. VI, § 10. 
The Commission conducted a hearing on February 12, 
2002, at which Judge Lewis was present and represented by 
counsel.  The following recited facts were undisputed at 
the hearing.∗  Judge Lewis, sitting as judge of the City of 
Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 
Court, entered an order on October 3, 2001, requiring 
Albert Valery to surrender custody of his two children to 
their mother no later than 3:00 p.m. on that date.  Judge 
Lewis denied the request of the children’s guardian ad 
litem for a stay of his order pending an appeal to the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach. 
Mr. Valery did not surrender custody of his children 
at 3:00 p.m. as ordered.  Instead, Mr. Valery brought the 
children to a circuit court hearing at 4:00 p.m. that day.  
At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court stayed 
Judge Lewis’ order pending a hearing scheduled for the 
afternoon of October 5. 
On October 4, at the request of the children’s mother, 
                     
∗ Likewise, at the hearing before this Court, counsel 
for Judge Lewis agreed that the factual findings of the 
Commission are undisputed. 
 
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a deputy clerk of the juvenile court issued a criminal show 
cause summons against Mr. Valery, based upon his failure to 
comply with Judge Lewis’ October 3rd order.  The show cause 
hearing was scheduled for the morning of October 5. 
At the show cause hearing, Mr. Valery’s counsel 
presented Judge Lewis with a certified copy of the circuit 
court’s stay order.  Judge Lewis proceeded with the show 
cause hearing, found Mr. Valery in willful contempt of the 
October 3rd order, sentenced him to ten days in jail, and 
ordered that he be held without bond.  Judge Lewis entered 
a contempt order styled “Certificate of Conviction,” which 
stated that Mr. Valery could purge the contempt and be 
released from jail upon his surrender of the children to 
their mother.  Judge Lewis’ order made no mention of the 
circuit court’s stay order.  Mr. Valery was taken into 
custody and remained there until the circuit court 
dismissed the show cause summons later that afternoon. 
Based upon these factual findings, the Commission 
concluded that Judge Lewis had violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 
and 3B(2) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for the State 
of Virginia and subsequently filed its formal complaint 
with this Court.  The portions of the Canons referenced in 
the complaint provide: 
 
 
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Canon 1 
 
A Judge Shall Uphold 
the Integrity and Independence 
of the Judiciary. 
 
 
A. An independent and honorable judiciary is 
indispensable to justice in our society.  A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining 
and enforcing high standards of conduct, and 
shall personally observe those standards so that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary 
will be preserved.  The provisions of these 
Canons are to be construed and applied to further 
that objective. 
 
Canon 2 
 
A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety 
and the Appearance of Impropriety 
in All the Judge’s Activities. 
 
 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the 
law and shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
Canon 3 
 
A Judge Shall Perform 
the Duties of Judicial Office 
Impartially and Diligently. 
 
*     *     * 
 
 
B.(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law 
and maintain professional competence in it.  A 
judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor or fear of criticism. 
 
In conducting the hearing on the formal complaint 
filed by the Commission, this Court considers the evidence 
and makes factual determinations de novo.  Commission v. 
Hoback, Record No. 911562 (Jan. 10, 1992).  The Commission 
 
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must prove its charges in this Court by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Id.  The term “clear and convincing 
evidence” has been defined as 
 
that measure or degree of proof which will produce in 
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or 
conviction as to the allegations sought to be 
established.  It is intermediate, being more than a 
mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such 
certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as 
in criminal cases.  It does not mean clear and 
unequivocal. 
 
Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 540-41, 
211 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1975) (quoting Cross v. Ledford, 120 
N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ohio 1954)). 
It is undisputed that the circuit court did not stay 
Judge Lewis’ order until after the 3:00 p.m. deadline had 
passed without Mr. Valery’s compliance with that order.  
Nevertheless, the issue we confront is not whether Judge 
Lewis had the authority to hold Mr. Valery in contempt for 
his failure to comply with an order that was ultimately 
stayed or whether a finding of contempt was appropriate 
given the circumstances of this case.  Instead, our concern 
is focused on Judge Lewis’ inclusion of the purge clause in 
his “Certificate of Conviction,” providing for Mr. Valery’s 
release from confinement if he surrendered the children as 
Judge Lewis had previously ordered. 
 
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Judge Lewis has conceded that, prior to entering the 
contempt order, he had been provided with a certified copy 
of the circuit court’s stay order.  He testified at the 
hearing before the Commission that including the purge 
clause in the contempt order was “[his] idea.”  Judge Lewis 
further testified that “when there has been a subsequent 
Order by a higher court, . . . normally nothing that is 
done by the higher court usually deprives the lower court 
of the obligation or the opportunity to enforce its own 
Orders.”  Although Judge Lewis stated that this was his 
first experience on the bench with a stay of one of his 
orders, he made no attempt to explain the inclusion of the 
purge clause as a mere mistake of law on his part.  
Instead, he testified that when a party obtains a stay of 
an order, “the fact that they’re asking the Court to not 
compel their performance does not mean that they’re not 
free to perform.” 
From Judge Lewis’ own testimony, we find clear and 
convincing evidence that, in providing for the purge of 
contempt and Mr. Valery’s release from confinement upon his 
surrender of the children to their mother, Judge Lewis 
deliberately, and with knowledge of the circuit court’s 
stay, attempted to enforce his October 3rd order.  Although 
Judge Lewis acknowledged that Mr. Valery was free to 
 
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surrender or not to surrender the children once the circuit 
court stayed his order, the effect of the purge clause was 
to coerce Mr. Valery to perform the very action that had 
been stayed by the circuit court.  Thus, Judge Lewis’ 
inclusion of the purge clause in his contempt order can 
only be construed as directly contrary to, and in disregard 
of, the circuit court’s stay order, and as a violation of 
the Canons previously cited. 
Public confidence in the judiciary and the 
administration of our legal system depends upon faithful 
adherence to the law, an essential part of which is 
embodied in the judgments and rulings of higher courts.  
Courts cannot reasonably expect citizens to comply with 
their orders if the courts themselves do not yield to the 
orders of higher courts.  Thus, we find clear and 
convincing evidence that Judge Lewis engaged in the conduct 
set forth in the formal complaint filed by the Commission, 
and that such conduct was prejudicial to the proper 
administration of justice, thereby warranting censure. 
Accordingly, we order that Judge Lewis be, and he 
hereby is, censured for engaging in “conduct prejudicial to 
the proper administration of justice.”  Va. Const. art. VI, 
§ 10; Code § 17.1-906. 
 
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