Title: Cafe Moda, LLC v. Palma

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

428 Nev, Advance Opinion “7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CAFE MODA, LLC, D/B/A CAFE MODA, No, 54703

Appellant,

ve. FILED
DONNY PALMA AND MATT RYAN
RICHARDS, orm
Respondents. aoa

 

  

Appeal from a district court judgment on a jury verdict in a
tort action. Highth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Valorie J. Vega,
Judge.

  
  
  
  

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded,

Lewis & Roca, LLP, and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Joel D. Henriod, and
Jacqueline A. Gilbert, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Law Offices of Michael A. Koning, P.C., and Michael A. Koning, Las
Vegas,
for Respondent Donny Palma,

Matt Ryan Richards, Las Vegas,
in Proper Person.

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 41.141, Nevada's
‘comparative-negligence statute, permits liability to be apportioned
between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor. Concluding

14- 06504

 
that NRS 41.141 is ambiguous in this regard, we construe the statute as
permitting such an apportionment in order to give effect to the
Legislature's intent. Having done #0, we determine that the negligent
tortfeasor, appellant Café Moda, is severally liable for 20% of respondent
Donny Palma's damages and that the intentional tortfeasor, respondent
Matt Richards, is jointly and severally liable for 100% of Palma’s damages.
We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's
judgment holding the tortfeasors jointly and severally liable.
FACTS:

Matt Richards and Donny Palma were patrons on Café Moda’s
premises, During an altercation between the two, Richards stabbed
nd Café
Moda, pursuing an intentional-tort theory of liability against Richards and

Palma repeatedly. Palma then brought suit against Richards

 

‘a negligence theory of liability against Café Moda,

At trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Palma. Having
found that Palma had not been comparatively negligent, it apportioned
‘80% of the fault to Richards and the remaining 20% to Café Moda. Based
upon its reading of NRS 41.141, however, the district court entered a
judgment against Richards and Café Moda that held each of them jointly
and severally liable for 100% of Palma’s damages. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Café Moda contends that NRS 41.141 permits

liability to be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and an

intentional tortfeasor. Consequently, it maintains, the district court erred
in holding it jointly and severally liable for 100% of Palma’s damages
when the jury found it to be only 20% at fault. As explained below, we
agree.

 

 
ae ae

 

Standard of review

Whether NRS 41.141 permits liability to be apportioned
between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor involves a
question of statutory construction, which this court reviews de novo. In re
Candelaria, 126 Nev. __, __, 245 P.3d 518, 520 (2010).

mit i ability between 9
tortfeasor_and_an_int ives effect

egislature’s intent

Although Palma's lawsuit against Café Moda and Richards
involves straightforward common-law tort principles, the parties recognize
that NRS 41.141 has

 

supplanted much of the common law in terms of how
liability should be imposed and apportioned amongst multiple defendants.
See Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 100 Nev. 703, 707-08, 692 P.2d 1282, 1285-
86 (1984) (explaining that NRS 41.141 “eliminatfed]" and “abolished” two
common-law doctrines: (1) a plaintiff's contributory negligence

 

a
complete bar to recovery, and (2) joint and several liability amongst
negligent defendants), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Countrywide Home Loans v, Thitchener, 124 Nev. 725, 740-43, 192 P.8d
243, 253-66 (2008); soe also 1973 Nev. Stat., ch. 787, at 1722 (isting a
twofold purpose for enacting NRS 41.141). ‘Thus, while the parties agree
that NRS 41.141 governs the issue presented in this caso, they disagree as
to how.

When considering a statute's application, we begin with its
plain language. Arguello v, Sunset Station, Inc,, 127 Nev, _, _, 262

 

 
P.3d 206, 209 (2011). Here, the plain language of NRS 41.141 provides in
relevant part as follows:

1, In any action to recover damages... in
which comparative negligence is asserted as a
defense, the comparative negligence of the
plaintiff...does not bar a recovery if that
negligence was not greater than the negligence or
gross negligence of the parties to the action
against whom recovery is sought.

 

4, Where recovery is allowed against more
than one defendant in such an action, except as
otherwise provided _in subsection 5, each
defendant is_severally liable to the plaintiff only
for that portion of the judgment which represents

the percentage of negligence attributable to
that defendant.

5. This section does not affect the joint and
several liability, if any, of the defendants in an
action based upon:

(b) An intentional tort[.]
NRS 41.141 (emphases added).

Both Café Moda and Palma offer a plain-language application
of the statute in support of their respective positions. Café Moda’s plain-
language argument illustrates NRS 41.141’s general framework: Because
Café Moda asserted comparative negligence as a defense (subsection 1),
and because it was sued on a negligence theory, subsection 5(b)'s
intentional-tort exception does not preclude application of subsection 4's
general rule regarding several liability. Once under subsection 4, Café
Moda contends that it is severally liable to Palma for only its portion of
the judgment—here, 20%,

 

om

 
Palma’s argument, on the other hand, relies on subsection 4's
express use of the word “negligence.” By using the word “negligence,”
Palma maintains that NRS 41.141 permits only “negligence” to be
apportioned and that such apportionment must be done entirely with
respect to the negligent parties in the case. Thus, Palma contends, when
the jury found that he had not been comparatively negligent, it effectively
apportioned 100% of the negligence to Café Moda, at which point the
Aistrict court properly held Café Moda, the only negligent party, liable for
100% of the judgment. As for Richards, the intentional tortfeasor, Palma
maintains that he also was properly held liable for 100% of the judgment
under subsection 5(b)'s exception?

Because both parties have presented a plausible plain-
language application of the statute, we conclude that NRS 41.141 is
ambiguous with respect to the question presented by this case. Attorney
General v, Nevada Tax Comm'n, 124 Nev. 282, 240, 181 P.3d 675, 680-81
(2008) A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood in
two or more senses by reasonably informed persons or it does not
otherwise speak to the issue before the court.” (quotation omitted).

Having concluded that NRS 41.141 is ambiguous, we must
construe it in a manner that is consistent with the Legislature's intent.
Hardy Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. __, __, 245 P.3d

1149, 1153 (2010). “[T}his court determines the Legislature's intent by

 

!We reject Palma’s alternative argument that his entire lawsuit was
“an action based upon... . [a]n intentional tort.” NRS 41.141(5)(). While
the act that precipitated his lawsuit against Café Moda and Richards was
indeed an intentional tort, he nevertheless pursued a negligence cause of
action against Café Moda. See Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 725
(N.Y. 2002) (rejecting an identical argument put forth by a plaintiff in a
similar factual situation),

 

 
evaluating the legislative history and construing the statute in a manner
that conforms to reason and public policy.” Great Basin Water Network v,
State Eng’r, 126 Nev, __, _, 284 P.3d 912, 918 (2010),

As mentioned previously, when the Legislature enacted NRS
41.141 in 1973, its purpose was to lessen the perceived unfairness in two
of our common-law tort doctrines. Warmbrodt, 100 Nev. at 707-08, 692
P.2d at 1285-86 (describing NRS 41,141's effect). First, by eliminating a
plaintiff's contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery, the
Legislature sought to ensure that a relatively low-fault plaintiff was not
left completely without recourse. See 1973 Nev. Stat., ch. 787, § 1, at
1722; Hearing on 8.B, 524 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 57th Leg.
(Nev., April 6, 1973). Second, by abandoning joint and several liability
amongst negligent defendants

 

the Legislature sought to ensure that a
negligent defendant's liability would be limited to an amount
proportionate with his or her fault. See 1973 Nev. Stat., ch. 787, at 1722;
Hearing on §.B. 524 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 57th Leg. (Nev.,
April 6, 1973)

‘To a certain extent, these policy interests run counter to each
other. Recognizing as much, the Legislature has amended NRS 41.141 on
three occasions in an attempt to strike a fair balance. Below, we briefly
summarize the evolution of NRS 41.141, as doing so helps us discern how
the Legislature would intend for NRS 41.141 to be applied in this case.

In 1979, the Legislature amended NRS 41.141 by eliminating
several liability for negligent defendants.* See 1979 Nev. Stat., ch. 629, §
6, at 1357. In essence, it brought back the common-law doctrine of joint

“This elimination was subject to an exception not relevant here. See
1979 Nev. Stat., ch. 629, § 6, at 1357.

 

 
and several liability and merely permitted one defendant to seek
contribution from another codefendant. Id., § 1, at 1355. From a policy
standpoint, this amendment shifted the balance toward ensuring that a
plaintiff was not left without recourse.

In 1987, the Legislature again revisited NRS 41.141. This

 

time, it re-implemented several liability amongst codefendants as the
general rule, but it carved out five exceptions to this general rule for when
joint and several liability would still apply. See 1987 Nev. Stat., ch. 709, §
1, at 1697-98; NRS 41.141(4), (6). Considering the general rule and the
five exceptions together, the practical effect of this amendment was to
maintain joint and several liability for all types of defendants except for
merely negligent defendants, From a policy standpoint, this amendment
shifted the balance toward ensuring that a negligent defendant's liability
‘would be limited.

‘The effect of the 1987 amendment was not lost on the
Legislature when it again considered NRS 41.141 in 1989. During
discussion of a bill to amend the statute, it was mentioned that the 1987
shift back to several liability for negligent defendants was “designed to
prevent the ‘deep-pocket doctrine.” See Hearing on A.B. 249 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 65th Leg. (Nev., March 8, 1989). With this
design in mind, the Legislature decided to maintain NRS 41.141’s

framework, choosing only to clarify the scope of one of the five exceptions.
See 1989 Nev. Stat., ch. 39, § 1, at 72-73; NRS 41.141(6).

NRS 41,141 has remained unchanged since 1989. Thus, in
light of the statute's design, we consider how the Legislature would intend
for NRS 41.141 to apply in this case. We start and finish by revisiting
Palma’s proffered application of the statute, which, again, relies upon

 

 
7

 

subsection 4's use of the word “negligence.” Under Palma’s proffered
application, NRS 41.141 technically affords several liability to all
negligent defendants, But because only “negligence” may be apportioned
under his application, affording several liability to a negligent defendant
provides no benefit unless the defendant has a codefendant who is also
being sued on a negligence theory. ‘Thus, in the case at hand where Café
Moda’s codefendant committed an intentional tort, Café Moda is
effectively denied the statute's benefit of several liability.

Not only does Palma's proffered application run counter to the
Legislature's design of NRS 41.141, but it produces the unreasonable
result of hinging the extent of a negligent defendant's liability on another
party's mindset. Meridian Gold v. State, Dep't of Taxation, 119 Nev. 630,
633, 81 P.3d 616, 518 (2003) C[W]e must construe statutory language to
avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” (quotation omitted)).

Accordingly, we must construe NRS 41.141 in a way that gives
effect to the statute's design and the Legislature's intent. Hardy

8When considering this same issue with regard to their own
comparative-negligence statutes, other jurisdictions have reached the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 14, 15-16 (Ct. App. 1991) According to [plaintiff] the statute has a
limited effect benefitting a negligent tortfeasor only where there are other
equally culpable defendants, but eliminating that benefit where the other
tortfeasors act intentionally. Stating the proposition reflects its
absurdity.”); Reichert. v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 381 (N.M. 1994) (“We cannot
find a sound basis in public policy to abrogate the legislature's
determination that comparative-fault principles should apply; rather, we
believe that public policy would support a holding that the bar owner may
reduce his liability by the percentage of fault attributable to [an
intentional tortfeasor).”); Chianese, 74 NE.2d at 726 (“[Plaintiff's
proposed application is] not only illogical but also inconsistent with the
chief remedial purpose of {the statute].”).

 

 

 
Companies, Inc,, 126 Nev. at __, 245 P.3d at 1153. To do so, we construe
subsection 4's use of “negligence” to mean “fault.” Cf, Hearing on S.B. 511
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 64th Leg. (Nev, May 13, 1987)
(explaining that it is the jury's responsibility to allocate “fault” under NRS
41.141, notwithstanding subsection 4’s use of the word “negligence”);
Black's Law Dictionary 683 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “fault” to encompass
of the actor’s intent). Such a
construction gives effect to the statute's design, climinates the

an array of wrongful conduct, regardle:

 

unreasonable result inherent in Palma's proffered application, and leaves
the remainder of the statute's language intact.
Under this construction, NRS 41.141’

 

pplication to this case
becomes straightforward. Because the jury found Café Moda to be 20% at

fault, it is to be held severally liable for 20% of Palma’s damages. And

 

because our construction of the statute leaves subsection 5 unchanged,
Richards remains jointly and severally liable for 100% of Palma’s
damages.
CONCLUSION

We conclude that NRS 41.141 is ambiguous with regard to
whether liability may be apportioned between a negligent tortfeasor and
an intentional tortfeasor. After reviewing NRS 41.141’s legislative
history, we believe that the most effective way to carry out the
Legislature's intent is to construe NRS 41.141(4)'s use of the word
“negligence” to mean “fault.” Having done so, we determine that appellant
Café Moda is severally liable for 20% of respondent Donny Palma’s
damages and that respondent Matt Richards is jointly and severally liable
for 100% of Palma’s damages. We therefore reverse the part of the district

court’s judgment imposing joint and several liability against Café Moda

 

 
 

ane

 

and remand this matter ¢o that the district court can enter a modified
judgment reflecting this decision. All other aspects of the district court's
judgment, not having been challenged, are affirmed.

J

Parraguirre
We concur:
dug hS ds,
Douglas

J.

Hardesty

0