Title: State v. David G. Alexander

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1973-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
David G. Alexander,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
207 Wis. 2d 643, 559 N.W.2d 925 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 18, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Christopher A. Mutschler, Michele A. Tjader, and Barry 
S. Cohen, S.C., Elkhart Lake and oral argument by Dennis M. 
Melowski. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
David G. Alexander, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 18, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The defendant David G. 
Alexander (Alexander) seeks review of his conviction for 
operating a motor vehicle while having a prohibited alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 or more, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b) (1993-94).1  One of the three elements of this 
offense is that the defendant must have two or more prior 
convictions, suspensions or revocations as counted under Wis. 
Stat. § 343.307(1).  
¶2 
The issue is whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it allowed the introduction of 
evidence of two or more prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations as counted under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1), and 
further submitted that element to the jury when the defendant 
                     
1  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-
94 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
2 
fully admitted to the element and the purpose of the evidence 
was solely to prove that element.  Because we conclude that the 
purpose of the evidence was solely to prove the element of two 
or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations, its 
probative value was far outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant.  We conclude that admitting any 
evidence of the element of prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations and submitting the element to the jury in this case 
was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  However, because of 
the overwhelming nature of the evidence as to the defendant’s 
guilt in this case, we also conclude that the error was 
harmless.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
¶3 
This case was heard before a jury in the circuit court 
for Milwaukee County, Timothy G. Dugan, judge, presiding.  The 
arresting officer, Officer Gallagher of the Oak Creek Police 
Department, was the State of Wisconsin’s (State’s) only witness. 
 He testified as follows.  In the early morning hours of October 
27, 1995, Officer Gallagher was driving northbound on South 27th 
Street in the City of Oak Creek when he noticed a vehicle 
approaching from behind.  Officer Gallagher was driving in the 
right driving lane of the two-lane divided highway and the 
vehicle was approaching in the far right lane which was a 
turning lane.  The vehicle approaching Officer Gallagher’s car 
moved left from the turning lane in front of the officer’s 
vehicle, nearly striking the median strip and then moving 
forward as Officer Gallagher did a quick turn snap into the left 
lane 
to 
avoid 
a 
collision. 
 
After 
going 
through 
the 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
3 
intersection, Officer Gallagher observed the vehicle for about 
two more blocks.  The vehicle went back and forth across the 
“fog line” (the far right illuminated line painted on the 
street), straddled the fog line, and struck the far right curb. 
  
¶4 
After these observations, the officer attempted to 
stop the vehicle.  Driving approximately two car lengths behind 
the vehicle, Officer Gallagher turned on the red lights and 
flashers of his squad car.  The vehicle did not stop.  After 
several blocks, the officer turned on the siren and the vehicle 
pulled over.  
¶5 
When Officer Gallagher approached the vehicle the 
driver had opened the window and the officer smelled a strong 
odor of intoxicants on the driver’s breath.  Officer Gallagher 
noticed the driver had slurred speech and his eyes were red and 
glassy.  At the officer’s request, the driver readily produced 
his identification.  The officer identified the driver as the 
defendant, Mr. David G. Alexander.  In response to Officer 
Gallagher’s questions, Mr. Alexander said that he had had a few 
drinks.  Officer Gallagher asked Mr. Alexander to recite the 
alphabet.  Mr. Alexander went through letters A to F very 
deliberately, correctly saying all those letters.  Mr. Alexander 
then stopped, looked up at the officer and said, “You got me.”   
¶6 
The 
officer then 
conducted 
three 
standard 
field 
sobriety tests.  It was drizzling and the street surface was 
gently sloped upward, but the surface was generally flat.  
Although Mr. Alexander had no difficulty exiting his vehicle, he 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
4 
failed each of the field sobriety tests.  Officer Gallagher 
informed him that he was under arrest for operating a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated (OWI).  The officer then transported 
Mr. Alexander to the Oak Creek Police Department. 
¶7 
At the police station, Officer Gallagher went over the 
“informing the accused” form with Mr. Alexander, ensured he 
understood each section and had him sign the form.  This 
document informs the arrested person that he is under arrest for 
drunk driving and that he has implied his consent to provide a 
sample of his breath, blood or urine at the officer’s request.  
The officer observed Mr. Alexander for 20 minutes as required by 
Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 311.06(3)(a) and then performed the 
Intoxilyzer test.  The defendant’s alcohol concentration was 
.24.  The officer then wrote a second citation for driving with 
a prohibited alcohol concentration.  
¶8 
After issuing the second citation, Officer Gallagher 
completed the “alcoholic influence report” which, among other 
things, informs the defendant of his Miranda rights.  The 
alcoholic influence report also contains a series of questions 
which the officer posed to the defendant.  In response to the 
questions, Mr. Alexander stated that he did not know where he 
was coming from when he was stopped; that he was stopped at 
11:00 p.m. (when he was really stopped at 3:05 a.m.); that he 
had been drinking beer; and that he was under the influence of 
an alcoholic beverage at the time he was answering these 
questions.   
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
5 
¶9 
The defendant also testified at the trial.  His 
testimony materially conflicted with the officer’s testimony in 
only a few respects.  Alexander testified that the turning lane 
in which he was driving continues through the intersection as a 
third lane.  He stated that he did not quickly move to the left 
as he was going through the intersection.  Also, rather than 
drizzling, he stated that it was raining fairly hard from the 
time he saw the officer’s vehicle through performing the field 
sobriety tests.  Alexander also attempted to explain his actions 
during his arrest.  He explained that when he told the officer, 
“You got me,” he meant the officer caught him not being able to 
say the alphabet because he was so nervous.  Alexander testified 
that his eyes were probably red and glassy because he had been 
awake for about 20 hours and he had been at a restaurant/bar 
with an open kitchen and smoky grill and people were smoking 
cigarettes.  He further testified that he was not able to 
complete two of the field sobriety tests because his right knee 
has been operated on seven times over the years.  Also, when 
asked if he was incapacitated when he was stopped, Alexander 
replied, “I didn’t believe so.  I felt fine.”   
¶10 Before the final pre-trial conference the defendant’s 
counsel filed a motion in which the defendant offered to 
stipulate that his driving record correctly sets forth that he 
has two prior OWI convictions.  With this offer to stipulate the 
defendant also filed a motion in limine requesting that the 
court order the State to refrain from introducing any evidence 
regarding the defendant’s prior OWI convictions.  Alexander also 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
6 
moved to modify the substantive jury instructions.  The thrust 
of the defendant’s proposals, as noted in the State’s brief, was 
to eliminate the element regarding his prior convictions as a 
matter for the jury to determine at trial, and to have this 
element considered only by the court at sentencing.  The State 
agreed to stipulate to the existence of the defendant’s prior 
OWI convictions, but it refused to waive that portion of the 
jury trial which would be relevant to making a finding on that 
element.   
¶11 The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion and 
concluded that the State can be required to stipulate to the 
fact that the defendant has two prior convictions, suspensions 
or revocations under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) but that the State 
cannot be forced to waive any portion of the jury trial.  
Therefore, evidence regarding the element of the defendant’s 
prior convictions, suspensions or revocations was presented to 
the jury although the extent of information that the State could 
introduce was limited.  
¶12 After the judge’s ruling on the defendant’s motion the 
parties 
agreed 
to 
the 
judge’s 
proposed 
jury 
instruction 
regarding their stipulation to the prior convictions: 
 
The District Attorney and defendant’s attorney have 
stipulated to the following facts: 
 
On the date and time in question in this case that the 
defendant had two or more convictions, suspensions or 
revocations as counted under section 343.307(1) of the 
Wisconsin Statutes. 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
7 
The 
judge 
also 
proposed 
giving 
the 
following 
cautionary 
instruction: 
 
Evidence has been received that the defendant has two 
or more convictions, suspensions or revocations as 
counted under section 343.307(1) of the statutes.  
This evidence is received solely because it bears upon 
the second element that the State must prove for the 
offense 
of 
driving 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration.  It must not be used for any other 
purpose and, particularly, you should bear in mind 
that conviction, suspension or revocation as counted 
under section 343.307(1) at some previous time is not 
proof of the guilt of the offense now charged. 
The parties agreed to this instruction as well.   
¶13 The 
judge 
instructed 
the 
jury 
during 
both 
his 
preliminary and final instructions as to the elements of the 
offense including the element of two or more prior convictions, 
suspensions or revocations under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  When 
the 
State 
rested 
its 
case 
and 
twice 
during 
his 
final 
instructions, the judge informed the jury of the parties’ 
stipulation regarding the prior convictions and gave the above 
cautionary instruction.   
¶14 The jury returned verdicts finding the defendant 
guilty of both charges: driving while under the influence of an 
intoxicant and driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration. 
 The court granted the State’s motion for judgment on the 
conviction and sentenced the defendant.  The sentence was stayed 
pending appeal.  
The 
court 
of appeals concluded 
in an 
unpublished decision that it was error for the circuit court to 
allow the State to submit evidence of the prior convictions to 
the jury but that the error was harmless. 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
8 
¶15 Alexander challenges the verdict finding him guilty of 
driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) (reprinted below).2  He makes two 
arguments.  First, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by allowing the jury to hear any evidence regarding 
his prior convictions.  Second, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by submitting to the jury the element 
that 
the 
defendant 
has 
two 
or 
more 
prior 
convictions, 
revocations or suspensions under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  The 
issue presented by this case is whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it admitted evidence 
of the element of two or more prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations under § 343.307(1) and submitted the element to the 
jury when the defendant fully admitted to the element and the 
purpose of the evidence was solely to prove that element.   
¶16 The question of whether to admit evidence is within a 
circuit court’s discretion.  See State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 
297, 320, 421 N.W.2d 96 (1988).  This court will reverse a 
discretionary 
decision 
when 
the circuit court 
erroneously 
exercises its discretion because it bases its decision upon an 
error of law.  See Marten Transport v. Hartford Specialty, 194 
Wis. 2d 1, 13, 533 N.W.2d 452 (1995) (citing Jesse v. Danforth, 
169 Wis. 2d 229, 246, 485 N.W.2d 63 (1992)).   
                     
2  “Operating under influence of intoxicant or other drug. 
(1)  No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: . . . 
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.”  Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
9 
¶17 The crime of Operating a Motor Vehicle with a 
Prohibited Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or more has three 
elements.  The first element is that a defendant drove or 
operated a motor vehicle on a highway.  The second element is 
that at the time a defendant drove or operated a motor vehicle, 
he or she had two or more prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations as counted under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  See Wis. 
JICriminal 2660B (1993); see also State v. Ludeking, 195 
Wis. 2d 132, 141, 536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995).  Section 
§ 343.307(1) includes convictions for OWI, and convictions, 
suspensions or revocations for refusal to submit to the chemical 
tests for alcohol.  See Wis. JICriminal 2660B, n.10.  The third 
element of this offense is that a defendant had a prohibited 
alcohol concentration at the time he or she drove or operated 
the motor vehicle.  See Wis. JICriminal 2660B.  If a defendant 
has two or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations 
under § 343.307(1), the prohibited alcohol concentration is 0.08 
grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of the person’s breath, 
or 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s 
blood.  See Wis. JICriminal 2660B; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(b).  If a defendant has only one or no prior 
convictions, suspensions or revocations under § 343.307(1), the 
prohibited alcohol concentration is 0.10 or more of alcohol in 
210 liters of the person’s breath, or 0.10 percent or more by 
weight of alcohol in the person’s blood.  See Wis. JICriminal 
2660A; see also § 340.01(46m)(a). 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
10
¶18 The issue in this case hinges on the exercise of the 
circuit court’s discretion under Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (reprinted 
below).3  This statute, which is parallel to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 (reprinted below),4 provides that relevant evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect.   
¶19 As a threshold matter, there is no question that 
evidence which serves to prove an element of a crime is 
relevant.  Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence.”  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  In 
this case, the defendant’s offer to stipulate to his prior OWI 
convictions was essentially an admission that he met the second 
element of the charged crime - operating with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration.  This admission is relevant evidence. 
¶20 To be excludable, the relevant evidence must not be 
simply prejudicial.  Nearly all of the State’s evidence is 
prejudicial to the defendant in some way.  See State v. Murphy, 
                     
3 “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03 
4 “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  FRE 403  
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
11
188 Wis. 2d 508, 521, 524 N.W.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1994).  To be 
excludable, the evidence must be unfairly prejudicial.  
¶21 “The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal 
defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant 
evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground 
different from proof specific to the offense charged.”  Old 
Chief v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650 (1997) (citations 
omitted);5 see also State v. Patricia A.M., 176 Wis. 2d 542, 500 
N.W.2d 289 (1993).  “’Unfair prejudice’ within this context 
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”  
Christensen v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 61 n.11, 
252 N.W.2d 81 (1977) (quoting FRE 403, Advisory Committee 
Notes).  Where prior convictions is an element of the charged 
crime, the risk of a jury using a defendant’s prior convictions 
as evidence of his or her propensity or bad character is great. 
 And where the prior offense is similar or of the same nature or 
character as the charged crime, the risk of unfair prejudice is 
particularly great.  See Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 652.   
¶22 The Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee 
(Committee) recognized the inherent danger of unfair prejudice 
to a defendant of admitting any evidence of the defendant’s 
prior convictions, suspensions or revocations under Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.307(1) and submitting the element to the jury.  See Wis. 
                     
5 Because we rely on Old Chief, we will discuss that opinion 
in more detail later in this opinion.   
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
12
JICriminal 2660-2665 Introductory Comment at 7.  The Committee 
suggested that at the defendant’s request the court give a 
cautionary instruction to the jury explaining that evidence of 
the prior offenses is relevant only as to the status of the 
defendant’s driving record and should not be used for any other 
purpose.  See Wis. JICriminal 2660B.  The Committee recognized, 
however, that “the potential prejudice to the defendant may be 
significant and may not be adequately cured by a limiting 
instruction.”  Wis. JICriminal 2660-2665 Introductory Comment 
at 7.  We agree with the Committee’s concerns. 
¶23 Evidence of prior convictions may lead a jury to 
convict a defendant for crimes other than the charged crime, 
convict because a bad person deserves punishment rather than 
based on the evidence presented, or convict thinking that an 
erroneous conviction is not so serious because the defendant 
already has a criminal record.  See Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 650-
651 (citations omitted); see also Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 
278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967); State v. Landrum, 191 Wis. 2d 
107, 122, 528 N.W.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1995).  A jury is likely to 
rely on the prior convictions as evidence of a defendant’s bad 
character so as to “deny him a fair opportunity to defend 
against a particular charge.”  Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 651 
(quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 
(1948)). 
¶24 In Old Chief, the accused was charged with assault 
with a dangerous weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm 
after being convicted of a crime punishable by more than one 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
13
year.  Because the defendant’s prior conviction was for assault 
causing serious bodily injury, he was particularly concerned 
that information regarding his previous assault conviction would 
improperly influence the jury in the current assault charge. 
¶25 In the present case informing the jury of the parties’ 
stipulation that the defendant had two or more convictions, 
suspensions 
or 
revocations 
as 
counted 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.307(1) was certainly less prejudicial than introducing the 
defendant’s driving record would have been.  Nonetheless, as we 
discuss later in this opinion, in a case where the defendant is 
charged with driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration and 
the jury is informed that he or she has two or more prior 
convictions, suspensions or revocations, it is highly probable 
that the jury will infer that the prior offenses are driving 
offenses and likely OWI offenses. 
¶26 The element that the defendant has two or more prior 
convictions is a status element of the offense which places him 
or her in a certain category of alleged offenders.  See Old 
Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 649.  Any evidence of the defendant’s 
admission to his prior OWI convictions has little probative 
value as to whether the defendant was operating a motor vehicle 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration.  The status element is 
completely 
“dependent 
on 
some 
judgment 
rendered 
wholly 
independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior 
charged against [the defendant].”  Id. at 654-55.  If evidence 
is admissible for some other reason, such as proving motive or 
intent, Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) regarding other crimes evidence 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
14
guarantees the State the opportunity to seek its admission.  See 
id. at 655.  At oral argument, counsel for the State conceded 
that evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions is not 
admissible for any purpose under § 904.04(2).  We agree.  
Accordingly, there is no probative value to this evidence other 
than to prove the defendant’s status.  Evidence of the status 
element is wholly independent of the concrete events that make 
up the gravamen of the offense, operating a motor vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration. 
¶27 There seems little doubt that the evidence of the 
defendant’s prior convictions, suspensions or revocations should 
be excluded and the status element not submitted to the jury 
because the probative value of the defendant’s admission is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant.  However, the State makes three arguments to 
support its position that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it admitted evidence of the 
defendant’s prior convictions, suspensions or revocations under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) and submitted that status element to the 
jury.  First, the State argues that not submitting the element 
to the jury was, in effect, a partial jury waiver which required 
the State’s consent.  Second, the State argues that the evidence 
had to be admitted to fulfill juror’s expectations.  Finally, 
the State argues that the evidence is necessary for a full 
evidentiary narrative which allows the State its right to a fair 
trial and opportunity to convict.  We will address each argument 
in turn. 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
15
¶28 The State asserts that not submitting the status 
element to the jury is a partial jury waiver.  The State argues 
that a defendant has no right to a trial by a judge alone and 
therefore, has no right to a trial only by a judge on one 
element.  The State’s argument, however, is misplaced: this is 
not an issue of jury waiver.  We agree that the defendant cannot 
waive a jury trial on the case or any part of the case without 
the State’s consent and the court’s approval.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 972.02(1).  If the parties agree to a full or partial 
jury waiver, the case or portion of the case is tried before the 
court.  See State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 565-66, 464 
N.W.2d 839 (1991).  However, Alexander does not propose that the 
element of his prior convictions be taken from the jury and 
determined by the judge alone.  He admits to the status element 
that he has two or more prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  His admission 
dispenses with the need for proof of the status element, either 
to a jury or to a judge.  See, e.g., State v. Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d 90, 104, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996) (citing State v. Meyer, 
258 Wis. 326, 338-39, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951) (both cases regarding 
penalty enhancer statutes).  Accordingly, this is not an issue 
of partial jury waiver, but one where the defendant has given up 
his right to a trial on that element.  
¶29 The State also argues that evidence of the defendant’s 
prior convictions is necessary to fulfill jurors’ expectations. 
 We agree that jurors bring certain expectations and knowledge 
to the courtroom.  The State argues that if the jury is not told 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
16
why the prohibited alcohol concentration for Mr. Alexander is 
0.08 or more instead of the more common prohibited alcohol 
concentration of .10 or more, the jury may think the lower 
alcohol concentration is a mistake.  Alternatively, the jury 
might think that Mr. Alexander is being unfairly singled out for 
harsher treatment.  Also, the State asserts that jurors may be 
puzzled by a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction, “and 
jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story’s truth 
can feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing 
that more could be said than they have heard.”  Old Chief, 117 
S.Ct. at 654.  The jury could draw a negative inference against 
the party who disappoints them and react with a not guilty 
verdict even though they are fully satisfied of all the elements 
of the crime.  See Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 654 (citing 
Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative 
Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Calif. 
L.Rev. 1011, 1019 (1978)).   
¶30 We are not persuaded by the State’s argument.  First, 
jurors are frequently told what the law is and are asked to 
apply it.  If the jury is instructed that the prohibited alcohol 
concentration is 0.08, it is presumed that they will follow that 
instruction.  See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990).  Second, the State provides no support for 
its assertion that it is common knowledge that the usual 
prohibited alcohol concentration is .10.  As counsel for 
defendant pointed out at oral argument, there are different 
prohibited alcohol concentrations for different circumstances.  
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
17
For example, the prohibited alcohol concentration for commercial 
drivers is 0.04 (Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4m)(a)), but an alcohol 
concentration of 0.00 is a condition of an occupational license 
for 
second 
and 
subsequent 
offenders. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.10(5)(a)2. 
¶31 The State also argues that any unfair prejudicial 
impact of admitting evidence and submitting the status element 
of the defendant’s prior convictions to the jury is minimal 
because the jurors do not have the foggiest idea what kind of 
convictions, suspensions or 
revocations 
are 
counted 
under 
§ 343.307(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes.  We disagree.  A 
strength of our jury system is that “jurors . . . bring their 
experiences, philosophies, and common sense to bear in their 
deliberations.”  State v. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, 264, 518 
N.W.2d 232 (1994).  It is highly likely that jurors’ experiences 
and common sense  would tell them that when a defendant is 
charged with driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration, 
the prior convictions, suspensions or revocations as counted 
under § 343.307(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes must be driving 
offenses 
and 
likely 
drunk-driving 
offenses. 
 
The 
words 
“suspensions or revocations” in a case where the defendant is 
charged with driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration, in 
particular raise the inference that the prior offenses are also 
driving offenses.  The unfair prejudicial impact of the evidence 
and status element itself is not minimal. 
¶32 Finally, the State argues that the evidence is 
necessary for the State’s full evidentiary narrative which 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
18
allows the State its right to a fair trial and opportunity to 
convict.  In general, we agree.  When a court balances the 
probative value against the unfair prejudicial effect of 
evidentiary alternatives, the court must also be cognizant of 
and consider a party’s need for “evidentiary richness and 
narrative integrity in presenting a case . . . .”  Old Chief, 
117 S.Ct. at 651.  “’To substitute for such a picture a naked 
admission might have the effect to rob the evidence of much of 
its fair and legitimate weight.’”  Id. at 653 (quoting Dunning 
v. Maine Central R. Co., 39 A. 352, 356 (1897)).  The persuasive 
power of a narrative story is an essential ingredient to the 
State’s right to prosecute.  Substituting concrete tangible 
evidence 
with 
abstract 
assertions 
is 
an 
unsatisfactory 
substitute for telling a complete story.  “[A] piece of evidence 
may address any number of separate elements, striking hard just 
because it shows so much at once . . . . .”  Old Chief, 117 
S.Ct. at 653.   
 
Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of 
reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative 
gains momentum, with power not only to support 
conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors 
to 
draw 
the 
inferences, 
whatever 
they 
may 
be, 
necessary to reach an honest verdict. 
Id.  A descriptive narrative assists the jury in ascertaining 
what the defendant has thought and done and establishes human 
significance. 
¶33 Evidence may be particularly important to fill gaps in 
the narrative.  “[O]ther crimes evidence is admissible ‘to 
complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
19
immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’”  State 
v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 348, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (quoting 
Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 347, 222 N.W.2d 871 (1974)). 
¶34 Nevertheless, we conclude, as did the Court in Old 
Chief, that the prosecution’s need for “evidentiary depth to 
tell a continuous story has . . . virtually no application when 
the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on 
some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete 
events of later criminal behavior charged against him.”  Old 
Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 654-55.  Proof of a status element goes to 
an element entirely outside the gravamen of the offense: 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration.  The evidence has no place in the State’s story, 
other than to lead the jurors to think that because the 
defendant has two prior convictions, suspensions or revocations, 
he was probably driving while intoxicated on the date in 
question.  
¶35 We 
conclude 
that 
introducing 
evidence 
of 
the 
defendant’s prior convictions, suspensions or revocations served 
no purpose other than to prove the status element of the charged 
offense.  Admitting this evidence to prove this status element, 
and submitting the status element to the jury adds nothing to 
the State’s evidentiary depth or descriptive narrative.  It does 
nothing to fulfill a juror’s expectations.  This evidence and 
element does, however, tell a juror that the defendant has had a 
problem in the past, probably with drinking and driving.  It 
raises an inference that the defendant has a bad character and a 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
20
propensity to drink and drive, and that is the very result 
prohibited by the rules of evidence. 
¶36 We recognize that in Old Chief the Court excluded the 
name and nature of the defendant’s prior felony conviction as 
unfairly prejudicial but allowed the element of the prior 
offense to go to the jury.  See Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 655.  
The most obvious reason the Court did not consider excluding the 
element entirely is that the defendant did not raise that as an 
issue.  Before the trial the defendant moved for an order that 
the government be restricted from offering any information about 
the defendant’s prior felony conviction except to say that he 
had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment 
exceeding one year.  See id. at 648.  It is also likely that the 
Court did not exclude the status element entirely because it 
recognized the government’s need to introduce the element to 
complete its story.  In most states it is not illegal to possess 
a firearm.  If, in Old Chief, the government only proved that 
the defendant possessed a firearm, most jurors would probably 
wonder what crime had been committed.  To complete its story, 
the government needed to prove that the defendant had a prior 
felony conviction.  Specifically, the government needed to 
explain that while most people may possess firearms legally, it 
is illegal for convicted felons to possess firearms. 
¶37 Weighing the probative value of the evidence of the 
defendant’s 
prior 
convictions, 
suspensions 
or 
revocations 
against the unfair prejudicial effect to the defendant, where 
the sole purpose of the evidence is to prove the status element, 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
21
we conclude that the probative value is virtually nil.  Second, 
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed 
by the 
danger of 
unfair 
prejudice. 
 
Because 
the 
prior 
convictions are of the same nature and character of the charged 
offense, the jury is likely to engage in propensity or bad 
character reasoning.   
¶38 Accordingly, we hold that when the sole purpose of 
introducing any evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions, 
suspensions or revocations under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) is to 
prove the status element and the defendant admits to that 
element, its probative value is far outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant.  We hold that admitting any 
evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions, suspensions or 
revocations and submitting the status element to the jury in 
this case was an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶39 When a circuit court is faced with the circumstances 
presented in this case, the circuit court should simply instruct 
the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) 
the defendant was driving or operating a motor vehicle on a 
highway; 
and 
2) 
the 
defendant 
had 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration at the time he or she drove or operated the motor 
vehicle.  The “prohibited alcohol concentration” means 0.08 
grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of the person’s breath or 
0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood. 
 See Wis. JICriminal 2660B.  The jury is charged to follow the 
instruction.  See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 507. 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
22
¶40 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held that admitting 
evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions is proper because 
prior convictions, suspensions or revocations is an element of 
the charged crime.  See Ludeking, 195 Wis. 2d at 141.  Although 
we agree that prior convictions, suspensions or revocations is 
an element of the crime of driving with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration, 
third 
offense, 
we 
do 
not 
agree 
that 
it 
automatically follows that admitting evidence of this element in 
this case is proper.  To the extent that any language in 
Ludeking is inconsistent with our holding in this case, it is 
overruled. 
¶41 We next turn to the question of whether allowing any 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
defendant’s 
prior 
convictions, 
suspensions or revocations under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) and 
submitting the status element to the jury was harmless error.  
We conclude that because of the overwhelming nature of the 
evidence as to the defendant’s guilt, admitting any evidence 
regarding his prior convictions, suspensions or revocations, and 
submitting the status element to the jury was harmless error. 
¶42 The test for harmless error is: 
 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the conviction.  If it did, 
reversal and a new trial must result.  The burden of 
proving no prejudice is on the beneficiary of the 
error, here the state.  The state’s burden, then, is 
to establish that there is no reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed to the conviction. 
State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985) 
(citations omitted).  The analysis focuses on “whether the error 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
23
‘undermines confidence in the outcome.’”  Id. at 545 (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
¶43 In this case there is no reasonable possibility that 
the error, admitting any evidence regarding the defendant’s 
prior convictions, suspensions or revocations, and submitting 
the status element to the jury, contributed to the conviction.  
The officer testified that that Alexander quickly changed lanes, 
causing the officer to make a quick turn snap to avoid a 
collision.  The officer also testified that he saw Alexander’s 
vehicle weave back and forth across the fog line, straddle the 
fog line and strike the curb.  When the officer stopped 
Alexander’s car and approached the vehicle, he noticed a strong 
smell of intoxicants on the defendant’s breath.  Alexander’s 
eyes were red and his speech was slurred.  Alexander could not 
recite the alphabet and stated to the officer, “You got me.”  
Alexander also failed the three field sobriety tests.  The 
Intoxilyzer 
test 
showed 
that 
Alexander 
had 
an 
alcohol 
concentration of .24 - three times the applicable legal limit.  
Finally, in response to questions on an “alcoholic influence 
report,” Alexander stated that he did not know where he was 
coming from when he was stopped.  He admitted that he had been 
drinking beer and that he was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time he was answering the questions.  
¶44 Given the overwhelming evidence against Alexander, we 
conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that admitting 
any 
evidence 
of 
his 
prior 
convictions, 
suspensions 
or 
revocations and submitting the status element to the jury 
No. 96-1973-CR 
 
24
contributed to his conviction for driving with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration.  The error was harmless.  Therefore, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
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