Title: Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Joseph Antonio, et al. v. SSA Security, INC. d/b/a Security Services of America, Misc. No. 
1, September Term, 2014 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – MARYLAND SECURITY GUARDS ACT – 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY – Court of Appeals held that Maryland Code (2000, 2010 
Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Article, § 19-501 codifies Maryland’s 
common law doctrine of respondeat superior and does not expand vicarious liability for 
the employers of Maryland security guards. The Maryland General Assembly did not 
indicate a clear intention to abrogate the common law by adoption of Maryland Code 
(2000, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Article, § 19-501 or its 
predecessors. 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
Case No. 13-1031 
Argued: 8 December 2014 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
Misc. No. 1  
 
September Term, 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOSEPH ANTONIO, ET AL. 
 
v. 
 
SSA SECURITY, INC. d/b/a SECURITY 
SERVICES OF AMERICA 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Watts, 
 
  
 
JJ. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: March 2, 2015 
 
 
The federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified to this Court the 
following question of law:  
Does the Maryland Security Guards Act, Md. Code Ann., 
Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 19-501, impose liability beyond common 
law principles of respondeat superior such that an employer 
may be responsible for off-duty criminal acts of an employee 
if the employee planned any part of the off-duty criminal acts 
while he or she was on duty? 
 
We answer the certified question in the negative. For reasons to be explained, we hold 
that § 19-501 of the Maryland Security Guards Act is a codification of Maryland’s 
common law doctrine of respondeat superior and does not broaden the scope of vicarious 
liability of the employers of  security guards for their employees’ acts beyond these 
principles. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
A summary of the certified facts of this case deserve mention.1 
Two security guard employees of SSA Security, Inc. (“SSA”), a security guard 
agency, and four of their confederates carried out a conspiracy to set fire during the early 
morning of 6 December 2004 to homes under construction in the Hunters Brook 
development in Charles County, Maryland. SSA had been hired previously by the 
builder/developer of Hunters Brook to provide security for the project while it was under 
                                              
1 We “accept the statement of facts in the certification order” when another court certifies 
a question of law to us. NVR Mortg. Finance, Inc. v. Carlsen, 439 Md. 427, 429 n. 2; 96 
A. 3d 202, 204 n. 2 (2014). The procedural pilgrimage of the case is also included to 
provide context. 
 
2 
 
construction. The arson was fueled by racial animus against Appellants and a desire to 
prevent them from moving into the neighborhood.2 The resulting fires destroyed ten 
homes and damaged twelve others (some completed and some under construction), 
making it one of the worst residential arsons in Maryland history. Fortunately, no one 
was killed or injured as a result of the crimes. 
 
Aaron Speed, one of the arsonists, had been hired originally by SSA in November 
2003, without the benefit of checking his references. Speed quit his employment with 
SSA in August 2004, after being reprimanded for “careless and aggressive conduct.” One 
of Speed’s supervisors placed a recommendation in Speed’s personnel file that he not be 
considered for rehire. Despite this recommendation, Speed was rehired by SSA in 
November 2004. 
As part of the conspiracy to set fire to the homes, Speed left his guard post at the 
development on 3 December 2004 in order to stash fuel that would be used by the others 
to set fire to the homes. While on-duty, Speed created also a map of the neighborhood, 
indicating which houses were owned or contracted for by racial minorities. 
                                              
2 Appellants were contract purchasers of the homes, but had not yet closed on the 
transactions or taken possession of the homes at the time of the arson. The developer bore 
the risk of loss due to fire. Two of the original plaintiffs in the underlying civil litigation, 
who had taken possession of their properties, reached a settlement of their claims with 
SSA. The remaining plaintiffs are Appellants here. 
3 
 
William Fitzpatrick, another SSA employee, was alleged also to have conspired to 
commit the arson.3 Fitzpatrick was on-duty guarding the development from 6:00 PM until 
5:00 AM on December 5-6, but, according to Appellants, left his post early to leave the 
properties unguarded so that Speed and the other conspirators could commit the arson. 
Appellants asserted ultimately various civil claims in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maryland against SSA, two of its corporate affiliates, and the five 
convicted arsonists. One of Appellants’ theories of SSA’s liability contended that 
Maryland Code (2000, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Article, § 
19-501 (hereinafter the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501) established a basis for 
SSA’s strict liability. 
Deciding a motion for summary judgment filed by SSA, Judge Alexander 
Williams, Jr. of the U.S. District Court held that the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-
501 was merely a codification of the common law and did not expand the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions regarding SSA’s strict liability 
for Speed’s and Fitzpatrick’s intentional torts and civil rights violations. Antonio v. Sec. 
Servs. of Am., LLC, 701 F. Supp. 2d 749, 766 (D. Md. 2010). After concluding that any 
intentional acts of Speed and Fitzpatrick were, considering the facts in the light most 
favorable to Appellants, outside the scope of employment, Judge Williams granted SSA’s 
                                              
3 Fitzpatrick was not charged criminally with Speed and the other conspirators, all of 
whom pleaded guilty or were found guilty at trial. Fitzpatrick was indicted for making 
false statements to investigators, but was not convicted. 
 
4 
 
motion regarding its liability under the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. Judge 
Williams would grant later SSA’s renewed motion for summary judgment regarding 
liability arising from SSA’s direct negligence and its vicarious liability for its employee’s 
negligence.4, 5 
On appeal, Appellants asked the federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to 
reverse the District Court’s decisions: (1) granting summary judgment in SSA’s favor as 
to the negligence claims; (2) granting summary judgment in SSA’s favor as to the claims 
premised on strict liability under the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501; and, (3) 
denying the request to certify to us the question regarding the interpretation of the 
Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. The federal appellate court, after affirming the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to the negligence claims, turned to the 
question requiring interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act. 
Appellants argued, as they do now, that the Maryland Security Guards Act extends 
the vicarious liability of security guard agencies beyond the Maryland common law 
doctrine of respondeat superior. The federal appellate court considered the text of the 
                                              
4 The federal trial court, interpreting Maryland law regarding damages, held that damages 
were not available for negligently inflicted emotional harm where the plaintiff was 
outside the zone of danger. Antonio v. Sec. Servs. of Am., LLC, No. 05-CV-2982-AW, 
2011 WL 3880425, at *7 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2011). The claims of the plaintiffs who had 
taken possession of the properties, and thus were arguably in the zone of danger, were 
allowed to proceed. As noted, those claims were settled. 
 
5 In the course of the litigation, Judge Williams considered and denied a request to certify 
to us a question regarding the interpretation of the Maryland Security Company Act § 19-
501. 
5 
 
statute and, after applying Maryland’s cannons of statutory construction, concluded that 
there were conflicting indications as to the meaning of the Maryland Security Guards Act 
§ 19-501. Thus, the Court certified the question to us to resolve the uncertainty.6 
II. OUR ANALYSIS 
We may answer questions certified to us by a United States court or the appellate 
court of another state or of a tribe if the answer might be determinative of an issue before 
the certifying court and there is no controlling Maryland authority. Md. Code (1974, 2013 
Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 12-603. The Maryland Security Guards 
Act § 19-501 has not been interpreted by Maryland’s appellate courts before and its 
application could be dispositive of whether Appellants’ strict liability contentions will 
allow certain of its claims to survive summary judgment.  
The District Court dismissed several of Appellants’ claims because the alleged 
torts and fair housing violations committed by SSA’s employees were beyond the scope 
of their employment. Appellants argued before the federal District Court, the federal 
Court of Appeals, and now us that the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 imposes 
liability on SSA for the actions of Speed and Fitzpatrick beyond those for which SSA 
would be liable under Maryland’s common law doctrine of respondeat superior. 
The relevant portion of the Act, § 19-501, provides: “A licensed security guard 
agency is responsible for the acts of each of its employees while the employee is 
                                              
6 Because the federal Court of Appeals certified the question, it did not decide whether 
the District Court abused its discretion in declining to certify the question.  
6 
 
conducting the business of the agency.” Appellants contend that this section of the statute 
creates strict liability for the “on-duty” acts of employees, including those outside the 
scope of employment. SSA argues that the statute merely codified the Maryland common 
law of respondeat superior. 
When interpreting statutes, our overarching goal is to ascertain and implement the 
intention of the Legislature. Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 
(2002). We turn first to the words of the statute. If, in pursuit of the North Star of intent, 
the words of the statute, given their common and ordinary meaning, are unambiguous and 
express a plain meaning, our inquiry stops normally and we interpret the statute as 
written. Oaks v. Conners, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). If the text is 
ambiguous, however, we look to other evidence of the Legislature’s intent, including the 
relevant statute’s legislative history, the structure of the statue, the relationship of the 
statute to other laws, and the relative rationality of competing constructions. Witte, 369 
Md. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165. 
There is, however, one important and particularly relevant interpretive principle 
reining-in our quest to elucidate the will of the Legislature: we will not presume 
abrogation of the common law unless the Legislature’s intent to do so is clear. Suter v. 
Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 232, 935 A.2d 731, 743-44 (2007) (citing Robinson v. State, 353 
Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 355–
7 
 
356 (1934)). When the intent of the Legislature is unclear with regard to abrogation, we 
will interpret the statute to be congruent with the common law.7  
A. Abrogation Here of the Common Law? 
 
Maryland’s common law doctrine of respondeat superior holds employers liable 
“for the tortious conduct of  . . . [an] employee committed while the servant was acting 
within the scope of the employment relationship.” Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 283, 
47 A.3d 560, 567 (2012)) (quoting Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 134, 442 A.2d 966, 
969 (1982)). For employee conduct to be within the scope of employment, “the acts must 
have been in furtherance of the employer's business and authorized by the employer.” 
Barclay, 427 Md. at 283, 47 A.3d at 567-68 (quoting S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 
461, 481, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (2003)). Expanding the vicarious liability of security guard 
agencies by statute to include all on-duty acts of employees (strict liability) would alter 
significantly the common law scheme of respondeat superior and amount to an 
abrogation of the common law. 
 
The common law doctrine of respondeat superior not only holds employers liable 
for the actions of their employees in furtherance of the employer’s business, but also 
                                              
7 This rule of statutory interpretation was formulated as well to implement the will of the 
Legislature. See, e.g., Hooper v. City of Baltimore, 12 Md. 464, 475 (1859) (stating that 
“the law . . . infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration [to the common law] 
other than what is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced”). The rule of 
construction seeks to limit judicial hair-splitting and reading acts of the Legislature as 
changing the common law when the Legislature had no such intention. In theory, it might 
also cause legislatures to announce clearly when it is their intent to abrogate the common 
law. 
8 
 
limits an employer’s liability to those situations. It is central to the doctrine that an 
employee’s acts committed outside the scope of employment, i.e., not in the furtherance 
of the employer’s business, are not attributable to the employer. The universe of the types 
of employee acts for which the employer might be held strictly liable is limited. 
 
A temporal interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 would 
eliminate the distinction between employees’ acts within the scope of employment and 
those outside the scope of employment. Rather than turning on the character of employee 
acts, the focus would be on when the acts happened and whether the security guard was 
on duty. Security guard agencies would be liable for a broader set of acts of their 
employees, including, according to Appellants, even acts in direct opposition to the 
employers’ interests. Such a change in employer liability would alter fundamentally the 
common law. 
Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, interpreting the Maryland Security Guards Act 
§ 19-501 to impose vicarious liability on security guard agencies for all on-duty acts of 
their employees would operate more than to supplement the common law. Statutes we 
have held to supplement, rather than abrogate, the common law provide typically 
alternative remedies or criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Nickens v. Mount Vernon Realty 
Grp., LLC, 429 Md. 53, 74-75, 54 A.3d 742, 755-56 (2012) (holding that a Baltimore 
City ordinance providing for a statutory eviction scheme supplemented, rather than 
abrogated, the common law remedy of peaceable self-help); Genies v. State, 426 Md. 
148, 159, 43 A.3d 1007, 1013 (2012) (holding that a statute creating a separate criminal 
offense for inmates exposing their private parts to correctional officers of the opposite 
9 
 
sex as a means to abuse corrections officers did not abrogate the pre-existing common 
law crime of indecent exposure). Appellants’ interpretation of the Maryland Security 
Guards Act § 19-501, in contrast, would not create a new cause of action, but rather 
would modify the liability of security guard agencies for existing torts committed by their 
employees.8  
The common law doctrine of respondeat superior answers the question: When is 
an employer liable for the torts of its employee? The Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-
501 answers the same question with specific reference to employers who are security 
guard agencies. To change the answer amounts to an abrogation of the common law. 
Therefore, we look for an abundantly clear intent on the part of the Legislature to change 
the common law by its adoption of § 19-501. 
B. Plain Language of the Statute 
The Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 holds clearly and unambiguously 
licensed security guard agencies liable civilly for some acts of their employees. The 
                                              
8  
Appellants argue that there could be some situations in which the off-duty acts of 
an employee could be within the scope of employment and, therefore, their interpretation 
of Maryland Code (2000, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Article, 
§ 19-501 would not eliminate the common law totally. We have stated “that a statute, 
made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away 
the common law.” Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999) 
(quoting Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934)).  
Appellants’ reasoning is misguided. Their interpretation would change the core of 
Maryland’s common law principles of vicarious liability of employers of security guards. 
Even if there were some remaining vestiges of the common law scheme of vicarious 
liability, this would not diminish the significant changes advanced by Appellants that 
would amount to abrogation.  
10 
 
parties disagree which acts of employees come within the statute. At issue is whether the 
Legislature intended the phrase “while the employee is conducting the business of the 
agency” to modify the common law principles of an employer’s vicarious liability. 
Appellants’ major premise revolves around the temporal meaning of “while.” 
When used grammatically as a conjunction, as it is in the Maryland Security Guards Act 
§ 19-501, “while” means typically “during,” “throughout the time that,” or “as long as.” 
Webster’s New Universal Unabridged 2084 (1983).9 According to Appellants then, a 
licensed security guard agency is liable for all acts of its employees performed during the 
time that the employee is also “conducting the business of the agency.” 
The Maryland Security Guards Act defines “conducting the business of the 
agency.” A licensed security guard agency is defined as “a person who is licensed by the 
Secretary to conduct a business that provides security guard services.” Maryland Security 
Guards Act § 19-101(g). Security guard services are defined as “any activity that is 
performed for compensation as a security guard to protect any individual or property. . . 
.” Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-101(l). 
                                              
9 Although the temporal meaning of “while” is uncontroversial generally, “resort to a 
dictionary, legal or otherwise, should logically include consultation of those editions (in 
addition to current editions) of dictionaries that were extant at the time of the pertinent 
legislative enactments.” Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 260 n.11, 884 A.2d 1171, 
1181 n.11 (2005). Looking at the most relevant present meaning of “while”—a 
Google.com search of “while definition”—indicates that the word’s meaning has not 
changed in the years since. See While, Google.com, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd= 
ssl#q=while.  
11 
 
Combining these terms, Appellants arrive at the following meaning of the 
Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501: A licensed security guard agency is liable for 
the actions of its employees occurring during the time that the employee is performing 
any activity for compensation to protect an individual or property.10 Expressed another 
way, a security guard agency is liable for all acts its employees commit when they are 
“on-duty.” 
SSA argues, in response, that if the General Assembly intended a temporal 
construction, extending liability to all acts of on-duty employees, it would have done so 
explicitly.11 Instead, the Legislature used language that SSA argues is a qualification 
based on the nature of the conduct. 
The language of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 is subject to differing 
reasonable interpretations. Although Appellants’ argument may sound logical, when 
taken as a whole, the phase “while the employee is conducting the business of the 
agency” could be understood as well as having the same meaning as the common law 
doctrine of respondeat superior. The common law doctrine imposes liability only for acts 
                                              
10 Appellants, in their reply brief to us, add the additional requirement (before a licensed 
security guard agency may be held liable) that there be a nexus between the tortious act 
and the provision of security guard services. 
 
11 SSA presented two arguments that are inapposite to the question before us: (1) that it is 
impossible to do a thing and its opposite at the same time (in this case, protect and 
destroy property) and (2) that Speed was off-duty at the time he and his co-conspirators 
committed the arson. The somewhat metaphysical question of whether it is possible to do 
a thing and its opposite at the same time is not part of the question certified to us. We 
shall not reformulate the question to put it in play. 
12 
 
by an employee furthering the employer’s business, Hopkins Chem. Co. v. Read Drug & 
Chem. Co., 124 Md. 210, 214, 92 A. 478, 479-480 (1914) (stating that employers are 
liable if an employee’s acts were “within the scope of his employment; not whether they 
were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by 
servant in furtherance thereof”), but we have summarized the rule as imposing liability 
for tortious acts “while the . . . [employee] was acting within the scope of the 
employment relationship.” Embrey, 293 Md. at 134, 442 A.2d at 969. Neither side’s 
urging of the meaning of the statute renders any of the text meaningless.12 Therefore, we 
move on to examine other indicia of legislative intent. 
C. Context of the Statute 
The crux of the Maryland Security Guards Act is the licensing scheme of security 
guard agencies, not the imposition of civil liability. The majority of the Act governs how 
an agency applies for and obtains the required licensure from the State to conduct a 
security guard agency. The “Miscellaneous Provisions” of the Act, of which § 19-501 is a 
part, however, contain sections addressed to the civil liability of security guard agencies. 
See the Maryland Security Guards Act §§ 19-504 (requiring a minimum amount of 
general liability insurance for agencies with more than five employees); 19-505(a)-(b) 
(requiring consent to venue); 19-505(f) (allowing for service of legal process under 
certain circumstances on Maryland Secretary of State). The internal structure of the 
                                              
12 Codification of the common law is not a meaningless legislative activity. Much of the 
Maryland Code is devoted to codification of significant areas of the common law. 
13 
 
Maryland Security Guards Act contributes nothing to illumination of the intentions of the 
General Assembly. 
The broader context of the Maryland Code provides some support for the 
Appellants’ interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. In other 
statutory schemes within the Code, the General Assembly uses the common law term 
“scope of employment.” See, e.g., Md. Code (1999, 2007 Repl. Vol.), Agriculture Art., § 
4-127 (“when construing or enforcing any provision of this subtitle, every act, omission, 
or failure of any person acting within the scope of employment or office and acting for or 
employed by another person is the act, omission, or failure of that person as well as of the 
person committing the act”); Md. Code (1999, 2007 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & 
Professions Art., § 12-501(b)(2) (using the term “scope of employment” regarding 
insurance requirements for licensed plumbers); Md. Code (1992, 2010 Repl. Vol.), 
Business Regulation Art., §9A-402(b)(2) (using the term “scope of employment” 
regarding insurance requirements for licensed heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning 
workers); Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-
303(b) (“a local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for 
damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the 
scope of employment with the local government”); Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), 
Criminal Law Art., § 10-108 (creating an exception to the criminal statute for possession 
of “a tobacco product or cigarette rolling paper by a minor who is acting as the agent of 
the minor’s employer within the scope of employment”); Md. Code (1978, 2014 Repl. 
Vol.), Education Art., § 6-111(a) (providing for full pay for employees absent due to 
14 
 
disability resulting from an assault “while in the scope of board employment”); Md. Code 
(2007), Human Services Art., §3-406 (prohibiting the State from paying judgments 
awarded against an employee under the section for acts or omissions occurring “outside 
the scope of employment”); Md. Code (1988, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Tax-General Art., §1-101 
(defining “Comptroller” to include “an employee of the Comptroller acting within the 
scope of employment”). It seems from this that the General Assembly is well acquainted 
with the common law term “scope of employment,” and is not averse to sprinkling it 
across the broad legislative landscape.  
Considering the language of the Maryland Security Guards Act §§ 19-501 in the 
foregoing context of the Maryland Code adds some weight to the Appellants’ 
interpretation. One might anticipate that the General Assembly would use the term 
“scope of employment” here if it intended to codify common law respondeat superior. In 
isolation, however, the absence of this term in § 19-501 does not provide sufficiently 
clear evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to abrogate the common law. 
D. Legislative History 
The language of the Maryland Security Guards Act §19-501 has its genesis in 
Senate Bill 968 of the 1986 session, which codified a regulatory scheme as Md. Code 
(1999, 2007 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Art., § 13-601 (hereinafter 
the Maryland Private Detectives Act § 13-601). Security guard agencies remained 
regulated as private detectives under the Business Occupations & Professions Article of 
the Maryland Code until 1996 when House Bill 42 separated the Code’s treatment of 
security guard agencies into its own title. 1996 Maryland Laws Ch. 602 (which 
15 
 
established the current regulatory scheme). The same language regarding liability was 
used in House Bill 42 as existed in the prior Article. Id. Thus, the legislative history of § 
13-601 of the Business Occupations & Professions Article of the Maryland Code, which 
covered civil liability for private detective agencies and security guard agencies before 
the reorganization, is informative regarding the analogous § 19-501 of the Maryland 
Security Guards Act. 
Senate Bill 968 of 1986 was introduced as a bill separate from a recodification 
initiative of the Maryland Code then underway. The separate bill was necessary because 
the General Assembly wished to address perceived substantive problems regarding the 
laws pertaining to private detectives. Department of Legislative Reference, Report on 
Senate Bill 968 at 1 (1986) (hereinafter “Report on Senate Bill 968”). Several issues with 
the pre-existing statutory language regarding the licensing and provision of private 
detective services were identified in the Report on Senate Bill 968. The Report did not 
identify any problem with the regime of vicarious liability of private detective agencies 
or security guard agencies then in force. Notably, it stated: “[F]or the most part, the 
proposals under the bill find their basis in actual law and practice and do not deviate 
substantially from the current law as it is now is applied. There is no attempt under the 
revision to change existing underlying policy.” Report on Senate Bill 968 at 2.  
The Report highlighted elements of Senate Bill 968 warranting special attention 
by the General Assembly, but in doing so did not mention § 591 of the Bill, the language 
of which would be codified later as Maryland Private Detectives Act § 13-601 and even 
16 
 
later replicated in the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. Of the part of Senate Bill 
968 which contained the relevant language, the Report noted: 
Part VI of the revised subtitle consists of 8 “miscellaneous” 
sections that do not fit well into any of the other 7 parts of the 
revised subtitle. While revision of these sections involve an 
extensive reorganization and restatement of the current 
subtitle, all of the revised sections are based on current law. 
 
Report on Senate Bill 968 at 8. In the opinion of the authors of the Report, the Bill did not 
modify the law regarding the vicarious liability of security guard agencies for acts of their 
employees. 
The Bill Analysis of the Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee 
interpreted similarly the “while the employee is conducting the business of the agency” 
language of Senate Bill 968. The Bill Analysis noted that “[t]he substantive changes are 
included for the limited purpose of clarifying existing law.” Department of Legislative 
Reference, Bill Analysis, Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee at 1 
(1986) (hereinafter Bill Analysis). Each section of the Bill was discussed in the Bill 
Analysis. For § 591, it observed that the Bill “[s]pecifies that the agency is responsible 
for the acts of its employees by clarifying provisions of Article 56, Section 81(a)(1).” Bill 
Analysis at 7. 
The Summary of Committee Report on Senate Bill 968 did not note anything of 
consequence regarding the vicarious liability of security guard agencies or private 
detective agencies. The Summary reiterated that “[t]he purpose of the bill is to clarify the 
current law without changing existing underlying policy.” Department of Legislative 
Affairs, Summary of Committee Report, Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs 
17 
 
Committee at 2 (1986) (hereinafter Summary of Committee Report). The Summary 
further noted that Senate Bill 968 “clarifies current law and sets forth explicit processes 
that are not included under current law.” Summary of Committee Report at 1. The 
legislative history of the Bill indicates overwhelmingly to us, at every turn, that the intent 
of the Legislature was to reiterate the law regarding security guard agencies’ vicarious 
liability as it existed at that time.  
Appellants argue that the law prior to Senate Bill 968 imposed strict liability on 
security guard agencies. They point also to the rejection of a proposed amendment to 
reword the relevant section of the Bill to incorporate the common law term “scope of 
employment” as evidence of the General Assembly’s rejection of SSA’s interpretation of 
the statute. 
Prior to adoption of Senate Bill 968 of 1986, Md. Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 
1983 Cum. Supp.), Article 56, § 81(a), enacted originally in 1951, governed the vicarious 
liability of security guard agencies for the acts of their employees. Section 81(a) 
provided: 
The holder of any license issued under the provisions of this 
subtitle may employ to assist him in his work and in the 
conduct of his business as many person as he may deem 
necessary, and he shall at all times during which such 
employment be accountable for the good conduct in the 
business of each and every person so employed. . . . The 
employer shall be responsible for the actions and conduct of 
all employees in connection with such employer’s business. 
 
Id. According to the legislative history, the General Assembly intended to incorporate the 
meaning of this statute into Senate Bill 968 of 1986, which later segued into the 
18 
 
Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. There is little evidence, however, from which 
we could uncover the intent of the Legislature regarding the 1951 Act.13 
 
The text of the 1951 statute does not establish, on its face, the General Assembly’s 
clear intention to abrogate the common law. The exact meaning of that statute is as 
ambiguous, in its fashion, as is the present §19-501. The text holding the employer 
responsible “for the good conduct in the business of each and every person so employed” 
and “for the actions and conduct of all employees in connection with such employer’s 
business” is consistent equally with the common law’s principles of vicarious liability 
and negligence standards as it is with any other interpretation. 
 
Appellants make a more nuanced additional argument for reading the predecessor 
and current statutes as abrogating the common law. They point out that the 1951 Act was 
enacted two years after Apex Smelting Co. v. Burns, 175 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1949). In 
Apex Smelting, the federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a directed 
verdict in favor of a security guard agency, finding that under Illinois’ negligence and 
respondeat superior jurisprudence the agency was not liable for an employee’s act of 
arson. Id. at 981. Appellants claim that the Maryland General Assembly reacted to the 
Seventh Circuit case by enacting the 1951 Act, intending that a case similar to Apex 
Smelting would come to a different result in Maryland as a consequence. 
                                              
13 The Maryland Department of Legislative Services did not begin retaining bill files and 
related material from the General Assembly’s legislative process until 1965, and even 
this initiative was not established with regularity until the 1970’s. 
19 
 
After Apex Smelting, the Illinois Legislature formulated a statute similar to 
Maryland’s 1951 Act. The Illinois statute read: 
The holder of a certificate of authority who employs persons 
to assist him in the work of private detective and in the 
conduct of such business shall at all times during such 
employment be legally responsible for the good conduct in 
the business of each and every person so employed. 
 
Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 
1973). Applying the statute in Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc. 
(involving a Chicago arson committed by an on-duty security guard), the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the statute broadened the scope of 
vicarious liability of security guard agencies to include all wrongful acts of employees 
“so long as they were committed while the employee was actually on the job.” Id.14 Thus, 
the plaintiff prevailed. 
Appellants’ argument continues by pointing out that subsequently the “good 
conduct” language (similar to both Maryland’s 1951 Act and the Illinois statute) became 
                                              
14 The reasoning of Stewart Warner may be less apt in interpreting Maryland law than it 
was in interpreting Illinois law. One thread in the reasoning of the Northern District of 
Illinois District Court was that interpreting the Illinois statute as codifying the common 
law would render the statute a nullity. Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1973). In Maryland, however, mere codification 
of the common law is not disfavored and is not considered a nullity. The District Court 
noted as well that the “apparent purpose” of the Illinois statute was to shift “the burden of 
loss from intentional injury inflicted by . . . [security] agency employees” from the 
consumers of the services to the agencies. Id. The policy reasons to adopt the 
interpretation might be the same in Maryland, but for the fact that the Maryland General 
Assembly did not make any such purpose obvious then or decades later. 
  
20 
 
controversial nationally. Some courts interpreted broadly similar statutes as the Steward 
Warner court did. See, e.g., Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 F.2d 591, 596-97 (7th 
Cir. 1985). Other courts, construed the “good conduct in the business” language to 
merely codify merely the common law. Knouse Foods Co-op., Inc. v. Burns Int'l Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 867, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Hoover Ball & Bearing Co. v. 
Pinkerton's, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Mich. 1980).15 Appellants contend that 
the Maryland General Assembly changed the language in Senate Bill 968 to clarify that 
the 1951 Act intended to broaden security guard agencies’ liability for all acts by guard 
employees while on-duty. That was, according to Appellants, the impetus for changing 
the language from holding security guard agencies responsible “for the good conduct in 
the business of each and every person so employed” to instead holding them responsible 
“for the acts of each of its employees while the employee is conducting the business of 
the agency.” 
Although Appellants advance an alluring causation narrative spanning decades 
and weaving through multiple related statutes and acts of the General Assembly, under 
close scrutiny it amounts ultimately to nothing more than plausible conjecture. It is 
equally likely that a general desire for implementation of a licensing regime for private 
detective and security guard agencies provided the motivation for the 1951 Act, with the 
                                              
15 Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (4th Ct. 
App. 1999) also held that the “good conduct in business” language of a California statute 
codified the common law. Senate Bill 968 was enacted in 1986, however, whereas Borg-
Warner was decided in 1999. 
 
21 
 
Legislature unaware of or unconcerned with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Apex 
Smelting.16 Similarly, although the General Assembly sought to make substantive 
changes with Senate Bill 968 that were deemed inappropriate for the contemporaneous 
Code recodification initiative, the substantive problems identified by the General 
Assembly necessitating Senate Bill 968 involved the licensing regime itself, not the state 
of vicarious liability of private detective and security guard employers. There is no 
evidence we could find that the court cases interpreting statutes from other jurisdictions 
with similar language to Maryland 1951 Act figured in the formulation of the language 
adopted ultimately in Maryland. We interpret legislation to abrogate the common law 
only when the Legislature’s intent to do so is clear. Suter, 402 Md. at 232, 935 A.2d at 
743-74. It is not clear that the General Assembly sought to do so in the 1951 Act. 
Appellants point also to a failed amendment to Senate Bill 968 that proposed to 
clarify that private detective and security guard agencies would be liable only for the acts 
of employees within the scope of employment. The Maryland Association of Contract 
Guard Services, a trade group, proposed to the Senate Committee on Economic and 
Environmental Affairs to change the language of § 591 of Senate Bill 968 to read: “A 
private detective agency is responsible for the acts of each of its employees if the acts are 
within the scope of the employment.” Loughlin Security Agency, Inc., Proposed 
Changes to Senate Bill 968 ‘Maryland Private Detectives Act’, Senate Committee on 
                                              
16 The 1951 Act was codified in Title 56 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which was 
titled “Licenses.” 
22 
 
Economic and Environmental Affairs (1986) (hereinafter Proposed Changes to Senate 
Bill 968). Senator Francis Kelly sponsored the amendment before the Committee. Francis 
Kelly & Maryland Association of Contract Guard Services, Amendment to Senate Bill 
No. 968 (1968). 
The trade group’s written testimony explaining the proposed change justified it as 
desirable because the extant phrase imposing liability—“while the employee is 
conducting the business of the agency”—was ambiguous. Proposed Changes to Senate 
Bill 968. The proposed change, it was contended, would make clear that security guard 
agencies were subject to common law vicarious liability for acts of employees. Id. The 
Committee declined to recommend favorably to the floor the proposed amendment for 
the second reading of the Bill. The Bill file maintained by the Department of Legislative 
Services is silent about any further attempts to amend § 591 of Senate Bill 968. 
Consideration of failed amendment proposals can be useful sometimes in 
ascertaining or confirming legislative intent. State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 721, 720 A.2d 
311, 317 (1998); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 313 Md. 
118, 125, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988); see also Ishola v. State, 404 Md. 155, 166, 945 A.2d 
1273, 1279 (2008) (using the rejection of a proposed amendment as evidence of 
legislative intent). Failed efforts to amend a proposed bill, however, are not conclusive 
proof usually of legislative will. City of Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty 
Associates, 395 Md. 299, 329, 910 A.2d 406, 424 (2006); Auto. Trade Ass'n of Maryland, 
Inc. v. Ins. Com'r, 292 Md. 15, 24, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (1981). This is because there can 
23 
 
be a myriad of reasons that could explain the Legislature’s decision not to incorporate a 
proposed amendment. City of Baltimore Dev. Corp., 395 Md. at 329, 910 A.2d at 424.  
Absent a clear indication in the legislative record, it is as likely that the effort to 
amend Senate Bill 968 in committee failed because, in the Committee’s view, the Bill 
reflected already common law vicarious liability as it is that the Committee intended to 
abrogate the common law by reporting an unamended version of the Bill to the floor. 
Overall, the legislative history of Senate Bill 968 does not illuminate any clear 
understanding of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 as abrogating the common 
law. 
E. Policy Considerations 
Consideration of the practical consequences of divergent interpretations of an 
ambiguous statute may provide insight into its meaning. When “confronted with 
ambiguity regarding legislative intent, it is our duty to announce a rule that we are 
convinced is best supported by sound jurisprudential policy germane to the pursuit of 
legislative intent.” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 493, 914 A.2d 735, 749 
(2007). In some cases, policy considerations may outweigh other principles of statutory 
construction. Id. 
Appellants urge that their interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 
19-501—that it imposes liability vicariously on security guard agencies for all acts of 
their employees committed while the employee is on-duty—represents the best policy, 
and the one that the Legislature aimed to enact. As this theory proceeds, security guard 
agencies are in a better position to screen their employees and manage them to ensure 
24 
 
that they do not cause harm to others. The inherent ability of security guards to inflict 
harm on others, in part because of the trust placed in them as a result of Maryland’s 
licensing scheme, justifies the additional responsibility placed on security guard agencies. 
Moreover, security guard agencies, as opposed to injured persons, are in a better position 
to plan for and absorb any harm caused by their employees. Appellants idealize their 
reading of the statute as leading to a more fair allocation of burdens, assigning 
responsibility to the party with greater information, and, implicitly, resulting in better 
management of security guards. 
Appellant’s policy arguments are appealing, but, as SSA offers, there are 
countervailing considerations. Most convincing of them is the wide range of potential 
acts for which security agencies could become liable were Appellants’ interpretation to 
be endorsed. Security guard agencies would be liable for an employee’s acts unrelated 
completely to their employment or the special trust placed in them. A security guard 
agency could become liable, for example, for an employee threatening his or her spouse 
over the telephone or publishing defamatory statements on Facebook. Such acts would be 
difficult to prevent by the employer and have no bearing on the agency’s business. 
As noted earlier, Appellants, in their reply brief, propose a limitation on their 
interpretation of the statute that would prevent the kind of absurd results of which SSA 
warns. They would add the requirement of a nexus between an employee’s on-duty 
wrongdoing and his or her provision of security services (such that the alleged tort is 
incident to the employee conducting the agency’s business) before liability could arise 
under the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. Appellants provide, beyond mere 
25 
 
benevolence, no principled support for this additional requirement in the text of the 
statute or any indicia of legislative intent. 
Although the requirement of such a nexus might dissipate the problematic 
hypotheticals suggested by SSA, that it was even proposed stands in opposition to the 
policy considerations underlying our rule of construction by which we interpret statutes 
in accordance with the common law, absent clear intent of abrogation. Ultimately, these 
policy considerations overcome whatever benefits might arise from the interpretation of 
the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 as proposed by Appellants. 
Even seemingly small changes to the law, though motivated by conciliation and 
good intentions, often require future clarification, as Appellants’ offered interpretation of 
the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 demonstrates. Courts would have to 
determine eventually what “nexus” between employees’ on-duty wrongdoing and 
providing security services is sufficient to impose vicarious liability on employers. 
Because neither the statute nor its legislative history provides guidance on that score, 
courts would be developing the nexus analysis from whole cloth, resulting in uncertainty 
in the public and business arenas until fleshed out. The one nexus that is well understood 
by lawyers and judges—within the scope of employment—would be entombed were we 
to accept Appellants’ offer in this regard. 
The common law doctrine of respondeat superior has its genesis in 17th and 18th 
Century England. Christine W. Young, Comment, Respondeat Superior: A Clarification 
and Broadening of the Current "Scope of Employment" Test, 30 Santa Clara L. Rev. 599, 
601 (1990). The doctrine was adopted by courts in the United States and, over time, 
26 
 
broadened to incorporate more acts of the employee. See generally id. (describing the 
adoption of respondeat superior by American courts and outlining its expansion in 
California). The common law has the advantage of the collective wisdom of a multitude 
of courts refining the doctrine over centuries. We are not convinced that the policy 
considerations that Appellants offer in support of their interpretation of the Maryland 
Security Guards Act § 19-501 are more desirable than (or an improvement over) those 
underlying the common law. 
III. CONCLUSION. 
Considering the ambiguity of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501, its 
context in the Maryland Code, its legislative history, and the policy considerations of 
alternative interpretations, we conclude that the Legislature has not indicated to our 
satisfaction a clear intent to abrogate the common law. We hold therefore that the 
Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 has the same meaning as Maryland’s common 
law doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, we answer the certified question in the 
negative. 
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED AS 
SET FORTH ABOVE. PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 12-610 OF THE COURTS AND 
JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
ARTICLE, 
THE 
COSTS 
SHALL 
BE 
DIVIDED 
EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.