Title: Maner v. Stephenson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 113
September Term, 1995
_____________________________________
ARNOLD H. MANER et ux. 
v.
  JAMES STEPHENSON et ux.
____________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
____________________________________
OPINION BY MURPHY, C.J.
____________________________________
       Filed:  June 6, 1996
      In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 499, 500,
1
97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court defined "nuclear
family" as "essentially a couple and their dependent children."
In this case, Arnold and Barbara Maner filed a petition under
Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) § 9-102 of the Family
Law Article for visitation with their grandchildren, who live in
Salisbury, Maryland with their mother and father, Kita and Jim
Stephenson, in an "intact nuclear family."   The issue we must
1
resolve is whether the trial court erred in denying that petition.
I
The grandchildren, Katie and Trey Stephenson, are ages nine
and six respectively.  The Maners also live in Salisbury and are
Katie and Trey's maternal grandparents.
  
The Maners filed their petition in the Circuit Court for
Wicomico County on July 14, 1994.  The Stephensons agreed, in their
original answer to the petition, that "it is important for the
children to maintain a relationship with the grandparents,
regardless of the relationship between the parties to this
proceeding" and were "willing to establish a regular and reasonable
visitation schedule."  The Stephensons allowed the Maners to see
their grandchildren once in August, twice in September, once in
October, and on Christmas Eve of 1994.  In an amended answer, filed
eight months after the original answer, however, the Stephensons
requested denial of the petition.
On April 24, 1995, Judge Alfred T. Truitt, Jr. held an
2
evidentiary hearing at which the Maners and Stephensons testified,
in addition to Kita's sister-in-law, grandmother, and several
friends and neighbors.  After hearing oral arguments, Judge Truitt,
in a written opinion, dated June 13, 1995, denied the Maners'
petition for visitation.  He first noted that Katie and Trey "have
a loving and healthy relationship" with their parents; that this
was undisputed; and that their parents "are active in the lives of
the children and a very stable 'nuclear family' exists between the
[parents] and their children."  Judge Truitt then discussed the
history of tension in this family and the events that led to the
Maners' petition.
The evidence presented by both sides at trial
establishes that the relationship between Kita Stephenson
and 
Barbara 
Maner 
is 
strained. 
 
This 
strained
relationship started when Kita was a child and continues
today.  The defendant's testimony revealed that she felt
as if she was always dominated by her mother, Barbara,
and that her brother Mark was favored over her.  This
favoritism extended to Mark's wife, Anne, and thus led to
a strained relationship between Anne and Kita.  Other
evidence presented by the defendants was that Barbara
Maner has been critical of both Kita and Jim Stephenson
(sometimes in front of the children).  Kita defined her
mother as a "relationship destroyer" and was not willing
to let the relationship she and her husband had with
their children be harmed.  The Stephensons also spoke of
the stress placed upon the family prior to, during and
after visits with the Maners.  They testified that this
stress made the children uncomfortable.  The Maners
themselves state that after long periods without
visitation, it took a while for the children to feel
comfortable around them.
 
The Maners testified that Kita was difficult to deal
with as a child and as an adult.  Barbara Maner says that
she loves her daughter except when she exhibits her
3
jealousy.
The cessation of visitation followed an incident
which occurred in October of 1993.  The Stephensons had
planned a camping trip with the children but agreed to
cancel the trip because Kita's grandmother, Beulah, was
going to be in town and there would be a family
gathering.  The cancellation of the trip was at the
request of Barbara Maner.  Just prior to the family
gathering, Barbara Maner called and said that the
Stephensons shouldn't come over.  The reason for this was
that Anne Maner did not want Kita to be present.  She was
upset that the Stephensons hadn't attended the birthday
party of her daughter Nancy earlier in the year.  This
angered the Stephensons and regular visitation of the
Maners with Katie and Trey ceased.  
Judge Truitt noted that the case appeared to be one of first
impression, because former grandparent visitation cases did not
involve intact nuclear families.  The intent of the grandparent
visitation statute, the court said, was, nonetheless, to permit
grandparents to petition for visitation of grandchildren in both
dissolved and intact nuclear families.  The issue, Judge Truitt
observed, was "[w]hether it is in the best interest of the two
grandchildren ... to award visitation rights to their maternal
grandparents ... even though such visitation is opposed by the
children's parents ...." 
In reviewing the law, Judge Truitt said that, to be awarded
visitation rights, the grandparents did not have to prove that
"exceptional circumstances [existed] ... rather, the outcome of the
grandparents' petition lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, guided solely by the best interests of the
      In Fairbanks, we said that a trial court, in determining the
2
best interests of the child, "should assess in their totality all
relevant factors and circumstances pertaining to the grandchild's
best interests," including, but not limited to: 
the nature and stability of the child's relationships
with its parents; the nature and substantiality of the
relationship between the child and the grandparent,
taking into account frequency of contact, regularity of
contact, and amount of time spent together; the potential
benefits and detriments to the child in granting the
visitation order; the effect, if any, grandparental
visitation would have on the child's attachment to its
nuclear family; the physical and emotional health of the
adults involved; and the stability of the child's living
and schooling arrangements.
330 Md. at 50.
4
grandchild."  Quoting from Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 50,
622 A.2d 121 (1993), the court noted that "the trial court should
also be alert to the psychological toll [the] visitation dispute
itself might exact on a child in the midst of contesting adults."
Addressing the factors enunciated in Fairbanks, id.,  the court
2
found:
a) the nature and stability of the children's
relationship with their parents is substantial and
stable;
b) even prior to October 1993, the maternal
grandparent's association with the children was at best
sporadic and had no regularity;
c) the potential benefits and detriments of granting
visitation is at best speculative and is therefore a
neutral factor;
d) it appears obvious from the testimony that
visitation would have a deleterious effect on the nuclear
family;
e) having heard the testimony and judged the
credibility of the witnesses, we are constrained to say
that the grandmother appears to be domineering and
immature and the grandfather is at best docile and
5
subdued, which indicates some emotional instability on
their part;
f) the stability of the children's living and
schooling arrangements is a neutral factor since all
parties live in the same community.
In addition to these findings, Judge Truitt observed that "the
grandchildren 
have 
ongoing 
visitation 
with 
their paternal
grandparents, an indication that their denial of visitation with
the Maners is not arbitrary."  (emphasis added).  Judge Truitt
accordingly found that visitation was not in the best interest of
the children.
The Maners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but
before that court heard the matter, we issued a Writ of Certiorari.
II
The Maners argue that, although the court's opinion referred
to the best interests standard, it improperly deferred to the
Stephensons' wishes because they are an intact nuclear family,
thereby imposing a higher burden of proof on the Maners.  In
addition, the Maners contend that the evidence does not support the
trial court's factual findings and that it should have applied a
rebuttable presumption that visitation with grandparents is in the
best interests of grandchildren.
The Stephensons argue that Judge Truitt applied the best
interests standard and did not require the Maners to meet a higher
burden of proof.  In this regard, to apply a rebuttable presumption
6
in favor of the grandparents, as urged by the Maners, is not in
accord with our cases or the plain language of the statute.
III
Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) § 9-102 of the
Family Law Article, entitled "Petition by grandparents for
visitation," provides:
An equity court may:
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a
grandchild by a grandparent; and
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of
the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent.
The statute in its original form was preceded by the phrase, "At
any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment,
or death."  See Ch. 276 of the Acts of 1981.  At the time
grandparent visitation rights were codified, Maryland courts
already had the authority, under the common law, to award
grandparents custody or visitation.  See, e.g., Maddox v. Maddox,
174 Md. 470, 199 A. 507 (1938) (custody granted to paternal
grandmother over mother); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 18 A.2d
199 (1941) (custody granted to maternal grandparents over father).
Thus, in Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 342, 488 A.2d 157 (1985), we
agreed with the Court of Special Appeals in Skeens v. Paterno, 60
Md.App. 48, 60, 480 A.2d 820, that the 1981 codification was "a
mere restatement of the existing law."  Indeed, the law was adopted
for the purpose of "clarifying that a court may grant visitation
7
rights to grandparents of a child."  Ch. 276 of the Acts of 1981.
By Ch. 252 of the Acts of 1993, the legislature amended § 9-
102 by deleting the phrase "At any time after the termination of a
marriage by divorce, annulment, or death."  The House Floor Report
pertaining to this amendment noted that courts had granted
visitation rights to grandparents after termination of the parents'
marriage and where no marriage was involved, but had "not
recognized visitation rights of grandparents when the marriage of
the parents is still intact."  The bill, therefore, made "the
marital status of parents irrelevant in determining visitation
rights of grandparents."  Floor Report, H.B. 30 (1993).  The plain
language of the statute, therefore, clearly reflects the
legislature's intent to allow courts to grant grandparents
visitation, even where the parents' marriage is intact, if it is in
the best interests of the children.
IV
Since the 1993 amendment, we have addressed this statute
twice.  In Fairbanks, supra, 330 Md. at 49, we held that a petition
for grandparent visitation under § 9-102 need not be supported by
exceptional circumstances.  The parents were divorced and shared
joint legal custody of their two children; the father was the
custodial parent and the mother enjoyed visitation rights.  The
maternal grandparents filed a petition for visitation, naming only
8
the father as a defendant.  The father agreed to allow the children
to see the grandparents while they were with their mother, but the
mother did not want to relinquish any of her time with the children
to her parents.  Id. at 43.  The trial court denied the petition
because it found no exceptional circumstances to support the
grandparents' petition.  Id. at 44.
We first held that the mother was a necessary party to the
suit.  Id. at 45.  We then examined the language of the statute and
the legislative history and determined that grandparent visitation
is "available, but not mandatory," id. at 46, that grandparents
need not show exceptional circumstances as a precondition to their
petition, id. at 47-48, and that grandparents' rights are "not
derivative" of the parent's rights.  Id. at 48.  We concluded that
"[t]he outcome of the grandparents' petition lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the best interests
of the grandchild."  Id. at 49.
In Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (1995), we held
that adoption of a child by her maternal grandparents does not
preclude her paternal grandparents from petitioning for visitation.
Following the mother's death, the maternal grandparents, the
Beckmans, adopted their granddaughter and the father retained
visitation rights.  Id. at 694.  The paternal grandparents, the
Boggses, then sought visitation.  The trial court granted their
9
petition, holding that the Beckman's adoption did not affect the
Boggses' rights and that visitation with the Boggses would be in
the child's best interests.  Id. at 695.
We agreed that the severing of the father's rights did "not
result in a corresponding loss of the Boggses' independent
grandparental rights under § 9-102 to petition for visitation."
Id. at 701.  While recognizing the special role grandparents may
play in a child's life, id. at 702, we reiterated that "all
relevant factors and circumstances should be considered in
assessing what will best serve the child's interest."  Id. at 693.
The Fairbanks factors, we emphasized, are guidelines; they were
meant to be illustrative of what should be considered and were not
intended as absolutes."  Id. at 703.  Although the trial court had
not explicitly addressed each of the Fairbanks factors, we upheld
its determination because it had considered all the evidence in
assessing the best interests of the child.
V
"As we have said, determinations concerning visitation are
within the sound discretion of the trial court as it is in the best
position to assess the import of the particular facts of the case
and to observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses."
Beckman, supra, 337 Md. at 703.  We must, therefore, determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
10
Maners' petition.  Id.; Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 470, 648
A.2d 1016 (1994).  
By its plain language, § 9-102 does not distinguish cases in
which the parents' marriage is intact from those in which the
marriage is ended or never existed.  In every grandparent
visitation case, therefore, the trial court must examine the
totality of the circumstances and determine whether granting the
petition would be in the child's best interests.  In this case, the
trial court properly considered all the relevant facts and
circumstances, applied the best interests standard, and did not
abuse its discretion in denying the Maner's petition.  That Judge
Truitt may have believed that this case was one of first impression
due to the presence of an intact nuclear family does not imply that
he deferred to the parents' wishes or imposed a higher burden of
proof on the Maners.
Judge Truitt acted well within his discretion in considering
the effect of visitation on the childrens' relationship with their
parents.  It was also permissible for him to consider the
relationship between the Maners and the Stephensons, or more
specifically between Kita and her mother.  Daugherty v. Ritter, 646
N.E.2d 66, 68 (Ind.App.2 Dist. 1995), aff'd, 652 N.E.2d 502 (Ind.
1995) ("While the [grandparent-grandchild] relationship may, in any
given case, be sufficient to make grandparent visitation in the
11
child's best interest, notwithstanding the dissension between the
parent and grandparent, it may not be sufficient to overcome the
effects of the discord on the child in another.").  In addition, we
have recognized that judicial supervision of familial relationships
is disruptive to the lives of children, In re Adoption No. 10941,
335 Md. 99, 120, 642 A.2d 201 (1994); see also Brooks v. Parkerson,
265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1995) ("[T]he impact of a lawsuit
to enforce maintenance of the [grandparent-grandchild] bond over
the parents' objection can only have a deleterious effect on the
child.").  We have also instructed trial courts to consider the
"psychological 
toll" 
of 
visitation 
disputes 
on 
children.
Fairbanks, supra, 330 Md. at 50.
Finally, it bears repeating that courts may not apply a
rebuttable presumption in favor of grandparent visitation.  Nothing
in the language of the statute or the legislative history supports
such a presumption.  Cf. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643
(Utah App. 1995) (holding that visitation statute similar to § 9-
102 is constitutional and does not presume grandparent visitation
to be in child's best interest).  While we have generally
recognized the great benefits to children of maintaining
relationships with grandparents, Beckman, supra, 337 Md. at 702, we
have held that § 9-102 leaves decisions regarding grandparent
visitation to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Fairbanks,
12
supra, 330 Md. at 46.  A presumption that grandparent visitation is
in the best interests of the child would undermine the trial
court's discretion and conflict with the unambiguous language of
the statute.  See also Brooks, supra, 454 S.E.2d 769.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; WITH COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 113
September Term, 1995
_____________________________________
ARNOLD H. MANER et ux. 
13
v.
  JAMES STEPHENSON et ux.
____________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
____________________________________
14
OPINION BY MURPHY, C.J.
____________________________________
       Filed:  June 6, 1996
      In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 499, 500,
3
97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Court defined "nuclear
family" as "essentially a couple and their dependent children."
In this case, Arnold and Barbara Maner filed a petition under
Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) § 9-102 of the Family
Law Article for visitation with their grandchildren, who live in
Salisbury, Maryland with their mother and father, Kita and Jim
Stephenson, in an "intact nuclear family."   The issue we must
3
resolve is whether the trial court erred in denying that petition.
I
The grandchildren, Katie and Trey Stephenson, are ages nine
and six respectively.  The Maners also live in Salisbury and are
Katie and Trey's maternal grandparents.
  
The Maners filed their petition in the Circuit Court for
Wicomico County on July 14, 1994.  The Stephensons agreed, in their
original answer to the petition, that "it is important for the
children to maintain a relationship with the grandparents,
regardless of the relationship between the parties to this
proceeding" and were "willing to establish a regular and reasonable
visitation schedule."  The Stephensons allowed the Maners to see
their grandchildren once in August, twice in September, once in
October, and on Christmas Eve of 1994.  In an amended answer, filed
eight months after the original answer, however, the Stephensons
requested denial of the petition.
On April 24, 1995, Judge Alfred T. Truitt, Jr. held an
2
evidentiary hearing at which the Maners and Stephensons testified,
in addition to Kita's sister-in-law, grandmother, and several
friends and neighbors.  After hearing oral arguments, Judge Truitt,
in a written opinion, dated June 13, 1995, denied the Maners'
petition for visitation.  He first noted that Katie and Trey "have
a loving and healthy relationship" with their parents; that this
was undisputed; and that their parents "are active in the lives of
the children and a very stable 'nuclear family' exists between the
[parents] and their children."  Judge Truitt then discussed the
history of tension in this family and the events that led to the
Maners' petition.
The evidence presented by both sides at trial
establishes that the relationship between Kita Stephenson
and 
Barbara 
Maner 
is 
strained. 
 
This 
strained
relationship started when Kita was a child and continues
today.  The defendant's testimony revealed that she felt
as if she was always dominated by her mother, Barbara,
and that her brother Mark was favored over her.  This
favoritism extended to Mark's wife, Anne, and thus led to
a strained relationship between Anne and Kita.  Other
evidence presented by the defendants was that Barbara
Maner has been critical of both Kita and Jim Stephenson
(sometimes in front of the children).  Kita defined her
mother as a "relationship destroyer" and was not willing
to let the relationship she and her husband had with
their children be harmed.  The Stephensons also spoke of
the stress placed upon the family prior to, during and
after visits with the Maners.  They testified that this
stress made the children uncomfortable.  The Maners
themselves state that after long periods without
visitation, it took a while for the children to feel
comfortable around them.
 
The Maners testified that Kita was difficult to deal
with as a child and as an adult.  Barbara Maner says that
she loves her daughter except when she exhibits her
3
jealousy.
The cessation of visitation followed an incident
which occurred in October of 1993.  The Stephensons had
planned a camping trip with the children but agreed to
cancel the trip because Kita's grandmother, Beulah, was
going to be in town and there would be a family
gathering.  The cancellation of the trip was at the
request of Barbara Maner.  Just prior to the family
gathering, Barbara Maner called and said that the
Stephensons shouldn't come over.  The reason for this was
that Anne Maner did not want Kita to be present.  She was
upset that the Stephensons hadn't attended the birthday
party of her daughter Nancy earlier in the year.  This
angered the Stephensons and regular visitation of the
Maners with Katie and Trey ceased.  
Judge Truitt noted that the case appeared to be one of first
impression, because former grandparent visitation cases did not
involve intact nuclear families.  The intent of the grandparent
visitation statute, the court said, was, nonetheless, to permit
grandparents to petition for visitation of grandchildren in both
dissolved and intact nuclear families.  The issue, Judge Truitt
observed, was "[w]hether it is in the best interest of the two
grandchildren ... to award visitation rights to their maternal
grandparents ... even though such visitation is opposed by the
children's parents ...." 
In reviewing the law, Judge Truitt said that, to be awarded
visitation rights, the grandparents did not have to prove that
"exceptional circumstances [existed] ... rather, the outcome of the
grandparents' petition lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, guided solely by the best interests of the
      In Fairbanks, we said that a trial court, in determining the
4
best interests of the child, "should assess in their totality all
relevant factors and circumstances pertaining to the grandchild's
best interests," including, but not limited to: 
the nature and stability of the child's relationships
with its parents; the nature and substantiality of the
relationship between the child and the grandparent,
taking into account frequency of contact, regularity of
contact, and amount of time spent together; the potential
benefits and detriments to the child in granting the
visitation order; the effect, if any, grandparental
visitation would have on the child's attachment to its
nuclear family; the physical and emotional health of the
adults involved; and the stability of the child's living
and schooling arrangements.
330 Md. at 50.
4
grandchild."  Quoting from Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 50,
622 A.2d 121 (1993), the court noted that "the trial court should
also be alert to the psychological toll [the] visitation dispute
itself might exact on a child in the midst of contesting adults."
Addressing the factors enunciated in Fairbanks, id.,  the court
4
found:
a) the nature and stability of the children's
relationship with their parents is substantial and
stable;
b) even prior to October 1993, the maternal
grandparent's association with the children was at best
sporadic and had no regularity;
c) the potential benefits and detriments of granting
visitation is at best speculative and is therefore a
neutral factor;
d) it appears obvious from the testimony that
visitation would have a deleterious effect on the nuclear
family;
e) having heard the testimony and judged the
credibility of the witnesses, we are constrained to say
that the grandmother appears to be domineering and
immature and the grandfather is at best docile and
5
subdued, which indicates some emotional instability on
their part;
f) the stability of the children's living and
schooling arrangements is a neutral factor since all
parties live in the same community.
In addition to these findings, Judge Truitt observed that "the
grandchildren 
have 
ongoing 
visitation 
with 
their paternal
grandparents, an indication that their denial of visitation with
the Maners is not arbitrary."  (emphasis added).  Judge Truitt
accordingly found that visitation was not in the best interest of
the children.
The Maners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but
before that court heard the matter, we issued a Writ of Certiorari.
II
The Maners argue that, although the court's opinion referred
to the best interests standard, it improperly deferred to the
Stephensons' wishes because they are an intact nuclear family,
thereby imposing a higher burden of proof on the Maners.  In
addition, the Maners contend that the evidence does not support the
trial court's factual findings and that it should have applied a
rebuttable presumption that visitation with grandparents is in the
best interests of grandchildren.
The Stephensons argue that Judge Truitt applied the best
interests standard and did not require the Maners to meet a higher
burden of proof.  In this regard, to apply a rebuttable presumption
6
in favor of the grandparents, as urged by the Maners, is not in
accord with our cases or the plain language of the statute.
III
Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) § 9-102 of the
Family Law Article, entitled "Petition by grandparents for
visitation," provides:
An equity court may:
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a
grandchild by a grandparent; and
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of
the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent.
The statute in its original form was preceded by the phrase, "At
any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment,
or death."  See Ch. 276 of the Acts of 1981.  At the time
grandparent visitation rights were codified, Maryland courts
already had the authority, under the common law, to award
grandparents custody or visitation.  See, e.g., Maddox v. Maddox,
174 Md. 470, 199 A. 507 (1938) (custody granted to paternal
grandmother over mother); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 18 A.2d
199 (1941) (custody granted to maternal grandparents over father).
Thus, in Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 342, 488 A.2d 157 (1985), we
agreed with the Court of Special Appeals in Skeens v. Paterno, 60
Md.App. 48, 60, 480 A.2d 820, that the 1981 codification was "a
mere restatement of the existing law."  Indeed, the law was adopted
for the purpose of "clarifying that a court may grant visitation
7
rights to grandparents of a child."  Ch. 276 of the Acts of 1981.
By Ch. 252 of the Acts of 1993, the legislature amended § 9-
102 by deleting the phrase "At any time after the termination of a
marriage by divorce, annulment, or death."  The House Floor Report
pertaining to this amendment noted that courts had granted
visitation rights to grandparents after termination of the parents'
marriage and where no marriage was involved, but had "not
recognized visitation rights of grandparents when the marriage of
the parents is still intact."  The bill, therefore, made "the
marital status of parents irrelevant in determining visitation
rights of grandparents."  Floor Report, H.B. 30 (1993).  The plain
language of the statute, therefore, clearly reflects the
legislature's intent to allow courts to grant grandparents
visitation, even where the parents' marriage is intact, if it is in
the best interests of the children.
IV
Since the 1993 amendment, we have addressed this statute
twice.  In Fairbanks, supra, 330 Md. at 49, we held that a petition
for grandparent visitation under § 9-102 need not be supported by
exceptional circumstances.  The parents were divorced and shared
joint legal custody of their two children; the father was the
custodial parent and the mother enjoyed visitation rights.  The
maternal grandparents filed a petition for visitation, naming only
8
the father as a defendant.  The father agreed to allow the children
to see the grandparents while they were with their mother, but the
mother did not want to relinquish any of her time with the children
to her parents.  Id. at 43.  The trial court denied the petition
because it found no exceptional circumstances to support the
grandparents' petition.  Id. at 44.
We first held that the mother was a necessary party to the
suit.  Id. at 45.  We then examined the language of the statute and
the legislative history and determined that grandparent visitation
is "available, but not mandatory," id. at 46, that grandparents
need not show exceptional circumstances as a precondition to their
petition, id. at 47-48, and that grandparents' rights are "not
derivative" of the parent's rights.  Id. at 48.  We concluded that
"[t]he outcome of the grandparents' petition lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the best interests
of the grandchild."  Id. at 49.
In Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (1995), we held
that adoption of a child by her maternal grandparents does not
preclude her paternal grandparents from petitioning for visitation.
Following the mother's death, the maternal grandparents, the
Beckmans, adopted their granddaughter and the father retained
visitation rights.  Id. at 694.  The paternal grandparents, the
Boggses, then sought visitation.  The trial court granted their
9
petition, holding that the Beckman's adoption did not affect the
Boggses' rights and that visitation with the Boggses would be in
the child's best interests.  Id. at 695.
We agreed that the severing of the father's rights did "not
result in a corresponding loss of the Boggses' independent
grandparental rights under § 9-102 to petition for visitation."
Id. at 701.  While recognizing the special role grandparents may
play in a child's life, id. at 702, we reiterated that "all
relevant factors and circumstances should be considered in
assessing what will best serve the child's interest."  Id. at 693.
The Fairbanks factors, we emphasized, are guidelines; they were
meant to be illustrative of what should be considered and were not
intended as absolutes."  Id. at 703.  Although the trial court had
not explicitly addressed each of the Fairbanks factors, we upheld
its determination because it had considered all the evidence in
assessing the best interests of the child.
V
"As we have said, determinations concerning visitation are
within the sound discretion of the trial court as it is in the best
position to assess the import of the particular facts of the case
and to observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses."
Beckman, supra, 337 Md. at 703.  We must, therefore, determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
10
Maners' petition.  Id.; Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 470, 648
A.2d 1016 (1994).  
By its plain language, § 9-102 does not distinguish cases in
which the parents' marriage is intact from those in which the
marriage is ended or never existed.  In every grandparent
visitation case, therefore, the trial court must examine the
totality of the circumstances and determine whether granting the
petition would be in the child's best interests.  In this case, the
trial court properly considered all the relevant facts and
circumstances, applied the best interests standard, and did not
abuse its discretion in denying the Maner's petition.  That Judge
Truitt may have believed that this case was one of first impression
due to the presence of an intact nuclear family does not imply that
he deferred to the parents' wishes or imposed a higher burden of
proof on the Maners.
Judge Truitt acted well within his discretion in considering
the effect of visitation on the childrens' relationship with their
parents.  It was also permissible for him to consider the
relationship between the Maners and the Stephensons, or more
specifically between Kita and her mother.  Daugherty v. Ritter, 646
N.E.2d 66, 68 (Ind.App.2 Dist. 1995), aff'd, 652 N.E.2d 502 (Ind.
1995) ("While the [grandparent-grandchild] relationship may, in any
given case, be sufficient to make grandparent visitation in the
11
child's best interest, notwithstanding the dissension between the
parent and grandparent, it may not be sufficient to overcome the
effects of the discord on the child in another.").  In addition, we
have recognized that judicial supervision of familial relationships
is disruptive to the lives of children, In re Adoption No. 10941,
335 Md. 99, 120, 642 A.2d 201 (1994); see also Brooks v. Parkerson,
265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1995) ("[T]he impact of a lawsuit
to enforce maintenance of the [grandparent-grandchild] bond over
the parents' objection can only have a deleterious effect on the
child.").  We have also instructed trial courts to consider the
"psychological 
toll" 
of 
visitation 
disputes 
on 
children.
Fairbanks, supra, 330 Md. at 50.
Finally, it bears repeating that courts may not apply a
rebuttable presumption in favor of grandparent visitation.  Nothing
in the language of the statute or the legislative history supports
such a presumption.  Cf. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643
(Utah App. 1995) (holding that visitation statute similar to § 9-
102 is constitutional and does not presume grandparent visitation
to be in child's best interest).  While we have generally
recognized the great benefits to children of maintaining
relationships with grandparents, Beckman, supra, 337 Md. at 702, we
have held that § 9-102 leaves decisions regarding grandparent
visitation to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Fairbanks,
12
supra, 330 Md. at 46.  A presumption that grandparent visitation is
in the best interests of the child would undermine the trial
court's discretion and conflict with the unambiguous language of
the statute.  See also Brooks, supra, 454 S.E.2d 769.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; WITH COSTS.