Title: Buettner v. Buettner

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

505 P.2d 600 (1973) Stella Behnen BUETTNER, Appellant, v. John Alvin BUETTNER, Respondent. No. 6801. Supreme Court of Nevada. February 2, 1973. Rehearing Denied April 13, 1973. *601 Harry E. Claiborne, Dean Breeze, Paul V. Carelli, III, Las Vegas, for appellant. Cromer & Barker, Las Vegas, for respondent. ZENOFF, Justice: The parties to this action, in contemplation of marriage, entered into an antenuptial agreement which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The antenuptial agreement was silent as to the separate property if any, of Stella Behnen, but listed the separate property of John A. Buettner, which was later estimated *602 by him to be worth approximately $400,000.00. Subsequent to the execution of the contract, but on the same day (December 6, 1970), the parties were married. Both parties had been married previously and had children by prior marriages. On April 9, 1971 Mr. Buettner instituted divorce proceedings against his wife alleging fraud and misrepresentation in the inducement to sign the prenuptial agreement, mental cruelty and incompatibility. The wife in her answer advanced the antenuptial agreement and urged the court, in the event it should award plaintiff a divorce, to enter its decree as to property settlement and support in conformance with the agreement of the parties. The judge, after trial to the court sitting without a jury, did not make any finding of fact as to plaintiff's allegation of fraud and misrepresentation by the wife to induce him to enter into the agreement. Nor did he make any finding as to the alleged mental cruelty of the wife. Instead, the divorce was granted upon the ground of incompatibility. As to the antenuptial contract, the court entered its finding of fact as follows: The court refused to honor the antenuptial agreement of the parties, whereunder the wife would get the house, all household goods and furniture and $500.00 per month for 5 years, and instead awarded the wife a dining room set, a couch and $2,000 payable at $166.67 per month for one year. Mrs. Buettner has appealed from this decree claiming the trial court erred in refusing to give effect to the antenuptial agreement of the parties. We are presented with two questions: (1) whether in this jurisdiction antenuptial contracts relating to property settlement and support in the event of divorce are void as contrary to public policy; and (2) if not, is this particular antenuptial contract so unconscionable or unfair that it should not be enforced? 1. While the court has never directly addressed itself to the question, a number of jurisdictions have announced the rule that contracts intended to promote or facilitate the procurement of a divorce are void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970); In re Cooper's Estate, 195 Kan. 174, 403 P.2d 984, 998 (Kan. 1965). The difficulty with the application of the rule is in determining when such a contract invites, promotes or encourages divorce. Agreements have been declared void which obligate one spouse to not defend or contest a divorce by the other spouse. Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237, 238 (1933); Gardine v. Cottey, 36 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (1950); Perry v. Perry, 183 Tenn. 362, 192 S.W.2d 830 (1946). Likewise, contracts under which there is an agreement to procure a divorce are invalid, McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 74 S.E.2d 320 (1953), as are those obligating the parties to conceal the true cause of the divorce by alleging another. Allen v. Allen, supra. In addition, and by far the majority of the cases wherein such contracts are declared void, are those whereunder the husband sought to relieve himself of his duty to support the wife in the event of divorce, or to limit his liability for such support to a small fraction of that which a court would be likely to decree in light of the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay. See, e.g., Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961), and cases collected in 57 A.L.R.2d 942, et seq. The reason such contracts tend to promote or encourage divorce is set forth in Crouch v. *603 Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964): While in the normal case the wife urges the invalidity of the contract, here, the husband, using a strange twist on the above rationale, argues that the contractual provision relating to the property settlement and support was so generous in favor of the wife that she was induced by the hope of financial gain to so abuse and mistreat her husband as to force him to bring an action for divorce. We are unconvinced. We do not find, nor did the trial court find, that the prospective wife entered into the contract with the intent to obtain a divorce from Mr. Buettner and thereby profit financially. There was no finding that the wife caused the divorce. In fact, it is uncontradicted in the record that the serious acts of divorce were committed not by the wife, but by the husband, who, on at least two occasions, beat the wife severely because of her refusal to change her name to conform to that of his previous wife in order to commit a tax fraud. As a result of such beatings, appellant was hospitalized and required to undergo surgery. Similarly, we do not believe the agreement to be so generous in favor of the wife that she would be induced to seek a divorce as a source of financial gain. In fact, it seems clear, particularly in light of Section 4 of the agreement requiring reciprocal wills, that it would have been in the best financial interest of the wife to remain married, thereby sharing in her husband's moderate wealth during their joint lives, and standing to receive a large share of his estate at his death. This case, then, does not stand on the same footing as those wherein certain types of antenuptial contracts are said to be violative of public policy because they induce, encourage or promote divorce. Antenuptial contracts whereby the parties agree upon the property rights which each shall have in the estate of the other upon his or her death have long been held to be conducive to marital tranquillity and thus in harmony with public policy. See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Stewart v. Stewart, 222 N.C. 387, 23 S.E.2d 306 (1942). We perceive no reason why a different rationale should apply where the parties have attempted to set contractually the property rights of each spouse and the amount of support due the wife in the event a prospective marriage fails. Other jurisdictions do uphold antenuptial contracts relating to property settlement and support in case of divorce. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okl. 1960); In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1964). We quote with approval language of the Supreme Court of Florida in Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970): The rule applicable to antenuptial contracts settling property rights upon the death of a spouse is set out by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: We have given careful consideration to whether antenuptial contracts settling alimony and property rights upon divorce are to be viewed in this state as void because contrary to public policy, and hold that they are not. Nevertheless, as with all contracts, courts of this state shall retain power to refuse to enforce a particular antenuptial contract if it is found that it is unconscionable, obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, material nondisclosure or duress. 2. Having determined that antenuptial contracts settling property rights and alimony in the event of divorce are not per se void, we direct our attention to the question whether the particular contract in this case is unconscionable, unreasonable in amount or improperly obtained. Respondent attaches much significance to the fact that the trial court made the following finding of fact: The finding, however, is merely conclusory. It indicates none of the indicia of unfairness or ultimate facts leading to the conclusion that the agreement was unfair and unjust. We therefore do not feel bound by the trial court's finding of fact that the contract was "unfair and unjust." The record does not reveal fraud, misrepresentation, material nondisclosure, duress or any other ultimate fact indicating unfairness or unconscionability of the contract. The husband's own testimony from the record clearly shows the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract: In summary, we hold that the antenuptial contract should be enforced. It is not void as against public policy, and it was fair and reasonable in its provisions, understandably and intelligently entered into, and not obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or nondisclosure on the part of the wife. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. THOMPSON, C. J., and MOWBRAY, GUNDERSON, and BATJER, JJ., concur.