Title: P. v. Cobb

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 3/8/10 (this opn. should follow lead companion case, S155481, also filed 3/8/10) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S159410 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E040848 
ROY COBB, JR., 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIF091750 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Having served his sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, defendant 
Roy Cobb, Jr. was committed in 2005 to a state hospital for treatment as a 
mentally disordered offender (MDO).  After that commitment ended, a jury found 
that his condition persisted, and his commitment was extended in this proceeding.1  
On appeal, defendant contended he was denied due process because he remained 
confined while his extension trial was continued, without good cause, beyond his 
scheduled release date. 
As we will explain, several issues presented here have been effectively 
resolved in the companion case, where they arose in the context of a commitment 
following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI).  (See People v. Lara 
(Mar. 8, 2010, S155481) __ Cal.4th __ (Lara).)   
                                              
1  
The record does not reflect whether defendant exercised his right to a jury 
trial with regard to his first commitment. (See Pen. Code, § 2966, subd. (b).)  
Further statutory references will be to the Penal Code. 
2 
This case differs from Lara, in that here the Court of Appeal held that the 
original finding that defendant was an MDO justified his confinement until the 
extension petition was tried, even if good cause was not shown for continuing his 
trial beyond his scheduled release date.  It reasoned:  “Essentially, there has 
already been a determination that the defendant is an MDO; at the trial, the 
prosecution simply must prove that the defendant is still an MDO.”   
The Court of Appeal erred.  It failed to acknowledge that the critical 
question at an extension trial is an MDO‟s current condition.  (§ 2972, subd. (c).) 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A prisoner certified as an MDO is treated by the Department of Mental 
Health as a condition of parole.  (§ 2962.)  Unless good cause is shown, at least 
180 days before parole is to end, the medical director of the state hospital “shall”  
inform the district attorney in writing if the parolee‟s “severe mental disorder is 
not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment.”  (§ 2970.)  The 
district attorney “may” then petition the superior court for another year of 
treatment.  (Ibid.)  The trial on the extension petition “shall” begin at least 30 
calendar days before “the time the person would otherwise have been released, 
unless the time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown.”  (§ 2972, 
subd. (a) (section 2972(a).)  If the patient is found to have a severe mental disorder 
that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and by 
reason thereof represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the 
patient shall be recommitted for one year.  (§ 2972, subd. (c).) 
Defendant‟s parole release date was May 27, 2006.  The district attorney 
filed a petition for continued treatment on March 6, and the trial began on June 19.  
Thus trial did not begin 30 days before the release date, and defendant was held an 
additional 23 days before his trial did begin. 
3 
On April 24, 2006, defendant‟s counsel announced that she was ready for 
trial and asked to proceed “forthwith.” 
The People replied that the assigned deputy, Charles Kenyon, was 
unavailable because he was at an out-of-town conference.  In addition, Kenyon 
had “three criminal trials set that should go before this matter.  He‟s requesting the 
last week of May for this case.” 
Defense counsel objected to the continuance on both statutory and 
constitutional grounds.  “[I]n order to be in compliance with Penal Code [section] 
29[7]2, subdivision (a), he would have to proceed to trial by May the 24th, which 
given everything else that is going on with the Court‟s calendar, it‟s unlikely that 
the Court is going to be available on May the 24th, and we will have yet another 
MDO that has not gone to trial in an expeditious fashion.” 
When the court indicated its intention to continue the case to May 2, 2006, 
defense counsel elaborated on her objection.  Defendant was in custody.  Trying 
the extension petition after his current term expired would violate his rights to 
liberty, due process, and equal protection under both the state and federal 
Constitutions. 
On May 2, defense counsel was again ready.  The court said it would trail 
the case until May 4 because it was trying another case.  Noting that the section 
2972(a) 30-day deadline had already passed, defense counsel renewed her 
statutory and constitutional objections.  The objections were overruled. 
On May 4, the defense again announced ready.  The deputy district attorney 
said that the treating physician was unavailable until June 9.  Pointing out that 
defendant‟s term would have expired by that time, defense counsel objected to the 
continuance and moved to dismiss the extension petition.  “This is a classic 
example of the ongoing problem with the district attorney‟s office,” she argued.  
“They file these cases at the last minute, and then they‟re not able to proceed in a 
4 
timely fashion as is required by [section 2972(a) and due process].”  The court 
overruled the objection and denied the dismissal motion, finding good cause for 
the continuance:  “Number one, this Court is in trial and has a priority criminal 
case coming at the conclusion of this trial.  Plus the doctor is not available until 
June 9.” 
On May 26, defense counsel moved for defendant‟s release on bail because 
his parole term would expire the next day.  Counsel argued that nothing in section 
2972(a) authorized keeping defendant in custody when parole ended.  The motion 
was denied. 
On June 9, defense counsel was again ready and renewed her motions for 
release and dismissal, noting that defendant‟s term had expired.  The deputy 
district attorney sought another week‟s continuance for two reasons.  He was 
engaged in another trial.  The treating physician, Dr. Rosten, was under court 
order to perform an examination in another case that day and had been subpoenaed 
in two other cases for the following week.  Defense counsel noted that the case 
had already been continued for weeks because of Dr. Rosten‟s trip to Spain.  “I 
think if the Court were to order this trial to begin, that the district attorney would 
either get Dr. Rosten here or get someone else here to say what it is they think they 
need to say about Mr. Cobb.  If he‟s as dangerous as the district attorney would 
lead the Court to believe, then it would seem to me that there would be more than 
one single solitary doctor in the whole wide world that could come in and talk 
about the relevant issues, particularly when Dr. Rosten has been in Spain and 
obviously someone else would have been treating him.” 
The motions to dismiss were denied.  “The Court finds there‟s good cause.  
The Court is . . . engaged in trial.  There‟s no other court available.  The district 
attorney is engaged in trial.  The witness is not available.”  The court continued 
the case until June 15.  Defense counsel reminded the court that defendant was 
5 
being kept in custody beyond his scheduled release date and that the court was 
giving priority to prosecutions of defendants who were not in custody. 
On June 15, Dr. Rosten was still unavailable, and defendant had not been 
transported to court.  Defense counsel yet again moved for dismissal and release.  
The court denied the motions and trailed the matter until the following Monday, 
June 19.   
Jury selection began on June 19.  On June 22, 2006, the jury found 
defendant to be an MDO and his commitment was extended.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed.   
We hold:  (1) At the end of his commitment, defendant was entitled, as a 
matter of due process, to release pending trial on the extension petition, unless 
good cause to continue the trial was shown or he waived time.  (2) The court did 
not lose jurisdiction to try him, however.  (3) He is not now entitled to release. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
The Statutory Deadline for Beginning Trial Is Directory 
In Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th __, the defendant was tried for falsely 
imprisoning a child, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed to a 
state hospital.   In a proceeding to extend his commitment, the statutory deadlines 
for filing the extension petition and commencing trial were not met.  The 
defendant contended the trial court thereby lost jurisdiction to try the case because 
the deadlines were mandatory.  We rejected this contention, concluding the 
deadlines were directory.  (Id. at pp. __-__ [pp. 6-12].)   
One of the grounds for our conclusion was that section 1026.5, subdivision 
(a)(2) expressly states the time limits set out in that section “are not jurisdictional.”  
The statute setting out the time limit for commencing an MDO recommitment trial 
does not have a similar disclaimer.  (See § 2972.)   However, this difference does 
not necessarily indicate the Legislature intended this deadline to be mandatory.  
6 
Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically 
deemed directory.  (Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [p. 7]; People v. Allen (2007) 
42 Cal.4th 91, 101-102 (Allen).)   
Moreover, the other factors we relied upon in Lara to conclude the 
Legislature intended the NGI time limits to be directory are also present here.  The 
Legislature‟s failure to include a penalty or consequence for non-compliance with 
the NGI statute‟s time limit indicates that the requirement is directory rather than 
mandatory.  (Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [p.10]; California Correctional 
Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145; 
Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410.)  Like the parallel provision 
governing NGI recommitment proceedings, section 2972 contains no indication 
that an MDO extension trial may not take place if the 30-day deadline is not 
satisfied.  Indeed, the statute itself provides that its time limit is not binding if 
good cause is shown for not having met it, or if the defendant waives time.  (See 
Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [p. 10].)   
Finally, the purposes of the MDO recommitment procedure would be 
defeated by holding the time limit mandatory.  As we said in Lara regarding the 
NGI recommitment procedure:  “Holding it to be mandatory would mean that a 
court, faced with a filing deadline missed for good cause, would be powerless to 
extend treatment under the statute no matter how great the defendant‟s need or the 
danger release might pose to the public.  Such an interpretation would run counter 
to the very purposes of the NGI statutes and the provision for extension of 
commitment.  It would elevate the secondary benefit to the defendant derived from 
the time limit over the fundamental purposes of the NGI provisions, to ensure that 
needed treatment is provided and the public protected.  (Cf. Williams, supra, 77 
Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [construing the time limit provisions of the Mentally 
Disordered Prisoners Act].)  [Fn.]”  (Id. at p. __ [p. 11].)   
7 
 
B. 
Due Process   
Our due process analysis in Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th __, began with the 
proposition that a “ „root requirement‟ of due process is that an individual be given 
an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any significant liberty or 
property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid 
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the 
event.  (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 379; see In re Roger S. (1977) 
19 Cal.3d 921, 937.)”  (Id. at p. __ [pp. 12-13].) 
In Lara, we concluded that the due process question should be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis.  (Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [p. 17].)  The reason for a 
delay should be balanced against its prejudicial effect.  A late extension petition 
filing potentially gives rise to two types of prejudice:  inability to prepare for trial 
in the remaining time, and involuntary commitment beyond the release date.  
(Ibid.)   Lara suffered both types of prejudice.  The petition to extend his 
commitment was filed so late that he did not have adequate time to prepare for 
trial before his term ended.  There was no good cause for the late filing, and he did 
not waive time.  Finally, he was subjected to nearly seven months of additional 
confinement after his release date, but before the adjudication to which he was 
entitled.  (Id. at pp. __ [pp. 18-22].) 
Here, Cobb was not even given the opportunity to go to trial before his term 
ended.  Not only was the 30-day deadline for trial commencement missed, the trial 
began 23 days after defendant‟s scheduled release date.  He objected to each 
continuance.  On appeal, he claimed the grant of continuances without good cause 
denied him due process.   
The Court of Appeal did not directly address this claim.  Instead, it 
assumed an absence of good cause, but concluded that defendant was not denied 
8 
due process. 2  It reasoned that defendant had notice and an opportunity to be 
heard when he was initially found to be an MDO.  “This notice and opportunity to 
be heard is also constitutionally sufficient to allow the defendant to be confined—
even after his or her release date—until the end of [an extension] trial.  Essentially, 
there has already been a determination that the defendant is an MDO; at the trial, 
the prosecution simply must prove that the defendant is still an MDO.”   
The Court of Appeal‟s analysis would render the procedural safeguards of 
notice and timely trial merely advisory.    
 “The MDO Act establishes a comprehensive scheme for treating prisoners 
who have severe mental disorders that were a cause or aggravating factor in the 
commission of the crime for which they were imprisoned.  (See § 2960.)  The act 
addresses treatment in three contexts—first,  as a condition of parole (§ 2962); 
then, as continued treatment for one year upon termination of parole (§ 2970); and 
finally, as an additional year of treatment after expiration of the original, or 
previous, one-year commitment (§ 2972).”  (People v. Garcia (2005) 127 
Cal.App.4th 558, 563.) 
Section 2962 lists six criteria that must be met for the initial MDO 
certification.  “The trial court must consider whether 1) the prisoner has a severe 
mental disorder; 2) the prisoner used force or violence in committing the 
underlying offense; 3) the severe mental disorder was one of the causes or an 
aggravating factor in the commission of the offense; 4) the disorder is not in 
                                              
2  
We need not resolve the question whether good cause was shown for 
continuing defendant‟s trial beyond his release date.  As we explain, even without 
good cause for the continuances, the trial court retained jurisdiction to conduct the 
extension hearing (see part II.A., ante), and the fact that defendant was not 
released did not affect the validity of the eventual extension order (see part II.C., 
post). 
9 
remission or capable of being kept in remission without treatment; 5) the prisoner 
was treated for the disorder for at least 90 days in the year before his release; and 
6) by reason of his severe mental disorder, the prisoner poses a serious threat of 
physical harm to others.  (§ 2962, subds. (a)-(d)(1).)”  (People v. Francis (2002) 
98 Cal.App.4th 873, 876-877 (Francis); accord, People v. Merfield (2007) 147 
Cal.App.4th 1071, 1075, fn. 2 (Merfield); People v. Hannibal (2006) 143 
Cal.App.4th 1087, 1094.) 
Three of the criteria are relevant only to the initial certification.  These three 
“concern past events that once established, are incapable of change:  whether the 
prisoner used force or violence in committing the underlying offense; whether he 
was treated for the disorder for at least 90 days in the year before his release; and 
whether his severe mental disorder was one of the causes or an aggravating factor 
in the commission of the underlying offense.”  (Francis, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 879; accord, Merfield, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1075-1076.)     
By contrast, the three criteria that must be satisfied for continued treatment 
relate, not to the past, but to the defendant‟s current condition.  At an extension 
proceeding, the questions are:  Does the defendant continue to have a severe 
mental disorder?  Is the disorder in remission?  Does the defendant continue to 
represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others?  (§ 2972, subd. (c).)  A 
defendant‟s condition a year earlier is relevant but not dispositive of these 
questions.  Therefore, contrary to the Court of Appeal‟s conclusion, the notice and 
opportunity to be heard that defendant was given when he was initially committed 
was no substitute for the hearing to evaluate whether his current condition justified 
extension of his commitment.   
10 
Accordingly, we hold that, without a time waiver or good cause, section 
2972 does not permit continued confinement when an extension trial does not 
begin before the scheduled release date.3  “As we explained in Allen, supra, 42 
Cal.4th 91, if an extension petition is not filed before the current commitment 
ends, the defendant is no longer subject to constraint under the NGI or MDO 
statutes.  If a petition is filed before the expiration date, but too late to allow a 
reasonable time for trial preparation,” the defendant may be entitled to release 
pending trial on the extension petition.  (Lara, at p. __ [pp. 22-23].)       
The Attorney General admits there is no “express language” in section 
2972 authorizing such confinement.  However, he notes that the purpose of the 
MDO Act is to protect the public by confining MDO‟s until the severe mental 
disorders causing or aggravating their crimes are in remission and can be kept in 
remission.  (See § 2960.)  Protection of the public is paramount, the Attorney 
General argues, and justifies an MDO‟s continued confinement under the 
circumstances posited by our question.     
The Attorney General is only partially correct.  Public protection is an 
important purpose of the legislation.  Another is protection of the patient‟s rights.  
“Like other involuntary civil commitment schemes, the MDO Act‟s 
comprehensive statutory scheme . . . represents a delicate balancing of 
countervailing public and individual interests.”  (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th 91, 98.)   
                                              
3  
As we noted in Lara, “[a] defendant released from commitment under the 
NGI or MDO statutes may, however, be subject to confinement under the LPS 
Act.  A defendant who falls under the provisions of the LPS Act is held in a 
therapeutic setting and is entitled to the more stringent timeframes and procedural 
protections the LPS Act provides.  This approach comports with the intent of the 
Legislature, honors due process, and ensures both that the defendant will be 
treated and the public protected.  [Citations.]”  (Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [p. 
23].)   
11 
Section 2970(a) protects an MDO‟s interests by requiring, among other things, 
that a commitment extension trial begin “no later than 30 calendar days prior to 
the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless the time is waived 
by the person or unless good cause is shown.”  The Attorney General‟s 
construction would render the waiver/good cause provisions surplusage, violating 
the rule of construction that courts should, if possible, accord meaning to every 
word and phrase in a statute to effectuate the Legislature‟s intent.  (St. Marie v. 
Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 282, 289; 
Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 991-992.) 
The Attorney General notes that section 2972(a) “states unequivocally and 
without qualification that „[t]he court shall conduct a hearing on the petition under 
Section 2970 for continued treatment.‟ ”  He argues that “[t]his directive evidences 
that, even without good cause or a time waiver, this hearing must occur to ensure 
the public is safe from MDO‟s.”   The Attorney General reads too much into the 
statute.  To be sure, the law provides that a hearing be held.  It also explicitly 
requires that notice be timely given and the hearing begin before the scheduled 
release date, unless the stated exceptions are met. 
C. 
Remedy 
    No relief is available in this case.  The court retained jurisdiction to try 
the petition.  (See part II.A., ante.)  The fact that defendant was not released did 
not affect the validity of the eventual extension order.  (Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at 
p. __ [p. 24].)    
12 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the MDO recommitment 
order is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
Defendant Cobb was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in 2001.  
The present appeal is from a judgment extending Cobb‟s commitment under the 
Mentally Disordered Offender Act (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.).  Although defense 
counsel stated at each court appearance, beginning over a month before 
defendant‟s prior commitment expired, that she was ready for trial on the petition 
to extend the commitment, that trial did not actually begin until 23 days after 
defendant‟s prior commitment had expired.  The trial court denied defendant‟s 
request for release that was made at the expiration of his prior commitment, and 
defendant was forced to remain in custody pending trial.  Defendant claims that he 
was prejudiced by the delayed trial and by his continued confinement and that the 
delay was without good cause.     
In People v. Lara (Mar. 8, 2010, S155481) __ Cal.4th __, this court upheld 
a judgment extending a commitment under Penal Code section 1026.5 where the 
filing of the petition and the commencement of the trial were delayed, the delay 
was without good cause, and the defendant similarly remained in custody pending 
trial even after the expiration of his prior commitment.  In my separate concurring 
opinion, I justified that decision on the ground that Lara had failed to establish 
actual prejudice from the delayed filing of the petition or start of the trial, or from 
his continued confinement pending the trial.  I found, in particular, that Lara had 
been granted sufficient time to prepare for trial and that there was no indication in 
 
2 
the record—indeed, not even an allegation—that his continued confinement 
pending trial had affected the fairness of the proceeding or undermined confidence 
in the outcome.  And I observed further that although a defendant involuntarily 
confined beyond his maximum commitment date without good cause and without 
statutory authorization “may be entitled to civil damages, . . . such confinement 
could not invalidate a trial conducted under fair procedures and resulting in an 
outcome that is reliable and unaffected by the error.”  (People v. Lara, supra, __ 
Cal.4th at p. __ [at p. 5] (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.).) 
The majority opinion deems Lara fully sufficient to dispose of this appeal.  
Thus, the opinion does not address the question whether good cause was shown 
“for continuing defendant‟s trial beyond his release date” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 8, 
fn. 2) because it concludes that defendant was not prejudiced by the delayed trial 
(even assuming the delay was unjustified) or by his continued confinement (even 
assuming the confinement was unlawful).  Although its finding that defendant was 
not prejudiced is thus critical to its conclusion, the majority opinion‟s discussion 
of prejudice nonetheless consists of exactly one sentence—“The fact that 
defendant was not released did not affect the validity of the eventual extension 
order”—and a citation to Lara.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  Although I agree with 
the ultimate conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced, I disagree that this 
analysis is sufficient to dispose of defendant‟s claim for relief.   
Unlike Lara, defendant Cobb argues that the failure to grant his request for 
release upon the expiration of his prior commitment, when combined with the 
lateness of his trial, was unfair in specific and concrete ways and caused him 
actual prejudice.  Defense counsel informed the court on the day jury selection 
began that it still had not received the curriculum vitae of the prosecution expert, 
nor had it received defendant‟s medical records “even though the Court previously 
ordered them to be sent down here from Atascadero so that Dr. Kania could use 
 
3 
them to evaluate [defendant].”   In addition, defense counsel complained that “Dr. 
Kania has not been able to evaluate [defendant] because we haven‟t gotten the 
records.”  When the court inquired whether the case was ready for trial in light of 
these circumstances, defense counsel reminded the court that “with [defendant] 
continuing to be in custody,” “the appropriate consequences are not that we delay 
the trial yet again.” 
A review of the entire record, however, does not support defendant‟s claim 
that his continued confinement forced defense counsel to go to trial earlier that she 
would have liked and without adequate time to prepare for trial.  The district 
attorney filed a petition to extend defendant‟s commitment on March 6, 2006—
nearly 12 weeks before the expiration of defendant‟s prior commitment and three 
and one-half months before trial actually began.  This was ample time to permit 
preparation of the defense.  Moreover, defense counsel announced that she was 
ready for trial on April 24, 2006, over a month before the prior commitment 
expired, and asked that the matter proceed “forthwith”—even though she had not 
yet received these documents or conducted an evaluation of defendant by an 
expert.  Indeed, counsel continued to say she was ready for trial at each succeeding 
court appearance, although the defense had not yet received those documents or 
had defendant evaluated by an expert.  Finally, the defense did ultimately receive 
the hospital records and was granted an extensive opportunity to examine the 
prosecution expert‟s qualifications outside the jury‟s presence.  These 
circumstances seriously undercut defendant‟s claim that he was forced to go to 
trial unprepared because of his continued confinement. 
In sum, the current record does not demonstrate that defendant‟s complaints 
about the prosecution‟s expert, the prosecution‟s incompetence in providing 
discovery, and various actions taken by the court and court staff are connected to 
the delayed trial or to his continued confinement pending trial, whether in the state 
 
4 
hospital or in the county jail, nor has he shown that either the delay in the trial or 
his continued confinement “interfered with his ability to prepare his defense or 
otherwise undermined the reliability of the verdict.  Hence, he suffered no 
prejudice.”  (People v. Lara, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [at p. 3] (conc. opn. of 
Baxter, J.).) 
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Cobb 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 157 Cal.App.4th 393 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S159410 
Date Filed: March 8, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: James A. Edwards* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. 
Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Sharon L. Rhodes, Bradley A. Weinreb and Robin 
Derman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Barbara A. Smith 
P.O. Box 25 
Spring Valley, CA  91976 
(619) 670-0675 
 
Robin Derman 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2230