Title: Teton Valley Ranch v. State Bd. of Equalization

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Teton Valley Ranch v. State Bd. of Equalization1987 WY 38735 P.2d 107Case Number: 86-185Decided: 04/03/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
TETON VALLEY RANCH and Wendell Wilson, Petitioners

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, TetonCountyBoard of Equalization, 
Teton

 
 
Ron 
Arnold of McCartney & Arnold, P.C., for Petitioners.

 
 
A. G. 
McClintock, Attorney General; Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Robert J. Walters, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondents. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ.  Urbigkit, Justice, concurring. 

 
 
MACY, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     This case comes before 
us on a certification from the district court. We are asked to review an order 
of the State Board of Equalization which upheld the decision of the Teton County 
Board of Equalization to modify the assessment of properties known as Teton 
Valley Ranch Subdivision, including the Sheep Mountain Commercial 
Subdivision.

 
 
[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 
[¶3.]     PetitionersTetonValley Ranch and Wendell Wilson present 
the following issues:

 
 
"I. 
WHETHER THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE?

 
 
"II. 
WHETHER THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S DECISION WAS RENDERED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH LAW?

 
 
"A. 
WHETHER THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION HAS FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN 'UNIFORM AND EQUAL ASSESSMENT' AND'FAIR VALUE'."

 
 
[¶4.]     RespondentsState Board of Equalization, Teton County 
Board of Equalization, and Teton County Assessor restate the issues 
as:

 
 
"I. IS THE DECISION OF THE APPELLEE STATE BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

 
 
"II. IS 
THE DECISION OF THE APPELLEE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ARBITRARY OR CONTRARY 
TO LAW?

 
 
"III. IS 
THE DECISION OF THE APPELLEESTATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION CONTRARY TO 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT PROPERTY BE VALUED AT ITS 'FAIR VALUE' FOR 
PROPERTY TAX PURPOSES?"

 
 
[¶5.]     Petitioners are record 
owners of certain real property located in Teton 
County, Wyoming, generally known as the Teton Valley 
Ranch Subdivision, Units I, II, and III and the Sheep Mountain Commercial 
Subdivision. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service desired to exchange 
federal land for this property; therefore, four appraisals of the property were 
performed.

 
 
[¶6.]     The first two 
appraisals were completed at the request of the Fish and Wildlife Service. 
Petitioners were dissatisfied with the results of these appraisals and, feeling 
that their property was worth more, arranged for the completion of two 
additional appraisals by other appraisers. The range of values resulting from 
the four appraisals was from a low of $ 3,219,090 to a high of $ 6 million. A 
so-called "blue ribbon" panel was commissioned to review only the two middle 
appraisals and to advise which of the two more closely reflected the current 
market value of petitioners' property.

 
 
[¶7.]     On December 17, 1984, 
the panel issued a "STATEMENT OF FINDINGS" indicating that the appraisal of $ 
3,515,000 more closely reflected the current market value of the property. Upon 
the basis of the "blue ribbon" panel's analysis and final recommendation, the 
fair market value of $ 3,515,000 was used in making the land 
exchange.

 
 
[¶8.]     The county assessor 
assessed the subject property for the 1985 tax year at a value of $ 564,708, 
which indicated a current market value of $ 7,058,850. Petitioners filed an 
appeal of the assessed valuation with the county board pursuant to § 39-2-302, 
W.S.1977. On July 16, 1985, the county board issued its decision 
indicating

 
 
"that 
the fair value of the property in question is $ 6,100,000.00, and that this 
amount is the sum upon which the tax assessment should be 
based."

 
 
Although 
this finding was a reduction in the county assessor's value of the property, it 
was adverse to petitioners. They timely filed a notice of appeal before the 
state board, and a hearing was held on August 28, 1985. On November 4, 1985, the 
state board issued an order affirming, for tax purposes, the value of 
petitioners' property at $ 6.1 million as set by the county 
board.

 
 
[¶9.]     On December 9, 1985, 
petitioners filed a petition for judicial review in district court. Both 
petitioners and respondents having requested that the proceeding be certified 
directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P., the district 
court entered its order on July 15, 1986, certifying the case to this 
Court.

 
 
[¶10.]  In essence, each of petitioners' claims 
questions the manner in which the state board arrived at its decision. 
Therefore, we will consider the claims together.

 
 
[¶11.]  Section 39-2-302 provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(b) The 
county board of equalization shall:

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
"(iv) 
Hear and determine the complaint of any person relative to any property 
assessment or value as returned by the county assessor subject to subsection (c) 
of this section.

 
 
"(c) * * 
* * Any person wishing to contest an assessment of his property shall file a 
statement under oath with the county board of equalization specifying the 
reasons why the assessment is incorrect and may appear at either meeting of the 
board in support of the claim. A county board of equalization may receive 
evidence relative to any assessment * * * *. Minutes of the examination shall be 
taken and filed with the county clerk."

 
 
[¶12.]  In accordance with this section, 
petitioners filed a sworn statement with the county board in which they set 
forth the facts relating to: (1) the land in question; (2) the appraisals 
conducted in conjunction with the proposed exchange of that land; and (3) the 
assessment performed by the county assessor. Petitioners also requested that the 
county board adopt the finding of the blue ribbon panel that the value of the 
land for tax purposes was $ 3,515,000. In addition, petitioners filed copies of 
the county's assessment and the blue ribbon panel's findings. At the hearing 
before the county board on June 10, 1985, petitioners presented argument and 
evidence and agreed to obtain copies of the four initial appraisals for the 
board members. The county assessor also appeared before the county board and 
explained that the difference in values between her assessment and the other 
appraisals occurred because, when a plat is subdivided, she is required by the 
state board to value each lot separately, whereas the other appraisals were made 
on the basis of the sale of the overall piece of property. The county board took 
the matter under advisement and, on July 16, 1985, issued its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.

 
 
[¶13.]  Petitioners appealed to the state board 
pursuant to § 39-1-304(a), W.S.1977, which provides that "the state board of 
equalization shall * * * * hear appeals from county boards of 
equalization."

 
 
[¶14.]  In accordance with Chapter XVII, § 4(a) 
of the Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State Tax Commission1 and § 
16-3-107, W.S.1977,2 a contested case hearing was held 
before the state board on August 28, 1985. At the hearing, prior to the taking 
of any testimony or evidence, the respondents requested the board to take 
judicial notice of the record of the proceedings before the county board. 
Petitioners made no objection, and the hearing officer granted the request. 
Thereafter, in the course of the hearing, the following exhibits were introduced 
and admitted: the four initial appraisals, the blue ribbon panel's report and 
findings, the county assessor's summary of value zones, maps of the property in 
question, and a letter from the state board to the county board stating that 
subdivision lands were being improperly assessed and directing the county board 
to ensure that assessments of such land be properly made in the future. In 
addition, the state board heard the testimony of Robert Mitchell, a member of 
the blue ribbon panel, James Shaw, the individual responsible for arranging for 
the appraisals and managing the land transaction between petitioners and the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, and DeAnn Sutton, the assessor for TetonCounty.

 
 
[¶15.]  In a comprehensive statement of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law issued November 4, 1985, the state board found in 
part:

 
 
"1. That 
on or about May 22, 1985, the Teton County Assessor prepared assessment 
schedules respecting [three] parcels ow[n]ed by Teton Valley Ranch * * * 
*.

"2. That 
the above-mentioned assessment reflected that the subject parcels were assessed 
at a value of $ 245,658.00, $ 178,978.00, and $ 117,536.00 respectively as rural 
subdivision lots.

"3. That 
the subject parcels were duly platted and approved for subdivision by the Teton 
County Commissioners in 1976 * * * * and in 1977 * * * *.

* * 
*

"5. That 
[the petitioners] also [own] property in TetonCounty, known as Sheep Mountain Commercial 
Subdivision. The county assessor prepared an assessment schedule on this 
property on or about April 11, 1985 which * * * * reflects an assessed valuation 
of $ 22,536.00. This property was duly platted and approved for subdivision by 
the Teton County Commissioners in 1980. * * * *

"6. That 
the subject properties are located in the D-2-1 Value Zone of District 2 in 
TetonCounty. * * * * The value 
zones in Teton County stem from a manual created from a reappraisal of Teton 
County property in 1978 done by a professional appraisal firm. According to the 
summary of values in the above-mentioned manual, the estimated value per acre is 
$ 30,000.00 for lands up to 4 acres; for parcels between 4 and 7 acres, the 
estimated value for the parcel is $ 120,000.00; for lands between 7 and 19.5 
acres, the estimated value per acre is $ 17,150.00; and for parcels having 
between 19.5 to 35 acres, the estimated value for the parcel is $ 335,000.00. 
These values apply for the 1985 tax year and were updated by the county assessor 
for the current tax year.

* * 
*

"8. That 
the Petitioners' property known as Teton Valley Ranch Subdivision, as well as 
the Sheep Mountain Commercia[l] Subdivision, was the subject of several 
appraisals between 1981 and 1984 for the purposes of a land exchange with the 
federal government. Specifically, four appraisals were performed on Teton Valley 
Ranch Subdivision * * * * and the Sheep Mountain Commercial Subdivision * * * 
*.

"9. That 
the four above-mentioned appraisals indicated the 
following:

"a. The 
Meiling appraisal concluded that the value of [the] subject properties was$ 
3,079,090.00. * * * *

"b. The 
Johnson appraisal concluded that the value of the subject properties was $ 
3,515,000.00 * * * *.

"c. The 
Moore appraisal 
concluded that the value of the subject properties was $ 4,156,000.00. * * * 
*

"d. The 
Ford appraisal concluded that the value of the subject properties was $ 
6,000,000.00.

"10. 
That a so-called 'blue ribbon panel' was commissioned on or about November 28, 
1984 to review the Johnson and Moore appraisals and advise through a consensus 
of opinion which of the two more closely reflected current market 
value.

"11. 
That the blue ribbon panel in its 'Statement of Findings' dated December 17, 
1984 concluded that the Johnson appraisal indicating a value of the subject 
properties as $ 3,515,000.00 more closely reflected current market value. * * * 
*

"12. All 
of the above-stated appraisals utilized a so-called 'development procedure' 
which is a method to determine value when there are few sales for a market 
comparison approach or when value indications through sales comparison need 
substantiation. * * * *

"13. 
That the Teton County Commissioners were instructed on or about October 11, 
1979, that subdivision lands did not qualify for assessment as agricultural 
lands. * * * *

"14. 
That the practice of the Teton County Assessor with respect to subdivision lands 
was and is to assess a subdivision as an aggregate of the individually assessed 
lots within the subdivision and that all subdivision lands in TetonCounty are assessed in this 
manner.

"15. 
That the Teton County Board of Equalization received evidence of the four 
above-mentioned appraisals * * * * and * * * * issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law * * * *.

"CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW

* * 
*

"3. 
That the State Board of Equalization is required pursuant to W.S. 
39-1-304(a)(xii) and (xiii) to 'Determine how lands should be classified for 
assessment purposes' and 'Prescribe the system for establishing the fair value 
of all property valued for property taxation to ensure that all property is 
uniformly valued.' In accordance with its statutory duties, the State Board 
directed all county assessors to assess subdivision lands at 8% of current 
market value.

"4. That 
county assessors are required by law to secure data concerning the listing and 
taxation of property within his or her county and gather data from public 
records and other sources as will enable him or her to assess all property at 
its fair value. W.S. 
18-3-204(a)(ii).

"5. That 
there is a formally filed subdivision plat relating to the subject 
properties.

"6. That 
at the time of assessment, the subject properties were properly classified and 
carried on the assessment [rolls] as rural subdivision 
lots.

"7. 
That the Teton County Assessor assessed the subject properties in accordance 
with State Board of Equalization directives and there was no evidence to 
indicate that such properties were assessed in a manner inconsistent or contrary 
to State Board directives or in a non-uniform manner.

"8. That 
the appraisals prepared by four certified appraisers were provided for the 
purposes of determining the fair market value of the subject properties 
contemplated a change in use of the subject properties. Although each appraisal 
reflected the use of recognized appraisal techniques, the disparity of 
conclusions of value indicated by each appraisal also reflect[s] that a variety 
of characteristics or factors influenced each appraiser in different 
degrees.

"9. That 
the appraisals for the proposed land exchange between Petitioners and the 
federal government apply to a sale of the entire parcel and not as individual 
subdivision lots.

"10. 
That the Teton County Board of Equalization decision to reduce the fair market 
value of the subject properties was proper inasmuch as the record indicates that 
the reduction was to correct the valuation of those properties to be consistent 
with the value of comparable property in the same value zone. It is not apparent 
from the record what weight, if any, was given to any or each of the four 
appraisals, although it appears that the Ford appraisal may have been given the 
most weight.

"11. 
That the Teton County Board of Equalization properly adjusted the value of the 
subject property for lack of subdivision improvements.

"12. 
That Petitioners have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the subject 
properties were assessed incorrectly, erroneously or in an otherwise unlawful 
manner.

"a. The 
mere showing that a different conclusion as to the fair market value of the 
properties should have been reached without evidence that the County Assessor or 
county board of equalization did not perform their duties imposed by law or 
otherwise in accordance with directives by the State Board of Equalization 
respecting assessment of property for property tax purposes or that those 
directives were incorrectly applied is insufficient.

"b. The 
record of the proceedings before the county board of equalization reflects that 
the county assessor and the county board considered the appraisals offered by 
Petitioner in support of the properties' fair market 
value.

"c. The 
presumption [is] that the county assessor and the county board of equalization 
exercised honest judgment in determining the fair value of property for property 
tax purposes." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶16.]  As the preceding discussion clearly 
demonstrates, petitioners have twice been afforded the opportunity to present 
their complaint at a trial-type hearing. On neither occasion does the record 
indicate that the evidence presented was not fully and fairly considered. Yet 
petitioners complain that the state board's findings are not supported by the 
evidence or somehow are contrary to law.

     
          
            
            
            
       

[¶17.]  When reviewing an agency 
decision:

 
 
"We 
examine the entire record to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings, and if there is, we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the agency. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it may be 
less than the weight of the evidence but cannot be contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence." Wyoming Insurance 
Department v. Avemco Insurance Company, 
Wyo., 726 P.2d 507, 509 (1986) (citation omitted).

 
 
In 
addition:

 
 
"If 
substantial evidence supports a finding, the agency, in light of the expertise 
and experience of its members, appropriately determines the ultimate weight 
assigned to such evidence." Gulf Oil Corporation 
v.      
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission, Wyo., 693 P.2d 227, 239 
(1985).

 
 
[¶18.]  In the present case, the state board had 
before it evidence of five widely divergent assessments of the value of the 
property. The state board also had before it evidence of the methods used and 
factors considered by the four appraisers and the county assessor in making 
their assessments. The county assessor testified that in 1977 the assessor's 
office hired a professional appraisal firm to conduct an assessment of all lands 
within TetonCounty. She testified 
further that the assessment was conducted in accordance with the directive of 
the state board that all lots, town lots, subdivisions and suburban lands be 
assessed at current market value. The county assessor also testified that, on 
the basis of this assessment, all lands in TetonCounty were then placed in value zones. 
Finally, she testified that the values assessed for each zone by the 
professional appraisal firm were later updated by her office for the 1985 tax 
year on the basis of current comparable sales on vacant lots within the 
particular value zone or, if there were no comparable sales, on the basis of 
general sales information from licensed real estate agents or appraisers in 
Teton County. While petitioners offered evidence of their appraisers' superior 
expertise, experience, and technique, they offered no evidence that the county 
assessor failed to assess the property in a manner consistent with the 
directives of the state board. Petitioners' claim that the state board made no 
finding that the $ 6.1 million assessment was a fair value in accordance with § 
39-2-102, W.S.1977,3 is without merit. As indicated in 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law quoted above, the state board 
acknowledged its duty to prescribe the system for establishing fair value and 
concluded that the assessor for TetonCounty assessed the property in question 
in accordance with that system. Thus, the state board concluded that the 
property was assessed in accordance with § 39-2-102 and its own rules and 
regulations.

 
 
[¶19.]  Petitioners claim that the state board 
failed to recognize fair value independently of uniform and equal assessment is 
also without merit. That the county assessor testified she applied her valuation 
approach to all properties uniformly does not mean she failed to arrive at a 
fair value. As indicated previously, the state board expressly stated in its 
conclusions of law that it is required to prescribe the system for establishing 
fair value and that the county assessor's valuation was in accordance with that 
system.

 
 
[¶20.]  In a proceeding of this nature, the 
burden of proof is upon the party asserting an improper valuation. Weaver v. State Board of Equalization, Wyo., 511 P.2d 97 
(1973); Scott Realty Company v. State Board 
of Equalization, Wyo., 395 P.2d 289 (1964); Bunten v.  
Rock Springs 
Grazing Association, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244 
(1923). Petitioners have failed to meet this 
burden.

 
 
[¶21.]  For all of the reasons stated above, we 
find that substantial evidence exists to support the state board's findings and 
that sufficient information was before the state board to preclude a finding 
that the state board's decision is arbitrary and contrary to law. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Chapter XVII, § 4(a) of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Wyoming State Tax Commission 
provides:

 
 
"Section 4. Definitions. For the 
purposes of appeals brought before the Board under these rules, the following 
definitions shall apply:

 
 
"(a) 'Appeal' - A proceeding before the 
Board in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are to be 
determined by the Board after an opportunity for hearing. An appeal is a 
contested case as that term is defined in W.S. 
16-3-107."

 
 

2Section 16-3-107, W.S.1977, provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) In any contested case, all parties 
shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice served 
personally or by mail. * * * *'

"(c) In all contested cases, depositions 
and discovery relating thereto, agencies shall have the authority to administer 
oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses and require the production of any 
books, papers or other documents relevant or material to the 
inquiry.

* * 
*

"(d) In all contested cases the agency 
shall as part of its rules of practice provide that the agency or one (1) of its 
presiding officers designated by it upon application of any party shall issue a 
subpoena requiring the appearance of witnesses for the purpose of taking 
evidence or requiring the production of any books, papers or other documents 
relevant or material to the inquiry.

* * 
*

"(g) In all contested cases the taking 
of depositions and discovery shall be available to the parties in accordance 
with the provisions of Rules 26, 28 through 37 (excepting Rule[s] 37(b)(1) and 
37(b)(2)(D) there from) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure * * * 
*.

* * 
*

"(j) Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to respond and 
present evidence and argument on all issues involved. Any person compelled to 
appear in person before any agency or representative thereof shall be accorded 
the right to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel or, if permitted 
by the agency, by other qualified representative.

"(k) Every party shall be accorded the 
right to appear in person or by or with counsel or other duly qualified 
representative in any agency proceeding in accordance with such rules as the 
agency prescribes and the pertinent rules of the supreme court of Wyoming."

 
 

3Section 39-2-102, W.S.1977, 
provides:

 
 
"All taxable property shall be valued at 
a fair value in conformity with the values and procedures prescribed by the 
board as provided by this act."

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice, concurring.

 
 
[¶22.]  Value in empirical terms is an intangible 
product of time and place: willing seller -- available buyer. Without buyer, 
there is no marketable value. 1 Bonbright, Valuation of Property (1st ed.) at 
59.1 Any statistical 
comparison of Wyoming real estate time-distinguished values 
between 1982 and the present would reveal a market decrease which may total 50 
percent overall. The specificity of economics cannot be mathematically converted 
into taxation assessment standards, Bonbright, supra, Ch. XVIII, Valuation for 
Tax Purposes: The General Property Tax, and is not within the uniformity, 
equality and fairness criteria of Art. 15, § 11, and Art. 1, § 28 of the  
Wyoming 
Constitution:

 
 
"All 
property, except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be uniformly 
assessed for taxation, and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal." 
Article 15, § 11,  
Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
"No tax 
shall be imposed without the consent of the people or their authorized 
representatives. All taxation shall be equal and uniform." Article 1, § 28,  
Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 
[¶23.]  I specially concur to address the 
particularized issue presented by appellant that the State, in failing to 
acknowledge the absorption factor in standard appraisal criteria, consequently 
fails to conform the assessment to the Wyoming Constitution, or Ch. 9, § 4 of 
the Wyoming Tax Commission's rules and regulations, as well as the controlling 
statute, § 39-2-102, W.S.1977.

 
 
[¶24.]  If value as a definable term is a price 
to be paid upon sale between a willing seller and a willing (available) buyer, 
see C F & I Steel Corporation v. State Board 
of Equalization, Wyo., 492 P.2d 529, 533 
(1972), then absorption is a relevant issue for review. See generally 
Bonbright, supra, Ch. III.

 
 
"In 
legal valuations, the most serious problems as to the use of sales as evidence 
of value occur in those cases where the objecting party to the dispute can 
present a forceful argument * * * * that the sales were not in the quantities 
that would be involved in a sale of the existing property * * * 
*.

 
 
"All of 
these types of objection are plausible and their force will be recognized by the 
appraisal profession. But their application in a given case cannot be determined 
by formulas * * * * and the courts have wisely refused to lay down any but the 
most general rules on these issues." Bonbright, supra, at 
137.

 
 
[¶25.]  Absorption (discount sellout), see 
Golder v. Department of Revenue,      
Ariz., 123      
Ariz. 260, 599 P.2d 216 
(1979), and the counterpoint aggregation (sometimes called plottage), are 
in the essence of the criteria of the willing and omnipresent "available" buyer. 
See rejection of discount sellout as a requirement for tax assessment, Palm Beach Development and Sales Corp. v. 
Walker, 478 So. 2d 1122 (1985). See 
also discussion of the inefficient market concept of real estate valuation, 
M.A.I., The Appraisal of Real Estate (8th ed. 1983), at 
62.

 
 
[¶26.]  Axiomatic factors for appraisal decision 
in the law merchant or comparable judicial proceedings such as eminent domain 
cannot equivalently be transferred to constitutional criteria of assessment for 
taxation.

 
 
"Common 
to the legal appraisals treated in the four previous chapters is an objective 
which sets the starting point for an inquiry as to the definition and 
measurement of property value -- the objective of indemnity. What the property 
is 'worth' must there be determined in the light of the purpose of the lawsuit, 
which is to fix a cash payment that will recompense the owner, in whole or in 
part, for the loss of his valued possession.

 
 
"When we 
turn to the valuations for tax purposes, a different situation is presented. No 
longer is the owner claiming a recompense for the loss of his property; on the 
contrary, he is being compelled to contribute to the government treasury, in an 
amount which, for some reason, is measured by an appraisal of his wealth, or of 
a specific portion of his wealth. The very meaning of 'value of the property,' 
no less than the practical technique of its measurement, now becomes dependent 
on issues that fall within the province of fiscal theory and tax 
administration.

 
 
"In 
canvassing the literature of public finance, one looks in vain for any master 
principle of tax apportionment which can take the place of the indemnity 
principle under the laws of damages and eminent domain, as the chief clue to the 
proper meaning of 'value.'" Bonbright, supra, at 451.

 
 
[¶27.]  The specific question presented is 
whether the local assessor by a process approved through action of the State 
Board of Equalization, can legally and constitutionally apply a unit price to 
multiple units in disregard of economic principles that may at the specific time 
control actual value, namely absorption in available market. See 1 Orgel on 
Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Ch. XIII, Assessed Valuations and Other Official 
Valuations as Evidence of Market Value (2d ed. 1953) at 629; and 5 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, Ch. 22 (Rev. 3d ed.) at 22-1.

 
 
[¶28.]  Value -- assessment -- taxation, has been 
addressed by this court in nine cases: Wyoming 
Board of Equalization v. State ex rel. Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative, Wyo., 637 P.2d 248 
(1981); Hillard v. Big Horn Coal 
Co., Wyo., 549 P.2d 293 (1976); 
Weaver v. State Board of 
Equalization, Wyo., 511 P.2d 97 
(1973); C F & I Steel Corporation v. 
State Board of Equalization, supra. 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. 
Bruch, Wyo., 400 P.2d 494 (1965); 
Scott Realty Company v. State Board of 
Equalization, Wyo., 395 P.2d 289 
(1964); J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. v. 
Hudson, Wyo., 370 P.2d 364 (1962); 
State ex rel. Greenwood v. 
Pearson, 46 Wyo. 307, 26 P.2d 641 
(1933); and Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing 
Association, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244 
(1923).

 
 
[¶29.]  In those cases, this court has 
consistently required only a rational method, equally applied to all property, 
which results in essential fairness. County assessors and the taxation system 
are not required to annually duplicate sales-transaction transient market 
conditions, and specifically so in regard to defining events related to the 
individual taxpayer, such as absorption or prospective future value. See Annot., 
24 A.L.R. 649; Finch v. Grays Harbor, Wash., 121 Wash. 486, 209 P. 833, 24 A.L.R. 644 
(1922).

 
 
[¶30.]  I specifically concur to make clear that 
in no way may mandates of the Constitution, Art. 1, § 28, and Art. 15, § 11 be 
subverted in the property assessment and taxation process. Sparks v. McCluskey, 
Ariz., 84 Ariz. 283, 327 P.2d 295 (1958);2 Appeal of Farmer, 
Idaho, 80 Idaho 72, 325 P.2d 278 (1958); Gerner v. State Tax Commission, N.M., 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619 (1963); City of Arlington v. Cannon, Tex. Civ. App., 263 S.W.2d 299 (1953), rev'd in 
part on other grounds 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414 
(1954); Finch v. Grays 
Harbor, supra. However, that 
requirement would not impose on the system an unmanageable burden as would 
result from the application of the differentiated market factor for which 
appellant contends.

 
 
[¶31.]  The uniformly computed and fairly applied 
appraisal methodology here in evidence, described in the testimony of the county 
assessor, can be sustained under the standards of our precedent. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Association, supra. See also In re 
Protest of Taxpayers of Town of Nichols Hills, Okl., 198 Okla. 500, 180 P.2d 157 (1947); City and County of Denver v. Lewin, Colo., 106 Colo. 331, 105 P.2d 854 (1940); and 
Twentieth Century Investment Company v. City of 
Juneau, Alaska, 359 P.2d 783 
(1961).

 
 
[¶32.]  In Bunten, supra, 
the principal Wyoming case, this court 
said:

 
 
"There 
is no such thing as absolute value * * * *. One man may give a different 
valuation to a piece of land than another * * * *." 215 P.2d  at 
248,

 
 
and:

 
 
"* * * * 
Plaintiff had the right [pursuant to the Wyoming 
Constitution, Art. 15, § 11] to have all the taxable property in the 
county, as well as in the state, assessed at a uniform rate, and a departure 
therefrom if made in an illegal manner is, where its property is assessed at 
full value, a discrimination against it which would not only be a fraud against 
plaintiff but would also violate the constitutional provision of uniformity. 
Such discrimination may arise in various ways, for instance by the adoption of a 
wrong or illegal rule, principle, or method; and an unjust tax resulting 
therefrom has frequently been enjoined as illegal." 215 P.2d  at 
251.

 
 
[¶33.]  I concur in this case on the basis that 
appellant failed to demonstrate that the assessor's rejection of absorption 
factoring in multiple-lot valuation was a constitutionally unacceptable 
tax-assessment method.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1           
"A current definition of market value is

 
 
"The most probable price in cash, terms 
equivalent to cash, or in other precisely revealed terms, for which the 
appraised property will sell in a competitive market under all conditions 
requisite to fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, 
knowledgeably, and for self-interest, and assuming that neither is under undue 
duress.

 
 
"Fundamental assumptions and conditions 
presumed in this definition are

 
 
"1. Buyer and seller are motivated by 
self-interest.

 
 
"2. Buyer and seller are well informed 
and are acting prudently.

 
 
"3. The property is exposed for a 
reasonable time on the open market.

 
 
"4. Payment is made in cash, its 
equivalent, or in specified financing terms.

 
 
"5. Specified financing, if any, may be 
the financing actually in place or on terms generally available for the property 
type in its locale on the effective appraisal date.

 
 
"6. The effect, if any, on the amount of 
market value of atypical financing, services, or fees shall be clearly and 
precisely revealed in the appraisal report." M.A.I., The Appraisal of Real 
Estate (8th ed. 1983) at 33.

 
 

2A detailed analysis and critique of the 
Arizona general property assessment system under the Arizona differentiated 
class valuation system is found in Handy, Valuation and Taxation of 
Residential Real Property in Arizona, 1985 Ariz. State L.J. 145 (1985). See 
also a different critique of Kansas property 
tax, Note, Kansas Property Tax: Mischievous, 
Misunderstood, and Mismanaged, 22 Washburn L.J. 318 
(1982).