Title: Alabama State Bar v. Jesse Derrell McBrayer

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel 01/09/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070661
_________________________
Alabama State Bar
v.
Jesse Derrell McBrayer
Appeal from the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals of the Alabama State Bar
(No. 07-3)
COBB, Chief Justice.
The Alabama State Bar ("the Bar") appeals the decision of
the Board of Disciplinary Appeals of the Alabama State Bar
("the Board") reversing the order of a panel of the
Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar ("the panel")
1070661
2
disbarring Jesse Derrell McBrayer, a member of the Alabama
State Bar, and remanding the case for a new hearing before the
panel.  We reverse and remand.
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History
On May 26, 2005, the Bar issued two sets of formal
charges against McBrayer.  One set of charges arose from
allegations that a client in a land-development purchase gave
McBrayer $500,000 to be deposited in his trust account.
Approximately a month after the funds were deposited, the
purchase fell through, and the client asked that the funds be
returned to him.  McBrayer eventually returned $235,000 to the
client, but he kept $265,000.  The client contended that
McBrayer had converted the funds for personal use; McBrayer,
however, contended that the $265,000 was his attorney fee,
although there was no written agreement concerning McBrayer's
attorney fee.  The client eventually sued McBrayer in federal
court, seeking the return of the $265,000, and McBrayer agreed
to the entry of a consent judgment.  McBrayer had refinanced
his house before the consent judgment was entered; however,
the mortgage company delayed recording the mortgage, and the
client filed the consent judgment before the recording of the
1070661
3
mortgage, thus giving the judgment priority.  The judgment was
eventually paid.  The client incurred $70,000 in attorney fees
in recouping the $265,000 retained by McBrayer.
The other charges brought against McBrayer by the Bar
involved a $100,000 loan another client had made to McBrayer.
A promissory note and a guarantee agreement were executed,
which stated that McBrayer would take out a home-equity line
of credit on his residence and would repay the full amount
plus 10 percent interest within 33 days.  McBrayer failed to
pay the loan on the due date.  The client asked McBrayer for
payment on numerous occasions; however, each time the client
asked to be paid, McBrayer would have an excuse as to why he
could not pay and promise to repay the loan within a few days
or a few weeks.  Seventeen months after the loan was made,
McBrayer wrote the client a check in the amount of $14,441.14,
which represented interest on the loan.  The client attempted
to deposit the check in his bank account, but the check was
returned for insufficient funds.  McBrayer told the client to
redeposit the check; instead, the client telephoned the bank
on which McBrayer's check was drawn on numerous occasions,
inquiring as to whether McBrayer had sufficient funds in his
1070661
4
account to pay the check.  Each time the client was told that
there were not sufficient funds in McBrayer's account to pay
the check.  The client then filed a complaint with the Bar,
and the Bar instructed McBrayer to give the client a cashier's
check in the amount of $14,441.14.  Instead, McBrayer wrote
the client another personal check for $14,441.14.  The client
deposited the check, and it was also returned for insufficient
funds.  The client sued McBrayer, attempting to collect on the
promissory note, and obtained a default judgment against
McBrayer.  The client has been unsuccessful in collecting on
the default judgment.
On August 22, 2005, the hearing officer for the panel set
a hearing for October 12, 2005, regarding the two complaints
against McBrayer.  On October 5, 2005, McBrayer filed a motion
to continue the hearing, claiming that he did not receive
timely notice to prepare for the hearing and that "[a] trip
concerning business, not law, and involving millions of
dollars was scheduled during and beyond the time period of the
hearing on October 12, 2005[,] and cannot be changed."
McBrayer's motion was denied.  On October 10, 2005, McBrayer
filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to
1070661
5
continue; that motion was granted, and the hearing was
rescheduled for February 16, 2006.  
On February 15, 2006, McBrayer filed another motion to
continue the hearing.  In his motion, McBrayer alleged that he
had only recently found counsel to represent him at the
hearing, that counsel required payment of a significant
retainer that McBrayer would be unable to pay for 30 days, and
that counsel who had agreed to represent him required a
continuance.  After the motion to continue was filed, the
attorney McBrayer had retained, James L. North, telephoned
counsel for the Bar and asked for a continuance.  Counsel for
the Bar agreed to the continuance, and the hearing was
continued until May 24, 2006.  As the new hearing date
approached, counsel for the Bar contacted North and learned
that North was no longer representing McBrayer.  According to
counsel for the Bar, North stated that McBrayer never
contacted North after the continuance was granted.  
The May 24, 2006, hearing was continued, apparently due
to the hospitalization of the Bar's counsel.  The hearing was
rescheduled for December 14, 2006.
1070661
6
On November 27, 2006, McBrayer filed another motion to
continue the hearing.  In support of his motion, McBrayer
argued that he had filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
on October 30, 2006, and that the bankruptcy court had
scheduled a motion hearing in the bankruptcy proceeding for
December 14, 2006.  The Bar opposed the motion to continue,
and the motion was denied.  On December 14, 2006, McBrayer
filed yet another motion to continue.  In his motion, McBrayer
alleged that he had had surgery on December 12, 2006, and that
he was restricted from driving and was taking Lortab, a pain
medication, which, he said, caused him to be unable to think
clearly.  However, on December 8, 2006, in the intervening
period between the denial of the first motion to continue and
the filling of the second motion to continue, the hearing
officer had continued the hearing due to his own illness.  
On February 21, 2007, the hearing officer rescheduled the
hearing for June 20, 2007.   On June 12, 2007, William J.
Baxley filed a motion for a continuance on McBrayer's behalf.
In his motion, Baxley stated that he had recently been
retained by McBrayer, that he had a conflict with the June 20,
2007, hearing date because of litigation commitments, and that
1070661
7
his representation of McBrayer was contingent upon a
continuance being granted.  The Bar objected to Baxley's
motion, arguing that McBrayer had made numerous requests for
continuances throughout the proceedings and that he had had
adequate time in which to secure legal counsel and had failed
to do so.  On June 14, 2007, the hearing officer denied
Baxley's motion to continue.  On June 19, 2007, McBrayer filed
another motion to continue as well as a motion to reconsider
Baxley's motion to continue.  In both motions McBrayer argued
that he had a right to legal counsel at the hearing.  
The panel convened on June 20, 2007, and first heard
arguments on McBrayer's motion to reconsider Baxley's motion
and his own motion to continue.  McBrayer argued to the panel
that his motions were premised on the fact that he did not
have legal counsel and that he needed legal counsel to
represent him.  McBrayer also argued that the delay in
obtaining Baxley's services was due to problems getting funds
for the retainer required by Baxley before he would agree to
represent McBrayer.  During the hearing, McBrayer made the
following statements:
1070661
8
"I have trouble hearing. I have hearing loss.
Also, I'm a severe diabetic.  It's related to my
diabetes as well.
"....
"I have my own medical issues I deal with all
the time, and they do cause problems.  And if I do
have a surgery, it's not like a normal person who
has surgery and that –- because of the severity of
my diabetes.
"And that –- I need counsel to help me to –-
with a sharper mind to know what's going on as to
the matters to be handled.
"I have not practiced essentially in the last
two years or so and have no intention of being very
active because of my medical problem."
McBrayer, however, never requested a continuance based on his
medical condition.  McBrayer's motion to reconsider and motion
to continue were denied, and the hearing took place.
After a hearing on both sets of formal charges, the panel
found McBrayer guilty of all charges and determined that he
should be disbarred.  McBrayer appealed to the Board. On
January 25, 2008, the Board entered an opinion reversing the
judgment of the panel, finding that the panel should have
stopped the June 20, 2007, hearing and transferred McBrayer to
disability inactive status because of his medical condition,
and remanding the case to the panel for a new hearing or the
1070661
9
entry of an order transferring McBrayer to disability inactive
status.  The Bar appeals.
II.  Standard of Review
"[W]hether [the Board] properly applied the 'clearly
erroneous' standard of review to [the panel's]
findings of fact is a question of law.  Likewise,
all other legal conclusions in the final order of
[the Board] present questions of law to us.  This
Court reviews questions of law de novo.  National
Ins. Ass'n v. Sockwell, 829 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 2002);
Moss v. Williams, 822 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2001); and
Reed v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State Univ.,
778 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 2000).  Such a de novo review
results in this Court's applying the same standard
[the Board] applied as to all questions of law,
including the application by [the Board] of the
'clearly 
erroneous' standard to [the panel's]
findings of fact."  
Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Ala.
2003).
III. Analysis
The Bar argues that the panel's denial of McBrayer's
motion to continue and motion to reconsider Baxley's motion
was not clearly erroneous and that the Board thus erred in
reversing the panel's decision.  We agree.
Rule 27(c), Ala. R. Disc. P., states:
"If during the course of a disciplinary proceeding,
the respondent contends that he or she is suffering
from a disability by reason of mental or physical
infirmity, illness, or addiction to drugs or
1070661
10
intoxicants, which makes it impossible for the
respondent to adequately defend himself or herself,
the 
Disciplinary 
Board 
shall 
enter 
an 
order
transferring the respondent to disability inactive
status until a determination is made of the
respondent's ability to adequately defend himself or
herself.  The Disciplinary Board shall appoint a
lawyer to represent the respondent if he or she is
without adequate representation, and may take or
direct such action to be taken as it deems necessary
or proper to determine whether the respondent is
able to adequately defend himself or herself,
including the examination of the respondent by such
qualified medical experts as the Disciplinary Board
shall 
designate. 
 
If 
the 
Disciplinary 
Board
determines that the respondent is able to adequately
defend himself or herself, it shall take such action
as it deems proper and advisable, including a
direction for the resumption of the disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent."
In its opinion reversing the decision of the panel, the Board
placed great emphasis on the fact that the word "shall"
appears in the first sentence of the rule.  The Board noted
that McBrayer suffers from a hearing loss and severe diabetes.
During the hearing McBrayer asked to remain seated because, he
said, he suffers from neuropathy and has "the shakes
sometimes."  The Board also noted that McBrayer stated that he
needed the assistance of counsel "with a sharper mind to know
what's going on as to the matters to be handled" and that he
"[had] no intention of being very active because of [his]
medical problem."  
1070661
11
In emphasizing the term "shall" in the first sentence of
Rule 27(c), the Board apparently dismisses the clause "which
makes it impossible for the respondent to adequately defend
himself."  (Emphasis added.)  McBrayer never specifically
asked for a continuance  based on his medical condition.
Instead, he argued primarily that under the Alabama Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure he was afforded the right to counsel
and his argument was peppered with references to various
health issues and concerns.  Never did McBrayer argue that his
medical condition made it impossible for him to adequately
defend himself.  In fact, the record reveals that McBrayer did
indeed defend himself.  In support of its finding that the
panel's disbarment of McBrayer should be reversed, the Board
observed that "[t]he case against McBrayer was so one-sided
that the panel reached a decision to disbar him in fifteen
minutes."  Although this statement is indeed true, it is not
apparent from the record that the fact that the panel reached
a decision so quickly was due to McBrayer's medical condition.
Instead, it appears that McBrayer did not prepare to defend
himself on the mistaken belief that the panel would grant his
motion to continue.  For example, McBrayer did not bring any
1070661
12
witnesses to testify on his behalf, and the documents he
needed to support his arguments during the hearing were in a
box in the trunk of his automobile.
Rule 19(a), Ala. R. Disc. P., states that "[c]lear and
convincing evidence shall be the standard of proof required in
all 
disciplinary 
proceedings, 
including 
petitions 
for
reinstatements and for transfer to disability inactive
status."  The record reveals that there was not clear and
convincing evidence that McBrayer was suffering from a
physical infirmity that made it impossible for him to
adequately defend himself.  Thus, the decision of the Board
that McBrayer should have been placed on disability inactive
status instead of disbarred is due to be reversed.
McBrayer argues, and the Board agreed, that he was
entitled to representation by counsel and that the hearing
should have been continued until his counsel could be present.
The Board's opinion states:
"He had, at the last moment (after he raised the
necessary money for a fee) hired a competent lawyer.
His 
retained 
counsel 
requested 
a 
two 
month
continuance.  The continuance was to accommodate a
conflict in the retained lawyer's schedule.  We
believe in the interest of fairness and to afford
full due process protection a continuance should
have been granted.  The case against McBrayer was so
1070661
13
one-sided that the panel reached a decision to
disbar him in fifteen minutes.  Only one time out of
four was the case continued because of McBrayer.  In
McBrayer's opening statement, he stated, 'I need
counsel to help me.' ...
"....
"Not only was McBrayer entitled to a lawyer, he
was greatly in need of one.  The Disciplinary Panel
should have issued an order transferring McBrayer to
disability inactive status or continued his cause
until his lawyer could defend him."
This Court has previously recognized "that the right to
engage in the practice of law in Alabama is a property right
that may be denied only if the denial comports with the
procedural due process of law guaranteed by the Alabama and
United States Constitutions."  Ex parte Case, 925 So. 2d 956,
961 (Ala. 2005).  Procedural due process includes the notice
of the charges against the lawyer as well as an opportunity to
be heard on those charges.  Id.  Procedural due process also
includes the right to be represented by counsel, if the
respondent so chooses.  Parducci v. Payne, 360 So. 2d 1023
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978).  The right to representation by
counsel, however, is not without limits.  In Averi v. Alabama
State Board of Podiatry, 567 So. 2d 343 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990),
the respondent appeared at the hearing and requested a
1070661
14
continuance, alleging that his attorney had "dropped" him.
The hearing officer denied the request, at which time the
respondent left the hearing.  The complaints against the
respondent were heard without the respondent being present,
and his license to practice podiatry was revoked.  The
respondent appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing
that his right to be represented by counsel was violated by
the board's refusal to continue the hearing.  The Court of
Civil Appeals held:
"We 
have 
found 
no 
absolute 
right 
to 
a
continuance of an administrative hearing unless the
refusal of such a continuance would be an abuse of
discretion.  Evers v. Medical Licensure Commission,
523 So. 2d 414 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).  Here, the
hearing was scheduled for November 19, 1988.  The
record reveals that [the respondent] had been
represented by counsel and that there had been no
motion to withdraw filed by [the respondent's]
attorney.  In fact, it appears from the record that
[the respondent] clearly had representation as late
as 5:00 p.m. on the day preceding the hearing.
Furthermore, [the respondent] was present at the
hearing but chose to leave.  In view of the above,
we cannot find that the board abused its discretion
in 
denying 
[the 
respondent's] 
motion 
for 
a
continuance."
567 So. 2d at 345.
The record reveals that over a 20-month period the
hearing regarding the charges against McBrayer was continued
1070661
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on 4 separate occasions.  Although only one continuance was
granted exclusively at McBrayer's request, McBrayer requested
a continuance for four of the five dates on which the hearing
was set.  On one of those occasions, McBrayer sought the
request because he had secured counsel on the eve of the
hearing.  The continuance was granted so that counsel could
prepare for the hearing, yet McBrayer never contacted the
attorney he had retained after the continuance was granted.
Furthermore, McBrayer had notice of the June 20, 2007, hearing
approximately four months prior to the hearing.  Yet,
according to the record, he apparently waited until less than
two weeks prior to the hearing to secure the assistance of
counsel.  Approximately 20 months elapsed between the time the
charges against McBrayer were filed and the hearing before the
panel.  Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
panel exceeded its discretion in denying McBrayer's last
motion for a continuance.
IV.  Conclusion
Because clear and convincing evidence that McBrayer's
medical condition made it impossible for him to adequately
defend himself during the panel hearing did not exist, we hold
1070661
On September 12, 2008, this Court rescinded Rule 5.1,
1
Ala. R. Disc. P., which established the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals, effective October 6, 2008.  Also on that date, the
Court amended Rule 12 to delete subparagraph (f), "Review by
the Board of Disciplinary Appeals," and adopted Rule 12.1,
Ala. R. Disc. P., entitled "Procedures –- Transitional
Provision," which provides: "For purposes of Rule 12, any
matters pending before the Board of Disciplinary Appeals on
the effective date of the amendments to these Rules effective
October 6, 2008, shall be resolved as soon as possible by the
Board of Disciplinary Appeals, and the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals shall remain in effect, notwithstanding the effective
date of the amendments to these Rules, for the limited purpose
of dispensing of pending matters."
16
that the Board erred in concluding that the panel should have
suspended the hearing and immediately placed McBrayer on
disability inactive status.  Likewise, the record does not
reflect that the panel clearly erred in denying McBrayer's
motion for a continuance because he was not represented by
counsel.  The order of the Board is hereby reversed, and this
matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.1
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
See, Lyons, Stuart, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Smith, J., concurs in the result.
Murdock, J., dissents.
Woodall and Bolin, JJ., recuse themselves.
1070661
I recognize that this Court, effective October 6, 2008,
2
rescinded Rule 5.1, Ala. R. Disc. P., which established the
Board.  See note 1 in the main opinion.
17
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
This case presents a close question as to whether the
assertions by the respondent, Jesse Derrell McBrayer, at his
hearing before the disciplinary panel, together with the
manner in which he conducted himself and attempted to defend
himself at that hearing, were sufficient to trigger the
protections afforded by Rule 27(c), Ala. R. Disc. P.  After
struggling with this issue, I have come to the conclusion that
erring on the side of caution in answering this question is
consistent with the letter and spirit of the rule.  I
therefore believe that the Board of Disciplinary Appeals ("the
Board") acted consistently with the rule.  Accordingly, I
respectfully must dissent from the decision to reverse the
decision of the Board.  I explain in more detail below my
reasons for doing so.
In addition, this case raises concerns regarding the
standard of review employed by the Board  and the evidentiary
2
standard of proof employed by a panel of the Disciplinary
1070661
See note 2 supra.
3
18
Board of the Alabama State Bar in disciplinary proceedings.
These concerns also are explained below.  
First, I disagree with the proposition, as stated in the
main opinion, that the standard of review by the Board of a
decision by a panel as to whether a respondent is entitled to
the protections afforded by Rule 27(c), Ala. R. Disc. P., is
a "clearly erroneous" standard of review.  ___ So. 2d at ___.
The case cited in the main opinion for this proposition is
Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1127 (Ala. 2003).
Tipler is a case that applied Rule 5.1(d), Ala. R. Disc. P.,
and, as such, stands for the different proposition that the
merits of a factual finding by a panel were subject to review
by the Board under the extremely deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard.
Prescribing the standard of review as to a determination
on the merits of whether a respondent has violated a rule of
professional conduct and, if so, whether the discipline
imposed by a panel is appropriate, Rule 5.1(d) stated,  in
3
part, as follows:  
"(d)  Scope and Standard of Review. ...  When
proceedings before the Board of Disciplinary Appeals
1070661
19
are conducted, the Board of Disciplinary Appeals
shall affirm the decision under review unless it
determines, that, based on the record as a whole,
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that
the form or extent of discipline imposed, when
considered under the Alabama Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Discipline, (1) bears no relation to the
conduct, (2) is manifestly excessive or insufficient
in relation to the needs and protection of the
public, the profession, or the administration of
justice, or (3) is arbitrary and capricious.  No
error shall be predicated on any ground not
presented 
to 
the 
Disciplinary 
Board 
or 
the
Disciplinary Commission.  In affirming, reversing,
or modifying a decision or order, the Board of
Disciplinary Appeals shall specifically state the
reason(s) for its conclusion(s) and the lega1 basis
on which it relies." 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, the "clearly erroneous" standard was
not prescribed by Rule 5.1(d) for the Board's review of panel
decisions regarding procedural matters such as whether to
grant a continuance, whether to appoint counsel for a
respondent, or whether the conditions that trigger the
protections afforded by Rule 27(c) are met.  
In this case, the Board states in its order that it
reviewed the transcript of the proceedings below and concluded
that those conditions were satisfied.  I cannot conclude that
the Board was in error in this regard.  Among other things, I
note that McBrayer advised the panel that he suffered from
diabetes and a hearing impairment.  (That impairment
1070661
20
manifested itself on more than one occasion during the hearing
before the panel.)  Later in the hearing, McBrayer asked and
received permission to question witnesses while sitting
because, 
according 
to 
McBrayer, McBrayer suffers from
"neuropathy and sometimes gets the shakes."  Moreover, as the
Board notes in its opinion, McBrayer stated in his opening
statement: "I need counsel to help me to -- with a sharper
mind to know what's going on as to the matters to be handled."
McBrayer also explained in his opening statement that he had
not practiced law in the two years immediately preceding the
hearing and that he did not intend to be "very active" in the
practice of law in the future "because of [his] medical
problem."  Later in the hearing, McBrayer testified that his
diabetic condition had "affected [his] mental capabilities to
some extent."
The Bar argues that McBrayer did not preserve the issue
of his right to the protections afforded by Rule 27(c).
McBrayer's counsel responds: 
"No formal petition or any other stringent
requirement is placed upon the respondent by Rule
27(c).  If an individual is unable to adequately
defend himself, how can he be expected to invoke
such procedural protections with the clarity and
skill of an attorney?  Setting such a high standard
1070661
21
to invoke the protection of Rule 27(c) is against
the letter and spirit of the rule."
I believe there is substantial merit to the argument of
McBrayer's counsel and that the Board acted appropriately, and
in accord with both the letter and spirit of Rule 27(c), in
erring on the side of caution in its determination as to
whether McBrayer said or did enough to trigger the protections
afforded by Rule 27(c).
Finally, I am concerned about the application of the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard of Rule 19(a), Ala.
R. Disc. P., in this case.  Rule 19(a) states that "[c]lear
and convincing evidence shall be the standard of proof in all
disciplinary 
proceedings, 
including 
petitions 
for
reinstatements and for transfer to disability inactive
status."  In so doing, the rule prescribes the evidentiary
standard that must be met in a disciplinary proceeding in
order for the panel to enter a final judgment transferring a
respondent to disability inactive status.  The question
presented in this case, however, is whether the conditions
necessary to trigger the protections afforded by Rule 27(c)
are met.  Those protections include the appointment of
counsel, if necessary, and the temporary transfer of a
1070661
22
respondent to disability inactive status until the panel has
had an opportunity to determine whether, in fact, the
respondent is unable to adequately defend himself or herself
and therefore should be placed on disability inactive status
indefinitely.  It is the determination on the merits at this
latter stage of proceedings, which was never reached in this
case, that is governed by the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard of Rule 19(a).