Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Barker

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Barker1999 WY 47978 P.2d 1156Case Number: 97-243Decided: 04/29/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION

 

DIVISION, (Appellant)

v.

LINDA BARKER, (Appellee) 
(Respondent/Claimant).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, The 
Honorable

John D. Troughton, Judge

   

 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. 
Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General. Argument presented by Mr. Haggerty, 
Representing Appellant.

 Sharon M. Rose of Vehar, Beppler, Lavery & Rose, 
P. C., Evanston. Argument presented by Ms. Rose, Representing 
Appellee.

 

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

    * 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

     LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

    
[¶1]     Linda Barker (Barker), Uinta County 4-H 
program coordinator, was injured in an auto accident after transporting two 4-H 
steers to Logan, Utah, for slaughter. Shortly after the accident, Barker's 
supervisor told her the accident was not covered by worker's compensation. 
Relying on this assertion, Barker did not file an accident report or a claim for benefits until two 
years later. A hearing examiner determined: (1) Barker's accident was work 
related, and (2) the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division (Division) was 
estopped from denying coverage. We affirm the district court's order which 
affirmed the hearing examiner's decision.

 

                                
ISSUES

 

   [¶2]     The Division presents the following 
issues for our review:

 

            A. Was the 
Hearing Examiner's application of estoppel against the Division contrary to 
law?

 

            B. Was the 
Hearing Examiner's conclusion that the Division suffered no prejudice contrary 
to law?

 

            C. Was the 
award of benefits unsupported by substantial evidence?

 

    [¶3]  Appellee, Linda Barker, rephrases the 
issues as follows:

 

            A. Should 
the court overrule Bauer v. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 695 
P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 
1985)?

 

            B. Was the 
hearing examiner's finding and conclusion that appellant was estopped from 
asserting the statute of limitations 
defense arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law?

 

            C. Was the 
hearing examiner's finding and conclusion that the lack of prejudice to the 
employer was imputed to the 
appellant arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not 
in accordance with 
law?

 

D. Was the hearing examiner's finding and conclusion 
that appellee was injured while in the scope of her employment supported by 
substantial evidence?

 

                                 
FACTS

 

   [¶4]     On August 25, 1993, Barker hauled two 
steers from Evanston, Wyoming to Logan, Utah to be slaughtered, graded, and 
packed.  Both steers were enrolled 
in the Uinta County 4-H market beef program, a program designed to teach youthful 
participants how to feed and care for market cattle. As part of the educational 
process, Barker has, over the years, endeavored to obtain grading information on 
each animal in the program. In doing so, Barker often utilized the volunteer 
services of Russ Reeder, a certified meat inspector who doubles as a meat cutting 
instructor at Utah State University in Logan. On the day of the accident, Reeder 
and his students slaughtered, graded, and packed the 
steers.

 

   [¶5]     Due to limited county resources, Barker 
used her own pickup truck and trailer to transport the animals. After delivering 
the steers, Barker headed back to Evanston. On this ill-fated journey, two 
vehicles racing up Logan Canyon failed to negotiate a turn and both collided 
with Barker's truck. In addition to cuts and bruises, Barker sustained a broken 
sternum, a broken left ankle, a shattered right knee, and two herniated discs in 
her back.

 

   [¶6]     Within days of the accident, Leanne 
Whitman, Barker's supervisor, visited Barker in the hospital and informed her 
that the accident would not be covered by worker's compensation. Earlier, 
Whitman and her supervisor had agreed that the accident was not work related. 
The two reached this conclusion because the steers, although enrolled in the 
market beef program, belonged to Barker's sons.

 

   [¶7]     Barker did not pursue a worker's 
compensation claim, instead relying on the other drivers' insurance. After about 
two years, however, Barker's insurance proceeds and accrued sick leave dwindled 
as she experienced continued difficulties resulting from her injuries. When 
Barker spoke with Uinta County Commissioner Wayne Asay about her predicament, 
Asay queried why Barker's injuries had not been covered by worker's 
compensation. Feeling that Barker had been misled by her supervisor, Asay 
encouraged her to file a claim. Barker 
filed her claim on October 17, 1995.

 

   [¶8]     Predictably, the Division objected to 
Barker's claim for benefits as untimely. The Division alternatively maintained 
that no evidence established that Barker was injured "within the scope and 
course of employment." After a contested case hearing, the hearing examiner 
ruled the Division was estopped from raising either a statute of limitations 
defense or the accident report requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 
(Michie 1991 Rpl.). The hearing examiner 
also found the accident had occurred in the course of Barker's employment, thus 
entitling her to coverage. The Division appealed to the district court, which 
affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. This appeal 
follows.

 

                          
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

   [¶9]     When considering an appeal from a 
district court's review of a hearing examiner's decision, we review the case as 
if it had come to us directly from the administrative agency. Manning v. State 
ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 938 P.2d 870, 872-73 (Wyo. 1997). Our review 
is limited to a determination of the matters specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 
1997), which mandates that the reviewing court shall:

 

            (ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

            (A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

            * * 
*

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

    [¶10] We afford respect and 
deference to a hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Haagensen v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997). "Substantial 
evidence" is a term of art, best described as relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind can accept as adequate 
to support an agency's conclusion.  
Id. In performing our substantial evidence review, we examine only the 
evidence which favors the prevailing party, allowing every favorable inference, 
while omitting consideration of any conflicting evidence. Id. Unlike its finding 
of facts, however, a hearing examiner's 
conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will be affirmed only 
if truly in accord with law.  Id. 
Barker's claim is governed by the laws in effect at the time of her injury. 
Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim of Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 984 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

                              
DISCUSSION

 

   Estoppel

 

   [¶11]  The record is clear that Barker did not 
file her claim for benefits within the one-year limitations period. See Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503(a) (Michie 1991 Rpl.). The record is also clear that 
Barker did not file an accident report within ten days of the accident as 
required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a) (Michie 1991 Rpl.). Because the 
employer had told Barker she was not entitled to coverage under the act, the 
hearing examiner concluded that the Division was estopped from relying on either 
the statute of limitations or the accident report 
requirement.

 

   [¶12]  The Division contends the hearing 
examiner improperly extended this court's estoppel jurisprudence in precluding 
the Division from relying on the accident report requirement. Barker counters 
that this case falls squarely within the parameters of Bauer v. State ex rel. 
Worker's Compensation Div., 695 P.2d 1048 (Wyo. 1985). In Bauer, the employer, 
the city of Saratoga, told the employee she was not entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits due to her part-time status. Relying on this information, 
the employee did not file a claim for benefits in a timely fashion. This court 
held that "the employer's misleading statements, although unintentional, were sufficient to constitute estoppel 
and prevent the employer and the state of Wyoming from invoking the statute of 
limitations as a defense." Id. at 1053.

 

   [¶13]  The Division argues that enactment of § 
27-14-502(c), which became effective July 1, 1987, has rendered Bauer obsolete. 
The Division urges that § 27-14-502(c) now provides the exclusive exception to 
the act's timing requirements and that Barker failed to prove the Division was 
not prejudiced by Barker's late filing.  The Division further contends that upholding the 
hearing examiner's decision would render § 27-14-502(c) 
meaningless.

 

            Subsection (c) of § 
27-14-502 provides:

             (c) Failure 
of the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to report the 
accident to the employer and to 
file the report with the clerk of court in accordance with subsection 
(a) of this section is a 
presumption that the claim shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted 
if the employee establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in investigating the 
accident and in monitoring medical treatment.

 

   [¶14]  As will be discussed later, the evidence 
establishes that Barker did not file an accident report within ten days for the 
same reason she did not file a claim within one year: she was told her injuries 
were not covered. If, as Barker was led to believe, her injuries were not 
covered, an accident report would be unnecessary. See Curnow v. State, ex rel., 
Workers' Compensation Div., 899 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Wyo. 1995) ("Injury" under § 
27-14-502 means compensable injury, i. e., one covered by worker's 
compensation). It would be inconsistent to estop the Division from raising the statute of 
limitations while at the same time allowing it to rely on the accident report 
requirement. Therefore, we hold that equitable estoppel may be invoked to 
prevent strict application of both the statute of limitations and the accident 
report requirement. With the Division estopped from invoking the accident report 
requirement, Barker was relieved from the burden of proving lack of prejudice 
under § 
27-14-502(c).

 

   [¶15]  We do not agree with the Division that 
our holding will render § 27-14-502(c) meaningless. This provision will still 
control except in rare situations where equitable estoppel is appropriate. See 
Borelson v. Holiday Inn, 911 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1996). The Division's fear that § 
27-14-502(c) will be rendered meaningless is greatly 
exaggerated.

 

   [¶16]  The Division also asserts that the case 
of B-F Drilling, Inc. v. State ex rel., Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
942 P.2d 392 (Wyo. 1997) changed the law of estoppel in Wyoming. The Division 
relies on the following language from that case:

 

            Estoppel 
arises only when a party, by acts, conduct or acquiescence causes another to 
change his position. It precludes a 
party who knows the truth from denying the assertion of any material 
fact with which he induced another 
to change his position where such other person is ignorant of the 
facts, had a right to rely upon the 
assertions, and suffers an injury.

 

   942 P.2d  at 397 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).

 

   [¶17]  According to the Division, this court 
now requires an act or some conduct by the party to be estopped. Since it was 
the employer, and not the Division, that told Barker the accident was not 
covered, the Division contends estoppel is inappropriate.  However, the Division's argument ignores 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-607 (Michie 1991 Rpl.) which provides that the Division 
"shall in all respects have the same rights of defense as the employer." Relying on this statute's predecessor, the 
Bauer court stated, "Although the worker's compensation division of the state of 
Wyoming is granted rights as broad as those of the employer, there is nothing in 
the statute which confers greater rights or would permit the State to assert 
defenses not available to the employer." Bauer, 695 P.2d  at 1053. The Division's 
argument was considered by this court in Bauer, where it was rejected. Id. at 
1052-53

 

   [¶18]  We turn next to the question whether the 
hearing examiner's application of estoppel against the Division was supported by 
substantial evidence. Although there is some conflict over the precise content 
of the conversation between Barker and her supervisor, our task is not to 
reweigh conflicting evidence, but only to examine the record to determine if 
substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's conclusion. Wyoming 
Steel & Fab Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994). Barker, who was hospitalized at the time she spoke to 
Whitman, testified that Whitman told her she would not be covered by worker's 
compensation.  This conversation 
occurred after Whitman consulted with her boss, who agreed that Barker's 
injuries were not work related. Further, Barker was unfamiliar with worker's 
compensation procedures.  Although 
she had been injured on the job before, that injury had been handled by her 
employer's private insurer. In addition, Barker confirmed that there was no posting of 
worker's compensation procedures, contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-507 
(Michie 1991 Rpl.). There is sufficient evidence to support the hearing 
examiner's use of estoppel against the Division.

 

   [¶19]  The Division next contends that, because 
Barker had consulted an attorney, her reliance on Whitman's statements was not 
justified as a matter of law. However, the Division's argument is not supported 
by the record. Although Barker mentioned in passing that an attorney represented 
her in settling her insurance claim against the two drivers, nothing in the record 
establishes that Barker discussed worker's compensation matters with the 
attorney.  Thus, the Division's 
claim is without merit.

 

   [¶20]  Finally, the Division urges us to 
overrule Bauer, arguing that case is "no longer workable." Overruling prior case 
law is, of course, an endeavor this court approaches with 
caution.

 

            We consider 
the doctrine of stare decisis to be an important principle which furthers 
the "`evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes 
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'" 
Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 
(Wyo. 1992) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. 
Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 
(1991)).

 

            Nevertheless, we should 
be willing to depart from precedent when it is necessary "`to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law 
and remedy continued injustice.'" Id. (quoting Gueke v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 728 P.2d 167, 171 (Wyo. 1986)). When precedential decisions are no 
longer workable, or are poorly 
reasoned, we should not feel compelled to follow precedent. Id. 
Stare decisis is a policy doctrine 
and should not require automatic conformance to past decisions 
Id.

 

Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692-93 (Wyo. 
1995)).

 

   [¶21]  There is no indication that overruling 
Bauer would remedy continued injustice. Quite the contrary, estoppel, when 
properly invoked, prevents injustice. Ten opinions from this court cite Bauer, 
but only four address estoppel claims. Of those four, in only one was the 
claimant successful. See State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Rivera, 796 P.2d 447, 450 (Wyo. 
1990).  Clearly, Bauer has neither 
encouraged employees to bypass the act's procedural requirements nor proved 
itself unworkable. We decline to overrule Bauer.

 

                          
Work-Related Injury

 

   [¶22]  The Division argues that even if it was 
properly estopped from asserting the timing requirements of the act, Barker 
failed to prove she was "injured while at work in a place where her employer's 
business required her presence." More specifically, the Division argues that 
grading of beef is not a requirement of the 4-H market beef program and, even if 
it is, the steers belonged to Barker's sons, a sure indication that the trip 
to Logan was personal and not in the 
course of employment.

 

   [¶23]  The Worker's Compensation Act provides 
compensation for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment while 
at work * * * in places where the employer's business requires an employee's 
presence." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Michie 1993 Cum. Supp.). In 
determining whether an injury is work related, the key question is whether the relationship between 
the injury and the employment is sufficient that the injury should be 
compensable. Haagensen v. State, ex rel., Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d  
at 867. A causal connection exists between the employee's injury and the course 
of employment when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, 
activity, environment or requirement of the employment. Id. Whether or not 
an employee's injury occurred in the 
course of employment is a question of fact, subject to our substantial evidence 
standard of review. DeWall v. State ex rel., Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 960 P.2d 502, 503 (Wyo. 1998).

 

   [¶24]  The choicest cuts from the evidence 
establish that Barker's injury was work related. While grading was not required 
for successful completion of the market beef program, Barker endeavored to 
obtain grading information on each animal in the program. With this information, 
the students could fine tune their feeding and care methods. A former 4-H 
coordinator testified that education is the primary purpose of the market 
beef program and grading information 
Acomplete[d] the education process."

 

   [¶25]  Were it not for the educational benefits 
to be derived from the grading information, Barker would not have driven to 
Logan to have the steers slaughtered and graded. Indeed, grade information would 
not have been necessary because one of the steers had already been sold to a 
private party and the other was to be 
consumed by the Barker family. The Division tries to make hay with the fact that 
the steers belonged to Barker's sons.  
However, the record establishes that the steers were enrolled in the 
market beef program. The fact the steers belonged to Barker's sons is incidental 
to the purpose of the trip to Logan: to gather educational grading information 
for members of the market beef program. The record further establishes that 
hauling 4-H animals was one of Barker's job duties. Because the county did not 
own a trailer, she used her own truck and trailer. We hold that substantial 
evidence in the record supports the hearing examiner's finding that Barker 
suffered her injuries in the course of her employment.

 

                              
CONCLUSION

 

   [¶26]  The hearing examiner properly estopped 
the Division from denying coverage to Barker for her work-related injuries. We 
affirm the district court's order which affirmed the hearing examiner's 
decision.