Title: Brown v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Damar Brown v. State of Maryland, No. 74, September Term, 2016.  Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION — RIGHT OF 
ACCUSED TO EXAMINATION 
Pursuant to § 4-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article, a defendant charged with 
misdemeanors by information, in circuit court, is not entitled to a preliminary hearing.  The 
surrounding statutory framework and Maryland Rules indicate that the phrase “in any other 
case” within § 4-102(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article refers specifically to situations 
in which a defendant is charged with a felony within the jurisdiction of the district court. 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.: 615114006 
Argued: March 7, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 74 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
  
DAMAR BROWN 
 
 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Getty, J. 
 
 
Filed: July 28, 2017 
 
 
In this case, we are asked to determine whether a defendant charged with 
misdemeanors by information, in circuit court, is entitled to a preliminary hearing pursuant 
to § 4-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) of the Maryland Code.  For the 
following reasons, we answer in the negative and hold that CP § 4-102 provides that in a 
circuit court proceeding a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged by 
information with felonies, but not when the defendant is charged by information with 
misdemeanors.   
BACKGROUND 
On April 3, 2015, two police officers observed Damar Brown walking in a manner 
that led the police to believe that Mr. Brown was carrying a concealed weapon.  The 
officers approached Mr. Brown and a scuffle ensued—an officer was struck in the face and 
the officers recovered a loaded .22 caliber revolver from the left front pocket of Mr. 
Brown’s sweatpants.  The officers also recovered a black ski mask from Mr. Brown’s 
hooded sweatshirt pouch pocket.  As a result, the officers arrested Mr. Brown. 
On April 4, 2015, the State charged Mr. Brown by a statement of charges in the 
District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City with wearing, carrying, or transporting 
a handgun, second-degree assault, and resisting or interfering with arrest, all of which 
constitute misdemeanor offenses.1  On April 24, 2015, the State filed an information in the 
                                                 
1 See Md. Code, Crim. Law § 4-203(c)(1) (wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun 
constitutes a misdemeanor); Md. Code, Crim. Law § 3-203(b) (second degree assault 
constitutes a misdemeanor); Md. Code, Crim. Law § 9-408(c) (resisting or interfering with 
arrest constitutes a misdemeanor). 
 
2 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City charging Mr. Brown with the same offenses.  Mr. Brown 
did not receive a preliminary hearing in district court prior to being charged in circuit court 
or thereafter.  
 
In the circuit court, on May 20, 2015, Mr. Brown moved for dismissal of the charges, 
arguing that the case was improperly before the circuit court because Mr. Brown had been 
charged with misdemeanors by means of criminal information without a preliminary 
hearing resulting in a finding of probable cause.  Mr. Brown contended that this procedure 
violated Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), CP § 4-102(2) and Maryland Rule 4-
201(c)(2)(A).  The State responded that Mr. Brown was not entitled to a preliminary 
hearing because he was only charged with misdemeanors.  The circuit court granted Mr. 
Brown’s motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.  
The State appealed the circuit court’s dismissal of charges.  In the Court of Special 
Appeals, Mr. Brown again argued that the controlling statute entitled him to a preliminary 
hearing.  In response, the State interpreted CP § 4-102(2) as entitling defendants to 
preliminary hearings if charged by information with a felony within the jurisdiction of the 
district court, but not when charged with misdemeanors.  Therefore, the State argued that 
Mr. Brown was not entitled to a preliminary hearing and the circuit court improperly 
dismissed the charges against Mr. Brown. 
In an unreported opinion filed on September 2, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals 
reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court improperly 
construed CP § 4-102(2) to require preliminary hearings in cases involving misdemeanors 
charged by information in circuit court.  State v. Brown, No. 1094, 2016 WL 4591529, at 
 
3 
 
*8–9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 2, 2016).2  Mr. Brown then petitioned this Court for a writ 
of certiorari, which we granted on December 2, 2016.  Brown v. State, 450 Md. 660 (2016).  
Mr. Brown presents one question for our review: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err in 
concluding that when the State charges misdemeanors by criminal information in the 
circuit court no preliminary hearing is required?” 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  
Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 480–81 (2017).  Furthermore, 
[t]his Court provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into 
law by the General Assembly.  We assume that the legislature’s intent is 
expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation 
focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and 
intent of the General Assembly. 
 
We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the 
language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, 
clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless 
or nugatory.  If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need 
not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.  Occasionally 
we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check 
of our reading of a statute’s plain language.  In such instances, we may find 
useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival 
legislative history of relevant enactments. 
Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 196–97 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178 (2011)). 
                                                 
2 On September 1, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals, in State v. Samples, 229 Md. App. 
531 (2016), released a nearly identical but reported opinion addressing the same issue.  Ms. 
Samples did not petition this Court for a writ of certiorari. 
 
4 
 
We view the plain language of a statute in the context of the statutory scheme to 
which it belongs, with a focus on ascertaining the intent or underlying policy of the General 
Assembly in the statute’s enactment.  Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 213 (2013).   
[T]he meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which 
it appears.  As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context, related 
statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of 
legislative purpose or goal must also be considered.  Thus, not only are we 
required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context 
of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. 
Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 359 (2013) (quoting Centre Ins. Co. 
v. J.T.W., 397 Md. 71, 81 (2007)).  Therefore, we shall analyze the plain language of CP § 
4-102 in the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, and determine in which 
cases defendants are entitled to preliminary hearings when charged by information in 
circuit court.   
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-201(a), an “offense shall be tried only on a charging 
document.”  A charging document is defined as “a written accusation alleging that a 
defendant has committed an offense.  It includes a citation, an indictment, an information, 
and a statement of charges.”  Md. Rule 4-102(a).  An information is defined as “a charging 
document filed in a court by a State’s Attorney.”  Md. Rule 4-102(e). 
CP § 4-102 establishes when the State may charge by information: 
A State’s Attorney may charge by information: 
(1) in a case involving a felony that does not involve a felony within the 
jurisdiction of the District Court, if the defendant is entitled to a preliminary 
hearing but does not request a hearing within 10 days after a court or court 
 
5 
 
commissioner informs the defendant about the availability of a preliminary 
hearing; or 
(2) in any other case, if a court in a preliminary hearing finds that there is 
probable cause to hold the defendant. 
 
The issue in this case is whether the phrase “any other case” of CP § 4-102(2) 
includes cases involving misdemeanors brought in the circuit court, or whether that 
subsection of the statute is limited to cases where a defendant is charged by information 
with felonies within the jurisdiction of the district court.  Mr. Brown argues that the phrase 
“any other case” subsumes instances where defendants are charged with misdemeanors by 
information in circuit court.  Therefore, according to Mr. Brown, the circuit court correctly 
dismissed his charges, and the Court of Special Appeals erred in its reversal.  Mr. Brown 
also contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred by performing statutory interpretation 
in a vacuum, ignoring relevant statutes and Maryland Rules in its construction of CP § 4-
102.  The State responds that the phrase “any other case” does not include misdemeanors 
and is limited to felonies within the jurisdiction of the district court.  Therefore, the State 
contends that the circuit court improperly dismissed the charges against Mr. Brown because 
he was not entitled to a preliminary hearing and the Court of Special Appeals correctly 
reversed the dismissal.  
The State has discretion to bring certain charges in district or circuit court, 
depending upon which crimes are charged.3  Maryland Rule 4-201 governs the use of 
                                                 
3 The district court has original jurisdiction in cases involving misdemeanors and certain 
felonies.  Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-301(b).  The circuit court has “full common-law 
and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county . . . .”  
 
6 
 
charging documents, expressly stating in which instances an offense may be tried by 
charging document.  The Rule indicates that, in district court, “an offense may be tried (1) 
on an information, (2) on a statement of charges filed pursuant to section (b) Rule 4-211, 
or (3) on a citation in the case of a petty offense or when authorized by statute.”  Md. Rule 
4-201(b).  Pursuant to this Rule, the State was authorized to initially charge Mr. Brown 
with misdemeanors in the district court by a statement of charges. 
In contrast, in the circuit court, 
an offense may be tried  
(1) on an indictment, or 
(2) on an information if the offense is (A) a misdemeanor, or (B) a felony 
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, or (C) any other felony and lesser 
included offense if the defendant requests or consents in writing to be 
charged by information, or if the defendant has been charged with the felony 
and a preliminary hearing pursuant to Rule 4-221 has resulted in a finding of 
probable cause, or if the defendant has been charged with the felony as to 
which a preliminary hearing has been waived, or 
(3) on a charging document filed in the District Court for an offense within 
its jurisdiction if the defendant is entitled to and demands a jury trial or 
appeals from the judgment of the District Court. 
Md. Rule 4-201(c).  Therefore, the State was also authorized to charge Mr. Brown with 
misdemeanors in circuit court by means of criminal information.   
This Rule indicates that the State may charge an accused by information with both 
felonies and misdemeanors in circuit court.  Where an accused is charged by information 
in circuit court, the Rule makes clear that he or she is entitled to a preliminary hearing when 
                                                 
Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1-501.  Thus, the district and circuit courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over a large number of offenses.  
 
7 
 
charged with felonies.  However, the Rule does not indicate that a defendant is entitled to 
a preliminary hearing when charged with a misdemeanor by information in circuit court.     
Mr. Brown attempts to argue that Rule 4-201(c) is consistent with his interpretation 
of CP § 4-102, because the Rule and statute are intended for different purposes.  However, 
upon closer examination, this distinction quickly dissolves.  Mr. Brown points out that Rule 
4-201(c) governs trial courts and indicates the types of charging documents on which a 
case “may be tried.”  Whereas, CP § 4-102 concerns when “[a] State’s Attorney may charge 
by information.”  However, the interaction of the statute and the Rule acts as two sides of 
the same coin.  Rule 4-201(c), among other things, indicates in which situations a defendant 
may be tried when charged by information.  Because, pursuant to Rule 4-102(e), an 
information is “a charging document filed in a court by a State’s Attorney,” it is implicit 
that any defendant tried for an offense that was charged by information was necessarily 
charged by a State’s Attorney.  Therefore, Rule 4-201(c) does not support the interpretation 
that CP § 4-102 requires preliminary hearings in cases where a defendant is charged with 
misdemeanors by information in circuit court.   
A review of the historical purpose of preliminary hearings further supports our 
conclusion that a defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged with 
misdemeanors by information in circuit court.  This Court has held that, absent a 
constitutional or statutory mandate requiring that a defendant receive a preliminary 
hearing, a preliminary hearing is not necessary.  Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 543 (1965).  
There is no specific constitutional provision in the federal or Maryland constitutions that 
affords defendants a right to a preliminary hearing.  Id. at 543; see also Crawford v. State, 
 
8 
 
282 Md. 210, 220–21 (1978) (“While there is no constitutional right to a preliminary 
hearing, the accused is entitled to such a hearing by statute if, as here, he makes a timely 
request for it.”). 
This Court has previously framed the purpose of preliminary hearings in several 
ways.  Crawford, 282 Md. at 220–21.  First, we have indicated that the purpose of 
preliminary hearings is to determine “whether the accused should be held for action of the 
Grand Jury or charged by the State’s Attorney on information.”  Id. at 220 (citing Arrington 
v. Warden, 232 Md. 672 (1963); Kochel v. State, 10 Md. App. 11 (1970)).  In addition, we 
have noted that preliminary hearings are “primarily for the benefit of the accused, insuring 
him against being committed to jail or being required to furnish bail pending grand jury 
action, unless the State establishes that there is probable cause for maintaining [] criminal 
proceedings against him.”  Kardy, 237 Md. at 543 (citing Lester B. Orfield, Criminal 
Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 49, et seq (1947)).  The Court of Special Appeals has 
echoed this sentiment, stating, “Prior to the expansion of the State’s information authority, 
the primary purpose of the preliminary hearing was to protect the accused from a unilateral 
decision to arrest with the accompanying likelihood of incarceration while awaiting grand 
jury action.”  Perkins v. State, 26 Md. App. 526, 530–31 (1975).  In short, the requirement 
of a preliminary hearing is aimed at preventing defendants from being incarcerated without 
a determination of probable cause while grand jury action is pending.   
The Court of Special Appeals has also previously considered a defendant’s right to 
a preliminary hearing when charged by information and held that, “[w]hen charging a 
prospective defendant with a felony, other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the 
 
9 
 
District Court, the State may proceed by way of criminal information, subject to the 
defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing.”  Id. at 530.  Thus, the intermediate appellate 
court indicated that a defendant has an absolute right to preliminary hearing only when 
charged with a felony outside of the jurisdiction of the district court.  Id.; accord CP § 4-
103(c).  As we will discuss in more detail below, this proposition stands in accordance with 
the statutes and Rules controlling the use of criminal information as a charging document 
and the right to a preliminary hearing.  Therefore, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly 
concluded with regard to the circuit court’s dismissal of Mr. Brown’s charges, “the 
language requiring a preliminary hearing was aimed at felonies for which a grand jury 
indictment otherwise would be required.”  Brown, No. 1094, 2016 WL 4591529, at *4.  
Here, Mr. Brown was charged with misdemeanors and was never incarcerated awaiting 
grand jury indictment, for which a preliminary hearing establishing probable cause would 
have been necessary.  Thus, Mr. Brown’s case falls outside the judicially announced 
purpose of preliminary hearings. 
The legislative history of CP § 4-102 and CP § 4-103 also supports our conclusion 
that a defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged with misdemeanors 
by information in circuit court.  In 2001, the General Assembly enacted CP § 4-102, which 
recodified the former Art. 27 § 592.  Originally enacted in 1933, § 592 abrogated a 
defendant’s common law right to indictment.  1933 Md. Laws, ch. 562; see also Moaney 
v. State, 28 Md. App. 408, 415 (1975).  The statute allowed a State’s Attorney to charge a 
felony by information under specified conditions rather than by indictment, which the 
common law right required.  Moaney, 28 Md. App. at 415–16.  Subsequently, § 592 was 
 
10 
 
repealed by 1963 Md. Laws, ch. 558 § 1.  The statute was readopted in 1973 in a revised 
format.  1973 Md. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 2 § 7A.  In this iteration, the statute stated that 
an accused may be charged by information 
(a) In all cases involving a felony, other than a felony within the jurisdiction 
of the District Court, in which the accused has not requested a preliminary 
hearing within ten days after being informed by the court or court 
commissioner of the availability of such a hearing, or in all cases in which a 
preliminary hearing has been held and probable cause to hold the accused 
has been found the state’s attorney may charge by information. 
 
(b) 
(1) In any case where the defendant has been charged with a felony, 
other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the defendant 
shall be advised by the court or court commissioner, at the time of the initial 
appearance required by the Maryland District Rules, of his right to request a 
preliminary hearing.  The defendant may make that request at the time of the 
initial appearance or at any time within ten days thereafter.  If the defendant 
fails to request a preliminary hearing within the ten-day period, it is waived.  
 
(2) If the state’s attorney elects to charge the accused by criminal 
information, the right of the defendant to the preliminary hearing is 
absolute, if he has requested such a hearing as set out above. 
 
 
(3) If the state’s attorney elects to charge the accused by grand jury 
indictment, the preliminary hearing is not a matter of right to the 
defendant but may be afforded in the court’s discretion. A preliminary 
hearing is not a matter of right in any other case, but may be afforded 
in any case in the court’s discretion, upon motion of the state’s 
attorney or the defendant. 
 
Md. Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1974 Supp.), Art. 27 § 592. 
 
The General Assembly enacted the current version of the statute, CP § 4-102, in 
2001 when it adopted the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code during Code 
Revision.  The revisor’s note for CP § 4-102 indicates that the statute is derived from Art. 
27 § 592(a) without substantive change, while the revisor’s note for CP § 4-103 indicates 
that it is derived from Art. 27 § 592(b), also without substantive change.  Further, the 
 
11 
 
revisor’s note to CP § 4-102 indicates that, “[i]n item (2) of this section, the former phrase 
‘other than a felony’ is deleted as implicit in the phrase a ‘felony within the jurisdiction of 
the District Court.’”4 
Subsection (a) of the prior version of the statute makes clear that a defendant is only 
entitled to a preliminary hearing in cases involving felonies, whether or not they fall outside 
the jurisdiction of the district court.  The format of this version of the statute indicates that 
the entirety of subsection (a) refers only to situations involving felonies.  There is an 
implication regarding the latter part of subsection (a), which is present day CP § 4-102(2), 
because the first part of the subsection (a), present day CP § 4-102(1), is specifically 
concerned with felonies outside the jurisdiction of the district court.  The implication is 
that the two parts of the statute are intended to apply exclusively to felonies.  Put simply, 
CP § 4-102(1) is intended to encompass situations where a defendant is charged with 
felonies outside the jurisdiction of the district court; whereas, CP § 4-102(2) controls in 
situations in which a defendant is charged with felonies within the jurisdiction of the 
district court.  The phrase “in all cases” in Art. 27 § 592(a) referred specifically to felonies 
that are within the jurisdiction of the district court.  This language is equivalent to the 
                                                 
4 Oddly, there are two different versions of the revisor’s note to CP § 4-102.  The quoted 
language in the opinion refers to the revisor’s note that appears in Senate Bill 1, 2001 Leg., 
415th Sess. (Md. 2001), which enacted CP § 4-102.  The same language appears in the 
Annotated Code of Maryland published by West.  See Md. Code Ann., CP § 4-102 (West 
2001).  However, in the Annotated Code of Maryland published by LexisNexis, the 
revisor’s note to CP § 4-102 is slightly different: “In item (2) of this section, the former 
phrase ‘other than a felony’ is deleted as implicit in the reference to ‘any other case’ within 
the District Court.”  Md. Code Ann., CP § 4-102 (LexisNexis 2001).  The reason for the 
discrepancy is unknown to this Court. 
 
12 
 
phrase “in any other case” of CP § 4-102(2).  Both phrases are specifically limited to 
situations that do not fall under CP § 4-102(1)—situations where a defendant is charged 
with a felony within the jurisdiction of the district court.    
The surrounding statutory framework and corresponding Maryland Rules further 
support this interpretation of CP § 4-102.  To determine the meaning of a statutory phrase, 
we must view the statute’s plain language within the context of the related and surrounding 
statutes.  See Mummert, 435 Md. at 213.  To further clarify the phrase “any other case” of 
CP § 4-102(2), we look to the statutes and Rules concerning a defendant’s right to a 
preliminary hearing. 
CP § 4-103, entitled “Preliminary hearing,” provides as follows: 
(a) Defendant to be advised of right. – If  a defendant is charged with a felony 
other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, at the time of 
the defendant’s initial appearance, as required by Maryland Rule 4-213, a 
court or court commissioner shall advise the defendant of the defendant’s 
right to request a preliminary hearing.  
 
(b) Time for waiver requests. – (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony 
other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the defendant 
may request a preliminary hearing at the defendant’s initial appearance or at 
any time within 10 days after the initial appearance. 
 
(2) If the defendant does not request a preliminary hearing within 10 
days after the initial appearance, the right to a preliminary hearing is 
waived. 
 
 
(c) When the right is absolute. – (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony 
other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the right of a 
defendant to a preliminary hearing is absolute if: 
 
(i) the defendant is charged by criminal information; and 
 
(ii) the defendant requests a preliminary hearing in accordance 
with subsection (b) of this section. 
 
13 
 
 
(2) If the defendant is charged by grand jury indictment, the right of a 
defendant to a preliminary hearing is not absolute but the court may 
allow the defendant to have a preliminary hearing. 
 
(3) In any other case, the right of a defendant to a preliminary 
hearing is not absolute, but on motion of the State’s Attorney or 
the defendant, and subject to the Maryland Rules, the court may 
allow the defendant to have a preliminary hearing. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In short, CP § 4-103(c) affords a defendant an absolute right to a 
preliminary hearing if he or she is charged by information with a felony outside the 
jurisdiction of the district court.  “In any other case,” a trial judge has the discretion to grant 
a defendant a preliminary hearing on motion by either party.  Moreover, there is no 
indication from this statute that an individual charged with misdemeanors by information 
in circuit court is entitled to a preliminary hearing.  The statute makes clear that a 
preliminary hearing is required only when a defendant is charged with a felony outside the 
jurisdiction of the district court.  
Mr. Brown argues that CP § 4-103 is consistent with his interpretation of CP § 4-
102(2).  He argues that the only reason the State would move for a preliminary hearing 
pursuant to CP § 4-103(c)(3) is to satisfy the preliminary hearing requirement of CP § 4-
102(2).  In other words, he argues that CP § 4-103(c)(3) provides an avenue through which 
the State may obtain a preliminary hearing in order to satisfy the requirement of CP § 4-
102(2).  We disagree.  The interaction between the two statutes does not imply that CP § 
4-102(2) involves cases in which a defendant is charged with misdemeanors by information 
in circuit court.  Instead, CP § 4-103(c)(3) simply allows the State to obtain a preliminary 
 
14 
 
hearing in situations where a defendant is charged with a felony within the jurisdiction of 
the district court.  
Other relevant Rules governing preliminary hearings indicate only that a defendant 
may request a preliminary hearing in situations where he or she is charged with a felony 
outside the jurisdiction of the district court.  See Md. Rule 4-221(a) (“A defendant charged 
with a felony that is not within the jurisdiction of the District Court may request a 
preliminary hearing at or within ten days after an initial appearance pursuant to Rule 4-
213(a).”).  Similarly, a defendant must be advised of his or her right to a preliminary 
hearing when he or she is “charged with a felony that is not within the jurisdiction of the 
District Court and has not been indicted . . . .”  Md. Rule 4-213(a)(4).  Furthermore, 
Maryland Rule 4-102(c)(2) indicates that an accused is entitled to a preliminary hearing 
when charged with a felony, but does not mention a preliminary hearing when an accused 
is charged with a misdemeanor by information in circuit court.  Thus, the Maryland Rules 
concerning a defendant’s right to or waiver of a preliminary hearing indicate that a 
defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing, in circuit court, when he or she is charged 
with felonies.  Moreover, there is no indication from these Rules that a defendant charged 
with misdemeanors by information in circuit court has a right to a preliminary hearing.  
Finally, Mr. Brown makes the additional argument that the Court of Special 
Appeals’ decision in this case stands in opposition to public policy, because it may subject 
indigent defendants to increased periods of incarceration.  Mr. Brown argues that, in the 
district court, defendants usually have a trial date set within 60 days.  Whereas, in circuit 
court, “the date for trial . . . shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance 
 
15 
 
of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 
4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.”  Md. Rule 4-
271(a)(1).  Furthermore, Mr. Brown alleges that the State often first charges defendants 
with misdemeanor firearms offenses in the district court by a statement of charges, then 
refiles the same charges in circuit court by criminal information.  As a result, Mr. Brown 
argues that the State intentionally adheres to this procedure to subject defendants who are 
unable to post bail to increased periods of incarceration.  
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.  First, Mr. Brown’s argument 
implies that he was unable to post bail and therefore subjected to an increased period of 
incarceration while awaiting trial on his misdemeanor charges in circuit court.  However, 
at the time the State filed charges against Mr. Brown in circuit court, he was being held on 
a violation of probation for a 2008 shoplifting case in Anne Arundel County, in which bail 
was not permitted.  Therefore, Mr. Brown was ineligible for bail at the time of his 
arraignment hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on May 20, 2015.  
In addition, this Court recently adopted changes to the Maryland Rules concerning 
bail procedure, some of which serve to alleviate the concerns raised by Mr. Brown.  The 
new Rules were adopted on February 16, 2017, and became effective on July 1, 2017.  See 
Md. Rule 4-216; Md. Rule 4-216.1.  The revised version of Rule 4-216.1 indicates that the 
revisions are intended 
to promote the release of defendants on their own recognizance or, when 
necessary, unsecured bond.  Additional conditions should be imposed on 
release only if the need to ensure appearance at court proceedings, to protect 
the community, victims, witnesses, or any other person and to maintain the 
integrity of the judicial process is demonstrated by the circumstances of the 
 
16 
 
individual case.  Preference should be given to additional conditions without 
financial terms. 
 
Thus, the new Rules are aimed at addressing Mr. Brown’s concerns of indigent defendants 
being subjected to increased periods of pretrial incarceration by encouraging the release of 
defendants on their own recognizance in appropriate circumstances.  Moreover, we 
conclude that these concerns are insufficient to refute the interpretation of CP § 4-102(2) 
that we have discerned from the legislative history, surrounding statutory framework, and 
related Maryland Rules governing preliminary hearings.  
CONCLUSION 
The plain meaning of the phrase “any other case” in CP § 4-102(2) does not include 
cases where a defendant is charged by information with misdemeanors in circuit court.  The 
legislative history of CP § 4-102, along with other relevant statutes and Maryland Rules 
controlling the use of information and preliminary hearings, make clear that this phrase 
refers to cases in which a defendant is charged with a felony within the jurisdiction of the 
district court, and that a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing in those cases.  Here, 
because Mr. Brown was charged by information with misdemeanors in circuit court, he 
was not entitled to a preliminary hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals, which correctly reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of Mr. 
Brown’s charges.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.