Title: Murphy v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
SIMON VAUGHN MURPHY   
 
v.   Record No. 080852 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
February 27, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal of a defendant’s conviction for possession 
of marijuana with the intent to distribute, we consider whether 
Code § 18.2-262 affords transactional immunity to a witness 
whose testimony is voluntary, rather than compelled. 
 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  In March 2005, 
Simon Vaughn Murphy stopped his vehicle at the Chesapeake Bay 
Bridge Tunnel toll plaza in Northampton County.  At the plaza, 
Virginia State Trooper C.L. Murphy (the trooper) smelled 
marijuana in the vehicle and ordered Murphy to “pull over.” 
 
Upon conducting a search of Murphy’s vehicle, the trooper 
found between 15 and 16 pounds of marijuana.  Murphy admitted 
that he was paid $2,000 to transport the marijuana.  Murphy and 
his passenger, Omar Dickson, were placed under arrest and 
charged with possession with the intent to distribute more than 
five pounds of marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.1, and 
with transporting more than five pounds of marijuana into the 
Commonwealth, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.01. 
 
Murphy later reached an oral agreement with the 
Commonwealth under which he agreed to plead guilty to the charge 
of possession with the intent to distribute and to testify when 
called by the Commonwealth at Dickson’s preliminary hearing and 
trial.  In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to seek a nolle 
prosequi of the transportation charge. 
 
In accordance with these terms, Murphy testified at 
Dickson’s preliminary hearing.  However, Murphy later filed a 
motion in the circuit court to dismiss the entire indictment 
pending against him, including the possession with intent to 
distribute charge.  Murphy argued that he was entitled to 
transactional immunity under Code § 18.2-262 because he had 
testified at Dickson’s preliminary hearing.  That section 
provides in relevant part: 
No person shall be excused from testifying . . . for the 
Commonwealth as to any offense alleged to have been 
committed by another under this article or under the Drug 
Control Act (§ 54.1-3400 et seq.) by reason of his 
testimony . . . tending to incriminate himself, but the 
testimony given . . . by such person on behalf of the 
Commonwealth when called for by the trial judge or court 
trying the case, or by the attorney for the Commonwealth, 
or when summoned by the Commonwealth and sworn as a witness 
by the court or the clerk and sent before the grand jury, 
shall be in no case used against him nor shall he be 
prosecuted as to the offense as to which he testifies. Any 
person who refuses to testify . . . shall be guilty of a 
Class 2 misdemeanor. 
 
Code § 18.2-262. 
 
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The circuit court denied Murphy’s motion.  The Commonwealth 
and Murphy later entered into a written plea agreement pursuant 
to Code § 19.2-254.  In accordance with that agreement, Murphy 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession 
with intent to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana, 
preserving his right to appeal the circuit court’s holding 
rejecting his immunity claim.  Following Murphy’s plea, the 
circuit court entered an order of nolle prosequi on the 
transportation charge and sentenced Murphy for the possession 
with intent to distribute conviction to a term of three years’ 
imprisonment with all but nine months suspended.  Murphy 
appealed his conviction. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, 
holding that Murphy implicitly waived any transactional immunity 
afforded by Code § 18.2-262 by voluntarily testifying with the 
understanding that the Commonwealth would withdraw one of the 
charges against him.  Murphy v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 535, 
543-45, 659 S.E.2d 538, 542 (2008).  The Court further held that 
Code § 18.2-262 does not require that a witness’ testimony be 
“compelled” in order for the statutory immunity provisions to 
apply.  Id. at 540, 659 S.E.2d at 540.  We awarded Murphy an 
appeal, and the Commonwealth assigned cross-error to the Court 
of Appeals’ judgment. 
 
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Murphy contends that Code § 18.2-262 automatically provides 
transactional immunity to a witness who testifies under the 
circumstances specified in the statute.  He maintains that this 
statutory protection is not limited to situations in which a 
witness’ testimony is compelled, but is afforded whenever the 
Commonwealth procures testimony from a witness concerning 
criminal activity in which the witness was engaged.  Murphy 
argues that once a witness protected by the statute testifies, 
the immunity protections of the statute are activated and any 
later waiver of that immunity must be made knowingly and 
voluntarily.  He asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in 
failing to hold that he did not make such a knowing and 
voluntary waiver, and in determining that he implicitly waived 
his immunity rights afforded under Code § 18.2-262. 
 
The Commonwealth assigns as cross-error the Court of 
Appeals’ holding that the immunity provisions of Code § 18.2-262 
are not limited to instances in which a witness’ testimony is 
compelled.  The Commonwealth argues that the immunity provisions 
of Code § 18.2-262 are implicated only when a witness’ testimony 
is compelled and that, therefore, Murphy did not receive 
immunity under the statute because his testimony was purely 
voluntary.  Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that by 
entering into the plea agreement, Murphy implicitly waived any 
statutory immunity that might have attached. 
 
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In reviewing these arguments, we first observe that neither 
Murphy nor the Commonwealth relies on the existence of an 
enforceable plea agreement entered under Rule 3A:8 or a separate 
immunity agreement executed by the parties.  Instead, both 
parties rely on the language of Code § 18.2-262 and argue their 
respective positions based on differing interpretations of the 
statute.  Thus, we focus our analysis directly on the 
substantive provisions of the statute. 
 
We begin by addressing the Commonwealth’s assignment of 
cross-error because that assignment determines the outcome of 
this appeal.  The interpretation of Code § 18.2-262 presents a 
pure question of law, which we review de novo on appeal.  See 
Young v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 528, 533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 493 
(2007); Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 
96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007); Washington v. Commonwealth, 
272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). 
 
We determine the meaning of the statute by examining its 
express language.  Washington, 272 Va. at 454, 634 S.E.2d at 
313; Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 604 S.E.2d 66, 68 
(2004); Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 
565 (2004).  We consider that language in its entirety, rather 
than by isolating particular words or phrases.  Young, 273 Va. 
at 533, 643 S.E.2d at 493; Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 
335, 345, 641 S.E.2d 486, 492 (2007); Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 
 
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Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001).  When the language of a 
statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of 
that language and may not assign the words a different 
construction.  Young, 273 Va. at 533, 643 S.E.2d at 493; Gunn v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587, 637 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2006); 
Tucker, 268 Va. at 493, 604 S.E.2d at 68; Commonwealth v. Diaz, 
266 Va. 260, 265, 585 S.E.2d 552, 554 (2003). 
 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the language of 
Code § 18.2-262 is unambiguous and grants immunity only to 
witnesses whose testimony is compelled.  Testimony is compelled 
if a witness is subjected to coercion or deception that impairs 
the witness’ voluntary choice and prevents his testimony from 
being an exercise of free will.  See United States v. Escandar, 
465 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Connecticut v. 
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 527-28 (1987).  Conversely, a witness’ 
testimony is not compelled when the testimony results from the 
exercise of choice or free will, and is not constrained by any 
interference.  Escandar, 465 F.2d at 442; see United States v. 
Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 337 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 
As relevant to this case, Code § 18.2-262 addresses the 
testimony of witnesses “called for . . . by the attorney for the 
Commonwealth” to testify regarding certain drug-related 
“offense[s] alleged to have been committed by another.”  Code 
§ 18.2-262.  The statute provides that “[n]o person shall be 
 
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excused from testifying . . . by reason of his testimony . . . 
tending to incriminate himself.”  Id.  Further, this section 
permits the Commonwealth to procure a witness’ testimony by 
offering to the witness a grant of immunity.  Id.  If the 
witness nonetheless refuses to testify, he is “guilty of a Class 
2 misdemeanor.”  Id. 
 
These provisions, when considered together, plainly do not 
apply to testimony that is voluntarily given.  To “excuse” a 
person is to “free from an obligation or duty” otherwise imposed 
on that person.  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
794 (1993).  Thus, under Code § 18.2-262, a witness will not be 
freed from an obligation or duty to testify by invoking his 
privilege against self-incrimination.  In requiring that any 
person called by the Commonwealth testify regarding certain 
drug-related offenses, and in including a criminal penalty for 
persons who refuse to testify after being provided immunity 
under the statute, the statutory language manifests a clear 
intent to limit its scope to compelled testimony. 
 
This conclusion is further supported when the statutory 
language is considered in the context of constitutional 
protections afforded compelled testimony.  The United States 
Constitution requires that a statute authorizing the compelled 
testimony of a witness grant to that witness immunity from 
prosecution that is coextensive with the scope of the Fifth 
 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  See United 
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000); Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 449, 453 (1972); Gosling v. Commonwealth, 
14 Va. App. 158, 163-64, 415 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1992); 
Commonwealth v. Sluss, 14 Va. App. 601, 604, 419 S.E.2d 263, 
264-65 (1992).  In accordance with this constitutional 
requirement, Code § 18.2-262 extends two types of immunity to a 
witness whose testimony is compelled. 
 
The first type of immunity, commonly known as “use” 
immunity, is reflected in the statutory language that the 
witness’ testimony “shall in no case be used against him.”  See 
Code § 18.2-262; Newton v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 433, 457, 
512 S.E.2d 846, 857 (1999); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 
86, 88, 379 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1989).  The “use” immunity granted 
by Code § 18.2-262 prevents a witness’ compelled testimony from 
being used against him in any criminal prosecution of that 
witness.  Newton, 29 Va. App. at 457, 512 S.E.2d at 857; 
Gosling, 14 Va. App. at 164, 415 S.E.2d at 873; Caldwell, 8 Va. 
App. at 88-89, 379 S.E.2d at 369-70. 
 
The second type of immunity, commonly known as 
“transactional” immunity, is provided in the statutory language 
that the witness shall not be prosecuted for “the offense as to 
which he testifies.”  See Code § 18.2-262; Newton, 29 Va. App. 
at 457, 512 S.E.2d at 857; Caldwell, 8 Va. App. at 88, 379 
 
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S.E.2d at 369.  This “transactional” immunity granted by Code 
§ 18.2-262 protects a witness from being prosecuted for the 
specified drug-related offenses referenced in the statute about 
which the witness testifies.*  Newton, 29 Va. App. at 457, 512 
S.E.2d at 857; Gosling, 14 Va. App. at 164, 415 S.E.2d at 873; 
Caldwell, 8 Va. App. at 88-89, 379 S.E.2d at 369-70. 
 
These provisions of Code § 18.2-262, which authorize 
compelled testimony from certain witnesses and in return grant 
those witnesses the described immunity, are fully coextensive in 
protection of a defendant's self-incrimination rights.  Thus, 
Code § 18.2-262 complies with the holding in Kastigar, providing 
the specified immunity to a witness whose compelled testimony 
tends to incriminate him.  See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449, 453.  
In view of these coextensive statutory provisions, which are 
plainly stated in the full text of the statute, we hold that the 
immunity protections of Code § 18.2-262 apply only to witnesses 
whose testimony is compelled. 
 
In the present case, Murphy’s testimony was voluntarily 
given in return for the Commonwealth’s oral agreement to dismiss 
the pending transportation of marijuana charge, which would have 
resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence of three years’ 
imprisonment.  Because Murphy’s testimony against Dickson was 
                     
* We observe that Code § 18.2-262, in providing both use and 
transactional immunity, exceeds the requirements of Kastigar.  
See 406 U.S. at 453. 
 
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purely voluntary, rather than compelled, we reject Murphy’s 
claim that he was entitled to dismissal of the possession with 
intent to distribute charge under the immunity provisions of 
Code § 18.2-262.  Further, given our conclusion that Murphy’s 
testimony was purely voluntary, we do not reach the issue 
whether a witness must specifically invoke his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination before his testimony may be 
deemed compelled within the meaning of Code § 18.2-262. 
 
Based on our holding, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment should be affirmed on the ground of cross-
error assigned by the Commonwealth.  We do not address Murphy’s 
assignments of error invoking the immunity provisions of Code 
§ 18.2-262, in light of our conclusion that the statutory grant 
of immunity is limited to compelled testimony, and that Murphy’s 
testimony was voluntarily given.  Accordingly, for the reasons 
stated above, we will sustain the Commonwealth’s assignment of 
cross-error, and will affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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