Title: David R. v. The Positive Safety Manufacturing Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0431 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
David R. and Eva Matthies,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
The Positive Safety Manufacturing Company,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
ARB Insurance Company, Safety Supply and Design, 
Inc., f/k/a Wardco, GHI Insurance Company and 
The Travelers Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Calumet 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald A. Poppy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Erik J. Pless and Everson, Whitney, Everson & Brehm, S.C., Green 
Bay, and John J. Bullaro, Jr., James R. Branit and Bullaro & 
Carton, Chicago, Illinois, and oral argument by James R. Branit. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by R. George Burnett and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, 
S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by R. George Burnett. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. 
Gleisner, III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, Milwaukee, 
and Rhonda L. Lanford and Habush, Habush, Davis & Rottier, S.C., 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard L. 
Zaffiro, Brookfield, on behalf of the Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin. 
 
2001 WI 82 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0431 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David R. and Eva Matthies,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
The Positive Safety Manufacturing  
Company,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
ARB Insurance Company, Safety Supply and  
Design, Inc., f/k/a Wardco, GHI Insurance  
Company and The Travelers Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Calumet 
County, Donald A. Poppy, Judge.    Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   On August 22, 1992, David R. 
Matthies' hand was injured by a punch press.  At the time of the 
accident, joint and several liability was a common-law rule in 
Wisconsin which permitted a plaintiff to recover his or her 
damages from any one of two or more persons whose joint or 
concurring 
negligent 
acts 
caused 
the 
plaintiff's 
injury.  
FILED 
 
      
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
2 
Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 
96 Wis. 2d 314, 330-31, 291 N.W.2d 825 (1980) (quoting Kingston 
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 613, 211 N.W. 913 
(1927)).  After Matthies' accident, but before he filed this 
action, the legislature modified joint and several liability.  
The legislature modified the doctrine by amending the statute on 
contributory negligence, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, to limit joint 
and several liability to a person found 51% or more causally 
negligent.1  1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1.  After Matthies filed this 
action, the Positive Safety Manufacturing Company (Positive 
Safety), the manufacturer of a safety device for the punch 
press, 
sought 
a 
declaratory 
order 
that, 
as 
amended 
and 
renumbered, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) (1995-96),2 applied to 
Matthies' claims; and, as applied, § 895.045(1) would limit 
Positive Safety's liability to only that amount of causal 
negligence the jury would attribute to Positive Safety.  Calumet 
County Circuit Judge Donald A. Poppy declined to enter the order 
Positive Safety sought, and, instead, declared § 895.045(1) 
unconstitutional in its retroactive application to this instant 
action.  This order was taken up by the court of appeals, which, 
in turn, certified its appeal to this court. 
                     
1 Causal 
negligence 
is 
that 
negligence 
which 
is 
a 
substantial factor in causing the injuries or damage.  See  
Merco Distrib. Corp. v. Commercial Police Alarm Co., 84 Wis. 2d 
455, 459, 267 N.W.2d 652 (1978).  
2  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
3 
¶2 
The circuit court correctly determined that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) is unconstitutional if retroactively applied in 
this case.  According to the test this court adopted in Martin 
v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), to determine 
the constitutionality of retroactively applying a statute, 
retroactive 
application 
of 
§ 895.045 
is 
unconstitutional.  
Retroactively 
applying 
§ 895.045(a) 
to 
this 
action 
would 
adversely impact Matthies' right to recover all of the damages 
adjudged due to him and this adverse impact substantially 
outweighs 
any 
public 
benefit 
that 
would 
be 
gained 
from 
retroactively applying § 895.045(1).  We thus affirm the circuit 
court. 
I 
¶3 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  Matthies was 
a machine operator at Mirro-Foley Company in Chilton, Wisconsin. 
On August 22, 1992, while operating a punch press, Matthies' 
left hand was severely injured.  According to medical records 
submitted to the trial court, parts of four fingers were 
severed.  
¶4 
On July 19, 1995, David Matthies and his wife, Eva 
Matthies, filed their complaint, in which David Matthies brought 
claims of common-law negligence and strict liability.3  Matthies 
brought these claims against Positive Safety, as well as Allen- 
Bradley Company, Inc., the manufacturer of the foot pedal used 
                     
3 Eva Matthies' claim for loss of society and companionship 
is not at issue.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
4 
to start 
the 
press, and 
E.W. Bliss 
Company, 
Inc., the 
manufacturer of the punch press.4   
¶5 
Matthies' complaint alleges that he was operating the 
punch press using a foot pedal and a pull-back device.  A pull-
back device is a harness that, if operating correctly, pulls 
back the machine operator so that the operator's hand cannot be 
caught in the punch press at the point where the press pinches 
the metal.  The complaint also alleges that Positive Safety, the 
manufacturer of the pull-back caused Matthies' injuries because, 
inter alia, the pull-back was ineffective, or defective and 
unreasonably dangerous. 
¶6 
On February 2, 1998, Positive Safety moved for a 
declaratory order that (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) applies to 
Matthies' strict liability claim; and (2) that Positive Safety's 
liability, if any, would be limited to only that portion of 
total causal negligence that the jury would attribute to 
Positive Safety.5  Positive Safety argued that if Mirro-Foley is 
found most at fault, Positive Safety would not be liable for 
                     
4  In August 1996, the Matthies settled with Allen-Bradley, 
E.W. Bliss, and their insurers, and they were dismissed from the 
lawsuit with prejudice. 
5 We address the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) to 
strict products liability claims in a case also mandated today, 
Fuschsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2000 WI 81, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  In Fuchsgruber, we hold that 
§ 895.045(1) does not apply to strict products liability claims. 
 Id. at ¶¶1, 30.  That holding applies here, and, consequently, 
there is no need to address the parties' contentions regarding 
§ 895.045's applicability to strict products liability claims.  
This court's decision here applies to Matthies' common-law 
negligence claim.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
5 
Matthies' entire damages under the former rule of joint and 
several liability; rather, Positive Safety's liability would be 
limited by § 895.045(1).  Matthies sought a declaration that 
retroactive application of § 895.045(1) is unconstitutional.   
¶7 
On January 29, 1999, the circuit court concluded that 
retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) to this case 
is unconstitutional.  Positive Safety sought interlocutory 
review of the circuit court's order, and Matthies joined in that 
request.  The court of appeals granted leave for appeal of the 
court's order pursuant to § 808.03(2).6  Then, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. Rule 809.61,7 the court of appeals certified the appeal to 
this court. 
II 
                     
6  Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) provides: 
(2) APPEALS BY PERMISSION.  A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
 
(a) Materially advance the termination of the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
 
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or 
irreparable injury; or 
 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in 
the administration of justice. 
 
7  Wisconsin Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 provides in pertinent 
part: 
The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal 
or other proceeding in the court of appeals upon 
certification by the court of appeals or upon the 
supreme court's own motion.   
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
6 
¶8 
The legislature enacted 1995 Wisconsin Act 17 before 
Matthies filed his complaint, but after his accident.  1995 
Wisconsin Act 17 amended Wis. Stat. § 895.045 as follows: 
 
 
Section 1. 895.045 of the statutes is renumbered 
895.045(1) and amended to read: 
 
 
895.045(1) 
(title) 
COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE.  
Contributory negligence shall does not bar recovery in 
an action by any person or the preson's person's legal 
representative 
to 
recover 
damages 
for 
negligence 
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, 
if such that negligence was not greater than the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is 
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
the 
proportion 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
negligence 
attributable attributed to the person recovering.  The 
negligence 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
shall 
be 
measured 
separately against the negligence of each person found 
to be causally negligent.  The liability of each 
person found to be causally negligent whose percentage 
of causal negligence is less than 51% is limited to 
the 
percentage 
of 
the 
total 
causal 
negligence 
attributed to that person.  A person found to be 
causally 
negligent 
whose 
percentage 
of 
causal 
negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the damages allowed. 
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045's predecessor, § 331.045, 
changed the common law rule of contributory negligence that had 
existed since the beginning of Wisconsin's jurisprudence.  A 
plaintiff's contributory negligence, of any amount, was a 
complete defense and barred the plaintiff's recovery.  Brewster 
v. Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 247 N.W. 449 (1933).  In 1931, the 
legislature adopted 
Wis. 
Stat. § 331.045, 
which 
permitted 
recovery where a plaintiff's negligence is "not as great as the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought."  Ch. 
242, Laws of 1931.  Under § 331.045, "a plaintiff who is charged 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
7 
with 49 percent of the total negligence recovers 51 percent of 
his [or her] damage, while one who is charged with 50 percent 
recovers nothing."  Lupie v. Hartzheim, 54 Wis. 2d 415, 416, 195 
N.W.2d 461 (1972) (citing Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 
Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970)).  In 1971, the legislature 
modified the comparative negligence standard to permit recovery 
where a plaintiff's negligence is not "greater than" the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.  Ch. 
47, 
Laws 
of 
1971. 
 
"Under 
this 
statutory 
modification, 
plaintiffs found 50 percent negligent will be able to recover 50 
percent of their damages from a defendant who is found to be 
equally at fault."  Lupie, 54 Wis. 2d at 417.  This is the 
comparative negligence standard we have in Wisconsin today.  
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1). 
¶10 Some cases only involve one tortfeasor, and so, the 
negligence is divided, if appropriate, between the two.  Where 
cases involve multiple tortfeasors, "this court has repeatedly 
interpreted the comparative 
negligence 
statute 
as clearly 
providing 
that 
the 
comparison 
of 
negligence 
between 
the 
plaintiff 
and 
multiple 
tort-feasors 
involves 
a 
separate 
comparison between the plaintiff and each of the defendants."  
Soczka v. Rechner, 73 Wis. 2d 157, 164, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976).  
The legislature appears to address this rule in the first 
sentence that it added to Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1):  "The 
negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
8 
the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent."8  
1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1.  Given that a plaintiff's negligence 
cannot be greater than the person against whom recovery is 
sought, a plaintiff's negligence cannot exceed the negligence of 
any one of the defendants, or the plaintiff cannot recover 
against that defendant.  Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  Where there 
are multiple defendants, the percentage of negligence that is 
allocated to each of the defendants found causally negligent 
cannot be combined to establish that the defendants' negligence 
is equal to or greater than the plaintiff's.  Ford, Bacon & 
Davis, 96 Wis. 2d at 326-27; Mariuzza v. Kenower, 68 Wis. 2d 
321, 325, 228 N.W.2d 702 (1975).  Even where multiple defendants 
may be jointly and severally liable, a plaintiff cannot recover 
from any one of them unless the plaintiff's negligence is "not 
greater than" each of the defendants' negligence.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1).  For example, if a plaintiff is found to be 40% 
negligent and one joint defendant 39% negligent, and the other 
21%, the plaintiff cannot recover.  
¶11 Joint and several liability among multiple tortfeasors 
has long been a common-law rule in Wisconsin and predates the 
adoption of the comparative negligence statute.  See Kingston, 
191 Wis. at 613. 
 
                     
8 The parties do not dispute the constitutionality of this 
part of the amendments to Wis. Stat. § 895.045 made by 1995 Wis. 
Act 17.  Accordingly, we do not now make any determination as 
the constitutionality of this provision.   
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
9 
The doctrine was initially applied at common law to 
situations where there was a concert of action or 
breach of a joint duty on the part of multiple 
tortfeasors.  Thus, persons who acted in concert or 
breached a common duty causing injury were considered 
to be joint tortfeasors and each could be held liable 
for the entire amount of the damages.  Later, the 
doctrine was extended to cases where a plaintiff 
sustained an indivisible injury, harm or damage as a 
result of the independent, separate, but concurring 
tortious acts of two or more persons.  "When two 
actors negligently conduct themselves so as to injure 
another, they become jointly and severally liable to 
the other if their actions concur in time to directly 
produce injury or to create an injury producing 
situation." 
Ford, Bacon & Davis, 96 Wis. 2d at 331 (quoting Butzow v. Wausau 
Mem'l Hosp., 51 Wis. 2d 281, 288-89, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971)), 
(other citations omitted). Each joint tortfeasor is held liable 
for the entire amount of damages because the injury would not 
likely have occurred but for the negligence of any one of the 
joint tortfeasors.  "The doctrine of joint and several liability 
is premised in the belief that an innocent victim should not 
suffer the loss caused by an immune or insolvent wrongdoer, when 
another wrongdoer is also liable."  McChrystal, Michael, Task 
Force on Tort Reform Research Paper on Joint and Several 
Liability, reprinted in Wisconsin Bar Bulletin 16 (June 1987).  
¶12 Also from early on, Wisconsin common law allowed for 
contribution between or 
among multiple 
joint 
tortfeasors.  
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) 
(citing Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 
1048 (1918)).  If one of two or more joint tortfeasors has paid 
all or a portion of a plaintiff's damages, that tortfeasor may 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
10
seek contribution, or reimbursement, from the other tortfeasors. 
 "Contribution is an equitable doctrine, and the right to it 
arises when one has paid more than his just proportion of a 
joint liability."  Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. 354, 358, 244 N.W. 
633 (1933).  In 1962, this court established the rule governing 
contribution that operates today: 
 
[W]e conclude the amount of liability for contribution 
of tort feasors who sustain a common liability by 
reason of causal negligence should be determined in 
proportion to the percentage of causal negligence 
attributable to each.  We make it plain at the outset 
that this refinement of the rule of contribution does 
not apply to or change the plaintiff's right to 
recover against any defendant tort feasor the total 
amount of his damage to which he is entitled.  
Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 6. 
¶13 Even though this court has held that contribution does 
not affect joint and several liability, the court has been 
repeatedly asked to modify joint and several liability to 
conform to contribution.  However, the court has rejected these 
requests and imposed joint and several liability even though the 
party's proportionate share of liability was less than another 
defendant's.  See Chille v. Howell, 34 Wis. 2d 491, 500, 149 
N.W.2d 600 (1967) (joint and several liability applied to a 
driver 
whose 
causal 
negligence 
was 
only 
20%); 
see 
also 
Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321, 331, 
227 N.W.2d 444 (1975) (joint and several liability applied to a 
defendant whose share of liability was only 30%).      
¶14 The legislature's amendment of Wis. Stat. § 895.045, 
however, significantly changed joint and several liability.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
11
Assuming that the plaintiff is not negligent, that plaintiff can 
still recover all of his or her damages from one of two more 
joint tortfeasors so long as one is found to be 51% or more 
causally negligent.  But a plaintiff can no longer recover all 
of his or her damages from that same tortfeasor if that 
tortfeasor is found to be less than 51% causally negligent.  
1995 Wisconsin Act 17, in amending § 895.045, thus limits a 
plaintiff's recovery from that tortfeasor found 51% or less 
causally negligent to that portion of the total negligence that 
is attributed to that tortfeasor.9  Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  The 
issue before us today is the effect of applying the amended 
§ 895.045(1) to Matthies' claim of negligence. 
III 
¶15 Whether a statute has a retroactive effect upon 
Matthies' negligence claim "involves the construction of a 
statute [Wis. Stat. § 895.045] in relation to a particular set 
of facts and is thus a question of law" which this court reviews 
de novo.  Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 401 N.W.2d 568 
(1987) (citing State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 24, 381 N.W.2d 
300 (1986)).  Legislation presumably operates prospectively, not 
retroactively, "unless the statutory language reveals by express 
language or necessary implication an intent that it apply 
retroactively."  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 180. 
                     
9 Obviously, since the amendment of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), 
only one causally negligent defendant can be held jointly and 
severally liable for all of the plaintiff's damages, because 
only one such defendant can be found 51% or more negligent.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
12
¶16 It is evident from the legislature's express language 
that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) apply 
retroactively.  According to 1995 Wisconsin Act 17, § 895.045(1) 
"first applies to civil actions commenced on the effective date 
of this subsection."  1995 Wis. Act 17, § 4.  We examined this 
same language in Neiman v. American National Property and 
Casualty Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶¶1, 11, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 
160.  This language was used in 1997 Wisconsin Act 89, § 4, 
which enacted new limits on recovery in wrongful death actions, 
and, of it, we stated, "this language indicates that the 
legislature intended to include within the scope of the 
amendment those claims in which the events giving rise to a 
cause of action had already occurred.  See Martin, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 200 (phrase 'filed on or after' in a legislative act 
indicated the legislature's intent to apply the new law 
retroactively)."  Id. at ¶11. 
¶17 Here, the language in 1995 Wis. Act 17 that it first 
applies to actions commenced on its effective date, indicates 
that Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) is also intended to apply to events 
which occurred before it became effective.  1995 Wisconsin Act 
17 first became effective on May 17, 1995, the day after the 
publication date.  Wis. Stat. § 991.11 (1993-94).  A civil 
action must accrue before it can be commenced; and, a civil 
action is not commenced until a summons and complaint is filed 
with the court.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 200; Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.02.  For § 895.045(1) to apply to an action filed on the 
date it becomes effective, events leading to the accrual of the 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
13
action must have occurred previously.  Section 895.045(1) thus 
applies to actions that have accrued prior to its enactment.  
Neiman, 2000 WI 83, ¶11; Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 199-200.  By its 
express 
language, 
the 
legislature 
plainly 
intended 
that 
§ 895.045(1) be given retroactive effect.    
¶18 Also, the "legislative history suggests that the 
legislature deliberately chose this retroactive application." 
Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 200.  The original legislation, 1995 
Senate Bill 11, § 4, included the adopted language, that Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045(1) was to be initially applied to actions 
commenced on its effective date.  However, the Assembly 
Judiciary Committee offered two amendments to change the 
effective date.  One, Assembly Amendment 1 to 1995 Senate Bill 
11, sought to change the initial applicability to "acts or 
omissions occurring" on the effective date of the legislation.  
This amendment would have had § 895.045(1) apply to those 
actions which accrued on or after its effective date.  Another 
amendment, Assembly Amendment 2 to 1995 Senate Bill 11, would 
have had § 895.045(1) apply "on the first day of the 6th month 
beginning after publication."  Neither of these amendments were 
adopted, further indicating that the legislature specifically 
intended § 895.045(1) to apply to actions which accrued prior to 
its enactment.  See Bill History for 1995 Senate Bill 11. 
¶19 In addition to determining whether the legislature 
intended Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) to apply retroactively, we must 
also determine whether, as applied to Matthies' negligence 
claim, § 895.045(1) has a retroactive effect.  Martin, 192 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
14
Wis. 2d at 199; Neiman, 2000 WI 83, ¶14.  For example, we 
concluded that the legislation in Martin had "a retroactive 
effect as applied to the Martins."  192 Wis. 2d at 199.  In 
Martin, Cheryl Martin was injured on July 10, 1985 when she ran 
into the back of a truck while riding her bicycle.  Id. at 163. 
 Her injury was aggravated the same day when her father "was not 
properly informed of the alternate modes of treatment available 
to treat [her] injuries."  Id. at 196.  At the time of Ms. 
Martin's injury, there was no limit to the amount of noneconomic 
damages a plaintiff could recover in a medical malpractice 
action.  Id. at 196-97.  Almost a year later, on June 13, 1986, 
the legislature enacted a cap on such damages of $1,000,000; the 
cap became effective the following day.  Id.  The Martins 
subsequently filed a medical malpractice action; and, in August 
1990, a jury awarded the Martins $2,150,000 in noneconomic 
damages.  Id. at 197.  We concluded that applying the cap to the 
Martins' award would have changed what they would have recovered 
under the law that existed at the time of the accident.  "Since 
the cause of action accrued at a time when no cap existed on the 
amount of noneconomic damages recoverable, application of the 
cap to the Martins' cause of action constitutes a retroactive 
application.  If we allowed the cap, it would act here to limit 
the recovery of a cause of action which, when it accrued, was 
unlimited."  Id. at 199. 
¶20 In Neiman, the statutory change after the claim at 
issue 
arose 
affected 
the 
defendant's 
liability, 
not 
the 
plaintiff's recovery.  At the time of the accident which caused 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
15
Kristine Neiman's child to be stillborn, Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
limited damages for the loss of society and companionship of a 
minor child in a wrongful death action to $150,000.  Neiman, 
2000 WI 83, ¶1.  In 1997, the legislature increased the limit to 
$500,000.  Id.  This court concluded that the statutory change 
had a retroactive effect as applied to the defendant.  That is, 
the insurer, American National Property and Casualty Company 
(ANPAC), had a right to a fixed exposure to liability that 
accrued on the date of the injury which would be adversely 
affected 
by 
retroactive 
application 
of 
the 
change 
to 
§ 895.04(4).  Id. at ¶20. 
¶21 Matthies contends that he has an accrued or vested 
right to recover all of his damages from any defendant that may 
be jointly and severally liable for his injuries, including 
Positive Safety, and applying Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1)'s change 
to joint and several liability may limit his recovery.  Positive 
Safety contends to the contrarythat Matthies' right to recovery 
does not vest or accrue until there has been a judgment in his 
favor, and that Matthies has no vested or accrued right in a 
particular remedy, in collecting on a judgment until it's final, 
in collecting from an immune or insolvent defendant, or, in 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
16
collecting from Positive Safety at all.10  Here, there was no 
fixed statutory limit upon exposure to liability as in Neiman, 
2000 WI 83, ¶20, or no statutory right to unlimited damages, as 
in Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 206-07.  Nonetheless, we disagree with 
Positive Safety's contentions.  Matthies does have a vested 
right to recover all of his damages that are adjudged due to him 
from any defendant that may be jointly and severally liable for 
his injuries.   
¶22 Matthies 
has 
a 
vested 
right 
in 
his 
claim 
for 
negligence.  "[A]n existing right of action which has accrued 
under the rules of the common law or in accordance with its 
principles is a vested property right."  Hunter v. School Dist. 
Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 445, 293 N.W.2d 515 
                     
10 Since joint and several liability relates to the extent 
of Positive Safety's liability, and not the existence of that 
liability, the court's determination of the effect of applying 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) could be considered premature.  See 
Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 185, 290 N.W.2d 
276 
(1980) 
(cross-claim 
for 
contribution 
premature 
when 
underlying negligence had not yet been determined).  However, 
there is no dispute that Positive Safety, if found liable, will 
either be liable for the entire amount of Matthies' damages or 
that portion allocated to Positive Safety if found less than 51% 
causally negligent, given Mirro-Foley's immunity as Matthies' 
employer, and taking into account, if necessary, Matthies' 
settlement proceeds.  Accordingly, inasmuch as the issue of 
retroactivity was appropriate for a declaratory order, the issue 
is 
appropriate 
for 
our 
consideration 
in 
reviewing 
the 
declaratory order. "Courts of record within their respective 
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could 
be claimed."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
17
(1980) (quoting 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 254 (1956)).11  
Matthies' negligence claim accrued on the date of his accident 
and injury.  "It is the fact and date of injury that sets in 
force and operation the factors that create and establish the 
basis for a claim of damages."  Id. at 442.  Contrary to 
Positive Safety's assertion, it is the date of injury which is 
the triggering event with respect to the application of Wis. 
                     
11 In Hunter, "this court concluded that an amended statute 
of limitations could not work to bar a plaintiff's cause of 
action for negligence which accrued prior to the statutory 
amendment.  The court in Hunter reasoned that the plaintiff had 
a vested right in a cause of action for negligence and that 
retroactive application of the amended statute of limitation 
would 'have the effect of destroying or terminating that 
right.'"  Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 205-06, 531 
N.W.2d 70 (1995) (quoting Hunter v. School Dist. Gale-Ettrick-
Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 441, 293 N.W.2d 515 (1980)).  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
18
Stat. § 895.045(1)the date that Matthies' claim accrued.12  
Included in Matthies' negligence claim is the right to recover 
                     
12 In cases concerning the past two major legislative 
changes to comparative negligence, this court measured whether 
those changes had retroactive effect based upon when the 
negligence claim accrued, i.e., when the accident and injury 
occurred. 
 
When, 
in 
1931, 
the 
legislature 
eradicated 
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery, Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045's predecessor, § 331.045, was to "take effect 
upon passage and publication," on June 16, 1931.  § 2, ch. 242, 
Laws of 1931.  Section 331.045 could have had retroactive effect 
by applying to an action that had already accruedwhere there 
had been an injury and accidentbut had not yet been tried as of 
June 16, 1931.  However, this court held that § 331.045 did not 
apply to actions which accrued prior to June 16, 1931.  
"Although sec. 331.045, Stats. 1931, relating to comparative 
negligence, changed the rule as to the effect of contributory 
negligence as a defense, that modification of the rule is not 
applicable in actions to recover for injuries sustained prior to 
June 16, 1931."  Peters v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 217 Wis. 
481, 486, 259 N.W. 724 (1935); see also Obenberger v. Interstate 
Oil Co., 211 Wis. 245, 246, 248 N.W. 97 (1933) ("The collision 
occurred prior to the enactment of the comparative negligence 
statute by the 1931 legislature, so that contributory negligence 
is an absolute bar."); Brewster v. Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 346, 
247 N.W. 449 (1933) (Plaintiff's negligence "constitutes a 
complete defense, as the collision occurred before the enactment 
of the Comparative Negligence Statute.").   
Similarly, when the legislature again modified contributory 
negligence in 1971, similar to the 1931 legislation, the 1971 
modification took effect on the day after it was published.  See 
1971 Assembly Bill 50 (which was enacted as ch. 47, Laws of 
1971).  The court again held that the modification was not 
retroactive, i.e., it did not apply to actions that had accrued 
prior to the amendment.  Holzem v. Mueller, 54 Wis. 2d 388, 398, 
195 N.W.2d 635 (1972).  This court has repeatedly rejected the 
contention that changes to contributory negligence lawwhich 
necessarily affect a plaintiff's recoveryshould apply after the 
accident or injury that gave rise to the plaintiff's negligence 
claim.  At no time has this court considered that these changes 
should apply at the point in time Positive Safety suggests, that 
is, after a plaintiff has obtained a judgment.    
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
19
under an unmodified doctrine of joint and several liability 
since, at the time Matthies' claim accrued, common law imposed 
joint and several liability upon any jointly liable person.  
See, e.g., Ford, Bacon & Davis, 96 Wis. 2d at 331-34.   
¶23 Matthies' right to recover those damages adjudged due 
to him under joint and several liability would be affected by 
retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  Section 
895.045(1) is retroactive for the reasons already stated herein. 
 Additionally, § 895.045(1) is retroactive because it attaches 
new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. 
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987).  
 
"Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or 
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or 
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions 
or considerations already passed, must be deemed 
retrospective."    
Welch v. 
Henry, 223 Wis. 319, 340, 
271 
N.W. 
68 
(1937) 
(Fairchild, J., dissenting) (quoting Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel v. Wheeler, Fed. Cas. No. 13,156, 2 Gall. *105, 
139).  Section 895.045(1) attaches new legal consequences to 
Matthies' injury.  At the time that Matthies' cause of action 
accruedon August 22, 1992 when he was injuredMatthies could 
recover, assuming no negligence on his part, all of his damages 
from any causally negligent tortfeasor regardless of what 
portion of the total causal negligence is ultimately attributed 
to that tortfeasor.  If § 895.045(1) were to apply to his 
negligence claim, Matthies could not recover all of his damages 
from any tortfeasor who is less than 51% causally negligent, as 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
20
he could previously.  Section  895.045 thus attaches a new 
disability to Matthies' negligence claim.   
¶24 Matthies' right to recover those damages adjudged due 
to him is impaired notwithstanding consideration of insolvent or 
immune individuals or entities which may also be jointly and 
severally liable, contrary to Positive Safety's contention.13  
Granted, Matthies cannot recover any damages from his employer, 
Mirro-Foley, nor can Positive Safety recover from Mirro-Foley 
any damages paid to Matthies' under a right to contribution 
since workers' compensation is "the exclusive remedy against the 
employer."  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  (We have described the 
effect of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) as "immunity."  See Mulder v. 
Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 175, 290 N.W.2d 276 
(1980)).  However, whether another jointly and severally liable 
person is immune or insolvent has no impact upon determining the 
retroactive effect of § 895.045(1).  A plaintiff's right to 
recovery is no less effected by retroactive application of 
§ 895.045(1) if the plaintiff is injured in a multi-car accident 
instead of on the job.   
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(1) would have retroactive 
effect if it were applied to Matthies' negligence claim because 
                     
13 Positive Safety also contends both in its briefs and at 
oral argument that even before the amendment to Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1), common law required the jury to consider and 
allocate the relative negligence of all causally negligent 
entities, regardless of whether or not those entities are 
parties.  However, Matthies does not dispute this, and, 
accordingly, we do not address Positive Safety's arguments on 
that matter.   
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
21
it would impair his right to recover all of his damages adjudged 
due to him from any defendant found causally negligent for his 
injuries, provided that Matthies' negligence is not found to be 
greater than that defendant's.  We thus find that § 895.045(1) 
has retroactive effect here.  We also find that the legislature 
expressly intended § 895.045(1) to apply retroactively.  Given 
the retroactive operation of § 895.045(1), we next consider 
whether such retroactivity is constitutional.  
IV 
¶26 "Retroactive 
legislation 
enjoys 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality, and the challenger bears the burden of 
overcoming that presumption."14  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 200.  
That burden is demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the 
legislation beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Benson, 218 
Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998).  Notwithstanding that 
heavy burden,  
 
because 
retroactive 
legislation 
presents 
unique 
constitutional problems in that it often unsettles 
important rights, it is viewed with some degree of 
suspicion and must be analyzed within a framework 
different from that of prospective legislation. "The 
[retroactive] aspects of legislation, as well as the 
prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not 
suffice for the former."  
                     
14 "Whether 
or 
not 
a 
legislative 
act 
that 
applies 
retroactively violates due process is a question of law, which 
this court reviews de novo."  Neiman v. Am. Nat'l Prop. and Cas. 
Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶8, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160 (citing 
Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 184, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987)).  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
22
Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976)).  Accordingly, we look first 
to whether Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1), as applied retroactively, 
meets the test of due process.15 
¶27 That Matthies has a vested property right which has 
been substantially impaired by retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) 
"is 
not 
dispositive 
for 
due 
process 
purposes.  . . . Having concluded that the statute retroactively 
affects a substantive right that accrued before the passage of 
the legislation, we then proceed to apply the balancing test set 
forth in Martin."  Neiman, 2000 WI 83, ¶14.  The Martin  test 
examines whether there is a rational basis for the retroactive 
application of the statute.  Id. at ¶9.  Whether there exists a 
rational basis involves weighing the public interest served by 
retroactively applying the statute against the private interest 
that retroactive application of the statute would affect.  
Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201. "Implicit within this analysis is a 
consideration of the unfairness created by the retroactive 
legislation."  Id. 
                     
15 Due process is a right guaranteed by the United States 
and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides: "All people are born equally 
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among 
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure 
these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed."  This due process 
clause is substantially equivalent to its counterpart in the 
federal constitution.  Neiman, 2000 WI 83, ¶8.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent 
part that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."    
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
23
 ¶28 In Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201-12, we examined whether 
retroactive application of the cap on noneconomic damages in 
medical 
malpractice 
actions 
violated 
due 
process. 
 
The 
defendants contended that retroactive application was warranted 
by increased medical malpractice costs incurred by defending 
medical malpractice actions and increased awards.  Id. at 202-
03.  However, the evidence indicated that few persons recover 
noneconomic damages in excess of $1,000,000.  Id. at 203-04.  
Consequently, applying the cap retroactively would have no real 
impact upon future malpractice costs, including malpractice 
insurance 
costs 
and 
funds 
available 
in 
the 
Patients' 
Compensation Fund.  Id. at 203-05.   
¶29 On the other side of the equation, retroactive 
application of the damages cap had a profound effect upon the 
private interest at issue, namely, the Martins' right to recover 
their actual noneconomic damages.  
 
In contrast, the Martins' right to unlimited damages 
was a fixed, substantive right.  If the cap is applied 
to the Martins the impairment of their right will be 
severe:  the Martins will lose $1,150,000 of their 
noneconomic damages.  Further, they will have had no 
meaningful notice of such impairment.  And, because of 
the seriousness nature of their injuries, they will be 
forced to help pay for "fixing" the system, while 
others less severely injured will not.  The taking is 
substantial; the unfairness is palpable. 
 
 
Accordingly, when we balance the public interest 
against the private interest affected here, keeping in 
mind basic considerations of fairness, we conclude 
that the private interest outweighs the minimal public 
interest served by the retroactive application of the 
cap. 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
24
Id. at 211.   
¶30 More recently, in Neiman, 2000 WI 83, ¶1, we examined 
the constitutionality of retroactively applying a statutory 
increase in recovery for the loss of society and companionship 
for wrongful death of a minor.  The private interests at issue 
included the settled expectations of those individuals and 
insurers who had obtained and provided coverage in relation to 
the amounts which were set by § 895.04(4) at the time of the 
injury.  Id. at ¶22.  In addressing such expectations, we 
stated: "[n]o  . . . pressure, economic or otherwise, appears to 
support the retroactive increase in damages for loss of society 
and companionship.  . . . In sum, the public interests served by 
retroactive application of the increase of wrongful death 
limitations 
do 
not 
support 
abrogation 
of 
the 
settled 
expectations that accrued at the time of the accident."  Id. at 
¶¶30, 31. 
¶31 With Neiman and Martin in mind, we turn to considering 
the public interest served by retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045(1) to Matthies' negligence claim.  "[T]he public 
purpose supporting retroactivity under a due process analysis 
must . . . be substantial, valid and intended to remedy a 
general economic or social issue."  Neiman, 2000 WI 83, ¶23.  
Indeed, where, as here, there is a substantial impairment of a 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
25
vested right, "a significant and legitimate public interest" 
must justify that impairment.  Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 188.16  
¶32 As an initial matter, we note that there is nothing in 
the Legislative Reference Bureau's legislative drafting file 
which 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature 
amended 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045 in response to a pressing, or otherwise, economic or 
social 
issue. 
 
The 
legislature 
considered 
a 
number 
of 
alternatives regarding 
joint 
and 
several liability 
before 
adopting the language that was enacted as 1995 Wis. Act 17.  The 
original legislation, 1995 Senate Bill 11, abrogated joint and 
several liability entirely.  "Under this bill, a joint tort-
feasor's liability is limited to the percentage of the total 
causal negligence attributed to that party."  Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau to 1995 Senate Bill 11 at 2.  
Subsequently, Senate Substitute Amendment 1 was offered and 
adopted, which read that "[t]he liability of each party found to 
be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 
less than 51% is limited to the percentage of the total causal 
negligence attributed to that party.  A party found to be 
causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% 
or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages 
                     
16 Regarding a contract clause challenge to a statutory 
modification of temporary total disability benefits, the court 
indicated that "[i]f the legislation constitutes a substantial 
impairment, there must exist a significant and legitimate public 
purpose behind the legislation. . . .  If the impairment is less 
than substantial, a diminished degree of scrutiny is required." 
 Chappy, 136 Wis. 2d at 188 (footnote omitted).  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
26
allowed."  Senate Substitute Amendment 1, to 1995 Senate Bill 11 
at 1-2.17  Before this language, as amended, was enacted as 
§ 895.045(1), the Senate considered abrogating joint and several 
liability where the person is 25% or less causally negligent, or 
alternatively, where the person is 49% or less causally 
negligent.  Senate Amendment 3, to Senate Substitute Amendment 
1, to 1995 Senate Bill 11; Senate Amendment 7, to Senate 
Substitute Amendment 1, to 1995 Senate Bill 11.  The Assembly 
considered another alternative, based upon a 15% limit provided 
that "the person's causal negligence is at least twice that of 
the causal negligence of the person recovering or the causal 
negligence of the person recovering is 0%, and only to the 
extent of the limits of any applicable insurance."  Assembly 
Substitute Amendment 1, to 1995 Senate Bill 11 at 2.  Evident 
from both the range of proposed changes and the final result, 
the legislature intended to modify the current common-law 
doctrine of joint and several liability.  But to determine, 
based on the legislative history available, what motivated the 
legislature to modify the doctrine, requires speculation.   
¶33 Positive Safety contends that the public interest 
served by Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1)'s modification of joint and 
several liability is fairnessapportioning liability according 
to the degree of causal negligence and thus paralleling the 
                     
17 Senate Amendment 1, to Senate Substitute Amendment 1, 
subsequently replaced "party" with "person."  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
27
legislative change from contributory to comparative negligence.18 
 However, as Positive Safety admits, "the modification of joint 
and several liability achieves the same important public goal as 
contribution, just by different means."  (Appellant's Initial 
Br. at 24.)  Yet, even after the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1), contribution remains a viable alternative to the 
legislature's modification of joint and several liability, 
whereby a joint tortfeasor can pursue other tortfeasors for 
reimbursement "in proportion to the percentage of causal 
negligence attributable to each."  Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 6.  
Long before the amendment to comparative negligenceover 75 
yearsthe 
doctrine 
of 
contribution 
ensured 
the 
equitable 
apportionment of fault among joint tortfeasors.  Ellis v. 
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).  
While Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) may have shifted, in part, the 
equitable apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors 
from a contribution action to a tort action, that shift does 
not, by itself, establish a public interest of fairness. 
¶34 Even 
if 
fairness 
were 
served 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(1), 
there 
is 
no 
need 
to 
apply 
§ 895.045(1) 
retroactively 
to 
ensure 
such 
fairness. 
 
The 
equitable 
apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors is ensured by 
contribution, 
when 
all 
such 
tortfeasors 
are 
collectible.  
                     
18 Positive Safety also refers to a number of out-of-state 
decisions to assert various public interests served by Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045(1).  We decline to regard those cases as 
authoritative in establishing a public interest here.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
28
Accordingly, while fairness may serve an interest of prospective 
application of § 895.045(1), it does not justify retroactive 
application thereof.  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201. 
¶35 Moreover, if the public interest served by Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) is to fairly allocate liability in proportion to 
that amount of negligence for which the person is causally 
negligent, the legislature would have abrogated joint and 
several liability entirely.  Even though the legislature 
initially considered that option, the legislature later rejected 
it.  See 1995 Senate Bill 11; see also Bill History for 1995 
Senate Bill 11.  Instead, the legislature adopted a partial 
abrogation of joint and several liability, under which a person 
who is 51% or more causally negligent could be liable for the 
entire amount of plaintiff's damages (minus any contributory 
negligence), regardless of the portion of the total negligence 
apportioned to that person.  1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1.   
¶36 Positive 
Safety 
also 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) serves a public interest of decreasing liability 
insurance costs and increasing the availability of liability 
insurance.  There is nothing in the record that supports such a 
conclusion, nor is there any indication that the legislature 
considered liability insurance costs or the availability thereof 
in drafting § 895.045(1).  More importantly, there is no 
evidence that liability insurance costs and availability turns 
upon whether the insured could be held partially liable, wholly 
liable, or jointly and severally liable.  What this court found 
in Martin also applies here:  "we . . . are familiar with the 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
29
generic reasons which are often cited for [limiting recovery].  
However, as stated above, there is little if any evidence in 
this record to support those assertions."  192 Wis. 2d at 205. 
¶37 Although there may be a public interest in fairness to 
warrant modification of joint and several liability, the same 
does 
not 
justify 
retroactive 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(1).  Rather, there is a public interest that is served 
by not applying that statute retroactively.  If § 895.045(1) 
could apply retroactively, such retroactive application could 
potentially affect cases that have been resolved by litigation 
or settlement, generating further, unnecessary, litigation.  In 
Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 157 
N.W.2d 595 (1968), we explained such effect of retroactively 
applying the change in the common law of contribution: 
 
The possibility of imposing an excessive burden on the 
administration of justice was a compelling judicial 
reason for the limitation placed on the retrospective 
application of this court's decision in [Bielski], 
which changed our contribution rule and discarded the 
concept of gross negligence. This is best described by 
former Mr. Justice Thomas E. Fairchild in his article 
in 46 Marquette L. Rev. 1, 15: 
 
"In 
Bielski the court 
limited 
the retrospective 
application of the change in law with respect to 
contribution and gross negligence. Here again were 
elements of law which are ordinarily not relied upon 
by people who are about to engage in tortious conduct. 
Yet the court was mindful of the fact that if full 
retrospective 
application 
were 
given, 
burdens 
of 
further litigation would 
probably 
be 
imposed on 
litigants and the public in cases where claims had 
been 
substantially disposed of by 
litigation or 
settlement.  Such burdens would seem to be wasteful."  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
30
Fitzgerald, 38 Wis. 2d at 577.19  We would not expect that, with 
any degree of frequency, cases would be reopened or there would 
be further litigation on cases already disposed of or settled.  
Nevertheless, the burdens of further litigation is another 
factor to consider in determining the public interest in 
retroactively applying a change in the law. 
                     
19 There is, however, an important distinction between 
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), and 
the case at hand as to what event would trigger retroactive 
application of the change in law.  In Bielski, this court 
refined the common law rule of contribution from "equal 
contribution" (three defendants pay one-third of the damages for 
which they are jointly and severally liable) to contribution 
based upon the amount of negligence assigned to each defendant 
(three defendants pay 15%, 35%, and 50%, respectively, of the 
damages according to the amount of negligence for which they are 
causally negligent).  Id. at 6-14.  The court determined that 
this modification applied at that point in time when the right 
to contribution typically arises, namely, when a tortfeasor has 
paid "more than his proportionate share."  Id. at 9.   
The new rules shall apply generally whether the cause 
of action has heretofore arisen or not except that 
they shall not apply in the following situations: (1) 
Where a judgment based upon the old rules has been 
entered and no motion to vacate it has been made or 
appeal taken before this date; (2) where verdicts have 
been rendered sufficient to dispose of the case under 
the former rules but where application of the new 
rules would require a new trial not required for other 
reasons; (3) when settlements have been effected with 
one 
co-tort-feasor 
in 
such 
manner 
as 
would 
sufficiently 
protect 
him 
from 
liability 
for 
contribution under the former rules. 
 
Id. at 19. 
 
Here, in contrast, the trigger, the right to recovery, 
arises at that point in time when that right accrues, i.e., at 
the time that the plaintiff is injured. Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 
199; Hunter, 97 Wis. 2d at 442.    
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
31
¶38 We next turn to the other side of the Martin balancing 
test, and consider the private interest which would be affected 
by the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  We 
keep in mind the basic unfairness of applying a rule that did 
not exist at the time that Matthies was injured.  See Martin, 
192 Wis. 2d at 201.   
¶39 Simply, the private interest affected is Matthies' 
right to recover all of his damages adjudged due to him from 
Positive Safety.  Here, as in Martin, a right of recovery that 
accrued on the date of injury has been substantially impaired by 
subsequent legislation.  192 Wis. 2d at 208-09.  In Martin, 
"[i]f applied, the cap on damages would retroactively impair 
that right [to recover, in full, the noneconomic damages awarded 
by the jury].  If the cap on damages were applied, the Martins 
would lose $1,150,000over half of their recovery.  This is a 
severe impairment of their rights."  Id. at 209.   
¶40 At the time that Matthies' claim accrued, Matthies 
could recover all of the damages may be awarded him from 
Positive Safety under the common law doctrine of joint and 
several liability if Positive Safety was found to be causally 
negligent.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045(1), applied retroactively, 
 would affect Matthies' vested right to recover all the damages 
awarded from Positive Safety.  If, at best, Positive Safety is 
found to be 50% causally negligent, Matthies will lose half of 
the damages to which he had been entitled to recover from 
Positive Safety as of the time his injury was incurred.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
32
Retroactive application of § 895.045(1) would thus substantially 
impair Matthies' negligence claim.  
¶41 "Our analysis also requires that we examine the 
fairness of the retroactive taking."  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 
209.  Here, as in Martin, the impairment of Matthies' right to 
recover those damages adjudged due to him is inherently unfair 
because Matthies had no real notice of the impending statutory 
impairment of that right.  In Martin, we said: 
 
The cap was published one day and it became law the 
next.  Without any meaningful notice, the Martins were 
stripped of their right to unlimited damages because 
they did not file on June 13, 1986, the day before the 
announced cap became effective . . . . 
Id.  Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) became effective the day 
after it was published.  1995 Wis. Act 17, § 4.  On May 16, 
1995, Matthies could recover all of his damages from Positive 
Safety; the next day, he could notunless, which, apparently, 
the parties agree may be unlikely, Positive Safety is found to 
be 51% or more causally negligent.20  
¶42 The lack of meaningful notice is also inherently 
unfair because Matthies had no notice that he should have filed 
this action on May 16, 1995, the date of publication, instead of 
May 17, 1995, or after.  However, another plaintiff who was 
injured after Matthies, but filed a negligence claim before, 
                     
20 Referring 
himself 
and 
Positive 
Safety's 
counsel, 
Matthies' counsel stated at oral argument that "we both 
recognized very clearly that this is a case where the employer 
may well be more than 51% at fault." 
  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
33
could 
fully 
recover 
(notwithstanding 
any 
contributory 
negligence) from any one of two or more joint tortfeasors.  The 
intrinsic unfairness in the lack of notice here bolsters the 
conclusion that the legislature typically enacts legislation to 
apply prospectively, rather than retroactively, so as to avoid 
disrupting settled expectations. 
 
Strong common-law tradition defines the legislature's 
primary function as declaring law to regulate future 
behavior.  Thus, as a matter of justice, no law should 
be enforced before people can learn of its existence 
and 
conduct 
themselves 
accordingly. 
 
In 
short, 
retroactivity 
disturbs 
the 
stability 
of 
past 
transactions. 
Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 293-94, 588 
N.W.2d 19 (1999) (quoting Employers Ins. v. Smith, 154 Wis. 2d 
199, 453 N.W.2d 856 (1990)). 
¶43 Here, the settled expectations are all on the side of 
Matthies.  The Martin balancing does not consider Positive 
Safety's private interest.  192 Wis. 2d at 210-211.  However, 
even if Positive Safety's interests were considered, Positive 
Safety had no interests that would be abrogated by retroactive 
application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  Unlike in Neiman, 
Positive Safety had no fixed exposure to liability as of the 
date of Matthies' injury, or no settled expectations of 
liability.  2000 WI 83, ¶¶20-22.  As of the time that Matthies' 
claim accrued, unmodified joint and several liability was the 
operative doctrine.  To apply the modified joint and several 
liability in § 895.045(1) would be a boon to Positive Safety.  
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
34
"This hardly befits notions of fundamental fairness."  Martin, 
192 Wis. 2d at 210.   
¶44 Now 
that 
the 
respective 
interests 
have 
been 
considered, the court balances them. 
 
Having considered the loss of rights incurred . . .  
and 
the 
unfair 
manner 
in 
which 
that 
loss 
was 
occasioned, we must engage in the due process analysis 
recited earlier to determine whether the retroactive 
application 
of 
[the 
statute 
at 
issue] 
is 
constitutional.  To restate that analysis, we must 
balance the public interest served by the retroactive 
application of the [statute at issue] against the 
private interests that are overturned by it, including 
any unfairness inherent in such application. 
Id. at 210-11. 
¶45 There is little in the balance on the side of a public 
interest served by retroactive application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1).  Contribution still operates to serve an asserted 
purpose of § 895.045(1) to ensure that one joint tortfeasor does 
not pay more than his or her portion of the total causal 
negligence.  There is no evidence that modification of joint and 
several liability would facilitate the acquisition of liability 
insurance, or reduce the cost thereof.  Nor is there any 
evidence that the legislature was faced with a pressing economic 
or 
social 
need 
to 
warrant 
retroactive 
application 
of 
§ 895.045(1).  
¶46 In contrast, retroactive application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) would severely impair Matthies' right to recover 
all of his damages adjudged due to him.  Joint and several 
liability applied to Positive Safety at the time that Matthies' 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
35
negligence claim accrued.  Yet, without any real notice, 
§ 895.045(1) was enacted, which would in effect, limit joint and 
several 
liability, 
and, 
as 
the 
parties 
predict, 
prevent 
Matthies' 
full recovery 
of 
his damages.  
At 
best, and 
disregarding the unique situation arising from the fact that he 
was injured at work (see § 102.03(2)), Matthies could lose half 
of his damages.  Where once Matthies was entitled to full 
recovery, 
that 
recovery 
will 
be 
limited 
to 
that 
causal 
negligence 
apportioned 
to 
Positive 
Safety, 
which 
may 
be 
considerably less than 50%.  It should be remembered that 
notwithstanding the legislature's modification of joint and 
several liability, the common law doctrine was originally 
adopted because, regardless of the fault attributed to any one 
of multiple joint tortfeasors, the injury or harm would not have 
occurred but for that tortfeasor's negligence.  See Ford, Bacon 
& Davis, 96 Wis. 2d at 331.  Here, "[t]he taking is substantial; 
the unfairness is palpable."  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 211.   
¶47 We find that Matthies has established beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
there 
is 
no 
rational 
basis 
for 
retroactively applying the partial abrogation of joint and 
several liability in Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) to his negligence 
claim.  Balancing the private interest against the public 
interest, we conclude that the substantial impairment of 
Matthies' right to recovery significantly outweighs the public 
interest, 
if 
any, 
served 
by 
retroactive 
application 
of 
§ 895.045(1).  Matthies was entitled to a full recovery of his 
damages at the time he was injured from any defendant found 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
36
causally negligent.  It would be unfair and violate due process 
to change that rule after the fact.  Accordingly, retroactive 
application of § 895.045(1)'s modification of joint and several 
liability is an unconstitutional violation of due process.21  We 
reiterate, though, that we find § 895.045(1) unconstitutional 
only as it applies retroactively.22 
V 
¶48 At the time that Matthies was injured by the punch 
press, there were no limits on his right to recover all of the 
damages adjudged due to him from any party found to be jointly 
and severally liable.  The enactment of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) 
impaired that right, which accrued to Matthies on the date he 
was injured.  In applying the Martin test to determine whether 
retroactive application of § 895.045(1) violates due process, we 
                     
21 Because we find that retroactive application of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.045(1) violates due process, we need not address 
Matthies' contention that such retroactive application violates 
the equal protection clauses of the United States and Wisconsin 
Constitutions 
and 
the 
remedies 
clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.   
22 We do not address amicus curiae Civil Trial Counsel of 
Wisconsin's contentions regarding the constitutionality of the 
prospective application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).  The 
arguments were made in response to Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers' amicus curiae brief filed with the court of appeals.  
The Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers did not repeat those 
arguments before this court, and instead, contended that "the 
constitutionality of applying the May 17, 1995 amendment to 
§ 895.045 to the facts of the case at bar ought to be resolved 
exclusively by determining that amendment's retroactive effect 
on the due process rights of Matthies."  (Initial Amicus Curiae 
Br. of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers at 2.)  We have 
done just that. 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
37
conclude that any public interest served by that retroactive 
application is substantially outweighed by the impairment of 
Matthies' 
right 
to 
recover. 
 
We 
hold 
that 
retroactive 
application of § 895.045(1) to Matthies' negligence claim would 
be unconstitutional, and we thus affirm the circuit court.  
By the Court.— The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 
99-0431 
 
 
1