Title: DORR v. WYOMING BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DORR v. WYOMING BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS2001 WY 3721 P.3d 735Case Number: 00-145Decided: 04/11/2001
 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                        
April 11, 2001  

 

MARK A. 
DORR, CPA,

Appellant(Petitioner),

v.

THE 
WYOMING BOARD OF

CERTIFIED 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,

Appellee(Respondent).

  

W.R.A.P. 
1209(b) Certification from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Greg L. 
Goddard of Goddard, Perry & Vogel, Buffalo, WY.  Argument by Mr. Goddard.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Douglas 
W. Weaver, Special Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Weaver.

 Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

             
HILL, Justice.

[¶1]      Mark A. Dorr 
(Dorr) appeals from a decision of the Wyoming Board of Certified Public 
Accountants (the Board) suspending his license to practice for one hundred 
days.  We conclude that the record 
does not contain clear and convincing evidence that Dorr violated Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 33-3-119 or 33-3-121(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999).  Therefore, we vacate the Board's order 
suspending Dorr's license.

 

[¶2]      Dorr presents the 
following issues for our consideration:

1.      
Did the 
Board properly find that Mark A. Dorr had violated Wyoming Statute §33-3-119 by 
having an office that was advertised as an office of a certified public 
accountant which was neither registered with the Board nor under direct 
supervision of a resident manager?

 

a.      
Did the 
evidence support the Board's findings?

 

b.      
Is 
Wyoming Statute §33-3-119 constitutional?

 

2.      
Did the 
evidence support the Board's finding that Mark A. Dorr violated Wyoming Statute 
§33-3-121(a)(ii) by committing dishonesty in the practice of public 
accounting?

 

3.      
Was the 
Board's designated investigator of Mark A. Dorr one David Kreycik exempt from 
being deposed by Mark A. Dorr?

 

4.      
Should 
the assistant attorney general in this matter have acted as both prosecutor and 
legal advisor to the Board?

 

The 
Board restates the issues differently:

1.                  
Is W.S. 
§33-3-119 (LEXIS 1999) constitutional?

 

2.                  
Was 
there sufficient evidence to find that Dorr had violated W.S. §33-3-119 (LEXIS 
1999)?

 

3.                  
Was 
there sufficient evidence to find that Dorr committed dishonesty in the practice 
of public accounting and as such violated W.S. §33-3-121(a)(ii) (LEXIS 
1999)?

 

4.                  
Was W.S. 
§16-3-107(k) (LEXIS 1999) violated?

 

5.                  
Was the 
Hearing Officer correct when he granted David Kreycik's Motion to Quash 
Subpoena?

 

FACTS

[¶3]      On January 22, 
1999, the Board filed a Complaint against Dorr alleging that he had failed to: 
(1) complete two audits and a tax return; (2) properly represent his fees for an 
audit; (3) complete a peer review as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-121; and 
(4) have a resident manager for an office represented as a certified public 
accounting firm as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-119.  The parties resolved the Complaint 
through a Settlement Agreement and Stipulation (the Settlement Agreement), which 
was accepted by the Board on May 5, 1999.  
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Dorr did not admit to any 
wrongdoing but he agreed to be bound by the following 
conditions:

 

13.       As of the 
date of this agreement, Dorr agrees to limit the scope of his practice to 
exclude all audits.  Prior to 
re-entry into audit practice, Dorr agrees to petition the Board for approval and 
agrees to a review of a post agreement audit engagement by a firm approved by 
the Board's representative.  This 
review is to demonstrate to the Board the [sic] Dorr is competent to 
perform audits.  The scope of the 
review is to be a "pre-issuance" review, the requirements of which are less in 
scope and magnitude than a peer review.  
Dorr further agrees to reimburse the Board for the costs associated with 
this review.  Should Dorr re-enter 
the audit practice, he further agrees to undergo peer review in compliance with 
the Board Rules and Regulations.

 

14.       Dorr shall 
fully comply with the Certified Public Accountant's Act of 1975, and the Board's 
administrative rules and regulations.  
Specifically, Dorr shall fully comply with Wyo. Stat. § 
33-3-119.

 

15.       Dorr agrees 
that the Board shall retain continuing jurisdiction over him to take further 
action as may be necessary to conclude this matter.

 

[¶4]      In June of 1999, 
Dorr was contacted by the Wyoming Beef Council to perform an audit.  Dorr filed a letter with the Board 
requesting permission to conduct the audit and initiate the process of a 
"pre-issuance" review of that audit as required by the Settlement 
Agreement.  At that time, Dorr did 
not inform the Beef Council of the restrictions imposed on his ability to 
perform audits by the Settlement Agreement.  A hearing was held on the matter on 
September 21, 1999.  During the 
hearing, Dorr amended his request to substitute an audit for the Sixth Judicial 
District Child Support Authority instead of the Beef Council.  The Board approved Dorr's request and 
allowed him to perform the audit.

 

[¶5]      On October 6, 
1999, the Board issued a Notice of Hearing to determine whether Dorr had 
complied with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.  Specifically, the Board noted that there 
were two allegations of non-compliance against Dorr.  First, it was asserted that Dorr had not 
retained a resident manager for his Cheyenne office.  Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement 
required Dorr to comply with the provisions of § 33-3-119, which requires all 
offices that advertise to the public as providing certified public accounting 
services to have a registered resident office manager.  Second, it was alleged that Dorr had 
given deceitful testimony during the September 21, 1999, hearing on his request 
to remove the audit restriction imposed by the Settlement Agreement.  The bases of the allegation was that 
Dorr had engaged in fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate or a permit in 
violation of § 33-3-121(a)(i) and had engaged in the dishonest practice of 
public accounting in violation of § 33-3-121(a)(ii) when he failed to disclose 
his restricted audit ability pursuant to the Settlement Agreement at the time he 
was tendered an engagement contract to perform an audit by the Beef 
Council.  

 

[¶6]      Prior to the 
hearing on the new allegations, Dorr attempted to take the deposition of Board 
member David J. Kreycik.  The 
Assistant Attorney General for the Board filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena of 
David J. Kreycik pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(h) (LEXIS 1999).  The Board, acting through the hearing 
officer assigned to the matter, granted the motion to Quash on the basis that 
Kreycik, as a member of the presiding agency, was not subject to being compelled 
to give testimony or a deposition under § 16-3-107(h).

 

[¶7]      A hearing was 
held before the Board and the hearing examiner on February 3, 2000. The hearing 
examiner made the following findings of fact and conclusions of 
law:

 

8.                  
On or 
about October 6, 1999, a Notice of Hearing was filed against Mr. Dorr, 
alleging several violations of Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement. 
Specifically, it was alleged that Mr. Dorr had violated Paragraph 14 
by:

A)                
Advertising 
an office offering certified public accounting services to the public, without 
having a resident manager at that location, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
§33-3-119;

B)                
Engaging 
in deceit in obtaining a certificate or permit to practice as a certified public 
accountant, in violation of Wyo. Stat. §33-3-121(a)(i); 
and

C)                
Dishonestly 
practicing public accounting, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
§33-3-121(a)(ii).

9.                  
After 
the date that the Settlement Agreement was entered into, Mr. Dorr, as the 
"CPA Network, Dorr and Associates", had established and maintained an office at 
1920 Thomes Avenue, Suite 110, Cheyenne, Wyoming (Office), offering certified 
public accounting services to the public.

10.             
That 
Office was advertised as offering certified public accounting services 
by:

A)                
A 
listing upon the building directory until August 26, 1999;

B)                
A sign1 posted upon the office door 
stating, "CPA Network now available on an appointment basis. If no one is in 
please call 635-8000 or out of Cheyenne call toll-free 1-877-579-8080. My 
apologies for any inconvenience. Mark A. Dorr, CPA"; 
and

C)                
Having 
informational pamphlets available for public access within the 
Office.

11.             
That 
Office was established and maintained as an office offering certified public 
accounting services as indicated by:

A)                
Its 
advertising;

B)                
Its 
receiving business mail at the address;

C)                
Its 
interacting with clients at the address. Specifically, Pat Swan, Executive 
Director of the Wyoming Beef Council, visited that Office on July 8, 1999, to 
conduct business with Mr. Dorr.

D)                
A 
Certificate of Organization for DORR, BENTLY & PECHA, THE CPA NETWORK, LLC 
filed with the Wyoming Secretary of State. That Certificate indicates that the 
LLC's business is that of "...the practice of accountancy in the State of 
Wyoming in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants..." and lists its principal 
place of business as 1920 Thomes, Suite 110 Cheyenne, WY 
82001.

12.             
After 
the date that the Settlement Agreement was entered into, the Office was 
not registered with the Board.

13.             
After 
the date that the Settlement Agreement was entered into, the Office was 
not under the direct supervision of a resident manager who served in that 
capacity for only one office.

14.             
In a 
previous hearing conducted by the Board, on September 21, 1999, wherein Mr. Dorr 
was the respondent, he testified under oath that:

A)                
"[s]hortly 
after" June of 1999, he contacted the Wyoming Beef Council and informed it of 
his restricted licensure status;

B)                
He owned 
1% share of the firm known as Dorr, Bentley and Pecha; and

C)                
His firm 
withdrew from certain audit engagements.2

15.             
On June 
15, 1999, Pat Swan, Executive Director of the Wyoming Beef Council, telephoned 
Mr. Dorr to inform him that the Beef Council had again approved of a contract 
extension for his firm to conduct its audit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1999. At or about that time, Mr. Dorr did not inform the client, Beef Council, 
that he could not perform the audit because of the restriction placed on his 
scope of practice by the Settlement Agreement and Board 
Order.

16.             
On June 
22, 1999, the Beef Council sent an audit engagement contract to Mr. Dorr, along 
with a letter.  At or about that 
time, Mr. Dorr did not inform the client, Beef Council, that he could not 
perform the audit because of the restriction placed on his scope of practice by 
the Settlement Agreement and Board Order.

17.             
On or 
about July 8, 1999, an agent of Mr. Dorr's office telephoned the Beef Council 
and informed Pat Swan that the audit contract sent to Mr. Dorr included some 
typographical errors in dates.  Ms. 
Swan retyped the audit contract and personally delivered it to Mr. Dorr's Office 
the same day.  At or about that 
time, Mr. Dorr did not inform the client, Beef Council, that he could not 
perform the audit because of the restriction placed on his scope of practice by 
the Settlement Agreement and Board Order.

18.             
On 
August 5, 1999, Mr. Dorr personally initiated a telephone call to Pat Swan at 
the Beef Council.  Ms. Swan returned 
that telephone call on August 6, 1999.  
Mr. Dorr was inquiring what date he could begin performing field work for 
the requested audit.  Because 
additional reports had to be obtained by the Beef Council, the audit field work 
could not start until later.  Mr. 
Dorr indicated that he would call the following week to set up a time to begin 
the audit field work.  At or about 
that time, Mr. Dorr did not inform the client, Beef Council, that he could not 
perform the audit because of the restriction placed on his scope of practice by 
the Settlement Agreement and Board Order.

19.             
On 
August 30, 1999, Mr. Dorr visited the Beef Council and informed Pat Swan that he 
was scheduled for a hearing before the Board concerning a complaint from the 
City of Douglas.  He indicated that 
he believed he could still perform the audit.  But, if he could not, he would assist 
the Beef Council in selecting another firm or in any other way.  At or about that time, Mr. Dorr did not 
inform the client, Beef Council, that he could not perform the audit because of 
the restriction placed on his scope of practice by the Settlement 
Agreement and Board Order.

20.             
During 
Mr. Dorr's entire dealings with Ms. Swan and the Beef Council, he intentionally 
failed to inform them concerning his restricted practice.  He told Ms. Swan that he believed 
everything was fine.  During this 
time he was restricted from any and all audit practice.

 

Conclusions 
of Law

 

. . . 
.

 

3.                  
Mr. Dorr 
has violated Wyo. Stat. §33-3-119, as established by his actions set forth in 
Findings of Fact 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, above.  He was responsible for the Office 
maintained, established and located at 1920 Thomes Avenue[,] Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  The Office was advertised 
as an office of a certified public accountant which was not registered with the 
Board or which was not under direct supervision of a resident manager, serving 
in that capacity at one office only.

4.                  
Wyo. 
Stat. §33-3-119 prohibits Mr. Dorr from serving as the resident manager of two 
separate offices located in Gillette and Cheyenne.

5.                  
There is 
no evidence in the record to hold that Mr. Dorr violated Wyo. Stat. 
§33-3-121(a)(i).  At no time 
relevant to these matters, was Mr. Dorr seeking to obtain a certificate or 
permit to practice.  Therefore, he 
could not have committed any fraud or deceit in connection therewith, regardless 
of the veracity of his testimony offered at the September 21, 1999, 
hearing.

6.                  
Mr. Dorr 
has violated Wyo. Stat. §33-3-121(a)(ii), by committing dishonesty in the 
practice of public accounting.  That 
conclusion is established by his actions set forth in Findings of Fact 5, 14, 
15, 16, 17 and 18, above.

7.                  
At no 
time did Mr. Dorr inform the Beef Council that he was prohibited from performing 
any audit because of a restriction placed upon his scope of practice.  He instead continued to lead the Beef 
Council into believing that he could and would be conducting the requested 
audit.  Mr. Dorr even initiated 
contact with the Beef Council on August 5, 1999, to further secure the audit 
work.

8.                  
Discussing 
a specific audit with the Beef Council, including an attempt to schedule field 
work, is audit practice.  We find 
that Mr. Dorr was conducting audit practice with the Beef Council, without 
informing it that he was prohibited from doing so.

9.                  
We 
conclude that Mr. Dorr's actions relating to the Beef Council audit, separately 
or collectively is dishonest conduct in the practice of public 
accounting.

10.             
Because 
Mr. Dorr has violated Wyo. Stat. §33-3-119 and/or §33-3-121(a)(ii), he has 
violated both Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement and Paragraph 3 of 
the Board Order.

11.             
The 
violations set forth, concluded and found herein, either separately or 
collectively, are grounds for discipline by the Board against the permit and/or 
certificate to practice held by Mr. Dorr, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §33-3-119; Wyo. 
Stat. §33-3-121(a)(ii); the Settlement Agreement; and/or the Board 
Order.

 

The 
Board suspended Dorr's license to practice public accounting for one hundred 
days.  Dorr appealed to the district 
court, which has certified the matter to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶8]      The Certified 
Public Accountant's Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-3-101 through 33-3-132 (LEXIS 
1999)) provides for judicial review of Board disciplinary proceedings pursuant 
to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-123 (LEXIS 
1999).  The standards for judicial 
review of agency action are set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 
1999):

 

(c)               
To the 
extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i)     Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii)   Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A)        
Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)        
Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)    In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)       
Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E)     Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

A 
disciplinary proceeding before a licensing board is an adversary proceeding 
where the burden is on the complaining party to present its case in a proper 
manner and to state with precision the charges against the licensee.  Devous v. Board of Medical 
Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 416 (Wyo. 1993).  Those charges must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939-40 (Wyo. 2000).  We have 
defined clear and convincing evidence to be the "kind of proof which would 
persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 
Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 291 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting MacGuire v. 
Harriscope Broadcasting Company, 612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 
1980)).

 

[¶9]      The 
interpretation of statutory language is necessary to our resolution of this 
case:

"We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent. We 
begin by making  "an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the 
words employed according to their arrangement and connection." ' 
* * *"

            
* * * "When the court determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, it must give effect to the plain language of the statute 
and should not resort to the rules of statutory construction." * * * If, on the 
other hand, the Court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use 
extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation to help it determine the 
legislature's intent.

 

Steele 
v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Basin Electric 
Power Co-Op. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo. 1999)).

 

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   Paragraph 14 of the Settlement 
Agreement required Dorr to comply with the provisions of § 33-3-119, which 
provides:

 

Each 
office of a certified public accountant established or maintained in Wyoming for 
the practice of public accounting which is advertised as an office of a 
certified public accountant shall be registered annually with the board.  No fee shall be charged for the 
registration of offices.  Each 
office shall be under the direct supervision of a resident manager who holds a 
permit.  The resident manager may 
serve in that capacity at one (1) office only.  The board shall by regulation prescribe 
the procedure to be followed in effecting these 
registrations.

 

The 
statute effectively defines what constitutes an "office" of a certified public 
accountant.  If an office is 
established or maintained in this state for the practice of public accounting 
and is advertised as an office of a certified public 
accountant, then the office must be registered annually with the Board.  The statute also requires each office to 
be under the direct supervision of a permitted resident manager.  Thus, a certified public accountant may 
own or lease physical office space in a building, but that would only constitute 
an "office" for purposes of § 33-3-119 if it were advertised as the office of a 
certified public accountant.  
Therefore, the dual requirements of the statute, annual registration, and 
direct supervision by a resident manager, are dependent on whether the office 
was "advertised."

 

[¶11]   There is no question here that Dorr 
had physical office space in Cheyenne, although all mail and phone calls 
received at that office were forwarded to Dorr's Gillette office.  There is also no question that the 
Cheyenne office was not registered with the Board, and there was no resident 
manager.  The question is whether 
that physical office was an "office" of a certified public accountant as set 
forth in § 33-3-119, and the resolution of that issue hinges on whether Dorr 
advertised the office.  The Board 
concluded that Dorr indeed had.  In 
support of its conclusion, the Board relied on the following findings: (1) a 
listing on the building directory that CPA Network had an office there; (2) a 
sign posted on the office door stating that Dorr's firm, CPA Network, was 
available on an appointment basis and listing contact telephone numbers; (3) 
informational pamphlets entitled "Divorce: Yours, Mine or Ours" with CPA Network 
listed on them, which were available to the public in the office; (4) business 
mail was received at the office; (5) Dorr met the director of the Wyoming Beef 
Council there; and (6) a certificate of organization was on file at the Wyoming 
Secretary of State's office, which stated that CPA Network's business was the 
practice of accountancy within the state of Wyoming.

 

[¶12]   Dorr counters with two 
arguments.  First, he contends that 
§ 39-3-119 is an unconstitutional infringement on his First Amendment rights to 
commercial speech.  Second, Dorr 
argues that none of the facts relied upon by the Board, individually or 
collectively, constitute an "advertised" office of a certified public 
accountant.  

 

[¶13]   Procedurally, Dorr is barred from 
raising his constitutional claim in the context of this case.  Dorr attempted to raise the issue during 
the hearing before the Board.  The 
Board correctly concluded that it did not have the authority to determine 
constitutional issues.  In re 
Shryack, 3 P.3d 850, 856 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Belco Petroleum Corporation 
v. State Board of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 214 (Wyo. 1978)).  The proper procedure is a declaratory 
judgment action pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.12. Shryack, 3 P.3d at 856-57; 
In re Conflicting Lease Applications for Wyoming Agr. Lease No. 1-7027, 
972 P.2d 586, 587 (Wyo. 1999).  
Since the issue is not properly before us, we decline to address the 
constitutionality of § 33-3-119.

 

[¶14]   In qualifying the requirement of a 
resident manager or annual registration by whether a CPA's office is "advertised 
as an office of a certified public accountant," Wyoming's statute appears to be 
unique.3  The term "advertised" is not defined in 
the Certified Public Accountant's Act of 1975.  When a term is not defined within a 
statutory scheme, we look to the ordinary and usual meaning accorded to the 
word.  RT Communications, Inc. v. 
State Board of Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 922 (Wyo. 2000).  In an ordinary sense, "advertise" 
means:

 

To 
advise, announce, apprise, command, give notice of, inform, make known, 
publish.  To call a matter to the 
public attention by any means whatsoever.  
Any oral, written or graphic statement made by the seller in any manner 
in connection with the solicitation of business and includes, without limitation 
because of enumeration, statements and representations made in a newspaper or 
other publication or on radio or television or contained in any notice, 
handbill, sign, catalog, or letter, or printed on or contained in any tag or 
label attached to or accompanying any merchandise.

 

Black's 
Law Dictionary 54 (6th Ed. 1990).  We will address each of the grounds 
cited by the Board in support of its conclusion that Dorr advertised an office 
of a certified public accountant.

 

[¶15]   Initially, we can quickly dispense 
with three of the grounds as irrelevant to whether Dorr advertised: (1) business 
mail was received at the office; (2) Dorr met the director of the Beef Council 
at the office; and (3) a certificate of organization was on file at the Wyoming 
Secretary of State's office.  These 
are indicative of the fact that Dorr had physical office space, but they do not 
evidence any form of advertising.  
We fail to see how having mail delivered to a particular place, meeting a 
potential client there, or having a certificate of organization on file at the 
office of the Secretary of State "advise, announce, apprise, command, give 
notice of" or call to the public's attention that Dorr maintained an office of a 
certified public accountant.  These 
findings are simply irrelevant to the issue.

 

[¶16]   The other three findings relied 
upon by the Board were: (1) the building directory listed CPA Network; (2) the 
handwritten sign posted on the office door stating that CPA Network was 
available on an appointment basis with contact telephone numbers listed; and (3) 
the presence of a brochure on divorce that included CPA Network's name and 
contact information.4  In the absence of a more specific 
definition of "advertised" either in the Act or in agency rules, we cannot 
conclude that these grounds are sufficient to find by clear and convincing 
evidence that Dorr had advertised the office of a certified public 
accountant.  An action may 
constitute "advertising" if it was intended to call the public's attention or if 
it did, in fact, have that affect.  
The record clearly indicates through Dorr's testimony that he did not 
have any intent to "advertise" to the public through a sign on an office 
door.  Certain activities, such as 
television or radio spots, would be by themselves indicative of advertising. We 
do not, however, perceive the directory or sign rising to that level.  It is important to note that neither the 
sign nor the directory listing contained more than the company name, Dorr's 
name, and a telephone number.  The 
inclusion of only that basic information supports Dorr's position.  In the absence of any evidence that 
Dorr's sign or the directory actually attracted potential clients, we conclude 
that there is no clear and convincing evidence that Dorr advertised an office of 
a certified public accountant within the meaning of § 
33-3-119.

 

[¶17]   The Board also suspended Dorr's 
license based on its conclusion that he had violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-3-121(a)(ii), which provides:

 

After 
notice and hearing, the board may revoke, or may suspend for a period not to 
exceed two (2) years, any certificate issued under this act [§§ 33-3-101 through 
33-3-132] or may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any permit issued under this 
act or may censure the holder of a permit for any of the following 
causes:

. . . 
.

   (ii)  Dishonesty, fraud or gross negligence in 
the practice of public accounting[.]

 

The 
Board concluded that Dorr's failure to inform the Beef Council of the 
restriction placed on his ability to conduct audits by the Settlement Agreement 
amounted to dishonesty in the practice of public accounting.  The Board's finding is insufficient to 
constitute clear and convincing evidence of dishonesty.  Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, 
Dorr was prohibited from conducting audits.  That prohibition was not, however, 
absolute: the Settlement Agreement provided for Dorr's re-entry to audit 
practice dependent on his compliance with the terms imposed under the 
Agreement.  The Beef Council 
contacted Dorr about performing an audit, and Dorr immediately filed a request 
with the Board to conduct the audit and to initiate the pre-issuance review 
required by the Settlement Agreement.  
This is exactly what the Settlement Agreement required Dorr to do.  Nowhere in that Agreement is there a 
requirement that Dorr inform the prospective audit client that his license was 
restricted5.  There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that Dorr owed some duty to disclose his license status to the Beef 
Council.  Perhaps he should have, 
but the Board has not directed us to any statute, rule, or accounting practice 
that required him to do so under the circumstances of this case.  Without reference to some standard, a 
practitioner would have no notice that their conduct is prohibited.  Since Dorr complied with the letter of 
the Settlement Agreement, we conclude that the Board has failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that Dorr committed dishonesty in the practice of 
public accounting.

 

[¶18]   Dorr raises two additional 
arguments:  (1) the hearing examiner 
erred in quashing Dorr's subpoena of Board member David J. Kreycik; and (2) the 
assistant attorney general improperly acted as both prosecutor and legal advisor 
to the Board.  Since we have found 
that both of the grounds relied upon by the Board in suspending Dorr's license 
are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence, these issues are moot.  However, we think it is appropriate to 
add a few brief words about these issues.

 

[¶19]   Prior to the hearing on the 
allegations that Dorr had violated the terms of the Settlement Agreement, he 
attempted to depose Board member David J. Kreycik.  The hearing examiner granted a motion to 
quash, and Dorr challenges that decision on appeal.  Dorr has not followed the correct 
procedure for challenging a denial of discovery request:

 

Any 
agency which is a party to the contested case is subject to the discovery 
provisions of this section but neither the agency, nor any member, officer or 
employee shall be required to disclose information which is confidential or 
privileged under the law and no member of the presiding agency shall be 
compelled to testify or give a deposition in a contested case.  Discovery sought from the agency 
initially shall be by written application.  
If the agency refuses to allow discovery in whole or in part the 
aggrieved party may apply to the presiding officer for an order compelling 
discovery.  If the presiding 
officer fails or refuses to compel discovery, the aggrieved party may apply to 
the district court for the district in which the hearing, deposition or other 
proceeding is being or is to be conducted for an order directed to the agency 
compelling discovery.  
The presiding officer or district court shall enter such order as may be 
appropriate.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(h) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).  The proper remedy for Dorr was to apply 
to the district court, not to wait until the matter had been decided and then 
raise it as an issue on appeal.  

 

[¶20]   Dorr also complained that the 
assistant attorney general assigned to this matter acted as the prosecutor while 
simultaneously advising the Board on legal matters.  We will make no finding regarding the 
propriety of the assistant attorney general's actions in this case, but we will 
emphasize what we recently stated in another case:

 

Dr. 
Painter alleges improper ex parte contacts occurred between the Board's 
attorney (who represented the Board and prosecuted Dr. Painter at the contested 
case hearing) and the Board sitting as decision maker.  She asserts these contacts adversely 
affected her right to a fair, unbiased hearing.  Due process requires that an agency 
provide a fair trial without the appearance of bias or prejudice.  State Transportation Commission of 
Wyoming v. Ford, 844 P.2d 496, 497-98 (Wyo. 1992); ANR Production Company 
v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 800 P.2d 492, 499 (Wyo. 
1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-112(a) (LEXIS 1999).  Additionally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-107(k) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added) prohibits the following 
contacts:

    (k) . . . Any person 
representing an agency at a hearing in a contested case in which the agency is a 
party shall not in the same case serve as presiding officer or provide ex 
parte advice regarding the case to the presiding officer or to the body or any 
member of the body comprising the decision makers.

The 
record and oral arguments make it clear the Board's attorney: (1) advised the 
Board throughout the development of the case against Dr. Painter; (2) prosecuted 
the case before the hearing panel which was comprised of Board members; and (3) 
continued to advise the Board during preparation of the final findings and 
order.  The separation of these 
functions is necessary to assure fairness.  
The contacts between the Board and its attorney violated § 16-3-107(k) 
and contributed to the overall appearance of unfairness regarding the 
proceedings.

 

Painter 
v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 938-39 (Wyo. 2000).  
Fundamental considerations require not just fairness in fact but also 
fairness in appearance.  Agencies 
sitting in a contested case proceeding must be vigilant to keep separate their 
prosecutorial and advisory functions.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   The Board's order suspending Dorr's 
license to practice public accounting was not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Therefore, that order is 
hereby vacated.       

FOOTNOTES

  1The sign was a 
printed on an 8 ½" by 11" sheet of paper taped to the 
door.

  
2The Board cites 
Paragraph 14 in its entirety in support of its conclusion that Dorr violated 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-121(a)(ii).  
See Conclusion of Law 6.  The 
Board, however, only discusses the failure of Dorr to inform the Beef Council of 
the audit restriction imposed by the Settlement Agreement in its Conclusions of 
Law.  Our review of the record 
indicates that there would be insufficient evidence to support the allegations 
relating to Dorr's ownership interest and his withdrawal from the audit 
engagements. 

  
3Other 
jurisdictions require a resident manager and annual registration without any 
qualifications.  See, e.g., 
Ark. Code Ann. § 17-12-403 (Michie 1999 Supp.); Iowa Code Ann. § 542C.19 
(West 1997); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 326.055 (West 1989); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-2-330 
(West 2001); and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.04.205 (West 2001 
Supp.).

  
4The brochures 
were located in a reception area inside the office.  The office was generally not open to the 
public since it was not Dorr's regular office and he met clients there only upon 
appointment.  The Board made no 
findings on the public's access to the area where the brochures were 
located.  

  
5The Board 
concluded that Dorr's preparatory work, including discussing the audit with the 
Beef Council and attempting to schedule fieldwork, constituted audit practice in 
violation of the restriction placed on his license under the Settlement 
Agreement.  The Notice of Hearing 
setting forth the charges against Dorr alleged that he failed to disclose the 
restrictions imposed on his license to the Beef Council.  The Notice did not allege that Dorr 
actually conducted an audit in violation of the Settlement Agreement.  Only issues and violations identified 
within a proper notice and complaint may be pursued at a contested case hearing 
and considered in issuance of an agency decision.  FRJ Corporation v. Mason, 4 P.3d 896, 900 (Wyo. 2000).