Title: People v. Reedy & Wilson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Reedy & Wilson (Ill. 
S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 85191, 85297 
cons.-Agenda 17-September 1998.
Modified Upon Denial of 
Rehearing March 29, 1999
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of 
the court:
In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to 
determine whether the General Assembly violated the single subject clause of the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)) when it enacted Public 
Act 89-404 (the Act) (Pub. Act 89-404, eff. August 20, 1995). Defendants in the 
present case were sentenced in accordance with the "truth-in-sentencing" law 
contained in Public Act 89-404. As codified in the provisions of section 
3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections, truth-in-sentencing makes 
defendants eligible to receive no more than 4½ days of good-conduct credit for 
each month of their sentences. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996). Prior to 
the Act's passage, persons convicted of certain crimes were eligible to receive 
one day of good-conduct credit for each day served in prison. See 730 ILCS 
5/3-6-3(a)(2) (West 1994). For the reasons that follow, we hold that Public Act 
89-404 violates the single subject rule.
BACKGROUND
Docket No. 85191
On December 13, 1995, defendant, Gary Reedy, was 
convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Lake County of aggravated battery 
with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1996)) based upon actions which 
took place on September 1, 1995. Reedy was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment 
on January 18, 1996. On appeal to the Appellate Court, Second District, Reedy 
claimed, inter alia, that Public Act 89-404, which includes 
the truth-in-sentencing law under which he was sentenced, violated the single 
subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court agreed, holding 
the Act void in its entirety and enjoining the State from enforcing the Act. 295 
Ill. App. 3d 34. The State subsequently brought the instant appeal as a matter 
of right. 134 Ill. 2d R. 317.
Docket No. 85297
On January 23, 1997, a jury convicted defendant, 
Daniel Wilson, of robbery, armed robbery, residential burglary, and two counts 
of home invasion as a result of events that took place on February 22, 1996. 
Consequently, the circuit court of Peoria County sentenced Wilson to 
consecutive, extended-term sentences of 40 years' imprisonment on the charge of 
armed robbery and one count of home invasion. On appeal to the Appellate Court, 
Third District, Wilson argued, inter alia, that the enactment 
of Public Act 89-404 was in violation of the Illinois Constitution. However, in 
an unpublished order, the appellate court followed its earlier holding in 
People v. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 462 (1997), stating that a 
defendant has no standing on direct appeal to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Act. No. 4-97-0267 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This 
court granted Wilson's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 
315.
We consolidated these appeals in order to 
address the issues raised in both cases.
ANALYSIS
Initially, the State claims that both defendants 
are precluded from challenging the constitutionality of section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) 
on direct appeal. We observe that, on this issue of standing, there exists a 
split among the districts of the appellate court. See Wilson, No. 
4-97-0267 (3d Dist.) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (denying 
standing on direct appeal); People v. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 462 (3d 
Dist. 1997) (same); People v. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (5th Dist. 
1998) (same); but see Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d 34 (2d Dist.) 
(recognizing standing on direct appeal); People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 
3d 182 (4th Dist. 1998) (same). The State relies primarily on the case of 
People v. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 462.
As in the present case, the defendant in 
Watford claimed that the truth-in-sentencing provisions of section 
3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) violate the single subject rule. The court held that a defendant 
sentenced under the truth-in-sentencing law may not challenge the 
constitutionality of that law on direct appeal. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 
3d at 464. The court in Watford reasoned that, since the Department of 
Corrections, and not the trial court, is charged with enforcing the 
truth-in-sentencing law, that law is in no way a condition of a defendant's 
sentence and is not within the scope of the sentencing proceedings. 
Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 464. The appellate court concluded that, 
in order for a defendant to contest the constitutionality of the 
truth-in-sentencing law, the Department of Corrections must first be allowed to 
enforce that law by calculating the defendant's good-time credit in accordance 
with the truth-in-sentencing scheme. After such time, the defendant may file a 
habeas corpus, mandamus, or declaratory judgment action 
alleging that the Department of Corrections is determining his good-time credit 
pursuant to an act that is unconstitutional. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 
at 464.
We are not convinced by Watford. As the 
appellate court in defendant Reedy's case properly noted, courts of this state 
have traditionally recognized that good-time credit is a part of every sentence. 
See, e.g., People ex rel. Colletti v. Pate, 31 Ill. 2d 354, 
357 (1964) (good-time credit is "a part of every sentence"); People v. 
Baptist, 284 Ill. App. 3d 382, 387 (1996) (a defendant's compliance with 
conditions for good-time credit is a term of the original sentence). Numerous 
appellate court decisions have acknowledged that, since good-time credit is 
inherent in each sentence of imprisonment, trial courts may deem the possibility 
of good-time credit a factor in determining defendants' sentences. See, 
e.g., People v. Fetter, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1009 (1992); 
People v. Clankie, 180 Ill. App. 3d 726, 733 (1989); People v. 
Torgeson, 132 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389 (1985).
In cases involving sentences imposed pursuant to 
the truth-in-sentencing law, we are doubly persuaded that good-time credit is an 
important factor. This is evidenced by section 5-4-1(c-2) of the Unified Code of 
Corrections, which mandates that, during sentencing, the trial court must both 
instruct the public that the defendant is subject to the truth-in-sentencing 
provisions of section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) and notify the public of the actual period 
of time the defendant will likely spend in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2) (West 
1996). The connection between the good-time credit scheme of the 
truth-in-sentencing law and sentencing hearings, therefore, is readily apparent. 
For these reasons we agree with the rationale expressed in People v. 
Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998):
Indeed, in light of 
the fact that the sentencing courts were allowed to consider defendants' 
potential good-time credit in deciding their sentences and that defendants were 
sentenced under the truth-in-sentencing law, it would be unjust to hold that 
defendants lack standing on direct appeal to challenge the constitutionality of 
the very statute under which they were sentenced. Moreover, the State's proposed 
approach-allowing a defendant to bring an action challenging the 
truth-in-sentencing law only after the Department of Corrections enforces 
it-would result in constant and unnecessary piecemeal litigation. We, therefore, 
hold that a defendant sentenced under the truth-in-sentencing provisions enacted 
by Public Act 89-404 may challenge the constitutionality of those provisions on 
direct appeal. We now turn to the merits of defendants' constitutional 
claims.
Single Subject Claims
Defendants argue that Public Act 89-404, which 
includes the truth-in-sentencing law, violates the single subject clause of the 
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)). This clause 
provides, in relevant part:
As we explained in 
Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997), the single subject clause 
regulates the process by which legislation is enacted. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 502.
We are mindful that, in determining whether a 
violation of the single subject clause exists, the term "subject" generally 
should be construed liberally in favor of the legislature. People v. 
Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 255 (1995). Indeed, we have long noted that 
legislative acts are to be afforded a considerable presumption of 
constitutionality. In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 422 
(1997). This presumption, however, is not without limits. As we have stated in 
the past, the subject of a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses, 
provided that the bill's provisions have a "natural and logical connection." 
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 515. That is, the General Assembly violates the 
single subject rule when it includes within one bill unrelated provisions that 
by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to one another. 
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 515; Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d  at 255. Our 
overview of the history and content of Public Act 89-404 reveals that, in 
striking resemblance to Johnson, this Act was enacted in violation of 
the single subject rule.
On March 3, 1995, Public Act 89-404, entitled "A 
Bill for an Act concerning the insanity defense," began as Senate Bill 1187. In 
that original form, it was designed to increase a defendant's burden of proof in 
asserting the insanity defense, redefine the term "insanity," and amend rules 
relating to petitions for the transfer or release of defendants found not guilty 
by reason of insanity. The Senate passed the bill in its entirety on April 25, 
1995. When addressed in the House of Representatives, however, Senate Bill 1187 
underwent a substantial metamorphosis. One particularly important amendment 
deleted the entire text of the bill. The House took this opportunity to 
incorporate within the contours of Senate Bill 1187 numerous matters in addition 
to the subject of the insanity defense. These other matters included the: (1) 
duties and jurisdiction of local law enforcement agents; (2) drug forfeiture 
procedures and the allocation of proceeds from the sale of drug forfeiture 
assets; (3) truth-in-sentencing legislation; and (4) perfection and satisfaction 
of hospital liens. As a result of this multifaceted expansion, the House renamed 
the bill "An Act in relation to governmental matters, amending named Acts." With 
the aforementioned amendments in place, the House passed the bill and returned 
it to the Senate for further approval.
Although the Senate subsequently debated over 
the amended bill, its discussions addressed only the truth-in-sentencing 
provisions added by the House. Absent from the debates were any discussions of 
the bill's insanity defense provisions and other amendments. Nevertheless, the 
Senate passed the bill in its amended form. Senate Bill 1187 was subsequently 
signed into law by Governor Edgar on August 20, 1995.
Public Act 89-404, as enacted, is comprised of 
10 sections addressing a number of topics. Section 5 of the Act amends the 
Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/1-1001 et seq. (West 1996)) by 
restating a sheriff's duty as "conservator of the peace." Section 10 of the Act 
likewise alters the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et 
seq. (West 1996)) by redefining local police officers' duty as "peace 
officers." Section 15 amends the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 
et seq. (West 1996)) by redefining the term "insanity" and 
enhancing the burden of proof for a defendant asserting the insanity defense. 
Section 20 amends the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et 
seq. (West 1996)) by changing the distribution of proceeds from the 
sale of certain drug forfeiture assets. Section 25 alters the Illinois 
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 
1996)) by providing for multiple convictions and sentences for violators of that 
Act, adding new sentencing guidelines, and redirecting the distribution of 
proceeds from the sale of forfeiture assets. Section 30 amends the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 
1996)) by defining the term "law enforcement agency" and increasing police 
officers' authority to make arrests outside of their primary jurisdictions. 
Section 35 amends the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 
et seq. (West 1996)) by dropping the requirement that judicial 
in rem proceedings be conducted without a jury. Section 40, 
which amends the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et 
seq. (West 1996)) in several respects, provides for new 
truth-in-sentencing rules for calculating good-conduct credit and early release 
and creates the Illinois Truth-in-Sentencing Commission. Section 40 also 
redefines the term "insanity" and modifies procedures regulating transfer or 
release petitions from defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Section 45 amends the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-101 et 
seq. (West 1996)) by providing that the homestead exemption is not 
available to property subject to certain drug asset forfeiture proceedings. 
Finally, section 50 amends the Hospital Lien Act (770 ILCS 35/0.01 et 
seq. (West 1996)) by, inter alia, bringing all 
hospitals operated by local governmental entities within the purview of that act 
and by altering the procedures for the perfection and satisfaction of hospital 
liens.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the 
legislature violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution in 
enacting Public Act 89-404. The Act was initially designed to address the 
singular subject of the criminal insanity defense. While this fact alone is not 
dispositive, we cannot overlook the fact that, as enacted, Public Act 89-404 
arguably deals with as many as five separate legislative topics involving both 
civil and criminal matters. In sum, the Act addresses such diverse issues as: 
the basic duties and jurisdiction of law enforcement officials; the burden of 
proof for a criminal defendant asserting the insanity defense; civil and 
criminal rules governing drug offense and drug asset forfeiture proceedings; 
truth-in-sentencing law; and rules for the perfection and satisfaction of 
hospital liens. Even when giving great deference to the legislature, the most 
lenient examination of the Act shows that its contents encompass at least two 
unrelated subjects: matters relating to the criminal justice system, and matters 
relating to hospital liens. In our opinion, even the most liberal attempt to 
reconcile these two subjects is unavailing.
The State's failure to explain the necessary or 
even logical connection between criminal legislation and hospital liens is 
unquestionable. The State argues, for example, that all measures within the Act 
are legitimately interrelated, since "each of the sections involves governmental 
matters which are the responsibility of the various county State's Attorneys." 
To say that such a "connection" satisfies the single subject rule strains 
credulity. Furthermore, that these topics might fit within the broad subject of 
"governmental matters" is not compelling. As we cautioned in Johnson, 
the permitted use of such a sweeping and vague category to unite unrelated 
measures would render the single subject clause of our constitution meaningless. 
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 517-18. We conclude that there is no "natural 
and logical connection" that could justify the enactment of these various 
matters in one act. Accordingly, we hold that Public Act 89-404 violates the 
single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution and is, therefore, 
unconstitutional in its entirety.
The State, nevertheless, advances three 
arguments explaining why this court should rule in its favor despite our finding 
of a single subject rule violation. First, the State entreats this court to 
adopt a rule that would limit the time in which a defendant could raise a single 
subject rule claim. This scheme, which the State has styled the "codification 
rule," would preclude a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of an 
act on single subject grounds once it has become codified. The State relies 
primarily upon the Iowa case of State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 
1990), which stated the rule as follows:
The policy behind 
the codification rule is to strike a balance between the protective goals of the 
single subject rule and the public's need for finality through the validation of 
new legislation. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d  at 475. In practice, the rule only 
allows a defendant to attack newly passed legislation on enactment-related 
constitutional grounds between the date that act is passed and its date of 
official publication.
We decline to adopt the codification rule for 
several reasons. First, the rule goes against this state's well-established 
single subject clause jurisprudence. Illinois cases on this subject illustrate 
the seriousness with which this court regards single subject clause violations. 
See, e.g., Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d 499; People v. 
Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235 (1995); Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 193 (1974).
In Johnson, for example, we emphasized 
the dual purposes of the single subject clause. On one hand, the clause serves 
to prevent the enactment of legislation that, standing on its own, could not 
garner the votes necessary for passage. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 514; 
Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 258 (1992). Indeed, in upholding the mandate of the Illinois 
Constitution, this court is duty-bound to ensure that the legislature refrains 
from the " 'practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in 
their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in 
their favor the advocates of all ***.' " Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d  at 
202, quoting People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494-95 
(1865).
A second and equally important purpose of the 
single subject clause is to facilitate the enactment of bills through a 
legislative process that is orderly and informed. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 514. By limiting each bill to a single subject, each legislator can better 
understand and more intelligently debate the issues presented by a bill. 
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 514-15. These dual purposes of the single 
subject clause, therefore, promote direct confrontation and informed discussion 
of legislative issues submitted for enactment.
A codification rule would, in no uncertain 
terms, drastically diminish the effect and importance of the single subject 
clause of the Illinois Constitution. That a "window of time" is available to 
challenging defendants is no consolation in such cases, since the time between 
an act's effective date and codification date is frequently minute. Moreover, a 
codification rule simply emphasizes finality over the importance of addressing 
the underlying wrong that exists in unconstitutionally enacted legislation. In 
our view, a codification rule would unjustifiably emasculate the single subject 
rule in Illinois, and we, therefore, reject such a proposition. See also 
People v. Worden, 299 Ill. App. 3d 836 (1998) (rejecting codification 
rule); People v. Dainty, 299 Ill. App. 3d 235 (1998) (declining to 
apply codification rule).
Next, the State contends that, although Public 
Act 89-404 may have violated the single subject rule, it was not the act under 
which defendants were sentenced. The State claims that, instead, Public Act 
89-462 is the law which applied to defendants' cases. The State's argument is 
disingenuous at best. Public Act 89-462 is comprised of a simple amendment 
adding the offense of predatory sexual assault of a child to the list of 
offenses to which the truth-in-sentencing law applies. The State argues that 
this amendatory language of Public Act 89-462 somehow validated all of the 
truth-in-sentencing provisions of Public Act 89-404 and, therefore, served as 
the curative legislation needed to bring the truth-in-sentencing law outside of 
single subject rule scrutiny.
As the State correctly asserts, the Illinois 
legislature has the power to enact curative legislation. See Johnson, 
176 Ill. 2d  at 518; Bates v. Board of Education, Allendale Community 
Consolidated School District No. 17, 136 Ill. 2d 260, 268 (1990). We note, 
however, that such legislation must exhibit on its face evidence that it is 
intended to cure or validate defective legislation. In Johnson, for 
instance, an act held to be unconstitutional for violating the single subject 
rule was validated in part by amendatory legislation that completely recodified 
a statutory provision within the invalidated act and that provided a clause 
expressly validating all actions taken in reliance on the defective statute. 
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d  at 521. In the case at bar, however, Public Act 
89-462 does not recodify the language of the truth-in-sentencing provisions of 
Public Act 89-404. It only inserts an additional offense to be included in the 
truth-in-sentencing provision. Moreover, it is entirely devoid of curative 
language that would validate any actions taken in reliance upon Public Act 
89-404. We conclude, therefore, that Public Act 89-462 did not serve as curative 
legislation for any portion of Public Act 89-404.
The State additionally argues that, assuming 
Public Act 89-404 was enacted in violation of the single subject rule, such a 
flaw can nonetheless be considered harmless. The State bases its contention on 
the notion that, since each of the sections within Public Act 89-404 possessed 
the necessary support for individual passage, the purpose of the single subject 
rule prohibiting "log rolling" of unpopular measures was not 
implicated.
The State's argument simply lacks merit. The 
State ignores the previously emphasized purpose of the single subject rule that 
promotes orderly and informed legislative debate and enactment. Since the crux 
of single subject rule analysis concerns the interrelatedness of an act's 
provisions, the harm in passing discordant bills in one act without informed 
debate is obvious. Moreover, we hold that the harmless error standard is 
entirely inapplicable to an analysis of the constitutionality of legislative 
enactments. In our view, when the manner in which the General Assembly enacts 
legislation contravenes a constitutional mandate, a harmless error standard is 
inappropriate. Such a standard, if endorsed by the judiciary, would be at least 
as deleterious to the single subject clause as the codification rule would 
be.
Lastly, the State contends that, if this court 
holds that Public Act 89-404 was unconstitutionally enacted, we should further 
hold that all sentences imposed under the invalidated truth-in-sentencing law 
were void and that remand for resentencing is necessary. The State argues that, 
since sentencing courts considered the less permissive good-conduct credit 
scheme of the void truth-in-sentencing law when imposing sentences, all 
sentences imposed thereunder should be revisited. We disagree.
The State relies upon People v. Garcia, 
179 Ill. 2d 55 (1997), and People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995), in 
support of its argument that defendants sentenced under the invalidated 
truth-in-sentencing law were improperly sentenced. Both Garcia and 
Arna, however, involved the correction of sentences that did not 
originally conform to mandatory sentencing statutes. In the case at bar, 
defendants' sentences were not defective for failing to comply with mandatory 
statutory guidelines. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record before us, and 
the State does not argue, that defendants did not receive sentences within 
statutory guidelines. Although the good-conduct credit scheme which may have 
been considered by the sentencing courts was invalid, the sentences imposed 
against defendants were, nevertheless, proper. Furthermore, it would be sheer 
speculation on our part to surmise the extent to which each sentencing court has 
ultimately factored in the truth-in-sentencing law's good-conduct credit scheme 
in imposing each sentence against every defendant before it. Consequently, we 
find no justification for disturbing any statutorily sound sentence imposed 
against any defendant under the void truth-in-sentencing law.
Amendatory Legislation
We note that, during the pendency of the appeals 
in this case, the General Assembly passed Public Act 90-592 (Pub. Act 90-592, 
eff. June 19, 1998). That act both deleted and recodified the entire 
truth-in-sentencing legislation originating from Public Act 89-404. Importantly, 
Public Act 90-592 contained the following two provisions:
In light of our 
previous discussion with respect to curative legislation, we note that, unlike 
all preceding amendments to Public Act 89-404, Public Act 90-592 truly served to 
cure the effect that the former act's invalidation had on the 
truth-in-sentencing law. Like the curative legislation deemed applicable in 
Johnson, Public Act 90-592 recodified the truth-in-sentencing 
legislation in its entirety. Noting that the best evidence of the legislature's 
intent is found in the plain language of a statute (Kunkel v. Walton, 
179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997); People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 350 
(1995)) and that subsection (a)(2) of Public Act 90-592 clearly states the 
legislature's intention to apply the revisited truth-in-sentencing law in a 
prospective manner only, we hold that these reenacted provisions do not apply to 
defendants in this case. This result is mandated by the language of subsection 
(a)(2), which applies the curative truth-in-sentencing legislation to offenses 
committed on or after June 19, 1998.
Finally, our decision is undisturbed by 
subsection (e) of Public Act 90-592, which provides that the validity of Public 
Act 89-404 is unaffected by this amendatory act at issue. As we stressed in 
Johnson:
Since the validity 
of Public Act 89-404 is determined by this court and not the legislature, 
subsection (e) of Public Act 90-592 is ineffectual.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that Public Act 89-404 is 
unconstitutional. Therefore, the judgment of the appellate court in the matter 
of People v. Reedy is affirmed, and the judgment of the appellate court 
in the matter of People v. Wilson is reversed.
No. 85191-Appellate court 
judgment affirmed.
No. 85297-Appellate court 
judgment reversed.