Title: Capwell v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Capwell v. State1984 WY 85686 P.2d 1148Case Number: 83-210Decided: 08/08/1984CHRISTOPHER JOHN CAPWELL, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER JOHN CAPWELL, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Allan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Roger Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; oral argument by Roger 
Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from 
appellant Christopher Capwell's conviction of attempted first degree sexual 
assault for which he was sentenced to a term of not less than five nor more than 
ten years.

[¶2.]     We will affirm the 
conviction but remand for resentencing.

[¶3.]     On December 21, 1982 
appellant, Capwell, knocked on the door of the victim's apartment asking to 
speak to "John." The victim was home alone and informed Capwell that no one 
named John lived there. She then called her husband at work, who agreed to 
return home immediately. Capwell left but shortly thereafter returned to the 
apartment requesting again to speak to John. He broke into the apartment, 
cornered the victim, and told her to get undressed. When she refused, he grabbed 
her by the hair, pulled her to the floor, and began forcibly removing her 
clothes.

[¶4.]     At this point the 
victim's husband and a friend, Tim Arnold, arrived at the apartment and saw 
Capwell kneeling over the partially nude victim. Capwell got up and left the 
apartment. The victim's husband and Mr. Arnold followed, keeping Capwell in view 
until he was arrested by a policeman who had responded to the husband's 
call.

[¶5.]     Appellant could have 
been charged with attempted first or second degree sexual assault under §§ 
6-4-314 and 6-4-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977. Section 6-4-314, attempt, 
provided:

"Whoever perpetrates an 
assault or assault and battery upon anyone with intent to commit a sexual 
assault in the first or second degree, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in 
the penitentiary not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) 
years."

Section 
6-4-302(a)(i), sexual assault in the first degree, 
provided:

"(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual 
assault in the first degree if:

"(i) The actor causes 
submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated 
to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement * * 
*."

The prosecution 
elected, however, to charge appellant with attempted first degree sexual assault 
by alleging an attempt under § 6-1-201(a)(i), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 19821, to violate the provisions of § 
6-4-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977, supra.

[¶6.]     By charging appellant 
under the general attempt statute, § 6-1-201(a)(i), supra, with attempted first 
degree sexual assault, rather than under the specific statute, § 6-4-314, supra, 
with attempted first or second degree sexual assault, the penalty to be imposed 
upon conviction2 was five to fifty years rather than 
one to five years. The question we must decide is whether attempted sexual 
assault in the first or second degree can be charged under either statute at the 
election of the State, or whether attempted sexual assault in the first or 
second degree can only be charged under § 6-4-314, W.S. 1977, 
supra.

[¶7.]     A statute making rape a 
crime was first adopted in Wyoming in 1899 with the enactment of § 4964, 
Revised Statutes of Wyoming, 1899, which provided:

"Whoever unlawfully has 
carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will, or of a woman or 
female child under the age of eighteen years, either with or without her 
consent, is guilty of rape, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a 
term not less than one year, or during life."

Attempted rape 
was not a crime until the adoption in 1911 of chapter 83, § 1 of the Session 
Laws of Wyoming, 1911 which provided:

"Whoever perpetrates an 
assault or assault and battery upon any female with intent to commit the crime 
of rape, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than 
one year nor more than fifty years."

[¶8.]     These statutes 
governing rape and attempted rape were simple, general statements of the common 
law. 65 Am.Jur.2d Rape § 2. They remained in effect until 1977 when the 
legislature undertook a comprehensive revision of the statutes pertaining to 
rape with the enactment of chapter 70 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1977. This 
revision substituted the term "sexual assault" for the term "rape," provided 
four degrees of sexual assault with a different penalty for each degree and 
adopted a specific statute, § 6-4-314, W.S. 1977, supra, making attempted sexual 
assault in the first or second degree a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term of one to five years. 

[¶9.]     In 1981, the 
legislature adopted a general attempt statute which made an attempt to commit a 
crime unlawful. The attempt was accomplished by undertaking any act that was a 
substantial step toward the commission of the crime, § 6-1-201(a)(i), supra. The 
penalty for conviction of the attempt was the same as for the commission of the 
underlying crime, § 6-1-204, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, 
supra.

[¶10.]  The State contends that the general 
attempt statute, being the later enactment, repealed by implication the specific 
statute relating to attempted first degree sexual assault, § 6-4-314, supra. We 
disagree.

"Repeals by implication 
are not favored * * * [and] the party so asserting bears `the burden of 
demonstrating beyond question that the legislative body by its later action 
evinced an unequivocal purpose of effecting a repeal.' * * * What must be shown 
is that the latter statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two 
cannot stand together, or that the whole subject of the earlier statute is 
covered by the latter one having the same object, clearly intending to prescribe 
the only rules applicable to the subject." Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 
582 P.2d 67, 73 (1978).

Where the 
statutes being considered are a special statute and a general statute relating 
to the same subject, as in this case, the policy against implied repeals has 
special force, there being a presumption that the special or specific act was 
intended to remain in force as an exception to the general or broad act. Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Commission 
of Maryland, 297 U.S. 209, 56 S. Ct. 417, 80 L. Ed. 586 (1936).

[¶11.]  We presume that the legislature enacts 
legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with reference to other 
statutes and decisions of the courts. Such legislation should, therefore, be 
construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing 
law. Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 
(1941). Statutes should be construed in pari materia and if the special act is 
inconsistent with the general law, the provisions of the special act will 
control, Carpenter & Carpenter, Inc. 
v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463 (1941).

"* * * `It is the general 
rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter 
as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be 
considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before 
or after such general enactment. Where the special statute is later, it will be 
regarded as an exception to or qualification of the prior general one; and where 
the general act is later the special statute will be considered as remaining an 
exception to its terms unless it is repealed in general words or by necessary 
implication.'" 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1973), p. 
315.

[¶12.]  It was clearly the intent of the 
legislature by its 1977 enactments to adopt fully comprehensive legislation 
dealing with sexual assault by providing for four degrees of sexual assault with 
different penalties as punishment for violation of each, and providing by 
specific statute punishment for attempted first or second degree sexual assault 
with the penalty for violation therein specified. In enacting the general 
attempt statute and the penalty provision, the legislature made no effort to 
repeal § 6-4-314, W.S. 1977, supra, nor was the statute referred to, mentioned, 
or even considered. Had the legislature intended to repeal § 6-4-314, supra, it 
could have done so by express legislative enactment. Failure to repeal the 
statute is at least indicative of an intent that it remain in effect as an 
exception to the general attempt statute.

[¶13.]  We conclude, therefore, that the later 
enactment of a general attempt statute evidences no intention on the part of the 
legislature to do other than provide that an attempt to violate an existing 
criminal statute, where the legislature has not already spoken with respect to 
that statute, is a crime. Thus, the general attempt statute is operative when 
applied to statutes where the legislature has not already spoken; and where the 
legislature has enacted a special statute making the attempt a crime, the 
special statute will prevail. This construction gives effect to both statutes 
and a policy that ambiguity concerning the application of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity. It is in conformance 
with

"* * * the principle that 
gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general 
statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, even if the general 
provision was enacted later. [Citations] This guide to statutory construction 
has special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the 
punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions. In 
this context, the principle is a corollary of the rule of lenity, an outgrowth 
of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and 
definite legislative directive." Simpson 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S. Ct. 909, 914, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1978).

[¶14.]  For the reasons stated, we conclude that 
the enactment of § 6-1-201(a), supra, did not effect repeal of § 6-4-314, supra. 
Having found that the special statute § 6-4-314, supra, is, upon the facts of 
this case, the only statute applicable to a charge of attempted first or second 
degree sexual assault, it is apparent that appellant could only have been 
subjected to the penalty provided by this statute, i.e., imprisonment for one to 
five years.

[¶15.]  A question still to be resolved is 
whether there must be a reversal of this case en toto requiring that appellant 
be charged anew and there be a retrial of the case or whether the conviction may 
be affirmed and the sentence corrected. This in turn depends upon whether the 
information charging the crime was sufficient to give notice of the crime 
charged.

[¶16.]  The State contends that this case is 
factually identical to United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979); but that is incorrect. The Batchelder case dealt with two separate 
legislative enactments, each complete in itself, specifying the prohibited 
activity and the penalty for violation. In this case there is just one statute, 
§ 6-4-302(a)(i), supra, making first degree sexual assault, the underlying 
offense, a crime. An attempt to violate the first degree sexual assault statute 
is made a crime by the specific intent statute. Here appellant was charged in an 
information that he

"* * * did unlawfully and 
feloniously, with the intent to commit a felony, attempt to unlawfully and feloniously 
inflict sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim, by causing 
submission of said victim by the actual application, reasonably calculated to 
cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement, * * * 
contrary to W.S. 6-1-201(a)(i), 6-4-302(a)(i), 1977 Republished Edition, 
contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided * * *." 
(Emphasis supplied.)

[¶17.]  Had the attempt been charged under § 
6-4-314, supra, the information might have also contained an allegation that 
appellant perpetrated an assault or assault and battery with intent to violate § 
6-4-302(a)(i), supra, with an appropriate substitution of the number of the 
specific intent statute, § 6-4-314, supra, for § 6-1-201(a)(i), supra. The 
information, drawn in the language of § 6-4-302(a)(i), contains an allegation 
that submission of the victim was caused by the actual application of "physical 
force." The effect of this language is to charge the same crime as would have 
been charged under § 6-4-314, supra. Appellant, therefore, had notice of the 
charge against him and could not have been prejudiced in his defense. We note, 
also, that there was no dispute over the fact that appellant did perpetrate an 
assault and battery upon the victim.

[¶18.]  With respect to the incorrect citation of 
number of the attempt statute, Rule 9, W.R.Cr.P., after providing that all 
prosecutions shall be by indictment or information, states: 

"The indictment or 
information shall state for each count the * * * citation of the statute * * * 
which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated. Error in the citation 
or its omission or any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to 
prejudice any substantial right of the defendant upon the merits or to mislead 
the defendant to his prejudice shall not be grounds for * * * reversal of a 
conviction."

The source of 
our Rule 9, with some minor modifications, is Rule 7, F.R.Cr.P. It was intended 
by adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that the precision and detail in 
pleadings formerly demanded no longer be required, that matters of form not 
perfect but not prejudicial be ignored, and that common sense and reason prevail 
over technicalities. 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 
123. Although Rule 9 provides that the information shall recite the statute 
which defendant is charged with violating, it has been held that recitation of 
the statute is not an absolute requirement nor is it controlling, but is 
intended for the benefit of the defendant and to give notice of the charge 
against him. 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 124. A 
failure to cite the statute or an incorrect citation of the statute which the 
defendant is alleged to have violated is not fatal nor does it require a 
reversal of the case, but bears only upon the question whether the defendant was 
confused to the point that he did not know the crime with which he was charged 
and was prejudiced in his defense. PAZ 
Morales v. United States, 
278 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1960); Gariepy v. 
United 
States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 
1951).

[¶19.]  In Gonzales v. State, Wyo., 551 P.2d 929, 931 
(1976), we held:

"[I]t is only necessary 
to allege sufficiently to allow the accused to understand the charge and prepare 
his defense.

* * * * * 
*

"The law seems clear that 
where a defendant is not misled to his prejudice, an indictment is not invalid 
because it does not conform exactly to the language of the 
statute."

[¶20.]  Appellant was charged here and found 
guilty of attempted first degree sexual assault. The elements of the crime of 
attempted first degree sexual assault were the same whether the attempt was 
charged under § 6-1-201(a)(i), supra, or under § 6-4-314, supra. The information 
filed and served upon appellant was fully effective to put him on notice that he 
was charged with the crime of attempted first degree sexual assault as fully as 
if the correct number of the attempt statute had been stated in the information. 
He was not prejudiced in his defense nor put at a 
disadvantage.

[¶21.]  We hold, therefore, that the statutory 
citation in the information is not controlling and that where, as here, the 
appellant has full and fair notice of the crime charged, is not surprised nor 
confused nor prejudiced in his defense, but is afforded a full and fair 
opportunity to defend the charge against him, there is no basis for reversal of 
the conviction.

[¶22.]  Appellant was convicted of attempted 
first degree sexual assault which, under our holding in this case, provides for 
a term of imprisonment of one to five years - not five to ten years as was 
imposed. Since the sentence is in excess of that authorized by law for the 
conviction of attempted first degree sexual assault, this cause, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P.,3 must be remanded to the district 
court for resentencing.

[¶23.]  Appellant next contends that he was 

"* * * never adequately 
identified in court by the victim or any witness nor was there any waiver by the 
defendant or any binding stipulation as to identity."

[¶24.]  Appellant, an indigent, was appointed 
counsel for his defense. His trial was scheduled to begin July 11, 1983. On the 
day of the trial, appellant requested that his attorney be discharged and 
different counsel appointed for his defense. Appellant informed the court that 
his attorney did not like him, that he had called him an "asshole" and kicked 
him. Appointed counsel denied kicking his client. The court asked appellant if 
there were any witnesses he wanted produced who were not there, any exhibits or 
evidence that he needed for his defense that were not available, or any other 
matter he wanted to bring to the court's attention. There were none. Appointed 
counsel advised the court that he was prepared and ready for trial and that he 
could defend appellant. The court denied the request for appointment of 
different counsel finding no factual basis or any other showing adequate to 
terminate appointed counsel's services.

[¶25.]  Appellant then advised the court that he 
would refuse to appear in court or proceed with the trial. The court explained 
that the trial would proceed without him. The trial was recessed and appellant 
returned to jail by the sheriff. An hour later, after having had an opportunity 
to consider the matter and discuss it with his counsel, appellant was returned 
to the court's chambers. The court then, after advising appellant that the trial 
would proceed, stated:

"THE COURT: * * * Do you 
understand that you have the right to be present at your 
trial?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I 
understand that.

"THE COURT: I will grant 
that right to you throughout the trial at any time or at any stage of the 
proceedings you wish to come up and to be present at that trial to hear and to 
see any of the witnesses or to participate in your trial, let the jailers know 
and they will let me know immediately. Periodically I will afford you the 
opportunity to talk to counsel in this matter to inform you what's going on 
during your trial.

"THE DEFENDANT: In other 
words, you're going to let me know when you find me guilty, right? 
Right?

"THE COURT: No, during 
the trial you will be informed. You have the opportunity now to hear and to see 
the witnesses, to be present throughout the trial, to observe the case being 
introduced against you, to exercise cross-examination. Whatever you wish to do 
in that regard [your appointed counsel] will be doing that in your behalf here 
in the courtroom while you are down in jail because you are in custody of the 
Laramie County Sheriff.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: I should tell 
you that Rule 42 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure also indicates that 
the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced in his 
presence shall not prevent continuing the trial on and including the return of 
the verdict. So there is provision. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"MR. GRANT: Your Honor, 
the State will request that he be present at the time the identification of the 
defendant is made by the complaining witness.

"THE COURT: Very 
well.

"THE DEFENDANT: How is 
that going to be accomplished?

"MR. GRANT: We'll have 
you brought up for identification purposes.

"THE DEFENDANT: Tied and 
bound or what?

"MR. GRANT: Whichever way 
you want to go.

"THE DEFENDANT: Okay, 
that's the way I want to go because if I'm not going to be here for the rest of 
the trial, there is no reason to be here to help the defense - I mean, the 
prosecution.

"THE COURT: Very 
well."

 

[¶26.]  Rule 42, W.R.Cr.P., provides in part as 
follows:

"In prosecution for 
offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the 
trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial 
to and including the return of the verdict."

Rule 42, 
W.R.Cr.P., was, with some modification, adopted from and patterned after Rule 
43, F.R.Cr.P. There is a good body of law construing the federal rule. Under the 
language of our statute, the defendant can waive his right to be present at his 
trial with the consent of the court. The court may continue the trial when the 
defendant voluntarily absents himself. The rule does not grant to the defendant 
a right of absence, and there is no due process violation should the court 
require his attendance at trial where identification is an integral part of the 
issues to be determined by the jury. United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d 547 
(3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1111, 93 S. Ct. 920, 34 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1973). The waiver of right to be present at trial must be knowingly and 
voluntarily made; and when this appears to the satisfaction of the 
court,

"[t]he Constitution does 
not require the court to discontinue a trial once commenced if the defendant has 
voluntarily absented himself." United 
States v. Partlow, 428 F.2d 814 (2nd Cir. 
1970).

[¶27.]  It has long been recognized that such 
constitutional rights as the right to confront witnesses, right to public trial, 
right to not be put in double jeopardy, as well as the right to be present at 
trial, may be waived by defendant without affecting due 
process.

[¶28.]  Regarding a defendant's presence at a 
felony trial,

"* * * it has been argued 
that the right is essentially for the benefit of the accused and that since the 
accused, by pleading guilty, can waive trial and subject himself to the severest 
penalty which might follow a trial, he should be able to waive any mere 
privilege on the trial that is designed only to aid him in shielding himself 
from such result." (Footnotes omitted.) 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 925, p. 
389, citing State v. Rohrich, N.D., 135 N.W.2d 175 (1965) and Frank v. State, 
142 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 645 (1914), error denied 
235 U.S. 694, 35 S. Ct. 208, 59 L. Ed. 429 
(1914); Thomas v. State, 117 
Miss. 532, 78 So. 147 (1918).

[¶29.]  In this case the court, exhibiting 
considerable patience, advised appellant meticulously and in detail concerning 
his right to be present at the trial, to participate in the decisions being 
made, to confront witnesses, to cross-examine, advised appellant of the right 
not to be present and the rights he would be giving up by his absence, inquired 
of him if he understood all of these rights, and appellant said that he did. The 
record amply supports the court's finding that appellant's absence from trial 
during the presentation of the State's case was a knowing and voluntary decision 
on his part. After the State rested its case, the appellant then chose to be 
present during the remainder of the trial. There was no denial of due process 
nor was there error in proceeding with the trial in the defendant's voluntary 
absence.

[¶30.]  Appellant contends, however, that we 
should reverse his conviction because neither the victim nor any witness 
adequately identified him in court as the perpetrator of the crime charged. It 
was appellant who made an in-court identification impossible by refusing to 
appear unless "tied and bound." The law is conflicting over whether bringing 
defendant into court "tied and bound" for identification is violative of due 
process. The trial court avoided the problem by not requiring appellant's 
appearance. It is ironic that this appellant should complain about the lack of 
identification of himself as the perpetrator of this crime. There was no issue 
and no question raised concerning his identification as the person who was 
observed assaulting the victim, followed until apprehended by the police, 
arrested and held in jail, charged with the crime of attempted first degree 
sexual assault, held in jail, and then transported from jail to court for trial. 
Appellant complains only that he was not identified as that person in court. 
That, of course, is unnecessary. It is only necessary that the person committing 
the crime be identified as the person charged in the indictment or 
information.

[¶31.]  The burden is upon the prosecution to 
prove every essential element of the crime charged. The prosecution must prove 
the corpus delicti, that is that a crime has been committed, and also that the 
party charged committed that crime. The person charged must be identified as the 
perpetrator, but,

"The method of 
identification used in a criminal trial is a matter largely within the 
discretion of the trial court.

* * * * * 
*

"A witness may identify 
accused by his name if such fact is known by the witness of his own knowledge." 
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 616.

[¶32.]  In determining whether the State met its 
burden of identifying the person charged as the one who attempted the sexual 
assault of the victim as described in the information filed, this court 
will,

"* * * `view the evidence 
presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution, leaving out of 
consideration any evidence in conflict therewith, while drawing all reasonable 
inferences possible therefrom. * * *'" Tageant v. State, Wyo., 673 P.2d 651, 656 (1983), quoting from Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690, 700 
(1978).

[¶33.]  The victim testified that she had 
identified Christopher Capwell at his preliminary hearing as her assailant 
charged in the proceeding before the court. She stated she observed the same man 
outside the courtroom in the hall of the courthouse during the trial of this 
case.

[¶34.]  Mr. Arnold identified Capwell for Officer 
Andreasen who took him into custody and transported him to the police station. 
Andreasen interviewed Capwell, testified that he was the same man whom he had 
taken to the station and who that morning he had seen a sargeant bringing up 
from jail for trial.

[¶35.]  Officer McLaughlin conducted the 
investigation of this reported crime. He was asked the following questions and 
gave these answers:

"Q. Did you learn the 
identity of the person that was taken into custody?

"A. Yes, I 
did.

"Q. Who was 
that?

"A. His name was 
Christopher Capwell.

"Q. Is he the same 
Christopher Capwell who is the defendant in this matter?

"A. Yes, he 
is.

"Q. Was he here this 
morning earlier?

"A. Yes, he 
was.

"Q. Is he the same 
Christopher Capwell who's been in the custody of the Laramie County Jail from - 
well, throughout the intervening period?

"A. Yes, he 
was."

[¶36.]  Applying our standard of review to the 
identification evidence in this case, we have no difficulty finding that the 
evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the burden of the State to identify 
appellant as the person charged in the information with the commission of this 
crime.

[¶37.]  Having found there was no error in the 
charge as presented in the information nor in the identification of appellant at 
the trial, the conviction of appellant is affirmed, but having also found that 
the sentence imposed upon the conviction was not a correct sentence under the 
law, this cause is herewith remanded to the district court for the purpose of 
correcting the sentence consistent with this opinion.

1 Section 6-1-201(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, provided:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if:

"(i) With the intention 
of committing the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards 
commission of the crime. A `substantial step' is conduct which is strongly 
corroborative of the firmness of the actor's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime * * *."

2 Section 6-1-204, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, provided:

"The penalty for attempt, 
solicitation and conspiracy is the same as the penalty for the most serious 
offense which is attempted, solicited or is an object of the conspiracy except 
that an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a capital crime is not 
punishable by the death penalty if the capital crime is not 
committed."

Section 6-4-306, 
W.S. 1977, provided in part:

"(a) A person convicted 
of sexual assault who does not qualify under the criteria of subsection (b) of 
this section shall be punished as follows:

"(i) For sexual assault 
in the first degree, imprisonment for not less than five (5) nor more than fifty 
(50) years."

3 Rule 36, W.R.Cr.P., 
provides:

"The court may correct an 
illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court 
may reduce the sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 
120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the 
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order 
or judgment of the Supreme Court having the effect of upholding the judgment of 
conviction. The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of a probation 
as provided by law."