Title: Jones Food Company, Inc. v. Clarence Shipman and Kathy Shipman (Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court: CV-00-148). Application Overruled. No Opinion.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel 09/21/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1051322
_________________________
Jones Food Company, Inc.
v.
Clarence Shipman and Kathy Shipman
Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-00-148)
On Application for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.  NO OPINION.
Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
See and Lyons, JJ., concur specially.
  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1051322
The opinion on 
original 
submission, 
released 
December 
15,
1
2006, was decided by a division of this Court on which I did
not sit.  On application for rehearing, Chief Justice Cobb,
who replaced Chief Justice Nabers, the author of the opinion,
dissented from overruling the application on rehearing; the
rehearing application was then referred to the entire Court
for decision.
2
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).1
On March 11, 1998, Jones Food Company, Inc. ("Jones
Food"), a franchisee of Huddle House, Inc., retained Clarence
Shipman, the owner of Shipman Heating and Air Conditioning, to
service 
the 
heating, 
ventilation, 
and 
air-conditioning
("HVAC") system at its East Meighan Boulevard Huddle House
restaurant in Gadsden.  Shipman had performed similar services
for Jones Food at other Huddle House restaurant locations.
Shipman and his assistant, Thomas McKinney, made the
service call.  The roof of the restaurant was about 9.5 feet
above the ground and flat; on all four sides, however, it was
surrounded by a facade that sloped inward at approximately a
45-degree angle and extended approximately three feet above
the flat roof, enclosing the rooftop HVAC components.  Shipman
and McKinney decided to use a 20-foot, portable extension
ladder to climb over the facade to access the HVAC system.
Safety instructions on the ladder warned against positioning
1051322
3
it at an angle to the ground of less than 75 degrees.  A
diagram on the ladder illustrated the proper angle for
positioning the ladder before ascending it.  
If the ladder had been positioned at the 75-degree angle
contemplated by the manufacturer, the top of the ladder would
have been approximately four feet from the top of the facade
because of the 45-degree inward slant of the facade.  To avoid
this, Shipman and McKinney leaned the ladder against the face
of the facade; the result was that the ladder leaned at
approximately a 45-degree angle to the ground instead of the
75-degree angle recommended by the manufacturer.  Thus, the
base of the ladder was positioned so that the angle between
the ladder and the ground was substantially less than the
minimum angle recommended by the manufacturer and illustrated
by the diagram on the ladder, with the feet of the ladder
resting on a dry, paved surface that sloped slightly away from
the back of the restaurant.  The bottom of the ladder was not
secured in any way, and the top of the ladder did not have
hooks or any other device to secure it to the roof.  
No Jones Food representative had recommended that Shipman
use the particular ladder that he chose to use.  No Jones Food
1051322
4
representative had told Shipman to position his ladder against
the building at the rear of the restaurant at the angle of the
facade, nor had any Jones Food representative otherwise given
Shipman any instruction as to how he should access the HVAC
system.  
Shipman remained on the ground and held the ladder as
McKinney climbed onto the roof.  When McKinney reached the top
of the facade, he stepped over it, stood on the roof, and held
the top of the ladder while Shipman climbed to the roof.  When
Shipman neared the top of the facade, McKinney repositioned
himself so that Shipman could climb over the facade and onto
the roof.  As McKinney changed his position, he continued to
hold the ladder with one hand; however, as Shipman prepared to
step over the facade, the foot of the ladder slipped and
Shipman fell to the ground.
Shipman sued Jones Food, seeking damages for medical
expenses, lost earnings, and personal injuries (including
permanent disability to his right leg) that resulted from the
accident.  Kathy Shipman, Shipman's spouse, also asserted a
claim of loss of consortium.  The principal claims by the
Shipmans were that Jones Food had negligently, recklessly, and
1051322
5
wantonly failed (1) to warn Shipman of the danger of the roof,
and (2) to repair and maintain the roof area free of defects
with railings or to provide a means of access to the roof
other than a portable ladder.  Jones Food asserted the
affirmative 
defenses 
of 
contributory 
negligence 
and 
assumption
of the risk.
On the day of Shipman's accident, a customer, Calvin
McCoy, was inside the restaurant.  As McCoy left the
restaurant, he noticed McKinney on the roof and saw a ladder
leaning against the building.  Before Shipman fell, McCoy told
him that an employee of another HVAC contractor had fallen
from the roof and that another contractor had braced the
bottom of the ladder against the tire of a truck in order to
secure it. 
Shipman testified that he had noticed the 45-degree slope
of the facade before the accident, but that he did not think
there was anything risky about the method he and McKinney used
to access the roof, nor did he observe any open-and-obvious
danger associated with the roof.  Tony Jones, the owner of
Jones Food, testified that on approximately eight occasions
before the accident he and another representative of Jones
1051322
6
Food had accessed the roof by placing a portable ladder along
the slope of the facade.  On some of those occasions the
ladder was secured at the bottom, but on others it was not.
Jones also testified that he did not consider it unreasonably
dangerous to climb a ladder that was aligned along the slope
of the facade of the building and that was not secured at the
bottom.  John Verhalen, a professional engineer and expert
witness for Jones Food, on the other hand, testified that it
was obvious that the bottom of an unsecured portable ladder
could "kick out" under the weight of a user if the ladder was
positioned at a 45-degree angle to the ground. 
The jury returned verdicts in the Shipmans' favor.
Following the denial of Jones Food's posttrial motions, Jones
Food appealed.
The Chief Justice in her dissent states that she is of
the "opinion that the trial court did not err in denying Jones
Food's motion for a judgment as a matter of law," based on
"the fact that the question whether a danger is open and
obvious is generally one of fact for the jury and given
Jones's testimony that he did not consider it unreasonably
dangerous to climb a ladder that was aligned with the slope of
1051322
7
the [45-degree] facade of the building and that was not
secured at the bottom." ___ So. 2d at ___.  
The dissent cites Howard v. Andy's Store for Men, 757 So.
2d 1208, 1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), for the proposition that
the "'question whether a danger is open and obvious is
generally one of fact.'" ___ So. 2d at ___.  Although this is
a correct statement of the law in general, this Court has held
that certain activities are as a matter of law open-and-
obvious hazards that an invitee should recognize through the
exercise of reasonable care.  Ex parte Schaeffel, 874 So. 2d
493 (Ala. 2004) (holding total darkness to be an open-and-
obvious hazard as a matter of law); Sessions v. Nonnenmann,
842 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 2003) (holding that an open stairwell is
an open-and-obvious hazard as a matter of law); Lilya v.
Greater Gulf State Fair, 855 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 2003) (holding
that the riding of a mechanical bull is an open-and-obvious
hazard as a matter of law); and Ex parte Neese, 819 So. 2d 584
(Ala. 2002) (holding that an upside-down doormat left out in
the rain on a sidewalk is an open-and-obvious hazard as a
matter of law).  
1051322
8
Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 1980), holds
that an aluminum ladder leaning against a metal gutter is an
open-and-obvious hazard as a matter of law.  In Quillen, the
plaintiff installed and repaired  television antennas.  At the
defendant's request, the plaintiff assisted with 
the
installation of 
a 
television antenna on the defendant's house.
The plaintiff climbed an aluminum extension ladder that was
leaning against a 
metal 
gutter.  
After 
successfully installing
the antenna, the plaintiff was about to climb down the ladder
when it shifted, causing the plaintiff to fall.  This Court
held: 
"[A]n aluminum ladder leaning against a metal gutter
constituted an open and obvious danger on the
defendant's property which the plaintiff, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have recognized.
There was no defect in the ladder, and its placement
and position on the premises were as obvious to the
plaintiff as they were to the defendant."  
388 So. 2d at 989.  The dissent would distinguish Quillen
based on Jones's testimony that he had previously used a
ladder in the same way Shipman used the ladder and was of the
opinion that doing so was not unreasonably dangerous.  Jones's
actions and testimony, however, cannot alter the law
established in Quillen.  The fact that some people may have,
1051322
9
without incident, ridden mechanical bulls, walked in total
darkness, stepped on wet doormats, traversed open stairwells,
and ascended precariously situated ladders without perceiving
their danger does not negate the open-and-obvious nature of
the danger as a matter of law.  
The dissent's proposition that Quillen should be
distinguished because in this case one person, the business
invitor, 
did not consider the 
way 
Shipman 
positioned Shipman's
own ladder to be dangerous would transform the legal question
whether certain dangers are open and obvious from one based on
observable facts -- the positioning and placement of the
ladder -- into one based on whether someone, in particular the
business invitor, considered the condition dangerous.  If he
did not, then the danger was not necessarily open and obvious.
I see no justification in reason or in law for such a
modification.
   
I also note that in this case, even if we were to abandon
established precedent in favor of the proposal urged by the
dissent, it would not alter the outcome.  The business
invitor's duty arises from his superior knowledge.  As this
Court stated in Breeden v. Hardy Corp., 562 So. 2d 159, 160
1051322
10
(Ala. 1990): "'[The] entire basis of an invitor's liability
rests upon his superior knowledge of the danger that causes
the invitee's injuries.  If that superior knowledge is
lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the invitor cannot be
held liable.'" (Quoting Heath v. Sims Bros. Constr. Co., 529
So. 2d 994, 995 (Ala. 1988)(citations omitted).)  In the case
before us, it cannot reasonably be argued that Jones's
knowledge of the danger was superior to Shipman's.  Although
the record is unclear as to whether Jones was aware of the
prior accident at the restaurant involving a ladder, the
undisputed testimony at trial was that one of Jones's
customers, Calvin McCoy, told Shipman of the prior accident
before Shipman began climbing the ladder.  Thus, even ignoring
the fact that climbing ladders is apparently an integral part
of Shipman's business, Shipman's knowledge of the particular
situation that presented itself to him at the East Meighan
Boulevard Huddle House restaurant in Gadsden was the same as,
or greater than, Jones's.  
The facts both in Quillen and in this case indicate that
the plaintiffs in both cases failed to exercise the reasonable
care required by the open-and-obvious hazard of an improperly
1051322
11
positioned ladder.  In both cases, the plaintiffs were trained
craftsmen, skilled in their respective businesses.  There is
no indication in either case that the defendant-invitor
possessed superior knowledge or owed any special duty to the
plaintiff.  In both cases, the open-and-obvious nature of the
hazard extinguished any duty that would otherwise have been
owed the invitees by the invitors.  The prior holding of this
Court that "Jones Food owed no common-law duty to Shipman
because the attendant risk here was open and obvious" should
not be disturbed when the law is clear, settled, and apposite.
Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, [Ms. 1051322, December 15, 2006]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006).  The judgment against Jones
Food Company was properly reversed.
For these reasons and because the Shipmans have not
demonstrated that this Court overlooked or misapprehended any
point of law or fact, Rule 40, Ala. R. App. P., I concur in
overruling the application for a rehearing.
Lyons, J., concurs.
1051322
12
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent from the majority's decision to overrule the
Shipmans' application for rehearing.  The opinion in this case
was issued before I took office as Chief Justice.  That
opinion reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the
Shipmans and held that the particular placement of a ladder
against the facade surrounding the roof of a Huddle House
restaurant -- i.e., at a 45-degree angle to the ground  -–
created an open-and-obvious danger as a matter of law.  I
disagree with that holding, and I would grant the application
for rehearing and affirm the judgment.
In its opinion, this Court, quoting Sessions 
v.
Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651–52 (Ala. 2002), correctly
stated the law concerning the duty an invitor owes a
contractor hired to perform work on the invitor's property.
However, I believe that this Court failed to properly consider
the testimony of Tony Jones, the owner of Jones Food Company,
Inc.  During trial, Jones admitted that he owed a duty to
Shipman to disclose that Thomas Cornelius, another heating-
and-air-conditioning repairman, had suffered a prior fall at
1051322
13
the Huddle House restaurant. The following exchange occurred
during trial:
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: [In your deposition,] I
asked you this question: 'Okay.  If you knew that –-
If you knew that that person had fallen or if your
company knew that that person had fallen from the
roof, where a ladder slid off that metal roof, do
you believe or do you feel that your company would
have had an obligation to tell Mr. Shipman about
that prior injury?'  What's your answer?
"[Jones]: I said –- Mr. Bergquist said you have to
answer.  Let's see.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: And what was your answer?
"[Jones]: I said, 'Yes.'  Okay.  Yes.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: And your answer was yes,
wasn't it?
"[Jones]: Yes, sir.  If I had known.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: And at that point –- 
"[Jones]: If I had known for sure that he had fell
off the building.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: Well, my question was not
only if you knew, but if your company knew, wasn't
it?
"[Jones]: Yes, sir that's what –- It's got your
company.  Uh-huh.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: Right.  So, let me ask you
that question again, Mr. Jones.  If somebody in your
company knew that Thomas Cornelius fell off a ladder
at that East Gadsden store before Mr. Shipman came
out there and put one on that roof to go up there
1051322
14
and do some work on your air conditioner, your
company had an obligation to tell him about that
prior injury, didn't they?
"[Jones]: Yes.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: Now, if your company knew
that Thomas Cornelius had fallen off that roof and
you let Clarence Shipman put a ladder on that roof
on the same angle, your company consciously made a
decision to let that gentleman go out there and
endanger himself on the roof that you knew somebody
else had been hurt on, didn't you?
"[Jones]: I don't want anyone to get hurt.
"[Plaintiffs' counsel]: That's not what I asked you,
Mr. Jones.  Your company made a conscious decision,
if it knew that Mr. Cornelius fell from that roof
prior to Mr. Shipman going out there, to let Mr.
Shipman go up there and face whatever danger may be
–- may exist in going on that roof with a ladder,
didn't it?
"[Jones]: When you put it like that, yes."
Although Jones was uncertain as to whether he learned of
Cornelius's fall prior to or immediately after Shipman's fall,
he admitted that some employees of Jones Food had knowledge of
Cornelius's fall before Shipman fell.  Furthermore, Jones
testified that he had accessed the roof at least eight times,
and some of those times had been by way of an unsecured ladder
set at a 45-degree angle.  Jones also testified that he did
not consider it unreasonably dangerous to climb a ladder that
1051322
15
was aligned along the slope of the facade of the building and
that was not secured at the bottom.  
When confronted with questions involving actionable
negligence, this Court must adhere to the following standard:
"'[W]here from the facts shown by the
evidence, although undisputed, reasonable
men might draw different conclusions as to
negligence 
or 
contributory 
negligence, 
such
questions are for the jury, and it is only
when the facts are such that all reasonable
men must draw the same conclusion that
negligence or contributory negligence is
ever a question of law for the Court.
White Swan Laundry Co. v. Wehrhan, 202 Ala.
87, 79 So. 479 [(1918)], Tennessee Mill &
Feed Co. v. Giles, 211 Ala. 44, 99 So. 84
[(1924)]; Callaway v. Moseley, 131 F.2d 414
(Ala. C.C.A. [1942]); Reaves v. Maybank,
193 Ala. 614, 69 So. 137 [(1915)].  In
other words, where not only the facts
constituting the conduct of the parties,
but also the standard of care which they
should have exercised, are to be determined
the case is entirely one of fact to be
decided by the jury.  When the proof
discloses such a state of facts, whether
controverted or not, that, in essaying to
fix responsibility for the injury or
damage, 
different 
minds 
may 
arrive
reasonably at different conclusions or may
disagree reasonably as to the inferences to
be drawn from the facts, the right of a
party in a negligence action to have a jury
pass upon the question of liability becomes
absolute.  Drew v. Western Steel Car & Mfg.
Co., 17[4] Ala. 616, 56 So. 995, 40 L.R.A.,
N.S., 890 [(1911)].'
1051322
16
"Patterson v. Seibenhener, 273 Ala. 204, 206-207,
137 So. 2d 758, 760 (1962).  When a trial court in
a negligence case is confronted with a motion for
directed verdict it must apply this standard, and,
in doing so, must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.  If any
reasonable inference drawn from the evidence proves
to be adverse to the moving party, a motion for
directed verdict is due to be denied.  Turner v.
Peoples Bank of Pell City, 378 So. 2d 706 (Ala.
1979).  Alford v. City of Gadsden, 349 So. 2d 1132
(Ala. 1977).  These principles are applicable to the
present case and govern our decision in determining
the propriety of the trial court's decision."
Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985, 988 (Ala. 1980).  "The
question whether a danger is open and obvious is generally one
of fact." Howard v. Andy's Store for Men, 757 So. 2d 1208,
1211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).  "[T]he plaintiff's appreciation
of the danger is, almost always, a question of fact for the
determination of the jury."  F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Bradbury,
273 
Ala. 
392, 
394, 
140 
So. 
2d 
824, 
825-26 
(1962).
Furthermore, "[t]here is a presumption that a jury's verdict
is correct; that presumption is strengthened when the trial
court has denied a motion for a new trial."  SouthTrust Bank
v. Donely, 925 So. 2d 934, 943 (Ala. 2005) (citing First
Alabama Bank of South Baldwin v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of
America, 619 So. 2d 1313 (Ala. 1993)). 
1051322
17
Previously, this court has held that placing a ladder
against a metal gutter on a home is an open-and-obvious
danger.  See Quillen, supra.  However, I disagree with this
Court's 
opinion 
that Quillen 
is persuasive authority.
Instead, I find the facts presently before this Court
distinguishable from the facts in Quillen.  Whereas Jones
testified that he had ascended to the roof of the Huddle House
in the same manner as did Shipman and did not consider it
unreasonably dangerous, no such evidence existed in Quillen.
Given the fact that the question whether a danger is open
and obvious is generally one of fact for the jury and given
Jones's testimony that he did not consider it unreasonably
dangerous to climb a ladder that was aligned with the slope of
the facade of the building and that was not secured at the
bottom, I am of the opinion that the trial court did not err
in denying Jones Food's motion for a judgment as a matter of
law.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Shipman, it is
obvious that the facts are not such that all reasonable men
must draw the same conclusion that the placement of the ladder
was an open-and-obvious danger.  Therefore, I respectfully
1051322
18
dissent from the majority's decision to overrule the
application for rehearing.