Title: Sam Parisi v. Broward County

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC93240
____________
SAM PARISI and SAM PARISI d/b/a SAM'S RECYCLING, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
BROWARD COUNTY,
Respondent.
[July 14, 2000]
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review Parisi v. Broward County, 710 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997), based on express and direct conflict with this Court's opinion in
Johnson v. Bednar, 573 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1991).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V,
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
FACTS
The present controversy evolved from Broward County’s (the County)
counterclaim for injunctive relief to prevent the petitioners, Sam Parisi and Sam
1The petitioners initially filed a complaint for declaratory relief and a motion for a restraining
order in response to the County’s administrative actions.  Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the
petitioners’ complaint.  However, the counterclaim filed by the County seeking injunctive relief
remained viable.
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Parisi d/b/a Sam's Recycling, Inc., from engaging in operations at their auto salvage
yard (the Yard) that endangered the environment.1  The trial court entered an order
granting the County’s request for injunctive relief and enjoined the petitioners from
engaging in operations at the Yard causing the discharge of hazardous materials, as
well as requiring the construction of additional secondary containment at the Yard.
The County subsequently moved to hold the petitioners in civil contempt for
failing to comply with previous orders enjoining environmental hazards.  At the
conclusion of the hearing, the County stated that "[w]e're asking this court to
exercise its power under the law and levy civil contempt fines.  We would like those
contempt fines secured by a bond."  (Emphasis supplied.)  
The trial court adjudged the petitioners in civil contempt and ordered the
petitioners to post a "bonded fine" as a contempt sanction to secure performance
of certain remedial measures on the property.  See Parisi, 710 So. 2d at 981.  The
contempt order required the petitioners to either post a bond or place funds in
escrow pending their compliance with the court's orders to remediate contamination
2The contempt order required three separate bonded fines in the amounts of $285,000,
$75,000, and $30,000.  The first bonded fine required the amount of $285,000 to be held in escrow or
posted as a bond until a remediation system had been constructed.  Because petitioners have
completed the construction of the remediation system, the $285,000 bonded fine is no longer at issue.  
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at the Yard.2  The contempt order provided that the bonded fines would carry over
"from year to year" until both the active remediation of the property and the
monitoring phase concluded.  The contempt order further provided that if
petitioners failed to comply with the orders to remediate the property, the funds
would revert to the County and petitioners' business could be shut down.
Petitioners argue that the trial court's order was deficient because it did not
consider their financial resources to post the bond before imposing the contempt
sanction.  The Fourth District rejected this argument, finding that all that was
required was that the trial court make a finding "that the contemnor had the ability
to comply with the underlying order that required some type of action."  Id. 
Accordingly, the Fourth District concluded that the contemnors' "ability to post the
bond would become relevant in a motion for contempt for the failure to post it,
where the county seeks the imposition of a fine under Johnson or of a purgeable jail
sentence."  Id.
On rehearing, Judge Warner dissented, concluding that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
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304 (1947), requires that:
[A] court which has returned a conviction for contempt must, in fixing
the amount of a fine to be imposed as a punishment or as a means of
securing future compliance, consider the amount of defendant's
financial resources and the consequent seriousness of the burden to
that particular defendant.
Parisi, 710 So. 2d at 982 (quoting United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304)
(emphasis supplied).  Judge Warner concluded that under this precedent, before
imposing a civil contempt fine, including the "bonded fine" imposed here, the trial
court must consider the financial resources of the contemnor.  See id.  
The core issue to resolve in this case is whether the "bonded fine" imposed
is a valid civil contempt sanction.  The County asserts that because the trial court
did not impose a fine, but instead imposed a "bonded fine," there was no need to
comply with the requirements applicable to contempt sanctions, including an
inquiry into the financial resources of the contemnor.  Alternatively, the County
asserts that this "bonded fine" was a compensatory contempt sanction for which
the financial resources of the contemnor do not need to be considered. 
ANALYSIS
In exploring whether the imposition of a "bonded fine" constitutes a valid
contempt sanction without consideration of the financial resources of the
petitioners, we begin our analysis with a review the of the contours of contempt
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jurisprudence.  "It has long been recognized that courts have the authority to
enforce a judgment by the exercise of their contempt powers."  Johnson, 573 So.
2d at 824.  The courts are granted this contempt authority because:  "The interests
of orderly government demand that respect and compliance be given to orders
issued by courts possessed of jurisdiction of persons and subject matter."  United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303.  Broad, discretionary contempt powers provide
the courts with the "power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates."  International Union, United
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).  As this Court recognized in Johnson:
"[W]ithout authority to act promptly and independently the courts
could not administer public justice or enforce the rights of private
litigants."  It is essential that our courts have the judicial power to
enforce their orders; otherwise, judgments are only advisory.  If a
party can make oneself a judge of the validity of orders issued by trial
courts, and by one's own act of disobedience set them aside, then our
courts are devoid of power, and the judicial power, both federal and
state, would be a mockery. 
573 So. 2d at 822 (quoting Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
450 (1911)) (citations omitted).  
While the inherent contempt power of a single judge is a bulwark of our legal
system, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that contempt power
3In fact, the motion for civil contempt in this case was filed only after criminal contempt
proceedings based on the same contemptuous conduct had been instituted, resulting in a hung jury.
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"uniquely is 'liable to abuse.'"  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831.  This is because in the
area of civil contempt proceedings, "the offended judge [is] solely responsible for
identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious conduct." 
Id.  Thus, a balance must be struck between the recognition that courts are vested
with contempt powers to vindicate their authority and the necessity of preventing
abuse of these broad contempt powers.  See id. at 831-32.
Contempt sanctions are broadly categorized as criminal or civil contempt. 
Civil contempt sanctions are further classified as either compensatory or coercive
sanctions.  See Johnson, 573 So. 2d at 824.  The same contemptuous conduct may
be the subject of both criminal and civil proceedings.3  The distinction between
criminal and civil contempt often turns on the "character and purpose" of the
sanctions involved.  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441). 
We have previously explained that "[t]he purpose of criminal contempt . . . is to
punish.  Criminal contempt proceedings are utilized to vindicate the authority of the
court or to punish for an intentional violation of an order of the court."  Bowen v.
Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985).  On the other hand, a contempt
sanction is considered civil if it "is remedial, and for the benefit of the
4For example, imprisonment imposed to punish a contemnor for a completed act of
disobedience may still have a coercive effect because the contemnor may be motivated to obey court
orders in the future.  See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828
(1994). 
5Numerous scholars have criticized the traditional distinction between criminal and civil
contempt as unworkable.  See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 n.3 (1994).  As one commentator has
observed: "Few legal concepts have bedeviled courts, judges, lawyers and legal commentators more
than contempt of court."  Id. (quoting Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the
Confusion between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 677 (1981)); see Gino F.
Ercolino, Comment, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell:  Further Clarification of Civil and Criminal
Contempt?, 22 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 291, 292-93 (1996); Philip A. Hostak,
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complainant."  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-28 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441). 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the stated purpose of a
contempt sanction is not determinative of whether a contempt sanction is civil or
criminal.  See id.  Further, regardless of whether a sanction is civil or criminal,
"[w]hen a court imposes fines and punishments on a contemnor, it is not only
vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it also is seeking to
give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the contemnor's behavior to conform
to the terms required in the order."  Id. at 828 (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S.
624, 635 (1988)).  In fact, as the Supreme Court recognized in Bagwell, most
contempt sanctions "to some extent punish a prior offense as well as coerce an
offender's future obedience."  Id.4   
Notwithstanding the "somewhat elusive" distinction between civil and
criminal contempt,5 determining whether the contempt proceedings are civil or
Note, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 181, 217-18 (1995).
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criminal is critical to the court and to the parties because the nature of the contempt
both determines the procedures for adjudication and sets the parameters for the
sanctions that can be imposed.  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 830-31; see also Gregory v.
Rice, 727 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 1999) (quoting In re Amendments to Fla. Family
Law Rules of Procedure, 723 So. 2d 208, 213 (Fla. 1998)).  Because criminal
contempt is "a crime in the ordinary sense," imposition of criminal contempt
sanctions requires that a contemnor be afforded the same constitutional due
process protections afforded to criminal defendants.  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826
(quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)); see, e.g., Gregory, 727 So.
2d at 253 (quoting Amendments, 723 So. 2d at 213); Bowen, 471 So. 2d at 1278. 
These rights include the right of criminal defendants to be represented by counsel,
the right to have the State prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
right not to incriminate oneself.  See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826-27.  Further, in
criminal contempt sanctions involving imprisonment for more than six months,
defendants are granted the right to a jury trial.  See id.  In addition to these
constitutional rights, our rules of criminal procedure provide specific procedures
for both direct and indirect criminal contempt. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830; 3.840.
6As we recognized in In re Amendments to Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, 723 So.
2d 208, 213 (Fla. 1998), and Gregory v. Rice, 727 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 1999), Bagwell requires
that we recede from Johnson v. Bednar, 573 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1991), to the extent it required a purge
provision only if incarceration was being ordered and not when a fine or other civil sanction was
imposed.
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On the other hand, "[b]ecause civil contempt sanctions are viewed as
nonpunitive and avoidable, fewer procedural protections for such sanctions have
been required."  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831.  Thus, civil contempt "may be imposed
in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Neither
a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required."  Id. at 827. While civil
contempt sanctions do not require the same procedural and constitutional
protections as criminal contempt, the key safeguard in civil contempt proceedings
is a finding by the trial court that the contemnor has the ability to purge the
contempt.6  See id. at 829; Gregory, 727 So. 2d at 253-54 (quoting Amendments,
723 So. 2d at 213); Pompey v. Cochran, 685 So. 2d 1007, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997).  
While there is a broad arsenal of coercive civil contempt sanctions available
to the trial court, including "incarceration, garnishment of wages, additional
employment, the filing of reports, additional fines, the delivery of certain assets, the
revocation of a driver's license," to be a valid civil contempt sanction the contempt
order must include a purge provision.  Gregory, 727 So. 2d at 254.  Without this
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critical protection, there is a danger that the contempt sanction could be
transformed from a civil to a criminal contempt sanction without any other
underlying procedural protections attendant to criminal proceedings.  See Bagwell,
512 U.S. at 827; Pompey, 685 So 2d at 1013.
For example, incarceration may be either a criminal or civil sanction.  If a
fixed sentence of imprisonment is imposed for a "completed act of disobedience,"
then the contempt is punitive and criminal because the contemnor cannot avoid the
confinement through compliance with the court's order.  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-
29.  In contrast, if incarceration is imposed as a coercive civil contempt sanction,
the ability to purge the contempt allows the contemnor to "carr[y] the keys of his
prison in his own pocket."  Id. at 828.
The dichotomy between coercive and punitive imprisonment has been
extended to contempt fines, requiring that contemnors be given the opportunity to
first purge the underlying contempt by performing an affirmative act before the fine
can be imposed. See id.  The United States Supreme Court explained that a fine is
criminal if "the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the
amount of the fine through compliance."  Id. at 829 (emphasis supplied).
An example of a valid coercive fine is a per diem fine imposed each day the
contemnor fails to comply with the court's order, but when the contemnor complies
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with the underlying order, the requirement to pay the additional fines will be purged. 
See id.  Similarly, the imposition of a fixed fine that is "imposed and suspended
pending future compliance" with the court's prior orders is considered a purgeable
sanction.  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829.  In contrast, any "flat, unconditional fine" is
considered a criminal sanction because it does not afford the opportunity to purge
the contempt through compliance.  Id.; see also United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at
305 (stating that a fine is coercive, rather than punitive, if "condition[ed] on the
defendant's failure to purge itself within a reasonable time").
A second important protection applicable in civil contempt proceedings
where a fine is imposed as a coercive sanction is that the trial court's discretion in
imposing the amount of the fine is not unlimited.  The United States Supreme Court
explained that in determining the amount of a coercive or criminal fine the court 
must . . . consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened
by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any
suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.  
It is a corollary of the above principles that a court which has
returned a conviction for contempt must, in fixing the amount of a fine
to be imposed as a punishment or as a means of securing future
compliance, consider the amount of defendant's financial resources
and the consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular
defendant.  
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied); see
Johnson, 573 So. 2d at 824.  Therefore, in imposing both criminal fines or coercive
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civil contempt fines, the court must consider the financial resources of the
contemnor in setting the amount of the fine.  See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at
304; Johnson, 573 So. 2d at 824.  Thus, in order to impose a valid coercive
sanction, the trial court must both consider the financial resources of the contemnor
before assessing the amount of the sanction and include a purge provision. 
APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS
As noted above, a monetary fine as a contempt sanction may be legally
imposed as a criminal contempt sanction, a coercive contempt sanction, or a
compensatory contempt sanction depending on the purpose for which it is
imposed, the procedures followed prior to its imposition, and the conditions under
which the fine is imposed.  We initially reject the County's argument that the
bonded fine constitutes a valid compensatory contempt sanction.  While courts
have the unquestioned authority to order a civil contempt fine to compensate for
losses sustained, "[i]f compensation is intended, the fine must be based on
evidence of the injured party’s actual loss." Johnson, 573 So. 2d at 824 (emphasis
supplied); see United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303; South Dade Farms, Inc. v.
Peters, 88 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 1956); National Exterminators, Inc. v. Truly Nolen,
Inc., 86 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1956), receded from on other grounds, Johnson, 573
So. 2d at 825.  
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The bonded fine imposed in this case cannot constitute a valid
compensatory sanction because the County did not submit any evidence to
establish that the amount of the sanction was related to damages suffered as a result
of the contemptuous conduct in violating the injunction.  Further, the entire amount
of the bond could be forfeited without any showing that the amount of the bond
was related to the actual damages suffered by the County.  There is no indication in
either the trial court's order or the Fourth District's decision that this contempt
sanction was considered a compensatory contempt sanction.  See Parisi, 710 So.
2d at 981.  Accordingly, we analyze the imposition of the bonded fine to determine
whether it constitutes a valid coercive civil contempt sanction.
We also agree with the petitioners that the bonded fine is an invalid coercive
civil contempt sanction.  Notwithstanding labels, the "bonded fine" imposed in this
case was intended to have the same effect as any contempt sanction.  Similar to a
fine, the contempt order required the funds to be placed immediately in escrow or a
bond to be posted immediately upon threat of the petitioners' business being shut
down.  The contempt order indicated that the bond would be carried over "from
year to year" for an indefinite period--until both the active cleanup and monitoring
phases of the remediation of the property had been completed.  Pending
compliance with the order to remediate the property, if the petitioners placed the
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funds in escrow, they would have been deprived of the use of the funds for a
period of years.  Alternatively, if the petitioners chose to post a bond, they would
be required to pay the bond premiums.
Because the bonded fine was a civil contempt sanction, similar to a fine, the
trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of the petitioners' financial resources
before assessing the amount of the bonded fine.  We conclude that the Fourth
District misapplied this Court's decision in Johnson and agree with Judge Warner’s
dissent that the trial court should have considered the financial resources of the
petitioners when determining what amount of bond constituted an appropriate civil
contempt sanction.
We also question whether there was an additional deficiency in this contempt
order because the petitioners were not afforded an opportunity to purge the
underlying contempt.  See generally Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29.  However, we
decline to reach this issue because it was not decided by the Fourth District in this
case.  Further, the Fourth District did not address the complicated procedural and
factual history in this case.
Finally, although courts have broad discretion in formulating a valid
contempt sanction, see Gregory, 727 So. 2d at 254, we conclude that the hybrid
contempt sanction in this case--termed a "bonded fine"--should not be utilized by
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trial courts in the future as a contempt sanction because of the confusion it is likely
to create both for the litigants and the courts.  We emphasize that our disapproval
of a bonded fine is not meant to restrict the ability of courts to impose creative
contempt sanctions or to enter a valid injunction and require the posting of a bond
incident to that injunction, where otherwise appropriate.  See, e.g, Martin v. Pinellas
County, 444 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.610.
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in result only.
I concur in result only.  I would quash simply for the reasons stated in Judge
Warner's dissenting opinion.
I am concerned that the majority's very long analysis deals with issues which
are not presented to us in this case.
SHAW, J., concurs.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
FourthDistrict - Case No.4D95-2949
(Broward County)
Paul R. Regensdorf of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale,
Florida,
for Petitioners
Edward A. Dion, County Attorney for Broward County, and Andrew J. Meyers,
Chief Appellate Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Sharon L. Cruz, Interim County
Attorney, Anthony C. Musto, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Tamara M. Scrudders,
Assistant County Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, Florida;  and Noel M. Pfeffer, Interim
County Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,  
for Respondents