Title: Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1450-OA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed Perkins and 
Ronald Zahn, 
          Petitioners, 
Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces 
de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, 
Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan 
Steil, Congressman Tom Tiffany, Congressman 
Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, 
Kathleen Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha,  
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge Bostelmann 
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Julie Glancey in 
her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann Jacobs  
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dean Knudson in 
his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Robert Spindell, 
Jr. in his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission and Mark Thomsen 
in his official capacity as a member of the  
Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
          Respondents, 
The Wisconsin Legislature, Governor Tony Evers, 
in his official capacity, and Janet Bewley 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader, on behalf of 
the Senate Democratic Caucus, 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 30, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
 
2 
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court with respect to all parts except ¶¶8, 69-72, and 81, 
in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined, and an opinion with respect to ¶¶8, 69–72, and 81, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., 
filed a concurring opinion.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners, there were briefs filed by Richard M. 
Esenberg, Anthony F. LoCoco, Lucas T. Vebber and Wisconsin 
Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee.  
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Black Leaders Organizing for 
Communities, Voces de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson and Rebecca Alwin, 
briefs, including amicus briefs, were filed by Douglas M. Poland, 
Jeffrey A. Mandell, Rachel E. Snyder, Richard A. Manthe, Carly 
Gerads and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison; Mel Barnes and Law 
Forward, Inc., Madison; Mark P. Gaber (pro hac vice), Christopher 
Lamar (pro hac vice)and Campaign Legal Center, Washington, D.C.; 
Annabelle Harless (pro hac vice) and Campaign Legal Center, 
Chicago. 
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Congressmen Glenn Grothman, 
Mike Gallagher, Bryan Steil, Tom Tiffany and Scott Fitzgerald there 
were briefs, including amicus briefs, filed by Misha Tseytlin, 
Kevin M. LeRoy, and Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Chicago.  
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz and Kathleen Qualheim, 
there were briefs, including amicus briefs filed by Charles G. 
 
 
3 
Curtis, Jr. and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison; Marc Erik Elias (pro 
hac vice), Aria C. Branch (pro hac vice), Daniel C. Osher (pro hac 
vice), Jacob D. Shelly (pro hac vice), Christina A. Ford (pro hac 
vice), William K. Hancock (pro hac vice) and Elias Law Group LLP, 
Washington, D.C.   
 
For the intervenors-petitioners Citizens Mathematicians and 
Scientists Gary Krenz, Sarah J. Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, 
Jean-Luc Thiffeault and Somesh Jha, briefs were filed by Michael 
P. May, Sarah A. Zylstra, Tanner G. Jean-Louis and Boardman & Clark 
LLP, Madison, and David J. Bradford (pro hac vice) and Jenner & 
Block LLP, Chicago. 
 
For the respondents Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann, Julie Glancey, Ann Jacobs, Dean Knudson, Robert 
Spindell, Jr. and Mark Thomsen there were letter-briefs filed by 
Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, Karla Z. 
Keckhaver, assistant attorney general, Thomas C. Bellavia, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
For the intervenors-respondents the Wisconsin Legislature 
there were briefs filed by Kevin M. St. John and Bell Giftos St. 
John LLC, Madison; Jeffrey M. Harris (pro hac vice), Taylor A.R. 
Meehan (pro hac vice), James P. McGlone and Consovoy McCarthy PLLC, 
Arlington, Virginia and Adam K. Mortara and Lawfair LLC, Chicago. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent Governor Tony Evers there were 
briefs filed by Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, Anthony D. 
Russomanno, assistant attorney general and Brian P. Keenan, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
For the intervenor-respondent Janet Bewley, State Senate 
Democratic Minority Leader on behalf of the State Senate Democratic 
 
 
4 
Caucus there were briefs filed by Tamara B. Packard, Aaron G. Dumas 
and Pines Bach LLP, Madison. 
 
There was an amicus brief filed by Daniel R. Suhr, 
Thiensville. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 87 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1450-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Billie Johnson, Eric O'Keefe, Ed Perkins and 
Ronald Zahn, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
Black Leaders Organizing for Communities, Voces 
de la Frontera, League of Women Voters of 
Wisconsin, Cindy Fallona, Lauren Stephenson, 
Rebecca Alwin, Congressman Glenn Grothman, 
Congressman Mike Gallagher, Congressman Bryan 
Steil, Congressman Tom Tiffany, Congressman 
Scott Fitzgerald, Lisa Hunter, Jacob Zabel, 
Jennifer Oh, John Persa, Geraldine Schertz, 
Kathleen Qualheim, Gary Krenz, Sarah J. 
Hamilton, Stephen Joseph Wright, Jean-Luc 
Thiffeault, and Somesh Jha,  
 
          Intervenors-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Marge 
Bostelmann in her official capacity as a member 
of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Julie 
Glancey in her official capacity as a member of 
the Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ann Jacobs 
in her official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dean Knudson in 
his official capacity as a member of the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Robert 
Spindell, Jr. in his official capacity as a 
member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
and Mark Thomsen in his official capacity as a 
member of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, 
 
          Respondents, 
FILED 
 
NOV 30, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
The Wisconsin Legislature, Governor Tony Evers, 
in his official capacity, and Janet Bewley 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader, on behalf of 
the Senate Democratic Caucus, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court with respect to all parts except ¶¶8, 69-72, and 81, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an 
opinion with respect to ¶¶8, 69–72, and 81, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., 
and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION.  Rights declared.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   The Wisconsin Constitution 
requires the legislature "to apportion and district anew the 
members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of 
inhabitants" after each census conducted under the United States 
Constitution every ten years.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  In 
fulfilling this responsibility, the legislature draws maps 
reflecting the legislative districts across the state.  Every 
census invariably reveals population changes within legislative 
districts, and the legislature must thereafter satisfy the 
constitutional 
requirement 
that 
each 
district 
contain 
approximately equal numbers of people by developing new maps, which 
are subject to veto by the governor.  When this occurs, courts are 
often asked to step in and draw the maps. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
3 
 
¶2 
This year, the legislature drew maps, the governor 
vetoed them, and all parties agree the existing maps, enacted into 
law in 2011, are now unconstitutional because shifts in Wisconsin's 
population around the state have disturbed the constitutionally 
guaranteed equality of the people's representation in the state 
legislature and in the United States House of Representatives.  We 
have been asked to provide a remedy for that inequality.  Some 
parties to this action further complain that the 2011 maps reflect 
a partisan gerrymander favoring Republican Party candidates at the 
expense of Democrat Party candidates, and ask us to redraw the 
maps to allocate districts equally between these dominant parties, 
although no one asks us to assign districts to any minor parties 
in proportion to their share of Wisconsin's electoral vote. 
¶3 
The United States Supreme Court recently declared there 
are no legal standards by which judges may decide whether maps are 
politically "fair."  Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499-
500 (2019).  We agree.  The Wisconsin Constitution requires the 
legislature——a political body——to establish the legislative 
districts in this state.  Just as the laws enacted by the 
legislature reflect policy choices, so will the maps drawn by that 
political body.  Nothing in the constitution empowers this court 
to second-guess those policy choices, and nothing in the 
constitution vests this court with the power of the legislature to 
enact new maps.  Our role in redistricting remains a purely 
judicial one, which limits us to declaring what the law is and 
affording the parties a remedy for its violation.   
¶4 
In this case, the maps drawn in 2011 were enacted by the 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
4 
 
legislature and signed into law by the governor.  Their lawfulness 
was challenged in a federal court, which upheld them (subject to 
a slight adjustment to Assembly Districts 8 and 9 in order to 
comply with federal law).  Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't 
Accountability Bd., 862 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (E.D. Wis. 2012).  In 
2021, those maps no longer comply with the constitutional 
requirement of an equal number of citizens in each legislative 
district, due to shifts in population across the state.  This court 
will remedy that malapportionment, while ensuring the maps satisfy 
all other constitutional and statutory requirements.  Claims of 
political unfairness in the maps present political questions, not 
legal ones.  Such claims have no basis in the constitution or any 
other law and therefore must be resolved through the political 
process and not by the judiciary. 
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND HOLDING 
¶5 
Billie Johnson et al., four Wisconsin voters ("Wisconsin 
voters"), filed a petition for leave to commence an original action 
in this court following the release of the results of the 2020 
census.  Claiming to live in malapportioned congressional and state 
legislative districts, they have asked us to declare the existing 
maps——codified in Chapters 3 and 4 of the Wisconsin Statutes——
violate the "one person, one vote" principle embodied in Article 
IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  They also have asked 
us to enjoin the respondents, the Wisconsin Elections Commission 
(WEC) 
and 
its 
members 
in 
their 
official 
capacity, 
from 
administering congressional and state legislative elections until 
the political branches adopt redistricting plans meeting the 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
5 
 
requirements of Article IV.  Because the legislature and the 
governor reached an impasse, the Wisconsin voters request a 
mandatory injunction,1 remedying what all parties agree are 
unconstitutional plans by making only those changes necessary for 
the maps to comport with the one person, one vote principle while 
satisfying other constitutional and statutory mandates (a "least-
change" approach). 
¶6 
We granted the petition and permitted the legislature, 
the governor, and several other parties to intervene.  The 
intervenors raised numerous issues of federal and state law.  In 
addition to the requirements of Article IV of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, we have been asked to consider the following laws in 
shaping any judicial remedy for the malapportioned congressional 
and state legislative districts:  (1) Article I, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution; (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965;2 and (4) multiple provisions of 
the Wisconsin Constitution's Declaration of Rights. 
¶7 
In anticipation of implementing a judicial remedy upon 
                                                 
1 A "mandatory injunction" is "[a]n injunction that orders an 
affirmative act or mandates a specified course of conduct."  
Mandatory injunction, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  When 
a court orders elections be conducted pursuant to modified maps, 
it is effectively ordering a mandatory injunction.  See Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 541 (1964). 
2 One intervenor invoked the Fifteenth Amendment of the United 
States 
Constitution, 
but 
did 
not 
develop 
an 
argument 
distinguishable from the intervenor's VRA argument.  See Hunter et 
al. Br. at 20, 30.  Accordingly, we do not address the Fifteenth 
Amendment further. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
6 
 
the expected impasse the political branches have now reached, we 
ordered the parties to address four issues: 
(1) 
Under the relevant state and federal laws, what 
factors should we consider in evaluating or 
creating new maps? 
(2) 
Is the partisan makeup of districts a valid factor 
for us to consider in evaluating or creating new 
maps? 
(3) 
The petitioners ask us to modify existing maps 
using a "least-change" approach.  Should we do so, 
and if not, what approach should we use? 
(4) 
As we evaluate or create new maps, what litigation 
process 
should 
we 
use 
to 
determine 
a 
constitutionally sufficient map?[3] 
We addressed the fourth question, at least preliminarily, in a 
prior order. 
¶8 
We hold:  (1) redistricting disputes may be judicially 
resolved only to the extent necessary to remedy the violation of 
a justiciable and cognizable right protected under the United 
States Constitution, the VRA, or Article IV, Sections 3, 4, or 5 
of the Wisconsin Constitution; (2) the partisan makeup of districts 
does not implicate any justiciable or cognizable right; and 
(3) this court will confine any judicial remedy to making the 
minimum changes necessary in order to conform the existing 
congressional and state legislative redistricting plans to 
constitutional and statutory requirements.  The existing maps were 
passed by the legislature and signed by the governor.  They 
                                                 
3 Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order (Wis. 
Oct. 14, 2021) (per curiam) (ordering supplemental briefing). 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
7 
 
survived judicial review in federal court.  Revisions are now 
necessary only to remedy malapportionment produced by population 
shifts made apparent by the decennial census.  Because the 
judiciary lacks the lawmaking power constitutionally conferred on 
the legislature, we will limit our remedy to achieving compliance 
with the law rather than imposing policy choices.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Legal Context 
¶9 
Historical context helps frame the Petitioners' claims 
by illustrating the one person, one vote principle.  The phrase 
"one person, one vote" is a relatively modern expression, but the 
concept of equal representation by population, as well as its 
alternatives, were familiar at the founding.  In eighteenth-
century England, over half of the members of the House of Commons 
were elected from sparsely populated districts, later branded the 
"rotten boroughs."  Such a system of representation undermined 
popular sovereignty.  5 T.H.B. Oldfield, The Representative 
History of Great Britain and Ireland 219 (1816) ("The great Earl 
of Chatham called these boroughs the excrescences, the rotten part 
of the constitution, which must be amputated to save the body from 
a mortification."). 
¶10 In contrast, representation by population gives an area 
with a larger population more influence in the legislative body 
than an area with a smaller population.  Our nation's founders 
enshrined this principle in Article I, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution.  Its third clause specifies that the House of 
Representatives, unlike its predecessor, the House of Commons, 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
8 
 
must be apportioned "among the several States . . . according to 
their respective Numbers[.]"  To account for population shifts, it 
requires the federal government to conduct a census every ten years 
and then reapportion representatives.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, 
cl. 3. 
¶11 The Framers established a bicameral legislature.  They 
viewed per capita representation in the House of Representatives 
as essential to the preservation of the people's liberty.  The 
Federalist No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  With respect to the Senate, the Framers enshrined the 
concept of state sovereignty by allocating senators equally among 
the states, regardless of population size.  See U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed 
of two Senators from each State.").  Accordingly, Senate seats are 
unaffected by redistricting. 
¶12 Redistricting involves many political choices, and the 
United States Constitution does not substantially constrain state 
legislatures' discretion to decide how congressional elections are 
conducted.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.  Nevertheless, 
redistricting must comply with the one person, one vote principle.  
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).  Even if a state does 
not gain or lose congressional seats, redistricting is often a 
constitutional imperative after each census due to geographic 
population shifts. 
¶13 Wisconsin's 
founders 
also 
guaranteed 
equal 
representation by population in our state constitution, which 
places an affirmative duty on the legislature to implement 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
9 
 
redistricting plans for the state legislature every ten years, 
after the federal census, to account for population shifts.  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 3.  No provision of the Wisconsin Constitution 
requires the legislature to apportion or district anew the state's 
congressional districts.4  Other federal and state laws, discussed 
in more detail in the remainder of this opinion, place further 
limitations on the legislature's discretion when implementing 
redistricting plans. 
B.  The 2020 Census 
¶14 The legislature enacted the current maps in 2011.  2011 
Wis. Act 44; 2011 Wis. Act 43.  Wisconsin's eight congressional 
districts are mapped in Wis. Stat. §§ 3.11 to 3.18 (2019–20).5  See 
also Wis. Stat. § 3.001 ("This state is divided into 8 
congressional districts.").  The state's 99 assembly districts are 
mapped in Wis. Stat. §§ 4.01 to 4.99, although a federal district 
court made a slight adjustment to Assembly Districts 8 and 9 after 
concluding the map violated the VRA.  Baldus, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 
863.  The state's 33 senate districts are mapped in Wis. Stat. 
§ 4.009.  See also Wis. Stat. § 4.001 ("This state is divided into 
33 senate districts, each composed of 3 assembly districts."). 
¶15 In August 2021, the United States Census Bureau 
delivered redistricting data to the State of Wisconsin based upon 
                                                 
4 The Petitioners agree this court has never held any 
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution imposes a one person, one 
vote requirement on congressional districts.  Omnibus Am. Pet., ¶1 
n.2. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019–20 version. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
10 
 
the 2020 census.  According to census data, the population of 
Wisconsin grew from 5,686,986 to 5,893,718.  In order to realize 
equal legislative representation across districts, the ideal 
congressional district should have 736,715 people, the ideal 
assembly district should have 59,533, and the ideal senate district 
should have 178,598.  While the ideal size of each district has 
changed, the number of districts remains the same.  Wisconsin has 
not lost or gained any congressional seats, and the number of 
assembly and senate districts is set by Wisconsin statutes.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 3.001, 4.001. 
¶16 The Wisconsin voters and many intervenors live in 
malapportioned districts, meaning they live in districts that are 
overpopulated.  For example, one Wisconsin voter, Johnson, lives 
in Assembly District 78, which has a population of 66,838——7,305 
more than ideal.  If the districts are not reapportioned, Johnson's 
vote will be diluted in the ensuing elections. 
C.  The Impasse 
¶17 On 
November 
11, 
2021, 
the 
legislature 
passed 
redistricting plans.  One week later, the governor vetoed the 
legislation.  The legislature has failed to override his veto.   
¶18 At this point, the political branches have reached an 
impasse, and our involvement in redistricting has become 
appropriate.  See Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished 
order, at 2 (Wis. Sept. 22, 2021, amended Sept. 24) (per curiam) 
(granting the petition for leave to commence an original action) 
("[J]udicial relief becomes appropriate in reapportionment cases 
only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
11 
 
constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an 
adequate opportunity to do so." (citation omitted)).  The parties 
present diametrically opposed views regarding the manner in which 
this court should remedy what all parties agree is an 
unconstitutional malapportionment of congressional and state 
legislative districts.   
¶19 Notwithstanding a history of judicial involvement in 
redistricting, in our constitutional order it remains the 
legislature's duty.  State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman (Zimmerman 
I), 22 Wis. 2d 544, 569–70, 126 N.W.2d 551 (1964).  Article IV, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution commands, "[a]t its first 
session after each enumeration made by the authority of the United 
States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the 
members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of 
inhabitants."  "The Framers in their wisdom entrusted this 
decennial exercise to the legislative branch because the give-and-
take 
of 
the 
legislative 
process, 
involving 
as 
it 
does 
representatives elected by the people to make precisely these sorts 
of political and policy decisions, is preferable to any other."  
Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 
639 N.W.2d 537 (per curiam).  The political process failed this 
year, necessitating our involvement.  As should be self-evident 
from this court's lack of legislative power, any remedy we may 
impose would be in effect only "until such time as the legislature 
and governor have enacted a valid legislative apportionment plan."  
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman (Zimmerman II), 23 Wis. 2d 606, 
606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964) (per curiam). 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
12 
 
III.  OUR REVIEW 
A.  Exercising Our Original Jurisdiction 
¶20 We review this case under our original jurisdiction 
conferred 
by 
Article 
VII, 
Section 3(2) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, pursuant to which "[t]he supreme court . . . may 
hear original actions and proceedings."  Generally, we exercise 
our original jurisdiction when the case concerns "the sovereignty 
of the state, its franchises or prerogatives, or the liberties of 
its people."  Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 436, 284 N.W. 42 
(1938) (per curiam) (quoting Att'y Gen. v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 35 
Wis. 425, 518 (1874)).  We granted the petition in this case 
because "[t]here is no question . . . that this matter warrants 
this court's original jurisdiction; any reapportionment or 
redistricting case is, by definition publici juris, implicating 
the sovereign rights of the people of this state."  Jensen, 249 
Wis. 2d 706, ¶17 (citing Heil, 230 Wis. at 443). 
B.  Principles of Interpretation 
¶21 This case requires us to interpret the United States 
Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution.  "Issues of 
constitutional interpretation . . . are questions of law."  James 
v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶15, __ Wis. 2d __, 960 N.W.2d 350 
(citation omitted).  We are bound by United States Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the United States Constitution.  State v. 
Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 
(citation omitted).  As the state's highest court, we are "the 
final 
arbiter 
of 
questions 
arising 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution[.]"  Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶25. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
13 
 
¶22 Our goal when we interpret the Wisconsin Constitution is 
"to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who 
adopted it[.]"  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
665 N.W.2d 328 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  "[W]e 
focus on the language of the adopted text and historical evidence 
[of its meaning] including 'the practices at the time the 
constitution was adopted, debates over adoption of a given 
provision, and early legislative interpretation as evidenced by 
the first laws passed following the adoption.'"  State v. 
Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶22, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847 (quoting 
Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28 n.10, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35). 
¶23 This case also requires interpretation of statutory 
provisions governing redistricting.  "Issues of statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law."  James, 
__ Wis. 2d __, ¶15 (citation omitted).  
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A. Relevant Considerations Under Federal and State Law 
1.  Federal Constitutional Requirements 
¶24 Both federal and state laws regulate redistricting.  
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires 
members of the House of Representatives to be chosen "by the People 
of the several states."  The United States Supreme Court construed 
this section to mean "that as nearly as is practicable one man's 
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another's."  Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8.  Similarly, the United 
States Supreme Court held, "the Equal Protection Clause requires 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
14 
 
that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct 
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal 
population as practicable."  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 
(1964); see also Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 
377 U.S. 656, 674–75 (1964) (holding even state senate districts 
must comply with the one person, one vote principle). 
¶25 As a matter of federal constitutional law, the one 
person, 
one 
vote 
principle 
applies 
more 
forcefully 
to 
congressional districts than to state legislative districts.  The 
United States Supreme Court declared:  "[There is] no excuse for 
the failure to meet the objective of equal representation for equal 
numbers of people in congressional districting other than the 
practical 
impossibility 
of 
drawing 
equal 
districts 
with 
mathematical precision."  Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 
(1973).  "[P]opulation alone" is the "sole criterion of 
constitutionality in congressional redistricting under Art. I, 
§ 2[.]"  Id.  For congressional districts, even less than a one 
percent difference between the population of the largest and 
smallest districts is constitutionally suspect.  Karcher v. 
Dagget, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983).  "[A]bsolute population 
equality" is "the paramount objective."  Abrams v. Johnson, 521 
U.S. 74, 98 (1997) (quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732). 
¶26 In contrast, the Equal Protection Clause, as applied to 
state legislative districts, imposes a less exacting one person, 
one vote principle.  Mahan, 410 U.S. at 322.  Consistent with 
principles of federalism, states have limited flexibility to 
pursue other legitimate policy objectives, such as "maintain[ing] 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
15 
 
the integrity of various political subdivisions" and "provid[ing] 
for compact districts of contiguous territory."  Brown v. Thomson, 
462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578) 
(modifications in the original). 
2.  Federal Statutes 
¶27 Federal statutes also govern redistricting.  2 U.S.C. 
§ 2c prohibits multimember congressional districts.  See also Wis. 
Stat. § 3.001 (same).  The VRA prohibits the denial or abridgment 
of the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in 
a language minority group, which implicates redistricting 
practices.  It provides, in relevant part: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner 
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 10303(f)(2)[, which protects language 
minority groups,] of this title, as provided in 
subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, 
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that 
the political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of 
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members 
have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice.  The extent to 
which members of a protected class have been elected to 
office in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered:  Provided, That 
nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to 
their proportion in the population. 
52 U.S.C. § 10301.  The "dispersal" of a minority group among 
 
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several districts can render the group an "ineffective" voting 
bloc.  Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017) (quoting 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986)).  Such a result 
may violate the VRA, even if the map drawers lacked discriminatory 
intent.  Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 71.  All parties in this case agree 
we should ensure any remedy we impose satisfies the requirements 
of the VRA. 
3.  Wisconsin Constitutional Requirements 
¶28 Via the Wisconsin Constitution, the people of Wisconsin 
have imposed additional requirements on redistricting.  Article 
IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides, "[a]t its 
first session after each enumeration made by the authority of the 
United States," i.e., the census, "the legislature shall apportion 
and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according 
to the number of inhabitants."  (Emphasis added.)  As we stated in 
our seminal decision in State ex rel. Attorney General v. 
Cunningham: 
It is proper to say that perfect exactness in the 
apportionment, according to the number of inhabitants, 
is neither required nor possible.  But there should be 
as close an approximation to exactness as possible, and 
this is the utmost limit for the exercise of legislative 
discretion. 
81 Wis. 440, 484, 51 N.W. 724 (1892).  Our decision in Cunningham 
comports with the provision's original meaning.   
 
¶29 The 
one 
person, 
one 
vote 
principle 
had 
been 
"germinating" since the nation's founding——although the phrase is 
a twentieth-century invention.  James A. Gazell, One Man, One Vote:  
Its Long Germination, 23 W. Pol. Q. 445, 462 (1970).  As a delegate 
 
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to the federal constitutional convention, founding father James 
Wilson was an outspoken advocate for equal representation by 
population:  "[E]qual numbers of people ought to have an equal no. 
of representatives. . . .  Representatives of different districts 
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their 
respective constituents hold to each other."  1 The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787 179–80 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(statement of James Wilson, Penn.); see also James Wilson, Of the 
Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania——Of the 
Legislative Department (1790–91), in 2 The Works of the Honourable 
James Wilson, L.L.D., 117, 129 (1804) ("Elections are equal, when 
a given number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as 
many representatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, 
in any other part of the state.").   
¶30 In choosing per capita representation for the House of 
Representatives, the founders rejected England's infamous rotten 
boroughs: 
The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England 
and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight million.  
The representatives of these eight millions in the House 
of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight.  Of 
this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and 
sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven 
hundred and twenty-three persons.  It cannot be supposed 
that the half thus elected . . . can add any thing 
either to the security of the people against the 
government, or to the knowledge of their circumstances 
and interests in the legislative councils. 
The Federalist No. 56, at 349 (James Madison).  In contrast, the 
equal proportion of representation prescribed by the Constitution 
"will render the [House of Representatives] both a safe and 
 
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competent guardian of the interests which will be confined to it."  
Id. at 350. 
¶31 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 further evidences the 
founders' regard for equal representation by population.  It 
states, in relevant part, "[t]he inhabitants of the said territory 
shall always be entitled to . . . a proportionate representation 
of the people in the legislature[.]"  Northwest Ordinance § 14, 
art. 2 (1787).  Its enactment guaranteed the equality of 
representation for newly admitted states.  
¶32 In the first redistricting case this court decided, a 
concurring 
justice 
referenced 
the 
Northwest 
Ordinance.  
Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 512 (Pinney, J., concurring).  He explained 
the phrase "according to the number of inhabitants" in Article IV, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution was "intended to secure in 
the future" a pre-existing right of the people, specifically, 
"'proportionate representation,' and apportionment 'as nearly 
equal as practicable among the several counties for the election 
of members' of the legislature[.]"  Id.   
¶33 Early legislative redistricting practices confirm this 
original meaning.  Id.  In 1851, the state's first governor, Nelson 
Dewey, vetoed 
the legislature's first redistricting plan, 
explaining in his veto message: 
I object to the provisions of this bill, because the 
apportionment in many cases, is not made upon the 
constitutional basis.  A comparison of some of the 
senatorial districts with the ratio and with each other, 
will clearly present its unconstitutional features. 
1851 Wis. Assemb. J. 810.  Consistent with its federal counterpart, 
 
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Article IV, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution gives the 
legislature the duty to enact a redistricting plan after each 
federal census to prevent one person's vote——in an underpopulated 
district——from having more weight than another's in an overly 
populated district.  Zimmerman I, 22 Wis. 2d at 564–69. 
¶34 In 
addition 
to 
proportional 
representation 
by 
population, the Wisconsin Constitution establishes principles of 
"secondary importance" that circumscribe legislative discretion 
when redistricting.  Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 
F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D. Wis. 1982).  In this case, the parties 
raise only malapportionment claims; no one claims the current maps 
violate one of these secondary principles.  Nevertheless, in 
remedying the alleged harm, we must be mindful of these secondary 
principles so as not to inadvertently choose a remedy that solves 
one constitutional harm while creating another. 
¶35 Article IV, Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
directs assembly districts "be bounded by county, precinct, town 
or ward lines[.]"  Applying the one person, one vote principle may 
make bounding districts by county lines nearly impossible.  See 
Wis. State AFL-CIO, F. Supp. at 635 (stating the maintenance of 
county lines is "incompatib[le] with population equality"); see 
also 58 Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 88, 91 (1969) ("[T]he Wisconsin 
Constitution no longer may be considered as prohibiting assembly 
districts from crossing county lines, in view of the emphasis the 
United States Supreme Court has placed upon population equality in 
electoral districts.").  Nonetheless, the smaller the political 
subdivision, the easier it may be to preserve its boundaries.  See 
 
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Baumgart v. Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002) ("Although avoiding the division of 
counties is no longer an inviolable principle, respect for the 
prerogatives of the Wisconsin Constitution dictate that wards and 
municipalities be kept whole where possible."). 
¶36 Article IV, Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
further commands assembly districts be "contiguous," which 
generally means a district "cannot be made up of two or more pieces 
of detached territory."  State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 
Wis. 90, 148, 53 N.W. 35 (1892).  If annexation by municipalities 
creates a municipal "island," however, the district containing 
detached portions of the municipality is legally contiguous even 
if the area around the island is part of a different district.  
Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 866 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
¶37 Article IV, Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution also 
requires assembly districts to be "in as compact form as 
practicable[.]"  We have never adopted a particular measure of 
compactness, but the constitutional text furnishes some latitude 
in meeting this requirement.  Additionally, Article IV, Section 4 
prohibits 
multi-member 
assembly 
districts; 
therefore, 
each 
district may have only a single representative.  Finally, Article 
IV, Section 5 states no assembly district can be "divided in the 
formation of a senate district," and senate districts must consist 
of "convenient contiguous territory" with each senate district 
served by only a single senator.   
¶38 In summary, the Wisconsin Constitution "commits the 
state to the principle of per capita equality of representation 
 
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subject only to some geographical limitations in the execution and 
administration of this principle."  Zimmerman I, 22 Wis. 2d at 
556.  In determining a judicial remedy for malapportionment, we 
will ensure preservation of these justiciable and cognizable 
rights explicitly protected under the United States Constitution, 
the VRA, or Article IV, Sections 3, 4, or 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
B.  This Court Will Not Consider the Partisan Makeup of 
Districts  
¶39 The simplicity of the one person, one vote principle, 
its textual basis in our constitution, and its long history stand 
in sharp contrast with claims that courts should judge maps for 
partisan fairness, a concept untethered to legal rights.  The 
parties have failed to identify any judicially manageable 
standards by which we could determine the fairness of the partisan 
makeup of districts, nor have they identified a right under the 
Wisconsin Constitution to a particular partisan configuration.  
Because partisan fairness presents a purely political question, we 
will not consider it. 
1.  Partisan Fairness Is a Political Question  
¶40 "Sometimes, . . . 'the 
law 
is 
that 
the 
judicial 
department has no business entertaining [a] claim of unlawfulness—
—because the question is entrusted to one of the political branches 
or involves no judicially enforceable rights.'"  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2494 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) 
(plurality)).  For this reason, "political questions" are non-
justiciable, that is, "outside the courts' competence[.]"  Id. 
 
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(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  Whether a map 
is "fair" to the two major political parties is quintessentially 
a political question because:  (1) there are no "judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards" by which to judge partisan 
fairness; and (2) the Wisconsin Constitution explicitly assigns 
the task of redistricting to the legislature——a political body.  
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
¶41 The lack of standards by which to judge partisan fairness 
is obvious from even a cursory review of partisan gerrymandering 
jurisprudence.  Partisan "gerrymandering" is "[t]he practice of 
dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of 
highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair 
advantage 
by 
diluting 
the 
opposition's 
voting 
strength."  
Gerrymandering, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  The United 
States Supreme Court declared partisan gerrymandering claims to be 
non-justiciable under the United States Constitution, and the very 
existence of such claims is doubtful.  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484; 
Vieth, 541 U.S. 267.  See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth's 
Gap:  Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 367 (2005).  Writing 
for the Court in Rucho v. Common Cause, Chief Justice Roberts noted 
at the outset the Court has never struck down a map as an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander and acknowledged that 
several decades of searching for a judicially manageable standard 
by which to judge maps' partisan fairness had been in vain.  139 
S. Ct. at 2491.   
 
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¶42 "Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a 
desire for 'proportional representation.'"  Id. at 2499.  Advocated 
by several parties in this case, proportional representation is 
the political theory that a party should win a percentage of seats, 
on a statewide basis, that is roughly equal to the percentage of 
votes it receives.  See Proportional representation, Black's Law 
Dictionary.  This theory has no grounding in American or Wisconsin 
law or history, and it directly conflicts with traditional 
redistricting criteria.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), abrogated on other 
grounds by Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484.  "It hardly follows from the 
principle that each person must have an equal say in the election 
of representatives that a person is entitled to have his political 
party achieve representation in some way commensurate to its share 
of statewide support."  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501.   
¶43 To begin with, measuring a state's partisan divide is 
difficult.  Wisconsin does not have party registration, so voters 
never formally disclose their party membership at any point in the 
electoral process.  Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 
110–11 (1981).  According to one recent survey, more than one-
third of Wisconsinites self-identify as independents, affiliating 
themselves with no party at all.  Marquette Law School Poll (Aug. 
3–8, 
2021), 
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/MLSP66Toplines.html. 
¶44 Even if a state's partisan divide could be accurately 
ascertained, what constitutes a "fair" map poses an entirely 
subjective question with no governing standards grounded in law. 
 
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"Deciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . . poses 
basic questions that are political, not legal.  There are no legal 
standards discernable in the Constitution for making such 
judgements[.]"  Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500.  Nor does the Wisconsin 
Constitution provide any such standards. 
¶45 The people have never consented to the Wisconsin 
judiciary deciding what constitutes a "fair" partisan divide; 
seizing 
such 
power 
would 
encroach 
on 
the 
constitutional 
prerogatives of the political branches.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291.  
In contrast to legislative or executive action, "'judicial action 
must be governed by standard, by rule,' and must be 'principled, 
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions' found in the 
Constitution or laws."   Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (quoting Vieth, 
541 U.S. at 278–79).  Nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution 
authorizes this court to recast itself as a redistricting 
commission in order "to make [its] own political judgment about 
how much representation particular political parties deserve——
based on the votes of their supporters——and to rearrange the 
challenged districts to achieve that end."  Id. at 2499. 
¶ 46 Nothing in the United States Constitution or the 
Wisconsin Constitution commands "that farmers or urban dwellers, 
Christian fundamentalists or Jews, Republicans or Democrats, must 
be accorded political strength proportionate to their numbers[.]"  
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288; see also id. at 308 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment) (stating there is "no authority" for the 
notion that a Democrat majority of voters in Pennsylvania should 
be 
able 
to 
elect 
a 
Democrat 
majority 
of 
Pennsylvania's 
 
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congressional delegation); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes 
Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to 
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 672–73 
(2002) ("So long as the state's majority has its advocate in the 
executive, is it necessarily true that the state's majority should 
control the legislature as well?"). 
¶47 Not only is a right to proportional party representation 
nonexistent in either constitution but the theory conflicts with 
principles that are constitutionally protected.  The theory is 
irreconcilable with the requirement that congressional and state 
legislative districts be single-member districts.  See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 2c; Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 4–5.  For state legislative 
districts, the theory is particularly ill suited because Article 
IV of the Wisconsin Constitution specifies requirements that favor 
the preservation of communities of interest, irrespective of 
individual partisan alignment.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 4–5 
(explaining state assembly districts must be compact, contiguous, 
and respect political boundary lines and state senate districts 
must be contiguous and not divide assembly districts in their 
formation); Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 863 (stating there is a 
"correlation between geographical propinquity and community of 
interest, and therefore compactness and contiguity are desirable 
features in a redistricting plan"). 
¶48 A proportional party representation requirement would 
effectively force the two dominant parties to create a "bipartisan" 
gerrymander to ensure the "right" outcome——obliterating many 
traditional redistricting criteria mandated by federal law and 
 
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Article IV of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See 2 U.S.C. § 2c; Wis. 
Const. art. IV, §§ 4–5.  Democrats tend to live close together in 
urban areas, whereas Republicans tend to disperse into suburban 
and rural areas.  See Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *6 ("Wisconsin 
Democrats tend to be found in high concentrations in certain 
areas[.]").  As a result, drawing contiguous and compact single-
member districts of approximately equal population often leads to 
grouping large numbers of Democrats in a few districts and 
dispersing rural Republicans among several.  These requirements 
tend to preserve communities of interest, but the resulting 
districts may not be politically competitive——at least if the 
competition is defined as an inter- rather than intra-party 
contest.  Davis, 478 U.S. at 159; see also Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an Empty Teapot:  Why the 
Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1, 42 n.117 (2008) (explaining "competitive primaries" often 
produce "responsiveness, accountability, and 'ritual cleansing'").  
Democrats in urban cities may win by large margins, thereby skewing 
the proportion of Democrat votes statewide relative to the 
proportion of Democrat victories. 
¶49 Perhaps the easiest way to see the flaw in proportional 
party representation is to consider third party candidates.  
Constitutional law does not privilege the "major" parties; if 
Democrats 
and 
Republicans 
are 
entitled 
to 
proportional 
representation, so are numerous minor parties.  If Libertarian 
Party candidates receive approximately five percent of the 
statewide vote, they will likely lose every election; no one deems 
 
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this result unconstitutional.  The populace that voted for 
Libertarians is scattered throughout the state, thereby depriving 
them of any real voting power as a bloc, regardless of how lines 
are drawn.  See Robert Redwine, Comment, Constitutional Law:  
Racial and Political Gerrymandering——Different Problems Require 
Different Solutions, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 373, 396–97 (1998).  Only 
meandering lines, which could be considered a gerrymander in their 
own right, could give the Libertarians (or any other minor party) 
a chance.  Proportional partisan representation would require 
assigning each third party a "fair" share of representatives (while 
denying independents any allocation whatsoever), but doing so 
would in turn require ignoring redistricting principles explicitly 
codified in the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶50 To sacrifice textually grounded requirements designed to 
safeguard communities of interest in favor of proportional 
representation between dominant political parties mandated nowhere 
in the constitution would ignore not only the text but its history.  
"The roots of Anglo-American political representation lie in the 
representation of communities[.]"  James A. Gardner, One Person, 
One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1237, 1243 (2002).  "The idea that the political interests of 
communal groups of individuals correlated strongly with territory 
served, for example, as an axiom in Madison's famous defense of 
the large republic in The Federalist No. 10."  James A. Gardner, 
Foreword, Representation Without Party:  Lessons from State 
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 Rutgers L.J. 
881, 935 (2006).  Proportional party representation is simply 
 
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incompatible with the constitutionally prescribed form of 
representative government chosen by the people of Wisconsin. 
¶51 The Wisconsin Constitution's "textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment" to confer the duty of redistricting on 
the state legislature evidences the non-justiciability of partisan 
gerrymandering claims.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  Article IV, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution unequivocally assigns the 
task of redistricting to the legislature, leaving no basis for 
claiming that partisanship in redistricting raises constitutional 
concerns.  "[P]artisan intent is not illegal, but is simply the 
consequence of assigning the task of redistricting to the political 
branches of government."  Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 
939 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom., 
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).  "[P]oliticians pass 
many statutes with an eye toward securing their elections and 
giving their party a leg up on the competition.  Gerrymandered 
districts are no different in kind."  Alexander & Prakash, Tempest 
in an Empty Teapot, at 7.   
¶52 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
like 
its 
federal 
counterpart, "clearly contemplates districting by political 
entities, . . . and unsurprisingly . . . [districting] turns out 
to be root-and-branch a matter of politics."  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 
285 (citations omitted).  For the same reasons cited by the United 
States Supreme Court, we "have no license to reallocate political 
power between the two major political parties," because "no legal 
standards [exist] to limit and direct [our] decisions."  Rucho, 
139 S. Ct. at 2507.  The Wisconsin Constitution contains "no 
 
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plausible grant of authority" to the judiciary to determine whether 
maps are fair to the major parties and the task of redistricting 
is expressly assigned to the legislature.  Id.  Adjudicating claims 
of "too much" partisanship in the redistricting process would 
recast this court as a policymaking body rather than a law-
declaring one.  
2. The Wisconsin Constitution Says Nothing About Partisan 
Gerrymandering 
¶53  The United States Supreme Court has been unable to 
identify "what it is in the Constitution that . . . might be 
offended by partisan gerrymandering."  Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, at 
369.  We are told if we look hard enough, we will find a right to 
partisan fairness in Article I, Sections 1, 3, 4, or 22 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Having searched in earnest, we conclude 
the right does not exist.  As the United States Supreme Court 
explained when it considered a partisan gerrymandering challenge 
to Wisconsin's current state legislative maps, courts are "not 
responsible for vindicating generalized partisan preferences."  
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1933.    
¶54 The first section in the Wisconsin Constitution's 
Declaration of Rights states:  "All people are born equally free 
and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.  This section 
enshrines a first principle of our nation's founding:  "[T]he only 
source of political power is in the people; . . . they are 
 
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sovereign, that is to say, the aggregate community, the accumulated 
will of the people, is sovereign[.]"  Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 497. 
¶55 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution has 
nothing to say about partisan gerrymanders.  "The idea that 
partisan gerrymandering undermines popular sovereignty because the 
legislature rather than the people selects representatives is 
rhetorical hyperbole masked as constitutional argument.  When 
legislatures draw districts, they in no way select who will occupy 
the resulting seats."  Alexander & Prakash, Tempest in an Empty 
Teapot, at 43.  Voters retain their freedom to choose among 
candidates irrespective of how district lines are drawn.  Id.   
¶56 Contriving a partisan gerrymandering claim from the text 
of the Wisconsin Constitution (aside from overstepping our 
judicial role) would require us to indulge a fiction——that partisan 
affiliation is permanent and invariably dictates how a voter casts 
every ballot.  Of course, political affiliation "is not an 
immutable characteristic, but may shift from one election to the 
next[.]"  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287.  "[V]oters can——and often do——
move from one party to the other[.]"  Davis, 478 U.S. at 156.  Not 
only is political affiliation changeable, but self-identified 
partisans can——and do——vote for a different party's candidates. 
¶57 If the constitution were misinterpreted to make 
changeable 
characteristics 
relevant 
factors 
in 
evaluating 
redistricting plans, "we fail to see why it demands only a partisan 
political mix."  Alexander & Prakash, Tempest in an Empty Teapot, 
at 21.  "[W]hy would a Constitution that never mentions political 
parties, much less Republicans[] [and] Democrats . . . grant 
 
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special status to partisan identity?"  Id.  If we opened the 
floodgates, 
what 
would 
stop 
claims 
seeking 
proportional 
representation for "gun owners" or "vegetarians"?  Id.  Nothing 
distinguishes 
partisan 
affiliation 
from 
hundreds——perhaps 
thousands——of other variables.  Id. at 22.  Dispositively, none of 
these factors are mentioned in the text of the constitution. 
¶58 Nothing supports the notion that Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution was originally understood——or has ever 
been interpreted——to regulate partisanship in redistricting.    
After discussing the concept of popular sovereignty in Cunningham, 
Justice Pinney declared:  "The rules of apportionment and the 
restrictions upon the power of the legislature are very simple and 
brief."  81 Wis. at 511.  He then proceeded to discuss only those 
requirements found in Article IV of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Id.  Regulation of partisanship is not among them. 
¶59 Likewise, Article I, Sections 3 and 4 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution do not inform redistricting challenges.  These 
sections state: 
Section 3.  Every person may freely speak, write and 
publish 
his 
sentiments 
on 
all 
subjects, 
being 
responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws 
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of 
speech or of the press.  In all criminal prosecutions or 
indictments for libel, the truth may be given in 
evidence, and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous be true, and was published 
with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to 
determine the law and the fact. 
Section 4.  The right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, to consult for the common good, and to petition 
 
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the government, or any department thereof, shall never 
be abridged. 
Collectively, these sections protect four related freedoms:  
(1) freedom of speech; (2) freedom of the press; (3) freedom of 
assembly; and (4) freedom of petition.  The First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution also secures these rights. 
 
¶60 Nothing about the shape of a district infringes anyone's 
ability to speak, publish, assemble, or petition.  Even after the 
most severe partisan gerrymanders, citizens remain free to "run 
for office, express their political views, endorse and campaign 
for their favorite candidates, vote, and otherwise influence the 
political process through their expression."  Radogno v. Ill. State 
Bd. of Elections, No. 11-CV-04884, 2011 WL 5025251 at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 21, 2011) (quoted source omitted).   
¶61 Parties urging us to consider partisan fairness appear 
to desire districts drawn in a manner ensuring their political 
speech will find a receptive audience; however, nothing in either 
constitution gives rise to such a claim.  "The first amendment's 
protection of the freedom of association and of the rights to run 
for office, have one's name on the ballot, and present one's views 
to the electorate do not also include entitlement to success in 
those endeavors.  The carefully guarded right to expression does 
not carry with it any right to be listened to, believed or 
supported in one's views."  Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 
927–28 (4th Cir. 1981).  Associational rights guarantee the freedom 
to participate in the political process; they do not guarantee a 
favorable outcome.  See Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 675 (N.D. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
33 
 
Cal. 1988).  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"[n]one of our cases establishes an individual's right to have a 
'fair shot' at winning[.]"  New York State Bd. of Elections V. 
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205 (2008).  Nor does the constitution. 
¶62 Article I, Section 22 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:  "[t]he blessings of a free government can only be 
maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, 
frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 22.  To fabricate a legal 
standard of partisan "fairness"——§ 22 does not supply one——would 
represent anything but "moderation" or "temperance[.]"  Whatever 
operative effect Section 22 may have, it cannot constitute an open 
invitation to the judiciary to rewrite duly enacted law by imposing 
our subjective policy preferences in the name of "justice[.]"  
¶63 Unlike 
the 
Declaration 
of 
Rights, 
Article 
IV, 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution express a series 
of discrete requirements governing redistricting.  These are the 
only Wisconsin constitutional limits we have ever recognized on 
the legislature's discretion to redistrict.  The last time we 
implemented 
a 
judicial 
remedy 
for 
an 
unconstitutional 
redistricting plan, we acknowledged Article IV as the exclusive 
repository of state constitutional limits on redistricting: 
[T]he Wisconsin constitution itself provides a standard 
of reapportionment 'meet [sic] for judicial judgment.' 
The legislature shall reapportion 'according to the 
number of inhabitants' subject to some geographical and 
political unit limitations in execution of this 
standard.  We need not descend into the 'thicket' to 
fashion standards whole-cloth. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
34 
 
Zimmerman I, 22 Wis. 2d at 562 (emphasis added) (quoted sources 
omitted).  In other words, the standards under the Wisconsin 
Constitution that govern redistricting are delineated in Article 
IV.  To construe Article I, Sections 1, 3, 4, or 22 as a reservoir 
of additional requirements would violate axiomatic principles of 
interpretation, see James, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶¶21–22, while plunging 
this court into the political thicket lurking beyond its 
constitutional boundaries.  Zimmerman I, 22 Wis. 2d at 562. 
C.  We Will Utilize a "Least-Change" Approach 
¶64 The constitutional confines of our judicial authority 
must guide our exercise of power in affording the Petitioners a 
remedy for their claims.  The existing maps were adopted by the 
legislature, signed by the governor, and survived judicial review 
by the federal courts.  See Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916; Baldus, 862 
F. Supp. 2d 860.  Treading further than necessary to remedy their 
current legal deficiencies, as many parties urge us to do, would 
intrude upon the constitutional prerogatives of the political 
branches and unsettle the constitutional allocation of power. 
¶65 For the paramount purpose of preserving liberty, the 
Wisconsin Constitution embodies a structural separation of powers 
among the three branches of government, restraining this court 
from exercising anything but judicial power.  "No political truth 
is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the 
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty" than the 
separation of powers.  The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James 
Madison); see also The Federalist No. 51, at 321–22 (James 
Madison) ("[The] separate and distinct exercise of the different 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
35 
 
powers of government . . . is admitted on all hands to be essential 
to the preservation of liberty.").  "While the separation of powers 
may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in order to 
ensure that we do not lose liberty."  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 710 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶66 This court's precedent declares that the legislature's 
enactment of a redistricting plan is subject to presentment and a 
gubernatorial veto.  Zimmerman I, 22 Wis. 2d at 559.  If the 
legislature and the governor reach an impasse, the judiciary has 
a duty to remedy the constitutional defects in the existing plan.  
See Zimmerman II, 23 Wis. 2d 606 (implementing a judicially-created 
plan).  But a duty to remedy a constitutional deficiency is not a 
prerogative to make law.  See Cunningham, 81 Wis. at 482–83 
(majority opinion) (describing the lawmaking prerogative). 
¶67 While courts sometimes declare statutes unconstitutional 
and may enjoin their enforcement, typically the judiciary does not 
order government officials to enforce a modified, constitutional 
version of the statute.  See generally Gimbel Bros. v. Milwaukee 
Boston Store, 161 Wis. 489, 496, 154 N.W. 998 (1915) (citing 1 
James High, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions § 2 (edition and 
year not specified in the citation)) ("While the power to issue 
mandatory injunctions is vested in courts of equity, it is a power 
which is sparingly used.").  Courts issue mandatory injunctions, 
an equitable remedy, "with extreme caution" and "only in cases of 
equitable cognizance[.]"  1 James High, A Treatise on the Law of 
Injunctions § 2 (4th ed. 1905) (emphasis added). 
¶68 Redistricting litigation presents a unique problem.  
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
36 
 
Unlike the constitutional monarchies of old England, which could 
exist in the absence of Parliament, our republican form of 
government presupposes the existence of a legislature.  U.S. Const. 
art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government[.]").  If the 
legislature and the governor reach an impasse, merely declaring 
the maps unconstitutional and enjoining elections pursuant to them 
creates an intractable impediment to conducting elections, 
imperiling our republican form of government.  Judicial action 
becomes appropriate to prevent a constitutional crisis.  But we 
must "limit the solution to the problem."  See Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006). 
¶69 Court involvement in redistricting, as in any other 
case, is judicial in nature.  In Jensen v. Wisconsin Elections 
Board, we stated:  "Courts called upon to perform redistricting 
are, of course, judicially legislating, that is, writing the law 
rather than interpreting it, which is not their usual——and usually 
not their proper——role."  249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶10.  With few 
exceptions confined to the judicial sphere——none of which are 
relevant to this case——we have no power to "judicially legislate."6  
"Safeguarding constitutional limitations on the exercise of 
legislative power is particularly important in light of its awesome 
sweep."  Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, ¶55, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 
N.W.2d 856 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  The people 
                                                 
6 We have limited legislative power to regulate certain 
subject matter related to the court system.  See, e.g., Rao v. WMA 
Sec., Inc., 2008 WI 73, ¶35, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
37 
 
vested the power in the legislature——not the executive and 
certainly not the judiciary.  Id.  "Because the people gave the 
legislature its power to make laws, the legislature alone must 
exercise it."  Id., ¶56. 
¶70 "From the very nature of things, the judicial power 
cannot legislate nor supervise the making of laws."  League of 
Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 2019 WI 75, ¶35, 387 Wis. 2d 511, 
929 N.W.2d 209 (quoting State ex rel. Rose v. Sup. Ct. of Milwaukee 
Cnty., 105 Wis. 651, 675, 81 N.W. 1046 (1900)).  By design, the 
judicial power has long been kept distinct from the legislative 
power.  See Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 52–53 
(Forum Trade Paperback ed., 2020) (2019) ("To the founders, the 
legislative and judicial powers were distinct by nature and their 
separation was among the most important liberty-protecting devices 
of the constitutional design, an independent right of the people 
essential to the preservation of all other rights later enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights.").    
¶71 We have the power to provide a judicial remedy but not 
to legislate.  We have no authority to act as a "super-legislature" 
by inserting ourselves into the actual lawmaking function.  Flynn 
v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 528–29, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) 
("If we are to maintain the public's confidence in the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary, we must exercise that power 
with great restraint, always resting on constitutional principles, 
not judicial will.  We may differ with the legislature's choices, 
as we did and do here, but must never rest our decision on that 
basis lest we become no more than a super-legislature.").  Courts 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
38 
 
"lack the authority to make the political decisions that the 
Legislature and the Governor can make through their enactment of 
redistricting legislation[.]"  Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 
380 (Minn. Spec. Redistricting Panel 2012) (citing LaComb v. Growe, 
541 F. Supp. 145, 151 (D. Minn. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Orwoll v. 
LaComb, 456 U.S. 966).  Stated otherwise, "[o]ur only guideposts 
are the strict legal requirements."7  In re Legislative Districting 
of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 298 (Md. 2002) (emphasis added).   
¶72 Because our power to issue a mandatory injunction does 
not encompass rewriting duly enacted law, our judicial remedy 
"should reflect the least change" necessary for the maps to comport 
with relevant legal requirements.  See Wright v. City of Albany, 
306 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237 (M.D. Ga. 2003) (citations omitted).  
Using the existing maps "as a template" and implementing only those 
remedies necessary to resolve constitutional or statutory 
deficiencies confines our role to its proper adjudicative 
                                                 
7 The judiciary lacks the institutional competency to make 
the kind of factual determinations necessary to properly consider 
various extra-legal factors.  In re Legislative Districting of the 
State, 805 A.2d 292, 298 (Md. 2002) ("When the Court drafts the 
plan, it may not take into account the same political 
considerations as the Governor and the Legislature.  Judges are 
forbidden to be partisan politicians.  Nor can the Court stretch 
the constitutional criteria in order to give effect to broader 
political judgments, such as . . . the preservation of communities 
of interest.  More basic, it is not for the Court to define what 
a community of interest is and where its boundaries are, and it is 
not for the Court to determine which regions deserve special 
consideration and which do not. . . .  Our instruction to the 
consultants was to prepare for our consideration a redistricting 
plan that conformed to federal constitutional requirements, the 
Federal Voting Rights Act, and the requirements of Article III, 
§ 4 of the Maryland Constitution.").  
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
39 
 
function, ensuring we fulfill our role as apolitical and neutral 
arbiters of the law.8  See Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *7 ("The 
court undertook its redistricting endeavor in the most neutral way 
it could conceive——by taking the 1992 reapportionment plan as a 
template and adjusting it for population deviations."); see also 
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:  The Political Seduction 
of the Law 88–89 (First Touchstone ed. 1991) (1990) (describing 
how Robert H. Bork, as special master in a redistricting case, 
drew lines without any consideration of the partisan effect of his 
remedy).  A least-change approach is nothing more than a convenient 
way to describe the judiciary's properly limited role in 
redistricting. 
¶73 The least-change approach is far from a novel idea; many 
courts call it the "minimum change doctrine," reflecting its 
general acceptance among reasonable jurists.  It was applied in 
numerous cases during the last two redistricting cycles.  See, 
e.g., Crumly v. Cobb Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Voter Registration, 
892 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2012) ("In preparing the draft 
map, the Court began with the existing map drawn by Judge Carnes 
in 2002.  The Court followed the doctrine of minimum change[.]"); 
Martin v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty., Ga., Comm'n, No. CV 112-058, 
                                                 
8 The legislature asks us to use the maps it passed during 
this redistricting cycle as a starting point, characterizing them 
as an expression of "the policies and preferences of the State[.]"  
Legislature Br. at 16 (quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 
(1973)).  The legislature's argument fails because the recent 
legislation did not survive the political process.  The existing 
plans are codified as statutes, without a sunset provision, and 
have not been supplanted by new law. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
40 
 
2012 WL 2339499, at *3 (S.D. Ga. June 19, 2012) ("Essentially, the 
Court is required to change only the faulty portions of the 
benchmark plan, as subtly as possible, in order to make the new 
plan constitutional.  Keeping the minimum change doctrine in mind, 
the Court only made changes it deemed necessary to guarantee 
substantial equality and to honor traditional redistricting 
concerns." (Internal citation omitted)); Stenger v. Kellet, No. 
4:11-cv-2230, 2012 WL 601017, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2012) ("A 
frequently used model in reapportioning districts is to begin with 
the current boundaries and change them as little as possible while 
making equal the population of the districts.  This is called the 
'least change' or 'minimal change' method . . . .  The 'least 
change' method is advantageous because it maintains the continuity 
of representation for each district and is by far the simplest way 
to reapportion[.]"); Below v. Gardner, 963 A.2d 785, 794 (N.H. 
2002) ("[W]e use as our benchmark the existing senate districts 
because the senate districting plan enacted in 1992 is the last 
validly enacted plan and is the clearest expression of the 
legislature's intent." (Quotation marks and quoted source 
omitted)); Alexander v. Taylor, 51 P.3d 1204, 1211 (Okla. 2002) 
("A court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative 
policies underlying the existing plan.  The starting point for 
analysis, therefore, is the 1991 Plan."); Bodker v. Taylor, No. 
1:02-cv-999, 2002 WL 32587312, at *5 (N.D. Ga. June 5, 2002) ("The 
court notes . . . that its plan represents only a small, though 
constitutionally necessary, change in the district lines in 
accordance with the minimum change doctrine."); Markham v. Fulton 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
41 
 
Cnty. Bd. of Registrations & Elections, No. 1:02-cv-1111, 2002 WL 
32587313, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2002) ("Keeping the minimum 
change doctrine in mind, the Court made only the changes it deemed 
necessary to guarantee substantial equality and to honor 
traditional redistricting concerns."). 
¶74  In 
declaring 
this 
court's 
role 
in 
resolving 
redistricting cases, we are mindful that "Wisconsin adheres to the 
concept of a nonpartisan judiciary."  SCR 60.06(2)(a).  "In the 
debate over the Wisconsin Constitution, objections to an elected 
judiciary had centered upon the dangers of partisanship.  The 
debate was resolved with the mandate that elections for state 
courts be distinctly non-partisan in character."  Ellen Langill, 
Levi Hubbell and the Wisconsin Judiciary:  A Dilemma in Legal 
Ethics and Non-Partisan Judicial Elections, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 985, 
985 (1998).  The Wisconsin Constitution discourages judicial 
partisanship.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 9 ("There shall be no 
election for a justice or judge at the partisan general election 
for state or county officer, nor within 30 days either before or 
after such election.").  Similarly, the Judicial Code of Conduct 
prohibits judges from "be[ing] swayed by partisan interests[.]"  
SCR 60.04(1)(b).   
¶75 To dive into the deepest of "political thicket[s],"9 as 
redistricting has been described, with the intention of doing 
                                                 
9 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality), 
abrogation recognized by Evenwel v. Abbott, 577 U.S. 937 (2016) 
("Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.  The remedy 
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that 
will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
42 
 
anything more than securing legal rights would be profoundly 
incompatible with Wisconsin's commitment to a nonpartisan 
judiciary.  If a simple majority of this court opted to draw maps 
from scratch, thereby fundamentally altering Wisconsin's political 
landscape for years, it would significantly "increase the 
political pressures on this court in a partisan way that is totally 
inconsistent with our jobs as [a] nonpartisan judiciary."  
Wisconsin Supreme Court Open Administrative Conference (Open 
Administrative Conference), at 33:36 (Jan. 22, 2009) (statements 
of Roggensack, J.), https://wiseye.org/2009/01/22/supreme-court-
open-administrative-conference-3/. 
¶76 Many intervenors have argued the 2011 maps entrenched a 
Republican Party advantage, so using them as a starting point 
perpetuates a partisan gerrymander.  In other words, these 
intervenors argue we must tip the partisan balance to benefit one 
party in order to avoid accusations of partisanship.  We reject 
this demand to "[s]imply undo[] the work of one political party 
for the benefit of another[.]"  Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 
756, 768 (E.D. Tex. 2005), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 
(2006) (plurality).  Endeavoring to rebalance the allocation of 
districts between the two major parties would be a decidedly 
nonjudicial exercise of partisanship by the court.  Instead, we 
adopt a neutral standard.  While the application of neutral 
standards inevitably benefits one side or the other in any case, 
                                                 
Congress."). 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
43 
 
it does not place our thumb on any partisan scale, as some 
intervenors urge us to do. 
¶77 "Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to 
become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the 
traditional respect for the Bench."  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (1906), 
as reprinted in Roscoe Pound Kindles the Spark of Reform, 57 A.B.A. 
J. 348, 351 (1971).  A least-change approach safeguards the long-
term institutional legitimacy of this court by removing us from 
the political fray and ensuring we act as judges rather than 
political actors.     
¶78 The judiciary has been repeatedly subject to "purely 
political attacks" by people who "did not get the result from the 
court . . . [they] wanted."  Patience Drake Roggensack, Tough Talk 
and the Institutional Legitimacy of Our Courts, Hallows Lecture 
(Mar. 7, 2017), in Marq. Law., Fall 2017, at 45, 46.  These often 
partisan onslaughts threaten the "[i]nstitutional legitimacy" of 
the judiciary, which, in turn, threatens the "rule of law" itself.  
Id.  By utilizing the least-change approach, we do not endorse the 
policy choices of the political branches; rather, we simply remedy 
the malapportionment claims.  Attempting to redress the criticisms 
of the current maps advanced by multiple intervenors would amount 
to a judicial replacement of the law enacted by the people's 
elected representatives with the policy preferences of unelected 
interest groups, an act totally inconsistent with our republican 
form of democracy. 
¶79 We close by addressing Article IV, Section 3 of the 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
44 
 
Wisconsin Constitution, which says, in each redistricting cycle, 
"the legislature shall apportion and district anew[.]"  (Emphasis 
added.)  Focusing on the word "anew," an intervenor and an amicus 
curiae argue the court must make maps from scratch.10  Although the 
proponents of this interpretation attempt to ground their argument 
in the provision's text, they miss the forest for the trees.  Read 
as a whole, the provision means the legislature must implement a 
redistricting plan each cycle and the language cannot reasonably 
be read to require the court to make maps at all, let alone from 
scratch. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶80 This case illustrates the extraordinary danger of asking 
the judiciary to exercise "FORCE" and "WILL" instead of legal 
"judgment."  The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).  
Manufacturing a standard of political "fairness" by which to draw 
legislative maps in accordance with the subjective preferences of 
judges would refashion this court as a committee of oligarchs with 
political power superior to both the legislature and the governor.  
See In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 
169 Wis. 2d xv, xxv (1992) (Day, J., concurring, joined by a 
majority) ("Tyranny need not be dressed in a military uniform, it 
can also wear a black robe!").  Judges must refuse to become 
"philosopher kings empowered to 'fix' things according to the 
dictates of what we fancy is our superior insight[.]"  Tyler v. 
Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 707 (6th Cir. 2016) 
                                                 
10 BLOC Br. at 31–36; Whitford Amicus Br. at 5–6. 
 
No. 2021AP1450-OA2021AP1450-OA 
45 
 
(Batchelder, J., concurring in part). 
¶81 In this case, we will implement judicial remedies only 
to the extent necessary to remedy the violation of a justiciable 
and cognizable right found in the United States Constitution, the 
VRA, or Article IV, Sections 3, 4, or 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  We will not consider the partisan makeup of 
districts because it does not implicate any justiciable or 
cognizable right.  We adopt the least-change approach to remedying 
any constitutional or statutory infirmities in the existing maps 
because the constitution precludes the judiciary from interfering 
with the lawful policy choices of the legislature.   
 
By the court.——Rights declared. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
1 
 
¶82 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  To the extent 
feasible, a court's role in redistricting should be modest and 
restrained.  We are not the branch of government assigned the 
constitutional responsibility to "apportion and district anew" 
after each decennial census; the legislature is.1  The job of the 
judiciary is to decide cases based on the law.2  Here, the laws 
passed in 2011 establishing legislative and congressional 
districts cannot govern future elections as written due to 
population shifts.  Accordingly, our role is appropriately limited 
to altering current district boundaries only as needed to comply 
with legal requirements.3  The majority opinion so concludes, and 
I join it in almost all respects.4 
                                                 
1 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3; Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 
WI 13, ¶6, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537. 
2 Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶1, 393 
Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35. 
3 Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) ("Whenever a 
district court is faced with entering an interim reapportionment 
order that will allow elections to go forward it is faced with the 
problem of 'reconciling the requirements of the Constitution with 
the 
goals 
of 
state 
political 
policy.' 
 
An 
appropriate 
reconciliation of these two goals can only be reached if the 
district court's modifications of a state plan are limited to those 
necessary to cure any constitutional or statutory defect." 
(citation omitted)); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973) 
("In fashioning a reapportionment plan or in choosing among plans, 
a district court should not pre-empt the legislative task nor 
'intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.'" (quoting 
another source)). 
4 I concur in the majority's conclusions that:  (1) remedial 
maps must comply with the United States Constitution; the Voting 
Rights Act; and Article IV, Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; (2) we should not consider the partisan makeup of 
districts; and (3) our relief should modify existing maps under a 
least-change approach.  I join the entirety of the majority opinion 
except ¶¶8, 69-72, and 81.  The paragraphs I do not join contain 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
2 
 
¶83 Where the political process has failed and modified maps 
are needed before the next election, the court's function is to 
formulate a remedy——one tailored toward fixing the legal 
deficiencies.5  The majority opinion asserts that only legal 
requirements may be considered in constructing a fitting remedy.  
That is not quite correct.  Legal standards establish the need for 
a remedy and constrain the remedies we may impose, but they are 
not the only permissible judicial considerations when constructing 
a proper remedy.6  For example, one universally recognized 
redistricting criterion is communities of interest.7  It is not a 
legal requirement, but it may nonetheless be an appropriate, 
                                                 
language that would foreclose considerations that could be 
entirely proper in light of the equitable nature of a judicial 
remedy in redistricting.  I address this below. 
The dissent uses the term "majority/lead opinion" to reflect 
that not all paragraphs of the court's opinion reflect the opinion 
of four justices.  While this is true, I use "majority opinion" 
for ease of use and to convey that the opinion is a majority except 
in the limited area of disagreement with the paragraphs I do not 
join. 
5 North Carolina v. Covington, 137 S. Ct. 1624, 1625 (2017) 
(per curiam) ("Relief in redistricting cases is 'fashioned in the 
light of well-known principles of equity.'" (quoting Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964))); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 
U.S. 125, 129 (1977) ("[I]n constitutional adjudication as 
elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special blend of what is 
necessary, what is fair, and what is workable." (quoting another 
source)). 
6 Covington, 137 S. Ct. at 1625 (explaining that a court in a 
redistricting action "must undertake an 'equitable weighing 
process' to select a fitting remedy for the legal violations it 
has identified" and noting "there is much for a court to weigh" 
(quoting another source)). 
7 See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 99-100 (1997). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
3 
 
useful, and neutral factor to weigh.8  Suppose we receive multiple 
proposed maps that comply with all relevant legal requirements, 
and that have equally compelling arguments for why the proposed 
map most aligns with current district boundaries.  In that 
circumstance, we still must exercise judgment to choose the best 
alternative.  Considering communities of interest (or other 
traditional redistricting criteria) may assist us in doing so.9  
In other words, while a remedy must be tailored to curing legal 
violations, a court is not necessarily limited to considering legal 
rights and requirements alone when formulating a remedy. 
¶84 This does not mean our remedial powers are without 
guardrails.10  And this is where the dissent errs.  The dissent 
argues we can take over the responsibility of the legislature 
entirely, discard policy judgments we don't like, and craft a new 
law from scratch consistent with our own policy concerns.  The 
reader should look past pleas for fairness and see this for what 
it is:  a claim of dangerously broad judicial power to fashion 
                                                 
8 Id. (noting with approval that a federal district court 
properly 
considered 
traditional 
redistricting 
criteria 
"includ[ing] maintaining core districts and communities of 
interest" when adopting a redistricting plan). 
9 Another example of a traditional and neutral redistricting 
criterion that may assist us, but does not implicate a legal right 
per se, is the goal of minimizing the number of voters who must 
wait six years between voting for their state senator.  See Prosser 
v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 864 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
10 Schroeder v. Richardson, 101 Wis. 529, 531, 78 N.W. 178 
(1899) ("[W]hile the power of a court of equity is quite broad 
where a remedy is called for and legal remedies do not meet the 
situation, it does not extend so far as to clothe the court with 
power to substitute judicial notions of justice for the written 
law."). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
4 
 
state policy.  According to the dissent, this court should simply 
ignore the law on the books——one the dissent makes clear it is not 
fond of——and draft a new one more to its liking. 
¶85 The majority opinion aptly explains that our judicial 
role forecloses this; our remedial powers are not so unbounded.11  
It is appropriate for us to start with the laws currently on the 
books 
because 
they 
were 
passed 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
constitutional process and reflect the policy choices the people 
made through their elected representatives.12  Our task is 
therefore rightly focused on making only necessary modifications 
to accord with legal requirements.13  A least-change approach is 
the most consistent, neutral, and appropriate use of our limited 
                                                 
11 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971) ("The remedial 
powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they 
are not unlimited."). 
12 Laws do not become any less authoritative simply because 
newly-elected politicians disapprove of them.  This court has no 
license to ignore laws based on our own personal policy 
disagreements or those of today's elected officials.  The law 
changes by legislation, not by elections.  See Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 
¶1. 
13 It appears that we also used the pre-existing statutory 
maps as our starting point in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 
23 Wis. 2d 606, 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964).  While we did not expressly 
adopt a least-change approach, the similarities between the 
remedial maps and the pre-existing statutory maps are striking.  
For example, of the 33 senate districts the court drew, 31 
consisted of some or all of the same counties as the parallel 
predecessor districts.  Compare Reynolds, 23 Wis. 2d at 617-18 
with Wis. Stat. § 4.02 (1963-64).  In contrast, only two districts—
—the 28th and the 31st——contained none of the same counties as 
they did under the prior maps.  Id. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
5 
 
judicial power to remedy the constitutional violations in this 
case.14 
¶86 We asked the parties to brief whether we should use a 
least-change approach, and if not, what approach we should use.  
The main alternative we received15 was an entreaty to use this as 
an opportunity to rearrange district boundaries with the goal of 
reversing what the dissent calls "an obsolete partisan agenda."16  
As the majority opinion explains, the Wisconsin Constitution does 
not preclude the legislature from drawing districts with partisan 
interests in mind.17  In reality, we are being asked to make a 
political judgment cloaked in the veneer of neutrality.  Namely, 
we are being asked to conclude that the current maps are likely to 
result in the election of too many representatives of one party, 
so we should affirmatively and aggressively redesign maps that are 
likely to result in the election of more members of a different 
political party.  The petition here——that we should use our 
equitable authority to reallocate political power in Wisconsin——
                                                 
14 The legislature, on the other hand, may decide for itself 
whether to defer to prior maps when enacting new districts into 
law.  The Wisconsin Constitution gives the legislature wide 
discretion to draft new maps from scratch based on the policy 
considerations it chooses.  Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 3. 
15 The Legislature suggested we start with their proposed 
maps.  But those maps, if not enacted into law, are mere proposals 
deserving no special weight. 
16 Dissent, ¶114. 
17 The majority opinion concludes a claim for partisan 
gerrymandering is neither cognizable nor justiciable under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  I agree and join the majority's holdings 
and analysis explaining why this is so. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.bh 
 
6 
 
is not a neutral undertaking.  It stretches far beyond a proper, 
focused, and impartial exercise of our limited judicial power. 
¶87 With this in view, parties are invited to submit 
congressional and state legislative maps that comply with all 
relevant legal requirements, and that endeavor to minimize 
deviation from existing law.18  Parties should explain in their 
proposals why their maps comply with the law, and how their maps 
are the most consistent with existing boundaries.  Parties should 
not present arguments regarding the partisan makeup of proposed 
districts.  While other, traditional redistricting criteria may 
prove helpful and may be discussed, our primary concern is 
modifying only what we must to ensure the 2022 elections are 
conducted under districts that comply with all relevant state and 
federal laws. 
                                                 
18 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
explicitly 
requires 
the 
legislature to draw new state assembly and state senate districts 
after each census.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3.  This section does 
not refer to congressional districts.  The parties dispute whether 
other provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution have anything to 
say about congressional districts.  Regardless of the answer to 
that 
question, 
we 
have 
explained 
that 
"congressional 
reapportionment and state legislative redistricting are primarily 
state, not federal, prerogatives," and that "the United States 
Constitution and principles of federalism and comity dictate that 
the states' role is primary."  Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶5.  Where 
judicial action is necessary, this includes the primary role of 
state supreme courts.  Id., ¶11.  Accordingly, it is fitting for 
us to address congressional malapportionment claims as well, 
whether under state or federal law. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶88 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  Redistricting 
is an "inherently political and legislative——not judicial——task," 
even when judges do it.  See Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 
13, ¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537 (per curiam).  That is 
one reason why I said that the federal courts, comprised of judges 
insulated from partisan politics by lifetime appointments, are 
best suited to handle redistricting cases.  See Johnson v. WEC, 
No. 2021AP1450-OA, unpublished order, at 15-16 (Wis. Sept. 22, 
2021) (Dallet, J., dissenting).  But now that we have stepped out 
of our traditional judicial role and into the "the political 
thicket" of redistricting, it is vital that this court remain 
neutral and nonpartisan.  See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 
1123 (2016).  The majority1 all but guarantees that we cannot.  
First, the majority adopts 2011's "sharply partisan" maps as the 
template for its "least-change" approach.  See Baldus v. Members 
of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 844 (E.D. 
Wis. 2012).  And second, it effectively insulates future maps from 
being challenged as extreme partisan gerrymanders.  The upshot of 
those two decisions, neither of which is politically neutral, is 
to elevate outdated partisan choices over neutral redistricting 
criteria.  That outcome has potentially devastating consequences 
for representative government in Wisconsin.  I therefore dissent. 
                                                 
1 I refer to Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's opinion as the 
"majority/lead opinion," because a majority of the court does not 
join it in its entirety.  I refer to the "majority" only when 
discussing conclusions in the majority/lead opinion that garnered 
four votes.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
2 
 
I 
¶89 The majority/lead opinion's adoption of a "least-change" 
approach to evaluating or crafting remedial maps does not "remov[e] 
us from the political fray and ensur[e] we act as judges rather 
than political actors."  Majority/lead op., ¶77.  It does the 
opposite, inserting the court directly into politics by ratifying 
outdated partisan political choices.  In effect, a least-change 
approach that starts with the 2011 maps nullifies voters' electoral 
decisions since then.  In that way, adopting a least-change 
approach is an inherently political choice.  Try as it might, the 
majority is fooling no one by proclaiming its decision is neutral 
and apolitical.   
¶90 Although no court in Wisconsin, state or federal, has 
ever adopted a least-change approach, the majority/lead opinion 
would have you believe that other jurisdictions commonly use such 
an approach when starting from legislatively drawn maps.  But the 
cases it cites provide virtually no support for this approach.  
One simply involves a state's supreme court approving the trial 
court's selection of a congressional map.  Alexander v. Taylor, 51 
P.3d 1204, 1211 (Okla. 2002).  All but one of the remaining cases 
began with court-drawn maps or involved local maps drawn for county 
boards and commissions.  See Below v. Gardner, 963 A.2d 785, 794 
(N.H. 2002).  The bottom line is that the least-change approach 
has no "general acceptance among reasonable jurists" when the 
court's starting point is a legislatively drawn map.  See 
majority/lead op., ¶73.   
¶91 To be sure, there may be limited circumstances in which 
a least-change approach is appropriate.  For example, when a court 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
3 
 
is redrawing maps based on a prior court-drawn plan, it may make 
sense to make fewer changes since the existing maps should already 
reflect neutral redistricting principles.  See, e.g., Hippert v. 
Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel 
2012) (explaining that the panel utilizes a least-change strategy 
"where feasible"); see also Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, No. C0-01-160, 
unpublished order, at 6 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Mar. 
19, 2002) (adopting the plan that the Hippert court used as its 
template).  Another situation where minimizing changes may be 
appropriate is when a court finds localized problems with a plan 
validly enacted through the political process.  See Baldus, 849 F. 
Supp. 2d at 859-60 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (holding that two Milwaukee-
area assembly districts violated the Voting Rights Act, but 
emphasizing that "the re-drawing of lines for [those districts] 
must occur within the combined outer boundaries of those two 
districts" to avoid disrupting the otherwise valid state map). 
¶92 Here, however, we are dealing with neither of those 
situations.  We are adopting statewide maps to replace a 2011 plan 
that the parties all agree is now unconstitutional.  More to the 
point, however, the 2011 map was enacted using a "sharply partisan 
methodology" by a legislature no longer in power and a governor 
who the voters have since rejected.  See id. at 844, 851 (adding 
that it was "almost laughable" that anyone would assert that those 
maps "were not influenced by partisan factors").  The partisan 
character of the 2011 maps is evident both in the process by which 
they were drawn——"under a cloak of secrecy," totally excluding the 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
4 
 
minority political party2——and in their departure from neutral 
traditional redistricting criteria.  See id. at 850 (explaining 
that the court shared "in many respects" plaintiffs' expert's 
concerns that the 2011 maps contained "excessive shifts in 
population, disregard for core district populations, arbitrary 
partisan motivations related to compactness, and unnecessary 
disenfranchisement").   
                                                 
2 At the outset of the 2011 redistricting process, "the 
Republican legislative leadership announced to members of the 
Democratic minority that the Republicans would be provided 
unlimited funds to hire counsel and consultants" to assist in 
redistricting, while "Democrats . . . would not receive any 
funding."  Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 844-45.  One of the drafters 
met with "every single Republican member of the State Assembly," 
but "[h]e did not meet with any Democrats."  Id. at 845.  Before 
each 
meeting, 
the 
participants 
were 
required 
to 
sign 
confidentiality agreements.  Id.  Another drafter held meetings 
"with the Republican members [of Congress]," who "expressed their 
desire to draw districts that would maximize the chances for 
Republicans to be elected."  Id. at 846.  In addition to keeping 
the plan secret from Democratic legislators, "[e]very effort was 
made to keep this work out of the public eye."  Id. at 845.   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
5 
 
¶93 It is one thing for the current legislature to entrench 
a past legislature's partisan choices for another decade.3  It is 
another thing entirely for this court to do the same.  For 
starters, the least-change approach is not the "neutral standard" 
the majority/lead opinion portrays it as.  Rather, applying that 
approach to 2011's maps affirmatively perpetuates the partisan 
agenda of politicians no longer in power.  It doesn't matter which 
political party benefits from the 2011 maps, only that we cannot 
start with them and maintain judicial neutrality.  Moreover, a 
least-change approach risks entrenching 2011's partisan agenda in 
future redistricting cycles.  If the party that benefits from the 
maps adopted in this case controls only the legislature for the 
next redistricting cycle, it has every incentive to ensure an 
impasse.  After all, an impasse will result in the court changing 
the maps as little as possible——thus preserving that party's hold 
                                                 
3 The majority/lead opinion hints that a least-change approach 
is appropriate because the 2011 maps were "codified as statutes, 
without a sunset provision, and have not been supplanted by new 
law."  Majority/lead op., ¶72 n.8.  But both the Wisconsin and 
U.S. Constitutions require that all maps be redrawn every ten years 
to account for population shifts since the prior census.    See 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 (requiring the legislature to "apportion 
and district anew the members of the senate and assembly" in the 
first session after each census); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  These are 
the sunset provisions.  In this respect, the 2011 maps are unlike 
an ordinary unconstitutional statute, since they were enacted 
without any expectation of longevity.  Indeed, at this point they 
are a practical nullity.  Accordingly, the majority/lead opinion's 
comparisons to the typical remedies when a court finds a statute 
unconstitutional are inapt.  See id., ¶¶67, 72 & n.8.  And the 
fact that the maps have "not been supplanted by new law," id., ¶72 
n.8, is precisely the reason why the court is redistricting at 
all.  It is hardly a reason to treat the prior maps as a valid 
template. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
6 
 
on power.  The point is, the least-change approach is anything but 
a "neutral standard."  Majority/lead op., ¶76.   
¶94 True neutrality could be achieved by instead adhering to 
the 
neutral 
factors 
supplied 
by 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions, 
the 
Voting 
Rights 
Act, 
and 
traditional 
redistricting criteria.  The population equality (i.e., "one 
person, 
one 
vote") 
principles 
in 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions 
and 
the 
federal 
Voting 
Rights 
Act, 
52 
U.S.C. § 10301(a), are universally acknowledged as politically 
neutral and central to any redistricting plan.  Likewise for the 
remaining requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution, compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivision boundaries.  
Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 3, 4.  In addition to these constitutional 
and 
statutory 
baselines, 
neutral 
factors 
include 
other 
"traditional 
redistricting 
criteria" 
such 
as 
compactness,4 
preserving communities of interest, and minimizing "senate 
disenfranchisement."5 
 
E.g., 
Baumgart 
v. 
Wendelberger, 
No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002).   
                                                 
4 Unlike the Wisconsin Constitution, the U.S. Constitution 
does not impose a compactness requirement on congressional 
districts.  Nonetheless, compactness is one of the traditional 
redistricting criteria applied by courts drawing congressional 
maps 
or 
reviewing 
legislatively-drawn 
ones. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 850; Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 
F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
5 Senate disenfranchisement occurs when a voter is shifted 
from an odd-numbered senate district (which votes only in midterm 
election years) to an even-numbered senate district (which votes 
only in presidential election years), thereby delaying for two 
years the voter's ability to vote for her state senator.  See 
Baumgart v. Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002).   
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
7 
 
¶95 The traditional redistricting criteria, however, are 
glaringly absent from the majority/lead opinion.  A charitable 
read of the majority/lead opinion is that whatever factors it 
doesn't discuss——preserving communities of interest and minimizing 
senate disenfranchisement, for example——are sufficiently baked 
into the 2011 maps such that we can simply rebalance the 
populations of existing districts and call it a day.  But, as 
mentioned previously, there is good reason to doubt that the 2011 
maps meaningfully balanced any of the traditional redistricting 
criteria. 
¶96 For one thing, while the 2011 maps were attacked in 
federal court for failing to satisfy some of the traditional 
redistricting criteria, the federal court examined those criteria 
only to the extent needed to justify constitutionally suspect 
population deviations between districts.  See Baldus, 849 F. Supp. 
2d at 849-52.  As a result, the federal court made no finding, for 
example, that the prior maps adequately accounted for communities 
of interest.  In fact, the federal court noted that it shared many 
of plaintiffs' expert's concerns that the maps did not do so.  See 
id. at 851.   
¶97 For another thing, even if the 2011 maps reflected the 
traditional redistricting criteria when they were adopted, we 
cannot assume that they still reflect those criteria today.  
Population shifts over the last ten years may have expanded or 
altered existing communities of interest, and various ways of 
equalizing the populations of state legislative districts may 
result in unnecessary senate disenfranchisement.  This is why even 
when other courts use a least-change approach, they acknowledge 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
8 
 
that traditional redistricting criteria might still require more 
substantial changes.  See, e.g., Alexander, 51 P.3d at 1211 
(starting with the prior legislatively enacted map but considering 
"[w]idely recognized neutral redistricting criteria" including 
core retention, communities of interest, and avoiding incumbent 
pairing); Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 380-82, 385-86 (using "a least-
change strategy where feasible" alongside considerations of 
communities of interest and incumbent residences). 
¶98 In this case we are adopting new maps, not reviewing 
legislatively enacted ones.  We should therefore ensure that the 
maps we adopt are the "best that c[an] be managed" under all 
relevant criteria, especially since we know that there is no single 
dispositive factor in crafting districts.  See Prosser v. Elections 
Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992); see also Baldus, 849 
F. Supp. 2d at 850 (explaining that "factors like homogeneity of 
needs and interests, compactness, contiguity, and avoidance of 
breaking up counties, towns, villages, wards, and neighborhoods," 
not just population equality, "are all necessary to achieve" a 
representative democracy).  Adopting the best maps possible based 
on all the relevant criteria protects our neutrality and ensures 
that the resulting districts foster a representative democracy.  
That is, in part, why the last three federal courts to draw 
Wisconsin's districts took a similar tack.  See Baumgart, 2002 WL 
34127471, at *2 ("The reapportionment of state legislative 
districts requires balancing of several disparate goals."); 
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 865 ("The issue for us is therefore 
remedy: not, [i]s some enacted plan constitutional? But, [w]hat 
plan shall we as a court of equity promulgate in order to rectify 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
9 
 
the admitted constitutional violation? What is the best plan?"); 
Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 637 (E.D. 
Wis. 1982) (discussing the traditional redistricting criteria 
before adopting the court's own plan, without deference to the 
last set of maps adopted by the legislature).  Along the way, we 
may have to make fewer changes in some places, and more changes in 
others.  See Robert Yablon, Gerrylaundering, 97 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2022) (explaining that in redistricting "we should 
not reflexively embrace the past for the sake of stability," but 
"we also should not reflexively embrace change above all else").  
But resorting to a least-change approach does not help us balance 
the relevant factors.  
¶99 More 
concerning 
than 
its 
silence 
regarding 
the 
traditional redistricting criteria is the possibility that the 
majority/lead opinion will prioritize its atextual least-change 
approach over the text of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The 
Wisconsin Constitution imposes several substantive requirements on 
assembly districts, including that they be in "as compact form as 
practicable."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 4.  The majority/lead 
opinion's reasoning suggests that, despite that constitutional 
directive and even if a more compact set of population-equalizing 
assembly maps is "practicable," the court is free to adopt a less 
compact set of maps simply because they make fewer changes to the 
2011 plan.  That cannot be right.  The least-change principle is 
found 
nowhere 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
or 
U.S. 
Constitutions.  
Constitutionally mandated criteria do not take a back seat to 
extra-constitutional methods like least-change.  See Yablon, supra 
(explaining that nothing would "license the legislature to adopt 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
10 
 
a map that subordinates the[] criteria [of the Wisconsin 
Constitution] to an extra-legal preference" for minimal changes to 
the previous maps).  
¶100 Likewise, the text of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides no support for the majority's hierarchical distinctions 
between its various criteria.  Nowhere does the Constitution 
relegate 
to 
"secondary 
importance" 
the 
requirements 
of 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivision 
boundaries found in Article IV, § 4.  Contra majority/lead op., ¶34 
(citing Wis. State AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 635).  And the 
majority 
offers 
no 
legitimate 
explanation 
for 
why 
some 
constitutional requirements are more important than others.  The 
source it cites for this supposed primary/secondary  distinction—
—Wisconsin State AFL-CIO——is of no help because that case found 
the distinction in an Illinois case citing the Illinois 
Constitution.  See Wis. Stat. AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 635 (citing 
People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 277 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1971)).  
Just as we cannot allow an atextual approach, such as least-change, 
to supersede the Constitution's text, we cannot pretend that some 
constitutional provisions are more important than others.   
¶101 Finally, the majority fails to flesh out exactly what a 
least-change approach entails, thus leaving the parties with 
little actual guidance.  What exactly, should the parties change 
the least?  Does "least change" refer to the fewest changes to 
districts' boundary lines?  The fewest number of people moved from 
one district to the next?  Moreover, based on recent population 
shifts, what is the feasibility of a least-change approach?  
Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 381 ("[P]opulation shifts within the state, 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
11 
 
however, sometimes [render] a least-change approach . . . not 
feasible.").  For example, Dane County has gained more than 73,000 
residents since the last census——more than the optimal population 
of an entire assembly district.6  Meanwhile, Milwaukee County and 
many of the state's rural areas have seen slow growth or outright 
declines in population.7  These population shifts suggest that the 
2011 district lines, particularly on a legislative level, may not 
provide a very useful template for crafting a remedial plan. 
II 
¶102 In an unnecessary and sweeping overreach, the majority 
effectively insulates future maps from constitutional attack by 
holding that excessive partisan gerrymandering claims are not 
viable under the Wisconsin Constitution.  It gets there by 
answering a constitutional question that we never asked, that the 
parties did not brief, and that is immaterial to this case.8  The 
majority seems to think that, because it fails to "find a right to 
partisan fairness in . . . the Wisconsin Constitution," the court 
cannot consider, for any reason, the partisan effects of remedial 
maps.  Majority/lead op., ¶53.  But there is no logical connection 
between these conclusions.  In fact, willfully blinding the court 
                                                 
6 See https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/milwaukee
countywisconsin,danecountywisconsin,marinettecountywisconsin/PST
045219. 
7 See id. 
8 The question we actually asked was whether the "partisan 
makeup of districts [is] a valid factor for us to consider in 
evaluating or creating new maps."  Johnson v. WEC, No. 2021AP1450-
OA, unpublished order, at 2 (Wis. Oct. 14, 2021). 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
12 
 
to the partisan makeup of districts increases the risk that we 
will adopt a partisan gerrymander. 
A 
¶103 The majority's gratuitous discussion of whether claims 
of extreme partisan gerrymandering are cognizable under the 
Wisconsin Constitution starts with a flawed reading of the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. 
Ct. 2484 (2019).  There, the Court held that excessive partisan-
gerrymandering claims were not justiciable under the federal 
constitution because there were no judicially manageable standards 
by which federal courts could determine that gerrymandering had 
gone too far.  Id. at 2498-2502 (clarifying that the Court does 
"not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering").  The Court 
observed, however, that this remained an open question under state 
constitutions.  Id. at 2507-08.  It should be obvious that here, 
because we have no partisan gerrymandering claim before us, Rucho 
is irrelevant.  Several parties have urged us not to adopt a map 
tantamount to a partisan gerrymander, and some have pointed out 
that Wisconsin's current legislative and congressional districts 
are the result of a "sharply partisan methodology."9  See Baldus, 
849 F. Supp. 2d at 844.  But nobody argues that we should strike 
                                                 
9 The majority mischaracterizes this argument as advocating a 
"proportional 
party 
representation" 
requirement. 
 
See 
majority/lead op., ¶¶42, 47.  No party has suggested that the court 
should radically reform our system of government to ensure the 
political parties are represented in proportion to their 
percentage of the statewide vote.  In fact, the only party that 
argues for a constitutional requirement that the court consider 
partisan metrics acknowledges that proportional representation by 
political party is unattainable given single-member districts and 
the political geography of Wisconsin. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
13 
 
down any existing map on the basis that it is an extreme partisan 
gerrymander.  Without an excessive partisan-gerrymandering claim 
before us, there is no reason for the majority to issue an advisory 
opinion about whether such claims are cognizable under the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶104 That said, even if someone had brought such a claim, the 
majority is wrong that determining when partisan gerrymandering 
has gone too far is a non-justiciable political question under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  It is not, as the majority claims, 
"obvious[ly]" 
impossible 
to 
develop 
judicially 
manageable 
standards for judging when partisan gerrymandering is excessive.  
Indeed, other state courts have done it.  See League of Women 
Voters of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737, 814, 821 (Pa. 2018) 
(holding that claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering are 
cognizable under the Pennsylvania Constitution and striking down 
the state's congressional map on that basis); Common Cause v. 
Lewis, No. 18CVS014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *2-3 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 3, 2019) (striking down state legislative maps as "extreme 
partisan gerrymandering").  And the federal courts had done it 
before Rucho.  See, e.g., Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. 
Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1078 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (concluding 
that "workable standards, which contain limiting principles, exist 
so that courts can adjudicate [partisan] gerrymandering claims 
just as they have adjudicated other types of gerrymandering 
claims"), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chabot v. Ohio A. Philip 
Randolph Inst., 140 S. Ct. 102 (2019); League of Women Voters of 
Mich. v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d 867, 911-12 (E.D. Mich. 2019) 
(explaining that "lower federal courts have formulated judicially-
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
14 
 
manageable standards for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
claims"), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chatfield v. League of 
Women Voters of Mich., 140 S. Ct. 429 (2019).  There is no reason 
why we could not develop similar standards to judge such claims in 
Wisconsin.   
¶105 In any case, there is no need for us to decide this 
question now.  We have no claim of excessive partisan 
gerrymandering before us.  We should wait until we do and then 
decide——with the benefit of full briefing from the parties——
whether our Constitution protects a practice that is "incompatible 
with democratic principles."  See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Ind. 
Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015). 
B 
¶106 Although the majority's rejection of extreme partisan-
gerrymandering claims has no effect on the outcome of this case, 
it likely has far-reaching consequences for future redistricting 
cycles. 
 
Discarding 
a 
potential 
limitation 
on 
partisan 
gerrymandering gives future legislators and governors a green 
light to engage in a practice that robs the people of their most 
important power——to select their elected leaders.  See The 
Federalist No. 37, at 4 (James Madison) ("The genius of republican 
liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should 
be derived from the people, but that those [e]ntrusted with it 
should be kept in independence on the people."). 
¶107 Extreme 
partisan 
gerrymandering 
strikes 
at 
the 
foundation of that power.  Representative government demands "that 
the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
15 
 
around."  Ariz. State Legis., 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Extreme partisan gerrymandering turns 
that on its head.  It allows a party in power to draw district 
lines that guarantee its hold on power for a decade or more, no 
matter what the voters choose. 
¶108 No problem, the majority says, "[e]ven after the most 
severe partisan gerrymanders, citizens remain free" to run for 
office, express their views, and vote for the candidates of their 
choice.  Majority/lead op., ¶60.  But the problem with extreme 
partisan gerrymandering isn't that it literally denies people the 
right to vote or run for office.  It's that extreme gerrymandering 
distorts the political process so thoroughly that those rights can 
become meaningless.  No matter how warped the process becomes, 
post-Rucho, the federal courts cannot intervene.  Now, the majority 
all but guarantees that we won't either. 
C 
¶109 The majority's misapplication of Rucho leads it to 
conflate how the court might analyze legislatively drawn maps with 
how it should select or draw remedial ones.  That error is evident 
from the start, as the majority frames the analysis around the 
question of whether we "should judge maps for partisan fairness," 
regardless of who draws them.  Majority/lead op., ¶39.  But "who 
draws them" makes all the difference.  There is a significant 
difference between second-guessing the partisan fairness of a map 
drawn by an inherently partisan legislature, which "would have the 
virtue of political legitimacy," and our task here, which is to 
"pick[] the [plan] (or devis[e] our own) most consistent with 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
16 
 
judicial neutrality."  See Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 867.  We are 
not asked to determine if maps enacted by the legislature through 
the normal legislative process amount to an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander.  Cf. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.  Rather, we 
are adopting maps because that process has failed.  In doing so, 
we must act consistent with our role as a non-partisan institution 
and avoid choosing maps designed to benefit one political party 
over all others.  See Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 867.  The people 
rightly expect courts to redistrict in neutral ways. 
¶110 The majority claims that considering partisanship for 
any reason is inconsistent with judicial neutrality.  That all-
or-nothing position distorts the nuanced reality of the court's 
role in redistricting.  Other courts' redistricting experience 
shows that partisanship is just another one of the many factors a 
court must balance when enacting remedial maps. 
¶111 The last three courts to tackle redistricting in 
Wisconsin all considered partisan effects alongside other 
generally accepted neutral factors when evaluating and choosing 
remedial maps.  See Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, at *3-4 (rejecting 
maps proposed by the parties on the grounds that they were drawn 
to preserve or obtain partisan advantage); Prosser, 793 F. Supp. 
at 867-68, 870-71 (analyzing the partisan effects of several 
proposals before ultimately adopting a court-drawn plan that was 
"the least partisan"); Wis. State AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 634.  
Those courts considered the partisan effects of their decisions 
not to enact their subjective view of what is politically fair but 
because courts, unlike legislatures, should not behave like 
political entities: 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
17 
 
Judges should not select a plan that seeks partisan 
advantage——that seeks to change the ground rules so that 
one party can do better than it would do under a plan 
drawn up by persons having no political agenda——even if 
they would not be entitled to invalidate an enacted plan 
that did so. 
Prosser, 793 F. Supp. at 867; see also Baumgart, 2002 WL 34127471, 
at *3 (following Prosser); Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶12 (quoting 
Prosser).  The Indiana Supreme Court likewise declined to enact "a 
plan that represents one political party's ideas of how district 
boundaries should be drawn [because doing so] does not conform to 
the principle of judicial independence and neutrality."  Peterson 
v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind. 2003). 
¶112 Indeed, although it sounds contradictory, the only way 
for the court to avoid unintentionally selecting maps designed to 
benefit one political party over others is by considering the maps' 
likely partisan effects.  The United States Supreme Court has 
suggested as much, explaining that taking a "politically mindless 
approach" to redistricting may lead to "grossly gerrymandered 
results," "whether intended or not."  Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 
U.S. 735, 753 (1973).  Refusing to consider partisan effects only 
increases the risk that the court will be used, intentionally or 
not, to achieve partisan ends.  This is especially true when our 
starting point is 2011's indisputably partisan maps. 
III 
¶113 I close with a lingering question that the majority/lead 
opinion surprisingly leaves unaddressed:  Exactly what maps are we 
talking about——congressional and state legislative maps or only 
the latter?  There is evidence in the majority/lead opinion to 
support both answers.  On the one hand, the majority/lead opinion 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
18 
 
begins by discussing the legislature's duty under Article IV, § 3 
of the Wisconsin Constitution "to apportion and district anew the 
members of the senate and assembly," and later explains that this 
requirement does not apply to congressional districts.  See 
majority/lead op., ¶¶1, 13 & n.4.  That suggests only state 
legislative maps are at play.  On the other hand, the majority/lead 
opinion 
identifies 
redistricting 
principles 
applicable 
to 
congressional maps under the federal constitution, but without 
stating that it intends to draw new congressional maps.  See 
id. ¶¶24-25.  Similarly, the majority/lead opinion states at 
different times that it intends to remedy the "malapportionment" 
of "each legislative district," id., ¶4 (emphasis added), but also 
that "any judicial remedy" in this case will be confined "to making 
the minimum changes necessary in order to conform the existing 
congressional and state legislative redistricting plans to 
constitutional and statutory requirements."  Id., ¶8 (emphasis 
added).  At least two parties, the Hunter Plaintiffs and the 
Congressmen, have suggested that they intend to litigate what, if 
anything, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
has 
to 
say 
about 
congressional redistricting, but so far the court has no motion or 
other briefing on that question.  So it is unclear from the start 
what the majority/lead opinion is even addressing. 
IV 
¶114 The majority repeatedly protests that any approach other 
than its preferred one would undermine our non-partisan role and 
imperil the legitimacy and independence of the judiciary.  But the 
neutral 
principles 
supplied 
by 
the 
U.S. 
and 
Wisconsin 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd 
19 
 
Constitutions, the Voting Rights Act, and the traditional 
redistricting criteria can preserve our independence while still 
guiding the parties and the court towards resolving this case.  
The majority deals a striking blow to representative government in 
Wisconsin by ignoring those neutral principles and committing the 
court to an approach that prioritizes an obsolete partisan agenda.  
I therefore dissent.   
¶115 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
No.  2021AP1450-OA.rfd