Title: Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc.1990 WY 123800 P.2d 505Case Number: 89-233Decided: 11/07/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
TRITON COAL COMPANY, 
INC.,

 APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

MOBIL COAL PRODUCING, 
INC.,

 APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Patrick R. Day, 
Holland & Hart, Cheyenne; Joseph W. Halpern, Holland & Hart, Denver, 
Colo., and Thomas A. Nicholas, III, Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Stephen J. 
Sorensen, Richmond, Va., Joseph W. Kennedy, Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & 
Kennedy, Wichita, Kan., and Thomas E. Lubnau, II, Lubnau & Lubnau, Gillette, 
for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The essential 
questions that must be resolved in this case relate to a claim of error for 
giving an instruction to which no formal objection was lodged at the appropriate 
time in the trial proceeding and to a claim of error for failure to give an 
instruction that was withdrawn. The issues are whether, in either instance, the 
appellant, Triton Coal Company, Inc. (Triton), developed a record that justifies 
this court in considering the claimed error or, in the alternative, whether the 
plain error doctrine permits this court to review the claims of error. Triton 
and Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. (Mobil), appellee, own and operate coal mines 
near Gillette, Wyoming. Triton, as the plaintiff, alleged that Mobil committed 
tortious interference with a contract between Triton and Western Farmers 
Electric Cooperative (Western Farmers), an Oklahoma utility that was a Triton 
coal customer. The case was tried to a jury, and the jury returned a verdict for 
Mobil, effectively finding that Mobil had not interfered with Triton's contract 
with Western Farmers. Triton has endeavored to pique the interest of this court 
with suggestions of interesting substantive matters that could have resulted in 
a different determination by the jury. We conclude, however, that there is no 
justification presented for reversing the judgment entered on the jury verdict 
because Rule 51, W.R.C.P., controls the disposition of the claimed instructional 
errors, and there is no reason to apply the plain error doctrine pursuant to 
Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

[¶2]      In its opening 
brief, Triton presents the issues on appeal in this way:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in submitting Instruction 7 to the jury, because that instruction 
erroneously endorsed Mobil's legally unsupportable theory that Triton's contract 
with WFEC ceased to exist when Triton filed an action for specific performance 
seeking to enforce that contract?

"2. Whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to submit Triton's Proposed Instruction 12 to the jury, 
which would have properly instructed the jury that * * * [Mobil's] own 
competitive interest in seeking prospective economic advantage did not 
constitute, as a matter of law, justification for interfering with Triton's 
preexisting contract rights?

"3. Whether these two 
erroneous rulings on jury instructions prejudiced Triton's substantial rights, 
because a properly instructed jury might have concluded both that Mobil's 
conduct was improper and that Mobil's conduct caused WFEC to breach its contract 
with Triton?

"4. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying Triton's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
to alter or amend the judgment, or for new trial?"

Mobil sets forth 
the issues in this way:

"1. Whether Triton can 
base any claim of error on the giving of Instruction No. 7, when it drafted a 
substantial part of the instruction, consented to the instruction, and did not 
object to the instruction.

"2. Whether Triton can 
base any claim of error on the trial court's failure to give an instruction 
proposed by Triton but affirmatively withdrawn by Triton at the instruction 
conference.

"3. Whether Triton can 
legitimately satisfy any of the elements of the `plain error' doctrine embodied 
in Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure 7.05.

"4. Whether Triton's 
failure to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence 
precludes Triton's assigning as error the trial court's overruling of its motion 
for judgment n.o.v."

[¶3]      In resolving the 
case, we first dispose of the questions of proper preservation of the 
instructional issues on the record so that those issues can be reviewed. We then 
address the application of the plain error doctrine to this situation as an 
alternative premise for considering the claims of error.

[¶4]      In 1977, Triton 
and Western Farmers entered into a sales contract pursuant to which Triton was 
to supply coal from its Buckskin Mine near Gillette to Western Farmers' power 
plant located at Hugo, Oklahoma.1 The contract provided that Triton 
would begin delivering coal to Western Farmers on October 1, 1981, and it would 
continue until Triton had delivered 18 million tons of coal or until the 
termination date of December 31, 1996. It was expected that Triton would deliver 
to Western Farmers approximately 1.2 million tons of coal each year. By 
amendment in 1982, price concessions were granted to Western Farmers in exchange 
for its agreement that Triton would provide all of Western Farmers' coal 
needs.

[¶5]      In July of 1984, 
Western Farmers notified Triton of its intention to quit purchasing Triton coal 
because of its inability to obtain transportation at a reasonable cost. On July 
27, 1984, Triton instituted an action in the United States District Court for 
the District of Wyoming in which it alleged that Western Farmers was in "total 
breach" of the contract, and it sought specific performance. That suit was 
settled by the parties in January of 1986. In the meantime, Western Farmers 
purchased coal from Mobil for almost a year. The settlement agreement between 
Western Farmers and Triton required Western Farmers to resume purchasing Triton 
coal and to pay Triton approximately $8.36 million which represented the 
difference between what Western Farmers had paid Mobil, for coal purchased from 
Mobil between February, 1985 and the date of settlement, and the amount that 
Western Farmers would have paid Triton for the same quantity of coal. Triton 
then resumed shipping coal to Western Farmers under modified terms of the 1977 
contract, and Mobil and Western Farmers agreed to terminate their contractual 
relationship by the end of 1986.

[¶6]      Triton then 
brought this action against Mobil claiming tortious interference with the 
contract between Triton and Western Farmers.2 Triton alleged that Mobil, knowing 
of the existence of its contract with Western Farmers, caused Western Farmers to 
breach that contract with resulting damages to Triton in excess of $8 million. 
The element of interference was founded on the contention that Western Farmers 
had stopped buying coal under its contract with Triton because it had been 
enticed by Mobil with considerably lower coal prices than those called for in 
Western Farmers' contract with Triton. Mobil's quoted price for coal was 
approximately $6.50 per ton while the contract price for Triton coal was between 
$11 and $12 per ton. The case was tried to a jury in 1989.

[¶7]      Prior to the time 
that the jury retired to deliberate, it received, among the court's 
instructions, Jury Instruction No. 7. The instruction read:

"A party repudiates a 
contract when it clearly and unequivocally announces its intention not to 
perform its obligations under the contract. This repudiation becomes a breach 
when it is so treated by the injured party. Any actions taken by Mobil after 
Triton treated its contract with Western Farmers as breached cannot be 
considered interference with that contract.

"Breach of contract is a 
failure, without legal excuse, to perform any part of a contract."

This instruction 
was developed after both parties submitted proposed instructions dealing with 
the subject matter.3

[¶8]      The next to the 
last day of trial, the trial judge and counsel for the parties worked almost six 
hours discussing and reworking the instructions to the jury. By agreement, the 
conference was not recorded. Objections to the final instructions were to be 
made the following day at a formal, recorded conference prior to submission of 
the instructions to the jury and before the closing arguments. On that occasion, 
Triton did raise objections to other instructions, but it did not object on the 
record to Jury Instruction No. 7. In fact, the record discloses that counsel for 
Triton discussed Jury Instruction No. 7 in his closing argument to the 
jury.

[¶9]      Triton also had 
submitted a proposed instruction to the effect that a competitive interest was 
not a defense to Mobil's tortious interference with an existing contract. At the 
formal instruction conference, Triton did object to the trial court's refusal to 
submit its proposed Jury Instruction No. 12 dealing with competitive interest. 
Immediately following that objection, however, Triton withdrew that proposed 
instruction without explanation. In presenting this appeal, Triton advises "* * 
* this withdrawal was inadvertent, and was occasioned by miscommunication 
between Triton's trial counsel, one of whom was preparing for oral argument and 
could not attend this instruction conference."

[¶10]   After deliberating, the jury 
returned a verdict finding that Mobil did not intentionally and improperly 
interfere with the contract between Triton and Western Farmers. Judgment was 
entered on that verdict in favor of Mobil, and Triton has taken this 
appeal.

[¶11]   The record and the briefs 
demonstrate that Triton's theory of this case was that, beginning sometime in 
1984, Mobil commenced an aggressive campaign with the purpose of inducing 
Western Farmers to breach its contract with Triton and buy coal from Mobil. 
Triton's burden at trial was to demonstrate that Mobil's actions satisfied the 
four elements necessary to prove tortious interference with Triton's contract 
with Western Farmers. In order to meet that burden, Triton was required to 
prove: (1) the existence of the Triton-Western Farmers contract; (2) Mobil's 
knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional and improper interference inducing or 
causing a breach; and (4) resulting damages. First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. 
Mudge, 748 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1988).4 The trial court granted Triton a 
partial summary judgment to the effect that the first two elements, that is the 
existence of the Triton contract with Western Farmers and Mobil's knowledge of 
that contract, were established, and the jury was so instructed.

[¶12]   Mobil, defending the case, asserted 
the breach of the contract with Triton was entirely attributable to Western 
Farmers. Mobil's defense was that Western Farmers initiated the business 
relationship with Mobil that resulted in the purchase of Mobil coal and that 
Mobil's actions were entirely in response to overtures from Western 
Farmers.

[¶13]   On appeal, Triton argues vigorously 
that Jury Instruction No. 7 undermined its theory of the case and that the court 
erred in submitting that instruction to the jury. Its position is that, even 
though it alleged a breach of contract when it sued Western Farmers, it always 
treated the contract as being in full force and effect and had, in fact, sought 
specific performance. Triton urges that the instruction relating to repudiation 
was improper in light of the evidence. More specifically, Triton's argument is 
that this instruction permitted Mobil to argue that there was no contract for 
Mobil to interfere with after Triton filed suit against Western Farmers on July 
27, 1984. The instruction justified Mobil's argument that its actions subsequent 
to that date could not constitute tortious interference with an existing 
contract. That contention was antithetical to Triton's position that it was 
attempting to achieve specific performance of the contract with Western Farmers; 
never treated its contract with Western Farmers terminated; and that the jury 
properly should have been instructed to consider Mobil's actions subsequent to 
the filing of the suit against Western Farmers.

[¶14]   Triton contends that the misleading 
instruction compelled the jury to disregard the improper conduct on the part of 
Mobil that occurred after July 27, 1984, the time that encompassed most of 
Triton's claims of impropriety. It had asserted at trial that Mobil's improper 
conduct led to the execution of the contract between Mobil and Western Farmers 
in 1985. The ultimate conclusion by Triton is that this error caused the jury to 
determine that Mobil did nothing that was improper.

[¶15]   Judicial review of claimed error 
with respect to jury instructions is controlled by application of Rule 51, 
W.R.C.P., as it has been interpreted by Wyoming precedent. Rule 51, W.R.C.P., 
states in pertinent part:

"* * * No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection."

Over the years, 
this court has been consistent in its interpretation of Rule 51, W.R.C.P. We 
consider only those claims of error relating to jury instructions in those cases 
where proper objections were raised. See Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892 (Wyo. 
1989); B-T Limited v. Blakeman, 705 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 1985); Cervelli v. Graves, 
661 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 1983); and Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979). 
Unless the circumstances justify a finding of plain error, we do not consider 
claims of error in jury instructions to which no objections were made. See 
Seaton v. State of Wyoming Highway Commission, District No. 1, 784 P.2d 197 
(Wyo. 1989); Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Company, 767 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989); 
Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1985); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 
632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981); Cox v. Vernieuw, 604 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1980); Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Company. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1973); and DeWitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734 (Wyo. 1963). In Goggins, 704 P.2d  at 1289, we stated with respect to 
this rule:

"The spirit and purpose 
of the rule is designed to appraise and inform the trial court of the purpose of 
the instruction in order that the judge may make such corrections as he deems 
necessary before submitting the instructions to the jury."

[¶16]   Triton here contends that it did, 
in fact, object to Jury Instruction No. 7. It first endeavors to persuade the 
court that it "constructively" objected to the instruction in its Pretrial 
Memorandum as well as in statements made by counsel to the court during the 
instruction conference that was not recorded. Triton states in its opening 
brief:

"Despite the failure by 
Triton's counsel to restate Triton's objection to Instruction 7 for the record 
on June 30, the previous objections to the instruction satisfied both the letter 
and the purpose of Rule 51. By objecting in writing to the substance of what 
became Instruction 7 in its pretrial memorandum and objecting to the actual 
instruction during the course of the June 29 conference, counsel for Triton 
adequately stated the nature and grounds of its objection for the trial 
court."

[¶17]   The function of Rule 51, W.R.C.P., 
is well established in our law, and we will not expand it by adding a 
"constructive objection" based on off-the-record statements by counsel or 
relation back to arguments made in earlier court proceedings not directly tied 
to the jury instruction preparation. See Morris v. State, 644 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 
1982). Triton had the opportunity and the obligation to make its objections to 
undesirable or unfavorable or improper jury instructions, on the record, during 
the formal jury instruction conference prior to submission of the instructions 
to the jury. It did not do so. The burden for that failure is properly placed 
upon the party at trial. We refuse to shift that burden to the trial judge and, 
furthermore, we do not perceive it as our role to assume that burden. Cullin v. 
State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977). Neither is it appropriate for this court to 
substitute, in the exercise of hindsight, its strategic and tactical judgment 
for that of trial counsel. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).

[¶18]   We turn then to the contention that 
the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that a competitive 
interest would not serve as a defense to Mobil's tortious interference with an 
existing contract. As we have noted, Triton withdrew that instruction without 
explanation, but Triton now urges that the withdrawal was inadvertent. In other 
cases, we have discussed the obligation of counsel to submit jury instructions 
for the trial court's consideration. For example, in Condict v. Whitehead, 
Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo. 1987), 
citing Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1973), we 
said:

"* * * Parties have not 
only the right but the duty to offer instructions. In the absence of submission 
of a proper written instruction, any claimed error is deemed to have been 
waived."

With respect to 
the failure to give Proposed Jury Instruction No. 12, Triton's withdrawal of 
that instruction waived any claim of error other than plain error. We do not 
perceive that the offering of an instruction that is withdrawn has any arguable 
standing sufficient to distinguish it from the failure to offer an instruction. 
Withdrawal of the instruction should be addressed in the same way, and we hold 
that withdrawal of an instruction forecloses an objection to the failure to give 
the instruction and amounts to a clear waiver of the right to have such an 
instruction given to the jury. As we did in considering the failure to object, 
we do not recognize "constructive preservation" of an issue for 
appeal.

[¶19]   Triton contends, however, that in 
any event it is entitled to present its claims under the doctrine of plain 
error. Plain error is recognized in Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P., which 
provides:

"Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court."

We first defined 
plain error in Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 1977), in which we 
said:

"* * * When review is 
sought under the plain error doctrine this Court must be able to discern from 
the record, without resort to speculation or equivocal inference, what occurred 
at trial, that is, we are entitled to know the particular facts. Further, the 
proponent of plain error must demonstrate the existence of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and 
obvious, not merely arguable, way. If these criteria are met, the error or 
defect must adversely affect some substantial right of the accused in order to 
avoid the application of the harmless error concept procedurally expressed in 
Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P." (Citations omitted.)

In Goggins, 704 P.2d  at 1291, citing Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984), we applied 
that plain error standard, saying:

"In order to invoke the 
plain-error rule, it is necessary to show

"`* * * (1) that the 
record reflects clear and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) that the 
facts prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) that the error affects a 
substantial right of the accused; and (4) that the defendant has been materially 
prejudiced by that violation.'"

[¶20]   Under our cases in which a party 
has failed to object to a jury instruction, the plain error doctrine is 
infrequently applied. For example, we said:

"* * * But the 
application of the plain-error doctrine must be exercised cautiously only in 
exceptional circumstances and must not be applied unless its denial would 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings." Cullin, 565 P.2d 445, 451, citing Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004 
(Wyo. 1974).

Later, we 
expanded upon the principle behind our reluctance to apply the 
doctrine:

"One important reason for 
invoking the plain-error doctrine when reviewing jury instructions which were 
not objected to during the trial, is that jury instructions are written with the 
particular facts and theories of each case in mind. The judge, with the advice 
and assistance of the attorneys in the case, attempts to tailor the instructions 
so that they help the jury develop a clear understanding of how the facts are to 
be determined under the applicable law of the case. The problems the jury may 
have with the applicable law will differ from case to case and therefore the 
instructions appropriate to each case may also differ. In many cases, any one of 
several instructions may be legally correct. It is the duty of the attorneys in 
each case to determine which legally acceptable instruction best presents the 
client's case. Neither the judge, nor the appellate court, has the appropriate 
perspective to make such a decision. Even if they did understand the case better 
than the attorney presenting it, their role prohibits them from urging one 
instruction over another providing both are legally sound. Thus, unless an 
instruction can be said to have plainly caused a fundamental prejudice to the 
defendant's legal rights, we will not overturn it on appeal unless it was 
objected to during the trial and a proper instruction was offered in its place." 
Gore v. State, 627 P.2d 1384, 1388-89 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶21]   After careful analysis of the 
record and pertinent authority, we conclude that the submission of Jury 
Instruction No. 7 in this case did not result in any fundamental prejudice to 
Triton's rights. We are not persuaded that there was any transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law. Little substantive difference can be 
discerned between Triton's Proposed Instruction No. 15 and Jury Instruction No. 
7 as it was submitted to the jury. The fact that an instruction may have been 
more precisely drafted or drafted in a way more favorable to a party does not 
warrant reversal for a new trial. Neither are we convinced that this instruction 
misstates the law in any substantial fashion. It is not our function to 
speculate as to what evidence the jury may or may not have considered in 
reaching its decision. Even if we assume, for purposes of discussion, that the 
instruction given was inadequate, the circumstances do not justify departure 
from Rule 51, W.R.C.P., particularly in light of the fact that Triton argued the 
instruction to the jury during closing argument. Triton has failed to convince 
this court that Jury Instruction No. 7 satisfies the plain error test heretofore 
adopted by this court.

[¶22]   We reach the same conclusion with 
respect to Triton's Proposed Instruction No. 12, the one that was withdrawn. In 
that specific instance, the record is not clear and unequivocal. The failure of 
the trial court to submit Triton's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 12, or some 
comparable substitute, did not necessarily transgress any clear rule of law. We 
are not satisfied that Triton has carried its burden of demonstrating that, even 
if there were an error in failing to instruct on competitive interest, the error 
was prejudicial. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 
1974). From the argument and authority presented, we cannot discern how 
inclusion of that instruction would have resulted in a different verdict. 
Condict, 743 P.2d 880. We conclude that Triton has failed to substantiate any 
showing of plain error as to either Jury Instruction No. 7 or the failure to 
give its Proposed Jury Instruction No. 12.

[¶23]   We note that, in articulating its 
issues presented for review, Triton included a claim of error in denying its 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to alter or amend the judgment, 
or for a new trial. This question was not further addressed in the brief 
submitted by Triton. Consequently, we are justified in applying to that 
contention our rule that the failure to present cogent argument or support a 
claim of error by pertinent authority justifies this court in refusing to 
consider that claim of error. TZ Land & Cattle Company v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204 (Wyo. 1990); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Wyoming 
Insurance Department, 793 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1990), and authorities cited therein. 

[¶24]   We hold that, because Jury 
Instruction No. 7 was submitted without objection and because Triton's Proposed 
Jury Instruction No. 12 was withdrawn, there is no error in the trial court 
proceedings. Triton has not satisfied the standard for asserting these claims of 
error under the plain error doctrine, and we affirm the judgment of the trial 
court.

FOOTNOTES

1 Triton Coal Company, 
Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shell Mining Company; Shell Mining Company 
is, in turn, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shell Oil Company. Shell Oil Company, 
as the original developer of the Buckskin Mine, subsequently assigned all 
Buckskin Mine contracts to Triton.

2 Triton's claim for 
punitive damages and Mobil's counterclaim for tortious interference by Triton 
with Mobil's contract with Western Farmers were disposed of by directed verdicts 
granted as to these claims upon motions made by the respective 
parties.

3 Triton's Proposed 
Instruction No. 15 read:

"A repudiation of a 
contract does not operate as a breach of that contract until it is treated as a 
breach by the injured party. The injured party has the option to either maintain 
an action at once for damages occasioned by such an anticipatory breach of the 
contract, or wait until performance is due and then sue for damages. Thus, the 
Western Farmers letter of July, 1987 did not operate as a breach of the contract 
until it was treated as a breach by Triton."

Mobil's Proposed 
Instruction No. O read:

"A party repudiates a 
contract when it clearly and unequivocally announces its intention not to 
perform its obligations under the contract. This repudiation becomes a breach 
when it is so treated by the injured party. If you find that, by the letter of 
July 13, 1984, Western Farmers repudiated its contract with Triton and that the 
action of Triton in bringing its lawsuit for breach of contract against Western 
Farmers on July 27, 1984 establishes that Triton treated the contract as 
breached, then any actions by Mobil or Western Farmers after that date are 
irrelevant, on the issue of whether Mobil tortiously interfered with the 
contract. Only those actions of Mobil or Western Farmers prior to July 27, 1984 
can be considered in determining whether Mobil tortiously interfered with the 
contract between Triton and Western Farmers."

4 In Toltec Watershed 
Improvement District v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 813 (Wyo. 1986), this court, 
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, p. 7 (1979), defined the tort of 
intentional interference with a contract in this way:

"`One who intentionally 
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract 
to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing 
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the 
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the 
third person to perform the contract.'"