Title: Steven Richard Taylor v. Walter A. McNeil, etc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1382 
____________ 
 
STEVEN RICHARD TAYLOR,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-143 
____________ 
 
STEVEN RICHARD TAYLOR,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 10, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Steven Richard Taylor appeals the denial of his amended motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  
Through his postconviction motion, Taylor challenges his capital murder 
 
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conviction and sentence of death.  Taylor has also filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, through which he alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to 
counsel‟s failure to raise several issues on direct appeal.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm 
the trial court‟s denial of his rule 3.850 motion and deny relief on his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Taylor is an inmate under sentence of death.  Through our prior opinion 
addressing Taylor‟s direct appeal, we have detailed the facts and procedural 
background surrounding the offense.  See Taylor v. State, 603 So. 2d 1038, 1039-
41 (Fla. 1993).   
 
The case currently under review is Taylor‟s first postconviction proceeding 
before this Court.  On November 1, 1995, Taylor filed a “shell” motion to vacate 
his judgment of conviction and sentence.  Amendments to the initial motion were 
filed on June 23, 2003, and May 13, 2004.  The final amended motion for 
postconviction relief was filed on May 23, 2005.  In his final amended motion, 
Taylor raised twenty-one claims.1  The postconviction court held a Huff2 hearing 
                                         
1.  The claims were as follows: (I) access to records and discovery 
violations; (II) production violations; (III) failure to produce trial file; (IV) 
ineffective assistance of counsel (DNA); (V) improper burden shifting through 
prosecutorial comments and jury instructions during the guilt phase; (VI) 
ineffective assistance of counsel (related to Timothy Cowart and mental 
 
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on December 13, 2005, and on June 21, 2006.  The postconviction court issued an 
order granting an evidentiary hearing on a limited number of those claims, which 
was held on August 6 and August 7, 2007.   
During the evidentiary hearing, the defense presented the testimony of (1) 
the current State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit who served as lead 
prosecutor at the initial trial; (2) an assistant state attorney who served as counsel 
at the initial trial and was serving as lead counsel in postconviction litigation; (3) 
Taylor‟s counsel during the initial trial; (4) the second chair counsel for Taylor at 
the initial trial; (5) Taylor‟s first postconviction attorney; (6) a police officer who 
testified at the initial trial; (7) an office employee of the Duval County Clerk of 
Courts who processed evidence at the time of the initial trial; (8) Shirley Zeigler (a 
former Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) DNA analyst); (9) Dr. 
Randell Libby (DNA expert); and (10) Timothy Cowart (Taylor‟s former cellmate, 
who testified against Taylor at the initial trial).  The State presented Dr. James 
                                                                                                                                   
retardation); (VII) improper jury instructions; (VIII) improper jury instructions; 
(IX) ineffective assistance of counsel (penalty phase); (X) improper weighing of 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (XI) ineffective assistance of counsel 
(mental health assistance); (XII) mental retardation; (XIII) challenge to Florida‟s 
sentencing scheme; (XIV) improper suggestion of death penalty; (XV) improper 
burden shifting in penalty phase; (XVI) improper comments to jury; (XVII) 
challenge to murder in course of a felony aggravating factor instruction; (XVIII) 
failure to identify mitigating factors; (XIX) improper instruction on aggravating 
factors; (XX) challenge to method of execution; and (XXI) change in law requires 
new penalty phase proceeding. 
 
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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Pollock (the DNA expert who testified for the State at the initial trial) and also the 
assistant state attorney who was initially presented by Taylor. 
To challenge the DNA evidence presented against Taylor at trial, the defense 
presented Dr. Libby to address alleged problems associated with Dr. Pollock‟s 
State testing procedures.  Dr. Libby testified that the FBI DNA testing protocol 
utilizes five to eight probes, but Dr. Pollock‟s State testing only utilized four.  
Further, Dr. Libby opined that three of the four probes utilized by Dr. Pollock were 
inconclusive.  One reason Dr. Libby used as a predicate for concluding that the 
probes were inconclusive was due to differences in the calculated lengths reports 
created by Dr. Pollock and Shirley Zeigler.  The defense also presented Shirley 
Zeigler, who worked as a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) analyst 
at the time the DNA evidence was processed.  Zeigler‟s initials were found on the 
calculated fragment report that was used by Dr. Pollock at Taylor‟s initial trial.  
Zeigler testified that she would have found two of the probes utilized by Dr. 
Pollock to be inconclusive, but did not disagree with Dr. Pollock‟s ultimate 
findings.   
Of additional note, during the evidentiary hearing, a police officer noted 
that, at trial, he testified that one of the exhibits collected from the scene 
represented a white blouse.  On cross-examination, however, the officer indicated 
that he did not remember the specific color of the blouse he collected on the day he 
 
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completed his report.  Further, Timothy Cowart was also presented as a witness at 
the evidentiary hearing to recant some of his testimony that he had previously 
presented during the initial trial. 
On October 5, 2007, the State filed a Motion to Strike and Objection to 
Defendant‟s Written Closing Argument and Memorandum of Law.  Taylor filed 
his Response to the State‟s Motion with an accompanying Motion to Amend the 
Pleadings to Conform with the Evidence.  On June 22, 2009, the postconviction 
court denied Taylor‟s rule 3.850 motion.  On June 26, 2009, the postconviction 
court filed an order granting the State‟s motion to strike and denying Taylor‟s 
motion to amend.  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Motion to Amend 
Taylor first asserts that the trial court erred in granting the State‟s motion to 
strike and denying his motion to amend.  In his final amended motion for 
postconviction relief, Taylor raised a number of challenges with regard to the DNA 
evidence presented against him at trial.  After the postconviction evidentiary 
hearing, Taylor filed a closing memorandum in the trial court, which also asserted 
a number of challenges to the DNA evidence presented at trial.  The State 
subsequently filed a motion to strike portions of Taylor‟s closing memorandum 
that were allegedly not covered in his postconviction motion.  The trial court did 
 
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not rule on the State‟s motion to strike until after it entered its order denying 
postconviction relief.  In a two page Order on Pending Motions, the trial court 
simply held: “Based upon the pleadings and consistent with the Court‟s Order 
Denying Defendant‟s Motion for Post Conviction relief . . . [t]he State‟s Motion to 
Strike and Objection to Defendant‟s Written Closing Argument and Memorandum 
of Law is GRANTED. . . . [and] [t]he Defendant‟s Motion to Amend the Pleadings 
to Conform with the Evidence is DENIED.”   
In his first claim on appeal, Taylor asserts that his closing memorandum did 
not raise any new claims, but even if it did, the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to adhere to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.190(b).  First, we must determine whether Taylor‟s amended 
motion for postconviction relief is governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.850 or 3.851.  The question of which rules of procedure are applicable is a 
question of law that is reviewed de novo.  See GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 
785 (Fla. 2007) (“Generally speaking, statutory interpretation is a question of law 
subject to de novo review.”) (citing BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 
2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003)).   
 
Rule 3.851(a) provides: 
This rule shall apply to all motions and petitions for any type of 
postconviction or collateral relief brought by a prisoner in state 
custody who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and 
death sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal.  It shall apply to 
 
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all postconviction motions filed on or after October 1, 2001, by 
prisoners who are under sentence of death.  Motions pending on that 
date are governed by the version of this rule in effect immediately 
prior to that date. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Taylor‟s initial motion to vacate judgment and sentence, 
which was a “shell motion,” was filed on November 1, 1995.  That motion was still 
pending on October 1, 2001, and is thus governed by “the version of this rule in 
effect immediately prior to that date,” which, here, is rule 3.850.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.851(a). 
 
Further, the applicability of rule 3.850 is consistent with this Court‟s 
decision in Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 2007).  In that case, Gore‟s initial 
postconviction motion was filed pursuant to rule 3.850 on September 28, 1999, but 
his amended postconviction motion was filed on January 7, 2002, after amendment 
of the rules.  See Gore, 964 So. 2d at 1261 n.1.  This Court held that rule 3.850, not 
rule 3.851, applied.  See id. at 1261.  Here the initial motion for postconviction 
relief was filed prior to the enactment of rule 3.851, and an amended motion was 
filed after that date.  Taylor‟s amended motion for postconviction relief is therefore 
governed by rule 3.850, not rule 3.851 as held in Gore. 
Rule 3.850, however, is silent with regard to amendments to postconviction 
motions.  Taylor asserts that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 is applicable 
here because in Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000), this Court 
acknowledged that postconviction cases are quasi-civil in nature.  Taylor‟s 
 
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argument, however, completely disregards this Court‟s decision in Huff v. State, 
762 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2000).  In Huff, this Court explicitly stated that 
“[t]he standard of review for a trial court‟s determination regarding a motion to 
amend a rule 3.850 motion is whether there was an abuse of discretion.”  762 So. 
2d at 481 (citing McConn v. State, 708 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)).   
Accordingly, because Taylor‟s motion for postconviction relief is governed by rule 
3.850, this Court only reviews the denial of Taylor‟s motion to amend for an abuse 
of discretion.  See Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1012 (Fla. 2009) (citing Huff v. 
State, 762 So. 2d 476, 481 (Fla. 2000)).   
 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor‟s motion 
to amend.  The arguments asserted by Taylor in his closing memorandum to the 
trial court were merely refinements and expansions upon arguments that had 
already been raised in his amended motion for postconviction relief.  The trial 
court meticulously analyzed each of Taylor‟s challenges to the DNA evidence, 
even as articulated by Taylor in his closing memorandum.  The trial court actually 
addressed each of Taylor‟s claims as they would have appeared in his amended 
motion, and therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether the trial court‟s 
denial of Taylor‟s motion to amend was an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, we 
deny relief on this claim. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
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Standard of Review 
In Pagan v. State, 29 So. 3d 938, 948-49 (Fla. 2009), this Court provided the 
appropriate standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims: 
Following the United States Supreme Court‟s decision 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held 
that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two 
requirements must be satisfied: 
 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or 
omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the 
broad range of reasonably competent performance under 
prevailing professional standards.  Second, the clear, 
substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and 
reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the 
outcome is undermined.  A court considering a claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific 
ruling on the performance component of the test when it 
is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations 
omitted).  Where this Court previously has rejected a substantive 
claim on the merits, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing 
to make a meritless argument.  See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 
1033 (Fla. 2009). 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed 
questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of 
review, deferring to the trial court‟s factual findings that are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the trial court‟s 
legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-
72 (Fla. 2004). 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‟s performance 
was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  “A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made 
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel‟s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel‟s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  The 
 
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defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action „might be considered sound 
trial strategy.‟ ”  Id.  (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 
(1955)).  “Judicial scrutiny of counsel‟s performance must be highly 
deferential.”  Id.  In Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 
2000), this Court held that “strategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel‟s decision was reasonable under 
the norms of professional conduct.” 
With respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigation 
evidence, the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510 (2003), that “Strickland does not require counsel to investigate 
every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely 
the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing.  Nor 
does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence 
at sentencing in every case.”  Id. at 533.  Rather, in deciding whether 
trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment with regard 
to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a 
reviewing court must focus on whether the investigation resulting in 
counsel‟s decision not to introduce certain mitigation evidence was 
itself reasonable.  Id. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.  When 
making this assessment, “a court must consider not only the quantum 
of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known 
evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.”  
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. 
An attorney can almost always be second-guessed for not doing 
more.  However, this is not the standard by which counsel‟s 
performance is to be evaluated under Strickland.  Deficient 
performance involves “particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that 
are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent 
performance under prevailing professional standards.”  Maxwell, 490 
So. 2d at 932.  
 
DNA Evidence 
 
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Taylor asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to request a 
Frye3 hearing; (2) failing to object to admission of DNA evidence and to Dr. 
Pollock‟s testimony about DNA; (3) failing to provide any expert testimony to 
support trial counsel‟s attack on the DNA evidence; (4) withdrawing a previously 
filed motion for continuance; (5) failing to request a Richardson4 hearing when 
Zeigler‟s name was revealed for the first time at trial; (6) failing to develop the 
theory of a second blouse; and (7) failing to object to improper prosecutorial 
comments.  As further discussed below, we conclude that Taylor has failed to 
satisfy his burden to demonstrate ineffectiveness for any of these claims. 
1) Failure to Request a Frye Hearing 
 
The postconviction court correctly found that trial counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to request a Frye hearing to challenge DNA evidence.  As the 
postconviction court noted in its final order, this Court has held that any 
refinements or additions to the Frye analysis which have evolved since the trial in 
this case was conducted cannot be retroactively applied in evaluating the 
effectiveness of trial counsel‟s performance.  See Armstrong v. State, 862 So. 2d 
705, 713 (Fla. 2003).  The bulk of Taylor‟s argument relies on case law that 
developed after the conclusion of the trial.  This Court has made clear that trial 
counsel “cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate the change in the law.”  
                                         
3.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
4.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
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Nelms v. State, 596 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 1992) (citing Stevens v. State, 552 So. 2d 
1082, 1085 (Fla. 1989)).   
 
We conclude that the decision by trial counsel not to request a Frye hearing 
was reasonable.  The only authority presented by Taylor during postconviction that 
both challenged the use of DNA evidence and existed at the time of the trial are 
academic articles and isolated, nonbinding decisions.  While this evidence 
certainly could have been presented at trial, it was not essential for counsel to be 
determined to be effective.  Further, none of the authority referred to by Taylor 
was binding on the trial court.  Trial counsel‟s omission of the specific authority 
referred to by Taylor on postconviction was reasonable and cannot be considered 
“outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards.”  Pagan, 29 So. 3d at 948 (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 
932).  Taylor therefore fails under the deficiency prong, and it is not necessary for 
us to address the prejudice prong of Strickland for this claim.  See Reaves v. State, 
826 So. 2d 932, 939 n.10 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 
(“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one.”)). 
2) Failure to Object to Admission of DNA Evidence and Failure to Object 
to Dr. Pollock’s Testimony About DNA 
 
 
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Taylor asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise specific 
objections with regard to both the DNA evidence generally and Dr. Pollock‟s 
testimony.  A review of the final order of the postconviction court reveals that the 
trial court articulated specific instances where trial counsel did challenge the DNA 
evidence.  Further, although trial counsel did not present a DNA expert at trial who 
had been hired to assist the defense as a witness, trial counsel did testify that he 
had multiple conversations with the expert and was prepared to address the DNA 
evidence at trial.  Counsel stated, “My feeling and my level of comfort after talking 
about this with [the DNA expert] was very good.”  Here, a review of the record 
and the final order of the postconviction court reveals that trial counsel‟s alleged 
failure to object with regard to the DNA evidence, especially when viewed in 
unison with the vigorous cross-examine of Dr. Pollock, was reasonable.  Trial 
counsel‟s failure to make specific objections appears to be the product of an overall 
strategy, and therefore his allegation of omission of certain specific objections does 
not amount to deficient performance.  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 
1048 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel‟s 
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”).  Taylor fails 
to satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, and, therefore, we need not address 
the prejudice prong of Strickland for this claim.  See Reaves, 826 So. 2d at 939. 
 
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3) Failure to provide any expert testimony to support trial counsel’s attack 
on the DNA evidence 
 
Taylor asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 
defense‟s DNA expert to testify at trial.  At the evidentiary hearing, when asked 
why he had not presented the defense expert as a witness, trial counsel responded 
that he was comfortable in cross-examining Dr. Pollock.  Trial counsel therefore 
made a strategic decision not to call the expert.  As noted above, conduct that 
appears to be the product of an overall strategy will not satisfy the deficiency 
prong of Strickland.  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d at 1048. 
4) Withdrawing motion for continuance 
Taylor next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing his 
motion for continuance days before trial, even though the motion indicated that his 
DNA expert had not completed his review of the records.  In response to inquiring 
as to why he did not pursue the continuance, defense trial counsel responded that 
his DNA expert informed him prior to trial that in the expert‟s opinion, the DNA 
testing was properly completed and that he did not have any major complaints with 
the DNA testing or DNA evidence.  Trial counsel therefore appeared to make a 
strategic decision not to proceed further with the motion for a continuance because 
the expert‟s testimony would have been detrimental to the defense, and his 
withdrawal of the motion does not constitute deficient performance as required by 
Strickland.  See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048. 
 
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5) Failure to request Richardson hearing when Zeigler’s name was 
revealed at trial 
 
Taylor asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
Richardson hearing when Zeigler‟s name was revealed for the first time at trial.  
First, Taylor fails to establish any deficient performance stemming from trial 
counsel‟s failure to request a Richardson hearing.  As articulated by this Court in 
Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 1995):  
[W]hen the State violates a discovery rule, the trial court has 
discretion to determine whether the violation resulted in harm or 
prejudice to the defendant, but this discretion can be properly 
exercised only after adequate inquiry into all the surrounding 
circumstances.  State v. Hall, 509 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1987).  In making 
such an inquiry, the trial judge must first determine whether a 
discovery violation occurred.  If a violation is found, the court must 
assess whether the State‟s discovery violation was inadvertent or 
willful, whether the violation was trivial or substantial, and most 
importantly, what affect it had on the defendant‟s ability to prepare for 
trial. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Here, the State had provided defense trial counsel with the 
calculated fragment report upon which Zeigler‟s initials appeared.  Trial counsel 
was therefore aware of Zeigler‟s existence, and although trial counsel may not 
have known Zeigler‟s full name, the State certainly did not inadvertently or 
willfully conceal her identity.  Trial counsel, therefore, cannot be said to have been 
deficient in failing to request a Richardson hearing when such a hearing was not 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
 
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Even if trial counsel‟s failure did amount to deficient performance, Taylor 
has failed to establish any prejudice.  The record reveals that although Zeigler 
testified during postconviction proceedings that there were differences between her 
report and that of Dr. Pollack, she did not disagree with Dr. Pollack‟s ultimate 
findings.  Accordingly, any potential error in failing to request a Richardson 
hearing was harmless.  Taylor therefore fails to meet his burden under the 
prejudice prong of Strickland.  Taylor has failed to establish either of the two 
prongs required by Strickland, so relief is not warranted for this claim. 
6) Blouse 
Taylor next asserts that that the trial court erred in denying relief on his 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the theory of a 
second, white blouse.  This claim is based upon an officer testifying at trial that he 
handled a white blouse, as opposed to the green blouse that was involved with the 
underlying murder.  The crux of Taylor‟s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
therefore, hinges on the existence of a phantom white blouse.  The trial court 
clearly examined the record, processed the evidence revealed during the 
evidentiary hearing, and made a factual determination that “it was the green blouse 
that the witnesses were referring to in their testimony and which was entered into 
evidence at trial.”  This Court will defer to the factual findings of the trial court on 
this issue as this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on 
 
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questions of the credibility of witnesses and the appropriate weight to be given to 
the evidence.  See Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 30 (Fla. 2008) (citing Blanco v. 
State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997)).  Competent, substantial evidence exists 
to support the trial court‟s finding that there is not, nor has there ever been, a 
phantom white blouse.  Accordingly, trial counsel cannot be said to have been 
deficient for failing to develop a theory revolving around the existence of such a 
blouse, nor can Taylor be said to have been prejudiced if no such blouse existed.  
This claim is a red herring and does not warrant relief. 
7) Improper Prosecutorial Comments 
Taylor next challenges trial counsel‟s failure to object to the following 
statement made by the prosecutor during closing arguments: 
You will recall that during our opening statements I was somewhat 
careful not to overstate the evidence because during your opening 
statements there is, as the court points out, a presumption of 
innocence.  And the presumption of innocence does not leave the 
defendant until evidence has been presented that wipes away that 
presumption.  There is no longer a presumption of innocence as 
evidence has been presented . . . . 
 
 
The trial court properly relied on this Court‟s decision in Dailey v. State, 965 
So. 2d 38, 44 (Fla. 2007), where we stated: “Regarding the prosecutor‟s statements 
concerning Dailey‟s presumption of innocence, we agree with the trial court that 
when read in context, the comments appear to be a statement by the prosecutor of 
her belief that the State satisfied its burden of proof.  Therefore, counsel‟s failure 
 
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to object was not deficient.”  Dailey, 965 So. 2d at 44 (emphasis supplied).  Here, 
the prosecutor prefaced his allegedly improper statement with a reiteration that the 
presumption of innocence exists.  Further, the prosecutor stated that the 
presumption is not removed “until evidence has been presented that wipes away 
that presumption.”  Viewed in context, the comment in question was not improper, 
and counsel‟s failure to object cannot amount to deficient performance.  See 
Dailey, 965 So. 2d at 44.     
 
Further, the finding of the trial court is consistent with this Court‟s decision 
in Belcher v. State, 961 So. 3d 239, 246 (Fla. 2007).  In that case, the prosecutor, 
during voir dire, asked: “Do you understand that does not mean he is innocent?   It 
means he is presumed to be innocent until you hear the evidence to the contrary?  
Can all of you agree with that?”  This Court stated: “The transcripts indicate that 
the prosecutor was merely explaining the presumption of innocence to prospective 
jurors.  In addition, as the lower court concluded, we do not see a proper basis for 
defense counsel to object.”  The comments in Belcher are similar to those made by 
the prosecutor here.  “Where this Court previously has rejected a substantive claim 
on the merits, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless 
argument.”  Pagan, 29 So. 3d at 949 (citing Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1033 
(Fla. 2009)).  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
 
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Brady5 and Giglio6 Claims 
Standard of Review 
Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the State is required to 
disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to 
the defense.  See Pagan, 29 So. 3d at 946.  To demonstrate a Brady violation, a 
defendant has the burden to establish (1) that favorable evidence, either 
exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the 
State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  
See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 988 (Fla. 2009) (citing Strickler v. Green, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).  This Court has explained that “[t]here is no Brady 
violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the 
prosecution, or where the defense . . .  had the information.”  Provenzano v. State, 
616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993) (citing Hegwood v. State, 575 So. 2d 170, 172 
(Fla. 1991); James v. State, 453 So. 2d 786, 790 (Fla. 1984)).  Questions of 
whether evidence is exculpatory or impeaching and whether the State suppressed 
evidence are questions of fact, and the trial court‟s determinations of such 
questions will not be disturbed if they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 911 (Fla. 2000).  To satisfy the 
materiality prong of Brady, a defendant must prove that there is a “reasonable 
                                         
5.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
6.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  
 
- 20 - 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A „reasonable probability‟ is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 
498, 506 (Fla. 2003) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) 
(plurality opinion)).  In other words, the question is whether “the favorable 
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light 
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290).   
 
A claim pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), alleges 
that a prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony against the defendant.  See 
Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 2008).  To demonstrate a Giglio 
violation, a defendant must prove that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to 
correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) 
the false evidence was material.  See San Martin v. State, 995 So. 2d 247, 254 (Fla. 
2008).  If the defendant establishes that a prosecutor has knowingly presented false 
testimony, the burden then shifts to the State to prove that there is not any 
reasonable possibility that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of 
the jury.  See Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
97, 103 (1976)).  While materiality is a component of both a Giglio and Brady 
 
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claim, the Giglio standard of materiality is more defense friendly.  See Guzman, 
868 So. 2d at 507. 
 
For both Brady and Giglio claims, as with any other postconviction claim, 
the defendant ultimately carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case based 
upon a legally valid claim.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 
2000).   Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden.  See id. 
(citing Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989)). 
DNA Evidence 
Taylor asserts that critical documents and witness names were either not 
provided to the defense or provided late.  Those documents and names include: (1) 
FBI/FDLE protocols; (2) calculated fragment length reports, summaries, and bench 
notes; and (3) the name of Shirley Zeigler.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
deny relief on each of these allegations. 
1) FBI/FDLE Protocols 
Taylor asserts that the FBI/FDLE protocols, allegedly not provided by the 
State until postconviction litigation, “established that Dr. Pollock either changed 
the protocol or violated the protocol in his conclusions.”  The only “violation” 
identified by Taylor, however, is the fact that the FBI protocols utilized five to 
eight probes, while Dr. Pollock only used four.  This “violation,” according to the 
defense‟s expert, undermined the reliability of the DNA evidence. 
 
- 22 - 
During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Pollock acknowledged that he deviated 
from the FBI protocols.  The only evidence presented by Taylor during the 
evidentiary hearing that directly challenged Dr. Pollack‟s ultimate findings, 
however, was the testimony of Dr. Libby, whom the postconviction court explicitly 
determined to be unreliable.  Although the postconviction court did not examine 
this evidence in the context of a Brady or Giglio violation, it still assessed the 
credibility of Dr. Libby with regard to Dr. Pollack‟s ultimate findings.  The 
postconviction court considered, and rejected, the relevance of the FBI/FDLE 
protocols in the ineffective assistance of counsel context.   
 
This Court will defer to the factual findings of the postconviction court on 
this issue as this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the 
postconviction court on questions of the credibility of witnesses and the 
appropriate weight to be given to the evidence.  See Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d at 30 
(citing Blanco, 702 So. 2d at 1252).  Even if we assume that the State inadvertently 
failed to disclose these protocols, in light of the trial court‟s findings of fact, the 
alleged violations cannot “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Smith, 931 So. 2d at 
796 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290) (articulating the materiality prong of 
Brady).  Further, there is no reasonable possibility that the allegedly false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.  See id. (articulating the 
 
- 23 - 
materiality prong of a Giglio claim).  Accordingly, this subclaim fails under the 
materiality prongs of both Brady and Giglio. 
2) Calculated Length Reports, Summaries, and Bench Notes 
Taylor asserts that the calculated length reports are material because they 
establish critical differences in lengths of DNA strands calculated by Dr. Pollack 
compared to those calculated by Shirley Zeigler.  In his initial brief to this Court, 
Taylor acknowledges that “it wasn‟t until three days before trial that [the defense‟s 
DNA expert] received the calculated fragment length reports/summaries and bench 
notes.”  Taylor further asserts that trial counsel “was essentially sandbagged into: 
(1) not calling [the DNA expert] to testify, (2) not having [the DNA expert] present 
during the trial, (3) withdrawing his Motion for Continuance, (4) being unable to 
discern what information Shirley Zeigler could supply, and (5) being unable to call 
her as a witness to impeach Dr. Pollock‟s trial testimony.” 
First, because Taylor ultimately asserts a discovery violation before trial, 
this claim should have been raised pursuant to Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 
(Fla. 1971), during trial, not in a postconviction motion pursuant to Brady.  “Where 
a defendant fails to timely object to a discovery violation or to request 
a Richardson hearing, the defendant does not preserve the point for appellate 
review.”  Major v. State, 979 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Celestine 
v. State, 717 So. 2d 205, 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)).  The only cognizable claim 
 
- 24 - 
here, therefore, is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
Richardson hearing on the alleged discovery violation.  As discussed in the 
previous section, this claim is also without merit. 
Second, even if this were a cognizable Brady claim, the evidence is not 
material.  As discussed above, the only evidence presented by Taylor during the 
evidentiary hearing that challenged the DNA evidence was the testimony of Dr. 
Libby and Shirley Zeigler.  These two witnesses testified with regard to the 
potential discrepancies in the calculated fragment length reports.  As previously 
articulated, however, Dr. Libby was found to be not credible by the trial court, and 
Zeigler did not disagree with the ultimate findings of Dr. Pollack.  The alleged 
violations, therefore, cannot “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Smith, 931 So. 2d at 
796 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290) (articulating the materiality prong of 
Brady).  Nor is there any reasonable possibility that the allegedly false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury.  See id. (articulating the materiality 
prong of a Giglio claim).  Accordingly, this subclaim fails under the materiality 
prongs of both Brady and Giglio. 
3) Name of Shirley Zeigler 
Finally, Taylor asserts that the State suppressed the name of Shirley Zeigler, 
which was allegedly only revealed during the cross-examination of Dr. Pollack.  
 
- 25 - 
Taylor asserts that Zeigler could have called into question Dr. Pollack‟s testimony, 
and had she been called at trial, the defense would have been able to impeach Dr. 
Pollack‟s testimony. 
 
First, because Taylor ultimately asserts a discovery violation that was 
discovered and known during trial, this claim should have been raised pursuant to 
Richardson at trial, not in a Brady claim at the postconviction stage.  See Major, 
979 So. at 244 (citing Celestine, 717 So. 2d at 206).  The only cognizable claim 
here, therefore, is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
Richardson hearing, which, as previously discussed, is without merit. 
Second, this is not a valid Brady violation because the State did not suppress 
the evidence.  Taylor admits in his brief that he possessed Zeigler‟s initials before 
trial as they were contained on the calculated fragment reports.  Taylor simply 
accuses the State of failing to identify whom those initials represented.  In fact, 
trial counsel was able to specifically identify those initials during the cross-
examination of Dr. Pollock.  Taylor thus fails to establish that the State suppressed 
Zeigler‟s name when it disclosed her initials through discovery.  See Ferrell v. 
State, 29 So. 3d 959, 980 (Fla. 2010) (“Because the evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing established that Ferrell‟s trial counsel was in possession of the information 
Ferrell alleged had been withheld, this Brady claim must fail.”). 
 
- 26 - 
Third, even if this were a cognizable Brady or Giglio claim, the evidence is 
not material.  Zeigler testified that despite her disagreement with certain elements 
of Dr. Pollock‟s testing procedures, she did not ultimately disagree with his 
findings.  Her testimony, therefore, is unlikely to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.  See Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506 (articulating the materiality prong of a 
Brady claim).  Nor is there any reasonable possibility that the false testimony could 
have affected the judgment of the jury.  See id. (articulating the materiality prong 
of a Giglio claim).  Accordingly, relief is not warranted for this subclaim. 
Blouse 
Taylor asserts without argument or analysis that the trial court erred in 
denying relief on his Brady and Giglio claims related to the blouse.  In his 
amended motion for postconviction relief, along with his initial brief to this Court, 
Taylor fails to identify a single piece of evidence that was suppressed by the State 
or any false testimony that was given by a witness.  These claims are therefore 
conclusory and are denied on that basis.  See Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1061 (citing 
Kennedy, 547 So. 2d 912). 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
To obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, a defendant 
has the burden to establish two things: (1) the evidence was not known by the trial 
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial and the defendant or defense counsel 
 
- 27 - 
could not have known of it by the use of diligence; and (2) the newly discovered 
evidence is of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  
See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 992 (Fla. 2009) (citing Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 
512, 521 (Fla. 1998)). 
 
Here, Taylor asserts that the recanted testimony of Timothy Cowart, 
Taylor‟s former cellmate who testified against him during the initial trial, warrants 
a new trial.  This Court has repeatedly held that recantations are “exceedingly 
unreliable” and that it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not 
satisfied that such testimony is true.  See Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1196 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994)).  
Cowart‟s recanted testimony is therefore to be reviewed with extreme skepticism.  
Further, this Court will defer to the factual findings of the trial court on this issue 
as this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions 
of the credibility of witnesses.  See Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 30 (citing Blanco, 702 So. 2d 
at 1252).  Here, the trial court determined that the recanted testimony of Cowart 
was not credible.  In light of the trial court‟s factual determination that Cowart‟s 
recanted testimony is not reliable, we deny relief on this claim. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Standard of Review 
 
- 28 - 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas 
relief based on ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a 
claim, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 
1981).  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to 
camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a 
postconviction motion.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  
“If a legal issue „would in all probability have been found to be without merit‟ had 
counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise 
the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel‟s performance ineffective.”  
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). 
Analysis 
 
- 29 - 
 
Taylor asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) raise a 
claim of fundamental error when the trial court did not order a Frye hearing sua 
sponte; and (2) argue that the prosecutor‟s comment on the presumption of 
innocence violated a fundamental right.  For the reasons discussed below, we deny 
relief on both of these claims. 
1) Failing to request Frye hearing sua sponte 
This Court has repeatedly held that absent a proper objection from the 
offended party, it is not an error for a trial court to admit evidence without a Frye 
hearing.  See McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 506 (Fla. 1999) (“McDonald 
argues the trial court failed to determine the admissibility of the DNA test results 
and the basis of the statistical comparisons according to the standards enunciated in 
Frye . . . .  Moreover, in the absence of a proper objection, we find no error in the 
admission of this evidence.”) (citing Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 580 (Fla. 
1997)); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 580 (“Unless the party against whom the evidence is 
being offered makes this specific objection, the trial court will not have committed 
error in admitting the evidence.”) (citing Archer v. State, 673 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 
1996)).  Accordingly, as a matter of law, the trial court here did not err in failing to 
conduct a Frye hearing sua sponte. 
Taylor‟s reliance on Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005), is 
misguided.  Nothing in Zack supports Taylor‟s contention that the trial court 
 
- 30 - 
should have ordered a Frye hearing sua sponte.  In fact, the trial court explicitly 
rejected Zack‟s contention that the “the trial court should have conducted a 
hearing sua sponte.”  Id.  Further, Zack is distinguishable because the trial, in that 
case, occurred in 1997, two years after this Court took judicial notice of the 
reliability of DNA evidence in Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1995).  
 
The trial court did not err in failing to order a Frye hearing sua sponte.  
Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be said to be ineffective for failing to raise 
this issue on appeal.  We therefore deny relief on this claim. 
2) Improper prosecutorial comments 
Taylor‟s petition challenges the same comment addressed in the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim.  As articulated previously, this statement was not 
improper.  Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be deemed to have been 
ineffective for failing to raise that issue on appeal.  See Pagan, 29 So. 3d at 949 
(citing Heath, 3 So. 3d at 1033). 
The petition also challenges the following jury instruction: 
The defendant has entered his plea of not guilty. This means you must 
presume or believe that the defendant is innocent.  This presumption 
of innocence stays with the defendant as to each material allegation in 
the charge and through each stage of the trial until that presumption of 
innocence has been overcome by the evidence to the exclusion of and 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Now, to overcome the defendant's 
presumption of innocence, the State has the burden of proving the 
following two elements: Number one, that the crime with which the 
defendant is charged was in fact committed, and two, that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime.  
 
- 31 - 
 
 
 Jury instructions are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule and, 
absent an objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if fundamental error 
occurred.  See Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1180 (Fla. 2006) (quoting State v. 
Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991)).  With regard to what constitutes 
fundamental error in a jury instruction, this Court has stated: 
We have explained that for jury instructions to constitute fundamental 
error, the error must “reach down into the validity of the trial itself to 
the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644-
45 (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  
Further, “ „fundamental error occurs only when the omission is 
pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to 
convict.‟  Failing to instruct on an element of the crime over which the 
record reflects there was no dispute is not fundamental error . . . .”  
Id. at 645 (citation omitted) (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 
863 (Fla. 1982)).  
 
Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 2008). 
 
Here, the trial judge appeared to be “merely explaining the presumption of 
innocence to [the] jurors.”  Belcher, 961 So. 2d at 246.  Further, the trial judge not 
only defined what the presumption of innocence means, but also reiterated that the 
State has the burden to establish the elements of the crime.  Accordingly, the jury 
instruction does not “reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that 
a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the 
alleged error.”  See Garzon, 980 So. 2d at 1042 (quoting Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644-
45).  The jury instruction does not constitute fundamental error, and appellate 
 
- 32 - 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge it on appeal.  See 
Pagan, 29 So. 3d at 949 (citing Heath, 3 So. 3d at 1033).  Accordingly, we deny 
relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of the rule 3.850 motion by 
the postconviction court and deny relief on the petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
W. Gregg McCaulie, Judge – Case No. 16-1991-CF-2456-AXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Michael P. Reiter, Venice, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent