Title: State ex rel. Griffin v. District Court of Fifth Dist

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Griffin v. District Court of Fifth Dist1992 WY 54831 P.2d 233Case Number: 91-272Decided: 05/04/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE of Wyoming, ex 
rel., John Scott GRIFFIN,

Petitioner,

v.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
FIFTH DISTRICT and Judge Gary P. Hartman, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District, 
Washakie County, Wyoming,

Respondent.

 

Thomas C. 
Bancroft, Worland, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Richard E. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
respondent.

Kent Richins, 
Worland, guardian ad litem.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Upon application 
of petitioner John Scott Griffin (father), this court issued an Alternative Writ 
of Mandamus and Prohibition on December 23, 1991. The father sought to prohibit 
the Wyoming district court from exercising jurisdiction in a child custody 
proceeding involving his one-year-old son, Spencer Bryce Griffin (child), and 
the boy's mother, Melissa V. Presnell (mother). The writ addressed the custody 
jurisdiction of the Wyoming district court as to whether it was in conflict with 
or alternative to a Virginia court where a proceeding for custody was also 
pending.

[¶2]      We hold that the 
jurisdiction provisions in the Wyoming Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA), Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-101 through § 20-5-125 (1987), and the federal 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A (Law. Co-op. 
1989), preclude Wyoming district court jurisdiction in this case where the child 
had been removed from Virginia by his mother unless the Virginia court 
relinquishes jurisdiction to the Wyoming district court.

I. 
FACTS

[¶3]      Spencer Bryce 
Griffin was born in Denver, Colorado on December 21, 1990. The child's mother 
and father1 had met shortly after the mother 
moved to Virginia in January, 1989. The father had lived in Virginia since 1976 
and continues to live there at this time. After becoming pregnant, the mother 
left Virginia in May, 1990 to stay with her sister in Denver, Colorado. The 
father joined the mother in Colorado in late December, 1990 during which time 
the child was born. Approximately three weeks later, the mother, father and 
child returned to the father's home in Virginia.

[¶4]      In April 1991, 
the father petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of 
Fairfax County, Virginia to grant temporary custody of the minor child to the 
father. Prior to court decision, however, the parents filed a stipulation, which 
became a judicial order, providing that the father would have temporary custody 
until permanent custody was established. Further, the consent order stipulated 
that the child would reside with the father at his home in Reston, Virginia, and 
the mother was given the option to continue living in the father's home until a 
permanent custody agreement was reached. Custody Proceeding No. 1 in Virginia 
was then dismissed. Both parents and the child mostly, but not at all times, 
resided together in Virginia until September, 1991 when the mother and child 
came to Wyoming. Whether the mother and the child came to Wyoming for a 
temporary visit or a permanent stay is totally in factual 
dispute.

[¶5]      Shortly after the 
mother and child left Virginia, the father filed a petition dated September 19, 
1991 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County, 
Virginia seeking to determine the child's custody pursuant to Virginia's Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. (Custody Proceeding No. 2) The mother received 
notice of a custody hearing scheduled for December 3, 1991 in the Virginia court 
when she was served with process by a Washakie County, Wyoming deputy sheriff on 
October 28, 1991.

[¶6]      The chronology of 
events and jurisdictional issues in this case became complicated, however, 
because the mother had filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, 
visitation and support in the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washakie County, 
Wyoming on October 10, 1991 - eighteen days before she received service of 
process of the Virginia custody proceeding initiated by the father. (Custody 
Proceeding No. 3) The mother admitted prior notice that the father "was going to 
file something," and thirty-six days after she came to Wyoming, the proceeding 
was filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washakie County, Wyoming. In 
filing in Wyoming, the mother failed to include the requisite affidavit pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-110 disclosing where the child had previously lived and 
whether or not there had been prior litigation concerning the child's custody. 
The father was served in Virginia with a summons and copy of the petition in the 
Wyoming action on October 29, 1991. The following day, the father filed a motion 
to dismiss the Wyoming proceeding on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. A 
memorandum filed in support of the father's motion advised the Wyoming district 
court that a custody proceeding was already pending in Virginia at the time of 
the mother's October 10, 1991 Wyoming filing.2 

[¶7]      Pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-5-107(c)3 and Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-108(d),4 Wyoming District Court Judge Gary 
P. Hartman contacted Virginia Family Court Judge Michael J. Valentine by 
telephone on December 2, 1991. Wyoming counsel for the mother, Wyoming counsel 
for the father, and a Wyoming court-appointed guardian ad litem attended the 
conference call in Judge Hartman's chambers. It appears from the record that 
Judge Valentine and Judge Hartman agreed that the December 3, 1991 hearing, 
scheduled in Virginia, would be limited to the purpose of deciding whether the 
father should be responsible to pay for the cost in bringing the mother and 
child to Virginia for custody determination. Further, Judge Valentine indicated 
that his court would not make a determination at the December 3, 1991 hearing as 
to whether Virginia should exercise jurisdiction in determining custody pursuant 
to the UCCJA.

[¶8]      Because Judge 
Valentine was indisposed and thus unable to conduct the December 3, 1991 
Virginia hearing, Judge David S. Schell presided over the hearing attended only 
by Virginia counsel representing the father. Judge Schell ordered that Virginia 
was the proper forum to determine custody in this case and assumed jurisdiction 
pursuant to Virginia's UCCJA. Judge Schell awarded temporary custody of the 
child to the father and ordered the mother to immediately return the minor child 
to Virginia. In addition, Judge Schell continued for a subsequent hearing the 
question of permanent custody, issued a detention order for the mother, and 
commanded that the child be placed in the father's custody in 
Virginia.

[¶9]      The next day, 
December 4, 1991, Judge Schell's order was presented to the Wyoming district 
court at a hearing on the father's motion to dismiss. During the hearing, Judge 
Hartman conducted a second telephone conference call - this time with Judge 
Schell - and then took the custody matter under advisement. Judge Hartman also 
entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from the state pending 
subsequent Wyoming district court proceedings. It is from that order that the 
father petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, a 
writ of certiorari.

[¶10]   On December 23, 1991, this court 
granted an alternative writ of mandamus and prohibition which directed Judge 
Hartman to desist from further proceedings and to show cause why he should not 
be absolutely restrained from exercising jurisdiction in this case as long as 
jurisdiction remains vested in the Virginia court. On January 6, 1992, Judge 
Hartman filed a response to the show cause order. This court then ordered that 
simultaneous briefs be submitted by the district court and the father on or 
before February 6, 1992. 

[¶11]   One significant document found in 
the Virginia record in this case is a memorandum submitted by Judge Valentine on 
January 23, 1992. In his notation, Judge Valentine concurs with Judge Hartman's 
impressions as to what Judge Valentine had indicated would be decided at the 
December 3, 1991 Virginia hearing. Further, Judge Valentine states that he did 
not adequately advise Judge Schell as to the nature of his December 2, 1991 
telephone conversation with Judge Hartman. From the record, it appears that 
Judge Schell sent the case back to Judge Valentine for further disposition, and 
Judge Valentine has agreed to await disposition of the proceeding in this 
Wyoming appellate court before taking any further action in Virginia.5

II. 
ISSUES

[¶12]   The respondent raises three issues 
in his brief before this court:

I. Whether the petitioner 
herein should be granted an extraordinary writ when he has chosen to eschew a 
plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law?

II. Whether the 
respondent improperly assumed jurisdiction of a child custody determination, or 
simply stayed further proceedings pending determination of proper 
jurisdiction?

III. Whether the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 deprives Virginia and Wyoming of authority to 
proceed in accord with provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act?

[¶13]   On the other hand, the father 
raises the following issue:

I. Did the trial court 
err in failing to dismiss the petition [to establish paternity, custody, 
visitation and support] of Melissa Presnell for lack of 
jurisdiction?

[¶14]   Because the Wyoming district court 
lacked jurisdiction to make a current custody determination under both the state 
UCCJA and the federal PKPA, we find that the father's single issue is 
dispositive.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-125 provides that 
"[u]pon request of a party to a custody proceeding which raises a question of 
existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this act, the case shall be given 
calendar priority and handled expeditiously." Consequently, this case was 
assigned to this court's expedited docket for prompt 
disposition.

[¶16]   A fundamental purpose of both the 
UCCJA and the PKPA is to avoid conflict and promote cooperation. Other 
underlying purposes include the elimination of forum shopping, to enable courts 
to act in the best interests of children, and to deter interstate abductions and 
other unilateral removals of children undertaken for purposes of obtaining 
custody. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-611, § 
7(c)(6), 94 Stat. 3568 (1980); Zappitello v. Moses, 458 N.W.2d 784, 786 
(S.D. 1990). In this case, ignoring Virginia's present "home state" status to 
determine custody by recognizing Wyoming jurisdiction under tenuous and 
unmerited reliance on one of the overlapping UCCJA/PKPA jurisdictional criteria 
would circumvent the purposes of both Acts.6

[¶17]   Because the consent order for 
temporary custody7 was signed by the mother and father 
in Virginia on April 10, 1991 and entered by the court, there has not yet been 
any formal custody determination made by any court. See Wyo. Stat. § 
20-5-103(a)(vi) and Va. Code Ann. § 20-125(6) (Michie 1990). Both the PKPA and 
the UCCJA provide a jurisdictional preference for the child's "home state" 
immediately preceding an application for an original custody determination. 28 
U.S.C.S. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii); Wyo. Stat. § 
20-5-104(a)(i).

[¶18]   W.S. 20-5-107 provides 
prerequisites to a Wyoming district court before exercising jurisdiction in a 
custody proceeding. Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-107(a) states:

A court of this state 
shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the 
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the same child was pending in a 
court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with 
this act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state 
because this state is a more appropriate forum or for other 
reasons.

In this case, 
the mother had not yet been properly served with process of the pending Virginia 
custody proceeding when she filed her petition in the Wyoming district court. 
Consequently, the Wyoming district court was uninformed of the pending Virginia 
proceeding at the time of the mother's filing. Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-107(c) provides 
the procedural mechanism in the event, as in this case, that the court is 
notified of pending proceedings in another state (supra n. 
3).

[¶19]   After learning of the pre-existent 
Virginia custody proceeding, the Wyoming district judge promptly communicated 
with the Virginia court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-107(c). However, the 
Wyoming proceeding was not stayed pending resolution of the "more appropriate 
forum" question by the Virginia court in order to secure Virginia court 
determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction or relinquish to the Wyoming 
district court.

[¶20]   Virginia has adopted a version of 
the UCCJA very similar in text and application to Wyoming's version of the Act. 
Va. Code Ann. § 20-125 through § 20-146. Va. Code Ann. § 20-126 (Michie 1990) 
states in part:

Grounds for 
jurisdiction. - A. A court of this 
Commonwealth which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction 
to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree 
if:

1. This Commonwealth (i) 
is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or 
(ii) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of 
the proceeding and the child is absent from this Commonwealth because of his 
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and 
a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this 
Commonwealth[.]

In this case, 
Virginia had been the child's home state nine months immediately preceding 
commencement of the father's Virginia custody proceeding, the child was absent 
from the state because of his mother's removal of the child to Wyoming for less 
than two months, and the father continued to live in Virginia. Thus, all of 
Virginia's statutory requirements to assume jurisdiction were met pursuant to 
Va. Code Ann. § 20-126(A)(1)(ii).

[¶21]   Further, the Virginia Supreme Court 
set forth its understanding of the general purposes of the UCCJA in Middleton 
v. Middleton, 227 Va. 82, 314 S.E.2d 362, 367 (1984):

We perceive that the 
Virginia UCCJA was enacted to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with 
courts of other states in matters of child custody; to promote cooperation with 
courts of other states so that a custody decree is rendered in a state which can 
best decide the issue in the interest of the child; to assure that litigation 
over the custody of a child ordinarily occurs in the state that is most closely 
connected with the child and his family and where significant evidence 
concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most 
readily available; to assure that the courts of this state decline the exercise 
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with 
another state; to discourage continuing controversies over child custody; to 
deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain 
custody awards; to facilitate the enforcement of foreign custody orders and to 
avoid relitigating foreign custody decisions in this state so far as possible; 
and to promote the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance 
between courts of this state and those of other states concerned with the same 
child.

Thus, because of 
the Virginia court's actions to date and the comparable statutory and policy 
elements in place, Virginia satisfies the requirement in Wyo. Stat. § 
20-5-107(a) that compels Wyoming to decline jurisdiction if a court in another 
state exercises jurisdiction "substantially in conformity with this act * * *." 
Unless and until the Virginia court either finds that Wyoming is a more 
appropriate forum or stays its proceedings for some other reason, Wyoming has no 
jurisdiction to determine permanent custody in the face of the temporary custody 
order existent in Virginia in its home state status of residency of the 
child.

[¶22]   Of equal importance, the 
respondent's partial compliance with the UCCJA provisions in Wyo. Stat. § 
20-5-107(c) and § 20-5-120 through § 20-5-123 do not overcome either of the 
statutory barriers to Wyoming assuming jurisdiction in this case: (1) under Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-5-104, the Wyoming district court could not properly assume 
jurisdiction because it fails to satisfy any of the four jurisdictional criteria 
set forth in the statute;8 and (2) under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A, 
the Wyoming district court was similarly precluded from exercising jurisdiction 
by four parallel jurisdictional criteria. 28 U.S.C.S. § 
1738A(c).

[¶23]   Respondent argues that he "has not 
exercised child custody jurisdiction, but has invoked jurisdiction to decide 
whether he has custody jurisdiction * * *." In that sense, respondent is 
claiming that he has not exercised custody jurisdiction at all and thus has not 
violated his statutory duty to defer to the Virginia court pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-5-107(a) ("A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
under this act if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the same child was pending in a court of another state * * *."). If 
this case is viewed in that light, the PKPA would not apply here because this is 
not a case in which two states would be asserting a jurisdictional 
interest in determining custody. Regardless of how respondent characterizes his 
actions in taking the matter under advisement and ordering that the child not be 
removed from Wyoming, the simple fact remains that these actions are directly 
tied to the Virginia court's jurisdictional authority to determine custody. To 
accept respondent's argument that he was not exercising jurisdiction to 
determine child custody would create a jurisdictional stalemate in total 
contravention to the underlying purposes of both the Wyoming UCCJA and the 
federal PKPA.

[¶24]   We hold that just as respondent is 
foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction under Wyoming's version of the UCCJA, 
respondent is similarly foreclosed by the PKPA. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(g) 
establishes the conditions under which a state court must refrain from 
entertaining a custody proceeding when a proceeding in the same matter is 
pending in another state:

A court of a State shall 
not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination 
commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where 
such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the 
provisions of this section to make a custody determination. Compare 28 
U.S.C.S. § 1738A(g) with Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-107(a).

[¶25]   In effect, this decision resembles 
the analysis and result in E.P. v. District Court of Garfield County, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1985). In E.P., the Colorado Supreme Court cited 
Colorado's version of the UCCJA and deferred modification of custody to the 
Wyoming court that had entered an original custody decree. The court 
stated:

We conclude that the 
UCCJA requires the juvenile court to stay any further action on the dependency 
proceeding and to refer the case to the Wyoming court that entered the original 
custody decree so that the state of Wyoming can determine whether it will assume 
jurisdiction over the matter of custody.

Id. at 
263.

[¶26]   A foreign state which is neither a 
decree state nor a home state may not assume jurisdiction in contravention to 
the UCCJA and PKPA preference for "home state" jurisdiction. See generally, 
Matter of B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1041-42 (D.C.App. 1989), Schwelb, A.J., 
concurring; Charlow, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering and the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 Fam.L.Q. 299, 307-08 (1991). Consequently, the 
Wyoming district court is required to relinquish jurisdiction to the Virginia 
court for further proceedings in that venue.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶27]   Remanded to the district court for 
entry of an order in accord herewith. The Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District 
Court for Washakie County, Wyoming shall prepare, duly authenticate and mail a 
copy of the record of proceedings and pleadings in its court to the Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, 4000 Chainbridge 
Road, Fairfax, VA 22030.

Footnotes

1 Paternity 
is not at issue in this case. In her Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody, 
Visitation and Support presented to the Wyoming district court, the mother 
states that "[t]here are no persons other than [John Scott Griffin] who would be 
presumed to be the father of [Spencer Bryce Griffin] nor is any other man 
alleged to be the father of said minor child." The father admitted in several 
documents filed by him in both the Virginia and Wyoming courts that he is the 
natural father of Spencer Bryce Griffin.

2 In addition 
to total omission of the required affidavit regarding the child's prior 
residency, Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-110, the mother, in prior litigation, provided only 
counsel assertions in the pleadings as factual support in the pending Wyoming 
custody proceeding until after a motion to strike was filed by the father. Those 
initial non-factually supported pleadings included the initial petition signed 
by counsel without verification, amendment to the petition signed by counsel 
without verification, a motion to quash service or, in the alternative, to deny 
jurisdiction signed by counsel without verification or supporting affidavit 
(apparently directed to the in-Wyoming service of process by the Virginia 
court), plaintiff's response to respondent's motion to dismiss and supporting 
memorandum signed by counsel without documents supporting assertions of fact 
provided in counsel's statement and unverified, and amendment to plaintiff's 
response to respondent's motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum signed by 
counsel without verification and no supporting 
documentation.

Conversely, in support of his motion to dismiss, father included with the 
memorandum a copy of the Virginia custody order document and other documentation 
from the Virginia proceeding.

The 
father responded to the unsubstantiated statements in pleadings and motions with 
a motion to strike for lack of factual support and alleged the documents "are 
replete with redundant, immaterial, i[m]pertinent, and scandalous statements" 
and "[t]hose documents, presented apparently as memoranda of law, contain 
rambling factual statements by Petitioner's then-attorney which are unsupported 
by affidavit or otherwise. All of those statements are, therefore, inadmissible 
hearsay." In support of the motion to strike, two affidavits of the father dated 
November 8 and November 18, 1991 were filed, along with an affidavit of Diane M. 
Griffin dated November 18, 1991, an affidavit of Michael H. Reser dated November 
18, 1991, and an affidavit of Christian S. Griffin-Owens and Donald H. Owens 
dated November 18, 1991. Service of the motion to strike and attached affidavits 
were made November 21, 1991. On November 27, 1991, succeeding counsel entered an 
appearance by a motion for a continuance on behalf of the mother, filed one 
affidavit on November 27, 1991 and a second affidavit on December 2, 1991. No 
documentary contest as a factual issue is raised or even allegations by pleading 
to contest the jurisdictional issues regarding the residency in Virginia of the 
mother and child between January 11, 1991 and September 4, 1991 or that the 
mother had only been in Wyoming thirty-six days when she initiated the Wyoming 
proceeding.

3 Wyo. Stat. 
§ 20-5-107(c) states in part:

If the court 
is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the child was pending in another state before this court assumed 
jurisdiction, the court shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court 
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be 
litigated in the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in 
accordance with W.S. 20-5-120 through 20-5-123.

4 Wyo. Stat. 
§ 20-5-108(d) states:

Before 
determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may communicate 
with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the 
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that 
jurisdiction will be exercised by the most appropriate court and that a forum 
will be available to the parties.

5 The record 
also contains a Motion to Clarify Prior Ruling submitted by the father's 
Virginia counsel and dated January 14, 1992. Counsel apparently sought to have 
Judge Schell take further action by contacting Judge Hartman to find out why 
Wyoming was not granting full faith and credit to Judge Schell's December 3, 
1991 temporary custody order. There is nothing in either the Virginia or Wyoming 
records to indicate what Judge Schell may have done with this 
motion.

6 If the 
UCCJA and PKPA conflict, the PKPA preempts state child custody jurisdiction law. 
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 37. See 
also Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 299 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied 
460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983) and In re McBride, 
469 So. 2d 645, 646 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).

7                                                                                        Consent 
Order

I John S. 
Griffin and I Melissa V. Presnell do hereby agree to the following with regard 
to the temporary custody of our son Spencer B. 
Griffin:

John S. 
Griffin shall have legal custody until a permanent Custody agreement can be 
reached.

John S. 
Griffin shall provide for all of Spencer B. Griffin's physical expenses; food, 
clothing, shelter, medical and babysitting expenses. Spencer B. Griffin shall 
reside at John S. Griffin's permanent address at 1740 Dressage Drive, Reston, VA 
22090 until a permanent custody agreement can be reached. Melissa V. Presnell 
shall have the option to continue living at 1740 Dressage Drive, Reston, VA 
22090 until a permanent custody agreement is 
reached.

Spencer B. 
Griffin shall not be removed from 1740 Dressage Dr. without the knowledge and 
consent of both parents.

Both parents 
shall have full reasonable access to Spencer B. 
Griffin.

/s/ John S. Griffin 4/10/91

/s/ Melissa V. Presnell 4-10-91

/s/ Judge

A COPY 
TESTE: BARBARA J. DAYMUDE, Clerk By: /s/ Deputy Clerk

8 First, 
Wyoming was not, by definition, the child's "home state" at the commencement of 
the proceeding. Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104(a)(i).

Second, we find nothing in the record to indicate that "significant 
connection[s]" exist as between the child and/or the mother with the state of 
Wyoming such that the "best interest[s] of the child" mandate Wyoming 
jurisdiction. Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104(a)(ii). Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104(b) states that 
mere physical presence of the child and one parent is not sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction. Further, the UCCJA "significant connection" criteria is eliminated 
as a ground for jurisdiction under the PKPA where, as here, there is a "home 
state" - Virginia. See Charlow, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering and the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 Fam.L.Q. 299, 308 
(1991).

Third, with the exception of a single, conclusory and unsupported 
statement in pleading by the mother's counsel that the father has a "volatile 
temper" and "shook said minor child by the upper arms * * *," there is nothing 
in the signed affidavits to provide evidence for "emergency jurisdiction" to be 
available under Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104(a)(iii). Likewise, there is no admissible 
evidence that the father abandoned or threatened the child with mistreatment. 
Certainly, the affidavits are preclusively determinative to the contrary as is 
the temporary custody order duly entered in the Virginia 
court.

Fourth, Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104(a)(iv) is clearly unavailable to confer 
jurisdiction because Virginia has jurisdiction as the child's "home state" 
pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 20-126(A)(1) and the Virginia court, at least at 
this point, has not declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of Wyoming or 
some other state being a more appropriate forum to determine child custody and 
had earlier exercised jurisdiction with the Custody Proceeding No. 1 by entry of 
the temporary custody order as a stipulated resolution of that proceeding.