Title: Aither v. Estate of Aither

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Aither v. Estate of Aither (2005-369); 180 Vt. 472; 913 A.2d 376

2006 VT 111

[Filed 09-Nov-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 111

                                No. 2005-369


  Karen Aither                                   Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Windham Family Court


  Estate of Jeffrey Aither                       May Term, 2006


  Katherine A. Hayes, J.

  Walter G. French and Jodi P. French, Law Clerk (On the Brief), West
    Dummerston, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   Wife Karen Aither appeals a family court
  decision denying her motion to enforce an initial temporary order barring
  husband Jeffrey Aither from disposing of any marital asset during the
  pendency of their divorce. Husband replaced wife as beneficiary of his life
  insurance policy in violation of the order, and then died before a final
  divorce decree was entered.  The family court concluded that it lacked
  jurisdiction to enforce its injunctive order after husband's death, and
  accordingly dismissed wife's motion as moot.  We reverse and remand.

       ¶  2.  The following facts are not disputed.  On February 11, 2005,
  wife filed for divorce from husband.  On February 14, the family court
  issued an initial temporary order barring both parties from selling,
  conveying, concealing, or encumbering "any marital asset," which was
  defined to include "whole life insurance policies," among other things. 
  When the order was issued, husband had a universal life insurance policy in
  the amount of $100,000 that named wife as primary beneficiary.  The parties
  do not dispute that the universal life policy was subject to the order's
  prohibition; universal life insurance is a type of whole life insurance. 
  Cf. Gleed v. Noon,