Title: Harris v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 21
September Term, 2007
_________________________________________
CHESTER HARR IS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
       * Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
               Harrell and Raker, JJ., Dissent.
_________________________________________
Filed:   September 11, 2008
*Raker, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
We issued a writ of certiorari in this criminal case to decide whether a trial court
erred by denying a defendant’s motion for a new trial where the guilty verdicts were
rendered by a jury which had never been sworn. 
I. 
On November 22, 2003, Michael Edwards was struck and killed by an
automobile allegedly driven by Chester Harris.  The State charged Harris with vehicular
manslaughter under Maryland Code (2002), §2-209 of the Criminal Law Article, and
several related  offenses.  Harris’s trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
commenced on October 28, 2004.  
After the judge conducted voir dire during the morning of October 28, the
attorneys accepted the panel of jurors and one alternate juror.  The judge then indicated
to the attorneys at a bench conference that he planned to release the jury for lunch early
so that he could hear the defense counsel’s motions.  During this bench conference, the
following exchange occurred:
“The Court: I will let this Jury go [to lunch].
“The Clerk: Do you want me to swear them in first?
“The Court: Yes, I’ll have you swear them first.  I’ll pick the
forelady or foreman first, too.”
-2-
The judge chose the jury forelady and explained her duties.  He then began to
excuse the jurors before having them sworn.  Defense Counsel repeated the clerk’s
previous inquiry as to swearing the jury:
“Defense Counsel: Your Honor, is the Jury going to be sworn?
“The Court: They’re going to lunch.  Why?
“Defense Counsel: I was just asking if they will be sworn.
“The Court: They are excused until 1:30.”
The transcript does not reflect that the jury was sworn once they returned from
lunch or that the jury was ever sworn thereafter.  In a docket entry for October 28,
2004, the clerk entered “jury not sworn.”  There is no docket entry indicating, over the
course of the two day trial, that the jury was ever sworn.  At the end of the second day,
the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the counts submitted to it.  Harris was sentenced
to a total of fifteen years imprisonm ent.
Thereafter, Harris filed a motion for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that the Court
did not swear the jury as required by Maryland Rule 4-312(h).  The rule states as
follows (emphasis added):
“(h) Impanelling the jury.  The jurors and any alternates to be
impanelled shall be called from the qualified jurors remaining on
the list in the order previously designated by the court and shall be
sworn.  The court shall designate a juror as foreman.”
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial judge disputed Harris’s contention
-3-
that jury was not sworn.  The judge stated:
“The jury was sworn.  What he’s talking about – I was trying to
figure out what he was talking about there.  The jury was sworn,
but what happened is they came over on a day we actually didn’t
start the trial until the next day.  And I hadn’t even voir dired the
jury yet and we started over.  He wanted me to swear – I didn’t
know what he meant by it.  But before the trial began, jury was
sworn.  So, I think that’s what he was referring to.  My memory is
backed up by the file.
* * *
“I’m not sure of the date, but like the 28th versus the 29th,
when the case began, you requested that I swear them ahead of
time and this was before the voir dire took place.  I couldn’t reach
them that day.  We started the next day.  That’s when the voir dire
took place.  That is when the jury was sworn.”
In response to the Judge’s statements, defense counsel explained as follows:
“As far as the chronology of the case, I would suggest to the
Court that we selected a jury in the morning of the first day of trial.
We concluded the selection at lunchtime.  A lunch break was taken.
Opening argument and testimony began in the afternoon upon our
return from the lunch break.  It was a two day trial where, at the
close of that day, the trial continued to the next morning and that
is when it concluded.  The jury was not sworn.  I viewed the
transcript – I viewed the tape of this trial and prior to the luncheon
break, I asked the Court to have the jury sworn and, according to
the transcript, the Court’s response was the jury was going to
lunch.  And when we returned from the lunch break, the trial
began, opening argumen ts began, and I don’t believe the jury was
sworn.”
The judge denied Harris’s motion for a new trial, saying:
-4-
“I have considered the argumen ts of counsel and reread my
notes with respect to the file.  I do not have a transcript in which
to refer to each item individually, only from my memory.  I find
that the evidence has been properly presented, that the jury was
sworn and that the motion for a new trial is denied.”
Harris appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial
court erred in not swearing the jury.  In a reported opinion, Harris v. State, 173
Md.App. 71, 917 A.2d 1162 (2007), the intermediate appellate court held that the trial
court properly denied Harris’s motion for a new trial.  The court noted that there “is a
strong presumption that judges and court clerks . . . properly perform their duties.”
Harris v. State, supra, 173 Md. App. at 82, 917 A.2d at 1168-1169, quoting
Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 126, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).  According to the
intermediate appellate court, “it was then incumbent upon Harris to persuade the trial
court that, in fact, the jurors had not been given an oath” and that Harris failed to
persuade the trial court.  Harris v. State, 173 Md.App. at 84, 917 A.2d at 1169.  The
Court of Special Appeals relied on the trial judge’s recollection, stating that “we are
satisfied that the court’s references to its recollection of the swearing of the jury, and
Harris’s failure to offer evidence to the contrary, result in Harris having failed to carry
his burden of persuasion.”  Harris, 173 Md.App. at 85, 917 A.2d at 1170.  Citing
United States v. Pinero, 948 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1991), the Court of Special Appeals
stated that “the absence of an affirmative statement in the transcript that the jury was
sworn furnishes no factual support for appellant’s contention that it was not.”  Harris,
173 Md.App. at 83, 917 A.2d at 1169.  The Court of Special Appeals did not mention
-5-
the docket entry stating that the jury was not sworn.
The Court of Special Appeals did reject an argument by the State that Harris
waived his objection to an unsworn jury by not raising the issue in a timely manner.
In so holding, the intermediate appellate court explained that “we are satisfied that
counsel’s two inquiries to the court regarding swearing of the jury were sufficient to
negate the State’s waiver argument.”  Harris, supra, 173 Md.App. at 79, 917 A.2d at
1166. 
Harris filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the
following two questions:
“1.
Did the trial judge court err in not swearing the jury?
“2.
Did the trial court unfairly restrict the defense closing
argument by preventing counsel from arguing problems with
eyewitness identification?
The State, in its answer, argued that Harris had failed to overcome the presumption of
regularity and that, alternativ ely, the failure to swear the jury was harmless error.  The
State also filed a conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the
following question:
“Is Harris’s claim that the jury was not sworn waived where he
did not bring it to the attention of the trial court until nine days
after the jury returned its verdict and Harris was sentenced?”
We granted both the petition and the cross-petition.  Harris v. State, 399 Md. 592, 925
-6-
A.2d 632 (2007).  We shall hold that Harris did establish that the jury was not sworn,
that there was no waiver of Harris’s objection to the unsworn jury, and that, under the
circumstances of this case, the harmless error doctrine is not applicable.  We shall,
therefore, reverse on the ground that the jury was never sworn.  Accordingly, we shall
not reach the second question presented in Harris’s certiorari petition.
II.
There is a presumption of regularity which normally attaches to trial court
proceedings, although its applicability may sometimes depend upon the nature of the
issue before the reviewing court.  See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502,
512, 74 S.Ct. 247, 253, 98 L.Ed.2d 248, 257 (1954) (“It is presumed the [trial court]
proceedings were correct and the burden rests on the [challenger] to show otherwise”);
Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78, 760 A.2d 647, 661 (2000) (“[A] presumption of
regularity attaches to the criminal case”); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d
105, 110 (1993); Schowgurow v. State, supra, 240 Md. at 126, 213 A.2d at 479.
Nonetheless, the presumption of regularity is rebuttable.  Beales v. State, supra, 329
Md. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110-111. (“[W]hen viewed as a whole,” the “record thus
demonstrates” that the presumption of regularity was rebutted).  
In the present case, both the trial transcript and the docket entries rebut any
presumption of regularity.  The trial transcript clearly shows that the jury was not
sworn before the jurors were dismissed for lunch.  When the jury reconvened after
lunch, the transcript reveals that the Circuit Court proceeded directly with opening
-7-
statements, without the oath being administered to the jury.  According to the trial
transcript, which the official reporter of the Circuit Court certified as being “complete
and accurate,” the jury was not sworn at any point during the trial.  The docket entry
stating that the jury was not sworn reinforces the accuracy of the transcript.
The State and the Court of Special Appeals both relied on United States v.
Pinero, supra, 948 F.2d 698, to support the assertion that Harris failed to meet his
burden of overcoming the presumption of regularity.  The Pinero opinion did not
mention a presumption of regularity.  In Pinero, the argument that the jury was not
sworn was made for the first time on appeal, and the appellate court pointed out that
there were no statements by trial counsel, the court reporter, or anyone else present at
the trial, that the jury had not been sworn.  In this context, the federal appellate court
simply stated that “[t]he mere absence of an affirmative statement in the record . . . is
not enough to establish that the jury was not in fact sworn.”  Pinero, 948 F.2d at 700.
The record in the present matter offers substantially more than the record in
Pinero to establish that the jury was not sworn.  The docket entries contain the
affirmative statement that the jury was not sworn. The trial transcript also shows two
inquiries from defense counsel regarding the unsworn jury, in addition to an inquiry
from the courtroom clerk.  It is also noteworthy that the transcript of the hearing on the
motion for a new trial discloses that the prosecuting attorney made no argument to
rebut defense counsel’s contention that the jury had never been sworn.  The prosecuting
attorney, however, did make rebuttal arguments regarding all of defense counsel’s other
-8-
1
Since the Court of Special Appeals and the arguments in this Court have focused on whether
the presumption of regularity was overcome, we have dealt with the issue on this basis.  We point
out, however, that there is authority holding that the record must affirmatively show that the jury was
sworn.  See, e.g., Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 329, 28 S.E. 159, 161 (1897) (“‘[T]he fact of
swearing [the jurors] must appear on the record’”); State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 980, 98 S.W.2d
707, 715 (1936) (“[I]t is imperative that the jury be sworn to try the cause and that the record show
it”); State v. Mitchell, 199 Mo. 105, 108, 97 S.W. 561, 562 (1906) (“[I]t is everywhere held that the
record proper in a criminal appeal must show that the jury was sworn to try the cause”); State v.
Moore, 57 W.Va 146, 148, 49 S.E. 1015, 1016 (1905) (“[A] person cannot be legally convicted
unless the record shows that the jury which tried the case were sworn according to law”).  Moreover,
most of the cases in other states, dealing with the issue of whether jurors were sworn, have not
considered the issue in terms of a presumption of regularity.  Nevertheless, we need not, and
therefore do not, express an opinion with respect to this matter.  We have simply assumed, arguendo,
that a presumption of regularity is applicable to the issue of whether the jury was sworn.
argumen ts at the hearing.  
The only thing contradicting the transcripts and the docket entries was the
statement by the trial judge, “only from my memory,” that “the jury was sworn.”  Under
the State’s argumen t, neither the transcripts nor the docket entries can overcome such
a statement by the trial judge from his “memory.”  The State cites no authority
supporting this position, and we are aware of none.
In sum, we hold that any presumption of regularity was overcome in the present
case.  The jury in this case was never sworn.1
III.
As earlier pointed out, Maryland Rule 4-312(h) mandates that the jury “shall be
sworn.”  The Rule represents the codification of a long-standing common law
requirement.
Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, in addition to providing
generally that Marylanders are entitled to the common law, distinctly provides that
-9-
2
Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights states as follows:
“Article 5. Common law and statutes of England applicable; trial by jury;
 property derived under charter granted to Lord Baltimore.
(a)(1) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit
of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen
hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to
their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by
the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first
day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may have since
expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject,
nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this
State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to
them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius
Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. 
(2) Legislation may be enacted that limits the right to trial by jury in civil
proceedings to those proceedings in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000.
(b) The parties to any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is
(continued...)
Maryland inhabitants are entitled to trial by jury in accordance with the common law.
The only exception to the right of a common law jury, under a 1992 constitutional
amendm ent, is that juries of six or more persons are permitted in civil cases.  See, e.g.,
Bryan v. State Roads Commission, 356 Md. 4, 9, 736 A.2d 1057 (1999) (“The jury trial
clause of Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights, from its inception as part of the
Constitution of 1776 until the 1992 constitutional amendm ent, meant ‘that it is the
historical trial by jury, as it existed when the Constitution of the State was first
adopted, to which the inhabitants of [the] State are entitled,”’ quoting Knee v. City
Pass. Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891 (1898)); State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354,
357-361, 609 A.2d 337 (1992); State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 566-572, 375 A.2d 228
(1977).2  In Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 408-409, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007), Judge
-10-
2
(...continued)
preserved are entitled to a trial by jury of at least 6 jurors. 
(c) That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing in this
Constitution prohibits trial by jury of less than 12 jurors in any civil proceeding in
which the right to a jury trial is preserved.”
Harrell for the Court reviewed the history of the common law jury, and he pointed out
that, when the jury “began to assume a form more recognizable to us under the reign
of King Henry II,” it was a “sworn jury.”  See also William Lambard, Eirenarcha or
The Office of Justices of Peace, at 308 (1581, 1582), reprinted in Professional Books
Limited (London 1972) (“But these men be not truly Jurors, till they be sworn, as their
name pretendeth, and otherwise their presentment is utterly void”).
In addition, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights requires, inter alia,
that in a criminal prosecution, the accused is entitled to “trial by an impartial jury,
without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.”  Courts have held
that a sworn jury is an element of an “impartial” jury and is necessary for a “legally
constituted” jury.  In  People v. Pribble, 72 Mich.App. 219, 224, 249 N.W.2d 363, 366
(1976), a Michigan court explained as follows: 
    “The required oath is not a mere ‘formality’ which is required
only by tradition. The oath represents a solemn promise on the part
of each juror to do his duty according to the dictates of the law to
see that justice is done.  This duty is not just a final duty to render
a verdict in accordance with the law, but the duty to act in
accordance with the law at all stages of trial.  The oath is
administered to insure that the jurors pay attention to the evidence,
observe the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses and conduct
themselves at all times as befits one holding such an important
position.  The oath is designed to protect the fundamental right of
trial by an impartial jury.”
-11-
See also People v. Pelton, 116 Cal. App. Supp. 789, 792, 7 P.2d 205 (1931) (Where the
jury was never sworn, the defendant was denied his right to “a legally constituted
jury”); Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533, 534, 640 S.E.2d 267, 268 (2007), certiorari
denied, 127 S.Ct. 2914, 168 L.Ed.2d 243 (2007) (An unsworn jury is not a “legally
constituted” jury); Sides v. State, 693 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Ind. S.Ct. 1998) (“[T]he oath
serves the dual function of impressing upon the jury the solemness of the trial and
ensuring a defendant’s right to an impartial jury”); Miller v. State, 122 Miss. 19, 37, 84
So. 161, 161 (1920) (Since the jury was not sworn before or during the evidentiary
portion of the trial, the court held that “the appellant was denied his right of a fair trial
by a legal jury”); State v. Mitchell, 199 Mo. 105, 108, 97 S.W. 561, 562 (1906) (“[T]he
tribunal [cannot] be considered as lawfully constituted unless the jurors . . . take [the]
oath”); State v. Barone, 329 Or. 210, 226, 986 P.2d 5, 17 (1999), certiorari denied, 528
U.S. 1086, 120 S.Ct. 813, 145 L.Ed.2d 685 (2000) (“The jury oath is designed to
vindicate a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights to a fair trial before an
impartial jury”); State v. Moore, 57 W.Va. 146, 148, 49 S.E. 1015, 1016 (1905) (“[A]
person cannot be legally convicted unless . . . the jury which tried the case were
sworn”).
Consequently, the failure to administer the oath to the jurors in the case at bar
was clearly error.  We now turn to the State’s waiver and harmless error arguments.
-12-
IV.
This Court has not previously considered the issues of waiver and harmless error
when there is either a complete failure to swear the jury or when the oath is belatedly
administered to the jurors after the introduction of evidence has begun.  Nevertheless,
these issues have been extensively treated by appellate courts in our sister states.
In those states where the matter has been considered, the courts have, almost
unanimously, held that the concepts of waiver and harmless error have no application
when the jury was never sworn.  On the other hand, several of the cases hold that,
where the jury was belatedly sworn or there was some other defect in administering the
oath, the failure to raise the issue in a timely manner constitutes a waiver.  In addition,
defects in connection with the administration of the oath have been deemed harmless
error by some courts.  See, e.g., Ex Parte Benford, 935 So.2d 421, 429-430 (Ala. S.Ct.
2006) (“[A]ny defect in the administration of the oath is reversible error only if some
objection was taken . . . during the progress of the trial” but “a verdict rendered by
jurors who have never been sworn is a nullity”) (internal quotation marks omitted,
emphasis in the original); State v. Godfrey, 136 Ariz. 471, 472-473, 666 P.2d 1080,
1081-1082 (1983) (The court distinguished the situation where “the jurors were never
sworn” from the situation where they were belatedly sworn prior to their deliberations);
People v. Pelton, supra, 116 Cal. App. Supp. at 791, 7 P.2d at 205 (“[W]hile mere
irregularities in the swearing . .  may be waived by failing to object until after a verdict,
an entire failure to swear the jury cannot be waived in any manner or under any
-13-
3
The only state appellate case, which has been called to our attention, holding that a complete
failure to swear the jury can be waived by counsel is State v. Vogh, 179 Or. App. 585, 41 P.3d 421
(2002).  If the Vogh case represents Oregon law, then Oregon law in this respect appears to be unique
among the several states.  See, however, State v. Barone, 329 Or. 210, 226, 986 P.2d 5, 17-18 (1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1086, 120 S.Ct. 813, 145 L.Ed.2d 685 (2000), where the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that a belated swearing of the jury did not constitute “structural error” but reserved the
question of whether the complete failure to swear the jury automatically required a reversal.
circumstances”); People v. Clouse, 859 P.2d 228, 233 (Colo. App. 1993) (The jury was
sworn during the prosecution’s case, and the court held that the error was harmless);
Spencer v. State, supra, 281 Ga. at 534, 640 S.E.2d at 268 (“[T]he failure to administer
[the] oath to the trial jury requires the setting aside of any conviction”);Grant v. State,
272 Ga. 213, 528 S.E.2d 512 (2000); State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 980, 98 S.W.2d
707, 715 (1936) (“[A] party may waive irregularities in the swearing of the jury, where
there has been substantial compliance with the statute [that the jury be sworn at the
beginning of the trial]”); State v. Mitchell, supra, 199 Mo. at 108, 97 S.W. at 562
(Since the jury was not sworn, the conviction was reversed); State v. Arellano, 125
N.M. 709, 711-712, 965 P.2d 293, 295 (1998) (As the jury was belatedly sworn,
defense counsel’s failure at the earlier stage of trial to call the court’s attention to the
omission constituted a waiver); Brown v. State, 220 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. App. 2007)
(“[A] complete failure to administer the jury oath renders the jury’s verdict a nullity
and is reversible error,” but “the untimely swearing of the jury does not render the
verdict void”); State v. Moore, supra, 57 W. Va. at 148, 49 S.E. at 1016 (The jury must
be “sworn in the manner prescribed by law before there can be a legal conviction”). 3
In situations where the jury was sworn, but where the administration of the oath
-14-
4
In this connection, see Alston v. State, 177 Md. App. 1, 934 A.2d 949 (2007), certiorari granted,
403 Md. 304, 941 A.2d 1104 (2008).
to jurors did not occur before all or a substantial part of the evidence had been
introduced, the cases appear to be in conflict with regard to the applicability of waiver
and/or harmless error principles. Compare, e.g., People v. Pribble, supra, 72 Mich.
App. 219, 249 N.W.2d 363, and Miller v. State, supra, 122 Miss. 19, 84 So. 161, with
State v. Godfrey, supra, 136 Ariz. 471, 666 P.2d 1080; People v. Clouse, supra, 859
P.2d at 233; State v. Frazier, supra,  339 Mo. at 979-982, 98 S.W.2d at 715-716; and
State v. Arellano, supra, 125 N.M. at 711-713, 965 P.2d at 295-297. Since, in the case
at bar, the jury was never sworn, we leave for another day the resolution of any issues
arising when there is a belated administration of the oath to jurors.4
We do agree with the great majority of cases that principles of waiver and
harmless error are inapplicable when a jury in a criminal case has never been sworn.
As previously discussed, the administration of the oath is an essential ingredient of a
legally constituted jury and an impartial jury. 
The State argues that, because many other rights associated with a trial by jury
or other defects in the composition of the jury can be waived, the right to have a sworn
jury should also be subject to waiver (State’s brief at 14-15).  Several of the examples
pointed to by the State (e.g., lack of opportunity to object to a particular juror for cause
or a non-citizen being on the jury) do not involve fundamental constitutional rights.
A sworn jury, however, is a necessary element for a legally constituted jury and an
impartial jury, rights protected by Articles 5 and 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
-15-
5
See n.3, supra.
6
If we were to hold that a verdict by an unsworn jury could be waived, we would then be faced
with the question of what constitutes a waiver.  In State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 567, 572-573, 375
A.2d 228, 232-233, 236 (1977), this Court held that waiver of the right to a unanimous jury verdict,
under Articles 5 and 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, required a Johnston v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant
himself.
Rights.  Moreover, the right to a legally constituted jury is different from many other
constitutional rights associated with a jury trial, including the basic right to have a jury
trial in criminal cases.  When a defendant has waived his right to a jury trial, the
defendant has nevertheless been tried by a legally authorized trier of fact, namely the
trial judge.  When a defendant has been tried and convicted by a jury which was not
sworn, and therefore not legally constituted, the defendant has not been adjudged guilty
by any authorized trier of fact.  As numerous cases hold, such a verdict is a nullity.  
Furthermore, even if we were to hold that a “jury trial” before a jury which was
never sworn could be waived (and we do not so hold), we agree with the Court of
Special Appeals that there would be no waiver in the present case.  Defense counsel
twice called the trial judge’s attention to the failure to swear the jury.  This was after
voir dire, immediately after the forelady was selected, and before opening argumen ts
and the introduction of evidence.  In the case relied on by the State, State v. Vogh, 179
Or. App. 585, 593-594, 41 P.3d 421, 426 (2002), the only case from a state appellate
court to hold that a complete failure to swear the jury can be waived,5 the issue of an
allegedly unsworn jury was not raised until sentencing, which was eight days after the
jury returned its verdict. 6  
-16-
Turning to the matter of harmless error, the appellate courts in other states,
almost unanimously, hold that the complete failure to swear the jury can never be
harmless error.  In this regard, a jury which has never been sworn falls into the same
“structural error” category as a defective reasonable doubt instruction, the denial of a
right to a jury trial, the total deprivation of counsel, discrimination in the selection of
juries, etc.  For a review of many errors of this type, see Judge Raker’s opinion for the
Court in Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 304, 768 A.2d 656, 659 (2001).  Although this
Court has not previously considered the issue of a jury which has never been sworn, we
have recognized that the harmless error doctrine does not apply when the trial is
presided over by “a judge who is not impartial.”  Redman v. State, supra, 363 Md. at
304 n.5, 768 A.2d at 659 n.5, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71
L.Ed. 749 (1927).  We perceive no basis to distinguish between a judge who is not
impartial and a jury which is not impartial.  And, as the cases in other states all hold,
an unsworn jury deprives the defendant of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.
This Court has also held that a conviction by a jury which is required to take an oath
containing an unconstitutional religious element, with those unwilling to take the oath
being excluded, must be reversed regardless of whether prejudice is shown in a
particular case.  Schowgurow v. State, supra, 240 Md. at 131, 213 A.2d at 482.
There is another reason why the harmless error principle is inapplicable when
a jury in a criminal case is never sworn.  For purposes of the protection against double
jeopardy, in a jury trial jeopardy attaches “when the jury is empaneled and sworn.”
-17-
7
We cite the Spencer case to illustrate the defendant’s risk when a jury is never sworn.  Whether
we would agree with the result in Spencer, however, is another matter.  We need not reach that issue
here.
Hubbard v. State, 395 Md. 73, 90, 909 A.2d 270, 279 (2006) (emphasis added).  See,
e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425,
433 (1973); State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 329, 658 A.2d 272, 276 (1995); Blondes
v. State, 273 Md. 435, 444, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975).  Unless courts were to create an
exception to this principle for unsworn juries (and no case has been called to our
attention creating such an exception), jeopardy will not attach if the jury is never
sworn.  In this situation, a defendant runs the risk that the State may attempt to
prosecute a second time  for the same offense.  See Spencer v. State, supra, 281 Ga. at
534-535, 640 S.E.2d at 268 (The defendant was “acquitted” by an unsworn jury, and
the state thereafter prosecuted him a second time for the same offense.  The Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the second prosecution was permissible because “jeopardy
does not attach in a jury trial until the jury is both impaneled and sworn.  * * *  Thus,
Spencer was not placed in jeopardy at all, regardless of the attempted trial and the
pronouncements of the fatally infirm jury”);7 Slaughter v. State, supra, 100 Ga. at 330,
28 S.E. at 161 (“[A] conviction by an unsworn jury is a mere nullity, of which the
accused could not, upon a subsequent arraignment, avail himself by a plea of autre fois
convict”).  See also People v. Pribble, supra, 72 Mich. App. at 225-226, 249 N.W.2d
at 366 (“Jeopardy could not attach in the instant case where the jury was not given the
oath which would authorize them to serve as a jury”).
-18-
Since the jury which convicted the petitioner Harris was never sworn, the
convictions must be reversed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
A P P EALS 
REVER S ED  
A N D  
C A SE
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL
AP P EALS 
W ITH  
D I R E C T IO N S 
TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCU IT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID 
BY 
THE 
MAYOR 
AND 
CITY
COUN CIL OF BALTIMORE
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 21
September Term, 2007
                                                                        
   
CHESTER HARR IS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                        
   
 
Bell, C.J.
         *Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                        
   
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.,
which Raker, J., joins.
                                                                        
   
Filed:   September 11, 2008
* Raker, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
1
Both the hand-written and typed versions of the relevant docket entry are not as clear as they
could be as to what part of the proceedings for that day, 28 October 2004, they purport to describe.
Both state, in relevant part, “10-28-04 Jury not sworn, voir dire not admin.”  Yet, the transcript of
proceedings for the morning of 28 October 2004 reveals that voir dire and jury selection did occur
before the lunch break.  Presumably, one inference therefore which may be drawn by a fact-finder
from the portion of the docket entry as to the jury not being sworn describes only what did not
happen prior to the lunch break.
It would be useful in determining what to make of the scope of this docket entry, relative to the two
day trial, to be apprised of any customs or practices in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City at the
time bearing on the regularity of making such notations and the significance that no subsequent note
on the topic was made.
I neither would affirm nor reverse the judgment in this case, at this point, but rather
would remand the matter for another trial judge to determine as a fact whether the jury
was sworn.  On an equivocal record, the Majority opinion appears to find as a fact that
the jury was not sworn.  Majority slip op. at 8.  While that may be a permissible
inference for a fact-finder to draw, in isolation, from the courtroom clerk 's docket entry
of 28 October 2004,1 the transcript of the morning proceedings of the same date (where
the courtroom clerk and defense counsel, in rapid order, invited the trial judge to let the
jury be sworn before releasing them for lunch), and the absence of any express
indication that the jury was sworn subsequently, there is the matter of the transcript of
the proceedings on the motion for new trial which contains a basis to infer otherwise.
Granting that the trial judge, in the course of the motion hearing and his ruling, did not
place his trial notes in the record literally, he nonetheless unequivo cally stated,
attributing as his source his memory and his notes, that “before the trial began, Jury
was sworn.”
I do not think that, as appellate judges, ordinarily we engage in fact-finding or the
drawing of factual inferences as to dispositive facts favoring the contentions of one
-2-
party or another (except insofar as, for analytical reasons, we might appear to do so in
the review of the grant of summary judgment in civil cases and the like).  I would
decline to make the present case an exception.  The resolution of the ultimate fact of
whether the jury in this trial was sworn is fit, in the first instance, for a fact-finder.  The
trial judge that presided over Harris' trial is a retired judge who may be called as a fact
witness and, unless destroyed, his redacted  trial notes examined.  If other courtroom
personnel and jurors present at the two day trial (28-29 October 2004) are compellable
and available, they also may be examined for their recollection and the basis therefor,
as possibly may Harris' then trial counsel, if desired.
If another trial judge, after hearing the relevant facts, finds that the jury was not
sworn, in that event, I would agree with the legal analysis of the Majority opinion here.
If the finding, however, were that the jury was sworn, and a more developed record
supported that finding, the Majority opinion, as such, becomes surplusage and Harris'
second issue would need to be reached.
In short, I am unwilling, on appeal and on the record before us at present, to weigh
the docket entry and transcript of the morning proceedings of 28 October 2004 against
the trial judge's memory and notes and find the latter incredible.
Judge Raker has authorized me to state that she joins in this dissenting opinion.