Title: JOHN RION V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN RION V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 197172 P.3d 734Case Number: 06-178, 179Decided: 12/13/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JOHN 
RION,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Edward 
J. Battitori of Meek & Battitori, Baxter Springs, Kansas; and Raymond D. 
Macchia of Macchia & Associates, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; Hill, 
J., files a specially concurring opinion, in which KITE, J., 
joins.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
appeals from his convictions for arson and felony property destruction on the 
ground that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Pursuant to Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 
(Wyo. 1993), 
this Court granted the appellant's Motion for Remand to Determine Ineffective 
Assistance of Trial Counsel.  The 
hearing upon remand took place in the district court on April 12, 2007.  Four witnesses, including defense trial 
counsel, testified at the hearing, the transcript of which is 120 pages in 
length.  On April 24, 2007, the 
district court issued a detailed eleven-page Decision Letter in which each of 
the allegations of ineffectiveness was individually considered and rejected. 
 An Order Upon Evidentiary Hearing 
was entered on May 15, 2007, in which the district court concluded that, because 
trial counsel's performance was reasonable and acceptable, there was no need to 
address the issue of prejudice.1 

 
 
[¶2]      In reviewing the 
decision of the district court after remand, we defer to the district court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we conduct a de novo review of the district court's 
conclusions of law, the latter of which includes the question of whether 
counsel's conduct was deficient.  Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 20, 
156 P.3d 986, 992 (Wyo. 2007).  It 
is of particular significance in the present case that the appellant bears the 
burden of proving deficient conduct, that there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance was competent, and that "we will not consider claims 
unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent authority."  Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 30, 
151 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Wyo. 2007), quoting Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, 
¶ 31, 128 P.3d 652, 665 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶3]      Despite the 
availability of the evidence from the remand hearing, despite bearing the burden 
of proof, and in the face of the above-recited standard of review and the 
district court's detailed decision letter, the appellant has presented to this 
Court only two and one-half pages of very generalized argument supporting his 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In effect, his brief is nothing more than 
a recitation of the allegations themselves, with no analysis of either the 
allegedly deficient conduct, or any prejudice that might have resulted 
therefrom.  Consequently, we 
summarily affirm the determinations of the district court and the appellant's 
convictions.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-prong 
test established in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), 
wherein the appellant must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, 
and (2) that prejudice resulted.   
Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 30, 151 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
specially concurring, with whom KITE, 
Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶4]      I agree that 
Rion's convictions should be affirmed, but I would address the issue he raised 
on its merits.  In essence, the 
majority affirms, "summarily," on the basis that because appellate counsel were 
ineffective in presenting to this Court the issue of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness, our precedents make it unnecessary to give that issue any 
substantive consideration.  In my 
view, that disposition deprives Rion of review of his contention that his trial 
attorney was ineffective, on the basis that his appellate counsel were also 
ineffective.

 
 
[¶5]      This matter was 
docketed in this Court on August 1, 2006.  
The filing of the notice of appeal in Rion's case was not completed in 
accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and, hence, appellate 
counsel was sanctioned.  In the year 
2006, Rion's appellate counsel filed four motions to extend the time to file a 
brief and those motions were granted by the Court.  However, on January 3, 2007, after those 
events had occurred, we remanded this case to the district court to conduct a 
hearing on the matter of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to our 
decision in Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993).  W.R.A.P. 21 
(Supp.2007) now sets out the procedure for such a hearing.  The briefing schedule was stayed during 
the remand.

 
 
[¶6]      The Calene hearing was conducted on April 
12, 2007.  The result of the hearing 
(the district court's decision letter) was received by this Court on May 9, 
2007, and a subsequent order effectuating the district court's findings and 
conclusions was received by this Court on May 15, 2007.  By order entered on May 17, 2007, a new 
briefing schedule was established.  
In that order, Rion was allowed 30 days in which to file his brief, 
rather than the usual 45 days allowed by W.R.A.P. 7.06(a).  That order also stated that Rion would 
not be allowed any additional 
extensions of time to file his brief.

 
 
[¶7]      However, Rion did 
file a motion for an extension of time in mid-June of 2007, premised on the 
disruption to one of his appellate counsel's life by flooding in Kansas.  Rion had two attorneys representing him 
in this appeal, one from Wyoming and one from 
Kansas.  That motion was identified by the Court 
as a fifth request for extension of time to complete Rion's brief, although this 
was a new briefing schedule that required the access to the materials developed 
at the Calene hearing.  The extension was granted allowing Rion 
until July 18, 2007, to file his brief.  
In bold type, the order granting that extension stated that, "no further requests for extensions of time 
will be considered."  
Nonetheless, on June 26, 2007, Rion filed yet another motion for an 
extension of time of 13 days (until July 31, 2007), to file his brief, because 
appellate counsel had not yet obtained a copy of the transcript of the Calene hearing and needed it to complete 
Rion's brief.  This motion was 
identified as a sixth request for an extension.  By order entered on June 27, 2007, that 
motion was denied.  The transcript 
of the Calene hearing was completed 
and filed in the district court on Friday, July 2, 2007.  Rion's brief was timely filed on July 
17, 2007.

 
 
[¶8]      In this appeal, 
Rion contends that the validity of his convictions for arson and felony property 
destruction was undermined by the substandard performance of his attorney at 
trial, i.e., ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The majority opinion opts to "summarily 
affirm" based upon appellate counsel's substandard performance.  I do not agree that appellate counsel 
failed to clearly pose the issue they wanted the Court to consider, i.e., were 
the findings and conclusion of the district court, to the effect that Rion was 
not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial, which findings 
were developed after the Calene 
hearing, and in the light of the proceedings at Rion's earlier trial in the 
district court, erroneous in any way?  
In my view, the record bears out that the district court's findings of 
fact were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusion that trial counsel were not 
ineffective as a matter of law is sound.  
Moreover, even if I were to agree with the majority's characterization of 
appellate counsel's performance, and it most certainly was marginal at best, I 
would take the view that this Court must identify that performance as 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and order new briefing in this 
case.

 
 
[¶9]      Based on the 
briefs, the transcript of Rion's trial, and the Calene hearing transcript most 
importantly, I conclude that Rion's trial counsel was not ineffective and, 
hence, the judgment and sentence of the district court should be 
affirmed.