Title: Porterie v. Peters

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

111 Ariz. 452 (1975) 532 P.2d 514 Urban PORTERIE, Appellant, v. Cabot B. PETERS and Jane Doe Peters, his wife, William E. Dunn and Jane Doe Dunn, his wife, and Harold J. Chittum and Jane Doe Chittum, his wife, Appellees. No. 11681. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. March 5, 1975. *453 Rosen & McGroder by David Neal Rosen, Phoenix, for appellant. Maupin, Wilson & Maud by Donald R. Wilson, Phoenix, for appellee Peters. Johnson, Tucker, Jessen & Dake by Kenneth L. Tucker and Michael M. Johnson, Phoenix, for appellees Dunn and Chittum. HOLOHAN, Justice. This action is one for damages for personal injuries the plaintiff alleged he sustained from a motor vehicle accident in which several vehicles were involved. From a jury verdict and judgment in favor of all the defendants and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appealed. The appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals, but this Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Rule 47(e)(5), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A, A.R.S. The accident occurred at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening on the Black Canyon Freeway near Cordes Junction, Arizona. About thirty minutes prior to the accident *454 a cattle truck had gone off the highway and overturned. A highway patrolman was investigating the accident. His patrol car was parked off the shoulder of the road. There was testimony that the top mount lights on the patrol car were operating. The order in which the crash or crashes occurred and relative sequence in which the vehicles involved in the accident were traveling, is in complete dispute by the parties. Plaintiff's Theory Appellant, plaintiff below, was a passenger in a 1962 Dodge pickup truck driven by defendant Peters. As they came over a hill he saw the taillights of a car in front of them (later identified as a Thunderbird). Plaintiff's host driver, Peters, veered to the left to go around the Thunderbird. As he did so, the Thunderbird pulled into the left lane. Peters, attempting to go around the Thunderbird, pulled back onto the right shoulder, but so did the Thunderbird. At that moment Peters' pickup was "tapped" in the rear by another car and knocked sideways so that the pickup hit the Thunderbird. Plaintiff sustained no injury until Peters' vehicle was "tapped" in the rear. It was plaintiff's theory that either defendant Dunn or defendant Chittum hit Peters' pickup in the rear forcing the pickup into the Thunderbird. Plaintiff joined as defendants Peters, his host driver, Dunn and Chittum. The driver of the Thunderbird was not made a party defendant. Peters' Theory Peters' account of the accident was similar to plaintiff's. It was his theory that defendant Dunn must have hit his car because it had damage on the left rear fender and to the front end. Dunn's and Chittum's Theory Dunn testified that he did not hit a car in front of him. It was his theory that he was hit in the rear by Chittum's pickup and was forced off the highway, hitting a highway sign which caused the front end damage to his pickup. Chittum testified that he hit Dunn's pickup but did not strike the Peters vehicle. It is both Dunn's and Chittum's theory that Peters' vehicle was not struck in the rear but rather the injury to plaintiff, if any, was caused by a collision of Peters' pickup with the Thunderbird. They contend they could in no way be considered negligent because they did not collide with Peters' pickup. The defendants contend that plaintiff was not injured as a result of this accident, and there is conflicting evidence as to whether plaintiff was injured by the accident. Plaintiff presented five questions on appeal: (1) Did the court err in refusing to give plaintiff's requested instruction based on Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to the effect that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant where plaintiff is injured by one or two or more negligent defendants, but cannot prove which one? (2) Did the court err in giving defendants' requested instruction as to proximate cause? (3) Was it error to refuse to instruct the jury that it was no defense to assert that a party not joined as a defendant was also a proximate cause of the accident? (4) Did the court err in failing to give a "to look is to see" instruction? (5) Did the court err in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for a mistrial because of remarks of defendants' counsel? Plaintiff requested an instruction based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 433 B. The instruction was written by hand. At the time the instructions were being settled, plaintiff read the following instruction into the record from the handwritten instruction: Plaintiff believed the handwritten instruction had been filed but it was not. The handwritten instruction was attached to plaintiff's brief and read as follows: Section 433 B of the Restatement is as follows: In a succession of decisions we have held that the burden of proving negligence rests upon the plaintiff. It is not incumbent upon the defendant to prove an absence thereof. Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168 (1934); Salt River Valley Water Users' Assn. v. Blake, 53 Ariz. 498, 90 P.2d 1004 (1939); Berne v. Greyhound Parks of Arizona, Inc., 104 Ariz. 38, 448 P.2d 388 (1968). It is plaintiff's position that where an innocent plaintiff is injured by one or more negligent defendants, but he cannot prove which defendant or defendants actually caused the injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he did not cause the injury. In support of his contention, plaintiff cites Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Plaintiff's offered instruction encompasses both subsections 2 and 3 of the Restatement. Subsection 2 relates to apportionment of harm to a plaintiff. In this case there was but a single injury to the plaintiff. Any instruction concerning apportionment would have been improper. The correctness of instructions given in a case must be determined in the light of the issue raised by the pleadings and by the evidence. Davis v. Burington, 101 Ariz. 506, 421 P.2d 525 (1966). If a requested instruction is partly correct and partly incorrect, it is not the duty of the trial court to reword the requested instruction so as to eliminate the incorrect statement. Powell v. Langford, 58 Ariz. 281, 119 P.2d 230 (1941); O'Rielly Motor Co. v. Rich, 3 Ariz. App. 21, 411 P.2d 194 (1966). A refusal to give an instruction which is not applicable to the facts in the case and does *456 not correctly state the law, is not grounds for reversal. Instructions must be measured by the facts and circumstances of the case in which they are given. For these reasons we hold it was not error to refuse to give the requested instruction. Additionally the facts of this case do not bring it within Rule 433 B, subsection 3 of the Restatement. The comment to the rule demonstrates that it was designed to apply only where it has been proven that each of two or more defendants had acted negligently. See comment (g) to Section 433 B, Restatement (Second) of Torts. The evidence is conflicting as to whether any of the defendants were negligent as well as to whether any of their actions caused injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is asking us to hold that the negligence of all of the defendants is clear, and this we cannot do. Mere abstract legal rules should not be given unless they are applicable to the issues in the case at issue. Plaintiff also cites the California case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); however, this case is not applicable. In Summers there was no question as to the negligent acts of the defendants. The question presented by the Restatement rule may be distinguished from the factual elements involved in this case. Under the Restatement rule, there are wrongful or negligent acts committed by all the defendants with only one act producing the plaintiff's injury. In the case at bar the proof is not clear as to which of the defendants, if any of them, committed an act of negligence which produced plaintiff's injury. By this holding we are not deciding to accept or reject Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The facts of the case at issue do not bring it under the rule. Plaintiff's second contention is that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction: It is argued that this instruction tells the jury that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was a cause of the injury and was more responsible for the injury than any other cause. Plaintiff asserts that because there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury, the instruction is erroneous. The Superior Court gave the following instruction to the jury as to proximate cause: The court also instructed the jury: Such instructions are a correct statement of the law and the jury was properly instructed in the issue of proximate cause. Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.2d 201 (1949); McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P.2d 869 (1968). The instruction objected to by the plaintiff is also a proper instruction where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the cause of the injury. Snethen v. Gomez, 6 Ariz. App. 366, 432 P.2d 914 (1967). A review of the record discloses sufficient evidence to authorize the instruction. *457 Jury instructions will not be considered "piecemeal." They must be considered as a whole. Arizona Public Service Company v. Brittain, 107 Ariz. 278, 486 P.2d 176 (1971). The instruction objected to by the plaintiff, together with the other instructions given, properly instructed the jury as to the applicable law. The instructions were a fair and complete presentation of the issues and theories involved in the case. Plaintiff's third contention is that the trial court erred in failing to give the following instructions: The trial court instructed the jury as to proximate cause and that there could be more than one proximate cause of the injury. The jury was also instructed: The court also gave the following instruction: These instructions are sufficiently broad to enable the jury to fully understand the law of the case. Jury instruction must be considered as a whole, the test being whether upon the whole charge the jury will gather the proper rules to be applied in arriving at a correct decision. Arizona Public Service Company v. Brittain, supra. In applying this test we find that the jury was sufficiently instructed. Plaintiff's next contention concerns the court's failure to give his requested lookout instruction. Defendant Peters, plaintiff's host driver, testified that he did not see the flashing light of the police vehicle, which light was visible for one-quarter to one-half a mile. The following instruction was requested: Plaintiff asserts that if Peters had looked ahead he would have seen the flashing light, but there was no evidence that if the defendant Peters had seen the lights, the accident would have been avoided. While instructions which go to the gist of the action, and are supported by the evidence, must be given, Casey v. Marshall, 64 Ariz. 232, 168 P.2d 240 (1946), it is not necessary for the trial judge to instruct on every refinement suggested by counsel. Instructions are not given to aid one side or the other in jury argument. Once the court defines in understandable language the legal principles applicable to a controversy, it is the obligation of counsel, in argument, to discuss the evidence and the applicability of the legal principles to the ultimate facts found by the jury. The requested instruction, even if supported by the evidence, is that type of instruction which should not be given. Matters of so-called common experience are more appropriately jury argument not jury instructions. The plaintiff finally urges that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial. In cross-examination counsel for defendants Dunn and Chittum asked the plaintiff if he was familiar with automobiles and vehicles in general and speeds. The following then took place: Plaintiff's counsel and counsel for defendant Peters objected. The court sustained the objection. Dunn's and Chittum's attorney then said: "When I say motorcycle bum, I don't mean it derogatory...." Later, the counsel who made the remark personally apologized to the plaintiff in the presence of the jury. Plaintiff also contends that the reading of plaintiff's deposition to the jury, after plaintiff testified, was improper because it was an attempt to create an impression that plaintiff's answers were different from the deposition when, as counsel contends, the answers were consistent. We find no error in opposing counsel reading from plaintiff's deposition. The deposition of a party may be used for any purpose. Rule 32(a)(2), Rules of Civil Procedure. The weight and effect of the testimony was for the jury. Concerning the remarks of counsel, the trial court is invested with great discretion in the conduct and control of the trial. Higgins v. Arizona Savings & Loan Association, 90 Ariz. 55, 365 P.2d 476 (1961). Whether to grant a mistrial is discretionary with the trial court. In Lane v. Mathews, 74 Ariz. 201, 245 P.2d 1025 (1952), reversed on other grounds in 75 Ariz. 1, 251 P.2d 303 (1953), we held that if the trial court did not feel a particular remark was of such a nature as to unduly prejudice the jury, such ruling would not be disturbed without a clear showing of prejudicial error. We cannot say from the record that the action taken by the trial court in failing to grant a mistrial was an abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, J., concur.