Title: Matter of Paternity of SDM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Paternity of SDM1994 WY 103882 P.2d 1217Case Number: C-93-5Decided: 10/10/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE PATERNITY OF SDM: RKS, JR.,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 

v.

 

SDM, 
by next friend TY,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County. The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge

Robert 
B. Carroll, Cheyenne, for Appellant. Donald A. Cole of Cole 
& Cole, Cheyenne, for Appellee TY. Ronald E. Triggs, 
Cheyenne, Guardian ad Litem.Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, 
MACY, and TAYLOR, JJ., and CARDINE, J., * Retired.* Retired July 6, 
1994.THOMAS, Justice.[¶1]  The essential issue in this case is 
whether a minor child is foreclosed by preclusive legal doctrines from an action 
to establish paternity. The action was commenced by the child's mother in the 
name of the child after the mother had stipulated to the dismissal with 
prejudice of an action to establish paternity filed by the mother and after a 
decree of divorce in which the child was declared the issue of the marriage of 
the mother and her husband. The putative father (RKS), relying upon the 
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and 
laches, sought dismissal of the action. The district court ruled the child was 
not foreclosed from pursuing the paternity action; found RKS was the natural 
father; and ordered child support, payment and provision of certain costs, 
expenses, and additional benefits by RKS. We hold a minor child has a separate 
and independent cause of action to establish paternity under our statutes, and 
the child was not foreclosed from that action by the earlier proceedings because 
the child was not a party to them. The Decree of Paternity entered by the 
district court is affirmed. [¶2]  RKS in his Appellant's Opening Brief 
asserts the following issues: 

I. 
Are parties to a paternity action and their privies prevented from relitigating 
paternity if the action is voluntarily dismissed before the informal 
hearing? II. Can a child born during a marriage bring a paternity 
action after a divorce in which the child's mother and presumed father have 
declared the child to be born as issue of their marriage?

 In 
the Brief of Appellees (the mother and the child, by her guardian ad 
litem), the issues are set forth in this way: 

I. 
Does the Appellant's failure to affirmatively plead res judicata, his 
counterclaim for paternity and his subsequent motions to join mother and 
presumed father waive res judicata? II. Whether the 
stipulation and order to dismiss with prejudice entered into by mother and 
putative father in the first paternity action preclude the current paternity 
action? 

A. 
The stipulation and order dismissing with prejudice are void. B. 
Res judicata does not apply to the minor child because she was not a 
party to the action.

 III. 
Whether the minor child is precluded by res judicata or collateral 
estoppel from bringing a paternity action after a divorce wherein the child's 
mother and mother's husband stipulated that the child was born as issue of their 
marriage?

 In 
his reply brief, RKS addresses the first issue articulated by the appellees, 
which he articulates in the identical language used by the 
appellees.[¶3]  This case is 
the third action in which paternity of the child has been addressed. Prior to 
the birth of the child, the mother instituted a paternity action on June 29, 
1989, alleging that RKS was the putative father. A guardian ad litem was 
appointed to represent the unborn child. RKS responded by filing a Motion to 
Dismiss in which he alleged that the husband of the mother was the presumptive 
father of the child pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 14-2-102(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 
1993).1[¶4]  
After the child was born on July 31, 1989, the mother executed an 
Affidavit for Dismissal of the paternity action in which she stated in part: 

4. 
That I agree that my husband, [husband's name], is the natural father of the 
minor child. 5. That I agree that [putative father's name] is not 
the natural father of said minor child.

 The 
attorneys for the parties then signed a Stipulated Motion for Dismissal. The 
guardian ad litem previously appointed for the child did not receive 
notice of the stipulation and did not participate in the dismissal action nor 
object to the dismissal. On August 14, 1989, the court entered an Order of 
Dismissal of that first action with prejudice. No appeal was taken from that 
ruling.[¶5]  In the second 
action relating to the child, the mother sought a divorce from her husband (the 
presumptive father) by a complaint filed November 21, 1989. The case was set for 
default hearing on January 30, 1990. The mother then filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Setting in which she asserted, "that there has arisen a substantial question of 
fact as to the biological paternity of the infant child born as issue of this 
marriage." In response to that motion, the court entered an order in which 
it set aside the default trial until biological paternity was determined, but no 
further action was taken to establish paternity. Subsequently, the mother, in an 
Affidavit for Divorce, and the mother and husband, in a Property Settlement 
Agreement, stated one child had been born as issue of the marriage, naming the 
child born on July 31, 1989. On April 27, 1990, a Decree of Divorce was entered 
stating the child was the issue of the marriage. The mother was awarded custody 
of the child, and the husband was granted visitation rights and ordered to pay 
child support. No appeal was taken from the divorce decree.[¶6]  This action to establish paternity was 
filed on October 15, 1990 by the child acting by and through her next best 
friend, her mother, alleging that RKS was the natural father. In responding to 
this action, RKS argued, among other things, that paternity had been adjudicated 
by the court in two prior proceedings, and those determinations were res 
judicata in this action. The district court, however, adopted the Report of 
the District Court Commissioner and found the child had not been a party to 
either the first paternity action or the divorce action. RKS then joined 
both the mother and the presumptive father as parties in this case. 
Subsequently, the court ordered genetic testing of the four parties and 
appointed a guardian ad litem for the child. The result of the genetic 
testing demonstrated the presumptive father, the ex-husband, was excluded as the 
child's biological father. The same tests indicated RKS was the biological 
father at a probability level of 99.17%. RKS has appealed the ruling of the 
district court supporting the right of the child to pursue this paternity 
action.[¶7]  RKS did not 
raise the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial 
estoppel or laches as affirmative defenses in his Answer and Counterclaim in 
this case. In pertinent part, WYO. R. CIV. P. 8(c) provides: 

Affirmative 
defenses. -- In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively * * * estoppel, * * * laches, * * * res judicata, * * * and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense.

 In 
Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446 (Wyo. 1993), we said: 

We 
strongly adhere to the rule forbidding us to "consider for the first time on 
appeal issues that were neither raised in, nor argued to, the trial court," 
except for those issues which are jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature. 
Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 1991).

 While 
RKS did not raise his affirmative defenses in his pleading, the issues were 
argued to the court. Consequently, the pleading may be considered as having been 
amended pursuant to WYO. R. CIV. P. 15(b). We also perceive that the question of 
whether a minor child has a separate and distinct cause of action to establish 
paternity in the absence of a child having been joined as a party in proceedings 
instituted by the mother or the putative father is fundamental in nature. We 
proceed to decide that issue.[¶8]  
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are historic 
features of the law in Wyoming. In Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 
213-14 (Wyo. 1984), we said: 

In 
this jurisdiction the doctrine of res judicata and the related doctrine of 
collateral estoppel have been recognized in a number of decisions over the 
years. Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982); Roush 
v. Roush, Wyo., 589 P.2d 841 (1979);  Bard Ranch Company v. 
Weber, Wyo., 557 P.2d 722 (1976); Blount v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 
510 P.2d 294 (1973); Knight v. Boner, Wyo., 459 P.2d 205 (1969); 
Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lee v. Brown, 
Wyo., 357 P.2d 1106 (1960); Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 
(1935), reh. denied 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936); and Cook v. 
Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824 (1920). See also Price v. Bonnifield, 
2 Wyo. 80 (1878). As recognized in this state, these doctrines incorporate a 
universal precept of common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a "right, 
question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the 
same parties or their privies." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 
153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), quoting from Southern 
Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. Ed. 355 (1897). These doctrines are founded upon the interest held by society 
in having differences conclusively resolved in a single action thereby avoiding 
the vexation and expense which are associated with piecemeal litigation. The 
necessity for sustaining this social interest is the justification for the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Montana v. United 
States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 153-154, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74; Barrett v. Town 
of Guernsey, supra, 652 P.2d at 398-399; and Rubeling v. Rubeling, 
supra, 406 P.2d  at 284. These doctrines, which inhibit the relitigation of 
claims or issues upon which there has been a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction, promote the reliance by citizens 
of the state upon courts to settle their disputes and they conserve judicial 
resources.The interest served by both doctrines is essentially the same, 
but courts, including this court, have been careful to distinguish between 
the two. Res judicata can be described generally as that rule which 
precludes the presentation by parties or those in privity with them of the same 
claim that was resolved by an earlier judgment. Cromwell v. County of 
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1877); Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 
supra, 557 P.2d  at 727; Willis v. Willis, supra, 49 P.2d  at 673; and 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 17 (1982). The effect of collateral 
estoppel is that of preventing relitigation of issues which were involved 
actually and necessarily in the prior action between the same parties. Roush 
v. Roush, supra, 589 P.2d  at 843; Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, supra, 
557 P.2d at 726-727; Willis v. Willis, supra, 49 P.2d at 673-677; and 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27 (1982).

[¶9]  These doctrines have been invoked in 
paternity proceedings. Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 
1991); CLS v. CLJ, 693 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1985). In JRW, 814 P.2d  
at 1264-65, we noted policy justifications in addition to those referred to in 
Delgue, saying: 

Additional 
justification for the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
includes: prevention of inconsistent decisions ( Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980)); the concept that each party 
shall be limited to one opportunity to try his case on the merits (see CLS v. 
CLJ, 693 P.2d 774, 776 (Wyo. 1985)); and preventing the legal system from 
becoming unmanageable, ( Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 674-75 (Wyo. 
1985)). As the United States Supreme Court has said, "'[the] doctrine of res 
judicata is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more 
technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, 
"of public policy and of private peace," which should be cordially regarded and 
enforced by the courts * * *.'" Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981) (quoting 
Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S. Ct. 506, 
508, 61 L. Ed. 1148 (1917)).

[¶10]  The four criteria for the application of 
res judicata were identified in JRW, 814 P.2d  at 1265 by this 
language: 

They 
are: "'(1) the parties were identical; (2) the subject matter was identical; (3) 
the issues were the same and related to the subject matter; and (4) the 
capacities of the persons were identical in reference to both the subject matter 
and the issues between them.'"

 The 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are very similar but, 
as noted in Delgue, res judicata is claim preclusion, while collateral 
estoppel is issue preclusion. Certainly, these two doctrines share the 
requirement that the parties are identical or the current parties are in privity 
with the parties in the prior action.[¶11]  It is clear the child was neither a 
party to the initial paternity action nor a party to the divorce. Consequently, 
the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel may only be invoked 
in this instance if the child can be found to have been in privity with the 
mother in the prior paternity suit or with the mother or the presumptive father 
in the divorce case.[¶12]  
The issue of privity is resolved by our statutes relating to parentage. 
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-104 (1990)2 recognizes an independent action by the child. The 
joinder of the paternity action with "an action for divorce, annulment, separate 
maintenance, support or any action affecting the parent and child relationship" 
is specifically authorized. WYO. STAT. § 14-2-106 (1986). The first sentence of 
WYO. STAT. § 14-2-107 (1986) most significantly provides that "the child shall 
be made a party to the action." Because this statutory requirement was ignored, 
the child in this case was not joined as a party in either prior action. Since 
the child could have been made a party and the statute clearly recognizes a 
separate action by the child, we conclude there was no privity between the 
mother and the child for purposes of the paternity issue in either of the prior 
actions. For the same reason, no privity with the presumptive father exists in 
the divorce case.[¶13]  With 
respect to the argument pressed by RKS that res judicata attaches to the 
dismissal of the first paternity action pursuant to WYO. R. CIV. P. 41(a) and 
12(b) (these rules were in effect on October 15, 1990 when the instant case was 
filed)3 , a Florida court has addressed that issue. In a case 
involving similar facts, the Florida Court of Appeals concluded trial court 
erred in barring the action of the child under the doctrine of res 
judicata on the rationale that dismissal with prejudice of the mother's 
earlier action against the putative father achieved that result. The court ruled 
neither the state nor the child were involved in the mother's prior action and, 
for that reason, res judicata could not be invoked to foreclose the right 
of the child or the subrogated right of the state to bring the action. Dep't 
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, on behalf of Ward v. Wyatt, 475 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). That result is sound and clearly indicates 
there would be no justification for asserting res judicata because of 
privity between the putative father and the child. Even though the child in our 
case had an   appointed guardian ad litem, the guardian ad 
litem took no part in the dismissal of the prior action and, we emphasize, 
the child was not joined as a party as the statute requires.[¶14]  In Matter of TLB, 771 P.2d 811, 
813 (Wyo. 1989), we said that the provisions of the Wyoming statute, which is 
substantially the Uniform Parentage Act, are in "derogation of the common law, 
must be strictly construed and carefully adhered to." In that case, the decree 
of paternity and order for custody and support were held void because the child 
was not made a party to the action, nor was a guardian ad litem appointed 
to represent the child's best interests. This inhibited the child from having 
any role in the proceeding or in the negotiation of an agreement between the 
parties. Furthermore, the agreement was not a product of the required informal 
hearing or the recommendation of the court. The first paternity action in this 
case is quite similar to TLB, and we hold the child is not precluded from 
bringing this action.[¶15]  
In a separate argument, RKS asserts the divorce decree involving the 
mother and the presumptive father resulted in a final adjudication of the issue 
of paternity of the child and that case justifies the invocation of the 
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and 
laches. Our examination of the record discloses that, while issues of 
custody and support were decided, the paternity of the child was not at issue in 
the divorce action. Paternity was not raised in the allegations of the 
complaint; the child was not served; did not appear; and was not represented by 
a guardian ad litem in the divorce case. Since the child was not a party 
in that case involving her mother and the presumptive father, she cannot be 
bound by the decree of divorce. Devereaux v. Devereaux, 144 Colo. 31, 354 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Colo. 1960).4 [¶16]  In Devereaux, the Colorado 
Supreme Court ruled that parentage of a child is not an issue in a divorce or 
annulment action between the parties. See also Shatford v. Shatford, 214 
Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d 917 (Ark. 1949) (holding the child was not bound by an 
action for paternity or legitimacy rendered in an annulment proceeding because 
he was not a party to the action); Daniels v. Daniels, 143 Cal. App. 2d 430, 300 P.2d 335 (Cal. App. 1956) (holding any ruling upon the issue of 
paternity made in a divorce action would not bind the child nor affect the 
child's right to compel support from a husband if he is the child's father); 
Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal. App. 2d 492, 26 Cal. Rptr. 236 (Cal. App. 
1962) (holding paternity in an interlocutory divorce decree was not res 
judicata as against the children whose paternity was litigated in the 
divorce proceeding); Beckwith v. Beckwith, 355 A.2d 537 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S. Ct. 2239, 56 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1978) 
(holding a child who was not a party to a divorce proceeding was not bound by a 
decision as to his legitimacy or illegitimacy); Buzzell v. Buzzell, 235 A.2d 828 (Me. 1967) (holding paternity determination reached in an 
annulment or divorce proceeding was not binding on the child in any later action 
brought by the child or in his behalf involving his legitimacy or rights of 
inheritance because the child was not a party to the proceeding resulting in the 
determination of paternity); In O    F    
L    v. M    R    
R   , 518 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (holding the 
weight of authority supports the view that a child is not bound by a finding of 
nonpaternity in a divorce or annulment action to which he was not a party). We 
hold that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel cannot be 
applied to the child in this action even though statements by the mother and the 
presumptive father regarding the parentage of the child are included within the 
divorce action.[¶17]  In 
addition to our ruling that the child cannot be bound by the doctrines of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel because the child was not a party, we note 
the issue of paternity was not resolved in Devereaux. As we have noted, 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel results in issue preclusion. Conceptually, 
collateral estoppel could be invoked ( JRW, 814 P.2d 1256), but the 
simple fact that the issues of custody and support were necessarily decided in 
the divorce action does not demonstrate paternity was at issue or was decided. 
Furthermore, since the child was not represented through a guardian ad 
litem nor made a party, the child had no full and fair opportunity to 
litigate paternity at that time.[¶18]  RKS also asserts the preclusive doctrine 
of judicial estoppel. We have continually expressed our concern about the 
invocation of inconsistent positions by parties in judicial proceedings. In 
Bredthauer, 864 P.2d  at 445, we said: 

This 
court has, on several occasions, invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
Matter of Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Wyo. 1991); Zwemer 
v. Production Credit Ass'n, 792 P.2d 245, 246 (Wyo. 1990); Anderson v. 
Sno-King Village Ass'n, Inc., 745 P.2d 540, 545 (Wyo. 1987); Texas West 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank, 743 P.2d 857, 866 (Wyo. 1987); 
Matter of Parental Rights of ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1986); Snell 
v. Ruppert, 582 P.2d 916, 918 (Wyo. 1978); Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 1978); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976); 
Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 89-93, 290 P. 561, 566-68 
(1930). In Hatten, this court held that where "a man is successful in the 
position taken in the first proceeding" then that position "rise[s] to the 
dignity of conclusiveness." Hatten, 42 Wyo. at 93, 290 P.  at 
568.In Allen, we described judicial estoppel as 

a 
doctrine which estops a party to play fast and loose with the courts or to 
trifle with judicial proceedings. It is an expression of the maxim that one 
cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. A party will just not be allowed to 
maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings * * 
*.

 Allen, 
550 P.2d  at 1142. In JRW, we stated that under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel: 

"[A] 
party who by his pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed a 
particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an 
inconsistent position in a subsequent action."

 JRW, 
814 P.2d  at 1265-66 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 761 (5th ed. 1979)). 
In addition to the requirement of inconsistent positions, most courts also 
require that the "initial position taken must be one regarding fact." In other 
words, judicial estoppel does not apply to legal conclusions based on undisputed 
facts. Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The 
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 NW. U.L. Rev. 1244, 1262 (1986); see 
also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 117b at 627 (1964).

[¶19]  In our case, the mother, the presumptive 
father, and RKS all permitted the court in the two prior cases to base an order 
and a decree on fraud and collusion. The mother and the presumptive father 
testified in their affidavits that they both knew the child was not their 
biological child at the time she was born. They both testified it was physically 
impossible for the presumptive father to be the sire of a child. The mother said 
that, when she signed the Affidavit for Dismissal in the first paternity action 
declaring the presumptive father to be the natural father, she had been 
cohabiting at the time of conception with RKS and engaging in sexual 
intercourse daily. Furthermore, the mother and RKS both knew he had claimed 
paternity of the child and was happy about her anticipated birth. These parties, 
in the previous actions, clearly were playing fast and loose with the 
courts.[¶20]  In JRW, 
814 P.2d  at 1265-66 (emphasis added) we adopted this definition for judicial 
estoppel: 

As 
defined in Black's Law Dictionary 761 (5th ed. 1979), judicial estoppel binds a 
party by his judicial declarations and he 

may 
not contradict them in a subsequent proceeding involving [the] same issues and 
parties. * * * Under this doctrine, a party who by his pleadings, 
statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed a particular position in a 
judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an inconsistent position in a 
subsequent action. (Emphasis added).

 In 
Henley v. Foster, 220 Ala. 420, 125 So. 662 (Ala. 1930), the Supreme 
Court of Alabama held that a decree annulling a marriage based on fraud and 
collusion between the parties did not bind the child of the wife to the 
determination of the child's illegitimacy that necessarily flowed from the 
annulment decree. Since it is clear in our case that the child was not a party 
to any prior judicial proceeding, judicial estoppel cannot inhibit her action to 
determine her paternity.[¶21]  
The father's final argument is that this action is barred by laches. 
Looking to WYO. STAT. § 14-2-104(a) (Cum. Supp. 1990), the father contends that 
this action was not brought within a reasonable time after learning the facts 
regarding paternity. "Determination of what constitutes 'reasonable time' is a 
question of fact for the trial court." JRW, 814 P.2d  at 1263. We cannot 
discern from this record that the affirmative defense of laches was before the 
trial court for its consideration. RKS well may have waived his right to have 
the issue decided by the trial court but, even if we should conclude it was 
argued and, therefore, before the court, we can find nothing that would persuade 
a trier of fact this action was not brought within a reasonable 
time.[¶22]  We do have a 
strong public policy that favors the presumption of legitimacy to avoid 
disruption of family relationships. We also maintain the entitlement of the 
child by statute to the rights of care, education, and maintenance. 
Balancing the equities in this situation, the innocent child's interest must 
weigh heavily in the balance. As we said, in Moore v. Moore, 231 Ore. 
302, 372 P.2d 981, 983 (Or. 1962) (emphasis added), "in these proceedings 
[paternity determinations] the criterion for judgment is the child's welfare 
and not the fault of the parent." Moore was followed and quoted in 
CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 533 (Wyo. 1992). The child in this case is 
entitled to the determination of her paternity in accordance with the correct 
facts. Those include the fact the mother and the presumed father were not living 
together at the time of her conception. Their marriage had ended emotionally, 
even though not legally, prior to the time of her conception. The mother was 
involved in a sexual relationship with RKS, and there is no danger of disrupting 
a family unit because that had occurred long ago. The child is entitled to 
support and the other benefits of a parent-child relationship from her 
biological parents.[¶23]  
While the recognition of the independent right of the child to bring an 
action to establish paternity despite a contrary conclusion in an earlier 
divorce may be somewhat troublesome, we do not anticipate any flood of 
litigation after custody and support have been determined in a prior divorce 
case. The parties can control that hazard and, if there is any question about 
paternity, it is easy to make the child a party to the divorce case and to 
achieve representation by guardian ad litem. We do intend to afford 
significant weight to the rights of the child.[¶24]  In summary, we hold that a child who has 
not been included as a party in any prior paternity case nor any prior divorce 
action cannot be foreclosed by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, or judicial estoppel with respect to the child's subsequent effort to 
achieve determination of paternity. Neither is laches available as a defense in 
this case.[¶25]  The 
decision of the district court is affirmed in all respects. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 

1 WYO. STAT. § 14-2-102(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1993) provides: 

(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: 

(i) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each 
other and the child is born during the marriage, or within three hundred (300) 
days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment or divorce or after a 
decree of separation is entered by a court * * *.

 

2 WYO. STAT. § 14-2-104 (1990), at the time this action was instituted 
provided, in pertinent part: (a) A child, his natural mother or a man 
presumed to be his father under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) may bring 
action: 

* * *(ii) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the 
father and child relationship presumed under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) 
only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge 
of relevant facts, but in no event later than five (5) years after the child's 
birth. After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by 
another man may be determined in the same action if he has been made a 
party.

* * *(c) An action to determine the existence of the father and 
child relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under W.S. 
14-2-102 may be brought within the time specified under W.S. 14-2-105(a) by the 
child, the department of health and social services, the mother or personal 
representative of the child, the personal representative or a parent of the 
mother if the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging himself 
to be the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the alleged 
father if the alleged father has died or is a minor.(d) Regardless of 
its terms, an agreement, other than an agreement approved by the court in 
accordance with W.S. 14-2-111(b), between an alleged or presumed father and the 
mother or child does not bar an action under this section.(e) If an 
action under this section is brought before the birth of the child, all 
proceedings shall be stayed until after the birth except service of process and 
the taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony.

 

3 WYO. R. CIV. P. 41 provides, in pertinent part: (a) Voluntary 
dismissal; effect thereof. 

(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. -- Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any statute, an action may be dismissed by the 
plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time 
before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary 
judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal 
signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated 
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, 
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits 
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action in which 
service was obtained based on or including the same claim.(2) By Order 
of Court. -- Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this 
rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon 
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. 
* * * Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph 
is without prejudice.

 WYO. R. CIV. P. 12(b) provides, in pertinent part: 

How presented. -- Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for 
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader 
be made by motion: * * * (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, * * *.

 

 

4 See also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, in Subsequent 
Proceedings, of Paternity Findings or Implications in Divorce or Annulment 
Decree or in Support or Custody Order Made Incidental Thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 
846 (1977).