Title: People v. Morgan

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90891-Agenda 7-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								CLIFTON MORGAN, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	In the present appeal, we consider the constitutionality of the
attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2000)), as amended by
Public Act 91-404 (Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000).
Public Act 91-404 amended the sentencing provisions of the
offense of attempted first degree murder by adding what has been
referred to as the "15-20-25 to life" provisions. The circuit court
of Sangamon County ruled that the attempt statute, as amended, is
unconstitutional because the "15-20-25 to life" sentencing
provisions mandate penalties for the offense of attempted first
degree murder that violate the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). Interpreting the
circuit court's order as effectively dismissing the charge of
attempted first degree murder against defendant, Clifton Morgan,
the State appeals the circuit court's ruling directly to this court,
pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 603 and 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	On July 27, 2000, an information was filed in the circuit court
of Sangamon County, charging defendant with one count of
aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West
2000)), one count of attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8-4,
18-2(a) (West 2000)), and one count of attempted first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 2000)). The charging
instrument, read as a whole, alleged that defendant "performed a
substantial step toward the commission of [armed robbery] in that
said defendant went to the residence of Willie Davis, armed with
a handgun, with the intent to rob Willie Davis"; that defendant
"knowingly performed a substantial step toward the commission
of [the offense of first degree murder] in that he, with the intent to
kill Willie Davis, shot a handgun at Willie Davis"; and "by means
of discharging a firearm, caused an injury to Willie Davis."
	On November 15, 2000, defendant filed a motion in the
circuit court, seeking the dismissal of the information charging
him with attempted first degree murder. Defendant argued that the
mandatory enhancement sentencing scheme for the offense of
attempted first degree murder, as set forth in subsections (c)(1)(B),
(c)(1)(C), and (c)(1)(D) of the attempt statute (720 ILCS
5/8-4(c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D) (West 2000)), is
unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers clause
of article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. II, §1) and imposes penalties which violate the proportionate
penalties clause of article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). Defendant also maintained that the
sentencing scheme: (1) violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the Illinois
Constitution; (2) is void for vagueness; and (3) requires penalties
for the offense of attempted first degree murder which (a)
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
11, of the Illinois Constitution; (b) punish a defendant twice for
the same conduct, in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution; and (c) violate the law
against double enhancement.
	Ruling on defendant's motion, the circuit court declared the
amended attempt statute unconstitutional on proportionality
grounds, stating:
			"In applying the constitution's proportionality test to
the sentencing ranges involved, I believe the required
sentences shock the moral sense of the community. As a
result, this court rules that the foregoing referenced
statutory provisions are unconstitutional."
	The State appealed directly to this court, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rules 603 and 604(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 603; 188 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1)).

ANALYSIS
	We begin our analysis with an examination of the attempt
statute, which is at issue in this appeal. Since the adoption of the
Criminal Code of 1961, Illinois law has provided that the offense
of attempt is committed when a person, "with intent to commit a
specific offense, *** does any act which constitutes a substantial
step toward the commission of that offense." 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a)
(West 2000). This general attempt provision presumptively applies
to all offenses (People v. Wallace, 57 Ill. 2d 285, 290-91 (1974);
People v. Taylor, 314 Ill. App. 3d 943, 945-46 (2000); 720 ILCS
Ann. 5/8-4, Committee Comments-1961, at 438 (Smith-Hurd
1993)) and it is no defense to a charge of attempt that, due to a
misapprehension of the circumstances, it would have been legally
or factually impossible to commit the principal offense. 720 ILCS
Ann. 5/8-4, Committee Comments-1961, at 437-38 (Smith-Hurd
1993).
	The attempt statute provides that, as a general matter, the
penalty for committing an attempt may not exceed the maximum
penalty for the offense attempted. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c) (2000). The
statute further specifies that, when the offense attempted is
designated a Class X felony, the attempt will be sentenced as a
Class 1 felony; when the offense attempted is designated a Class
1 felony, the attempt will be sentenced as a Class 2 felony; when
the offense attempted is designated a Class 2 felony, the attempt
will be sentenced as a Class 3 felony; and when the offense
attempted does not fall within one of the specified categories, the
attempt will be sentenced as a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS
5/8-4(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), (c)(5) (West 2000).
	Special sentencing rules apply, however, when the offense
attempted is first degree murder. Under ordinary circumstances,
the offense of attempted first degree murder is to be sentenced as
a Class X felony, which carries a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years.
720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West
2000). If certain aggravating factors are present, however, the
sentencing range is increased to a minimum of 20 years and a
maximum of 80 years. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(A) (West 2000).
	Effective January 1, 2000, the attempt statute was amended by
Public Act 91-404, which added the following provisions:
			"(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder while
armed with a firearm is a Class X felony for which 15
years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed
by the court;
			(C) an attempt to commit first degree murder during
which the person personally discharged a firearm is a
Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the
term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
			(D) an attempt to commit first degree murder during
which the person personally discharged a firearm that
proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent
disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another
person, is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a
term of natural life shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS
5/8-4(c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D) (West 2000).
	Accordingly, the attempt statute, as amended, requires the
offense of attempted first degree murder to be sentenced as a Class
X felony with the mandatory addition of 15 years, 20 years or 25
years to life, based on the extent to which a handgun was involved
in the commission of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(B),
(c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D) (West 2000).
	As noted above, the general attempt provision is ordinarily
applicable to all offenses. However, there are exceptions. Where
application of the attempt provision to a principal offense creates
an inherent impossibility, the offense cannot exist. See People v.
Viser, 62 Ill. 2d 568, 581 (1975) (attempt statute not applicable to
felony-murder statute).
	Applying this principle, it was determined in People v.
Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d 238 (1983), that the offense of attempted
voluntary manslaughter was inherently impossible. In Reagan, the
defendant was charged with three counts of attempted murder and
three counts of armed violence. Defendant raised the affirmative
defense of self-defense and was acquitted of attempted murder.
Instead, defendant was found guilty of three counts of attempted
voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.
Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter did not exist. The appellate
court agreed and reversed defendant's convictions, holding that it
was inherently impossible to commit the offense of attempted
voluntary manslaughter.
	On review, this court affirmed the appellate court's judgment.
Viewing the attempt statute in conjunction with the voluntary
manslaughter statute, this court reasoned that, because the offense
of attempt requires the intent to commit a "specific offense," an
attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter necessarily would
require a person "to specifically intend to kill with an
unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force in
self-defense." Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d  at 240. Finding it inherently
impossible to intend an unreasonable belief, this court concluded
that the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter did not exist.
Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d  at 240. See also Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 581 ("[t]here
is no such criminal offense as an attempt to achieve an unintended
result").
	After Reagan was decided, the legislature enacted Public Act
84-1450 (Pub. Act 84-1450, eff. July 1, 1987), amending the laws
of this state with regard to murder. As noted in People v. Jeffries,
164 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1995), the legislature, intending to remedy
"the confusion and inconsistency that had developed in regard to
the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes," renamed the
offense of murder to first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.
38, par. 9-1, now codified at 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2000)),
abolished the offense of voluntary manslaughter and created the
offense of second degree murder to take its place (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987, ch. 38, par. 9-2, now 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 2000)). Second
degree murder was defined by statute as first degree murder plus
the existence of one of two possible statutory mitigating
circumstances. 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 2000).(1) This meant that a
defendant charged with first degree murder could raise, as an
affirmative defense, the existence of a statutory mitigating
circumstance and bear the burden of proving its existence. If
successful, the defendant would be found guilty of the lesser
offense of second degree murder. People v. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d 441,
447 (1995).
	With the creation of this new second degree murder statute,
a conflict arose over the application of the attempt statute. Some
courts held that it was not inherently impossible to apply the
attempt statute to second degree murder, while other courts
disagreed. In Lopez, this court resolved the conflict, holding that
it was inherently impossible to commit attempted second degree
murder and, for that reason, the offense of attempted second
degree murder, like attempted voluntary manslaughter, did not
exist under the laws of this state.
	In Lopez, this court reviewed the consolidated appeals of two
defendants who had been convicted of attempted first degree
murder. Both defendants had introduced evidence of mitigating
circumstances at their trials and, in both cases, the trial courts
refused to instruct the juries on attempted second degree murder,
ruling that no such offense existed. The appellate court panels
affirmed. On review, a majority of this court affirmed the
convictions, agreeing with the lower courts that the offense of
attempted second degree murder did not exist under Illinois law.
This court explained that it was the wording of the attempt statute,
not the wording of the second degree murder statute, which led to
the conclusion that attempted second degree murder is an offense
that is inherently impossible to commit.
	Looking to the language in subsection (a) of the attempt
statute, we noted in Lopez that the offense of attempted second
degree murder, if it existed, would require a showing that the
defendant intended to commit the "specific offense" of second
degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2000); Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d  at 449. Second degree murder, like first degree murder,
requires the intent to kill, but also requires the presence of a
mitigating circumstance which reduces the defendant's culpability
and, accordingly, the applicable sentencing range. 720 ILCS 5/9-2
(West 2000). This court then reasoned that, "for an attempted
second degree murder, the defendant must intend the presence of
a mitigating factor, which is an impossibility." Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d 
at 449.
	It was argued in Lopez that the failure to recognize attempted
second degree murder as an offense rendered the attempt statute
unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution. In support of this argument, defendants
pointed out that, if attempted second degree murder was not a
recognized offense, a person who acted with the intent to kill, but
failed to cause the death of the victim, would necessarily be
convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class X felony,
punishable by a term of imprisonment between 6 and 30 years
(720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3)
(West 2000)), whether or not mitigating circumstances existed. At
the same time, however, if a person acted with the intent to kill
and succeeded in killing the victim, the person, having been
charged with first degree murder, would have the opportunity to
reduce his culpability, as well as the applicable sentencing range,
by introducing evidence that mitigating circumstances existed. If
successful in proving the mitigating circumstances, the person
would be convicted of the lesser offense of second degree murder,
a Class 1 felony, punishable at that time by a term of
imprisonment between 4 and 15 years (720 ILCS 5/9-2(d) (West
1992)) or, perhaps, a term of probation (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 (West
1992)). Thus, defendants argued, the failure to recognize
attempted second degree murder as an offense resulted in the
possibility that a defendant would be sentenced to a greater term
of imprisonment if the victim lived than if the victim died. Lopez,
166 Ill. 2d  at 450. On this basis, defendants argued that the penalty
for attempted first degree murder was disproportionate to the
severity of the offense.
	This court acknowledged in Lopez that, where mitigating
circumstances are present, a defendant who intends to kill is
subject to a greater sentencing range when the victim lives than
when the victim dies. Nonetheless, this court held that the attempt
statute was not rendered unconstitutional. Although the sentencing
range for attempted first degree murder was broader than the
sentencing range for second degree murder, the sentencing range
for attempted first degree murder encompassed the sentencing
range for second degree murder. Thus, we concluded, "the
disparity in sentencing range here is [not] cruel, degrading, or so
wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the
moral sense of the community." Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d  at 450-51.
Moreover, we held that, in the absence of a proportionate penalties
violation, the wording of the attempt statute, which required us to
hold that attempted second degree murder could not exist as an
offense in this state, was a matter better addressed to the
legislature. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d  at 449-50.
	Against this backdrop, we are now asked to consider the
validity of the attempt statute as amended by Public Act 91-404.
The Act creates a mandatory sentencing scheme which increases
the penalty for the offense of attempted first degree murder based
on the extent to which a firearm is involved in the commission of
the offense. Pursuant to the amended statute, a defendant whose
actions demonstrate an intent to kill, but do not result in death, is
subject to sentencing ranges of 21 to 45 years, 26 to 50 years, or
31 years to natural life, depending on whether a firearm was in the
defendant's possession, discharged, or the cause of bodily harm.
At the same time, however, no provision has been made for one
charged with attempted first degree murder to introduce mitigation
evidence. Accordingly, the mandatory enhanced sentencing ranges
created by the Act are applicable without regard to whether
defendant acted under extreme provocation or while possessing an
unreasonable belief that his actions were necessary for his defense.
	Defendant argues here, as he did before the circuit court, that
the attempt statute has been rendered unconstitutional by the
addition of this mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme. The
circuit court ruled that, because the mandatory enhanced
sentencing ranges are applicable whether or not defendant acted
under extreme provocation or while possessing an unreasonable
belief that his actions were necessary for his defense, the
sentencing scheme, as set forth in subsections (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C),
and (c)(1)(D) of the attempt statute, violates the proportionate
penalties clause of our state constitution, which requires the
legislature to proportion penalties "according to the seriousness of
the offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11; People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 474 (1998). We agree.

Standing
	As an initial matter, we address the issue of defendant's
standing. In the case at bar, the information filed against
defendant, read in its entirety, alleges that during the commission
of the offense of attempted first degree murder defendant was
armed with a firearm and that he discharged the firearm, striking
Willie Davis and causing him injury. The State maintains that,
based on the facts alleged in the information, defendant will be
directly affected only by the "25 to life" mandatory enhanced
sentencing provision in subsection (c)(1)(D) of the attempt statute
and, therefore, defendant has no standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the sentencing provisions contained in
subsections (c)(1)(B) and (c)(1)(C). Accordingly, the State argues
that this court must restrict its review to the question of whether
the mandatory enhanced sentence of 25 years or up to a term of
natural life, required by section 8-4(c)(1)(D), violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. We
disagree.
	The general rule is that courts will not consider the validity of
a statutory provision unless the person challenging the provision
is directly affected by it or the unconstitutional feature is so
pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid. People v. Palkes,
52 Ill. 2d 472, 480-81 (1972); Huckaba v. Cox, 14 Ill. 2d 126
(1958); People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337 (1955). In either case, a
party has standing to bring a constitutional challenge only if the
party is able to show himself to be within the class aggrieved by
the alleged unconstitutionality. People v. Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d 1,
6 (1976); see People v. Sonntag, 238 Ill. App. 3d 854, 858 (1992).
	Here, the information charges defendant with committing the
offense of attempted first degree murder. If convicted of that
charge, defendant will be eligible to receive one of the several
penalties provided for in subsection (c)(1) of the statute. The "15-20-25 to life" sentencing scheme is contained in subsection (c)(1)
and provides for increasingly severe penalties depending on the
extent to which a firearm is used in the commission of the offense.
Thus, in the case at bar, the proper penalty to be imposed will
depend on whether the evidence adduced at trial shows that
defendant, while taking a substantial step toward the commission
of the offense of first degree murder, was in possession of a
firearm, discharged a firearm, or discharged a firearm causing
serious injury. The facts alleged in the information bring defendant
within the scope of the entire "15-20-25 to life" sentencing
scheme, placing him at risk of being sentenced to any of the
mandatory enhancements. Accordingly, defendant has sufficiently
shown himself to be among the class of persons directly affected
by the allegedly unconstitutional sentencing scheme in its entirety.
	We acknowledge that, in People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440
(2002), this court declined to examine in its entirety a similar "15-20-25 to life" sentencing scheme. However, the facts of that case
distinguish it from the matter at bar. In Hill, the defendant was
charged with violating a specific provision of the home invasion
statute, section 12-11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides:
			"(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the
line of duty commits home invasion when without
authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of
another when he or she knows or has reason to know that
one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly
enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such
dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to
know that one or more persons is present and
* * *
				(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or
threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or
persons within such dwelling place whether or not
injury occurs[.]" 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2000).
	As provided in subsection (c) of the home invasion statute,
"[a] violation of subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which 15
years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court." 720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2000).
	The charges filed against the defendant in Hill made it clear
that only the 15-year mandatory enhancement provision was
implicated. There was no risk that the defendant in Hill, if
convicted of the offense charged, would be sentenced under any
other sentencing provision of the "15-20-25 to life" sentencing
scheme. Accordingly, this court held that the defendant in Hill had
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the sentences
attached to the distinctly separate and uncharged offenses set forth
in sections 12-11(a)(4) and 12-11(a)(5) of the Code (720 ILCS
5/12-11(a)(4), (a)(5) (West 2000)). Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 445-46. See
also People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 644 (2000) (defendants do
not have standing to challenge a statute as it might be applied to
others).
	Unlike the situation in Hill, however, the charged offense in
the case at bar does not limit defendant's exposure to a single
sentence. If convicted of the offense charged, defendant, in the
case at bar, may be sentenced under any provision of the "15-20-25 to life" sentencing scheme, depending on the facts proved at
trial. Thus, we conclude that the defendant here has standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme in its
entirety.
	There is another matter which we feel compelled to address,
although the parties have not raised it. Defendant argues, and the
circuit court found, that the attempt statute, as amended, is
unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause when
mitigating circumstances exist which would have reduced the
underlying offense of first degree murder to second degree murder.
The circuit court found that, when mitigating circumstances are
present, the mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme subjects a
defendant convicted of attempted first degree murder to penalties
which are not set according to the seriousness of the offense. In the
case at bar, however, defendant is challenging the constitutionality
of the statute prior to trial and, thus, he has not yet alleged or
established the existence of statutory mitigating circumstances in
this case. Thus, one might suggest that defendant's constitutional
challenge comes too soon. We find, however, that defendant's
challenge to the constitutionality of the attempt statute at this
juncture is not premature.
	Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the attempt
statute is rooted in the fact that attempted second degree murder is
not a recognized offense in this state and, barring its existence, the
presence of mitigating circumstances is not relevant to a charge of
attempted first degree murder. Thus, as a practical matter, the
defendant here, like every defendant charged with attempted first
degree murder, may be prevented from introducing mitigating
evidence at trial. In other words, because defendant's culpability
cannot be reduced by proof that he acted under extreme
provocation or while possessing an unreasonable belief that his
actions were necessary for his defense, there would be no purpose
for introducing this type of mitigation evidence at trial and
defendant may be foreclosed from doing so. Moreover, even
should defendant be able to introduce mitigation evidence at trial,
because attempted second degree murder is not a recognized
offense, the jury would never be instructed to consider whether the
mitigation evidence was sufficient to reduce defendant's
culpability. Defendant would never have the opportunity to have
a jury decide whether he acted under extreme provocation or while
possessing an unreasonable belief that his actions were necessary
for his defense. For this reason, defendant may be in no better
position after trial to argue the unconstitutionality of the statute
and the matter may evade appellate review. Further, denying
defendant the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the
attempt statute at this juncture would hamper his ability to shape
a defense to the charge of attempted first degree murder. Thus, we
conclude that, in the case at bar, defendant's challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute is not premature.

Constitutionality
	Turning now to the central issue in this appeal, we consider
whether the circuit court was correct when it found that the
attempt statute, as amended by Public Act 91-404,
unconstitutionally violates the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution. The standard by which we review a court's
ruling that a statute is unconstitutional is de novo. People v.
Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001); People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000). We begin our assessment with the
understanding that all statutes carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000); People
v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000). To overcome this
presumption, the party challenging the statute bears a heavy
burden of clearly establishing its constitutional infirmities. People
v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 237 (1994). Any reasonable
construction which affirms a statute's constitutionality must be
adopted, and any doubt regarding a statute's construction must be
resolved in favor of the statute's validity. Burger v. Lutheran
General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 32 (2001); People v. Shephard,
152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992).
	When analyzing whether a proportionate penalties violation
has been demonstrated, the ultimate issue is whether the penalty
attached to the offense has been set by the legislature "according
to the seriousness of the offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. In
People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 474 (1998), we discussed
three analyses which courts have employed when assessing
proportionality claims: (1) whether the penalty is cruel, degrading
or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock
the moral sense of the community (People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 236 (1995); People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962));
(2) whether the described offense, when compared to a similar
offense, carries a more severe penalty although the proscribed
conduct creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety
(People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (1997); People v. Farmer,
165 Ill. 2d 194, 210 (1995); People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill. 2d 190,
194-97 (1983)); or (3) whether the described offense, when
compared to an offense having identical elements, carries a
different sentence (People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 417-18
(1996)). These three analyses provide the general framework for
evaluating whether a proportionate penalties clause violation has
been established.
	In the case at bar, the circuit court, applying the first prong of
the Lombardi test, held that the attempt statute, as amended by
Public Act 91-404, violates the proportionate penalties clause of
our state constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. More
specifically, the circuit court found that, because the statute does
not permit the introduction of statutory mitigating factors, the
penalties imposed on one convicted of attempted first degree
murder under the mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme are not
set according to the seriousness of the offense. In other words,
because the mandatory enhancements to the sentencing range for
an attempted first degree murder conviction are added without
regard to whether mitigating circumstances are present, the
penalties for that offense are, in some instances, so
disproportionate to the offense committed that they " ' "shock the
moral sense of the community." ' " Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d  at 236,
quoting People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962), quoting
People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413,
421-22 (1894).
	Initially, we acknowledge that the legislature has the authority
to set the nature and extent of criminal penalties and that courts
may not interfere with such legislation unless the challenged
penalty is clearly in excess of the very broad and general
constitutional limitations applicable. People ex rel. Carey v.
Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981). We further acknowledge
that the legislative purpose for enacting Public Act 91-404 is the
deterrence of the use of firearms in the commission of offenses.
The presence of firearms during the commission of an offense
always poses an extreme danger, not only to intended victims, but
also to innocent bystanders. Thus, we will not second-guess the
legislature's determination that the protection of society
necessitates the imposition of severe penalties whenever a firearm
is used in the course of an offense. See Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 457-58.
Thus, we cannot say that, where mitigating circumstances are not
present, it would be cruel, degrading or so wholly disproportionate
to the offense committed to subject a defendant who commits the
offense of attempted first degree murder to mandatory add-on
sentences of 15 years, 20 years or 25 years to life, depending on
whether a firearm is present, discharged or the cause of bodily
injury. Nor would the imposition of these penalties run counter to
the general sentencing directive that "the penalty for committing
an attempt may not exceed the maximum penalty for the offense
attempted." The penalty for first degree murder is a term of
imprisonment between 20 and 60 years (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 2000)), which must be enhanced by the
addition of 15 years, 20 years, or 25 years to life, depending on
whether the defendant, in committing the offense, was in the
possession of a firearm, discharged a firearm, or caused bodily
injury or death as a result of the use of a firearm (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d) (West 2000)). We conclude, then, that the
mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme added to the offense of
attempted first degree murder does not make the penalty for
committing an attempt exceed the maximum penalty for the
offense attempted and, therefore, the penalty is not inherently
unconstitutional.
	As the circuit court recognized, however, the difficulty stems
from the fact that the wording of the attempt statute makes the
offense of attempted second degree murder an inherent
impossibility. For this reason, where the offense attempted would
otherwise constitute second degree murder (i.e., first degree
murder where mitigating circumstances are present), the defendant
cannot be convicted of attempted second degree murder, but must
be convicted of attempted first degree murder. Accordingly, it is
possible, as we acknowledged in Lopez, that the penalty for the
attempt will exceed the maximum penalty for the actual
underlying offense, i.e., second degree murder. Under the statutory
scheme, when a firearm is not involved in the commission of the
offense, the penalty for attempted first degree murder is not so
disparate that the statute is rendered unconstitutional by the
defendant's inability to prove the existence of mitigating
circumstances. However, when a firearm is involved in the offense
and the mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme applies, the
penalty ranges for attempted first degree murder far exceed the
penalty range for second degree murder. Because the enhanced
penalties apply without regard to the defendant's ability to prove
the existence of mitigating circumstances, we conclude that the
attempt statute is rendered unconstitutional.
	When Public Act 91-404 was enacted, the wording of the
general attempt provision was not changed and, accordingly, the
offense of attempted second degree murder remains an inherent
impossibility. Moreover, no provision was made for the
introduction of mitigating evidence that would lessen a
defendant's culpability for an attempted first degree murder.
Instead, the Act created a mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme
that substantially increases the penalty for attempted first degree
murder when a firearm is involved in the offense. Under the
amended statute, then, a defendant whose actions would have
resulted in a conviction for second degree murder if the victim
died, must be convicted of attempted first degree murder if the
victim lives. In addition, when a gun is used in the commission of
the offense, the defendant will be subject to the mandatory
enhanced sentencing scheme. As a result, based on the statute as
it is now written, where mitigating circumstances exist the penalty
for an attempt to commit murder involving the use of a firearm
will always be greater than the penalty for the underlying offense
committed, i.e., second degree murder.
	The inequity of the situation created by the amended attempt
statute is graphically demonstrated by the example proposed by the
circuit court judge in this case. The court stated:
			"Assume that we have a woman who has suffered
physical abuse at the hands of her husband or boyfriend
for many years. After growing tired of this abuse, she
decides to stop the cycle of abuse by killing her
companion and decides to kill her companion with a
firearm. While her decision to kill her companion is
unlawful, her decision to kill him with a firearm is
understandable since most women will not fare well in the
attempt to kill a man with a knife or a club. This is not an
unusual situation and several women have been charged
with murder under similar circumstances in Central
Illinois in the recent past. *** In this example, if the
woman is successful in killing her companion, the
mitigation factors can be raised, and there is some
possibility that a jury could return a verdict of [s]econd
[d]egree [m]urder. But *** if the woman fails to kill her
companion, but does inflict serious bodily harm on him,
she faces a minimum sentence of 31 years. She has made
a terrible mistake in not making sure that she has killed
her companion!"
	As the above example makes clear, under the current laws of
this state, the defendant who intends to kill and, while using a
firearm, succeeds in killing his or her victim has the opportunity
to present mitigation evidence, the proof of which will result in a
conviction on the lesser offense of second degree murder and,
accordingly, exposure to a sentencing range of 4 to 20 years. If the
victim does not die, however, the defendant is foreclosed from
presenting mitigating evidence in the hopes of securing a
conviction on a lesser offense and, correspondingly, a lesser
sentence. In fact, where mitigating circumstances are present, the
defendant who possesses a gun with the intent to kill and who
takes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense of
murder will be subject to a sentencing range where the minimum
sentence is one year greater than the maximum sentence available
if the same defendant actually fired the gun and caused the
victim's death.
	In sum, we find the attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West
2000)), as amended by Public Act 91-404, is unconstitutional
because it permits a defendant convicted of attempted first degree
murder to be subject to penalties that are not set according to the
seriousness of the offense. The amended statute provides that a
defendant who intends to kill but fails to cause the death of his
victim shall be convicted of attempted first degree murder,
whether or not mitigating circumstances exist, and shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment between 6 and 30 years, with
the mandatory addition of 15 years, 20 years, or 25 years to life,
depending on whether a firearm was in defendant's possession,
discharged, or the cause of bodily harm or the death of another. At
the same time, a defendant who intends to kill and succeeds in
causing the death of the victim, whether or not a firearm is used in
the commission of the offense, will be subject to a sentencing
range of 4 to 20 years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(1.5) (West 2000)) and
may even be eligible for a sentence of probation (730 ILCS
5/5-6-1 (West 2000)) if the defendant can demonstrate that he
acted under serious provocation or while possessing the
unreasonable belief that self-defense was necessary. Thus, under
the current attempt statute, persons whose actions are identical
may be exposed to vastly disparate sentences depending on
whether the victim lives or not. Moreover, the irony is that the
person who fails to kill his victim stands to be sentenced to a much
greater sentence than the person who actually causes the death of
his victim. For these reasons, we find the attempt statute (720
ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2000)), as amended by Public Act 91-404,
unconstitutional.
	Because we find that the attempt statute violates the
proportionate penalties clause of this state's constitution, we need
not consider defendant's alternative argument, that the amended
attempt statute violates the separation of powers clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1).

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we find that the sentencing ranges
created by the amended attempt statute violate the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §11). Accordingly, we find the attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4
(West 2000)), as amended by Public Act 91-404, adding the "15-20-25 to life" sentencing provisions to the offense of attempted
first degree murder, to be unconstitutional.
	The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.



Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	Although the majority finds that the enhanced sentencing
scheme for attempted first degree murder is not inherently
unconstitutional, it nonetheless concludes that the statute is
unconstitutional because it violates the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Specifically, the
majority finds that attempted first degree murder carries a more
severe penalty than a similar offense, second degree murder, even
though attempted first degree murder creates a less serious threat
to the public health and safety. I believe the majority erred in
comparing attempted first degree murder with second degree
murder for purposes of the proportionate penalties analysis.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
	As noted, the analysis used by the majority in finding that the
statute violates the proportionate penalties clause is whether the
described offense, when compared with a similar offense, carries
a more severe penalty even though the proscribed conduct creates
a less serious threat to the public health and safety. This analysis
applies a two-step, cross-comparison analysis. People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002). The first step considers whether the
purposes of the compared offenses are distinct such that
comparative proportionality review is not appropriate. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454. If the purposes are deemed related, the second step
considers whether the offense with the harsher penalty is more
serious than the offense with the less severe penalty. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d  at 454.
	The majority does not address the first step of the
proportionate penalties analysis: whether the compared offenses
share a common statutory purpose. Instead, the majority simply
addresses the second step of the proportionate penalties analysis
and concludes that the offense with the harsher penalty is less
serious than the offense with the less severe penalty. The
majority's failure to address the first step is significant, because
the purposes of the compared offenses are distinct. Absent a
shared statutory purpose, there is no need to reach the second step
of the analysis.
	That the compared offenses do not share a common statutory
purpose is evident from the language of the respective statutes. A
person commits an attempt when he acts "with intent to commit a
specific offense." 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2000). The relevant
portion of the first degree murder statute provides that a person
commits first degree murder when he "kills an individual without
lawful justification" and in performing the acts that cause the
death, he "intends to kill *** that individual or another." 720 ILCS
5/9-1(a) (West 2000). In contrast, the second degree murder
statute provides that a person commits second degree murder when
he commits the offense of first degree murder and one of two
mitigating circumstances are present. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (West
2000). Those mitigating circumstances are where the defendant is
"acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender
endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the
death of the individual killed" (720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1) (West 2000))
or where at the time of the killing the defendant "believes the
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or
exonerate the killing" (720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 2000)).
	The attempt to commit first degree murder statute, then, is
directed at those intending, albeit unsuccessfully, to kill without
lawful justification. In contrast, the second degree murder statute
is directed against those who, although perhaps intending to kill
and succeeding in doing so, do not intend to kill unlawfully. There
is a significant difference between the conduct at issue in each
statute, particularly with regard to the mind set of the perpetrator.
Because the two statutes are directed at entirely different mental
states and conduct, the two statutes do not share a common
statutory purpose. Consequently, in light of the distinct purposes
of the compared offenses, comparative proportionality review of
those offenses is not appropriate.
	I also disagree with the majority's comparison of attempted
first degree murder with the crime of second degree murder
because I believe the majority is essentially resurrecting the
offense of attempted second degree murder, an offense that this
court declined to recognize in People v. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d 441
(1995). In Lopez, we noted that attempted first degree murder
requires the intent to kill without lawful justification. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d  at 445. We observed in Lopez that under the prior voluntary
manslaughter statute, if a person attempted to kill someone but
believed the circumstances were such that if they existed would
justify the killing, he did not intend to kill without lawful
justification and thus did not commit a criminal offense. Lopez,
166 Ill. 2d  at 448. It followed, then, that " '[t]he requirement of the
attempt statute is not that there be an intent to kill, but that there
be an intent to kill without lawful justification.' " (Emphasis
added.) Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d  at 446, quoting People v. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d 238, 240 (1983). Consequently, we concluded in Lopez there
could be no crime of attempted second degree murder because a
defendant could not intend to kill without lawful justification and
also intend the presence of a mitigating circumstance such as a
sudden and intense passion due to serious provocation or the
unreasonable belief in the need for the use of deadly force. Lopez,
166 Ill. 2d  at 448-49.
	Nonetheless, the majority finds that the statute here violates
the proportionate penalties clause because a defendant charged
with attempted first degree murder will never have the opportunity
to present mitigating evidence which would be a defense to a
charge of second degree murder. Slip op. at 16. The majority
therefore concludes that persons whose actions are identical
(except that one victim dies and one lives) may be exposed to
vastly disparate sentences. Slip op. at 17.  I disagree. Based upon
Lopez, a defendant charged with attempted first degree murder can
raise the mitigating factors set forth in the second degree murder
statute to negate a charge that he intended to unlawfully kill.
Accordingly, a defendant charged with attempted first degree
murder can claim either that he believed he was acting in self-defense, and thus intended to kill but not to kill unlawfully, or that
he acted negligently or accidentally and thus did not intend to kill
at all. The defendant can argue that, absent an intent to kill without
lawful justification, he did not commit attempted first degree
murder. Such a defendant would not be raising attempted second
degree murder, but would simply be denying altogether that he
committed attempted first degree murder. Consequently, I disagree
with the majority's conclusion that "the enhanced penalties apply
without regard to the defendant's ability to prove the existence of
mitigating circumstances." Slip op. at 15.
	Because I believe the majority erred in comparing attempt to
commit first degree murder with second degree murder for
purposes of the proportionate penalties analysis, I dissent from the
majority opinion. I would reverse the circuit court's judgment
declaring the "15/20/25 to life" portion of the attempt statute
unconstitutional.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
	 
1.      1The statutory mitigating factors are:
			"(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the
individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to
kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the
individual killed; or
	(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances
to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the
killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but
his belief is unreasonable."