Title: Safdar v. Aziz (Opinion on Application - Partial Affirm / Reverse)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

SAFDAR v AZIZ 
 
Docket No. 156611.  Decided March 27, 2018. 
Zaid Safdar filed an action in the Oakland Circuit Court, Family Division, seeking a 
divorce from Donya Aziz.  The court granted a judgment of divorce, which provided that the 
parties would share joint legal custody of their minor child and that defendant would have sole 
physical custody of the child.  Defendant appealed the court’s denial of her motion for attorney 
fees in relation to the judgment.  While that appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, 
defendant moved in the trial court for a change of domicile.  The court, Lisa Langton, J., denied 
defendant’s motion, reasoning that under MCR 7.208(A), it lacked the authority to modify the 
custody order while defendant’s appeal of the attorney-fee award was pending in the Court of 
Appeals.  The court rejected defendant’s reliance on Lemmen v Lemmen, 481 Mich 164 (2008)—
which held that under MCL 552.17(1) and MCR 7.208(A)(4), a trial court may modify an order 
or judgment concerning child support or spousal support after a claim of appeal is filed or leave 
to appeal is granted—reasoning that Lemmen was limited to when a party sought to alter child 
and spousal support awards while an appeal was pending and did not apply to changes in 
domicile.  The court also denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.  Defendant applied for 
leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which granted the application.  The Court of Appeals, 
O’BRIEN, P.J., and JANSEN and MURRAY, JJ., reversed in a per curiam opinion, holding that 
Lemmen also applied to judgments concerning the care and custody of children.  321 Mich App 
219 (2017).  Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. 
 
 
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to 
appeal and without hearing oral argument, held: 
 
 
A circuit court has jurisdiction to consider a motion to change the domicile of a minor 
child established by a custody award in a divorce judgment while that underlying judgment is 
pending on appeal.  MCL 722.27(1)(c)—a provision of the Child Custody Act (CCA), 
MCL 722.21 et seq., governing circuit courts’ powers to resolve custody disputes—is an 
exception otherwise provided by law to the rule in MCR 7.208(A) that a trial court may not 
amend a final judgment after a claim of appeal has been filed or leave to appeal has been 
granted. 
 
 
1.  MCR 7.208(A) states that a trial court may not set aside or amend a final judgment 
after a claim of appeal has been filed or leave to appeal has been granted except in certain 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
situations, including, under MCR 7.208(A)(4), as otherwise provided by law.  Lemmen held that 
the Legislature’s grant of continuing jurisdiction to modify child and spousal support orders in 
divorce proceedings in MCL 552.17(1) and MCL 552.28 satisfies the “otherwise provided by 
law” requirement of MCR 7.208(A)(4).  In so holding, Lemmen made clear that another law need 
not grant jurisdiction specifically for judgments pending on appeal to qualify as an exception 
under MCR 7.208(A)(4).  Rather, a statute satisfies MCR 7.208(A)(4) when the Legislature has 
authorized continuing jurisdiction to amend or modify a final judgment.  As Lemmen explained, 
the authorization in MCL 552.17(1) to amend or modify a judgment “as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children require” suggested that the purpose of allowing 
modification of a final judgment regarding child support was to ensure the welfare of the 
children when the circumstances of the parents or the needs of the children have changed, and 
therefore requiring the trial court to wait to make modifications until after an appeal was 
completed would be contrary to the plain language of the statutes and would defeat their purpose. 
 
 
2.  The Court of Appeals erred to the extent it concluded that a circuit court may derive 
continuing jurisdiction over a motion for change in domicile only from MCL 552.17(1) rather 
than directly from MCL 722.27(1), and that portion of the decision was vacated.  While 
Lemmen’s reasoning applies to the Legislature’s broad grant of authority in the CCA, the circuit 
court’s jurisdiction to modify a final judgment with respect to the child custody dispute may be 
derived exclusively from MCL 722.27(1) of the CCA, which applies more specifically to this 
situation than MCL 552.17 and is therefore favored.  A motion for change of domicile brought 
under MCL 722.31(4) falls within the scope of a “child custody dispute” as the term is used in 
MCL 722.27(1).  MCL 722.27(1) reflects the Legislature’s intent to protect the interests of 
children in the face of changing circumstances by authorizing jurisdiction in the circuit court 
until the child reaches adulthood.  MCL 722.27(1)(c) specifically permits the circuit court to 
modify or amend its orders when proper cause is shown or when there has been a change of 
circumstances.  Its sole limiting principle is that the modification be in the best interests of the 
child.  As in Lemmen, it would be contrary to the plain language of the CCA to require a court to 
wait for the conclusion of an appeal to address a change in circumstances that would affect the 
interests of the child.  Accordingly, MCL 722.27(1) authorizes the continuing jurisdiction of a 
circuit court to modify or amend its previous judgments or orders and is an exception to MCR 
7.208(A) otherwise provided by law. 
 
 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part; case remanded to the Oakland Circuit Court for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
FILED  March 27, 2018 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
ZAID SAFDAR, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 156611 
 
DONYA AZIZ, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
PER CURIAM. 
At issue in this case is whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to consider a motion 
to change the domicile of a minor child established by a custody award in a divorce 
judgment while that underlying judgment is pending on appeal.  To answer that question, 
we must determine whether MCL 722.27(1)(c)—a provision of the Child Custody Act 
(CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., governing circuit courts’ powers to resolve custody 
disputes—falls under an exception to the rule in MCR 7.208(A) that a trial court may not 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
2 
amend a final judgment after a claim of appeal has been filed or leave to appeal has been 
granted.  In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the result reached by the Court of 
Appeals and hold that MCL 722.27(1) is an exception “otherwise provided by law” under 
MCR 7.208(A)(4). 
MCR 7.208(A) provides: 
 
Limitations.  After a claim of appeal is filed or leave to appeal is 
granted, the trial court or tribunal may not set aside or amend the judgment 
or order appealed from except 
(1) by order of the Court of Appeals, 
(2) by stipulation of the parties, 
(3) after a decision on the merits in an action in which a 
preliminary injunction was granted, or 
(4) as otherwise provided by law. 
MCL 722.27(1) states, in relevant part:  
If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as 
an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another 
action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for 
the best interests of the child the court may do 1 or more of the following: 
*   *   * 
(c) . . . modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper 
cause shown or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 
18 years of age and, subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time 
enforcement act, 1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605b, until the child reaches 19 
years and 6 months of age.  The court shall not modify or amend its 
previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the 
established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear 
and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.  The 
custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time 
the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, 
discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. 
 
3 
This Court reviews de novo both a trial court’s jurisdictional rulings, Jeffrey v 
Rapid American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 184; 529 NW2d 644 (1995), and the proper 
interpretation and application of statutes and court rules, Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 
578-579; 751 NW2d 493 (2008).  De novo review means we review this issue 
independently, without any required deference to the trial court.  See Fletcher v Fletcher, 
447 Mich 871, 882; 526 NW2d 889 (1994) (discussing the nature of de novo review). 
We have answered a question closely related to the one presented here.  In 
Lemmen v Lemmen, 481 Mich 164, 167; 749 NW2d 255 (2008), we held that the 
Legislature’s grant of continuing jurisdiction to modify child and spousal support orders 
in divorce proceedings in MCL 552.17(1) and MCL 552.28 satisfies the “otherwise 
provided by law” requirement of MCR 7.208(A)(4).  In so holding, we made clear that 
another law need not grant jurisdiction specifically for judgments pending on appeal to 
qualify as an exception under MCR 7.208(A)(4).  Rather, a statute satisfies MCR 
7.208(A)(4) when the Legislature has authorized continuing jurisdiction to amend or 
modify a final judgment.  In Lemmen, we examined the language of MCL 552.17(1) and 
found that its authorization to amend or modify a judgment “as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children require” suggested “that the purpose of allowing 
modification of a final judgment regarding child support is to ensure the welfare of the 
children when the circumstances of the parents or the needs of the children have 
changed.”  Lemmen, 481 Mich at 167.  “[T]o require the trial court to wait to make 
modifications until after an appeal is completed is contrary to the plain language of the 
statutes and would defeat their purpose . . . .”  Id.  
 
4 
In this case, the Court of Appeals found Lemmen’s reasoning equally applicable to 
situations involving custody.  But the court reasoned that because a motion for change in 
domicile is brought under MCL 722.31(4) of the CCA, rather than under MCL 552.17, an 
additional interpretive step was necessary to connect Lemmen’s statement about child 
support modification to the dispute over domicile at issue here.  It reasoned that MCL 
552.17(1) must be read in pari materia with the CCA because both “relate to the same 
person or thing, or the same class of persons or things.”  Safdar v Aziz, 321 Mich App 
219, 226; ___ NW2d ___ (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  Thus, it 
concluded that a circuit court may derive continuing jurisdiction over a motion for 
change in domicile from MCL 552.17(1) and that such jurisdiction attaches whenever a 
parent’s motion concerns custody.  See id. at 227. 
We mostly agree.  Lemmen’s reasoning applies to the Legislature’s broad grant of 
authority in the CCA, but the circuit court’s jurisdiction to modify a final judgment with 
respect to the child custody dispute may be derived exclusively from MCL 722.27(1) of 
the CCA, without resort to MCL 552.17.  As between two applicable provisions, we 
favor the more specific.  See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v Amalgamated Bank, 566 US 
639, 648; 132 S Ct 2065; 182 L Ed 2d 967 (2012) (“When the conduct at issue falls 
within the scope of both provisions, the specific presumptively governs, whether or not 
the specific provision also applies to some conduct that falls outside the general.”).  A 
motion for change of domicile brought under MCL 722.31(4) falls within the scope of a 
“child custody dispute” as the term is used in MCL 722.27(1).  See Grange Ins Co of 
Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 511; 835 NW2d 363 (2013) (concluding that “the 
custody order controls the determination of a minor child’s domicile” under both the 
 
5 
common law and the CCA).  MCL 722.27(1) reflects the Legislature’s intent to protect 
the interests of children in the face of changing circumstances by authorizing jurisdiction 
in the circuit court until the child reaches adulthood.  
MCL 722.27(1)(c) specifically permits the circuit court to modify or amend its 
orders when proper cause is shown or when there has been a change of circumstances.  
Its sole limiting principle is that the modification be in the best interests of the child.  As 
in Lemmen, it would be contrary to the plain language of the CCA to require a court to 
wait for the conclusion of an appeal to address a change in circumstances that would 
affect the interests of the child.  Therefore, we hold that MCL 722.27(1) authorizes the 
continuing jurisdiction of a circuit court to modify or amend its previous judgments or 
orders and is an exception to MCR 7.208(A) “otherwise provided by law.”  Accordingly, 
we vacate the Court of Appeals decision to the extent it derived jurisdiction from MCL 
552.17, affirm the result reached, and remand to the Oakland Circuit Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We do not retain jurisdiction.  
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement