Title: COOPER v. BOOHER

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

COOPER v. BOOHER  COOPER v. BOOHER 2004 OK 40 93 P.3d 19 Case Number: 98447 Decided: 06/01/2004 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DEACON COOPER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. GLYNN BOOHER, WARDEN, JOHN LILLEY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Defendant/Appellee. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV ¶0 The Honorable Franklin D. Rahhal, Judge of the District Court of Okfuskee County, Oklahoma, dismissed Plaintiff/Inmate's petition, ruled the action was frivolous and granted Defendant/Warden's motion for sanctions in the amount of $103.50. Inmate appealed. Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, affirmed dismissal of petition but reversed sanction order, holding that a party who wishes to move for sanctions under CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED IN PART; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Deacon Cooper, pro se. Richard W. Kirby, General Counsel, and Ronald A. Anderson, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee. BOUDREAU, J. ¶1 Deacon Cooper (Inmate), an inmate at John Lilley Correctional Center in Boley, Oklahoma, tested positive for use of marijuana and received administrative discipline. He appealed unsuccessfully to Glynn Booher (Warden) and then to the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC), arguing that the drug test was administered in a manner not in accordance with DOC policy and not in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Inmate then filed what has been called in the papers before us a petition for writ of mandamus in district court asking the court to command prison officials to retest him. Warden responded with a motion to dismiss the petition and a motion for sanctions. ¶2 The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the dismissal of the petition but reversed the sanction order. COCA held as a matter of first impression that a party who wishes to move for sanctions under ISSUE ¶3 The first impression issue on certiorari is: In an action commenced by an inmate, must a defendant who wishes to move for sanctions under § 566 comply with the safe harbor provision that is found in § 2011. We answer "no". STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶4 Because the issue is one of statutory construction, our review is de novo. Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, ANALYSIS ¶5 Fundamental to statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. City of Durant v. Cicio, ¶6 We first address § 2011. Section 2011 was amended in 1994 to add a special notice provision, commonly referred to as a safe harbor provision, that applies to a party who wishes to file a sanction motion pursuant to § 2011(C)(1)(a). C. SANCTIONS 1. HOW INITIATED. a. By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subsection B of this section. It shall be served as provided in Section 2005 of this title, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within twenty-one (21) days after service of the motion or such other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. ¶7 Under the plain meaning of the words, prior to filing a sanction motion pursuant to § 2011(C)(1)(a) the movant must serve the motion on the offending party and wait at least twenty-one days. Only if the offending party does not withdraw or appropriately correct the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial within twenty-one days after service may the movant file the motion. We have said that the purpose of the sanction provision in § 2011 is to discourage pleadings, motions or other papers that are frivolous or are filed for an improper purpose such as delay. State ex rel. Tal v. City of Oklahoma City, ¶8 We now turn to § 566. This statute was last amended effective July 1, 2002. A. Any action initiated against any person, party or entity, the state, the Department of Corrections, another state agency, or political subdivision, or an original action in an appellate court, or an appeal of an action whether or not the plaintiff was represented in the district court, by an inmate may be: * * * 2. Dismissed with prejudice . . . on a motion of the defendant, if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. * * * C. If the court determines before or at trial that one or more of the causes of action are frivolous or malicious, any one or more of the following sanctions may be imposed: * * * 2. Court costs not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per cause of action; ¶9 We see no ambiguity in this language and therefore we must apply the plain meaning of the words. Keating v. Edmondson, supra. Under the plain meaning of the words, § 566 authorizes the court to impose sanctions on an inmate who initiates a frivolous or malicious action; § 566 does not require the defendant to comply with any safe harbor provision like that found in § 2011. ¶10 Our conclusion that § 566 does not incorporate the safe harbor provision of § 2011 is reinforced by the fact that the Legislature amended § 566 in 2002. At the time of the 2002 amendment to § 566, the safe harbor provision had already been in effect in § 2011 for eight years. If the Legislature intended to add a safe harbor provision to § 566, it could have used the same language it used in its 1994 amendment to § 2011. See, e.g., Ind. School Dist. #I-20 of Muskogee County v. Oklahoma St. Dept. of Education, CONCLUSION ¶11 We hold that the safe harbor provision that is applicable to sanction motions filed pursuant to CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED IN PART; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. WATT, C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, and EDMONDSON, JJ., concur. OPALA, V.C.J., dissents and writes separately. KAUGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part (joins OPALA, V.C.J.). FOOT