Title: State v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. CSX Transp., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2832.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2832 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. CSX Transp., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2832.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 5589.21—Preemption—Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act—Federal Railroad Safety Act—Judgment reversed and 
trial court’s dismissal of all charges reinstated. 
(No. 2020-0608—Submitted April 28, 2021—Decided August 17, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Union County, Nos. 14-19-07 
through 14-19-11, 2020-Ohio-2665. 
__________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., announcing the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Third District 
Court of Appeals, we are asked whether R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act (the “Termination Act”), 49 U.S.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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10101 et seq., or the Federal Railroad Safety Act (the “Safety Act”), 49 U.S.C. 
20101 et seq. 
{¶ 2} With exceptions not applicable here, R.C. 5589.21 prohibits a stopped 
train from blocking a railroad crossing for more than five minutes; a violation of 
the statute is a first-degree misdemeanor, R.C. 5589.99.  The General Assembly 
enacted this statute to enhance public safety by ensuring the unhindered flow of 
emergency responders across railroad crossings.  R.C. 5589.20. 
{¶ 3} The Termination Act created the Surface Transportation Board and 
grants the board exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carriers.”  49 
U.S.C. 10501.  The Termination Act provides the exclusive remedies with respect 
to operating rules, practices, routes, services, and facilities of rail carriers and 
expressly preempts other federal and state laws in conflict with it.  49 U.S.C. 
10501(b).  Because R.C. 5589.21 regulates, manages, and governs rail traffic in this 
state by prescribing how long a train may stay stopped while blocking a crossing, 
it conflicts with and is expressly preempted by the Termination Act. 
{¶ 4} The Safety Act provides a limited exception to the Termination Act’s 
preemptive force, permitting the Secretary of Transportation and the states, where 
applicable, to regulate railroad safety.  However, R.C. 5589.21 is a not a law related 
to railroad safety, because a limit on the amount of time that a train may occupy a 
crossing is not related to the safe operation of trains.  Rather, “improper 
obstructions create uniquely different local safety problems by preventing the 
timely movement of ambulances, the vehicles of law enforcement officers and 
firefighters, and official and unofficial vehicles transporting health care officials 
and professionals.”  R.C. 5589.20.  Although blocking a railroad crossing poses a 
threat to public safety, a statute prohibiting the blocking of a crossing does not fall 
under the federal Safety Act, because it does not affect the safety of railroad 
operations themselves or seek to reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents, 
see 49 U.S.C. 20101. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 5} In this case, the state charged appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc. 
(“CSX”), with violating R.C. 5589.21 on five occasions, but the trial court 
concluded that the Termination Act and the Safety Act preempted Ohio’s 
antiblocking statute and dismissed the charges.  The appellate court rejected the 
argument that federal law preempted R.C. 5589.21 and reversed the dismissal of 
the charges. 
{¶ 6} However, because R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by federal law, we 
reverse the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial 
court’s dismissal of all the charges brought against CSX for violating R.C. 5589.21. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 7} In 2018, the state charged CSX with violating R.C. 5589.21 five times 
in Union County.  CSX moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the 
Termination Act and the Safety Act preempt R.C. 5589.21.  In support of its motion, 
CSX presented the affidavit of Blair Johnson, whose job duties include overseeing 
personnel responsible for moving trains in and out of the Honda plant near 
Marysville.  He explained that CSX regularly delivers goods and supplies to the 
plant and that CSX’s trains occasionally block grade crossings while loading and 
unloading at the plant and while entering and exiting it.  He also noted that one of 
the alleged violations of R.C. 5589.21 occurred because a train had to block a 
crossing to allow another train using the same track to pass. 
{¶ 8} The trial court granted CSX’s motion, relying on state and federal 
cases holding that blocked-crossing statutes are preempted by federal law. 
{¶ 9} The Third District Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that 
 
it is our view that if any Ohio court is going to adopt and incorporate 
the judicial determination of other jurisdictions as the law of Ohio 
that under the [Termination Act], a railroad company has 
untrammeled discretion to block any rail crossing in any community 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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in the state for any purpose, for any amount of time, regardless of its 
reasons or operational necessity, and regardless of the jeopardy to 
the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens caused by that 
blocked crossing; and that any legislation enacted by the duly 
elected state legislature to address those specific public health, 
safety and welfare concerns in terms which even remotely appear 
designed to influence or dissuade the behavior of the railroad 
company at such a crossing, is null and void ab initio, then the court 
making that ruling should be the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
 
2020-Ohio-2665, 154 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 10} We accepted CSX’s appeal to review two propositions of law: 
 
1. R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the ICC Termination Act. 
2. R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act. 
 
See 159 Ohio St.3d 1486, 2020-Ohio-4232, 151 N.E.3d 635. 
II. Law and Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
{¶ 11} Federal preemption is a question of law.  Merck Sharp & Dohme 
Corp. v. Albrecht, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1668, 1680, 203 L.Ed.2d 822 (2019).  
We review questions of law de novo.  State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-
Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 9. 
B. Ohio’s Antiblocking Statute 
{¶ 12} R.C. 5589.21 provides: 
 
 
(A)  No railroad company shall obstruct, or permit or cause 
to be obstructed a public street, road, or highway, by permitting a 
January Term, 2022 
 
5 
railroad car, locomotive, or other obstruction to remain upon or 
across it for longer than five minutes, to the hindrance or 
inconvenience of travelers or a person passing along or upon such 
street, road, or highway. 
 
(B)  At the end of each five minute period of obstruction of 
a public street, road, or highway, each railroad company shall cause 
such railroad car, locomotive, or other obstruction to be removed for 
sufficient time, not less than three minutes, to allow the passage of 
persons and vehicles waiting to cross. 
 
(C)  This section does not apply to obstruction of a public 
street, road, or highway by a continuously moving through train or 
caused by circumstances wholly beyond the control of the railroad 
company, but does apply to other obstructions, including without 
limitation those caused by stopped trains and trains engaged in 
switching, loading, or unloading operations. 
 
C. Federal Preemption of State Law 
{¶ 13} The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides 
that the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute “the supreme Law of 
the Land.”  U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2.  “It is well established that within 
constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express 
terms.”  Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. 
Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 203, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). 
D. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act 
{¶ 14} The Termination Act abolished the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and created the Surface Transportation Board, 109 Stat. 803, to allow 
competitive rates for rail transportation, to minimize regulatory control, and to 
promote efficiency, without detriment to public health and safety, 49 U.S.C. 10101.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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The Termination Act grants the board exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation 
by rail carriers” and sets forth remedies with respect to operating rules, practices, 
routes, services, and facilities of rail carriers.  49 U.S.C. 10501(b)(1).  
“Transportation” is broadly defined in the Act to include the movement of “a 
locomotive, car, * * * or equipment of any kind related to the movement of 
passengers or property, or both, by rail.”  49 U.S.C. 10102(9)(A).  The board also 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the “construction, acquisition, operation, 
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, 
or facilities.”  49 U.S.C. 10501(b)(2).  The Act states, “Except as otherwise 
provided in this part [49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.], the remedies provided under this 
part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the 
remedies provided under Federal or State law.”  49 U.S.C. 10501(b). 
{¶ 15} When construing the Termination Act, we have explained that the 
board has “exclusive jurisdiction over all physical instrumentalities possessed and 
all services provided by rail carriers that are related to the movement of passengers 
and/or property.  This broad, sweeping language shows Congress’s intent to 
preempt any state effort to regulate rail transportation.”  Girard v. Youngstown Belt 
Ry. Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 79, 2012-Ohio-5370, 979 N.E.2d 1273, ¶ 22.  The Act 
displaces “ ‘ “regulation,” i.e., those state laws that may reasonably be said to have 
the effect of “manag[ing]” or “govern[ing]” rail transportation.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 23, 
quoting Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th 
Cir.2001), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1286 (6th Ed.1990). 
{¶ 16} R.C. 5589.21 directs a rail carrier to move a “railroad car, 
locomotive, or other obstruction”—i.e., equipment related to moving passengers or 
property by rail—after the car has stopped and blocked a railroad crossing for more 
than five minutes.  It then prohibits a rail carrier from obstructing the crossing for 
three minutes, after which it may block the crossing again for another five minutes.  
January Term, 2022 
 
7 
Consequently, it takes little effort to conclude that R.C. 5589.21 directly regulates 
rail transportation. 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 5589.99, blocking a railroad crossing with a stopped 
train for more than five minutes is a first-degree misdemeanor.  R.C. 5589.21(C) 
provides exceptions from criminal liability for a continuously moving train and for 
stoppages that are beyond the rail carrier’s control.  No party asserts that either of 
these exceptions provide a defense to the charges brought against CSX, since the 
exceptions do not apply to “stopped trains and trains engaged in switching, loading, 
or unloading operations,” id., which is what occurred here.  R.C. 5589.21 therefore 
regulates the movement of railroad equipment, an activity that Congress placed 
under the exclusive authority of the Surface Transportation Board. 
{¶ 18} R.C. 5589.21 also provides a criminal remedy related to railroad 
practices and services, addressing the public-safety issues created by a train 
blocking a crossing during loading, unloading, or switching operations.  But again, 
the Termination Act sets forth the exclusive remedies against rail carriers and 
preempts all state-law remedies brought against them.  Further, the board, not the 
courts of this state, has exclusive jurisdiction over the remedies provided by the 
Termination Act. 
{¶ 19} Because R.C. 5589.21 regulates how long a train may remain 
stopped across a railroad crossing for switching, loading, or unloading operations 
at an industrial customer’s plant or to let another train pass, the statute usurps the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the board and therefore is preempted by the Termination 
Act.  Compliance with the state statute in any practical way would force CSX to 
move its railroad lines and facilities so that a train may load, unload, or switch cars 
without blocking a crossing.  However, the “construction, acquisition, operation, 
abandonment, or discontinuance” of railroad facilities are also matters committed 
to the board and are not subject to state regulation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 20} This conclusion accords with the overwhelming weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions that have held that the Termination Act preempts state 
antiblocking laws like R.C. 5589.21.  E.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, 22 F.4th 1190, 
1194 (10th Cir.2022); Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 807 (5th 
Cir.2011); State v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 107 N.E.3d 468, 477 (Ind.2018); State v. 
BNSF Ry. Co., 56 Kan.App.2d 503, 513, 432 P.3d 77 (2018); People v. Burlington 
N. Santa Fe RR., 209 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1531, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 243 (2012); 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 227 Or.App. 468, 475, 206 
P.3d 261 (2009); Canadian Natl. Ry. Co. v. Des Plaines, 1st Dist. No. 1-04-2479, 
2006 WL 345095, *3 (Ill.Ct.App.2006); Seattle v. Burlington N. RR. Co., 145 
Wash.2d 661, 669, 41 P.3d 1169 (2002); see also Delaware v. Surface Transp. Bd., 
859 F.3d 16, 21-22 (2d Cir.2017) (statute prohibiting nonessential train idling at 
night in certain places preempted by the Termination Act); Griffioen v. Cedar 
Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 914 N.W.2d 273, 286 (Iowa 2018) (“laws, ordinances, 
and common-law damage actions challenging where and when railroads placed 
their railcars on their transportation lines * * * are generally preempted” by the 
Termination Act); Anderson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 375 Ark. 466, 475, 291 S.W.3d 586 
(2009) (Termination Act preempts state proceeding to order rail carrier to reopen 
private crossing).  As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, 
“[r]egulating the time a train can occupy a rail crossing impacts, in such areas as 
train speed, length and scheduling, the way a rail carrier operates its trains, with 
concomitant economic ramifications.”  Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 
439, 444 (5th Cir.2001). 
E. The Federal Railroad Safety Act 
{¶ 21} The issue becomes, then, whether the Safety Act creates an 
exception to the Termination Act’s preemption of state law or itself also preempts 
R.C. 5589.21. 
{¶ 22} The Safety Act provides in part: 
January Term, 2022 
 
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A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of 
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security 
matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the 
subject matter of the State requirement.  A State may adopt or 
continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, 
or order— 
(A) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety or security hazard; 
(B) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the 
United States Government; and 
(C) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 
 
49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2). 
{¶ 23} As applied to the circumstances of this case, the Termination Act 
and the Safety Act are in conflict.  The Termination Act gives the board exclusive 
jurisdiction over transportation by rail, which includes railroad safety, and provides 
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this part [Title 49, Subtitle IV, Part A], the 
remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation 
are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.”  The 
Safety Act, however, is codified in a different part of the United States Code—Title 
49, Subtitle V, Part A—and provides for regulation and remedies related to railroad 
safety to be established by other entities, namely the Secretary of Transportation 
and the states.  49 U.S.C. 20106 et seq. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 24} As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen 
confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on the same topic, this 
Court is not at ‘liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments’ and 
must instead strive ‘ “to give effect to both.” ’ ”  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1624, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018), quoting Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974), quoting United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939).  We 
may conclude that “two statutes cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the 
other,” only if there is “ ‘ “a clearly expressed congressional intention” ’ that such 
a result should follow.”  Id., quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533, 115 S.Ct. 2322, 132 L.Ed.2d 462 (1995), quoting 
Morton at 551.  We therefore presume that “ ‘Congress will specifically address’ 
preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.”  
Id., quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 
830 (1988). 
{¶ 25} “The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to 
statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted by a specific 
prohibition or permission.  To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is 
construed as an exception to the general one.”  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, L.L.C., v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012).  
“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled 
or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.”  Morton at 
550-551. 
{¶ 26} The Termination Act sets forth the federal policy for “regulating the 
railroad industry,” 49 U.S.C. 10101; it is a general statute, overriding other state 
and federal laws regarding railroad transportation.  On the other hand, the Safety 
Act specifically “promote[s] safety in every area of railroad operations,” 49 U.S.C. 
20101; it permits the Secretary of Transportation and the states, where applicable, 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
to regulate railroad safety.  Therefore, if R.C. 5589.21 is a law related to railroad 
safety, then it is not preempted by the Termination Act, and it may—or may not—
be preempted by the Safety Act. 
{¶ 27} As the state argues in its brief, quoting DeHahn v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
925 N.E.2d 442 (Ind.App.2010), the Safety Act “is concerned with creating a ‘safe 
roadbed for trains,’ not covering the regulation of peripheral areas such as 
roadways.”  We agree. 
{¶ 28} In enacting the Safety Act, Congress expressed its purpose: “to 
promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related 
accidents and incidents.”  49 U.S.C. 20101.  Considering this purpose, it is manifest 
that when Congress excluded laws related to railroad safety from federal 
preemption, it intended to permit those laws that make it safer to operate a railroad 
or that prevent railroad accidents such as derailments and collisions with 
pedestrians and automobiles.  In contrast, the General Assembly in R.C. 5589.20 
expressed its determination that R.C. 5589.21 is needed to ensure the movement of 
emergency vehicles across the grade—an important matter of public safety, but not 
one of railroad safety.  Accord BNSF Ry. Co., 22 F.4th at 1196 (Oklahoma’s 
antiblocking statute addresses “public safety issues—not rail safety issues”).  
Further, Ohio’s prohibition on blocking a railroad crossing for more than five 
minutes disserves Congress’s purpose of making railroad operations safer.  For 
example, once a train blocks a crossing, it has five minutes or less to clear the 
crossing, which means the train might have to exceed federal speed limits to avoid 
committing a first-degree misdemeanor under Ohio law.  See 49 C.F.R. 213.9.  
Similarly, obeying R.C. 5589.21 might require railroad employees to forgo 
federally mandated equipment checks, such as testing the airbrakes before moving 
the train.  See 49 C.F.R. 232.215. 
{¶ 29} Numerous courts have held that the Safety Act precludes state laws 
like R.C. 5589.21 because the requirements of antiblocking laws conflict with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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federal regulations on speed, train length, crossing approach, and airbrake testing.  
E.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Plymouth, 283 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir.2002); Eagle 
Marine Industries, Inc. v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 227 Ill.2d 377, 380, 882 N.E.2d 
522 (Ill.2008); Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 589 Pa. 576, 596-597, 910 A.2d 20 
(2006); Seattle, 145 Wash.2d at 673, 41 P.3d 1169; Weyauwega v. Wisconsin Cent. 
Ltd., 384 Wis.2d 382, 2018 WI App 65, 919 N.W.2d 609, ¶ 61. 
{¶ 30} Nor is R.C. 5589.21 saved from preemption by the carve-out for 
stricter railroad-safety regulations aimed at “an essentially local safety or security 
hazard,” 49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2)(A).  As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
explained, “[t]he purpose of the savings clause is to ‘enable the states to respond to 
local situations not capable of being adequately encompassed within the uniform 
national standards.’ ”  Duluth, Winnipeg & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Orr, 529 F.3d 794, 
796 (8th Cir.2008), quoting H.R.Rep. No. 91-1194, at 11 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104, 4117.  However, “[i]f the local situation is actually statewide 
in character or capable of being adequately encompassed within national uniform 
standards, it will not be considered an essentially local safety hazard.”  (Emphasis 
deleted.)  Id. at 798. 
{¶ 31} R.C. 5589.21 does not address essentially local safety hazards.  First, 
as explained above, R.C. 5589.21 is not a railroad-safety statute.  Second, it is a 
statewide law that applies a blanket prohibition on blocking crossings regardless of 
the circumstances at individual crossings.  Moreover, the public-safety concerns 
caused by a train blocking a railroad crossing for an extended time are capable of 
being served by national standards, but the Secretary of Transportation has chosen 
not to develop those standards.  Therefore, neither of the savings clauses in 49 
U.S.C. 20106(a)(2) apply to R.C. 5589.21. 
{¶ 32} Consequently, the Termination Act preempts an antiblocking statute 
like R.C. 5589.21, and the Safety Act does not exempt R.C. 5589.21 from the 
January Term, 2022 
 
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Termination Act’s preemptive force.  R.C. 5589.21 therefore may not be enforced 
against CSX. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 33} We acknowledge the significant danger to the public that is created 
when stopped trains obstruct the movement of first responders across railroad 
tracks.  However, the regulation of railroad transportation is a matter of federal law, 
and the federal government alone has the power to address the threat to public 
safety caused by blocked crossings.  Because R.C. 5589.21 is preempted, it cannot 
be enforced against CSX.  The trial court correctly dismissed the charges in this 
case. 
{¶ 34} For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Third District 
Court of Appeals, and we reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of all charges brought 
against CSX for violating R.C. 5589.21. 
Judgment reversed. 
DEWINE, J., concurs. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR,  C.J. 
STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY, J. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 35} To reduce safety hazards created by stopped trains at railroad 
crossings, the General Assembly laudably enacted R.C. 5589.21.  The statute places 
limits on the length of time that a train may be parked across a public grade 
crossing.  While I am wholly sympathetic to the General Assembly’s goal to 
improve public safety, I cannot disregard the law of federal preemption.  The 
General Assembly’s antiblocking statute is federally preempted by the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq.  Because the lead opinion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
states that the statute is preempted on different grounds, I must respectfully concur 
in judgment only. 
Federal Preemption 
{¶ 36} Federal preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2; State ex rel. Yost v. 
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 165 Ohio St.3d 213, 2021-Ohio-2121, 177 N.E.3d 
242, ¶ 10.  And pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the United States Congress has 
the power to preempt state law.  Volkswagen at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 37} Federal preemption is fundamentally a question of congressional 
intent, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 
L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), and may be either expressed or implied, Gade v. Natl. Solid 
Wastes Mgt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). 
{¶ 38} Congress enacted the FRSA “to promote safety in every area of 
railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  49 U.S.C. 20101.  The goal was to create nationally uniform “[l]aws, 
regulations, and orders related to railroad safety.”  (Emphasis added.)  49 U.S.C. 
20106(a)(1).  Congress included an express preemption clause in the FRSA as well 
as two safe-harbor provisions.  Under the first safe-harbor provision, states are 
permitted to “adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to 
railroad safety * * * until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad 
safety matters) * * * prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject 
matter of the State requirement.”  (Emphasis added.)  49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2).  And 
under the second safe-harbor provision, states may adopt or continue to enforce a 
more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when it (1) is 
“necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard,” (2) 
is not incompatible with federal law, and (3) does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce.  49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2). 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
{¶ 39} Here, the lead opinion maintains that the FRSA does not apply 
because R.C. 5589.21 is an antiblocking statute, not a railroad safety statute.  But 
R.C. 5589.21 is more than simply an antiblocking statute; it is a safety measure that 
promotes public safety and seeks to prevent any hindrance or inconvenience of 
travel for the public and for emergency responders relating to blocked railroads. 
{¶ 40} The General Assembly found that “the improper obstruction of 
railroad grade crossings by trains is a direct threat to the health, safety, and welfare 
of the citizens of this state inasmuch as improper obstructions create uniquely 
different local safety problems” for emergency responders.  (Emphasis added.)  
R.C. 5589.20.  It thus enacted R.C. 5589.21. 
{¶ 41} The language in R.C. 5589.20 indicates that R.C. 5589.21 
necessarily considers public-safety issues beyond quick responses to emergency 
situations and considers the safety of the public, including those related to railroad-
safety issues.  This conclusion is further supported by the fact that any fine collected 
for a violation of R.C. 5589.21 is paid to a fund for the improvement of railroad 
grade crossings in the county or the municipal corporation in which the violation 
had occurred.  R.C. 5589.24.  This shows the General Assembly’s intent in enacting 
R.C. 5589.21 was to promote the safety of the public at railroad grade crossings. 
{¶ 42} Therefore, reading R.C. 5589.21 in light of R.C. 5589.20 and 
5589.24, it is clear that R.C. 5589.21 is designed to protect citizens from railroad-
related accidents or incidents and that it is a safety statute that falls under the FRSA.  
Thus, this court must look to see whether other federal laws regulate safety at grade 
crossings. 
{¶ 43} The FRSA and regulations implemented by the Federal Railroad 
Administration (“FRA”) specifically refer to matters related to safety at grade 
crossings.  Under the FRSA, “the Secretary of Transportation shall maintain a 
coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing 
problem and measures to protect pedestrians in densely populated areas along 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
railroad rights of way.”  49 U.S.C. 20134(a).  To carry out this duty, the secretary 
of transportation may use his authority regarding traffic, highway, and vehicle 
safety.  Id. 
{¶ 44} Related to this provision, the FRA requires ten states, including 
Ohio, to “develop and submit to FRA for review and approval an updated State 
highway-rail grade crossing action plan” to address safety risks.  49 C.F.R. 
234.11(c).  The purpose of the requirement is “to reduce accident/incidents at 
highway-rail and pathway grade crossings nationwide” by requiring states to 
develop or update the states’ action plans and to implement them.  49 C.F.R. 
234.11(a). 
{¶ 45} While the primary purpose of R.C. 5589.21 is more specific than 
those purposes in the FRSA statutory provisions and the federal regulations, we 
must acknowledge that trains that are blocking an intersection for a length of time 
are necessarily included in the broad subject matter of grade-crossing safety.  
Therefore, R.C. 5589.21 cannot fall within the first safe harbor and is preempted. 
{¶ 46} Additionally, in 49 C.F.R. 213.9(a), the FRA has dictated maximum 
operating speed limits for trains.  This regulation “should be understood as covering 
the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the 
conditions imposed by grade crossings.”  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 
U.S. 658, 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993).  The time limitation in 
R.C. 5589.21 will necessarily affect train speed.  The primary purpose of the 
regulation is irrelevant—the only issue is whether regulations have been adopted 
that cover the subject matter.  Easterwood at 675.  Thus, R.C. 5589.21 regulates a 
second subject matter that is covered by federal law, see CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Plymouth, 283 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir.2002), and is further support for the 
conclusions that R.C. 5589.21 is preempted and that it does not fall within the first 
safe harbor. 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
{¶ 47} The state also cannot meet the requirements of the second safe 
harbor, because R.C. 5589.21 is incompatible with federal law.  The FRSA’s use 
of the term “federal law” is broad.  “Federal law” does not mean simply that the 
state’s law is incompatible with the FRSA; it refers to a state law’s incompatibility 
with other federal law as well.  This includes the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. 
{¶ 48} As correctly stated by the lead opinion, the General Assembly’s 
restriction on how long a train may be stopped on tracks usurps the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) and interferes with the 
regulations in place involving switching, operations, and routes.  See Girard v. 
Youngstown Belt Ry. Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 79, 2012-Ohio-5370, 979 N.E.2d 1273, 
¶ 18 (STB has exclusive jurisdiction over certain aspects of interstate rail activity); 
Seattle v. Burlington N. RR. Co., 145 Wash.2d 661, 667, 41 P.3d 1169 (2002) 
(antiblocking statute was preempted by ICCTA because it attempted to regulate 
switching activities).  Therefore, the Ohio statute is incompatible with federal law 
and is preempted by the FRSA.  See Mundelein v. Wisconsin Cent. RR., 227 Ill.2d 
281, 299, 882 N.E.2d 544 (2008). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 49} Unfortunately, R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by federal law.  Other 
states that have decided similar issues of preemption have reached the same 
conclusion.  Although I personally think the applicable federal law does not 
adequately protect the public, my hands are tied. 
{¶ 50} Additionally, I encourage our General Assembly to work with 
Ohio’s senators and representatives in Congress to resolve issues related to trains 
blocking public grade crossings.  This issue is one of great importance, as shown 
by an abundance of case law from numerous jurisdictions.  We would all benefit 
from additional guidance that encourages safety and uniformity in all jurisdictions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
{¶ 51} Because I find that R.C. 5589.21 is preempted under the FRSA, I 
respectfully concur in judgment only. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 52} This case addresses whether federal law preempts R.C. 5589.21, a 
state law that limits the length of time a train may be parked across a public grade 
crossing.  In this case, two opinions, each concurred in by only one other justice, 
decide that this statute, which has existed in one form or another for more than 150 
years, is preempted.  But these opinions reach their conclusions without agreeing 
between them why, or by what act, the Ohio statute is preempted.  And this occurs 
even though R.C. 5589.21 is a safety statute aimed at regulating railroads and even 
though federal law permits states to regulate any subject matter related to railroad 
safety that federal law has not yet regulated.  Moreover, these opinions reach their 
conclusions even though all seven justices of this court agree that no federal law 
exists to regulate blocked railroad crossings. 
{¶ 53} Justice Kennedy’s opinion concludes that R.C. 5589.21, which 
explicitly addresses safety and railroads, is nonetheless not about railroad safety.  
She concludes that the statute may not to be analyzed under the federal law that 
provides a safe harbor from preemption for state laws regulating subject matter that 
federal law does not regulate.  That opinion also notes with approval that several 
other courts (many of them federal) have decided that blocked-crossing statutes are 
preempted by federal law.  Justice Fischer’s opinion concludes, and I agree, that 
R.C. 5589.21 is about railroad safety and that it is properly analyzed under the 
federal regulation that contains a preemption safe harbor.  However, Justice 
Fischer’s opinion concludes that even though the federal government has not 
regulated blocked crossings, because it has regulated other subject matter 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
addressing the safety of grade crossings, Ohio’s blocked-crossing statute is 
preempted.  I disagree. 
{¶ 54} Under a plain reading, a statute that is about safety and railroads is 
about railroad safety.  Since the federal government has not acted to protect citizens 
from the effects of railroad cars that block crossings, nor granted impunity for the 
blocking of crossings, the Ohio legislature is permitted to enact laws to protect the 
safety of Ohio citizens in this scenario.  While other jurisdictions hold that their 
grade-crossing laws are preempted by federal law despite a lack of federal 
regulation on that subject matter, those nonbinding precedents do not deprive 
Ohioans of the protections afforded by the Ohio General Assembly.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 55} Justice Kennedy’s statement of the facts of this case need not be 
repeated in this dissent; they are straightforward and not at issue.  This is not a mere 
technical or close-call violation of the statute with which CSX has been charged.  
Each instance in which CSX was charged involved blocking the crossing in 
question with a stopped train for much longer than the statutorily permitted period.  
In Marysville Municipal Court case No. 18CRB440, the state alleged that a 
stationary CSX train had blocked the intersection of Paver Barnes Road at Shirk 
Road for at least one hour.  In Marysville Municipal Court case No. 18CRB509, 
the state alleged that a stationary CSX train had blocked the intersection of Bear 
Swamp Road at Benton Road for at least one hour.  In Marysville Municipal Court 
case No. 18CRB606, the state alleged that a CSX train had blocked Warner Road 
in Jerome Township for more than one hour.  In Marysville Municipal Court case 
No. 18CRB924, the state alleged that a CSX train had blocked Bear Swamp Road 
near the intersection of Benton Road for approximately 45 minutes.  Finally, in 
Marysville Municipal Court case No. 18CRB1048, the state alleged that a CSX 
train had blocked a crossing on State Route 739 near the intersection of Bear 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
Swamp Road for more than one hour.  The charging affidavit in that case also cited 
an instance when Liberty West Road was simultaneously blocked by a stationary 
CSX train. 
{¶ 56} As related in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, CSX moved to dismiss all 
the charges.  That motion was granted, and the state appealed.  The Third District 
Court of Appeals reversed the judgments and essentially referred the matter to this 
court for final determination.  2020-Ohio-2665, 154 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 31-32. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
{¶ 57} The legal principle of federal preemption finds its roots in the United 
States Constitution, which provides: 
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; * * * shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 
U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2.  In accordance with that statement, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that state laws that conflict with federal laws are 
without effect.  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).  “Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute’s 
express language or through its structure and purpose.”  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 
555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008).  It is difficult to imply 
federal preemption because there is a presumption against preemption.  New York 
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 654-655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995).  Nevertheless, when a 
federal statute contains an express preemption clause, there is no need to apply the 
general presumption against preemption: instead, the federal statutory language is 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
simply applied.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, ___ U.S. ___, 
___, 136 S.Ct. 1938, 1946, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016).  But “[i]f a federal law contains 
an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the 
question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still 
remains.”  Altria Group at 76.  This is because “when the text of a pre-emption 
clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept 
the reading that disfavors pre-emption.’ ”  Id. at 77, quoting Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 449, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005).  
This general statement relies on the principle that the “ ‘historic police powers of 
the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”  (Brackets added in Altria.)  Id., quoting Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947).  And the converse is also true.  Generally, “an ‘assumption’ of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a 
history of significant federal presence.”  United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108, 
120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000). 
{¶ 58} Railroads historically have been and still are federally regulated due 
to their inherently interstate nature.  See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 
531 (“An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by 
compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to equip their cars 
with automatic couplers and continuous brakes and their locomotives with driving-
wheel brakes, and for other purposes”); Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, 24 
Stat. 379 (1887) (regulating interstate commerce and creating the Inter-State 
Commerce Commission); California v. Cent. Pacific RR. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 39-40, 8 
S.Ct. 1073, 32 L.Ed. 150 (1888) (noting Congress’s broad use of commerce-clause 
powers to create and regulate a vast system of railroads connecting the eastern 
United States with the Pacific).  Yet, Ohio and other states have long exercised 
some degree of police power over crossings.  Capelle v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
136 Ohio St. 203, 208, 24 N.E.2d 822 (1940) (noting blocked-crossing statutes in 
Ohio as early as 1853).  Under these circumstances, when confronting an issue that 
implicates both a long history of a state’s exercise of police powers (regulation of 
grade crossings) and a long history of federal regulations (regulation of railroads 
generally) it is most appropriate to simply apply the text of the relevant statutes 
without any presumption.  See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 665, 
113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (noting that application of the explicit 
preemption language in the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), 49 U.S.C. 
20101 et seq., with safe harbors, incorporates the requisite solicitude toward states’ 
rights created by the presumption against preemption); but see State v. Norfolk S. 
Ry. Co., 107 N.E.3d 468, 472-473 (Ind.2018) (applying the presumption against 
preemption regarding state blocked-crossing legislation, finding that the state’s 
long history of exercising police power in regard to railroad crossings justified 
application of that presumption). 
{¶ 59} R.C. 5589.21 provides: 
 
(A)  No railroad company shall obstruct, or permit or cause 
to be obstructed a public street, road, or highway, by permitting a 
railroad car, locomotive, or other obstruction to remain upon or 
across it for longer than five minutes, to the hindrance or 
inconvenience of travelers or a person passing along or upon such 
street, road, or highway. 
(B) At the end of each five minute period of obstruction of a 
public street, road, or highway, each railroad company shall cause 
such railroad car, locomotive, or other obstruction to be removed for 
sufficient time, not less than three minutes, to allow the passage of 
persons and vehicles waiting to cross. 
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
(C)  This section does not apply to obstruction of a public 
street, road, or highway by a continuously moving through train or 
caused by circumstances wholly beyond the control of the railroad 
company, but does apply to other obstructions, including without 
limitation those caused by stopped trains and trains engaged in 
switching, loading, or unloading operations. 
 
CSX argues that two federal statutory schemes preempt this Ohio law.  Justice 
Kennedy finds that one scheme, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination 
Act (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., preempts R.C. 5589.21.  Justice Fischer, 
however, finds that the other scheme, the FRSA, 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq., preempts 
R.C. 5589.21. 
A.  Whether the FRSA or the ICCTA Is Applicable 
{¶ 60} The FRSA is one of several federal railroad-safety laws that have 
been enacted from the late 19th century to the present.  Charles McDonald, Federal 
Railroad Safety Program: 100 Years of Safer Railroads (1993), available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=15698 
(accessed 
Aug. 
10, 
2022) 
[https://perma.cc/Z2MY-D9ZE].  The FRSA states explicitly that it preempts state 
law, as follows: 
 
(1)  Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety 
and laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall be 
nationally uniform to the extent practicable. 
(2)  A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, 
or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of 
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security 
matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
subject matter of the State requirement.  A State may adopt or 
continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or 
order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, 
or order— 
(A)  is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety or security hazard; 
(B)  is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of 
the United States Government; and 
(C)  does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 
 
{¶ 61} The ICCTA also states explicitly that it preempts state law, but in 
this way: 
 
(b)  The jurisdiction of the [Surface Transportation] Board 
over— 
(1)  transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided 
in this part [49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.] with respect to rates, 
classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other 
operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such 
carriers; and 
(2)  the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, 
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, 
or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State, is exclusive.  Except as otherwise provided in 
this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to 
regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the 
remedies provided under Federal or State law. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
49 U.S.C. 10501.  “Transportation” is defined broadly to include “equipment of 
any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail” and 
“services related to that movement, including receipt, delivery, * * * and 
interchange of passengers and property.” 49 U.S.C. 10102(9)(A) and (B). 
{¶ 62} Although the ICCTA’s preemption provisions are broadly worded, 
the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (with the benefit of amicus briefing 
from the implementing agency, the Surface Transportation Board) held that the 
ICCTA and the FRSA must be read in pari materia and that federal preemption of 
state laws regarding railroad safety falls under the FRSA’s preemption provision, 
49 U.S.C. 20106(a).  Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 248 F.3d 517, 522-523 (6th 
Cir.2001).  That court explained: 
 
[T]he district court did not have the benefit of federal agency input 
regarding the jurisdictional relationship between the ICCTA and 
FRSA.  As a result of this critical handicap, it did not achieve a 
“reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the 
[ICCTA] and its surrounding regulatory scheme” to affect FRSA 
and its regulations.  [Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486, 116 
S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996)].  Rather, the district court’s 
decision erroneously preempts state rail safety law that is saved 
under FRSA if it tangentially touches upon an economic area 
regulated under the ICCTA.  * * * 
While the [Surface Transportation Board] must adhere to 
federal policies encouraging “safe and suitable working conditions 
in the railroad industry,” the ICCTA and its legislative history 
contain no evidence that Congress intended for the [Surface 
Transportation Board] to supplant the [Federal Railroad 
Administration]’s authority over rail safety.  49 U.S.C. § 10101(11).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
Rather, the agencies’ complementary exercise of their statutory 
authority accurately reflects Congress’s intent for the ICCTA and 
FRSA to be construed in pari materia.  For example, while 
recognizing their joint responsibility for promoting rail safety in 
their 1998 Safety Integration Plan rulemaking, the [Federal Railroad 
Administration] exercised primary authority over rail safety matters 
under 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., while the [Surface Transportation 
Board] handled economic regulation and environmental impact 
assessment. 
 
(Second set of brackets added in Tyrrell.)  Tyrrell at 522-523.  In stating this, the 
Sixth Circuit rejected a broad textual interpretation of the ICCTA of the sort 
advanced by CSX in this case, because such an interpretation of the ICCTA would 
“implicitly repeal[] FRSA’s first saving clause.”  Id. at 523.  Thus, the federal court, 
in analyzing federal law, accepted the plaintiff’s argument that when a state statute 
is “one dealing with rail safety, [it] requir[es] analysis under the FRSA’s 
preemption provision.”  Id. at 521. 
{¶ 63} In short, the ICCTA is not to be so broadly applied as to implicitly 
repeal the FRSA.  By its terms, the FRSA preempts only laws, regulations, and 
orders “related to railroad safety” and railroad security.  49 U.S.C. 20106(a).  And 
while the ICCTA may preempt laws bearing on other railroad-related topics, state-
enacted laws related to railroad safety and security are preempted, if at all, by the 
FRSA.  Tyrrell at 523; see also Island Park, L.L.C., v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 
107 (2d Cir.2009) (“FRSA provides the appropriate basis for analyzing whether a 
state law, regulation or order affecting rail safety is pre-empted by federal law”); 
Boston & Maine Corp. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 364 F.3d 318, 321 (D.C.Cir.2004) 
(“primary jurisdiction over railroad safety belongs to the [Federal Railroad 
Administration], not the [Surface Transportation Board]”); Iowa, Chicago & E. RR. 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
Corp. v. Washington Cty., 384 F.3d 557, 560 (8th Cir.2004) (“arguing that ‘rail 
safety’ for purposes of FRSA preemption does not include the highway safety risks 
created at rail crossings [is a] cramped reading of the FRSA [that] is inconsistent 
with 49 U.S.C. § 20134(a), with the federal rail crossing regulations discussed in 
Easterwood, and with common sense”).  All three opinions in this case appear to 
agree that because R.C. 5589.21 is a railroad-safety statute, the FRSA is 
appropriately considered as a source of potential preemption. 
{¶ 64} A paramount question is whether R.C. 5589.21 is a railroad-safety 
law.  The text of R.C. 5589.21 does not use the word “safety,” railroad or otherwise.  
It addresses “the hindrance or inconvenience of travelers or a person passing along 
or upon such street, road, or highway.”  R.C. 5589.21(A).  However, the General 
Assembly amended R.C. 5589.21 in 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 207, 148 Ohio Laws, 
Part V, 10849 (“S.B. 207”), when it enacted R.C. 5589.20, which states: 
 
The general assembly finds that the improper obstruction of railroad 
grade crossings by trains is a direct threat to the health, safety, and 
welfare of the citizens of this state inasmuch as improper 
obstructions create uniquely different local safety problems by 
preventing the timely movement of ambulances, the vehicles of law 
enforcement officers and firefighters, and official and unofficial 
vehicles transporting health care officials and professionals.  It is the 
intent of the general assembly in amending sections 5589.21, 
5589.24, and 5589.99 of the Revised Code that the health, safety, 
and welfare of the citizens of this state be enhanced through those 
amendments. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  This statement of intent specifically refers to the amendment of 
R.C. 5589.21 as expressly related to public safety, and it indicates that obstructions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
of grade crossings create local safety problems by preventing the movement of first 
responders’ and other officials’ vehicles.  I therefore would hold, in agreement with 
the opinion authored by Justice Fischer and joined by one other justice, that R.C. 
5589.21 is a state law providing for the safety of Ohioans in regard to railroad 
crossings. 
{¶ 65} CSX orally argued that R.C. 5589.21 is directed to local safety, not 
“railroad safety,” narrowing its focus, for example, to keeping railway workers and 
passengers safe.  This conclusion seems to have been adopted by Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion.  But FRSA defines railroad safety broadly: “The purpose of this chapter is 
to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related 
accidents and incidents.”  (Emphasis added.)  49 U.S.C. 20101.  R.C. 5589.21 is 
expressly aimed at preventing railroad operations from causing incidents that risk 
the safety of those who cross the rails and the ability of first responders and other 
safety workers to keep others safe.  Grade-crossing safety (though not blocking, 
particularly) is, moreover, directly contemplated by the FRSA, in 49 U.S.C. 20134 
and regulations created thereunder, including 49 C.F.R. 234.105, 234.106, 234.107, 
and 234.209.  R.C. 5589.21 is a safety statute and its direct and only subject is the 
railroads.  I would hold, consistently with Justice Fischer’s opinion, that R.C. 
5589.21 is a railroad-safety statute and, thus, that the FRSA, and not the ICCTA, 
applies. 
{¶ 66} CSX and Justice Kennedy’s opinion rely on a number of cases for 
the proposition that the ICCTA preempts blocked-crossing statutes in general and 
R.C. 5589.21 in particular.  However, these cases are neither binding nor 
persuasive.  For example, in considering a blocked-crossing statute in the context 
of a claim of negligence per se based on a violation of a statute, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ICCTA preempted the 
claim.  Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 806-808 (5th Cir.2011).  It 
reasoned that the ICCTA was aimed primarily at preempting the states’ attempts to 
January Term, 2022 
 
29 
economically manage or govern railroading.  Id. at 804-806.  Then the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that Mississippi’s blocked-crossing statute, as a per se source of liability, 
was the state’s attempt to implicitly regulate train length, speed, and scheduling, all 
of which amounted to economic management or governance of railroading 
throughout the state and thus was preempted by the ICCTA.  Id. at 807-808. 
{¶ 67} However, Elam and decisions like it evince little consideration of the 
FRSA.  See Ezell v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 866 F.3d 294, 300 (5th Cir.2017) 
(dismissing the FRSA in one paragraph); Elam at 808 (dismissing the FRSA in one 
paragraph); Franks Invest. Co., L.L.C. v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 593 F.3d 404 (5th 
Cir.2010) (not mentioning the FRSA at all); Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 
F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2001), fn.18 (refusing to consider the FRSA); Norfolk S. Ry. 
Co., 107 N.E.3d at 478 (declining to consider the FRSA); State v. BNSF Ry. Co., 
56 Kan.App.2d 503, 517-518, 432 P.3d 77 (2018) (declining to consider the FRSA); 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 227 Or.App. 468, 471, 206 
P.3d 261 (2009), fn.2 (mentioning the FRSA in a footnote with little analysis). 
{¶ 68} The Fifth Circuit obliquely acknowledged the viability of the 
approach that I take in this dissent when it explicitly declined to consider the FRSA 
or “what impact the ICCTA would have upon a state provision pertaining strictly 
to such traditionally state-controlled safety issues as local law enforcement and 
emergency vehicle access.”  (Emphasis added.)  Friberg at 444, fn.18.  Several 
courts have followed the Fifth Circuit’s approach on this issue when not according 
full consideration to the FRSA.  See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Edmond, 504 F.Supp.3d 1249, 
1258-1260 (W.D.Okla.2020) (collecting cases).  The United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio expressly joined the Fifth District’s approach 
when considering R.C. 5589.21 in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, N.D.Ohio No. 
3:16CV2242, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64959 (Apr. 28, 2017).  However, the city’s 
law director, the defendant in Williams, not only did not oppose CSX’s arguments 
that federal law preempted R.C. 5589.21, he joined them, noting that he had advised 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
and warned municipal officials that “federal law indeed preempts the blocked-
crossing law.”  Id. at *6.  Thus, Williams is not a case in which the adversarial 
process functioned to produce a reliable result—it is a case in which the district 
court, having no alternative guidance, essentially adopted CSX’s position, which 
was not disputed by the parties. 
{¶ 69} There are cases (though they are few) in which courts have robustly 
analyzed both the ICCTA and the FRSA and concluded that one or both preempted 
state blocked-crossing statutes.  For example, in People v. Burlington N. Santa Fe 
RR., 209 Cal.App.4th 1513, 148 Cal.Rptr. 243 (2012), a California court of appeals 
concluded that the ICCTA, rather than the FRSA, was the appropriate federal law 
to consider when a railroad had been fined for blocking a crossing, id. at 1522-
1528.  However, it reached that conclusion by inserting the word “primarily” into 
the statutory-purpose analysis to evade the safety implications of the blocked-
crossing statute at issue.  Id. at 1524.  I find that case to be unpersuasive, especially 
considering the explicit safety considerations iterated by the Ohio General 
Assembly in S.B. 207 and set forth in R.C. 5589.20. 
{¶ 70} In short, R.C. 5589.21, which is especially referenced in R.C. 
5589.20, is a safety statute.  Its direct and only target is railroad operations.  The 
FRSA, and not the ICCTA, is the vehicle for the preemptive analysis that should 
be applied to R.C. 5589.21. 
B.  Whether the FRSA Preempts R.C. 5589.21 
{¶ 71} As a safety statute then, the question remains: Does R.C. 5589.21 fit 
within either of the two safe harbors of the FRSA to avoid federal preemption?  
According to 49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2), these two distinct safe harbors are 
 
[1.]  A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, 
or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of 
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the 
January Term, 2022 
 
31 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security 
matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the 
subject matter of the State requirement. 
 
and 
 
[2.]  A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more 
stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or 
security when the law, regulation, or order— 
(A)  is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local 
safety or security hazard; 
(B)  is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of 
the United States Government; and 
(C) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 72} Under the first safe harbor, the FRSA would preempt R.C. 5589.21 
if the secretary of transportation were to prescribe a regulation or issue an order 
covering the subject matter of blocked crossings.  “[P]re-emption will lie only if 
the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state 
law.”  Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387.  The parties, 
the trial court, and the three opinions in this case appear to agree that there is no 
federal regulation or order directly covering the topic of blocked crossings. 
{¶ 73} The most analogous regulation that the parties cite, or which 
research reveals, is 49 C.F.R. 234.209, which prohibits railroads, “without first 
taking measures to provide for safety of highway traffic,” from permitting trains to 
stand within a grade-crossing warning system’s approach circuit, “other than 
normal train movements or switching operations, where the warning system is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
32 
designed to accommodate those activities.”  However, this section, when read in its 
entirety and in the context of related regulations, is a maintenance regulation 
directing that warning systems are not to be interfered with unless alternative 
traffic-control measures are in place.  And because “normal train movements or 
switching operations” are exempted, the regulation does not control when trains 
block crossings under ordinary conditions.  In the absence of federal regulation 
substantially subsuming the subject matter of blocked crossings, R.C. 5589.21 does 
fall under the safe harbor contemplated in 49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2), and Ohio “may 
adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety * * * 
until the Secretary of Transportation * * * prescribes a regulation or issues an order 
covering the subject matter of the State requirement.”1 
{¶ 74} I recognize that many of the courts that have considered the matter 
have differed with this analysis and instead accepted the view that blocking statutes 
implicitly regulate train speed, length, and safety checks.  See, e.g., Mundelein v. 
Wisconsin Cent. RR., 227 Ill.2d 281, 882 N.E.2d 544 (2008) (collecting cases); 
Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 589 Pa. 576, 910 A.2d 20 (2006); CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Plymouth, 283 F.3d 812, 816-817 (6th Cir.2002); Seattle v. Burlington N. RR. 
Co., 145 Wash.2d 661, 673, 41 P.3d 1169 (Wash.2002).  These decisions address 
broad implicit concepts of the nature of blocking statutes.  They reach the 
conclusions that such laws are not saved by the first safe harbor, because there are 
federal regulations governing train speed and safety checks (such as brakes).  See 
49 C.F.R. 213.9 (speed limits); 49 C.F.R. Part 232 (brake requirements).  In these 
instances, federal regulation of train speed and safety checks are found to have 
substantially subsumed the subject matter of blocked crossings because, in effect, 
 
1. I also note, but do not specifically analyze in this case, that under the second safe harbor, Ohio 
may “adopt or continue in force” an additional or more stringent law related to railroad safety when 
the law is “necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard,” is not 
incompatible with federal law, and does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.  49 U.S.C. 
20106(a)(2). 
January Term, 2022 
 
33 
they control how long a train will linger across a grade crossing.  This reasoning is 
apparent in the opinion authored by Justice Fischer. 
{¶ 75} However, I view this differently.  Holding that speed and safety 
checks impliedly subsume the subject matter of blocked crossings because blocked-
crossing legislation is impliedly related to speed and safety checks does not take 
into account the plain fact that R.C. 5589.21 does not in any manner address speed, 
length, or safety checks.  R.C. 5589.21 states only that a train (however long or 
short, slow or fast, safe or not) cannot (without valid reason) be stopped across a 
grade crossing for longer than five minutes.  Thus, R.C. 5589.21(C) applies only to 
trains that are stopped.2  Under R.C. 5589.21, CSX may still operate a train of any 
length or at any speed and conduct all required safety checks—it just cannot stop 
across a road for too long.  I note that R.C. 5589.21(C) also provides a valid excuse 
when the stoppage is “caused by circumstances wholly beyond the control of the 
railroad company.”  If a federal law or regulation either directly or implicitly 
required CSX to block a crossing for a prohibited amount of time (a proposition 
CSX suggested in oral argument but never clearly explained in its brief), the Ohio 
statute might not apply, because that would likely be a circumstance beyond CSX’s 
control.  But that has not been shown in the record of this appeal.  For these reasons, 
I would hold that the Ohio statute does not conflict with or regulate the same subject 
matter as existing federal law and accordingly, that R.C. 5589.21 is not preempted 
by federal law. 
 
2. Though the statute also applies to “switching” operations, as the term is used, “switching” means 
the process of sorting items of rolling stock into complete trains or the reverse.  CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 689, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011) (“switching” is the name 
for a process involving frequent starts and stops to add and remove individual rail cars).  In United 
States v. Seaboard Air Line RR. Co., 361 U.S. 78, 80 S.Ct. 12, 4 L.Ed.2d 25 (1959), the Supreme 
Court noted that it had previously recognized that “ ‘switching operations’ were not ‘train’ 
movements within the meaning of [a federal railroad] Act,” id. at 80, quoting United States v. Erie 
RR. Co., 237 U.S. 402, 408, 35 S.Ct. 621, 59 L.Ed. 1019 (1915), and that “ ‘switching [is] classifying 
and assembling cars within railroad yards for the purpose of making up trains,’ ” id. at 81, quoting 
United States v. N. Pacific Ry. Co., 254 U.S. 251, 254-255, 41 S.Ct. 102, 65 L.Ed. 249 (1920). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
34 
{¶ 76} Finally, some Ohio court decisions that note the failure of the federal 
authorities to legislate railroad safety have held that R.C. 5589.21 is within the safe 
harbor provided by the FRSA.  See State v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 139 
Ohio App.3d 271, 273-274, 743 N.E.2d 513 (9th Dist.2000); State v. Chessie Sys. 
RR., 9th Dist. Wayne No. 2494, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 24, *4-7 (Jan. 3, 1990).  
While I would not fully embrace the rationales adopted in these various cases, I 
would reach the same conclusions using the rationale set forth in this opinion. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 77} In my view, as the law exists today, neither the ICCTA nor the FRSA 
preempts the operation and application of R.C. 5589.21.  No opinion in this case 
has garnered a majority to say which of those two preempts R.C. 5589.21.  Like 
Justice Fischer, I would hold that the FRSA, not the ICCTA, is the appropriate 
federal statutory scheme for examining whether preemption applies, because, as 
informed by R.C. 5589.20, R.C. 5589.21 is a public-safety statute focused 
exclusively on railroading.  Thus, the FRSA, not the ICCTA, governs railroad 
safety.  However, I would also hold that R.C. 5589.21 is not preempted by the 
FRSA.  A safe-harbor provision in 49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2) permits states to adopt or 
continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the 
secretary of transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the 
subject matter of the state requirement.  Because no federal regulations have been 
adopted to address the topic of blocked crossings, the FRSA does not preempt R.C. 
5589.21.  I would not find that federal regulations on brake testing, speed, or other 
topics operate to substantially subsume or implicitly preempt R.C. 5589.21. 
{¶ 78} Finally, I note that if a federal regulation were to apply in such a way 
as to permit or require CSX to block a crossing with a stopped train for longer than 
the time permitted by R.C. 5589.21, then the exclusion in division C of R.C. 
5589.21 would operate to render R.C. 5589.21 inapplicable.  R.C. 5589.21 does not 
apply to the obstruction of a public street, road, or highway when the blockage is 
January Term, 2022 
 
35 
caused by circumstances beyond the control of the railroad company.  A federal 
regulation, if shown to require such a stoppage given the factual circumstances of 
a particular train, would be just such a circumstance, but that has not been shown 
in this record. 
{¶ 79} For all these reasons, I would conclude that R.C. 5589.21 is not 
preempted by existing federal law.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
David W. Phillips, Union County Prosecuting Attorney, and Samantha M. 
Hobbs, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Mayer Brown, L.L.P., and Evan M. Tager; and Shumaker, Loop & 
Kendrick, L.L.P., Terrance K. Davis, and Nicholas T. Stack, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost. 
Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., Joseph J. Santoro, and Richard C.O. Rezie, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Railroad Association. 
Burns White, L.L.C., and Colleen A. Mountcastle; and Kathryn D. 
Kirmayer and Daniel Saphire, urging reversal for amicus curiae Association of 
American Railroads. 
_________________