Title: State v. Loayza

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2066-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Alfonso C. Loayza, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 389 Wis. 2d 625,937 N.W.2d 299 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 11, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 10, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock   
 
JUDGE: 
John M. Wood & Richard T. Werner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general; with 
whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Michael C. Sanders. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Jennifer A. Lohr and Lohr Law Offices, LLC, Madison. There was 
an oral argument by Jennifer A. Lohr. 
 
 
2021 WI 11 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2066-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF1219) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Alfonso C. Loayza, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 11, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The State of Wisconsin seeks 
review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of 
appeals that reversed Alfonso Loayza's judgment of conviction 
for eighth offense operating while intoxicated (OWI).1  The court 
of appeals determined that the State did not prove, by a 
                                                 
1 State v. Loayza, No. 2018AP2066-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2019) (per curiam) (reversing and 
remanding judgment and order of the circuit court for Rock 
County, Richard T. Werner and John M. Wood, Judges). 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
2 
 
preponderance of the evidence, one of Loayza's prior convictions 
and accordingly remanded the instant conviction for resentencing 
as a seventh offense. 
¶2 
Failure to prove a prior conviction is of import 
because repeat OWI offenders are subject to a system of enhanced 
penalties based on the number of prior convictions.  The types 
of prior convictions that are "countable" for purposes of 
enhanced penalties are set by statute.2 
¶3 
Arguing that the court of appeals erred, the State 
contends 
that 
it 
proved 
the 
existence 
of 
Loayza's 
1990 
California 
OWI 
conviction 
by 
referring 
to 
both 
Loayza's 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) driving record and 
documentation from California.  Loayza disagrees, asserting that 
the record is insufficient to demonstrate that he was convicted 
of a countable offense in California in 1990.   
¶4 
Based on a review of the record before us, including 
Loayza's admissions contained in the California documentation, 
together with the DOT driving record and the references to his 
probation contained in the California materials, we determine 
that it is more likely than not that Loayza had a 1990 
California OWI conviction.  We therefore conclude that the State 
has met its burden of proof, demonstrating by a preponderance of 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (2011-12). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
3 
 
the evidence the existence of Loayza's 1990 California OWI 
conviction. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶6 
On May 26, 2012, Loayza was stopped by a police 
officer for speeding.  During the course of the stop, Loayza 
admitted to recently drinking, and a preliminary breath test 
indicated a 0.14% blood alcohol concentration.  A subsequent 
blood test confirmed that Loayza's blood alcohol concentration 
was well above the legal limit for driving.3  Upon running a 
check of Loayza's driving record, the officer noted that Loayza 
had eight prior alcohol-related convictions. 
¶7 
The State charged Loayza with one count of OWI4 as a 
ninth offense and one count of operating with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration (PAC),5 also as a ninth offense.  Detailed 
in the complaint were Loayza's alleged prior convictions——three 
convictions from California in 1989, 1990, and 1991, and five 
subsequent convictions in Wisconsin between 1992 and 2009. 
¶8 
Moving to collaterally attack all three of his 
California convictions, Loayza did not contest the existence of 
the convictions, but argued instead that the pleas in those 
                                                 
3 Due to his prior convictions, Loayza was prohibited from 
driving with a blood alcohol concentration above 0.02.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c). 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a). 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
4 
 
cases were entered without a valid waiver of counsel.  In an 
affidavit 
accompanying 
the 
motion, 
Loayza 
acknowledged 
convictions in 1989, 1990, and 1991, but averred that he had no 
recollection as to whether he was represented at sentencing for 
any of those convictions or whether the judge advised him 
regarding his right to counsel.  The circuit court denied this 
motion in its entirety. 
¶9 
Loayza ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of OWI 
as a ninth offense.6  However, he made his plea contingent on the 
State proving his number of prior convictions. 
¶10 At sentencing, the State submitted three exhibits as 
proof of Loayza's prior convictions.  First, it offered a 
certified copy of Loayza's DOT driving record, which listed 
eight prior convictions.   
¶11 Second, the State submitted a set of documents from 
San Mateo County, California, that related to Loayza's 1989 and 
1990 convictions.  This material included a criminal complaint 
alleging an offense date of March 5, 1990, charging Loayza with 
three counts——the California equivalents of OWI, PAC, and 
operating after revocation (OAR).  It also included a guilty 
plea form dated May 11, 1990, indicating a no contest plea to 
the offense correlated with the California OAR statute.  The 
submission further contained a case docket reflecting that 
                                                 
6 The Honorable Richard T. Werner presided over Loayza's 
plea, entered the judgment of conviction, and heard a motion for 
resentencing and a postconviction motion alleging an unduly 
harsh sentence.  The additional postconviction proceedings at 
issue in this case took place before the Honorable John M. Wood. 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
5 
 
Loayza's probation on "count 1," the OWI count, was revoked on 
January 22, 1992. 
¶12 Third, the State offered documents from Santa Clara 
County, California, which addressed Loayza's 1991 conviction.  
These materials included a felony complaint filed against Loayza 
again charging him with three counts——OWI, PAC, and OAR.  As 
relevant here, the complaint contained the following allegation:  
"It is further alleged that the said defendant did commit a 
violation of Vehicle Code Section 23152(A) [(OWI)], on or about 
MARCH 5, 1990, and was duly convicted thereof in the MUNICIPAL 
Court of the County of SAN MATEO, State of California in Docket 
218M258."  The 1991 Santa Clara County materials also included a 
"felony minutes" sheet indicating that Loayza pleaded guilty to 
a PAC charge on October 30, 1991, and at that time admitted to 
three prior offenses. 
¶13 Loayza conceded that the State offered sufficient 
proof of his 1991 conviction.  However, he asserted that it 
failed to establish the existence of the 1989 and 1990 
convictions. 
¶14 The circuit court rejected Loayza's arguments and 
determined that both the 1989 and 1990 convictions were 
established through the exhibits submitted by the State.  With 
regard to the 1990 conviction, the circuit court referenced the 
San Mateo County documents, stating, "[i]t's clear to me by 
reading this documentation that he was convicted of that, and I 
think this is competent proof of that particular conviction." 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
6 
 
¶15 Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
Loayza's current conviction constituted a ninth offense and 
sentenced him to a bifurcated sentence consisting of five years 
of initial confinement followed by five years of extended 
supervision.  Loayza subsequently filed the first of two 
postconviction motions challenging the proof submitted for the 
1989 and 1990 California convictions.  In this initial motion, 
he sought resentencing, arguing that the State did not offer 
sufficient proof of the 1989 conviction.  The circuit court 
agreed, amending the judgment of conviction to reflect an eighth 
offense rather than a ninth.  However, it sentenced Loayza to 
the same term of confinement and supervision that it had 
initially imposed. 
¶16 Loayza then brought the postconviction motion at issue 
in the present case.  He contended that his sentence should be 
modified to reflect its status as a seventh offense rather than 
an eighth offense.   
¶17 Specifically, he argued that the California documents 
provided by the State do not support the determination that a 
conviction occurred in 1990.  He asserted first that the 
California materials are not sufficiently reliable to prove the 
1990 conviction because the documents were not certified.  
Second, he contended that the submitted California materials do 
not prove that a conviction occurred in 1990 because no judgment 
of conviction was included and the case dockets do not list any 
information regarding the ultimate disposition of the charges.   
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
7 
 
¶18 Finally, Loayza argued that even if the materials 
prove a conviction occurred, they do not prove that the 
conviction was for OWI.  The plea form in the record states that 
Loayza pleaded guilty to a violation of the California "Vehicle 
Code, § 14601.2(a)," which corresponds to the statute number 
used in the 1990 complaint for operating while suspended or 
revoked, not OWI. 
¶19 The 
circuit 
court 
rejected 
Loayza's 
arguments, 
observing 
that 
Loayza 
"admitted 
and 
conceded 
the 
1990 
conviction.  That's made clear by Judge Werner's written 
decision where he stated earlier that the defendant concedes 
there's sufficient evidence to establish the seven prior 
convictions."  The circuit court noted that the San Mateo County 
documents may not be complete, but relied on the Santa Clara 
County 
documents' 
notation 
that 
Loayza 
had 
three 
prior 
convictions at the time of his 1991 conviction: 
[F]or whatever reason we have what we have from San 
Mateo County.  But much more critical to me, as far as 
I'm concerned, is even better information that comes 
from Santa Clara County document [sic] of three priors 
and documents that are in fact signed by a judge with 
regard to the felony minutes. 
¶20 Loayza appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
State v. Loayza, No. 2018AP2066-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2019) (per curiam).  It determined that the 
proffered evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that Loayza 
was convicted of OWI in 1990.   
¶21 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
acknowledged 
that 
"[t]he 
complaint alleges the same offense date as the DOT report; the 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
8 
 
complaint charges OWI (among other offenses); and the plea 
questionnaire is dated with the same day that the DOT shows as 
the conviction date."  Id., ¶9.  However, it concluded that 
"other aspects of the California material cast doubt on whether 
any conviction occurred in that case and, if it did, that it was 
for OWI."  Id.  
¶22 It observed that there is no judgment of conviction in 
the record, and the docket printout does not expressly show that 
a conviction occurred.  Id., ¶10.  In the court of appeals' 
view, the plea form, which uses the statute number corresponding 
to operating after suspension and revocation, "supports an 
inference that, if there was a conviction in May 1990 as 
reported by the DOT record, it was not for OWI, but only for 
operating after suspension and revocation."  Id., ¶11. 
¶23 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded "that the 
DOT driving record entry for an OWI conviction in May 1990 is 
rendered unreliable by the California materials."  Id., ¶15.  
Viewing the Wisconsin DOT and California materials as a whole, 
the court of appeals determined that the submissions "are not 
sufficiently reliable to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there was an OWI conviction in 1990."  Id.  The State 
petitioned this court for review. 
II 
¶24 We are asked to review whether the State proved, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of Loayza's 1990 
California OWI conviction.  If so, that conviction can serve as 
a penalty enhancer in this case.  Whether there exists 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
9 
 
sufficient evidence to prove a penalty enhancer presents a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court or court of 
appeals.  State v. Koeppen, 2000 WI App 121, ¶36, 237 
Wis. 2d 418, 614 N.W.2d 530. 
III 
¶25 Pursuant 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes, 
repeat 
OWI 
offenders are subject to a system of increased penalties based 
on the number of prior convictions.  State v. Braunschweig, 2018 
WI 113, ¶15, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am). 
 
As 
relevant 
here, 
the 
types 
of 
prior 
convictions that are "countable" for purposes of enhanced 
penalties are set by Wis. Stat. § 343.307 and include:7  
Convictions under the law of another jurisdiction that 
prohibits a person from refusing chemical testing or 
using a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the 
influence of a controlled substance or controlled 
substance analog, or a combination thereof; with an 
excess or specified range of alcohol concentration; 
while under the influence of any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely driving; or 
while having a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance in his or her blood, as those or 
substantially 
similar 
terms 
are 
used 
in 
that 
jurisdiction's laws. 
§ 343.307(1)(d). 
                                                 
7 Although not relevant to the present case, convictions 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1) (homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle) and Wis. Stat. § 940.25 (injury by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle) are also countable for purposes of determining the 
penalty for a repeat OWI offender.  See State v. Carter, 2010 WI 
132, 
¶3, 
330 
Wis. 2d 1, 
794 
N.W.2d 213; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am). 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
10 
 
¶26 A previous conviction is not an element of an OWI 
offense.  State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 538, 319 
N.W.2d 865 (1982).  However, in any OWI prosecution, the burden 
is on the State to prove any prior convictions.  See 
Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, ¶32; State v. Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d 91, 104, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996).  It must do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 
¶39. 
¶27 At 
issue 
in 
the 
present 
case 
is 
whether 
the 
documentary evidence in the record is sufficient to establish, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, Loayza's 1990 California OWI 
conviction.  The State has not offered a certified copy of a 
judgment of conviction reflecting Loayza's 1990 California 
conviction.   
¶28 However, this deficiency is not necessarily fatal to 
the State's case, as this court has previously stated that "the 
convictions may be proven by certified copies of conviction or 
other competent proof offered by the state before sentencing."  
McAllister, 
107 
Wis. 2d at 
539 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Such 
"competent proof must reliably demonstrate, with particularity, 
the existence of each" prior conviction.  State v. Spaeth, 206 
Wis. 2d 135, 150, 556 N.W.2d 728 (1996). 
¶29 As "competent proof," the State offers among other 
items a certified copy of Loayza's DOT driving record to 
establish the existence of his 1990 California conviction.  The 
driving record contains an entry indicating that Loayza was 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
11 
 
convicted of an OWI offense in California on May 11, 1990, for a 
violation occurring on March 5, 1990. 
¶30 The court of appeals has previously determined that a 
DOT certified driving transcript is admissible evidence to 
establish repeater status.  State v. Van Riper, 2003 WI App 237, 
¶2, 267 Wis. 2d 759, 672 N.W.2d 156.  Such a conclusion 
logically followed from this court's determination in Spaeth 
that a teletype of a defendant's DOT driving record is 
sufficient to establish the existence of a prior OAR conviction.  
Id., ¶16; see Spaeth, 206 Wis. 2d at 153.   
¶31 Indeed, a certified DOT driving record is "a public 
record and admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule" 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 908.03(8).8  State v. Leis, 134 
Wis. 2d 441, 445, 397 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1986).  It is "self-
authenticating by virtue of a certificate attached to the record 
bearing the State of Wisconsin, Department of Transportation 
seal and the facsimile signature of the Administrator of the 
Division 
of 
Motor 
Vehicles 
attesting 
to 
the 
record's 
authenticity."  Id. 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.03(8) provides that the following 
"are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant 
is available as a witness:" 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in 
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth 
(a) the activities of the office or agency, or (b) 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law, or 
(c) in civil cases and against the state in criminal 
cases, 
factual 
findings 
resulting 
from 
an 
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by 
law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
12 
 
¶32 Loayza thus does not challenge the admissibility of 
the DOT driving record.  He focuses his challenge on the 
information contained within the driving record regarding the 
1990 California conviction, arguing that despite the entry 
referencing the 1990 conviction, the underlying documentation 
does not support the premise that he was convicted of OWI at 
that time. 
¶33 The court of appeals agreed with Loayza.  It focused 
its review on the San Mateo County materials submitted by the 
State.  Beginning its analysis, the court of appeals observed 
that 
although 
the 
record 
contains 
a 
criminal 
complaint 
indicating an offense date of March 5, 1990, and a conviction 
date of May 11 of that same year, no judgment of conviction was 
included in the record, and the docket printout that was in the 
record does not expressly show that a conviction occurred.  
Loayza, No. 2018AP2066-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶9-10.   
¶34 Next, the court of appeals further opined that "[e]ven 
if a conviction did occur in that case, the materials raise 
doubt about whether it was for OWI."  Id., ¶11.  To explain, the 
May 1990 plea form does not identify to which of the three 
charges (OWI, PAC, or OAR) Loayza entered a no contest plea, but 
the statute number referenced is that for the OAR charge.  Id.  
"Thus, the plea form supports an inference that, if there was a 
conviction in May 1990 as reported by the DOT record, it was not 
for 
OWI, 
but 
only 
for 
operating 
after 
suspension 
and 
revocation."  Id.  In sum, in the court of appeals' view, the 
California materials submitted in the record, although "clearly 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
13 
 
for the case that corresponds to the DOT entry of a conviction 
in May 1990, . . . do not show that a conviction occurred then, 
or at any other specific time."  Id., ¶13. 
¶35 We agree with the State that the court of appeals 
erred.  Specifically, upon review of the entire record and in 
light of the DOT driving record and the applicable burden of 
proof (preponderance of the evidence), the court of appeals did 
not give proper weight to Loayza's previous admissions to the 
1990 California conviction or to the materials in the record 
relating to Loayza's 1991 California OWI conviction from Santa 
Clara County.   
¶36 To explain, the record contains several actions on 
Loayza's part that can reasonably be construed as admissions to 
the 1990 conviction.  First, when early in this case Loayza 
collaterally attacked all three of his California convictions, 
his affidavit referred to his "three Prior California DUI/OWI 
Convictions from 1989, 1990 and 1991."  At that time, he did not 
challenge the existence of any of these convictions, but instead 
asserted that he did not recall if he was represented by counsel 
and had not validly waived counsel.  Thus, Loayza's own 
affidavit, at a bare minimum, acknowledges the existence of the 
1990 conviction. 
¶37 Second, the 1991 Santa Clara County materials provide 
an additional instance of an admission to the 1990 San Mateo 
County conviction.  The complaint filed in the 1991 Santa Clara 
County case alleges as a prior conviction the 1990 conviction in 
San Mateo County, and the "felony minutes" of Loayza's plea 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
14 
 
hearing in the 1991 case indicate that Loayza admitted to three 
prior convictions.  Based on the complaint and the entire record 
in this case, including the DOT driving record, it is a 
reasonable inference that one of the three admitted prior 
convictions was the 1990 San Mateo County conviction. 
¶38 We 
have 
previously 
opined 
that 
"a 
defendant's 
admission, whether given personally or imputed through counsel, 
is competent proof of prior . . . convictions."  Spaeth, 206 
Wis. 2d at 148; see also Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d at 105 ("If an 
accused admits to a prior offense that admission is, of course, 
competent proof of a prior offense and the State is relieved of 
its burden to further establish the prior conviction.").  
Although Spaeth addressed OAR convictions, we can think of no 
reason why it is not applicable also to OWI convictions. 
¶39 Further, the record of the 1990 San Mateo County case 
contains a reference to Loayza's probation being revoked and 
Loayza being sentenced on "count 1."  In the complaint, count 1 
corresponds to the OWI charge.  From this notation, it is a 
reasonable inference that Loayza was convicted and placed on 
probation for the 1990 OWI conviction.  Indeed, his probation 
could not have been revoked on count 1 had he not been placed on 
probation on count 1, and he could not have been placed on 
probation had he not been convicted.  Accordingly, the notation 
that Loayza's probation was revoked supports the inference that 
he was convicted of the identified "count 1" for OWI. 
¶40 With an eye toward the fact that the applicable burden 
of proof here is a preponderance of the evidence, Loayza's 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
15 
 
admissions, coupled with the DOT driving record and the 
references to his probation, are sufficient to meet such a 
burden.  The State must demonstrate only that it is more likely 
than not that Loayza was convicted of OWI in 1990.  See State v. 
Rodriguez, 2007 WI App 252, ¶18, 306 Wis. 2d 129, 743 N.W.2d 460 
(citing United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270, 280 (7th Cir. 
1995)) (explaining that "to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence means that it is 'more likely than not' that the 
examined action occurred").  On this record, it has done so. 
¶41 Although we determine that Loayza's challenge to the 
veracity of the DOT driving record is unsuccessful, we emphasize 
that the information contained in a DOT driving record is not 
unassailable.  Indeed, "the accused must have an opportunity to 
challenge the existence of the prior offense."  Wideman, 206 
Wis. 2d at 105.  Accordingly, we have previously offered the 
following guidance:   
The State and defense counsel should, prior to 
sentencing, investigate the accused's prior driving 
record.  The State should be prepared at sentencing to 
establish the prior offenses by appropriate official 
records or other competent proof.  Defense counsel 
should be prepared at sentencing to put the State to 
its proof when the state's allegations of prior 
offenses are incorrect or defense counsel cannot 
verify the existence of the prior offenses. 
Id. at 108. 
¶42 Such an admonition is consistent with this court's 
statement in State v. Saunders concerning the proof necessary to 
apply a general repeater sentencing enhancement:   
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
16 
 
[A] defendant is always permitted to contest the 
authenticity or, more likely, the accuracy of even a 
certified copy of a judgment of conviction.  Human 
beings complete these forms and, although we would 
hope that typographical errors within these important 
documents 
are 
rare, 
errors 
may 
nonetheless 
exist. . . . Put simply, judicial personnel are not 
infallible.  Accordingly, even a certified copy of a 
document establishing a prior conviction may be 
rebutted, 
just 
as 
inaccuracy 
in 
a 
presentence 
investigation report may be challenged. 
State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 
N.W.2d 263. 
¶43 As the court of appeals in the present case correctly 
stated, "[a] DOT record may be sufficiently reliable when that 
is the only information available, but additional information 
may cast doubt on the reliability of a DOT entry to a degree 
that makes the entry insufficiently reliable to meet the State's 
burden."  Loayza, No. 2018AP2066-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶7. 
¶44 We further emphasize that a challenge to a DOT driving 
record does not involve any burden shifting.  Both the burden of 
production and the burden of proof remain on the State to prove 
prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence whether or 
not a defendant raises an objection. 
¶45 In sum, based on a review of the record before us, 
including Loayza's admissions contained in the California 
documentation, together with the DOT driving record and the 
references 
to 
his 
probation 
contained 
in 
the 
California 
materials, we determine that it is more likely than not that 
Loayza was convicted in California of OWI in 1990.  We therefore 
conclude 
that 
the 
State 
has 
met 
its 
burden 
of 
proof, 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
17 
 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence the existence 
of Loayza's 1990 California OWI conviction. 
¶46 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
2018AP2066-CR   
 
 
 
1