Title: Sidwell v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sidwell v. State1998 WY 106964 P.2d 416Case Number: 97-11Decided: 08/19/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Douglas SIDWELL, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot Springs County, Gary P. Hartman, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Stephen Singer, 
Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Scott Michael Powers, Taylor Reed, 
Dyan Davidson and Luke Tremain, Student Interns, for 
Appellant(Defendant).

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee(Plaintiff).

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ., and GRANT, 
District Judge.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant's 
orchestrated efforts to lure two teenaged friends of his son far from home for a 
sexual encounter struck a sour note when the boys realized their predicament and 
fled into the custody of authorities. Convicted on two counts of taking indecent 
liberties with minors, appellant appeals alleging several procedural 
irregularities. Finding none, we affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, 
Douglas Sidwell (Sidwell), presents three issues on 
appeal:

1. Did the trial 
court deprive the appellant of his right to confront the witnesses against him 
when it refused his request for another preliminary hearing even though critical 
portions of the preliminary hearing that was held were never 
recorded?

2. Did the trial 
court deprive the appellant of a fair trial when it denied the appellant's 
challenges for cause of venire persons who admitted they were strongly biased 
against the appellant's homosexual lifestyle?

3. Did the trial 
court deprive the appellant of his right to confront the witnesses against him 
when it denied him the opportunity to impeach a key prosecution 
witness?

As appellee, the 
State answers each of the questions posed by Sidwell in the 
negative.

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      The 
forty-eight-year-old Sidwell invited two young men, sixteen and seventeen years 
of age at the time, on a trip from Evansville, Wyoming to Thermopolis, Wyoming, 
ostensibly for an overnight visit and swim. In anticipation of the trip, Sidwell 
provisioned his vehicle with a cooler full of beer and liquor, some xxx-rated 
video tapes, and a VCR. Upon their arrival in Thermopolis, Sidwell, his 
twenty-two-year-old male companion and the two boys1 took occupancy of a motel room. 
During the night, Sidwell and his male companion showed pornographic movies and 
made alcohol available to the juveniles. Sidwell attempted to fondle both 
juveniles. Failing that effort, Sidwell and his male companion engaged in mutual 
oral sex without concern for the presence of the juvenile boys. Next morning, 
the two juveniles were left alone long enough to make good their escape. With 
the recruiting trip in shambles, Sidwell and his male companion were arrested in 
the Wind River Canyon as they fled homeward.

[¶4]      Charged with two 
counts of taking immoral or indecent liberties with a minor in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-105 (Rpl. July 1994), Sidwell was given a preliminary hearing on 
April 10, 1995. The preliminary hearing ran long and was continued to May 16, 
1995. In the interim, Sidwell discovered that the machine recording his April 
10th hearing had malfunctioned. Aware of the problem in early May, Sidwell's 
counsel waited until October 9, 1995, two weeks before trial was scheduled to 
begin, to move for a second preliminary hearing in order to rectify the 
recording problem. That motion was denied.

[¶5]      Jury selection 
consumed the entire day of February 27, 1996. Voir dire was marked by frank 
discussions concerning the panel's views on homosexuality, pornography, children 
as victims, and the use of alcoholic beverages. In the course of the jury 
selection, the district court gave its imprimatur to three prosecution 
challenges for cause and four such challenges made on behalf of Sidwell. Three 
panel members expressed disdain for homosexuality, founded upon religious 
beliefs. When each agreed to put aside personal views to consider the evidence, 
the district court refused Sidwell's challenges for cause. After Sidwell passed 
on the panel for cause, a jury was seated including none of those who had voiced 
objections to homosexuality.

[¶6]      Trial began the 
next day, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts late in the 
afternoon of February 29, 1996. Free on bond, Sidwell was again incarcerated 
when a hearing revealed his contact with a third troubled youth and efforts to 
have one of his victims recant his trial testimony. With credit for the time 
thus served, Sidwell was sentenced to concurrent terms of not less than 
forty-two months nor more than eighty-four months. This appeal timely 
followed.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      In his first 
issue, Sidwell scores the district court's refusal to remand for a second, 
fully recorded, preliminary hearing. He also claims the district court 
erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of one victim concerning prior 
legal difficulties. Both issues implicate constitutional rights to confrontation 
and cross-examination. As such, they present questions of law which require de 
novo assessment on appeal. United States v. McCarty, 82 F.3d 943, 949 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 257, 136 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1996). If, 
however, we find that the right to confrontation has not been abridged, the 
nature and extent of cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent a demonstrated abuse of that 
discretion. Id.; Amin v. State, 686 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 
1984).

[¶8]      Sidwell also 
asserts that his challenges to the three homophobic jury panel members were 
improperly denied by the district court. Such claims, too, are usually amenable 
to the "abuse of discretion" standard. Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1041 
(Wyo. 1986), aff'd, 731 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1987). However, they are not the proper 
subject of appellate review unless the appellant has exhausted his peremptory 
challenges and refused to accept the panel. Lee v. State, 743 P.2d 296, 298 
(Wyo. 1987). The appellant in this case passed the jury panel for cause. As a 
consequence, he is foreclosed from pursuit of that issue on appeal. Munoz v. 
State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1993).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Sidwell claims he 
was hamstrung in his efforts to confront and cross-examine his youthful 
accusers. The right to confrontation is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10. Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶10]   Sidwell alleges that the incomplete 
record of his preliminary hearing, combined with the district court's refusal to 
remand for a new preliminary hearing, abridged his constitutional right to 
confront and cross-examine the accuser whose preliminary testimony was lost. 
This argument misperceives the guarantee of confrontation. "Generally speaking, 
the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 
20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985).

[¶11]   Sidwell does not contend that he 
was denied the unfettered opportunity to crossexamine his accuser, either 
at the preliminary hearing or, more importantly, before the jury. He does not 
claim that his right to physically face and cross-examine his accuser was less 
than fully vindicated. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S. Ct. 989, 
998, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987). Rather, Sidwell claims the absence of a record 
deprived him of opportunities to impeach his accuser's statements to the jury 
with disparate statements made during the preliminary 
hearing.

[¶12]   Ironically, every impeachment 
opportunity identified by Sidwell involves preliminary hearing testimony which 
paints a much less flattering portrait of him than that sketched at trial. Had 
he a perfect record, Sidwell still would have faced a true "Hobson's choice," as 
Justice Brown instructed us on the term. See Schmidt v. State, 738 P.2d 1105, 
1106 n. 1 (Wyo. 1987). Rare and suspect would be the defender willing to expose 
a jury to such damning preliminary hearing testimony in order to question the 
relatively tepid version of events given at trial.

[¶13]   Our decision is not, however, fact 
driven. Assuming a full record would, indeed, have aided Sidwell, we nonetheless 
affirm the district court's denial of remand. Sidwell's unfettered 
opportunity for cross-examination fully vindicated his constitutional rights 
to confrontation and cross-examination. Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1557-58 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 115, 116 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1991). 
So long as those rights are jealously safeguarded, a trial court is vested with 
and may properly exercise wide latitude in controlling cross-examination. 
McCarty, 82 F.3d  at 950; Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 392 (Wyo. 
1979).

[¶14]   Barring the constitutional 
argument, Sidwell persists in attacking the district court's refusal to remand 
as violative of the entitlement afforded by W.R.Cr.P. 
5.1(d):

Record of 
proceedings. - On timely application to the court, counsel for the parties shall 
be given an opportunity to have the recording of the [preliminary] hearing made 
available for their information in connection with any further proceedings or in 
connection with their preparation for trial.

In the face of 
the foregoing rule, we are asked if the district court's refusal to order a 
second preliminary hearing "exceeds the bounds of measured reason in light of 
those matters properly before that court[,]" and, as such, constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo. 
1995).

The motion for 
remand was made in the face of an impending trial date. No rationale is offered 
for the five month delay between discovery of the poor recording and the 
resultant motion for remand.

[¶15]   Timeliness can be of the essence in 
criminal proceedings. For example, waiting until shortly before trial to issue 
discovery demands is, per se, unreasonable. Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 841 
(Wyo. 1978). It should be no surprise that a similar rule applies in this case. 
In construing W.R.Cr.P. 5.1(d), we hold "timely" to mean proximally to Sidwell's 
arraignment unless good cause is shown why counsel could not and did not 
discover and challenge the defect in the early days of trial preparation. 
Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo. 1994). Here, Sidwell waited five 
months, until just before trial was set, to complain of the defect. Such a 
belated application cannot be considered "timely" as that term is used in 
W.R.Cr.P. 5.1(d). There was no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
rejection of the untimely remand motion.

[¶16]   Finally, Sidwell complains that his 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine his other2 accuser was fettered in the course 
of the following exchange at trial:

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: And at the time you came up here you were on probation 
-

[PROSECUTOR]: 
Your Honor, I'm going to object. I think this is an improper line of questioning 
at this point.

THE COURT: 
Counsel, where are we going with this?

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: I was just following up.

THE COURT: I 
believe it is, objection sustained.

In reliance upon 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), Sidwell 
claims that the foregoing amounts to reversible error. In Davis, the appellant 
was convicted of burglary on the testimony of a juvenile. Based upon a state 
statute sealing juvenile records, the trial court refused to allow inquiry of 
the juvenile concerning his probation. Davis won a new trial when the United 
States Supreme Court held that the trial court's curtailment of the juvenile's 
cross-examination was constitutional error of the first magnitude. Id. at 318, 
94 S. Ct. 1105.

[¶17]   Determination of whether the 
instant case comes within the ambit of Davis is hampered by a record which 
offers only that which is quoted above. Unlike Davis, nothing in this record 
tells us whether Sidwell's second accuser was on probation, let alone what 
circumstances, if any, might have led to such a status. That information is 
indispensable because W.R.E. 609(d) only permits admission of a juvenile 
adjudication when "conviction of the offense would be admissible to attac[k] the 
credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is 
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence."

[¶18]   Davis has already been glossed 
under a long standing rule regarding preservation of such questions on appeal. 
Connor v. State, 537 P.2d 715, 718 (Wyo. 1975) (citing State v. Ditzel, 77 Wyo. 
233, 243-44, 314 P.2d 832, 832 (1957)). One claiming improper exclusion of 
evidence must come to the appellate court armed with a record which is fleshed 
out, at the sticking point, with an offer of proof. The only exception occurs 
when the record otherwise clearly discloses the nature of the expected 
testimony. Connor, 537 P.2d  at 718. Here, we have neither. Questions of the 
right to confrontation will not be freighted by a record which deprives a 
reviewing court of any information from which compliance vel non with W.R.E. 
609(d) might be determined.

[¶19]   This record does reveal an 
unfettered opportunity for cross-examination which apprised the jury that 
the second accuser had, four times, run away from home; been placed in a group 
home on account of his flight tendencies; was an underage drinker; was familiar 
with xxx-rated videos; and, most telling, never wanted to press charges against 
Sidwell, let alone testify at trial. Penetrating cross-examination or not, 
however, we hold that the absence of an offer of proof compounded by a record 
which otherwise fails to disclose the nature of the expected testimony failed to 
adequately preserve Sidwell's final issue for appellate 
consideration.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶20]   Sidwell's cross-examination of his 
accusers proceeded without encumbrance. Nothing in the record suggests that his 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine his two accusers was in any way 
fettered or restricted. The district court is affirmed in all 
respects.

Footnotes

1 Prior to 
trial, the district court granted Sidwell's motion in limine, preventing the 
prosecution from referring to the victims as "boys." The district court's 
caution against inflaming the jury with potentially charged terms is to be 
commended. With the facts no longer in doubt, however, we need have no such 
compunction about making a fully accurate report.

2 The missing 
preliminary hearing testimony was from one of Sidwell's accusers, while this 
argument pertains to cross-examination of the 
other.