Title: Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Hummel

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

435 S.W.2d 774 (1969) ARKANSAS RELEASE GUIDANCE FOUNDATION, Appellant, v. James HUMMEL et al., Appellees. No. 5-4678. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 13, 1969. Burl C. Rotenberry and Gene Worsham, Little Rock, for appellant. U. A. Gentry and H. B. Stubblefield, Little Rock, for appellees. JONES, Justice. This is an appeal by Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation from an adverse decree *775 of the Pulaski County Chancery Court on a petition for a declaratory judgment filed by the appellant. The question presented is whether a "Halfway House" as proposed by the appellant, is an "institution of an educational, religious or philanthropic nature" permitted in a class "D" apartment district under the zoning ordinances of the City of Little Rock. The appellant, Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation, was incorporated as a domestic nonprofit corporation on October 20, 1967, for the following corporate purposes: The appellant purchased two adjacent two and one-half story residential buildings at 2115 and 2121 Arch Street in the City of Little Rock, and on January 30, 1968, filed with the Department of Community Development for the City of Little Rock, applications for certificates of occupancy. The applications set out that the property was located in a residential zoning district "D" of the City of Little Rock. Both applications were practically the same, and the one for 2115 Arch Street stated as follows: On February 2, 1968, the appellant was advised by the director of the Department of Community Development that certificates of occupancy would be issued as requested when the municipal code requirements as to inspections of the property were complied with. In the meantime thirteen property owners in the vicinity of appellant's property filed petitions with the city remonstrating against the proposed use of appellant's property, and the appellees threatened the appellant with legal action to prevent the operation of the proposed Halfway House at the proposed addresses. *776 On February 6, 1968, because of threatened litigation, the appellant filed its petition for a declaratory judgment in the Pulaski County Chancery Court naming the thirteen remonstrating individual property owners as defendants. The prayer of the petition was for a declaratory judgment and determination that "said Halfway House may be properly and legally operated within said class `D' zoning area" and that the court declare and determine the appropriate zoning classification of the plaintiff's Halfway House facility under the zoning regulations and code of ordinances of the City of Little Rock, and that said Halfway House facility be declared appropriately located in said class "D" zoning district. The appellees filed their answer praying a dismissal of the petition filed by the appellant, and in the alternative, that the appellant be permanently enjoined from the operation of the facility at the proposed site. After hearing testimony on both sides of the issue, on April 24, 1968, the chancellor rendered a decree as follows: On appeal to this court the appellant relies on the following points for reversal: The City of Little Rock draws its zoning authority from Ark.Stat.Ann. § 19-2805 (Repl.1968) which provides as follows: Arkansas Statute Annotated § 19-2806 (Repl.1968) provides as follows: Little Rock Municipal Ordinance. No 5420, as amended, was passed under authority of the aforesaid statute, and § 43-4 "C" of the ordinance pertaining to "C" two-family districts provides as follows: Appellant's property is in a "D" zone district and § 43-5 of the ordinance provides: The appellant contends that its proposed use of its property as a Halfway House is permissible under the ordinance and the appellees contend that it is not. The parties seem to agree, however, that if appellant's proposed use of its property is permissible under the ordinance, the permission is to be found under Subsection 4 of § 43-5 "C," supra, applicable to "institutions of an educational, religious or philanthropic nature." Neither the appellant nor the appellees have cited any case, and our own research has revealed none, in which any state court has considered the use of property as a Halfway House for parolees and released convicts as institutions of an educational, religious or philanthropic nature within the terms of a zoning ordinance. The ordinance involved here contains 63 definitions of the words and terms used therein, and "educational institution" is defined as follows: "Religious" and "philanthropic" are not defined by the ordinance, nor is an institution of a "religious or philanthropic nature" defined. The appellees were all residents of the same "D" zone or district where appellant's property is located, so certainly the chancellor did not err in restricting his decree to the "D" zone in which the parties defendant lived. (See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 34-2510 [Repl.1962]). So the question here is whether appellant's proposed use of its property is permissible under the provisions of the zoning ordinance, in the "D" zone where the property is located. *778 The evidence in this case reveals that the appellant's property is located in a quiet, older residential section of Little Rock, consisting primarily of large two story homes, some of which have been converted into apartment buildings and some still occupied by the original owners as single family dwellings. The appellant does not contend that the proposed use of its property would convert the property from family dwellings to an "educational institution" as defined in the ordinance, and there is no serious contention that the proposed Halfway House would be an institution of an educational or religious nature. So the question boils down to whether appellant's proposed use of its property as a Halfway House would constitute an institution of a "philanthropic nature" as contemplated in the passage, and as intended by the terms, of the ordinance. Section 43-22(4) of the zoning ordinance fixes the jurisdiction of the board of zoning adjustment and vests it with the power to hear requests for variances from the literal provisions of the ordinance, but courts have no such authority under the statutes or under the declaratory judgment procedure. We conclude, therefore, that in the absence of an ordained definition for institutions of "religious or philanthropic nature", we must examine the ordinance in the light of its purpose, and the appellant's petition in the light of the use to be made of the property. McQuillian, Municipal Corporations, volume 8, 1965 revised, § 25.17, states: In 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 16, we find the following: The case of City of Little Rock v. Sun Building & Developing Co., 199 Ark. 333, 134 S.W.2d 582, 583, had to do with a zoning ordinance where it was contended that the ordinance amounted to the taking of private property without just compensation, and in that connection, this court said: Now, as to the ordinance we are dealing with in the case at bar: "Educational institution" is specifically defined by the longest of the 63 definitions in the ordinance and "educational institution" is the only institution that is defined. It is noted that the definition specifically refers to school or academy, public or founded or *779 owned or conducted by or under the sponsorship of a religious or charitable organization. The definition also includes "college or university, public or founded or conducted by or under the sponsorship of a religious or charitable organization." Certainly it is reasonable to interpret an "institution of an educational nature", as set out in § 43-4 "C" (4), supra, to simply mean an "educational institution" as defined in the ordinance. But the ordinance provides no such aid in defining "institutions of a religious or philanthropic nature." The words "religious" and "philanthropic" are broad general terms and as was said of the terms "philanthropic" and "eleemosynary" in the 1942 case of Westchester County Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. v. Mengel, et al., Zoning Board of Appeals, 292 N.Y. 121, 54 N.E.2d 329, they In Yonkley, Zoning Law and Practice, §§ 19-6___19-7, third edition, in connection with the interpretation of zoning ordinances, is found the following statements: Also in Yonkley, Zoning Law and Practice, § 161, p. 320, first edition is found the following: The objects recited in appellant's corporate charter as well as the testimony and other evidence before the chancellor, indicate that a maximum number of twenty men, all of them convicted criminals and parolees, would be assigned two to a room, and would be housed and boarded at the Halfway House. The record reveals that there are other so-called "halfway houses" in Little Rock, but none of them have to do with the rehabilitation of convicted felons. So in the absence of specifically ordained definitions of institutions of a religious or philanthropic nature, we conclude that the chancellor was entitled to *780 consider the overall purpose of zoning ordinances in general in determining whether appellant's proposed use of its property was permissible under the provisions of the ordinance. We conclude that the chancellor's findings that appellant's Halfway House is not an institution of an educational, religious or philanthropic nature, as contemplated by the ordinance, is not against the preponderance of the evidence and that the decree of the chancellor should be affirmed. Affirmed. HOLT, J., not participating.