Title: In re Killington Ltd

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-535


 In re Killington, Ltd. and                   Supreme Court
 International Paper Realty Corp.
                                              On Appeal from
                                              Environmental Board

                                              May Term, 1992



 Jan S. Eastman, Acting Chair

 Allan R. Keyes and John A. Serafino of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland,
   for appellant Killington, Ltd.

 Robert E. Woolmington of Witten, Saltonstall & Woolmington, P.C.,
   Bennington, for appellees Town of Shrewsbury and Shrewsbury Planning
 Commission

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Mark J. DiStefano, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for appellee Vermont Agency of Natural
   Resources



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
           Specially Assigned



      DOOLEY, J.  The Vermont Environmental Board denied an Act 250 permit
 to Killington, Ltd., for construction of a pond intended to enhance
 Killington's snowmaking capacity at its ski area.  Killington appeals that
 ruling, which was based on the Board's conclusion that the proposed
 construction would not satisfy 10 V.S.A. { 6086(a)(8)(A) because it would
 imperil a habitat necessary to the survival of a population of black bears.
 We affirm.
      Application for the permit was filed on February 18, 1986, with
 District Environmental Commission No. 1.  The application sought approval to
 divert the waters of Madden Brook to build a snowmaking pond in an area
 known as Parker's Gore East in the Town of Mendon.  After extensive hearings
 and procedural maneuvering, the district commission denied the application
 on July 14, 1987.  The Commission found that construction of the pond would
 threaten a population of black bears by making inaccessible a stand of beech
 trees used by the bears for food.  The Commission also found that the
 construction would prevent the bears from using a tract of spruce and fir
 to travel into Parker's Gore East, where they build up body fat in the fall
 in preparation for winter hibernation.
      Pursuant to 10 V.S.A. { 6089(a), Killington appealed the Commission's
 denial to the Environmental Board on August 13, 1987.  The appeal
 challenged the Commission's decisions to grant party status to certain
 organizations and municipalities and to impose conditions on any permit that
 might be issued.  Its fundamental challenge, however, was to the conclusion,
 under 10 V.S.A. { 6086(a)(8)(A) (hereinafter criterion 8(A)), that the
 project would significantly impair necessary wildlife habitat, would not
 utilize all feasible and reasonable means of lessening the alleged
 impairment, and would be a detriment to the general welfare of the public.
 Killington asserted that the Commission's findings did not support its
 conclusions and that the conclusions were based on a fundamental
 misconstruction of the term "necessary wildlife habitat" as used in the
 statute.
      Pursuant to Environmental Board Rule 14(A), and over Killington's
 objection, the Board granted party status to Two Rivers-Ottauquechee
 Regional Planning Commission and the towns and planning commissions of
 Shrewsbury and Bridgewater because they adjoined land "contiguous to the
 site of the proposed project that is owned or controlled by Killington."
 During the evidentiary stage of the Board's review, the Town of Shrewsbury
 sought to present evidence that, in addition to the harm likely to be done
 to the bears' use of the beech, spruce and fir trees, the proposed pond
 construction would also destroy wetlands in Parker's Gore East critical to
 the animals' survival.  The subject of the wetlands had not been raised by
 any party before the Commission and was not addressed in the Commission's
 findings, conclusions or order.  Over Killington's objection, the Board
 allowed the evidence to be presented because it was probative of "the
 existence of necessary bear habitat in Parker's Gore East" and the likely
 effect of pond construction and operation on that habitat, the issues raised
 by Killington's appeal.
      On May 11, 1989, the Board ruled that the term "necessary wildlife
 habitat" in criterion 8(A) covered habitat critical to the survival of the
 particular wildlife population dependent on it, and that Parker's Gore East
 constituted necessary wildlife habitat.  It also concluded that construction
 and operation of the pond would destroy or significantly impair that habitat
 in a number of respects.  On September 21, 1990, the Board issued its final
 findings.  It concluded that Killington met none of the sub-criteria of
 criterion 8(A), (FN1) which, if satisfied, allow the issuance of a permit
 regardless of the imperilment of necessary wildlife habitat.  Therefore, the
 Board also denied the permit.
      On appeal, Killington contends that (1) the Board erred in granting
 party status to the municipalities and planning commissions; (2) the Board
 erred in considering the issue of wetlands in Parker's Gore East; (3) the
 Board erred in defining "necessary wildlife habitat" for the purpose of
 criterion 8(A) to mean habitat critical to the survival of a particular
 population of wildlife, rather than to that of an entire species in Vermont;
 and (4) the Board's findings did not support its conclusions that necessary
 black bear habitat existed in Parker's Gore East and that such habitat would
 be destroyed or imperiled by the proposed project.
      It is important at the outset to emphasize the deference with which we
 treat decisions by the Environmental Board as to matters properly within its
 jurisdiction.  See In re Denio, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 608 A.2d 1166, 1171 (1992)
 (Board's decisions presumed to be "'correct, valid, and reasonable . . . and
 we will normally defer to its determinations'") (quoting Vermont State
 Colleges Faculty Federation v. Vermont State Colleges, 151 Vt. 457, 460, 561 A.2d 417, 419-20 (1989)).  The Board, of course, is required to follow both
 the standards established by the Legislature and the procedures which it has
 itself adopted in order to carry out its statutory mandate.  However,
 "'absent compelling indication of error,' we will sustain the interpretation
 of a statute by the administrative body responsible for its execution."  In
 re Duncan, 155 Vt. 402, 408, 584 A.2d 1140, 1144 (1990).  The same is true
 for an agency's interpretation of its own rules.  See Rogers v. Watson, 156
 Vt. 483, 489, 594 A.2d 409, 412 (1991).  As to findings of fact, we must
 affirm the Board if its findings are based on substantial evidence.  10
 V.S.A. { 6089(c); see Denio, ___ Vt. at ___, 608 A.2d  at 1170-71.
 Conclusions, in turn, are affirmed when "rationally derived from [the]
 findings and based on a correct interpretation of the law."  In re Southview
 Associates, 153 Vt. 171, 178, 569 A.2d 501, 504 (1989).
      Killington first argues that the Board erred in admitting parties to
 the permit-approval proceeding that were not entitled to be included.  At
 the outset, we must narrow this claim to the Town of Shrewsbury and the
 Shrewsbury Planning Commission (hereinafter Shrewsbury).  The parties to
 which Killington objects, other than Shrewsbury, did not present evidence,
 cross-examine Killington's witnesses, or otherwise participate in the
 hearings.  In order to obtain relief on appeal, Killington must show that an
 asserted error prejudiced its rights.  See Cadel v. Sherburne Corp., 139 Vt.
 134, 136,