Title: Matter of Estate of Ambers

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

477 N.W.2d 218 (1991) In the Matter of the ESTATE OF George AMBERS, Deceased. AMBERS HEIRS, Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. Byron and Gail NELSON, Appellees and Cross-Appellants. Civ. No. 910036. Supreme Court of North Dakota. November 12, 1991. *219 Cunningham Law Firm, Minot, for appellants and cross-appellees; argued by Kathleen B. Cunningham. Lee Hagen Law Office, Ltd., Fargo, and LaQua Law Office, Fessenden, for appellees and cross-appellants; argued by Leland F. Hagen. Appearance by Vincent A. LaQua. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. Ambers Heirs[1] (Contestants) have appealed[2] from a county court judgment, entered on a jury verdict, admitting the November 2, 1987, will of George Ambers to probate, appointing Gail Nelson as personal representative of the estate, and ordering that she recover from Contestants her costs and disbursements in the amount of $9,622.57. We affirm. George Ambers was born in 1907, the fourth of eleven children. A bachelor, he lived with his father until his father died in 1954. He then lived alone until he moved into a Maddock nursing home in 1981. He lived in a Harvey nursing home from 1986 until his death in 1988. Byron and Gail Nelson began renting George's farmland in 1965. George and the Nelsons developed a close, affectionate relationship. On October 23, 1987, George executed a general power of attorney appointing Gail as his attorney in fact. On November 2, 1987, George executed a will *220 leaving his entire estate to Gail and Byron Nelson and appointing Gail as the personal representative of the estate. In October 1988, Gail filed a petition for formal probate of the 1987 will and her appointment as personal representative of the estate. In November 1988, Contestants filed a petition for adjudication of intestacy, appointment of a special administrator, and objection to the proposed personal representative. Contestants alleged, among other things, that the will George Ambers executed on November 2, 1987, was not valid because its execution was procured by fraud, and at the time it was executed, George was "under the undue influence of Gail Nelson and Byron Nelson", "was not of sound and disposing mind", and was "incapacitated from forming the intent necessary to execute a testamentary document." On June 9, 1989, a will executed by George in 1955 was discovered. In that will, George left his entire estate "to Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of America, Incorporated, [for] ... the use and benefit of the CRIPPLED CHILDRENS' SCHOOL at Jamestown, North Dakota." The 1955 will also provided: "I have deliberately and intentionally not given any devise or bequest to any of the brothers or my sister." Contestants entered into an agreement with Lutheran Health Systems under which Contestants would attempt to defeat the 1987 will and would receive 40 per cent of the estate if successful, with the other 60 per cent going to the Anne Carlson School.[3] After a jury trial, judgment was entered admitting the 1987 will to probate, appointing Gail the personal representative of the estate, and ordering that she recover from the Contestants her costs and disbursements of $9,622.57. Contestants appealed, raising the following issues: "A competent testator may dispose of his property as he wishes without regard to the desires of prospective beneficiaries or the views of juries or courts so long as the terms of the will are not prohibited by law or opposed to public policy." Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 505 (N.D.1954). On the other hand, "[w]here a person by fraud, duress, or undue influence induces another to bequeath all his property to him, the court having jurisdiction over the probate of wills can give adequate relief by refusing to admit the will to probate." V Scott on Trusts § 489.1 (4th ed. 1989). Contestants contend that Gail and Byron Nelson engaged in "deception by fraud" and that the trial court erred in refusing to give their requested jury instructions on fraud. In Krueger v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 305 N.W.2d 18, 25 (N.D.1981), we set forth a number of principles relevant to this case: Several witnesses called by the Contestants testified that they knew of no fraud committed by the Nelsons. Contestants acknowledge that "[i]n this case there is no one fact that stands out as `this is fraud'." However, the use of inferences from established facts to reach a determination is necessary and common in fraud cases. Adams v. Little Missouri Minerals Ass'n, 143 N.W.2d 659 (N.D.1966). No productive purpose would be served by detailing the evidence relied upon by the Contestants as showing fraud in support of their argument that the trial court erred in refusing to give their requested jury instructions. It is sufficient to summarize it as follows: The Nelsons rented George's land since the 1960's and Gail drafted the leases after 1977; Gail got George to execute a ten-year CRP lease "with George receiving only Fourteen Dollars ($14.00) per acre ... when the total CRP payment was Thirty-Nine Dollars ($39.00) per acre"; Gail did not mention George's need for a nursing home to his relatives; Gail made the contacts regarding nursing homes for George and made the moving arrangements; after George entered a nursing home in 1981, Gail made his bank deposits, received his bank statements, received his mail in her mailbox, stored his personal property, had the keys to his house, and handled his financial affairs; Gail never discussed with George's relatives any animosity that existed between George and his relatives; the Nelsons visited George regularly while he was in the nursing homes; Gail arranged to have George give her a power of attorney and arranged "for the attorney to mention drafting a Will to George"; "[d]uring all of George's conversations with the drafting attorney Gail and/or Byron were present"; and Gail told no one about the will and "made no attempt to ascertain if George's relatives were in contact with him." The evidence shows that George thought very highly of the Nelsons and reposed a great deal of trust in them, that the Nelsons provided much helpful assistance to George over a period of many years, and that George and the Nelsons had a close, affectionate relationship. Our attention has not been drawn to any evidence from which a reasonable juror could reasonably draw an inference of fraud. In our view, "the most that was shown was the existence of lawful influences arising from the claims of a close relationship which were not inconsistent with an assumption that the will expressed the voluntary intent of the testator" [In re Kaufmann's Will, 14 A.D.2d 411, 221 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605 (1961)], undeceived by any fraud by the Nelsons. "[A] requested instruction, not applicable to the evidence, should be refused." Schan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 793, 803 (N.D.1974). "A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a valid applicable theory, but only if there is some evidence to support it." State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 753 (N.D.1976). "[A] trial court may properly refuse to submit an inapplicable or irrelevant instruction to the jury." State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460, 465 (N.D.1985). A trial court does not err in refusing to give requested instructions not warranted by the evidence. Because there was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably draw an inference of fraud, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the Contestants' requested fraud instructions. Contestants argue that the trial court erred in changing their requested jury instruction on "Presumption Against a Power of Attorney" and by adding an instruction defining "transaction." Section 59-01-08, N.D.C.C., provides: Section 59-01-16, N.D.C.C., provides: We construed the effect of §§ 59-01-08 and 59-01-16, N.D.C.C., in Estate of Zins v. Zins, 420 N.W.2d 729, 731 (N.D.1988): Contestants requested an instruction that would have told the jury that (1) "Gail Nelson was a Power of Attorney for George Ambers", which (2) "created a fiduciary relationship", (3) "[t]he Power of Attorney benefits from George Ambers 1987 Will" and (4) "[a]ll transactions between a Power of Attorney and the beneficiary ... in which the Power of Attorney attains any advantage to her benefit are presumed to be under undue influence." In other words, the Contestants urge that any benefit received by a person with a power of attorney under a beneficiary's will is presumed to have resulted from undue influence. Without more, we decline to apply a presumption of undue influence merely because a person with a power of attorney benefits from the beneficiary's will. In Estate of Mehus, 278 N.W.2d 625, 632 (N.D.1979), this court held that the presumption of undue influence against an agent "arises in cases in which the principal makes a gift as well as in other transactions." In Mehus, the presumption was applied to one who had used his position as his mother's attorney-in-fact to purchase joint savings certificates in his and his mother's names. In Estate of Wagner, 265 N.W.2d 459 (N.D.1978), this court rejected the contestants' request that it adopt a presumption of undue influence "where the contestant has shown (1) a confidential relationship between the proponent and the testator; (2) participation in the preparation or procurement of the Will of the testator; (3) a substantial bequest or benefit to the proponent by the terms of that Will." Id., at 462. In Estate of Polda, 349 N.W.2d 11, 14 (N.D.1984), will contestants presented evidence raising a suspicion of undue influence: We went on to observe, in rejecting a request to apply a presumption of undue influence: Id., at 15. We conclude that the mere receipt of benefits under a will by one who has been issued a power of attorney by the testator is an insufficient basis for adopting a presumption of undue influence. Without more, we decline to adopt the presumption sought by the Contestants. The Contestants point to the following evidence in support of their request for a presumption of undue influence (page references to the record omitted): The Nelsons state in their brief, without rebuttal, the following circumstances surrounding the drafting of George Ambers' will (page references to the record omitted): There is no evidence that the Nelsons used Gail's power of attorney to influence George to name them as beneficiaries in his will; there is no evidence that they took advantage of their close relationship with George to influence his will; and there is no evidence that the Nelsons ever asked to be named in George's will, engaged in any activity designed to influence his will, or participated in the drafting of George's will. There is no evidence of a nexus between the Nelsons' receipt of benefits under George's will and Gail's power of attorney. We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the Contestants' requested instruction on the presumption of undue influence. Contestants argue that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction defining "transaction": Contestants assert that the error involves the trial court's "definition of transaction as both limited to business and in no way recognizing a gift as a transaction." While we question whether a wholly unilateral gift or will on the part of a donor or testator, with no participation by one receiving the gift or a devise or bequest constitutes a "transaction" for purposes of *224 the presumption of undue influence created by § 59-01-16, N.D.C.C., we need not resolve the issue, as no error, if any, has been preserved for review. After some discussion between the trial court and counsel, the trial court read to counsel its proposed instruction defining a transaction. After the trial court read the proposed instruction, counsel for the Contestants said: "I don't have a problem." Contestants did not object to the instruction and it therefore became the law of the case. Erickson v. Schwan, 453 N.W.2d 765 (N.D.1990); Deichert v. Fitch, 424 N.W.2d 903 (N.D.1988); Rau v. Kirschenman, 208 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1973). The trial court allowed Gail Nelson to recover costs and disbursements of $9,622.57 from the Contestants. Contestants argue that the trial court erred and contend that the costs and disbursements should have been paid out of the estate, pursuant to § 30.1-18-20, N.D.C.C., which provides: This court construed § 30.1-18-20, N.D.C.C., in Estate of Honerud, 326 N.W.2d 95, 97 (N.D.1982): "We find that it must appear that the personal representative acted in good faith, that his conduct was free from fraud, and that he benefited the estate before attorney fees and costs may be awarded by the court." Contestants' challenge of George Ambers' 1987 will did not benefit the estate and was not intended to benefit the estate. The purpose of the challenge was limited to effecting a change in who received the estate. Furthermore, to rule as the Contestants urge would diminish the estate and the Nelsons, as the sole beneficiaries of the will, would have to bear the entire expense of upholding the will challenged by the Contestants. "It seems to us that the probate code should not be construed so as to permit one heir or devisee to finance his or her lawsuit against another heir or devisee out of the funds of the estate." Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 171 (N.D.1985), quoting Estate of Kesting, 220 Neb. 524, 371 N.W.2d 107, 109 (1985). Nor should a devisee be forced to bear the expense of upholding a will challenged by an heir or another devisee in a proceeding that was not intended to benefit the estate. We conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing Gail Nelson, the proponent of George Ambers' 1987 will appointing her as personal representative of the estate, to recover her costs and disbursements from the Contestants who caused her to incur the expenses. Contestants allege that the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence part of a deposition of Sidney Ambers. The Nelsons offered the deposition of Sidney Ambers, but sought to have three parts excluded. The trial court agreed to exclude two parts but would not allow the third part to be excluded. The Nelsons withdrew the offer of the deposition and it was never received into evidence. Because neither the Nelsons nor the Contestants thereafter offered the deposition, no issue on this matter has been preserved for review. Affirmed. GIERKE, VANDE WALLE, LEVINE and MESCHKE, JJ., concur. [1] The Contestants are heirs at law of George Ambers pursuant to the law of intestate succession, § 30.1-04-03 (2-103), N.D.C.C. [2] While Byron and Gail Nelson filed a notice of cross appeal from the judgment, they did not raise any cross-appeal issues in their brief or argument and we deem the cross appeal to have been abandoned. [3] Presumably, Lutheran Health Systems and the Anne Carlson School are successors of the beneficiaries provided for in the 1955 will. [4] Counsel for Contestants acknowledged at oral argument that George Ambers' relatives did not visit him as often as the Nelsons did and asserted that a relative would visit George every three to six months. Counsel also observed in Contestants' brief: "By late 1981 when George entered the Maddock Home Nelsons were making a point of visiting regularly and from 1986 to his death in August of 1988 they made at least seventy-four (74) visits to George at the Harvey Nursing Home." (Page references omitted.)