Title: Shaw Constr., LLC v. Rocky Mountain Hardware, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHAW CONSTRUCTION, LLC,  a Colorado limited liability company, v. ROCKY MOUNTAIN HARDWARE, INC., an Idaho Corporation2012 WY 60Case Number: S-11-0171Decided: 04/18/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 

 
SHAW 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Colorado limited liability 
company,Appellant(Defendant),v.ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HARDWARE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Peter 
F. Moyer, Jackson, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Mark 
D. Sullivan, Mark D. Sullivan, P.C., Wilson, Wyoming.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      Shaw 
Construction, LLC (Shaw) appeals from the district court’s order requiring it to 
pay for hardware furnished by Rocky Mountain Hardware, Inc. (RMH) on a 
construction project owned by Snake River Sporting Club, Inc. (Snake 
River).  The district court also 
awarded contractual interest and attorney fees under the terms of a 2003 credit 
agreement between Shaw and RMH.  
Shaw claims the district court erred by concluding it had entered into a 
contract with RMH.  We affirm. 

 
ISSUE

[¶2]      Shaw articulates 
the following issue in its appellate brief:
 
            
Is the Plaintiff entitled to contract damages, 21% interest and 
attorney’s fees, based on a 2003 account credit application signed solely by an 
unknown “guarantor” over 4 years prior to a 2008 construction job, where the 
district court expressly found that there was no contract between the parties 
for the 2008 job? 
 
RMH 
rephrases the issue as:
 
Should 
this Court overturn a district court decision that is fully supported by the 
evidence presented at trial?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Shaw and RMH had 
worked together for several years before the project at issue in this case.  In 2003, Shaw completed an application 
to obtain a line of credit from RMH.  
After reviewing Shaw’s references, RMH approved a credit line of $10,000, 
subject to the following terms:  the 
balance would be payable “net 10,” which meant payment would be due by the 
10th day of the month following the 
purchase; any unpaid balance would accrue 1.75% interest per month; and RMH 
would be entitled to legal fees and costs associated with collecting delinquent 
balances.  Over the years, RMH 
supplied hardware for several jobs on which Shaw was the general contractor, and 
Shaw promptly paid all of its bills.    
 
[¶4]      In 2007, Shaw 
became involved with the construction of a members lodge for Snake River.  There was originally another general 
contractor on the job, but that relationship ended.  Shaw took over the project as 
construction manager, rather than general contractor.  
 
[¶5]      On February 21, 
2008, Shaw issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for outstanding needs on the 
job.  The RFP referred repeatedly to 
“subcontractors,” although Shaw employees testified that was an error since Shaw 
was not acting as general contractor.  
Attachment C to the RFP included the following statement at the top:  “CONTRACT TO BE ISSUED BY SNAKE RIVER 
SPORTING CLUB,” but then stated that all “successful Subcontractors will be 
required to execute an agreement using the Shaw Builders LLC subcontract . . . 
.”  The RFP also included 
information regarding pay applications in Attachment F.  That provision 
stated:
 
All 
subcontractors will be required to fill out this pay application each month and 
turn into Shaw Construction for approval by the 20th of each month.  Payment from the Snake River Sporting Club should be 
expected by the 15th of the following month if all 
information is correct and able to be validated in a timely manner.  
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)    
 
[¶6]      Although RMH was 
chosen as the hardware supplier, no separate contract was ever executed between 
RMH and either Shaw or Snake River.  
Nevertheless, Shaw ordered the hardware and RMH delivered it to the Snake 
River project from May through August 2008.  It invoiced Shaw a total of $31,131.17, 
referencing Shaw’s credit account with RMH.  None of the balance due was paid and, in 
mid-August 2008, Shaw notified RMH that it needed to submit its bills to Snake 
River.  RMH subsequently filed a 
lien against the project, and Snake River declared bankruptcy.  
 
[¶7]      RMH filed the 
instant action against Shaw, claiming Shaw was obligated to pay the outstanding 
balance.  RMH asserted that it had a 
written contract with Shaw by virtue of the 2003 credit agreement, which 
entitled it to payment for the hardware, as well as, legal fees and 
interest.  It also asserted claims 
for breach of oral contract and quantum meruit.  Shaw defended on the grounds that it was 
simply acting as construction manager on the job and Snake River was responsible 
for all payments to suppliers.  
  
 
[¶8]      The district 
court held a bench trial on January 6, 2011, and, at the conclusion, ruled in 
favor of RMH.  Shaw appealed.    
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶9]      Because this case 
was tried to the district court, we apply the following standard of 
review:
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 
given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A 
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
 
Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 
(Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).   

 
[W]e 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below 
is true and give that party 
every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. 

 
Comet 
Energy Servs., LLC v. Powder River Oil & Gas Ventures, LLC,  2010 WY 82, ¶ 9, 239 P.3d 382, 386 (Wyo. 2010), 
quoting Cook 
v. Eddy, 
2008 WY 111, ¶ 6, 193 P.3d 705, 708 (Wyo. 2008).  The district 
court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Id.  

 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]   The district court’s Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment included the following 
rulings:
 
            
B.        RMH 
Approved Shaw’s Credit Application in 2003
 
3.         
Shaw applied for and received approval of credit from RMH in September, 
2003.  The terms of that credit were 
set forth in the application and approval, and include a 1.75% per month finance 
charge.  That credit application 
states that Shaw is required to pay all collection costs, court costs and legal 
fees incurred to collect delinquent balances.  That credit [agreement] allowed Shaw to 
order the manufacture of hardware by RMH.
 
            
4.         
Pursuant to and under the terms of that credit agreement, over a period 
of more than five years, Shaw Construction ordered the manufacture and delivery 
of hardware and accessories for a variety of construction projects in the 
Jackson area for which Shaw Construction was acting as the General 
Contractor.
 
            
C.        The 
Snake River Sporting Club Project
 
            
5.         
Shaw assumed construction management responsibilities at the Snake River 
Sporting Club Members’ Clubhouse Project (the “Project”) in the fall of 2007 
after the general contractor left the job. 

6.         
Shaw began working with subcontractors on the Project in the fall of 
2007, and began coordinating hardware orders with Rocky Mountain Hardware in 
early 2008.
 
            
7.         
Shaw issued a Request for Proposals to potential subcontractors wishing 
to bid on the Project on February 21, 2008.  
 
            
8.         
The Request for Proposals nowhere identified or stated that Shaw 
Construction was acting as the Construction Manager for the Project, rather than 
as a General Contractor.
 
            
9.         
The Request for Proposals stated that the winning bidders on the Project 
would be required to enter into a Shaw Construction subcontract.  
 
            
10.       
The Request for Proposals failed to attach the contract between Shaw and 
the Snake River Sporting Club, which would have disclosed to all bidders that 
for the Snake River Sporting Club project Shaw was acting as a construction 
manager, rather than a general contractor.
 
            
11.       
RMH responded to the Request for Proposals and provided Shaw Construction 
with a preliminary quote and work order for the required hardware on the 
Project.
 
            
12.       
After consultation and approval by the architect and interior designer 
for the Project, Shaw approved and authorized the hardware order.  RMH manufactured some of the hardware, 
and ordered other hardware items manufactured by other suppliers for delivery to 
Shaw.  
 
            
13.       
Shaw subsequently also ordered bathroom accessories for the Project, 
again directly ordering those accessories from RMH.
 
            
14.       
Shaw took delivery of the hardware and bathroom accessories in June and 
July of 2008. 
 
            
15.       
RMH issued invoices to Shaw for the hardware and accessories in May, 
June, July and August of 2008.  The 
invoices were addressed to Shaw, on Shaw’s account with RMH, and were for 
hardware and accessories delivered to Shaw for the Project.  The total amount of those invoices was 
$31,131.17.  
 
            
16.       
In June, 2008, the Snake River Sporting Club did not pay Shaw for its 
work and thereafter defaulted on its obligations to Shaw.  
 
            
17.       
Shaw thereafter notified RMH that payment for the hardware and 
accessories was the owner’s obligation, not Shaw’s, and that RMH should seek 
redress from the Snake River Sporting Club directly.
 
            
18.       
Shaw had never before communicated to RMH that RMH must enter into a 
contract directly with the Snake River Sporting Club. The Snake River Sporting 
Club therefore had no account with RMH and no contract with 
RMH.
 
            
19.       
Wade Grant, Sr., who was the Snake River Sporting Club’s representative 
and project manager, testified for Shaw.  
During his testimony Mr. Grant acknowledged that he had no contract with 
RMH, and did not even speak with RMH’s representatives.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
 
            
NOW, THEREFORE, after presentation of the parties’ evidence and due 
consideration by the Court, the Court concludes as 
follows:
 
a.    
Shaw 
Construction and RMH had a binding contract, consisting of the specific terms of 
the credit application and approval coupled with subsequent oral and written 
agreements whereby RMH was to manufacture and provide hardware and accessories 
to Shaw for the Project, for which Shaw was to pay RMH.  
 
b.    
Shaw 
Construction has defaulted on its obligation to pay RMH for the hardware and 
accessories Shaw ordered for the Snake River Sporting Club Project and thereby 
breached the parties’ contract.
 
[¶11]   We start our analysis with a 
clarification of the district court’s decision.  Shaw argues that the district court 
erred by concluding that the 2003 credit agreement, alone, provided the basis 
for an award to RMH in this case.  
Shaw’s argument presents an overly narrow view of the district court’s 
order.  Paragraph a. of the district 
court’s conclusions of law and judgment clearly indicates that, in finding Shaw 
contracted to pay RMH for the hardware, the district court relied upon the 
credit agreement, “coupled with subsequent oral and written agreements” between 
the parties.  
 
[¶12]   Despite that clear ruling, Shaw 
claims that the district court “expressly found that no 2008 contract” existed 
between Shaw and RMH.  Shaw refers 
to the following verbal statement by the judge to support its interpretation of 
the district court’s decision:  

 
            
THE COURT:  . . . .  Some of the things that stood out to me 
here in the evidence is that there is absolutely no dispute, there is no 
evidence that Rocky Mountain Hardware had a contract with – setting aside the 
credit agreement – there is no evidence that Rocky Mountain Hardware had a 
contract with Shaw or with Snake River Sporting Club. 
 
Again, 
Shaw misinterprets the district court’s ruling.  It is clear from the full transcript of 
the district court’s verbal ruling and the written judgment that the district 
court simply meant the parties had not entered into a formal written contract 
with regard to the hardware for the Snake River project.  The district court concluded, 
nevertheless, that Shaw and RMH had contracted for the hardware.  
 
[¶13]   We turn now to a review of whether 
the district court’s findings are supported by the evidentiary record.  The basic elements of a contract include 
an offer, acceptance and consideration.  Prudential Preferred Properties v. J & J 
Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Wyo. 1993).  See also, Western Municipal Constr. of Wyo., Inc. v. 
Better Living, LLC, 2010 WY 
92, ¶ 11, 234 P.3d 1223, 
1228 (Wyo. 2010).  A 
party who is seeking to establish that a contract exists has the burden of 
proof.  See Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2008 WY 145, ¶ 22, 197 P.3d 148, 155 (Wyo. 2008).  The determination of whether a contract 
has been created involves a question of fact.  Hunter v. Reece, 2011 WY 97, ¶ 13, 253 P.3d 497, 500 
(Wyo. 2011); Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. 
Morris, 756 P.2d 774, 775 
(Wyo. 1988).  As we stated above, we 
do not disturb a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.
 
[¶14]   The record contains more than ample 
evidence to support the district court’s determination that RMH and Shaw had 
contracted for the hardware.  RMH 
presented a submittal/quote to Shaw in response to its RFP for hardware for the 
Snake River project.  After 
receiving approval from the architect and interior designer, Shaw ordered the 
hardware from RMH.  The products 
were delivered to Shaw.  Thus, the 
evidence established that Shaw ordered specific products from RMH at an agreed 
upon price and accepted them when they were delivered.  This evidence was sufficient to 
establish all of the requisite elements of a contract—offer, acceptance and 
consideration.  

 
[¶15]   The conclusion that Shaw entered 
into a hardware contract with RMH is further supported by the invoices issued by 
RMH, which showed that the materials were “sold to” Shaw and the amounts due 
were applied to Shaw’s credit account with RMH.  We have ruled that terms included on an 
invoice accompanying the delivery of materials are binding on the parties.  Joe’s Concrete & Lumber, Inc. v. 
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 2011 WY 74, ¶¶ 4, 18-19, 252 P.2d 445, 447, 449 (Wyo. 2011) (recognizing attorney fees provision on invoices was 
enforceable).  The district court’s 
finding that Shaw and RMH had entered into a contract for the hardware is not 
clearly erroneous.  

 
[¶16]   Shaw claims, nevertheless, that it 
did not enter into contracts with any suppliers for the Snake River project 
because it acted as construction manager, rather than general contractor.  The difference between a construction 
manager and a general contractor was explained by Shaw’s project superintendent, 
William Linton:
 
Q.        Let’s 
talk about some of the ways in which Shaw’s role is different when it’s the 
construction manager as opposed to the general contractor.
 
A.        
Okay.
 
Q.        Now, 
as a construction manager, Shaw would not typically be in contract with 
individual subcontractors or vendors or suppliers; is that 
correct?
 
A.        In 
general, yes.
 
Q.        And 
so there would be no subcontractors on a construction management project.  They would all be in direct contract, in 
theory, with the owner. 
 
            
Is that right?
 
A.           
Correct in 
theory, yes.
 
Q.        So 
there are really only contractors on those projects?
 
A.        I 
think that’s the correct terminology.
 
Q.        When 
you’re acting as the construction manager, Shaw Construction doesn’t actually 
pay those vendors; the vendors or material men or – the contractors are paid by 
the owner directly.  Is that 
right?
 
A.        The 
contractors, yes.
 
[¶17]   Shaw claims that the RFP alerted 
RMH that Shaw was the construction manager, rather than general contractor on 
the Snake River project and, therefore, would not be the contracting entity or 
ultimately responsible for payment.  
It also argues that the evidence showed that RMH’s sales representative 
for the Snake River project was made aware that RMH was supposed to contract 
directly with the owner rather than Shaw.  

 
[¶18]   The district court reviewed the RFP 
and ruled that it was not sufficient to alert RMH that Shaw was merely a 
construction manager rather than a general contractor.  The district court’s determination is 
supported by the evidence.  The RFP 
document was internally inconsistent, stating that the successful bidders would 
be required to enter into the standard Shaw subcontract, but also stating that 
all contracts would be issued by Snake River.  Even Shaw employees testified that the 
RFP did not accurately reflect the fact that Shaw was simply a construction 
manager rather than a general contractor.    
 
[¶19]   The district court specifically 
found that Shaw did not communicate to RMH that it must enter into a contract 
directly with the owner until after the 
hardware had already been ordered.  
The evidence pertaining to RMH’s knowledge of the need to contract with 
the owner is open to interpretation.  
E-mail messages exchanged by the RMH sales representative and Shaw 
employees when the products were ordered were admitted into evidence at the 
trial and, although they confirm that RMH was expecting some type of a formal 
contract indicating it had been awarded the job, the messages are not clear as 
to whether Shaw or the owner would be entering into the hardware contract with 
RMH.  Furthermore, Shaw project 
superintendent William Linton’s testimony about whether he had informed RMH of 
the need to enter into a contract directly with Snake River was equivocal.  As the finder of fact, the district 
court had the responsibility to assess the credibility of the witnesses and 
weigh the evidence.  We do not re-weigh disputed evidence on appeal.  Mullinnix,  ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 916.  On this record, the district court’s 
finding that RMH was not aware that the owner would be the contracting party on 
the Snake River project was not clearly erroneous.  
 
[¶20]   In addition, even if the RMH sales 
representative was made aware of the fact that the owner intended to be the 
contracting entity on the project, that circumstance never came to 
fruition.  RMH did not enter into a 
contract with the owner and, in fact, had no contact with the owner’s 
representative.  The evidence 
clearly demonstrates, consistent with the district court’s ruling, that RMH 
dealt directly with Shaw and Shaw ordered the materials.    
 
[¶21]   Once Shaw and RMH contracted for 
the hardware and RMH did not require payment up front, the terms of Shaw’s 
credit agreement with RMH came into play.  
The agreement consisted of Shaw’s application for credit, including a 
list of credit references that RMH contacted, and RMH’s letter approving the 
line of credit.     

 
[¶22]   Shaw claims, on appeal, that the 
credit agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2011), because it was not properly subscribed, in that the 
Shaw representative who signed the credit application could not be identified 
and he or she signed only the “Personal Guarantee” portion of the 
application.  We reject Shaw’s 
argument for a number of reasons.  
First, Shaw did not sufficiently present its statute of frauds defense to 
the district court.  Although it 
included the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense in its answer and there 
was evidence presented challenging the validity of the credit agreement, Shaw 
does not direct us to any place in the record where it argued the specific legal 
issue to the district court.  We 
typically do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, unless they 
are fundamental or jurisdictional in nature.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Teton 
County, 2009 WY 122, ¶ 15, 
217 P.3d 401, 405 (Wyo. 
2009).  
 
[¶23]   Moreover, Shaw provides no cogent 
argument or citation of pertinent authority to support its statute of fraud 
claim on appeal.  J & T Properties, LLC v. Gallagher, 
2011 WY 112, ¶ 23, 256 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2011).  Shaw’s argument consists of the 
following statement:  “The Statute 
of Frauds may apply to an alleged contract such as the 2003 Account Credit 
Application, where there is an issue as to whether the document was properly 
'subscribed’ by a party to be bound thereby.  W.R.S. § 1-23-105.”  Shaw presents no analysis of the 
elements of a statute of frauds defense or the possible exceptions to 
application of the statute.  We, 
therefore, decline to further address this claim.     
 
[¶24]   Under the credit agreement, Shaw 
agreed to pay the costs of collection, including legal fees, and interest on any 
unpaid balances.  Although Shaw 
suggested that the agreement was not valid because no one could identify the 
Shaw representative who signed it and it was only signed in the “Personal 
Guarantee” space, the evidence demonstrated that the application was, in fact, 
authorized by Shaw as the credit references were provided on Shaw 
letterhead.  RMH also sent Shaw a 
confirmatory letter, indicating the credit account had been opened and there is 
no indication Shaw objected.  The 
best evidence that Shaw authorized the application and entered into the credit 
agreement was that following the opening of the account, Shaw and RMH operated 
under this agreement for several years prior to the Snake River project.  The district court properly ruled the 
credit agreement applied in this case and, pursuant to its terms, Shaw was 
responsible for the principal balance due on the hardware contract, together 
with contractual interest and attorneys fees.2
 
[¶25]   Affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1Shaw used 
a font size in its brief which does not meet the requirements of the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
W.R.A.P. 7.05(b)(3) requires:  
“Briefs must be in no smaller type or font than 10 characters per inch. 
Fonts for word processors that 
will appear as no smaller than 10 characters per inch are Times New Roman 13, CG 
Times 13, or Courier 12.” The Clerk of the Wyoming Supreme Court 
measured the font used by Shaw at 16 characters per inch, which is much too 
small.  We strongly encourage all 
litigants to familiarize themselves with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and follow them in preparing their briefs.    
2We note that the credit agreement had an original limit of $10,000.  Neither the district court nor the 
parties ascribe any special significance to this term, perhaps because RMH’s 
credit and accounts receivable manager testified that Shaw’s credit limit had 
been increased informally over the years because of its prompt payments.