Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Porter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may 
be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Porter, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4352.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-4352 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PORTER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Porter, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-4352.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client with whom 
a consensual sexual relationship did not exist prior to the client-lawyer 
relationship—Two-year suspension with the second year stayed on 
conditions. 
(No. 2021-0754—Submitted September 8, 2021—Decided December 15, 2021.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2020-068. 
______________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Sean Richard Porter, of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0096622, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2017. 
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{¶ 2} In a November 2020 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged 
Porter with engaging in improper sexual relationships with two clients, making a 
false statement of fact to a tribunal by filing a fraudulently notarized affidavit, and 
knowingly making false statements of material fact in connection with the resulting 
disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and misconduct.  After a 
hearing before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, the 
board issued a report finding that Porter committed all of the charged misconduct 
and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years with 
the final year conditionally stayed and that we place additional conditions on his 
reinstatement.  Porter objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing that 
the board did not afford appropriate weight to the aggravating and mitigating 
factors present in this case and that the proposed sanction is inconsistent with our 
precedent.  For the reasons that follow, we overrule Porter’s objections and adopt 
the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 4} In December 2018, M.H. retained Porter, who was then employed by 
Barr, Jones & Associates, L.L.P. (“Barr Jones”), to represent her in her divorce.  At 
that time, M.H. was a recovering alcoholic who was living and working at a 
California rehabilitation facility, from which she had recently graduated.  Her three 
children were living in Ohio with their father.  She had no prior relationship with 
Porter. 
{¶ 5} Although M.H.’s divorce was contentious, it was finalized in May 
2019 and Porter continued to represent M.H. in several postdecree matters.  By July 
2019, Porter and M.H. had begun to exchange inappropriate and sexually 
suggestive text messages. 
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{¶ 6} On July 12, Porter filed a motion for contempt against M.H.’s former 
spouse and included an affidavit that was purportedly signed by M.H. and notarized 
by Porter on July 11.  Porter later admitted that he had signed M.H.’s name to the 
affidavit and notarized that signature, fraudulently attesting that he had personally 
observed M.H. sign the document, before filing it with the court. 
{¶ 7} In August and September, M.H. twice flew to Ohio to attend 
postdecree hearings.  After each hearing, Porter and M.H. had sexual intercourse in 
M.H.’s hotel room.  As M.H. was returning to California at the conclusion of her 
September trip, Porter broke up with her. 
{¶ 8} On October 15, M.H. informed Barr Jones of Porter’s improper 
conduct.  When confronted by the firm’s partners, Porter initially denied the 
allegations.  Later that day, he admitted that he had engaged in improper conduct 
with M.H.  Following that discussion, Barr Jones partner Andrew D. Jones sent 
Porter an email confirming the firm’s understanding that Porter would (1) have no 
further contact with M.H., (2) prepare a motion to withdraw from M.H.’s case, (3) 
write a check to the firm to reimburse M.H. for all the fees for her postdecree 
matters, and (4) self-report his ethical violations to the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel and provide written confirmation of that report to the firm. 
{¶ 9} On October 16, Porter notified relator of his misconduct with respect 
to M.H.  He also issued to the firm a $4,000 check, which the firm refunded to M.H. 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated and the board found that Porter’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting or engaging in 
sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed prior to 
the client-lawyer relationship) and 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly 
making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal). 
 
 
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Count Two 
{¶ 11} A.H.’s spouse filed for divorce in July 2019, and the following 
month, A.H. was charged with domestic violence.  She retained Porter to represent 
her in both proceedings and had no prior relationship with him. 
{¶ 12} On October 3, A.H. invited Porter to dinner to celebrate a favorable 
ruling in her criminal case.  Porter—who still was representing A.H. in both cases—
accepted the invitation.  After dinner, A.H. asked Porter whether he wanted to see 
a movie and they drove to the theater in separate cars.  At the theater, Porter asked 
A.H. to get into his car, where they engaged in intimate physical contact.  Porter 
suggested that they go to his nearby apartment, and A.H. agreed.  There, they 
engaged in sex. 
{¶ 13} Over the next two weeks, Porter and A.H. exchanged numerous text 
messages.  On October 15—the day on which Porter’s employer confronted him 
about his inappropriate relationship with M.H.—A.H. sent Porter a text message 
informing him that she had not been able to sleep for a few nights and that she 
“couldn’t tell anybody” and asking whether she was a “horrible person now.”  
Porter responded, “No not at all let’s not tell anyone.”  And when A.H. asked what 
would happen if she got pregnant, Porter told her, “[You have] nothing to worry 
about but we will work together to hide it.” 
{¶ 14} The following day, Porter reported his misconduct with M.H. to 
relator but failed to mention that he had engaged in similar misconduct with A.H.  
Although Barr Jones was unaware of Porter’s misconduct with A.H., the firm 
removed him from her case on October 30 based on his misconduct with M.H.  
After the firm terminated Porter’s employment on December 6, he asked A.H. to 
help him get a job with her employer.  A.H. recommended Porter for an entry-level 
position, but her employer did not hire him. 
{¶ 15} Porter ended his relationship with A.H. in March 2020.  On April 9, 
A.H. filed a grievance against him.  In his response to that grievance, Porter 
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repeatedly and falsely stated that their inappropriate relationship did not begin until 
November 2019, after his employer had removed him from her case.  He 
characterized A.H.’s grievance as frivolous and claimed that her reports that their 
relationship occurred during their attorney-client relationship were “fraudulent,” 
that she had “mental issues” and an “evil motive,” and that she was “clearly acting 
on emotions and anger” after he ended their relationship.  At his disciplinary 
hearing, however, he admitted that his response to disciplinary counsel was a 
complete fabrication. 
{¶ 16} The parties stipulated and the board found that Porter’s conduct with 
respect to A.H. violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) and 8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
making a false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 17} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 18} As for aggravating factors, the board accepted the parties’ 
stipulations that Porter had committed multiple offenses and submitted false 
evidence, made false statements, or engaged in other deceptive practices during the 
disciplinary process.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4) and (6).  The board also found 
that five additional aggravating factors were present—namely, that Porter had acted 
with a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, failed to 
cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding, refused to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his conduct, and caused harm to vulnerable clients.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(B)(2), (3), (5), (7), and (8). 
{¶ 19} The parties stipulated and the board found that two mitigating factors 
were present—Porter has no prior discipline and had made a timely, good-faith 
effort to make restitution to M.H.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (3).  The board 
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also considered but rejected Porter’s claims that he had made full and free 
disclosure to the board, submitted evidence of his good character or reputation, and 
established the existence of a qualifying mental disorder.  The board found that 
Porter’s duplicity during relator’s investigation overshadowed his eventual 
admission of wrongdoing and that his admissions were tainted by his refusal to 
acknowledge that he was solely responsible for his violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.8(j). 
{¶ 20} In determining its recommended sanction for Porter’s misconduct, 
the board considered more than a dozen cases in which we imposed sanctions 
ranging from a public reprimand to disbarment for misconduct that involved sexual 
activity with a client.  Because Porter took advantage of the attorney-client 
relationship and his client’s vulnerable circumstances for his own sexual 
gratification and engaged in a course of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
and misrepresentation, the board concluded that Porter’s misconduct warranted an 
actual suspension from the practice of law.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 
155 Ohio St.3d 100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, ¶ 22 (stating that an actual 
suspension is appropriate for attorneys who have taken advantage of the attorney-
client relationship and their clients’ vulnerable circumstances); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 191, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995) (holding 
that an attorney who engages in a course of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation will be actually suspended from the practice of law for 
an appropriate period of time). 
{¶ 21} In determining the recommended length of the suspension, the board 
considered four cases in which we imposed two-year suspensions and conditionally 
stayed from as many as 18 months to as few as six months of those suspensions. 
{¶ 22} In Sarver, an attorney engaged in a sexual relationship with an 
indigent client he had been appointed to defend against serious criminal charges 
and then denied his misconduct when confronted by the judge presiding over the 
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client’s criminal case.  Just two aggravating factors were present—Sarver had acted 
with a dishonest and selfish motive and committed multiple offenses.  In mitigation, 
Sarver had no prior discipline and had made full and free disclosure to the board 
and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.  He also 
had had criminal sanctions imposed for actions relating to his improper sexual 
relationship, submitted evidence of his good character and reputation, successfully 
completed court-ordered counseling, entered into a contract with the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”), and made a good-faith effort to address the issues 
underlying his misconduct.  We suspended Sarver from the practice of law for two 
years with 18 months conditionally stayed. 
{¶ 23} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Williams, 104 Ohio St.3d 317, 2004-Ohio-
6588, 819 N.E.2d 677, an attorney had an inappropriate sexual relationship with a 
vulnerable client he was representing in criminal and domestic-relations cases.  As 
aggravating factors, we found that Williams had preyed on his client by exploiting 
her emotional and financial weaknesses and steadfastly denied the sexual 
relationship under oath.  In addition to having no prior discipline, Williams had 
eventually admitted his misconduct and apologized for his actions.  We imposed 
the same sanction on Williams that we imposed on Sarver—a two-year suspension 
with 18 months conditionally stayed. 
{¶ 24} Here, the board distinguished Porter’s misconduct from Sarver’s and 
Williams’s on the grounds that Porter’s misconduct involved two vulnerable clients 
and more egregious aggravating factors.  Similar circumstances were present in 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Sleibi, 144 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-2724, 42 
N.E.3d 699, in which we imposed a two-year suspension with six months 
conditionally stayed on an attorney who engaged in sexual activity with four clients.  
Like Porter, Sleibi had acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern 
of multiple offenses, and caused harm to vulnerable clients.  But in addition to 
having no prior discipline, Sleibi had exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the 
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disciplinary proceedings and presented evidence of his good character and 
reputation.  Although Sleibi had expressed some remorse for his misconduct, we 
declined to credit that remorse as a mitigating factor because he had not apologized 
to his clients and had made several attempts to discredit and embarrass them, as 
Porter did here. 
{¶ 25} The board found that this case had aggravating factors similar to 
those in Disciplinary Counsel v. Benbow, 153 Ohio St.3d 350, 2018-Ohio-2705, 
106 N.E.3d 57, but that it also involved two vulnerable victims.  In Benbow, we 
imposed a two-year suspension with the second year conditionally stayed on an 
attorney who violated multiple professional-conduct rules by engaging in sexual 
activity with a single client and repeatedly lying about that conduct during the 
disciplinary investigation.  Like Porter, Benbow had acted with a dishonest or 
selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, 
failed to cooperate, and made false statements during the disciplinary process.  In 
addition to having no prior discipline, Benbow had submitted approximately 40 
letters attesting to his good character and reputation. 
{¶ 26} Mindful of the fact that the primary purpose of the disciplinary 
process is to protect the public, the board recommends that we suspend Porter from 
the practice of law for two years with one year stayed on the conditions that he (1) 
schedule an OLAP evaluation within 60 days of our decision in this case, (2) 
comply with the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(A) governing the employment 
of a disqualified or suspended attorney by an attorney or law firm, (3) commit no 
further misconduct, and (4) pay the costs of this proceeding. 
{¶ 27} In addition to the conditions for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar 
R. V(24), the board recommends that Porter be required to submit (1) proof that he 
has complied with all OLAP recommendations, (2) an opinion from a qualified 
healthcare professional that he is able to return to the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law, and (3) proof that he has completed six hours of 
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continuing legal education addressing ethical boundaries for professionals.  The 
board further recommends that upon reinstatement to the profession, Porter be 
required to cooperate with a monitoring attorney who would be responsible for 
preapproving all professional relationships with prospective female clients, 
monitoring approved relationships, and reviewing all of Porter’s communications 
with female clients. 
Porter’s Objections to the Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 28} In two objections, Porter challenges the board’s rejection of several 
mitigating factors, including his diagnosed mental disorders, his self-report to 
relator and subsequent cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, and his 
character references.  Citing those purported mitigating factors and claiming that 
his misconduct is less egregious than the conduct at issue in the cases relied on by 
the board, Porter asserts that the appropriate sanction for his misconduct is a two-
year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed. 
{¶ 29} Porter’s contention that the board improperly failed to attribute 
mitigating effect to certain diagnosed mental disorders is without merit.  In order 
to establish a mental disorder as a mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), 
an attorney must establish that (1) a qualified healthcare professional has diagnosed 
the attorney with a disorder, (2) the disorder contributed to cause the misconduct, 
(3) the attorney has achieved a sustained period of successful treatment, and (4) a 
qualified healthcare professional has rendered a prognosis that the attorney will be 
able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law under 
specified conditions. 
{¶ 30} In this case, it is undisputed that Tara LeMasters, a licensed 
professional clinical counselor, has diagnosed Porter with clinical depression, 
anxiety, and an adjustment disorder.  In addition, LeMasters testified that based on 
her training, education, and experience, she had determined that those disorders 
contributed to cause his misconduct.  She expressed her professional opinion that 
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with continued treatment, Porter would be able to return to the competent, ethical, 
and professional practice of law. 
{¶ 31} But LeMasters also admitted that her first meeting with Porter 
occurred on April 12, 2021—just 16 days before his disciplinary hearing—and that 
he was in the early phase of his treatment, having completed just four 60- to 90-
minute sessions.  She recommended a three-year period of treatment beginning with 
biweekly sessions for six months to one year, backing down to bimonthly sessions 
for the remainder of the term, with monthly follow-up sessions thereafter. 
{¶ 32} On these facts, it is evident that Porter has not achieved the sustained 
period of successful treatment that is necessary for a disorder to qualify as a 
mitigating factor.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Karp, 156 Ohio St.3d 218, 
2018-Ohio-5212, 124 N.E.3d 819, ¶ 31-32 (finding that an attorney had not 
achieved a sustained period of successful treatment after five months of 
psychotherapy resulting in the remission of his depression for a little less than two 
months). 
{¶ 33} In his objections, Porter asserts that obtaining mental healthcare 
during the COVID-19 pandemic “was nearly impossible, with the majority of the 
country on lockdown and health care severely curtailed for all but those with life-
threatening conditions.”  At his disciplinary hearing, Porter testified that he had 
attempted to work through his problems on his own before seeking help.  He gave 
no indication of how long he had waited to seek treatment after he learned of M.H.’s 
allegations against him in October 2019—five months before the COVID-19 
shutdown.  Although he testified that he eventually reached out to OLAP and 
LeMasters to find a preferred provider to conduct an assessment, the only 
suggestion in the record that the pandemic delayed those efforts was Porter’s 
statement, “But I think because of COVID and that kind of stuff, it got kind of 
delayed.”  In fact, Porter offered no evidence tending to demonstrate what efforts 
he and/or OLAP undertook to find a treatment professional when he first contacted 
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OLAP or that OLAP had attributed any of the delay in his diagnosis and treatment 
to the pandemic.  Nor did Porter request a continuance of his disciplinary hearing 
to permit him to establish a more sustained period of treatment.  On these facts, we 
find that Porter’s mental disorders are not a mitigating factor. 
{¶ 34} Next, Porter contends that the board failed to properly consider that 
he fully cooperated in these disciplinary proceedings by self-reporting his 
relationship with M.H., making full restitution to her, and entering into stipulations 
of fact and misconduct.  We disagree. 
{¶ 35} While it is true that it was Porter who first brought his inappropriate 
relationship with M.H. to relator’s attention, he hardly did so voluntarily.  Indeed, 
the board found that Porter made that report only because his firm’s partners had 
informed him that they would report his misconduct to disciplinary counsel if he 
did not do so himself.  Moreover, Porter’s initial report to relator actively concealed 
the fact that he had engaged—and continued to engage—in the same type of 
misconduct with A.H. 
{¶ 36} In his response to A.H.’s grievance six months later, Porter attacked 
A.H.’s character and credibility as he repeatedly and falsely claimed that their 
personal relationship did not commence until after the attorney-client relationship 
had ended.  Although Porter has since admitted that his response to that grievance 
was a complete fabrication, he continues to deny responsibility for his actions and 
claim that his misconduct was not as egregious as that of other attorneys sanctioned 
by this court, because, according to him, his inappropriate relationships with M.H. 
and A.H. were consensual and initiated by his clients. 
{¶ 37} Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in consensual 
sex with a client unless that consensual sexual relationship predates the attorney-
client relationship because “[t]he client’s reliance on the ability of her counsel in a 
crisis situation has the effect of putting the lawyer in a position of dominance and 
the client in a position of dependence and vulnerability,” Disciplinary Counsel v. 
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Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d 509, 510, 664 N.E.2d 522 (1996).  Regardless of whether a 
client initiates or consents to sexual activity with the lawyer, it is the lawyer’s duty 
to ensure that the attorney-client relationship remains on a professional level.  Id.  
Despite this fact, Porter continues to attribute blame to his clients for his current 
predicament.  We therefore agree with the board’s assessment that “[Porter’s] 
duplicity during the investigatory phase of the proceedings overshadowed the 
admissions of wrongdoing that he made during the hearing, and * * * those 
admissions were tainted by his refusal to acknowledge that his multiple violations 
of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) were his sole responsibility.” 
{¶ 38} Porter’s claim that the board inappropriately discounted his 
character evidence is likewise unavailing.  As the board noted, two of the letters 
were from attorneys who had only witnessed Porter’s work as a docket clerk in his 
father’s office during his senior year of high school and undergraduate summer 
breaks.  The remaining two letters were from law-school friends.  None of the 
authors claimed to have had any professional contact with Porter after he was 
admitted to the bar, and none of them explained why they continued to hold him in 
such high regard despite the truth of the allegations lodged against him.  Therefore, 
they could offer little, if any, insight into Porter’s current character or reputation as 
an attorney. 
{¶ 39} Porter’s final argument is that his misconduct is not as egregious as 
that of the attorneys in the cases cited by the board.  That argument rests largely on 
Porter’s flawed claims that he is somehow less culpable for his misconduct because 
his clients purportedly initiated and willingly participated in the affairs.  As we have 
already explained, regardless of whether Porter’s clients initiated or consented to 
the sexual activity, it was Porter’s duty alone to ensure that the attorney-client 
relationship remained on a professional level. 
{¶ 40} Porter also seeks to distinguish his misconduct from that of Sarver, 
who was charged with two counts of sexual battery arising from his sexual 
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relationship with a single client (though the charges were dismissed as part of a plea 
agreement), see Sarver, 155 Ohio St.3d 100, 2018-Ohio-4717, 119 N.E.3d 405, at 
¶ 8, and Sleibi, who was accused of (but never charged with) rape, see Sleibi, 144 
Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-2724, 42 N.E.3d 699, at ¶ 9.  He further contends that 
his conduct is not as egregious as that of Benbow, who on one occasion engaged in 
sexual conduct with his client inside a courthouse.  See Benbow, 153 Ohio St.3d 
350, 2018-Ohio-2705, 106 N.E.3d 57.  While we acknowledge that there are some 
factual differences between Porter’s misconduct and the misconduct at issue in each 
of those cases, we are nonetheless persuaded that the board struck the right balance 
with its recommended sanction given that Porter engaged in inappropriate sexual 
conduct with two vulnerable clients, engaged in repeated instances of dishonesty 
beginning with his false notarization of an affidavit and spanning all stages of the 
disciplinary process, and refused to acknowledge both the wrongful nature of his 
misconduct and the harm that he had caused to his clients.  We therefore overrule 
each of Porter’s objections and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} Accordingly, Sean Richard Porter is suspended from the practice of 
law for two years with the second year stayed on the conditions that he (1) contact 
OLAP to schedule a mental-health assessment within 60 days of the issuance of 
this order and, if OLAP determines that treatment is necessary, enter into an OLAP 
contract for a duration to be determined by OLAP and comply with all treatment 
recommendations, (2) comply with the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(A) 
during the term of his suspension, (3) commit no further misconduct, and (4) pay 
the costs of this proceeding. 
{¶ 42} In addition to the conditions for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar 
R. V(24), Porter shall be required to submit (1) proof that he has complied with all 
OLAP recommendations, (2) an opinion from a qualified healthcare professional 
that he is able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, 
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and (3) proof that he has completed six hours of continuing legal education, 
approved by relator and in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, addressing 
ethical boundaries for professionals. 
{¶ 43} Upon reinstatement to the practice of law, Porter shall be required to 
cooperate with a monitoring attorney appointed by relator for two years.  The 
monitoring attorney, who may be a supervising attorney in a law firm that employs 
Porter, shall be responsible for preapproving all professional relationships with 
prospective female clients, monitoring approved relationships, and reviewing all 
written, electronic, and verbal communications with Porter’s female clients.  If 
Porter fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he 
will serve the entire two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Porter. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Matthew A. Kanai, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Holly Marie Wilson, for respondent. 
_________________