Title: Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2187.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2187 
WYMSYLO, DIR., APPELLEE, v. BARTEC, INC., D.B.A. ZENO’S VICTORIAN 
VILLAGE, ET AL., APPELLANTS; DEWINE, ATTY. GEN., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2187.] 
R.C. Chapter 3734—Smoke Free Workplace Act—Legislation requiring 
proprietors of public places of employment to prevent smoking on 
premises is valid exercise of state’s police power—State’s enforcement of 
legislation against property owners does not constitute regulatory taking 
without just compensation. 
(No. 2011-0019—Submitted October 19, 2011—Decided May 23, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-173,  
2010-Ohio-5558. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. Chapter 3794, the Smoke Free Workplace Act, is a valid exercise of the 
state’s police power by Ohio voters and does not amount to a regulatory 
taking. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to address several constitutional 
challenges to the Smoke Free Workplace Act, R.C. Chapter 3794. 
I.  Factual Background 
{¶ 2} On November 7, 2006, Ohio voters passed a ballot initiative to 
enact the Smoke Free Workplace Act (“the Smoke Free Act”).  Codified in R.C. 
Chapter 3794, the act became effective on December 7, 2006.  The Ohio 
Department of Health (“ODH”) and its designees are charged with the 
enforcement of the Smoke Free Act.  R.C. 3794.07.  Subject to certain 
exemptions, proprietors of public places of employment are not to permit smoking 
in their establishments.  R.C. 3794.02(A).  Zeno’s Victorian Village is a privately 
owned bar in Columbus that has been cited for violations of the act on multiple 
occasions. 
{¶ 3} ODH’s director filed a complaint seeking preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief ordering Bartec, Inc., d.b.a. Zeno’s Victorian Village, 
and Richard Allen, the CEO and sole shareholder of Bartec, Inc. (collectively 
“appellants”) to comply with the Smoke Free Act and to pay all outstanding fines.  
Appellants answered the complaint and admitted receiving nine notices of 
violations after investigations had been completed and that a tenth investigation 
was pending.  They raised the affirmative defenses that R.C. Chapter 3794 is 
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to them and that R.C. Chapter 
3794 has been enforced in an unconstitutional manner and in a manner that is 
inconsistent with its plain language.  Appellants also filed a counterclaim for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against ODH and a cross-claim against the Ohio 
Attorney General, alleging that the Smoke Free Act operates in violation of 
appellants’ constitutional rights under the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
16, 19, and 20, that the act is invalid as applied to them, and that ODH engaged in 
rulemaking that exceeds its authority.1   
{¶ 4} The trial court consolidated the parties’ requests for preliminary 
injunction with the trial on the merits.  At trial, evidence was presented that 
appellants had been cited ten times for violating the Smoke Free Act between July 
2007 and September 2009.  Eight of the ten violations were not appealed.  The 
two violations that were appealed were upheld by the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas.  The trial court, however, found that ODH has implemented a 
policy of strict liability for violations of the Smoke Free Act by issuing fines 
regardless of whether the appellants were actually “permitting” smoking to occur 
at Zeno’s.  The court observed, “Property owners, however, have no control over 
whether someone rips out a cigarette and lights up.  Again, the Department of 
Health’s interpretation of the Smoke Free Act makes property owners liable for 
the actions of third parties upon which the property owner has little to no control.”  
                                                 
1  The actual relief sought by appellants with respect to their declaratory judgment is somewhat 
unclear because the answer/counterclaim/cross-claim filed in the record is missing two pages.  The 
only part of the request for relief that appears in full is a request for 
a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting 
1. Any further unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful enforcement of R.C. 3794 
and OAC 3701. 
2. Any further  Ohio Attorney General collection efforts against Zeno’s and 
similarly situated proprietors that have been, are, and continue to be issued under an 
unconstitutional and unlawful framework. 
3. Current Ohio Attorney General collection efforts which, if successful, will 
effectuate the permanent cessation of Zeno’s as a going business concern.  
But a fragment of another request for what appears to be declaratory relief reads as 
follows: 
3. Relevant policies of the Ohio Department of Health constitute unlawful 
agency policymaking. 
4. The Ohio Department of Health’s interpretations and applications of relevant 
provisions of R.C. [Chapter] 3794 and OAC [Chapter] 3701 are in contravention of 
the language of the statute drafted and handed down by Ohio’s legislative branch of 
government. 
5. Ohio Attorney General’s Office collection efforts effectuate a taking of 
property without just compensation. 
From appellants’ trial brief, it appears that they were requesting that R.C. Chapter 3794 be 
declared unconstitutional as applied to them, that the citations already issued be invalidated, and 
that future enforcement against them be enjoined.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The trial court held that this ODH policy of imposing liability without fault was 
stricter than R.C. 3794.02 allowed and that ODH had exceeded its authority in 
implementing it.  The trial court denied ODH’s request for a permanent injunction 
and vacated the ten citations. 
{¶ 5} ODH appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, raising three 
assignments of error.  The first alleged that the trial court failed to apply the plain 
language of the Smoke Free Act.  The second alleged that the trial court erred 
when it held that ODH engaged in unlawful rulemaking.  The third asserted that 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying ODH’s complaint for injunction.  
Appellants filed a cross-appeal, arguing that they were entitled to declaratory and 
injunctive relief to prohibit further unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful 
enforcement of R.C. Chapter 3794 and to prohibit the Ohio Attorney General 
from attempting to collect the outstanding fines. 
{¶ 6} The Tenth District reversed the trial court’s judgment.  Jackson v. 
Bartec, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-173, 2010-Ohio-5558.  The court of appeals 
examined R.C. 3794.02 and determined that the plain language of the statute and 
related Administrative Code sections required proprietors covered by the Smoke 
Free Act to assume some level of responsibility for conduct occurring on their 
premises.  Id. at ¶ 19.  The court of appeals determined that appellants were 
challenging  ODH’s method of enforcement as applied and that appellants were 
therefore required to develop a factual record so that their challenge could be fully 
considered on appeal.  By not pursuing an administrative hearing and failing to 
develop the necessary record, appellants had waived any error.  Id. at ¶ 24.  
Because the ten orders finding violations of the Smoke Free Act had become final 
orders, the court of appeals held that the trial court should not have heard 
appellants’ collateral attack on the enforcement issue and thus erred as a matter of 
law in vacating the violations.  Id. at ¶ 25.  With respect to appellants’ argument 
that the Smoke Free Act is unconstitutional on its face, the appellate court relied 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
on its previous decision in Deer Park Inn v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 185 Ohio 
App.3d 524, 2009-Ohio-6836, 924 N.E.2d 898, to hold that the act is 
constitutional. 
{¶ 7} After resolving the constitutional issues, the Tenth District 
addressed whether ODH was entitled to a permanent injunction.  The court stated, 
 
 
On this record, the evidence is overwhelming that Bartec 
repeatedly and intentionally violated the Smoke Free Act, failed to 
comply with its provisions as R.C. 3794.09(D) requires, and in so 
doing exposed patrons and employees to the very harm the statute 
is designed to prevent.  Due to the hearing the court conducted and 
the evidence adduced as a result of the hearing, the trial court 
could reach no other conclusion than that ODH is entitled to the 
statutory injunction it requested. 
 
Id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 8} Based on its resolutions of ODH’s assignments of error, the Tenth 
District overruled appellants’ cross-assignments of error as an impermissible 
collateral attack on the final orders of violation. 
{¶ 9} We accepted appellants’ appeal to this court on the following three 
propositions of law: 
{¶ 10} 1.  “The Health Department’s method of enforcing the smoking 
ban violates separation of powers, and must be discontinued.” 
{¶ 11} 2.  “Inclusion of bars as proprietors subject to R.C. [Chapter] 3794 
exceeds the outer limits of the state police power, and unreasonably extinguishes 
property rights.” 
{¶ 12} 3.  “Ohio’s declaratory judgment statute enables previously-cited 
Ohioans to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or rule.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 13} Because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 
and cannot use declaratory judgment to vacate final orders, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals with respect to the ten earlier violations.  We 
also hold that the Smoke Free Act is a valid exercise of the state’s police power 
and does not constitute a taking. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 14} R.C. 3794.04 expresses the purpose of the Smoke Free Act passed 
by Ohio voters. 
 
Because medical studies have conclusively shown that 
exposure to secondhand smoke from tobacco causes illness and 
disease, including lung cancer, heart disease, and respiratory 
illness, smoking in the workplace is a statewide concern and, 
therefore, it is in the best interests of public health that smoking of 
tobacco products be prohibited in public places and places of 
employment and that there be a uniform statewide minimum 
standard to protect workers and the public from the health hazards 
associated with exposure to secondhand smoke from tobacco. 
The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed 
so as to further its purposes of protecting public health and the 
health of employees and shall prevail over any less restrictive state 
or local laws or regulations. Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to permit smoking where it is otherwise restricted by 
other laws or regulations. 
 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 15} The act also provides that “[n]o proprietor2 of a public place3 or 
place of employment4 * * * shall permit smoking in the public place or place of 
employment * * *.”  (Footnotes added.)  R.C. 3794.02(A).  Another section states,  
 
No person shall refuse to immediately discontinue smoking 
in a public place, place of employment, or establishment, facility 
or outdoor area declared nonsmoking [under this chapter] when 
requested to do so by the proprietor or any employee of an 
employer of the public place, place of employment or 
establishment, facility or outdoor area. 
 
R.C. 3794.02(D).  Proprietors of public places and places of employment are 
required to remove all ashtrays and receptacles used for disposing of smoking 
materials and to post at every entrance “no smoking” signs, which shall be 
“clearly legible to a person of normal vision throughout the areas they are 
intended to mark.”  R.C. 3794.06.  Only private residences and certain family-
owned and -operated places of employment, retail tobacco shops, outdoor patios, 
private clubs, and designated smoking rooms in hotels and nursing homes are 
exempt from the reach of the act.  R.C. 3794.03. 
{¶ 16} According to the rules promulgated by ODH pursuant to R.C. 
3794.04, once a report of violation is received, ODH has two alternatives.  It may 
                                                 
2 “ ‘Proprietor’ means an employer, owner, manager, operator, liquor permit holder, or person in 
charge or control of a public place or place of employment.”  R.C. 3794.01(G). 
 
3 “ ‘Public place’ means an enclosed area to which the public is invited or in which the public is 
permitted and that is not a private residence.”  R.C. 3794.01(B). 
 
4 “ ‘Place of employment’ means an enclosed area under the direct or indirect control of an 
employer that the employer's employees use for work or any other purpose, including but not 
limited to, offices, meeting rooms, sales, production and storage areas, restrooms, stairways, 
hallways, warehouses, garages, and vehicles. An enclosed area as described herein is a place of 
employment without regard to the time of day or the presence of employees.”  R.C. 3794.01(C). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
dismiss the report if, after construing the allegations as true, it determines that the 
report is frivolous, was not made in good faith, or is too old to be reasonably 
investigated.  Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(C).  If it concludes that the report may 
have merit, ODH must issue to a proprietor a written notice and copy of the report 
of violation and allow for written statements or evidence to contest the report.  
Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(D).  After the written notice is issued, ODH must 
investigate.  Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(D)(2).  Upon finding a violation, ODH 
must provide a proprietor with either a letter of warning if there has been no 
finding of violation within the previous two years or a written proposed finding of 
violation and a proposed civil fine.  Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(F).  The fine per 
day for a violation of R.C. 3794.02(A) shall be not less than $100 and not more 
than $2,500.  R.C. 3794.07(B).  The fine shall be doubled for intentional 
violations.  Id. 
{¶ 17} A proprietor who receives a proposed finding of violation and 
proposed civil fine may request an administrative review to present its case and to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.  Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-
08(F)(2).  The hearing officer must prepare a report and recommendation 
including findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which objections may be 
filed.  ODH is required to approve, modify, or disapprove the report.  Id.  An 
affected proprietor may appeal a final ODH decision to the Franklin County 
Common Pleas Court pursuant to R.C. 119.12.  R.C. 3794.09(C). 
A.  Scope of Appeal 
{¶ 18} Before addressing the merits of appellants’ appeal, we must 
determine which issues are properly before this court.  The first two propositions 
of law assert that ODH’s method of enforcing the Smoke Free Act violates the 
separation-of-powers doctrine, exceeds the state’s police power, and constitutes a 
taking of property.  The third proposition of law addresses the denial of 
appellants’ request for declaratory judgment. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 19} With regard to the first two propositions, the Tenth District Court 
of Appeals concluded that these arguments were as-applied constitutional 
challenges that should have been raised at the administrative level.  2010-Ohio-
5558, ¶ 22-25.  Because the court of appeals determined that appellants never 
argued an as-applied challenge during the administrative process, it held that the 
issues had been waived, and the trial court erred in vacating the violations.  
Appellants counter that the issues were properly raised as facial challenges and 
that they did not need to exhaust administrative remedies. 
 
1.  The As-Applied v. Facial Constitutional Challenge 
{¶ 20} Like statutes and ordinances, administrative rules may be 
constitutionally challenged on their face or as applied.  Jones v. Chagrin Falls, 77 
Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388 (1997).  The distinction between the two types 
of constitutional challenges is important.  For example, the standard of proof 
depends upon which type of challenge is being made.  See State ex rel. Ohio 
Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-
Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 21 (a facial constitutional challenge requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas an as-applied challenge requires clear 
and convincing evidence).  More relevant to this case, however, is that parties 
advancing an as-applied challenge must raise that challenge at the first available 
opportunity, and failure to do so results in waiver.  They need not do so if arguing 
a facial challenge.  Southwestern City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Kinney, 24 Ohio 
St.3d 184, 494 N.E.2d 1109 (1986), syllabus; Reading v. Pub. Util. Comm., 109 
Ohio St.3d 193, 2006-Ohio-2181, 846 N.E.2d 840, ¶ 16 (facial constitutional 
challenge may be raised for the first time in appeal from administrative agency, 
but as-applied constitutional challenge must be raised first in the agency to allow 
the parties to develop an evidentiary record). 
{¶ 21} A facial challenge alleges that a statute, ordinance, or 
administrative rule, on its face and under all circumstances, has no rational 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.  Jaylin Invests., Inc. v. 
Moreland Hills, 107 Ohio St.3d 339, 2006-Ohio-4, 839 N.E.2d 903, ¶ 11.  Facial 
challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are the most difficult to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the act would be valid.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).  If a statute is unconstitutional 
on its face, the statute may not be enforced under any circumstances.  When 
determining whether a law is facially invalid, a court must be careful not to 
exceed the statute's actual language and speculate about hypothetical or imaginary 
cases.  Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 
442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008).  Reference to extrinsic facts is 
not required to resolve a facial challenge.  Reading at 195. 
{¶ 22} A party raising an as-applied constitutional challenge, on the other 
hand, alleges that “the ‘application of the statute in the particular context in which 
he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional.  The 
practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional “as applied” is to prevent its 
future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative.’ ”  
Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Housing Div., 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-
357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 14, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Because an as-applied challenge depends upon a particular set of 
facts, this type of constitutional challenge to a rule must be raised before the 
administrative agency to develop the necessary factual record.  Reading, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 193, 2006-Ohio-2181, 846 N.E.2d 840, ¶ 13. 
2. Appellants’ Separation-of-Powers Proposition—An As-Applied 
Constitutional Challenge 
{¶ 23} In their first proposition of law, appellants allege that ODH’s 
method of enforcing the smoking ban violates the separation of powers and is 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
therefore unconstitutional.  They argue that this is a facial challenge.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 3794.02(A) provides that no proprietor shall permit smoking 
in a public place or place or employment.  In accordance with that statutory 
provision, ODH adopted Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-02(B), requiring a proprietor 
to take “reasonable steps including, but not limited to, requesting individuals to 
cease smoking, to ensure that tobacco smoke, in an area directly or indirectly 
under the control of the proprietor, does not enter any area in which smoking is 
prohibited.”  Appellants contend that ODH, in its efforts to enforce this 
regulation, has adopted an unwritten policy of strict liability.  In other words, if an 
investigator sees smoking in a public place or place of employment covered by 
the Smoke Free Act, the proprietor is automatically charged with violating R.C. 
3794.02 regardless of the steps the proprietor has taken to comply with the act.  
Appellants contend that the adoption of a policy of strict liability exceeds the 
statutory authority granted to ODH, thereby usurping the legislative function and 
violating the separation of powers. 
{¶ 25} The resolution of this proposition, however, depends upon the 
particular set of facts and circumstances surrounding each of the ten separate 
violations.  Due to the unwritten nature of the alleged strict-liability policy, 
extrinsic evidence is required to prove that the policy existed and that ODH 
investigators implemented it when conducting its investigations into the ten 
complaints.  Thus, appellants are raising an as-applied challenge on separation-of-
powers grounds. 
{¶ 26} Nevertheless, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court 
should not have entertained this as-applied challenge to the ten past violations.  
Appellants had the opportunity to request an administrative hearing in which they 
could have developed a record to show that ODH’s investigators used a strict-
liability approach.  See Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(F) and (G); R.C. 3794.09.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Because appellants failed to request an administrative hearing for eight of their 
violations and because they failed to prosecute the two administrative appeals 
they did request, appellants did not raise any constitutional challenge regarding 
any of its ten violations.  Therefore, appellants failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies, and this constitutional issue is not properly before the 
court. 
3.  Appellants’ Police-Power and Takings Proposition—An As-
Applied Constitutional Challenge 
{¶ 27} In their second proposition of law, appellants assert that their 
inclusion as proprietors subject to the Smoke Free Act exceeds the outer limits of 
the state’s police power and unreasonably extinguishes property rights.  
Additionally, they argue that prohibiting smoking in an adults-only liquor-
licensed establishment, such as Zeno’s, is unduly oppressive and amounts to a 
taking.  It is clear that this is an as-applied challenge.  Appellants are not 
contending that there is no set of circumstances under which the Smoke Free Act 
would be valid.  Again, appellants are contending that, as applied to their 
particular circumstances, R.C. 3794.02 is unfair and unconstitutional. 
{¶ 28} Appellants acknowledge that this second proposition of law raises 
an as-applied challenge but nonetheless urge this court to adopt their arguments 
and invalidate the ten violations.  However, as discussed above, because 
appellants did not raise this as-applied constitutional challenge in any of the 
violations they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and this challenge 
is not properly before the court. 
B.  Declaratory Judgment—Collateral Attack or Alternate Remedy 
{¶ 29} In response to ODH’s complaint, appellants filed a counterclaim 
and cross-claim requesting declaratory judgment.  The Tenth District held that the 
declaratory judgment was an as-applied challenge to the Smoke Free Act and was 
an improper means to collaterally attack the ten final orders finding violations.  
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
2010-Ohio-5558, ¶ 36.  Appellants argue that the appellate court interpreted their 
request for relief as addressing only the past ten violations.  Appellants contend 
that this characterization ignored the prospective aspect of their request for 
declaratory relief, i.e., their request to prevent ODH from continuing to apply its 
unwritten policy of strict liability. 
{¶ 30} Declaratory judgment is available to challenge the constitutionality 
of an administrative rule or policy.  Karches v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 526 
N.E.2d 1350 (1988).  But it may not be used to review administrative 
proceedings.  Driscoll v. Austintown Assoc., 42 Ohio St.2d 263, 271, 328 N.E.2d 
395 (1975) (“the declaratory judgment action is independent from the 
administrative proceedings; it is not a review of the final administrative order”). 
{¶ 31} The three essential elements for declaratory relief are (1) a real 
controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable in 
character, and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.  
Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 97, 296 N.E.2d 
261 (1973), citing Am. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 296, 89 
N.E.2d 301 (1949). 
{¶ 32} Although the existence of another adequate remedy does not 
preclude an action for declaratory judgment, Civ.R. 57, we have also indicated 
that a party must exhaust an available administrative remedy before instituting a 
declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of an administrative 
regulation as applied.  Driscoll at 273-274.  We further stated, 
 
This court has recognized at least two situations in which 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required prior to filing 
a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of 
zoning.  One, of course, is the situation in which there is no 
administrative remedy available which could provide the relief 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
sought.  Kaufman v. Newburgh Heights, [26 Ohio St.2d 217, 271 
N.E.2d 280 (1971)].  The other is the situation in which the 
administrative remedy is unnecessarily onerous.  Burt Realty Corp. 
v. Columbus, [21 Ohio St.2d 265, 257 N.E.2d 355 (1970)]. 
 
Driscoll at 275. 
1.  The Ten Orders Finding Violations Are Final 
{¶ 33} Appellants argue that an administrative appeal would have been 
futile and costly, and therefore they were not required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies before seeking a declaratory judgment on the 
constitutionality of the Smoke Free Act.  But nothing in the record suggests that 
the administrative process under the Smoke Free Act is unduly burdensome or 
costly.  The act provides proprietors, like appellants, several opportunities to 
contest a reported violation.  A proprietor may submit a written statement or 
evidence after receiving a written notice of an alleged violation.  Ohio Adm.Code 
3701-52-08(F).  During an on-site visit by an investigator, a proprietor may 
demonstrate compliance with the act.  A sanitary and program administrator for 
ODH testified that if no violations are observed during the investigation, the 
complaint against the proprietor would be dismissed.  If the investigation results 
in proposed findings of violation and a civil fine, a proprietor will be afforded the 
opportunity to submit additional evidence.  Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(F)(1).  
Certain repeat violators will be afforded the opportunity to request administrative 
review of the proposed findings, during which they may present evidence and 
cross-examine witnesses.  Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(F)(2) and (F)(2)(a)(iv).  If 
the hearing report goes against the proprietor, the proprietor may object to ODH.  
Ohio Adm.Code 3701-52-08(F)(2)(a)(vi).  At any of these stages, given a proper 
challenge to the method of enforcing R.C. 3794.02, ODH could have found that 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
there was insufficient evidence of a violation and dismissed the complaints 
against appellants.  Therefore, an administrative remedy was available. 
{¶ 34} Appellants also argue that pursuant to Johnson’s Island, Inc. v. 
Danbury Twp. Bd. of  Trustees, 69 Ohio St.2d 241, 431 N.E.2d 672 (1982), 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the constitutionality 
of a statute is raised as a defense in a proceeding brought to enforce the statute.  
However, the original enforcement of the Smoke Free Act against appellants 
occurred when the Columbus City Health Department, ODH’s designee, issued 
the ten proposed findings of violation and civil fine.  These orders became final 
when they were not challenged on appeal and the time for appeal has passed.  
Collateral attacks of final judgments are disfavored and succeed only in limited 
situations—fraud or lack of jurisdiction.  Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 
Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22-23.  
Because appellants do not argue either fraud or lack of jurisdiction, their attempt 
to invalidate the ten violations through a declaratory judgment action is an 
improper collateral attack. 
2.  Future Application of Smoke Free Act to Zeno’s 
{¶ 35} Although appellants are foreclosed from challenging the violations 
already 
issued, 
we 
agree 
with 
appellants 
that 
their 
declaratory 
judgment/injunction action also sought to prevent future enforcement of the 
Smoke Free Act.  Appellants raised an as-applied challenge and, therefore, must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that future enforcement of the act would 
violate their constitutional rights. 
{¶ 36} As an initial matter, we note that the Smoke Free Act was passed 
as a ballot initiative by Ohio voters.  The Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1, 
provides, 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a 
general assembly consisting of a senate and house of 
representatives but the people reserve to themselves the power to 
propose to the general assembly laws and amendments to the 
constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a 
referendum vote as hereinafter provided. * * * The limitations 
expressed in the constitution, on the power of the general assembly 
to enact laws, shall be deemed limitations on the power of the 
people to enact laws. 
 
{¶ 37} Therefore, the same constitutional challenges that would invalidate 
legislation enacted by the General Assembly would also invalidate laws passed by 
ballot initiative. 
 
a.  Unlawful Enforcement of the Smoke Free Act 
{¶ 38} In their counterclaim, appellants requested that ODH be enjoined 
from unlawful enforcement of R.C. Chapter 3794.  Specifically they contended 
that ODH’s policy of strict liability—where there’s smoke, there’s a violation—
exceeds the authority R.C. Chapter 3794 grants to ODH. 
{¶ 39} A rule adopted by an administrative agency is “valid and 
enforceable unless unreasonable or in conflict with the statutory enactment 
covering the same subject matter.” Amoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground 
Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd., 89 Ohio St.3d 477, 484, 733 N.E.2d 592 
(2000).  In this respect, “an administrative rule cannot add or subtract from the 
legislative enactment.” Id. at 484. 
{¶ 40} In ruling in favor of appellants, the trial court found that the 
following facts had been brought forward at trial: 
 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
(1) The Department of Health has in the past implemented a policy 
of strict liability for violations of the SmokeFree Act in regards to 
property owners such as [appellants]; (2) In the case of 
[appellants,] the Department of Health implemented this policy 
and cited [appellants] for violations of the SmokeFree Act without 
regard to whether [appellants] were actually permitting smoking to 
occur on the premises of Zeno’s; (3) If a complaint was filed and 
the Department of Health found someone smoking at Zeno’s, 
[appellants] were fined; (4) The Department of Health has never 
once fined an individual for smoking in a public place; and (5) 
[appellants] posted “no smoking” signs in Zeno’s, removed all 
ashtrays from Zeno’s, and would regularly ask patrons who were 
smoking on the premises to put out their cigarette or take it 
outside. 
 
{¶ 41} The trial court’s first finding may have been based in part on the 
Tenth District’s decision in Pour House, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 185 Ohio 
App.3d 680, 2009-Ohio-5475, 925 N.E.2d 621 (10th Dist.).  In that case, a bar in 
Toledo had been cited by the Toledo-Lucas County Health Department for 
violating the Smoke Free Act.  The hearing examiner concluded that the 
proprietor’s evidence of good-faith efforts to comply with the act, though 
credible, was unavailing, because R.C. 3794.02 imposes strict liability.  The court 
of appeals in Pour House stated, 
 
The question before us is the meaning of the phrase “permit 
smoking” [in R.C. 3794.02(A)].  Does this phrase mean that the 
statute is violated if smoking occurs in a prohibited place, 
regardless of the measures taken by the proprietor to prevent it?  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Or does this phrase mean that the statute is violated only if the 
proprietor affirmatively allows smoking in a prohibited place, or 
implicitly allows smoking by failing to take reasonable measures 
to prevent it? 
 
Id. at ¶ 15.  The appellate court determined that a violation of R.C. 3794.02(A) 
occurs only when the proprietor permits smoking.  “A proprietor permits smoking 
when the proprietor affirmatively allows smoking or implicitly allows smoking by 
failing to take reasonable measures to prevent patrons from smoking * * *.”  Id. at 
¶ 18. 
{¶ 42} In Pour House, ODH had argued that once it proved that smoking 
had occurred, the burden shifted to the proprietor to prove that it had not 
permitted smoking.  The Tenth District rejected that argument, stating, 
“Permitting smoking is an element of the smoking violation; the opposite is not an 
affirmative defense.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  The appellate court remanded the case to the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas with instructions to remand to the 
hearing examiner to determine whether the bar had violated the Smoke Free Act.  
Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 43} The Tenth District’s decision in Pour House, however, does not 
establish that ODH has engaged in a widespread policy of strict liability in 
investigating and citing proprietors for violations of the Smoke Free Act.  Nor 
does the evidence in this case, contrary to the trial court’s finding. 
{¶ 44} A sanitary and program administrator for ODH testified that the 
determination of whether a proprietor is permitting smoking is conducted on a 
case-by-case basis.  Appellants’ main contention is that investigators never 
inquired of appellants’ employees whether they had taken steps to prevent 
smoking in prohibited areas.  The smoking enforcement coordinator for the city of 
Columbus, however, testified that when he observed a patron smoking at Zeno’s, 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
he would on occasion speak with the employees and that none had told him that 
they had asked the patron to stop smoking. 
{¶ 45} Substantial evidence exists that appellants at least implicitly 
permitted smoking.  For instance, on August 6, 2007, a Columbus City Health 
Department investigator witnessed two people smoking at Zeno’s and observed 
cigarette butts in plastic cups filled halfway with water.  On November 29, 2007, 
another investigator found multiple Zeno’s patrons who were smoking and who 
were using partially filled plastic cups as ashtrays.  Although appellant Richard 
Allen was present at the time, the investigator did not witness him address any of 
the smoking patrons.  On November 6, 2008, a third investigator witnessed at 
least eight patrons smoking and using small plastic cups as ashtrays. 
{¶ 46} The trial court also ignored the fact that appellants were cited nine 
times for allowing ashtrays to be present.  Although the “ashtrays” used were 
plastic cups filled with water, R.C. 3794.06(B) requires proprietors to remove all 
ashtrays and “other receptacles used for disposing of smoking materials” from 
any area where smoking is prohibited. 
{¶ 47} Finally, in eight of the violations, the investigator determined that 
the violation was intentional and doubled the fine.  The court of appeals agreed: 
 
On this record, the evidence is overwhelming that Bartec 
repeatedly and intentionally violated the Smoke Free Act, failed to 
comply with its provisions as R.C. 3794.09(D) requires, and in so 
doing exposed patrons and employees to the very harm the statute 
is designed to prevent.  Due to the hearing the court conducted and 
the evidence adduced as a result of the hearing, the trial court 
could reach no other conclusion. 
 
Jackson, 2010-Ohio-5558, at ¶ 33. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 48} We therefore conclude that appellants have failed to establish that 
appellants will be subject to an unlawful policy of strict liability. 
b.  The Smoke Free Act Does Not Unreasonably Interfere with 
Property Rights or Amount to a Taking 
{¶ 49} The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 19, provides, “Private 
property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.”  
Appellants present a two-fold argument that the inclusion of Zeno’s within the 
Smoke Free Act is unconstitutional.  First, they contend that the act exceeds the 
limits of the state’s police powers.  Second, appellants argue that the act amounts 
to a taking without compensation.  We disagree with both arguments. 
 
1.  Valid Exercise of Police Power 
{¶ 50} The fundamental nature of property rights in Ohio was recently 
reaffirmed.  Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 
N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 38.  But it has also long been established that the guaranties of the 
Ohio Constitution are subject to a reasonable, nonarbitrary exercise of the police 
power of the state or municipality, when exercised in the interest of public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare.  Yajnik, 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 
N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16.  In Olds v. Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447, 3 N.E.2d 371 (1936), we 
noted,  
 
The exercise of the police power is inherent in government and 
essential to its existence and inevitably comes into conflict with the 
constitutional guaranties of the right of property and liberty of 
contract.  In each case presented the court must draw the line of 
demarcation. Courts do not attempt to define police power with 
exactness, and inevitably the individual case must stand upon its 
own footing. 
 
January Term, 2012 
21 
 
Id. at 451.  Whether a statute is “truly in the public welfare within the meaning of 
Section 19, and thus superior to private property rights, [the] legislation must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must confer upon the public a benefit commensurate 
with its burdens upon private property.”  Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 
138 Ohio St. 540, 546, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941).  A court will not invalidate the 
judgment of the General Assembly as to whether an exercise of the police power 
bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare of the public unless that judgment appears to be clearly erroneous.  
Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), paragraph six 
of syllabus.  We believe that the same holds true for legislation passed by Ohio 
voters pursuant to a ballot initiative. 
{¶ 51} We have previously stated that the General Assembly has the 
authority to enact a public-smoking ban.  D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. 
of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 54 (“Within its 
constitutional grant of powers, the General Assembly possesses both the authority 
to enact smoking legislation such as the regulation at issue and the prerogative to 
delegate that authority to local boards of health”).  Although the Smoke Free Act 
was ultimately passed pursuant to a ballot initiative, the voters of Ohio also have a 
legitimate purpose in protecting the general welfare and health of Ohio citizens 
and workforce from the dangers of secondhand smoke in enclosed public places.  
By requiring that proprietors of public places and places of employment take 
reasonable steps to prevent smoking on their premises by posting “no smoking” 
signs, removing ashtrays, and requesting patrons to stop smoking, the act is 
rationally related to its stated objective.  Although appellants complain that the 
Smoke Free Act is not being enforced against actual smokers themselves, the 
evidence establishes that ODH has not received a complaint against an individual 
smoker.  The trial court may have also questioned how much a property owner 
can do, but the evidence also establishes that during their on-site visits, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
investigators did not witness appellants or their employees ask patrons to stop 
smoking or remove the makeshift ashtrays being used.  It is not unreasonable or 
arbitrary to hold responsible the proprietors of public places and places of 
employment for their failure to comply with the Smoke Free Act. 
{¶ 52} Appellants would have us limit the police power to simply abating 
public nuisances.  Although the “state may use its police power to enjoin a 
property owner from activities akin to public nuisance without offending either 
the Due Process or Takings Clause,” State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 84 Ohio 
St.3d 116, 125, 702 N.E.2d 81 (1998), we have not expressly limited the police 
power to nuisance and decline to do so. 
 
“The police power is inherent in sovereignty; and its 
exercise is justified by the necessity of the occasion.  Its foundation 
is the right and duty of the government to provide for the common 
welfare of the governed.  It is tersely expressed in the maxim, 
‘salus populi suprema lex.’5  While, therefore, a broad discretion is 
given to the Legislature to provide for the general welfare, it 
necessarily is not an arbitrary or unlimited discretion * * *.” 
 
(Footnote added.)  State v. Martin, 168 Ohio St. 37, 40, 151 N.E.2d 7 (1958), 
quoting State v. Boone, 84 Ohio St. 346, 351, 95 N.E. 924 (1911).  In R.C. 
3794.04, the state declared the necessity for regulating smoking in public places 
and places of employment.  Our review of the act leads us to conclude that it is 
neither unduly oppressive nor arbitrary in its restrictions.  Appellants’ own 
witness testified that most patrons who are asked to stop smoking readily do so. 
                                                 
5  This phrase has been translated as “[t]he safety of the people is the supreme law.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1870 (9th Ed.2009). 
January Term, 2012 
23 
 
{¶ 53} We therefore hold that the Smoke Free Act is a valid exercise of 
the state’s police power by Ohio’s voters. 
  
2.  The Smoke Free Act Does Not Amount to a Taking 
{¶ 54} Appellants contend that the Smoke Free Act is unconstitutional 
because it effects a regulatory taking without just compensation.  Specifically, 
appellants argue that R.C. Chapter 3794 confiscates a proprietor’s control over its 
indoor air.  But the standard to be used depends on the type of regulatory taking 
involved: 
 
Two types of regulatory actions will be deemed to be per se 
takings for Fifth Amendment purposes: first, those government 
actions that cause an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion 
of property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 
(1982), 458 U.S. 419, 435-440, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 
(state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install 
cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a taking); and 
second, government regulations that completely deprive an owner 
of “all economically beneficial uses” of the property. (Emphasis 
sic.) Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992), 505 U.S. 
1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798. A Lucas taking is 
also known as a categorical, or total, taking, and in such a case, the 
government must pay just compensation for the total property 
taken except to the extent that “background principles of nuisance 
and property law” independently restrict the owner's intended use 
of the property. Id. at 1030.  “ ‘Outside these two relatively narrow 
categories (and the special context of land-use exactions * * *), 
regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set 
forth in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978).’ ” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. (2005), 544 U.S. 528, 538, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022, 875 N.E.2d 59, ¶ 18.  Because 
there is no physical invasion of appellants’ property and there is no claim that the 
Smoke Free Act deprives appellants of all economically beneficial uses of their 
property, the only possible taking involved is a partial regulatory taking under 
Penn Cent. 
{¶ 55} With a Penn Cent. regulatory taking, a court engages in a factual 
inquiry of the following three factors: “(1) the economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental 
action.”  Shelly Materials at ¶ 19, citing Penn Cent. at 124. 
{¶ 56} Appellants submitted evidence that their gross sales declined in 
2009, but the Smoke Free Act became effective in December 2006, and in 2007 
and 2008 appellants’ gross sales actually increased.  Furthermore, Columbus’s 
smoking ban, found at Columbus Code of Ordinances Chapter 715, is very similar 
to R.C. Chapter 3794 and went into effect in January 2005.  Still, appellants’ 
gross sales increased in 2005 and 2006.  Thus, appellants have failed to 
demonstrate that the Smoke Free Act has had a significant economic impact on 
their business. 
{¶ 57} The second and third factors also do not support finding a taking in 
this case.  As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Penn Cent.: 
 
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law,” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
January Term, 2012 
25 
 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 [43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322] (1922), 
and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide variety of 
contexts, that government may execute laws or programs that 
adversely affect recognized economic values.  Exercises of the 
taxing power are one obvious example.  A second are the decisions 
in which this Court has dismissed “taking” challenges on the 
ground that, while the challenged government action caused 
economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were 
sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the 
claimant to constitute “property” for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
 
Penn Cent. at 124-125.  The “taking” of appellants’ indoor air space is not the 
type of taking contemplated by either the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution or the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 19.  Appellants have also 
failed to demonstrate that the Smoke Free Act interfered with a distinct 
investment-backed expectation.  The goal of this legislation is to protect the 
health of the workers and other citizens of Ohio.  R.C. 3794.04.  It does so by 
regulating proprietors of public places and places of employment in a minimally 
invasive way.  We therefore hold that the Smoke Free Act does not constitute a 
taking. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 58} Because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 
and may not use declaratory judgment as a collateral attack on a final judgment, 
the ten previous violations of the Smoke Free Act are res judicata.  We also hold 
that the Smoke Free Act is a valid exercise of the state’s police power by Ohio 
voters and does not amount to a regulatory taking.  The judgment of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Stacy Hannan, Robert 
Moormann, and Angela M. Sullivan, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees 
Theodore E. Wymsylo and Michael DeWine. 
 
Maurice A. Thompson, for appellants. 
 
Law Office of Joseph C. Lucas, L.L.C., and Tyler W. Kahler, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio Licensed Beverage Association, Buckeye Liquor 
Permit Holders Association, and Dr. Michael L. Marlow. 
 
Finney, Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson Co., L.P.A., and Christopher P. 
Finney; and Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, urging reversal 
for amici curiae Ohio Liberty Council, Ohio Freedom Alliance, and Coalition 
Opposed to Additional Spending & Taxes. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tracie M. Boyd, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Franklin 
County District Board of Health. 
 
McTigue & McGinnis, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, Mark A. McGinnis, 
and J. Corey Colombo, urging affirmance for amici curiae American Cancer 
Society, East Central Division; American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network; 
Academy of Medicine of Cleveland & Northern Ohio; American Heart 
Association, Great Rivers Affiliate; American Lung Association of the Midland 
States; American Medical Association; Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights; 
Association of Ohio Health Commissioners, Inc.; Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Kids; Cleveland Clinic; Ohio Asthma Coalition; Ohio Chapter of the American 
January Term, 2012 
27 
 
College of Cardiology; Ohio Osteopathic Association; Ohio State Medical 
Association; and Tobacco Control Legal Consortium. 
______________________