Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Louise Tesmer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1088-J 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against the Honorable Louise Tesmer,  
Circuit Court Judge, Milwaukee County. 
 
 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST TESMER. 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 28, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
Geske, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the Honorable Louise Tesmer, there were 
briefs by Ralph A. Weber and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Dueren, 
Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., and Matthew T. Fricker and Kravit & 
Gass, S.C., all of Milwaukee and oral argument by Ralph A. Weber 
and Matthew T. Fricker. 
 
 
For the Wisconsin Judicial Commission there was a 
brief by Frank M. Tuerkheimer and LaFollette & Sinykin and James 
C. Alexander and Wisconsin Judicial Commission, all of Madison, 
and oral argument by Frank M. Tuerkheimer. 
 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1088-J 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings against the HON. LOUISE M. 
TESMER, Circuit Judge, Milwaukee County. 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding.  Reprimand imposed.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   This is a review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.91,1 of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendation for discipline of the judicial conduct panel 
concerning the conduct of the Hon. Louise M. Tesmer, circuit 
judge for Milwaukee county. The panel, by a divided vote, 
concluded that Judge Tesmer engaged in judicial misconduct by 
having a friend, who is a law professor, prepare for her use 
opinions on dispositive motions in cases over which she 
presided. The panel majority concluded that the judge thereby 
wilfully violated two rules of the former Code of Judicial 
                     
1 757.91 provides: Supreme court; disposition. The supreme 
court shall review the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendations under s. 
757.89 and 
determine 
appropriate 
discipline in cases of misconduct and appropriate action in 
cases of permanent disability. The rules of the supreme court 
applicable to civil cases in the supreme court govern the review 
proceedings under this section.   
No.  97-1088-J 
 
2 
Ethics:2 one prohibiting a judge from permitting on an aggravated 
or persistent basis private communications designed to influence 
the 
judge’s 
decision; 
the 
other 
proscribing 
a 
judge’s 
initiating, permitting, engaging in or considering ex parte 
communications concerning a pending matter. As discipline for 
that judicial misconduct, the panel majority recommended that 
Judge Tesmer be reprimanded.  
¶2 
We 
determine 
that 
Judge 
Tesmer’s 
ongoing 
and 
persistent discussions of dispositive motions in cases pending 
before her with a person unconnected with the judicial system, 
even though disinterested in the pending matters, and her use of 
his assistance to draft opinions in those matters violated the 
prohibition of private communications designed to influence a 
judge’s 
decision. 
Those 
discussions 
and 
her 
friend’s 
participation in the preparation of opinions continued for three 
years, over which time he drafted opinions in at least 32 cases. 
While the panel majority found that Judge Tesmer had a good 
faith belief that her conduct did not violate the Code, a 
finding we adopt, we agree with the panel majority that she 
should have known that it constituted a violation of the rule 
prohibiting private communications. Consequently, and as it did 
not result from duress or coercion, Judge Tesmer’s conduct was 
                     
2 Except where otherwise noted, Code references are to the 
Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR ch. 60, in effect between 1993 and 
1997, the time relevant to this proceeding.   
No.  97-1088-J 
 
3 
“wilful,” so as to constitute judicial misconduct under Wis. 
Stat. § 757.81(4)(a).3  
¶3 
We do not conclude, however, as the panel majority 
did, that Judge Tesmer’s conduct was also a wilful violation of 
the proscription of a judge’s ex parte communications concerning 
pending matters. We agree that the communications Judge Tesmer 
had on an ongoing basis with her law professor friend were “ex 
parte,” but we determine that her violation of the proscription 
was not wilful, in that she is not chargeable with having known 
that they violated that rule of the Code.  
¶4 
Because there was no evidence, nor had it been 
alleged, that Judge Tesmer’s use of her friend’s assistance 
caused actual harm to any of the parties in pending matters or 
that someone other than Judge Tesmer made the decisions on the 
substantive motions and in light of her belief that her conduct 
was not proscribed by the Code of Judicial Ethics, we determine 
that the appropriate discipline to impose for her judicial 
misconduct is a reprimand. That is the least severe of the four 
forms of discipline we are constitutionally authorized to 
impose.4  
                     
3 Section 757.81(4)(a) provides:  
(4) “Misconduct” includes any of the following:  
(a) Wilful violation of a rule of the code of judicial 
ethics.   
4 Art. VII, sec. 11 provides, in pertinent part:  
No.  97-1088-J 
 
4 
¶5 
Pursuant to customary procedure, we afforded the 
parties the opportunity to file briefs and, at Judge Tesmer’s 
request, held oral argument on the panel’s report. Judge Tesmer 
contested 
one 
of 
the 
panel’s 
factual 
findings 
and 
its 
conclusions that she violated two rules of the Code of Judicial 
Ethics. She also objected to the panel’s recommendation of 
discipline. 
The 
Judicial 
Commission 
contested 
only 
the 
disciplinary recommendation, 
taking 
the 
position 
that the 
seriousness of her judicial misconduct warrants Judge Tesmer’s 
suspension from judicial office for six months.  
¶6 
The judicial conduct panel consisted of three judges 
of the Court of Appeals -– the Hons. Neal Nettesheim, Gordon 
Myse, and Charles Dykman, who presided. Judge Tesmer and the 
Judicial Commission entered into a stipulation of facts, based 
on which and on evidence presented at a hearing the panel made 
findings of fact to the requisite clear, satisfactory and 
convincing burden of proof as follows.5  
¶7 
Judge Tesmer, first elected circuit court judge in 
1989, was rotated to the large claims part of the civil division 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee county in 1993. At that time, 
                                                                  
“Each justice or judge shall be subject to reprimand, 
censure, suspension, removal for cause or for disability, by the 
supreme 
court 
pursuant 
to 
procedures 
established 
by 
the 
legislature by law.”    
5 Notwithstanding that the panel reported its factual 
findings as having been made “unanimously,” in his dissent to 
the report, Judge Dykman appeared to reject at least one of 
those findings -- that Judge Tesmer’s friend recommended 
analyses and dispositions to Judge Tesmer.   
No.  97-1088-J 
 
5 
it was the practice of the judges handling large claims cases to 
render decisions on dispositive motions in those cases each 
Monday. 
During 
the 
time 
relevant 
to 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding, August, 1993 through July, 1996, Judge Tesmer was 
responsible for the resolution of at least 350 dispositive 
motions. Her usual practice for handling dispositive motions was 
the following.  
¶8 
A week before the scheduled hearing date, Judge Tesmer 
directed her law clerk to prepare a memorandum and recommended 
disposition for each dispositive motion. The law clerk, a county 
employee, was to complete the memorandum, including a draft 
explanation of the disposition recommended, before noon on the 
Friday preceding the hearing. Judge Tesmer began her review of 
the dispositive motions scheduled for a Monday during the 
afternoon of the preceding Friday. She took the files home with 
her on Friday afternoon, including the parties’ briefs, the 
clerk’s memoranda and at times relevant case law and statutes. 
She continued her review of the files on Saturday morning.  
¶9 
Professor John McCormack, a tenured faculty member of 
the University of Loyola Law School in Chicago and a longtime, 
close friend of Judge Tesmer, regularly visited her in the 
Milwaukee area. He was not a court employee or part of an 
accepted or approved judicial internship program. When he 
arrived at her home mid-morning on Saturday, Judge Tesmer gave 
Professor McCormack case files on certain matters that were 
awaiting resolution the following Monday and had him prepare 
drafts of opinions she could read from the bench at the 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
6 
hearings. At times, in the morning of the Monday set for 
hearing, Judge Tesmer gave her court reporter textual material 
to be typed as the proposed opinion in the matter.  
¶10 At 
some 
point 
after 
1994, 
Judge 
Tesmer 
became 
dissatisfied with the quality of her law clerk’s memoranda. 
Although she had no independent recall of when she first used 
Professor McCormack’s assistance, there was evidence of one 
instance in 1993 and one in 1994. The frequency increased 
significantly in 1996, during the first six months of which he 
assisted on 21 motions. From August, 1993 to June, 1996, he was 
involved in at least 32 dispositive motion matters.  
¶11 All conversations between the judge and Professor 
McCormack concerning work on pending matters were confidential, 
and no notice was given to any of the parties in those matters 
of those conversations or of Professor McCormack’s assistance. 
Professor McCormack had no interest in any of the cases on which 
he provided assistance, was not acquainted with any litigant, 
counsel for a litigant, witness, or anyone else involved in any 
case on which he assisted, and had no interest in the outcome of 
any of those matters. He did not inject any extraneous factual 
matter into the draft opinions he prepared; those drafts 
reflected only the facts that had been presented by the parties. 
It was not contended that he benefited from the assistance he 
gave Judge Tesmer.  
¶12 When she asked for his assistance on a motion, Judge 
Tesmer would provide Professor McCormack the clerk’s memorandum 
and the parties’ briefs, tell him whether she was going to grant 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
7 
or deny the motion, and state the “fundamental basis” for her 
decision. In some cases, she told him she was not comfortable 
with some aspect of the clerk’s work and asked him to rework the 
clerk’s analysis. In other cases, she would direct his attention 
to a particular portion of a party’s brief and tell him to use 
the brief’s analysis as the basis of the opinion. Professor 
McCormack did not take any notes during his discussions with the 
judge.  
¶13 Prior to her discussions with Professor McCormack, 
Judge Tesmer was fully conversant with the parties’ submissions 
and the relevant facts. Professor McCormack never worked on a 
motion without first discussing it with the judge and receiving 
instruction as to the outcome and the rationale. In drafting an 
opinion, he would begin with the “fundamental rationale” 
identified by Judge Tesmer, and if he felt that additional 
analysis was necessary, he would discuss his concerns with her. 
¶14 Judge Tesmer reviewed Professor McCormack’s work to 
ensure that it was consistent with her decision, and she 
retained final decisional authority in each case. There was no 
evidence, nor had it been alleged, that Judge Tesmer abdicated 
her decision-making authority to Professor McCormack. Judge 
Tesmer never told any of her colleagues on the circuit court of 
the assistance she was receiving from Professor McCormack. She 
had a “good faith belief” that his assistance was permitted 
under the Code of Judicial Ethics. She and Professor McCormack 
viewed his role as akin to a law clerk’s.  
No.  97-1088-J 
 
8 
¶15 The panel, with the apparent exception of Judge 
Dykman, found that Professor McCormack was “more than a 
scrivener” and that he participated in the decision-making 
process and discussed, evaluated, and recommended analyses and 
dispositions to Judge Tesmer as part of his participation. In 
addition, the panel found that he “influenced” the judge on the 
issues he worked on.  
¶16 We 
note 
here 
and 
discuss 
below 
Judge 
Tesmer’s 
contention 
that 
the 
finding 
that 
Professor 
McCormack 
participated in the decision-making process on each case he 
worked on and discussed, evaluated, and recommended analyses and 
dispositions to her as part of his participation in her work on 
the pending motions was clearly erroneous. She did not contest 
the finding that he “influenced [her] on the issues on which he 
worked.”  
¶17 Based on those facts, the panel majority concluded 
that Judge Tesmer’s use of Professor McCormack to assist her in 
the preparation of opinions on dispositive motions was an 
“aggravated or persistent failure” to comply with the standard 
set forth in former SCR 60.01(10):  
 
 A judge should always bear in mind the need for 
scrupulous adherence to the rules of fair play. A judge 
should not permit private interviews, arguments, briefs or 
communications designed to influence his or her decision.  
It specifically pointed to Professor McCormack’s discussions of 
pending cases, his modification of law clerk memoranda and all 
or part of the judge’s opinions, and the incorporation of 
written material he drafted into the judge’s decisions as 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
9 
violating that rule. Because her failure to comply with that 
standard extended over a period of nearly three years and 
because Professor McCormack’s participation was significant and 
increased noticeably in the months preceding the Judicial 
Commission’s notification to her of its concern, the panel 
majority concluded that her violation of the standard was 
“persistent” and therefore constituted a violation of a rule of 
the Code of Judicial Ethics:6 The panel majority concluded 
further that Judge Tesmer should have known that Professor 
McCormack’s involvement in her judicial decision making was 
prohibited by the Code.   
¶18 The panel majority also concluded that Judge Tesmer’s 
discussions with Professor McCormack constituted “ex parte 
communications” concerning pending actions or proceedings within 
the meaning of SCR 60.20(1)7 and violated that rule of the Code. 
The panel majority rejected as overly restrictive Judge Tesmer’s 
contention that “ex parte communications” are limited to a 
judge’s communication with a party to a proceeding out of the 
presence of the other party or parties. Noting non-party 
                     
6 Under the former Code, “An aggravated or persistent 
failure to comply with the standards of SCR 60.01 is a rule 
violation.” SCR 60.17.   
7 SCR 
60.20 
provided, 
in 
pertinent 
part: 
Ex 
parte 
communications.  
(1) A judge shall not initiate, permit, engage in or 
consider ex parte communications concerning a pending or 
impending action or proceeding [with exceptions not pertinent 
here].   
No.  97-1088-J 
 
10
contacts by judges that have been held to be prohibited, the 
panel majority suggested that Professor McCormack’s assistance 
created the possibility that “extraneous matters may be injected 
into the trial process without the knowledge or consent of the 
parties, thereby jeopardizing the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding.”  
¶19 The panel majority concluded that Judge Tesmer’s 
violation 
of 
the 
ex 
parte 
communication 
prohibition 
was 
“wilful,” as that term is used in the statutory definition of 
“judicial misconduct.” In that respect, the panel majority 
concluded that Judge Tesmer freely engaged in the communications 
with Professor McCormack, her conduct did not result from duress 
or coercion, and she should have known that those communications 
were not permitted by the Code.   
¶20 In recommending that Judge Tesmer be reprimanded for 
her judicial misconduct, the panel majority considered the 
nature of the misconduct and the impact it had on the judicial 
system. It specifically noted that Judge Tesmer retained control 
over the decisional process, did not abdicate her decision-
making responsibility, and controlled the outcome and the choice 
of supporting rationale in each case. It acknowledged that she 
was motivated by a desire to provide litigants with well-crafted 
opinions and held a good faith belief that Professor McCormack’s 
contributions to her opinions were no different than the 
contributions of a regularly employed law clerk.  
¶21 Judge Dykman dissented from the majority’s conclusions 
that Judge Tesmer’s conduct violated the Code of Judicial 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
11
Ethics. In addition, he stated in his dissent that there was no 
testimony to support the majority’s factual finding that 
Professor McCormack recommended analyses and dispositions to 
Judge 
Tesmer. 
Contrary 
to 
the 
majority’s 
statement 
that 
Professor McCormack was not subject to the same control and 
scrutiny as is a regularly employed law clerk, Judge Dykman 
asserted that Professor McCormack was subject to control and 
scrutiny based on the facts that Judge Tesmer knew what he was 
doing, reviewed his work, and sometimes changed her mind and 
rejected work he had done for her. Judge Dykman also expressed 
difficulty in differentiating between the assistance Professor 
McCormack provided to Judge Tesmer and the assistance judges 
receive from unpaid judicial interns provided through law school 
programs. He found no evidence to support the majority’s view 
that, unlike law clerks or judicial interns, litigants did not 
expect that Professor McCormack would be drafting language Judge 
Tesmer used in resolving legal questions.  
¶22 On the issue of whether Judge Tesmer’s conduct 
violated the rules of the Code of Judicial Ethics, Judge Dykman 
considered the purpose of the two specified rules to be to 
assure fairness, concluding that in order to be prohibited by 
SCR 
60.01(10), 
private 
interviews, 
arguments, 
briefs 
or 
communications “must somehow affect how the public views a 
judge’s conduct.” Noting the absence of testimony concerning 
what litigants expect regarding judicial assistance or how the 
public 
views 
the 
type 
of 
assistance 
Professor 
McCormack 
provided, 
Judge 
Dykman 
expressed 
disagreement 
with 
any 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
12
assumption that the public would view unbiased and uninterested 
help in drafting language for judicial decisions as unfair to 
the litigants.  
¶23 Finally, Judge Dykman concluded that the two rules did 
not sufficiently identify the type of conduct they prohibited, 
pointing out that no one reasonably could expect them to be 
interpreted literally, as they would prohibit a judge from 
having a communication about a pending case with a law clerk, 
secretary, legal intern, or judicial colleague. In his view, the 
rules did not prohibit assistance by disinterested persons 
skilled in legal writing, whose only involvement was to assist a 
judge in putting decisions in proper form. 
¶24 In this review, Judge Tesmer argued that the panel 
majority’s finding that Professor McCormack “participated in her 
decision-making 
process” 
and 
“recommended 
analyses 
and 
dispositions 
as 
part 
of 
his 
participations” 
is 
clearly 
erroneous, contending that there was no evidence to support that 
finding. She also asserted that the finding led directly to the 
panel 
majority’s 
conclusion 
that 
she 
engaged 
in 
private 
communications designed to influence her decision, thereby 
rendering that conclusion improper.  
¶25 In support of her contention, Judge Tesmer relied on 
several other panel findings in respect to Professor McCormack’s 
participation in the drafting of opinions on dispositive 
motions: he never worked on a motion without first discussing it 
with and receiving instruction from her as to outcome and 
rationale; there was no evidence she abdicated her decisional 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
13
authority to him; she reviewed his work product to ensure that 
it was consistent with her decision; she retained final 
decisional authority in each case. Judge Tesmer also cited one 
instance in which she initially had decided to deny a summary 
judgment motion but after instructing Professor McCormack as to 
the outcome and rationale for that decision and following his 
preparation of a draft opinion supporting it, she changed her 
mind and drafted a new opinion herself, which she issued orally 
from the bench, granting the motion.  
¶26 Judge Tesmer also sought to distinguish between her 
“decisions” and the “opinions” that explained the rationale for 
them. 
She 
asserted 
that 
SCR 
60.01(10) 
did 
not 
address 
communications that influenced merely a judge’s opinion but was 
limited to those that influenced a judge’s decision. Judge 
Tesmer insisted that there was no evidence in the record that 
Professor McCormack participated in her decision-making process.  
¶27 We find no merit in the distinction Judge Tesmer urged 
for 
purposes 
of 
the 
rule 
prohibiting 
a 
judge’s 
private 
communications designed to influence a judge’s decision. Both 
the judge and Professor McCormack testified that they viewed his 
work for her as essentially that of a law clerk, which Judge 
Tesmer described as discussing, evaluating and recommending 
analyses and dispositions to judges as a matter of their regular 
employment. She also testified that Professor McCormack helped 
her in developing her rationale and that in her discussions with 
him he would ask whether she thought of something, and if she 
had not, it could be added. For his part, Professor McCormack 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
14
testified that he felt free to suggest alternative rationales, 
and if Judge Tesmer accepted them, they were incorporated into 
the opinion. He said he felt free to advise if he thought the 
law clerk’s rationale did not lead to the conclusion she sought, 
and if he thought her conclusions were wrong, he would point 
that out to her, and if she agreed, he would rewrite the 
opinion.  
¶28 The fact that Professor McCormack did not discuss with 
Judge Tesmer what decision she should reach in each of the cases 
he worked on does not undermine the finding that he participated 
in the decision-making process. Professor McCormack’s testimony 
is clear that when he arrived at her home on Saturday mornings, 
Judge Tesmer would tell him about the case she wanted him to 
work on and, in his words, “ . . . would tell me her tentative 
outcome on the case  . . . [and] would suggest rationales, 
sometimes by pointing to the parties’ briefs.” (Emphasis 
supplied.) He testified further that when she told him the 
tentative outcome and rationale she had reached, her final 
outcome and rationale had not yet been determined. He stated 
that he would have discussions with her regarding both the 
outcome and the rationale of a case, although she would be the 
“ultimate determinative factor” in what was going to be included 
in her opinion.  
¶29 We reject Judge Tesmer’s contention that the panel 
majority’s finding that Professor McCormack participated in her 
decision 
making and discussed, evaluated, 
and 
recommended 
analyses and dispositions to her as part of that work is clearly 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
15
erroneous. There is ample support on the record for that 
finding, and we adopt it in this review.  
¶30 In 
respect 
to 
the 
panel 
majority’s 
conclusions 
regarding 
her 
misconduct, 
Judge 
Tesmer 
argued 
that 
the 
prohibition 
of 
“private 
interviews, 
arguments, 
briefs 
or 
communications designed to influence” a judge’s decision did not 
apply to her accepting assistance from a “disinterested law 
professor.” She based that argument on the history of SCR 
60.01(10), the practice of some judges who were subject to a 
similar rule, the fairness context of the rule, and the 
testimony of four Wisconsin judges regarding their understanding 
of it.  
¶31 The history of SCR 60.01(10), including the related 
provision now set forth in the 1997 Code of Judicial Conduct,8 
provides no support for Judge Tesmer’s argument for the reason 
that she used Professor McCormack’s assistance not because he 
was a law professor with expertise in the particular fields of 
law at issue in the cases before her but because he was a “best 
friend” and experienced in legal writing. The historical 
development of rules regulating judges’ communications with law 
professors and other legal experts is not relevant to the rule 
at issue here.  
¶32 Judge Tesmer’s argument based on the practice of a 
handful of judges in this country who were subject to an ethical 
rule similar to SCR 60.01(10) to consult regularly with legal 
                     
8 SCR 60.04(1)(g).   
No.  97-1088-J 
 
16
experts 
and 
others 
about 
pending 
cases 
and 
issues 
is 
unpersuasive. There is ample authority, some of which cited by 
the Judicial Commission, for the opposite proposition -- that a 
judge’s private, undisclosed communication with persons outside 
the judicial system is improper. Moreover, there was no evidence 
that Judge Tesmer either was aware of or relied on the practice 
of other judges subject to a similar rule in determining whether 
her conduct was prohibited by our rule.  
¶33 Focusing on the portion of SCR 60.01(10) that states 
the need for a judge’s adherence to rules of fair play, Judge 
Tesmer argued that the prohibition of private communications 
designed to influence a judge’s decision set forth in that rule 
is to be interpreted as limited to communications that would 
pose a threat to fair play, that is, communications with persons 
interested in the matter. It is her position that the only 
communications that threaten fairness are those with interested 
parties and that give one side an advantage in a contested 
matter. 
Thus, 
she 
contended, 
her 
communications 
with 
an 
“objective and disinterested professor” did not threaten fair 
play and were not prohibited by the rule.  
¶34 We find no merit to that argument. The rule, by its 
terms, prohibits private communications designed to influence a 
judge’s decision, and it is the element of privacy that impinges 
on fairness. The fundamental fairness to be zealously guarded 
and scrupulously adhered to implicates the basic principle of 
American justice cited by the dissenting panel member: “That the 
parties will present their case to the judge, who will decide 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
17
their dispute under the law and on the facts of the case.” A 
corollary to that principle is that persons outside the judicial 
system have no place in a judge’s decision making.  
¶35 That is not to say that a judge may not seek 
independently the advice of an expert on the state of the law 
applicable to a particular proceeding. Our current rules 
specifically authorize such communication but require that the 
judge notify the parties in the pending proceeding, inform them 
of the information received, and afford them the opportunity to 
respond to it. Yet, expert advice on legal issues from a person 
outside the judicial system is not equatable to an outside 
person’s direct involvement in the discussion of outcomes of 
dispositive motions and the development of rationales to support 
them. 
The 
latter 
poses 
a 
significant 
threat, 
actual 
or 
potential, to the fairness of the proceeding. The panel majority 
rightly concluded that SCR 60.01(10) is not limited to improper 
influences on a judge’s decision; it extends, in the majority’s 
words, “to ‘well-intentioned’ influence such as that offered by 
Professor McCormack.” 
¶36 In order to ensure that litigants and other persons 
interested in matters pending in the courts may become informed 
of the identity of the persons with whom the judges consult in 
carrying out their adjudicative responsibilities, we shall 
propose for adoption a rule of judicial administration requiring 
each judge to have on file with the clerk of the judge’s court 
and with the chief judge of the judicial administrative district 
the names of staff -– law clerks, judicial interns, externs, and 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
18
others –- who participate to any extent in the judge’s decision-
making process. Following notice and a public hearing on the 
proposal, we will adopt a rule to address the concerns raised in 
this proceeding.  
¶37 While 
the 
panel 
majority 
found 
that 
Professor 
McCormack had no interest in any case on which he provided 
assistance, was not acquainted with any litigant in any of those 
cases or any counsel to a litigant, witness, or anyone else 
involved, and had no interest in the outcome of any of the 
motions 
on 
which 
he 
worked, 
the 
prohibition 
of 
private 
communications designed to influence a judge’s decision is 
intended not only to prevent actual unfairness to litigants in 
pending proceedings but also to avoid the potential for 
unfairness. In that respect, the panel majority properly took 
into consideration that Professor McCormack was not subject to 
the same regulation and control as a member of Judge Tesmer’s 
staff would be. Notwithstanding that she always reviewed his 
work before incorporating it into her own and that the 
confidentiality of their discussions was preserved, Professor 
McCormack was not subject to Judge Tesmer’s disciplinary 
authority or to sanctions that might be imposed on a court 
employee.  
¶38 Further, the rule is also directed at avoiding the 
appearance that the process might be unfair. Judge Tesmer’s 
regular recourse to Professor McCormack’s review of confidential 
law clerk memoranda, their discussion of fundamental rationales 
for decisions she initially arrived at, and his development of 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
19
those and other rationales to support her eventual decisions 
reasonably could be perceived by litigants, had they been aware, 
that Judge Tesmer was deciding substantive matters on the basis 
of material and arguments of which they were unaware and had no 
opportunity to confront.  
¶39 The fourth basis of Judge Tesmer’s argument that the 
proscription of SCR 60.01(10) did not apply to her use of 
Professor McCormack’s assistance was the testimony of four 
current or former judges of the Milwaukee county circuit court, 
who testified that they did not view the acceptance of 
assistance from a disinterested law professor as violating that 
rule. Judge Tesmer contested the panel majority’s limitation of 
the use of that testimony to the issue of discipline to be 
recommended. 
She 
took 
the 
position 
that 
the 
judges’ 
understanding of the rule was relevant to the issue of whether 
it stated with sufficient clarity the judicial conduct that it 
proscribed.  
¶40 The panel majority properly rejected the testimony of 
the four judges on the issue of whether Judge Tesmer’s conduct 
violated the Code of Judicial Ethics provisions, as that was the 
ultimate issue of law to be decided, one on which testimony is 
not admissible. Moreover, those judges explicitly were not 
called as expert witnesses, nor were they qualified as experts 
during their examination.  
¶41 The other rule of the Code of Judicial Ethics the 
panel majority concluded that Judge Tesmer violated is the 
prohibition of a judge’s initiating, permitting, engaging in or 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
20
considering ex parte communications concerning pending actions 
or proceedings, SCR 60.20. Judge Tesmer based her argument that 
her conduct did not violate that rule on what she termed the 
common understanding of “ex parte communication.” Relying on the 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “ex parte” as “On one side 
only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the 
application of, one party only,” she took the position that to 
be ex parte, the communication must be with a party or a person 
acting in a party’s interest outside the presence of another 
party to an adversarial proceeding. Thus, she contended, the 
rule did not apply to her use of Professor McCormack’s 
assistance, as he was neither a party to a pending proceeding 
nor acting on a party’s behalf and had no interest in any case 
on which he worked. The panel majority rejected that narrow and 
overly restrictive interpretation of “ex parte,” noting that it 
would have the effect of jeopardizing the fundamental fairness 
of proceedings.  
¶42 Judge Tesmer’s position that in order to be prohibited 
an ex parte communication must have the potential to jeopardize 
the fairness of a proceeding by giving one party an advantage in 
having access to the judge is unduly restrictive. Her insistence 
that Professor McCormack’s work on her pending cases did not 
place one party in any of those cases at a disadvantage and thus 
did not jeopardize fairness ignores the fundamental principle 
that a fair hearing requires each party to have a reasonable 
opportunity to hear the claims of an opposing party and respond 
to them.  
No.  97-1088-J 
 
21
¶43 Judge Tesmer’s discussions with a person outside of 
and unconnected with the judicial system concerning dispositive 
motions in proceedings pending before her outside the presence 
and without the knowledge of the parties to those proceedings 
constituted ex parte communications as that term is used in SCR 
60.20. The ex parte communication prohibition set forth in the 
current Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR 60.04(1)(g), now makes 
explicit what was implicit in its predecessor. The affirmative 
statement introducing the current prohibition states, “A judge 
shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a 
proceeding, or to that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard 
according to law.” Two of the exceptions to the prohibition that 
follow concern communication with legal experts, other judges 
and court personnel:  
 
 . . .  
 
2. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested 
expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the 
judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the 
person consulted and the substance of the advice and 
affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.  
 
3. A judge may consult with other judges or with court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying 
out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities.  
 
¶44 Our determination that Judge Tesmer’s use of Professor 
McCormack’s assistance on dispositive motions in pending cases 
violated two rules of the Code of Judicial Ethics does not itself 
constitute a determination that she thereby engaged in judicial 
misconduct. 
Because 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
judicial 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
22
misconduct specifies “wilful violation of a rule of the code of 
judicial ethics,” there remains the issue of whether her 
violation of those rules was wilful. We determine that her 
violation of the private communications prohibition was wilful 
and 
that 
her 
violation 
of 
the 
ex 
parte 
communications 
proscription was not.  
¶45 Prior judicial disciplinary cases have established that 
“wilful” means that the judge’s conduct was not the result of 
duress or coercion and that the judge knew or should have known 
that the conduct was prohibited by the Code of Judicial Ethics. 
In Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 147 Wis. 
2d 861, 872, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989), the statutory term “wilful” 
was understood to mean “freely made and not the result of duress 
or coercion.” The issue of a judge’s knowledge as an element of 
wilfulness arose in Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Pressentin, 139 Wis. 2d 150, 155, 406 N.W.2d 779 (1987). There we 
held that a judge’s conduct was wilful, whether or not the judge 
had actual knowledge of the prohibition of a rule of the Code of 
Judicial Ethics, for the reason that the judge was chargeable 
with the knowledge of the ethical rules governing judges.  
¶46 Here, there was no contention or finding that Judge 
Tesmer’s conduct was the result of duress or coercion. It was 
also uncontested and the panel specifically found that Judge 
Tesmer had a good faith belief that Professor McCormack’s 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
23
assistance was permitted under the Code. The issue, then, is 
whether Judge Tesmer was chargeable with the knowledge that her 
conduct violated the two Code provisions. The panel majority 
concluded as a matter of law that she should have known her 
communications with Professor McCormack were prohibited by those 
Code provisions.  
¶47 Contesting that conclusion, Judge Tesmer asserted that 
the only evidence in the record relevant to that issue was the 
testimony of the four circuit judges that they did not view 
either rule as prohibiting a judge from accepting assistance from 
a disinterested law professor. Based on that testimony, Judge 
Tesmer also argued that the panel majority erred in concluding 
that the private communications prohibition in SCR 60.01(10) was 
not fatally ambiguous, as it determined that “[n]o reasonable 
judge would have believed that enlisting the aid of a person 
completely removed from the judicial process was acceptable in 
light of [that prohibition].”  
¶48 Judge 
Tesmer 
contended 
that 
the 
panel 
majority 
improperly limited its consideration of the judge’s testimony to 
the issue of discipline to be recommended. She argued that their 
testimony was relevant on the issue of what a reasonable judge 
would have understood the rule to prohibit and, thus, to the 
issue of whether she should be held chargeable with the knowledge 
that her conduct violated that prohibition.  
No.  97-1088-J 
 
24
¶49 The panel majority properly restricted the use of the 
judges’ testimony to the issue of discipline. The testimony of 
those judges, none of whom was offered as an expert witness, was 
neither relevant nor admissible on the issue of whether Judge 
Tesmer’s communications with and use of Professor McCormack 
violated the provisions of the Code of Judicial Ethics. That was 
the ultimate legal issue for the panel majority to decide in the 
first instance. Moreover, in respect to its relevance to the 
wilfulness issue as stated by Judge Tesmer, as none of the judges 
testified to having had any conversation with Judge Tesmer prior 
to the commencement of this disciplinary proceeding on the 
subject of Professor McCormack’s involvement in her work, their 
testimony was not relevant on the question of what she knew or 
should have known at the time she had him assist her.  
¶50 The panel majority properly concluded that Judge 
Tesmer’s use of Professor McCormack’s assistance in deciding 
substantive motions in pending cases was a wilful violation of 
the rule proscribing, on an aggravated or persistent basis, 
private communications designed to influence a judge’s decision, 
as she should have known that it violated that rule. We 
explicitly invited judges’ attention to the Code’s prohibition of 
private communications designed to influence the judge’s decision 
in Bahr v. Galonski, 80 Wis. 2d 72, 257 N.W.2d 869 (1977). There, 
the judge appeared to have considered evidence and opinions 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
25
outside the record in a child visitation modification proceeding, 
but there was no allegation there that the judge’s informal 
communications exerted any particular influence upon the matter 
at issue. The judge acknowledged on the record that he discussed 
the case with a family court commissioner, his wife, and “anybody 
who I thought could help me to make up my mind.” Id., 89. Because 
Judge Tesmer’s violation of SCR 60.01(10) was wilful, it 
constituted judicial misconduct.  
¶51 In respect to the ex parte communications proscription, 
however, we conclude that Judge Tesmer’s violation of SCR 60.20 
was not wilful, as she did not know that her use of Professor 
McCormack’s assistance violated that rule, and she was not 
properly chargeable with that knowledge. We disagree with the 
panel majority’s conclusion that Judge Tesmer should have known 
that her contacts with Professor McCormack were prohibited by SCR 
60.20. Whether or not she in fact did so, Judge Tesmer was 
entitled to rely on the common usage of the term “ex parte” as 
defined in standard dictionaries. In that respect, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (Sixth Ed. 1990) defines “ex parte” as follows: “On 
one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on 
the application of, one party only.” In addition, the only 
reported cases in which a judge was disciplined for having 
engaged in ex parte communications concerned communications with 
one of the parties to a pending proceeding. Judicial Disciplinary 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
26
Proceedings Against Carver, 192 Wis. 2d 136, 531 N.W.2d 62 
(1995); Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Aulik, 146 Wis. 
2d 57, 429 N.W.2d 759 (1988). Because Judge Tesmer’s violation of 
SCR 60.20 was not wilful, it did not constitute judicial 
misconduct.  
¶52 We turn now to the issue of discipline to impose for 
Judge Tesmer’s judicial misconduct. Judge Tesmer argued that no 
discipline should be imposed for the reason that the 1997 Code of 
Judicial 
Conduct 
adequately 
protects 
the 
court 
system 
by 
explicitly prohibiting judges from accepting the assistance of 
disinterested law professors unless notice and opportunity to 
respond are given to the parties in the underlying proceeding. 
The Judicial Commission contended that the reprimand recommended 
by the panel majority is insufficient in light of the long period 
of time during which Judge Tesmer engaged in the misconduct, the 
numerous instances of it, and the facts that she kept it 
confidential from litigants and colleagues and apparently never 
consulted the ethics rules that might have applied to it. It also 
emphasized the potential her misconduct created for harm to the 
court system and to the public it serves. The Judicial Commission 
took the position that Judge Tesmer’s misconduct warrants her 
suspension from judicial office for six months.   
¶53 The panel majority addressed the seriousness of the 
misconduct and the impact it had on the judicial system and 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
27
recommended a reprimand as the appropriate discipline. It 
considered the impact of the misconduct on the judicial system to 
have been mitigated by the fact that Judge Tesmer retained 
control over the decisional process in respect to the outcome and 
the choice of supporting rationale in each of the cases in which 
Professor McCormack assisted her. The panel majority also took 
into account that Judge Tesmer’s conduct was motivated by a 
desire to provide litigants with well-crafted opinions and that 
she believed Professor McCormack’s contribution to those opinions 
to have been no different than that provided by a regularly-
employed law clerk.  
¶54 We determine that on the facts and circumstances before 
us, Judge Tesmer’s judicial misconduct warrants the reprimand 
recommended by the panel majority. Her use of Professor McCormack 
to assist her in dealing with dispositive motions in pending 
cases created a serious threat to the fairness of those 
proceedings and to the integrity of the judicial process in 
general. She shared with someone unconnected with the judicial 
system confidential information and work product of her staff, 
discussed with that person her tentative decisions on dispositive 
motions and rationales to support them, and was influenced by him 
on the issues awaiting decision in pending cases. While the 
potential for harm to the court system, to the litigants in the 
cases she decided, and to the public’s perception of the fairness 
No.  97-1088-J 
 
28
of the judicial system was great, Judge Tesmer’s insistence on 
retaining and exercising ultimate decision-making authority in 
those 
cases 
and 
her 
confidence 
in 
Professor 
McCormack’s 
disinterest and discretion in assisting her mitigate the severity 
of the disciplinary response to that misconduct. So, too, does 
her good faith belief, albeit unjustified, that having Professor 
McCormack assist her in disposing of pending motions was not 
prohibited by the Code of Judicial Ethics.  
¶55 IT IS ORDERED that the Hon. Louise M. Tesmer is 
reprimanded 
for 
judicial 
misconduct 
established 
in 
this 
proceeding.  
No. 97-1088.wab 
 
1 
¶56 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.    (Dissenting).   Ask any 
judge or justice what duties they assign to law clerks/interns 
and the response will be largely the same: draft memoranda on 
issues of law; draft memoranda on cases; assist in the drafting 
of opinions; research; discuss issues and cases.  This, of 
course, was precisely the role of Professor McCormack. 
¶57 The majority says that Judge Tesmer "should have 
known" that her use of Professor McCormack violated the Code of 
Judicial Ethics.  But just what is it about her use of Professor 
McCormack as a law clerk/intern that she "should have known" was 
a violation?  The majority opinion fails to answer that question 
with any degree of clarity.  And that, I submit, is because 
there is no clarity, no direction, to be found.  The basic 
problem is the lack of any rules, regulations, or guidelines 
with respect to law clerks/interns.  Without them, judges have 
been left largely adrift as to where the lines are drawn.  
Accordingly, I conclude that there is no standard that gave any 
degree of fair notice to Judge Tesmer that what she was doing 
was a violation.  It is not Judge Tesmer who has failed the 
system; it is the system that has failed Judge Tesmer. 
¶58 Judge Tesmer is accused of violating SCR 60.01, which 
read literally forbids contact with anyone with respect to the 
judge's decision making responsibility.  No one suggests it be 
read literally: to do so would be to forbid the use of law 
clerks/interns who are an accepted part of the judiciary. 
No. 97-1088.wab 
 
2 
¶59 Thus the question is: where are the lines drawn?  Who 
can be a law clerk/intern?  What are the parameters of 
utilization?9   
¶60 May a law clerk/intern be a law professor?  The 
Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, 
regulation or guideline forbidding it, and I can find none. 
¶61 May the law clerk/intern do some or all of their work 
outside the actual physical surroundings of the court to which 
they are assigned?  The Judicial Commission and the majority 
opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline forbidding it, 
and I can find none. 
¶62 Must the law clerk/intern be part of a formally 
recognized 
program 
of 
law 
clerks/interns? 
 
The 
Judicial 
                     
9 I note that Rules for the First Judicial District, State 
of Wisconsin (1990) regarding legal interns and law clerks 
provide as follows: 
VII. LEGAL INTERNS AND LAW CLERKS 
148. ASSIGNMENT 
 
Legal interns and law clerks shall be assigned by 
the Chief Judge or Deputy Chief Judge. 
151. PRIVILEGE 
 
All transactions and communications between a 
judge and his assigned legal intern or law clerk, 
during 
the 
period 
of 
each 
assignment, 
are 
privileged to the judge. 
154. WORK PRODUCT 
 
The work product of a judge who has been assisted 
by a legal intern or law clerk is the sole 
responsibility of the judge. 
 
The Rules are the same today.  The Judicial Commission neither 
briefed nor argued that these rules apply.  I can only conclude 
that the Rules for the First Judicial District are irrelevant to 
this case or are largely ignored. 
No. 97-1088.wab 
 
3 
Commission 
and 
the 
majority 
opinion 
point 
to 
no 
rule, 
regulation, or guideline requiring it, and I can find none. 
¶63 Must the law clerk/intern be registered with the court 
where the law clerk/intern works?  The Judicial Commission and 
the majority opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline 
requiring it, and I can find none. 
¶64 Must the law clerk/intern be a graduate lawyer?  The 
Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point to no rule, 
regulation or guideline of the circuit court requiring it, and I 
can find none. 
¶65 Must a law clerk/intern be at the very least a law 
student?  The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion point 
to no rule, regulation, or guideline requiring it, and I can 
find none. 
¶66 If the law clerk/intern must be a lawyer, must that 
person be only a "recent graduate" or is there no limit to the 
number of years that have passed since law school to be 
eligible?  The Judicial Commission and the majority opinion 
point to no rule, regulation or guideline providing the answer, 
and I can find none. 
¶67 Can a law clerk/intern, performing his or her duties 
as a law clerk/intern, be simultaneously employed outside the 
judicial system?  The Judicial Commission and the majority 
opinion point to no rule, regulation or guideline providing the 
answer, and I can find none. 
¶68 The questions posed, and not answered by any rule, 
regulation, or guideline, leave all judges and not just Judge 
No. 97-1088.wab 
 
4 
Tesmer in a legal and ethical quandary.  If the majority’s 
decision is a rule of reason, as suggested by the majority's 
ambiguity in setting out precisely what it is about Judge 
Tesmer’s actions that violate the Code, it is a rule of reason 
left solely to an after the fact determination subject to the 
eyes of the beholder.  That is not fair, it is not just, it is 
not practical.  It contravenes fundamental notions of fair 
notice and due process.  
¶69 The majority opinion, by drawing the line here, 
provides a start in the right direction.  At least we all know  
that we cannot use a law professor as a law clerk/intern if the 
professor works out of our home on weekends.  But we must draw 
the lines more brightly.  We must provide rules, regulations and 
guidelines to assist all of us in knowing what are the 
parameters.  What if the next case involves a law professor 
working in chambers during court hours? 
¶70 Everyone agrees that Judge Tesmer's use of Professor 
McCormack was in good faith: she did not believe her actions 
were in any way wrong.  Everyone agrees that she maintained 
decisional responsibility.  Everyone agrees that Professor 
McCormack was a totally disinterested participant.  Everyone 
agrees that he functioned, in essence, as a law clerk/intern. 
¶71 Nevertheless the majority says she is guilty of 
judicial misconduct.  But what exactly, in retrospect, was wrong 
here?  Was it that he was a professor?  Or was it that Professor 
McCormack was her friend?  Or was it that he worked at her home 
No. 97-1088.wab 
 
5 
instead of in chambers?  Or was it that he worked only on 
weekends? 
¶72 To hold as does the majority that Judge Tesmer's use 
of Professor McCormack was willful because she "should have 
known" it was beyond the bounds, is to ignore our own failings 
in providing guidance on these questions.  As part of the order 
in this case, this court should establish a panel to explore and 
answer these questions in order to provide guidance for the 
future. 
¶73 Given the need for some basic understanding with 
respect to the role of law clerk/interns, I agree with the 
majority to the extent that in the future these actions 
constitute a violation of the Judicial Code.  This at least 
gives notice to all judges that there are some limits.  But I 
further conclude that Judge Tesmer's actions were not willful.  
Given the lack of rules, regulations or guidelines clearly 
delineating that these actions were wrong, she did not have fair 
notice and thus should not be held to a "should have known" 
standard.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to that portion 
of the majority opinion finding that Judge Tesmer is guilty of 
judicial misconduct.   
¶74 I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske 
joins in the dissent.