Title: Prejean v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Prejean v. State1990 WY 70794 P.2d 877Case Number: 89-187Decided: 06/29/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JERRY KEN PREJEAN, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, 
Sr. Asst. Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program, Thomas J. Alisankus, Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The primary 
question we resolve in this appeal is whether an individual, upon being 
incarcerated following a violation of parole, is entitled to credit for time 
that he served as a residential inmate in a community correctional facility. A 
secondary question that is posed is whether one who is committed to the state 
penitentiary is entitled to credit for pre-sentence confinement against both the 
maximum and minimum sentence. The district court, upon sentencing Jerry Ken 
Prejean (Prejean) after he violated his parole, refused to give him credit for 
the time served in the community correctional facility and also concluded that 
he should receive no credit for pre-sentence confinement against either his 
maximum or minimum sentence. We must reverse and remand the case with 
instructions to credit Prejean with all of his pre-sentence confinement, 
including the time served in the community correctional facility, against both 
the maximum and minimum sentence.

[¶2]      In his brief, as 
appellant in this case, Prejean articulates the following issues:

"I. Did the district 
court err in refusing to credit Mr. Prejean's sentence with time served in 
pre-sentence confinement?

"A. Credit off maximum 
sentence

"B. Credit off minimum 
sentence

"II. Did the district 
court err in refusing to credit Mr. Prejean's sentence with time served at the 
Community Alternatives detention facility?"

The State of 
Wyoming, in its Brief of Appellee, prefers this statement of the 
issues:

"I. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it did not reduce appellant's minimum and maximum 
sentences by the amount of time which appellant spent in pretrial 
detention.

"II. The time which 
appellant spent at a community correction facility could not have been credited 
to his sentence."

[¶3]      In June of 1988, 
Prejean was charged with one felony count of fraud by check in violation of § 
6-3-702(a) and (b)(iii), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987). He waived preliminary 
examination and was arraigned upon the information filed in the district court 
on June 30, 1988. He then entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency, 
and he was referred to the Wyoming State Hospital for an evaluation. 
Subsequently, on September 28, 1988, Prejean changed his plea to guilty, and he 
then was sentenced by the district court to a term of not less than four years 
and not more than seven years in the Wyoming state penitentiary. Imposition of 
the sentence was suspended, and Prejean was placed on probation for five years, 
subject to the condition that the first-year probation be served in the 
community correctional facility in Cheyenne as a residential inmate.

[¶4]      Prejean completed 
nearly six months at the community correctional facility, but he then failed to 
return from a furlough. Subsequently, he was apprehended and charged with escape 
from detention in violation of § 6-5-206(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.). He 
pleaded guilty to that charge and was sentenced to a term of not less than two 
years nor more than three years in the Wyoming penitentiary, which was to be 
served concurrently with any other sentence imposed in Albany County. 
Thereafter, the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for 
Albany County, revoked Prejean's probation and reimposed the original term of 
four to seven years without affording credit for pre-sentence confinement or for 
any time served as a residential inmate in the Cheyenne community correctional 
facility. Prejean appeals from the sentence.

[¶5]      We can dispose 
readily of the second claim that presentence confinement1 should be credited against both the 
maximum and minimum term. In Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo. 1990), this 
court held unequivocally that, when a sentence to a term of imprisonment is 
imposed, pre-sentence confinement must be credited against both the maximum term 
and the minimum term. We recognized that the trial courts could control the time 
actually served by simply augmenting the maximum and minimum term to encompass 
pre-trial confinement so long as the statutory maximum term was not exceeded and 
the appropriate differential maintained between maximum and minimum term. 
Renfro, and the cases there cited, dispose of this issue and require that 
Prejean's sentence be reversed so that appropriate credit against both the 
maximum and minimum terms can be afforded upon resentencing.

[¶6]      Apparently, there 
is a collateral question with respect to credit for the time spent at the 
Wyoming State Hospital pending examination. In our view, that time must be 
included in the pre-sentence confinement time for which credit must be given. 
That is the effect of Lightly v. State, 739 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶7]      The second issue 
to be addressed is slightly more difficult. We hold, however, that, upon being 
sentenced to the penitentiary for violation of probation, one who has served 
time as a resident in a community correctional facility, pursuant to § 7-18-108 
or § 7-18-109, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), is entitled to credit for that time 
served. In Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1989), we held 
that:

"* * * Although 
participation in these programs is imposed as a condition of probation, such 
placement falls within the definition of `official detention' provided in 
W.S. 6-5-201(a)(ii)." (Emphasis added.)

That holding was 
reached in an instance in which Peper was charged with escape from detention, 
and we also noted that "participation in a community correctional program 
does not constitute `supervision on probation or parole.'" Peper, 768 P.2d  at 29 (emphasis added.) Certainly, it was on the basis of Peper that 
Prejean was charged with, and convicted of, escape from detention.

[¶8]      Our examination 
of pertinent cases in this area discloses that whether time in a community 
correctional facility, such as the one to which Prejean was directed as a 
requirement of his probation, counts as time served if probation is revoked 
frequently depends, according to the courts, upon whether a charge of escape 
from detention will lie. See State v. Babcock, 226 Kan. 356, 597 P.2d 1117 
(1979). See also Lock v. State, 609 P.2d 539 (Alaska 1980); Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141 (Alaska App. 1983); State v. Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. 126, 504 A.2d 43 
(A.D. 1986), certification denied 103 N.J. 499, 511 A.2d 671 (1986). Certainly, 
as Peper establishes, the situation in Wyoming fits that condition.

[¶9]      Consequently, it 
is our conclusion that, so long as the State of Wyoming continues to provide 
that:

"(a) An offender or an 
inmate is deemed guilty of escape from official detention and shall be punished 
as provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without proper authorization, 
he:

"(i) Fails to remain 
within the extended limits of his confinement or to return within the time 
prescribed to a community correctional facility to which he was assigned or 
transferred; or

"(ii) Being a participant 
in a program established under the provisions of this act he leaves his place of 
employment or fails or neglects to return to the community correctional facility 
within the time prescribed or when specifically ordered to do so." § 7-18-112, 
W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.);

it must accept 
the concomitant that such time must be counted against a sentence that is later 
imposed upon violation of probation. This is the thrust of the cases in other 
jurisdictions.

[¶10]   The judgment of the district court 
is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to resentence Prejean 
affording him credit against both the maximum and minimum terms imposed for the 
full time served in pre-sentence confinement including the time served in the 
community correctional facility and the time spent in the Wyoming State Hospital 
for examination for mental illness or deficiency.

FOOTNOTES

1 As used here, 
"presentence confinement" is simply a condensation of the phrase "presentence 
confinement incarceration" used in Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 
1990), where it is defined in footnote 8.