Title: State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Presler

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

246 N.W.2d 570 (1976) STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Wilfred Oscar PRESLER, Respondent. No. 45781. Supreme Court of Minnesota. October 8, 1976. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Thomas K. Overton, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant. Robins, Meshbesher, Singer & Spence, Kenneth Meshbesher, and John P. Clifford, Minneapolis, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court without oral argument. SCOTT, Justice. This is an appeal by the state from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a driver's license revocation proceeding under the implied-consent law. The issues at the jury trial de novo in district court were whether the respondent had refused to submit to the chemical testing and, if so, whether the refusal was reasonable. The jury, by special verdict, found that respondent had refused a breathalyzer test and a blood test and that the refusal was not based upon reasonable grounds. Upon respondent's motion the district court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly overturned the jury's finding that respondent refused testing. We affirm. On September 1, 1972, a qualified police officer, based upon reasonable and probable cause to believe that respondent was driving or operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, lawfully placed him under arrest and transported him to the traffic interview room. Pursuant to the provisions of the implied-consent law, Officer Don Bowles then offered him a blood or a breath test. According to the record, Officer Bowles gathered the usual preliminary details as to identification and then advised respondent of his rights regarding chemical testing. The officer testified that at one point respondent indicated that he wanted to take a blood test, but that thereafter he would not *571 say that he would take a blood test. An implied-consent form was then completed indicating that respondent refused to submit to testing. The officer determined that a videotape interview was necessary, based upon this equivocation by respondent. The videotape was twice played to the jury during the trial. The following is a complete transcript of that tape: The sole dispute which arises from this testimony is respondent's claim that upon completion of the videotape he told the *572 officers that he would take a blood test. He further testified that the officers said that they did not have time to take him to a hospital and that there were "customers waiting." Thus, he asserts that there was no refusal to submit to chemical testing. At the trial, the officer testified that he was unable to remember respondent asking him for a test after the completion of the videotaping. In granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court, in a memorandum, stated as follows: On the record presented, we affirm the trial court's judgment that no reasonable man could find that respondent refused to take a chemical test. Respondent indicated that he was willing to take the blood test at the beginning of the interrogation. While his later statements were somewhat equivocal, this was not sufficient in the confusing circumstances of this case to constitute a refusal. The trial court properly granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Rule 50.02, Rules of Civil Procedure; Filas v. Daher, 300 Minn. 137, 218 N.W.2d 467 (1974). Affirmed.