Title: Powers v. Hayes

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Powers v. Hayes (2000-033); 172 Vt. 535; 776 A.2d 374

[Filed 01-Mar-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-033

                             JANUARY TERM, 2001

Rachel Powers	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
v.	                               }	Washington Superior Court
                                       }	
Katherine A. Hayes, Esq.	       }
Barr, Sternberg & Moss, P.C.	       }	DOCKET NO. 497-9-98 Wncv

                                                Trial Judges: Alden T. Bryan 
                                                (Ret.), Specially Assigned and 
                                                Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Rachel Powers, administrator of the Estate of Charles
  Powers, appeals from a ruling  of the Washington Superior Court that
  granted summary judgment to defendants Katherine Hayes  and the firm of
  Barr, Sternberg & Moss P.C., dismissing plaintiff's attorney malpractice
  action.   Plaintiff argues that the grant of summary judgment was in error
  because there existed enough  circumstantial evidence to create a genuine
  issue of material fact regarding the issue of causation.   We agree and
  reverse.

       On the eve of major surgery, Charles Powers hired attorney Hayes to
  draft a will that would  leave all of his assets to his daughter Rachel
  Powers.  He had used the services of Hayes in the past  and had a working
  relationship with her.  The meeting to draft the will was very hurried
  because  Hayes was leaving for an appointment outside of the office, and
  she suggested that the two meet at a  later date in order to review
  Powers's estate plan in more detail.  Powers rejected the suggestion 
  because he was going into surgery the next day and needed to get the will
  drafted and executed as  soon as possible.  Hayes drafted the will, and it
  was executed that same day.  Powers made it clear to  Hayes that he wished
  his daughter Rachel to receive "everything."

       The bulk of Charles Powers' estate consisted of the assets contained
  in his IRA.  The  beneficiary of the IRA was Colleen Fitzpatrick, Powers'
  ex-girlfriend.  He had been living with her  when the beneficiary
  designation was made, but the relationship had ended by the time he hired 
  Hayes to draft the will.  He had been married and divorced twice and had
  one daughter, Rachel  Powers, from his first marriage.  He was very fond of
  his daughter and sought to provide for her  when he was gone. 

       At the time she drafted the will, Hayes was aware of the existence of
  the IRA from prior 

 

  representation of Powers.  Hayes did not mention the IRA to Powers, but
  drafted the will to  read that he gave to his daughter, "all of my estate
  of every kind and description, both real and  personal, wherever situated
  and whenever or however acquired."  Powers died about two months  after the
  surgery.  Because he had not changed the beneficiary of his IRA, it passed
  to Colleen  Fitzpatrick, and not to his daughter, despite the presence of
  the will.

       Plaintiff brought this attorney malpractice action, alleging that
  Hayes was negligent in failing  to inform Powers that he had to change the
  beneficiary of the IRA to redirect it to his daughter and  that the will
  would not affect the disposition of the IRA.  Defendants moved for summary
  judgment,  relying in part on the deposition of David Frank, who was
  Powers's investment advisor on the IRA.   Frank testified at his deposition
  that he had told Powers that he should change the beneficiary on the  IRA,
  repeatedly encouraged him to do so and sent him a change of beneficiary
  form to complete.  At  the same time, Frank encouraged Powers to obtain a
  will.  While he told Powers that the purpose of  the IRA beneficiary change
  was to ensure that the daughter received one hundred per cent of the IRA 
  proceeds, he never discussed with Powers the interrelationship between the
  will and the IRA  beneficiary designation.

       Defendants argued, and the superior court apparently accepted, that
  plaintiff was unable to  show that any negligence of Hayes was the
  proximate cause of the daughter's loss of the IRA  proceeds.  Specifically,
  defendant argued that the Frank deposition showed that Powers knew that he 
  had to change the IRA designation in order to get the proceeds to his
  daughter and further advice  to  that effect from Hayes would have been
  duplicative and unsuccessful.   

       This Court reviews a motion for summary judgment using the same
  standard as the trial court.  O'Donnell v. Bank of Vermont, 166 Vt. 221,
  224,