Title: Harry Butler v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
CORRECTED OPINION
____________
No. SC95158
____________
HARRY BUTLER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
     REVISED OPINION 
[April 3, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal Harry Butler’s conviction for first-degree murder and his
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons stated below, we affirm Butler’s conviction and his sentence.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of March 13, 1997, or early morning hours of March 14, 1997,
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Leslie Fleming (Fleming), also known as Bay, was stabbed multiple times and
asphyxiated by her former boyfriend, Harry Butler (Butler).  Shawna Fleming
(Shawna), Leslie’s sister, discovered Fleming’s body at about 7:15 a.m. on the
morning of March 14 when LaShara Butler (LaShara), the couple’s six-year old
daughter, opened the apartment door for Shawna.  According to LaShara’s trial
testimony, on the night before the body was discovered, she had been sleeping with
her mother when her father entered the bedroom, picked her up, and took her to her
own room.  LaShara testified that she saw his face during this process.  LaShara
also stated she heard her mother say, “Stop,” saw her father’s leg pinning down her
mother’s leg, and heard her mother screaming as though she were being hurt. 
Officer Scott Ballard, one of the first officers on the scene, testified that on the way
to the police station,  LaShara said, "My daddy hurt mommy.  I heard him yelling at
her.”
Lola Young, a long-time neighbor of Fleming’s who had also known Butler
for some time, testified she saw Butler hiding in the bushes near Fleming’s
apartment between 3:30 and 4 a.m., around the same time as the murder.  She also
stated that soon after seeing Butler, she saw a blue car speed through the housing
complex, stop abruptly, pick up Butler, and speed off.  Latwanda Allen (Allen)
testified that she, Butler and Martisha Kelly (Kelly) are cousins.  Allen said Kelly
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told her Butler killed Fleming.  At trial, Kelly denied having made the statement.  
Detective Steffens testified that Kelly stated she went by Fleming’s apartment
the morning of the murder, looked through a window and noticed the apartment
was in disarray.  Steffens also testified he questioned Butler, and Butler denied any
involvement in the murder.  During the interview, Steffens noticed superficial cuts
on Butler’s hands, which Butler explained he received from falling off a bicycle and
from a broken bottle.  A broken beer bottle was found on the floor of Butler’s
room.
Detective Green testified Kelly told him the murder weapon could be found
in a dumpster near a food store where a pair of blue shorts, a white T-shirt, a pair
of underwear, a towel, and a pair of tennis shoes having no laces were eventually
found.  However, no weapon was recovered from this location.  Dr. Jeannie
Eberhardt, a forensic scientist specializing in DNA serology, testified she found the
presence of blood on the white T-shirt, but she was unable to confirm a DNA
profile of the blood.  Blood stains found on the denim shorts, towel, and boxer
shorts were also tested, with the same result.  The blood was either of an
inadequate amount or degraded.  The dyes of the denim shorts inhibited DNA
testing.  However, testing of the sneakers revealed a DNA profile consistent with
that of the victim.
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Shawna testified that Fleming ended her relationship with Butler several
months before the murder.  On March 9 Butler moved out of the apartment at
Fleming’s request.  He was present, however, in the apartment on March 11 when
Shawna visited her sister.  Fleming told Shawna to leave and call the police. One of
the officers who arrived on the scene observed red marks on Fleming’s back and
an injury to her shoulder.  Butler was arrested, but bonded out the next evening. 
Two days after the incident with the police, Butler was again seen at Fleming’s
apartment.  An employee of a cable company, John Dosher, was removing a cable
box from the residence.  He indicated that Fleming and Butler seemed affectionate
with no animosity between them.
Lakisha Miller (Miller), Butler’s cousin and Fleming’s best friend, who was
known as Red, testified she spent the night with Fleming, at Fleming’s request, on
the night of March 12.  She said she last spoke with Fleming at 8 p.m. on the night
of March 13.  Miller testified that Butler did not like her and that he was upset over
the breakup with Fleming.  She also said Butler was upset because Fleming was
having an affair with Adonis Hartsfield.
Terry Jackson, Butler’s coworker and acquaintance for many years, testified
that he gave Butler a ride the day before the murder.  During that ride, Butler said he
was going to kill Bay (Fleming) and Red (Miller).
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Dennis Tennell (Tennell) testified that he shared a motel room with Butler on
the night of the murder and that he allowed Butler to borrow a pair of his Nike
sneakers the next morning because Butler’s shoes were wet.  Tennell identified the
sneakers found in the dumpster as Butler’s.  Butler testified he and Tennell attended
a party and arrived at their room around 2 a.m.  Tennell left for an hour on a “dope
run.”  At some time during the night, Butler noticed his blue and white Converse
sneakers were missing and when he asked Tennell where they were, Tennell
responded, “I’m on a mission with them.”  Butler then borrowed Tennell’s black
Nikes, which Butler was wearing when arrested.  As Butler and Tennell left their
room, the police confronted them.  Tennell ran away and Butler was taken to the
police department for questioning.  Butler testified he did not know Fleming was
dead at this time.  
At the penalty phase, several family members, including Butler’s father,
Junior Butler, testified concerning Butler’s early life.  Prior to the death of his
mother, Butler lived with his mother and father, with Junior Butler supporting the
family on fifty dollars a week.  Junior Butler indicated that he was tried and
acquitted of the murder of Butler’s mother when Butler was eight years old.  After
his mother’s death, Butler went to live with his grandmother.  Butler’s sister,
Sandra Butler, testified Butler protected her as a child.  When their grandmother
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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died, Junior Butler again took custody of Butler and his siblings.  When Butler
reached age eighteen, he moved out of his father’s house.
On June 28, 1998, the jury recommended Butler be sentenced to death by a
vote of eleven to one.  The trial court denied Butler’s motion for new trial at a
hearing on August 7, 1998.  On November 2, 1998, the trial judge conducted a
Spencer1 hearing during which the defense presented additional mitigating testimony
from a psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Maher.  Dr. Maher testified that he interviewed
Butler concerning his use of drugs and his psychiatric background.  Butler
informed him that he used a lot of cocaine on the night of murder, but he also said
he did not commit the murder.  Dr. Maher indicated that one of the effects caused
by the use of cocaine was irrational, repetitive actions.  He opined that the number
of stab wounds in this case suggests this type of behavior.  Dr. Maher further
opined that a child whose mother dies as a result of violence faces a great risk of
participating in violence to resolve conflicts, especially when this factor is coupled
with other dysfunctional social activities, such as drug use. 
On January 11, 1999, the trial judge concurred with the jury recommendation
and sentenced Butler to death.  The trial judge found one aggravating circumstance,
that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  The defense requested
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two statutory mitigating circumstances, that the defendant was acting under the
influence of emotional and mental disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his act was impaired.  However, the trial judge found no statutory
mitigating factors and four nonstatutory mitigating factors including:  (1) Butler was
reared without his natural mother (some weight); (2) Butler is a loving and good son
(some weight); (3) Butler is well thought of by neighbors and coworkers (slight
weight); and (4) Butler has a long-term substance abuse problem (slight weight). 
Butler filed a timely notice of appeal on February 9, 1999.
In this appeal Butler claims the trial court erred by:  (1) permitting the State to
elicit testimony concerning prior acts of violence allegedly committed by the
defendant; (2) permitting an unqualified expert witness to testify concerning DNA
evidence; (3) denying the defense motion for a new trial following the discovery of
a probation violation report on one witness that was not disclosed by the State; (4)
instructing the jury that the only proposed statutory aggravating circumstance had
been established by the evidence; (5) failing to consider a statutory mitigating
circumstance proposed by the defense during the penalty phase; and (6) imposing a
death sentence that is excessive, disproportionate, and cruel and unusual
punishment under the United States and Florida Constitutions.  
We deny relief on all of Butler’s claims and affirm both the finding of guilt
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and the sentence of death.
ISSUES
  Prior Acts Of Violence
Butler first argues the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask him,
Detective Marvin Green, and Theodore Dallas questions related to prior domestic
violence allegations against him.  Contending that this evidence was similar fact
evidence, Butler argues this evidence should have been excluded because it was
used only to show Butler’s propensity to commit the crime charged or his bad
character and because the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by the
prejudice.  See §§ 90.403-90.404, Fla. Stat. (1995).  
On April 30, 1997, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by Butler.  The notice specifically sought to
introduce evidence of a March 11, 1997, domestic violence incident in which Butler
allegedly sexually battered and assaulted Fleming.  On July 14, 1997, Butler filed a
motion to strike the State’s notice, alleging the March 11 incident bore no similarity
to the March 14 murder.  He further argued such evidence was irrelevant and could
only be used to show bad character and propensity of the defendant to commit
violent acts.  The defense filed a motion in limine on June 24, 1998, seeking to
exclude the following evidence:
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1.  Any evidence of the Defendant’s alleged statement, “gonna kill       
Bay and Red.”
2.  Any mention of Leslie Fleming’s alleged fear of the Defendant.
3.  Any mention that the Defendant allegedly kidnaped Leslie      
Fleming on or about March 11, 1997.
4.  Any mention that Defendant allegedly touched, struck or caused      
bodily harm to Leslie Fleming on or about March 11, 1997.
5.  Any mention that the Defendant allegedly committed a sexual      
battery upon Leslie Fleming on or about March 11, 1998 [sic].
6.  Any mention of prior allegations of abuse, physical or emotional,     
 towards Leslie Fleming by the Defendant.
Defendant again alleged such evidence was irrelevant and that any relevance would
be outweighed by the prejudice that would result from its admission.  
At the June 23, 1998, pretrial hearing on this motion, defense counsel noted
that a prior hearing had been held on the domestic battery charge before a different
judge, who found the charge admissible to show motive.  At the 1998 hearing, the
present trial judge granted the motion to exclude the sexual battery and kidnapping
(paragraphs three and five of the motion) to the extent that the State could not raise
them in opening statement.  Otherwise, the State was directed to approach the
bench prior to introducing the evidence.  The judge then denied the exclusion
requested in paragraph four of the motion in limine to the extent it would be
introduced to show motive or any other issue at trial.  Defense counsel in fact
conceded the domestic battery was relevant to this murder case.  Finally, the judge
ruled that any evidence presented in relation to statements Fleming may have made
2.  § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1997).
3.  See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).
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concerning previous abuse (paragraphs two and six) would be dealt with
contemporaneously.  The motion was denied as to any statements made by the
defendant (paragraph one).       
Generally, any evidence relevant to prove a material fact at issue is admissible
unless precluded by a specific rule of exclusion.  See § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (1997);
Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2000).  Collateral crime evidence, codified in
section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1997), is also relevant and admissible if used to
prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.  However, even relevant evidence will be
inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice2 or if introduced to prove defendant’s bad character or propensity
to commit the crime charged.3  See Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998);
Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1993); State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129
(Fla. 1986).  As we stated in Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988):
The only limitations to the rule of relevancy are that the state should
not be permitted to make the evidence of other crimes the feature of
the trial or to introduce the evidence solely for the purpose of showing
bad character or propensity, in which event it would not be relevant,
and such evidence, even if relevant, should not be admitted if its
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probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.  
We have consistently adhered to this principle in other cases where evidence is
being introduced pursuant to Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
In this case the evidence complained of was elicited during the cross-
examination of three defense witnesses (including the defendant).  A prosecutor can
use cross-examination to delve further into issues raised during the direct
examination and to impeach a witness’s credibility.  See Steinhorst v. State, 412
So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982); Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999).  Additionally, we have often said that cross-examination is not limited to the
exact details testified to on direct examination but extends to the whole subject and
all matters that modify, supplement, contradict, rebut or make clearer the direct
testimony.  See Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1997); Geralds v. State,
674 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1996).  Although evidence of collateral crimes may be raised
for these purposes, such evidence should not become a feature of the trial.  The
other crimes evidence in this case was used during Detective Green’s cross-
examination to elaborate on why the police believed Butler was a suspect.  The
evidence was used during Theodore Dallas’s cross-examination to test his
knowledge of the relationship between the defendant and the decedent.  The other
crimes evidence was used as impeachment during the cross-examination of Butler. 
4.  Tennell later explained during direct examination that he ran away when
Butler told him to and that he was carrying cocaine with him that morning. 
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Furthermore, the use of this evidence did not become a feature of the trial; it
covered very little of the cross-examination of these witnesses.
During direct examination by defense counsel, Detective Green stated he had
been reading e-mail about crimes committed in his patrol area during the same week
as Fleming’s murder when he heard a call of a possible homicide over his radio. 
He asked officers to confirm the address and noticed it matched the same address
as shown in the e-mail concerning a domestic violence incident two days earlier
involving Butler.  Green then testified to seeing Butler and Dennis Tennell near the
crime scene and approached them.  As he did, Tennell4 ran away, but Butler
remained, voluntarily complying with Green’s request to go down to the police
station.  
On cross-examination, the prosecutor again asked Green about the e-mail
concerning the previous domestic violence incident in the context of how this e-
mail, in conjunction with the address where the murder occurred, led the police to
suspect Butler.  As the prosecutor questioned Green, he began to delve into what
was termed “the serious nature” of the allegations against Butler.  The defense
attorney objected and the trial judge told the prosecutor to stay away from the
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nature of the allegations.
The prosecutor asked these questions to determine the officer’s knowledge
about the identity of the possible perpetrator.  This is a proper purpose under
section 90.404(2)(a).  While the prosecutor’s characterization of the domestic
violence incident as “serious” and “violent” was not necessary to achieve this
purpose, no prejudice resulted from these comments since they were brief and
immediately met by admonishment from the court.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 748
So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1999); Oats v. State, 446 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1984).  Therefore, we
find any error caused by this characterization to be harmless.  See State v. DiGuilio,
491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). 
Butler also alleges error during cross-examination of his friend Theodore
Dallas.  On direct examination, Dallas indicated he was aware of the relationship
between Butler and Fleming, a relationship which had begun some seven years
earlier.  Dallas further indicated there was no friction between Butler and Fleming. 
On cross-examination Dallas continued this theme and indicated Butler was not
upset that Fleming was leaving him and seeing another man.  He indicated Butler
and Fleming never had any problems.  
After Dallas acknowledged the March 11 domestic violence incident, the
prosecutor asked him about an April 24, 1993, domestic violence incident.  During
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the bench conference after defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor argued
defense counsel had opened the door to this line of questioning by eliciting
information from Dallas about the nature of the relationship between Butler and
Fleming.  The prosecutor further argued he could properly test in his cross-
examination the extent of Dallas’s knowledge and what information he had on
which to base an opinion.  The trial judge overruled the objection and directed the
State to limit the scope of questioning to the nature of the act about which the 
prosecution already had a factual basis.  
When the prosecutor asked other questions concerning the 1993 incidents,
defense counsel again objected on the basis that the prosecutor was going into the
specifics of the incidents.  The trial judge ultimately directed the prosecutor to ask
Dallas if he was aware of any incident in which Fleming was allegedly touched or
struck on the particular date in order to avoid making the prior abuse a feature of
the trial.  Dallas admitted to hearing rumors of abuse in the relationship, but stated
many relationships had those kind of problems.
The purpose of the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Theodore Dallas was
to test his credibility concerning the relationship between Butler and Fleming. 
Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
   90.608
Who may impeach.–Any party, including the party
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calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by:
   (1)  Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent
with the witness’s present testimony.
   (2)  Showing that the witness is biased.
   (3)  Attacking the character of the witness in accordance with the
provisions of s. 90.609 or s. 90.610.
   (4)  Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the
witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the
witness testified.
   (5)  Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified
to by the witness being impeached.
(Emphasis added.)  The prosecutor’s questions specifically tested the basis for the
witness’s recount of the matters about which he testified, those matters being the
lack of discord between the defendant and the victim.  See Bonifay v. State, 626
So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993).  
This Court has in prior cases found admissible testimony concerning
specific acts committed by the defendant to rebut a witness’s testimony describing
the defendant as benign or to show motive or premeditation where the defendant
has committed prior acts of violence against the same victim.  See Pittman v. State,
646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994) (found admissible prior threats against the murder
victim and her family); Hildwin v. State, 531 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1988) (finding the
State could introduce rebuttal evidence of defendant’s prior specific acts of
misconduct and violence to rebut expert testimony that defendant would be a good
prisoner).  Admission of the evidence concerning prior incidents of violence against
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the victim was not error.   
Butler next complains of the other crimes testimony elicited from him during
the State’s cross-examination.  On direct examination by defense counsel, Butler
indicated that he loved Fleming and that they had made love on the Tuesday before
the murder.  He gave the impression that they had a good relationship and that he
was not concerned about what may have been going on between Fleming and
Adonis Hartsfield.  He admitted to being arrested on March 11, 1997, but he
indicated there had been an argument with Fleming, not serious fighting.  
On cross-examination Butler again tried to minimize the circumstances of his
arrest by indicating the couple had consensual sex on March 11 and by saying the
ride in his car on that day was not against her will.  He indicated the incident did not
involve rape or kidnapping.  However, he acknowledged that he was told the case
was being referred to the prosecutor’s office on felony charges.  Additionally,
during cross-examination and in response to Butler’s assertion that he would never
hurt Fleming, the prosecutor asked about a 1993 incident in which Butler choked
Fleming.
When a defendant takes the stand, his credibility may be impeached in the
same manner as any other witness.  See Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla.
1992).  More specifically, impeachment may be through questioning concerning
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prior acts of misconduct in a situation where the defendant has testified on direct
examination that he has not or would not participate in such misconduct.  See Lusk
v. State, 531 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).   In this case, Butler took the stand
and testified he would never hurt the victim.  The evidence concerning the 1993
incident was relevant to this issue; therefore, the trial court properly allowed cross-
examination concerning the incident.
Prior to trial, the trial judge ruled that the March 11 domestic violence
incident was admissible at trial to show motive.  The defendant, however, maintains
the prosecutor should not have questioned him about possible felony charges
arising out of that incident.  This question was relevant impeachment evidence given
the fact that Butler was downplaying the seriousness of the events and said it was
merely an “argument.”  Moreover, the questioning was relevant to the issue of
motive based on the seriousness of these possible charges, and it helped put into
context the defendant’s statement to Dennis Tennell that he was going to kill
Fleming.  The trial court did not err in allowing this limited cross-examination
because it tended to “modify, supplement, contradict, rebut, or make clearer the
facts testified to in chief.”  Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1953).
In sum, the trial court did not err in allowing the cross-examination of three
defense witnesses on other crimes evidence because the evidence was admissible
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to explain and modify direct testimony, was relevant and probative, and its
probative value was not outweighed by the prejudicial effect. 
Unqualified Expert Witness
Butler next contends DNA expert Dr. Jeannie Eberhardt was not qualified to
testify to the frequency to which DNA profiles occurred in the population because
she did not assist in creating the database that she used to determine the
frequencies nor was she trained in statistics.  We disagree and affirm the trial
court’s finding that the DNA expert was qualified to give an expert opinion. 
DNA testing requires a two-step process, one biochemical and the other
statistical.  The first step uses principles of molecular biology and chemistry to
determine that two DNA samples look alike.  The second step uses statistics to
estimate the frequency of the profile in the population.  Both steps must satisfy the
Frye test.  See Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997).  The Frye test requires
that the scientific principles or methodologies to which an expert testifies must be
generally accepted in the scientific community before they will be considered valid
in the courts.  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Butler relies on Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1997), in arguing that
Dr. Eberhardt lacked the requisite knowledge to testify about her DNA testing and
population frequencies.  In Murray, the expert who testified had no knowledge
5.  In its 1992 publication, the National Research Council (NRC) explicitly
withheld endorsement of the PCR method of DNA testing.  See Murray, 692 So.
2d at 160 (relying on National Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic
Science 70 (1992)).
 
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about the database on which his population frequency calculations were based,
repeatedly evaded questions about the procedures he used in his testing, and misled
the court as to the scientific community’s acceptance of PCR (Polymerase Chain
Reaction) DNA testing5 at that time.  This Court ultimately found the expert was not
qualified, but further held assembly or creation of the database is not necessary to
testify to results.  However, “a sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in
the study of authoritative sources” is necessary.  Murray, 692 So. 2d at 164.  
Contrary to Butler’s assertion, Dr. Eberhardt was qualified to testify as to
population frequencies of the DNA profile she discovered.  Although she did not
participate in the creation of the database, she was familiar with samples from
which the database was created.  Moreover, Dr. Eberhardt stated the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement in Tampa conducted validation studies of its 
own on the database she used.  Although these studies were conducted before she
began working there, her training consisted of conducting “revalidations” of those
databases.
Butler’s argument at trial and in his brief before this Court that a person who
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was not involved in creating a database and who has no knowledge other than that
contained in an article about a database cannot testify to her personal knowledge of
the validity of a database misstates the holdings in Brim and Murray.  In Brim we
held the second step of the DNA analysis process, statistical probabilities, must
meet the Frye test, and in Murray we found a particular expert unqualified whose
testimony did not adequately give the population frequency of a DNA profile. 
Butler’s argument, however, overlooks the fact that the Murray decision also states
creation of the database is not a necessary prerequisite to testifying; a sufficient
knowledge of the authorities pertinent to the database is an adequate basis on which
to render an opinion.  In Murray, the unqualified expert stated Murray’s DNA
sample matched the one recovered from the crime scene and “91.8 percent of the
population would be anticipated to have different DNA types.”  Murray v. State,
692 So. 2d at 163.  This Court properly characterized that testimony as not
enlightening since it did not demonstrate to the jury what segment of the population
the profile was more likely to match.  
Dr. Eberhardt’s testimony did for the jurors what the expert’s testimony in
Murray could not--it explained the significance of the information and data they
were given.  She testified the DNA profile of the blood on Butler’s sneaker
matched that of Leslie Fleming.  She explained that she then calculated a statistical
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frequency that could tell her “how common or how rare that type of profile would
be found in any given population.”  She concluded, “[T]he DNA profile found on
the sneaker, as well as the DNA profile from Leslie Fleming occurs approximately
one in 3,000 in the African American population, approximately one in 112,800
individuals of the Caucasian, and approximately one in 538,000 in the Southeastern
Hispanic population.”  This testimony quantitatively helped the jury and the trial
court understand the importance of a DNA match.  See Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d
257 (Fla. 1995) (first case where this Court took judicial notice that DNA
methodology conducted properly would satisfy the Frye test).
Butler also contends Dr. Eberhardt’s use of the product rule to determine
population frequencies was error.  Several Florida cases, as well as cases from
other jurisdictions, have accepted use of the product rule.  See Brim v. State, 695
So. 2d at 272 (observing that the NRC adopted the ceiling principle amid
speculation that product rule calculations did not account for population
substructures, but later disavowed the ceiling principle and renewed its approval of
product rule calculations); Clark v. State, 679 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
(“[P]roduct rule calculations are appropriate as a matter of scientific fact and law.”)
(citing National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence
(prepublication copy 1996)); see also United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir.
6.  In United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provides an understandable
explanation of the intricacies of DNA tests and analyses.
  
Forensic DNA tests compare allele combinations at loci where the
alleles tend to be highly variable across individuals and ethnic groups.
If there is no match between the alleles from the evidence DNA and
the potential suspect's DNA, the suspect is generally ruled out as the
source of the evidence, unless the failure is attributable to inadequate
test conditions or contaminated samples. If there is a match, analysts
use the frequency of the alleles' appearance in the relevant population
to calculate the probability that another person
 could have the same pattern of allele pairs.
 
Id. at 1152 n.7 (relying on Georgia Sargeant, DNA Evidence Finding Stricter
Scrutiny, New Uses, Trial, Apr. 1993, at 15).  In United States v. Bonds, 12 F. 3d
540 (6th Cir. 1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
illustrates the product rule:
  
To estimate the frequency of a suspect's overall DNA pattern, the
individual allele frequencies are multiplied together, using a
multiplication or product rule, to compute an aggregate estimate of the
probability that this combination of alleles in the suspect's DNA
sample would be encountered in a particular racial population. 
Id. at 550.  
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1993); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).6  Butler’s
contention is inaccurate in light of the case law that continues to uphold the validity
of the product rule.  This argument is without merit.  Dr. Eberhardt was qualified to
testify as an expert because her testimony was based on proven scientific
principles.
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Denial Of Motion For New Trial
Butler argues that the prosecution’s nondisclosure of Lola Young’s
probation violation report compromised his right to a fair trial.  Moreover, he
argues the State had constructive knowledge of this report and is responsible for
any adverse consequences flowing from its nondisclosure.  The State argues the
defense had the same access to the court file containing the probation report, and
that even if the report had been disclosed, its use would have been limited, so no
prejudice has ensued to the defendant.  Thus, the State posits no violation of Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), has been demonstrated.
The State is required to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession or
control that is favorable to the accused or that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused.  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The defendant must prove three elements to establish a Brady
claim:  (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence has been suppressed by
the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice has ensued.  See 
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
While Butler has demonstrated this violation report was in the possession of
-24-
the State and that it contained information that could have been used in impeaching
Young, he has failed to demonstrate that this report was material.  As this Court
explained in Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1999), an item of evidence is
material if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.  Thus, the question is
whether in the absence of this evidence the defendant received a fair trial.  We must
also ask whether the suppressed evidence could reasonably be taken to put the
case in such a different light that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.  See
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).   
This prong of the Brady standard has not been satisfied because this
violation report does not undermine our confidence in this verdict.  There is no
doubt that the defense had in its possession information concerning the witness’s
background.  Lola Young was deposed on December 12, 1997, six months before
trial.  At the time of the deposition she was on probation.  In response to
questioning, Young indicated she was not only on probation but also in a drug
treatment program.  She also indicated she had several drug-related convictions.
Thus, the defense was aware of both the witness’s prior drug convictions and her
present treatment for drug use and, based on this information, could have
developed a line of inquiry as it related to her ability to perceive.  This is the same
-25-
line of inquiry Butler now says he could have pursued with the violation report. 
Additionally, any error in the prosecutor’s failure to disclose this violation
report was harmless.  When Young’s testimony is weighed against the other
evidence presented at trial, it does not minimize Butler’s guilt.  At trial, six-year-old
LaShara testified she saw her father’s face when he removed her from her mother’s
bed, and she said that later the same night she was awakened by her mother’s
screams and saw her father’s leg pinning down her mother.  The jury also heard
and considered testimony that the tennis sneaker Butler had been wearing and that
was found in a dumpster had blood on it matching Fleming’s DNA.   
Jury Instruction On Statutory Aggravator
Butler argues the jury instruction on the statutory aggravating circumstance of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel indicated that the aggravator had been established and
deprived the jury of its decision-making on this issue.  This issue has not been
preserved for review since no objection was made in the trial court.  There was no
objection made to the jury instructions once each party was apprised by the court
of how the instruction would be worded.  See Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207,
1211 (Fla. 1997).  The defense’s failure to object is illustrated by the following
exchange that occurred during the trial regarding where to place the definition of the
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator.  
-26-
THE COURT:   Aggravating circumstance that can be considered is
limited to the following that are the following.  I think I’m going to
leave that is the following established by the evidence or that is
established by the evidence.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  If you are going to make it singular.
THE COURT:  So I will put a comma in there by the following that is
established by the evidence the crime for which -- and was conscious. 
It reads standing alone with an -- insert special instruction at that point.
  
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Pardon me, Judge?
THE COURT:  I inserted it right after that just before if you find the
aggravating circumstances.
 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  That’s fine, Judge.  
No objection was made by the defense during this discussion.  It is clear from this
exchange that defense counsel accepted not only the placement of the definition of
the HAC aggravator, but also the wording of the instructions related to it. 
As the State points out, this issue is also without merit.  The defense has
proffered an argument based purely on semantics.  The instructions given at trial on
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator read as follows, in pertinent part:
     The aggravating circumstance that you may consider is limited to
the following, that is established by the evidence:   The crime for
which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel.  
(Emphasis added.)  The standard jury instructions on aggravators states:  “The
-27-
aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following
that are established by the evidence.”   The only practical difference between the
two instructions is that the one given at trial involved one aggravator while the
standard jury instruction contemplates a situation where more than one aggravator
has been established by the evidence.  Defense counsel showed an awareness of
this slight linguistic difference when he stated, “If you are going to make it singular”
after the judge stated he would instruct the jury to consider a certain aggravator. 
Had defense counsel disagreed with these instructions, he should have objected at
that moment.  His failure to do so indicates his agreement with the court’s version
of the jury instructions.  
We therefore deny relief on this claim. 
Failing To Consider Statutory Mitigators
Butler next argues the trial court erred in failing to consider, as a separate
mitigating circumstance, the evidence presented concerning his impaired mental
capacity due to cocaine use.  Although a jury instruction on this mitigator was
given, the State maintains Butler abandoned this as a separate mitigator when it was
not discussed in the defense sentencing memorandum to the trial judge.  The
memorandum included the statutory mental mitigator of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance and the seven nonstatutory mitigators requested, including
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Butler’s long-term substance abuse problem.  The record indicates the trial judge
considered and weighed all of the mitigating evidence offered by the defense.
Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), requires specific findings
as to both aggravating and mitigating factors.  The State may not prevent the
sentencer from considering any relevant mitigators and, likewise, the sentencer may
not refuse to consider any mitigating evidence.  See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982).  In Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990), this Court
sought to clarify and make more uniform the application of the law pertaining to
mitigators by stating:
     When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court
must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating
circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is
supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory
factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature.  See Rogers v. State, 511 So.
2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988). The court
must find as a mitigating circumstance each proposed factor that is
mitigating in nature  and has been reasonably established by the greater
weight of the evidence. . . .  The court next must weigh the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating and, in order to facilitate appellate
review, must expressly consider in its written order each established
mitigating circumstance. Although the relative weight given each
mitigating factor is within the province of the sentencing court, a
mitigating factor once found cannot be dismissed as having no weight.
To be sustained, the trial court's final decision in the weighing process
must be supported by "sufficient competent evidence in the record." 
Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981).
Id. at 419-420 (footnotes omitted).  
7.   Although Dennis Tennell discussed Butler’s use of beer and cocaine on
the night of the murder and Antonio Strappy indicated Butler appeared as if he had
been using drugs, neither said Butler was in any way incapacitated that night. 
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The trial court adequately considered the impaired capacity mitigator. 
Butler’s argument to the contrary is belied by the sentencing order itself.  The
sentencing order explicitly discusses the impaired capacity issue.  The judge
considered this factor in the discussion of the HAC aggravator.  The trial judge
stated the defense offered the impaired capacity evidence in the form of Dr.
Maher’s testimony “to mitigate the State’s position that the crime was torturous.”
The court then pointed out that the defense failed to present testimony at trial that
substantiated the claim that Butler was in fact impaired by his use of cocaine and
other substances at the time of the murder.7  For these reasons, the court
concluded the crime was heinous, atrocious, and cruel.  See Brown v. State, 721
So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1998) (finding, despite defendant’s use of cocaine and alcohol on
the night of the murder, that no evidence was presented that he was actually
intoxicated at the time of the crime or that his capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his act was impaired); Cooper v. State, 492 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1986) (finding
consumption of alcohol and marijuana on the day of the murder without more does
not compel a finding of the diminished capacity mitigator).  Therefore, the trial
judge’s conclusion that the weight of the HAC aggravator was not diminished by
-30-
this proposed mitigator was proper.
Butler’s use of cocaine and alcohol was also explored by the trial judge
during the discussion of the statutory mitigating circumstances of under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and as a separate nonstatutory
mitigating factor of long-term substance abuse.  The trial judge followed the
Campbell directive in discussing all the mitigating evidence presented. 
Proportionality
In deciding whether the death sentence is proportional in a particular case,
this Court is required to consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the case
and compare it to other capital cases.  See Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923 (Fla.
2000) (citing Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998)); Brown v. State, 721 So.
2d 274 (Fla. 1998).  Comparing this case to other capital cases with similar
aggravating and mitigating circumstances demonstrates that Butler’s sentence of
death is proportional.
The trial court found one aggravating circumstance, heinous, atrocious or
cruel (HAC), and several mitigating circumstances, including under extreme mental
or emotional disturbance.  Butler argues the death penalty is not proportional
because the murder was committed during an emotional, domestic dispute.  This
argument is not persuasive or dispositive of the issue.  As we held in Pooler v.
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State, 704 So. 2d 1375 (1997), there is no per se “domestic dispute” exception to
imposition of the death penalty.  Domestic situations are evaluated in the same
manner as other cases for determination as to whether a death sentence may be
disproportional given the overall circumstances.  See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 691
So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1997) (death penalty affirmed where the defendant killed his wife
and the trial court found HAC and prior felony, as well as a number of statutory
and nonstatutory mitigators). 
Given the overall circumstances of this case, imposition of a sentence of
death is not disproportional.  We have upheld the death sentence in several cases
where the HAC aggravator has been found along with several mitigating factors. 
See Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1997).  Moreover, the death penalty
has been held to be proportional in several cases where a domestic relationship
existed between victim and defendant.  See Pooler, 704 So. 2d at 1380; Spencer;
Cummings-El v. State, 684 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1996); Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1366
(Fla. 1994); Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990).  
In Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1996), we affirmed a sentence of
death where the defendant shot his live-in girlfriend twice in her head.  One
aggravator, a previous felony conviction for second-degree murder of another
woman the defendant had known, was found and given great weight.  This Court
-32-
found the death sentence was proportionate to other cases where death had been
imposed on defendants who had prior felony convictions.  See Duncan v. State,
619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993) (death sentence affirmed where single aggravating factor
of prior second-degree murder of fellow inmate was weighed against numerous
mitigators).  Moreover, in Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1366, the defendant killed
both his wife and her son.  He was tried separately for each murder.  He was
convicted of first-degree murder for his wife’s murder and sentenced to death. 
The trial court found the previous conviction of a felony and  HAC aggravators. 
Defendant’s sentence was found to be proportional.   
In Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994), the trial court found the
HAC aggravator and five mitigators.  This Court found the death sentence was
proportional particularly in light of the length of time the child had suffered.  We
found the death sentence proportionately warranted although the trial court found
that at the time of the murder, Cardona was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance due to her diminished standard of living and daily cocaine
use, which substantially impaired her ability to conform her conduct to the
requirements of the law.   
Similarly, in this case, Fleming suffered several instances of prior abuse by
the defendant, and there was no evidence of extreme mental or emotional
-33-
disturbance and little evidence of drug use.  Moreover, the evidence presented at
trial indicates that she also suffered for a long period of time throughout the attack. 
As the trial judge pointed out in his order, the stab wounds were so numerous that
the medical examiner testified she had run out of new words to describe them.  In
fact, several of the wounds were defensive indicating the victim was alive for a
substantial portion of the attack.  The number of stab wounds inflicted on this
victim shows the type of indifference to human life to which this Court alluded in
Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1998).  Butler was also unfazed by the
presence of the victim’s children in the apartment at the time.  The totality of the
circumstances in this case, which includes this indifference combined with the
brutality of this murder, supports imposition of the death penalty.  See Brown v.
State, 721 So. 2d at 277.  We find this sentence proportional.
On rehearing, Butler asserts that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates
the United States Constitution under the holding in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct.
2428 (2002).  We recently denied a similar claim in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d
693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143
(Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002).  We likewise deny relief in this case.
CONCLUSION
-34-
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Butler’s conviction for first-degree
murder and his sentence of death.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
SHAW, Senior Justice, concurs as to the conviction and dissents as to the
sentence.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring.
I fully concur with the majority’s opinions.
I write only to comment upon the “nonunanimous advisory sentence” section
of Justice Pariente’s concurring and dissenting opinion.  Of course, the reason for
the nonunanimous jury is that this is what has been mandated by Florida statute
since 1972, § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat., and that statute was upheld in 1975 against a
constitutional attack based upon the assertion that “a simple majority vote violates
the defendant’s right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Florida and United States
Constitution.”  Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428
U.S. 923 (1976).  The concurring and dissenting opinion advocates revising Florida
law on this specific issue, although it has been applied for twenty-eight years and
-35-
has been repeatedly upheld by this Court—as recently as 1997.  See Whitfield v.
State, 706 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 840 (1998); Thompson v.
State, 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994), cert denied, 515 U.S. 1125 (1995); Brown v.
State, 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
The contention of the concurring and dissenting opinion is based in part on
the statute being unconstitutional as to article I, section 22, of the Florida
Constitution.  However, that provision of Florida’s constitution has not changed
since this Court’s various opinions upholding the capital sentencing statute.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur in the affirmance of appellant's conviction, I agree with
Justice Pariente that the United State's Supreme Court's decision in Ring v.
Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), requires that appellant's sentence be vacated.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction, but would reverse the death
sentence.  In my opinion, death is not a proportionate sentence in this case
involving a single aggravating circumstance, because Butler's crime is not among
the most aggravated and least mitigated of capital murders.  See Jones v. State, 705
-36-
So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1998); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973).  In
addition, I believe that the jury instruction given in this case created a danger that
the jury did not actually find the sole aggravating factor necessary to render Butler
eligible for the death sentence.  This concern is magnified by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), which Butler
cites in his motion for rehearing.  Butler's reliance on Ring also presents this Court
with an additional question about the constitutionality of the death sentence that I
do not believe is adequately addressed in the majority opinion.  
I.  NONUNANIMOUS ADVISORY SENTENCE
Butler asserts on rehearing that his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed,
relying for support on Ring, in which the United States Supreme Court held that
any fact necessary to impose a sentence of death must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.  I recognize that this Court has rejected numerous Ring claims
raised in postconviction proceedings in cases that involved prior violent felony
aggravating circumstances, beginning with Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693
(Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143
(Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002).  We have also considered and
summarily rejected Ring-based claims in direct appeals.  See Lugo v. State, 28 Fla.
L. Weekly S159 (Fla. Feb. 20, 2003); Kormondy v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S135
-37-
(Fla. Feb. 13, 2003); Doorbal v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S108 (Fla. Jan. 30, 2003);
Anderson v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S51 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2003); Israel v. State, 28
Fla. L. Weekly S7 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2002).  I concurred in the results in those cases
because of the existence of a prior violent felony conviction aggravator or a
unanimous advisory sentence in each instance. 
This case is different, however, because it is a direct appeal that does not
involve either a prior violent felony aggravator or a unanimous jury advisory
sentence.  In Butler's penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death by
an eleven-to-one vote.  The trial court, in its order sentencing Butler to death, found
as the sole aggravating circumstance that the homicide was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.  The fact that this case does not involve a prior-conviction
aggravator places squarely before us, in a direct appeal as opposed to the
postconviction proceedings in Bottoson and King, the question of the validity of
the nonunanimous advisory sentence as a foundation for the death sentence.  See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.").  This case therefore poses a crucial question as to the constitutional
validity of the death sentence, a question that the majority does not satisfactorily
8.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)
-38-
answer by pointing out that the Court "denied a similar claim" in Bottoson and
King.  See majority op. at 34.  I believe that our constitutionally and statutorily
mandated duty of review in direct death appeals8 compels us to emerge from
behind these distinguishable postconviction decisions and directly address the issue
in this case.
In my view, the United States Supreme Court decision in Ring, considered 
in tandem with the jury-trial guarantee in article I, section 22 of the Florida
Constitution, requires that we reverse Butler's death sentence.  First, because of an
erroneous jury instruction, the jury may not have found the existence of the single
aggravating circumstance that rendered Butler eligible for the death penalty, as I
believe is required by Ring.  Second, the jury's advisory sentence was not
unanimous, as I believe is required by article I, section 22, consistent with all other
jury findings in criminal cases in this state.
In Ring, the Court held that "[c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital
defendants, are entitled under the Sixth Amendment to a jury determination of any
fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."
122 S. Ct. at 2432.  The Court further held that where "aggravating factors operate
as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth
9.  The Court in Ring identified Florida was one of four states that utilized
hybrid death schemes in which both the judge and the jury play an active role in
death sentencing.  See 122 S. Ct. at 2442 n. 6.  The other states are Delaware,
Indiana, and Alabama.  Delaware changed its sentencing statute shortly after the
Ring decision to prohibit a death sentence in the absence of a unanimous jury
finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of at least one aggravating
circumstance.  See 73 Del. Laws 423 (2002) (amending Del. Code Ann. tit.11, §
4209).  Indiana amended its death penalty law after Ring to eliminate jury overrides.
See 2002 Ind. Acts 117, § 2 (amending Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (2002)).
-39-
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury." Id. at 2443 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).  Although a majority of the Supreme Court has adhered
to the proposition that it is constitutionally permissible for the judge to make the
ultimate determination of whether the death sentence should be imposed, the
constitutional requirement of Ring is that the jury make the required predicate
factual determinations that render the defendant eligible for the death penalty.9  As
recently explained by Justice Scalia:
In Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), we held that aggravating
circumstances that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty
"operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense.'" 122 S. Ct. at 2443 (emphasis added).  That is to say, for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the underlying
offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included offense of "murder
plus one or more aggravating circumstances": Whereas the former
exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the
latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to death.
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123 S. Ct. 732, 739 (2003) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.).  Moreover, as Justice Scalia stated in his
-40-
concurring opinion in Ring, 
I believe that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls them
elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane— must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . .
. . . [W]hether or not the States have been erroneously coerced
into the adoption of "aggravating factors," wherever those factors
exist they must be subject to the usual requirements of the common
law, and to the requirement enshrined in our Constitution, in criminal
cases:  they must found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
122 S. Ct. at 2444-45 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia acknowledged in Ring
that the Court's holding magnifies the burdens imposed on the states under Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), by creating an evidentiary standard for
aggravating circumstances "that a unanimous jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt."  122 S. Ct. at 2444 (emphasis supplied). 
Under Florida's sentencing scheme, however, the jury's role is not to make
binding determinations of fact as to the existence of aggravating circumstances that
qualify the defendant for the ultimate punishment of death.  The jury merely makes
a sentencing recommendation based on a determination that at least one aggravating
circumstance exists and that the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh(s) any
mitigating circumstance.  In this case, we cannot be certain that the
recommendation reflects a finding of the existence of the single aggravating
10.  In addition, the fact that the jury was told that its role is advisory 
presents additional concerns in light of Ring, as more fully discussed in Justice
Lewis's separate concurrence in Bottoson.  See 833 So. 2d at 731-34 (Lewis, J.,
concurring in result only). 
-41-
circumstance submitted to the jury.  The trial court instructed the jury to consider
the single aggravating circumstance "that is established by the evidence" rather than
"if it is established by the evidence."  See majority op. at 25-27.  Because of the
trial judge's misstatement, it cannot now be determined whether the jury found that
the HAC aggravator existed, as required for a death recommendation, or whether
its advisory sentence reflects a mistaken perception that the judge had already
found the existence of the aggravator.10  
Also—and this is a crucial concern here—under Florida's sentencing scheme
the jury's advisory sentence of death need not be unanimous; a bare majority will
suffice.  Because of its place in Florida's common law, the consistency of its
application in the criminal law of our state, and its codification in our rules of
procedure, I agree with Justice Shaw's observation in Bottoson that the
"requirement of unanimity has been an inviolate tenet of Florida jurisprudence since
the State was created."  833 So. 2d at 714 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only)
(emphasis supplied).  Apart from capital sentencing, the requirement of unanimity
has been scrupulously honored in the criminal law of this state for any finding of
11.  See State v. Tripp, 642 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. 1994) ("This special
verdict form—not allegations in an information—indicates when a jury finds a
weapon has been used."); State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1984)
("The question of whether an accused actually possessed a firearm while
committing a felony is a factual matter properly decided by a jury."). 
-42-
guilt and for any fact that increases the maximum punishment.  Unanimity of
verdicts has always been part of Florida's common law.  See Motion to call Circuit
Judge to Bench, 8 Fla. 459, 482 (1859) ("The common law wisely requires the
verdict of a petit jury to be unanimous."); see also Jones v. State, 92 So. 2d 261,
261 (Fla. 1956) ("In this state, the verdict of the jury must be unanimous."); Grant
v. State, 14 So. 757, 758 (Fla. 1894) (stating that procedure in returning verdicts
requires jury to have come to unanimous agreement with respect to its verdict).  A
unanimous jury finding is also required in order to increase the authorized
punishment for the use of a weapon or firearm during a felony under section
775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2002).11  Statutes governing several substantive crimes
also raise the maximum potential sentence based on guilt-phase, unanimous jury
findings of aggravating circumstances.  See §§ 794.011, (sexual battery); 810.02
(burglary), 810.08 (trespass), 812.13 (robbery), Fla. Stat. (2002).  The requirement
of jury unanimity is also written into our rules of procedure.  See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.440 ("No verdict may be rendered unless all of the trial jurors concur in it.")
Florida's exclusion of the death penalty from the requirement of jury
-43-
unanimity cannot be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court's recognition
in Ring that "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would
be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a
defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to
death," and its holding that "the Sixth Amendment applies to both."  122 S.Ct. at
2443 (emphasis supplied).  The right to trial by jury in Florida would be senselessly
diminished if the jury is required to return a unanimous verdict on every fact
necessary to render a defendant eligible for a penalty with the exception of the final
and irrevocable sanction of death. 
The absence of a requirement of a unanimous jury finding as a precondition
to a sentence of death is, in my view, a matter of constitutional significance.  Article
I, section 22 of our constitution provides:  "The right of trial by jury shall be secure
to all and remain inviolate."  Justice Shaw observed in Bottoson that the principle
that the right to trial by jury shall "remain inviolate" has been enshrined in every
Florida Constitution since 1838.  833 So. 2d at 714 (Shaw, J., concurring in result
only).
In Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992), this Court stated:
[W]hen called upon to construe their bills of rights, state courts should
focus primarily on factors that inhere in their own unique state
experience, such as the express language of the constitutional
-44-
provision, its formative history, both preexisting and developing state
law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within the state, the
state's own general history, and finally any external influences that may
have shaped state law.
Id. at 962.  Applying the criteria in Traylor to article I, section 22 in light of the
holding in Ring leads me to conclude that the state constitutional right to trial by
jury requires a unanimous jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt on the existence
of any element necessary to increase an authorized punishment, most especially the
ultimate punishment of the death penalty.  Simply put, the requirement of jury
unanimity for proving every other element of a criminal offense in Florida, except
for the critical element required in order to impose the death penalty, is not
constitutionally justified in light of Ring.
The justification for the reexamination of our precedent leading to this
conclusion comes in part from the fact that in Ring, the United States Supreme
Court receded from its own precedent when it declared Arizona's death penalty
statute unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, twelve years after it had upheld
the same statute against a Sixth Amendment challenge in Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990).  It is the Ring decision, and, in the words of Justice Scalia, the
acquiring of "new wisdom" that it represents, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, that creates
serious implications for Florida's death penalty scheme and calls on us to
-45-
reexamine our own precedent interpreting our state constitution.  Only the United
States Supreme Court can overrule its own precedent, but this Court is obligated,
when prompted by issues raised in a case pending review, to examine the effect of
Supreme Court pronouncements on its own jurisprudence.  See Brown v. State,
719 So. 2d 882, 889 (Fla. 1998) (receding from 16-year-old decision in holding that
the State and the trial court should accept the stipulation of a prior conviction in a
prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, based on a recent
United States Supreme Court decision).
I acknowledge that beginning in 1975, this Court has upheld Florida's death
penalty statute against constitutional claims based on the lack of a unanimous
advisory sentence.  See Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1975).  Alvord
relied in part on Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld a state conviction resting on a nine-to-three guilty
verdict, concluding that "jury unanimity" for a conviction has never been a
"requisite of due process of law" that the states are obligated to follow.  Id. at 359. 
However, this Court never analyzed the fact that in this state, jury findings of
unanimity have always been required on issues that relate to guilt or to increases in
the maximum punishment.  Frankly, prior to Apprendi and Ring, there would have
been no reason to re-examine our precedent in this area.  
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Further, in rejecting the constitutional challenge to a nonunanimous advisory
sentence in Alvord, this Court relied on Watson v. State, 190 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
1966), which construed a predecessor to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2002),
that required imposition of a death sentence for first-degree murder unless the jury
then recommended mercy.  This Court reasoned in Watson that requiring a
unanimous vote for a jury recommendation would reduce a defendant's chances of
mercy.  190 So. 2d at 166.  Alvord does not discuss the distinction between the
statute construed in Watson—which was subsequently invalidated by Furman v.
Georgia—and section 921.141, which expanded the jury's role by giving it an
affirmative voice in imposing death. 
In my view, we are obligated to reevaluate the legal reasoning of Alvord and
our subsequent adherence to it in the light of Ring's implications for nonunanimous
advisory verdicts under our state constitution.  In State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552,
554 (Fla. 1995), this Court receded from precedent of eleven years' vintage in
concluding that "the legal fictions required to support the intent for [attempted]
felony murder are simply too great."  The Court stated:
In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the importance of
the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis provides stability to the law
and to the society governed by that law. State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d
1016 (Fla.1995) (Harding, J., dissenting). Yet stare decisis does not
command blind allegiance to precedent. "Perpetrating [sic] an error in
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legal thinking under the guise of stare decisis serves no one well and
only undermines the integrity and credibility of the court." Smith v.
Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1096 (Fla.1987) (Ehrlich, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.  These observations resonate deeply in this area of the law, where we have
relied on United States Supreme Court precedent which that Court receded from in
Ring.  See, e.g., Mills v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 532, 537 (Fla. 2001) (holding, in a
decision issued before Ring, that "[b]ecause Apprendi did not overrule Walton, the
basic scheme in Florida is not overruled either").
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Ring, "although 'the
doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law,' . . . [the
Court's] precedents are not sacrosanct." 122 S. Ct. at 2442-433.  In a direct appeal
of a judgment and sentence imposing the ultimate punishment of death, based on a
nonunanimous jury recommendation and a single aggravating factor not involving
prior convictions, this Court should reexamine the effect of the United States
Supreme Court decision in Ring on our own precedent.  Cf. Smith v. State, 598
So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992) ("[A]ny decision of this Court announcing a new
rule of law, or merely applying an established rule of law to a new or different
factual situation, must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state
in every case pending on direct review or not yet final.").  The issue of the
12.  As discussed in my concurring-in-result-only opinion in Bottoson, I
believe that special verdict forms reflecting unanimous jury findings on aggravating
circumstances should be used "to ensure that future verdicts comply with our state
constitutional requirements . . . as well as the Sixth Amendment dictates of Ring." 
See 833 So. 2d at 723-25.
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application of Ring to cases that are already final (i.e., in the postconviction stage)
is not before us today, and therefore I would not address the extension of a
unanimity requirement to such cases.  See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980)
(setting standards for retroactive application of decisions of United States Supreme
Court or Florida Supreme Court announcing new rule of law to cases already final). 
Butler's motion for rehearing presents us with the opportunity, and I believe the
obligation, to address the issues discussed herein in a direct appeal.
Accordingly, I would reverse Butler's death sentence under the narrow
circumstances presented by the facts of this case, and remand for a new penalty
phase.12  In the alternative, I would reduce Butler's sentence to life imprisonment
without parole based on a proportionality analysis as explained below. 
II.  PROPORTIONALITY
Independent of the effect of Ring, I believe that pursuant to a proportionality
analysis, the sentence in this single-aggravator case should be reduced to life. 
Although the trial court found no statutory mitigation in this case, there is evidence
that Butler was drinking alcohol and using cocaine on the night of the murder.  Dr.
13.  In Cardona, the facts underlying HAC revealed an eighteen-month
history of "torturous" child abuse culminating in the three-year-old victim's death,
641 So. 2d at 365, which I do not find paralleled by the prior incidents of abuse
against the adult victim in this case.
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Michael Maher explained that irrational, repetitive actions are a common effect
caused by the use of cocaine.  He opined that the number of stab wounds in this
case—which the trial court used to support the HAC aggravator—is consistent
with this effect.  Further, regarding the violent death of Butler's mother when Butler
was only eight, Dr. Maher explained that a child whose mother dies as a result of
violence faces a greater risk of participating in violence to resolve conflicts,
especially when combined with drug use. 
With the exception of Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1994),13 the
trial court found additional aggravators other than HAC in the cases affirming death
sentences cited by the majority.  See Pooler v. State, 704 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla.
1997) (HAC, prior violent conviction, committed during burglary); Cummings-El v.
State, 684 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1996) (HAC, CCP, prior violent felony, committed
during burglary); Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 1994) (HAC and
prior violent felony); Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 1990) (reversing
the finding of HAC but affirming the finding of CCP and stating, "[t]his is not a
case involving a sudden fit of rage").
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Moreover, it appears that the majority opinion relies on impermissible
nonstatutory aggravation to support its finding that the death sentence is
proportionate.  Specifically, the majority states:
Butler was also unfazed by the presence of the victim's children in the
apartment at the time.  The totality of the circumstances in this case,
which includes this indifference combined with the brutality of the
murder, supports imposition of the death penalty.
Majority op. at 33 (emphasis supplied).  The fact that the murder occurred in the
presence of the victim's children does not support any specific statutory aggravator
in this case.  Thus, to the extent that the majority has improperly considered
inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation, its proportionality analysis is flawed.
In my view, Butler's crime is not among the "most aggravated and
unmitigated of [the] most serious crimes" for which the death penalty is reserved. 
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d at 7.   See also Jones v. State, 705 So. 2d at 1368
(reversing death sentence on proportionality grounds in case with one aggravating
factor and "copious unrebutted mitigation").  Therefore, I would reverse the death
sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
Frank Quesada, Judge - Case No. CRC 97-04690 CFANO-A
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James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee