Title: State ex rel. Beard v. Hardin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Beard v. Hardin, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1286.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-1286 
THE STATE EX REL. BEARD ET AL. v. HARDIN ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Beard v. Hardin, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-1286.] 
Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel city council and county board of 
elections to place proposed charter amendment on the ballot—City council 
did not have a clear legal duty to submit the proposal to the board of 
elections—Proposal violated Columbus City Charter 42-2(d), which states 
that the proposal to be submitted may not address multiple or unrelated 
subject matters—Board of elections did not have a clear legal duty to place 
a proposed charter amendment on the ballot when city council had not 
passed an ordinance approving the placement of the amendment on the 
ballot—Writs denied. 
(No. 2018-0335—Submitted March 26, 2018—Decided April 4, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, Jonathan C. Beard and a 
committee in support of an initiative petition, Everyday People for Positive Change, 
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent members of the Columbus City 
Council to approve an ordinance placing a proposed city-charter amendment on the 
May 8, 2018 ballot.  Relators also seek to compel respondent Franklin County 
Board of Elections to place the proposed amendment on the ballot.  We deny the 
writs as to all respondents. 
I. Case Background 
{¶ 2} In May 2017, Beard submitted to the Columbus city clerk a certified 
copy of a petition for an initiative that would amend 11 sections of the Columbus 
City Charter.  He was acting on behalf of Everyday People for Positive Change, the 
petition committee organized to support the proposed ballot measure. 
{¶ 3} The petition’s title states its objectives, in general terms: 
 
To enact electoral system and related administrative changes 
to Columbus City Council by amending Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 17, 
18, 20, 22, 41, and 46 of the Charter to create ten city council 
districts, establish nomination requirements for candidates from 
districts, provide for election of council members from districts, 
reduce the number of council members elected at-large to three, 
regulate growth in council staffing, change the process for mid-term 
appointments to vacant council seats, create term limits, establish 
contribution limits for council elections, and provide public access 
television for council elections. 
 
The proposed changes would increase the size of city council (from 7 to 13 
members); introduce district representation for 10 of the seats; impose term limits; 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
establish new rules for filling vacancies on council; establish new eligibility 
requirements for members; limit the number of staff employed by council; and 
introduce rules for city-council campaigns, including contribution limits and 
guaranteed time on public-access television. 
{¶ 4} The city attorney reviewed the petition in May 2017, as required by 
Columbus Charter 42-5.  In a memorandum to the city clerk and council members, 
the city attorney stated his opinion that the petition violates the one-proposal rule, 
which provides that “[a] petition may only contain one proposal, which shall not 
address multiple or unrelated subject matters.”  Columbus Charter 42-2(d).  
Relators knew of the city attorney’s concerns in May 2017, as shown in a letter 
dated May 16, 2017, in which their attorney expressed his disagreement with the 
city attorney’s determination. 
{¶ 5} Relators circulated the petition for signatures, and on February 6, 
2018, Beard filed signed part-petitions with the city clerk.  The Franklin County 
Board of Elections validated a sufficient number of signatures for the proposal to 
be placed on the May 8 ballot. 
{¶ 6} On February 26, as required by Columbus Charter 42-9, the city 
attorney advised the city clerk and the city council on the legal sufficiency of the 
petition.  In this memorandum, the city attorney again stated his opinion that the 
“petition violates the single-subject requirement.”  Based on his conclusion that the 
petition is not legally sufficient, the city attorney told the council that it could 
“reject forwarding these proposed amendments to the City Charter to the Board of 
Elections for voter consideration.”  The same day, the council passed an ordinance 
providing that the proposed charter amendment would not be placed on the May 8 
ballot. 
{¶ 7} Relators filed this original action for a writ of mandamus on March 5. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4
II. Argument of the Parties Regarding Issuance of the Writs of Mandamus 
{¶ 8} Relators argue, relying on jurisprudence interpreting the one-subject 
rule in Article II, Section 15(D), of the Ohio Constitution, that the proposed charter 
amendments do not violate the one-proposal rule, because the provisions all share 
a “common purpose, which is the comprehensive improvement of Columbus City 
Council.”  Respondent members of the city council argue that we need not reach 
the merits of relators’ claim, because it is barred under the doctrine of laches.  
Respondents also assert that this court should not follow the constitutional-one-
subject-rule jurisprudence, because the one-subject rule “is not applicable” here.  
The council members argue that the proposed amendment fails because it contains 
“disjointed and unrelated topics and subjects.”  Respondent Franklin County Board 
of Elections argues that it carried out its legal obligation and duty by certifying the 
signatures on the petitions pursuant to the statutory framework governing charter-
amendment initiatives and that it cannot place the issue on the ballot without city 
council acting first. 
III. Relators’ Motions 
A. Motion for leave to file an amended complaint 
{¶ 9} Relators moved for leave to amend their complaint to add as relators 
five additional members of Everyday People for Positive Change.  This request is 
governed by Civ.R. 15(A), which provides that leave to amend shall be freely given 
“when justice so requires.”  See Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 7.  Given the policy favoring the 
amendment of pleadings, and because the amended complaint does not change the 
substantive issues in this case or delay its resolution, we grant the motion.  See State 
ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 
1050, ¶ 26-27. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
B. Motions for leave to file amended affidavits 
{¶ 10} In their brief, the council members argue that we should deny the 
writs because the affidavit supporting relators’ complaint does not comply with 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2), which requires an affidavit supporting an original-action 
complaint to “be made on personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in 
evidence, and showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to all 
matters stated in the affidavit.”  As the council members point out, we have 
“routinely dismissed original actions, other than habeas corpus, that were not 
supported by an affidavit expressly stating that the facts in the complaint were based 
on the affiant’s personal knowledge.”  Hackworth at ¶ 24.  “An affidavit that is 
made ‘to the best of’ an affiant’s ‘personal knowledge and information’ does not 
satisfy S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2), because that type of statement does not make clear 
‘which allegations are based on personal knowledge and which allegations are 
based simply on information.’ ”  State ex rel. Simonetti v. Summit Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 151 Ohio St.3d 50, 2017-Ohio-8115, 85 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 11, quoting State 
ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment for an Elected Law Dir. v. Bay Village, 
115 Ohio St.3d 400, 2007-Ohio-5380, 875 N.E.2d 574, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 11} In the affidavit filed with the complaint in this case, Beard said, “The 
statements that I make in this Affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge or 
upon information that I believe to be true.”  (Emphasis added.)  Because the 
affidavit is qualified in this way, it does not comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2).  
In addition, an affidavit made by Beard that was submitted by relators as evidence 
fails to comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06 because it has the same defect. 
{¶ 12} Relators filed two motions to amend and two new affidavits to 
address these problems.  The new affidavits remove the offending language that 
qualifies the statements as based on information that Beard “believe[s] to be true”; 
therefore, they comply with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2) and 12.06.  But they also 
include other, relatively minor changes.  Most notably, they state, “All the electors 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
6
who signed the petition reside in Franklin County, Ohio.  None of the electors who 
signed the petition reside in Delaware County, Ohio or in Fairfield County, Ohio.”  
It will become evident later that these substantive changes are not material to our 
analysis. 
{¶ 13} We ordinarily allow relators an opportunity to cure noncompliance 
with the personal-knowledge requirement.  See State ex rel. Youngstown v. 
Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 
1229, ¶ 14.  Therefore, because the other changes to the affidavits are immaterial, 
we grant the motions related to Beard’s affidavits.  Now that that defect has been 
cured, we reject the council members’ argument that the writ should be denied for 
noncompliance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(2).  
IV. Law and Analysis 
A. Laches 
{¶ 14} We have applied laches in elections cases, which require relators to 
act with “[e]xtreme diligence and promptness.”  State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. 
Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 113, 712 N.E.2d 696 (1999).  “The 
elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, 
(2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the 
injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State ex rel. Polo v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277 (1995). 
{¶ 15} In claiming laches, the council members emphasize that the city 
attorney first opined that the proposed amendment violates the one-proposal rule in 
May 2017, soon after relators filed their precirculated petition with the city clerk.  
They say that relators delayed in challenging the city’s determination by nearly ten 
months.  We reject this argument because the council members fail to identify what 
action relators could have taken before now. 
{¶ 16} The two most obvious possible causes of action—mandamus and 
declaratory judgment—would have been unavailable to relators in May 2017.  For 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
a mandamus claim to succeed, a relator must have a clear legal right to, and the 
respondent must have a clear legal duty to provide, the relief requested.  State ex 
rel. Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940,  
¶ 13.  Relators’ desired outcome here is for the proposed charter amendment to be 
placed on the ballot, and the city council’s role toward that end is to pass an 
ordinance.  See Columbus Charter 42-11.  But the council clearly had no duty to 
provide that relief back in May 2017, before the petition had even been circulated.  
Indeed, Columbus’s process does not even require the city clerk, the city attorney, 
or the city council to approve the form of a petition before it may be circulated for 
signatures.  Because the city attorney’s May 2017 opinion did not prevent relators 
from taking the next step in the petition process, a mandamus action would have 
been both unnecessary and ineffective at that time. 
{¶ 17} Our holding in State ex rel. Barren v. Brown, 51 Ohio St.2d 169, 365 
N.E.2d 887 (1977), which the council members cite in their brief, does not require 
us to change our conclusion.  That case involved the attorney general’s decision not 
to certify ballot language for a referendum petition under R.C. 3519.01.  Id. at 169-
170.  Unlike the council in this case, the attorney general had a clear legal duty, 
arising under the statute, to certify the ballot language.  No city official had a clear 
legal duty to approve the form of relators’ petition in May 2017. 
{¶ 18} Relators could not have brought a valid declaratory-judgment action 
based on the city attorney’s legal determination.  A declaratory-judgment action 
requires, among other things, the existence of a real controversy between adverse 
parties.  Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher, 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 148-149, 586 N.E.2d 
80 (1992).  The parties here are relators on one side and the city council—the 
legislative body empowered to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot, 
see Columbus Charter 45-1—and the board of elections on the other.  In May 2017, 
the council did not take a position on the sufficiency of relators’ petition; only the 
city attorney had done that.  And the city attorney merely advised the council 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8
concerning his opinion about the petition.  Nothing in the record shows that the 
council—a political body consisting of seven members—would later accept the city 
attorney’s advice and reject the petition once signatures were gathered.  Therefore, 
in May 2017, there was no clear or real controversy between the adverse parties in 
this action. 
{¶ 19} Relators are correct in their argument that their first opportunity to 
assert their rights arose when the city council passed an ordinance rejecting the 
petition to place the proposed charter amendments on the ballot on February 26.  The 
council members do not argue that the lapse of time between that event and the filing 
of this action—just seven days—was unreasonable.  We hold, therefore, that relators’ 
claim is not barred under the doctrine of laches. 
B. Charter amendments 
{¶ 20} A municipality may adopt a charter for local self-government upon 
approval of its electors.  Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Sections 7 and 8.  Once 
adopted, a charter may be amended only with the electors’ approval.  Ohio 
Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 9.  One way for a proposed charter amendment 
to reach the ballot is for at least 10 percent of the electors who voted in the most 
recent general municipal election to sign a petition calling for submission of the 
proposal.  Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Sections 9 and 14.  When a sufficient 
number of electors sign the petition, the municipality’s legislative authority, by 
ordinance, shall submit the proposal to the electorate.  Ohio Constitution, Article 
XVIII, Sections 8 and 9. 
{¶ 21} Columbus’s charter prescribes additional rules for proposing a charter 
amendment by petition.  See Morris v. Macedonia City Council, 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 
55, 641 N.E.2d 1075 (1994) (“Procedures may be added to the constitutional 
amendment process if the additions do not conflict with the Ohio Constitution”).  One 
of those rules—that “[a] petition may only contain one proposal, which shall not 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
address multiple or unrelated subject matters or questions of law,” Columbus Charter 
42-2(d)—is central to this case. 
{¶ 22} Columbus’s process for initiating a proposed amendment by petition 
begins with the formation of a “petition committee,” consisting of five electors, that 
“represent[s] the petitioners in all matters relating to” the petition.  Columbus Charter 
42-3.  Before circulating a petition for signatures, the petition committee must file a 
certified copy of the petition with the city clerk.  Columbus Charter 42-4.  The city 
clerk must “forward the certified copy of the petition forthwith to the city attorney 
and the members of council,” at which point “[t]he city attorney shall determine if 
the petition addresses a single subject and meets the requirements as to form.”  
Columbus Charter 42-5.  The city attorney is required to report his findings to the 
city clerk and the members of council, id., but the charter does not require the city 
clerk, the city attorney, or the council to approve the form of the petition before it 
may be circulated for signatures. 
{¶ 23} Once signatures have been obtained, the part-petitions must be filed 
with the city clerk.  Columbus Charter 42-7.  The city clerk forwards the petition to 
the elections authority for validation of signatures and to the city attorney “to advise 
on the legal sufficiency of the petition, based upon any applicable local, state or 
federal laws, rules or regulations.”  Columbus Charter 42-9.  When the city clerk 
receives the elections authority’s report and the city attorney’s findings, she must 
forward them to the city council.  Id.  The council then, by ordinance, must either 
approve or reject the petition to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot.  
Columbus Charter 42-11, 45, and 45-1. 
1. Claim against the council members 
{¶ 24} To prevail in this mandamus case, relators must prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that they have a clear legal right to have their proposed charter 
amendment placed on the May 8 ballot, that the council members are under a clear 
legal duty to provide that relief, and that relators have no adequate remedy in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
10 
ordinary course of the law.  Linnabary, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 
N.E.3d 940, at ¶ 13.  Given the proximity of the May 8 election, relators lack an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Greene v. 
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 
N.E.2d 300, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 25} The city charter provides that “[p]roposed amendments to this 
charter shall be submitted by the council forthwith upon a petition signed by 
electors of the city equal to not less than ten percent of the total vote cast at the last 
preceding regular municipal election.”  Columbus Charter 45.  It further provides:  
 
Upon receipt of the report regarding the validation of 
signatures, the city clerk shall read a summary of the same into the 
record.  The council shall forthwith determine the sufficiency of the 
petition.  Should the council find such petition sufficient, it shall 
forthwith by ordinance provide for the submission of such proposed 
charter amendment to a vote of the electors of the city. 
 
Columbus Charter 45-1.  Therefore, the council’s legal duty to approve the petition 
to place the proposed charter amendments on the ballot is clear, but the duty arises 
only if it finds that relators’ petition is “sufficient.” 
{¶ 26} The city council found that the petition was not sufficient for one 
reason—because it violates the one-proposal rule for amending the charter 
amendment by petition.  Columbus Charter 42-2(d) provides: “A petition may only 
contain one proposal, which shall not address multiple or unrelated subject matters 
* * *.”  Based on the arguments presented by the parties, the only question before 
us is whether council correctly determined that the proposed charter amendment 
addresses multiple or unrelated subject matters. 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
{¶ 27} “In construing charter provisions, we apply ‘general laws regarding 
statutory interpretation, including construing charter language according to its 
ordinary and common usage.’ ”  State ex rel. Paluch v. Zita, 141 Ohio St.3d 123, 
2014-Ohio-4529, 22 N.E.3d 1050, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Commt. for Proposed 
Ordinance to Repeal Ordinance No. 146–02, W. End Blight Designation v. 
Lakewood, 100 Ohio St.3d 252, 2003-Ohio-5771, 798 N.E.2d 362, ¶ 19.  When 
“the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation 
[because an] unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.”  Sears v. 
Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 28} This case presents a straightforward application of the rules of 
construction to the Columbus City Charter.  A “proposal” may be “something put 
forward for consideration or acceptance.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1819 (2002).  Here, however, the word “proposal” does not stand alone; 
it is modified by the clause “shall not address multiple or unrelated subject matters.”  
Columbus Charter 42-2(d). 
{¶ 29} “Subject matter” is defined as “[t]he issue presented for 
consideration.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1652 (10th Ed.2014).  And the phrase 
“subject matter” is modified in the disjunctive by the words “multiple” and 
“unrelated.”  Columbus Charter 42-2(d).  The common meaning of multiple is more 
than one.  “Unrelated” can be defined as “discrete, disjoined, [or] separate.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2507 (2002). 
{¶ 30} The title of relators’ proposed city-charter amendment begins, “To 
enact electoral system and related administrative changes to Cols. City Council  
* * *.”  The 11 proposed amendments address three distinct “subject matters,” 
including changing council’s composition as a body (i.e., adding seats and 
introducing districts), changing its administrative support (i.e., staffing limits), and 
changing its selection (i.e., campaign finance and public-access television). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
{¶ 31} The proposed charter amendments are related to the number of 
members serving on the city council, and whether those members represent the city 
at large or by district relate to the composition of the council as a body.  However, 
these provisions, which change the composition of the council body, are not related 
to a limit on the number of employees hired by the council, because the employees 
do not serve as members of the council.  Similarly, campaign reforms—namely, 
campaign-contribution limits and broadcast time on public-access TV during a 
campaign—affect candidates for the council, not the composition of the council 
body or the council employees.  Moreover, campaign reforms may also affect 
candidates for the city council who will never be elected to serve on the council 
body, so these provisions do not relate to the composition of the council body or 
the council’s employees.  Therefore, construing the plain and unambiguous 
language of the charter, the proposed city-charter amendments are “multiple” and 
“unrelated.”  Columbus Charter 42-2(d). 
{¶ 32} Contrary to relators’ arguments that the proposed city-charter 
amendments satisfy Columbus Charter 42-2(d) because they “have a commonality 
or unity of purpose,” the language of the Columbus City Charter requires that a 
proposal “shall not address multiple or unrelated subject matters or questions of 
law.”  Columbus Charter 42-2(d).  To accept relators’ argument, this court would 
have to ignore or replace the coordinating conjunction “or” in the phrase “multiple 
or unrelated subject matters.”  Id.  However, “[i]n matters of construction, it is the 
duty of this court to give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or to 
insert words not used.”  (Emphasis added.)  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. 
Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988), paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  The word “or” in Columbus Charter 42-2(d) cannot be read as “and.”  
The proposed city-charter amendment violates the limiting language of the one-
proposal rule for two independent reasons.  Therefore, relators’ petition is 
January Term, 2018 
 
13 
insufficient on two different grounds and the council had no clear legal to place 
relators’ petition for a charter amendment on the ballot. 
2. Claim against the board of elections 
{¶ 33} To prevail against the board of elections, relators must prove that 
they have a clear legal right to have their proposed charter amendment placed on 
the May 8 ballot and that the board has a clear legal duty to provide that relief.  
Linnabary, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, at ¶ 13.  Relators 
have not met their burden with respect to the board of elections, because it has no 
clear legal duty to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. 
{¶ 34} The city charter required the city clerk to forward the signed petition 
to the board of elections for validation of signatures.  Columbus Charter 42-9.  It is 
undisputed that the board carried out its duty when it confirmed that a sufficient 
number of valid signatures appear on the petition.  After the board notifies the city 
clerk of its findings, it does not have any other duties with respect to the petition 
unless the city council passes an ordinance approving the placement of the 
amendment on the ballot.  See Columbus Charter 42-11, 45-1, and 45-2; Ohio 
Constitution, Article XVIII, Sections 8 and 9 (providing that proposed municipal-
charter amendments shall be submitted by the municipality’s legislative authority 
by ordinance).  Because the council has not passed such an ordinance, relators have 
no claim against the board of elections. 
{¶ 35} Finally, the council members argue that we should dismiss this case 
because relators did not name the Fairfield County Board of Elections and the 
Delaware County Board of Elections as respondents.  The city of Columbus, the 
council members point out, extends into those counties as well.  Because we reject 
relators’ claim against the Franklin County Board of Elections, there is no need for 
us to address relators’ alleged failure to name all necessary respondents. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
V. Conclusion 
{¶ 36} Relators’ petition is insufficient because it does not comply with the 
plain and unambiguous language of the one-proposal rule in Columbus Charter 42-
2(d).  Therefore, the Columbus city council has no clear legal duty to place relators’ 
petition for charter amendment on the ballot.  The Franklin County Board of 
Elections has no clear legal duty to place the proposed charter amendment on the 
ballot because the city council had not passed an ordinance approving the 
placement of the amendment on the ballot.  For these reasons, the writs of 
mandamus are denied. 
Motions granted 
and writs denied. 
O’DONNELL and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DEWINE, JJ., concur in judgment in part 
and dissent in part, and would grant the petition in part and grant a writ of 
mandamus ordering the Columbus City Council to submit Relators’ proposed 
amendment to the Columbus City Charter for a vote of the electors in the May 8, 
2018 Primary Election. 
_________________ 
 
FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 37} Although I would employ a somewhat different analytical approach 
than that used in the lead opinion, I concur in the judgment denying the writs of 
mandamus.  I write separately to note that relators Jonathan C. Beard, a member of 
the committee in support of an initiative petition, Everyday People for Positive 
Change, the committee itself, and five other members of the committee are not 
challenging the Columbus city council’s authority to disapprove the petition based 
on the council’s determination that the proposal violates the one-proposal rule.  
When considering a petition for a proposed charter amendment, a city council’s 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
constitutional authority is circumscribed: its review “is limited to matters of form, 
not substance.”  Morris v. Macedonia City Council, 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 55, 641 
N.E.2d 1075 (1994).  “A city council may not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial 
determinations * * *.”  Id.  Our prior cases have suggested that a possible violation 
of similar one-subject rules is a question of substance, not form.  See State ex rel. 
Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 184, 2012-Ohio-4310, 977 
N.E.2d 590, ¶ 12; State ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 165, 169, 685 N.E.2d 224 (1997). 
{¶ 38} Relators do not argue that council lacks the authority to exclude the 
proposal from the ballot; instead, relators simply argue that council’s determination 
was incorrect.  I write to make clear that because relators have not challenged 
council’s authority to decide the one-proposal question, this court has not decided 
in this case whether council had that authority.  See Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 
330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2 (“It has long been the policy of this court 
not to address issues not raised by the parties”). 
{¶ 39} I accordingly concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Fitrakis & Gadell-Newton, L.L.C., and Robert J. Fitrakis, for relators. 
Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, and Richard N. Coglianese, Joshua 
T. Cox, and Charles P. Campisano, Assistant City Attorneys, for respondents 
Shannon G. Hardin, Michael Stinziano, Elizabeth Brown, Mitchell J. Brown, Jaiza 
Page, Emmanuel V. Remy, and Priscilla R. Tyson. 
Ronald J. O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Harold J. 
Anderson III, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Franklin County 
Board of Elections. 
_________________