Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Scott E. Selmer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0886-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Scott E. Selmer, Attorney at Law: 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
Complainant-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Scott E. Selmer,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SELMER 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 23, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
June 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Steinmetz, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by 
Scott Herrick and Herrick, Kasdorf, Dymzarov & Vetzner, Madison 
and oral argument by Scott Herrick. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief 
by William J. Weigel, counsel for the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility. 
 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0886-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Scott E. Selmer, Attorney at Law: 
Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility,  
 
 
Complainant-Respondent, 
 
v.  
Scott E. Selmer,  
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney’s 
license 
suspended.  
¶1 
PER CURIAM   Attorney Scott E. Selmer appealed from 
the referee’s recommendation that the court suspend his license 
for one year as discipline reciprocal to that imposed on him by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1997. He contended that the 
referee in the instant proceeding erred in denying his request 
for time to conduct additional discovery and in recommending 
that 
the 
motion 
of 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility (Board) for summary judgment be granted. Arguing 
that an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine the existence 
of any of the three grounds set forth in the Wisconsin 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
2 
reciprocal discipline rule, SCR 22.25(5),1 that would render 
improper the imposition of discipline identical to that imposed 
in Minnesota, he asked that the matter be remanded to the 
referee to hold a hearing after he takes the depositions of 
three persons connected with the Minnesota proceeding.  
¶2 
We determine that the referee’s denial of Attorney 
Selmer’s request for additional time to conduct discovery, which 
was implicit in her report recommending that summary judgment 
for the Board be granted, was proper and that the Board is 
entitled to judgment without an evidentiary hearing. Attorney 
Selmer failed to establish or demonstrate how additional 
discovery would establish any of the grounds that would make the 
imposition of reciprocal discipline inappropriate, that is, that 
the Minnesota disciplinary proceeding was so lacking in notice 
or opportunity to be heard as to have deprived him of due 
                     
1  SCR 22.25 provides, in pertinent part: Reciprocal 
discipline. 
 . . .  
(5) Upon the expiration of 20 days from service of the 
complaint issued under sub. (2), the referee shall file a report 
with the court recommending the imposition of the identical 
discipline or medical suspension unless:  
(a) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity 
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;  
(b) There was such an infirmity of proof establishing the 
misconduct or medical incapacity that the referee could not 
accept as final, the conclusion on that subject; or  
(c) the misconduct established justifies substantially 
different discipline in this state.   
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
3 
process, that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing 
his misconduct in that proceeding that the referee in the 
instant proceeding could not accept the Minnesota determination 
as final, or that his misconduct established in the Minnesota 
proceeding 
justifies 
substantially 
different 
discipline 
in 
Wisconsin. Accordingly, we suspend his license to practice law 
in Wisconsin for 12 months as discipline reciprocal to that 
imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court for his professional 
misconduct.  
¶3 
The Minnesota referee concluded that Attorney Selmer 
had engaged in a pattern of frivolous and harassing conduct by 
filing counterclaims alleging racial discrimination in actions 
brought against him by his creditors and by filing claims in 
state 
and 
federal 
courts 
alleging 
racial 
discrimination, 
knowingly offered false and misleading evidence in response to 
discovery 
requests, 
failed 
to 
supplement 
incomplete 
and 
misleading responses to discovery requests, failed to comply or 
make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with legally proper 
discovery requests, made false statements of fact in attempts to 
advance his own interests, and engaged in dishonest conduct in 
those actions. Based on those conclusions, the referee in the 
instant proceeding concluded that Attorney Selmer violated the 
following Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys: SCR 
20:3.12 by knowingly advancing claims, defenses, or factual 
                     
2  SCR 20:3.1 provides, Meritorious claims and contentions 
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:  
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
4 
positions that were frivolous; SCR 20:3.33 by offering evidence 
he knew to be false; SCR 20:3.44 by failing to make reasonably 
                                                                  
(1) 
knowingly 
advance 
a 
claim 
or 
defense 
that 
is 
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may 
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law;  
(2) knowingly advance a factual position unless there is a 
basis for doing so that is not frivolous; or 
(3) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, 
delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the client when 
the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an action would 
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.  
(b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or 
the respondent in a proceeding that could result in deprivation 
of liberty, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to 
require that every element of the case be established.   
3  SCR 20:3.3 provides: Candor toward the tribunal 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:  
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure 
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by 
the client;  
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel; or 
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a 
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its 
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.  
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) apply even if 
compliance 
requires 
disclosure 
of 
information 
otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6.  
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is false.  
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
5 
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery 
                                                                  
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the 
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will 
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not 
the facts are adverse.   
4  SCR 20:3.4 provides: Fairness to opposing party and 
counsel  
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence 
or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other 
material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not 
counsel or assist another person to do any such act;  
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to 
testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is 
prohibited by law;  
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 
no valid obligation exists;  
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery 
request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply 
with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing part;  
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue 
except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion 
as to the justness or a cause, the credibility of a witness, the 
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an 
accused; or 
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from 
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:  
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent 
of a client; and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s 
interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from 
giving such information.  
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
6 
request by an opposing party; SCR 20:4.15 by knowingly making a 
false statement of fact to a third person.  
¶4 
Attorney Selmer was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1978. His office is located in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, and his current mailing address is in Golden Valley, 
Minnesota. He has been disciplined in Wisconsin twice previously: 
in 1990 the Board privately reprimanded him for failing to 
provide competent representation by filing papers that reflected 
a lack of knowledge of Wisconsin appellate procedure and 
tribunals and for filing documents with a circuit court and with 
the Court of Appeals while suspended from practice in this state 
for 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
continuing 
legal 
education 
requirements. In 1995 the court imposed on him a public reprimand 
reciprocal to the reprimand imposed on him by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court for the following misconduct: failing to promptly 
provide his client in a personal injury matter a full accounting 
of funds he received on her behalf, charging and suing that 
client to collect an unreasonable fee, abusing the discovery 
process in that action, failing to maintain proper trust account 
                     
5  SCR 20:4.1 provides: Truthfulness in statements to others 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly:  
(a) make a false statement of a material fact or law to a 
third person; or 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 
Rule 1.6.   
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
7 
books and records and falsely certifying that he had done so, and 
commingling personal and client funds in his trust account. In 
addition to that reciprocal reprimand, we conditioned Attorney 
Selmer’s continued practice of law on his furnishing the Board 
quarterly, or as the Board might otherwise direct, for a period 
of two years a copy of his trust account records. Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Selmer, 195 Wis. 2d 687, 538 N.W.2d 252.  
¶5 
At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for Attorney 
Selmer asserted that Attorney Selmer’s license to practice law 
in Minnesota currently is suspended. He stated further that 
Attorney Selmer has not engaged in the practice of law in 
Wisconsin since the one-year license suspension was imposed in 
Minnesota in September 1997.  
¶6 
The facts of the instant proceeding are not disputed. 
At the outset of the proceeding, the referee, Attorney Janet 
Jenkins, entered a scheduling order that provided a two-month 
period for completion of discovery. Two weeks after that order 
was entered, counsel for Attorney Selmer wrote counsel for the 
Board, with a copy to the referee, asking him to stipulate to a 
proposed order allowing Attorney Selmer to conduct depositions of 
three 
persons 
connected 
with 
the 
Minnesota 
disciplinary 
proceeding, including the prosecutor. Asserting that he would 
have to seek an order from the referee before proceeding with 
those depositions, the letter stated that upon the Board 
counsel’s stipulation to the depositions, he was requesting the 
referee to execute an enclosed order and notices of depositions; 
if the Board objected to the depositions, he was requesting the 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
8 
referee to schedule argument on his discovery request and to toll 
the discovery period pending resolution.  
¶7 
Board counsel declined to stipulate to the proposed 
depositions, stating, in part, that Minnesota would oppose the 
deposition 
of 
the 
person 
who 
prosecuted 
the 
Minnesota 
disciplinary proceeding on the ground that a court order from the 
appropriate Minnesota county was necessary to compel that 
person’s testimony. Attorney Selmer’s counsel never requested 
issuance of such a subpoena, nor did he reassert a request for 
discovery in the instant proceeding or ask the referee to extend 
the time to conduct discovery until more than three months after 
the discovery period set forth in the scheduling order had 
expired.  
¶8 
On November 5, 1998, after the Board had filed a motion 
for judgment on the basis of the pleadings and Attorney Selmer’s 
responses to its interrogatories and demand for production of 
documents and after that motion had been fully briefed by both 
parties, Attorney Selmer filed with the referee a request for 
authorization to conduct the depositions of the three persons 
connected with the Minnesota disciplinary proceeding. The referee 
set a briefing schedule on the discovery motion, specifically 
directing Attorney Selmer to address her concerns regarding the 
untimeliness of the request, the pendency of the Board’s summary 
judgment motion, and the relevance or materiality of the 
testimony of the proposed deponents. The referee requested “a 
fair amount of specificity about what [Attorney Selmer] believes 
that the testimony of these individuals will bring to the issue 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
9 
before us.” After Attorney Selmer filed his brief on the 
discovery issue and the Board filed a responsive brief arguing 
that the discovery Attorney Selmer requested was untimely and 
unsupported, the referee filed her report recommending that the 
Board’s summary judgment motion be granted, as there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and, consequently, the Board was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
¶9 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the 
Board submitted by affidavit its interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents and Attorney Selmer’s answers and 
responses to them, the transcript of the four-day disciplinary 
hearing in Minnesota, Attorney Selmer’s brief, appendix, and 
reply brief filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court in his appeal 
of the Minnesota referee’s decision, and the brief and appendix 
of the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Responsibility submitted in 
that appeal. For his part, Attorney Selmer submitted no 
affidavits or other evidence in opposition to the summary 
judgment motion and made no claim that he was unable to do so. 
Instead, he asserted that summary judgment should not be granted 
and that the referee should reserve judgment until he had a fair 
opportunity to develop at a hearing his full factual defense to 
the application of the Wisconsin reciprocal discipline rule. 
Significantly, Attorney Selmer did not raise in his brief the 
matter of the discovery depositions he had proposed in his June 
3, 1998 letter to Board counsel.  
¶10 The referee found that Attorney Selmer had been given 
the opportunity to develop his defense to the summary judgment 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
10
motion and failed to demonstrate that there were genuine issues 
for hearing, as the only “facts” he submitted were his answers to 
the Board’s interrogatories, which the referee found insufficient 
in that they were not based on personal knowledge or on a factual 
basis but were conclusory, inadmissible hearsay, and irrelevant 
to the issue of the application of the reciprocal discipline 
rule. Thus, the referee concluded, the Board was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The referee concluded further that, 
based on the Minnesota proceeding, the Board had established by 
clear and satisfactory evidence that Attorney Selmer engaged in 
professional misconduct, and she recommended that the court 
impose a reciprocal 12-month license suspension as discipline for 
it.  
¶11 In respect to the discipline recommended, the referee 
observed that Attorney Selmer had been involved in more than 20 
legal actions arising from claims made by creditors against him 
individually or against his professional association in which he 
knowingly offered false and misleading evidence in response to 
discovery, failed to comply with discovery, made false statements 
of fact to advance his own interests, and engaged in dishonest 
conduct. The referee considered that misconduct serious and 
substantial, as it adversely affected others by putting them to 
the time and expense of defending claims for which Attorney 
Selmer had little or no evidence. The referee considered as 
aggravating factors that Attorney Selmer’s misconduct was for his 
own personal gain, seeking to avoid the payment of legitimate 
claims of creditors, and that it was similar to his abuse of the 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
11
litigation process to harass others for which he previously was 
publicly reprimanded.  
¶12 Attorney 
Selmer 
argued 
in 
this 
appeal 
that 
an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether any of the 
three conditions that might prevent the imposition of identical 
reciprocal discipline has been met and that the referee erred in 
recommending that summary judgment be granted to the Board. He 
contended further that the referee should have allowed him to 
depose three persons he believed had important personal knowledge 
regarding the Minnesota disciplinary proceeding that would be 
relevant to his contention that, in light of what he perceived to 
be a racial component and prosecutorial misconduct in that 
proceeding, the reciprocal discipline rule should not be applied 
to him.  
¶13 The referee properly refused to grant Attorney Selmer’s 
motion for the authorization of discovery depositions. He filed 
that motion more than three months after the date set forth in 
the referee’s scheduling order for completion of discovery had 
passed. There is no merit to Attorney Selmer’s contention that he 
was entitled to rely on his letter to Board counsel during the 
discovery period seeking a stipulation to discovery depositions 
in which he stated that if the Board objected, he was requesting 
the referee to schedule argument and toll the discovery period 
pending resolution. When the Board told him five days prior to 
the expiration of the discovery period that it would not join in 
his request for the proposed discovery order, Attorney Selmer did 
not ask the referee to extend the discovery period until well 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
12
after that period had expired. Indeed, he waited several months, 
even after the Board filed a motion for summary judgment and he 
had briefed that motion without raising the discovery matter, to 
ask the referee to authorize the discovery depositions.  
¶14 Notwithstanding the untimeliness of that motion, the 
referee set an expedited briefing schedule on it and specifically 
asked Attorney Selmer to address her concerns regarding its 
untimeliness, the pendency of the Board’s summary judgment 
motion, and the relevance or materiality of the testimony of the 
proposed deponents. Attorney Selmer’s contention in this appeal 
that the referee failed to address his discovery motion is 
disingenuous. The referee implicitly denied Attorney Selmer’s 
motion when she determined in her report that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact to warrant an evidentiary hearing 
and that the Board was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
¶15 As he did before the referee, Attorney Selmer also 
argued in this appeal that he was denied due process in the 
Minnesota proceeding for the reason that he was unable to present 
evidence concerning the reasonableness of his actions in the 
underlying litigation that led to that proceeding. Contrary to 
that contention, the referee found that Attorney Selmer not only 
had the opportunity to be heard in the Minnesota proceeding but 
also availed himself of that opportunity by testifying at length 
regarding his actions in those lawsuits and by cross-examining 
adverse witnesses.  
¶16 The referee found no evidence to substantiate Attorney 
Selmer’s claim that he had been denied due process in the 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
13
Minnesota proceeding by being barred from proving the merits of 
the racial discrimination claims he made in the underlying 
litigation in which his misconduct occurred because those cases 
had been settled prior to trial. Thus, he contended, he was 
unable 
to 
present 
exculpatory 
evidence 
in 
the 
Minnesota 
proceeding. The referee properly rejected Attorney Selmer’s claim 
that further discovery in the context of those lawsuits would 
have provided evidence of racial discrimination, as he was not 
specific as to what evidence he expected to produce but only 
asserted generally the conclusion that evidence no longer 
available 
would 
have 
supported 
his 
racial 
discrimination 
allegations.  
¶17 Moreover, a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding does not 
afford an attorney the opportunity to relitigate misconduct 
allegations that have been heard and decided in another 
jurisdiction or to litigate the validity of the disciplinary 
proceeding in that jurisdiction. The conditions set forth in SCR 
22.25(5) regarding deprivation of due process and infirmity of 
proof in a disciplinary proceeding in another jurisdiction are 
designed to ensure that the attorney had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the misconduct allegations in the 
proceeding and at the outcome of that proceeding was supported by 
the evidence. The record amply demonstrates that Attorney Selmer 
had been given the opportunity to present his claims and 
contentions 
in 
the 
course 
of 
the 
Minnesota 
disciplinary 
proceeding, both before the referee and before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.  
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
14
¶18 We also reject Attorney Selmer’s contention that the 
Minnesota proceeding was defective in that it was based on 
conduct that predated a prior imposition of discipline by the 
Minnesota authorities. He asserted that the conduct that was the 
subject of the second proceeding was known to the Minnesota 
disciplinary authorities but not included in the earlier 
proceeding that resulted in his being publicly reprimanded and 
placed on probation. While he accused the Minnesota authorities 
of not including all of his conduct in the first proceeding so 
that they would be able to allege in the second proceeding that 
he had violated the probation previously imposed, there was no 
finding or conclusion in the Minnesota referee’s report or in the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion that Attorney Selmer violated 
the probation earlier ordered. Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court explicitly addressed with approval the referee’s rejection 
of Attorney Selmer’s argument regarding earlier misconduct being 
the subject of the second disciplinary proceeding. In that 
regard, the referee was satisfied that Attorney Selmer had been 
provided with a “panoply of due process protections,” including a 
hearing, discovery, access to the disciplinary authority’s files, 
entitlement to cross-examination, and the right of review.  
¶19 We adopt the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in respect to the applicability of the reciprocal 
discipline rule in this proceeding. Attorney Selmer failed to 
establish that the Minnesota proceeding was so lacking in notice 
or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due 
process, that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing 
No. 
98-0886-D 
 
15
his misconduct in that proceeding that the referee could not 
accept as final the Minnesota conclusion on that subject, or that 
the misconduct established in the Minnesota proceeding justifies 
substantially different discipline in Wisconsin. The referee 
properly determined that the Board is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, and we accept the referee’s recommendation that 
identical reciprocal discipline be imposed. In light of the 
representation that he has not practiced law in Wisconsin at 
least since September 1997, we order that suspension to commence 
forthwith. We also require Attorney Selmer to pay the costs of 
this proceeding, as the referee recommended.  
¶20 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Scott E. Selmer to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for 12 months, commencing 
the date of this order.  
¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Scott E. Selmer pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility 
the costs 
of this 
proceeding, 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time specified 
and absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the 
costs within that time, the license of Scott E. Selmer to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further 
order of the court.  
¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Scott E. Selmer comply with 
the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.  
¶23 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J., did not participate.  
 
 
1