Title: Gerber v. Cook

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

90 Ariz. 390 (1962) 368 P.2d 458 Arthur GERBER, and Allan Gerber, co-partners doing business as Arthur Gerber and Company, Appellants, v. William J. COOK, Jr., doing business as Cook Produce Company, and Jack T. Helm, Appellees. No. 6743. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. January 24, 1962. *391 Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, for appellants. McKesson, Renaud & Cook, Phoenix, for appellees. LOCKWOOD, Justice. Plaintiffs Arthur Gerber and Allan Gerber d.b.a. Arthur Gerber and Company, produce brokers, appeal from a declaratory judgment construing a crop financing agreement in favor of defendants William J. Cook, Jr., d.b.a. Cook Produce Company, and Jack T. Helm, growers of produce. Plaintiffs and defendants, entered into a contract dated July 9, 1951. Plaintiffs were to finance a part of defendant's operation, and in consideration plaintiffs were to have the exclusive right to sell all the crops on commission. On August 31, 1953 the parties executed a supplement to the contract providing in part as follows: It was acknowledged in the contract that the "spring lettuce deal" planting normally commenced about the early part of December, harvesting and shipping running through the latter part of April or early May, and that "the cantaloupe deal" generally commenced planting about the middle of March, harvesting and shipping running from about the last of June through the last of July. Defendants commenced planting their 1955 cantaloupe crop March 25th, harvesting beginning June 26th. After the shipping of the spring lettuce crop in May, 1955, plaintiffs sent defendants a check for $2,641.25, as their share of a profit which was made. The cantaloupe crop was sold at a loss. The highest amount of money advanced by plaintiffs between March 25th and June 26th was in excess of $30,000, but part of it was used by defendants in harvesting the overlapping spring lettuce crop. Thus less than $30,000 was advanced for planting and harvesting the cantaloupe crop. Defendants contended plaintiffs should share in the loss under paragraph 2 c. supra which the latter denied, claiming paragraph 2 d. was applicable. In settling accounts, defendants offset $8,525.10 (which it was agreed was one-third the loss on the cantaloupe crop) against certain debts owed to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment suit followed. The trial was to the court without a jury. The trial court held that the supplemental contract was ambiguous on its face on the question involved, and permitted parol evidence to explain the meaning which the parties intended to give to it. Judgment was rendered for defendants, on the basis that: Plaintiffs' appeal is based on the proposition that the contract was clear and unambiguous on its face, and that the trial court (1) improperly admitted parol evidence to explain its meaning, and (2) improperly construed it. We are of the opinion the trial court did not err in this respect. The contract was ambiguous in that it shows a definite intent by the parties to keep the crop "deals" separate, but does not state explicitly whether for purposes of determining participation in profit or loss under paragraph 2, advances "which were outstanding" during the overlapping period of growing and harvesting of separate crops were to be separated. Hence parol evidence was properly admitted.[1] There was sufficient evidence, although conflicting, to sustain the trial court's findings and we will therefore not disturb them.[2] Judgment affirmed. UDALL, V.C.J., STRUCKMEYER and JENNINGS, JJ., and R.C. STANFORD, Jr., Superior Court Judge, concurring. Note: BERNSTEIN, C.J., having disqualified himself, the Honorable R.C. STANFORD, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this appeal. [1] "In determining the construction placed upon an ambiguous contract, the construction placed upon it by the parties, whether evidenced by some acts or circumstances contemporaneous with the execution of the contract, or by subsequent acts or circumstances, or formal expressions, is entitled to consideration in resolving the ambiguity." Crone v. Amado, 69 Ariz. 389, 397, 214 P.2d 518, 523, (1950); Quoting Powers v. World's Fair Mining Co., 10 Ariz. 5, 8, 86 P. 15, 17 (1906). [2] Rossi v. Stewart, 90 Ariz. 207, 367 P.2d 242 (1961); Bonine v. Bonine, 90 Ariz. 664, 367 P.2d 664 (1961).