Title: LAPP v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LAPP v. STATE2004 WY 142100 P.3d 862Case Number: 03-136, 03-137Decided: 11/17/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

DONNA 
LAPP,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Gary Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director PAP; Robert W. Ingram, Student Director PAP; Jacob E. Eppler, 
Eric Phillips, Sarah A. Rodrigues, Student Interns PAP; and Brittny Lewton, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Lewton.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J. 
RETIRED.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Donna Lapp was 
found guilty by a jury of one count of forgery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-602(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) and two counts of check fraud in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-702(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003). She appeals the 
convictions, claiming plain error occurred in the manner in which the district 
court instructed the jury concerning intent to defraud.  She also claims insufficient evidence 
was presented to support the convictions.  
We affirm the forgery conviction and reverse the check fraud 
convictions.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Ms. Lapp presents 
the following issues:

 

I.          
Whether plain error occurred when the jury was not instructed on the 
meaning of the critical element intent to defraud or specific 
intent.

 

II.          
Whether it was plain error for the jury to be instructed on the 
presumption of intent to defraud when the state failed to present the prima 
facie evidence necessary for the presumption.

 

III.         
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of the intent 
to defraud element for the fraud by check convictions.

 

IV.        
Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
[doubt] that Ms. Lapp signed Mr. Evans' signature with an intent to 
defraud.

 

[¶3]      The State 
rephrases the issues as follows:

 

I.          
Did the district court commit plain error when it failed to instruct the 
jury as to the definition of the term "intent to defraud?"

 

II.          
Did the state present sufficient evidence from which the jury could find 
that appellant failed to pay the two insufficient funds checks within five days 
of notice of their dishonor, thereby supporting the jury instruction that such 
failure may be evidence of an intent to defraud?

 

III.         
Did the state present sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding 
that appellant was guilty of fraud by check?

 

IV.        Did 
the state present sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that 
appellant authenticated the unauthorized signature of Gary Evans with intent to 
defraud?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In February of 
2002, Ms. Lapp asked a co-worker to notarize an automobile title bearing the 
name Gary Evans on the front and what Ms. Lapp represented to be Mr. Evans' 
signature on the back.  A few months 
later, Mr. Evans attempted to obtain a bank loan and was asked to provide the 
automobile title as collateral.  He 
searched his home and could not find the title.  Although Ms. Lapp helped Mr. Evans look 
for the title and spoke to the bank loan officer, she did not reveal that she 
previously removed the title from his home, represented the signature on the 
back as being his and had it notarized.  
Mr. Evans testified the signature on the title was not his and he did not 
give Ms. Lapp permission to sign his name on the title.  No evidence was presented concerning 
what happened to the title after it was notarized.

 

[¶5]      In March of 2002, 
Ms. Lapp wrote a check for $1,800 to her former husband, Curtis Lapp.  After he deposited the check in his bank 
account, Mr. Lapp received notice that there were insufficient funds to cover 
the amount.  In June of the same 
year, Ms. Lapp again wrote a check to Mr. Lapp, this time in the amount of 
$4,800.  As with the prior check, 
Mr. Lapp was notified after he deposited the check and withdrew a slightly 
smaller amount from his account that there were insufficient funds to cover Ms. 
Lapp's check.  A bank representative 
contacted Mr. Lapp and informed him he was responsible for bringing his account 
current.  Mr. Lapp obtained another 
check from Ms. Lapp. This time, however, Mr. Lapp's bank contacted the bank the 
check was written on to verify that funds were available to cover the 
check.  The bank was informed the 
funds were not available. Ultimately, Ms. Lapp repaid Mr. Lapp all of the money 
she owed him as a result of the insufficient funds checks.

 

[¶6]      The State filed 
charges against Ms. Lapp, alleging she committed one count of forgery in 
violation of § 6-3-602(a)(ii) and two counts of issuing checks in amounts 
exceeding $500 without sufficient funds in violation of § 6-3-702(b)(iii).  The charges were joined for purposes of 
trial, which was held April 3 and 4, 2003.  
The jury found Ms. Lapp guilty of all three counts and she was sentenced 
to three concurrent terms of five to ten (5-10) years in the Wyoming Women's 
Center.     

    

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

¶7]       Because Ms. 
Lapp did not offer an instruction on intent to defraud or object to the 
instructions given, we review her first two claims for plain error.  Under the plain error standard, she must 
show a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, the violation clearly 
appeared in the record, and the violation resulted in denial of a substantial 
right to her material prejudice.  
Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶25, 72 P.3d 803, ¶25 (Wyo. 
2003).  Our standard for reviewing 
alleged error in jury instructions is:

 

We 
afford significant deference to the trial court in instructing the jury:  

 

"The trial 
judge is afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, 
and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed 
as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover 
the issues."

 

Wilson 
v. State, 
14 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).

 

[¶8]      In reviewing Ms. 
Lapp's sufficiency of the evidence claims, we must determine whether a rational 
jury could find the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Vlahos v. 
State, 2003 WY 103, ¶36, 75 P.3d 628, ¶36 (Wyo. 2003).  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by Ms. Lapp.  
Id.  We afford to the 
State every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the 
evidence it presented.  
Id.  It was the jury's 
responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence and we will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the jury.  
Id.  Our only duty is 
to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals could have 
come to the same result.  Id. 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

1.                  
Plain 
Error in Failing to Instruct on Intent to Defraud

 

[¶9]      Ms. Lapp asserts 
that to support the convictions the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she committed the charged offenses with the specific intent to 
defraud.  She contends plain error 
occurred because the jury was not instructed on this crucial element.  The State responds that the district 
court properly instructed the jury that intent to defraud was an element of both 
crimes charged.  The State contends 
the phrase "intent to defraud" does not have a technical legal meaning so 
different from its ordinary meaning as to require a separate jury instruction 
defining the phrase.  We agree with 
the State.

 

[¶10]   Jury instructions should inform the 
jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their 
findings with respect to the material facts.  Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, 
¶20, 68 P.3d 1167, ¶20 (Wyo. 2003).  
A failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal 
offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction.  Id.  The test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.  
Id.  

 

A 
court need not give an instruction defining a term unless it has a technical 
legal meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without 
further explanation, would misunderstand its import in relation to the factual 
circumstances. Prejudicial error must be demonstrated by appellant and prejudice 
will not be presumed unless the instruction confused or misled the jury with 
respect to the proper principles of law. Failure to instruct properly on an 
element of a crime does not constitute plain error where that element is not 
contested at trial or where evidence of the defendant's guilt is 
overwhelming.

 

Wilson, 
14 P.3d  at 916.

 

[¶11]   In Wilson, the defendant 
claimed error in the trial court's refusal to give an instruction defining 
"serious bodily injury" as used in the aggravated assault and battery 
statute.  We found no error, 
concluding the decision to give or refuse an instruction on the definition of a 
term used in describing an element of an offense was within the latitude 
afforded to the district court to tailor the instructions to the circumstances 
of the case.  Id. 

 

[¶12]   We similarly held in 
Cardenas 
v. State, 811 P.2d 989, 996 (Wyo. 1991) that the 
term "threat" did not have a technical meaning so different from its ordinary 
meaning as to require an instruction defining it, and the instructions provided 
by the court adequately informed the jury of the elements of aggravated assault 
and battery.  We reached the same 
conclusion in Rowe v. 
State, 974 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 1999) with respect to the word "intentionally" as used in 
the felony child abuse statute.  We 
said, "Any attempt to instruct with respect to such a self-explanatory term 
would have a reasonable tendency to confuse the jury."  Id.

 

[¶13]   In the present case, the jury was 
instructed as follows concerning the elements of the charges filed against Ms. 
Lapp:

 

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5

 

The 
elements of the crime of Forgery, as charged in this case, 
are:

 

1.  On or about the 7th day of 
February, 2002

 

2.  In Hot Springs County, 
Wyoming

 

3.  The Defendant, Donna 
Lapp

 

4.  With intent to 
defraud

 

5. 
Authenticated, any writing so that it purported to be the act of another who did 
not authorize that act.

 

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

 

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.

 

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 6

 

The 
elements of the crime of Fraud by Check, as charged in this case, 
are:

 

1.  On or about the 5th day of 
March, 2002,

 

2.  In Hot Springs County, Wyoming, 

 

3.  The Defendant, Donna 
Lapp,

 

4.  Knowingly issued,

 

5.  A check in the amount of $500.00 or more 
($1800.00),

 

6.  Which check was not paid because the 
drawer of the check had insufficient funds or credit with the 
drawee.

 

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

 

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.

 

Instruction 
No. 7 relating to the check Ms. Lapp wrote for $4,800 set forth the same 
elements as those contained in Instruction No. 6.  Instruction No. 8 defined "knowingly 
issues" as "issuing a check to obtain property or to pay a debt with intent to 
defraud or deceive any other person." The court also gave the following 
instruction:

 

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 9

 

            
Any of the following [may be] evidence that the person at the time he 
issued the check or other order for the payment of money intended that it should 
not be paid:

            
(i)  . . 
.

            
(ii) Proof that at the time of issuance he did not have sufficient funds 
with the drawee and that he failed to pay the check or other order within five 
(5) days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor, personally given or 
sent to the address shown on the check or other order; or

            
(iii) Proof that when presentment was made in a reasonable time the 
issuer did not have sufficient funds with the drawee and he failed to pay the 
check or other order within five (5) days after receiving notice of nonpayment 
or dishonor, personally given or sent to the address shown on the check or other 
order.

 

[¶14]   These instructions, when viewed as 
a whole and in the context of the entire trial, fairly and adequately instructed 
the jury.  Instructions No. 5, 6 and 
7 informed the jurors of the elements of each of the offenses charged so they 
could apply the law to the evidence presented.  The instructions left no doubt as to the 
evidence necessary for the jury to find Ms. Lapp committed the crimes of forgery 
and check fraud.  Instruction No. 5 
informed the jurors that in order to find Ms. Lapp guilty of forgery, they had 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that without Mr. Evans' authority Ms. Lapp 
presented the signature on the automobile title as being his with the intent to 
defraud.  Instructions No. 6 and 7 
further informed the jurors that in order to find Ms. Lapp guilty of check 
fraud, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly issued the 
checks in the respective amounts with insufficient funds in her bank account to 
cover them.  Concerning specifically 
the check fraud charges, Instructions No. 8 and 9 defined the term "knowingly 
issues" and informed the jury concerning the types of proof available to show 
that checks were issued with the intent that they not be paid. 

 

[¶15]   Ms. Lapp cites Henderson v. 
State, 976 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1999) and Justice Rose's dissent in Broom v. 
State, 695 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1985) in support of her argument that the jury 
should have been instructed on the meaning of "intent to defraud."  Although jury instructions defining the 
term were given in those cases, this Court did not hold in either case that such 
an instruction was required.

 

[¶16]   In the context of the instructions 
as a whole, we conclude the term "intent to defraud" does not have a technical 
meaning so different from its ordinary meaning as to require an instruction 
defining it.  Particularly in the 
context of the evidence presented here, the words "intent" and "defraud" are 
self-explanatory.  Even if they were 
not, the instructions given, considered together, adequately informed the jurors 
what they needed to find to support a guilty verdict. We conclude no violation 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law was committed, and there was no plain 
error.

 

 

2.                  
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 

 

 

[¶17]   Ms. Lapp next claims there was 
insufficient evidence to support the two convictions for check fraud because no 
evidence was presented that she wrote the checks with the intent to defraud. 
Specifically, she asserts the State presented no evidence as to the status of 
her checking account at the time the checks were issued or that she failed to 
pay the checks within five days after receiving notice of nonpayment. 

 

[¶18]   Addressing the first check fraud 
conviction, the State responds that the evidence showed Ms. Lapp wrote Mr. Lapp 
a check for $1,800, he deposited it in his bank account, Ms. Lapp's bank 
returned the check to Mr. Lapp's bank because there were not sufficient funds in 
Ms. Lapp's account to cover it and $1,800 was charged against Mr. Lapp's 
account.  With respect to the second 
conviction, the State asserts the evidence showed Ms. Lapp gave Mr. Lapp a check 
for $4,800, which he deposited, the check was returned for insufficient funds 
and $4,800 was charged against Mr. Lapp's account.  The State also asserts the evidence 
showed that neither check was paid within five days after Ms. Lapp received 
notice and demand for payment.  The 
State contends this evidence was sufficient to support the two convictions.  We hold that the State presented 
insufficient evidence to meet its burden of showing Ms. Lapp failed to pay the 
checks within five days after receiving notice and demand for payment. 

 

[¶19]   The State's evidence showed the 
checks were dated March 5, 2002, and June 24, 2002.  The State's evidence further showed that 
the sheriff's office served Ms. Lapp with notices of demand for payment of the 
checks on July 25, 2002.  Although 
the sheriff testified that to his knowledge payment was never made on the 
checks, Mr. Lapp testified that Ms. Lapp paid him all the money she owed 
him.  Mr. Lapp testified that she 
did not pay him all at one time and made the first payment on the $1,800 check 
sometime in 2002.  However, he could 
not remember when in 2002 she made the first payment nor could he remember when 
she paid the remainder of the $1,800.  
The State did not question Mr. Lapp concerning when Ms. Lapp paid him the 
$4,800.  Because the State could not 
or did not establish when Ms. Lapp paid the amount of the checks, it failed to 
carry its burden of proving that she failed to pay within five days after 
service of notice and demand for payment.  
Affording to the State every favorable inference that may be reasonably 
and fairly drawn from this evidence, we conclude the evidence was insufficient 
to meet the State's burden of proof.  
A reasonable inference simply cannot be made from Mr. Lapp's vague 
testimony that Ms. Lapp failed to pay the check amounts within five days after 
receiving the July 25, 2002, notice and demand for payment. 

 

 

b.                 
Forgery 

 

[¶20]   In her final argument, Ms. Lapp 
asserts insufficient evidence was presented to support the forgery 
conviction.  Specifically, she 
claims the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she signed Mr. 
Evans' signature on the title with the intent to defraud or that she did so 
knowing she did not have the authority to sign it.  She points to evidence that she signed 
Mr. Evans' signature to many documents, which evidence she asserts created "a 
reasonable inference" that she believed she had authority to sign this document. 
Claiming she had an ownership interest in the titled vehicle, Ms. Lapp also 
cites Rickman v. State, 205 S.W. 711, 712 (Ark. 1918) in which a forgery 
conviction was overturned because the defendant had an ownership interest in the 
property at issue.  Ms. Lapp asserts 
she had an ownership interest in the titled vehicle because she paid $200 toward 
its purchase.  

 

[¶21]   The State responds that sufficient 
evidence was presented from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Ms. Lapp forged Mr. Evans' signature on the title without authority 
to do so and with intent to defraud.  
On this issue, we agree with the State.  Ms. Howe testified that Ms. Lapp brought 
the title to her and asked her to notarize it for Mr. Evans.  Mr. Evans testified he did not authorize 
Ms. Lapp to sign his name and that he went looking for the title and was unable 
to find it when the bank requested it before processing his loan request.  He testified that although Ms. Lapp 
helped him search for the title, she did not tell him she had previously taken 
it and had it notarized.  The bank 
loan officer testified that she also spoke to Ms. Lapp and Ms. Lapp told her 
they could not find the title and might have to apply for a new one.  Ms. Lapp did not mention to her that she 
previously had the title notarized. 

 

[¶22]   Looking only at the State's 
evidence and giving to it all favorable inferences, we conclude a rational jury 
could find the State proved the essential elements of forgery beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury with respect to the resolution of conflicting evidence.  Id.  A quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Lapp was 
guilty of forgery.  Id.  In reaching this result, we find the 
following excerpt from Henderson, 976 P.2d  at 208, 
significant:

 

It 
is true that there is no evidence of express statements or admissions by [the 
defendant] that he intended to defraud [the bank]. The jury can find the 
requisite intent through reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. The 
rule, as we have expressed it, is that the state of mind of a defendant can be 
inferred from his acts, his conduct, his words, and other circumstances in the 
case. If the requisite intent to defraud could not be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence, it often would be impossible to establish that intent, 
because those intent on defrauding others are not likely to tell the victims 
what their intentions are at the time of the criminal act.       

 

[¶23]   We affirm the forgery conviction 
and reverse the check fraud convictions based upon insufficient 
evidence.