Title: P. v. Villa

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 3/16/09 (this opinion should precede the companion case, S153183, also filed 3/16/09) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S151561 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A111891 
AVELINO CEJA VILLA, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 97879 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Avelino Ceja Villa, a lawful resident alien, pleaded guilty to a felony in this 
state in 1989 and served a three-year period of probation.  Now, many years later, 
he is facing removal from this country by federal immigration authorities, 
allegedly because of his 1989 conviction.  In a companion case, we address 
whether, and to what extent, persons in similar situations are entitled to have their 
guilty pleas vacated by a writ of error coram nobis.  (People v. Kim (Mar. 16, 
2009, S153183) __ Cal.4th ___.)  In this case, we hold that because Villa is no 
longer in California custody as a result of his 1989 conviction, but is instead in 
federal custody in another state, he is ineligible for relief by way of a writ of 
habeas corpus.  In suggesting otherwise, the Court of Appeal erred. 
FACTS 
Villa resides in this country but is not a United States citizen; he is a citizen 
of Mexico.  He applied for lawful permanent resident status in 1987, under a 
federal amnesty program.  In 1989, while his residency application was pending, 
 
1
he pleaded guilty in Alameda County Superior Court to violating Health and 
Safety Code section 11351, possession of cocaine for sale.  As a result, the court 
placed him on probation for three years.  At that time, he was told the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS)1 had not placed a deportation hold on him, 
although the prosecutor noted that there “[s]hould be” one.  The INS was 
apparently untroubled by his felony conviction, however, for in 1990 it granted 
him lawful permanent resident status.  
In 2005, Villa applied to the INS to renew his permanent resident status.  
The INS instead arrested him and served him with a notice to appear for removal 
proceedings.  The only basis for his detention and pending deportation was his 
1989 conviction.  Villa alleges he is currently in the custody of the INS in a 
contract detention facility in Alabama.2  
After being placed in federal detention, Villa filed a petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis in the Alameda County Superior Court,3 making three 
allegations:  (1) That when he entered his plea the trial court failed to advise him 
under Penal Code section 1016.5 of the possibility he could be deported as a result 
                                              
1  
Like the Court of Appeal below and the parties, we will continue to refer to 
the federal authorities as the “INS,” although that agency has since been 
reorganized into the Department of Homeland Security.  Deportations are now 
prosecuted by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  (See U.S. v. 
Garcia-Beltran (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F.3d 1126, 1129, fn. 2 [“The INS is now 
known as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)”].) 
2  
Villa requests we take judicial notice of two articles from local newspapers 
describing the federal immigration detention facility in Etowah, Alabama.  As 
these articles are unnecessary to the resolution of this case, the request is denied.  
(Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45-46, fn. 9.) 
3  
As his conviction was attained by a plea with no appeal, the trial court was 
the proper court in which to seek coram nobis relief.  (Pen. Code, § 1265.) 
 
2
of his conviction; (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
misadvising him he would not be deported as a result of his guilty plea; and (3) his 
rights under the Vienna Convention for Consular Relations and Optional Protocol 
on Disputes of April 24, 1963 (21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820) (the Vienna 
Convention) were violated because he was not told of his right to contact the 
Mexican Consulate.  The trial court denied the petition, first finding the court that 
had taken his plea in 1989 had in fact advised him of its immigration 
consequences.  (The record of the plea proceeding confirms this conclusion.)  The 
trial court also ruled Villa had failed to allege facts demonstrating ineffective 
assistance of counsel and that the proof of his crime was “extremely strong,” 
presumably rendering any treaty violation harmless.  Villa appealed, raising the 
issues of the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel and the treaty violation.   
The Court of Appeal rejected both claims, finding that the alleged treaty 
violation should have been raised on direct appeal, citing Breard v. Greene (1998) 
523 U.S. 371, 375-376.  The appellate court further held that Villa’s 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim was not cognizable on coram nobis.  It then 
considered whether it could grant relief by considering Villa’s coram nobis 
petition as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  (See Escamilla v. Department of 
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 511 [“The label given 
a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative; rather, the true nature of a 
petition or cause of action is based on the facts alleged and remedy sought in that 
pleading”].)  In a split decision, the appellate court concluded that although Villa 
was in federal custody in Alabama and not in California state custody, he could 
challenge the legality of that custody by filing a habeas corpus petition in 
California.  But the appellate court ultimately denied relief because Villa did not 
allege his federal custody was due solely to his California conviction.  The 
concurring justice agreed that relief on both coram nobis and habeas corpus should 
 
3
be denied, but disagreed that Villa’s federal custody entitled him to challenge his 
long-final state conviction in a state habeas corpus petition. 
Villa did not seek review in this court.  Although the People prevailed in 
the appellate court, they petitioned for review, contending the Court of Appeal 
incorrectly held that a writ of habeas corpus was an available remedy for a litigant, 
like Villa, who has already served his state sentence and who is presently detained 
by a governmental entity other than the State of California. 
Because the Court of Appeal’s decision conflicted with In re Azurin (2001) 
87 Cal.App.4th 20, we granted review. 
DISCUSSION 
The writ of habeas corpus enjoys an extremely important place in the 
history of this state and this nation.  Often termed the “Great Writ,” it “has been 
justifiably lauded as ‘ “the safe-guard and the palladium of our liberties” ’ ” (In re 
Saunders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 704) and was considered by the founders of this 
country as the “highest safeguard of liberty” (Smith v. Bennett (1961) 365 U.S. 
708, 712).  As befits its elevated position in the universe of American law, the 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus to inquire into an allegedly improper 
detention is granted express protection in both the United States and California 
Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Cal. Const., art. I, § 11.)  In this state, 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus is implemented by Penal Code section 
1473, subdivision (a), which provides:  “Every person unlawfully imprisoned or 
restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of 
habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.”  
(Italics added.) 
As the italicized text in Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (a) 
demonstrates, a necessary prerequisite for issuance of the writ is the custody or 
restraint of the petitioner by the government.  “Thus, it is well settled that the writ 
 
4
of habeas corpus does not afford an all-inclusive remedy available at all times as a 
matter of right.  It is generally regarded as a special proceeding.  ‘Where one 
restrained pursuant to legal proceedings seeks release upon habeas corpus, the 
function of the writ is merely to determine the legality of the detention by an 
inquiry into the question of jurisdiction and the validity of the process upon its 
face, and whether anything has transpired since the process was issued to render it 
invalid.’ ”  (In re Fortenbury (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 284, 289.) 
The key prerequisite to gaining relief on habeas corpus is a petitioner’s 
custody.  Thus, an individual in custody for a crime (or alleged crime) may — 
within limits — challenge the legality of that detention on habeas corpus.  A 
petitioner in custody can also challenge the conditions of confinement, a challenge 
related not to the petitioner’s underlying conviction but instead to his or her actual 
confinement.  (In re Allison (1967) 66 Cal.2d 282, 285 [“The writ of habeas 
corpus may be sought by one lawfully in custody for the purpose of vindicating 
rights to which he is entitled even in confinement”].)  
In previous eras, the custody requirement was interpreted strictly to mean 
actual physical detention.  (Matter of Ford (1911) 160 Cal. 334, 339-342 [habeas 
corpus unavailable for one released on bail]; In re Gow (1903) 139 Cal. 242, 243 
[same, for one released on own recognizance; improper to voluntarily submit to 
custody in order to file a writ petition]; see Parker v. Ellis (1960) 362 U.S. 574 
(per curiam) [habeas corpus petitioner’s release from prison before his case could 
be heard by the Supreme Court rendered his case moot and the court lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed].)  This view has since been somewhat relaxed.  Thus, “the 
decisional law of recent years has expanded the writ’s application to persons who 
are determined to be in constructive custody.  Today, the writ is available to one 
on parole (In re Jones (1962) 57 Cal.2d 860), probation (In re Osslo (1958) 51 
Cal.2d 371), bail (In re Petersen (1958) 51 Cal.2d 177), or a sentenced prisoner 
 
5
released on his own recognizance pending hearing on the merits of his petition (In 
re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606).”  (In re Wessley W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 240, 
246.)  A sentence of a fine or imprisonment (in the alternative) similarly suffices 
to meet the custody requirement for habeas corpus relief.  (In re Catalano (1981) 
29 Cal.3d 1, 7-9.)   
Habeas corpus practice in the federal courts has generally followed this 
trend.  (See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236 [defendant released 
on parole is still “in custody” for federal habeas corpus purposes]; Hensley v. 
Municipal Court (1973) 411 U.S. 345 [same, re defendant released on his own 
recognizance]; Carafas v. LaVallee (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 238-241 [custody 
requirement satisfied although the petitioner was unconditionally released before 
completion of proceedings on his habeas corpus petition].)  
Under all of these scenarios, the habeas corpus petitioner is deemed to be in 
constructive custody because he or she “is subject to ‘restraints not shared by the 
public generally’ ” (In re Smiley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 613, quoting Jones v. 
Cunningham, supra, 371 U.S. at p. 240) and “may later lose his liberty and be 
eventually incarcerated” (In re Wessley W., supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 246).   
By contrast, collateral consequences of a criminal conviction — even those 
that can later form the basis of a new criminal conviction — do not of themselves 
constitute constructive custody.  For example, in In re Stier (2007) 152 
Cal.App.4th 63, a medical doctor pleaded guilty in 2000 to taking indecent 
liberties with a child in North Carolina.  He completed his probation in California 
and duly registered as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.  He also 
reported his crime to the California Medical Board, which required him to serve a 
five-year supervised probation and undergo a psychiatric evaluation, but 
eventually found him fit to practice medicine.   
 
6
In 2003, a new law was enacted mandating revocation of the medical 
license of anyone required to register as a sex offender.  Stier then filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming the requirement that he register as a sex 
offender constituted constructive custody for habeas corpus purposes.  The trial 
court agreed and granted the writ, but the Court of Appeal reversed, explaining:  
“Although respondent asserted in his petition that ‘his liberty is unlawfully 
restrained in violation of the laws of the State of California,’ for purposes of 
proving entitlement to habeas corpus relief in the present case, he is not.  
Respondent’s allegation that he is ‘under the constructive custody of the State of 
California because if he fails to register, he is subject to criminal prosecution’ does 
not ‘satisfy the habeas corpus jurisdictional requirements under California law.’  
[Citation.]  Since respondent ‘is not in prison or on probation or parole or 
otherwise in constructive custody, the remedy of habeas corpus is not available to 
him—and it is immaterial that lingering noncustodial collateral consequences are 
still attached to his conviction.’  [Citation.]  Neither the prospect of the loss of 
respondent’s medical license nor the speculative risk of future custody in the event 
he fails to register as a sex offender proves constructive custody as required in a 
habeas corpus action.  [Citations.]  The ‘states’ sexual offender registration laws 
do not render a habeas petitioner “in custody” because they are a collateral 
consequence of conviction that do not impose a severe restraint on an individual’s 
liberty.  [Citations.]’ ”  (In re Stier, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 82-83, italics 
added; see also In re Wessley W., supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 247 [listing of 
petitioner’s name in a rap sheet is not constructive custody].) 
In addition to the sex offender registration requirement and the possible 
loss of a professional license, other collateral consequences of a criminal 
conviction may continue well after the conviction and the completion of the 
sentence, including one’s “inability to vote, engage in certain businesses, hold 
 
7
public office, or serve as a juror.”  (Maleng v. Cook (1989) 490 U.S. 488, 491-
492.)  Amici curiae remind us that a criminal conviction will often preclude legal 
firearm ownership.4  While the continuing existence of the collateral 
consequences of a criminal conviction may be relevant to determining a mootness 
claim (Maleng v. Cook, at pp. 491-492), “once the sentence imposed for a 
conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conv
are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the purpos
of a habeas attack upon it” (id. at p. 49
iction 
es 
2). 
                                             
We face in the instant case the application of an increasingly familiar 
collateral consequence of a criminal conviction:  deportation.  Here, as in the 
companion case, People v. Kim, supra, __ Cal.4th ___, a longtime legal resident 
faces involuntary removal from the country and possibly permanent separation 
from his family and friends as a result of a criminal conviction entered long ago.  
Only one California case has addressed whether persons in INS custody pending 
deportation proceedings, who have served their sentences and are no longer in 
actual state custody, can be considered to be in the state’s constructive custody for 
habeas corpus purposes.  In In re Azurin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 20, the petitioner, 
 
4  
For example, it is a felony for “[a]ny person who has been convicted of a 
felony under the laws of the United States, the State of California, or any other 
state, government, or country” to “own[], purchase[], receive[], or [have] in his or 
her possession or under his or her custody or control any firearm.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 12021, subd. (a).)  Some misdemeanor convictions result in a 10-year ban on 
firearm ownership.  (Id., subd. (c)(1).)  Further, under federal law, no one “who 
has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year” (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) or “who has been convicted in any 
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” (id., § 922(g)(9)) may 
“possess . . . any firearm or ammunition” or may “receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce” (id., § 922(g)).  
 
8
a Philippine national living in the United States, pleaded guilty in 1990 to having 
committed a felony.  He was sentenced to a term in the California Youth 
Authority, thereafter completed his parole, and was released from custody.  When 
the INS sought to deport him in 1998 by relying on his 1990 conviction, he filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was in the constructive custody of 
the State of California because he was in INS custody as a result of his 1990 state 
conviction.  The Azurin court concluded the boundaries of the constructive 
custody concept are not so expansive:  “[A]lthough any custody of Azurin under 
the deportation proceedings was apparently based solely on the ‘fact’ of his 1990 
conviction in California [citation], during those proceedings Azurin was not ‘in the 
custody of the same sovereign responsible for the original conviction,’ but instead 
was ‘in the custody of the INS, an agency of a different sovereign.’  [Citations.]  
Further, such deportation proceedings were simply a ‘collateral consequence’ of 
Azurin’s 1990 conviction.  [Citations.]  As such, the pendency of those 
proceedings, without more, did not constitute ‘custody’ in California under such 
1990 conviction for purposes of satisfying the habeas corpus jurisdictional 
requirements of California law.”  (Id. at p. 26, fn. omitted; see also In re Wessley 
W., supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 240 [defendant whose probation had terminated was 
not in constructive custody].) 
We agree with this reasoning and apply it here.  Villa completed his 
probation for his 1989 conviction many years ago and is no longer in any form of 
state custody, actual or constructive, as a result of that conviction.  That the INS, a 
completely different governmental entity, chose to resurrect that old conviction 
and use it to form the basis of a new and collateral consequence for Villa, while 
undoubtedly unfortunate for him and his family, does not — without more — 
convert his detention by federal immigration authorities in Alabama into some 
late-blossoming form of custody for which the State of California is responsible.   
 
9
Both parties and the Court of Appeal below discuss the relevance of the 
fact that an order to show cause, should one issue, would be directed to a person 
— Villa’s federal custodian — who arguably would have no legal obligation to 
comply.  Penal Code section 1477 specifies that “[t]he writ must be directed to the 
person having custody of or restraining the person on whose behalf the application 
is made, and must command him to have the body of such person before the Court 
or Judge before whom the writ is returnable, at a time and place therein specified.”  
From this, the People argue habeas corpus in inappropriate here because “a 
California court lacks jurisdiction to direct federal immigration officials to comply 
with a state writ of habeas corpus.”  By contrast, Villa adopts the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal below that “[s]ection 1477 is not an impediment to the court 
entertaining a petition . . . .  The import of section 1477 is not to effectuate habeas 
corpus relief, but is to commence adversarial proceedings.”   
That Villa is being detained by a different sovereign is not necessarily 
dispositive for habeas corpus purposes.  True, in a typical habeas corpus case, the 
writ normally is directed to the custodian.  (Pen. Code, § 1477.)  “The role that the 
writ of habeas corpus plays is largely procedural.  It ‘does not decide the issues 
and cannot itself require the final release of the petitioner.’  [Citation.]  Rather, the 
writ commands the person having custody of the petitioner to bring the petitioner 
‘before the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable’ (Pen. Code, § 1477), 
except under specified conditions (id., §§ 1481-1482), and to submit a written 
return justifying the petitioner’s imprisonment or other restraint on the petitioner’s 
liberty (id., § 1480).”  (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738, fn. omitted, 
italics added.)  But as Villa argues, habeas corpus “is not now and never has been 
a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand 
purpose — the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free 
 
10
from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.”  (Jones v. Cunningham, supra, 371 
U.S. at p. 243.)   
Thus, for example, in In re Shapiro (1975) 14 Cal.3d 711, we held that a 
state parolee subsequently arrested by federal authorities and detained in an out-
of-state federal detention facility (McNeil Island in the State of Washington) could 
seek state habeas corpus relief when the state placed a detainer hold on him with 
federal officials.  (Id. at pp. 714-715.)  Although Shapiro (like Villa) was being 
held by a different sovereign in a different state, his petition did not seek to 
ameliorate the terms or conditions of his confinement in the federal penitentiary or 
to have federal officials respond to the allegations.  Rather, it was directed to the 
California Adult Authority (the precursor to the Board of Parole Hearings).  “It is 
the existence of the detainer initiated in California which is causing the petitioner 
deleterious consequences at McNeil Island, and petitioner correctly concludes that 
if the parole violator warrant is invalid the detainer itself will be removed.”  (Id. at 
p. 715.) 
The critical factor in determining whether a petitioner is in actual or 
constructive state custody, then, is not necessarily the name of the governmental 
entity signing the paycheck of the custodial officer in charge, or even if the 
petitioner is within the geographic boundaries of the State of California.  Instead, 
courts should realistically examine the nature of a petitioner’s custody to 
determine whether it is currently authorized in some way by the State of 
California.  Unlike the petitioner in In re Shapiro, supra, 14 Cal.3d 711, for 
example, Villa is not subject to a detainer hold placed by California state officials.  
Nor is his detention in Alabama either a part of the sentence (probation) the 
Alameda County Superior Court imposed for his 1989 crime (In re Osslo, supra, 
51 Cal.2d at p. 376 [probation is custody for habeas corpus purposes]) or 
otherwise authorized by state law.  Instead, his detention is directly traceable to 
 
11
applicable federal laws governing immigration and to the discretion of federal 
immigration officials and, presumably, that of the United States Attorney General.  
Under such circumstances, Villa cannot be considered to be in custody for state 
habeas corpus purposes.  
Villa raises several arguments against this conclusion, but none is availing.  
Emphasizing the flexible nature of the habeas corpus remedy, he argues we should 
further expand the definition of “custody” to include his case.  Indeed, he frankly 
admits he “seeks a redefinition of the habeas corpus remedy beyond the traditional 
prerequisite of actual state custody.”  As we have explained, however, although a 
liberalization of the meaning of “custody” has occurred over the years, all such 
expansions have involved substitutes (such as parole, probation, or release on bail) 
for an actual custodial sentence the trial court could have imposed, or are 
otherwise related to some official state action (like a detainer hold) connected to a 
person’s custodial status.  The present restraint on Villa’s freedom, while perhaps 
factually traceable to his 1989 state conviction (inasmuch as the immigration 
authorities cite the conviction as the reason for deportation), simply has too little 
to do with his long-final state conviction and completed sentence.  Villa’s proposal 
for a further expansion of the meaning of custody for habeas corpus purposes 
would stretch the concept past the breaking point and convert habeas corpus into 
an all-inclusive, free-floating, postconviction remedy untethered to its historical 
moorings. 
Villa also argues that both state and federal law allow the filing of a habeas 
corpus petition to challenge the validity of a prior conviction, even though the 
sentence for the prior conviction has been fully served.  The existence of prior 
felony convictions are, of course, a common reason why a criminal sentence is 
enhanced (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 818 [“ ‘[R]ecidivism . . . is a 
traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an 
 
12
offender’s sentence’ ”]), and habeas corpus is available to challenge the 
constitutionality of such prior convictions (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 
429).  But when an offender’s present sentence is lengthened as a result of a prior 
conviction, the offender’s custody is directly attributable to the prior conviction.  
The sentence for Villa’s 1989 crime, by contrast, terminated long ago, and the 
state has not sought to impose any additional punishment on him as a result of that 
offense. 
Garlotte v. Fordice (1995) 515 U.S. 39, also cited in support, is similarly 
distinguishable.  In Garlotte, the petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of 
three years’ imprisonment for marijuana possession with the intent to distribute.  
He was also sentenced to two concurrent indeterminate life terms for two counts 
of murder, to be served consecutively to the term for marijuana possession.  The 
trial court ordered the petitioner to serve the determinate sentence first and then at 
least 10 years of the life sentence.  The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition 
seeking to withdraw his plea to the possession count, but as his three-year sentence 
for that crime had expired, the lower courts ruled he was no longer in custody for 
that crime despite the fact he was still serving two life terms.  The high court 
disagreed, viewing the petitioner’s “sentences in the aggregate, not as discrete 
segments” (id. at p. 47) and noting that a reversal of the three-year sentence for 
possession could have affected the setting of an overall parole eligibility date (id. 
at p. 46, fn. 5).  Thus, for habeas corpus purposes he was deemed still in custody 
for the marijuana possession conviction. 
As is apparent on its face, Garlotte is distinguishable from Villa’s case 
because, viewing the sentences in the aggregate, the petitioner in Garlotte was still 
in custody for his crimes.  By contrast, Villa has been free of any state custody or 
restraint since at least 1992, when his three-year probationary period ended.   
 
13
Villa also argues there must be some form of remedy to persons in his 
position, arguing that deportation is a harsh consequence for his long-final 
criminal conviction.  But Villa was afforded legal counsel and the right to a jury 
trial in 1989.  Prior to accepting his guilty plea, the trial court admonished him in 
accordance with Penal Code section 1016.5 regarding the immigration 
consequences of the plea.  Villa could subsequently have moved to withdraw his 
plea (id., § 1018), could have appealed, and then could have petitioned for review 
in this court.  While serving his three-year probation, he could have sought relief 
on habeas corpus.  In short, his available remedies under state law for an allegedly 
uninformed plea were ample. 
We appreciate that the consequences for Villa on the facts of this case seem 
harsh and that “[a]lthough deportation is not technically a criminal punishment, it 
may visit great hardship on the alien.  [Citation.]  As stated by the Court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 
deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth living.’ ”  (Fiswick 
v. United States (1946) 329 U.S. 211, 222, fn. 8.)  This complaint, however valid, 
is more appropriately directed to the federal authorities who have chosen — 
belatedly — to deport Villa for his past transgression after initially granting him 
permanent lawful resident status and allowing him to live in this country for 
15 years despite knowledge of his criminal conviction.  Villa’s complaints may 
also be fairly directed to the Legislature, which has enacted statutory remedies for 
other persons facing analogous problems.  (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 1016.5 
[authorizing a motion to vacate for a trial court’s failure to admonish defendant of 
immigration consequences; no custody requirement]; id., § 1473.6 [authorizing a 
motion to vacate for newly discovered evidence of fraud or false testimony by a 
 
14
government agent; no custody requirement].)5  As a final avenue of relief, Villa 
can seek a pardon from the Governor.  (Mendez v. Superior Court (2001) 87 
Cal.App.4th 791, 803.)  We understand that these meager options may be cold 
comfort for him, but their negligible nature does not convince us we should alter 
the law of habeas corpus to hold he is in state custody for habeas corpus purposes. 
Finally, Villa contends he is entitled both to a writ of error coram nobis and 
to vacate his plea under Penal Code section 1016.5.  He did not raise these issues 
in a petition for review in this court or in an answer to the People’s petition.  
Accordingly, they are not properly before us.  (Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV 
Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 654, fn. 2; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.516.)  In any event, as we explain in the companion to this case, People v. Kim, 
supra, __ Cal.4th ___, claims such as Villa raised in his coram nobis petition in 
                                              
5  
“The legislative history of [Penal Code] section 1473.6 reflects the belief 
that at the time of the introduction of the legislation, ‘Currently, other than a 
pardon, no remedy exists for those no longer in the system to challenge their 
judgment when they learn that their conviction was obtained in part because of 
fraud or false evidence by a government official.’  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10, 2002, 
p. 5.)  The legislation was originally introduced to address a problem illustrated by 
the so-called Rampart scandal [citation] in which it was discovered that certain 
Los Angeles Police Department officers had engaged in misconduct, including 
planting evidence, filing false police reports, committing perjury, and creating 
nonexistent confessions.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10, 2002, p. 6; Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Apr. 10, 2002, pp. 3-4.)  Because the misconduct was discovered many years after 
it occurred, those who were no longer in custody at the time of the discovery of the 
misconduct would not be able to set aside their convictions.  (Sen. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Apr. 10, 2002, p. 6; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 
(2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10, 2002, pp. 3-4; [citation].)”  (People 
v. Germany (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 784, 791, italics added, fns. omitted.) 
 
15
 
16
the trial court — ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of the Vienna 
Convention — are errors of law, not of fact, and are thus not cognizable on coram 
nobis.  Further, the record indicates the trial court informed him of the potential 
immigration consequences of his plea, thereby satisfying Penal Code section 
1016.5. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal below, construing Villa’s petition as one for habeas 
corpus, denied relief on the ground that he had failed to allege he was restrained of 
his liberty “solely because of the California conviction” he suffered in 1989.  We 
agree with this result for a different reason:  Villa is in neither actual nor 
constructive state custody as a result of his 1989 conviction.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Villa 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XX 148 Cal.App.4th 473 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S151561 
Date Filed: March 16, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Larry J. Goodman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Rodney Richard Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel; and Linda Starr for Northern California Innocence Project as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Laurence 
K. Sullivan, Christopher J. Wei and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Rodney Richard Jones 
P. O. Box 189 
45100 Main Street, Suite 4 
Mendocino, CA  95460 
(707) 937-0549 
 
Jeffrey M. Laurence 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-3664 
(415) 703-5897