Title: People v. Superior Court

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE,  
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
BRYAN MAURICE JONES, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S255826 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D074028 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
CR136371 
 
 
December 2, 2021 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
S255826 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
A jury convicted Bryan Maurice Jones of capital murder 
and returned a verdict of death in 1994.  Decades later, after 
this court affirmed his conviction and death sentence on appeal, 
Jones filed a habeas corpus petition claiming the prosecution 
had used peremptory strikes to discriminate against prospective 
jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 
(Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  
In connection with this petition, Jones filed a motion for 
postconviction discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9 
seeking access to the prosecutor’s jury selection notes.  The trial 
court granted the motion, rejecting the District Attorney’s 
argument that the notes are shielded from disclosure as 
attorney work product.  The Court of Appeal affirmed. 
 
We affirm as well.  At the Batson/Wheeler hearing, the 
prosecutor had relied on an undisclosed juror rating system to 
explain his reasons for the challenged peremptory strikes.  By 
putting the rating system at issue, the prosecutor impliedly 
waived any claim of work product protection over notes 
containing information about the system.  The District Attorney 
may not now invoke attorney work product protection to 
withhold information necessary to the fair adjudication of 
Jones’s Batson/Wheeler claim.   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
2 
 
I. 
 
During jury selection at Jones’s 1994 trial, defense counsel 
raised multiple objections to the prosecution’s use of peremptory 
strikes to eliminate Black jurors from the jury pool.  On each 
occasion, counsel argued the strikes were motivated by race and 
therefore invalid under Batson and Wheeler.   
 
Jones initially challenged the prosecutor’s strikes of 
prospective jurors Y.J. and C.G.  To evaluate Jones’s claim, the 
trial court employed the familiar three-step framework set out 
in Batson.  (See, e.g., People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 
280.)  At the first step of the inquiry, the trial court determined 
that Jones made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination 
and proceeded to the second step of the inquiry by asking the 
prosecutor to provide his reasoning for the strikes.  The 
prosecutor explained that he used a numerical rating system to 
evaluate prospective jurors sight unseen based on answers in 
their written juror questionnaires; he told the court that both he 
and another member of the prosecution team had assigned Y.J. 
and C.G. low scores using this system.  The prosecutor offered 
that Prospective Juror Y.J., for instance, was rated “13th lowest 
of the whole group,” and “[t]here were too many people that are 
[rated] better than her.”  The prosecutor went on to elaborate on 
the ratings of Y.J. and C.G. by describing their written answers 
to specific questions on the questionnaires.  At the third and 
final step of the inquiry, the trial court accepted the prosecutor’s 
explanations for the two strikes as race neutral and denied 
Jones’s Batson/Wheeler challenge.   
 
Jones renewed the challenge when the prosecutor struck 
another Black prospective juror, J.Y.  After the trial court found 
a prima facie showing of discrimination, the prosecutor similarly 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
3 
 
cited the prospective juror’s low score, explaining that it was 
“based upon our numerical analysis by three people who 
independently read the questionnaire.”  The trial court again 
accepted the prosecutor’s explanations and denied the 
challenge. 
 
The seated jury ultimately found Jones guilty and 
returned a verdict of death.  On direct appeal of the judgment, 
Jones claimed that the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of Y.J. 
and C.G. were improper and that the prosecutor’s proffered race 
neutral justifications were pretexts for discrimination.  (See 
People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 916.)  We rejected the 
argument, concluding “our usual deference to the trial court’s 
assessment of the prosecutor’s sincerity [was] appropriate” on 
the facts presented.1  (Id. at p. 918.)  Finding no other reversible 
error, we affirmed Jones’s conviction and sentence.  (Id. at 
p. 981.) 
 
In 2014, the year after we decided Jones’s direct appeal, 
and 20 years after the trial, Jones filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in this court.  He substantively amended the 
petition in 2018.  Among other claims, the amended petition 
alleged that Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise 
and 
properly 
litigate 
Batson/Wheeler 
challenges.  
 
1  
On direct appeal, Jones also renewed his challenge to the 
removal of Prospective Juror N.S.  (See People v. Jones, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at p. 916.)  With respect to N.S., the trial court had 
ruled there was no prima facie showing of discrimination.  
Because it was unclear whether the trial court had applied the 
correct prima facie case standard, we independently reviewed 
the record and upheld the trial court’s conclusion that Jones 
failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination 
concerning N.S.  (Id. at pp. 919–920.) 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
4 
 
Specifically, the petition asserted that trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to raise a Batson/Wheeler objection when the 
prosecutor used 13 of 17 peremptory challenges to strike women 
(see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 146 
[holding that gender is an impermissible basis for the exercise 
of peremptory strikes]; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 
1158 [same]), and for inadequately litigating Batson/Wheeler 
challenges to the removal of Black prospective jurors.  The 
amended petition also renewed the Batson/Wheeler claims 
raised on appeal, citing additional evidence not in the trial 
record.   
 
In connection with his habeas petition, Jones filed a 
motion for postconviction discovery in superior court under 
Penal Code section 1054.9 (section 1054.9).  The motion 
requested production of contemporaneous jury selection notes 
created by the prosecutor and other members of the prosecution 
team as they prepared for and conducted jury selection in 
Jones’s trial.2  The District Attorney opposed the motion, 
asserting the jury selection notes were core work product 
absolutely protected by Code of Civil Procedure section 
2018.030, 
subdivision 
(a), 
and 
consequently 
were 
not 
discoverable.  (See Pen. Code, § 1054.6 [“Neither the defendant 
nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any 
materials or information which are work product as defined in 
subdivision (a) of Section 2018.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
. . . .”].)  In reply, Jones argued that the prosecutor “effectively 
 
2  
Jones also requested other items related to jury selection, 
including prosecution policies and training materials and 
records related to other cases tried by the prosecutor.  The 
questions on which we granted review concern only the jury 
selection notes. 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
5 
 
waived” any work product privilege over the notes when he 
offered reasons for the challenged strikes that were based on 
notes of a juror rating system.  Jones further argued the notes 
were subject to disclosure under Evidence Code section 771, 
which requires the production of any writing used to refresh the 
memory of a testifying witness, and that trial counsel would 
have been entitled to the jury selection notes if counsel had 
requested them during the Batson/Wheeler hearing. 
 
The trial court rejected the District Attorney’s work 
product argument and granted Jones’s motion.  Voicing general 
agreement with Jones’s arguments, the court determined that 
Jones was entitled to any notes “that could possibly impeach” 
the prosecutor’s comments during the Batson/Wheeler hearings.  
The court observed that without such material, Jones would be 
unable to address the legitimacy of the prosecutor’s reasons for 
striking prospective jurors.     
 
The District Attorney petitioned for a writ of mandate 
and/or prohibition seeking to vacate the trial court’s order.  The 
Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition.  We granted the 
District Attorney’s petition for review and transferred the 
matter to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order 
to show cause. 
 
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
trial court’s order.  (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (2019) 34 
Cal.App.5th 75 (Jones).)  The Court of Appeal began by 
questioning “whether the work product privilege remains 
absolute when a court has an obligation to evaluate the intent 
of the prosecution, and the written mental impressions 
themselves may reveal an effort to unlawfully exclude 
prospective jurors based on race or gender.”  (Id. at p. 81.)  The 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
6 
 
court opined that to extend absolute work product protection to 
such writings, as opposed to writings reflecting the attorney’s 
thoughts and opinions about the legal case or trial strategy, 
would be inconsistent with the nature of an inquiry that 
requires trial courts to evaluate the prosecutor’s reasons for 
exercising challenged strikes.  (Id. at p. 82.)  But even assuming 
jury selection notes are otherwise nondiscoverable work 
product, the court went on to hold that the prosecution had 
waived work product protection.  (Id. at p. 83.)  Citing both 
Evidence Code section 771 and United States v. Nobles (1975) 
422 U.S. 225, 239 (Nobles), the court reasoned that because the 
prosecutor had used his notes to refresh his recollection about 
the reasons for striking the challenged jurors and because he 
described the numerical evaluations detailed in those notes, the 
opposing party was entitled to see the notes upon request.  
(Jones, at pp. 83–85.)  
 
We granted the District Attorney’s petition for review to 
consider whether the trial court’s disclosure order was 
permissible.  In addressing this issue, the Court of Appeal 
applied an abuse of discretion standard, which is the usual 
standard for reviewing discovery rulings.  (Jones, supra, 34 
Cal.App.5th at p. 79.)  But the particular discovery ruling at 
issue in this case encompasses various determinations — 
including whether, as Jones has argued, the prosecution waived 
any applicable work product through its litigation conduct — 
that arguably call for a more demanding standard of review.  
Several courts have treated claims regarding the waiver of work 
product protections and other privileges as mixed questions of 
law and fact subject to independent review on appeal.  (See, e.g., 
Behunin v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 833, 842–843; 
McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
7 
 
1229, 1235–1236; U.S. v. Sanmina Corp. (9th Cir. 2020) 968 
F.3d 1107, 1116; U.S. v. Lara (4th Cir. 2017) 850 F.3d 686, 690.)  
But not all courts are in accord.  (See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp. 
(3d Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 153, 161 [applying an abuse of discretion 
standard]; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (2d Cir. 2000) 219 F.3d 
175, 182 [same].)  We do not resolve the issue here, since neither 
party has briefed it and the answer is immaterial in any event.  
Whether we were to apply independent review or a more 
deferential standard, we would conclude the trial court properly 
ordered disclosure of the requested materials in order to ensure 
fair adjudication of Jones’s Batson/Wheeler claims. 
II. 
 
More than four decades ago, this court in Wheeler held 
that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective 
jurors on the basis of race or other forms of group bias violates 
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.  (Wheeler, 
supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276–277.)  Several years later, the 
United States Supreme Court in Batson reached the same 
conclusion under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  (Batson, supra, 
476 U.S. at p. 86.)  As a result of these decisions, a litigant has 
the right to challenge an opponent’s discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges.  But as both the United States Supreme 
Court and this court have repeatedly made clear, the harm of 
the 
practice 
is 
not 
limited 
to 
individual 
litigants.  
Discrimination in jury selection also does grievous injury to the 
jurors and to “the very integrity of the courts” charged with 
ensuring equal justice for all comers in a diverse society.  
(Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 238 (Miller-El); accord, 
People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1154.)   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
8 
 
 
Courts 
employ 
a 
three-step 
inquiry 
to 
uncover 
unconstitutional discrimination in the exercise of peremptory 
strikes.  Once a defendant has made out a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a 
neutral justification for the strike; the trial court must then 
decide whether purposeful discrimination has occurred.  
(Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168; People v. 
Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 280.) 
 
Although 
this 
burden-shifting 
framework 
is 
well 
established, experience has demonstrated “the practical 
difficulty 
of 
ferreting 
out 
discrimination 
in 
selections 
discretionary by nature, and choices subject to myriad 
legitimate influences.”  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 238.)  
Assessing an attorney’s motivation for striking a juror, as 
required at Batson’s third step, is often a sensitive and 
challenging inquiry.3  The trial court must discern the motives 
of the striking attorney by “assess[ing] the plausibility of [the 
attorney’s proffered] reason in light of all evidence with a 
bearing on it.”  (Id. at p. 252.)  Considering “all evidence with a 
bearing” on the attorney’s motives typically requires the trial 
court to evaluate factors such as the attorney’s demeanor, the 
plausibility of his or her explanations, as well as the court’s own 
observations, if any, about the struck juror as compared with the 
other jurors in the venire.  (Ibid.; see also People v. Lenix (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 602, 613.)  A trial judge may also further question the 
 
3  
As the trial judge remarked in this case:  “I will tell you, 
as a long time trial judge, this is a very difficult issue for trial 
judges to deal with because you have an attorney at sidebar and 
he or she is making representations to you as to why a 
peremptory challenge was made, and it’s always been, for this 
Court, a very uncomfortable sidebar.” 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
9 
 
attorney on any particular proffered rationale for a challenged 
strike and may rely on the judge’s own experiences both as an 
attorney and on the bench.  “ ‘Usually, “the issue comes down to 
whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral 
explanations to be credible.” ’ ”  (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
1134, 1147, quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 
339.)   
 
While a trial court’s determination at Batson/Wheeler’s 
third step is ordinarily made on the basis of oral representations 
and personal observation, appellate and postconviction review 
is often confined to the written record.  Although not limited to 
the precise arguments or evidence presented to the trial court 
on the challenged peremptory strikes (see, e.g., People v. Lenix, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622), reviewing courts are generally 
constrained to “rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to 
distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham 
excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group 
discrimination” (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282).  In some 
cases, limitations in the trial record may make it difficult for a 
reviewing court to fully evaluate a claim of Batson/Wheeler 
error.   
 
Attorneys and courts have, on various occasions, relied on 
jury selection notes to provide additional evidentiary support for 
Batson/Wheeler claims raised on appeal or in postconviction 
proceedings.  Recent decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court offer important examples.  In Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. 
231, for instance, the court granted federal habeas relief to a 
prisoner who alleged that prosecutors impermissibly struck 
Black veniremembers on the basis of race at his trial many years 
earlier.  In reaching that conclusion, the high court cited 
considerable evidence bearing on the issue of discrimination, 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
10 
 
including the prosecutor’s notations on jury cards indicating the 
race of each veniremember.  The high court observed that “the 
prosecutors’ own notes proclaim that [an] emphasis on race was 
on their minds when they considered every potential juror.”  (Id. 
at p. 266.) 
 
In granting the discovery order in this case, the trial court 
pointed specifically to Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. 488 
[136 S.Ct. 1737] (Foster), in which the prosecution’s jury 
selection notes formed the centerpiece of the petitioner’s claim 
on habeas.  The prosecution’s jury selection file, which petitioner 
had obtained through a public records request, unambiguously 
revealed 
the 
role 
race 
played 
in 
the 
prosecution’s 
decisionmaking process.  The prosecutor had used a highlighter 
to identify all of the Black prospective jurors, with the legend 
stating that the highlighting “ ‘represents Blacks.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 1744.)  Additionally, the letter B appeared next to each Black 
prospective juror’s name.  On the questionnaires of Black jurors, 
the “juror’s response indicating his or her race had been circled.”  
(Ibid.)  There were also handwritten notes indicating the 
prosecution’s aversion to seating Black jurors, an investigator’s 
draft affidavit explaining who to select “ ‘[i]f it comes down to 
having to pick one of the black jurors,’ ” and notes that put an N 
(allegedly for no) next to every prospective Black juror’s name.  
(Ibid.)   
 
Rejecting the state’s entreaties to ignore the jury selection 
file, the high court concluded that the file was not only relevant, 
but dispositive; the prosecutor’s notes revealed a singular focus 
on the jurors’ race that “plainly demonstrate[d] a concerted 
effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.”  (Foster, 
supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1755; see ibid. [“The contents of the 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
11 
 
prosecution’s file . . . plainly belie the State’s claim that it 
exercised its strikes in a ‘color-blind’ manner.”].) 
 
These cases offer particularly prominent examples of how 
jury notes can shed light on an attorney’s contemporaneous 
motives in striking a prospective juror, but they are not isolated 
ones.  In Mitcham v. Davis (N.D.Cal. 2015) 103 F.Supp.3d 1091, 
for instance, the federal court reviewed the prosecutor’s jury 
selection notes before granting habeas relief to a California 
prisoner on Batson-related grounds.  The notes revealed that the 
prosecutor had kept track of the race of the Black jurors but not 
of other jurors and had rated every Black juror as unacceptable.  
The prosecutor’s notes during the voir dire of one Black juror 
stated:  “ ‘Keep if necessary to avoid Wheeler — She would try to 
be fair.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1097.)  The notes also revealed evidence of 
racial bias in the striking of certain White jurors with Black 
relatives; next to one White juror, he wrote: “ ‘Think her 
husband is black.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
Jones directs us to other cases in which courts in this state 
and elsewhere have found probative evidence in jury selection 
notes.4  Many — though not all — of these cases involve similar 
claims of racial bias bolstered by jury selection notes.  In one 
case, initially tried in 2002 in North Carolina and overturned on 
collateral review in 2020, newly disclosed jury selection notes 
revealed that prosecutors had described Black veniremembers 
in starkly derogatory terms compared with similarly situated 
White veniremembers.  For example, a prospective Black juror 
with a criminal record was labeled a “thug[]” while a White 
venireman who prosecutors noted had an “ext[ensive] [criminal] 
 
4  
We granted Jones’s request to take judicial notice of several 
unpublished opinions and pleadings as relevant to this appeal.   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
12 
 
record” was described as a “n[e’er] do well.”  Similarly, 
prosecution notes described a prospective Black juror as a “blk. 
Wino — drugs,” but a White veniremember with a drinking 
problem as “drinks — country boy — OK.” 
 
In another case, a Georgia court concluded that jury 
selection notes contributed to the “undeniable” evidence of 
discrimination.  (State v. Gates (Ga.Super.Ct., Jan. 10, 2019, 
No. SU-75-CR38335) 2019 Ga.Super. LEXIS 420, p. *4 [Order 
on Defendant’s Extraordinary Motion for New Trial].)5  In 1977, 
Johnny Lee Gates, a Black man, was convicted of murder by an 
all-White jury following a three-day trial and sentenced to 
death.  Jury selection notes revealed that the prosecutor 
indicated the race and sex of each prospective juror in his notes, 
using the letter W for White prospective jurors and the letter N 
to indicate that prospective jurors were Black.  The prosecutor 
described the Black jurors in derogatory terms and gave every 
Black juror the prosecution’s lowest juror rating, while giving 
the lowest rating to only one of the 43 prospective White jurors.   
 
In each of these cases, the jury selection notes proved 
important in litigating a claim of discrimination many years 
after the fact.  But as is true of any other type of evidence, jury 
selection notes may be relevant to the inquiry even when they 
do not contain a smoking gun.  Nor are jury selection notes 
necessarily relevant only to prove improper motivation; they 
 
5  
Because Gates’s trial occurred before Batson, the trial 
court applied the standard set forth in Swain v. Alabama (1965) 
380 U.S. 202, and therefore considered evidence of systemic 
discrimination, including evidence of jury selection notes for 
trials other than Gates’s.  Although the court found Gates had 
demonstrated discrimination in jury selection, the court 
ultimately rejected Gates’s claim for procedural reasons. 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
13 
 
may also counter claims of racial bias.  For example, in In re 
Freeman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 630, the petitioner claimed the 
prosecutor had struck prospective jurors he believed were 
Jewish.  We concluded that the petitioner did not meet his 
burden to show improperly motivated strikes in part because 
the prosecutor’s notes revealed detailed observations about 
individual veniremembers’ characteristics but made neither 
explicit nor implicit reference to the religion of prospective 
jurors he ultimately excused.  (Id. at pp. 642–644.)6   
 
The District Attorney in this case agrees that when jury 
selection notes are available, they often prove relevant, and 
sometimes 
dispositive, 
particularly 
in 
adjudicating 
Batson/Wheeler claims on postconviction review.  But as the 
District Attorney correctly notes, neither Foster nor any other 
case binding on this court answers the question when, precisely, 
jury selection notes must be made available for purposes of the 
Batson/Wheeler inquiry.7  We now turn to that question as it is 
presented in this case. 
 
6  
We note that recording prospective jurors’ race, gender, or 
other characteristics may be benign and may also assist in the 
evaluation of Batson/Wheeler motions by making a complete 
record of the composition of the venire and the seated jury. 
7  
As explained above, the petitioner in Foster obtained jury 
selection notes through a public records request.  This case 
raises no question about the availability of the notes under 
California’s Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.). 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
14 
 
III. 
 
The question here arises from a request for postconviction 
discovery under section 1054.9.8  Section 1054.9 authorizes 
postconviction discovery in certain felony cases but identifies 
the scope of discoverable materials as those “materials in the 
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities 
to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time 
of trial.”  (Id., subd. (c); see id., subd. (a); In re Steele (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 682, 690 (Steele).)  The District Attorney contends that 
Jones is not entitled to jury selection notes because Penal Code 
section 1054.6 specifies that, under the statutory discovery 
rules, “[n]either the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is 
required to disclose any materials or information which are 
work product as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 2018.030 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure.”  The District Attorney argues the 
notes constitute protected work product as defined in Code of 
Civil Procedure section 2018.030, subdivision (a) and the court 
therefore may not order their disclosure.9 
 
8  
We are concerned in particular with postconviction 
discovery sought before an order to show cause issues.  We 
express no view regarding the available scope of discovery after 
issuance of an order to show cause.  (See In re Scott (2003) 29 
Cal.4th 783, 813 [after order to show cause issues, the “scope of 
discovery in habeas corpus proceedings has generally been 
resolved on a case-by-case basis” and referees may fashion fair 
discovery rules to govern the proceedings]; see id. at p. 814.)   
9  
The District Attorney alternatively suggests that the jury 
selection notes are not subject to postconviction discovery orders 
because they are not included in the list of mandatory pretrial 
discovery materials that Penal Code section 1054.1 requires the 
prosecution to provide even absent a disclosure request.  But as 
 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
15 
 
 
The work product doctrine now codified in Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2018.030 was initially developed by courts.  In 
an influential statement of the doctrine, the United States 
Supreme Court described the rationale as follows:  “[I]t is 
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, 
free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their 
counsel.  Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he 
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant 
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his 
strategy without undue and needless interference.”  (Hickman 
v. Taylor (1947) 329 U.S. 495, 510–511; see Coito v. Superior 
Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 489–494 (Coito) [recounting the 
history of work product doctrine].)  When the Legislature later 
codified the doctrine, it assigned attorney work product either 
absolute or qualified protection, depending on the type of 
material at issue.  “Absolute protection is afforded to writings 
 
we explained in Steele, postconviction discovery under section 
1054.9 is not limited to materials the prosecution had “a 
statutory duty to provide” at the time of trial; postconviction 
discovery also extends to, among other things, materials “to 
which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial 
had the defendant specifically requested them.”  (Steele, supra, 
32 Cal.4th at pp. 695, 697.)  The criminal discovery statutes 
expressly recognize that the availability of discovery may be 
governed 
by 
“other 
express 
statutory 
provisions” 
and 
constitutional mandates.  (Pen. Code, § 1054, subd. (e).)  In 
short, the fact that jury selection notes are not included in Penal 
Code section 1054.1 as items of mandatory pretrial discovery, 
along with witness lists and defendant statements, does not 
mean that the jury selection notes are not discoverable under 
section 1054.9.  The District Attorney raises no other argument 
that the governing statutes preclude the disclosure of the notes, 
and we do not consider any statutory arguments that have not 
been raised. 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
16 
 
that reflect ‘an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal research or theories.’  ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 2018.030, 
subd. (a).)  All other work product receives qualified protection; 
such material ‘is not discoverable unless the court determines 
that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking 
discovery in preparing that party’s claim or defense or will result 
in an injustice.’  (§ 2018.030, subd. (b).)”  (Coito, at p. 485.)   
 
The District Attorney asserts that jury selection notes are 
writings entitled to absolute protection under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2018.030, subdivision (a) because they reveal 
an attorney’s opinions and impressions of potential jurors.  
Jones, for his part, argues that the work product doctrine does 
not reach opinions and impressions of jurors, as opposed to 
opinions and impressions of the legal case.  He characterizes the 
District Attorney’s opposing view as overly broad and unmoored 
from the doctrine’s central purposes — namely, to allow 
attorneys to prepare their cases for trial and to prevent their 
opponents from free-riding on their efforts.  (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2018.020.)   
 
We need not resolve this broad dispute about the reach of 
work product protection to answer the question before us, which 
concerns one party’s invocation of the work product doctrine to 
shield matters it had put in issue during the litigation of the 
Batson/Wheeler challenge.  Even if we assume that jury 
selection notes are protected work product as defined by Code of 
Civil 
Procedure 
section 
2018.030, 
subdivision 
(a), 
we 
nonetheless agree with the courts below that the prosecutor in 
this case impliedly waived any work product protection when he 
justified his peremptory challenges by putting in issue 
information the District Attorney now seeks to withhold as 
confidential in postconviction discovery. 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
17 
 
 
Although the work product statute does not directly 
address the issue of waiver, it is well established that work 
product protection, like other forms of privilege, can be waived 
through conduct.  (See Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 1176, 1186 (Ardon); Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 807; BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1240, 1254.)  Waiver may be found 
where the privilege holder, without coercion, discloses a 
significant part of the communication to another person.  (Labor 
& Workforce Development Agency v. Superior Court (2018) 19 
Cal.App.5th 12, 35–36; cf. Evid. Code, § 912, subd. (a) [setting 
out the same waiver standard for enumerated forms of privilege, 
not including work product protection].)  An implied waiver may 
also be found when a party “has put the otherwise privileged 
communication directly at issue and . . . disclosure is essential 
for a fair adjudication of the action.”  (Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. 
Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 31, 40, citing Mitchell v. 
Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 609 (Mitchell).)   
 
Much like the work product doctrine itself, this second 
theory of implied waiver is premised on the need to protect the 
integrity of the judicial proceeding.  The cases recognize that 
allowing one party to rely on a document to establish key facts 
while simultaneously shielding that same document from the 
other 
side 
works 
an 
unfair 
adversarial 
advantage.  
Considerations of basic fairness accordingly “may require 
disclosure 
of 
otherwise 
privileged 
information 
or 
communications where [a party] has placed in issue a 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
18 
 
communication which goes to the heart of the claim in 
controversy.”  (Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604.)10   
 
Courts have found implied waiver in a variety of litigation 
contexts.  In Nobles, for example, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected an argument that criminal defense counsel could 
simultaneously rely on a testifying defense investigator to 
impeach the credibility of a critical prosecution witness while 
also claiming the investigator’s report was protected by the work 
product doctrine.  The court explained:  “At its core, the work-
product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, 
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and 
prepare his client’s case.  But the doctrine is an intensely 
practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our 
adversary system. . . .  [¶]  . . . Respondent, by electing to 
present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with 
respect to matters covered in his testimony.  Respondent can no 
more advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral 
testimonial use of work-product materials than he could elect to 
testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters 
reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.”  
(Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 238–240, fn. omitted.)11   
 
10  
The Legislature has similarly determined that tendering 
a particular issue in a proceeding waives certain privileges.  
(See, e.g., Evid. Code, §§ 958, 996, 1016.)   
11  
The Nobles court explained that waiver “normally” does 
not extend to counsel’s use during trial of “notes, documents, 
and other internal materials prepared to present adequately his 
client’s case.”  (Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 239, fn. 14.)  We 
likewise affirm that “[w]hat constitutes a waiver with respect to 
 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
19 
 
 
Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 
59 Cal.App.4th 110 is also instructive.  The plaintiff in Wellpoint 
brought an employment discrimination action in which the 
employer raised an affirmative defense based on corrective 
action it had taken in response to an internal investigation.  The 
plaintiff sought production of the investigative reports.  
Overruling the employer’s claims of privilege, the Court of 
Appeal concluded the plaintiff was entitled to the reports.  It 
reasoned that the “adequacy or thoroughness of a defendant’s 
investigation of plaintiff’s claim,” while typically “irrelevant” to 
most civil actions, is highly relevant “if the employer chooses to 
defend by establishing that it took reasonable corrective or 
remedial action.”  (Id. at p. 126, italics added.)  By raising this 
defense, the employer had “inject[ed] into the lawsuit . . . an 
issue concerning the adequacy of the investigation,” resulting in 
waiver of the work-product doctrine.  (Id. at p. 128.)  “If a 
defendant employer hopes to prevail by showing that it 
investigated an employee’s complaint and took action 
appropriate to the findings of the investigation, then it will have 
put the adequacy of the investigation directly at issue, and 
cannot stand on the attorney-client privilege or work product 
doctrine to preclude a thorough examination of its adequacy.  
The defendant cannot have it both ways.  If it chooses this 
course, it does so with the understanding that the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine are thereby 
waived.”  (Ibid.)   
 
work-product 
materials 
depends, 
of 
course, 
upon 
the 
circumstances” (ibid.) and do not suggest that an attorney’s 
ordinary reliance on notes throughout trial would necessarily 
waive work product protections.   
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
20 
 
 
The Court of Appeal in this case, citing Nobles and 
Wellpoint, adopted similar reasoning to find implied waiver.  It 
then went on to liken the prosecutor to a witness who testified 
after refreshing his recollection with his notes, citing Evidence 
Code section 771.  (Jones, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 83–84.)  
We agree with the District Attorney that section 771 has no 
direct application here, since an attorney in a Batson/Wheeler 
hearing does not testify as a sworn witness.  But the analogy 
nonetheless serves.  The law requires disclosure of notes used to 
refresh a witness’s recollection for much the same reason courts 
imply waiver in other contexts:  to ensure the basic fairness of 
the proceedings where a party has put the substance of 
privileged material in issue.  (See, e.g., Kerns Constr. Co. v. 
Superior Court (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 405, 411 [an attorney may 
not provide a witness with protected documents, “allow a 
witness to testify therefrom and then claim work product 
privilege to prevent the opposing party from viewing the 
document from which he testified”].)  
Here, the prosecutor invoked an undisclosed juror rating 
system in justifying his use of peremptory challenges at the 
second step of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry.  Had the prosecutor 
instead relied solely on a straightforward listing of juror 
characteristics, the prosecutor’s reasons could have been 
questioned by the defense and judged against the trial court’s 
own observations.  But the defense and trial court had no way 
of confirming or evaluating the prosecutor’s claims that he used 
a race-neutral rating system they had never seen.  Unlike an 
attorney who simply glances at her or his notes to recall a 
particular answer provided during voir dire, for example, a 
striking attorney who makes this sort of “testimonial use” of 
undisclosed writings gains an unfair adversarial advantage by 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
21 
 
doing so.  (Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 239, fn. 14.)  Effectively 
the striking attorney has placed in issue information that goes 
to the heart of the question before the court, whether there has 
been discrimination in jury selection.  Under our cases, that 
choice is one that constitutes waiver of any claim that the 
information may be withheld as protected work product. 
 
The District Attorney protests that there could have been 
no effective waiver because any disclosure or invocation of 
protected information was coerced.  (See Regents of University 
of California v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 672, 679.)  
The District Attorney stresses that an attorney provides a 
justification for striking the challenged prospective jurors only 
at the request of the court — a request compelled by Batson, and 
therefore one that the attorney is hardly free to refuse.  All of 
this is true, but it hardly follows that a striking attorney must 
explain the challenged strikes by invoking an otherwise 
confidential rating system she or he believes to be protected 
work product.   
 
Here, when the trial court asked the prosecutor to defend 
the challenged strikes, the prosecutor did not simply cite 
concerns about the prospective jurors’ occupations, volunteer 
activities, or other characteristics established through voir dire.  
Instead, the prosecutor pointed to the documented results of a 
purportedly color-blind numerical rating system devised by the 
prosecution and offered detailed explanations regarding the low 
scores multiple prosecution team members had given each of the 
struck jurors.12  Considering this record of the Batson/Wheeler 
 
12  
The District Attorney suggests in reply that any waiver 
was “inadvertent,” bringing the notes within the exception for 
 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
22 
 
hearings at trial and the waiver principles we have discussed, 
we conclude that the District Attorney’s assertion of work 
product protection is not a basis for overturning the 
postconviction trial court’s disclosure order.  The point, in the 
end, is simple:  A striking attorney cannot both stand on such a 
rating system and assert privilege over it.13 
IV. 
For these reasons, we reject the District Attorney’s 
argument that work product protection categorically bars 
disclosure of jury selection notes in postconviction discovery.  
Here there has been an implied waiver of any claim to work 
product protections and so the jury selection notes are subject to 
disclosure.  This is true for notes revealing a clear focus on 
impermissible discrimination, such as the notes in Foster, as 
well as those that might not, on their own, reveal a 
discriminatory purpose but that would tend to support the 
Batson/Wheeler challenge when aggregated with other evidence 
or notes.   
 
We recognize, however, that disclosure of jury notes, like 
disclosure of any other attorney writing, can risk unnecessary 
incursion on the confidentiality of attorney work product beyond 
the scope of the matter now at issue.  Though the notes may 
illuminate an attorney’s opinions and impressions of prospective 
 
inadvertent disclosure recognized by Ardon, supra, 62 Cal.4th 
1176.  The analogy is inapt; in that case, as in other inadvertent 
disclosure cases, the disclosures at issue were accidental.  That 
is not the case here, where the prosecutor made a calculated 
decision to provide explanations of his rating system. 
13  
We express no view on whether, under different 
circumstances, there would be a waiver of any work product 
protection attaching to jury selection notes. 
PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
23 
 
jurors — the matter specifically at issue in a Batson/Wheeler 
claim — they may also reveal opinions and impressions of the 
case and legal strategy. 
 
To the extent the District Attorney raises concerns about 
overbroad discovery in this context, the law offers answers.  
Attorneys resisting what they view as overbroad discovery 
efforts may “make a preliminary or foundational showing that 
disclosure would reveal . . . ‘impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
or legal research or theories[]’ (§ 2018.030, subd. (a)[])” 
unrelated to jury selection, and “[u]pon an adequate showing, 
the trial court should then determine, by making an in camera 
inspection if necessary, whether absolute work product 
protection applies to some or all of the material.”  (Coito, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at pp. 495–496.)  In this way, the trial court may 
ensure on a “case by case” basis (id. at p. 495) that necessary 
redactions are made to protect core work product that is not 
relevant to the Batson/Wheeler challenge at issue.   
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, and the 
case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
 
KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Superior Court (Jones)  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 34 Cal.App.5th 75 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S255826 
Date Filed:  December 2, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: San Diego  
Judge: Joan P. Weber  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Mark A. Amador, Linh Lam, 
Samantha Begovich and Anne Spitzberg, Deputy District Attorneys, 
for Petitioner. 
 
Jeff Rubin, Deputy District Attorney (Santa Clara), for California 
District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Shelley J. Sandusky, Cliona Plunkett and Rachel G. Schaefer for Real 
Party in Interest. 
 
Michael C. McMahon for California Public Defenders Association and 
Todd W. Howeth as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
Wesley A. Van Winkle for Private Practice Capital Habeas Corpus 
Attorneys as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Kristen A. Johnson, Natasha C. Merle, Liliana Zaragoza and 
Mahogane C. Reed for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 
Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Anne Spitzberg  
Deputy District Attorney 
300 West Broadway, Suite 860 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 531-3591 
 
Rachel G. Schaefer 
Habeas Corpus Resource Center 
303 Second Street, Suite 400 South 
San Francisco, CA 94107 
(415) 348-3800 
 
Natasha Merle 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 
New York, NY 10006 
(212) 965-2200