Title: Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Martorana

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Martorana, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1686.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1686 
GEAUGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MARTORANA. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Martorana,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1686.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Charging clearly excessive fee—Public reprimand. 
 (No. 2011-2028—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided April 30, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-056. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kim Gerette Martorana, of Auburn Township, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0060109, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1992.  In an 11-count, first amended complaint, relator, Geauga County Bar 
Association, alleged that Martorana violated five Rules of Professional Conduct 
as a result of her connections with a paralegal support company and out-of-state 
counsel and two additional rules as a result of charging excessive and 
nonrefundable fees in five client matters.  The parties initially submitted a 
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consent-to-discipline agreement, in which Martorana stipulated to all of the 
charged misconduct and the parties recommended a stayed six-month suspension.  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended 
adoption of the agreement, but we rejected the parties’ recommended sanction and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings.  Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Martorana, 131 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2012-Ohio-79, 959 N.E.2d 537. 
{¶ 2} On remand, the parties submitted stipulations of facts, misconduct, 
and aggravating and mitigating factors, and, for a second time, they recommended 
a sanction of a stayed six-month suspension.  In the stipulations, Martorana again 
admitted to committing all of the charged misconduct, and relator therefore did 
not present any additional evidence at the panel hearing.  The panel adopted the 
parties’ stipulated facts and agreed with the proposed sanction, but it found only 
one violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended dismissal of 
the remaining six charges based on insufficiency of the evidence.  The board 
agreed with the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, except it concluded that 
Martorana’s misconduct warrants a public reprimand.  No party has filed 
objections to the board’s recommendation. 
{¶ 3} Upon our independent review of the record, we adopt the board’s 
findings of fact and misconduct and agree that the appropriate sanction is a public 
reprimand. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Relator 
alleged 
that 
Martorana 
charged 
excessive 
and 
nonrefundable fees in five client matters, improperly divided fees with out-of-
state counsel, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, failed to supervise 
nonlawyers in a connected paralegal support company, and failed to disclose to 
her clients her relationships with out-of-state counsel and the paralegal support 
company.  However, the panel and board found that relator proved only one rule 
violation—charging a clearly excessive fee as prohibited by Prof.Cond.R. 1.5. 
January Term, 2013 
 
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{¶ 5} As to that one rule violation, the stipulated facts demonstrate that 
Martorana, doing business as Martorana Legal Services, L.L.C. (“MLS”), 
provided mortgage-related services for homeowners facing foreclosure.  
Martorana requested that her clients enter into a written fee agreement requiring 
an up-front flat fee deemed earned in full by MLS at the time of payment.  The 
agreement also stated, however, that the client was entitled to a full refund if MLS 
declined representation and no legal work beyond the initial review was 
completed. 
{¶ 6} In each of the five matters at issue, the client contacted MLS for 
mortgage-related assistance, executed Martorana’s written fee agreement, and 
paid a flat fee ranging from $1,695 to $2,300.  However, for various reasons, 
MLS was unable to complete the requested work.  For example, in one case, the 
client requested an interest-rate adjustment, but after reviewing the necessary 
paperwork from the client, MLS informed him that it could not negotiate an 
adjustment with the client’s lender.  Other clients requested that MLS obtain a 
loan modification, but after reviewing the client’s financial records, MLS 
informed them that it could not obtain the modification.  In each matter, the client 
either requested a refund or expressed dissatisfaction with MLS.  However, in 
three of the cases, Martorana refused to refund any of the client’s money, and in 
the two other matters, she refunded less than one-third of the flat fee.  After the 
filing of the original complaint, Martorana made full restitution in all five cases. 
{¶ 7} The board on remand found that Martorana’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, 
charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee).  This rule lists a 
number of factors that must be considered in determining whether a fee is 
reasonable, including the time and skill required to perform the legal services, the 
amount involved, and the results obtained.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(1) and (4).  
While the record here is unclear on what, if any, legal skill was required to 
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perform MLS’s mortgage-related services for these five clients, the record is clear 
that the cost of MLS’s services was disproportionate to any benefit that the clients 
received.  Based on these findings, we agree with the board that Martorana 
charged a clearly excessive fee and violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). 
{¶ 8} In addition, we accept the panel and board’s recommendation to 
dismiss the remaining allegations for insufficiency of the evidence.  Accordingly, 
the other six alleged rule violations are hereby dismissed. 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury 
caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc.Reg., and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  
{¶ 10} We have already identified Martorana’s ethical breaches to her 
clients.  As mitigating factors, the board found an absence of a prior disciplinary 
record, a cooperative attitude during the disciplinary investigation, and full 
restitution to each of the five clients.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), and 
(d).  In addition, the board highlighted the significant changes that Martorana 
made to her law practice after relator notified her that she may be engaging in 
professional misconduct.  For example, she has since changed her standard fee 
agreement to charge an hourly fee with a retainer, rather than a flat fee, and she 
terminated her relationships with the paralegal support company and out-of-state 
counsel.  The board found only one aggravating factor—that Martorana engaged 
in multiple acts of misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). 
{¶ 11} For precedent, the board has not cited any case law for its 
recommendation of a public reprimand.  The panel, however, relies primarily on 
January Term, 2013 
 
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Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Harwood, 125 Ohio St.3d 31, 2010-Ohio-1466, 925 
N.E.2d 965, in which we issued a stayed six-month suspension to an attorney who 
violated five Rules of Professional Conduct relating to his work for foreclosure 
companies.  In that opinion, we explained that an attorney’s alliances with 
nonattorney companies to represent clients in mortgage-foreclosure proceedings 
can result in certain “ills,” such as the unauthorized practice of law and the 
improper division of legal fees.  Id. at ¶ 13.  While relator here claimed that 
Martorana’s misconduct led to some of these same ills, those charges against 
Martorana have now been dismissed.  And, unlike this case, Harwood did not 
include an allegation for charging a clearly excessive fee.  We therefore disagree 
with the panel that the sanction imposed in Harwood is relevant to our analysis. 
{¶ 12} Instead, we look to guidance in our precedent involving similar 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5.  Under that line of cases, we have consistently 
issued public reprimands to attorneys for charging an excessive fee when the 
record also includes significant mitigating evidence.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009-Ohio-5960, 918 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 23-29 
(public reprimand for attorney who charged excessive fees; mitigating factors 
included lack of a prior disciplinary record, cooperation in the disciplinary 
investigation, and the attorney’s inexperience); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Randolph, 
85 Ohio St.3d 325, 326-327, 708 N.E.2d 192 (1999) (public reprimand for 
attorney who charged excessive fees; mitigating factors included attorney’s 
complete restitution and acceptance of responsibility); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Seibel, 132 Ohio St.3d 411, 2012-Ohio-3234, 972 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 8-16 (public 
reprimand for attorney who charged a nonrefundable fee; mitigating factors 
included lack of a prior disciplinary record, acceptance of responsibility, 
cooperation with the disciplinary investigation, and restitution); Trumbull Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Rucker, 134 Ohio St.3d 282, 2012-Ohio-5642, 981 N.E.2d 866, ¶ 3-6 
(public reprimand for attorney who charged a nonrefundable fee; mitigating 
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factors included lack of a prior disciplinary record, cooperation with the 
disciplinary investigation, and restitution). 
{¶ 13} While we have imposed harsher sanctions for charging an 
excessive fee, those sanctions have typically been imposed in cases with 
significant aggravating factors, most notably a failure to return the client’s money.  
For example, in Akron Bar Assn. v. Carr, 131 Ohio St.3d 210, 2012-Ohio-610, 
963 N.E.2d 802, the respondent attorney—similar to Martorana here—was found 
in violation of only one disciplinary rule, Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a).  However, that 
attorney did not make restitution, he was driven by a selfish motive, and he failed 
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Accordingly, we 
issued a six-month, fully stayed suspension on conditions, including the condition 
to make complete restitution.  Id. at ¶ 19.  See also Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
Halliburton-Cohen, 106 Ohio St.3d 98, 2005-Ohio-3956, 832 N.E.2d 42 (attorney 
who charged an excessive fee, along with other misconduct, suspended for six 
months, stayed on the condition that she fully refund her client; prior discipline 
was considered an aggravating factor). 
{¶ 14} Similarly, we have also imposed harsher sanctions on attorneys 
who charged a clearly excessive fee and committed additional misconduct.  For 
example, in Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Cook, 121 Ohio St.3d 9, 2009-Ohio-259, 
901 N.E.2d 225, the attorney not only charged an excessive fee, but he also failed 
to deposit unearned funds in a client trust account and failed to maintain records 
for client funds in his possession.  Id. at ¶ 8.  We accordingly issued a six-month 
suspension, stayed on conditions, including the condition to repay his client.  Id. 
at ¶ 12.  See also Toledo Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 121 Ohio St.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-
777, 903 N.E.2d 306 (attorney suspended for six months, stayed on conditions, 
for charging two clients an excessive fee, impermissibly sharing fees with another 
lawyer, and failing to deposit unearned fees in a client trust account); Dayton Bar 
Assn. v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012-Ohio-879, 965 N.E.2d 268 (attorney 
January Term, 2013 
 
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suspended for six months, stayed on conditions, for charging a client an excessive 
fee, continuing a representation that created a conflict of interest, and engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶ 15} While Martorana’s misconduct affected five clients, she has 
violated only one disciplinary rule.  In addition, she has no prior disciplinary 
record, she fully cooperated in the disciplinary investigation, she made significant 
changes to her law practice, and—unlike the respondent in Carr—she made 
complete restitution to each client.  A public reprimand here is consistent with our 
precedent involving cases of similar misconduct and aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  Accordingly, we accept the board’s recommendation and hereby publicly 
reprimand Kim Gerette Martorana for her violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents and would impose a six-month stayed suspension. 
__________________ 
Patricia J. Schraff and Todd Petersen, for relator. 
Gallagher Sharp, Monica A. Sansalone, and Jamie A. Price, for 
respondent. 
______________________