Title: Boucek v. Boucek

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,155 
 
JOHN D. BOUCEK, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD BOUCEK and DIANA PECK, 
as Executors of the ESTATE OF BERNICE E. BOUCEK, Deceased, 
Sued Individually and as Trustee of the CLARENCE F. and BERNICE E. BOUCEK 
Irrevocable Trust, Dated July 15, 1996; and as Successor Co-Trustees of the 
Revocable Inter Vivos Trust of BERNICE E. BOUCEK, Dated August 3, 2004, 
Appellees. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When a party seeks to enforce a contractual obligation under a joint, mutual, and 
contractual will, the party's claim constitutes a demand against the estate; and the relevant 
statute of limitations is the nonclaim statute, K.S.A. 59-2239. 
 
2.  
 
The statute of limitations governing breach of trust and constructive fraud causes 
of action is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). It begins to run at discovery of the breach or the alleged 
fraudulent act, which in this case was no earlier than the date on which a transfer from the 
irrevocable trust was made.  
 
3. 
Courts do not favor revocation of will by implication. A later testamentary 
document that does not expressly revoke a prior joint, mutual, and contractual will but 
2 
 
 
 
contains inconsistent provisions operates as revocation of the will and a rescission of the 
contract by implication only to the extent of the inconsistency. 
 
4. 
On the record in this case, the plaintiff's breach of contract, breach of trust, and 
constructive fraud claims are not subject to summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed May 27, 2011. 
Appeal from Ottawa District Court; JOHN E. WECKEL, judge. Opinion filed July 12, 2013. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the district court is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded.  
 
David R. Klaassen, of Marquette, argued the cause, and Heather R. McCollum, of the same firm, 
and Larry G. Michel and Karen Q. Couch, of Kennedy Berkley Yarnevich & Williamson, Chartered, of 
Salina, were with him on the briefs for appellant.   
 
Robert A. Martin, of Norton, Wasserman, Jones & Kelly, L.L.C., of Salina, argued the cause and 
was on the briefs for appellees.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  This trust and estate case began with family intrigue, betrayal, and 
revenge. 
 
The plaintiff is John D. Boucek; the defendants are his brother and sister, Richard 
Boucek and Diana Peck. John filed this suit in 2006 against his mother, Bernice Boucek, 
both individually and in her capacity as trustee for two trusts. Bernice has since died, and 
Richard and Diana have stepped into her shoes in their capacities as executors for her 
estate and as successor cotrustees of a 2004 trust.  
 
3 
 
 
 
The district court judge granted summary judgment to Richard and Diana based on 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
 
A panel of our Court of Appeals affirmed the district court judgment as right for 
the wrong reason. The panel rejected John's argument that Bernice's 2004 actions—
designed to disinherit him—constituted a breach of her 1989 joint, mutual, and 
contractual will (1989 Will) made with the parties' father, Clarence "Frank" Boucek. It 
instead concluded that an irrevocable 1996 trust (1996 Trust) created by Bernice and 
Frank implicitly revoked or modified the 1989 Will and that a lack of clarity about the 
identity of the property owned by the 1996 Trust required a limited remand to the district 
court for factual findings. The panel also rejected a statute of limitations defense 
advanced by Richard and Diana on the breach of contract claim, and it upheld the district 
judge's grant of summary judgment against John on his claims for breach of trust 
regarding the 1996 Trust and constructive fraud. Boucek v. Boucek, No. 103,155, 2011 
WL 2175969 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion).  
 
This court granted John's petition for review on all issues, and it granted Richard 
and Diana's cross-petition for review on their affirmative defenses, including the statutes 
of limitations applicable to John's three causes of action. For the reasons we explain 
below, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision in part and reverse it in part. We reverse 
the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. On the record before us and under the governing law, Richard and 
Diana are not entitled to summary judgment on any of John's three claims.  
 
4 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
In 1989, Bernice and Frank executed a joint, mutual, and contractual will in which 
they agreed that, after the death of the second of them, all of their property should be 
distributed to their four children, including John, in equal shares.  
  
 
In 1996, after Frank learned that he had cancer, he and Bernice created and 
executed an irrevocable trust. The 1996 Trust instrument, like the 1989 Will, references a 
particular piece of real property, the homestead. The 1996 Trust's distribution provisions 
are largely similar to those of the 1989 Will, although there are some differences; for 
example, the couple's two sons are granted life estates rather than fee simple in the 
homestead. Ownership of the homestead, which appears to be the principal prize at stake 
in this litigation, was never transferred to the 1996 Trust. The record on appeal is not 
clear on exactly what other property was transferred to the 1996 Trust.  
 
 
In 1998, Frank died. A copy of the 1989 Will was filed with Bernice's affidavit 
more than 6 months after Frank's death. The 1989 Will apparently was never probated.  
 
 
As the century turned, familial disharmony led to John filing several lawsuits 
against members of his family, including Bernice, after he was excluded from the family 
business. 
  
 
In August 2004, Bernice executed a new, revocable inter vivos trust (2004 Trust) 
and a new, pour-over will with the express intent to disinherit John. The 2004 Trust 
instrument provided that, at Bernice's death, all of the 2004 Trust property would be 
distributed to Richard, Diana, and their sister. No property was to pass to John. 
  
5 
 
 
 
 
On September 8, 2004, Bernice transferred substantially all of her property, 
including property that had been in the 1996 Trust, to the 2004 Trust. 
  
 
John filed this action against Bernice on September 6, 2006. He made three 
claims: breach of the 1989 Will, i.e., breach of contract; breach of trust regarding the 
1996 Trust; and constructive fraud.  
 
 
In July 2007, Bernice sought summary judgment, and the district judge denied it. 
The judge reasoned that facts in issue in this case were being litigated in a different 
action. 
  
 
Bernice died in January 2008, and a will contest ensued. After trial in Ottawa 
County, the district judge ruled that the 1996 Trust revoked or superseded the 1989 Will; 
that the 1989 Will was presumptively revoked; and that the 2004 Will, not the 1989 Will, 
should be admitted to probate. John appealed these rulings to the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
In March 2009, Richard and Diana renewed the defense motion for summary 
judgment in this action. The district judge granted the motion on the basis of "collateral 
estoppel, res judicata, claim preclusion and/or issue preclusion" applying "because 
possible controverted facts ha[d] previously been litigated and decided between the 
parties" in the will contest. 
 
 
On June 18, 2010, the Court of Appeals ruled on John's appeal in the will contest, 
affirming the admission of the 2004 Will to probate but otherwise abrogating the findings 
and conclusions from district court.  In re Estate of Boucek, No. 101,767, 2010 WL 
2502879 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion). 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
On John's appeal from the summary judgment granted by the district judge in this 
case, a panel of our Court of Appeals disagreed with the district judge's rationale and held 
that the earlier will contest did not bar John's claims as a matter of law. See In re Estate 
of Boucek, 2010 WL 2502879, at *1 (district judge's factual findings, rulings outside 
admission of 2004 Will to probate abrogated). But the panel nevertheless concluded that 
summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Richard and Diana, save a 
limited remand to settle the factual question of exactly which property was transferred to 
the 1996 Trust. Boucek, 2011 WL 2175969, at *2-9. 
 
On the breach of contract claim, the panel rejected Richard and Diana's statute of 
limitations defense: 
 
 
"Defendants also argue that John's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
But assuming the 1989 [W]ill remained in effect at all after Clarence and Bernice signed 
the 1996 [T]rust, the breach of the contractual provisions did not occur until Bernice's 
new will was submitted for probate in 2008. See In re Estate of Stratmann, 248 Kan. 
[197,] 203[, 806 P.2d 459 (1991)] (claim for breach of contractual will to be brought 
against estate of party breaching that contract). Because the breach of contract claim lies 
against the estate of the party executing a later will inconsistent with the contractual will, 
the cause of action would not accrue until the death of the second party to the contractual 
will and the presentation of the later will rather than the contractual will for probate. The 
claim here was timely." Boucek, 2011 WL 2175969, at *8.  
 
On the merits of the breach of contract claim, the panel upheld the district judge's 
summary judgment because, in its view, the 1996 Trust modified or revoked the 1989 
Will. Boucek, 2011 WL 2175969, at *6. Bernice's actions disinheriting John in 2004 thus 
could not have breached her contractual obligations under the 1989 Will.  
 
7 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals did not address Richard and Diana's statute of limitations 
defenses to John's breach of trust and constructive fraud claims, but it nevertheless 
upheld summary judgment in favor of them on those two claims. On the breach of trust 
claim, the panel relied on language in the 1996 Trust instrument granting broad discretion 
to the trustee. On the constructive fraud claim, the panel held that John had not come 
forward with evidence to establish the existence of a necessary "confidential relationship" 
between himself as beneficiary and Bernice as testator. Boucek, 2011 WL 2175969, at 
*8-9.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our discussion and disposition addresses each of the issues raised in John's 
petition for review as well as the statute of limitations and other defenses raised by 
Richard and Diana. We have taken the liberty, however, of some reordering and 
restatement of the issues for clarity of analysis.  
 
The standard of review governing cases that arise on appeal from summary 
judgment is a familiar one, and it applies here: 
 
 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is 
sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come 
forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude 
summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive 
issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable 
minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment 
8 
 
 
 
must be denied." Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 296 Kan. 943, Syl. 
¶ 1, 298 P.3d 250 (2013).  
 
Statutes of Limitations and Other Affirmative Defenses  
 
 
We discuss Richard and Diana's arguments on the applicable statutes of limitations 
and other affirmative defenses first, because, if they prevail on any one of them, they may 
be entitled to summary judgment on one or more of John's claims for a reason other than 
that upon which the Court of Appeals panel relied. We do not, at this procedural juncture, 
review either the res judicata or collateral estoppel rationales of the district judge; 
because we did not grant Richard and Diana's cross-petition for review on res judicata, 
and neither side sought review of that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion rejecting 
collateral estoppel. In short, this approach allows the Court of Appeals panel's discussion 
of these two doctrines to stand and to become law of the case. See State v. Collier, 263 
Kan. 629, 631-34, 952 P.2d 1326 (1998) (argument made to, resolved by appellate court 
becomes law of case, generally cannot be revisited, challenged on remand, or later 
appealed). Neither the doctrine of res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel can 
be relied upon on remand. 
 
On the statutes of limitations, Richard and Diana argue that the latest point at 
which the clock would have begun to run was 1999. That year, Bernice began to make 
conveyances of property out of the 1996 Trust without consideration. If the first of these 
conveyances was the triggering event, then the 5-year statute for breach of a written 
contract would have run in 2004. See K.S.A. 60-511. The 2-year statute of limitations for 
breach of trust and constructive fraud would have run in 2001. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). 
Again, this suit was filed on September 6, 2006. 
 
Richard and Diana's arguments are unpersuasive.  
9 
 
 
 
 
John had standing, as a beneficiary under the 1989 Will, to bring a breach of 
contract claim for Bernice's testamentary dispositions of property subject to the 1989 
Will that were at odds with its provisions. When a party seeks to enforce a contractual 
obligation under a joint, mutual, and contractual will, the claim constitutes a demand 
against the estate. In re Estate of Pallister, 13 Kan. App. 2d 337, 338, 770 P.2d 494 
(1989). The relevant statute of limitations is the nonclaim statute, K.S.A. 59-2239(1) (all 
demands against estate due within 4 months after date of publication, 30 days after actual 
notice). See Nelson v. Nelson, 288 Kan. 570, Syl. ¶ 20, 592, 205 P.3d 715 (2009) 
(nonclaim statute applies to third-party beneficiary's breach of contract claims; does not 
shorten time for tort claims, including fraud, under K.S.A. 59-2239[2]). Because suit was 
filed before Bernice's death in 2008, John's breach of contract claim was not time barred. 
 
John's breach of trust and constructive fraud claims are subject to K.S.A. 60-
513(a)(3), and its 2-year limitations period begins to run from the discovery of the breach 
or the alleged fraud. These two claims are based on Bernice's transfers of property out of 
the 1996 Trust, and Richard and Diana point to some evidence that John was aware of 
certain transfers dating back as far as 1999. The problem for them is that John is not 
suing on those transfers. His petition and his later arguments focus on Bernice's 
September 8, 2004, transfers. This means, again, that his September 6, 2006, claims were 
timely filed. 
 
Richard and Diana's other affirmative defenses also cannot carry the day. See State 
ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 389, 22 P.3d 124 (2001) (party asserting 
affirmative defense bears burden of proof).   
 
When there is no statute of limitations problem, there is little room for application 
of the equitable doctrine of laches. See Meneley, 271 Kan. at 388-89 (defining laches, 
10 
 
 
 
waiver). Richard and Diana's passing suggestion that, if a cause of action exists, the Bank 
of Tescott rather than John "may be the proper owner of the claim" does not qualify as an 
appellate argument, and any standing or assignment issue is deemed abandoned. See 
Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636, 688, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012) (issue mentioned in passing 
but not argued, supported; deemed waived, abandoned); State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, 
139, 284 P.3d 251 (2012) (same).  
 
John's failure to raise his alleged interests under the 1989 Will and/or the 1996 
Trust in his 2001 bankruptcy case also does not preclude this action. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(1) (2000) (bankruptcy estate includes all legal, equitable interests of debtor in 
property as of commencement of case); In re Smith, 293 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) 
(when cause of action had not accrued at commencement of bankruptcy case, neither 
cause of action nor any later recovery property of estate); In re Estate of Burcham, 248 
Kan. 897, 907, 811 P.2d 1208 (1991) (third-party beneficiary interest in will vests when 
will probated).  
 
Richard and Diana also have asserted that John waived any right to assert a claim 
under the 1996 Trust by arguing that his only claims arose under the 1989 Will and that 
the 1996 Trust was ineffective. Insofar as they are focusing on certain aspects of the 
breach of contract claim, they may be correct. But John's petition is clear that his breach 
of trust claim and constructive fraud claim are based on the transfers out of the 1996 
Trust, and his argument that it did not effectively revoke or modify the contractual 
provisions of the 1989 Will to capture the homestead property or other specific property 
does not waive his ability to raise his breach of trust or constructive fraud claims for any 
property that was transferred from the 1996 Trust.  
 
Finally, Richard and Diana's invocation of the doctrine of "unclean hands" does 
not afford them the relief they seek on John's breach of trust or constructive fraud claims 
11 
 
 
 
either. Although John may have had knowledge of certain transfers Bernice made out of 
the 1996 Trust before 2004, including property transferred to John himself, this is not 
evidence that John's conduct was in any way deceitful or unfair. John's knowledge of or 
participation in these earlier transactions has nothing to do with the propriety of the 
September 8, 2004, transfers at the heart of the breach of trust and constructive fraud 
claims. Nor do any of these transfers form the basis of the controversy here. See Goben v. 
Barry, 234 Kan. 721, Syl. ¶ 3, 676 P.2d 90 (1984) (under unclean hands doctrine, court 
may deny relief to party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, deceitful; doctrine 
applicable only when conduct pertains to controversy at issue). 
 
Having studied the alternate routes to summary judgment defendants urged us to 
follow and upon which we accepted review, we turn now to the road the Court of 
Appeals panel took on each of John's claims.  
 
Contractual Nature of 1989 Will  
 
The parties agree that the 1989 Will is a joint, mutual, contractual will. See Reznik 
v. McKee, Trustee, 216 Kan. 659, 671-79, 534 P.2d 243 (1975) (setting out factors to 
consider in determining whether will is contractual); In re Estate of Zahradnik, 6 Kan. 
App. 2d 84, 89-91, 626 P.2d 1211 (1981) (same). In that will, Frank and Bernice 
"mutually agree[]" that they will leave to the survivor "all property, real and personal of 
the party first to die, and on the death of the survivor, leav[e] all of his or her property to 
our children equally, share and share alike." Article VI of the 1989 Will describes a 
particular parcel of property—the homestead—and specifically devises it, in fee simple, 
"to Richard C. Boucek and John D. Boucek, share and share alike." All other property, on 
the death of the survivor, "shall be divided among our children equally, share and share 
alike."  
 
12 
 
 
 
"[A] joint, mutual[,] and contractual will speaks to the property of each testator at 
the time of his or her respective death and includes all after-acquired property of the 
survivor unless a different intention appears from the will." In re Estate of Jud, 238 Kan. 
268, 274, 710 P.2d 1241 (1985). "Once one of the parties to a contractual will dies and 
the other party accepts benefits under the will, the survivor cannot then revoke or alter the 
terms of the will. . . . [A]fter-acquired property passes under a contractual will unless the 
will provides otherwise." Bell v. Brittain, 19 Kan. App. 2d 1073, 1081, 880 P.2d 289 
(1994), aff'd 257 Kan. 407, 893 P.2d 251 (1995). If a contractual will is probated after the 
death of the first testator, the third-party beneficiary obtains an enforceable interest at that 
time. See In re Estate of Burcham, 248 Kan. 897, Syl. ¶ 2, 901-04.  
 
In this case, it does not appear the 1989 Will was probated after Frank's death. A 
copy of it was merely filed along with Bernice's affidavit. Yet, in 2004, Bernice was still 
bound by any contractual provisions in the 1989 Will that had survived the creation and 
execution of the irrevocable 1996 Trust. See Bell, 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1082-83 (citing In 
re Estate of Burcham, 248 Kan. at 901-03, 909-10). To the extent John can demonstrate 
that Bernice's 2004 Will and 2004 Trust violated the 1989 Will's surviving provisions, he 
proves a breach of contract.   
 
Effect of Irrevocable 1996 Trust 
 
"The legal effect of a written instrument is a question of law for the court to 
decide." Galindo v. City of Coffeyville, 256 Kan. 455, Syl. ¶ 2, 885 P.2d 1246 (1994). 
And whether an instrument is clear or ambiguous is a matter of law to be decided by the 
court. Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211 Kan. 833, 839, 508 P.2d 889 (1973).  
 
13 
 
 
 
The same rules that apply to the construction of wills apply to trusts and most 
other written documents. In re Estate of Sanders, 261 Kan. 176, 182, 929 P.2d 153 
(1996).  
 
 
"'In considering a will a court cannot begin by inferring a testator's intention and 
then construe the will to give effect to such intention however probable it may be, nor can 
it rewrite the will, in whole or in part, to conform to such presumed intention. It is the 
duty of a court to construe not to construct a will.'" 261 Kan. at 182 (quoting In re Estate 
of Graves, 203 Kan. 762, Syl. ¶ 4, 457 P.2d 71 [1969]).  
 
In other words, if the language of a written instrument is clear, it should be carried 
out as written. Sanders, 261 Kan. at 182 (quoting In re Living Trust of Huxtable, 
243 Kan. 531, 534, 757 P.2d 1286 [1988]).  
 
As mentioned previously, contractual wills prevent the surviving spouse from 
escaping the obligations of his or her agreement by merely revoking or amending the 
will. Reznik, 216 Kan. at 679. But two parties to a contract, including a contractual will, 
can agree to rescind or modify their contract. See Allen v. Allen, 108 Kan. 765, 767-68, 
196 Pac. 1075 (1921); see also Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, P.A., 279 Kan. 755, 
774, 112 P.3d 81 (2005) (modification of contract requires mutual assent, meeting of 
minds). Courts do not favor revocation by implication. See Bradshaw v. Bangley, 194 Va. 
794, 799-800, 75 S.E.2d 609 (1953). A later testamentary document that does not 
expressly revoke a prior will but contains inconsistent dispositions operates as revocation 
by implication only to the extent of the discordant provisions. See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 2d 
11, §§ 7, 23 (implied revocation of will by later document); see also, e.g., In re Estate of 
Pickrell, 248 Kan. 247, 256, 806 P.2d 1007 (1991) (where conflict exists between earlier 
executed will and later amended inter vivos trust as to how death taxes and administration 
expenses are to be paid, the last instrument in time controls); In re Estate of Rinker, 158 
Kan. 406, 415-16, 147 P.2d 740 (1944) (to revoke former will, later will must expressly 
14 
 
 
 
revoke former will or contain provisions so inconsistent with it that it is impossible for 
both instruments to stand together); Dunsworth v. Dunsworth, 148 Kan. 347, 354-55, 81 
P.2d 9 (1938) (same). 
 
The 1996 Trust does not include language expressly revoking the 1989 Will as a 
whole or rescinding any of its contractual provisions. And John argues that the 1996 
Trust did not do implicitly what it failed to do explicitly.  
 
Richard and Diana, of course, take the opposite view. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the 1996 Trust evidenced a mutual decision by Frank and Bernice to 
modify the will, stating:  "The trust demonstrates clearly and unambiguously an intent to 
reject the 1989 [W]ill as the means of disbursing property placed in the trust. In doing so, 
it modifies or rescinds the 1989 [W]ill as a contract." Boucek, 2011 WL 2175969, at *6. 
And they point to evidence regarding Frank and Bernice's intent in creating the 1996 
Trust:  Bernice testified she understood the 1996 Trust's purpose was to protect the 
family farm from creditors whom the family anticipated as a result of Frank's diagnosis 
of and treatment for cancer at a time when he was uninsured. Bernice also said she 
believed the 1996 Trust "overrode" the 1989 Will. And Richard Comfort, the attorney for 
Frank and Bernice at the time, testified that they intended their 1996 Trust to supersede 
their 1989 Will.   
 
The problem with this largely uncontroverted evidence is its irrelevance. Because 
there is no ambiguity in either the 1989 Will or the 1996 Trust, there is no need for 
testimony about intent to clarify intent or meaning. See, e.g., Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas 
Gas Supply Corp., 250 Kan. 438, 452, 827 P.2d 24 (1992) (parol evidence inadmissible 
to contradict, alter, vary terms of written instrument unless ambiguity exists on vital 
point, rendering such evidence necessary to ascertain parties' intent); In re Estate of 
Rinker, 158 Kan. at 412.  
15 
 
 
 
 
 
At most, reading the two unambiguous written instruments together, the 1996 
Trust modified the 1989 Will in certain particulars; it did not fully revoke it as a 
testamentary instrument nor fully rescind it as a contract. The 1996 Trust affected only 
the items of personal property and parcels of real property whose joint or individual 
ownership was transferred to it before Frank's death. On these items and parcels, and only 
on these items and parcels, the provisions of the 1996 Trust were inconsistent with and 
thus superseded the provisions of the 1989 Will by Frank's and Bernice's mutual assent. 
As the homestead never became part of the corpus of the irrevocable 1996 Trust, it 
remained—at a minimum, between July 15, 1996, and September 8, 2004—subject to the 
fee simple disposition recited in the 1989 Will rather than the life estate disposition 
recited in the 1996 Trust. To the extent it is unclear what other jointly or individually 
owned property was transferred to the 1996 Trust before Frank's death, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals panel that a limited remand to the district court would have been 
necessary to determine that question and thus which other items and parcels remained 
subject to the 1989 Will or became subject to the 1996 Trust between, at a minimum, July 
15, 1996, and September 8, 2004. However, as discussed below, Bernice's September 8, 
2004, actions purported to control both categories of property, i.e., property subject to the 
joint, mutual, and contractual 1989 will as well as property subject to the irrevocable 
1996 Trust. Because, as we discuss below, a remand of the entire case is necessary, the 
limited remand envisioned by the Court of Appeals panel need not be isolated from the 
other issues that require attention in the district court.  
 
Propriety of Summary Judgment 
 
Having determined the effect of the 1996 Trust on the 1989 Will, we move to the 
question central to this appeal:  Has John come forward with evidence sufficient to 
withstand Richard and Diana's motion for summary judgment on his three claims? To 
16 
 
 
 
recap on certain of the pertinent uncontroverted facts, on August 3, 2004, with the 
express purpose of disinheriting John, Bernice executed a new revocable inter vivos trust. 
The 2004 Trust was created for the sole benefit of Bernice during her life. At her death, 
all of the Trust property was to be distributed to all of her children except John. Also on 
August 3, 2004, Bernice executed a new, pour-over will. Shortly thereafter, for no 
consideration, Bernice transferred substantially all of her property, that is, each item and 
parcel subject to either the 1989 Will or the 1996 Trust, to herself as trustee of the 2004 
Trust. These transfers included the homestead.    
 
 
Breach of Contract 
 
 
John has come forward with evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact on whether Bernice breached her contract with Frank, to the extent 
that property she transferred to her revocable 2004 Trust had previously remained subject 
to the joint, mutual, and contractual 1989 Will. At this juncture, for example, the 
homestead appears to be in this category of property, as it was never transferred to the 
1996 Trust before Frank's death. Because the 1989 Will qualified as a contract as well as 
a testamentary instrument, Bernice was not free to remove property from its reach 
unilaterally, either before or after Frank's death. See Bell, 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1081. And, 
as a third-party beneficiary of the contract embodied in the 1989 Will, John may seek to 
enforce the Will's provisions. See In re Estate of Burcham, 248 Kan. 897, Syl. ¶ 2; Bell, 
19 Kan. App. 2d at 1081-83. Bernice's actions in 2004 appear to have been contrary to 
the 1989 Will. John's breach of contract claim must be remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings.   
 
17 
 
 
 
 
Breach of Trust 
 
 
This claim focuses on the other category of property belonging to Bernice, the 
property transferred to the 1996 Trust by mutual agreement with Frank during his 
lifetime. As stated above, it is unclear from the record before us exactly which items and 
parcels belong in this category, but treating it as a category is sufficient for purposes of 
this appeal.   
 
The Court of Appeals panel correctly noted that "[t]rust instruments will be 
enforced as they are written when the language is clear as to the testators' intent." Boucek, 
2011 WL 2175969, at *8. Looking to the language of the 1996 Trust, the panel concluded 
that there was no breach of the 1996 Trust, as a matter of law, because it afforded 
Bernice, as trustee, "the right to 'handle' the trust property in [her] 'sole discretion [as she] 
may deem best.'" 2011 WL 2175969, at *8.  
 
The 1996 Trust is denominated irrevocable for the benefit of Frank and Bernice as 
settlors and trustees. Its Section I, describing the trust property, refers to the original trust 
estate as that described in an attached schedule. In the record before us, there is no 
attached schedule. During their lifetimes, Frank and Bernice were to receive income from 
the trust property, and, upon either or both of them becoming incompetent or upon their 
deaths, the surviving or successor trustee could pay certain expenses from income or 
principal. After the death of the surviving trustee, the remaining trust estate is to be 
distributed as follows:  John and Richard, in their lifetimes, are to share equally "the 
income and use of the profits, rents, crops and earnings" from the homestead property, 
which is specifically described; all other trust property is to be divided into separate equal 
trusts for each of Frank and Bernice's four living children or their living descendants.    
 
18 
 
 
 
The 1996 Trust instrument grants the trustees "absolute discretion" to allocate 
between principal and income; it waives fees; and it bestows general trustee powers, 
including the ability to "lease, sell, improve or otherwise handle [trust property] as they 
in their sole discretion may deem best."  
 
Section IX, entitled "Transfer of Trust Property," states:  
 
"The Trustees shall have full power and authority in their discretion, without 
notice to anyone, and without order of any court, to sell at private sale, to exchange under 
private contract, and to transfer and convey any of the Trust property and receive the 
consideration therefore, whether in cash or other property, a[t] such times and for such 
consideration as the Trustees may deem to be to the best interests of the Trust. Such sales 
and transfers of the Trust property by the Trustees may be either for cash or upon terms 
as may appear in the sole discretion of the Trustees for the best interests of the Trust."   
 
John claims Bernice breached the 1996 Trust by transferring property out of the 
Trust without consideration "and otherwise in violation" of the Trust. He correctly 
observes:  "The Irrevocable Trust is by its terms 'irrevocable.'" And he argues:  
"Regardless of how broadly the trust defines a trustee's discretion—including 'absolute,' 
'sole,' or 'uncontrolled'—such discretion must be exercised 'in good faith and in 
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the 
beneficiaries.'"   
 
Even if we agree with the Court of Appeals that the 1996 Trust grants broad 
discretion to the Trustees in handling trust property, Bernice had a fiduciary obligation to 
the Trust. See K.S.A. 58a-814; Jennings v. Murdock, 220 Kan. 182, 193-211, 553 P.2d 
846 (1976); Elward v. Elward, 117 Kan. 458, 459, 232 Pac. 240 (1925) (trustee may not 
"'so exercise[e] his discretion as to oppress the beneficiary or cause loss to the trust 
property'"). Even if the instrument's terms gave Bernice discretion to remove assets, with 
19 
 
 
 
or without consideration, her discretion was to be exercised in "the best interests of the 
Trust." Based on the undisputed facts, drawing all reasonable inferences in John's favor, 
there remain genuine issues of material fact on whether Bernice's 2004 actions breached 
the 1996 Trust, particularly because of her admitted purpose to defeat the earlier 
irrevocable 1996 Trust's distribution to John. Reversal of summary judgment is 
compelled, and the breach of trust claim must be remanded to district court for further 
proceedings.   
 
 
Constructive Fraud 
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that because there was no breach of the 1996 
Trust, there could be no claim for constructive fraud. Because we have concluded that 
John's breach of contract and breach of trust claims survive summary judgment, so too 
does his constructive fraud claim. It also must be remanded to district court for further 
proceedings.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The district court judge erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of 
collateral estoppel. The applicable statutes of limitations do not bar plaintiff John D. 
Boucek's claims for breach of contract, breach of trust, and constructive fraud. The Court 
of Appeals panel erred in upholding judgment for defendants Richard Boucek and Diana 
Peck. We agree with the panel's remand order but hold that remand should be broader.  
 
The judgment of the district court is reversed. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the district court 
for further proceedings.