Title: State v. Ogden

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_OGDEN.92-386; 161 Vt. 336; 640 A.2d 6

[Opinion Filed 05-Nov-1993]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 03-Feb-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 92-386


 State of Vermont                   Supreme Court

                                    On Appeal from
        v.                          District Court of Vermont
                                    Unit No. 3, Essex Circuit

 Danelle Ogden                      May Term, 1993


 Alan W. Cheever, J.

 Thomas M. Kelly, Drug Prosecutor, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.    Defendant Danelle Ogden appeals his conviction for
 knowing and unlawful delivery of more than one-half ounce of marijuana in
 violation of 18 V.S.A. { 4230(b)(2).  He claims that: (1) a search of his
 residence was improperly executed and evidence from it should have been
 suppressed; (2) the statement of a police informant should have been
 admitted into evidence because it was an admission by the government as a
 party opponent in the prosecution; and (3) flawed instructions prevented the
 jury from giving fair consideration to the defense of entrapment.  We
 affirm.
      On August 24, 1990, two undercover officers of the Northern Vermont
 Drug Task Force met an informant in Norton, Vermont, to arrange a purchase
 of illegal drugs, as part of an investigation in an area of the town known

 

 as Earth People's Park.  The informant, Robin Stengel, had been a resident
 of the Park and had agreed to introduce the officers to individuals who
 could sell them marijuana.  As a result of Stengel's efforts, defendant met
 with the officers just outside the Park and delivered to them approximately
 ten ounces of marijuana for $500.
      Continuing its investigation, the Task Force obtained six search
 warrants for residences in the Park, including defendant's.  Before the
 execution of the warrants, the police knew that marijuana cultivators in the
 Park carried guns and would discharge them to warn others of police presence
 in the Park, that shots had been fired at a police officer when he entered
 the Park to make an arrest, and that others had complained of shots being
 fired at them in the Park.  The trial court found that the officers had a
 reasonable basis to believe that there was a risk defendant would use
 firearms or otherwise engage in violence upon police entering his property.
      On September 28, 1990, the police executed the warrant to search
 defendant's home for evidence of marijuana cultivation and sale.  Defendant
 was at home and in bed at the time.  At approximately 6:25 a.m., the police
 approached a woodshed-type foyer attached to defendant's house and found the
 door to the shed ajar.  They entered the open door and proceeded to a second
 door, which was closed but unlocked, knocked loudly on the door, announced
 "State Police, search warrant," and immediately entered the premises.  As a
 result of the search, police seized marijuana and other evidence of
 cultivation.  Defendant was tried before a jury on the August 24 delivery of
 marijuana and unsuccessfully asserted the defense of entrapment.

 

                                     I.
      Defendant first contends that the results of the September 28 search
 should have been suppressed because the search was illegal.  Alternatively,
 defendant claims that the evidence should have been excluded because its
 prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.  We find no error in the
 decision to admit the evidence at trial.
      According to the first part of defendant's argument, the search was
 illegal because the State did not comply fully with the procedural
 requirements of its execution.  Defendant asserts that valid execution of a
 warrant requires police to knock, announce their presence and purpose, and
 wait a reasonable period of time prior to entering the premises, and that
 only exigent circumstances, not present in this case, can excuse full
 compliance.  The State argues that no such "knock and announce" requirement
 exists as a matter of state or federal constitutional law, and that even if
 it does, sufficient exigency existed to validate the immediate entry into
 defendant's home.
      In its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress evidence resulting
 from the search, the trial court found that police, prior to entering the
 closed inner door, "pounded" on the door and uttered in a loud voice "State
 Police - Search Warrant."  The court also found that defendant's bedroom was
 directly above the entrance to the house; that defendant's girlfriend,
 present with him at the time of the search, was a light sleeper; and that an
 officer outside the house clearly heard the other officers "pounding,
 shouting and stomping through the dwelling."  The court concluded that
 defendant's testimony that police failed to "knock and announce" was not

 

 credible.  Since the court found and defendant on appeal does not contest
 that the police knocked and announced their presence prior to entry, we need
 not decide whether either the Fourth Amendment to the United States
 Constitution or Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution mandates
 this procedure in executing a search warrant.  We assume for purposes of
 discussion only that it is required.  The issue is whether, after providing
 notice of their presence and intent to search prior to entry, exigent
 circumstances can permit immediate entry, and if so, whether sufficient
 exigency existed the morning of September 28, 1990.
      An exigency may excuse compliance with a knock-and-announce
 requirement.  Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 606 (2d Cir. 1991);
 Beshears v. State,