Title: Montague v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, 
JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
 
CHAUNCEY LAMONT MONTAGUE 
 
v.   Record No. 090337 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
  
 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
  
November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the record supports a 
circuit court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence.  The defendant contended that he was unlawfully seized 
when two police officers approached him requesting information 
regarding his identity, and used that information to determine 
whether there were outstanding warrants for his arrest and 
whether he was trespassing on private property.  We also 
consider whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
defendant’s conviction for assault and battery of a law 
enforcement officer. 
Chauncey Lamont Montague was convicted in a bench trial in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Danville for possession of 
cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250; possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2; 
possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-308.4; and assault and battery of a law 
enforcement officer, in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C).  Before 
trial, Montague filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing 
that the cocaine and firearm were obtained as a result of an 
unlawful seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The circuit court denied Montague’s motion.  At the 
conclusion of the bench trial, the circuit court sentenced 
Montague to a total of fifteen years and six months’ 
imprisonment, with ten years suspended. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Montague’s convictions in an 
unpublished order.  Montague v. Commonwealth, No. 1663-07-3 
(January 20, 2009).  The Court held that the circuit court did 
not err in denying Montague’s motion to suppress the evidence, 
because the encounter between the police and Montague was 
consensual in nature.  Id., slip op. at 5.  The Court also held 
that the evidence was sufficient to support Montague’s 
conviction for assault and battery of a law enforcement officer.  
Id., slip op. at 6. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that in January 2007, 
Lieutenant Gary Wilson and Officer Larry D. Land were engaged in 
off-duty employment at a local apartment complex.  The officers 
were patrolling the premises in an effort to prevent individuals 
who had been barred from the complex from trespassing.  The 
officers, who were wearing their police uniforms, observed 
Montague and a female companion leave one of the apartment 
 
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buildings and walk toward a nearby unoccupied vehicle that had 
its engine running. 
 
When Officer Land asked Montague whether he lived at the 
apartment complex, Montague responded that he did not.  Officer 
Land also asked Montague whether he owned the vehicle, and 
Montague replied that he did.  Although Montague was unable to 
produce any documentation establishing his identity, he provided 
the officers with his name, social security number, and date of 
birth. 
 
After receiving that information, Officer Land contacted a 
police “dispatcher” to determine whether there were any 
outstanding arrest warrants for Montague.  Angela Davis, 
Montague’s companion, heard Officer Land contacting the 
dispatcher.  However, the record contains no evidence indicating 
whether Montague was aware that Officer Land was attempting to 
obtain this information. 
 
During the two or three minutes that the officers waited 
for a response from the dispatcher, the officers engaged in 
general conversation with Montague and remained a distance of 
between four and five feet from him.  Meanwhile, Davis walked 
about five feet away from the officers and sat on the steps of 
an apartment building. 
 
During this time, Montague did not ask the officers whether 
he was free to leave, nor did he attempt to leave.  Also, the 
 
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officers did not discuss with Montague whether he was permitted 
to leave. 
 
As the officers continued to wait for a response from the 
dispatcher, Officer Land reviewed the “ban list” of individuals 
who were barred by the owner of the property from entering the 
premises.  Officer Land testified that he customarily reviewed 
this list while waiting for a response regarding outstanding 
warrants because this procedure “makes it a little bit quicker 
for” the person talking with the police.  Montague’s name did 
not appear on the “ban list.” 
 
When the dispatcher relayed to the officers that there were 
two outstanding warrants for Montague’s arrest, the officers 
immediately informed Montague that he was under arrest.  As the 
officers attempted to take Montague into custody, Montague began 
“struggling,” “twisting,” and “jerking,” in an apparent attempt 
to resist the officers’ joint efforts to place him in handcuffs. 
 
During this struggle, Montague repeatedly tried to reach 
into one of his pants pockets.  When Officer Land pulled 
Montague’s hand out of that pocket, a handgun fell onto the 
ground.  Officer Land also observed some “packets” fall from 
Montague’s sweatshirt pocket. 
 
As Montague continued to resist the officers’ attempt to 
place handcuffs on him, Lieutenant Wilson saw Montague push 
Officer Land and strike him in the chest with an elbow.  
 
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Ultimately, after a period of several minutes, the officers were 
able to subdue Montague.  The officers then retrieved the 
firearm and the “packets” that later were determined to contain 
cocaine. 
 
In his first argument on appeal, Montague contends that the 
Court of Appeals erroneously upheld the circuit court’s denial 
of his motion to suppress the evidence.  Montague asserts that 
his encounter with the police officers was not consensual, and 
that the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe 
that he was engaged in criminal activity.  According to 
Montague, the officers unlawfully seized him at the time that 
they asserted the authority to check for outstanding warrants 
and to ascertain whether he was trespassing at the apartment 
complex.  Montague maintains that under these circumstances, a 
reasonable person would not have thought that he was free to 
leave the officers’ presence.  We disagree with Montague’s 
arguments. 
 
The determination whether a person has been seized within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of 
law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.  Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 177, 670 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2009); 
McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 551-52, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 
(2008).  Under the Fourth Amendment, any seizure of a person, no 
matter how brief, must have an objective justification related 
 
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to law enforcement.  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
551 (1980); see Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 195, 413 
S.E.2d 645, 647 (1992). 
 
A person is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
when the police “by means of physical force or show of 
authority” restrain that person’s freedom of movement.  
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
19 n. 16 (1968); McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 
S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); Baldwin, 243 Va. at 196, 413 S.E.2d at 
647.  Conversely, a voluntary encounter between the police and a 
citizen does not constitute a seizure prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); 
Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 169, 655 S.E.2d 1, 4 
(2008); Harris v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 28, 32, 581 S.E.2d 206, 
209 (2003).  Thus, even when the police do not have a reasonable 
suspicion that an individual may be engaged in criminal 
activity, they may approach that person and request information 
regarding the person’s identity without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435; Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality 
opinion); McCain, 261 Va. at 491, 545 S.E.2d at 546. 
 
The Fourth Amendment also is not implicated when a person 
voluntarily responds to a police request to produce 
 
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identification, even if the person’s response later is used 
against him in a criminal prosecution.  See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 
434; Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98; Baldwin, 243 Va. at 196, 413 
S.E.2d at 648.  As long as the police do not convey, by word or 
deed, that compliance with their request is mandatory, there is 
no requirement that these encounters be based on an objective or 
particularized suspicion regarding the person approached.  See 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54; 
Baldwin, 243 Va. at 196, 413 S.E.2d at 647-48. 
 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that most individuals 
will feel obligated to respond when asked questions by a police 
officer, but has held that this fact alone will not convert a 
consensual encounter into a seizure.  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; 
Baldwin, 243 Va. at 197, 413 S.E.2d at 648.  The Court has 
explained that a contrary conclusion would create constitutional 
barriers to everyday encounters between the police and 
individual citizens, imposing unrealistic burdens on “a wide 
variety of legitimate law enforcement practices.”  Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 554.  Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded that an 
encounter between the police and a citizen does not constitute a 
seizure unless, taking into account all the circumstances of the 
encounter, “a reasonable person would . . . believe[] that he 
was not free to leave.”  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Harris, 
266 Va. at 32, 581 S.E.2d at 209; Baldwin, 243 Va. at 196, 413 
 
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S.E.2d at 647-48; see Malbrough, 275 Va. at 169, 655 S.E.2d at 
4. 
 
If the person to whom the police questions are directed 
objectively “remains free to disregard the questions and walk 
away,” there is no demonstrable restriction on the person’s 
liberty and the encounter does not result in a seizure.  
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54; Baldwin, 243 Va. at 196, 413 
S.E.2d at 647.  Some factors that might indicate the occurrence 
of a seizure include the threatening presence of several police 
officers, their display of weapons, a physical touching of the 
person to whom the questions are directed, and the use of 
language indicating that compliance with the police request is 
required.  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555; McCain, 261 Va. at 491, 
545 S.E.2d at 545-46; Baldwin, 243 Va. at 196, 413 S.E.2d at 
648. 
 
Based on the facts and circumstances before us, we conclude 
that the evidence supports the circuit court’s conclusion that 
the police encounter with Montague was consensual, and that 
Montague was not seized until the police attempted to take him 
into custody upon learning of the outstanding arrest warrants.  
At the outset of the encounter, the police merely approached 
Montague and asked whether he resided at the apartment complex.  
When Montague replied that he did not live there, the police 
requested that Montague provide some information regarding his 
 
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identity.  Montague willingly provided the police his name, 
social security number, and date of birth. 
 
During the encounter, which lasted only two or three 
minutes, the police checked the “ban list” but did not engage in 
any show of force or use language indicating that Montague was 
required to remain at that location.  Also, the police did not 
tell Montague that he was required to stay, and Montague did not 
make any attempt to leave.*  Instead, Montague remained in the 
area, standing about five feet away from the officers while his 
companion moved to sit on some nearby steps.  Thus, the evidence 
supports the circuit court’s conclusion that a reasonable person 
in Montague’s position would not have thought that he was 
required to remain in the police officers’ presence after 
providing them with the requested information regarding his 
identity. 
 
The fact that the officers did not explicitly tell Montague 
that he was free to leave is not determinative of the issue 
whether a seizure occurred.  Harris, 266 Va. at 33, 581 S.E.2d 
at 210; see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996).  
Rather, that evidence is only one fact among many that we 
consider based on the record before us.  See Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); McCain, 275 Va. at 552, 
                     
* The record does not contain any evidence indicating that 
Montague was aware of Officer Land’s contact with the police 
dispatcher. 
 
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659 S.E.2d at 515.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in confirming the circuit court’s denial of 
Montague’s motion to suppress the evidence. 
 
We next consider Montague’s argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction under Code § 18.2-57(C) 
for assault and battery of a law enforcement officer.  According 
to Montague, the evidence failed to establish that Montague 
intended to inflict physical harm on Officer Land.  We disagree 
with this argument. 
 
Code § 18.2-57(C) prohibits a person from committing an 
assault and battery knowing or having reason to know that the 
victim is a law enforcement officer.  Because Montague does not 
dispute that he knew Officer Land was a law enforcement officer, 
the sole issue before us is whether the evidence supports the 
circuit court’s determination that Montague committed an assault 
and battery on Officer Land. 
 
In this challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573, 667 
S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524, 
659 S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 
148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008).  We will affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence 
to support it.  Code § 8.01-680; Britt, 276 Va. at 574, 667 
 
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S.E.2d at 765; Jay, 275 Va. at 524, 659 S.E.2d at 319; Bolden, 
275 Va. at 148, 654 S.E.2d at 586. 
 
Assault and battery are common law crimes.  An assault is 
an “attempt with force and violence, to do some bodily hurt to 
another, whether from wantonness or malice, by means calculated 
to produce the end if carried into execution; it is any act 
accompanied with circumstances denoting an intention, coupled 
with a present ability, to use actual violence against another 
person.”  Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 387, 585 
S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003); accord Carter v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
44, 47, 606 S.E.2d 839, 841 (2005); Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 
Va. 679, 681, 36 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1946).  Battery is the actual 
infliction of corporal hurt on another that is done willfully or 
in anger.  Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 35, 557 S.E.2d 
220, 222 (2002); see Jones, 184 Va. at 682, 36 S.E.2d at 572.  
The intent to harm may be shown by the circumstances of the 
offense, including the actor’s words and conduct.  Vaughn, 263 
Va. at 36, 557 S.E.2d at 223. 
 
Here, the evidence showed that Montague pushed Officer Land 
and struck him in the chest with an elbow.  This sequence of 
events occurred as Montague was trying to prevent the police 
officers from taking him into custody on outstanding arrest 
warrants.  Viewed in this context, the evidence was sufficient 
to establish that Montague acted with the intent to inflict 
 
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physical harm on Officer Land in order to impede the officers’ 
ability to subdue Montague.  Accordingly, we hold that the Court 
of Appeals did not err in concluding that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Montague under Code § 18.2-57(C) of the 
crime of assault and battery of a law enforcement officer. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
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