Title: Commonwealth v. DePina

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11794 
SJC-11932 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ESAU DePINA. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ISAIAH MONTEIRO. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     November 10, 2016. - March 13, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Lowy, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Testimony before grand jury, 
Hearsay, Admission by silence, Statement of codefendant, 
Joint venturer, Prior misconduct, Immunized witness, Third-
party culprit, Expert opinion.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Joint Enterprise.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Confrontation of witnesses, 
Hearsay, Conduct of prosecutor, Opening statement, 
Instructions to jury, Severance, Trial of defendants 
together. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 10, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for Esau DePina. 
 
Stephen Neyman for Isaiah Monteiro. 
 
Audrey Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendants, Isaiah Monteiro and Esau DePina, were each found 
guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, as well as of related offenses, in the shooting 
death of the victim, Anthony Hamilton, on November 16, 2009.1  In 
this direct appeal, they challenge the substantive admission of 
a witness's grand jury testimony, various statements in that 
testimony they claim are independently inadmissible, certain 
portions of the prosecutor's opening statement, the jury 
instructions on immunized witness testimony, and the denial of 
their motions to sever; they also raise various evidentiary 
issues.  In addition, both defendants seek relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We discern no error warranting reversal, and, 
having carefully reviewed the record, see no reason to reduce or 
set aside the verdicts under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the defendants' convictions. 
 
1.  Background and proceedings.  a.  Facts.  We recite the 
facts that the jury could have found, reserving certain details 
for later discussion.  On November 16, 2009, at approximately 
                     
 
1 Esau DePina also was convicted of four charges of armed 
assault with the intent to murder, unlawful possession of a 
firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification card, and discharge of a firearm within 500 feet 
of a building.  Isaiah Monteiro also was convicted of unlawful 
possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition, 
and acquitted of four charges of assault with intent to murder 
and one charge of discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a 
building. 
3 
 
 
1 P.M., the victim was with several of his friends on the front 
porch of a house on Johnson Court in Brockton.  A man approached 
on foot and shot him.  Witnesses near the scene -- neighbors, a 
carpenter, and the driver of a passing vehicle -- described 
hearing at least three gunshots and seeing a man running, 
climbing through a hole in a fence, and getting into a waiting 
vehicle.  None of the witnesses was able to provide more than a 
general description of that individual, whom most described as a 
relatively dark-skinned male in a gray hooded sweatshirt. 
 
No bullets were recovered from the victim's body, but 
fifteen cartridges, eight spent shells, and three lead fragments 
were found at the scene.  A State police ballistics expert 
determined that all of the shots were fired by the same gun, 
likely a .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol, but were unable to 
identify a specific weapon or manufacturer.  Forensic examiners 
also took cast impressions of four partial footprints found near 
the location where the fleeing man had climbed through a fence, 
but investigators were unable to determine the precise size or 
brand of the shoe that made the impression. 
 
With few leads, there was little progress in the 
investigation for several months.  In the summer of 2010, police 
spoke with Licea DaSilva, Monteiro's girl friend at the time of 
the shooting.  Police also spoke with Kevin Dossanto, Monteiro's 
cousin.  From their statements, police learned that Monteiro had 
4 
 
 
been "jumped" by the victim and the victim's brother some time 
before the shooting.  They also learned that Monteiro and DePina 
had spent the weekend before the shooting at a hotel in 
Brockton, with DaSilva and others.  DaSilva, who had been 
consuming alcohol and drugs, saw Monteiro with a handgun and 
"shells" in the room. 
 
On the following Monday morning, Monteiro and DaSilva drove 
to the school she attended.  DaSilva gave Monteiro permission to 
use her vehicle for the rest of the day, and asked him to bring 
her lunch.  Dossanto later went with Monteiro to the hotel and 
to deliver lunch to DaSilva.  En route, they picked up DePina.  
When they dropped her lunch off at school, DaSilva noticed that 
DePina was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt, which she thought 
was strange given the weather.  The three men then continued 
"joy riding" around Brockton, while listening to music and 
smoking marijuana. 
 
At some point, Dossanto noticed that they had entered the 
north side of Brockton.  This was a part of the city they 
generally avoided because of a "beef" between residents who grew 
up on the north side and those, like Dossanto, Monteiro, and 
DePina, who grew up on the south side.  When Dossanto asked why 
they were on the north side, Monteiro told him not to worry 
about it. 
5 
 
 
 
As they were driving near Johnson Court, Monteiro pointed 
out a group of people standing on the street.  After passing 
Johnson Court, Monteiro pulled over and DePina got out of the 
vehicle.  Less than one minute later, Dossanto heard multiple 
gunshots.  DePina returned to the vehicle almost immediately 
thereafter and said, "I think I got him."  Monteiro said "are 
you sure" or "all right."  DePina replied that they had "to get 
the hell out" of the area, and Monteiro drove to a mutual 
friend's house.  When Dossanto asked what had happened, Monteiro 
replied that "shit popped off," which Dossanto understood to 
mean that someone had been shot.  When he attempted to ask more 
about it, Monteiro told him to "[s]top acting like a bitch." 
 
Later that day, Monteiro and DePina returned to pick up 
DaSilva at her school.  Soon after getting into the vehicle, 
DaSilva received a telephone call from her sister, Anita 
Rodriguez, telling her of the shooting and the victim's death,2 
and asking to be picked up at their house near Johnson Court.  
DePina and Monteiro said that they did not want to go to the 
north side of town, and particularly did not want to go near 
Johnson Court because they had a "beef" with people in that 
area, but ultimately did go with DaSilva to get her sister.  At 
her sister's urging, DaSilva then drove past the scene of the 
                     
 
2 DaSilva, who was from the north side of Brockton, and the 
victim were friends. 
6 
 
 
shooting.  The defendants appeared nervous and DaSilva's sister 
asked them, "[I]f you didn't do it, what's the big deal?," to 
which neither responded.3 
 
b.  Pretrial proceedings.  Prior to trial, the defendants 
filed a number of motions concerning the anticipated evidence at 
trial.  While some were allowed, many were denied.  Among those 
denied were motions to sever, to exclude testimony that DaSilva 
had seen Monteiro with a gun the weekend before the shooting, to 
introduce testimony concerning a violent altercation between the 
victim and an unknown individual shortly before his death, and 
to admit testimony from an individual who had been planning to 
purchase heroin from the victim later on the day he was killed. 
 
After the jury were empanelled but before opening 
statements, DaSilva, whom the Commonwealth had summonsed to 
testify, asserted her right to remain silent under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Appointed counsel 
maintained, among other things, that inconsistencies between 
DaSilva's grand jury testimony and the testimony she intended to 
give at trial would expose her to perjury charges.  The judge 
held an in camera hearing on the validity of this claim (Martin 
hearing).  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 504 
                     
 
3 It was not clear whether Rodriguez's question was directed 
at one or both of the defendants. 
7 
 
 
(1996).  At the hearing, DaSilva spoke freely; among other 
things, she mentioned her fear of testifying, and she claimed 
that police coerced her into falsely telling the grand jury that 
she had seen Monteiro with a gun the weekend before the killing.  
On this basis, the judge determined that DaSilva had asserted a 
valid claim under the Fifth Amendment as, were she to testify to 
the contrary, she "necessarily" would admit to perjury.  The 
Commonwealth then obtained a grant of immunity and an order that 
DaSilva testify at trial.  Thereafter, and before opening 
statements were made, DaSilva's counsel said that she was 
willing to do so. 
 
c.  Proceedings at trial.  The prosecutor's opening 
statement focused largely on the evidence that DaSilva and 
Dossanto had provided to the grand jury and to which it was 
expected they would testify at trial.  In addition to key 
testimony from the two, one of whom proved to be uncooperative, 
a series of witnesses testified to hearing gun shots and seeing 
a man running, climbing through a fence, and entering a vehicle 
around the time of the shooting.  Investigating officers 
testified to their efforts to obtain and examine physical 
evidence, largely consisting of the inconclusive cartridges, 
shells, and footprints. 
 
Dossanto was the primary source of information concerning 
the events on the day of the shooting.  Among other things, he 
8 
 
 
testified that he had been in the vehicle with Monteiro and 
DePina on that day, with Monteiro driving and DePina a 
passenger.  The group drove around town, eventually arriving at 
Johnson Court, where Monteiro pointed out a group of people, and 
parked the vehicle.  DePina got out and disappeared from view, 
and Dossanto then heard several gunshots.  DePina returned 
immediately thereafter, got into the vehicle, and told Monteiro 
to leave the scene.  As they were driving away, Monteiro told 
Dossanto that "shit popped off." 
 
On direct examination, Dossanto acknowledged that he had 
not come forward earlier with this information because he feared 
retaliation if he cooperated with police.  On cross-examination, 
Dossanto conceded that he did not speak to police until they 
approached him nine months after the shooting, and told him that 
he was a "person of interest" in the investigation.  He 
initially told police that he had "nothing to do with" the 
shooting, and that he did not know DaSilva.  After police told 
him that they knew he had been with Monteiro and DePina that 
day, and that he had "better start talking" to avoid being sent 
to prison, however, he implicated Monteiro and DePina by 
"fill[ing] in the blanks" for the police interviewers. 
 
During the first day of DaSilva's testimony, she stated, as 
she had at the Martin hearing, that her testimony before the 
grand jury had been coerced, and asserted multiple times that 
9 
 
 
she did not remember events to which she had testified at the 
grand jury.4  The judge conducted a voir dire examination to 
ascertain whether, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 
Mass. 55 (1984), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. 
Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431 (2005), and its progeny, DaSilva's 
grand jury testimony was admissible substantively.  During that 
examination, DaSilva continued to maintain that she did not have 
an independent memory of certain events, alluding to a learning 
disability that affected her abilities in this regard.  The 
examination ended with DaSilva running out of the court room.  
The judge continued the trial until the following day, ordered 
DaSilva held overnight in custody, and found her in contempt.  
Her attorney informed the judge the following morning that, 
prior to testifying the preceding day, DaSilva had been 
threatened in the hallway, but nonetheless would be willing to 
testify.  When direct examination resumed, however, she 
continued to maintain that she could not remember most of the 
events on the weekend prior to, and the day of, the shooting. 
 
This led to a second voir dire examination at which DaSilva 
continued to claim that she was unable to remember certain 
events, and that her statements before the grand jury had been 
                     
 
4 The jury heard that DaSilva had received immunity for her 
testimony, although they were not told when she was given that 
immunity.  During the judge's final charge, they were told that 
they could consider the grant of immunity in weighing her 
credibility. 
10 
 
 
coerced.  On cross-examination by defense counsel, she was able 
to recount considerably more information than on direct 
examination by the Commonwealth.  Discrediting DaSilva's memory 
loss as feigned, the judge allowed portions of her grand jury 
testimony to be admitted substantively, on "a question by 
question basis." 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendants raise several claims of 
error on appeal.  They challenge the substantive admission of 
DaSilva's grand jury testimony on both evidentiary and 
constitutional grounds, and also claim that such testimony 
contained several independently inadmissible portions.  They 
assert error as well in six further respects:  (a) the 
prosecutor's opening statement; (b) the judge's instructions 
concerning immunized witness testimony; (c) the denial of a 
motion to sever; (d) the partial denial of a motion to introduce 
third-party culprit evidence; (e) the testimony of a ballistics 
expert; and (f) Dossanto's testimony as to his fear of 
testifying.  Both defendants also seek relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
 
a.  Admission of DaSilva's grand jury testimony.  The 
defendants claim that the admission of DaSilva's grand jury 
testimony as substantive evidence, to which they objected at 
trial, was error.  In light of the paucity of physical evidence 
and the Commonwealth's resulting reliance on DaSilva's 
11 
 
 
testimony, as well as that of Dossanto, the defendants maintain 
that this was prejudicial error warranting a new trial. 
 
The defendants suggest two reasons why admission of the 
grand jury testimony was error.  First, both maintain that the 
judge's findings were inadequate to satisfy the prerequisites 
for admissibility of grand jury testimony as set forth in Daye, 
393 Mass. at 73-74, and Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 
745 & n.12 (2000).  Specifically, they claim that the judge 
failed to make necessary findings that DaSilva's testimony was 
not coerced.  Second, Monteiro argues that the admission of such 
testimony was in violation of the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  After 
considering each of these contentions, we turn to the 
defendants' argument that, even if not erroneously admitted on 
these grounds, four specific portions of the testimony should 
have been excluded on evidentiary grounds. 
i.  Prerequisites for substantive admission of grand jury 
testimony.  When a witness, who is on the stand and therefore 
available for cross-examination, testifies to a lack of memory, 
his or her previous testimony before the grand jury may be 
admitted substantively if the judge determines that three 
conditions have been met.  The judge must find, first, that the 
witness is in fact feigning his or her lack of memory; second, 
that the grand jury testimony was not coerced; and, third, that 
12 
 
 
the grand jury testimony was in the witness's own words, 
involving more than mere confirmations or denials of statements 
made by the interrogator.5  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 
Mass. 742, 754-755, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2312 (2014), citing 
Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 745 & n.12, and Daye, 393 Mass. at 75.  A 
trial judge's findings on these issues are entitled to 
substantial deference and are "conclusive as long as . . . 
supported by the evidence."  Maldonado, supra at 756, quoting 
Sineiro, supra at 742 n.6. 
 
In this case, the judge's determination that DaSilva's 
statement to the grand jury met the requirements to be admitted 
substantively is "supported by the evidence."  Maldonado, supra, 
quoting Sineiro, supra.  As to the first prerequisite, feigned 
memory loss, there is little question that the evidence amply 
supports the judge's finding.  The judge noted that, at the 
Martin hearing, DaSilva had remembered relevant events and 
similarly could recount events when asked about them during the 
voir dire examination by defense counsel.  He noted also that 
                     
5 In Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. 431 (2005), we identified an additional requirement:  
where grand jury testimony relates to an essential element of 
the offense, the Commonwealth must offer corroborative evidence, 
in addition to that testimony, in order to sustain a conviction.  
While we have sometimes called this a fourth prerequisite, in 
fact the requirement goes to the sufficiency of the evidence 
rather than to its admissibility.  See Commonwealth v. Clements, 
436 Mass. 190, 193 (2002). 
13 
 
 
DaSilva had indicated her desire not to get "involved," and had 
reasons that might cause her to feign memory loss.6 
 
As to the second prerequisite, the judge did not expressly 
find that DaSilva's grand jury testimony was not coerced, nor 
was he requested to do so.  Although an express finding is, of 
course, to be preferred, it is not essential where the evidence 
supports the judge's implicit finding that DaSilva had not been 
coerced.7  See Maldonado, 466 Mass. at 756.  Where, as here, a 
judge demonstrates familiarity with the requirements for the 
substantive admission of grand jury testimony based on a feigned 
loss of memory, the admission of the testimony implies a factual 
finding that it was not coerced.  See id.  This comports with 
the general principle that a judge's ruling on an ultimate issue 
implies resolution of subsidiary factual issues in favor of the 
prevailing party.  See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 
137 (2001), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 392 Mass. 
                     
 
6 At the first voir dire, the judge commented, "I have 
observed her in-camera.  She doesn't have a problem with memory.  
You can see from the transcript, she specifically gave me 
reasons why she didn't want to testify.  She is up here and even 
when I am questioning her, she thinks this is a game." 
 
7 During oral argument before us, counsel for DePina urged 
that, where, as here, a witness's claim of coercion was 
uncontroverted, the judge must make a specific finding that he 
or she does not credit that claim in order to make a finding 
that there was no coercion.  We decline to adopt this 
suggestion. 
14 
 
 
583, 588 (1984), S.C., 400 Mass. 1007 (1987) and 409 Mass. 1 
(1990). 
The judge had observed DaSilva over two days, having 
conducted both a Martin hearing and two voir dire examinations.  
While, at the time of the judge's ruling, DaSilva's consistent 
claim of police coercion had not been controverted,8 the judge 
was nonetheless not required to credit it.  Cf. Maldonado, 466 
Mass. at 756 (judge entitled not to credit claim of coercion).  
He had found DaSilva generally not credible, and already had 
determined that her claimed lack of memory was a sham, observing 
that she "thinks this [trial] is a game," and noting that she 
did not have the same loss of memory when responding to defense 
counsel or when testifying in camera.  The final Daye-Sineiro 
requirement was met by DaSilva's testimony, in her own words, 
before the grand jury; she plainly did far more than confirm or 
deny the prosecutor's questions.  See id.  The defendants do not 
argue otherwise. 
 
ii.  Confrontation clause.  Monteiro claims that, due to 
DaSilva's asserted lack of memory, he was unable to cross-
examine her on the substance of her testimony, in violation of 
the confrontation clause.  This claim is without merit. 
                     
8 The prosecutor later presented evidence from police 
officers denying any coercion of DaSilva. 
15 
 
 
 
Where a witness testifies at trial and is cross-examined, 
any limitation on the effectiveness or substance of that cross-
examination stemming from feigned memory loss generally does not 
implicate the confrontation clause.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 576 (2008).  See also Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. at 437-438, citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 
561 (1988) (lack of "substantive content of a witness's answers 
does not mean that the defense has been deprived of the 
opportunity to confront").  But see Commonwealth v. Stewart, 
454 Mass. 527, 533 (2009) (reaffirming holding in Daye that 
total loss of memory preventing effective cross-examination may 
preclude admission of grand jury testimony at trial). 
 
Here, DaSilva was available for cross-examination at trial.  
Defense counsel was able to conduct, and did conduct, an 
effective cross-examination.  DaSilva recanted her grand jury 
testimony incriminating the defendants, and acknowledged some 
memory of the period in question.  She testified to using 
alcohol and drugs the weekend prior to the killing and to being 
brought food by the defendants that day.  She explicitly denied 
any memory of bad blood between Monteiro and the victim, any 
memory of seeing Monteiro at the hotel with a gun on the weekend 
prior to the shooting, and any memory of DePina wearing a gray 
sweatshirt on the day of the shooting.  Cf. Daye, 393 Mass. at 
71 n.15 (cross-examination "could hardly hope to accomplish 
16 
 
 
more" than to convince witness to tell different, non-
incriminating story [citation omitted]). 
iii.  Independently inadmissible portions of grand jury 
testimony.  Both defendants contend that even if the grand jury 
testimony was properly admitted, four specific portions should 
have been excluded. 
A.  "Totem pole" hearsay.  The defendants argue that two 
statements made by DaSilva's sister, Rodriguez, and introduced 
through DaSilva's grand jury testimony, should have been 
excluded as "totem pole" hearsay.  Totem pole hearsay is 
admissible only if each of the multiple hearsay statements falls 
within an exception to the hearsay rule.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Gil, 393 Mass. 204, 218 (1984); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 805 (2016).  We agree that at least one statement ought not to 
have been admitted, but the error does not require a new trial. 
The first challenged statement -- DaSilva's testimony to 
the grand jury that Rodriguez said the defendants appeared 
nervous -- constituted hearsay not within any exception.  Before 
the grand jury, DaSilva testified that DePina and Monteiro acted 
nervously:  they "didn't want to go" back toward Johnson Court, 
they "were mad," and their reaction was "unusual."  She further 
testified, "My sister had noticed it, too, and said, 'Do they 
have something to do with it?'  Because my sister was like, 'oh, 
they're acting really nervous.'"  As neither defendant objected 
17 
 
 
to this particular statement at trial, we review only to 
determine whether its admission caused a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, 450 Mass. 25, 37 (2007).  Because the statement was 
cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence, namely 
DaSilva's own observations of the defendants' demeanor, we 
conclude that it did not.  See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 
456, 471 (2014) (cumulative hearsay does not create substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Britt, 
465 Mass. 87, 92 (2013) (no substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice where "jury could have inferred" same 
fact from properly admitted evidence). 
 
In the second challenged statement, DaSilva related in her 
grand jury testimony, later admitted at trial, that Rodriguez 
asked DePina and Monteiro, "Well, if you didn't do it, what's 
the big deal?" and that neither responded.  DePina contends that 
this, too, is totem pole hearsay.  The judge allowed the 
question to come in as an adoptive admission by silence.  
Because Monteiro objected,9 we review to determine whether the 
error, if any, prejudiced the defendants.  See Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 431 Mass. 168, 176 n.7 (2000).  An error is 
                     
 
9 Monteiro's objection put the judge on notice, and thus 
served the purpose of the requirement of a contemporaneous 
objection.  Although DePina did not object at trial, we treat 
the issue as preserved for both defendants.  See Commonwealth v. 
Charles, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 598 n.7 (2003). 
18 
 
 
prejudicial if we "cannot find 'with fair assurance'" that it 
did not "substantially sway[]" the verdict (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 545 (2013). 
 
Although the statement was not directed explicitly at 
either defendant, arguably one or both defendants might have 
been expected to deny what could have been perceived as an 
accusation.  In that event, the testimony properly could have 
been admitted as an adoptive admission.  See Commonwealth v. 
Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 719 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 
(1994).  We have cautioned, however, against the use of adoptive 
admissions by silence, because the lack of response may be due 
to "inattention or perplexity" rather than acknowledgment of 
guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 430 Mass. 700, 705 (2000).  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that admission of 
Rodriguez's remark was error, we discern little, if any, impact 
on the verdicts.  The jury were presented with far more direct 
evidence of the defendants' guilt through Dossanto, as well as 
through DaSilva's own statements, and the prosecutor did not 
mention Rodriguez's statement in her closing argument. 
 
B.  Statements by nontestifying codefendant.  DePina 
challenges the admissibility of two statements he ascribes to 
Monteiro that were introduced as part of DaSilva's grand jury 
testimony.  Because there was no objection at trial, we review 
any errors to determine whether they give rise to a substantial 
19 
 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 381 (2009).  DaSilva testified that, 
before the killing, Monteiro said that he had been jumped by the 
victim and the victim's brother.  She also testified that, after 
the shooting, one of the defendants mentioned that he did not 
want to drive past Johnson Court because of a "beef" with people 
there.  DePina contends that these statements were hearsay and 
admitted improperly against him. 
The first statement as to Monteiro previously having been 
jumped by the victim, while relevant to Monteiro's motive and 
admissible against him, should not have been admitted against 
DePina.  A limiting instruction was neither requested nor given.  
Nonetheless, the error did not give rise to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as the improper 
testimony added little to the case against DePina.  DaSilva's 
testimony on this point was limited to one statement, and, in 
closing, the prosecutor mentioned DaSilva's statement in passing 
as a possible motive for the shooting, while focusing 
extensively on the "beef" between the north and south sides of 
Brockton. 
The second statement was admitted properly as a statement 
of a joint venturer.  A hearsay statement by one codefendant is 
admissible against another, absent testimony by the codefendant, 
if there is independent evidence of the existence of a joint 
20 
 
 
venture and the statement was made during and in furtherance of 
that joint venture.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 
Mass. 1, 8 (2014).  DePina concedes that, here, there was 
independent evidence of the joint venture.  Statements made to 
conceal a joint venture are considered to be in furtherance of 
the joint venture and, therefore, are admissible against all of 
the joint venturers.  See Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 
502, 519 (1993).  See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marrero, 436 
Mass. 488, 494 (2002) (statements made "only a few hours after 
the crimes" and while defendants were together were part of 
joint venture).  On this record, a reasonable judge could have 
decided that the second statement, regarding a desire to avoid 
Johnson Court, reflected a fear of being caught near the scene 
of the crime, and thus was a continuing effort to conceal the 
joint venture.  There was no error in the admission of this 
statement. 
 
C.  Portions of grand jury testimony as to which DaSilva 
had not claimed lack of memory.  DePina argues that on at least 
one occasion, the prosecutor strayed, without specific 
objection, from the judge's instruction that grand jury 
testimony be introduced on a "question-by-question" basis, and 
that it only be admitted where DaSilva specifically denied 
memory of a topic.  DePina claims the failure to follow the 
judge's instruction created a substantial likelihood of a 
21 
 
 
miscarriage of justice by introducing evidence as to which 
DaSilva had not feigned memory loss.  See Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 
743-744. 
 
In fact, the prosecutor did follow the judge's question-by-
question order.  DaSilva testified on direct examination that 
she could not remember whether anyone other than Monteiro was in 
her vehicle on the day of the shooting.  In response, the 
prosecutor introduced her statements to the grand jury 
discussing who had been in the vehicle, as well as what they 
were wearing, what they were discussing, and how they were 
acting.  The grand jury testimony that was admitted simply 
provided a complete answer to the question DaSilva was unwilling 
to answer on the stand; she could not have been expected to 
remember the clothing, conversations, and behavior of people 
whom she claimed not to remember at all.  There was no error. 
 
D.  Prior bad act evidence.  Monteiro filed a motion before 
trial to exclude references to his possession of a gun on the 
weekend before the shooting.10   He contends that the judge 
abused his discretion in denying the motion. 
 
Evidence of a defendant's possession of a gun may be 
admissible to show that he or she had the means to commit the 
                     
 
10 At that point, Monteiro expected the prosecutor to 
introduce evidence of gun possession through DaSilva's live 
testimony; it ultimately was introduced through her grand jury 
testimony. 
22 
 
 
offense.  See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 
(2015).  The Commonwealth generally may not introduce evidence 
of a gun, however, where the gun "definitively could not have 
been used in the commission of the crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012) (excluding weapons of 
different caliber).  In this case, DaSilva testified before the 
grand jury that Monteiro had a handgun in his possession on the 
weekend before the shooting.  After some prompting, DaSilva 
agreed that it was a "gun that kind of looks like a policeman's 
gun."  This testimony was read at trial.  The ballistics 
evidence established that the cartridges found at the scene were 
from a .40 caliber handgun, and there was testimony that 
.40 caliber Glock handguns are common police weapons.  As the 
weapon DaSilva described could have been the weapon used in the 
shooting, there was no error in the admission of her testimony 
as evidence of means.11 
 
b.  Opening statement.  Both defendants argue that the 
prosecutor impermissibly referenced potentially inadmissible 
                     
11 Monteiro also argues that the gun DaSilva testified she 
saw at the hotel was black, although, during the shooting, 
another witness saw a brown gun.  This argument misconstrues the 
trial testimony.  No witness at trial identified the color of 
the weapon, although one witness testified that he saw "a brown 
hand with a gun in it."  In any event, we have rejected the 
argument that testimony of gun possession is inadmissible where 
a witness testified that the gun used in the commission of the 
crime was a different color.  See Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 
Mass. 218, 235 n.12 (1991). 
23 
 
 
evidence in her opening statement, creating a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  There was no error. 
 
The opening statement referred to DaSilva's anticipated 
testimony.  The defendants argue that because the prosecutor 
knew that DaSilva might recant her incriminating statements on 
the stand, and that, if she were to do so, the judge might rule 
against any subsequent motion to admit her grand jury testimony, 
the prosecutor should have avoided making any reference to 
testimony she planned to elicit from DaSilva. 
 
A prosecutor's opening statement may reference anything 
that he or she reasonably believes in good faith will be proved 
by evidence introduced during the course of the trial, even if 
he or she is not certain the necessary evidence will be 
admitted.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 455-
456 (1978) (opening statement previewed testimony from witness 
whom prosecutor knew to be asserting Fifth Amendment right).  
Specifically, the fact that an adverse evidentiary ruling might 
later bar introduction of certain evidence does not preclude a 
prosecutor from mentioning it in his or her opening.  See id. 
at 456-457. 
 
Here, the prosecutor had a reasonable and good faith belief 
that she would produce the evidence that she set out in her 
opening statement.  While informed that DaSilva had claimed at 
the Martin hearing that her statements to the grand jury had 
24 
 
 
been false, and had suggested she would refuse to testify, the 
prosecutor learned from DaSilva's counsel, immediately before 
opening statements, that DaSilva did, in fact, intend to 
testify.12  The prosecutor then gave an opening statement that 
included the evidence she expected to introduce through DaSilva.  
The mere possibility that DaSilva might recant on the stand, and 
that the Commonwealth might not be permitted to introduce 
inconsistent grand jury if she did so, did not bar the 
prosecutor from previewing the testimony she anticipated.  See 
Fazio, 375 Mass. at 456. 
 
c.  Immunized witness testimony.  DePina maintains that the 
jury instructions concerning DaSilva's immunized testimony, to 
which there was no objection, were error that created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We discern 
no error in the absence of the instructions DePina now requests. 
 
Although the judge did instruct the jury, in accordance 
with the model jury instructions, see Massachusetts Superior 
Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions § 7.8, at 7-37 (Mass. 
Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2013), that they "may take [a grant of 
immunity] into consideration in assessing the witness's 
credibility," DePina contends that the judge also should have 
informed the jury explicitly that, by statute, they could not 
                     
12 Indeed, before receiving confirmation that DaSilva 
intended to testify, the prosecutor had prepared an alternative 
opening statement, omitting any mention of DaSilva. 
25 
 
 
find the defendants guilty solely on the basis of DaSilva's 
immunized testimony.  See G. L. c. 233, § 20I; Commonwealth v. 
Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 440 (2014). 
 
We do not require any specific instructions regarding the 
testimony of an immunized witness, and we have rejected a 
requirement that a judge instruct explicitly that a conviction 
cannot be based solely on the testimony of such a witness.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Brousseau, 421 Mass. 647, 652-654 (1996).  
Rather, the focus is on whether the charge as a whole adequately 
explains the issue.  See id. at 654.  Here, the judge informed 
the jury that they could consider the effect of immunity on 
DaSilva's credibility, and counsel for both sides argued 
extensively in closing about the credibility of the immunized 
witness.  See id., and cases cited (noting importance of 
counsels' argument on issue of credibility when evaluating 
adequacy of jury instructions).  The instructions were more than 
sufficient to inform the jury of the dangers of exclusive 
reliance on immunized witness testimony. 
 
d.  Denial of motion to sever.  Prior to trial, and again 
at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendants 
moved to sever the trials, arguing that the defenses would be 
mutually antagonistic, and that failure to sever would prevent 
them from receiving a fair trial.  Monteiro claims that the 
26 
 
 
judge abused his discretion by denying this motion.  We do not 
agree. 
 
A decision to sever a trial generally is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
McAffee, 430 Mass. 483, 485 (1999).  Severance on the ground of 
mutually antagonistic defenses is required only where "the 
acceptance of one party's defense will preclude the acquittal of 
the other."  See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 Mass. 740, 749 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 657 
(1982).  It is not enough that a joint trial may cause a 
defendant to pursue a different strategy, or that a defendant 
would stand a better chance of acquittal if tried alone.  See 
McAfee, supra at 486.  Where some defenses overlap, while others 
are independent, a joint trial is appropriate.  See Ramos, 
supra. 
 
We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision 
not to sever the defendants' trials.  Each defendant sought to 
undermine the credibility of the Commonwealth's key witness, 
while also advancing his own separate grounds of defense.  See 
id.  Here, as in Ramos, supra, the defenses were, if anything, 
overlapping, and certainly not so mutually antagonistic as to 
require severance.13 
                     
13 On appeal, DePina argues that Monteiro's inculpatory 
statements were inadmissible against DePina, and were so 
27 
 
 
 
e.  Third-party culprit evidence.  Monteiro moved prior to 
trial to introduce various pieces of third-party culprit 
evidence.  The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, 
denied the motion in part, not allowing the introduction of 
evidence that the victim had been assaulted by an unknown 
assailant shortly before the shooting, and that the victim was 
planning to sell heroin to a particular individual on the day he 
was killed.  Monteiro argues that the partial denial was an 
abuse of discretion requiring a new trial. 
 
In order to be admissible, third-party culprit evidence 
"must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense 
raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or speculative."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  Where 
the third-party culprit evidence is hearsay not within an 
exception, there must be "substantial connecting links" between 
                                                                  
prejudicial that their introduction required that he be tried 
separately.  See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 
(1968).  Evidence which does not expressly and directly 
implicate a defendant, however, does not implicate the Bruton 
rule.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69-70, cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. 
Pontes, 402 Mass. 311, 314-315 (1988).  Nor does evidence 
properly admitted under the joint venture exception to the 
hearsay rule.  See Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 319 
(2007).  See also Pontes, supra at 314, quoting Bruton, supra at 
128 n.3 (statements must be "clearly inadmissible" against 
codefendant).  Because the statement concerning being jumped 
implicated DePina only by inference, and the statement about 
Johnson Court properly was admissible against him, neither gave 
rise to a Bruton error. 
28 
 
 
the evidence and the offense (citation omitted).  Silva-
Santiago, supra. 
 
Monteiro sought to elicit hearsay testimony that, at some 
point shortly before the victim was killed, an unidentified 
attacker had thrown a brick at the victim, in order to suggest 
that others might have wished the victim harm.  The judge 
concluded that the evidence of an attack by an unknown 
assailant, at an unspecified time, was "not relevant."  We 
discern no error.  The proposed evidence lacked sufficient 
"connecting links" and would have served to confuse the jury.  
See Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801.  See also Commonwealth v. 
O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 588-589 (2000) (evidence of hostility 
and fear between victim and alleged third-party culprit not 
admissible because it lacked sufficient connecting links). 
 
Monteiro also sought to elicit testimony from a man who 
purportedly planned to buy heroin from the victim on the day of 
his death.  Monteiro argued that evidence that the victim was a 
drug dealer suggested that people other than the defendants, 
such as rival drug dealers, might have had motive to kill him.  
The judge correctly concluded that such an inference, in the 
absence of any further evidence, amounted to no more than pure 
speculation.  See Silva-Santiago, supra. 
 
f.  Ballistics evidence.  Monteiro contends that testimony 
by the Commonwealth's ballistics expert caused a substantial 
29 
 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by improperly appealing 
to the jury's emotions and impermissibly suggesting that 
Monteiro was a person of bad character who had been involved in 
other shootings.  More specifically, the expert testified that, 
during the course of the investigation, he compared ballistics 
from the cartridges found at Johnson Court to those found at 
other crime scenes in Brockton.  The ballistics examiner noted 
these comparisons and testified that he had been unable to find 
any matches. 
 
Because a defendant may suggest to the jury that inadequate 
investigation led police to miss evidence which would have 
implicated others, or would exculpate the defendant, see 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980), the 
Commonwealth may present evidence to rebut such a contention, 
even if it otherwise would be inadmissible.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 753 (2009).  In 
anticipation of such a defense, the Commonwealth elicited, 
without objection, a brief statement from an investigating 
officer of the result of ballistics tests.  There was no error.14 
 
g.  Fear of retaliation.  Monteiro argues that by eliciting 
testimony from Dossanto as to his fear of retaliation for 
                     
 
14 Even if the admission had been error, the testimony did 
not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Contrary to Monteiro's suggestion, the expert's testimony did 
not appeal to the jury's emotions, nor did it imply that the 
defendants had been involved in other crimes. 
30 
 
 
cooperating with the Commonwealth, the prosecutor improperly 
vouched for his credibility, creating a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Toward the end of the direct examination of Dossanto, the 
prosecutor asked him, without objection, why he had not come 
forward earlier and why he was not "honest" when police 
initially approached him.  This was not impermissible vouching.  
Vouching occurs when an attorney indicates his or her personal 
belief in the credibility of a witness, or indicates personal 
knowledge beyond the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 
Mass. 181, 190 (2011).  "[T]estimony regarding a witness's fear 
of retaliation," on the other hand, "generally is admissible in 
the discretion of the [trial] judge, for the purpose of 
establishing witness credibility."  Id. at 193.  See 
Commonwealth v. Auguste, 418 Mass. 643, 647 (1994), and cases 
cited.  Here, the prosecutor did not suggest any personal 
knowledge or reliance on facts not in evidence.  Rather, she 
allowed the witness to explain his earlier reticence, and his 
lack of initial honesty, in order to respond to an obvious 
avenue of attack on the witness's credibility by defense 
counsel.  See Rosario, supra; Auguste, supra at 647-648. 
 
h.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We are satisfied that the verdicts were 
31 
 
 
not contrary to law, against the weight of the evidence, or 
otherwise unjust.  We therefore decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set aside the verdicts 
or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.