Title: State v. Randy J. Lechner

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2830-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Randy J. Lechner,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 30, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 20, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis J. Barry 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Craig W. Albee and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Craig W. Albee. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Sharon Ruhly, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2830-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Randy J. Lechner,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
APR 30, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Dennis J. Barry, Judge.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  This case presents three 
issues for review:1 
(1) 
Whether 
the 
State 
violated 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy when the 
defendant pled no contest to and was sentenced for both second-
degree reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle where the defendant's criminal conduct resulted in the 
death of one person; 
                     
1 In our consideration and analysis of the present case, we 
have renumbered and slightly reworded the three issues certified 
by the court of appeals to better reflect the issues as raised 
by the parties in their briefs and as presented during oral 
arguments before this court.  We do not believe that this 
renumbering and rewording alters in any material way the issues 
as certified by the court of appeals.   
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
2 
(2) 
Whether 
the 
State 
violated 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy when the 
defendant pled no contest to and was sentenced for two counts of 
second-degree reckless endangerment arising out of one episode 
of reckless driving; and 
(3) Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it sentenced the defendant to the maximum prison 
term allowed by law or when it decided not to modify the 
sentence it imposed on the defendant when the record shows, 
inter alia, that the circuit court referred to a presentence 
report containing inaccurate information as to the number of the 
defendant's criminal convictions and that the circuit court 
admonished the legislature's failure to be tough on drunk 
drivers.  
¶2 
This case is before the court on a request for 
certification filed by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96). The Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Judge Dennis J. Barry, denied defendant Randy Lechner's 
motion for post-conviction relief, concluding that (1) Lechner's 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy was not 
violated when he pled no contest to both second-degree reckless 
homicide and intoxicated vehicular homicide for the slaying of 
one person; (2) Lechner's constitutional right to be free from 
double jeopardy was not violated when he pled no contest to two 
counts of reckless endangerment arising out of one episode of 
reckless driving; and (3) the circuit court was not required to 
modify the prison term to which it sentenced Lechner.  Lechner 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
3 
appealed both the judgment of conviction and sentence and the 
circuit court's denial of his post-conviction motions.  The 
court of appeals certified to this court three issues for 
review.  We answer each of the three issues in the negative and 
affirm the order of the circuit court. 
¶3 
The relevant facts of this case are not disputed.  On 
December 4, 1994, a witness observed a vehicle driven by the 
defendant, Randy Lechner, weaving in and out of traffic as it 
passed each in a succession of vehicles traveling southbound on 
State Highway 31.  In his rearview mirror, the witness watched 
Lechner drive his vehicle across the double yellow center line 
of the highway to pass the vehicle traveling immediately behind 
the witness.  The witness testified that Lechner then passed the 
vehicle in which he was traveling and the vehicle immediately in 
front of the witness.  When Lechner reentered the southbound 
lane of traffic, the driver of the vehicle Lechner had just 
passed was forced to brake to avoid a collision.  The witness 
estimated that Lechner was driving at a speed between 60 and 65 
miles per hour even though the posted speed limit in that 
designated no passing zone was 45 miles per hour.  The witness 
then watched as Lechner again drove his vehicle across the 
center line, passed another vehicle, and abruptly cut back into 
the southbound lane of traffic.  Once again, the driver of the 
vehicle Lechner had just passed was forced to brake to avoid a 
collision. 
¶4 
When Lechner again drove his vehicle across the center 
line to pass another vehicle, he collided head-on with a 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
4 
northbound vehicle driven by Jan Pinney.  The collision caused 
great bodily harm to Jan and to her daughter, Heather Pinney, 
and it killed seven-year-old Robert Pinney.  Lechner was later 
arrested and taken into custody.  A post-arrest blood test 
showed that Lechner had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.142%, 
a level above the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle.  
See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(1993-94).2 
¶5 
In its criminal complaint and amended complaint, the 
State charged Lechner with ten counts of violating state law: 
(1) one count of second-degree reckless homicide; (2) one count 
of intoxicated vehicular homicide; (3) two counts of causing 
great bodily harm by operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol;3 (4) three counts of operating a vehicle 
with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration; and (5) three 
counts of recklessly endangering the safety of another. 
¶6 
Relevant to the three issues now before this court, 
Lechner by pretrial motion challenged on constitutional grounds 
the charges for reckless homicide and intoxicated vehicular 
                     
2 Unless otherwise stated, all future references to Wis. 
Stats. are to the 1993-94 version of the statutes. 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m) "Prohibited alcohol concentration" 
means one of the following: 
 (a) If the person has one or no prior convictions, 
suspensions, or revocations . . . an alcohol concentration of 
0.1 or more. 
3 The State later reduced one count of causing great bodily 
harm by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol to one count of causing bodily harm by operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
5 
homicide, arguing that he could not be convicted twice for 
killing the same person.  The circuit court denied Lechner's 
motion.  Lechner also challenged on constitutional grounds the 
three counts of reckless endangerment, arguing that he could not 
be charged more than once for the same criminal act of reckless 
driving.  The circuit court denied this motion.  After a plea 
agreement was reached by the State and Lechner, Lechner 
ultimately pled no contest to the following offenses: (1) 
second-degree reckless homicide, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06; (2) homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a); (3) causing great bodily 
harm by intoxicated use of a vehicle, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.25(1)(a); (4) causing injury by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a); and (5) two 
counts of second-degree recklessly endangering the safety of 
another, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(2).4  
¶7 
At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced 
Lechner to the maximum sentence on each count, with the 
sentences to run consecutive to each other, for a total prison 
sentence of 30 years.  The court rejected both the State's 
recommended sentence of 20 years and defense counsel's four-year 
recommendation.  After the sentence was imposed, Lechner filed a 
post-conviction motion challenging his convictions and his 
                     
4 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed the 
three counts of operating a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63 and one of the 
three counts of second-degree reckless endangerment. 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
6 
sentence.  Lechner again argued that his separate convictions 
for reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle and his two convictions for reckless endangerment 
violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy 
and violated his fundamental right to due process.  Lechner also 
challenged the sentences imposed by the court, arguing that the 
circuit court had erroneously exercised its discretion by 
relying on inaccurate information in the presentence report, by 
ignoring mitigating factors, and by employing a preconceived 
sentencing policy. 
¶8 
After a hearing, the circuit court denied Lechner's 
post-conviction motions.  Lechner appealed to the court of 
appeals for review of the circuit court's denials.  The court of 
appeals requested certification of this case pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  We accepted the certification and answer 
the three issues certified by the court of appeals. 
¶9 
The first two issues certified by the court of appeals 
require us to discern whether the State violated the defendant's 
constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy.  Whether 
an individual has been twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution is a 
question of law.  See State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 492, 
485 N.W.2d 1 (1992)(citing State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 
107, 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985)).  Reviewing the first two certified 
issues, we therefore owe no deference to the circuit court's 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
7 
decisions.  See id.; State v. Harris, 161 Wis. 2d 758, 760, 469 
N.W.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶10 Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
protect a criminal defendant against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.5  The double jeopardy clause 
embodies 
three 
protections: 
"protection 
against 
a 
second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;  protection 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the 
same offense."  Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 492 (citing North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).  In two separate 
multiplicity challenges, the defendant here raises the third 
protection against double jeopardy.6 
                     
5 The 
double 
jeopardy 
clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides:  "[N]or shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." 
 U.S. Const. amend. V.  Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution states:  "[N]o person for the same offense may be 
put twice in jeopardy of punishment."  Because the jeopardy 
provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions are 
"identical in scope and purpose," this court has accepted 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, where applicable, 
as 
controlling 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
provisions 
of 
both 
constitutions.  Day v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 588, 591, 251 N.W.2d 
811 (1977); see also State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 220, 226 
N.W.2d 504 (1975). 
6 The term "multiplicity," as used in double jeopardy 
challenges, is defined as encompassing both the charging of a 
single statutory offense in more than one count, see Harrell v. 
State, 
88 
Wis. 2d 
546, 
555, 
277 
N.W.2d 
462 
(Ct. 
App. 
1979)(citing United States v. Free, 574 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 
1978)), and the question of merger: "whether a single criminal 
episode which contains the elements of more than one distinct 
offense merges into a single offense."  Id. (citing United 
States v. Umentum, 401 F.Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Wis. 1975)). 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
8 
¶11 The protection against multiple punishments for the 
same offense is generally invoked in both a "lesser-included 
offense" case where the defendant argues that he or she has been 
punished for committing a greater offense and a lesser-included 
offense, see, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 432 U.S. 137 
(1977); Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 492-93, and a "continuous 
offense" case where the defendant argues that he or she has been 
punished for two or more counts of the same offense arising out 
of one criminal act.  See, e.g., In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 
(1887); Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 64-65.  The defendant here raises 
both challenges.  Although the focus of our analysis of each of 
the defendant's challenges varies, we apply the same test to 
both. 
¶12 A defendant may be charged and convicted of multiple 
counts or crimes arising out of one criminal act only if the 
legislature intends it.  See State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 
754, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991); Geitner v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 128, 
130-31, 207 N.W.2d 837, 839 (1973); see also Missouri v. Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359, 366-69 (1983).  We must, therefore, discern 
whether the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments 
for the offenses at issue in this case.  Wisconsin courts employ 
a two-part test to determine whether the legislature intended 
that multiple punishments be imposed on one defendant for the 
same offense arising from a single course of conduct.  See 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493.  In determining the legislature's 
intent, the courts of this state consider: (1) whether each 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
9 
offense is identical in law and in fact;7 and (2) whether the 
legislature intended to allow multiple convictions for the 
offenses charged.  Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493, 495.  With this 
two-part test, we analyze in turn both the defendant's "lesser-
included 
offense" 
challenge 
and 
his 
"continuous 
offense" 
challenge. 
¶13 On appeal, the defendant first argues that the State 
violated his constitutional right to be protected from double 
jeopardy when the judgment of conviction was entered and he was 
sentenced for both second-degree reckless homicide in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 940.06 and homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) where one 
criminal act by the defendant resulted in the death of one 
                     
7 As we explained in State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 485 
N.W.2d 1 (1992), the focus of the first part of this test varies 
with respect to particular challenges raised.  In a "lesser-
included offense" challenge, the factual situations underlying 
the offenses are the same, so our focus is on whether the 
offenses are also identical in law.  See id. at 493-94 n.8; see, 
e.g., State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 753-57, 467 N.W.2d 531 
(1991); State v. Wolske, 143 Wis. 2d 175, 180-185, 420 N.W.2d 60 
(Ct. App. 1988).  In a "continuous offense" challenge, the 
course of conduct is alleged to have constituted multiple 
violations of the same statutory provision, so our focus is not 
on statutory definitions but on the facts of a given defendant's 
criminal activity.  See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493-94 n.8; see, 
e.g., State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 65-68, 291 N.W.2d 809 
(1980); State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 758, 242 N.W.2d 206 
(1976).  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
10
person.8  The defendant contends that the reckless homicide 
offense is a lesser-included offense of the intoxicated use 
offense, and therefore conviction and punishment under both 
provisions are multiplicitous.  We disagree. 
¶14 In analyzing the "lesser-included offense" challenge, 
we must first determine whether the offenses of second-degree 
reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
are the same offense or are different in either fact or law.  
Since the factual situations underlying both offenses in this 
case are identical, our focus is on whether the offenses are 
also identical in law.  The determinative inquiry, therefore, is 
whether the criminal statutes define one offense as a lesser-
included offense of the other.  See Sauceda, 183 Wis. 2d at 493-
94 n.8; see, e.g., Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 753-57; State v. 
Wolske, 143 Wis. 2d 175, 180-85, 420 N.W.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1988). 
                     
8 On appeal, the defendant also argues that to convict him 
of and sentence him for both second-degree reckless homicide and 
homicide 
by 
intoxicated 
use 
of 
a 
vehicle 
violated 
his 
constitutional right to due process and "fundamental fairness." 
By pleading no contest to the charged offenses, the defendant 
waived these constitutional challenges.  It is well-established 
that a plea of no contest, knowingly and understandingly made, 
constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, 
including claimed violations of constitutional rights.  See 
State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 122-23, 332 N.W.2d 744 
(1983)(citing  Hawkins v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 443, 448, 132 N.W.2d 
545, 547-48 (1965)).  We therefore do not address the due 
process and fundamental fairness arguments here raised by the 
defendant.  The defendant's plea of no contest, however, did not 
waive his double jeopardy challenges.  See State v. Hartnek, 146 
Wis. 2d 188, 192 n.2, 430 N.W.2d 361 (1988); State v. Morris, 
108 Wis. 2d 282, 284 n.2, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982). 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
11
¶15 Under 
Wisconsin 
law, 
the 
determination 
whether 
offenses are different in law or whether one offense is a 
lesser-included 
offense 
of 
another 
is 
controlled 
by 
the 
"elements only" test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), which has been codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(1).9  See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493.  In Blockburger, 
the United States Supreme Court held that where the same act 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, 
the test under the double jeopardy clause is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.  
See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.  Under this test, two offenses 
are different in law if each statutory crime requires for 
conviction proof of an element which the other does not require. 
 See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 494-95.  Only then can it be said 
that the legislature has promulgated separate, distinct offenses 
providing for multiple convictions and punishments.  See State 
v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 411-12, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983). 
¶16 Applying the "elements-only" test of Blockburger and 
Wis. Stat. § 939.66(1) to the offenses involved in this case, we 
conclude that second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser-
included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  A 
                     
9 Wis. Stat. § 939.66 Conviction of included crime 
permitted.  Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor 
may be convicted of either the crime charged or an 
included crime, but not both.  An included crime may 
be any of the following: 
 
(1) A crime which does not require proof of any fact 
in addition to those which must be proved for the 
crime charged.  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
12
comparison of the elements of the statutes involved reveals that 
a conviction for second-degree reckless homicide requires proof 
of elements not required to prove homicide by intoxicated use of 
a vehicle and that a conviction for homicide by intoxicated use 
of a vehicle requires proof of elements not required to prove 
second-degree reckless homicide.   
¶17 The 
offense 
of 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.06 comprises two elements: (1) that 
the defendant caused the death of the victim; and (2) that the 
defendant caused the death by criminally reckless conduct.10  See 
Wis. JI-Criminal 1060 at 1 (1989).  In contrast, the offense of 
homicide by intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) comprises three elements: (1) that the 
defendant operated a motor vehicle; (2) that the defendant's 
operation of that vehicle caused the death of the victim; and 
(3) that the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant 
at the time he or she operated the vehicle.  See Wis. JI-
Criminal 1185 at 1 (1993).   
¶18 A conviction for homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle, therefore, does not require proof that the defendant 
acted with criminal recklessness or that such conduct caused the 
victim's death.  Similarly, a conviction for second-degree 
reckless homicide does not require proof that the defendant was 
                     
10 "Criminal 
recklessness" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.24(1): 
"[T]he 
actor 
creates 
an 
unreasonable 
and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human 
being and the actor is aware of that risk."  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
13
operating a motor vehicle or that the defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol.  Under the elements-only test applied in 
this state, second-degree reckless homicide in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06 is not a lesser-included offense of homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle in violation of § 940.09(1)(a). 
¶19 Since second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser-
included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, we 
presume that the legislature intended to permit cumulative 
punishments for both offenses.  See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 495 
(citing Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 756; Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 63).  
This presumption is rebutted only if other factors clearly 
indicate a contrary legislative intent.  See Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
at 755 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367).  Factors that may 
indicate 
a contrary legislative intent 
regarding multiple 
punishment include the language of the statutes, the legislative 
history, 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
proscribed 
conduct, 
and 
the 
appropriateness of multiple punishment.  See Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
at 756; Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W.2d 729, 
734 (1981).  In this case, none of these factors indicates a 
legislative intent contrary to allowing convictions for both 
second-degree reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use 
of a vehicle where the criminal act of the defendant resulted in 
a single death. 
¶20 First, the language of the statutes does not indicate 
a contrary legislative intent.  Both Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06 and 
940.09(1)(a) expressly provide that a person is guilty of a 
Class C felony if that person commits certain proscribed conduct 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
14
causing the death of another person.  Neither section states or 
implies that a conviction under its provisions precludes a 
conviction for homicide under a separate statutory section, even 
if a person's criminal act causes the death of only one person. 
 In enacting the specific language of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06 and 
940.09(1)(a), the legislature did not indicate that a person 
could not be convicted of violating both statutes for causing 
the death of one person. 
¶21 Second, the legislature, 
by 
enacting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2), has specifically addressed the issue of multiple 
homicide convictions for a criminal act causing a single death. 
 Where a single act of a defendant forms the basis for a crime 
punishable under more than one statutory provision, Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(2) provides that a defendant may not be convicted for 
two criminal homicides if one is "a less serious type of 
criminal homicide."11  The defendant in this case argues that 
this section "unequivocally" evinces the legislature's intent to 
allow only one homicide conviction for causing the death of one 
person.  A closer reading of the plain language in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(2), however, establishes just the opposite.   
                     
11 Wis. Stat. § 939.66 Conviction of included crime 
permitted.  Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor 
may be convicted of either the crime charged or an 
included crime, but not both.  An included crime may 
be any of the following: . . .  
 
(2) A crime which is a less serious type of criminal 
homicide than the one charged. 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
15
¶22 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) does not 
prohibit multiple homicide convictions for killing one person.  
It bars multiple convictions only when one of the homicide 
convictions 
is 
for 
a 
"less 
serious 
type" 
of 
homicide.  
Noticeably 
absent 
from 
the 
prohibitions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2) is a bar against multiple homicide convictions when 
the homicides are "equally serious."  Since the legislature 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) as a prohibition against multiple 
homicide convictions and limited its application to situations 
where one homicide conviction is for a less serious type of 
homicide, we can infer a legislative intent not to prohibit 
multiple convictions when the defendant is convicted for equally 
serious types of homicide. 
¶23 The inference that the legislature did not intend to 
prohibit multiple convictions for "equally serious" homicides is 
supported by the fact that the statutory provision immediately 
following Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) prohibits multiple convictions 
when one crime is a "less serious or equally serious type of 
battery."  Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m)(emphasis added).  When 
originally enacted in 1986, Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) prohibited 
multiple convictions for two battery offenses only when one 
conviction was for a less serious type of battery.  See 1985 
Wis. Act 144, § 1.  In 1993, at the same time the legislature 
created a number of separate but equally serious battery 
offenses, it amended Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) to prohibit 
multiple convictions for less serious or equally serious types 
of battery.  See 1993 Wis. Act 441, §§ 2 and 4.  With this 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
16
amendment, the legislature apparently intended to bar multiple 
convictions for a single act of battery, regardless of the 
seriousness of the offenses. 
¶24 In contrast, when it amended Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) 
in 1991 to raise homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle to a 
Class C felony, the legislature did not amend Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.66(2) to bar multiple convictions for that offense and 
other equally serious types of homicide.  See 1991 Wis. Act 277, 
§ 53-57.  Although different homicide offenses of the same 
criminal class have existed since Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) was 
enacted, the legislature has never amended that section to bar 
multiple convictions for equally serious types of homicide.  
¶25 Considering the specific acts of the legislature and 
comparing the current language in Wis. Stat. §§ 939.66(2) and 
(2m), we can reasonably presume that the legislature was aware 
of the distinction between "less serious" and "equally serious" 
types of crimes.  We can similarly presume from the presence of 
the "equally serious" language in Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2m) and 
its absence in the immediately preceding § 939.66(2) that the 
legislature intended to 
prohibit 
multiple 
convictions for 
equally serious types of battery, but it did not intend to 
prohibit multiple convictions for equally serious types of 
homicide.  See In re R.W.S., 162 Wis. 2d 862, 879, 471 N.W.2d 16 
(1991).  The legislative history and precise language of Wis. 
Stat. § 939.66(2) and (2m) evince a legislative intent to allow 
multiple convictions for equally serious homicides when a single 
act of the defendant results in the death of one person. 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
17
¶26 The defendant responds by arguing that his convictions 
are barred under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2) because second-degree 
reckless homicide is a "less serious type of homicide" than 
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  The defendant notes 
that a conviction for the intoxicated use offense carries the 
additional 
punishments 
of 
a 
mandatory 
revocation 
of 
the 
defendant's driver's license and a $250 driver assessment 
surcharge.  The defendant contends that since a conviction for 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
does 
not 
include 
these 
additional sanctions, that offense must be a less serious type 
of homicide than the intoxicated use offense.  We find the 
defendant's argument unpersuasive.   
¶27 Whether the legislature intended two classifications 
of homicide to be less or equally serious types of homicide is 
determined by reference to the penalty structure the legislature 
established in Wis. Stat. §§ 939.50 through 939.52.  "While the 
word 
'serious' 
is 
not 
expressly 
defined 
in 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§] 939.66, seriousness of an offense has been determined by this 
court on the maximum penalty which may be imposed."  State v. 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
18
Davis, 144 Wis. 2d 852, 857 425 N.W.2d 411 (1988).12  Particular 
to this case, the legislature has classified both second-degree 
reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
as Class C felonies.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06 and 940.09(1).  
Both offenses, therefore, carry the same maximum penalty of ten 
years in prison.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c).  Accordingly, 
applying the test this court established in Davis, we conclude 
that second-degree reckless homicide is not a less serious type 
of criminal homicide than homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2). 
¶28 We find irrelevant to this analysis the fact that a 
conviction for second-degree reckless homicide does not also 
carry a revocation of driving privileges or a $250 surcharge for 
driver assessment program.  Neither the revocation nor the 
                     
12 In State v. Davis, 144 Wis. 2d 852, 425 N.W.2d 411 
(1988), this court, considering the maximum possible prison 
sentence available for each offense, concluded that felony 
murder was a "less serious type of criminal homicide" than 
deprived mind murder under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2).  Id. at 861. 
 The court recognized that Wis. Stat. § 940.02 classified both 
offenses as Class B felonies carrying a 20-year maximum prison 
sentence.  The court, however, found more significant that a 
conviction for deprived mind murder, unlike a conviction for 
felony murder, did not bar a separate conviction for an 
underlying felony offense, and therefore could result in a 
maximum sentence of 40 years.  See id. at 859-61.  In this case, 
since neither second-degree reckless homicide nor homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle is based on the commission of an 
underlying felony offense, we need not consider whether the 
possible penalty for an underlying offense increases the total 
maximum prison term to which the defendant could be sentenced.  
Rather, we find dispositive in this case the maximum prison 
sentence 
provided 
for 
each 
offense 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(c).  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
19
surcharge affects the maximum possible penalty allowed by the 
penalty structure the legislature established in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.50 through 939.52.  The absence of a license revocation 
and a surcharge does not make second-degree reckless homicide a 
"less serious type of criminal homicide" than homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2). 
¶29 Furthermore, it appears that the legislature enacted 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06 and 940.09(1)(a) to proscribe different 
criminal acts and to protect distinct public interests.  The 
conduct proscribed by the intoxication statute is operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated and thereby causing death or great 
bodily injury.  See Wolske, 143 Wis. 2d at 184 (citing State v. 
Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 591, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985)); cf. 
Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d at 414-415 (discussing Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.25 (1981-82)).  The purpose of the intoxication statutes 
is to "provide maximum safety for all users of the highways of 
this state" from the harm threatened by "[o]peration of motor 
vehicles 
by persons who 
are under 
the influence 
of an 
intoxicant."  Wolske, 143 Wis. 2d at 184 (quoting Caibaiosai, 
122 Wis. 2d at 591). 
¶30 In contrast, the reckless homicide statutes proscribe 
a 
person 
from 
knowingly 
creating 
an 
"unreasonable 
and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another 
person."  Wis. JI-Criminal 1060 at 1.  Wis. Stat. § 940.06 does 
not target alcohol use, nor is its scope limited to a 
defendant's operation of a motor vehicle.  The apparent purpose 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
20
of the reckless homicide statutes is to provide maximum safety 
on and off the highway to members of the general public. 
¶31 "Where the statutes intend to protect multiple and 
varied interests of the victim and the public, multiple 
punishments are appropriate."  Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d at 416.  
The different conduct proscribed by and the different purposes 
of the reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle statutes further convince us that the legislature 
intended 
multiple 
convictions 
and 
punishments 
for 
those 
offenses. 
¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
legislature intended that multiple convictions and punishments 
attend the separate homicide offenses to which the defendant 
here pled no contest.  We therefore answer in the negative the 
first issue certified by the court of appeals.  The defendant's 
convictions and punishments for second-degree reckless homicide 
and 
homicide 
by 
intoxicated 
use 
of 
a 
vehicle 
are 
not 
multiplicitous, and, therefore, do not violate his right to be 
free from double jeopardy. 
¶33 The defendant next argues that the State violated his 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when he 
pled no contest to and was sentenced for two separate counts of 
second-degree recklessly endangering the safety of another, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30, arising from one episode of 
reckless driving along a one-half mile stretch of highway.  The 
defendant contends that to divide this offense into more than 
one count is multiplicitous, and that to convict and punish him 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
21
under both reckless endangerment counts therefore violate his 
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.  Again we 
disagree. 
¶34 The double jeopardy clause bars the State from 
dividing a single offense into multiple charges.  See State v. 
Blenski, 73 Wis. 2d 685, 245 N.W.2d 906 (1976).  In determining 
whether the State has impermissibly divided a single course of 
conduct into separate violations of the same statute, courts of 
this state consider (1) whether each offense is identical in law 
and in fact; and (2) whether the legislature's intent is to 
allow multiple convictions.  See Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 65, 67. 
¶35 In analyzing the defendant's "continuous offense" 
challenge, we must first discern whether the separate counts of 
second-degree reckless endangerment to which the defendant pled 
no contest are different in either fact or law.  See Rabe, 96 
Wis. 2d at 65; State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 758, 242 
N.W.2d 206 (1976).  Since the defendant pled no contest to two 
separate counts of violating the same statutory provision, the 
offenses are identical in law.  See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493-
94 n.8; Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d at 758.  Our focus, therefore, is 
not on statutory definitions but on the facts giving rise to 
each offense; the determinative inquiry is whether a conviction 
for each offense requires proof of an additional fact that 
conviction for the other offenses does not.  See Sauceda, 168 
Wis. 2d at 493-94 n.8; Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 758; see, e.g., 
Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 65-68; Harrell, 88 Wis. 2d at 556-60.  
Accordingly, in "continuous-offense" cases such as this one, 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
22
"the 
question 
turns 
on 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
repeated 
commission of the same offense at different places or times 
constitutes an ongoing crime or several separate offenses."  
Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 65. 
¶36 In Rabe, this court upheld the defendant's conviction 
for separate counts of homicide for each death caused by the 
defendant's negligent operation of a vehicle where all deaths 
resulted from one accident.  See id. at 76.  The court there 
recognized that even though the offenses may be identical and 
contained within the same statutory section, the factual 
circumstances may be separated in time or sufficiently different 
in nature to justify multiple punishments.  See id. at 65-66. 
¶37 As in Rabe, the issue in this case is whether a 
defendant's acts constituted an ongoing crime or separate 
offenses.  The defendant in this case argues that his reckless 
driving constituted just one offense because it occurred over a 
30-second period of time and covered only a one-half mile 
stretch of road.  This argument is unpersuasive.  We do not 
dispense justice solely by the hands of a clock or the lengths 
of a ruler.  See, e.g., Harrell, 88 Wis. 2d at 566 (holding that 
two acts of sexual intercourse between defendant and victim, 
separated by 20 minutes of conversation, constituted two 
separate and distinct acts of rape); Melby v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 
368, 234 N.W.2d 634 (1975)(holding possession at same time and 
place of two types of illicit drug constituted two separate 
punishable counts of possessing a dangerous drug); Madison v. 
Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d 71, 223 N.W.2d 865 (1974)(holding four 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
23
obscene magazines sold to the same person at the same time and 
place constituted four separate violations of an obscenity 
ordinance).  Despite the length of time and the distance 
traveled, the defendant's conduct in this case supports two 
counts of reckless conduct. 
¶38 The record in this case establishes that the defendant 
committed at least two distinct acts of reckless conduct, 
putting at risk the life of a different person with each act.  
According to the record, a witness observed the vehicle driven 
by the defendant swerving in and out of traffic at a rate of 
speed well above the posted speed limit.  On at least two 
separate occasions, the defendant drove his vehicle across the 
double yellow centerline of the highway, accelerated, and passed 
a different vehicle.  On at least two separate occasions, the 
defendant 
abruptly 
reentered 
the 
southbound 
traffic 
lane, 
forcing the driver of the vehicle he had just passed to take 
evasive action to avoid a collision.  Each time he drove his 
vehicle across the centerline of the highway, passed a different 
vehicle, and abruptly reentered the traffic lane, the defendant 
created a separate, unreasonable and substantial risk of harm to 
a different human being—the driver of the vehicle he had just 
passed and cut off on the highway. 
¶39 It is significant that the defendant here did more 
than pass at one time a continuous line of cars, putting each 
successive driver at risk as he passed him or her.  Each of the 
defendant's decisions to pass each successive vehicle was not 
the result of an original impulse to pass the first vehicle, but 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
24
rather was a fresh impulse.  Each of the defendant's acts of 
reckless conduct had come to an end before a separate act began. 
 Each time he pulled his vehicle out and passed a different 
vehicle, the defendant commenced a separate, conscious decision 
to act.  Each time the defendant exited and reentered the 
traffic 
lane, 
he 
completed 
a 
separate, 
distinct 
act 
of 
criminally reckless conduct. 
¶40 Based on the facts set out in record, we conclude that 
there was a sufficient break in the defendant's conduct to 
constitute at least two separate and distinct criminal acts of 
second-degree 
reckless 
endangerment 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.30(2).  See Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 66; Harrell, 88 Wis. 2d at 
565. 
¶41 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant's 
repeated 
commission of the same offense at different places and times 
constituted separate punishable offenses, we next look to the 
intent of the legislature.  It is multiplicitous to charge 
separate counts of the same offense, and to impose separate 
punishments upon conviction, if other factors clearly indicate 
that the legislature intended a single unit of prosecution for 
the offenses for which the defendant was convicted.  See Rabe, 
96 Wis. 2d at 69; Blenski, 73 Wis. 2d at 693-94. 
¶42 We conclude that there are no factors which clearly 
indicate that the legislature intended that all acts of second-
degree reckless endangerment be prosecuted in a single count.  
First, this court has held that, as a general rule, where 
different victims are involved, the legislature intends to allow 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
25
a corresponding number of punishable crimes.  See Rabe, 96 
Wis. 2d at 67-68; see also Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213, 223, 
271 N.W.2d 668 (1978).  In this case, each of the defendant's 
distinct criminally reckless acts endangered the safety of at 
least one other human being (the driver of each vehicle he 
passed and then cut off).  We, therefore, presume that the 
legislature intended to allow a separate punishable offense for 
each of the defendant's criminally reckless acts. 
¶43 Second, the language and purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.30(2) indicate that the legislature's intent was to allow 
multiple convictions and punishments for each act of reckless 
endangerment.  When reviewing the language of a criminal statute 
"[t]he test is whether the individual acts are prohibited, or 
the course of action which they constitute.  If the former, then 
each act is punishable separately. . . .  If the latter, there 
can be but one penalty."  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302 (quoting 
Wharton's Criminal Law (11th ed.) §34 n.3); see also Rabe, 96 
Wis. 2d at 70-74.  Section 941.30(2) does not proscribe reckless 
conduct generally, but rather penalizes individual acts of 
criminal recklessness.  For each conviction for violating Wis. 
Stat. § 941.30(2), a defendant must first be found to have 
endangered the safety of another person.  See Wis. JI-Criminal 
1347 at 1 (1989).  Proof of the defendant's reckless conduct 
alone is insufficient for a conviction.  See id.  Section 
941.30(2), 
therefore, 
punishes 
the 
individual 
acts 
of 
a 
defendant and not the course of action which those acts 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
26
constitute.  Each of the defendant's acts of second-degree 
reckless endangerment is separately punishable. 
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
legislature intended that 
multiple 
punishments 
attend the 
separate counts to which the defendant here pled no contest.  We 
therefore answer the second issue certified by the court of 
appeals in the negative.  The defendant's convictions and 
punishments 
for 
two 
counts 
of 
second-degree 
recklessly 
endangering safety were not multiplicitous and, therefore, do 
not violate his rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
¶45 The third issue certified by the court of appeals is 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
either when it initially sentenced the defendant or when it 
refused to modify that sentence.  On appeal, the defendant 
challenges on a number of grounds the sentence imposed by the 
circuit court and the court's decision not to modify its 
sentence.  We address each in turn. 
¶46 At the outset of our analysis, we note that our review 
of the circuit court's decision on sentencing differs from the 
standard of review we employed when considering the first two 
issues here addressed.  When a criminal defendant challenges the 
sentence imposed by the circuit court, the defendant has the 
burden to show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the 
record for the sentence at issue.  See State v. Thompson, 172 
Wis. 2d 257, 263, 493 N.W.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1992).  When 
reviewing a sentence imposed by the circuit court, we start with 
the presumption that the circuit court acted reasonably.  See 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
27
Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980).  We 
will not interfere with the circuit court's sentencing decision 
unless the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971).13  On appeal, we will "search the record to determine 
whether in the exercise of proper discretion the sentence 
imposed can be sustained."  Id. at 282. 
¶47 The defendant first argues that the circuit court's 
consideration of inaccurate information concerning the number of 
his criminal convictions violated his constitutional right to 
due process and requires resentencing.  It is well-settled that 
a criminal defendant has a due process right to be sentenced 
only upon materially accurate information.  See United States v. 
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Bruneau v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 166, 
174-75, 252 N.W.2d 347 (1977).  A defendant who requests 
resentencing due to the circuit court's use of inaccurate 
information at the sentencing hearing "must show both that the 
information was inaccurate and that the court actually relied on 
the inaccurate information in the sentencing."  State v. 
Johnson, 158 Wis. 2d 458, 468, 463 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1990).   
                     
13 The issue on review before the court is not whether we, 
as individual judges, each would have imposed a different 
sentence in the present case or would have modified that 
sentence on the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief.  
The issue is whether the sentencing court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in its decisions.  Appellate judges should not 
substitute their preference for a particular sentence merely 
because they would have imposed a different sentence had they 
been in the circuit judge's position.  See Cunningham v. State, 
76 Wis. 2d 277, 251 N.W.2d 65 (1977).  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
28
¶48 Both parties and the circuit court recognize that the 
presentence report inaccurately listed the number of the 
defendant's prior criminal convictions.  Rather than having four 
prior criminal convictions as listed in the presentence report, 
the defendant had three prior arrests and only one prior 
criminal conviction.14  The question that remains is whether the 
circuit court relied on the inaccurate number of convictions 
when sentencing the defendant.  We conclude that it did not. 
¶49 The defendant has failed to show that the circuit 
court relied on the inaccurate number of the defendant's prior 
                     
14 Upon closer review, the inaccuracies in the presentence 
report do not appear as significant as the defendant would have 
this court believe.  Although the record is somewhat unclear 
concerning Randy Lechner's criminal history, it appears that 
Lechner was arrested three times, once in each 1980, 1988, and 
1990, but was ultimately convicted of only one criminal charge. 
 In 1980, Lechner was arrested in Illinois and charged with two 
counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance (cocaine) and two counts of possession with intent to 
deliver marijuana.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the 
Illinois prosecutor consolidated two of the counts against 
Lechner and dismissed the other two.  Lechner then pled guilty 
to the consolidated count of possession with intent to deliver 
both a controlled substance and marijuana.  Since the two counts 
were consolidated, the 1980 arrest resulted in only one criminal 
conviction.  For this conviction, the court sentenced Lechner to 
three years of probation.  In 1988, Lechner was arrested in 
Illinois and charged with battery.  According to Lechner, he 
paid a fine for this offense.  The record shows only that the 
battery charge was dismissed.  Finally, in 1990, Lechner was 
arrested in Wisconsin for battery.  Apparently pursuant to 
another negotiated plea, Lechner was charged only with a 
violation 
of 
a 
misdemeanor 
disorderly 
conduct 
ordinance.  
Lechner pled no contest to this ordinance violation, paid a 
fine, and was ordered by the court to attend an "Alternatives to 
Aggression" program.  According to the presentence report, 
Lechner admitted that alcohol or drug use played a part in both 
battery arrests.  Lechner later disputed this statement.  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
29
convictions contained in the presentence report.  On the 
contrary, the record shows that the circuit court in this case 
considered, and based its sentence on, those primary factors a 
circuit court should consider when deciding which sentence to 
impose.  These factors include "the gravity of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the need for protection of the 
public."  Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 284; see State v. Wickstrom, 118 
Wis. 2d 339, 354-55, 348 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1984).   
¶50 At 
the 
sentencing 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
progressed 
through 
a detailed and 
comprehensive 
checklist 
considering the defendant's conscious decision to drink and 
drive, his "extremely reckless manner" of driving, and the 
"magnitude of the tragedy."  The court also considered that the 
defendant had dropped out of high school, had a criminal record, 
and had a long history of drug and alcohol problems.  In 
addition, 
the 
court 
considered 
the 
defendant's 
need 
for 
correctional treatment and rehabilitation, the need to protect 
the public from future criminal conduct by this defendant; and 
the need to impose a sentence that would prevent others from 
drinking and driving. 
¶51 Before sentencing the defendant, the circuit court 
specifically referred to the inaccurate information contained in 
the presentence report when considering the character of the 
defendant.  The circuit court's reference to the defendant's 
prior convictions, however, appears to have been no more than 
the court identifying individual episodes amounting to "warning 
signals" of which the defendant should have been aware.  The 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
30
court included as warning signals not only the defendant's prior 
convictions, but also his long history of drug and alcohol use, 
his 
participation 
in 
a 
treatment 
program 
for 
aggressive 
behavior, and his failure to complete a treatment program for 
alcohol abuse. 
¶52 The circuit court made clear at the hearing on the 
motion 
for 
post-conviction 
relief 
that 
its 
focus 
during 
sentencing was not on the number of the defendant's prior 
convictions, but on the fact that the events giving rise to 
those alleged convictions evidenced the defendant's long history 
of drug and alcohol abuse—a history not disputed by the 
defendant.  The circuit court, referring to the inaccurate 
information in the presentence report, explained: 
 
[I]n 1980 the defendant was convicted of two criminal 
counts of chemical usage, abuse, sale, but it's quite 
evident that the defendant was involved with mind 
altering chemicals.  Again, you can substitute the 
number two for number ten or number one or even a 
deferred prosecution and no convictions.  The point 
was, he had a problem.  He had a brush with difficulty 
related to alcohol or mind altering drugs. . . . [T]he 
point was throughout his life, there were warning 
signs, and in so ignoring them, that was the factor . 
. . that I considered. . . . The inaccuracies [in the 
presentence report] in my opinion are not of such a 
nature that it's of any relevance to what this court 
considered. 
 
When sentencing the defendant, the circuit court did not 
consider the gravity of his past offenses; nor did it express a 
need or desire to punish him as a repeat offender or as a career 
criminal.  Rather, the court considered the defendant's past 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
31
record of criminal offenses and his history of undesirable 
behavior patterns.  Both are relevant factors in assessing the 
defendant's character.  See State v. Tew, 54 Wis. 2d 361, 367-
68, 195 N.W.2d 615 (1972).  In this case, the number of the 
defendant's criminal offenses was a proper and relevant factor 
for the circuit court to consider regardless of whether the 
offenses resulted in dismissal, acquittal, or conviction.  See 
Elias, 93 Wis. 2d at 284; State v. Bobbitt, 178 Wis. 2d 11, 18, 
503 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶53 Considering 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
defendant's 
sentencing 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
in-depth 
consideration of the gravity of the offenses in this case, the 
character of the defender, and the need for protection of the 
public, we conclude that the circuit court did not rely on 
inaccurate information in the presentence report and, therefore, 
did not violate the defendant's due process right to be 
sentenced only on materially accurate information.  The circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying the 
defendant's request for resentencing. 
¶54 The defendant next argues that his sentence must be 
modified because the inaccurate information contained in the 
presentence 
report 
was 
used 
to 
calculate 
the 
sentencing 
guidelines under Wis. Stat. § 973.012.15  The defendant argues 
                     
15 Wis. Stat. § 973.012 provides: 
A sentencing court, when imposing a sentence, 
shall take the guidelines established under [Wis. 
Stat. §] 973.011 into consideration.  If the court 
does not impose a sentence in accordance with the 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
32
that recalculated sentence guidelines present a "new factor" the 
circuit court should consider in modifying the defendant's 
sentence.  A "new factor" is "a fact or set of facts highly 
relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the 
circuit judge at the time of original sentencing, even though it 
was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of 
the parties."  State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 434 N.W.2d 
609 (1989).  Although the decision whether a new factor exists 
is a question of law, which we review de novo, see Franklin, 148 
Wis. 2d at 9, we will overturn a circuit court's decision 
whether the new factor justifies sentence modification only when 
the court erroneously exercised its discretion.  See State v. 
Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 546, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983); State v. 
Smet, 186 Wis. 2d 24, 34, 519 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶55 Whether or not the recalculated sentence guidelines 
constitute a new factor, the circuit court's decision in this 
case not to modify the defendant's sentence based on the revised 
sentencing 
guidelines 
was 
not 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  A recalculation of the sentencing guidelines based 
on the accurate number of the defendant's prior convictions 
would have changed only the suggested sentence for the two 
second-degree recklessly endangering safety convictions from a 
                                                                  
recommendations in the guidelines, the court shall 
state on the record its reasons for deviating from the 
guidelines.  There shall be no right of appeal on the 
basis of the circuit court's decision to render a 
sentence that does not fall within the sentencing 
guidelines.  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
33
term of imprisonment to a sentence of probation.16  The circuit 
court, however, stated that based on what it found to be 
aggravating circumstances in this case it did not rely on the 
guidelines when it initially sentenced the defendant.  A 
sentencing court is not required to impose a sentence that falls 
within the sentence suggested by the sentencing guidelines.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.012. 
 
[T]he sentencing guidelines . . . [are] just that: 
guidelines, 
not 
edicts. 
 
Unless 
and 
until 
the 
legislature does away with indeterminate sentencing or 
adopts a system of minimum mandatory sentences for 
certain crimes, the responsibility of the trial court 
will continue to be to sentence within the range of 
the penalties established by the legislature. 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Administration Felony Sentencing 
Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 207, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984) 
(Bablitch, J. concurring).  The decision to impose a sentence 
outside those guidelines under the circumstances of this case, 
therefore, was within the sound discretion of the sentencing 
court.  The fact that the sentencing court did not follow the 
sentencing guidelines did not give the defendant a right to 
                     
16 Recalculating the sentencing guidelines would not have 
altered the suggested maximum sentence for each homicide 
conviction.  Calculated using the accurate number of the 
defendant's prior convictions, the sentencing guidelines for 
each of the homicide convictions would have called for sentences 
of 96-120 months.  Calculated using the inaccurate information 
contained in the presentence report, the sentencing guidelines 
called for a sentence of 108-120 months.  The maximum sentence 
suggested for each homicide conviction, calculated under either 
sentencing guidelines, was 120 months, the maximum sentence 
allowed under the law.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.50(c).     
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
34
appeal his sentence.  See State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 685, 
538 N.W.2d 249 (1995)(per curiam); Wis. Stat. § 973.012.17 
¶56 Although the inaccuracy in the presentence report 
resulted in a miscalculation of the sentencing guidelines, the 
circuit court indicated that it did not rely on the initial 
sentencing guidelines and that it would not have followed the 
recalculated sentencing guidelines.  The court was under no 
obligation to do so.  Based on the circumstances of this case, 
the circuit court's decision not to modify the defendant's 
sentence in light of the recalculated sentence was not an 
erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶57 The defendant also argues that the sentence to a 
prison term of 30 years was unduly harsh and excessive because 
the court applied a preconceived sentencing policy and because 
the sentence was disproportionately harsh in relation to 
sentences imposed in  similar cases in Racine County.  We 
recognize that it is an erroneous exercise of discretion for a 
sentencing court to have a preconceived sentencing policy 
"closed to individual mitigating factors."  State v. Ogden, 199 
                     
17 Under Wis. Stat. § 973.012, the circuit court was 
required to state on the record its reasons for deviating from 
the sentence recommended in the sentencing guidelines.  When 
initially sentencing the defendant, the court in this case was 
unaware, due to the inaccurate presentence report, that it was 
imposing a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines, and 
therefore did not state any reasons for doing so.  At both the 
sentencing hearing and the hearing on the post-conviction 
motions, however, the court set forth a detailed explanation of 
the reasons for the sentence it 
imposed. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, we find that the circuit court satisfied the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.012.  
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
35
Wis. 2d 566, 571, 544 N.W.2d 574 (1996).  A prohibited 
sentencing policy exists, however, only where the court's 
predispositions are "specific or rigid so as to ignore the 
particular circumstances of the individual offender upon whom he 
or she is passing judgment."  Id.  The current record does not 
establish that the circuit court applied such a specific or 
rigid sentencing policy. 
¶58 The 
defendant's 
argument 
that the 
circuit 
court 
applied a preconceived sentencing policy is based solely on a 
short colloquy delivered by the circuit court during sentencing. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court expressed its 
disappointment with the legislature's mere rhetoric of getting 
tough on drunk driving.  This colloquy, however, did not render 
the circuit court's sentence a result of some preconceived 
sentencing policy.  On the contrary, the record shows that the 
circuit court considered and weighed all relevant factors when 
sentencing the defendant.  In particular, the circuit court 
considered a list of mitigating factors including the fact that 
the defendant expressed sincere remorse for the crimes he 
committed, that he had a successful career; and that he had a 
family to support.   
¶59 In light of the gravity of the crime involved here and 
the defendant's refusal to heed a number of warning signals, the 
circuit court decided not to give much weight to these 
mitigating factors.  Based on the "entire picture and all the 
opportunities that presented themselves [to the defendant]," the 
circuit 
court 
decided 
that 
the 
maximum 
sentences 
were 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
36
appropriate and that those sentences should run consecutively.  
The record does not support the defendant's argument that the 
circuit court applied a preconceived sentencing policy. 
¶60 The defendant's argument that the sentence was unduly 
harsh and excessive in relation to other sentences imposed in 
OWI cases in Racine county is without merit.  There is no 
requirement that defendants convicted of committing similar 
crimes must receive equal or similar sentences.  On the 
contrary, 
individualized 
sentencing 
is 
a 
cornerstone 
to 
Wisconsin's system of indeterminate sentencing.  "[N]o two 
convicted felons stand before the sentencing court on identical 
footing.  The sentencing court must assess the crime, the 
criminal, and the community, and no two cases will present 
identical factors."  Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 
at 201.  Imposing such a requirement would ignore the particular 
mitigating and aggravating factors in each case.  The defendant 
here has failed to establish any connection between himself and 
his crimes and those defendants and crimes to which he has 
compared his sentence.  Absent such connection, "disparate 
sentences are totally irrelevant" to the sentence imposed in 
this case.  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 272. 
¶61 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State did 
not violate the defendant's constitutional rights to be free 
from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same crime when the 
defendant pled no contest to and was sentenced for both second-
degree reckless homicide and homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle.  We further conclude that the State did not violate the 
No.  96-2830-CR 
 
37
defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy when he pled 
no contest to and was sentenced for two separate counts of 
second-degree reckless endangerment.  Finally, we also conclude 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it sentenced the defendant to the maximum 30-
year prison sentence or when it decided not to modify this 
sentence.  We therefore answer in the negative each of three 
issues certified by the court of appeals and affirm the order of 
the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The order of the Racine County Circuit Court 
is affirmed.   
   
 
 
 
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