Title: Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.1983 WY 107671 P.2d 303Case Number: 83-48Case Number: 83-48Decided: 10/27/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
DOROTHY G. RANDELL, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

WYOMING STATE TREASURER, EX 
REL., WYOMING 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT-DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the 
District Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Mitchell E. 
Osborn and Edward L. Grant of Grant & Grant, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and 
CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]      The question 
posed in this case is whether the appellant, the Executive Director and 
Educational Consultant for the Wyoming State Board of Nursing, was covered under 
the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 through 
27-12-804, W.S. 1977, when she incurred a disabling injury. Two theories are 
asserted by the appellant. First, she argues that she is a professional nurse 
employee, which is a category included in § 27-12-106, W.S. 1977, which in 
pertinent part provides:

"(a) The 
extrahazardous occupations and employees to which this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 
27-12-804] applies are:

* * * * * 
*

"(xxxviii) 
Professional nurse employees, excepting private duty 
nurses."

Secondly, 
the appellant contends that she was covered under the circumstances in 
accordance with the provisions of § 27-12-107(b), W.S. 1977, which provides in 
pertinent part as follows:

"(b) This act also 
applies to all other state employees, officers or persons working for the state 
* * * while traveling in state owned vehicles or a duly authorized private 
vehicle, but only when the travel occurs in the performance of the employees' 
duties."

After 
hearing evidence in the case, the district court held that the appellant was not 
covered by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act under either theory. We are 
persuaded of the correctness of that determination by the district court under 
the applicable standards, and we shall affirm the judgment of the district 
court.

[¶2.]      While not 
presenting a statement of the issues as such in her brief, the arguments of the 
appellant are succinctly stated as follows:

"APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT BY VIRTUE OF 
HER BEING A `PROFESSIONAL NURSE EMPLOYEE,' ENUMERATED AS AN EXTRAHAZARDOUS 
OCCUPATION BY W.S. 27-12-106(a)(XXXVIII)."

"APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AS SHE WAS A 
STATE EMPLOYEE COVERED `WHILE TRAVELING IN . . . A DULY AUTHORIZED PRIVATE 
VEHICLE . . . IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE'S DUTIES.' W.S. 27-12-107 
(1977)."

The Wyoming 
State Treasurer, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, in its brief 
which presents both the position of the State as employer and the State as 
administrator of the Worker's Compensation Act, states the issues in the 
following way:

"I. WHETHER APPELLANT 
DOROTHY G. RANDELL'S EMPLOYMENT AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANT 
FOR THE WYOMING STATE BOARD OF NURSING CONSTITUTES EXTRAHAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENT AS 
A `PROFESSIONAL NURSE EMPLOYEE' AS THAT TERM IS USED IN SECTION 
27-12-106[a](xxxviii), W.S. 1977.

"II. WHETHER 
APPELLANT DOROTHY G. RANDELL'S INJURY OCCURRED WHILE SHE WAS TRAVELING IN A DULY 
AUTHORIZED PRIVATE VEHICLE, AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF APPELLANT'S DUTIES AS 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANT FOR THE WYOMING STATE BOARD OF 
NURSING."

[¶3.]      The appellant was 
employed as Executive Director and Educational Consultant for the State Board of 
Nursing from July 3, 1973, until she retired because of her disabilities flowing 
from the injury involved in this case, which she did on April 30, 1982. The 
injury was incurred on October 19, 1981. On that occasion the appellant was 
carrying materials to be used in administering the practical nurses examination 
the following morning, and she was on the way to her car in her parking space in 
the parking lot at the building in which her office was located. On the way to 
her car she tripped over a protruding curb elevated above the sidewalk and fell. 
This happened shortly before 5:00 p.m., and the appellant testified that she was 
on her way home, and that she had the testing materials with her because she 
intended to review them prior to the examination and would then be able to 
proceed directly from her home to the testing site, which was a motel complex in 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, away from her office. As a result of the fall the appellant 
sustained injuries which were diagnosed as "a compression fracture, T-12, 
osteoporosis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine initiated or 
aggravated by trauma." The appellant resigned as of April 30, 1982, because the 
disabilities resulting from her injury prevented her from resuming her 
duties.

[¶4.]      Prior to her 
employment by the Wyoming State Board of Nursing the appellant had worked as a 
staff nurse, as an instructor and associate professor of nursing at several 
universities and as the director of a large public health nursing unit. There is 
no dispute with respect to her qualifications by both education and experience 
to be employed as a nurse. At the time she was injured she was licensed as a 
nurse in Colorado, Washington and Wyoming. With respect to her duties as the 
Executive Director and Educational Consultant for the State Board of Nursing the 
appellant testified that she frequently was required to be actually present in 
hospitals, clinics, nursing homes and schools where student nurses receive 
clinical training. The appellant further testified that her job involved the 
exercise of nursing judgment and knowledge as well as the performance of 
administrative functions. She was charged, as a part of her official duties, 
with administering the nursing licensing examinations given semi-annually to 
registered nurses who wished to practice in Wyoming.

[¶5.]      The only witness 
other than the appellant who testified at the hearing was the Claims Supervisor 
for the Worker's Compensation Division. The Claims Supervisor testified that the 
State Board of Nursing maintained coverage under the Worker's Compensation Act 
only for its members when traveling in a state or duly authorized private 
vehicle. No requests had been made by the State Board of Nursing to extend 
coverage to its employees because they were engaged in the extra-hazardous 
occupation of a professional nurse employee.

[¶6.]      We shall deal 
first with the argument that the appellant, by statutory definition, was engaged 
in an extra-hazardous occupation. Coverage of state employees under the Worker's 
Compensation Act is governed by § 27-12-107, W.S. 1977. Section 27-12-107(a) 
lists several specific jobs which are considered extra-hazardous occupations. 
There is no argument made that the appellant fit any of those categories, and 
her argument is premised upon coverage in accordance with § 27-12-107(b), which 
in the part pertinent to this contention states:

"(b) This act also 
applies to all other state employees, officers or persons working for the state 
not specifically mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, including those of 
the legislative service office, when employed in an occupation enumerated by 
W.S. 27-315 [§ 27-12-106] as extrahazardous * * *."

Succinctly, 
it is the appellant's position that her employment comes within the category of 
"professional nurse employees" which is listed as an extra-hazardous occupation 
enumerated in § 27-12-106(a)(xxxviii), W.S. 1977. Her assumption that she is a 
professional nurse employee is premised upon the requirement that she have 
nursing skills in order to fulfill the duties of her position. No further 
definition of the functions of "professional nurse employees" can be found in 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶7.]      A definition 
section is, however, included in the provisions of the Wyoming Statutes 
regulating the profession of nursing, §§ 33-21-101 through 33-21-118, W.S. 1977. 
Section 33-21-101 provides in part as follows:

"(a) When used in 
this act [§§ 33-21-101 to 33-21-118], the terms herein have the following 
meanings:

"(i) The practice of 
`professional nursing' is the accountable performance for compensation of any 
act, or the making of any decisions, requiring substantial specialized 
knowledge, judgment and skills that must be acquired from accredited schools of 
professional nursing, based upon the application of principles of physical, 
biological and behavioral sciences that will assist the public in attaining 
better health status by:

"(A) Administering 
medical regimens as prescribed by a licensed or legally authorized physician or 
dentist;

"(B) Using the 
nursing process of:

"(I) `Nursing 
assessment or nursing diagnosis' meaning the identification of the health status 
and needs of an individual recognizing that that individual is a physical, 
social and psychological being;

"(II) `Nursing 
planning' meaning the formulation of a program of action to meet those needs 
identified through nursing assessment or nursing 
diagnosis;

"(III) `Nursing 
intervention' meaning the implementation of the program of 
action;

"(IV) `Nursing 
evaluation' meaning a continuing appraisal of the effectiveness of the nursing 
assessment, nursing diagnosis, nursing planning and nursing 
intervention;

"(C) Initiating 
health care; delegating, supervising, instructing and counseling for the 
promotion of well-being, maintenance of health and prevention of 
illness;

"(D) Performing such 
additional acts under emergency situations and other expanded roles requiring 
additional education and training, which are recognized by the medical and 
nursing professions as appropriate to be performed by a registered professional 
nurse. The foregoing does not include acts of medical diagnosis or prescription 
of medical therapeutic or corrective measures, except as may be authorized by 
rules and regulations jointly promulgated by the Wyoming state board of nursing 
and the Wyoming state board of medical examiners and which shall be implemented 
by the Wyoming state board of nursing.

"(E) Professional 
nurses functioning within the provisions of W.S. 33-179.1(a)(i)(D) [paragraph 
(a)(i)(D) of this section] shall be regulated in accordance with rules and 
regulations jointly promulgated by the Wyoming state board of nursing and the 
Wyoming state board of medical examiners. The rules and regulations shall define 
the degree of participation and supervision of the licensed physicians, where 
appropriate."

[¶8.]      The district 
court quite aptly contrasted that definition with the provisions of § 33-21-104, 
W.S. 1977, outlining powers and duties of the Wyoming State Board of Nursing. 
That statute reads as follows:

"(a) The board, in 
addition to powers and duties provided by law, shall have the following powers 
and duties:

"(i) To adopt and 
revise rules and regulations necessary to effectuate the provisions of this act 
[§§ 33-21-101 to 33-21-118];

"(ii) To establish 
minimum criteria for curriculum and prescribe standards for educational programs 
preparing persons for licensing.

"(iii) To accredit 
programs which meet the requirements of the board;

"(iv) To provide for 
surveys of nursing educational programs as deemed necessary by the 
board;

"(v) To deny or 
withdraw accreditation from educational programs for failure to meet prescribed 
curricula or other standards, after reasonable notice and 
hearing;

"(vi) To examine, 
license, renew the license of and issue temporary permits to duly qualified 
applicants;

"(vii) To set fees 
for licensing and renewal of licenses within the maximum limit provided by the 
act;

"(viii) To revoke or 
suspend license if deemed necessary;

"(ix) To initiate the 
prosecution of person violating the act; and

"(x) To maintain a 
permanent file of nurses who are on inactive status and to reactivate the status 
of the nurses when appropriate."

The district 
judge then noted that the business of the Wyoming State Board of Nursing and the 
claimant as its Executor Director and Educational Consultant was quite different 
from the duties of a professional nurse employee. In considering whether the 
evidence established that the appellant worked as a professional nurse employee, 
the district judge in his decision letter stated:

"* * * There is no 
testimony that her business for the state is the administering of prescribed 
medical regimens to patients; the state business administered by the claimant 
does not require the claimant to apply the `nursing process' upon individual 
patients nor does it involve the initiation of health care; acts in emergency 
situations, nor any of the functions of nurse employees at hospitals or other 
institutions. Although the State of Wyoming and 
the claimant are vitally concerned and play a most significant role in the level 
at which professional nursing is conducted in Wyoming, the Wyoming state nursing board does not deliver 
nursing services."

[¶9.]      The burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence in worker's compensation cases is 
assigned to the claimant. Matter of 
Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 (1983); Alco of   Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982); and Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, Wyo., 
474 P.2d 297 (1970). In a number of prior cases we find reflected the 
proposition that it is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court as 
to whether an employee is employed in an extra-hazardous occupation. Alco 
of Wyoming v. Baker, supra; Claim of 
Merritt, Wyo., 455 P.2d 661 (1969); Rocky Mountain Tank & Steel Co. v. 
Rager, Wyo., 423 P.2d 645 (1967); In 
re Gimlin, Wyo., 403 P.2d 178 (1965); In re Sikora, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557 
(1941); In re Roby, 54 Wyo. 439, 93 P.2d 940 (1939); In re Pope, 54 Wyo. 
266, 91 P.2d 58 (1939); Fox Park Timber 
Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 120 A.L.R. 1020 (1938); In re Lamont, 48 Wyo. 56, 41 P.2d 497 
(1935); Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 43 
Wyo. 108, 299 P. 284 (1931); Leslie v. 
City of Casper, 42 Wyo. 44, 288 P. 15 (1930); and In re Karos, 34 Wyo. 357, 
243 P. 593 (1926). This court will not invade the province of the fact finder 
and reach a different factual conclusion in any appealed case if there is 
substantial evidence to support the findings made below. Matter of Creek, Wyo., 657 P.2d 353 (1983); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 
(1977); and Rocky Mountain Tank & 
Steel Co. v. Rager, supra.

[¶10.]    The evidence in this case is 
deficient with regard to whether the Wyoming State Board of Nursing is engaged 
in an extrahazardous occupation. The appellant emphasizes the fact that her job 
required her to possess the skills and training necessary to be licensed as a 
nurse. That fact alone is not dispositive of the threshold question of whether 
the Wyoming State Board of Nursing was engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation 
as required by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, 
supra; Claim of Merritt, supra, and In re Lamont, supra. The principal duties of 
the Board as defined by § 33-21-104, W.S. 1977, result in the conclusion that it 
is primarily concerned with administration and regulation of the practice of 
nursing within the state. Nothing in the evidence offered by the appellant 
demonstrates that the Wyoming State Board of Nursing is engaged in the actual 
practice of "professional nursing." See Section 33-21-101(a)(i), W.S. 
1977.

[¶11.]    Section 27-12-107(c), W.S. 
1977, pledges the State of Wyoming to contribute the sum of money found due as a 
premium for Worker's Compensation coverage on all state employees. The state 
agencies are made responsible for administering the act as an employer with 
respect to the employees of that agency and for filing quarterly payroll 
reports. Under this statute it is clear that the State of Wyoming has recognized 
that through its agencies it engaged in extra-hazardous occupations. It is 
equally clear that not all state employees are intended to be covered. This 
individual treatment of the state agencies and their employees for determination 
of coverage is analogous to the rule which recognizes that in some phases a 
private employer's business may be covered by worker's compensation and it may 
not be covered as to other phases. Claim 
of Merritt, supra; Rocky Mountain 
Tank & Steel Co. v. Rager, supra; In re Gimlin, supra, and Leslie v. City of Casper, supra. In this 
regard we also note the testimony of the Claims Supervisor for the Worker's 
Compensation Division that no coverage had been maintained by the Wyoming State 
Board of Nursing for its employees except when they were traveling in a state or 
duly authorized private vehicle. To the extent that the statutory provisions 
must be construed in resolving the problem in this case, some deference should 
be given to the construction of the statutes by the Wyoming State Board of 
Nursing and the Worker's Compensation Division of the Office of the Wyoming 
State Treasurer. Matter of Hasser, Wyo., 647 P.2d 66 (1982); Demos v. Board of 
CountyCommissioners of Natrona County, Wyo., 
571 P.2d 980 (1977).

[¶12.]    The general rule is that if 
an employer is not engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation as part of its 
activities, then the hazardous quality of the individual employee's own work 
activities is not considered material. 1C Larson, Worker's Compensation Law, § 
55.41, p. 9-235 (1982). See Beswick v. 
State Industrial Accident Commission, 248 Or. 456, 435 P.2d 461 (1967); and 
Thomas v. Gardner, 75 N.M. 371, 404 P.2d 853 (1965). While the appellant definitely perceives herself as having been 
involved in an extra-hazardous occupation, the statutory functions of her 
employer do not suggest that. Neither does the evidence support the proposition 
that the Wyoming State Board of Nursing is engaged in the practice of 
"professional nursing" so as to make the appellant a professional nurse employee 
within the statutory definition. We agree with the district court that the 
appellant did not meet her burden of proof with respect to demonstrating her 
coverage under those provisions of § 27-12-107(b) relating to employment in an 
occupation enumerated as extra-hazardous.

[¶13.]    We turn then to the question 
of whether the appellant was injured "while traveling in state owned vehicles or 
a duly authorized private vehicle, but only when the travel occurs in the 
performance of the employees' duties." We recall briefly the facts noted above 
which are that at the time of her injury the appellant was walking from her 
office to her automobile to return to her home, and while doing so she was 
carrying materials to be used in connection with a nursing examination to be 
given the following day. In this regard the district court found that the travel 
contemplated at the time the injury was incurred was not in a duly authorized 
private vehicle. The court noted the absence of any evidence that the State of 
Wyoming 
maintains any authority over an employee's mode of conveyance to and from work, 
and further that there was no satisfactory evidence that the appellant was 
traveling in the performance of her duties. Furthermore, the court noted that 
there was no evidence that at the time of the fall the appellant was doing 
anything with respect to the vehicle other than walking across the parking lot 
to it. Essentially, then, the district court concluded that the evidence failed 
to support the burden of proof assigned to the appellant to demonstrate that she 
was at the time of the injury "traveling in * * * a duly authorized private 
vehicle, but only when the travel occurs in the performance of the employees' 
duties." In our view the evidence as set forth in the record supports the 
factual determinations by the district court, and leads to the conclusion that 
the appellant was not covered under this aspect of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act.

[¶14.]    The appellant urges upon the 
court the concept of liberal construction of the Worker's Compensation Act in 
favor of the claimant, citing Wright v. 
Wyoming State Training School, 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211 (1953). The court 
does not deny that legal proposition, but notes that it is tempered by a 
requirement that a construction not be afforded which results in an extension of 
the coverage to situations which are not reasonably within the language of the 
statute. Alco of   Wyoming v. Baker, supra; In re Hardison, Wyo., 
429 P.2d 320 (1967). It is our conclusion that the statute cannot in this 
instance be construed in a manner which overcomes the factual determinations of 
the district court. The appellant has failed to produce evidence which brings 
her within the coverage extended by the 
statute.

[¶15.]    The order of the district 
court denying the appellant's application and claim for benefits under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act must be affirmed.