Title: State v. Cameron

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,093 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ANDRAY S. CAMERON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
Under the facts of this case, a defendant's sentence of lifetime postrelease 
supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) for three counts of aggravated indecent 
solicitation of a child is not cruel or unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights; in other words, the punishment it is not so disproportionate to 
the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 
dignity. Factors leading to this conclusion include:  the nature of the offense, which is 
serious and is a sex crime against a minor that historically has been treated as a forcible 
or violent felony regardless of whether there is physical force; the defendant's 
characteristics; and the penological goals of postrelease supervision, which include 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. These factors outweigh the lack 
of strict proportionality with other sentences in Kansas and other jurisdictions, especially 
given that the sentence is not grossly disproportionate.  
 
2. 
 
Applying the factors related to a case-specific proportionality challenge that a 
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the sentence in this case to lifetime postrelease supervision under 
2 
 
K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) for three convictions of aggravated indecent solicitation of a 
child is not cruel and unusual punishment.  
 
3. 
 
A sentence of lifetime postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) for 
three counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child is not categorically 
disproportionate and, therefore, is not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
4. 
 
When the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1) are examined in pari materia with a 
view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony, there is no 
reasonable doubt that the legislature intended the more specific and more severe 
provision of (d)(1)(G) to apply to sexually violent offenses rather than the more general 
provision of (d)(1)(B). This means that an offender convicted of a "sexually violent 
crime" committed after July 1, 2006, must be sentenced to receive lifetime postrelease 
supervision upon release from prison. 
 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; JEAN SCHMIDT, judge. Opinion filed July 27, 2012. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Theresa L. 
Barr, of the same office, was with her on the briefs for appellant. 
 
 
Natalie A. Chalmers, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
3 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  As required by K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), the district court in this 
case sentenced Andray S. Cameron, in part, to lifetime postrelease supervision for his 
convictions of three counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. On appeal, 
Cameron argues his sentence to lifetime postrelease supervision is a disproportionate and 
cruel and/or unusual punishment that violates § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Cameron also 
argues the district court erred by not recognizing the court had the discretion to sentence 
him to a shorter postrelease supervision term of 24 months under a different statutory 
subsection, K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(B). 
 
 
We reject Cameron's arguments regarding the constitutionality of his sentence, 
concluding the lifetime postrelease supervision sentence is not disproportionate to the 
seriousness of Cameron's crime, is not grossly disproportionate to the sentences imposed 
for other crimes in Kansas or similar crimes in other states, and is not categorically 
unconstitutional. We also reject his argument that the district court had discretion to 
sentence him to a postrelease supervision term of 24 months, finding there is no 
reasonable doubt that the Kansas Legislature intended the more severe penalty of lifetime 
postrelease supervision must be imposed when a defendant is sentenced for a sexually 
violent crime. Consequently, we affirm Cameron's sentence. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
 
Cameron pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a 
child, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3511(a), a severity level 5 person felony. A person 
commits aggravated indecent solicitation of a child by "[e]nticing or soliciting a child 
under the age of 14 years to commit or to submit to an unlawful sexual act." K.S.A. 21-
3511(a).  
 
4 
 
Under the facts of this case, 45-year-old Cameron was married to the victim's 
biological grandmother, making him the stepgrandfather of the 12-year-old female 
victim. According to the factual statement offered by the State as the basis for the plea, 
Cameron's wife was "raising" the victim at the time of the incident. The State proffered 
that the victim told her grandmother that Cameron "put his thing up and down on her 
butt, soliciting her to engage in acts of an unlawful sexual nature, those acts being—act 
of sexual intercourse, and an act of criminal sodomy, and an act of lewd fondling of [the 
victim.]" The State also proffered that Cameron admitted to police that he had been 
drinking heavily. Cameron, after initially denying the allegations, in a second interview 
"confessed to waking up with an erect penis and pressing that against the back side of 
[the victim] and soliciting her for the sex acts described previously." The district court 
accepted Cameron's plea and found him guilty of three counts of aggravated indecent 
solicitation involving enticement to commit or submit to sexual intercourse, sodomy, and 
lewd fondling or touching.  
 
As part of the plea agreement, it was agreed that Cameron would be sentenced to 
24 months' postrelease supervision. The district court determined, however, it could not 
follow the plea agreement because K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) expressly mandates lifetime 
postrelease supervision for sexually violent offenders; Cameron's offense meant he fell 
within the mandate. The court offered Cameron the opportunity to withdraw his guilty 
plea, but Cameron decided not to withdraw his plea and instead chose to ask that the plea 
agreement be enforced. Cameron also filed a motion requesting a downward departure 
from lifetime postrelease supervision and a motion arguing lifetime postrelease 
supervision was cruel and/or unusual punishment under the Kansas Constitution and the 
United States Constitution. Cameron's motion was essentially the same as that of the 
defendant in State v. Mossman, No. 103,111 (this day decided), who was represented by 
the same trial counsel. 
 
5 
 
Specifically, Cameron noted that K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) provides that an 
individual convicted of a sexually violent crime committed on or after July 1, 2006, who 
is released from prison "shall be released to a mandatory period of postrelease 
supervision for the duration of the person's natural life." An individual sentenced to 
lifetime imprisonment under K.S.A. 21-4643 is excepted from this requirement. Included 
in the definition of sexually violent crimes is the crime of aggravated indecent solicitation 
of a child, Cameron's crime of conviction in all three counts in this case. See K.S.A. 22-
3717(d)(2)(G).  
 
Mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision includes a general requirement that the 
person cannot commit a new criminal offense and may include several other specific 
"conditions targeted toward facilitating rehabilitation, restitution, and safe reintegration 
into society. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Gaudina, 284 Kan. 354, 359, 160 P.3d 854 
(2007). These conditions may include payment of costs, fines, and restitution; completing 
educational requirements; performing community service; reporting to a supervising 
officer; and abiding by other special conditions allowed by administrative regulations and 
orders. K.S.A. 21-4703(p) (defining "postrelease supervision"); K.S.A. 22-3717(m) 
(listing possible conditions). In addition to discussing these general conditions, Cameron, 
in his motion, stressed the potential of life in prison if he violates his postrelease 
conditions by committing a new felony. See K.S.A. 75-5217(c) ("upon revocation [of 
postrelease supervision], the inmate shall serve the entire remaining balance of the period 
of postrelease supervision"). Both the restrictions that accompany lifetime postrelease 
supervision and the potential for life in prison, Cameron argued in his motion, makes the 
sentence disproportionate. 
 
At sentencing, the district court denied Cameron's motion for a sentencing 
departure. In addition, citing State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), 
the district court rejected Cameron's contention that lifetime postrelease supervision is 
unconstitutional.  
6 
 
 
On appeal, Cameron renews his argument that lifetime postrelease supervision 
constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although in this 
appeal, Cameron has different counsel than Mossman's appellate counsel, Cameron's 
arguments are very similar to those asserted by Mossman. However, Cameron does make 
the additional argument that the district court had the discretion to sentence him to a 
shorter postrelease supervision term under a different statutory provision.  
 
This court transferred Cameron's case from the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
K.S.A. 20-3018(c) (transfer on court's own motion), along with Mossman's appeal. At the 
time of the transfer and in light of Cameron's challenge under the Eighth Amendment's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, this court directed the parties to file "supplemental 
briefs addressing whether the categorical analysis set out in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), which was decided after [Cameron's] 
briefs were submitted, should apply." The State's brief in this appeal and in Mossman's 
appeal were filed by the Shawnee County District Attorney's office and made similar 
arguments in both appeals. As a result, the legal arguments in this case are essentially the 
same as those considered in Mossman and it is only the factual circumstances of the two 
cases that are distinguishable. See Mossman, slip op. at 4. 
 
§ 9 OF THE KANSAS CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
With that in mind, we first turn to Cameron's argument that his lifetime postrelease 
supervision sentence, imposed pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), violates § 9 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. In Mossman, we determined the applicable standard 
of review for this issue, stating: 
 
7 
 
"[I]n deciding whether a sentence is cruel or unusual under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution 
Bill of Rights, a district court must make both legal and factual determinations. [Citation 
omitted.] When the district court's decision is appealed, an appellate court applies a 
bifurcated standard of review:  All of the evidence is reviewed, but not reweighed, to 
determine if there is sufficient support for the district court's factual findings, and the 
district court's legal conclusions drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo. [Citations 
omitted.]" Mossman, slip op. at 8.  
 
We also explained in Mossman that "[b]oth a district court making the initial 
determination regarding whether a statute is constitutional and an appellate court 
conducting a review of that determination are required by the separation of powers 
doctrine to presume the statute is constitutional." This means, we explained, that "if there 
is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutional, courts have the duty to do so 
by resolving all doubts in favor of constitutionality. [Citations omitted.]" Mossman, slip 
op. at 8. 
 
This presumption arises from the separation of powers doctrine, which also 
imposes a limitation on courts by prohibiting judicial resolution of issues that are not ripe 
for decision. Although recognizing the requirement of ripeness, in Mossman we rejected 
the State's argument that a defendant's arguments regarding the constitutionality of 
lifetime postrelease supervision are not ripe for decision on direct appeal. We reached 
this conclusion because,  
 
"[e]ven though the supervision will not begin until sometime in the future after the 
defendant has completed a term of imprisonment and no one knows exactly what 
conditions will be imposed on the defendant at that time, the claim is ripe because the 
postrelease supervision term is part of the sentencing judgment and it is known that the 
defendant's rights and liberties will be restricted in some manner." Mossman, slip op., 
Syl. ¶ 3. 
 
8 
 
In light of that conclusion, we considered Mossman's arguments, and likewise can 
consider those made by Cameron.  
 
Freeman Factors 
 
Cameron's arguments regarding constitutionality under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights are framed by this court's decision in Freeman. In that 
decision, this court recognized:  "Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible, 
although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so disproportionate to the crime for 
which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of 
human dignity." Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367. This court set out a three-part test to aid in 
administering this principle, stating: 
 
"(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be 
examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this 
inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the 
extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the 
prescribed punishment; 
"(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this 
jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes 
punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent 
suspect; and 
"(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the 
same offense." Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367.  
 
Accord State v. Levy, 292 Kan. 379, 384-85, 253 P.3d 341 (2011); State v. Reyna, 
290 Kan. 666, 689, 234 P.3d 761, cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 532 (2010); State v. 
Mondragon, 289 Kan. 1158, 1162-63, 220 P.3d 369 (2009). 
 
No one factor controls. "Ultimately, one consideration may weigh so heavily that 
it directs the final conclusion," but "consideration should be given to each prong of the 
9 
 
test." State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). Particularly 
where the focus of an argument is proportionality, which is the focus of Cameron's 
arguments, "the factual aspects are a necessary part of the overall analysis." Ortega-
Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161. Further, this court has stated that the use of these factors is 
disfavored if analyzing any aspect of a criminal sentence other than its length. See State 
v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1032-33, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 
(2002), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 102 P.3d 
445 (2004), rev'd on other grounds Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 
L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006). 
 
 First Freeman Factor 
 
With regard to the first Freeman factor—nature of the offense and the character of 
the offender—Cameron, in his written brief to the district court, pointed to facts 
particular to this case: 
 
"The nature of the offense involved [Cameron's] soliciting his 12-year-old step-grand-
daughter to commit or submit to three different sex acts on one occasion. He spoke not 
once, but twice to law enforcement about it and showed remorse. He immediately went 
into inpatient alcohol treatment at his own expense. He was 46 years old [sic] with no 
prior felony record. He had held a job with Goodyear for many years."  
 
At the motions hearing, Cameron also pointed the district court to the report of Dr. 
George Hough for evidence regarding the nature of the offense and Cameron's character. 
It appears from the record that Dr. Hough was a psychologist who evaluated Cameron, 
but Dr. Hough's report was not included in the record on appeal.  
 
With regard to the first Freeman factor, the district judge made the following 
findings on the record: 
10 
 
 
"[T]he circumstances of the case appear to be that Mr. Cameron did engage in some sort 
of unlawful activity with a child. She was I think 11, close to 12, when it occurred. He 
was extremely intoxicated, according to his statements, at the time. . . . [H]is version of 
the events was mirrored in his statements to Dr. Hough and to law enforcement officers 
. . . in several statements. 
"Mr. Cameron was totally cooperative with law enforcement. Had he not given 
statements, this case would have been substantially more difficult to prove, because, of 
course, it would have necessitated the testimony of the victim. 
"Mr. Cameron did choose to accept responsibility for his actions as part of his 
treatment program.  
. . . . 
". . . [T]he Court does note that [Dr. Hough's] report did contain information 
assessing Mr. Cameron's risk levels to the community, risk for reoffending, et cetera. And 
his numbers were all very low for risk of future type of sexual offense. That he . . . is not 
attracted to young children. His . . . sexual preferences and attractions are to adult 
females. 
"There was, of course, the alcohol, which was a primary element to the intent in 
this case, or according to Dr. Hough. 
"But the point is, on this case, that the nature of the offense, even what he agreed 
to plead to, the lesser offense, were clearly offenses that fall within those offenses . . . 
provided by statute to be addressed by Jessica's Law."  
 
On appeal, Cameron makes no attempt to argue how the first Freeman factor 
should be analyzed under his particular facts or how the district court's findings should 
impact his appeal. Instead, he merely argues that the district court's "analysis was 
insufficient." It is unclear why Cameron would characterize those findings as insufficient, 
and Cameron's counsel was unable to identify insufficiencies when asked to do so during 
oral argument. The findings address the components outlined in the first Freeman factor, 
and we find them sufficient for appellate review. 
 
11 
 
As Cameron admits, his crime involved activities with a 12-year-old girl, who was 
his stepgranddaughter. Although alcohol was viewed as a significant causative factor, 
more so than a proclivity to engage in sexual activities with a child, there is no question 
that the crime is very serious and one that can create significant psychological harm. 
Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's findings relating to the first 
Freeman factor, and we will not reweigh that evidence. In turn, the district court's factual 
findings support its legal conclusion that the first Freeman factor does not weigh in 
Cameron's favor. 
 
Moreover, Cameron's failure to adequately brief the issue constitutes a waiver of 
any arguments regarding the first Freeman factor. See State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, Syl. 
¶ 5, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012). Nevertheless, we must address the other Freeman factors. 
 
 Second Freeman Factor 
 
Under the second Freeman factor—comparison of his punishment with 
punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses—Cameron argued in 
his presentencing motion, as he does on appeal, that his lifetime postrelease supervision 
sentence is disproportionate to other sentences in Kansas. He provides the example of 
intentional second-degree murder, which carries a longer prison sentence but carries a 
shorter postrelease supervision term of only 36 months. Cameron also provided the sole 
example of second-degree murder at the motions hearing before the district court. See 
K.S.A. 21-3402 (intentional second-degree murder is a severity level 1 person felony); 
K.S.A. 21-4704(a) (for a severity level 1 person felony, presumptive prison sentence with 
criminal history score of "I" is 165-155-147 months' incarceration; presumptive prison 
sentence with criminal history score of "H" is 186-176-166 months' incarceration); 
K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(A) (36 months' postrelease supervision). Although the district court 
did not specifically address the disproportionality of the sentence as compared to one 
imposed for second-degree murder, the judge concluded:  "I'm without specific evidence 
12 
 
to show that application of the law in this case would be disproportionate to . . . other 
sentences imposed within this jurisdiction."  
 
This same argument was discussed in Mossman. There, we concluded that while a 
defendant subject to lifetime postrelease supervision is under a longer cumulative 
sentence than a defendant sentenced for second-degree murder, a "sentence to lifetime 
postrelease supervision [for a sexually violent offense] is not grossly disproportionate in 
relation to the sentence applicable to second-degree murder in Kansas when we consider 
the penological purposes, the seriousness of the crime, and the other concerns discussed 
in relation to the first Freeman factor." Mossman, slip op. at 19-20. In other words, the 
difference in proportionality between Cameron's sentence, especially in light of the 
factual circumstances, and one imposed for second-degree murder is not so significant 
that the second Freeman factor outweighs the first Freeman factor. 
 
But, we still must evaluate this conclusion in light of the third Freeman factor. 
 
 Third Freeman Factor 
 
Under the third Freeman factor—comparison of the penalty with punishments in 
other jurisdictions for the same offense—Cameron made the general acknowledgment in 
his presentencing motion and at the motions hearing that many states have passed some 
form of "Jessica's Law." He argued in his written motion that this did not foreclose his 
requested relief because "in Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, . . . the Court said, 
'Ultimately, one consideration may weigh so heavily that it directs the final conclusion.' 
Not all three Freeman factors need to be found to find the sentence unconstitutional." 
And in Cameron's arguments at the motions hearing, he also pointed to Massachusetts as 
an example of a state that changed its laws to allow district courts to exercise discretion 
in deciding whether "to impose the life time" sentence. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, § 45 
13 
 
(2010) (some enumerated sex offenders "may" be sentenced to lifetime parole 
supervision; others "shall" be sentenced to lifetime parole supervision).  
 
The district court summarily rejected these arguments, concluding it did not "have 
sufficient information to show that application in this case would be disproportionate to 
the application in other jurisdictions." On appeal, Cameron cites to the limited use of 
postrelease supervision in other states for crimes similar to aggravated indecent 
solicitation of a child.  
 
Essentially the same arguments regarding the third Freeman factor were presented 
in Mossman. If anything, Cameron presents a weaker argument because he admits six 
other states impose mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision in cases involving crimes 
like Kansas' aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-
1001 (2011) (Colorado); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-625(4)(b) (2011) (Montana); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 176.0931, 179D.097 (2011) (Nevada); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-6.4(a), (c) 
(2005) (New Jersey); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a (A)(13); tit. 57, § 584 (N)(2) (2011) 
(Oklahoma); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(3)(a) (2008) (Utah). In contrast, in Mossman, 
only three states had the same mandatory requirement for a crime comparable to 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child, although several states had similar provisions 
or made for discretionary imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision for crimes like 
that committed by Mossman. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 144.103(2), 163.375(1)(c) 
(2011). 
 
While we find some merit to Cameron's arguments that only a minority of states 
impose a similar punishment, the lifetime postrelease supervision sentence is 
proportionate to sentences mandated in some other jurisdictions and is not grossly 
disproportionate in light of the strength of the first Freeman factor. As we held in 
Mossman: 
 
14 
 
"Under the facts of this case, a defendant's sentence of lifetime postrelease 
supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) for the crime of aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child is not cruel or unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill 
of Rights; in other words, it is not so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. Factors leading to this 
conclusion include:  the nature of the offense, which is serious and is a sex crime against 
a minor that historically has been treated as a forcible or violent felony regardless of 
whether there is physical force; the defendant's characteristics; and the penological goals 
of postrelease supervision, which include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. These factors outweigh the lack of strict proportionality with other 
sentences in Kansas and other jurisdictions, especially given that the sentence is not 
grossly disproportionate." Mossman, slip op., Syl. ¶ 5.   
 
For these same reasons, Cameron's sentence for the crime of aggravated indecent 
solicitation of a child does not violate § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
Next, Cameron argues his lifetime postrelease supervision sentence violates the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the 
Unites States Constitution. Under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 
L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), a challenge pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to a term-of-years 
sentence as disproportionate and therefore cruel and unusual punishment falls into one of 
two general classifications. "The first [category] involves challenges to the length of 
term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case. The second 
comprises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain 
categorical restrictions on the death penalty." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021; see State v. 
Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 863-66, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010) (discussing Graham). These two 
classifications will be discussed separately.  
 
 
15 
 
1. Case-Specific Proportionality Challenge 
 
With regard to the first federal classification—involving a case-specific 
proportionality analysis—in Mossman, we held this issue involves the same standard of 
appellate review as applies to the application of the Freeman factors. As opposed to the 
district court which decided Mossman's motions and considered pre-Graham Eighth 
Amendment decisions, the district court in this case did not specifically address the 
Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, Cameron does not suggest any reason why our 
application of the Freeman factors would not control the case-specific considerations 
under the Eighth Amendment. Cameron argues the Kansas Constitution provides him 
broader protection than does the Eighth Amendment. In contrast, he does not suggest any 
basis for finding case-specific disproportionality under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution if we have rejected such an argument under § 9 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
Further, as we noted in Mossman, the United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized that it is only the rare case where the threshold comparison of the gravity of 
the offense and the harshness of the penalty will lead to an inference of gross 
disproportionality. Mossman, slip op. at 25-26 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022). This 
case is not such a rare case given the severity of the crime. Moreover, while the sentence 
is lengthy, lifetime postrelease supervision is not as harsh a punishment as imprisonment 
and is aimed at safely integrating a sex offender into society and protecting the public. 
Given the seriousness of the offense, the vulnerability of Cameron's victim, the potential 
psychological damage to the victim, and the penological goals of postrelease supervision, 
we conclude Cameron's case-specific arguments are unavailing.  
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
2. Categorical Proportionality Challenge 
 
In response to this court's order for supplemental briefing, Cameron also takes a 
broader approach by asserting that the second federal classification—a categorical 
proportionality—leads to the conclusion that lifetime postrelease supervision imposed for 
a certain class of offenders is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. In Graham, the Court indicated its earlier decisions had 
considered two categorical subsets in the context of its death penalty cases:  one related 
to the nature of the offense, the other to the characteristics of the offender. Graham, 130 
S. Ct. at 2022. 
 
Cameron describes this class of offenders as those who have committed "a sex 
offense, not involving pornography, where the offender and the victim do not engage in 
physical contact, much less a physical sexual act." The State argues that Cameron tries to 
name a much too narrow class of offenders and that by making such a narrow and 
specific class at issue, Cameron essentially makes a "thinly veiled attempt at a second 
chance at the Freeman analysis." The State also asserts that Cameron is not even a 
member of his proposed class of offenders in that "Cameron pled guilty to the act of 
placing his penis on a 12-year-old child's buttocks along with other acts of solicitation." 
In response to this latter point made by the State, Cameron argues:  "Although the 
statement that Mr. Cameron pressed his penis against 'the back side of J.M.' was included 
in the State's factual basis [at the plea hearing], this was not an element of the charged 
crime."  
 
Regardless of the factual basis of the plea, as we held in Mossman, we do not find 
a basis for considering a classification of an offense that is any narrower than the crime of 
conviction—aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. See Mossman, slip op. at 32 
(concluding category for analysis was crime of conviction, which in that case was 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child). Consideration of categorical challenges, we 
17 
 
held in Mossman, presents an issue of law subject to unlimited review. Mossman, slip op. 
at 29. 
 
In Mossman, we rejected a categorical argument relying on United States v. 
Williams, 636 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 188 (2011). In Williams, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether lifetime supervised release for child 
pornography was cruel and unusual punishment. In rejecting the constitutional challenge, 
the court stated: 
 
"Here, 'objective indicia' suggest that society is comfortable with lifetime 
sentences of supervised release for sex offenders, as such sentences are common. 
According to the United States Sentencing Commission, in the last five years, federal 
courts have sentenced 1875 defendants convicted of child pornography and child 
prostitution crimes to lifetime supervised release. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Federal 
Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release 58–59 (July 2010), www. ussc. gov/ general/ 
20100722_ Supervised_ Release. pdf. By way of comparison, in banning the sentence of 
life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the Supreme Court noted that 
there were then just 123 people in the county serving such sentences. See Graham, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2024. Further, the percentage of federal sex offenders receiving life terms of 
supervised release is increasing, climbing from 9.3 percent in 2005, to 20.5 percent in 
2009. [Citation omitted.]" Williams, 636 F.3d at 1233-34. 
 
In addition, as we have previously discussed here and in Mossman, several other 
states have adopted lifetime postrelease supervision for many, if not, all sexually violent 
crimes. Mossman, slip op. at 20-22. Hence, the numbers cited in Williams do not reflect 
the total number of sex offenders subject to lifetime postrelease supervision.  
 
The Williams court next exercised its "'independent judgment'" by considering 
"'whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.'" 
Williams, 636 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026). The Williams court 
noted that the goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation "are central purposes of the 
18 
 
criminal justice system, and they are particularly critical here given the propensity of sex 
offenders to strike again." More specifically, the court noted:  "Supervised release can 
further the end of rehabilitating sex offenders. . . . Relatedly, supervised release helps 
incapacitate sex offenders by keeping them under the watchful eye of probation officers 
who may be able to detect problems before they result in irreparable harm to innocent 
children." Williams, 636 F.3d at 1234. 
 
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion applies equally to those sentenced in Kansas to 
postrelease supervision for the crime of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child.  
 
As a result, we hold that Cameron's sentence of lifetime postrelease supervision 
under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) for his conviction of aggravated indecent solicitation of a 
child is not categorically disproportionate and, therefore, is not cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(B) 
 
Finally, Cameron argues that the district court erred in imposing lifetime 
postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G) because the court had the 
authority and discretion to sentence him to a shorter postrelease supervision term, 24 
months, under a different statutory subsection, K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(B). This issue 
requires us to construe K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1), and this task presents a question of law 
over which this court exercises unlimited review. See State v. Sellers, 292 Kan. 346, 356, 
253 P.3d 20 (2011); State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1010, 218 P.3d 432 (2009). 
 
The subsection of K.S.A. 22-3717 on which Cameron relies, (d)(1)(B), provides: 
 
"Except as provided in subparagraphs (D) and (E), persons sentenced for 
nondrug severity levels 5 and 6 crimes and drug severity level 3 crimes must serve 24 
19 
 
months, plus the amount of good time and program credit earned and retained pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4722, and amendments thereto, on postrelease supervision." 
 
 
Cameron acknowledges that his offense also falls under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), 
which requires an offender convicted of a "sexually violent crime" committed after July 
1, 2006, to receive lifetime postrelease supervision upon release from prison. "Sexually 
violent crime" includes aggravated indecent solicitation with a child under K.S.A. 21-
3511. See K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(2)(G). But Cameron argues that both subparagraphs of 
subsection (d)(1)—(d)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(G)—apply because both are listed in the statute 
and the language in (d)(1)(B) does not create an exception for offenses falling under 
(d)(1)(G). He essentially contends the rule of lenity requires the lesser of the two 
postrelease supervision terms.  
 
A similar argument was considered in State v. Chavez, 292 Kan. 464, 254 P.3d 
539 (2011), in which the defendant sought the application of the more lenient sentencing 
provisions of one subparagraph of a statute's subsection rather than a harsher penalty in 
the same subsection. As in this case, the more lenient provision was more general and the 
harsher provision was more specific. The court noted that the circumstance of having to 
"reconcile two provisions within the same subsection of the same statute . . . triggers a 
responsibility that this court consider the various provisions of the act in pari materia 
with a view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony, if 
possible. [Citation omitted.]" Chavez, 292 Kan. at 467. Discussing the rules of strict 
construction and lenity that apply to the construction of ambiguous criminal statutes, the 
Chavez court noted:  "[T]he general rule of strict construction of criminal statutes is 
constrained by the rule that the interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect 
legislative design and intent. [Citation omitted.] Moreover, the rule of lenity is subject to 
the existence of 'any reasonable doubt' as to the statute's meaning." Chavez, 292 Kan. at 
468. In part because of the specific language of one subparagraph as compared to the 
more general language of the other subparagraph, the court concluded there could be no 
20 
 
reasonable doubt that the legislature intended for the more specific and severe penalty to 
apply. Chavez, 292 Kan. at 468; see also State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1001, 236 P.3d 
481 (2010) (citing In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 82, 169 P.3d 1025 [2007], cert. denied 555 
U.S. 937 [2008]) (indicating a specific provision within a statute controls over a more 
general provision within the statute). 
 
 
Likewise, when we consider the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1) in pari 
materia with a view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony 
there is no reasonable doubt that the legislature intended the more specific and more 
severe provision of (d)(1)(G) to apply to a sentence imposed for a conviction of a 
sexually violent offense rather than the more general provision of (d)(1)(B) that Cameron 
seeks to apply. This means that an offender convicted of a "sexually violent crime" 
committed after July 1, 2006, must be sentenced to receive lifetime postrelease 
supervision upon release from prison. 
 
 
The district court did not err in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision 
under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G).  
 
 
Affirmed.