Title: Leo v. Hillman

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

LEO_V_HILLMAN.93-621; 164 Vt 95; 665 A.2d 572

[Opinion Filed 07-Jul-1995]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 9-Aug-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.     



                                 No. 93-621


Patricia B. Leo, et al                            Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

Donald F. Hillman, et al                          November Term, 1994


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Richard H. Munzing of Weber, Perra & Wilson, P.C., Brattleboro, for
 plaintiffs-appellants 

Robert S. DiPalma and April Shafer Johnson of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc.,
 Burlington, for defendants-appellees 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   Plaintiffs are family members of Judith Leo-Coneys, who
was murdered by Francis Malinosky in 1979.  They brought this action in 1992
against Dr. Donald F. Hillman and University Associates in Psychiatry, Inc.
(UAIP), seeking damages for wrongful death and infliction of emotional
distress, and for Judith Leo-Coneys's pain and suffering.  Plaintiffs appeal
from a summary judgment dismissing the wrongful death and emotional distress
claims. Defendants Hillman and UAIP cross-appeal from the court's order
denying summary judgment on the issues of a purported release in defendants'
favor and survival claims on behalf of the victim.  We affirm. 

     The complaint alleges that Judith Leo-Coneys had been involved in a
romantic relationship with Francis Malinosky, which she ended in the summer
of 1979.  Malinosky became distraught and sought psychological treatment with
defendant Hillman, a licensed psychologist employed by UAIP.  Malinosky met
with Hillman six times between September 4, 1979 and October 12, 1979, and in
furtherance of the treatment, on October 18, 1979, Hillman 

 

met with both Malinosky and Leo-Coneys.  That same evening Malinosky held
Leo-Coneys at gunpoint until she agreed to reconcile with him. Leo-Coneys
informed Hillman of the incident. On November 5, 1979, Leo-Coneys disappeared
and was never seen alive again.  Malinosky was considered a principal suspect
and about three weeks later, Malinosky also disappeared. 

     As trustee for the decedent, Patricia Leo filed suit against Malinosky
in April 1980, alleging, inter alia, that he inflicted "great pain and
suffering of body and mind, and on information and belief, the possible death
of Judith Leo-Coneys."  In September 1981, Leo, individually and as trustee
for Leo-Coneys and guardian for Leo-Coneys's son, entered into a release
agreement with Malinosky's legal representative, under which she agreed to
discharge Malinosky from all future claims. 

     In April 1990, Malinosky was apprehended in California then extradited
to Vermont to stand trial for the murder of Leo-Coneys. Later that year,
Malinosky entered into a plea agreement and led authorities to Leo-Coneys's
body.  Thereafter, Malinosky filed a written statement with the Chittenden
Superior Court stating that he had shot and killed Leo-Coneys on November 5,
1979. 

     Leo was appointed administrator for Leo-Coneys's estate in August 1992. 
Plaintiffs filed the present action against Hillman and UAIP in September
1992, alleging wrongful death, reckless and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and a survival action for pain and suffering.  Plaintiffs asserted
that Hillman knew Malinosky posed a serious threat to Leo-Coneys but
discouraged her from reporting the gun incident of October 18, 1979 to the
authorities. Plaintiffs also alleged that Hillman knew or should have known
that Malinosky was dangerous, but did nothing to confront Malinosky or to
protect Leo-Coneys. 

     Defendants Hillman and UAIP moved for summary judgment.  The court
granted the motion as to the claims of wrongful death and for infliction of
emotional distress but denied it as to plaintiffs' survival claims.  The
present appeal and cross-appeal followed. 

 

                  I. Statute of Limitations Discovery Rule

     Plaintiffs argue that the wrongful death claim is not barred under 14
V.S.A.  1492(a), which states in relevant part that: "[s]uch action shall
be brought in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person
and commenced within two years from his decease . . . ."   The statute is
clear on its face and therefore requires no additional interpretation.
Burlington Elec. Dep't v. Vermont. Dep't of Taxes, 154 Vt. 332, 335-336, 576 A.2d 450, 452 (1990).  Section 1492(a) prescribes a limitation period that is
necessarily determinable where facts are known and indisputable.  14 V.S.A.
 1492(a).  Accordingly, a claim for wrongful death must be commenced within
two years of the date of decedent's death.  Despite the apparent clarity of
this reading, plaintiffs argue that the court should have read  1492(a) to
include a proviso that the cause of action does not accrue until discovery of
deceased person's death, similar to the discovery proviso in 12 V.S.A. 
512(4), which provides that actions for personal injury shall be commenced
within three years after the date of the discovery of the injury. 

     In Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516, 526,