Title: Byers v. STANDARD CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

151 S.E.2d 38 (1966) 268 N.C. 518 Mrs. Esther W. BYERS, Administratrix of Estate of Weaver Byers, Deceased v. STANDARD CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY. No. 445. Supreme Court of North Carolina. November 23, 1966. *39 Hayes & Hayes, North Wilkesboro, for plaintiff, appellant. Moore & Rousseau, North Wilkesboro, for defendant, appellee. BRANCH, Justice. Plaintiff's principal assignment of error is based upon her exception to the allowing of defendant's motion for involuntary nonsuit. The State Highway Commission is an administrative agency of the State, to which the State has delegated the police power to establish, maintain and improve the state and county highways. The Commission possesses such additional powers as are incidental to the purposes for which it was created. Davie Contractors, Inc., v. Hertz Corp., 256 N.C. 277, 123 S.E.2d 802. Certain powers are specifically delegated to the State Highway Commission by G.S. § 136-72, which reads as follows: In the case of Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273, the Court considered a violation of G.S. § 119-43 relative to the *40 storage, labelling and handling of gasoline, and speaking through Bobbitt, J., said: This Court has considered a great many statutes which impose a specific duty for the protection of others, and has held in many instances that violation thereof constitutes negligence per se. The violation of an ordinance against employing children under twelve years of age was held negligence per se. Leathers v. Tobacco Co., 144 N.C. 330, 57 S.E. 11, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 349. The violation of an ordinance that forbade a railroad to block crossings for more than ten minutes was held negligence per se. Dickey v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 N.C. 726, 147 S.E. 15. The failure to obtain a permit to operate oversize or overweight vehicles in violation of G.S. § 20-119 was negligence per se. Lyday v. Southern R.R., 253 N.C. 687, 117 S.E.2d 778. Also, the violation of many of the safety statutes relative to the operation of motor vehicles has been held to constitute negligence per se. Thus, the general rule in North Carolina is that the violation of a statute or ordinance that imposes upon a person a specific duty for the protection of others constitutes negligence per se. The basis of the rule seems to be that the statute prescribes the standard of care, and the standard fixed by the Legislature is absolute. Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E.2d 331. Upon proof of breach of the statute, negligence is proven. This Court has not specifically held that G.S. § 136-72 is a statute imposing a specific duty for the protection of others. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in the case of Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 69 S.E.2d 441, in considering a statute regulating and controlling the size and weight of vehicles using the Virginia highways, used this language: There is sufficient evidence to show that defendant's agent violated the provisions of G.S. § 136-72. Upon being confronted with the warning sign on the bridge and being on notice that the bridge was being repaired, the defendant's agent could have foreseen that some injury or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected by entering upon the bridge with the heavily laden truck. The defendant contends that the plaintiff's intestate was contributorily negligent. Since the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence is upon the defendant, nonsuit on this ground should be allowed only when plaintiff's evidence, taken in the light most favorable to him, so clearly establishes this defense that no other reasonable inference or conclusion can be drawn therefrom. Waters v. Harris, 250 N.C. 701, 110 S.E.2d 283. *41 Plaintiff's evidence shows nothing more than that the deceased proceeded out on the bridge towards the other side after having been engaged in conversation with defendant's driver. The conclusions defendant would have us draw from the evidence adduced at the trial amount to nothing more than inferences. "Nonsuit on the issue of contributory negligence should be denied when the relevant facts are in dispute or opposing inferences are permissible from plaintiff's proof." (Italics ours) Wilson v. Camp, 249 N.C. 754, 107 S.E.2d 743. It is clear from plaintiff's evidence that her intestate was lawfully on the bridge. "It is the duty of drivers of vehicles to use due care to avoid injuries to pedestrians and other travelers lawfully using the way, or to persons rightfully working therein, and they are liable for injuries proximately resulting from their negligence in this regard." 25 Am.Jur., Highways, § 225, p. 519. For reasons stated, the judgment allowing defendant's motion for nonsuit is Reversed.