Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF TIMOTHY SMITH: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. TIMOTHY SMITH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF TIMOTHY SMITH: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION V. TIMOTHY SMITH2005 WY 137121 P.3d 150Case Number: 04-205Decided: 10/18/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
WORKER'S

COMPENSATION CLAIM OF TIMOTHY 
SMITH:

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
TIMOTHY 
SMITH,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 

Representing Appellant:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. 
Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Frank B. 
Watkins, Roberts & Watkins, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming.

            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division (Division) challenges an award of attorney fees made by 
the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).  The Division also challenges the 
district court's appointment of counsel for claimant in the district court 
appeal and an award of attorney fees to counsel for his efforts during that 
appeal.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the awards of attorney fees.  
We also find no error in the district court's appointment of counsel to 
represent claimant in the district court appeal.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The following 
issues are presented for our review:

 
 

1.      
Did the OAH abuse its 
discretion by awarding attorney fees and costs in the amount of $24,205.97, or 
was the award otherwise not in accordance with law?

 
 
2.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion by appointing counsel to represent claimant in defending the 
Division's appeal of the OAH decision and awarding attorney fees for such 
representation?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Timothy Smith 
(claimant) was employed by United Parcel Service (UPS) for twenty-four 
years.  He filed a report of injury 
with UPS claiming that he had incurred a work-related injury (tinnitus and 
hearing loss) as a result of his employment.  The Division determined that claimant 
had not suffered a compensable injury and denied benefits.  Claimant filed a timely objection to the 
denial of his claim.  The matter was 
referred to the OAH for hearing.  An 
attorney, Frank B. Watkins, was appointed to represent claimant.  The Division and UPS contested the 
compensability of claimant's injury.  
An evidentiary hearing was held January 30, 2003.  On March 11, 2003, the OAH entered its 
order denying benefits on the basis that claimant had failed to establish a 
compensable injury.

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Watkins 
subsequently filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees.  The motion was supported by an itemized 
statement reflecting fees and costs totaling $24,205.97.1  The Division objected to the fee 
request, filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection to Attorney's Fees and also 
submitted an affidavit of counsel reflecting hours that the Division's attorney 
had billed.  UPS filed an objection 
to the request in which it stated:

The Employer/Objector 
United Parcel Service (UPS), takes no position with respect to the 
Employee/Claimant's request for attorney's fees in this case to the extent those 
fees will not be charged against UPS' account and shall no [sic] affect UPS' 
experience rating, as established by Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-602(d).  If the claimed attorney's fees will have 
any impact on UPS' experience rating or account, UPS' [sic] joins in the 
objection of the Division of Worker Safety and 
Compensation.

 
 
A hearing was held on the 
motion.  The OAH found that the 
requested attorney fees and costs were reasonable and entered an order awarding 
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $24,205.97.

 
 
[¶5]      The Division 
appealed the attorney fee award to the district court.  The district court appointed Mr. Watkins 
to represent claimant in the appeal.  
The district court affirmed the award and also entered an order awarding 
additional attorney fees in the amount of $2,167.77 for defense of the district 
court appeal.  The Division filed 
this appeal. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We review administrative decisions pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2001) which states, in pertinent 
part, that the reviewing court shall:

 
 
(ii) 
       Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A) 
      Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
 [or]

 
 
            
 . . .

 
 
(E) 
      Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
[¶7]      We review an award of attorney fees under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 
862 (Wyo. 1997); Burd v. State ex rel. 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2004 WY 108, ¶ 28, 97 P.3d 802, 809 (Wyo. 2004).  "When an abuse of discretion is the 
issue on review, the reviewing court examines the question of whether the 
agency's decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors and whether 
it is rational.'"  State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div. v. Gerrard, 2001 WY 7, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 20, 23 (Wyo. 2001) 
(quoting Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996)).  "A court 
abuses its discretion only when it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances."  
Johnston, 938 P.2d  at 862 (quoting Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 
(Wyo. 
1993)).  The burden of proof rests with the party 
attacking the trial court's ruling to establish an abuse of discretion.  Johnston, 938 P.2d  at 862; UNC Teton Exploration Drilling  v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 595 
(Wyo. 
1989).  The interpretation and 
correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
involve questions of law over which our review authority is plenary.  We affirm conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency only if they are in accord with the law.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2002 WY 145, ¶¶ 9-10, 55 P.3d 23, 
26 (Wyo. 2002).  Whether a claimant 
is entitled to paid legal representation is a matter of law which we review de novo.  Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 954 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Award of Attorney Fees by 
OAH

 
 
[¶8]      A hearing 
examiner is authorized to award reasonable fees pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-602(d) (LexisNexis 2001).  The 
statute does not specify factors that the hearing examiner must consider in 
making his attorney fee award.  We 
have suggested, however, that hearing examiners refer to the factors set forth 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) (LexisNexis 2001) which 
states:

 
 
(b)       In civil actions 
for which an award of attorney's fees is authorized, the court in its discretion 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party without requiring 
expert testimony.  In exercising its 
discretion the court may consider the following factors:

 
 
(i)         The 
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly;

 
 
(ii)        The 
likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other 
employment by the lawyer;

 
 
(iii)       The fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;

(iv)       The amount 
involved and the results obtained;

 
 
(v)        The time 
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

 
 
(vi)       The nature 
and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;

 
 
(vii)      The experience, 
reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
and

 
 

(viii)          
Whether the fee is fixed 
or contingent.

 
 

Cargile v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 
965 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 
1998).  We have also approved 
application of the lodestar test to determine the reasonableness of attorney 
fees.  The lodestar test requires 
that two elements be considered: 1) whether the fee charged represents the 
product of reasonable hours at a reasonable rate; and 2) whether other factors 
of discretionary application should be considered to adjust the fee upward or 
downward.  Burd, ¶ 25; Forshee v. Delaney, 2005 WY 103, ¶ 7, 
118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶9]      The Division 
contends that, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d), the hearing examiner 
is not authorized to award attorney fees which exceed the benefits at issue.2  The Division also contends that the 
award is unreasonable and excessive when evaluated properly pursuant to the 
factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) and the lodestar test.  

 
 
[¶10]   In support of its position that the 
attorney fee award cannot exceed the benefits at issue, the Division relies upon 
that portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) which states, "[a]n award of 
attorney's fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not exceed 
the benefits at issue in the contested case hearing."  According to the Division, the "benefits 
at issue" total $1,277.00 and any attorney fee award in excess of that amount 
violates the clear dictates of the statute.  We disagree.  We rejected a similar argument in State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div. v. Gerrard, 2001 WY 7, 17 P.3d 20 (Wyo. 2001) and held 
that the limiting language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) applies only to a 
prevailing employer's attorney fees.  
We stated, "[c]ontrary to the Division's contention, the language did not 
diminish or limit the hearing examiner's jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the 
employee and award that attorney reasonable fees."  Gerrard, ¶ 15.  
The Division acknowledges our holding in Gerrard, but asks us to reconsider our 
decision.  We decline to do so and 
reaffirm our holding in Gerrard that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) does not limit an award of an employee's attorney 
fees to the "benefits at issue."3

 
 
[¶11]   In support of its contention that 
the OAH abused its discretion, the Division challenges the sufficiency of the 
findings by the hearing examiner.  
In his order, the hearing officer identified, and stated that he 
considered, all of the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b).  The hearing examiner specifically noted 
that claimant's attorney had presented an itemized billing of the attorney 
fees.  He commented on the 
litigation:

 
 
. . . The matter was 
vigorously and extensively litigated.  
The issue was precedent setting for UPS nationwide.  The UPS attorney, . . . , represented 
that his law firm, . . . , billed more hours and billed more fees to his client 
than Employee/Claimant's attorney has billed Workers' Compensation in this 
case.

 
 
The hearing examiner 
indicated that he reviewed and considered the Division's objection, its 
supporting memorandum and affidavit in opposition to the attorney fee 
request.  The hearing examiner 
determined that the fees and costs were "reasonable and proper under the 
circumstances of this case."  There 
is sufficient evidence in the record to support the determination of the hearing 
examiner.

 
 
[¶12]   The hourly rate of claimant's attorney was 
established by regulation and was not challenged by the Division.  The Division did not object to the costs 
incurred by claimant's attorney.  
The Division's attack on the fee application focused upon the total hours 
claimed.  However, despite the 
submission of an itemized billing by claimant's attorney, the Division did not 
object to any specific item in the billing.  In support of its position, the Division 
contends that the total award is unreasonable because "the benefits at issue" 
totaled only $1,277.00.  
Additionally, the Division suggests that reasonableness of attorney fees 
should be measured by the approximately $6,700.00 in attorney fees and costs 
which it incurred in defending the claim.

 
 
[¶13]   We have no difficulty in understanding why 
the hearing examiner may have rejected the Division's contentions.  As previously mentioned, much more was 
at stake for claimant than the $1,277.00 in medical bills.  The Division's affidavit reflecting 
attorney fees which it had incurred, even if relevant, is hardly 
persuasive.  The affidavit was not 
supported by an itemization of hours spent by the Division's attorney and would 
not have been helpful to the hearing examiner in evaluating the reasonableness 
of time spent by claimant's attorney for specific tasks.  More significantly, the record reflects 
that counsel for UPS took the lead in the litigation.  Claimant, on the other hand, was forced 
to battle both the Division and an employer who was highly motivated to prevail 
in a case which it deemed "precedent setting."  It is not surprising that the Division 
incurred fewer hours in defense of the litigation than did claimant.  

 
 
[¶14]   The record reveals that the employer's 
perception of the significance of this case played a substantial role in the 
amount of time and resources expended by the parties.  According to counsel for UPS, "this was 
a case that had important implications for UPS."  During the hearing on attorney fees, the 
hearing examiner observed, "[i]t was unusual for me to see a Work[er's] Comp 
case that was treated this way."  He 
characterized the litigation as "total war."  Counsel for the employer explained that 
UPS was concerned that a determination of compensability would open the door to 
future benefit claims by claimant.  
More significantly, UPS was concerned that a compensability determination 
in favor of claimant would result in future hearing loss claims by other UPS 
employees.  Additionally, UPS feared 
that an unfavorable result in a hearing loss case could result in imposition of 
federally mandated "hearing conservation programs."  As a byproduct of the UPS risk 
perception, several experts were involved, numerous depositions were taken and 
many hours were spent in litigation by counsel for all 
parties.

 
 
[¶15]   The hearing examiner recognized that the 
litigation was novel and difficult and could properly give considerable weight 
to this factor in determining a reasonable attorney fee.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b)(i).  The hearing examiner could also properly 
conclude that the extensive time and labor reflected in Mr. Watkins' bill was 
warranted because of the nature of the vigorous defense mounted by UPS and the 
Division.  Id.  Similarly, under the lodestar test, the 
hearing examiner could properly determine that a downward adjustment of the fee 
request was not warranted.  We find 
no abuse of discretion in the hearing examiner's award of attorney fees. 

 
 

Award of Attorney Fees by 
the District Court

 
 
[¶16]   The Division also challenges the 
district court's appointment of Mr. Watkins as claimant's attorney in the 
district court appeal.  Initially, 
the Division contends that the appointment of Mr. Watkins was improper because 
he was not representing the employee in the appeal "he was representing 
himself."  We find no merit to the 
Division's contention.  

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Watkins was appointed to 
represent claimant in the district court appeal pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-615 (LexisNexis 2001) which states, in pertinent part, "[t]he district 
court may appoint an attorney to represent the employee during proceedings in 
the district court and appeal to the supreme court.  The district court may allow the 
attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceedings 
in district court.  . . 
."

 
 
[¶18]   The statute clearly and 
unambiguously authorizes the district court to appoint an attorney to represent 
an employee in "proceedings in district court."  The term "proceedings" includes 
representation of an employee in an appeal to the district court.  Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
713 P.2d 187, 194 (Wyo. 1986).  In this case, claimant was the employee 
and named party.  Mr. Watkins is not 
a party in this case.  The appeal to 
the district court initiated by the Division, even if limited to an issue 
relating to attorney fees, did not change the parties or effect a de facto substitution of the 
parties.  We have previously 
recognized that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 authorizes a district court to award 
attorney fees when the only issue on appeal is the correctness of an OAH 
decision regarding attorney fees.  
Painter, 931 P.2d  at 956.  

 

[¶19]   The Division also contends that 
appointment of an attorney and an award of attorney fees by the district court 
is precluded by our decision in Sheneman 
v. Division of Worker's Safety, 962 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1998).  In Sheneman, the employee sought review by 
the district court of an order of the Internal Hearing Unit of the Workers' 
Compensation and Safety Division that denied the relief sought by the 
employee.  The district court 
affirmed the decision.   The 
district court also denied a request for attorney fees for representation of the 
employee in the district court appeal.  
We affirmed denial of attorney fees on the basis that an award of 
attorney fees was not authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 
because:

 
 
No benefits were at issue 
in the review of the final order by the IHU that Sheneman sought in the district 
court.  The only issue was whether 
Sheneman had made a timely filing of his objection to the Final Determination of 
the Division of Worker's Safety and Compensation, Department of Employment and a 
request for a hearing.  The district 
court correctly determined that no attorney's fees were authorized pursuant to 
statute because no benefits were at issue in the review sought by Sheneman.  The plain and unambiguous language of 
WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-615 forecloses Sheneman's claim for attorney's fees.

 
 

Sheneman, 
962 P.2d  
at 876.  We based our decision in Sheneman on an interpretation of that 
portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 which states, "[a]n award of attorney's 
fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not exceed the benefits 
at issue in the appeal."  In Sheneman we noted that, "[t]he plain 
language of this statute limits an award of attorney's fees to the benefits at 
issue in the appeal."  Sheneman, 962 P.2d  at 
876.

 
 
[¶20]   Subsequently, in Gerrard, we were called upon to 
determine if similar statutory language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) 
limited an award of attorney fees by the OAH for the representation of a 
claimant to the "benefits at issue in the contested case hearing."  We held that the statutory language did 
not restrict the amount of attorney fees allowable for representation of a 
claimant.  We explained our 
reasoning:

 
 
It being concluded § 
27-14-602(d) applies, we now address the pivotal issue of whether, as the 
Division contends, the statutory language precludes the employee's attorney from 
being awarded attorney's fees in excess of the sums at issue in the contested 
case proceeding.  In order to 
ascertain this issue, we must examine and interpret the language of the 
statute.

 
 
In 1995, § 27-14-602(d) 
was amended by the legislature to add the language denoted by bold italics, as 
follows:

 
 
(d) Upon request, the 
hearing examiner may appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants 
and may allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the 
conclusion of the proceeding.  An 
appointed attorney shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner 
either from the worker's compensation account, from amounts awarded to the 
employee or claimants or from the employer.  In 
any contested case where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a 
prevailing employer's attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of 
the hearing examiner from the worker's compensation account, not to affect the 
employer's experience rating.  An 
award of attorney's fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not 
exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case hearing.  In all other cases if the 
employer or division prevails, the attorney's fees allowed an employee's attorney shall not affect 
the employer's experience rating.  
Attorney fees allowed shall be at an 
hourly rate established by the director of the office of administrative hearings 
and any application for attorney's fees shall be supported by a verified 
itemization of all services provided.  
No fee shall be awarded in any case in which the hearing examiner 
determines the claim or objection to be frivolous and 
without legal or factual justification.  

 
 
1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193, 
§ 1.

 
 
The first sentence of the 
statute remained unchanged and provides that "the hearing examiner may appoint 
an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed 
attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the 
proceeding."  The hearing examiner's 
jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the employee and award reasonable attorney's 
fees at the conclusion of the proceeding was retained wholly intact.  The change affected by the added 
amendment language was that, in the event of a contested case regarding 
compensability of an injury, a prevailing employer's attorney's fees could be 
awarded but were not to exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case 
hearing.  The hearing examiner's 
jurisdiction to award a prevailing employer's attorney's fees not to exceed the 
benefits at issue in the contested case hearing was added.  Contrary to the Division's contention, 
the language did not diminish or limit the hearing examiner's jurisdiction to 
appoint counsel for the employee and award that attorney reasonable fees.  To conclude otherwise would render the 
first sentence of the statute meaningless, and this we will not do.  US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission, 989 P.2d 616, 
619-20 (Wyo. 1999); McClellan v. State, 933 P.2d 461, 465 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
Our conclusion is further 
supported by the preamble language to this session law:

 
 
AN ACT to amend W.S. 
27-14-602(d) and 27-14-615 relating to worker's compensation;  allowing payment of attorney fees 
incurred by prevailing employers in contested cases and appeals;  specifying that fees shall not be 
awarded in the case of certain frivolous claims or objections;  and providing for an effective 
date.  

            

1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
193.  Likewise it is consistent with 
our holding in  Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998), that a hearing examiner has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for an 
employee when the Division issues a final determination regarding compensability 
of an injury and further to award fees to the appointed attorney at the 
conclusion of the proceedings, regardless of whether a full contested case 
hearing is held.

 
 

Gerrard, ¶¶ 13  16.  

 
 
[¶21]   We conclude that our analysis in Gerrard is applicable to our 
interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-615.4  Both statutes, Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-14-602(d), which we interpreted in Gerrard, and Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-615, 
which is at issue in this case, were amended in 1995.  The language added in both statutes was 
substantially similar, the only difference being that Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-14-602(d) relates to contested case hearings and Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-615 
involves appeals of the contested case hearing.

  

[¶22]   The first sentence of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 27-14-615 authorizes the district court to appoint an attorney to 
represent an employee in proceedings before the district court.  The Division urges us to adopt an 
interpretation of the statute which would "render the first sentence 
meaningless" and would unduly restrict a claimant's right to legal 
representation.  We rejected a 
similar argument in Gerrard relating 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-14-602(d) and reject it here.  The 1995 amendment of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-14-615 did not change the first sentence.  The added language authorized an award 
of attorney fees to the employer's attorney but did not restrict the district 
court's authority to appoint counsel for the employee in the appeal and to award 
employee's counsel a reasonable attorney fee.

 
 
[¶23]   To hold otherwise would result in a 
legal environment that would allow the Division an uncontested appeal of every 
attorney fee award.  Such a result 
is not warranted by the language of the statute and would undermine a claimant's 
right to counsel.  Few attorneys, if 
any, would choose to represent claimants at the hearing level if they are 
required to fight for their statutorily authorized fees on appeal.  

 
 
[¶24]   We hold that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-615, a district court has authority to award reasonable attorney 
fees in its discretion to an employee's attorney and that the amount of the 
attorney fees awarded is not limited to the "benefits at issue" in the 
appeal.  To the extent that this 
decision conflicts with our holding in Sheneman, we hereby overrule Sheneman.        

 
 
[¶25]   In conclusion, we find no abuse of 
discretion by the OAH and affirm its award of attorney fees.  We also affirm the district court's 
appointment of Mr. Watkins and its award of attorney fees.  

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The fee 
request included $3,708.47 in costs.  
The Division did not challenge the award of 
costs.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-602(d) (LexisNexis 2001) states:

 
 
(d)  Upon request, the hearing examiner may 
appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the 
appointed attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the 
proceeding.  An appointed attorney 
shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner either from the 
worker's compensation account, from amounts awarded to the employee or claimants 
or from the employer.  In any 
contested case where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a prevailing 
employer's attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of the 
hearing examiner from the worker's compensation account, not to affect the 
employer's experience rating.  An 
award of attorney's fees shall be for a reasonable number of hours and shall not 
exceed the benefits at issue in the contested case hearing.  In all other cases if the employer or 
division prevails, the attorney's fees allowed an employee's attorney shall not 
affect the employer's experience rating.  
Attorney fees allowed shall be at an hourly rate established by the 
director of the office of administrative hearings and any application for 
attorney's fees shall be supported by a verified itemization of all services 
provided.  No fee shall be awarded 
in any case in which the hearing examiner determines the claim or objection to 
be frivolous and without legal or factual 
justification.

 
 

3Comment 
regarding the phrase "benefits at issue" is warranted.  The Division contends throughout its 
brief that the "benefits at issue" totaled only $1,277.00, which was the amount 
of medical bills incurred by claimant.  
This characterization does not accurately reflect what was at stake for 
claimant in the contested case hearing.  
If claimant met his burden of proof of establishing a compensable injury, 
he was potentially eligible to receive additional benefits including payment of 
future medical bills and awards for impairment and disability.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-403 (LexisNexis 
2001).

 
 

4The full 
text of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§  27-14-615 states:

 
 

Appointment 
of attorneys for court proceedings; fees.

 
 
The 
district court may appoint an attorney to represent the employee during 
proceedings in the district court and appeal to the supreme court.  The district court may allow the 
attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceedings 
in district court and the supreme court may allow for reasonable fees for 
services at the conclusion of the proceedings in the supreme court. In 
any appeal where the issue is the compensability of an injury, a prevailing 
employer's attorney fees shall also be paid according to the order of the 
district court or supreme court from the worker's compensation account, not to 
affect the employer's experience rating. An award of attorney's fees shall be 
for a reasonable number of hours and shall not exceed the benefits at issue in 
the appeal.  In all other 
cases, if the employer or division prevails in the district court or 
supreme court, as the case may be, the fees allowed an employee's attorney shall 
not affect the employer's experience rating.

 
 
(Emphasized 
language was added in 1995.)