Title: State v. D.W.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. D.W., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4544.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4544 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. D.W., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. D.W., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4544.] 
Juvenile law—R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) amenability hearing can be waived under 
proper procedures—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. 
(No. 2011-1677—Submitted June 5, 2012—Decided October 4, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 95750, 2011-Ohio-4096. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An amenability hearing under R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) may be waived provided (1) 
the juvenile, through counsel, expressly states on the record a waiver of 
the amenability hearing and (2) the juvenile court engages in a colloquy on 
the record with the juvenile to determine that the waiver was made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we decide whether a hearing to determine a 
juvenile’s amenability to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system may be 
waived, and we set forth the standard for valid waiver.  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that the record does not support a finding that D.W. waived his 
right to an amenability hearing.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand this case to the juvenile court for an amenability 
hearing or proper waiver of it. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellant, D.W., was charged with burglary, a felony, and other 
crimes in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, case 
No. DL 09-121602.  At the time of the offenses, D.W. was 17 years old. 
{¶ 3} The juvenile court conducted a probable cause hearing.  After 
stipulating to D.W.’s birth date, the juvenile court heard testimony from Shanay 
Ball, a victim of the crimes.  The juvenile court stated, “Based on the testimony, 
the Court finds that there is probable cause here.”  The juvenile court then noted 
that transfer of jurisdiction to adult court was discretionary and that D.W. had 
been bound over in a prior case.  The following exchange occurred: 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So the Court’s aware he has been 
bound.  He does have a prior bindover that the Court has just to 
refresh the Court’s recollection. 
THE COURT: Yes.  He has a bindover pending, right? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He actually was bound over. 
[ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR]: And been indicted in adult 
court. 
THE COURT: Right.  Right.  I mean, so he has a case 
pending that was transferred, but that hasn’t been— 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Resolved in any way, no. 
THE COURT:  —resolved yet.  Okay.  All right.  So we’ll 
have to refer him to our Clinic here at the Court for a full 
psychological. 
[ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I believe 
we’ve had some preliminary discussions about waiving the 
amenability.  It has already been found.  I don’t even know that we 
need to waive amenability. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If we could approach, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. Okay. 
* * *  
(Discussion held off of the record.) 
* * * 
THE COURT: Okay.  All right.  Because this Court has 
already found this alleged delinquent to be not amenable to the 
juvenile justice system on a prior case in which the Court 
transferred jurisdiction to the adult court, the Court in this case 
then will, based on this probable cause finding will then—we will 
transfer this case over to the adult court, as well, without having 
another amenability hearing.  And so we will not refer him to the 
Court Clinic at this time. 
 
{¶ 4} D.W. was subsequently bound over to the common pleas court and 
indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury on one count each of burglary, theft, 
vandalism, and criminal damaging and two counts of bribery.  A jury acquitted 
him of bribery, but found him guilty of the other charges.  He was sentenced to 
six years in prison and mandatory postrelease control. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 5} The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.  State 
v. [D.W.], 8th Dist. No. 95750, 2011-Ohio-4096.  In doing so, it concluded that 
“the juvenile court first held a probable cause hearing but then never held an 
amenability hearing.”  Id. at ¶ 30.  Without elaboration, the appellate court then 
held that although the juvenile court did not conduct the amenability hearing, 
D.W., “through his counsel, waived the amenability hearing.”  Id.  It concluded 
that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the case to the 
common pleas court.  Id. 
{¶ 6} D.W. appealed, and we accepted the cause as a discretionary 
appeal.  State v. [D.W.], 130 Ohio St.3d 1493, 2011-Ohio-6556, 958 N.E.2d 956.  
Two propositions of law are before us:  
 
(1) The R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) amenability hearing cannot be 
waived. 
(2) Waiver of the R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) amenability hearing 
before the juvenile court is not valid unless it is expressly stated on 
the record by the juvenile through his or her counsel, and the trial 
court must determine through a colloquy with the juvenile that the 
waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. 
 
ANALYSIS 
A. A juvenile has a right to an amenability hearing to determine if 
the juvenile can remain within the juvenile justice system or 
be bound over to adult court, and pursuant to Juv.R. 3,1 
the juvenile may waive the right to the amenability hearing 
                                                          
 
1 Juv.R. 3 was amended on July 1, 2012, 132 Ohio Laws lxx.  Because D.W.’s probable-
cause hearing took place in 2010, our references to this rule are to the former version, 69 Ohio 
St.3d CXLVII, unless otherwise noted.  As it pertains to D.W.’s issue before us, Juv.R. 3 has not 
changed. 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
1. The Juvenile Court Milieu 
{¶ 7} More than 40 years ago, the court recognized that juvenile courts 
are “rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris.”  Kent v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).  “The 
juvenile courts were premised on profoundly different assumptions and goals than 
a criminal court, United States v. Johnson (C.A.D.C.1994), 28 F.3d 151, 157 
(Wald, J., dissenting), and eschewed traditional, objective criminal standards and 
retributive notions of justice.”  In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 274, 2007-Ohio-
4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 66.  The objectives of the juvenile court “are to provide 
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, 
not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.”  Kent at 554. 
{¶ 8} The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that juveniles 
have “diminished culpability” and are therefore “ ‘less deserving of the most 
severe punishments.’ ”  Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 
L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), quoting Graham v. Florida, __ U.S.__, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 
2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).  Because of juveniles’ “ ‘lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” they “are more * * * susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” and their 
characters are “not as well formed.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570, 
125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
367, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993).  Accordingly, the actions of 
juveniles are less likely to be evidence of “irretrievably depraved character” than 
are the actions of adults.  Id. at 570.  “From a moral standpoint it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater 
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”  Id.  See 
also Miller, __ U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-2465, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, and fn. 5. 
{¶ 9} But in response to a rise in rates and severity of juvenile crime and 
the belief that not all juveniles can be rehabilitated, in 1969, the General 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Assembly enacted a statutory scheme that provides for some juveniles to be 
removed from the juvenile courts’ authority.  One such provision, R.C. 2152.12, 
formerly R.C. 2151.26, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 320, 133 Ohio Laws, Part III, 2040, 
2049-2050, is at issue in this appeal.  That statute allows juvenile courts to 
transfer certain juveniles to adult court to face criminal sanctions. 
{¶ 10} “Two types of transfer exist under Ohio’s juvenile justice system: 
discretionary and mandatory.”  State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 728 N.E.2d 
1059 (2000).  “Mandatory transfer removes discretion from judges in the transfer 
decision in certain situations.”  Id. R.C. 2152.12(A).  “Discretionary transfer, as 
its name implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to adult 
court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation 
within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety.”  Id.; R.C. 
2152.12(B). 
{¶ 11} In instances of discretionary transfer, as in this case,  
 
the juvenile court is also to determine the age of the child 
and whether probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile 
committed the act charged.  R.C. 2152.10(B) and 2152.12(B)(1) 
and (2).  However, if probable cause exists and the child is eligible 
by age, the juvenile court must then continue the proceeding for a 
full investigation.  R.C. 2152.12(C) and Juv.R. 30(C).  This 
investigation includes a mental examination of the child, a hearing 
to determine whether the child is “amenable to care or 
rehabilitation within the juvenile system” or whether “the safety of 
the community may require that the child be subject to adult 
sanctions,” and the consideration of 17 other statutory criteria to 
determine whether a transfer is appropriate. Juv.R. 30(C); R.C. 
2152.12(B), (C), (D), and (E). 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
 
In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 12} An amenability hearing helps determine whether a juvenile who is 
eligible for discretionary bindover will be transferred to adult court.  A critical 
stage of the juvenile proceedings, the hearing affects whether the juvenile faces a 
delinquency adjudication, or adult criminal sanctions and the label “felon.”  Kent, 
383 U.S. at 560, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.  Given the nature and 
consequences of the amenability hearing, juvenile court judges are entrusted with 
significant authority when conducting the hearings. 
{¶ 13} The role of parens patriae is not the juvenile court’s sole focus 
during an amenability hearing.  Procedural protections are vital. 
{¶ 14} “The State is parens patriae * * * [b]ut the admonition to function 
in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.”  Id. at 
554-555.  In Kent, the Supreme Court decided whether a juvenile court properly 
waived jurisdiction over a juvenile before transferring him to criminal court.  Id. 
at 552.  Before the transfer, the juvenile court judge did not hold a hearing and did 
not confer with the juvenile, his counsel, or his parents.  Id. at 546.  The United 
States Supreme Court held that “as a condition to a valid waiver order, [the 
juvenile] was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social 
records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the 
court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision” before 
being transferred to the adult court for criminal prosecution.  Id. at 557.  It insisted 
that the hearing “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment,” id. at 562, including “constitutional principles relating to due process 
and the assistance of counsel,” id. at 557. 
{¶ 15} Ten years later, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the United States Supreme Court again confirmed that a 
juvenile court must recognize a juvenile’s due process rights.  Gault held that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”  Id. 
at 13.  That decision led the states, including Ohio, to look at the process they 
used to adjudicate juveniles. 
 
In the wake of Gault and its progeny, we also found that 
“numerous constitutional safeguards normally reserved for 
criminal 
prosecutions 
are 
equally 
applicable 
to 
juvenile 
delinquency proceedings,” State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 
2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 26, and overruled prior 
decisions that held to the contrary, see In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 
[70,] at 76, 48 O.O.2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 808. 
 
In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d, 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 73. 
{¶ 16} One such constitutional safeguard that has been extensively 
developed through our jurisprudence has been a juvenile’s right to counsel.  See 
id., paragraph two of the syllabus (a juvenile may waive the right to counsel); In 
re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110, syllabus (a 
juvenile who is the subject of a parental-rights termination has a statutory right to 
counsel, citing State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 693 N.E.2d 
794 (1998)). 
{¶ 17} Today, we analyze another vital safeguard: the juvenile’s right to 
an amenability hearing before being transferred from juvenile court to adult court. 
2. The Relevant Statutory Scheme 
{¶ 18} The General Assembly codified the right to an amenability hearing 
in discretionary bindovers in R.C. 2152.12(B).  That statute provides, 
 
Except as provided in division (A) of this section, after a 
complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
for committing an act that would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, the juvenile court at a hearing may transfer the case if the 
court finds all of the following: 
(1) The child was fourteen years of age or older at the time 
of the act charged. 
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child 
committed the act charged. 
(3) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation 
within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may 
require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.  In making its 
decision under this division, the court shall consider whether the 
applicable factors under division (D) of this section indicating that 
the case should be transferred outweigh the applicable factors 
under division (E) of this section indicating that the case should 
not be transferred. The record shall indicate the specific factors 
that were applicable and that the court weighed. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 19} The right to a hearing is also set forth in our rules of procedure for 
the juvenile courts.  Pursuant to Juv.R. 30, 
 
(A)  Preliminary hearing. 
In any proceeding where the court considers the transfer of 
a case for criminal prosecution, the court shall hold a preliminary 
hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the 
child committed the act alleged and that the act would be an 
offense if committed by an adult. The hearing may be upon motion 
of the court, the prosecuting attorney, or the child. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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* * * 
(C) Discretionary transfer. 
In any proceeding in which transfer of a case for criminal 
prosecution is permitted, but not required, by statute, and in which 
probable cause is found at the preliminary hearing, the court shall 
continue the proceeding for full investigation. The investigation 
shall include a mental examination of the child by a public or 
private agency or by a person qualified to make the examination. 
When the investigation is completed, an amenability hearing shall 
be held to determine whether to transfer jurisdiction. The criteria 
for transfer shall be as provided by statute. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} The safeguard of a hearing is contained in the Revised Code and 
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, and it is grounded in due process and other 
constitutional protections.  As the United States Supreme Court makes clear, 
“there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result [the transfer of a 
juvenile to adult court] of such tremendous consequences, without ceremony—
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of 
reasons.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. 
{¶ 21} D.W. argues that by using “shall,” the plain language of R.C. 
2152.12(B)(3) and Juv.R. 30 require the juvenile court to perform an amenability 
hearing before determining whether to transfer a juvenile from the juvenile court 
system to the adult criminal system.  We agree.  We have no doubt that a 
juvenile’s right to an amenability hearing, like a juvenile’s right to counsel, is 
compelled by federal due process protections, Kent at 557, our statutory 
framework, R.C. 2152.12(B), and our rules, Juv.R. 30.  But in so holding, we also 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
make clear that contrary to D.W.’s assertions, the amenability hearing can be 
waived under Juv.R. 3. 
{¶ 22} D.W. contends that because Juv.R. 3 deals with the rights of the 
child, but R.C. 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30 deal with the juvenile court’s duty to act as 
parens patriae, the statute and the rule impose a duty upon the juvenile court that 
cannot be waived by the juvenile. 
{¶ 23} Juv.R. 3 states that although a juvenile may not waive his right to 
be represented by counsel at a Juv.R. 30 hearing, “[o]ther rights of a child may be 
waived with permission of the court.”  But the rule does not identify those “other 
rights.” We must therefore determine whether “other rights” include the right to 
an amenability hearing. 
{¶ 24} Even though “[t]here is a presumption against the waiver of 
constitutional rights * * *,” an individual can still waive his constitutional rights 
as long as the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently and is an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 
1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).  We hold similarly.  See, e.g., In re C.S., 115 Ohio 
St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 95, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
at 41-42, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (a “juvenile may waive his rights”). 
{¶ 25} It is important to note that pursuant to Juv.R. 3, juveniles may 
waive their “other rights,” but only “with the permission of the court.”  The 
quoted language reflects the notion that the juvenile court must not abandon its 
roles as parens patriae and protector of the due process rights of the juvenile.  
Thus, the court must ensure that the juvenile’s waiver of the right to an 
amenability hearing is made knowingly, intelligently, and intentionally and that it 
is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right.  By constructing the rule in this 
manner, we reconcile, as we must, the parens patriae duty of the juvenile court 
with the due process rights and autonomy of the juvenile. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 26} We therefore hold that one of the “other rights” that may be 
waived under Juv.R. 3 is the right to an amenability hearing. 
{¶ 27} We now turn to the manner in which any waiver of the amenability 
hearing must take place and the standards that juvenile judges should follow in 
determining whether the waiver is proper. 
B. For a juvenile to properly waive the right to an amenability hearing, the 
waiver must be expressly stated on the record by the juvenile, through counsel, 
and the juvenile court must determine, through colloquy with the juvenile, 
that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
{¶ 28} Waiver is often presented in the context of right to counsel.  In In 
re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, we set forth the 
requirements for a valid waiver of right to counsel, which have been incorporated 
into the new Juv.R. 3.  We conclude that the same reasoning applies here and 
adopt a standard similar to that for waiver of the right to counsel for the waiver of 
the right to an amenability hearing. 
{¶ 29} In In re C.S., we held: 
 
An effective waiver of the right to counsel by a juvenile 
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  State v. Gibson 
(1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 74 O.O.2d 525, 345 N.E.2d 399, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  In a juvenile court proceeding in 
which the judge acts as parens patriae, the judge must scrupulously 
ensure that the juvenile fully understands, and intentionally and 
intelligently relinquishes, the right to counsel. Id. at paragraph two 
of the syllabus; * * * In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. [725,] 737-738, 
543 A.2d 719 [(1988)] (“It is now commonly recognized that 
courts should take ‘special care’ in scrutinizing a purported 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
confession or waiver by a child”), citing Haley [v. Ohio], 332 U.S. 
[596,] 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 [1948)]. 
In the discharge of that duty, the judge is to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue with the juvenile.  Instead of relying solely on 
a prescribed formula or script for engaging a juvenile during the 
consideration of the waiver, see Iowa v. Tovar (2004), 541 U.S. 77, 
88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209, the inquisitional approach is 
more consistent with the juvenile courts’ goals, and is best suited 
to address the myriad factual scenarios that a juvenile judge may 
face in addressing the question of waiver. 
 
Id. at ¶ 106-107. 
{¶ 30} The holding in In re C.S. was incorporated into the new Juv.R. 3, 
which also addresses a juvenile’s right to waive counsel. 
{¶ 31} Juv.R. 3(D) now sets forth specific criteria that must be followed 
in order for the waiver to be valid: 
 
 
Any waiver of the right to counsel shall be made in open 
court, recorded, and in writing. In determining whether a child has 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to 
counsel, the court shall look to the totality of the circumstances 
including, but not limited to: the child’s age; intelligence; 
education; background and experience generally and in the court 
system specifically; the child’s emotional stability; and the 
complexity of the proceedings. The Court shall ensure that a child 
consults with a parent, custodian, guardian, or guardian ad litem, 
before any waiver of counsel. However, no parent, guardian, 
custodian, or other person may waive the child’s right to counsel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 32} Because the same underlying principles that we addressed 
regarding the nature of juvenile courts in the context of a juvenile’s waiver of his 
right to counsel are present in our analysis of a juvenile’s waiver of an 
amenability hearing, we conclude that the holding in In re C.S. and the language 
of Juv.R. 3 are persuasive and applicable to the standard that we adopt today. 
{¶ 33} Cognizant of the parens patriae duty of the juvenile court, the due 
process rights of the juvenile, the General Assembly’s expression of public policy 
in R.C. 2152.12, Juv.R. 3 and 30, and precedent, see, e.g., Kent and In re C.S., we 
hold that in situations in which a juvenile is subject to discretionary transfer and 
the juvenile wishes to waive the right to an amenability hearing, the juvenile court 
must engage in a two-step process to determine the validity of the waiver. 
{¶ 34} First, before being transferred, the juvenile may waive the right to 
an amenability hearing only if the waiver is expressly stated on the record and 
through counsel. 
{¶ 35} The requirement that the juvenile expressly state on the record that 
he or she is waiving the right to an amenability hearing demonstrates that the 
waiver is an “ ‘ “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” ’ ”  
State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 31, quoting 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 
(1993), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 
1461 (1938).  The requirement that the juvenile requests the waiver on the record 
also allows the juvenile court to fulfill its duty to protect the due process rights of 
the juvenile. 
{¶ 36} Moreover, the child’s right to counsel is required by Juv.R. 3, 
which provides that a child may not waive the right to be represented by counsel 
at a transfer hearing conducted pursuant to Juv.R. 30.  By requiring counsel to 
enter the request, there can be no question that the child was represented as 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
required and no question that the juvenile has received “the assistance of counsel 
to cope with problems of law.”  Gault, 387 U.S. at 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 
527. 
{¶ 37} Second, the juvenile court must determine that the waiver is 
offered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Proper determination must 
include a colloquy with the juvenile and must occur on the record.  The colloquy 
allows the juvenile court to fulfill its parens patriae duty by ensuring that the 
juvenile fully understands and intentionally and intelligently relinquishes the right 
to an amenability hearing.  And it allows the judge “to engage in a meaningful 
dialogue with the juvenile,”  In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 
N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 107, to guarantee that the juvenile’s due process rights are 
protected. 
{¶ 38} Additionally, by requiring the court to determine that the waiver is 
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, we comport with the plain 
language of Juv.R. 3, which states that rights of a child may be waived “with the 
permission of the court.” 
{¶ 39} Finally, requiring that a meaningful colloquy between the juvenile 
court and the juvenile occur on the record provides an additional due process 
safeguard to protect the juvenile.  It also is consistent with the language of R.C. 
2152.12(B)(3), which states, “The record shall indicate the specific factors that 
were applicable and that the court weighed” when deciding whether a child is 
amenable to rehabilitation. 
{¶ 40} In fact, this case illustrates the problems that arise when waivers 
are not clearly set forth on the record.  There is no evidence in the record to 
support a finding that D.W., either himself or through his counsel, waived his 
right to an amenability hearing.  The record lacks any meaningful discussion 
about the amenability hearing.  Absent an express statement on the record by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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either D.W. or his counsel requesting waiver of his right to an amenability 
hearing, we will not hold that D.W. waived this right.2 
{¶ 41} We recognize that the state argues that the amenability hearing was 
properly waived and that the court of appeals agreed.  However, based upon the 
record before us, there is no indication of a proper waiver. 
C. Application 
{¶ 42} The two-step process we set forth today effectively balances the 
parens patriae duty of the juvenile court with the juvenile’s due process rights 
while comporting with the plain language of R.C. 2152.12, Juv.R. 3 and 30, and 
our jurisprudence.  We turn now to its application here. 
{¶ 43} At the outset, we address the state’s argument on implied waiver.  
An implied waiver runs counter to the very idea of our definition of waiver: an 
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”  State v. Foster, 
109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 31, quoting Johnson, 304 
U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1029, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461.  The record is devoid of any 
evidence that D.W. or his counsel intentionally relinquished or abandoned his 
right to an amenability hearing.  There is no evidence that the juvenile knew he 
had a right to an amenability hearing. The judge failed to recognize a need for 
                                                          
 
2 We recognize the state’s argument that D.W.’s failure to object to the juvenile court’s 
decision not to conduct an amenability hearing acts as a forfeiture and that he waives all but plain 
error.  We are not persuaded. 
Initially, we observe that the state did not raise the issue of waiver to the court of appeals 
in response to D.W.’s appeal.  It cannot present that claim here in the first instance.   See, e.g., 
State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 565, 709 N.E.2d 1166 (1999) (party who failed to raise an issue 
to the court of appeals waived his arguments); see also State v. Scudder, 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 268, 
643 N.E.2d 524 (1994). 
Second, although the record in this case does not contain any objection by the defense to 
the failure of the juvenile court to conduct an amenability hearing, and we will not presume that 
any objection was made, we hold that D.W. timely raised this issue on appeal.  See State v. 
Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985) (juvenile who was transferred to adult 
court, pled guilty to charges, and was subsequently convicted appealed convictions alleging that 
the bindover proceeding was not proper.) 
 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
further inquiry of the juvenile as to whether he knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily dispensed with an amenability hearing. 
{¶ 44} Based on the language in the record, the juvenile court found that 
an amenability hearing was not required because he had found probable cause, 
and D.W. had been bound over in a prior case.  The state argues that it is 
impractical to prevent a juvenile from waiving an amenability hearing after he has 
already been found not to be amenable to the juvenile justice system.  Again, we 
must disagree. 
{¶ 45} Each case presented to the juvenile court must be assessed upon its 
own merits.  In State v. Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1981), this 
court held that once a juvenile is bound over, the juvenile is bound over for all 
future felonies.  Id., syllabus.  However, the General Assembly expressly 
overruled this holding as acknowledged in the legislative notes to R.C 2151.011: 
 
The General Assembly hereby declares that its purpose in enacting 
the language in division (B) of section 2151.011 and divisions (B) 
and (C) of section 2151.26 of the Revised Code that exists on and 
after the effective date of this act is to overrule the holding in State 
v. Adams (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 120, regarding the effect of 
binding a child over for trial as an adult. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1, 96, Section 3(B). 
{¶ 46} In other words, in the wake of Adams, the General Assembly 
prohibited juvenile courts from holding that once a juvenile has been bound over 
to adult court, the juvenile will be bound over in all future felonies.  We must 
respect the right of the General Assembly to limit our holdings as long as the 
constitution permits it do so.  Here, the legislature acted within its role, and we 
must give effect to legislative intent and ensure that our juvenile courts do so as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
well.  State v. Elam, 68 Ohio St.3d 585, 587, 629 N.E.2d 442 (1994).  According 
to statute then, a juvenile court cannot bind over a juvenile on the sole basis that 
the juvenile has been previously bound over. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 47} We hold that an amenability hearing under R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) 
may be waived provided (1) the juvenile, through counsel, expressly states on the 
record a waiver of the amenability hearing and (2) the juvenile court engages in a 
colloquy on the record with the juvenile to determine that the waiver was made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
{¶ 48} Here, the juvenile court failed to conduct an amenability hearing 
before transferring D.W. to adult court, based upon the mistaken belief that a prior 
bindover of the juvenile negated the need for an amenability hearing.  The court 
thus never asked the juvenile whether he was waiving the hearing.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
juvenile court for an amenability hearing, or proper waiver of it, consistent with 
this opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Nathaniel J. 
McDonald, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Timothy McGinty, Acting Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Daniel T. Van and Katherine Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellee. 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jill Beeler, Assistant Public 
Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________