Title: Palmer v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School Dist. No. 1,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Palmer v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School Dist. No. 1,1990 WY 3785 P.2d 1160Case Number: 89-78Decided: 01/12/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARDELL 
PALMER, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

BOARD 
OF TRUSTEES OF CROOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Crook County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

James 
L. Edwards of Stevens, Edwards & Hallock, Gillette, for 
appellant.

Mark 
L. Hughes of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for 
appellee.

Tracy 
J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, Powell, filed an amicus 
curiae brief on behalf of the Wyoming School Boards 
Ass'n.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Mardell 
Palmer (Palmer) challenges the district court's judgment affirming her 
termination and seeks reinstatement as a continuing contract teacher in Crook 
County School District No. 1 (District). She asserts that the School District 
Board of Trustees (Board) acted arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally in 
terminating her employment pursuant to the Board's Reduction in Professional 
Staff Work Force (RIF) policy.

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
the following issues on appeal:

I. 
Did the administration attempt to realign the classes and courses to be taught 
in accordance with the reduction in force (RIF) policy and not infringe on the 
right of the appellant as a continuing contract teacher?

II. 
Did the Crook County School Board properly implement the District RIF 
policy?

III. 
Did the Board of Trustees conduct themselves in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner toward the appellant through either their notice and conduct at the April 
7, 1988, meeting, or their findings of fact and conclusions of 
law?

[¶3]      In contrast, the 
District frames the issue on appeal in the context of the scope of judicial 
review pursuant to W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii) (Oct. 1982 Repl.). Appellee identifies 
the issue as:

I. 
Was the decision of the District Court and the Board of Trustees of Crook County 
School District No. 1 to terminate the contract of Mardell 
Palmer:

a. 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

b. 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

c. 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

d. 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

e. 
Unsupported by substantial evidence?

[¶4]      Finally, in an 
amicus brief submitted on behalf of the District by the Wyoming School Boards 
Association, two issues are addressed:

I. 
Does a teacher by virtue of acquiring continuing contract status have the right 
to require the Board of Trustees to realign teachers and curriculum so as to 
create a position for her when such realignment would be contrary to the Board's 
determination of what is in the best interests of the 
students?

II. 
Did the Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1 properly 
implement the RIF policy and procedures, including requirements for notice to 
the teacher, and was the determination of the Board arbitrary, capricious or 
unsupported by substantial evidence?

[¶5]      We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶6]      Palmer taught 
physical education and general science at Sundance High School for seven 
consecutive years until the end of the 1987-88 school year. In March, 1988, she 
became aware that the District, faced with financial concerns and a declining 
enrollment, was considering implementing its RIF policy by eliminating several 
staff positions, including her own combination physical education/science 
position. On April 7, 1988, Palmer, accompanied by counsel, attended a special 
meeting of the Board where they discussed the proposed RIF with the Board. The 
Board also heard comments from several individuals on behalf of Palmer and 
received petitions supporting her continued employment. Despite these factors, 
the Board accepted a recommendation from the District Superintendent to 
implement the RIF policy. In addition to Palmer's position as a physical 
education/science teacher, the Board voted to eliminate five and one-half other 
teaching positions in the District. All teachers in the District received notice 
of the Board's action to implement the RIF policy following the April 7 special 
meeting.

[¶7]      Palmer received 
written notice of recommendation of her termination on or about April 12, 1988. 
The notice, dated April 11, 1988, contained three reasons for the Board's 
reduction in the teaching staff: (1) limited financial resources of the 
District; (2) decreased enrollment; and (3) other events beyond the control of 
the Board. On April 15, 1988, Palmer requested a hearing before the Board 
pursuant to W.S. 21-7-108 (July 1986 Repl.); the Board granted Palmer's request 
and conducted a hearing on June 22, 1988. Discovery of additional evidence 
necessitated a supplemental hearing held on October 3, 1988. Following both 
hearings, the Board voted to terminate Palmer's employment with the District 
effective at the end of the 1987-88 school year.

[¶8]      Pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12 and W.S. 16-3-114, Palmer petitioned the district court for review 
of the Board's administrative action, and on October 12, 1988, the district 
court heard oral arguments and reviewed the record. The court concluded that the 
Board had authority under W.S. 21-7-111(a)(iv) (Cum.Supp. 1988)1 to terminate a continuing contract 
teacher due to limited financial resources and decreased enrollment. The court 
recognized the limited scope of judicial review of discretionary administrative 
actions supported by substantial evidence. On February 28, 1989, the district 
court entered an order affirming the Board's action terminating Palmer. This 
appeal followed.

[¶9]      Having reviewed 
the record and briefs, we recognize two issues for decision. First, we must 
consider whether the District satisfied procedural notice requirements; and 
second, we must determine whether the Board's decision to terminate Palmer was 
supported by substantial evidence.

[¶10]   The standard of judicial review for 
administrative actions is governed by W.R.A.P. 12.09, W.S. 16-3-114(c)2 and Wyoming case law. We apply the 
same standard of judicial review previously applied by the district court in 
this case. In determining whether an agency decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion, a court must review the record taken as a whole and 
ascertain whether the decision is supported by the evidence contained in the 
record. Holding's Little America v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie 
County, 670 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Wyo. 1983); and Toavs v. State By & Through 
Real Estate Commission, 635 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Wyo. 1981). We are not bound to 
accept any of the conclusions reached in the district court, but are obligated 
to review the appeal as if it came directly to the court from the Board. Sellers 
v. Wyoming Board of Psychologist Examiners, 739 P.2d 125, 126 (Wyo. 1987). 
Deference is owed to the Board's administrative determination, not that of the 
district court's decision. Zezas Ranch, Inc. v. Board of Control, 714 P.2d 759, 
764 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶11]   Palmer argues that the Board abused 
its discretion by making its decision without a sufficient factual basis. W.S. 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) establishes that administrative actions mut be supported by 
"substantial evidence" or be reversed on judicial review. On several occasions 
this court has defined the "substantial evidence" test in the school board 
administrative context. In Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, 
544 P.2d 870, 874 (Wyo. 1976) (quoting Howard v. Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 214 P.2d 737, 740 (1950)), the court defined substantial evidence as "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
See also Ririe v. Board of Trustees of School District No. One, Crook County, 
Wyoming, 674 P.2d 214, 228 (Wyo. 1983); and Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1178 (Wyo. 1976). The weight to 
be given the evidence and the credibility of witnesses is to be determined by 
the finder of fact (the Board in this case) and not the reviewing court. The 
burden is on the appellant to demonstrate that the Board's decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence. Westates Construction Co. v. Sheridan County 
School District No. 2, Board of Trustees, 719 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Wyo. 
1986).

PROCEDURAL 
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

[¶12]   Palmer contends that the District's 
published notice of the April 7, 1988 special board meeting was inaccurate in 
that the notice printed in the local newspaper and the copies of the meeting 
agenda distributed to Board members failed to state that reduction in the 
professional staff work force would be discussed at the meeting. The District 
counters Palmer's claim with evidence of compliance with W.S. 16-4-404(b) (Oct. 
1982 Repl.).3 The District argues that express 
notice of "hiring professional staff," in conjunction with Palmer's constructive 
notice of the purpose of the meeting and community awareness of topics to be 
discussed satisfies the statutory notice requirement.

[¶13]   Palmer's procedural argument fails 
since the record establishes that the District met the requirements of the law, 
and in any case, Palmer did not suffer as a result of the alleged improper 
notice. While it is questionable whether "hiring professional staff" is 
synonymous with "reduction in force," there is no doubt that the business to be 
transacted at the special meeting dealt with personnel decisions. Palmer was 
informed of the purpose of the special meeting by other means, and both she and 
her counsel attended and participated in the meeting. Members of the community 
appeared on behalf of Palmer and offered positive verbal and written support of 
Palmer's qualifications. Following the April 7 meeting, Palmer received written 
notice of recommendation of her termination. She requested and received an 
extensive hearing before the Board pursuant to W.S. 21-7-108. Adequate notice is 
a requisite element of administrative agency action. Here, Palmer received all 
the notice required by law, and could not demonstrate any prejudice or harm from 
the alleged inadequate notice.

SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE

[¶14]   We next consider whether the Board 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously by terminating Palmer's employment as a 
continuing contract teacher without sufficient facts before it to support its 
decision. It is well established that this court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of administrative agencies, including school districts, if the 
record establishes that the agency decision is supported by substantial 
evidence. Westates, 719 P.2d  at 1372. The record establishes that the Board 
voted to terminate Palmer based on evidence of financial exigency and declining 
enrollment. 

[¶15]   It is the role of an elected school 
board to consider all of the circumstances impinging on the efficient operation 
of the school district and to exercise its discretion to ensure the best 
possible education for students. In the spring of 1988, the Board was faced with 
a projected decline in revenues, coupled with overstaffing resulting from a 
decline in student population. This was presented to the Board together with the 
superintendent's RIF recommendation at the April 7, 1988 Board meeting. The 
recommendation to RIF Palmer (among others) was based on elimination of classes 
which she taught. The recommendation was presented in more detail in the form of 
exhibits and testimony by the superintendent of schools and the director of 
curriculum at the June 22, 1988 hearing. The record was supplemented at the 
October 3, 1988 hearing.

[¶16]   Palmer argues that enrollment 
actually increased, there were alternate methods for reorganizing the district 
staff, that the district had adequate financial resources, and that the board 
erred in its factual findings. However, the district court correctly noted that 
whether this decision was the "best" under the circumstances is not the test. 
The record contains relevant evidence that reasonably supports the Board's 
decision. A decline in revenues required economic choices, and realignment of 
classes to best meet student needs suggested retaining all mathematics teachers 
and reducing the number of science teachers. Consequently, we hold that the 
Board's decision as to Palmer is supported by substantial 
evidence.

[¶17]   There is no evidence before us that 
the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously in any other respect. Palmer 
received a fair and complete hearing before the Board voted to terminate her 
employment. The Board acted under authority of W.S. 21-7-111(a)(iv) and within 
the letter of its RIF policy. Despite the allegation in Palmer's brief, we found 
no evidence in the record of a pretextual termination or retaliation. Finally, 
we emphasize that Wyoming statutes do not demand, and we do not impose, a 
requirement that school boards realign teaching duties premised on seniority. 
Cf. Strand v. Special School District, 392 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Minn. 
1986).

[¶18]   We find that the Board did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously or abuse its discretion. Appellant Mardell Palmer 
received adequate notice of the April 7, 1988 special board meeting. Further, 
the Board's action was supported by substantial evidence. These findings dispose 
of all the issues raised by the appeal. The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 21-7-111(a)(iv), states:

(a) Nothing in this article shall prohibit:

* * * * * *

(iv) The termination of the contract of a teacher at the end of current 
school year because of a decrease in the size of faculty due to decreased 
enrollment or other event beyond the control of the board * * 
*.

2 W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii) states that the court shall set aside agency 
action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

3 W.S. 16-4-404(b) states:

(b) Special meetings may be called by the presiding officer of a 
governing body by giving notice of the meeting to each member of the governing 
body and to each newspaper of general circulation, radio or television station 
requesting the notice. The notice shall specify the time and place of the 
special meeting and the business to be transacted. No other business shall be 
considered at a special meeting.