Title: Bayless v. TTS Trio Corp.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11958 
 
HOWARD H. BAYLESS, administrator,1  vs.  TTS TRIO CORPORATION2 & 
others.3 
 
 
 
Worcester.     January 11, 2016. - April 28, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Alcoholic Liquors, Sale to intoxicated person.  Negligence, 
Serving alcoholic liquors to guest.  Practice, Civil, 
Affidavit. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 14, 2014. 
 
 
Motions to strike an affidavit and for partial summary 
judgment were heard by Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
Leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed in 
the Appeals Court by Peter J. Agnes, Jr., J.  The Supreme 
Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from 
the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Scott T. Ober (Margarita I. Warren with him) for the 
defendants. 
                     
 
1 Of the estate of Herman T. Bayless, Sr. 
 
 
2 Doing business as Kaizen Restaurant. 
 
 
3 Thuc Tang, Son Vo, and Chau Ho. 
2 
 
 
Ernest E. Wessell for the plaintiff. 
 
Annette Gonthier Kiely, Thomas R. Murphy, Erin K. Thurston, 
& Lisa DeBrosse Johnson, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial 
Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, we are asked to determine whether 
an affidavit submitted pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 60J (commonly 
referred to as the dram shop act), must be a sworn statement 
based upon personal knowledge.4  Section 60J prescribes the 
procedural requirements applicable to "[e]very action for 
negligence in the distribution, sale or serving of alcoholic 
beverages to a minor or to an intoxicated person."5  Pursuant to 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys in support of the 
plaintiff. 
 
 
5 General Laws c. 231, § 60J, provides in pertinent part: 
 
 
"Every action for negligence in the distribution, sale 
or serving of alcoholic beverages to a minor or to an 
intoxicated person shall be commenced in the superior court 
department and shall proceed according to the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise provided for by 
this section. 
 
 
"The plaintiff shall file, together with his 
complaint, or at such later time not to exceed ninety days 
thereafter, an affidavit setting forth sufficient facts to 
raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for 
judicial inquiry. 
 
 
"Any party may make a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure[, 365 Mass. 824 (1974)].  Any such motion shall 
be heard and decided promptly after issue is joined as to 
any party, unless the court enlarges the time for 
discovery.  Said enlarged time for discovery shall not 
exceed ninety days, except on further order of the court." 
3 
 
§ 60J, within ninety days of filing his or her complaint, a 
plaintiff must file an affidavit "setting forth sufficient facts 
to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for 
judicial inquiry."  Herman T. Bayless, the plaintiff's decedent, 
was killed in a one-car accident after leaving a restaurant 
owned by the defendants where he had consumed alcoholic 
beverages.  The plaintiff alleged that prior to his decedent's 
fatal motor vehicle accident, the defendants exhibited 
negligent, wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct by selling and 
serving alcoholic beverages to the decedent while he was 
obviously intoxicated, and that such conduct was the proximate 
cause of the decedent's death.  The plaintiff submitted an 
affidavit pursuant to § 60J (§ 60J affidavit) that was signed by 
the plaintiff's counsel.  The affidavit stated that it was based 
on information and belief gathered from witness statements, a 
police report, and a medical toxicology report.  The defendants 
argue that an affidavit submitted pursuant to § 60J must be 
based upon personal knowledge.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that an affidavit based on information and belief may 
be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 60J, and that in 
this case it was. 
4 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts alleged in the 
§ 60J affidavit submitted by the plaintiff.6  On April 14, 2011, 
Howard H. Bayless was killed in a one-car accident when he drove 
in an intoxicated state shortly after leaving Kaizen Sushi Bar 
and Grill (restaurant), which was owned and operated by the 
defendants.  The accident occurred at approximately 9:04 P.M. on 
a clear and straight road.  The decedent's estimated speed at 
the time of the accident was seventy-nine miles per hour in a 
thirty miles per hour zone. 
 
The decedent was a frequent patron of the restaurant, and 
was observed on numerous occasions to drink strong alcoholic 
beverages to excess, causing him to become loud and boisterous 
and to exhibit impaired speech and coordination.  On several 
occasions, friends and family of the decedent observed him 
leaving the restaurant in an obviously intoxicated condition, 
intending to drive home.  The decedent was served regularly by 
an unnamed bartender, Jane Doe, who would often engage in 
lengthy conversations with the decedent.7  Jane Doe often would 
continue to serve the decedent alcoholic beverages when he was 
noticeably intoxicated.  On one occasion, the decedent was at 
                     
 
6 The defendants sought to strike the entire affidavit as 
insufficient and therefore did not present any facts or evidence 
in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. 
 
 
7 Friends and family did not know the bartender's full name 
but she was familiar to them. 
5 
 
the restaurant with his two minor daughters when he became 
obviously intoxicated.  One daughter began to cry, and when Jane 
Doe asked her why, she said that it was because her father was 
intoxicated.  Despite the daughter's stated concern, Jane Doe 
continued to serve the decedent alcoholic beverages. 
 
On the day of the accident, the decedent was at the 
restaurant from approximately 2 P.M. until 8:50 P.M.  Other 
witnesses observed and spoke with him during that time.  One 
witness who knew the decedent well saw him at the restaurant at 
approximately 4 P.M. until the witness left at 6 P.M.  During 
this time, the witness observed the decedent drink several 
alcoholic beverages and saw Jane Doe serve him these beverages.  
At the time, the decedent was being loud and gregarious.  One of 
the decedent's daughters telephoned him four times while he was 
at the restaurant to tell him to stop drinking and return home 
for a family barbecue.  At 6:30 P.M., during one of her 
telephone calls, she noticed that his speech was slurred and he 
was very "loud and boisterous."  Because she had seen her father 
intoxicated on prior occasions, she concluded that he was highly 
intoxicated.  When she requested that he stop drinking and 
return home, he handed the cellular telephone to Jane Doe, who 
attempted to ease the daughter's concerns.  The daughter 
reiterated that she would like her father to stop drinking and 
return home.  At approximately 6 P.M. on that day, a former 
6 
 
employee of the decedent had arrived at the restaurant to have 
dinner.  After dinner, he sat with the decedent and ordered a 
drink.  The decedent's demeanor was loud and he was stumbling 
over words.  Jane Doe, with whom the witness was familiar, told 
the witness that she was concerned about the decedent because he 
had not eaten anything and was intoxicated.  The witness saw 
Jane Doe offer the decedent food, but he refused to eat.  
Subsequently, the witness saw Jane Doe continue to serve the 
decedent alcoholic beverages, which he consumed.  The witness 
left the restaurant at approximately 8:45 P.M.  The police 
determined that the decedent purchased twelve drinks while he 
was at the restaurant.  At approximately 9 P.M., the decedent 
telephoned his daughter and told her that he was on his way 
home.  He said he was on Cedar Street.  During this telephone 
call, the daughter noticed that the decedent's speech was 
slurred and she had difficulty understanding him.  At 
approximately 9:04 P.M., the decedent lost control of his 
vehicle and crashed on Cedar Street, approximately two miles 
from home.  He died at the scene as a result of multiple 
traumatic injuries. 
 
The plaintiff filed a complaint under the Commonwealth's 
wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2.  He later filed an 
affidavit, pursuant to § 60J, after a Superior Court judge 
7 
 
granted his motion to extend time to file the affidavit.8  The 
defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's affidavit and for 
partial summary judgment of the plaintiff's complaint, based on 
the insufficiency of the submitted affidavit.  A second judge in 
the Superior Court denied the defendants' motion, concluding 
that a § 60J affidavit need not be based on personal knowledge 
and that an affidavit based on information and belief may be 
sufficient to satisfy § 60J.  The defendants filed a petition 
for interlocutory relief, which a single justice of the Appeals 
Court allowed.  We transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the outcome of a motion for 
summary judgment de novo "to determine whether all material 
facts have been established such that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  American Int'l Ins. 
Co. v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG, 468 Mass. 109, 113, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 871 (2014).  At issue in this case is the 
procedural requirement under § 60J that the plaintiff must file, 
either with the complaint or within ninety days thereafter, an 
affidavit "setting forth sufficient facts to raise a legitimate 
question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry."  
Submission of a timely affidavit is required, but in 
                     
 
8 The defendants filed a motion to vacate the judge's order 
extending the time to file an affidavit.  The motion was denied. 
8 
 
"appropriate circumstances" a judge has the discretion to extend 
the ninety-day period.9  Croteau v. Swansea Lounge, Inc., 402 
Mass. 419, 421-422 (1988).  The statute does not define the word 
"affidavit," nor does it provide guidance as to what standard 
the affidavit must meet to be considered sufficient.  The 
question is one of first impression.  The defendants argue that 
an appropriate § 60J affidavit must be a sworn statement based 
on personal knowledge because that is the plain and unambiguous 
meaning of the term "affidavit," and therefore, the plaintiff's 
affidavit is insufficient. 
 
"When a statute does not define its words we give them 
their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are 
consistent with the statutory purpose. . . .  We derive the 
words' usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known 
to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal 
contexts and dictionary definitions" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  
Generally, affidavits must be made on the affiant's personal 
knowledge.  However, this does not mean that an affidavit based 
                     
 
9 The defendants raise the timeliness of the plaintiff's 
affidavit in their statement of issues presented on appeal.  
However, they do not advance any argument as to this issue.  It 
is deemed waived.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 
367 Mass. 921 (1975); Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 836 
n.15 (2001).  In any event, the issue is without merit.  A trial 
judge has discretion to extend the ninety-day period.  Croteau 
v. Swansea Lounge, Inc., 402 Mass. 419, 421-422 (1988). 
9 
 
upon the information and belief of the affiant is never accepted 
by courts.  There are various instances where an affidavit based 
upon information and belief is accepted.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 551 n.10 (2009) 
(application for wiretapping may be based on personal knowledge 
or information and belief); Knott v. Racicot, 442 Mass. 314, 
324-325 (2004) (affidavit submitted with motion for relief from 
judgment based on information and belief); Commonwealth v. 
Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 270-271 (2004) (notwithstanding 
requirement of Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 [a] [2][, as appearing in 
442 Mass. 516 (2004),] that affidavits be on personal knowledge 
of affiant, affidavit in support of motion seeking documentary 
evidence may be on information and belief provided it is based 
on specific and reliable known sources); Sher v. Desmond, 70 
Mass. App. Ct. 270, 281 (2007) (affidavit submitted with 
grandparent visitation complaint based on information and 
belief).  Although § 60J does not provide guidance regarding the 
form and substantive requirements for the affidavit, it 
incorporates the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 
11 (e) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010), provides some guidance for 
instances such as this, when a statute requires an affidavit to 
be filed.  The rule states that when an affidavit is permitted 
or required to be filed it may be made "by the party, or by a 
10 
 
person having knowledge of the facts for and on behalf of such 
party."  One commentator has observed that rule 11 (e) permits 
affidavits based on something other than personal knowledge, 
particularly where a statute requires an affidavit without 
specifying that it be based on the personal knowledge of the 
affiant.  See J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 23.1.3 
(2d ed. 2006).  We recognize that in some instances affidavits 
may be based on sources other than personal knowledge. 
 
The defendants argue that the plain meaning of the term 
"affidavit" was established in Howland v. Cape Cod Bank & Trust 
Co., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 949 (1988), and should be applied 
here.  Howland was a case that involved a will contest and an 
affidavit submitted pursuant Rule 16 of the Supplemental Rules 
of the Probate Court, as amended (1987).  Id.  The court 
observed that the term "affidavit" is "a word which implies a 
statement under oath by a person having direct knowledge of the 
facts which he verifies, except as otherwise clearly stated in 
the affidavit itself."  Id.  The defendants contend that this 
definition requires that the affidavit be based on personal 
knowledge and should be applied to § 60J affidavits.  To support 
their argument, the defendants cite two Superior Court decisions 
that adopted Howland's definition.  We are not persuaded.  
Howland does not mandate an affidavit to be based on personal 
knowledge in every circumstance.  Howland contemplates that 
11 
 
affidavits will be based on direct knowledge "except as 
otherwise clearly stated in the affidavit itself."  Id.  By 
simply stating in the affidavit that it is based on information 
and belief, the affidavit would be sufficient under the 
definition articulated in Howland.  In addition, the two 
Superior Court cases that the defendants rely on do not 
interpret Howland's definition of "affidavit" as requiring 
affidavits submitted pursuant to § 60J to be based on personal 
knowledge.  We have reviewed the two cases; they actually 
concluded that § 60J does not require an affidavit to be based 
on personal knowledge. 
 
The defendants next argue that because of the specific 
reference to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), in the 
third paragraph of § 60J, the plaintiff's affidavit must comport 
with the requirements of rule 56 (e).10  The defendants' argument 
would require the affidavit to be based on personal knowledge 
and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence.  This 
argument has no merit. 
                     
 
10 Rule 56 (e) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), requires that affidavits "shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or 
served therewith." 
12 
 
 
The standard articulated in § 60J is different from the 
standard a party must meet to succeed in a motion for summary 
judgment.  Section 60J requires an affidavit to contain 
"sufficient facts to raise a legitimate question of liability 
appropriate for judicial inquiry," whereas rule 56 (e) requires 
an affidavit to contain "specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial."  Moreover, the affidavit required 
under § 60J is intended for use at the initial stages of 
litigation and precedes formal discovery, whereas an affidavit 
in support of a motion for summary judgment typically follows 
formal discovery.  It would be impractical to require a party to 
submit an affidavit conforming with rule 56 (e) requirements at 
the outset of the litigation when there has not been any formal 
discovery.  The purpose of § 60J is to help eliminate frivolous 
claims at the early stage of litigation.  If a rule 56 (e) 
standard is required at the outset, many viable claims may be 
stymied because the requisite information needed to proceed will 
require discovery, and personal knowledge may be elusive without 
discovery due to the nature of the cause of action.11  In 
                     
 
11 If the affidavit under § 60J must be based upon personal 
knowledge, this would hinder plaintiffs who were so intoxicated 
when they were at the establishment that they do not remember 
what happened or, as here, the estate of a decedent who 
allegedly died while driving under the influence of alcohol.  
This also would hinder plaintiffs who were injured as a result 
of a patron being overserved at an establishment because, 
presumably, the plaintiff would not have personal knowledge of 
13 
 
addition, the statute specifically provides an opportunity for 
the defendants to file a motion for summary judgment.  The 
logical and plain reading of the statute suggests that the 
affidavit required by § 60J need not meet the summary judgment 
standard at the outset of litigation because the defendants have 
a subsequent opportunity to file a motion for summary judgment.  
This case is similar to Sher, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 278, where 
the Appeals Court concluded that the affidavit required when 
filing a complaint for grandparent visitation does not have to 
meet a summary judgment standard because it is required at the 
initial stages of the action and is "filed prior to the 
initiation of any formal postcomplaint discovery."  The court 
noted that the summary judgment procedure "remains otherwise 
available to a parent."  Id.  We conclude that a § 60J affidavit 
need not comply with rule 56 (e) requirements.12  The § 60J 
                                                                  
what happened at the establishment prior to his or her injuries.  
Both of these situations are plausible under § 60J. 
 
 
12 The defendants also take issue with the fact that the 
plaintiff's counsel signed the § 60J affidavit, where the 
plaintiff is the administrator of the decedent's estate.  If the 
statute were interpreted to mean that only the plaintiff could 
be the affiant, many valid claims would not be viable because of 
the reasons already articulated in this opinion.  See 
Courtemanche v. Beijing Restaurant, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 107, 
110 (D. Mass. 2007).  The defendants further argue that if the 
plaintiff's counsel is allowed to sign the affidavit, any dram 
shop negligence complaint will proceed to trial unless there is 
evidence of counsel's intentional "design to defraud or to seek 
an unconscionable advantage."  Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. 
M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 416 (1998).  This argument has no 
14 
 
affidavit must, however, provide identifiable sources of 
information that are reasonably reliable, and set forth details 
of that information.  See Lampron, 441 Mass. at 270-271. 
 
The defendants also argue that the affidavit did not set 
forth sufficient facts to raise a legitimate question of 
liability.  We first address the standard of review.  We already 
have decided that the affidavit need not meet a rule 56 (e) 
standard at this stage in the litigation.  However, the standard 
of review applicable to a § 60J affidavit is higher than the 
standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), which is concerned 
                                                                  
merit.  The legal analysis is the same for § 60J despite the 
fact it is the plaintiff's counsel who is signing the affidavit.  
The affidavit still would be evaluated for whether the plaintiff 
has put forth sufficient facts to raise a legitimate question of 
liability.  Because it was the plaintiff's attorney who signed 
the affidavit, Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), as amended, 456 Mass. 
1401 (2010), would apply, stating, "[t]he signature of an 
attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that he 
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief there is a good ground to support it; 
and that it is not interposed for delay."  We conclude that 
plaintiff's counsel conducted a diligent investigation and is an 
appropriate individual to sign an affidavit under § 60J. 
 
 
The defendants also argue that the affidavit is not sworn 
to or signed under the pains and penalties of perjury.  We agree 
with the Superior Court judge that because an affidavit 
submitted upon information and belief is sufficient to satisfy 
§ 60J, to require an affiant to swear to these facts would be 
inapposite. 
 
15 
 
with the sufficiency of the pleadings.13  In contrast, the 
purpose of the procedural requirements in § 60J is to "promote 
the availability of liability insurance by establishing 
mechanisms whereby the incidence of frivolous claims might be 
reduced."  Croteau, 402 Mass. at 422.  The purpose of § 60J 
would not be served if the standard of review was the same as 
that applicable to a motion to dismiss.  Courtemanche v. Beijing 
Restaurant, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D. Mass. 2007) 
("Given the specific intent of the legislature, this Court 
understands the affidavit requirement to necessitate more than 
what is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss").  Section 
60J requires a showing that the complaint raises a legitimate 
question of liability.  As previously discussed, the § 60J 
affidavit must provide identifiable sources of information that 
are reasonably reliable, details of that information, and an 
assurance that the complaint is not frivolous. 
 
The defendants next contend that the standard of review 
should be similar to that applicable to procedural requirements 
                     
 
13 "In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under [Mass. 
R. Civ. P.] 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), '[w]e take as true 
"the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as 
may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor . . . ."  
Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 223 (2011), 
S.C., 466 Mass. 156 (2013), quoting Marram v. Kobrick Offshore 
Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 (2004).  "What is required at the 
pleading stage are factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting 
(not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief . . . ."  
Golchin, supra, quoting Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 
623, 636 (2008). 
16 
 
for medical malpractice claims.  G. L. c. 231, § 60B.  The 
purpose of § 60B is to discourage frivolous claims and to 
"ensure the continued availability of medical malpractice 
insurances at a reasonable cost," Vasa v. Compass Med., P.C., 
456 Mass. 175, 178 (2010), quoting Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 
Mass. 645, 647 (1977), which is somewhat similar to the purpose 
of § 60J.  See Croteau, 402 Mass. at 421-422 ("designed to 
promote the availability of liability insurance by establishing 
mechanisms whereby the incidence of frivolous claims might be 
reduced").  Section 60B requires every malpractice action to be 
heard by a tribunal where the plaintiff will make an "offer of 
proof" and the tribunal decides "if the evidence presented if 
properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate 
question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry."  In 
both §§ 60B and 60J, the plaintiff must provide facts that raise 
a legitimate question of liability.  The defendants argue that 
in Little v. Rosenthal, 376 Mass. 573, 578 (1978), this court 
decided that the phrase "legitimate question of liability" in 
§ 60B created a heightened pleading standard that is analogous 
to a judge deciding a defendant's motion for a directed verdict.  
Because § 60J has the same language, the defendants argue, the 
heightened pleading standard should be adhered to when judges 
are evaluating affidavits under § 60J.  We disagree. 
17 
 
 
Although there are similarities in the two statutes, there 
is one major difference that is fatal to the defendants' 
argument.  In Little, this court held that the standard used by 
the medical malpractice tribunal is akin to that of a judge 
deciding a motion for directed verdict because of the tribunal's 
role of evaluating evidence, not because of the "legitimate 
question of liability" language.  Id. at 578.  Section 60B 
requires the tribunal to evaluate evidence submitted by the 
plaintiff.  Id.  The statute permits the tribunal to "summon or 
subpoena any such records or individuals to substantiate or 
clarify any evidence which has been presented before it."  G. L. 
c. 231, § 60B.  In contrast, § 60J merely requires the plaintiff 
to file an affidavit that includes sufficient facts to raise a 
"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial 
inquiry."  There is no language in § 60J indicating that the 
judge's role in this context includes an evaluation of evidence.  
Because § 60J does not require plaintiffs to present evidence as 
does § 60B, we decline to adhere to the same standard applied by 
tribunals in evaluating medical malpractice causes of action. 
 
We now decide whether the facts set out in the plaintiff's 
affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to raise a legitimate 
question of liability.  The defendants' liability is grounded on 
the common law of negligence.  Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 
18 
 
Mass. 323, 327 (1982).  To demonstrate the defendants' 
liability, the plaintiff must prove that the decedent was 
"(1) a patron of premises (2) who is served intoxicating 
liquors (3) while he is intoxicated (4) and under 
circumstances from which the defendant knew or reasonably 
should have known that he was intoxicated when served (5) 
operates a motor vehicle while intoxicated (6) such 
operation was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant (7) 
and a person of ordinary prudence would have refrained from 
serving liquor to that patron in the same or similar 
circumstances (8) and such operation causes the plaintiff's 
death or injury within the scope of the foreseeable risk." 
 
Id. at 331 n.9.  The defendants argue that the plaintiff has not 
put forth sufficient facts to establish that the decedent was 
obviously intoxicated at the time he was last served.  "To 
prevail in a dram shop case, a plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the patron in question was 
exhibiting outward signs of intoxication by the time he was 
served his last alcoholic drink."  Rivera v. Club Caravan, Inc., 
77 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 20 (2010).  The plaintiff can prove this 
through circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 20-21. 
 
The § 60J affidavit here alleges that multiple witnesses, 
including the decedent's daughter, heard or observed the 
decedent being loud and boisterous and exhibiting slurred speech 
on the night of his death.  It sets forth witness statements 
that describe the decedent's behavior at the restaurant at 
various times from approximately 4 P.M. to 8:45 P.M.  One 
witness joined the decedent for two rounds of drinks and was 
19 
 
told by Jane Doe, with whom he was familiar, that she was 
concerned that the decedent was intoxicated and had not eaten 
anything.  The witness then observed Jane Doe offer the decedent 
food but the decedent declined her offer.  The witness 
subsequently observed Jane Doe serving the decedent more drinks, 
despite her previous expressed concern for his state of 
inebriation.  The witness described the decedent as being loud 
and slurring his speech.  The witness left the restaurant at 
approximately 8:45 P.M., about fifteen minutes before the 
decedent telephoned his daughter.  The decedent's daughter spoke 
to her father at approximately 9 P.M., four minutes before he 
lost control of his vehicle.  Her father told her that he had 
left the restaurant and was heading home.  Her father's speech 
was slurred, making it difficult for her to understand him.  The 
witness statements that chronicled the decedent's night up until 
approximately four minutes before his fatal crash, along with 
the information from the police report and medical toxicology 
report, set out sufficient facts to raise a legitimate question 
of liability at this stage in the litigation.  A finder of fact 
could infer from the daughter's observations that the decedent's 
speech was slurred and hard to understand upon leaving the 
restaurant four minutes before his fatal crash, and that he most 
likely was exhibiting behavior that would put Jane Doe on notice 
that he was intoxicated.  At the very least, the witness 
20 
 
statements and the information from the police report and 
medical toxicology report set out sufficient facts to raise a 
legitimate question of liability at this stage in the 
litigation.  The plaintiff does not need to win his case at this 
point in the action.  He need only present sufficient facts to 
raise a legitimate question of liability by providing 
identifiable sources of information on which the complaint is 
based, details of that information, and facts indicating that 
the information is reasonably reliable.  He has done so.  He 
also has shown that the claim is not frivolous, one of the 
objectives of § 60J. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the plaintiff's affidavit based upon information and belief is 
sufficient to satisfy the procedural requirement under G. L. 
c. 231, § 60J, and the plaintiff has sufficiently raised a 
legitimate question of liability.  The order denying the 
defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's G. L. c. 231, 
§ 60J, affidavit and for partial summary judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.