Title: Infinite Sec. Solutions, LLC v. Karam Props. II, Ltd.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties, II Ltd., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-
1101.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1101 
INFINITE SECURITY SOLUTIONS, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. KARAM PROPERTIES II, 
LTD., APPELLEE. 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INFINITE SECURITY 
SOLUTIONS, L.L.C., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties, II Ltd.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1101.] 
A trial court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a case has 
been dismissed only if the dismissal entry incorporated the terms of the 
agreement or expressly stated that the court retained jurisdiction to 
enforce the agreement. 
(Nos. 2013-1671 and 2013-1795—Submitted July 9, 2014—Decided March 26, 
2015.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lucas County,  
No. L-12-1313, 2013-Ohio-4415. 
______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A trial court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a case has 
been dismissed only if the dismissal entry incorporated the terms of the 
agreement or expressly stated that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce 
the agreement. 
______________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, we consider a trial court’s authority 
to retain jurisdiction when it dismisses a civil case to thereafter enforce a 
settlement agreement between the parties.  In case No. 2013-1671, we have 
accepted the following certified-conflict question: “[Is] a dismissal entry that does 
not either embody the terms of a settlement agreement or expressly reserve 
jurisdiction to the trial court to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement * * * 
an unconditional dismissal?”  137 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2014-Ohio-176, 2 N.E.3d 
267.  We have also accepted a related discretionary appeal, case No. 2013-1795, 
in which appellant, the Travelers Indemnity Company (“Travelers”), asserts the 
following proposition of law: “A trial court’s entry of dismissal that (1) states 
[that] the parties have resolved their differences or have arrived at a settlement 
agreement, (2) states that the dismissal is without prejudice, (3) permits the 
submission by the parties of a final entry of dismissal, and * * * (4) provides a 
time-frame for the filing of any final entry of dismissal, is a conditional dismissal 
that does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider and enforce the terms 
of the settlement agreement.” 
{¶ 2} Both the conflict question and the proposition of law presume a 
trial court’s authority to “conditionally” dismiss a civil action and thereby retain 
jurisdiction for further proceedings.  In this opinion, we reject the notion of a 
“conditional” dismissal, but we hold that a trial court may, when it dismisses a 
January Term, 2015 
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civil action upon notification that the parties have settled, expressly retain 
jurisdiction for the specific purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 3} These appeals stem from two cases filed in the Lucas County 
Court of Common Pleas.  Both cases involve claims that arose as a result of a fire 
at the Hunter’s Ridge apartment complex in Toledo, Ohio. 
{¶ 4} The first case was filed by appellee Infinite Security Solutions, 
L.L.C. (“Infinite”) against Karam Properties I, Ltd. (“Karam I”) and appellee 
Karam Properties II, Ltd. (“Karam II”) to recover for security services that 
Infinite provided at the Hunter’s Ridge complex pursuant to a contract with 
Karam Managed Properties, L.L.C.  Karam I and Karam II answered Infinite’s 
complaint, but urged that Toledo Properties, L.L.C., was the proper defendant.  
Karam I and Karam II also filed a counterclaim against Infinite, purportedly on 
behalf of Toledo Properties, to recover for the portion of the damage resulting 
from the Hunter’s Ridge fire that was not covered by insurance.  The 
counterclaim alleged that Infinite negligently permitted the use of fireworks, 
which caused the fire. 
{¶ 5} In an amended complaint, Infinite eliminated Karam I as a 
defendant.  The trial court granted Infinite leave to file a second amended 
complaint naming Karam Managed Properties and Toledo Properties as 
defendants, but Infinite did not do so. 
{¶ 6} Travelers filed the second case against Infinite.  Travelers alleged 
that as a result of the fire, it paid approximately $8.9 million under an insurance 
policy issued to Karam Managed Properties, which managed the Hunter’s Ridge 
complex, and Toledo Properties, which owned the complex.  Travelers claimed 
that, to the extent of its payments under the policy, it was subrogated to its 
insureds’ rights, claims, and causes of action against Infinite. 
{¶ 7} The trial court consolidated the two cases. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} On May 19, 2011, during a pretrial settlement conference, the 
parties orally agreed to settle their claims.  They agreed that Infinite would pay a 
fixed sum to settle all the claims against it and informed the trial court that they 
had resolved all issues except how to split the settlement money.  The parties 
stated that they would attempt to resolve their competing claims to the settlement 
funds but that they would submit the issue to the trial court if they were unable to 
agree. 
{¶ 9} Lucas County Gen.R. 5.05(F) affords a litigant’s counsel 30 days 
following settlement of a case to submit a dismissal entry before “the judge may 
order the case dismissed for want of prosecution or file an order of settlement and 
dismissal and assess costs.”  Nevertheless, on May 26, 2011, just one week after 
the parties agreed to settle, the trial court sua sponte filed a dismissal entry, which 
stated, “Parties having represented to the court that their differences have been 
resolved, this case is dismissed without prejudice, with the parties reserving the 
right to file an entry of dismissal within thirty (30) days of this order.” 
{¶ 10} Travelers filed a motion to set aside the dismissal entry pursuant to 
Civ.R. 60(B) on June 20, 2011.  Travelers argued that the dismissal was a mistake 
because “the settlement had not been finalized, no monies exchanged hands, no 
papers were exchanged or signed and the remaining outstanding issue of the 
priority/apportionment of the proceeds between Travelers and Karam ha[d] not 
been resolved.”  Travelers asked the trial court to vacate the dismissal entry 
pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and to reopen the case to decide the priority issue.  
Karam II, along with nonparties Karam Managed Properties, and Toledo 
Properties, opposed Travelers’ motion, arguing that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to decide the priority issue because it arose after the final settlement 
agreement and was the subject of a pending federal lawsuit.  Infinite, on the other 
hand, filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and for an order 
permitting it to pay the agreed-upon settlement amount to the court. 
January Term, 2015 
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{¶ 11} At a hearing on Travelers’ motion, the trial judge emphasized that 
the May 26, 2011 dismissal was without prejudice and functioned as “a 
placeholder entry, pending submission of whatever the final entry is.”  On 
October 12, 2012, the trial court denied both Travelers’ and Infinite’s motions as 
moot.  The court held that its dismissal was conditional, that it retained 
jurisdiction to determine the priority issue without vacating the dismissal entry, 
and that Travelers’ claim to the settlement funds had priority.  The trial court 
ordered Infinite to forward all but $25,000 of the settlement funds to Travelers 
and ordered the parties to complete and execute a settlement agreement and 
release within 30 days. 
{¶ 12} Karam II, along with nonparties Karam I, Karam Managed 
Properties, and Toledo Properties, (collectively, “Karam”) filed a notice of appeal.  
Karam argued that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after 
dismissing the cases, lacked authority to decide the priority issue because it was 
not raised in either the pleadings or the settlement agreement, and erred in its 
reading of the Travelers policy. 
{¶ 13} The Sixth District Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to enter the October 12, 2012 judgment because of its prior 
dismissal.  The court of appeals held that the May 26, 2011 entry, which 
“unequivocally dismissed the action,” was “unconditional” because it neither 
incorporated the terms of the parties’ settlement nor expressly retained 
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.  2013-Ohio-4415, 2 N.E.3d 297, 
¶ 16-17 (6th Dist.).  The court of appeals therefore concluded that the dismissal 
had relieved the trial court of jurisdiction, and it dismissed Karam’s appeal for 
lack of a final, appealable order.  Travelers filed a discretionary appeal in this 
court, and we accepted it.  137 Ohio St.3d 1473, 2014-Ohio-176, 2 N.E.3d 268. 
{¶ 14} Pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(4) of the Ohio Constitution, 
the Sixth District certified its judgment as in conflict with Estate of Berger v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Riddle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 66195 and 66200, 1994 WL 449397 (Aug. 18, 
1994), and Hines v. Zofko, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 93-T-4928, 1994 WL 117110 
(Mar. 22, 1994), on the following question:  “[Is] a dismissal entry that does not 
either embody the terms of a settlement agreement or expressly reserve 
jurisdiction to the trial court to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement * * * 
an unconditional dismissal?”  2013-Ohio-4415, 2 N.E.3d 297, at ¶ 22.  In Berger 
and Hines, the courts characterized dismissal entries as conditional when the 
entries stated that all claims were settled and dismissed, even though the entries 
did not incorporate the terms of the settlements or expressly retain jurisdiction. 
{¶ 15} This court consolidated the certified-conflict case and Travelers’ 
discretionary appeal.  137 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2014-Ohio-176, 2 N.E.3d 267. 
Analysis 
{¶ 16} A settlement agreement is a contract designed to terminate a claim 
by preventing or ending litigation.  Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners 
Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502, 660 N.E.2d 431 
(1996). The law highly favors settlement agreements, id., and a trial judge 
generally has discretion to promote and encourage settlements to prevent 
litigation, Rulli v. Fan Co., 79 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 683 N.E.2d 337 (1997).  
Because a settlement agreement constitutes a binding contract, a trial court has 
authority to enforce the agreement in a pending lawsuit.  Mack v. Polson Rubber 
Co., 14 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 470 N.E.2d 902 (1984), citing Spercel v. Sterling 
Indus., Inc., 31 Ohio St.2d 36, 285 N.E.2d 324 (1972), syllabus. 
{¶ 17} Many of Ohio’s common pleas courts, including the trial court 
here, have addressed within their local rules the procedure the parties and the trial 
court should follow once the parties reach a settlement in a civil case.  See, e.g., 
Loc.R. 4.02 of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, General Division;  
Loc.R. 10 of the Court of Common Pleas of Ashtabula County, General Division; 
Loc.R. 7(B) of the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County, General Division; 
January Term, 2015 
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Loc.R. 25.03 of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, General 
Division; Loc.R. 4.04(B) of the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County, 
General Division; Lucas County Gen.R. 5.05(F); Loc.R. 10(A) of the Court of 
Common Pleas of Medina County, General Division; Loc.R. 6.02 of the Court of 
Common Pleas of Miami County, General Division; Loc.R. 13.03 of the Court of 
Common Pleas of Union County, General Division.  Many of the local rules, 
including the Lucas County rule, operate in the same manner; with minor 
variations, they provide counsel a stated period of time following a notification of 
settlement to submit a final dismissal entry and state that if counsel fails to do so, 
the trial court may file its own dismissal entry, generally for want of prosecution.  
In our view, that is the best and preferred procedural practice for concluding a 
civil case following an agreement among the parties to settle. 
{¶ 18} Utilizing that procedure, a case remains pending following 
notification of settlement until counsel submits a notice of dismissal or, after a 
stated period of time, the trial court files a dismissal entry.  The resulting delay 
allows the parties to finalize and execute their agreement and necessary releases 
while the trial court still has jurisdiction over the parties and their pending claims. 
{¶ 19} Even when their local rules provide otherwise, however, trial 
courts often issue what they refer to as “conditional” dismissals.  The Sixth 
District here described a conditional dismissal as a dismissal that depends on a 
stated event, like compliance with a settlement agreement, the failure of which 
will trigger a resurrection of the court’s jurisdiction.  2013-Ohio-4415, 2 N.E.3d 
297, ¶ 11.  An unconditional dismissal, on the other hand, includes no triggering 
event and deprives the court of jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement.  
Showcase Homes, Inc. v. Ravenna Savs. Bank, 126 Ohio App.3d 328, 710 N.E.2d 
347 (3d Dist.1998). 
{¶ 20} Here, both the trial court and the court of appeals focused on 
whether the trial court’s dismissal was conditional or unconditional as the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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linchpin for determining whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the 
parties’ settlement agreement.  And both the certified-conflict question and 
Travelers’ proposition of law presume that the trial court had jurisdiction to 
decide the priority issue so long as its May 26, 2011 dismissal was conditional. 
{¶ 21} The focus on conditionality is consistent with opinions of other 
Ohio appellate districts.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Spies v. Lent, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas 
No. 2008 AP 05 0033, 2009-Ohio-3844, ¶ 46; Econo Prods., Inc. v. Bedell, 9th 
Dist. Summit No. 17117, 1995 WL 553203 (Sept. 20, 1995).  Those courts, in 
turn, rely on authority from this court stating that a trial court loses authority to 
proceed when it unconditionally dismisses a case.  See State ex rel. Rice v. 
McGrath, 62 Ohio St.3d 70, 71, 577 N.E.2d 1100 (1991).  See also Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sutula, 126 Ohio St.3d 19, 
2010-Ohio-2468, 929 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 2, quoting State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 
96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 22 (trial court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction following an unconditional dismissal or a 
voluntary dismissal). 
{¶ 22} But the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a 
conditional dismissal.  Instead, Civ.R. 41 provides for voluntary or involuntary 
dismissals and for dismissals with or without prejudice.  And although we have 
stated that a court loses jurisdiction when it dismisses a case “unconditionally,” 
we have never expressly held that a court may “conditionally” dismiss a case.  
Neither have we defined what “conditional dismissal” means or under what 
circumstances such a dismissal is appropriate.  Faced with those questions here, 
we reject the notion of a “conditional” dismissal and focus more precisely on the 
fundamental question of whether, and if so, how, a trial court may retain 
jurisdiction after a dismissal for purposes of enforcing a settlement agreement. 
{¶ 23} Despite differing approaches, several Ohio appellate courts have 
accepted, as a fundamental principle, that a court may, in some circumstances, 
January Term, 2015 
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dismiss an action while retaining authority to enforce an underlying settlement 
agreement.  See, e.g., Grace v. Howell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20283, 2004-
Ohio-4120, ¶ 12; Connolly v. Studer, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 07 CA 846, 2008-
Ohio-1526, ¶ 17 (court had authority to enforce settlement when dismissal with 
prejudice incorporated agreement and specifically retained jurisdiction to enforce 
it).  Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that following a 
dismissal with prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(ii), a district court may have 
ancillary jurisdiction over disputes arising out of a settlement agreement “if the 
parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been 
made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a 
provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by 
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.”  Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 
391 (1994). 
{¶ 24} Other states that have grappled with this issue have reached 
differing conclusions.  See Condon v. Condon, 177 Wash.2d 150, 298 P.3d 86, 
¶ 18 (2013) (“best practice” would be for a trial court to expressly retain 
jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement or enter a delayed dismissal); Dir. of Ins. 
v. A & A Midwest Rebuilders, Inc., 383 Ill.App.3d 721, 725, 891 N.E.2d 500 
(2008) (court may expressly retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement 
in a dismissal entry); Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So.2d 797, 803 
(Fla.App.2003) (court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce a settlement 
agreement when it approves the agreement by order and expressly retains 
jurisdiction to enforce its terms).  But see In re Vaishangi, Inc., 57 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 
690, 442 S.W.3d 256 (2014) (parties cannot reinvest the court with jurisdiction to 
enforce a settlement agreement); SFPP, L.P. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 123 
Nev. 608, 173 P.3d 715 (2007) (final dismissal deprives court of jurisdiction; 
parties cannot contract to extend court’s jurisdiction); Russell v. Bd. of Cty. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Commrs. of Carter Cty., 2000 OK CIV APP 21, 1 P.3d 442, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (“Where a 
case is dismissed as part of the settlement, the trial court loses jurisdiction to 
enforce the settlement”).  California has addressed this issue in its civil rules and 
permits courts, upon the parties’ request, to retain jurisdiction to enforce a 
settlement agreement following dismissal.  Cal.Civ.Proc.Code. 664.6. 
{¶ 25} We agree with those jurisdictions that allow a court to retain 
jurisdiction after a dismissal in order to enforce an underlying settlement 
agreement.  Therefore, we hold that, as a general principle, a trial court may retain 
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement when it dismisses a civil case.  
Retaining jurisdiction provides the most efficient means of enforcing the 
agreement.  It keeps the matter in the court most familiar with the parties’ claims, 
if not their settlement positions.  And it keeps the parties from having to file 
another action.  The question, then, is how retention of jurisdiction is achieved. 
{¶ 26} Travelers, with support from decisions in four Ohio appellate 
districts, contends that a dismissal entry need only allude or refer to a settlement 
for the dismissal to be conditional.  See Henneke v. Glisson, 12th Dist. Clermont 
No. CA2008-03-034, 2008-Ohio-6759, ¶ 18; State ex rel. Spies, 5th Dist. 
Tuscarawas No. 2008 AP 05 0033, 2009-Ohio-3844, ¶ 47; Estate of Berger, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 66195 and 66200, 1994 WL 449397; Hines, 11th Dist. 
Trumbull No. 93-T-4928, 1994 WL 117110.  Karam, with support from decisions 
in seven appellate districts, including the Sixth District in this case, contends that 
in order for a court to enforce a settlement following a dismissal, the dismissal 
entry must either incorporate the settlement agreement or expressly state that the 
court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.  See Said v. Admr., Bur. of 
Workers’ Comp., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130355 and C-130360, 2014-Ohio-
841, ¶ 10; Bugeja v. Luzik, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 06 MA 50, 2007-Ohio-733, 
¶ 8; Smith v. Nagel, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22664, 2005-Ohio-6222, ¶ 6; Grace, 2d 
Dist. Montgomery No. 20283, 2004-Ohio-4120, ¶ 13; Showcase Homes, Inc., 126 
January Term, 2015 
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Ohio App.3d at 331, 710 N.E.2d 347 (3d Dist.); Hart v. Smolak, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 94APE12-1808, 1995 WL 518849 (Sept. 5, 1995).  We agree, 
generally, with Karam and the majority of appellate courts that have addressed 
this question. 
{¶ 27} Courts have inherent authority to enforce their final judgments and 
decrees.  Rieser v. Rieser, 191 Ohio App.3d 616, 2010-Ohio-6227, 947 N.E.2d 
222, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.); In re Whallon, 6 Ohio App. 80, 83 (1st Dist.1915).  Courts 
also have the authority “to enter judgment by consent of the parties for the 
purpose of executing a compromise and settlement of the claims for relief in an 
action.”  Grace at ¶ 9.  In a consent decree, the litigants stipulate to the 
termination of a lawsuit by assenting to specified terms, which the court agrees to 
enforce as its judgment by journalizing an entry reflecting the terms of the 
settlement agreement.  Id.  When the court incorporates the terms of the parties’ 
settlement agreement into a consent decree, the court can enforce those terms as 
its judgment.  Nippon Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. One Source Mgt., Ltd., 6th Dist. 
Lucas No. L-10-1247, 2011-Ohio-2175, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 28} But as Travelers and the amicus argue, parties may wish to shield 
the terms of their settlement agreements from public scrutiny for a variety of 
reasons, and requiring that settlement terms be incorporated into a dismissal entry 
may discourage parties from settling.  While parties must make the fact of their 
settlement agreement known to the court, and may for many reasons want to 
incorporate the terms of the settlement into the entry, the court is not required to 
incorporate the terms of the settlement into the entry in order for the court to 
retain jurisdiction to enforce that agreement.  Having declined to require the 
inclusion of the terms of the settlement agreement itself, we come to the critical 
question of how a court should express its intention to retain jurisdiction for the 
purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement when the terms are not 
incorporated in the dismissal.  Two principles are important here. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 29} First, a court speaks only through its journal entries.  State ex rel. 
Worcester v. Donnellon, 49 Ohio St.3d 117, 118, 551 N.E.2d 183 (1990).  Neither 
the parties nor a reviewing court should have to review the trial court record to 
determine the court’s intentions.  Rather, the entry must reflect the trial court’s 
action in clear and succinct terms. 
{¶ 30} Second, a court’s judgment entry is presumed to be final.  Ohio 
Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 
N.E.2d 550, ¶ 24.  The principle of finality “requires that there be some end to 
every lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and public confidence” in the 
legal system.  Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 144-145, 493 N.E.2d 1353 
(1986) (lead opinion).  Absent a clear indication that the trial court intends to 
retain jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement, parties must be 
entitled to rely on the finality of the court’s action, subject to any right the 
plaintiff may have to refile the claims. 
{¶ 31} We also recognize, however, that requiring specific or 
hypertechnical language is inefficient and counterproductive.  As Karam suggests, 
the following language in a dismissal entry would suffice: “The court hereby 
retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement reached between the 
parties.”  If there is uncertainty as to the terms of the settlement agreement, the 
court should hold a hearing to determine whether an enforceable agreement exists.  
Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 17 (lead 
opinion), citing Rulli, 79 Ohio St.3d at 376-377, 683 N.E.2d 337. 
{¶ 32} Applying these principles here, we agree with the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals that the trial court’s May 26, 2011 dismissal entry did not retain 
jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.  As the basis for its 
dismissal, the trial court simply acknowledged the parties’ representation that they 
had resolved their differences.  Although the dismissal entry reserved to the 
parties the right to file a second dismissal entry within 30 days, the trial court did 
January Term, 2015 
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not expressly retain jurisdiction to enforce the underlying settlement agreement or 
to conduct any further proceedings in relation to the cases.  Nor did the court 
purport to condition its dismissal on the parties’ filing of a later entry.  Therefore, 
we agree with the Sixth District that the May 26, 2011 entry divested the trial 
court of jurisdiction and precluded further proceedings, including the October 12, 
2012 judgment from which Karam appealed. 
Civ.R. 60(B) 
{¶ 33} Although the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide unresolved 
issues pertaining to settlement after it dismissed the underlying cases, Travelers 
moved the trial court for an order vacating the dismissal entry, pursuant to Civ.R. 
60(B).  The trial court denied Travelers’ motion as moot, based on its erroneous 
determination that it retained jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings despite 
the dismissal.  Because neither the trial court nor the court of appeals has 
considered Travelers’ entitlement to relief under Civ.R. 60(B), we do not 
determine that issue here.  Instead, we remand the cause to the trial court for it to 
determine whether Travelers is entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 34} With respect to the certified-conflict question, we disavow reliance 
upon the conditional/unconditional dichotomy to determine whether a trial court 
has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement following dismissal.  A trial 
court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a case has been 
dismissed only if the dismissal entry incorporated the terms of the agreement or 
expressly stated that the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.  
Because the trial court’s dismissal entry did not incorporate the terms of the 
settlement agreement or expressly state that the court was retaining jurisdiction to 
enforce the settlement agreement, we agree with the court of appeals that the entry 
divested the trial court of jurisdiction and precluded further proceedings, 
including the October 12, 2012 judgment from which Karam appealed.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing Karam’s 
appeal, and we remand this matter to the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas 
for further proceedings, including a determination of Travelers’ Civ.R. 60(B) 
motion. 
Judgment affirmed 
 and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 35} Respectfully, I dissent.  In my view, because the trial court lacked 
the authority to issue the dismissal entry under either Civ.R. 41 or Lucas County 
Gen.R. 5.05(F), this court should not reach the issue presented.  I would dismiss 
case No. 2013-1671 as having been improvidently certified.  The two cases that 
were certified by the court of appeals as being in conflict with this case do not 
squarely present the same issue for review, as they do not definitively 
demonstrate that the dismissal entries were issued without authority.  Turning to 
the discretionary appeal (case No. 2013-1795), I would hold that the trial court 
committed reversible error as it lacked authority under Civ.R. 41 and Lucas 
County Gen.R. 5.05(F) to issue an entry of dismissal, and I would reverse the 
judgment of the Sixth District and remand the matter to the trial court with 
instructions to vacate the dismissal entry. 
{¶ 36} The salient facts in this case are as follows.  On May 19, 2011, 
appellees, Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C. (“Infinite”) and Karam Properties II, 
Ltd., and appellant, the Travelers Indemnity Company (“Travelers”), notified the 
trial court that they had settled their claims, except for the issue of how to split the 
settlement money.  Lucas County Gen.R. 5.05(F) affords a litigant’s counsel 30 
January Term, 2015 
15 
 
days following settlement of a case to submit a dismissal entry before “the judge 
may order the case dismissed for want of prosecution or file an order of settlement 
and dismissal and assess costs.”  Nevertheless, on May 26, 2011, just one week 
after the parties agreed to settle, the trial court sua sponte filed a dismissal entry, 
which stated, “Parties having represented to the court that their differences have 
been resolved, this case is dismissed without prejudice, with the parties reserving 
the right to file an entry of dismissal within thirty (30) days of this order.” 
{¶ 37} In my view, the majority’s analysis is misdirected.  In cases in 
which a trial court sua sponte issues a dismissal entry after notification of 
settlement, our analysis should begin with a determination whether the trial court 
had authority to dismiss the case.  The question whether the trial court properly 
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement is reached only if we 
determine that the dismissal was proper.  In this case, because the trial court 
lacked authority to issue the dismissal entry, the trial court committed reversible 
error. 
{¶ 38} Civ.R. 41 provides for two types of dismissals, voluntary, Civ.R. 
41(A), and involuntary, Civ.R. 41(B).  The trial court did not proceed under either 
Civ.R. 41(A) or (B). 
{¶ 39} Civ.R. 41(A) provides two methods for voluntary dismissal: by a 
plaintiff under Civ.R. 41(A)(1) and by order of the court under Civ.R. 41(A)(2).  
Dismissals pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1) may be effected by the plaintiff, under 
certain circumstances, without an order from the court.  As neither Infinite nor 
Travelers filed a notice of dismissal in this case, Civ.R. 41(A)(1) does not apply. 
{¶ 40} Civ.R. 41(A)(2) permits a plaintiff who cannot voluntarily dismiss 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1) to move the court for an order dismissing the action 
without prejudice.  A plaintiff must file a motion for an action to be dismissed 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2).  Accordingly, the dismissal order in this case was not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
 
based on the authority of Civ.R. 41(A)(2), as neither Infinite nor Travelers moved 
the court to dismiss the action. 
{¶ 41} Furthermore, the dismissal entry was not pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B).  
Civ.R. 41(B)(1) permits a trial court, after notice to the plaintiff, to dismiss sua 
sponte an action when “the plaintiff fails to prosecute, or comply with [the civil] 
rules or any court order.”  A trial court enters a dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) to 
penalize the plaintiff.  2 James M. Klein and Stanton G. Darling II, Civil Practice, 
Section 41:30, 244 (2d Ed.2004).  In this matter, there was no reason to penalize 
either Infinite or Travelers, as neither had failed to prosecute or comply with the 
rules or any order of the court.  Furthermore, Civ.R. 41(B)(2), permitting a trial 
court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action after the plaintiff, in a nonjury trial, has 
completed presentation of its evidence, is inapplicable under the current facts. 
{¶ 42} Accordingly, by dismissing the action, the trial court committed 
reversible error.  See Logsdon v. Nichols, 72 Ohio St.3d 124, 647 N.E.2d 1361 
(1995) (a trial court’s ex parte granting of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A)(2) is reversible error); Svoboda v. Brunswick, 6 Ohio St.3d 348, 453 N.E.2d 
648 (1983) (trial court’s failure to provide notice to plaintiff, or plaintiff’s 
counsel, prior to dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) was an abuse of 
discretion). 
{¶ 43} Turning to Lucas County Gen.R. 5.05(F), its express terms 
provided litigant’s counsel 30 days from May 19, 2011, to submit an order of 
dismissal.  Only if the parties failed to present an order of dismissal within 30 
days was the trial court authorized to order the case dismissed.  It is undisputed 
that the trial court did not provide the parties the time permitted by Lucas County 
Gen.R. 5.05(F). 
{¶ 44} The courts in this state are entitled to adopt rules concerning local 
practice in their respective courts.  Article IV, Section 5(B), Ohio Constitution.  A 
trial court’s interpretation or application of its local rules is reviewed for an abuse 
January Term, 2015 
17 
 
of discretion.  Michaels v. Michaels, 9th Dist. Medina No. 07CA0058-M, 2008-
Ohio-2251, ¶ 13.  While a court is to adhere to its local rules, “ ‘there is no error 
when, in its sound discretion, the court decides that the peculiar circumstances of 
a case require deviation from its own rules.’ ”  Yanik v. Yanik, 9th Dist. Summit 
No. 21406, 2003-Ohio-4155, ¶ 9, quoting Lorain Cty. Bank v. Berg, 9th Dist. 
Lorain No. 91CA005183, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3799 (July 22, 1992).  An 
abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling.  Blakemore v. 
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 
{¶ 45} There were no peculiar circumstances present in this case.  In 
explaining the dismissal entry, the trial court stated that it was “a placeholder 
entry, pending submission of * * * the final entry * * * once [the parties] finalized 
everything, and this is why the language reads the way it is and why the case was 
dismissed without prejudice.”  This explanation does not describe a peculiar 
circumstance that supports a deviation from Lucas County Gen.R. 5.05(F).  
Therefore, the trial court acted arbitrarily by not adhering to Lucas County Gen.R. 
5.05(F) and the dismissal was reversible error. 
{¶ 46} As demonstrated in Logsdon, 72 Ohio St.3d 124, 647 N.E.2d 1361, 
our initial focus must be on whether the trial court acted within the bounds of its 
authority under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and local rules.  In Logsdon, 
the trial court signed and filed a dismissal entry at the plaintiffs’ request pursuant 
to Civ.R. 41(A)(2).  Id. at 125.  However, opposing counsel had not been given 
notice and an opportunity to respond.  Id.  Upon recognizing that it had not 
followed the proper procedure in dismissing the case, the trial court sua sponte 
signed and filed a second entry vacating the first entry.  Id.  On appeal, we 
adopted the court of appeals’ conclusion that a trial court retains, “in some 
instances, the jurisdiction to deal with a dismissal entry improperly filed.”  Id. at 
127. 
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18 
 
{¶ 47} Since the trial court lacked the authority to issue the dismissal 
entry here, I would reverse the judgment of the Sixth District and remand the 
cause to the trial court with instructions to vacate the dismissal entry and for 
further proceedings. 
{¶ 48} I would also encourage the Commission on the Rules of Practice 
and Procedure to propose amendments to Civ.R. 41 that would empower the 
parties to have an active involvement in the procedure that dismisses their cause 
of action upon a settlement.  Perhaps California’s civil rule could be used as a 
model.  Cal.Civ.Proc.Code 664.6 states: 
 
If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed 
by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the 
court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon 
motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the 
settlement.  If requested by the parties, the court may retain 
jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until 
performance in full of the terms of the settlement. 
 
{¶ 49} The rule’s restriction that a trial court may enter judgment upon 
settlement only on the motion of a party places everyone on notice that a 
judgment may be entered.  Additionally, the burden is on the parties to request 
that the court retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, thereby letting them 
determine whether the court retains jurisdiction after dismissal. 
{¶ 50} The commission will be able to review the effects of Civ.R. 41 and 
recommend the necessary changes after careful study, and this court can then 
amend the rule after public comment. 
{¶ 51} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2015 
19 
 
 
Davis & Young, and Paul D. Eklund, for appellant. 
 
Kisling, Nestico & Redick, L.L.C., John J. Reagan, Alberto R. Nestico, 
and Christopher J. Van Blargan, for appellees. 
 
Smith, Rolfes & Skavdahl, Co., L.P.A., Jerome F. Rolfes, and Amanda M. 
Rieger, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Ohio Association of Civil Trial 
Attorneys. 
__________________