Title: State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2516.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2516 
THE STATE EX REL. MOSIER, APPELLANT, v. FORNOF,  
MAGISTRATE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2516.] 
Prohibition — Mandamus — Juvenile court and juvenile-court magistrate do not 
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed on child-custody 
matter — Adequate remedy at law by appeal — Judgment affirmed and 
writs denied. 
(No. 2009-2175 — Submitted May 26, 2010 — Decided June 10, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-09-1192, 2009-Ohio-5618. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request 
of appellant, Tonya Mosier, for writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent 
appellees, Magistrate Judith Fornof and the judges of the Lucas County Court of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, from determining child-custody issues 
concerning Mosier’s daughter and to vacate the entries and orders relating to child 
custody in the underlying proceeding. 
{¶ 2} “Neither mandamus nor prohibition will issue if the party seeking 
extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  Dzina 
v. Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 12.  “In 
the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant 
v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 3} For the following reasons, the juvenile court judges and magistrate 
do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to decide child-custody 
matters in the underlying proceeding. 
{¶ 4} First, they have specific statutory jurisdiction to do so.  See R.C. 
2151.23(A)(2) (juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction “to determine the 
custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state”); R.C. 3109.042 
(“An unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the sole residential parent and 
legal custodian of the child until a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order 
designating another person as the residential parent and legal custodian”).  Mosier 
is an unmarried female who gave birth to the child, and there is no allegation or 
evidence in the record that the child is a ward of another state court. 
{¶ 5} Second, Mosier erroneously claims that R.C. 3109.12 divested the 
juvenile court of jurisdiction to determine her child’s custody because she had not 
filed a proper complaint.  That statutory provision relates to the procedure that a 
father of a child born to an unmarried woman must use when requesting 
reasonable parenting time rather than legal custody.  See R.C. 3109.12(A) (“If a 
child is born to an unmarried woman and if the father of the child has 
acknowledged the child and that acknowledgement has become final * * * or has 
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been determined in an action under Chapter 3111. Of the Revised Code to be the 
father of the child, the father may file a complaint requesting that the court of 
appropriate jurisdiction of the county in which the child resides grant him 
reasonable parenting time rights with the child * * *” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 6} “ ‘Custody’ refers to the right to ultimate legal and physical control 
over a child, while ‘parenting time rights’ grant a parent the power of temporary 
physical control for the purpose of visitation.”  Williamson v. Cooke, Franklin 
App. No. 09AP-222, 2009-Ohio-6842, ¶ 22, citing Braatz v. Braatz (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 706 N.E.2d 1218 (“ ‘Visitation’ and ‘custody’ are related but 
distinct legal concepts.  ‘Custody’ resides in the party or parties who have the 
right to ultimate legal and physical control of a child.  ‘Visitation’ resides in a 
noncustodial party and encompasses that party’s right to visit the child”).  
Through his counterclaim and motion in the underlying juvenile court proceeding, 
the child’s father had sought custody of the child, not increased parenting time or 
visitation. 
{¶ 7} Therefore, Mosier’s claim alleges, at best, an error in the court’s 
exercise of its jurisdiction rather than a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See 
Jimison v. Wilson, 106 Ohio St.3d 342, 2005-Ohio-5143, 835 N.E.2d 34, ¶ 11.  
Because the juvenile court judges and magistrate do not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to determine child-custody matters in the 
underlying case, Mosier has an adequate remedy by appeal to raise her claims, 
and the court of appeals properly dismissed her action for extraordinary relief in 
prohibition and mandamus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Lydy & Moan, Ltd., Daniel T. Ellis, and Frederick E. Kalmbach, for 
appellant. 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and John A. Borell, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
______________________