Title: In Re Weeks

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

134 Ariz. 521 (1983) 658 P.2d 174 In re the Matter of Tim WEEKS, East Phoenix Justice of the Peace Court No. 1. No. JUD-5. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 26, 1983. *522 Mallin, Lemberg & Arnold by Charles L. Arnold, Phoenix, for Commission on Judicial Qualifications. Castro, Zipf & Rogers by Alfred J. Rogers, Phoenix, for respondent. CAMERON, Justice. The Arizona Commission on Judicial Qualifications found that the respondent, Tim Weeks, Justice of the Peace of the East Phoenix Precinct of Maricopa County, Arizona, had violated Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 45, Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S., and art. 6.1 § 4 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona, and censure by this court was recommended. We have jurisdiction pursuant to art. 6.1 of the Arizona Constitution and Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure for the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 17A A.R.S. We must answer two questions in this matter: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are not in dispute and are as follows. Respondent was a duly elected Justice of the Peace for the East Phoenix Precinct No. 1, Maricopa County. In February of 1980, as a result of complaints filed with the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, respondent met with the Commission and discussed the reasons for delay in his court, particularly in rendering decisions on submitted matters. The Commission on Judicial Qualifications made specific suggestions to respondent regarding his office practices, and requested that the respondent submit status reports to the Commission. After receiving a series of reports, the Commission, believing that the respondent had resolved his difficulties of undue delay in deciding matters under advisement, terminated its inquiry concerning the conduct of the respondent. Thereafter, further complaints were received by the Commission, and specifically: While these cases were pending for decision, the respondent completed and filed with the Maricopa County finance department, affidavits for the months of September 1981 through January 1982, certifying under oath that no cause had been submitted to him for decision which remained pending or undetermined for 60 days or more since the date of submission for decision. These affidavits were made pursuant *523 to A.R.S. § 11-424.02 which reads as follows: After a hearing at which time the respondent appeared and discussed the heavy workload of his court, the Commission made Findings of Fact and the following Conclusions of Law and Recommendation: Prior to the final recommendation of the Commission, the respondent resigned his office effective 18 October 1982. Ordinarily, given the respondent's resignation, this matter would be dismissed as moot, since the respondent no longer has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, and it would not be reasonably expected that he would be in the same legal posture again. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1182-83, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356-57 (1982). We note, however, that because the respondent did not, in the course of his resignation, agree not to seek this office in the future, a determination of the matter is procedurally appropriate. Cf. Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.Ariz. 1970), aff'd 400 U.S. 884, 91 S. Ct. 139, 27 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1970) (a defendant previously engaged in illegal conduct "cannot, by his own voluntary conduct, moot the case and thereby deprive the Court of jurisdiction"); see also Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consol. Mining Co., 152 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir.1945), cert. denied 327 U.S. 803, 66 S. Ct. 960, 90 L. Ed. 1028 (1946). More immediately, we have held that We think that this is a proper case in which to apply this rule, and we therefore proceed to consider the merits of this matter. Our duties in regard to recommendations of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications have been previously stated: DELAY We believe that unnecessary and unwarranted delay in the rendering of a decision violates the Arizona Constitution which provides for removal or censure of a justice of the peace for "wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties * * *." Ariz. Const. art. 6.1 § 4. We also believe this conduct of a judge violates the Code of Judicial Conduct and specifically Canon 3(a)(5) which reads, "A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court." What constitutes an unreasonable delay will usually depend upon the facts in each case. In Arizona, however, for a justice of the peace, the legislature has set by statute, A.R.S. § 11-424.02, the time limit within which justices of the peace should act in deciding cases under advisement. In the cases that have been decided regarding delay, the courts have unanimously held that unnecessary, unwarranted delay is a violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct which subjects a judge to judicial discipline. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed, among other things, that The court went on to state: In In re Corning, 538 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1976), the respondent was charged with having failed The respondent was removed from office after having failed, as in the instant case, to respond to efforts of the judicial qualifications commission to rehabilitate the respondent. Frequently, lack of diligence is coupled with other derelictions of duty, and the Michigan Supreme Court in In The Matter of Heideman, 387 Mich. 630, 198 N.W.2d 291 (1972), removed a judge for failure to order jury trials upon request, failure to promptly process, try and dispose of cases that came before him, as well as failure to keep an accurate record of the proceedings. In In the Matter of Kohn, 568 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1978), the respondent was censured for discourtesy to attorneys, as well as for delay in deciding cases under submission. *525 In the instant case, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications made a conscientious effort to assist respondent in developing office procedures to prevent unnecessary delay in deciding matters under advisement but to no avail. As is recognized by the reporter's notes to the Code of Judicial Conduct: We believe that unreasonable delay in deciding matters under advisement is a valid ground for discipline, and in the instant case, the Commission's Conclusions of Law Numbers 2, 3, and 4 are approved by this court. Canon 3(A)(5), Rule 45, Rules of the Supreme Court, 17A A.R.S. FALSE AFFIDAVITS It is uncontested that the respondent signed affidavits claiming to have no cases under advisement for more than 60 days, in order to obtain his salary as required by the statute, when in fact he did have matters under advisement for longer than that period of time. Admittedly, respondent and the Commission's specially appointed attorney signed a stipulation of facts dated 23 June 1982 agreeing that the "filing of said inaccurate monthly salary affidavits was not done intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by respondent, but was due to an oversight on his part." Even with this stipulation, however, we believe that the filing of the false affidavits constitutes "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." Art. 6.1 § 4, supra. The signing of a series of false affidavits by a judge brings the integrity of the entire judicial system into question and is prejudicial to the administration of justice. This conduct violates Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as adopted by this court. We agree with the Commission in its Conclusion of Law Number 1, and the Commission's Recommendation. The respondent Tim Weeks is hereby censured by this court. GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur. HOLOHAN, Chief Justice (concurring and dissenting). At the time the Judicial Qualifications Commission made its finding and recommendation the respondent was holding the office of justice of the peace, a "judge" as defined in Article VI.I Section 5 of the Arizona Constitution. I agree with the majority that the commission acted within its jurisdiction. There is no disagreement on my part that the case is not moot when issues are raised which should be decided for the guidance of public officers in the future administration of their office. I also concur in the majority's reasoning and holding concerning the findings of the commission. My disagreement with the majority concerns the suggestion that this court or the commission continues to have jurisdiction over a judge after his resignation. Section 4 of Article VI.I of the Arizona Constitution grants this court the power to retire, censure or remove a judge for specified acts of misconduct. If the individual is not a judge this court cannot retire, censure or remove him from what he no longer has the office of judge. What the majority is really saying in this case is that a judge cannot avoid censure or removal by the simple device of resigning and running for office again at the next election. If the majority had the power to amend the constitution, the above situation could be prevented. Since the amendment of the constitution is not within the power of this court I dissent from any attempt to change the plain meaning of the constitution by interpretation to achieve a desirable result.