Title: State v. Swan

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

#28450-r-DG 
2019 S.D. 14 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
* * * * 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL BERT SWAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
GRANT COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. SPEARS 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
GRANT FLYNN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
 
and appellee. 
 
SCOTT R. BRATLAND 
Watertown, South Dakota 
Attorney for defendant  
 
and appellant. 
 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARGUED OCTOBER 3, 2018 
 
OPINION FILED 03/13/19 
#28450 
 
-1- 
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice 
 
[¶1.]  
Michael B. Swan appeals his conviction for second-degree murder, 
arguing the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on the 
lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter.  Swan also claims 
the circuit court erred by denying his two motions for judgment of acquittal.  We 
reverse and remand.   
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
Sixty-three-year-old Swan and his wife, 77-year-old Angelina Swan, 
resided in an apartment in Milbank.  At approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 24, 
2016, Swan called his longtime friend Duane Pollock and claimed he was unable to 
wake Angelina.  Pollock arrived at Swan’s apartment within five minutes to check 
on Angelina, but was unable to detect a pulse.  Pollock attempted to open Angelina’s 
mouth and found that her jaw was locked shut.  Pollock also noticed extensive 
bruising on Angelina’s face and arms. 
[¶3.]  
Pollock contacted the Grant County Detention Center and requested 
an ambulance and the assistance of law enforcement.  Milbank Police Officer 
Michael Morgan arrived at Swan’s apartment at approximately 4:15 a.m.  Officer 
Morgan observed that Angelina was cold, gray, stiff, and that her jaw was locked.  
He also noticed that Angelina had a black eye, bruising on the left side of her face 
and right hand, and blood in her nose.  Officer Morgan contacted Milbank Chief of 
Police Boyd Van Vooren, who contacted the South Dakota Division of Criminal 
Investigation (DCI). 
#28450 
 
-2- 
[¶4.]  
DCI Special Agent Cameron Corey, along with Special Agents Jeff 
Kollars and Jeff Belon, investigated Angelina’s death.  Agent Corey conducted two 
interviews with Swan.  Swan explained that on the afternoon of October 23, 2016, 
he and Angelina watched television for most of the day and had no visitors.  Swan 
claimed that between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m., Angelina was lying in her chair and he 
told her she should go to bed.  Swan stated that Angelina kicked her foot at him 
because she did not want to go to bed.  In response, Swan claimed “he gave the 
bottom of her foot a pop.”  Swan then assisted Angelina to the bathroom and then to 
the bedroom, where he helped her lay down on an air mattress.   
[¶5.]  
Swan told Agent Corey that he and Angelina “squabbled after she had 
gone to bed, but that’s all, just husband and wife after so much time, just 
squabbling.”  Swan also stated that “[w]e didn’t really fight or anything like that, 
just squabbled.”  He claimed the couple was not “cursing at each other or anything 
like that.  It did get a little vocal when I was taking her to bed saying just lay down, 
get some sleep.  That’s all.”   
[¶6.]  
Swan claimed that after Angelina fell asleep, he sat at his desk and 
could hear her snoring.  He also claimed that he checked on her periodically.  Once 
when he checked on her, Swan stated Angelina had rolled off the air mattress, but 
she did not want Swan to help her back onto it.  Swan continued watching 
television and checking on Angelina until at least 2:00 a.m.  Around that time, 
Swan claimed he could no longer hear Angelina snoring, so he went to check on her 
again.  Swan claimed that he found Angelina in the same position next to the air 
mattress, but that he was not able to wake her up.  Swan said he began slapping 
#28450 
 
-3- 
the side of Angelina’s face but that she still would not wake up.  He also claimed 
that he attempted to give Angelina mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.  When that 
failed, Swan stated he called Pollock for help. 
[¶7.]  
Minnehaha County Medical Examiner Dr. Kenneth Snell performed an 
autopsy the next day.  Dr. Snell discovered that Angelina had suffered a severe 
atlanto-occipital dislocation (AOD), also known as an internal decapitation.  
Additionally, his examination found that Angelina had sustained two subdural 
hemorrhages, hemorrhaging to the sclera in both eyes, and several hemorrhages on 
her back where her ribs met her spine.  Dr. Snell further noted bruising on 
Angelina’s upper and lower eyelids and left cheek, as well as bruising on her 
abdomen, right buttock, right arm, right hand, right thigh, right knee, and inner 
left shin.  Dr. Snell concluded that Angelina’s death was caused by internal 
decapitation likely caused by someone stomping on her neck. 
[¶8.]  
The State initially charged Swan with domestic simple assault, but 
amended the complaint to charge Swan with second-degree murder after receiving 
the autopsy results.  Swan was indicted and a trial was held on September 11, 2017.  
Throughout the trial, Swan asserted that Angelina’s death resulted from a fall.  
Swan denied that he and Angelina had engaged in a violent altercation. 
[¶9.]  
Swan requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser-included 
offenses of first-degree and second-degree manslaughter.  The State opposed the 
instructions, arguing there was no factual basis to support these offenses.  The 
circuit court agreed with the State and denied the requested instructions. 
#28450 
 
-4- 
[¶10.]  
During trial, Swan orally moved for judgment of acquittal after the 
State rested its case, which the circuit court denied.  Swan was convicted of second-
degree murder.  He then renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, but the 
circuit court denied his written motion as well.  Swan was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  He appeals his conviction and sentence, asserting the following 
issues for our review: 
1. 
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by 
refusing to instruct the jury on first- and second-degree 
manslaughter. 
 
2. 
Whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support Swan’s conviction of second-degree murder. 
Analysis & Decision 
1. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to 
instruct the jury on first- and second-degree manslaughter. 
 
[¶11.]  
Swan argues he was entitled to lesser-included offense instructions on 
the second-degree murder charge on which he was convicted, including first- and 
second-degree manslaughter.  Swan claims the circuit court abused its discretion by 
denying the proposed instructions.  Specifically, Swan asserts there was sufficient 
evidence in the record to support his contention that he acted in the “heat of 
passion” in killing Angelina, thereby justifying an instruction on the charge of first-
degree manslaughter under SDCL 22-16-15.   
[¶12.]  
Our standard of review of a circuit court’s denial of a proposed jury 
instruction is well settled.  State v. Randle, 2018 S.D. 61, ¶ 32, 916 N.W.2d 461, 
469.   
We review a [circuit] court’s refusal of a proposed instruction 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  The trial court has broad 
#28450 
 
-5- 
discretion in instructing the jury.  Jury instructions are 
satisfactory when, considered as a whole, they properly state the 
applicable law and inform the jury.  Error in declining to apply a 
proposed instruction is reversible only if it is prejudicial, and the 
defendant has the burden of proving any prejudice. 
 
Id. at 469-70 (quoting State v. Shaw, 2005 S.D. 105, ¶ 18, 705 N.W.2d 620, 625).  
“An erroneous instruction is prejudicial if in all probability it produced some effect 
upon the verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it.”  
Id. at 470 (quoting Shaw, 2005 S.D. 105, ¶ 18, 705 N.W.2d at 625-26).   
[¶13.]  
Swan was charged and convicted of second-degree murder.  Second-
degree murder is defined as a “[h]omicide . . . perpetrated by any act imminently 
dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, 
although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular 
person, including an unborn child.”  SDCL 22-16-7.  Swan requested the jury be 
instructed on first- and second-degree manslaughter.  First-degree manslaughter is 
a lesser-included offense of first- and second-degree murder.  SDCL 22-16-20.1.  
Second-degree manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first- and second-degree 
murder and first-degree manslaughter.  Id.  First-degree manslaughter is a 
“[h]omicide . . . perpetrated . . . (2) Without any design to effect death, including an 
unborn child, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner[.]”  SDCL 
22-16-15(2).  Second-degree manslaughter is “[a]ny reckless killing of one human 
being, including an unborn child, by the act or procurement of another which, under 
the provisions of this chapter, is neither murder nor manslaughter in the first 
degree, nor excusable nor justifiable homicide . . . .”  SDCL 22-16-20.   
#28450 
 
-6- 
[¶14.]  
As to first-degree manslaughter, acting within the “‘[h]eat of passion’ is 
defined as an ‘intent formed suddenly, under the influence of some violent emotion, 
which for the instant overwhelmed the reason of the slayer.’”  State v. Hart, 
1998 S.D. 93, ¶ 15, 584 N.W.2d 863, 865 (quoting Graham v. State, 346 N.W.2d 433, 
434 (S.D. 1984)).  “Heat of passion” is further defined in the South Dakota Pattern 
Jury Instruction that Swan requested at trial:  
“Heat of passion” which will reduce a killing from murder to 
manslaughter in the first degree means a suddenly formed 
passion which was caused by reasonable and adequate 
provocation on the part of the person slain, causing a temporary 
obscurity of reason rendering a person incapable of forming a 
premeditated design to kill and which passion continues to exist 
until the commission of the homicide. 
 
“Heat of passion” is such mental disturbance or condition as 
would so overcome and dominate or suspend the exercise of the 
judgment of the defendant as to render his mind for the time 
being deaf to the voice of reason, make him incapable of forming 
and executing the distinct intent to take human life, and to 
cause him, uncontrollably, to act from impending force of the 
disturbing cause rather than from any real wickedness of heart 
or cruelty or recklessness of disposition.  The sufficient 
provocation must be such as would naturally and reasonably 
arouse the passion of an ordinary person beyond his power to 
control. 
 
SDPJI 3-24-26 (1996). 
[¶15.]  
Pursuant to SDCL 22-16-20.2, “[a] lesser included offense instruction 
shall be given at any homicide trial whenever any facts are submitted to the trier of 
fact which would support such an offense pursuant to this chapter.”  When deciding 
to give the jury a lesser-included offense instruction, the circuit court must consider 
“whether there is some evidence to support giving the instruction.”  State v. Waloke, 
2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 30, 835 N.W.2d 105, 114 (quoting State v. Hoadley, 2002 S.D. 109, 
#28450 
 
-7- 
¶ 64, 651 N.W.2d 249, 264).  But “the question is not . . . whether there was 
sufficient evidence.”  Id. (quoting Hoadley, 2002 S.D. 109, ¶ 64 n.14, 651 N.W.2d at 
264 n.14).  “[W]hen a defendant’s theory is supported by law and has some 
foundation in evidence, however tenuous, the defendant has a right to present it.”  
Randle, 2018 S.D. 61, ¶ 33, 916 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting State v. Birdshead, 
2015 S.D. 77, ¶ 27, 871 N.W.2d 62, 73).   
[¶16.]  
Swan notes evidence in the record that he believes shows he acted in a 
heat of passion in killing Angelina, entitling him to a jury instruction for first-
degree manslaughter.  Two of Swan’s neighbors testified at trial that Swan and 
Angelina could be heard arguing or slamming doors almost daily.  Pollock’s wife, 
Sandra Pollock, testified that Swan and Angelina drank beer and that Pollock took 
Swan to the liquor store to buy beer on almost a daily basis.  In Swan’s interview 
with Agent Corey, Swan stated that he had been drinking alcohol and arguing with 
Angelina throughout the evening of October 23, 2016.  Swan revealed in the 
interview that he and Angelina had been “squabbling” and that Angelina had 
kicked Swan and he retaliated by clapping the bottom of Angelina’s foot.  Swan also 
revealed that Angelina requested that he come into the bedroom to help her about a 
half-dozen times.  Angelina asked Swan to get her aspirin and water, to help her to 
the bathroom, to turn down the television, and to reposition her on the air mattress.  
Swan also stated that Angelina was having trouble walking due to back pain earlier 
that day, and that he assisted her in getting around.  There is also evidence that 
Angelina may have been showing the early signs of dementia and that Swan had a 
history of high blood pressure.   
#28450 
 
-8- 
[¶17.]  
Swan claims this evidence shows that he could have become 
increasingly frustrated with Angelina on October 23, 2016, and killed her in a heat 
of passion.  He asserts this frustration was the result of Angelina’s neediness and 
dependence on him, shown by her numerous requests for him to help her.  Swan 
argues these details amount to at least “some evidence” that he may have killed 
Angelina in a heat of passion.  Waloke, 2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 30, 835 N.W.2d at 114 
(quoting Hoadley, 2002 S.D. 109, ¶ 64, 651 N.W.2d at 264).  He therefore asserts 
that this evidence factually supports instructions on first-degree manslaughter.  
SDCL 22-16-20.2. 
[¶18.]  
The State also appeared to advance the heat of passion theory in its 
closing arguments: 
What did happen?  The truth of the matter is the defendant and 
Angelina Swan, they lived a miserable life.  They fought and 
yelled at each other.  They drank.  That’s all they did.  The[ir] 
[neighbors] who had no interest in this case heard them 
screaming at each other constantly.  The defendant admits he 
was—she was asking him for stuff constantly.  He was annoyed.  
He was frustrated.  She kept asking for things, bring me this, 
bring me that.  He said it was like every five minutes.  [“]I would 
go sit down and ten minutes later she would be asking me for 
something again.[”]  And you know what, she does probably 
have a sore back.  She does maybe have some cognitive 
disabilities, maybe some memory loss.  She’s needy.  She’s 
dependent.  She’s becoming more and more dependent on this 
defendant all the time and he can’t handle it.  He gets fed up by 
it.  And instead of helping her the way he should have, he grew 
angry and he started beating her up.  I think with his foot, the 
foot you saw . . . [h]e’s stomping on her.  She’s protecting herself.  
And he stomps on her neck and he ends her life.  Maybe he 
didn’t mean to, but he did.  It’s the only medical explanation 
that there is in this case. 
 
[¶19.]  
At the very least, the evidence referenced by Swan certainly amounts 
to “any facts . . . which would support” first-degree manslaughter.  SDCL 22-16-
#28450 
 
-9- 
20.2.  There was at least “some evidence” presented to the circuit court that 
supported the possibility of a heat of passion killing.  Waloke, 2013 S.D. 55, ¶ 30, 
835 N.W.2d at 114 (quoting Hoadley, 2002 S.D. 109, ¶ 64, 651 N.W.2d at 264).  
Therefore, the circuit court abused its discretion in rejecting Swan’s proposed 
instruction for first-degree manslaughter.∗   
[¶20.]  
“If evidence has been presented which would support a conviction of a 
lesser charge, refusal to give the requested instruction would be reversible error.”  
State v. Williams, 2008 S.D. 29, ¶ 34, 748 N.W.2d 435, 446 (quoting State v. 
Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126, 132 (S.D. 1982).  There was evidence that entitled 
Swan to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter, 
so we must reverse Swan’s conviction for second-degree murder and remand for a 
new trial.  Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of jury 
instructions for lesser-included offenses, we do not reach the issue of whether there 
                                            
∗ 
Swan also argues he was entitled to an instruction on second-degree 
manslaughter.  As noted above, second-degree manslaughter involves a 
reckless killing that is neither murder, first-degree manslaughter, nor 
justifiable homicide.  SDCL 22-16-20.  SDCL 22-1-2(1)(d) defines reckless as: 
 
import[ing] a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of a 
substantial risk that the offender’s conduct may cause a certain 
result or may be of a certain nature.  A person is reckless with 
respect to circumstances if that person consciously and 
unjustifiably disregards a substantial risk that such 
circumstances may exist[.] 
 
Swan has presented no evidence that he acted recklessly by consciously and 
unjustifiably disregarding a substantial risk.  The evidence presented only 
shows that Angelina’s death was either the result of a fall or of a stomping to 
the neck.  Therefore, Swan was not entitled to an instruction for second-
degree manslaughter.   
#28450 
 
-10- 
was sufficient evidence in the record to support Swan’s conviction of second-degree 
murder. 
[¶21.]  
KERN, JENSEN and SALTER, Justices, concur.