Title: Ayers v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JARREAU AYERS, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§   No. 623, 2002 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§   Cr.A. No. IN-02-03-1668; 1669; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§      1670 and 1671 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§  
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  December 9, 2003 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  March 12, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc). 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire, Figliola & Facciolo, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Jarreau Ayers (“Ayers”), was indicted on 
single counts of non-capital Murder in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the 
First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 
and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited.  Following a jury trial, 
he was found guilty on all charges.  He was sentenced that same day.   
Ayres has raised four issues in this direct appeal.  First, he argues that 
there was no rational basis in the evidence to instruct the jury that he could 
be found guilty as an accomplice, pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 271.  
Second, he argues that the trial judge erroneously denied the defense’s 
request for a unanimity instruction regarding whether he was a principal or 
an accomplice.  Third, he contends that the trial judge erred in not 
instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault.  Finally, he 
argues that the trial judge erred by allowing the State to introduce excerpts 
of a witness’s prior out-of-court tape-recorded statement, when the entire 
tape was available.   
We have concluded that Ayres’ arguments are without merit.  
Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
The background for this homicide began the day before Arthur Wells 
was killed.  On January 21, 2000, a party was held for Gregory “Ya Yo” 
 
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Simon in Wilmington, Delaware.  The party ended around 1:30 a.m.  As 
people were leaving, Keenan Anderson, who had attended the party, grabbed 
Regina Thomas, another guest.  Ms. Thomas was the girlfriend of Tywaan 
“Reality” Johnson, who was also present at the party.  Johnson told Keenan 
to keep his hands to himself.  Keenan replied with an expletive.  Johnson 
began screaming at Anderson.  Anderson, who was only 5’ 7” tall, asked for 
help from Ayers.  Arthur Wells, the victim, attempted to intercede between 
Johnson and Anderson, telling both men to “chill.”  Anderson cursed again. 
Wells grabbed Anderson by his neck and slammed him against a car.  
Kennard Ringold, another guest, then attempted to break up the fight 
between Wells and Anderson.  As Anderson’s friends started coming across 
the street to Anderson’s aid, Johnson fired two shots into the air from a .45 
semiautomatic handgun.  Ayers then yelled to Johnson, “you busting your 
gun off, but you ain’t killing nothing.”  Johnson then aimed his gun in 
Ayers’ direction and fired. This caused everyone to disperse. 
Anderson left in a car with someone known as “Black Swan.”  
Thomas and Johnson got into a Jeep.  Ayers drove off with Ringold.  Ayers 
asked for Ringold’s gun.  About a block away from the club, Ringold gave 
Ayers his 9mm semiautomatic handgun, and Ayers exited the vehicle.  The 
car in which Anderson had been riding was behind Ringold’s car.  When 
 
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Ringold’s car stopped and Ayers got out, Anderson got out of his car as 
well.   
The two men walked back to the club.  At the intersection of 7th and 
Tatnall, they saw a gold Nissan.  Ayers shot at the car.  When a police car 
responded to the scene, Ayers and Anderson fled in different directions.  
They met at a nearby house where Ringold subsequently picked them up.  
As they had fled in different directions from the police, Ayers had thrown 
Ringold’s gun away.  He was later able to retrieve it. 
The following evening, Ayres and Anderson attended a party on 35th 
Street in Wilmington.  After the party, the two men left with Damon 
Gregory and others in Gregory’s car.  They drove to the Getty Station at the 
intersection of 30th and Market Streets to get some food.  At the gas station, 
they met “Ya Yo” Simon.  As Anderson was walking out of the store, he 
overheard Simon tell Ayers, “the boy you was [sic] beefing with the night 
before is over by the KFC.”   Across the street from the gas station was a 
Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant.  Ayers and Anderson saw a Jeep 
Cherokee on the corner.    At that point, it was unclear who was inside the 
Jeep, because the windows were tinted. 
Ayers then walked over to Gregory’s car and said something to 
Gregory.  Gregory then drove his car across the street and parked behind the 
 
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Jeep.  Ayers and Anderson then walked across the street toward the Jeep.  
Ayers walked up to Gregory’s car, leaned inside, and told Gregory to move 
the car, “because something might get messy.”  Gregory moved the car and 
was driving toward 30th and Tatnall when he heard some gunshots.   
Gregory turned the corner and waited for a few minutes.  Gregory saw 
Anderson and Ayers run towards Gregory’s car.  Both men got inside.  
Gregory asked the two men what had happened.  First Anderson, and later 
Ayres, stated, “We handled that nigger.”  Gregory asked if they still had the 
gun that Ayers had used the night before.  Ayres replied that he had thrown 
it behind Rash’s Food Market. 
Arthur Wells died as a result of gunshot wounds to the back and 
abdomen.  The police recovered two 9mm bullets from Wells’ body and 
clothing, and three 9mm shell casings at the scene.  The police also 
recovered a 9mm semiautomatic handgun behind Rash’s Food Market.  The 
bullets and shell casings matched the bullets and shell casings found near the 
shoot-out the previous night.  They were subsequently matched to the 
handgun Ringold had given to Ayers. 
Accomplice Liability Instruction Proper 
At trial, the State’s initial theory of its murder case against Ayers 
coincided with the Indictment:  that Ayers shot Wells and was guilty as a 
 
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principal.  During the course of the State’s case-in-chief, testimony elicited 
on cross-examination by the defense suggested the possibility that Anderson, 
and not Ayers, had shot Wells.  Nevertheless, the State continued to contend 
that Ayers was the shooter.  As a result of this testimony, however, the State 
began to develop the alternative position that if Anderson was the shooter, 
Ayers was liable as an accomplice. 
After all evidence had been introduced, the trial judge presented 
counsel with draft jury instructions.  The instructions included provisions for 
the State’s alternative theory of accomplice liability.  Ayers objected on the 
ground that the State had indicted Ayers on the theory that he was the 
principal who shot Wells and that there was no evidence to support a theory 
of accomplice liability.  The trial judge overruled the objection.  The 
accomplice liability instruction was given to the jury. 
The record reflects sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Ayers 
was guilty as a principal by actually shooting Wells.  Evidence introduced at 
trial that Ayers was guilty as the shooter included the following:  testimony 
by Gregory that on the night of the shooting, Ayers told him to move his car 
because “something might get messy”; testimony by Ringold that the 
weapon used in Wells’ murder was the same 9mm semiautomatic handgun 
he had given Ayers the night before; expert testimony linking that gun to the 
 
7
shooting of the gold Nissan; eyewitness testimony that Ayres had shot at the 
gold Nissan; testimony by Gregory that after the Wells’ shooting Ayres had 
stated that Ayres had thrown the gun behind Rash’s Market, the same 
location at which the gun was later recovered by the police; testimony by 
Gregory that after the Wells shooting, Ayres had said, “We handled that 
nigger”; and testimony by Anderson that Ayres shot Wells.  
The record also includes evidence that Anderson was the person who 
actually shot Wells.  Evidence introduced during the State’s case-in-chief 
that Anderson was the shooter (principal) included the following:  testimony 
that Wells had grabbed Anderson by the neck the night before the shooting; 
testimony by Gregory that:  he saw Anderson, not Ayers, holding the gun at 
30th and Market streets; Gregory knew Anderson was looking for Wells; 
Gregory knew Anderson was in the same area as Ayers at the time of the 
shooting; and that Anderson told Gregory, “We handled that nigger.”  
The record also includes evidence that, if Anderson actually shot 
Wells, Ayers was Anderson’s accomplice.  Evidence introduced during the 
State’s case-in-chief that Ayers was Anderson’s accomplice included the 
following:  Ayers’ statement to Gregory before the shooting to move his 
vehicle because “something might get messy”; Ayers’ statement to Gregory 
after the shooting that he threw the gun behind Rash’s Market; Ayers’ 
 
8
statement to Gregory after the shooting that, “If anybody asked, we ride [sic] 
with you”; and Ayers’ statement to Gregory after the shooting that, “We 
handled that nigger.” 
It is well established under Delaware law that a defendant can be 
indicted as a principal and then convicted as an accomplice.1  Accordingly, 
Ayres was on notice that he could be convicted as an accomplice.2  
Nevertheless, Ayers presented a defense that portrayed Anderson as the 
person who shot Wells3 and sought to convince the jury that Ayers’ presence 
was simply as an innocent bystander rather than as Anderson’s accomplice.   
A person is guilty as an accomplice when “[i]ntending to promote or 
facilitate the commission of the offense the person … [a]ids, counsels or 
agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it ….”4  
Although the State did not indict Ayres an as accomplice to the Wells’ 
murder, the jury heard testimony, and was presented with other evidence, 
that Ayers aided Anderson.  The record reflects sufficient evidence from 
                                                 
1 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 275(a) (2001); Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1228 (Del. 
1996); Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 123 (Del. 1988). 
2 Holder v. State, 692 A.2d 882, 886 (Del. 1997). 
3 Evidence produced during the defense’s case that Anderson, and not Ayers, was the 
shooter included testimony by Ayers that it was Anderson who shot Wells and that Ayers 
was talking to a woman named Fatiman Ali when the shooting occurred.  Additional 
testimony included the following:  testimony by Ali that she and Ayers were talking 
when they heard gunshots; testimony by witnesses that they saw Anderson with a gun on 
the night of the Wells shooting; testimony by Gregory that Anderson had the gun and did 
the shooting; and testimony by a jailhouse informant that Anderson told him Anderson 
had shot Wells. 
4 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 271(2)(b) (2001). 
 
9
which a jury could reasonably conclude that Ayres was Anderson’s 
accomplice in the shooting of Arthur Wells.  Therefore, we hold that the trial 
judge properly permitted the jury to consider Ayres’ culpability both as a 
principal and under the State’s alternative theory, as Anderson’s accomplice.   
Unanimity Instruction Not Required 
 
After the trial judge denied Ayers’ objection to the accomplice 
liability instruction, the defense requested the jury be instructed that their 
verdict must be unanimous regarding whether Ayres was an accomplice or 
the principal.  The trial judge denied that defense request.  Ayres’ second 
claim of error is that once the trial judge decided to instruct the jury on 
accomplice liability, it was erroneous not to give a specific unanimity 
instruction with respect to that basis of Ayers’ culpability, as either the 
principal or as an accomplice.   
This Court has previously held that a specific unanimity instruction is 
not required in every case where a defendant may be convicted as a principal 
or as an accomplice.5  A specific unanimity instruction is required, however, 
if “one count encompasses two separate incidents,” either of which could 
                                                 
5 Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1276, 1386 (Del. 1993); Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 122 (Del. 
1988). 
 
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support a defendant’s conviction for a particular charge.6   The law is well 
settled that a specific unanimity instruction is necessary only in certain 
limited instances, as when a single count in an indictment encompasses two 
separate instances of conduct.7   
Wells’ homicide involved a single individual with a single gun.  Thus, 
it constituted a single incident.  If the jury all agreed that Anderson and 
Ayers were involved in a principal-accomplice relationship and that one of 
the two men shot Wells, their verdict would be considered unanimous.  The 
trial judge properly refused to require the jury to identify which man was the 
shooter and which was the accomplice.8   
Under the circumstances of this case, the general unanimity 
instruction on the issue of principal and accomplice liability was proper.  
Where, as here, the count involved only a single incident, the jury must 
unanimously find only “that a principal-accomplice relationship existed 
between the participants with respect to that particular charge.”9  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge properly denied Ayres’ request 
                                                 
6 Liu v. State, 628 A.2d at 1386; Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 79 (Del. 1993); Probst v. 
State, 547 A.2d at 122. 
7 Liu v. State, 628 A.2d at 1386. 
8 See, e.g., Hendricks v. State, 2002 WL 2030875, *1 (Del. Sept. 3, 2002); Stevenson v. 
State, 709 A.2d 619, 634-35 (Del. 1998); Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d at 1228; Pope v. State, 
632 A.2d at 79. 
9 Probst v. State, 547 A.2d at 123.   
 
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for a specific unanimity instruction on the State’s alternate principal and 
accomplice theories of culpability. 
Assault Instruction Properly Denied 
 
Ayres third argument is that the trial judge erred by denying the 
defendant’s request for a jury instruction of assault as a lesser-included 
offense of homicide.  The standard of review for a denial of a requested jury 
instruction is de novo.10  Ayres argues that he was entitled to jury 
instructions on the lesser-included offense of assault on the State’s theory of 
accomplice liability, pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 271, 274 and 
Chance v. State.11  The record reflects that the trial judge properly concluded 
there was no rational basis in the evidence for an instruction to the jury on 
assault.   
As part of its instructions on accomplice liability, the Superior Court 
properly followed this Court’s holdings in Chance and Demby v. State,12 by 
instructing the jury on the lesser-included degrees of homicide.  In the event 
the jury found that Ayers was Anderson’s accomplice rather than an 
innocent bystander, that instruction permitted the jury to find Ayers guilty of 
a homicide offense in such degree as was compatible with his own mental 
                                                 
10 Yocum v. State, 777 A.2d 782, 784 (Del. 2001). 
11 Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351 (Del. 1996).  Ayres had requested the instruction during 
the prayer conference.  Upon the State’s objection to the request, it was denied by the 
trial court. 
12 Demby v. State, 744 A.2d 976 (Del. 2000). 
 
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state as the non-shooter.13  The record reflects no rational basis in the 
evidence, however, for instructing the jury on assault.14  Unlike Chance, 
where the various participants in the assault beat and kicked the victim to 
death, this case involved a lone gunman who walked up to Wells and shot 
him in the back and abdomen.  
Evidentiary Rule of Completeness 
 
Ayres’ final argument on appeal is that the trial judge erred by 
admitting into evidence only excerpts of a videotaped statement rather than 
the entire tape.  Ayres argues that the State violated the Best Evidence Rule 
when it provided only selected portions of the witness’s videotaped 
statement rather than the entire tape.  We review for abuse of discretion a 
trial judge’s decision regarding the admission of such evidence.15   
 
At trial, Simon testified for the defense and stated that, although he 
did not see Wells get shot, he saw Ayers with Fatimah Ali right before and 
after the shooting. He also testified that he told the police that Anderson 
killed Wells.  Simon’s testimony at trial, however, was contrary to his two 
prior statements to the police.   
                                                 
13 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 274 (2001). 
14 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(c) (2001). 
15 Longfellow v. State, 688 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Del. 1997). 
 
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Following Simon’s trial testimony, the State then called Detective 
John Ciritella to present Simon’s prior out-of-court statements under Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507.  In addition to Ciritella’s testimony about these 
prior statements, excerpts from Simon’s videotaped statement on June 19, 
2000 were played for the jury.  When the State attempted to admit the 
excerpted tape into evidence, Ayers objected, arguing that under the Best 
Evidence Rule, the entire tape needed to be played for the jury, “whether I 
play it for the jury or the State does.”   
The trial judge postponed decision on the issue.  Ayers later informed 
the trial judge of his intention to redact the entire tape and play it for the jury 
the following day.  The next day, however, Ayers informed the trial judge 
that the redacted tape was “terrible,” and he chose not to introduce it.  He 
then asked the trial judge not to admit the State’s excerpted tape into 
evidence and to instruct the jury not to consider it in any way.  The Superior 
Court refused Ayers’ application. 
 
On appeal, Ayers argues that the State violated the Best Evidence 
Rule16 when it provided only selected portions of the witness’s videotaped 
statement rather than the entire tape.  In response, the State submits that it 
                                                 
16 See D.R.E. 1002; Atkins v. State, 523 A.2d 539 (Del. 1987).  In Atkins, this Court held 
that it was contrary to D.R.E. 1002 to admit into evidence the transcripts to prove the 
contents of several tape recorded conversations instead of all of the original tape 
recordings which were available.  Atkins v. State, 523 A.2d at 545. 
 
14
was attempting to prove an event, i.e., the prior statement by Simon.  Under 
the Best Evidence Rule, the State has the option of proving an event, such as 
Simon’s prior statement, by offering the testimony of witnesses or by 
introducing a tape recording of the prior statement.17   
In this case, the State elected to use the option of presenting testimony 
from Detective Ciritella to prove Simon’s prior statement.  The State then 
sought to corroborate Ciritella’s testimony with excerpts of the videotaped 
statement.  Accordingly, Ayers’ argument does not raise any proper 
concerns about a violation of the Best Evidence Rule. 
Instead, Ayers’ argument implicates the rule of completeness, which 
is codified in D.R.E. 106.18  In its common law form, the rule of 
completeness states that “one ‘against whom a part of an utterance has been 
put in, may in his turn complement it by putting in the remainder, in order to 
secure for the tribunal a complete understanding of the total tenor and effect 
of the utterance.’”19  The purpose of the rule of completeness is “to prevent 
misleading impressions which often result from taking matters out of 
                                                 
17 See Atkins v. State, 523 A.2d at 542. 
18 D.R.E. 106 provides that: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to 
be considered contemporaneously with it. 
19 Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1213-14 (Del. 1999) (quoting J. Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2113, p. 653 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978)). 
 
15
context.”20  In this case, Ayers had the opportunity to correct any 
“misleading impressions” by presenting the entire (redacted) videotaped 
statement to the jury, but he chose not to do so.   
Nevertheless, Ayers did cross-examine both Ciritella and Simon about 
Simon’s prior statement.  Simon testified that part of his conversation with 
the police  was not recorded, and that the police told him what to say.  Thus, 
the record reflects that Ayers used his own witness to correct any misleading 
impressions that may have been created by the State playing an incomplete 
tape.  Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial judge 
properly exercised his discretion in allowing the State to play excerpts of  
Simon’s prior videotaped statements to corroborate Detective Ciritella’s 
testimony.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
                                                 
20 Burke v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 497 (Del. 1984).