Title: State v. Hemond

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Hemond (2003-329); 178 Vt. 470; 868 A.2d 734

2005 VT 12

[Filed 02-Feb-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 12

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-329

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2004

  State of Vermont	              }	      APPEALED FROM:
                                      }
                                      }       District Court of Vermont,
       v.	                      }       Unit No. 3, Franklin Circuit
                                      }	
  James Hemond	                      }
                                      }	      DOCKET NO. 1740-12-01 Frcr

                                              Trial Judge: Michael S. Kupersmith

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant appeals a district court judgment convicting him,
  after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle in a grossly negligent
  manner with serious injury resulting, in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1091(b). 
  Defendant presses three arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court's
  exclusion of his exculpatory written statement to the police on the day of
  the incident violated his right to present evidence and the rule of
  completeness; (2) the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments that
  the outcome of the case would have no bearing on complainant's pending
  civil case against defendant was prejudicial; and (3) the prosecutor's
  expressions of personal opinion in his closing were plain error.  None of
  defendant's arguments warrants reversal.  First, the court acted within its
  discretion by excluding the written statement because no part of the
  statement was introduced, so that the rule of completeness did not apply. 
  Second, the prosecutor's remarks concerning the impact this case would have
  on the civil case were not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal,
  considering defendant already planted the seed in the jury's mind of
  complainant's potential motive to lie.  Finally, the prosecutor's use of
  expressions like "I think" during his closing did not amount to plain
  error.  Therefore, we affirm.  

       ¶  2.  Defendant was charged with grossly negligent operation of a
  motor vehicle, in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1091(b), for "blocking a
  motorcycle from passing and braking abruptly, thereby causing an accident
  in which [complainant] suffered serious bodily injury."  At trial,
  complainant testified that he was driving his motorcycle southbound on
  Route 7 in Georgia, Vermont, at approximately fifty to fifty-five miles per
  hour, when he came up behind the car driven by defendant.  According to
  complainant, defendant's car was moving below the speed limit, at about
  forty miles per hour.  Complainant signaled to pass and pulled into the
  left lane.  Defendant's car then pulled into the left lane, preventing
  complainant from passing.  Both vehicles then returned to the right lane.  
   
       ¶  3.  Complainant again signaled to pass and, as he moved into the
  left lane, defendant's car "jerked into the left hand lane."  Complainant
  testified he immediately pulled back into the right lane, as did
  defendant's car.  At this point, complainant estimated that both vehicles
  were traveling at about thirty-five miles per hour.  As the vehicles
  approached the intersection with Interstate 89, where a concrete barrier
  divides the road, the car "slammed on his brakes" and slowed down. 
  Complainant applied his brakes but could not stop in time, and the
  motorcycle's front tire hit the car's rear bumper.  Complainant flew
  through the motorcycle's windshield, and his left shoulder hit the rear
  tailgate of the car.  Defendant stopped and called 911.  

       ¶  4.  Franklin County Deputy Sheriff Jacy Dennett responded to the
  scene and spoke with defendant.  At trial, Deputy Dennett testified that
  defendant explained he had pulled over to the left and slowed down "to
  prevent [complainant] from passing" and "to block him."  The prosecutor
  asked the deputy if defendant had said why he was preventing the vehicle
  from passing, and the deputy replied, "[h]e didn't want the vehicle to pass
  him before the median."  

       ¶  5.  Next to testify was Deputy Sheriff Allison Geary who also was
  present at the scene of the accident.  She testified that defendant told
  her he had pulled over to stop the motorcycle from passing him because he
  was going to be turning onto I-89.  "He had simply stated that he had
  pulled over so the motorcycle would not pass him."  

       ¶  6.  On cross-examination of Deputy Geary, defense counsel offered
  a written statement defendant had provided to Deputy Geary after the
  accident.  In the statement, defendant wrote that he was worried about the
  complainant's vehicle passing and "getting in connection with island."  The
  written statement does not say that defendant tried to block the
  motorcycle.  The State objected to the written statement as hearsay, and
  the district court sustained the objection. 

       ¶  7.  We turn first to defendant's contention that the exclusion of
  his written statement was reversible error because it violated the rule of
  completeness and his right to present evidence.  "We will reverse a trial
  court's decision to admit evidence only if the court withheld or abused its
  discretion."  State v. Gemler, 2004 VT 3, ¶ 11, 176 Vt. 257,