Title: Dunlap v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
  
SAMUEL M. DUNLAP, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 277, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IS01-12-0461 
§                   IS01-11-0186           §   
                IS01-11-0187 
 
Submitted: October 24, 2002 
  Decided:   December 13, 2002 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 13th day of December 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Samuel M. Dunlap, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court judge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”), 
Driving While License is Suspended or Revoked and Driving After Judgment 
Prohibited.  Dunlap was sentenced to a total of 8 years incarceration at Level V, 
 
 
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to be suspended after 15 months and successful completion of the Key Program 
for decreasing levels of probation.  This is Dunlap’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Dunlap’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made  a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 
arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of 
the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least 
arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary 
presentation.1 
                                                 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
(3) 
Dunlap’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Dunlap’s counsel informed Dunlap of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the 
complete trial transcript.  Dunlap was also informed of his right to supplement 
 
 
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his attorney’s presentation.  Dunlap responded with a brief that raises two issues 
for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by 
Dunlap’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Dunlap and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(4) 
Dunlap raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims 
that: a) the breath test result indicating a blood alcohol level of .194 should have 
been suppressed because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion 
to stop him for DUI; and b) the testimony of the arresting officer at the 
suppression hearing was not credible and should not have been allowed. 
(5) 
In February 2002, Dunlap’s counsel filed a pre-trial motion to 
suppress the breath test result on the ground that the arresting officer did not 
have reasonable suspicion to stop Dunlap for DUI.  At the suppression hearing, 
the evidence established that Jason Bergman, a patrolman with the Millsboro 
police department, was on patrol the evening of November 4, 2001.  At around 
10:00 p.m., Bergman’s attention was drawn to a green Ford Ranger driven by 
Dunlap.  Bergman ran a registration check using the computer in his vehicle and 
cross checked that with the driver’s license.  That check revealed that the driver’s 
license had been suspended and that the holder of the license had a history of 
 
 
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DUI charges.  The driver of the Ranger also matched a description of the driver 
with the suspended license.  Bergman noted that the Ranger was traveling under 
10 mph in a 25 mile per hour zone and that it was weaving as it traveled 
westbound on Old Landing Road and crossed over Route 113.  Bergman 
activated his emergency lights and siren and followed the Ranger to the 
intersection of Old Landing Road and Delaware Avenue, where it stopped.2  
(6) 
After getting out of the police car, Bergman approached the Ranger 
and asked Dunlap for his registration, driver’s license and proof of insurance.  
Dunlap angrily replied that Bergman was “stupid” and threw the car key at him, 
hitting him in the chest.  As Dunlap continued his diatribe, Bergman noted that 
there was a strong odor of alcohol about him and that his speech was slurred. 
Bergman ordered Dunlap out of the Ranger, handcuffed him, placed him in the 
police car and drove him back to the station for a breath test.  Bergman testified 
that he did not do any field testing because Dunlap had been combative when he 
was taken into custody.  
                                                 
2At the suppression hearing, the State also played a videotape Bergman had made while 
he was following Dunlap’s Ranger as it traveled along Old Landing Road.  
 
 
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(7) 
On cross examination, Bergman agreed that Dunlap’s vehicle did 
not go into the shoulder as it traveled along Old Landing Road and that there 
was no center line marked on that portion of the road where Bergman testified 
he saw Dunlap’s vehicle weaving back and forth.  At the end of the suppression 
hearing, counsel for Dunlap argued that the traffic stop was illegal because there 
was no reasonable basis for Patrolman Bergman to believe that Dunlap was 
driving under the influence of alcohol and moved to suppress the results of the 
breath test conducted at the police station.  The Superior Court denied the 
motion to suppress. 
(8) 
At a subsequent Superior Court bench trial,3 the breath test result 
indicating a blood alcohol level of .194 was admitted into evidence, as was a 
three-hour long videotape of what occurred after Dunlap was taken back to the 
police station and Dunlap’s certified driving record showing that he previously 
had been adjudged an habitual offender.  After admitting the stipulated evidence 
and reviewing the tape, the Superior Court found Dunlap guilty of the charged 
offenses. 
                                                 
3Dunlap agreed to the presentation of stipulated evidence at a bench trial, since he 
intended to appeal only the Superior Court’s denial of his suppression motion. 
 
 
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(9) 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires 
that a traffic stop and any subsequent police investigation be reasonable in the 
circumstances.4  The stop must be justified at its inception by a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity5 and any further inquiry must be reasonably related 
in scope to the purpose for the stop.6  Moreover, any investigation of the vehicle 
or its occupant beyond that required to complete the purpose for the stop 
constitutes a separate seizure that must be supported by independent facts 
sufficient to justify the additional intrusion.7  Measured against these standards, 
Dunlap’s first claim is without merit.  The traffic stop was clearly based upon a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Moreover, the police officer’s decision 
                                                 
4Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2001) (citing United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975)). 
5Id. 
6Id. 
7Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del. 2001) (citing Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 
735 A.2d 491, 499 (1999)). 
 
 
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to order Dunlap out of his vehicle, handcuff him and take him back to the police 
station for a breath test were  clearly reasonable and justified based upon the 
police officer’s observation of Dunlap’s behavior.   
(10) Dunlap’s second claim is also without merit.  The trier of fact is the 
sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and is responsible for resolving any 
conflicts in the testimony.8  There is no evidence in the record suggesting that 
the Superior Court judge, as the trier of fact at the suppression hearing, abused 
his discretion by accepting the police officer’s testimony concerning the traffic 
stop and Dunlap’s subsequent arrest.  
(11) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Dunlap’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We are also satisfied that Dunlap’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Dunlap could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm 
is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The 
motion to withdraw is moot. 
                                                 
8Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
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BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
Justice