Title: Jamie Lee Tasker v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1281 
____________ 
 
JAMIE LEE TASKER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[November 10, 2010] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Tasker v. State, 12 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).  The 
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the 
Second District Court of Appeal in Stubbs v. State, 951 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2007), Spell v. State, 731 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and Bogan v. State, 725 
So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const. 
 
The issue presented in this case is whether a claim of scoresheet error, in this 
case involving imposition of victim injury points in a Criminal Punishment Code 
 
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sentencing scoresheet, which is raised for the first time after revocation of 
probation in a motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), 
is preserved for review on appeal.  As we explain below, we conclude that a claim 
of scoresheet error pertaining to victim injury points that are included on the 
scoresheet filed in the initial sentencing proceeding in which the defendant is 
placed on probation may be raised for the first time in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion  
during the appeal from revocation of probation, and the issue is thereby preserved 
for appellate review.  The First District held to the contrary and did not reach the 
merits of Tasker‟s claim that sexual contact victim injury points were improperly 
included on his sentencing scoresheet.  Our holding requires us to quash the 
decision of the First District, and in so doing, we remand to that court the question 
of whether the victim injury points were improperly imposed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Jamie Lee Tasker, age thirty-five at the time of the offenses, was charged by 
information filed in Suwannee County in October 2004 with one count of lewd and 
lascivious molestation of a female twelve years of age or older but under the age of 
sixteen, in violation of section 800.04(5), Florida Statutes (2004).  He was also 
charged with child abuse in violation of section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes (2004), 
in relation to another child.  In December 2004, Tasker pled guilty as charged to 
both counts.   
 
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At the sentencing hearing on January 11, 2005, adjudication was withheld 
and Tasker was placed on ten years‟ sex offender probation for Count I, lewd and 
lascivious molestation, and a concurrent term of five years‟ probation for Count II, 
child abuse, all to commence after serving six months in the county jail.  He was 
also formally designated a sex offender subject to all statutory requirements.  The 
Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) scoresheet prepared for this initial sentencing 
hearing included forty victim injury points for sexual contact.1  Tasker did not 
object at that time to inclusion of the victim injury points on the initial CPC 
scoresheet and he did not take a direct appeal. 
Tasker subsequently violated his probation on several occasions, and was 
returned to probation each time with additional conditions.  However, at a violation 
of probation hearing on April 12, 2007, Tasker admitted that he tested positive for 
cocaine use.  The disposition hearing was held May 10, 2007, at which Tasker was 
found to have violated his probation by testing positive for cocaine use.  Based on 
an updated scoresheet, which included the same victim injury points for sexual 
contact, Tasker was adjudicated guilty and sentenced on Count I, lewd and 
                                          
 
 
1.  Section 921.0021(7)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that if a 
conviction is for an offense involving sexual contact which does not include sexual 
penetration, the sexual contact must be scored on the Criminal Punishment Code 
sentencing scoresheet in accord with the provisions of section 921.0024, Florida 
Statutes (2004).  Section 921.0024(1)(a) provides that forty victim injury points 
must be imposed for “sexual contact” not involving penetration.    
 
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lascivious molestation of a child, to 120 months in prison.  As to Count II, child 
abuse, Tasker was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to thirty-six months in prison 
concurrent with the sentence for Count I.  Tasker did not object to the scoresheet 
during the disposition hearing when he was sentenced to prison. 
Tasker then appealed to the First District Court of Appeal.  During that 
appeal, but before the first brief was served, Tasker‟s appellate counsel filed a 
motion to correct sentencing error in the trial court, pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).  In the motion, he alleged as a sentencing error 
that the victim injury points on his CPC sentencing scoresheet were not supported 
by the record and were therefore improperly included on the scoresheet.  Without 
holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued an order on September 10, 
2008, denying the motion on the merits.  That ruling was included in a 
supplemental record, which was then filed in Tasker‟s appeal to the First District 
pursuant to rule 3.800.   
The First District, however, did not reach the merits of Tasker‟s claim that 
inclusion of the victim injury points on the scoresheet was error, but ruled instead 
that the issue was not preserved.  See Tasker v. State, 12 So. 3d 889, 890 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2009).  The First District held in pertinent part as follows: 
During the pendency of this appeal, appellate counsel filed a motion 
to correct sentence, pursuant to rule 3.800(b)(2), Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, challenging the assessment of forty points.  The 
trial court denied the motion. 
 
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Under our case authority, appellant has not preserved the issue 
of the assessment of victim injury points.  As we explained in 
Fitzhugh v. State, 698 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), “an 
appeal from resentencing following violation of probation is not the 
proper time to assert an error in the original scoresheet.”  See also 
Bowman v. State, 974 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).  Importantly, 
section 924.06(2), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that “an appeal of 
an order revoking probation may review only proceedings after the 
order of probation.”  We acknowledge other districts have held to the 
contrary.  See Stubbs v. State, 951 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) 
(holding that trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to 
challenge the inclusion of victim injury and legal constraint points at 
sentencing following revocation of probation); Spell v. State, 731 So. 
2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding defendant could challenge victim 
injury points after revocation of community control); Bogan v. State, 
725 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that defendant could 
challenge assessment of victim injury points in appeal of revocation of 
probation despite the fact that defendant did not raise the issue at the 
original sentencing hearing or in a prior appeal); see also Routenberg 
v. State, 802 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that a claim that 
victim injury points for penetration were incorrectly assessed on 
scoresheet could be raised in a rule 3.800(a) motion even after 
violation of probation); and Wright v. State, 707 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1998) (explaining defendant did not waive right to challenge 
scoresheet points for victim injury for penetration by not raising issue 
at original sentencing hearing).  We certify conflict with Stubbs, 
Spell, and Bogan. 
 
Id. at 890-91.   
In Stubbs v. State, 951 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the first conflict 
case, the Second District had for consideration a challenge to the accuracy of a 
CPC scoresheet that was prepared for Stubbs‟ first sentencing proceeding, in which 
he was placed on probation, and was subsequently used to determine his prison 
sentence after his violation of probation.  Stubbs, 951 So. 2d at 911.  The trial court 
 
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rejected Stubbs‟ claim made in the resentencing proceeding after revocation of 
probation, but the district court reversed.  Id. at 911.  Citing a number of its earlier 
decisions, the Second District held that a defendant may challenge the inclusion of 
victim injury points in a revocation proceeding even when those points were not 
challenged at the original sentencing or on direct appeal.  Id.  The Fourth District 
expressly aligned itself with Stubbs in the case of Bryant v. State, 37 So. 3d 269, 
271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that a defendant may challenge the inclusion of 
sentencing points after violation of probation, including in a rule 3.800(b)(2) 
motion, even when the points were not challenged at the original sentencing or on 
direct appeal). 
In the second conflict case, Spell v. State, 731 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), 
the Second District held that a defendant has the right to challenge victim injury 
points at a resentencing upon revocation of probation even if the points were not 
challenged at the original sentencing.  Id. at 10.  In so holding, the district court 
found Spell‟s case indistinguishable from Wright v. State, 707 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1998), in which the Second District previously held that the defendant may 
object to victim injury points on the scoresheet used at the resentencing after 
revocation of probation, even if no objection was raised as to the original 
scoresheet.   
 
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In the third conflict case, Bogan v. State, 725 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1999), the Second District held that the defendant could challenge victim injury 
points after revocation of his probation even though he failed to object at the 
original sentencing when he was placed on probation.  Id. at 1217.   As explained 
below, we agree with the Second District in Stubbs, Spell and Bogan, and with the 
Fourth District in Bryant, that a defendant may, after revocation of probation, 
challenge inclusion of victim injury points in the CPC sentencing scoresheet which 
is relied upon at the resentencing even if no objection to the scoresheet was raised 
at the time of the initial sentencing when the defendant was placed on probation.   
We further hold that where the claim is raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion after 
revocation of probation, it is thereby preserved for appellate review. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In holding that Tasker was barred from appealing the denial of his claim of 
sentencing error that was raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion after revocation of 
probation, the First District relied upon its earlier decision in Fitzhugh v. State, 698 
So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and on section 924.06(2), Florida Statutes (2007).  
We conclude that neither section 924.06(2), Florida Statutes, nor the principle of 
law set forth in Fitzhugh bars a defendant from appealing a claim of sentencing 
error that was raised in a motion filed under rule 3.800(b)(2) after revocation of 
probation.  The district court‟s decision in Fitzhugh will be discussed first. 
 
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In Fitzhugh, the First District held that an appeal from resentencing 
following violation of probation is not the proper time to assert an error in the 
original scoresheet and that a contemporaneous objection must be made at the time 
of sentencing.  698 So. 2d at 573.  However, we find it significant—and a 
distinguishing factor—that in Fitzhugh, the sentencing error was not raised in any 
form in the trial court but was raised for the first time in the district court in the 
probation revocation appeal.  Thus, Fitzhugh was decided on the principle of 
contemporaneous objection.  See also Bryant, 37 So. 3d at 271 (distinguishing 
Fitzhugh on the basis that Fitzhugh first raised his claim of scoresheet error on 
appeal, rather than in the circuit court).  Moreover, Fitzhugh was decided before 
rule 3.800 was amended to specifically allow motions to correct sentencing errors 
to be filed during an appeal, as Tasker did in this case, without regard to whether a 
contemporaneous objection to the error was made during sentencing.2   
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 was amended in 1999 to add 
subdivision (b)(2), which was intended to resolve the difficulties presented by 
sentencing errors being raised for the first time on appeal, just as occurred in 
                                          
 
 
2.  We also amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e), to 
provide that a sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error 
has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal, either “(1) at the time 
of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.800(b).”  See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 827 So. 2d 888, 
904 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added).   
 
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Fitzhugh.  See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 
& Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, & 9.600, 761 So. 2d 1015 
(Fla. 1999) (hereafter “Amendments”).  In determining whether Tasker preserved 
his claim of sentencing error for review in the appeal from his revocation of 
probation, we first examine the applicable provisions of rule 3.800, as amended, 
which provide in pertinent part as follows: 
Rule 3.800.  Correction, Reduction, and Modification of 
Sentences 
(a) Correction.  A court may at any time correct an illegal 
sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a 
sentencing scoresheet, or a sentence that does not grant proper credit 
for time served when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records 
demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief, provided that a 
party may not file a motion to correct an illegal sentence under this 
subdivision during the time allowed for the filing of a motion under 
subdivision (b)(1) or during the pendency of a direct appeal.  All 
orders denying motions under this subdivision shall include a 
statement that the movant has the right to appeal within 30 days of 
rendition of the order. 
. . . . 
(b) Motion to Correct Sentencing Error 
. . . . 
(2) Motion Pending Appeal.  If an appeal is pending, a 
defendant or the state may file in the trial court a motion to correct a 
sentencing error.  The motion may be filed by appellate counsel and 
must be served before the party‟s first brief is served.  A notice of 
pending motion to correct sentencing error shall be filed in the 
appellate court, which notice automatically shall extend the time for 
the filing of the brief until 10 days after the clerk of circuit court 
transmits the supplemental record under Florida Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 9.140(f)(6). 
 
 
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Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800.  The amendment was intended to “place correction of 
alleged errors in the hands of the judicial officer [the trial judge] best able to 
investigate and to correct any error.”  Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 571 (Fla. 
2008) (quoting Amendments, 761 So. 2d at 1016).  Subdivision (b)(2) was 
therefore added to rule 3.800, allowing a sentencing error to be raised for the first 
time after the notice of appeal is filed but before the party‟s first brief is served.  In 
amending the rule, we explained: 
[R]ule 3.800(b) as it is currently written has fallen far short of the goal 
of providing a “failsafe” method for defendants to seek to have 
sentencing errors corrected in the trial court and thereby preserve 
them for appellate review.  The plethora of appellate cases addressing 
the issue of whether unpreserved sentencing error may be presented 
on appeal demonstrates that despite the availability of the present rule 
3.800(b), many sentencing errors have gone unnoticed and 
uncorrected by trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court.  There 
are multiple reasons why rule 3.800(b) has failed to provide a 
“failsafe” method to detect, correct and preserve sentencing errors. . . .  
. . . . 
 
. . . [T]he amended rule is intended to provide one mechanism 
whereby all sentencing errors may be preserved for appellate review.  
. . .  “This includes errors in orders of probation, orders of community 
control, cost and restitution orders, as well as errors within the 
sentence itself.”  The amendment to rule 3.800(a) will make it clear 
that a rule 3.800(b) motion can be used to correct any type of 
sentencing error, whether we had formerly called that error erroneous, 
unlawful, or illegal.  
   
Amendments, 761 So. 2d at 1017-19 (emphases added).  Moreover, rule 3.800 
makes clear that a sentencing scoresheet error may be raised at any time.  See Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) (“A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed 
 
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by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, or a 
sentence that does not grant proper credit for time served . . . .”).  In its holding in 
Bryant v. State, that a scoresheet error pertaining to prior offenses that was raised 
after revocation of probation was preserved for review, the Fourth District 
observed: 
If we were to hold otherwise, the defendant still could raise the 
alleged sentencing error through postconviction motions.  Under rule 
3.800, the defendant could file a motion to correct sentencing error, 
even while an appeal is pending.  Brooks v. State, 969 So.2d 238, 241 
(Fla. 2007).  Under rule 3.850, the defendant could file a motion 
raising a sentencing error within two years after the sentence becomes 
final.  Id.  Given the opportunity to file these motions, we see no legal 
or practical reason why a defendant who fails to raise the challenge at 
his original sentencing cannot raise the challenge after his violation of 
probation.  In the interests of justice and judicial economy, however, 
defendants obviously should raise the challenge at the earliest 
opportunity. 
 
Bryant, 37 So. 3d at 271.  This Court similarly recognized in Brooks v. State, 969 
So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2007), that rule 3.800(b) was amended “ „to provide defendants 
with a mechanism to correct sentencing errors in the trial court at the earliest 
opportunity‟ and „to give defendants a means to preserve these errors for appellate 
review.‟ ”  Brooks, 969 So. 2d at 241 (quoting Amendments, 761 So. 2d at 1016).   
In explaining the rationale behind amending rule 3.800(b) to allow 
sentencing errors to be raised in the trial court after the notice of appeal, we noted 
that “trial counsel have come to rely upon appellate counsel to detect these errors 
and raise them on appeal.”  Amendments, 761 So. 2d at 1017.  “[A]n advantage of 
 
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this amendment is that it will give appellate counsel, with expertise in detecting 
sentencing errors, the opportunity to identify any sentencing errors and a method to 
correct these errors and preserve them for appeal.”  Id. at 1018.  In the present 
case, appellate counsel recognized a possible sentencing error and filed a motion 
under rule 3.800(b)(2) during the pendency of the appeal from the sentence 
imposed after the revocation of probation.  This was a proper use of rule 
3.800(b)(2) to correct the alleged scoresheet error and, just as the rule intended, the 
motion preserved the issue of the scoresheet error for appellate review. 
We also conclude, contrary to the holding of the First District, that section 
924.06(2), Florida Statutes, raises no procedural bar to appellate review of a 
sentencing error that was raised for the first time after revocation of probation in a 
rule 3.800(b)(2) motion.  Because the question involves interpretation of a statute, 
it is subject to de novo review.  See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors 
Charter Schools, Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1232 (Fla. 2009).  We begin with the well-
recognized principle that “[l]egislative intent guides statutory analysis, and to 
discern that intent we must look first to the language of the statute and its plain 
meaning.”  Fla. Dep‟t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 
(Fla. 2009) (citing Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 
(Fla. 2004)).  “[L]egislative intent is determined primarily from the text” of the 
statute.  Continental Cas. Co. v. Ryan Inc. Eastern, 974 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. 2008) 
 
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(citing Maggio v. Fla. Dep‟t of Labor & Emp‟t Sec., 899 So. 2d 1074, 1076-77 
(Fla. 2005)).  Thus, we begin with careful consideration of the text of section 
924.06(2), which states: 
 
(2)  An appeal of an order granting probation shall proceed in 
the same manner and have the same effect as an appeal of a judgment 
of conviction.  An appeal of an order revoking probation may review 
only proceedings after the order of probation.  If a judgment of 
conviction preceded an order of probation, the defendant may appeal 
from the order or the judgment or both.  
 
§ 924.06(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).3   
The First District relied on section 924.06(2) to conclude that a scoresheet 
error raised for the first time after revocation of probation may not be reviewed in 
the appeal from the revocation of probation.  See Tasker, 12 So. 3d at 890.  
However, the First District‟s reading of section 924.06(2) neither accords with the 
actual text of the statute nor effectuates what we discern to be the legislative intent 
behind the statute.  We recognize that section 924.06(2) limits the issues which 
may be reviewed on an appeal from a revocation of probation to those 
“proceedings after the order of probation.”  § 924.06(2), Fla. Stat.  In determining 
if the claim made in Tasker‟s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion falls within the category of 
“proceedings after the order of probation,” we note first that sentencing after 
revocation of probation is a “deferred sentencing proceeding.”  Green v. State, 463 
                                          
 
 
3.  This provision was first enacted, in similar form, in 1959.  See ch. 
59-130, § 3, at 234, Laws of Fla. 
 
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So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1985).  The deferred sentencing proceeding in this case, 
and the court‟s reliance on the CPC scoresheet prepared for that deferred 
sentencing proceeding, necessarily occurred “after the order of probation.”  
Additionally, the rule 3.800(b)(2) proceeding to correct sentencing error, which 
Tasker initiated in the trial court, also occurred “after the order of probation.”   
Thus, Tasker‟s appeal of the denial of his 3.800(b)(2) motion does not violate the 
express terms of section 924.06(2).    
We are not at liberty to extend or modify the express and unambiguous 
terms of section 924.06(2) by adding limitations on appellate review that do not 
appear in the provision.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citing 
A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  Nor do we 
conclude that the interpretation given the statute by the First District is necessary to 
effectuate legislative intent.  See, e.g., Fla. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 14 
So. 3d at 234 (“Where the statute‟s language is clear or unambiguous, courts need 
not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate 
legislative intent.”).   Therefore, based on the clear and unambiguous language of 
section 924.06(2), we find that the First District‟s interpretation of section 
924.06(2) as raising a procedural bar to appellate review of Tasker‟s claim was 
incorrect. 
 
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Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we hold that a claim of scoresheet 
error on the initial CPC sentencing scoresheet utilized when a defendant is placed 
on probation may be raised for the first time after revocation of probation; and if 
the claim of error is timely raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion during appeal from 
the revocation of probation, the claim is preserved for review in that appeal.  
Because Tasker raised his claim of scoresheet error in a properly filed motion 
under rule 3.800(b)(2), we find his claim was preserved for appellate review.    
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we quash the decision of the First District in Tasker 
v. State, 12 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), and remand for determination of 
Tasker‟s claim that forty sexual contact victim injury points were improperly 
included on his scoresheet.  We approve the decisions of the Second District Court 
of Appeal in Stubbs v. State, 951 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), Spell v. State, 
731 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and Bogan v. State, 725 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1999).   
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., concurring with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., dissenting with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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CANADY, C.J., concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority‟s decision that a claim of scoresheet error 
pertaining to victim injury points that were included in the Criminal Punishment 
Code (CPC) scoresheet filed in the initial sentencing proceeding in which the 
defendant was placed on probation—pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement—
may be raised for the first time in a timely motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) during the appeal from the sentencing following 
revocation of probation.  I write separately to articulate why, given the procedural 
posture of this case, Jamie Lee Tasker‟s claim is not procedurally barred. 
 
Section 924.06, Florida Statutes (2007), sets forth the circumstances when a 
defendant may appeal from a criminal proceeding.  Section 924.06(2) states that 
“[a]n appeal of an order revoking probation may review only proceedings after the 
order of probation.”  A challenge to a “proceeding” can only be understood to 
mean a challenge to the validity of a proceeding or a challenge to a specific 
determination or determinations made in a proceeding.  By limiting a defendant‟s 
right to appeal following an order revoking probation to “proceedings after the 
order of probation,” the statute prohibits the defendant from challenging 
determinations that were litigated or could have been litigated in connection with 
the imposition of probation—such as a conviction that was the basis for the 
imposition of probation. 
 
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In Tasker‟s case, the determinations made for purposes of completing the 
CPC sentencing scoresheet were not at issue until the sentencing following 
revocation of probation.  The propriety of the sexual contact victim injury points 
were not litigated and could not have been litigated at the time probation was 
imposed.  The limitation in section 924.06(2), Florida Statutes, therefore has no 
application here. 
Tasker received probation as the result of a negotiated plea agreement.  
Tasker, his defense counsel, and the State Attorney negotiated a plea agreement 
under which Tasker pleaded guilty to charges of lewd and lascivious molestation 
of a child twelve years of age or older but under the age of sixteen and child abuse.  
Under the agreement, Tasker faced up to twelve months of incarceration in the 
county jail and ten years of sex offender probation.  A CPC scoresheet was 
prepared for this initial sentencing, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.704(d)(1).  The CPC scoresheet included forty victim injury points 
based on sexual contact and stated that the lowest permissible prison sentence for 
the offenses was 72.15 months.  The trial court, however, accepted the plea 
agreement and imposed a downward departure sentence.  The trial court withheld 
adjudication and directed that Tasker serve six months in the county jail followed 
by concurrent terms of probation on the two counts. 
 
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Because the trial court imposed jail time and probation rather than 
sentencing Tasker to prison pursuant to the CPC scoresheet, the determinations 
made for purposes of completing the CPC scoresheet were not at issue during the 
initial sentencing proceeding.  Given the plea agreement with the State Attorney, 
which was accepted by the trial court, Tasker had no reason to object to the 
scoresheet points.  Had the trial court rejected the plea agreement, Tasker would 
have had an opportunity to withdraw his plea and litigate the propriety of the 
scoresheet calculations at that time.  See Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 
1996) (“[W]hen there has been a firm agreement for a specified sentence and the 
judge determines to impose a greater sentence, the defendant has the right to 
withdraw the plea.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g).”).  But in this case, the trial court 
accepted the negotiated sentence, rendering the details of the scoresheet immaterial 
to the proceeding. 
Furthermore, given the disposition pursuant to the plea agreement, Tasker 
had no legal ability to then challenge on appeal the assessment of points on the 
CPC scoresheet.  Section 924.06(3) states that a “defendant who pleads guilty with 
no express reservation of the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue . . . shall 
have no right to a direct appeal.”  (Emphasis added.)  In Tasker‟s case, the points 
on the scoresheet were not relevant to—much less legally dispositive of—the trial 
court‟s order of incarceration and probation, which was based on the plea 
 
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agreement.  Thus, the inclusion of victim injury points on the CPC scoresheet was 
not a determination that could have been litigated by the defendant at the time of 
the initial sentencing. 
 
Given the procedural posture of this case, Tasker did not have a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge the imposition of the sexual contact victim injury points 
until the sentencing proceeding following revocation of his probation.  After that 
sentencing proceeding, Tasker properly preserved the issue for appellate review by 
filing a timely rule 3.800(b)(2) motion in the trial court.  Accordingly, Tasker‟s 
appellate claim that the sexual contact victim injury points were improperly 
included in his CPC scoresheet should have been considered on its merits by the 
First District Court of Appeal. 
 
I recant the contrary view expressed in my specially concurring opinion in 
Stubbs v. State, 951 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 
 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I agree with the First District Court of Appeal that section 924.06(2), Florida 
Statutes, procedurally bars Tasker from challenging victim injury points that were 
included on his original scoresheet in 2005.  See Tasker v. State, 12 So. 3d 889 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2009).  Section 924.06(2) limits those issues that may be considered 
on appeal from an order revoking probation to only those “proceedings after the 
 
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order of probation.”  Therefore, Tasker cannot now challenge the victim injury 
points, which were assessed prior to his order of probation. 
 
Tasker‟s victim injury points appeared on his original scoresheet at his initial 
sentencing, which was the product of a negotiated plea.  Tasker did not challenge 
the victim injury points at his original sentencing or at two subsequent hearings 
regarding violations of his probation.  Id. at 890.  Instead, Tasker waited until after 
his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison to challenge his original 
scoresheet.  Id.  In my view, Tasker cannot now attempt to utilize Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800 as a backdoor approach to preserving this issue for 
appeal.  In order to preserve an argument challenging an original sentence under 
rule 3.800, Tasker was required to make a contemporaneous objection at the time 
he was sentenced.  See Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494, 504 (Fla. 2008) (“In Florida, 
a specific, contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a sentencing 
error.”); State v. Montague, 682 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 1996) (“[O]nly sentencing 
errors „apparent on the face of the record do not require a contemporaneous 
objection in order to be preserved for review.‟ ” (quoting Taylor v. State, 601 So. 
2d 540, 541 (Fla. 1992))); Forehand v. State, 537 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 1989) (“[A] 
contemporaneous objection is not necessary to preserve the appeal of either an 
illegal sentence or an unauthorized departure from the sentencing guidelines.  
Absent a contemporaneous objection, however, sentencing errors must be apparent 
 
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on the face of the record to be cognizable on appeal.” (citing Dailey v. State, 488 
So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1986); State v. Whitfield, 487 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1986))).  Yet 
Tasker failed to object here, and no error is apparent on the face of the record.4    
 
Tasker received probation in lieu of jail time as part of a negotiated plea 
when, according to the computation of sentence points, Tasker could have been 
sentenced to up to twenty years in prison with a lowest permissible prison sentence 
of 72.15 months.  That Tasker received only six months in jail followed by 
probation shows that he clearly benefited from the plea.  Now that Tasker has 
violated the terms of his probation, he must accept the burden of his plea.  Tasker 
should not now be allowed to evade his sentence by challenging victim injury 
points assessed on his original scoresheet by way of a rule 3.800 motion.  Allowing 
him to do so will only discourage the State from negotiating pleas in the future.  
State v. Swett, 772 So. 2d 48, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“[T]o permit the evasion of 
                                          
 
 
4.  The forty victim injury points complained of were assessed for “sexual 
contact.”  As part of his negotiated plea, Tasker pled guilty to a violation of section 
800.04(5)—lewd and lascivious molestation of a person less than sixteen years of 
age, or “[a] person who intentionally touches in a lewd or lascivious manner the 
breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a 
person less than 16 years of age.”  § 800.04(5), Fla. Stat.  Tasker pled guilty to 
both counts of the information; and Count I clearly states that Tasker “did then and 
there unlawfully and intentionally touch in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, 
genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of L.T., a person 
12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age, contrary to Florida Statute 
800.04(5).” 
 
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negotiated pleas and sentences by utilization of a Rule 3.800 motion in mitigation 
would discourage the state from entering into plea bargains in the future.”).        
 
The majority asserts that the revocation proceeding is a deferred sentencing 
hearing and thus qualifies as “after the order of probation.”  I disagree.  A deferred 
sentencing proceeding is not the same as resentencing which proceeds de novo.  
Rather, sentencing after revocation of probation involves the original scoresheet 
calculated at the original sentencing, minus those offenses for which the offender‟s 
probation has been completed, and any “additional offense” that is “pending before 
the court for sentencing at the time.”  Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864, 869 (Fla. 
2010); see also § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (“If probation or community control is 
revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense 
charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged 
guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before 
placing the probationer on probation or the offender into community control.”).5  
                                          
 
 
5.  I disagree with the concurring opinion, which asserts that the victim 
injury points assessed on Tasker‟s original scoresheet were never relevant until his 
sentencing after revocation of probation.  See Canady, C.J., concurring op. at 18.  
Section 921.0024(3), Florida Statutes, provides: 
 
A single scoresheet shall be prepared for each defendant to determine 
the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose . . . .  
The scoresheet or scoresheets must cover all the defendant‟s offenses 
pending before the court for sentencing.  The state attorney shall 
prepare the scoresheet or scoresheets, which must be presented to the 
defense counsel for review for accuracy in all cases unless the judge 
 
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No rule provides that points assessed for victim injury can be relitigated at 
sentencing following a revocation of probation.  Indeed, Tasker tacitly admitted to 
the sexual contact when he pled guilty as part of his negotiated plea.  Therefore, I 
                                                                                                                                        
directs otherwise.  The defendant‟s scoresheet or scoresheets must be 
approved and signed by the sentencing judge. 
 
(Emphasis added); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(1), (4).  The scoresheet that is 
presented to the defense for a determination of accuracy is the very same 
scoresheet utilized by the judge in sentencing the defendant pursuant to the 
guidelines, which includes consideration of victim injury points.  See Fla. R. Crim. 
P. 3.704(d)(9).   
 
Furthermore, a trial judge is not required to accept the terms of a plea 
negotiation.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 667 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1996).  Before a trial 
judge can accept the plea he must determine whether the defendant entered into the 
negotiation voluntarily.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172.  In order to make a 
voluntariness determination, the trial judge is required to  
 
place the defendant under oath and shall address the defendant 
personally and shall determine that he or she understands: 
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the maximum 
possible penalty, and any mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(c).  The minimum and maximum sentence necessarily 
includes consideration of the defendant‟s scoresheet, which includes victim injury 
points. 
  
Therefore, regardless of whether the trial judge ultimately rejected the plea 
or accepted the terms of the agreement and imposed a short jail term and probation, 
as happened in this case, the victim injury points were at issue during the initial 
sentencing when the trial judge was making his voluntariness determination—after 
the scoresheet was presented to the defense for accuracy and when it was approved 
and signed by the sentencing judge.  See § 921.0024(3), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.172(c)(1).   
 
Accordingly, in my view, the time for objecting to the imposition of victim 
injury points was then, not during sentencing following revocation of probation. 
 
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believe Tasker is prohibited from challenging victim injury points on appeal from 
his revocation of probation here. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D07-3072 
 
 
(Suwannee County) 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen Phillip Gifford, Second Judicial 
Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Heather 
Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida 
 
 
for Respondent