Title: Torres v. Department of Corrections

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 122 
Docket: 
Kno-15-505 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 22, 2016 
Decided: 
August 2, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JORGE A. TORRES 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  Jorge A. Torres appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Knox 
County, Billings, J.) dismissing, for failure to pay an initial partial filing fee, 
Torres’s petition seeking judicial review of a final Department of Corrections 
decision.  We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  This case has an exceedingly muddled procedural history, 
compounded by confounding actions by the Department of Corrections.  In an 
effort to ensure that this series of events is not repeated, we describe the 
events that occurred in some detail. 
 
2 
  
[¶3]  Torres is incarcerated at the Maine State Prison.  On July 20, 2015, 
pursuant to 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001-11008 (2015) and M.R. Civ. P. 80C, he filed a 
petition in the Superior Court (Knox County) for judicial review of a final 
Department of Corrections decision finding him guilty of the disciplinary 
offense of tattooing.  With the petition, he filed an application to proceed 
without payment of fees, an indigency affidavit, and a certified prisoner 
account statement.  See 4 M.R.S. § 1058(1) (2015); M.R. Civ. P. 91(a)(1), (2).  
The account statement showed that he had $0.03 available in his general 
account, that the average monthly balance in that account during the previous 
six months was $3.14, and that the average monthly deposits during those 
months equaled $25.83. 
 
[¶4]  In an order dated July 22, 2015, the court (Billings, J.) found that 
Torres’s application to proceed without payment of fees was complete, that 
the petition for review was not frivolous, and that Torres was proceeding in 
good faith.  Based on the information in Torres’s account statement, the court 
ordered him to pay an initial partial filing fee of $5.16 by August 12, “failing 
which the matter shall be dismissed for lack of prosecution.” 
 
[¶5]  Through a motion dated July 29, but not received by the court until 
August 7, 2015, Torres requested that the court “clarify prisoner funds and 
 
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inability to pay partial filing fee,” arguing that because he did not have the 
means to pay the initial partial filing fee, the court could not prevent him from 
proceeding with his petition for review.  He included an updated certified 
account statement showing that he had no money available in his general 
account, that the average monthly balance during the previous six months was 
$2.15, and that the average monthly deposits during those months was 
$25.83. 
[¶6]  At the same time, Torres filed a “motion on acceptance of service” 
and a “motion to request service.”  In these motions, he asserted that he was 
unable to pay for service by certified mail as required by 5 M.R.S. § 11003(1), 
but had mailed four copies of his petition, eight copies of service 
acknowledgement forms, four self-addressed stamped envelopes, and a letter, 
by ordinary first class mail, to the Assistant Attorney General representing the 
Department.1  Attached to one of these motions was a letter Torres received 
from the Department’s counsel after he attempted to serve the Department by 
regular mail.  The letter, dated July 1, 2015, states: 
 
I am responding to your letter dated June 26, 2015 asking 
me to accept service by regular mail of a Rule 80C that you may 
have filed in court. 
 
                                         
1  Torres also alleged that the Department does not send prisoners’ mail by certified mail. 
 
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I have checked your facility account and have been told that 
you received $100.00 as recently as May 11, 2015 and then 
proceeded to spend most of it on canteen purchases on May 15 
and May 21.  Therefore, I will not accept service.2 
 
Torres requested that the court serve his petition on the Department of 
Corrections or that it order the Attorney General’s Office to accept service of 
his petition by regular first class mail.  
 
[¶7]  On September 8, 2015, one month after filing his motions, Torres  
filed a “motion to request status update on previous motions.”  And, after 
hearing nothing from the court, on September 23, 2015, Torres filed a “motion 
to request leave to amend original complaint.”  Two days later, the court 
issued an order dismissing the petition, based on its finding that Torres had 
failed to pay $5.61 by August 12.  The court made no finding regarding 
Torres’s ability to pay the initial partial filing fee.  The court also did not 
address Torres’s motions about service costs or amended pleadings, declaring 
that all pending motions were moot. 
 
[¶8]  On October 13, 2015, Torres filed a timely notice of appeal, along 
with an application to proceed with the appeal without payment of fees, an 
                                         
2  The trial court file contains a statement of the “facility account,” showing that $25 of that $100 
was used to make a payment towards Torres’s fine obligations, $69.36 was spent in the prison 
canteen, and the remainder was used for telephone calls.  The statement also shows that, other than 
the $100 he received on May 11, the only other deposit of money greater than $10 since 
December 29, 2014, was a $45 deposit made on April 29, 2015.  From that sum, $11.25 was taken 
for fine payments. 
 
5 
indigency affidavit, and an updated certified account statement.  The same 
day, the court found that the appeal was not frivolous and was taken in good 
faith, and ordered that Torres pay an initial partial appeal filing fee of $4.83 by 
October 30, 2015, “failing which the matter shall be dismissed for lack of 
prosecution.”  
 
[¶9]  Also on October 13, although no portion of the filing fee had been 
paid, the clerk’s office electronically sent the notice of appeal and copies of all 
of Torres’s filings to the Office of the Clerk of the Law Court.3  That office 
issued a “notice of docketing” to Torres and to the Office of the Attorney 
General, on behalf of the Department of Corrections.  On October 22, 2015, we 
received a letter from the Department of Corrections stating, inter alia: 
 
The Department of Corrections was not served and is not a 
party to the case.  Therefore, we will not be participating in the 
appeal unless the court directs us to do so. 
 
[¶10]  Meanwhile, back in the trial court, Torres again moved “to clarify 
prisoner funds and inability to pay partial filing fee,” arguing that he did not 
have the means to pay the initial partial appeal filing fee and that he could not 
be prevented from proceeding with the appeal on that basis.  On November 4, 
2015, the court denied the motion without comment.  On November 17, 2015, 
                                         
3  Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) requires a trial court clerk to “transmit a copy of the 
notice of appeal” to the Clerk of the Law Court “[u]pon receipt of the notice of appeal and, when 
required, the requisite fee or waiver.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
6 
Torres filed an “objection” to the denial of the motion.  One month later, on 
December 16, the court ordered Torres to provide yet another updated 
certified account statement; stated that it would “reassess [Torres’s] financial 
status and issue an appropriate order”; and stayed, pending receipt of the 
updated account statement, the previous order requiring the initial partial 
appeal filing fee. 
 
[¶11]  Given the Department’s assertion that it was “not a party to the 
case,” and that it would “not be participating in the appeal unless the court 
direct[ed] [it] to do so,” we invited the Attorney General’s Office to file a brief 
as amicus curiae, and ordered that the Department “will be a party to this 
action unless the dismissal is affirmed.”  The Department, while continuing to 
assert that it was “not a party to this appeal” because it had not been served, 
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that neither we nor the trial court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.  We decided to consider the 
Department’s motion with the merits of the appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 
 
[¶12]  We first note that the Attorney General’s Office, in its brief, has 
now requested leave to withdraw the Department’s motion to dismiss this 
 
7 
appeal.  That request is granted, and we therefore do not address the motion 
further. 
B. 
Dismissal for Failure to Pay Initial Partial Filing Fee 
 
[¶13]  Torres argues that because he has no funds with which to pay the 
initial partial filing fee, the court abused its discretion when it dismissed his 
petition for failure to pay that fee.  The Attorney General’s Office agrees with 
Torres and recommends that the case be remanded for the trial court to 
determine whether Torres has the ability to pay the filing fee.  “We review the 
court’s dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute for an abuse of 
discretion.”  West Point-Pepperell v. State Tax Assessor, 1997 ME 58, ¶ 7, 
691 A.2d 1211.  We review the Superior Court’s authority de novo, City of 
Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶ 6, 886 A.2d 1281, and we also interpret 
statutes and court rules de novo, Carrier v. Sec’y of State, 2012 ME 142, ¶ 12, 
60 A.3d 1241 (statutes); Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 2009 ME 122, ¶ 7, 
984 A.2d 207 (rules). 
 
[¶14]  Any person seeking to proceed with an action, motion, or appeal 
without payment of fees or costs may file or renew an application in the court 
where the action, motion, or appeal is to be filed.  M.R. Civ. P. 91(a)(1), (f)(1).  
The person must include an affidavit disclosing his or her assets, income, and 
 
8 
expenses, and certifying that the filing is made in good faith.  M.R. Civ. P. 
91(a)(2), (f)(1).  Although nonincarcerated persons may have filing fees and 
service costs waived altogether, there is no such option for incarcerated 
persons seeking to “bring a civil action arising under federal or state law in 
any court in this State with respect to a condition of that person’s confinement 
or the effect of an action or inaction by a government official on the life of that 
person confined.”  4 M.R.S. § 1058(1).  The only relief available to them is to 
have an extended period of time to pay the entire fee.  4 M.R.S. § 1058(2)-(5) 
(2015).  In order to receive that relief, incarcerated persons seeking to bring 
certain civil actions without prepayment of the filing fee must submit, in 
addition to the documents required by Rule 91, a certified prisoner account 
statement.  4 M.R.S. § 1058(1).  Section 1058 governs the process by which the 
court must then review the prisoner’s application.  See 4 M.R.S. § 1058(2)-(5). 
 
[¶15]  The court must waive prepayment of the full filing fee if it “finds 
that the action or appeal is not frivolous and has been brought in good faith 
and that the person is without sufficient funds to pay the filing fee.”  4 M.R.S. 
§ 1058(2).  Where the court makes these findings and waives prepayment, it 
must “assess the person’s financial status and, when funds exist, collect as a 
 
9 
partial payment of the filing fee an initial partial filing fee.”4  4 M.R.S. 
§ 1058(3).  In any event, 
A person may not be prohibited from bringing a civil action or 
appealing a civil action if the court finds that the action or appeal 
is not frivolous and has been brought in good faith and that the 
person has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 
partial filing fee. 
 
4 M.R.S. § 1058(5). 
 
[¶16]  We have not previously examined the question presented here: 
whether a court can dismiss an indigent prisoner’s action for failure to pay the 
initial partial filing fee without first determining that the person has the 
ability to pay that fee.  The relevant provisions of section 1058 are virtually 
identical to provisions found in the federal statute governing prisoner 
applications to proceed with an action or appeal without payment of fees.  
See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(a), (b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-95).  
The provisions of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(b) that require eventual payment in full 
                                         
4  The statute specifies that the initial partial filing fee is 20% of whichever is greater: “the 
average monthly deposits” to the person’s account during the six months preceding the filing of the 
action or appeal, or “the average monthly balance” in the person’s account during the same period.  
4 M.R.S. § 1058(3)(A), (B) (2015).  Torres does not claim that the court calculated the initial partial 
filing fee incorrectly. 
 
Where the court waives prepayment of the full filing fee and assesses an initial partial filing fee, 
the applicant must still eventually pay the full filing fee.  4 M.R.S. § 1058(3) (2015).  To satisfy this 
obligation, after payment of the initial partial filing fee, the person must “make monthly payments 
of 20% of the preceding month’s deposits to the general client account” each time his or her 
account balance exceeds $10.  4 M.R.S. § 1058(4) (2015). 
 
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and establish the procedure for assessing and collecting initial partial filing 
fees were enacted as part of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, “which 
installed a variety of measures designed to filter out the bad claims filed by 
prisoners and facilitate consideration of the good.”  Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 
627, 629-30 (2016) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶17]  As both Torres and the Attorney General’s Office point out, 
several federal appeals courts have directly addressed the issue and have 
concluded that the trial court may not dismiss a prisoner’s claim due to failure 
to pay a partial initial filing fee without first finding that the prisoner has the 
ability to pay the fee.  See Thomas v. Butts, 745 F.3d 309, 312-13 (7th Cir. 
2014) (per curiam) (concluding that the trial court “abused its discretion by 
dismissing the case without determining whether [the plaintiff, a prisoner,] 
was at fault for not paying [the] initial [partial filing] fee”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 
281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] district court cannot dismiss an 
[indigent] prisoner’s case based on his failure to pay the initial fee when his 
failure to pay is due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 
ordered.”); see also Wilson v. Sargent, 313 F.3d 1315, 1320-22 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam); Hatchet v. Nettles, 201 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam); Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
 
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Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); 
Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir. 1997).5 
 
[¶18]  These decisions are grounded in the plain language of provisions 
of section 1915(b) that are analogous to those found in 4 M.R.S. § 1058—the 
court is to collect the initial partial filing fee “when funds exist,” 28 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1915(b)(1); see 4 M.R.S. § 1058(3), and the court cannot prohibit a person 
from proceeding with a nonfrivolous action brought in good faith where the 
person “has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing 
fee,” 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(b)(4); see 4 M.R.S. § 1058(5).  As the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals pointed out, the filing fee requirements for prisoners do not 
violate the constitutional right of access to the courts because they contain 
these provisions.  Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847-48. 
 
[¶19]  Based on the plain language of section 1058, we reach the same 
conclusion here.  In reviewing a prisoner’s application to proceed with a 
motion, action, or appeal without payment of fees or costs, where the court 
finds that the action or appeal is not frivolous and has been brought in good 
faith and that the applicant does not have sufficient funds to pay the full filing 
fee, it must waive prepayment of the full fee.  See 4 M.R.S. § 1058(2).  
                                         
5  Citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(b)(4) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-95), the United States Supreme 
Court stated recently that “[t]he initial partial filing fee may not be exacted if the prisoner has no 
means to pay it.”  Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2016). 
 
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The court must then assess an initial partial filing fee.  See 4 M.R.S. 
§ 1058(3)(A), (B).  If the person claims that he or she does not have enough 
money to pay the initial partial filing fee, the court must make a finding as to 
the person’s ability to pay.  See 4 M.R.S. § 1058(3), (5).  The court cannot 
dismiss an action based on nonpayment of the initial partial filing fee unless it 
has found that the person has the ability to pay the fee.  See 4 M.R.S. § 1058(3), 
(5); see also, e.g., Thomas, 745 F.3d at 312-13; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. 
 
[¶20]  Here, because the court made no finding as to Torres’s ability to 
pay when it dismissed his case, we must vacate the judgment and remand the 
case to the Superior Court to determine whether Torres has means to pay the 
initial partial filing fee, and for the case to proceed accordingly. 
C. 
Service 
 
[¶21]  On remand, the court should also address the motions pending 
when it dismissed Torres’s petition, including Torres’s motions requesting 
that the court pay for service costs or order the Department to accept service 
by regular first class mail.  
 
[¶22]  Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, a petition for 
review of a final agency decision “shall be served by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, upon” the agency, the parties to the agency proceeding that 
 
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gave rise to the decision to be reviewed, and the Attorney General.  5 M.R.S. 
§ 11003(1).  That means that, in cases like this one, where the court must 
order all or part of an indigent prisoner’s service costs to be paid as an 
administrative expense of the court, see M.R. Civ. P. 91(c), if the Attorney 
General’s Office will not accept service by regular mail, the judicial branch will 
bear the cost of having the prisoner’s suit against the Department of 
Corrections served on the Department’s counsel by certified mail.  
 
[¶23]  The Attorney General’s Office argues that the certified mail 
requirement “allows for an inexpensive and informal method of service” and 
helps to “alert[] the agency as to the nature of the communication” because “it 
is often difficult to identify whether the communication has some legal 
significance.”  Whether it is “inexpensive” to accomplish service by certified 
mail depends, of course, on one’s circumstances.  According to Torres, each 
mailing costs about $7.  Moreover, the Department makes no claim that it did 
not understand the nature of Torres’s petition or that it did not receive it.  
See Gaeth v. Deacon, 2009 ME 9, ¶ 27, 964 A.2d 621 (“The purpose of the rule 
regarding service is to achieve due process by giving sufficient notice of civil 
actions.”); Phillips v. Johnson, 2003 ME 127, ¶ 24, 834 A.2d 938 (“[A]ctual 
notice is the ultimate goal of any form of service . . . .”).  Torres’s petition is 
 
14 
titled “PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION” and, in 
the caption, clearly identifies the Department as a defendant.  Rather than 
invoking the certified mail requirement to ensure that it was aware of the 
nature of Torres’s communication, however, it appears that the Department 
used the requirement as a tool to punish Torres for (in the Department’s 
view) mismanaging his personal funds. 
[¶24]  At this time, no statute or rule authorizes us or the trial court to 
order the Department, in whose custody Torres is confined, to simply 
acknowledge service in these circumstances.  As the Department’s counsel’s 
letter to Torres and the Attorney General’s brief both state, however, the 
Department can and does sometimes waive the certified mail requirement 
and accept service by regular mail.6  In this case, however, given the length of 
time the case has languished, and the obvious familiarity of the Department 
with Torres’s complaint, we would expect the Department to acknowledge 
that it has been served and to move forward with its defense to the merits of 
Torres’s petition.  See M.R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). 
                                         
6  The Department may, in general, wish to standardize a process for accepting service by regular 
mail. 
 
15 
The entry is: 
Order dismissing petition vacated.  Remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Jorge A. Torres, appellant pro se 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, James E. Fortin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and 
Diane E. Sleek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, 
for amicus curiae Office of the Attorney General 
 
The Department of Corrections did not file a brief 
 
 
 
Knox Superior Court docket number AP-2015-16 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY