Title: Koran v. White

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

363 P.2d 1038 (1961) 69 N.M. 46 George T. KORAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lowell E. WHITE, Defendant-Appellee. No. 6727. Supreme Court of New Mexico. August 3, 1961. *1039 Rueckhaus & Watkins, Addison L. Strong, Albuquerque, for appellant. John E. Hall, Albuquerque, for appellee. CARMODY, Justice. Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his suit, which sought to establish an oral contract with respect to the net profits from the sale of property purchased by the defendant for subdivision purposes. The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the trial court are as follows: Plaintiff contends that the evidence established an oral contract, and quotes liberally from portions of the testimony which would sustain such a finding. He omits discussion of any testimony supporting the findings of the court. However, the defendant-appellee has rectified this omission by detailing the evidentiary matters which support the findings. Plaintiff seeks to avoid the necessity of attacking the findings by the argument that, this suit being in the nature of an equitable action, the supreme court will try the case de novo, sift the evidence, and determine the issues independently of the trial court's decision. There is authority that such is the practice in some jurisdictions, either where the age-old distinction between law and equity still exists, or where such appellate procedure is directed by the constitution or by statute. However, this is not the rule in New Mexico, and is not in accord with our appellate practice. Rule 15(6) (Sec. 21-2-1(15) (6), N.M.S.A. 1953) contemplates a direct attack on the questioned findings, and absent such attack, the findings will not ordinarily be disturbed. Witherspoon v. Brummett, 1946, 50 N.M. 303, 176 P.2d 187; Luna v. Flores, 1958, 64 N.M. 312, 328 P.2d 82; Marrujo v. Martinez, 1959, 65 N.M. 166, 334 P.2d 548. The rule, both in its present form and as applied even before adoption of formal rules, does not differentiate between actions at law and equitable proceedings, and it has been given effect by us in many cases which were of an equitable nature [Newcomb v. White, 1890, 5 N.M. 435, 23 P. 671 (suit in chancery to foreclose liens); Arias v. Springer, 1938, 42 N.M. 350, 78 P.2d 153 (to cancel deed on ground of forgery); Everett v. Gilliland, 1943, 47 N.M. 269, 141 P.2d 326 (fraud and deceit); Hugh K. Gale, Post No. 2182 Veterans of Foreign Wars, of Farmington v. Norris, 1949, 53 N.M. 58, 201 P.2d 777 (to compel trustee to convey title); Bounds v. Carner, 1949, 53 N.M. 234, 205 P.2d 216 (injunction); Provencio v. Price, 1953, 57 N.M. 40, 253 P.2d 582 (specific performance and to quiet title); Archuleta v. Velasquez, 1955, 60 N.M. 97, 287 P.2d 989 (to cancel or reform a deed); and Hines v. Hines, 1958, 64 N.M. 377, 328 P.2d 944 (divorce)], as well as in dozens of cases sounding only in law (see, Luna v. Flores, supra, and Marrujo v. Martinez, supra, where some of the cases are cited). *1041 We do find cases in New Mexico which seem to state a contrary rule; but upon examination thereof, it would appear that the holdings were on the basis that where most of the testimony is by deposition, or by a transcript of the testimony at a former trial by an absent witness, then the appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether the judgment is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, In re Jubala's Estate, 1936, 40 N.M. 312, 59 P.2d 356; and Davidson v. Enfield, 1931, 35 N.M. 580, 3 P.2d 979. However, in the instant case, the transcript of the testimony is somewhat in excess of 400 pages, and all but approximately 60 pages thereof was given by witnesses who were seen and heard by the trial court. We are satisfied that the findings of the trial court are based upon substantial evidence, and they will not be disturbed. In a case such as this, where conflicting evidence is so pronounced, the trier of the facts is in a much better position to weigh the evidence than is the appellate court. The reason for such a rule, even in a jurisdiction which follows the so-called de novo rule, is so graphically stated in Creamer v. Bivert, 1908, 214 Mo. 473, 113 S.W. 1118, 1120, that it bears repeating here: Even though the plaintiff is thus thwarted in his effort to circumvent the findings, he also contends that, as a matter of law, the pleadings admitted the existence of an oral contract and that therefore the court erred in not so concluding. In making this assertion, plaintiff quotes part of a paragraph *1042 of the defendant's answer, and thereafter assumes deletion therefrom of certain words and phrases which the plaintiff contends are legal conclusions, and thereupon places his own construction upon the emasculated paragraph. For example, plaintiff would eliminate such phrases as "preliminary discussions were carried on" and "without any final agreement being made," with the result that he construes the answer to mean just the contrary to that which was obviously intended by the pleader. In the first place, such an argument was never raised in the trial court, by motion or otherwise, and is apparently an attempt to raise a question not raised below and not jurisdictional, so it will not be considered by us. See, Supreme Court Rule 20(1) (Sec. 21-2-1(20) (1), N.M.S.A. 1953). See, also, Danz v. Kennon, 1957, 63 N.M. 274, 317 P.2d 321; Soens v. Riggle, 1958, 64 N.M. 121, 325 P.2d 709; and Metzger v. Ellis, 1959, 65 N.M. 347, 337 P.2d 609. In the second place, even though we do not deem it necessary to quote the answer in this opinion, plaintiff's construction of the answer is a strained one, and if a rule were to be adopted giving binding effect to the construction placed by adverse parties on their opponents' pleadings, it can well be imagined what a chaotic condition would result. Suffice it to say that, in our opinion, the answer did not admit the contract alleged by the plaintiff, but merely admitted that certain preliminary discussions had been carried on between the parties; that no agreement had been entered into, orally or in writing; and that the negotiations were discontinued after the plaintiff disclosed that he was unable or unwilling to proceed with the development and construction on the property. From what has been said, we find plaintiff's contentions without merit, and the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed at plaintiff's cost. It is so ordered. MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., concur. COMPTON, C.J., and CHAVEZ, J., not participating.