Title: Ex parte Tim Tucker.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  December 6, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180773
____________________
Ex parte Tim Tucker
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Mary Young
v.
City of Orange Beach and Tim Tucker)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CV-16-900795)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Tim Tucker petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its order
1180773
denying his summary-judgment motion in which he contends that
he is entitled to State-agent immunity for all claims asserted
against him by Mary Young in an action stemming from injuries
Young sustained when she tripped and fell on a residential
street in the City of Orange Beach ("the City") and to enter
a summary judgment in his favor.  We grant the petition and
issue the writ.
Facts
Tucker is the public-works director for the City.  In
that capacity, he oversees the Street, Refuse, Maintenance,
Custodial, Landscape, Battlefield/Golf Course, and Beach
Departments for the City.  Tucker reports to Ken Grimes, the
city administrator.  Tucker is responsible for initiating,
monitoring, and supervising maintenance and repair work
performed by each of the above-listed departments, including
maintenance and repair work on the roads in the City.  Thus,
Tucker is charged with supervising the Street Department's
maintenance of 34 miles of roads within the City's
jurisdiction and its mowing of property abutting 17 miles of
state roads.  
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Tucker's duties include implementation of the City's
annual resurfacing project.  The list of streets to be
resurfaced is generated based on relative wear and tear.  The
assistant 
public-works 
director, 
Rick 
White, 
submits
recommendations to Tucker of roads and streets that should be
included in the resurfacing project, and Tucker, in turn,
reviews the list and provides that list to Grimes.  The mayor
and the city council have an opportunity to provide input and
to make additions to and/or deletions from the list before a
final determination is made as to which streets will be
resurfaced.  Tucker testified that the  Street Department's
goal is to repave every road and street in the City once every
10 to 12 years.  
Tucker 
testified 
by 
affidavit 
that, 
aside 
from
resurfacing,  work on the shoulder of the roads is performed
on an "as noted and needed" basis.  It is undisputed that the
City has no written policies or procedures with regard to how
often or in what manner repairs are to be made to the
shoulders of roads within the City.  Repairs are performed
when a problem is brought to the City's attention by an
employee or by a complaint from a member of the public.   In
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his capacity as public-works director, Tucker prioritizes
repairs and maintenance based on such factors as the severity
of the condition or defect, the availability of labor and
materials, and budgetary constraints.  There is no written
policy concerning the prioritization of repairs; instead,
Tucker uses his judgment to make the decisions as to whether
and when repair work is performed.
In 2012, Young was living in the Bear Point Community on
Dowdy Lane, two streets over from Louisiana Avenue.  Young
testified that she had lived in the community for several
years, that she had lived on Dowdy Lane for approximately
7 years, and that before that she had lived on Louisiana
Avenue.  The Bear Point Community is a single-family
residential neighborhood with no sidewalks in which homes are
close to the streets and front yards extend all the way to the
street, including on Louisiana Avenue.  Young 
submitted Google
Earth mapping-service photographs from April 2011 indicating
that at that time the surface of Louisiana Avenue was flush
with the shoulder of the street and accompanying lawns. 
In October 2012, Mobile Asphalt Company, LLC ("Mobile
Asphalt"), contracted with the City to perform its annual
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resurfacing project, which had been voted on and approved by
the city council ("the 2012 repavement project").  The project
included resurfacing Louisiana Avenue in the Bear Point
Community.  Mobile Asphalt's contract with the City specified
that it was to pave a 1.5-inch overlay on the streets to be
resurfaced.  It is undisputed that, at that time, "dressing"
of the edge of roadways was the City's responsibility, not the
contractor's.  Kenny White, the City's street superintendent,
served as the foreman on the shoulder work after Mobile
Asphalt had repaved Louisiana Avenue.1  Rick White testified
that the shoulder work involved "putting dirt down [and]
raking it to elevation," followed by seeding the ground with
grass to help hold the dirt in place.  White testified that
the goal is to "keep dirt ... about an inch, inch and a half
below surface [of the road] for when the grass grows and easy
shed for water."  White stated that this standard was just
something "we've always done" and that it was not contained in
a written City policy.2  Tucker confirmed in his affidavit
that this is the usual guideline used and that "there is no
1Rick White and Kenny White are not related.
2At the time of his testimony, Rick White had worked for
the City for over 23 years. 
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written standard dictating the amount of fill that is required
to be placed."  Rick White testified that he visited the
worksite daily to ensure that the work was being performed
correctly.  Kenny White kept a daily log of the work his crew
performed.  Tucker testified that those records indicated that
dirt was added alongside the asphalt on Louisiana Avenue on
December 10, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, and 27, 2012.  At the
conclusion of the resurfacing project, Rick White inspected
the work that had been performed by Mobile Asphalt and the
City.  White told Tucker that the work had been performed
satisfactorily.  
Tucker 
then 
approved 
Mobile 
Asphalt's invoice
for payment on the project.  Tucker testified that to his
knowledge the City never received any complaints about the
shoulder along Louisiana Avenue from the time the street was
resurfaced until the date of Young's accident.
On January 16, 2015, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Young
was walking her dog along Louisiana Avenue.  Young testified
that it was dark and that there were no street lights.  Young
attempted to get her dog back on the street after it had
veered off the asphalt, and she then tried to step onto the
street as well from the shoulder.  Young's foot caught on the
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edge of the asphalt of the street, and she tripped and fell to
the ground.  Young testified that she broke her shoulder as a
result of the fall and that she had to have immediate surgery. 
Young estimated that where she tripped and fell there was a
six-inch differential between the shoulder of the road and the
asphalt roadway.  Her son later measured Louisiana Avenue
drop-off ranges from the roadway to the shoulder from between
three inches to nine inches.  
On July 22, 2016, Young filed a complaint in the Baldwin
Circuit Court asserting claims of negligence and wantonness
against the City, Tucker in his individual capacity, and
Mobile Asphalt.  Young alleged that the defendants had
"breached their duty by not inspecting and correcting the
significant shoulder drop offs at various locations within the
City of Orange Beach, including Louisiana Avenue, at any point
during or after the repaving process ...."  The City and
Tucker filed a joint answer to the complaint on September 2,
2016.
On May 6, 2019, the City and Tucker filed a summary-
judgment motion, an accompanying brief, and supporting
evidentiary materials with respect to the claims Young
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1180773
asserted against Tucker.  In their brief, the City and Tucker
contended that Tucker is entitled to State-agent immunity from
the claims Young asserted against him.  Specifically, they
conceded that Tucker's responsibilities as public-works
director for the City included "initiating, monitoring and
supervising maintenance and repair work" for the City's
streets, but they argued that "when and where that work is
performed is wholly discretionary."  They contended that this
discretion entitles Tucker to State-agent immunity from
Young's claims.
On May 17, 2019, Young filed a response in opposition to
the City and Tucker's summary-judgment motion.  In her
response, Young argued that Tucker had violated specific
standards applicable to the Louisiana Avenue repavement
project and that, therefore, he was not entitled to State-
agent immunity.  Specifically, Young contended that the
Alabama 
Department 
of 
Transportation's 
Standard 
Specifications
for 
Highway 
Construction 
("the 
ALDOT 
Specifications") 
provided
"clear and detailed regulations for shoulder/roadside repair
work" that Tucker had violated during the repavement of
Louisiana Avenue.  She also argued that the City of Orange
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Beach Construction Standards for Miscellaneous Construction,
Utility Excavation, and Right-of-Way and Pavement Restoration
("the City Construction Standards") "required that all lawn
areas affected by a construction project be replaced with
materials that were existing prior to the project" and that
Tucker had violated this standard as well.
On May 21, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on the
City and Tucker's summary-judgment motion.  On the same date,
the circuit court entered an order denying their summary-
judgment motion.
Tucker timely petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus.  We ordered answers and briefs and granted a motion
filed by the City to stay the proceedings below.  
Standard of Review
"'While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1996) ....
"'Summary judgment is 
appropriate only
when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v.
La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
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1996).  A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675
So. 
2d 
397 
(Ala. 
1996), 
Fuqua 
v.
Ingersoll–Rand Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala.
1991); will accord the nonmoving party all
reasonable favorable inferences from the
evidence, Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley
Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala.
1992); and will resolve all reasonable
doubts against the moving party, Hurst,
supra, Ex parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185
(Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment
will, de novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court.  Fuqua,
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that
factual material available of record to the
trial court for its consideration in
deciding the motion.  Dynasty Corp. v.
Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank,
599 So. 2d 595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell,
599 So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1992).'"
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912–13 (Ala. 2000)).  A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the
petitioner can demonstrate:  "'(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
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jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).
Analysis
As we noted in the rendition of the facts, Tucker
contends that he is entitled to State-agent immunity for the
claims asserted against him by Young and that, therefore,
those negligence and wantonness claims should be dismissed.  
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"....
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in
the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"....
"(b) allocating resources; 
"....
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner ....
"....
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"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"....
"(2) 
when 
the 
State 
agent 
acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law."
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (plurality
opinion).3
We note that "[i]mmunity applies to employees of
municipalities in the same manner that immunity applies to
employees of the State.  See Ex parte City of Birmingham, 624
So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 1993).  Ex parte Cranman, [792 So. 2d 392
(Ala. 2000),] did nothing to alter this application."  City of
Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 916 (Ala. 2007). 
Furthermore,
"[t]his 
Court 
has 
established 
a
'burden-shifting' process when a party raises the
defense of State-agent immunity.  Giambrone v.
Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).  In
3"Although Cranman was a plurality decision, the
restatement of law as it pertains to State-agent immunity set 
forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by the Court in
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000)."  Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299,
305 (Ala. 2008).
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order to claim State-agent immunity, a State agent
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
the
plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would
entitle the State agent to immunity.  Giambrone, 874
So. 2d at 1052; Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709
(Ala. 2002).  If the State agent makes such a
showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
show 
that 
the 
State 
agent 
acted 
willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
his or her authority.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at
1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte Davis, 721
So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  'A State agent acts
beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he
or she "fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated
on a checklist."'  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052
(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala.
2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
Young concedes that Tucker met his prima facie burden of
demonstrating that her claims arise from a function that would
entitle Tucker to State-agent immunity.  However, Young
contends that she then met her burden of showing that Tucker
acted beyond his authority by violating specific regulations
applicable to him in the performance of his duties as public-
works director for the City.  Specifically, Young notes that
§ 410.05(b) of the ALDOT Specifications addresses "Edge
Requirements" for paving roads, and it provides:
"These edges shall be neatly shaped to line behind
the breakdown roller and shall be trimmed as
necessary after final rolling, to an accurately
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1180773
lined string or wire providing a maximum tolerance
of 2 inches {50 mm} outside the theoretical edge of
pavement, with a maximum variation from a true line
of ½ of an inch {12 mm} in 10 feet {3 m} and a slope
not flatter than 1:1.  Edges that are distorted by
rolling shall be corrected promptly."
(Emphasis added.)  Young also observes that Tucker testified
in 
his 
deposition that, 
although 
bid-contracting documents 
for
City repaving work before 2014 did not specify whether the
ALDOT Specifications applied to such work, it was Tucker's
understanding that the ALDOT Specifications did apply
"regardless of whether or not they're specifically called out
in the bid documents."  Thus, Young argues that Tucker
violated § 410.05(b) of the ALDOT Specifications by approving
the completed repavement of Louisiana Avenue, which clearly
had a shoulder drop-off larger than two inches, and by failing
to rectify the "dangerous edges" present on that street before
Young's accident occurred. 
Young argues that, in addition to violating § 410.05(b)
of the ALDOT Specifications, Tucker violated § 6.6(A) of the 
City Construction Standards, which provides, in part:  "All
established lawn areas affected by the construction project
will be replaced with similar type landscape materials which
were existing prior to the project."  Young contends that
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because some significant variances in shoulder depth on
Louisiana Avenue existed at the time of her accident, Tucker
did not ensure that lawns adjacent to the street were restored
with 
similar 
landscape 
materials 
after 
the 
repavement project.
Young contends that Tucker had no discretion to deviate from
either § 410.05(b) of the ALDOT Specifications or § 6.6(A) of
the City Construction Standards with respect to the repaving
of Louisiana Avenue.
Tucker offers two responses to Young's contention that he
violated § 410.05(b) of the ALDOT Specifications and § 6.6(A)
of the City Construction Standards and that, by doing so, he
acted beyond his authority.  First, he argues that Young did
not demonstrate that either of those standards was applicable
to the 2012 repavement project or that either of them applied
to Tucker individually.  However, as Young observes, Tucker's
own 
testimony 
appeared 
to 
confirm 
that 
the 
ALDOT
Specifications applied to the 2012 repavement project, and
there is no evidence indicating that City Construction
Standards did not apply.  
Tucker's contention that the standards did not apply to
him individually is more well taken, given that the evidence
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shows that Tucker's responsibility is that of a department
supervisor, not streets-project manager.  Kenny White was the
foreman for the shoulder work in repaving Louisiana Avenue,
and Rick White performed the inspections of the 2012
repavement project.  However, as Young notes, Tucker did not
argue to the circuit court that he was entitled to a summary
judgment because Young failed to demonstrate that the
standards applied to him individually.  Therefore, we cannot
issue a writ of mandamus based on this argument.  See, e.g.,
Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 786 (Ala. 2003) ("In
determining, on mandamus review, whether the trial court
exceeded the limits of its discretion, 'the appellate courts
will not reverse the trial court on an issue or contention not
presented to the trial court for its consideration in making
its ruling.'" (quoting Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071,
1073 (Ala. 1999))).
Tucker's second, and primary, contention is that, because
Young's accident occurred more than two years 
after completion
of the 2012 repavement project, the real issue is "continuing
maintenance and upkeep of the shoulders," not the initial
repaving of Louisiana Avenue.  Tucker argues that the
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submitted evidence indicates that the repaving of Louisiana
Avenue was performed in accordance with applicable standards. 
Kenny White's log showed that dirt had been added to the
shoulder of the road on several days following Mobile
Asphalt's completion of its repaving responsibilities. 
Rick White inspected the work performed by Mobile Asphalt and
by the City and indicated to Tucker that the work had been
performed in a satisfactory manner.  The City had no record of
complaints about the shoulders of Louisiana Avenue in the
ensuing two years before Young's accident.  Tucker reasons
that, because the evidence does not indicate that there were
any issues with the initial work performed in repaving
Louisiana Avenue in 2012, the issue encountered by Young
concerned ongoing maintenance of City roads and streets.  It
is undisputed that Tucker is responsible for initiating,
monitoring, and supervising repairs and maintenance of roads
and streets in the City.  However, which roads and streets are
repaired and when such maintenance occurs is entirely left to
Tucker's discretion.  The Public Works Department depends upon
tips from City employees and citizens to inform the City about
issues with City roads and streets.  Once Tucker is made aware
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of a problem, he must weigh various factors about how and when
to perform any necessary maintenance, including considering
the severity of the condition or defect, the availability of
labor and materials, and budgetary constraints.  Tucker
contends that the regulations Young cites do not address his
responsibilities with respect to ongoing maintenance and
repair of City roads and streets and that, therefore, Young
failed to demonstrate that Tucker acted beyond his authority
in failing to have maintenance performed along the shoulder of
Louisiana Avenue in 2015.  
We agree with Tucker.  Young contends in her brief that
"there is substantial evidence the dangerous pavement edge
drop off existed at the time of the project."  But other than
an assumption that the shoulder could not have degraded from
two inches to six inches between 2012 and 2015, Young has not
pointed to evidence of the shoulder condition of Louisiana
Avenue in 2012 after the completion of the repavement project. 
Young argues that "[t]he fact that the dangerous and excessive
drop off remained after the project was complete, does not
allow, by any standard, for an exercise of judgment as to
whether the violative drop off could remain unaddressed.  The
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duty imposed at the time of construction continues."  But
Young cites no evidence or authority to support that argument. 
Section 410.05(b) of the ALDOT Specifications and § 6.6(A) of
the City Construction Standards address standards for paving
a roadway; they in no way address ongoing maintenance of roads
and streets within the City, which is addressed by the process
about which Tucker testified and for which Young has cited no
specific standard that was violated.
As Tucker observes, the situation presented here is
similar to one this Court addressed in Ex parte Estate of
Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2006).  The Court later
summarized its decision in Reynolds as follows:
"In Reynolds, the plaintiff, who was injured in
an automobile accident, alleged that the accident
resulted when the tires of his vehicle left the
roadway and he was unable to steer the vehicle back
onto the roadway.  The plaintiff alleged that his
inability to steer the vehicle back on the roadway
was caused by the front right tire of his automobile
entering a 'channel' in the paved surface.  The
plaintiff sued the district engineer of the Alabama
Department of Transportation ('ALDOT') as well as
ALDOT's 
district 
maintenance 
superintendent,
alleging that the two had negligently, wantonly,
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, and in bad
faith failed to inspect, maintain, and repair the
area of the roadway where the accident occurred. The
evidence indicated that both the district engineer
and maintenance superintendent inspected highways in
the district, determined whether maintenance and
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repair were necessary, and supervised the roadwork.
Both men would prioritize and rank projects based on
the degree of the danger a condition created, the
type of work needed, the availability of labor
resources, and the particular road.  Both men used
ALDOT's 'Maintenance Manual' and 'Field Operations
Manual' in performing their duties.  The maintenance
supervisor, however, argued that the manuals often
did not provide explicit guidelines for particular
situations and that the exercise of judgment was
often required.  The plaintiff, however, argued that
the district engineer and maintenance supervisor
were negligent in inspecting the road in question
because 
the 
former 
acting 
district 
engineer
testified via affidavit that he had observed
numerous places on the road where the pavement and
shoulder had been damaged by large trucks getting
too close to the shoulder of the road.  He also
testified via affidavit that the road contained
areas where the shoulder was higher than the roadway
as well as areas where the shoulder was lower than
the roadway.
"In issuing the writ of mandamus, this Court
held that although the ALDOT manuals set forth
criteria by which decisions were made and set out
duties, the manuals gave the district engineer and
district maintenance supervisor a significant degree
of 
discretion 
in 
inspecting 
the 
highways,
formulating plans and policies, and exercising
judgment in allocating resources for inspections.
Thus, by exercising judgment in actually undertaking
to accomplish the necessary maintenance and repairs,
the district engineer and district maintenance
supervisor were entitled to State-agent immunity."
Slack v. Stream, 988 So. 2d 516, 529 (Ala. 2008) (emphasis
added).  
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Tucker's responsibilities for maintenance and repair of
City streets and roads are similar to those of the defendants
in Reynolds in that he must make decisions about prioritizing
repairs based on various factors such as the degree of traffic
on the particular street, the severity of the damage, the
available manpower, and funding.  Unlike the defendants in
Reynolds, however, Tucker's duties do not include personally
inspecting the roads and streets or personally supervising the
roadwork.  If anything, Tucker's responsibilities fall even
more into the category of formulating plans and policies for
maintenance and repair work than did the responsibilities of
the defendants in Reynolds, and he has more discretion in
allocating resources than they did because there is no
evidence of any kind of maintenance manual or 
field-operations
manual that directs Tucker with regard to prioritizing repair
jobs.  
In short, Young's argument glosses over the more than
two-year gap between the completion of the 2012 repavement
project and her accident in January 2015.  Even assuming that
§ 410.05(b) of the ALDOT Specifications and § 6.6(A) of the
City Construction Standards applied to the 2012 repavement
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project and that they applied to Tucker individually, those
regulations concern only duties in the performance of paving
a roadway; they do not set any standards for repair and
maintenance of City roads and streets.  Based on the evidence
presented, it appears that Young's allegations concern the
maintenance and/or repair along the shoulder of Louisiana
Avenue.  It is undisputed that Tucker exercises judgment in
determining how and where to use the limited resources
available to the City to repair and maintain its roads and
streets.  "These decisions are the very sort protected by
State-agent immunity as described in Cranman."  Reynolds, 946
So. 2d at 456–57.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in
denying Tucker's summary-judgment motion.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Tucker is entitled to State-agent
immunity from all claims Young asserted against him.  The
circuit court is therefore directed to enter a summary
judgment in favor of Tucker.
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PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and
Stewart, JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result.
23