Title: LINDA MACK V CITY OF DETROIT

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2002  
LINDA MACK,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118468  
THE CITY OF DETROIT, 
a Michigan Municipal Corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
Plaintiff 
alleges 
in 
this 
action 
that 
she 
was  
discriminated against in her employment as a Detroit police  
officer on the basis of her sex and sexual orientation in  
violation of the declaration of rights contained in the  
Charter of the city of Detroit.  Plaintiff further contends  
that the charter creates a private cause of action allowing  
 
recovery for violation of the rights set forth in it.  
Assuming the charter provides no explicit private right of  
recovery, plaintiff alternatively urges this Court to create,  
as a cumulative remedy available under the charter, such a  
cause of action.  
We hold that regardless of whether the charter provides  
a private cause of action against the city for sexual  
orientation discrimination, such a cause of action would  
contravene the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL  
691.1407.
 Accordingly, we do not accept plaintiff’s  
invitation to recognize such a cause of action.  
Further, because the plaintiff failed to plead a  
recognized claim in avoidance of governmental immunity, her  
sexual orientation discrimination claim should have been  
dismissed.
 Governmental immunity is a characteristic of  
government and thus a plaintiff must plead her case in  
avoidance of immunity.  To the extent that it holds otherwise,  
McCummings v Hurley Medical Ctr, 433 Mich 404; 446 NW2d 114  
(1989), is overruled.  
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision,  
reinstate the trial court’s order of summary disposition in  
favor of the city of Detroit regarding the sexual orientation  
claim, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for  
reconsideration of the sex discrimination claim in light of  
2  
this opinion.1  
I. Facts and Procedural History  
In 1974, plaintiff was hired by the city as a police  
officer.  During the course of her employment, she attained  
the status of lieutenant and held the positions of acting  
inspector, acting command lieutenant, acting administrative  
lieutenant, and acting inspector of the sex crimes unit.  The  
claims before the Court arose during plaintiff’s tenure with  
the sex crimes unit.  
Plaintiff alleges that, while working in the sex crimes  
unit, 
she 
was 
repeatedly propositioned by male supervisors for  
sex and that she rebuffed the unwelcome advances, in part  
because she is a lesbian.  Plaintiff complained to her  
superiors, who allegedly refused to take any action because of  
her sexual orientation.  Plaintiff also claims that she  
endured further discrimination and harassment as a result of  
her sexual orientation.  Specifically, she complains that the  
police department gave her an afternoon desk job answering  
phones, 
prohibited 
her 
from 
participating 
in 
any 
investigative  
work, and restricted her from taking more than two weekends  
1The city appealed the Court of Appeals holding that the 
courts could recognize a private cause of action for sexual 
orientation 
discrimination under the city charter, but not the 
court’s resolution of plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim. 
For this reason, we remand the case to that Court for 
reconsideration 
of 
plaintiff’s 
charter-based 
sex  
discrimination claim in light of this opinion.  
3  
 
off a month. She has since retired from the police force.  
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging intentional infliction of  
emotional distress and violations of the charter of the city  
of Detroit. Regarding the latter claims, plaintiff maintained  
that the city violated § 2 of the charter’s declaration of  
rights by discriminating on the basis of sex and sexual  
orientation.2
 The city moved for summary disposition,  
asserting that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which  
relief can be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8).  Specifically, the  
city argued that plaintiff’s tort claims were barred by  
governmental immunity and that the city charter did not give  
plaintiff a private cause of action. The trial court agreed  
with the city and granted its motion for summary disposition.  
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the violation of the rights  
guaranteed by the city charter created a private cause of  
action.3  
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals reversed,  
2Section 2 provides:  
The city has an affirmative duty to secure the 
equal protection of the law for each person and to 
insure equality of opportunity for all persons.  No  
person shall be denied the enjoyment of civil or 
political rights or be discriminated against in the 
exercise thereof because of race, color, creed, 
national origin, age, handicap, sex, or sexual 
orientation.  
3Plaintiff elected not to appeal the trial court’s ruling 
dismissing the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim. Therefore, those claims are not before this Court.  
4  
 
holding that plaintiff had a private cause of action for sex  
and sexual orientation discrimination. The majority reasoned  
that there is an express civil right to be free from  
employment 
discrimination based on one’s sex arising under the  
Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and that the city  
extended that protection to its charter.4  Relying on Pompey  
v General Motors, 385 Mich 537; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), the  
majority concluded that equal opportunity in the pursuit of  
employment was a protected right, and because the city  
extended that protection to include sexual orientation  
discrimination, the courts could recognize, as a cumulative  
remedy, a civil action for such a claim.  
The dissent opined that it was not clear that a city had  
authority to create a cause of action and questioned whether  
Pompey should be extended to rights created by city charters.  
The city appealed the Court of Appeals holding that the  
judiciary could recognize a private cause of action for sexual  
orientation discrimination. We granted leave to appeal. 464  
Mich 874 (2001).  
II. Standard of Review  
The issues presented are whether the city charter may  
create a cause of action against the city for sexual  
orientation discrimination in the face of state governmental  
4243 Mich App 132; 620 NW2d 670 (2000).  
5  
 
  
 
immunity law and whether governmental immunity is an  
affirmative defense or a characteristic of government so that  
a plaintiff must plead in avoidance of it. 
These are  
questions of law that the Court reviews de novo. Burt Twp v  
Dep’t of Natural Resources, 459 Mich 659, 662-663; 593 NW2d  
534 (1999).  We also review a trial court’s decision to grant  
or deny a motion for summary disposition de novo.  Beaudrie v  
Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). Because  
this is a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR  
2.116(C)(8), we test the legal sufficiency of the complaint on  
the basis of the pleadings alone. Id.  
III. Discussion  
A. Governmental Immunity  
Plaintiff contends that the charter expressly creates a  
private 
cause 
of 
action 
for 
sexual 
orientation  
discrimination.5  However, whether the charter attempted to  
create a private cause of action for sexual orientation  
discrimination is an irrelevant inquiry because we hold that  
5In the alternative, plaintiff urges this Court to extend 
the holding in Pompey to recognize a cumulative remedy for 
sexual orientation discrimination under the charter.  We  
decline to do so.  Rather, we conclude that Pompey is  
inapplicable to the case before us.  Pompey contemplated a 
cumulative remedy for discrimination in private employment, 
whereas plaintiff in this case seeks to impose liability on a 
municipality.  Accordingly, unlike the Court in Pompey, we 
must 
address 
whether 
governmental 
immunity 
precludes 
the 
Court 
from 
recognizing 
a 
private 
cause 
of 
action 
for 
a  
municipality’s 
tortious 
conduct 
except 
as 
expressly 
authorized 
by the Legislature.  
6  
 
 
the charter could not create a cause of action against the  
city without contravening state governmental immunity law.6  
Const 1963, art 7, § 22 governs the authority of a city  
to enact a charter:  
Under general laws the electors of each city 
and village shall have the power and authority to 
frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an 
existing charter of the city or village heretofore 
granted or enacted by the legislature for the 
government of the city or village. Each such city 
and village shall have power to adopt resolutions 
and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, 
property 
and 
government, 
subject 
to 
the  
constitution and law. 
No enumeration of powers 
granted to cities and villages in this constitution 
shall limit or restrict the general grant of 
authority conferred by this section. [Emphasis 
added.]  
Thus, although art 7, § 22 grants broad authority to  
municipalities, it clearly subjects their authority to  
6Justice CAVANAGH’s assertion that whether the charter  
creates a cause of action is a relevant inquiry because its 
answer affects causes of actions against nongovernmental 
entities ignores the fact that our opinion pertains only to 
actions against governmental entities.  Because we are only 
addressing the creation of a cause of action against a  
governmental entity, whether the charter does or does not 
create such an action is ultimately irrelevant because the 
GTLA does not permit such an action.  Our opinion does not 
address, as Justice CAVANAGH curiously alleges, whether a city 
can 
create 
a 
cause 
of action against nongovernmental entities.  
We also point out that discrimination claims have always 
been 
characterized 
as a species of statutory tort. Donajkowski  
v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 247; 569 NW2d 574 (1999). 
Consequently, Justice CAVANAGH’s suggestion that a charter 
discrimination claim might not fall within the ambit of the 
GTLA is without foundation.  
7  
  
constitutional and statutory limitations.7  
One such statutory limitation involves governmental  
immunity.  In the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), the  
Legislature expressly stated that “[e]xcept as otherwise  
provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from  
tort liability if [it] is engaged in the exercise or discharge  
of a governmental function.” MCL 691.1407(1). Accordingly,  
a governmental agency is immune unless the Legislature has  
pulled back the veil of immunity and allowed suit by citizens  
against the government.  The GTLA allows suit against a  
governmental agency in only five areas.8  However, there are  
7This constitutional limitation on a municipality’s 
authority is repeated in the Home Rule City Act, most 
emphatically in MCL 117.36, which states:  
No provisions of any city charter shall  
conflict with or contravene the provisions of any 
general law of the state.  
See also MCL 117.4j(3), which governs permissible charter 
provisions:  
[Each city may in its charter provide] [f]or  
the exercise of all municipal powers in the  
management and control of municipal property and in 
the administration of the municipal government, 
whether such powers be expressly enumerated or not; 
for any act to advance the interests of the city, 
the 
good 
government 
and 
prosperity 
of 
the  
municipality and its inhabitants and through its 
regularly constituted authority to pass all laws 
and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns 
subject to the constitution and general laws of  
this state. [Emphasis added.]  
8The five statutory exceptions to governmental immunity 
are the “highway exception,” MCL 691.1402, the “motor vehicle  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
other areas outside the GTLA where the Legislature has allowed  
specific actions against the government to stand, such as the  
Civil Rights Act.9 Further, municipalities may be liable  
pursuant to 42 USC 1983. Monell v New York City DSS, 436 US  
658; 98 S Ct 2018; 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978).  
However, none of the exceptions where a suit is allowed  
against the government can be read to allow suit for sexual  
orientation discrimination.  Likewise, no statute grants  
governmental agencies the authority to create an immunity  
exception for sexual orientation discrimination or waive  
immunity in the area of civil rights.  Notably, the CRA, which  
makes a municipality liable for specific civil rights  
violations, neither provides a cause of action for sexual  
orientation discrimination nor grants municipalities the  
authority to create one.  MCL 37.2101 et seq.10  Moreover, the  
exception,” 
MCL 
691.1405, 
the 
“public 
building 
exception,” 
MCL 
691.1406, the “proprietary function exception,” MCL 691.1413, 
and the “governmental hospital exception,” MCL 691.1407(4).  
9 MCL 37.2103(g) and 37.2202(a); see Manning v Hazel  
Park, 202 Mich App 685, 699; 509 NW2d 874 (1993) (governmental 
immunity is not a defense to a claim brought under the Civil 
Rights Act).  
10Indeed, as this Court has consistently held since its 
seminal case, Ross, exceptions to governmental immunity are 
narrowly construed. See, e.g., Haliw v Sterling Heights, 464 
Mich 297, 303; 627 NW2d 581 (2001); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd  
Comm, 463 Mich 143, 149; 615 NW2d 702 (2000); Ross v Consumers  
Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 
(1984). Consequently, because the CRA does not recognize 
sexual orientation discrimination, that act cannot be  
construed as providing a basis for governmental agencies to  
9  
 
  
CRA limits complaints to causes of action for violations of  
the act itself:  
A person alleging a violation of this act may 
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive 
relief or damages, or both. 
[MCL 37.2801(1)  
(emphasis added).][11]  
In sum, without some express legislative authorization,  
the city cannot create a cause of action against itself in  
contravention of the broad scope of governmental immunity  
established by the GTLA.  No such legislative act has  
recognized 
sexual 
orientation 
discrimination 
claims.  
Accordingly, 
this 
Court 
declines 
to 
circumvent 
the 
limitations  
placed on a municipality by the Legislature and recognize a  
cause of action against the city for sexual orientation  
discrimination.12  
create such a cause of action.  
11We make no determination regarding the validity of the 
city’s attempt in its charter to provide a cause of action for 
sex discrimination, a protection similarly provided by the 
CRA. That claim is not before us.  However, in keeping with 
this opinion, we note that, at least in regard to governmental 
immunity, a city may not alter in any respect its liability 
excepted 
from 
governmental 
immunity 
by 
the 
Legislature 
without 
express authority to do so.  
12To be certain, we emphasize that our opinion does not  
address whether a city can create rights, protect against 
discrimination, or create a cause of action against a 
nongovernmental 
entity.  Preemption of civil rights, by either 
the constitution or the Civil Rights Act, is not addressed by 
our opinion.  Rather, our analysis concerns only governmental 
immunity and the city’s lack of authority to create a cause of  
action against a governmental entity in light of state 
governmental immunity law. Accordingly, should there be any 
question concerning the scope of our holding, we hold that any  
10  
 
 
B. A City Cannot Waive Governmental Immunity  
Because the city abandoned its assertion of governmental  
immunity to this Court and the law regarding the nature of  
governmental immunity has been misguided for some time, we  
will address the viability of plaintiff’s complaint here as it  
pertains to governmental immunity.13  
1. The Nature of Governmental Immunity  
A governmental agency is immune from tort liability if  
the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or  
discharge of a governmental function.  MCL 691.1407(1).  This  
Court has taken steps to clarify the origin and history of  
governmental 
immunity, most recently in Pohutski v Allen Park,  
465 Mich 675; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). See also Ross v Consumers  
Powers (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). The  
Court does not need to reiterate that history today, but we  
attempt by the city to create a cause of action against itself 
in its charter for sexual orientation discrimination is  
preempted by the governmental tort liability act.  We have not  
addressed whether the CRA preempts a city from creating 
additional 
civil 
rights or protecting them through means other 
than the creation of a private cause of action, nor have we 
addressed whether a city can create a cause of action against 
a nongovernmental defendant. Those questions are not before 
us.  
13We note that the city raised governmental immunity as 
a defense in the trial court, but failed to argue this issue 
in the Court of Appeals or in this Court.  In light of our 
holding that governmental immunity is not an affirmative 
defense, 
but 
a 
characteristic of government, failure to assert 
its immunity on appeal does not preclude the Court from 
considering it now.  
11  
 
 
 
  
take 
this 
opportunity to clarify that governmental immunity is  
a characteristic of government.  Canon v Thumudo, 430 Mich  
326; 422 NW2d 688 (1988); Hyde v Univ of Michigan Regents, 426  
Mich 223; 393 NW2d 847 (1986); McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65;  
247 NW2d 521 (1976); Markis v Grosse Pointe Park, 180 Mich App  
545; 448 NW2d 352 (1989); Ross, supra at 621, n 34; Galli v  
Kirkeby, 398 Mich 527, 532, 540-541; 248 NW2d 149 (1976). As  
such, plaintiff must plead her case in avoidance of immunity.  
See Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm’rs, 465 Mich 492, 499; 638  
NW2d 396 (2002); Haliw v Sterling Heights, 464 Mich 297, 304;  
627 NW2d 581 (2001); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich  
143, 172, n 29; 615 NW2d 702 (2000); Ross, supra at 621, n 34.  
To the extent that it holds otherwise, McCummings v Hurley  
Medical Ctr, 433 Mich 404; 446 NW2d 114 (1989), is overruled.  
Until 1989, it was well established in Michigan that  
governmental immunity was a characteristic of government.  
See, e.g., Hyde14 and Canon.15  In McCann, Justice RYAN stated  
that a plaintiff must plead facts in avoidance of immunity,  
14“Unlike other claims of immunity, sovereign and  
governmental immunity are not affirmative defenses, but 
characteristics 
of 
government 
which 
prevent 
imposition 
of 
tort 
liability.” Id. at 261, n 35 (citations omitted).  
15“Unlike a claim of individual immunity, sovereign and 
governmental immunity are not affirmative defenses, but 
characteristics 
of 
government 
which 
prevent 
imposition 
of 
tort 
liability.  A plaintiff therefore bears the burden of pleading 
facts in the complaint which show that the action is not 
barred by the governmental immunity act.” Id. at 344, n 10.  
12  
 
reasoning:  
At first impression, it may appear appropriate  
to 
characterize 
governmental 
immunity 
as 
an  
affirmative defense.  However, a careful analysis 
of the doctrine as construed by this Court  
indicates that, to plead a cause of action against 
the state or its agencies, the plaintiff must plead 
and prove facts in avoidance of immunity.  In  
McNair v State Highway Dep’t, 305 Mich 181, 187; 9 
NW2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the 
state’s failure to plead sovereign immunity will 
not constitute a waiver because “failure to plead 
the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a 
cause of action where none existed before.”  In  
Penix v City of St Johns, 354 Mich 259; 92 NW2d 332 
(1958), we held that a complaint which contained no 
averment that the defendant was engaging in a 
proprietary function, and which in fact alleged 
activity to which governmental immunity applied, 
stated no cause of action against the municipality. 
Thus, although we have on occasion referred to  
governmental immunity as a defense, see [McNair]; 
Martinson v Alpena, 328 Mich 595, 599; 44 NW2d 148 
(1950), 
our 
past 
treatment 
of 
the 
doctrine  
indicates that its inapplicability is an element of 
a plaintiff’s case against the state. [McCann,  
supra at 77, n 1 (opinion of RYAN, J.).]  
This reasoning was reiterated nearly ten years later in Ross:  
In [Galli], four members of this Court held 
that plaintiffs must plead facts in their complaint 
in avoidance of immunity, i.e., they must allege 
facts which would justify a finding that the 
alleged tort does not fall within the concept of 
sovereign or governmental immunity.  This may be 
accomplished by stating a claim which fits within 
one of the statutory exceptions or pleading facts 
which demonstrate that the tort occurred during the 
exercise or discharge of a non-governmental or 
proprietary function.  See [McCann, supra at 77]. 
Sovereign 
and 
governmental 
immunity 
are 
not  
affirmative 
defenses, 
but 
characteristics 
of  
government 
which 
prevent 
imposition 
of 
tort  
liability upon the governmental agency. Galli,  
supra, p 541, n 5; McCann, supra, p 77, n 1. [Ross,  
supra at 621, n 34.]  
13  
 
 
 
 
However, 
in 
McCummings, this Court departed from years of  
precedent and concluded that governmental immunity is an  
affirmative 
defense 
rather 
than 
a 
characteristic 
of  
government. The McCummings Court reasoned:  
The pronouncements in Hyde and Canon clearly 
do not square with the statement in Ross that  
“[s]overeign and governmental immunity from tort 
liability exist only when governmental agencies are 
‘engaged in the exercise or discharge of a  
governmental function.’” If it takes a legislative 
decree for immunity to exist, and then only under 
circumstances defined by the Legislature, how can 
it be said that sovereign or governmental immunity 
is a “characteristic of government?”  
We are persuaded that the reasoning in Ross is  
correct, i.e., that immunity from tort liability 
exists only in cases where the governmental agency 
was engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 
governmental function.  The question whether a 
governmental agency was engaged in a governmental 
function when performing the act complained of is a 
question best known to the agency and best asserted 
by it.  It naturally follows that plaintiffs need 
not plead facts in avoidance of immunity, but that 
it is incumbent on the agency to assert its 
immunity as an affirmative defense. The fact that  
the source of the immunity is a legislative act 
makes the contention of immunity no less a matter 
for assertion as an affirmative defense.  
We are also persuaded that there is no sound 
basis for requiring individuals, but not agencies, 
to assert governmental immunity as an affirmative 
defense.
 The source of the immunity from tort 
liability is the same.  MCL 691.1407. 
Nor do we  
perceive any basis for treating the alleged 
immunity of a governmental agency any differently, 
for pleading purposes, from any other type of 
immunity granted by law. 
Immunity must be  
[pleaded] as an affirmative defense. [Id. at 410­
14  
 
 
 
 
411.][16]  
See also Scheurman v Dep’t of Trans, 434 Mich 619; 465 NW2d 66  
(1990); Tyrc v Michigan Veterans’ Fund, 451 Mich 129; 545 NW2d  
642 (1996).  
We conclude that McCummings was wrongly decided and,  
returning to our prior precedent, overrule McCummings’  
conclusion that governmental immunity is an affirmative  
defense.
 MCL 691.1407(1) states, “[e]xcept as otherwise  
provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from  
tort liability if [it] is engaged in the exercise or discharge  
of a governmental function.”  Thus, by its terms, the GTLA  
provides that unless one of the five statutory exceptions  
applies, a governmental agency is protected by immunity.  The  
presumption is, therefore, that a governmental agency is  
immune and can only be subject to suit if a plaintiff’s case  
falls within a statutory exception.  As such, it is the  
responsibility of the party seeking to impose liability on a  
governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within  
one of the exceptions.  
In addition to the textual support for this conclusion in  
the language of the GTLA, we note that the McCummings Court  
relied on a substantively flawed analysis in reaching the  
contrary opinion. First, the McCummings Court’s reliance on  
16The McCummings Court also amended MCR 2.111(F)(3) to  
reflect its holding. Id. at 412.  
15  
 
 
  
 
Ross to support its conclusion that governmental immunity is  
an affirmative defense is perplexing, given that Ross itself  
described governmental immunity as a characteristic of  
government. Id. at 621, n 34.  Second, in support of its  
analysis the McCummings Court asked, “If it takes a  
legislative decree for immunity to exist, and then only under  
circumstances defined by the Legislature, how can it be said  
that sovereign or governmental immunity is a ‘characteristic  
of government?’” Id. at 410-411.  
In response, we merely observe that, historically,  
Michigan recognized at common law governmental immunity for  
all levels of government until this Court chose to abrogate  
governmental immunity for municipalities in 1961. Williams v  
Detroit, 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).  In response to  
Williams and the possibility that this Court would further  
erode the remaining common-law governmental immunity for  
counties, 
townships, 
and 
villages, 
the 
Legislature 
enacted 
the  
Governmental 
Immunity 
Act 
of 
1964 
(GIA), 
thereby 
reinstituting  
governmental immunity protection for municipalities and  
preserving sovereign immunity for the state. In effect, the  
GIA restored the Williams status quo ante. Pohutski, supra at  
682.
 Thus, contrary to McCummings, it did not take a  
legislative decree to create governmental immunity, but a  
legislative act to preserve the doctrine that this Court had  
16  
 
 
historically recognized as a characteristic of government.  
The 
McCummings 
suggestion 
that 
governmental 
immunity 
could 
not  
be a characteristic of government because it was created by  
legislation misapprehends the history of the Court’s actions  
and the legislative response.  We believe that once the  
sequence of the judicial and legislative events is grasped,  
the analytical flaw at the root of McCummings is apparent.17  
For these reasons,18 we overrule McCummings19 to this  
extent and return to the longstanding principle extant before  
17More important, notwithstanding that governmental 
immunity is now established by a legislative act rather than 
the common law, we hold that the Legislature is within its 
inherent constitutional authority to structure governmental 
immunity solely as it deems appropriate. 
Where the  
Legislature has afforded municipalities the protection of 
governmental immunity and done so in a comprehensive fashion 
as it has done in the GTLA, the governmental immunity as set 
forth in the GTLA is a characteristic of government.  
18We note that requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden 
of pleading in avoidance of governmental immunity is also 
consistent with a central purpose of governmental immunity, 
that is, to prevent a drain on the state’s financial 
resources, by avoiding even the expense of having to contest 
on the merits any claim barred by governmental immunity.  
19In overruling McCummings, the Court is mindful of the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  Stare decisis, however, is not 
meant to be mechanically applied to prevent the Court from 
overruling earlier erroneous decisions.  Robinson v Detroit, 
462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).  Rather, stare decisis 
is a “principle of policy” not “an inexorable command,” and 
the Court is not constrained to follow precedent when 
governing decisions are badly reasoned.  Id. at 464. 
We  
conclude 
that 
it 
is 
appropriate to overrule McCummings despite 
stare decisis because that case was both badly reasoned and 
inconsistent with a more intrinsically sound prior doctrine 
and the actual text of the GTLA.  
17  
McCummings that, governmental immunity being a characteristic  
of government, a party suing a unit of government must plead  
in avoidance of governmental immunity.20 
 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint  
A plaintiff pleads in avoidance of governmental immunity  
by stating a claim that fits within a statutory exception or  
by pleading facts that demonstrate that the alleged tort  
occurred 
during 
the 
exercise or discharge of a nongovernmental  
or proprietary function.  McCann, supra at 77. Plaintiff did  
neither in this case.  
Governmental 
immunity 
protects 
the 
conduct 
of  
governmental agencies, which include two types of actors: the  
state and political subdivisions. MCL 691.1401(d).  The  
Detroit Police Department, as a political subdivision, MCL  
691.1401(b), is a “governmental agency” for purposes of  
20We apply this holding to plaintiff’s sexual orientation 
claim, but remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration 
of plaintiff’s other claims, as indicated previously. See n  
1.
 
With 
the 
exception 
of 
her 
sexual 
orientation  
discrimination claim against the city, which is disposed of in 
this opinion, plaintiff shall be allowed to amend her  
complaint to attempt to plead in avoidance of governmental 
immunity in regard to her other claims.  
As to all other cases pending that involve governmental 
immunity, plaintiffs shall be allowed to amend their  
complaints in order to plead in avoidance of governmental 
immunity.  If a case is pending on appeal and governmental 
immunity is a controlling issue, the Court of Appeals may 
remand to allow amendment.  As MCR 2.111(F)(3) encompasses 
other species of “immunity granted by law,” but does not 
explicitly 
refer 
to 
governmental immunity, it is not necessary 
to amend the court rule because of our holding.  
18  
governmental immunity.  MCL 691.1401(d).  As such, absent the  
applicability of a statutory exception, it is immune from tort  
liability if the tort claims arise from the department’s  
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.  MCL  
691.1407(1).  “‘Governmental function’ is an activity that is  
expressly 
or 
impliedly 
mandated 
or 
authorized 
by 
constitution,  
statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.”  MCL  
691.1401(f).
 It is well established in Michigan that the  
management, operation, and control of a police department is  
a governmental function. Moore v Detroit, 128 Mich App 491,  
496-497; 340 NW2d 640 (1983); Graves v Wayne Co, 124 Mich App  
36, 40-41; 333 NW2d 740 (1983).  
Plaintiff’s claims regarding the police department all  
involve decisions that are part and parcel of the department’s  
discharge of governmental functions. The decisions at issue  
in this case are job reassignment, distribution of vacation  
time, and determining the extent to which department officers  
are 
involved 
in 
investigations.  These are ordinary day-to-day  
decisions that the police department makes in the course of  
discharging its governmental function.  As such, the police  
department’s conduct is within the scope of § 7.  Thus,  
plaintiff’s claim is barred unless it falls within one of the  
statutory exceptions.  As discussed above, plaintiff’s sexual  
orientation discrimination claim falls under no immunity  
exception.  
19  
Further, plaintiff’s complaint makes no mention of  
governmental immunity with respect to any of her claims. In  
fact, it was not until the city moved for summary disposition  
that plaintiff claimed that her action was not barred by  
governmental immunity.  Even then, however, plaintiff’s  
responsive 
pleading 
went only to her intentional infliction of  
emotional distress claim, which she abandoned by failing to  
raise it in the Court of Appeals.  
Because plaintiff failed to state a claim that fits  
within a statutory exception or plead facts that demonstrate  
that the alleged tort occurred during the exercise or  
discharge of a nongovernmental or proprietary function, we  
conclude that plaintiff did not plead and could not plead in  
avoidance of governmental immunity and that her sexual  
orientation 
discrimination 
claim 
should 
have 
been 
dismissed 
on  
the city’s motion for summary disposition.  
IV. The Dissents  
Justices Weaver and Cavanagh criticize our opinion  
primarily on the ground that our decision is allegedly reached  
without the benefit of briefing or argument.  This argument  
camouflages their reluctance to address the core legal  
questions at hand.  
First, concerning McCummings, additional briefing would  
not assist this Court in addressing this question of law. All  
the relevant argument is embodied in the years of case law on  
20  
 
 
 
 
the nature of governmental immunity. 
Of that case law,  
McCummings is an aberration; its doctrine stands alone in our  
jurisprudential history in holding that governmental immunity  
is an affirmative defense and not a characteristic of  
government.
 
In 
this 
case, 
we 
addressed 
which 
was  
aberrational: McCummings or the remaining eighty years of case  
law. We have concluded that McCummings was the aberration.  
Regarding 
the 
dissenters’ assertion that the issue of the  
charter being preempted by the GTLA was not briefed or raised  
by the parties, we note that the issue was squarely in front  
of the parties.  The central question in this case was whether  
the charter’s purported creation of a cause of action for  
sexual orientation discrimination is preempted by state law.  
The governmental tort liability act is a state law.  If the  
charter creates a cause of action for sexual orientation  
discrimination, then it conflicts with the state law of  
governmental immunity.  
Questioning by several members of  
this Court at oral argument specifically raised the  
governmental immunity issue.21
 We absolutely oppose the  
21  
Justice TAYLOR: . . . I’ve got a question which 
is on a little different track. Pompey and Holmes  
in their most elementary reading give private 
causes of action for civil rights problems. They, 
however, give that cause of action to one citizen 
against another.  One of the old really venerable 
principles of law is of course that the government 
can only be sued when it allows itself to be sued. 
Why is it not the case that Pompey and Holmes could  
21  
 
dissenters’ apparent position that although a controlling  
legal issue is squarely before this Court, in this case  
preemption by state law, the parties’ failure or refusal to  
offer correct solutions to the issue limits this Court’s  
ability to probe for and provide the correct solution. Such  
an approach would seriously curtail the ability of this Court  
to function effectively and, interestingly, given the  
dissenters’ position, actually make oral argument a moot  
practice.  
To be certain, we emphasize that, contrary to Justice  
be left entirely intact and a court hold that 
whatever they said, they never abrogated the  
immunity that a government has that it can only 
eliminate expressly, that is the ability to not be 
sued.  Said better, why wouldn’t it be a sensible 
thing for a court to hold that whatever Pompey and  
Holmes said, they never gave authority to sue a 
city or any other kind of government, and there is 
nowhere in the statutes or the constitution where  
governmental immunity in this regard has been 
abrogated.  And we always have to read our law, I 
think, our case law is that we always tilt in the 
direction of immunity.  
* * *  
Justice YOUNG: Why do you read this provision 
[CRA] as abrogating governmental immunity? . . . .  
* * *  
Justice MARKMAN: 
But 
Justice TA Y L O R’s  
question as I understand is a more generic question 
. . . It’s whether the municipality can create any 
cause of action that will burden the sovereign to a 
greater extent.  
22  
 
CAVANAGH’s 
allegation, 
we 
have 
not 
disregarded 
“the  
foundational 
principles 
of 
our 
adversarial 
system of  
adjudication.” Post at 1. Rather, addressing a controlling  
legal issue despite the failure of the parties to properly  
frame the issue is a well understood judicial principle. See  
Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 549, 558; 121 S  
Ct 1043; 149 L Ed 2d 63 (2001) (majority and dissent both  
stating that whether to address an issue not briefed or  
contested by the parties is left to discretion of the Court);  
Seattle v McCready, 123 Wash 2d 260, 269; 868 P2d 134 (1994)  
(indicating that the court “is not constrained by the issues  
as 
framed 
by 
the 
parties 
if 
the 
parties 
ignore a  
constitutional mandate, a statutory commandment, or an  
established precedent”).  In fact, all three dissenters  
recently signed or concurred in an opinion where this Court  
decided an issue not raised or briefed by any party.  
Federated Publications, Inc v Lansing, 467 Mich ___; ___ NW2d  
___ 
(2002) 
(resolving 
a 
standard 
of 
review 
issue).  
Accordingly, we find no merit in the dissents’ criticism of  
our opinion on the ground that the parties did not brief the  
issue themselves and interpret their dissenting statements as  
an indication of their reluctance to address the core legal  
questions before us.  
In his dissent, Justice CAVANAGH has fired his standard  
shot: this Court overrules cases capriciously.  Now he has  
23  
 
added a fusillade, suggesting that the majority “tees up”  
issues it wants the parties to brief, and somewhat  
inconsistently, that the majority decides matters without  
briefing by the parties.  While we recognize that following  
the law as enacted by our Legislature is sometimes at odds  
with our dissenting colleague’s personal policy preferences,  
our constitutional duty demands that we follow the rule of  
law.  While Justice CAVANAGH chooses to characterize his policy  
frustrations as the majority’s judicial disobedience, neither  
the law, this Court’s history, nor Justice CAVANAGH’s own  
judicial history supports his characterization.  
On the so-called briefing issue, we think Justice CAVANAGH  
wants it both ways.  In this case, where the controlling legal  
issue was discovered after the parties had submitted their  
briefs, Justice CAVANAGH complains.  In other cases, when the  
Court has believed there might be a controlling issue on which  
it wanted the benefit of the parties’ briefing, Justice  
CAVANAGH also complains. See, e.g., Robinson v Detroit, 462  
Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (a case cited in his footnote  
9), wherein Justice CAVANAGH dissented, criticizing the  
majority for flagging in its grant order a legal issue the  
Court specifically wanted briefed by the parties. 461 Mich  
1201.22  
22For example, Justice CAVANAGH cites People v Hardiman, 
465 Mich 902; 638 NW2d 744 (2001), as an example of this Court  
24  
 
 
Apart from Justice CAVANAGH’s desire to have it both ways  
on the issue of party “briefing,” no one can seriously  
question the right of this Court to set forth the law as  
clearly as it can, irrespective whether the parties assist the  
Court in fulfilling its constitutional function. 
The  
jurisprudence of Michigan cannot be, and is not, dependent  
upon whether individual parties accurately identify and  
elucidate controlling legal questions. 
 Concerning Justice CAVANAGH’s habitual assertion that  
this Court casually disregards stare decisis, we note that  
Justice CAVANAGH himself is no stranger to overruling  
precedent.  See, e.g., DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398  
NW2d 896 (1986), overruling Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483;  
asking the parties if a precedent should be overruled, People  
v Atley, 392 Mich 298; 220 NW2d 465 (1974). 
We note that  
Justice CAVANAGH agreed that Atley should be overruled in his  
partial concurrence in Hardiman. 465 Mich 417, 432; 646 NW2d 
744 (2002).  
Similarly, Justice CAVANAGH criticizes this Court for  
asking the parties to brief whether the federal subjective 
entrapment test should be adopted in Michigan in our grant 
order in People v Johnson, ___ Mich ____; ___ NW2d ___ (2002).  
465 Mich 911 (2001).  However, when Justice CAVANAGH was in the  
majority, the Court asked the parties to do the very same 
thing in People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61; 461 NW2d 884 (1990).  
433 Mich 1226 (1989).  
Finally, we note that in regard to the majority deciding 
issues not briefed by the parties, Justice CAVANAGH recently 
authored the opinion in Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich ___; 
___ NW2d ___ (2002), in which this Court decided an issue that 
was never briefed by the parties.  That is, applying the 
common meaning of “motor vehicle” to determine whether the 
term encompasses a forklift.  
25  
 
 
 
 
 
330 NW2d 22 (1982); AFSCME v Highland Park Bd of Ed, 457 Mich  
74; 577 NW2d 79 (1998), overruling Ensley v Associated  
Terminals, Inc, 304 Mich 522; 8 NW2d 161 (1943); Haske v  
Transport Leasing, Inc, 455 Mich 628, 652; 566 NW2d 896  
(1997), overruling Rea v Regency Olds/Mazda/Volvo, 450 Mich  
1201; 536 NW2d 542 (1995); W T Andrew Co v Mid-State Surety,  
450 Mich 655; 545 NW2d 351 (1996), overruling Weinberg v Univ  
of Michigan Regents, 97 Mich 246; 56 NW 605 (1893); People v  
Kevorkian, 447 Mich 436; 527 NW2d 714 (1994), overruling  
People v Roberts, 211 Mich 187; 178 NW 690 (1920); In re  
Hatcher, 443 Mich 426; 505 NW2d 834 (1993), overruling Fritts  
v Krugh, 354 Mich 97; 92 NW2d 604 (1958); Mead v Batchlor, 435  
Mich 480; 460 NW2d 493 (1990), overruling (to the extent  
inconsistent) Sword v Sword, 399 Mich 367; 249 NW2d 88 (1976);  
Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271; 454 NW2d 85 (1990), overruling  
unidentified prior Supreme Court cases; Schwartz v Flint, 426  
Mich 295; 395 NW2d 678 (1986), overruling Ed Zaagman, Inc v  
Kentwood, 406 Mich 137; 277 NW2d 475 (1979); McMillan v State  
Hwy Comm, 426 Mich 46; 393 NW2d 332 (1986), overruling Cramer  
v Detroit Edison Co, 296 Mich 662; 296 NW 831 (1941), and  
Dawson v Postal Telegraph-Cable Co, 265 Mich 139; 251 NW 352  
(1933).  
More important, we emphasize that this stout defense of  
stare decisis by Justices CAVANAGH and KELLY is their standard  
26  
 
 
 
argument when they are unhappy with the result of an opinion.  
See Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2002)  
(KELLY, J., dissenting). 
Their charge is that the new  
composition of this Court is the explanatory variable for a  
deteriorating respect for precedent. Sington provides the  
latest example of their argument, but it also demonstrates how  
statistically insignificant are the occasions when this Court  
(as opposed to its pre-1999 predecessor) has overturned its  
prior cases.  
In Sington, Justice KELLY states that, in the five years  
from 1993 to 1997, twelve cases were overturned by this Court  
whereas in the four and a half years from 1998 to July, 2002,  
twenty-two cases were overturned.  During the 1993 to 1997  
period, the Court overruled precedent at a rate of about one­
twelfth of one percent (12 of 13,682 cases disposed of), while  
during the 1998 to 2002 period, the Court overruled precedent  
at about a rate of one-fifth of one percent (22 of 11,190).  
The contrast is one-twelfth of one percent in the Court’s  
“good ole days” versus one-fifth of one percent in the new  
world of the current Court, even counting against the current  
Court the six cases decided in 1998 before this majority came  
into existence. 
Viewed in this context, no neutral  
commentator would conclude that the majority has a complete  
disregard for stare decisis, but that the dissenters are  
strict adherents.  In other words, Justice KELLY and Justice  
27  
CAVANAGH’s records do not reflect a previous hard line  
adherence to stare decisis and their dissatisfaction is not  
with our alleged lack of adherence to stare decisis, but in  
their inability to reach the policy choice they prefer given  
the majority’s commitment to follow the laws enacted by our  
Legislature.  
I think it is fair to say that the cases Justice CAVANAGH  
cites in footnote 9 more probably reveal his desire that this  
Court never address a controlling legal issue.  Yet, we  
welcome Justice CAVANAGH’s newly announced repudiation of  
“judicial activism in any form.”  We question whether his new  
judicial philosophy includes the obligation to respect and  
follow the law, even where it is inconvenient to one’s policy  
preferences or even when the parties fail to bring the  
controlling law to the Court’s attention.  
V. Conclusion  
We hold that regardless whether the charter attempted to  
create a private cause of action against the city for sexual  
orientation discrimination, it could not do so without  
contravening governmental immunity law.  Accordingly, this  
Court is without authority to act on plaintiff’s request to  
recognize such a cause of action.  
In addition, we hold that, governmental immunity being a  
characteristic of government, a party suing a unit of  
government must plead in avoidance of governmental immunity.  
28  
We overrule McCummings to the extent it holds otherwise.  
Plaintiff did not plead in avoidance of governmental  
immunity in her complaint.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals  
holding is reversed, and the trial court’s order for summary  
disposition in favor of defendant is reinstated with regard to  
the 
sexual 
orientation discrimination claim.  Because the city  
did not appeal the Court of Appeals resolution of the sex  
discrimination claim, we remand that issue to the Court of  
Appeals for reconsideration in light of this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
YOUNG, J.  
29  
 
 
___________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LINDA MACK,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118468  
THE CITY OF DETROIT, 
a Michigan Municipal Corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion  
that a cause of action created by defendant’s city charter and  
brought against the city of Detroit would contravene the  
governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407.  I  
further 
object 
to 
the majority’s assertion that plaintiff must  
plead in avoidance of governmental immunity.  
In reaching its holding, the majority disregards the  
foundational 
principles 
of 
our 
adversarial 
system of  
adjudication.
 As protectors of justice, we refrain from  
deciding issues without giving each party a full and fair  
  
 
 
opportunity to be heard.  But not for this concern, the  
judicially 
created 
doctrine of standing would be discarded, as  
it 
ensures 
“concrete 
adverseness 
which 
sharpens 
the  
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends  
for illumination . . . .” Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 204; 82  
S Ct 691; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962) (Brennan, J.).  However, the  
majority has disregarded such considerations, misconstruing  
the proper scope of its authority, by making dispositive an  
issue never argued or briefed by the parties.  Neither of the  
parties has had the benefit of sharing with this Court their  
thoughts on the effect of the tort immunity act on this case,  
though the implications of the majority’s holding are vast.  
Never before have I witnessed such overreaching conduct from  
members of this Court.  
I. THE GTLA DOES NOT NULLIFY PRIVATE ACTIONS CREATED BY A CITY  
In the majority’s haste to apply the GTLA, it fails to  
adequately consider several foundational issues. First, the  
majority 
neglects 
to 
properly 
address 
a 
dispositive  
preliminary issue: is an action alleging a violation of a city  
charter a tort?  Neither plaintiff nor defendant considered  
this claim a tort.  Further, because a charter is a city’s  
“constitution,” Bivens v Grand Rapids, 443 Mich 391, 401; 505  
NW2d 239 (1993), this action does not resemble our typical  
understanding of a tort.  It is far from clear that the  
2  
 
Legislature intended that the GTLA preclude such actions, and  
the majority’s reference to Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460  
Mich 243, 247; 569 NW2d 574 (1999), which proclaimed in the  
most cursory fashion that a statutory violation sounds in  
tort, does not aid in this determination.  At the very least,  
briefing and argument on this issue could have clarified the  
nature of the debate.  
Moreover, the majority’s claim that the scope of the GTLA  
nullifies any attempt by a city to create a cause of action  
that could be brought against a governmental agency ignores  
the fact that the tort immunity act does not bar gross  
negligence 
claims 
against 
government 
officers, 
MCL  
691.1407(2), nor does it prohibit actions brought against  
government entities for injuries arising out of actions not  
related to the discharge of a “government function.”  MCL  
691.1407(1).  Thus, even if one concludes that plaintiff’s  
claim against the city properly sounds in negligence, a cause  
of action created by the Detroit charter could be brought  
under the theory of gross negligence against government  
officers or against the city when not engaged in a government  
function.  Therefore, the majority errs in concluding that any  
action created by a city’s charter that could be brought  
against a governmental entity would violate the GTLA.  
3  
 
 
  
II. THE CHARTER CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION  
Having 
demonstrated why the issue is not “irrelevant,” in  
spite of the majority’s assertions otherwise, I believe it is  
necessary to clarify that the plain language of the charter  
creates a cause of action.1  
The Detroit citizenry clearly has the right to be free  
from discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual  
orientation:  
The city has an affirmative duty to secure the 
equal protection of the law for each person and to 
insure equality of opportunity for all persons.  No  
person shall be denied the enjoyment of civil or 
political rights or be discriminated against in the 
exercise thereof because of race, color, creed, 
national origin, age, handicap, sex, or sexual 
orientation.
 [Charter, Declaration of Rights, 
§ 2.]  
Defendant city of Detroit, however, claims the plain language  
of the charter prescribes an exclusive administrative remedy  
for this broadly pronounced right, prohibiting enforcement by  
its citizenry:  
The city may enforce this declaration of 
rights and other rights retained by the people. 
[Id. at § 8.]  
Defendant’s cursory assertion that this provision prohibits  
individual enforcement of the rights granted in the charter  
1 See Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682, 691; 520 NW2d 135 
(1994) 
(“The 
prevailing 
rules 
regarding 
statutory 
construction 
are well established and extend to the construction of home  
rule charters.”)  
4  
 
 
 
results 
from 
an 
erroneous interpretation of the plain language  
of the text.2  Certainly this provision grants the city the  
authority to enforce the rights proclaimed in the charter.  
However, this grant of authority is not exclusive.  The  
drafters gave the city the power to enforce the declaration of  
rights and other rights retained by the people. 
If one  
accepts defendant’s claim that this text gives the city the  
exclusive authority to enforce the declaration of rights, the  
drafters also would have granted to the city the exclusive  
authority to enforce “other rights retained by the people.”  
In other words, with the adoption of the charter as  
constructed by defendant, the people of Detroit purportedly  
stripped themselves of their ability to bring civil actions to  
enforce any “other right.” Even if the city had the authority  
to enforce these rights, the text simply does not support such  
an unprecedented grant of authority.  
Further, the drafters used “may,” not “shall,” in this  
provision. “May” suggests that one “is permitted to” or has  
discretion.  Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).  If the drafters  
had intended to grant the city the exclusive authority to  
enforce the charter, they certainly would have used “shall,”  
mandating such action.  Id. (“shall” implies a duty or  
2 This Court has certainly consistently eschewed any 
deviation from our “textualist” approach.  
5  
 
requirement).  Moreover, the citizens of Detroit surely did  
not intend to grant the city the discretionary and exclusive  
power to enforce both the rights under the charter and all  
others retained by the people.  Thus, by use of the permissive  
and 
discretionary 
term, the drafters indicated an intention to  
permit enforcement mechanisms beyond those powers granted to  
the city.  Any other interpretation ignores the text of the  
charter.  
Reference to the city’s ordinances supports this  
interpretation of the charter.3
 In 1988, the city  
deliberately 
clarified 
that 
those 
who 
experienced  
discrimination on the basis of AIDS and conditions related to  
AIDS could bring a civil action to enforce their rights  
granted by the city.  Chapter 27, article 7 prohibits such  
discrimination in the employment, housing, business, and  
educational arenas.  See generally, §§ 27-7-1 to 27-7-90. In  
particular, the charter prohibits discrimination in the  
provision of public facilities or services. Section 27-7-7.  
The enforcement provision includes the following subsection:  
Any 
aggrieved 
person 
may 
enforce 
the  
provisions of this article by means of a civil 
action. [Section 27-7-10(a).]  
3 Brady v Detroit, 353 Mich 243, 248; 91 NW2d 257 (1958) 
(“Provisions pertaining to a given subject matter must be 
construed together, and if possible harmonized.  It may not be 
assumed that the adoption of conflicting provisions was 
intended.”)  
6  
  
Clearly, the city intended to create a civil cause of action  
for the victims of such discriminatory practices.  Assuming  
drafters of the ordinance did not intend to contravene the  
charter, which we must, we may only conclude that the  
authority granted to the city in the declaration of rights,  
§ 8, did not give the city the sole right to enforce the  
charter.  
Although defendant correctly referenced ordinance 27-7­
10, it draws the wrong conclusion.  As noted, article 7 of  
chapter 27 was enacted in 1988.  Detroit Ordinance § 24-88,  
July 14, 1988; see also Detroit Ordinance § 33-88, September  
21, 1988.  In contrast, the enabling ordinances at issue here  
were enacted in 1979.  Detroit Ordinance § 303-H, January 24,  
1979.  It is entirely reasonable to conclude that the city  
simply intended to clarify that a private cause of action  
could be had under the charter when enacting § 27-7-10, as had  
been authorized implicitly by the charter.  
The inclusion of § 27-2-10 was particularly appropriate  
because of the circuit courts’ treatment of similar claims.  
In this case, for example, the court noted that this issue had  
arisen in the past.  Without direction from the Court of  
Appeals, the trial court refused to recognize a cause of  
action. Certainly an ordinance or charter amendment that made  
clear that a cause of action existed for a violation of any  
7  
 
 
 
 
right provided by the charter would have made this exercise  
even simpler. 
However, its absence cannot force the  
conclusion 
that 
an 
action 
only 
for 
AIDS-related 
discrimination  
was intended.  In this age of the overly rhetorical and often  
vacuous concern over “special rights,” it is unreasonable to  
presume the charter permits individual actions for AIDS­
related discrimination, but not for the other forms of  
discrimination enumerated in the declaration of rights, § 2.  
Therefore, though we often rely on the maxim that the  
inclusion of one term implies the exclusion of another, that  
inference loses force where the circumstances indicate  
otherwise.4
 In this case, the circumstances suggest the  
opposite, i.e., that the express provision of a cause of  
action 
for 
AIDS-related 
discrimination 
only 
clarifies 
that 
the  
charter permitted such actions for all violations.  
Additional support for this conclusion can be found in  
the drafters’ decision to include two provisions that suggest  
that Detroit’s citizens retained the right to sue for  
violations of the charter. The declaration of rights clearly  
states:  
The enumeration of certain rights in this  
4 See Luttrell v Dep’t of Corrections, 421 Mich 93, 102; 
365 NW2d 74 (1984) (holding that “the effect of the rule 
‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius,’ while a valid maxim,  
[may be] so much at odds with the other [rules of  
construction] 
that 
reason 
dictates 
it 
[may 
be] 
inapplicable”).  
8  
 
 
Charter shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. [Declaration of 
Rights, § 7.]  
In that same vein, the charter’s chapter on human rights ends  
with the following proclamation:  
This chapter shall not be construed to  
diminish the right of any party to direct any 
immediate legal or equitable remedies in any court 
or other tribunal. [Section 7-1007.]  
This evidence indicates an intention to create a scheme  
whereby 
the 
administrative 
remedies 
supplement 
an 
individual’s  
ability to bring a private cause of action.5  In light of this  
analysis, a rational interpreter must conclude that neither  
the drafters nor the citizenry intended to grant the city  
exclusive, 
discretionary 
authority 
to 
remedy 
violations 
of 
the  
rights granted in the charter. Therefore, I would hold that  
the charter does, in fact, create a damages action for  
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
III. IMMUNITY AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE  
The majority has opportunistically seized on the  
5The charter’s preamble provides additional support for 
the conclusion that the charter created both rights and 
remedies to which the city itself must adhere:  
We, the people of Detroit, do ordain and 
establish this Charter for the governance of our 
city, as it addresses the programs, services and 
needs of our citizens; . . . pledging that all our  
officials, elected and appointed, will be held  
accountable 
to 
fulfill 
the 
intent 
of 
this 
Charter . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
9 
circumstances presented in this case to overrule decades of  
sound precedent and unsettle an area of law that had finally  
achieved some stability. In proclaiming that plaintiff must  
plead in avoidance of immunity, the majority ignores not only  
the value of precedent, but also the sound principles on which  
McCummings v Hurley Medical Ctr, 433 Mich 404; 446 NW2d 114  
(1989), was based.  In McCummings, the Court held that the  
entity 
claiming 
immunity 
must 
affirmatively 
plead 
the 
defense.  
This unanimous pronouncement was based, in part, on the  
doctrine’s statutory foundation.  No longer could we solely  
rely on the doctrine’s common-law history to determine the  
parameters of the defense.6  Therefore, though the judiciary  
traditionally considered sovereignty a “characteristic” of  
government, this understanding was no longer dispositive of  
procedural 
or 
substantive 
issues 
once 
the 
Legislature 
codified  
the doctrine.  This view is no less relevant today, and the  
majority’s 
attempt 
to proclaim otherwise by once again relying  
on outdated jargon adds little to our understanding of  
governmental immunity.  
Having identified a flaw in the majority’s deceptively  
useful rationale (i.e., because the Court has declared  
6 See Const 1963, art 3, sec 7 (“The common law and the 
statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, 
shall remain in force until they expire by their own 
limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.”)  
10  
immunity a “characteristic” in the past, it is not an  
affirmative defense), we must now turn to its substantive  
conclusions. Does the governmental immunity statute require  
that plaintiffs plead in avoidance of immunity?  MCL 691.  
1407(1) provides:  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
government agency is immune from tort liability if 
[it] is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 
governmental function.  
Although this section makes clear that governmental entities  
may 
claim 
immunity 
when performing a governmental function, it  
does not, as the majority claims, create a textual presumption  
in favor of the government.  Rather, the statute identifies  
the scope of immunity.  The procedural duty to plead is simply  
not mentioned, and as such, the text–as it pertains to  
pleading–is silent.  
Building on this Court’s pronouncement in Ross v  
Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 333 NW2d 641  
(1984), which clarified that the Legislature intended that  
immunity from tort liability exist only when an entity was  
engaged in a governmental function, the McCummings Court  
arrived at the most logical conclusion, i.e., that “[t]he  
question whether a governmental agency was engaged in a  
governmental 
function when performing the act complained of is  
a question best known to the agency and best asserted by it.”  
11  
  
 
Id. at 411.7 
Furthermore, the McCummings Court correctly  
noted that no valid reason to exempt agencies from the  
pleading burden placed upon individuals could be discerned.  
The source of immunity for both government bodies and  
individuals is grounded in § 1407. Because the text makes no  
distinction in this regard, a prudent observer will agree that  
the majority’s reversal is based on its own policy  
considerations, which ignore both the intent of the  
Legislature and the judicially sound doctrine of stare  
decisis.  This is particularly true because, though the  
Legislature revised the GTLA after McCummings in 1986, 1996,  
and 1999, it failed to amend the statute to alter the rule  
that placed the burden of pleading on the government.  
Unfortunately, the majority dismisses this legislative  
acquiescence, an indicator of its intent.  
In sum, the fact remains that governmental immunity is a  
defense to liability. 
Although the majority erroneously  
declares that plaintiff must plead in avoidance of the  
doctrine, the government continues to bear the onus of proof.  
If a trial court finds the parties have equally carried the  
7The Court in Ross undertook an almost impossible task, 
clarifying more than a century’s worth of judicial and 
legislative commentary on governmental immunity.  It did not, 
however, examine on which party the burden of pleading should 
fall.  Any reference to that burden in Ross does not, contrary 
to 
the 
majority’s 
assertions, diminish the foundation on which 
the Court in McCummings relied.  
12  
 
 
 
burden of production concerning the applicability of the  
doctrine, the court must find for the plaintiff.  Any  
indication to the contrary in the majority’s opinion may only  
be referenced as dicta, as the issue this case presents is  
limited to the sufficiency of the pleadings.  
Shockingly, without the issue being contemplated, let  
alone raised by the parties, the majority concludes that  
plaintiff’s claim should have been dismissed for its failure  
to plead in avoidance of government immunity. Slip op at 2,  
21-22, 26.  However, our precedent and court rules had  
expressly placed this burden on the government. I object to  
the majority’s application of its holding, which placed the  
burden of prescience on plaintiff.  
IV. PRINCIPLES OF THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM  
The majority’s disingenuous response to the dissenting  
opinions 
requires 
clarification.  The majority claims that any  
briefing on the propriety of the rule in McCummings would be  
a waste of time because “additional briefing would not assist  
this Court in addressing this question of law.”  Slip op at  
22.  This comment flies in the face of the foundations of our  
adversarial system, in which the parties frame the issues and  
arguments for a (presumably) passive tribunal. 
The  
adversarial system ensures the best presentation of arguments  
and theories because each party is motivated to succeed.  
13  
 
 
 
Moreover, the adversarial system attempts to ensure that an  
active 
judge 
refrain 
from 
allowing 
a 
preliminary 
understanding  
of the issues to improperly influence the final decision.  
This allows the judiciary to keep an open mind until the  
proofs and arguments have been adequately submitted.8
 In  
spite of these underlying concerns, the majority today claims  
that the benefits of full briefing are simply a formality that  
can be discarded without care.  The majority fails to  
comprehend how the skilled advocates in this case could have  
added anything insightful in the debate over the proper  
interpretation of a century’s worth of precedent.  Whatever  
its 
motivation, 
the 
majority undermines the foundations of our  
adversarial system.  
The majority also implies that the “central question in  
this case was whether the charter’s purported creation of a  
cause of action for sexual orientation discrimination is  
preempted” by the GTLA. Slip op at 23. However, the extent  
of the parties’ preemption briefing focused solely on the  
relevance of the Civil Rights Act vis-à-vis the charter­
created cause of action.  Moreover, the questions by this  
Court during oral argument do not substitute for proper  
8 See Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law, pp 120-123, 
126-129, 131-135, cited in Tidmarsh & Trangsrud, Complex  
Litigation and the Adversary System, (New York: Foundation  
Press, 1988).  
14  
  
 
 
briefing, but only illustrate how the Court pursues its own  
end in a fashion unanticipated by the parties.  
While occasionally a court may find it necessary to  
resolve an issue not briefed by the parties, the frequency  
with which the majority undertakes such activist endeavors  
demonstrates its desire to arrive at its destination.9  
9 The majority frequently engages in at least three 
distinct types of activist behavior: overruling precedent; in 
grants of leave, directing parties to address issues not 
initially raised or briefed by the parties in their  
application for leave to appeal; and, as in this case, holding 
dispositive issues neither raised nor argued before this 
Court.  
To review instances where this majority has overruled 
precedent, see, e.g., People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; ___ NW2d 
___ (2002); Koontz v Ameritech Svcs, Inc, 466 Mich 304; 645 
NW2d 34 (2002); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 
732; 641 NW2d 567 (2002); Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 
Mich 675; 641 NW2d 219 (2002); Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm'rs, 
465 Mich 492; 638 NW2d 396 (2002); Brown v Genesee Co Bd of  
Cmmr's, 464 Mich 430; 628 NW2d 471 (2001); People v Glass, 464  
Mich 266; 627 NW2d 261 (2001); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 
463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000); Mudel v Great Atlantic &  
Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2000); Stitt v  
Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591; 614 NW2d 88  
(2000); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000); 
People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411; 605 NW2d 667 (2000);  
McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15; 597 NW2d 148 (1999); People  
v Lukity, 460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); Ritchie-Gamester  
v Berkley, 461 Mich 73; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).  
For examples of grant orders which directed the parties’ 
to address issues the majority found relevant, see People v  
Glass, 461 Mich 1005; 610 NW2d 872 (2000) (directing the 
parties to address whether the prosecutor’s actions removed 
the taint of alleged racial discrimination in the grand jury 
selection process, whether MCR 6.112 conflicted with MCL 
767.29, 
and 
whether 
the Court properly exercised its authority 
over criminal procedure).  See also People v Hardiman, 465  
(continued...) 
15  
 
(...continued)
Mich 902; 638 NW2d 744 (2001) (directing the parties to brief 
whether “the inference upon inference rule of People v Atley, 
392 Mich 298 (1974), was violated under the facts . . . and 
whether 
that 
decision should be overruled”); People v Johnson, 
465 Mich 911; 638 NW2d 747 (2001) (directing the parties to 
brief whether this Court should adopt the federal subjective 
entrapment defense); People v Reese, 465 Mich 851; 631 NW2d 
343 (2001) (directing the parties to “specifically address 
whether MCL 768.32 prevents this Court from adopting the 
federal model for necessarily lesser included offense  
instructions and, if it does, whether such prohibition 
violates Const 1963, art 6, § 5.  In all other respects, leave 
to appeal is denied.”); People v Lett, 463 Mich 939, 620 NW2d 
855 (2000) (rejecting the prosecutor’s concession concerning 
the constitutional nature of the error and directing the 
parties to address whether the trial court’s declaration of a 
mistrial 
was 
based 
on manifest necessity; further ordering the 
parties to address six additional issues, including whether 
the defendant’s claim was forfeited or waived and the extent  
to which the law might be clarified concerning presence of 
manifest necessity).  
I thank the majority for pointing out that I object both 
when the parties have not had an opportunity to argue or brief 
an issue, and when the majority has forced the disposition of 
an issue not raised by either party. To clarify, it’s not that 
I wish to have “it both ways,” but that I object to judicial 
activism in any form.  
Further, 
the 
majority 
accurately 
documents 
that, 
throughout my twenty-year tenure on this Court, I have, on 
occasion, found it necessary to overrule precedent or request 
briefing on an issue.  The majority also clarifies that policy 
considerations may influence one’s understanding of the 
appropriate method by which to apply or interpret the law. 
With this I do not disagree. Neither the majority nor I can 
escape the fact that, as judges, we are not computers, but 
human beings, doing our best to apply the law in an unbiased 
fashion, in accord with our constitutional mandate and within 
the strictures of the adversary system.  Whether in the  
majority or the dissent, every justice must recognize and 
appropriately set aside such considerations in the execution 
of their duties under the law.  
16  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
Because a majority of this Court erroneously refuses to  
recognize that the charter creates a cause of action and that  
plaintiff need not plead in avoidance of immunity, there is no  
need to thoroughly analyze the remaining issues. Suffice it  
to say, I would hold that a municipality has the power, on the  
basis of the police powers inherent in its home rule  
authority, to protect its citizens from discrimination.  No  
state law preempts this protection, and governmental immunity  
does not bar an action based not on a theory of tort  
liability, but on a violation of the organic law of a city  
granting its citizens fundamental rights.  Therefore, for the  
reasons noted, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
17  
  
  
_________________________ 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LINDA MACK,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118468  
THE CITY OF DETROIT, 
a Michigan Municipal Corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting)  
I dissent from the majority decision.  
The majority has decided important issues involving  
governmental immunity that were not raised or briefed by the  
parties and that are very significant to the people of Detroit  
and all the people of Michigan.  The majority should have  
insured that it had briefing and heard argument on these  
issues before deciding them.  
A  
Without 
the 
benefit of briefing or argument, the majority  
 
  
overrules settled precedent1 to hold that governmental  
immunity cannot be waived because it is a characteristic of  
government.  In McCummings v Hurley Medical Ctr, 433 Mich 404,  
411; 466 NW2d 114 (1989), this Court held that governmental  
immunity must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.  The  
majority overrules McCummings and holds that immunity is an  
unwaivable characteristic of government.  The parties did not  
raise or address in any court whether governmental immunity is  
a characteristic of government or an affirmative defense.2  
While the general concept of governmental immunity was  
alluded to in questioning during oral argument before this  
Court, the questioning did not reference the concept of  
immunity as a characteristic of government and did not  
foreshadow 
an 
intent 
to reconsider McCummings. The majority’s  
decision to reach out and overrule a case that was not raised,  
1The 
majority’s 
assertion 
that 
McCummings 
is 
an  
“aberration” is their view. 
However, it was signed by six 
justices with Justice Griffin concurring separately and has 
been the law for fourteen years. See, e.g. Scheurman v Dep’t  
of Trans, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), and Tyrc v  
Michigan Veterns’ Fund, 451 Mich 129; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).  
2Although the city raised governmental immunity as an 
affirmative defense at the trial court level, the city never 
specifically addressed immunity relative to plaintiff’s 
charter-based claim of sexual orientation discrimination at  
any level.  The only briefing regarding immunity in the trial 
court 
was 
in 
response to plaintiff’s intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim. Plaintiff abandoned that claim in  
the trial court and thereafter, the city abandoned its 
immunity claim.  
2  
 
   
briefed, or argued is certainly efficient.  However, the  
majority’s efficiency in this case forsakes procedural  
fairness.  It is worth emphasis that the majority can only  
conclude that the city has not waived governmental immunity by  
overruling McCummings.  
I decline the majority’s invitation to take a position  
without 
briefing 
and 
argument 
on 
whether 
governmental 
immunity  
is a characteristic of government, an affirmative defense, or  
some 
other 
judicially 
determined 
hybrid. 
These  
characterizations have significant procedural consequences.  
It is the role of the Court to respond to issues properly  
before it and to seek additional briefing and argument on  
significant matters that may have been overlooked by the  
parties.  This is especially true where the issues are of  
great importance, such as the issues not briefed or argued in  
this case, which seriously affect the settled law of this  
state.  
The 
majority’s 
decision to address and resolve this issue  
without briefing or argument is inappropriate.  Before  
deciding this significant change in the law of governmental  
immunity, the Court should have had briefing and argument.  
B  
The question whether a charter-created cause of action  
for sexual orientation discrimination conflicts with the  
3  
governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407, a  
question that the majority concludes decides this case, was  
not briefed or argued by the parties at any level.3  It is not  
possible to agree with the majority contention that this  
specific question was “squarely in front of the parties” when  
neither party addressed it at any level.  Ante at 24. 
The  
conflict analysis of the parties and the courts below  
addressed 
whether 
a 
charter-created cause of action for sexual  
orientation discrimination conflicted with the Civil Rights  
Act (CRA).  Furthermore, the city only characterized the  
question of conflict with CRA as one premised on the law of  
preemption in its brief to this Court.  It is again worthy of  
note that it is only the majority’s overruling of McCummings  
that allows the majority to shift the focus of the conflict  
analysis from the CRA to the GTLA.  
C  
Although the majority asserts that whether the electors  
of Detroit intended to create a cause of action to vindicate  
the charter-created civil right to be free from sexual  
orientation discrimination is an “irrelevant” inquiry, the  
intent of the electors, as expressed in the charter is  
3The Michigan Constitution and the Home Rule City Act 
require that home rule city charters not conflict with state 
law.  
4  
noteworthy.4  After all, the issue presented at the outset of  
this case was whether the charter language created a cause of  
action to vindicate the charter’s declaration of rights.  
The charter’s declaration of rights provides:  
The city has an affirmative duty to secure the 
equal protection of the law for each person and to 
insure equality of opportunity for all persons.  No  
person shall be denied the enjoyment of civil or 
political rights or be discriminated against in the 
exercise thereof because of race, color, creed, 
national origin, age, handicap, sex, or sexual 
orientation. [ Section 2.]  
The language of § 2 is not ambiguous.  It, as would be  
commonly understood by the ratifiers, secures a set of rights  
to each person of Detroit. 
Furthermore, § 8 of the  
declaration of rights provides:  
The city may enforce this Declaration of 
Rights and other rights retained by the people.  
While it can be argued that the permissive “may” of § 8  
tempers the city’s otherwise “affirmative duty” under § 2 to  
“insure the equality of opportunity for all persons,” it is by  
no means clear that, pursuant to § 8, the ratifiers intended  
to diminish the individual rights declared in § 2.  More  
importantly, 
the 
unambiguous 
language 
of 
the 
charter  
demonstrates that the charter ratifiers, the electors of  
4Further, it should be of interest to the people of 
Detroit that the city’s position in this litigation seeks to 
disclaim individual rights that its electors deemed worthy of 
charter protection.  
5  
Detroit, intended that the people of Detroit have the  
opportunity to seek enforcement of their charter-based rights  
in the proper court or tribunal.  Art 7, ch 10, § 7-1007  
provides:  
This chapter shall not be construed to  
diminish the right of any party to direct any 
immediate legal or equitable remedies in any court 
or other tribunal.  
By these words the ratifiers of the charter would have  
expected that individuals could also vindicate their charter­
declared rights in the proper court or tribunal.5  In other  
words, it was the express intent of the electors of Detroit to  
raise the veil of immunity within the city limits with respect  
to the civil rights declared in the charter’s declaration of  
rights.  
The fact that the majority’s decision leaves a charter­
based right with no remedy6 accentuates the inappropriateness  
of the majority’s decision to dispose of this case on the  
5As reiterated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Davis v Passman, 442 US 228, 242; 99 S Ct 2264; 60 L Ed 2d 846 
(1979), “‘The very essence of civil liberty,’ wrote Mr. Chief 
Justice Marshall in Marbury v Madison, 5 US [1 Cranch] 137, 
163; 2 L Ed 60 (1803), ‘certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever 
he receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government 
is to afford that protection.’”  
6Section 8 of the charter declares that the city “may” 
enforce the declaration of rights, not that it “must” enforce 
those rights.  If the city opts not to enforce the declaration 
of rights, as it may so choose to do under § 8, the individual 
Detroiter would have a right with no remedy.  
6  
 
 
basis of issues that were not raised, not briefed, and not  
argued by the parties.  
KELLY, J., concurred with WEAVER, J.  
7