Title: Sauk County v. S.A.M.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1033 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of      
S. A. M.: 
 
Sauk County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
S. A. M., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 523, 950 N.W.2d 690 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 28, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Taggart   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring/dissenting opinion, in which 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Elizabeth G. Rich and Rich Law SC, Plymouth. There was 
an oral argument by Elizabeth G. Rich.  
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief filed by 
Douglas B. Raines and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by Douglas B. Raines. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, 
assistant state public defender, with whom on the brief was 
Kelli S. Thompson, state public defender, for the Office of the 
State Public Defender. There was an oral argument by Colleen D. 
Ball. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 46 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1033 
(L.C. No. 
2017ME102) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
S. A. M.: 
 
Sauk County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
S. A. M., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring/dissenting opinion, in which 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This case involves the ability 
of involuntarily committed persons to receive appellate review 
of their commitment orders.  Frequently, appellate courts 
dismiss these appeals as moot because the underlying commitment 
order expires before the court issues a decision on its merits.  
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
2 
Such routine dismissals result in the validity of these liberty-
depriving orders largely evading review. 
¶2 
S.A.M. is among those committed citizens whose appeal 
went unaddressed because the order extending his commitment 
(also called "recommitment") expired before the court of appeals 
could decide the merits of his appeal.  He argues the court of 
appeals erred in dismissing his appeal as moot because either 
the order's ongoing collateral consequences render it not moot 
or an exception to mootness applies.  He further asks that if we 
rule in his favor on the mootness issue, that we then review the 
merits 
of 
his 
due-process 
and 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenges. 
¶3 
Though in Portage County v. J.W.K. we concluded that 
the expiration of the recommitment order rendered the appeal 
moot, 
that 
holding 
was 
expressly 
"limited 
to 
situations 
where . . . no collateral implications of the commitment order 
are raised."  2019 WI 54, ¶28 n.11, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 
N.W.2d 509.  Collateral consequences having been raised here, we 
hold that at least two such consequences render an appeal of an 
expired recommitment order not moot:  (1) the restriction of 
one's constitutional right to bear arms; and (2) the liability 
for the cost of one's care.  On the merits, we hold that 
S.A.M.'s due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges 
fall short.  For those reasons, we reverse the court of appeals' 
dismissal of S.A.M.'s appeal and affirm S.A.M.'s recommitment 
order. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Wisconsin's 
legal 
framework 
governing 
involuntary 
mental-health commitments is important to understanding this 
case.  Before initially committing a person to the state or 
county's care, the government must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the person is: (1) mentally ill;1 (2) a proper 
subject for treatment; and (3) currently dangerous under at 
least one of five standards.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e) 
(2019-20).2  Those five standards are: 
 First Standard: there is a substantial probability of 
physical harm to one's self evidenced by recent threats 
of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm; 
 Second Standard: there is a substantial probability of 
physical harm to others evidenced by recent homicidal or 
other violent behavior, or a recent overt act, attempt or 
threat to do serious physical harm that placed others in 
reasonable fear of serious physical harm; 
 Third Standard: there is a substantial probability of 
physical impairment or injury to one's self or others 
evidenced by a pattern of recent acts or omissions 
manifesting impaired judgment, and there is either no 
reasonable 
provision 
for 
one's 
protection 
in 
the 
                                                 
1 The state or a county may also civilly commit a person who 
is drug dependent or developmentally disabled, but this opinion 
will focus on mental illness because that was the basis for 
S.A.M.'s commitment. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
4 
community or a reasonable probability that one will not 
avail himself or herself of those services; 
 Fourth Standard: there is a substantial probability that 
death, 
serious 
physical 
injury, 
serious 
physical 
debilitation, or serious physical disease will imminently 
ensue that makes one unable to satisfy basic needs as 
evidenced by recent acts or omissions, and there is 
either no reasonable provision for one's treatment and 
protection in the community or a reasonable probability 
that one will not avail himself or herself of those 
services; and 
 Fifth Standard: (1) there is a substantial probability 
both that one needs care or treatment to prevent further 
disability or deterioration and that, if left untreated, 
one will lack necessary services and suffer severe 
mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in 
the loss of one's ability to function independently in 
the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional 
control over one's thoughts or actions; (2) either (a) an 
incapability of expressing an understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or 
treatment and the alternatives after such were explained, 
or (b) a substantial incapability of applying such an 
understanding to one's mental illness to make an informed 
choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or 
treatment; and (3) either no reasonable provision for 
one's care or treatment in the community or a reasonable 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
5 
probability that one will not avail himself or herself of 
those services. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.3  Upon sufficient evidence of both a treatable 
mental illness and at least one of these forms of dangerousness, 
the circuit court must order the person initially committed for 
no more than six months.  § 51.20(13)(a), (g)1.  It must then 
also issue a firearms ban, i.e. "order the individual not to 
possess a firearm, [and] order the seizure of any firearm owned 
by the individual."  § 51.20(13)(cv)1. 
¶5 
The government may thereafter seek to extend the 
initial commitment.  Recommitment again requires clear and 
convincing evidence of the same three elements required for the 
initial commitment: mental illness, treatability, and current 
dangerousness under at least one of the five standards outlined 
above.  Recommitment proceedings can differ from initial 
commitment proceedings in one significant way.  In an initial 
commitment proceeding, the government may prove dangerousness 
only with evidence of recent acts, omissions, or behavior.  In a 
recommitment 
proceeding, 
though, 
the 
government 
may 
alternatively prove dangerousness by "showing that there is a 
substantial likelihood, 
based on the subject individual's 
treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject 
for commitment [under one of the five dangerousness standards] 
if 
treatment 
were 
withdrawn." 
 
§ 51.20(1)(am). 
 
If 
the 
                                                 
3 This summary of the statutory dangerousness standards 
omits elements not relevant to S.A.M.'s case and thus is not 
applicable to every civil commitment. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
6 
government presents clear and convincing evidence that the 
committed person remains mentally ill, treatable, and dangerous 
under one of the five standards (whether by recent conduct or 
via the § 51.20(1)(am) alternative showing), then the court must 
order that person recommitted for a period not to exceed one 
year, along with another firearms ban.  § 51.20(13)(cv)1., 
(g)1. & (g)3. 
¶6 
Given these orders' limited duration, timely appellate 
review before their expiration proves difficult.  The court of 
appeals reports that between 2018 and 2020, it issued no 
decision regarding an initial six-month commitment before the 
order expired.  Recommitment orders, which last for generally 
one year, fared somewhat better; the court of appeals decided 40 
percent of those appealed before their expiration.  Though the 
reasons for delay vary, rarely does fault lie with the person 
committed——as is certainly the case for S.A.M. 
¶7 
S.A.M. 
is 
diagnosed 
with 
bipolar 
disorder 
with 
psychotic features.  In late 2017, S.A.M. was subjected to an 
emergency detention after his father reported that he made 
statements about wanting to die.  His father informed the 
responding sheriff that S.A.M. had been homeless for some time.  
S.A.M. displayed signs of malnourishment and suffered from 
trench foot due to not changing his shoes for long periods of 
time. 
 
An 
examining 
psychiatrist 
noted 
that 
S.A.M. 
had 
discontinued taking previously prescribed medication and had a 
long history of such noncompliance.  S.A.M. admitted to acts of 
self-harm and substance abuse, predominantly alcohol but illicit 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
7 
drugs as well.  In January 2018, in statements to his sister, 
S.A.M. threatened self-harm and told her he wanted to die.  
Based on this behavior, Sauk County ("the County") successfully 
petitioned to have S.A.M. involuntarily committed to its care 
for six months of compelled treatment.  This initial commitment 
order included a firearms ban that would "remain in effect until 
lifted by the court" and survive the commitment order's 
expiration.  S.A.M. did not appeal this initial commitment 
order. 
¶8 
Before the initial commitment order expired, the 
County petitioned to extend S.A.M.'s involuntary commitment.  
The 
petition 
contained 
two 
relevant 
representations 
from 
psychiatrist Dr. Linda DiRaimondo:  (1) S.A.M. suffers from a 
"chronic mental disorder" (bipolar disorder); and (2) though 
currently medication compliant, S.A.M. "has not been in the past 
when not on commitment and has regressed to an acute psychotic 
state 
and 
required 
hospitalization." 
 
On 
those 
bases, 
Dr. DiRaimondo opined that there is "a substantial likelihood, 
based on [S.A.M.'s] treatment record, that if treatment were 
withdrawn, [he] would regress and become a proper subject for 
commitment."  The day before the recommitment trial, S.A.M. 
filed a motion asking, in part, for the circuit court4 to order 
the County to "elect under which standard of dangerousness it 
seeks to proceed" and preclude it "from presenting evidence as 
to other forms of dangerousness." 
                                                 
4 The Hon. Patrick J. Taggart of the Sauk County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
8 
¶9 
The circuit court addressed S.A.M.'s motion at the 
start of the trial.  S.A.M. argued that the petition "clearly 
enunciated" only one method of proving dangerousness——the 
recommitment alternative under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) that 
there was a substantial likelihood S.A.M. would be a proper 
subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.  According 
to S.A.M., that theory was contradicted by the County's proposed 
order, which did not include the language of § 51.20(1)(am) but 
instead broadly stated that S.A.M. was "dangerous because the 
subject evidences behavior within one or more of the standards 
under §§ 51.20(1) or (1m), Wis. Stats. (except for proceedings 
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., Wis. Stats.)."  S.A.M. argued these 
imprecise filings violated his right to due process by providing 
inadequate "notice of what he's up against."  The County stood 
by its petition's reliance on § 51.20(1)(am) and asserted, 
"there's a substantial likelihood that [S.A.M.] would be a 
proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.  And 
that's what the county intends to show today."  The circuit 
court 
accepted 
the 
County's 
assertion, 
inviting 
S.A.M.'s 
objection if the County began to introduce evidence supporting a 
different theory of dangerousness. 
¶10 The circuit court then proceeded with the trial.  
Dr. DiRaimondo and S.A.M.'s social worker, Brigette Chizek, both 
testified in favor of recommitment; S.A.M. testified against it.  
Dr. DiRaimondo repeated her bipolar disorder diagnosis of S.A.M. 
and affirmed it was treatable.  As to S.A.M.'s dangerousness, 
she opined that S.A.M. "would not take his medication if he were 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
9 
not on a court order" based on his treatment record, which 
showed that when not in a supervised setting, "he has stopped 
his medication" and that he "recently told his case manager" 
that "he does not feel he needs . . . medication." 
¶11 Chizek then testified to S.A.M.'s history of substance 
abuse, medication noncompliance, and resulting mental-health 
instability and self-harm ideations.  She averred that S.A.M., 
after being told of the services available to him to assist his 
independence, 
"talks 
about 
not 
wanting 
those," 
with 
the 
exception of the community support program in which he was 
currently participating.  She stated his post-commitment plan 
was to stay with his grandmother and then at a motel until he 
could find a place to live.  But she recounted how he had 
previously disappeared from his grandmother's home, which led to 
the events underlying his initial commitment discussed above.  
She expressed her concern that a similar scenario would play out 
if treatment were withdrawn and affirmed that he currently 
needed a structured setting.  She also recounted that S.A.M. had 
recently urinated in his pants and refused to change out of the 
soiled clothing.  Finally, she acknowledged that as recently as 
the past month, S.A.M. told her he would continue his 
medications if released from his commitment. 
¶12 Taking the witness stand last, S.A.M. reaffirmed his 
statement about staying medication compliant post-commitment and 
agreed that the medication benefited him in managing his mental 
illness.  He explained that he hoped to start working as a 
laborer, as he has in the past.  He further testified that he 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
10 
would not repeat his past mistake of going off medication, 
chalking his recent lapse up to the "hard times" he was 
experiencing six months prior. 
¶13 The circuit court, after recounting all of this 
evidence, found grounds for a six-month recommitment order.  The 
recommitment order also provided that S.A.M. "is prohibited from 
possessing any firearm. . . . This prohibition shall remain in 
effect until lifted by the court.  Expiration of the mental 
commitment proceeding does not terminate this restriction." 
¶14 S.A.M. timely filed his notice of intent to pursue 
post-commitment relief.  An unfortunate series of events then 
delayed his appeal.  First, the State Public Defender was unable 
to appoint S.A.M. post-commitment counsel until more than four 
months into his six-month commitment (nearly three months after 
the deadline to appoint appellate counsel).  Then, it took 
another two months for the full record, including transcripts, 
to be transmitted to appointed counsel——just as the recommitment 
order was expiring.  Next, S.A.M.'s attorney delayed filing his 
notice of appeal, albeit with good cause.  Additional months 
passed before the court of appeals received the record. 
¶15 By this time, S.A.M.'s appeal had been expired for 
over six months.  Consequently, the court of appeals directed 
the parties to brief whether the case was moot.  The court of 
appeals finally rendered its decision in September 2020——over 
two 
years 
after 
the 
circuit 
court 
issued 
the 
six-month 
recommitment order.  See Sauk County v. S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020).  The court 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
11 
of appeals dismissed S.A.M.'s appeal as moot, concluding that 
the order neither caused ongoing collateral consequences nor 
presented an issue triggering a mootness exception.  Id. 
¶16 We granted S.A.M.'s petition for review on the 
mootness issue as well as the merits issues he raised.  We 
additionally asked the parties to brief the following issue: 
Whether this court has the authority, through its 
"superintending and administrative authority over all 
courts" (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)) and/or its 
authority 
to 
"regulate 
pleading, 
practice, 
and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts" (Wis. 
Stat. § 751.12(1)), to require the court of appeals to 
expedite the disposition of appeals under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 51, or in some other manner to ensure that 
appellants under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 receive an appeal 
that 
addresses 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
appellants' 
contentions? 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 This case presents issues of mootness, procedural due 
process, and sufficiency of the evidence.  Both mootness and 
procedural due process present questions of law we review de 
novo.  Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶16, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 
937 N.W.2d 901 (mootness); Teague v. Schimel, 2017 WI 56, ¶19, 
375 Wis. 2d 458, 896 N.W.2d 286 (procedural due process).  
Whether the County presented clear and convincing evidence to 
justify recommitment is a mixed question of fact and law.  
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶24, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 
N.W.2d 277.  S.A.M. challenges only the legal application of the 
undisputed facts to the statutory standards, which we review de 
novo.  Id., ¶25. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
12 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶18 Our analysis begins with the mootness question, 
focusing on whether the collateral consequences of expired 
recommitment orders render appeals of such orders not moot.  
Because we determine that the ongoing collateral consequences of 
recommitment do render these appeals not moot, we turn to the 
merits of S.A.M.'s due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
claims. 
A.  Mootness 
¶19 In Wisconsin, dismissal of a case as moot is an act of 
judicial restraint rather than a jurisdictional requirement.  
See D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶19.  A case is moot when the 
resolution of an issue will have no practical effect on the 
underlying controversy.  See id.  This means an appeal from an 
order like S.A.M.'s is not moot when the direct or collateral 
consequences of the order persist and vacatur of that order 
would practically affect those consequences.  See id., ¶23 
(citing State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis. 2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635 
(1976)).  Here, S.A.M. posits that three collateral consequences 
from his now-expired recommitment order render his appeal not 
moot:  (1) the firearms ban; (2) the liability for the cost of 
his care while committed; and (3) the stigma associated with a 
mental-health commitment. 
¶20 We recently explained 
that whether a collateral 
consequence renders an appeal not moot turns on the existence of 
a "causal relationship" between a legal consequence and the 
challenged order.  See id., ¶¶23-25 (quoting Theoharopoulos, 72 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
13 
Wis. 2d at 333).  We conclude such a causal relationship exists 
between a recommitment order and at least two collateral 
consequences:  (1) the firearms ban; and (2) the liability for 
the cost of care.  We address each in turn. 
1.  Firearms ban 
¶21 Two terms ago, we held that an appeal of an expired 
initial 
commitment 
order 
is 
not 
moot 
because 
the 
order 
collaterally subjects the committed person to a continuing 
firearms ban.  See id., ¶25.  We recognized that this firearms 
ban 
constitutes 
an 
ongoing 
impairment 
of 
the 
person's 
constitutional right to bear arms, which we deemed to be "no 
minor consequence."  Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend II; Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 25; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008); Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 
WI 19, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233).  We also explained that 
prevailing in an appeal of an expired initial commitment order 
voids the firearms ban.  Id.  Because voiding the firearms ban 
is a "practical effect" that has a "causal relationship" to the 
successful appeal of an expired initial commitment order, we 
deemed the appeal not moot.  Id. 
¶22 The question before us is whether that same rationale 
applies to recommitment orders.  The court of appeals concluded 
it did not.  In its view, with which the County agrees, vacating 
the recommitment order and voiding its corresponding firearms 
ban would have no practical effect because the separate ban 
attached to S.A.M.'s unchallenged initial commitment order would 
still be in effect.  S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, at ¶¶8-12. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
14 
¶23 We disagree.  The court of appeals is correct that the 
firearms ban attached to an initial commitment will continue to 
bar the committed person from possessing a firearm even if we 
vacate a subsequent recommitment order.  But that fact does not 
mean 
prevailing 
in 
a 
recommitment 
appeal 
would 
have 
no 
"practical effect" on restoring one's constitutional right.  
Prevailing on appeal would vacate the recommitment order and 
practically alter a committed person's "record and reputation" 
for dangerousness, a factor a reviewing court must consider when 
weighing 
a 
petition 
to 
cancel 
a 
firearms 
ban.  
§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b.  Additionally, if a committed person 
succeeds in vacating an expired recommitment order, the fact 
that the recommitment order no longer exists might influence the 
reviewing court's weighing of whether restoring gun rights would 
be consistent with the "public interest."  Id.  Even if 
marginal, these practical effects on a committed person's 
ability to restore a constitutional right remain "no minor 
consequence."  D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶25.  Thus, the "causal 
relationship" between these practical effects and our vacatur of 
an expired recommitment order renders an appeal of such orders 
not moot. 
2.  Cost of care liability 
¶24 Likewise, a person's mandatory liability for the cost 
of the care received during a recommitment is a collateral 
consequence that renders recommitment appeals not moot.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2), a committed person like S.A.M. "shall be 
liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
15 
supplies" related to each commitment period.  If the underlying 
commitment order is vacated, however, the liability tied to that 
particular commitment period no longer exists.  See Jankowski v. 
Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431, 438-40, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981); 
Ethelyn I.C. v. Waukesha County, 221 Wis. 2d 109, 120-21, 584 
N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1998).  For that reason, a direct causal 
relationship exists between vacating an expired recommitment 
order and removing the liability it creates, sufficient to 
render recommitment appeals not moot. 
¶25 The court of appeals' contrary position, again adopted 
by the County, is that S.A.M. failed to show "actual monetary 
liability" because he presented no evidence of collection 
efforts against his debt by the time of the appeal.  See S.A.M., 
No. 2019AP1033, at ¶14.  This position misses the mark for two 
related reasons.  First, it is irrelevant whether collection 
efforts have begun because, regardless, S.A.M. remains liable 
solely by virtue of § 46.10(2)'s mandatory language ("shall be 
liable").  And second, it is enough to overcome mootness when 
there is the "potential" for collection actions because of the 
liability.  See State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537, 424 
N.W.2d 411 (1988) (holding that a deceased defendant's appeal 
was not moot because his conviction may lead to "potential 
collateral consequences" for his estate); see also D.K., 390 
Wis. 2d 50, ¶24 (applying to ch. 51 commitment orders the same 
collateral-consequences rationale used in criminal cases).  The 
threat of potential collection actions to recoup the costs 
associated with S.A.M.'s recommitment care may follow S.A.M. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
16 
unless and until his recommitment order is vacated or the 
liability is satisfied.  See Jankowski, 104 Wis. 2d at 438. 
¶26 We are also not persuaded by the County's argument 
that a committed person's liability is contingent on a person's 
ability to pay.  That is simply not the law.  A "liable 
person['s] ability to pay" only informs to whom collection 
efforts should be directed, see § 46.10(3), and what, if any, 
settlement or agreement might be appropriate to satisfy the 
debt, see § 46.10(7).  Neither of those considerations, however, 
extinguish the liability.  And in fact, this liability permits 
the government to continually probe S.A.M.'s financial condition 
to reevaluate his ability to pay.  See § 46.10(8)(c).  Thus, 
vacating a recommitment order will have the practical effect of 
removing the order's attached liability, regardless of the 
person's ability to pay. 
¶27 Accordingly, we conclude an appeal of an expired 
recommitment order is not moot because vacating the order would 
still have practical effects on two of the order's collateral 
consequences——the ability to restore a constitutional right and 
the liability for the cost of care received while subject to the 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
17 
recommitment order.5  Because S.A.M.'s appeal is not moot, we 
turn to the merits of his appeal. 
B.  Due Process 
¶28 On the merits, S.A.M. first argues the County's 
imprecise pretrial filings violate his due-process right to 
adequate notice as to which specific theory of dangerousness 
justified his recommitment.6  S.A.M.'s argument relies solely on 
our 
recent 
D.J.W. 
decision. 
 
There, 
we 
required 
"clarity . . . regarding 
the 
underlying 
basis 
for 
a 
recommitment," such that "going forward circuit courts in 
recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings 
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. 
on 
which 
the 
recommitment 
is 
based." 
 
D.J.W., 
391 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶40, 42.  According to S.A.M., due process demands 
that recommitment petitions provide the same type of "clarity." 
¶29 S.A.M.'s reliance on D.J.W. is misplaced for two 
reasons.  First, D.J.W. addressed a circuit court's legal 
responsibility to facilitate meaningful appellate review, not a 
                                                 
5 Given this holding, we refrain from addressing S.A.M.'s 
stigma argument.  See Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 
WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15.  And because his 
appeal is not moot, we need not address any exceptions to 
mootness.  See id.  For related reasons, we determine this case 
is not the proper vehicle in which to address our constitutional 
and statutory authority to expedite review of appeals from civil 
commitment orders. 
6 The government may not "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law," which 
includes a procedural right to notice.  See Wis. Const. amnd. 
XIV, § 1; Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶23, 377 
Wis. 2d 38, 899 N.W.2d 303. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
18 
county's pretrial notice responsibilities.  And second, our 
April 2020 D.J.W. decision indicated relief under its holdings 
would be prospective; its holding does not reach back to 
S.A.M.'s 2018 recommitment trial.  See id., ¶59.  Because S.A.M. 
relies only on the inapt D.J.W. to support his due-process 
claim, we cannot say the County's notice violated his procedural 
due-process rights.  See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. 
Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not 
step out of our neutral role to develop or construct arguments 
for parties." (citing State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶26, 374 
Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848)). 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
¶30 S.A.M. 
next 
challenges 
whether 
the 
evidence 
sufficiently establishes his dangerousness under any standard.7  
To be sufficient, the evidence must be clear and convincing that 
an individual is currently dangerous; it is not enough to show 
only 
that 
a 
person 
once 
was 
dangerous. 
 
D.J.W., 
391 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶34 (citing J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶24).  In a 
recommitment proceeding, the evidence may take the form of 
either: (1) recent acts, omissions, or behaviors exhibiting 
dangerousness; or (2) evidence that if treatment were withdrawn 
the person would be substantially likely to engage in the types 
of dangerous acts, omissions, or behaviors that meet one of the 
five dangerousness standards.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2., 
(1)(am). 
                                                 
7 S.A.M. does not challenge the circuit court's conclusions 
that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
19 
¶31 S.A.M. levels two sufficiency arguments.  First, he 
contends that the evidence under either evidentiary pathway is 
insufficient.  Second, he contends that the County's witnesses 
failed to recite the statutory standards being applied with near 
exactness as Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 
Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, allegedly requires.  We disagree 
with both contentions. 
1.  Sufficient evidence 
¶32 We are persuaded that 
the evidence sufficiently 
establishes that S.A.M. is dangerous under the Third Standard by 
way 
of 
the 
recommitment 
alternative. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c., (1)(am).  Under those two provisions, the 
County's burden was to show a substantial likelihood, based on 
S.A.M.'s treatment history, that if treatment were withdrawn he 
would 
again 
face 
"a 
substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
impairment or injury to himself" and that there is either no 
"reasonable provision for [his] protection . . . available in 
the community" or that S.A.M. would not, to a "reasonable 
probability," "avail himself . . . of these services."  Id. 
¶33 The circuit court aptly summarized much of the record.  
It recounted Dr. DiRaimondo's testimony about S.A.M. telling his 
case manager "that he didn't need [his medication]," as well as 
her own opinion that "if there's no court order, [S.A.M.] won't 
take his medications."  The circuit court then reiterated the 
social worker's testimony that when S.A.M. is off medication and 
"on his own, he is unstable, threat[ens] to harm himself, [and 
is] not compliant when he's in the group home."  Though S.A.M. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
20 
promised he would maintain medication compliance absent a court 
order, 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
skeptical 
about 
S.A.M.'s 
explanation 
that 
his 
recent 
noncompliance 
and 
resulting 
dangerousness were solely the result of "hard times": 
Certainly the Court understands hard times, but those 
hard times certainly may and may be likely to continue 
in the future.  Whether one is on a court order or 
not, hard times happen.  And the Court has a duty to 
make sure that if they happen, that [S.A.M.] has the 
proper treatment to deal with, with those hard times 
when he would be on his own. 
It is evident the circuit court found S.A.M. not credible on 
this point, a finding to which we defer.  See Metro. Assocs. v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶61, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 
N.W.2d 784 ("When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it 
is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and 
of the weight to be given to each witness's testimony." (quoting 
Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. 
App. 1998)).  Instead, the circuit court expressly agreed with 
the two professionals' shared "concern that this situation may 
happen 
all 
over 
again 
if 
the 
Court 
does 
not 
grant 
the . . . extension," i.e. if compelled treatment is withdrawn. 
¶34 The evidence further addresses the likelihood that 
S.A.M. would avail himself of community resources available for 
his protection.  S.A.M.'s social worker testified that "[w]hen 
talking about what services are available"——including services 
that would assist his living independently——"he talks about not 
wanting those."  Moreover, the circuit court recounted her 
testimony about S.A.M. disappearing from his grandmother's home—
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
21 
—leading to the events underling his initial commitment——"under 
somewhat of the same circumstances that he proposes now to live 
with his grandmother, move to a motel and get a job."  While the 
circuit court acknowledged "that's a good plan," it also 
recognized that "as recently as six months ago that plan didn't 
work out" and failed to provide for his protection.  Taken 
together, we conclude that the evidence sufficiently proves 
S.A.M. 
is 
dangerous 
under 
the 
Third 
Standard 
via 
the 
§ 51.20(1)(am) recommitment alternative. 
2.  Melanie L. 
¶35 S.A.M.'s reliance on Melanie L. is also unavailing. 
Melanie L. involved a county expert's "failure to answer 
questions 
using 
the 
terms 
in 
the 
statute." 
 
349 
Wis. 2d 148, ¶91.  The expert opined that "Melanie was incapable 
of 
applying 
an 
understanding 
of 
the 
medication 
'to 
her 
advantage.'"  Id.  By contrast, the statutory standard demanded 
that 
she 
be 
"substantially 
incapable 
of 
applying 
an 
understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives 
to his or her mental illness . . . to make an informed choice as 
to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment."  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)4.b.  Because there was conflicting evidence 
on this standard, we concluded that the expert's deviation from 
the statutory terms cast doubt on whether the expert "was 
applying 
the 
standard 
or 
changing 
the 
standard."  
Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶90-91.  As such, the County failed 
to meet its clear-and-convincing burden.  Id., ¶94. 
No. 
2019AP001033 
 
22 
¶36 We face a different record here than we did in 
Melanie L.  The record before us shows the circuit court, 
parties, and witnesses all in accord regarding the statutory 
standards they were applying.  The County made clear at the 
outset that it "intends to show today" that "there's a 
substantial likelihood that the individual would be a proper 
subject 
for 
commitment 
if 
treatment 
were 
withdrawn," 
as 
§ 51.20(1)(am) requires.  Though no witness recited the Third 
Standard with exactness, the experts' repeated references to 
S.A.M. both reporting and threatening self-harm make clear to 
this court that they were properly assessing the "probability of 
physical impairment or injury to himself" if the commitment 
ended. 
 
We 
therefore 
conclude 
the 
evidence 
on 
S.A.M.'s 
dangerousness sufficiently justified his recommitment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 Though 
S.A.M.'s 
recommitment 
order 
expired, 
the 
ongoing collateral consequences causally related to it could be 
practically affected by a favorable decision, rendering his 
appeal not moot.  The merits of his appeal, however, do not 
warrant vacating the recommitment order.  As such, we reverse 
the court of appeals' dismissal of S.A.M.'s appeal but affirm 
the circuit court's recommitment order. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
1 
 
¶38 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the 
recommitment order should be affirmed.  I dissent from the 
majority opinion because it upends the longstanding mootness 
doctrine in a recommitment appeal.  To the extent the court is 
disappointed with the delay in this case, so am I.  However, the 
volume of similar cases that will await the appellate system in 
the future because of this opinion does not bode well for better 
case processing.  With no moot appeals in these cases, the 
appellate system will be flooded. 
¶39 It would be one thing had the court concluded that an 
exception to the mootness doctrine was fulfilled because this 
issue is capable of repetition yet is likely to evade review.  
However, the court did not.  Instead, the court inexplicably 
chose this case to overturn the mootness doctrine.  Spending 
most of its analysis on doing away with the mootness doctrine in 
recommitment 
cases, 
the 
court 
decides 
that 
S.A.M. 
faces 
"collateral consequences."1  Of course there can be consequences 
of a commitment——direct and collateral.  In and of themselves, 
                                                 
1 The term "collateral consequences" is a term of art in the 
criminal context.  See State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶¶60-61, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 (explaining in the plea withdrawal 
context that a "direct consequence [of a conviction] . . . is 
one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic 
effect," while "[c]ollateral consequences are indirect and do 
not flow from the conviction" such as consequences that "rest[] 
not with the sentencing court, but instead with a different 
tribunal or government agency").  This meaning does not fit well 
within the commitment context.  See Marathon Cnty. v. D.K., 2020 
WI 8, ¶¶23-25, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (analyzing 
"collateral consequences," including firearms bans, in the 
commitment context).  
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
2 
 
the existence of potential and unproven collateral consequences 
alone have never been determinative of mootness or lack thereof.  
Restrictions on the ability of S.A.M. to possess a firearm 
because of this recommitment and uncertain and unpursued 
potential financial liability as a result of the recommitment 
order are nothing more than theoretical possibilities.  The 
relevant order expired.  We ought not presume collateral 
consequences that do not exist.  Here there are none.  I am 
concerned about the unintended consequences of the court's 
error.  
¶40 I agree that this case took far too long to process, 
but that defect should not cause the court to dismantle the 
established law on collateral consequences or the doctrine of 
mootness.  A theoretical and unproven collateral consequence has 
never been a standalone reason to conclude that a case is not 
moot.  There are many potential consequences of being committed, 
yet in the past we have nonetheless correctly concluded that 
cases are moot.  Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (concluding that a sufficiency of 
the evidence challenge to a Chapter 51 recommitment was moot 
when the order expired).  Apparently the court sub silentio 
overrules J.W.K. and every other case that deemed a commitment 
or recommitment appeal to be moot.  The majority fails to answer 
what if any limits might apply.  The majority does not and 
cannot differentiate S.A.M.'s firearms ban or possible financial 
liability from that of any other commitment or recommitment.  
The majority makes no mention of the practical effect of a 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
3 
 
firearms ban or possible liability on S.A.M. that might be 
different from any other recommittee.  See State ex rel. Riesch 
v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, ¶11, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 N.W.2d 219 
(holding that a case is moot where the litigants fail to 
demonstrate that resolution of the case would have a "practical 
effect" on the case and parties).   
¶41 In fact, S.A.M. faces a firearms ban regardless of his 
recommitment, and there is no indication the government has or 
will pursue recovery in his initial commitment let alone this 
recommitment.  The majority fails to analyze why this case, as 
opposed to any other, is an exception to the mootness doctrine.  
The opinion is devoid of any explanation why these facts are 
unique or what the practical effect is for S.A.M. that would not 
be the exact same for any other.  Because the law on the 
mootness doctrine and collateral consequences has been upended 
and reinvented by the majority opinion, and it needlessly opens 
the floodgates to appellate review of all commitments and 
recommitments, I dissent.  
¶42 Appeals are sometimes moot, and this case is one 
example of an appeal that is otherwise moot.  Marathon Cnty. v. 
D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 ("Mootness 
is a doctrine of judicial restraint.  An issue is moot when its 
resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying 
controversy.  Because moot issues do not affect a live 
controversy, this court generally declines to reach them.  But 
we may overlook mootness if the issue falls within one of five 
exceptions:  (1) the issue is of great public importance; (2) 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
4 
 
the issue involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) the 
issue arises often and a decision from this court is essential; 
(4) the issue is likely to recur and must be resolved to avoid 
uncertainty; or (5) the issue is likely of repetition and evades 
review." (Citations omitted.)); id., ¶22 ("We have previously 
concluded that an expired initial commitment order is moot."  
(citing Winnebago Cnty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, 366 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶30, 878 N.W.2d 109).). 
¶43 The majority does not decide this case because of any 
of the foregoing exceptions to mootness.  It does not conclude 
that the issue is capable of repetition yet is likely to evade 
review.  See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶¶29-30.  While a firearms 
ban may be considered a "collateral consequence," it is not with 
regard 
to 
S.A.M.'s 
recommitment 
order. 
 
In 
fact, 
the 
recommitment order has no impact on his inability to possess a 
firearm.  He is otherwise subject to a firearms ban in his 
initial order.  Nonetheless, the majority somehow concludes that 
S.A.M.'s firearms ban in his recommitment order defeats any 
claim of mootness.  In addition, the majority concludes that 
theoretical, 
speculative, 
and 
highly 
unlikely 
financial 
liability exists for this recommitment, even when there is no 
indication it will be pursued and no indication it was pursued 
for 
the 
initial 
commitment. 
 
Without 
any 
mention 
of 
distinguishing facts of S.A.M.'s recommitment, and since these 
are consequences of every commitment or recommitment, the 
majority opinion leads to the inescapable conclusion that no 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
5 
 
commitment or recommitment appeal is ever moot.  I respectfully 
disagree.  
¶44 S.A.M. 
identifies 
three 
potential 
collateral 
consequences that he contends make his appeal not moot.  He 
contends the firearms ban, the monetary liability for care, and 
social stigma are the collateral consequences that save his 
appeal.  The majority adopts two of the three, without any 
supporting evidence of them being actual consequences, and 
concludes that they are collateral consequences.  S.A.M. does 
not demonstrate that either of these are actual or even likely 
consequences of his recommitment.  This appeal is of his 
recommitment, not his commitment.   
¶45 A 
firearms 
ban 
has 
been 
labeled 
a 
collateral 
consequence, but it has never been an automatic exception to 
mootness in a recommitment hearing.  Here, this is the issue to 
be decided.  In this case, the circuit court prohibited S.A.M. 
from possessing any firearms when it ordered his initial 
commitment.  That prohibition was not lifted.  S.A.M. did not 
appeal his initial commitment order.  He does not argue in this 
case 
that 
the 
initial 
commitment 
was 
legally 
improper, 
unsupported by factual evidence, or otherwise subject to 
revocation.  Thus, it is undisputed that, no matter what the 
outcome of the current appeal, S.A.M. will not be able to 
possess a firearm and will not be able to do so until he seeks 
review of the firearms ban contained in the original commitment 
order.  S.A.M. has not demonstrated that his right to possess a 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
6 
 
firearm is in any way impacted by the firearms ban from his 
recommitment order. 
¶46 Although S.A.M. speculates that two valid firearms 
bans could, at some point in time, impact his ability to lift 
the initial firearms ban, he cites no allegation or evidence 
that he intends to challenge the initial firearms ban, nor does 
he cite any basis for the court to conclude that such a 
challenge would somehow be successful.  A firearms ban can be 
revoked only if the court, in its discretion, determines S.A.M. 
is "not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and 
[revoking the ban] would not be contrary to public interest."  
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b.  Moreover, given that S.A.M. was 
subject to his initial commitment and recommitment in the same 
county, S.A.M. could seek revocation of both the initial 
firearms ban and the firearms ban included in his recommitment 
order if and when he challenges the initial recommitment order.  
§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.a. (stating that individuals may file a 
petition to revoke a firearms ban either at the court that 
ordered the ban or "in the county where the individual resides 
to cancel the order").  When considering whether to revoke the 
initial firearms ban, the circuit court would need to review 
"the individual's record and reputation."  § 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b.  
S.A.M.'s record would be the same whether the court was 
reviewing the initial firearms ban or the ban included in the 
recommitment order.  I note that this court affirms his 
recommitment order.   
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
7 
 
¶47 It would be pure speculation to predict whether and to 
what extent a reversal of the recommitment order here, which has 
not happened, would impact how the initial firearms ban would be 
reviewed by a circuit court in future proceedings.  S.A.M.'s 
argument that resolution of this appeal will, at some point, 
allow him to own a firearm is mere guesswork, which cannot 
overcome mootness concerns.  See Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11 
(explaining that a case is moot where resolution of the case 
would not have a "practical effect" on the case and litigants); 
PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶¶30, 49, 317 Wis. 2d 656766 
N.W.2d 559 (holding that a case was moot where resolution of the 
case would not provide the plaintiff any form of effective 
relief).  I recognize that a firearms ban has profound 
consequences and is a collateral or perhaps direct consequence 
in most circumstances, but it alone does not control whether an 
appeal of a recommitment is moot.  Here, S.A.M. has not 
demonstrated that the firearms ban in his recommitment is an 
exception to mootness.  
¶48 Second, as to S.A.M.'s financial argument, Wisconsin 
law states that individuals who are involuntarily committed may 
be required to pay for their care to the extent they are able.  
Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2).  However, there has been absolutely no 
showing that S.A.M. is in any way liable for his care or that 
the government seeks or will seek any such reimbursement.  In 
fact, the County stated at oral argument that it has no 
intention to seek such relief from S.A.M.  Why would the 
government first seek costs of recommitment when there is no 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
8 
 
indication it sought costs in the initial commitment?  Plus, 
legal protections are in place should such recovery someday be 
sought.  Recovery for the cost of care would require litigation 
on legal claims and issues that are not before us and, up to 
this point, have not been advanced in any other court 
proceedings.   
¶49 For S.A.M. to be held liable for the costs of care, 
the County would first have to choose to advance its claims.  
There is no available evidence showing that the County will or 
is likely to pursue such a claim.  In addition, the County would 
have to comply with numerous legal requirements before obtaining 
a money judgment against S.A.M.  By statute, the County must 
prove the "costs of the care, maintenance, services and 
supplies" provided to S.A.M.  § 46.10(2).  Furthermore, the 
County must conduct an "investigation" and consider S.A.M.'s 
"ability 
to 
pay." 
 
§ 46.10(3). 
 
"[U]nder 
all 
of 
the 
circumstances," the government may collect only from those 
individuals and assets that are best able to pay and those the 
committee is not "dependent upon."  § 46.10(2)-(3).  In 
addition, this court held in Jankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104 
Wis. 2d 431, 435-38, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981), that the state cannot 
collect costs of care for Chapter 51 commitments or detentions 
that were illegal or invalid.  See, e.g., Waukesha Memorial 
Hosp. v. Nierenberger, No. 2013AP480, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶12-15 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2013) (considering whether an 
individual could be liable for a hospital bill after a Chapter 
51 emergency detention by first reviewing whether the detention 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
9 
 
was valid).  To recover from S.A.M., the County must overcome 
any other defenses S.A.M. may have.  See, e.g., § 46.10(11)(a) 
("[I]n any action to recover from a person liable under this 
section, 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
may 
be 
pleaded 
in 
defense.").  Here there is absolutely no indication S.A.M. 
himself could be financially responsible for his care. 
¶50 To overcome mootness concerns, S.A.M. asks that we 
speculate that the state, at some point in time in the future, 
will seek to recoup the costs of care, that S.A.M. will have the 
ability to pay, that the state fully satisfies Wis. Stat. 
§ 46.10, and that S.A.M. will not have any valid defense to 
assert.  S.A.M.'s argument relies on a series of assumptions, 
yet we have absolutely no indication in the record before us 
that any of those assumptions are legitimate.  The majority's 
conclusions have sweeping consequences which are contrary to our 
mootness doctrine.  See City of Racine v. J-T Enters. of Am., 
Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 701-02, 221 N.W.2d 869 (1974) (holding 
that a case was moot in a zoning dispute where a municipality 
asked for a ruling on the legality of land use which it believed 
would occur in the future, and reasoning that simply because a 
legal dispute may occur "at some time in the future" could not 
serve to overcome mootness); Ziemann v. Village of N. Hudson, 
102 Wis. 2d 705, 708, 710-11, 307 N.W.2d 236 (1981) (concluding 
that a case was moot where property owners sued to prevent the 
sale of land to a municipality to use the property as a park 
when the sale was completed, even though there could be a future 
legal dispute over the use of the property as a park); see also 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
10 
 
United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) ("One 
can never be certain that findings made in a decision concluding 
one lawsuit will not someday control the outcome of another 
suit.  But if that were enough to avoid mootness, no case would 
ever be moot" (cleaned up).).   
¶51 Finally, no Wisconsin court has ever concluded that 
social stigma alone is a collateral consequence of commitment 
that will defeat the mootness doctrine.  In fact, S.A.M. fails 
to demonstrate that he has experienced any social stigma, let 
alone social stigma as a result of the recommitment.  I would 
not invariably extend social stigma of a recommitment to the 
level of being a collateral consequence.  S.A.M. fails to 
provide any evidence or describe what negative consequences he 
himself has experienced and will continue experiencing as a 
result of the recommitment order.  Furthermore, S.A.M. does not 
dispute that he was mentally ill nor that his initial commitment 
was justified.  There is simply no evidence or description 
showing the extent to which any social stigma S.A.M. experiences 
is caused by his admittedly valid initial commitment, the 
serious mental health issues he experienced in the past, and the 
fact that he was recommitted for an additional six months.  It 
is by no means a given that those in society who stigmatize 
S.A.M. for his mental health history will stigmatize him less if 
his recommitment order were reversed on appeal, only after the 
recommitment period has terminated.  If we concluded that mere 
conjecture on social stigma was sufficient to overcome mootness, 
we would be forced to revisit many of our prior decisions.  See, 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
11 
 
e.g., Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11 (holding that a parole 
revocation decision on the basis of an alleged failure to 
cooperate and violation of jail rules, among other offenses, was 
moot where the defendant was discharged from the underlying 
conviction and the revocation did not impact any of current 
condition of probation).  Further, if S.A.M.'s position were 
adopted, the status of mootness as an effective legal doctrine 
in Wisconsin would be called into serious doubt.   
¶52 Even if the merits of S.A.M.'s appeal should be 
addressed, as the majority accurately holds, his due process 
challenge to his recommitment order fails.  Majority op., ¶¶28-
29.  Due process does not require that the County identify a 
particular subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) 
(i.e., 2.a. through 2.e.).  Procedural due process requires only 
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action" and 
"an opportunity to present their objections."  Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).  S.A.M. does 
not 
contend 
that 
he 
was 
deprived 
the 
"opportunity 
to 
present . . . objections" prior to his recommitment.  Id.  In 
fact, he was appointed an attorney at state expense, who through 
motion practice and targeted cross-examination, provided S.A.M. 
a substantive defense at his recommitment hearing.  Further, 
S.A.M. does not claim that the County failed to provide notice 
of its intention to pursue recommitment, its petition to the 
court, or the time, place, and manner by which recommitment 
would be determined.  S.A.M. and his counsel were informed of 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
12 
 
the County's charge that without commitment he would regress 
back 
to 
his 
prior 
"acute 
psychotic 
state 
and 
required 
hospitalization," thus requiring an extended commitment.  They 
were also informed that the County would be proceeding under 
Chapter 51, and that the County believed if treatment were 
withdrawn S.A.M. would be the proper subject for commitment.  
Furthermore, S.A.M. was informed via court notice of the experts 
the County intended to rely on for in-court testimony, as well 
as the subject matter of the experts' testimony.   
¶53 The County did not violate S.A.M.'s procedural due 
process rights in the civil commitment proceedings below.  
Compare DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 774 n.1, 788 
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a ticket that cited to the wrong 
legal provision and did not include a notice of hearing, in 
conjunction with a summons mailed to the plaintiff of the time, 
place, and subject matter of a hearing, satisfied due process 
even though the plaintiff asserted that he never received the 
mailed summons); Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 
F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2016) (notice of "the date, time, and 
location" of a legal violation and the possibility of a hearing 
was sufficient for procedural due process); Herrada v. City of 
Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
notice satisfied due process despite the fact that it contained 
false and misleading information on the legal consequences of 
the proceedings because the notice nonetheless "clearly state[d] 
that a hearing is available to contest the City's allegation 
that" the plaintiff committed a violation of law); see also 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
13 
 
Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶21, 377 Wis. 2d 38, 899 
N.W.2d 303 ("Although the text of the [United States] and 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
provisions 
differ, 
they 
provide 
identical procedural due process protections.").  If there were 
a legitimate concern as to what subdivision paragraph of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) the County was proceeding under, a motion 
for more definite pleadings could be made.  No such motion was 
made in the case at issue.  Procedural protections already exist 
if there is confusion as to the basis for the recommitment.  No 
record exists that such confusion was present here.  Thus, due 
process does not require the County to more specifically 
identify the statutory subdivision paragraph under which it 
seeks a recommitment order.  
¶54 I agree with the majority that the record demonstrates 
that 
both 
the 
third 
standard 
for 
dangerousness 
and 
the 
alternative 
recommitment 
standard 
for 
dangerousness 
were 
satisfied. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. 
& 
1(am).  
Specifically, I agree with the majority that, based on the 
available record, S.A.M. would face "'a substantial probability 
of physical impairment or injury to himself' and that there is 
either 
no 
'reasonable 
provision 
for 
[his] 
protection . . . available in the community' or that S.A.M. 
would 
not, 
to 
a 
'reasonable 
probability,' 
'avail 
himself . . . of these services.'"  Majority op., ¶¶32, 34 
(quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.).  Nonetheless, "if a question 
becomes moot . . . it will not be determined by the reviewing 
court" 
unless 
there 
exists 
"exceptional 
or 
compelling 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
14 
 
circumstances."  J-T Enters., 64 Wis. 2d at 701-02.  This case 
is moot, and no collateral consequence sufficient to overcome 
mootness resulted from S.A.M.'s recommitment.  Thus, the 
majority's discussion of the merits, while correct, is in this 
case unnecessary and ancillary to the damage done to the 
mootness doctrine.  
¶55 The majority opinion essentially concludes that the 
mootness doctrine never applies in Chapter 51 proceedings.  It 
does so without even requiring proof of an exception to mootness 
or any showing that there is a practical effect to S.A.M.  The 
majority makes no effort to explain how S.A.M.'s circumstances 
are unique so to overcome mootness.  The majority in fact does 
not in any way explain why S.A.M. is different from any other 
committee or recommittee.  The majority creates a legal 
presumption that collateral consequences always result from a 
Chapter 51 commitment, and that the mootness doctrine is 
inapplicable in Chapter 51 commitments and recommitments.  I 
disagree, and would conclude that the mootness doctrine, along 
with its exceptions, should remain a viable rubric when 
considering a case.  
¶56 Finally, as for expedited disposition of Chapter 51 
appeals, this court could address and fully vet any such 
proposal through administrative rulemaking.  In such a hearing, 
the court could also consider whether the text of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1) grant the court the 
authority to mandate any such expedited disposition.  The court 
should not engage in that debate and conclude the outcome in 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
15 
 
this opinion.  To the extent that the majority seeks to improve 
efficiency in Chapter 51 appeals, its decision today will have 
the polar opposite effect.  The majority's decision will flood 
the appellate system with otherwise moot cases because those 
cases too will have a firearms ban and have the potential for 
financial liability.  We can expect more, not less, delay and 
sometimes, justice delayed is justice denied. 
¶57 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this writing. 
 
No.  2019AP1033.akz 
 
 
 
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