Title: Southern Cotton Oil Division v. Childress

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

377 S.W.2d 167 (1964) SOUTHERN COTTON OIL DIVISION, etc., Appellant, v. Minnie Lee CHILDRESS et al., Appellees. No. 5-3162. Supreme Court of Arkansas. April 6, 1964. *168 Hout, Thaxton & Hout, Newport, Rose, Meek, House, Barron, Nash & Williamson, Little Rock, for appellant. Pickens, Pickens & Boyce, Newport, Smith, Williams, Friday & Bowen, Robert V. Light, Little Rock, for appellees. McFADDIN, Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case, and necessitates a review of the holdings on the matter of "horse-play"[1] or "skylarking." Mrs. Minnie Lee Childress seeks recovery for herself and children because of the death of her husband, George Childress, while in the employ of the appellant, Southern Cotton Oil.[2] The facts are without substantial dispute. For many years the appellant, Southern Cotton Oil has had a cottonseed oil mill at Newport. George Childress worked for the appellant for about seven years. On August 15, 1957, he reported for work about 7:00 A.M. and was assigned the job of using a compressed air hose for blowing out the vent pipes in the soybean storage shed. Alfred Ballentine, a fellow-employee, was working that day in another room of the plant. About 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon Ballentine needed an 18" pipe wrench and went to the soybean shed to see about getting the wrench. George Childress was then using a high-pressure air hose with a nozzle on the end of it, blowing out the vents in the storage room. As Ballentine went by Childress, one or the other made a friendly and challenging gesture. After Ballentine investigated the matter of the pipe wrench, he started out of the bean shed and passed by Childress; and they engaged in friendly scuffling and in the process of the scuffle Ballentine got hold of the nozzle of the air hose that was blowing in a continuous stream and in some way the end of the air hose was forced against the anus of the deceased and air forced into his body and as a result George Childress died. A portion of this scuffle was witnessed by Mr. Jerry Jeffrey, manager of the Company, who immediately went to the men and, finding that Childress had been injured, he made arrangements for Childress to be taken to the hospital. The company paid the medical and hospital bills that resulted from the injury. Childress died on August 18, 1957, of internal injuries, the result of the air being forced into his body. *169 Alfred Ballentine testified that he and George Childress had been friends for seven years; that they had scuffled there at the Southern Cotton Oil plant five or six times before that day; that there was no anger or ill feelings between them; and that it was just friendly playing. Ballentine said that when he passed by Childress enroute to see about the pipe wrench, Childress was seated in the door at work and Childress reached for him; that as Ballentine came back, Childress jumped up and went running around Ballentine with the air hose, as though to wrap it around him; that they started scuffling and Ballentine tried to get loose and Childress was trying to tie the house around him; that they were not mad, they were just playing, and that they scuffled for a few minutes and some way in the process the air was forced into Childress' body through his anus. Ballentine also testified that during the entire time he worked at the plant no one gave him any instructions or warning regarding the use of the air hose; that he did not know that an air hose could injure a man seriously or kill him; that he did not know that placing the air hose near a man's rectum might kill him. Ballentine said some other employees had used the air hose to clean the lint off their clothes; and that he had never played with an air hose before. A number of other witnesses testified, but all the evidence was about to the same general effect as that heretofore mentioned. The fact remains that Childress and Ballentine, while on the job, engaged in a friendly scuffle, and as a result Childress was killed. The Workmen's Compensation Commission refused to allow compensation.[3] On appeal the Circuit Court reversed the Commission and held that Mrs. Childress and her children were entitled to recover compensation. The Circuit Court was of the view that our case of Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545, changed the holding in Hughes v. Tapley, relied on by the Commission. From the Circuit Court judgment, Southern Cotton Oil prosecutes this appeal; and we are thus presented with the problem of whether there may be a recovery in a case like this one wherein a worker is injured in what is called "horse-play" or "sky-larking." I. The Holdings Generally. Before considering our own cases, it is proper that we consider as background information the trend generally in "horse-play" cases. The earlier workmen's compensation cases usually held that there could be no recovery in "horse-play" cases;[4] but Justice Cardozo's opinion in Leonbruno v. Champlain, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711, 13 A.L.R. 522 *170 (1920),[5] is generally credited with having ushered in the modern ruling. Justice Cardozo there said: The courts then began to allow recovery to the innocent victim of the horseplay, but a majority continued to refuse recovery to the instigator of the horseplay if he were injured. Larson[4] states this rule: The trend of the recent cases has been to eliminate the distinction between instigator and victim, and to examine the real facts as to: (a) whether there was a substantial deviation from employment; (b) the extent of the horseplay; (c) whether it should have been known to the employer so as to be stopped; and (d) other factors which might tend to allow recovery to the injured party. Larson[4] has several pages devoted to these various matters. In 99 C. J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 225, p. 753, after stating the general rule, the text states: The text then adds this: "Other authorities go further and hold that the test of coverage by the compensation statute is whether or not the horseplay, skylarking, and practical joking that caused the injury may reasonably be regarded as an incident of the particular employment, and where it may be so regarded, an injured employee is entitled to compensation even though he was a participant." *171 Schneider[6] says: "Since a majority of the jurisdictions now award compensation to innocent or non-participating employees, and to employees whose participation is but momentary and not `aggressive', a rule, under the broader conception of the law, may be said to be that injuries sustained by an employee while in the course of his employment as a result of another's horseplay, are compensable as arising out of and in the course of his employment. Hon. Samuel B. Horovitz, writing in 3 NACCA Law Journal 57, in 1949, said: To list all the cases and Law Review articles on this matter would be a work of supererogation.[7] To sum up: the recent cases are in accord with the words of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Crilly v. Ballou (1958), 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d 493, in which the Michigan Court reviewed its own earlier case denying recovery, overruled it, and said: II. Our Own Cases. Turning from the holdings elsewhere, we come to our own cases. There are four of these: (1) Birchett v. Tuf-Nut Garment Mfg. Co. (1943) 205 Ark. 483, 169 S.W.2d 574. We denied compensation to an employee, saying: (2) Hughes v. Tapley (1944), 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429. Work had temporarily stopped and Hughes intended to throw a lighted fuse near a deaf and dumb fellow employee named Turley, which would have caused the man to be frightened and jump. Hughes got a carbide light, apparently to be used in lighting the fuse; and when he placed the carbide lamp on a box of powder the lamp toppled over and Hughes was injured. He claimed compensation from Tapley, his employer. The Commission denied recovery to Hughes, and we affirmed, saying: We then quoted from an annotation as follows: (3) Barrentine v. Dierks (1944), 207 Ark. 527, 181 S.W.2d 485. Barrentine and a fellow employee (Parker) had a fight before lunch regarding something Barrentine might have said about Parker. After lunch, while Barrentine was getting a drink of water, Parker slipped up behind him and hit Barrentine on the head. The Commission denied recovery to Barrentine, finding that the "assault was caused by feeling engendered from purely personal causes and had no connection with the work of the master and did not arise out of employment." We affirmed the Commission's findings and refusal of an award of compensation to Barrentine. (4) The foregoing three cases all indicate denial of compensation; but then ten years later came the fourth case, Johnson v. Safreed (1954), 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545. Johnson and his fellow employee, Deloney, engaged in an affray and bitter words in the course of the work; and since Deloney was senior in point of service, the master, Safreed, discharged Johnson, who left the place of work and started to a truck to be transported to town. Deloney pursued Johnson and struck him on the head with a pick, inflicting injuries for which Johnson sought compensation from Safreed, the master. The Workmen's Compensation Commission denied recovery to Johnson, finding: (1) that Johnson was the original aggressor in the affray; and (2) Johnson's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. This Court, in an opinion by Justice Millwee, reversed the Commission and held that Johnson was entitled to compensation. Justice Millwee reviewed the earlier cases and the present ones, saying: Johnson v. Safreed was an assault case; and if a recovery can be allowed the original aggressor in an assault case, then likewise, recovery can be allowed the original instigator in a horseplay case. One cannot read the Opinion in Johnson v. Safreed without being convinced that in 1954 this Court departed from the older holdings (like Hughes v. Tapley) and took a positive step toward the award of compensation in a case like the one at bar. The holding in Johnson v. Safreed was so understood by the Bench and Bar contemporaneously with the Opinion. In an article in 1957 in 11 Ark. Law Review, p. 429, after reviewing the three earlier cases heretofore mentioned, the writer of the article said of Johnson v. Safreed: The learned Circuit Judge in the case at bar rendered an Opinion which, after reviewing our earlier cases, concluded with these words: "The important question which poses itself to this court appears to be whether *174 or not the injury which caused the death of Childress arose out of the employment. In reading Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954), it is crystal clear that the Arkansas Supreme Court is no longer using as the test in Workmen's Compensation cases, `whether the parties here were acting in the furtherance of the employer's business,' as stated in the Opinion of the Commission in the instant case. In the Johnson v. Safreed case the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that the more modern rule and the more humanitarian doctrine of `arising out of the employment' would be the applicable yardstick. * * * We agree with the Circuit Court; conclude that the claimants are entitled to compensation in the case at bar; and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. HARRIS, Chief Justice. While I have every sympathy with an injured employee, and with his family where the injury is fatal, and likewise fully agree that a liberal construction should be given the Compensation Act, nonetheless, it does not appear to me that recovery should be allowed in this type of case. I cannot bring myself to feel that it is right or proper, or that the ends of justice are best served by permitting the recovery of compensation by a worker, or his dependents, where the employee sustained his injury at a time when he was not performing his duties, but rather, to the contrary, had deliberately stepped aside to commit an act to satisfy his own sense of humor, such act being totally unrelated to the task for which he was employed.[1] There are numerous cases from various jurisdictions relative to injuries sustained while engaging in horseplay; some allow recovery, and some deny it, but according to 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 225, Page 753, the majority view is as follows: The court majority in the case before us appear to take the view that Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429, was overruled by Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545. Quoting from the majority opinion: I do not agree with that analysis. As stated by Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Volume 1, Section 23.50, Page 354: "While assaults and horseplay have some features in common, they also have some differences which make it doubtful whether the reasoning of assault *175 cases can be taken over bodily and applied to horseplay. This reasoning pictures the day-to-day enforced contact of divergent personalities under the strains of industrial life, with the not improbable culmination in flareups of temper as the direct result of this environment. There is something relentless and inescapable about the emotional explosion that is thus ultimately thrust upon the claimant "aggressor" virtually against his will. But in a horseplay case, the most you can say is that the employment environment provides temptation and opportunity, rather than implacable emotional pressure. Hence, when a prankster sets out to play a practical joke, there is a higher probability that the action may amount to a deliberate and conscious deviation from employment than in the assault cases, in which almost every instance of violence is a spontaneous and unpremeditated reaction to the play of the surroundings on the claimant's temperament." Also, Justice Millwee, who wrote the opinion in Johnson v. Safreed, supra, makes it a point to particularly call attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the claimant in that case was "work-connected." In fact, this is emphasized three times in the opinion. The majority quote a portion of the opinion of the Circuit Court in the present case, stating that they agree with the findings therein. One of these findings was that "the conditions of employment did induce the horseplay;" also, "the injury which caused the claimant's death arose out of his employment." I cannot agree with these conclusions, nor definitely determine the basis upon which they were made. It is to be supposed that these findings relate to the fact that the employer had the air hose on the premises, and that fact "induced the horseplay;" also, because Childress was injured by the perversive use of one of the pieces of equipment necessary to his work, the injury "arose out of the employment." I, of course, agree that an innocent victim of horseplay should be granted compensation, but where the injury is the result of the injured person's willful, deliberate, and total departure from the duties for which he was employed, I cannot see that compensation is in order. To my way of thinking, Childress was as far from performing his duties at the time of injury, as if, instead of wrestling annd playing with an air hose, he had spent that time asleep or entirely away from the premises. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. [1] Most of the American cases use the word, "horse-play"; and most of the English cases use the word, "sky-larking." We make no distinction in terminology. [2] At the time of the death of George Childress, Southern Cotton Oil appears to have been a division of Wesson Oil and Snowdrift Company. Later Southern Cotton Oil appears to have become a division of Hunt Food & Industries, Inc., and is so styled in the briefs in this Court. For brevity, we merely call the appellant "Southern Cotton Oil." [3] The opinion of the Commission reads in part: "Briefly, the facts are these. On August 15, 1957, the deceased, George Childress, and a fellow employee, Alfred Ballentine, during work hours became engaged in friendly `horseplay' which resulted in a high pressure air hose causing serious injury to George Childress, resulting in his death on August 18, 1957. The positions of the claimants and respondent are clear, the question being whether said accidental injury comes within the purview of the Act. The case of Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944), involved horseplay and the court said: `While it is true that appellant, in the instant case, has received most serious and painful injuries, he was, on the evidence presented, the unfortunate victim of his own acts, and his injuries resulting therefrom did not arise out of his employment and therefore he is not entitled to compensation.' The Commission holds that this is still the law in this State; and in the instant case, we find that the deceased was the instigator of the horseplay; that the parties here were not acting in the furtherance of the employer's business; and that the conditions of employment did not induce the horseplay." [4] Larson comments on page 343: "The modern observer may find it hard to believe that such claims were uniformly denied in early compensation law; * * *" The Law of Workmen's Compensation by Prof. Arthur Larson, Vol. I, page 343, § 23.10. [5] In Vol. 13 of A.L.R. there are reported several of the leading cases on horseplay, being: Socha v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1921), 105 Neb. 691, 181 N.W. 706, 13 A.L.R. p. 513 (an air hose fatality, like the case at bar); Payne v. Industrial Comm. (1920), 295 Ill. 388, 129 N.E. 122 13 A.L.R. p. 518 (also an air hose case); Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills (1920), 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711, 13 A.L.R. p. 522; and Hollenbach v. Hollenbach (Ky. 1918), 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152, 13 A.L.R. p. 524; and the annotation in 13 A.L.R. p. 540 et seq., "Workmen's Compensation: right to compensation in case of injuries sustained through horseplay, or fooling." This annotation is supplemented in 20 A.L.R. 882, 36 A.L.R. 1469, 43 A.L.R. 492, 46 A.L.R. 1150, and 159 A.L.R. 319. [6] Schneider's Workmen's Compensation, 3rd or Permanent Edition, Text Vol. 6, page 560, § 1609. [7] We do mention these few in each of which recovery was allowed the injured claimant, although he might have been the instigator of the horseplay: Diaz v. Newark Industrial Co. (N.J.1960), 60 N.J.Super. 424, 159 A.2d 462, affirmed 65 N.J.Super. 249, 167 A.2d 662; Petro v. Martin Baking Co. (1953), 239 Minn. 307, 58 N.W.2d 731; Cunning v. City of Hopkins (1960), 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876; and Ransom v. H. G. Hill Co. (1959), 205 Tenn. 352, 326 S.W.2d 659. See also 65 Harvard Law Review p. 360; 37 Virginia Law Review p. 766; 34 Cornell Law Quar. p. 460; 54 Harvard Law Review p. 154; 41 Illinois Law Review p. 311; 26-27 NACCA Law Journal p. 248; and 29 NACCA Law Journal p. 239. [1] The Commission found that Childress instigated the horseplay which resulted in his fatal injury, and this is not disputed.