Title: In re Ronald Combs

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 75













In re Ronald Combs (2009-422)
 
2011 VT 75
 
[Filed 6-Jul-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 75
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2009-422
 
NOVEMBER TERM, 2010 
 
In re Ronald Combs
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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Franklin Superior Court
 
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DOCKET NO. S450-06 Fc
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge:  Ben W. Joseph
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
 Petitioner appeals from a trial court order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR), which alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel.  Petitioner makes two arguments: (1) the trial court erred in
holding that petitioner's criminal defense counsel did not render ineffective
assistance by failing to seek a bifurcated trial and explaining its merit to
petitioner; and (2) the trial court failed to consider his claim that his
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not seeking a stipulation that
petitioner was insane at the time of the offense.  We affirm on the first
claim, but agree that the trial court failed to resolve the second claim. 
For this reason, we reverse and remand.
¶ 2.            
On October 20, 1995, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and
was sentenced to serve thirty-five years to life in prison.  This Court
affirmed his conviction in State v. Combs, No. 1996-018 (Vt. February
24, 1997) (unpub. mem.). 
In October 2006, petitioner filed a PCR petition, claiming that the State had
not met its burden of proof in his criminal case.  Petitioner amended his
petition several years later, focusing on the claim that he had received
ineffective assistance from his defense counsel.  The trial court
adjudicating petitioner's petition (PCR court) conducted an evidentiary hearing
on October 6, 2009, and subsequently denied the PCR petition.  This appeal
followed.  
 
¶ 3.            
Petitioner was initially arrested and charged with murder in 1990. 
At that time, he retained a private attorney as his defense counsel. 
Shortly after his arrest, petitioner's competency and sanity were evaluated,
and he was deemed incompetent to stand trial because he suffered from
schizophrenia paranoid type.  Petitioner spent the following four years
involuntarily committed to the Vermont State Hospital, until the State raised
the issue of his competency again in 1994.  A second psychiatric
evaluation in 1994 led to the conclusion that petitioner was competent to stand
trial, though the evaluation deemed his competence to be "marginal."  Both
physicians who evaluated petitioner concluded that the insanity defense could
be supported given petitioner's psychiatric condition at the time of the
crime.  All psychiatric evidence suggested that petitioner was insane at
the time of the murder.  At a later hearing, the State prosecutor
questioned the ethics of prosecuting a defendant who may have been legally
insane at the time of the alleged crime.  
 
¶ 4.            
The district court considering the criminal case specifically questioned
defense counsel about his decision not to proceed with an insanity
defense.  Defense counsel explained that petitioner genuinely desired to
plead not guilty and did not want the implication of guilt from an insanity
defense.  In response, the judge told defense counsel that "it can be a
separate issue as to whether or not . . . he
committed the act," and that "his mental state" at the time of the act could be
assessed "secondly."  The judge continued: "I just want to make sure that
this has been clearly discussed, and I don't see that in order to use an
insanity defense that it's essential that the act be admitted, and I guess I
would like that discussed with your client.  Maybe what we can do is you
can discuss that with him for a while . . . ." 
Without consulting petitioner, who was present in court, defense counsel
responded that he had discussed "all of this" with his client and that
petitioner was "quite adamant about the fact that he [did] not wish to pursue
that defense in any way, shape or strategy."  Defense counsel clarified
that his client was not refusing the insanity defense because he believed he
would have to admit the act in order to raise the issue of insanity, and the
court proceeded with the understanding that petitioner did not want a separate
consideration of the insanity defense. 
 
¶ 5.            
Petitioner went to trial, and a jury convicted him of first degree
murder.  He was sentenced to serve thirty-five years to life in
prison.  
 
¶ 6.            
More than ten years after his original conviction, petitioner filed a
pro se PCR petition.  In the amended petition considered by the PCR court,
petitioner claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
defense counsel failed to: (1) pursue an insanity defense when petitioner
was deemed incompetent and was hospitalized for several years prior to his
trial; (2) stipulate to insanity with the State's attorney when that
opportunity presented itself; (3) bifurcate the trial upon the invitation of
the court; and (4) pursue an insanity defense at trial.  Petitioner
claimed that absent the above errors by defense counsel, there was a
"reasonable probability" that he would have received a more favorable
resolution of his case.    
 
¶ 7.            
At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner offered an expert witnessa
criminal defense lawyerwho testified that petitioner's defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for the second and third reasons
above, and that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
criminal prosecution would have been different without the unprofessional
errors.  The State offered the testimony of defense counsel in the
underlying criminal case, as well as that of an expert witness, also a criminal
defense lawyer.  The State's expert witness testified that defense
counsel's assistance was not ineffective for the third reason above, failure to
bifurcate the trial, and, even if the assistance was ineffective, there was no
reasonable probability of a different result.  This witness did testify
that defense counsel's assistance was ineffective for the second claimed
reason, failure to stipulate to insanity,[1]
but again there was no reasonable probability of a different result if the
representation had been effective.
 
¶ 8.            
After a hearing, the PCR court denied petitioner's PCR petition,
reasoning that "[b]ecause it was [petitioner] who
[chose] not to raise insanity as a defense, [defense counsel] did not conduct
himself in a manner that supports a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel.' "  In reaching this conclusion,
the court specifically addressed the bifurcation claim.  It recited the discussion
between defense counsel and the district court judge, summarized above. 
It found that petitioner refused to use an insanity defense "in any way," and
petitioner had the right to make that choice.  It found credible the
testimony of defense counsel that he repeatedly raised the insanity defense
with petitioner and held that it did not matter whether defense counsel used
the term "bifurcation."  The court never mentioned the second claim in the
petition, counsel's failure to stipulate to insanity, and failed to resolve
it.  Petitioner now appeals to this Court.
 
¶ 9.            
We review findings of fact in PCR appeals using a clearly erroneous
standard.  State v. Bristol, 159 Vt. 334, 336,
618 A.2d 1290, 1291 (1992).  We will not disturb the findings if
they are supported by any credible evidence, and even when the evidence is
conflicting, we defer to the trial court's judgment.  Id. at
336-37, 618 A.2d  at 1291.  A petitioner bears the
burden of proof on a PCR petition and must show, "by a preponderance of the
evidence, that fundamental errors rendered his conviction defective."  In re Liberty, 154 Vt. 643, 644, 572 A.2d 1381, 1382 (1990)
(mem.).  Vermont uses a two-part standard
for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claima test that is
essentially equivalent under the United States and Vermont constitutions. 
In re Russo, 2010 VT 16, ¶ 16, 187 Vt. 367, 991 A.2d 1073.  Ineffective assistance of counsel cases first require that
the petitioner show by a preponderance of the evidence that defense counsel's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness informed by
prevailing professional norms." In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. 209, 212, 647 A.2d 316, 319 (1994); see also In re Washington, 2003 VT 98, ¶ 8, 176 Vt.
529, 838 A.2d 87 (mem.).  If this first burden
is met, petitioner must further show that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defense by demonstrating " a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.' " Dunbar, 162 Vt. at 212, 647 A.2d  at 319
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)); see also Russo,
2010 VT 16, ¶ 16; Washington, 2003 VT 98, ¶ 8.  
 
¶ 10.        
As this Court has previously acknowledged, petitioner's burden in
ineffective assistance of counsel cases "is a heavy one."  Dunbar,
162 Vt. at 212, 647 A.2d  at 319.  Trial counsel
is allowed much discretion in decisions regarding trial strategy, and we will
not measure counsel's competence based on the failure of that strategy.  Id. 
Instead, we must assess whether counsel's decisions were "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in a criminal case at that time."  In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 32, 460 A.2d 472, 477 (1983).  Furthermore, as we recited in In re Pernicka,
fairly assessing counsel's performance requires " that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.' " 
147 Vt. 180, 183, 513 A.2d 616, 618 (1986) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689).  Due to the difficulties of making such an evaluation, " a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . .
.' "  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689).
 
¶ 11.        
Petitioner presents two main arguments on appeal: (1) the PCR court
erroneously held that defense counsel was under no duty to inform his client
about the advantages of a bifurcated trial despite the district court judge
inviting bifurcation and directing defense counsel to discuss it with his
client; and (2) the PCR court failed to address whether defense counsel was
ineffective for not seeking a stipulation with the State. In making the first
argument, petitioner claims that he was offered[2] a procedural option that no defendant
would refusethat is, to first go to trial to determine his guilt or innocence
and then, if found guilty, to decide whether to advance an insanity defense to
avoid a long jail sentence.  He faults defense counsel for not fully
explaining this option and its obvious advantages.  His expert witness
testified that the failure to advise petitioner properly
was ineffective assistance of counsel.  Defense counsel testified that
petitioner had categorically rejected an insanity defense under all
circumstances primarily because he had spent a lengthy period in the state
mental institution and did not want to go back there.  The State points to
the record of the hearing in the criminal case in which the district judge
suggested bifurcation and defense counsel stated that he had "discussed all of
this" with petitioner.  The district court accepted defense counsel's
testimony that defendant refused to raise an insanity defense.  Those
findings are not clearly erroneous.
 
¶ 12.        
The decision on whether to raise an insanity defense in a criminal case
resides with the defendant.  State v. Bean, 171 Vt. 290, 302, 762 A.2d 1259, 1267 (2000); see also State v. Tribble,
2005 VT 132, ¶ 31, 179 Vt. 235, 892 A.2d 232.  It is the duty of counsel
to implement the client's decision.  Tribble, 2005 VT 132, ¶ 34.  Counsel cannot pursue an insanity
defense over the objection of defendant.  Based on its findings, the PCR
court ruled that petitioner made the decision not to raise an insanity defense
after advice from defense counsel and defense counsel could not be faulted for
a wrong decision.  We uphold that conclusion as supported by the evidence
and the findings.  Thus, petitioner failed to prove that defense counsel's
representation was ineffective on this issue, and we must affirm the court's
decision.
 
¶ 13.        
Petitioner's next claim of error on appeal is that the PCR court
improperly failed to address whether defense counsel was ineffective for not
seeking a stipulation with the State that petitioner was "not guilty by reason
of insanity."  Petitioner correctly indicates that both expert witnesses
who testified agreed that defense counsel should have pursued such a
stipulation and fell below the reasonable standard of care for failing to do
so.  Petitioner relies upon opinions of the examining mental health
professionals that petitioner was insane at the time of the offense and a
comment by the prosecuting attorney in 1994 that he was researching the ethical
propriety of prosecuting a defendant who had been found insane by the examining
mental health professionals.  The State's expert witness testified that it
was speculative whether the prosecutor would have entered into a stipulation of
insanity.  
 
¶ 14.        
Petitioner argues that defense counsel could have imposed the insanity
defense on him between 1990 and 1994 before he was deemed competent to stand
trial because he had been declared incompetent at that point and therefore
could not control defense strategy by objecting to an insanity defense. 
Except for transcripts of hearings, the record from the criminal case was not
before the PCR court.  Thus, for example, the opinions of the mental
health professionals were not before the PCR court, and it was unclear when the
opinions that defendant was incompetent were reached.  The statement of
the prosecutor that he was researching the ethics of the prosecution came after
the determination that petitioner had been found competent to stand
trial.  The court made no findings about what occurred during the period
in question and never addressed petitioner's claim.
 
¶ 15.        
The PCR court had the duty to make findings on the disputed evidence
before it and to address each of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel.  While the court generally denied petitioner relief, its
decision never addressed his claim regarding a stipulation of insanity. 
In the absence of findings and conclusions, and a clear decision, we cannot
review the court's judgment.  See In re Hale Mtn. Fish & Game Club,
Inc., 2007 VT 102, ¶ 10, 182 Vt. 606, 939 A.2d 498; Klein v. Klein,
150 Vt. 466, 472, 555 A.2d 382, 386 (1988).  Thus, on petitioner's second
claim on review, we reverse and remand for proper findings and determination of
the claim.    
 
Reversed and
remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.
                                                                                                                      

 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

[1] 
The expert witness testified that defense counsel "should have pursued" a
possible stipulation with the prosecutor and then added, "I don't necessarily
disagree with" petitioner's expert witness that defense counsel's failure fell
"below the standard of care."  For purposes of this decision, we take that
statement as the expression of an opinion that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel.
[2]  For purposes of this decision, we
assume that the district court made a firm offer of a bifurcated proceeding and
would have gone through with it.  We offer no opinion on the
appropriateness of the bifurcation procedure.