Title: Benson v. City of Madison

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2366 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Thomas F. Benson, Mark Rechlicz, Mark Rechlicz  
Enterprises, Inc., Robert J. Muranyi, RJM Pro 
Golf Incorporation and William J. Scheer, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Madison, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
371 Wis. 2d 760, 886 N.W.2d 593  
(2016 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J. concurs 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY 
J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioners, there were briefs 
by Kevin J. Palmersheim, Cathleen A. Dettmann and Haley 
Palmersheim, SC Middleton and oral argument by Kevin J. 
Palmersheim. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent, 
there 
was 
a 
brief 
by 
Catherine M. Rottier and Boardman & Clark, LLP, Madison, with 
whom on the brief was Michael P. May and Doran E. Viste, City of 
Madison Attorney’s Office.  There was an oral argument by 
Catherine M. Rottier and Paul Norman.  
 
 
2017 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2366 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV180) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas F. Benson, Mark Rechlicz, Mark Rechlicz 
Enterprises, Inc., Robert J. Muranyi, RJM Pro 
Golf Incorporation and William J. Scheer, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Madison, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Benson v. City of 
Madison, No. 2015AP2366, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Aug. 25, 2016), which affirmed the Dane County circuit court's1 
judgment dismissing a lawsuit filed by the petitioners against 
the City of Madison ("the City") pursuant to the Wisconsin Fair 
Dealership Law ("the WFDL"), a statute that governs, among other 
things, the termination or nonrenewal of specified types of 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Richard G. Niess presided. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
2 
 
business relationships.  See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 135 
("Dealership Practices") (2013-14).2 
¶2 
The City owns four public golf courses: Odana, Yahara, 
Monona, and Glenway.  For years, the City entered into 
"operating agreements" ("Agreements") with the petitioners, four 
"golf professionals" ("Golf Pros"), to oversee the clubhouse 
operations at these courses.3  That is, while the City maintained 
the physical golf courses, the Golf Pros performed varied tasks 
such as collecting greens fees, hiring and managing attendants, 
supervising golfing, operating the clubhouse and pro shop, 
selling concessions, and giving lessons.4   
¶3 
In 2012 the City informed the Golf Pros that it would 
not be renewing the Agreements.  The Golf Pros subsequently 
filed a lawsuit against the City, both alleging that the City 
had failed to comply with the WFDL in ending the City's 
relationships with them and seeking damages.  The circuit court 
below ultimately dismissed the lawsuit on summary judgment, 
concluding that the relationships between the Golf Pros and the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 "Golf professional" is an appellation recognized by the 
Professional Golfers' Association.   
4 Technically speaking, one of the four Agreements at issue 
in this case was entered into by the City and a corporation 
owned by one of the Golf Pros.  For simplicity, this opinion 
will refer to this corporation by its sole shareholder, the Golf 
Pro.  We also note that a second corporation owned by another of 
the Golf Pros is a petitioner on this appeal, but we will not 
reference that entity further.   
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
3 
 
City did not constitute "dealerships" protected by the WFDL.  
See Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3).  The Golf Pros appealed, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  Benson, unpublished slip op., ¶2.   
¶4 
On this appeal, we are asked to resolve two principal 
questions: first, whether the WFDL applies to the City at all; 
and second, whether the relationships between the Golf Pros and 
the City are "dealerships" under the WFDL.  Additionally, 
assuming we answer both questions in the affirmative, the City 
contends that the Golf Pros' lawsuit is time-barred and should 
be dismissed on grounds of governmental immunity. 
¶5 
We conclude that the WFDL applies to the City; that 
the relationships between the Golf Pros and the City are 
"dealerships" under the WFDL; that the Golf Pros' lawsuit is not 
time-barred; and that the City is not immune from the lawsuit.  
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Although the City's relationships with the Golf Pros 
span back a number of years, the most recent version of the 
Agreements governed a period running from January 1, 2008, to 
December 31, 2012.5  Because the nature of the relationships 
between the City and the Golf Pros is central to this case, we 
first summarize the duties of the City and of the Golf Pros, as 
                                                 
5 The four Golf Pros began their respective relationships 
with the City in 1977, 1981, 1985, and 1999.  According to the 
parties, the Agreements "were generally for five-year terms." 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
4 
 
well as overall financial arrangements, as set forth in these 
Agreements.   
¶7 
Each Golf Pro entered into a separate Agreement with 
the City, with each of the four Golf Pros managing clubhouse 
operations at one of the City's four courses.  The Agreements 
begin by noting, inter alia, that the City "is engaged in the 
operation and maintenance of [the golf course] and desires to 
engage a competent and qualified golf professional to operate, 
manage, and provide certain services at [the golf course]"; that 
"the Golf Pro desires to procure from the City the right to 
operate and provide the services"; and that "the public interest 
and welfare will be served . . . by the granting of an agreement 
to a reputable party who will provide certain services to the 
public patronizing the golf course."  The Agreements then grant 
to each Golf Pro "the exclusive privilege and obligation to 
operate" one of the four golf courses. 
¶8 
Pursuant to the Agreements, each Golf Pro was hired to 
perform the following tasks, among others (some of which 
overlap): 
 "[s]upervise and operate the [golf course] in a clean, 
efficient, and creditable manner," "manag[e] the speed 
of play," "efficiently start[] play on the first tee 
so as to maximize play and revenue to the City," and 
"provide a ranger/ambassador when heavy play so 
requires"; 
 "[e]mploy attendants to sell and collect green fees, 
resident and non-resident annual passports and other 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
5 
 
established player promotional devices, renewals, and 
take and process reservations," and "collect for the 
City all green fees, locker fees, player promotional 
pass fees, and tournament fees"; 
 "operate concession rights at the pro shop, clubhouse, 
and golf course," "sell food and beverages" during 
specified periods, "[o]btain the necessary licenses to 
operate and maintain on the premises a concession 
operation for the sale of beverages, confections, and 
food," and "sell golf clothing and golf equipment"; 
 "[p]rovide a sufficient number of motorized golf carts 
to meet the needs of the public" and "rent and operate 
golf carts and equipment"; and 
 "teach and give golf lessons for compensation" as well 
as "conduct" a specified number of "free clinics each 
season." 
¶9 
Significantly, the Golf Pros were "responsible for the 
purchase of all supplies and equipment used in the pro shop, 
golf range, motorized cart concessions, and food and beverage 
concessions."  Each Golf Pro was entitled to "hire assistants to 
assist in the operation" of the golf course, "concessions and 
collecting money due the City under" the Agreement.  But the 
Golf Pros were "responsible for the hiring and supervision of 
all employees necessary for the efficient operation of the 
clubhouse and the pro shop and further, the hiring, training, 
scheduling and supervision of course rangers and starters."  The 
Golf Pros were also "responsible for the salaries, benefits, and 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
6 
 
premiums for Worker's Compensation and Social Security, all 
income tax deduction and any other tax or payroll deductions 
required by law" for these employees.  The Golf Pros were 
required to maintain a number of different types of insurance. 
¶10 The Agreements did not oblige the Golf Pros to 
maintain the physical courses; this was performed by the City 
through its own employees.  The City also owned the land and 
buildings and paid relevant utilities.6 
¶11 The City paid each Golf Pro a "base contract payment" 
specified in the Agreements.  The Golf Pros also received: 
All income from concessions, sale of merchandise at 
the pro shop, golf instruction, pull cart . . . and 
golf club rental, except for a return each week to the 
City of Madison fifteen (15%) percent of the gross 
receipts of pull carts . . . and golf club rental, and 
eleven (11%) percent of the restaurant concession.7 
¶12 According to the Agreements, the Golf Pros did not 
receive any money from the "green fees, locker fees, player 
promotional pass fees, and tournament fees"; the Golf Pros 
simply collected these fees and "remit[ted]" them to the City.  
According to the parties, "the City set the prices for greens 
                                                 
6 The Agreements did provide that the Golf Pros would 
"cooperate with city employees to keep the premises . . . and 
the area adjacent to the buildings, up to 25 yards, in a tidy 
and presentable condition at all times."  Additionally, the Golf 
Pros were "responsible for all cleaning of the clubhouse 
buildings." 
7 Certain of the Agreements differed regarding the manner in 
which riding cart and driving range revenue was allocated.  This 
difference does not affect our decision in this case. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
7 
 
fees, passes and locker fees" and furnished "the equipment 
necessary to process payments of greens fees, locker fees and 
charges for season passes."  On the other hand, the Golf Pros 
set food, beverage, and merchandise prices. 
¶13 The Agreements required the Golf Pros to provide 
either $1,000 or $3,500 (depending on the Agreement) each year 
"to a fund to be matched by the City to execute a formal 
marketing plan for [the City's] golf program."  The Agreements 
state that the Golf Pros "agree[] to participate in the creation 
of this marketing plan." 
¶14 Finally, 
the 
Agreements 
provide 
that 
"[t]he 
relationship between the City and the Golf Pro shall be one of 
an independent contractor and not one of employer and employee," 
adding: 
[I]n the operation and conduct of this Agreement, the 
City does not grant Golf Pro the right to sell or 
distribute any goods or services provided by the City, 
nor does the City grant Golf Pro the right to use a 
City trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype, 
advertising or other commercial symbol. 
¶15 On August 1, 2012——a few months before the expiration 
of the Agreements——the Golf Pros met with the City's Parks 
Superintendent ("Superintendent") and other City employees.  The 
Superintendent informed the Golf Pros that "the golf operation 
was not sustainable" and asked for "proposals for clubhouse 
operations for the next term of the" Agreements.  Proposals were 
submitted, but on October 8, 2012, the City's mayor decided to 
"recommend internalizing clubhouse operations" to the City's 
Common Council.  On October 12, 2012, the Superintendent 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
8 
 
informed the Golf Pros that the Agreements were not going to be 
renewed. 
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶16 On October 25, 2012, the Golf Pros served the City 
with a notice of claim.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.80 ("Claims 
against governmental bodies or officers, agents or employees; 
notice of injury; limitation of damages and suits.").  On 
January 17, 2014, the Golf Pros filed a complaint in Dane County 
circuit court against the City alleging that the City had failed 
to comply with the WFDL in terminating the City's relationships 
with them; the Golf Pros sought damages.  Specifically, the 
complaint alleged that the City "failed to provide to the Golf 
Pros any written notice of termination or nonrenewal, let alone 
a notice that can be said to comply with the requirements" of 
the WFDL and "failed to provide the Golf Pros with the required 
60 days in which to rectify any claimed deficiency," adding that 
"indeed [the City] claimed no deficiency in the Golf Pros' 
performance whatsoever." The Golf Pros argued that the City's 
"nonrenewal and termination of the Golf Pros' respective 
[Agreements] was a direct violation of the WFDL."8   
¶17 On August 31, 2015, the circuit court issued a 
decision and order granting a motion for summary judgment filed 
by the City and denying a motion for partial summary judgment 
filed by the Golf Pros.  The decision was based on the circuit 
                                                 
8 On May 19, 2014, the Golf Pros filed an amended complaint. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
9 
 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
"[t]he 
Golf 
Pros' 
contractual 
relationships with the City were not protected 'dealerships' 
under the [WFDL]."  On September 29, 2015, the circuit court 
entered an order for judgment and judgment of dismissal. 
¶18 On November 11, 2015, the Golf Pros filed a notice of 
appeal.  On August 25, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed, 
"agree[ing] with the circuit court that . . . the Golf Pros did 
not have dealerships."  Benson, unpublished slip op., ¶2.  On 
September 26, 2016, the Golf Pros filed a petition for review in 
this court.  On January 10, 2017, we granted the petition. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 This appeal arose following the circuit court's 
decision on summary judgment.  "We review summary judgment 
rulings independently, applying the well-established standards 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08."  Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 
2016 WI 53, ¶35, 369 Wis. 2d 547, 881 N.W.2d 309 (quoting 
Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶20, 338 
Wis. 2d 761, 809 Wis. 2d 529).  
¶20 In this case we interpret and apply the WFDL.  "The 
interpretation and application of a statute present questions of 
law that this court reviews de novo while benefitting from the 
analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court."  State v. 
Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶46, 373 Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144 (quoting 
State 
v. 
Alger, 
2015 
WI 
3, 
¶21, 
360 
Wis. 2d 193, 
858 
N.W.2d 346). 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
10 
 
¶21 The WFDL governs "dealerships," which are specially-
defined "contract[s] or agreement[s]" entered into between 
"grantors" 
and 
"dealers." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 135.02-135.025.  
Generally speaking, where dealerships exist, the WFDL imposes 
certain 
obligations 
on 
grantors 
with 
respect 
to 
those 
relationships.  For instance, grantors are prohibited from 
"terminat[ing], 
cancel[ling], 
fail[ing] 
to 
renew 
or 
substantially chang[ing] the competitive circumstances of a 
dealership agreement without good cause," Wis. Stat. § 135.03, 
and usually must provide "at least 90 days' prior written notice 
of termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change 
in competitive circumstances."  Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  If a 
grantor "violates" the WFDL,  
a dealer may bring an action against such grantor in 
any court of competent jurisdiction for damages 
sustained by the dealer as a consequence of the 
grantor's violation, together with the actual costs of 
the action, including reasonable actual attorney fees, 
and the dealer also may be granted injunctive relief 
against unlawful termination, cancellation, nonrenewal 
or substantial change of competitive circumstances. 
Wis. Stat. § 135.06. 
¶22 In this case we are asked to determine whether the 
WFDL applies to the City, and if so, whether the relationships 
between the Golf Pros and the City are "dealerships" under the 
WFDL.  We now examine these questions. 
A.  Whether the WFDL Applies to the City 
¶23 To ascertain whether the WFDL applies to the City, we 
look to the text of the relevant statute.  As explained, the 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
11 
 
WFDL concerns itself with "dealerships," which are entered into 
between "grantors" and "dealers."  The WFDL defines "grantor" to 
mean 
"a 
person 
who 
grants 
a 
dealership." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(5).  "Dealer" is defined to mean "a person who is a 
grantee of a dealership situated in this state."  § 135.02(2).  
Finally, the statute defines "dealership" in part as follows: 
A contract or agreement, either expressed or 
implied, whether oral or written, between 2 or more 
persons, by which a person is granted the right to 
sell or distribute goods or services, or use a trade 
name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising 
or other commercial symbol, in which there is a 
community of interest in the business of offering, 
selling 
or 
distributing 
goods 
or 
services 
at 
wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement or otherwise. 
§ 135.02(3)(a) (emphasis added).  Thus, whether the WFDL applies 
to the City turns on whether the City is a "person" under the 
WFDL. 
¶24 Luckily, "[p]erson" is defined in the WFDL: "a natural 
person, 
partnership, 
joint 
venture, 
corporation 
or 
other 
entity."  Wis. Stat. § 135.02(6) (emphasis added).  We agree 
with the Golf Pros that the City falls within this definition.  
The WFDL applies by its terms to "corporation[s]," and the City 
is a municipal corporation.  See, e.g., City of Madison v. 
Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 370, 243 N.W.2d 422 (1976) 
("By statute, the City of Madison is 'a body corporate and 
politic, with powers and privileges of a municipal corporation 
at common law and conferred by these statutes.'  [Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
12 
 
§ 66.019].[9]  This court has repeatedly held that a city is a 
municipal 
corporation."); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.09(7)(a) 
("The 
corporate authority of the city shall be vested in the mayor and 
common council.").   
¶25 This interpretation comports with our oft-repeated 
rules that "[s]tatutory language is given its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning" and that "[i]f the meaning of the statute 
is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 
WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  "Without some 
indication to the contrary, general words (like all words, 
general or not) are to be accorded their full and fair scope.  
They are not to be arbitrarily limited.  This is the general-
terms canon."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012) (referring to this 
rule by its Latin designation, "generalia verba sunt generaliter 
intelligenda"); see also, e.g., State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶39, 
373 Wis. 2d 1, 889 N.W.2d 423 ("We will not read into the 
statute a limitation the plain language does not evidence." 
(quoting Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 
759 
N.W.2d 571)). 
 
The 
general 
term 
"corporation" 
thus 
presumptively should be read to include more specific types of 
corporations.  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.019 has since been renumbered.  See 
1999 Wis. Act 150, § 41. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
13 
 
¶26 Numerous courts have similarly concluded that statutes 
referring to "corporations" include within their ambit municipal 
corporations.  See, e.g., Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373, 
373-78 (1936) (section of Bankruptcy Act affected municipal 
corporations, where the section applied to "person[s]" and 
"person" was defined to include corporations); Hoye v. United 
States, 277 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir. 1960) (section of Internal 
Revenue Code defining "person" to include "an officer or 
employee of a corporation" contemplated municipal corporations 
because the section made "no distinction in its applicability to 
different classes of corporations"); Madison Cty. Fiscal Court 
v. Kentucky Labor Cabinet, 352 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Ky. 2011) 
(cities were "subject to . . . wage and hour requirements" of 
statute defining "employer" to include "corporation[s]," because 
"[a] municipal corporation is a corporation" (second alteration 
in original)). 
¶27 But we need not look beyond Wisconsin for guidance on 
the question.  In Hyland, Hall & Co. we considered "whether 
cities and counties have standing to sue for treble damages 
under the Wisconsin antitrust act."  Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 
Wis. 2d at 367.  The City itself was one of the plaintiffs in 
that case.  See id. at 367-68.  The relevant statute applied to 
"person[s]," which was defined to include "corporations."  Id. 
at 369 (quoting then-Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 133.04).  We noted 
that we had "repeatedly held that a city is a municipal 
corporation" and concluded that "cities . . . are 'corporations' 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
14 
 
within the meaning of" the statute such that the City was 
"entitled to sue for treble damages."  Id. at 370-71. 
¶28 In the course of our analysis in that case, we also 
observed that Wis. Stat. § 990.01 provided as follows: 
Construction 
of 
laws; 
words 
and 
phrases. 
 . . . In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words 
and phrases which follow shall be construed as 
indicated unless such construction would produce a 
result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature: 
. . . . 
(26) Person.  "Person" includes all partnerships, 
associations and bodies politic and corporate. 
Id. 
at 
369 
(emphasis 
added) 
(quoting 
then-Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(26)).  Reasoning that a city is a "body politic and 
corporate," we confirmed that was "no contradiction" between 
Wis. Stat. § 133.04 and Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26).  Id. at 370-71. 
¶29 Hyland, Hall & Co. all but disposes of the instant 
question.  As in Hyland, Hall & Co., we are presented with a 
statute that pertains to "person[s]," defined to include 
"corporation[s]."  As in Hyland, Hall & Co., we have additional 
guidance from the legislature regarding the definition of the 
word "person": we should construe that word in the WFDL to 
include "bodies politic or corporate" "unless such construction 
would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
15 
 
the legislature."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26).10  And finally, as in 
Hyland, Hall & Co., the entity under consideration is the City, 
a municipal corporation.  One of the only differences between 
Hyland, Hall & Co. and this case is that the City was a 
plaintiff in the former but finds itself to be a defendant in 
the latter. 
¶30 "What 
is 
of 
paramount 
importance 
is 
that 
[the 
legislature] be able to legislate against a background of clear 
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the 
language it adopts."  DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI 114, ¶47, 365 
Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545 (alteration in original) (quoting  
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989), superseded by 
statute as stated in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557–58 (2005)).  It would be peculiar, to 
say the least, for us to conclude that the City is a 
"corporation" and a "person" under the relevant statute in 
Hyland, Hall & Co. but not in this case.  Indeed, Hyland, Hall & 
Co. and this case both involve chapters of the Wisconsin 
Statutes——Chapter 133 and Chapter 135, respectively——concerned 
with the "Regulation of Trade."  See Wis. Stat. (Table of 
Contents).  The reasoning in Hyland, Hall & Co. applies with 
equal force here, so we simply apply it.  See DOJ v. DWD, 365 
                                                 
10 Since City of Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 
Wis. 2d 364, 370, 243 N.W.2d 422 (1976), the definition of 
"person" in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) has been expanded to 
"include[] all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or 
corporate."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 694, ¶47 (observing that the word "disclose" had been 
interpreted in a prior case involving a different statute than 
the one at issue and stating, "[W]e would require a convincing 
reason indeed to interpret 'disclose' any differently in this 
context.").  
¶31 The noscitur a sociis canon of construction does not 
change our conclusion.  That canon provides that "an unclear 
statutory term should be understood in the same sense as the 
words immediately surrounding or coupled with it."  Wis. 
Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶40, 
270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  For reasons already discussed, 
the word "corporation" is not unclear, so we have no need to 
resort to the canon.  But even if we did, the words "natural 
person," "partnership," "joint venture," and "other entity" do 
not so plainly evidence legislative exclusion of municipal 
corporations from the meaning of "corporation" that we may 
conclude that the City falls outside the WFDL. 
A court has no right to resort to the maxim[] of 
noscitur a sociis . . . for the purpose of reading 
into a statute a distinction which the legislature 
neither made nor intended to make.  [This] rule[] [is] 
not the master[] of the courts, but merely their 
servant[], to aid them in ascertaining the legislative 
intent.  [It] afford[s] a mere suggestion to the 
judicial mind that, where it clearly appears that the 
lawmakers were thinking of a particular class of 
persons or objects, their words of more general 
description may not have been intended to embrace any 
other than those within the class. 
Boardman v. State, 203 Wis. 173, 176, 233 N.W.2d 556 (1930) 
(quoting Benson v. Chicago St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 77 N.W. 798, 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
17 
 
799 (1899)); see also, e.g., State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶35, 
308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (concluding that the noscitur a 
sociis canon did not apply because of a lack of similarity 
between listed terms); cf. Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 
WI 10, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 ("If the legislature 
intended such a narrow construction, the legislature could have 
clearly placed such a restriction in the text of the statute."). 
¶32 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 135.07 must be considered.  That 
section, entitled "Nonapplicability," lists certain parties to 
whom the WFDL does not apply.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 135.07 
("This chapter does not apply: . . . (2) To the insurance 
business.").  Cities are not among those listed.  Clearly the 
legislature recognized the need to circumscribe the WFDL in 
certain 
circumstances, 
and 
we 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
the 
possibility that the WFDL might apply to cities is so far-
fetched as to have escaped its consideration.  "Under the well-
established canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
expression of one thing excludes another), where the legislature 
specifically enumerates certain exceptions to a statute, we 
conclude, based on that rule, that the legislature intended to 
exclude any other exception."  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶22, 
259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416; cf. Lake City Corp. v. City of 
Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 171, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997) ("It is 
clear that the legislature knew how to accomplish this goal, 
since it included similar qualifying language in this very same 
statute."). 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
18 
 
¶33 In sum, we conclude that the City is a "person" under 
the WFDL, and that the WFDL therefore applies to it.11  
 
B.  Whether the Relationships Between the Golf Pros  
and the City Are "Dealerships" Under the WFDL 
¶34 Having concluded that the WFDL applies to the City, we 
now address whether the relationships between the Golf Pros and 
the City are "dealerships" under the WFDL.  Whether a 
relationship constitutes a "dealership" under the WFDL is a 
recurring question for courts, see Bush v. Nat'l School Studios, 
Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 635, 646, 407 N.W.2d 883, in part because the 
definition of "dealership" in the WFDL is "both extremely broad 
and highly nuanced."  Baldewein Co. v. Tri-Clover, Inc., 2000 WI 
20, ¶12, 233 Wis. 2d 57, 606 N.W.2d 145.  "In most cases, there 
is rarely an obvious answer to the question of whether a 
business is a dealership . . . ."  Bush, 139 Wis. 2d at 647. 
¶35 Again, the WFDL defines "dealership" in part as 
follows:  
                                                 
11 Consequently, we need not consider whether the City also 
qualifies as an "other entity" under the WFDL's definition of 
"person."  See Wis. Stat. § 135.02(6).  However, we observe that 
the term "entity" is obviously a broad one.  See, e.g., Entity, 
Black's Law Dictionary 650 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "entity" to 
mean "[a]n organization (such as a business or governmental 
unit) that has a legal identity apart from its members or 
owners" (emphasis added)).  And while one might argue that the 
scope of this term should be limited by the ejusdem generis 
canon 
of 
construction, 
pursuant 
to 
which 
"general 
words 
follow[ing] specific words in the statutory text . . . should be 
construed in light of the specific words listed," State v. 
Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶27, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447, 
application of that canon would require a court to determine 
first the meaning of the word "corporation" anyway. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
19 
 
A contract or agreement, either expressed or 
implied, whether oral or written, between 2 or more 
persons, by which a person is granted the right to 
sell or distribute goods or services, or use a trade 
name, trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising 
or other commercial symbol, in which there is a 
community of interest in the business of offering, 
selling 
or 
distributing 
goods 
or 
services 
at 
wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement or otherwise. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(a). 
 
In 
determining 
whether 
this 
definition is satisfied, our cases have typically divided the 
statutory language into three parts: (1) the existence of a 
contract or agreement between two or more persons; (2) by which 
a person is granted one of the rights specified; and (3) in 
which there is the requisite "community of interest."  See, 
e.g., Kania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 99 Wis. 2d 746, 763, 300 
N.W.2d 63 (1981). 
¶36 In arguing that a dealership existed in this case, the 
Golf Pros point to Wis. Stat. § 135.025, which states that 
Chapter 135 "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying remedial purposes and policies."  § 135.025(1).  
The statute lists the WFDL's "underlying purposes and policies" 
as follows:  
(a)  To promote the compelling interest of the 
public in fair business relations between dealers and 
grantors, and in the continuation of dealerships on a 
fair basis; 
(b)  To protect dealers against unfair treatment 
by grantors, who inherently have superior economic 
power and superior bargaining power in the negotiation 
of dealerships; 
(c)  To provide dealers with rights and remedies 
in addition to those existing by contract or common 
law; 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
20 
 
(d)  To govern all dealerships, including any 
renewals or amendments, to the full extent consistent 
with the constitutions of this state and the United 
States. 
§ 135.025(2).  Pursuant to established case law, however, the 
rule of liberal construction set forth in § 135.025(1) does not, 
generally speaking, apply to the definition of "dealership": 
If a relationship is a dealership, the protections 
afforded the dealer are to be construed and applied 
liberally to the dealer. But the statute itself 
undertakes to draw a line to encompass the kinds of 
enterprises and relationships which are to enjoy such 
protection. There is no basis upon which the courts 
can 
provide 
that 
protection 
to 
enterprises 
and 
relationships 
which 
fall 
without 
the 
legislative 
line." 
Kania, 99 Wis. 2d at 775 (quoting H. Phillips Co. v. Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D. Wis. 1980)); 
cf. DOJ v. DWD, 365 Wis. 2d 694, ¶31 ("This policy contains the 
very language we must interpret in this case. We cannot construe 
the statute liberally in aid of disclosure of information and 
protection from retaliatory action for disclosure of information 
until we know what the terms 'disclosure of information' and 
'retaliatory action' mean."). 
¶37 Returning to the three-part test for the existence of 
a dealership, we already know that the City, like the Golf Pros, 
is a "person" under the WFDL. Additionally, the Agreements 
between the parties are obviously "contract[s] or agreement[s]."  
Our 
inquiry 
thus 
revolves 
around 
whether 
the 
other 
two 
conditions necessary for the creation of a dealership are 
satisfied.  We examine each in turn, and conclude that a 
dealership exists. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
21 
 
1.  The Right to Sell or Distribute Goods or Services 
¶38 We conclude that the Agreements between the City and 
the Golf Pros "granted [the Golf Pros] the right to sell or 
distribute goods or services."  Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(a).12 
¶39 In analyzing this question, the court of appeals below 
"acknowledge[d] difficulty in identifying whether the Golf Pros 
were actually selling or distributing any City goods or services 
and, if so, what those City goods or services were."  Benson, 
unpublished slip op., ¶26.13  The court of appeals "agree[d] 
that, at the most abstract level, it might be said that the Golf 
Pros sold or distributed a City 'service,' namely, the service 
of providing golf courses for public use."  Id.  But then the 
court of appeals concluded: 
[T]he most accurate way to view the unique facts here 
is that the Golf Pros were not selling or distributing 
City goods or services; rather, the Golf Pros were 
engaged in the business of selling or renting non-City 
goods (golfing equipment, concessions, and pro shop 
                                                 
12 Because we conclude that the Golf Pros were "granted the 
right to sell or distribute goods or services," we need not 
determine whether the Golf Pros were likewise "granted the right 
to . . . use a trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype, 
advertising 
or 
other 
commercial 
symbol." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(a). 
13 We assume without deciding for purposes of this case 
that, as the court of appeals below indicated might be the case 
under the WFDL, the issue is whether the Golf Pros possess the 
right to sell or distribute City goods or services rather than, 
for example, "the right to sell non-City goods and their own 
services on City property."  Benson v. City of Madison, No. 
2015AP2366, unpublished slip op., ¶26 n.8 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Aug. 25, 2016).  An argument might be made that either would 
meet the plain terms of the statute.  
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
22 
 
items) and selling their own professional services to 
the City and the public, including golf course 
management services to the City and golf lessons to 
golf course patrons.  
Id.  We do not subscribe to this reasoning; the court of 
appeals' initial conception of the service at issue was closer 
to the mark. 
¶40 In order to make golf courses available to paying 
members of the public, the City had to do more than merely open 
up some of its land.  It had to perform a number of tasks to 
create, maintain, and operate its land as golf courses.  
Producing a golf course and opening it up to the public for use 
in exchange for money is undoubtedly a service.  See Service, 
Black's Law Dictionary 1576 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "service" 
as "the performance of some useful act or series of acts for the 
benefit of another, usu. for a fee").  
¶41 The City granted the Golf Pros the right to sell this 
City service to the public.  We have characterized "the right to 
sell" 
under 
the 
WFDL 
variously 
(but 
not 
necessarily 
exhaustively) as the "unqualified authorization to transfer the 
product at the point and moment of the agreement to sell" or the 
"authority to commit the grantor to a sale."  Foerster, Inc. v. 
Atlas Metal Parts Co., 105 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 313 N.W.2d 60 (1981).  
The City granted the Golf Pros authority to commit it to a sale 
of its service in a number of ways.   
¶42 Most importantly, a member of the public seeking to 
golf on a City course set her reservation through the Golf Pro 
or the Golf Pro's attendants and paid her greens fee to the Golf 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
23 
 
Pro or the Golf Pro's attendants.  The City provided "the 
equipment necessary to process payments of greens fees, locker 
fees and charges for season passes" and the Golf Pro remitted 
the resultant revenue to the City.  In this way, the Golf Pros 
sold access to City courses. 
¶43 Similarly, the City required the Golf Pros to operate 
golf club and cart rental services to those using the City's 
courses.  The Golf Pros provided the carts and clubs and the 
money earned from portions of the service was shared between the 
Golf Pros and the City. 
¶44 In some of these instances the Golf Pros set the 
relevant prices; in others the City set the relevant prices.  
But in each case the City instituted the service, authorized the 
Golf Pros to sell that service, and took some or all of the 
income generated by the service.  
¶45 This case is distinguishable from Bakke Chiropractic 
Clinic v. Physicians Plus Ins. Corp., 215 Wis. 2d 605, 573 
N.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1997).  That case involved a health 
maintenance organization insurer which "enter[ed] into provider 
agreements 
directly 
with 
independent 
chiropractors 
and 
chiropractic clinics"; the providers then provided "services 
to . . . members" of the insurer.  Bakke, 215 Wis. 2d at 608-09.  
The court of appeals concluded that the providers in Bakke sold 
"only their own chiropractic services, to [the insurer] and to 
others," rather than the insurer's product, which the court of 
appeals characterized as "health insurance coverage."  Id. at 
616.  The court of appeals contrasted this with our decision in 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
24 
 
Bush.  Id. at 615-16.  The putative dealer in Bush was a 
photographer who worked for a "corporation engaged in the school 
photography business."  Bush, 139 Wis. 2d at 637-38.  The Bakke 
court explained that "[e]ven though Bush performed numerous 
services for [the corporation], all of his efforts were directed 
toward selling [the corporation's] products and services to the 
public."  Bakke, 215 Wis. 2d at 616. 
¶46 This case is more like Bush in this regard than Bakke.  
In selling access to the City's golf course and renting out 
carts and clubs, the Golf Pros were selling the City's service 
of providing a functioning golf course to members of the public.  
This is not to foreclose the possibility that the Golf Pros were 
also selling some of their own services to the City.  But even 
if they were doing so, they were simultaneously selling the 
City's service to the public.14 
¶47 The City suggests, at least with regard to the 
collection of greens fees and money for season passes, that the 
Golf Pros "exercised no more discretion and assumed no more risk 
in these transactions than a movie theater cashier or parking 
lot attendant."  Assuming this argument is correct, we fail to 
see exactly what it proves.  The WFDL does not provide that 
every agreement granting a person "the right to sell or 
                                                 
14 We need not examine whether or how other of the many 
activities performed by the Golf Pros may have contributed to 
the "sell or distribute" requirement of the WFDL.  With regard 
to some of these activities, like the sale of merchandise, the 
City received no income.  
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
25 
 
distribute goods or services" is a dealership; there also must 
be the requisite community of interest, a subject to which we 
will turn momentarily.  At present, we simply conclude that the 
Agreements between the City and the Golf Pros granted the Golf 
Pros the right to sell or distribute the City's services. 
¶48 Before 
proceeding 
to 
the 
community 
of 
interest 
analysis, we pause to recognize that the Agreements specifically 
provide that "the City does not grant Golf Pro the right to sell 
or distribute any goods or services provided by the City."  But 
Wis. Stat. § 135.025 states that "[t]he effect of this chapter 
may not be varied by contract or agreement.  Any contract or 
agreement purporting to do so is void and unenforceable to that 
extent only."  § 135.025(3).  We are thus required to reject the 
City's attempt to contract around the WFDL. 
2.  Community of Interest 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 135.02(1) defines "[c]ommunity of 
interest" as "a continuing financial interest between the 
grantor and grantee in either the operation of the dealership 
business 
or 
the 
marketing 
of 
such 
goods 
or 
services."  
§ 135.02(1).  We have identified two "guideposts" to be used in 
analysis 
of 
whether 
a 
community 
of 
interest 
exists: 
a 
"continuing financial interest," that is, "a shared financial 
interest in the operation of the dealership or the marketing of 
a good or service," and "interdependence," or "the degree to 
which the dealer and grantor cooperate, coordinate their 
activities 
and 
share 
common 
goals 
in 
their 
business 
relationship."  Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
26 
 
604-05, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987), on reconsideration, 147 Wis. 2d 
308, 433 N.W.2d 8 (1988).  In Baldewein Co. we stated: 
When a dealer sinks substantial resources into 
its relationship with a particular grantor——time, 
money, employees, facilities, inventory, advertising, 
training——or derives substantial revenue from the 
relationship (as a percentage of its total), or some 
combination of the two, the grantor's power to 
terminate, cancel, or not renew the relationship 
becomes a substantial threat to the economic health of 
the dealer and a community of interest can be said to 
exist. 
Baldewein Co., 233 Wis. 2d 57, ¶27.15   
                                                 
15 In the past we have also listed several considerations 
that are "useful in determining whether a community of interest 
exists," Central Corp. v. Research Products Corp., 2004 WI 76, 
¶34, 272 Wis. 2d 561, 681 N.W.2d 178: 
[H]ow long the parties have dealt with each other; the 
extent and nature of the obligations imposed on the 
parties in the contract or agreement between them; 
what percentage of time or revenue the alleged dealer 
devotes to the alleged grantor's products or services; 
what percentage of the gross proceeds or profits of 
the alleged dealer derives from the alleged grantor's 
products or services; the extent and nature of the 
alleged grantor's grant of territory to the alleged 
dealer; the extent and nature of the alleged dealer's 
uses of the alleged grantor's proprietary marks (such 
as trademarks or logos); the extent and nature of the 
alleged dealer's financial investment in inventory, 
facilities, and good will of the alleged dealership; 
the personnel which the alleged dealer devotes to the 
alleged dealership; how much the alleged dealer spends 
on advertising or promotional expenditures for the 
alleged grantor's products or services; the extent and 
nature of any supplementary services provided by the 
alleged dealer to consumers of the alleged grantor's 
products or services. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
27 
 
¶50 The undisputed facts establish that there exists a 
community of interest in the business of selling the City's 
services, that is, a "continuing financial interest between the 
[City] and [the Golf Pros] in . . . the operation of the 
dealership business."  Wis. Stat. § 135.02(1).   
¶51 To begin with, the record shows that the Golf Pros 
"[sunk] substantial resources into its relationship with" the 
City.  They were required to hire, train, and compensate 
employees, purchase "all supplies and equipment" pertaining to 
the golf carts and golf range, contribute to a marketing plan, 
and maintain insurance.  In addition, the Golf Pros were 
required to sell food, beverages, and merchandise, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 593, 606, 407 
N.W.2d 873 (1987), on reconsideration, 147 Wis. 2d 308, 433 
N.W.2d 8 (1988).   
Although we have stated that these extrastatutory items 
"should" be considered by courts, id. at 606, it is more 
accurate to say that some or all "may" be considered; the 
factors are meant to be a helpful aid in addressing the 
overriding community of interest question, not an unwieldy 
burden.  See generally Home Protective Servs., Inc. v. ADT Sec. 
Servs., 
Inc., 
438 
F.3d 
716, 
719-20 
(7th 
Cir. 
2006) 
(characterizing the list as "long" and attempting to "distill[]" 
it).  It remains true, however, that a court should examine the 
totality of the relationship between the grantor and the dealer.  
See Ziegler Co., 139 Wis. 2d at 605-06. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
28 
 
required obtaining both these commodities and any appropriate 
licenses.16 
¶52 In Kania we found detrimental to the putative dealer's 
case the facts that he was "not authorized to sell [the putative 
grantor's] 
services" 
and 
that 
he 
"was 
paid 
for 
his 
transportation services on a weekly basis at a specified rate"; 
here, the Golf Pros were authorized to sell the City's services, 
and while they were paid a retainer by the City, they also 
shared with the City revenue from the cart and golf club 
services.  Kania, 99 Wis. 2d at 770.  The operation of the golf 
courses "was a joint undertaking of [the Golf Pros] and [the 
City]. [They] shared in the profitability of the undertaking."  
Bush, 139 Wis. 2d at 655.  The City and the Golf Pros' 
relationship was a lengthy one, and they shared the duties 
inherent in maintaining an operative course, "cooperat[ing], 
coordinat[ing] their activities and shar[ing] common goals in 
their business relationship."  Ziegler Co., 139 Wis. 2d at 605. 
                                                 
16 While we did not rely on all of these activities for our 
analysis of whether the Golf Pros had been granted the right to 
sell or distribute goods or services, the Golf Pros were 
required to perform these activities as a condition of their 
arrangements with the City.  Consequently, the Golf Pros' 
significant investment in these activities is relevant to the 
question of whether "the grantor's power to terminate, cancel, 
or not renew the relationship [was] a substantial threat to the 
economic health of the dealer."  Baldewein Co. v. Tri-Clover, 
Inc., 
2000 
WI 
20, 
¶27, 
233 
Wis. 2d 57, 
606 
N.W.2d 145.  
Similarly, insofar as the Golf Pros were selling a City service 
by providing access to City golf courses, the nature of the Golf 
Pros' investment in those courses is relevant. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
29 
 
¶53 In sum, the relationships between the Golf Pros and 
the City fulfill the statutory definition of "community of 
interest": "a continuing financial interest between the grantor 
and grantee in . . . the operation of the dealership business."  
Wis. Stat. § 135.02(1).  Given the above, it is more than fair 
to say that the City's "power to terminate, cancel, or not renew 
the relationship[s] [was] a substantial threat to the economic 
health of the [Golf Pros]."  Baldewein Co., 233 Wis. 2d 57, ¶27. 
C.  Remaining Issues 
¶54 We now dispose of the City's remaining arguments.  The 
City argues that the Golf Pros' WFDL claims are time-barred.  We 
disagree.  Under Wis. Stat. § 893.93(3)(b), "[a]n action under 
ch. 135" "shall be commenced within one year after the cause of 
action accrues or be barred."  § 893.93(3)(b).  The notice of 
claim statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80, increased the applicable 
period in this case to one year and 120 days.  See Colby v. 
Columbia Cty., 202 Wis. 2d 342, 357, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996).  
Next, 
[i]n Wisconsin, a cause of action generally accrues 
for statute of limitations purposes "'where there 
exists a claim capable of present enforcement, a 
suable party against whom it may be enforced, and a 
party who has a present right to enforce it.'"  When a 
grantor violates the provisions of the WFDL, the 
dealer 
is 
given 
a 
claim 
capable 
of 
present 
enforcement, a suable party in the grantor, and a 
present right to enforce that claim. 
Les Moise, Inc. v. Rossignol Ski Co., Inc., 122 Wis. 2d 51, 57, 
361 N.W.2d 653 (1985) (citation omitted) (quoting Barry v. 
Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 573, 107 N.W. 488 (1906)). 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
30 
 
¶55 In Les Moise we considered whether, "where the grantor 
has terminated the dealer as of a future date and given the 
dealer written notice of that decision," accrual of a cause of 
action under the WFDL for termination without good cause, see 
Wis. Stat. § 135.03, differed from accrual of a cause of action 
under the WFDL for termination without proper written notice, 
see Wis. Stat. § 135.04.  Les Moise, 122 Wis. 2d at 60-61.  The 
suggestion had been made that the former cause of action accrued 
on the date of termination, whereas the latter cause of action 
accrued when the written notice was received.  Id.  We concluded 
that "[w]hen the dealer receives a written termination notice, 
he may bring an action under sec. 135.03, if the grantor lacked 
good cause to terminate, or under sec. 135.04, if the written 
notice did not comply with that provision."  Id. at 61. 
¶56 Here, the only notice the Golf Pros received occurred 
on October 12, 2012, when the Superintendent informed the Golf 
Pros that the Agreements were not going to be renewed.  This is 
the earliest date on which their causes of action might have 
accrued.  The Golf Pros filed their complaint on January 17, 
2014, within one year and 120 days of October 12, 2012.  Their 
claims are not time-barred. 
¶57 The City argues that the Golf Pros' causes of actions 
actually accrued in August 2012 when the Superintendent asked 
for new proposals because the Golf Pros "knew by [then] that the 
City would be making significant changes" and that "their five-
year contracts would not be renewed on substantially the same 
terms."  We reject this argument.  In examining this issue, the 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
31 
 
circuit court below cited our decision in Les Moise, where we 
explained that "when Les Moise received the written termination 
notice it was immediately informed of the intention of the 
grantor and it was immediately capable of determining whether 
the written notice and termination violated the WFDL."  Les 
Moise, 122 Wis. 2d at 62.  In contrast, the facts below 
demonstrate that as of August 2012 the Golf Pros did not know 
what the grantor's decision would be and were not capable of 
assessing whether the City had complied with the WFDL. 
¶58 The City also argues that the notice of claim statute 
does not apply here, thus reducing the Golf Pros' time to file 
their lawsuit to one year, rather than one year and 120 days.  
We agree with the Golf Pros that the notice of claim 
requirements apply under the circumstances of this case.   
¶59 As a general rule, the notice of claim requirements 
govern in "all actions."  See City of Racine v. Waste Facility 
Siting Bd., 216 Wis. 2d 616, 621-24, 575 N.W.2d 712 (1998).  
However, exceptions to this rule exist.  See, e.g. E-Z Roll Off, 
LLC v. Cty. of Oneida, 2011 WI 71, ¶¶21-22, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 
N.W.2d 421 
(collecting 
cases). 
 
To 
determine 
whether 
an 
exception exists, we examine whether there is a "a specific 
statutory 
scheme 
in 
conflict 
with 
the 
notice 
of 
claim 
requirements," whether there is "a legislative preference for a 
prompt resolution of the type of claim under consideration," and 
whether "the purposes for which § 893.80 was enacted would be 
furthered by requiring that a notice of claim be filed."  Id., 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
32 
 
¶¶23-24, 29 (citing Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 225 
Wis. 2d 615, 625, 593 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
¶60 These considerations counsel in favor of applying the 
notice of claim requirements here.  The WFDL's statute of 
limitations 
period 
of 
one 
year 
is 
not 
"more 
restrictive . . . than 
the 
120-day 
notice 
of 
claim 
requirements."  Id., ¶27.  Further, although the WFDL allows for 
injunctive relief, it also permits damages, Wis. Stat. § 135.06, 
and "[t]he plain meaning of the statute places the choice in the 
hands of the dealer."  Frieburg Farm Equip., Inc. v. Van Dale, 
Inc., 978 F.2d 395, 402 (7th Cir. 1992).  The Golf Pros do not 
seek injunctive relief in this case.  See E-Z Roll Off, 335 
Wis. 2d 720, ¶28.  Finally, the twin purposes of the notice of 
claim 
requirements, 
"to 
give 
governmental 
entities 
the 
opportunity to investigate and evaluate potential claims" and 
"to afford governmental entities the opportunity to compromise 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
33 
 
and budget for potential settlement or litigation," are well-
served in cases like this one.17   
¶61 The City's final argument is that it is immune from 
the Golf Pros' lawsuit under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  But 
"[g]overnmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies 
only to claims based in tort . . . ."  Scott v. Savers Property 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶53, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 
N.W.2d 715 (2003).  The City does not develop an argument 
explaining why a statutory WFDL claim is "based in tort," other 
than to contend that "the focus is not on the particular legal 
theory pled" and that the Golf Pros' "claim is based solely on 
the City's discretionary policy decision to change the operation 
of its golf courses."   
¶62 The mere fact that the City's decision may have been, 
in the City's words, "a high-level, planning decision that 
required the exercise of discretion and the weighing and 
balancing of numerous factors inherent in governmental decision-
                                                 
17 We note that in most lawsuits it is the plaintiff seeking 
exemption from the notice of claim requirements; here, the City 
seeks exemption in order to shorten the applicable limitations 
period.  See, e.g., E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. Cty. of Oneida, 2011 WI 
71, ¶23, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 N.W.2d 421 (framing one part of 
the three-part inquiry used in determining whether an exception 
to the notice of claim requirements exists as "whether there is 
a specific statutory scheme for which the plaintiff seeks 
exemption" (emphasis added) (citing Town of Burke v. City of 
Madison, 225 Wis. 2d 615, 625, 593 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1999)).  
We need not and do not express an opinion on a threshold 
question of whether an entity like the City is permitted to 
argue that it should not have been given notice of a claim, 
because the argument fails in this case anyway. 
No. 
2015AP2366   
 
34 
 
making" does not establish the City's right to immunity.  Cf., 
e.g., 
Energy 
Complexes, 
Inc. 
v. 
Eau 
Claire 
Cty., 
152 
Wis. 2d 453, 464, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989) ("We conclude that 
neither 
the 
common 
law 
nor 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§] 
893.80(4) . . . immunize 
the 
County 
from 
ECI's 
breach 
of 
contract lawsuit, even if the contract was terminated because of 
legislative acts occurring after the contract was signed.").  
Without more, we conclude that the City is not immune from suit. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 We conclude that the WFDL applies to the City; that 
the relationships between the Golf Pros and the City are 
"dealerships" under the WFDL; that the Golf Pros' lawsuit is not 
time-barred; and that the City is not immune from the lawsuit.  
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2015AP2366.dk 
 
1 
 
 
¶64 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the court's 
opinion but for one persnickety point——our analysis treated a 
certain piece of evidence in the wrong part of the dealership 
analysis.  As our opinion accurately observes, a dealership is 
(as relevant here) a "contract or agreement . . . between 2 or 
more persons, by which a person is granted the right to sell or 
distribute goods or services . . . in which there is a community 
of interest in the business of . . . selling . . . goods or 
services . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3)(a). 
¶65 This case requires us to address both the "selling 
goods or services" and the "community of interest" elements of 
the definition of a dealership.  The first element inquires into 
the relationship between the parties as it relates to the sale 
of goods or services.  Contracts described by this element are 
those in which "a person is granted the right to sell or 
distribute 
goods 
or 
services . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(3)(a).  Although the operative part of this phrase 
appears in the passive voice ("is granted"), we know the 
"granting" party is the City of Madison.  Thus, the "person" to 
whom the phrase refers must be the Golf Pros.  It necessarily 
follows, then, that the goods or services to which this element 
applies must belong to the grantor (because a grantee need not 
grant itself rights in its own property, and a grantor may not 
grant rights in something it does not own). 
¶66 So if the contracts under consideration created 
dealerships, they must have conferred on the Golf Pros the right 
No.  2015AP2366.dk 
 
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to sell goods or services belonging to the City.  Our opinion 
correctly concludes they did——we said the contracts were selling 
access to the City's golf courses.  That is certainly a service, 
and a particularly welcome one at that.  See Majority op., ¶¶40-
41. 
¶67 Our analysis of this dealership element should have 
stopped there.  Instead, we proceeded to address the contracts' 
requirement that the Golf Pros provide golf club and cart rental 
services to the City's golfers.  But the clubs and carts belong 
to the Golf Pros, not the City.  So the "goods or services" 
element of the dealership statute simply has nothing to say 
about them.  They do, however, belong in the "community of 
interest" element of the analysis, which our opinion deftly 
handles, and so I need say no more. 
¶68 For this reason, I concur. 
 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶69 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
dispositive issue is whether the City of Madison is a "person" 
in the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.  If it is not, the Law is 
not applicable to municipalities.1 
¶70 This case is one of first impression.  Neither the 
parties, the majority, nor I could find any reported case, 
either in Wisconsin or in any of the other many states with 
similar dealership statutes, holding that a municipality is 
subject to the statute.  I would affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court and the decision of the court of appeals, but on 
the ground that that the Fair Dealership Law does not apply to 
the City of Madison. 
¶71 The majority opinion's ruling that the City of Madison 
is a "person" in the Law does not follow or provide clear 
                                                 
1 I therefore need not and do not address the stretch the 
majority opinion makes to fit the instant case into the 
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law. 
The word "dealership" is used instead of "franchise" in the 
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law to avoid confusion between the 
Dealership Law and the Wisconsin Franchise Investment Law, Wis. 
Stat. ch. 553.  Foerster, Inc. v. Atlas Metal Parts Co., 105 
Wis. 2d 17, 23-24, 313 N.W.2d 60 (1981).  For an historical 
recount of the circumstances leading up to the enactment of the 
Fair Dealership Law, see Robert B. Corris, In the Trenches:  
OPEC, Gas Lines, and the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. 
Lawyer, Apr. 1999, at 25. 
The word "franchise" also has a special meaning in 
municipal law.  See 12 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations ch. 34 (3d ed. 1995).  The word franchise is often 
used in municipal law to refer to a municipality entering into 
an agreement with a utility company enabling the utility to use 
property owned by the municipality.   
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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interpretive rules2 and has, I think, widespread ramifications 
for all municipalities in this state and the many contracts on 
diverse topics to which they are parties.  Municipalities will 
be limited with regard to managing their finances and their 
contracts.  The majority opinion has not considered these 
ramifications.3  
¶72 The 
Wisconsin 
Fair 
Dealership 
Law, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 135.02(5) and (6), defines "grantor" under the Law as a 
"person" to whom the Law applies.  It further defines "person" 
as a natural person, partnership, joint venture, corporation, or 
other 
entity. 
 
The 
legislature 
has 
not 
referenced 
"a 
municipality" or any governmental entity in the definition of 
"person" for purposes of the Dealership Law:    
Wis. Stat. 135.02.  Definitions.  In this chapter 
[135]: 
. . . .   
(5) "Grantor" means a person who grants a dealership. 
(6)"Person" means a natural person, partnership, joint 
venture, corporation or other entity. 
¶73 Although rules of interpretation serve the court, they 
are not absolute rulers of a court's interpretation.  Boardman 
                                                 
2 See majority op., ¶30 (The legislature should "'be able to 
legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so 
that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.'") 
(quoted source omitted). 
3 Consequences 
are 
an 
important 
consideration 
in 
interpreting a statute.  If an interpretation results in 
"unreasonable or absurd" consequences, that interpretation may 
be rejected.  Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 
19, ¶20, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233 (2017).    
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
3 
 
v. State, 203 Wis. 173, 233 N.W. 556 (1930) (quoting Benson v. 
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 77 N.W. 798, 799 (Minn. 
1899)).  Nevertheless, numerous interpretive rules point to the 
conclusion that a municipality does not fall within the 
definition of "person" under the Fair Dealership Law.   
¶74 Applying these rules and looking to other factors, I 
conclude that the City of Madison does not fall within the 
definition of "person" in the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.   
¶75 First, the Legislature's instructions to the court in 
deciding whether a statute governs a municipality make clear 
that the Fair Dealership Law should not be interpreted as 
applying to a city.  
¶76 The legislature has clearly and explicitly stated that 
the powers conferred on cities "shall be limited only by express 
language."  Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).4  Included among the powers 
conferred on a city is "the management and control of the city 
property."  Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).5  The golf courses at issue 
are the property of the City of Madison.   
¶77 In addition to the power to manage its property, the 
City of Madison is also statutorily authorized to own, operate, 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1) for the same provision relating 
to village powers. 
5 The court has stated that "[t]he City of Madison possesses 
the broad home rule powers outlined by Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5) and 
Article XI, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  This power 
allows the City to act for the 'health, safety, and welfare of 
the public,' and  to carry out its policy goals by 'license, 
regulation, suppression . . . and other necessary or convenient 
means.'"  Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane County Tavern League, Inc., 
2008 WI 38, ¶49, 308 Wis. 2d 684, 748 N.W.2d 154.  
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
4 
 
and finance parks and golf links.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.0621(2). 
The City of Madison has adopted an ordinance creating a golf 
subcommittee 
of 
the 
Board 
of 
Park 
Commissioners. 
 
The 
subcommittee "[a]dvises the Commission regarding policies, rate 
structure, rules and regulations, capital improvements, user 
complaints, operations and the selection of golf pros."  See 
Madison, Wis. General Ordinances § 33.05(5)(a).  
¶78 The Fair Dealership Law does not contain any express 
language 
limiting 
a 
city's 
power 
to 
contract 
about 
the 
management and control of its golf links.  No other law is cited 
as expressly limiting the City in the operation of its golf 
links.   
¶79 In addition to these powers, the city council "shall 
have power to act for the government and good order of the city, 
for its commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and 
welfare of the public . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).   
¶80 The legislature has mandated that a city's powers 
"shall be liberally construed in favor of the rights, powers and 
privileges of cities to promote the general welfare, peace, good 
order and prosperity of such cities and the inhabitants 
thereof."  Wis. Stat. § 62.04.   
¶81 According to these statutes, the City of Madison has 
the power——which is to be liberally interpreted——to manage its 
property, operate golf links, and to act for the good order of 
the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, 
safety, and welfare of the public. 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶82 And the legislature has clearly and explicitly stated 
that the powers conferred on cities "shall be limited only by 
express language."  Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).   
¶83 The majority opinion ought to follow the legislature's 
instructions in Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5):  It ought to interpret 
the Dealership Law as not limiting the powers of the City of 
Madison because nothing in the Fair Dealership Law expressly 
limits the City of Madison in exercising management over its 
golf courses or expressly limits the City's power to act for the 
good order of the city, its commercial benefit, or for the 
health, safety, and welfare of the public with regard to its 
golf courses.   
¶84 Applying the legislative instructions in § 62.11(5) to 
the instant case, I conclude that the City of Madison does not 
fall within the definition of the word "person" in the Fair 
Dealership Law.   
¶85 Second, the interpretive rule denominated "statutes in 
derogation 
of 
sovereignty" 
supports 
the 
legislature's 
instructions that the powers conferred on cities "shall be 
limited only by express language."  Under this interpretive 
rule, 
applicable 
to 
all 
subdivisions 
of 
government, 
any 
statutory provision that is susceptible to being read as 
applying to a governmental entity and to a private entity should 
be read as not applying to the governmental entity absent other 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
6 
 
indicia supporting a contrary result.6  This rule is premised on 
the 
policy 
of 
preserving 
for 
the 
public 
the 
efficient 
functioning of government.7   
¶86 This rule of statutory interpretation has been applied 
in Wisconsin cases.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Reis, 
230 Wis. 683, 687, 284 N.W. 580 (1939) (When the legislative 
intent is to "include the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, 
it 
is 
explicitly 
so 
stated 
in 
the 
definition. . . . It is universally held both in this country 
and in England that such statutes do not apply to the state 
unless 
the 
state 
is 
explicitly 
included 
by 
appropriate 
language."); Sullivan v. School Dist. No. 1 of City of Tomah, 
179 Wis. 502, 506-07, 509-10, 191 N.W. 1020 (1923) ("Legislation 
in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed 
most favorably to the public corporation and not to the claimant 
for damages. . . . [G]eneral statutes are not to be construed to 
include, to its hurt, the sovereign. . . .  [Application of a 
statute to a political subdivision] is a matter which rests with 
the wisdom of the Legislature, and not with the courts, and 
until such change is effected by a proper statute, we must 
consider it our duty to adhere to our former decisions and to 
pronounce in favor of the nonliability doctrine."). 
                                                 
6 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland 
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 62.1, at 377-82 (7th ed. 
2014).   
7 3 Singer, supra note 6, § 62.1, at 377-82.   
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶87 Applying this interpretive rule to the instant case, I 
conclude that the City of Madison does not fall within the 
definition of the word "person" in the Fair Dealership Law. 
¶88 Third, in addition to the two interpretive rules 
described above supporting the conclusion that the City of 
Madison is not governed by the Fair Dealership Law, another 
similar rule of statutory interpretation "long followed"8 and 
"generally applied"9 in Wisconsin law validates the conclusion 
that the City of Madison does not fall within the definition of 
"person," namely the "presumption of inapplicability."   
¶89 The 
court 
has 
adopted 
the 
"presumption 
of 
inapplicability" as an interpretive aid.  Statutory provisions 
that do not explicitly govern governmental entities do not apply 
to governmental entities:  
Statutory provisions which are written in such general 
language as to make them reasonably susceptible to 
being construed as applicable alike both to the 
government and to private parties are subject to a 
presumptive rule of construction which exempts the 
government from their operation in the absence of 
other particular indicia supporting a contrary result 
in particular instances.  
Wis. Veterans Home v. Div. of Nursing Home Forfeiture Appeals, 
104 Wis. 2d 106, 110, 310 N.W.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting 3 
                                                 
8 Wis. Veterans Home v. Div. of Nursing Home Forfeiture 
Appeals, 104 Wis. 2d 106, 110, 310 N.W.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1981) 
9 DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 194, 515 
N.W.2d 888 (1994), abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel. 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 547 N.W.2d 587 
(1996). 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
8 
 
Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 62.01, at 63 (4th 
ed. 1974)).10  
¶90 Although Wisconsin cases rely on this "presumption of 
inapplicability," the cases acknowledge, as do I, that this 
presumption may be overcome.   
¶91 The presumption may be overcome when (1) the statute's 
objective "could not be accomplished without including the 
government"; or (2) including a particular activity under the 
statute "would not vitally interfere with the processes of 
government."11     
¶92 The Golf Pros have not overcome the presumption of the 
inapplicability of the Fair Dealership Law to the City of 
Madison.  The objectives of the Law can be accomplished without 
including the City of Madison as a "person" in the Law.  
Including the City as a "person" in the Law vitally interferes 
with the City's managing recreational facilities and the fiscal 
policies of the City.   
¶93 Applying this "presumption of inapplicability" in the 
instant case, I conclude that the City of Madison does not fall 
within the definition of the word "person" in the Fair 
Dealership Law. 
                                                 
10 For a nearly identical statement in a more recent version 
of Sands, see 3 Singer, supra note 6, § 62.1,  at 377-78. 
11 Town of Janesville v. Rock Cty., 153 Wis. 2d 538, 542-44, 
451 N.W.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1989); DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 
Wis. 2d 178, 194-95, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994), overruled in part by 
State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of Grange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 
597, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996). 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶94 Fourth, the legislature has not defined "person" for 
the Fair Dealership Law.  When the legislature wants the word 
"person" to mean a governmental body, it knows how to write such 
a definition.  
When the legislature wants to govern a 
governmental body, it has included one or more words in the 
enumeration of "person" conveying that meaning.  Yet, the 
legislature did not refer to a governmental body in the 
definition of "person" in the Fair Dealership Law.    
¶95 The legislature often defines words exclusively and 
distinctively 
for 
particular 
statutory 
enactments.12  
"[S]pecially-defined words or phrases are given their technical 
or special definitional meaning."13   
¶96 For example, the Wisconsin antitrust law unequivocally 
defines 
"person" 
for 
purposes 
of 
that 
law 
to 
include 
"individuals, the state and all its political subdivisions, all 
counties, 
cities, 
villages, 
towns, 
school 
districts, 
governmental agencies and bodies politic and corporate, and all 
corporations . . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 133.02(3).  
                                                 
12 See, e.g., State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶73, 348 
Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560 ("The word 'recklessly' is defined 
differently in the second-degree reckless homicide statute (Wis. 
Stat. § 939.24(1)) and in the criminal child abuse statute 
§ 948.03(1)), resulting in requiring different mens rea."). 
13 DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI 114, ¶22, 365 Wis. 2d 694, 875 
N.W.2d 545 (citation omitted).  See also Bruno v. Milwaukee 
Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶8, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656 ("We have 
'long recognized that when a court construes an ordinance or 
statute, words must be given their common meaning.' It is also 
'well established that technical words or phrases with a 
peculiar meaning in the law must be construed according to such 
meaning.'") (quoted sources omitted). 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶97 The Fair Dealership Law unequivocally defines "person" 
for purposes of the Fair Dealership Law.  Unlike in the 
antitrust act, the definition of the word "person" in the Fair 
Dealership Law does not refer to a "governmental agency," a 
"municipal corporation," a "body politic," a "municipality," a 
"county," a "city," a "town," a "school district," a "political 
subdivision," or similar words referring to a governmental body. 
¶98 In Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26), the legislature defines 
"person" as including "all partnerships, associations and bodies 
politic 
or 
corporate." 
 
This 
definition 
applies 
to 
the 
interpretation of Wisconsin laws "unless such construction would 
produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature."  The legislature has manifested its intent that 
this definition of "person" in § 990.01(26) does not apply in 
the instant case; the legislative special definition of "person" 
in the Fair Dealership Law is inconsistent with the definition 
of "person" in § 990.01(26).  The special definition of "person" 
in the Fair Dealership Law controls.  It does not reference 
"body politic."   
¶99 This court has stated numerous times that the plain 
meaning of the statutory text is the controlling interpretive 
rule in this court.  This court assumes that the legislature 
says what it means and means what it says.  Heritage Farms, Inc. 
v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶14 n.9, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 
N.W.2d 652 (stating that "courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there;" "every word excluded from a statute must be 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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presumed to have been excluded for a purpose") (citations 
omitted); Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 82, ¶102, 319 
Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) (same); See 
also Ball v. Dist. No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & 
Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984) 
("The . . . presumption is that the legislature chose its terms 
carefully and precisely to express its meaning.").  
¶100 Applying this interpretive rule in the instant case, I 
conclude that the City of Madison does not fall within the 
definition of the word "person" in the Dealership Law. 
¶101 Fifth, the City is not a "corporation" in the 
definition of "person" under the Fair Dealership Law.  The word 
"corporation" is not defined in the Fair Dealership Law.    
¶102 The majority opinion proffers four cases to support 
its conclusion that the City of Madison is a "corporation" under 
the definition of "person" in the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.  
None of the cases interprets the words "person" or "corporation" 
in the context of the Fair Dealership Law. 
¶103 Three of the four cases are not Wisconsin cases.  Each 
of these non-Wisconsin cases involved a different federal or 
state statute, and in no statute did the statutory definition of 
"corporation" include a local political subdivision.  None of 
these non-Wisconsin cases defines "person" as "person" is 
defined in the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law. 
¶104 In each of these three cases the court examined the 
definition of the word "corporation," the context of the 
definition, the purpose of the statute, and the operation of the 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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statute.  See City of Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373 (1936); 
Hoye v. United States, 277 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1960); Madison 
Cty. Fiscal Court v. Kentucky Labor Cabinet, 352 S.W.3d 572 (Ky. 
2011).  In each case the court concluded that the legislature 
intended the word "corporation" to include the political 
subdivision at issue.   
¶105 That said, these cases neither support the majority 
opinion's 
view 
that 
the 
word 
"corporation" 
in 
the 
Fair 
Dealership Law includes the City of Madison nor undercut my 
conclusion that the word "corporation" does not include the City 
of Madison.  Rather, these three non-Wisconsin cases stand for 
the unremarkable proposition that in some instances, legislation 
included a governmental entity within the word "corporation." 
¶106 The majority opinion seems to champion the notion that 
every time the word "corporation" is used in a statute it refers 
to a municipal corporation.  If this is the majority opinion's 
claim, it is wrong.  If, however, the majority opinion claims 
that in some statutes the word "corporation" may be interpreted 
to include a municipal corporation, this claim is supported by 
the three non-Wisconsin cases.     
¶107 Indisputably, 
the 
City 
of 
Madison 
is 
sometimes 
referred to as a municipal corporation.  But the question in the 
instant 
case 
is 
whether 
a 
municipal 
corporation 
is 
a 
"corporation" within the meaning of the word "corporation" in a 
particular statute. 
¶108 The particular statute in the instant case is the Fair 
Dealership Law, and the question presented is:  Does the word 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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"corporation" in the definition of "person" in the Law include a 
municipal corporation?   
¶109 The fourth case that the majority opinion relies on, 
City of Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 243 
N.W.2d 422 (1976), relates to yet a different statute, the 
Wisconsin antitrust act.  In its discussion of Hyland, Hall & 
Co., the majority opinion continues what appears to be a 
misguided attempt to demonstrate that municipal corporations 
fall within the word "corporation" every time a statute uses the 
word "corporation."   
¶110 In Hyland, Hall & Co., the City of Madison (in its 
capacity as a City and school district) sued a private 
corporation under the Wisconsin antitrust act for damages for 
fixing bids on plumbing contracts.  At the time, Wis. Stat. 
§ 133.01 
provided 
that 
"any . . . person, 
corporation, 
copartnership, trustee or association" shall be liable "to any 
person transacting or doing business in this state" for treble 
damages for violating the Act.  Section 133.04 of the act stated 
that the word "person" "shall be deemed to include, besides 
individuals, 
corporations, 
partnerships 
and 
associations 
existing under or authorized by the laws of the United States, 
any of the territories, of this or any other state or any other 
state . . . ." 
¶111 The defendants in Hyland, Hall & Co. argued that the 
City of Madison was not a person within the definition of Wis. 
Stat. § 133.04 and was not entitled to seek treble damages under 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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the antitrust act.  The court rebuffed the defendant's position 
on several grounds.   
¶112 Quoting Wis. Stat. § 66.019, the court noted that the 
city is "a body corporate and politic, with powers and 
privileges of a municipal corporation at common law and 
conferred by these statutes."  The court then read Wis. Stat. 
§§ 133.04 and 990.01(26) together and concluded that the City 
was a person (that is, a corporation existing under Wisconsin 
law) that could be a plaintiff in an antitrust suit.  At the 
time Hyland, Hall & Co. was decided, § 990.01 stated that 
"'person' includes all partnerships, associations and bodies 
politic and corporate."  The court's brief discussion of why 
these two provisions were to be read together is, in my opinion, 
garbled and hard to understand.   
¶113 Perhaps that is why the Hyland, Hall & Co. decision 
did not rely on this reasoning alone.  The court went on to 
explain in Hyland, Hall & Co. that the interpretation of the 
Wisconsin antitrust act was governed by the interpretation of 
the federal Sherman Act.  Under the Sherman Act, the civil 
remedy of treble damages had been afforded to a municipality.  
Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d at 375.  Thus, the court 
interpreted the Wisconsin statute as affording the City a civil 
remedy of treble damages.       
¶114 The Hyland, Hall & Co. court did not, however, decide 
whether the City would be subject to a treble-damage judgment if 
it were a defendant (rather than a plaintiff) in an antitrust 
case.  The court explicitly acknowledged that the words "person" 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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and "corporation" in the antitrust act might have different 
meanings depending on whether the City was a plaintiff or 
defendant in an antitrust suit.  Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 
at 375.14  According to the court, "the right to sue for treble 
damages and liability to suit are not necessarily reciprocal."  
Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d at 376. 
¶115 Hyland, Hall & Co. is not on all fours and does not 
govern the instant case.  Hyland, Hall & Co. involves a 
different statute and different definitions than those in the 
instant case, and the antitrust Act and the Fair Dealership Law 
serve different purposes.  Hyland, Hall & Co. stands for the 
unremarkable, well-accepted proposition that the words "person" 
and "corporation" can have different meanings in different 
statutes. 
¶116 The persuasiveness of the four cases the majority 
opinion cites is significantly undermined by the general rule 
that the legislature can ascribe different meanings to the same 
word in different statutes (and sometimes even in the same 
statute).  
                                                 
14 "'Most words have different shades of meaning and 
consequently may be variously construed, not only when they 
occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the 
same statute or even in the same section.' . . . A given term in 
the 
same 
statute 
may 
take 
on 
distinct 
characters 
from 
association 
with 
distinct 
statutory 
objects 
calling 
for 
different implementation strategies.  The point is the same even 
when the terms share a common statutory definition . . . ."  
Envtl. Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007). 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶117 I conclude that the City of Madison does not fall 
within 
the 
definition 
of 
the 
word 
"corporation" 
in 
the 
definition of "person" in the Fair Dealership Law.  
¶118 Sixth, the City does not fall within the phrase "other 
entity" in the definition of "person" under the Dealership Law. 
The phrase "other entity" can signify a wide variety of 
entities.  There is no legislative history supporting the 
conclusion that "other entities" in the Fair Dealership Law 
refers to municipal corporations.       
¶119 The 
ejusdem 
generis 
canon 
of 
interpretation, 
a 
variation of the maxim noscitur a sociis, is helpful in 
interpreting the phrase "other entity" in the instant case.15       
¶120 Ejusdem generis applies when general words (for 
example, "other entity" in the instant case) follow specific 
words enumerated in a statutory list.16    
¶121 The canon advises that the general words "other 
entities" are interpreted to embrace only bodies similar in 
nature to those enumerated by the preceding specific words.  The 
entities enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 135.02(6) are set forth in 
terms of entities conducting business or commerce.   
                                                 
15 2A Singer, supra note 6, § 47:17, at 364-65.  The 
majority opinion refers to "noscitur a sociis." 
16 2A Singer, supra note 6, § 47:17 at 364-65.   
For further discussion of the ejusdem generis canon, see La 
Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 332-34, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976). 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is inapplicable if the text 
has a clear, plain and reasonable meaning on its face.  State v. 
Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶14, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171.  
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶122 The Golf Pros in effect assert that inasmuch as the 
entities enumerated as "persons" conduct business and commerce, 
the City of Madison can and should be bound by the Fair 
Dealership Law when it engages in business and commerce as a de 
facto private enterprise.  The Golf Pros argue that the City 
should be held to the same standard as any private golf course 
operation under the Fair Dealership Law.  
¶123 But a municipality, in contrast to a private entity, 
does not engage in business or commerce for the purpose of 
profit or revenue.  A municipality's power is limited to 
engaging in activities in furtherance of its powers and in 
furtherance of the public interest.  In the instant case, the 
City has the express power to operate golf links.  Although the 
City of Madison operates golf links that might have belonged to 
and been operated by a private entity, the City is not 
necessarily treated under the law in the same way as a private 
enterprise operating golf links.17    
¶124 Applying the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis in 
the instant case, I conclude that the City of Madison does not 
fall within the definition of "other entity" and does not fall 
within the definition of the word "person" in the Dealership 
Law.   
                                                 
17 See Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, 
373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233 (2017) (a city operating a bus 
enterprise is not treated the same as a private enterprise 
operating a bus service). 
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¶125 Seventh, the majority opinion errs in relying on Wis. 
Stat. § 135.07 and the canon expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (the expression of one thing excludes another) to 
conclude that the City of Madison falls within the definition of 
"person" within the Fair Dealership Law.18  See majority op., 
¶32. 
¶126 In Wis. Stat. § 135.07, the legislature excluded three 
specified entities from the application of the Fair Dealership 
Law.  This statute provides as follows: 
135.07  Nonapplicability.  This chapter does not 
apply: 
(1) To a dealership to which a motor vehicle dealer or 
motor vehicle distributor or wholesaler as defined in 
s. 218.0101 is a party in such capacity. 
(2) To the insurance business. 
(3) Where goods or services are marketed by a 
dealership on a door to door basis.   
¶127 The majority opinion asserts that when the legislature 
expressly excludes something from a statute it does not intend 
to exclude anything else.19  Majority op., ¶32.  Thus, asserts 
the majority opinion, because Wis. Stat. § 135.07 creates only 
three exceptions to the Fair Dealership Law, the legislature 
intended no other exceptions.  Applying the canon to § 135.07, 
                                                 
18 The Golf Pros cite Caflisch v. Staum, 2000 WI App 113, 
¶13, 235 Wis. 2d 210, 612 N.W.2d 385, for the expression of the 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon:  "When the 
legislature provides a finite list of exceptions to a general 
rule, [courts] presume that the legislature did not intend other 
exceptions."  
19 See 2A Singer, supra note 6, § 47:23, at 406-13. 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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the majority opinion concludes that because the City is not 
excepted as one of the three statutory exceptions, the City is 
not excepted from the Fair Dealership Law.20    
¶128 A canon may be overcome by a strong indication of 
contrary legislative intent.  And a contrary legislative intent 
is strong in the instant case. 
¶129 The three excepted entities clearly fall within the 
statutory definition of "person" to which the Fair Dealership 
Law is applicable:  a motor vehicle dealership, the insurance 
business, and door-to-door dealerships.  This section excludes 
three "persons" to which the Fair Dealership Law would otherwise 
apply.  Section 135.07 does not exclude these three entities 
from the definition of "persons."    
¶130 In contrast, the City of Madison does not fall within 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
"person" 
to 
which 
the 
Fair 
Dealership Law is applicable.  Therefore the legislature did not 
have to exclude the City of Madison from the application of the 
Fair Dealership Law in Wis. Stat. § 135.07.     
¶131 Accordingly, applying the text of Wis. Stat. § 135.07 
and the canon, I conclude that the City of Madison does not fall 
within the definition of "person" under the Fair Dealership Law.   
¶132 Eighth, the legislative declaration that the Fair 
Dealership Law be "liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying remedial purposes and policies," Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
20 See Foster v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 12, 20, 233 N.W.2d 411 
(1975) (this "statute stops with the single exception it 
creates"). 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
20 
 
§ 135.025(1), does not mean that the boundaries of coverage of 
the Law are to be construed extensively.21  Moreover, the court 
places heavy emphasis on the right of free contract, declaring 
that "the right of free contract is a property right protected 
by both state and federal constitutions and should not be 
lightly impaired."  Kania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 99 
Wis. 2d 746, 774-75, 300 N.W.2d 63 (1981).  
¶133 Ninth and finally.  No case has been cited, and I 
could not find any, applying a dealership statute to a 
governmental entity. 
¶134 More than 20 states apparently have statutes similar 
to the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.  Gary W. Leydig, Survey of 
State 
Dealer 
Laws 
at 
3 
n.11, 
http://www.leydiglaw.com/userfiles/file/survey%20of%20state%20de
aler%20laws.pdf.  According to Leydig's survey, the Wisconsin 
Fair Dealership Law, enacted in 1973, is "one of the oldest and 
most litigated dealership statutes on the books."  The Wisconsin 
Fair Dealership Law has served as a reference for other states 
in interpreting and applying their own statutes.  See Leydig, 
Survey of State Dealer Laws at 5.   
                                                 
21 This court has given a narrow interpretation of the 
legislature's 
instruction 
to 
give 
a 
statute 
a 
"liberal 
interpretation construction."  See, e.g., DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI 
114, ¶¶30-34, 365 Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545.   
The Fair Dealership Law's liberal construction rule does 
not apply to whether the Law applies to a particular contract in 
the first instance.  See H. Phillips Co., Inc. v. Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (W.D. Wis. 1980).   
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶135 Using WestLaw, I searched cases in many states and I 
could find no reported cases in these jurisdictions that apply 
the dealership statutes to a contract between a governmental 
entity and a private entity.  This lack of any cases is 
persuasive that the dealership statutes are not applicable to 
political subdivisions. 
* * * * 
¶136 The majority opinion forsakes the usual rules of 
statutory interpretation in deciphering the meaning of the word 
"person" in the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law.  Its analysis 
neglects to address the relationship of the Dealership Law, 
municipal constitutional and statutory home rule, and other 
statutes governing governmental entities.  Its weak analysis 
inevitably leads the majority opinion to the wrong conclusion.  
And I am concerned, as I stated previously, that the majority 
opinion 
has 
not 
considered 
the 
consequences 
of 
its 
interpretation of the word "person" and that it is establishing 
a 
far-reaching 
precedent 
that 
will 
produce 
unreasonable 
results.22  
¶137 For the reasons I have set forth, I write in dissent.  
I conclude that the City of Madison does not fall within the 
definition of "person" for the purposes of Wis. Stat. chapter 
135.   
                                                 
22 See Anderson v. Aul, 2015 WI 19, ¶114, 361 Wis. 2d 63, 
862 N.W.2d 304 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
plain meaning analysis includes consideration of consequences of 
alternative interpretations to avoid unreasonable results). 
No.  2015AP2366.ssa 
 
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¶138 Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court and the decision of the court of appeals but on 
the ground that the Fair Dealership Law does not apply to the 
City of Madison. 
¶139 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
 
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