Title: Daniel v. McCoy

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 17 
Docket: 
Yor-22-221 
Submitted 
On Briefs:  November 17, 2022 
Decided: 
 March 2, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
WILLIAM B. DANIEL 
 
v. 
 
JENNIFER M. MCCOY 
 
 
CONNORS, J. 
[¶1]  Jennifer M. McCoy appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Biddeford, Sutton, J.) adopting, over her objection, the final order of a 
Family Law Magistrate (Cadwallader, M.) that ordered McCoy’s divorce from 
William B. Daniel, awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities of the 
parties’ child to Daniel, and distributed the parties’ property.  Clarifying the 
procedural avenue a party must take to object to a magistrate’s factfinding as 
being insufficient and the options available to the District Court when a party 
makes such an objection, we vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  McCoy and Daniel were married in 2016.  In July 2021, Daniel filed 
a complaint for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.  Over the 
 
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next few months, the parties participated in case management hearings and 
mediation. 
[¶3]  The first status conference was held by teleconference toward the 
end of September, and both parties appeared.  A second status conference was 
scheduled for November 8, 2021, via teleconference.  McCoy did not appear.  
The magistrate ordered that a third status conference be scheduled, again by 
teleconference, and noted that if McCoy failed to appear “at the next court event, 
she [would] be defaulted.”  The order also required that Daniel send a proposed 
judgment to McCoy.  Roughly two weeks before the third conference, Daniel 
filed a document that was captioned “Stipulated Divorce Judgment.” 
[¶4]  McCoy failed to appear for the third status conference.  As a result, 
the magistrate held a hearing on Daniel’s complaint for divorce and made 
determinations on parental rights, child support, and property division.  The 
magistrate went through Daniel’s proposed judgment during the fifteen-minute 
hearing.  Daniel was the only witness, and no exhibits were entered in evidence. 
[¶5]  The magistrate granted Daniel’s complaint for divorce and 
judgment was entered on January 25, 2022.  The judgment, which is identical 
to the “Stipulated Divorce Judgment” that Daniel filed except that the 
magistrate made some minor edits, contains two findings supported by 
 
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competent evidence admitted during the hearing.  See Low v. Low, 2021 ME 30, 
¶ 2, 251 A.3d 735.  First, the parties are the parents of one child who is currently 
four years old.  Second, they are joint owners of two parcels of real estate, one 
in Kennebunkport and one in Strong.1  The judgment contains a third finding 
not supported by competent evidence: “[Daniel] has been solely responsible for 
making payments on [the parties’ debt consolidation] loan since 
June 1, 2021 . . . .” 
[¶6]  The remainder of the judgment contains the magistrate’s allocation 
of parental rights and responsibilities and division of property.  The magistrate 
awarded Daniel sole parental rights and responsibilities of the child, awarded 
McCoy supervised visitation at Daniel’s discretion under conditions consistent 
with the child’s “best interest,” ordered that McCoy pay child support, and 
distributed the parties’ real estate and personal property in accordance with 
Daniel’s requests.  Specifically, the magistrate awarded the Kennebunkport 
property to Daniel and ordered that he pay McCoy 50% of the value of the 
parties’ equity in the property.  The magistrate also ordered that the Strong 
property be sold and that 25% of the proceeds be set aside for anticipated 
 
1  It is not entirely clear where the second parcel of property is located.  Although the judgment 
states that the parcel is in Strong, other filings in the record reflect that it is in Avon. 
 
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capital gains taxes, with any unused proceeds from the sale to be used to pay 
off the debt consolidation loan and then split equally between the parties. 
[¶7]  Regarding the parties’ personal property, the magistrate awarded 
Daniel, inter alia, a Ford F-250 truck and McCoy any vehicle she had acquired 
since the parties separated.  The magistrate also awarded McCoy a 
Subaru Impreza, even though there was no mention of this vehicle during the 
hearing. 
[¶8]  McCoy, acting pro se, timely filed, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118(a), an 
objection to the final order of the magistrate.  McCoy requested that the court 
reject the order, schedule a new final hearing, and order that Daniel pay for an 
attorney for her.  The court (Sutton, J.) denied McCoy’s request and adopted the 
judgment, making one correction, i.e., that McCoy did not appear for the 
hearing. 
[¶9]  Approximately two weeks later, after obtaining counsel, McCoy filed 
motions (1) for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), (2) to set 
aside the default pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), (3) to reconsider or for a new 
trial pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59, and (4) for amended or additional factual 
findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  McCoy’s Rule 52(b) motion requested 
“specific factual findings regarding the specific division of assets, debts, and 
 
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personal property” and included a list of proposed findings addressing those 
issues and two proposed findings concerning the child. 
[¶10]  By written order entered on June 10, 2022, the same judge denied 
McCoy’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and Rule 55(c) motion, reasoning that she had 
failed to diligently pursue her legal rights.  It also denied her Rule 59 motion on 
the ground that the record supported the judgment.  The court did, however, 
grant her Rule 52(b) motion and made twelve additional findings, which were 
based on its own review of the record, concerning McCoy’s participation in the 
proceedings and the value of the property.  McCoy timely appealed.  M.R. App. P. 
2B(c)(1); 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2022). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶11]  McCoy argues that the court erred or abused its discretion because, 
despite her motion for further findings, the court failed to state the factual basis 
for, and failed to consider the factors germane to, its allocation of parental 
rights and responsibilities and its division of the parties’ property.2 
 
2  McCoy also argues that the court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) and 
Rule 55(c) motions.  Given our ruling, we need not address these arguments. 
 
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A. 
When asserting that a magistrate’s judgment lacks sufficient 
factfinding, the objecting party should make her claim in a 
Rule 118(a) objection, not a Rule 52 motion after the District Court 
has reviewed the Rule 118(a) objection. 
 
[¶12]  Before addressing McCoy’s arguments, we must determine what 
findings are properly before us, i.e., solely the findings made by the magistrate 
contained in the divorce judgment or those findings and the findings made by 
the court after granting McCoy’s Rule 52(b) motion. 
[¶13]  The court adopted the magistrate’s factual findings without 
conducting further proceedings.  See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a)(2).  Because the court 
never took evidence and merely adopted the magistrate’s findings, it was error 
for it to grant McCoy’s Rule 52(b) motion and make additional findings on its 
own. 
[¶14]  When a party objects to a magistrate’s judgment on the ground 
that the judgment contains insufficient factfinding, the party should file an 
objection pursuant to Rule 118(a) and specifically assert that there are 
insufficient findings to support the magistrate’s judgment.  The reviewing court 
can then adopt the judgment, “set the matter for further hearing before a judge 
or magistrate[,] or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.”  
M.R. Civ. P. 118(a)(2). 
 
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[¶15]  What the reviewing court cannot do is make its own additional 
findings without further hearing.  Factfinding “is not an action that could be 
taken by a reviewing judge, who can only consider the record as presented to 
the judicial officer who presided at the underlying hearing.”  Kline v. Burdin, 
2017 ME 194, ¶ 13, 170 A.3d 282.  The amendment, clarification, or creation of 
factual findings “can be properly accomplished only by the judicial officer who 
issued the findings in the first place.”  Id.; see Pratt v. Sidney, 2009 ME 28, ¶ 12, 
967 A.2d 685 (explaining that the court could not “make its own new findings 
of fact without hearing any evidence” when reviewing a challenge to the 
magistrate’s findings). 
[¶16]  Consequently, it was erroneous for the court to make additional 
findings on its own.  As such, the only findings properly before us on appeal are 
those contained in the magistrate’s judgment.  Because the court adopted the 
magistrate’s judgment,3 we review the magistrate’s factual findings for clear 
error and discretionary decisions for an abuse of discretion.4  See Pratt, 2009 
ME 28, ¶ 7, 967 A.2d 685; Wong v. Hawk, 2012 ME 125, ¶ 14, 55 A.3d 425. 
 
3  A court may modify the magistrate’s judgment or order to fix a clerical error, as it did here, 
without setting the matter for rehearing or influencing our standard of review.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(a); 
M.R. Civ. P. 100. 
 
4  As noted, McCoy filed a Rule 118(a) objection and, when the District Court denied her objection, 
filed various post-judgment motions, including a Rule 52(b) motion.  Her Rule 52(b) motion was 
inappropriate because, as discussed, the reviewing court could not make additional findings of fact 
 
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B. 
A remand is necessary because the existing record does not support 
the judgment. 
 
 
1. 
Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
 
[¶17]  Magistrates have jurisdiction to enter final orders involving 
parental rights and responsibilities when the matter is uncontested.  
See 4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D)(3) (2022); Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶¶ 5-6, 955 
A.2d 202 (noting that a magistrate entered an order concerning parental rights 
and responsibilities, child support, and paternity after a party failed to appear). 
[¶18]  A court order establishing parental rights and responsibilities, 
whether entered by a magistrate or a judge, must state whether parental rights 
will be allocated, shared, or sole in accordance with the standard of the best 
interest of the child.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(1) (2022).  “This standard 
applies without regard to whether a parent appears or fails to appear at 
scheduled court events.”  Ezell, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 35, 955 A.2d 202 (Levy, J., 
concurring).  The court, through the magistrate or judge, makes the best 
 
based on its review of the record.  A motion for further findings would be permissible if the reviewing 
court reopened the record pursuant to Rule 118(a)(2) and made its own findings, and a party found 
those new findings to be insufficient to sustain the new judgment.  Because McCoy challenges the 
magistrate’s factfinding, or lack thereof, she needed to make her claim in her Rule 118(a) objection.  
Her pro se objection does not make this specific argument and simply challenges the magistrate’s 
ruling as unjust.  Given the previous lack of clarity as to how and when to make a claim that a 
magistrate’s factfinding is insufficient, neither McCoy nor the District Court can be faulted for failing 
to adhere to this procedure, and, in any event, a remand is required for the reasons set forth in 
Section II.B. 
 
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interest determination by considering nineteen statutory factors.  See 19-A 
M.R.S. § 1653(3)(A)-(S).  Although the court is required to consider the best 
interest factors, it need not robotically address every factor “solely for the sake 
of assuring the parties that it considered every factor, so long as it is otherwise 
evident that the court has evaluated the evidence with the best interest factors 
in mind.”  Nadeau v. Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 957 A.2d 108. 
[¶19]  Here, the only finding in the parental rights portion of the 
judgment is that McCoy and Daniel are the child’s parents.  The judgment 
contains no reference to the best interest factors as a whole or to any factor in 
particular.  See Whitmore v. Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 9, --- A.3d ---.  There is no 
indication of how the evidence supports the award of sole parental rights and 
responsibilities to Daniel with only supervised visitation to McCoy at Daniel’s 
discretion and under conditions that are in the child’s best interest.  Cf. 19-A 
M.R.S. § 1653(1)(C) (explaining that, unless contrary to a child’s best interest, 
“it is the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and 
continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or 
dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the rights and 
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy”).  Although the 
judgment uses the phrase “best interest,” it is not part of a finding—it is the 
 
10 
court qualifying the conditions under which McCoy may have contact with the 
child.  We must therefore vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the 
trial court for further proceedings on this issue. 
2. 
Property Distribution 
[¶20]  Magistrates may also distribute property in an uncontested 
divorce proceeding.  See 4 M.R.S. § 183(1)(D)(3).  The principles governing 
property distribution are the same for magistrates and judges.  The division of 
marital property, whether through a magistrate or a judge, must be in 
proportions that are just.  See Viola v. Viola, 2015 ME 6, ¶ 9, 109 A.3d 634.  
Importantly, “a just distribution is not synonymous with an equal distribution; 
rather the division must be fair and just considering all of the circumstances of 
the parties.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  To make a just determination, the 
court must consider all relevant factors, including 
A.  The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital 
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; 
 
B.  The value of the property set apart to each spouse; 
 
C.  The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the 
division of property is to become effective, including the 
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the 
home for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of the 
children; and 
 
D.  Economic abuse by a spouse. 
 
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19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2022). 
 
 
[¶21]  When applying section 953(1), the court, through the magistrate 
or judge, “need not specifically enumerate [its] findings on each factor, as long 
as it appears that the court has considered those factors, and all other relevant 
factors in reaching its decision.”  Hutt v. Hanson, 2016 ME 128, ¶ 12, 147 A.3d 
352 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  “The court is only required to 
make findings that are sufficient to inform the parties of the court’s reasoning 
and sufficient for effective appellate review.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶22]  Here, the property and debt at issue include two parcels of real 
estate, a Ford F-250 truck, a Subaru Impreza, a debt consolidation loan, and 
various items of personal property.  Beginning with the real estate, although 
the magistrate found that the parties are the owners of real estate in 
Kennebunkport and Strong, it did not assign a dollar value to each parcel of 
property or determine how the parties paid for the properties, whether the 
parties contributed in other ways to the properties, the economic 
circumstances of each party, or the reasoning behind each award.  Moreover, 
the magistrate could not have made these findings because very little evidence 
was admitted during the hearing.  McCoy accurately points out that Daniel’s 
testimony was mostly a recitation of his requests, not substantive evidence. 
 
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[¶23]  Although there is a finding to support the allocation of the debt 
consolidation loan, as noted above, see supra ¶ 5, the record lacks competent 
evidence to support the finding.  Specifically, in the judgment, the magistrate 
noted that “[b]ecause [Daniel] has been solely responsible for making 
payments on the [debt consolidation] loan since June 1, 2021, the division of 
proceeds shall account for [McCoy’s] non-contribution.”  There is nothing in the 
record supporting the finding that McCoy has not been contributing to the loan.  
Daniel testified only that he was asking the court to order that the loan be paid 
with the proceeds from the sale of the Strong property. 
[¶24]  Thus, the magistrate’s distribution of the parties’ property and 
debt was an abuse of discretion and erroneous because there are insufficient 
findings in the judgment to support the awards and the record lacks competent 
evidence to support a finding that was made.  Although the magistrate did state 
on the record that Daniel’s request “seems fair,” that statement is not enough 
to inform the parties, or us on appeal, of the magistrate’s reasoning behind the 
distribution of the parties’ property. 
[¶25]  We recognize that it is common practice in family matters for 
evidence and findings to be brief when a party fails to appear.  Many proposed 
judgments presented to the court, particularly at a default hearing, may not 
 
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contain all the necessary findings.  Parties and counsel should take care to 
present adequate evidence upon which the court can base its judgment rather 
than simply reciting the terms being sought.  It is, however, the responsibility 
of the court to ensure that the appropriate factors are considered and 
enumerated, at least in summary fashion, in the final judgment. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michelle R. King, Esq., Irwin & Morris, Portland, for appellant Jennifer M. McCoy 
 
Keith P. Richard, Esq., Archipelago, Portland, for appellee William B. Daniel 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number FM-2021-191 
For Clerk Reference Only