Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Alan D. Eisenberg

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1083-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alan D. Eisenberg, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EISENBERG 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 18, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Richard 
J. Cayo and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument 
by Richard J. Cayo and Alan D. Eisenberg. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart and Lee, Kilkelly, Paulson & Younger, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Paul W. Schwarzenbart. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 11
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1083-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan D. Eisenberg, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 18, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Alan D. Eisenberg has appealed 
from 
a 
referee's 
report 
concluding 
that 
he 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be revoked.   
¶2 
We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We further 
determine 
that 
the 
seriousness 
of 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
misconduct, when coupled with his extensive prior disciplinary 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
2 
 
history, warrants the revocation of his license to practice law 
in Wisconsin.  We also conclude that the full costs of the 
proceeding, which are $30,933.35 as of September 23, 2009, 
should be assessed against Attorney Eisenberg. 
¶3 
Attorney Eisenberg was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1966.  In 1970 he was suspended from the practice 
of law for one year for pursuing a course of vindictive and 
reckless harassment and psychological persecution of a judge.  
See State v. Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 N.W.2d 529 (1970).  
In 1988 he was suspended from the practice of law for two years 
for conflict of interest, offensive personality, and dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 
(1988).  In 1996 he was publicly reprimanded for activity 
occurring during the 1988 suspension consisting of a failure to 
close out a trust account and failing to advise the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility upon his reinstatement 
that he had not closed the account.  In 2004 he was suspended 
from the practice of law for one year for engaging in eight 
counts of misconduct committed in five separate matters.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 269 
Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  His license to practice law was 
reinstated in 2007. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2007 WI 7, 298 Wis. 2d 578, 726 N.W.2d 634.  
¶4 
On May 11, 2007, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
issued a complaint against Attorney Eisenberg alleging two 
counts of misconduct in violation of the Wisconsin Rules of 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
3 
 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  Both counts arose out of 
Attorney Eisenberg's representation of W.D.   
¶5 
In September 2000 the Jefferson County district 
attorney's office filed a criminal complaint against W.D. 
charging him with second-degree recklessly endangering safety, 
battery, and disorderly conduct.  The criminal charges arose out 
of a report of domestic violence made by W.D.'s estranged wife, 
M.D.  The criminal case was tried to a jury in Judge Randy 
Koschnick's court.  The jury acquitted W.D. of all three 
charges.  The jury returned its verdict around 8 p.m. on 
March 21, 2001.   
¶6 
At the time of the criminal trial, W.D. and his wife 
were also involved in a divorce action.  Attorney Eisenberg 
represented W.D. in that case as well.  M.D. was represented by 
Attorney Brad Wilcox.  On March 22, 2001, the day after the 
return of the jury verdict in the criminal case, Attorney 
Eisenberg filed a civil complaint on behalf of W.D. against M.D.  
The complaint in the civil case alleged that M.D. had made false 
statements to the police, that the false statements caused W.D. 
to be falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted, that W.D.'s 
character was defamed, that W.D.'s reputation was reduced such 
that others would not desire to associate with him, and that 
damages should be assessed against M.D. 
¶7 
Attorney Eisenberg filed the civil complaint just 
before a scheduled pretrial conference with the family court 
commissioner 
in 
the 
divorce 
action. 
 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
approached M.D.'s divorce attorney, Brad Wilcox, prior to the 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
4 
 
pretrial conference, accompanied by W.D. and W.D.'s mother.  
Attorney Eisenberg asked Attorney Wilcox why M.D. was not 
present.  According to Attorney Wilcox, Attorney Eisenberg said, 
"I've got something for her," and then said that M.D. was a liar 
and had perjured herself and wanted to know where she was so he 
could serve her.  Attorney Wilcox accepted service of the 
summons and complaint for M.D. because he felt she would be 
distressed if she was personally served with the papers.  During 
the conference with the family court commissioner, Attorney 
Eisenberg again called M.D. a liar and a perjurer.  Attorney 
Eisenberg also told the commissioner that the jury in the 
criminal case had "stormed the judge's chambers and demanded to 
know why the woman [M.D.] was not being prosecuted for perjury."   
¶8 
When M.D. learned about the civil suit, she told 
Attorney Wilcox she wanted to file bankruptcy.  Attorney Wilcox 
told her a judgment would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy and 
urged her to retain Attorney Raymond Krek to represent her.   
¶9 
On March 26, 2001, four days after filing the civil 
suit, Attorney Eisenberg faxed a copy of the complaint to a 
local newspaper, the Daily Jefferson County Union.  He spoke 
with a reporter and repeated the story about jurors allegedly 
going to Judge Koschnick's chambers and asking that M.D. be 
prosecuted for perjury.  The newspaper published this statement. 
¶10 Attorney Krek filed an answer on M.D.'s behalf denying 
the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative 
defenses and counterclaims against W.D.  Attorney Eisenberg 
filed a reply to the counterclaims.  Attorney Krek amended the 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
5 
 
answer and asserted a counterclaim alleging the complaint 
against M.D. was frivolous under Wis. Stat. § 814.025 (2001-02).1  
On June 18, 2001, Attorney Krek filed a motion to dismiss and a 
supporting memorandum of law, asserting both privilege and the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.025 (2001-02) states:  Costs upon 
frivolous claims and counterclaims.   
(1) If an action or special proceeding commenced 
or continued by a plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense 
or cross complaint commenced, used or continued by a 
defendant is found, at any time during the proceedings 
or upon judgment, to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs 
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
(2) The costs and fees awarded under sub. (1) may 
be assessed fully against either the party bringing 
the 
action, 
special 
proceeding, 
cross 
complaint, 
defense or counterclaim or the attorney representing 
the party or may be assessed so that the party and the 
attorney each pay a portion of the costs and fees. 
(3) In 
order 
to 
find 
an 
action, 
special 
proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint 
to be frivolous under sub. (1), the court must find 
one or more of the following: 
(a) The action, special proceeding, counterclaim, 
defense or cross complaint was commenced, used or 
continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of 
harassing or maliciously injuring another. 
(b) The party or the party's attorney knew, or 
should 
have 
known, 
that 
the 
action, 
special 
proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint 
was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and 
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
(4) To the extent s. 802.05 is applicable and 
differs from this section, s. 802.05 applies. 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
6 
 
judicial finding of probable cause in the criminal proceedings 
as grounds for dismissal.  On July 5, 2001, Attorney Eisenberg's 
office filed and served the plaintiff's witness list in the 
civil case.  Attorney Eisenberg said his associate, Jennifer 
Hoffmann, did 100 percent of the work on the witness list after 
he instructed her to speak to W.D. and his mother. 
¶11 On July 23, 2001, a hearing on the motion to dismiss 
was held before Jefferson County Circuit Judge William Hue.  
Attorney Eisenberg had not filed a responsive brief before the 
hearing, and Judge Hue granted Attorney Eisenberg permission to 
file a brief by July 30, 2001.  At the hearing, Attorney 
Eisenberg again said, 
the jury marched in to chambers . . . and suggested to 
the judge that [M.D.] should be criminally charged.  I 
found out about it from either the jury foreman or one 
of the jurors calling me and telling me they had gone 
in and asked why this woman wasn't charged with a 
criminal slander or perjury or something.   
After the hearing, Attorneys Krek and Eisenberg spoke, and 
Attorney Eisenberg told Attorney Krek that the only reason he 
sued M.D. was to get some leverage in the divorce case.   
¶12 On August 8, 2001, the circuit court entered an order 
dismissing the malicious prosecution and false imprisonment 
claims.  The court did not dismiss the abuse of process and 
defamation claims at that time.  Between August 17 and 
September 25, 2001, Attorney Krek deposed the people on the 
plaintiff's witness list.  W.D. said he had no personal 
knowledge concerning statements M.D. made to police officers and 
did not remember talking to officers regarding statements M.D. 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
7 
 
had made to them.  Regarding his motivation for bringing the 
lawsuit, W.D. initially said, "I don't recall."  He later said 
it was not to get back at M.D., but rather to obtain 
compensation for bad publicity he had received during the 
criminal case.  Other people on the witness list said they were 
not aware they were on the list and had not spoken with Attorney 
Eisenberg before their depositions.  None of the plaintiff's 
witnesses said they felt W.D.'s reputation in the community had 
declined as a result of the criminal prosecution.   
¶13 In October 2001, at Attorney Eisenberg's request and 
over Attorney Krek's strong objection, Judge Hue directed the 
parties to mediate.  At Judge Hue's request, Judge Koschnick 
agreed to serve as the mediator.  After obtaining input from the 
parties as to dates they would be available, Judge Koschnick's 
staff scheduled the mediation for December 6, 2001.  On 
December 4 and 5, 2001, Attorney Krek sent extensive materials 
to Judge Koschnick for the mediation.  Attorney Eisenberg sent 
nothing.   
¶14 On 
the 
morning 
of 
December 
6, 
2001, 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's office called Judge Koschnick's chambers to advise 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
would 
not 
be 
appearing 
for 
the 
mediation.  At Judge Hue's request Judge Koschnick prepared an 
affidavit recounting Attorney Eisenberg's failure to appear.   
¶15 On December 14, 2001, on the court's own motion, Judge 
Hue dismissed W.D.'s claims and granted default judgment to M.D. 
on her counterclaims as a sanction for Attorney Eisenberg's 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
8 
 
failure to appear for the mediation.  In his memorandum 
decision, Judge Hue said: 
The Court reluctantly concludes that there is no 
sanction short of dismissal of Plaintiff's claim with 
prejudice and granting judgment by default upon the 
Defendant's counterclaim, along with an order refusing 
to allow Plaintiff to oppose Defendant's damage claim, 
which will serve to address and remedy Mr. Eisenberg's 
pattern of abuse and egregious conduct at issue, now 
and in the future.  Dismissal, default and inability 
to participate in damages adjudication is a sad 
consequence of Plaintiff's decision to retain Mr. 
Eisenberg to prosecute and defend this case initially 
and throughout these proceedings. . . .  
¶16 Attorney Eisenberg filed a notice of appeal.  The 
appeal was dismissed.   
¶17 On November 25, 2002, Attorney Krek filed an affidavit 
in support of a motion for relief under Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 
814.025.  On January 7, 2003, the circuit court quantified 
M.D.'s 
damages 
and 
entered 
judgment 
for 
M.D. 
on 
her 
counterclaim.  M.D. was awarded a total judgment in the amount 
of $121,905.78.  This figure included double costs and interest 
under § 807.01(3).  The court also issued a memorandum decision 
on M.D.'s motion for relief under Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 
814.025.  The court noted that M.D.'s request for relief under 
those statutes would require a special proceeding, concluded 
that Attorney Eisenberg had not received an opportunity to 
respond and had not waived his right to trial, and ordered that 
the court would conduct that special proceeding.  An appeal was 
taken from the default judgment in favor of M.D., but it was 
dismissed. 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
9 
 
¶18 On 
October 
2, 
2003, 
Judge 
Hue 
commenced 
the 
evidentiary hearing in the special proceeding on M.D.'s motion 
for attorney fees and costs for frivolous litigation.  On the 
second day of the hearing, Judge Hue recused himself. 
¶19 Reserve Judge Lawrence Gram was assigned to take over 
the matter and completed the special proceeding, hearing 
testimony on an additional three days.  On January 2, 2004, 
Judge Gram entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
judgment on the motion for sanctions.  Judge Gram concluded that 
Attorney Eisenberg violated § 802.05 by not making a proper 
investigation or reasonable inquiry into the grounds for the 
civil complaint and by not making sure the complaint was well-
grounded in fact and as warranted by existing law.  Judge Gram 
also concluded that Attorney Eisenberg violated § 802.05 not 
only by failing to ensure the pleadings were not used for the 
improper purposes of harassment, undue delay, or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, but also by knowingly using 
the pleadings for improper purposes.   
¶20 Judge Gram also concluded that Attorney Eisenberg 
violated § 814.025(3)(a) in that he both commenced and continued 
a frivolous action.  Judge Gram concluded Attorney Eisenberg 
knew the action was commenced in bad faith and solely for the 
purposes of harassing and maliciously injuring M.D., and he knew 
that continuing the action for defamation was in bad faith and 
solely for the purposes of harassing and maliciously injuring 
M.D.  
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
10 
 
¶21 Judge Gram also concluded that Attorney Eisenberg 
violated § 814.025(3)(b) in that he knew the action was without 
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported 
by any good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law.  Judge Gram said under the reasoning 
of Jandrt v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 531, 597 N.W.2d 744 
(1999), even if Attorney Eisenberg commenced the defamation 
action with a reasonable expectation that a basis existed in law 
or fact, after the depositions of the plaintiff's named 
witnesses, Attorney Eisenberg knew, or should have known, that 
the continuation of the action was frivolous as no basis in fact 
existed.  Judge Gram awarded M.D. a monetary judgment in the 
amount of $102,660.79 against Attorney Eisenberg, and in the 
amount of $11,406.76 against W.D.  Attorney Eisenberg requested 
reconsideration.  The motion was denied. 
¶22 Attorney Eisenberg appealed.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  Eisenberg v. Deutsch, No. 2004AP1178, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2005).  The court of appeals 
also deemed the appeal frivolous and remanded the matter to the 
circuit court for a determination of M.D.'s appellate attorney 
fees and costs.  After this court denied a petition for review, 
Attorney Krek sought to schedule a hearing to determine and 
recover M.D.'s appellate fees and costs.   
¶23 On July 11, 2006, Attorney Eisenberg filed pro se 
motions to adjourn and to deny fees for the appeal and the 
underlying action.  He asserted the court of appeals had awarded 
appellate costs, but not necessarily "against him," and the 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
11 
 
trial court should consider whether appellate costs should be 
awarded against appellate counsel, Attorney Herbert Bratt.  
Attorney Krek objected to Attorney Eisenberg's motions and moved 
for sanctions on the grounds that Attorney Eisenberg's motion to 
deny fees was frivolous.  Attorney Eisenberg, represented by 
Attorney Wendy Patrickus, filed a motion to allocate appellate 
fees to Attorney Eisenberg's appellate counsel, Attorney Bratt, 
and to deny appellate costs after the date of the court of 
appeals' decision.  The motion did not challenge the award of 
costs in the underlying action. 
¶24 Judge Gram held a hearing on the appellate costs 
motion, after which he made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and issued judgment.  Judge Gram concluded that Attorney 
Eisenberg's motion to deny fees was frivolous; that after 
receiving Attorney Krek's response, Attorney Eisenberg failed to 
withdraw his unwarranted defense; and that Attorney Eisenberg 
caused delays and made unwarranted claims and defenses as a 
pattern of activity on remand.  Judge Gram ordered Attorney 
Eisenberg to pay M.D. $22,298.93 in appellate costs and fees, of 
which $4,062 related to enforcement of the order for appellate 
costs.  Attorney Eisenberg paid the attorney fees and costs for 
the original civil case and the appeal on August 25, 2006. 
¶25 The OLR's complaint alleged two counts of misconduct: 
 
Count One:  By filing a complaint and by pursuing 
the action in Jefferson County [] when he knew and 
when it was obvious that the lawsuit would serve 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
12 
 
merely 
to 
harass 
or 
maliciously 
injure 
[M.D.], 
[Attorney] Eisenberg violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(3).2 
 
Count Two:  By filing the pro se motion on 
July 11, 2006, to deny fees for the underlying action 
when he knew all appeals had been exhausted and the 
award affirmed, and that his motion was unwarranted 
under existing law and without a good faith basis for 
an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law, [Attorney] Eisenberg violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(1).3 
¶26 Richard C. Ninneman was appointed referee.  A hearing 
was 
held 
over 
the 
course 
of 
four 
days, 
beginning 
on 
September 30, 2008. 
¶27 Judge Koschnick testified at the hearing that after a 
jury has returned its verdict and the verdict has been read in 
open court and the lawyers agree the jury can be excused, his 
customary practice is to tell the jurors that they are excused 
but if they have questions or comments for him, he would be 
happy to meet with them in the following five or ten minutes.  
He said typically most of the jurors remain and he goes to the 
jury deliberation room and asks if they have any comments about 
how they were treated or if they have any suggestions for how 
the jury system in Jefferson County might be improved.  He 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) provides that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a 
defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the 
client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an 
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another." 
3 SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) states that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is 
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may 
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law; . . . ." 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
13 
 
testified while he did not specifically recall a meeting with 
jurors in the W.D. criminal case, he did remember that at least 
several jurors did remain after returning their verdict.  Judge 
Koschnick testified: 
One of the jurors asked a question to the effect 
of will [M.D.], the alleged victim, be in trouble or 
subject to some type of criminal charge by virtue of 
their not guilty verdict.  . . .  The tone of the 
question, the demeanor of the juror was clearly one of 
concern for the welfare of the alleged victim.  The 
question was asked in a way that led me to believe 
that the juror was concerned that the not guilty 
verdict would result possibly in the alleged victim 
being subject to some type of prosecution, and the 
juror did not want this to happen. . . . I tried to 
reassure her. I believe it was a female. . . . I told 
her that I had been a lawyer for 14 years before 
becoming a judge and I had never seen a victim 
arrested or prosecuted as a result of an acquittal.   
¶28 When questioned about the newspaper article that said, 
"Jury stormed judge's chambers and demanded to know why the 
woman was not being prosecuted for perjury," Judge Koschnick 
testified: 
No jurors were ever in my chambers.  Security 
officers wouldn't let them back there.  I wouldn't 
invite them back there for any reason.  All my 
discussions are done in the jury deliberation room 
with jurors, and nobody demanded anything.  And nobody 
stormed anything.  It was peaceful and civilized 
throughout.  We had a short discussion with the 
jurors, I did.  They were excused.  . . .  
I also remember reading that newspaper article 
within a few days after the trial and being outraged 
at what was being claimed, and so that's why I 
remember the conversation, because the article made 
this false claim a few days later and I still remember 
my thoughts at the time.  . . .  I was also frustrated 
I couldn't respond because of judicial ethics.  The 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
14 
 
civil suit had been filed.  I wanted to tell that 
reporter that this was a lie in his newspaper, but I 
couldn't 
respond because of the judicial ethics 
requirement that I not comment when there's a pending 
case. 
¶29 Although Attorney Eisenberg was represented by counsel 
at the hearing before the referee, he conducted the cross-
examination of Judge Koschnick and also conducted the direct 
examination of M.D.  The examination of M.D. consisted largely 
of Attorney Eisenberg asking M.D. why she was crying and 
breathing heavily.  At one point, after counsel for OLR had 
objected to one of Attorney Eisenberg's questions and the 
referee said he saw no relevancy in Attorney Eisenberg's line of 
questioning, Attorney Eisenberg countered with, "The relevancy 
of it is that an observation was made that the crying and heavy 
breathing was complete fakery." 
¶30 Attorney Eisenberg testified at the hearing that he 
filed the civil suit against M.D. because W.D. had told him, "I 
want to be cleared."  Attorney Eisenberg testified that he had 
received two telephone calls from jurors the morning after the 
verdict in the criminal case, but neither one would give their 
name.  He said both jurors told him they believed M.D. had lied, 
and one of the jurors told him "we went into the judge's 
chambers and talked about it."  Attorney Eisenberg testified: 
I was extremely impressed by it, so that confirmed in 
my mind what I believed about [W.D.] and his need for 
immediate redress in the public eye, and in the public 
conscience, and for the sake of his peace of mind and 
his parents and his family and his friends. So, 
therefore, I knew that I knew enough about this case.  
I had investigated it to death.  I had witnesses.  I 
had talked to everybody and as far as I was concerned, 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
15 
 
the proof was in the pudding.  I not only won the case 
but jurors called me. 
¶31 The referee issued his report and recommendations on 
December 17, 2008.  The referee concluded that the OLR proved by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence the violation 
alleged in Count One of its complaint, but that it had failed to 
meet its burden of proof with respect to the allegations 
contained in Count Two. 
¶32 The referee's findings of fact in support of his 
conclusion that Attorney Eisenberg filed and pursued the W.D. 
civil action to harass or maliciously injure M.D. included: 
• 
Attorney Eisenberg rushed to file the W.D. civil 
action less than 18 hours after the acquittal verdict in 
the criminal case in order to serve the summons and 
complaint on M.D. at a previously scheduled pretrial 
conference in the divorce action. 
• 
Attorney Eisenberg hurried to do this because he 
knew and believed that such action would further harass and 
intimidate M.D. and enable Attorney Eisenberg and his 
client to improperly gain an advantage or leverage in the 
pending divorce suit. 
• 
In his rush to file the civil suit, Attorney 
Eisenberg failed to perform the appropriate legal research 
or factual inquiry which would have made it obvious that 
the claims would serve merely to harass or maliciously 
injure M.D. 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
16 
 
• 
The complaint sought compensatory and punitive 
damages from M.D. at a time when Attorney Eisenberg clearly 
knew, from financial disclosures in the divorce action, 
that M.D. was virtually judgment-proof. 
• 
Attorney Eisenberg went to the divorce pretrial 
expecting or at least hoping to personally confront and 
serve M.D. with the new legal process in the presence of 
W.D. and his mother, and when M.D. did not appear, Attorney 
Eisenberg confronted M.D.'s then-divorce attorney in a rude 
and intimidating manner. 
• 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
told 
the 
family 
court 
commissioner a totally false and untrue account about 
jurors storming Judge Koschnick's chambers.  
• 
In furtherance of his campaign of intimidation, 
Attorney Eisenberg proceeded to contact the local newspaper 
for the purpose of not only publicizing the filing of the 
civil action, but to repeat the false account of the jury 
reaction to M.D.'s testimony in the criminal case so as to 
harass and maliciously injure M.D. in the eyes of the local 
community. 
• 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
again 
repeated 
the 
false 
account about the jury reaction in the criminal trial to 
Judge Hue, thereby continuing his campaign of attack to 
intimidate, harass, and maliciously injure M.D. in the eyes 
of the trial judge in the civil suit. 
• 
Immediately after the July 23, 2001, hearing on 
motions to dismiss, Attorney Eisenberg told Attorney Krek 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
17 
 
that the civil action had been filed to gain leverage in 
the divorce action, and if the divorce case could be 
resolved, the civil suit would likewise be resolved. 
• 
Attorney Eisenberg filed a witness disclosure 
list in the civil action without any reasonable inquiry as 
to the testimony of the witnesses identified so as to cause 
M.D. and her attorney the expense of pursuing discovery 
depositions of those witnesses, only to find that none of 
them were in a position to offer testimony in support of 
the claims against M.D. in the civil suit.  
• 
Attorney Eisenberg's prosecution of the civil 
action may be characterized by his pattern of delays, 
requests for adjournment, and nonappearances at depositions 
and a mediation which he had requested. 
• 
The trial court concluded the civil action was 
used for improper purposes and was frivolous.  The court of 
appeals, in turn, found the appeal itself to be per se 
frivolous. 
• 
Following denial of a petition for review, 
Attorney Eisenberg's pro se motion regarding denial of 
attorney fees both as to the trial court action and the 
appeal was unwarranted by law in Wisconsin and the law of 
the case, and represents another example of Attorney 
Eisenberg's continued campaign of intimidation, harassment, 
and acts to maliciously injure M.D.  
• 
Attorney Eisenberg's conduct in the civil action 
became a vendetta on the part of Attorney Eisenberg to 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
18 
 
personally attack, harass, and maliciously injure M.D., 
which vendetta continued in the disciplinary proceeding 
when he subpoenaed M.D. to appear without any purpose 
relevant to the proceedings. 
• 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
testimony 
in 
the 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
was 
deliberately 
evasive, 
inconsistent, 
contradictory, 
false, 
incredible, 
and 
untrustworthy, and Attorney Eisenberg showed no remorse for 
the seriousness of the allegations in the OLR's complaint.   
¶33 The referee commented extensively on what he termed 
Attorney Eisenberg's lack of candor throughout the disciplinary 
proceeding.  The referee found "Mr. Eisenberg's testimony under 
oath at various times to be deliberately evasive; inconsistent 
and contradictory; and false, incredible and impossible to 
believe."  The referee was particularly troubled by Attorney 
Eisenberg's claim that one or more jurors had contacted him the 
morning following the acquittal verdict in the criminal case: 
But 
the 
most preposterous testimony by Mr. 
Eisenberg relates to his account about a juror or two 
jurors contacting him on the morning following the 
acquittal 
verdict 
and 
claiming 
that 
the 
[W.D.] 
criminal jury stormed/marched into Judge Koschnick's 
chambers 
demanding 
that 
[M.D.] 
be 
charged 
with 
perjury.  According to Attorney Wilcox, that afternoon 
Mr. Eisenberg told the family court commissioner at a 
scheduling conference in the [] divorce action that "a 
juror" had called him that morning and when told about 
the new lawsuit he was filing, the juror purportedly 
responded "good, she deserves it."  The following 
month, when Mr. Eisenberg spoke to a news reporter for 
the Daily Jefferson County Union, the news reporter 
testified that Mr. Eisenberg stated "a juror" called 
him.  Three months later in a court argument before 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
19 
 
Judge Hue, Mr. Eisenberg stated: " . . . The jury came 
back 
with 
a 
not 
guilty, 
and 
the 
jury 
marched 
into . . . chambers and suggested to the judge that 
M.D. should be criminally charged.  I found out about 
it from either the jury foreman or one of the jurors 
calling me and telling me they had gone in and asked 
why this woman wasn't charged with a criminal slander 
or perjury or something. . . . " 
The next reference to this alleged jury reaction 
appears in Mr. Eisenberg's testimony before Judge Gram 
on December 23, 2003, during the special proceedings.  
Initially, Mr. Eisenberg testified about a phone call 
from a woman juror, but during cross-examination, he 
recalled for the first time that two jurors called him 
on the morning following the acquittal complaining 
about 
[M.D.]'s 
alleged 
perjury 
and 
wanting 
Mr. 
Eisenberg to do something about it. 
At 
this 
disciplinary 
hearing, 
Mr. 
Eisenberg 
totally abandoned the single juror contact version of 
this event.  He testified that the morning after the 
acquittal when he was in his office, he "got two phone 
calls, one from a woman, who did not want to give me 
her 
name, 
and 
I believe there was a man who 
called. . . . I was extremely impressed with the fact 
that I got calls from jurors.  That doesn't happen all 
the time.  . . . "  This referee is skeptical of the 
change in Mr. Eisenberg's recollection from a phone 
contact from a single juror to two phone calls from 
two jurors. 
Next, if two separate jurors took the trouble to 
locate and speak by phone with Mr. Eisenberg about the 
jury 
marching/storming 
into 
Judge 
Koschnick's 
chambers, allegedly complaining about M.D. committing 
perjury and eliciting Mr. Eisenberg's help, then why 
did both jurors refuse to give Mr. Eisenberg their 
names?  . . .  This referee is skeptical about why two 
jurors go to the trouble of contacting Mr. Eisenberg 
in the first instance and then both refuse to identify 
themselves. 
However, 
if these two jurors contacted Mr. 
Eisenberg to report this extraordinary event, but 
refused to reveal their names, is it not reasonable to 
expect 
that 
Mr. 
Eisenberg 
would 
contact 
Judge 
Koschnick's court personnel to verify the accuracy of 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
20 
 
this account?  This is particularly true when you 
consider that Mr. Eisenberg had just spent the 
previous two days in trial before that court and on 
the afternoon of the alleged two juror calls, he was 
at the Jefferson County Courthouse to attend a pre-
trial 
conference in the [] divorce proceedings.  
However, Mr. Eisenberg made no such contact.  And if 
this juror contact occurred, is it not reasonable to 
expect an experienced criminal lawyer to report this 
to the Jefferson County District Attorney rather than 
contacting the editor of the local newspaper?   
However, any questions about this entire incident 
are quickly resolved when one considers the testimony 
of Judge Koschnick himself.  Judge Koschnick testified 
that as is his custom, he went to the jury room after 
the verdict in the [W.D.] criminal action to inquire 
about their general jury experience.  He said one 
juror expressed concern to him that the acquittal 
verdict not result in any type of prosecution of 
[M.D.], which the juror did not want to see happen. 
Judge Koschnick was unequivocal that there were no 
jurors storming or marching into his chambers——
something that neither he nor his bailiff would ever 
allow.  There was no claim by any juror that [M.D.] 
had lied nor any request or demand for any criminal 
action against [M.D.].  In fact, Judge Koschnick 
testified that seven years later he still recalls he 
"was outraged" when he read Mr. Eisenberg's version of 
the event as reported in the local paper.  Judge 
Koschnick's testimony on this entire subject was very 
clear and very credible.  
Therefore, 
either 
you 
have 
a 
completely 
fabricated story by two separate but unidentified 
jurors, which Mr. Eisenberg recklessly repeats to a 
family court commissioner, a newspaper reporter and a 
judge or you have a completely fabricated story by 
Mr. Eisenberg.  There is no doubt in this referee's 
mind 
that 
the 
fabrication 
was 
the 
product 
of 
Mr. Eisenberg, under oath, in both the [W.D.] special 
proceeding and this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶34 The referee noted that in the civil action, Judge Gram 
found that M.D. was a victim of domestic violence and that as a 
battered woman, M.D. was "vulnerable" to Attorney Eisenberg's 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
21 
 
cross-examination style which was described as putting "the 
witness 'through the wringer' in an uncivil and condescending 
manner, . . . ."  The referee said when one considers Judge Gram 
found the purpose of the civil action was harassment, "one would 
think Mr. Eisenberg would think twice before calling [M.D.] as a 
witness in this disciplinary proceeding.  He did not."   
¶35 In describing M.D.'s testimony at the disciplinary 
hearing, the referee said M.D. "was clearly an emotionally 
distraught person."  The referee found it significant that 
Attorney Eisenberg, not his attorney, conducted the examination.  
The referee noted the topics covered in the questioning were 
whether or not M.D. made false statements during the criminal 
trial, to which she responded, "No"; whether her emotional state 
at the disciplinary hearing was some kind of fakery; whether she 
believed 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
was 
only 
doing 
his 
job 
in 
representing W.D.; and whether she had met or spoken to Attorney 
Eisenberg before the criminal trial.  The referee said none of 
this had any relevancy to the disciplinary charges and "when one 
considers Mr. Eisenberg's repeated references to M.D. as a 
'liar' or 'perjurer' and her testimony at the criminal trial as 
'lies' or 'perjury,' this referee is deeply troubled as to why 
M.D. was subpoenaed as a witness in this hearing in the first 
place."  The referee said rather than exhibiting some remorse 
for his past conduct, Attorney Eisenberg's "subpoena herein 
directed to [M.D.] for no relevant reason whatsoever, indicates 
to this referee that the civil action had become a vendetta by 
Mr. Eisenberg against [M.D.] which should not go unpunished."   
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
22 
 
¶36 The referee noted that Judge Koschnick testified about 
M.D.'s "possible trauma" in facing Attorney Eisenberg's cross-
examination during the criminal trial, but said he "frankly, 
believed her, . . . ."  The referee also concluded "that 
[M.D.]'s emotional appearance at the hearing in this proceeding 
was no fakery or acting.  She appeared to be genuinely upset at 
being forced to endure another confrontation with, and cross-
examination by, Mr. Eisenberg." 
¶37 Turning to the recommended discipline, the referee 
noted that at the initial scheduling conference, Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
counsel 
objected 
to 
references 
in 
the 
OLR's 
complaint 
regarding 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
prior 
discipline, 
claiming that history might improperly influence the referee in 
his initial determination of whether Attorney Eisenberg violated 
the supreme court rules as alleged in this case.  At that time 
the referee represented that he would not review the reported 
disciplinary cases until he had reached his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  Having made those findings and conclusions, 
the referee said he reviewed, for the first time, Attorney 
Eisenberg's four prior disciplinary matters.   
¶38 The referee noted that in the 2004 action the referee 
had recommended revocation, pointing to Attorney Eisenberg's 
substantial 
disciplinary 
history 
and 
what 
that 
referee 
characterized as a propensity to lie under oath; a propensity to 
minimize culpability by trying to place blame on others, 
portraying himself as the victim, and claiming there was no real 
injury; and no demonstration of remorse.  Referee Ninneman said: 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
23 
 
In the instant proceedings this referee has the very 
same concerns, arrived at independently and without 
the 
benefit 
of 
first 
reviewing 
[Eisenberg, 
269 
Wis. 2d 43].  The court in [Eisenberg, 269 Wis. 2d 43] 
rejected 
the 
revocation 
recommendation, 
given 
Mr. Eisenberg's age, . . . . 
Although some of Mr. Eisenberg's actions in the 
[W.D.] 
civil 
action 
pre-dated 
the 
decision 
in 
[Eisenberg, 269 Wis. 2d 43], his conduct in this 
disciplinary proceeding does not.  When one considers 
that Mr. Eisenberg embarked on another campaign to 
harass, intimidate and maliciously injure another, 
this time not a judge but a litigant, and that this 
campaign continued in this disciplinary proceeding, he 
is undeserving of an age deferment.  This, coupled 
with his evasive, contradictory, incredible and false 
testimony in this proceeding makes OLR's recommended 
six-month suspension inadequate.  Considering that 
"Wisconsin has long adhered to a system of progressive 
discipline," 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Converse, 
2006 
WI 
4, 
287 
Wis. 2d 72, 
89, 
707 
N.W.2d 530, 538, this referee strongly recommends that 
Mr. Eisenberg's license to practice law be revoked. 
¶39 The referee also recommended that Attorney Eisenberg 
be assessed the full costs of the proceeding.   
¶40 On appeal Attorney Eisenberg argues that the OLR 
failed to prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
that his actions were taken for no reason other than to harass 
or maliciously injure M.D., and that he had a subjective intent 
to do so.  He also argues that in the event this court finds he 
did 
violate 
SCR 
20:3.1(a)(3), 
a 
reprimand 
would 
be 
an 
appropriate sanction. 
¶41 Attorney Eisenberg admits that he is an aggressive 
litigator, and he concedes that M.D. may be an emotionally 
fragile person.  He says although the referee and Judge 
Koschnick may have felt sympathy for M.D., neither that sympathy 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
24 
 
nor the fact that M.D. may have been the type of person who 
would find Attorney Eisenberg's litigation style to be painful, 
constitutes evidence, let alone proof, that the only purpose for 
filing the civil suit was to harass or injure M.D.  Attorney 
Eisenberg strongly argues that the evidence does not support a 
finding of a subjective intent on his part to harass or injure 
M.D.  Although the referee criticized Attorney Eisenberg's 
decision to call M.D. as a witness at the disciplinary hearing 
and 
personally 
conduct 
the 
examination 
of 
her, 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
argues 
his 
examination 
of 
M.D. 
was 
courteous, 
relatively brief, and devoted primarily to topics relevant to 
whether he had a legitimate purpose in filing the civil suit.   
¶42 Attorney Eisenberg argues that even if this court were 
to agree that the OLR did establish a violation of SCR 
20:3.1(a)(3), the referee's recommendation of revocation is 
"wildly disproportionate to the sanctions suffered by other 
attorneys found to have violated this rule."  He argues there is 
not a single reported case in which a sole count of a frivolous 
filing has resulted in the revocation of an attorney's license.  
He argues that prior cases involving SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) have 
generally resulted in reprimands or short-term suspensions. 
¶43 In support of his claim that a reprimand is an 
appropriate level of discipline, Attorney Eisenberg points to In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Caldwell, 171 Wis. 2d 393, 
491 N.W.2d 482 (1992), in which the attorney was found to have 
violated a predecessor of SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) by filing an action 
when he knew or when it was obvious it would serve merely to 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
25 
 
harass or maliciously injure the defendants.  The attorney in 
that case was publicly reprimanded.  Attorney Eisenberg notes 
that the OLR itself sought only a six-month suspension at the 
time it filed its complaint in this case, and that sanction was 
predicated on an alleged violation of two counts of misconduct, 
only one of which was sustained by the referee.  
¶44 The OLR asserts that the referee's conclusion that 
Attorney Eisenberg violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) finds its factual 
foundation in the referee's assessment of undisputed evidence 
and the credibility of witnesses whose testimony the referee 
personally observed.  The OLR says there is no basis for 
reversing the referee's conclusion that Attorney Eisenberg 
violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) since that conclusion rests on the 
referee's assessment of witness credibility and the referee's 
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. 
¶45 The OLR argues that Attorney Eisenberg is again 
seeking to retry the sanctions issue in the underlying civil 
action.  The OLR says according to Attorney Eisenberg, he is not 
a wrongdoer; he was victimized in the underlying action and he 
is being victimized here.  The OLR notes in the course of the 
disciplinary hearing, Attorney Eisenberg's counsel referred to 
the "Eisenberg Effect" and claimed that no other lawyer in this 
state would have been sanctioned for the conduct in the 
underlying case; no lawyer other than Eisenberg would find 
himself on the receiving end of a disciplinary prosecution for 
the conduct at issue.  The OLR says: 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
26 
 
While Eisenberg apparently prides himself on the 
rude and abrasive style he employs as a trial lawyer, 
sanctions were not imposed against him in the Civil 
Action based on style.  Nor did the Referee reject his 
explanations 
for 
his 
motive 
in 
commencing 
and 
continuing the Civil Action based on style.  In the 
Civil Action, Judge Hue gave Eisenberg plenty of 
latitude, if anything more latitude than would be 
afforded to most lawyers.  Eisenberg abused it.  It 
was not Eisenberg's style, it was the substance of 
Eisenberg's conduct which led to sanctions.  A 
different "A" word applies.  Eisenberg was not 
sanctioned for being an "aggressive litigator," he was 
sanctioned for being an abusive litigator; a lawyer 
the referee found wholly lacking in credibility.   
¶46 The OLR suggests that if there is in fact an 
"Eisenberg Effect," it is Attorney Eisenberg's abusive conduct 
and disrespect for other parties, other lawyers, and the legal 
system which leads to sanctions. 
¶47 The OLR notes that in concluding there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Attorney Eisenberg knew the 
civil suit would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
M.D., the referee focused on Attorney Eisenberg's lack of 
candor, his lack of remorse, and other evidence supporting 
detailed findings as to his intent, including the fact that a 
criminal acquittal does not mean that a complaining witness made 
false statements actionable as defamation; the fact that a 
vulnerable witness under stress becomes confused under oath or 
admits inconsistencies while testifying at trial does not mean 
that witness made false statements actionable as defamation; the 
fact that the complaint in the civil action was filed the day 
after the criminal acquittal and was filed without interviewing 
a single third-party witness later included in the plaintiff's 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
27 
 
witness list; the fact that Attorney Eisenberg sought to 
personally serve the process on M.D. the day after he had 
reduced her to tears on the witness stand with his client and 
client's mother present as an audience; the fact that Attorney 
Eisenberg called M.D. a liar and a perjurer at the conference 
with the family court commissioner and indicated the civil 
action would delay the divorce proceeding; the fact that soon 
after filing the complaint Attorney Eisenberg contacted the 
local newspaper to seek out publicity about the suit; the fact 
that in justifying his filing of the suit, Attorney Eisenberg 
purported to rely on the results of a polygraph examination of 
his client under circumstances where no foundation was laid for 
polygraph results to be admissible in the case; and the fact 
that the polygraph results indicated W.D. had thrown M.D. on the 
ground, establishing that M.D. had in fact been physically 
abused by her husband, notwithstanding his acquittal. 
¶48 The OLR says ample evidence supports the referee's 
findings that Attorney Eisenberg commenced and continued the 
civil action against M.D. when he knew or it was obvious to him 
that the action would serve merely to harass or maliciously 
injure her.  The OLR asks this court to affirm the referee's 
legal 
conclusion 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
violated 
SCR 
20:3.1(a)(3).   
¶49 The OLR continues to recommend a suspension of at 
least six months duration.  The OLR says the cases upon which 
Attorney Eisenberg relies in support of his argument that he 
should merely be reprimanded "do not present a multiple 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
28 
 
recidivist attorney with a disturbing disciplinary history like 
Eisenberg's."  The OLR says: 
Positions Eisenberg has advanced in this defense of 
this 
matter, 
unfortunately, 
illustrate 
the 
same 
pattern seen in his most recent disciplinary case; a 
litany 
of 
excuses 
and 
denials 
of 
personal 
responsibility for the conduct which led to the 
initiation of the disciplinary action, and ultimately 
expressions 
of 
defiance 
and 
disrespect 
for 
the 
disciplinary process. 
¶50 The 
OLR 
asks 
this 
court 
to 
impose 
discipline 
commensurate with the violations as necessary and appropriate 
for the protection of the public.  It also asks this court to 
assess all costs of this proceeding against Attorney Eisenberg.   
¶51 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The court may 
impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the referee's 
recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
¶52 Attorney Eisenberg has failed to show that any of the 
referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, 
we adopt them.  The circuit court and the court of appeals 
declared the W.D. civil action to be frivolous.  Attorney 
Eisenberg was assessed a hefty monetary penalty, which he paid.  
Attorney Eisenberg does not ask this court to revisit the 
findings of frivolousness or the sanctions imposed against him 
by the lower courts, as that would be improper.  The 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
29 
 
determination that sanctions were appropriately imposed against 
Attorney Eisenberg for violating Wis. Stat. § 814.025 by 
initiating and maintaining a suit in order to harass M.D. has 
been affirmed by the court of appeals, and this court denied a 
petition for review.  That determination may not be collaterally 
attacked in a disciplinary proceeding.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 754, 324 N.W.2d 432 
(1982).   
¶53 Lauer 
was 
a 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
against 
an 
attorney charged with knowingly maintaining a frivolous action 
as proscribed by then-SCR 20.36.  The provisions of former 20.36 
are now found, in substantially the same form, in SCR 20:3.1.  
In the Lauer case, a circuit court had ordered the attorney to 
pay costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 (1979-80) for bringing a frivolous claim.  The Board 
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility filed a misconduct 
complaint against Attorney Lauer, asserting he had violated SCR 
20.36 because he knew, or should have known, that the frivolous 
action he had commenced in circuit court was without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by 
a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law.  The referee in Lauer recommended that 
a private reprimand be issued.  Attorney Lauer appealed, arguing 
that the referee had improperly concluded that Attorney Lauer 
had violated SCR 20.36 solely on the basis of the previous 
determination by the circuit court that he had violated the 
frivolous claim statute. 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
30 
 
¶54 The Lauer court agreed that a finding of frivolousness 
under the statute could not, per se, constitute a violation of a 
disciplinary rule.  Lauer pointed out that although the statute 
and the rule were similar, they were not identical, and the 
assessment of costs under the statute does not, in and of 
itself, constitute a violation of the professional conduct rule.  
The Lauer court explained: 
 
However, it does not follow that where there is a 
violation of the statute there must be a violation of 
the disciplinary rule.  To the extent they treat the 
same activity, the statute and the rule differ 
significantly.  A violation of the statute requires 
that a party or a party's attorney knew or should have 
known that the action, special proceeding, counter-
claim, defense or cross-complaint was without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.  A violation 
of SCR 20.36 requires that the claim or defense 
unwarranted under existing law must be knowingly 
advanced.   
108 Wis. 2d at 757 (emphasis in original).   
¶55 The Lauer court also noted that under the frivolous 
claim statute, the test applied is an objective one.  By 
contrast, under the disciplinary rule, the appropriate test is 
subjective because the referee or reviewing court must determine 
whether an attorney has violated a disciplinary rule that sets 
forth the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can 
fall without being subject to disciplinary proceedings.  The 
Lauer court wrote: 
In making that determination in the context of SCR 
20.36(1)(b), we find it appropriate to apply the 
subjective standard, that is, whether the attorney, in 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
31 
 
fact, knew the claim he was advancing was unwarranted 
under existing law and could not be supported by a 
good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law.  Such knowledge is an issue 
of 
fact 
which, 
in 
the 
context 
of 
an 
attorney 
disciplinary proceeding, must be established by clear 
and satisfactory evidence, . . . while a finding of 
frivolousness under sec. 814.025, Stats., must be 
based on a preponderance of the evidence.   
108 Wis. 2d at 758 (emphasis added and internal citations 
omitted). 
¶56 Thus, in the instant matter, the focus of the inquiry 
before the referee, and now before this court, is whether there 
was clear and satisfactory evidence that Attorney Eisenberg 
filed a civil suit knowing that the suit would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure M.D.  The referee's detailed 
findings of fact, as summarized above, clearly demonstrate that 
the OLR has met its burden of proof.  The record clearly 
establishes that Attorney Eisenberg had no good-faith legal 
basis for filing the civil lawsuit, but rather his motive was 
part of a continuing campaign to intimidate, harass, and 
maliciously injure M.D.   
¶57 The record supports the referee's conclusion that 
Attorney Eisenberg rushed to file the civil suit less than 24 
hours after the acquittal verdict in the criminal case hoping to 
personally confront M.D. at the divorce pretrial conference.  
When he learned that M.D. was not going to be present at the 
conference, 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
confronted 
M.D.'s 
divorce 
attorney in a rude and intimidating manner.  After rushing to 
file the baseless civil suit, Attorney Eisenberg had numerous 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
32 
 
opportunities to dismiss the case but instead pressed on with 
his campaign of harassment and intimidation.  His tactics 
included contacting the local newspaper, failing to appear for 
the mediation he had demanded, and repeating and embellishing 
the false account about the reaction of the jury in the criminal 
case. 
 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
campaign 
of 
harassment 
and 
intimidation 
toward 
M.D. 
continued 
into 
the 
disciplinary 
proceeding itself, as evidenced by Attorney Eisenberg's decision 
to personally examine M.D. at the hearing before the referee.   
¶58 We agree with the referee that the evidence in this 
record is sufficient to support a determination that Attorney 
Eisenberg "filed a suit, asserted a position, . . . or took 
other action on behalf of [W.D.] when [he] [knew] or when it 
[was] obvious that such an action would serve merely to harass 
or maliciously injure another."  The referee's findings of fact 
are supported by clear and convincing evidence and we adopt 
them.  We also adopt the referee's conclusions of law flowing 
from those findings of fact. 
¶59 Turning to the appropriate sanction, as the referee 
noted, Wisconsin has long adhered to a system of progressive 
discipline. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Converse, 2006 WI 4, ¶37, 287 Wis. 2d 72, 707 N.W.2d 530.  As we 
noted in 2004 when we suspended Attorney Eisenberg's license to 
practice law for one year, his disciplinary history has spanned 
four decades and demonstrates a clear pattern of inappropriate 
behavior.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 
269 Wis. 2d 43, ¶33.  We commented that the violations at issue 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
33 
 
in that case "would certainly warrant revocation, . . . ."  Id., 
¶34.  However, we did not impose that sanction because, "[g]iven 
Attorney Eisenberg's age, revocation might effectively prohibit 
him ever practicing law again."  Id. 
¶60 If Attorney Eisenberg had no prior disciplinary 
history, or if he had a lesser disciplinary history, revocation 
would not be on the table.  However, this is the fifth time 
Attorney Eisenberg has been disciplined.  We are cognizant that 
the majority of the conduct at issue here occurred prior to or 
concurrent with the conduct at issue in the 2004 disciplinary 
case.  A small amount of the conduct at issue did post-date the 
2004 suspension.  In determining the appropriate sanction, we 
note that there are some disturbing similarities between the 
conduct in the instant case and the conduct which formed the 
basis for Attorney Eisenberg's first suspension in 1970.   
¶61 In the 1970 case this court found that Attorney 
Eisenberg pursued a course of vindictive and reckless harassment 
and psychological persecution against a Milwaukee County judge.  
Attorney Eisenberg's conduct was of such aggravated nature as to 
cause the judge great mental suffering and anguish.  State v. 
Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d at 367-68.  In the instant case, Attorney 
Eisenberg pursued a course of vindictive and reckless harassment 
and psychological persecution against M.D.  His conduct was of 
such aggravated nature as to cause M.D. great mental suffering 
and anguish.   
¶62 In the 2004 proceeding we expressed the highest 
concern over Attorney Eisenberg's continued and persistent 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
34 
 
inability to comport himself with the behavior that is expected 
of attorneys.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 269 Wis. 2d 43, ¶33.  The facts of this case have 
served only to heighten our concern that Attorney Eisenberg is 
apparently unable to conform his conduct to the standards 
expected of all members of the Wisconsin bar.  While the current 
misconduct, standing alone, would not warrant revocation, the 
behavior at issue here is the latest in a long line of episodes 
of misconduct permeating Attorney Eisenberg's entire legal 
career.  In light of the aggravated nature of the misconduct and 
Attorney Eisenberg's extensive disciplinary history, we conclude 
that no sanction short of revocation would be sufficient to 
protect the public, achieve deterrence, and impress upon 
Attorney Eisenberg the seriousness of his misconduct.  We also 
agree with the OLR that Attorney Eisenberg should be assessed 
the full costs of the proceeding. 
¶63 IT IS ORDERED that Count Two of the OLR's complaint is 
dismissed. 
¶64 IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the license of Alan D. 
Eisenberg to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective 
April 1, 2010. 
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Alan D. Eisenberg shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.   
¶66 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Alan D. Eisenberg comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an 
attorney whose license to practice law has been revoked. 
No. 
2007AP1083-D   
 
 
 
1