Title: FOSTER APIARIES INC v HUBBARD A

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-399 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 FOSTER APIARIES, INC. a Montana Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs . HUBBARD APIARIES, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Fergus. Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Parrish, Knopp & O'Hare, Lewistown, Montana Robert Knopp argued, Lewistown, Montana Fdr Respondentt K . Robert Foster argued, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: June 16, 1981 Decided : JUL 2 1905 Filed: [JILZ- Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Hubbard A p i a r i e s , I n c . , a p p e a l s from d e n i a l of its motions t o v a c a t e and d i s m i s s a d e f a u l t judgment of $11,968 e n t e r e d J u n e 20, 1979, by t h e Fergus County D i s t r i c t Court. A p p e l l a n t Hubbard is a Michigan c o r p o r a t i o n which p r o c e s s e s honey p r o d u c t s . Respondent F o s t e r A p i a r i e s , I n c . , is a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n which produces honey. I n November 1978 F o s t e r shipped beeswax t o Hubbard f o r p r o c e s s i n g . A d i s p u t e over t h e accounting a r o s e between t h e p a r t i e s . F o s t e r f i l e d a complaint i n Fergus County D i s t r i c t Court on February 1 9 , 1979, which was served March 9 , 1979. On March 15 t h e p r e s i d e n t of Hubbard A p i a r i e s s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r t o F o s t e r ' s a t t o r n e y , Robert F o s t e r : "Dear Mr. F o s t e r : "Enclosed p l e a s e f i n d p h o t o c o p i e s of i n v o i c e s f o r which we s e n t checks. "We were n o t aware t h e r e was a problem. F o s t e r s e n t i n cappings-slum. W e rendered and r e p o r t e d . What more can w e do o r say! "Yours s i n c e r e l y , "/s/ R. L. Hubbard" Hubbard d i d n o t r e t a i n l o c a l c o u n s e l o r f u r t h e r communicate w i t h F o s t e r ' s c o u n s e l . D e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d on June 20, 1979. Although n o t i c e of d e f a u l t was n o t s e n t t o Hubbard, t h e company had a c t u a l n o t i c e o f t h e d e f a u l t judgment a g a i n s t it on September 20, 1979. Hubbard t h e n c o n t a c t e d c o u n s e l i n Michigan who secured Montana counsel. On behalf of Hubbard A p i a r i e s , counsel f i l e d a motion t o v a c a t e and d i s m i s s on February 1 3 , 1980, c l a i m i n g l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . When t h a t motion was denied on J u n e 11, 1980, Hubbard renewed t h e motion t o d i s m i s s and v a c a t e on June 17, 1980, on t h e grounds of m i s t a k e , ina-dvertence, s u r p r i s e o r excusable n e g l e c t and o f f e r e d an answer t o t h e complaint. The motion was deemed denied by f a i l u r e of t h e c o u r t t o r u l e on t h e motion. N o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d August 21, 1980. W e f i n d t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s fundamental t o t h i s appeal : 1. Was Hubbard's appeal t o t h i s Court t i m e l y f i l e d under Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P.? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r when it denied Hubbard's June 1 7 , 1980, motion t o v a c a t e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on grounds of m i s t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c e , s u r p r i s e o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t ? 3 . Did F o s t e r comply w i t h t h e R u l e 5 5 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., r e q u i r e m e n t o f showing by " a f f i d a v i t o r o t h e r w i s e ? " 4 . Was Hubbard's l e t t e r t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s counsel an appearance r e q u i r i n g a three-day n o t i c e of e n t r y of d e f a u l t ? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t a p p o i n t i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r Hubbard under Rule 5 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.? Accompanying a motion t o d i s m i s s , respondent F o s t e r a r g u e s t h a t t h i s Court h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear Hubbard's a p p e a l because it is untimely. A s t h e f a c t s r e f l e c t , t h e c o u r t denied Hubbard's f i r s t motion t o d i s m i s s on June 11. N o t i c e of appeal was n o t f i l e d u n t i l August 2 1 , seventy-one days l a t e r . T h i s , F o s t e r a r g u e s , is beyond t h e t h i r t y - d a y time l i m i t mandated by Rule 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P. The t i m e l i m i t s f o r f i l i n g a n a p p e a l a r e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l and e x c l u s i v e . An a p p e l l a n t h a s a d u t y t o p e r f e c t its appeal i n t h e manner and time provided i n Rule 5 . Absent t h i s c o m p l i a n c e , t h i s C o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hea-r t h e a p p e a l . P r i c e v . Zunchich ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 612 P.2d 1296, 37 St.Rep. 1058. Hubbard responds t h a t F o s t e r ' s argument b e l i e s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Michigan c o r p o r a t i o n was appearing s p e c i a l l y , c h a l l e n g i n g o n l y t h e c o u r t 1 s j u r i s d i c t i o n . The n e c e s s i t y of p r e s e n t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s t o t h e c o u r t and o b t a i n i n g a r u l i n g , s e p a r a t e from o t h e r v i a b l e i s s u e s , r e s u l t s i n two motions and two h e a r i n g s , both of which may p r o v i d e a p p e a l a b l e d e c i s i o n s . Hubbard concludes t h a t it would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e q u i r e t h e d e f a u l t e d d e f e n d a n t t o a p p e a l t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e c i s i o n p r i o r t o judgment on o t h e r motions. I n our view n e i t h e r p a r t y is completely c o r r e c t . The appeal of t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard1s f i r s t motion t o d i s m i s s is untimely. However, t h e second d e n i a l is t i m e l y and p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is based on t h e premise t h a t we have h e r e two s e p a r a t e f i n a l o r d e r s , each c o n t r o l l e d s e p a r a t e l y by t h e p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s and each s i n g u l a r l y a p p e a l a b l e . A s Chief J u s t i c e Haswell s t a t e d i n S h i e l d s v. P i r k l e R e f r i g e r a t e d F r e i g h t L i n e s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . , 591 P.2d 1120, 1125, 36 St.Rep. 472, 478, t h e r e is no q u e s t i o n t h a t a n o r d e r r e f u s i n g t o v a c a t e a d e f a u l t judgment is immediately a p p e a l a b l e . T h i s being t h e c a s e Hubbard should have appealed promptly when t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied its motion t o d i s m i s s on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l grounds. I t should be noted t h a t Hubbard moved t o v a c a t e f o r l a c k of p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , which can be waived i f n o t appealed p r o p e r l y , a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n , which may be r a i s e d a t any time. Hubbard's r i g h t t o appeal t h e d e n i a l of its February 1 4 , 1980, motion was e x t i n g u i s h e d when it f a i l e d t o a p p e a l w i t h i n t h e time l i m i t s of Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. Hubbard is n o t p e r s u a s i v e r e g a r d i n g its i s s u e of s p e c i a l appearance. The company has n o t shown t h a t its s p e c i a l appearance somehow engaged a new s e t of p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s . W e a l s o d i r e c t Hubbard's a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e is no longer any d i s t i n c t i o n between a g e n e r a l o r s p e c i a l appearance i n Montana. With t h e a d o p t i o n of Rule 1 2 , M.R.Civ.P., we a b o l i s h e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f g e n e r a l and s p e c i a l appearances. The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e is p r e s e r v e d by i n c l u d i n g it i n a d e f e n d a n t ' s i n i t i a l response t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. Once a p a r t y h a s r a i s e d t h e j u r i s d i c - t i o n a l i s s u e i n its p l e a d i n g , t h e c l a i m is n o t l o s t o r w a i v e d s o l e l y b e c a u s e o f t h e r e s p o n s e . Knoepke v . Southwestern Railway Co. ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 620 P.2d 1185, 37 St.Rep. 1910. See a l s o Dragor Shipping C o r p o r a t i o n v . Union Tank Car Company ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 7 ) , 378 F.2d 241; Orange T h e a t r e Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp. ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 4 4 ) , 139 F.2d 871; 2 A Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e Yl12.12. An immediate a p p e a l of t h e c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e f i r s t m o t i o n would n o t h a v e e x p o s e d a p p e l l a n t t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. By f i l i n g a second m o t i o n t o v a c a t e on o t h e r , n o n j u r i s d i c t i o n a l g r o u n d s , Hubbard accepted t h e d e n i a l and admitted t h e a u t h o r i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t over t h e company and t h e c a s e . Regarding t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard's June 17 motion, we f i n d t h a t t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was t i m e l y f i l e d . D i s r e g a r d i n g t h e improper d e v i a t i o n s from t h e procedures o u t l i n e d i n Rules 6 0 ( b ) and 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., we f i n d t h a t t h e motion would be deemed denied on August 1 0 , 1980, f i f t e e n days a f t e r h e a r i n g . A p p e l l a n t f i l e d its n o t i c e of a p p e a l on August 21, 1980, w e l l w i t h i n t h e t h i r t y - d a y time l i m i t . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Court has t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s a c t i o n on t h e second motion. Although w e have t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear Hubbard's c l a i m s of e r r o r r e g a r d i n g its second motion t o v a c a t e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l was n o t e r r o r because t h e motion was untimely f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : "The motion s h a l l be made w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , and f o r r e a s o n s ( I ) , ( 2 ) , and ( 3 ) when a d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d , whether i n l i e u of p u b l i c a t i o n o r n o t , n o t more t h a n 60 days a f t e r t h e judgment, o r d e r or proceeding was e n t e r e d o r t a k e n , o r , i n a c a s e where n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment is r e q u i r e d by Rule 7 7 ( d ) , n o t more t h a n 60 days a f t e r s e r v i c e o f n o t i c e o f e n t r y o f j udgment . " The record d i s c l o s e s t h a t Hubbard had a c t u a l n o t i c e no l a t e r than September 20, 1979. One hundred and f o r t y - seven days l a t e r Hubbard moved t o d i s m i s s under Rule 60. T h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y and s t r i c t l y e n f o r c e d t h e sixty-day l i m i t a t i o n . See Strnod v. Abadie ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 1 Mont. 224, 376 P.2d 730. I n t h e c a s e a t hand, Hubbard simply s t a t e d t h a t it d i d n o t know t h a t f u r t h e r a c t i o n was r e q u i r e d of it by way of an appearance. T h i s does n o t c o n s t i t u t e e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t , e s p e c i a l l y when a p p e l l a n t ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e is t h e p r e s i d e n t of a l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n doing b u s i n e s s on a m u l t i - s t a t e b a s i s . I n Morris v . Frank T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Co. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . , 601 P.2d 698, 36 St.Rep. 1875, we s t a t e d : "A f a i l u r e t o appear due t o f o r g e t f u l n e s s and t h e p r e s s of o t h e r , more important b u s i n e s s is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t . Dudley v . S t i l e s ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. 566, 386 P.2d 342, 343. Even t h e most l i b e r a l approach t o t h i s problem cannot s a v e a p p e l l a n t s 1 c a s e . . . . A l i b e r a l c o u r t c a n n o t f i n d e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t where a d e f e n d a n t h a s w i l l i n g l y s l u m b e r e d on h i s r i g h t s and ignored t h e j u d i c i a l machinery e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w . ' " 601 P.2d a t 699. I t is our view t h a t h e r e a g a i n , a s i n its t a r d y a p p e a l t o t h i s Court, a p p e l l a n t s l e p t on i t s r i g h t s and t h e r e b y e x t i n g u i s h e d them. Hubbard admitted t o having a c t u a l n o t i c e of t h e d e f a u l t on September 20, 1979. I f we a r e t o s t r i c t l y a p p l y t h e language of Rule 6 0 ( b ) , Hubbard had u n t i l November 1 9 , 1979, t o move t h e c o u r t t o v a c a t e t h e judgment. I t is simply n o t r e a s o n a b l e f o r a p a r t y t o w a i t u n t i l February 14 t o r a i s e an i s s u e of e r r o r i n r e g a r d t o a d e f a u l t judgment. H u b b a r d 1 s i n c a l c i t r a n c e c a n n o t b e condoned by allowing it t o now complain of impropriety. S i n c e w e have no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear Hubbard's a p p e a l of t h e f i r s t d e n i a l of i t s motion t o v a c a t e , Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., and s i n c e t h e second motion was untimely f i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Rule 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., w e w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r Hubbard's o t h e r i s s u e s . There could be no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard's second motion t o v a c a t e , s i n c e t h e motion should have been denied a s untimely. No cause s h a l l be r e v e r s e d upon appeal by reason o r e r r o r committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t where t h e record shows t h a t t h e same r e s u l t would have been a t t a i n e d had t h e t r i a l c o u r t n o t committed t h e e r r o r o r e r r o r s . Rule 1 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P. See a l s o G a l i g e r v . Hansen ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 133 Mont. 34, 319 P.2d 1051. Only s u b s t a n t i a l prejudice t o the r i g h t s of Hubbard would warrant reversal. N o such prejudice occurred because of the alleged e r r o r s of the t r i a l court. Af f irmed. W e concur: