Title: State v. Jenkins

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP46-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jimothy A. Jenkins, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 280, 827 N.W.2d 929 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Carl Ashley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJ., dissent. Opinion filed.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Joseph E. Redding, West Allis, and oral argument by Joseph E. 
Redding. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Aaron 
O’Neill, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP46-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF1225) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jimothy A. Jenkins, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Jimothy 
A. Jenkins, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals affirming a judgment and order of the Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, Carl Ashley and Rebecca F. Dallet, Judges.1   
                                                 
1 State v. Jenkins, No. 2012AP46-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013). 
The 
Honorable 
Carl 
Ashley 
entered 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction and imposed sentence.  The Honorable Rebecca F. 
Dallet entered the order denying Jenkins' postconviction motion. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
A jury found the defendant guilty of one count of 
first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime, with 
use 
of 
a 
dangerous 
weapon, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.05, and 939.63 (2007-08);2 one count of 
first-degree reckless injury, party to a crime, with the use of 
a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23(1)(a), 
939.05, and 939.63; and one count of possession of a firearm by 
a felon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).   
¶3 
After trial, the defendant brought a postconviction 
motion seeking a new trial on the grounds that he had 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that a new trial was 
required in the interest of justice.3   
¶4 
After an evidentiary Machner4 hearing, the circuit 
court denied the defendant's postconviction motion seeking a new 
trial, determining that the defendant's trial counsel was not 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.15(1) reads as follows: 
(1) Motion. A party may move to set aside a verdict 
and for a new trial because of errors in the trial, or 
because the verdict is contrary to law or to the 
weight of evidence, or because of excessive or 
inadequate damages, or because of newly-discovered 
evidence, or in the interest of justice.  Motions 
under this subsection may be heard as prescribed in s. 
807.13.  Orders granting a new trial on grounds other 
than in the interest of justice, need not include a 
finding that granting a new trial is also in the 
interest of justice. 
4 State v. Machner, 101 Wis. 2d 79, 303 N.W.2d 633 (1981). 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
3 
 
ineffective and that a new trial was not required in the 
interest of justice.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court. 
¶5 
The defendant raises two issues on review.   
¶6 
First, 
did 
the 
defendant 
receive 
ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel when defense trial counsel failed to 
present testimony at trial of potentially exculpatory witnesses, 
namely an eyewitness other than the State's witness and 
witnesses with evidence that another person committed the 
homicide for which the defendant was convicted?     
¶7 
Second, did the court of appeals err in refusing to 
order a new trial in the interest of justice under the court of 
appeals' discretionary reversal authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35?5   
¶8 
We address only the issue of whether the defense trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to call the eyewitness Cera 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35, governing discretionary reversal 
by the court of appeals, reads as follows:  
Discretionary reversal.  In an appeal to the court of 
appeals, if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed 
from, regardless of whether the proper motion or 
objection appears in the record and may direct the 
entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the 
trial court for entry of the proper judgment or for a 
new trial, and direct the making of such amendments in 
the pleadings and the adoption of such procedure in 
that court, not inconsistent with statutes or rules, 
as are necessary to accomplish the ends of justice. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
4 
 
Jones to testify at trial.  We conclude, under the totality of 
the circumstances in the instant case, that the defendant has 
demonstrated both prongs of the test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel as articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984):  trial counsel's deficient performance that did not 
meet the standard of objective reasonableness, and prejudice 
against the defendant that resulted from the trial counsel's 
deficient performance.   
¶9 
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new 
trial.6  
I 
 
¶10 The facts in the instant case are undisputed for the 
purposes of this appeal. 
 
¶11 On March 23, 2007, the car in which Toy Kimber and 
Anthony Weaver were traveling ran out of gas near 2100 North 
38th Street in Milwaukee.  Kimber lived seven blocks away on 
45th Street.   
¶12 After leaving the car, the two men met two young 
women, one of whom was Cera Jones.  Kimber admitted to buying 
$10 worth of marijuana from Jones.  During their conversation, a 
car drove past them, made a U-turn, and drove towards the four 
individuals.  A man exited the car's rear seat holding a rifle.  
                                                 
6 We need not and do not address whether defense trial 
counsel was ineffective in any other respects, and we do not 
address whether the court of appeals erred in failing to 
exercise its discretionary reversal authority to order a new 
trial in the interest of justice. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
5 
 
He shot at Kimber and Weaver, injuring Kimber in the leg and 
killing Weaver.  The shooter then reentered the vehicle and the 
vehicle drove away. 
 
¶13 Immediately after the shooting, police officers talked 
to both Kimber and Jones.  Kimber initially told police that he 
did not know the shooter.  Jones initially told police that she 
could not see the shooter's face because it was dark and he was 
wearing a hood. 
 
¶14 The next morning, March 24, 2007, Kimber was re-
interviewed by the police and shown a photo array, which 
included the defendant.  Kimber identified the defendant as the 
shooter.  Kimber had known the defendant for at least three 
years and may have seen the defendant earlier in the evening. 
 
¶15 Jones was re-interviewed by the police on April 1, 
2007.  Jones told police that she had not seen the shooter 
before.  She stated that the shooter had a clean-shaven baby 
face and medium complexion and that he did not have acne scars.  
Jones was also shown a photo array, which included the 
defendant.  She did not select the defendant from the array.  In 
a statement attached to the defendant's postconviction motion, 
Jones attests that she also gave a statement that the defendant 
was definitely not the shooter and that she had seen the 
defendant across the street minutes after the shooting occurred.  
The police report does not include these two statements. 
 
¶16 The defendant was arrested and charged.  While 
awaiting trial, the defendant shared a jail pod with Corey Moore 
and Christopher Blunt.  According to statements and affidavits 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
6 
 
in the defendant's motion for a new trial, while in jail, Blunt 
recognized the defendant and admitted that he [Blunt] had 
committed the shooting.  Moore stated that he overheard this 
conversation.   
 
¶17 The defendant brought the conversation with Blunt to 
his attorney's attention.  Defense trial counsel then informed 
the prosecutor in writing of Blunt's and Moore's statements.  
Defense trial counsel did not further interview Blunt or Moore. 
 
¶18 At trial, Kimber's testimony that the defendant was 
the shooter was the only evidence that directly tied the 
defendant to the shooting.7  Kimber testified that on the night 
of the shooting, prior to being shown a photo array, he 
identified the defendant as the shooter.8  On being shown the 
photo 
array, 
Kimber 
identified 
the 
defendant. 
 
Kimber 
additionally testified that there was a history of disputes 
between people living around 45th Street, such as himself, and 
people living around 38th Street, such as the defendant. 
                                                 
7 The State and the defendant each called witnesses to 
testify at trial.  For example, the State called various police 
officers who responded to the crime scene and conducted 
interviews and photo arrays.  The State also called a witness 
who allegedly told police that he had seen the defendant hold a 
firearm similar to the one used in the shooting and a witness 
who allegedly told police that she was in the defendant's 
alleged alibi location and did not see the defendant.  None of 
these witnesses introduced evidence that directly connected the 
defendant to the shooting. 
8 Police officers testified that at the scene of the 
shooting Kimber said he did not know who shot him. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
7 
 
¶19 In contrast, the defendant testified that he was in 
the home of Daniel McFadden at the time of the shooting.  
McFadden's home is across the street from the scene of the 
shooting.   
¶20 McFadden testified that the defendant was asleep and 
that he woke the defendant when the shots were fired.  On cross-
examination, McFadden also testified that immediately following 
the shooting, he told police officers that he had not seen the 
defendant at the time of the shooting and had last seen him 
around 2 p.m. that afternoon.   
¶21 The State and the defendant stipulated that Kimber had 
five adult convictions and four juvenile adjudications, that the 
defendant had two prior juvenile adjudications, and that 
McFadden 
had 
one 
adult 
conviction 
and 
three 
juvenile 
adjudications.   
¶22 The jury convicted the defendant of the crimes 
charged. 
 
¶23 The 
defendant 
moved 
for 
a 
new 
trial 
in 
a 
postconviction motion based upon both (1) ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to investigate, subpoena, and present 
witnesses who would have supported the proposition that the 
defendant was not the shooter; and (2) the interest of justice.  
Attached to the postconviction motion were signed statements by 
Jones and Moore obtained by the defendant's postconviction 
counsel's investigator and the investigator's report regarding a 
conversation with Blunt. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
8 
 
 
¶24 The circuit court granted a 
Machner evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
¶25 At the Machner hearing, the parties stipulated that 
Moore and Blunt would have testified similarly to the statements 
they gave to the investigator.  Moore's statement attests that 
while sharing a jail pod, Blunt made statements to the defendant 
admitting 
to 
the 
shooting 
of 
Kimber 
and 
Weaver. 
 
The 
investigator's report about Blunt indicates that Blunt denied 
making those statements and denied knowing the defendant. 
 
¶26 At 
the 
Machner 
hearing, 
defense 
trial 
counsel 
testified that his notes regarding individual witnesses had been 
destroyed in a flood.  He stated that his trial strategy was 
twofold——attacking the credibility of the victim eyewitness, 
Kimber, and providing an alibi for the defendant. 
 
¶27 In response to questions about why he did not call 
Jones as a witness, defense trial counsel testified as follows: 
• He was uncertain whether he met with Jones; he could 
not 
specifically 
recall 
whether 
he 
had 
met 
or 
interviewed Jones; 
• He could not recall why he did not call Jones as a 
witness; 
• He could not recall why or whether Jones's testimony 
would have fit with the theory of the case; 
• He would have read police reports detailing Jones's 
testimony; 
• He could not recall discussing the photo array with 
Jones; and 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
9 
 
• He could not recall why he did not discuss Jones's 
photo array with the relevant police officer. 
 
¶28 At the hearing, Jones testified that: 
• She did not identify the defendant in the photo array; 
• She told officers that the shooter had a smooth baby 
face, which the defendant does not have; 
• She told the officers that the defendant was not the 
shooter; 
• She knew the defendant from the neighborhood; 
• She spoke with defense trial counsel on multiple 
occasions 
but 
was 
not 
contacted 
afterwards 
or 
subpoenaed to be called as a witness; and 
• On the evening of the shooting, she told officers that 
she could see the shooter's face before he put his 
hood up. 
¶29 Regarding why he did not call either Moore or Blunt as 
a witness, defense trial counsel testified as follows: 
• He never talked to Blunt; 
• He believed that Moore would have been "credible"; 
• He requested that the prosecutor interview Moore; 
• He could not recall whether he or his investigator 
ever talked to Moore; and 
• Moore's counsel told him that Moore would not testify. 
¶30 The circuit court denied the motion for a new trial 
both with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel and the 
interest of justice. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
10 
 
¶31 The circuit court reasoned that trial counsel was not 
ineffective because (1) Jones would "not come across as a 
credible witness" and in any event "there is not a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different,"9 and (2) the statements of other witnesses whom 
defense counsel had not called at trial "would not have come in" 
under hearsay rules.10 
                                                 
9 The circuit court stated its reasoning at the Machner 
hearing as follows: 
And the reasons that I think that the defense 
can't meet that burden [of prejudice] is because I 
think there are just way too many inconsistencies with 
Miss Jones' statements and I think all of what she 
testified to is frankly she just did not come across 
as a credible witness.  I'm going to go through those 
specifics that show that I don't believe that she was 
credible and I think that the jury would have had 
difficulty with some of these statements as well. 
. . . .  
So I just think that given the contradictions in 
her testimony, I don't find her credible.  I think she 
would have been impeached on the stand with all these 
statements and her descriptions kept changing.  And I 
think that based on that, even if she had testified, 
there is not a reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. 
10 The circuit court stated its reasoning at the Machner 
hearing as follows:   
I just think in terms of a hearsay analysis at that 
point, that those statements just would not have come 
in in that way.  We'd have an alleged statement 
overheard by someone who isn't available, essentially 
not testifying, not being made available by his 
attorney. . . . And then to try to get in what he 
supposedly heard someone else say who also is saying 
he didn't say it, it really is so attenuated.  I just 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
11 
 
¶32 The circuit court also decided for the same reasons 
that the interest of justice did not necessitate a new trial. 
¶33 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court order 
denying the motion for a new trial for ineffective assistance of 
counsel and denying the motion for a new trial in the interest 
of justice.   
II 
 
¶34 Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to 
effective 
counsel 
by 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.11  The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel's conduct 
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.12   
¶35 Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel is a two-part inquiry under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).13  A defendant must show both 
                                                                                                                                                             
don't think that there is that reliability of which 
hearsay statements are based on so as to allow that to 
come in in that fashion. 
11 U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
12 State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶34, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 
N.W.2d 364 (citing State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶39, 244 
Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984))). 
13 State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 
N.W.2d 695 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
12 
 
(1) that counsel performed deficiently; and (2) that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.14   
 
¶36 When reviewing whether counsel performed deficiently, 
the Strickland standard requires that the defendant show that 
his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness considering all the circumstances.15  A court is 
highly 
deferential 
to 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
counsel's 
performance.  A court must make every effort to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time, and to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight.16  Strategic decisions made 
after less than complete investigation of law and facts may 
still be adjudged reasonable.17  "Just as a reviewing court 
should not second guess the strategic decisions of counsel with 
the benefit of hindsight, it should also not construct strategic 
defense which counsel does not offer."18 
¶37 Even 
if 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, 
a 
defendant must also show prejudice by demonstrating that there 
                                                 
14 Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶33 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687). 
15 Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22. 
16 Id. 
17 Id., ¶23. 
18 Harris v. Reed, 894 F.2d 871, 878 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(concluding that trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
offer a strategic reason for not calling potentially exculpatory 
witnesses). 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
13 
 
is a reasonable probability that the errors "had an adverse 
effect on the defense."19  The proper test for prejudice in the 
context of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether "there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
probability 
that, 
but 
for 
counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."20  The 
required showing of prejudice is that "counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable."21  A defendant fails to demonstrate 
prejudice if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.22   
 
¶38 Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.23  This court will 
uphold the circuit court's findings of fact, including the 
circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct and 
                                                 
19 State v. Burton, 2013 WI 61, ¶49, 349 Wis. 2d 1, 832 
N.W.2d 611 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  See also Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18 (harmless error rule, made applicable to criminal 
proceedings by § 972.11(1)). 
20 Burton, 349 Wis. 2d 1, ¶49 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 693). 
21 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
22 State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶2, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485 (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶44, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189). 
23 Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶33. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
14 
 
strategy, unless they are clearly erroneous.24  Whether counsel's 
performance satisfies the standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a question of law which we determine independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analysis.25 
¶39 We turn to the arguments relating to defense trial 
counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel.     
III 
 
¶40 We first address whether defense trial counsel's 
representation fell below the objective standard of reasonably 
effective assistance.26   
¶41 Failure to call a potential witness may constitute 
deficient performance.  In Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 862 
(7th Cir. 2012), the court declared that "in a 'swearing match' 
between two sides, counsel's failure to call two useful, 
corroborating witnesses, despite [potential bias as a result of] 
the family relationship, constitutes deficient performance."27  
See also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1030 (7th Cir. 
2006) (the testimony of witnesses who would corroborate the 
                                                 
24 State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305. 
25 State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶141 n.87, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 
832 N.W.2d 560; Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶33 (citing Thiel). 
26 Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36. 
27 Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1033 (7th Cir. 
2006)). 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
15 
 
defendant's account was a "crucial aspect of [the] defense"); 
State v. White, 2004 WI App 78, ¶¶20-21, 271 Wis. 2d 742, 680 
N.W.2d 362 (trial counsel's performance 
was deficient for 
failure to call witnesses who would have brought in evidence 
that "went to the core of [the] defense.").   
¶42 Defense trial counsel's deficient performance is clear 
from the record.  He knew of Jones.  He knew she was an 
eyewitness and could testify about the shooting. He knew her 
statements would contradict or impeach the eyewitness upon whom 
the prosecution's entire case relied, Kimber.  He knew that 
Jones had not identified the defendant on the night of the 
shooting and that she did not identify him when she examined a 
photo array.   
¶43 Jones's 
testimony 
fit 
defense 
trial 
counsel's 
professed trial strategy of discrediting and impeaching the 
State's witness. 
¶44 Similarly, 
Jones's 
eyewitness 
testimony 
would 
corroborate the defendant's version of events and support 
defense trial counsel's professed alibi defense.  Jones would 
have testified that she saw the defendant across the street 
immediately after the shooting.   
¶45 A failure to call a key witness, however, does not 
always necessarily constitute deficient performance.  The 
failure to call a witness may have been a reasonable trial 
strategy.   
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
16 
 
¶46 The record is devoid of any reasonable trial strategy 
to support defense trial counsel's not calling Jones as a 
witness at trial.  
¶47 At the Machner hearing, defense trial counsel could 
give no reason why he did not call Jones as a trial witness.  
Indeed, defense trial counsel could not even recall having met 
with Jones, let alone provide a reason for why he chose not to 
call her as an witness at trial.  We cannot figure out any 
reasonable trial strategy.        
¶48 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that defense 
trial counsel's representation fell below the objective standard 
of reasonably effective assistance. 
IV 
 
¶49 As 
noted 
above, 
once 
deficient 
performance 
is 
established, the defendant must demonstrate that the deficient 
performance was prejudicial.  To demonstrate prejudice, the 
defendant must show that, absent defense trial counsel's errors, 
there was a reasonable probability of a different result. 
¶50 Our prejudice analysis is necessarily fact-dependent.  
Whether counsel's deficient performance satisfies the prejudice 
prong 
of 
Strickland 
depends 
upon 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances at trial.28  The circuit court and court of appeals 
determined that because of inconsistencies in Jones's statements 
in the initial police report, the second police report, the 
postconviction motion papers, and the Machner hearing testimony, 
                                                 
28 Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶62. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
17 
 
the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that 
had Jones been called as a witness the result would have been 
different.29  We disagree with these courts. 
¶51 Looking at the totality of the evidence in the trial, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
defendant 
sufficiently 
demonstrated 
a 
reasonable probability that a different result would have 
occurred but for the failure to call Jones. 
¶52 The State's case rested almost completely on the 
testimony of one eyewitness, the victim Kimber.  The defense 
offered no contradictory eyewitness testimony.  No physical 
evidence directly tied the defendant to the shooting.   
¶53 In such a case, contradictory eyewitness testimony 
supporting the defendant would expose vulnerabilities at the 
center of the State's case.  When defense trial counsel knew 
about Jones and that she could contradict the prosecution's 
central 
eyewitness 
testimony, 
the 
excluded 
contradictory 
eyewitness would have contributed strongly to doubts regarding 
the prosecution's case.  See United States ex rel. Hampton v. 
Leibach, 347 F.3d 219 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that failure 
to call key witnesses in a case with no physical evidence was 
prejudicial). 
¶54 Jones's testimony also would have supported the 
defendant's 
own 
testimony 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
in 
a 
                                                 
29 State v. Jenkins, No. 2012AP46-CR, unpublished slip op. 
¶¶15-17 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013). 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
18 
 
neighboring house at the time of the shooting and came out 
afterwards.   
¶55 Although 
Jones's 
statements 
were 
not 
necessarily 
consistent over time, and her credibility could be challenged, 
Kimber, the prosecution's key eyewitness, had similar if not 
more substantial credibility problems.   
¶56 The circuit court noted that Jones's description of 
the shooter got "better and better as time [went] on," but the 
same characterization could be applied to the statements of the 
prosecution witness, Kimber, whose memory of the shooting seemed 
to improve the day after the shooting.  On the night of the 
shooting, he told police that he could not identify the shooter.  
The next morning, he affirmatively identified the defendant in a 
photo array.  At trial, he averred that he did actually identify 
the defendant on the night of the shooting, even though the 
police report and an officer's testimony contradicted him. 
¶57 The court of appeals noted that Jones was inconsistent 
in describing her involvement in a marijuana sale earlier in the 
evening.  Yet Kimber was involved in the same transaction, with 
similarly inconsistent testimony. 
¶58 The parties appear not to dispute that Jones's 
credibility was not subject to attack by a prior criminal 
conviction.  Kimber, the State's key eyewitness, had nine prior 
convictions or juvenile adjudications; his prior convictions may 
be used to attack his credibility.30       
                                                 
30 See Wis. Stat. § 906.09; State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33, 
¶21, 270 Wis. 2d 62, 676 N.W.2d 475. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
19 
 
¶59 In the particular credibility contest in the present 
case, in which  
• both 
eyewitnesses 
had 
inconsistencies 
in 
their 
statements;  
• the prosecution eyewitness had an extensive criminal 
record and (as far as the record shows) the defense 
eyewitness had none;  
• the entire basis of the prosecution's case rested on 
its eyewitness identification; and  
• no physical or other evidence directly tied the 
defendant to the crime;  
we hold that the failure to call Jones as a witness at trial to 
give testimony contradictory to that of the State's eyewitness 
had a reasonable probability of affecting the result of the 
case. 
¶60 As Strickland notes, "a verdict or conclusion only 
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been 
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.   
¶61 Our conclusion that defense trial counsel's deficient 
performance in the instant case was prejudicial is supported by 
Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 633-34 (7th Cir. 2000), in 
which the court granted relief because defense trial counsel's 
error was prejudicial in "crippl[ing]" the defendant's defense 
by excluding entirely the testimony that would have most 
supported the defendant's theory.  The Washington court declared 
that the additional witnesses themselves had weaknesses and 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
20 
 
potential inconsistencies, but "the mere fact that some negative 
evidence would have come in with the positive does not eliminate 
the 
prejudicial 
effect 
of 
leaving 
corroborative 
evidence 
unintroduced" and inconsistencies in the prosecution's own 
witnesses' testimony made it more likely that the additional 
corroboration of alibi witnesses would change the result of the 
case. 
¶62 Wisconsin case law has similarly recognized that when 
a potential witness "would have added a great deal of substance 
and credibility" to the defendant's theory and when the witness 
"could not have been impeached as having a criminal record," the 
exclusion of the witness's testimony is prejudicial, even if the 
witness's credibility could be impeached.  State v. Cooks, 2006 
WI App 262, ¶63, 297 Wis. 2d 633, 726 N.W.2d 322.   
¶63 The court of appeals in Cooks, quoting the federal 
Washington case, 219 F.3d at 634, noted that "the mere fact that 
some negative evidence would have come in with the positive does 
not eliminate the prejudicial effect of leaving corroborative 
evidence unintroduced."  Cooks, 297 Wis. 2d 633, ¶63.     
¶64 In assessing the prejudice caused by the defense trial 
counsel's performance, i.e., the effect of the defense trial 
counsel's deficient performance, a circuit court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury in assessing which 
testimony would be more or less credible.31 
                                                 
31 In contrast, in a Machner hearing, a circuit court may 
weigh the credibility of the witnesses, including trial counsel, 
in assessing the deficiency and reasonableness of the trial 
counsel's performance. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
21 
 
¶65 State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 
N.W.2d 12, demonstrates this principle.  In Guerard, the court 
concluded that defense counsel in that case was deficient in 
failing to call a witness.  The court held that despite the 
internal inconsistencies and credibility concerns regarding that 
witness's testimony, defense counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial. 
 
The 
perceived 
weaknesses 
in 
the 
witness's 
testimony 
"would 
have 
been 
a 
factor 
for 
the 
jury 
to 
consider . . . . The jury would have had to determine the weight 
and credibility to assign" to the witness's statements.32   
¶66 Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, 
we conclude that defense trial counsel's performance was 
prejudicial to the defendant; there is a reasonable probability 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different had 
defense trial counsel called Jones to testify at trial. 
* * * * 
¶67 We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances 
in the instant case, that the defendant has demonstrated both 
prongs of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel as 
articulated in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668:  trial counsel's 
deficient performance that did not meet the standard of 
objective reasonableness, and prejudice against the defendant 
that resulted from the trial counsel's deficient performance.   
                                                 
32 State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, ¶¶46, 49, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 
682 N.W.2d 12. 
No. 
2012AP46-CR   
 
22 
 
 
¶68 Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. 
 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶69 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  Because I agree 
that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's 
failure to present the eyewitness testimony of Cera Jones at 
trial, I join the majority opinion.  However, I write separately 
to provide guidance on an issue of central importance not fully 
addressed by the majority in this case, namely, whether the 
circuit court properly scrutinized and weighed the credibility 
of Jones's testimony in applying the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel test set forth in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The propriety of the 
circuit court's decision in this regard presents an issue that 
was both briefed and argued before us. 
¶70 As correctly noted by the majority, the test for 
determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance 
of counsel is two-pronged.  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶21, 
324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687).  The first prong requires the defendant to show that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient.  Id.  The second prong 
requires the defendant to prove that trial counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  Id.    
¶71 In discussing the issue of ineffective assistance, the 
circuit court focused on the credibility of Jones, in regard to 
the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, rather than on 
the matter of deficient performance of the defendant's counsel.1  
                                                 
1 The record is clear that the circuit court made no 
findings of fact——credibility or otherwise——with respect to 
trial counsel's deficient performance. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
The circuit court ultimately concluded that trial counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to call Jones to testify at trial. 
The circuit court reasoned that, even if trial counsel's failure 
to call Jones was deficient, such an unprofessional error did 
not prejudice the defendant because there was not a reasonable 
probability that Jones's testimony would have altered the 
outcome of the trial in light of her failure to come across as a 
credible witness.  
¶72 The circuit court erred in discrediting Jones's 
testimony for two reasons.  First, the general rule in Wisconsin 
is that issues of witness credibility and the weight to be given 
to their testimony are matters for the jury to decide.  State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987).  Second, a 
defendant attempting to establish prejudice for purposes of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim need only show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
error, the outcome of the trial would have been different.  
State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 
305 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  As to the latter 
point, "reasonable probability" does not mean "more likely than 
not."  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).   
¶73 A proper application of the above legal principles to 
the facts of this case would require the circuit court to 
consider the following questions in assessing whether trial 
counsel's error in failing to call Jones prejudiced the 
defendant: (1) Was Jones's testimony within the realm of 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
believability in light of the totality of circumstances of the 
case?; and (2) Was Jones's testimony materially beneficial to 
the defendant's theory of the case?  
¶74 Had the circuit court limited its inquiry to these 
questions, it would have correctly reserved questions as to the 
credibility and significance of Jones's testimony for the jury.  
I. 
¶75 A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a 
trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶10, 249 Wis. 2d 
586, 638 N.W.2d 301.  Consistent with this fundamental right, 
Wisconsin law provides that it is ordinarily the task of a jury 
to decide both the credibility of a witness and the weight to be 
given to his or her testimony.  Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 16.  
This principle is confirmed by Wis JI——Criminal 300, which 
instructs, 
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to weigh 
the testimony of witnesses and to determine the effect 
of the evidence as a whole. You are the sole judges of 
the credibility, that is, the believability of the 
witnesses and of the weight to be given to their 
testimony. 
¶76 While under certain circumstances it is possible for a 
circuit court to determine that a witness's testimony is 
incredible as a matter of law, it must be cognizant that "[e]ven 
though there be glaring discrepancies in the testimony of a 
witness at trial, or between his [or her] trial testimony and 
his [or her] previous statements, that fact in itself does not 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
result in concluding as a matter of law that the witness is 
wholly incredible."  Ruiz v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 230, 232, 249 
N.W.2d 277 (1977).  Instead, "the question is whether the 
factfinder believes one version rather than another or chooses 
to disbelieve the witness altogether. Only a question of 
credibility . . . is raised. That question [is] one for the 
jury."  Id.; see also McFowler v. Jaimet, 349 F.3d 436, 454 (7th 
Cir. 2003) ("Inconsistencies in a witness's testimony are not 
unusual either, and normally these are left for the factfinder 
to assess.").  A court should not substitute its judgment for 
that of the factfinder in this regard except where the evidence 
is inherently or patently incredible.  Gauthier v. State, 28 
Wis. 2d 412, 416, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 
916 (1966).   
II. 
¶77 The legal principle that it is normally the province 
of the jury to scrutinize and weigh the testimony of witnesses 
in criminal cases must apply when a circuit court is addressing 
the prejudice prong of a claim for ineffective assistance.  See 
majority op., ¶64.  Adhering to this legal principle in the 
context of ineffective assistance is entirely consistent with 
the test for determining prejudice set forth in Strickland.  
¶78 As noted, the test for prejudice asks whether there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
error, the result of the trial would have been different.  State 
v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶54, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  In the context of a 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
criminal conviction, "'the question is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder 
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'"  Id. 
(quoting 
Strickland, 
466 
U.S. 
at 
695). 
 
"'A 
reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
¶79 Importantly, in order to establish prejudice, a 
defendant need not show that counsel's unprofessional error more 
likely than not altered the outcome of the case.  Dyess, 124 
Wis. 2d at 544 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  Thus, 
where a circuit court requires a defendant to convince the court 
as to the believability of an uncalled witness in order to 
establish prejudice, it not only ignores the role that a 
factfinder typically plays in determining the guilt or innocence 
of a defendant, it also imposes a heightened burden on the 
defendant that was expressly considered and rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland. 
¶80 Unfortunately, we have not specifically addressed the 
propriety of a circuit court's decision to scrutinize and weigh 
the credibility of an uncalled witness for purposes of assessing 
the prejudice prong of a claim for ineffective assistance.  The 
result is that we have produced opinions reflecting somewhat 
inconsistent views on the topic.  
¶81 For example, in State v. Vennemann, 180 Wis. 2d 81, 
97, 508 N.W.2d 404 (1993), we briefly addressed the issue in a 
case involving a claim of ineffective assistance based on trial 
counsel's failure to call a witness.  Specifically, we agreed 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
with the circuit court's conclusion that the outcome of the 
trial would not have been different had the testimony of the 
uncalled witness been presented at trial because the uncalled 
witness "could have been easily impeached by other inconsistent 
testimony."  Id. 
¶82 Conversely, in State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, ¶49, 273 
Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12, another case involving a claim of 
ineffective assistance based on trial counsel's failure to call 
certain witnesses, we concluded that the defendant had satisfied 
his burden of establishing prejudice notwithstanding the "the 
strength of the victim's testimony and the existence of some 
inconsistency 
between 
[the 
victim's] 
testimony 
and 
[the 
exculpatory confession that was the subject of the uncalled 
witness' testimony]. . . ."  Although the circuit court in 
Guerard had not made an explicit credibility determination with 
respect to the substance of the uncalled witness' testimony, as 
was the case in Vennemann, we nevertheless explained that it was 
the proper role of the jury to determine the weight and 
credibility to assign to the exculpatory confession at issue.  
Id.  
¶83 When it comes to the correctness of a circuit court's 
decision to scrutinize and weigh the credibility of an uncalled 
witness for purposes of assessing prejudice in the context of 
ineffective assistance, Guerard provides the better approach.  
That is to say, Guerard's approach is more consistent with 
controlling legal principles in Wisconsin, whereas Vennemann's 
approach is not.  Specifically, the court's discussion in 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
Vennemann does not appear to contemplate that: (1) the well-
established rule in Wisconsin is that witness credibility 
determinations in criminal cases are generally reserved for the 
jury;2 
and 
(2) 
reasonable 
probability 
for 
purposes 
of 
Strickland's prejudice prong does not require a defendant to 
show that it is more likely than not that a new trial would 
produce a different result.3  
¶84 That Guerard provides the better approach toward 
dealing with a circuit court's ability to make credibility 
determinations in assessing prejudice for purposes of an 
ineffective assistance claim is confirmed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  In Ramonez v. Berghuis, 
490 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2007), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a state circuit court 
erred in discrediting the testimony of three potential witnesses 
when assessing whether trial counsel's failure to investigate 
those witnesses prejudiced the defense, in violation of the 
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  The Ramonez court refused to defer to the circuit 
court's assessment as to the lack of credibility and helpfulness 
of the witnesses, reasoning in pertinent part that "our 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 398 
N.W.2d 763 (1987) ("The credibility of witnesses and the weight 
given to their testimony are matters left to the jury's 
judgment."). 
3 State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 641, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985) (explaining that, in establishing prejudice in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
defendant need not demonstrate that counsel's deficient error 
more likely than not altered the outcome of the trial.). 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
Constitution leaves it to the jury, not the judge, to evaluate 
the credibility of witnesses in deciding a criminal defendant's 
guilt or innocence."  Id.  
¶85 We have approved a similar approach to that of Guerard 
and Ramonez in addressing the standard for a "reasonable 
probability of a different outcome" in a case involving the 
recantation of a witness's testimony.  In State v. McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d 463, 468, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), we considered the 
defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence: the victim's recantation of her accusation of sexual 
assault.  In denying the defendant's motion, the circuit court 
determined that the victim's recantation was less credible than 
her accusation; as a result, the circuit court reasoned that the 
defendant had failed to establish a reasonable probability of a 
different result at a new trial.  Id. at 474.  
¶86 On review, we concluded that the circuit court 
"employed the wrong legal standard when determining that there 
was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome."  Id. 
at 475-76.  We explained that the proper standard asked whether 
there was a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both 
the accusation and the recantation, would have a reasonable 
doubt 
respecting 
the 
defendant's 
guilt. 
 
Id. 
at 
474. 
Accordingly, 
we 
were 
troubled 
by 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination that a finding of "less credible" led to a 
conclusion 
of 
"no 
reasonable 
probability 
of 
a 
different 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
outcome," because "less credible is far from incredible."  Id. 
at 474-75.4   
¶87 Thus, while we have not specifically addressed the 
propriety of a circuit court's decision to scrutinize and weigh 
the credibility of an uncalled witness for purposes of assessing 
prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance, I believe 
that Guerard and Ramonez are instructive in that they advocate 
an approach that most clearly comports with controlling legal 
principles in Wisconsin.  That is to say, it is the jury's duty 
to resolve questions as to the credibility and significance of 
an uncalled witness's testimony.  See majority op., ¶¶64-65. 
III. 
¶88 Because there are instances in which a circuit court 
can properly determine that a witness's testimony is incredible 
as a matter of law, I cannot advocate a bright-line rule wherein 
a circuit court must always conclude that a defendant was 
prejudiced by his or her counsel's failure to call a particular 
witness at trial.  Rather, the better approach is for a circuit 
court to consider the following questions when evaluating 
prejudice for purposes of an ineffective assistance claim: (1) 
is the uncalled witness's testimony worthy of belief in light of 
the totality of circumstances of the case?; and (2) is the 
                                                 
4 The McCallum concurrence suggested that, when faced with a 
recantation and an accusation, "[t]he circuit court does not 
determine which of the two statements is more credible; the 
circuit court is not to act as a thirteenth juror."  State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 490, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
uncalled witness's testimony materially beneficial to the 
defendant's theory of the case? 
¶89 As to the former inquiry, the circuit court should 
simply ask whether the uncalled witness's testimony has any 
indicia of credibility in light of the evidence presented at 
trial.5  In answering this question, the fact that the circuit 
court may be troubled by inconsistencies in the uncalled 
witness's testimony is not necessarily of any import.  The 
existence of inconsistencies in a witness's testimony does not 
normally lead to a finding that the testimony is incredible as a 
matter of law; rather, the existence of discrepancies ordinarily 
creates a credibility question for the jury to resolve.  Ruiz, 
75 Wis. 2d at 232.  
¶90 As to the latter inquiry, the circuit court should 
simply consider whether the proposed testimony would be helpful 
to the defendant's trial strategy such that, if the jury were to 
believe 
the 
proposed 
testimony, 
it 
would 
likely 
have 
a 
reasonable doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.  
IV. 
¶91 If the circuit court had applied the above approach to 
the facts of this case, then it would have properly reserved 
questions as to the credibility and the weight of Jones's 
testimony for the jury to resolve.  
                                                 
5 This type of threshold inquiry pays tribute to the 
"reasonable probability" language of the test for determining 
prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694 (1984), while not imposing a more heightened burden upon the 
defendant than that contemplated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Strickland. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
¶92 First, it is clear that Jones's eyewitness testimony 
was within the realm of believability in light of the totality 
of circumstances of this case.6  As the majority explains, the 
only direct evidence that the state had to link the defendant to 
the shooting was the eyewitness testimony of the victim, Toy 
Kimber.  Majority op., ¶18.  As a result, the case boiled down 
to a credibility determination between Kimber and the defendant. 
¶93  It is important to note that Kimber originally told 
police that he did not know the identity of the person who shot 
him.  It was not until the next morning that Kimber identified 
the defendant as the shooter upon seeing the defendant's picture 
in a photo array.  The record reflects that Kimber had known the 
defendant for at least three years and that there was a history 
of disputes between people living around North 45th Street, 
including Kimber, and people living around North 38th Street, 
including the defendant.  The record also indicates that Kimber 
had five adult convictions and four juvenile adjudications and 
that Kimber changed his story at trial with respect to his 
identification of the shooter on the night in question. 
¶94 In comparison, Jones, the only other eyewitness to the 
shooting, did not have an extensive criminal record.  By all 
accounts, Jones appeared to be a neutral eyewitness to the 
shooting.  She was neither a victim of the shooting, nor was she 
someone who possessed a familial or romantic relationship with 
the defendant, as she testified.  That there may have been 
                                                 
6 The circuit court never made an explicit finding that 
Jones's testimony was incredible as a matter of law.  See 
majority op., ¶31 n.9. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
inconsistencies in Jones's testimony should not have rendered 
her testimony unworthy of belief, particularly in light of 
Kimber's own inconsistent statements and the fact that the state 
had little evidence that directly linked the defendant to the 
shooting.  Questions as to the credibility and the weight to be 
given to Jones's testimony should have been left for the jury to 
answer.7 
¶95 Second, 
it 
is 
evident 
that 
Jones's 
eyewitness 
testimony was materially beneficial to the defendant's theory of 
the case.  The defendant's trial strategy was two-fold: 
(1) attack the credibility of the victim eyewitness, Kimber; and 
(2) provide an alibi for the defendant.  As to the former, it is 
clear that Jones's testimony would have helped undermine 
Kimber's identification of the defendant as the shooter.  She 
would have testified that she knew the defendant from the 
neighborhood and that the defendant was not the shooter.  She 
would have further testified that she did not identify the 
defendant to police officers upon viewing a photo array and that 
she told police officers the shooter had a smooth baby face, a 
feature that the defendant did not possess.  As to the latter, 
Jones's testimony would have helped support the defendant's 
alibi defense: she would have testified that she saw the 
defendant across the street from the shooting minutes after the 
shooting occurred, which is consistent with the defendant's 
alibi theory.  Thus, Jones's testimony, if believed by the jury, 
                                                 
7 Indeed, the State conceded this point at oral argument. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
would likely have created a reasonable doubt respecting the 
defendant's guilt.  
V. 
¶96 Because I agree that the defendant was denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, I join 
the majority opinion.  However, I write separately to fully 
address the impropriety of the circuit court's decision to 
scrutinize and weigh Jones's testimony in assessing prejudice 
for purposes of the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance. 
Because 
the 
general 
rule 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
that 
witness 
credibility determinations in criminal cases are for the jury to 
decide, and because the test for establishing prejudice in the 
context of ineffective assistance does not require a defendant 
to establish that trial counsel's error more likely than not 
altered the outcome of the case, the circuit court erred in 
discrediting Jones's testimony.  The circuit court's inquiry 
regarding prejudice should have been limited to the following 
questions: (1) was Jones's testimony within the realm of 
believability in light of the totality of circumstances of the 
case?; and (2) was Jones's testimony materially beneficial to 
the defendant's theory of the case?  
¶97 Had the circuit court limited its inquiry to the 
aforementioned questions, it would have correctly reserved 
questions as to the credibility and significance of Jones's 
testimony for the jury. 
¶98 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur.  
 
No.  2012AP46-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶99 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  In my view, 
Jenkins did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
case at issue.  Given the highly deferential standard and the 
presumption in favor of finding that counsel's performance was 
objectively reasonable, I conclude that counsel's performance 
was neither deficient, nor was Jenkins prejudiced by counsel's 
alleged failures, such that there is a "reasonable probability" 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
Further, I conclude that Jenkins is not entitled to a new trial 
in the interest of justice.1 
I. 
ANALYSIS 
¶100 "Whether a convicted defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a two-part inquiry."  State v. Carter, 
2010 WI 40, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  "First, 
the 
defendant 
must 
prove 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient.  Second, if counsel's performance was deficient, the 
defendant 
must 
prove 
that 
the 
deficiency 
prejudiced 
the 
defense."  Id.  A defendant "must satisfy both prongs of the 
Strickland test" to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Id.  I conclude that neither prong is satisfied in 
the case at issue. 
A. Deficient Performance 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion does not address whether Jenkins is 
entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because it 
concludes that a new trial is warranted on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
¶101 "To demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant 
must show that his counsel's representation 'fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness' 
considering all the 
circumstances." 
 
Carter, 
324 
Wis. 2d 640, 
¶22 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  "In evaluating the reasonableness 
of 
counsel's 
performance, 
this 
court 
must 
be 
'highly 
deferential.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  
"Counsel enjoys a 'strong presumption' that his conduct 'falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'"  
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  "Indeed, counsel's 
performance need not be perfect, nor even very good, to be 
constitutionally adequate."  Id. (citing State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 
111, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305). 
¶102 This presumption of constitutional adequacy extends to 
decisions of trial strategy.  See Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶23.  
"Counsel's decisions in choosing a trial strategy are to be 
given great deference. . . .  Even decisions made with less than 
a thorough investigation may be sustained if reasonable, given 
the strong presumption of effective assistance and deference to 
strategic decisions."  State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶26, 336 
Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 (citing Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 
¶23; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91).  "We must make 'every 
effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
of 
counsel's 
challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective 
at 
the 
time.'" 
 
Carter, 
324 
Wis. 2d 640, 
¶22 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
¶103 In light of that deferential standard, counsel's 
performance in the case at issue was not deficient.  The 
"witnesses" 
that 
counsel 
chose 
not 
to 
call, 
Cera 
Jones 
("Jones"), 
Christopher 
Blunt 
("Blunt"), 
and 
Corey 
Moore 
("Moore"), were significantly compromised, would not cooperate 
with counsel in his preparation of the case, and in any event, 
would not necessarily have aided Jenkins' defense.2  From the 
perspective of counsel at the time of trial, we must presume 
that counsel concluded that these witnesses were not worth 
calling.  In fact, presenting these witnesses might have 
detracted from the defense that counsel was putting forward.  
Thus, it is speculative to conclude as the majority does that 
counsel's failure to call the witnesses was deficient, as that 
term is defined for purposes of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
¶104 Defense counsel's strategy at trial was simple: 
present evidence that Jenkins could not have been the shooter 
because he was across the street at a "trap" house at the time 
of the shooting.3  In support of this strategy, counsel called 
both Jenkins and Daniel McFadden ("McFadden"), a friend who 
Jenkins was socializing with the night of the shooting, as 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion rests its conclusion of deficient 
performance solely on counsel's decision not to call Jones.  As 
a result, the majority opinion does not address counsel's 
decision not to call Blunt and Moore.  Majority op., ¶9, n.6.  
Because I conclude that counsel did not perform deficiently, I 
address all the potential witnesses. 
3 The record reflects that a "trap" house is a place for 
young people to "hang out . . . smoke weed [and] drink." 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
witnesses.  Both Jenkins and McFadden testified that Jenkins was 
asleep at the "trap" house when he was awoken by the shots.  As 
the majority opinion correctly notes, the prosecution had only 
one witness refuting this version of events.  Majority op., ¶18.  
The state called Toy Kimber, a man with five adult convictions 
and four juvenile adjudications, in its attempt to tie Jenkins 
to the shooting.  Id., ¶21. 
¶105 At the time counsel was developing Jenkins' defense 
strategy, the only statements in the record from Jones were her 
statements to police in the days following the shooting.  
According to the police reports, Jones indicated that she did 
not see the shooter's face because he was wearing a hood, and 
stated that she was not familiar with the place of the shooting 
or the people involved.  Jones had further told police that she 
was not focused on the shooter, but rather, her attention was 
drawn to the laser target on the victim standing in front of 
her.  Further, Jones initially concealed from police that she 
had been involved in a drug deal just prior to the shooting, but 
subsequently gave several different accounts of that drug deal.  
Jones' inconsistent and less than exculpatory statements provide 
a reasonable explanation for why counsel would not have believed 
that Jones would assist in Jenkins' defense. 
¶106 Given that these were the facts available to counsel 
at the time of trial, counsel had no reason to call Jones, as 
her testimony would not necessarily have bolstered Jenkins' 
defense. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
¶107 The majority makes much of Jones' testimony at the 
Machner hearing, wherein Jones first claimed that she had also 
told police that Jenkins was definitely not the shooter.  The 
circuit court, however, found that Jones' testimony in this 
regard was not credible.  Indeed, as the trial court noted, 
Jones' testimony seemed to get "better and better" as time went 
on, something that ordinarily does not occur with eyewitnesses.  
The circuit court detailed why Jones would be impeached and how 
she was not a credible witness.  The circuit court concluded, 
based on Jones' own statements, that Jones was herself involved 
in a drug deal that evening.  As the circuit court concluded at 
the Machner hearing, "there are way too many inconsistencies 
with Miss Jones's statements and . . . frankly she just did not 
come across as a credible witness."  Majority op., ¶31 n.9. 
¶108 The majority opinion fails to properly defer to the 
circuit court's credibility determinations: "this court will not 
exclude 
the 
circuit 
court's 
articulated 
assessments 
of 
credibility and demeanor, unless they are clearly erroneous."  
Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶19 (citing Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 
¶23).  The circuit court was in the best position to evaluate 
the witnesses and it determined that Jones' testimony is 
relegated to having questionable value, at best.  Under these 
circumstances, it is not difficult to see why counsel would not 
put Jones on the stand, even assuming he knew of her potentially 
exculpatory testimony.  Not calling a drug dealing witness, who 
gave several inconsistent and impeachment-worthy statements to 
police, does not rise to the requisite level of deficient 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
performance.  Simply stated, in finding counsel to be deficient, 
the 
majority 
supplants 
the 
circuit 
court's 
credibility 
determinations with its own credibility assessments.  Typically, 
we 
do 
not 
second-guess 
the 
circuit 
court's 
credibility 
determinations, and I would not do so in the case at issue.  See 
Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶19 (citing Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 
¶23). 
¶109 The majority also does not respect the presumption due 
to counsel——that he acted reasonably.  Instead, the majority 
presumes that Jones is a credible, believable, game-changing 
witness.  The majority concludes that counsel should have known 
that the jury would have believed her inconsistent, impeachable 
testimony.  The majority does not find it significant that, even 
assuming counsel knew that Jones would testify as she did at the 
Machner hearing, counsel would also have to account for Jones' 
previous inconsistent statements and her involvement in a drug 
deal that evening.  Perhaps even more jugular is that in order 
for the jury to believe Jones' testimony the jury would have to 
determine that the police lied and that they failed to include 
Jones' exculpatory statements in the police reports.4  To the 
extent that it can be believed that counsel knew or should have 
known about Jones' exculpatory testimony, counsel's performance 
in not calling Jones still was not necessarily deficient.  
Counsel's decision to not call Jones was just as likely a 
reasoned strategy. 
                                                 
4 Other significant Brady implications may also arise given 
the assumptions made by the majority.  See Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
¶110 In its effort to cast counsel's performance as 
deficient, the majority opinion reads as if counsel did not even 
try to develop witnesses for the trial.  In point of fact, the 
opposite rings true.  In building his trial strategy, counsel 
testified 
at 
the 
Machner 
hearing 
that 
he 
"definitely" 
interviewed Jones as a possible witness, though he could not 
remember precisely how many times he spoke with her or the 
substance of those conversations.  Jones herself testified at 
the Machner hearing that counsel had spoken with her a total of 
four times, twice by phone and twice in person.  The record 
further reflects Jones' only known statements at the time of 
trial were not exculpatory, and it was not until Jenkins' 
postconviction motion that Jones was revealed as a potentially 
exculpatory witness.  In fact, since by all accounts counsel did 
interview Jones, he likely concluded that she was either not 
exculpatory or not credible.  Indeed, at least two other 
potentially exculpatory witnesses besides McFadden were present 
at trial, but counsel chose not to call these witnesses because 
he concluded that they lacked credibility.  The presumption due 
to counsel is virtually nonexistent in the majority opinion. 
¶111 A lot can happen in two and a half years to change a 
witness' testimony.  The first we know of Jones' potentially 
exculpatory testimony is at the Machner hearing.  The Machner 
hearing occurred two years and six months after Jenkins' trial.  
Although counsel did not have detailed recall, as he had lost 
his file in a flood, it is speculative to assume that Jones' 
testimony at a trial some 30 months previous would have matched 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
her statement at the Machner hearing.  Again, the only 
information in the police reports, which were created around the 
time of the shooting two and a half years earlier, is that Jones 
did not add to the defense presented. If we afford proper 
deference to the circuit court, no credible evidence in this 
record demonstrates that counsel knew, at the time of trial, of 
Jones' potentially exculpatory testimony.  If the majority were 
to couple the deference due to the circuit court with the 
presumption due to counsel, it would be hard pressed to conclude 
that counsel was deficient.  
¶112 Without presuming that counsel acted effectively, the 
majority nonetheless concludes that counsel was deficient.  In 
so doing, the majority must speculate that counsel did not have 
a good reason for not calling Jones and give virtually no weight 
to the circuit court's determinations, even though that court 
heard the testimony and reviewed the matter at Jenkins' Machner 
hearing. 
¶113 Correctly, the majority does not opine that counsel's 
performance was deficient with respect to the other two 
allegedly exculpatory witnesses, Blunt and Moore.  According to 
affidavits attached to Jenkins' motion for a new trial, Moore, 
Blunt, and Jenkins all shared a jail pod after Jenkins' arrest. 
Thus, had they testified, the jury would have learned that the 
defendant was in jail.  Jenkins argues that counsel is deficient 
because while they were in jail together, Blunt allegedly 
confessed to Jenkins that he was the true perpetrator of the 
shooting.  Moore allegedly witnessed the confession. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
¶114 Although Blunt later denied having confessed, Jenkins 
nonetheless argues that Moore's hearsay testimony regarding the 
confession could have come in under two hearsay exceptions.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 908.01(4)(a)1, 908.04(1)(a).   
¶115 The majority does not contradict the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Jenkins' trial counsel was not ineffective for 
deciding not to call Blunt and Moore.  State v. Jenkins, No. 
2012AP46-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶20-22 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Jan. 15, 2013).  I agree with the court of appeals' analysis 
that counsel was not deficient for not calling Blunt or Moore. 
¶116 The parties stipulated that had Blunt been called as a 
witness he would have denied knowing Jenkins or anything about 
the shooting.  Id., ¶22.  Counsel cannot be deficient for 
failing to call a witness who would have added nothing to his 
client's case.  Id.  Thus, counsel's decision not to call Blunt 
as a witness was not deficient performance. 
¶117 With respect to counsel's decision not to call Moore, 
Jenkins conceded that because Moore was in the postconviction 
phase of his own trial, Moore's attorney refused to allow him to 
be interviewed or make him available to Jenkins' counsel.  This 
concession reveals that Jenkins' counsel was not deficient in 
not calling Moore as witness.  Such investigation weighs 
strongly in favor of constitutionally adequate performance.  See 
Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶22. 
¶118 Further, at the Machner hearing counsel articulated a 
reasonable strategic reason behind not putting the alleged 
confession into evidence: the confession testimony was not 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
credible and he "didn't want to . . . put a bunch of stuff into 
evidence that's gonna blow up in our face or make the jury think 
we're trying to blow smoke at them."  Such a decision is a 
reasonable determination related to trial strategy, and not 
deficient performance.  See Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶23; 
Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706, 715, 203 N.W.2d 56 (1973) 
(holding that "[a]n attorney's strategic decision based upon a 
reasonable view of the facts not to call a witness is within the 
realm of an independent professional judgment."). 
¶119 As a practical matter, this was a difficult case for 
the defense to build.  Witnesses were not exactly cooperative 
with counsel.  Counsel was forced to secure the assistance of 
Jenkins' sister to try and get witnesses to cooperate in 
Jenkins' defense.  In requesting an adjournment just prior to 
trial, counsel averred that he had enormous problems in locating 
possible witnesses and securing their cooperation.  Counsel's 
request for an adjournment was granted.  Counsel further 
testified at the Machner hearing that possible witnesses 
regularly failed to show up for scheduled meetings, and that 
they regularly changed their stories from one meeting to the 
next, making a "multitude" of conflicting statements.  All of 
this speaks to counsel acting in a diligent and professional 
manner under very difficult circumstances.  When a witness does 
not cooperate, it cannot always be said that counsel is 
deficient.  Here, at most, counsel failed to call a number of 
witnesses who had given several contradictory statements.  
Counsel was not deficient for failing to call such witnesses. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
¶120 Jenkins' defense was that he was not the shooter, and 
that he was actually across the street at the time of the 
shooting.  Jenkins had a witness who corroborated his testimony, 
and refuted the sole witness for the prosecution.  Counsel 
described McFadden at the Machner hearing as "quite cooperative 
and quite credible" and "a good witness, one that's credible as 
to alibi."  By contrast, other possible witnesses had given 
counsel a "multitude" of conflicting statements.  Under these 
circumstances, 
why 
would 
counsel 
confuse 
the 
jury 
with 
cumulative witnesses who had made a number of different, 
possibly contradictory, perhaps nonexistent, statements over the 
course of time?  Jenkins' counsel introduced what he believed to 
be a credible witness who supported his defense.  It cannot be 
deficient performance for counsel to decide not to call 
cumulative, impeachable witnesses who might, in fact, undermine 
the client's case. 
¶121 As we have stated, "[a] court must be vigilant against 
the skewed perspective that may result from hindsight, and it 
may not second-guess counsel's performance solely because the 
defense proved unsuccessful."  Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶25 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Harper, 57 
Wis. 2d 543, 556–57, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973)).  Nonetheless, the 
majority opinion tends to second-guess counsel's actions.  
Counsel in the case at issue, however, did not render deficient 
performance as that term has heretofore been defined.  Thus, the 
first prong is not satisfied. 
B. Prejudice 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
¶122 In addition to finding that counsel was deficient, the 
majority must also conclude that Jenkins was prejudiced to the 
requisite degree.  To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant 
must essentially show a "reasonable probability" that the 
outcome at trial would have been different if counsel had called 
the witnesses.  The majority rests its prejudice determination 
on Jones' testimony alone.  It concludes that her testimony 
alone, albeit conflicting and contradictory, would have changed 
the jury's conclusions.  For many of the reasons discussed 
previously, I disagree.  Jones' testimony would have, at best, 
been of minimal assistance to the defense and more likely, been 
harmful and damaging.  I respectfully disagree with the 
majority’s conclusion that Jones' testimony would have affected 
the outcome of the trial. 
¶123 "To warrant setting aside the defendant's conviction, 
the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial to his defense."  Carter, 324 
Wis. 2d 640, ¶37 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–93).  "It 
is not sufficient for the defendant to show that his counsel's 
errors 'had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  
"Rather, the defendant must show that 'there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.'"  Id.; see 
also Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶24.  Jenkins cannot make this 
showing in the case at issue. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
¶124 The 
defense 
strategy 
was 
to 
challenge 
the 
identification of Jenkins as the shooter and instead establish 
an alibi defense.  Even if Jones' testimony could have supported 
both parts of that defense, it is difficult to conclude that, 
given the significant problems with her inconsistent statements 
and involvement in a drug deal that evening, her testimony would 
have been persuasive to the jury. 
¶125 Even assuming that it was error for Jenkins' trial 
counsel to not call Jones, Blunt, and Moore, the inclusion of 
their testimony would not have aided Jenkins' defense to the 
requisite degree.  In the case of Jones, both the court of 
appeals and the circuit court concluded, "given all her 
contradictions . . . this court cannot say that there's a 
reasonable probability that but for not calling her the result 
would have been different."  Jenkins, No. 2012AP46-CR, ¶15.  I 
agree. 
¶126 Jenkins was also not prejudiced by counsel's failure 
to call Blunt or Moore.  As the circuit court properly 
concluded, Moore's testimony would have been inadmissible 
hearsay.  Jenkins cannot have been prejudiced by counsel's 
failure to call a witness who would not have been allowed to 
testify.  As for Blunt, the parties stipulated that, had he been 
called as a witness, Blunt would have denied involvement in the 
shooting, and would have denied knowing Jenkins.  It cannot be 
said that Blunt's testimony would have changed the outcome of 
the trial. As such, failing to call him did not prejudice 
Jenkins.  Thus, the second prong is, likewise, not shown. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
C. Discretionary Reversal 
¶127 Jenkins has also asked this court to grant him a new 
trial under our power of discretionary reversal.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06.  Because I conclude that counsel was not ineffective, 
however, I also conclude that the case at issue was fully tried, 
and a new trial in the interest of justice is not warranted.  
See State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶¶61-64, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 
N.W.2d 227.   
¶128 Indeed, when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, relief is afforded to the defendant who 
proves that claim.  The interest of justice analysis is not 
intended as a fallback position for a defendant who does not 
succeed in a claim  of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, 
e.g., State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 147, ¶15, 337 Wis. 2d 688, 808 
N.W.2d 130.  The interest of justice statute "'was not intended 
to vest this court with power of discretionary reversal to 
enable a defendant to present an alternative defense at a new 
trial merely because the defense presented at the first trial 
proved ineffective.'"  State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶146, 348 
Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560 (quoting State v. Hubanks, 173 
Wis. 2d 1, 29, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
¶129 Jenkins' assertion is that counsel was ineffective.  
If he cannot meet that test, he most certainly cannot meet what 
should be the more stringent standard set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06.  Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 is not intended to provide 
relief for a defendant who cannot meet the burden of showing 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶130 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶131 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP46-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1