Title: In re Estate of Perry

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Estate of Perry (2011-079)
 
201 VT 9
 
[Filed 31-Jan-2012]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 9
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-079
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2011
 
In re Appeal of the Estate of
  Farwell W. Perry, Late of Wallingford, Vermont
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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Superior Court, Rutland Unit, 
 
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Civil Division
 
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DOCKET NO. 573-7-10
  Rdcv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Probate law generally treats a will and all valid codicils thereto as a
single testamentary instrument.  This case presents a purported agreement
to bifurcate the allowance of a will from the future allowance of a codicil,
and a probate court order that does not reflect such an agreement. The superior
court found that the purported agreement controls, notwithstanding the probate
court order to the contrary.  We reverse.  
¶ 2.            
Farwell W. Perry died on May 18, 2009, leaving behind a wife and four
adult children (three sons and a daughter).  On June 12, 2009, his widow
petitioned the Rutland District Probate Court to admit his will, executed in
October 2008.  The probate court set a hearing for July 15, 2009 to
consider the allowance of the will.  Shortly before the hearing,
decedent's sons filed a motion to continue the hearing to allow the interested
persons to determine whether they wished to consent to the allowance of both
the will and a newly discovered two-page letter from decedent to his children
purporting to be a codicil to his will.[1]
 The codicil involved a single, discrete piece of the estate: a trust
which previously had been established with daughter as sole beneficiary would
now include all four children as equal beneficiaries.  Sons further wrote
in their motion: "Thereafter, if all of the interested persons have not
consented to the allowance of both instruments, the Court may schedule a
hearing on the allowance of both instruments."  The probate court granted
the continuance and rescheduled the hearing for August 31, 2009. 
¶ 3.            
In late July 2009, all interested parties apparently consented to the
Rutland probate court's jurisdiction over the estate of decedent and signed a
"Consent to Jurisdiction" to that effect.  Earlier, the probate court had
appointed an administrator c.t.a.  The consent-to-jurisdiction filing
noted this fact and further opposed Henry Pascarella serving in any fiduciary
capacity regarding the administration of the estate in Connecticut.[2]  This consent to jurisdiction was
sent to the Rutland probate court sometime after August 27, 2009.
  All parties agree that by this filing they consented to the
admission of the 2008 will as the last will and testament of decedent. 
The probate court issued an order allowing the will on September 1, 2009. 
The order states "[t]hat all known heirs at law and the surviving spouse have
consented to the allowance of the Last Will and Testament and any codicil(s)
thereto." (Emphasis added.)  Despite the language purporting to allow
"any codicil(s) thereto," the admitted will did not include the codicil at
issue in this case.  Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, we assume that
a codicil not initially filed with the willas in this caseis not a codicil
for the purposes of the order allowing the will and "any codicil(s) thereto."
¶ 4.            
Eight months later, on April 30, 2010, sons petitioned the probate court
to allow the above-referenced codicil.[3] 
The administrator c.t.a. opposed the petition, arguing that the time to appeal
the allowance of the will had expired.  Decedent's daughter also moved to
dismiss the petition as untimely, arguing that the appeal needed to be filed
"within 30 days of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed
from."  V.R.A.P. 4.  Daughter claimed that the probate court's order
of September 1, 2009allowing the will "and any codicil(s) thereto"was a final
order, rendering sons' petition to admit the codicil untimely.  Both the
administrator c.t.a. and daughter denied that there had been any agreement to
consider the alleged codicil at a later date. 
¶ 5.            
After a review of correspondence in the probate file, the probate court
denied the motion to dismiss.  Apparently, the court found a letter in the
file from the attorney for decedent's sons faxed to the register of the probate
court dated August 27, 2009.  The letter stated that "[t]he several
parties have reached an agreement to allow the Last Will and Testament of
[decedent]," and to the appointment of the administrator c.t.a., and "have
agreed to hold in abeyance the need to hold a hearing on the allowance of the
purported Codicil to the will, dated March 2, 2009."  The court found
that, pursuant to sons' attorney's letter, there was an understanding that the
matter of the allowance of the codicil would be held in abeyance.  The
court recognized that, whether or not such an agreement to bifurcate the
proceedings actually existed at the time sons' attorney faxed his letter to the
court, it could be "inferred that all parties were in accord with the contents
of [the] letter," relying on the fact that no one challenged the claim of
agreement in the letter to the register. 
¶ 6.            
Daughter appealed to the superior court, arguing that the probate court
erred as a matter of law when it denied her motion to dismiss and allowed an
impermissible collateral attack on its final order allowing the will.  She
also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The superior judge
acknowledged that if interested parties stipulate to the allowance of a will
while they are aware of a purported codicil, a party may not later attack the
will by petitioning for the allowance of the codicil.  She further
acknowledged that a will would normally not be allowed without simultaneous
consideration of a claimed codicil.  However, the superior court held that
the probate court relied upon:
the
representation of the parties' attorneys, both express and by tacit consent,
that there was an agreement among the parties to consent to allowance of the
2008 will, eliminating the need for a scheduled hearing
. . . and to hold in abeyance the issue of whether a hearing
would be needed to decide whether the alleged codicil would also be allowed.
The superior court found that the letter
faxed by sons' attorney clearly described such an agreement, despite daughter's
claims to the contrary.  Because the probate court had not yet addressed
the merits of whether the codicil should be allowed, the superior court
remanded the case, permitting the probate court to address these merits. 
¶ 7.            
Daughter now appeals from this decision, raising essentially the same
arguments as below: there was never an agreement to bifurcate the proceedings,
and the superior court erred by ignoring the finality of the probate court's
order admitting the will and permitting sons to collaterally attack that
order.  
¶ 8.            
The letter from sons' attorney to the register of the probate court
representing that "[t]he several parties have reached an agreement to allow the
Last Will and Testament of [decedent]," and that they "have agreed to hold in
abeyance the need to hold a hearing on the allowance of the purported Codicil
to the will" appears clear on its face.  However, the order issued by the
probate court allowing the will makes no mention of any bifurcation of the allowance
of the will from consideration of the purported codicil.  It clearly
states "[t]hat all known heirs at law and the surviving spouse have consented
to the allowance of the Last Will and Testament and any codicil(s) thereto." 
(Emphasis added.)   While the parties all knew about the codicil at
this time, and the order purports to allow any codicils, only the will itself
was admitted.  The court order did not grant an exception to the principle
that wills and their codicils are considered one instrument.
¶ 9.            
For over a century, it has been a clear principle of our law that "[a]
codicil is regarded as a part of the will; and the will and codicil are to be
construed as one instrument."  Barnes v. Hanks, 55 Vt. 317, 319
(1883); see also In re Peck's Estate, 101 Vt. 502, 506, 144 A. 686, 687
(1929) ("A will and codicil must be construed together as constituting one
instrument."). Therefore, when parties stipulate to the allowance of the will,
as a general rule, they are also stipulating to the allowance of any known
codicils, since the will and codicils are a single testamentary instrument. And
because the will and codicils are a single instrument, the order allowing the
will and codicils is a final order; there would be no reason to leave open the
possibility of future allowances since any codicils were considered and
admitted with the will.  See In re Estate of Seward, 139 Vt. 623,
624, 433 A.2d 274, 274-75 (1981) ("An order admitting a will to probate is
generally considered to be an
appealable final order.").  Because an order allowing a will is a final,
appealable order, any later petitions to allow a codicil are impermissible
collateral attacks.  Ransom v. Bebernitz, 172 Vt. 423, 428, 782 A.2d 1155, 1159 (2001) ("[A]n unappealed decree of the probate court, even if
erroneous as a matter of fact or law, is conclusive as to all matters covered
by the decree, including the provisions of the will there in issue, and is not
subject to collateral attack.").
¶ 10.        
The law is therefore clear: an order allowing a will normally includes
any known codicils, and any later effort to allow a codicil is an impermissible
collateral attack on a final order.  In this case, the purported agreement
was nothing more than a letter from sons' attorney faxed to the register of the
probate courtit was not even an official court filing.  Copies of the fax
purportedly went to the four attorneys with stakes in this matter, but at least
one of those attorneys later contended that no agreement ever existed.
 Assuming arguendo there was an agreement to bifurcate the proceedings,
the probate court's order allowing the will did not reflect such an agreement
or place a time limit on how long the parties had to decide whether to submit
the purported codicil to probate.  Without such a time limit, the probate
proceedings could have theoretically remained open for years until the parties
decided to present the codicil.  This would defeat the principle of
finality accorded an order allowing a will.  A letter to a register does
not, alone, justify a departure from this clear principle. 
¶ 11.        
Beyond the purported agreement's incompatibility with established case
law, the superior court's decision to endorse a bifurcation was inconsistent
with the goals of our probate statutes to efficiently and expeditiously
administer an estate.  Based on the probate court order allowing the will,
two secretaries of state have issued certificates of apostille.  The
Connecticut probate court relied upon the Rutland probate court's final order
when it gave full faith and credit to the order and dismissed the Connecticut
proceedings.  The administrator c.t.a. and the trustee, in reliance upon
the final order, used certificates of apostille to recover assets from bank
accounts around the world, and those banks relied upon the apostille
certificates in disclosing sensitive information.  Public policy favors
the speedy administration of probate proceedings, and absent some compelling
reason, the later allowance of codicils undermines this policy.  The superior
court's ruling fails to account for these many policy issues, all of which
daughter raised in her appeal to the superior court from the probate court's
ruling allowing sons to petition to admit the codicil. 
¶ 12.        
Accordingly, we follow established case law and public policy and hold
that the codicil cannot now be admitted.  We reverse the superior court's
decision and deny sons' petition to allow the codicil.  
¶ 13.        
Finally, we consider appellee's motion to strike a portion of appellants'
reply brief, though not essential to our decision.  Daughter filed two
affidavits from attorneys connected to this case with her reply brief. 
Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a) states: "The original papers and
exhibits filed in the superior or District Court, the transcript of
proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the
clerk of such court shall constitute the record on appeal
in all cases."  The two affidavits filed in this appeal were not filed
with the trial court.  We therefore strike the affidavits from the record
on appeal.  See Pope v. Birchwood Manor Corp., 134 Vt. 577, 581,
367 A.2d 674, 677 (1976).  
           
Reversed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen B. Martin, Superior
  Judge (Ret.),
Specially Assigned
 

[1]  The term "interested person" includes
heirs, devisees, legatees, children, spouses, and such other persons as the
court directs.  V.R.P.P. 17(a)(1).
 
[2]  Decedent also left a will executed in
2005 that named Henry Pascarella as executor.  Mr. Pascarella initiated
probate proceedings in Connecticut, but after all parties consented to the
Rutland probate court having jurisdiction over the estate and to the admission
of the 2008 will in Vermont, the Connecticut court dismissed the proceedings. 
 
[3]  Sons' petition followed two appeals by
non-family members to the superior court concerning matters not relevant to the
instant appeal.  The appeals were filed by Mr. Pascarella and John Connellpersons
negatively affected by the parties' consent to probate the 2008 will in Vermont
instead of the 2005 will in Connecticut.