Title: Proctor v. Bunting

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RONALD E. PROCTOR,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellant,
v.
KEITH BUNTING, et al.,
Defendants Below-
Appellees.
§
§
§  No. 291, 2001
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Sussex County
§  C.A. Nos. 01A-01-004;
§  01A-04-001; and 01A-01-003
§
§
Submitted: April 3, 2002
  Decided:
May 7, 2002
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Ronald Proctor, pro se.
Gregory E. Smith, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware for appellees.
HOLLAND, Justice:
2
The plaintiff-appellant, Ronald Proctor, is an inmate in the custody of
the Delaware Department of Correction, incarcerated at the Delaware
Correctional Center (“DCC) in Smyrna, Delaware.  Proctor filed this appeal
from several final civil judgments entered by the Superior Court.  Those
judgments dismissed each of Proctor’s three respective appeals from the
Court of Common Pleas on various jurisdictional grounds.
In the opinion which provided the rationale for its judgments, the
Superior Court provided an extensive procedural history of the three actions
that have been consolidated before this Court on appeal.  The Superior
Court’s opinion provided detailed legal explanation for why the Court of
Common Pleas appropriately dismissed each of Proctor’s lawsuits.  In
dismissing Proctor’s lawsuits, the Court of Common Pleas and the Superior
Court both characterized Proctor’s proceedings in those courts as legally
frivolous.
The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgments.1  The
State alleges that it is manifest on the face of Proctor’s opening brief that his
appeal is without merit.  We agree.
The record reflects that Proctor filed his notice of appeal in this Court
on June 22, 2001.  His opening brief on appeal was due to be filed on
                                                
1 Most of the appellees are employees of the State of Delaware.
3
August 6, 2001.  Proctor was granted an extraordinary number of extensions
of time in order to file his opening brief.
Proctor finally filed an opening brief on March 26, 2002.  Proctor’s
opening brief does not reflect a good faith effort at complying with the rules
of this Court.  It also fails to raise and address the substantive merits of even
one legal issue.  Instead, Proctor’s opening brief states, “All arguments are
omitted but review is demanded de novo.”
It is well established that this Court will not review a legal issue on
appeal unless it is fully and fairly presented in the opening brief.2
Nevertheless, this Court generally affords self-represented litigants some
latitude in complying with the formal requirements for filing documents.
Proctor’s failure even to attempt to raise a single articulable legal issue in his
opening brief, however, can only be construed as a waiver of all claims on
appeal.3
The record reflects that Proctor’s appeal in this Court is frivolous and
constitutes an abuse of the judicial process.  Accordingly, pursuant to 10
Del. C. § 8803(e), Proctor is enjoined from filing any future claims in this
Court without first seeking leave of the Court.  In the event such leave is
                                                
2 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).
3 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).
4
granted, Proctor’s future requests to proceed in forma pauperis in any matter
before this Court must be accompanied by an affidavit containing the
following certifications required by Section 8803(e):
(i) 
The claims sought to be litigated have never been raised
or disposed of before in any court;
(ii)
The facts alleged are true and correct;
(iii)
The affiant has made a diligent and good faith effort to
determine what relevant case law controls the legal issues raised;
(iv)
The affiant has no reason to believe the claims are
foreclosed by controlled law; and
(v)
The affiant understands that the affidavit is made under
penalty of perjury.
Proctor also is reminded of the provisions in Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §
8805(a):
(a)  Upon a court’s finding pursuant to § 8803(b) or (c) of
this title that a prisoner has filed a factually frivolous or
malicious action, or upon a court’s finding that the action is
legally frivolous and that even a pro se litigant, acting with due
diligence, should have found well settled law disposing of
issue(s) raised, the court may order the Department of
Correction to forfeit the portion of the litigant’s behavior good
time credits accumulated from the date the action was received
by the court up to and including every month until the action
was disposed of by the court. Upon the court’s forwarding of
such an order to the department of Correction setting forth such
a finding, the Department shall forfeit the prisoner’s
5
accumulated good time as ordered by the court.  To the extent
the Department does not have jurisdiction to forfeit
accumulated good time for a particular prisoner, the court shall
forward the order to the appropriate agency who shall forfeit the
prisoners accumulated good time as ordered by the court.4
Although we are taking no forfeiture action in this appeal, in the event that
Proctor files another matter in this Court that is found to be factually or
legally frivolous, this Court may order the Department of Correction to
forfeit a portion of Proctor’s accumulated good time credits.5
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.
                                                
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8805(a) (1999).
5 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8805 (1999).