Title: Lavoie v. Justice of the District Court Department

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12923 
 
LINDSEY LAVOIE  vs.  A JUSTICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT 
& others.1 
 
 
May 27, 2020. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
The petitioner, Lindsey Lavoie, appeals from a judgment of 
a single justice of this court denying her petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Lavoie 
sought interlocutory review of an order of the District Court 
denying her motion for summary judgment in a civil action for 
damages under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150.  As 
pertinent here, Lavoie argues that relief is warranted because 
the motion judge "violated Mass. R. Civ. P. 56[, 365 Mass. 824 
(1974),] . . . in denying her meritorious [summary judgment] 
motion, and in failing to comply with [Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56 (d)]."2  We affirm. 
                                                          
 
1 Gavin Peters, and all justices of the Trial Court. 
 
2 Rule 56(d) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 
365 Mass. 824 (1974), states in relevant part:  "If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or 
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted.  It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages 
or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just." 
2 
 
 
 
 
The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that 
"review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be 
obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial 
court or by other available means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). 
 
It is true that the denial of Lavoie's summary judgment 
motion will not itself be reviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment on the merits.  See Shenker v. DeJesus, 432 Mass. 1019, 
1019 (2000); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 
398 Mass. 118, 126 (1986).  However, the merits of the 
underlying legal issues that formed the basis for the summary 
judgment motion may be reviewed on appeal.  Shenker, supra.  See 
Deerskin Trading Post, supra ("The merits of a claim are better 
tested on appeal on the record as it exists after an evidentiary 
trial than on the record . . . at the time the motion for 
summary judgment was denied").  Under these circumstances, 
Lavoie has not met the requirement of rule 2:21(2).3 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Mark D. Stern for the plaintiff. 
                                                          
 
 
3 Although, practically speaking, the motion judge's alleged 
failure to comply with Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (d) may escape review 
in the normal course, it is apparent on the record before us 
that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in 
concluding that that very limited issue did not require an 
exercise of this court's extraordinary superintendence power.  
See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019), and 
cases cited. 
 
Lavoie alleges that there are other instances where, as she 
claims happened here, judges of the Trial Court did not comply 
with rule 56 (d).  It behooves judges, where practicable, to 
assist parties in identifying material factual issues that are 
undisputed, and therefore do not need to be tried, and thereby 
streamline trials.