Title: SUN RIVER CATTLE v MINERS BANK

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No, 12511 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1974 S U N RIVER CATTLE C O M P A N Y e t a 1. , P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, -vs - MINERS BANK O F MONTANA e t a l , , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana Kendrick Smith argued and Gerald R. Allen and Sam Chase appeared, Butte, Montana For Respondents: Alexander, Kuenning and Miller, Great F a l l s , Montana Edward C , Alexander argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Henningsen, Purcell and Genzberger, Butte, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Wesley Wertz, Helena, Montana Turnage and McNeil, Polson, Montana Luxan, Murfitt and Davis, Helena, Montana Submitted : June 13, 1974 Decided : Filed : J ~ L 2 3 1974 P E R CURIAM: This matter comes on a motion to correct a remittitur. A f i n a l opinion, per curiam, was issued i n Sun River Cattle Co., Inc., a corporation; Louis Skaar & Sons; and Bruce E. Beck & Sons, Plaintiffs and appellants, v. Miners Bank of Montana, N.A., a Banking Corporation, Defendant and R.espondent, on April 1 7 , 1974. Petition for rehearing was denied and the order denying the rehearing together with a copy of the opinion was issued a s the remittitur and sent t o the clerk of court of Silver B o w County. The remittitur reversed the judgment and i n effect directed judgment to be entered for the amounts of the checks involved. The opinion did not comply with Rule 31, M.R.App.Civ.P., that "* * the mandate shall contain instructions with respect t o allowance of interest." Now, p l a i n t i f f s seek correction or clarification on interest. Plaintiffs' position i s that interest runs on each of the six checks from the second day following f i n a l receipt of each of the s i x checks by the bank. Defendant's position is: f i r s t , t h i s Court has l o s t jurisdic- tion over the remittitur; second, since the opinion merely reversed the judgment a new t r i a l i s called for, rather than an entry of judg- ment for plaintiffs; third, that i n any event, additional evidence i s called for before the t r i a l court t o establish a measure of damages because, even i f there was l i a b i l i t y under the rule of section 87A-4-302, R.C.M. 1947, the measure of damages would be that prescribed by section 878-4-103(5), R.C.M. 1947, t h i s argument i s based on a t o r t rule where any loss triggered by "bad faith" should c a l l for the amount of the item reduced by an amount which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care,and the damages suffered as a proximate consequence of the bad f a i t h ; and fourth, that since the action sounds i n the nature of a t o r t based on a violation of statutory obligation, the obligation t o pay does not a r i s e u n t i l a judgment i s entered determining l i a b i l i t y and fixing the amount. We shall narrow the issue by disposing of defendant's first two contentions. This Court clearly has jurisdiction to correct oversights or omissions. See State ex rel. Kruletz v . District Court, 110 Mont. 36, 39, 98 P.2d 883, as to district courts. More- over, here, defendant goes on to seek clarification and direction, so really does not seriously make its contention. Defendant states that a new trial follows a simple reversal of a judgment and cites Steen v . Hendy, 107 Cal. 49, 4 0 P. 386. Steen was not followed by this Court in State ex rel. La France Copper Co. v . District Court, 4 0 Mont. 206, 211, 105 P. 721. In La France it was stated that this Court "should exercise its undoubted authority to take the initiative in disposing of litigation as expeditiously as possible * * * . I f Rule 31, M.R.App. Civ.P. ,, provides: "fc * * If a judgment is * * * reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the district court, the mandate shall contain instructions with respect to allowance of interest. I I What has happened here is that the Court simply overlooked and omitted directions as contemplated by the rules. This leads us . directly to the main issue: that is, to direct the disposition of the case, If that issue be determined that a money judgment should be entered for the amount of the six checks on the basis argued by plaintiffs, further evidence on damages would not be proper. Clearly, we held the defendant bank became liable on each of the six checks because of its statutory duty to pay, return, or give notice of dishonor by the "midnight deadline", being the next day after receipt. We held, as the discussion in the opinion re- flects, that the Bank failed to carry its burden of proof on its defense. It is at this point that the bank urges we held in tort, as in fraud or bad faith; and thus the rule of Resner v . Northern Pacific Railway, Mont . , 520 P.2d 655, 31 St. Rep. 268, applies in that the tort claim does not bear interest until the amount of damages is determined by judgment. The bank's position i s a strained one. The opinion r e f l e c t s the holding t o be that the s i x checks were payable by virtue of section 878-4-302, R.C.M. 1947. The obligation to pay a r i s e s on a negotiable instrument for a specific, definite amount of money 1947 making section 17-204, R.c.M./, applicable. In Mitchell v. Banking Corp. of Montana, 94 Mont. 165, 177, 22 P.2d 175, t h i s Court held that a bank's creditors were entitled to interest from the date of the complaint for the entire amount due from a stockholder on a statutory l i a b i l i t y of the stockholder tothe extent of par value of the stock, and stated: "* * * The interest comes i n the nature of a penalty for delay i n the prompt payment of the statutory l i a b i l i t y on demand. " See W. J. Lake & Co. v. Montana H . P . Co., 109 Mont, 434, 97 P.2d Our holding i s based upon contract law a s to negotiable instru- ments and statutory duties thereunder. The evidence concerning bad f a i t h and fraud only went t o the weight of the evidence and the burden of proof. Accordingly, it i s ordered: That the remittitur provide for interest on each of the s i x checks for the face amount of the checks, together with interest a t s i x per cent per annum from the second day a f t e r f i n a l receipt of each check and for costs herein.