Title: Attletweedt v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Attletweedt v. State1984 WY 75684 P.2d 812Case Number: 83-254Decided: 07/25/1984JAMES ATTLETWEEDT, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES ATTLETWEEDT, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, R.M. Forrister, J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, 
and Martin J. McClain, Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, 
Laramie, for appellant; oral 
argument by Martin J. McClain.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee; oral argument by Michael 
A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is another case 
engendered by the enactment of the new criminal code with an effective date of 
July 1, 1983. Appellant contends that his sentence on October 21, 1983 should 
have been under the new criminal code rather than under the former law, although 
he pleaded guilty to grand larceny on June 3, 1983.

[¶2.]     We will reverse and 
remand for resentencing.

[¶3.]     Appellant's guilty plea 
was to an information charging him with grand larceny of personal goods in value 
of approximately $390.00 in violation of § 6-7-301, W.S. 1977, which 
provided:

"Whoever feloniously 
steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away the personal goods of another of 
the value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or upwards, is guilty of grand 
larceny, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) 
years."

At the time he 
pleaded guilty, appellant was specifically informed that he could receive a 
sentence of up to ten years in the state penitentiary.

[¶4.]     Section 6-3-402, W.S. 
1977, of the new criminal code consolidated many of the larceny offenses into 
one statute. It provides:

"(a) A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

"(b) A bailee or any 
person entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or other 
property, excluding public servants subject to W.S. 6-5-109, who, with intent to 
steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own 
or another's use is guilty of larceny.

"(c) Larceny 
is:

"(i) A felony punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or more;

"(ii) A misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more 
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is 
two hundred dollars ($200.00) or more and less than two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00); [or]

"(iii) A misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more 
than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is less than two hundred dollars ($200.00).

"(d) Conduct denoted 
larceny in this section constitutes a single offense embracing the separate 
crimes formerly known as larceny, larceny by bailee, embezzlement or related 
offenses."

[¶5.]     Since the effective 
date of the new criminal code was July 1, 1983, appellant contends that when he 
was sentenced on October 21, 1983, he was subject to a maximum sentence of one 
year and/or a fine of not more than $2,000.00 inasmuch as the value of the 
property taken was $390.00.

[¶6.]     The trial court imposed 
sentence under the former law in reliance on subsection (b) of § 6-1-101, W.S. 
1977, of the new criminal code. Section 6-1-101 of the new code 
provides:

"(a) This act may be 
cited as the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982.

"(b) This act does not 
apply to crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act. Prosecutions 
for a crime shall be governed by the law in effect on the date when the crime 
occurred. A crime was committed prior to the effective date of this act if any 
of the elements of the crime occurred prior to the effective date of this 
act.

"(c) In a case pending on 
or after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to 
the effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different 
from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser 
sentence."

[¶7.]     The appellant points to 
subsection (c) of that statute and argues that it requires any penalty to be the 
lesser of the penalties authorized by the former and present 
laws.

[¶8.]     It is obvious that 
subsections (b) and (c) are ambiguous, if not inconsistent. Prosecution includes 
sentencing. Territory of Wyoming v. 
Nelson, 2 Wyo. 346, 352 (1880); Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. 
Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658, 94 S. Ct. 2532, 2535, 41 L. Ed. 2d 383, reh. denied 
419 U.S. 1014, 95 S. Ct. 334, 42 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1974). If a case spans the 
effective date of the new code, sentencing (part of prosecution) cannot be both 
(1) governed by the law in effect on the date the crime occurred, and (2) be the 
lesser of the penalties provided by the former law and new code. Appellant urges 
us to completely disregard the provisions of subsection (b) insofar as they 
pertain to sentencing. Appellee suggests that subsection (c) provides an 
exception to the general rule and that the determination as to its applicability 
is governed by the word "pending." It contends that the case ceases to be 
pending when guilt is ascertained.

[¶9.]     We cannot completely 
agree with either position. We cannot disregard subsection (b) as it pertains to 
sentencing, and we cannot consider a case as not pending after guilt is 
ascertained and prior to sentencing.

[¶10.]  A statute which is uncertain and 
susceptible to more than one meaning must be considered ambiguous. DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479, 481 (1977). When a statute is ambiguous, we will resort to rules of 
statutory construction for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent. Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61, 
62 (1981); DeHerrera v. Herrera, 
supra.

[¶11.]  The rule of construction most useful in 
this situation is that which directs interpretation which is reasonable and 
practical, which will not have the effect of nullifying the operation of the 
statute, and which will not render it meaningless if there is any other possible 
interpretation. U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Avionics, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121, 126 (1983); Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681, 684 (1982); State Board of Equalization v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805, 810 (1980); Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558, 564 
(1979). It is proper to consider the purpose of legislation in ascertaining 
legislative intent. School Districts Nos. 
2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 in County of Campbell v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751, 756 
(1967). Creation of a specific mode of exercising power excludes all others and 
where a special provision is made by statute it prevails over the general. Town of Worland v. Odell & Johnson, 
79 Wyo. 1, 329 P.2d 797, 807 (1958). Every word, clause, and sentence must 
be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous. Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 
Wyo., 651 P.2d 778, 787 (1982).

[¶12.]  Applying these rules to § 6-1-101 
together with the rule that any ambiguity in a penal statute should be resolved 
in favor of the defendant, Horn v. 
State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 925, 927 (1976), we find that we must recognize the 
special provision relative to the penalty to be imposed in subsection (c) as 
controlling over the general provision as to the effective date contained in 
subsection (b). Thus, we do not render any part of the act meaningless, 
superfluous or inoperative; and we give effect to all of the language used by 
the legislature.

[¶13.]  Utilizing the above-mentioned rules of 
statutory construction, we conclude that the legislative intent is to have the 
law in effect prior to July 1, 1983 control all aspects of the prosecution for a 
crime in which any of its elements occurred prior to that date, with a single 
exception - any original sentence imposed after July 1, 1983 must be the lesser 
of that provided for the crime where the new code and the old code 
diverge.

[¶14.]  Therefore, inasmuch as the legislature 
has provided a lesser penalty in the new code for the crime committed by 
appellant, and the case was pending on or after the effective date of the new 
code, appellant should have been sentenced under the provisions of the new 
code.

[¶15.]  Reversed and remanded for 
resentencing.