Title: Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12080 
 
TIMOTHY P. CHAMBERS1 & another2  vs.  RDI LOGISTICS, INC., & 
another;3 DEE & LEE, LLC, & another,4 third-party defendants. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 5, 2016. - December 16, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, 
& Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Independent Contractor Act.  Federal Preemption.  Statute, 
Federal preemption, Severability.  Practice, Civil, Summary 
judgment, Standing.  Employment, Retaliation.  Protective 
Order. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 20, 2013. 
 
 
An emergency motion for a protective order was considered 
by Richard T. Moses, J.; a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by him; and the case was heard by him on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
 
 
2 Leroy Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated. 
 
 
3 Richard J. Deslongchamps, Jr. 
 
 
4 Three T & C Transport, Inc. 
2 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Harold L. Lichten (Peter M. Delano with him) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Michael T. Grant (Andrew J. Fay with him) for the 
defendants. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  We are called upon in this case chiefly to 
consider whether G. L. c. 149, § 148B, the independent 
contractor statute, is preempted by the Federal Aviation 
Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c).  The plaintiffs, who contracted with the 
defendants through small corporations that the plaintiffs 
apparently formed for this purpose, performed services in 
Massachusetts as furniture delivery drivers.  They brought this 
putative class action against the defendants under the 
independent contractor statute, asserting that they had been 
misclassified as independent contractors.  Following the 
addition of other claims and counterclaims, summary judgment 
entered for the defendants dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on 
the ground that they were preempted by the Federal statute. 
 
We conclude that, while a portion of the independent 
contractor statute is preempted by the FAAAA, the remainder is 
severable and remains applicable to the plaintiffs' 
misclassification claim.  Nor is summary judgment dismissing 
that claim warranted on the separately asserted basis that the 
3 
 
plaintiffs lack standing as individuals to assert claims for 
misclassification under the statute.  Material issues of 
disputed fact preclude the entry of summary judgment on either 
basis.  We conclude similarly that the dismissal, without 
explanation, of the claim of retaliation that Timothy Chambers 
individually asserts under G. L. c. 149, § 148A, was improper. 
 
Finally, we review the denial of the plaintiffs' request 
for a protective order, brought in the wake of the defendants' 
communications with putative class members in which they were 
offered payments in exchange for signed releases.  While 
discerning no abuse of discretion requiring reversal in these 
circumstances, we acknowledge the legitimate concerns raised by 
such communications and the authority of a judge to enter 
appropriate protective orders when necessary. 
 
1.  Background.  Since this case concerns a grant of 
summary judgment, we "summarize the relevant facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff[s]."  Somers v. Converged 
Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 584 (2009).  RDI Logistics, Inc. 
(RDI), is a furniture delivery company headquartered in South 
Easton.  Richard Deslongchamps, Jr., is the founder and 
president of RDI.  The company provides "last mile" delivery 
services for large retail furniture companies.5  The plaintiffs 
                                                          
 
 
5 "Last mile" delivery services consist of delivery from a 
warehouse where furniture is stored to individual customers. 
4 
 
delivered furniture for RDI for several years on a full-time 
basis, working approximately sixty hours per week over five or 
six days.  Since RDI only does business with independent 
business entities, the plaintiffs incorporated prior to entering 
into contracts with RDI.6  The contracts contained both 
nonsolicitation and noncompete clauses, which effectively 
prevented the plaintiffs from performing any delivery work for 
RDI's competitors during their tenure with the company and for 
three years thereafter. 
 
RDI's managers informed the plaintiffs that their contracts 
would be terminated if they worked for any company other than 
RDI.  The company also required the plaintiffs to wear uniforms 
and to display signs on their trucks bearing either RDI's logo 
or the logos of RDI's customers.  RDI deducted from the 
plaintiffs' pay the costs of uniforms, truck lease payments, and 
damage allegedly done to customers' property in the course of 
their deliveries.  RDI also regulated how the plaintiffs loaded 
the furniture on their trucks, which customers they delivered 
to, and the specific windows of time in which they were to 
deliver their goods to customers.  Finally, RDI required that 
the plaintiffs follow prescribed routes to reach their customers 
                                                          
 
 
6 Johnson and his then partner, Daryl McConaga, formed Dee & 
Lee, LLC, in August, 2007.  Chambers formed Three T & C 
Transport, Inc., in early 2009.  RDI filed a third-party 
complaint for indemnity against both of these entities. 
5 
 
and use global positioning system devices to ensure that the 
plaintiffs did not deviate from their assigned routes. 
 
After approximately four years of service, RDI terminated 
its contract with Johnson's company in December, 2011, under 
disputed circumstances.7  During the summer of 2013, Chambers 
informed his fellow drivers at RDI that he suspected that RDI 
was misclassifying them as independent contractors rather than 
as employees.  In August, 2013, RDI informed Chambers that his 
contract was subject to a sixty-day review period.8  On the 
evening of September 18, 2013, Deslongchamps confronted Chambers 
and accused him of attempting to file a lawsuit under the 
independent contractor statute.  After a brief argument, 
Deslongchamps fired Chambers. 
 
Two days later, the plaintiffs filed a class action 
complaint against RDI and Deslongchamps, individually, alleging 
misclassification.  In October, 2013, they filed an amended 
complaint, adding a claim for unjust enrichment stemming from 
the purported misclassification, as well as an individual claim 
on behalf of Chambers alleging retaliation under G. L. c. 149, 
                                                          
 
 
7 Although the record is not clear on the circumstances 
surrounding this issue, it appears that RDI terminated Johnson 
for failing to wear his seat belt while making deliveries. 
 
 
8 The parties alternatively refer to this notice as a "60-
day termination notice."  It is not clear in the record whether 
the notice explicitly provided for the termination of Chambers's 
contract. 
6 
 
§ 148A.  The defendants asserted two counterclaims for breach of 
contract against Johnson, maintaining that he had violated a 
release of claims against RDI that he signed upon his 
termination.  They also filed a third-party complaint against 
the plaintiffs' respective corporations, asserting that the 
contracts between those corporations and RDI indemnified RDI 
against any damages resulting from the plaintiffs' claims. 
 
In July of 2014, the parties engaged in an unsuccessful 
mediation effort.  Three months later, as discovery was 
underway, RDI sent a series of letters on an ex parte basis to 
certain current and former RDI contractors.  Each letter 
contained a check for $1,000 that would, if endorsed, 
purportedly release all claims against RDI.  The two-page 
letters, in essence, stated that two individuals had filed a 
class action complaint against RDI in which they claimed that 
they were misclassified as independent contractors.  The 
letters, which contained the Superior Court case caption, noted 
that although "RDI believes firmly that it has not acted 
improperly with regard" to its classification of its workers, it 
would offer "a one-time payment in exchange for a release" of 
any claims relating, inter alia, to the classification of those 
workers. 
 
On learning of these letters, the plaintiffs sought an 
emergency protective order barring RDI from engaging in further 
7 
 
communications with "putative class members."  They asked the 
judge to strike "any alleged settlements obtained as the result 
of the letters and checks" that had been mailed.  The motion was 
denied.  A few months later, the plaintiffs filed a motion for 
reconsideration of their emergency motion, claiming that an RDI 
driver had informed the plaintiffs' counsel that he and his 
fellow drivers feared they would lose their contracts with RDI 
if they did not endorse the checks.  The judge denied that 
motion.  The plaintiffs sought interlocutory review before a 
single justice of the Appeals Court, which also was denied. 
 
 Two weeks later, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment on their misclassification claim.  In response, the 
defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all of 
the plaintiffs' claims, along with their claims against Johnson 
and the plaintiffs' companies.  The judge denied the plaintiffs' 
motion and allowed the defendants' motion on the ground that the 
FAAAA preempted the independent contractor statute in its 
entirety.9  The plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed, along with 
the defendant's claims against Johnson and the plaintiffs' 
                                                          
 
 
9 The parties do not reference the plaintiffs' unjust 
enrichment claim, and the judge did not provide a reason for its 
dismissal.  We assume that the claim was dismissed concurrently 
with the misclassification claim.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
dismissal of that claim. 
8 
 
companies.10  We allowed the plaintiffs' application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Summary judgment.  The defendants 
claim that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
all of the plaintiffs' claims.  They contend that the 
plaintiffs' misclassification claim fails for two reasons.  
First, they suggest that the statute is preempted by the FAAAA.  
Second, they argue that the plaintiffs do not have standing 
under the independent contractor statute because their contracts 
with RDI were through corporate entities.  The defendants also 
suggest that Chambers' retaliation claim fails because he does 
not have standing unless he proves that he is an employee. 
 
i.  Standard of review.  "We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo to determine 'whether, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material 
facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.'"  DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 
464 Mass. 795, 799 (2013), quoting Juliano v. Simpson, 461 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
10 The judge dismissed the defendants' counterclaims against 
Johnson and the plaintiffs' corporations because they were 
rendered moot after summary judgment issued on the 
misclassification claim.  Given our reversal of the award of 
summary judgment, the defendants' claims are no longer moot.  
See Donahue v. Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 121 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(reversing Federal District Court's denial of plaintiffs' motion 
on mootness grounds, after having vacated that court's order 
allowing summary judgment for defendant).  Accordingly, we 
vacate the dismissal of the defendants' counterclaims. 
9 
 
527, 529-530 (2012).  Because we review this matter de novo, "no 
deference is accorded the decision of the judge in the trial 
court."  Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 
637 (2012).11  The defendants, as the moving parties, bear the 
"burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law."  DeWolfe, supra. 
 
ii.  Misclassification claim.  A.  Independent contractor 
statute.  The independent contractor statute "establishes a 
standard to determine whether an individual performing services 
for another shall be deemed an employee or an independent 
contractor for purposes of our wage statutes."12  Somers v. 
Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 589 (2009).  "Under this 
standard, '"an individual performing any service" is presumed to 
be an employee'" (citations omitted).  Sebago v. Boston Cab 
Dispatch, Inc., 471 Mass. 321, 327 (2015).  "The purpose of the 
independent contractor statute is 'to protect workers by 
classifying them as employees, and thereby grant them the 
benefits and rights of employment, where the circumstances 
                                                          
 
 
11 The plaintiffs ask this court to allow their motion for 
summary judgment on each claim at issue before us.  We decline 
to do so.  See Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 
91, 97 (2011) ("Denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
interlocutory and hence not subject to an appeal as of right"). 
 
 
12 The independent contractor statute most recently was 
amended in 2004.  See St. 2004, c. 193, § 26.  The statute was 
first enacted in 1990.  See St. 1990, c. 464. 
10 
 
indicate that they are, in fact, employees" (citation omitted).  
Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 620 
(2013). 
 
To establish that a presumptive employee is actually an 
independent contractor, an employer must prove that 
 
"(1) the individual is free from control and direction 
in connection with the performance of the service, both 
under his contract for the performance of service and in 
fact; and 
 
 
"(2) the service is performed outside the usual course 
of the business of the employer; and 
 
 
"(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the service 
performed." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B.  To "rebut the presumption of employment," 
an employer must satisfy all three of these prongs.  Depianti, 
465 Mass. at 621. 
 
B.  The FAAAA.  In enacting the FAAAA in 1994, Congress 
sought to deregulate the trucking industry.  See Dan's City Used 
Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (2013).  Congress 
acted based on a finding "that [S]tate governance of intrastate 
transportation of property had become 'unreasonably 
burden[some]' to 'free trade, interstate commerce, and American 
consumers.'"  Id., quoting Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker 
Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002).  Toward that end, 
Congress included a preemption clause in the statute that 
11 
 
expressly preempts any State "law, regulation, or other 
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, 
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the 
transportation of property."  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012). 
 
"The critical question in any preemption analysis is always 
whether Congress intended that [F]ederal [law] supersede [S]tate 
law" (citation omitted).  Bay Colony R.R. v. Yarmouth, 470 Mass. 
515, 518 (2015).  While Congress's intent to preempt State law 
under the FAAAA is explicit, "that 'does not immediately end the 
inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of 
Congress'[s] displacement of [S]tate law still remains.'"  Id., 
quoting Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 
 
In order to determine this scope, we "focus first on the 
statutory language, 'which necessarily contains the best 
evidence of Congress['s] pre-emptive intent'" (citation 
omitted).  Dan's City Used Cars, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1778.  The 
breadth of the FAAAA's preemption clause is "purposefully 
expansive."  Massachusetts Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 769 F.3d 
11, 18 (1st Cir. 2014).  Any State laws "'having a connection 
with, or reference to,' carrier '"rates, routes, or services," 
are pre-empted'" (citation omitted).  Rowe v. New Hampshire 
Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008). 
 
Congress's overarching goal in establishing such expansive 
preemption was twofold.  First, it aimed to "ensure 
12 
 
transportation rates, routes, and services that reflect[ed] 
'maximum reliance on competitive market forces,' thereby 
stimulating 'efficiency, innovation, and low prices,' as well as 
'variety' and 'quality'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 371.  
Second, Congress wanted to sweep aside "a patchwork of [S]tate 
service-determining laws, rules, and regulations" that would 
undercut this goal.  Id. at 373. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the FAAAA's 
preemptive effect broadly, concluding that preemption occurs "at 
least where [S]tate laws have a 'significant impact' related to 
Congress'[s] deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 371.  Despite its expansive ambit, 
however, the FAAAA's preemption is not unlimited.  State laws 
that "affect fares in only a 'tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral . . . manner'" are not preempted (citation omitted).  
Id. 
 
The defendants contend that the FAAAA preempts the 
independent contractor statute for two reasons.  First, they 
contend that the FAAAA preempts the statute because the second 
prong of G. L. c. 149, § 148B (prong two), dictates that motor 
carriers such as RDI perform their services using employees 
rather than independent contractors.  They also argue that prong 
two cannot be severed from the statute because the Legislature 
drafted the statute as a conjunctive test with three inseparably 
13 
 
intertwined prongs.  Second, the defendants argue that the FAAAA 
preempts the application of the independent contractor statute 
to motor carriers such as RDI because enforcement of the 
plaintiffs' misclassification claim would have an impermissible 
impact on motor carriers' services.13 
 
C.  Prong two.  The defendants are correct that prong two 
draws the independent contractor statute into the gravitational 
pull of the FAAAA's preemption.  Prong two provides an 
impossible standard for motor carriers wishing to use 
independent contractors.  This de facto ban constitutes an 
impermissible "significant impact" on motor carriers that would 
undercut Congress's objectives in passing the FAAAA; the statute 
containing prong two also forms part of an impermissible 
"patchwork" of State laws due to its uniqueness.  See Rowe, 552 
U.S. at 371, 373. 
 
A delivery driver for a motor carrier necessarily will be 
performing services within "the usual course of the business of 
the employer" whenever a court concludes that delivery services 
                                                          
 
 
13 Before turning to analysis, we denote the limited scope 
of the defendants' challenge to the independent contractor 
statute.  The issue here is not whether the independent 
contractor statute is facially preempted, but rather whether the 
FAAAA preempts the independent contractor statute, in whole or 
in part, as applied to motor carriers such as the defendants.  
See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 319 (1997).  
Accordingly, the application of the independent contractor 
statute to entities other than motor carriers will be unaffected 
by this decision. 
14 
 
are part of its usual course of business.  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 148B (a) (2).  Prong two thereby, in essence, requires that 
motor carriers providing delivery services, such as RDI, use 
employees rather than independent contractors to deliver those 
services.  As a result, motor carriers are compelled to adopt a 
different manner of providing services from what they otherwise 
might choose because prong two dictates the type of worker that 
will provide the services.  This likely also would have a 
significant, if indirect, impact on motor carriers' services by 
raising the costs of providing those services.  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 151, § 1 (requiring that employers pay employees minimum 
wage).  The statute containing prong two therefore contravenes 
the objectives of Congress in enacting the FAAAA by 
"substitut[ing] . . . its own governmental commands for 
'competitive market forces' in determining (to a significant 
degree) the services that motor carriers will provide."  Rowe, 
552 U.S. at 372. 
 
Moreover, with prong two included, the statute contravenes 
the congressional objective of preventing a "patchwork of 
[S]tate service-determining laws."  Id. at 371.  Unlike the 
first and third prongs, prong two "stands as something of an 
anomaly" amongst State laws regulating the classification of 
workers.  Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 
429, 438 (1st Cir. 2016).  Very few States have enacted such a 
15 
 
test, which explicitly hinges employee status on the connection 
between the services performed by the worker and the employer's 
usual course of business.  Id., and cases cited.  The 
provision's distinctiveness both undercuts Congress's intent to 
prevent "a patchwork of [S]tate service-determining laws, rules, 
and regulations," Rowe, supra, and suggests that Congress did 
not intend to allow such provisions to stand as a "type of pre-
existing and customary manifestation of the [S]tate's police 
power."  Schwann, supra. 
 
D.  Severability of prong two.  The defendants take the 
view that the prongs of the independent contractor statute are 
nonseverable because they operate conjunctively and are 
inextricably intertwined.  They argue that, given that prong two 
of the independent contract statute triggers the FAAAA's 
preemption, the entire statute, on this view, must fall.  This 
contention fails for several reasons. 
 
When compelled to strike down part of a statute, the court 
will, "as far as possible, . . . hold the remainder to be 
constitutional and valid, if the parts are capable of separation 
and are not so entwined that the Legislature could not have 
intended that the part otherwise valid should take effect 
without the invalid part."  Massachusetts Wholesalers of Malt 
Beverages, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 411, 420 (1993), 
quoting Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 387 Mass. 
16 
 
531, 540 (1982).  "On the other hand, '[i]f the court is unable 
to know whether the Legislature would have enacted a particular 
bill without the unconstitutional provision, it will not sever 
the unconstitutional provision, but will strike the entire 
statute'" (citation omitted).  Murphy v. Commissioner of the 
Dep't of Indus. Accs., 418 Mass. 165, 169 (1994). 
 
The initial inquiry in determining the severability of the 
independent contractor statute is whether the statute is 
"capable of separation."  Massachusetts Wholesalers of Malt 
Beverages, Inc., 414 Mass. at 420.  A statute is capable of 
separation when, as here, the severed provision "is not so 
connected with and dependent upon other clauses of the act as to 
constitute an essential factor of the whole."  Petition of 
Worcester County Nat'l Bank of Worcester, 263 Mass. 394, 400 
(1928).  Although the prongs of the independent contractor 
statute are conjunctive, they operate independently of one 
another.  The statute as severed would provide two independent 
tests that motor carriers would have to meet in order to 
establish that their workers are independent contractors. 
 
The defendants contend nonetheless that the statute is "so 
entwined that the Legislature could not have intended that the 
part otherwise valid should take effect without the invalid 
part" (citation omitted).  Murphy, 418 Mass. at 169.  While the 
independent contractor statute is itself silent on the issue of 
17 
 
severability, the Legislature has stated generally that "[t]he 
provisions of any statute shall be deemed severable, and if any 
part of any statute shall be adjudged unconstitutional or 
invalid, such judgment shall not affect other valid parts 
thereof."  G. L. c. 4, § 6, Eleventh.  There is, then, a 
presumption in favor of the severability of the statute.  See 
Peterson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 444 Mass. 128, 138 (2005). 
 
The question thus becomes whether upholding the statute as 
severed would frustrate the legislative purpose of the 
independent contractor statute.  That purpose is "to protect 
workers by classifying them as employees, and thereby grant them 
the benefits and rights of employment, where the circumstances 
indicate that they are, in fact, employees."  Taylor v. Eastern 
Connection Operating, Inc., 465 Mass. 191, 198 (2013).  In 
enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to provide 
greater protection than did the common-law "right to control" 
test that previously governed misclassification claims.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Savage, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 717 (1991). 
 
Since the "right to control" test is incorporated in the 
first prong of the statute, the practical effect of striking the 
statute if it were not severable would be to eliminate the third 
prong, the so-called "independent business" test.  The 
elimination of that test, and the return to the status quo ante, 
cannot be readily reconciled with the Legislature's intent to 
18 
 
provide additional safeguards for the Commonwealth's workers 
beyond that test.  We agree with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit that the Legislature would have 
preferred "two-thirds of this loaf over no loaf at all" in order 
to provide the most protection for workers in the Commonwealth.  
See Schwann, 813 F.3d at 441 (concluding independent contractor 
statute is severable under Massachusetts law).14 
 
E.  The statute as severed.  The defendants contend in the 
alternative that the FAAAA preempts the independent contractor 
statute, even as severed, because the enforcement of the 
plaintiffs' claims would have some impact on the defendants' 
services. 
 
The statute as severed, applying only the first and third 
prongs, does not have "a 'significant impact' related to 
Congress'[s] deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives" 
(citation omitted), Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371, because it does not 
target or restrict motor carriers in any way.  Motor carriers, 
                                                          
 
 
14 The defendants point to several instances in which the 
Legislature has considered and rejected amendments to the 
independent contractor statute that purportedly would have had 
the effect of rendering prong two severable.  None of these 
amendments, however, directly addressed the issue of 
severability.  Rather, they were attempts to substantively alter 
the provisions of the statute.  We cannot conclude that, in 
rejecting these proposed amendments, the Legislature intended 
that the independent contractor statute be nonseverable.  Cf. 
Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 555 n. 14 (2013) ("We 
do not draw conclusions concerning the intent of the Legislature 
based on the failure to enact a subsequent amendment"). 
19 
 
like any other industry, may structure their business model to 
use either independent contractors or employees.  The first 
prong requires that an employer prove that a worker is "free 
from control and direction in connection with the performance of 
the service," both contractually and factually, in order to 
establish that a worker is an independent contractor.  See G. L. 
c. 149, § 148B (a) (1).  The third prong requires, in turn, 
that, to be an independent contractor, "the individual is 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that 
involved in the service performed."  G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a) 
(3).  Unlike prong two, there is nothing intrinsic to these 
provisions that prevents motor carriers from using independent 
contractors.  To the extent that the first and third prongs have 
an effect on motor carriers, we conclude that such an effect is 
too "indirect, remote, and tenuous" to trigger the FAAAA's 
preemption.  See, e.g., Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump 
Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999) (upholding California's 
prevailing wage law against FAAAA preemption claim). 
 
Moreover, the statute as severed represents exactly the 
sort of traditional exercises of State police power where 
preemption is presumptively disfavored.  See New York State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
20 
 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) ("where [F]ederal law is said to 
bar [S]tate action in fields of traditional [S]tate 
regulation, . . . we have worked on the 'assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded 
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress'" [citation omitted]).  While the uniqueness 
of prong two, and its significant impact on motor carriers, 
suffices to overcome this presumption, the statute with only 
prongs one and threethe first and third prongs falls into the 
category of "generally applicable background regulations" that 
Congress presumptively does not intend to preempt.  See Dilts v. 
Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 646 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2015). 
 
Finally, without prong two, the statute contains only 
commonly used State and Federal tests of employment, indicating 
that it does not fall within the intended scope of the FAAAA's 
preemption.15  In enacting the FAAAA, Congress was concerned with 
                                                          
 
 
15 At least sixteen other States have enacted a statute 
using similar language to that in the first and third prongs of 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B -- the right to control and independent 
business tests -- to determine whether workers are employees or 
independent contractors.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-210(e) 
(2016); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-70-115(1)(b) (2016); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 31-222(a)(1)(B) (2016); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, 
§ 3302(10) (2016); Idaho Code Ann. § 72-1316(4) (2016); 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1472(12)(E) (2016); Me. Rev. Stat. 
tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2016); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 612.085 (2016); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-1-42(F)(5) (2016); 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
21 
 
State laws that created a "patchwork" of differing State 
regulations that would interfere with "the competitive 
marketplace."  Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373.  State laws that are "more 
or less nationally uniform" do not pose a "patchwork problem."  
Schwann, 813 F.3d at 440. 
 
The defendants' contention that the statute if severed 
nonetheless would be preempted rests on the untenable view that 
the FAAAA preempts any State regulation that, if enforced, would 
have any impact on motor carriers.  In advancing this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
§ 753(l)(2)(B) (2016); S.D. Codified Laws § 61-1-11 (2016); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-207(e)(1) (2016); Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-
204(3) (LexisNexis 2016); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(B) 
(2016); Wash. Rev. Code § 50.04.140 (2016); W. Va. Code § 21A-
1A-16(7) (2016). 
 
 
Additionally, the test to determine employment under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012) (FLSA), 
also includes analysis similar to the first and third prongs of 
G. L. c. 149, § 148B.  See, e.g., Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 
1114, 1117, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that degree of 
purported employer's control and economic dependence of worker 
on employer are both relevant to determining employment under 
FLSA).  In a majority of States, the common-law test 
incorporates the right to control analysis of the first prong, 
and in some States, the test also incorporates the independent 
business analysis of the third prong.  See Feary, Independent 
Contractor Employment Classification:  A Survey of State and 
Federal Laws in the Motor Carrier Industry, 35 Transp. L.J. 139, 
146-148 (2008).  Finally, the language in the first and third 
prongs is integral to parts of the Federal Internal Revenue 
Service test to determine employment.  See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 
1987-1 C.B. 296 (setting forth twenty-factor test to determine 
employment status, which includes level of control exercised by 
employer and whether worker works full time for that employer). 
22 
 
contention, the defendants rely primarily on the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 
S. Ct. 1422 (2014).  They mistakenly interpret Ginsberg as a 
pronouncement that the application of any State law to motor 
carriers is preempted if it would have even a tangential impact 
on their provision of services.  The Ginsberg Court held that 
the FAAAA preempted a plaintiff's State law claim for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against an airline 
for terminating his membership in its frequent flyer program.  
See id. at 1426-1427.  The claim at issue in Ginsberg, however, 
directly concerned services provided by the airline -- admission 
to the frequent flyer program and its attendant benefits.  See 
id. at 1430-1431.  Hence, the forbidden connection under the 
FAAAA was obvious:  the plaintiffs' requested relief consisted 
of better services at a lower rate. 
 
What Ginsberg teaches is that State laws are "more likely 
to be preempted when they operate at the point where carriers 
provide services to customers at specific prices."  Dilts, 769 
F.3d at 646.  Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs' 
misclassification claim is not directly related to the 
defendant's "services," but relates instead to a "generally 
applicable background regulation[] . . . several steps removed 
from prices, routes, or services."  Id.  This tenuous connection 
to services does not, without more, fall within the FAAAA's 
23 
 
preemptive scope.  See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 655 ("If 'relate to' were taken 
to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, 
then . . . Congress's words of limitation [would be] a mere 
sham").  If the FAAAA preempted any regulation that could result 
in an effect on motor carriers, the defendants would be exempt 
from all State regulation, a result that the FAAAA clearly does 
not countenance.16  See Dan's City Used Cars, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 
1778 ("the breadth of the words "related to" [in the FAAAA] does 
not mean the sky is the limit"). 
 
Because there are material facts in dispute as to the 
plaintiffs' claims under the statute as severed, summary 
judgment should not have been allowed on the plaintiffs' 
misclassification claim. 
 
F.  Plaintiffs' standing.  The defendants contend that the 
grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs' misclassification 
claims was warranted for the separate reason that the plaintiffs 
                                                          
 
 
16 Indeed, the FAAAA's preemption clause explicitly exempts 
several areas of State regulation that could result in an 
increase in costs for motor carriers.  For example, the FAAAA 
explicitly allows State regulation of motor carriers related to, 
inter alia, "motor vehicles," "highway route controls," 
"limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle," 
and "insurance requirements."  See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).  
This list was not "intended to be all inclusive, but merely to 
specify some of the matters that are not 'prices, rates or 
services' and which are therefore not preempted."  H.R. Conf. 
Rep. 103-677, 103d Cong., 2d sess. (1994), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1756. 
24 
 
lack standing to bring such claims.  The defendants maintain in 
this regard that the protections of the independent contractor 
statute apply only to "individuals" who perform services as 
such.  See G. L. c. 149, § 148B ("For the purpose of this 
chapter and chapter 151, an individual performing any service, 
except as authorized under this chapter, shall be considered to 
be an employee . . .").  They argue that the plaintiffs, in 
contracting with RDI through corporate entities, foreclosed any 
claim for misclassification.  Because the relevant facts are in 
dispute, however, summary judgment on this basis is unwarranted. 
 
The defendants urge that the plaintiffs ceded standing 
under the independent contractor statute because they 
purposefully chose and financially benefited from using the 
corporate form.  They construe the statutory reference to 
"individuals who provide services" as meaning that only workers 
who provide services as individuals have standing.  In so 
limiting the scope of the statute, the defendants cite to an 
advisory from the Attorney General stating that "legitimate 
independent contractors and business-to-business relationships 
in the Commonwealth . . . will not be adversely impacted by [the 
independent contractor statute]."  See Advisory 2008/1, Attorney 
General's fair labor and business division. 
 
The statutory reference to "individuals who provide 
services," however, does not expressly exclude individuals who 
25 
 
provide services through a corporation.  The Attorney General's 
advisory, which the defendants emphasize reflects this 
understanding, notes as well that "businesses . . . created and 
maintained in order to avoid [application of the independent 
contractor statute]" would not immunize employers against 
enforcement.17  The Attorney General articulated certain factors 
material to a determination whether the corporate form 
represents a legitimate business-to-business relationship, or 
one whose raison d'etre is to prevent the classification of 
workers as employees: 
"[Whether] the services of the alleged independent 
contractor are not actually available to entities beyond 
the contracting entity, even if they purport to be so; 
whether the business of the contracting entity is no 
different than the services performed by the alleged 
independent contractor; or the alleged independent 
contractor is only a business requested or required to be 
so by the contracting entity." 
 
Id.  This nonexhaustive list of factors properly focuses on 
whether the worker's use of the corporate form was at the 
worker's behest or forced upon the worker by an employer in 
order to misclassify him or her.  See Anderson vs. 
                                                          
 
 
17 "Insofar as the Attorney General's office is the 
department charged with enforcing the wage and hour laws, its 
interpretation of the protections provided thereunder is 
entitled to substantial deference, at least where it is not 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statutory 
provisions."  Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 447 Mass. 363, 367-368 
(2006). 
26 
 
Homedeliveryamerica.com, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 11-10313-GAO 
(D. Mass. Dec. 30, 2013). 
 
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged enough facts to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they have 
standing under the independent contractor statute.  They assert 
that they formed companies only to be able to contract with RDI, 
did not perform services for any companies other than RDI, and 
were forbidden from performing work for any companies other than 
RDI.  These allegations raise the question whether the 
plaintiffs incorporated for their own benefit, as the defendants 
suggest, or whether RDI required them to incorporate in order to 
misclassify them as independent contractors.  Summary judgment 
is precluded on this basis. 
 
iii.  Retaliation claim.  Apparently due to the grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants dismissing the plaintiffs' 
misclassification claim on preemption grounds, Chambers's 
retaliation claim also was dismissed.  The parties disagree 
whether the retaliation claim is independent of the 
misclassification claim, and whether it properly was dismissed. 
 
General Laws c. 149, § 148A, provides that "[a]ny employer 
who discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any 
employee because such employee . . . has instituted . . . any 
proceeding under or related to this chapter . . . shall have 
violated this section."  Chambers claims that his contract with 
27 
 
RDI was terminated in retaliation for the assertion of his 
rights under the independent contractor statute, and that 
irrespective of whether he succeeds in establishing that he was 
misclassified as an independent contractor, he may pursue his 
claim for retaliation.  By contrast, the defendants maintain 
that Chambers's retaliation claim properly was dismissed along 
with the misclassification claim, because G. L. c. 149, § 148A,  
only applies to workers classified as employees under the 
independent contractor statute.  Insofar as we vacate the 
allowance of summary judgment on the plaintiffs' 
misclassification claim, Chambers's retaliation claim is 
revived, even under the defendants' suggested interpretation of 
the statute.18  We leave for another day resolution of this 
dispute as to statutory interpretation. 
 
b.  Emergency motion for protective order and motion for 
reconsideration.  The plaintiffs argue that the judge erred in 
denying their emergency motion for a protective order to enjoin 
RDI from contacting its workers and to invalidate any releases 
that were executed.  They contend that the judge was obligated 
to allow their requests because the defendants' communications 
with its workers were misleading and coercive.  We review the 
judge's denial of the motions to determine whether either 
                                                          
 
 
18 The plaintiffs could succeed in establishing that they 
are misclassified employees. 
28 
 
constituted an abuse of his discretion.  See Merles v. Lerner, 
391 Mass. 221, 226 (1984).  An abuse of discretion occurs when 
the judge's decision rests upon "a clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that 
[it] falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives," or 
when the judge's decision constitutes a "significant error of 
law" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Ellis, 475 Mass. 459, 
476 (2016). 
 
The plaintiffs filed their motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 
(d), 365 Mass. 767 (1974), which provides, in relevant part, 
that a court "may require such security and impose such terms as 
shall fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class 
in whose behalf the action is brought or defended."  "We have 
noted that [rule 23] '"was written in the light of [Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23]," . . . hence case law construing the Federal rule is 
analogous and extremely useful'" (citations omitted).  Longval 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 417 n.9 (2007). 
 
In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981), where 
a protective order had been issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(d), the United States Supreme Court concluded that "[b]ecause 
of the potential for abuse, a . . . court has both the duty and 
the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and 
to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and 
parties."  A protective order is appropriate to prevent 
29 
 
"[m]isleading or coercive communications with potential class 
members that could or are intended to undermine participation in 
a class or collective action."  Davine vs. Golub Corp., U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 14-30136-MGM (D. Mass. Oct. 24, 2014), citing 
Gulf Oil Co., supra at 102.  In this regard, courts should 
scrutinize with care instances in which employers send 
communications to class and putative class members who are their 
workers, given the heightened possibility of coercion between an 
employer and its workers.  See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).  Moreover, when 
employers do send communications to class members, putative or 
otherwise, "it is critical that the class receive accurate and 
impartial information regarding the status, purposes and effects 
of the class action."  Id. 
 
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court made clear 
that a court's authority to issue protective orders is bound by 
the limits of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  See Gulf Oil Co., 452 U.S. at 103  (striking down 
protective order as invalid restraint on expression).  
Accordingly, the issuance of a protective order "should be based 
on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing 
of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with 
the rights of the parties."  Id. at 101.  Additionally, the 
30 
 
issuance of a protective order must be "justified by a 
likelihood of serious abuses."  Id. at 104. 
 
In denying the plaintiffs' motions, the judge appears 
adequately to have taken these factors into account.  The judge 
denied the plaintiffs' initial emergency motion because he 
concluded that "the subject correspondence issued to present and 
former drivers [for RDI] is neither misleading [n]or coercive 
and amply notifies recipients of the pending litigation."  The 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration asserted similar grounds 
as their initial motion, with the addition of allegations that 
Deslongchamps had terminated Chambers in retaliation for 
asserting his rights under the independent contractor statute.  
The motion stated also that several unnamed affiants contacted 
the plaintiffs' counsel, stating that they feared retaliation 
from RDI if they did not endorse the checks.  The judge denied 
the motion for reconsideration because "there [had] not been a 
sufficient showing that Chambers was terminated in violation of 
[G. L. c. 149, § 148A,] or that the defendants engaged in 
illegal coercive tactics in connection with the settlement of 
individual claims." 
 
The judge's determination that the letters were not 
coercive or misleading such that they merited the issuance of a 
protective order was not unreasonable based on the record before 
him.  The letters contained a citation to the plaintiffs' class 
31 
 
action and they fairly described the status of the case.  
Additionally, the letters explicitly stated that RDI would not 
consider the employees' decision whether to endorse the check in 
business dealings unrelated to the matter.  The letters also 
advised the recipients that they may wish to consult with an 
attorney before deciding whether to endorse the check.  Finally, 
the fact that several drivers contacted the plaintiffs' counsel 
suggests that the letters provided sufficient information to 
allow such contact. 
 
Absent further information suggesting that the 
communication was misleading or coercive, we conclude that the 
judge, on the record before him, did not abuse his discretion in 
denying the emergency motion for a protective order or the 
motion for reconsideration.  We do not express a view as to the 
validity of the releases in question.19 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The denials of the emergency motion for a 
protective order and the motion for reconsideration are 
affirmed, and the grant of summary judgment is vacated.  The 
                                                          
 
 
19 The validity of such releases and the judge's decision on 
a preliminary basis not to issue a protective order invalidating 
them are quite different matters.  We note that releases "will 
be enforceable as to the statutorily provided rights and 
remedies conferred by the Wage Act only if such an agreement is 
stated in clear and unmistakable terms."  Crocker v. Townsend 
Oil Co., 464 Mass. 1, 14 (2012).  "[T]he release must be plainly 
worded and understandable to the average individual, and it must 
specifically refer to the rights and claims under the Wage Act 
that the employee is waiving."  Id.  Whether the releases here 
satisfy such criteria is not before us. 
32 
 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.