Title: In re Adoption of J.M.D.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 99,687 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION TO ADOPT 
J.M.D. AND K.N.D., 
Minor Children. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The question of whether a natural parent must consent to the adoption of his or her 
children by a stepparent is governed by the provisions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d), 
unaffected by the termination of parental rights provisions in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-
2136(h). Under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d), a natural parent's consent to a stepparent 
adoption of his or her children is mandatory unless the district court finds that the natural 
parent has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for 2 consecutive years next 
preceding the filing of the petition for adoption or that the natural parent is incapable of 
giving such consent. 
 
2. 
 
In determining whether a natural parent has assumed the duties of a parent, the 
court must recognize that there are numerous duties associated with being a parent to a 
child and all such duties may be considered in the context of all surrounding 
circumstances. 
 
3. 
 
A determination of the best interests of the child cannot override the requirement 
that a natural parent who has assumed his or her parental responsibilities must consent 
before a stepparent adoption can be granted. 
2 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
A natural parent's unfitness will not obviate the need for the natural parent's 
consent to a stepparent adoption, unless the district court finds that the natural parent's 
unfitness has prevented him or her from assuming the duties of a parent for 2 consecutive 
years next preceding the filing of the petition for stepparent adoption. 
 
5. 
 
Whether a natural parent has failed or refused to assume his or her parental duties 
for 2 years next preceding the filing of a stepparent adoption petition is a question of fact 
which is reviewed on appeal to determine whether the decision was supported by 
substantial competent evidence. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
factual finding, the appellate court should review the facts in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party below and must not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness 
credibility. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 41 Kan. App. 2d 157, 202 P.3d 27 (2009). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; RICHARD T. BALLINGER, judge. Opinion filed September 16, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Elizabeth Lea Henry, of Henry & Mathewson, P.A., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant natural father.  
 
Martin W. Bauer, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., of Wichita, argued the 
cause and was on the briefs for appellee stepfather. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
3 
 
 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  S.M.H. (Mother) is the biological mother of J.M.D. and K.N.D. Her 
current husband (Stepfather) petitioned to adopt the children without the consent of their 
biological father, M.A.D. (Father). The district court determined that Father's consent to 
the adoption was unnecessary, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted 
Stepfather's adoption. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding 
insufficient evidence to support the district court's determination that Father had failed to 
assume his parental duties for the 2 consecutive years immediately preceding the 
adoption petition. Stepfather seeks our review of the Court of Appeals' decision. We 
reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Mother and Father were married in 1993, and the two children involved in this 
action were born during the marriage; J.M.D. in 1996 and K.N.D. in 1998. J.M.D. was 
diagnosed with cancer in 1999 and subsequently underwent numerous hospitalizations, 
chemotherapy, and radiation treatments.  
 
In November 2000, Mother and Father, who were living in Missouri, began caring 
for Mother's 4-year-old stepsister (H.R.B.) and Mother's 1 1/2-year-old half-sister 
(L.H.D.) and subsequently became their official managing conservators and guardians. 
Between December 2000 and the summer of 2002, Mother and Father twice separated 
and reconciled. By July 2002, Father was unemployed and acting as the primary 
caretaker for all four children.  
 
On July 18, 2002, L.H.D. sustained serious and ultimately fatal physical injuries 
while under Father's supervision. Social service workers removed the other children from 
the home, while investigating Father's culpability for the child's injuries and resulting 
death. On July 23, 2002, Father was charged with felony child abuse for inflicting cruel 
4 
 
 
 
and inhuman punishment by "beating, kicking, hitting, knocking to the ground and by 
throwing water on L.H.D." He was released on bond, pending trial, conditioned on 
having no contact with the children. During the period of Father's release on bond, 
Mother obtained a divorce decree which granted her sole custody of the children and 
ordered Father to pay $254 per month for child support. After his bond was revoked for 
having contact with the children, Father pled to charges and was sentenced to a prison 
term with a mandatory release date of December 8, 2014. 
 
In March 2003, Mother and her children relocated to Kansas, where Mother met 
and ultimately married Stepfather in August 2004. With Mother's consent, Stepfather 
petitioned to adopt J.M.D. and K.N.D. in June 2007. Stepfather's counsel filed a petition 
for habeas corpus, seeking to have Father brought to Kansas from the Missouri South 
Central Correctional Center to participate in the adoption proceedings. Missouri prison 
officials refused to honor the Kansas habeas corpus writ, but arrangements were made to 
allow Father to participate in the trial by telephone. 
 
Claiming that his right to due process was implicated, Father sought to delay the 
proceedings until he could appear in person. In denying the continuance motion, the 
district court noted that Stepfather had made every effort to obtain Father's presence and 
that, notwithstanding earlier possible parole dates, Father's release was not assured until 
his mandatory release date in 2014, over 7 years later. Citing to the children's interest in a 
timely decision and the demands of judicial economy, the court found that Father's ability 
to participate by telephone satisfied his right to due process. 
 
At trial, Father presented evidence of his contacts with the children while he was 
imprisoned, both directly through letters and telephone calls and indirectly through his 
sister, T.R. On the other hand, Stepfather presented the testimony of a school counselor 
and the children's treating psychologist, relating the impact on the children of L.H.D.'s 
5 
 
 
 
death and Father's incarceration. Both testified that the children suffered from anxiety and 
symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and opined that they would benefit from the 
closure and permanency that would be attained through the adoption. 
 
During the 2 years preceding the adoption petition, June 2005 to June 2007, Father 
was earning approximately $20 per month in prison wages and was receiving a veteran's 
disability payment of approximately $105 per month. T.R. testified that Father would 
provide her with money to occasionally purchase $10 or $20 gift cards for the children 
and to send cards and money for birthdays and Christmas. However, none of the 
disability payments were ever utilized to directly pay child support to Mother. In 
September 2006, child support enforcement authorities contacted Father about his failure 
to pay child support. After Father requested a reduction in the court-ordered support of 
$254 per month, it was set at $5 per month, presumably based solely on his prison wages. 
Thereafter, Father paid the $5 per month support, plus an additional $3.50 per month 
toward his arrearage. 
 
At the close of evidence, the parties argued differing interpretations of a 2006 
amendment to K.S.A. 59-2136(d), which added the language:  "The court may consider 
the best interests of the child and the fitness of the nonconsenting parent in determining 
whether a stepparent adoption should be granted." L. 2006, ch. 22, sec. 1(d). Ultimately, 
the district court opined that the amendment required the judge to consider the best 
interests of the child and the fitness of the nonconsenting parent, notwithstanding the 
provision's ambiguity or possible conflict with subsection (h) of the statute.  
 
The district court then proceeded to find that Father was unfit and that the 
Stepfather's adoption was in the best interests of the children. Further, the trial court held 
that Father had failed to assume the duties of a parent for 2 consecutive years prior to the 
6 
 
 
 
filing of the adoption petition. Accordingly, the court terminated Father's parental rights 
and determined that his consent to the adoption was not necessary. 
 
Father appealed, arguing: (1) The district court misinterpreted and misapplied the 
stepparent adoption statute by considering Father's fitness and the best interests of the 
children as overriding factors in granting Stepfather's petition for adoption; (2) there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Father's consent to the adoption was not 
required; and (3) Father was denied due process when the court refused to continue the 
trial until he could be released from prison and attend the trial in person. In a split 
decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court. In re Adoption of J.M.D., 41 
Kan. App. 2d 157, 202 P.3d 27 (2009) (Marquardt, J., dissenting).  
 
Relying on In re Adoption of G.L.V., 286 Kan. 1034, 190 P.3d 245 (2008), the 
majority found that to dispense with the requirement of the natural father's consent to a 
stepparent adoption, the court must find that the nonconsenting father had failed to fulfill 
his parental duties for 2 consecutive years next preceding the adoption petition, 
regardless of any determination the court may make with respect to the natural father's 
fitness or the best interests of the child. J.M.D., 41 Kan. App. 2d at 162-64. The majority 
acknowledged that the district court in this case had correctly applied the stepparent 
adoption statute by first making a determination that Father had failed to assume his 
parental duties so as to permit the adoption to proceed without Father's consent, and then 
the court independently considered Father's fitness and the best interests of the children in 
determining the propriety of granting the adoption. However, the majority found that the 
district court's determination that Father had failed to fulfill his parental duties was not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 164-70. 
 
The dissent took issue with the majority's statutory interpretation, opining that 
eliminating Father's fitness and the best interests of the children as factors to consider in 
7 
 
 
 
determining whether the natural parent's consent was required rendered meaningless the 
2006 amendment to K.S.A. 59-2136(d). See 41 Kan. App. 2d at 174-75 (Marquardt, J., 
dissenting). Further, the dissent disagreed with the majority's assessment of Father's 
efforts toward fulfilling his parental duties, finding such efforts should be ignored as 
incidental. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 175. 
 
In seeking review, Stepfather separately states a number of issues. He contends the 
Court of Appeals misinterpreted G.L.V., as that case relates Father's unfitness to the 
determination of whether consent is required and misconstrued the time period which 
may be considered when determining whether Father has failed or refused to assume 
parental duties. He urges an interpretation of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d), whereby the 
word "must" means "may," rather than being the equivalent of "shall." Additionally, 
Stepfather urges this court to revisit the judicially created "two-column ledger" approach 
in applying K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d) and to replace it with a totality of the 
circumstances analysis. In essence, then, Stepfather is challenging the manner in which 
appellate courts have interpreted and applied the stepparent adoption provisions of K.S.A. 
2010 Supp. 59-2136(d).  
 
 With respect to the unique facts of this case, Stepfather asserts that the evidence 
was sufficient to support the district court's findings and that the Court of Appeals erred 
in making its own findings that Father financially and emotionally supported his children 
in a significant and appropriate manner. We will look first at the legal framework for 
analyzing whether a father's consent is necessary in a stepparent adoption and then 
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in this case to support the district court's finding 
that Father's consent was not required.  
 
8 
 
 
 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
Statutory interpretation is a legal question over which appellate courts exercise 
unlimited review, unfettered by the trial court's interpretation. State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 
157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006).  
 
 
B.   Analysis 
 
Our obvious starting point when considering how a statutory procedure is 
supposed to operate is to look at the applicable statutes. Generally, Article 21 of Chapter 
59 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated governs adoptions. Specifically, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 
59-2136 applies where a relinquishment or consent to an adoption has not been obtained 
from a natural parent, and the court is permitted to determine the necessity of such a 
relinquishment or consent. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(a). Even more specific to our 
case, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d) applies when a stepfather seeks to adopt his wife's 
children. That provision states: 
 
 
"(d)  In a stepparent adoption, if a mother consents to the adoption of a child who 
has a presumed father under subsection (a)(1), (2) or (3) of K.S.A. 38-1114 and 
amendments thereto, or who has a father as to whom the child is a legitimate child under 
prior law of this state or under the law of another jurisdiction, the consent of such father 
must be given to the adoption unless such father has failed or refused to assume the duties 
of a parent for two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption 
or is incapable of giving such consent. In determining whether a father's consent is 
required under this subsection, the court may disregard incidental visitations, contacts, 
communications or contributions. In determining whether the father has failed or refused 
to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the 
petition for adoption, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that if the father, after 
having knowledge of the child's birth, has knowingly failed to provide a substantial 
9 
 
 
 
portion of the child support as required by judicial decree, when financially able to do so, 
for a period of two years next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption, then such 
father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent. The court may consider the 
best interests of the child and the fitness of the nonconsenting parent in determining 
whether a stepparent adoption should be granted." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 
59-2136(d). 
 
The italicized last sentence was added in 2006. L. 2006, ch. 22, sec. 1(d). What 
role the unfitness of a nonconsenting parent plays in a stepparent adoption is the principal 
question presented in this appeal. However, before focusing our attention on the specific 
language of this subsection (d), we pause to consider how it fits with the other provisions 
of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136, in order to fulfill our directive to construe the various 
provisions of an act in pari materia. See Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 
281 Kan. 209, 215, 130 P.3d 57 (2006).  
 
As noted, subsection (a) describes the applicability of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136. 
Subsection (b) clarifies that, wherever practicable, the statute's provisions applicable to 
the father shall also apply to the mother, and vice versa. Subsection (c) addresses the 
appointment of an attorney to represent any father who is unknown or whose 
whereabouts are unknown, and it directs the court to publish notice where no person is 
identified as the father or possible father.  
 
Pointedly, subsection (c) differentiates between stepparent adoptions and all other 
cases. In stepparent adoptions, the court "may" appoint an attorney, but "[i]n all other 
cases, the court shall appoint an attorney." K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(c).   
 
Subsection (e) directs that, when a mother desires to relinquish or consent to the 
adoption of her child, "a petition shall be filed in the district court to terminate the 
parental rights of the father, unless the father's relationship to the child has been 
10 
 
 
 
previously terminated or determined not to exist by a court." K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-
2136(e). However, the subsection commences by declaring that the provisions of 
subsection (d), addressing stepparent adoptions, are specifically excepted from the 
termination provisions set forth in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(e). In other words, a 
petition to terminate the father's parental rights is not mandated in a stepparent adoption. 
 
Subsection (f) addresses the manner by which notice is to be given to the person 
identified as the father or possible father. Subsection (g) clarifies that the court need not 
go through the termination of parental rights procedure set forth later in the statute, if the 
court has been unable to identify a possible father and no one has claimed custodial rights 
for the child.  
 
Subsection (h) is important to our understanding of subsection (d). Before taking a 
close look at that subsection, we note that the last subsection, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-
2136(i), addresses the impact of the termination of parental rights on the right to inherit 
of both the birth parents and the child. Returning to subsection (h), we set out that 
provision in its entirety, noting in italics the relevant 2006 changes made in H.B. 2665 at 
the same time the last sentence of subsection (d) was added. See L. 2006, ch. 22, sec. 
1(h). 
  
 
"(h)(1)  When a father or alleged father appears and asserts parental rights, the 
court shall determine parentage, if necessary pursuant to the Kansas parentage act. If a 
father desires but is financially unable to employ an attorney, the court shall appoint an 
attorney for the father. Thereafter, the court may order that parental rights be terminated, 
upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence of any of the following: 
 
(A)  The father abandoned or neglected the child after having knowledge of the 
child's birth; 
 
(B)  the father is unfit as a parent or incapable of giving consent; 
11 
 
 
 
 
(C)  the father has made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with 
the child after having knowledge of the child's birth; 
 
(D)  the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without 
reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the 
child's birth; 
 
(E)  the father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the pregnancy; 
 
(F)  the birth of the child was the result of rape of the mother; or 
 
(G)  the father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two 
consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition. 
 
"(2)  In making a finding whether parental rights shall be terminated under this 
subsection, the court may: 
 
(A)  Consider and weigh the best interest of the child; and 
 
(B)  disregard incidental visitations, contacts, communications or contributions. 
 
"(3)  In determining whether the father has failed or refused to assume the duties 
of a parent for two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition for 
adoption, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that if the father, after having 
knowledge of the child's birth, has knowingly failed to provide a substantial portion of 
the child support as required by judicial decree, when financially able to do so, for a 
period of two years next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption, then such father 
has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 
Supp. 59-2136(h). 
 
 
In his supplemental brief filed with this court, Stepfather suggests that the 2006 
addition of the provision in K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(2)(A), permitting the court to consider and 
weigh the best interest of the child in deciding whether to terminate parental rights under 
subsection (h), manifests a legislative intent "to allow a trial court, within its discretion, 
to use the child's best interest, or parent's unfitness, or both, as considerations for 
deciding whether or not to terminate a parent's rights in a stepparent adoption" under 
subsection (d). The apparent notion is that the legislature intended to impliedly 
incorporate the provisions of subsection (h) into the stepparent provisions of subsection 
12 
 
 
 
(d). Both the statutory language and legislative history of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136 
belie such an intent. 
 
K.S.A. 59-2136 originated in 1990, as part of the Kansas Adoption and 
Relinquishment Act. See L. 1990, ch. 145, sec. 26 (S.B. 431). The Act was the result of a 
study by the Family Law Advisory Committee on Kansas adoption and relinquishment 
laws, and the purpose of the bill was to consolidate the applicable laws which were 
previously scattered throughout multiple articles in two different chapters of the Kansas 
Statutes. See Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee, March 28, 1990, Attachment 3. 
During hearings on the bill, the Advisory Committee presented its comments on each of 
the new and amended provisions within the Act. Accompanying the section which would 
become K.S.A. 59-2136(d) was the following comment: 
 
 
"Subsection (d) limits the grounds for termination of certain natural fathers' 
parental rights in connection with stepparent adoptions. Generally, if the child was the 
product of a marriage or attempted marriage, the consent of the father must be obtained 
unless there was a failure to assume parental duties for two years. The committee justifies 
this differing treatment of certain fathers in stepparent adoptions on the basis there is not 
the urgency to create a new family for the child since the child is residing with the mother 
and stepfather." (Emphasis added.) Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee, March 
28, 1990, Attachment 3.  
 
The clearly stated intent was to treat the parental rights termination of natural or 
presumed fathers differently in stepparent adoptions than in other types of adoptions. 
That stated intent contradicts any implication that the legislature intended to incorporate 
the parental termination provisions of subsection (h) into the stepparent adoption 
provisions of subsection (d).  
 
13 
 
 
 
Moreover, the 2006 amendments to K.S.A. 59-2136 do not indicate a legislative 
intent to change the original enactment's purposefully disparate treatment of fathers in 
stepparent adoptions. After the amendments, subsection (c) retained its different 
provision for appointing an attorney for unknown fathers in a stepparent adoption, and 
subsection (e) still excepted stepparent adoptions from the requirement of filing a petition 
to terminate the parental rights of the father. Perhaps more to the point, the 2006 change 
in subsection (h) permitting the district court to consider and weigh the best interest of 
the child was explicitly made applicable when the court is making a finding "whether 
parental rights shall be terminated under this subsection." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 
Supp. 59-2136(h)(2). If a court is determining under subsection (d) whether a father has 
failed to assume the duties of a parent within the preceding 2 years, it is not making a 
finding whether parental rights should be terminated under subsection (h). Likewise, the 
subsection (d) addition in 2006 makes consideration of the best interests of the child and 
the fitness of the nonconsenting parent applicable to the determination of "whether a 
stepparent adoption should be granted," rather than being applicable to the prefatory 
determination of whether father's rights should be terminated to make way for the 
adoption.  
 
In short, the termination of parental rights provisions in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-
2136(h) simply do not apply to the question of whether a natural father must consent to 
the adoption of his children by a stepfather. The legislature intended for that question to 
be answered by the provisions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 2136(d), unaffected by the 
provisions governing the termination of parental rights in other types of adoptions. 
Stepfather's policy argument—that it should not be more difficult to terminate the 
parental rights of a father in a stepparent adoption than it is to terminate a father's parental 
rights in a stranger adoption—are more properly directed to the legislature. See O'Bryan 
v. Columbia Ins. Group, 274 Kan. 572, Syl. ¶ 2, 56 P.3d 789 (2002) ("Courts should 
avoid making public policy where the statutory law has developed."). 
14 
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals appropriately decided the matter based solely on the 
provisions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d), which the panel construed in light of its 
understanding of our decision in G.L.V. That case was our first opportunity to apply 
K.S.A. 59-2136(d) after the 2006 amendments. Stepfather contends that G.L.V. contained 
incorrect dicta, which the Court of Appeals misapplied to reach an incorrect result.  
 
G.L.V. involved an attempted stepparent adoption without the natural father's 
consent, where father had paid court-ordered child support, plus additional amounts on an 
arrearage, for over 3 years preceding the filing of stepfather's adoption petition. However, 
father had not had any significant contact with his children for the 9 years prior to the 
adoption proceedings, albeit father's parents and other family members had maintained a 
relationship with the children. Unlike the present case, the father in G.L.V. was not 
incarcerated. 
 
The district court in G.L.V. noted that Kansas cases had created a two-sided ledger 
approach to determining whether a parent has failed to perform his or her parental duties 
during the 2 years before an adoption petition is filed:  "On one side of the ledger is the 
'"love and affection"' that a parent shows his or her child; on the other is the financial 
support provided during that time." G.L.V., 286 Kan. at 1038. The district court noted 
further that a parent must fail both sides of the ledger to have his or her parental rights 
terminated, i.e., to permit the stepparent to adopt the children without the natural parent's 
consent. The court found that the two-sided ledger formula would require a denial of the 
adoption in that case because the natural father had provided sufficient child support to 
pass the financial test, even though the father "'miserably'" failed the "'"love and 
affection" test.'" 286 Kan. at 1038.  
 
15 
 
 
 
However, the district court struggled with how the 2006 amendment to subsection 
(d)—permitting the district court to consider best interests of the child and the fitness of 
the nonconsenting natural father—was suppose to affect the judicially created two-sided 
ledger test. Ultimately, the district court opined that there was no evidence that father was 
an unfit parent and that "'[c]onsideration of the best interest of the children does not 
clearly favor one parent over the other,'" so that the outcome reached under the ledger test 
in that case was not altered by the 2006 amendment to K.S.A. 59-2136(d).  
 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,  
 
"concluding that the 2006 amendment to K.S.A. 59-2136(d) did not abrogate the parental 
duties test (based on the two-sided ledger) previously adopted by the Kansas Supreme 
Court in [In re Adoption of B.M.W., 268 Kan. 871, 2 P.3d 159 (2000),] and [In re 
Adoption of K.J.B., 265 Kan. 90, 959 P.2d 853 (1998),] even though it granted a district 
court discretionary authority to consider the best interests of the child and the fitness of 
the nonconsenting parent. [In re Adoption of G.L.V., 38 Kan. App. 2d 144, 154-55, 163 
P.3d 334 (2007)]." 286 Kan. at 1039.  
 
The stepfather sought review with this court, arguing in the alternative that, after the 2006 
amendment to K.S.A. 59-2136(d), either:  (1) the best interests of the child involved in a 
contested stepparent adoption are an overriding factor in determining whether to grant the 
adoption; or (2) the court-made two-sided ledger has been converted to a three-column 
ledger with love and affection in one column, financial support in another, and the best 
interests of the child in the third column, all entitled to equal weight and consideration.  
 
In its comprehensive review of the Court of Appeals decision, this court traced the 
history of stepparent adoption proceedings in this state, specifically looking at the 
decisions in In re Adoption of B.M.W., 268 Kan. 871, 2 P.3d 159 (2000); In re Adoption 
of K.J.B., 265 Kan. 90, 959 P.2d 853 (1998); In re Adoption of S.E.B., 257 Kan. 266, 891 
16 
 
 
 
P.2d 440 (1995); In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, 747 P.2d 145 (1987); In re 
Adoption of C.R.D., 21 Kan. App. 2d 94, 897 P.2d 181 (1995); and In re Adoption of 
Baby Boy S., 16 Kan. App. 2d 311, 822 P.2d 76 (1991). That review called into question 
the legitimacy of the two-sided ledger test. 
 
G.L.V. described how the two-sided ledger test had originated in a concurring 
opinion in C.R.D. that advocated for an approach that "was clearly at odds with the 
previous decisions of Kansas courts, which had consistently held that a determination as 
to whether the nonconsenting parent had failed to assume parental duties was based on a 
review of all of the circumstances. See, e.g., S.E.B., 257 Kan. at 273; F.A.R., 242 Kan. at 
236." G.L.V., 286 Kan. at 1049. G.L.V. pointed out that the newly proposed test had 
restricted the factors to be considered to only two parental duties—love and affection, 
and financial support—even though "there are numerous duties associated with being a 
parent to a child." 286 Kan. at 1049, 1054. Moreover, we opined in G.L.V. that the 
statutory interpretation in the C.R.D. concurrence "was only loosely based on the 
language of K.S.A. 59-2136(d)" and that the C.R.D. majority completely ignored the 
statutory rebuttable presumption arising from insubstantial payment of judicially decreed 
child support. G.L.V., 286 Kan. at 1049.  
 
G.L.V. later clarified that C.R.D.'s refusal to apply the statutory presumption was 
based on an overbroad declaration of a natural parent's constitutional rights. 286 Kan. at 
1058-60. Moreover, the opinion intimated that this court's adoption of the two-sided 
ledger test in K.J.B. was suspect because the K.J.B. opinion did not comment on the 
constitutional considerations in play or discuss the effect on its decision of the statutory 
rebuttable presumption. 286 Kan. at 1050. Nevertheless, G.L.V. avoided explicitly 
disapproving the two-sided ledger paradigm because that "approach [was] not under 
attack in [that] appeal" and because the specific, narrow questions posed in the 
17 
 
 
 
stepfather's petition for review could be answered without such a holding. 286 Kan. at 
1054.  
 
We note, however, that the G.L.V. opinion also cited to the rationale in B.M.W., 
268 Kan. at 880-84, where the court found it persuasive that the legislature had not 
amended K.S.A. 59-2136(d) to set forth an alternative framework to the two-sided ledger 
approach after its judicial pronouncement. See G.L.V., 286 Kan. at 1054. Here, we have 
the 2006 legislative amendment, even though G.L.V. questioned whether that change was 
aimed at the two-sided ledger aspect of the stepparent adoption procedure. Nevertheless, 
this court has not always found that legislative inaction, even for long periods of time, 
precludes the subsequent correction of judicially created rules which are contrary to 
plainly worded statutes. See State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 49-50, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) 
(abrogating judicially created rules governing independent admissibility of K.S.A. 60-455 
evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs notwithstanding legislative inaction for 
decades); see also Casco v. Armour Swift-Eckrich, 283 Kan. 508, 521-29, 154 P.3d 494 
(2007) (abrogating judicially created parallel injury rule notwithstanding legislative 
inaction for 76 years).  
 
This is a circumstance where legislative inaction should not control our decision. 
The two-sided ledger formulation was cut from whole cloth to address a nonexistent 
constitutional infirmity and to fix a situation that was not broken. As G.L.V. explained: 
 
 
"As this discussion of the development of Kansas stepparent adoption law 
demonstrates, we have consistently repeated that all surrounding circumstances are to be 
considered when determining whether a natural parent must consent to a stepparent 
adoption—that is, whether the natural parent has 'assumed[d] the duties of a parent for 
two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption or is incapable 
of giving such consent.' See K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 59-2136(d); B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 882. 
This statement recognizes that there are numerous duties associated with being a parent 
18 
 
 
 
to a child, and all such duties—even though not explicitly enumerated—may be 
considered." 286 Kan. at 1053-54. 
 
Accordingly, we now take the step which was justified by our analysis in G.L.V.; 
we put to rest the artificial constraints of the two-sided ledger approach and return to the 
historical approach of considering "all surrounding circumstances." See G.L.V., 286 Kan. 
at 1044-46, 1049, 1053. Likewise, effect must be given to the plainly stated statutory 
rebuttable presumption  
 
"that if the father, after having knowledge of the child's birth, has knowingly failed to 
provide a substantial portion of the child support as required by judicial decree, when 
financially able to do so, for a period of two years next preceding the filing of the petition 
for adoption, then such father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent." 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d).  
 
Of course, a natural father is still free to argue that the stepparent has failed to 
establish the conditions precedent to the presumption set forth in the statute, such as the 
father's financial ability to pay the judicially decreed child support amount. Or, a natural 
father might still argue that his "showering of affection" on the child or the performance 
of other parental duties has effectively rebutted the statutory presumption emanating from 
financial nonsupport.  
 
Likewise, on the flip side, a district court is not precluded from considering a 
natural father's unfavorable child support payment performance as part of "all of the 
surrounding circumstances," even though all of the conditions for the statutory 
presumption have not been met. In other words, as we call on district courts to do in 
many other contexts, the trial court must look at the totality of the circumstances when 
determining whether a natural father has failed to assume his parental duties under K.S.A. 
2010 Supp. 59-2136(d). 
19 
 
 
 
 
Our modification of the formula for determining whether a parent has failed to 
assume parental duties does not change our decision in G.L.V. that such a failure of 
parental duties must be found before the court can factor in the best interests of the child. 
We stand by our holding that "the best interests of the child as expressed in the 2006 
amendment [to K.S.A. 59-2136(d)] does not trump the requirement that a natural parent 
who has assumed his or her parental responsibilities must consent before a stepparent 
adoption can be granted." 286 Kan. at 1063. 
 
What remains to be determined is the role that fitness of the nonconsenting parent 
should play in the stepparent adoption procedure. Contrary to Stepfather's assertion about 
the dicta in G.L.V., that opinion included an explicit disclaimer: 
 
 
"We observe that our decision in this case does not extend to the statutory 
language in the amendment dealing with the 'fitness of the nonconsenting parent.' K.S.A. 
2007 Supp. 59-2136(d). Unfitness was simply not an issue in this case. As the district 
court noted in its decision, there was no allegation of unfitness of the natural father. No 
evidence was presented on this issue upon hearing before the district court, and the 
stepfather has raised no question of unfitness on appeal. Thus, we do not in this opinion 
determine what the legislature intended by this phrase, except to acknowledge that the 
fitness of a nonconsenting parent is a much different question." 286 Kan. at 1063-64. 
 
Perhaps the logically consistent approach would be to treat the fitness factor the 
same as the best-interests-of-the-child factor and direct that the district court must make a 
finding on whether the natural father has assumed parental duties within the preceding 2 
years, i.e., whether the natural father's consent is required, before looking at the fitness of 
the natural father. The problem with that approach is finding a purpose to be served by a 
parental fitness assessment at that stage of the proceeding. See State v. Trautloff, 289 
Kan. 793, 797, 217 P.3d 15 (2009) (courts presume legislature does not intend to enact 
20 
 
 
 
useless or meaningless legislation); see also State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 
P.3d 240 (2008) (when legislature revises existing law, court presumes legislature 
intended to change law as it existed prior to amendment).  
 
In G.L.V., we recognized the dilemma of finding a purpose for the 2006 
amendments when we said that  
 
"[t]he additional language expressly authorizing a court to consider the best interests of 
the child in determining whether to grant a stepparent adoption provides the court with 
additional discretionary powers to consider the best interests of the child in denying the 
adoption—even where a natural parent has not assumed the duties of a parent as 
articulated by this court—for unique reasons." (Emphasis added.) 286 Kan. at 1064.  
 
The opinion then set forth some examples of where it might be best not to grant the 
stepparent an adoption, even though the natural father's consent is not required because of 
a failure to assume parental duties. Unfortunately, that stated purpose does not translate 
well to explain why the fitness of the nonconsenting parent language was included in the 
2006 amendment.  
 
It makes scant sense to say that a stepparent adoption may proceed without the 
natural father's consent because he has failed to assume his parental duties, i.e., his 
parental rights may be terminated for unfitness, yet the district court has the discretion to 
deny the adoption because of the fitness of the nonconsenting parent. How can the natural 
father be at once unfit for purposes of excusing consent but fit for purposes of denying 
the adoption? Likewise, if the unfitness factor was meant to refer to acts or omissions 
more than 2 years prior to the filing of the stepparent adoption petition, then the 2-year 
language in 59-2136(d) is rendered meaningless and that subsection becomes the 
equivalent of the subsection (h) termination provisions.  
 
21 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, we must attempt to find a resolution to the ambiguities which the 
legislature has created and declined to remedy. Such a resolution cannot produce a bright-
line rule, easy of application. We must attempt to read the added language permitting 
consideration of the fitness of the nonconsenting parent in conjunction with the mandate 
to determine from all of the surrounding circumstances whether the natural parent has 
assumed his or her parental duties. Accordingly, we hold that a natural parent's unfitness 
will not obviate the need for his or her consent to a stepparent adoption, unless the district 
court finds that the unfitness has prevented the natural parent from assuming the duties of 
a parent for 2 consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption. For 
instance, a father may be communicating with his children on more than an incidental 
basis quantitatively, but because of the father's unfitness the contacts might be deemed to 
be psychologically or emotionally abusive for the children. In such an event, the district 
court might find that the natural father has failed to assume his parental duty of 
safeguarding his children's physical, mental, or emotional health. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 
38-2202(d) (definition of a child in need of care).  
 
Before moving on, we pause to note that Stepfather also mentioned the argument 
in Judge Marquardt's Court of Appeals dissent that suggested that the word "must" in 59-
2136(d) should be read as "may." See J.M.D., 41 Kan. App. 2d at 175. We presume the 
argument is addressed to the portion of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d) that says "the 
consent of such father must be given to the adoption unless such father has failed or 
refused to assume the duties of a parent . . . ." (Emphasis added.) If so, we need not 
extend the discussion. The context in which the word "must" is used in that phrase leaves 
no room for speculation; it was intended to convey that the consent is mandatory.  
 
22 
 
 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that "[w]hether a parent has refused or 
failed to assume parental duties for the 2 years prior to the filing of the adoption petition 
presents a question of fact." J.M.D., 41 Kan. App. 2d at 165. However, the panel found 
insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding on that question and reversed. 
See 41 Kan. App. 2d at 170. 
 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
Stepfather argues that the panel applied the incorrect standard of review and 
inappropriately retried the facts of the case. Citing to In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 705, 
187 P.3d 594 (2008), he contends the correct standard should be: "whether after a review 
of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioners, a rational fact 
finder could have found that [sic] the determination to be highly probable." Stepfather's 
proposed standard applies to child in need of care determinations; the proper appellate 
standard of review for stepparent adoptions is for substantial competent evidence. See 
286 Kan. at 702; see also B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 882-83 ("Under K.S.A. 59-2136(d), 
whether a parent has refused or failed to assume parental duties for 2 years prior to filing 
an adoption petition is a question of fact, reviewed on appeal only to determine whether 
the decision is supported by substantial competent evidence."). 
 
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court should not reweigh 
the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the appellate court should 
review the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below to 
ascertain whether the trial court's decision is properly supported by substantial competent 
evidence. In re Adoption of A.J.P., 24 Kan. App. 2d 891, 892-93, 953 P.2d 1387 (1998). 
In other words, appellate review of factual questions should accord a great deal of 
23 
 
 
 
deference to the trial judge's determination, even in those instances where the appellate 
jurists might have decided the case differently. 
 
 
B.  Analysis 
 
Given the Court of Appeals' reliance on G.L.V., it might be helpful to begin by 
pointing out some rather significant distinctions between that case and the one currently 
before us. There, the district court specifically found that there was no evidence that the 
father was an unfit parent. See G.L.V., 286 Kan. at 1064 (no evidence presented on issue 
of unfitness in district court and no allegation of unfitness raised on appeal). Here, the 
district court declared that the stepfather had established the father's unfitness by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, in G.L.V. the district court denied the stepparent 
adoption petition based upon its finding that the natural father's consent was required. 
The decisions of both the Court of Appeals and this court affirmed the trial court's 
determination that the natural father had assumed his parental duties within the 2 years 
preceding the adoption proceedings. In contrast, here, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's granting of the adoption, overruling the trial judge's finding that Father 
had not assumed his parental duties within the 2 years preceding the adoption. That result 
required the Court of Appeals to find that, even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Stepfather (who prevailed below) and without reweighing evidence or 
assessing witness credibility, there was insufficient competent evidence to support the 
trial court's determination of a failure of parental duties. See J.M.D., 41 Kan. App. 2d at 
170. We disagree with that assessment based on all of the surrounding circumstances. 
 
We do agree, however, that the evidence did not support the district court's finding 
that Stepfather had established nonpayment of child support sufficient to trigger K.S.A. 
24 
 
 
 
2010 Supp. 59-2136(d)'s rebuttable presumption of a nonassumption of parental duties. In 
G.L.V., we reiterated that adoption statute provisions purporting to eliminate the necessity 
of a natural parent's consent to adopt based on the parent's failure to fulfill parental 
obligations must be "'strictly construed in favor of maintaining the rights of natural 
parents.'" 286 Kan. at 1042 (quoting B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 881-82). Accordingly, Father's 
nonperformance must literally meet all of the stated conditions of the statutory 
presumption. 
 
For the presumption to arise, the father's failure to provide a substantial portion of 
the judicially decreed child support must have been for the 2-year period immediately 
preceding the filing of the adoption petition. As the Court of Appeals noted, after Father's 
judicially decreed child support was lowered to $5 per month, he paid all of that amount 
for the last 10 months before the adoption proceedings commenced. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 
166. There was not 2 consecutive years of nonpayment of court-ordered child support, 
even though the modified court order may have been obtained by withholding 
information about the $105 monthly veteran's benefits. Under a strict and literal reading 
of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 59-2136(d), the circumstances necessary to create the statutory 
rebuttable presumption were simply not present. 
  
Where we part company with the Court of Appeals opinion is its declaration that 
"the statute does not require a parent to provide court-ordered child support to the extent 
to which the parent is financially able in order to establish such parent has assumed his or 
her duties under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 59-2136(d)." 41 Kan. App. 2d at 167. The panel 
suggests that if Father can establish that he was financially unable to pay a substantial 
portion of the premodification court-ordered amount of $254 per month, then he had no 
duty as a parent to pay any amount of support. To the contrary, even if the statutory 
presumption is not in effect, a parent still has a duty to support his or her child to the 
extent to which the parent is financially able. See State ex rel. Secretary of SRS v. Bohrer, 
25 
 
 
 
286 Kan. 898, 906, 189 P.3d 1157 (2008) ("Parents have a common-law duty to support 
their minor children, regardless of any statute imposing such an obligation."). Before 
modification, Father had a parental duty to pay as much of the $254 as he was able. 
Further, he had an obligation to disclose the existence of his $105 per month veteran's 
payments when the court was modifying child support and he had a duty to pay as much 
of his $125 per month income as he was financially able to pay, both before and after the 
modification of the judicially decreed amount. Father did not pay all that he could, and 
the evidence supports the district court's finding that child support payments were 
incidental and insufficient to establish an assumption of parental duty. 
 
With respect to the emotional support aspect of parental duties, the Court of 
Appeals engaged in a quantitative analysis of the contacts Father had with the children 
during the 2 years preceding the adoption. The panel opined, apparently based on its 
interpretation of G.L.V., that "we do not consider, and are prohibited from considering in 
this stepparent adoption proceeding, the events leading up to Father's incarceration or his 
fitness as a parent in light of the events that transpired." J.M.D., 41 Kan. App. 2d at 170. 
We disagree.  
 
The parental duty involved is to provide for and nurture the children's mental and 
emotional health, rather than to simply make frequent contact with the children. A father 
who verbally berates and abuses his child is not assuming a parental duty, even if that 
contact is made three times a day. Moreover, an assessment of the effect on the child of 
the contact and communications between father and child cannot be divorced from their 
prior relationship, e.g., a child having observed his father kill another child. 
 
The district court in this case had the opportunity to hear all of the witnesses, 
including the children's counselor and treating psychologist. We are unprepared to say 
that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to granting the adoption, that the 
26 
 
 
 
evidence was insufficient to establish that Father had failed to assume the parental duty of 
providing for his children's psychological and emotional health in the 2 years next 
preceding the adoption petition. Accordingly, we affirm the district court and reverse the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
ATTORNEY FEES 
 
In the Court of Appeals, court-appointed counsel for the indigent natural father 
sought attorney fees and costs. The panel noted that the trial court had awarded attorney 
fees to Father's trial counsel as costs of the action, which were then assessed against the 
Stepfather, as petitioner. Citing to In re Adoption of D.S.D., 28 Kan. App. 2d 686, 687-
88, 19 P.3d 204 (2001), the panel opined that "the district court below had the authority 
to assess the fees of Father's court-appointed trial counsel against Stepfather." J.M.D., 41 
Kan. App. 2d at 172-73. Therefore, the panel found that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
7.07(b) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 62), the Court of Appeals had discretionary authority to 
assess against Stepfather the attorney fees of Father's court-appointed appellate counsel. 
41 Kan. App. 2d at 173. However, the panel exercised its discretion to reduce the claimed 
hourly rate of $200 to the rate established for court-appointed attorneys in criminal cases, 
which was $80 per hour. The resulting total award was $3,941.76. See 41 Kan. App. 2d at 
173-74. 
 
Neither party has sought review of the Court of Appeals' ruling on those appellate 
attorney fees. However, Father's court-appointed attorney has moved this court for 
additional fees in connection with the petition for review proceedings. That motion is 
timely under Supreme Court Rule 7.07(b) and is accompanied by the required affidavit. 
Father's attorney claims to have performed 16 hours of professional services and to have 
advanced $245.91 in costs. Again, the attorney requests to be paid at the customary 
27 
 
 
 
billing rate in Sedgwick County of $200 per hour, which counsel contends is consistent 
with her experience and ability. 
 
Stepfather's response to the motion for attorney fees is somewhat obtuse and takes 
the form of four statements. The first statement is that the "birth father filed the appeal 
and therefore he should be ordered to bear the attorney's fees for his counsel." Of course, 
that was an argument to make in the Court of Appeals. It is the Stepfather who filed the 
petition for review in this court, causing Father to incur additional attorney fees. 
 
Stepfather's second point is that "the trial counsel fees should have been adjusted 
under the Court of Appeals' holding but that type of authority was not available to the 
trial court." We confess to some confusion as to how that point impacts the decision 
before us. We do, however, understand Stepfather's third point, which is essentially that 
this court should follow the lead of the Court of Appeals and approve a lower fee. 
Finally, in his fourth point, Stepfather advises that he has lost his job but continues to 
support the two children involved in this appeal, as well as three others. 
 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that "it may appear harsh to require a 
prospective adoptive parent to pay attorney fees for an attorney appointed to represent the 
parental rights of [an] indigent biological parent." 41 Kan. App. 2d at 173. Accordingly, 
the panel ameliorated that harshness by adjusting the hourly rate to comport with criminal 
defense appointments. We concur with that method of balancing the interests of all 
concerned. Therefore, we award attorney fees at the hourly rate of $80, which results in 
an assessment of fees and costs against Stepfather for the proceedings in connection with 
the petition for review of $1,525.91. 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed; judgment 
of the district court is affirmed. 
28 
 
 
 
 
DAVIS, C.J., concurs in the result.