Title: Bravo v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bravo v. State1995 WY 96897 P.2d 1303Case Number: 94-179Decided: 06/21/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Richard 
Manuel BRAVO,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender; Gerald Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid Program; and Patti 
Pennock, Student Intern, argued, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen.; 
Sylvia Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen.; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.; and 
Mark T. Moran, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to the charge of grand larceny while 
reserving the right on appeal to seek review of the district court's ruling on 
his motion to suppress. The issue we decide is whether the district court erred 
in determining that Officer Simpson made no promises to appellant and finding 
appellant was not induced to confess and return the stolen 
items.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3]      On December 29, 
1993, Officer Simpson of the Jackson Police Department investigated a reported 
larceny at the Jackson Bootlegger. The owner, Rhonda Bailey, had reported items 
missing and that appellant, who was an employee, had been observed at the store 
in "suspicious circumstances."

[¶4]      Officer Simpson 
located appellant at the residence of appellant's girlfriend where he 
occasionally stayed. Officer Simpson introduced himself as a police officer with 
the Jackson Police Department and asked if he could speak privately with 
appellant. The two of them stepped outside onto the porch, where appellant was 
advised that Rhonda Bailey had reported clothing items were missing from the 
Jackson Bootlegger; that appellant had been observed in suspicious 
circumstances; and that many of the items were in his size. Officer Simpson then 
asked appellant if he knew anything about the missing items. Appellant 
immediately dropped his head, stated to Officer Simpson that he had "really 
screwed up," and stated that he had taken several of the missing items. Officer 
Simpson further advised that Ms. Bailey was concerned about the missing items; 
that she wanted the items back; that she had a hard time pointing the finger at 
appellant; and that he did not know what Ms. Bailey's intentions were. 
Thereafter, appellant turned over all the missing items to Officer Simpson, 
albeit not all at once.

[¶5]      The total value 
of the items appropriated from the Jackson Bootlegger approximated $7,000.00. 
Upon learning the extent of the quantity and value, Ms. Bailey elected to press 
charges. Appellant was arrested and charged with grand 
larceny.

[¶6]      During a motion 
to suppress hearing, appellant argued that his admission to the theft was 
induced by a promise not to prosecute by Officer Simpson. Antithetically, the 
court found the admission voluntary, and appellant thereafter entered his 
conditional plea of guilty.

MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS

[¶7]      It is well 
established that when reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress,

[f]indings on factual issues made by the district 
court considering a motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 378 (Wyo. 1989); Roose v. 
State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). * * * Since the district court conducts 
the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to: assess the 
credibility of the witnesses; the weight given the evidence; and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the district court's determination. United States v. 
Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1406 (10th Cir. 1990).

Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). See also Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350, 354 (Wyo. 1993); 
United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1551 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United 
States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 730 (10th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Evans, 
937 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991)).

[¶8]      Statements are 
made voluntarily if they are the product of a free and deliberate choice rather 
than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 
(Wyo. 1993). We determine voluntariness by examining the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the confession. Id.; Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 141 
(Wyo. 1986). The State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a confession was voluntary. However, the movant at a suppression 
hearing may be required to go forward with evidence on the issue of the 
involuntariness of his confession and the State may then rebut the issue. Garcia 
v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 605 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶9]      At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Simpson related his conversation with and demeanor 
toward appellant before appellant confessed to the theft. Officer Simpson 
testified that he made no promises; informed appellant that he did not know what 
Ms. Bailey's intentions were; and that the words "prosecute" and "pressing 
charges" were not used.

[¶10]   Appellant testified that Officer 
Simpson told him that he was not under arrest when he came to talk to him; that 
he was not intimidated or scared by Officer Simpson's demeanor during their 
discussion; and that Officer Simpson told him that if he returned all of the 
stolen items, Ms. Bailey would not be interested in "pressing charges." Upon 
hearing that Ms. Bailey would not press charges, appellant admitted to the theft 
and returned the stolen items.

[¶11]   At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the district court ruled:

The court finds that there was no custodial 
interrogation in this matter, certainly at least until the point that Mr. Bravo 
was advised of his Miranda rights and perhaps not even thereafter. In any event, 
whether or not the interrogation became custodial at some point Mr. Bravo's 
admissions were voluntary, they were not produced by threats or improper 
influences or promises.

I cannot find anything from anything I have heard 
here today that was a promise made by Mr. Simpson to Mr. Bravo that he would not 
be prosecuted or that charges would be pressed. Officer Simpson has very 
unequivocally stated from the stand that he did not do that. He explained the 
testimony at the preliminary hearing, and I do not find that Mr. Bravo's 
confessions and the statements he made were the result of any promises. Quite to 
the contrary. They were voluntary.

Essentially, the district 
court was faced with a situation where two parties testified to two different 
versions of what occurred. "[R]esolution of conflicting evidence is within the 
province of the [district] court, and its findings must be given great weight 
when considered in light of its opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses." 
Garcia, 777 P.2d  at 606. The district court considered the totality of the 
circumstances, assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 
given to their testimony, and made the necessary inferences, deductions and 
conclusions therewith. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err 
in finding that appellant's admission to the theft was 
voluntary.

[¶12]   Affirmed.