Title: Jones v. Lenoir City Car Works

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

392 S.W.2d 671 (1965) Dailey E. JONES, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. LENOIR CITY CAR WORKS, Defendant-in-Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. July 14, 1965. Acuff & Acuff, Knoxville, for plaintiff in error. Donaldson, Montgomery & Kennerly, Knoxville, for defendant in error. CHATTIN, Justice. Plaintiff-in-error, Dailey E. Jones, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, brought this action for workmen's compensation benefits due to an alleged occupational disease, silicosis, contracted in the course of his employment against the defendant, Lenoir City Car Works. The defendant relied upon the one year statute of limitations which, after a hearing, was sustained by the trial judge and dismissed petitioner's suit. Petitioner has perfected an appeal in error to this Court. The errors assigned complain of the action of the trial judge in admitting an extrajudicial statement of petitioner into evidence; and that there is no material evidence to support the judgment. The facts are petitioner was sixty-one years of age at the time of the trial, June *672 24, 1964. He had an eighth grade education. He was employed by the defendant as a coremaker. Sand and silicate clays were used to make the cores. In the process of making the cores, dust ladened with airborne particles of silicate was created. It is the theory of the petitioner the breathing of the silicate dust caused the contraction of silicosis. Petitioner had worked on and off for the defendant over a period of forty years. Approximately eight years prior to the trial, he was examined by defendant's physician and x-rays were made of his chest. He was told at this time he should quit smoking and drinking. Periodically during this period of time, the defendant's physician had examined and taken x-rays of petitioner's chest. During the month of January 1963 he was examined twice by the defendant's physician. At no time was he advised by the physician of the condition of his health. Petitioner testified at the trial, as follows: He testified on his pre-trial deposition, which is filed in the record, as follows: He had been under the care of Dr. Harold D. Freedman since May 1962. Dr. Freedman had treated him for "hypertension and extreme weakness with shortness of breath." In May 1963, he went to Dr. Robert W. Newman, who hospitalized him and made tests at the University of Tennessee Hospital. He was in the hospital for about five days after which, he returned to work. He worked for two weeks, but pain in his chest grew worse and he quit his work on July 19, 1963. Eight weeks after the tests were run at the hospital, Dr. Newman informed petitioner he silicosis. After petitioner quit work he made application for retirement benefits. On August 30, 1963, petitioner was requested to make a statement as to his application for retirement. His statement was recorded on a dictaphone recorder. In answer to questions of Mr. T.C. Mims, Claim Agent, petitioner stated he had had shortness of breath for about five or six years and that it had progressively become worse. He also stated he had always thought this condition was caused from inhaling the silicate dust. *673 He further admitted he had talked with Mr. J.E. Griffith, Claim Agent, in January and February of 1960; and that Griffith told him at first he had a "cavity" in his right lung. That on the second occasion he talked with Griffith he told him he had a spot on his lung. Counsel objected to the introduction of the foregoing extrajudicial statements on the grounds that petitioner was not represented by Counsel at the time and the statements were not under oath. The trial judge overruled the objection. The record shows, however, on the trial of the case, petitioner, on cross examination, admitted the truth of the statements. It is settled that in this State that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible for the purposes of impeachment and testing the credibilty of the witness, but are not to be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein. Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917); King v. State, 187 Tenn. 431, 215 S.W.2d 813 (1948); Rhea v. State, 208 Tenn. 559, 347 S.W.2d 486 (1961). But, where the witness, on cross examination and under oath, affirms the truth of the extrajudicial statements, he is then subject to the safeguards of the hearsay rule, and the statements may then be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. McFarlin v. State, 214 Tenn. 613, 381 S.W.2d 922 (1964). Moreover, "[a]ny statement, whether oral or written, made by or attributable to a party to an action, which constitutes an admission against his interest and tends to establish or disprove any material fact in the case, is competent evidence against him in such action." 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 272, page 697; Nelson v. Rural Educational Ass'n. 23 Tenn. App. 409, 134 S.W.2d 181 (1939). We are of the opinion the trial judge was not in error in admitting this evidence. We overrule petitioner's assignment on this point. We now consider whether there is any material evidence to support the finding of the trial judge petitioner's action was barred by the statute of limitations of one year. T.C.A. Section 50-1108 provides: In construing the foregoing provision this Court, in the case of Adams v. American Zinc Company, 205 Tenn. 189, 326 S.W.2d 425 (1959), said: "[T]hat `the beginning' of the incapacity for work resulting from an occupational disease, within the meaning of Section 50-1108, T.C.A., is when such occupational disease, with the knowledge of the employee, or knowledge that he should have had in the exercise of reasonable caution, that he has an occupational disease and that it has injuriously affected his capacity to work to a degree amounting to a compensable disability." Petitioner testified at the trial the first time he realized he had silicosis was when Dr. Newman told him. He thought he was suffering from bronchitis. However, in the statement to Mr. Mims he testified, as follows: From the foregoing admission and the other testimony of petitioner, it is apparent petitioner knew he had a spot and silica dust on his right lung almost four years prior to the filing of his petition in December 1963; that he thought he had an occupational disease; that it was necessary for him to rest at intervals during his working hours; and that due to the condition of his lung his capacity to work had been affected. The record also shows that Mr. Griffith suggested to petitioner that he retire. But petitioner stated he would not make application for retirement because he would have to see a doctor. He did not see a doctor until May 1962. Thus, it is our opinion there is material evidence to support the finding of the trial court that petitioner, more than one year prior to the filing of his petition in this *676 cause, had knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable caution should have had knowledge he was suffering from an occupational disease, and that the disease had injuriously affected his capacity to work to a degree amounting to a compensable disability. This Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burnett, said: Again, in the case of Hartwell Motor Company v. Hickerson, 160 Tenn. 513, 26 S.W.2d 153 (1930), the following was quoted with approval: In the case of Riley v. Knoxville Iron Company, 178 Tenn. 107, 156 S.W.2d 398 (1941), this Court approved the following rule: In White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, Inc., 210 Tenn. 449, 360 S.W.2d 12, this Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice White, said: There being material evidence in the record to support the finding by the trier of the facts that petitioner knew, or by the exercise of reasonable caution should have known, that he had an occupational disease which had "injuriously affected his capacity to work to a degree amounting to a compensable disability" for more than one year prior to the filing of his petition herein, we must overrule petitioner's assignment of error on this point. It results all assignments are overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs. BURNETT, C.J., and WHITE, DYER and HOLMES, JJ., concur.