Title: In re B.M.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re B.M.  (95-087); 165 Vt 331; 682 A.2d 477

[Opinion Filed 05-Jul-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 5-Jul-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                            No. 95-087


In re B.M., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Family Court

                                             April Term, 1996


Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for appellant father

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Barbara L.
  Grippen, Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for appellee Department of
  Social and Rehabilitation Services

       Charles S. Martin of Martin and Paolini, Barre, for appellee Juvenile


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.   This termination-of-parental-rights case poses painfully
  difficult questions.  Father, who did not play a significant caretaking
  role in this child's early life, has overcome substance abuse problems and
  stabilized his life, and now believes he can act as a parent to his young
  daughter.  The child, now almost nine years old, has been in the custody of
  the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) for over five
  years, living with the same foster parents for that time.  In such cases,
  there are no good solutions, but this case is particularly troubling given
  the prolonged uncertainty that this child has endured.  Father raises
  salient criticisms of the family court's decision, which we address and to
  some extent accept.  Nonetheless, we affirm the court's order terminating
  father's residual parental rights.(FN1)

                                I.

 

       SRS first became involved with this family in the summer of 1990, when
  the child was almost three.  Her mother reported to SRS that the child had
  been abused by a family friend. SRS opened a voluntary protective services
  case because of concerns that the child was not adequately supervised and
  that mother had problems with substance abuse.  For the next few months, an
  SRS social worker made monthly home visits and met with mother.  Father was
  sometimes present during these visits, but made no effort to talk with the
  social worker and was not identified as a primary caregiver for the child. 
  During this time, father was on probation following a burglary conviction,
  and repeatedly tested positive for cocaine.  He was also charged with
  assaulting mother, but the charges were dropped when the state's attorney
  was unable to subpoena mother to testify.

       In April 1991, the situation became critical.  A police officer was
  called to mother's home on a charge of unlawful trespass, and  found father
  there visibly intoxicated.  Mother was also intoxicated, and the police
  confiscated evidence of cocaine use. Neighbors reported that the parents
  were constantly drinking and abusing drugs, and that the child was left
  unsupervised. The next morning, the social worker and a police detective
  visited the home and found it in total disarray, with trash, garbage, and
  beer cans strewn throughout the apartment.  Both parents were visibly hung
  over, and mother admitted that they had been partying for several days. 
  The child was filthy and hungry.  She was taken into protective custody,
  and an emergency detention order was issued the same day.

       The child was found to be in need of supervision by agreement of the
  parties.  Neither parent appeared for a scheduled disposition hearing.  The
  first disposition report prepared by SRS recommended substance abuse
  treatment for both parents, participation in a parent education program,
  and father's  successful completion of probation.  At father's request, the 
  report was amended to focus more on reunification with him, because of
  mother's lack of cooperation.  The primary goal set  for both parents was
  attaining sobriety.  The plan anticipated reunification by mid-November of
  1991.

 

       At that time father was not complying with either his probation
  requirements or the case plan.  He disappeared for a time in September, not
  showing up for his job, not reporting to his probation officer, not showing
  up for visits with the child, and not going to his treatment program at the
  University of Vermont. He later resumed treatment, but continued to test
  positive for cocaine and was discharged from the program for noncompliance
  in November 1991.  He re-entered the program the next month, again testing
  positive for cocaine, and no-showed for most of his urine tests in January
  1992.  Also in January, he was arrested and charged with aggravated assault
  based on an incident involving mother's new boyfriend.  In February, the
  SRS  caseworker decided that the case plan goal should be changed to
  termination of parental rights because of the child's need for  permanence
  and the parents' failure to engage in treatment.  That  change was made in
  April 1992, at the twelve-month plan review.

       SRS waited six months, however, to file the petition for termination
  of parental rights. Father pursued an administrative appeal of the case
  plan goal but was unsuccessful.  The court proceedings were delayed for
  almost two years due to a number of pretrial motions.  The court did not
  begin hearings on the petition for termination of parental rights until
  April 1994. The hearings concluded in August 1994, and the court issued its
  decision five months later.

       By the time of the hearings, father had made significant positive
  changes in his life.  He had been sober for over two years, was regularly
  employed, and had been discharged from drug treatment and from probation. 
  He had married in 1993, and he and his wife were in the process of buying a
  house.  Nonetheless, SRS continued to prosecute the
  termination-of-parental-rights petition, maintaining that father's
  improvement had come too late  given the child's need for permanency, and
  that at any rate  father was still unable to adequately parent his daughter
  because of her special needs.

       Two procedural issues in this case merit special attention. First,
  although we draw our description of the facts from the family court's
  findings, we are concerned that the court in this difficult and close case
  chose to adopt SRS's proposed findings  essentially verbatim.  Even the 

 

  conclusions of law were altered only slightly from the proposed conclusions
  submitted by SRS. A court's adoption of a party's proposed findings is not
  error, and the findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
  See V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2).  Nonetheless, this was, in the court's words, a
  "tough case," one that the court took five months to decide.  Under these
  circumstances, it would have been better for all concerned, including this
  Court, if the decision below reflected the court's independent evaluation
  of the case.

       The length of time the court took to issue the decision raises the
  other troubling procedural issue: the unreasonable and unconscionable delay
  that this child has endured while waiting for a final decision about her
  future and her relationship with her natural father.  The problem began
  with SRS's inexplicable  six-month delay in filing the petition for
  termination of parental rights, and continued with the numerous pretrial
  motions that slowed the progress of this case.  The five days of hearings
  were held over a five-month span, and as already mentioned, the court did
  not issue a decision until another five months had passed.  Nor has the
  appeal progressed as rapidly as possible, because of extensions of time for
  filing the briefs. Each of the parties contributed to this problem, and the
  court system must also take its share of the blame.  The tragic result,
  however, is that our decision issues more than five years after this child,
  then only three, was removed from her home and placed with foster parents. 
  The harm that this child has suffered by remaining in limbo for so many
  years cannot be undone.

       We also recognize that, at this writing, nearly two years have passed
  since the hearings were held.  To some extent, we have assumed that the
  status quo has continued, specifically that the child still lives with the
  same foster parents and that father has continued to abstain from drug use. 
  We have no way of knowing what has happened in the past two years, however,
  and base our decision only on the evidence before the family court.

                                     II.

       Termination of residual parental rights at a modification hearing
  requires a two-step analysis.  In re M.M., 159 Vt. 517, 521, 621 A.2d 1276,
  1279 (1993).  In order to modify the 

 

  existing disposition order, the court must first find that "changed 
  circumstances so require in the best interests of the child."  33  V.S.A. §
  5532(a).  Modification is warranted where there has been a substantial
  change in material circumstances, which is "`most  often found when the
  parent's ability to care properly for the  child has either stagnated or
  deteriorated.'"  In re M.M., 159  Vt. at 521, 621 A.2d  at 1279 (quoting In
  re H.A., 153 Vt. 504, 515, 572 A.2d 884, 890 (1990)).  A finding that a
  parent has made some progress does not, however, preclude a finding of
  changed circumstances.  In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 181-82,