Title: State of Florida v. Bruce Belvin

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-593 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
BRUCE BELVIN,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 1, 2008] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  In its 
decision the district court ruled upon the following question, which was certified to 
be of great public importance: 
DOES ADMISSION OF THOSE PORTIONS OF THE BREATH 
TEST AFFIDAVIT PERTAINING TO THE BREATH TEST 
OPERATOR‘S PROCEDURES AND OBSERVATIONS IN 
ADMINISTERING THE BREATH TEST CONSTITUTE 
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND VIOLATE THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT‘S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN LIGHT OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT‘S HOLDING IN 
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)? 
 
 
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Id. at 1054.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons that follow we approve the decision of the Fourth District and answer the 
certified question in the affirmative. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Bruce Belvin was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI).  At a non-
jury trial in county court, the breath test technician, Rebecca Smith, who 
administered the breath test and prepared the breath test affidavit, did not testify.  
The breath test affidavit was admitted over Belvin‘s objections that the technician 
should be present and subject to cross-examination.  Belvin appealed his 
conviction and sentence to the circuit court arguing the failure to have the breath 
technician testify in person at trial violated his right to confrontation as espoused in 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  The circuit court affirmed the 
conviction and ruled that the breath test affidavit was not testimonial in nature and 
that Crawford did not preclude its admission.   
 
Belvin next sought certiorari review in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, 
which found admission of certain portions of the breath test affidavit during 
Belvin‘s criminal trial violated his constitutional right to confrontation under 
Crawford.  The district court noted that breath test affidavits are usually prepared 
by law enforcement agencies for use in criminal trials or driver‘s license 
revocation proceedings.  See Belvin, 922 So. 2d at 1050-51.  Thus, the court 
 
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opined that such affidavits qualify as statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.  Id.  Thus, the Fourth District 
remanded the cause for a new trial and certified the question to this Court for our 
review.   
DISCUSSION 
The State first contends breath test affidavits are not testimonial and that 
technician Smith‘s breath test affidavit in this case was admissible under Crawford.  
Conversely, Belvin argues the breath test affidavit pertaining to the breath test 
operator‘s procedures and observations are testimonial evidence.  Thus, the 
affidavit is inadmissible under Crawford.  We will first address whether breath test 
affidavits are testimonial to determine whether technician Smith‘s breath test 
affidavit in this case was admissible under Crawford. 
 
In order to introduce breath test results as evidence in a DUI prosecution, the 
State must first present evidence that the test was performed substantially in 
accordance with approved methods, that is, by a person trained and qualified to 
conduct it, on an approved machine that has been tested and inspected.  See State 
v. Donaldson, 579 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1991).  Sections 316.1934(5) and 90.803(8), 
Florida Statutes (2007), provide for the introduction of affidavits containing the 
necessary evidentiary foundation as a public records exception to the hearsay rule.  
 
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Such an affidavit is admissible without further authentication and is presumptive 
proof of the results of an authorized test to determine alcohol content of the blood 
or breath of a defendant.  § 316.1934(5), Fla. Stat.  The affidavit must contain the 
following: 
(a) The type of test administered and the procedures followed; 
(b) The time of the collection of the blood or breath sample 
analyzed; 
(c) The numerical results of the test indicating the alcohol 
content of the blood or breath; 
(d) The type and status of any permit issued by the Department 
of Law Enforcement which was held by the person who performed the 
test; and  
(e) If the test was administered by means of a breath testing 
instrument, the date of performance of the most recent required 
maintenance on such instrument.  
 
Id.  The statute also provides that the law enforcement agency shall provide a form 
for the affidavit and that the person tested may subpoena the person who 
administered the test as an adverse witness at a civil or criminal trial.  Id.   
 
Section 90.803(8), Florida Statutes (2007), is the public records and reports 
exception to the hearsay rule.  It excludes from hearsay the following: 
Records, reports, statements reduced to writing, or data compilations, 
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth the activities of 
the office or agency, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by 
law as to matters which there was a duty to report, excluding in 
criminal cases matters observed by a police officer or other law 
enforcement personnel, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances show their lack of trustworthiness.  The criminal case 
exclusion shall not apply to an affidavit otherwise admissible under s. 
316.1934 or s. 327.354.   
 
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§ 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.  An item of evidence that meets the requirements of this 
statutory provision may however be excludable for other reasons.  The 
introductory language to section 90.803 states that items satisfying the 
requirements of this exception are ―not inadmissible‖ merely because the evidence 
is hearsay.  An item of evidence, such as the affidavit involved in this case, may be 
inadmissible for other reasons, including that the use of the affidavit would violate 
the defendant‘s constitutional right of confrontation.  The Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.‖  U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI.  The right guaranteed by this clause of the Sixth Amendment 
differs from the kind of protection that is afforded by state evidence rules 
governing the admission of hearsay.  See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004).  
The standard for determining whether the admission of a hearsay statement 
against a criminal defendant violates the right of confrontation was modified by the 
Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington.  Before Crawford, the Confrontation 
Clause issue was controlled by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  In 
Roberts the Court said that a hearsay statement could be admitted in a criminal trial 
without violating the right of confrontation if it was shown that the declarant was 
unavailable and the out-of-court statement bore adequate indicia of reliability.  
 
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This test focused on the reliability of the statement.  As explained in Roberts, a 
statement had adequate indicia of reliability if it either fell within a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception or if it bore ―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖  Id. 
However, in Crawford, the Supreme Court dispensed with the Roberts 
reliability analysis for testimonial hearsay and held the admission of a hearsay 
statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the Sixth 
Amendment if (1) the statement is testimonial, (2) the declarant is unavailable, and 
(3) the defendant lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.  
The Court emphasized that if ―testimonial‖ evidence is at issue, ―the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required:  unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  ―Only [testimonial 
statements] cause the declarant to be a ‗witness‘ within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.‖  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).  ―It is the 
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, 
while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.‖  Id. 
Thus, we must initially determine whether the breath test affidavit at issue in 
the instant case contains testimonial statements.  While Crawford did not establish 
a precise definition for the term ―testimonial,‖ the Supreme Court provided some 
guidance, holding that, at a minimum, statements are testimonial if the declarant 
 
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made them at a ―preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and 
[in] police interrogations.‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  Following Crawford, the 
Supreme Court established a general rule for determining whether statements are 
testimonial or nontestimonial: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.   
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 822.  The distinction rests on the primary 
purpose of the statement. 
Applying the rationales of Davis and Crawford to the instant case, we 
conclude that the breath test affidavit is testimonial.  First, the affidavit was ―acting 
as a witness‖ against the accused.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; see Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 51.  The technician who created the breath test affidavit did so to prove a critical 
element in Belvin‘s DUI criminal prosecution.  In other words, the breath test 
affidavit was created ―to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.‖  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; see Thomas v. United States, 914 
A.2d 1, 12-13 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 241 (2007).   Second, the 
affidavit was not created during an ongoing emergency or contemporaneously with 
the crime.  Instead, it was created ―well after the criminal events had transpired.‖  
 
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Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 129 (Va. 2008) (Keenan, J., 
dissenting); see Davis, 547 U.S. at 830, 832.  Third, the affidavit was created at the 
request of the police for Belvin‘s DUI prosecution.  See State v. Caulfield, 722 
N.W. 2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo.), cert. 
dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1441 (2007).  Finally, the affidavit falls squarely into the 
category of ―formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,‖ which the 
Supreme Court listed in the various formulations of the core class of ―testimonial‖ 
statements.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).  A breath test affidavit is 
created under circumstances where the technician is expecting it will be used at a 
later trial.  More precisely, the sole purpose of a breath test affidavit is to 
authenticate the results of the test for use at trial.  See § 316.1934(5), Fla. Stat. 
(2007). 
The State argues that a common thread in testimonial statements is that they 
generally contemplate the examination of a declarant and the give-and-take of 
questions and answers.  The State claims the breath test affidavits provided for in 
section 316.1934(5) simply involve a technician‘s observations regarding the 
administration of a breath test, not the examination of a declarant and the give-and-
take of questions and answers.  These arguments are unpersuasive.  A statement 
does not have to be the product of interrogation in order for it to be testimonial.  
Statements, for example, that are voluntarily given to police officers or prosecutors 
 
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by declarants who are subsequently unavailable to testify may be testimonial even 
when they do not involve the ―give-and-take of questions and answers.‖ 
Additionally, the State‘s contention that the breath test affidavits ―simply involve a 
technician‘s observations regarding the administration of a breath test‖ is belied by  
the Fourth District‘s observations concerning what is done in the testing process 
and what is recorded in the affidavit.  The court said:  
Breath testing operators are required to follow certain procedures to 
ensure the reliability of the test results, including maintaining a breath 
test log, observing the defendant for a fixed period of time, and 
analyzing the requisite number of samples within a specified time 
frame.  Their affidavits are based on what they did and observed while 
testing the subject.  Among other things, the affidavit contains the 
technician‘s statement of when he began the period of observation and 
what procedures he followed in conducting the breath test.  These 
recordings are ―testimonial‖ in our view. 
Belvin, 922 So. 2d at 1050-51 (footnote omitted).   
 
A breath test affidavit fits squarely within the definition of ―testimonial‖ 
provided by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington.  While Davis addressed 
the issue in the context of police interrogation, its principles are still applicable to 
this case.  It is also conceivable that the breath test affidavit is, in fact, a type of 
interrogation.  It is after all, a series of structured questions developed by state 
officials and answered by the breath technician who administers the breath test and 
records specific observations made at the time of testing the accused.  ―[T]he 
information recorded by the technician who administered the test is admitted to 
 
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establish a critical element of the crime of driving under the influence.‖  Belvin, 
922 So. 2d at 1051.  Therefore, the type of statements contained in breath test 
affidavits are testimonial under Davis because ―the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.‖  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
The State also argues that the breath test affidavit is more akin to a ―business 
record‖ or ―public record‖ than it is to an ―affidavit,‖ and that Crawford would 
allow admission of business records and some other official records because they 
are not testimonial in nature.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 (―Most of the hearsay 
exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial — for 
example, business records . . . .‖).  The State contends, citing United States v. 
Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985), that the breath test affidavits 
provided for in section 316.1934(5) are routine, objective observations, made as 
part of the everyday function of the preparing official and involve a technician 
mechanically registering an unambiguous factual matter.  While this Court and 
other courts have held that records kept in the ordinary course of business are 
generally admissible, this general rule is not applicable when the record is being 
prepared at the specific request of a law enforcement agency and is not simply a 
 
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record that is normally generated by that business under circumstances that do not 
involve law enforcement. 
For example, in Baber v. State, 775 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2000), a case which 
predates Crawford, we held that admission of a hospital record as a business record 
does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  In Baber, the defendant was charged with 
DUI manslaughter.  The defendant was seriously injured in the accident and his 
blood was ―tested for alcohol content‖ on the hospital‘s chemical analyzer.  Baber, 
775 So. 2d at 259.  The parties agreed the blood test was done for the purpose of 
medical treatment.  The State wanted to introduce the blood alcohol report through 
the hospital‘s medical record custodian ―who laid the necessary foundation through 
the business record hearsay exception.‖  Id.  The report was admitted over the 
defendant‘s objections.  Id.  We said ―that a hospital record of a blood test made 
for medical purposes, which is maintained by the hospital as a medical or business 
record may be admitted in criminal cases pursuant to the business record exception 
to the hearsay rule.‖  Id. at 263.  However, in an abundance of caution and 
apparent foresight, we emphasized that ―defendants must be given a full and fair 
opportunity to contest the trustworthiness of such records before they are submitted 
into evidence.‖  Id.; see also Love v. Garcia, 634 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1994) (holding 
once predicate has been laid for admission of medical records under the business 
 
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record exception to hearsay the opposing party must be given an opportunity to 
prove the untrustworthiness of the records). 
 
However, the district courts of appeal in a number of cases post-Crawford 
have distinguished Baber.  In Johnson v. State, 929 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), 
approved, No. SC06-86 (Fla. May 1, 2008), the defendant opposed the introduction 
of a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (―FDLE‖) lab test through the 
supervisor, not the person who actually performed the test.  The lab report 
indicated that the substance tested was in fact a controlled substance.  The Second 
District Court of Appeal in finding the test result not admissible through the 
supervisor distinguished Baber on the ground that the hospital in Baber did not 
have an interest in the outcome of any future criminal case lodged against the 
defendant.  Johnson, 929 So. 2d at 7.  In other words, the hospital record in Baber 
was made during the ordinary course of the hospital‘s business and not for use in a 
future prosecution.  The court also pointed out that ―[t]he business records 
exception may have been the vehicle for admitting the report, but the vehicle does 
not determine the nature of the out-of-court statement.‖  Id. at 8. 
Similarly, in Rivera v. State, 917 So. 2d 210, 211 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), the 
defendant was convicted for trafficking in cocaine.  On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the trial court erred in introducing an FDLE lab report, which indicated 
that the substance tested was cocaine, through the records custodian, pursuant to 
 
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section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes.  The State in Rivera called a supervisor of the 
chemist who actually performed the test in order to introduce the test into evidence 
because the chemist who actually performed the test was unavailable.  Id.  The 
Fifth District Court of Appeal declined to apply Baber to the case and noted that 
―extending this exception to a FDLE lab records custodian in a criminal 
proceeding would threaten Rivera‘s right under the Confrontation Clause to 
question the witness to ensure a fair trial.‖  Rivera, 917 So. 2d at 212.  The district 
court reasoned that the supervisor ―under cross-examination, could not have 
answered questions concerning chain of custody, methods of scientific testing, and 
analytical procedures regarding the contraband at issue.‖  Id.  The district court 
differentiated between the indicia of reliability of a hospital test on a patient‘s 
blood alcohol level for the benefit of the patient‘s medical treatment with the 
State‘s testing of alleged drug samples to incriminate and convict the accused.  Id.  
In Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the First District Court of 
Appeal found that an FDLE lab report admitted over defense objection violated the 
defendant‘s right to confrontation where the person who performed the test did not 
testify.  The court reasoned that ―[a]pplying Crawford, Florida courts have 
consistently held that records such as the FDLE report before us are testimonial in 
nature.‖  Id. at 1192.   
 
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In two other cases from the Second District, Williams v. State, 933 So. 2d 
1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), and Sobota v. State, 933 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2006), the court confronted the same issue and found that admission of the reports 
without the testimony of the preparer violated the Confrontation Clause.  Both 
cases were reversed and remanded.  And in a case which involved the admission of 
a breath test affidavit, the Second District also found admission of the affidavit by 
a person other than the person who administered the test to be error.  See Williams, 
933 So. 2d at 1283. 
We agree with the analyses of the district courts that these affidavits are 
testimonial. 
The State next argues that even if the breath test affidavit is deemed 
testimonial in nature, there is no Crawford violation because technician Smith was 
unavailable to testify and Belvin waived his opportunity to cross-examine her prior 
to trial by failing to depose her under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.220(h)(1)(D).  This discovery rule permits defendants to take depositions in cases 
involving misdemeanors or criminal traffic offenses when good cause is shown to 
the trial court. 
 
The record in this case demonstrates technician Smith was unavailable at 
trial.  Belvin‘s counsel repeatedly told the trial court that technician Smith was 
―not available to anybody at this point‖ because she allegedly had left the State in 
 
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order to avoid a misdemeanor battery charge.  Because there was no evidence to 
contradict these statements, the State met its burden of showing that technician 
Smith was unavailable at trial.   
 
Because Crawford‘s unavailability prong has been satisfied, we next address 
whether Belvin had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  To support its 
position that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, 
the State cites to Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), 
approved, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S184 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2008).  In Blanton the Fifth 
District held that Crawford‘s goal of preventing the use of statements not 
previously tested through the adversary process can be satisfied by means of a 
discovery deposition.  However, the First District in Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 
693, 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), approved, 974 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2008), rejected the 
conclusion reached in Blanton.  The First District concluded that a discovery 
deposition does not qualify as a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  In the 
decision now under review, the Fourth District relied on Lopez to conclude that 
―the taking of a discovery deposition cannot be treated as a proceeding that affords 
an opportunity for cross-examination.‖  Belvin, 922 So. 2d at 1053 (quoting Lopez, 
888 So. 2d at 701).   
In our review of Blanton and Lopez, we concluded that the exercise of the 
right to take a discovery deposition under rule 3.220 does not serve as the 
 
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functional substitute of in-court confrontation of the witness.  See State v. Lopez, 
974 So. 2d 340, 349-50 (Fla. 2008); Blanton v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S184, 
S186 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2008).  As we explained in Lopez, there are a number of 
reasons why a discovery deposition does not satisfy the opportunity for cross-
examination that is required under Crawford.  See Lopez, 974 So. 2d at 347-50.  
First, rule 3.220(h) was not designed as an opportunity to engage in adversarial 
testing of the evidence against the defendant, nor is the rule customarily used for 
the purpose of cross-examination.  Instead, the rule is used to learn what the 
testimony will be and attempt to limit it or to uncover other evidence and 
witnesses.  A defendant cannot be ―expected to conduct an adequate cross-
examination as to matters of which he first gained knowledge at the taking of the 
deposition.‖  State v. Basiliere, 353 So. 2d 820, 824-25 (Fla. 1977).  This is 
especially true if the defendant is ―unaware that this deposition would be the only 
opportunity he would have to examine and challenge the accuracy of the 
deponent‘s statements.‖  Id. at 824.  Second, a discovery deposition is not intended 
as an opportunity to perpetuate testimony for use at trial, is not admissible as 
substantive evidence at trial, and is only admissible for purposes of impeachment.  
Third, the defendant is not entitled to be present during a discovery deposition 
pursuant to rule 3.220(h).  Based on this analysis, we cannot conclude that Belvin 
 
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waived his opportunity to cross-examine technician Smith by failing to depose her 
under rule 3.220(h)(1)(D). 
Furthermore, even though section 316.1934(5) gives a defendant the right to 
subpoena the breath test operator as an adverse witness at trial, the statutory 
provision does not adequately preserve the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.  Importantly, the burden of proof lies with the state, not the 
defendant.  ―Not only does a defendant have no burden to produce constitutionally 
necessary evidence of guilt, but he has the right to stand silent during the state‘s 
case in chief, all the while insisting that the state‘s proof satisfy constitutional 
requirements.‖  Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901, 908 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), 
approved in part and quashed in part, 33 Fla. L. Weekly S177 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2008). 
Because Crawford‘s requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-
examination has not been satisfied, the admission of those portions of the breath 
test affidavit pertaining to the breath test technician‘s procedures and observations 
in administering the breath test violated Belvin‘s Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation. 
We therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative. 
Other Issue Raised 
 
The State also argues the district court erred in granting certiorari relief 
because the circuit court‘s decision did not violate ―a clearly established principle 
 
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of law.‖  The State contends the principle of law set forth in Crawford is anything 
but clearly established especially when the opinion expressly refrained from 
defining testimonial statement.  Conversely, Belvin asserts the Crawford decision 
was controlling law when the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, 
rendered its opinion.  Thus the Fourth District did not err in concluding that the 
circuit court violated a clearly established principle of law by deciding the case 
contrary to the holding in Crawford. 
The Fourth District summarized the standard for determining whether a 
lower court has violated a clearly established principle of law in the following 
passage: 
 
In Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 
523, 530 (Fla. 1995), the supreme court discussed the standard of 
review that applies when a district court reviews an appellate decision 
of a circuit court.  The court explained that the proper inquiry is 
whether the circuit court afforded the petitioner procedural due 
process and applied the correct law.  Failure to apply the correct law, 
which is synonymous with departure from the essential requirements 
of the law, is something more than a simple legal error.  Id. at 528.  To 
warrant a writ of certiorari, the error must be serious enough to 
constitute a departure from the essential requirements of the law.  Id.  
There must be a violation of a clearly established principle of law 
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.  Id. (citing Combs v. State, 436 
So. 2d 93, 95-96 (Fla. 1983)). 
Belvin, 922 So. 2d at 1048.   
 
Contrary to the State‘s assertions, for purposes of certiorari review a clearly 
established law can derive from recent controlling constitutional law.  See Allstate 
 
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Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003) ( ―‗Clearly established 
law‘ can derive from a variety of legal sources, including recent controlling case 
law, rules of court, statutes, and constitutional law‖).  Moreover, all of the United 
States Supreme Court decisions applying or announcing rules of criminal law must 
be ―applied retroactively to all cases, State or Federal, pending on direct review or 
not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‗clear 
break‘ with the past.‖  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (emphasis 
added); see also Smith v. State, 598 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992) (applying the 
Griffith rule to decisions of the Florida Supreme Court).   
We find no error in the district court‘s resolution of this issue.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we find the portions of the breath test affidavit 
containing the operator‘s procedures and observations in administering the breath 
test are testimonial and their admission at Belvin‘s criminal DUI trial without a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the operator violated his right of confrontation 
under Crawford.  We therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative and 
approve the decision of the Fourth District.   
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur. 
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which BELL, 
J., concurs. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority‘s statement that the breath test technician was 
unavailable and that Belvin did not ―[waive] his opportunity to cross-examine 
technician Smith by failing to depose her under rule 3.220(h)(1)(D).‖  Majority op. 
at 17.  However, because I believe that the majority has extended the Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 
(2006), decisions beyond their intended reach by excluding Belvin‘s breath test 
affidavit, I respectfully dissent.  I would join the well-reasoned decisions of federal 
courts and courts from other states that have concluded that lab reports and 
documents of their kind do not come within the definition of ―testimonial‖ under 
Crawford.  See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007) (discussing this point in 
detail and citing cases).  Moreover, even if this affidavit was testimonial, Belvin 
waived any objection to it by not subpoenaing the technician, which he had a right 
to do under the statute.  In this regard, I would follow the decision of the Colorado 
Supreme Court in Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007). 
 
Crawford has undeniably redefined Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  I 
agree with the majority that our analysis should first be whether the challenged 
affidavit is testimonial.  The United States Supreme Court did not define 
 
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―testimonial‖ in Crawford, though I believe the California Supreme Court‘s 
analysis of the proper definition is correct.  See Geier, 161 P.3d at 133.  Greier set 
forth a three-part analysis for determining when certain evidence is testimonial and 
applied it to the DNA lab report at issue.  I would employ the same analysis and 
rationale here.  The California Supreme Court explained: 
While we have found no single analysis of the applicability of 
Crawford and Davis to the kind of scientific evidence at issue in this 
case to be entirely persuasive, we are nonetheless more persuaded by 
those cases concluding that such evidence is not testimonial, based on 
our own interpretation of Crawford and Davis.  For our purposes in 
this case, involving the admission of a DNA report, what we extract 
from those decisions is that a statement is testimonial if (1) it is made 
to a law enforcement officer or by or to a law enforcement agent and 
(2) describes a past fact related to criminal activity for (3) possible use 
at a later trial.  Conversely, a statement that does not meet all three 
criteria is not testimonial. 
Regarding the first point, as the court noted in Crawford it is the 
―involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial 
evidence‖ that implicates confrontation clause concerns.  (Crawford, 
supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354.)  In this respect, we use the 
term agent not only to designate law enforcement officers but those in 
an agency relationship with law enforcement.  Regarding the third 
point, while the possible use of such statements at a later trial remains 
an important consideration, as we noted in our Cage decision, Davis 
―now confirms that the proper focus [about whether an out-of-court 
statement is testimonial] is not on the mere reasonable chance that an 
out-of-court statement might later be used in a criminal trial.‖  (People 
v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 984, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 
205, fn. 14; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at p. 926 [―A 
reasonable person reporting a domestic disturbance, which is what 
[the victim] in Davis was doing, will be aware that the result is the 
arrest and possible prosecution of the perpetrator. . . .  So it cannot be 
that a statement is testimonial in every case where a declarant 
reasonably expects that it might be used prosecutorially‖ [since the 
 
- 22 - 
victim surely expected such and yet her statements were held in Davis 
to be nontestimonial]].) 
. . . [Applying this analysis, t]here is no question that the DNA 
report [at issue here] was requested by a police agency.  Even if the 
employees of [the laboratory in this case] are not themselves members 
of law enforcement, they were paid to do work as part of a 
government investigation; furthermore, it could reasonably have been 
anticipated that the report might be used at a later criminal trial.  [The 
lab analyst‘s] observations [in this case], however, constitute a 
contemporaneous recordation of observable events rather than the 
documentation of past events.  That is, [the analyst] recorded her 
observations regarding the receipt of the DNA samples, her 
preparation of the samples for analysis, and the results of that analysis 
as she was actually performing those tasks.  ―Therefore, when [she] 
made these observations, [she]––like the declarant reporting an 
emergency in Davis––[was] ‗not acting as [a] witness [ ]; and [was] 
‗not testifying.‘‖ (United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-
927.) 
We find support for this distinction even in the post-Crawford 
but pre-Davis decisions that concluded scientific evidence 
memorialized in routine forensic reports is not testimonial.  A 
common theme that unites these decisions is that the circumstances in 
which these reports are generated involve the contemporaneous 
recordation of observable events.  (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 705 [―Certificates of chemical analysis 
. . . merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test 
determining the composition and quantity of a substance]; State v. 
Lackey, supra, 120 P.3d at p. 352[, overruled on grounds other than 
statement as to admissibility of autopsy report, 158 P.3d 317] 
[Preclusion of autopsy report because of unavailability of medical 
examiner would be ―a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact 
that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive 
observations of the physical body . . .‖]; People v. Brown, supra, 801 
N.Y.S.2d at p. p. 711 [―The notes and records of the laboratory 
technicians who tested the DNA samples in this case . . . were made 
for the routine purpose of ensuring the accuracy of the testing done in 
the laboratory and as a foundation for formulating the DNA profile‖].)  
The post-Davis federal cases that have held such statements are not 
testimonial because they are business records are consistent with this 
theme since under the Federal Rules of Evidence a business record is 
 
- 23 - 
defined as ―‗[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in 
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at 
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation.‘‖  (United 
States v. Feliz, supra, 467 F.3d at p. 234, quoting Fed. Rules Evid[.], 
rule 803(6), 28 U.S.C.; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 
926-927.) [n.12] 
[N.12].  We do not hold that simply because a 
document qualifies as a business record that it is 
necessarily nontestimonial since conceivably some such 
document could contain historical facts.[1] 
Thus, we find unpersuasive those cases, cited above, holding 
that under Davis various types of forensic evidence in the form of 
laboratory reports were testimonial because their primary purpose was 
to establish a fact at trial regarding the defendant‘s guilt of the 
charged crime.  This reading of Davis equates a testimonial statement 
with any statement that it might reasonably be anticipated will be used 
at trial, an approach that, as we noted in Cage, Davis rejects.  In our 
view, under Davis, determining whether a statement is testimonial 
requires us to consider the circumstances under which the statement 
was made.  As we read Davis, the crucial point is whether the 
statement represents the contemporaneous recordation of observable 
events.  But, as we have also observed, even before Davis a number of 
                                          
 
 
1.  I emphasize that I do not believe that evidence is nontestimonial simply 
because it falls under the business record definition of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence or the business record definition of a state‘s rules of evidence.  Under 
Crawford, if evidence is testimonial, it falls under the Confrontation Clause.  The 
fact that federal or state rules of evidence define a ―business record‖ in a manner 
that captures testimonial evidence does not exempt the evidence from the reach of 
the Sixth Amendment.  Business records are not ipso facto nontestimonial.  
Instead, it is the nontestimonial nature of evidence that may remove it from 
Crawford, a quality many business records coincidentally possess.  As the 
California Supreme Court observes here, one such nontestimonial quality business 
records often possess is that they are a contemporaneous recording of present––not 
past––events. 
 
- 24 - 
courts had pointed to the circumstances under which statements were 
made in laboratory reports and other types of forensic evidence as a 
reason to find those statements nontestimonial under Crawford, 
notwithstanding their possible use at trial.  Those same circumstances 
are also present here. 
For example, [the analyst‘s] report and notes [in this case] were 
generated as part of a standardized scientific protocol that she 
conducted pursuant to her employment . . . .  While the prosecutor 
undoubtedly hired [the laboratory employing the analyst] in the hope 
of obtaining evidence against defendant, [the analyst] conducted her 
analysis, and made her notes and report, as part of her job, not in order 
to incriminate defendant.  Moreover, to the extent [the analyst‘s] 
notes, forms and report merely recount the procedures she used to 
analyze the DNA samples, they are not themselves accusatory, as 
DNA analysis can lead to either incriminatory or exculpatory results. . 
. . 
Thus, like the DNA analysis records in People v. Brown, supra, 
9 Misc.3d 420, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, [the analyst‘s] notes were made 
―during a routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure accurate 
analysis.‖  (Id. at p. 712; see also Rollins v. State (Ct.Spec.App.2005) 
161 Md.App. 34, 866 A.2d 926, 954 [―findings in an autopsy report of 
the physical condition of a decedent, which are routine, descriptive 
and not analytical,‖ held nontestimonial].)  In simply following [the 
laboratory‘s] protocol of noting carefully each step of the DNA 
analysis, recording what she did with each sample received, [the 
analyst] did not ―bear witness‖ against defendant.  (State v. Forte, 
supra, 629 S.E.2d at p. 143.)  Records of laboratory protocols 
followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not accusatory.  
―Instead, they are neutral, having the power to exonerate as well as 
convict.‖  (Ibid.) 
Accordingly, even under this earlier authority, the 
circumstances under which [the analyst‘s] report and notes were 
generated, and not whether they would be available for use at trial, 
would have been determinative of whether they were testimonial, and 
pursuant to this authority they would not have been.  Davis confirms 
that the critical inquiry is not whether it might be reasonably 
anticipated that a statement will be used at trial but the circumstances 
under which the statement was made.  We conclude therefore that the 
DNA report was not testimonial for purposes of Crawford and Davis. 
 
- 25 - 
Geier, 161 P.3d at 138-40 (some citations omitted); accord State v. O‘Maley, 932 
A.2d 1 (N.H. 2007), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 7, 2007) (No. 07-7577); 
State v. Crager, 879 N.E. 2d 745 (Ohio 2007). 
Similarly, I believe that under Geier‘s analysis, Belvin‘s affidavit is not 
testimonial.  The majority comes to the opposite conclusion because the 
circumstances surrounding the making of this affidavit ―objectively indicate that 
there [was] no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose . . . [was] to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later prosecution.‖  Majority 
op. at 9 (quoting Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74).  First, as set forth in Geier above, I 
do not agree that the breath test affidavit recorded past events.  Second, although 
the instant affidavit was ―relevant to later prosecution,‖ id., this did not end the 
Supreme Court‘s analysis in Davis or the California Supreme Court‘s analysis in 
Geier.  Neither should it end our analysis in this case.  In Davis, the victim‘s 911 
call to report domestic abuse, though a call for help, surely also had a ―primary 
purpose‖ of proving criminal acts for later prosecution.  As various courts have 
noted and as was discussed in Geier, it was not excluded.  See Davis, 126 S. Ct. 
2266; United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924-27 (7th Cir. 2006) (making this 
same observation as to Davis); Geier, 161 P.3d at 139 (same, citing People v. 
Cage, 155 P.3d 205 (Cal. 2007)).  Instead, the Supreme Court in Davis considered 
all of the factors surrounding the 911 call, not just that it was made to the police in 
 
- 26 - 
connection with a crime.  Similarly, though Belvin‘s affidavit had a prosecution-
related ―primary purpose,‖ there are other countervailing factors to consider. 
Breath test affidavits do not involve the expression of opinion or exercise of 
discretion; they merely state the results displayed by a breathalyzer after applying 
formulaic procedures.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 
2005) (concluding that ―[c]ertificates of chemical analysis are neither discretionary 
nor based on opinion‖ and are thus not testimonial).  Such affidavits do not cast the 
shadow of ―the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed‖––
that is, ex-parte testimony––and I would not exclude them.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
50. 
Instead, I would align this Court with the body of cases cited by the 
California Supreme Court that have not excluded similar documents.  See Geier, 
161 P.3d at 135-37 (citing cases).  Many other courts have also held analogous 
documents to be nontestimonial.  Cf. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (blood and urine analysis 
prepared at request of officer not testimonial); United States v. Washington, 498 
F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (blood test for illegal drug not testimonial); United States 
v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2005) (warrant of deportation not 
testimonial); United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(certification of nonexistence of record created by government in preparation for 
trial not testimonial); United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005) 
 
- 27 - 
(same); Perkins v. State, 897 So. 2d 457 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (autopsy report 
not testimonial); Neal v. State, 635 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (certificate of 
inspection of breath testing device not testimonial); Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (lab 
report on cocaine weight not testimonial); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 
2004) (blood alcohol test made at request of officer not testimonial); People v. 
Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (autopsy report not testimonial); 
Felix v. State, No. 05-04-01322-CR, 2005 WL 3163677 (Tex. App. 2005) 
(unpublished) (blood alcohol test not testimonial). 
Moreover, even if this breath test affidavit was testimonial, I would not 
exclude it.  I would follow the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Hinojos-
Mendoza and of the Virginia Supreme Court in Magruder v. Commonwealth2 and 
hold that Belvin waived his opportunity to cross-examine.  Section 316.1934(5), 
Florida Statutes (2007),3 provides that the ―[a]dmissibility of the affidavit does not 
abrogate the right of the person tested to subpoena the person who administered the 
test for examination as an adverse witness at a civil or criminal trial or other 
                                          
 
 
2.  Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008) (holding under 
an analogous statute that defendants waived their opportunity to cross-examine 
analysts). 
 
3.  I agree with the Fourth District‘s decision in State v. Irizarry, 698 So. 2d 
912 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), that State v. Donaldson, 579 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1991), has 
been superseded by section 316.1934(5), Florida Statutes (effective July 1, 1991). 
 
- 28 - 
proceeding.‖  Belvin did not do this.  In Hinojos-Mendoza, the Colorado Supreme 
Court dealt with a similar statute.  That Court stated: 
Section 16-3-309(5) requires that at least ten days prior to trial a 
party––in this case the defendant––request that the lab technician 
testify, or else the lab report will be admitted without the technician‘s 
in-court testimony.  Failure to timely request the presence of the lab 
technician therefore waives the right to confront the technician.  
Hinojos-Mendoza argues that by admitting testimonial lab reports 
without a showing of the technician‘s unavailability and without a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination, section 16-3-309(5) violates 
on its face the state and federal Confrontation Clauses.  See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 
It is well-established, however, that the right to confrontation 
can be waived.  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 
L.Ed.2d 314 (1966); Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th 
Cir. 1999).  Waiver is defined as the ―intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.‖  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Consequently, there is no appeal from a waived right.  
United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2004).  
Crawford did not alter the fact that the right to confrontation can be 
waived. 
―The primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to secure 
for a defendant the opportunity of cross-examination.‖  People v. Dist. 
Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Colo. 1994) (emphasis added); see 
generally Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.  
Assuming the opportunity for confrontation is provided, the right to 
confrontation is not denied because the prosecution is allowed to 
present testimony which the defendant chooses not to cross-examine.  
Dist. Court, 869 P.2d at 1288.  In other words, where a defendant 
chooses not to take advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness, the defendant has not been denied his constitutional right to 
confrontation.  The procedure provided in section 16-3-309(5) for 
ensuring the presence of the lab technician at trial does not deny a 
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the technician, but simply 
requires that the defendant decide prior to trial whether he will 
conduct a cross-examination.  The statute provides the opportunity for 
 
- 29 - 
confrontation––only the timing of the defendant‘s decision is 
changed. 
We have recognized the constitutionality of similar statutory 
procedural requirements affecting the exercise of other fundamental 
constitutional rights.  For example, a statute requiring a defendant to 
make a timely pretrial disclosure of alibi witnesses, or lose the chance 
to call those witnesses, does not infringe the defendant‘s constitutional 
right to call witnesses in his own defense.  People v. Hampton, 696 
P.2d 765, 774 (Colo. 1985).  We have also held that the statutory 
prerequisites to a jury trial in municipal court of filing a written 
demand and payment of a fee do not abridge the constitutional right to 
a jury trial.  Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992).  As we 
said in Christie, ―[t]he requisite . . . demand [for the lab technician to 
testify] is no more burdensome to a defendant than is making the 
decision [whether to cross-examine the technician] itself.‖  837 P.2d 
at 1244. 
We note that other jurisdictions have upheld the post-Crawford 
constitutionality of statutes similar to section 16-3-309(5).  See State 
v. Cunningham, 903 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. 
Walsh, 121 Nev. 899, 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. 
Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155, 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. 
Birchfield, 342 Or. 624, 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding 
Oregon‘s statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab 
technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would 
be constitutional).  But see Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313 (holding that 
a similar Minnesota statute violates the Confrontation Clause because 
it does not give the defendant adequate notice that failure to comply 
with the statutory notice requirement waives the right to 
confrontation).  We find no constitutional infirmity in section 16-3-
309(5), and we therefore uphold the facial constitutionality of the 
statute. 
2.  As-Applied Challenge 
Hinojos-Mendoza relies upon our decision in Mojica-Simental 
to argue that section 16-3-309(5) is unconstitutional as applied in his 
case because he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally 
waive his fundamental right to confrontation.  [People v. Mojica-
Simental, 73 P.3d 15 (Colo. 2003).]  In Mojica-Simental, we stated in 
dicta that waiver of the right to confrontation must be voluntary, 
knowing, and intentional.  73 P.3d at 20.  We noted that ―[i]f a 
 
- 30 - 
defendant does not have actual notice of the requirements of the 
statute, or mistakenly fails to notify the prosecution to have the 
technician present to testify, there is a significant possibility that a 
defendant‘s failure to act may not constitute a voluntary waiver of his 
fundamental right to confrontation.‖  Id. at 20-21.  We suggested a 
number of factors for a trial court to consider when determining the 
admissibility of a lab report under section 16-3-309(5), including 
whether ―an attorney or a pro se litigant actually knew that he was 
required to notify the opposing party of his desire to have the witness 
present.‖  Id. at 21.  Hinojos-Mendoza argues that because his 
attorney was unaware of section 16-3-309(5)‘s procedural 
requirement, he did not voluntarily waive his fundamental 
constitutional right to confrontation, and thus, the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied. 
The dicta in Mojica-Simental was based on the faulty premise 
that the right to confrontation can only be waived if the defendant 
personally makes a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver.  73 
P.3d at 20.  We cited People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), to 
support the statement in dicta that waiver of the confrontation right 
must be voluntary, knowing, and intentional.  Id.  In Curtis, we held 
that the right to testify was among ―that group of rights so 
fundamental and personal‖ as to require ―the procedural safeguards 
concerning voluntary, knowing and intentional waiver . . . established 
for the right to counsel.‖ 681 P.2d at 511 (emphasis added).  We 
determined that the decision whether to testify had to be made by the 
defendant personally, not by counsel, and in order to ensure that a 
waiver of the right to testify is voluntary, knowing, and intentional, 
trial courts must give defendants a thorough on-the-record 
advisement.  Id. at 513-15. 
The fact that relinquishment of the right to testify requires a 
voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver by the defendant does not 
mean that all fundamental constitutional rights are subject to the same 
requirements.  ―Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the 
defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain 
procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant‘s 
choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the 
right at stake.‖  Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770.  The right to 
counsel, the right to testify, the right to trial by jury, and the entrance 
of a guilty plea are sufficiently personal and fundamental as to require 
 
- 31 - 
a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver by the defendant 
himself. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 511. 
However, ―as to other rights ‗[d]efense counsel stands as 
captain of the ship.‘‖  Id. (quoting Steward v. People, 179 Colo. 31, 
34, 498 P.2d 933, 934 (1972)).  The right to confrontation falls into 
the class of rights that defense counsel can waive through strategic 
decisions, such as choosing whether and how to conduct cross-
examination or by stipulating to the admission of evidence.  Id. 
(―[D]ecisions committed to counsel include . . . whether and how to 
conduct cross-examination . . . .‖); Morse v. People, 180 Colo. 49, 54, 
501 P.2d 1328, 1330-31 (1972) (defense counsel‘s stipulation to 
admission of witness depositions waived the defendant‘s right to 
confront the witnesses at trial); see also Aptt, 354 F.3d at 1282 
(defense counsel waives defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as 
the defendant does not object and the decision is one of reasonable 
trial strategy); Hawkins, 185 F.3d at 1154-56 (same); 3 Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.6(a) (2d ed. 1999) (―[T]he 
Supreme Court has indicated, in dictum or holding, that counsel has 
the ultimate authority in . . . foregoing cross-examination.‖).  ―Putting 
to one side the exceptional cases in which counsel is ineffective, the 
client must accept the consequences of the lawyer‘s decision to forgo 
cross-examination . . . .‖  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418, 108 
S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). 
Defense counsel, therefore, may waive a defendant‘s right to 
confront the technician who prepared a lab report by not complying 
with the procedural requirements of section 16-3-309(5).  Moreover, 
we presume that attorneys know the applicable rules of procedure. 
Christie, 837 P.2d at 1244.  Given this knowledge, we can infer from 
the failure to comply with the procedural requirements that the 
attorney made a decision not to exercise the right at issue.[n.6]  See id. 
at 1243-44; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528-29, 528-29, 
92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (a trial court should give ―due 
consideration [to] any applicable formal procedural rule‖ when 
determining whether the defendant waived the right to a speedy trial 
by failing to request one).  Therefore, where a defendant such as 
Hinojos-Mendoza is represented by counsel, the failure to comply 
with the statutory prerequisites of section 16-3-309(5) waives the 
defendant‘s right to confront the witness just as the decision to forgo 
cross-examination at trial would waive that right.[n.7]  Many other 
 
- 32 - 
courts have found a valid waiver in similar circumstances.  See 
Brooks, 638 S.E.2d at 138 (―In sum, we hold a defendant‘s failure 
timely to notify the Commonwealth of his desire to confront the 
forensic analyst at trial constitutes a waiver of that right.‖); City of 
Las Vegas, 124 P.3d at 208; State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374, 378 
(N.D. 2006); Deener, 214 S.W.3d at 528; see also Caulfield, 722 
N.W.2d at 318-19 (Anderson, J., dissenting).[n.8] 
[N.6].  As already explained in this opinion, the 
right to confront the lab technician is not a personal right 
that can only be waived by the defendant.  Unlike the 
situation in Christie, wherein the right to a jury trial was 
at stake, the trial court does not need to make sure that 
the attorney‘s failure to comply with section 16-3-309(5) 
reflects the informed and voluntary decision of the 
defendant. 
[N.7].  We offer no opinion on whether the 
analysis would be altered if Hinojos-Mendoza had been a 
pro se defendant. 
[N.8].  This conclusion may, at first blush, appear 
to implicate what is known as the demand-waiver 
doctrine, which presumes waiver of a right through 
inaction.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 525, 92 S.Ct. 2182.  The 
Supreme Court disapproved of a strict demand-waiver 
doctrine in determining whether the right to a speedy trial 
was waived, because the doctrine is inconsistent with the 
definition of waiver as the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.  Id.  In Christie, however, we explained the 
difference between uninformed inaction and informed 
inaction, noting that ―[i]n the latter case . . . there is a 
‗decision‘ made, namely, the informed decision not to 
exercise the right . . . .‖  837 P.2d at 1243. 
Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 668-70.  It appears to me that the Colorado 
Supreme Court was correct in its analysis.  Instead of adopting the analysis of the 
dissent in Magruder, as the majority has done today, see majority op. at 8, I would 
 
- 33 - 
apply the reasoning of the majorities in Hinojos-Mendoza and Magruder to this 
case and reach the same result as those courts reached. 
 
Finally, I note the very practical point that the procedure which is set by the 
statute to allow the defendant to require the technician to come to court recognizes 
that in the vast, vast majority of cases, the technician‘s testimony adds nothing to 
the proceedings.  If the defendant does have a real need to cross-examine the 
technician, the procedure provides a way to do it.  Unfortunately, with the 
thousands of breath tests that are performed, usually the technician will have no 
present recollection of the particular test other than what is recorded in the 
affidavit.  In such cases, requiring the State to offer the technician‘s vacuous 
testimony will at best be costly and time-consuming and at worst inhibit the 
prosecution of DUI cases. 
 
As to this last point, I am very concerned that the majority‘s decision will 
needlessly make it much more difficult and expensive to prosecute DUI cases.  
This will have an adverse effect on the safety of our highways and streets.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s holding that the breath test 
affidavit should be excluded under the Confrontation Clause. 
BELL, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D04-4235 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia Terenzio, 
Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and James J. Carney and Richard 
Valuntas, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Richard W. Springer and Catherine Mazzullo of Richard W. Springer, P.A., Palm 
Springs, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent