Title: Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2317.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2317 
WILHELM-KISSINGER, APPELLEE, v. KISSINGER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2317.] 
Final, appealable order — R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) — An order denying a motion to 
disqualify counsel in a divorce proceeding is not a final, appealable order. 
(No. 2010-0992 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided May 19, 2011.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 25105. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a divorce proceeding is not a final, 
appealable order. 
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MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} Jeffrey R. Kissinger, appellant, appeals from a decision of the 
Ninth District Court of Appeals, which determined that the trial court’s denial of 
his motion to disqualify opposing counsel was not a final, appealable order.  We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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accepted jurisdiction to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeals.  Wilhelm-
Kissinger v. Kissinger, 125 Ohio St.3d 1461, 2010-Ohio-2753, 928 N.E.2d 737.  
The certified question before us is “Whether the denial of a motion to disqualify 
counsel in a divorce proceeding affects a substantial right and is a final and 
appealable order.” 
{¶ 2} Consistent with the decision below, we hold that the denial of a 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a divorce proceeding is not a final, 
appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).  Accordingly, we answer the certified 
question in the negative and affirm the judgment below. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} This appeal stems from divorce proceedings involving Kissinger 
and appellee, Beth A. Wilhelm-Kissinger.  During the proceedings, a dispute 
arose regarding allegedly illegally obtained and privileged e-mail messages 
between Kissinger and his attorney that Wilhelm-Kissinger had apparently taken 
from Kissinger’s computer and given to her attorney.  Kissinger moved the 
Summit County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division to 
disqualify Wilhelm-Kissinger’s attorney.  After a hearing in which Wilhelm-
Kissinger’s attorney reported that he never sought or reviewed any of the e-mail 
messages in question, the trial court denied the disqualification motion, and 
Kissinger appealed. 
{¶ 4} The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed Kissinger’s appeal, 
determining that it had no jurisdiction because the denial was not a final, 
appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) (“An order is a final order that may be 
reviewed * * * [if it] grants or denies a provisional remedy”).  Kissinger moved 
for reconsideration, arguing that the denial constituted a final, appealable order 
under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) (“An order is a final order that may be reviewed * * 
*[if it] affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding * * *”).  The Ninth 
District Court of Appeals upheld its decision to dismiss the appeal.  Wilhelm-
January Term, 2011 
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Kissinger v. Kissinger (Apr. 15, 2010), Summit App. No. 25105.  Kissinger then 
moved the court of appeals to certify a conflict between its reconsidered decision 
and the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Crockett v. Crockett, 
Franklin App. No. 02-AP-482, 2003-Ohio-585.  In Crockett, the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals concluded that in light of the “well-established [principle] that 
the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel affects a substantial right,” as well as 
the nature of “[d]ivorce [as] purely a matter of statute,” the denial of a motion to 
disqualify opposing counsel is final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).  Id. 
at ¶ 9-10.  The Ninth District Court of Appeals certified the conflict, and we 
accepted jurisdiction over the appeal. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} Ohio’s courts of appeal have jurisdiction “to review and affirm, 
modify, or reverse final orders.”  Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  
R.C. 2505.02 sets forth several types of final, appealable orders.  The present 
appeal involves the category defined by R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), which makes an 
“order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding” a final, 
appealable order. 
{¶ 6} A “[s]pecial proceeding” is “an action or proceeding that is 
specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at 
law or a suit in equity.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(2).  Therefore, divorce, a statutory 
matter that did not exist at common law, qualifies as a special proceeding.  State 
ex rel. Papp v. James (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 373, 379, 632 N.E.2d 889 
(identifying divorce as a “special statutory proceeding” under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) 
because “[t]here was no common-law right of divorce.  Divorce is purely a matter 
of statute”). 
{¶ 7} An order affects a substantial right for the purposes of R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2) only if an immediate appeal is necessary to protect the right 
effectively.  Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 
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181 (To prevail in contending that an order affects a substantial right, “appellants 
must demonstrate that in the absence of immediate review of the order they will 
be denied effective relief in the future”).  Covered rights include any “right that 
the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, 
or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  R.C. 
2505.02(A)(1). 
{¶ 8} We have previously held that a decision granting a motion to 
disqualify opposing counsel is a final, appealable order that a party deprived of 
counsel can appeal immediately.  See Russell v. Mercy Hosp. (1984), 15 Ohio 
St.3d 37, 39, 15 OBR 136, 472 N.E.2d 695 (“in the civil context, the grant of a 
motion to disqualify counsel * * * constitutes a final appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02”).  See also State v. Chambliss, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2011-Ohio-__, __ 
N.E.2d __, syllabus (“A pretrial ruling removing a criminal defendant’s retained 
counsel of choice is a final order subject to immediate appeal”).  We now address 
whether in the special proceeding of divorce, an order denying a motion to 
disqualify opposing counsel also qualifies as a final, appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2). 
{¶ 9} Orders granting and denying disqualification of counsel differ in 
two key respects.  First, an order granting disqualification immediately and 
definitely affects the party it deprives of chosen counsel; the purpose of appealing 
such an order is to prevent the removal itself.  By contrast, an order denying 
disqualification, standing alone, affects no right held by the unsuccessful movant 
because there is no substantial right to disqualify opposing counsel. 
{¶ 10} Second, an order granting disqualification typically imposes a 
permanent effect because it is unlikely to be reconsidered as a trial progresses.  
Russell, 15 Ohio St.3d at 41, 15 OBR 136, 472 N.E.2d 695, quoting Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord (1981),  449 U.S. 368, 380, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 
L.Ed.2d 571 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
January Term, 2011 
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Corp. (1949), 337 U.S. 541, 546-547, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (“ [U]nlike 
the denial of a motion disqualifying counsel, which is ‘ “subject to 
reconsideration from time to time” ’ during the progress of the trial, a trial court, 
for all practical purposes, will be unlikely to ever have an opportunity to change 
its ruling granting disqualification”).  Therefore, a grant of a motion to disqualify 
counsel must be appealed immediately or its effect will be irreversible.  An order 
denying disqualification, however, lacks a similarly permanent effect.  See 
Russell, 15 Ohio St.3d at 41, 15 OBR 136, 472 N.E. 2d 695 (“In contrast to a 
motion denying disqualification, a motion so granting is necessarily more 
conclusive. * * * It has irreparable and unreviewable consequences for the 
individual who hired the disqualified counsel as well as for disqualified counsel”).  
That order may be revisited throughout trial, and the party seeking 
disqualification may pursue other avenues, such as disciplinary proceedings, to 
address any improprieties that occur. 
{¶ 11} With these differences in mind, we cannot conclude that an order 
denying disqualification in the divorce context requires immediate appeal to 
ensure the protection of a substantial right.  Accordingly, although it occurs in a 
special proceeding, such a denial is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 12} We hold that in the context of divorce proceedings, the denial of a 
motion to disqualify counsel is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2).  In so holding, we follow the reasoning of the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals concerning such a denial, which does not affect a substantial right in a 
special proceeding.  Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative 
and affirm the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Goldman & Rosen, Ltd., Gary M. Rosen, and Mark A. Riemer, for 
appellant. 
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