Title: Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0332 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Antwaun A., a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem, 
Emmanuel L. Muwonge,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health & Social 
Services and Racine County Department of Human 
Services,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Ernestine Honeycutt, Truck Insurance Company, 
Cigna Insurance Company, Commercial Union 
Insurance Company, and Horace Mann Insurance 
Company,  
 
Defendants, 
Gene Matthews a/k/a The Reverend Gene Matthews, 
State Farm General Insurance Co., Gerald H. 
Bassinger and Judith Bassinger, Secura 
Insurance, a mutual company, and Ziko Milicevic,  
 
Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-
 
Respondents, 
Ernie Veto d/b/a Racine Apartment Managers, 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., and Gerald 
Hoornstra,  
 
Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Maxine Thomas, Roman Serembiczky, Carl R. 
Eisenman, John W. Carbonneau, Joe H. Halbur, 
Paulette A. Martini, and First Bank Southeast 
n/k/a Firstar Bank, a domestic corporation, and 
City of Racine,  
 
Third-Party Defendants.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 1, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Wayne J. Marik 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Crooks, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Wilcox, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Emmanuel L. Muwonge and Muwonge & Associates, S.C., Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Emmanuel L. Muwonge. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Heritage Mutual, 
the cause was submitted on the brief of Arthur P. Simpson and 
Simpson & Deardorff, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the defendant-third-party plaintiff-
respondent, Reverend Gene Matthews, there was a brief by Wayne M. 
Yankala, Karyn Gimbel Youso and Mingo & Yankala, S.C., Milwaukee 
and oral argument by Wayne M. Yankala. 
 
 
For the defendants-third-party plaintiffs-
respondents, Gerald & Judith Bassinger and State Farm General 
Insurance, there was a brief by Michael A. Mesirow, Thomas A. 
Cabush and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Michael A. Mesirow. 
 
 
For the defendants-third-party plaintiffs-
respondents, Ziko Milicevic & Secura Insurance Company, there was 
a brief (in the court of appeals) by James T. Murray, Jr., Molly 
C. Feldbruegge and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee 
and oral argument by James T. Murray, Jr. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Heiner Giese and 
Giese & Weden Law Offices, Milwaukee for the Apartment 
Association of Southeastern Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark K. Thomsen 
and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield for the Wisconsin Academy 
of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas M. Pyper, 
Elizabeth M. Estes and Whyte, Hirschboeck, Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee 
for the Wisconsin Realtors Association, The Institute for Real 
Estate Management and The Wisconsin Apartment Association. 
 
No. 
97-0332 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0332 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Antwaun A., a minor, by his Guardian ad  
Litem, Emmanuel L. Muwonge,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health &  
Social Services and Racine County  
Department of Human Services,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Ernestine Honeycutt, Truck Insurance  
Company, Cigna Insurance Company,  
Commercial Union Insurance Company, and  
Horace Mann Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Gene Matthews a/k/a The Reverend Gene  
Matthews, State Farm General Insurance  
Co., Gerald H. Bassinger and Judith  
Bassinger, Secura Insurance, a mutual  
company, and Ziko Milicevic,  
 
          Defendants-Third- 
          Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Ernie Veto d/b/a Racine Apartment  
Managers, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,  
and Gerald Hoornstra,  
 
          Defendants-Third- 
          Party Plaintiffs, 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
No. 
97-0332 
 
2 
     v. 
 
Maxine Thomas, Roman Serembiczky, Carl R.  
Eisenman, John W. Carbonneau, Joe H.  
Halbur, Paulette A. Martini, and First  
Bank Southeast n/k/a Firstar Bank, a  
domestic corporation, and City of Racine,  
 
 
          Third-Party Defendants.  
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Wayne Marik, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (1997-98).  The court of appeals asks this court 
to address the following question: 
 
Does a landlord of an older residential rental 
property have a common law duty to inspect, or test, 
for contamination from lead-based paint once the 
landlord knows that the paint is flaking from the 
walls? 
We conclude that the presence and danger of lead paint was 
foreseeable and determine that the landlords had a common law 
duty to test the residential property for lead paint.  Because 
the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment and in 
concluding that no common law duty existed, we reverse and 
remand that part of the circuit court’s decision. 
¶2 
In addition to the certified issue, we accepted for 
review all issues raised in Antwaun A.’s appeal.  He asserts a 
violation of Wisconsin’s Safe Place Statute.  Because the 
affected parts of the properties were not places of employment 
or public buildings, we conclude that this cause of action must 
No. 
97-0332 
 
3 
fail.  We also determine that, contrary to Antwaun A.’s 
argument, a violation of neither Wis. Stat. § 151.07(2)(d) 
(1991-92)1 
nor 
City 
of 
Racine 
Ordinance 
§ 11.09.040(e) 
constitutes negligence per se.  Finally, we decide that Antwaun 
A. may not maintain a personal injury cause of action based on 
any implied warranty of habitability.  Accordingly, on these 
issues we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment 
against Antwaun A. 
¶3 
We are asked in this case to determine when landlords 
have a duty to test their rental properties for lead paint.  In 
May of 1991, three-year-old Antwaun A. was diagnosed with lead 
poisoning.  He contends that this poisoning was caused by lead 
paint peelings, flakes, and chips that he had ingested in 
various apartments in the City of Racine.  Two apartments are at 
issue in this appeal. 
¶4 
First, Gerald and Judith Bassinger (the Bassingers) 
owned a residence in the City of Racine (the Bassinger Property) 
where Antwaun A. and his mother, Maxine Thomas, resided from 
August 1990 to May 1991.  This property contained three separate 
rental units.   
¶5 
Second, Gene Matthews owned a residence in the City of 
Racine (the Matthews Property) where Antwaun A.’s aunt, Willie 
May Williams, resided from March 1989 to January 1994.  Neither 
                     
1 1993 
Wis. 
Act 
27, 
§ 433 
renumbered 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 151.07(2)(d) as § 254.166.  All further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 1991-92 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
4 
Antwaun A. nor his mother ever resided at the Matthews Property, 
although Antwaun A. alleges that he frequently was a guest at 
his aunt’s residence.  The Matthews Property was a single-family 
dwelling which Matthews rented to Williams during the time at 
issue in this appeal.  Both the Bassingers and Matthews were 
insured by State Farm General Insurance Company. 
¶6 
Shortly after being diagnosed with lead poisoning, 
Antwaun A. filed suit against a host of corporations, individual 
landlords, and their insurers.  In his complaint, Antwaun A. 
alleged five causes of action as follows:   
 
(1) common law negligence;  
(2) violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 151.07(2)(d), 
constituting negligence per se; 
(3) “failure to warn;” 
(4) violation 
of 
the 
City 
of 
Racine 
Ordinance 
§ 11.09.040(e), constituting negligence per se; and  
(5) breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 
Six months later, Antwaun A. amended his complaint to add a 
violation of Wisconsin’s “Safe Place Statute,” Wis. Stat. 
§ 101.11(1), as a sixth cause of action.  
¶7 
All of the defendants save the Bassingers, Matthews, 
and State Farm either settled with Antwaun or were dismissed 
from the suit for various reasons unimportant for this appeal.2  
                     
2 Defendant 
Ziko 
Milicevic 
and 
his 
insurer, 
Secura 
Insurance, were part of the summary judgment motion at the 
circuit court below.  The circuit court concluded that Antwaun 
A. had failed to produce any evidence that he had been exposed 
to lead paint on the Milicevic property and failed to oppose 
Milicevic’s motion for summary judgment.  Milicevic and Secura 
were dismissed from the action. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
5 
After discovery, these remaining defendants brought various 
motions for summary judgment.   
¶8 
The circuit court granted summary judgment as to all 
the remaining defendants on every one of Antwaun A.’s causes of 
action.3  The circuit court reasoned that neither of the 
apartments violated the Safe Place Statute, the Matthews 
Property because it was not covered by the statute and the 
Bassinger Property because the peeling paint was not in a public 
or common area.  As for Antwaun A.’s claims of negligence per se 
because of the violation of Wis. Stat. § 151.07(2)(d) and the 
City of Racine Ordinance, the circuit court concluded that the 
                                                                  
When Antwaun A. filed this appeal, he included Milicevic 
and Secura as respondents.  However, much like in the circuit 
court, Antwaun A. did not set forth in this court any argument 
against Milicevic.  We conclude that, having failed to oppose 
Milicevic’s summary judgment motion at the circuit court, 
Antwaun in effect consented to the dismissal.  See Agnew v. 
Baldwin, 136 Wis. 263, 267, 116 N.W. 641 (1908).  Antwaun A. 
admitted as much at oral argument.  Upon remand, Milicevic and 
Secura are dismissed from this action. 
Additionally, 
Heritage 
Mutual 
Insurance 
Company, 
the 
company that had provided insurance to Matthews from March 1994 
to October 1995, argued to this court that it should be 
dismissed from the case.  First, it contends that there was no 
evidence of lead poisoning during the period of time it provided 
coverage to Matthews.  Second, it argues that its policy with 
Matthews contained a “pollution exclusion clause” that excludes 
coverage for lead poisoning.   
In light of our recent decision in Peace v. Northwestern 
National Ins. Co., No. 96-0328 (S. Ct., July 9, 1999) (of even 
date), we conclude that Heritage is under no obligation to 
provide coverage for lead poisoning as that falls within the 
pollution exclusion clause of its policy with Matthews.  The 
clause here is identical to the one that appeared in Peace.   
3 Circuit Court for Racine County, Wayne Marik, Judge. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
6 
legislative bodies that enacted these rules did not express an 
intent for their violation to constitute negligence per se.   
¶9 
The circuit court further concluded that, while the 
Bassingers and Matthews may have had actual or constructive 
knowledge about peeling or chipping paint, no evidence in the 
record suggested that either landlord had any actual or 
constructive knowledge of the presence of lead on their 
properties.4  Noting that Wisconsin law was silent, the circuit 
court looked to various other jurisdictions that had decided the 
issue.  The circuit court concluded that Wisconsin ought to 
follow those other jurisdictions that have required a landlord 
to have either actual or constructive knowledge of lead paint 
before a duty to act attends. 
¶10 Finally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
landlords violated no implied warranty of habitability.  It 
posited that such a duty was applicable only to a tenant under a 
lease.  This precluded Matthews from being negligent since 
Antwaun A. was not a tenant in his building.  Similarly, the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
implied 
warranty 
of 
habitability did not impose liability on the Bassingers because 
only damages under the lease contract are actionable.  Since 
Antwaun A. was seeking damages for personal injuries, the 
                     
4 The circuit court grouped the common law negligence cause 
of action with the “failure to warn” cause of action, concluding 
that they were both “based upon principles of common law 
negligence.” 
No. 
97-0332 
 
7 
circuit 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
landlords. 
¶11 Antwaun A.’s case was dismissed in its entirety.  He 
appealed to the court of appeals which certified the case to 
this court.  
¶12 It is well settled that when this court reviews a 
motion for summary judgment it applies the same standards as the 
circuit court:  summary judgment should only be granted if there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980); Wis. Stat. § 802.08. 
 This appeal requires that we both interpret statutes and assess 
the scope of a common law duty.  These are questions of law that 
we review independently of the legal determinations rendered by 
the circuit court.  Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 
No. 96-2489 (S. Ct. Apr. 16, 1999) (interpretation of statutes 
question of law); Ceplina v. South Milwaukee School Board, 73 
Wis. 2d 338, 341, 243 N.W.2d 183 (1976) (existence and scope of 
duty question of law); In re Revocable Trust of McCoy, 142 
Wis. 2d 750, 754, 419 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
97-0332 
 
8 
I. 
¶13 We address first whether the circuit court erred in 
granting summary judgment against Antwaun A. on his cause of 
action based on the common law duty to exercise ordinary care in 
testing for lead paint.  Antwaun A. argues that the circuit 
court erred when it concluded that the landlords were under no 
common law duty to test for lead paint absent actual or 
constructive 
knowledge 
that 
their 
particular 
properties 
contained lead paint.  We agree.  As a result, we conclude that 
a landlord of a house constructed prior to 1978 is under a 
common law duty to test for lead paint when the landlord knows 
or, in the use of ordinary care, should have known that the 
residence contained peeling or chipping paint.  We therefore 
reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the landlords. 
¶14 As with any negligence claim, Antwaun A. must show 
that there exists: (1) A duty of care on the part of the 
defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or 
damage as a result of the injury.  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 
Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).  This case involves a 
determination of only the first prong:  whether the landlords 
had a duty to test for lead paint, and if so, when that duty 
arose.   
¶15 In this state all persons have a duty of reasonable 
care to refrain from those acts that unreasonably threaten the 
safety of others.  Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
9 
176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956) (adopting Palsgraf v. Long Island R. 
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).  
This duty arises “when it can be said that it was foreseeable 
that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone.”  
A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 
483-84, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974); see also Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 
Wis. 2d 518, 532, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991).  Thus, the existence of 
a duty hinges on foreseeability.  These general principles of 
negligence are fully applicable in the landlord and tenant 
context.  Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 
734, 742-43, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979); Wis JI-Civil 8020 (1996). 
¶16 All parties in large part agree on the test that 
should be employed to ascertain whether it was foreseeable that 
peeling and chipping paint would result in lead poisoning.  That 
test is nothing more than a specific application of the general 
duty a landlord has to use ordinary care under the circumstances 
to avoid exposing persons lawfully on the property from an 
unreasonable risk of harm.  Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 741-43; 
Wis JI-Civil 8020 (1996);5 see also Restatement (Second) of 
                     
5 Wis JI-Civil 8020:  Duty of Owner or Possessor of Real 
Property to Nontrespasser User . . . An owner of property must 
use ordinary care under the existing circumstances to maintain 
his or her premises to avoid exposing persons on the property 
with consent to an unreasonable risk of harm . . . . 
No. 
97-0332 
 
10
Torts, § 358, p. 243 (1965).  The applicable test essentially 
consists of two parts:  (1) whether the landlord knew or in the 
use of ordinary care should have known about the presence of 
peeling and chipping paint; and (2) whether the landlord knew or 
in the use of ordinary care should have known that the chipping 
and peeling paint contained lead. 
¶17 This case does not primarily concern the first part of 
the test.6  Both landlords had notice of deteriorating paint in 
the apartments that they rented to Antwaun A.’s mother and aunt. 
 It is also undisputed that the landlords did not have any 
actual knowledge of lead paint on their properties during the 
                                                                  
In performing this duty, an owner of premises must use 
ordinary care to discover conditions or defects on the property 
which expose a person to an unreasonable risk of harm.  If an 
unreasonable risk of harm existed and the owner was aware of it, 
or, if in the use of ordinary care he or she should have been 
aware of it, then it was his or her duty to either correct the 
condition or danger or warn other persons of the condition or 
risk as was reasonable under the circumstances.  
6 Matthews readily admits that he received notice of peeling 
paint in 1990 when the Matthews Property was inspected by the 
Racine County Housing Authority.  The Bassingers, however, 
contend that they were never notified of peeling paint in the 
bathroom where the lead paint was eventually discovered.  
Rather, they state that they were notified of cracked and 
crumbling plaster on the ceiling of the bathroom and rectified 
that problem.   
We see no merit in the Bassingers’ attempt to draw a 
distinction between paint chips and plaster chips because, as 
they admitted at oral argument, the plaster in the bathroom was 
painted.  The dust and debris associated with paint-laden 
crumbling plaster is indistinguishable from the dust and debris 
associated with only the peeling paint.  
No. 
97-0332 
 
11
time that Antwaun A. or his relatives were tenants at the two 
properties. 
¶18 The contested issue in this case concerns whether the 
Bassingers or Matthews should have known of the presence of lead 
paint.  The landlords maintain that they should not have known, 
as the record is devoid of any facts that would permit the 
inference that they were presented with any information that 
would tip them off to the possibility of lead paint on their 
properties.  Antwaun A. maintains that the landlords should have 
known of the possibility of lead paint because common knowledge 
would suggest that it would be foreseeable that older houses in 
an urban area contain lead paint.   
¶19 All parties agree that there is no Wisconsin law that 
directly addresses this issue.  The landlords point us to a 
number of cases from across the country in support of their 
position.  See Sonja Larson, Landlord’s Liability for Injury or 
Death of Tenant’s Child From Lead Paint Poisoning, 19 A.L.R.5th 
405, 419-24. § 3(b) (1994).  These cases hold that a landlord’s 
duty to test for lead paint is not triggered by the peeling of 
paint in a house constructed prior to 1978, the year that the 
use of lead paint was banned.7  Courts have concluded that such 
injuries are not foreseeable because knowledge of the dangers of 
lead paint are not within the common knowledge of landlords.  
                     
7 Pursuant to its authority under the Consumer Product 
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2057, 2058, the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission banned lead paint for residential uses after February 
27, 1978.  16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (1999). 
No. 
97-0332 
 
12
Kolojeski v. John Deisher, Inc., 239 A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. 1968); 
Hayes v. Hambruch, 841 F. Supp. 706, 711 n.2 (D. Md. 1994); see 
also Garcia v. Jiminez, 539 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 
1989); c.f. Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147, 
1155 (Md. 1994).  Similarly, courts have concluded that such 
injuries are not foreseeable because a landlord would not expect 
a tenant to “eat[] a portion of the premises.”  Montgomery v. 
Cantelli, 174 So.2d 238, 240 (La. 1965); see also Dunson v. 
Friedlander Realty, 369 So.2d 792, 795 (Ala. 1979); but see 
Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. App. 1982); Acosta 
v. Irdank Realty Corp., 238 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1963). 
¶20 While we recognize that the above cases and others 
like them represent the majority position, we are not persuaded 
that their rationales continue with as much force as they may 
have at one time.  Many of the courts that adopted the rule of 
law proposed by the landlords in this case were based on facts 
that arose from the 1960s and 1970s when knowledge of the 
dangers of lead paint was not widespread.  Hayes, 841 F. Supp. 
at 708 (lead poisoning diagnosed in 1978); Dunson, 369 So.2d at 
795 (case decided in 1979); Kolojeski, 239 A.2d at 330 (lead 
poisoning diagnosed in 1966); Montgomery, 174 So.2d at 239-40 
(lead poisoning occurred in the early 1960s); but see Brown v. 
Dermer, 707 A.2d 407, 408 (Md. App. 1998) (lead poisoning 
diagnosed in 1985).   
¶21 Some of the more recent applications of this rule are 
based on binding precedent stretching back three decades.  See, 
No. 
97-0332 
 
13
e.g., Felton, by Felton v. Spratley, 640 A.2d 1358, 1361-62 (Pa. 
Super. 
1994) 
(relying 
on 
the 
1968 
Kolojeski 
decision).  
Additionally, some of these courts stated that their decision 
was based in part on the fact that the dangers of lead paint 
were not well known and left open the possibility that changed 
facts would result in changed law.  Hayes, 841 F. Supp. at 711 
n.2; Kolojeski, 239 A.2d at 331; Felton, 640 A.2d at 1365-67 
(Beck, J., dissenting). 
¶22 We believe that this case presents changed facts and 
warrants a changed application of law.  Here any negligence on 
the part of the landlords would have occurred no earlier than 
1989 when Williams moved into the Matthews Property and 1990 
when Antwaun A. moved into the Bassinger Property.  Simply put, 
we are persuaded that awareness of the dangers of lead paint in 
1989 or 1990 is on a different plane than the awareness of such 
dangers ten, twenty, or thirty years earlier.  This has a direct 
bearing on whether it was foreseeable in 1989 or 1990 that 
peeling or chipping paint in a pre-1978 house contained lead and 
whether it was foreseeable that lead ingested by children would 
be an unreasonable risk of physical harm.8   
¶23 By the 1990s federal, state, and local legislation 
identifying the dangers associated with lead paint not only 
                     
8 We agree with those other courts which have concluded 
“[i]t is well known that children of tender years have a 
proclivity to put anything they can get into their hands into 
their mouths.”  Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. 
App. 1982); see also Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 238 N.Y.S.2d 
713, 714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).  
No. 
97-0332 
 
14
existed, but was well-established.  Congress passed the Lead-
Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act in 1970, marking the 
federal government’s first comprehensive attempt at abating lead 
paint in this country.  Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4821 et seq.)  As the legislative 
history to that law indicates, Congress discerned a lack of 
public awareness of the problems associated with lead paint.  
Senate Rep. No. 1432, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 116 (1970), 
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6130, 6131 (“A paradoxical 
feature of this insidious disease is the lack of attention it 
receives.”).  
¶24 In 
addition 
to 
Congress, 
federal 
agencies 
have 
promulgated rules related to the use and disclosure of lead 
paint.  As noted above, the Consumer Products Safety Commission 
banned lead paint from residential use after February of 1978.  
16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (1999).  Both the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) have also set 1978 as the threshold date for “target 
housing”housing that is likely to contain lead-based paint.  40 
C.F.R. § 745.103 (1999); 24 C.F.R. § 35.86.  The EPA requires 
all sellers of residential housing built prior to 1978 to attach 
the following statement to the contract to sell: 
 
Every purchaser of any interest in residential real 
property on which a residential dwelling was built 
prior to 1978 is notified that such property may 
present exposure to lead from lead-based paint that 
may place young children at risk of developing lead 
poisoning.   
No. 
97-0332 
 
15
40 C.F.R. § 745.113 (emphasis added).  See also 24 C.F.R. 
§ 35.92(b)(1) (comparable HUD regulation). 
¶25 Similarly, Wisconsin prohibited the application of 
lead paint in 1980.  § 657u, ch. 221, Laws of 1979 (codified at 
Wis. Stat. § 151.03).  At the same time, the legislature adopted 
legislation aimed at both identifying those persons suffering 
from lead poisoning and eradicating the presence of lead paint 
in houses, especially those occupied by children under the age 
of six.  § 657u, ch. 221, Laws of 1979 (codified at Wis. Stat. 
§ 151.07).  
¶26 In addition, the City of Racine enacted an ordinance 
in 1975 that prohibited lead paint from being used on most 
surfaces.  Since 1975, that ordinance has been amended numerous 
times, culminating in the current version which resembles Wis. 
Stat. § 151.07.  Racine Ord. 11.09.040(e).  Through its numerous 
amendments, however, the City of Racine has not wavered in its 
prohibition of lead paint. 
¶27 While the extent and duration of legislation in this 
area suggests that the danger of children ingesting lead paint 
chips is foreseeable, the existence of legislation is not the 
only reason we reach this conclusion.  The dangers of lead and 
lead poisoning have been frequent topics of public service 
campaigns.  Contained within this record is a copy of a booklet 
printed 
in 
1987 
reiterating 
the 
dangers 
of 
lead 
paint, 
especially as it relates to children.   
¶28 Additionally, the mass media has frequently written 
articles or produced video segments highlighting the dangers 
No. 
97-0332 
 
16
associated with lead paint, especially related to children.  
These reports have also repeatedly documented that the bulk of 
the lead poisoning cases stem from older housing where lead 
paint was applied years ago and has since deteriorated.  See, 
e.g., Jean Latz Griffin, “Lead Paint Poisoning Hits a New 
Generation,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 15, 1989, available at 1989 
WL 4632504; Dennis J. McGrath, “Lead-Paint Ordinance Denounced 
by 
Landlords,” 
Minneapolis 
Star-Tribune, 
August 
8, 
1989, 
available at 1989 WL 3808978; Renee Loth, “When Will We Stop 
Poisoning Our Children?,” Boston Globe, Feb. 21, 1988, available 
at 1988 WL 4597658; “HUD Rule on Removing Lead-Based Paint 
Slated,” Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1986, available at 1986 WL-WSJ 
285949.9 
¶29 In light of all of these considerations, we decline to 
adopt the duty advanced by the landlords.  We are persuaded that 
by 1989, the dangers of lead paint in residential housing was so 
extensively known that we would not be ascribing to the 
landlords “a knowledge and expertise not ascribable . . . to 
people without special training or experience.”  Kolojeski, 239 
A.2d at 331.   
¶30 Instead we conclude that a duty to test for lead paint 
arises 
whenever 
the 
landlord 
of 
a 
residential 
property 
constructed before 1978 either knows or in the use of ordinary 
care should know that there is peeling or chipping paint on the 
                     
9 In fact, a cursory search on Westlaw for newspaper or 
magazine articles related to the dangers of lead paint prior to 
1990 returned well over 1,000 articles. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
17
rental property.  Where peeling or chipping paint is present in 
a pre-1978 residential structure, it is foreseeable that lead 
paint may be present which, if accurate, would expose the 
inhabitants to an unreasonable risk of harm.  Based on this 
conclusion, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of the Bassingers and Matthews.   
II. 
¶31 Next we address Antwaun A.’s Safe Place Statute cause 
of action.  The Safe Place Statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1), 
creates three different categories of persons covered by the 
statute:  employers, owners of places of employment, and owners 
of public buildings.  Naaj v. Aetna Insur. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 121, 
126, 579 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1998).  Antwaun A. asserts claims 
only under the latter two categories. 
A. 
¶32 We are able to quickly dispose of Antwaun A.’s claim 
that the apartments were a “place of employment” under the 
statute.  A “place of employment” is defined as  
 
every place, whether indoors or out or underground and 
the 
premises 
appurtenant 
thereto 
where 
either 
temporarily or permanently any industry, trade or 
business is carried on, or where any process or 
operation, directly or indirectly related to any 
industry, trade or business, is carried on, and where 
any person is, directly or indirectly, employed by 
another for direct or indirect gain or profit, but 
does not include any place where persons are employed 
in private domestic service which does not involve the 
use of mechanical power or in farming. . . .  Wis. 
Stat. § 101.01(2)(f). 
No. 
97-0332 
 
18
¶33 It is uncontroverted in the record that neither the 
Bassingers nor Matthews employed any person on a regular basis 
at their properties.  See Brueggeman v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 141 Wis. 2d 406, 410-11, 415 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1987).  
The “employment” Antwaun A. refers to is, in part, the 
landlords’ occasional entry onto the property to collect rent.  
Such conduct on the part of a landlord does not make the 
property a place of employment as to all tenants at all times.  
See Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300, 304, 108 N.W.2d 563 (1961). 
  
¶34 Similarly, Antwaun A. contends that because Matthews 
briefly hired a tenant living at one of the properties to make 
repairs at the property, that act makes the property a place of 
employment with respect to all tenants and frequenters.  This, 
too, is incorrect under the rule established in Frion, 13 
Wis. 2d at 304.  The properties at issue in this appeal are not 
places of employment as that phrase is defined in the Safe Place 
Statute. 
B. 
¶35 Antwaun A.’s argument that the properties were “public 
buildings” as that phrase is defined in the Safe Place Statute 
is also unavailing: 
 
"Public 
building" 
means 
any 
structure, 
including 
exterior parts of such building, such as a porch, 
exterior platform or steps providing means of ingress 
or egress, used in whole or in part as a place of 
resort, 
assemblage, 
lodging, 
trade, 
traffic, 
occupancy, or use by the public or by 3 or more 
tenants. . . .  Wis. Stat. § 101.01(2)(g). 
No. 
97-0332 
 
19
¶36 Antwaun A. contends that “tenant” above refers to 
persons in possession while the landlords contend that the term 
refers to the number of units in the building.  We have never 
squarely addressed this issue, but language from our prior cases 
shows that the landlords have the better argument. 
¶37 In Gobar v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., 179 Wis. 256, 259, 
191 N.W. 509 (1923), this court concluded that a two-story 
building with two units was not a “public building” under the 
statute.  The upper unit was a residential unit rented to a 
family of four and the lower unit was a commercial unit rented 
to an individual who ran a saloon.  Id. at 256-57.  See also 
Holcomb v. Szymczyk, 186 Wis. 99, 100-01, 202 N.W. 188 (1925) 
(“two-story frame residence building, arranged for and occupied 
by four families” is considered a public building); Davis v. 
Lindau, 270 Wis. 218, 219-20, 70 N.W.2d 686 (1955) (two-
apartment building is not a public building).   
¶38 Such 
an 
interpretation of 
“tenant” 
excludes the 
Matthews Property from the statute, as it was a property with 
only one unit.  The Bassinger Property, however, contained three 
units and conceivably could be covered under the statute.   
¶39 The duty of the owner under the Safe Place Statute 
extends only to those portions used or held out to be used by 
the public or by the tenants in common.  Lealiou v. Quatsoe, 15 
Wis. 2d 128, 135, 112 N.W.2d 193 (1961); Frion, 13 Wis. 2d at 
304; Hemmingway v. City of Janesville, 275 Wis. 304, 307, 81 
N.W.2d 492 (1957).  Here, as the circuit court concluded, the 
record indicates through excerpts of Thomas’ deposition that the 
No. 
97-0332 
 
20
peeling and chipping paint was present solely in Thomas’ 
bathroom.  This was not an area open to the public or shared by 
the three tenants in common.  It does not constitute a violation 
of the Safe Place Statute.10  The circuit court correctly granted 
summary judgment in favor of both landlords on this issue. 
III. 
¶40 We next address whether the circuit court erred in 
granting summary judgment against Antwaun A. on his cause of 
action based on a violation of Wis. Stat. § 151.07(2)(d) or City 
of Racine Ordinance § 11.09.040(e).  Antwaun A. maintains that a 
violation of these enactments constitutes negligence per se.  We 
disagree.   
¶41 The violation of a statute does not automatically 
impose civil liability.  This court has said that three 
                     
10 Antwaun A. contends, however, that the bathroom was not 
the only place in the Bassinger Property that had peeling and 
chipping paint.  He points to an affidavit of an expert witness 
indicating 
that 
the 
front 
porch 
of 
the 
Bassinger 
Propertycertainly a common area of the buildingexperienced 
chipping and peeling paint as well.  The difficulty with the 
expert, however, is that he did not view the property until well 
over two years had elapsed since Thomas vacated the apartment.   
While his affidavit indicates that the paint deterioration 
at the Matthews Property “had existed there for some time” his 
statements about the Bassinger Property were more circumspect.  
The expert only indicated that the paint on the porch “had been 
deteriorating prior to my visit.”  Considering the length of 
time between Thomas’ tenancy and the expert’s visit, the circuit 
court 
appropriately 
concluded 
that 
this 
testimony 
is 
insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
that would warrant the issue being submitted to the jury.   
No. 
97-0332 
 
21
questions must be answered in the affirmative before the 
violation of a statute will constitute negligence per se: 
 
(1) the harm inflicted was the type the statute was 
designed to prevent; (2) the person injured was within 
the class of persons sought to be protected; and (3) 
there is some expression of legislative intent that 
the statute become a basis for the imposition of civil 
liability. 
Tatur v. Solsrud, 174 Wis. 2d 735, 743, 498 N.W.2d 232 (1993).   
¶42 This court has repeatedly indicated that a statute 
will not be interpreted to impose a greater duty than that 
imposed by the common law unless it “clearly and beyond any 
reasonable doubt expresses such purpose by language that is 
clear, unambiguous, and peremptory.”  Delaney v. Supreme 
Investment Co., 251 Wis. 374, 380, 29 N.W.2d 754 (1947) 
(citations omitted); see also Bennett v. Larson Co., 118 Wis. 2d 
681, 694, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984); Burke v. Milwaukee & Suburban 
Transport Corp., 39 Wis. 2d 682, 689-90, 159 N.W.2d 700 (1968); 
Kalkopf v. Donald Sales & Mfg. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 247, 254-56, 147 
N.W.2d 277 (1967).  A court may also look to the legislative 
history of a statute to discern whether the legislature intended 
a violation to impose negligence per se.  See Tatur, 174 Wis. 2d 
at 743-44; Bennett, 118 Wis. 2d at 694. 
A. 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 151.07(2)(d) provides: 
 
(2) If the department determines that lead-bearing 
paints are present in or upon any dwelling, the 
department may: . . .  
 
    (d) Notify the owner of the dwelling of the 
presence of lead-bearing paints.  The department may 
No. 
97-0332 
 
22
issue 
instructions 
to 
remove, 
replace 
or 
cover 
securely and permanently these paints within 30 days, 
in a manner the department prescribes.  The failure to 
remove lead-bearing paints within the time prescribed 
shall be prima facie evidence of negligence in any 
action 
brought 
to 
recover 
damages 
for 
injuries 
incurred after the time period expires. 
The statute is designed to discover and correct the sources of 
lead poisoning.  When the Department of Health and Social 
Services is notified that “an occupant of a dwelling has blood 
lead poisoning” the department is authorized to inspect the 
occupant’s dwelling “for the presence of lead-bearing paints.”11 
 Wis. Stat. § 151.07(1).  Upon completion of that inspection, 
the department may take a number of protective measures, 
including notifying the owner of the dwelling of the lead-based 
paint and issuing instructions to that owner for the removal of 
that hazard.  Wis. Stat. § 151.07(2). 
¶44 Antwaun A.’s claim that a violation of this statute 
constitutes negligence per se is irretrievably snagged for two 
reasons.  Both relate to the issue of whether “there is some 
expression of legislative intent that the statute become a basis 
for the imposition of civil liability.”  Tatur, 174 Wis. 2d at 
744.   
¶45 As the circuit court noted, nothing in the record 
indicates that either the Bassingers or Matthews received any 
notification from the department that their properties contained 
lead paint.  They did not “fail to remove lead-bearing paints 
                     
11 The Department of Health and Social Services is now the 
Department of Health and Family Services. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
23
within the time prescribed” by the department in violation of 
the statute.  Wis. Stat. § 151.07(2)(d).  Antwaun A. finds this 
fact irrelevant and argues that it does not relieve landlords of 
their “independent duty . . . imposed by the statutes” to insure 
that lead paint is not found on the rental property.  He 
contends that under the circuit court ruling, a landlord’s duty 
will in effect vary with the resources available for government 
officials to conduct inspections. 
¶46 Antwaun A.’s argument misses the mark.  We have 
discovered no “independent duty” on a landlord that is “imposed” 
by Wis. Stat. ch. 151.  Section 151.07(2)(d) creates a duty on 
the landlord only upon receiving notice of the presence of lead 
paint from the department.  It does nothing more.  This, of 
course, does not mean that a landlord is necessarily off the 
proverbial hook; it only means that this statute does not impose 
any heightened duty on a landlord over and above that imposed by 
the common law. 
¶47 In light of these considerations, we cannot conclude 
that the legislature expressed a clear intention beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a violation of Wis. Stat. § 151.07(2)(d) 
constituted negligence per se.12  See Burke, 39 Wis. 2d at 694.  
The legislature may, of course, enact legislation that evinces 
its intent to impose negligence per se for a violation of the 
law; it has not done so in chapter 151. 
                     
12 As a result, we need not address the other two factors 
that must be met for a statute to impose negligence per se. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
24
B. 
¶48 City of Racine Ordinance 11.09.040(e) dictates that no 
dwelling may contain lead paint.  However, the ordinance makes 
some exceptions.  Where the paint, having already been legally 
applied, “tightly adheres” it need not automatically be removed 
from walls, baseboards, step risers, and other areas that do not 
present a “chewable surface.”  Nonetheless, the ordinance 
requires “complete paint removal” of certain areas such as 
windows, handrails, and any chewable surface that might exist in 
a house regardless of the condition of the paint.  Finally, the 
ordinance requires that areas of peeling, flaking, or chipping 
paint must be either stripped bare or covered by some durable 
material such as plasterboard or wood paneling; such surfaces 
may not merely be repainted.   
¶49 As the circuit court indicated, this ordinance traces 
its history to 1970, although it has been amended and recreated 
several times since then.  The substance of these amendments is 
not important to the resolution of this case.   
¶50 The circuit court noted, correctly, that the City of 
Racine’s lead paint provision was one of more than a dozen 
standards that the City considered to be necessary for habitable 
living quarters.  In addition to the lead paint provision, 
subsection (e), other standards included those ranging from the 
relatively minor (adequate kitchen cabinet space, subsection 
(g)) to the substantial (structural integrity of the building, 
subsection (d)).   
No. 
97-0332 
 
25
¶51 There is scant legislative history surrounding the 
enactment and amendment of this ordinance.  The words of the 
ordinance do not declare any intent to establish a private right 
of action in favor of those persons affected by a violation of 
the ordinance.  See McNeill v. Jacobson, 55 Wis. 2d 254, 258-59, 
198 N.W.2d 611 (1972).  Indeed, the common council would seem to 
have disavowed such a result, as it created a penalty provision 
that imposes fines reaching as high as $750 without mentioning 
the additional imposition of civil liability in a private suit. 
 Racine Ord. 11.09.070; see generally, Grube v. Daun, 210 
Wis. 2d 681, 689-91, 563 N.W.2d 523 (1997). 
¶52 Additionally, given the placement of the lead paint 
subsection with the panoply of other regulations ranging from 
the pedestrian (size of screening mesh, subsection (o)) to the 
weighty (necessity of having a bathroom, subsection (j)), we 
cannot conclude that the Racine Common Council intended a 
violation of these provisions to carry with it civil liability. 
 Rather, it would seem as though the common council intended to 
“secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity.”  
McNeill, 55 Wis. 2d at 259; see also Kranzush v. Badger State 
Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 75, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981). 
¶53 As noted above, Antwaun A. faces a stiff burden to 
establish that the common council intended a violation of the 
ordinance to constitute negligence per se.  Burke, 39 Wis. 2d at 
694; Delaney, 251 Wis. at 380.  We do not believe that he has 
met his burden and affirm the circuit court’s decision that the 
No. 
97-0332 
 
26
violation of this ordinance did not constitute negligence per 
se.  
IV. 
¶54 Finally, we address Antwaun A.’s claim that the 
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
landlords on his warranty of habitability cause of action.  
Antwaun A.’s argument is two-fold.  First, he contends that no 
privity of contract is needed in order to assert a breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability.  Second, he posits that 
damages under the implied warranty of habitability are not 
limited to contractual damages but also encompass compensatory 
damages.  We disagree on both counts. 
¶55 This court first recognized the existence of an 
implied warranty of habitability in Pines v. Perssion, 14 
Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).  Under that doctrine, the 
residential lease between a landlord and tenant carries with it 
an implied promise that the premises will be fit for human 
habitation.  Id. at 596-97.   
¶56 Our cases in this area of law have involved claims of 
a breach of the lease and have sought contractual damages.  Id. 
at 597.  We can find no Wisconsin case that has allowed a party 
to seek compensatory damages for the violation of the implied 
warranty of habitability.  Antwaun A. asserts that this is 
merely coincidental and not by design.  To the contrary, we 
agree with the circuit court when it artfully stated: 
 
A tenant’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability is a breach of contract claim for 
No. 
97-0332 
 
27
contractual damages.  An injured parties’ claim for 
personal injuries is a tort claim in negligence for 
compensatory damages.  Such claims may coexist, they 
may be caused by the same act, and they may be owned 
by the same party if it is the tenant who was injured. 
 It is not the breach of warranty, however, that gives 
rise to the cause of action for the personal injury.  
Instead, it is the negligent act or omission.   
See also Stone v. Gordon, 621 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1995); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972). 
¶57 This distinction between negligence and breach of 
contract is consistent with our statements in Pagelsdorf, 91 
Wis. 2d at 744-45, where we concluded that it would be 
“anomalous” for the law to require a landlord to warrant 
habitability but grant immunity for “the landlord’s negligence 
in 
maintaining 
the 
premises . . . under 
general 
negligence 
principles.”  The distinction described by the circuit court 
also comports with the codification of the implied warranty of 
habitability which addresses damages in contractual terms.  Wis. 
Stat. § 704.07(4).   
¶58 We conclude that Antwaun A.’s implied warranty of 
habitability cause of action cannot be maintained against 
Matthews because Antwaun A. was not in privity of contract with 
that landlord.  Antwaun A.’s implied warranty of habitability 
cause of action cannot be maintained against the Bassingers 
because he seeks compensatory rather than contractual damages.  
The circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
the landlords. 
V. 
No. 
97-0332 
 
28
¶59 In sum, we conclude that the presence and danger of 
lead paint was foreseeable and hold that the landlords had a 
common law duty to test the residential property for lead paint. 
Because the circuit court erred in concluding that no common law 
duty existed and in granting summary judgment, we reverse and 
remand that part of the circuit court’s decision.  However, we 
determine that the circuit court properly entered summary 
judgment in favor of the landlords on all of the other causes of 
action raised by Antwaun A.  Accordingly, we affirm those parts 
of the circuit court’s decision. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded.  
 
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
1 
¶60 N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J. 
(concurring).   Although 
I 
concur with the mandate, I write separately to address the 
majority's conclusion that a landlord's duty to test for lead-
based paint arises "whenever the landlord of a residential 
property constructed before 1978 either knows or in the use of 
ordinary care should know that there is peeling or chipping 
paint on the rental property."  Majority op. at 14.  I agree 
that a landlord's duty arises when the landlord knows or, in the 
use of ordinary care, should know that paint that is flaking, 
peeling or chipping from the walls contains lead.  I concur 
because 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
quite 
arbitrary 
distinction between residential property constructed before and 
after 1978.  Rather, I conclude that a trier of fact should 
examine all of the circumstances presented in a given case to 
determine if a landlord had a duty to test for contamination 
from lead-based paint.  Certainly, the age of the premises is 
but one factor to consider. 
¶61 The majority begins the analysis by stating that the 
issue in this case is whether the landlord involved should have 
known of the presence of lead-based paint.  See majority op. at 
9.  This issue pertains to the second element of the majority’s 
test for ascertaining the foreseeability that flaking, peeling 
or chipping paint would result in lead poisoning.13  See majority 
                     
13 The test, as stated by the majority:  "(1) whether the 
landlord knew or in the use of ordinary care should have known 
about the presence of peeling and chipping paint; and (2) 
whether the landlord knew or in the use of ordinary care should 
have known that the chipping and peeling paint contained lead." 
 Majority op. at 9.   
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
2 
op. at 8.  The majority bases its foreseeability test, in part, 
on both Wis JICivil 8020 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 358 (1965).14  I first note that the language in the majority's 
foreseeability test is not consistent with the language in 
§ 358.  Subsections 358(1)(a) and (b) employ the expression, 
"has reason to know of the condition . . . . "  While the phrase 
"has reason to know" may seem congruent with the majority's 
phrase, 
"should 
have 
known," 
the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
specifically differentiates the two phrases.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 12.  Comment (a) to § 12 explains that 
"[t]hese two phrases . . . differ in that 'reason to know' 
                     
14 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358 (1965), "Undisclosed 
Dangerous Conditions Known to Lessor," states:   
(1)  A lessor of land who conceals or fails to 
disclose to his lessee any condition, whether natural 
or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to persons on the land, is subject to 
liability to the lessee and others upon the land with 
the consent of the lessee or his sublessee for 
physical harm caused by the condition after the lessee 
has taken possession, if 
 
(a)  the lessee does not know or have reason to 
know of the condition or the risk involved, and 
 
(b)  the lessor knows or has reason to know of 
the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk 
involved, and has reason to expect that the lessee 
will not discover the condition or realize the risk. 
 
(2)  If the lessee actively conceals the condition, 
the liability stated in Subsection (1) continues until 
the lessee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity 
to take effective precautions against it.  Otherwise 
the liability continues only until the vendee has had 
reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and 
to take such precautions.  
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
3 
implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas 
'should know' implies that the actor owes another the duty of 
ascertaining the fact in question."  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §  12 cmt. a (1965).  I agree with the majority, however, 
that we should express the test using the phrase, "should have 
known," because it is more consistent with the language in Wis 
JICivil 802015 and with the case law in Wisconsin.16 
¶62 As stated above, the majority premises a landlord's 
duty to test for lead-based paint on whether a residential 
rental property was constructed before 1978.  See majority op. 
at 14.  I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a 
property's age alone creates circumstances from which a landlord 
"should have known" that lead exists in chipping or peeling 
paint.  I disagree for several reasons.   
¶63 First, the 1978 date is arbitrary.  The majority 
points out that lead-based paint was banned for residential uses 
in 
1978 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Consumer 
Products 
Safety 
                     
15 The language of Wis JICivil 8020 mimics the majority's 
"know" and "should have known" language:  "[i]f an unreasonable 
risk of harm existed and the owner was aware of it, or, if in 
the use of ordinary care he or she should have been aware of it, 
then it was his or her duty to either correct the condition or 
danger or warn other persons of the condition or risk as was 
reasonable under the circumstances."  We recognize that while 
the phrase, "should have been aware of it," is not exactly the 
same as the phrase, "should have known," the two phrases are 
analogous.       
16 See Maci v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wis. 2d 710, 
717, 314 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1981)(quoting Wis JICivil 8020). 
 See also Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 423 n.6, 541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995)(citing Wis JICivil 8020 with approval).    
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
4 
Commission.  See majority op. at 10 n.7.  While the use of lead-
based paint became illegal after 1978, undoubtedly some homes 
continued to be painted with such paint after that date.  In 
some situations, the majority's test may result in a person that 
rents a residence built after 1978 not having the same 
protection as one renting a residence built before 1978, even 
though the rental residence involved does contain lead-based 
paint.17  A landlord should not have a different duty to test 
solely based on the age of the residence he or she owns. 
¶64 Second, the ban on the use of lead-based paint in 
1978, and the media coverage surrounding it, is not enough to 
provide a particular landlord with constructive notice of the 
possibility of lead-based paint in a rental residence.  The 
majority cites to both federal and state legislation prohibiting 
the use 
of lead-based 
paint, 
as 
well as 
media reports 
documenting the dangers of lead-based paint.  See majority op. 
at 12-14.  The majority implies that because the danger of lead-
based paint is now more well-known, landlords who own residences 
built before 1978 should know that their residences may contain 
lead-based paint.  See majority op. at 14. 
                     
17 For instance, if a tenant lives at a property built after 
1978 where the landlord did not know of lead-based paint in the 
residence, the tenant may have no recourse since the landlord's 
constructive notice is not triggered by the age of the 
residence.  Moreover, tenants may actually be put in danger by 
the test as stated by the majority because landlords who own 
residences built after 1978 may be lulled into a false sense of 
security. 
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
5 
¶65 The majority opinion states that Wisconsin prohibited 
the use of lead-based paint in 1980, and that the City of Racine 
adopted an ordinance in 1975 that banned the use of lead-based 
paint on most surfaces.  See majority op. at 13.  If we are to 
adopt a “magic” date, why should it be 1978, rather than 1975 or 
1980?    
¶66 However, the majority never cites evidence of any 
communication from which a landlord should know that the “magic” 
year upon which the duty to test is based is 1978.  Indeed, the 
mere fact that lead-based paint's dangers have been publicized 
does not amount to constructive notice,18 as required by the 
majority's test.  See Felton by Felton v. Spratley, 640 A.2d 
1358, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).  Constructive notice should 
not be attributed to a landlord simply because his or her 
property was built before 1978.  The majority's distinction, 
arbitrarily based on the 1978 ban, creates a duty on landlords. 
 The majority has not adequately demonstrated, however, that 
landlords have had sufficient notice communicated to them that 
the federal ban on the use of paint containing lead occurred in 
                     
18 In Franklin Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meeme Town Mutual, 68 
Wis. 2d 179, 184, 228 N.W.2d 165 (1975)(quoting Thompson v. 
Dairyland Mutual Insurance Co., 30 Wis. 2d 187, 192, 140 N.W.2d 
200 (1966)), this court defined constructive notice as "neither 
notice nor knowledge but . . . a policy determination that under 
certain circumstances a person should be treated as if he had 
actual notice."  The majority's use of the phrase, "should have 
known," appears to be an adoption of a constructive notice 
approach.     
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
6 
1978.  If the majority’s test remains intact, such a showing may 
be needed in each and every case.19  Id. 
¶67 Third, the majority has not cited any legal support 
for its arbitrary selection of 1978.  In discussing constructive 
notice, the Maryland court of appeals held that "[k]nowledge of 
a condition which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
persons on the land may not be imputed to a landlord merely from 
general 
knowledge 
that 
other 
properties 
of 
like 
age, 
construction, or design might possibly contain such hazardous 
conditions."  Richwind v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147, 1154-55 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1994).  Instead, other jurisdictions have held that 
constructive notice may be inferred from a landlord's reasonable 
inspection of a residence.  See, e.g., Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 
S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that a jury found a 
landlord knew or should have known that a residence contained 
lead-based paint because the landlord's manager inspected the 
property weekly and bought paint for the residence); Felton, 640 
A.2d at 1361.  Another court held that a landlord must retain 
sufficient control of a residential rental premises to have 
constructive notice of lead-based paint on the property.  Brown 
                     
19 The majority cites EPA and HUD regulations which require 
the attachment of statements regarding lead-based paint to 
contracts 
for 
the 
sale 
of 
pre-1978 
residential 
housing.  
However, such statements would not provide notice to those 
landlords which have not bought or sold pre-1978 housing since 
these EPA and HUD regulations became effective.  Accordingly, 
the fact that such statements might be required does not obviate 
the need to evaluate the extent of the landlord's notice under 
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.    
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
7 
by Brown v. Marathon Realty, Inc., 565 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1991).  I favor an approach whereby a trier of fact 
examines the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
a landlord had constructive notice that flaking, chipping, or 
peeling paint in a residence contained lead.  Age of the 
premises is one factor to consider.       
¶68 Finally, I disagree with the majority's use of the 
1978 distinction because the creation of such a distinction is 
more properly left to the legislature.  In State v. Amoco Oil 
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 226, 259, 293 N.W.2d 487 (1980) (citing Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-731 (1963)), this court stated: 
 
The court should not substitute its social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislative 
body.  The legislature has broad scope to experiment 
with solutions to economic problems and has the power 
to 
regulate 
injurious 
commercial 
and 
business 
practices as long as it does not run afoul of the 
federal constitution, state constitution, or federal 
statutes. 
In incorporating the 1978 date into its test, the majority is 
usurping the role of the legislature.  With the 1978 date, the 
majority creates more than a common law dutyit engages in 
judicial legislating by substituting its social and economic 
beliefs for the legislature’s judgment.  See Amoco Oil Co., 97 
Wis. 2d at 259. 
¶69 In summary, I agree with the mandate that a landlord's 
duty to test for lead-based paint arises when the landlord knows 
or should have known that flaking, peeling or chipping paint 
contains lead.  I write only to state my concern with the 
No. 97-0332.npc 
 
8 
majority's 
distinction 
between 
residential 
properties 
constructed before or after 1978, especially in light of the 
lack of legal support for that distinction, and the negative 
ramifications such a line may have on both landlords and tenants 
who may be victims of lead poisoning. 
 I 
conclude 
that 
the 
trier of fact should examine all relevant circumstances in each 
case to determine if a landlord knew or should have known that 
flaking, chipping or peeling paint on the premises involved 
contained lead.  The duty to test should not be based on the 
selection of an arbitrary date. 
 
 
¶70 For these reasons, I concur. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
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