Title: Hastings v. Demming

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

694 So. 2d 718 (1997)
Herbert HASTINGS, et al., Petitioners,
v.
Charles DEMMING, et ux., Respondents.
No. 89130.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 8, 1997.
Jesse L. Skipper of Skipper & Day, St. Petersburg; and Dan Carlton, Sarasota, for Petitioners.
Allyson Palmer of Graves & Palmer Chartered, Sarasota, for Respondents.
Kimberly A. Staffa of Fox, Grove, Abbey, Adams, Byelick & Kiernan, St. Petersburg, for Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae.
OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Hastings v. Demming, 682 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), in which the district court certified conflict with the opinions in Breakers Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gloger, 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) and City of Lake Mary v. Franklin, 668 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). This case is concerned with the scope of the district courts' authority to review nonfinal orders denying summary judgment in the context of workers' compensation immunity claims. The district court, in addition to certifying conflict, also certified the following question to be of great public importance:
Hastings, 682 So. 2d  at 1116. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The recent changes to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure make clear that the answer to the certified question must be no. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court in this case and disapprove Gloger and Franklin to the extent that they are inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
The record in this case reflects the following. Charles Demming was injured when he fell after ladder cables failed and the ladder collapsed under him. He was working for the American Sign Company (ASC) at the time of the accident. He and his wife, Diana Demming, sued both ASC and Herbert Hastings. *719 Hastings is an officer and director of ASC. The complaint alleged that Hastings was culpably negligent in failing to properly maintain the cables on the ladder. It further alleged that ASC was guilty of failing to reasonably supervise Hastings in his capacity as the company's overseer of operations. Both Hastings and ASC filed motions for summary judgment contending that they were immune under the Workers' Compensation Act. After a hearing (not part of this record) the two motions were denied without elaboration. Hastings and ASC sought review of that order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi). At that point in time, the rule stated:
The district court dismissed the appeal concluding that the trial court order at issue had not determined that Hastings and ASC were not entitled to workers' compensation immunity as a matter of law. In reaching this resolution the district court wrote:
Hastings, 682 So. 2d  at 1109. The district court then applied this interpretation of the law and concluded:
Id. at 1110. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has interpreted the rule differently. That reasoning is explained by this excerpt from Judge Klein's opinion in Breakers Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gloger, 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). There, he wrote:
Breakers, 646 So. 2d  at 237-38. Admittedly, the rule as presented to the various district courts was susceptible to both interpretations. Our recent amendments to the appellate rules should eliminate the confusion. The subject rule now reads:
Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773, 796 (Fla.1996). We changed the phrasing of the subject rule in order to settle the inconsistency between the district courts. Nonfinal orders denying summary judgment on a claim of workers' compensation immunity are not appealable unless the trial court order specifically states that, as a matter of law, such a defense is not available to a party. In those limited cases, the party is precluded from having a jury decide whether a plaintiff's remedy is limited to workers' compensation benefits and, therefore, an appeal is proper. Otherwise, the denial of the summary judgment may be based on a factual dispute and the party is still likely able to present an immunity defense to the jury. In those cases, the new rule makes clear that the district courts have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the nonfinal order. In sum, the new rule codifies the result reached by the district court in this case.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, we answer the certified question in the negative and we approve the decision below. Further, we disapprove Gloger and Franklin to the extent that they are inconsistent with the reasoning set out in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.