Title: State v. Plew

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

150 Ariz. 75 (1986) 722 P.2d 243 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William Allen PLEW, Jr., Appellant. No. 6690. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. June 19, 1986. *76 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., William J. Schafer III, Chief Counsel, Criminal Div., Phoenix, and Bruce M. Ferg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, for appellee. Daniel F. Davis, Tucson, for appellant. GORDON, Vice Chief Justice. William Allen Plew, Jr. was convicted of attempted second degree murder, A.R.S. §§ 13-1001 and -1104, and of aggravated assault, A.R.S. § 13-1204. It was alleged and proven that these offenses were of a dangerous nature and were committed while on parole. Consequently, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment by authority of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 (now § 13-604.02). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Const. art. 6 § 5(3) and A.R.S. §§ 13-4033 and -4035. On September 19, 1983, a shooting occurred at the home of the victim, Joseph Molina. Molina was shot five times with a small caliber handgun, but the two versions of how the shots came to be fired were diametrically opposed. The appellant, testifying on his own behalf, claimed that Molina was angry and abusive over Plew's cocaine debts and threatened him with a gun. The appellant testified that he then grabbed the gun and struggled with Molina, during which the gun went off and "just kept going off." In contrast, Molina testified that the appellant, without provocation, simply pulled out a gun and shot him five times. Everyone agreed that the appellant purchased cocaine from Molina, but as with most of the evidence in the case the facts were sharply disputed. The appellant testified that he bought cocaine from Molina frequently indeed, three times the day of the shooting while Molina maintained that sales were infrequent. In any event, the shooting arose out of a dispute over money owed by appellant to Molina for cocaine. The state charged appellant with attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault; the appellant relied upon a self-defense argument. At the close of evidence the defense offered four possible jury instructions *77 on self-defense; all were denied by the trial judge as unsupported by the evidence. Appellant was subsequently convicted of attempted second degree murder, a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder, and of aggravated assault. The appellant now urges that the trial court's refusal to give a self-defense instruction constitutes reversible error. The law in Arizona regarding self-defense is well-established. A self-defense instruction must be given if the accused can demonstrate that 1) he reasonably believed that he was in immediate physical danger; 2) he acted solely because of his belief; and 3) he used no more force than appeared reasonably necessary under the circumstances. State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 482, 690 P.2d 775, 783 (1984). The defendant's own testimony can raise the inference of self-defense, State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104, 664 P.2d 646, 648 (1983), even if the evidence is in conflict on this issue. State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. at 482, 690 P.2d at 783. Moreover, a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction "whenever there is the slightest evidence of justification for the defensive act." State v. Bojorquez, 138 Ariz. 495, 497, 675 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1984). Accord, State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. at 482, 690 P.2d at 783; State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. at 104, 664 P.2d at 648. The "slightest evidence" is that evidence "tending to prove a hostile demonstration, which may be reasonably regarded as placing the accused apparently in imminent danger of losing [his] life or sustaining great bodily harm...." State v. Wallace, 83 Ariz. 220, 223, 319 P.2d 529, 531 (1957). The appellant stated that he went to Molina's house that night in order to pay for some cocaine, and that while there Molina became verbally abusive. Upon cross-examination the appellant testified: (emphases added) This testimony by the appellant, if viewed in isolation, would supply the quantum of evidence necessary to support a *78 claim of self-defense and allow us to conclude without further analysis that the trial court erred in denying a self-defense instruction. However, the state maintains that other testimony by the appellant himself defeats the claim of self-defense. (emphases added) The state asserts that this testimony by appellant precludes a claim of self-defense because the appellant denies assaultive behavior or any intent to harm Molina. See State v. Miller, 129 Ariz. 42, 628 P.2d 590 (App. 1981). A defendant who denies shooting the victim may not thereafter claim self-defense. State v. Dixon, 15 Ariz. App. 62, 485 P.2d 1179 (1971). However, the record in this respect is more notable for its ambiguity than its clarity. While the appellant does indeed deny shooting the victim or intending any harm, he also states several times that he is unsure of exactly what transpired. His testimony throughout the cross-examination is ambivalent on this point.[1] It is not our function to re-weigh the evidence on appeal; and our resolution of this case does not require us to believe or disbelieve the appellant's testimony. The only issue we need address is whether the appellant presented the "slightest evidence" of self-defense at trial. Because we believe that the requisite modicum of evidence was presented, we must reverse the appellant's convictions. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. HOLOHAN, C.J., and HAYS, CAMERON and FELDMAN, JJ., concur. [1] In any event, the state's focus on the actual shooting may be misdirected. The critical inquiry may be whether the appellant initiated the struggle for the gun if the resulting discharges whether intended or not were simply a natural consequence of the struggle.