Title: Tracy and Damian Osterhues v. Board of Adjustment for Washburn County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 92 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2194 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Tracy and Damian Osterhues, Art and Ellen  
Jacobs, and Andrew and Luella Peterson,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Board of Adjustment for Washburn County,  
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
Washburn County,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 101 
Reported at:  273 Wis. 2d 718, 680 N.W.2d 823 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Rasmussen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross-appellants-petitioners 
there were briefs by Joseph R. Cincotta and Schweitzer & 
Cincotta LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Joseph Cincotta. 
 
For the defendant-co-appellant-cross-respondent there was a 
brief by William G. Thiel and Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, S.C., 
Eau Claire, and oral argument by William G. Thiel. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent there was a 
brief by R. Michael Waterman and Mudge, Porter, Lundeen & 
Seguin, S.C., Hudson, and oral argument by R. Michael Waterman. 
 
2005 WI 92 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2194   
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 0012) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tracy and Damian Osterhues, Art and Ellen  
Jacobs, and Andrew and Luella Peterson,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Adjustment for Washburn County,  
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent, 
 
Washburn County,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Osterhues v. Board of 
Adjustment 
for 
Washburn 
County, 
2004 
WI 
App 
101, 
273 
Wis. 2d 718, 680 N.W.2d 823, that reversed a judgment and order 
of the circuit court for Washburn County, Robert H. Rasmussen, 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
2 
 
Judge.  The court of appeals held that a county board of 
adjustment does not have the authority to conduct a de novo 
review of a county zoning committee's decision.  We reverse.   
¶2 
When reviewing the decision to grant or deny a 
conditional use permit, a county board of adjustment has the 
authority to conduct a de novo review of the record and 
substitute its judgment for the county zoning committee's 
judgment.  Moreover, under the applicable state statute, a board 
has authority to take new evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 59.694 (2001-
02).1  We reach this conclusion for the following reasons: First, 
the plain language of the statute gives the board "all of the 
powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken" when "error 
is alleged."  Second, the Wisconsin law is based on a model 
statute enacted by almost all states, and other states have 
consistently agreed that the board of adjustment has the power 
of de novo review.  Third, it appears from prior appellate 
decisions that boards of adjustment in this state commonly 
exercise the power of de novo review, and take additional 
evidence, when reviewing grants and denials of conditional use 
permits. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
The facts material to this appeal are undisputed.  In 
2001, the Washburn County Highway Department (the Department) 
was searching for a site upon which to construct a new gravel 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
3 
 
pit.  The Department decided that Alvin Todd's 40-acre parcel in 
the Town of Beaver Brook would suit its purposes.  However, 
Todd's parcel was zoned "Agricultural (A)."  Under Washburn 
County's zoning ordinance, a gravel pit is a conditional use, 
not a permitted use, in that zone.  Accordingly, the Department 
conditioned its purchase on its ability to obtain a conditional 
use permit from the Washburn County Zoning Committee (the 
Committee) authorizing the construction of the gravel pit.   
¶4 
On June 25, 2001, the Department filed its application 
for a conditional use permit with the Committee.  On July 9, 
2001, the Committee notified the surrounding property owners, 
including plaintiffs Damian and Tracy Osterhues, that it would 
consider the Department's application on July 24, 2001.  The 
Committee also consulted with the host municipality, the Town of 
Beaver Brook, requesting Beaver Brook's recommendation on the 
permit application.  On July 11 Beaver Brook recommended 
granting the permit subject to thirteen conditions.  On July 24 
County Highway Commissioner Mike Servi appeared before the 
Committee to request the permit.  Tracy Osterhues and others 
appeared in opposition.  The meeting minutes do not disclose the 
extent to which she and other citizens opposing the permit were 
allowed to present evidence, but Osterhues does not dispute that 
she had a full opportunity to argue her case before the 
Committee.  Ultimately, the Committee voted to grant the permit, 
with only one vote opposed.  On July 31 the Committee issued a 
written order memorializing the permit grant.  
No. 2003AP2194 
 
4 
 
¶5 
In August 2001 the Town of Beaver Brook asked the 
Committee to reconsider the permit grant because "the Town Board 
of Beaver Brook has changed [its] recommendation . . . ."  The 
Committee agreed to do so, and scheduled the matter for 
rehearing at the September 25, 2001, Committee meeting.  The 
Osterhues and others again appeared in opposition.  The 
Committee reapproved the permit grant with some additional 
conditions. 
¶6 
On 
November 
19, 
2001, 
the 
Osterhues 
and 
other 
surrounding property owners filed a notice of appeal of the 
Committee's 
decision 
with 
the 
Washburn 
County 
Board 
of 
Adjustment (the Board), alleging several errors including claims 
that the surrounding neighbors received insufficient notice of 
the project and that the Committee's action violated several 
Washburn County ordinances.  The Board considered the matter at 
its meeting on January 9, 2002.  Various surrounding property 
owners, including Tracy Osterhues, spoke in opposition to the 
project.2  The Town Chairman of Beaver Brook also spoke in 
opposition.  In response, the Washburn County Corporation 
Counsel 
appeared 
and 
"addressed 
alleged 
errors 
by 
the 
committee." 
¶7 
One of the primary issues debated before the Board 
concerned the extent of the Board's review.  Tracy Osterhues 
asked the Board to "hear this case all over again and decide for 
                                                 
2 Osterhues presented some evidence to the Board.  Although 
the Board heard the evidence, it ultimately restricted its 
review to whether the Committee erred procedurally. 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
5 
 
itself. . . . I am asking [you to] decide this case on your own 
merits."  The Board's counsel advised the Board that it had the 
power to decide appeals only "where there is deemed to be an 
error.  . . . [Y]our jurisdiction is merely to determine whether 
there is an error of fact or law below and then to issue an 
appropriate order."  The Board's counsel further advised that 
even if the Board did find error, the appropriate remedy was not 
to decide the case itself, but to "return [the case] to the 
zoning committee with orders to them to hear the case or to 
follow your instructions."  One Board member openly expressed 
the view that he would have voted differently if he had been 
part of the Zoning Committee, but based on the Board's counsel's 
advice, he felt constrained because he could not discern any 
"error" the Committee had made. 
¶8 
The Board voted to affirm the Committee's decision.  
On January 17, 2002, it issued detailed written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  Among the Board's conclusions of law 
were the following: 
11. The function of the Board of Adjustment when 
sitting on an appeal of a decision such as this is, in 
accord with § 300 of the Zoning Code[,] to correct any 
error in the decision on appeal.  It is not to re-
decide the matter or substitute its thoughts or 
opinions for those of the Committee or administrator 
who issued the decision brought up on appeal. 
12. The Committee acted within its scope of 
authority under the Zoning Code and did not commit 
error.  
¶9 
On 
February 
21, 
2002, 
the 
Osterhues 
and 
two 
neighboring couples filed a complaint in the circuit court for 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
6 
 
Washburn 
County 
seeking 
certiorari 
review 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10).3 
 
The 
Osterhues 
reiterated 
their 
argument that the Board had "complete power and full authority" 
to "fully review" the Committee's decision, but did not exercise 
that power based upon the allegedly faulty advice of its 
counsel. 
¶10 The circuit court agreed with the plaintiffs and 
granted summary judgment in their favor on June 25, 2003, 
remanding the case to the Board to conduct a de novo review of 
the Committee's decision.  The Board appealed, and the court of 
appeals reversed.  We granted review. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶11 This case is before us on certiorari review.  Our 
function is therefore limited to determining "(1) whether the 
board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on 
a correct theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the board might reasonably make the 
order or determination in question based on the evidence."  
State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington County Bd. of Adjustment, 
2004 WI 23, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401 (citing 
Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 
253, 469 N.W.2d 831 (1991)).   
                                                 
3 The other named plaintiffs were Art and Ellen Jacobs and 
Andrew and Luella Peterson. 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
7 
 
¶12  Our review of the extent of the Board's power under 
the statutory scheme is de novo.  Accord State v. Outagamie 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶22, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 
N.W.2d 376.  We conclude that the Board's action does not 
satisfy the second prong of the traditional certiorari test; by 
misconstruing its own authority to act on appeal, the Board 
proceeded on an incorrect theory of law. 
B. 
General Principles 
¶13 We begin by reviewing the sources of the Board's 
authority. 
¶14 The 
legislature 
has 
given 
counties 
substantial 
discretion in setting up boards of adjustment:  
The county board may provide for the appointment 
of a board of adjustment, and in the regulations and 
restrictions adopted under s. 59.69 may provide that 
the board of adjustment may, in appropriate cases and 
subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, make 
special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in 
harmony with its general purpose and intent and in 
accordance with general or specific rules therein 
contained. 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(1).   
¶15 After creating a board of adjustment and defining its 
power, "[t]he county board shall adopt rules for the conduct of 
the 
business 
of 
the 
board 
of 
adjustment . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(3).  
¶16 The substantial discretion granted Washburn County in 
setting up its board means that we must examine the state 
statute, the County ordinances, and the Board's Bylaws to 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
8 
 
determine the extent of the Board's power in its review of the 
Committee's grant or denial of a conditional use permit.   
¶17 The powers of a board of adjustment are set out in 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7). 
 
Specifically 
at 
issue 
here 
is 
§ 59.694(7)(a), which gives a board the power to "hear and 
decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in an order, 
requirement, decision or determination made by an administrative 
official in the enforcement of s. 59.69 or of any ordinance 
enacted pursuant thereto."  (Emphasis added.)  In exercising 
that power, a board may "reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or 
may modify the order, requirement, decision or determination 
appealed from, and may make the order, requirement, decision or 
determination as ought to be made, and to that end shall have 
all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken."  
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(8) (emphasis added).   
¶18 The particular "appeal" at issue is rooted in the 
community's zoning structure.  Most municipal zoning ordinances 
provide for both "permitted uses" and "conditional uses" in each 
zone.  Generally speaking, only conditional uses require a 
special permit from the zoning authority.  Washburn County is no 
exception.  Under its zoning ordinance, "[a]ny use listed as a 
Conditional Use in this Ordinance shall be permitted only 
upon . . . issuance of a Conditional Use Permit by the Zoning 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
9 
 
Committee."  Washburn County Zoning Ordinance, art. XX, § 200 
(1988).4   
¶19 The parties agree that the land in question is zoned 
"Agricultural (A)."  Permitted uses in that zone include general 
farming, one- and two-family dwellings, and stables, among other 
things.  Washburn County Zoning Ordinance art. IX, § 91 (1988).  
Uses such as airports, cemeteries, and (important for our 
purposes) gravel pits are conditional uses in the Agricultural 
zone.  Id., § 92. 
¶20 If a Washburn County landowner proposes to construct a 
conditional use on his or her property, he or she must obtain 
the County's approval by following the procedures set out in the 
County Zoning Ordinance.  Namely, the landowner must apply to 
the County Zoning Administrator and receive a permit issued by 
the Committee.  Washburn County Zoning Ordinance art. XX, § 200 
(1988).  The Committee may request assorted information about 
the landowner's proposal, and must consider the proposal at a 
public hearing.  Id., §§ 201, 204.  If the Committee decides to 
issue the permit, it may attach any conditions (such as the 
conditions requested by the Town of Beaver Brook) that it 
                                                 
4 The ordinance numbers cited herein correspond to the 
numbering system contained in copies of the County ordinances 
provided to the court by the parties.  We note that Washburn 
County has since renumbered its ordinances into a comprehensive 
collection.  For example, the zoning ordinance is now located in 
Washburn County's Land Development Code (chapter 38 of the new 
numbering system) at article IV.  As neither party objected to 
the ordinances filed with the court, we will continue to refer 
to the old numbering system for purposes of this opinion.   
No. 2003AP2194 
 
10 
 
"deem[s] 
necessary 
in 
furthering 
the 
purposes 
of 
this 
Ordinance."  Id., § 203.   
¶21 After the Committee issues its decision, "any person 
aggrieved" may take an appeal to the Board.  Washburn County 
Zoning Ordinance art. 
XXX, 
§ 301 
(1988). 
 
There 
is no 
requirement that the "aggrieved person" first make an argument 
before the Committee.  Upon such appeal, the Board takes 
jurisdiction and "shall hear and decide appeals where it is 
alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or 
determination 
made 
by 
an 
administrative 
official 
in 
the 
enforcement or administration 
of 
this 
Ordinance."5 
 
Id., 
§ 300(1).  The Ordinance further provides that the Board "shall 
adopt such rules as it deems necessary for the conduct of 
business . . . ."  Id., § 302. 
¶22 In compliance with the Ordinance, the Board has 
adopted "Rules and By-laws of the Washburn County Board of 
Adjustment[ ]" (hereinafter "Bylaws").  The Bylaws provide that 
the Board assumes "all responsibilities, duties and powers as 
provided [in Wis. Stat. § 59.6946] and by related statu[t]es."  
                                                 
5 The Board does not dispute that the Committee is an 
"administrative official" or that its action was taken "in the 
enforcement or administration of this Ordinance."  Accordingly, 
the only issue we must decide is the extent of the Board's 
review. 
6 The 
Bylaws 
reference 
Wis. Stat. § 59.99, 
which 
was 
renumbered § 59.694 by 1995 Wis. Act 201, § 479.  According to 
Act 201, the change was "nonsubstantive."  Although it appears 
that the Board has not amended its Bylaws to take this change 
into account, we proceed with the understanding the Bylaws 
effectively refer to § 59.694, as § 59.99 no longer exists. 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
11 
 
Bylaws, § I(1).  Further, the Board has "[t]he powers and duties 
[as] identified in Section[ ] 59.97(7)7 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
and in the Washburn County Zoning Ordinance."  Id., § IV.  
Finally, in exercising its power to hear appeals, the Board  
may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify 
the order, requirement, decision or determination 
appealed from and may make such order, requirement, 
decision or determination as ought to be made, and 
shall have all the powers of the office [sic] from 
whom the Appeal is taken, and may issue, or direct the 
issuance, of a permit. 
Id. 
¶23 Apart from minor stylistic changes, this language was 
copied verbatim from Wis. Stat. § 59.694(8) ("Order on Appeal").  
The similarities in language of the statute and the ordinance 
and Bylaws, coupled with the declaration in the Bylaws that the 
Board assumes "all responsibilities, duties and powers as 
provided [in Wis. Stat. § 59.694] and by related statu[t]es," 
make it apparent that the Bylaws are intended to allow the Board 
to wield all the power permitted under the state statutory 
scheme, specifically § 59.694(7) and (8). 
C. 
Statutory Interpretation 
¶24 As we have repeatedly held, statutory interpretation 
begins with the plain language of the statute.  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  However, the plain meaning is 
                                                 
7 The parties agree that the reference to § 59.97(7) is an 
obvious typographical error intended to refer to § 59.99(7) 
("Powers of Board"), since renumbered § 59.694(7).  See supra 
n.6. 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
12 
 
seldom determined in a vacuum; statutory language should be 
"interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . ."  Id., ¶46. 
¶25 The plain language of both the statute and the 
ordinance indicates that the Board may hear "appeals" from the 
Committee's decisions to grant or deny conditional use permits.  
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(a); Washburn County Zoning Ordinance, 
art. XXX, § 300.  The term "appeals" normally suggests appellate 
jurisdiction.  The Board argues that it would be incongruous for 
this court to conclude that the Board, on appeal, may conduct a 
de novo review or take new testimony.  The Board argues that the 
court should consider the dictionary definition of "appeal:" "A 
proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by 
bringing it to a higher authority; esp., the submission of a 
lower court's or agency's decision to a higher court for review 
and possible reversal."  Black's Law Dictionary 94 (7th ed. 
1999).  The Board argues that this definition shows that it is 
the decision of the lower authority that should be the subject 
of the higher authority's consideration, not the substance of 
the matter.  The Board then cites several non-zoning cases in 
which courts have construed the word "appeal."   
¶26 It would be easy enough to collect cases interpreting 
and defining the word "appeal."  But "appeal" is a broad term, 
and 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
word 
may 
be 
different 
in 
the 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
13 
 
administrative context than as normally used by courts.8  As one 
court interpreting an identical statute recognized, the meaning 
of the word "appeal" in any given context "cannot be decided by 
simply applying an abstract definition to that word."  Messer v. 
Snohomish County Bd. of Adjustment, 578 P.2d 50, 56 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 
1978). 
 
Rather, 
"[t]he 
scope 
and 
nature 
of 
an 
administrative appeal or review must be determined by the 
provisions of the statutes and ordinances which authorize them."  
Id.  We agree.   
¶27 The 
Board 
must 
acknowledge 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(c) gives boards power "to authorize upon 
appeal in specific cases variances from the terms of the 
ordinance . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, a 
paragraph in the same subsection of the statute that defines the 
powers of boards of adjustment and authorizes the "appeal" from 
the Zoning Committee in this case, uses the word "appeal" in 
situations which virtually require the taking of evidence.  The 
word "appeal" is used also in connection with variances in the 
Board's bylaws.  Bylaws, § IV(2). 
                                                 
8 As 
examples, 
the 
Employee Trust 
Funds 
Board 
hears 
"appeals" 
from 
the 
Department 
of 
Employee 
Trust 
Funds' 
decisions.  Wis. Stat. § 40.02(19); Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 
11.02(3), (5) (Jan. 2004).  Such an "appeal" is treated as a 
contested case in which both parties may conduct discovery and 
present evidence.  Wis. Admin. Code §§ ETF 11.03(6), 11.05, 
11.06 (Jan. 2004).   
Similarly, although in a different context, either party 
may "appeal" from a judgment in municipal court, and a new trial 
may be held in circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 800.14(1) and (4). 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
14 
 
¶28 In 
addition, 
resort 
to 
the 
Board's 
dictionary 
definition of "appeal" is unnecessary because the Board's Bylaws 
expressly define the word as "A complaint of an injustice done 
or error committed in which both the facts and the law are 
reviewed.  [The Board of Adjustment hears and decides] Appeals 
regarding interpretations of [the] County Zoning Ordinance."  
Bylaws, § XI(2) (emphasis added).  This specialized definition 
of "appeal" differs from the sense in which courts normally use 
the word.  Accordingly, we decline the Board's invitation to 
limit its power on grounds that the governing statute uses the 
word "appeal."  To confirm the Bylaws' seemingly conclusive 
definition of "appeal," we consider the context of the statute 
by looking at the surrounding statutory scheme.   
¶29 First, we note that the Board has the power to hear 
appeals "where it is alleged there is error . . . ." in the 
decision below.  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(a) (emphasis added).  
The Board construes this to mean that it must find some error 
before it can perform a substantive review of the Committee's 
action.  At oral argument, the County and the Board disagreed as 
to the type of "error" the Board must find in order to exercise 
de novo review or receive additional evidence.  The County 
asserted that the Board could proceed upon a finding of any 
error, whether that error was procedural, substantive, or 
equitable.  The Board, on the other hand, argued that only a 
finding of procedural error would permit a substantive review. 
¶30 The 
statute 
does 
not 
limit 
the 
Board 
to 
any 
prerequisite finding of error.  All that is required for a board 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
15 
 
to proceed is that error be alleged.  The error alleged may be 
procedural, substantive, or equitable because the statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(a) and (8), does not limit the type of 
error that a board may review.  Subsection (8) gives a board 
"all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken."  
Because in this case the Committee has the power to take 
evidence and decide whether to grant a conditional use permit, 
the Board must have the same power, as the statute gives it "all 
the powers" the Committee has.9 
¶31 The Board initially acted on this understanding of its 
power.  The statute requires that error be alleged by a "person 
aggrieved" by the Committee's decision.  Wis. Stat. § 59.694(4).  
There is no dispute, for instance, that Tracy Osterhues was a 
"person aggrieved" by the Committee's decision or that she and 
others alleged errors by the Committee.  Osterhues alleged error 
in her notice of appeal to the Board and she orally alleged 
error at the hearing before the Board.  The hearing minutes 
specifically state that the Washburn County Corporation Counsel 
appeared representing the Committee and "addressed alleged 
errors by the committee."  In short, the Board's own minutes 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs met the requirements necessary 
to trigger the Board's de novo review. 
                                                 
9 Osterhues points out the circuity in the Board's argument: 
If the Board may not conduct a substantive review, how may it 
determine whether there is substantive error in the Committee's 
decision? 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
16 
 
¶32 Next, we note that there is no requirement that the 
"person aggrieved" participated in any way in the Committee's 
hearing on the permit application.  This is significant because 
it is conceivable——even likely——that the Board would be the only 
administrative body with the power to hear the evidence of a 
"person aggrieved" who did not appear before the Committee 
(perhaps because the person did not know that the applicant had 
requested a permit hearing).  In that situation, due process 
would require the Board to allow such a person to present 
evidence.  "The ultimate test to determine whether due process 
of law has been accorded a party to an administrative proceeding 
is the presence or absence of fair play," which includes the 
right to present "competent evidence."  Bituminous Cas. Co. v. 
DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 730, 734, 295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(quoting State ex rel. Richey v. Neenah Police & Fire Comm'n, 48 
Wis.2d 575, 580, 180 N.W.2d 743 (1970)). 
¶33 In reviewing the Committee's decision, the Board may 
decide to review the record of evidence presented to the 
Committee and may render an independent decision on that basis.  
It may also decide to take new testimony and evidence to 
supplement the record.  If it does not do so, the Board may have 
to defend its action on an incomplete record in the event of 
certiorari review. 
¶34 The plain-meaning interpretation that the Board may 
exercise de novo review and take additional evidence is 
confirmed by reference to other courts' interpretation of 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
17 
 
identical language, and by the past practices of boards of 
adjustment revealed in past Wisconsin appellate decisions. 
D. 
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) 
¶35 Wisconsin's 
zoning 
laws, 
including 
the 
statutes 
governing county boards of adjustment, date to 1927.  In that 
year, the legislature enacted, almost verbatim, the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) that had been promulgated by 
the United States Department of Commerce under Herbert Hoover 
earlier.  See ch. 408, Laws of 1927.  The similarity between the 
revised SSZEA (1926) and Wisconsin's law (1927) is unmistakable.  
The 1926 SSZEA provided: 
The board of adjustment shall have the following 
powers: 
1. 
To hear and decide appeals where it is 
alleged there is error in any order, requirement, 
decision, or determination made by an administrative 
official in the enforcement of this act or of any 
ordinance adopted pursuant thereto. 
. . . .  
In exercising the above-mentioned powers such 
board may, in conformity with the provisions of this 
act, reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may 
modify 
the 
order, 
requirement, 
decision, 
or 
determination appealed from and may make such order, 
requirement, decision, or determination as ought to be 
made, and to that end shall have all the powers of the 
officer from whom the appeal is taken. 
A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 10-11 (U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce 1926). 
¶36 The original Wisconsin statute corresponding to the 
quoted language is textually identical except that "section 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
18 
 
59.97" was substituted for the first instance of "this act."  
Wis. Stat. § 59.99(7)(a), (8) (1927).  To remove any possible 
doubt, a copy of the SSZEA, annotated with the aforementioned 
change, appears in the statute's drafting file.  See Legislative 
Reference Bureau Drafting File for Assembly Bill 603, ch. 408, 
Laws of 1927.  That our statute was based on the SSZEA is 
therefore beyond dispute.  See also Klinger v. Oneida County, 
149 Wis. 2d 838, 842 n.3, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989) (noting that 
Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) is modeled on the SSZEA). 
¶37 When a Wisconsin statute adopts a model law, it is 
appropriate to reference the case law of other jurisdictions 
that have also enacted the same law.  See, e.g., Knight v. 
Milwaukee 
County, 
2002 
WI 
27, 
¶28, 
251 
Wis. 2d 10, 
640 
N.W.2d 773; National Operating, L.P. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
2001 WI 87, ¶30, 244 Wis. 2d 839, 630 N.W.2d 116. 
¶38 Because the statutory language at issue is taken from 
a model act that has been adopted in most jurisdictions,10 there 
is no paucity of case law deciding the issue now before this 
court.  Courts in other jurisdictions, construing statutes 
effectively identical to Wisconsin's, have repeatedly concluded 
that a board of adjustment has broad power to conduct a de novo 
                                                 
10 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was extremely 
successful, having been "adopted at one point in all 50 states, 
and is still in effect (with various modifications) in 47 
states."  Homer Township v. Zimney, 490 N.W.2d 256, 258 (N.D. 
1992) (quoting 1 Williams Am. Land Plan, § 18.01 (1988 rev.)). 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
19 
 
review and may take additional evidence.11  See also 4 Anderson's 
American Law of Zoning § 2205, at 14-15 (4th ed. 1997) (board 
has power to conduct a de novo review); 3 Rathkopf's The Law of 
Zoning and Planning § 57:9, at 57-27 (Ziegler rev. 2002) (board 
has power to "reverse or affirm, wholly or partly . . . and make 
such order, requirement, decision, or determination as, in its 
opinion, ought to be made in the case.") (emphasis added).  In 
exercising this power, the Board necessarily can——indeed, must——
                                                 
11 See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Bd. of Adjustment 
for City and County of Denver, 55 P.3d 252, 256 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2002) (Because the board has all the powers of the officer from 
whom the appeal is taken, "[i]n effect, the board steps into the 
shoes of the zoning administrator because it is granted the 
power to do that which ought to have been done in the first 
place.  The board's review therefore is de novo."); Brown v. 
Montgomery, et al., 193 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Mo. 1946) (language from 
the act authorizes the board to provide a de novo hearing, and 
the decision below did not bind the board on issues of fact); 
Arents v. Squires, 166 N.E.2d 848, 852-53 (N.Y. 1960) (The Board 
has "all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is 
taken," and the nature of the board's power "is not changed by 
the particular board or officer that exercises it, but the power 
classifies itself according to its function."); Silver Griddle 
Co. v. City of Oklahoma City, 570 P.2d 619, 622 (Okla. 1977) 
("[I]f the Board of Adjustment thinks that the Appellee should 
have been granted a permit, then it has the authority to modify 
the order and grant the permit."); Fleishon v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment et al., 2 Pa. D.&C.2d 45, 47 (Pa. Com.Pl. 1954) (The 
board has the power to "consider the entire issue de novo" and 
"was 
not 
created 
to 
be 
a 
mere 
'rubber 
stamp' 
for 
an 
administrative officer."); Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of 
Myrtle Beach, 602 S.E.2d 76, 79 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (board 
exercises "substantial power" with "[f]ew restrictions" and is 
authorized to apply the ordinance as dictated by the facts 
before it); Messer v. Snohomish County Bd. of Adjustment, 578 
P.2d 50, 56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (Board may grant a de novo 
hearing but is not required to do so).   
No. 2003AP2194 
 
20 
 
make factual determinations.  See 3 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning 
and Planning, § 57:11, at 57-31 (Ziegler rev. 2002). 
E. 
Wisconsin Practice 
¶39 Our holding that the Board has discretion to take 
evidence and perform a de novo review of the Committee's 
decision finds additional support in the past practice of 
similar boards in other counties, as evidenced in our case law.  
¶40 For example, in State ex rel. Brookside Poultry Farms, 
Inc. v. Jefferson County Board of Adjustment, we noted that, on 
appeal from a county zoning committee, the Jefferson County 
Board of Adjustment "conducted the appeal as a contested case 
hearing and ordered the parties to present their cases as if the 
appeals were de novo proceedings."  131 Wis. 2d 101, 107, 388 
N.W.2d 593 (1986).  Similarly, in Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin v. Dane County Board of Adjustment, the 
Dane County Board of Adjustment took extensive testimony and 
conducted a de novo hearing upon appeal of a zoning committee's 
grant of a conditional use permit.  2000 WI App 211, ¶¶4-5, 8, 
238 Wis. 2d 810, 618 N.W.2d 537.  In Wolff v. Town of Jamestown, 
the court of appeals observed that when the Town of Jamestown 
appealed the Grant County Planning and Zoning Committee's grant 
of a conditional use permit, the Grant County Board of 
Adjustment 
"ultimately 
denied 
the . . . application 
[for 
conditional use permit]."  229 Wis. 2d 738, 742, 601 N.W.2d 301 
(Ct. App. 1999).  The Grant County Board of Adjustment did not 
remand the appeal to the Committee.  In all three cases, it is 
plain that the Board of Adjustment exercised its power of de 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
21 
 
novo review without objection.  At oral argument, the Board's 
counsel anecdotally confirmed that other boards of adjustment 
use similar practices. 
¶41 Quite possibly, Wisconsin boards of adjustment believe 
they have these powers because widely circulated guidebooks 
governing Wisconsin board practice so state.   
¶42 In 
1960 
the 
League 
of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities 
published Zoning Boards of Appeal: A Manual on Their Powers and 
Duties with Suggested Rules of Procedure (1960).  This manual 
plainly contemplates the Board hearing evidence, including 
allowing the appellant to examine the administrative official 
whose decision is appealed.  Id. at 7-8.  Significantly, "[t]he 
board is not bound by the decision of the building inspector or 
administrative officer on questions of fact." Id. at 9 (citing 
Brown v. Montgomery, 193 S.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Mo. 1946)).12  The 
League's guide interpreted identical language found in both 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)7 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(a), 
referencing a board's power "to hear and decide appeals where it 
is alleged that there is an error," to mean that the Board has 
the power "to correct mistakes made by the administrative 
official."  Id. at 11.  Similarly, the Land Use Education 
Center's 
Zoning 
Board 
Handbook 
for 
Zoning 
Boards 
of 
                                                 
12 See supra n.9.  Although the League's guide is written 
for boards of appeal, not boards of adjustment, the same 
statutory language from the SSZEA is at issue; the difference is 
not substantive.  Further, the case cited for this proposition, 
Brown, involves a board of adjustment, not a board of appeal. 
No. 2003AP2194 
 
22 
 
Adjustment/Appeals (July 2001) anticipates that the Board will 
hear testimony and take other evidence.  Id. at 12. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶43 The Washburn County Board of Adjustment determined 
that it could not substantively disagree with the County Zoning 
Committee, and that it could do nothing unless it found 
procedural error.  In adhering to these mistaken principles, the 
Board proceeded on the wrong theory of law.  The Board has the 
authority to perform a substantive, de novo review of the 
Committee's decision, and may take additional evidence if 
necessary.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the circuit court, so that it 
may in turn remand the matter to the Washburn County Board of 
Adjustment for reconsideration in accord with the principles 
expressed in this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
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