Title: State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan, 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 2001-
Ohio-1289] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. TOMA, APPELLANT, v. CORRIGAN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 589.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit judge of common pleas court, probate 
division, from proceeding in a probate case — Court of appeals’ denial 
of writ affirmed, when. 
(No. 00-2196 — Submitted July 17, 2001 — Decided August 22, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 78316. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In March 1999, the ancillary administrator of the estate of 
Margaret E. Meszaros filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas, Probate Division, for a declaratory judgment.  Appellant, Charles 
J. Toma, was one of the defendants.  The administrator alleged the following in 
his complaint. 
 
Beginning in November 1995, Toma assisted Meszaros in the 
management of her financial affairs and had a power of attorney for her. Toma 
induced Meszaros to create a brokerage account with Prudential Securities that 
designated Toma as a joint owner with the right of survivorship. Toma 
represented to Meszaros that he would manage her funds, pay her bills, and 
distribute account assets upon her death in accordance with her will. 
 
In November 1996, Meszaros became physically incapacitated and was 
unable to live alone.  Toma moved Meszaros from her home in Florida and placed 
her in a nursing home close to where he lived in Tulsa, Oklahoma. When the 
nursing home arrangements became unsatisfactory in late November 1996, Toma 
agreed to pay Rose Mary Gordyan her travel expenses and costs to move 
Meszaros to Ohio so that she could live with Gordyan.  Toma further agreed to 
pay Gordyan $2,600 per month to provide the equivalent of nursing home care to 
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Meszaros.  At that time, Meszaros was totally dependent on her caregivers, Toma 
and Gordyan.  On December 18, 1996, within a few days of moving to Ohio, 
Meszaros was admitted to a hospital in Parma, Ohio, and she subsequently died 
on January 16, 1997. 
 
According to Meszaros’s administrator, beginning in November 1996, 
Toma systematically liquidated the assets of the Prudential Securities account for 
his own benefit.  Most of the money drawn from Toma on the account cleared that 
account after Meszaros had moved to Ohio, and one check for $34,156 cleared the 
account well after Meszaros had died.  In sum, Toma drafted checks and 
withdrew cash in an amount over $175,000 from the account from November 13, 
1996, through January 29, 1997.  Upon demand, Toma refused to return these 
funds to the Meszaros estate for distribution according to her will. 
 
The administrator requested, inter alia, that the probate court enter a 
judgment declaring that the assets taken by Toma from the Prudential Securities 
account were assets of the Meszaros estate and that judgment be entered against 
Toma in an amount equal to all funds converted and received by him from the 
account plus interest, less any amount actually spent by Toma for or on behalf of 
Meszaros. 
 
Toma moved to dismiss the administrator’s probate court action for lack 
of personal jurisdiction over him, and, after a hearing, a magistrate recommended 
that the probate court grant the motion and dismiss Toma from the case.  In his 
report, the magistrate noted that Toma had arranged Meszaros’s transportation to 
Ohio.  In May 2000, appellee, Judge John E. Corrigan of the probate court, denied 
Toma’s motion to dismiss “after reviewing the entire file, the report of the 
magistrate and oral testimony.” 
 
In July 2000, Toma filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Corrigan from further 
proceeding in the probate court case and requiring that he dismiss Toma as a 
January Term, 2001 
3 
defendant in that case.  Attached to Toma’s complaint was his affidavit in which 
he stated that he lives in Tulsa, Oklahoma, that he does not transact business in 
Ohio, that he owns no real or personal property in Ohio other than his share of the 
Meszaros estate, that the Prudential Securities account he jointly owned with 
Meszaros was located in Florida, that the payees on the checks written by him on 
the account were located in either Florida or Oklahoma, and that all of the 
administrator’s acts that were alleged to constitute conversion were performed 
either in Florida or Oklahoma. 
 
Judge Corrigan moved to dismiss Toma’s prohibition action for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the court of appeals sua sponte 
converted the motion to a motion for summary judgment.  Toma filed a brief in 
opposition. 
 
In November 2000, the court of appeals denied the writ.  The court of 
appeals held that Judge Corrigan did not patently and unambiguously lack 
personal jurisdiction over Toma and that Toma had an adequate remedy by appeal 
to challenge Judge Corrigan’s ruling. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon Toma’s appeal as of right as well 
as his request for oral argument. 
Oral Argument 
 
Toma requests oral argument pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2). 
 
We deny Toma’s request for the following reasons.  First, S.Ct.Prac.R. 
IX(2) does not mandate oral argument in this appeal.  S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A).  
Second, Toma has not established that the usual factors warrant oral argument 
here.  See State ex rel. Woods v. Oak Hill Community Med. Ctr. (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 459, 460, 746 N.E.2d 1108, 1111. Although he raises a constitutional issue, 
the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve it.  See State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 166, 
169, 724 N.E.2d 411, 415.  And finally, Toma does not even specify why oral 
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argument would be beneficial here.  State ex rel. Lee v. Trumbull Cty. Probate 
Court (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 369, 371, 700 N.E.2d 4, 7. 
Prohibition 
 
Toma asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the requested writ 
of prohibition.  Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a 
postjudgment appeal from a decision overruling a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction will provide an adequate legal remedy and consequently 
warrant denial of the writ.  Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
Domestic Relations Div. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 375, 667 N.E.2d 1189, 1191. 
 
Toma contends that the probate court patently and unambiguously lacks 
personal jurisdiction over him.1  In deciding if an Ohio court has personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, we must determine (1) whether Ohio’s 
long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the applicable Rule of Civil Procedure, 
Civ.R. 4.3(A), confer personal jurisdiction and, if so, (2) whether granting 
jurisdiction under the statute and rule would deprive the nonresident defendant of 
the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  U.S. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc. 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183-184, 624 N.E.2d 1048, 1051. 
 
R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(9) authorize a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and to provide service of 
process to effectuate that jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from the 
defendant’s “[c]ausing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside 
this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he [the person to 
be served] might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured 
                                                          
 
1. 
Toma does not contend that the probate court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
administrator’s declaratory judgment action.  See State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common 
Pleas Court, Probate Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1306, where we noted 
that probate courts have jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions related to the 
January Term, 2001 
5 
thereby [by the act] in this state.”  R.C. 2307.382(A)(6); differing wording of 
Civ.R. 4.3(A)(9) bracketed; see Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 311-
312, 695 N.E.2d 751, 754. 
 
It is not patent and unambiguous that R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) and Civ.R. 
4.3(A)(9) are inapplicable here.  “[C]onversion is the wrongful exercise of 
dominion over property to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding 
it from his possession under a claim inconsistent with his rights.”  Joyce v. Gen. 
Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 551 N.E.2d 172, 175.  The 
administrator alleged in his complaint that Toma had converted Meszaros’s 
property after he had helped move her to Ohio and further converted the property 
of her Ohio estate following her death.  See Winters Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of 
the syllabus (“The title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his 
personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of 
the estate * * *.”); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), 
Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant’s 
actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed 
tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock 
involved was of an Ohio corporation). 
 
Although we recognize that the tort of conversion generally occurs where 
and when the actual injury takes place and not at the place of the economic 
consequences of the injury, see, e.g., Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc. (C.A.5, 
1989), 889 F.2d 612, 619, and United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd. (C.A.1, 
1999), 191 F.3d 30, 37-38, we note that in overruling Toma’s jurisdictional 
challenge, Judge Corrigan considered evidence, including oral testimony, that is 
not part of the record in Toma’s prohibition action.  Without all of the evidence 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
administration of an estate, including actions to determine the validity of inter vivos transfers 
where the property transferred would revert to the estate if the transfers were invalidated. 
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that was before Judge Corrigan, we are reluctant to grant extraordinary relief in 
prohibition.  See Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 238, 638 
N.E.2d 541, 545 (“Where personal jurisdiction turns upon some fact to be 
determined by the trial court, its ruling that it has jurisdiction, if wrong, is simply 
error for which prohibition is not the proper remedy.”). 
 
Under the second part of the personal jurisdiction analysis, an Ohio court 
may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the nonresident 
has certain minimum contacts with Ohio so that the case does not offend 
traditional due process concerns of fair play and substantial justice.  Internatl. 
Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95; Clark, 
82 Ohio St.3d at 313-314, 695 N.E.2d at 756. The constitutional touchstone is 
whether the nonresident defendant purposely established contacts in Ohio so that 
the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.  Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 
L.Ed.2d 528, 541-542.  Although the unilateral activity of third parties does not 
satisfy this requirement, jurisdiction is proper if the contacts proximately result 
from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with 
Ohio.  Id., 471 U.S. at 474-475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183-2184, 85 L.Ed.2d at 541-542; 
Corporate Partners, L.P. v. Natl. Westminster Bank, PLC (1998), 126 Ohio 
App.3d 516, 522, 710 N.E.2d 1144, 1148. 
 
Exercising personal jurisdiction over Toma in the probate court action 
appears to comport with fair play and substantial justice.  One could reasonably 
infer from the allegations of the administrator’s complaint that Toma, at a time 
when Meszaros was totally dependent upon him, facilitated her move to Ohio and 
paid for her care in this state by Gordyan, so that the move was not a completely 
unilateral choice by a third party.  As alleged by the administrator, Toma himself 
established contacts with Ohio and then purposefully converted assets intended 
for the Ohio resident and her estate.  Under these circumstances, Toma could 
January Term, 2001 
7 
reasonably anticipate being haled into an Ohio court to answer concerning his 
transactions relating to Meszaros and her estate. 
 
Despite Toma’s contentions to the contrary, this case is not comparable to 
State ex rel. Connor v. McGough (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 546 N.E.2d 407, 
where we granted a writ of prohibition because the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment patently and unambiguously prevented the Ohio court 
from asserting personal jurisdiction in an Ohio wrongful death case over a 
German resident for his involvement in an automobile accident with the Ohio 
resident in Germany.  This is not one of those rare cases, like Connor, in which 
we issued the writ based on the lack of personal jurisdiction that was “premised 
on a complete failure to comply with constitutional due process.”  Fraiberg, 76 
Ohio St.3d at 378, 667 N.E.2d at 1193. 
 
In sum, the “issuance of a writ of prohibition based on the alleged lack of 
personal jurisdiction is, even more than a claimed lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, an ‘extremely rare occurrence.’ ”  State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. 
v. Skok (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 647, 710 N.E.2d 710, 712, quoting Clark, 82 
Ohio St.3d at 315, 695 N.E.2d at 757.  Toma failed to establish that this case is 
one of those extremely rare cases in which an Ohio court patently and 
unambiguously lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  
Consequently, Toma has an adequate legal remedy by postjudgment appeal to 
raise his personal jurisdiction claims.  By so holding, we need not expressly rule 
on the merits of his claims because our review is limited to whether personal 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking.  Suburban Constr. Co., 85 
Ohio St.3d at 647, 710 N.E.2d at 712. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Wargo & Wargo and Mark Fusco, for appellant. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
__________________