Title: Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Windsor Industries

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

1
Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 051335             JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
June 8, 2006 
WINDSOR INDUSTRIES, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the chancellor 
correctly determined in a declaratory judgment action that 
property acquired by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1973 should 
be reconveyed by the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner to 
the successor-in-interest of the original owner for the original 
purchase price by operation of Code § 33.1-90.1 
                     
1 The parties do not dispute that in 1973 the Commonwealth 
of Virginia acquired the property in question on behalf of its 
agency formerly designated as the Department of Highways and now 
designated as the Virginia Department of Transportation.  In the 
intervening years, the agency and its directing authority have 
undergone several changes of designation, though the 
responsibilities of each remained essentially unchanged.  The 
agency is now subject to the direction of the Commonwealth 
Transportation Board, which is chaired by the Secretary of 
Transportation.  Code § 33.1-1.  The Commonwealth Transportation 
Commissioner is the vice-chair of the Board and the 
administrative head of the agency.  Id.; Code § 33.1-3.  For 
clarity in this opinion, we will refer to the Virginia 
Department of Transportation as “VDOT” and to the Commonwealth 
Transportation Commissioner as “the Commissioner” in accord with 
the current designations. 
 
 
 
2
BACKGROUND 
The issues raised in this appeal are questions of law 
decided by the chancellor on the written record and cross-
motions for summary judgment by the parties, and the facts are 
undisputed.  Accordingly, we will review the record and consider 
the issues de novo.  See, e.g., Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 
Va. 546, 552, 611 S.E.2d 366, 369 (2005); Wilby v. Gostel, 265 
Va. 437, 440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003); Eure v. Norfolk 
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 
667 (2002). 
By a deed dated October 1, 1973 and recorded on November 
27, 1973 among the appropriate land records, 1314 West Main 
Corporation conveyed to the Commonwealth of Virginia in fee 
simple two lots consisting of 1.773 acres, more or less, in 
Chesterfield County for $21,000.  The property was acquired in 
anticipation of its eventual use by VDOT in State Highway 
Project 0288-020-101, RW-204, for the construction and 
improvement of Route 288, a non-interstate highway.  J. Kenneth 
Timmons, Jr. (“Timmons”) executed the deed in his capacity as 
president of 1314 West Main Corporation. 
On March 31, 1977, 1314 West Main Corporation merged with 
another entity of which Timmons was also president to become 
Windsor Industries, Inc.  At that time, Timmons became president 
 
 
3
of Windsor Industries, as well as its majority stockholder.  
Windsor Industries was dissolved by operation of law as of 
September 1, 1988 after failing to pay its annual registration 
fee to the State Corporation Commission. 
In a letter dated September 10, 2002 to David A. Schneider, 
the District Right of Way and Utilities Manager for VDOT’s 
Richmond District, Timmons sought reconveyance of the 1314 West 
Main Corporation property pursuant to Code § 33.1-90.  In that 
letter, Timmons stated that “[a]bout 3 years ago I contacted 
[VDOT] and asked them to consider conveying the lots to me for 
the consideration that I received in 1973.  I was told that the 
lots would be used temporarily for the construction office for 
the contractor doing work on Route 711.”  Noting that “[t]he 
work on [Route] 711 seems to be completed,” Timmons requested 
that VDOT reconvey these lots to him for the consideration of 
$21,000. 
After an unexplained delay of over a year, Schneider 
responded to Timmons in a letter dated November 21, 2003.  
Noting that “Windsor Industries, Inc., the successor to 1314 
West Main Corporation, was dissolved as of September 1, 1988,” 
Schneider maintained that “[t]he ability of Windsor to demand 
reconveyance under the law did not arise until twenty years 
after the acquisition.  This would have been November 27, 1993, 
 
 
4
at the latest.”  Schneider further maintained that “[a]t that 
time Windsor Industries had been dissolved and its right to 
request restoration had expired.”  Schneider advised Timmons 
that “because the property is suitable for independent 
development, VDOT will offer the property for sale to the public 
at its current fair market value.” 
On January 7, 2004, counsel for Timmons wrote to Schneider 
contesting Schneider’s determination that the dissolution of 
Windsor Industries “extinguished” the right to seek reconveyance 
of the 1314 West Main Corporation property under Code § 33.1-90.  
Rather, counsel contended that Timmons, as the sole director of 
the dissolved corporation, had the authority under Code § 13.1-
745 to control the assets of the dissolved corporation and “to 
pursue remedies which existed prior to [the corporation’s] 
termination” including the ability “to convey property which has 
been overlooked or not conveyed for some reason in a 
liquidation.” 
Subsequently, Timmons and his counsel met with Schneider 
and another VDOT employee to discuss the matter.  Following that 
meeting, Timmons’ counsel by a letter dated July 6, 2004 
reiterated “some of the points that were made at” the meeting.  
It was Timmons’ position that Code § 33.1-90, as in effect when 
the property was conveyed in 1973, permitted the successor or 
 
 
5
assignee of 1314 West Main Corporation to seek reconveyance of 
the property and that the statute placed no time limit on when 
the seller is required to demand that reconveyance. 
On July 14, 2004, VDOT advised Timmons’ counsel that one of 
the two lots previously conveyed to the Commonwealth by 1314 
West Main Corporation would be offered for sale by sealed bid on 
August 2, 2004.  VDOT provided Timmons’ counsel with a copy of 
the public notice of the sale and the necessary forms to permit 
Timmons to submit a bid for the lot. 
On July 22, 2004, Timmons’ counsel filed in the trial court 
a motion for declaratory judgment on behalf of Windsor 
Industries, “a Virginia corporation in dissolution, proceeding 
under Section 13.1-745 of the Code of Virginia (as amended), 
successor in title and interest to 1314 West Main Corporation,” 
against the Commissioner.  Windsor Industries sought a 
determination that it was entitled to reconveyance of the 1314 
West Main Corporation property under Code § 33.1-90.  Pending 
resolution of that matter, Windsor Industries also sought a 
temporary restraining order barring the Commissioner from going 
forward with the planned sale on August 2, 2004. 
Following a hearing on Windsor Industries’ request for a 
temporary restraining order and over the Commissioner’s 
objection, the chancellor granted Windsor Industries the 
 
 
6
requested injunction.  VDOT thereafter complied with the 
injunction order and also halted the planned sale of the second 
lot previously owned by 1314 West Main Corporation pending the 
outcome of the declaratory judgment action.2 
In his answer to the motion for declaratory judgment, the 
Commissioner asserted a plethora of legal and equitable theories 
under which he contended Windsor Industries should be barred 
from seeking reconveyance of the 1314 West Main Corporation 
property.  Ultimately, Windsor Industries and the Commissioner 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment supported by memoranda 
of law. 
The chancellor heard oral argument from the parties and 
took the matter under advisement.  On February 3, 2005, the 
chancellor issued an opinion letter stating that “[a]ccording to 
the parties there are four issues to be determined by the 
[c]ourt.”  The chancellor summarized those issues as follows: 
(1) What is the nature of the inchoate statutory 
benefit [of Code § 33.1-90]?  (2) Was it possible for 
Windsor Industries, Inc. (“Windsor”), a subsequent 
corporation, to obtain the reconveyance opportunity?  
                     
2 While the precise status of the second lot is not 
established in the record before us, the motion for declaratory 
judgment clearly referenced the entire parcel of land acquired 
by the Commonwealth under the 1973 deed, and the Commissioner 
does not contend that the chancellor’s judgment was limited in 
its effect to only one lot in that parcel.  Accordingly, our 
reference herein to the 1314 West Main Corporation property is 
intended to include the entire parcel consisting of two lots. 
 
 
7
(3) When did the reconveyance opportunity come into 
existence, if at all?  (4) Has Windsor waited too long 
in making its demand upon the Commonwealth? 
 
The chancellor initially concluded that, pursuant to Code 
§ 13.1-745(B), a dissolved corporation such as Windsor 
Industries “retains its directors as trustees of corporate 
assets by operation of law.”  The chancellor further concluded 
that “Mr. Timmons fits this definition and is thus a proper 
party to make written demand for reconveyance on the 
Commonwealth.” 
The chancellor then addressed the respective positions of 
the parties, considering first what result would obtain if Code 
§ 33.1-90 created a property right in the form of a possibility 
of reverter, as Windsor Industries contended, and then the 
result which would obtain under the Commissioner’s contention 
that the statute created only “a legislative gratuity that could 
be withdrawn or redistributed at any time without creating a 
constitutional issue.”  The chancellor opined that although a 
possibility of reverter is not a vested property right, it is a 
property right subject to vesting and, therefore, cannot be 
subsequently modified by statutory amendment.  Thus, the 
chancellor, citing Code § 1-16 and Citizens Mutual Building 
Association v. Edwards, 167 Va. 399, 404, 189 S.E. 453, 455 
(1937), opined that if Windsor Industries, as the successor of 
 
 
8
1314 West Main Corporation, received a possibility of reverter 
under Code § 33.1-90, the contingencies for reversion and the 
vesting of the right to reconveyance of the property were 
established by the version of the statute as it was in force at 
the time of the original transfer of the property in 1973.  
Under this reasoning, the chancellor concluded that Windsor 
Industries’ “right to make demand on the Commonwealth would have 
commenced in 1984 [prior to the corporation’s dissolution in 
1988]” and Windsor Industries “would have a successful claim, 
subject to the issue of the timeliness” of its claim. 
The chancellor then considered what effect the statute 
would have if it provided only a “legislative gratuity.”  The 
chancellor noted that “[t]his argument is primarily based on 
federal case law arising from other states, and the [c]ourt is 
not convinced that such a concept is the law of this 
Commonwealth.”  See, e.g., Harrison v. Phillips, 185 F. Supp. 
204, 207 (S.D. Tex. 1960).  Nonetheless, the chancellor 
concluded that even by accepting the Commissioner’s contention, 
Windsor Industries would still be entitled to seek reconveyance 
of the property in question because the various versions of the 
statute resulting from subsequent amendments of Code § 33.1-90 
never expressly limited or withdrew the contingent right of the 
original property owner for reconveyance, and the current 
 
 
9
version provides for specific time periods in which the demand 
for reconveyance must be made.  The chancellor noted that one of 
those time periods is “within thirty days from publication in a 
newspaper” of VDOT’s notice of intent to offer the property for 
sale to the public.  The chancellor opined that Timmons’ 
original written demand on VDOT, which the chancellor concluded 
had resulted in the Commissioner’s decision to offer the 
property in question for sale, and the filing of the declaratory 
judgment action within 30 days of the Commissioner’s notice of 
the intent to sell, “equate to substantial compliance with [Code 
§ 33.1-90].” 
The chancellor did not expressly decide whether Windsor 
Industries’ authority to seek reconveyance was premised upon a 
property right in the form of a possibility of reverter or a 
mere statutory gratuity.  Rather, the chancellor determined that 
under either rationale the demand for reconveyance made in 2002 
was not barred by the express terms of any version of Code 
§ 33.1-90. 
The chancellor then considered the Commissioner’s 
assertions that Windsor Industries’ demand for reconveyance was 
untimely.  The chancellor first concluded that the former one-
year limitation of Code § 8.01-248, which the Commissioner 
relied upon, did not apply to a claim involving real property.  
 
 
10
Gilley v. Nidermaier, 176 Va. 32, 41, 10 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1940).  
Additionally, the chancellor opined that “[t]here is no statute 
of limitations that is applicable to the right to demand 
reconveyance under § 33.1-90.”  The chancellor further concluded 
that laches could not apply to the claim for reconveyance 
because despite “a substantial delay in the exercise of the 
reconveyance opportunity . . . the Commissioner has simply not 
been prejudiced by this delay.”  Thus, the chancellor concluded 
that under any version of Code § 33.1-90, the demand for 
reconveyance in this case was not untimely or barred by laches. 
The Commissioner filed a motion for reconsideration.  After 
receiving briefs from both parties, the chancellor advised the 
parties in a letter dated March 17, 2005 that he remained of 
opinion that Windsor Industries was entitled to reconveyance of 
the property.  In a final decree dated March 30, 2005, 
incorporating by reference the rationale stated in the prior 
opinion letters, the chancellor entered judgment for Windsor 
Industries.  The final decree expressly directed that “upon 
payment to the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner of the 
original purchase price, with no interest, the Commissioner 
shall forthwith re-convey to [Windsor Industries], or its 
assigns, by appropriate deed, the [1314 West Main Corporation] 
property.”  We awarded the Commissioner this appeal. 
 
 
11
DISCUSSION 
Initially, we note that although the 1973 deed by which the 
Commissioner obtained the property in question on behalf of the 
Commonwealth did not reference Code § 33.1-90, the Commissioner 
does not dispute that the acquisition of the property was 
consummated subject to the provisions of that statute.  We also 
note that this deed did not create a true reversion or vested 
property right in favor of the grantor, 1314 West Main 
Corporation, at that time. 
While the chancellor concluded that it was unnecessary to 
determine “the specific nature of the inchoate statutory 
benefit” created by Code § 33.1-90, the resolution of this issue 
is central to our analysis in this appeal.  Thus, we begin our 
analysis by determining what right or interest, if any, the 
General Assembly intended to give a property owner by providing 
for the possible reconveyance of property acquired by the 
Commissioner in 1973 pursuant to Code § 33.1-90. 
On brief, the Commissioner appropriately describes the 
purchase of the 1314 West Main Corporation property as an 
“advanced acquisition.”  This term is not defined in the Code of 
Virginia.  However, there can be no doubt that such an 
acquisition of real property by the Commissioner is advantageous 
to the Commonwealth by facilitating the timely and economical 
 
 
12
acquisition of real property for transportation construction or 
improvement which the Commissioner anticipates will be needed in 
the future.  Advance acquisitions of property for transportation 
projects by the Commissioner are the subject matter of Code 
§ 33.1-90, which in 1973 and in its current version provide that 
the Commissioner determine in advance of acquisition that the 
property will be required for construction of a transportation 
project that does not involve the Interstate Highway System, 
such as the present case, within 10 years of his determination. 
At the time the Commissioner acquired the property in 
question, Code § 33.1-90 provided, in pertinent part, with 
regard to the property owner that: 
In the event that the highway project . . . 
contemplated has not been let to contract or 
construction commenced within a period of . . . eleven 
years . . . from the date of the acquisition of such 
property, upon written demand of the owner or owners, 
their heirs, or assigns, such property shall be re-
conveyed by the Commonwealth of Virginia to such owner 
or owners, their heirs or assigns, upon repayment of 
the original purchase price, without interest. 
 
Former Code § 33.1-90 (Supp. 1973). 
The Commissioner maintains that this provision of Code 
§ 33.1-90 creates merely “an inchoate statutory right,” which he 
says “is analogous to the inchoate dower right” once provided 
for by statute.  Like rights of dower, the Commissioner 
maintains that the right granted to the landowner by Code 
 
 
13
§ 33.1-90 is a “statutory gratuity” subject to alteration or 
revocation by the General Assembly.  Upon this premise, the 
Commissioner contends that at the time it sold the property in 
question to the Commonwealth, 1314 West Main Corporation 
retained no right or estate in the property.  Accordingly, the 
Commissioner further contends that Windsor Industries, as 
successor in interest to 1314 West Main Corporation, could not 
acquire the right to exercise the “statutory gratuity” granted 
by Code § 33.1-90, because that right had not yet accrued at the 
time Windsor Industries was dissolved as a corporation. 
In contrast, Windsor Industries contends that Code § 33.1-
90, as it was in effect at the time the property was conveyed to 
the Commonwealth in 1973, created a property right in the form 
of a “possibility of reverter.”  As a property right, the 
possibility of reverter was assignable as part of the assets of 
1314 West Main Corporation when that entity merged with another 
to create Windsor Industries and, thus, was an asset of Windsor 
Industries at the time of its dissolution.  Accordingly, Windsor 
Industries contends that Timmons, as the principal officer and 
majority stockholder of Windsor Industries, was empowered as a 
trustee of the dissolved corporation to exercise the possibility 
of reverter if and when it accrued. 
 
 
14
“ ‘A possibility of reverter . . . is not an estate, 
present or future, but a possibility of having an estate.’ ”  
Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 648, 66 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1951) 
(quoting Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 479, 155 S.E. 
802, 806 (1930)).  “ ‘In the case of a fee limited upon a 
condition subsequent [a possibility of reverter] is a contingent 
right of re-entry upon condition broken.’ ”3  Id. 
The 1973 version of Code § 33.1-90 expressly provided the 
conditions subsequent or contingencies which limited the fee 
simple ownership obtained by the Commonwealth in the property in 
question.  As material to the present case, those contingencies 
were that the anticipated highway project not be let to contract 
or construction commenced within a period of 11 years from the 
date of the acquisition of the property by the Commonwealth.  
Upon the occurrence of either contingency, the statute 
authorized the original owner, or its assigns, to demand 
                     
3 A possibility of reverter may also arise where a grant or 
devise creates a “qualified fee limited to determine upon a 
contingency which may never happen.”  In such a case, the 
occurrence of the contingency results in the immediate revesting 
of the fee.  The person entitled to the fee does not have to 
make a re-entry.  Copenhaver, 155 Va. at 479, 155 S.E. at 806.  
As will become apparent, here we are not concerned with this 
form of a possibility of reverter because the statute clearly 
requires affirmative action in the form of a written demand on 
the part of one claiming the right to enforce a breach of a 
condition subsequent. 
 
 
 
15
reconveyance of the property by the Commonwealth.  Upon a 
written demand, the statute provided that the property “shall be 
reconveyed.”  These provisions of the statute clearly evince the 
intent of the General Assembly to grant a landowner more than a 
mere “statutory gratuity.”  Rather, we are of opinion that the 
General Assembly intended to grant the property owner a 
contingent right to reconveyance of the property acquired by the 
Commonwealth in anticipation of its need for a public highway 
project if the property so acquired is not ultimately used for 
that purpose within 11 years.  Accordingly, we hold that upon 
conveying its property to the Commonwealth on October 1, 1973, 
1314 West Main Corporation was granted an interest in that 
property in the form of a possibility of reverter pursuant to 
Code § 33.1-90. 
However, a possibility of a reverter, while an interest in 
real property, does not accrue into an enforceable right to 
reconveyance until the contingencies for the forfeiture of the 
fee occur.  See Copenhaver, 155 Va. at 478, 155 S.E. at 806.  
Thus, at the time of the 1973 conveyance, 1314 West Main 
Corporation had “only a bare possibility that the land [would] 
return to [it], upon the happening or failure to happen of the 
various contingencies upon which the estate granted [depended].  
The interest of the grantor [was] purely contingent.”  Id. 
 
 
16
(quoting 1 Frederick D.G. Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 780, 
at 1012-14 (2d ed. 1928)) (emphasis in original).  Accordingly, 
we now consider whether 1314 West Main Corporation’s possibility 
of reverter ripened into an enforceable right to reconveyance 
and, if so, when that occurred.  Sanford is particularly 
instructive on this point. 
Where there is a breach of a condition subsequent 
upon which the possibility of reverter depends, the 
estate vested in the grantee does not cease in him and 
revest ipso facto in the grantor or his successors, 
but remains unimpaired in the grantee or his 
successors until entry, or its equivalent, by the 
grantor or his successors; for the right to enforce 
the forfeiture may be waived, and the law, favoring 
the vested estate, will not permit its destruction 
until the right to forfeit has been exercised. 
 
Sanford, 192 Va. at 649, 66 S.E.2d at 497; see also Copenhaver, 
155 Va. at 479, 155 S.E. at 806. 
In this case, as we have noted, the possibility of reverter 
was granted by Code § 33.1-90 rather than by the terms of the 
1973 deed conveying the property to the Commonwealth.  In 
addition to the contingencies upon which the possibility of 
reverter depended in order to accrue into an enforceable right, 
the statute established the procedures for the property owner to 
exercise that right.  In this context, the statute is broad in 
scope.  Thus, we are of opinion that until the possibility of 
having an estate in the property vested into an enforceable 
right, the contingencies upon which it depended and the 
 
 
17
procedures for exercising the right accrued remained subject to 
modification by future amendment.  Such modification includes 
extending the period of time before the right could accrue and 
also establishing periods of limitation on enforcing the right, 
so long as such amendment did not fully extinguish the former 
owner’s possibility of reverter.  See, e.g., Haas v. Lee, 263 
Va. 273, 276, 560 S.E.2d 256, 257-58 (2002) (holding that 
“matters of procedure, such as statutes of limitations, may be 
altered or curtailed by the legislature if a reasonable 
opportunity and time are afforded to enforce and protect any 
interests and rights, provided vested interests and contractual 
rights are neither impaired nor destroyed”); see also Board of 
Supervisors v. FCS Bldg. Ass’n, 254 Va. 464, 467, 492 S.E.2d 
634, 636 (1997); Harris v. DiMattina, 250 Va. 306, 313, 462 
S.E.2d 338, 341 (1995); Buenson Div., Aeronca, Inc. v. McCauley, 
221 Va. 430, 432, 270 S.E.2d 734, 735-36 (1980). 
Prior to 1314 West Main Corporation’s possibility of 
reverter ripening into an accrued right, in 1983 the General 
Assembly amended Code § 33.1-90.  1983 Acts ch. 146.4  In 
                     
4 Code § 33.1-90 has been amended a number of times since 
1983, but generally those amendments are not material to the 
issues presented in this appeal.  Accordingly, we will only 
reference those amendments that are germane to our analysis 
without addressing the full provisions of those amendments.  See 
 
 
18
pertinent part, the 1983 amendment changed the time for letting 
the transportation project to contract or commencing 
construction on the property from 11 to 20 years.  Id.  The 
Commissioner does not dispute that in the 20 years following its 
acquisition, the 1314 West Main Corporation property had not 
been permanently utilized in a project for the construction or 
improvement of Route 288.5  Thus, the first date on which 1314 
West Main Corporation or its successor potentially could have 
obtained the right to demand reconveyance would have been 
October 1, 1993, rather than in 1984. 
As the quoted passage from Sanford, supra, makes clear, 
however, when there has been an actual breach of a condition 
subsequent upon which a possibility of reverter depends, as in 
this case, the fee vested in the Commonwealth by the 1973 deed 
did not automatically revest in the original grantor or its 
successor.  Rather, the original grantor, or its successor, was 
required to make “entry, or its equivalent” to exercise the 
right to reconveyance.  The landowner does so by “written 
                                                                  
1988 Acts. ch. 80, 1992 Acts ch. 108, 1998 Acts ch. 426, and 
2000 Acts ch. 898. 
 
5 The record suggests that the property was used for 
subsidiary support for this and other road improvement projects 
over the years, but that no permanent improvements were made on 
the property itself. 
 
 
 
19
demand” pursuant to the provisions of Code § 33.1-90.  
Significantly, the 1973 and 1983 versions of the statute placed 
no time limitation within which the demand was required to be 
made.  No written demand for reconveyance was made until at 
least 1999, when Timmons made his first inquiry to VDOT 
concerning the property.  Thus, before that date, the 
Commonwealth remained vested with title to the property, and the 
contingencies and procedures for making the demand for 
reconveyance remained subject to change by amendment of Code 
§ 33.1-90. 
In 1997, the General Assembly extensively revised 
Code § 33.1-90 and significantly altered the procedures under 
which a former owner of property acquired by the Commonwealth 
could demand reconveyance of that property.  1997 Acts ch. 93.  
As relevant to this case, Code § 33.1-90 was amended to provide 
that: 
If the transportation project contemplated . . . has 
not been let to contract or construction commenced 
within a period of twenty years from the date of the 
acquisition of such property and a need for the use of 
such property has not been determined for any 
alternative transportation project, upon written 
demand of the owner or owners, their heirs or assigns, 
received within ninety days from the expiration of 
such twenty-year period . . . or within thirty days 
from publication in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the political subdivision in which the property is 
located of a notice of the Commissioner’s intent to 
dispose of such property and [the Commissioner] shall 
notify to the extent practical, the last known 
 
 
20
owner(s) of said property by certified mail, such 
property shall be reconveyed by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia to such owner or owners, their heirs or 
assigns, upon repayment of the original purchase 
price, without interest.  Unless the reconveyance is 
concluded no later than six months from the receipt by 
the Commissioner of a written demand, the reconveyance 
opportunity shall lapse. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
In addition to altering the contingency upon which the 
possibility of reverter depended so as to permit the 
Commissioner to assess the property for use in an alternative 
transportation project, the clear import of this change in the 
law was to provide for specific time periods in which the 
written demand for reconveyance is required to be made upon the 
occurrence of one or more of the contingencies and to require 
any such reconveyance to occur in a timely manner.  The 
provisions of the statute accomplish this in principal part by 
requiring the Commissioner, upon determining that the property 
acquired pursuant to the statute is not needed for a 
transportation project and will be offered for sale to the 
public, to give notice of that intended sale, and to make a bona 
fide effort to locate the original owner or his heirs or 
assigns, who would then be required by written demand to seek 
reconveyance of the property within 30 days of that notice.  As 
the chancellor correctly noted, this notice requirement and the 
corresponding requirement that the written demand be made within 
 
 
21
30 days thereafter are stated in the disjunctive and, thus, are 
not dependant upon a prior timely demand having been made by the 
former owner within 90 days from the expiration of the 20 year 
designated timeframe. 
The provisions in the 1997 amendment to Code § 33.1-90 were 
clearly intended to provide certainty in the disposition of 
property acquired by the Commissioner for anticipated 
transportation projects, while allowing sufficient time and 
opportunity for VDOT to use the property so acquired to the best 
interest of the public.  The salutary function of the amendment 
is to make certain that, to the extent practicable, property 
acquired by “advance acquisition” but not ultimately used for 
any public transportation project should be reconveyed to the 
original owner, provided the owner can be found and desires to 
recover it for the original purchase price.  As pertinent to the 
present case, the provisions of the 1997 version of Code § 33.1-
90 became applicable to the determination of when the 
possibility of reverter under consideration ripened into an 
enforceable right to reconveyance.  This is so because the prior 
versions of the statute placed no time limitation within which 
the landowner was required to make a written demand for 
reconveyance and, thus, avoid a waiver of the right to enforce 
the forfeiture. 
 
 
22
In determining when the possibility of reverter granted by 
Code § 33.1-90 ripens or accrues into an enforceable right to 
reconveyance, the comprehensive structure of the statute is 
significant.  As amended in 1997, the statute provides not only 
the contingencies upon which this property right depends, but 
also the method and time limitations for exercising that 
contingent right in the event of the occurrence, or breach, of 
those contingencies.  The statute necessarily permits the 
Commissioner to refuse a written demand for reconveyance made 
within 90 days from the expiration of the 20-year period when 
the Commissioner has determined a need to use the property for 
any “alternative transportation project.”  Implicit in the 
statute’s requirement that the original property owner make a 
written demand is that the right to enforce reconveyance accrues 
when and if the demand is refused by the Commissioner without 
proper justification.  In the absence of a written demand and 
refusal by the Commissioner following expiration of the 20-year 
period, the statute permits the original property owner to make 
a written demand for reconveyance within 30 days from the 
publication of the Commissioner’s intent to dispose of the 
property to the public.  Without question, that publication  
invokes the statute’s requirement that the owner make a written 
demand to enforce its then accrued right to reconveyance within 
 
 
23
30 days of that publication in order to avoid a waiver of that 
right. 
In the present case, the property in question was not let 
to contract or had construction commenced on it within 20 years 
of its acquisition.  Assuming that the inquiry made in 1999 and 
alluded to in Timmons’ September 10, 2002 letter, was a demand 
for reconveyance, it was not made within the 90 day requirement 
of the statute as in effect on that date.  Moreover, because it 
would appear that the Commissioner had determined that the 
property was amenable for use in an “alternative transportation 
project” for construction work on Route 711, even if the demand 
had been timely, the Commissioner was statutorily authorized to 
retain the property and refuse the demand. 
However, when the Commissioner subsequently determined that 
the property was no longer needed for any alternative 
transportation project and that it would be offered for sale to 
the public, the possibility of reverter vested into an 
enforceable right, and the alternative procedure for exercising 
that right pursuant to Code § 33.1-90 as in effect at that time 
became operative.  We agree with the chancellor that the 
publication of notice of the intent to sell triggered the 30 day 
time period in which 1314 West Main Corporation or its successor 
could again demand reconveyance of the property at its original 
 
 
24
price.6  We further agree that the initiation of the declaratory 
judgment action within 30 days of that notice constituted 
substantial compliance with the requirement for a written demand 
for reconveyance.  Accordingly, we hold that the terms of Code 
§ 33.1-90 for reconveyance of the property to its original 
owner, or its assigns, have been met. 
The Commissioner contends, however, that even if Code 
§ 33.1-90 provides the original owner of property acquired by 
the Commissioner with a continuing property interest in the form 
of a possibility of reverter, Windsor Industries never acquired 
that interest.  Because that interest could not accrue into an 
enforceable right to reconveyance before October 1, 1993, the 
Commissioner contends that there was no vested property right 
for 1314 West Main Corporation to assign to Windsor Industries 
in 1977 when the later entity was created and received the 
assets of the former.  We disagree. 
While a possibility of reverter is not a vested interest in 
real property, it is a property interest.  Although 
                     
6 While the record contains a copy of the public notice of 
sale, it does not contain a certification that this notice was 
published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by 
the statute.  However, we will assume that such is the case 
because we will not presume that the Commissioner would have 
intended to proceed with the sale of the property in question on 
August 2, 2004 without fully complying with the notice 
requirements of the statute. 
 
 
25
possibilities of reverter were inalienable at common law, they 
are alienable by both deed and will under the provisions of Code 
§§ 55-6 and 64.1-46.  See Sanford, 192 Va. at 648, 66 S.E.2d at 
497; Copenhaver, 155 Va. at 496, 155 S.E. at 812.  Accordingly, 
though not yet an accrued right of re-entry, the possibility of 
reverter of the 1314 West Main Corporation property was an 
alienable property interest, which Windsor Industries acquired 
when the former entity was merged into the latter. 
The Commissioner further contends that a dissolved 
corporation cannot seek to enforce a right that accrues after 
its dissolution.  Again, we disagree. 
While it is true that a corporation in dissolution cannot 
“carry on any business except that appropriate to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs,” it nevertheless “continues 
its corporate existence” and the trustees of the dissolved 
corporation are nonetheless required to collect and account for 
the corporation’s assets.  Code § 13.1-745(A).  Moreover, until 
the winding up of affairs of the corporation are concluded, the 
fact of dissolution does not “[p]revent commencement of a 
proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name.”  
Code § 13.1-745(B). 
In this case, the possibility of reverter was a property 
interest of Windsor Industries and, thus, was an asset of the 
 
 
26
corporation at the time of its dissolution.  The duty of 
Timmons, as the principal stockholder and chief executive 
officer of the corporation, was to act as a trustee in 
dissolution and secure that asset for proper distribution to the 
dissolved corporation’s creditors and/or stockholders.  See, 
e.g., Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 451, 25 S.E.2d 
363, 377 (1943) (holding that “[o]n dissolution, the board of 
directors of a corporation . . . holds the assets as a trustee 
to be paid or distributed to . . . stockholders”).  The fact 
that the possibility of reverter had not accrued into an 
enforceable right to reconveyance of the property in question at 
that time is not relevant.  Accordingly, we hold that Timmons, 
as trustee of the assets of the dissolved Windsor Industries, 
was the proper party to make demand on the Commissioner for 
reconveyance of the 1314 West Main Corporation property and the 
subsequent declaratory judgment action was properly filed in the 
name of Windsor Industries pursuant to Code § 13.1-745. 
Finally, we turn to consider the Commissioner’s remaining 
assertion that Windsor Industries’ claim for reconveyance is 
time-barred either by operation of Code § 8.01-248, Code § 8.01-
246(4), or upon the application of the doctrine of laches.  The 
Commissioner’s reliance upon these statutes is misplaced; nor do 
we agree with the assertion that in the absence of their 
 
 
27
applicability there is no statute of limitations that is 
applicable to the right to demand reconveyance under Code 
§ 33.1-90. 
Although not mentioned by the Commissioner, we take this 
opportunity to note that Code § 8.01-255.1, among other things, 
applies to actions for re-entry on land by reason of a breach of 
a condition subsequent and imposes a limitation of 10 years for 
the action to be commenced or entry to be made from the time the 
breach of the condition occurs.  Beyond question, this statute 
is applicable to a possibility of reverter such as, for example, 
one created by the provisions of a particular deed.  However, in 
the case of a possibility of reverter granted to the landowner 
under the provisions of Code § 33.1-90, the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-255.1 are superseded by the more specific time 
limitations provided in Code § 33.1-90.  The same rationale 
disposes of the Commissioner’s reliance upon Code §§ 8.01-248 
and -246(4).  Our determination that Windsor Industries’ demand 
for reconveyance, in the form of the motion for declaratory 
judgment, was timely under the 30 day requirement of Code 
§ 33.1-90 results from the comprehensive and broad scope of the 
statute which in effect contains its own statute of limitations. 
Similarly, the Commissioner’s argument concerning the 
equitable doctrine of laches is misplaced.  Although this case 
 
 
28
was brought as a chancery action for declaratory judgment, as in 
Sanford, the “remedy for enforcing the forfeiture is purely 
legal.”  Id. at 649, 66 S.E.2d at 498.  As was made clear in 
Sanford, where an action brought in equity is subject to a legal 
remedy, although the chancellor retains jurisdiction and can 
administer complete relief, “equity will respect the applicable 
statute of limitation[s].”  Id.; see also Kappa Sigma 
Fraternity, Inc. v. Kappa Sigma Fraternity, 266 Va. 455, 467, 
587 S.E.2d 701, 708 (2003); Belcher v. Kirkwood, 238 Va. 430, 
433, 383 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1989). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the chancellor did not err 
in concluding that Windsor Industries was entitled to the 
reconveyance of the 1314 West Main Corporation property.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment below requiring the 
Commissioner to convey the property to Windsor Industries, or 
its assigns, upon payment of the original purchase price of 
$21,000, with no interest. 
Affirmed.