Title: Dockins v. Balboa Ins. Co.

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

764 S.W.2d 529 (1989) Wanda DOCKINS and Lonzo Dockins, Plaintiffs-Appellees. v. BALBOA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. January 9, 1989. Charles F. Sterchi, III, Debra L. Fulton, Carpenter & O'Connor, Knoxville, for defendant-appellant. John M. Norris, Taylor & Groover, Knoxville, for plaintiffs-appellees. DROWOTA, Justice. Plaintiffs-appellants, Wanda and Lonzo Dockins, have sued under their uninsured motorist coverage for injuries suffered by Mrs. Dockins. Defendant Balboa Insurance Company denied coverage by virtue of certain household exclusions in the policy, and the trial court granted summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, and we granted an appeal to consider whether these exclusions were rendered invalid by a revision of the governing statutes in 1982. Mrs. Dockins was injured while a passenger in her husband's vehicle and by the negligence of Jimmy Moore, who was driving the car with her permission. This was, it appears, a one-car accident. The vehicle was listed on the declarations page of the Balboa policy, and for purposes of the uninsured motorist part of the policy, Mrs. Dockins was an owner and an insured. The policy provided the minimum, identical amounts of liability and uninsured motorist coverages, as well as a small medical expense coverage. Under the uninsured motorist portion, the policy provides: It further provides in this part, under "Exclusions," "this policy does not apply ... to damages because of bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle owned by you or a family member." The plaintiffs allege that Jimmy Moore has no liability insurance, and the parties also presume that the liability part of the Dockins' policy, which insured anyone driving with permission, excludes coverage for injuries to named insureds. The plaintiffs reason then, that if the injuries to Mrs. Dockins are excluded from coverage, the vehicle becomes an "uninsured" vehicle, within the meaning of the statute, if not within the meaning of the insurance policy. A similar argument was made, and rejected, in Holt v. State Farm Mutual Insurance *530 Co., 486 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1972), where this Court held that a policy definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" that excluded the vehicles upon which the policy was written did not contravene the applicable statute. That is, in requiring that uninsured motorist coverage be offered with every automobile liability policy, the Legislature had not required the carrier to provide coverage in situations that it unquestionably could exclude from liability coverage, namely, injuries to the insured caused by his own negligence or that of a family member or permittee.[1] The Court of Appeals acknowledged that under Holt the exclusions in the Dockins' policy would be given effect, but construed a 1982 amendment to T.C.A. § 56-7-1202 to require a different result. The amendment relied upon was part of a complete re-drafting of sections 56-7-1201 and 1202, 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 835, which was codified as follows: T.C.A. § 56-7-1201 (Supp. 1982) (subsections c, e, and f omitted). T.C.A. § 56-7-1202 (Supp. 1982). Before the 1982 amendments sections 56-7-1201 and -1202 read as follows: T.C.A. § 56-7-1201 (1980) (emphasis added, final two paragraphs omitted). T.C.A. § 56-7-1202 (1980). As can be seen "uninsured motor vehicle" was not comprehensively defined. In the original act section 56-7-1202, formerly section 56-1149, simply included as uninsured those vehicles on which there was appropriate liability coverage, but for which funds were unavailable to the injured insured because of the insurer's insolvency. And even that attempted definition was, and is, elsewhere limited. See T.C.A. § 56-7-1203. In 1974 section 56-7-1201 was amended to include "underinsured motorists," 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 697, a term that was later qualified with reference to cooperative use vehicles. 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 359. These partial definitions were deleted by the 1982 amendments, and the substituted section 56-7-1202 eliminated the terms "insolvency" and "underinsured" and the proviso for cooperative use vehicles. It appears to us the Legislature simply combined those two categories in a single paragraph to require coverage by the insured's own insurer when the funds to which she is entitled from other policies, bonds, and securities cannot be collected. The reference to collectibility also appears in the last paragraph of section one of the amendment, now T.C.A. XX-X-XXXX(d). And this is precisely what the legislative history suggests. Senate Record No. 52 at 12-23 (March 11, 1982). Senator Davis, the sponsor, explained the revision of section 56-7-1202 as the elimination of the term "underinsured," which had, he said, been the subject of some confusion and misunderstanding. In an unmistakeable reference to our decision in Rogers v. Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Co., 620 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1981), the previous year, the Senator explained that under then-existing law an injured insured was not protected by her uninsured motorist coverage so long as the at-fault driver carried the per-person and per-accident limits established by the Financial Responsibility Act even though the per-accident amount might be divided with several other injured persons and she did not receive the amount of her uninsured motorist limits. The redrafting eliminated all the terminology and phrases upon which the Rogers decision relied. There was no discussion at all of the exclusions previously approved and frequently included in policies written in this State. Moreover, the remainder of the 1982 enactment belies any conclusion the Legislature intended to transform uninsured motorist requirements into broad coverage, amounting, in effect, to personal injury protection. The second paragraph of section one, now T.C.A. § 56-7-1201(b), forbids in some situations and restricts in others the "stacking" of separate coverages, or cumulation of benefits from separate policies. This approach does not suggest the expansive interpretation of uninsured motorist coverage given elsewhere. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nester, 459 So. 2d 787 (Miss. *533 1984) (permitting owner/passenger to recover cumulatively on four coverages, when her authorized driver caused an accident). Reading the amendment as a whole and in light of its predecessor and its legislative history, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the kind of exclusion upon which the defendant in this case relies. Recently, the Legislature has expressly adopted exclusions of this nature. 1988 Tenn. Pub. Acts 769 (codified at T.C.A. § 56-7-1202(b)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1988)). We find nothing in that action and debate, albeit remote, to cast doubt on the conclusion reached here. Accordingly, defendant Balboa was entitled to summary judgment, as granted by the trial court, and that judgment is hereby reinstated. Costs should be taxed to Appellees. HARBISON, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur. [1] See also Shambely v. Walls, 600 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. App. 1980). Exclusions while an insured is occupying an owned, but not insured, vehicle were upheld in Hill v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 535 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. 1976), and in Graves v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 671 S.W.2d 841 (Tenn. App. 1984), and rest on a slightly different rationale.