Title: Thach v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1656 
____________ 
 
NGOC C. THACH, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
June 30, 2022 
 
GROSSHANS, J. 
 
In this case, we consider whether midtrial amendments to a 
charging document that alter the elements of a criminal offense are 
per se prejudicial.  For the reasons explained below, we hold that 
any such amendments should be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, if they 
prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.  Consistent with 
our holding, we approve the First District Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Thach v. State, 304 So. 3d 387, 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), and 
disapprove the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decisions in 
 
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Viladoine v. State, 268 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), and Simbert 
v. State, 226 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), to the extent that they 
apply a per se prejudice rule to midtrial amendments.1 
I.  Background 
Through a second amended information, the State charged 
Ngoc C. Thach with three counts of capital sexual battery, nine 
counts of sexual battery, and three counts of lewd or lascivious 
molestation.  As charged, these crimes were committed against his 
three stepdaughters.  Relevant to this case are two counts of capital 
sexual battery and two counts of sexual battery.  We refer to all four 
as sexual battery counts. 
At trial, the three stepdaughters testified for the State, 
detailing Thach’s multiple sexual encounters with them.  However, 
they did not give any testimony establishing one element of sexual 
battery (penetration or union with the victim’s body part) for the 
four sexual battery counts.  As a result, the evidence as to those 
charges was insufficient to prove an essential element of the 
offenses as charged.  See § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2017). 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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Noting the lack of evidence of penetration or union, Thach 
sought a judgment of acquittal as to those four sexual battery 
charges.  After expressing agreement with Thach’s insufficiency 
argument, the State moved to amend the four counts so that each 
alleged the crime of lewd or lascivious molestation.  Defense counsel 
objected, describing the prejudice to Thach as follows: 
Well, Judge, I guess the only thing is that the lewd and 
lascivious molestation would require evidence of lewd or 
lascivious touching.  And so the State is alleging that the 
union satisfies that and potentially I could have cross-
examined the witness more in that sense, had I known 
the State might proceed on that charge.  And I 
understand that, you know, I had the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness, but to that extent that’s the 
only thing I can suggest to the court would create a 
prejudice. 
 
Rejecting Thach’s argument on prejudice, the trial court 
allowed the amendment.  Ultimately, the jury found Thach guilty on 
the four amended counts and others.  The court entered judgment 
in accordance with the verdicts and imposed lengthy prison 
sentences. 
Thach appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing 
the midtrial amendment.  The First District disagreed.  At the 
outset, the court articulated the following legal standard governing 
 
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amendments: “[T]he State ‘may substantively amend an information 
during trial, even over the objection of the defendant, unless there 
is a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
defendant.’ ”  Thach, 304 So. 3d at 388 (quoting State v. Anderson, 
537 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Fla. 1989)).  Applying that standard, the 
court held that the amendment did not prejudice Thach.  This was 
so, the First District reasoned, because the four sexual batteries 
were charged in such a way “that the amended lewd or lascivious 
molestation charges could not help but have been proven if the . . . 
[sexual battery] allegations were proven.”  Id. at 388.  Judge Bilbrey 
dissented.  He would have reversed, reasoning that because the 
amendment altered the elements of the charged offense it violated 
due process and was per se prejudicial.  Id. at 391 (Bilbrey, J. 
dissenting). 
Thach then sought discretionary review of the First District’s 
decision on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with the 
Fourth District’s case law on the application of a per se prejudice 
 
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rule for substantive midtrial amendments.  We granted 
discretionary review to resolve the conflict.2 
II.  Legal Standard 
 
Our well-established standard for amending an information 
midtrial was first adopted in Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 
(Fla. 1976).  In that case, we abandoned a strict formalistic 
approach and adopted a more flexible standard which required the 
trial court to consider the prejudice to the accused to determine if 
the amendment was permissible.  We noted that the emphasis on 
prejudice, rather than technical irregularities, was consistent with 
rule 3.140(o) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 
 
2.  Because the conflict issue here requires us to determine 
the proper rule of law governing substantive midtrial amendments, 
the standard of review is de novo.  See Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 
2d 359, 360 (Fla. 2008). 
 
3.  Today’s version of the rule is nearly identical to the prior 
version we considered in Lackos and provides as follows: 
 
No indictment or information, or any count thereof, shall 
be dismissed or judgment arrested, or new trial granted 
on account of any defect in the form of the indictment or 
information or of misjoinder of offenses or for any cause 
whatsoever, unless the court shall be of the opinion that 
the indictment or information is so vague, indistinct, and 
indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him 
or her in the preparation of a defense or expose the 
 
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In the forty-five years since Lackos was decided, we have 
reaffirmed our commitment to the prejudice standard as governing 
the permissibility of midtrial amendments.  See Anderson, 537 So. 
2d at 1375 (“Lackos stands for the proposition that the state may 
substantively amend an information during trial, even over the 
objection of the defendant, unless there is a showing of prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the defendant.”); State v. Clements, 903 So. 
2d 919, 921 (Fla. 2005) (Holding that the state may substantively 
amend an information midtrial unless it prejudices the defendant’s 
substantial rights). 
Our case law has never recognized a per se prejudice rule.  
Rather, the origin of this rule appears to trace back to the Fourth 
District’s decision in Green v. State, 728 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1999).  In applying the prejudice standard, the Fourth District 
considered a midtrial amendment that changed the identity of the 
battery victim.  Consistent with our case law, the Fourth District 
 
accused after conviction or acquittal to substantial 
danger of a new prosecution for the same offense. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(o). 
 
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held that this amendment prejudiced the substantial rights of the 
defendant by significantly impairing the preparation of his defense.  
However, one sentence in Green’s analysis appears to have laid the 
groundwork for what would later be understood as the per se 
prejudice rule.  The Green court reasoned that an “amendment is 
permissible when it merely clarifies some detail of the existing 
charge.”  Id. at 781. 
The First District expanded upon this reasoning in Wright v. 
State, 41 So. 3d 924, 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).  Holding that a 
substantive midtrial change to the elements of the crime charged is 
per se prejudicial, the district court reasoned: 
While a trial court’s ruling on a motion to amend the 
information is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, it is 
well settled that the State may not amend an information 
during trial if the amendment prejudices the defendant.  
It is likewise clear the changing or adding of an offense in 
an information is a substantive change evoking prejudice 
and requiring a continuance.  Further, an amendment 
that substantively alters the elements of the crime charged 
is per se prejudicial. 
 
Id. at 926 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Since Wright, the per se prejudice rule has been applied in 
only a handful of cases—namely, the two conflict cases. 
 
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In Simbert, the Fourth District reversed the defendant’s 
conviction for lewd or lascivious battery after the State’s midtrial 
amendment changed an element of the charge from oral to digital 
penetration.  226 So. 3d at 885.  The court, relying on Green and 
Wright, held that the amendment was per se prejudicial because it 
did not merely clarify the charge but instead changed an essential 
element of the crime.  Id. at 885-86. 
Similarly, in Viladoine, the Fourth District reversed a sexual 
battery conviction where the mode of unlawful contact was 
amended midtrial, reasoning that the amendment altered the 
elements of the charged crime and was thus per se prejudicial.  268 
So. 3d at 805-06. 
Having reviewed our case law, we now conclude that this per 
se prejudice rule is an unwarranted expansion of Lackos, Anderson, 
and Clements—which do not hold or suggest that one factor will 
always be dispositive of the prejudice analysis.  And neither Thach 
nor the dissent provide any persuasive reason to extend Lackos, 
Anderson, and Clements in this regard.  Accordingly, we reaffirm 
that the proper standard is an individualized showing of prejudice 
 
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to the substantial rights4 of the defendant.  Prejudice, in this 
context, depends not on any one factor, but on the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the amendment.  Contrary to the 
dissent’s unfounded assertion, we are not creating a new standard 
today.  The standard we now adhere to has been our rule for forty-
five years.5 
Nor do we share Thach’s or the dissent’s concerns that this 
standard is too difficult for Florida courts to apply uniformly.  In 
comparable circumstances, we have found this type of 
individualized fact-specific analysis workable.  For example, when 
the State commits a discovery violation in a criminal case, it does 
 
4.  In this context, a defendant’s substantial rights encompass 
the right to a fair trial.  38 Fla. Jur. 2d New Trial § 12 (2022) 
(equating substantial rights with entitlement to a fair trial); cf. 
Carlson v. State, 166 So. 3d 957, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); 
Hutchinson v. State, 738 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Peevey v. 
State, 820 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).   
 
5.  We acknowledge that today is the first time we have used 
the phrase “totality of the circumstances” in discussing the 
prejudice analysis.  However, it is clear from our case law that the 
prejudice determination depends on the facts and circumstances of 
the case being reviewed.  Thus, we break no new ground by saying 
that the prejudice analysis requires consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances. 
 
 
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not result in an automatic mistrial.  Instead, the trial court 
conducts a Richardson6 analysis to determine whether the discovery 
violation warrants a mistrial or some other remedy.  See Landry v. 
State, 931 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  Carrying out 
this analysis requires courts to look to the specific facts and 
circumstances of each case and determine whether the defendant 
was prejudiced by the discovery violation.  See McDuffie v. State, 
970 So. 2d 312, 321 (Fla. 2007).  And like the individualized 
prejudice analysis for midtrial amendments, it safeguards 
defendants’ rights while ensuring the prompt and efficient 
administration of justice.7 
 
6.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
7.  To the extent the dissent expresses concern that a totality 
of the circumstances test is insufficient to protect the constitutional 
interest at stake, that concern is misplaced.  Courts routinely 
analyze due process claims by assessing the totality of the 
circumstances.  See Moore v. State, 289 So. 3d 943, 945 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2020) (voluntariness of confession); State v. Laing, 182 So. 3d 
812, 816 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (objective entrapment); Rolle v. State, 
112 So. 3d 729, 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (suggestiveness of out-of-
court eyewitness identification); Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142, 
156 (Fla. 2003) (imposition of increased sentence “after 
unsuccessful plea discussions in which the trial judge 
participated”); Luckes v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936, 939 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (extended detention following arrest authorized by lawful 
warrant); Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 2007) 
 
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Finally, we categorically reject the dissent’s assertion that our 
decision will lead to “trials by ambush.”  In no way do we suggest 
that the State has unfettered discretion to amend the information at 
any time or for any reason.  Where, under the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case, an amendment prejudices a 
defendant’s substantial rights, that amendment would be improper.  
See, e.g., Davis v. State, 313 So. 3d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); Davis 
v. State, 740 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Johnson v. State, 439 
So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Turner v. State, 376 So. 2d 429, 430 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979).  However, we decline to adopt a blanket rule 
that requires a finding of prejudice when a midtrial amendment 
alters the elements of a charged offense. 
D.  Application 
Having determined the applicable law, we return to the facts 
before us.  The First District applied the correct rule of law by using 
the prejudice standard and engaging in a fact-specific individualized 
inquiry.  It considered the allegations in the information compared 
 
(conscience-shocking conduct by government officer); Hale v. Boyle 
Cnty., 18 F.4th 845, 852 (6th Cir. 2021) (excessive force on 
detained individuals). 
 
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to the amended charges and the defendant’s theory of the case.  As 
to the latter point, the court stressed: 
The State charged and convicted Appellant on other 
counts of lewd or lascivious molestation against the same 
victims.  And Appellant’s trial tactics on these counts 
never suggested that the stepdaughters misinterpreted 
Appellant’s touching, or that he did not conduct these 
acts in a sensual manner.  Appellant cross-examined 
each victim, knowing that he was charged with multiple 
counts, including other lewd or lascivious acts, without 
questioning how he touched them.  Instead, Appellant’s 
defensive posture was that his victims’ allegations were 
all fabricated. 
 
Thach, 304 So. 3d at 389 (citing Holland, 210 So. 3d 238, 240 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2017)). 
We further note that the amended charges alleged sexually 
motivated touching against the same victims and stemming from 
the same incidents as the original charges. 
The dissent seems to suggest that Thach was prejudiced 
because he was unaware of the amended charges before trial and 
thus relied on the original charges in his jury selection, opening 
statements, and cross-examination of the witnesses.  See dissenting 
op. at 18.  However, the dissent overlooks facts supporting a finding 
of no prejudice.  Besides the points noted above, had the amended 
charges prejudiced Thach, we would have expected him to request 
 
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that the court recall witnesses for additional cross-examination so 
that he “could have cross-examined the witness[es] more in that 
sense.”  But Thach did not.  Nor did he request a continuance.  
Instead, he chose to proceed on the charges as amended and gave a 
closing argument that repeated the same themes discussed in 
opening statements. 
Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we agree that 
Thach was not prejudiced by the midtrial amendment.  Thus, the 
amendment was permissible. 
E.  Conclusion 
Because the First District applied the correct prejudice 
standard and its analysis is supported by the record, we approve 
the decision below.  We disapprove of Simbert, Viladoine, and Wright 
to the extent they apply the per se prejudice rule and are 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and 
COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
At the time this case proceeded to trial by jury, Ngoc Thach 
was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery, eight 
counts of sexual battery, and three counts of lewd or lascivious 
molestation.  The charged offenses stemmed from incidents 
involving Thach’s three stepdaughters.  Because the victims failed 
to give testimony establishing penetration or union with respect to 
four of the sexual battery counts, Thach sought a judgment of 
acquittal after the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief.  Over 
Thach’s prejudice objections, the trial court permitted the State to 
amend—or replace—these four counts so that each instead charged 
the crime of lewd or lascivious molestation.  Thach did not testify 
nor present any witnesses; thus, the evidentiary phase of this jury 
trial formally ended immediately after the State was permitted to 
replace the four sexual battery counts with four counts of lewd or 
lascivious molestation.8 
 
8.  In fact, for all practical purposes, the presentation of 
evidence ended even before the charges were amended.  After the 
State rested its case and the trial court excused the jury to address 
Thach’s motion for judgment of acquittal—which led to the State 
 
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Consequently, defense counsel delivered his closing argument 
without having an opportunity to cross-examine the victims 
specifically about the amended charges.  Because Thach was clearly 
prejudiced by these amendments at the very end of the evidentiary 
phase of his trial, his unequivocal right to due process of law was 
violated. 
The events leading up to the motion for judgment of acquittal 
and the trial court’s ruling are well described in Judge Bilbrey’s 
dissent: 
After the State rested its case-in-chief, Appellant moved 
for a judgment of acquittal as to counts 2 and 3, each of 
which alleged sexual battery by a person age 18 or older 
upon a child under the age of 12 years, a crime known as 
capital sexual battery.  The prosecutor initially agreed 
that a JOA was warranted as to counts 2 and 3.  The 
prosecutor also agreed that a JOA was warranted as to 
count 8, which alleged sexual battery by a person in 
familial or custodial authority of a child between the age 
of 12 and 18 years.  Further, the prosecutor conceded 
that the evidence did not establish capital sexual battery 
as alleged in count 1. 
 
 
As for counts 12 and 13, the prosecutor argued that 
those counts of sexual battery by a person in familial or 
custodial authority of a child between the age of 12 and 
18 years, should be “JOAed down to a lesser included 
 
being allowed to amend the charges—the defense rested without 
presenting any witnesses. 
 
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offense[s] of molestation.”  Defense counsel reminded the 
trial court that lewd and lascivious molestation is not a 
lesser included offense of sexual battery by a person in 
familial or custodial authority.  The trial court agreed to 
give the parties some time to consider the appropriate 
dispositions. 
 
 
After a break, the prosecutor announced that she 
did not think, after all, the charges could be reduced by 
“JOA-ing . . . down,” and therefore, she orally moved to 
amend count 1 from capital sexual battery to lewd or 
lascivious molestation.  The defense objected.  When 
asked what prejudice the defense would suffer, defense 
counsel replied that his cross-examination would have 
been different, and he would have cross-examined the 
victim regarding the evidence to support lewd and 
lascivious touching.  The objection was overruled.  The 
State was also permitted to orally amend counts 2, 12, 
and 13 to allege lewd and lascivious molestation rather 
than sexual battery, over the objection of the defense.  A 
judgment of acquittal was entered as to counts 3 (capital 
sexual battery) and 8 (sexual battery by a person in 
familial or custodial authority on a child between the age 
of 12 and 18 years). 
 
Thach v. State, 304 So. 3d 387, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (Bilbrey, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
The First District agreed with the trial court’s conclusion, 
holding that amending the four counts did not prejudice Thach.  Id. 
at 388.  The court noted, “While the two crimes are different, the 
manner that these four sexual battery counts were charged in the 
second amended information were such that the amended lewd or 
 
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lascivious molestation charges could not help but have been proven 
if the greater offense allegations were proven.”  Id. 
As emphasized by Judge Bilbrey’s dissent, “[a]lthough the 
conduct constituting capital sexual battery will as a practical 
matter ordinarily—if not always—also constitute lewd or lascivious 
molestation, the formal elements of these two crimes are quite 
different.”  Id. at 391 (quoting Roughton v. State, 185 So. 3d 1207, 
1210 (Fla. 2016)).  Section 794.011(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2016), 
defines “sexual battery” as the “oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, 
or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal 
penetration of another by any other object,” while section 
800.04(5)(a) defines lewd or lascivious molestation as when a 
perpetrator “intentionally touches in a lewd or lascivious manner 
the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing 
covering them, of a person less than 16 years of age, or forces or 
entices a person under 16 years of age to so touch the perpetrator.” 
Notably, the crime of “[l]ewd or lascivious battery is a 
permissive lesser included offense of sexual battery, Williams v. 
State, 957 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 2007), and thus an ‘acquittal down’ 
could not have been granted reducing the charges to lewd or 
 
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lascivious battery either.”  Thach, 304 So. 3d at 391 n.2 (Bilbrey, J., 
dissenting) (citing State v. Green, 149 So. 3d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2014) (explaining that only a necessarily lesser included 
offense of the charged offense may be the subject of an “acquittal 
down”)).  Thus, the State’s only option was to substantively amend 
the four charges, leaving defense counsel with the prospect of 
delivering his closing argument without having had the opportunity 
to cross-examine the victims specifically about the amended 
charges. 
It is axiomatic that due process of law affords a person 
charged with having committed a crime with the right to know what 
the charge is before proceeding to trial.  Here, after the defense 
proceeded throughout the State’s entire case-in-chief in reliance on 
the original charges, the State was permitted to substantively 
amend four charges.  Defense counsel participated in jury selection, 
presented an opening statement, and conducted cross-examination 
of state witnesses, all under the umbrella of the original charges.  
Naturally then, once the State moved to amend the charges, defense 
counsel objected to the amendments and addressed the issue of 
prejudice.  He stated: “I guess the only thing is that the lewd and 
 
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lascivious molestation would require evidence of lewd or lascivious 
touching.  And so the State is alleging that the union satisfies that 
and potentially I could have cross-examined the witness more in 
that sense, had I known the State might proceed on that charge.  
And I understand that, you know, I had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, but to that extent that’s the only thing I can 
suggest to the court would create a prejudice.” 
Contrary to the First District’s curious suggestion that it 
“cannot imagine what other questions that Appellant would have 
asked the witnesses about the manner of his touches,” as noted by 
defense counsel at the time, he “could have cross-examined the 
witness more in that sense” had he known that the original charges 
would later be replaced with substantively different charges.  Id. 
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
Thach was not prejudiced by these late amendments. 
I also disagree with the majority’s decision to disapprove of the 
long-established per se prejudicial rule, which the majority notes, 
see majority op. at 6, traces back to 1999.  See majority op. at 1-2 
(“We . . . disapprove the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decisions 
in Viladoine v. State, 268 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), and 
 
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Simbert v. State, 226 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), to the extent 
that they apply a per se prejudice rule to midtrial amendments.”).  
In its place, the majority created a new standard for determining 
whether charges may be changed at any time during a trial: 
“Prejudice, in this context, depends not on one factor, but on the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the amendment.”  
Majority op. at 9.  Comparing this new standard to a Richardson 
inquiry, the majority contends that the new standard will not be 
difficult for Florida courts to apply uniformly.9  See majority op. at 
9.  This standard, however, casts such a wide net of factors and 
circumstances to consider that it is unlikely any defendant will ever 
be able to prove prejudice, regardless of how obvious the prejudicial 
effect of an amendment may be. 
Moreover, the majority’s new standard ignores the import of 
the notice of charges aspect of due process of law: the accused 
must know the charges before trial.  I agree with Judge Bilbrey that 
“[w]hen the State is permitted to amend a charge in midtrial, not 
merely to correct a scrivener’s error, but instead to change an 
 
9.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
 
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element of the offense, a defendant is thus subjected to be found 
‘guilty of a charge for which he was not on trial’ and such is a 
violation of due process.”  Thach, 304 So. 3d at 391 (Bilbrey, J., 
dissenting).10 
For more than two decades, the per se prejudicial rule has 
guarded the right to due process in cases where the State seeks, 
during trial, to substantively change a charged offense.  This sound 
rule should have been applied here.  It makes absolutely no sense, 
after not only the conclusion of the State’s case, but what turned 
out to be the presentation of all the evidence, to allow the State to 
amend four charges to allege crimes that require proof of different 
elements.  For the majority to permit such a clear violation of due 
process will, in no small measure, facilitate the very thing that 
Florida laws, including Florida’s extensive rules of criminal 
procedure, are intended to prevent—trials by ambush. 
 
10.  Judge Bilbrey and the majority have noted that the 
amendments in this case occurred in midtrial.  However, because 
Thach exercised his right not to present a defense case, the 
amendments actually occurred at the end of the evidentiary phase 
of the trial, with only closing argument and the jury charge left. 
 
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The implications of the majority’s decision to reject the per se 
prejudicial rule cannot be understated.  As a result of the majority’s 
disapproval of this decades-long safeguard, citizens will be required 
to proceed to trial without certainty of what the ultimate charges 
against them will be. 
Because I cannot agree to such a diminution of our valued 
constitutional right to due process of law, I cannot agree with the 
majority’s decision. 
I respectfully dissent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District – Case No. 1D19-3660 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, 
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 
and Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney General, 
Tallahassee, Florida 
 
for Respondent