Title: CHRISTOPHER A. DOOLITTLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRISTOPHER A. DOOLITTLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 52154 P.3d 350Case Number: 05-177, 06-86Decided: 03/23/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
CHRISTOPHER A. 
DOOLITTLE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Edward 
Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant 
(05-177):

Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Domonkos. 

 
 
Representing Appellee 
(05-177):

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David J. Willms, Assistant Attorney 
General.      Argument by Mr. 
Willms.

 
 
Representing Appellant 
(06-86):

Christopher 
A. Doolittle, pro se.

 
 
Representing Appellee 
(06-86):

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Mr. 
Doolittle was suspected of dealing methamphetamine in the Cheyenne area.  Pursuant to a sting operation, an 
informant asked Mr. Doolittle to meet at a nightclub near the Wyoming/Colorado 
border.  When Mr. Doolittle arrived, 
he crossed into Wyoming, but parked his vehicle 
on the Colorado side of the border.  Wyoming law enforcement officers immediately 
arrested him for conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine.  A search of his vehicle led to the 
discovery of drugs, drug dealing paraphernalia, and several weapons.  Mr. Doolittle filed a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during the search, claiming the officers were outside of their 
jurisdiction to arrest him, or alternatively, that they lacked probable 
cause.  The district court denied 
the motion.  Subsequently, Mr. 
Doolittle entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver and one count of felony possession 
of a controlled substance.  In these 
two consolidated appeals, he contends the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress and by failing to award him credit for time served.  We affirm the district court's decision 
to deny the motion to suppress.  We 
remand the case to the district court for entry of a corrected judgment and 
sentence.      

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      The issues for review on 
appeal are:

 
 

I.                     
Whether the district 
court erred when it denied Mr. Doolittle's motion to 
suppress.

 
 

II.                   
Whether the district 
court erred because it did not award credit for time 
served.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      In the morning hours of 
April 16, 2004, detectives from the Cheyenne Police Department and special 
agents of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (collectively 
"detectives") arrested Michael Collins, who admitted to dealing methamphetamine 
in the Cheyenne 
area.  Mr. Collins advised the 
detectives that Mr. Doolittle was his supplier.  He explained to the detectives that Mr. 
Doolittle would front the drugs without requiring prepayment.  After the drugs were sold, they would 
meet to exchange money and more drugs.  
At the detectives' request, Mr. Collins agreed to cooperate in a sting 
operation for the apprehension of Mr. Doolittle. 

 
 

[¶4]      At approximately 1:30 
p.m. that same day, Mr. Collins made a series of recorded phone calls to Mr. 
Doolittle in an attempt to set up a meeting to pay Mr. Doolittle for drugs he 
previously advanced to Mr. Collins and to replenish Mr. Collins' supply of 
methamphetamine.  The phone calls 
were made in the presence of the detectives and the detectives recorded, and 
listened to, the phone calls as they occurred.  Mr. Doolittle stated he was in 
Colorado but would drive to Wyoming within a matter 
of hours to make the exchange.  Mr. 
Doolittle agreed to meet in the parking lot of a nightclub near the 
Wyoming/Colorado border.  Mr. 
Collins informed the police that Mr. Doolittle would be driving a two-door 
Oldsmobile Achieva and that he would be carrying a handgun in his waistband or 
in his vehicle.  The detectives 
intended to arrest Mr. Doolittle for the ongoing drug distribution conspiracy 
upon his arrival.  

 
 

[¶5]      At 
approximately 3:00 p.m., the Oldsmobile Achieva arrived near the meeting 
place.  After crossing into 
Wyoming, the 
vehicle continued up a driveway that curved back into the parking lot of the 
Colorado Lottery Outlet located behind the nightclub.  The vehicle stopped on the Colorado side of the 
Wyoming/Colorado border.  As Mr. 
Doolittle stepped out of the vehicle, detectives arrested him for conspiracy to 
deliver methamphetamine.  

 
 

[¶6]      Detectives 
searched Mr. Doolittle and his vehicle incident to the arrest.  The search uncovered pipes used for 
smoking methamphetamine, approximately one-half ounce of methamphetamine (a 
street value of $1,400.00), a digital scale commonly used to weigh illicit 
drugs, packing material consistent with illicit drug sales, a handgun under the 
front seat, and other items related to drug sales.1  After being advised of his Miranda rights, Mr. Doolittle admitted 
he had been dealing methamphetamine to Mr. Collins for re-sale in Wyoming and admitted 
ownership of the weapons.  A later 
search of his Wyoming residence, pursuant to his consent, 
uncovered more drug dealing paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and ammunition.  

 
 

[¶7]      A 
criminal Information was filed on April 29, 2004, charging Mr. Doolittle with 
one count of felony possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and 
one count of felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1031(c)(ii).  The Information further alleged that 
these charges were subject to sentencing enhancement due to the use of a 
firearm.  Mr. Doolittle pled not 
guilty to the charges.  He filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest.  He claimed the arrest was unlawful 
because the detectives did not have jurisdiction to arrest him in Colorado.  The motion to suppress was denied.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. 
Doolittle changed his plea to no contest on both counts.  He reserved his right to appeal the 
district court's ruling on the motion to suppress.  The State consented to the conditional 
plea and agreed to recommend a sentence of ten to twelve years. 

 
 

[¶8]      Mr. 
Doolittle was sentenced on April 22, 2005, to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for 
a single term of not less than seven years nor more than twelve years.  Mr. Doolittle appealed from the judgment 
and sentence.  Thereafter, Mr. 
Doolittle, acting pro se, petitioned 
the district court seeking a corrected sentence.  Mr. Doolittle claimed the district court 
failed to award him credit for his presentence incarceration.  The motion was denied resulting in 
another appeal.  We subsequently 
entered an order consolidating both appeals.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]      Our 
review of a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress is guided by the 
following:

 
 
[W]e 
do not interfere with the [district court's] findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  When the 
district court has not made specific findings of fact, we will uphold its 
general ruling if the ruling is supportable by any reasonable view of the 
evidence.  We consider the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling because of the 
district court's ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the 
evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions at the 
hearing on the motion.

 
 

Gunn v. 
State, 2003 
WY 24, ¶ 5, 64 P.3d 716, 719 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo. 2002) (quotation marks omitted)).  "The determination of whether a sentence 
is illegal is a question of law, which we review de novo."  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶10]   Mr. Doolittle asserts two 
errors for our review pursuant to his appeals.  First, he claims the district court 
erred by denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was obtained 
pursuant to a search incident to an unlawful arrest.  If we disagree with Mr. Doolittle's 
first assignment of error, he contends that the district court erred by denying 
his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

 
 
Extraterritorial  Arrest

 
 

[¶11]   Mr. Doolittle contends 
that his arrest was unlawful because Wyoming 
law enforcement officers were not legally authorized to arrest him in Colorado.  He claims that the detectives were not 
in fresh pursuit.  Mr. Doolittle 
also argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest him because they 
did not make any personal observations of the conspiracy other than seeing Mr. 
Doolittle's vehicle cross the Wyoming state line.  As a result of the unlawful arrest, Mr. 
Doolittle asserts that all items obtained from the search should have been 
excluded from evidence. 

 
 

[¶12]   The validity of a 
warrantless arrest is determined by applying the law of the state in which the 
arrest occurred.  Six Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 861 
(Wyo. 1980) (citing United States v. Morris, 445 F.2d 1233 
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957, 92 S. Ct. 322, 30 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1971); State v. 
Coleman, 579 P.2d 732 (Mont. 1978)).  It is undisputed that the arrest 
occurred in Colorado.  Colorado's statute on the subject provides 
that an officer may cross boundary lines "when the offense was committed in the 
officer's presence or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
alleged offender has committed a criminal offense."  Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-106 (West 
2005).  Colorado has interpreted 
"reasonable grounds" to mean probable cause.  People v. McKay, 10 P.3d 704, 706 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2000).  "Probable cause to 
arrest exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, the objective facts 
and circumstances warrant the belief by a reasonable and prudent person, in 
light of that person's training and experience, that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it."  Id.  
See also Mascarenas v. State, 2003 WY 124, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d 1258, 1261 
(Wyo. 2003) (defining probable cause as "the facts and circumstances within the 
peace officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information 
 sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the 
person arrested has committed  an offense") (emphasis 
omitted).

 
 

[¶13]   After holding a hearing 
on the motion to suppress, the district court determined probable cause existed 
for the warrantless arrest of Mr. Doolittle.  Pursuant to an ongoing investigation of 
methamphetamine trafficking in the city of Cheyenne, detectives arrested Mr. Collins who readily 
provided the name of Mr. Doolittle as the individual responsible for supplying 
him with methamphetamine for distribution in Wyoming.  
Upon learning this information, detectives listened to, and recorded, a 
telephone conversation between Mr. Doolittle and Mr. Collins wherein they agreed 
to meet so that Mr. Doolittle could retrieve the proceeds owed to him for a 
prior delivery of methamphetamine and replenish Mr. Collins' drug supply.  Mr. Collins also provided the detectives 
with information concerning the make and model of Mr. Doolittle's vehicle and 
advised them that Mr. Doolittle would be armed with a weapon.  

 
 

[¶14]   We find no error with the 
district court's determination.  
Based upon the information discussed above, the detectives could 
reasonably conclude that Mr. Doolittle previously conspired to deliver drugs to 
Mr. Collins for distribution in Wyoming, and 
was entering Wyoming with the intent to continue that 
conspiracy.2  The telephone call making arrangements 
to exchange proceeds from a prior drug sale for more drugs was made in the 
presence of the detectives.  By 
crossing into Wyoming at the time and place 
agreed upon, Mr. Doolittle's actions constituted an overt act committed in 
Wyoming in 
furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy.  

 
 

[¶15]   Mr. Doolittle faults the 
detectives for making the arrest outside of their jurisdiction and contends that 
this requires suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of his 
arrest.  He relies on the general 
rule that law enforcement officers are not permitted to make warrantless arrests 
outside of the territorial limits of their jurisdiction absent statutory 
authority.  See, e.g., 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 69 (1995).  Although Mr. Doolittle recognizes that 
fresh pursuit is an exception to the prohibition on extraterritorial arrests, he 
claims that the detectives were not in fresh pursuit.  Mr. Doolittle contends that the 
detectives' action of lying in wait for his arrival does not qualify as fresh 
pursuit.  He claims that he was 
unaware that he was being pursued and he was not fleeing from Wyoming's 
jurisdiction.  He further claims 
that a chase did not begin in Wyoming as required for the fresh pursuit 
doctrine to apply.  

 
 

[¶16]   If we were analyzing Mr. 
Doolittle's claim under the common law doctrine of fresh pursuit, his argument 
might have some merit.  See, e.g., 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 72 (1995) (stating that the 
common law requires an officer to begin the chase in his or her own jurisdiction 
and continue until the suspect is caught); State v. Goff, 118 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Neb. 
1962) (emphasizing that individual sought must be attempting to escape or 
fleeing to avoid an arrest), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Fletcher, 378 N.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Neb. 1985).  However, Colorado has enlarged upon the 
common law pursuant to its codification of Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-104(1)(c) (West 2005), which defines fresh pursuit as "the pursuit without 
unnecessary delay of a person who has committed a crime or who is reasonably 
believed to have committed a crime."  
Whether an arrest is valid under the "fresh pursuit" doctrine is 
evaluated in Colorado by considering three criteria:  (1) the police must act without 
unnecessary delay; (2) the pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted, but 
there need not be continuous surveillance of the suspect or uninterrupted 
knowledge of his whereabouts; and (3) the temporal relationship between the 
commission of the offense, the commencement of the pursuit, and the apprehension 
of the suspect - - the greater the length of time, the less likely the police 
action constituted fresh pursuit.  
Charnes v. Arnold, 600 P.2d 64, 66 (Colo. 1979).  There is no requirement that the suspect 
recognize he is being pursued.  Six Feathers, 611 P.2d  at 861.  There is also no requirement that "an 
actual in-sight chase" begin within the officer's territorial jurisdiction.  State v. Green, 901 P.2d 1350, 1356-1357 
(Kan. 1995) 
(relying on Charnes, 600 P.2d 
64).

 
 

[¶17]   Admittedly, the facts of 
the present case do not fit easily within the traditional sense of fresh pursuit 
where it is envisioned that an officer observes a crime and immediately begins 
chasing a fleeing suspect across a jurisdictional boundary line.  However, when evaluated under the 
criteria set forth under Colorado law, we do not find Mr. Doolittle's 
arrest to be unlawful.  Detectives 
immediately set up surveillance at the location where Mr. Doolittle agreed to 
meet Mr. Collins in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy.  Mr. Doolittle arrived as expected, but 
after driving into Wyoming, continued on a 
driveway which curved back over to the Colorado side of the border.  The detectives followed Mr. Doolittle's 
vehicle across the border and apprehended him after he stepped out of the 
car.  The police action in this case 
was without unnecessary delay and was continuous and uninterrupted.  Mr. Doolittle was apprehended as close 
to the time the crime was committed as was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  We find Mr. 
Doolittle's arrest was lawful.3

 
 
Credit for Time 
Served

 
 

[¶18]   In both 
of these appeals, Mr. Doolittle contends that the district court erred by 
denying him credit for his presentence incarceration.  We recently stated that "[a] defendant 
is entitled to credit for time spent in presentence confinement, against both 
the minimum and maximum sentence, if the defendant was unable to post bond for 
the offense of which he was convicted."  
Manes, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d  at 
181.  A sentence which does not 
include proper credit for presentence incarceration is illegal.  Id., citing Gomez v. State, 2004 WY 15, ¶ 18, 85 P.3d 417, 421 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 

[¶19]   At sentencing, the 
district court discussed the imposition of Mr. Doolittle's sentence as 
follows:

 
 
            
You're hereby imposed - - the Court hereby imposes a sentence [of] not 
less than 7 years no more than 12 years.  
That 7 years is arrived at in view of, among other factors, of the length 
of time in which you've been incarcerated here.  So the Court has considered that in 
imposition of the sentence.

 
 
            
You won't be entitled to that time.  
If you hadn't done that time, your sentence would have been 8 to 12, but 
in view of that term of incarceration, it seems to me that 7 to 12 - - the 12 is 
a somewhat higher number than customarily in a case like this, but I think it's 
necessary . . . .

 
 
No further findings were 
made concerning the time Mr. Doolittle was incarcerated prior to his 
sentencing.  The written judgment 
and sentence omits any discussion regarding credit for presentence incarceration 
even though required to do so pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) and (F), which 
provides:

 
 
(c) 
Sentence.

 
 
   

 
 
   (2) Contents. -- A written 
sentence shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk of court without 
delay. The sentence may be included in the judgment or separately entered. 
Except for forfeit offenses for which citations have issued, other misdemeanors 
where the penalty imposed does not exceed a fine of $200.00, and pleas entered 
under Rule 43(c)(2), as a minimum the sentence shall:

 
 
   

 
 
   (E) Include a finding of all time 
served by the defendant in presentence confinement for any sentenced 
offense;

 
 
   (F) State the extent to which 
credit for presentence confinement is to be given for each sentenced 
offense;

 
 
Because the written 
sentencing order failed to comply with our rules of criminal procedure, Mr. 
Doolittle is entitled to a limited remand for a determination of credit unless 
we are able to fashion a correct award from the record.  Eustice v. State, 871 P.2d 682, 685 
(Wyo. 1994). 

 

[¶20]   In its appellate brief, 
the State contends that a remand is unnecessary because a correct award can be 
fashioned from the record.  The 
State proposes that we adjust Mr. Doolittle's sentence so that 371 days are 
credited against both the minimum and maximum terms of the eight to twelve year 
sentence mentioned by the district court.  
Mr. Doolittle contends that credit should be applied against the seven to 
twelve year sentence.  The district 
court's oral pronouncement is ambiguous regarding whether Mr. Doolittle is 
entitled to receive any credit for his presentence incarceration and the written 
judgment and sentence lacks any findings which would provide clarification.  As a matter of law, we are unable to 
determine the sentence intended to be imposed by the district court.  We remand this case to the district 
court for entry of a corrected sentence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶21]   We affirm the district 
court's decision to deny Mr. Doolittle's motion to suppress.  However, the written judgment and 
sentence does not comply with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(E) and (F) 
because it lacks any specific findings concerning Mr. Doolittle's presentence 
incarceration.  This case is 
remanded to the district court for issuance of a corrected sentence consistent 
with this opinion. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1An inventory 
search revealed more handguns located in a safe in the trunk of the car.  

 
 

2Mr. 
Doolittle also claims that probable cause did not exist for his arrest because a 
defendant cannot conspire to deliver a controlled substance with a state 
agent.  He relies on Palato v. State, 988 P.2d 512 
(Wyo. 1999), 
to support his position.  Mr. 
Doolittle's claim is without merit.  
Mr. Collins implicated Mr. Doolittle in an ongoing conspiracy that began 
long before Mr. Collins became a state agent.  The theory was then corroborated by the 
telephone call between Mr. Collins and Mr. Doolittle when Mr. Doolittle agreed 
to meet Mr. Collins to obtain his profits from a previous sale of 
methamphetamine and to replenish Mr. Collins' drug 
supply.

 
 

3Alternatively, the State contends Mr. Doolittle's arrest was lawful 
pursuant to the interstate compact, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-60-203 (West 
2005), which states:

 
 
(1)        It 
shall be competent for any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal 
peace unit of a state, party to this compact, to enter any and all other states, 
parties to this compact, without interference:

 
 
(a)  While in pursuit of any person who has 
committed a felony    in 
said state. . . 

 
 
Because this 
alternative was not presented to the district court, we decline to address it 
for purposes of this appeal.