Title: DONALD MARK ADAMS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DONALD MARK ADAMS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 50697 P.2d 622Case Number: 84-173Decided: 04/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD MARK ADAMS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 
Natrona County 
Court, Stephen E. Davidson, 
J.

 
 
Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, 
for appellant (defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
of being in "actual physical control" of his parked vehicle while intoxicated. 
He raises two issues on appeal:

"I

"Whether the element of 
`actual physical control' contained in Section 31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, is 
unconstitutionally vague?

"II

"Whether there existed 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant was in `actual physical 
control' of his vehicle at the time of his arrest * * *."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On May 17, 1983, at 
approximately 11:30 p.m., appellant was found by Highway Patrolman Tom Chatt 
parked near Highway 220 between Casper and Rawlins, at or near Milepost 75, with 
his vehicle off the right side of the highway about 20 feet. The engine was not 
running, none of the lights were on, and the keys were in the ignition but in 
the off position. Appellant was unconscious and intoxicated. He was in the 
driver's seat behind the steering wheel.

[¶4.]     When Officer Chatt 
arrived, appellant did not respond to audible stimuli but did awaken when shaken 
by the officer. Officer Chatt characterized appellant's conduct and bearing as a 
"little bit unsteady," but he did not stumble. His speech was either "slightly 
slurred" or "slightly slow speech." At times appellant appeared confused, but 
was at all times courteous and cooperative. Appellant stipulated that his blood 
alcohol reading was .152 shortly after his arrest, and the degree of his 
intoxication was not an issue at trial, nor is it an issue on 
appeal.

[¶5.]     Appellant was charged 
with being in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle while in an 
intoxicated condition which rendered him incapable of safely operating such 
vehicle. He was charged with violating § 31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum. 
Supp.:

"It is unlawful for any 
person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive or have actual 
physical control of any vehicle within this state."1

[¶6.]     Appellant was tried by 
the Honorable Stephen E. Davidson, Natrona County Judge, sitting without a jury, 
and found guilty. His conviction was affirmed by the district court sitting as 
an intermediate appellate court.

I

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
the words "actual physical control," contained in § 31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, are 
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. He did not designate a constitutional 
issue on appeal, nor was it raised in the courts below. Appellant merely states 
in his brief that the statute is unconstitutional but he cites no authority. We 
have not had an occasion to consider the constitutionality of § 31-5-233(a). 
However, other states have addressed the constitutional challenge that is now 
before us.

[¶8.]     In 1956, Montana had a provision 
in its statute which utilized the term "actual physical control" in almost the 
identical manner as involved here. See § 32-2142(1) subd. (a) R.C.M. 1947. The 
Montana Supreme Court held that the statute was "neither vague nor uncertain." 
State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 
(1958). The court stated:

"* * * Using the term in 
`actual physical control' in its composite sense, it means `existing' or 
`present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation.' Thus, 
if a person has existing or present bodily restraint, directing influence, 
domination, or regulation, of an automobile, while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor he commits a misdemeanor within the provisions of [the 
statute]. * * *"

[¶9.]     In arriving at the 
above definition, the Montana court interpreted the words "actual," 
"physical," and "control" in their ordinary meaning. This is consistent with the 
general rule that words of a statute are to be interpreted in their ordinary, 
everyday sense unless a contrary interpretation is indicated in the specific 
statute. Wyoming State Department of 
Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 
(1982).

[¶10.]  We are satisfied with the Montana Supreme 
Court's definition of "actual physical control," and are persuaded that such 
definition is applicable to the Wyoming statute. We hold, therefore, that § 
31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, is not unconstitutional because of vagueness or 
ambiguity. See also Parker v. State, 
Okla. Crim. App., 424 P.2d 997 (1967).

II

[¶11.]  Before 1981, § 31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, 
made it an offense for anyone, who was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a motor 
vehicle, to drive any vehicle within the state. The legislature amended the 
statute in 1981. The word "drive" was retained, and the words "or have actual 
physical control of" were added in the disjunctive. Ch. 12, S.L. of Wyoming, 1981.

[¶12.]  We conclude that the legislature intended 
that the present law cover factual situations not covered by the earlier 
statute, and more particularly, that the legislature intended that the law 
should apply to persons having control of a vehicle while not actually driving 
it or having it in motion. The new statute defines two different offenses, 
"driving a vehicle" while intoxicated and "having actual physical control of a 
vehicle" while intoxicated.

[¶13.]  Appellant contends that there was no 
"actual physical control" under the circumstances of this case, that is, the 
vehicle lights were off, the engine was not running, the ignition key was in an 
"off" position, and the vehicle was off the road. Appellant cites the following 
cases to support his contention. Key v. 
Town of Kinsey, Ala. Crim. App., 424 So. 2d 701 (1982); State v. Zavala, 136 Ariz. 356, 666 P.2d 456 (1983); Garcia v. Schwendiman, Utah, 645 P.2d 651 (1982); State v. Bugger, 25 
Utah 2d 404, 
483 P.2d 442 (1971).

[¶14.]  Other jurisdictions have held otherwise, 
and we believe their determination more nearly comports with Wyoming public policy. 
The controlling facts in Hughes v. 
State, Okla. Crim., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), are almost identical to the facts 
in the case here. In Hughes, the keys 
were merely in the ignition and the accused was unconscious behind the wheel of 
his parked car.2 The Oklahoma court found the accused to be in 
"actual physical control" of an automobile.3 The court there 
said:

"* * * We believe that an 
intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a 
threat to the safety and welfare of the public. The danger is less than where an 
intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle, but it does exist. The 
defendant when arrested may have been exercising no conscious violation with 
regard to the vehicle, still there is a legitimate inference to be drawn that he 
placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time 
started the automobile and driven away. He therefore had `actual physical 
control' of the vehicle within the meaning of the statute. * * *" Id., at 
1024.

[¶15.]  An intoxicated person seated behind the 
steering wheel of an automobile is a threat to the safety and welfare of the 
public. The danger is less than that involved when the vehicle is actually 
moving; however, the danger does exist and the degree of danger is only slightly 
less than when the vehicle is moving. As long as a person is physically or 
bodily able to assert dominion in the sense of movement by starting the car and 
driving away, then he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he 
would if he were actually driving it. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338 
(1954); and State v. Ruona, 
supra.

[¶16.]  We believe that the legislative intent in 
enacting the "actual physical control" portion of § 31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977, is 
apprehending the intoxicated driver before he can do any harm by operating a 
motor vehicle. Mason v. State, Okla. 
Crim., 603 P.2d 1146 (1979); and Hughes 
v. State, supra. Furthermore, the statute is indicative of public policy of 
the State of Wyoming to discourage intoxicated persons from 
making any attempt to enter a vehicle except as passengers or passive occupants. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 
supra.

[¶17.]  We believe there was sufficient evidence 
in this case to support the trial court's finding that appellant was "in actual 
physical control" of his vehicle at the time of his 
arrest.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

1 Now § 31-5-233(a), W.S. 
1977 (November 1984 Replacement).

2 We learn some of the 
details of Hughes from Mason v. 
State, Okla. Crim., 603 P.2d 1146 (1979).

3 The applicable 
Oklahoma 
statute was 47 O.S. § 11-902, which in pertinent part, is almost identical to § 
31-5-233(a), W.S. 1977.