Title: Jerry Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3150 and 98-3484 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Jerry Teague,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe  
of Chippewa Indians,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
First Financial Bank,  
 
Garnishee.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 581, 599 N.W.2d 911 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 6, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gallagher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by John H. Zawadsky, Michael P. Erhard, Andrew W. 
Erlandson, Beth Ermatinger Hanan and Reinhart, Boerner, Van 
Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by 
Michael P. Erhard. 
 
 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., John E. Jacobson and Jacobson, Buffalo, 
Schoessler & Magnuson, Ltd., St. Paul, Minnesota, and Kevin 
Osterbauer and Bad River Legal Department, Odanah, and oral 
argument by John E. Jacobson. 
 
2000 WI 79 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jerry Teague,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe  
of Chippewa Indians,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jerry Teague,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe  
of Chippewa Indians,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
First Financial Bank,  
 
          Garnishee. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
FILED 
 
JULY 6, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
2 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.   This 
case 
concerns 
the 
interpretation of a statute affording full faith and credit to 
the judgments of tribal courts in this state.  Specifically, the 
case raises the question of whether under Wis. Stat. § 806.245 
(1995-96),1 a tribal court judgment can be denied full faith and 
credit because a complaint concerning the same subject matter 
was filed first in state circuit court.  The case arises out of 
a contract dispute between the Bad River Band of the Lake 
Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Band) and Jerry Teague, 
a non-tribal member who was once employed as the general manager 
of the Band's casino.  After Teague's employment with the casino 
ended, the parties embarked upon a litigation journey, filing 
overlapping suits in circuit court and tribal court.   
¶2 
Litigation began when Teague filed a complaint in 
circuit court seeking arbitration pursuant to the terms of his 
employment contract.  Over a year later, the Band filed its own 
suit in tribal court, challenging the validity of the contract 
under tribal law.  The tribal court reached judgment first, 
invalidating the contract.  The Band then moved the circuit 
court for full faith and credit for the judgment pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  The motion was denied.  The circuit court 
concluded that under the state's "prior action pending" rule, 
the tribal court, as a court of concurrent jurisdiction, did not 
properly have jurisdiction over the matter because the case was 
                     
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted.  
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
3 
filed in circuit court first.  See Syver v. Hahn, 6 Wis. 2d 154, 
94 N.W.2d 161 (1959).  The court of appeals reversed, and Teague 
petitioned for review.  We now hold that the prior action 
pending rule of Syver does not apply to these circumstances 
because an Indian tribal court is a court of an independent 
sovereign.  However, under the circumstances of this case, 
principles of comity required that the state and tribal courts 
confer for purposes of allocating jurisdiction between them, in 
order to avoid both the race to judgment and inconsistent 
results that occurred here.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
¶3 
The Band is a federally recognized Indian tribe, 
possessing inherent powers of self-government over its members 
and its territory pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479.  The Band has two fundamental 
governing documents: its constitution, adopted under section 16 
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,2 and its corporate 
charter issued by the Secretary of the United States Department 
of the Interior under section 17 of the same act.3   
¶4 
In April 1993, Jerry Teague, a non-tribal member, was 
hired as the general manager of the Bad River Casino, which the 
Band operates on its reservation in northern Wisconsin.  On 
November 3, 1993, after a probationary period, Teague and then-
Bad River Tribal Chairman Donald Moore, Sr., formalized Teague's 
employment by signing a three-year contract.  The contract set 
                     
2 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1983).  
3 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1983).  
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
4 
forth the terms of Teague's day-to-day employment at the casino 
and also stated that disputes over termination "shall be 
submitted 
for 
arbitration 
under 
chapter 
788, 
Wisconsin 
Statutes."  On March 15, 1995, Teague and Moore's successor, 
Elizabeth Drake, signed a new contract containing a similar 
arbitration clause. 
¶5 
On July 19, 1995, Teague left the Band's employ.4  In 
November of that year, he filed a complaint in Ashland County 
Circuit Court seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
contracts, and alternately, seeking damages for breach of 
contract.  The Band moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it stated that 
disputes over termination should be submitted for arbitration 
under chapter 788, Wisconsin Statutes, which does not apply to 
contracts between employers and employees.  The Band also 
invoked its sovereign immunity as a federally recognized Indian 
tribe.  Teague then moved for partial summary judgment on the 
sovereign immunity issue. 
                     
4 The parties dispute the circumstances under which Teague 
left his job at the casino.  Teague contends that he was fired, 
while the Band maintains that he quit.  The tribal court did not 
reach the issue, instead concluding that because the contracts 
were not valid, Teague was not entitled to arbitrate the 
question.  The Ashland County Circuit Court found the contracts 
valid and ordered arbitration.  The arbitrator awarded damages. 
 Whatever the case, the issue is not before the court and is not 
relevant to our determination of whether the tribal court 
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
5 
¶6 
On September 25, 1996, the circuit court, Judge Thomas 
J. Gallagher, presiding, denied the Band's motion to dismiss, 
ruling that the reference to the Wisconsin Statutes did not 
invalidate the arbitration clause because only certain state 
public sector employment contracts are excluded from the scope 
of chapter 788.  The court also held that the Band implicitly 
waived its sovereign immunity by including the arbitration 
clause, since a dispute cannot be arbitrated without such a 
waiver.  Furthermore, the court found that the casino was an 
"economic affair or enterprise" operating under the Band's 
corporate charter which contains a "sue and be sued" clause,5 and 
thus, it could not invoke sovereign immunity with respect to its 
                     
5 The Bad River Constitution, Article VI, Section 1(f), 
states: 
Section 1. Enumerated powers.  The Tribal Council 
shall exercise the following powers, subject to any 
limitations imposed by the Constitution or statutes of 
the United States, and subject further to all express 
restrictions upon 
such 
powers contained 
in 
this 
Constitution and the attached Bylaws. . . . (f) To 
manage all economic affairs and enterprises of the 
Band in accordance with the terms of the charter which 
may be issued to the Band by the Secretary of the 
Interior. 
The relevant portion of the Corporate Charter states: 
5. 
The 
Band, 
subject 
to 
any 
restrictions 
contained in the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, or in the Constitution and By-laws of the said 
Band, shall have the following corporate powers, in 
addition to all powers already conferred or guaranteed 
by the tribal Constitution and By-laws: . . . (i) To 
sue and to be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction 
within the United States . . . .  
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
6 
casino activities.  The Band then amended its answer, adding the 
affirmative defense that the 1995 contract was not valid because 
it did not have the approval of the tribal council and the 
United States Secretary of the Interior as required by the 
Band's corporate charter. 
¶7 
Then, in December 1996, the Band filed a complaint in 
the Bad River Tribal Court seeking a declaration on the validity 
of the 1995 contract, reasserting its claim that the contract 
lacked the requisite approval of the Tribal Council.  The Band 
amended its tribal court complaint on January 7, 1997, to 
request a declaration on the validity of the 1993 contract as 
well. 
¶8 
The Band then filed a motion in the circuit court, 
contending that under United States Supreme Court precedent, 
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), and 
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 
471 U.S. 845 (1985), the circuit court was required to stay its 
proceedings until the tribal court ruled on the tribal law 
challenges to the contracts and all tribal remedies were 
exhausted.  Teague countered that the issue of the contracts' 
validity was not dispositive, since even if they were not 
properly executed, he was still entitled to rely on the apparent 
authority of the tribal officials who signed them. 
¶9 
On February 5, 1997, the circuit court held that in 
light of Teague's "apparent authority" argument, it was under no 
obligation to stay its proceedings because the tribal court 
proceedings would not entirely dispose of Teague's claims: 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
7 
 
[N]o matter what the tribe does concerning this 
declaratory judgment action that's before it, which is 
limited to interpreting whether both, it now turns 
out, of the contracts under which he worked for a 
considerable period of time are void because the 
people that signed them on behalf of the tribe lacked 
the legal authority to do so under Tribal Law.  That 
is not going to be the end of this case, and I fail to 
see the judicial economy ofof any theory of Tribal 
Exhaustion . . . If it was going to be determinative I 
might go along with it, but it's not going to 
be . . . The decision ultimately is going to turn on 
Wisconsin Contract Law . . . . 
The court also expressed its opinion that: 
 
[T]he Tribal Court is free to go ahead and do whatever 
they want to do, and they've got a very limited issue 
here to decide and it would seem to me that they could 
schedule this case and get those issues out of the way 
before I ever get to the rest of this case. 
¶10 The Band returned to tribal court, amending its 
complaint to include the allegation that given his position with 
the Band, Teague could not have formed any reasonable belief 
that would make the contracts valid under an apparent authority 
analysis.  Teague accepted service of the amended tribal court 
complaint through counsel on March 25, 1997.  Teague did not 
plead responsively in the tribal court, seek a stay of the 
tribal court proceedings, or appear before the tribal court in 
order to challenge its personal or subject matter jurisdiction. 
 However, he did participate fully in discovery, which was 
conducted simultaneously for both the circuit court and tribal 
court proceedings.   
¶11 On May 29, 1997, the Band moved for default judgment 
in tribal court.  On July 25, 1997, the tribal court held a 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
8 
hearing and granted the Band's motion, holding that the 
contracts were invalid because they were not approved by the 
tribal council.  The tribal court rejected Teague's apparent 
authority argument, concluding that because of his experience 
with the Band, he could not reasonably have believed that the 
contracts were valid without the tribal council's approval.  
Teague did not appeal in the tribal court system. 
¶12 Tribal court judgment in hand, the Band returned to 
the circuit court seeking full faith and credit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245.  Pursuant to the requirements of the statute, the 
Band submitted a copy of its governing documents and tribal 
court code, as well as the record of the tribal court 
proceedings and certifications that the Band grants full faith 
and credit to the judicial records of Wisconsin courts and to 
the acts of other state governmental entities. 
¶13 Teague opposed the motion, arguing that Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245 incorporates the "prior action pending" rule and thus, 
the tribal court could not have subject matter jurisdiction 
because Teague's circuit court complaint was filed first.  See 
Syver, 6 Wis. 2d at 154.  Teague also asserted that the tribal 
court did not have personal jurisdiction over him, that the 
judgment was not on the merits and that it was procured through 
fraud and coercion.   
¶14 The circuit court agreed and denied full faith and 
credit. 
 
The 
court 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.245 
incorporated Syver's prior action pending rule and thus the 
tribal court was deprived of jurisdiction.  The court also held 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
9 
that the tribal court judgment was not on the merits because it 
was a default judgment and that the Band had engaged in fraud 
and coercion by filing and pursuing its action in the tribal 
court.  The court did not rule on the personal jurisdiction 
issue. 
¶15 After the Band made an unsuccessful attempt to 
petition the court of appeals for leave to appeal the circuit 
court's order by permission, a two-day jury trial began in 
circuit court.  The jury found both contracts enforceable.  The 
circuit court then ordered the parties to arbitrate the question 
of whether Teague was wrongfully terminated.  The arbitrator 
awarded Teague $390,199.42, and the circuit court entered 
judgment on September 15, 1998.  The Band appealed, arguing that 
the circuit court erred by failing to give full faith and credit 
to the tribal court judgment.6   
¶16 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
prior action pending rule did not render the tribal court 
judgment invalid under Wis. Stat. § 806.245 because a tribal 
court is the court of a separate sovereign, not a court of 
concurrent jurisdiction.  Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake 
Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 229 Wis. 2d 581, 593-94, 599 
N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1999).  The court of appeals also rejected 
                     
6 In the court of appeals, the Band alleged other errors 
concerning the selection and instruction of the jury and certain 
evidentiary rulings.  The court of appeals did not address these 
claims because of the dispositive nature of its decision on the 
full faith and credit issue and they are not before us now. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
10
Teague's arguments that the judgment was obtained through fraud 
and coercion.  Id. at 594-96.  We accepted review. 
¶17 Our review requires the interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 806.245 to undisputed facts.  Thus, it is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  J.L. Phillips & Assoc., 
Inc. v. E&H Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 354, 577 N.W.2d 13 
(1998).  The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature.  County of 
Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 
 We first look for that intent in the plain language of the 
statute.  Id.  If the meaning of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, we cannot look beyond the language of the statute 
to determine its meaning.  City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 
536, 545, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992).  However, if the statutory 
language is ambiguous or unclear, we may examine the statute's 
history, scope, context, subject matter and objective in order 
to ascertain legislative intent.  Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 302.  A 
statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in two 
or more different ways by reasonably well-informed persons.  Id. 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.245 provides: 
 
806.245 Indian tribal documents: full faith and 
credit. 
 
(1) 
The 
judicial 
records, 
orders 
and 
judgments of an Indian tribal court in Wisconsin and 
acts of an Indian tribal legislative body shall have 
the same full faith and credit in the courts of this 
state as do the acts, records, orders and judgments of 
any other governmental entity, if all of the following 
conditions are met: 
 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
11
(a) The tribe which creates the tribal court and 
tribal legislative body is organized under 25 USC 
461 to 479. 
 
(b) The tribal documents are authenticated under sub. 
2. 
 
(c) The tribal court is a court of record. 
 
(d) The tribal court judgment offered in evidence is 
a valid judgment. 
 
(e) The tribal court certifies that it grants full 
faith and credit to the judicial records, orders 
and judgments of the courts of this state and to 
the acts of other governmental entities of this 
state. 
The parties agree that a tribal court judgment must receive full 
faith and credit if it meets the five statutory requirements.  
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(1).  Teague contends that the Bad River 
Tribal Court judgment is not a valid judgment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245(1)(d).   
¶19 The statute sets out six factors for courts to 
consider when assessing the validity of a judgment: 
 
(4) In determining whether a tribal court judgment is 
a valid judgment, the circuit court on its own motion, 
or on the motion of a party, may examine the tribal 
court record to assure that: 
 
(a) The tribal court had jurisdiction of the subject 
matter and over the person named in the judgment. 
 
(b) The judgment is final under the laws of the 
rendering court. 
 
(c) The judgment is on the merits. 
 
(d) The judgment was procured without fraud, duress 
or coercion. 
 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
12
(e) The judgment was procured in compliance with 
procedures required by the rendering court. 
 
(f) The proceedings of the tribal court comply with 
the Indian civil rights act of 1968 under 25 USC 
1301 to 1341. 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4). 
¶20 Teague argues that the tribal judgment was invalid 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(a), (c) and (d) because the tribal 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, the judgment was 
not on the merits and was procured by fraud and coercion.  
However, his principal argument against granting full faith and 
credit is that Wisconsin's "prior action pending" rule prevented 
the tribal court from assuming jurisdiction.  Teague argues that 
because he filed his action in circuit court before the Band 
filed in tribal court, he won the "race to the courthouse" and 
the tribal court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action.  We disagree. 
¶21 Indian tribes are separate sovereigns under federal 
law.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 
202 (1987).  The United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
the 
federal 
government's 
policy 
of 
deferring 
to 
tribal 
sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government.  See Iowa 
Mut., 480 U.S. at 14 (1987); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold 
Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 
220-21 (1959).  This policy is also reflected in the numerous 
federal statutes designed to promote tribal self-government.  
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450, 450a (Indian Self-Determination and 
Education 
Assistance 
Act); 
25 
U.S.C. 
§§ 476-479 
(Indian 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
13
Reorganization Act); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (Indian Civil Rights 
Act). 
¶22 Historically, individual states have had almost no 
power to restrict or infringe upon that sovereignty.  In 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), the Supreme Court, in 
an 
opinion 
written 
by 
Chief 
Justice 
Marshall, 
laid 
the 
foundation for the recognition of tribal sovereignty.  Worcester 
concerned the conviction of two missionaries for violating a 
Georgia state law requiring non-Indians living in Cherokee 
territory to obtain a license from the state governor.  Id. at 
537-38.  Concluding that the Indian tribes had sovereign 
authority over their lands and thus the state law had no effect 
in Cherokee territory, Marshall noted that: "The Indian nations 
had always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial . . . ." 
 Id. at 559.   
¶23 The basic policy of Worcester has been a vital part of 
American jurisprudence and its recognition of tribal sovereignty 
has not only endured, but has been expanded to restrict the 
jurisdiction of state courts when tribal issues are involved.  
Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.  For example, in Williams, the Court 
concluded that state courts had no jurisdiction over a claim 
filed by a non-Indian operating a general store on the Navajo 
reservation against Indian defendants to collect for goods sold 
to them on credit.  Id. at 217-18.  The Court explained:  
 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
14
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise 
of 
state 
jurisdiction 
here 
would 
undermine 
the 
authority 
of 
the 
tribal 
courts 
over 
Reservation 
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the 
Indians to govern themselves.  It is immaterial that 
respondent 
is 
not 
an 
Indian.  
He was 
on the 
Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took 
place 
there. 
 
The 
cases 
in 
this 
Court 
have 
consistently 
guarded 
the 
authority 
of 
Indian 
governments 
over 
their 
reservations . . . If 
this 
power is to be taken away from them, it is for 
Congress to do it. 
Id. at 223 (citation omitted). 
¶24 Tribal courts in particular have been heralded as 
playing "a vital role in tribal self-government" and the federal 
government has consistently encouraged their development.  Iowa 
Mut., 480 U.S. at 14-15.  This encouragement is apparent in the 
doctrine of tribal exhaustion.  The doctrine was introduced in 
National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853, in which the Court held that 
anyone asserting an absence of tribal power under federal law 
has an action that may be pursued in federal court.  However, 
the Court tempered this right with the concept of tribal 
exhaustion: that the federal court must stay its hand and permit 
the tribal court to first rule on its own jurisdiction in the 
case.  Id. at 856.  Similarly, in Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 15-
16, the Court recognized that as a matter of comity, federal 
courts should allow tribal courts first to determine their own 
jurisdiction.  Iowa Mutual involved a question of tribal court 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian entity conducting business on a 
reservation.  The Court refrained from ruling on whether the 
tribal 
court 
had 
jurisdiction, 
concluding 
that 
civil 
jurisdiction "presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
15
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal 
statute."  Id. at 18.   
¶25 In some instances, Congress has acted to create shared 
jurisdiction over tribal matters in the state courts.  In 1953, 
Congress passed Public Law 280.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1360.  Although 
the bulk of Public Law 280 focuses on criminal jurisdiction, it 
also grants the State of Wisconsin jurisdiction over civil 
actions arising on Indian lands.  Public Law 280 provides in 
relevant part: 
 
Each of the States listed in the following table 
shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action 
between Indians or to which Indians are parties which 
arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposite 
the name of the State . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1360.  Wisconsin is included in the accompanying 
table as a "mandatory" Public Law 280 state.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1360(a).  The statute provides that all Indian country in 
Wisconsin is covered by Public Law 280. 
¶26 As originally enacted, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.245 was 
limited to judgments of the Menominee Indian tribe.  See § 1, 
ch. 369, Laws of 1981.  However, in 1991, the legislature 
amended § 806.245 and expanded its scope to make the judgments 
of all Indian tribal courts in Wisconsin eligible for full faith 
and credit, provided they meet the statutory criteria.  1991 
Wis. Act 43, § 1. 
¶27 The accompanying Legislative Council prefatory note 
indicates that the statute is intended to create full faith and 
credit for tribal judgments consistent with the full faith and 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
16
credit afforded the judgments of courts of other states.  See 
Legislative Council Prefatory Note, 1991, Wis. Stat. Ann., 
§ 806.245 (West 1994) (statutory language "is consistent with 
the doctrine of full faith and credit, as it applies to state 
court judgments, in which the judgment of another state’s court 
is presumed to be valid").  However, the language and structure 
of Wis. Stat. § 806.245 is strikingly different from Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.24, the Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, which establishes 
the procedure by which other states’ judgments are afforded 
constitutional full faith and credit. 
¶28 Unlike the Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.245 by its terms clearly contemplates a discretionary 
judicial inquiry into the jurisdictional and procedural validity 
of tribal court judgments before full faith and credit will be 
afforded.7 
 Several commentators have indicated 
that the 
Wisconsin 
tribal 
full 
faith 
and 
credit 
statute 
is 
more 
accurately characterized as a codification of principles of 
comity rather than the statutory equivalent of constitutional 
full faith and credit.  See Darby L. Hoggatt, The Wyoming Tribal 
Full Faith and Credit Act: Enforcing Tribal Judgments and 
Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 531, 552-
56 (1995); Recognition of Tribal Court Orders in Wisconsin: An 
Overview of State and Federal Law, State Bar of Wisconsin, 
Indian Law News, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1999). 
                     
7 By contrast, the Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.24, 
imposes 
procedural 
requirements 
only, 
basically 
relating to filing, notice, and stays pending appeal. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
17
¶29 The statute is notably silent as to the jurisdictional 
validity of a tribal judgment that is rendered while an earlier-
filed state court action regarding the same subject matter is 
pending.  Teague argues for the application of the general rule 
governing 
jurisdictional 
tug-of-wars 
between 
courts 
of 
concurrent 
jurisdiction 
within 
the 
state. 
 
It 
is 
well-
established 
in 
Wisconsin 
that 
when 
two 
courts 
possess 
jurisdiction over a particular subject matter and one of the 
courts has assumed jurisdiction, it is reversible error for the 
other to also assume jurisdiction.  Syver, 6 Wis. 2d at 154; 
State ex rel. White v. District Court, 262 Wis. 139, 143, 54 
N.W.2d 189 (1952); Kusick v. Kusick, 243 Wis. 135, 138, 9 N.W.2d 
607 (1943).   
¶30 Teague contends that this "prior action pending" rule 
should apply to the tribal court in this case because the tribal 
court is a court of concurrent jurisdiction under Public Law 
280.  True, there is concurrent subject matter jurisdiction in 
state and tribal court by virtue of Public Law 280.  But it does 
not 
follow 
from 
the 
fact 
of 
concurrent 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction that the prior action pending rule of Syver should 
apply. 
¶31 The cases Teague cites are distinguishable because 
they involve jurisdictional conflicts between Wisconsin courts 
of concurrent jurisdiction.  Sheridan v. Sheridan, 65 Wis. 2d 
504, 513, 223 N.W.2d 557 (1974); see also State ex rel. Kern v. 
Kern, 17 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 116 N.W.2d 337 (1962).  For example, 
Syver, 6 Wis. 2d at 158, involved a dispute between a Walworth 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
18
County Circuit Court and a county court.  White, 262 Wis. at 
143, involved a question of concurrent jurisdiction between a 
state criminal court and a state juvenile court.  Here, although 
the tribal court is located within the geographic boundaries of 
the state, it is not a Wisconsin court; it is the court of an 
independent sovereign.  Although full faith and credit here is 
statutory 
and 
conditional 
rather 
than 
constitutional 
and 
presumed, it would be incorrect, given the tribe’s sovereign 
status, to apply a state court common law rule to find an 
erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the tribal court.8 
¶32 In addition, applying the prior action pending rule to 
deprive tribal court judgments of full faith and credit under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245 would distort the purposes of Public Law 
280.  Public Law 280 was not designed to deprive tribal courts 
of jurisdiction where they properly have it.  Rather, its 
primary purpose was to respond to a problem of lawlessness on 
certain Indian reservations and the lack of adequate tribal law 
enforcement institutions.  Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 
379 (1976).  The civil jurisdiction component was included in 
order to "redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for 
                     
8 Teague points to Minnesota as a state which has applied a 
"first to file" rule in cases such as this one.  See Patsch v. 
Sun Prairie Island Indian Community, 567 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1997).  However, we note that another Minnesota case 
explained that the "first to file" rule in that state is not in 
fact a per se rule but is based upon principles of comity and 
will be applied only when it is consistent with sound judicial 
administration to do so.  Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 
284 (Minn. 1996). 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
19
resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, 
and between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting 
the courts of the States to decide such disputes."  Id. at 383. 
 Thus, Public Law 280 concerns providing Indian litigants with 
jurisdictional options beyond the tribal courts, not depriving 
tribal courts of jurisdiction that they otherwise rightfully 
possess as the courts of an independent sovereign.  
¶33 Accordingly, we decline to extend the prior action 
pending rule of Syver to these circumstances.  However, this 
leaves the conflict between the state and tribal judgments in 
this case unresolved, and does nothing to address the larger 
problem of state and tribal duplicate adjudication.  We are 
faced, then, with the unfortunate choice of ratifying either a 
"race to the courthouse" or a "race to judgment," a situation 
the legislature appears not to have contemplated in the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  Either choice would produce 
undesirable and unreasonable results, which we presume the 
legislature did not intend to encourage by the adoption of the 
tribal full faith and credit statute.  On one hand, awarding 
exclusive jurisdiction to the winner of the race to the 
courthouse (Teague) puts litigants rather than courts in charge 
of 
a 
sensitive 
jurisdictional 
question 
and 
deprives 
the 
respective courts of the opportunity to weigh considerations of 
comity.  On the other hand, granting full faith and credit to 
the winner of the race to judgment (the Band) promotes 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
20
competition between state and tribal courts, wastes judicial 
resources, and creates an adversarial atmosphere.9   
¶34 This, ultimately, is not a question of full faith and 
credit 
under 
the 
statute 
but 
of 
judicial 
allocation 
of 
jurisdiction pursuant to principles of comity. Unfortunately, 
the law currently provides no protocols for state or tribal 
courts to follow in this situation.  Similar problems exist 
between the courts of different states, and in this context, 
states have in some areas of the law developed procedures to 
follow in cases of jurisdictional conflict, where two sovereigns 
have jurisdiction over the same matter.  See, e.g., Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 822; Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.025(1).10  The development of similar protocols between 
                     
9 Teague cites the following from United States Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and of course we agree:  
"Whether tribal court, state court or federal court, we must all 
strive to make the dispensation of justice in this country as 
fair, efficient and principled as we can."  Lessons From the 
Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 9 Tribal Court Rec. 12, 
14 (Spring-Summer 1996). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 822.06 provides in relevant part: 
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody 
proceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and 
other information supplied by the parties under s. 
822.09 and shall consult the child custody registry 
established under s. 822.16 concerning the pendency of 
proceedings with respect to the child in other states. 
 If the court has reason to believe that proceedings 
may be pending in another state it shall direct an 
inquiry to the state court administrator or other 
appropriate official of the other state. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
21
                                                                  
(3) If the court is informed during the course of 
the 
proceeding that 
a 
proceeding 
concerning the 
custody of the child was pending in another state 
before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay 
the proceeding and communicate with the court in which 
the other proceeding is pending to the end that the 
issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum 
and that information be exchanged in accordance with 
ss. 822.19 to 822.22.  If a court of this state has 
made a custody decree before being informed of a 
pending proceeding in a court of another state it 
shall immediately inform that court of the fact.  If 
the court is informed that a proceeding was commenced 
in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it 
shall likewise inform the other court to the end that 
the issues may be litigated in the more appropriate 
forum. 
(4) The communication between courts called for 
by sub. (3) or s. 822.07(4) may be conducted on the 
record by telephone conference to which the courts and 
all counsel are parties. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 822.07(4) states: 
Before determining whether to decline or retain 
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of 
another state and exchange information pertinent to 
the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a 
view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised 
by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be 
available to the parties. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.025(1) provides: 
[I]f a question arises as to which court should 
exercise jurisdiction, a conference involving both 
judges, all counsel and guardians ad litem may be 
convened under s. 807.13(3) to resolve the question.  
The petitioner shall send a copy of any order rendered 
pursuant to this petition, motion or order to show 
cause to the clerk of the court in which the original 
judgment or order was rendered. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
22
state and tribal courts in Wisconsin is a matter of high 
priority and should be pursued.11 
¶35 Until then, we must rely upon the traditional doctrine 
of comity, pursuant to which courts will as a matter of 
discretion rather than obligation defer to the assertion of 
jurisdiction or give effect to the judgments of other states or 
sovereigns out of mutual respect, and for the purpose of 
furthering the orderly administration of justice.  Daniel-Nordin 
v. Nordin, 173 Wis. 2d 635, 651, 495 N.W.2d 318 (1993);  
Sheridan, 65 Wis. 2d at 510; Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 361, 
92 N.W.2d 738 (1958); Sengstock v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 165 
Wis. 2d 86, 95, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1991).  The doctrine of 
comity has been described as follows: 
 
Comity, being a rule of practice and not a rule of 
law, rests upon the exercise of sound judicial 
discretion.  Taus v. Taus (1958), 2 Wis. 2d 562, 87 
N.W.2d 246.  The scope of comity is determinable as a 
matter of judicial policy.  International Harvester 
Co. v. McAdam (1910), 142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042. 
 
There are circumstances under which this court has 
held that it would be an abuse of discretion to 
exercise judicial power.  Thus, in Brazy v. Brazy 
                     
11 We note the existence of the state, tribal and federal 
court forum, jointly sponsored by this court, the Wisconsin 
Tribal Judges Association and federal judges from Wisconsin.  
The forum is comprised of state, tribal and federal judges, and 
other representatives of the three governments.  At a meeting in 
March 1999 the forum touched on issues of state and tribal court 
relations from an historical perspective, but did not directly 
address the issue now before us.  We believe that this is a 
logical forum for the development of protocols governing the 
exercise of jurisdiction between the state and tribal courts. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
23
(1958), 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738, 93 N.W.2d 856, 
this court has stated: 
 
"...The orderly administration of justice requires 
that there be some rule for avoiding the conflicting 
exercise of jurisdiction by two courts both of which 
are competent to decide the issues.  Ordinarily, a 
court should not exercise jurisdiction over subject 
matter 
over 
which 
another 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction has commenced to exercise it.  See 14 Am. 
Jur., Courts, p. 435, sec. 243; 21 C.J.S., Courts, p. 
745, sec. 492."  Brazy, supra, p. 361, 92 N.W.2d p. 
742. 
Sheridan, 65 Wis. 2d at 510.12 
¶36 This is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, which provides that while "[a] state may 
entertain an action even though an action on the same claim is 
pending in another state . . . courts will frequently, in their 
discretion, grant a stay of the second action pending the 
outcome of the first."  Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
§ 86 cmt. B (1969).  Comity "promote[s] justice between 
individuals, and . . . produce[s] a friendly intercourse between 
the sovereignties to which they belong."  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 
                     
12  It has been said in the area of state/tribal court relations 
that "[t]he matter of comity is as much a matter for the courts 
to decide as it is for the Legislature to decide, if not more." 
 Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164, 171 (N.D. 
1990) (Vandewalle, J., concurring). See also Mexican v. Circle 
Bear, 
370 
N.W.2d 
737, 
744 
(S.D. 
1985) 
(Henderson, 
J., 
concurring)(courts apply comity to "give effect to the laws and 
judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a 
matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect"). 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
24
U.S. 113, 165 (1895).  The principles of comity have regularly 
been applied between state or federal courts and tribal courts.13 
¶37 We conclude that comity in this situation required 
that the circuit court and tribal court confer for purposes of 
allocating jurisdiction between the two sovereigns.  As we have 
noted, in the family law and child custody field, statutes 
requiring or encouraging such conferences in cases of interstate 
jurisdictional 
conflict 
already 
exist. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 822.06(2), (3) and (4); Wis. Stat. § 767.025(1).  In Daniel-
Nordin, 
173 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
651, 
a 
case 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.025(1), we suggested that principles of comity, in 
addition to the statute, support communication and cooperation 
between courts of concurrent jurisdiction for purposes of 
                     
13 See, e.g., National Farmer Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 
471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985) (although concurrent jurisdiction 
existed in both federal and tribal court, principle of comity 
required that tribal remedies be exhausted before federal court 
proceeded with resolution of case); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987) (same); Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 290 
(generally comity will resolve instances when two courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject; "first to file 
rule" not applied); Mexican, 370 N.W.2d at 741 (based on 
principles of comity, tribal court orders should be recognized 
in state court absent full faith and credit requirement); 
Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 167-68 (same); Sengstock v. San Carlos 
Apache Tribe, 165 Wis. 2d 86, 95-96, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 
1991) (before effective date of current Wis. Stat. § 806.245 and 
thus full faith and credit not required, nonetheless circuit 
court recognized tribal court judgment under principles of 
comity); Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State 
Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas, 70 Judicature 154, 155 (1995) 
("[b]y giving deference to each other's judgments without any 
legal requirement to do so, state and tribal courts demonstrate 
respect for each other's . . . jurisdiction"). 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
25
jurisdiction allocation: "[w]hen the courts of two states have 
jurisdiction to decide a matter, the orderly administration of 
justice requires that these courts attempt to avoid conflicting 
exercises of jurisdiction." 
¶38 Requiring such a conference under these circumstances 
ensures that the issue of jurisdiction allocation, involving as 
it does an evaluation of principles of comity and tribal 
exhaustion, will be decided by the courts in an atmosphere of 
mutual respect and cooperation, rather than by the litigants in 
the height of adversarial battle.  In cases of jurisdictional 
conflict such as this one, such a conference should be convened 
as soon as either court is aware of the pendency of an action on 
the same subject matter in the other jurisdiction.  Comity is, 
of course, a reciprocal principle.  Until more formal protocols 
are established, such a procedure will avoid competition between 
courts and the risk of inconsistent results, and will foster the 
greatest amount of respect between state and tribal courts. 
¶39 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for a conference between the circuit 
and tribal courts for purposes of addressing the appropriate 
allocation of jurisdiction over the issues in this case.  Full 
faith and credit under Wis. Stat. § 806.245 cannot properly be 
considered until the jurisdictional conflict is resolved between 
the courts.14 
                     
14 Accordingly, we do not reach Teague’s arguments under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.245(4)(a), (c) and (d) that the tribal court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over him, that the judgment was not 
on the merits, and that the judgment was obtained by fraud. 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
26
¶40 Our holding today should be placed in the larger 
context of the struggle that is taking place, in Wisconsin and 
throughout the country, over issues of jurisdictional conflict 
and full faith and credit between tribal, state and federal 
courts.  In 1993, the Conference of Chief Justices, together 
with the National Center for State Courts, held a conference to 
develop a strategy for resolving the jurisdictional problems 
encountered by tribal, state and federal courts.15   One of four 
major recommendations to emerge from the conference was that 
"[t]ribal, state, and federal courts should continue cooperative 
efforts to resolve and reduce jurisdictional disputes."16  In 
1994, the Conference of Chief Justices created a standing 
committee on state/tribal jurisdictional issues, the central 
goals of which have been "communication, cooperation, and 
comity."17 
 
Our 
decision 
today 
seeks 
to 
ensure 
that 
jurisdictional disputes between state and tribal courts in 
Wisconsin will be resolved in conformity with those goals. 
¶41 We conclude that the "prior action pending" rule of 
Syver does not apply to deprive a tribal court of the subject 
matter jurisdiction necessary for its judgments to receive full 
                     
15 Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State 
Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas, 70 Judicature 154, 155 (1995). 
16 Sovereignty Symposium VII, Full Faith and Credit at 3, 
Oklahoma Supreme Court (1994) (reprinting Report and Resolution 
arising out of 1993 Santa Fe Conference). 
17 Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State 
Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas, 70 Judicature 154, 155 (1995). 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
27
faith and credit under Wis. Stat. § 806.245.  We further 
conclude that principles of comity in this situation required 
the circuit and tribal courts to confer for purposes of 
jurisdiction allocation prior to proceeding to judgment.  We 
therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit 
court to convene such a conference, at which the respective 
courts will weigh considerations of comity and tribal exhaustion 
to determine whether the judgments should be reopened for 
purposes of jurisdiction allocation and retrial.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.   
 
 
 
 
Nos. 98-3150 & 98-3484 
 
 
1