Title: Mullis v. Sechrest

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 283A97
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY 1998
STEVE MULLIS and BLAINE SCOTT MULLIS
v.
HARRY SECHREST and CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION
Appeal by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2)
from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 126
N.C. App. 91, 484 S.E.2d 423 (1997), affirming in part and
vacating in part an order entered by Caviness, J., on 9 August
1995 in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  On 23 July 1997,
this Court allowed discretionary review of additional issues. 
Heard in the Supreme Court 15 December 1997.
James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Edward T. Hinson, Jr.,
John S. Arrowood, and Fred B. Monroe, for plaintiff-
appellees.
Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by James G.
Middlebrooks, for defendant-appellant Sechrest.
ORR, Justice.
This is an action to recover damages for an injury
sustained by plaintiff Blaine Mullis on 18 October 1990.  At the
time of the accident, Blaine was sixteen years old and a junior
at Garinger High School.  On the day of the accident, Blaine’s
industrial arts or “shop” class was attending a student assembly. 
Blaine left the assembly without the permission of his
instructor, defendant Sechrest, and returned to the shop
classroom.  Although the door was locked, another student, also
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working in the classroom unsupervised, let Blaine into the
classroom.  Blaine then began to construct a wooden “rabbit box”
using a Rockwell tilting arbor saw, more commonly known as a
table saw.  Blaine failed to position the safety guard in place
over the saw blade while operating the saw.  Subsequently, while
attempting to cut a board with the saw, the board bucked upwards,
causing Blaine to sever the fingers and thumb on his left hand.
After the accident, medical personnel were able to
reattach Blaine’s fingers; however, his thumb was ultimately
amputated.  In July 1991, Blaine underwent a procedure at Duke
University in which a toe was removed from his foot and attached
to his left hand to serve as a substitute for his thumb.  Despite
this procedure, Blaine continues to suffer a permanent partial
disability to his left hand as a result of this accident. 
Plaintiff Steve Mullis, Blaine’s father, is also a party to this
suit because he is responsible for Blaine’s medical bills and
expenses.
On 18 November 1992, plaintiffs filed this action
against “Harry Sechrest and the Charlotte[-]Mecklenburg Board of
Education.”  In their only claim for relief, plaintiffs allege
that defendant Board “provided, permitted and directed the
operation of a Rockwell tilting arbor saw . . . in its industrial
arts class.”  Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Sechrest,
a teacher employed by defendant Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, negligently failed to give adequate instructions
regarding the proper use of the table saw and failed to
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adequately warn of the inherent dangers of its use.  Plaintiffs
also allege defendants provided an unsafe saw.
Defendants filed an answer on 25 January 1993, denying
any negligence on the part of defendants; moving to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6); and
asserting contributory negligence as a defense.  On 29 April
1994, defendants filed a motion to amend their answer to allege
that both defendants were entitled to governmental immunity
because the Board had “not purchased liability insurance for
claims of the kind and level asserted here.”  The trial court
allowed this motion on 14 July 1994.
Subsequently, on 18 July 1995, defendants submitted a
motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative,
partial summary judgment.  Plaintiffs then filed a motion to
amend their initial complaint on 28 July 1995.  By this motion,
plaintiffs sought to add an allegation that defendant Board had
waived any immunity that might cover it and defendant Sechrest by
purchasing liability insurance.  After a hearing, the trial court
entered an order allowing plaintiffs’ motion to amend their
complaint and denying defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings.  The order also granted partial summary judgment on
the basis of governmental immunity for defendant Board for all
claims determined to be $1,000,000 or less and granted summary
judgment for defendant Sechrest on the ground that “he is a
public officer immune from suit by the plaintiffs.”
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
held (1) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
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allowing defendants to amend their answer to assert the defense
of governmental immunity, (2) that the trial court did not err in
determining that the Board was entitled to sovereign immunity for
all claims of $1,000,000 or less, and (3) that the trial court
erred in holding that defendant Sechrest was entitled to summary
judgment “because he is a public officer immune from suit by the
plaintiffs.”  Defendant Sechrest subsequently filed a notice of
appeal to this Court based upon the dissent below and a petition
for discretionary review of additional issues.  On 23 July 1997,
we allowed defendant Sechrest’s petition for discretionary review
of additional issues.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals focused
on the issue of whether defendant Sechrest was entitled to
public-officer immunity.  However, the threshold issue to be
determined in this case is whether defendant Sechrest is being
sued in his official capacity, individual capacity, or both.  In
his brief, defendant Sechrest contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in determining that the plaintiffs brought suit against him
in his individual capacity, rather than in his official capacity. 
Defendant Sechrest notes that if the plaintiffs sued him “in his
official capacity, he is entitled to governmental immunity to the
same extent as the Board.”  We agree with defendant Sechrest and,
accordingly, reverse the Court of Appeals.
The initial complaint in this case was filed on
18 November 1992 and failed to specify in the caption whether
plaintiffs were suing defendant Sechrest in his individual or
official capacity.  An amended complaint was also submitted and
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similarly failed to specify whether plaintiffs were suing
defendant Sechrest in his individual or official capacity.  In
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985), the
United States Supreme Court stated that where the complaint does
not clearly specify whether the defendants are being sued in
their individual or official capacities, “[t]he ‘course of
proceedings’ . . . typically will indicate the nature of the
liability sought to be imposed.”  Id. at 167 n.14, 87 L. Ed. 2d
at 122 n.14 (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 878, 884 (1985)).
This Court recently examined the distinction between
official and individual capacity claims in Meyer v. Walls, 347
N.C. 97, 489 S.E.2d 880 (1997), in which we stated:
“The crucial question for determining
whether a defendant is sued in an individual
or official capacity is the nature of the
relief sought, not the nature of the act or
omission alleged.  If the plaintiff seeks an
injunction requiring the defendant to take an
action involving the exercise of a
governmental power, the defendant is named in
an official capacity.  If money damages are
sought, the court must ascertain whether the
complaint indicates that the damages are
sought from the government or from the pocket
of the individual defendant.  If the former,
it is an official-capacity claim; if the
latter, it is an individual-capacity claim;
and if it is both, then the claims proceed in
both capacities.”
Id. at 110, 489 S.E.2d at 887 (quoting Anita R. Brown-Graham &
Jeffrey S. Koeze, Immunity from Personal Liability under State
Law for Public Officials and Employees:  An Update, Loc. Gov’t L.
Bull. 67, at 7 (Inst. Of Gov’t, Univ. Of N.C. at Chapel Hill),
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Apr. 1995 [hereinafter “Law Bulletin”]).  As Brown-Graham and
Koeze further explained:
It is true that it is often not clear in
which capacity the plaintiff seeks to sue the
defendant.  In such cases it is appropriate
for the court to either look to the
allegations contained in the complaint to
determine plaintiff’s intentions or assume
that the plaintiff meant to bring the action
against the defendant in his or her official
capacity.
Law Bulletin at 7; see Yeksigian v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 104 (7th
Cir. 1990) (court employs presumption against personal liability
in the absence of clear expression that plaintiff intends to sue
defendants in their individual capacities).
Based on Meyer, our analysis begins with answering the 
“crucial question” of what type of relief is sought.  Here,
plaintiffs are seeking to recover monetary damages for pain and
suffering, future medical expense, and permanent disability.  As
stated above, if money damages are sought, the court must
ascertain whether the complaint indicates that the damages are
sought from the governmental entity or from the pocket of the
individual.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the
course of the proceedings and allegations contained in the
pleading to determine the capacity in which defendant is being
sued.
In the present case, a review of the course of
proceedings and the allegations contained in the complaint leads
us to conclude that this suit was brought against defendant
Sechrest solely in his official capacity.  First, as noted above,
defendants failed to specify whether they were suing defendant
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Sechrest in his individual or official capacity.  Additionally,
in the section of the complaint identifying “Parties, Capacity,
Jurisdiction and Venue,” plaintiffs allege that defendant
Sechrest is “an adult citizen and resident of Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, and is employed by the Charlotte[-]Mecklenburg
Board of Education as a teacher.”  This allegation establishes
that defendant Sechrest is an agent of defendant Board.
Further, plaintiffs set forth only one claim for relief
in their complaint.  In the beginning of their claim for relief, 
plaintiffs allege that “the Defendant Charlotte[-]Mecklenburg
School System provided, permitted and directed the operation of a
Rockwell tilting arbor saw, model #34-399 in its industrial arts
class.”  Later in the complaint, plaintiffs specifically allege
that defendant Sechrest negligently failed to give reasonable or
adequate instructions or warnings concerning the dangers inherent
in the use of the saw and provided a machine that was unsafe. 
However, we note that it was necessary to allege defendant
Sechrest’s negligence in the complaint because he was acting as
an agent of defendant Board in performing his duties.  See Moore
v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 481 S.E.2d 14 (1997).  The
fact that there is only one claim for relief is also indicative
of plaintiffs’ intention to sue defendant Sechrest in his
official capacity, as an agent of defendant Board.
Finally, focusing on the course of proceedings in the
present case, it is important to note that on 29 April 1994,
defendants filed a motion to amend their answer to allege that
both defendants were entitled to governmental immunity because
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the Board had not purchased a contract of insurance that covered
exposures of $1,000,000 or less.  This motion was allowed by the
trial court on 14 July 1994.  Subsequently, on 28 July 1995,
plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint.  In their
motion, plaintiffs state that “[b]y this Motion, Plaintiffs seek
to amend their Complaint by adding an allegation that Defendant
Charlotte[-]Mecklenburg Board of Education (the “School Board”)
has waived any immunity that might cover it and Defendant Harry
Sechrest by purchasing liability insurance.”  Although the
defense of immunity had been raised by defendants, plaintiffs did
not attempt to amend their complaint to specify whether they
intended to sue defendant Sechrest in his individual or official
capacity, or both.  In fact, by their reference to liability
insurance, plaintiffs’ intent appears to be to sue defendant
Sechrest solely in his official capacity.
“[I]n 1972 this State abandoned Code pleadings in favor
of notice pleadings.”  Watkins v. Hellings, 83 N.C. App. 430,
433, 350 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1986), rev’d on other grounds, 321 N.C.
78, 361 S.E.2d 568 (1987).  This change allowed a more liberal
approach to pleading, while still ensuring that the opposing
party would have adequate notice of the issues in order to
present a proper defense.  As stated by this Court, "[u]nder the
notice theory of pleading, a statement of a claim is adequate if
it gives sufficient notice of the events or transactions which
produced the claim to enable the adverse party to understand its
nature and basis and to file a responsive pleading."  Pyco Supply
Co. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 321 N.C. 435, 442, 364
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S.E.2d 380, 384 (1988).  Thus, in order for defendant Sechrest to
have an opportunity to prepare a proper defense, the pleading
should have clearly stated the capacity in which he was being
sued.
It is a simple matter for attorneys to clarify the
capacity in which a defendant is being sued.  Pleadings should
indicate in the caption the capacity in which a plaintiff intends
to hold a defendant liable.  For example, including the words “in
his official capacity” or “in his individual capacity” after a
defendant’s name obviously clarifies the defendant’s status.  In
addition, the allegations as to the extent of liability claimed
should provide further evidence of capacity.  Finally, in the
prayer for relief, plaintiffs should indicate whether they seek
to recover damages from the defendant individually or as an agent
of the governmental entity.  These simple steps will allow future
litigants to avoid problems such as the one presented to us by
this appeal.
Taken as a whole, the amended complaint, along with the
course of proceedings in the present case, indicate an intent by
plaintiffs to sue defendant Sechrest in his official capacity. 
As we have previously noted, official-capacity suits are merely
another way of pleading an action against the governmental
entity.  Moore, 345 N.C. at 367, 481 S.E.2d at 21.  The immunity
available to the Board of Education has already been determined
and is not before us on appeal.  In the opinion below, the Court
of Appeals held that the Board of Education is entitled to
governmental immunity from suit for the first $1,000,000 in
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damages which may be awarded.  Similarly, defendant Sechrest, in
his official capacity, is entitled to governmental immunity to
that same extent.
Based on our holding above, it is not necessary for us
to address the remaining issue which is whether defendant
Sechrest is entitled to assert public-officer immunity.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.