Title: KC v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KC v. STATE2004 WY 7492 P.3d 805Case Number: C-03-11Decided: 06/28/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 

IN 
THE INTEREST OF:

 

KC, 
a minor,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable H. Steven Brown, District Judge by 
assignment

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Harry 
G. Bondi of Harry G. Bondi Law Offices, P.C., Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Bondi.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      After 
trial before the juvenile court, KC, a minor, was adjudicated a juvenile 
delinquent.  KC appeals that 
determination, raising procedural errors.  
Upon our review, we reverse and remand. 

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      A summary of the 
issues presented by the parties is as follows:

 

1.  Did 
the court abuse its discretion when it prohibited two of KC's proposed witnesses 
from testifying for violating its sequestration order?

 

2.  Did reversible error occur because the prosecutor 
failed to provide KC with a copy of the tape-recorded police interview with the 
alleged victim?
 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On October 8, 
2002, a juvenile petition was filed alleging that KC was a juvenile 
delinquent.  The petition stemmed 
from allegations that KC subjected a female minor to sexual contact in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-313 (LexisNexis 2003) and immodest, immoral, or 
indecent liberties in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 
2003).  An affidavit of Casper 
Police Detective Scott Jones supporting the petition was also filed on that 
date.  In his affidavit Detective 
Jones stated that he interviewed the alleged victim in the presence of her 
grandmother concerning the incident and that this interview was tape 
recorded.  The affidavit also 
detailed that the alleged victim had advised Detective Jones that on October 3, 
2002, while KC and the victim were attending high school, KC touched her 
inappropriately, and caused the victim to touch him inappropriately.  That same day, KC's counsel filed a 
joint entry of appearance and motion for discovery.  Trial was subsequently scheduled for 
February 20, 2003. 

 

[¶4]      Just before trial 
was to commence, and also during the middle of trial, KC's counsel requested 
relief from the court because the State had failed to produce the taped 
statement.  The court denied this 
relief because the court found the motion untimely and, based on the State's 
representation that the tape had been lost, it would be impossible for the court 
to order its production.  The court 
further ruled that even if the tape were available, it would not be allowed into 
evidence. 

 

[¶5]      During trial, the 
alleged victim's testimony varied only slightly from what Officer Jones had 
reported the alleged victim originally advised him during the taped 
interview.  Officer Jones was not 
called to testify during the trial, neither were two other students that 
reportedly witnessed the incident. 

 

[¶6]      KC intended to 
call four minor witnesses, all students who had supposedly heard the alleged 
victim state on two separate occasions that the incident did not happen.1  KC called witness #1, and she briefly 
began to testify she had heard the alleged victim speak about the incident with 
KC.  However, before witness #1 
could finish testifying, it was determined that the alleged victim was required 
to testify further.  While an 
attempt to locate the alleged victim was being made, witness #1 spoke with 
witness #2.  Thereafter, the court 
refused to hear the testimony of witness #1 and witness #2, ruling that witness 
#1 had violated the court's oral order regarding witnesses by speaking with 
witness #2.  Later, in explaining 
this ruling, the court reasoned that the testimony of witness #1 and witness #2 
would be of no assistance to the court because the court found that the 
testimony would duplicate that offered by witness #3 and would be of no help to 
KC.  The court further concluded 
that the testimony would be immaterial to its determination because the victim's 
statements were made in response to, and in an atmosphere of, intimidation.2  

 

[¶7]      During the trial, 
witness #3 was allowed to testify that when she confronted the alleged victim 
and used profane language, the alleged victim denied that she had made any 
statements about KC.  Witness #4 
confirmed that this conversation occurred.  
Finally, KC testified that he was in the room before the alleged victim 
and that the incident simply did not occur.  KC further indicated that he believed 
that the alleged victim had made up the incident in order to seek revenge for an 
apparent altercation that had previously occurred between KC and a friend of the 
alleged victim.  

 

[¶8]      Upon conclusion 
of the trial, the court held that there were insufficient facts to support the 
immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties allegation, but that the evidence 
supported the allegation that KC committed an improper sexual touching of the 
victim.  On March 3, 2003, KC filed 
a Combined Motion for New Trial, Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Provide Crucial Evidence to the Minor Child, Renewed Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, and Motion for New Trial Based on Court's Refusal to Admit the 
Testimony of the Minor Child's Witnesses, [witness #1 and witness #2].  This combined motion was apparently 
denied.  On April 21, 2003, KC filed 
another separate motion for production of the interview tape; this motion was 
also denied.  The court ultimately 
adjudicated KC a juvenile delinquent.  
This appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶9]      We stated in 
Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58-59 (Wyo. 2000): 

 

Violations of sequestration orders, and the 
sanctions therefor, are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we 
will reverse only if that discretion is abused. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo. 1996).  A search 
for an abuse of discretion calls upon this court "to determine whether the trial 
court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling 
was arbitrary or capricious." Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Prohibition 
of Witness Testimony

 

[¶10]   KC contends that the court abused 
its discretion when it prohibited two of his proposed witnesses, witness #1 and 
witness #2, from testifying for violating the court's oral order.  KC complains that the court's ruling 
prohibited him from presenting a full defense and, therefore, resulted in an 
unfair trial.  We 
agree.

 

[¶11]   We addressed a very similar 
argument in Towner v. State, 685 P.2d 45, 47-49 (Wyo. 1984) (footnotes 
omitted):

 

The question presented to us is whether the 
trial court erred in excluding the defense witnesses' testimony due to their 
apparent violation of the sequestration order.  Rule 615, W.R.E., provides for exclusion 
of witnesses.   Under this 
rule, sequestration of witnesses is a matter of right for either party.  The purpose is to prevent the tailoring 
of evidence to conform to prior testimony and to assist the parties in detecting 
falsehoods and testimony which is less than candid. United States v. Ell, 
718 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1983); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S. Ct. 1330, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1976); 3 Louisell & Mueller § 370 (1979).  Although Rule 615, W.R.E., does not 
provide for sanctions for violations of the rule, the most often invoked 
remedies are (1) to hold the witness in contempt;  (2) to make the violation a subject for 
cross-examination and comment; and (3) to disallow the testimony 
altogether.  3 Louisell & 
Mueller § 371; 13 Land & Water L.Rev. 909 (1978), "Article VI of the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence:  
Witnesses."

 

The United States Supreme Court held in 
Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 14 S. Ct. 10, 37 L. Ed. 1010 
(1893):

 

"If 
a witness disobeys the order of withdrawal, while he may be proceeded against 
for contempt, and his testimony is open to comment to the jury by reason of his 
conduct, he is not thereby disqualified, and the weight of authority is that he 
cannot be excluded on that ground, merely, although the right to exclude under 
particular circumstances may be supported as within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." 14 S. Ct.  at 10.

 

We have previously addressed this question in 
circumstances where the judge allowed witnesses to testify although they had 
been in the courtroom in violation of a sequestration order.  We affirmed the allowance of that 
testimony, stating that permitting witnesses to testify was a matter addressed 
to the discretion of the court and that we would reverse only for gross abuse of 
that discretion. Whiteley v. State, Wyo., 418 P.2d 164 (1966); Pixley 
v. State, Wyo., 406 P.2d 662 (1965).  
We have not, however, addressed the question of the propriety of 
excluding testimony because of a violation of a sequestration 
order.

 

The general rule is that a party who does not 
know of nor procures the violation should not be deprived of essential 
testimony.  88 C.J.S. Trial § 
70.  However, when a party knows 
that a witness is violating the rule and allows the violation to continue, he 
may lose the right to present the witness or to object on those grounds.  23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1013.  

 

"A 
party should not be denied his witness because of misconduct which the party has 
not caused.  Refusal to permit a 
witness to testify in a criminal case on the ground that he had violated the 
order excluding witnesses is reversible error where neither the state nor the 
defendant was responsible for the violation of the order and did not know he was 
present.'   Excluding testimony 
is not an appropriate remedy.  
Rather, the jury should be instructed on the credibility of the 
witness.  If the order is willfully 
violated, the court may properly hold the witness in contempt of court."  (Citations omitted.) State v. 
Wells, Mont., 658 P.2d 381 (1983).

 

Exclusion of the witness' testimony is too grave 
a sanction where the violation was not intentional and was not procured by the 
connivance of the party or his counsel. A practical and sensitive accommodation 
between the defendant's right to present a defense and the trial court's need to 
control the proceedings must be maintained.  Exclusion should be allowed only when it 
is necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact finding process.  State v. Burdge, 295 Or. 1, 664 P.2d 1076 (1983).

 

United States v. Schaefer, 
299 F.2d 625, 631, 14 A.L.R.3d 1 (7th Cir. 1962), held that exclusion of 
testimony was too harsh in situations where the witness did not willfully 
violate the sequestration order and there was no indiction that the witness was 
in court with

 

"the 
consent, connivance, procurement or knowledge of the appellant or his 
counsel.'  . . .  [D]isqualification of the offending 
witness absent particular circumstances is too harsh a penalty on the innocent 
litigant." See also, United States v. Johnston, 578 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 931, 99 S. Ct. 321, 58 L. Ed. 2d 325.

 

Braswell v. Wainwright, 
463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1972), found error in excluding testimony because of a 
sequestration violation on grounds of Sixth Amendment rights and due process, 
stating that the defendant's right to obtain witnesses in his behalf was 
violated.  Since neither the 
defendant nor his counsel was involved in the violation, there could not have 
been a waiver of a constitutional right which would render the exclusion 
proper.  Testimony was considered 
properly excluded when the court found connivance of the government's counsel 
and prejudice to the defendant, United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315 
(11th Cir. 1983), and where a defendant violated the sequestration order by 
comparing testimony with another witness. United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied  
419 U.S. 857, 95 S. Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed. 2d 91.

 

United States v. Gibson, 
675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 972, 103 S. Ct. 305, 74 L. Ed. 2d 285, stated that most authorities agree that the "particular 
circumstances" of Holder v. United States, supra, sufficient for 
exclusion are indications that the witness violated the order with the consent, 
connivance, procurement or knowledge of the party seeking the testimony.  This case held there was no abuse of 
discretion in excluding testimony because the witness stayed in the courtroom 
with the knowledge of the defendant and another witness gave substantially 
identical testimony. Excluding two witnesses for a violation was held not to 
deprive the defendant of his right to obtain witnesses in his behalf where three 
other witnesses testified to the same facts and the defendant and his counsel 
knew of their presence in the courtroom.  
Calloway v. Blackburn, 612 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 
1980).

 

[¶12]   Here, just as in Towner, 
there was no evidence presented nor was it claimed that one witness spoke to the 
other witness with the knowledge or consent of KC or his counsel.  In addition, a review of the record 
discloses that reasonable confusion remained on the part of KC and his counsel 
regarding the extent of the oral order entered by the court.  

 

[¶13]   When entering the order, the court 
simply stated:

 

I'll go ahead and state for the record that we 
have entered an order of sequestration under Wyoming statute allowing only 
parents and the alleged victim, the alleged defendant and his parents, and 
counsel present in the courtroom.

 

Later, KC's 
counsel somewhat understandably indicated that he believed the order merely 
excluded the witnesses from the courtroom, as is required in juvenile 
proceedings in Wyoming, and that the order did not prohibit the witnesses from 
speaking to one another about what had occurred in court.  KC's counsel correctly reminded the 
court that it had not given any instruction to the parties or their respective 
counsel to advise their witnesses not to discuss their testimony with 
others.  Moreover, although a sign 
was posted on the courtroom door explaining that the pending matter was a 
confidential closed juvenile action, it only indicated that no one was allowed 
to enter.  In fact, the court 
admitted that it had entered an oral exclusionary order and did not enter a 
separate sequestration order, but it believed that the purpose of the 
exclusionary order was also to sequester the witnesses. 

 

[¶14]   We certainly identify with the 
court's frustration when faced with the prospect that the confidentiality of the 
juvenile proceeding had been compromised.3   We further support the court's 
concerns that if witnesses are allowed to speak to others about what occurred 
when they are before a juvenile court, the required sanctity and confidentiality 
of a juvenile proceeding would be quickly eroded.  However, we cannot agree that the 
appropriate remedy in this instance was the exclusion of the witnesses' 
testimony.  The result of such a 
sanction was that KC was unable to fully present a defense to the criminal 
allegations made against him when he played no part in the violation of the 
court's order.  We, therefore, hold 
that the court abused its discretion by excluding the witnesses as a sanction 
for violating the court's oral order.  

 

[¶15]   We further do not agree with the 
court's characterization that the testimony of witness #1 and witness #2 would 
be of no assistance to the court because the court found the testimony would 
duplicate that offered by witness #3 and would be of no help to KC.  KC's counsel informed the court during 
trial that witness #1 and witness #2 were prepared to testify about a separate 
and distinct incident than that addressed by witness #3.  Therefore, it was unreasonable for the 
court to conclude that the testimony of witness #1 and witness #2 would be 
cumulative.  

 

[¶16]   The State argues that the court's 
perspective permitted the court to reasonably conclude that the proposed 
testimony of witness #1 and witness #2, even if accepted as true, would be 
viewed as having limited, if any, impeachment value.  In particular, the State asserts that 
the alleged victim's later denial of her accusations against KC could also be 
explained as an effort to avoid an uncomfortable situation, rather than 
untruthfulness on the alleged victim's part, given the intimidating and 
confrontational nature of witness #1 and witness #2 when they interacted with 
the alleged victim.  While the 
alleged victim clearly testified about the confrontation, we believe it a better 
practice for the court to elicit testimony from all concerned before making any 
ultimate conclusions or characterizations, particularly in a criminal 
action.  It appears, moreover, that 
this procedure would have been particularly appropriate because KC's sole 
defense was his insistence that the incident simply never occurred.  Such a practice is obviously preferred 
because it allows the court to consider the differing perspectives of the 
witnesses.  Allowing all those 
concerned to testify further permits the defendant to fully present a defense to 
the charges levied against him as constitutionally mandated.  In addition, a full and complete record 
may then be developed if this court is later required to address any issues on 
appeal.

 

[¶17] 
  We also are not persuaded by the 
State's argument that Towner is distinguishable from the instant case 
because the Towner matter involved a jury and this action was tried 
before the court.  Obviously the 
presence of a jury requires the court to consider how the jury might be affected 
by any court ruling excluding testimony or later explanatory jury instructions, 
if testimony is allowed.  However, 
such concerns are nonexistent when a matter is tried before the court.  When a matter is presented only to a 
judge with experience in assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing of 
evidence, there would appear no reason not to allow the proffered witnesses to 
testify and provide the criminal defendant every opportunity to fully present a 
defense to the allegations asserted.4

 

Non-Production 
of Investigatory Tape

 

[¶18]   KC also argues that his rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and the Sixth and Tenth Sections of Article 1 of the Wyoming 
Constitution were violated as a result of the court denying him access to the 
alleged victim's tape-recorded statement.  
We do not agree.5  

 

[¶19]   As pointed out by the State, the 
case of Hensley v. State, 2002 WY 96, ¶¶14-15, 48 P.3d 1099, ¶¶14-15 
(Wyo. 2002), sets forth that when advancing a Brady6 claim, a defendant is required 
to establish three things:  1) that 
the loss or destruction of the evidence occurred because of the calculated, bad 
faith effort of authorities to deny the defendant exculpatory evidence, rather 
than through accident or negligence or as a normal course of handling such 
evidence; 2) the evidence was constitutionally material7 and its exculpatory value was 
apparent to authorities prior to its loss or destruction; and 3) the defendant 
had no reasonably available alternative means of obtaining comparable evidence 
or otherwise demonstrating his innocence.  
See also Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 763-64 (Wyo. 
1993).  The record evidences that KC 
failed to show any of the required elements.

 

[¶20]            
Initially, KC was unable to establish that the investigatory tape was 
lost or destroyed because of the calculated, bad faith effort of authorities 
with the intent to deny him the tape.  
Rather, all that was established was that Detective Jones was unable to 
locate the investigatory tape for production.  Further, while it is true that the 
alleged victim testified at minor variance with what Officer Jones had reported, 
KC was unable to establish that this evidence was constitutionally material and 
that its exculpatory value was apparent to authorities prior to its loss or 
destruction. Finally, KC had a reasonably available alternative means of 
obtaining comparable evidence or otherwise demonstrating his innocence.  For instance, KC could have subpoenaed 
Detective Jones and required him to testify.  

 

[¶21]   KC's solitary defense was his 
assertion that the events did not occur as averred between the alleged victim 
and himself.  KC chose to testify on 
his own behalf.  Likewise, KC called 
upon witness #3 and witness #4 to testify and attempted to call witness #1 and 
witness #2.  KC could have performed 
his own investigation, located the other persons who were in the room during the 
alleged incident, and required their testimony at trial through subpoena.  Therefore, it is clear that KC had a 
reasonably available alternative means of obtaining comparable evidence or 
otherwise demonstrating his innocence.  

 

[¶22]            
Hence, we hold that the court acted properly when it denied KC's 
requested relief and ruled that the tape would not be allowed into 
evidence.  Further, we agree with 
the court that KC's requested relief was untimely, as counsel for KC waited 
until just before trial was to begin to bring this issue to the court's 
attention.  The court appropriately 
admonished KC's counsel that such important matters should have been formally 
brought before the court well in advance of the trial date. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   For the foregoing reasons, we 
reverse the adjudication of KC as a juvenile delinquent and remand this matter 
for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion. 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Because 
KC's intended witnesses were all minors and we desire to keep their anonymity, 
as well as for purposes of clarity in this opinion, we will simply refer to 
these witnesses by numerical order.

 

2The 
alleged victim testified that both witness #1 and witness #2 as well as others 
confronted her about the incident with KC. 

 

3Although 
the court questioned numerous witnesses regarding the statements of witness #1 
to witness #2, it was never ascertained if witness #1 discussed her testimony 
with witness #2 or simply indicated that the alleged victim was needed in order 
to give further testimony and was not immediately present to do so.  Witness #1 further indicated that she 
was not aware that she could not speak to anyone about her testimony in court. 

 

4In 
hindsight, this case also points out the necessity for a court to give explicit 
instructions to the parties and their counsel concerning both the exclusionary 
and sequestration elements that apply to parties, counsel, and witnesses in 
juvenile proceedings.

 

5Our 
holding concerning the exclusion of witnesses by the court is dispositive; 
however, because we remand this matter, presumably for new trial, we choose to 
address this issue.

 

6Brady 
v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).

 

7Evidence 
is considered "constitutionally material" only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been made available to the defendant, the 
result of the trial would have been different.  Relish v. State, 860 P.2d 455, 
460 (Wyo. 1993).