Title: HARRY E WEAKLAND V TOLEDO ENGINEERING CO

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2003  
HARRY E. WEAKLAND,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,  
v 
No. 119495  
TOLEDO ENGINEERING COMPANY, 
INC., USF&G/ST. PAUL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and SECOND INJURY FUND,  
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.  
PER CURIAM  
I  
In this worker’s compensation matter, we are called on to  
construe 
the 
statutory provision that places the 
obligation 
on  
the employer to supply the injured employee with appliances  
that are necessary to alleviate the effects of the work­
related injury.
 MCL 418.315(1). 
We affirm the Worker’s  
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) decision that only  
the modifications to a van constitute appliances within the  
meaning of subsection 315(1) of the Worker’s Disability  
Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.315(1).  Furthermore, we  
  
overrule Wilmers v Gateway Transportation Co (On Remand), 227  
Mich App 339; 575 NW2d 796 (1998).  
II  
Plaintiff was employed as a bricklayer by defendant  
Toledo Engineering. In January, 1981, while at work, he was  
injured and disabled, and later began to receive worker’s  
compensation.  
Subsequently, 
his 
physical 
health 
deteriorated,  
and by 1990 he was having difficulty walking any substantial  
distance without assistance.  As his condition worsened,  
plaintiff acquired assistive devices, including a motorized  
cart, as well as a van that was customized to transport the  
cart.  
Plaintiff 
sought 
reimbursement 
for 
the 
cost and  
customization of the van and other related expenses pursuant  
to MCL 418.315(1), arguing that these were “appliances”  
necessary to cure or relieve the effects of his compensable  
injury.  The magistrate, after taking proofs on this issue,  
ordered reimbursement for the motorized cart and the  
reasonable cost of the van and its conversion. On appeal, the  
WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s order regarding reimbursement  
for the cost of the van conversion, but reversed regarding the  
cost of the van and the cart.  
 The Court of Appeals denied  plaintiff’s application for  
leave to appeal.  Plaintiff then filed an application for  
leave to appeal in this Court, and defendants sought leave to  
appeal regarding the award of reimbursement for the van  
2  
conversion. This matter turns on the proper construction of  
MCL 418.315(1).  
III  
We review questions of statutory construction de novo.  
DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300  
(2000).  The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to  
give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Farrington v Total  
Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). That  
intent is clear if the statutory language is  unambiguous, and  
the statute must then be enforced as written.  Lorencz v Ford  
Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).  
IV  
Subsection 315(1) of the WDCA governs liability of an  
employer for the cost of enumerated assistive devices:  
The employer shall furnish, or cause to be 
furnished, to an employee who receives a personal 
injury arising out of and in the course of  
employment, reasonable medical, surgical, and  
hospital 
services 
and 
medicines, 
or 
other  
attendance or treatment recognized by the laws of 
this state as legal, when they are needed. However, 
an employer is not required to reimburse or cause 
to be reimbursed charges for an optometric service 
unless that service was included in the definition  
of practice of optometry under section 17401 of the 
public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.17401, as 
of May 20, 1992. An employer is not required to 
reimburse or cause to be reimbursed charges for 
services performed by a profession that was not 
licensed or registered by the laws of this state on 
or before January 1, 1998, but that becomes  
licensed, registered, or otherwise recognized by 
the laws of this state after January 1, 1998. 
Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in 
excess of 56 hours per week if the care is to be 
provided by the employee's spouse, brother, sister, 
child, parent, or any combination of these persons.  
3  
 
 
  
After 10 days from the inception of medical care as 
provided in this section, the employee may treat 
with a physician of his or her own choice by giving 
to the employer the name of the physician and his 
or her intention to treat with the physician. The 
employer or the employer's carrier may file a 
petition objecting to the named physician selected 
by the employee and setting forth reasons for the 
objection. If the employer or carrier can show 
cause 
why 
the 
employee 
should 
not 
continue  
treatment 
with 
the 
named 
physician 
of 
the  
employee's choice, after notice to all parties and 
a prompt hearing by a worker's compensation 
magistrate, the worker's compensation magistrate 
may order that the employee discontinue treatment 
with the named physician or pay for the treatment 
received from the physician from the date the order 
is mailed. The employer shall also supply to the  
injured 
employee 
dental 
service, 
crutches,  
artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing  
apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure,  
so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the  
effects of the injury. If the employer fails, 
neglects, or refuses so to do, the employee shall 
be reimbursed for the reasonable expense paid by 
the employee, or payment may be made in behalf of 
the employee to persons to whom the unpaid expenses 
may be owing, by order of the worker's compensation 
magistrate. The worker's compensation magistrate 
may prorate attorney fees at the contingent fee 
rate paid by the employee. [Emphasis added.]  
In Wilmers, the Court of Appeals addressed the scope of  
the services and devices that an employer can be called on to  
provide to an injured employee pursuant to MCL 418.315. It  
concluded that an entire custom equipped van, and not just the  
required vehicular modifications, could be considered a  
reasonably 
necessary 
“appliance” 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
subsection  
315(1). Wilmers, supra at 345-346.  In doing so, the Court  
reversed the decision of the WCAC, which had found that  
4  
 
 
characterizing an entire vehicle as an appliance would be  
stretching the statute beyond the clear terms used by the  
Legislature.  
Judge Young dissented from the decision of the Court of  
Appeals in Wilmers. Concluding that a van did not constitute  
an “appliance” within the meaning of subsection 315(1), he  
discussed the substantial difference between a van and the  
examples of appliances provided by subsection 315(1):  
I conclude that the Legislature’s selection of 
the phrase “other appliances,” when preceded by 
specific examples of artificial adaptive aids (such 
as crutches, hearing aids, dentures, glasses, 
etc.), creates an unambiguous legislative intent to 
mandate that an employer is obligated only to 
supply devices of like kind. . . . Consequently, I 
find it hard to reconcile with my construction of 
the statute the majority’s view that a van is 
considered to be “like” such adaptive aids as a 
crutch, a hearing aid, false teeth, or a pair of 
eyeglasses. [Id. at 352.]  
We agree with that dissenting opinion’s conclusion  
regarding the proper understanding of “other appliances.”  
Judge Young was applying the canon of statutory construction  
described formally as ejusdem generis.  This Court has  
utilized this canon frequently in defining the scope of a  
broad term following a series of specific items.  In  
discussing this canon in Huggett v Dep’t of Natural Resources,  
464 Mich 711, 718-719; 629 NW2d 915 (2001), we described how  
meaning is given to the general term in that situation as  
follows:  “[T]he general term is restricted to include only  
5  
 
 
things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those  
specifically enumerated”; that is, because the listed items  
have a commonality, the general term is taken as sharing it.1  
As Judge Young pointed out, the statutorily listed items,  
“dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth,  
eyeglasses, hearing apparatus” share a commonality in that  
they are artificial adaptive aids that serve to directly  
ameliorate the effects of the medical condition.  A van is  
dissimilar to the listed items in MCL 418.315(1) because it is  
not an artificial adaptive aid. Rather, a van is simply a  
means of transportation. The “adaptive aid” ameliorating the  
effects 
of 
the 
medical 
condition 
and 
permitting 
the  
utilization of the van is the vehicular modification.  
Accordingly, the phrase “other appliances” as used in  
subsection 315(1) should not be understood to encompass the  
van itself; it encompasses only the necessary modifications  
made to the van so that it can be operated by someone who is  
disabled.  Therefore, defendants are not obligated to provide  
plaintiff with a van under the statutory provision at issue.  
1 In A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University 
Press, 
1997), 
p 
26, United States Supreme 
Court 
Justice 
Antonin Scalia explains that the 
ejusdem 
generis 
canon of statutory construction  
stands for the proposition that when a text lists a 
series of items, a general term included in the 
list should be understood to be limited to items of  
the same sort. For instance, if someone speaks of 
using “tacks, staples, screws, nails, rivets, and 
other things,” the general term “other things” 
surely refers to other fasteners.  
6  
V  
We affirm the WCAC determination that the employer was  
not obligated to provide a van to plaintiff, and we overrule  
Wilmers for the reasons stated above.  
In all other respects, we also affirm the decision of the  
WCAC.  The WCAC had concluded that the particular motorized  
cart purchased by plaintiff was not medically necessary.  This  
was a factual determination that was properly supported in the  
record and, thus, is conclusive.  Mudel v Great Atlantic &  
Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 703-704; 614 NW2d 607 (2000).  
Defendants’ application for leave to appeal as cross­
appellants to contest the WCAC decision to reimburse plaintiff  
for the cost of the van conversion is denied as abandoned  
inasmuch as an appeal was not sought on this issue before the  
Court of Appeals. MCR 7.207.  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
7  
 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
HARRY E. WEAKLAND,  
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,  
No. 119495  
TOLEDO ENGINEERING COMPANY, 
INC., USF&G/ST. PAUL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and SECOND INJURY FUND,  
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
Though not joining in the opinion, I concur in the result  
because the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission  
correctly found that the van at issue was not an “appliance”  
pursuant to MCL 418.315(1).  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
HARRY E. WEAKLAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant
Cross-Appellee, 
v 
No. 119495 
TOLEDO ENGINEERING COMPANY INC.,
USF&G/ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY,
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants-Appellees
Cross-Appellants. 
___________________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
The 
majority 
today 
overrules 
Wilmers 
v 
Gateway 
Transportation Co (On Remand)2 and holds that a van is not an  
appliance within the meaning of subsection 315(1) of the  
Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.315(1).  
Ante at 1. 
The decision furthers a trend of ignoring this  
Court's prior interpretation of the WDCA and adopts a strict  
and harsh approach that we have previously disavowed.  Because  
I disagree and would reaffirm Wilmers, I respectfully dissent.  
2  227 Mich App 339; 575 NW2d 796 (1998).  
 
 
 
 
 
THE MAJORITY OVERRULES WILMERS WITHOUT ADDRESSING  
THE CASE LAW RELIED ON IN THE DECISION  
In the past, this Court interpreted the WDCA and its  
predecessors broadly.  For example, in Wells v Firestone Tire  
& Rubber Co,3 Justice Cavanagh wrote for the majority:  
The statutory workers' compensation scheme was 
enacted for the protection of both employees and 
employers who work and do business in this state. 
The system assures covered employees that they will 
be compensated in the event of employment-related 
injuries.  In addition, employers are assured of the 
parameters of their liability for such injuries.  By 
agreeing 
to 
assume 
responsibility 
for 
all  
employment-related 
injuries, 
employers 
protect 
themselves from the possibility of potentially 
excessive damage awards.  In order to effectuate  
these policies, the statute has been liberally 
construed to provide broad coverage for injured 
workers.  
Wells reflected the Court's view that "[t]he social and  
remedial purposes of the [WDCA] were structured to quickly and  
assuredly compensate employees for injuries suffered."  
Farrell v Dearborn Mfg Co, 416 Mich 267, 280; 330 NW2d 397  
(1982).  Until recently, Michigan courts adhered to this view.4  
3  421 Mich 641, 651; 364 NW2d 760 (1984).  
4 See, e.g., Hagerman v Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720,  
739; 579 NW2d 347 (1998); Derr v Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 
452 Mich 375, 388; 550 NW2d 759 (1996); Sobotka v Chrysler  
Corp (After Remand), 447 Mich 1, 20, n 18; 523 NW2d 454 
(1994); Paschke v Retool Indus, 445 Mich 502, 511; 519 NW2d 
441 (1994); Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 191; 
312 NW2d 640 (1981); Century Indemnity Co v Schmick, 351 Mich 
622, 626; 88 NW2d 622 (1958); McCaul v Modern Tile & Carpet,  
Inc, 248 Mich App 610, 619; 640 NW2d 589 (2001); James v  
Commercial Carriers, Inc, 230 Mich App 533, 538-539; 583 NW2d 
(continued...)  
2  
 
 
  
  
 
 
In Wilmers, the Court of Appeals interpreted the statute  
consistently with precedent. Specifically, the Wilmers Court  
reasoned:  
The Worker's Disability Compensation Act is 
remedial legislation that should be interpreted  
liberally in a humanitarian manner in favor of the  
injured employee. Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber  
Co, [supra at 651]; Matney v Southfield Bowl, 218 
Mich App 475, 486; 554 NW2d 356 (1996).  Literal  
constructions that produce unreasonable or unjust  
results that are inconsistent with the purpose of 
the act should be avoided. Rowell v Security Steel  
Processing Co, 445 Mich 347, 354; 518 NW2d 409 
(1994). . . .  [T]he clear purpose of § 315(1) is to  
provide the injured employee with such services and  
products as are reasonably necessary to cure or 
relieve the effects of injury.  Here, plaintiff's 
evidence (which was never rejected by the magistrate 
or the WCAC) indicated that one of the effects of 
his injury is a loss of mobility, including an 
inability to use an ordinary car, or even a 
specially equipped one, for transportation.  We  
conclude that under these circumstances the entire  
specially equipped van that plaintiff requires for 
transportation, 
and 
not 
just 
its 
special 
modifications, may be considered a reasonably 
necessary "appliance" for purposes of § 315(1). 
[Wilmers, supra at 345-346 (emphasis added).]  
Today, the Court rejects Wilmers and the cases on which  
it relied. 
It does so without addressing Wilmers'  
interpretation of the WDCA, focusing instead on Judge Young's  
4 (...continued) 
913 (1998); Tulppo v Ontonagon Co, 207 Mich App 277, 283; 523  
NW2d 883 (1994); Isom v Limitorque Corp, 193 Mich App 518, 
522-523; 484 NW2d 716 (1992); Andriacchi v Cleveland Cliffs  
Iron Co, 174 Mich App 600, 606; 436 NW2d 707 (1989); Gross v  
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 87 Mich App 448, 450; 274 
NW2d 817 (1978); Welch v Westran Corp, 45 Mich App 1, 5; 205 
NW2d 828 (1973), aff'd 395 Mich 169 (1975).  
3  
 
  
 
dissent.  
This omission is not surprising.  Earlier, the majority  
was confronted with the fact that the WDCA has long been  
broadly interpreted, and the majority chose to ignore that  
fact.  For instance, in Crowe v Detroit,5 the dissent noted  
that the majority "ignores our duty to recognize that the WDCA  
is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed in  
favor of the employee, and must be construed to grant rather  
than deny benefits." Id. at 22 (Cavanagh, Weaver, and Kelly,  
JJ., dissenting).  
The majority reacted dismissively, stating:  
We do not think that the statute at issue is  
ambiguous.  
In any event, if the statutory language were 
ambiguous, our first duty is to attempt to discern 
the legislative intent underlying the ambiguous 
words.
 Only if that inquiry is fruitless, or 
produces no clear demonstration of intent, does a 
court resort to the remedial preferential rule 
relied on in the dissent. [Id. at 13.]  
The response indicates the majority's preferred method of  
legislative interpretation.  However, it avoids the fact that  
Michigan courts have consistently applied a different  
interpretation than the majority does to the WDCA.  Thus,  
without overruling or distinguishing it, the majority ignores  
past case law because the majority disagrees with it.  
Likewise, 
the 
majority 
disregarded 
the 
accepted  
5  465 Mich 1; 631 NW2d 293 (2001).  
4  
 
  
 
interpretation of the WDCA in DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp,  
461 Mich 394; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).  There, the majority noted  
the accepted interpretation, but ignored it, holding that the  
"plain 
language 
of 
the 
statute" 
precluded 
a 
broad  
interpretation, "no matter how liberally that language is  
construed." 
Id. at 406.  Moreover, the majority did not  
acknowledge that "any inquiry into the applicability of the  
[WDCA]" involved principles of liberal construction, but  
instead restricted those principles to where the statutory  
language was ambiguous.  Hagerman v Gencorp Automotive, 457  
Mich 720, 739; 579 NW2d 347 (1998).  
The Court of Appeals in Wilmers applied our longstanding  
broad interpretation of the WDCA.  The majority would overrule  
the result the Wilmers Court reached without confronting or  
even acknowledging the precedent that Wilmers relied on.  
Of course, a dearth of analysis begs a dearth of  
argument.  It is difficult to analyze the majority's reasoning  
in changing the law when it provides no reasoning to question.  
The opinion states why the majority's view is correct, but  
fails to state why the old view is wrong.  
THE WILMERS COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT A VAN  
COULD BE AN "APPLIANCE" UNDER SUBSECTION 315(1)  
The Wilmers Court held that a specially modified van  
could be an "appliance" under subsection 315(1).  The section  
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
at issue provides:  
The employer shall also supply to the injured 
employee 
dental 
service, 
crutches, 
artificial 
limbs, 
eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and 
other appliances necessary to cure, so far as  
reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of  
the injury. . . .  [MCL 418.315(1) (emphasis  
added).]  
Specifically, Wilmers held that loss of mobility was a  
consequence of the appellant's injury and that a van was  
necessary to give the appellant a sense of normalcy.  Wilmers,  
supra at 345-346.  
The dissent in Wilmers and the majority here assert that  
"appliance" cannot mean a van because a van is not similar to  
or related to the other items listed in MCL 418.315(1).  Ante  
at 6.  They would restrict "appliance" to mean "artificial  
adaptive aids that serve to directly ameliorate the effects of  
a medical condition." Ante at 6.  
As in Wilmers, the plaintiff here cannot walk without  
difficulty.6  This lack of mobility is the result of a work­
related medical condition in both cases. 
What could  
ameliorate a lack of mobility?  I submit that a van reasonably  
falls within the majority's definition of an appliance in  
6 The 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Appellate 
Commission 
rejected 
plaintiff's claim for reimbursement for the van on the basis 
of factual distinctions between this case and Wilmers, even 
though it applied Wilmers. 
However, the majority opinion 
today would foreclose the possibility of a van being 
considered as an appliance under the WDCA in any factual 
situation.  
6  
 
 
 
certain cases.  
The majority argues that a van is unlike crutches,  
prostheses, or hearing aids.  However, in some cases a van  
serves the same purpose as crutches or prostheses because it  
allows an individual freedom of movement. 
Moreover,  
subsection  315(1) also includes the term "dental service" as  
well as artificial teeth.  Dental service is a broad term that  
is unlike any of the others and it may include anything from  
cosmetic surgery to jaw repair.  
The Wilmers Court was not alone in holding that the term  
"appliance" may include a van in a worker's compensation  
context. It noted:  
Our conclusion is supported by the decisions of 
courts in several other states that have held that  
specially 
equipped 
vans 
for 
paraplegics 
may 
constitute, in their entirety, a compensable  
"appliance" 
or 
"apparatus" 
under 
worker's  
compensation statutes similar to § 315(1).  Terry  
Grantham Co v Industrial Comm, 154 Ariz 180; 741 P2d  
313 (Ariz App, 1987); Aino's Custom Slip Covers v 
DeLucia, 533 So 2d 862 (Fla App, 1988); Edgewood  
Boys' Ranch Foundation v Robinson, 451 So 2d 532 
(Fla App, 1984); Manpower Temporary Services v  
Sioson, 529 NW2d 259 (Iowa, 1995); Mississippi  
Transportation Comm v Dewease, 691 So 2d 1007 (Miss,  
1997).  We find the following passage from the Iowa  
Supreme Court's decision in Manpower Temporary  
Services particularly instructive:  
"We begin with the unusually strong medical 
evidence of necessity and of the record that [the 
injured employee's] family status and past lifestyle 
reveal no other use for the van.  That evidence  
refutes any contention that the van is a frill or 
luxury and reveals what can be described as an 
appliance, not greatly different from crutches or a  
7  
  
 
 
wheelchair. The point is that a van is necessary in 
order to make [the injured employee's] wheelchair 
fully useful.  
"In another context, like other courts, we have 
agreed with the dictionary definition that describes 
the term 'appliance' as 'a means to an end.' Murray 
v Royal Indem Co, 247 Iowa 1299, 1301; 78 NW2d 786,  
787 (1956).  The 'end' of the van is merely an 
extension of [the injured employee's] 300-pound 
wheelchair. Without a van she is, more than need be, 
a prisoner of her severe paralysis. The [factfinder] 
could thus reasonably view the van as an appliance, 
a necessary part of [the injured employee's] care. 
[529 NW2d 264.]"  
We acknowledge that there are decisions from 
courts in some other states that deny worker's 
compensation coverage for specially equipped cars 
and vans on the ground that such vehicles simply do 
not constitute a medical apparatus or device, and 
decisions from courts in still other states that  
allow reimbursement only for the cost of the special 
vehicle modifications or allow the employer to 
offset the cost of the vehicle before modification  
with the cost of an average, midpriced car of the 
same year.  However, we are persuaded that, under 
the circumstances of this case, and given the kind 
of substantial vehicle modifications that this  
plaintiff requires, the entire vehicle may here be 
considered an "appliance" covered by § 315(1), even 
though it is not actually necessary to rebuild the 
entire vehicle to accommodate the handicap.  The  
WCAC's interpretation of the term "appliance" is  
unduly restrictive and contrary to the principle of  
interpreting the Worker's Disability Compensation  
Act in a liberal and humanitarian manner so as to  
effectuate the remedial goal of relieving injured  
workers from the effects of injury. [Wilmers, supra  
at 346-347.]  
CONCLUSION  
Therefore, considering the majority's own malleable  
8  
 
definition of "appliance"7 and other jurisdictions' decisions,  
I submit that the Wilmers Court reasonably concluded that a  
van could be an "appliance" under subsection 315(1).  I would  
reaffirm Wilmers as good law.  
Marilyn Kelly  
7  Ante at 5.  
9