Title: People v. Ramsey

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 83987-Agenda 2-January 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								DANIEL RAMSEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Hancock County,
defendant, Daniel Ramsey, was convicted of two counts of first
degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, and
one count each of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home
invasion and residential burglary. In finding defendant guilty of
these offenses, the jury rejected defendant's claim that he was
insane under section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as
amended by section 15 of Public Act 89-404 (720 ILCS 5/6-2
(West 1996)). The jury also determined that defendant was eligible
for the death penalty based on the cold, calculated and
premeditated manner of the crimes. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West
1996).
	After a sentencing hearing, the jury found that there were no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death
sentence. The trial court then sentenced defendant to death. In
addition, the court sentenced defendant to terms of imprisonment
on his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, home invasion, and residential burglary.
Defendant's death sentence has now been stayed pending direct
review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we reverse defendant's
convictions and remand for a new trial.
	At issue in this appeal is the law governing defendant's
insanity defense. The trial proceedings utilized the version of the
insanity defense statute as amended by section 15 of Public Act
89-404 because that was the version of the law in effect when the
crimes were allegedly committed. The amended version of the law
was significant because it altered the definition of insanity. Under
the amendment, a defendant could no longer raise an insanity
defense based on his inability "to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law."(1) In addition, the amendment increased a
defendant's burden of proof for an insanity defense from "a
preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and convincing
evidence." See Pub. Act 89-404, §15 (eff. August 20, 1995),
codified at 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a), (e) (West 1996).
	When defendant's insanity defense failed, he argued in his
post-trial motion that the amended version of the insanity defense
statute was unconstitutional and should not have been followed
because Public Act 89-404 violated the single subject rule in
article IV, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IV, §8(d)). Defendant asserted that because of Public Act
89-404's constitutional infirmities, he should have been tried
under the former version of the law with its broader definition of
insanity and its less stringent burden of proof.
	Although the trial court rejected defendant's constitutional
challenge, its ruling came before our opinion in People v. Reedy,
186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999), which was filed while this appeal was
pending. In Reedy our court held that Public Act 89-404 does
violate the single subject rule and is unconstitutional in its entirety.
Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 12. As a result, the law is void ab initio;
" '[i]t is *** as though no such law had ever been passed.' "
People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990), quoting People v.
Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 394 (1932). Section 6-2 of the Criminal
Code therefore remained as it was before the adoption of Public
Act 89-404's amendments (Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 390), and those
amendments should not have been applied at defendant's trial. The
judgment of the circuit court must therefore be reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with the version of
the law in effect prior to Public Act 89-404.
	In reaching this conclusion, we note that the General
Assembly has now enacted new legislation containing the same
revisions to the insanity defense statute originally included in
Public Act 89-404. The new legislation, set forth in Public Act
90-593, section 15, is not claimed to suffer from the same single
subject rule problems that rendered Public Act 89-404 invalid, and
we must presume it to be constitutional (see People v. Hickman,
163 Ill. 2d 250, 257 (1994)). The new law, however, cannot be
applied on retrial.
	Application of criminal or penal measures to events occurring
before their enactment is restricted by article I, section 10, of the
United States Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall
*** pass any *** ex post facto Law" (U.S. Const., art. I, §10) and
by article I, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §16), which contains similar language. Our court has
held that a "law is ex post facto if it makes criminal an act that was
innocent when done, if it increases the punishment for a previously
committed offense, or if it alters the legal rules of evidence to
make conviction easier." People v. Shumpert, 126 Ill. 2d 344, 351
(1989); accord People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 107 (1990); see
Brewer v. Peters, 262 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613 (1994). A law which
abolishes an affirmative defense of justification or excuse
constitutes an ex post facto law because "it expands the scope of
a criminal prohibition after the act is done." Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 49, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 43, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2723 (1990); see also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169, 70 L. Ed. 216, 217, 46 S. Ct. 68, 68 (1925) (a law is ex post facto if
it "deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available
according to law at the time when the act was committed").
	Under these standards, application of Public Act 90-593 to
defendant's case would violate the prohibition against ex post
facto laws for two reasons. First, it would deprive defendant of an
affirmative defense he possessed under the former version of the
statute, namely, that he is not guilty because he lacked the capacity
" 'to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.' " See
United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052, 1054 & n.1 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding ex post facto clause precludes retroactive
application of amendment to federal insanity defense statute
eliminating identical prong of insanity defense), quoting United
States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Kowal, 596 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D. Conn. 1984) (same); United
States v. Lakey, 610 F. Supp. 210, 212-13 (S.D. Tex. 1985)
(same). Second, by increasing the burden of proof a defendant
must meet in order to establish that he was insane at the time of
the offense, the amendment makes it easier for the State to secure
a conviction. See, e.g., People v. Eckhardt, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1077,
1080 (1987) (holding that shift in burden of proof relating to
insanity defense would be improper ex post facto application of
statute if applied to a trial for an offense committed prior to the
amendment to the law); People v. Ahmad, 206 Ill. App. 3d 927,
937 (1990) (same).
	In a supplemental brief ordered by our court, the State agrees
with this conclusion and concedes that an application of Public
Act 90-593's provisions at defendant's retrial would violate ex
post facto principles.
	For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions and
sentences are reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.
On retrial, defendant shall be allowed to assert an insanity defense
in accordance with section 6-2 of the Criminal Code as it existed
prior to the amendments contained in Public Acts 89-404 and
90-593. Specifically, defendant shall be allowed to present an
insanity defense based on his inability to conform his conduct to
the law. In addition, he shall only be required to prove his insanity
at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring:
	I agree with the holding that Public Act 89-404 is void ab
initio.
	During the pendency of this appeal, the General Assembly
enacted a different act, Public Act 90-593. Public Act 90-593
reenacted the amendment to the insanity defense statute that was
originally included in the void act. The parties' initial briefs did
not address the effect of Public Act 90-593 on this case.
Consequently, this court sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing.
We directed the parties to brief the issues of "whether Public Act
90-593 applies retroactively to [defendant] and, if so, whether
retroactive application of Public Act 90-593 would violate the
constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto application of the
law." The parties complied.
	Defendant maintains that Public Act 90-593 does not apply
retroactively to him under principles of statutory construction. In
the alternative, defendant asserts that retroactive application would
result in ex post facto violations.
	The State does not address whether Public Act 90-593 applies
retroactively to defendant. Nonetheless, the State concedes that
retroactive application would violate the constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
	The majority opinion determines that the constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws prohibit retroactive
application of Public Act 90-593 to defendant. I would not
address the ex post facto issue, for the reasons explained below.
	Ex post facto literally means after the fact. Black's Law
Dictionary 520 (5th ed. 1979). Both the United States and Illinois
Constitutions prohibit the state from enacting an ex post facto law.
U.S. Const., art. I, §10 (providing that "[n]o State shall *** pass
any *** ex post facto Law"); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §16
(providing that "[n]o ex post facto law *** shall be passed").
Essentially, this prohibition means that the legislature cannot
change a criminal or penal law, after the fact, to be less favorable
to a defendant regarding events that occurred before the change.
See generally Carmell v. Texas, No. 98-7540 (U.S. May 1, 2000)
(discussing meaning of prohibition). It therefore follows that the
constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws are not
implicated unless the legislature is changing a law after the fact.
Here, because legislative intent is clear that Public Act 90-593 is
not to be applied retroactively, there is no reason to conduct an ex
post facto analysis. The principle is well established that courts
will not consider a constitutional question if the cause can be
determined on other grounds. E.g., People ex rel. Waller v. 1990
Ford Bronco, 158 Ill. 2d 460, 464 (1994). Consequently, I would
determine this cause solely on the basis that Public Act 90-593
does not apply retroactively to defendant.
I. Applicable Precedent
	This case is analogous to People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24,
50 (1997). There, this court was presented with an issue of
whether an amendment to a statute would apply in that appeal.
Defendant was convicted of the offense of obstructing justice. The
State, however, failed to prove at trial the venue in which the
offense occurred. Because venue was an established element of the
offense, this failure necessitated reversal of that conviction. After
defendant's trial, the venue statute was amended to remove the
necessity of proving venue to obtain a criminal conviction. The
State argued that the amended statute should be applied on appeal
to sustain defendant's conviction. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d  at 49-50.
	In resolving this issue, this court in Digirolamo followed a
long line of Illinois cases where, in determining whether the
amendment applied, we utilized the legislative intent approach and
its substantive-procedural distinction. Under this approach, an
amendment to a statute is generally construed to apply
prospectively and not retroactively, unless the legislature intended
a retroactive application of the amendment and the amendment
affects only procedure or remedies. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d  at 50.
Accordingly, this test begins with the presumption that a new
statute will not be applied on appeal unless the legislature
expressly provides for such application. The language of the
amendment at issue showed that the legislature did not intend a
retroactive application. Also, the amendment effected a change in
more than procedure or remedies. We therefore held that the
amendment could not be applied retroactively to defendant, and
we reversed his conviction for that offense. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 50-52. Given that the amendment was not applied retroactively
to defendant, there was no possibility of an ex post facto violation.
	In the present case, there is no indication that the legislature
intended Public Act 90-593 to apply retroactively. Also, the
statutory amendment at issue affects substantive rights, not
procedure or remedies. Therefore, pursuant to Digirolamo, Public
Act 90-593 cannot be applied retroactively to defendant. This
appeal could be resolved on that basis alone.
II. Inapplicable Precedent

	As noted, this case turns on whether the amendment to the
insanity defense statute contained in Public Act 90-593 may be
applied retroactively to defendant. Digirolamo and First of
America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), contain
seemingly contradictory statements concerning when to apply an
amended statute on appeal. Digirolamo provides that, "[g]enerally,
an amendment to a statute will be construed to apply prospectively
and not retroactively" unless the legislature intended a retroactive
application of the amendment and the amendment affects only
procedure or remedies. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d  at 50. Armstead
states that, with regard to statutory amendments, "a reviewing
court should simply apply the law as it exists at the time of the
appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right."
Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290. Thus, each of these statements
appears to be a generally applicable canon of statutory
construction for courts to follow when determining whether an
amended statute will be applied on appeal. On their face, the canon
in Digirolamo favors prospective application whereas the canon
in Armstead favors retroactive application.
	Although these canons are opposed on their face, there is no
conflict between the holdings of Digirolamo and Armstead. Each
decision relied on a line of case law that supported its outcome and
that followed its pertinent canon of statutory construction. The
United States Supreme Court recently observed, "It is not
uncommon to find 'apparent tension' between different canons of
statutory construction. As Professor Llewellyn famously
illustrated, many of the traditional canons have equal opposites."
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 263, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 251, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 (1994). Therefore, "another canon
of unquestionable vitality" useful to remember when faced with
this scenario is "the 'maxim *** that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used.' " Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 265, 128 L. Ed. 2d 
at 252, 114 S. Ct.  at 1497, quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 399, 5 L. Ed. 257, 290 (1821).
	As discussed above, the present appeal is analogous to
Digirolamo. Both this case and Digirolamo involved statutory
amendments to a criminal statute and potential ex post facto
violations. Armstead, on the other hand, is not applicable to this
appeal. Unlike the present case, Armstead concerned a statutory
amendment to a civil statute that possibly implicated rights vested
under our due process clause (Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282). See
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-30, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23-24,
101 S. Ct. 960, 964-65 (1981) (explaining that, in addressing
whether application of a statutory amendment would violate ex
post facto principles, it is not relevant whether the statutory
change touches on any vested right).
	Nevertheless, given the confusion that has resulted from the
two canons, I take this opportunity to explain the legal history
behind the canons. I then propose that this court adopt a new test
for determining when a new or amended statute will be applied on
appeal to pending cases. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the United
States Supreme Court similarly was faced with seemingly
contradictory canons of statutory construction for determining
when a new federal statute will be applied on appeal to pending
cases. The Supreme Court successfully reconciled the principles
underlying the two canons into a single test. We should do
likewise here.
III. Historical Presumption Against the Retroactive Application
of Statutes
	Historically, there has been a presumption against the
retroactive application of statutes. Both this court and the United
States Supreme Court have discussed this presumption.
	This court has reviewed the origin and rationale of the
presumption as follows.
			"As a general matter it is clear that prospective
application of statutes is to be preferred to retroactive, or
retrospective, application. This preference has existed
from time out of mind. 'The doctrine that legislation must
be prospective in character is traceable to Coke and
Bracton, who recognized it as a rule of construction
founded on doctrines of natural law, and it was
incorporated into American jurisprudence by the learned
jurists Kent and Story.' (Orlicki v. McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346.) The doctrine has sometimes been treated as
a constitutional restraint on legislation, and sometimes as
a rule of statutory construction. [Citations.]
			The preference for prospectivity is founded upon:
			'[the] fundamental principle of jurisprudence that
retroactive application of new laws is usually unfair.
There is a general consensus that notice or warning of
the rule should be given in advance of the actions
whose effects are to be judged ***. ***' 1A A.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction §41.02, at 340-01
(4th ed. 1986).
			It has thus been our general rule of construction that an
amendatory act will be construed as prospective.
[Citations.] ***
			*** Since no statute will violate the Constitution
merely because it operates prospectively, prospectivity is
to be preferred." Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union,
Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 308-09 (1988).
	The United States Supreme Court has also explained the basis
for its traditional presumption against the retroactive application
of statutes. "The presumption against the retroactive application
of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that
the law affords the individual citizen. That presumption 'is deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine
centuries older than our Republic.' [Citation.]" Lynce v. Mathis,
519 U.S. 433, 439, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63, 71, 117 S. Ct. 891, 895
(1997). "Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is
and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations
should not be lightly disrupted." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 265, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 252, 114 S. Ct.  at 1497. "This doctrine finds
expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The specific
prohibition on ex post facto laws is only one aspect of the broader
constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In
both the civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places
limits on the sovereign's ability to use its lawmaking power to
modify bargains it has made with its subjects." Lynce, 519 U.S.  at
439-40, 137 L. Ed. 2d  at 71, 117 S. Ct.  at 895.
	The Supreme Court has elaborated on the various federal
constitutional provisions that possibly may be violated by a
retroactive application of new statutes.
			" 'The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive
application of penal legislation. Article 1, §10, cl. 1,
prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive
legislation, laws 'impairing the Obligation of Contracts.'
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the
Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving
private persons of vested property rights except for
'public use' and upon payment of 'just compensation.'
The prohibitions on 'Bills of Attainder' in Art. 1, §§9-10,
prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons
and meting out summary punishment for past conduct.
[Citation.] The Due Process Clause also protects the
interests in fair notice and repose that may be
compromised by retroactive legislation ... .' [Citation.]"
Lynce, 519 U.S.  at 440 n.12, 137 L. Ed. 2d  at 71 n.12, 117 S. Ct.  at 895 n.12, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 266, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 253, 114 S. Ct.  at 1497.
The above list of potential constitutional problems is not
exhaustive. For example, both this court and the Supreme Court
have concluded that retroactive application of a statute may violate
the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995); In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 203-04
(1982).
	As the foregoing discussion shows, a general presumption
against the retroactive application of statutes is deeply embedded
in our legal history. This presumption initially was rooted in
fairness and freedom from arbitrary governmental actions. Later,
this presumption was expressed in various constitutional
provisions. Consequently, applying statutes prospectively has been
the preferred practice because it avoids the myriad constitutional
problems that may arise from applying a statute retroactively.
IV. Historical Exceptions to the Presumption Against the
Retroactivity of Statutes
	For nearly as long as the general presumption against the
retroactive application of statutes has existed, jurists have also
recognized that the retroactive application of a statute is desirable
in certain situations. Hence, legal history records the development
of a number of exceptions to the general presumption against
retroactivity. The following discussion demonstrates that certain
exceptions have long existed to the general presumption against
the retroactive application of statutes. This list is intended to be
illustrative, not exhaustive.
	Illinois has, for example, long recognized the exception that
a new or amended statute may be applied retroactively on appeal
where the legislature intended a retroactive application of the
statute and the statute affects only procedure or remedies. See,
e.g., People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 50 (1997); Rivard v.
Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 310
(1988); Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346 (1954); Theodosis
v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 341 Ill. App. 8 (1950); see also In
re Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d 512, 522 (1987) (noting that our General
Assembly incorporated part of this exception into the Illinois
Statute on Statutes), quoting Orlicki, 4 Ill. 2d  at 346, quoting Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 131, par. 4. This court's decision in
Digirolamo illustrates the application of this exception. The
United States Supreme Court continues to recognize a principle
that is similar in application. See Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-74,
275, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257, 258, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501, 1502 (allowing
statutory changes in procedure or in prospective relief to be
applied on appeal, but characterizing those changes as not truly
retroactive in effect).
	Another exception found in Illinois law is that a statutory
amendment may be applied "retroactively" where the legislature
enacted the amendment merely to clarify an existing law that was
ambiguous, rather than to change the law. In re Marriage of Cohn,
93 Ill. 2d 190, 202 (1982); see, e.g., Varelis v. Northwestern
Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 461-63 (1995); People v.
Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41 (1983); People ex rel. Spitzer v.
County of La Salle, 20 Ill. 2d 18, 28 (1960). Like the exception
discussed above, this exception gives effect to the legislature's
intent in drafting the statute.
	A third exception long recognized in Illinois law concerns
"nonvested rights." This exception is best understood by
discussing its origin. Justice Story, the same learned jurist who has
been credited with incorporating into American jurisprudence the
general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes,
in 1814, wrote Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C. N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). There,
sitting on circuit, Justice Story was construing a provision of the
New Hampshire Constitution that broadly prohibited all
"retrospective" laws. In doing so, he offered what today remains
the basic definition of a statutory law that is operating with truly
retroactive effect. "Justice Story first rejected the notion that the
provision bars only explicitly retroactive legislation, i.e., 'statutes
... enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage.'
[Citation.] Such a construction, he concluded, would be 'utterly
subversive of all the objects' of the prohibition. [Citation.] Instead,
the ban on retrospective legislation embraced 'all statutes, which,
though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and
past transactions.' [Citations.]" Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 268-69, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254, 14 S. Ct.  at 1498-99. Justice Story elaborated:
		"Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches
a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already past, must be deemed
retrospective." Society for the Propagation of the Gospel,
22 F. Cas.  at 767.
	Both this court and the Supreme Court have long utilized
Justice Story's definition of what constitutes a retroactive law.
See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 268-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55,
114 S. Ct. at 1498-99; First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282, 290 (1996) (and cases cited therein); Theodosis v.
Keeshin Motor Express Co., 341 Ill. App. 8 (1950). Unlike New
Hampshire, Illinois has never had an express constitutional
prohibition of retrospective laws. See Theodosis, 341 Ill. App. at
12. Nonetheless, our legislature in 1874 set forth a general
presumption against statutory retroactivity in our Statute on
Statutes (Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346 (1954), quoting
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 131, par. 4), which still appears on the
books today (see 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1998)). In the same manner
that Justice Story limited the reach of New Hampshire's
constitutional prohibition of "retrospective" laws to only those
laws with truly retroactive effect, this court has limited the reach
of Illinois' statutory presumption against retroactive laws to only
those laws with truly retroactive effect. This court did this by
creating a broad exception to the Statute on Statute's presumption
against statutory retroactivity for "nonvested rights." See Orlicki,
4 Ill. 2d  at 346-48.
	This "nonvested rights" exception to the general presumption
against the retroactive application of statutes remains in Illinois,
though, over time, it came to be treated in a line of cases as its
own general rule. See Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289-90 (and cases
cited therein). Stated as a general rule, or canon, this exception
came to provide that "a reviewing court should *** apply the law
as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would
interfere with a vested right." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290.
	First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282
(1996), typifies application of this third exception. In Armstead,
this court was presented with an issue of whether an amendment
to a statute would apply in that appeal. Plaintiff wanted to register
its underground storage tanks pursuant to the Gasoline Storage Act
(Act) (430 ILCS 15/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)) so that it would
qualify for monies for cleanup. The Act was amended during the
appeal. The amendment expressly stated that underground storage
tanks taken out of operation before January 2, 1974, could not be
registered. It was undisputed that plaintiff's tanks were taken out
of operation before that date and, thus, could not be registered if
the new amendment applied. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 284-87. The
amendment implicated plaintiff's due process rights.
	In determining whether the amendment would be applied on
appeal to the parties' existing controversy, this court in Armstead
defined retroactivity in words nearly identical to those used by
Justice Story nearly two centuries before:
			"The application of an amendment to an existing
controversy does not necessarily constitute retroactivity.
'[I]t is well settled that a statute is not retroactive just
because it relates to antecedent events, or because it draws
upon antecedent facts for its operation.' [Citation.]
Instead, this court has defined a retroactive change in the
law as ' "one that takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect
of transactions or considerations already past." '
[Citation.]" Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289-90.
The Armstead opinion further stated:
			"With this understanding of retroactivity, there is little
reason to focus on legislative intent. The legislature is
without constitutional authority to enact a law that is truly
retroactive, in that it impairs vested rights, even if that is
its expressed intention. [Citation.] Moreover, where an
amendment has no such retroactive impact, there is
simply no need to apply further rules of construction to
determine legislative intent because the amendment by
definition has only prospective application. Thus, a
reviewing court should simply apply the law as it exists at
the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere
with a vested right." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290.
The opinion determined that plaintiff did not have a vested right
to register its underground storage tanks under the preamended
Act. Since no vested right was at issue, the opinion held that the
amended Act would be applied to the appeal. Under the amended
Act, plaintiff did not have the right to register its tanks. Armstead,
171 Ill. 2d  at 290-93.
	In reviewing past decisions regarding when a statutory
amendment would be applied to an existing controversy on appeal,
the opinion stated that the jurisprudence was not consistent.
Sometimes this court would apply a "legislative intent approach"
to the question, and at other times would apply a "vested rights
approach" to the question. Under the vested rights approach, this
court did not look at legislative intent. Rather, this court simply
applied the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing
so would interfere with a vested right. The opinion defined a
"vested right" as an interest that is protected from interference by
our due process clause. The opinion then described the vested
rights approach as "the better approach." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at
289.
	There is no doubt that Armstead correctly held that the
amended Gasoline Storage Act applied in that appeal. Some
jurists, however, have understood the language in Armstead as
suggesting a categorical presumption in favor of application of all
new rules of law, with the sole exception being that "unless doing
so would interfere with a vested right" (Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at
290). In my view, Armstead was never intended as having a
universal application. Rather, Armstead was meant to apply only
to those cases raising due process concerns. See Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 289 (defining "vested right" as an interest that is protected by
our due process clause).
	It is true, as Armstead intimated, that the legislature lacks the
authority to enact a retrospective statute in violation of our due
process clause. This truth, though, was never intended to be
extended to mean that all other new statutes (i.e., those that do not
violate the due process clause if applied retroactively) shall be
applied on appeal, regardless of legislative intent. Such an
understanding of Armstead would turn the general presumption
against the retroactivity of statutes on its head. It would fail to
account for the myriad constitutional problems other than due
process that may arise from applying a statute retroactively.
Finally, it would conflict with the primary rule of statutory
construction that, in interpreting a statute, courts are to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Kraft, Inc.
v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).
V. Adoption of New Test
	The United States Supreme Court recently set forth the
following test for determining when a new federal statute will be
applied on appeal to pending cases.
			"When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after
the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's
proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is
no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however,
the statute contains no such express command, the court
must determine whether the new statute would have
retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a
party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. If the statute would
operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches
that it does not govern ***." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280,
128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at 1505.
See also Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. ___, ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347,
356-57, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 2003 (1999) (restating the same test).
	In the above test, the Supreme Court has successfully
harmonized the legislative intent approach with Justice Story's
definition of a truly retroactive law. First, the test reconfirms the
"traditional rule" that "new statutes do not apply retroactively
unless Congress expressly states that they do." (Emphasis in
original.) Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 237, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 354, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1461-62 (1995). In
reaffirming this principle for the modern era, the Court explained:
			"The presumption against statutory retroactivity had
special force in the era in which courts tended to view
legislative interference with property and contract rights
circumspectly. In this century, legislation has come to
supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and
circumspection has given way to greater deference to
legislative judgments. [Citations.] But while the
constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation
are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate
default rule. Because it accords with widely held
intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a
presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide
with legislative and public expectations. Requiring clear
intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive
application and determined that it is an acceptable price to
pay for the countervailing benefits. Such a requirement
allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental
policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of
statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving legislators
a predictable background rule against which to legislate."
(Emphasis in original.) Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 272-73, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 256-57, 114 S. Ct.  at 1500-01.
	Second, the test also continues to adhere to Justice Story's
definition of a retroactive law. The Court explained, "Even absent
specific legislative authorization, application of new statutes
passed after the events in suit is unquestionably proper in many
situations." (Emphasis added.) Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501. This means that, where the
legislature is silent as to the temporal reach of a statute, a court
must proceed to a determination of whether application of the new
statute would have a truly retroactive effect. If there is no truly
retroactive effect, then application of the new statute on appeal is
proper. Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-74, 275, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257,
258, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501, 1502. As examples of statutory changes
that have no truly retroactive effect, the Court mentioned those
changes concerning prospective relief and many, but not all,
changes to procedural rules. Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-74, 275 &
n.29, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257, 258 & n.29, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501, 1502
& n.29.
	The Court elaborated further on the subject of retroactivity:
			"A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely
because it is applied in a case arising from conduct
antedating the statute's enactment [citation] or upsets
expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must
ask whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.
The conclusion that a particular rule operates
'retroactively' comes at the end of a process of judgment
concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law
and the degree of connection between the operation of the
new rule and a relevant past event. Any test for
retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard
cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of
legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However,
retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have
'sound ... instinct[s],' [citation] and familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and
settled expectations offer sound guidance." Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 254-55, 114 S. Ct.  at
1499.
	This court should adopt the Supreme Court's test for
determining when a new or amended statute will be applied on
appeal to pending cases. Applying that test to the present case
yields the following analysis. First, we must determine whether the
General Assembly has expressly prescribed the statute's proper
reach; if the General Assembly has done so, there is no need to
resort to judicial default rules. See Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 261-62, 114 S. Ct.  at 1505. Here, with respect to the
insanity provisions at bar, the General Assembly expressly
prescribed that they were to take effect over six months after the
effective date of the enactment, i.e., on January 1, 1999. See Pub.
Act 90-593, §99 (eff. June 19, 1998). Because the General
Assembly was clear that it did not intend for a retroactive
application of these amendments to the insanity defense statute,
our inquiry ends. These amendments, therefore, shall not be
applied on retrial.
	For the above reasons, I agree that defendant is entitled to a
new trial in which he must be permitted to assert an insanity
defense in accordance with the insanity defense statute as it
existed before Public Act 89-404. I would not reach the ex post
facto issue.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, also specially concurring:
	I agree with the court that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
I also agree that on retrial any insanity defense raised by defendant
must be done so in accordance with section 6-2 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 as it existed prior to the amendments contained in
Public Act 89-404. I do so, however, for reasons other than those
stated in today's opinion.
	The record reveals that defendant sought to refute the State's
murder charges by asserting the affirmative defense of insanity,
i.e., he was not guilty because he was insane at the time of the
crimes. At trial, defendant challenged the constitutionality of
Public Act 89-404 in its entirety by claiming that the Act had been
passed in violation of the single subject rule contained in our state
constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d). Defendant's
motive in challenging the Act is not difficult to discern-section 15
of Public Act 89-404 amended the Illinois insanity provision to
make it more difficult for criminal defendants to establish the
defense. Specifically, the amendment (i) disallowed a claim of
insanity premised on the defendant's inability to conform conduct
to the requirements of the law, and (ii) increased the defendant's
burden of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, if Public Act 89-404 were to be
declared unconstitutional on single subject grounds, the law would
be void, and the changes it wrought to the insanity statute would
not apply to defendant. In essence, defendant argued that because
the Act was a nullity by virtue of its unconstitutional passage, he
should be tried under the former version of the law with its
broader definition of insanity and its less stringent burden of proof.
The circuit court rejected defendant's single subject rule challenge,
and eventually the jury rejected defendant's claim that he was
insane.
	On appeal, defendant raises a number of issues that he
believes mandate the reversal of his convictions. First among these
is his renewal of his single subject rule challenge to Public Act
89-404. In fact, as originally briefed by the parties, the issue was
simply whether Public Act 89-404 was enacted in contravention
of the single subject rule. Defendant argued in his brief that the
rule was violated because the Act contains discordant provisions
that have no legitimate relation to each other. The State, in its
brief, responded that all of the measures within the Act are
legitimately interrelated because each of the sections addresses
governmental matters that fall under the purview of the various
county State's Attorneys. If this court were to find that the Act
violated the single subject rule, the State alternatively asked that
this court hold that the Act's subsequent codification served to
close the window of time within which single subject rule
challenges can be made. In other words, the State invited this court
to adopt the so-called "codification rule," a rule adopted by the
judiciary in some states where the state constitution requires that
legislation relate to a single subject.
	On January 22, 1999, while this case was pending, we issued
our opinion in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). Reedy
presented this court with the very same arguments vis   vis Public
Act 89-404 and the single subject rule. After considering those
arguments, we declared Public Act 89-404 unconstitutional on the
ground that it was passed in violation of the single subject rule.
Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 11-12 (rejecting notion that single subject rule
met where all sections related to matters within control of county
State's Attorneys). Moreover, we refused to adopt the
"codification rule." See Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d  at 12-13 (declining to
adopt codification rule).
	In light of Reedy, Public Act 89-404 is invalid. This means,
as the court today correctly observes, that it is as " ' "though no
such law had ever been passed." ' " Slip op. at 2, quoting People
v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990), quoting People v.
Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 394 (1932). Defendant's trial was
conducted in accordance with the changes to the insanity defense
contained in Public Act 89-404 because those provisions were in
effect at the time defendant allegedly committed the crimes in
question.(2) We now know, however, that those provisions were
enacted in contravention of our state constitution. Due to the
constitutional infirmity, we must act as though those provisions
had never been passed. Based on these principles, we must
conclude that the insanity defense provisions applicable in the
present case are not the more stringent amendments of Public Act
89-404, but the more lenient provisions of the Criminal Code of
1961. Compare 720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 1996) with 720 ILCS 5/6-2
(West 1992). Thus, defendant, as it turns out, was correct all along
when he argued to the trial judge that the "tougher" insanity
provisions should not have been used due to the single subject
violation.
	Our decision in Reedy, however, was not the only event that
occurred during the pendency of this appeal. A new wrinkle
developed when our General Assembly sought to reenact the
amendments to the insanity defense statute that were contained in
Public Act 89-404. This legislative action took place on June 19,
1998, well after defendant had filed his opening brief in this court
on April 3, 1998. Although the State filed its responding brief on
October 30, 1998, and defendant filed a reply brief on December
14, 1998, none of these briefs that post-dated the passage of the
new legislation, Public Act 90-593, mentioned the General
Assembly's action. As a result, this court on its own motion
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs. Specifically, our
order, entered October 21, 1999, directed the parties to address
"whether Public Act 90-593 applies retroactively to appellant and,
if so, whether retroactive application of Public Act 90-593 would
violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
application of the law."
	In response to our query, the State asserted that because
Public Act 89-404 was void at the time of trial, the changes it
wrought to the insanity statute were inapplicable to defendant.
Moreover, the State conceded that the application of the newly
enacted Public Act 90-593 "to any retrial of Defendant on the
same charges would violate ex post facto principles." The
defendant agreed with the State, but posited that the constitutional
ex post facto question need not be addressed because Public Act
90-593 cannot be given a retroactive application. Defendant
maintained that the statute does not contain language, express or
implied, indicative of anything other than a legislative intent for
forward application of the amendments. He pointed out that
section 99 of Public Act 90-593 provides that "[t]his Act takes
effect upon becoming law [June 19, 1998], except that the
amendatory changes to Sec. 18-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961
take effect January 1, 1999." Pub. Act 90-593, §99 (eff. June 19,
1998). The excepted "amendatory changes" referred to in section
99 are the insanity defense provisions at issue in this case.
	In light of the above, the question we must resolve now is
which insanity provisions will apply at defendant's retrial. Our
task has been made easier because the State and the defendant both
agree that the law as it existed prior to the enactment of Public Act
89-404 applies. Despite the agreement of the parties, the court
today nevertheless undertakes an ex post facto analysis and
concludes that the ex post facto clause prohibits application of the
amendments to defendant on retrial. As an initial matter, I question
whether, in view of the fact that neither party argues that the
provisions are to be applied on retrial, the court's discussion is
warranted. In other words, should this court decide the
constitutional issue in the absence of a legal question disputed by
the parties? Notwithstanding the apparent absence of a legally
disputed issue in this case, the court reaches and considers the
constitutional ex post facto question without first determining
whether the amendments at issue even apply to conduct occurring
before their enactment. Stated differently, if the amendments do
not apply to the events in question in the first instance, then,
necessarily, no ex post facto problem would exist in this case.
Thus, if the court wishes to consider the matter further (despite the
State's concession), then the court's initial consideration should
rest upon the temporal reach of the amendments of question,
which is a question of statutory retroactivity.
	As I noted several months ago in my special concurrence in
Premier Property Management, Inc. v. Chavez, 191 Ill. 2d 101,
116-17 (2000) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by
McMorrow, J.), however, our case law on the issue of statutory
retroactivity is unclear. This is so because one line of cases in our
jurisprudence espouses a "vested rights" approach while another
line of cases embraces a "legislative intent" approach to the same
question. Compare First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), with People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24
(1997); see also Premier, 191 Ill. 2d  at 115-17 (Freeman, J.,
specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (discussing cases).
One could argue that the conflict between Armstead and
Digirolamo is reason enough for this court to address the
retroactivity issue in this case even in the face of the concession
made by the State. I have previously pointed out the dichotomy
between Armstead and Digirolamo and have noted that other
courts and jurists have commented upon it as well. Premier, 191 Ill. 2d  at 117-18 (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by
McMorrow, J.), citing White v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 295 Ill.
App. 3d 296, 299 (1998); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting). To resolve the
conflict, I suggested in Premier that this court follow the lead of
the United States Supreme Court in this area because that Court
had addressed a similar conflict within its own jurisprudence. See
Premier, 191 Ill. 2d  at 120 (Freeman, J., specially concurring,
joined by McMorrow, J.), quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
511 U.S. 244, 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 261-62, 114 S. Ct. 1483,
1505 (1994).(3) I continue to believe that our adoption of the federal
principles would go a long way in settling the question of which
rule will apply in the face of legislative silence on the issue. The
federal rule looks first to the language of the statute to determine
whether the legislative branch has defined the statute's temporal
reach. If it has, the court's inquiry ends. Premier, 191 Ill. 2d  at 121
(Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). As
I stated in Premier, the presumption against statutory retroactivity
discussed in Landgraf has no force in cases where the legislature's
intent is clear. See Premier, 191 Ill. 2d  at 121 (Freeman, J.,
concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). In the absence of any
express indication as to the statute's proper reach, Landgraf directs
a court to resort to a series of judicial default rules to determine
whether the new provision should have retroactive effect. See
Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 262, 114 S. Ct.  at
1505. ("[I]f the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring such a result").
	I strongly believe that the need for guidance from this court is
manifold and goes beyond mere confusion in our lower courts. I
note that prior to the United States Supreme Court's issuance of
Landgraf, one of the federal courts of appeal pointed out that the
federal judiciary's lack of a clear, definitive retroactivity rule
provided incentive for Congress to avoid explicitly addressing
whether a new statute will have prospective or retroactive effect.
See Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 966 F.2d 225, 227
(7th Cir. 1992) (noting that when Congress could not agree on
retroactivity, it "dumped the question into the judiciary's lap
without guidance," a "politically convenient solution" "facilitated
by the fact that the courts do not have a consistent rule for
deciding [retroactivity]" thereby allowing "[e]ither of the
contending factions in Congress" to "hope that statutory silence
would work in its favor"). Two years later, the Supreme Court
provided the needed definitiveness in Landgraf when it reaffirmed
the traditional presumption in favor of prospectivity. It is my hope
that this court will soon do likewise.
	In addition, by failing to clarify which analysis is to be
utilized in the face of legislative silence on the temporal operation
of a statute, i.e., Armstead's vested rights analysis or Digirolamo's
legislative intent approach, this court runs the risk of blurring the
line between vested rights concerns and ex post facto concerns, a
point on which the United States Supreme Court has specifically
warned state courts against. The Court spoke to this problem at
length in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960 (1981). At issue in that case was whether a Florida statute
that reduced the amount of "gain time" to be deducted from a
convicted prisoner's sentence was unconstitutional as applied to
those prisoners whose crimes were committed before the statute's
enactment. The Florida Supreme Court had previously held that
the statute could be given a retroactive application because the
" 'gain time' " allowance was " 'an act of grace rather than a
vested right and may be withdrawn, modified, or denied.' "
Weaver, 450 U.S.  at 28, 67 L. Ed. 2d  at 22, 101 S. Ct.  at 963,
quoting Harris v. Wainwright, 376 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1979). In
reversing the Florida Supreme Court, the Court noted the
following:
			"In using the concept of vested rights [citation], the
Florida court apparently drew on the test for evaluating
retrospective laws in a civil context. See 2 C. Sands,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction §41.06 (4th ed.
1973); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 692, 696 (1960); Smead, The Rule Against
Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775, 782 (1936).
Discussion of vested rights has seldom appeared in ex
post facto analysis, as in identifying whether the
challenged change is substantive rather than procedural.
[Citation.] When a court engages in ex post facto
analysis, which is concerned solely with whether a statute
assigns more disadvantageous criminal or penal
consequences to an act than did the law in place when the
act occurred, it is irrelevant whether the statutory change
touches any vested rights. Several state courts have
properly distinguished vested rights from ex post facto
concerns. [Citations.]." (Emphasis added.) Weaver, 450 U.S.  at 29 n.13, 67 L. Ed. 2d  at 23 n.13, 101 S. Ct.  at 964
n.13.
The Court stated that, in contrast to the Florida Supreme Court's
reasoning, "a law need not impair a 'vested right' to violate the ex
post facto prohibition." Weaver, 450 U.S.  at 29, 67 L. Ed. 2d  at 23,
101 S. Ct.  at 964. The court explained this at length:
			"Evaluating whether a right has vested is important for
claims under the Contracts or Due Process Clauses, which
solely protect pre-existing entitlements. [Citations.] The
presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is
not relevant, however, to the ex post facto prohibition,
which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe
than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be
punished occurred. Critical to relief under the Ex Post
Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less
punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental
restraint when the legislature increases punishment
beyond what was prescribed when the crime was
consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal
provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it
violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more
onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense."
Weaver, 450 U.S.  at 29-31, 67 L. Ed. 2d  at 23-24, 101 S. Ct.  at 964-65.
Weaver thus demonstrates that a judicial default rule premised
solely on vested rights will not always ensure against an ex post
facto violation. This case then, like Premier before it, presents us
with the opportunity to bring needed clarity to this area of the law.
The court, like it did in Premier, unfortunately lets this chance
pass.
	As Landgraf makes clear, when the question of a statute's
temporal reach is at issue, the court must begin with the language
contained in the statute. Likewise, in this case, the language of
Public Act 90-593 is important. This is particularly true in
criminal cases because section 4 of the construction of statutes act
(5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1998)) states that the law which was in effect
at the time of the commission of an offense is controlling in a
criminal proceeding. Thus, we should first look to the language of
Public Act 90-593 in order to ascertain whether the legislature
explicitly indicated that such was not to be the case. Public Act
90-593 does not contain any express statement that the General
Assembly intended for the act to have retroactive operation.
Indeed, a reading of the entire Act compels the opposite
conclusion. First of all, when the General Assembly wanted a
specific provision of Public Act 90-593 to apply to cases pending
on the effective date of the enactment, the General Assembly
specifically so stated. See, e.g., Pub. Act 90-593, §45 (eff. June
19, 1998). This occurred in only one instance throughout the entire
Act. Moreover, with respect to the insanity provisions at issue in
this case, the General Assembly explicitly stated that these were
to take effect six months after the effective date of the enactment.
Courts have held that the legislature's postponement of an
effective date is direct evidence that a retroactive application was
not intended. See, e.g., United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017,
1022-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that congressional intent against
retroactivity was manifested by its express delaying of the
effective date for six months); Ocean & Atmospheric Science, Inc.
v. Smyth Van Line, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Twiss v. State Department of Treasury, 124 N.J. 461, 468,
591 A.2d 913, 916 (1991); Jordan v. Westhill Central School
District, 42 A.D.2d 1043, 348 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1973); see also 2 N.
Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §41.04, at 352 (5th
ed. 1993). Given the lack of language expressly indicating that the
insanity provisions were to apply retroactively, along with the
explicit statement that the effective date of those provisions was
to be postponed, it seems clear that the legislature did not intend
the insanity provision to apply retroactively to crimes occurring
before the effective date. In other words, the plain language of the
statute cannot be construed to have anything other than a
prospective operation, which thereby precludes any possible ex
post facto problem in this case. 
	As the foregoing demonstrates, the language of Public Act
90-593 speaks definitively to the temporal reach of the Act. But
let us suppose that Public Act 90-593 lacked such a statement. In
other words, would the same result (prospective application of the
insanity provisions) obtain if the legislature had been silent on the
question? I believe it would. If the legislature had been silent on
the question, the traditional rule of prospectivity, discussed in
Landgraf, would operate because the changes to the insanity
defense statute are more than just procedural in nature. Given this
fact, I would not construe the statute to have retroactive reach
absent a clear expression from the legislature that such an
operation was in fact intended. I would reach this result based on
the following observations.
	As one commentator has explained, absent constitutional
restriction, "there is no question of the legislature's general power
to enact laws which operate retrospectively or retroactively." N.
Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §41.04, at 350 (5th
ed. 1993).(4) Courts have generally applied strict construction to
prevent retroactive operation in order to ensure that the statute
would not violate constitutional prohibitions. As explained in
Sutherland: "The principle explanation offered by courts is that the
statute must be construed to sustain its constitutionality and thus
prospective operation will be presumed where a retroactive
operation would produce invalidity." 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction §41.04, at 350 (5th ed. 1993). To this end,
the following principles have been recognized by the judiciary:
			"Where a statute affects inchoate rights or is remedial
in nature, it will be construed retroactively if the
legislative intent clearly indicates that retroactive
operation is intended. A remedial statute that does not
take away vested rights can operate retroactively in the
absence of language manifesting a contrary intent.
Likewise, where a new statute deals only with procedure,
prima facie it applies to all actions-to those which have
accrued or are pending and to future actions. It has been
held that there is a presumption that procedural statutes
apply retroactively. But steps already taken, including
pleadings, and all things done under the old law continue
effective, unless an intent to the contrary is plainly
manifested. Absent a clearly expressed legislative purpose
to the contrary, pending cases are only affected in relation
to future proceedings from the point reached when the
new law becomes operative." 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction §41.04, at 351 (5th ed. 1993).
Courts, therefore, will allow a retroactive law if such a law does
not contravene a preexisting contractual right or a vested right
enjoyed by the parties. See Landgraf, 511 U.S.  at 273-75, 128 L. Ed. 2d  at 257-58, 114 S. Ct.  at 1501-02 (giving examples of types
of laws that can be applied to conduct occurring before
enactment).
	As illustrated above, in civil cases, the only bar to retroactive
legislation is whether the change in law impairs preexisting
contractual rights or impairs vested rights protected from state
interference by the due process clause. In the criminal context,
however, the focus on vested rights does not always prevent an ex
post facto problem because, as mentioned previously, the United
States Supreme Court has warned that "a law need not impair a
'vested right' to violate the ex post facto prohibition." Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964
(1981). The Court has defined an ex post facto law as one that
"must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring
before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender
affected by it." Weaver, 450 U.S.  at 29, 67 L. Ed. 2d  at 23, 101 S. Ct.  at 964. In a thoughtful analysis, the Supreme Court of
California explained the concerns that arise in this area:
			"Beyond [the Weaver ex post facto definition], the
picture is much less clear. To begin with no guidance can
be found in the concept of vested rights ***. Somewhat
more helpful is the procedural-substantive distinction, but
even that traditional tool must be used with great care in
[the ex post facto context]: 'Changes which may be
designated as procedural do not, as a rule come within
the ex post facto doctrine, but that in itself is not the true
test.' [Citations.] Likewise, the United States Supreme
Court recently reiterated in Weaver that 'no ex post facto
violation occurs if the change effected is merely
procedural' [citation], but immediately qualified the rule
by the caveat that 'Alteration of a substantial right,
however, is not merely procedural, even if the statute
takes a seemingly procedural form.' [Citation.] This is
because 'it is the effect, not the form, of the law that
determines whether it is ex post facto.' [Citation.] Yet the
high court did not undertake to define what is a
'substantial right' for this purpose, less still to prepare an
inclusive list of such rights." (Emphasis added.) People v.
Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 667 P.2d 149, 153, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696 (1983).
In the footnote which accompanies the last line of the above
quotation, the California court noted that "[a] few kinds of
statutes, even though procedural in appearance, have consistently
been held subject to the ex post facto clause because of their
substantial effect on a defendant's rights: e.g., statutes deleting
elements of the crime, lowering the prosecution's burden of proof,
or impairing a defense." Smith, 34 Cal. 3d  at 260 n.5, 667 P.2d  at
153 n.5, 193 Cal. Rptr.  at 696 n.5. 
	These comments, in my view, demonstrate that caution must
be used in criminal cases when courts, in the face of legislative
silence on the temporal reach of statute, apply presumptions based
on the procedural-substantive distinction. The changes to the
insanity defense provisions cannot be considered merely
procedural due to the fact that if applied to this defendant they
would narrow the definition of insanity and in essence would
deprive defendant of an affirmative defense that existed at the time
he allegedly committed the offenses in question. Moreover, the
amendment raises the quantum of proof required of defendant
from the preponderance of the evidence to the more demanding
"clear and convincing standard." The recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Carmell v. Texas, No. 98-7540 (May
1, 2000) demonstrates that the Court has retained the long-held
recognition that "a law which changes the rules of evidence by
which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict" than was
previously required does in fact violate the ex post facto clause.
See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45-46, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30,
41, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2721 (1990) (citing favorably Duncan v.
Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 38 L. Ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570 (1894)).
Because I believe that the amendments at issue deal with
substantive and not procedural matters, I would presume a
prospective application of the amendments in this case had the
legislature not expressly indicated the temporal operation of the
amendments. To construe Public Act 90-593 in any other way
would call the statute's constitutionality into question. I note that
one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction is that courts will
discard an interpretation which would render a statute
unconstitutional. See People v. Williams, 119 Ill. 2d 24, 28 (1987).
Applying this rule of statutory construction here would therefore
require that this court presume a prospective application of the
amendment in the face of the legislature's silence on the question.
	This case represents the second case in the past six months in
which this court has had an opportunity to speak clearly on the
issue of statutory retroactivity. Once again, however, a majority
has chosen to let the opportunity pass even though several
members of the court have broached the topic in separate opinions.
It is my hope that a majority of this court will soon confront the
issue and resolve the questions that have arisen under our current
case law.
	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.
1.      1Public Act 89-404 did not change the other prong of the definition
of insanity, which permits a defendant to argue that he is not guilty
because he "lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1996).

2.     1Public Act 89-404 went into effect on August 20, 1995, and the
crimes at issue here occurred in July 1996.

3.      2This is the same test cited with approval by Justice Bilandic in his
separate opinion. See slip op. at 16-17 (Bilandic, J., specially
concurring).

4.      3For example, in this case, had the legislature stated explicitly that
the amendments in question were to be applied to conduct occurring
before the Act's passage, this court would have been duty-bound to give
effect to that intent to the extent that the Constitution does not bar such
an application. In such a case, the constitutional ex post facto issue
could not be avoided. In other words, the case would have presented the
court with a straightforward ex post facto question. As the case
currently stands, the question is one of statutory construction.