Title: James D. Lee v. Astoria Generating Company/Astoria Generating Company v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., Inc.

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 161  
James D. Lee,
           Respondent,
        v.
Astoria Generating Company, L.P., 
et al.,
           Appellants,
---------------------------------
Astoria Generating Company, L.P., 
et al.,
           Third-Party
        Plaintiffs-Appellants.
        v.
Elliott Turbomachinery Co., Inc., 
et al.,
           Third-Party
        Defendants-Appellants.
Barbara Goldberg, for appellants/third-party appellants 
Astoria Generating Company, L.P., Orion Power New York GP, Inc.,
Orion Power New York, L.P. and Orion Power New York LP, LLC.
Curt J. Schiner, for third-party appellants Elliott
Turbomachinery Co., Inc. and Elliott Company.
Paul T. Hofmann, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether
a barge containing an electricity generating turbine is a vessel
under 33 USC § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
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No. 161
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Compensation Act (LHWCA) and whether that provision preempts New
York State Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.  We hold that
the barge is a vessel and plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240(1) and
241(6) claims are preempted.  
The Gowanus Gas Turbines electric generation facility
in Brooklyn is a facility owned and operated by defendants
Astoria Generating Company, L.P., Orion Power New York, GP, Inc.,
Orion Power L.P. and Orion Power New York, LP, LLC
(Astoria/Orion).  The site, located on navigable waters in the
Gowanus Canal, is comprised, in part, of four barges that are
each 80 feet wide by 200 feet long that collectively house eight
individual gas turbine generating units.  While stationed, the
barges are afloat in the bay and connected to a power grid. 
Periodically, approximately once a decade, the barges are moved
to drydock for maintenance.  They are also capable of being moved
for the purpose of providing electric power at other locations.
Two of the barges had been so moved on at least one occasion.  
In 2000, Astoria/Orion hired third-party defendants
Elliott Turbomachinery, Co., Inc. and Elliott Company (Elliott),
a company based in Pennsylvania, to perform an overhaul of the
turbines at the Gowanus facility.  This involved disassembling
the entire turbine, shipping parts of it back to Elliott's shop
in Pennsylvania for restoration or replacement, and returning it
to the site for Elliott's millwrights to reassemble.  In 2001,
plaintiff, a millwright employed by Elliott, injured his back
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No. 161
1  "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of
this title shall be exclusive in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee" (33 USC § 905[a]).  Section 904
provides that "[e]very employer shall be liable for and shall
secure the payment to his employees of the compensation payable
under sections 907, 908 and 909 of this title."  
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while performing work on a turbine on barge number one at the
facility.  According to plaintiff, he was ordered by his
supervisor to enter the turbine's exhaust well through a hatch to
weld some fixtures inside.  To reach the location of the repair,
plaintiff used a ladder to access the exhaust well and entered
the hatch.  From there, he was to climb down the base of the
exhaust well, but his feet slipped from under him and he fell
eight feet to the base of the exhaust well, injuring his back.   
After the accident, plaintiff claimed and was awarded
benefits under the LHWCA, which "provides workers' compensation
to land-based maritime employees" (Stewart v Dutra Constr. Co.,
543 US 481, 488 [2005]).  He also commenced this state court
action against Astoria/Orion, asserting Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1)
and 241(6) claims and common law negligence claims. 
Astoria/Orion subsequently filed a third-party complaint against
Elliott seeking indemnification.  
Elliott moved for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint and third-party complaint, arguing, among other things,
that 33 USC § 905(a)1 precludes lawsuits against it as an
employer of the injured worker and that plaintiff's state claims
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No. 161
2   "In the event of injury to a person covered under this
chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person,
or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason
thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party
. . . and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void . . . The remedy provided in this
subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the
vessel except remedies available under this chapter" (33 USC §
905[b]). 
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were preempted by section 905(b)2 and federal maritime law.  The
barge owners cross-moved for summary judgment, also arguing that
the plaintiff's claims were preempted.  In opposition, plaintiff
argued that the claims were not preempted because (1) the barge
did not constitute a vessel under section 905(b) and (2) maritime
jurisdiction did not apply to his claims against the barge
owners.    
Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the
complaint and third-party complaint.  It concluded, among other
things, that section 905 of the LHWCA preempted the Labor Law
240(1) and 241(6) claims.  The court adopted the Department of
Labor's determination that plaintiff is a covered employee under
the LHWCA and concluded the barge is a vessel under recent
federal case law.  It also dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 200
and common law negligence claims. 
The Appellate Division "reversed" the Supreme Court
order, reinstated plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6)
claims and granted summary judgment as to the Labor Law § 240(1)
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No. 161
3  It appears that the Appellate Division affirmed the
dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common law
negligence claims.  Astoria/Orion did not appeal the denial of
that part of their summary judgment motion that sought relief on
the third-party complaint. 
4  In Perini North River, the Supreme Court explained the
history of the LHWCA.  Prior to 1972, the LHWCA applied only to
injuries that occurred on navigable waters (Perini North River,
459 US at 313).  In 1972, Congress expanded the coverage landward
and created a scope of persons covered, which became the situs
and status test (id. at 317-318).  The Perini North River Court
then held that "when a worker is injured on the actual navigable
waters in the course of his employment on those waters, he
satisfies the status requirement . . . and is covered under the
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claim in plaintiff's favor.3  It held that the Labor Law claims
are not precluded by the LHWCA because the barge is not a vessel. 
It further stated, "even if the barge were a vessel, federal
maritime jurisdiction would not preempt these claims" (55 AD3d
124, 126 [1st Dept 2008]).  The Appellate Division granted
Astoria/Orion and Elliott leave to appeal and certified the
following question to this Court:  "Was the order of this Court,
which reversed the order of Supreme Court, properly made?"  We
now reverse and answer the certified question in the negative. 
         The LHWCA provides compensation to workers injured on
navigable waters of the United States in the course of their
employment (Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
United States Department of Labor v Perini North River Associates
459 US 297, 325 [1983]; see Chandris, Inc. v Latsis, 515 US 347,
360 [1995]).4  It operates as a no-fault workers' compensation
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No. 161
LHWCA (id. at 324).  The Court noted that "Congress was concerned
with injuries on land, and assumed that injuries occurring on the
actual navigable waters were covered, and would remain covered"
(id. at 319).    
5  The dissent's reliance upon Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.
v City of Cleveland (409 US 249 [1972]) and McLaurin v Noble
Drilling, Inc. (529 F3d 285 [5th Cir 2008]) is misplaced --
neither of those cases involved claims traditionally covered
under the LHWCA.  The Supreme Court created the maritime tort
inquiry in Executive Jet.  There, the Court "concluded that
maritime locality alone is not a sufficient predicate for
admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases" (409 US at 261). 
In McLaurin, the Fifth Circuit continued the use of such inquiry
in the context of a shipyard accident.  The court, noting that
"[i]njury on navigable waters is a sine qua non of the maritime
tort, . . . held that a maritime worker injured on dry land
cannot sustain a cognizable injury under § 905(b) of the LHWCA"
(529 F3d at 290 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
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scheme for eligible workers and precludes recovery of damages
against their employer (33 USC § 905[a]).  The LHWCA also permits
an injured employee to recover damages against a third person
other than his or her employer (33 USC § 933[a]).  Section 905(b)
of the LHWCA, consistent with § 933(a), permits an injured person
covered under the Act to bring an action in negligence against a
vessel, but provides that such remedy "shall be exclusive of all
remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this
chapter."  Contrary to the dissent's position, one need not
conclude that plaintiff is entitled to assert a maritime tort
claim to invoke section 905(b) where the worker was injured on
navigable waters (see e.g. Stewart, 543 US 481 [discussing the
application of section 905(b) without any maritime tort
inquiry]).5  Section 905(b) of the LHWCA applies to the "injury
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No. 161
     
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of a person covered under this chapter" where the liability of a
vessel is at issue.  Thus, because the LHWCA covers plaintiff's
injury upon navigable waters, whether section 905(b) applies in
this case hinges upon whether the structure upon which plaintiff
was injured is a vessel.  Although the LHWCA does not define
"vessel," the United States Supreme Court has provided detailed
guidance concerning the definition and characteristics of a
vessel, holding that the statutory definition of the term in 1
USC § 3 is applicable in this context.  
A "'vessel' includes every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on water" (Stewart v Dutra Construction
Company, 543 US 481, 489 [2005], quoting 1 USC § 3).  Structures
temporarily stationed in a particular location maintain their
status as vessels.  However, floating structures that are "not
practically capable of being used as a means of transportation"
do not qualify as vessels (id. at 493 [internal quotation marks
and citation omitted]).  Such floating structures (non-vessels)
are permanently fixed or moored "to shore or resting on the ocean
floor" (id. at 493-494).  
Here, the barge, located on navigable waters in the
Gowanus Bay, is a vessel within the LHWCA.  The barges owned by
Astoria/Orion have been tugged on water approximately once a
decade to a maintenance station and, at least once, to provide
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No. 161
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energy to another part of New York City in an emergency.  Thus,
the barge at issue is practically capable of being used as a
means of transportation on water.  Although the barge is
stationed at the Gowanus facility, because it is not permanently
anchored or moored, it has not lost its status as a vessel. 
Accordingly, the barge is a vessel under section 905(b).
The remaining issue is whether section 905(b) preempts
plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.  It is well
recognized that the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const., art VI, cl.2)
"'may entail pre-emption of state law either by express
provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and
state law'" (Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 356 [2006],
quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]).  Congress'
intent to preempt "may be explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. 
In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is
pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law
(Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516 [1992]).  State
law will not "be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" (New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 US at 655).  
Here, the LHWCA clearly states in section 905(b) that
an action in negligence may be brought against a vessel and that
such remedy "shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the
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No. 161
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vessel except remedies available under this chapter" (33 USC §
905[b]).  Congress clearly intends that actions maintained
against a vessel be brought solely within the confines of the
LHWCA and nowhere in the Act does it permit strict liability
claims, as provided in Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). 
Therefore, section 905(b) of the LHWCA expressly preempts
plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims.  Contrary to
the Appellate Division's alternative holding, Cammon v City of
New York (95 NY2d 583 [2000]) does not support the premise that
New York's Labor Law is not preempted by section 905(b).  Cammon 
involved an injured worker receiving benefits under the LHWCA and
a defendant landowner.  Thus, this case did not involve section
905(b), "Negligence of vessel," as set forth in the LHWCA.  While
it is true that Federal maritime law does not generally supersede
state law (see Cammon, 95 NY2d at 587), in this case, where
Congress explicitly limited claims against the vessel owner to
that Federal Act, state law claims are preempted.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, the order of Supreme Court reinstated
and the certified question answered in the negative.  
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Lee v Astoria Generating Co., L.P.
No. 161 
CIPARICK, J.(dissenting) :
 Because plaintiff cannot assert a maritime tort claim
for vessel negligence against the vessel owner, section 905 (b)
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act does not
apply to preempt his state law claims.  Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.  
The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA or the Act) (33 USC 901 et seq.) establishes workers'
compensation benefits to "land-based maritime workers" (Stewart v
Dutra Constr. Co., 543 US 481, 488 [2005]; see also McLaurin v
Noble Drilling (US),Inc., 529 F3d 285, 289 [5th Cir 2008]). 
Under the LHWCA, qualified employees injured during the course of
their employment may, regardless of fault, recover workers'
compensation benefits from their employers (see 33 USC 904).  An
injured employee may also seek to recover against a vessel owner
where the negligence of the vessel caused his or her injuries
(see 33 USC 905 [b]).  Specifically, section 905 (b) of the LHWCA
provides, 
"In the event of injury to a person covered
under [the LHWCA] caused by the negligence of
a vessel, then such person, or anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages by
reason thereof, may bring an action against
such vessel as a third party in accordance
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No. 161
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with the provisions of section 933 of this
title, and the employer shall not be liable
to the vessel for such damages directly or
indirectly and any agreements or warranties
to the contrary shall be void . . .  The
liability of the vessel under this subsection
shall not be based upon the warranty of
seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time
the injury occurred.  The remedy provided in
this subsection shall be exclusive of all
other remedies against the vessel except
remedies available under this chapter"
(emphasis added).  
If there is no remedy provided by section 905 (b),
there is no "exclusive remedy" that preempts state law actions.
Section 905 (b) does not create a new statutory negligence cause
of action or maritime tort, nor does it extend or create new
admiralty jurisdiction (see Richendollar Diamond M Drilling Co.,
819 F2d 124, 128 [5th Cir 1987]).  Rather, it merely preserves an
injured employee's right to recover for vessel negligence under
existing maritime law (see Kerr-McGee Corp. v Ma-Ju Mar. Servs.,
Inc., 830 F2d 1332, 1339 [5th Cir 1987]; see also Matter of
Donjon Mar. Co., 2008 WL 3153721 [SD NY 2008]).  If a plaintiff
cannot state a cause of action for a maritime tort, section 905
(b) does not provide any remedy and so does not apply to preempt
state law causes of action against vessel owners (see McLaurin,
529 F3d at 289; see also Robertson v Arco Oil & Gas Co., 766 F
Supp 535, 537-538 [WD La 1991] [where the plaintiff's claim fell
within admiralty jurisdictions, "[h]is maritime law remedy
against the vessel owner . . . consist[ed] of a section 905 [b]
suit for negligence]).  Thus, to determine whether a plaintiff's
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No. 161
1  This Court has a history of preserving state claims where
doing so is not inconsistent with the federal scheme (see e.g.
Matter of People v Applied Card Sys., Inc., 11 NY3d 105 [2008];
Arons v Jutkowitz, 9 NY3d 393 [2007]).  As the Appellate Division
noted, this is particularly true in cases involving the health
and safety of our workers (see e.g. Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6
NY3d 338 [2006]; Cammon v City of New York, 95 NY2d 583 [2000]),
a matter which has historically been within the police powers of
the state.  
2  The majority conflates the issue of workers' compensation
benefits under the Act with the potential maritime tort remedy
under the Act (see majority op, at 5-6).  As to the former, a
covered worker need only sustain some injury on the navigable
waters to satisfy the status test for workers' compensation
benefits (see Director, Off. of Workers' Compensation Programs,
United States Dept. of Labor v Perini N. River Assocs., 459 US
297, 324 [1983]).  As to the latter -- the tort claim -- the
alleged wrong must "bear[] a significant relationship to a
traditional maritime activity" (Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v City
of Cleveland, 409 US 249, 268 [1972]).   The federal courts have
recently used the Exec. Jet test to ascertain whether a plaintiff
can assert a section 905 (b) vessel negligence claim (see e.g.
McLaurin, 529 F3d at 289).  
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state claims are preempted by the "exclusive remedy" language of
section 905 (b), a court must first ascertain whether the
plaintiff can state a maritime tort claim for vessel negligence
against the vessel owner.1
A tort claim qualifies as a "maritime tort" and falls
under the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction where the injury
satisfies a maritime situs/status test (see Richendollar, 819 F2d
at 127).2  That is, "where the wrong (1) took place on navigable
waters ('situs') and (2) 'bear[s] a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity' ('status')," the alleged wrong may
be susceptible to suit under a maritime tort cause of action
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No. 161
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(Keene Corp. v United States, 700 F2d 836, 843 [2d Cir 1983],
quoting Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v City of Cleveland, 409 US 249,
268 [1972]).  In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. (513 US 527 [1995]), the Supreme Court explained the
status test, or "connection" test, as having two components: 
"The connection test raises two issues.  A
court, first, must 'assess the general
features of the type of incident involved,'
to determine whether the incident has 'a
potentially disruptive impact on maritime
commerce.'  Second, a court must determine
whether 'the general character' of the
'activity giving rise to the incident' shows
a 'substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity.'"
(id. at 534 [internal citations omitted], quoting Sisson v Ruby,
497 US 358, 363, 364 n2, 365 [1990]).  The federal courts have
considered various factors to determining whether an alleged
wrong bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity, including: 
"1) the functions and roles of the parties;
2) the types of vehicles and
instrumentalities; 3) the causation and type
of injury; 4) traditional concepts of the
role of admiralty law; 5) the impact of the
event on maritime shipping and commerce;   
6) the desirability of a uniform national
rule to apply to such matters, and 7) the
need for admiralty 'expertise' in the trial
and decision of the case"
 
(Ciolino v Sciortino Corp., 721 F Supp 1491, 1493 [D Mass 1989],
citing Shea v Rev-Lyn Contr. Corp., 868 F2d 515, 517-518 [1st Cir
1989], Drake v Raymark Indus., Inc., 772 F2d 1007 [1st Cir 1985],
Molett v Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F2d 1419, 1426 [5th Cir 1987],
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No. 161
3 Stewart, although instructive for limited purposes here,
is distinguishable on its facts.  In that case, the plaintiff, a
marine engineer, was injured when a dredge collided with a vessel
(a scow) upon navigable waters (see 543 US at 485).  The
plaintiff had been hired by the dredge's owner "to maintain the
mechanical systems" of the dredge (id.).  The Supreme Court
observed that the "question in th[e] case [was] whether a dredge
is a 'vessel' under § 2 (3) (G) of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act" (id. at 484).  Notably, after
answering that narrow question, the Court remitted the matter for
further proceedings.             
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Oman v Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F2d 224, 230 [4th Cir 1985];
Harville v Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 731 F2d 775, 779-87 [11th
Cir 1984], and Kelly v Smith, 485 F2d 520, 525 [5th Cir 1973]). 
As stated by the majority opinion, here, plaintiff's
injury occurred in navigable waters on a "vessel," as the Supreme
Court recently broadly defined that term in Stewart (543 US at
495).3  Thus, the "situs" test for a maritime tort sounding in
negligence is satisfied (see Exec. Jet Aviation, 409 US at 268). 
However, the status test is not satisfied because plaintiff's
activity on defendant's vessel bore no cognizable relationship to
maritime activity or commerce.  As a result, section 905 (b)
cannot apply to preempt plaintiff's state law claims against the
vessel owner (see e.g. McLaurin, 529 F3d at 291-292).
Plaintiff was employed by third-party defendant Elliot
as a millwright to perform substantial mechanical work on gas
turbine electrical generating units owned by defendant/third-
party plaintiff.  These generating units happened to be housed on
defendant's barges, i.e., vessels; however, other than their
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No. 161
4  While Cammon v City of New York does not form the basis
for this dissent, the majority is mistaken to reject that case
out-of-hand as distinguishable.  To be sure, Cammon involved an
action by an employee against a property owner -- but so does
this case.  During an earlier hearing to determine plaintiff's
eligibility for LHWCA workers' compensation benefits, the
testimony of Astoria/Orion's asset manager, Liam Baker, indicated 
that, at a minimum, Astoria/Orion owned the electrical lines
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incidental location upon navigable waters, no other features of
the gas turbine electrical generating units -- nor of plaintiff's
employment working on those units -- bore any relation to a
traditional maritime activity or to maritime commerce (see Jerome
B. Grubart, Inc., 513 US at 534).  Indeed, the gas turbines are
part of a power-generating operation that includes land-based
structures adjacent to the barge turbines.  Electricity generated
by the barge turbines are conveyed over power lines, which are
land-based, for transmission to energy consumers.  
In Matter of Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc. v
City of New York (44 NY2d 536 [1978]), we determined that, for
the purposes of taxation, the barges were properly "classified as
structures affixed to the land on which is situated the
land-based distribution system to which [the barges] are
physically connected and integrally related," and, as such, could
be taxed as real property rather than personal property (id. at
542).  A structure so entwined with a land-based energy
production operation that we saw fit to permit its taxation as
real property plainly has no relation to any traditional maritime
activity.4  
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No. 161
connecting the barges to Consolidated Edison's substation, and
implied that Astoria/Orion owned the piers to which the barges
were moored.  Moreover, notably, when asked to describe the
distance between Consolidated Edison's substation and
Astoria/Orion's generating barges, Baker observed that substation
abutted the "property line" of Astoria/Orion, approximately 100
yards from the barges.  Thus, here, plaintiff was injured while
working on a barge attached to Astoria/Orion's land, and, as
noted, we have already determined -- albeit for tax purposes --
that the barges are taxable as real property.  In short,
plaintiff was injured while working on the vessel portion of
Astoria/Orion's integrated power generating station.  In my view,
the holding of Cammon would apply with equal force here, and
bears repeating: "State application of strict liability here will
not 'unduly interfere[] with the federal interest in maintaining
the free flow of maritime commerce' . . . Local regulations that
do not affect vessel operations, but rather govern liability with
respect to landowners and contractors within the State, have no
extraterritorial effect" (95 NY2d at 589, citing American
Dredging Co. v Miller, 510 US 443, 458 [1994] [Souter, J.,
concurring]). 
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That plaintiff recovered workers' compensation benefits
under the LHWCA is of no import, inasmuch as the question whether
plaintiff can recover no-fault benefits under the act is distinct
from the question whether he can recover in maritime tort for
vessel negligence under section 905 (b).  Significantly, section
933 (a) of the LHWCA expressly recognizes that an employee
covered by the LHWCA may have state law remedies against third
parties other than his or her employer (see McLaurin, 529 F3d at
292).  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit explained in McLaurin, 
"[s]ection 933 specifically forbids a claim
against the employer or a person in his
employ, leaving [section] 904 [workers'
compensation claims] as the only avenue of
recovery against the employer or a negligent
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No. 161
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coworker  . . . Notably, unlike employers,
vessel owners are not mentioned in [section]
933, so a maritime worker may attempt to
recover against a vessel owner for vessel
negligence under [section] 905 (b) [or]
against a vessel owner as a third-party
tortfeasor under [section] 933"
 
(529 F3d at 292, quoting 33 USC § 933 [quotation marks and
original alterations omitted]). 
The plain language of section 905 (b) makes recovery
under that section the "exclusive remedy" where an injured
employee has a cause of action for vessel negligence (33 USC 905
[b]).  However, where, as here, the injured employee has no cause
of action for vessel negligence under maritime law, section 933
of the LHWCA expressly recognizes and preserves state law causes
of actions against third parties, including vessel owners who are
not also employers.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate
Division reinstating plaintiff's Labor Law claims against the
owner of the barges, Astoria-Orion, and granting plaintiff
partial summary judgment on the 240 (1) claim.  
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, order of Supreme Court, New York
County, reinstated and certified question answered in the
negative.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith
and Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to affirm
in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
Decided November 23, 2009