Title: Cary v. ONEOK, Inc.

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

Cary v. ONEOK, Inc.  Cary v. ONEOK, Inc. 1997 OK 60 940 P.2d 201 68 OBJ 1635 Case Number: 81356, 81655 Decided: 05/06/1997 Modified: 05/07/1997 Supreme Court of Oklahoma ERIC CARY, a minor, by and through his mother and next friend LORIE S. CARY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ONEOK, INC., Defendant-Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. 3 ¶0 Certiorari granted to review the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion which affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the disfigured minor plaintiff from the courtroom during liability phase of bifurcated trial. We hold that a party may not be excluded based solely on his physical appearance. Judgment of District Court reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS Tom King, KING, ROBERTS & BEELER, Michael D. Lewis, Gary Peterson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant, Eric Cary, D. Lynn Babb, G. Calvin Sharpe, PIERCE, COUCH, HENDRICKSON, BAYSINGER & GREEN, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee, ONEOK, Inc. SUMMERS, V.C.J.: [940 P.2d 202] ¶1 The question is whether it was error to exclude a badly burned child from a portion of his damage suit trial because of his physical appearance. We hold that it was, and reverse. ¶2 Eric Cary is a boy who was severely burned when the water heater in the garage of his home exploded. He was trapped in the garage until rescued by his mother, and suffers from permanent disfigurement. At the time of the incident he was almost three years old. His mother brought this suit on his behalf ¶3 Prior to trial Oneok presented a motion for bifurcation, asking that the liability phase and the damage phase each be tried separately. Oneok also asked that Eric, then six and one-half years old, be kept out of the court room for the liability phase, fearing that the jury would be sympathetic to plaintiff because of his disfigurement. The trial court granted the bifurcation and then ordered that Eric be excluded from the liability portion of his trial. After the trial court so ruled Oneok's counsel suggested that he be allowed to inquire of the mother as to whether the child has no specific recollection of the incident, to be "of some benefit to the jury as to explain why the child is not here because of his tender years." But the court settled that request with these words: "[T]hat's not the reason he's not here. He's not here because he's scarred so badly I think it would be unfairly prejudicial." Plaintiff's counsel objected to the ruling. ¶4 After a trial on the issue of liability the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We have granted [940 P.2d 203] certiorari and now reverse.¶5 Plaintiff asserts that the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2, § 63, requires that a party be permitted to attend his own civil trial. He continues by pointing out that children younger than six have been permitted to testify in trials. In this case plaintiff was the only eye witness to the incident. Regardless of whether he was to testify, Eric's counsel asserts that his presence would be of aid to his attorney by showing the jury the actual person whose life has been affected. He asserts that a jury may respond differently when faced with the person who suffered the harm. ¶6 Oneok asserts that Eric's appearance would serve no legitimate purpose, and would inflame the passions of the jury. Oneok argues that the Oklahoma Constitution does not guarantee an individual's right to be present during the trial of his or her case. It contends that Lorie Cary's presence during the trial protected the injured child's rights, as she was his mother and legal representative. Oneok also surmises that Eric would have been of no assistance at trial due to his young age at the time of the incident and his cloudy recollection of the events. ¶7 This Court has never been faced with this precise issue. We have said, however, that "a party to an action should have a reasonable opportunity to attend its trial." Goff v. Goff, 396 P.2d 513 , 517 (Okla.1964); Jones v. Nicoma Park Radio & Television Serv., 408 P.2d 770 , 774 (Okla. 1965). Both Goff and Jones involved parties who voluntarily absented themselves from the proceedings, and we held that it was not error for the trial to be held in their absence. ¶6 Oneok asserts that Eric's appearance would serve no legitimate purpose, and would inflame the passions of the jury. Oneok argues that the Oklahoma Constitution does not guarantee an individual's right to be present during the trial of his or her case. It contends that Lorie Cary's presence during the trial protected the injured child's rights, as she was his mother and legal representative. Oneok also surmises that Eric would have been of no assistance at trial due to his young age at the time of the incident and his cloudy recollection of the events. ¶7 This Court has never been faced with this precise issue. We have said, however, that "a party to an action should have a reasonable opportunity to attend its trial." Goff v. Goff, 396 P.2d 513 , 517 (Okla.1964); Jones v. Nicoma Park Radio & Television Serv., 408 P.2d 770 , 774 (Okla. 1965). Both Goff and Jones involved parties who voluntarily absented themselves from the proceedings, and we held that it was not error for the trial to be held in their absence. ¶8 Courts differ in their approach to this question. Some courts hold that the right to attend trial is an absolute right, arising out of state or federal constitutional provisions. Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 589 A.2d 363 (Conn. 1991)( state constitutional right to jury trial mandated that party be allowed to be present during trial); Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1978)( the constitutional right to jury trial carries with it the right to be physically present during the trial regardless of whether you are adequately represented by counsel); In re Rosemary Watson, 153 Cal. Rpt.151 (Cal.Ct.App. 1979)(fundamental due process right to be present during a commitment proceeding which could result in the loss of substantial personal liberty). ¶9 In Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985), the Circuit Court observed that although the Due Process clause does not give a civil litigant the absolute right to be present personally during his trial, due process is offended if he is excluded arbitrarily or in the absence of extreme circumstances. It went on to conclude that a plaintiff's physical appearance alone does not warrant his expulsion. Id. At 215. ¶10 Others, without relying on constitutional provisions, hold that absent an overwhelming reason to the contrary, a party has a right to attend the trial of his lawsuit. Mason v. Moore, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1996)(injured infant was entitled to be present during trial absent [940 P.2d 204] an express waiver or unusual circumstances, and reliance on stereotypical assumption that jury will be prejudiced is insufficient); Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1983) aff'd 727 F.2d 1100 (1983)(severely injured passenger was entitled to be present at the liability phase of his trial); Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952)(woman on a stretcher had a right to be present at her trial). ¶11 It appears to be universally settled that a party's disruptive behavior is a legitimate basis for excluding the litigant. Illinois v. Allen, 398 U.S. 915 (1970)(Criminal defendant may be excluded because of disruptive behavior); Kimith v. State, 546 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Morley v. Superior Court of Arizona, 639 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981). Closer to our case here, many jurisdictions have agreed that exclusion of a party is permissible if prejudice will occur by the party's physical appearance and the party's condition is such that he or she cannot comprehend the proceedings and aid counsel in the representation. Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, supra (due process would be otherwise offended); Morley v. Superior Court of Arizona, 639 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981); Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn.1964)(party who was incapable of understanding proceedings due to his injury was properly excluded); Reems v. St. Josephs Hosp. & Health Center, 536 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 1995)(child injured at birth was properly excluded because child could not assist in or understand proceedings); Caputo v. Joseph J. Sarcona Trucking Co., 611 N.Y.S.2d 655 (S.Ct. 1994)(trial court properly excluded a party that was mentally disabled and could not assist counsel). ¶12 Regardless of their approach, courts agree on two points: (1) The ideals behind due process and a fair trial permit a party to be present in the courtroom absent extreme conditions and (2) the possibility of juror sympathy alone is not juror prejudice, and is insufficient to exclude a party from the courtroom. Helminski, 766 F.2d at 216; Morley, 638 P.2d at 1334; Reems, 536 N.W.2d at 669. It also appears that a party's physical condition alone does not warrant exclusion. Helminski, 766 F.2d at 214. ¶13 Oklahoma has never held, nor do we so hold here, that a party's right to be present in the courtroom is absolute. We can contemplate situations in which the disruptive behavior of a party would necessitate the party's exclusion from the courtroom, and a trial may proceed after a party has voluntarily waived the right to be present. Goff, 396 P.2d at 517. However, we find no authority for the proposition that a party may be excluded solely by reason of his disfigurement. Absent a voluntary waiver we hold that only in the case of extreme circumstances may a party be excluded from the proceedings. See Mason v. Moore, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 196; Marks, 562 F. Supp. at 768. Exclusion of a party is disfavored. The party seeking exclusion must bear the burden of showing that only through exclusion can a fair trial be obtained. Helminski. supra at 216. ¶14 A party's physical appearance cannot be the sole basis for exclusion from the courtroom, and does not amount to an "extreme circumstance" permitting exclusion. We agree with the Florida Supreme Court which stated: One who institutes an action is entitled to be present when it is tried. That, we think, is a right that should not be tempered by the physical condition of the litigant. It would be strange, indeed, to promulgate a rule that a plaintiff's right to appear at his own trial would depend on his personal attractiveness, or that he could be excluded from the court room if he happened to be unsightly from injuries which he was trying to prove the defendant negligently caused. Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones ¶15 Rather than assuming the jury will be prejudiced by a physically scarred plaintiff, this holding aligns us with those courts which repose trust in the jury. A jury will generally follow the court's instructions and decide a case based on the law presented. Helminski, 766 F.2d at 216. "In our view where, as here, the movant relies solely on a stereotypical assumption that a party's disability will prejudice the jury, there are insufficient grounds for excluding that party from the trial." Mason, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 196. ¶16 We agree that a fundamental cornerstone of due process is an impartial jury. Agee v. Gant, 412 P.2d 155 , 162 (Okla. 1966). We do not agree with Oneok's assumption that the likelihood of jury sympathy is the equivalent of prejudice, and amounts to a denial of due process. A juror's sympathetic feeling toward a party does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the jury will disregard the law to reach a verdict based on sympathy alone. ¶17 Helminski ¶18 There may need to be a re-examination of those cases, including Helminski, which hold that a disfigured plaintiff may be excluded if he or she cannot aid the attorney or comprehend the proceedings. These cases were decided before the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a law that specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of a physical or mental handicap. Title 42 U.S.C. §12132 (1990).5 Those cases which followed this reasoning and were decided after the ADA's enactment did not address the issue.6 ¶19 Even were we to conclude that the Helminski standard survived the ADA, and was the preferable approach, we find that it has not been satisfied in this case. The record is far from clear that Eric could not meaningfully comprehend what was going on. He was six and one-half years old at the time of trial, and there is no allegation of a mental handicap which would have precluded him from comprehending the basic events of the trial as they occurred. The defendant has the burden of showing grounds for exclusion. ¶20 Other courts have permitted young injured children who were parties to be present in the courtroom despite that fact that they could not fully comprehend the proceedings. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945)(three-year-old child permitted in courtroom); Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. La. 1974)(disfigured child injured by heater burns permitted to remain in courtroom). While the comprehension of a child might be less than that of an adult, a child Eric's age likely has some understanding of the basic events of a trial as they occur, and there is nothing in the record to the contrary. [940 P.2d 206] ¶21 Oneok also failed to show that Eric Cary would have been of no assistance to his attorney. Oneok admits that the child has a recollection of the incident, even though his mother says that recollection has changed as time passed. Assistance to an attorney does not necessitate that the party be there to testify. The importance of the physical presence of a party cannot be anticipated, as developments may occur at trial that were unplanned by the attorney. The attorney "cannot know all that his client knows. Oftentimes it is essential for the proper presentation of the case to have the client at hand ready to prompt the cross-examiner and to respond to his inquiries." Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 589 A.2d 363 (Conn. 1991). Again, the defendant who would exclude a party bears the burden of persuasion. ¶22 The Helminski court spelled out under what circumstances a court could, in its discretion, exclude a disabled plaintiff, and concluded that the lower court committed error in excluding him for reasons of physical appearance alone. It went on to hold the error harmless, and affirmed the judgment for the defendant. In that case, however, the disabled child was developmentally retarded from birth, was autistic, was not toilet trained, could not speak, and required 24-hour a day care. Eric, as far as we can tell from the record, was a normal six and one-half year old boy but for his burns and scars. To extend the harmless error doctrine to his case would trivialize his right to observe and be a part of the proceedings which likely will profoundly influence much of the rest of his life. ¶23 Based on the record before the trial court and before us on review, we conclude that Eric was entitled to attend the liability phase of his own trial, and his exclusion requires reversal. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated, the judgment for the Defendant is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. ¶24 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, WILSON, WATT, JJ. - Concur ¶25 LAVENDER, SIMMS, HARGRAVE, OPALA, JJ. - Dissent FOOT