Title: In re D.S.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re D.S., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3687.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3687 
IN RE D.S. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as In re D.S., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3687.] 
(No. 2012-1041—Submitted May 7, 2013—Decided August 29, 2013.) 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 97757, 2012-Ohio-2213. 
____________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, J., dissent. 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as 
having been improvidently accepted.  The state’s proposition of law presents a 
substantial question regarding the effect of a juvenile’s failure to provide 
discovery on the calculation of speedy-trial time.  I would address the merits of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
the appeal and hold that the statutory speedy-trial time is tolled when a juvenile 
prosecuted as a serious youthful offender (“SYO”) fails to respond to the state’s 
request for discovery.  Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the juvenile court for a reinstatement of the 
adjudication of delinquency and sentence. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Appellee, D.S., was indicted on one count of murder, two counts of 
felonious assault, and two counts of attempted felonious assault in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, case No. DL 09-119366.  At 
the time of the offenses, D.S. was 15 years old. 
{¶ 4} A complaint of delinquency had been filed by the Cuyahoga 
County prosecutor on October 20, 2009.  At a hearing on October 28, 2009, D.S. 
denied the allegations in the complaint and was admitted to detention. 
{¶ 5} On January 13, 2010, D.S. sought discovery from the state.  On 
January 19, 2010, the state filed a request for reciprocal discovery.  The state 
responded to D.S.’s discovery request on the same day and supplemented the 
response on January 27, 2010, and again on May 4, 2010. D.S. never responded to 
the state’s January 19, 2010 discovery request. 
{¶ 6} On May 4, 2010, after the juvenile court denied a motion to bind 
over the juvenile to common pleas court to be tried as an adult, the state filed a 
notice of intent to prosecute D.S. as a serious youthful offender.  The grand jury 
returned the five-count SYO indictment on May 28, 2010.  The juvenile court 
scheduled trial for August 16, 2010.  At the time, no objection was raised as to the 
date of the trial. 
{¶ 7} When the trial began, D.S. had not responded to the state’s January 
19, 2010 discovery request.  The state neither informed the trial court of D.S.’s 
failure to provide discovery nor moved to compel discovery. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
{¶ 8} D.S. was adjudicated delinquent as to all charges.  The trial court 
imposed a juvenile disposition for murder and committed D.S. to the Department 
of Youth Services (“DYS”) until his 21st birthday.  The adult portion of his SYO 
sentence included a 15-years-to-life prison term with a consecutive three-year 
term for a firearm specification, a one-year prison term for each of two charges of 
attempted felonious assault with an additional and consecutive three-year term for 
a firearm specification on each charge of attempted felonious assault, and a two-
year term for each of two felonious-assault charges, with an additional 
consecutive three-year term for a firearm specification on each charge.  The 
prison terms on the counts of murder, attempted felonious assault, and felonious 
assault were ordered to be served concurrently. 
{¶ 9} D.S. appealed the sentence to the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  
8th Dist. No. 95803, 2011-Ohio-5250.  The appellate court held that there was no 
final, appealable order, because the juvenile court “did not dispose of all counts at 
the traditional juvenile adjudication level.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  The appellate court held 
that the juvenile court’s “juvenile disposition for murder did not cover D.S.’s four 
assault adjudications with firearm specifications, as they were not addressed in the 
dispositional hearing or journal entry.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 10} Upon remand, the juvenile court ordered a juvenile disposition on 
each of the five counts.  On the murder count, D.S. was ordered to be committed 
to DYS until his 21st birthday, with a concurrent year of commitment for the 
firearm specification.  For each of the two felonious-assault counts, D.S. was 
ordered to serve a term of commitment of a minimum of 12 months and a 
maximum period not to exceed his 21st birthday.  Each felonious-assault count 
also included a concurrent one-year commitment for a firearm specification.  The 
juvenile dispositions for the two counts of attempted felonious assault merged 
with the felonious-assault terms of commitment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 11} D.S. again sought review in the Eighth District and asserted that 
his right to a speedy trial had been violated.  8th Dist. No. 97757, 2012-Ohio-
2213.  The state countered that D.S.’s speedy-trial time had been tolled as a result 
of his failure to respond to its discovery request.  The Eighth District reversed the 
juvenile court’s decision because it found that D.S.’s right to a speedy trial had 
been violated.  In so doing, it concluded: 
  
To hold that 30 days count against D.S., for a motion he 
filed months before he even had a right to a speedy trial, after the 
state delayed for almost three months, and where there is no 
indication in the record that the state was delayed in its trial 
preparations by D.S.’s lack of response, would be an injustice and 
not in keeping with the purposes of either speedy trial rights or 
discovery. 
 
Id. at ¶ 37.  The appellate court stated that it was reluctant to “ ‘reach back’ to 
events that occurred prior to D.S.’s speedy trial rights even being implicated.”  Id. 
at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 12} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal.  133 Ohio St.3d 
1410, 2012-Ohio-4650, 975 N.E.2d 1029. 
ANALYSIS 
Ohio’s criminal rules and established case law mandate 
reciprocity in criminal discovery 
{¶ 13} The purpose of the criminal discovery rules is to “prevent surprise 
and the secreting of evidence favorable to one party.”  State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio 
St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 860 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 18.  The exchange of information 
in discovery helps achieve the purpose of the discovery rules: “to produce a fair 
trial.”  Id. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 14} Likewise, Juv.R. 1 mandates that the Juvenile Rules be interpreted 
and construed in a manner that ensures a fair hearing, enforces the constitutional 
rights of the parties, and secures a simple and uniform procedure.  Juv.R. 1; In re 
L.A.B., 121 Ohio St.3d 112, 2009-Ohio-354, 902 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 56.  Prompt 
responses to discovery ensure a hearing not subject to surprise by either side. 
{¶ 15} Juv.R. 24 governs discovery in the juvenile system and is modeled 
after the former Crim.R. 16(A).1  That rule provides: 
 
Upon written request, each party of whom discovery is 
requested shall, to the extent not privileged, produce promptly for 
inspection, copying, or photographing the following information, 
documents, and material in that party’s custody, control, or 
possession. 
 
Juv.R. 24(A). 
{¶ 16} Given the mandate that juvenile courts must afford every juvenile 
fundamental due process,  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 
(1967);  In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 76, 
it is imperative that we impose every reasonable safeguard that ensures a fair trial 
for the juvenile.  One such safeguard includes not allowing parties to ignore 
discovery requests and requiring parties to promptly respond to discovery 
requests. 
D.S. Failed to Respond to the State’s Request for Discovery 
{¶ 17} This appeal illustrates why we have discovery obligations in the 
juvenile courts and why those obligations must be enforced. 
                                          
 
1 The previous version of Crim.R. 16(A) states, “Upon written request each party shall forthwith 
provide the discovery herein allowed.  Motions for discovery shall certify that demand for 
discovery has been made and the discovery has not been provided.”  34 Ohio St.2d li. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 18} D.S. argues that in order for his lack of response to merit a tolling 
of his speedy-trial time, the state was obligated to serve another request for 
discovery under the criminal rules once the state sought the SYO dispositional 
sentence.  This argument is unpersuasive. 
{¶ 19} The fact that the state sought an SYO dispositional sentence is 
irrelevant because the state made its Juv.R. 24 request for discovery on January 
19, 2010, many months prior to the state’s notice of intent to seek an SYO 
sentence on May 4, 2010.  The state was not required to make another request for 
discovery after it sought the SYO dispositional sentence.  The state’s notice of 
intent to seek an SYO disposition did not extinguish D.S.’s duty to respond to the 
state’s January 19, 2010 discovery request.  His duty to provide discovery 
remained throughout the SYO proceedings.  Because D.S. never provided the 
state with his discovery responses, he wholly failed to meet his duty. 
{¶ 20} Further, at the time of the notice of intent to seek an SYO 
disposition, the state had already provided D.S. with its discovery and had twice 
supplemented its response.  Therefore, the state met its obligation and should not 
be forced to bear the burden of making another request for discovery simply 
because it sought an SYO disposition. 
{¶ 21} Moreover, D.S. continued to accept the state’s supplemental 
discovery responses, even as late as May 4, 2010, the same date the state sought 
an SYO sentence.  This shows that the parties, notably D.S., continued to operate 
under the discovery requests made pursuant to the Juvenile Rules, even on the 
date of the state’s notice of intent to seek an SYO sentence.  It seems 
disingenuous that D.S. now argues that his lack of response did not constitute a 
tolling event.  D.S. should not be rewarded for his complete failure to meet his 
duty by never responding to the state’s discovery request. 
{¶ 22} The Eighth District’s decision was based in part on the fact that the 
state did not file a motion to compel discovery when the state had been “presented 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
with four on-the-record opportunities to seek the court’s intervention in 
compelling D.S. to respond to its discovery requests, but never did.”  2012-Ohio-
2213, at ¶ 32.  That analysis is specious because D.S.’s duty to respond to 
discovery was triggered on January 19, 2010, pursuant to Juv.R. 24. When a duty 
to respond to discovery is triggered, a party does not have to compel an opponent 
to hand over discovery.  See Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 511 
N.E.2d 1138 (1987) (holding that Crim.R. 16 “does not grant discretion to a party 
to ignore a request of an opposing party until a court orders compliance”).  Thus, 
there is an expectation that parties will comply with their duty to respond to 
discovery requests irrespective of court intervention.  Here, the state could have 
moved to compel discovery.  However, the state’s failure to do so does not vitiate 
D.S.’s duty to respond to the state’s January 19, 2010 discovery request. 
Failure to respond to discovery tolls the speedy-trial time 
{¶ 23} A juvenile facing an SYO dispositional sentence is entitled to a 
speedy trial.  R.C. 2152.13(C)(1).  The right to a speedy trial is triggered by a set 
of specific occurrences under R.C. 2152.13(C)(1): 
 
Once a child is indicted, or charged by information or the 
juvenile court determines that the child is eligible for a serious 
youthful offender dispositional sentence, the child is entitled to an 
open and speedy trial by jury in juvenile court and to be provided 
with a transcript of the proceedings. The time within which the 
trial is to be held under Title XXIX of the Revised Code 
commences on whichever of the following dates is applicable: 
* * * 
 
(c) If the child is not charged by an original complaint that 
requests a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence, on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
date that the prosecuting attorney files the written notice of intent 
to seek a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 24} Here, the original complaint was filed on October 20, 2009.  The 
notice of intent to seek an SYO disposition was filed on May 4, 2010, which 
triggered D.S.’s right to a speedy trial. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2945.71 sets forth the applicable speedy-trial times: 
 
(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending: 
* * * 
(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy 
days after the person’s arrest. 
 
R.C. 2945.71(E) provides: 
 
For purposes of computing time under division[] * * * 
(C)(2) * * * of this section, each day during which the accused is 
held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as 
three days. 
 
{¶ 26} Here, D.S. was charged with a felony, granting him a right to a 
speedy trial within 270 days of the date on which his right was triggered pursuant 
to R.C. 2945.71(C).  Additionally, D.S. was held in jail on the pending charges, so 
each day counted as three days.  R.C. 2945.71(E).  Therefore, he was guaranteed 
trial within 90 days of the date on which his speedy-trial right was triggered.  The 
state gave notice of intent to seek an SYO dispositional sentence on May 4, 2010, 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
triggering D.S.’s right to a speedy trial within 90 days.  Therefore, his speedy-trial 
clock would have expired on August 2, 2010. 
{¶ 27} D.S. was not brought to trial until August 16, 2010.  However, the 
required speedy-trial time can be extended for a number of reasons pursuant to 
R.C. 2945.72, which states: 
 
The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, 
or, in the case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be 
extended only by the following: 
* * * 
(D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or 
improper act of the accused. 
  
{¶ 28} In Palmer, we held that “a defendant’s failure to respond within a 
reasonable time to a prosecution request for reciprocal discovery constitutes 
neglect that tolls the running of speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(D).”  
State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 860 N.E.2d 1011, at ¶ 24.  
In that case, the defendant responded to the state’s request for discovery after 60 
days.  We held that the defendant’s “response clearly could have been prepared 
and served much earlier than 60 days after it was requested, and it was neglect 
* * * not to have done so.” Id. at ¶ 23.  Thus, “a defendant’s failure to respond 
within a reasonable time to a prosecution request for reciprocal discovery 
constitutes neglect that tolls the running of speedy-trial time.”  Id. at ¶ 24.  We 
also held in Palmer that “the tolling of statutory speedy-trial time based on a 
defendant’s neglect in failing to respond within a reasonable time to a prosecution 
request for discovery is not dependent upon the filing of a motion to compel 
discovery by the prosecution.”  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
{¶ 29} The Eighth District held that D.S.’s speedy-trial right had been 
violated because no tolling resulted from the failure to respond to the state’s 
request for discovery.  2012-Ohio-2213, at ¶ 23.  The appellate court 
distinguished the present case from Palmer because the defendant in Palmer 
“responded, but untimely, whereas here, D.S. never responded at all.”  Id. at ¶ 32. 
This distinction defies logic.  It is unreasonable to say that one party should have 
his speedy-trial time tolled because he responded late to a request for discovery 
but that another party who fails to respond at all should face no tolling. 
{¶ 30} The Eighth District also based its decision in part on the fact that 
the request for discovery was made before D.S. had any right to a speedy trial and 
held that events that occur prior to the triggering of the speedy-trial clock should 
not toll it.  2012-Ohio-2213 at ¶ 23.  The appellate court’s reasoning is flawed 
because D.S. was required to respond to the state’s Juv.R. 24 discovery request.  
In fact, because of his failure to provide discovery to the state, D.S.’s speedy-trial 
clock had not even started to run at the time of trial.  Therefore, his speedy-trial 
right was not violated when his trial occurred on August 16, 2010. 
{¶ 31} The appellate court also held that D.S.’s speedy-trial clock should 
not be tolled because there was “no indication whatsoever in this record that the 
state was delayed in its trial preparation by D.S.’s failure to respond to its request 
for discovery.” Id. at ¶ 36.  Similarly, D.S. argues that there is no tolling of the 
speedy-trial clock, because the state was not harmed or delayed in its trial 
preparation because D.S. had no evidence to offer.  This argument is 
unpersuasive, especially considering that the goal of discovery is to provide a fair 
trial based on full information.  Therefore, the failure to respond to discovery is 
harmful in and of itself. 
{¶ 32} Moreover, we have held that a lack of evidence does not release a 
party from his duty to respond to a request for discovery.  In Palmer, the 
defendant satisfied his duty of reciprocal discovery when he “responded to the 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
state’s reciprocal discovery response * * * advising the state that he did not intend 
to introduce any tangible documents, exams, or tests at trial and that he did not 
have additional witnesses to disclose other than those previously identified by the 
state.”  State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 860 N.E.2d 1011, 
¶ 4. 
{¶ 33} Like the defendant in Palmer, D.S. should have responded that he 
did not have any evidence to disclose.  The court of appeals’ decision allows a 
party to circumvent the duty of reciprocal discovery by later arguing that there 
was no harm to the opposing party because he did not have any evidence to 
disclose.  The state should not be punished in a case in which the juvenile failed 
to provide any discovery or to notify the state of his intention to rely on the state’s 
evidence.  Failure to make any response, given the duty of reciprocal discovery, 
constitutes neglect and warrants the tolling of the speedy-trial time. 
The majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently 
accepted is inconsistent with this court’s recent decision in State v. Athon 
{¶ 34} The majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted is especially troubling given our recent decision in State 
v. Athon, 136 Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-1956, 989 N.E.2d 1006. 
{¶ 35} In Athon, the defendant was charged with operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, speeding, and driving without 
having reinstated a suspended driver’s license.  Athon asked his attorney to obtain 
evidence related to his arrest by making a request for public records to the Ohio 
State Highway Patrol, pursuant to Ohio’s public-records law, R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 36} In addressing the propriety of using the public-records law instead 
of discovery in a criminal case, we turned to Crim.R. 16, which implements the 
principle of reciprocal discovery.  The rule states: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
If the defendant serves a written demand for discovery or 
any other pleading seeking disclosure of evidence on the 
prosecuting attorney, a reciprocal duty of disclosure by the 
defendant arises without further demand by the state. 
 
Crim.R. 16(H). 
{¶ 37} Although Athon sought information through a public-records 
request and not under Crim.R. 16, we held that “[b]ecause Athon received 
evidence from the State Highway Patrol that could have been obtained from the 
prosecutor through discovery, he had a reciprocal duty to provide discovery to the 
state * * *.”  Athon, 136 Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-1956, 989 N.E.2d 1006, at ¶ 3.  
“Circumventing the discovery process frustrates the purpose of Crim.R. 16, which 
is to regulate the fair exchange of information between parties to a criminal case.”  
Id. at ¶ 2.  Therefore, we held, “When an accused directly or indirectly makes a 
public records request for information that could be obtained from the prosecutor 
through discovery, the request is the equivalent of a demand for discovery and 
triggers a duty to provide reciprocal discovery as contemplated by Crim.R. 16.”  
Id. at ¶ 19.  Although a public-records request is not discovery governed by 
Crim.R. 16, we held that such a request triggers a duty of reciprocal discovery 
like the duty in Crim.R. 16.  Id. at ¶ 22.  We thereby extended the duty of 
reciprocal discovery found in Crim.R. 16 to apply to requests for discoverable 
information made under public-records law.  We refused to allow the defendant in 
that case to circumvent the rules of discovery because “when criminal defendants 
use public records requests to circumvent discovery rules, they act contrary to the 
public policy against gamesmanship and ‘trial by ambush’ and undermine the 
intent of * * * Crim.R. 16 to establish ‘open discovery’ in criminal cases.”  Id. at 
¶ 11. 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
{¶ 38} But in the present case, the majority provides D.S. with that 
opportunity in direct contravention of our holding in Athon.  A request for 
discovery under Juv.R. 24 is even more similar to a request under Crim.R. 16 than 
is a public-records request.  Juv.R. 24 was modeled after former Crim.R. 16, and 
both seek to ensure that parties come to trial with adequate information. 
{¶ 39} Consistent with this court’s decision in Athon, a party should not 
be allowed to shirk his duty of responding to discovery when he has requested 
discovery from an opponent.  And by dismissing the appeal, the majority allows 
D.S.—and other recalcitrant juveniles, including those charged with the most 
serious of juvenile offenses—to evade that duty.  Therefore, I must dissent from 
the decision to dismiss the appeal as improperly accepted. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sheryl A. Trzaska, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee. 
________________________