Title: Smith v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEALS – REMAND – INCONSISTENT VERDICTS – A criminal
defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony, but was acquitted of, among other things, first-degree assault.  The
Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions because it found them inconsistent with
the acquittal for first-degree assault.  The Court of Special Appeals also remanded the case
to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of guilty against the defendant for the
crime of misdemeanor theft, an offense that was neither explicitly charged nor pursued at
trial.  Such a remand was improper for two reasons.  First, a conviction for misdemeanor
theft would have been based on the reversed conviction for robbery with a dangerous
weapon.  Once a conviction for a greater offense has been reversed due to inconsistency, it
cannot provide the basis for a conviction for a lesser included offense.  Second, neither the
State nor the defendant was given an opportunity to present an argument regarding
misdemeanor theft at trial.  A defendant may not be convicted of an uncharged lesser
included offense unless the parties have been given an opportunity to present arguments
regarding that offense before the trial court.
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 1
September Term, 2009
RICHARD C. SMITH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
  
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Barbera
Adkins,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Harrell and Murphy, JJ., Concur and Dissent.
Filed:   December 30, 2009
In a bench trial, held in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Richard C. Smith,
the petitioner, was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in
the commission of a felony but acquitted of several other charges, including first-degree
assault.  The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed the two
convictions because it concluded that they were inconsistent with the acquittal for first-
degree assault.  The intermediate appellate court then remanded the case to the trial court
with directions to enter a judgment of guilty against the petitioner for the crime of
misdemeanor theft, an offense that was neither explicitly charged nor pursued at trial.
We have been asked to determine whether this remand was in error and whether a
conviction for misdemeanor theft would be inconsistent with the acquittal for first-degree
assault.  In regard to the first issue, we shall hold that the remand was in error for two
reasons: (1) the conviction for the greater offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon was
reversed for inconsistency and therefore could no longer provide the basis for a conviction
for the lesser offense of misdemeanor theft, and (2) neither the State nor the petitioner was
given an opportunity to present an argument regarding misdemeanor theft at trial.  We need
not address the second issue because, consistent with our resolution of the first issue, the
offense of misdemeanor theft was not properly before the Court of Special Appeals and is
not properly before this Court.  We shall accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals with regard to the remand.
1 Robbery with a dangerous weapon, as charged against Smith, occurs when a person
“commit[s] or attempt[s] to commit robbery under § 3-402 of this subtitle . . . with a
dangerous weapon . . . .”  Md. Code (1957, 2009 Supp.), § 3-403(a) of the Criminal Law
Article.  Robbery with a dangerous weapon is a felony.  § 3-403(b) of the Criminal Law
Article.
Robbery is a common law crime in Maryland and is defined as “the felonious taking
and carrying away of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence,
by violence, or by putting him in fear.”  Coles v. State, 374 Md. 114, 123, 821 A.2d 389, 394
(2003) (quoting Darby v. State, 3 Md. App. 407, 413, 239 A.2d 584, 588 (1967)); see also
§ 3-402 of the Criminal Law Article (prohibiting robbery).  By statute, robbery also
requires proof of intent to withhold property of another:
(i) permanently;
(ii) for a period that results in the appropriation of
a part of the property’s value;
(iii) with the purpose to restore it only on
payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(iv) to dispose of the property or use or deal with
the property in a manner that makes it unlikely
that the owner will recover it.
§ 3-401(e) of the Criminal Law Article.
2 Use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, as charged against Smith, occurs
when a person uses “any handgun in the commission of . . . any felony . . . .”  § 4-204(a) of
(continued...)
2
I.
Procedural Background
This case originated in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  Petitioner Richard
C. Smith, under indictment, was charged with two counts of robbery with a dangerous
weapon,1 two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony,2 two counts of first-
2(...continued)
the Criminal Law Article.  Use of a handgun in the commission of a felony is a
misdemeanor.  § 4-204(b) of the Criminal Law Article.
3 Assault in the first degree, as charged against Smith, occurs when a person
“commit[s] an assault with a firearm, including . . . a handgun . . . .”  § 3-202(a)(2) of the
Criminal Law Article.  Assault in the first degree is a felony.  § 3-202(b) of the Criminal
Law Article.  In Maryland, assault can be either “(1) an attempt to commit a battery or (2)
an intentional placing of another in apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.”
Edmund v. State, 398 Md. 562, 571, 921 A.2d 264, 269 (2007) (quoting Ford v. State, 330
Md. 682, 699, 625 A.2d 984, 992 (1993)).  Battery is “any unlawful force used against the
person of another, no matter how slight.” Id. (quoting State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 510,
510 A.2d 253, 257 (1986)).
3
degree assault,3 and two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.
In a bench trial, the trial judge convicted Smith of one count of robbery with a dangerous
weapon and one count of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, but acquitted
Smith of the other charges, including both counts of first-degree assault.
Smith appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that, among
other things, the trial court issued impermissibly inconsistent verdicts when it convicted
Smith of robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony and acquitted him of first-degree assault.  The intermediate appellate court, in an
unreported opinion, agreed with Smith that the convictions were inconsistent, concluding
that first-degree assault is a lesser included offense of both robbery with a dangerous weapon
and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.  The Court of Special Appeals also
agreed that the inconsistency was impermissible because the trial court had not explained the
inconsistent verdicts, as required by our decision in State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 190, 916
4 The Court of Special Appeals directed the trial court to enter a guilty verdict for
misdemeanor theft under § 7-104(a) of the Criminal Law Article.  Under that provision,
misdemeanor theft occurs when a person
 
willfully or knowingly obtain[s] or exert[s] unauthorized control
over property, if the person:  (1) intends to deprive the owner of
the property; (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or
abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of
the property; or (3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property
knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will
deprive the owner of the property.
§ 7-104(a) of the Criminal Law Article.  Theft is a misdemeanor if the property at issue has
a value of less than $1,000.  § 7-104(g)(2) of the Criminal Law Article.
5 We have not been asked to decide whether the Court of Special Appeals correctly
concluded that the trial court issued inconsistent judgments.  Neither the State nor the
petitioner has requested a review of that decision.
4
A.2d 294, 305 (2007).  Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s
judgment.  In addition, the intermediate appellate court remanded the case to the trial court
with directions to enter a guilty verdict against Smith for misdemeanor theft, an offense the
State neither explicitly charged nor pursued at trial.4
Smith petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, asking us to decide the following
questions:
1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in directing the trial
court to enter a guilty verdict on misdemeanor theft, where the
State did not pursue such a conviction at trial?
2.  Is the misdemeanor theft conviction ordered by the Court of
Special Appeals impermissibly inconsistent with the trial court’s
acquittal on the first degree assault charge?5
5
We granted certiorari as to both questions.  We answer the first question in the
affirmative and need not answer the second question because of our resolution of the first
question.
Facts of the Case
This case involves two incidents that occurred after midnight on September 9, 2006,
in Silver Spring.  In the first incident, Ruben Levell was walking near his apartment when
a man approached him, pointed a gun at Levell’s face, demanded Levell’s cell phone, and
searched Levell’s pockets and removed Levell’s keys.  A second man joined the gunman and
asked what the gunman had gotten from Levell.  When the gunman informed the second man
that he had gotten nothing, one of the men dropped Levell’s keys and told him to run.  Levell
told the men that he needed his keys to get into his apartment, and one of the men told him
to pick them up.  Levell did so and ran home.  Levell later identified Smith as the second
man, although he acknowledged that he could not be sure.
In the second incident, Joseph Durbin was jogging when he was approached by a man
who pointed a gun at his head and asked if Durbin had any money.  Durbin did not, so the
gunman asked if Durbin had anything else.  Durbin gave the gunman his MP3 player.  The
gunman then patted down Durbin, asked him again if he had any money, and turned out
Durbin’s pockets.  A second man approached and told Durbin to run away, after which the
gunman asked Durbin if he wanted his house key, which had dropped from Durbin’s turned-
out pocket.  Durbin took the key, ran to a nearby house, and called the police.  Later that
6
night, police officers drove Durbin to a location where the police had two men under arrest,
and Durbin identified them as the men from the incident.  At trial, Durbin said that it was
possible that Smith was one of the men from the incident, but that he could not be sure.
Smith and another man, Christopher Bailey, were arrested later on the night of the two
incidents.  Detective Sheila Sugrue of the Montgomery County Police saw Smith and
another man standing on a street corner and saw that they matched the description she had
received of two men who had committed an armed robbery.  When Detective Sugrue exited
her car and identified herself as a police officer, Smith stopped and spoke with her while the
other man, later identified as Bailey, ran away.  Smith told Detective Sugrue that he had
watched a movie at a nearby theater and was waiting for a bus, although no movies were
playing at the theater that late at night and Detective Sugrue had seen Smith fail to get on a
bus that had arrived and departed while Smith waited.  Bailey was apprehended later.
Smith and Bailey were arrested.  Smith was charged with eight counts:  robbery with
a dangerous weapon of Levell (count 1); use of a handgun in the commission of a felony,
with respect to Levell (count 2); first degree assault of Levell (count 3); conspiracy to
commit the armed robbery of Levell (count 4); robbery with a dangerous weapon of Durbin
(count 5); use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, relating to Durbin (count 6); first-
degree assault of Durbin (count 7); and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon of Durbin (count 8).
7
The case proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.  At the close
of the State’s case, Smith moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.  He argued that
the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the second man in either incident and that,
even if he were the second man, the evidence was insufficient to show that he had aided and
abetted the gunman.  The trial court granted the motion with respect to counts one, two, and
three, and denied the motion with respect to the other counts.  At the close of all evidence,
Smith renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court granted with
respect to counts four and eight, as well as count seven for first-degree assault.  The trial
court ultimately convicted Smith of  robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun
in the commission of a felony, as those charges related to Durbin.
On appeal, as explained above, the Court of Special Appeals reversed both
convictions because it concluded they were inconsistent with the acquittal for first-degree
assault.  The intermediate appellate court then remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to enter a verdict of guilty against Smith for misdemeanor theft.  We granted
Smith’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  Smith v. State, 407 Md. 276, 964 A.2d 675 (2009).
II.
We first address whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in remanding the case
to the trial court with directions to enter a verdict of guilty for misdemeanor theft even
though that offense was never charged or pursued at trial.  We shall hold that such a remand
was impermissible for two reasons.  First, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the
8
conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon due to inconsistency.  This conviction, now
reversed, could no longer provide the basis for a conviction for the lesser included offense
of misdemeanor theft.  Second, neither Smith nor the State had an opportunity to present
arguments regarding misdemeanor theft in the trial court.  The parties must be given that
opportunity before a defendant may be convicted of an uncharged lesser included offense.
Parties’ Contentions
Smith presents several arguments why he believes that the intermediate appellate
court erred.  He first refutes the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on Hagans v. State, 316
Md. 429, 559 A.2d 792 (1989), in directing the trial court to convict him of the uncharged
lesser included offense of misdemeanor theft.  Smith admits that, consistent with Hagans,
a jury may convict a defendant of a lesser included offense even though that offense was not
explicitly charged.  Smith argues, however, that Hagans also includes a number of
exceptions to this rule, one of which he considers relevant:  an uncharged lesser included
offense may only be submitted to a jury if one of the parties has requested or agreed to the
submission.  Neither party made such a request or agreement in this case.  Smith argues that,
absent such a request, the trial judge, acting as fact-finder, could not have found Smith guilty
of misdemeanor theft and an appellate court cannot now remand his case with instructions
for the trial court to do so.
Smith also refutes the Court of Special Appeals’ reliance on Brooks v. State, 314 Md.
585, 552 A.2d 872 (1989).  Smith acknowledges that, in Brooks, this Court reversed a
9
conviction but directed the trial court to enter a verdict of guilty for a lesser included offense
because “[w]hen the jury convicted Brooks of [the greater offense], it necessarily convicted
him of [the lesser included offense] as well.”  314 Md. at 601, 552 A.2d at 880.
Nonetheless, he argues that Brooks implicitly supports his position.  Unlike the present case,
Smith asserts, the defendant in Brooks was explicitly charged with the lesser included
offense.  Also unlike the present case, the lesser included offense in Brooks was submitted
to the jury, in its role as the finder of fact.  Smith considers these differences between Brooks
and the present case to be significant.
Smith next discusses cases in which other appellate courts have reversed a conviction
and directed the trial court to convict a defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense.
He cites several courts that have determined that such a remand is appropriate.  See Shields
v. State, 722 So.2d 584, 587 (Miss. 1998) (finding the evidence insufficient and directing the
lower court to convict on a lesser included offense that was not before the jury); United
States v. Hunt, 129 F.3d 739, 746 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d
380, 383 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).  Smith distinguishes these cases from the present case
because each court applied the four-part test from Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445, 451
6 In Allison v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that an appellate court may modify a conviction to a lesser included
offense, but that 
[i]t must be clear (1) that the evidence adduced at trial fails to
support one or more elements of the crime of which appellant
was convicted, (2) that such evidence sufficiently sustains all
the elements of another offense, (3) that the latter is a lesser
included offense of the former, and (4) that no undue prejudice
will result to the accused.
409 F.2d 445, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129 (1967)).
10
(D.C. Cir. 1969),6 and determined that a conviction for the lesser included offense would not
be unduly prejudicial to the defendant.
Smith then cites cases where other courts have reached a different conclusion, holding
that such a remand is only appropriate if the lesser included offense was submitted to the
jury.  For example, Smith notes that the Supreme Court of New Mexico has stated that
directing a trial court to enter a judgment of conviction against a defendant for “an offense
not presented to the jury would deprive the defendant of notice and an opportunity to defend
against that charge” and would create “the problem of convicting [the d]efendant on appeal
of a charge he did not in fact defend at trial.”  State v. Villa, 98 P.3d 1017, 1018, 1021 (N.M.
2004); see also State v. Brown, 602 S.E.2d 392, 399-401 (S.C. 2004) (identifying notice
concerns, among others, when refusing to direct a trial court to convict for a lesser included
offense).  Smith argues that he, like the defendant in Villa, was deprived of any opportunity
at trial to defend himself against a conviction for misdemeanor theft.  Smith also notes that
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has stated that a conviction reversed for insufficient
11
evidence is “not sufficiently reliable to be recast as a jury finding of guilty on the elements
of a lesser included offense,” State v. Myers, 461 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Wisc. 1990), and he
argues that his reversed conviction is similarly unreliable.  Finally, he cites cases where
courts have refused to direct a trial court to convict a defendant of a lesser included offense
that was not submitted to the jury because the decision whether to submit a lesser included
offense to a jury is a matter of trial strategy that should be left to the parties.  Myers, 461
N.W.2d at 782-83; Villa, 98 P.3d at 1021.  Smith argues that the reliability, notice, and trial
strategy issues discussed in these cases are implicated in the present case, although he admits
that each of these cases involved a jury verdict that was reversed for insufficient evidence.
Smith concludes with a preservation argument.  He contends that the Court of Special
Appeals should not have considered the offense of misdemeanor theft because the State
failed to preserve its argument that this offense should be considered on appeal.  Citing
Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262, 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995), and Maryland Rule 8-131(a),
Smith asserts that appellate courts will ordinarily refuse to consider issues that were not
raised below.  If the State wished to pursue a conviction for misdemeanor theft, Smith
concludes, it should have done so in the trial court.
In response, the State focuses primarily on its contention that Smith’s arguments are
irrelevant to bench trials.  According to the State, the holding from Hagans – that a trial
judge cannot submit an uncharged lesser included offense to the jury absent a request or
agreement from one of the parties – is inapplicable when the case is before a judge.  The
12
State argues that this holding from Hagans was based on our conclusion that the decision
whether to submit an uncharged lesser included offense to the jury is a matter of trial strategy
best left to the parties.  Unlike a jury trial, where the parties might choose not to submit an
uncharged lesser included offense to the fact-finder in hopes of receiving a favorable
compromise verdict, the State asserts that a bench trial presents no such strategic decision
because a judge cannot compromise with him or herself.  Absent this strategic concern, the
State contends that a trial judge should always be allowed to convict a defendant of an
uncharged lesser included offense.  Finally, the State concludes that if a trial judge can
convict a defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense without a request or agreement
from one of the parties, an appellate judge can direct the trial judge to do so.
The State also specifically addresses Smith’s arguments about reliability, notice, and
preservation.  Again, the State’s responses rely mainly on its contention that bench trials are
different than jury trials.  Regarding reliability, the State argues that an unreliable verdict is
unlikely to result when an appellate court remands a case with directions to convict the
defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense.  This is so, the State asserts, because a
judge, unlike a jury, should only convict a defendant of a greater offense if he or she also
finds sufficient evidence to convict on the lesser included offense.  The State argues that
notice is a non-issue as well because the defendant should always be aware that the State
might request consideration of a lesser included offense and because the defendant is not
faced with the strategic concerns that might arise if the State could pursue a compromise
7  The State also argues that it cannot see how Smith’s defense would have changed
if he had known that the State might pursue a conviction for misdemeanor theft.  We express
no opinion on what Smith’s defense may or may not have been under different
circumstances at trial, but Smith would have had an opportunity to explain his alternate
defenses, if there were any, if he had been given an opportunity to do so before the trial
court.
13
verdict.7  The State then argues that Smith’s preservation arguments actually concern trial
strategy, but that there is no relevant strategic concern in a bench trial because the parties
cannot forgo the pursuit of a lesser included offense in hopes of achieving a favorable
compromise verdict because, again, a judge cannot issue a compromise verdict.
The State presents two final arguments why a remand like the one in this case is
appropriate.  First, the State argues that there is no preservation issue because the State must
necessarily make all the evidentiary and sufficiency arguments pertaining to the lesser
included offenses to succeed in convicting a defendant on a greater offense.  This is so, the
State contends, because the State can only achieve a conviction on the charged greater
offenses if it also proves each element of the lesser included offenses.  Second, the State
argues that the remand in this case appropriately balances the defendant’s due process rights
and the public’s interest in respecting the fact-finder’s verdict.
Effect of the Reversal for Inconsistency
The first error in the Court of Special Appeals’ remand concerns its reliance on a
conviction that it reversed for inconsistency.  The intermediate appellate court reversed
Smith’s conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon because it was inconsistent with
his acquittal for first-degree assault.  That reversed conviction, however, provided the only
14
basis for directing the trial court to enter a judgment of guilty against Smith for misdemeanor
theft.  We hold that an appellate court may not rely on a conviction that has been reversed
for inconsistency as the basis for directing a trial court to enter a judgment of guilty for a
lesser included offense.
This Court has addressed inconsistent verdicts several times in recent years.  Until
2008, we joined most jurisdictions in following the “normal” rule that inconsistent verdicts
were generally acceptable.  Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 19, 949 A.2d 619, 624 (2008).  By
2008, however, we had also identified a wide variety of exceptions to that rule.  For
example, seemingly inconsistent verdicts by a trial judge in a non-jury trial were, and still
are, only acceptable if the trial judge explains the apparent inconsistency on the record.
Williams, 397 Md. at 189-90, 916 A.2d at 305; Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528, 544-45, 209
A.2d 765, 772 (1965).  Inconsistent verdicts were unacceptable in criminal trials when the
judge rendered guilty verdicts that were inconsistent with non-guilty verdicts rendered by
the jury.  Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 401, 809 A.2d 653, 667 (2002).  Inconsistent jury
verdicts of guilty were also invalid.  Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 55, 512 A.2d 358, 362
(1986).  In 2003, we held that inconsistent jury verdicts were unacceptable in all civil cases.
Southern Management v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 487-88, 836 A.2d 627, 630 (2003).  We also
recognized that inconsistent verdicts were contrary to law and gave trial courts the discretion
to reject them.  Price, 405 Md. at 21, 24, 949 A.2d at 626, 627.
8 This rejection of inconsistent verdicts is consistent with our tolerance of apparently
inconsistent verdicts in a bench trial when the judge explains the inconsistency on the record.
In such a case, the judge must explain the inconsistency so that it “in substance disappears
upon review of the trial court’s explanation.”  State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 189-90, 916
A.2d 294, 305 (2007).  Such an explanation shows why apparently inconsistent verdicts are,
in fact, consistent.
15
In Price, we reevaluated our approach to inconsistent verdicts and, because of these
many exceptions, rejected the common law “normal” rule.  Instead, we held that no
inconsistent jury verdicts would be tolerated.8  Price, 405 Md. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630.  In
reaching this conclusion, we noted that the traditional justifications for tolerating
inconsistent jury verdicts would be as applicable to civil cases as criminal cases, but that we
had chosen to reject inconsistent verdicts in civil jury trials but not in criminal jury trials.
Price, 405 Md. at 23-24, 949 A.2d at 627.  Similarly, we noted that because criminal
defendants receive greater procedural protections, there was little sense in rejecting
inconsistent civil jury verdicts, but not inconsistent criminal jury verdicts.  Price, 405 Md.
at 27, 949 A.2d at 629.  Accordingly, we joined a minority of states in rejecting all
inconsistent verdicts.  Price, 405 Md. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630.
This case concerns the relationship between a reversed conviction predicated on an
inconsistent verdict and a conviction for an uncharged lesser included offense based on that
reversed conviction.  Our decisions make clear that a conviction for a greater offense
constitutes a finding of guilt for all lesser included offenses.  Brooks, 314 Md. at 601, 552
A.2d at 880; see also Grimes v. State, 44 Md. App. 580, 583, 409 A.2d 767, 769 (1980),
rev’d on other grounds, 290 Md. 236, 429 A.2d 228 (1981) (Wilner, J.) (“[A] conviction of
9 Neither party disputes the contention that misdemeanor theft is a lesser included
offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon.  See Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 583, 597
A.2d 1359, 1374 (1991); see also Rudder v. State, 181 Md. App. 426, 467, 956 A.2d 791,
815 (2008) (“Theft is a lesser included offense within the greater inclusive offense of
robbery, for robbery is, by definition, a theft from the person accomplished by force or threat
of force.”).  But see Spitzinger v. State, 340 Md. 114, 121-22, 665 A.2d 685, 687 (1995)
(explaining that felony theft is not a lesser included offense of robbery because the value of
the property at issue in the robbery could be lower than is required for felony theft).
16
the greater presupposes a finding of guilt on the lesser included offense as well.”).  For
example, in the present case, a conviction for the greater offense of robbery with a dangerous
weapon constituted a finding of guilt for misdemeanor theft because misdemeanor theft is
a lesser included offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon.9  See Thomas v. State, 277
Md. 257, 264-67, 353 A.2d 240, 245-47 (1976) (articulating the test for identifying lesser
included offenses) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180,
182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309 (1932)).  If a conviction for a greater offense is reversed, a defendant
may sometimes be convicted of a lesser included offense without a new trial.  See Brooks,
314 Md. at 601, 552 A.2d at 880 (remanding the case to the trial court, following a reversal,
with instructions for the trial court to convict the defendant of a lesser included offense
without a new trial).
We have never held, however, that a defendant may be convicted of a lesser included
offense based on a conviction that has been reversed due to inconsistency.  Brooks presents
a set of circumstances where an appellate court may properly reverse a conviction and
remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of guilty for a lesser
included offense.  314 Md. at 601, 552 A.2d at 880.  In Brooks, like this case, the greater
17
offense was robbery with a dangerous weapon.  314 Md. at 586-87, 552 A.2d at 873.  We
reversed the conviction for that offense because the trial court had misinterpreted a particular
element of robbery with a dangerous weapon – whether a toy gun could constitute a
“dangerous weapon.”  Brooks, 314 Md. at 600-01, 552 A.2d at 880.  We concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt robbery with a dangerous
weapon.  Brooks, 314 Md. at 600-01, 552 A.2d at 880.  In so concluding, this Court did not
disturb the trial court’s findings regarding the assault and theft elements of robbery with a
dangerous weapon.  We could therefore be confident that the trial court had found sufficient
evidence to satisfy these remaining elements.  Those elements – assault and theft –
constituted simple robbery, so we instructed the trial court to enter a judgment of guilty
against the defendant for that offense.  Brooks, 314 Md. at 601, 552 A.2d at 880.
The reversal in this case, however, was different.  The Court of Special Appeals
reversed the conviction for the greater offense because it was inconsistent with an acquittal
for a lesser included offense.  The question here is whether the intermediate appellate court
could use that reversed conviction as the basis for directing the trial court to enter a judgment
of guilty for another lesser included offense.  We conclude that it could not.  In a case such
as this, where the conviction for the greater offense was reversed due to inconsistency, an
appellate court may not remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter a judgment
of conviction against the defendant for a lesser included offense.
18
We reach this conclusion for three reasons.  First, and most importantly, a conviction
that has been reversed for inconsistency is not sufficiently reliable to be the basis for a
conviction of a lesser included offense.  A conviction is reversed for inconsistency “because
we can have no confidence in a judgment convicting [the defendant] of one crime when the
judge, by his acquittal of another, appears to have rejected the only evidence that would
support the conviction here.”  Johnson, 238 Md. at 543, 209 A.2d at 772 (quoting United
States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 905 (2nd Cir. 1960)).  When a conviction is reversed for
inconsistency, there can be no confidence about the judge’s rationale for reaching the
inconsistent verdict, nor can there be confidence about which aspects of his conviction have
been left undisturbed.  Unlike the reversal in Brooks, which affected only one aspect of the
reversed conviction that did not affect the lesser included offense, the reversal in this case
makes the entire conviction unreliable.
Second, our conclusion in this case is supported by our decision in Price and the other
cases through which we have entirely rejected inconsistent verdicts.  In Price, we declared
that “inconsistent verdicts shall no longer be allowed.”  405 Md. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630.  As
explained above, we had already rejected inconsistent verdicts in a wide variety of other
situations, and we had long held them “contrary to law.”  Price, 405 Md. at 19-29, 949 A.2d
at 624-30.  If we allowed an appellate court to rely on an inconsistent judgment as the basis
for directing a trial court to convict a defendant, we would be retreating from this long line
10 We note that Smith cannot be tried again or convicted of either robbery with a
dangerous weapon or use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.  Collateral estoppel
prohibits retrial for these offenses because the acquittal for the lesser included offense of
first-degree assault precludes a finding of guilty for either greater offense.  See Ferrell v.
State, 318 Md. 235, 241, 567 A.2d 937, 940 (1990) (explaining that, under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Maryland common law, “when an
issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit” (quoting Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 475 (1970))).
(continued...)
19
of cases.  Instead, we reaffirm our disapproval of inconsistent verdicts by refusing to allow
an appellate court to use one of them as the basis for a subsequent conviction.
Finally, our decision is consistent with the criminal justice system’s presumption in
favor of the defendant.  A defendant “is ‘presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that presumption attends him throughout the trial until overcome by
proof establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.’”  State v.
Adams, 406 Md. 240, 320, 958 A.2d 295, 344 (2008) (quoting Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87,
98, 145 A.2d 428, 434 (1958)).  A conviction that has been overturned due to inconsistency
is too unreliable to serve as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is guilty of
a different crime, even a lesser included offense.
The Court of Special Appeals in this case reversed the conviction for robbery with
a dangerous weapon because it was inconsistent, but subsequently relied on that conviction
when it directed the trial court to convict the defendant of a lesser included offense.  This
was in err.  Once a conviction for a greater offense has been reversed due to inconsistency,
it cannot provide the basis for a conviction for a lesser included offense.10
10(...continued)
20
Failure to Pursue Misdemeanor Theft at Trial
The Court of Special Appeals also erred in its remand because the parties were given
no opportunity to present arguments on the uncharged lesser included offense before the trial
court.  We reach this conclusion based on our review of Hagans, Brooks, and other cases
from this and other jurisdictions, as well as our consideration of fairness concerns and the
appropriate allocation of judicial decision-making.
Both parties and the Court of Special Appeals have discussed extensively our decision
in Hagans.  Pursuant to Hagans, a defendant may be convicted of a lesser included offense
in a jury trial even though that offense was not charged, subject to some exceptions.  316
Md. at 448, 559 A.2d at 801.  In Hagans, we cited a number of factors in reaching this
conclusion, including:  defendants would be protected by giving the jury an alternative to
a guilty verdict on the greater offense; defendants would be prevented from going free when
the prosecutor has not proven an element of the greater offense; and punishments would
more accurately conform to crimes actually committed.  316 Md. at 448, 559 A.2d at 800
(citing Note, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania:  Uncertainty in the
Courts, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 125, 126 (1979)).  These factors are equally applicable to bench
trials, where prosecutors and the public both have an interest in ensuring that defendants are
convicted for offenses the defendants did commit, but not for offenses of which they are
21
innocent.  Consistent with Hagans, we conclude that a judge, not just a jury, may convict a
defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense.
Our other holding in Hagans has limited applicability to this case.  In Hagans, we
specifically considered the circumstances under which an uncharged lesser included offense
may be submitted to a jury, not a judge.  316 Md. at 455, 559 A.2d at 804.  We held that a
judge, sitting in a jury trial, may only submit a lesser included offense to the jury if either
the defendant or the State requests or affirmatively agrees to the submission.  Hagans, 316
Md. at 455, 559 A.2d at 804.  We concluded that the ultimate decision whether to submit
such an offense to the jury “is a matter of prosecution and defense strategy which is best left
to the parties,” but we did not prohibit the judge from initially raising the issue of a lesser
included offense.  Hagans, 316 Md. at 455, 559 A.2d at 804.  Of particular relevance to the
present case, we did not address the circumstances upon which the finder of fact in a bench
trial might consider an uncharged lesser included offense.
This requirement from Hagans, that an uncharged lesser included offense may only
be submitted to the jury with a request or agreement from the parties, does not apply to
bench trials.  It was based on our conclusion that the decision whether a jury should consider
an uncharged lesser included offense is one of trial strategy that is better left to the parties.
Hagans, 316 Md. at 455, 559 A.2d at 804.  This is a strategic decision because it presents
an important choice for both parties:  whether to submit an uncharged lesser included offense
to the jury or hope that the jury will choose the desired result when it has an “all or nothing”
22
choice.  Hagans, 316 Md. at 454-55, 559 A.2d at 804 (quoting People v. Sowinski, 498
N.E.2d 650, 659 (Ill. App. 1986)).  On the contrary, there is no such strategic decision to be
made in a bench trial.  The parties cannot hope for a compromise verdict because a judge
cannot compromise with him or herself and because a judge can only properly convict a
defendant if there is sufficient evidence to do so.  Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206, 699 A.2d
1170, 1194 (1997) (“[T]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.”).
We see no reason, however, why the parties in a bench trial should be allowed to decide
whether the court will consider an uncharged lesser included offense when there are no
countervailing concerns regarding trial strategy.
In regard to an appellate court’s role in convicting a defendant of a lesser included
offense, our holding in Brooks supports the conclusion that an appellate court may
sometimes instruct the trial court to find a defendant guilty of a lesser included offense when
the greater offense has been reversed.  In Brooks, we reversed the conviction on the greater
offense and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to convict the defendant
of a lesser included offense that had been both charged and submitted to the jury.  314 Md.
at 601, 552 A.2d at 880.  We concluded that a conviction of the greater offense meant that
the defendant necessarily had been convicted of the lesser included offense as well.  Brooks,
314 Md. at 601, 552 A.2d at 880.  As discussed in the previous section of this opinion, an
appellate court may, under the appropriate circumstances, remand a case with directions to
enter a verdict of guilty as to a lesser included offense.
23
This case does not, however, present the appropriate circumstances for such a remand.
The State has, in effect, proposed the following rule:  a judge, sitting as the trier of fact in
a bench trial, may convict a defendant of a lesser included offense of one of the charged
offenses even though the lesser included offense was neither expressly charged nor
mentioned at trial.  Under this rule, a trial judge could convict a defendant of a lesser
included offense even though neither party nor the judge had uttered a single word about that
offense before the verdict was announced.  The defendant’s first opportunity to present an
argument regarding the lesser included offense would be in an appellate proceeding.  As a
matter of fairness and judicial economy, we reject this rule.  Instead, we hold that a trial
court may not convict a defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense unless the parties
are given an opportunity to present arguments on that offense in the trial court.
This rule properly allocates responsibility to the trial court.  It ensures that the trial
court will have an opportunity to hear arguments on the lesser included offense, if the parties
choose to make such arguments, which is consistent with the principle that a trial judge must
be allowed to consider the arguments in a case.  See Nelson v. Carrol, 350 Md. 247, 252, 711
A.2d 228, 230 (1998) (“A trial judge must be given a reasonable opportunity to consider all
legal and evidentiary arguments in deciding what issues to submit to the jury and in framing
proper instructions to the jury.” (quoting Kent Village v. Smith, 104 Md. App. 507, 517, 657
A.2d 330, 334 (1995))).  This rule also allocates the appropriate fact-finding responsibilities
to the trial court, which we have frequently noted is best qualified to evaluate and weigh the
24
evidence in a case.  See, e.g., Schade v. Board of Elections, 401 Md. 1, 34-35, 930 A.2d 304,
324 (2007) (noting that the trial court “is in the best position, a position far more superior
than that of an appellate court, to evaluate and weigh . . . evidence”); Bowie v. MIE, 398 Md.
657, 684, 922 A.2d 509, 525 (2007) (noting “the trial court’s unique position to weigh the
credibility of the evidence and testimony adduced at trial”).  Furthermore, this rule is
consistent with our preference for limiting unnecessary appeals.  See Md. Rule 8-131
(allowing an appellate court to consider issues not raised in the trial court to “avoid the
expense and delay of another appeal”); Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 676, 684 A.2d 445, 452
(1996) (noting that one purpose of Maryland Rule 4-252 is to avoid unnecessary appeals);
see also Taha, 378 Md. at 500, 836 A.2d at 649 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that “[o]ne
reason underlying the contemporaneous objection rule is to avoid unnecessary appeals” and
promotion of judicial economy).
This rule also eliminates concerns that might arise, for both the defendant and the
State, if the parties are not given an opportunity to present closing arguments regarding the
lesser included offense.  See Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202, 220-21, 963 A.2d 1184, 1195
(2009) (finding prejudice where the jury was presented with a new theory of culpability after
closing arguments); Lee v. State, 405 Md. 148, 161-62, 950 A.2d 125, 132-33 (2008) (noting
the “importance of closing arguments”); Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 419, 463 A.2d 808,
809 (1983) (explaining that “the opportunity for summation by defense counsel prior to
verdict in a non-jury trial as well as in a jury trial is a basic constitutional right guaranteed
11 This rule will not necessarily give either party an opportunity to present new
evidence regarding the uncharged lesser included offense or to change their overall trial
strategies.  Either party, or the judge, may raise the uncharged lesser included offense at any
time before the fact-finder renders the verdict.  Cf. Hagans, 316 Md. at 433-37, 559 A.2d at
794-95 (allowing the judge or the parties to raise the offense after the close of evidence).
This rule does, however, give the parties an opportunity to present arguments to the trial
court regarding the lesser included offense before the judge renders a verdict.
25
by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution”).  By giving the parties a chance to present arguments that directly
address the uncharged lesser included offense, this rule will provide the trial court with
arguments from both parties on the lesser included offense, including whether it is even a
lesser included offense at all, which will assist the court and is in keeping with our
adversarial system.  See Lee, 405 Md. at 162, 950 A.2d at 133 (explaining that
“‘[s]ummation provides counsel with an opportunity to creatively mesh the diverse facets
of trial, meld the evidence presented with plausible theories, and expose the deficiencies in
his or her opponent’s argument’” (quoting Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 230, 596 A.2d 1024,
1037 (1991))).11
This rule is consistent with our decisions in both Hagans and Brooks, which provide
the parties with an opportunity to address, in closing arguments, all the offenses that the fact-
finder is considering.  In Hagans, we allowed the trial judge to instruct the jury on an
uncharged lesser included offense.  316 Md. at 455, 559 A.2d at 804.  Closing arguments
occur after the jury is given its instructions, so, under Hagans, the parties must know by
closing arguments what offenses the fact-finder is considering.  See Md. Rule 4-325(a).
26
Similarly, the jury in Brooks was given instructions on the lesser included offense, and,
again, the parties gave their closing arguments after those instructions were given.  314 Md.
at 587, 552 A.2d at 873.  In the present case, we are giving the parties in bench trials the
same opportunity to present arguments to the fact-finder on uncharged lesser included
offenses as we have afforded to the parties in jury trials.
The rule we announce in this case is similar to the rule in other jurisdictions.  The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, for example, has held that a trial court may consider a
lesser included offense sua sponte in a non-jury trial, but has explained that the trial court
should “indicate to the parties at the close of the evidence its intention to raise a lesser-
included offense and . . . give both sides an opportunity to express their views on the
subject.” In re Nathan L., 776 A.2d 1277, 1281 (N.H. 2001).  Similarly, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that a trial judge could consider a lesser included
offense sua sponte, but specifically noted that the court had consulted counsel and received
the government’s acquiescence before convicting the defendant of that offense.  Mungo v.
United States, 772 A.2d 240, 244 (D.C. 2001); see also Hawthorne v. United States, 829
A.2d 948, 951-52 (D.C. 2003) (quoting language from Mungo regarding the consultation of
counsel in regard to a lesser included offense).  The intermediate appellate court in Colorado
has also concluded that a trial court may not consider a lesser included offense when the
State has not taken a position on the lesser included offense.  In re J.A.M., 43 P.3d 673, 675
12 Several other courts have come to a contrary conclusion, holding that a trial judge
has complete discretion whether to consider an uncharged lesser included offense.  See State
v. Atkinson, 741 A.2d 991, 994-95 (Conn. 1999) (holding that “the court is obliged to
consider all applicable lesser included offenses in a trial without a jury”); Sorrell v. State,
855 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fl. App. 2003) (finding “no authority for the proposition that in a
non-jury trial a judge may find a defendant guilty of a lesser included offense only when the
parties argue to the court that guilt on a lesser charge is a potential outcome”); State v.
Archuleta, 772 P.2d 1320, 1321 (N.M. App. 1989) (holding that “a trial court, sitting without
a jury, may consider a lesser charge when neither party has requested a finding on that
charge or argued it to the court”); Shute v. State, 877 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (holding that “[i]n a bench trial, the prosecution is not required to submit a lesser
included offense charge to the trial judge” and that “[t]he trial court is authorized to find the
appellant guilty of any lesser offense for which the State provides the required proof”).  With
all due respect to our sister jurisdictions, none of these cases present an argument that
dissuades us from our conclusion that we are adopting a better rule.
27
(Colo. App. 2001).  These decisions support our conclusion in this case that a trial judge
cannot unilaterally convict a defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense.12
Finally, we see no detriment to giving the parties an opportunity to present an
argument at trial regarding an uncharged lesser included offense.  Indeed, we see only
advantages.  Cf. Collier v. State, 999 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining
that requiring the State or defendant to request a jury instruction on a lesser included offense
“places no onerous burden on the State”).  As we have explained in this opinion, this rule
will allow both parties to direct their arguments to the charges that the trial court is actually
considering, while allowing the trial judge to convict the defendant of the crime, if any, that
the defendant actually committed.  It will also prevent unnecessary appeals by giving the
parties an opportunity to present arguments on the uncharged lesser included offense in the
trial court, where such arguments are most appropriate.
28
In conclusion, we hold that a trial judge may not convict a defendant of an uncharged
lesser included offense unless the parties are given an opportunity to present arguments on
that offense before the trial court.  Once the court has given the parties that opportunity, the
trial court may convict the defendant of the uncharged lesser included offense regardless of
whether either party requests or agrees that the court should consider that offense.
Having so concluded, we also conclude that an appellate court may not direct a trial
court to enter a judgment of conviction for an uncharged lesser included offense under the
same circumstances.  If an appellate court could direct a trial court to enter such a judgment,
then it would be directing the trial court to do exactly what we have forbidden – convict a
defendant without giving the parties an opportunity to present arguments on the uncharged
lesser included offense before the trial court.  This would undermine the rule in this opinion
as it would require the parties to present arguments on the uncharged offense for the first
time on appeal.  Accordingly, we also hold that an appellate court may not direct the trial
court to enter a judgment of conviction for an uncharged lesser included offense when the
parties had no opportunity to present arguments on that offense before the trial court.
III.
We have also been asked to determine whether a conviction for misdemeanor theft
in this case would be inconsistent with the acquittal for first-degree assault.  We need not
consider that issue because the offense of first-degree assault is no longer before this Court,
by virtue of our affirmative answer to the first question presented in this appeal.  Neither this
29
Court, nor the Court of Special Appeals, could have properly directed the trial court to enter
a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor theft.  We therefore need not consider whether
such a conviction would have been inconsistent with Smith’s acquittal for first-degree
assault.  By opining on that matter, we would be “rendering [a] purely advisory opinion[],
a long forbidden practice in this State.”  Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 320, 978 A.2d
687, 698 (2009) (quoting Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 46, 464 A.2d 1076, 1078 (1983)).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY
WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
AND FOR THE USE OF A HANDGUN
IN THE COMMISSION OF A
FELONY AND TO REMAND THE
CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
DIRECTING THE CIRCUIT COURT
TO 
ENTER 
JUDGMENT 
OF
ACQUITTAL FOR ROBBERY WITH
A DANGEROUS WEAPON AND FOR
USE OF A HANDGUN IN THE
COMMISSION OF A FELONY.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY
COUNTY.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No.1
September Term, 2009
                                                                                 
RICHARD C. SMITH
    
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                                 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera, 
JJ.
                                                                                 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
by Murphy, J.,
which Harrell, J. joins.
                                                                                 
Filed:   December 30, 2009
I agree with the majority’s conclusions that (1) “a trial judge may not convict a
defendant of an uncharged lesser included offense unless the parties are given an
opportunity to present arguments on that offense before the trial court,” and (2) “[o]nce
the court has given the parties that opportunity, the trial court may convict the defendant
of the uncharged lesser included offense regardless of whether either party requests or
agrees that the court should consider that offense.”  I dissent, however, from that portion
of the majority opinion in which those conclusions are applied to the facts of this case.  
I.
I am persuaded that Petitioner is not entitled to reversal of the convictions for
robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.  In
my opinion, those convictions should be reinstated under the “slip of the tongue” rule
applied in Reed v. State, 225 Md. 566, 171 A.2d 464 (1961), when this Court stated that
“[a]lmost anyone can make a slip of the tongue, and judges are not immune from such
errors.”  Id. at 570, 171 A.2d at 466.  I would hold that the “slip of the tongue” rule is
equally applicable to the issue of whether, as soon as the Circuit Court announced that it
was granting Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to “count seven”
(first degree assault), Petitioner could no longer be convicted of either robbery with a
deadly weapon or use of a handgun. 
In Reed, the defendant/appellant, who was charged with various offenses in a
fourteen count indictment, elected to be tried before a judge of the Criminal Court of
Baltimore.  At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, while moving for a “directed
verdict” as to all counts, defense counsel argued that the defendant was entitled to a
2
directed verdict as to the counts that charged him with “sale” of heroin and marihuana,
“on the ground that the evidence showed that the sale alleged was made to a person other
than the individual named in the indictment as the purchaser.”  Id. at 569, 171 A.2d at
465.  The trial judge overruled the motion as to the counts that charged the defendant with
“possession” of drugs, but “granted [the motion] as to the sale.”  Id.   At this point, “[t]he
defendant’s trial counsel . . . rested the case as to possession and control and proceeded to
argue those questions to the court.”  Id.  The record shows that, at the conclusion of that
argument, the trial judge -- after stating that he “was completely satisfied that this crime
has been involved with narcotic drugs” -- announced, “I will have to find him guilty on
the count other than possession.”  
On appeal to this Court, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a reversal of
the convictions entered on the “possession” counts of heroin and marihuana on the
ground that he had been acquitted of those counts by operation of law when the trial judge
erroneously found him guilty of the “sale” counts that were no longer before the court. 
While rejecting that argument, this Court stated:
After a careful study of the entire colloquy relating to the
sufficiency of the evidence both before and after the closing
argument of defense counsel, we have no doubt (assuming no
error by the court reporter) that a slip of the tongue is exactly
what occurred in the judge’s statement of the counts upon which
he was finding the defendant guilty. . . .  Any different
interpretation of the judge’s statement would lead to the
conclusion that he was finding the defendant guilty of selling
and dispensing [narcotic drugs], when the transcript makes it
perfectly clear that he had already found the defendant not guilty
of those charges because of the discrepancy in proof as to the
3
identity of the purchaser.
Id. at 570-71, 171 A.2d at 466.  From my review of the record in the case at bar, which
includes the Circuit Court’s statement that “the assault merges into the robbery,” I have
no doubt that a slip of the tongue is exactly what occurred when the Circuit Court granted
the motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to “count seven.”  I would therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that Court to affirm
Petitioner’s convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony.  
II.
In the alternative, assuming that the judgment of acquittal entered on count seven
required reversal of the convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony, a judgment of acquittal as to the first degree
assault charged in count seven did not operate to prohibit the Circuit Court from
convicting Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of (simple) robbery as well as the
lesser-included offense of misdemeanor theft.  While some degree of assault is a lesser
included offense of the crime of robbery, a first degree assault is not an essential element
of robbery.  For that reason, if it is necessary that the case at bar be remanded to the
Circuit Court for further proceedings, I would expressly hold that Respondent is entitled
to a new trial on the charges of both robbery and misdemeanor theft, rather than to merely
present additional argument on the misdemeanor theft charge.  
Judge Harrell has authorized me to state that he joins this concurring and dissenting
4
opinion.