Title: Lee v. Weir

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Lee 
v. Weir, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8104.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8104 
LEE, APPELLANT, v. WEIR, DIR., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lee v. Weir, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8104.] 
Habeas corpus—Appellant had alternative remedies at law to challenge juvenile 
court’s grant of permanent custody of minor child to county agency—Court 
of appeals’ judgment denying petition affirmed. 
(No. 2015-1536—Submitted August 16, 2016—Decided December 14, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-150417. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Ricardo G. Lee, appeals from the judgment of the First 
District Court of Appeals denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Because 
Lee had alternative remedies at law to challenge the juvenile court’s grant of 
permanent custody of minor child, R.L., we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} On July 6, 2015, Lee filed his second petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the First District Court of Appeals, alleging that appellee, Hamilton 
County Job and Family Services (“Family Services”) Director Moira Weir, is 
unlawfully restraining his biological minor son, R.L. (d.o.b. 3/14/2012), pursuant 
to a juvenile court order. 
{¶ 3} The petition asserts that on December 26, 2012, Family Services filed 
a complaint in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court alleging that R.L. was 
dependent and seeking emergency removal and temporary custody.  The court, 
through a magistrate judge, held a hearing on the emergency request on December 
28, 2012. 
{¶ 4} After the hearing, the magistrate issued an order stating that Lee is the 
“alleged father of [R.L.]” and that the mother’s husband, Alisher 
Shermukhamedov, is the “legal father by law of [R.L.].”  As to Lee, the magistrate’s 
order states that “Ricardo has a turbulent relationship with [R.L.’s mother].  Mother 
was the victim.  Ricardo Lee has been violent and abusive toward mother.  He has 
been charged multiple times with aggravated menacing and domestic violence.  He 
had a stay away order and was convicted of Menacing.  He is currently on 
probation.”  The magistrate concluded that the evidence presented at the hearing 
demonstrated that R.L. was in “imminent risk of harm,” that the child was currently 
missing, and that the child’s mother was a “flight risk.”  Based on its determination 
that “[t]he child’s continued residence in or return to the home would be contrary 
to the child’s best interest and welfare,” the magistrate judge granted temporary 
custody of R.L. to Family Services. 
{¶ 5} More than two years later, in April 2014, the juvenile court granted 
permanent custody of R.L. to Family Services. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 6} Weir filed both a motion to dismiss Lee’s petition and an answer, 
arguing that Lee’s petition was successive and barred by res judicata and that Lee 
had—and had used—alternative remedies at law to challenge the custody order. 
{¶ 7} One week later, the court of appeals issued a one-page judgment entry 
granting Weir’s motion to dismiss and noting that Lee’s petition “demonstrated no 
grounds for relief.” 
{¶ 8} Lee timely appealed to this court and on August 29, 2016, filed a 
motion to expedite. 
Analysis 
{¶ 9} In a child-custody action, a writ of habeas corpus will be granted only 
if the petitioner establishes that “(1) the child is being unlawfully detained, and (2) 
the petitioner has the superior legal right to custody of the child.”  Holloway v. 
Clermont Cty. Dept. of Human Servs., 80 Ohio St.3d 128, 130, 684 N.E.2d 1217 
(1997).  In this context, “[h]abeas corpus relief is the exception rather than the 
general rule.”  Id.  Further, a petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus in 
a child-custody action “ ‘when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law.’ ”  In re G.T.B., 128 Ohio St.3d 502, 2011-Ohio-1789, 947 N.E.2d 166,  
¶ 8, quoting In re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 
427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 10} Lee had the right to challenge the magistrate’s order granting 
temporary custody by filing a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order.  Juv.R. 
40(D)(2)(b).  Moreover, Lee had the right to challenge to the magistrate’s decision 
“in any subsequent hearing in the case, and appeal any adverse judgment by the 
juvenile court.”  Rammage v. Saros, 97 Ohio St.3d 430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 
N.E.2d 278, ¶ 10.  Indeed, Lee, represented by counsel, appealed the juvenile 
court’s order granting permanent custody to Family Services.  The availability of 
alternative remedies in the ordinary course of the law, even if those remedies were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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not sought or were unsuccessful, precludes a writ of habeas corpus.  State ex rel. 
O’Neal v. Bunting, 140 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-4037, 18 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 14-15. 
{¶ 11} Lee had—and has used—alternative remedies at law to challenge the 
juvenile’s court’s judgment granting permanent custody of R.L. to Family Services.  
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals.  We also 
deny Lee’s August 29, 2016 motion to expedite as moot. 
Judgment affirmed 
and motion denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Ricardo G. Lee, pro se. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christian J. 
Schaefer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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