Title: Com. v. Bracero

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

515 Pa. 355 (1987) 528 A.2d 936 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Victor M. BRACERO, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted May 15, 1987. Decided July 9, 1987. *356 Christopher J. Coyle, Lebanon, for appellant. Robert W. Feeman, Dist. Atty., John E. Feather, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Bradford H. Charles, Lebanon, for appellee. Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ. LARSEN, Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court[1] which affirmed a judgment of sentence for burglary. The appellant, Victor Bracero, was tried before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, and convicted of the burglary of a dwelling house on South Tenth Street in the City of Lebanon. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain exculpatory evidence offered by him during his trial. On February 14, 1981, the home of Mr. and Mrs. Steinrock at 225 South Tenth Street, Lebanon, Pennsylvania was burglarized. On February 17, 1981, the appellant was arrested and charged with committing that crime. Subsequently, the appellant came to trial on the burglary charge. At the beginning of the trial, appellant's counsel met in chambers with the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney. Appellant's counsel made an offer of testimony that proposed to place before the jury evidence tending to exculpate the appellant by implicating another individual as the burglar. The relevant exchange between and among defense counsel, the prosecutor and the court is quoted and set out in the opinion of the Superior Court as follows: (N.T., 6-23-81, at 3-6). At a later time in the proceedings, counsel for appellant again attempted to have the testimony of Harry Tobias admitted. Commonwealth v. Bracero, 325 Pa.Super. 494, 473 A.2d 176 (1984). The appellant argued to the Superior Court that the statements of "Spunk" offered through the testimony of Harry Tobias, even though hearsay, should have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule because they were declarations against the declarant's penal interest. The Superior Court, relying on its opinion in Commonwealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973), held that the statements made by "Spunk" were not made *360 under circumstances insuring that they were trustworthy and reliable. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's ruling excluding the out of court statements allegedly made by "Spunk". The appellant's petition for allowance of appeal to the court was granted. The appellant argues that the rule adopted by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Hackett, supra. and applied in this case should be rejected by this Court. In Hackett, the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin and of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a narcotic drug. At trial the defendant asserted the defense that he had been drugged involuntarily. He sought to call one Dennis Keyser to the stand to testify as a defense witness. It was ascertained preliminarily that Keyser would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify if called as a witness. The trial judge, therefore, declined to permit defendant to call Keyser. In addition, the trial court refused to allow into evidence certain oral and written statements made by Keyser which exculpated the defendant. The defendant wanted to call his former counsel who would have testified that Keyser admitted to him that he, Keyser, put heroin in the defendant's soda bottle without the knowledge of the defendant. The trial court refused to allow this testimony. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and held that Keyser's out of court statements made to both a member of the bar and the accused were relevant and trustworthy and should have been admitted. The court said: *361 Id., 225 Pa.Superior Ct. at 29-30, 307 A.2d at 338. The appellant argues that the admissibility requirement of Hackett, namely, that the evidence must show that the declaration against penal interest was made to "reliable persons of authority or those having adverse interests to the declarant," is not supported by logic or precedent. The appellant urges us to adopt the view expressed by a plurality of this Court in Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 324 A.2d 344 (1974), and Commonwealth v. Colon, 461 Pa. 577, 337 A.2d 554 (1975). In Nash, the defendant Alfred Nash was tried as a co-defendant with one James Robinson. Nash was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault and battery and carrying a concealed weapon. Robinson was convicted of aggravated robbery. The trial court refused to allow the testimony of one Renee Edwards, a girlfriend of Robinson, who was called as a defense witness. Ms. Edwards would have testified that a Willis Daniels had admitted to her that he committed the crimes for which Nash and Robinson were on trial. The testimony was rejected as inadmissible hearsay. Following the trial in Nash, and while that case was pending on appeal, the Superior Court decided Commonwealth v. Hackett, supra and the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Chambers v. State of Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973). Each of these cases decided that, under certain circumstances, an out of court declaration against penal interest is admissible into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. In Chambers, the accused was not permitted to introduce the testimony of three witnesses who would have testified that another person confessed to the murder for which he was being tried. Finding that the ruling of the Mississippi court was in error, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court said: Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually premised on the view that admission would lead to the frequent presentation of perjured testimony to the jury. It is believed that confessions of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous considerations and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest. While that rationale has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism, we need not decide in this case whether, under the circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose by excluding trustworthy testimony. The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. *363 Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S. Ct. 351, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948). In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest. Chambers v. State of Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 298, 299 and 302, 93 S. Ct. at 1047, 1048 and 1049. All of the Justices who participated in the decision in Nash agreed that the appellants were to have a new trial.[2] The Court split on the reasons for this conclusion. Two of the Justices, (O'Brien, J. joined by Eagen, J.) relying heavily on Chambers and Hackett, adopted the view that the requirements of Chambers and Hackett should be applied to the declarations offered by the appellants. Then Justice (now Chief Justice Nix) concurred in the result. The trial court was instructed to conduct a retrial "in light of the rule announced in Chambers and Hackett." On the other hand, three of the Justices (Roberts, J. joined by Jones, C.J. and Pomeroy, J.) took the position that declarations against penal interest are admissible as a hearsay exception on the same basis as statements against pecuniary interest and proprietary interest without a preliminary determination of reliability. *364 In Commonwealth v. Colon, 461 Pa. 577, 337 A.2d 554 (1975), this Court once again considered the issue of the admissibility as a hearsay exception, of out of court declarations against penal interest. In Colon, the entire court agreed that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to admit the accused's offer of the statement of another person confessing to the crime for which the accused was charged. The opinion of Justice Roberts announcing the decision of the Court was joined by the Chief Justice Jones and Justice Manderino. Justices Eagen, O'Brien and Nix (now Chief Justice) concurred in the result and Justice Pomeroy wrote a separate concurring opinion. In the opinion announcing the decision of the Court, Justice Roberts stated: Commonwealth v. Colon, 461 Pa. at 581, 337 A.2d 554. It is clear that we recognize and accept that a declaration against the declarant's penal interest is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Commonwealth *365 v. Colon, supra, Commonwealth v. Nash, supra, Commonwealth v. Hackett, supra. We, however, have never endorsed the view that all such declarations against penal interest are automatically admissible as a hearsay exception merely because they are or tend to be against the declarant's penal interest. To be admissible, considerable assurance of the reliability of such a declaration is required. Chambers v. State of Mississippi, supra, Commonwealth v. Hackett, supra. In the Federal Courts, the admissibility of declarations against penal interest is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3), which provides: We believe that a rule requiring assurance of the trustworthiness and reliability of an out of court statement, such as that announced in Hackett and Chambers, and as mandated by the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 804(b)(3)), is the better view. Experience teaches us that it is not rare for friends, peers and family members to go to extraordinary lengths to help an accused win an acquittal or avoid a jail sentence. In Chambers, the Supreme Court noted the following hypothetical: Chambers v. State of Mississippi, 93 S. Ct. at 1049. The Commonwealth, in its brief, proposes a similar hypothetical situation as follows: Furthermore, it must be remembered that in such cases we are often dealing with "witnesses" who themselves are actively engaged in a criminal lifestyle. "Telling a story" to help a friend or relative to "beat the rap," can not be viewed as an extraordinary occurrence. Accordingly, we hold that declarations against penal interest are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule only when there are circumstances that provide clear assurance that such declarations are trustworthy and reliable. In the instant case, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion, which was affirmed by the Superior Court, that the alleged statements against penal interest attributed to "Spunk" were not made under circumstances *367 that provide the required assurance of reliability and therefore, are inadmissible. The order of the Superior Court is affirmed. NIX, C.J., files a concurring opinion which HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ., join. FLAHERTY, J., files a concurring opinion. NIX, Chief Justice, concurring. I agree that the proffered testimony was properly excluded. In my judgment the holding of the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court that declarations against penal interest may provide an exception to the hearsay rule where the circumstances surrounding the declaration provide a clear assurance of their trustworthiness was purely gratuitous. Since the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court fails to provide any guidance as to what circumstances would supply the necessary reliability for establishing the exception, I believe the discussion should be regarded as pure dicta without any precedential value. When a situation presents itself that would justify the recognition of such an exception to the hearsay rule we then can properly acknowledge such an exception. HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ., join in this concurring opinion. FLAHERTY, Justice, concurring. I disagree that, before a declaration against penal interest may be admitted, a preliminary determination that there exists a "considerable assurance of reliability" is required. At the outset, some assurance of reliability inheres in the "circumstance that the fact stated, being against the declarant's interest, is not likely to have been stated untruthfully." 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1455. The ultimate question of the degree of reliability which should be attributed to the evidence is a proper one for resolution by the fact-finder. During the trial, opposing counsel, through the vehicle of cross-examination, may probe for weaknesses, inconsistencies, *368 and the bias of the witness attesting to the out-of-court declaration. In closing, the fact-finder's attention may again be focused upon the reliability of the declaration through proper argument. Ultimately, the question of the degree of reliance to be placed on the declaration should be determined by the fact-finder. Those courts which have imposed a requirement of additional indicia of reliability have, as the opinion authored by Mr. Justice Larsen correctly notes, been largely motivated out of fear of opening a door to perjured testimony regarding declarations that were never made. In the words of Professor Wigmore, however, "This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent." 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1477. Thus, where the out-of-court declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, I would admit evidence of his declaration against penal interest, and allow this evidence to be tested in the traditional fashion. Because it has not been demonstrated that the out-of-court declarant was indeed unavailable at the time of trial, however, I would exclude the evidence in this case. The witness Tobias would have testified that the declarant left for Florida on the 21st of February. The trial of the instant matter was conducted in June of the same year. It seems likely that the declarant intended to absent himself from the jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding prosecution, and Tobias's testimony would have indicated the same. But whether the declarant was still absent at the time of trial is not known. Before admitting the out-of-court declaration, I would require the party offering the evidence to show that the declarant's presence at trial could not have been secured. As this was not done, the evidence was properly excluded. Thus, I concur in the result. [1] This case was heard and decided by a panel of the Superior Court (Wickersham, Beck and Montemuro, JJ.). Judge Wickersham wrote the opinion of the court joined by Judge Montemuro. Judge Beck filed a dissenting opinion. [2] Nash was argued before Jones, C.J. Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy and Nix, JJ. Manderino, J. took no part in the consideration or decision.