Title: VERNON L. STEPHENSON v. PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AKA PACIFICORP, A Maine Corporation; RAND HAAPAPURO; WELDON DUNN AKA OKIE ROWE; LEONARD GRADERT; and DANNY FOSTER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VERNON L. STEPHENSON v. PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AKA PACIFICORP, A Maine Corporation; RAND HAAPAPURO; WELDON DUNN AKA OKIE ROWE; LEONARD GRADERT; and DANNY FOSTER1989 WY 171779 P.2d 1169Case Number: 88-264Decided: 09/01/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

VERNON L. STEPHENSON, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY AKA PACIFICORP, A MAINE CORPORATION; RAND HAAPAPURO; WELDON DUNN AKA 
OKIE ROWE; LEONARD GRADERT; AND DANNY FOSTER, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Donald P. White 
and Wesley A. Roberts of White, White & Keenan, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

Richard E. Day 
and Richard L. Williams of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellees Pacific Power & Light Co. 
and Weldon Dunn.

Ward A. White of 
Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellees Rand Haapapuro, Leonard 
Gradert and Danny Foster.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, JJ., 
and RAPER, J. (Ret.).

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Vernon 
Stephenson was injured in an industrial accident. He brought suit against 
several co-employees alleging culpable negligence and against the property owner 
and one of its employees alleging negligence. The district court granted summary 
judgment to all defendants.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.

[¶3.]     Appellant articulates 
the following issues:

I. Did the district court 
err in granting summary judgment for Combustion Engineering co-employees when 
there existed genuine issues of material fact as to their culpable 
negligence?

II. Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment for Pacific Power & Light and Weldon 
Dunn a/k/a Okie Rowe when there existed genuine issues of material fact as to 
their direct liability and/or vicarious liability?

III. Did the district 
court err in ruling that appellant's conduct precluded recovery against any of 
the defendants?

We will also 
address the related issue presented by appellees Pacific Power & Light 
Company and Weldon Dunn as to whether the district court correctly determined 
that the actions or inactions of those appellees were not the proximate cause of 
appellant's injury as a matter of law.

[¶4.]     On April 25, 1985, 
appellant was seriously injured when he fell from a scaffolding upon which he 
was working at the Jim Bridger Power Plant in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. At the time of the accident, 
appellant was employed by Combustion Engineering Inc. which had contracted with 
appellee Pacific Power & Light Company (PP & L), the owner of the plant, 
to provide certain engineering and maintenance services at the 
plant.

[¶5.]     By initial complaint 
dated April 2, 1987, and three amendments thereto, appellant brought a personal 
injury action against Combustion Engineering co-employees Rand Haapapuro, Norm 
Aisenbrey, Leonard Gradert, and Danny Foster; against PP & L and PP & L 
employee Weldon Dunn, aka Okie Rowe; and against various John Doe defendants.1 With respect to PP & L and 
Weldon Dunn, appellant essentially alleged that they owed a duty to appellant as 
an invitee to maintain the building where the accident occurred in a safe 
condition and that, by failing to flag or barricade the doorway where the 
scaffolding was located, they breached that duty resulting in appellant's 
injury. Appellant alleged, with respect to the co-employee defendants, that they 
failed to respond to repeated complaints and requests to have the doorway 
flagged or barricaded and that such failure amounted to culpable negligence 
which resulted in appellant's injury.

[¶6.]     After the defendants 
answered and discovery was conducted, each defendant moved for summary 
judgment.2 Memoranda, depositions, and other 
documentary materials were filed in support of and against the motions for 
summary judgment.3 By decision letter and order, the 
district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The district court 
determined that, while the co-employee defendants may have been negligent, there 
was no evidence that they had engaged in willful or wanton misconduct or that 
they had possessed a state of mind approaching an intent to do harm and, 
therefore, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on 
appellant's claims of culpable negligence. The basis of the grant of summary 
judgment to PP & L and Weldon Dunn is less clear, but it appears the 
district court determined, with respect to the claims against all defendants, 
that appellant was precluded from recovery by contributory negligence, 
assumption of the risk, and the obvious danger rule. Additionally, the district 
court's decision letter can be read as determining that the actions of the 
defendants were not the proximate cause of appellant's injury as a matter of 
law.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶7.]     On appeal from a grant 
of summary judgment, we review the judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same materials and following the same standards. Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986). The party 
moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Johnston, 758 P.2d 566; Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 
1987). We have defined a material fact as one which, if proved, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the claim or defense 
asserted by the parties. Johnston, 758 P.2d 566; 
Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1988). We review the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the 
benefit of every favorable inference which may be drawn from the facts in the 
materials submitted in the record. Jones, 718 P.2d 890; Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 
713 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1986). Even if the evidence in the case 
is not significantly in dispute, if that evidence is subject to differing 
interpretations or if reasonable minds might disagree as to its significance, 
summary judgment is not proper. Fegler v. Brodie, 574 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1978); 10A C. 
Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2725 
at 106-09 (1983).

FACTS

[¶8.]     With the above 
standards in mind, we examine the evidence in the record upon which the summary 
judgment was premised. Most of the following facts are gathered from the 
depositions of appellant, Danny Foster, and Bill Huebner. Appellant, an 
experienced ironworker, was hired by Combustion Engineering on April 22, 1985, 
for work at the Jim Bridger Power Plant. Appellee PP & L, the owner of the 
plant, had previously entered into a contract with Combustion Engineering by 
which Combustion Engineering was to perform various technical and engineering 
services, furnish labor therefor, and perform specified work at the plant. 
Appellees Rand Haapapuro, Leonard Gradert, and Danny Foster were employees of 
Combustion Engineering as were Norm Aisenbrey4 and Bill Huebner. Appellee Weldon 
Dunn, aka Okie Rowe, was a shop foreman for PP & L at the PSIBuilding where the accident 
occurred.

[¶9.]     Upon reporting to work 
at the plant on Monday, April 22, 1985, appellant first met with Rand Haapapuro 
who briefly instructed appellant regarding safety. Rand Haapapuro was introduced 
to appellant as a safety engineer. Thereafter, appellant was introduced to his 
immediate supervisor, Danny Foster, to Foster's supervisor, Leonard Gradert, and 
to an unidentified PP & L engineer.5 Appellant was then informed of his 
job assignment, which was that he and Bill Huebner were to install a new 
overhead door at the PSIBuilding. The PSIBuilding was a shop in which PP & L, 
among other things, serviced vehicles used at the plant. The PP & L engineer 
and appellant went over the shop drawings (i.e., plans/blueprints) which the 
engineer had prepared regarding the installation of the new 
door.

[¶10.]  Later that day, appellant and Bill 
Huebner erected a scaffolding inside the door opening and commenced work on the 
installation of the new door. This door opening was the only vehicle access to 
the building. The working platform on the scaffolding was approximately fifteen 
to seventeen feet above the shop floor. An access ladder was built into the 
scaffolding. The scaffolding was on rollers so that it could be moved, and it 
had a brake to lock it into place. Some of the equipment used on the job by 
appellant and Bill Huebner belonged to PP & L, including a cherry picker, a 
forklift, and perhaps the scaffolding.

[¶11.]  Upon commencing work on the scaffolding, 
appellant and Bill Huebner immediately encountered problems with PP & L 
vehicle traffic coming into and out of the building. Appellant stated that the 
vehicles would "come whipping around there and blow the horn or whatever." Bill 
Huebner stated that for a vehicle coming into the building from the outside it 
was like driving into a cave. Vehicle traffic approaching from the outside had 
no warning of the presence of the scaffolding and workmen inside the door. Each 
time a vehicle approached, appellant and Bill Huebner had to descend from the 
scaffolding and move it out of the way. In addition to the inconvenience, 
appellant stated that he perceived the safety problem.

[¶12.]  That Monday appellant communicated to 
Leonard Gradert and the PP & L engineer the safety problem and the need for 
a barricade or flagging. The PP & L engineer responded that the door could 
not be barricaded because of the need for vehicle access, and he refused to 
commit himself regarding flagging off the door. Appellant and Bill Huebner also 
discussed the need for flagging with Danny Foster on that Monday. Danny Foster 
relayed the complaint to his supervisor, Leonard Gradert, who responded that the 
door could not be shut off but that he would refer the matter to PP & L. 
Danny Foster also mentioned the problem to Rand Haapapuro. Danny Foster stated 
that he did not personally assume responsibility for flagging off the door 
because Leonard Gradert had informed him that this project was to be supervised 
by PP & L's Weldon Dunn and that he, Foster, was to stay away from it. 
Similarly, appellant and Bill Huebner had been told, or were under the 
impression, that they were prohibited from barricading or flagging off the 
door.

[¶13.]  The record indicates this pattern of 
complaints to Combustion Engineering superiors and to PP & L personnel 
continued until the time of the injury producing accident, with the same 
ineffectual buck passing and lack of action on the problem. On Tuesday, April 
23, 1985, a PP & L vehicle ran into the scaffolding. It is unclear from the 
deposition testimony whether either appellant or Bill Huebner was on the 
scaffolding when it was struck. Although no injuries occurred as a result of 
this collision, a section of the scaffolding was damaged to the point that it 
had to be replaced. The materials in the record indicate that Danny Foster, 
Leonard Gradert, Rand Haapapuro, and the PP & L engineer were all aware that 
the scaffolding had been struck by a vehicle. During his deposition, appellant 
was asked if he had informed Leonard Gradert and the PP & L engineer about 
this incident:

Q. I want to know 
specifically if you told Leonard and the PP & L engineer about 
it.

A. Yes, sir. Yes, 
sir.

Q. What did they say 
about that?

A. They was sorry, you 
know, sorry it happened and apologized. They said they would try to correct 
it.

Q. Did you ask them about 
the flagging and the flagmen or the barricades?

A. Yes, sir, I told them 
that we needed a barricade and to have someone out there to watch 
it.

Q. What did they say 
about that?

A. They said they would 
talk about it and try to correct the situation.

Q. Who are they going to 
talk to? Do you have any idea?

A. I don't know. I guess 
the PP & L engineer was going to go to his boss and I suppose Leonard was 
going to go to this Norm fellow.

[¶14.]  The deposition testimony indicates that 
Weldon Dunn, the PP & L shop foreman, controlled the flow of traffic into 
and out of the PSIBuilding. He attempted, 
largely unsuccessfully according to the deposition testimony, to work out an 
arrangement with appellant and Bill Huebner by which he would schedule several 
vehicles in the shop at one time in order to minimize the traffic flow. 
According to appellant, after the collision with the scaffolding on Tuesday, 
either he or Bill Huebner, upon hearing a vehicle approach, would hurry down the 
scaffolding to make sure the vehicle stopped. Appellant stated that the fact 
that he and Bill Huebner were having to hustle down the scaffolding to do their 
own flagging was communicated to or known by Rand Haapapuro, Leonard Gradert, 
Danny Foster, and the PP & L engineer.

[¶15.]  Appellant's injury occurred on Thursday 
morning, April 25, 1985.6 Despite the continuous complaints, 
the doorway still had not been barricaded or flagged. Appellant stated that 
several times that morning he had come down the scaffolding to flag cars. On 
appellant's final such descent he fell off the scaffolding ladder and onto a 
pile of iron which was lying on the floor, severely injuring his left knee. 
Appellant said that he had heard a vehicle approaching and that he was hurrying 
down the scaffolding to prevent the vehicle from colliding with the scaffolding. 
Appellant was unable to identify exactly what precipitated his fall; i.e., 
whether he missed a step or a handhold. He stated, "I started down and the next 
thing I knew I was laying in this pile of iron." Appellant could not say whether 
or not the vehicle hit the scaffolding, although he testified that Bill Huebner 
told him it did.

[¶16.]  Bill Huebner testified that appellant was 
hurrying down to stop the car. Bill Huebner further stated that he thought the 
vehicle bumped the scaffolding, although that might have happened prior to 
appellant's descent. Neither appellant nor Bill Huebner could say whether the 
vehicle actually knocked appellant off the scaffolding. Danny Foster testified 
that he informed Leonard Gradert of the accident and reiterated the need for a 
barricade or flagging, to which information Leonard Gradert indicated that "he 
just hadn't got ahold of anybody either yet." Other evidence in the record will 
be mentioned as it pertains to the discussion of the specific 
issues.

CULPABLE 
NEGLIGENCE

[¶17.]  We first address appellant's contention 
that summary judgment was improperly granted on his claims of culpable 
negligence against the Combustion Engineering co-employees. At the time of 
appellant's injury7 the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-103 (1977), excepted 
culpably negligent co-employees from the general grant of immunity to employers 
and co-employees.8 That statute, in material part, 
provided:

(a) The rights and 
remedies provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 to -804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required 
by this act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees are culpably 
negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an 
employee and his dependents against any other person.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶18.]  The definition of culpable negligence and 
the showing required for recovery were set out in our opinion in Bryant v. 
Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 1986):

In order to recover 
against a coemployee under this section of the Worker's Compensation Act, a 
plaintiff must establish more than simple negligence; the coemployee's conduct 
must constitute "culpable" negligence. In Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), we defined 
the term "culpable negligence" as "willful and serious misconduct." We defined 
the term "willful" in this context as "`such as is done purposely, with 
knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard 
of consequences.'" Id., quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 
206, 149 A.L.R. 998 (1943).

The aggravating factor 
which distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negligence is the actor's 
state of mind. In order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful 
misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted with a state of mind that 
approaches intent to do harm. State of mind, of course, may be difficult to 
prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish that willful misconduct 
has occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally committed an act 
of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow.

(Citations 
omitted), quoted in Johnston, 758 P.2d  at 
568-69.

[¶19.]  In the instant case, we are unable to 
agree with appellant's contention that the conduct of these co-employees 
surmounted simple negligence and reached the level of culpable negligence. The 
evidence does indicate that each of the co-employee appellees was in a 
supervisory capacity in relation to appellant and, under the circumstances, it 
would appear that these co-employees owed appellant a duty to provide safe 
working conditions. See Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989), and Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 
(Wyo. 1981). 
Appellant asserts that there is factual dispute as to whether the supervisory 
co-employees had knowledge of the hazardous situation. The co-employee 
appellees, however, concede such knowledge for purposes of this summary judgment 
review. These appellees convincingly argue, nevertheless, that, while their 
conduct might well have constituted ordinary negligence, it lacked the character 
of willfulness; i.e., their conduct did not demonstrate a state of mind 
approaching intent to do harm. The co-employee appellees describe their actions 
as "ineffectual" and as a "bureaucratic shuffle" wherein each, while never 
affirmatively refusing to act, repeatedly passed the buck to others they assumed 
were more responsible. We think this is a fair characterization of the conduct 
of the co-employees as reflected in the record and, while such conduct may have 
been less than reasonable under the circumstances, culpable negligence "involves 
more than unreasonable conduct; it involves willfulness." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 
1137.

[¶20.]  We conclude that the evidence in the 
record, viewed from the vantage point most favorable to appellant, demonstrates 
that the co-employee appellees may not have fulfilled their duty to provide 
appellant with a safe working environment but that the breach of this duty was a 
matter of negligence at most, and appellant failed to present evidence of 
culpable negligence. Thus, co-employees Leonard Gradert, Rand Haapapuro, and 
Danny Foster were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OF 
PP & L AND WELDON DUNN

[¶21.]  In his third amended complaint, appellant 
alleged that PP & L and its agent/employee, Weldon Dunn, owed appellant, by 
virtue of his status as a business invitee, a duty of care to maintain the 
PSIBuilding in a safe condition and that they 
negligently maintained an unsafe work environment at the entrance to the 
building which proximately caused appellant's injuries. As noted previously, it 
is not clear whether or not the district court considered the nature of any duty 
that PP & L and Weldon Dunn may have owed appellant or whether such duty was 
breached, but rather the district court apparently granted summary judgment to 
these appellees on the basis of absolute defenses and proximate cause. We must 
initially examine, however, the legal grounds of potential liability of these 
appellees as the premises owner and its employee; i.e., the nature of the duty 
that PP & L and Weldon Dunn may have owed to 
appellant.

[¶22.]  In Jones, 718 P.2d 890, we noted that a 
premises owner may be liable to a worker injured on the premises under either of 
two theories. First, the owner may be liable vicariously for the negligence of 
the worker's employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Second, apart from 
vicarious liability, the owner may be directly liable for his own negligence in 
connection with the work to be done.

"So far as he in fact 
gives directions for the work, furnishes equipment for it, or retains control 
over any part of it, he is required to exercise reasonable care for the 
protection of others * * *. If the work is done on the employer's own land, he 
will be required to exercise reasonable care to prevent activities or conditions 
which are dangerous to those outside of it, or to those who enter it as 
invitees. In all of these cases, he is liable for his personal negligence, 
rather than that of the contractor." (Footnotes omitted.) W. Keeton, Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts § 71 at 510-511 (1984).

Id. at 
893-94.

[¶23.]  With respect to vicarious liability, the 
controlling question is whether or not Combustion Engineering was an independent 
contractor. If Combustion Engineering was an independent contractor, then PP 
& L and Weldon Dunn are entitled to rely upon the general rule that the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the 
contractor unless the employer did not exercise care in the selection of the 
contractor. Jones, 718 P.2d  at 898. The premier consideration in determining 
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is whether the employer 
has the right to control the details of the work whereby liability is sought to 
be established. Noonan, 713 P.2d 160; Combined Insurance Company of 
America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 
1978). Ordinarily this is a question of fact for the jury and becomes one of law 
only when but one inference can be drawn. Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 164; Combined 
Insurance Company of America, 584 P.2d  at 
1042.

[¶24.]  Our review of the record reveals that the 
evidence is conflicting regarding PP & L's right to control the details of 
the work performed by Combustion Engineering on this project. The contract 
between PP & L and Combustion Engineering indicates the relationship is one 
of owner/independent contractor. The following provisions of the contract 
address this issue:

Article 4.1 Independent 
Contractor

Contractor is an 
independent contractor, and all persons employed by Contractor in connection 
herewith shall be employees of Contractor, and not employees of Company, in any 
respect.

Article 4.2 General 
Supervision

All work will be subject 
to general supervision and inspection by a representative of Company, who may 
exercise such control of the work as is required to safeguard the interests of 
Company and Owners.

[¶25.]  Thus, the contract contemplated that 
Combustion Engineering would be an independent contractor, and the contractual 
retention of general powers of supervision as to results by PP & L does not 
alter that relationship. See Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 165. Although not conclusive, 
the contract is a strong indication of the intended relationship. Id. Certain deposition 
testimony, however, presents a different picture from that demonstrated by the 
contract. Although appellant stated that PP & L did not direct him as to the 
details of his work, he also stated that it seemed like Combustion Engineering 
was just a labor broker and that the Combustion Engineering employees had to get 
PP & L's approval for everything they did. Bill Huebner, in his deposition, 
discussed the role of Combustion Engineering's foreman, Danny Foster, on the 
project:

And he [Foster] said that 
he had nothing to do with it. We were working for PP & L, for Okie Rowe 
[Dunn] mainly, because I went to him several times and asked him about something 
on the door or the iron or what. And he says, I don't know. He says, It's not my 
baby.

Later in the 
deposition, this exchange occurred:

Q. So this two and a half 
weeks you are on the job, you knew that the chain of command was from you to 
Danny Foster?

A. But then Danny Foster 
told us for - that we had to see Okie or PP & L for whatever we 
needed.

Q. But you didn't. You 
continued to see Danny.

A. And Danny said, we - 
I've got nothing to do with it. You are on our payroll. But you are working for 
PP & L.

[¶26.]  Similarly, Danny Foster testified that 
Leonard Gradert instructed him that Weldon Dunn would be the boss on this 
particular job and that he (Foster) was not to get involved in it. Danny Foster 
further stated that it was unusual for Leonard Gradert to instruct him to stay 
away from the job, that it had never happened before, and that Weldon Dunn was 
involved as a hands-on foreman on this job. Thus, reviewing the record in the 
light most favorable to appellant, as we must, the evidence as to PP & L's 
and Weldon Dunn's right to exercise control and the actual exercise of control 
over the details of the work is conflicting, and clearly more than one inference 
can be drawn from such evidence. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to 
whether appellant was the employee of an independent contractor in relation to 
these appellees on this project. PP & L and Weldon Dunn were not entitled to 
summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability.

[¶27.]  A somewhat similar analysis applies to 
the alleged direct liability of PP & L and Weldon Dunn. Again, the right to 
control the details of the work is a critical determinant. An owner, however, 
may relinquish enough control so as to preserve or insure the contractor's 
independent status and yet retain sufficient control to sustain direct liability 
for his own negligence. Jones, 718 P.2d  at 895. In Jones, we pointed out that, 
in situations where the owner maintains control over the hazard causing the 
harm, the owner should not be exempt from liability. This principle is 
encompassed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965), which 
provides:

One who entrusts work to 
an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, 
is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the 
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure 
to exercise his control with reasonable care.

Quoted in Jones, 
718 P.2d  at 895. Accordingly, we held in Jones that

an owner of a work site 
who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent contractor's 
performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety owes a duty of 
reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor even if the 
employee is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to 
perform.

Id. at 896. See Brewster v. 
Salveson Construction, Inc., 765 P.2d 1350 (Wyo. 1988); Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348 (Wyo. 1988); and Stockwell v. Parker 
Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1987), as recent cases stating and 
applying the above principle.

[¶28.]  Returning to the record evidence in the 
instant case, we first observe that all the evidence indicating the retention 
and exercise of control by PP & L and Weldon Dunn recited in connection with 
the analysis of vicarious liability is applicable to the alleged direct 
liability of these appellees. Further, although again somewhat conflicting, 
there is considerable deposition testimony that these appellees exercised 
control over the hazard - i.e., the flow of traffic into and out of the PSI 
Building - and that they assumed affirmative duties as to safety. Appellant 
stated that, on the Monday when he began work, he approached the unidentified PP 
& L engineer about barricading the door and that the PP & L engineer's 
response was to the effect that: "Well, we couldn't barricade the door; that 
they had to have access to get vehicles in and out." Appellant further testified 
that every time the PP & L engineer came around he (appellant) would bring 
up the need for some kind of safety measures. Appellant described the PP & L 
engineer's response as: "Said he would work on it, see what he could do." 
Appellant also stated that, after the first collision by a PP & L vehicle 
with the scaffolding, the PP & L engineer apologized and said he would try 
to take care of the problem.

[¶29.]  Similarly, Bill Huebner stated that he 
and appellant could not themselves put up flagging because they were told that 
it would interfere with PP & L's traffic, that Weldon Dunn informed them 
they would have to work around the traffic, and that PP & L would not allow 
them to block off the traffic. Danny Foster's deposition testimony corroborated 
Bill Huebner's statement. This evidence demonstrates that there are genuine 
issues of material fact regarding whether PP & L and Weldon Dunn (1) 
exercised control over the details of the project as a whole, (2) exercised 
control specifically over the hazard allegedly causing the harm, and (3) assumed 
affirmative duties as to safety. PP & L and Weldon Dunn were not entitled to 
summary judgment on the question of direct liability of an owner to the employee 
of an independent contractor.

PROXIMATE 
CAUSE

[¶30.]  PP & L and Weldon Dunn argue that, 
even if they owed a duty to appellant, it can be inferred that the district 
court found that any negligence by these appellees was not the proximate cause 
of appellant's injury, and they contend that the district court was correct in 
this determination.9 It is not entirely clear that the 
district court relied upon a lack of proximate cause in granting summary 
judgment to these appellees. Nevertheless, the evidence in the record indicates 
the presence of a factual issue precluding summary judgment on this 
basis.

[¶31.]  Proximate cause is the concept "that the 
accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of 
negligence." McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983), quoted in Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, 
Inc., 735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 1987). Proximate cause is normally a 
question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree. Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 
(Wyo. 1985); Caterpillar Tractor Company v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983). In McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 414, we 
stated that the ultimate test of proximate cause is the foreseeability of 
injury, and we noted that it is not necessary that the specific injury be 
foreseen - it is sufficient if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that 
the same general type of injury would be likely in the absence of adequate 
safeguards. See also Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1978) (only 
necessary that defendant should have anticipated some injury or harm might 
result from his conduct).

[¶32.]  We have defined legal causation as that 
conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's 
injuries. Buckley, 703 P.2d  at 1091. In that case we said 
that,

if the conduct is "that 
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a sufficient 
intervening cause produces the injury, without which the result would not have 
occurred," it must be identified as a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm. If, however, it created only a condition or occasion for the harm to occur 
then it would be regarded as a remote, not a proximate, cause, and would not be 
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.

Id. at 1092 (quoting Lemos 
v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 10, 200 P. 791 (1921)), quoted in 
Bettencourt, 735 P.2d  at 726. An intervening cause is one which occurs 
subsequent to the defendant's negligent act or omission, and an intervening 
cause will generally relieve a defendant from liability if it was unforeseeable. 
McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 414; Fagan v. Summers, 498 P.2d 1227 (Wyo. 1972). A foreseeable 
intervening cause, however, will not relieve a tort-feasor from liability. 
McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 414.

[¶33.]  With respect to proximate cause, PP & 
L and Weldon Dunn argue the following: The evidence is equivocal as to whether a 
vehicle struck the scaffolding at the time of appellant's injury, but, in any 
event, the testimony indicates that, even if the scaffolding was bumped by the 
vehicle, it happened before appellant began his descent and, therefore, 
appellant was not knocked off the scaffolding by the incoming vehicle; that, 
even if a barricade or flagging had been in place, appellant would have had to 
climb down the scaffolding to move it out of the way; and that, consequently, 
the lack of flagging or a barricade was not the proximate cause of appellant's 
injuries, but rather appellant's own actions proximately caused his injuries. 
Although this characterization of the evidence by PP & L and Weldon Dunn is 
accurate as far as it goes, it does not paint a complete picture. Furthermore, 
we do not agree with the legal conclusion which these appellees insist flows 
inevitably from such evidence. This Court has stated that, even where the 
evidence is undisputed, the question of proximate cause is for the trier of fact 
if different inferences might be drawn from such evidence. Bettencourt, 735 P.2d  
at 726; O'Malley v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, 77 
A.L.R. 582 (1931).

[¶34.]  As appellant points out, there is 
evidence in the record that appellant, after the Tuesday collision of a vehicle 
with the scaffolding, adopted the practice of hurrying down the scaffolding to 
stop approaching vehicles and prevent them from striking the scaffolding. More 
importantly, both appellant and Bill Huebner repeatedly stated that, at the time 
of the accident, appellant was doing that very thing; i.e., hurrying down the 
scaffolding to stop the approaching vehicle. Clearly the evidence in the record 
would permit the inference that appellant's injury was the natural and probable 
consequence of the failure of these appellees to control the flow of traffic 
through the doorway.

[¶35.]  We agree with appellant that the fact 
that the vehicle apparently did not knock him off the scaffolding is not 
controlling, and neither is the fact, also relied upon by these appellees, that 
appellant as a matter of course was required to descend and move the scaffolding 
many times a day. The evidence indicates that appellees' inaction on the safety 
problem forced appellant to hastily descend the scaffolding in a manner he would 
not otherwise have done. We conclude that reasonable minds could disagree as to 
whether the allegedly negligent failure of PP & L and Weldon Dunn to 
barricade or flag off the entrance to the building was a substantial factor in 
bringing about appellant's fall from the scaffolding. Thus, proximate cause 
represents an issue for the trier of fact.

[¶36.]  Similarly, to the extent appellant's own 
actions may have operated as an intervening cause, the foreseeability of those 
actions is a question for the trier of fact. We have stated that an intervening 
cause is "reasonably foreseeable if it is a probable consequence of the 
defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to the stimulus of the 
situation created thereby." Buckley, 703 P.2d  at 1092. In addition, if appellant 
was negligent and such negligence contributed to his injuries, the trier of fact 
must balance the respective negligence of the parties, if any, under comparative 
negligence principles. This aspect of the case will be discussed more fully in 
the succeeding section of this opinion. Summary judgment for PP & L and 
Weldon Dunn cannot be sustained premised upon a lack of proximate 
cause.

ASSUMPTION OF THE 
RISK/OBVIOUS DANGER

[¶37.]  As a final issue, appellant argues that 
the district court erroneously applied assumption of the risk and the obvious 
danger rule as a complete bar to recovery. We agree. PP & L and Weldon Dunn 
do not address this issue on appeal, and it might be assumed they have conceded 
it.10 Nevertheless, we will consider the 
issue briefly.

[¶38.]  Distinctions between assumption of the 
risk and contributory negligence have not been recognized by this Court. 
Barnette, 622 P.2d  at 1361; Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979). Before the 
enactment of the comparative negligence statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (1977), 
contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk as included therein, was an 
absolute defense to a negligence action. Barnette, 622 P.2d  at 1361; Brittain, 
601 P.2d  at 534. With the advent of comparative negligence legislation, however, 
assumption of the risk, as a form of contributory negligence, became a basis for 
an apportionment of fault and no longer operated as a complete bar to recovery. 
Barnette, 622 P.2d  at 1361; Brittain, 601 P.2d  at 534. Thus, if appellant was 
negligent, it was for the jury to measure the relative degrees of 
fault.

[¶39.]  Our recent decisions with respect to the 
obvious danger rule compel a similar conclusion. In O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 
696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985), we addressed the impact of comparative negligence on 
the obvious danger rule, concluding that those situations wherein the obvious 
danger rule operates to negate a duty on behalf of the property owner - i.e., 
operates as an absolute bar to recovery - were narrowly limited to dangers 
presented by naturally existing conditions, particularly accumulations of ice 
and snow. We held in O'Donnell that, where the plaintiff in that case 
encountered an obviously dangerous condition created by the municipal defendant, 
the negligence of the plaintiff was to be compared to the negligence of the 
defendant. We stated in that case: "Gone are the days when a scintilla of 
negligence by the plaintiff will bar recovery." Id. at 1284.

[¶40.]  In Jones, 718 P.2d  at 897-98, we quoted 
from O'Donnell and noted the limited application of the "no duty" obvious danger 
rule:

Under the obvious-danger 
rule, an owner of property has no duty to his invitees "to correct an obvious 
and known danger resulting from natural causes." O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 
Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1985); see also Note, The Obvious Danger Rule - A 
Qualified Adoption of Secondary Assumption of Risk Analysis, 21 Land & Water 
L.Rev. 251 (1986). But the 
obvious-danger rule does not apply when a dangerous condition is created by the 
owner or his servants. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, supra, at 1283.

(Emphasis 
added.) Thus, we held in Jones that, even if the danger created by the defendant 
property owner was perfectly obvious to the plaintiff, it was the jury's 
function under the comparative negligence statute to compare the plaintiff's 
negligence with that of the defendant. Jones, 718 P.2d  at 898. The same is true 
in the instant case. To the extent the district court relied upon assumption of 
the risk and the obvious danger rule in granting summary judgment to PP & L 
and Weldon Dunn, it was in error.

[¶41.]  To summarize, we hold that appellant 
failed to demonstrate a genuine factual issue with respect to the culpable 
negligence of co-employees Rand Haapapuro, Leonard Gradert, and Danny Foster, 
and the summary judgment for those appellees is affirmed. Alternatively, the 
record does disclose genuine issues of material fact as to the negligence of 
appellees PP & L and Weldon Dunn, and, therefore, we reverse the summary 
judgment entered in favor of those appellees.

[¶42.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1 Two John Doe defendants 
were replaced by named defendants in the amendments to the initial complaint. 
The final John Doe defendant was never identified and never became a party to 
this action. See note 5, infra.

2 The sequence of 
procedural events became somewhat convoluted after the third amended complaint 
was filed. Certain defendants moved for summary judgment, and an initial 
decision letter was entered before all the defendants had answered and before 
defendant Danny Foster had even been served with a complaint. By stipulation 
among counsel for all parties, the affected defendants waived the defects and 
filed the necessary responsive pleadings and motions so that the decision letter 
and order granting summary judgment would apply to all named defendants. This 
was assertedly done to simplify the appeal process for appellant. The final 
order granting summary judgment notes these irregularities and the curative 
actions and grants summary judgment to all the named 
defendants.

3 In addition to the 
depositions in the record, depositions were apparently taken from Rand 
Haapapuro, Leonard Gradert, and Norm Aisenbrey, as excerpts from these 
depositions were quoted in the memoranda in support of summary judgment filed in 
the district court by the co-employee defendants. These depositions were never 
made part of the record and were not included in the record on appeal. As a 
consequence, we granted appellant's motion to strike the entire original appeal 
brief of PP & L and Weldon Dunn which quoted and relied heavily upon this 
nonrecord material. PP & L and Weldon Dunn filed an amended brief 
eliminating all references to the offending material. Similarly, during oral 
argument we granted appellant's previously filed motion to strike portions of 
the co-employees' brief which also referred to the nonrecord depositions. This 
Court will not consider matters not contained in the record, Mentock v. Mentock, 
638 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 1981), and statements in briefs are not 
evidence which a reviewing court can consider. Majority of Working Interest 
Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1070 (Wyo. 1986).

4 Norm Aisenbrey, a party 
defendant in the action below, was dismissed from this appeal by order of this 
Court pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties. It appears that 
Norm Aisenbrey was the overall superintendent at the plant for Combustion 
Engineering. The stipulation dismissing him from this appeal apparently reflects 
appellant's acknowledgment that there is no evidence indicating Norm Aisenbrey 
was aware of the alleged safety problems associated with this accident or that 
he was even aware of the existence of this particular 
project.

5 The unidentified PP 
& L engineer was listed as John Doe, defendant, in the proceedings below. 
Although extensive discovery was had and appellant repeatedly amended his 
complaint, the PP & L engineer was never identified or served with process; 
thus, he never became an actual party to this action.

6 The deposition testimony 
of each deponent indicates some confusion as to whether the accident occurred on 
Wednesday or Thursday, but it seemed to be resolved that it happened on 
Thursday, and this is the date indicated on the accident report filed with the 
Workers' Compensation Division.

7 Worker's compensation 
provisions in effect at the time of the injury control the rights of the injured 
worker. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529 (Wyo. 1965).

8 Section 27-12-103 was 
repealed in 1986. The current exclusive remedy provision in the Act, Wyo. Stat. 
§ 27-14-104 (1977), extends immunity to culpably negligent 
co-employees.

9 The Combustion 
Engineering co-employees raise a similar argument in their brief, but our 
holding on the question of culpable negligence regarding those appellees 
precludes the necessity of addressing their proximate cause 
argument.

10 The Combustion 
Engineering co-employees similarly did not address this 
issue.