Title: Susan Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wisconsin

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 109 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP40 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Susan Hatleberg,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Norwest Bank Wisconsin, n/k/a Wells Fargo Bank,  
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 48 
Reported at:  271 Wis. 2d 225, 678 N.W.2d 302 
(Ct. App. 2004–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 7, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Eugene D. Harrington   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Dennis M. Sullivan, Stephanie Finn and Herrick & Hart, S.C., 
Eau Claire, and oral argument by Dennis M. Sullivan. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Paul J. 
Gossens and Paul J. Gossens, S.C., Wauwatosa, and oral argument 
by Paul J. Gossens. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John E. Knight, James 
E. Bartzen, Kirsten E. Spira and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field 
LLP, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Bankers Association. 
 
 
2005 WI 109 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP40   
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 261) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Susan Hatleberg,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Norwest Bank Wisconsin, n/k/a Wells Fargo  
Bank,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank 
Wisconsin, 2004 WI App 48, 271 Wis. 2d 225, 678 N.W.2d 302.  The 
court of appeals affirmed a judgment of the circuit court for 
Eau Claire County, Eugene Harrington, Judge, holding Norwest 
Bank (now known as and hereinafter referred to as Wells Fargo 
Bank) liable for breach of fiduciary duty in its capacity as 
trustee of an irrevocable trust set up by Susan Hatleberg's 
No. 2003AP40 
2 
 
mother, Phyllis Erickson.  Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm on 
different grounds.   
¶2 
In this case, during its tenure as trustee, Wells 
Fargo became aware of a defect in a trust that it had not 
drafted.  It did not reveal that defect to the grantor, 
Erickson.  After Erickson's death, the trust was subject to 
increased tax liability due to the drafting defect.  Hatleberg 
sued Wells Fargo on behalf of Erickson's estate, alleging 
several theories of liability.  The circuit court concluded that 
Wells Fargo breached a duty to Erickson, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.   
¶3 
We reach the following conclusions: First, on the 
facts of this case, Wells Fargo had no duty to review the 
Erickson trust to ensure its effectiveness as an instrument to 
avoid estate taxes.  The pertinent facts are that the trust 
instrument did not assign this responsibility to the trustee and 
the trustee did not draft the trust.  Second, inasmuch as 
Erickson's estate suffered no physical harm, Wells Fargo was not 
subject to "Good Samaritan" liability under § 323 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Third, Wells Fargo negligently 
breached a duty to Erickson by continuing to advise her to 
contribute money to the trust to save estate taxes after it 
realized the trust was defective.  Therefore, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals on different grounds and remand 
to the circuit court to allow it to determine whether there 
ought to be any adjustment in damages. 
 
No. 2003AP40 
3 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The Eau Claire bank now known as Wells Fargo has been 
called several names.  In 1984 it was known as American National 
Bank and Trust Company.  At some point in 1984, Ted Erickson, 
Phyllis Erickson's husband, met with Dale Sevig, American 
National's "Vice President and Senior Trust Officer," about 
estate planning possibilities.1  On September 6, 1984, Sevig 
wrote a follow-up letter to Ted Erickson, expressing Sevig's 
interest in "hopefully help[ing] you with your estate and 
investment planning."  Sevig attached extensive documentation 
and a suggested estate plan for the Ericksons. 
¶5 
Unfortunately, Mr. Erickson died in March 1985.  On 
March 27, 1985, Sevig wrote another letter, this one to Mrs. 
Erickson, expressing condolences and soliciting her business: 
"[I]t will be quite easy to set up a trust account so we can 
help you on bill paying and watching your investments, plus 
whatever else needs to be done on your financial matters."  
Sevig's handwritten note on the letter indicates that he called 
Mrs. Erickson about the letter on April 8, 1985.2  Eventually, 
she agreed to set up a revocable trust, with the bank serving as 
trustee.  Sevig set up the revocable trust and handled many of 
                                                 
1 Sevig stated that one of his roles at the bank was to 
"solicit . . . business if possible for the bank." 
2 Wells Fargo's expert admitted that if he had received the 
letters Sevig sent Erickson, "it would be fair to conclude that 
the bank is saying 'We have special knowledge to be your estate 
and investment planner.'"  
No. 2003AP40 
4 
 
Erickson's finances through it.3  The revocable trust is not at 
issue in this case.   
¶6 
Sevig also recommended that Erickson set up an 
irrevocable trust to reduce her estate taxes by taking advantage 
of the gift tax exemption.4  He offered to refer her to an 
attorney he believed to be an expert in estate planning who 
would draft the irrevocable trust.  Erickson decided that she 
would set up an irrevocable trust, but she wanted her neighbor, 
Attorney Richard Duplessie, to draft the trust instrument.  By 
his own admission, Duplessie was not an expert in estate 
planning; nevertheless, Erickson insisted that he draft the 
trust.  Duplessie agreed to do so, essentially copying the 
instrument from a form book.  Duplessie testified that Erickson 
intended the trust to provide a way for her to reduce her estate 
taxes. 
                                                 
3 Despite his repeated contacts with the Ericksons, Sevig 
claimed that he never held himself out as a financial planner.  
However, he also testified that he was "probably" Phyllis 
Erickson's "sole financial advisor."  Sevig also stated that the 
bank's 
job 
with 
respect 
to 
Erickson 
was 
"investment 
management . . . where we could suggest various courses of 
investments for her and carry those out."  In her revocable 
trust, Erickson gave the bank the right to "invest, reinvest, 
[and] maintain" her investments at the bank's "sole discretion."  
As Sevig summarized it, "She just plain gave us the right to 
manage her portfolio as we deemed fit for her." 
4 See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2000) ("In the case of gifts 
(other than gifts of future interests in property) made to any 
person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $10,000 
of such gifts to such person shall not . . . be included in the 
total amount of gifts made during such year."). 
No. 2003AP40 
5 
 
¶7 
The parties agree that the trust was defective because 
it did not contain "Crummey provisions."5  These provisions take 
their name from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Crummey v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).  
Crummey provisions give the trust beneficiaries a present 
interest in the trust, thereby bringing the trust corpus within 
the gift exception to the federal income tax, and removing it 
from the estate.  Id. at 83-84.  Because the beneficiaries gain 
a present interest, the funds are not considered part of the 
estate, and are not taxed upon distribution.  See Mark Bradley 
et al., Eckhardt's Workbook for Wisconsin Estate Planners, 
§ 8.246 at 85-86 (4th ed. 2003).  In effect, the provisions 
require the trustee to notify the trust beneficiaries that they 
have some form of present interest in the trust funds.  See id.  
If the beneficiaries are not given a present interest, the trust 
deposits do not qualify as gifts and therefore are not immune 
from federal taxation. 
¶8 
Initially, this error went unnoticed.  In 1985 
Erickson began to make deposits of $40,000 ($10,000 for each of 
four family members) annually into the irrevocable trust, and 
continued to do so for 11 years.  
                                                 
5 Wells Fargo asserted at oral argument that this is 
technically incorrect.  Counsel stated that the trust need not 
contain explicit Crummey provisions so long as the beneficiaries 
are somehow notified of their present interest.  For our 
purposes, the distinction is not relevant because neither action 
was taken here.   
No. 2003AP40 
6 
 
¶9 
In 
1988 
Sevig 
noticed 
the 
absence 
of 
Crummey 
provisions in the trust during the bank's annual review of the 
trust provisions.  He immediately notified Duplessie via a 
handwritten note, and attached suggested Crummey provisions that 
would "solve the gift tax exclusion problem."  Until that time, 
Duplessie had never heard of Crummey provisions.  Duplessie 
received the communication but informed Sevig that he believed 
the trust was adequate as written.  Duplessie also thought 
Sevig's concern was irrelevant as it was too late to add the 
Crummey provisions.  He "assumed that [because this was an 
irrevocable 
trust], 
that 
meant 
you 
couldn't 
amend 
it."  
Duplessie also (erroneously) believed the trust was "completely 
funded"; i.e., he believed Erickson would not make any further 
contributions to the trust principal.  The trust was never 
amended.   
¶10 Duplessie 
and 
Sevig 
independently 
admitted 
that 
neither one of them informed Erickson of the concerns about her 
trust.  On the contrary, Sevig advised Erickson to continue to 
make trust contributions, which she did.  Sevig stated: "I 
reviewed your trust for gifts made in 1990 and 1991 as follows: 
1. $10,000.00 to Susan on 12-11-90.  You can do so again in 1991 
for the $10,000.00 annual exclusion. . . .  Again, for estate 
tax purposes, it makes sense to do the gifts."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Hatleberg testified that Sevig told Erickson "there 
[were] absolutely no problems, everything was fine.  She had 
nothing to worry about."  In 1995 Sevig advised Erickson that "I 
No. 2003AP40 
7 
 
think 
you 
can 
afford 
another 
round 
of 
gifts 
for 
the 
grandchildren."   
¶11 Erickson continued to make gifts each year through tax 
year 1996.  She deposited a total of $440,000 in the trust over 
the 11-year period between 1985 and 1996.  She died in November 
1998.  Upon her death, Sevig wrote to her probate attorney: "The 
lack of [ ] 'Crummey' provision[s] concerns one for her taxable 
estate."  When the estate filed its tax return, it had to 
recapture 
the 
$440,000 
in 
gifts 
and 
pay 
$173,644.00 
in 
additional estate taxes.  Hatleberg, who described herself as 
"stunned" at that development, called Sevig to demand an 
explanation; Sevig replied, "I prefer not to answer that 
question with you because I may have to face you in a court some 
day."  When later questioned about what he meant by that, Sevig 
said, "We can smell these things."  
¶12 On April 17, 2000, Hatleberg sued Wells Fargo and 
Duplessie, alleging negligence.  Duplessie reached a $173,000 
settlement with the estate and has been dismissed from the 
lawsuit.  The remaining parties tried the case without a jury on 
July 23 and 24, 2002. 
¶13 The circuit court rendered its decision on August 22, 
2002.  The court made extensive factual findings, of which the 
following are excerpts: 
Finding No. 1: "Crucial to [Sevig's] advice was the 
tax savings that could be achieved for federal estate 
taxes."   
No. 2003AP40 
8 
 
Finding No. 4: "[T]he reduction of the estate tax 
liability was one of the essential purposes for the 
trust."   
Finding No. 16: "Mr. Sevig and others at [Wells Fargo] 
discovered the fundamental flaw in the irrevocable 
trust in 1988.   . . . [N]either Sevig nor any other 
representative of [Wells Fargo] did anything to alert 
Mrs. Erickson or her beneficiaries about the trust 
document flaws."  
¶14 Later in its oral decision, the court added, "suffice 
it to say the primary purpose for the trust was to reduce the 
Ericksons' estate tax."  The court concluded that Wells Fargo 
"had a duty to Phyllis Erickson and her beneficiaries to furnish 
complete and accurate information concerning the trust."  The 
court held that Wells Fargo breached that duty, and that damages 
of $300,933.00 would make the estate whole.  It concluded that 
Wells Fargo was entitled to an offset of approximately $173,000 
due to the Duplessie settlement, and therefore owed the estate 
$127,993.00.  Wells Fargo moved for reconsideration, asking, 
among other things, for the court to make findings assessing the 
comparative negligence of the parties.  The court granted the 
motion and held that Wells Fargo was 60 percent liable and 
Duplessie was 40 percent liable.  Accordingly, the court 
increased Wells Fargo's liability to $182,359.31.  Wells Fargo 
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  We granted Wells 
Fargo's petition for review.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 Whether negligence exists is a mixed question of fact 
and law.  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 423, 541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995).  "Whether certain events occurred are 
No. 2003AP40 
9 
 
questions of historic fact to be determined by the circuit 
court."  Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 2001 WI App 135, ¶8, 
246 Wis. 2d 614, 630 N.W.2d 230.  "Findings of fact shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses."  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) (2001-
02).6  On the other hand, the existence and scope of a duty of 
care is a pure question of law, which this court reviews de 
novo.  Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶15, 
251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158.  Whether the facts as found 
show that the defendant violated a particular duty is also a 
question of law.  Jorgensen, 246 Wis. 2d 614, ¶8. 
¶16 In 
reviewing 
the 
court's 
award 
of 
damages, 
an 
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the fact 
finder's.  Teff v. Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp., 2003 WI App 
115, ¶41, 265 Wis. 2d 703, 666 N.W.2d 38.  Rather, we simply 
determine whether the award falls within reasonable limits, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the award.  
Id. 
III. NEGLIGENCE 
¶17 In this case, it is undisputed that Wells Fargo, in 
its capacity as trustee, paid asset manager, and (arguably) 
financial planner, owed certain duties to Erickson.  Indeed, in 
Wisconsin, "'[e]veryone owes to the world at large the duty of 
                                                 
6 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP40 
10 
 
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the 
safety of others.'"  Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶13, 262 
Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).  
In other words, "[e]very person has a duty to use ordinary care 
in all of his or her activities, and a person is negligent when 
that person fails to exercise ordinary care."  Alvarado, 262 
Wis. 2d 74, ¶14. 
¶18 We must decide the scope of Wells Fargo's duties to 
Erickson.  We have organized our analysis into three categories: 
(1) Duties arising in Wells Fargo's undisputed capacity as 
trustee; (2) Duties arising in Wells Fargo's disputed capacity 
as financial planner or advisor; and (3) Duty to avoid 
negligently providing inaccurate information.  We address each 
in turn.  Ultimately, we conclude that Wells Fargo violated a 
duty arising in its capacity as a financial advisor to avoid 
providing false information to Erickson. 
A. 
Duties Arising in Wells Fargo's Capacity as Trustee 
¶19 The parties, and the court of appeals, focused their 
analyses on Wells Fargo's duties as a trustee.  As the court of 
appeals correctly noted, generally a trustee's duties are 
explicitly defined in the trust instrument.  Hatleberg, 271 
Wis. 2d 225, ¶10; see also McGeoch Building Co. v. Dick & 
Reuteman Co., 253 Wis. 166, 175, 33 N.W.2d 252 (1948) ("[T]he 
instrument creating the trust . . . is to be looked to for 
stipulations fixing the obligations of the parties"); Saros v. 
Carlson, 244 Wis. 84, 88, 11 N.W.2d 676 (1943) ("It is a 
No. 2003AP40 
11 
 
trustee's paramount duty to . . . comply with the terms of the 
trust."). 
¶20 However, the duties of a trustee go beyond the four 
corners of the trust document.  For example, a trustee has the 
duty to be "vigilant" in guarding the trust's assets.  In re 
Revocable Trust of McCoy, 142 Wis. 2d 750, 756, 419 N.W.2d 301 
(Ct. App. 1987).  The trustee must "warn [the grantor] regarding 
easily identifiable impediments or pitfalls" that would thwart 
the grantor's intent.  Id. at 757.  This court has recognized 
the trustee's duty to "disclos[e] relevant information."  Hammes 
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 79 Wis. 2d 355, 368, 255 
N.W.2d 555 (1977). 
¶21 This 
court 
has 
also 
held 
that 
trustees 
are 
fiduciaries, and as such, have a duty to employ "diligence, 
prudence, 
and 
absolute 
fidelity" 
in 
managing 
a 
trust.  
Sensenbrenner 
v. 
Sensenbrenner, 
76 
Wis. 2d 625, 
635, 
252 
N.W.2d 47 (1977).  Wisconsin has enacted the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act, which explicitly defines "fiduciary" to include "a trustee 
under any trust . . . or any other person acting in a fiduciary 
capacity 
for 
any 
person, 
trust, 
or 
estate."  
Wis. Stat. § 112.01(1)(b).   
¶22 With these background principles in mind, we turn to 
the parties' arguments. 
¶23 Hatleberg raises three arguments that Wells Fargo 
breached a duty in its capacity as Erickson's trustee.  First, 
she argues that Wells Fargo, as trustee, had a duty to review 
the trust to ensure that it worked for its intended purpose.  
No. 2003AP40 
12 
 
Second, Hatleberg believes that a duty of notification arose 
when Wells Fargo discovered the deficiency in the trust.  Third, 
she alleges that Wells Fargo violated its fiduciary duty as 
trustee. 
¶24 Hatleberg first argues that because Wells Fargo held 
itself out as possessing special expertise in trust planning and 
management, it owed Erickson a duty to review the trust to 
ensure that it would perform its intended purpose.  The court of 
appeals did not directly decide this question; it "disagree[d]" 
with Wells Fargo's contention that it had no duty to examine the 
document for accuracy, Hatleberg, 271 Wis. 2d 225, ¶10, but 
later noted that "Wells Fargo may have originally had no duty to 
review the trust for accuracy . . . ."  Id., ¶15.  Ultimately, 
it appears the court "[a]ssum[ed] without deciding that Wells 
Fargo had no duty originally, [but] it created the duty itself."  
Id., ¶10.   
¶25 Here, the trust instrument contained no language 
requiring the trustee to review it for effectiveness.  In view 
of the fact that Wells Fargo did not draft the trust, we have 
serious reservations about Hatleberg's invitation to impose 
liability for failing to ensure that the trust worked for its 
intended tax avoidance purpose.  In this case, Wells Fargo was 
involved in Erickson's estate and financial planning from the 
beginning, and had at the very least a general idea as to her 
intentions.  Some trustees, however, might not be aware of the 
ultimate purposes of particular trusts.  Their activities might 
be limited to safeguarding a trust's assets and distributing the 
No. 2003AP40 
13 
 
assets to the beneficiaries.  We are reluctant to impose 
liability on a trustee for not discovering and correcting a 
defect in a trust resulting from negligence by an unaffiliated 
drafter, unless that responsibility was assumed by contract.  We 
therefore decline to impose a general duty to review a trust 
document drafted by another and draw legal conclusions as to its 
effectiveness. 
¶26 We turn now to Hatleberg's second argument.  The 
parties, and the court of appeals, focused on Hatleberg's 
contention that when Wells Fargo discovered that the trust was 
defective, it should have notified her.  Hatleberg relies on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323, commonly known as the "Good 
Samaritan" provision.  It provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to 
render 
services 
to 
another 
which 
he 
should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of the 
other's person or things, is subject to liability to 
the other for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to 
exercise 
reasonable 
care 
to 
perform 
his 
undertaking, if  
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases 
the risk of such harm, or  
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's 
reliance upon the undertaking. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1976) (emphasis added).   
¶27 On 
its 
face, 
this 
provision 
requires 
that 
the 
plaintiff suffered "physical harm" to her person or property.  
Hatleberg argues that Erickson's estate "suffered real physical 
harm by having its assets reduced."  The court of appeals 
appears to have accepted Hatleberg's argument, but did not 
No. 2003AP40 
14 
 
specifically cite the Restatement; instead, it relied on Nischke 
v. Farmers & Merchants Bank & Trust, 187 Wis. 2d 96, 522 
N.W.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1994).  In turn, the Nischke court directly 
relied on the Restatement.  It stated: "Wisconsin has long 
recognized that liability may be imposed on one who, having no 
duty to act, gratuitously undertakes to act and does so 
negligently."  Id. at 113.  Nischke then cited and quoted the 
Restatement. 
¶28 In Nischke, the "physical harm" to be remedied was 
soil and water contamination caused by a leaking underground 
gasoline storage tank.  187 Wis. 2d at 102.  Here, the only harm 
is the reduction of the estate's assets.  Despite the voluminous 
number of cases applying this section of the Restatement, we 
have found no cases——and Hatleberg has not cited any——holding 
that 
purely 
economic 
harm 
satisfies 
the 
"physical 
harm" 
requirement.  On the contrary, the authority is unanimous: the 
Good Samaritan provision of the Restatement does not apply to 
"economic harm arising out of an alleged abuse of a contractual 
relationship."  Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th 
Cir. 1990); see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1980) 
("Neither 
the 
rule 
nor 
its 
accompanying 
commentary 
and 
illustrations extends liability for negligence to encompass 
economic losses"); Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare 
Trust v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1183 (D. Or. 
1998) ("[P]hysical harm is a requisite element of a claim for 
breach of an assumed duty"); Nat'l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel 
No. 2003AP40 
15 
 
Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Neb. 1983); Carlotti v. Employees 
of Gen. Elec. Fed. Credit Union No. 1161, 717 A.2d 564, 566-67 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).  We discern no justification to depart 
here from the established interpretation.  Purely financial harm 
does not equal physical harm.  We decline to extend the Good 
Samaritan rule to nonphysical harm, and withdraw any language to 
the contrary in the court of appeals' opinion. 
¶29 Finally, in her third argument, Hatleberg alleges 
that, as the trustee, Wells Fargo acted as a fiduciary, and had 
a duty to provide Erickson with information relevant to trust 
administration——specifically, its knowledge that the trust was 
defective due to the lack of Crummey provisions. 
¶30 Wells Fargo disputes that it had any such duty, but 
argues that even if it did have a duty to disclose the 
information about the lack of Crummey provisions, it adequately 
satisfied its obligation by disclosing the information to the 
trust drafter, Attorney Duplessie.  Wells Fargo argues that 
Duplessie was Erickson's agent for purposes of the irrevocable 
trust.  The parties dispute the facts relating to Duplessie's 
status (or lack thereof) as Erickson's agent.  The circuit court 
made 
no 
factual 
findings 
about 
Duplessie's 
post-drafting 
relationship with Erickson.  As a matter of course, this court 
is not qualified to make findings of fact.  See Wurtz v. 
Fleischman, 
97 
Wis. 2d 100, 
108, 
293 
N.W.2d 155 
(1980).  
Accordingly, we could remand for further factual findings.  
However, in light of our conclusion in Part III.C., infra, we 
need not decide whether the notice to Duplessie satisfied Wells 
No. 2003AP40 
16 
 
Fargo's fiduciary duty to "disclose relevant information."  
Therefore, the need for a remand on those grounds is obviated. 
B. 
Duties Arising in Wells Fargo's Capacity as Financial 
Advisor 
¶31 Hatleberg argues that Wells Fargo held itself out as 
an 
expert 
in 
financial 
planning, 
and 
that 
it 
committed 
professional negligence by failing to inform her of the problems 
with the trust.  As a threshold matter, Wells Fargo disputes the 
contention that it was Erickson's "financial planner," alleging 
instead that it was only her "investment planner."  On the facts 
here, we fail to see how the label pinned on the bank would 
include or exclude the bank from concern about the tax 
consequences flowing from its management of Erickson's money.  
The facts show that, by his own admission, Wells Fargo's 
employee, Sevig, deliberately solicited Erickson's business and 
extensively managed her financial affairs.  Indeed, Wells 
Fargo's own expert admitted at trial that if he had been on the 
receiving end of Sevig's solicitations, he would have concluded 
that Wells Fargo wanted to be his "investment planner."   
¶32 Whether Wells Fargo styles itself an "investment 
planner," "financial planner," or "financial advisor," it bears 
responsibility for its actions.  A fiduciary duty may arise in 
these 
circumstances. 
 
See 
Merrill 
Lynch 
v. 
Boeck, 
127 
Wis. 2d 127, 
136, 
377 
N.W.2d 605 
(1985) 
("A 
fiduciary 
relationship arises from a formal commitment to act for the 
benefit of another . . . or from special circumstances from 
which the law will assume an obligation to act for another's 
No. 2003AP40 
17 
 
benefit.").  In determining whether a fiduciary relationship has 
arisen, courts consider a variety of factors, including whether 
there is dependence and inequality based on weakness of age or 
mental 
strength, 
lack 
of 
business 
intelligence, 
inferior 
knowledge of facts involved, or other conditions giving one side 
an advantage over the other.  Prod. Credit Ass'n of Lancaster v. 
Croft, 143 Wis. 2d 746, 755-56, 423 N.W.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1988).  
Wells Fargo admitted at oral argument that it owed a fiduciary 
duty to Erickson, and that that duty required it to furnish 
complete and accurate information to the grantor.  Again, 
however, it argues that it satisfied the duty to Erickson by 
notifying Duplessie of the problem.  For the same reason 
discussed above, we decline to determine whether notice to 
Duplessie satisfied Wells Fargo's obligation to Erickson to 
disclose information about the defect. 
¶33 Instead, we turn to Hatleberg's final argument, which 
definitively settles this case. 
C. 
Duty to Avoid Negligently Providing Information 
¶34 Even if we accept, arguendo, Wells Fargo's arguments 
that its notice to Duplessie constituted notice to Erickson, we 
still must address the fact that Sevig continued to advise 
Erickson to contribute money to the trust to save estate taxes 
after he knew the trust was defective.   
¶35 Wisconsin courts have frequently held that claims for 
professional malpractice lie in tort.  See, e.g., Milwaukee 
County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 43 Wis. 2d 445, 452-53, 168 
N.W.2d 559 (1969) (architects); Smith v. Long, 178 Wis. 2d 797, 
No. 2003AP40 
18 
 
802, 505 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1993) (lawyers); Milwaukee 
Partners v. Collins Engineers, Inc., 169 Wis. 2d 355, 363, 485 
N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1992) (engineers).   
¶36 Wells Fargo admitted at oral argument that it had a 
professional duty to furnish complete and accurate information 
to Erickson.  We need not go that far.  This is not a "duty to 
disclose" case.7  
¶37 In this case, despite its knowledge of the problem 
with the trust, Wells Fargo assured Erickson that "she had 
nothing to worry about," and that "for estate tax purposes, it 
makes sense to do the gifts."  These assertions are not 
disputed.  Thus, we decide only whether, by affirmatively making 
such statements to Erickson, Wells Fargo breached a duty.  We 
conclude that it did.   
¶38 Wisconsin has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 552.  See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 
Wis. 2d 376, 385-86, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983); Milwaukee Partners, 
169 Wis. 2d at 362-63.  That section provides in relevant part: 
§ 552. 
Information 
Negligently 
Supplied 
for 
the 
Guidance of Others. 
(1) One 
who, 
in 
the 
course 
of 
his 
business, 
profession or employment, or in any other transaction 
in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for 
                                                 
7 In general, "silence, a failure to disclose a fact, is not 
an intentional misrepresentation unless the seller has a duty to 
disclose."  Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 288 
N.W.2d 95 (1980); see also Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 
2004 WI 32, ¶¶12, 14, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233. 
No. 2003AP40 
19 
 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable 
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise 
reasonable 
care 
or 
competence 
in 
obtaining 
or 
communicating the information.   
¶39 We conclude that all the elements listed in § 552 are 
present here.  Wells Fargo made false statements to Erickson by 
telling her that "for estate tax purposes, it makes sense to do 
the gifts" and that there were "no problems" with her trust 
after it knew of the Crummey problem.  Wells Fargo made the 
statements in the course of its business.  Wells Fargo intended 
to guide Erickson's business practices ("it makes sense to do 
the gifts").  Wells Fargo had a pecuniary interest in the 
transactions, as it received a fee for serving as the trustee.  
Erickson relied on Wells Fargo's statements and suffered 
pecuniary loss in the amount of more than $173,000 in taxes.  
Accordingly, Wells Fargo had——and breached——a duty under § 552. 
¶40 Similarly, we have no difficulty concluding that Wells 
Fargo's statements to Erickson are negligent misrepresentations 
under 
Wisconsin 
common 
law.8 
 
The 
tort 
of 
negligent 
misrepresentation has four elements.  Gorton v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 223, 533 N.W.2d 746 (1995).  They are:  
(1) a duty of care or voluntary assumption of a duty 
on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that 
duty, i.e., failure to exercise ordinary care in 
making the representation or in ascertaining the 
facts; (3) a causal link between the conduct and the 
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage as a result of 
the injury.  
Id.; see also Wis JI——Civil 2403. 
                                                 
8  
Indeed, 
it 
is 
not 
impossible 
to 
view 
the 
bank's 
representations to Erickson as intentional misrepresentations. 
No. 2003AP40 
20 
 
¶41 Wells Fargo's conduct satisfies all these elements.  
We have already discussed Wells Fargo's potential duty under 
various theories: its duty as trustee, its duty as financial 
planner or advisor, and its duty under the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts to avoid negligent misrepresentations.  Under any of 
these theories, Wells Fargo had a duty to ensure that the 
information it actually provided to Erickson was correct.  Wells 
Fargo breached that duty by failing to exercise ordinary care; 
it told Erickson to continue contributing to the trust even 
though it knew the trust was defective for her objective.  
Finally, both the causal link and resulting injury are clear; 
Erickson's estate paid increased taxes due to Wells Fargo's 
failure to inform her of the deficiencies.  Had it told her of 
the problem, she could have remedied it in part by giving the 
beneficiaries a present interest in future gifts or by setting 
up a new trust.   
¶42 As a matter of law, we conclude that, because Wells 
Fargo held itself out as an expert in managing Erickson's 
finances, it had a duty to avoid providing false information to 
its client.  It breached that duty, and we therefore affirm the 
court of appeals. 
¶43 Our holding should not be interpreted as encouraging 
trustees and financial professionals to remain silent rather 
than risk providing false information to their clients.  As we 
have recognized, trustees have a duty to disclose "relevant 
information."  Hammes, 79 Wis. 2d at 368.   
 
No. 2003AP40 
21 
 
IV. DAMAGES 
¶44 As we have noted, the circuit court apportioned the 
damages, finding Wells Fargo 60 percent liable and Duplessie 40 
percent liable.  Wells Fargo does not challenge that finding on 
appeal, and we do not disturb it.  However, our holding in this 
case is that Wells Fargo's liability does not date back to its 
original receipt of the trust document in 1985, but began when 
it first negligently misrepresented to Erickson that she should 
continue making contributions to the trust.  This occurred in 
1988, three years after the trust's creation.  In light of this 
change from the circuit court's and court of appeals' holdings 
in this case, we remand this case to the circuit court to allow 
it to determine whether there ought to be any adjustment in 
damages.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶45 In summary, we reach the following conclusions: First, 
on the facts of this case, Wells Fargo had no duty to review the 
trust to ensure its effectiveness as an instrument to avoid 
estate taxes.  Second, inasmuch as Erickson's estate suffered no 
physical harm, Wells Fargo was not subject to "Good Samaritan" 
liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Third, Wells 
Fargo negligently breached a duty to Erickson by continuing to 
advise her to contribute money to the trust to save estate taxes 
after it realized the trust was defective.  Therefore, we 
ultimately affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
remand to the circuit court to allow it to determine whether 
No. 2003AP40 
22 
 
there ought to be any adjustment of damages, consistent with our 
holding. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No. 2003AP40 
 
 
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