Title: Haischer v. CSX

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-00-003270
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 57
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
FRANCIS L. HAISCHER
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    May 7, 2004
Petitioner, Francis Haischer, sued his former employer, CSX Transportation, Inc.,
under the Federal Boiler Inspection Act (BIA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-03, for injuries he
sustained while working as a locomotive engineer on March 1, 2000.  A jury in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City found liability on CSX’s part and awarded $203,898 in damages,
including $101,949 for lost wages.  On CSX’s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the judgment as to liability but concluded that the Circuit Court had erred in precluding
collateral source evidence offered by CSX, and it therefore remanded for a new trial limited
to damages.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Haischer, 151 Md. App. 147, 824 A.2d 966 (2003).
We granted cross-petitions for certiorari to consider whether the Court of Special
Appeals erred (1) in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under the
BIA, and (2) in holding that the collateral source evidence offered by CSX was admissible.
We agree with the intermediate appellate court with respect to the first issue but shall reverse
as to the second.
BACKGROUND
The accident in question occurred around 11:30 p.m. on March 1, 2000.  Haischer and
Rudy Carroll, the conductor, had been working, without incident, as a two-man crew on a
switching job.  When he went on duty just before 4:00, Haischer looked over the locomotive
but did not find anything to be in improper condition.  Near the end of their shift, Haischer
and Carroll were in the locomotive on a side track waiting for permission from the dispatcher
to enter the main track.  
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Inside the cab is a unit known as a Head of Train Device (HTD), which appears to be
about the shape and size of a stereo receiver and sits on top of a console located immediately
to the left of where the engineer sits.  When in use, the device enables the engineer to
monitor air pressure throughout the train.  The back cover of the device, which is not
immediately visible to the engineer when sitting in his seat, faces a small set of steps that lead
to the nose area of the cab.  The back cover of the HTD is attached to the unit by a piano
hinge on the bottom and by two screws at the top.
While waiting for clearance to move, Haischer left his seat and went to a refrigerator
in the nose of the engine to get some water for himself and Mr. Carroll.  Haischer said that
he may have brushed against the cabinet as he left, as there was very little room in the cab
at that point.  The steps leading to the nose are steep – 12 to 14 inches apart – and the area
in the nose is constricted.  Thus, Haischer said, when returning to the cab, he had to “kind
of get your shoulders out first and then sort of take off like a runner from the starting block.”
Prior to his return, the screws holding the HTD door closed had come loose, and the door was
hanging down on its hinge.  As Haischer returned to the cab, he drove his shoulder hard into
the hanging door, causing him to drop to his knees.  Haischer said that it was both dark and
noisy in the cab and that he did not see or hear the HTD door come open.  The screws
apparently were still in their holes, as Haischer testified that, after the accident, the door was
re-closed and the screws tightened in order to keep the door shut.  Haischer claimed that he
had not previously noticed that the door had come open.  Most of that part of Haischer’s
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testimony was corroborated by Mr. Carroll.
As soon as he returned to the yard, Haischer reported the incident to the yardmaster
and then immediately filed an accident report in which he claimed that the accident resulted
from defective equipment, in that the rear cover of the HTD “was not secured properly.”  He
kept an already-scheduled appointment with his doctor two days later to get a cortisone shot
for pre-existing pain in the shoulder, and then, on March 20, saw an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr.
Wardell, who had been suggested to him by a friend.  Dr. Wardell initially diagnosed his
condition as an acute exacerbation of a pre-existing calcium deposit and resulting bursitis;
he recommended, and ultimately performed, surgery to correct that condition and determine
if anything else was amiss.  The surgery revealed a tear in the rotator cuff; the doctor
removed the calcium deposit and repaired the tear.  Dr. Wardell later opined that the rotator
cuff tear was caused by the accident and that, because of the demands of the job, Haischer
was permanently disabled from continuing to work as a locomotive engineer.  Haischer made
casual inquiries into other employment but declined vocational rehabilitation assistance
belatedly offered by CSX and has not returned to work since the accident on March 1, 2000.
In June, 2000, Haischer filed suit under both the Federal Employer’s Liability Act
(FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, and the BIA, alleging, among other things, that (1) the HTD
device, and therefore the locomotive, was defective, (2) he had no knowledge of its defective
condition, (3) he relied on information from others as to whether the locomotive was free
from defective conditions or hazards, and (4) CSX should have known that the locomotive
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was unsafe due to the defective condition of the HTD device door.  Prior to the
commencement of voir dire, Haischer withdrew his separate FELA claim and proceeded
solely on the BIA count.  Liability on that count was the basis for the favorable judgment.
DISCUSSION
Liability Under BIA
Section 20701 of 49 U.S.C. provides, in relevant part, that a railroad carrier may use
or allow to be used a locomotive only when the locomotive and its parts and appurtenances
“are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.”
 That statute, first enacted in 1911, was codified as § 23 of Title 45 of the U.S. Code, dealing
with railroads, and was part of a number of boiler inspection and safety appliance laws to
which the Federal Employer’s Liability Act applied.  In 1994, the statute was code-revised
and moved to title 49 as part of the Federal code revision effort.  See P.L. 103-272, 108 Stat.
745, and House Report (Judiciary Committee) No. 103-180, 7/15/93, accompanying H.R.
1758, 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 916-920 (103rd Cong., 2d. Sess. 1994).
Standing alone, § 20701 does not purport to confer any rights on persons injured when
coming into contact with a locomotive or parts thereof that are not in proper condition and
safe to operate.  As the Supreme Court made clear in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188,
69 S. Ct. 1018, 1034, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 1302 (1949) with respect to the predecessor statute
(title 45, § 23), however, “it has been held consistently that the Boiler Inspection Act
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supplements the Federal Employers’ Liability Act by imposing on interstate railroads ‘an
absolute and continuing duty’ to provide safe equipment.”  That conclusion, it stated, “stems,
not from any express statutory language, but by implication from §§ 3-4 of the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 53-54 . . . which bar pleadings of, respectively,
contributory negligence and assumption of risk ‘in any case where the violation by such
common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury
or death of such employee.’”  
The Court explained that, although it is § 1 of FELA (45 U.S.C. § 51) that creates the
basis of an employee’s suit for violation of the BIA and that section refers to defects due to
the railroad’s “negligence,” it was the Congressional intent “to treat a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act as ‘negligence’ – what is sometimes called negligence per se.”  Id. at 189, 69
S. Ct. at 1034, 93 L. Ed. at 1303, (quoting from San Antonio & A.P.R. Co. v. Wagner, 241
U.S. 476, 484, 36 S. Ct. 626, 630, 60 L. Ed. 1110, 1117 (1916)).  Thus, the Court concluded
that the BIA is substantively an amendment to the FELA and “dispense[s], for the purposes
of employees’ suits, with the necessity of proving that violations of the safety statutes
constitute negligence; and making proof of such violations is effective to show negligence
as a matter of law.”  Urie v. Thompson, supra, at 189, 69 S. Ct. at 1034, 93 L. Ed. at 1303.
See also Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485,  63 S. Ct. 347, 351, 87 L. Ed.
411, 415 (1943): (“Negligence is not the basis for liability under the [Boiler Inspection]
Act.”).
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CSX contends that Haischer failed to present any evidence that the HTD device was
not in “proper condition” or was not “safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal
injury” – that it was defective in any way.   The railroad suggests three possible reasons for
the door coming loose –  that Haischer brushed against it, causing it to fall open; that it came
open due to continuous vibration from operation of the engine; or that maintenance personnel
failed to tighten the screws adequately – and it maintains that none of those reasons creates
liability under BIA.  The first two possible reasons, it claims, do not show any defect in the
device, which is a necessary element for liability; the third, it argues, constitutes not a defect
in the device but negligence on the part of other employees, which may be the basis for
liability under FELA but not under BIA.  In that regard, it uses the sword of strict liability
as a shield: if negligence is not the basis for liability under BIA, the railroad cannot be liable
for an injury caused by its negligence.
The railroad’s position is supported neither by case law interpreting BIA nor by logic.
The simple answer is that it really does not matter which of the three suggested reasons
actually caused the door to come loose.  As was shown from the incident itself, it was at least
a jury question of whether, when the door came loose and was left hanging, the device, and,
consequently, the locomotive, ceased to be in “proper condition” and, in fact, became unsafe
to operate.  It was the railroad’s duty under § 20701 to make certain that the screws were
sufficiently tightened so that they would not come loose, whether by someone brushing
against the door or because of normal vibration from the engine.  Even though traditional
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negligence need not be shown under BIA, both of those prospects were entirely foreseeable,
and, to satisfy its statutory duty to provide safe equipment in proper condition, the railroad
was obliged to assure, through appropriate maintenance, that the screws would remain
securely in place.  The failure to do so constitutes the kind of “negligence per se” that the
Urie Court held was imposed by BIA.  Compare Zachritz v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,
81 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1935) (plaintiff injured when he fell while attempting to board
locomotive by grabbing handrail; no defect shown in handrail); Ford v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 54 F.2d 342 (2nd Cir. 1931) (same); Harlan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 73 S.W.2d 749
(Mo. 1934) (plaintiff injured when trapdoor was negligently left open; no defect in trapdoor).
Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., supra, 317 U.S. 481, 63 S. Ct. 347, 87 L. Ed. 411,
illustrates the point.  A brakeman, standing on top of a locomotive tender, was attempting to
pull a water spout over the tender when he slipped on ice that had formed on the top of the
tender.  He claimed that the ice had formed because of a small leak at the collar of a manhole
on the tender, from which water flowed onto the surface of the tender.  The jury, in a special
verdict, found that there was no such leak, which raised the question of whether the general
verdict for the brakeman could stand.  
The Supreme Court held that, under BIA, the verdict could stand – that BIA imposed
an absolute and continuing duty to maintain the locomotive and its appurtenances in safe
condition, without unnecessary peril to life or limb and that “[t]he use of a tender, upon
whose top an employee must go in the course of his duties, which is covered with ice seems
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to us to involve ‘unnecessary peril to life or limb’ – enough so as to permit a jury to find that
the Boiler Inspection Act has been violated.”  317 U.S. at 486, 63 S. Ct. at 351, 87 L. Ed. at
415.  That conclusion was founded on the Court’s rejection of the notion that the BIA covers
“only defects in construction or mechanical operation” and its view that “[c]onditions other
than mechanical imperfections can plainly render equipment unsafe to operate without
unnecessary peril to life or limb.”  Id, at 487-88, 63 S. Ct. at 352, 87 L. Ed. at 416.  See also
Topping v. CSX Transp., Inc., 1 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1993) (relying on Lilly in upholding
liability under BIA for injuries suffered when locomotive engineer slipped on metal object,
holding that it was a jury question whether presence of loose object in cab of engine rendered
locomotive unsafe to operate).  
Collateral Source Evidence
The railroad’s position, throughout trial, was that the incident was, at worst, a minor
one which could not have produced the disabling injuries Haischer was claiming and that he
was essentially a malingerer.  Because of his claimed disability, Haischer was receiving at
least $2,320/month from the Railroad Retirement Board, and CSX wanted that fact
communicated to the jury.  Prior to trial, Haischer moved in limine to preclude CSX from
offering evidence of his receipt of those disability benefits, citing Eichel v. New York Cent.
R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 84 S. Ct. 316, 11 L. Ed.2d 307 (1963) for the proposition that such
collateral source evidence was inadmissible.  CSX responded that there were exceptions to
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that rule, that the court had some discretion to admit such evidence, at least where the
plaintiff claimed to be impoverished by reason of his inability to work, and that CSX would
alert the court in advance if it intended to offer that kind of evidence.  Both sides seemed to
agree that it was not necessary to decide the issue at that time, so long as CSX did not
produce the evidence prior to a court ruling.
The issue arose again at the end of Haischer’s case, when, based on certain statements
made by plaintiff’s counsel in his opening statement and evidence produced by Haischer that
CSX regarded as suggesting either financial strain or possible malingering on Haischer’s
part, CSX sought permission from the court to call Haischer, as a defense witness, to testify
regarding the retirement benefits he was receiving.  CSX argued that collateral source
evidence was admissible to show malingering and to rebut a claim of financial hardship.  
CSX alluded first to the comment in plaintiff’s counsel’s opening statement that “this
is [Haischer’s] only day or few days in court and so I would ask you to remember that, and
whatever the outcome is, this is it for him.  If his situation changes five years, ten years down
the road, he’s not coming back.”  That statement, CSX argued, was an indication of financial
hardship.  The railroad called attention next to three aspects of Haischer’s testimony.  Early
in direct examination, Haischer recounted some of the fringe benefits he had received as part
of his employment compensation package, including health insurance. Later, he was asked
whether he was continuing to receive those fringe benefits, and he responded that the
insurance would continue for another two years for himself and one year for his 15-year-old
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son who lived with him, and that thereafter he would have to pick up that insurance himself.
He estimated the cost at about $6,000/year. 
The second segment of Haischer’s testimony noted by CSX came when he was asked
how long he had planned to continue working for the railroad, and he responded:
“Well, depending on how the economy went, and my 401K, I
was putting the maximum into it, but the way things were
stacking up, it looked like I was going to have to go until I was
65.  Figuring my son would go to college, I would have to do
that and I wanted some money set aside for my own retirement.
So I was pretty much figuring on 65.”
CSX then alluded to testimony that Haischer had given some consideration to
returning to school and quoted him as saying “how could I go back to school to better myself
in that fashion and pay for the tuition and pay for the books and all the accouterments that
I would need to go back to school when there’s no money coming in?”  Upon our review of
the record, we are unable to find any such statement in Haischer’s testimony.
CSX treated those statements not only as an indication of financial distress and
malingering but also as misleading, as suggesting that Haischer had no income.  Relying on
Eichel, the trial court denied the request.  It did not interpret counsel’s opening remark as a
suggestion that a verdict in this case would be Haischer’s only source of income and did not
regard the testimony noted by CSX as a sufficiently strong indication of either financial
distress or malingering to overcome the prejudice that would accrue from admitting the
collateral source evidence.
On appeal, CSX expanded the basis of its argument in favor of allowing the collateral
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source evidence.  It complained not only about counsel’s opening statement and Haischer’s
testimony regarding his eventual need to replace the health insurance but also about a
statement made in closing argument (to which no objection was made), certain snippets of
testimony by two experts called by Haischer, and Haischer’s testimony that he was no longer
able to do certain maintenance around his house, that he had to pay someone to do it for him,
and that, because of his inability to do the maintenance work, he had considered selling the
house.  
The statement in closing argument, similar to that made in the opening statement, was
to the effect that Haischer could not come back into court later if his situation worsened –
that “[t]his is it for him today.”  Citing Weinell v. McKeesport Connecting R.R. Co., 411 F.2d
510 (3rd Cir. 1969) and Kodack v. Long Island R.R. Co., 342 F.2d 244 (2nd Cir. 1965), the
railroad argued that those statements were improper.  The appellate court treated that
complaint as going to the propriety of the statements themselves, not as a basis for allowing
collateral source evidence and, especially in the absence of any objection to the argument,
concluded that those statements did not, of themselves, warrant reversal.
The Court of Special Appeals found merit in the overall collateral source argument,
however.  Focusing on (1) Haischer’s testimony that, in his disabled condition, he would be
unable to earn a wage comparable to that he earned as a railroad engineer, that it would cost
him $6,000 to replace the railroad’s health insurance, that he had intended to work until 65
in order to be able to send his son to college and to accumulate additional savings for his
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retirement, and that he was unable to maintain his home without employing others to provide
routine maintenance services, (2) a statement from Haischer’s vocational rehabilitation
expert, Herman Bates, that Haischer had discussed with him “the possibility of selling his
home because he couldn’t take care of the maintenance,” and (3) a statement from Haischer’s
expert economist, Raymond Strangways, regarding a projected decrease in Haischer’s future
earnings and loss of fringe benefits, the court concluded Haischer had “opened the door for
the introduction of evidence regarding the annuity payments Haischer is receiving.”  
On the basis of that testimony, the appellate court found Eichel and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Stillman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 811 F.2d 834 (4th Cir.1987)
distinguishable, “because in neither of those cases did the employer’s attempt to offer
evidence of Railroad Retirement benefits follow from the plaintiff’s evidence of inferior or
damaged financial security.”  CSX Transp., Inc., supra, 151 Md. App. at 165, 824 A.2d at
976.  Relying on its earlier decision in Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 42 Md. App. 291, 400
A.2d 440 (1979), the court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence of malingering
“to open the door to the introduction of evidence of Haischer’s Railroad Retirement annuity.”
CSX Transp., Inc., supra. at 166, 824 A.2d at 977.  Upon those conclusions, the court vacated
the money judgment and remanded for a new trial, limited to the issue of damages.
The collateral source rule permits an injured person to recover the full amount of his
or her provable damages, “regardless of the amount of compensation which the person has
received for his injuries from sources unrelated to the tortfeasor.”  Motor Vehicle Admin. v.
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Seidel, 326 Md. 237, 253, 604 A.2d 473, 481 (1992).  The doctrine is widely accepted (see
Restatement 2d of Torts, § 920A(2) (1977) and comment b. thereto) and rests on public
policy considerations – principally that the wrongdoer should not receive a windfall because
the plaintiff received a benefit from an independent source, but also that, to the extent the
collateral benefit arises from insurance maintained by the plaintiff, the rule encourages the
maintenance of insurance.  See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seidel, supra, 326 Md. at 254, 604
A.2d at 481-82, quoting from Restatement 2d, § 920A, comment b; also Green v. Denver &
Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).
The basic law regarding the admissibility, in an FELA or BIA case, of evidence that
the plaintiff is receiving Railroad Retirement benefits was set by the Supreme Court in Eichel
v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., supra, 375 U.S. 253, 84 S. Ct. 316, 11 L. Ed.2d 307.  The
plaintiff sued his railroad employer under FELA, claiming that, as a result of the employer’s
negligence, he suffered a permanently disabling injury.  The railroad offered evidence that
the plaintiff was receiving Railroad Retirement benefits to impeach his testimony as to both
his reason for not returning to work and the permanence of his injuries.  The trial court
excluded the evidence, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and, as did the
Court of Special Appeals in this case, remanded for a new trial as to injury and damages.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit decision.
The railroad did not dispute that the evidence could not be considered in mitigation of
damages, but asserted that it was admissible as bearing on the extent and duration of the
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claimed disability; i.e., to show malingering on the plaintiff’s part.  The Court noted that
Railroad Retirement benefits are the equivalent of Social Security benefits for common
carrier employees, that, because they are not attributable to contributions by the employer,
they cannot be used to mitigate damages.  It then concluded that the likelihood of the jury
misusing evidence of those benefits for that impermissible purpose clearly outweighed any
probative value of the evidence to show malingering.  It posited, in that regard, that “[i]nsofar
as the evidence bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be other evidence
having more probative value and involving less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of
a disability pension.”  Eichel, 375 U.S. at 255, 84 S. Ct. at 317, 11 L. Ed.2d at 309.  The
Court added that the substantial probative value of the evidence “cannot reasonably be said
to be outweighed by the risk that it will create substantial danger of undue prejudice through
being considered by the jury for the incompetent purpose of a set-off against lost earnings.”
Id.
Two aspects of the Eichel decision are important.  First, though using a balancing
approach, the Court did not view the admissibility of this kind of evidence as discretionary
on the part of the trial court, as Justice Harlan did in a concurring and dissenting opinion and
as would be the case if the issue were controlled by Fed. R. Evid. 403 or its common law
antecedent, but ruled as a matter of substantive law that the danger of misuse outweighed any
probative value of the evidence, at least as to malingering.  Most courts seem to have viewed
the ruling in Eichel that way and have not applied, or even purported to apply, a discretionary
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balancing approach.  See Reed v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England R.R. Co., 939
F.2d 128 (3rd Cir. 1991); Stillman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., supra, 811 F.2d 834; Page v. St.
Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 349 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1965); Wilcox v. Clinchfield R.R. Co.,
747 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1984); Schroeder v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 397 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.
1968); Sheehy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1980); Green v. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R. Co., supra, 59 F.3d 1029; Finley v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 1 F.Supp.2d
440 (E.D.Pa.1998); Lucht v. C & O Ry. Co., 489 F.Supp. 189 (W.D.Mich.1980); Hileman
v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 685 A.2d 994 (Pa. 1996); Melton v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R. Co., 763 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. App. 1988).  Compare McGrath v. Consol. Rail Corp., 136
F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that Eichel did not establish per se rule of inadmissibility
and that issue is to be determined by applying Fed. R. Evid. 403).  
Second, although we have not previously addressed the issue precisely, the Eichel
view that collateral source evidence is substantively inadmissible is consistent with decisions
of this Court regarding such evidence.  See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seidel, supra, 326 Md.
at 253, 604 A.2d at 481.  (“Since 1899, the collateral source rule has been applied in this
State to permit an injured person to recover in tort the full amount of his provable damages
regardless of the amount of compensation which the person has received for his injuries from
sources unrelated to the tortfeasor.”).
Because we have adopted the collateral source rule as part of our own substantive law,
whether we view the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eichel as a matter of substantive Federal law
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that we are obliged to apply under the Supremacy Clauses in both the Federal and Maryland
Constitutions or, as the McGrath court did, as a matter of Federal evidence law that we are
not obliged to follow is of little consequence.  The principle underlying the Eichel ruling is
entirely consistent with that underlying our adoption of the collateral source rule, and so we
hold, as a matter of State law and subject to the discussion below, that evidence of a
plaintiff’s receipt of Railroad Retirement benefits is ordinarily inadmissible to show possible
malingering on the part of the plaintiff.  As the Eichel Court noted, there is, on the one hand,
too much danger that the jury might use such evidence for the impermissible purpose of
mitigating damages, and, on the other, alternative ways of showing malingering that do not
carry that danger.  To the extent that the Court of Special Appeals found the collateral source
evidence admissible to show malingering on Haischer’s part, it erred.
Notwithstanding the language used in Eichel, most courts faced with the issue have
concluded that there are certain limited exceptions to the inadmissibility of collateral source
evidence in FELA and BIA cases.  The one at issue here is that, if the plaintiff claims, in
argument or through the introduction of evidence, that he/she is in financial distress due to
the injury arising from the railroad’s negligence or violation of BIA and has no other
sufficient source of income, evidence that the plaintiff is receiving Railroad Retirement
benefits is admissible to rebut that claim.  See Santa Maria v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 81
F.3d 265, 273 (2nd Cir. 1996); Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967,
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013, 88 S. Ct. 1262, 20 L. Ed.2d 162 (1968)); Moses v. Union Pac.
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R.R., 64 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1995), rehearing denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27909
(1995); Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. 825 S.W.2d 839, 842-43 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
That evidence, the courts have held, may be used “for the narrow purpose of testing the
credibility of plaintiff’s assertion regarding financial distress.”  Leake v. Burlington N. R.R.
Co., 892 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. App. 1995); also Lange v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 703 F.2d
322, 324 (8th Cir. 1983). 
We agree that use of such evidence for that limited purpose is proper.  The question
then becomes whether Haischer, through the argument and evidence noted, opened the door
to the admission of that evidence – whether he, in fact, asserted a level of poverty that was
misleading.
The Court of Special Appeals found telling the testimony by Haischer and two of his
experts that, due to his injury, Haischer would be unable to earn a wage comparable to that
earned as a railroad engineer, that he would, within a year or two, incur a cost of $6,000 to
replace the health insurance supplied by CSX, that he had planned to work until 65 in order
to be able to afford to send his son to college, and that he would be unable to maintain his
home without employing others to do the kind of maintenance and repairs that he used to do.
CSX, as noted, complains as well about Haischer’s opening statement.  We do not believe
that any of that testimony, or the opening statement, together or separately, justified the
admission of the collateral source evidence.
The rationale for the exception is that, without it, the plaintiff may be able to paint a
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truly misleading picture for the jury of the extent of his/her loss and thus obtain a recovery
in excess of what is warranted.  See Gladden v. P. Henderson Co., supra, 385 F.2d 480, 483-
84.  That rationale necessarily governs the scope of the exception.  We reject CSX’s
argument, now relegated to a footnote in its brief, that counsel’s remark in opening statement
that Haischer’s “day in court” was “it for him” and that he could not return for more if his
situation changed in the future, served to put Haischer’s financial condition at issue.  Apart
from the lack of any objection, that remark was not only correct but in no way implied that
a recovery in this case would be Haisher’s only source of income.  Reading the remark in its
entirety, all counsel said was that this was Haischer’s one opportunity for a recovery in this
case.  He in no way implied that Haischer had no other source of income or that he would be
destitute without a proper verdict.  Compare Weinell v. McKeesport Connecting R.R. Co.,
supra, 411 F.2d at 512 (holding improper a statement by counsel that FELA provided “the
only method” by which an injured railroad worker may “be paid for an on-the-job injury
while he was at work for the Railroad”).  CSX’s reliance on that case is misplaced: apart
from the more egregious nature of the remark, the court reversed the plaintiff’s judgment on
other grounds and did not hold that collateral source evidence was admissible because of that
statement.  The same holds true for the other two cases cited by CSX – Kodack v. Long
Island R.R. Co., supra, 342 F.2d at 247 (statement that FELA plaintiff had “no compensation
rights” improper but harmless, no issue being raised about admission of collateral source
evidence) and Stillman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., supra, 811 F.2d 834 (error to inform jury
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that FELA was plaintiff’s “only possible remedy”).
CSX also misreads the nature of the testimony underlying its argument.  None of the
testimony referred to suggested that Haischer was impecunious or had no other source of
income.  It apparently was a fact – as it was not disputed – that Haischer was facing the loss
of health insurance that he had received as a fringe benefit and that it would cost $6,000 to
replace that insurance.  Haischer did not say, or imply, that he could not afford to replace the
insurance, but only that he would have to do so.  In testifying regarding his previous intention
of continuing to work until he was 65, in order to put additional money aside in his 401k plan
and pay for his son’s college education, Haischer did not say that, in his present
circumstances, he would not be able to afford to send his son to college.  Evidence as to his
expected work-life is not only relevant, but necessary, to establish the amount of his wage
loss.  If that kind of evidence suffices to trigger collateral source evidence, there would be
nothing left of the collateral source rule.  See Leake v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., supra, 892
S.W.2d 359, 363 (court erred in admitting collateral source evidence based on plaintiff’s
testimony that he would have had to work 14 more years to retire).  
The testimony regarding maintenance and repairs at his home dealt with Haischer’s
physical inability to do that kind of work “because it prompted pain,” which required him to
employ people for that purpose and led him to consider selling the house.  Neither he nor his
experts suggested that he could not afford to have the maintenance done.  Indeed, he stated
that he did employ persons to do that work, indicating that he could afford to do so.
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Most of the cases in which collateral source evidence was allowed to rebut indications
of impecuniousness involved far more specific and direct evidence of impoverishment and
are therefore distinguishable.  See, for example, Lange v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., supra, 703
F.2d at 324 (collateral source evidence admissible to test credibility of plaintiff’s testimony
that he had to return to work immediately after surgery because he had no disability income);
Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., supra, 385 F.2d 480 (collateral source evidence admissible
to rebut testimony that plaintiff did not return to doctor because his “bills got behind” and
that he returned to work to catch up on his bills and support his family); Moore v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co., supra, 825 S.W.2d at 842-43 (collateral source evidence admissible to rebut
testimony that plaintiff could not continue with physical therapy because he could not afford
it).  Compare Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Haynes, 592 So.2d 536, 541-42 (Ala.1991)
(collateral source evidence not admissible to rebut testimony that plaintiff could not afford
to go to trade school).
On this record, the trial court did not err in excluding the collateral source evidence
offered by CSX.  We shall therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
AFFIRM JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
CITY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT/CROSS-PETITIONER.