Title: Doe v. Forrest

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Doe v. Forrest (2002-184); 176 Vt. 476; 853 A.2d 48

2004 VT 37

[Filed 07-May-2004]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 28-May-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 37

                                No. 2002-184

  Jane Doe	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Bennington Superior Court

  Gary Forrest, Richard Forrest,	         March Term, 2003
  Bennington County Sheriff's Department,
  County of Bennington and State of Vermont

  Richard W. Norton, J.

  David Putter, Montpelier, and Bradley Myerson, Manchester Center, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant. 

  Pietro J. Lynn and Heather E. Thomas of Lynn & Associates, P.C.,
    Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Gibson, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   This case requires the Court to determine
  whether a sheriff can be held liable as the employer of a deputy who
  perpetrates intentional criminal misconduct while on duty. 
  Plaintiff-victim was coerced into performing oral sex by then-Bennington
  County Deputy Sheriff Richard Forrest (Forrest).  Forrest voluntarily pled
  nolo contendere to charges of lewd and lascivious behavior in violation of
  13 V.S.A. § 2601 and neglect of duty in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3006. 
  Plaintiff subsequently filed a civil action against Forrest's employers,
  Bennington County Sheriff Gary Forrest (Sheriff Forrest) and Bennington
  County Sheriff's Department (collectively the defendants), (FN1) asserting
  several claims of vicarious liability for the injuries she suffered as a
  result of Forrest's criminal conduct.  Forrest was initially a named
  defendant, but plaintiff voluntarily dismissed him from the case because of
  his lack of assets.  The Bennington Superior Court granted defendants'
  motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's claims.  Plaintiff
  now appeals to this Court, alleging that the court improperly granted
  summary judgment for defendants on several theories of direct and vicarious
  liability.  We hold that, on the record evidence, the trial court correctly
  ruled that defendants are not directly liable for Forrest's misconduct
  under 24 V.S.A. § 309, and that summary judgment for defendants was proper
  on two of plaintiff's theories of vicarious liability.  We also hold that
  there is sufficient evidence to withstand the summary judgment motion on
  plaintiff's theory of vicarious liability under Restatement of Agency
  (Second) § 219(2)(d) (1958), and reverse and remand.
   
       ¶  2.  On December 21, 1997, plaintiff, then twenty years old, was
  working alone as a cashier at a convenience store in East Dorset, Vermont. 
  Forrest, who was on duty and wearing his department-issued uniform, badge,
  gun, and handcuffs, entered the convenience store between 8:00 p.m. and
  9:00 p.m.  This was Forrest's third visit to the store since 6:30 p.m. that
  evening.  Although this particular stop was not prompted by a specific
  request, Forrest routinely checked the store during his East Dorset patrol
  as part of his "community policing function," pursuant to a contract
  between the Bennington County Sheriff's Department and the Town of East
  Dorset.  As such, he had become familiar with several of the store's
  employees and developed something of a personal relationship with
  plaintiff.  During some of these routine checks, Forrest jokingly
  threatened to handcuff or ticket plaintiff.  He also bragged about his
  exploits as a police officer and that he was trained to "shoot to kill." 
  In the weeks preceding December 21, his routine checks at the store
  increased in frequency and duration, as he apparently became more
  personally interested in plaintiff.

       ¶  3.  When Forrest entered the store, plaintiff was on the telephone
  with her mother while attending to customers at the check-out counter. 
  After those customers left the store, he took the telephone from plaintiff
  and jokingly told her mother, who was also an employee of the store, to
  stop harassing plaintiff.  Forrest then hung up the telephone and began
  asking plaintiff questions that were sexual in nature.  He turned the
  store's thermostat to ninety degrees and informed her that he had done so. 
  As she was readjusting the thermostat, he took hold of her hair, which was
  in a ponytail, and used it to move her head in various directions.  He told
  her that he liked women who wore their hair in a ponytail so that he could
  control them.  He then put his arm around plaintiff, who said nothing, but
  moved away from him and returned to the check-out counter. 

       ¶  4.  Forrest then selected an adult magazine from the store's
  magazine rack and showed plaintiff a picture of a woman performing
  fellatio.  After a short conversation pertaining to the sexual act depicted
  in the magazine, he began to maneuver her into a secluded area of the
  store, where he coerced her to perform oral sex.  He also kissed and
  fondled her breasts.  After approximately fifteen minutes, she moved away
  from Forrest, who departed soon thereafter.  She then telephoned for help.
  Forrest did not during the sexual assault unholster his weapon or
  handcuffs, nor did he threaten to use either instrument on plaintiff.  
   
       ¶  5.  As a result of the incident, Forrest resigned from the
  Sheriff's Department.  Following an investigation by the Vermont State
  Police, he was charged with, and voluntarily pled nolo contendere to, a
  criminal charge of lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing and "causing
  his penis to contact the mouth of [plaintiff] in violation of 13 V.S.A. §
  2601."  He also pled nolo contendere to a charge of neglect of duty for
  engaging in "open and gross lewd and lascivious conduct with [plaintiff]
  while assigned to patrol duty in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3006."  He was
  sentenced to three-to-five-years' imprisonment, all suspended, and was
  placed on probation and ordered to have no contact with plaintiff or her
  family.
        
       ¶  6.  Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging various state
  and federal claims and seeking monetary damages for injuries she suffered
  as a result of Forrest's conduct.  After plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
  all federal claims, defendants moved to dismiss her state law claims,
  arguing that an employee's intentional sexual misconduct could not be
  imputed to an employer because such conduct is beyond the scope of
  employment.  Finding further discovery warranted, the trial court denied
  defendants' motion to dismiss.  

       ¶  7.  After approximately two years of discovery, defendants moved
  for summary judgment, reasserting their argument that Forrest's misconduct
  was not within the scope of his employment; that no theory of vicarious
  liability recognized in Vermont would impute Forrest's conduct to
  defendants; and that there was no evidence to indicate that Sheriff Forrest
  had negligently trained Deputy Forrest, or that Sheriff Forrest knew or
  should have known that Deputy Forrest had a propensity to assault women. 
   
       ¶  8.  Following a hearing, the court granted defendants' motion. 
  The court found that 24 V.S.A. § 309, which plaintiff asserted was a basis
  for liability, was not applicable; that based on the undisputed material
  facts defendants were not vicariously liable under the doctrine of
  respondeat superior or alternative theories of liability under the
  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d); and that there was no evidence
  indicating defendants had negligently supervised Forrest.  The court then
  entered judgment in favor of defendants.   This appeal followed.  

       ¶  9.  Our review of summary judgment is de novo, and in proceeding
  with that review, this Court applies the same standard as the trial court. 
  Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Agency of Transp., 174 Vt. 341, 344,