Title: Scott F. Anderson v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3281 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of Sanctions in State v. Willie 
Rodgers: 
 
Scott F. Anderson,  
 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, The 
Honorable Robert Crawford, Presiding,  
 
Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  211 Wis. 2d 889, 568 N.W.2d 653 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-UNPUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 17, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondents-petitioners there were briefs 
by Thomas G. Cannon and O’Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., Milwaukee 
and oral argument by Thomas G. Cannon. 
 
 
For the appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Scott F. Anderson, Milwaukee. 
 
No.  96-3281 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3281 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Sanctions in State v.  
Willie Rodgers: 
 
Scott F. Anderson,  
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County,  
The Honorable Robert Crawford, Presiding,  
 
          Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 17, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 
reversing an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 
Robert Crawford, Judge.  The circuit court order imposed a fine 
of 50 dollars on Attorney Scott Anderson for arriving to court 
eight minutes late in violation of a pretrial scheduling order. 
  
¶2 
The issue presented is whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its power to sanction an attorney for being 
                     
1 Anderson v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, No. 96-
3281, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 1997). 
No.  96-3281 
 
2 
late to a scheduled court appearance in violation of a pretrial 
scheduling order.  
¶3 
We hold that a circuit court has authority under Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) §§ 802.10(7) and 805.03 (1995-96)2 to make such 
orders "as are just" imposing sanctions on an attorney who 
disobeys a pretrial scheduling order by arriving late to a 
scheduled court appearance.  Based on the record in this case, 
we conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion under Wis. Stat. (Rule) §§ 802.10(7) and 805.03.  
Accordingly we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The facts are not in dispute for purposes of our 
review.  On November 5, 1996, Attorney Scott Anderson, who was 
representing a defendant in a criminal case before Judge Robert 
Crawford, arrived at the courtroom at 8:38 a.m. for a jury trial 
scheduled to commence at 8:30 a.m.   
¶5 
The date and time of trial were established in a 
September 6, 1996, pretrial scheduling order signed by Judge 
Crawford.  Attorney Anderson acknowledged in writing that he had 
received and read a copy of the order.   
¶6 
The scheduling order states that "[a]ll attorneys and 
parties are to appear timely at the scheduled time for each 
court appearance."  The last paragraph of the order, entitled 
                     
2 All further references to Wisconsin statutes will be to 
the 1995-96 versions unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  96-3281 
 
3 
"SANCTIONS," warns that "[u]nless good cause is shown for 
failure to comply, the court may impose appropriate sanctions." 
¶7 
After Attorney Anderson's late arrival on November 5, 
1996, Judge Crawford called the case, and the following exchange 
took place: 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  I want the record to reflect 
that Mr. Anderson is eight minutes late for court this 
morning.  I start my jury trials at 8:30.  It's 
important for me.  I'm going to try to try two cases 
today.  Mr. Anderson shows up late.  What's the reason 
why you are late, Mr. Anderson? 
 
MR. 
ANDERSON: 
 
I 
don't 
have 
any 
reasonable 
explanation, Judge. 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  I'm going to exercise my 
inherent authority and fine you fifty dollars . . . . 
 I'm not holding you in contempt of court under 
Chapter 785 because this absence of yours did not 
occur in my presence and I don't have authority to 
hold you in summary contempt. 
¶8 
The circuit court then entered a written order stating 
that the circuit court possesses inherent authority to maintain 
order in its courtroom and that under the circuit court's 
inherent authority, Attorney Anderson was fined 50 dollars for 
arriving late to court without a reasonable explanation.   
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court order, 
ruling that a "circuit court may no longer exercise this 
independent 
inherent 
power 
to 
deal 
with 
an 
attorney's 
contemptuous behavior outside the statutory scheme."  Anderson 
v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, No. 96-3281, unpublished 
slip op. at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 1997).  The court of appeals 
further concluded that "[t]here is no residual of inherent 
No.  96-3281 
 
4 
authority which exists outside the contempt statutes permitting 
the trial court to fine a lawyer for arriving late."  Anderson, 
unpublished slip op. at 7.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the proper way to sanction tardy attorneys is through the 
nonsummary contempt procedure under Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1).  
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the order and 
remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to 
vacate the order.  We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals but on different grounds. 
II 
¶10 The question of whether a circuit court has the power 
to sanction an attorney for being late to a scheduled court 
appearance in violation of a pretrial scheduling order is a 
question of law, which this court determines independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses.  
¶11 This case presents an important issue for circuit 
courts, 
practicing 
attorneys 
and 
litigants 
in 
Wisconsin.  
Circuit courts are pressed with heavy dockets and complex cases. 
 In order to adjudicate cases in a timely manner and to serve 
the interests of all litigants, circuit courts must have the 
power to effectively manage court business.  To this end, 
lawyers must comply with scheduling orders.  Circuit courts, in 
turn, must consider lawyers' scheduling difficulties as well as 
the scheduling conflicts presented by other courts.  In short, 
circuit courts and lawyers must be considerate of each other's 
No.  96-3281 
 
5 
needs and must treat each other with respect and fairness, 
bearing in mind their respective roles and concerns. 
¶12 In this case the circuit court had two jury trials 
scheduled for the day on which Attorney Anderson arrived late to 
court.3  Attorney Anderson, when asked why he was late, offered 
no explanation.  At a minimum, he should have apologized to the 
circuit court for his tardiness.   
¶13 We agree with the court of appeals that our decision 
in Gower v. Circuit Court for Marinette County, 154 Wis. 2d 1, 
452 N.W.2d 355 (1990), would not permit the circuit court to 
find an attorney summarily in contempt under Chapter 785 for 
arriving late to a court proceeding.  In Gower we held that 
summary contempt proceedings could not be used when the 
attorney's tardiness was not committed in the actual presence of 
the court.  See Gower, 154 Wis. 2d at 11.  However, because the 
circuit court in this case expressly stated that it was not 
holding Attorney Anderson in contempt for being late, Gower is 
not determinative of the circuit court's powers in this case. 
¶14 Counsel for the circuit court asserts that Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) §§ 802.10(7) and 805.03 authorize a circuit court to 
                     
3 As discussed in oral argument before this court, it is not 
uncommon for multiple misdemeanor cases to be scheduled for the 
same time in the same circuit court.  As a result, a case 
scheduled for 8:30 a.m. may not be called by the court until 
later in the day.  Thus it is not unusual for attorneys to 
handle other business in the courthouse or to appear before 
another judge while waiting for a case to be called. 
No.  96-3281 
 
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sanction tardy attorneys, independent of the court's contempt 
power under Chapter 785.  
¶15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
(Rule) 
§ 802.10(7) 
provides 
that 
"[v]iolations of a scheduling or pretrial order are subject" to 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 805.03.  Section 805.03 provides that "[f]or 
failure . . . to obey any order of court, the court in which the 
action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just . . . ." 
¶16 Attorney Anderson contends that Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§§ 802.10(7) and 805.03 are inapplicable to his conduct in a 
criminal case because these rules are designed to ensure that 
litigants and lawyers in civil actions do not disrupt the 
orderly administration of justice.  
¶17 Attorney Anderson fails to note, however, that the 
rules of practice in civil actions, including Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§§ 802.10(7) and 805.03, apply to criminal proceedings through 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  "[R]ules of evidence and practice in 
civil actions shall be applicable in all criminal proceedings 
unless the context of a section or rule manifestly requires a 
different construction."  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).  Furthermore, 
in State v. Heyer, 174 Wis. 2d 164, 171, 496 N.W.2d 779 (Ct. 
App. 1993), the court of appeals concluded that the context of 
Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 805.03 does not require a different 
construction.   
¶18 Finally, neither the text nor the legislative history 
of Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.10(7) requires a construction that is 
not applicable to criminal proceedings.  Section 802.10 governs 
No.  96-3281 
 
7 
calendar practice for most actions or special proceedings in 
Wisconsin courts.  See Judicial Council Notes 1977 to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.10.  According to the Judicial Council Committee's Note, 
§ 802.10 places the responsibility for moving a case on the 
attorneys as well as on the court.  See Judicial Council 
Committee Note 1974 to Wis. Stat. § 802.10, West's Wis. Stat. 
Ann. (1994).  
¶19 Our examination of Wis. Stat. (Rule) §§ 802.10(7) and 
805.03 thus leads us to conclude that these rules apply to 
criminal cases and that circuit courts have authority to 
sanction a tardy attorney under §§ 802.10(7) and 805.03 when the 
attorney fails to obey a pretrial scheduling order.  The circuit 
court's power to sanction under §§ 802.10(7) and 805.03 is 
independent of the court's contempt power. 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. (Rule) § 805.03 provides that in cases 
of failure to obey an order of the court, the circuit court may 
make such orders in regard to the failure "as are just."  Thus 
(Rule) § 805.03 grants a circuit court discretion in determining 
the appropriate sanction and imposes a duty on the circuit court 
to make such orders as are just.  See Johnson v. Allis Chalmers 
Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 274-75, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991).   
¶21 We must determine whether the circuit court in this 
case appropriately exercised its discretion in fining Attorney 
Anderson 50 dollars for arriving eight minutes late for a jury 
trial in violation of a pretrial scheduling order.  We will 
sustain a circuit court's order imposing sanctions under Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 805.03 unless the court erroneously exercised its 
No.  96-3281 
 
8 
discretion.  A discretionary decision will not be disturbed if a 
circuit court has examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  See 
Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 273 (citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)).  
¶22 A court should use caution in imposing sanctions 
against attorneys.  See Strong v. Brushafer, 185 Wis. 2d 812, 
822, 519 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1994).  Mistakes by attorneys can 
often be corrected without sanctions if they are isolated 
mistakes 
resulting 
from 
inexperience, 
inadvertence 
or 
misunderstanding.  See Brushafer, 185 Wis. 2d at 822 (citing SCR 
60.01(7) that "[a] judge should utilize opportunities to 
criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and 
counselors, 
brought 
to 
his 
or 
her 
attention . . . .").  
Furthermore, circuit courts should tailor sanctions to the 
severity of the misconduct.   
¶23 Arbitrary 
action 
by 
a 
circuit 
court 
undermines 
attorney and public confidence that they will receive fair 
treatment by the circuit court.  This court has stated as 
follows: 
 
[B]oth the sheer volume and the type of cases 
respondent [judge] has heard can lead to the kind of 
exasperation and impatience he has shown.  Be that as 
it may, the conduct of those who aspire to be judges, 
both off the bench but particularly on the bench, must 
be such as to warrant the respect of the public and 
the confidence of litigants that they will be treated 
fairly, impartially and considerately. 
No.  96-3281 
 
9 
In Re Complaint against Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 512-13, 294 
N.W.2d 485 (1980). 
¶24 For a reviewing court to determine whether the 
sanctions imposed in a particular case are just, the circuit 
court must make a record of the reasons for imposing sanctions 
in that case.  To make a record, the circuit court should, as it 
did in this case, give the attorney an opportunity to explain 
his or her tardiness.  The record must address the disruptive 
impact on the court's calendar resulting from the attorney's 
late arrival, the reasonableness of the attorney's explanation 
and the severity of the sanction to be imposed. 
¶25 Counsel for the circuit court in this case argues that 
circuit courts have the power to sanction an attorney for being 
late, regardless of whether the attorney's tardiness had an 
actual disruptive effect, in order to create a particular 
courtroom atmosphere or "culture."  We conclude that a circuit 
court's interest in creating a particular courtroom "culture" 
does not outweigh the need for fairness and or the need for the 
circuit court to make a record when imposing sanctions for an 
attorney's tardiness. 
¶26 A circuit court's failure to delineate the factors 
that influenced its decision constitutes an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971).  In this case the circuit court merely stated 
that Attorney Anderson was eight minutes late, that it had two 
jury cases to try that day and that "I start my trials at 8:30. 
 It's important for me."  The circuit court did not state how 
No.  96-3281 
 
10
the eight-minute delay would affect the court's ability to try 
the two cases that day or other calendared matters or why those 
eight minutes warranted a 50 dollar sanction.  The record does 
not show whether the eight-minute delay caused any problems for 
jurors, victims, witnesses, law enforcement officers, or court 
staff.  The record does not show whether the attorney was 
frequently tardy.  Thus, the record does not demonstrate that 
the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law or used a demonstrated rational process to reach 
a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  
¶27 Because the circuit court in this case did not 
articulate its reasoning on the record, we are unable to 
conclude that the sanction imposed against Attorney Anderson for 
being eight minutes late was just.  We therefore conclude that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. 
¶28 Because we conclude that a circuit court has authority 
under Wis. Stat. (Rule) §§ 802.10(7) and 805.03 to impose 
sanctions on attorneys who are tardy to scheduled court 
appearances, we need not discuss a circuit court's inherent 
power to impose sanctions under the circumstances in this case. 
 We note that characterizing a power as an inherent power does 
not excuse a court from developing a record to support its 
decision. 
¶29 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the order of the circuit court and remanding 
the cause to the circuit court with directions to vacate the 
No.  96-3281 
 
11
order imposing a fine of 50 dollars on Attorney Anderson for 
being eight minutes late to a scheduled jury trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
1