Title: Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

ROSS_V_TIMES_MIRROR_INC.94-224; 164 Vt 13; 665 A.2d 580

[Filed 07-Jul-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-224


Edward H. Ross                                    Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

Times Mirror, Inc., Times Mirror                  February Term, 1995
Magazine, Inc. d/b/a Ski Magazine,
and George Bauer


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Edward H. Ross, pro se, Waterbury, plaintiff-appellant

Robert B. Hemley and Lucy T. Brown of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for
defendants-appellees 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.    Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Chittenden
Superior Court granting defendants' summary judgment motion on plaintiff's
claims of wrongful discharge, age discrimination, and tortious interference
with an employment contract.  We affirm. 

     Plaintiff was employed by defendant Times Mirror, Inc. (TMI) in 1980 as
a sales representative for some of its magazines and worked out of the New
York office.  In 1984, plaintiff was promoted to New England sales manager of
SKI magazine and transferred to Burlington, Vermont. Shortly after arriving
in Vermont, difficulties arose between plaintiff and his new supervisor,
advertising manager Ellen McVickar.  McVickar complained to both plaintiff
and her supervisor, defendant George Bauer, that plaintiff's communication
with the New York office was inadequate.  In June 1988, McVickar issued a
written warning to plaintiff, which was placed in his personnel file.  Later
that same month, plaintiff received a letter from Bauer placing him on
probation, explaining that if he did not improve his communication, he could
be terminated.  Plaintiff's correspondence improved and he was taken off
probation in 

 

September 1988.

     Although plaintiff received a laudable annual review in May 1989, the
friction continued to plague plaintiff and McVickar's relationship. In June
1989, an important advertiser wrote a letter to Bauer which criticized
McVickar and praised plaintiff.  Convinced that plaintiff had enticed the
advertiser to write the letter, McVickar recommended to Bauer that he
terminate plaintiff.  Bauer then scheduled an August meeting with him in New
York.  When plaintiff did not attend the meeting, Bauer terminated plaintiff
by phone. 

     Plaintiff believed he was terminated without good cause and in
retaliation for the embarrassing letter.  He brought the present action
advancing three wrongful discharge theories: (1) breach of an oral contract
to employ him until his retirement, (2) promissory estoppel based on a
promise of permanent employment and promises implicit in TMI's employee
handbook and a progressive disciplinary policy and (3) breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff also claimed that his
termination constituted age discrimination and he accused defendant Bauer of
interference with his employment contract with TMI.   Defendants denied the
allegations, and after several months of discovery moved under V.R.C.P. 56
for summary judgment. 

     The court granted defendants' motion, concluding that permanent
employment status, even if a correct characterization, did not rebut the
presumption of at-will employment and that any promised employment until
retirement was barred by the Statute of Frauds.  It also concluded that a
disclaimer in TMI's personnel handbook negated any effect defendant's
disciplinary policy had on the at-will relationship. It rejected plaintiff's
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim for lack of adequate
factual support on the element of bad faith. Finally, the court concluded
that plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to either
age discrimination or contract interference. 

     In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as
the trial court, namely, that the motion should be granted when, taking all
allegations made by the nonmoving party as true, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

 

as a matter of law.  Pierce v. Riggs, 149 Vt. 136, 139,