Title: State v. Anthony Caliguiri

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). GARIBALDI, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Court determines whether a prosecutor may refuse to admit a defendant to a Pretrial Intervention (PTI) Program solely because he is charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, which is a third-degree offense carrying a mandatory term of imprisonment. Early in the morning of April 4, 1996, Anthony Caliguiri was parked in a lot in front of a Krauser's convenience store in South River. The lot is located within 1000 feet of a school. When police approached Caliguiri, they spotted marijuana on the front seat of his car. On further search, the officers uncovered an additional quantity of the drug and a box of Ziploc bags. In addition, Caliguiri guided the officers to another large Ziploc bag of marijuana concealed in the trunk. When questioned at police headquarters, Caliguiri indicated that while he would have shared some of the drugs with his close friends, he never intended to sell the drugs. Nevertheless, he was ultimately indicted on three counts, including third-degree possession with the intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. Caliguiri, who had an unblemished record, a job, and good family support, applied for admission to the Middlesex County Pretrial Intervention Program. Although the prosecutor acknowledged that Caliguiri satisfied all of the applicable criteria of the statute and Guidelines, with the exception of the nature of the offense, his application was rejected by the criminal division manager. In evaluating Caliguiri's application, the criminal division manager noted that the offense was too serious to be considered for PTI and carried a presumption of incarceration. The trial court reversed the decision, subject to review by the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office. The Prosecutor's Office subsequently denied the application, relying on a purported legislative belief that drug offenses near a school were deserving of enhanced punishment and too serious for pretrial intervention. The trial court ordered Caliguiri's admission to PTI over the prosecutor's objection. The court determined that the prosecutor denied the application solely because Caliguiri committed a school zone offense, an action the trial court considered impermissible. Finding Caliguiri otherwise amenable to rehabilitation, the court concluded that the prosecutor's rejection represented a clear error in judgment. On appeal, the Appellate Division held PTI presumptively unavailable to defendants charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. However, because the prosecutor considered Caliguiri categorically ineligible for PTI, the court ordered a remand to allow Caliguiri the opportunity to rebut the presumption against admission. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification and summarily remanded the case to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of Section 8 of the Attorney General's Directive, which required county prosecutors to object to any PTI applications by persons charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, unless the prosecutor determined that the proofs available for trial would not sustain a conviction of that charge. The directive also required the prosecutor to appeal any adverse ruling on those applications. On remand, the Appellate Division again ordered reconsideration of Caliguiri's application, concluding that violating N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 was analogous to committing a second-degree offense, for which PTI is only presumptively, as opposed to categorically unavailable. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certification filed by both Caliguiri and the State. HELD: While prosecutors may not treat offenders of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as categorically ineligible for admission to PTI, they may treat N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as equivalent to a second-degree offense and consider PTI presumptively unavailable. 1. Although any defendant charged with a crime is eligible for PTI, the Guidelines and the statute governing the program provide the prosecutor and criminal division manager with specific criteria to apply in reviewing a PTI application. A prosecutor may reject an applicant solely because of the nature of the offense when the Guidelines express a presumption against PTI. (pp. 6-8) 2. Although judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to divert an offender from prosecution is permitted, the power of that review is tightly circumscribed. Specifically, a court must find that the prosecutor based a decision on an inappropriate factor, failed to mention a relevant factor, or so inappropriately weighed the relevant factors that the decision amounts to a patent and gross abuse of discretion. (pp. 8-9) 3. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 is a third-degree crime, which allows for alternative sentencing possibilities under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (CDRA). (pp. 9-11) 4. The PTI Guidelines make diversion available to all defendants, and the nature of that program suggests that categorical rejections must be disfavored. (pp. 11-12) 5. A careful reading of the CDRA and related precedent demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to preclude drug offenders from PTI. (pp. 12-13) 6. While post-conviction sentencing alternatives not only contradict the legislative intent underlying the CDRA, but also utterly subvert the punishments imposed by statute, PTI intervenes prior to conviction. Thus, PTI admissions are unaffected by the CDRA's rejection of post-conviction sentencing alternatives. (pp. 13-16) 7. Nothing in either the PTI Guidelines or the CDRA reveals any intent to categorically exclude N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders from admission into PTI. That notwithstanding, there is a presumption against diversion for offenders charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. (pp. 16-17) 8. Although the Legislature established N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as a third-degree crime, its especially stern punishments indicate that the Legislature considered it a serious crime. Thus, in light of the general tenor of the CDRA and the goals of the PTI Guidelines, prosecutors may treat N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as equivalent to a second-degree offense and consider PTI presumptively unavailable. (pp. 17-18) 9. A remand is appropriate because the prosecutor failed to consider all the relevant factors. A prosecutor applying an inappropriate per se rule necessarily fails to consider all the relevant factors. (pp. 18-20) 10. On remand, Caliguiri need only show compelling reasons to rebut the presumption against PTI. (p. 20) 11. The Attorney General's Directive is not consistent with the established requirements for PTI and inappropriately alters the criteria for admission to the program, which are jointly governed by statute and court rule. (pp. 20-21) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and modified in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although Justice Stein concurred in the Court's disposition to the extent that it rejects the State's position that third-degree school-zone offenses are categorically ineligible for PTI, he disagreed with the Court's holding that third-degree offenders are presumptively ineligible for PTI, believing that the showing required to rebut the presumption would be insurmountable in the vast majority of cases and would inevitably lead to the unwarranted incarceration of many defendants who would otherwise appear to be the most suitable for diversion into PTI. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE HANDLER did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ANTHONY CALIGUIRI, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued February 2, 1999 -- Decided April 14, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinions are reported at 305 N.J. Super. 9 (1997) and 308 N.J. Super. 214 (1998). Cecelia Urban, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Linda K. Danielson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by GARIBALDI, J. In this appeal, the Court must determine if a prosecutor may refuse to admit a defendant to a Pretrial Intervention (PTI) Program solely because he is charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, that crime is a third-degree offense carrying a mandatory term of imprisonment. Neither R. 3:28, Guidelines for the Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey, Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comments on R. 3:28, (1999), or the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act ("CDRA") provide that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders should be categorically ineligible for PTI. The policies underlying both the Guidelines and the CDRA, however, warrant treating N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as essentially equivalent to a second-degree offense for which PTI is presumptively unavailable. Because the prosecutor in this case considered the offender catagorically ineligible, we remand the application to the prosecutor for reconsideration. On remand, the offender must show "compelling reasons" to obtain admission to PTI. We also affirm the Appellate Division's decision to invalidate part of the Attorney General's Supplemental Directive for Prosecuting Cases Under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act ("Attorney General's Directive"), issued January 6, 1997. In rejecting Caliguiri's application, the prosecutor relied on a purported legislative belief that drug offenses near a school were "deserving of enhanced punishment" and "too serious for Pre-Trial Intervention." The trial court ordered Caliguiri's admission to PTI over the prosecutor's objection. The prosecutor argued that all relevant factors had been considered, and that no mitigating factors outweighed the nature of the offense. When questioned by the court, the prosecutor did not identify any additional factors to support the decision to deny PTI. The court determined that the prosecutor denied Caliguiri's application solely because defendant committed a school zone offense. Because the Legislature designated N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 a third-degree crime, the court held that the prosecutor could not base his rejection solely on the nature of the offense. Finding Caliguiri otherwise amenable to rehabilitation, the court concluded that the prosecutor's rejection represented a clear error in judgment. The State appealed. The Appellate Division held PTI presumptively unavailable to defendants charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. 305 N.J. Super. 9 (1997) ("Caliguiri I"). However, because the prosecutor considered Caliguiri categorically ineligible for PTI, the court ordered a remand to allow Caliguiri the opportunity to rebut the presumption against admission. We granted the State's petition for certification, 152 N.J. 186 (1997), and summarily remanded the case to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of Section 8 of the Attorney General's Directive. Section 8 provides, in relevant part, that county prosecutors "shall object" to any PTI applications by persons charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 "unless the prosecutor determines that the proofs available for trial would not sustain a conviction of that charge." Ibid. The Attorney General's Directive also required the prosecutor to appeal any adverse ruling on those applications. On remand, the Appellate Division again ordered reconsideration of Caliguiri's application. 308 N.J. Super. 214 (1998) ("Caliguiri II"). Relying on this Court's statement in State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 449 (1997), the court again concluded that violating N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 was analogous to committing a second-degree offense, for which PTI is presumptively unavailable. In response to the State's argument that there was no standard to determine whether Caliguiri's presumptive ineligibility had been rebutted, the court adopted the "serious injustice" standard provided by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d. We granted the petitions for certification of Caliguiri and the State. 155 N.J. 586 (1998). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, and COLEMAN join in this opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE HANDLER did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ANTHONY CALIGUIRI, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. STEIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Defendant, a gainfully employed twenty-five-year-old with no prior convictions, was indicted for third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property. The indictment's reference to distribution was based on defendant's admission that he would share the 1.5 ounces of marijuana with some friends, not on the basis of an intent to sell the drugs. After Caliguiri applied for admission to the Middlesex County Pretrial Intervention (PTI) program, the prosector acknowledged that, apart from the nature of the offense, Caliguiri satisfied all the criteria for admission to that program. He had an unblemished record, good family support, a job, and appeared to be amenable to rehabilitation. In addition, Caliguiri had cooperated with the police by volunteering the name of the seller and the location of the sale. Nonetheless, the State opposed defendant's admission to PTI on the ground that third-degree school-zone drug offenders were categorically ineligible for PTI. The Court's disposition offers defendant some hope of admission to PTI because the Court properly rejects the State's contention that third-degree school-zone drug offenders are categorically ineligible for PTI. But the faint promise of PTI the Court extends with one hand it retracts substantially with the other by its holding that third-degree school-zone offenders, just like second-degree offenders, must be considered presumptively ineligible for PTI, a presumption so strong that it can be overcome only by compelling reasons consisting of evidence of something extraordinary or unusual, something 'idiosyncratic,' in [the defendant's] background. State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 252 (1995) (quoting State v. Jabbour, 188 N.J. 1, 7 (1990)). I join the Court's disposition to the extent that it rejects the State's position that third-degree school-zone offenders are categorically ineligible for PTI. But I cannot join in its holding that third-degree offenders are presumptively ineligible for PTI. NO. A-214/215 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ANTHONY CALIGUIRI, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. DECIDED