Title: Commonwealth v. Gardner

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11751 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  THOMAS GARDNER. 
 
 
 
 
Bristol.     November 10, 2017. - June 18, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Cross-examination by prosecutor, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Lesser 
included offense, Capital case.  Evidence, Cross-
examination, Impeachment of credibility. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 25, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On the morning of Saturday, November 5, 2011, the 
defendant, Thomas Gardner, and the victim, Michael Duarte, met 
to conduct a drug transaction at a house in New Bedford that was 
owned by the defendant's ex-wife.  Four days later, after the 
victim's girl friend had reported him missing, the police found 
2 
 
 
the victim's body wrapped in a painter's tarpaulin hidden 
beneath the basement stairs of that house.  The police also 
found evidence of the victim's blood in the kitchen, and a trash 
bag outside the house that contained clothing and a hammer 
bearing both the victim's and the defendant's blood.  Further 
investigation showed that the victim had died of blunt force 
trauma to the head.  He had suffered nineteen lacerations to his 
head and had four skull fractures; these injuries were 
consistent with blows from a hammer. 
 
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in 
the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.1  
The defendant appeals from his convictions, claiming that (1) 
the prosecutor's references to the defendant's prearrest silence 
during cross-examination and in closing argument were improper; 
(2) the prosecutor mischaracterized evidence during closing 
argument; and (3) the judge's instructions to the jury 
concerning lesser included offenses were erroneous.  Although we 
agree that certain of the prosecutor's questions and comments 
concerning the defendant's failure to contact the police before 
his arrest were improper, we conclude that neither these errors 
nor the other arguments raised by the defendant created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
                     
 
1 The jury also found the defendant guilty of larceny of a 
motor vehicle; violation of an abuse prevention order; and 
larceny. 
3 
 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions and decline 
to exercise our extraordinary authority to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Facts.  We summarize the facts relevant to this appeal as 
the jury could have found them, reserving certain details for 
later discussion.  The victim lived in New Bedford with his girl 
friend and their two daughters.  Shortly before 9 A.M. on 
November 5, 2011, the victim left his home, driving a Honda 
Civic automobile, after telling his girl friend that he was 
going to look at a house, located on Churchill Street, that was 
for sale.  He was supposed to return home shortly to take care 
of his daughters.  When the victim failed to return, his girl 
friend began calling him repeatedly on his cellular telephone 
beginning at 9:30 A.M., but she was unable to reach him.  That 
afternoon, she drove to the house on Churchill Street that the 
victim had gone to see, but no one answered when she knocked on 
the door.  Later that evening she contacted the New Bedford 
police to report that the victim was missing. 
 
On the morning of November 9, officers with the Fairfield, 
Connecticut, police department learned that the victim's Honda 
Civic was at a rest area off of Interstate Route 95.  When the 
first officer arrived, she observed the victim's vehicle parked 
at the far end of the parking lot, and the defendant sitting in 
the driver's seat. 
4 
 
 
 
When the defendant saw the police cruiser, he fled in the 
vehicle, reaching speeds in excess of one hundred miles per hour 
and, among other things, struck another vehicle and ran over the 
foot of a police officer.  The defendant eventually lost control 
of the vehicle, abandoning it in a wooded area.  He continued on 
foot until he reached Westport, Connecticut, where he entered a 
building that was under construction and hid. 
 
Shortly afterward, police officers arrested the defendant 
as he walked through Westport.  The defendant initially denied 
that he was Thomas Gardner and claimed that he was a 
construction contractor working on the building where he had 
been hiding. 
 
The defendant was eventually transported to a police 
station in Fairfield, Connecticut, where he was questioned by a 
member of the Massachusetts State police and a detective with 
the New Bedford police department.  The interview was recorded 
and later shown to the jury at trial.2  After the police read the 
defendant the Miranda rights and informed him that the interview 
was being recorded, the defendant waived his rights and agreed 
                     
 
2 The defendant challenged the voluntariness of his 
statements.  After a hearing, the motion judge found that the 
statements "were freely and voluntarily given beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  After the videotape was played for the jury, 
and later in his final instructions, the trial judge told the 
jury that they should not consider the statements made by the 
defendant unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant had made the statements and that he had made them 
voluntarily, freely, and rationally. 
5 
 
 
to speak with police.  The defendant stated that he was 
traveling with a "buddy" who was going to Florida and who had 
agreed to drop the defendant off at his mother's house in 
Pennsylvania on the way.  The defendant said that he and his 
friend had left New Bedford late in the evening on November 6 in 
the friend's Honda Civic.  En route, they pulled off at the 
Fairfield rest stop, where they remained for two days.  The 
defendant said that his friend had been inside a restaurant at 
the rest stop when the police cruiser had appeared, and that the 
defendant fled without him in the Honda Civic.  After some 
prompting, the defendant indicated that the person he had been 
traveling with was the victim, who, he suggested, was going to 
Florida to get away from his girl friend.  After further 
questioning about his trip, the defendant terminated the 
interview. 
 
Later that same day, the New Bedford police department 
contacted the defendant's ex-wife and obtained her permission to 
search the Churchill Street house.  There, the police discovered 
the victim's body hidden beneath a staircase in the basement, 
wrapped in a painter's tarpaulin secured with tape, with a 
plastic bag placed over his head.  A paint can, a white 
painter's cloth, and other painter's materials had been piled on 
top of the body.  In the kitchen, blood was found on the floor, 
a ceiling fan, and a wall clock.  Police also detected blood on 
6 
 
 
the basement stairs.  There was testimony that the blood on the 
wall clock in the kitchen belonged to the victim.  Outside the 
house, the police discovered a trash bag containing a sweatshirt 
with both the victim's and the defendant's blood on a sleeve, a 
T-shirt with the victim's blood on the back, and a hammer 
bearing both the victim's and the defendant's blood.  Subsequent 
investigation of the defendant's cellular telephone showed that 
on November 5, 2011, the defendant had called the victim at 8:24 
A.M. and 10:47 A.M., and that the victim had called the 
defendant at 8:38 A.M. and 9:06 A.M. 
 
The medical examiner testified that the victim's death was 
caused by blunt force trauma to the head and brain injuries.  
The victim had suffered nineteen lacerations and two abrasions 
to his head; thirteen of the lacerations went to the bone.  
There were four distinct skull fractures.  All of these injuries 
were consistent with having been caused by blows from a hammer.  
All the injuries were inflicted at around the same time and, 
although any one laceration alone could have been fatal, there 
was no way to determine the order in which the injuries were 
sustained, which injury rendered the victim unconscious, or 
which caused his death.  The victim also had lacerations on his 
face, bleeding around both eyes, and minor abrasions on his 
right hand.  He was missing some teeth that were later 
7 
 
 
discovered in his stomach.  The medical examiner opined that the 
victim had swallowed them prior to his death. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified in his own defense.  He 
admitted that he had killed the victim with the hammer that the 
police had found, but claimed that he had acted in self-defense.  
He testified that he was living at the Churchill Street house 
and that, on the morning of November 5, 2011, he had arranged to 
meet the victim there to buy heroin from him.  When the 
defendant gave the victim money for the heroin purchase, 
however, the victim became angry because the defendant already 
owed him money and did not have enough cash for the new 
purchase.  According to the defendant, the victim punched him 
and a fight ensued, during which the victim tackled him and 
slammed him to the floor; the victim then got on top of the 
defendant, putting his knees on the defendant's chest and his 
hands around the defendant's throat, choking him.  The defendant 
testified that he then grabbed a hammer from a nearby shelf and 
began "slapping" the victim's head with the side of the hammer 
before finally striking him with the face of the hammer and 
knocking him out briefly.  After the defendant stood up and 
tried to catch his breath, however, the victim regained 
consciousness, grabbed the defendant's pants leg, and tried to 
yank the defendant back down to the ground.  At that point, the 
defendant testified, he struck the victim again with the face of 
8 
 
 
the hammer, killing him.  The defendant then wrapped the 
victim's body in a tarpaulin and put it in the basement; 
disposed of the hammer and clothes in the trash; took the money 
from the victim's wallet; sent a false text message to the 
victim's cellular telephone asking him why he had not yet 
arrived; hid the victim's wallet and the victim's cellular 
telephone; and arranged to meet a friend to sell him the 
victim's drugs.  The next day the defendant fled New Bedford. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Prosecutor's references to the defendant's 
prearrest silence.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor 
improperly cross-examined him about his prearrest silence,3 and 
exploited that evidence in closing argument, in violation of the 
common law and his privilege against self-incrimination under 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the prosecutor's cross-examination 
concerning the defendant's prearrest silence was permissible in 
light of the omissions and falsehoods in the defendant's 
postarrest statements. 
                     
 
3 "Prearrest" silence occurs in the period prior to custody, 
"[w]hen a citizen is under no official compulsion whatever, 
either to speak or to remain silent."  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 
U.S. 231, 243-244 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).  See 
Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 55, 60 (1982).  
"Postarrest" silence is silence at the time of arrest and after 
receiving Miranda warnings.  See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 
618-619 (1976).  See also Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-
606 (1982) (per curiam). 
9 
 
 
 
We begin our analysis by noting that we have not previously 
considered whether art. 12 prohibits use of a defendant's 
prearrest silence for impeachment.  See Commonwealth v. 
Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 59 (1982).4  Instead, we have resolved 
issues involving use of a defendant's prearrest silence for 
impeachment on evidentiary grounds.  See Commonwealth v. Niemic, 
472 Mass. 665, 672-673 (2015); Nickerson, supra at 60-61.5 
 
We first addressed the use of a defendant's prearrest 
silence for impeachment in Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 54.  We 
recognized that where a defendant does not contact the police to 
tell them his story before he is arrested, and later testifies 
at trial to facts that he failed to disclose to the police 
before his arrest, the defendant's prearrest silence typically 
is of limited probative value with respect to the credibility of 
his testimony.  See id. at 60-61 & n.6.  We explained that there 
may be many reasons why a defendant does not wish to come 
                     
 
4 "The Supreme Court of the United States . . . held that a 
defendant's pre-arrest silence may be used to impeach him 
without denying fundamental fairness guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment" to the United States Constitution, but 
"left it to the States to determine under their own rules of 
evidence when pre-arrest silence is so inconsistent with a 
defendant's testimony that impeachment by reference to that 
silence is probative." Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 59, citing 
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239. 
 
 
5 The defendant in Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 59, made no 
claims under the Massachusetts Constitution, and accordingly we 
decided the case solely on common-law grounds.  See Irwin v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 852 n.31 (2013). 
10 
 
 
forward and speak to the police that have no bearing on his 
guilt or innocence.  See id. at 61 n.6.  "[A]n individual's 
failure to speak may be the result of his awareness that he has 
no obligation to speak, his caution arising from knowledge that 
anything he says may be used against him, and his belief that 
efforts to exonerate himself would be futile."  Id., citing 
People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 458 (1981).  Moreover, "some 
individuals [may] not come forward because they want to avoid 
contact with the police."  Nickerson, supra. 
 
Jurors, however, who may not recognize the wide variety of 
alternative explanations for a defendant's prearrest silence, 
may overvalue such evidence and "construe such silence as an 
admission and, as a consequence, may draw an unwarranted 
inference of guilt."  Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 61 n.6, quoting 
Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d at 459.  Given these circumstances, allowing 
a defendant to be impeached based on his prearrest silence may 
result in substantial prejudice to that defendant, "burden[ing] 
his right to testify in his own defense."  Nickerson, supra at 
61, citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 246 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 
Consequently, we advised in Nickerson, 386 Mass. at 62, 
that "[i]n general, impeachment of a defendant with the fact of 
his prearrest silence should be approached with caution, and, 
wherever it is undertaken, it should be prefaced by a proper 
11 
 
 
demonstration that it was 'natural' to expect the defendant to 
speak in the circumstances."  The trial judge may consider 
conducting a voir dire in these circumstances and, "if the 
evidence is admitted, the judge should, on request, instruct the 
jury to consider that silence for the purposes of impeachment 
only if they find that the witness naturally should have spoken 
up in the circumstances."  Id.6 
 
Applying this test to the situation in Nickerson, 386 Mass. 
at 55, 61-62, where the defendant testified at trial that 
another person had committed the assault and battery at issue, 
we held that it was improper for the judge to instruct the jury 
that, in assessing the defendant's credibility, they could 
consider the defendant's failure to give this information to the 
police before his arrest.  We reasoned that, if the defendant 
had volunteered this information to the police, it would have 
shown that he was at the scene of the crime when it was 
committed, had seen the victim attacked and the weapon used, and 
knew the identity of the attacker -- information that "would 
                     
 
6 In contrast to impeachment of a testifying defendant, 
before a witness other than the defendant can be impeached with 
his or her failure to report exculpatory evidence to police, the 
Commonwealth must establish "[1] that the witness knew of the 
pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he 
possessed exculpatory information, [2] that the witness had 
reason to make the information available, [and] [3] that he [or 
she] was familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper 
authorities."  Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 238 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 288, 296–297 
(1981). 
12 
 
 
have gone a long way toward proving that the defendant committed 
the crime charged and, as an admission, would have been 
admissible as tending to prove his guilt."  Id. at 60.  Hence 
"[i]t would not have been 'natural' for the defendant to have 
come forward . . . and produce incriminating evidence against 
himself."  Id. 
 
More recently, in Niemic, 472 Mass. at 668-669, 673, a 
murder case where the defendant took the stand to testify that 
he had stabbed the victim in self-defense, we also held that it 
was error for the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant 
about his failure to contact police and tell them about his 
alleged self-defense before his arrest.  As in Nickerson, 386 
Mass. at 60, we concluded that "it would not have been natural 
for [the defendant] to seek out police to tell his exculpatory 
story."  Niemic, supra at 673.7  See Commonwealth v. Irwin, 72 
                     
 
7 It is important to distinguish the situation where a 
defendant is being questioned about his or her failure to 
contact the police, however, from the situation where a 
defendant is being questioned about omissions in prearrest 
statements or inconsistencies between those statements and the 
defendant's later testimony.  For example, although we held in 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 672-673 (2015), that it 
was improper for the prosecutor to question the defendant about 
his failure to contact the police to tell them that he had 
stabbed the victim in self-defense, we also held that the 
prosecutor could properly question the defendant about voluntary 
prearrest statements that he had made to civilian witnesses in 
which he had omitted any mention of self-defense, where it would 
have been natural for him to explain that he had been acting in 
self-defense.  See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 
13 
 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 643, 653-654 (2008) (prosecutor's focus during 
cross-examination of defendant and in closing argument on 
defendant's refusal to participate in prearrest interview with 
police detective was improper); Commonwealth v. Ewing, 67 Mass. 
App. Ct. 531, 544-545 (2006), S.C., 449 Mass. 1035 (2007) 
(prosecutor's remarks urging jury to discredit defendant's 
testimony because he did not contact police prior to trial after 
learning of charges not proper). 
 
There are, however, situations where a defendant's 
testimony suggests that it would have been natural for him to 
contact police in the circumstances described, and in those 
cases it is appropriate for the prosecutor to cross-examine the 
defendant about his failure to do so.  For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 524, 534 (1994), the 
Commonwealth alleged that the defendant had shot a father and 
son who were his social friends.  The father died from his 
wounds, while the son survived.  Id. at 527.  The defendant 
testified that the son had shot the father, that the son had 
then threatened the defendant's wife, and that while the 
defendant was protecting his wife another acquaintance struggled 
with the son over the gun, resulting in the son's shooting.  Id. 
at 534.  Given this testimony, we concluded that it was not 
                                                                  
243-244 (2010), vacated on another grounds, 567 U.S. 948 (2012), 
S.C., 464 Mass. 580, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 865 (2013). 
14 
 
 
improper for the prosecutor to question the defendant about his 
failure to contact the police after the shootings, because "if 
the defendant's story were true, he naturally would have 
contacted the police to get help for his wounded friend," the 
father.  Id. at 536.  "The prosecutor did not ask any questions 
about the defendant's failure to inculpate [the son] (and thus 
exculpate himself)," but "simply brought out the fact that the 
defendant did not come forward when it would have been natural 
for him to do so."  Id. at 536-537. 
 
Here, after the defendant testified that he had killed the 
victim in self-defense, the prosecutor repeatedly cross-examined 
the defendant about his failure to contact the police during the 
period between the victim's death on November 5, 2011, and his 
arrest on November 9, 2011.8   
As in the cases cited above, the 
                     
 
8 For example, at one point the prosecutor engaged in the 
following colloquy with the defendant: 
 
Q.:  "And it never occurred to you during any of this that 
you might want to call the police?" 
 
A.:   "Yes, it did.  I wanted to call the police, yes." 
 
Q.:  "You wanted to call the police?" 
 
A.:   "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  Did you call the police on November 5th, 
2011?" 
 
A.:   "No." 
 
Q.:  "The 6th?" 
15 
 
 
prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument were 
improper insofar as they focused on the defendant's prearrest 
silence.  Notwithstanding the defendant's statement that he 
"wanted to call the police," the record suggests that, even 
assuming that he had killed the victim in self-defense, it would 
not have been natural for him to contact the police or volunteer 
information to them under the circumstances.  In addition to the 
fact that telling his story to the police would have implicated 
him in the victim's death, the defendant had other reasons for 
avoiding the police:  he was a drug addict; he had taken the 
victim's money and his vehicle; and he had been previously 
arrested for violating a restraining order that his ex-wife had 
obtained, and he knew that he had violated that order again by 
being in the Churchill Street house. 
                                                                  
 
A.:   "No." 
 
Q.:  "The 7th?" 
 
A.:   "No, I did not." 
 
Q.:  "The 8th?" 
 
A.:   "No." 
 
The prosecutor returned to this line of questioning three more 
times during cross-examination of the defendant, asking the 
defendant to "tell the jury when it crossed [his] mind to call 
the police after this happened," and whether he was thinking 
about calling the police while he was hiding the defendant's 
body, while he sent a text message to his ex-wife, or while he 
was trying to sell drugs to another friend. 
16 
 
 
 
We reject the Commonwealth's argument that it was 
appropriate for the prosecutor to question the defendant about 
his prearrest silence because he dissembled in his postarrest 
statement.  Our decisions have carefully distinguished 
impermissible references to a defendant's prearrest silence from 
permissible references to a defendant's postarrest statements.9  
Even where we have concluded that the prosecutor properly 
referred to inconsistencies and omissions in a defendant's 
postarrest statement, we have still held that references to a 
defendant's prearrest silence were improper.  See Commonwealth 
v. Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 116-118, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 
(2000) (prosecutor could properly comment on defendant's 
failure, during his postarrest interrogation, to ask appropriate 
questions about what had happened to his wife and daughter, but 
that it was error for prosecutor to question officer about 
defendant's prearrest silence when told of his wife's death).  
                     
 
9 In a line of cases beginning with Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 
the United States Supreme Court defined the category of 
infractions involving the use of a defendant's silence that 
gives rise to constitutional error.  In Doyle, the Court held 
that the "use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] 
silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda 
warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."  Id. at 619.  The Court in Doyle did not, however, 
establish a prophylactic rule that gives rise to a 
constitutional error in every case in which a prosecutor refers 
to a defendant's postarrest silence.  The rule announced in 
Doyle does not apply to impeachment testimony regarding prior 
inconsistent statements after Miranda warnings.  See Anderson v. 
Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (per curiam). 
17 
 
 
Cf. Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 71-72 & n.13, 76 
(2010) (prosecutor could elicit testimony concerning defendant's 
failure to ask how his son was killed to show consciousness of 
guilt, but testimony about prearrest silence were not proper).  
The fact that the defendant ultimately chose to speak to the 
police after his arrest, but did so falsely, does not change our 
conclusion that his prearrest silence was of minimal probative 
value. 
 
Because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
references to the defendant's prearrest silence during the 
defendant's cross-examination and closing argument, we determine 
whether those errors resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 
Mass. 189, 201 (2017).  We conclude that they did not, because 
the defendant's testimony and self-defense claim were 
extensively and primarily undermined by other evidence at trial. 
 
First, the jury saw the videotape recording of the 
defendant's interrogation following his arrest in Connecticut, 
during which the defendant said nothing about his alleged fight 
with the victim, the victim's death, or killing in self-defense.  
Instead, the defendant spun an elaborate tale about traveling 
south with the victim and having left him behind at the rest 
stop restaurant when he fled from the police.  At trial, the 
defendant admitted that the story he had told during this 
18 
 
 
interrogation was a lie.  As described above, the prosecutor 
permissibly cross-examined the defendant about the falsehood of 
his story and the inconsistencies between it and the defendant's 
testimony at trial, and emphasized this topic in closing 
argument.10 
 
Second, certain forensic evidence contradicted the 
defendant's testimony.  Although the defendant testified that he 
                     
 
10 The prosecutor's cross-examination and comments in 
closing argument concerning the defendant's postarrest 
statements to police were proper, in contrast with the 
references to the defendant's prearrest silence.  The defendant 
certainly had the right to refuse to speak to the police 
following his arrest, as he was informed at the outset of his 
interrogation.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 
336, 341, 345 (2012).  Having chosen to speak, the defendant's 
omissions in his postarrest statements to the police and the 
inconsistencies between those statements and his testimony at 
trial could be properly used by the prosecutor to question his 
credibility.  "A defendant who takes the witness stand . . . is 
subject to the ordinary rigors of proper cross-examination, 
including questioning about prior inconsistent statements 
voluntarily made."  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 639 
(1997).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 551-
552 (2003) (prosecutor could properly comment on defendant's 
failure to indicate he acted in self-defense in statement given 
to police); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 118, cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000) (where defendant charged with 
murdering wife gave voluntary postarrest statement to police 
during which he maintained innocence but failed to ask any 
questions about what had happened to wife or condition of 
daughter, prosecutor could properly comment on defendant's 
failure to ask appropriate questions that innocent party would 
ordinarily ask); Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 410 Mass. 641, 648-
650 (1991), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. King, 
445 Mass. 217 (2005) (where defendant in rape case testified at 
trial that victim had made sexual advances to him, but omitted 
that information in first statement to police, trial judge 
properly instructed jury that if they found that defendant had 
made false statements to police they could consider statements 
as evidence of consciousness of guilt). 
19 
 
 
and the victim were on the floor near some shelves when he 
struck most of the hammer blows, the forensic chemist saw no 
visible blood in that area but found visible blood on a ceiling 
fan and a wall clock.  Most of the blood on the kitchen floor 
was in a different area from where the defendant alleged that he 
had fought with the victim and struck him with the hammer.  The 
medical examiner stated that the scrapes on the victim's hands 
were "very small," "lacking any contusion around them," and that 
there were no injuries to the victim's forearms; this is 
contrary to what one might expect if the victim had engaged in a 
protracted struggle with the defendant.11  And two witnesses who 
saw the defendant later on Saturday, November 5, testified that 
the defendant's demeanor was normal and that they did not notice 
that he had any injuries.  See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 
792, 802 (1996). 
 
Finally, the jury heard extensive evidence tending to show 
the defendant's consciousness of guilt, including his efforts to 
conceal the victim's body and the evidence of the crime; the 
admittedly false text message sent to the victim's cellular 
telephone making it appear as if the victim had not come to the 
Churchill Street house on the morning of November 5; the 
                     
 
11 The medical examiner testified that it was possible the 
abrasions on the victim's right hand were caused by punching the 
defendant, but that it was very unlikely given the absence of 
any bruising. 
20 
 
 
defendant's departure from New Bedford; and, after being 
discovered in Connecticut, his flight, efforts to hide, and 
false statements to police.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 
Mass. 201, 217 (2014) ("[e]vidence of flight, concealment, false 
statements to police, destruction or concealment of evidence, . 
. . or similar conduct generally is admissible as some evidence 
of consciousness of guilt"); Barnoski, 418 Mass. at 537 n.8 
(defendant's consciousness of guilt supported by "ample 
evidence, other than the defendant's failure to go to police, of 
the defendant's flight and concealment to justify this 
instruction"). 
 
Given all of this other evidence, we conclude that the 
prosecutor's improper references to the defendant's prearrest 
silence would have played little if any role in the jury's 
decision to reject the defendant's version of events.  
Accordingly, we conclude there was no substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice. 
 
2.  Prosecutor's statement in closing argument.  During 
closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statement: 
"We now know that the defendant had a flurry of blows 
on [the victim's] head, that he was not unconscious 
for a period of time.  And according to the defendant, 
he was the one who knocked him out.  He was down on 
the ground.  He was unconscious.  That was the 
defendant's opportunity to flee there.  That was his 
time to leave.  All he had to do was walk out the door 
of the house.  He didn't do that.  He chose to stay, 
and he chose to strike [the victim] again and again 
21 
 
 
and again in the head with that hammer.  And so [the 
victim] breathes his last breath on the kitchen floor 
. . . ." 
 
Defense counsel did not object to this statement at trial.  The 
defendant argues on appeal that the prosecutor mischaracterized 
the evidence, and thereby caused a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 
375, 379–380 (1995). 
 
We disagree.  There was ample evidence to support the 
prosecutor's statement that the defendant struck the victim with 
the hammer again and again, and the defendant admitted as much.  
The medical examiner testified that the victim had suffered a 
total of nineteen lacerations to his scalp and that the victim's 
injuries could have been caused by the hammer identified as the 
murder weapon.  Further, given the defendant's admission that 
one of the hammer blows he struck rendered the victim 
unconscious, the medical examiner's testimony that any of the 
lacerations and fractures she found on the victim's head could 
have been sufficient to do that, and her testimony that the 
victim only had minor scrapes on his hands and no injuries on 
his forearms where defensive wounds would be expected, it was 
certainly open to the prosecutor to suggest that some of the 
hammer blows were struck after the victim had lost 
consciousness.  See Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 829 
(2013) ("In closing argument, '[p]rosecutors are entitled to 
22 
 
 
marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may 
draw from it.' . . . Those inferences need only be reasonable 
and possible" [citation omitted]). 
 
The defendant's argument that the prosecutor 
mischaracterized the evidence is based on the contention that 
the prosecutor was recounting the defendant's testimony about 
the altercation with the victim.  This is not a fair 
interpretation of the prosecutor's statement, where he cited 
only the defendant's admission that he had knocked the victim 
out, leaving him on the ground and unconscious.  The prosecutor 
was not reciting the defendant's entire story about the fight, 
nor was he required to do so.  Citing the defendant's admission 
that he had knocked out the victim did not require the 
prosecutor to accept the defendant's other testimony that he did 
not strike the victim again while the victim was unconscious.  
The prosecutor was free to argue to the jury that they could 
rely on some of the defendant's admissions without being bound 
by all of his testimony.  See Commonwealth v. McInerney, 373 
Mass. 136, 142-143 (1977) (jury may accept defendant's 
admissions as true while still rejecting his accompanying 
exculpatory statements as untrue). 
 
3.  Jury instructions on lesser included offenses.  As a 
general rule, "a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a 
lesser included offense of the charged crime, when the facts 
23 
 
 
could support the lesser offense."  Commonwealth v. Shelley, 477 
Mass. 642, 643 (2017).  Instructing the jury on the lesser 
included offense "gives the jury a third option, beyond 
acquittal or conviction" on the charged offense, and thus 
"mitigates concern that a jury would return a guilty verdict for 
the greater crime, even if they believe the prosecution has not 
proved each element, because the jury believe that the 
defendant's conduct warrants some form of punishment."  Id. at 
644. 
 
The defendant contends that the judge's instructions on the 
lesser included offenses to murder in the first degree were 
defective because they supposedly failed to make it clear that 
murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter are 
lesser included offenses of murder in the first degree committed 
with deliberate premeditation.  The defendant's argument is 
premised on two statements in the judge's instructions.  First, 
in the course of instructing the jury on murder in the second 
degree, the judge said:  "The requirements of proof for murder 
in the second degree are the same as for murder in the first 
degree with extreme atrocity or cruelty but without the element 
that the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty."  The judge repeated this statement the next day in the 
course of reinstructing the jury in response to their request 
for "a definition of the various charges and conditions."  
24 
 
 
Second, while reinstructing the jury, the judge also said:  "If 
you look at those elements [of manslaughter] and compare it, 
say, to the elements of second-degree murder, you'll find that 
they are the identical element[s], except in second-degree 
murder, the Commonwealth has to prove the absence of mitigating 
circumstances."  Because the first statement compared the 
elements of murder in the second degree only with the elements 
of murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, but not with the elements of murder in the first degree 
committed with deliberate premeditation, the defendant contends 
that these statements misled the jury into believing that murder 
in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter are lesser 
included offenses only of murder committed with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty, but not of murder committed with deliberate 
premeditation.  Consequently, the defendant argues that the jury 
were not given the option of finding the defendant guilty of 
murder in the second degree or voluntary manslaughter as lesser 
included offenses of murder in the first degree committed with 
deliberate premeditation. 
 
We conclude that there was no error in the judge's 
instructions.  As an initial matter, both of the statements by 
the judge are legally correct, as the defendant concedes.  The 
first statement is taken verbatim from the instruction on murder 
in the second degree contained in the Model Jury Instructions on 
25 
 
 
Homicide at 58 (2013).  It properly states that the elements of 
murder in the second degree are the same as for murder in the 
first degree with extreme atrocity or cruelty, except that the 
former lacks the element of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
id. at 43 (instruction for murder in the first degree with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty).  Likewise, the second statement is 
correct because "[a] killing that would otherwise be murder in 
the . . . second degree is reduced to the lesser offense of 
voluntary manslaughter where the Commonwealth has failed to 
prove that there were no mitigating circumstances."  Id. at 64. 
 
Furthermore, considered in their entirety and as a whole, 
the judge's instructions plainly informed the jury they could 
consider murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter 
as lesser included offenses of murder in the first degree with 
deliberate premeditation.  See Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 
15, 26 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 207 
(2012) ("When reviewing jury instructions, '[w]e evaluate the 
instruction as a whole, looking for the interpretation a 
reasonable juror would place on the judge's words.' . . .  We do 
not consider bits and pieces of the instruction in isolation"). 
 
The verdict slip clearly listed "Guilty of the lesser 
included offense of Murder in the Second Degree" and "Guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Manslaughter" as options for the 
jury to consider, following the options of not guilty, and 
26 
 
 
guilty of murder in the first degree on each of the three 
theories (deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
and felony-murder).12  Moreover, when the judge described the 
verdict slip to the jury at the outset of his instructions on 
homicide, he specifically identified murder in the second degree 
and manslaughter as lesser included offenses of murder in the 
first degree under the theories of both deliberate premeditation 
and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Given this context, it was 
sufficiently clear to the jurors that they could consider murder 
in the second degree and manslaughter as lesser included 
alternatives to murder in the first degree with deliberate 
premeditation. 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record pursuant to our obligation under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and conclude that there are no grounds for reversing the 
defendant's convictions or for granting any other relief. 
                     
 
12 Insofar as the judge's instruction and the verdict slip 
suggested that "traditional" murder in the second degree was a 
lesser included offense of felony-murder in the first degree, 
the defendant received an instruction beyond what he was 
entitled to receive, because at the time of trial murder in the 
second degree based on malice was not a lesser included offense 
of felony-murder in the first degree.  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 
460 Mass. 294, 307 n.19 (2011) (distinguishing between 
"'traditional' murder in the second degree based on malice, and 
felony-murder in the second degree based on a felony not 
punishable by life imprisonment").  But see Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 (2017) (in trials commencing after 
date of opinion, defendant may not be convicted of felony-murder 
without proof of one of the three prongs of malice). 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.