Title: State v. Thomas

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

110 Ariz. 120 (1973) 515 P.2d 865 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Donnell THOMAS, Appellant. No. 2199. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 7, 1973. Rehearing Denied December 11, 1973. *122 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Paul J. Prato, Former Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Messing, Hirsh & Franklin by Robert J. Hirsh, Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the defendant, Donnell Thomas, from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to the crime of first degree murder, §§ 13-451 and 452 A.R.S., with a sentence of death thereon, § 13-453 A.R.S. Omitting questions concerning the death penalty, defendant asks that the following questions be answered on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On 4 October 1969, Mason Branch, a clerk at the Crown Liquor Store in Tucson, Arizona, was shot and killed during the course of an armed robbery. After investigation, the Tucson police obtained arrest warrants for the defendant Donnell Thomas as well as David Williams, Robert Skinner, and Paul Wright. David Williams entered a plea of guilty and was given the death penalty which plea and sentence was set aside on appeal. State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 421, 489 P.2d 231 (1971). Williams again plead guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Paul Wright was tried and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, armed robbery, and conspiracy. He was given probation. Robert Lee Skinner was tried and convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed and the verdict, judgment and sentence were affirmed. See State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 515 P.2d 880, filed this day. The defendant Thomas was arrested in Oakland, California, on 6 November 1969. He admitted that he had spent most of the day of the murder with the codefendants Skinner, Williams, and Wright, and that he, Thomas, had been in the Crown Liquor Store on the night of the murder, but he denied any knowledge or involvement in the robbery and homicide. After a mistrial as a result of a "hung" jury, Thomas was tried again, convicted, and sentenced to death. The State contended that Thomas shot Branch five times during a robbery committed by Thomas and the three other men. Damaging evidence of the defendant's participation in the crime was given by Gilbert Alzua who testified that, while both were inmates of the county jail, the defendant had admitted killing Branch and robbing the store, and by the admission of testimony given at the first trial by Lucius Sorrell, an inmate of the Arizona State Mental Hospital and a user of heroin and LSD. The prior testimony of Sorrell indicated that Thomas came to Sorrell's apartment and asked to borrow a gun to "pull a job." Thomas left without the gun and returned shortly to tell the witness that he didn't need to borrow the gun because he "already had one." Also, in his prior testimony, Sorrell stated that he saw Thomas and three other men running through a park near his apartment and a short distance from the liquor store about the time of the robbery and murder. On cross-examination at the first trial, Sorrell said that he was unable to see Thomas clearly, but recognized him by his *124 build and a hat he was wearing. He said that his inability to see from one eye and the darkness did not prevent him from observing accurately. ADMISSION OF SORRELL'S PREVIOUS TESTIMONY When Sorrell was called as a witness for the State he said he did not remember the events of 4 October 1969 surrounding the crime, nor did he remember the defendant or the other men accused of responsibility for the robbery and murder. The Deputy County Attorney, over the objection of the defendant's attorney, sought to introduce Sorrell's prior testimony given at defendant's first trial, at which time Sorrell had testified extensively and had been subjected to cross-examination by defendant's attorney. Prior to admission of this testimony, the court questioned Sorrell as follows: It was apparent that the witness was either mentally incapable of testifying as to the events to which he previously testified or was refusing to testify. The court ruled that "it is obvious that the man is incapable of testifying," and over timely objections by defendant admitted the prior testimony on the grounds of present incompetence of the witness. The right to confrontation granted to defendants by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is also a valuable right for the trier of fact, allowing the witness's demeanor to be observed and his credibility weighed. Government v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (3rd Cir.1967). The United States Supreme Court has based its decisions on admissibility of prior testimony primarily on the opportunity to cross-examine at the time the prior testimony was taken, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S. Ct. 2308, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1972), or, if the witness is available, on the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the trial in which the prior testimony or statement is admitted. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965). In the instant case it is immaterial for the purposes of the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution whether the witness could be available for cross-examination at the second trial or not. His testimony at the prior trial of the same defendant upon the same charge was subject to cross-examination by defendant at that time and was, for Sixth Amendment purposes, admissible. The defendant contends, however, that Rule 256 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1956), 17 A.R.S., which governs admissibility of prior testimony is the exclusive test of admissibility in Arizona. Rule 256 provides as follows: Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Moore, 40 Ariz. 174, 11 P.2d 347 (1932), interpreted the civil rules' counterpart of what is now Rule 256 and found that only where the witness was dead or beyond the jurisdiction of the court would prior testimony be admitted: In Adkins v. State, 42 Ariz. 534, 28 P.2d 612 (1934), the court construed Section 5058, Revised Code 1928, which is substantially the same as the current Rule 256. We said, in response to the argument that the court should have admitted testimony of an absent witness who was ill in Williams, Arizona: It would appear from the dicta in Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Moore, supra, and the holding in Adkins v. State, supra, that Rule 256 limits the admissibility of prior testimony of a previous trial with the same parties and issues solely to the situation wherein the witness is either dead or beyond the jurisdiction of the State. We do not believe that Rule 256 is so limiting. Rather, we believe that Rule 256 is a permissive rule specifically allowing the introduction of previous testimony when the conditions of Rule 256 are met, and not so restrictive as to preclude the admission of previous testimony when, as here, for example, the witness through no fault of the party offering the prior testimony refuses or is incapable of testimony even though present in court. We agree with the rationale of the Colorado court: Our position in this regard is buttressed by Rule 30 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1956) concerning the admissibility of testimony taken at a preliminary hearing which reads: It would seem strange indeed to allow testimony from the preliminary hearing to be admitted when the witness is present and refused to testify, see State v. Dixon, 107 Ariz. 415, 489 P.2d 225 (1971), and yet not allow the testimony from a former trial on the same issues with the same party. So much of the statements in Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Moore, supra, and Adkins v. State, supra, as may appear to be contrary, are by this opinion overruled. We hold the prior testimony of the witness Sorrell under the facts in this case was admissible. (See Rule 19.3, subd. c, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1973, not in effect at the time of the trial in the instant case.) Defendant also complains that the court erred in allowing the County Attorney to lead the witness Sorrell while attempting to get him to testify. The trial court has wide discretion in allowing the parties, upon an adequate showing, to examine a called witness as a hostile witness. State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d 81 (1965); State v. Michael, 103 Ariz. 46, 436 P.2d 595 (1968). In the instant case, the witness was refusing or was unable to testify and the trial court allowed the County Attorney to cross-examine as a hostile witness including leading questions. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. IMPEACHMENT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS ALZUA Gilbert Alzua testified that after Thomas was transferred to the Pima County Jail, Thomas admitted to Alzua that he, Thomas, took part in the robbery and he shot Branch himself. On cross-examination it was brought out that Alzua had been convicted of three felonies prior to his arrest for the fourth which placed him in the jail with Thomas. After Alzua's statement to the police, charges of embezzlement were continued indefinitely and Alzua was released on his own recognizance. Horton Weiss, the prosecutor in the instant case, was also the prosecutor in the Alzua case. Alzua testified that he had been released on bond but later stated that he might have been released upon his own recognizance. Alzua also stated his attorney posted bond for him. The defense attempted to introduce a record from the Justice Court which indicated that Alzua was released on his own recognizance and his case continued indefinitely. This offer was objected to by the State and the objection was sustained. Defendant states in his brief: We believe that the evidence was admissible in that it indicated that the witness might be receiving preferred treatment in return for his very damaging testimony against the defendant. We do not find, however, that the exclusion was prejudicial. The defense was able, through the testimony of Alzua's attorney, to bring before the jury the same information: And: And: Defendant also complains that he was unduly limited in cross-examining the witness Alzua by "a battery of objections" made by Mr. Horton Weiss for the State. We note, however, in the complete transcript that many of the objections were sustained. We find no error or undue limitations on the defendant's right to cross-examine the State's witness Alzua. PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE A pathologist testified as to the injuries which caused the death of Branch and the State sought admission of four pictures of the deceased on the autopsy table with wire probes jutting out of the nude body in the places where bullets entered and exited. The following transpired: The defense counsel contended that the autopsy pictures admitted over objection had no relevance to any issue in the case and should have been excluded. He argued that, since the manner and circumstances of Branch's death were not contested, the photographs had no probative value. There are many theories which allow admission of photographs of a corpse in a homicide prosecution. They have been held admissible to prove the corpus delicti, State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506 (1957); to identify the victim, State v. Robinson, 89 Ariz. 224, 360 P.2d 474 (1961); to show the nature and location of the fatal injury, State v. Robinson, supra; to help determine the degree or atrociousness of the crime, People v. Keeling, 152 Cal. App. 2d 4, 312 P.2d 407 (1957); to corroborate state witnesses, State v. Hudson, 38 N.J. 364, 185 A.2d 1 (1962); to aid the jury in fixing the punishment, State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz. 46, 402 P.2d 1 (1965); to illustrate or explain testimony, People v. Dugger, 179 Cal. App. 2d 714, 4 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1960); and to corroborate the State's theory of how and why the homicide was committed, Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940). The trial court has a considerable measure of discretion in admitting or excluding gruesome pictures, and it is no valid objection that such photos may be inflammatory or prejudicial, for one cannot exclude otherwise competent evidence of a gruesome or unpleasant occurrence simply because it may arouse emotions. Young v. State, 38 Ariz. 298, 299 P. 682 (1931). The defense cites State v. Beers, 8 Ariz. App. 534, 448 P.2d 104 (1968) and State v. Makal, 104 Ariz. 476, 455 P.2d 450 (1969), cert. den., 404 U.S. 838, 92 S. Ct. 128, 30 L. Ed. 2d 71, as authority for exclusion of the pictures. The court in Beers, supra, said that the duty of the trial court is "to weigh the danger of prejudice to the defendant, against the probative value of the evidence." Where the "photographs are so inflammatory as to outweigh their probative value," the appellate court should reverse the trial court. In Makal, supra, this court said, "* * * Where as here there was substantially no controversy concerning the commission of the offenses, there was no significant reason for their admission into evidence. The photographs were highly inflammatory, without any particular saving purpose, and could only have tended to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors * * *." Here the pictures, though admittedly inflammatory, did serve the purpose of explaining the autopsy and the paths of the bullets. We find no abuse of discretion in admitting them into evidence. REOPENING OF THE STATE'S CASE At the end of the defendant's case, the following transpired: The court then admonished the jury to be ready to deliberate on the following day. On the next morning the following occurred out of the presence of the jury: A motion to reopen is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196 (1964); State v. Moreno, 92 Ariz. 116, 374 P.2d 872 (1962). In the instant case the witnesses called had both testified at the previous trial and the defense *132 was not surprised by their testimony. We do not find that the trial court abused its broad discretion in allowing the State to reopen. MISCONDUCT OF PROSECUTOR The defendant assigns error to the conduct of the Deputy County attorney, Mr. Horton Weiss, because of (a) improper offers of evidence, (b) frequent objections to cross-examination of the State's witnesses which denied the right of confrontation, (c) frequent objections which prevented defense counsel from developing continuity of direct examination of defense witnesses, and (d) failure to disclose evidence inconsistent with the State's theory of the case. Defendant first contends that the County Attorney committed misconduct by making offers of evidence knowing the evidence to be inadmissible. The evidence specifically objected to was a prior statement of the witness Alzua not for the purpose of impeachment but to bolster the witness's testimony. For example: While we may question the trial tactics of Mr. Weiss, a more timely objection by defendant's attorney would have been helpful and we find no prejudice in the instant case. Second, the defendant contends that continued objections to defendant's cross-examination of the State's witnesses prevented the defendant from exercising his right of confrontation. The defendant's position in the present case is that the objections were so frequent that the right to confrontation was destroyed. We are referred to only a "reading of the entire transcript" which we have done. We find that most of those objections on cross-examination were sustained, and properly so, by the trial court. We have *133 not been able to find any witness for the State whom defense counsel was unable to confront fully and defendant in his brief does not direct us to any specific instances. We find no error. The third point raised by the defendant is that the Deputy County Attorney's "continued and repeated objections to appellant's questions on direct examination prevented appellant from developing any continuity on his direct examination." Specifically, we are directed to the testimony of Kevin Breslin. On the thirteen pages of direct examination Mr. Weiss made 30 objections to questions asked by defense counsel, 23 of which were overruled. He also made seven other interruptions. At one point the following exchange took place: After reading the foregoing and the similar futile efforts of the defense counsel to develop any continuity of testimony by the other witnesses for the defense, we must agree that the interruptions were frequent, baseless in most cases, and a hinderance to the defense. There can be no justification for such conduct. As we said in State v. Moore, 108 Ariz. 215, 495 P.2d 445 (1972) "[m]isconduct alone will not cause a reversal, as a new trial should not be granted to punish counsel for its misdeeds, but where the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel, we will reverse." 108 Ariz. at 222, 495 P.2d at 452. This is a case in which, while we deplore the conduct of Mr. Weiss, a reading of the entire transcript does not reveal that the defense was effectively prevented from presenting his case and we find no reversible error. Defendant also contends that the County Attorney suppressed evidence beneficial to the defendant: The only question is whether the picture is inconsistent with the State's theory of the case or whether the picture provides evidence favorable to the defense. In State v. Altman, 107 Ariz. 93, 482 P.2d *135 460, the court said: "[i]n the instant case, there is no allegation that the prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant; therefore, the failure of the trial court to grant Appellant's motion was not reversible error." 482 P.2d at 464. Under the existing rules, the defendant is required to show more before he is entitled to the picture. DEATH PENALTY We have not, in this opinion, discussed issues involving the death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) and Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1972). In accordance with our announced policy in this regard, the death penalty is set aside and reduced to life imprisonment. State v. Taylor, 109 Ariz. 267, 508 P.2d 731 (1973); State v. Chatman, 109 Ariz. 275, 508 P.2d 739 (1973); § 13-1717, subd. B A.R.S. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.