Title: Dodson v. Dodson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 63
September Term, 2002
_________________________________________
JAMES J. DODSON
v.
AMELIA C. DODSON
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
       * Eldridge 
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   April 5, 2004
* Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
The issue in this case is whether, under Maryland law, a trial court may award
compensatory damages, based upon the alleged negligent failure to comply with a court
order, in a civil contempt action.  We shall answer that question in the negative and
reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
In 1999, the respondent Amelia C. Dodson filed, in the Circuit Court for
Worcester County, a divorce action against the petitioner James J. Dodson.  A pendente
lite order issued on July 30, 1999, inter alia, granted Amelia custody of the parties’
three children, granted to Amelia and the children use and possession of the parties’
condominium in Ocean City, Maryland, and provided that James “shall pay the monthly
mortgage payment, monthly assessment dues, monthly taxes, insurance and water bill”
pertaining to the Ocean City condominium (emphasis added).  A revised pendente lite
order was filed on October 31, 2000, although it did not modify the above-quoted
provision concerning “insurance.”
There were two separate insurance policies providing fire insurance for the
Dodsons’ Ocean City condominium.  A master fire policy covered the building and the
Dodsons’ unit, except for personal property contained in the unit.  The premiums on
this policy were paid by the condominium association, with each member paying his
or her unit’s share as part of the condominium association assessments and dues.  In
addition, James and Amelia Dodson had an insurance policy, through the Atlantic-
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Smith, Cropper & Deeley insurance agency, covering personal property in their
condominium unit.  The premium for the personal property insurance was paid
quarterly, amounting to $56.50 every three months.  According to the testimony of a
representative of the insurance agency, a bill for the quarterly premium would be sent
to James Dodson prior to each due date, and he would then send a check to the agency.
On the evening of December 19, 2000, while Amelia Dodson was at a party and
the three children were in the Ocean City condominium unit under the care of a
babysitter, a fire broke out in the condominium unit.  It was caused by a lighted lamp
which was lying on a bed.  Apparently, the lamp had fallen on the bed when two of the
children were playing in one of the bedrooms.  Although no one was injured, the fire
caused substantial damage to the condominium unit and to the personal property
contents.  The insurance on the structure had been in effect, and that insurance paid for
the repairs to the unit.  Nevertheless, when the Dodsons on December 20, 2000,
contacted the Atlantic-Smith, Cropper & Deeley insurance agency to report the fire
damage to the contents of the condominium unit, they were informed by a
representative of the agency that the insurance policy covering the contents had been
canceled on December 4, 2000, for nonpayment of the quarterly premium which had
been due on November 1, 2000.
Although there were some conflicts in the testimony concerning the Dodsons’
procedures for making sure that bills were paid, it was undisputed that the quarterly
premium payment due on November 1, 2000, had not been paid.  It was also undisputed
that James Dodson had not received the bill for the premium due on November 1st and
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that he had not received a December 14, 2000, letter from the insurance agency
informing him that the policy had been canceled for nonpayment of the quarterly
premium.  
Prior to their separation, the Dodsons’ principal residence had been in Clinton,
Maryland.  After their separation, and during the years 1999 and 2000, Amelia and the
children resided at the Ocean City condominium, and James resided at various places
in Clinton, Maryland, and Waldorf, Maryland.  A representative of the insurance
agency testified that a premium payment, for an earlier quarterly period in the year
2000, was in an envelope which showed a Waldorf return address for James Dodson
which was different than the address in the agency’s records, and that the agency sua
sponte changed its records to reflect the new address shown on the outside of the
envelope.  When the bill for the November 2000 quarterly premium and the December
14, 2000, letter were sent to this new address, James was no longer living there.  
In January 2001, Amelia commenced the present action by filing, in the Circuit
Court for Worcester County, a petition to hold James in contempt.  The petition referred
to the court’s pendente lite order requiring James to pay for “insurance” on the
condominium.  It stated that James “failed to pay” the premium due in November 2000,
that the fire in December 2000 damaged personal property belonging to Amelia and the
children, that there was no insurance to cover the damage, and that the uncompensated
damages totaled $25,000.00.  The petition requested the following:
“A. 
Find the Defendant in contempt;
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“B.
Order Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff for her loss;
“C.
Impose appropriate sanctions against Defendant for his
contempt, including incarceration;
“D.
Order Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney’s
fees related to this motion and hearing thereon;
“E.
Issue the attached Show Cause Order and schedule a
hearing at the earliest possible time; and
“F.
Grant such other and further relief as this cause may
require.”
Subsequently, a show cause order was issued by the court.
The defendant James responded by asserting that he had timely paid all insurance
premiums when he was given the bills, and that the fire was caused by “the bedroom
mattress which caught on fire because Plaintiff left a lamp thereon, and went to a party,
leaving the children home with a babysitter.”  At the hearing on the contempt petition
and in a memorandum, James asserted that the “insurance” referred to in the pendente
lite order was the insurance on the condominium unit, not the contents, and that the
insurance on the unit was always maintained.  James also argued, inter alia, that a
contempt action was not an appropriate action to resolve the question of which party’s
negligence caused a loss to the contents, that the use of a contempt action to resolve
this issue was “to short circuit due process of law to Defendant,” that “[n]egligence is
a tort action to which Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury under [the] facts,” that
contempt “require[s] a willful action or inaction in violating a clear mandate of [a]
Court Order” and “does not include and can not be support[ed] by innocent inaction or
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negligence,” and that the plaintiff “does not have the ability to pay” the compensatory
damages demanded of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff Amelia asserted that the “insurance” referred to in the pendente lite
order included insurance coverage on the personal property contents of the
condominium, that James was responsible for paying the premiums and had, in fact,
paid the premiums until November 2000, that James’s failure to pay the premium in
November 2000 was a violation of the pendente lite order, that “[n]othing in Lynch [v.
Lynch, 342 Md. 509, 677 A.2d 584 (1996)] or any other appellate decisions in
Maryland requires a finding of ‘wilfulness’ before holding a defendant in civil
contempt,” that James “may be held in contempt for not paying the insurance premium
. . . regardless of whether the Court determines that the failure to pay was negligent or
wilful,” that “the petitioner in a contempt proceeding must only prove that the money
was not paid,” and that “a trial court may award compensatory damages in a civil
contempt proceeding.”  The only authority relied upon for the assertion that
compensatory damages may be awarded in a civil contempt action was Jones v. Wright,
35 Md. App. 313, 370 A.2d 1144 (1977).
Following the hearing at which several witnesses testified, and the submission
of memoranda, the trial judge filed a written opinion and order holding that this was a
civil rather than a criminal contempt action, that the defendant James was required by
the pendente lite order to pay the November 2000 premium bill for insurance on the
condominium contents, “that the defendant failed, albeit negligently, to timely pay that
insurance bill,” and that “this court finds the defendant to be in civil contempt.”  The
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court also found that the negligence was solely that of the defendant; neither the
insurance agent nor the plaintiff were found to be negligent. The court rejected the
defendant’s argument that he should have a jury trial on the negligence issue.  With
regard to the defendant’s inability to pay defense, the court stated:
“Negligently failing to pay the insurance bill does not constitute an
inability to obey the court order.  Additionally, in the instant case,
there is not even a suggestion by the Defendant that he could not
afford to pay the small insurance premium as it came due.”
The trial court did not address the defendant’s contention that he did not have the
ability to pay the demanded compensatory damages.  
Finally, the court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that, under Maryland law,
compensatory damages could be awarded in a civil contempt action.  The court awarded
the plaintiff compensatory damages of $19,311.00 but rejected the request for
attorney’s fees, stating:
“The Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees in the amount of
$2,461.50.  While Maryland does permit an award of attorney’s
fees in contempt actions, any award is left to the discretion of the
trial judge.  Because in this case, the Defendant’s contempt was
negligent, and the issues involved somewhat complex, this Court
does not believe that attorney’s fees are warranted, and, therefore,
none will be ordered.”
The defendant James appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the
intermediate appellate court affirmed in an unreported opinion.  Thereafter, we granted
the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  Dodson v. Dodson, 371 Md. 68, 806
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1
In Save-Mor Drugs v. Upjohn Co., 225 Md. 187, 170 A.2d 223 (1961), the trial court in a civil
contempt action for violating an injunction awarded to the plaintiff costs of the litigation and
attorneys’ fees.  This Court described the award as “essentially an award for damages,” but pointed
out that “no question is raised here as to the kind of relief granted and we shall therefore not go into
that matter.”  225 Md. at 191, 194, 170 A.2d at 225, 228.  In Jones v. State, 351 Md. 264, 278, 718
A.2d 222, 229 (1998), we commented, citing a general treatise, that a possible sanction in a civil
contempt action may be a “civil fine” to compensate the plaintiff; no such “fine” was imposed or
involved in that case.  
In addition, where an earlier judgment mandates the payment of a sum of money, and the
defendant fails to comply, Maryland Rule 2-648(a), inter alia, authorizes a money judgment for the
specific amount still due on the earlier judgment.  While this Rule has been deemed applicable in
civil contempt actions, Lynch v. Lynch, 342 Md. 509, 516 n.4, 677 A.2d 584, 588 n.4 (1996), the
Rule does not provide for compensatory damages.  It simply authorizes a judgment for the unpaid
amount mandated by the prior judgment. 
In a few other jurisdictions, there are statutes expressly authorizing the award of compensatory
damages in contempt actions, but Maryland has no such statute.  In jurisdictions where the issue is
not controlled by statutes, the decisions are in conflict, and to some extent may reflect different
views concerning the nature and classifications of contempt actions.  
A sampling of the cases holding that compensatory damages may not be recovered in contempt
actions include Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage and Finance Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 288, 315 So.2d
431, 437 (1975) (“An indemnity or a compensatory award of damages must be determined in an
ancillary proceeding and is not permissible as an integral part of the court’s adjudication of
contempt.  * * *  [E]ither party on demand would be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
damages”); H. J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.2d 164, 175, 266 P.2d 5, 12 (1954) (“To allow
compensatory damages in the contempt proceeding would have the effect of turning it into an action
for damages.  In an action for damages, the parties are ordinarily entitled to a trial by jury”); Camp
v. East Fork Ditch Co., 55 P.3d 304, 318 (Idaho 2002) (“Under Idaho law, however, the court in a
contempt proceeding does not have the authority to order the contemnor to pay damages to the
complainant”); Eberle v. Greene, 71 Ill. App. 2d 85, 93, 217 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1966) (“The established
rule in Illinois is that the Court may imprison . . . for contempt of its orders but is without authority
to recompense Plaintiff for his damages”); State ex rel. Flynn v. District Court, 24 Mont. 33, 60 P.
(continued...)
A.2d 679 (2002).
II.
This Court has not previously decided whether compensatory damages may be
awarded in a civil contempt action; the issue, therefore, is one of first impression for
the Court.1  Nevertheless, an award of compensatory damages is ordinarily inconsistent
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1
(...continued)
493 (1900); Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 741, 119 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1963) (“[I]ndemnity for
damages cannot be secured in a contempt proceeding”); Elliott v. Burton, 19 N. C. App. 291, 295,
198 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1973) (“[T]he trial judge in this State has no authority to award indemnifying
fines or other compensation to a private party in a contempt proceeding”).
Other cases, chiefly relying upon dicta in United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-
304, 67 S.Ct. 677, 701, 91 L.Ed. 884, 918 (1947) (a criminal contempt case involving a fine payable
to the Government), and Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444, 449, 31 S.Ct.
492, 499, 501, 55 L.Ed. 797, 807, 809 (1911) (a contempt case involving imprisonment only), have
taken the position that a “compensatory fine” designed to compensate the plaintiff may be levied in
a civil contempt case.  See, e.g., Lyon v. Bloomfield, 355 Mass. 738, 744, 247 N.E.2d 555, 559
(1969) (“[A] fine may be assessed for the benefit of a party who has suffered injury because of the
contempt”); Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 519, 241 A.2d 336, 339 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1081, 89 S.Ct. 857, 21 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969) (“[A] Court can for present or past acts of misbehavior
amounting to civil contempt impose an unconditional compensatory fine”); Gordon v. S. S. Vedalin,
346 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (D. Md. 1972). 
with the nature of a constructive civil contempt action under Maryland law.
A.
In the leading case of State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 726-727, 298 A.2d
867, 875 (1973), Judge J. Dudley Digges for the Court summarized the history of and
the confusion surrounding contempt actions (footnote omitted):
“The history of the contempt power is very old with roots
stretching back to the early English monarchs and the common law.
The power began as a means of assuring the efficiency and dignity
of the sovereign but it soon spread to protect representatives of the
king.  The contempt power of the courts had a similar origin in that
the lord chancellor’s authority was derived from the king.  But, as
the courts became more independent of the crown and their power
increased, the authority to punish with contempt was carried with
them.  In time it was so established that the power was considered
inherent in the courts.  See Ex parte Maulsby, 13 Md. 625, 634
(1859) for an early statement of this rationale in Maryland.  See
also Hitzelberger v. State, 173 Md. 435, 438, 196 A. 288 (1938);
Kelly v. Montebello Park Co., 141 Md. 194, 118 A. 600 (1922).
Through the years the historical foundation of the contempt power
has tended to erode and crumble and out of the rubble, confused
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and indistinct categories have arisen.”
Judge Digges continued (267 Md. at 727, 298 A.2d at 875-876, footnote omitted):
“Today, contempts are classified as civil or criminal and at least
in theory either of these may be direct or constructive.  The various
categories are not mutually exclusive and in fact the nomenclature
assigned to a contempt involves both classes, e.g., a constructive
civil, or a direct criminal contempt. Historically, criminal
contempts were positive acts which offended the dignity or process
of the court.  Holding an offending party in contempt of court was
designed to vindicate the authority and power of the court and
punish disobedience to its orders.  The people were considered as
the real interested parties to prosecution and the State was
generally the prosecutor.  See, e.g., Sheets v. City of Hagerstown,
204 Md. 113, 102 A.2d 734 (1954); Kelly v. Montebello Park Co.,
141 Md. 194, 118 A. 600 (1922).  At common law what in
Maryland is now regarded as civil contempt probably did not exist;
but rather, a process which was employed as a procedure for civil
execution was used as a sanction against a party who disobeyed a
court order issued for the benefit and advantage of another party in
the proceedings.  Through the years, civil contempt was substituted
for civil execution, and now, in most jurisdictions, civil and
criminal contempt are the composite parts of the whole law of
contempt, although historically they are derived from a different
lineage.”
The Court in Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. at 728-729, 298 A.2d at 876, went on to
point out that, in many other jurisdictions, the distinctions between different types of
contempts are “frequently hazy and indistinct,” that the classification of contempts “has
plagued the courts of this country on innumerable occasions,” and that the approach
employed in numerous cases elsewhere, including decisions by the United States
Supreme Court, “is unacceptable.”  As to Maryland, however, the Court emphasized
that the law concerning contempt is clear, and that the purpose of civil contempt is to
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coerce present or future compliance with a court order, whereas imposing a sanction
for past misconduct is the function of criminal contempt (267 Md. at 728, 730, 298
A.2d at 876, 877):
“But, in this State, the distinction between the two types of
contempt has been preserved and is important.  A civil contempt
proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private
parties to a suit and to compel obedience or orders and decrees
primarily made to benefit such parties.  These proceedings are
generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future
compliance.  Thus, a penalty in a civil contempt must provide for
purging.  On the other hand, the penalty imposed in a criminal
contempt is punishment for past misconduct which may not
necessarily be capable of remedy.  Therefore, such a penalty does
not require a purging provision . . . .
* * *
If it is civil contempt, the sanction is coercive and must allow for
purging.”
Although we have repeatedly stated that the sanction in civil contempt actions
is “remedial,” our opinions have explained that “remedial’ in this context means to
coerce compliance with court orders for the benefit of a private party or to issue
ancillary orders for the purpose of facilitating compliance or encouraging a greater
degree of compliance with court orders.  We have not used the term “remedial” to mean
a sanction, such as a penalty or compensation, where compliance with a prior court
order is no longer possible or feasible.  See, e.g., Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 89, 807
A.2d 1, 11 (2002) (“[T]he purpose of [sanctioning] the contemnor is remedial, . . . i.e.
. . . ‘to compel obedience to orders’”); Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 552 n.15,
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766 A.2d 98, 107 n.15 (2001) (“An example of a remedial sanction in civil contempt
is [a] Rule 15-207(e)(4)-type order”); Ott v. Frederick County, 345 Md. 682, 688, 694
A.2d 101, 105 (1997) (“‘[T]he purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to coerce future
compliance’”); Lynch v. Lynch, supra, 342 Md. at 519, 677 A.2d at 589 (Civil contempt
“‘proceedings are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future
compliance’”); In re Ann M., 309 Md. 564, 569, 525 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1987) (“The
sanction imposed for civil contempt is coercive and must allow for purging”);
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 355, 464 A.2d 228, 233 (1983) (“[T]he purpose
of the contempt proceedings . . . was to coerce the defendants to comply with court
orders”); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 689, 262 A.2d 52, 55 (1970) (The
sanction “for civil contempt . . . is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant
to do what he has refused to do”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Lee, 170 Md.
43, 47, 183 A. 560, 562, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680, 56 S.Ct. 947, 80 L.Ed. 1400 (1936)
(“[C]ontempts have been divided into two classes with regard to their inherent
character or nature, namely, criminal and civil, or punitive and coercive”).
As emphasized in several of the above-cited cases, because the purpose of civil
contempt is to coerce or facilitate compliance with court orders, the sanction imposed
for civil contempt “must provide for purging.”  See, e.g., In re Ann M., supra, 309 Md.
at 569, 525 A.2d at 1057; State v. Roll and Scholl, supra, 267 Md. at 728, 298 A.2d at
876.  
Furthermore, in light of the coercive nature of civil contempt, a present inability
to comply with the prior court order, or with the purging provision if it is different from
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the prior order, is a defense in a civil contempt action and precludes the imposition of
a penalty.  See, e.g., Long v. State, supra, 371 Md. at 89-90, 807 A.2d at 11 (“[T]his
Court consistently, and emphatically, has held that a civil contemnor may be
incarcerated only when he or she has been found to have ‘the present ability to purge
the contempt’”); Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra, 362 Md. at 549, 766 A.2d at 105
(Sanctions “in the civil contempt proceedings” may not be imposed upon a contemnor
if “it was shown that . . . he or she did not have the present ability to purge”); Thrower
v. Support Enforcement, 358 Md. 146, 161, 747 A.2d 634, 642 (2000) (“It defies any
semblance of logic or human experience to suppose that, on $69/week unemployment
benefits and with no other significant assets, [the defendant] would be able to pay $840
[, the purge amount,] within a month”); Dorsey and Craft v. State, 356 Md. 324, 351,
739 A.2d 41, 56 (1999) (“[P]resent inability to comply with the court order or the
purging provision is traditionally a defense in a constructive civil contempt case”);
Jones v. State, 351 Md. 264, 276, 718 A.2d 222, 228 (1998) (“[A]ny party judged to be
a civil contemnor must be afforded the opportunity to show a present inability to purge
the contempt”); Lynch v. Lynch, supra, 342 Md. at 523, 677 A.2d at 591 (“[T]he goal
of civil contempt proceedings, to coerce compliance with a court order entered
primarily for the benefit of private parties to a suit, cannot be accomplished when the
responsible party is [presently] unable, for whatever reason, to comply”); Rutherford
v. Rutherford, supra, 296 Md. at 357, 464 A.2d at 233 (Civil contempt adjudications
were reversed because, inter alia, “the trial judges found that the defendants lacked a
present ability to comply with the . . . orders”); Elzey v. Elzey, 291 Md. 369, 374, 435
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A.2d 445, 447-448 (1981) (“In all civil contempt proceedings, any order imposing a
penalty upon the defendant must contain a purging provision with which the defendant
has the ability to comply.  * * *  Moreover, the issue is not the ability to pay at the time
the payments were originally ordered; instead, the issue is his present ability to pay”).
In fact, and wholly apart from the sanction, normally in a constructive civil
contempt action there cannot even be a finding or adjudication that the defendant is in
contempt unless the defendant has the present ability to comply with the earlier court
order or with the purging provision.  Ott v. Frederick County, supra, 345 Md. at 689,
694 A.2d at 105; Lynch v. Lynch, supra, 342 Md. at 520-529, 677 A.2d at 589-594.  The
only exception to this general rule is set forth in Maryland Rule 15-207(e), which
permits a finding of contempt, and the issuance of certain court orders, where a
defendant has failed to comply with spousal or child support orders under conditions
specified in the Rule.  See Wilson v. Holliday, 364 Md. 589, 774 A.2d 1123 (2001);
Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra, 362 Md. at 544-561, 766 A.2d at 103-112; Jones v. State,
supra, 351 Md. at 272-276, 718 A.2d at 226-228; Ott v. Frederick County, supra, 345
Md. at 684 n.2 (majority opinion), 689-691 (concurring opinion), 694 A.2d at 102 n.2
(majority opinion), 105-106 (concurring opinion).  By its terms, Rule 15-207(e) is not
applicable under the facts of the present case.  
It is obvious that the Circuit Court’s order in the present case cannot be
reconciled with the above-described nature of a constructive civil contempt action
under Maryland law.  The purpose of this proceeding and of the Circuit Court’s order
was not to coerce the defendant’s present or future compliance with the earlier pendente
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lite order. 
The civil contempt order in the case at bar contained no purging provision.
James Dodson had no present ability to comply with any requirement that the insurance
premium due on November 1, 2000, be paid so that there would be no December 2000
cancellation of the insurance policy on the condominium’s contents.  There has been
no suggestion in this case that James Dodson is presently failing to pay any insurance
premiums which he is obligated to pay or that he has failed to pay any such premiums
since December 2000.
Unlike every other case in this Court which has upheld a constructive civil
contempt sanction, this case involves no current obligation under a court order.
Instead, the only failure to comply with a court order was a single episode of inaction
which took place in the fall of 2000.  The direct adverse result, namely the cancellation
of the insurance policy, was a one-time event in December 2000, and it is over with.
It is not possible to reinstate the insurance policy retroactive to December 2000 when
the fire occurred.
The purpose of Amelia Dodson’s civil contempt action was to impose a sanction
upon James Dodson for a past failure to comply with a court order.  This Court has
consistently held that a civil contempt action will not lie for such purpose.  See, e.g.,
Lynch v. Lynch, supra, 342 Md. at 529, 677 A.2d at 594; Rutherford v. Rutherford,
supra, 296 Md. at 357, 464 A.2d at 233; Elzey v. Elzey, supra, 291 Md. at 375-376, 435
A.2d at 448; State v. Roll and Scholl, supra, 267 Md. at 728, 730, 298 A.2d at 876, 877.
Under the circumstances of our prior cases, we have pointed out that a constructive
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criminal contempt action is the appropriate means to punish a past willful violation of
a court order.  Under circumstances like those in the case at bar, a tort action sounding
in negligence or a breach of contract action would be the appropriate means for the
injured party to seek compensation.
B.
There are additional reasons for not allowing compensatory damages, based upon
a past negligent failure to comply with a court order, to be recovered in a civil contempt
action.
Under settled Maryland law, one may not be held in contempt of a court order
unless the failure to comply with the court order was or is willful.  A negligent failure
to comply with a court order is simply not contemptuous in a legal sense.  This is true
of civil contempt as well as criminal contempt.  Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra, 362 Md.
at 544, 766 A.2d at 103 (“The contemnor may . . . defend by establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, ‘that the failure to pay was not an act of willful or
contumacious non-compliance’”); Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 572, 750 A.2d 35, 46
(2000); Jones v. State, supra, 351 Md. at 273, 718 A.2d at 227 (A showing that the
failure to comply with the court order “was not an act of willful or contumacious non-
compliance” is a defense in a civil contempt action); Lynch v. Lynch, supra, 342 Md.
at 523, 677 A.2d at 591 (“‘[A]n unintentional inability to pay precludes [a sanction] for
either civil or criminal contempt’”); Rutherford v. Rutherford, supra, 296 Md. at 364,
464 A.2d at 237 (“[C]ontempt is the refusal to comply with the court order, and not
merely the breach of the prior support agreement”) (emphasis added).  Furthermore,
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this Court has taken the position that a civil contempt adjudication, even though it is
for a coercive purpose, “labels the defendant a contemnor and imputes guilt to him or
her.”  Lynch v. Lynch, supra, 342 Md. at 529, 677 A.2d at 594.  An adjudication of civil
contempt, based upon mere negligent inaction and not upon willful conduct, is flatly
inconsistent with the above-cited cases.
This litigation, although labeled a civil contempt action, was in essence a tort
suit for money damages based upon James Dodson’s alleged negligent inaction.  Under
Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a party in a tort suit for money
damages exceeding $10,000.00 is entitled to a jury trial.  A party in a civil contempt
action, however, is not entitled to a jury trial.  Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492, 508-
509, 754 A.2d 1018, 1027 (2000); Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368,
387-388, 514 A.2d 4, 14-15 (1986).
James Dodson requested a jury trial in the present case, but the request was
denied on the ground that this was a civil contempt action.  If we were to affirm the
judgment below, we would be allowing the state constitutional jury trial right to be
circumvented simply by the label which a plaintiff attaches to a lawsuit.  Nevertheless,
we have consistently refused to permit circumvention of the right to a jury trial by
attaching a particular label to a court action.  See, e.g., Martin v. Howard County, 349
Md. 469, 488-489, 709 A.2d 125, 135-136 (1998) (“[N]either the titles of [the]
complaints nor the labels attached . . . determine whether the action is essentially legal
or equitable” for purposes of the right to trial by jury.  The plaintiff’s “repeated reliance
on the label given” does not determine the jury trial right.  “If the plaintiff requests
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money damages . . . there is a constitutional right to a jury trial”).
Other substantive or procedural rights of a defendant could be circumvented by
allowing the use of a civil contempt action to recover compensatory damages based on
the defendant’s alleged negligence.  For example, a defendant is entitled to raise
contributory negligence as a defense in a tort action sounding in negligence, but
contributory negligence has never been deemed a defense in a civil contempt case.  In
a circuit court tort action, the defendant is entitled to filed counterclaims, cross-claims,
or third party claims under Maryland Rules 2-331 and 2-332; there is no rule or
Maryland precedent explicitly allowing such claims in a contempt action.  If the present
case had been brought as a tort action, James Dodson may well have been able to
convince a jury that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent or that the negligence of
the insurance agency was a proximate cause of the property damage.
C.
In summary, we hold that compensatory damages may not ordinarily be
recovered in a civil contempt action.  The Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Jones
v. Wright, supra, 35 Md. App. 313, 370 A.2d 1144, relied on by the courts below, is
inconsistent with this holding and is overruled.  Furthermore, we specifically hold that
compensatory damages may never be recovered in a civil contempt action based upon
a past negligent act by the defendant.  This case does not present the issue of whether,
under exceptional circumstances, a willful violation of a court order, clearly and
directly causing the plaintiff a monetary loss, could form the basis for a monetary
award in a civil contempt case.  We shall leave the resolution of that question for
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another day.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WORCESTER
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF’S PETITION.  COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT AMELIA C. DODSON.