Title: North Miami Con. SD v. State Ex Rel. Manchester CS

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

300 N.E.2d 59 (1973)
NORTH MIAMI CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL., Appellants (Third Party Defendants below), State of Indiana ex rel. North Miami Consolidated School District, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
STATE of Indiana ex rel. Manchester Community Schools et al., Appellees (Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs below).
No. 371S76.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 14, 1973.
Rehearing Denied October 5, 1973.
*60 Lynn A. Ford, Wabash, Frank E. Spencer, Indianapolis, Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellants.
Charles R. Tiede, of Plummer, Tiede, Magley & Metz, Wabash, for appellees.
HUNTER, Justice.[*]
This appeal arises as a result of a dispute over a school participation agreement which formed Upper Wabash Vocational School. The original parties to the agreement were Peru Community Schools, School City of Wabash, and the Metropolitan School District of Wabash County. The purpose of the agreement was to provide for the operation, control, and maintenance of an area vocational school. The plan was approved by the State Board of Education, and shortly thereafter Manchester Community Schools became a party to the participation agreement on July 12, 1965. The plaintiff, North Miami Consolidated *61 School District, joined as a participant on January 15, 1969. The administrative control of Vocational was vested in a Board of Managers which was composed of the heads of the participating school corporations. One of the primary functions of the board was to determine Vocational's yearly budget and to proportion the fiscal outlay to each of the participating schools:
The participation agreement additionally stated that future facilities for Vocational "shall be provided at such time and ... cost as may be determined by the Participating School Corporations." On July 1, 1970, North Miami determined to unilaterally withdraw from the Board of Managers of Vocational without the consent of the other participating schools. North Miami contended that it had no obligation to pay a share of the cost of construction of new vocational facilities during the fiscal year of 1971.
On September 4, 1970, North Miami commenced the instant action seeking a declaration of its rights and liabilities under the school participation agreement. The defendant participating schools counter-claimed and also filed a third party complaint against North Miami and joined the State Board of Tax Commissioners as a third party defendant. The participating schools moved for summary judgment on February 18, 1971. Summary judgment was granted and from that adverse judgment North Miami appeals. Additionally, the Tax Commissioners are appealing the overruling of their motion to dismiss. For reasons of clarity, we shall treat the two consolidated appeals independently.
Following the filing of the various pleadings, a pre-trial conference was held on February 8, 1971. The trial court issued its pre-trial order and delineated the issues as follows:
The express purpose of Trial Rule 16, Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, IC 1971, 34-5-1-1, is to provide for a pre-2trial conference in which to simplify the issues raised by the pleadings and to define these issues within a pre-trial order. Trial Rule 16(J) reads in pertinent part as follows:
The trial court in the instant case issued such an order, supra, which was not objected to by North Miami. Nor did North Miami subsequently move to modify the pre-trial order. Thus, the order has supplanted the allegations raised in the pleadings and controls all subsequent proceedings in the case. When a pre-trial order specifies the issues of the case, the parties will not be permitted to go into other issues, unless the pre-trial order is amended. Fernandez v. United Fruit Co. (2nd Cir., 1952), 200 F.2d 414, cert. denied 345 U.S. 935, 73 S. Ct. 797, 97 L. Ed. 1363 (1953). Prior to the adoption of our Trial Rule 16, which is based in pertinent part on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Indiana law was to the same effect on the issue of the pre-trial conference. Johnson et al. v. Glassley et al. (1949), 118 Ind. App. 704, 83 N.E.2d 488. Therefore, North Miami's contention that it was denied a trial on the issues raised by the pleadings is without merit. The issues in this case are those found by the trial court's pre-trial order, not the issues raised by allegations in the pleadings.
On the question of whether summary judgment was properly granted, we are concerned here with an inquiry as to the existence of genuine issues of fact. Summary judgment is only proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and therefore a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Central Realty, Inc. v. Hillman's Equipment, Inc. (1969), 253 Ind. 48, 246 N.E.2d 383.
The trial court was not functioning in a vacuum when it determined that no issue of fact was present in the instant case. The trial judge had before him the admissions from the pleadings, stipulated facts from the pre-trial conference, the participation agreement binding North Miami, various interrogatories and answers, the record of minutes from North Miami's board meetings, and numerous sworn affidavits from the parties involved.
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not denied. T.R. 8(D). North Miami's complaint alleged:
Exhibit A, appended to and incorporated in the complaint recites:
North Miami's Exhibit B, again attached to and incorporated in its complaint, recites in part:
Through its undenied allegations, North Miami has admitted it is a participating *64 school under a valid participation agreement obligating North Miami to support Upper Wabash Vocational School. Further, North Miami stipulated:
Interrogatories, which were before the trial court when it granted summary judgment, established inter alia that North Miami school officials were aware of the proposed construction of new facilities at Vocational. Questions were propounded to the Superintendent of North Miami Consolidated Schools:
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants filed numerous affidavits showing that North Miami was aware of the proposed construction at Vocational, that the architect employed was approved by North Miami, that the Superintendent of North Miami Schools certified correct copies of minutes of North Miami School Board meetings, and that these minutes reflected the Board's awareness that construction was planned at Vocational. Further, Donald Musselman, a member of North Miami's Board of Education, swore by affidavit that he was a member of Vocational's Board of Managers until June 30, 1970, and that the other members of North Miami's Board of Education were informed by him of the proposed facilities for Vocational. Four members of North Miami's School Board swore by affidavit to the above facts.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, North Miami filed a single affidavit. The sworn statement of Forrest Long, a school board member, is that he was unaware of the plans to purchase land on which to construct new facilities for Vocational. It is on the strength of this one affidavit that North Miami urges a genuine issue of fact exists which must be resolved by trial. We do not agree. Whether or not Long had personal awareness of the construction plans is not material to the issues in this case. It is uncontroverted that the plans were discussed at School Board meetings, and the plans were *65 subsequently approved. This is reflected in North Miami's Board minutes on January 21, 1969:
The trial court found as a matter of law that North Miami was estopped to deny that the acts of its representatives on the Board of Managers did not bind North Miami to support the construction at Vocational. It concluded that no genuine issue of material fact was presented by Long's affidavit. Summary judgment is intended to obviate the need for a trial when no genuine issue of fact exists. Central Realty, Inc. v. Hillman's Equipment, Inc., supra. Accepting Long's allegations as true, which we do, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Certainly, this Court must guard against an improvident award of summary judgment when genuine issues of fact exist. But under the facts of this case, we agree with the trial court's ruling that no genuine issue of fact exists for adjudication by trial.
The remaining question presented by the instant case is whether the trial court applied the correct law to the established facts. The pertinent statutory guidelines are contained in IC 1971, XX-XX-XX-X; Ind. Stat. Ann. § 28-6307 (1970 Repl.), which reads in applicable part as follows:
It is clear that the above statute answers in the negative the question of whether North Miami can unilaterally withdraw from the Board of Managers of *66 Vocational. The relationship of the parties may be dissolved only by majority vote of the participating school boards. Therefore, North Miami remains obligated under the participation agreement.
Prior to the granting of summary judgment, the participating schools made application to the trial court for an order of mandate pendente lite against the State Board of Tax Commissioners. The application was sustained and the order was issued on February 24, 1971. The participating schools sought to mandate the Tax Board to include in the budget and the tax levies of North Miami Consolidated School District for the year of 1971, a sum which represented the assessed share owed by North Miami as a participating school under the agreement discussed supra.
The Tax Board alleges that the above order was not valid, because the Tax Commissioners were not a party to the contract between North Miami and the other participating schools. In essence, the Tax Board takes the position that the third party complaint did not set out a good claim against it.
However, it is an admitted fact that but for the appropriation mandated, North Miami did not have sufficient funds in its budget with which to pay its lawful share to Upper Wabash Vocational School. It is also uncontroverted that North Miami accepted the benefit of the mandated funds and did pay Vocational. Additionally, the Tax Board acknowledges that it had the power to modify North Miami's 1971 budget.
The parties have presented to this Court erudite briefs and esoteric discussions on questions ranging from joinder of proper parties to requirements for mandate. But in the final analysis, a decision by this Court that the order of mandate was contrary to law would not affect the 1971 fiscal outlay of North Miami. Therefore, we do not reach a discussion of the various issues raised, but choose instead to dismiss as moot the appeal of the State Board of Tax Commissioners. This Court will dismiss an appeal when it involves a moot question unless the question involves a matter of great public interest. Gardner v. Grills (1961), 242 Ind. 29, 175 N.E.2d 696. We find no great public interest which will be served by an opinion on this matter now before us.
For the foregoing reasons discussed, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
[*]  Transferred and re-assigned to this office June 25, 1973.