Title: Brewster v. Woodhaven Building

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Brewster v. Woodhaven Building & Development, No. 82, September Term, 1999.
CIVIL PROCEDURE—FINAL JUDGMENTS—TRANSFER OF VENUE— A trial court’s
order transferring a civil case from one circuit court to another circuit court is a final
judgment and thus immediately appealable.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. C98-10180
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 1999
                                                                                
ANDRE W. BREWSTER, et al.
v.
WOODHAVEN BUILDING AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., et al.
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
                                                                              
Opinion by Raker, J.
Rodowsky, Wilner and Cathell, JJ., dissent.
                                                                             
Filed:   August 22, 2000
The issue in this case is whether a trial court’s order transferring a civil case from one
circuit court to another circuit court is a final judgment and thus immediately appealable.
Petitioners in this case appealed the Court of Special Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal from
a transfer of venue, in a suit claiming injury to real property caused by Respondents’
channeling of water into a stream that runs across the property.  We shall hold that the transfer
order is an immediately appealable final judgment, and we shall remand the case to the Court
of Special Appeals to consider the merits of the appeal.
I.
Petitioners, plaintiffs below, are Andre W. Brewster, three other owners of riparian land
along the Piney Run in Baltimore County, and the Piney Run Preservation Association.  The
Piney Run, according to the complaint, is a stream that begins at its headwaters near the border
between Baltimore and Carroll counties, crosses northern Baltimore County, and joins the
Western Run, which, in turn, flows to the Loch Raven Reservoir.  Respondents, defendants
below, are Woodhaven Building and Development, Inc. (“Woodhaven”), the Town of
Hampstead, Maryland (“Hampstead”), the County Commissioners of Carroll County (“Carroll
County”), The Fields Homeowners Association (“The Fields”), Hill/Reedy, Inc. (“Hill/Reedy”),
and Carroll County employees Myron R. Frock and James E. Slater, Jr. (“Frock” and “Slater”).
The complaint, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 10, 1998,
alleges that Woodhaven built the Roberts Fields housing development and shopping center in
Carroll County; that polluted storm water runoff from the development and shopping center
are channeled into the Piney Run; that The Fields, as the homeowners’ association for the
Roberts Fields development, owns the holding ponds from which the runoff flows; that
Hill/Reedy owns part of the shopping center; that Hampstead owns the storm drains that direct
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the Roberts Fields storm water into the Piney Run; and that Frock and Slater are responsible
for reviewing storm water management plans for the vicinity of the headwaters of the Piney
Run in Carroll County.  The complaint also states that Carroll County owns the Hampstead
Waste Water Treatment Plant, and that the plant discharges its effluent into the Piney Run.  The
complaint alleges that the water added to the stream by Respondents pollutes the stream and
otherwise damages Petitioners’ property; it asserts theories of liability under the headings of
riparian rights, negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability; and it seeks a permanent
injunction and damages.
Woodhaven and Hill/Reedy answered the complaint.  The Fields, Hampstead, Carroll
County, Frock, and Slater moved to dismiss on grounds of improper venue, pursuant to
Maryland Rule 2-322(a)(2).  The Fields and Hampstead also moved, in the alternative, for
transfer to a more convenient forum, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-327(c).  Conducting no
hearing, the Baltimore County trial judge granted the motion of The Fields, and issued an order
on February 1, 1999, stating that “as a matter of convenience, this claim shall be transferred
to the Circuit Court for Carroll County, Maryland or for proper venue.  Vast majority of parties
and witnesses are in Carroll Co. and this makes venue in that Co. much more convenient.”
Petitioners filed a motion for a hearing and for reconsideration of this ruling on February 4,
1999; their motion also points out that the court’s order of February 1, 1999 did not rule on
the motions of the other defendants.  On February 5, 1999, the court denied Petitioners’
motion, and issued an order on the docket sheet, stating as follows:
Obviously it was not the intention of the Court to have one
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defendant’s case tried in Carroll Co. and the rest in Balto. Co.
Thus the case was transferred as to all defendants and such
Motions were granted.  If for some reason convenience is the
only reason to transfer as said in Order of 2/1/99 the case is
transferred to Carroll Co. for that reason.  For clarity, the entire
case is moved to Carroll Co.
Petitioners noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The Fields moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that a circuit court’s order transferring a case to another
circuit court is not immediately appealable because it is not a final judgment.  The Court of
Special Appeals granted the motion, in an order issued without opinion on June 3, 1999.  We
granted a writ of certiorari.
II.
Petitioners argue that a trial court’s order is immediately appealable if it is either a final
judgment or a collateral order, and that the transfer order in this case was both.  It is a final
judgment, they argue, because it terminated the litigation in the court that issued it, the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County.  Petitioners argue that the transfer order in this case is appealable
also because it satisfies the collateral order doctrine as set out in Pittsburgh Corning v.
James, 353 Md. 657, 728 A.2d 210 (1999).  We need not address their argument on this point
because, as we explain below, the transfer order is immediately appealable because it is a final
judgment.
Respondents initially argue that under Maryland Rule 2-602, an order that fails to
dispose of the merits of a case is not a final judgment.  Rule 2-602 provides, in pertinent part,
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  The statutes concerning final judgments do not take us very far.  They establish a right
1
of appeal from a final judgment, but do not indicate which orders constitute final judgments.
Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 12-101(f) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article states that 
(continued...)
that
an order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether
raised by original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party
claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
to the action:
(1) is not a final judgment.
Because the order in the present case did not adjudicate the merits of the case, Respondents
argue, it is not a final judgment under Rule 2-602.  Respondents’ main argument, however, is
that although an order need not necessarily dispose of the merits of a case to be a final
judgment, an order’s effect of terminating a case in a particular court does not suffice to make
the order a final judgment.  Rather, they contend, the order must also deprive the party of the
means to pursue the claims at issue in any court.
III.
The final judgment rule  derives originally from the English common law principle that
1
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(...continued)
1
“Final judgment” means a judgment, decree, sentence, order,
determination, decision, or other action by a court, including an
orphans’ court, from which an appeal, application for leave to
appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.
Section 12-301 of the same Article provides, in pertinent part, that with exceptions not here
relevant, 
a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or
criminal case by a circuit court.  The right of appeal exists from
a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original,
special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case
the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.
We have observed on many occasions that these provisions leave the elements of finality to
be determined by the courts.  See, e.g., Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579, 587, 644 A.2d 1070,
1074 (1994); Sigma Repro. Health Cen. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 664, 467 A.2d 483, 485
(1983).
a writ of error ordinarily would not lie until there had been a final disposition of an entire
controversy.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 15A
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3906, at 264 (2d ed. 1991).  The core of the final
judgment rule is thus that a trial court’s decision disposing of the merits of the parties’ claims
may be appealed.  On this the parties to this case do not disagree.
Respondents’ initial argument, however, based on Maryland Rule 2-602, is that this core
of the final judgment rule is really the entirety of the final judgment rule:  If the order in
question does not dispose of the parties’ claims on the merits, it cannot be a final judgment.
Despite the seemingly restrictive language of Rule 2-602, this is not the law.  It is well settled
that an order need not necessarily dispose of the merits of a case to be a final judgment.  See,
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e.g., Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 6, 720 A.2d 583, 585 (1998) (“The notion . . . that an order
terminating the case in the circuit court is not final and appealable unless it settles the rights
of the parties or concludes the cause of action, has consistently and expressly been rejected
by this Court.”); Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 401, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993) (“Contrary
to the view expressed by the defendant . . . a trial court’s order sometimes may constitute a
final appealable judgment even though the order fails to settle the underlying dispute between
the parties.”); Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 85, 548 A.2d 837, 839 (1988) (“An order of a
circuit court . . . [may be] a final judgment without any adjudication by the circuit court on the
merits.”).
IV.
The dispute in this case centers on the second, narrower argument advanced by
Respondents:  If a judgment does not settle the merits of the case, it must deny the party
challenging it the ability to litigate the case in any forum, in order to be a final judgment.
Petitioners’ reply is that the judgment need only deny the party the ability to litigate the case
in the particular court that has issued the judgment—the availability of another forum is
irrelevant.  
Our cases pertaining to this question show that an order is final if it terminates the
litigation in a particular court.  The cases stating the general rule that a judgment terminating
litigation is a final judgment date from an early period.  As early as 1835, we were already
referring to the “well established rule” that 
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no appeal can be prosecuted in this Court, until a decision has
been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle, and
conclude the rights of the party involved in the action, or denying
to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the
suit.
Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-13 (Md. 1835).  Thus, it is well settled that an
order denying a party the ability to pursue claims anywhere is an immediately appealable final
order.  We have often reiterated this point, applying it over an extraordinarily long historical
period and an impressively wide range of subject matter.  See Grimberg v. Marth, 338 Md.
546, 551-52, 659 A.2d 1287, 1290 (1995) (an orphans’ court’s denial of a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment was an immediately appealable final judgment because it “has
the effect of putting the parties out of court”); Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566
A.2d 767, 773 (1989) (a qualified domestic relations order, which left certain issues to be
determined before a marital property division would be completed, was not a final judgment
because it was not “so final as either to determine and conclude the rights involved or to deny
the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his or her rights in the subject
matter of the proceeding”) (emphasis omitted); Peat & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86,
91, 394 A.2d 801, 804 (1978) (a trial court’s order denying a party’s motion to disqualify
opposing counsel was not an immediately appealable final judgment because it did not
“determine and conclude the rights involved” or “deny the appellant the means of further
prosecuting or defending his rights in the subject matter of the proceeding”); McCormick v.
St. Francis de Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 426-27, 149 A.2d 768, 771 (1959) (a trial court’s
order granting defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s initial pleading is an immediately
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appealable final judgment because “[t]he effect of the court’s ruling was to put the plaintiff out
of court and deny her the means of further prosecuting her case against the moving parties”);
Jeffers v. State, 203 Md. 227, 239, 100 A.2d 10, 11 (1953) (a trial court’s order dismissing
father’s petition to dismiss mother’s petition charging him with a child support obligation was
not an immediately appealable final judgment, because “an order of the Circuit Court which
does not settle and conclude the rights of the parties, and does not deny to the parties the
means of further prosecuting or defending the action, is not a final judgment”); In re Buckler
Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427, 125 A. 177, 178 (1924) (a trial court’s order striking the pleading
of a would-be party attempting to intervene, on the ground that the would-be party had no
interest in the suit, is not an immediately appealable final judgment, because the order did not
prevent it from filing a separate action, and thus did not “deny to the party seeking redress . .
. the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights in the subject matter of the
proceeding”); Bragunier v. Penn, 79 Md. 244, 245-46, 29 A. 12, 12 (1894) (a trial court’s
order dismissing plaintiff’s petition was an immediately appealable final judgment “inasmuch
as it denied the petitioner the means of further prosecuting his suit”); Gittings v. State, 33 Md.
458, 461, 462-63 (1871) (a trial court’s order to submit to the jury the question of a
defendant’s residence for purposes of determining whether the court had personal jurisdiction
was not immediately appealable because it was not “so far final as to settle and conclude the
rights of the party involved in the action, or to deny to him the means of further prosecuting
or defending the suit”); Boteler & Belt, 7 G. & J. at 113 (a trial court’s order granting a motion
for a new trial was not immediately appealable because it neither settled the merits nor denied
-9-
 There is no distinction, for finality purposes, between a circuit court order sending a
2
case to the District Court and a circuit court order sending a case to another circuit court.  The
(continued...)
the party the means to litigate the suit).
We have also stated from an early period, however, the more specific proposition that
a judgment terminating litigation in a particular court is a final judgment.  In Waverly Mutual
Ass’n v. Buck, 64 Md. 338, 1 A. 561 (1885), the appellee borrower in a suit to foreclose a
mortgage moved to dismiss the lender’s appeal on the ground that the Circuit Court’s order was
not a final judgment.  The Circuit Court had held that the lender was not entitled to foreclose.
This Court overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal.  We stated that
it is now a well-settled principle, that the ruling of the court
below must, in order to form the proper basis for an appeal, be so
far final as to determine and conclude the rights involved in the
action, or deny to the party who seeks redress by an appeal, “the
means of further prosecuting or defending the suit” in the Court
of original jurisdiction.  Boteler v. State, 7 G. & J. 109; Welch
v. Davis, 7 Gill, 364, Green v. Hamilton, 16 Md. [317];
Hazlehurst v. Morris, 28 Md. 67.
Id. at 342, 1 A. at 562 (emphasis added).  The Circuit Court’s order satisfied this definition,
because it denied to the lender “its right to the relief invoked in its bill of complaint, and it
cannot proceed a step further in the prosecution of its suit.”  Id. at 343, 1 A. at 563. 
We have applied the principle that an order terminating litigation in a particular court
is a final judgment in recent cases as well.  In Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 720 A.2d 583
(1998), we considered whether an order transferring the action from the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County to the District Court of Maryland was an appealable order.   We held that
2
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(...continued)
2
State’s twenty-four circuit courts are entirely separate courts, as set forth in Article IV, § 20
of the Maryland Constitution.  All circuit courts are not simply divisions of a single unified
court which have “equivalent status and jurisdiction.”  Dissent at p. 5.  Simply because the
circuit courts may be of equivalent status and jurisdiction does not permit this Court to treat
as a single entity what the Constitution has established as entirely separate courts.  
In point of fact, there are jurisdictional differences among the circuit courts.  Many
public local laws confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court of one particular county or
Baltimore City.  A few public general laws do the same thing.  See e.g., Maryland Code (1997,
1999 Supp.) § 2-215(c) of the Insurance Code.
the order of the Circuit Court, “having the effect of terminating the case in the circuit court,
is a final judgment.”  352 Md. at 5, 720 A.2d at 585 (quoting Montgomery County v. Revere
Nat’l Corp., 341 Md. 366, 378, 671 A.2d 1, 7 (1996)).  In Carroll v. Housing Opportunities
Com’n , 306 Md. 515, 510 A.2d 540 (1986), we considered whether a circuit court’s order
denying Carroll a jury trial and remanding the case to the District Court is appealable.  We held
that it was final and appealable.  Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, said:
In the present case, however, the circuit court’s orders denied
Mrs. Carroll all relief in the circuit court; they completely
terminated the action in circuit court, remanding the case to the
District Court for trial.  Nothing was left to be done in the circuit
court.  Accordingly, the order was a final appealable judgment.
Id. at 520, 510 A.2d at 542.  In Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 81, 548 A.2d 837, 837 (1988),
we considered whether the dismissal of one of multiple defendants, based on improper venue,
was a final judgment immediately appealable by the plaintiff when certified under Maryland
Rule 2-602(b).  We held that the dismissal order was an immediately appealable final judgment
under these circumstances because “the plaintiffs were deprived of the means of further
prosecuting their claim against [the dismissed defendant] in that court,” even though they
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could still enforce their rights by initiating a suit against him in another court.  See id. at 86-
87, 548 A.2d at 840 (emphasis added).  And in Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 620 A.2d 305
(1993), we held that the trial court’s order to the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration
was an immediately appealable final judgment, even though the parties were thereby afforded
the opportunity to pursue their rights before the arbitrator.  See id. at 403-04, 620 A.2d at 311.
See also Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 476, 540 A.2d 805, 806 (1988) (“Ordinarily a circuit
court judgment is final only if it terminates the action in that court.”); Eastern Stainless Steel
v. Nicholson, 306 Md. 492, 501-02, 510 A.2d 248, 252-53 (1986) (a trial court’s order
remanding a case to an administrative agency is a final judgment because it terminates the
proceedings in the court, even though the parties continue before the agency); Brown v. Baer,
291 Md. 377, 385-86, 435 A.2d 96, 100-01 (1981) (same); Department of Public Safety v.
LeVan, 288 Md. 533, 543-44, 419 A.2d 1052, 1057 (1980) (same). 
Respondents’ position suggests that certain of our cases stating the general proposition
that an order terminating litigation is a final judgment conflict with the more specific
proposition that an order terminating litigation in a particular court is a final judgment.  The
formulation in Rohrbeck and several of the other cases cited above, that the order is not final
if it does not deny the party the means of “further prosecuting or defending his or her rights
and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding,” 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d at 773
(emphasis added), is susceptible of this interpretation, because it may be taken to suggest that
if the party can pursue the subject matter before another tribunal, then the order is not final.
 See also, e.g., Grimberg, 338 Md. at 551, 659 A.2d at 1290; Schlossberg v. Schlossberg,
-12-
275 Md. 600, 612, 343 A.2d 234, 242 (1975); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. at 427, 125 A.
at 178.  This notion is without merit, however.  We have never explicitly stated that an inability
to pursue the substance of a claim in any forum is a requirement of finality, and we reject this
notion now.  An order putting the appellant out of every court is simply one type of instance
of a final judgment.  This proposition is entirely consistent with the proposition that an order
putting an appellant out of a particular court is also a final judgment.  It follows that an order
transferring a case from one circuit court to another, for proper venue or for a more
convenient forum, and thereby terminating the litigation in the transferring court, is a final
judgment and thus immediately appealable.  At the same time, an order denying a motion to
transfer is not an immediately appealable final judgment, because the litigation may continue
in the court issuing the order.
V.
Consideration of some of the underlying purposes of the final judgment rule supports
our conclusion.  We have often stated that the purpose of the final judgment rule is to avoid
piecemeal appeals, see, e.g., Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 314-15, 529 A.2d
356, 358 (1987), and the reason for avoiding piecemeal appeals is the promotion of judicial
efficiency.  One aspect of judicial efficiency that concerns us here is interruption of the trial
court process by repeated application to appellate courts.  
Postponing review until the final judgment, or minimizing the
number of occasions for interlocutory appeal, also is important
to avoid interference with the trial process. . . .   Repeated
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interruptions of the trial court process . . . may require wasteful
losses of familiarity with the case by court and perhaps counsel
as well.
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra, § 3907, at 277.  
This sort of interruption cannot occur in a case in which a motion to transfer has been
granted.  In the transferring court, there are no longer any proceedings to interrupt, for the
proceedings have been terminated.  In the receiving court, the proceedings cannot be
interrupted, because they have not yet begun.  The case is otherwise when a motion to transfer
is denied; to allow immediate appeal then would interrupt an ongoing trial court process.  This
difference justifies the distinction we make in allowing immediate appeal from the granting
of a transfer order and disallowing immediate appeal from the denial of a transfer order.
It is also instructive to compare the rules on the appealability of decisions on motions
to transfer due to improper venue or inconvenient forum with the rules on the appealability
of decisions on motions to dismiss for improper venue or inconvenient forum.  An order
granting such dismissal is immediately appealable, while an order denying it is not, see
Pittsburgh Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 728 A.2d 210 (1999); Wilde v. Swanson, 314
Md. 80, 86-87, 548 A.2d 837, 840 (1988).  This approach is justified by the same
considerations we have just mentioned as justifying a like approach to transfer orders.  With
both a transfer order and a dismissal order, the party challenging the order is put out of the
particular court that grants the order, while being left free to pursue the case in another court.
In both situations, there is no danger of interrupting an ongoing trial court process.
Conversely, when either a transfer motion or a dismissal motion is denied, the party
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  The dissent argues that our holding is inconsistent with Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411,
3
483 A.2d 68 (1984) and suggests that our decision “may . . . put into jeopardy our holding in
Parrott.”  The dissent’s concern about Parrott is ill-founded. In that case, no issue was raised,
or even discussed, as to whether the circuit court order was a final, appealable judgment under
the principle that an order terminating a case in a particular court is final and appealable.  No
(continued...)
challenging the court’s order is not put out of court, and to permit an immediate appeal would
be to interrupt the trial court’s process.  
The two situations—transfer and dismissal—should therefore be treated alike.  The
allowance of transfers in our rules was not intended to create an exception to the principles
for determining whether an order is final and appealable.  It would be illogical to conclude that,
on the one hand, the dismissal for lack of venue in Wilde, 314 Md. at 87, 548 A.2d at 840, was
properly entered as a final judgment because the dismissal deprived the plaintiffs “of the means
of further prosecuting their claim against [the defendant] in that court,” but, on the other hand,
if the plaintiffs’ case had been transferred out of the original circuit court to another circuit
court, the transfer order would have lacked finality.
VI.
Our holding that an order granting a transfer of venue from one circuit court to another
is immediately appealable permits the party who opposed the order either to file an appeal
from the order within 30 days of its entry, or to wait until the litigation has been completed in
the transferee court and appeal from that court’s final judgment on the ground that the case
should not have been transferred.   A decision to forego the immediate appeal does not prevent
3
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(...continued)
3
case involving this principle was cited in Parrott.  The parties simply proceeded upon the
assumption that the order was interlocutory.  The only two issues in Parrott were the
“constitutional right” doctrine and the “collateral order” doctrine.  Judge Rodowsky, writing
for the Court, set forth the issues and arguments as follows:
Parrott took the position that an interlocutory appeal lies in this case for
either of two reasons.  First, Maryland cases view certain removal orders as
within a class of orders which grant or deny an absolute constitutional right and
are on that ground immediately appealable.  Secondly, the issue in this case
meets the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.
The State recognized that its position of nonappealability conflicts with
certain earlier cases.  The State submitted, however, that later decisions which
look to the collateral order doctrine had eroded the constitutional right approach
to appealability and that the subject appeal fails the collateral order test.
301 Md. at 414, 483 A.2d at 69.  A case constitutes no precedent with respect to an issue
which was not raised and which was not considered by the court.  See e.g., State v. Griffiths,
338 Md. 485, 496, 506, 659 A.2d 876, 882, 887 (1995).  
In addition, the law concerning finality and appealability of judgments in criminal cases
is different, in many respects, from the law applicable to civil cases.  For example, a final
judgment (including sentence) on single count in an indictment can be appealed even though
there is no final judgment on another count in the same indictment charging a different offense.
Moreover, in a civil action, both the plaintiff and the defendant enjoy rights concerning venue.
Both parties enjoy the privilege of transferring a case to a venue which either one can show to
be more convenient.  In a criminal case, however, the prosecution is constrained in a manner
that is not at all analogous to the venue selection by a civil plaintiff.  Article 20 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights requires that criminal cases be brought where the crime
occurred.  Thus, it is usually the defendant who seeks a transfer; such defendant would have
little cause to appeal a transfer order which he or she sought.  The State, having much less
“venue” rights than a civil plaintiff, would ordinarily not attempt to appeal a transfer order.
Thus, in criminal cases, there is much less need for an immediate appeal of transfer orders. 
  The dissent’s view that our decision is inconsistent with our holding in Leung v.
4
Nunes, 354 Md. 217, 729 A.2d 956 (1999) ignores the proposition that a party may elect to
appeal within thirty days of the entry of the order or wait until the litigation has been
completed.
a party from raising the propriety of the transfer in the later appeal.   In this respect, our
4
holding is consistent with a large body of our case law.
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We have often permitted an appeal from a judgment ultimately disposing of a case based
on an issue that could have been, but was not, made the basis of an earlier appeal.  Probably the
circumstance closest to the present case is when a party first contends before the trial court
that it should not be ordered to arbitrate, is ordered to arbitrate, does not take an immediate
appeal from that order terminating the proceeding in the trial court, submits to arbitration, and
appeals the issue only after an arbitration award has been confirmed by the trial court in a new
proceeding.  In Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 667 A.2d 649 (1995), the
plaintiffs sued a corporation and its president individually for, inter alia, breach of contract
and negligence.  The Circuit Court for Cecil County granted the corporation’s motion to
compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the contract in dispute.  The
plaintiffs then moved in the Circuit Court to compel the president to arbitrate.  He opposed
their motion on the ground that he was not a party to the arbitration agreement or the
underlying contract.  The court, ruling that the president was bound by the agreement, ordered
him to arbitrate.  This was a final appealable judgment terminating the case in the Circuit Court.
See Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 401-402, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993), and cases there
cited.  The president in Testerman, however, did not take an immediate appeal but waited until
the termination of arbitration and the arbitrator’s award.  In a new circuit court action to
confirm the award, the court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.  Only at this point
did the president appeal and raise the issue before an appellate court that, because he was not
a party to the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract, he should not have been
required to submit to arbitration and was not  bound by the arbitration award.  This Court agreed
-17-
  The appeal, although reported as Board of Educ. for Dorchester County v. Hubbard,
5
involved two separate cases, one from Dorchester County and one from Garrett County.
with the president, holding that, although the president’s tort liability could be tried in court,
the trial judge could not force him to litigate his liability through arbitration.  We did not
penalize the president for failing to appeal immediately the trial court’s order to arbitrate,
despite the fact that this order was appealable as a final judgment. 
Similarly, in Board of Educ. for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 783-
785, 506 A.2d 625, 629-630 (1986), teachers sought to arbitrate their grievances with the
Garrett County Board of Education.   The Board filed in the Circuit Court for Garrett County
5
a declaratory judgment action seeking a stay of arbitration and a declaration that the issue in
dispute was not arbitrable under collective bargaining agreements and state law.  The Circuit
Court ordered the Board to proceed with arbitration, and the Board took no appeal from that
final judgment terminating the case.  Subsequent to the arbitrator’s decision a few months later,
the Board brought a new action in the Circuit Court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision.  After
the petition was denied, the Board appealed on the sole ground that the dispute between it and
the teachers was not properly the subject of arbitration.  We entertained the Board’s appeal,
despite the fact that the Board could have appealed and raised the very same issue immediately
after the Circuit Court’s final order in the declaratory judgment action to proceed with
arbitration.  Again, we did not penalize a party for failing to appeal an issue at the earliest
possible moment.  Cf. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (although “a
President is allowed to immediately appeal an order requiring production of subpoenaed
-18-
  The collateral order doctrine “treats as final and appealable a limited class of orders
6
which do not terminate the litigation in the trial court.”  Public Serv. Com’n v. Patuxent
Valley Conservation League, 300 Md. 200, 206, 477 A.2d 759, 762 (1984) (emphasis
added).
materials . . . . we believe that the White House should not be penalized because it waited until
the district court issued its final ruling”).
There are many other situations when a party foregoes the right to an earlier appeal.  but
may still seek appellate review when the judgment becomes final.   A party may seek appellate
review of issues that were appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  See Pulley v. State,
287 Md. 406, 419, 412 A.2d 1244, 1251 (1980) (holding that if an order is appealable as a
final judgment  under the collateral order doctrine, a party’s failure to appeal or to perfect an
6
appeal from that order does not “cause a forfeiture of a defendant’s right to a review of the . . .
ruling” in an appeal from a later order terminating the case on its merits).  See also Carbaugh
v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328, 449 A.2d 1153, 1156 (1982) (permitting defendant with right to
an immediate appeal under collateral order doctrine to forego immediate appeal and raise issue
after final judgment); Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701, 481 A.2d 186, 191 (1984) (allowing
appeal after entry of final judgment even though order was immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine).  
A party may forego the right to an immediate appeal of an injunction and raise the same
issue in a later appeal.  See Save-Mor Drugs v. Upjohn Co., 225 Md. 187, 194, 170 A.2d 223,
227 (1961) (holding that “[t]he appellant, Save-Mor, could have appealed from the order
granting the interlocutory injunction, but it was not bound to do so, and it could bring up for
-19-
review the questions which it might have so presented on appeal from the final decree”).  See
also, e.g., Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 647-648, 217 A.2d 531, 551 (1966); Washington
Cleaners v. Albrecht, 157 Md. 389, 401, 146 A. 233, 237 (1929); Lippy v. Masonheimer, 9
Md. 310, 315 (1856).  Still another situation in which a party has a right to seek appellate
review of a judgment deciding an issue, but may forego that right and later raise the issue by
seeking appellate review of a subsequent judgment, involves review of judgments by
intermediate appellate courts remanding cases.  See Public Serv. Com’n v. Maryland
People’s Counsel, 309 Md. 1, 522 A.2d 369 (1987) (holding that the law of the case doctrine
does not preclude the Court of Appeals from deciding an issue on review of a second judgment
by the Court of Special Appeals, where the first judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on
the issue was not appealed by the defendant).  See also Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 462
A.2d 58 (1983); Houghton v. County Com’rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 414, 504 A.2d
1145, 1149 (1986).  
Finally, a party may forego an appeal from a final judgment terminating a case in a
particular court, but subsequently raise the issue in a separate proceeding in declaratory
judgment actions to resolve questions of insurance liability coverage when the insured is a
defendant in a tort suit.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 319 Md. 247, 255, 572 A.2d 154, 158
(1990) (holding an insurer’s failure to bring a declaratory judgment action, “or to take an
appeal from the dismissal of such an action without a declaration, will not operate as an
estoppel or a waiver against the insurer”).  In all these situations, an appeal was taken when the
judgment was final, raising an issue on which an earlier appeal was permissible but not taken.
-20-
Our holding today is consistent with these cases. 
No principle or rule of law stands in the way of permitting a party to choose between
immediately appealing of the transfer order and waiting until the end of the case to litigate this
issue further.  For instance, the fact that more than 30 days might have passed since the transfer
order was entered does not prevent an appeal from the ultimate disposition of the case based
on the argument that the transfer was improper.  It is true that “[t]he requirement . . . that an
order of appeal be filed within thirty days of a final judgment is jurisdictional; if the
requirement is not met, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must be
dismissed.”  Houghton, 305 Md. at 413, 504 A.2d at 1148.  But an appeal from the judgment
ultimately disposing of the case is not an appeal from the order that is more than 30 days old,
namely the transfer order.  The propriety of the transfer is merely the ground on which this
appeal is taken.  The amount of time that passes from the date of the transfer order is only
relevant to how long the adverse party has to appeal that order.
Nor does the doctrine of res judicata mean that a decision to forego appeal of the
transfer order has the effect of precluding further litigation of the issue in the appeal from the
ultimate judgment.  While ordinarily the failure to appeal from an appealable order precludes
later appellate review of that order under the doctrine of res judicata, this is not a universal
or absolute rule.  The doctrine of res judicata is grounded in the public policy against
repetitive litigation, see Pat Perusse Realty v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 45, 238 A.2d 100, 108
(1968); but there are occasions where a final judgment will not be given preclusive effect.  See
e.g., Montgomery County v. Revere Nat’l Corp., 341 Md. 366, 382, 671 A.2d 1, 9 (1996)
-21-
(stating that “fundamental public policy of a state may sometimes require that a final consent
judgment be vacated or not given preclusive effect”).
In conclusion, we note that a review of this Court’s opinions over the past forty or fifty
years will show that no one issue has been the subject of more opinions than the question of
whether a trial court order is appealable.  The bar has had more difficulty determining finality
and appealability than with perhaps any other issue.  Nonetheless, there exists one principle of
appealability to which this Court has continuously adhered, one that is simple and
understandable.  An order which terminates the proceeding in a particular court is final and
appealable.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS DISMISSING THE
APPEAL 
REVERSED. 
 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR
CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS
OF THE APPEAL.  COSTS TO ABIDE
THE RESULT IN THAT COURT.
Dissenting Opinion follows:
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.:
The Court today holds that an order of a Circuit Court, entered under Maryland Rule
-22-
2-327(b) or (c), that transfers a case to another Circuit Court having equivalent jurisdiction
but better (or exclusive) venue constitutes a final judgment that is immediately appealable. 
To reach that result, the Court misinterprets some cases, pays no heed to others, and comes
to the extraordinary conclusion that there can be more than one final judgment in a single
case.  The Court’s decision is flat-out inconsistent with Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411, 482
A.2d 68 (1984), notwithstanding the majority’s rather strained and unconvincing attempt to
distinguish that case and, but for this new notion that there can be multiple final judgments,
is also inconsistent with our unanimous holding last year in Leung v. Nunes, 354 Md. 217,
729 A.2d 956 (1999).  With respect, I dissent.
The Court recognizes the long-established rule in this State, articulated at least as
early as Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 113 (1835) that
“no appeal can be prosecuted in this Court, until a decision has
been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle,
and conclude the rights of the party involved in the action, or
denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or
defending the suit.”
See also Popham v. State, 333 Md. 136, 142, 634 A.2d 28, 31 (1993), confirming that
principle in nearly identical language (to constitute a final judgment, the order must be “so
far final as to determine and conclude the rights involved in the action, or to deny to the
party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights
and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding”).
The Court then proceeds, however, to construe the alternative requirement that the
lower court decision “deny to the party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further
-1-
prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding” as
being satisfied when the order removes the case, on venue grounds, from one Circuit Court
to another.  As a basis for that construction, it states that “[w]e have applied the principle
that an order terminating litigation in a particular court is a final judgment” (emphasis
added), citing as authority for that proposition cases treating as final judgments orders of a
Circuit Court transferring an action to the District Court of Maryland, or dismissing an
action seeking judicial review of an administrative agency decision and remanding the case
to the agency, or requiring parties to arbitrate a dispute otherwise triable in the court. 
Those cases, however, do not support the notion that the transfer of a case, for venue
purposes, from one Circuit Court to another constitutes a final, appealable judgment.
The Court first relies on Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 720 A.2d 583 (1998).  In
that case, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County transferred a tort case to the District
Court on the ground that the amount in controversy did not exceed $2,500, that the case
was therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court, and that the Circuit
Court had no jurisdiction to try it.  That order, we held, constituted a final judgment because
it “terminated the case in the circuit court.”  Id. at 5, 720 A.2d at 585 (quoting from
Montgomery County v. Revere, 341 Md. 366, 378, 671 A.2d 1, 7 (1996)).  We never said
that the order was final because it terminated the case in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County.  It was final because the case was terminated “in the circuit court.”  The crucial
point was that, due to the court’s jurisdictional determination, the plaintiff lost her ability
to litigate in a Circuit Court — any Circuit Court — where she had the right of jury trial,
-2-
the right to conduct discovery, and the right of direct appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals.  The termination of her action in a Circuit Court had more than mere logistical
consequences.  The same situation pertained in Carroll v. Housing Opportunities
Comm’n, 306 Md. 515, 510 A.2d 540 (1986), also cited by the Court; there, too, we
observed that the order transferring the case to the District Court “completely terminated
the action in circuit court.”  Id. at 520, 510 A.2d at 542.  As in Ferrell, the plaintiff lost her
right of jury trial, of discovery, and of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
The same principle was involved in the cases remanding an action to an
administrative agency or dismissing an action in favor of arbitration.  The rationale for
regarding an order remanding an action to an administrative agency as a final judgment was
lucidly explained in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 6, 432 A.2d 1319, 1322-23 (1981):
“When a court remands a proceeding to an administrative
agency, the matter reverts to the processes of the agency, and
there is nothing further for the court to do.  Such an order is
an appealable final order because it terminates the judicial
proceeding and denies the parties means of further
prosecuting or defending their rights in the judicial
proceeding.”
(Emphasis added).  See also Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 306 Md. 492, 501-02,
510  A.2d 252-53 (1986).
That is also the rationale for regarding orders to arbitrate as final judgments.  In
Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 620 A.2d 305 (1993), the plaintiff filed an action for
specific enforcement of a marital separation agreement, an agreement that contained an
arbitration clause.  The court construed the agreement and directed that the plaintiff pursue
-3-
her claim for alimony under the agreement through arbitration.  Citing Houghton v. County
Comm’rs of Kent Co., 305 Md. 407, 412, 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986), for the
proposition that an order that has “the effect of putting the parties out of court . . . is a final
appealable order,” we concluded:
“A circuit court’s order to arbitrate the entire dispute before
the court does deprive the plaintiff of the means, in that case
before the trial court, of enforcing the rights claimed.  The
order effectively terminates that particular case before the trial
court.  Thus, the order would clearly seem to be final and
appealable under the above cited cases.”
Those cases, and others like them, are entirely consonant with the general rule
regarding final judgments and do not support the proposition adopted by the Court in this
case.  We are not dealing here with plaintiffs who have been denied a judicial remedy, as is
the situation when cases are remanded to administrative agencies or dismissed in favor of
arbitration.  Nor, as is the situation with a remand to the District Court, are we dealing with
plaintiffs who have been prevented from trying their case in a Circuit Court, of having a jury
trial with respect to issues triable before a jury, of preserving their right of direct appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals, of having all of the discovery and motion practice available in
a circuit court.  The only effect of the order under consideration is that the plaintiffs must
try their case in Carroll County rather than in Baltimore County, in a court of equivalent
status and jurisdiction.  This is not at all like the situations in Ferrell, Carroll, Schultz, or
Horsey.
The Court cites Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 548 A.2d 837 (1988), as authority
-4-
for regarding a venue transfer order as a final judgment, but that case stands for no such
proposition.  Indeed, it demonstrates the opposite.  In Wilde, the Circuit Court dismissed
the action against one of several defendants on the ground that, as to that defendant, there
was a lack of venue.  The court then entered that order of dismissal as a final judgment
under Maryland Rule 2-602.  We agreed that the order was properly entered as a final
judgment under the rule, but only because the effect of the order dismissing the defendant
deprived the plaintiffs “of the means of further prosecuting their claim against him in that
court.”  What the Court here neglects to consider and give effect to is that the action
against the one defendant was not transferred to another Circuit Court; it was dismissed.  If
the plaintiffs wanted judicial relief against that defendant, they would have been forced to
file a new action.  Wilde points out, quite clearly, the distinction between a dismissal for
lack of venue and the transfer of an action to another circuit court.  The whole purpose of
allowing a transfer, rather than requiring a dismissal, was to avoid the consequence of what
occurred in Wilde — to keep the action alive in every respect, but simply transfer it for
trial to a court having proper venue.
In Leung v. Nunes, supra, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City transferred  a tort
case, under Rule 2-327(c), to the Circuit Court for Howard County.  No appeal was taken
from that order, and the case was tried on its merits in Howard County.  Following the entry
of defendants’ judgments by the Circuit Court for Howard County, far longer than 30 days
after the transfer order, the plaintiff noted an appeal, from those judgments, complaining
only about the transfer order.  The Court of Special Appeals reviewed the merits of that
-5-
order and reversed the Howard County judgments, holding that the case was erroneously
transferred.  Despite what would clearly be a jurisdictional defect if the transfer order were
to be regarded as a final judgment, we granted certiorari to review the merits of the
transfer order, and we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
The only basis upon which we could have reviewed the transfer order in that case was
to treat the judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Howard County as the final judgment
in the case and to regard the transfer order as an interlocutory order reviewable on appeal
from the later-entered final judgment.  Under what, up to now, has been our clear and
routine jurisprudence, if a transfer order constitutes a final judgment, as the Court now
holds, the transfer order in Leung would have been unreviewable, for, as noted (1) no
appeal had been taken from that order, and (2) the only appeal that was taken was filed long
after the 30 days allowed for noting an appeal.  We would have lacked substantive
jurisdiction to enter the mandate that we entered.
The Court’s current belief that a venue transfer order constitutes a final,
immediately appealable judgment is also inconsistent with our holding in Parrott v. State,
supra, 301 Md. 411, 483 A.2d 68, that an order removing a case from one Circuit Court to
another under Article IV, § 8 of the Maryland Constitution is an interlocutory order that is
not immediately appealable.  This Court has always regarded removal orders under Article
IV, § 8 as interlocutory in nature, but, until Parrott, we had entertained immediate appeals
from them on the theory that any order that denied an absolute Constitutional right was
immediately appealable.  See Smith v. Fredericktown Bank, 258 Md. 141, 265 A.2d 236
-6-
In a footnote, the majority attempts to dismiss Parrott on the alternative grounds that
1
(1) the issue of whether the transfer order in that case constituted a final judgment was never
raised or decided, and (2) in any event, there are differences between the finality of judgments
in criminal and civil cases.  I shall respond in a footnote.  The first basis is perplexing.  As just
noted, we dismissed the appeal in Parrott “[b]ecause the order or removal appealed from in
this case is not a final judgment and does not fall within the collateral order doctrine
exception.”  How is that not a holding regarding an issue in the case?  It is true that Parrott
claimed that the order was interlocutorily appealable, and for good reason, for, up to that point,
we had consistently regarded such orders as  interlocutory, and appealable as such.  The point
is, however, that, notwithstanding our determination in Parrott that we would no longer regard
removal orders as immediately appealable interlocutory orders, we would not have dismissed
the appeal if we believed that the order before us constituted an appealable final judgment.  We
would not have played so fast and loose with a jurisdictional issue in a criminal case.  That
would have been manifestly unjust.  We dismissed the appeal because we concluded that the
removal order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order.  That is what
we plainly said, and that is what we plainly did.
The second basis offered by the majority is equally mysterious.  What difference does
it make that, in a criminal case, a judgment on one count of an indictment or information may
be appealed even though there is no judgment yet entered on another count?  All that signifies
is that we have not, as of yet, applied a common law equivalent of Maryland Rule 2-602 to
criminal cases.  It says absolutely nothing about the nature and effect of a removal order.  If
removal on venue grounds does not constitute a final judgment in a criminal case, even though
it terminates the action in the transferring Circuit Court, how can such a removal constitute a
final judgment in a civil case on the ground that it terminates the action in the transferring
(1970).  In Parrott, we abrogated that broad doctrine of immediate appealability, and with
that abrogation went the right of immediate appeal from removal orders: “Because the
order of removal appealed from in this case is not a final judgment and does not fall within
the collateral order doctrine exception, we dismissed Parrott’s appeal.”  Parrott, supra,
301 Md. at 426, 483 A.2d at 75 (emphasis added).  In direct defiance of Parrott, and all of
the removal cases preceding Parrott, the majority regards a transfer order from one Circuit
Court to another as a final judgment, not an interlocutory order.1
-7-
(...continued)
1
court?
To avoid the obvious consequence of Leung, the majority holds that a party
opposing a transfer order may either appeal immediately or wait until the litigation has been
completed in the transferee court “and appeal from that court’s final judgment on the
ground that the case should not have been transferred.”  It says that “[w]e have often
permitted an appeal from a judgment ultimately disposing of a case based on an issue that
could have been, but was not, made the basis of an earlier appeal,” citing cases involving
orders to arbitrate.  Once again, it has failed to recognize a critical distinction between
those cases and this one.
In Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 667 A.2d 649 (1995), a plaintiff who had
filed suit against a contractor for damages was ordered to arbitrate the dispute in
accordance with an arbitration clause in the contract.  He did not appeal from that order but
proceeded with the arbitration, which ended with an award against him.  He apparently
appealed from a subsequent order of the Circuit Court confirming the award, complaining
that (1) he was not a party to the agreement to arbitrate, and (2) the arbitrator had no
authority to award counsel fees.  No issue was raised in that appeal over Testerman’s right
to appellate review of the judgment confirming the arbitration award or whether he had
waived his right to raise the first issue by not appealing from the order to arbitrate, and no
comment appears in the Court’s opinion with regard to either matter.  Nonetheless, because
the first order, requiring the parties to arbitrate, could have been appealed as a final
-8-
judgment, the Court now treats that case as authority for the proposition that there can be
two (or more) final judgments in the same action.
Testerman is a weak reed on which to rely.  An order to arbitrate may be entered in
three contexts under the Uniform Arbitration Act.  Maryland Code, §3-207 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings. Article, allows a party to an arbitration agreement to file a
petition to compel arbitration if the other party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate. 
Section 3-208 permits a person, threatened with arbitration, to petition the court to stay the
arbitration on the ground that the person never agreed to arbitrate the matter.  In either
situation, if the court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, it must order
arbitration.  Such an order is immediately appealable, because it exhausts the court’s
jurisdiction.  There is nothing left in the court — any court.  The party has been deprived of
his, her, or its alleged right to a judicial resolution.  Horsey v. Horsey, supra, 329 Md.
392, 620 A.2d 305.  A third context, under § 3-209, is where the court already has litigation
pending before it but, upon a determination that one or more (but less than all) of the issues
in the litigation is subject to arbitration, stays the litigation so that those particular issues
may be submitted to arbitration.  Whether that kind of order constitutes an immediately
appealable final judgment is another matter, upon which we have not as yet opined. 
Testerman apparently involved an order entered under either § 3-207 or 3-208; the judicial
proceeding was ended when the order was entered.
Sections 3-223, 3-224, and 3-227 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
permit parties who have been through arbitration to file certain post-award petitions in the
-9-
It may be that, if a party moved to stay arbitration under § 3-208 or objected to a
2
petition to order arbitration under § 3-207 on the ground that he, she, or it never agreed to
arbitrate the matter and failed to appeal an adverse determination in that proceeding, principles
of res judicata or collateral estoppel would preclude an attempt to raise that issue again in a
petition to vacate an award; that is a matter on which we have yet to opine.  Any such bar,
however, if one did exist, would not affect the appealability of the order denying post-award
relief.
Circuit Court — to modify or correct an award (§ 3-223), to vacate an award (§ 3-224), or
to confirm an award (§ 3-227).  Unless the matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant to an
order entered under § 3-209, this would be a new action in the Circuit Court, seeking only
the particular relief allowed under the respective statute, and any final order entered by the
court in that action would constitute the single, final, appealable judgment in that action.   In
2
viewing Testerman and similar cases (see Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305
Md. 774, 506 A.2d 625 (1986)) as involving two final judgments, either of which can be
appealed, the Court overlooks the plain fact that, in those arbitration settings, there are not
two judgments in the same case but two separate cases, seeking different relief.  That is
clearly not the situation when a case is transferred for venue purposes.  The case filed in
the transferor court is simply tried in the transferee court, subject to all of the same rules
of substance and  procedure that would have applied in the transferor court.  There is no
new action; the parties do not start over, but simply pick up in the second court where they
were in the first one.
Finally, the Court finds some succor in the fact that a party who may appeal
immediately from an interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine or under § 12-
-10-
303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article may choose not to appeal at that time
and appeal later from the final judgment.  The critical — and obvious — distinction is that
the first order is, indeed, an interlocutory one.  Although the law allows an immediate
appeal from certain kinds of interlocutory orders, its general preference is to have but one
appeal at the end, which is why, subject to ordinary rules of waiver or mootness, it permits a
party appealing from the final judgment to contest interlocutory orders entered during the
action.  With but one possible contextual exception, we have never endorsed the notion of
there being more than one final judgment in a single action.  The only potential exception is
those actions in which an equity court has a continuing jurisdiction to entertain and enter
final orders in discrete proceedings, an example being a divorce or receivership action. 
The holding today, that there can be more than one final judgment in this kind of case, is
unprecedented.
In regarding the transfer order as a final judgment, the Court overlooks two
important aspects of such an order that clearly demonstrate its interlocutory nature.  If the
party opposing the transfer  prevails in the transferee court, the issue of the transfer will
effectively become moot, and the prospect of an issue being made moot by further
proceedings in the action is, or at least should be, one of the critical factors in determining
whether the order generating that issue is interlocutory, rather than final.  On the other
hand, if, as in Leung, that party loses in the transferee court, it can raise the transfer issue,
along with any other issues it chooses to raise, in an appeal from what is clearly the final
judgment.  In either event, there is simply no need to have the transfer order immediately
-11-
appealable and certainly no reason to regard such an order as a final judgment simply in
order to provide a ground for immediate appealability.
There is no logical basis for the Court’s holding.  It can serve no useful purpose.  Its
only effects will be deleterious.  It will be used to create delay in the trial of cases that are
transferred under Rule 2-327, as parties opposing the transfer, by immediately appealing,
can put the case “on ice” for a year or more.  Cases will linger dormant on the docket as
witnesses die or have their memories fade; the animosity and uncertainty inherent in
litigation will persevere.  By recognizing the prospect of there being two or more final
judgments in a single action, this new approach will certainly sow confusion over what is or
is not a final judgment, not just in this context but in many others, to which I am sure the
Court has given no thought.  The summary, almost cavalier, treatment of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, which may be real problems, will surely return to haunt the Court.  If all
of that were not enough, this new rule of immediate appealability is likely to engender
dozens of additional appeals for the Court of Special Appeals, which is in no need of
additional work.
Judges Rodowsky and Cathell have authorized me to state that they join in this
dissenting opinion.