Title: Matter of Steiner

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER 
OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF DELAWARE: 
 
MARK E. STEINER, 
 
Respondent.  
§ 
§  No. 461, 2002 
§ 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 6, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: February 27, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Review of the Report of the Board on Professional 
Responsibility.  Three-Year Suspension. 
 
 
Charles J. Slanina, Esquire, Tybout Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Respondent. 
 
 
Mary Susan Much, Esquire, Chief Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Curiam: 
 
2 
 
This is a lawyer disciplinary proceeding.  The respondent, Mark 
Steiner, pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor criminal charges.  Steiner’s 
criminal convictions form the underlying basis for this disciplinary 
proceeding.  A panel of the Board on Professional Responsibility (the 
Board) issued its report recommending that this Court suspend Steiner from 
the practice of law for a period of two years beginning March 13, 2001, the 
date this Court placed Steiner on interim suspension.  The Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) has filed objections to the Board’s report and 
recommended sanction.  After careful consideration, the Court has 
determined, under the particular circumstances of this case, that Steiner 
should be suspended from the practice of law for three years, effective 
March 13, 2001. 
Facts 
 
Steiner was admitted to practice as a Delaware lawyer in 1989.  In 
March 2001, the ODC filed a verified petition in this Court seeking Steiner’s 
interim suspension from the practice of law.  The basis for the ODC’s 
petition was Steiner’s indictment on two counts of first degree vehicular 
assault,1 a felony, and one count of driving under the influence,2 a 
                                                 
1 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 629 (2001).  
2 See  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177 (1995 & Supp. 2002). 
 
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misdemeanor.3  Steiner was suspended from the practice of law on an 
interim basis, effective March 13, 2001.  Until his interim suspension, 
Steiner practiced law with the Public Defender’s Office in Georgetown, 
Delaware.   
On June 25, 2001, Steiner pleaded guilty to two counts of second 
degree vehicular assault4 and one count of DUI, all misdemeanor offenses.  
The Superior Court sentenced Steiner on June 25, 2001 to three consecutive 
six-month terms at Level V incarceration, suspended entirely for three years 
of probation with special conditions attached, including participation in a 
substance abuse program and a “zero tolerance” provision for drug and 
alcohol use.  On September 20, 2001, and again on December 13, 2001, the 
Superior Court found Steiner in violation of probation based on his 
consumption of alcohol.  As a result of his second violation, Steiner was 
                                                 
3 DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROC. R. 16(a) provides, in part, as 
follows: 
Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer 
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court (i) has been charged 
with or convicted of a felony, (ii) has been charged with or convicted of 
other criminal conduct which demonstrates that the lawyer poses a 
significant threat of substantial harm to the public or to the orderly 
administration of justice, or (iii) has otherwise engaged in professional 
misconduct which demonstrates that the lawyer poses a significant threat 
of substantial harm to the public or to the orderly administration of justice, 
the ODC shall transmit such evidence to the Court together with a petition 
and proposed order for the lawyer’s immediate interim suspension 
pending the disposition of disciplinary proceedings as otherwise described 
in these Rules. . . . 
4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 628 (2001).  
 
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sentenced, among other things, to serve a period of confinement at a halfway 
house, followed by a period of home confinement and additional probation. 
 
On February 28, 2002, the ODC filed a petition with the Board on 
Professional Responsibility asserting that Steiner’s criminal conduct violated 
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b).  Rule 8.4(b) 
provides that it is “professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness 
or fitness as a lawyer.”5  Steiner filed an answer and admitted the facts and 
rule violation set forth in the ODC’s petition.  
Board Proceedings and Decision 
On April 24, 2002, the Board held a hearing on the ODC’s petition for 
discipline.  Given Steiner’s admissions, the only issue for the Board to 
consider was the appropriate sanction.  The parties agreed that a suspension 
in excess of six months was appropriate.  The Board heard testimony from 
Steiner’s father, Steiner’s therapist, and Steiner himself. 
In its report to this Court, the Board reviewed the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in Steiner’s case.  The Board rejected the ODC’s 
arguments regarding the existence of several aggravating factors.  First, 
although concerned with Steiner’s relapses, the Board concluded that 
                                                 
5 DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2003). 
 
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Steiner’s postconviction alcohol consumption, which resulted in his 
probation violations, did not reflect a pattern of misconduct.  Second, the 
Board did not accept the ODC’s argument that Steiner’s sanction should be 
enhanced because his probation violations constituted further misconduct 
similar to the misconduct for which Steiner already had been placed on 
interim suspension.  In mitigation, the Board concluded that Steiner’s 
alcohol addiction was a mitigating factor.  The Board also found Steiner’s 
remorse to be a mitigating factor.  Based on these findings, the Board 
recommended that this Court suspend Steiner for a period of two years 
beginning March 13, 2001, the date of the interim suspension order. 
Supreme Court Review 
 
The ODC filed objections to the Board’s report and recommended 
sanction.  Steiner did not.  With or without objections, this Court has an 
obligation to review the record independently and determine whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the Board’s factual findings.6  We review de 
novo the Board’s conclusions of law.  We also will review the Board’s 
recommendation on the appropriate sanction, which, while helpful, is not 
binding on the Court.7  In fact, the Court has wide latitude in determining the 
                                                 
6 In re Reardon, 759 A.2d 568, 575 (Del. 2000). 
7 In re Mekler, 669 A.2d 655, 668 (Del. 1995). 
 
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appropriate form of discipline.  We will review the sanction to ensure that it 
is appropriate, fair and consistent with our prior disciplinary decisions.8 
Given Steiner’s admission of misconduct, the only issue remaining for 
the Court’s review is the Board’s recommended sanction.  In determining an 
appropriate disciplinary sanction, this Court looks to the four-part 
framework set forth in the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(“ABA Standards”).9  This framework requires the Court to determine first: 
(i) the ethical duty violated; (ii) the lawyer’s state of mind; and (iii) the 
actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.10  Based on 
these considerations, the Court will make a preliminary determination of the 
appropriate sanction.  The Court then will review the particular aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in the case to determine if an increase or 
decrease in the sanction is justified.11   
 
In Steiner’s case, the Board did not articulate specific findings with 
respect to the first three factors of the ABA Standards.  Based on the 
undisputed factual record, however, we find that driving a car while 
intoxicated clearly reflects Steiner’s knowing, criminal misconduct.  As this 
                                                 
8 See In re Howard, 765 A.2d 39, 45 (Del. 2000). 
9 In re Benge, 754 A.2d 871, 879 (Del. 2000). 
10 See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Std. 3.0 (1991). 
11 In re Reardon, 759 A.2d at 575.  
 
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Court has noted in other cases, a Delaware lawyer’s knowing criminal 
misconduct violates the lawyer’s duties to the public, to the legal system, 
and to the legal profession.12  Moreover, Steiner’s misconduct caused 
significant physical injuries to two people and certainly the results could 
have been much more devastating. 
 
Under the circumstances, ABA Standard 5.1213 mandates a period of 
suspension, as the parties concede.  The issue is the appropriate length of the 
suspension.  To make this determination, we must review the specific 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the case,14 as well as our prior 
disciplinary decisions. 
Aggravating Factors 
 
ABA Standard 9.22 reflects that the following factors may be 
considered in aggravation: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or 
                                                 
12 In re Howard, 765 A.2d at 44-45 (holding that one of a lawyer’s most 
fundamental duties is “to abide by the law and to maintain the standard of personal 
integrity and honesty upon which the community relies”); In re Melvin, 807 A.2d 550, 554 
(Del. 2002) (noting that, as an experienced public defender, the respondent “held a unique 
position of public trust and knew or should have known that his criminal conduct would 
seriously adversely reflect on his own fitness to practice law and on the integrity of the 
profession”). 
13 “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 [involving 
dishonest conduct or serious intentional criminal conduct] and that seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.” 
14 ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Std. 2.3 cmt. (1991) (“The 
specific period of time for the suspension should be determined after examining any 
aggravating or mitigating factors in the case.”). 
 
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selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad 
faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of 
false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the 
disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 
(h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) indifference to making restitution and (k) illegal conduct, including that 
involving the use of controlled substances.15 
 
In addition, ABA Standard 8.0 separately discusses enhanced 
sanctions for a lawyer who has been subject to prior discipline.  ABA 
Standard 8.0 reflects that a lawyer subject to prior discipline who engages in 
further misconduct presents such a serious risk as to warrant special 
consideration under the ABA Standards.  In relevant part, ABA Standard 
8.1(b) provides, absent other aggravating or mitigating circumstances, that 
disbarment is generally the appropriate discipline when a lawyer who has 
been suspended for misconduct knowingly engages in further similar acts of 
misconduct.16 
                                                 
15 ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Std. 9.22 (1991 & Supp. 
1992). 
16 Id. Std. 8.1(b). 
 
9 
 
In this case, the ODC asserts, among other things, that the Board erred 
by failing to consider in aggravation that Steiner had been subject to prior 
discipline.  The ODC argues that Steiner was suspended by this Court, on an 
interim basis, for engaging in criminal conduct.  After his suspension, 
Steiner continued to engage in criminal conduct by knowingly violating the 
zero tolerance provision of the Superior Court’s probationary sentences.  
The ODC is not arguing for Steiner’s disbarment, which, absent mitigating 
factors, is the recommended sanction under ABA Standard 8.1(b).  The 
ODC argues, however, that the Board should have considered the provisions 
of Standard 8.1(b) and increased the length of Steiner’s suspension given his 
further criminal misconduct, which continued after this Court suspended 
him. 
 
Furthermore, the ODC argues that the Board erred by failing to find in 
aggravation that Steiner had engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  In arguing 
the existence of a pattern of misconduct, the ODC points out that Steiner 
first was arrested in February 2001.  As a condition of his release on bail, he 
was placed under a zero tolerance provision for drug and alcohol use.  The 
ODC contends, and Steiner does not dispute, that he violated that condition 
of the bail order in May 2001.  Furthermore, the ODC points out, Steiner 
violated the zero tolerance provision contained in the Superior Court’s June 
 
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2001 sentencing order in September 2001 and again in December 2001.  The 
Superior Court found Steiner in violation of his probation on both occasions.  
The ODC argues that these flagrant violations of Superior Court 
orders establish a pattern of misconduct that should have been considered by 
the Board as an aggravating factor.  Additionally, the ODC asserts that 
Steiner violated his probation again, only months after the Board held the 
disciplinary hearing in this matter. The Court takes judicial notice that the 
Superior Court again found Steiner in violation of his probation on July 2, 
2002.  The Superior Court discharged Steiner from one of his probationary 
sentences as unimproved and sentenced him on the remaining counts to a 
total period of eighteen months at Level V incarceration suspended for 
eighteen months at Level IV home confinement.   
 
Under the circumstances, we agree that Steiner’s continued alcohol 
consumption in flagrant violation of the Superior Court’s zero tolerance 
orders establishes a pattern of misconduct under the ABA Standards.  
Moreover, we find that Steiner’s series of probation violations constituted 
further acts of knowing misconduct similar to acts for which Steiner was 
already under suspension.  Accordingly, on both grounds, we conclude that 
the Board should have weighed Steiner’s probation violations in 
aggravation. 
 
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Mitigating Factors 
 
In addition to the aggravating factors that were not considered, the 
ODC asserts that the Board erred by weighing Steiner’s alcohol addiction in 
mitigation.  Specifically, the ODC argues that, under ABA Standard 9.32(i), 
a mental disability or chemical dependency, such as alcoholism, should be 
considered as a mitigating factor only if:  
 
(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by 
a chemical dependency or mental disability; 
 
(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the 
misconduct; 
 
(3)  the respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained 
period of successful rehabilitation; and 
 
(4)  the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely.17 
The ODC asserts that the evidence presented at the Board hearing did 
not meet these qualifying criteria.  Steiner does not dispute the ODC’s 
contention.  Under the circumstances, we must agree.  In order for chemical 
dependency to be considered in mitigation, it is critical that the respondent 
                                                 
17 ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Std. 9.32(i) (1991 & Supp. 
1992). 
 
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prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a sustained period of recovery 
from the addiction which led to the misconduct.  Only four months had 
elapsed from the time of Steiner’s December 2001 probation violation and 
the Board’s hearing in April 2002.  Even assuming no relapses occurred 
during that time period, we cannot concluded that four months in recovery 
from a longstanding addiction establishes “a meaningful and sustained 
period of successful rehabilitation.”18 
We commend Steiner’s efforts at rehabilitation.  Nonetheless, his 
recovery is nascent and cannot yet be declared “successful” under the ABA 
Standards. Steiner’s July 2002 probation violation is an indication to this 
Court that his addiction remains a threat to his clients, the public, and the 
legal system.  Accordingly, we find that the Board erred in considering 
Steiner’s addiction to be a mitigating factor in this case, recognizing the 
contention that alcohol addiction is an illness. Nevertheless, it must be 
remembered that we are dealing with a lawyer’s service to the public and 
that we are the body that must determine whether and when that lawyer will 
be deemed fit to return to that important responsibility. 
                                                 
18 ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Std. 9.32(i) (1991 & Supp. 
1992). 
 
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Prior Delaware Cases 
 
This Court recently had to consider the appropriate sanction to impose 
upon a lawyer whose only professional misconduct resulted from a 
misdemeanor drug conviction with no other associated disciplinary rule 
violations.  In that case, In re Howard,19 the Court found a substantial period 
of suspension to be justified because the respondent’s criminal conduct 
reflected “an indifference to his legal obligations and his lack of respect for 
his position as an officer of this Court.”20  The Court imposed a three-year 
suspension. 
 
Given the range of authorized suspension sanctions under our rule,21 
we find that a three-year suspension also is appropriate in Steiner’s case.  
Although Steiner’s misconduct did not injure a client, it did cause serious 
physical injuries to two people.  Furthermore, unlike Howard, who offered 
proof of a meaningful and sustained period of recovery from his drug 
addiction, Steiner did not establish his successful rehabilitation from his 
alcohol addiction.  Under the circumstances, a three-year suspension is fair 
and is consistent with our goals of protecting the public and the 
                                                 
19 765 A.2d 39 (Del. 2000). 
20 In re Howard, 765 A.2d at 45. 
21 Effective May 7, 2002, the Court reduced the maximum suspension period from 
five years to three years.  See DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROC. R. 8(a)(2). 
 
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administration of justice, preserving confidence in the legal profession, and 
deterring other lawyers from similar misconduct. 22 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Steiner shall be suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of three years retroactive to March 1, 2001, the 
date his interim suspension began.  Steiner may seek reinstatement after 
February 29, 2004. 
                                                 
22 See In re Figliola, 652 A.2d 1071, 1076 (Del. 1995).