Title: Stern v. Board of Regents

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Jodi Stern, et al. v. Board of Regents, University System of Maryland, et al.
No. 85, September Term, 2003
Headnote:
The defense of sovereign immunity is, generally, applicable to contract actions
involving the State unless it is expressly waived by the General Assembly.
The “sue or be sued” language in Md. Code (1978, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 12-104
(b)(3) of the Education Article does not generally waive sovereign immunity
in all contract actions involving the Board of Regents; an appropriation of
funds to pay an adverse judgment is required and no such appropriation, or
ability to levy a tax to satisfy an adverse judgment, was present here.  Md.
Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 12-201 (a) of the State Government Article
limits the waiver of governmental immunity to those contracts that are written
and executed, i.e., signed, by an official acting within his or her scope of
authority.  Here, no signed written contract existed between the parties.
Finally, the defense of sovereign immunity is not necessarily waived for
declaratory or injunctive relief in all contract actions.  Where there is no claim
seeking to enjoin future enforcement of laws on the basis that the laws are
unconstitutional or otherwise improper, or attempting to restrain the
enforcement of regulations alleged to be in violation of state or federal statutes
or constitutions, sovereign immunity may remain, in appropriate
circumstances, a bar to such claims against the State.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case #C-2003-86236 AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 85
September Term, 2003
Jodi Stern, et al.
v.
Board of Regents, University System of
Maryland, et al.
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia
Greene,
   
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Dissenting opinion by Wilner, J.,  which
Bell, C.J. joins
Filed: April 12, 2004
1 Md. Code (1978, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 12-101 (b)(4) of the Education Article
enumerates the eleven public higher education institutions under the jurisdiction of the Board
of Regents, including:
(i) University of Maryland, Baltimore;
(ii) University of Maryland Baltimore County;
(iii) University of Maryland, College Park;
(iv) University of Maryland Eastern Shore;
(v) University of Maryland University College;
(vi) Bowie State University;
(vii) Coppin State College;
(viii) Frostburg State University;
(ix) Salisbury University;
(x) Towson University; and 
(xi) University of Baltimore.”
The University of Maryland University College and Coppin State College are the two
institutions that did not raise tuition, mid-year, for the Spring 2003 semester.  Students from
the other nine institutions are involved in this lawsuit.
2 Hereinafter we shall refer to appellees collectively as the “Board.”
This case arises out of a mid-year tuition increase authorized by the Board of Regents
of the University System of Maryland.  On January 23, 2003, the Board of Regents,
responding to the Legislature’s mid-fiscal year budget cuts, authorized its constituent
institutions to increase their respective tuition for the 2003 Spring semester by up to five
percent.  Of the eleven institutions authorized to raise tuition, nine chose to do so.1
Appellants, representative students who were enrolled at the nine institutions electing to raise
tuition for the Spring 2003 semester, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against
the Board of Regents, Chancellor William E. Kirwan and David Ramsey, President of the
University of Maryland, Baltimore, appellees, challenging the Board’s authority to impose
the mid-year tuition increase.2
Appellants alleged three counts in their February 14, 2003 complaint, including breach
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of contract, equitable estoppel and violation of the Consumer Protection Act for deceptive
trade practices.  Along with their complaint, appellants included a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction requesting that the Circuit Court enjoin
collection of the tuition increase.  Appellants then moved to certify their suit as a class action.
The Circuit Court, on March 4, 2003, denied appellants’ motion for a preliminary
injunction and scheduled a hearing on the merits.  On March 19, 2003, the parties filed a
stipulation that the ruling on the motion to certify the suit as a class action would be stayed
until the Circuit Court’s ruling on the merits of the preliminary injunction.  The parties also
stipulated that appellants could conduct discovery and offer evidence as if the class had been
certified.
On April 15, 2003, the Circuit Court heard arguments on the cross-motions for
summary judgment and ruled that sovereign immunity barred appellants’ contract claims and
that appellants failed to establish the existence of a written contract in respect to tuition
signed by an authorized employee or official of the University.  In granting the Board’s
motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court stated:
“Even if this Court were to find that a contract existed between the
[appellants] and the [Board], such a contract would clearly have to be an
implied contract.  The Court [of Special Appeals] in Mass Transit
Administration versus Granite Construction Company [57 Md. App. 766, 471
A.2d 1121 (1984)] has made it clear that no matter how well founded a claim
against the State or its agencies might be, if it’s based on an implied contract,
it’s barred by the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity due to the absence of a
written contract.” [Alterations added.]
The Circuit Court additionally found that the other two counts in appellants’ complaint, the
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equitable estoppel and Consumer Protection Act (CPA) counts, could not be asserted against
a State agency.  Appellants have not presented the CPA and equitable estoppel issues in this
appeal.
On the following day, appellants filed a Motion to Alter or Amend.  The Circuit Court
held a hearing on this motion on April 22, 2003 and denied the motion; a written opinion was
issued on April 23, 2003.  In that opinion, the Circuit Court stated:
“this Court finds as a matter of law that there is no express contract between
[appellants] and any of the [appellees].  Despite [appellants’] contention that
various documents (including the fees sheets, registration packets, tuition bills
and acceptance of tuition payments) created an express contract between the
parties, that does not - - as a matter of law - - constitute an express contract.
It is noteworthy but not dispositive, that various University catalogs disclaim
the existence of a contract.
. . . 
“The Court believes that is what best describes, legally, the relationship
between the parties here, that is, a quasi-contract between the students and
their respective universities. . . . 
“Other jurisdictions have held that under ‘quasi-contract’ analysis, a
university may make unilateral changes if such changes are within the
reasonable expectations of reasonable students in light of all of the
circumstances and in light of all the materials that establish the framework of
the relationship.”
The Circuit Court went on to find that the Board’s actions in this case were reasonable and
thus denied appellants’ motion.
Appellants then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  On
December 11, 2003, on our own initiative, this Court granted a writ of certiorari to undertake
review of these issues prior to the intermediate appellate court taking action on the case.
3 The questions posed by appellants do not directly address whether they are entitled
to refunds.  In the suits below, however, they pressed a claim for damages relating to the
tuition increases.  Additionally, the appellants in their briefs proffer our recent case of
Frankel v. Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland, 361 Md. 298, 761 A.2d
324 (2000), as support for their claims of damages.  Frankel was a refund case.  Accordingly,
we will also address the matter of refunds in relation to sovereign immunity in the
circumstances of this case.
-4-
Stern v. Board of Regents, 378 Md. 613, 837 A.2d 925 (2003).  In their brief, appellants
present two questions for our review:
“1.  Did the University System of Maryland’s mid-year tuition increase
breach the contracts it had made with students regarding the price owed for the
Spring 2003 semester?
“2.  If so, do the appellees enjoy sovereign immunity from enforcement
of the tuition contract?”3
The Board filed a cross-appeal challenging the Circuit Court’s ruling that appellants’ claim
for declaratory and injunctive relief was not barred by sovereign immunity.  The Board
presents three questions in its cross-appeal:
“1.  Did the trial court correctly conclude that there was no express written
contract executed by an authorized University official and that sovereign
immunity barred the students’ claim for damages?
“2.  Did the trial court correctly conclude that the students’ claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief was not barred by sovereign immunity and
could be based upon a quasi-contract theory?
“3.  Did the trial [court] correctly conclude that the students were not entitled
to any declaratory and injunctive relief under a quasi-contract theory because
the University acted reasonably in raising tuition?” [Alterations added.]
We answer in the affirmative to appellants’ second question and hold that the Board has
sovereign immunity from suit on the tuition increase.  As we hold that the Board has
sovereign immunity, we do not directly address the merits of appellants’ first question.  In
4 At the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, due to printing errors, some bills
were mailed on January 3, 2003 and due January 22, 2003, despite being dated on December
17, 2002 with a printed January 6, 2003 due date.
5 If the bill was not paid by the due date, each institution advised its students of the
imposition of late fees, loss of university privileges and potential referrals to collection
agencies and litigation.
-5-
reference to the Board’s cross-appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in not concluding
that, under the circumstances of this case, appellants’ claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief were barred by sovereign immunity.
I. Facts
During a typical year, the Board sets tuition rates approximately one year in advance.
For the academic year in question in the case sub judice, the 2002-2003 school year, the
Board provisionally approved tuition rates based upon its budget in August of 2001.  These
rates were increased slightly in May of 2002 following the General Assembly’s enacting of
the State Budget and in light of the University’s actual budget appropriation.
During the Fall 2002 semester, appellants received registration materials advertising
courses for the Spring 2003 semester, with pricing, from their respective institutions.
Appellants relied on these registration materials in their decisions to enroll in classes for the
Spring 2003 semester.  In November and December of 2002,4 after following the proper
registration procedures, appellants received bills from their respective institutions confirming
the specific charges due for the spring courses for which appellants’ had registered.  These
bills had due dates ranging from December 17, 2002 until January 31, 20035 and a majority
6 The Board contends that the “[t]he need to consult with various people about the text
combined with the fact that the [University System of Maryland] was officially closed from
December 24 through January 2, 2003, made it impossible to mail the letter before January
8, 2003” (alterations added).
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of students promptly paid their bills and received $0 balance notices prior to the due dates.
The State budget crises escalated in the fall of 2002, thus the possibility of budget cuts
for several State agencies was apparent.  In October and November of 2002, the presidents
of the various University of Maryland System institutions and the Board met to discuss the
possibility of budget cuts to the University System and approaches on how to deal with
possible cuts.  A mid-year tuition increase, along with expanded hiring freezes, staff
furloughs and cancellation of certain operating expenses, were discussed as a method of
absorbing the cost of the likely budget cuts.
The Board learned of $30.4 million in immediate budget cuts for fiscal year 2003 on
November 20, 2002.  After discussing the cuts with the presidents of each university
institution, it was determined not to raise tuition at that time.  Approximately one month later,
on December 23, 2002, the Board learned that another $36.6 million in budget cuts for the
fiscal year 2003 was probable.  In reaction to discovering that information, the Board called
a special meeting on December 23, 2003 to consider mid-year tuition increases for the Spring
semester of 2003.  A letter to students was soon prepared to inform the students of the
imminent tuition increase.  That letter was mailed to the University System institutions on
January 8, 2003 and was promptly sent out by each institution to each respective student.6
7 Appellants contend that by the time many of the students received this January 8,
2003 letter, they had already registered for their courses, received a bill, paid it and had $0
account due balances.
8 As previously mentioned, Coppin State College and University of Maryland
University College chose not to raise tuition.
-7-
The text of that letter to the students was signed by the Chancellor and the Board of
Regents’ Chairman.  It discussed the various methods by which the University System had
already attempted to absorb previous budget cuts, including hiring freezes, eliminating
positions and reducing operating expenses.  Relevant to the case sub judice, the letter also
stated that if further budget cuts occurred the University System would find it necessary to
approve mid-year tuition increases for the Spring 2003 semester that would not exceed 5%.7
On January 17, 2003, Governor Ehrlich’s budget for fiscal year 2004 was released to
the public and it confirmed the additional $36.6 million budget cut.  In response to the
official word of the University System’s loss of budgetary funds, the Board met on January
23, 2003 and authorized tuition increases of up to 5% for the Spring 2003 semester at nine
of its institutions.8  The tuition increase recovered approximately $12.9 million of the total
$60.7 million budget cuts.
Appellants challenged the Board’s authority for its January 23rd approval of the mid-
year tuition increase, alleging that it violated appellants’ express contracts with their
respective institutions.
II. Discussion
The primary question in the case sub judice is whether the Board has sovereign
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immunity barring appellants’ claims that the Board breached a tuition contract with
appellants.  We ultimately hold that the Board is entitled to sovereign immunity under these
circumstances, thus appellants’ claims are barred.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized as applicable in actions
against the State of Maryland and its official representatives.  Baltimore County, Maryland
v. RTKL Associates, Inc., ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2004);  ARA Health Services, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 344 Md. 85, 91, 685 A.2d 435, 438 (1996);
see also Board of Trustees of Howard Community College v. John K. Ruff. Inc., 278 Md.
580, 584, 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976).  We have said that sovereign immunity is rooted in the
common law and “is firmly embedded in the law of Maryland.”  Katz v. Washington Sub.
Sanitary Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979).  The doctrine was
“[d]erived from the ancient view of the sovereign as infallible” and its effect “precludes suit
against governmental entities absent the State’s consent.”  ARA Health, 344 Md. at 91-92,
685 A.2d at 438 (alteration added).  See also Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md.
54, 58-59, 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986).  We have emphasized that “the dilution of the doctrine”
of sovereign immunity should not be accomplished by the judiciary, and that any direct or
implied diminution of the doctrine falls within the authority of the General Assembly.   ARA
Health, 344 Md. at 92, 685 A.2d at 438; see also Welsh, 308 Md. at 59, 521 A.2d at 315.
The test that this Court has utilized in assessing whether the doctrine applies in a particular
case is “(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for its protection; and, if so, (2)
-9-
whether the legislature has waived immunity, either directly or by necessary implication, in
a manner that would render the defense of immunity unavailable.”  ARA Health, 344 Md. at
92, 685 A.2d at 438.  See also Ruff, 278 Md. at 586, 366 A.2d at 363.
As we have stated, when a governmental agency or actor can, and does, avail itself
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, no contract or tort suit can be maintained thereafter
against it unless the General Assembly has specifically waived the doctrine.  The doctrine
serves many purposes, including protecting “the State ‘from burdensome interference with
its governmental functions and [preserving] its control over State agencies and funds.’”
Maryland State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 333, 726 A.2d 238, 248 (1999)
(quoting Katz, 284 Md. at 507, 397 A.2d at 1030) (alteration added).  Even where a statute
specifically waives the doctrine, a suit may only be maintained where there are “funds
available for the satisfaction of the judgment” or the agency has been given the power “for
the raising of funds necessary to satisfy recovery against it.”  University of Maryland v.
Maas, 173 Md. 554, 559, 197 A. 123, 126 (1938).  In that regard, where a statute specifically
authorizes suit and a waiver of immunity, we stated in Ruff, a case involving the Board of
Trustees of Howard Community College, that:
“We conclude that when the General Assembly expressly authorizes
suits to be brought against one of the State’s agencies, it is the giving of a
positive consent and has the effect of waiving sovereign immunity as to that
agency within its scope of duties and obligations.  It does not necessarily
follow, however, that a money judgment may therefore be obtained, even with
respect to matters within the scope of the duties of the agency. . . . [A]n action
for a money judgment may not be maintained unless funds had been
appropriated for that purpose or the agency can provide funds by taxation.”
9 Section 12-102 states, in relevant part:
“§ 12-102. Board of Regents – Government of University; members.
   (a) University as body corporate and politic. – (1) There is a body corporate
and politic known as the University System of Maryland.
(2) The University is an instrumentality of the State and a public
corporation.
(3) The University is an independent unit of State government.
(4) The exercise by the University of the powers conferred by this
subtitle is the performance of an essential public function.
   (b) Government of University. – The government of the University System
of Maryland is vested in the Board of Regents of the University System of
Maryland.”
-10-
Ruff, 278 Md. at 590, 366 A.2d at 366.  It is clear that without a specific legislative waiver
and appropriation, or taxing power, sovereign immunity is applicable in respect to the State.
There is no doubt, and the parties in this case do not dispute, that the Board is
considered to be an arm of the State Government for the purposes of asserting the defense
of sovereign immunity.  See Md. Code (1978, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 12-102 of the Education
Article;9 see also Frankel v. Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland, 361 Md.
298, 301, 761 A.2d 324, 325 (2000) (recognizing that the University of Maryland, which is
a part of the University System of Maryland, is an independent unit of the Maryland State
government); Maas, 173 Md. at 557, 197 A. at 124 (recognizing that the University of
Maryland was a State actor for the purposes of sovereign immunity); University of Maryland
v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 482, 182 A. 590 (1935) (holding that the University of Maryland
Law School was a State agency).  As the Board is clearly considered a State actor and may
raise the defense of sovereign immunity, the next factor to consider is whether the General
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Assembly has either directly or implicitly waived the Board’s immunity in factual
circumstances such as in the case sub judice.
Appellants argue that the Board cannot avail itself of the defense of sovereign
immunity for four reasons.  First, appellants contend that this Court’s decision on the waiver
issue in Frankel, supra, 361 Md. 298, 761 A.2d 324, stands for the proposition that sovereign
immunity has been waived in all cases involving tuition disputes.  Second, appellants argue
that a contract existed between the parties, which fell within the requirements of Md. Code
(1984, 1999 Repl. Vol), § 12-201 (a) of the State Government Article and its waiver of
sovereign immunity in actions involving a written contract executed by a State official acting
within his or her authority.  Appellants’ third argument is that the Board cannot avail itself
of the defense of sovereign immunity because that defense does not apply to any request for
declaratory or injunctive relief.  Finally, appellants contend that the Board breached a
contract between the parties by unreasonably raising tuition for the Spring 2003 semester
after the students had paid the bill in full and that the Board cannot assert sovereign
immunity as a defense.
The Board counters by arguing that sovereign immunity is not waived in the case sub
judice.  They contend that sovereign immunity is not waived where, as in this case, there is
no express written contract executed, i.e., signed, by a State official acting within the scope
of his or her authority.  They add that the burden was on appellants to prove whether such
a contract existed and that the trial court correctly found that appellants failed to meet that
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burden.  The Board additionally argues that even if an implied contract existed, such a
contract does not defeat the defense of sovereign immunity as the Board urges this Court that
the facts in the case sub judice are distinguishable from those of Frankel.  They additionally
contend that sovereign immunity bars declaratory and injunctive relief in contract actions
and, in the alternative, that appellants’ claim was not a proper claim for declaratory and
injunctive relief.  Finally, the Board asserts that, even if sovereign immunity is waived as to
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, the Board acted reasonably in raising tuition
under the circumstances.
For the reasons stated infra, we agree with the Board and hold that sovereign
immunity was not waived under the circumstances in this case and appellants are thus not
entitled to any relief.
A. The Frankel case
As mentioned previously, appellants rely heavily on our recent case of 
Frankel, supra.
Appellants claim that the language in Frankel should be applied to the case sub judice, as it
waives sovereign immunity in that case for four independent reasons:
“(1) the general waiver of governmental immunity in contract actions, Md.
Code Ann., St. Gov’t § 12-201; (2) the right to a refund against the State by a
claimant who pays a greater amount of a fee or charge than is properly and
legally payable, Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 13-901(a); (3) the policy passed
by the Board entitling a student to a refund upon re-classification from out-of-
state to in-state status, which gives rise to a common law contract action; or (4)
the ‘sue and be sued’ provision in Section 12-104(b)(3) of the Education
Article, which waives immunity in actions within the scope of the Board of
Regents’ duties and obligations, including tuition and contract matters.”
10 In footnote 1 in RTKL Associates, supra, ___ Md. at ___ n.1, ___ A2d at ___ n.1,
we stated:
“The issue of whether Art. 25A, § 1A(c) and its counterparts applicable
(continued...)
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We do not agree.
In Frankel, we held that a University of Maryland, College Park student was entitled
to have a determination of his residency status for tuition purposes based on his domicile and
not the policies regarding primary sources of income.  In Frankel, the Board of Regents
argued that the student’s retrospective claims were barred by sovereign immunity.  In
response to the Board’s argument, we discussed several ways in which sovereign immunity
may have been waived in that case.  First, we stated:
“[T]here is no merit in the suggestion that Jeremy’s claim is barred by
governmental immunity.  Even if the only basis for the claim were the general
waiver of governmental immunity in contract actions set forth in Code (1984,
1999 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-201 through 12-204 of the State Government Article,
Jeremy’s claim would not be barred by the one year period of limitations in §
12-202.  Jeremy filed this action within a year from the final administrative
decision denying his request for in-state status and his claim for a refund.   As
previously discussed, he did not abandon his claim for a refund.
Frankel, 361 Md. at 308, 761 A.2d at 329.  Neither in this, nor any other section of Frankel,
did we address the merits of the question of whether Md. Code §§ 12-201 through 12-204
of the State Government Article waived the Board’s immunity in that case, i.e., we never
addressed whether there was a written contract executed by a State official acting within his
or her scope of authority between Mr. Frankel and the Board of Regents.  The case provides
no discussion in that regard.  We merely stated that § 12-202’s statute of limitations10 would
10(...continued)
to actions against the State and other political subdivisions of the State are true
statutes of limitations or conditions on the right to sue has not been raised in
this case and is not relevant to this case.  That issue is before us in another
case.  We refer to those provisions as statutes of limitations for convenience
and because the parties have done so.”
We likewise refer in this case to the time period in § 12-202 as a “statute of limitations”
solely for purposes of convenience.
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not defeat the student’s claim and we went on to address the merits of three other ways in
which the Board had, in that case, waived its immunity.  Frankel, therefore, is not dispositive
on this issue.
The next alternative waiver of immunity discussed in Frankel involved a theory that
the Tax General Article authorized a refund for tuition overcharges.  We stated: 
“There are, moreover, grounds for Jeremy’s claim other than §§ 12-201
through 12-204 of the State Government Article.  It may be that Code (1988,
1997 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.), § 13-901(a) of the Tax General Article, is
applicable when a state college or university charges a student more for tuition
than is legally payable.  That section broadly authorizes a refund claim against
the State by a claimant who ‘(1) erroneously pays to the State a greater amount
of . . . fee, [or] charge . . . than is properly and legally payable.’  Under §
13-1104(a), a claimant has three years from the date of payment to file ‘a claim
for refund under this article . . . ,’ and Jeremy clearly filed his claim and
brought this action within that time.”
Frankel, 361 Md. at 308, 761 A.2d at 329 (emphasis added).  The language “[i]t may be that
Code (1988, 1997 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.), § 13-901 (a) of the Tax General Article, is
applicable”  makes clear that we did not specifically hold that Md. Code (1988, 1997 Repl.
Vol., 1999 Supp.), § 13-901 (a) of the Tax-General Article applied in Frankel.  That
11 The issue in the present case is not what relief is available for a person who has
been charged more “than is legally payable,” but whether tuition payment increases are legal
in the first instance.
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language was dicta.11
Next, the Frankel case sets out what is perhaps the crux of its holding – its discussion
of the Board’s specific adopted policy and regulations entitling students to a refund of tuition
where a student is reclassified from an out-of-state to in-state status.  In that regard, we said:
“If the statutory refund remedy in §§ 13-901(a)(1) and 13-1104(a) of
the Tax General Article is inapplicable to this case, the result would be no
different.  The General Assembly delegated to the Board very broad authority
over tuition and fees (§ 12-109(e)(7) of the Education Article), and the Board
adopted a Policy and regulations entitling a student to a credit or refund of
tuition upon re-classification from out-of-state status to in-state status.   It has
long been settled in Maryland that when one pays to a state government agency
or a local government more in taxes, fees, or charges than the government is
entitled to, and when the law specifically authorizes ‘a refund, although no
particular statutory remedy is provided,’ a common law contract ‘action . . .
is available.’  Apostol v. Anne Arundel County, 288 Md. 667, 672, 421 A.2d
582, 585 (1980); See, e.g., White v. Prince George’s Co., 282 Md. 641,
653-654 n.7, 387 A.2d 260, 267 n.7 (1978) (where the law ‘provided that the
[claimant] was entitled to a refund but did not contain a special statutory
remedy, . . . an action in assumpsit could be maintained’); Baltimore v.
Household Finance Corp., 168 Md. 13, 14, 176 A. 480, 481 (1935) (a law,
providing that one who paid ‘more money for taxes or other charges than was
properly and legally chargeable’ was entitled to a refund, ‘changed the
common law rule that taxes [or other charges] paid under a mistake of law
could not be recovered,’ and therefore the plaintiff could bring an action in
assumpsit, subject to the statute which ‘provides that suits in assumpsit shall
be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued’);
Baltimore v. Home Credit Co., 165 Md. 57, 65, 166 A. 604, 607-608 (1933)
(same); George’s Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County Com’rs of Allegany
County, 59 Md. 255, 260-261 (1883) (same).”
Frankel, 361 Md. at 308-09, 761 A.2d at 329-30 (emphasis added).
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The operative facts in Frankel, which distinguish it from the case sub judice, included
a specific authorization by the Legislature to the Board of Regents, allowing the Board to set
forth a policy to provide a refund to students who received a residency reclassification for
tuition purposes and the Board of Regents had established a refund policy.  We noted in
Frankel that by enacting § 12-109 (e)(7) of the Education Article, the General Assembly
authorized the presidents of the various institutions, subject to the Board of Regents’ policies,
to set tuition and fees.  In that case, the President of the University of Maryland, College Park
adopted a policy, pursuant to the Board of Regents’ policy, that provided for the
aforementioned refund.  In Frankel, we merely held that a common law action to recover a
tuition refund for reclassifications of residency status existed.  Once the Board of Regents
and President of the University adopted a refund policy in respect to residency
reclassifications pursuant to a delegation of authority from the Legislature, it necessarily
waived its sovereign immunity in suits to recover under that policy.  Our holding on that
issue in Frankel relied upon the well-settled law as stated in Apostol v. Anne Arundel County,
288 Md. 667, 672, 421 A.2d 582, 585 (1980), where we stated:
“It is firmly established in this State that once a taxpayer voluntarily
pays a tax or other governmental charge, under a mistake of law or under what
he regards as an illegal imposition, no common law action lies for the recovery
of the tax absent a special statutory provision sanctioning a refund.  This is
true even if payment is made under protest.  Moreover, in these circumstances,
no common law or declaratory judgment action lies to challenge the validity
of a tax so paid.  Where there is a special statutory provision sanctioning a
refund, although no particular statutory remedy is provided, an action in
assumpsit is available.  However, where there is statutory authorization for a
refund and a special statutory remedy set forth, that remedy is exclusive. These
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principles have recently been reviewed at length in Baltimore County v. Xerox
Corp., 286 Md. 220, 406 A.2d 917 (1979); White v. Prince George’s Co., 282
Md. 641, 650-654, 387 A.2d 260 (1978); and Rapley v. Montgomery County,
261 Md. 98, 274 A.2d 124 (1971).
“Furthermore, the rule that no action lies to challenge the validity of a
tax paid under a mistake of law, except for any refund sanction specifically
provided by the Legislature, has been applied consistently by this Court,
regardless of the nature of the legal attack mounted or the type of mistake of
law claimed.” [Emphasis added.]
The Board has adopted no policy in reference to refunds caused by general tuition
increases; rather it adopted the tuition increase at issue in the case at bar – not a refund
policy.  The emphasized language in the quote from Apostol clearly illustrates that the
common law right to sue for a refund only exists where a refund is authorized, although no
statutory procedure for the remedy is provided.  Apostol does not even mention sovereign
immunity or how its holding relates to that doctrine.  The more logical interpretation of
Apostol is that, where the General Assembly authorizes a refund (in Frankel that refund was
authorized pursuant to a legislative delegation of authority), sovereign immunity may be
waived and a right to sue the State in an attempt to avail oneself of the refund may exist.  The
cases do not support extending this holding to waive immunity where no refund policy is
authorized or exists.
In the case sub judice, unlike Frankel, no tuition refund policy exists for mid-semester
increases of tuition.  Appellants do not fall into a class, such as Frankel’s residency
reclassification class, subject to a refund policy provided for by a legislative delegation of
power to the Board and/or Presidents of the System institutions.  As no refund policy was
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provided for situations like the case sub judice, no waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant
to a legislative delegation of authority, such as the ones in Frankel and Apostol, existed.
Finally, appellants’ contend that our discussion in Frankel regarding the “sue or be
sued” provision in Md. Code (1978, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 12-104 (b)(3) of the Education
Article (§ 12-104 (b)(3)), indicates that the Board’s sovereign immunity has been waived.
We stated in Frankel:
“Apart from the general waiver of governmental immunity for contract
actions in §§ 12-201 through 12-204 of the State Government Article, and the
law concerning refunds of overpayments to governmental agencies, the
General Assembly has authorized the Board to ‘[s]ue and be sued. . . .’ Code
(1978, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 12-104(b)(3) of the Education Article.  Although a
‘sue and be sued’ provision ordinarily does ‘“not alone constitute a general
waiver of [governmental] immunity,”’ it does waive immunity in actions
concerning matters within the scope of the governmental agency’s ‘“duties and
obligations.”’  Jackson v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n, 289 Md. 118, 124,
422 A.2d 376, 379 (1980), quoting Board of Trustees of Howard Community
College v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590, 366 A.2d 360, 366 (1976),
and Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 512, 397
A.2d 1027, 1033 (1979).  See O & B, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park &
Planning Com’n, 279 Md. 459, 466-468, 369 A.2d 553, 557-558 (1977);
Weddle v. School Commissioners, 94 Md. 334, 51 A. 289 (1902).  The Board
has a duty to ‘prescribe policies and procedures’ for the University System,
and, in order to carry out that power and ‘accomplish the purposes of the
University,’ the Board was granted the authority to ‘[e]nter into contracts of
any kind.’ § 12-104(b)(5) and (j) of the Education Article.  As earlier
mentioned, the Board is expressly granted the authority to set ‘tuition and
fees.’ § 12-109(e)(7) of the Education Article. Although the Board’s waiver
of governmental immunity for actions filed in tort may be limited ‘to the extent
of any applicable liability insurance,’ the waiver of immunity for other actions
is not so limited.  See § 12-104(b) and (i) of the Education Article.  Under all
of the circumstances, the statutory authorization to ‘be sued’ waives any
governmental immunity in declaratory judgment and contract actions to
recover tuition overcharges which the Board might otherwise have enjoyed.”
-19-
Frankel, 361 Md. at 309-10, 761 A.2d at 330 (emphasis added).  Appellants appear to
interpret § 12-104 (b)(3) as granting an absolute waiver of sovereign immunity “in actions
concerning matters within the scope of the governmental agency’s ‘duties and obligations.’”
Id. at 310, 761 A.2d at 330 (internal citations omitted).  The plain reading of that language
in Frankel limited its application in that case to “contract actions to recover tuition
overcharges,” because, as we had noted earlier, there was legislation enabling the Board to
adopt a policy regarding residency reclassifications and an express policy adopted by the
Board pursuant to that authority relating to residency reclassifications and refunds of tuition
sums in those instances beyond those sums that were legally payable had the residency
classifications been initially correct.  This statement in Frankel is also restricted by the last
element in the Maas and Ruff test of the waiver of sovereign immunity, which was not
overruled by Frankel.
As previously mentioned, Mass, supra, and later Ruff, supra, set out the elements to
be considered by a court in addressing the issue of whether sovereign immunity has been
waived.  The Maas test was succinctly set forth in Ruff, a case where the issue of sovereign
immunity was not briefed by the parties, but where this Court stated:
“Legislative authority for a governmental agency to be sued is not free
from restrictions, even though limitations are not expressly made by the
Legislature.  Such authority does not impose unqualified liability even as to
matters within the scope of the agency’s duties and obligations.  This Court
has consistently held that suits may not be maintained unless money has been
appropriated for the payment of such damages as may be awarded, or the
agency itself is authorized to raise money for that purpose.  We said in
University of Maryland v. Maas, supra, 173 Md. at 558-559, 197 A. at 125: 
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‘The decisions in this state go further than holding that
without legislative sanction an arm of the state government . . .
may not be sued, and are to the effect that, even though there is
a legislative authorization to sue, such suits may not be
maintained unless funds are available or may be made available
by the agency itself for the purpose of paying the claim for
damages that may be established by the suit. . . .
‘So it is established that neither in contract nor tort can a
suit be maintained against a government agency, first, where
specific legislative authority has not been given, second, even
though such authority is given, if there are no funds available for
the satisfaction of the judgment, or no power reposed in the
agency for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy a recovery
against it.’
See Bolick v. Bd. of Education of Charles Co., supra, 256 Md. at 183, 260
A.2d at 32, and Thomas L. Higdon, Inc. v. Board, supra, applying it; Weisner
v. Bd. of Education, supra; Williams v. Fitzhugh, supra; Fisher & Corozza Co.
v. Mackall, 138 Md. 586, 114 A. 580 (1921); Weddle v. School
Commissioners, supra.  It follows, and we so hold, that sovereign immunity
is a valid defense against a suit brought for a money judgment in assumpsit
under the contract here against the Board unless funds have been appropriated
for the payment of such damages as may be awarded, or the Board is
authorized to raise funds for that purpose.”
Ruff, 278 Md. at 590-91, 366 A.2d at 366.  The Ruff Court went on to hold that the Board of
Trustees of Howard County Community College did not have the power to provide funds by
taxation, but remanded the case to hear arguments on whether funds had been appropriated
for the purpose of satisfying a monetary judgment arising out of the underlying construction
contract in that case.
In the case sub judice, appellants also argue that § 12-104 (b)(3), which authorizes the
Board of Regents to “[s]ue and be sued,” and the language in Frankel stating that § 12-104
(b)(3) “waives any governmental immunity in declaratory judgment and contract actions to
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recover tuition overcharges,” waives the Board’s sovereign immunity in all contract cases
falling within the scope of the Board’s duties and obligations.  Appellants cite the Education
Article of the Maryland Code to assert that the Board of Regents has extensive powers,
including the right to “[e]xercise all the corporate powers granted Maryland corporations
under the Maryland General Corporation Law,” pursuant to § 12-104 (b)(1) (alteration
added), and the rights to “[e]nter into contracts of any kind,” pursuant to § 12-104 (b)(5)
(alteration added).  Appellants cite § 10-208 (5) of the Education Article for the Board of
Regents’ power to “set guidelines for tuition and mandatory fees.” Appellants argue that
these provisions of the Education Article illustrate that mid-year tuition increases fall within
the scope of the Board’s official duties and, because Frankel, 361 Md. at 309-10, 761 A.2d
at 330 (internal citations omitted), states that “sue and be sued” language “does waive
immunity in actions concerning matters within the scope of the governmental agency’s
‘duties and obligations,’” that the “sue and be sued” provision of § 12-104 (b)(3) waives the
Board’s sovereign immunity.
While we agree that § 12-104 (b) is a specific legislative act that discusses the scope
of the duties of the Board of Regents, including the setting of tuition, and may satisfy the first
prong of the Maas and Ruff test, we nevertheless hold that even if the general “sue or be
sued” language asserted by appellants was, by itself, a waiver of sovereign immunity, which
we do not hold, appellants nonetheless did not satisfy their burden under the second prong
of the Maas and Ruff test. 
-22-
Appellants argue that the General Assembly specifically authorized some suits by
enacting § 12-104 (b)(3), with its “sue and be sued” language.  Coupling this legislative
consent to “sue and be sued” with the Board’s authority to set tuition and to enter into
contracts, the first prong of the Maas and Ruff test might be satisfied.  See Frankel, 361 Md.
at 309-10, 761 A.2d at 330; see also Jackson v. Housing Opportunities Comm’n of
Montgomery County, 289 Md. 118, 124, 422 A.2d 376, 379 (1980) (holding that the first
prong of the waiver test was satisfied under the circumstances of that case as the Legislature
enacted a law allowing the housing authority to “sue and be sued”); Katz, supra, 284 Md. at
512-15, 397 A.2d at 1032-34 (holding that the Washington Suburban Sanitary District Code’s
language to “sue and be sued,” under the circumstances there present, satisfied the first prong
of the waiver test); O & B, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 279
Md. 459, 466-468, 369 A.2d 553, 557-558 (1977) (limiting the waiver of immunity of a “sue
and be sued” provision to “actions as would be necessary to carry out the agency’s
purposes”); Ruff, 278 Md. at 590, 366 A.2d at 366 (holding that “sue and be sued” language
may satisfy the first prong of the waiver test, but that even where such language may satisfy
the first prong, immunity is waived only where funds have been appropriated for the purpose
of satisfying the judgment, or the ability to raise those funds is given by the Legislature);
Lohr v. Upper Potomac River Comm’n, 180 Md. 584, 588-89, 26 A.2d 547, 549-50 (1942)
(holding that the “sue and be sued” language was a limited waiver of immunity in that the
actions must be necessary to carry out the agency’s purpose); Weddle v. The Board of County
12  In addition, the parties may have assumed that sufficient funds existed to refund
the relatively small sum in that case, i.e.,  difference between out-of-state and in-state tuition
for one student.  In either case, it appears that the issue was not raised by the parties in
Frankel.
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School Commissioners of Frederick County, 94 Md. 334, 344, 51 A. 289, 291 (1902)
(holding that “sue and be sued” language waives immunity “in respect to all matters within
the scope of [the State actor’s] duties and obligations,” but that immunity cannot be waived
where there is no power to raise funds to pay damages) (alteration added).
While the language in Frankel regarding the “sue and be sued” provision of § 12-104
(b)(3) may, under some circumstances, waive the Board’s sovereign immunity for actions
within the scope of its authority, thus satisfying the first prong of the Maas and Ruff test, it
does not eliminate the need for analysis under the second prong of that test.  In Frankel, we
did not formally discuss the second prong of the Maas and Ruff test, as we held that
immunity was waived by the Legislature’s granting of authority to the Board to create a
refund policy and the Board’s creation of its own refund policy.  The discussion of the “sue
and be sued” provision followed Frankel’s discussion of the Board’s tuition refund policy
for reclassifications of residency for tuition purposes, a policy which we acknowledged under
the specific circumstances of that case waived governmental immunity in and of itself.  There
was thus no need for this Court to determine whether funds had been appropriated for Mr.
Frankel’s refund, or whether the Board was authorized to raise funds to pay for the refund
because of the existence of the Board’s own refund policy.12
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We reiterate that the factual circumstances in Frankel were very different than those
in the case sub judice.  In Frankel, if the student’s proper classification was as a Maryland
resident, he had overpaid his tuition, i.e., paid more than was legally due, and there was an
express statutory source and an express policy requiring a refund.  In the case at bar, the issue
is whether the new tuition sums are legally payable in the first instance, not whether there has
been overpayment based on an improper residency classification.  In the case sub judice,
there is no refund policy that covers appellants’ situation, therefore in attempting to
determine the extent to which the holdings in Frankel apply in this case we must also
examine and contrast the “policy issues” present in this case with the policy in Frankel, and
even if we presume the policy issues are similar, we must investigate whether the Board is
able to levy a tax to raise funds for the repayment of a mid-year tuition increase of the scope
here present or whether money has been appropriated and is available for the purpose of
claims regarding the cumulative substantial tuition increases.  The “policy” issue in Frankel
was a legislatively authorized Board of Regents policy where the appropriation of funds was
presumed by the parties and the Court to exist.  The policy issue in the current case is
whether the Board can legally impose a tuition increase, and whether the process of
registration constitutes an express written contract signed by an authorized person, which
might constitute a waiver of immunity, which, in turn, would make the increased tuition not
legally payable.  The issue is thus different than the issue resolved in Frankel.
It is clear that no statutory authority exists to authorize the Board of Regents to levy
-25-
a tax for the purpose of repaying “illegal” mid-year tuition increases, so, under the Frankel
scenario, even if it were applicable, the determinative issue then would be whether money
has been appropriated for the payment of damages arising from claims such as appellants’
claims in the case sub judice.   The General Assembly is cognizant of how to specifically
authorize the power to raise funds in satisfaction of the second prong of the Mass and Ruff
test, as it has enacted a power to appropriate funds for the purpose of paying judgments
arising from an express legislative waiver of immunity in Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.),
§ 12-203 of the State Government Article.  Section 12-203 states that to fund damages
arising out of actions based on § 12-201 of the State Government Article, discussed infra,
“the Governor shall include in the budget bill money that is adequate to satisfy a final
judgment that . . . is rendered against the State or any of its officers or units.”  No such
language appears in Title 12 of the Education Article and the parties have not directed us to
any other such legislative authority applicable in the circumstances of this case.
In Maas, after holding that the University of Maryland was a State entity and that the
Laws of 1812 (chapter 159), declaring that the University “be able in law to sue and to be
sued,” might waive the University’s sovereign immunity, this Court, nevertheless, held that
the suit claims against the University could not proceed.  We stated:
“In the case of Williams v. Fitzhugh, 147 Md. 384, 128 A. 137, suit was
brought against the Board of Trustees of the State Normal School by one of the
teachers for damages for an alleged breach of contract of employment.  The
right to maintain this suit was denied on the ground that the Board of Trustees
had no means of ‘procuring funds beyond the amount it receives from the state
treasury under budget appropriations by the General Assembly for specific
-26-
uses.’  To the same effect is the case of Fisher & Carrozza Bros. Co. v.
Mackall, 138 Md. 586, 114 A. 580 and Stanley v. Mellor, 168 Md. 465, 178
A. 106.
“The decisions in this state go further than holding that without
legislative sanction an arm of the state government, such as the University of
Maryland, may not be sued, and are to the effect that, even though there is a
legislative authorization to sue, such suits may not be maintained unless funds
are available or may be made available by the agency itself for the purpose of
paying the claim for damages that may be established by the suit.  And this is
supported by the case of Fisher & Carrozza Bros. Co. v. Mackall, supra. This
court there said, quoting from Weddle v. School Commissioners, 94 Md. 334,
51 A. 289, and approving this doctrine as laid down in State v. Rich, supra,
that, ‘notwithstanding the statute authorized a suit by or against a board of
county school commissioners, the court held that the board was not liable in
an action of tort because it had no power “to raise money for the purpose of
paying damages.”’  This doctrine, as applied to actions in tort, is extended to
actions in contract in the case of Williams v. Fitzhugh, supra.
“So it is established that neither in contract nor tort can a suit be
maintained against a governmental agency, first, where specific legislative
authority has not been given, second, even though such authority is given, if
there are no funds available for the satisfaction of the judgment, or no power
reposed in the agency for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy a recovery
against it.
. . . 
“Under the Laws of 1916, chapter 372, the State College of Agriculture
was declared to be ‘capable in law of suing and being sued’ (section 1), and
the University of Maryland, under the Laws of 1812 (chapter 159) was
declared to ‘be able in law to sue and to be sued, plead and interplead, answer
and be answered, in any Court or Courts, before any judge or judges within the
State, and elsewhere, in all manner of suits, pleas, cases and demands of
whatever kind, nature or form that may be, and to do all and every other matter
and thing hereby contemplated to be done, in as full and effectual a manner as
any other person or persons, bodies corporate or public in like cases can or
may do.’  Thus was the University of Maryland by legislative enactments
rendered liable to be sued, but even so, this does not fully satisfy the
requirements of the rule, because it is definitely alleged and clearly shown that
the University of Maryland has only such funds as are appropriated for its use
by the Legislature of Maryland, to be distributed by another arm of the state
government, namely, the Comptroller and Treasurer of the State, for definite
-27-
and limited purposes, nor has the University of Maryland power or authority,
in itself, to raise moneys for the payment of damages.”
Maas, 173 Md. at 558-60, 197 A. at 125-26 (emphasis added).  See Katz, 284 Md. at 512-15,
397 A.2d at 1032-34 (holding that immunity was only waived due to the statutory provision
authorizing the State agency “to certify a tax rate sufficient to produce funds to satisfy a
judgment rendered against it,” where the “sue and be sued” provision satisfied the first prong
of the waiver test); Weddle, 94 Md. at 344,  51 A. at 291 (holding that while “sue and be
sued” language may waive immunity “in respect to all matters within the scope of [the State
actor’s] duties and obligations,” immunity is not waived where there is no power to raise
funds to pay damages and statutory language “provides that the school fund of the State shall
be kept inviolate and appropriated only to the purposes of education”); see also Kim, supra,
353 Md. at 332-34, 726 A.2d at 248-49.
Similarly, in the case sub judice, appellants offer no evidence of whether sufficient,
or even any, funds were appropriated for the purpose of satisfying adverse judgments based
on claims or disputes relating to general tuition increases.  The only evidence offered by
appellants in this regard is a financial statement entitled “Balance Sheet” dated June 30,
2002.  The data shown in that statement does not address how the potential funds listed are
to be appropriated or spent.  At oral argument, appellants’ counsel argued that the “cash and
cash equivalents” listed on the financial statement satisfied appellants’ burden to show that
funds were appropriated for the purpose of paying a judgment in its favor.  We disagree.
Not only is this financial statement one assessing the assets of the University System
-28-
as a whole and apparently not just for the institutions imposing the mid-year tuition increase,
it is dated prior to the major budgetary cuts made by the Governor, cuts which are at the heart
of the need to raise tuition mid-year in the first instance.  In addition, the emphasized
language from the next above excerpt from this Court’s Maas decision illustrates that there
have long been serious limitations and outside controls placed on the distribution of funds
of the University of Maryland.
The “sue or be sued” language of § 12-104 (b)(3) does not waive sovereign immunity
for appellants’ claims against the Board in the absence of proof that the necessary
appropriations, or authority to tax, exists.  Appellants had the burden to establish the requisite
appropriations or taxing authority.  They failed to meet that burden.  Moreover, Frankel was
a narrowly limited case involving residency reclassifications where statutory authorized
refund policies existed.  It is limited to its, and similar, contexts.
B. § 12-201
As we have held that the Frankel case and § 12-104 (b)(3) of the Education Article
do not serve to waive the Board’s sovereign immunity, we now address the question of
whether Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 12-201 (a) of the State Government Article (§
12-201(a)) waives immunity in this case.  Section 12-201, in its entirety, states:
“§ 12-201. Sovereign immunity defense barred.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the State, the
State, its officers, and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign
immunity in a contract action, in a court of the State, based on a written
contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units
while the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of
-29-
the official or employee.
(b) In an action under this subtitle, the State and its officers and units
shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(d) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.” [Emphasis added.]
Appellants’ argument that § 12-201 (a) applies to situations as in the case sub judice fails,
as the agreement between the parties here does not fit within the narrow definition of a
“written contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the
official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee.”
We have long held that courts should not “either directly or by necessary implication” dilute
the doctrine of sovereign immunity by “judicial fiat.”  ARA Health, 344 Md. at 92, 685 A.2d
at 438; see also Welsh, 308 Md. at 59, 521 A.2d at 315 and cases therein cited; Dunne v.
State, 162 Md. 274, 159 A. 751, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 287 U.S. 564, 53 S. Ct.
23, 77 L. Ed. 497 (1932). 
Appellants contend that they have an express written contract, encompassing several
written documents, with the Board and that those documents need not be signed to be
executed within the meaning of § 12-201 (a).  At oral argument, appellants’ counsel argued
that the bill sent to students after the students had registered constituted the specific writing
that had been executed by a State official acting within his or her scope of authority.  They
also contend that normal contract principles allow an express contract to consist of more than
one document and does not even need to be in writing.  They add that a contract can be
executed without being signed.  The Board counters by arguing that the plain language of §
12-201 (a) requires a written contract and an execution of that contract by a person with the
-30-
proper authority, which is satisfied only with a signature.
We agree with the Board’s narrow interpretation of § 12-201 (a), as we will construe
legislative dilution of governmental immunity narrowly in order to avoid weakening the
doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat.  We have long recognized that “the cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (2001) (quoting In re Anthony
R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139 (2000) (internal citation omitted)).  As a first step, a
court should thoroughly examine the plain language of the statute when attempting to
ascertain the Legislature’s intentions.  Holbrook, 364 Md. at 364, 772 A.2d at 1246; In re
Anthony R., 362 Md. at 57, 763 A.2d at 139.  The Court, when possible, “will give effect to
the statute as it is written,” where the statutory language in question has an unambiguous
plain meaning.  Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting
Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003) (internal citation omitted)).
We, however, will not add or delete words from the statute, Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219,
222, 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002), and we will look “beyond the statute’s plain language in
discerning the legislative intent” only where the statutory language is ambiguous.
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833 A.2d
1014, 1021 (2003).
When read in a narrow light, as is the case for interpretations of legislative limitations
on sovereign immunity, § 12-201 (a) is clear and unambiguous.  It requires that a waiver of
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sovereign immunity exists only where it is “based on a written contract that an official or
employee executed for the State” (emphasis added).  A written contract is defined as one
“whose terms have been reduced to writing.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 327 (Bryan A. Garner
ed., 7th ed., West 1999).  Black’s Law Dictionary goes on to quote from the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 95 (1981) (citations omitted), stating:
“Written contracts are also commonly signed, but a written contract may
consist of an exchange of correspondence, of a letter written by the promisee
and assented to by the promisor without signature, or even of a memorandum
or printed document not signed by either party.  Statutes relating to written
contracts are often expressly limited to contracts signed by one or both
parties.  Whether such a limitation is to be implied when not explicit depends
on the purpose and context.” [Emphasis added.]
As indicated above, the term “written contract,” by itself, defines a completed agreement.
As such, it was not necessary for the Legislature to use the word “executed” in the statute
unless the term was a further limitation on the waiver of immunity.  In the context of the
statute, had “executed” not meant “signed,” it would have been surplusage.  Moreover, an
“executed” contract is defined as a “contract that has been fully performed by both parties”
or as a “signed contract.”    Black’s Law Dictionary 321(Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West
1999).  The term, “executed” is defined as “(Of a document) that has been signed.”  Id. at
589.  Black’s Law Dictionary supplemented its definition of “executed” with the following:
“‘[T]he term “executed” is a slippery word.  Its use is to be avoided except
when accompanied by explanation. . . . A contract is frequently said to be
executed when the document has been signed, or has been signed, sealed, and
delivered.  Further, by executed contract is frequently meant one that has been
fully performed by both parties.’  William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of
Contract 26 n. * (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).”
13 In fact, there are several documents involved in the alleged contract between these
two parties.  The January 8, 2003 letter informing the students of a possible mid-semester
increase in tuition gave notice that the Board intended to exercise its authority to raise tuition,
which was enumerated in several institutions’ course catalogs and web sites, is another
writing that contributes to the transaction at issue.  In fact, the January 23, 2003 tuition
increase and subsequent bill is another writing which is part of the same transaction.  In any
event, we need not consider the exact legal significance of each document or their
relationship with each other because we hold that § 12-201 (a) requires a signature.  There
is insufficient evidence that the bills in this case were signed for the purposes of § 12-201
(a) by a person expressly authorized by the Board to execute contracts on its behalf.
-32-
Id. 
In the case sub judice, the interpretation of § 12-201 (a), i.e., a legislative limitation
on sovereign immunity, must be viewed within the context of an unfavored limitation on a
well-recognized and ancient doctrine with a strong public policy to insulate the State “from
burdensome interference with its governmental functions and [preserve] its control over State
agencies and funds.” Kim, 353 Md. at 333, 726 A.2d at 248 (quoting Katz, 284 Md. at 507,
397 A.2d at 1030).  Given that context, and the narrow definitions quoted above, we hold that
the waiver language of § 12-201 (a) requires a written contract signed by a person expressly
authorized to execute the contract for the University System.
Here, appellants argue that the students’ bill constitutes the writing that is dispositive
of the Board’s assent to a written contract.  Even if that document is to be considered to
constitute the written contract for the purposes of § 12-201 (a), which we do not hold,13 it
was not signed for the purposes of § 12-201 (a).  At oral argument, appellants argued that our
case of Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546 (1882), which held that a printed letterhead on a
14 We have held that equity can impose a constructive trust, even where there has been
no required compliance with the Statute of Frauds.  Part performance can be an exception to
the Statute of Frauds requirements.  Certain admissions can take a matter out of the ambit of
the Statute of Frauds.  Such matters, generally, are not applicable in respect to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
15 Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as applying so as to limit the application
of Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.), Title 21 of the Commercial Law Article,
“The Maryland Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,” in appropriate cases.  Apparently, that
Act is not implicated in this case.  Its application was not argued.
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memorandum was sufficient to satisfy the signature requirement of the statute of frauds, is
analogous to the University System institutions sending appellants their bills printed with the
institutions’ seal.  We disagree, because the context of the statute of frauds is significantly
different than the context of the case at bar.14  As we have said, we construe limitations on
the doctrine of sovereign immunity narrowly.  Here, we interpret § 12-201 (a) to require a
signature of a State official with the proper authority because of the statute’s “executed”
requirement.  Letterhead, a school stamp or a school insignia on a document will not suffice
to waive the defense of sovereign immunity under § 12-201 (a); a signature of a duly
authorized person is required.  As the parties here did not have such a signed written contract
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 12-201 (a), the Board has not waived its sovereign
immunity under that statute.15
C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Appellants contend, and the trial court found, that the Board could not raise sovereign
immunity as a defense to appellants’ claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief
based on this Court’s holdings in Glover v. Glendening, 376 Md. 142, 829 A.2d 532 (2003)
16 The Board also challenges whether appellants’ claims are declaratory or injunctive
at all.  As we hold that sovereign immunity is not necessarily waived for all claims of
declaratory or injunctive relief, including cases such as the one at bar, we need not address
this last issue.
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and Jackson v. Millstone, 369 Md. 575, 801 A.2d 1034 (2002).  The Board, in its cross-
appeal from the trial court’s finding on this matter, asserts that appellants’ construction of
those cases attempts to extend the holdings of those cases far beyond their intended scope.16
We agree with the Board that extending the waiver of sovereign immunity to include all
declaratory relief, where the unlawful implementation of, or failure to implement, a statute
or regulation by a State official is not alleged, is not generally appropriate.
In Glover, supra, we held, relying on Jackson, supra, as being dispositive as to the
sovereign immunity issue, that the defense of sovereign immunity is rejected in actions for
declaratory or injunctive relief against state actors where the plaintiff claims that the state is
acting in violation of a federal statue or regulation.  Glover, 376 Md. at 147-50, 829 A.2d at
535-37.  Specifically, in Jackson, we stated:
“Where a statute or regulation is invalid, sovereign immunity does not
preclude a declaratory judgment action or suit for an injunction against the
governmental official who is responsible for enforcing the statute or
regulation.  As Judge Delaplaine explained for the Court in Davis v. State,
supra, 183 Md. at 389, 37 A.2d at 883, ‘if a person is directly affected by a
statute, there is no reason why he should not be permitted to obtain a judicial
declaration that the statute is unconstitutional.’  The Court in Davis went on
to point out that, in addition, ‘a court of equity has power to restrain the
enforcement of a void statute or ordinance at the suit of a person injuriously
affected.’ Ibid.  Specifically with regard to sovereign immunity, the Davis
opinion held (183 Md. at 393, 37 A.2d at 885):
‘Although a State may not be sued without its consent, an
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officer of the State acting under color of his official authority
may be enjoined from enforcing a State law claimed to be
repugnant to the State or Federal Constitution, even though such
injunction may cause the State law to remain inoperative until
the constitutional question is judicially determined.’
See also, e.g., Police Comm’n v. Siegel, 223 Md. 110, 115, 162 A.2d 727, 729,
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909, 81 S.Ct. 273, 5 L.Ed.2d 225 (1960); Pitts v. State
Bd. of Examiners, 222 Md. 224, 226, 160 A.2d 200, 201 (1960);  Pressman v.
State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 84, 102 A.2d 821, 825 (1954), and cases
there cited;  Baltimore Police v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282, 309-310, 780
A.2d 410, 426-427 (2001).
“In addition, § 10-125 of the State Government Article specifically
authorizes a declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of a state
administrative regulation, and the statute in subsection (c) expressly provides
that ‘[t]he unit that adopted the regulation shall be made a party to the
proceeding . . . .’  Even if sovereign immunity were otherwise a defense to this
type of action (and, as shown by the above-cited cases, it is not a defense), §
10-125 would constitute a waiver of such immunity.”
Jackson, 369 Md. at 590-91, 801 A.2d at 1043.  This language in Glover and Jackson clearly
illustrates that our primary concern was to allow plaintiffs access to courts so they are able
to challenge the legality of State laws and regulations, or the alleged unlawful
implementation of such law and regulations by a State official.  No language in those
opinions suggests that a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity should be found to exist in
respect to all declaratory relief sought against the State or a State official, especially where
the stated claim is based upon an alleged contract, not an unlawful statute or an alleged
illegal implementation of a State law or regulation.  In the case sub judice, appellants do not
claim that a statute is unlawful, nor do they claim that a State official is unlawfully applying
a statute.  They seek relief based solely upon an alleged tuition contract with the Board.  As
the cases of Glover and Jackson do not stand for the proposition that sovereign immunity is
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waived for all declaratory or injunctive relief sought, and the stated claim here does not
challenge the legality of a statute or an official’s implementation of a statute as in those
cases, sovereign immunity is not waived.
III. The Merits
While both parties urge the adoption of the holding in Gamble v. University System
of New Hampshire, 147 N.H. 443, 610 A.2d 357 (1992) a case in respect to the merits,
because we hold that the Board may avail itself of the defense of sovereign immunity, thus
barring appellants’ claims, we need not reach the merits of appellants’ first question
presented relating to whether the Board breached a contract with appellants for the Spring
2003 semester’s tuition.
IV.  Conclusion
We hold that the Board may avail itself of the defense of sovereign immunity in the
case sub judice.  Md. Code (1978, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 12-104 (b)(3) of the Education Article,
which authorizes the Board of Regents to “[s]ue and be sued,” does not waive sovereign
immunity where the Legislature did not authorize a method of appropriating the funds for an
adverse judgment.  We additionally hold, and the trial court correctly found, that pursuant
to Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 12-201 (a) of the State Government Article, the
Board did not waive sovereign immunity because the contract was not signed by a duly
authorized person.  Finally, we reverse the trial court’s finding that sovereign immunity is
waived for all actions in which declaratory and/or injunctive relief is sought.  To hold
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otherwise would improperly extend the Glover and Jackson cases.  Accordingly, we affirm
the order of the Circuit Court in part and reverse in part.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
A F F I R M E D  
I N  
P A R T  
A N D
REVERSED IN PART.  COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANTS.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-03-000986
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 85
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
JODI STERN, ET AL.
v.
BOARD OF REGENTS, 
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF MARYLAND, 
ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.,
 which Bell, C.J., joins
______________________________________
Filed:   April 12, 2004
1 It is not for this Court, or any court, to second-guess the Executive decisions made
by the Board of Regents as to how best to meet the financial crisis it faced.  It should be
noted, however, that the prospect of significant reductions in the University’s budget was
known to the Board as early as October, 2002.  The University concedes in its brief that
“[t]he likelihood of budget cuts to the University System of Maryland (“USM”) was
discussed at meetings of the USM presidents and Board of Regents in October and early
November, 2002” and that “[v]arious cost containment actions, such as an expanded hiring
freeze, staff furloughs, lay-offs, tuition increases, and deferral or cancellation of various
operating expenses, were mentioned during these discussions.”  (Emphasis added).  If the
Board had even tentatively in mind exercising the authority reserved in its various catalogs
to raise tuition for the spring semester, it could have alerted the students to that possibility
long before January 8, 2003, and, if necessary, put a warning to that effect on the registration
statements and bills.  That would have avoided entirely any legitimate claim of breach of
contract, as the students would have registered for the spring semester with that prospect in
mind.
With respect, I dissent.  I understand full well the financial dilemma that faced the
Board of Regents when it was informed of the impending $36 million budget reduction on
December 23, 2002.  By the time the Board of Regents and the nine colleges opted to resolve
that dilemma by increasing tuition for the spring semester, however, the University, through
its colleges, had entered into clear written contracts with the students setting forth the fees
that were to be charged for the spring semester, and the University, in my view, is not
permitted to deal with its financial problem by breaching those contracts.1
The core complaint of the students which to me, has merit is that, (1) through a
combination of related documents, written contracts were entered into with the students, (2)
the contracts were within the scope of Maryland Code, § 12-201 of the State Government
Article, (3) the University has breached those contracts by raising the prices called for in the
contracts, and (4) the University is precluded by §12-201 from raising the defense of
sovereign immunity to the students’ claims for breach of contract.  The University is not
2 Although the contracts may have been with the individual colleges, I shall, for
convenience, regard them as being with the University and treat the University in all respects
as the contracting party.
-2-
permitted to breach its contracts, and it remains liable for having done so.2 
The real issue is whether the University, through its colleges, entered into express
written contracts with the students, executed by an official or employee of the University
acting within the scope of the person’s authority.  I believe that it did.  
A written contract can arise from several writings; it does not need to be on one piece
of paper that all parties sign.  As we held in Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 637, 217 A.2d
531, 545 (1966):
 “A contract need not be evidenced by a single instrument.
Where several instruments are made a part of a single
transaction they will all be read and construed together as
evidencing the intention of the parties in regard to the single
transaction.  This is true even though the instruments were
executed at different times and do not in terms refer to each
other.”
Thus, if A, in writing, advertises its willingness to sell widgets for $10/widget, and
B, in response, offers in writing to purchase 100 widgets at that price, and A responds, in
writing, that B’s order for 100 widgets has been received and accepted, the parties have a
written, enforceable, executory contract.  A is required to deliver the widgets at the accepted
price, and B is obligated to pay the $1,000.  That is simple Hornbook contract law and is
essentially what occurred here, although it was a service, rather than a product, that was
offered and accepted at a set price.
-3-
I start with the fact that, after satisfying admission requirements, the plaintiffs were
duly and formally admitted as students of the University and thus became eligible to register
for courses offered by the University.  The catalogs published by the University described
the available courses with sufficient definiteness that both the University and the students
knew what was being offered.  The catalogs also informed the students of the tuition and
other fees that would be charged.  Those charges, the University concedes in its brief, were
set by the Board of Regents.  The catalogs constituted, in a contract sense, an invitation to
the students to bid.
By formally registering for offered courses, in light of the quoted tuition and fees
pertaining to such registration, the students did, indeed, bid.  When their registrations were
accepted by the University, in writing and on its official form, and bills were sent, in writing
and on the University’s official form, showing the courses for which the students had
registered and the amounts due by reason of that registration, written contracts arose.  At that
point, the students had a contractual right to attend those courses and, if completed
successfully, to be given credit for them toward a degree.  At that point, subject to its own
policies regarding withdrawals, which formed part of the contract, the University had a
contractual right to payment.  A perfected and enforceable contract was then in place.
Brushing all this fundamental contract law aside, the Court denies relief essentially
on four grounds: (1) the University reserved the right in its catalogs to change the quoted
tuition and fees; (2) the contracts were implied, rather than express, ones and implied
3 Indeed, the Court’s approach would allow even more egregious breaches.  Suppose,
instead of raising tuition after registration had been completed, the Board of Regents decided
to deal with the financial crisis by shutting down Bowie State University or one of the Law
Schools for the spring semester, but yet retain the tuition paid by the students for that
semester.  Would the Court hold that the students could not recover their tuition because of
the University’s sovereign immunity – that there was no enforceable contract?  If not, how
would the Court distinguish that circumstance from the one now before us?
-4-
contracts are not within the ambit of § 12-201; (3) the contracts were not “executed” by an
official or employee of the University, and (4) there are no funds to pay any refunds to the
students.  None of those grounds, in my view, has any merit.  
It is true that, in its various catalogs, the University indicated that quoted tuition and
fees were subject to change, although none of the catalogs suggested that changes could be
made after registration was complete and bills had been sent and paid. At oral argument, the
University noted that there was no time limit on when changes could be made and suggested
that tuition could be increased even after the semester had started, and possibly after it ended.
Under the University’s theory, the University could raise tuition for the spring semester
retroactively, at the end of May, and presumably deny the students course credit if the
increased amount was not paid.  I doubt that the Court, upon clear reflection, would approve
of that, yet it follows inexorably from the Court’s position that there is no enforceable
contract.3  I would hold that the ability to increase tuition or fees ended when registration for
the spring semester courses occurred and a bill for that semester was sent.  That is when the
contract was formed; that is when the ability to change its terms ended.
The Court does not explain, and I am at a loss to understand, why the contracts are
-5-
implied, rather than express ones.  In County Comm’rs of Caroline County v. J. Roland
Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83, 94, 747 A.2d 600, 606 (2000), we adopted the definition
of “express contract” found in Black’s Law Dictionary 323 (6th ed. 1990): “an actual
agreement of the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of
making it, being stated in distinct and explicit language, either orally or in writing.”  We
accepted as well the statement from Klebe v. United States, 263 U.S. 188, 192, 44 S. Ct. 58,
59, 68 L. Ed. 244, 247 (1923) that “[a] contract implied in fact is one inferred from the
circumstances or acts of the parties; but an express contract speaks for itself and leaves no
place for implications.”  
Under those definitions, I would hold the contracts here to be express ones.  No term
is missing or left to implication; no agreement is left to implication.  Through the acceptance
of the registrations and the sending of the bills, the University has expressly committed itself
to accept the students into the courses for which they registered at the prices stated on the
bills.  Nothing is left to extrinsic proof.  The documents themselves, on their face, evidence
the contracts and contain all of the necessary terms.  If the University were to sue a student
for non-payment of the fees, all it would have to produce to establish an express contract
would be the registration form and the bill, and possibly the catalog.  
The Court holds that the contracts were not signed by anyone, and, for that reason, do
not fall within the ambit of § 12-201.  The statute does not require an actual signature by
anyone, but only that the contract be “executed for the State” by an authorized official or
-6-
employee.  In Porter v. General Boiler Casing Co., 284 Md. 402, 410, 396 A.2d 1090, 1095
(1979), we held, explicitly, that “a signature is not required in order to bring a contract into
existence, nor is a signature always necessary to the execution of a written contract.  The
purpose of a signature is to demonstrate ‘mutuality or assent’ which could as well be shown
by the conduct of the parties.”  (Emphasis added).  Quoting 1 A. Corbin, Contracts §31 at
114 (1963), we added that, at common law, the making of a valid contract did not require a
writing at all, “and even if there is a writing, there need be no signatures unless the parties
have made them necessary at the time they expressed their assent and as a condition
modifying that assent.”  Porter, supra, at 410-11, 396 A.2d at 1095.
I recognize that the waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity in breach of contract
actions was a somewhat limited one, in that the Legislature attached a number of conditions
to it, and that the Court should not extend that waiver beyond what was expressed by the
Legislature.  It is clear from the legislative history of §12-201, however, that the waiver was
intended to be remedial in nature (see Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates,        Md.      
,       A.2d         (S.T. 2003, No. 77, Op. filed April 9 , 2004)) – to correct what the Legislature
regarded as the injustice of allowing the State and its agencies, with impunity, to breach
solemn contracts that they had made – so there needs to be some balance in interpretation.
If the Legislature intended to restrict the waiver to contracts personally signed by someone
in authority, it would have said so, but it did not say so.  The University has never even
suggested, much less argued, that any of the documents that, to me, form the contract, were
4 It is important to note that, when the complaint was filed, the predominant remedy
sought was injunctive relief to preclude the University from charging the extra fees.  Had that
relief been granted, as it should have been, prior to the students being forced to pay the extra
tuition, no monetary judgment, or, at worst, a limited one, would have been necessary and
the issue of available appropriations to pay any judgment would probably not have arisen.
In any event, as to those students who have since paid the extra tuition, § 12-203 requires the
Governor to include in the budget bill money that is adequate to satisfy final judgments.  See
Maryland Constitution, Art. III, §52(4) and (12). Even if that is done in succeeding years, as
necessarily it must at this point, there will be funds available to discharge any judgments.
-7-
not prepared and issued by officials or employees who were authorized to do so, and, in the
absence of any evidence to that end, we may presume that they were so prepared and issued,
especially as they are all on University forms, many containing the University or college seal.
Finally, as to the sovereign immunity issue, the University acknowledges, as it must,
that the Legislature has authorized it to be sued, not that such express authorization is any
longer necessary with respect to contracts falling within the ambit of §12-201.  Section 12-
203 of the State Government Article requires the Governor to place sufficient funds in the
State budget to discharge the University’s obligation.  All of the necessary pieces, even under
a University of Maryland v. Maas analysis, are thus in place.  The Court briefly
acknowledges the existence of §12-203, but takes no account of it, noting only that no such
provision appears in the Education Article of the Code.  So what?  No other statute is
necessary.4   
I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand for further proceedings
to formulate a judgment that would honor and enforce the contracts with the students.  
Chief Judge Bell authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.
-8-