Title: Logan v. City Council of the City of Roanoke

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JACQULYN C. LOGAN, ET AL.  
 
v.   Record No. 070371    
 
    OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
               April 18, 2008 
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY 
OF ROANOKE, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Charles N. Dorsey, Judge 
 
The primary issue we decide in this appeal is whether Code 
§ 15.2-2255 permits a local governing body to delegate to a 
planning commission or other agent the authority under a 
subdivision ordinance to grant exceptions involving public 
improvements.  We also consider the issue whether certain 
provisions in the Roanoke City Subdivision Ordinance1 (the 
Subdivision Ordinance) provided adequate standards, in 
compliance with Code § 15.2-2242(1), for rendering 
discretionary decisions granting exceptions under that 
Ordinance.  Finally, we consider whether neighboring landowners 
may seek a declaratory judgment regarding a locality’s 
application of a subdivision ordinance. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                     
1 All references to the Roanoke City Subdivision Ordinance 
contained in this opinion relate to the Ordinance as it was 
written in 2004, because the parties and the circuit court 
relied exclusively on this version of the Ordinance when the 
case was decided by the circuit court.  Since 2004, the 
Ordinance has been renumbered and portions have been amended.  
 
1
 
In 2004, George Leonard Boone, president of Boone Homes, 
Inc., a land development company, began working with officials 
from the City of Roanoke (the City) to obtain approval of a 
subdivision plat providing for the construction of about 60 
single-family homes in southern Roanoke.  Boone planned to 
build this housing development, known as “Wilton,” on about 50 
acres of mountainous land. 
 
Boone worked with R. Brian Townsend, the City’s Director 
of Planning, Building, and Economic Development, to obtain 
approval of the Wilton subdivision plat.  Townsend was the 
subdivision agent authorized by the City Council and the City 
Planning Commission, under former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-
5(a)2 and 31-65,3 to make decisions regarding exceptions to the 
Subdivision Ordinance. 
 
In December 2004, Townsend conditionally approved a 
portion of the subdivision plat for the Wilton development.  
The approved portion of the plat incorporated the following 
exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance requirements: 1) an 
exception from the 10% maximum grade requirement for local 
streets, as set forth in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-70, 
to allow for a maximum grade of 16% for one local street; 2) an 
                     
2 Under current Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-600, the City 
Planning Commission is authorized to elect an agent to 
administer and enforce the Ordinance. 
3 Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-210 is the current provision 
that permits an agent to grant exceptions to the Ordinance. 
 
2
exception from the minimum requirement for local streets of a 
30-foot-wide paved surface, as set forth in former Subdivision 
Ordinance § 31-90(b),4 to permit several streets 22 feet in 
width; 3) an exception from the maximum length for cul-de-sac 
streets of 600 feet, as set forth in former Subdivision 
Ordinance § 31-70, to permit a cul-de-sac street of 1800 feet; 
and 4) permission to construct street blocks up to a maximum 
length of 1800 feet, a departure from former Subdivision 
Ordinance § 31-67,5 which states that blocks longer than 1200 
feet, or less than 360 feet, “may be cause for disapproval of 
the preliminary plat.” 
 
Boone requested several of these exceptions in order to 
construct an access road, named Wilton Park Drive, leading into 
the Wilton development.  Under Boone’s plan, Wilton Park Drive 
would intersect with Peakwood Drive, an existing main road in a 
residential area of the City known as Prospect Hills.  To 
construct Wilton Park Drive, Boone planned to demolish a house 
he owned on a one-acre lot that connects the Wilton property 
with Peakwood Drive and construct the entry to Wilton Park 
Drive on that lot.  The proposed Wilton Park Drive would have a 
downward grade of 16% and, like all the proposed roads in the 
                     
4 Current Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-400 provides 
requirements for the width of paved streets. 
5 Current Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-301 addresses 
interconnected systems of streets and the “maximum street 
length between such connections.” 
 
3
Wilton subdivision, would end in a cul-de-sac. 
 
In October 2005, Jacqulyn C. Logan and 15 additional 
landowners who own homes on Peakwood Drive near the proposed 
Wilton subdivision filed a bill of complaint for declaratory 
judgment against the Roanoke City Council, the City Planning 
Commission, Townsend, and Boone Homes, Inc. (collectively, the 
defendants).  Logan and the additional complainants 
(collectively, Logan) alleged that Peakwood Drive, a curved 
road located on a mountainside, would be “unsafe and 
inappropriate” for the additional vehicle traffic that would 
result from construction of the Wilton subdivision. 
 
Logan also alleged in the bill of complaint that the 
Subdivision Ordinance was both facially invalid and invalid as 
applied to the approval of the Wilton subdivision plat.  Logan 
asserted the following particular claims relevant to this 
appeal: 1) former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90(b) 
were unlawful because they stated less stringent standards for 
granting exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance than the 
standards provided in Code § 15.2-2242(1); 2) in violation of 
Code § 15.2-2255, the City Council improperly delegated to its 
subdivision agent the authority to grant exceptions under the 
Subdivision Ordinance involving public improvements; 3) former 
Subdivision Ordinance §§ 65 and -90(b) failed to provide 
adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent’s decisions 
 
4
whether to grant exceptions under the Ordinance; 4) the 
subdivision agent lacked authority under Code §§ 15.2-2242 and 
–2255 to grant exceptions relating to public improvements; 5) 
the subdivision agent acted arbitrarily and capriciously when 
he granted the exceptions; and 6) the approval of plans for 
proposed Wilton Park Drive violated former Subdivision 
Ordinance § 31-86 because the plans would alter the boundaries 
of lots in Prospect Hills and would alter Peakwood Drive. 
 
The defendants filed demurrers to the bill of complaint.  
The circuit court sustained the demurrers regarding Logan’s 
claims one, two, and four, as listed above, and granted Logan 
leave to amend those claims. 
 
After Logan filed an amended bill of complaint, the 
defendants again filed demurrers.  Among other things, the 
defendants contended that Logan did not have a private right of 
action to challenge enforcement of the Subdivision Ordinance as 
applied to the Wilton subdivision plat.  The circuit court held 
that the amended bill of complaint was not significantly 
different from Logan’s original pleading, and again sustained 
the demurrers regarding claims one, two, and four. 
 
The case proceeded to a five-day bench trial, in which the 
circuit court heard evidence relating to each of the granted 
                     
6 The current Subdivision Ordinance does not contain a 
provision that specifically addresses boundary line relocation.  
 
5
exceptions.  Following the trial, in a letter opinion, the 
circuit court dismissed Logan’s remaining claims.  The circuit 
court held that Logan could seek a declaratory judgment under 
Code § 8.01-184 to determine the adequacy of standards for 
granting exceptions under the Subdivision Ordinance, and the 
propriety of the particular decisions Townsend made concerning 
the Wilton subdivision plat.  The circuit court concluded that 
former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90 contained 
definite and sufficient standards under Code § 15.2-2242(1) to 
guide the subdivision agent in exercising his discretion under 
those provisions.  The circuit court also held that Logan 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
subdivision agent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner 
in granting the challenged exceptions. 
 
We awarded Logan this appeal.  We also granted the 
defendants’ assignments of cross-error, in which they assert 
that Logan did not have a right of action to challenge the 
subdivision agent’s application of the Subdivision Ordinance in 
approving the Wilton subdivision plat. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Delegation of Authority to Subdivision Agent 
Logan argues that the City Council was prohibited by Code 
§ 15.2-2255 from adopting a provision in its Subdivision 
Ordinance that delegated to its subdivision agent the authority 
 
6
to approve exceptions involving public improvements.  The 
statute provides: 
The administration and enforcement of subdivision 
regulations insofar as they pertain to public improvements 
as authorized in §§ 15.2-2241 through 15.2-2245 shall be 
vested in the governing body of the locality in which the 
improvements are or will be located.  
 
Except as provided above, the governing body shall be 
responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions 
of the subdivision regulations through its local planning 
commission or otherwise. 
 
Code § 15.2-2255. 
Relying on the Dillon Rule of strict construction, Logan 
contends that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 removes 
the category of public improvements from the general authority 
of a local governing body to delegate matters concerning the 
application and enforcement of its subdivision ordinance.  
Thus, Logan contends that only a local governing body, not its 
designated agent, may grant exceptions pertaining to public 
improvements as part of the subdivision plat approval process. 
 
In response, the defendants contend that the first 
paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 addresses situations in which 
real property is subject to the subdivision ordinances of both 
a county and a municipality.  According to the defendants, in 
such situations, the administration and enforcement of 
subdivision ordinance provisions pertaining to public 
improvements shall be vested in the governing body of the 
 
7
locality in which the improvements are located.  Thus, the 
defendants assert that because approval of the Wilton 
subdivision plat did not involve public improvements located in 
more than one jurisdiction, this statutory provision did not 
prevent the City from delegating to Townsend the authority to 
grant exceptions relating to public improvements proposed for 
the Wilton subdivision.  We agree with the defendants’ 
arguments. 
 
We examine the language of Code § 15.2-2255 in the context 
of related statutes that also address the application and 
enforcement of subdivision ordinances.  Our consideration of 
the various statutes involves a pure question of law, which we 
determine de novo on appeal.  Miller v. Highland County, 274 
Va. 355, 364, 650 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2007); Budd v. Punyanitya, 
273 Va. 583, 591, 643 S.E.2d 180, 184 (2007); Boynton v. 
Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006).  The 
central focus of our analysis is to ascertain and give effect 
to the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the provisions 
concerning subdivision ordinances adopted by localities.  See 
Miller, 274 Va. at 364, 650 S.E.2d at 535; Boynton, 271 Va. at 
227, 623 S.E.2d at 925; Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 
544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003). 
We determine the General Assembly’s intent from the words 
employed in the statutes.  Miller, 274 Va. at 364, 650 S.E.2d 
 
8
at 535; Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2d 127, 
129 (2005); Horner v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 268 Va. 187, 192, 
597 S.E.2d 202, 204 (2004).  We may not add words to a statute 
or ignore any of the actual statutory language.  Purce v. 
Patterson, 275 Va. 190, 194, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (2008); BBF, 
Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331, 645 S.E.2d 467, 
469 (2007).  Thus, we presume that every part of a statute has 
some effect, and we will not consider any portion meaningless 
unless absolutely necessary.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 
630, 634, 652 S.E.2d 111, 113 (2007); Level 3 Commcn’s of Va., 
Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 268 Va. 471, 477-78, 604 S.E.2d 71, 
74 (2004); Department of Medical Assistance Servs. v. Beverly 
Healthcare of Fredericksburg, 268 Va. 278, 285, 601 S.E.2d 604, 
608 (2004); Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 340-
41, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998).  Additionally, because the 
several statutes we consider impact the same subject, we 
harmonize their provisions whenever possible.  Peerless Ins. 
Co. v. County of Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483 
(2007); Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 
423, 439-40, 621 S.E.2d 78, 87 (2005); Capelle v. Orange 
County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005). 
We disagree with Logan’s argument that the first paragraph 
of Code § 15.2-2255 is intended to restrict a governing body’s 
power to delegate the administration and enforcement of 
 
9
subdivision regulations pertaining to public improvements.  
Such a construction would render meaningless the phrase “in 
which the improvements are or will be located.” 
Instead, we conclude that the first paragraph of the 
statute is intended to address situations in which existing or 
proposed public improvements may be subject to the subdivision 
ordinances of more than one locality.  Such circumstances may 
arise under the provisions of Code §§ 15.2-2248 and –2249.  
Under Code § 15.2-2248, in five specified counties, the 
subdivision regulations adopted by a municipality located 
within those counties shall apply in certain circumstances 
beyond the municipality’s corporate limits into unincorporated 
regions of the county, if the municipal ordinance so provides.  
However, under Code § 15.2-2249, the subdivision regulations 
adopted by the local governing bodies of these five counties 
shall apply in all unincorporated areas of those counties, 
including those areas over which a municipality may extend the 
application of its subdivision ordinance, provided that any 
such municipality has been given the opportunity to approve or 
disapprove the county’s proposed regulations.   
 
The General Assembly specifically contemplated that 
disagreements could arise under these provisions regarding 
whether the regulations of a county or a municipality should be 
applicable to a given area.  To address this problem, Code 
 
10
§ 15.2-2250 permits a municipality or a county, or both these 
parties, to petition the circuit court for the county in which 
the major part of the disputed territory lies, and the circuit 
court “shall hear the matter and enter an appropriate order.”  
Id. 
 
Viewed in the context of these statutes, the legislative 
intent of Code § 15.2-2255 is plain.  We conclude that the 
General Assembly intended to make certain that control over the 
development of public improvements not be subject to 
uncertainty on the part of local officials or to an unresolved 
dispute between a county and a municipality.  By enacting Code 
§ 15.2-2255, the General Assembly specified that with regard to 
public improvements authorized by the subdivision ordinance 
enabling statutes, the administration and enforcement of 
subdivision regulations will be controlled by the governing 
body in which the improvements are or will be located.  
Accordingly, this provision removes any uncertainty regarding 
which jurisdiction shall exercise control over present and 
proposed public improvements physically located in a given 
jurisdiction. 
 
In view of this statutory purpose, we hold that the first 
paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 does not reflect a legislative 
intent to prevent a local governing body from delegating to an 
agent the responsibility to administer and enforce subdivision 
 
11
regulations pertaining to public improvements within that 
locality.  In fact, such delegation is expressly authorized by 
the second paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255, subject to the 
restrictions imposed by the first paragraph concerning public 
improvements that may be within the joint control of more than 
one locality. 
Our conclusion is not altered by Logan’s argument that the 
Dillon Rule of strict construction prohibits this result.  
Under the Dillon Rule, municipal corporations and counties 
possess and may exercise only those powers expressly granted by 
the General Assembly, powers necessarily or fairly implied from 
such express powers, and those powers that are essential and 
indispensable.  Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 408 
n.3, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 n.3 (2004); Arlington Co. v. White, 
259 Va. 708, 712, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2000); Board of 
Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 503, 522 
S.E.2d 610, 613 (1999); County of Fairfax v. Southern Iron 
Works, Inc., 242 Va. 435, 448, 410 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1991).  
Here, the City Council’s delegation of authority to its 
subdivision agent was expressly authorized by the second 
paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255.  Therefore, the City did not 
violate the Dillon Rule by delegating authority to its 
subdivision agent to administer and enforce the provisions of 
the Subdivision Ordinance pertaining to public improvements. 
 
12
B. Adequacy of Subdivision Ordinance Standards 
Logan argues that the former Subdivision Ordinance did not 
comply with the provisions of Code § 15.2-2242(1), which permit 
local governing bodies to adopt procedures for granting 
exceptions under their subdivision ordinances.  Logan contends 
that the former Subdivision Ordinance failed to articulate 
standards required by Code § 15.2-2242(1) to guide decisions 
regarding the approval of exceptions.  According to Logan, the 
evaluative factors listed in former Subdivision Ordinance 
§§ 31-65 and –90(b) provided little or no guidance for the 
granting of exceptions.  Logan also contends that the language 
in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67 regarding block lengths 
lacked any substantive standard for permitting an exception 
under that section.   
Initially, we do not consider Logan’s argument that former 
Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67 was facially invalid because it 
lacked any standard to guide administrative review of its 
provisions.  Logan did not make such an allegation in her 
amended bill of complaint and, therefore, the issue was not 
properly before the circuit court and is not before us in this 
appeal.  See Board of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 
538, 587 S.E.2d 570, 578-79 (2003); Jenkins v. Bay House 
Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43, 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003).  
Accordingly, we confine our review to Logan’s remaining 
 
13
allegations that former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and –
90(b) were facially invalid. 
In considering Logan’s argument, we observe that the 
General Assembly has required that all local governing bodies 
adopt subdivision ordinances.  Code § 15.2-2240.  Those 
subdivision ordinances must include the provisions specified in 
Code § 15.2-2241, and may contain certain optional provisions 
set forth in Code § 15.2-2242. 
The language of Code § 15.2-2242(1), which details one 
such optional provision, states that a subdivision ordinance 
may include provisions for “variations in or exceptions to the 
general regulations of the subdivision ordinance in cases of 
unusual situations or when strict adherence to the general 
regulations would result in substantial injustice or hardship.”  
Under this authority, the City Council included several 
provisions in the former Subdivision Ordinance authorizing the 
subdivision agent to grant exceptions to the Ordinance’s 
requirements. 
When a legislative body delegates its authority to an 
administrative agent, that body must prescribe sufficient 
standards to guide the administrator in exercising the 
delegated authority.  Bell v. Dorey Electric Co., 248 Va. 378, 
382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1994); Ours Properties, Inc. v. Ley, 
198 Va. 848, 851-53, 96 S.E.2d 754, 756-58 (1957).  Therefore, 
 
14
we consider whether former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and –
90(b) prescribe sufficient standards to guide the subdivision 
agent’s decision whether to grant exceptions under those 
sections. 
Former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65, entitled “General 
requirements; exceptions from article,” provided: 
The arrangement of lots, character of the subdivision, and 
extent, width, grade and location of all streets shall 
conform to the officially adopted master plan or parts, 
divisions or sections thereof and shall be considered in 
their relation to existing and planned streets, 
topographical conditions and public convenience and 
safety, and in their appropriate relation to the proposed 
uses of adjacent land; provided, however, that the agent 
may determine that the size or shape of the land, 
topography, proposed land use or other special conditions 
make compliance with all provisions of this article 
impractical and may make exceptions to provisions 
contained herein, provided such exceptions are not in 
conflict with provisions of other city ordinances.  
 
Because former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 did not 
define the term “impractical,” we employ the general definition 
of that word in considering the adequacy of the stated 
standards.  See Adams Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 274 Va. 189, 196, 645 S.E.2d 271, 275 (2007); Hoffman 
Family, L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 272 Va. 274, 284, 634 
S.E.2d 722, 727 (2006).  The word “impractical” is defined as 
“incapable of being put into use or effect or of being 
accomplished or done successfully or without extreme trouble, 
 
15
hardship, or expense.”  See Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1136 (1993). 
We also observe that former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-
90(b) required that local streets have a minimum paved width of 
30 feet.  However, this section also provided for an exception 
to that requirement, stating that “[i]n cases where the cross 
slope will not permit a greater width,” the agent may modify 
the minimum paved width requirement “in a manner that will 
result in the best possible utilization of the land to be 
subdivided, giving consideration to the topography of the land 
and general character and density of the proposed subdivision.” 
Upon our review, we hold that former Subdivision Ordinance 
§§ 31-65 and –90(b) prescribed adequate standards for the 
subdivision agent’s exercise of delegated authority consistent 
with the directive of Code § 15.2-2242(1).  The subdivision 
agent was required to consider several factors under former 
Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 before granting an exception to 
the stated ordinance requirements.  That section also 
prohibited the agent from granting an exception to an ordinance 
requirement if the exception would be in conflict with any 
provision of any city ordinance. 
Absent such a conflict, former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-
65 permitted the subdivision agent to grant an exception based 
on such factors as the size or shape of the parcel, its 
 
16
topography, the proposed land use, or other special conditions 
upon determining that compliance with the general subdivision 
ordinance requirements would be “impractical.”  Under former 
Subdivision Ordinance § 31-90(b), the agent could not permit an 
exception from the minimum width requirement of 30 feet for 
paved local streets unless a situation presented by a “cross 
slope” indicated that such an exception was needed.  This 
section further required that the agent consider the topography 
and character of the subdivision to achieve the best 
utilization of the land.  Thus, we hold that the circuit court 
did not err in concluding that these provisions contained 
adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent’s decisions 
whether to grant the allowable exceptions. 
C. Agent’s Application of Subdivision Ordinance 
The defendants argue as a matter of cross-error that Logan 
did not have a right to file a declaratory judgment action 
challenging Townsend’s application of the Subdivision Ordinance 
in granting exceptions for the Wilton subdivision.  According 
to the defendants, our holdings in Shilling v. Jimenez, 268 Va. 
202, 597 S.E.2d 206 (2004), and Miller v. Highland County, 274 
Va. 355, 650 S.E.2d 532 (2007), require that we dismiss this 
portion of Logan’s appeal.  
 
In response, Logan asserts that the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, Code §§ 8.01-184 through -191, permits her present 
 
17
challenge to Townsend’s application of the Subdivision 
Ordinance.  Logan contends that her case may be distinguished 
from the proceedings in Shilling, which did not include the 
locality as a party defendant but involved a neighboring 
landowner’s suit against an adjoining property owner.  Logan 
further maintains that our decision in Shilling is not 
controlling because in that case, we did not address a 
subdivision agent’s interpretation of an ordinance or an 
agent’s allegedly arbitrary and capricious actions granting 
exceptions to that ordinance.  We disagree with Logan’s 
arguments. 
 
In Shilling, we considered the issue whether the 
declaratory judgment statutes may be used to maintain a third-
party challenge to a government action when such challenge is 
not authorized by statute.  The complainants in Shilling filed 
a declaratory judgment action requesting that a circuit court 
declare void the creation of a certain “family subdivision” 
approved under an ordinance allowing conveyances to members of 
a landowner’s immediate family.  268 Va. at 205-06, 597 S.E.2d 
at 208.  The neighboring landowners alleged that local 
officials wrongfully approved the subdivision based on factual 
misrepresentations made by the applicant.  Id. 
 
The defendants filed demurrers alleging that the local 
governing body was the sole entity authorized to enforce the 
 
18
ordinance, and that the complainants could not seek to enforce 
the ordinance provisions by employing the remedy of declaratory 
judgment.  The circuit court sustained the demurrers and 
dismissed the bill of complaint with prejudice.  Id. at 206, 
597 S.E.2d at 208.  We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, 
holding that the complainants, who were strangers to the 
subdivision approval process, did not have a third-party right 
of action to enforce the locality’s application of its 
subdivision ordinance in a declaratory judgment suit, because 
no statute granted third parties this right.  Id. at 208, 597 
S.E.2d at 209-10. 
 
Three years after our decision in Shilling, we were asked 
in Miller to consider the complainants’ attempted use of the 
declaratory judgment statutes to challenge a planning 
commission’s determination that that a conditional use permit 
was in “substantial accord” with the locality’s comprehensive 
plan.  274 Va. at 368-69, 650 S.E.2d at 538; see also Code 
§ 15.2-2232.  We held that the complainants failed to assert a 
valid request for declaratory relief because no statute 
specifically authorized such a right of action.  Miller, 274 
Va. at 371-72, 650 S.E.2d at 540. 
We explained that the purpose of the declaratory judgment 
statutes is to provide a mechanism for obtaining preventive 
relief to resolve controversies involving legal rights, without 
 
19
requiring one party to invade the asserted rights of another in 
order to allow an ordinary civil action for damages.  Miller, 
274 Va. at 370, 650 S.E.2d at 539; Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. 
Mill Two Assocs. P’ship, 259 Va. 685, 693, 529 S.E.2d 318, 323 
(2000); Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 592, 318 
S.E.2d 407, 413 (1984).  We emphasized that our declaratory 
judgment statutes “do not create or alter any substantive 
rights, or bring any other additional rights into being.”  
Miller, 274 Va. at 370, 650 S.E.2d at 539; accord Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 419, 177 S.E.2d 519, 
522 (1970). 
 
We conclude that the holdings in Shilling and Miller 
require dismissal of the part of Logan’s appeal challenging 
Townsend’s application of the Subdivision Ordinance to the 
proposed Wilton subdivision.  Like the complainants in those 
two cases, Logan has attempted to use the declaratory judgment 
statutes to create a right of appeal to the circuit courts that 
does not otherwise exist.  Because the declaratory judgment 
statutes do not create such rights, and in the absence of 
statutory authority granting her a right of appeal to actions 
taken under the Subdivision Ordinance, Logan remained a 
stranger to the subdivision approval process and was not 
authorized to challenge Townsend’s actions under that 
 
20
Ordinance.7  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
concluding that Logan had a third-party right of action to 
challenge the City’s approval of the Wilton subdivision plat, 
and that this part of Logan’s appeal must be dismissed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on our holdings in this appeal, we will affirm the 
part of the circuit court’s judgment concluding that the City 
lawfully delegated authority to its subdivision agent to 
administer and enforce the provisions of the Subdivision 
Ordinance pertaining to public improvements.  We also will 
affirm the part of the circuit court’s judgment holding that 
former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and –90(b) provided 
adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent’s exercise of 
discretion in granting exceptions allowed under those Ordinance 
provisions.  We will enter final judgment in favor of the 
defendants on these parts of the circuit court’s judgment. 
                     
7 We observe that, in one of her assignments of error, 
Logan challenged the circuit court’s “ruling that [former] City 
Code § 31-8 permitted Townsend to approve a change to the 
boundaries of a lot, even though the purpose and effect of the 
change was to add a new intersection to, and thus physically 
alter, Peakwood Drive.”  Logan did not assign error, however, 
on the separate basis that approval of the changes to Peakwood 
Drive violated Code § 15.2-2275, which, among other things, 
prohibits a locality from allowing under its subdivision 
ordinance the alteration of a boundary line of a lot when that 
action “involve[s] the relocation or alteration of streets, 
alleys, easements for public passage, or other public areas.”  
Therefore, we do not consider the impact of Code § 15.2-2275 on 
the actions relating to Peakwood Drive taken pursuant to the 
former Subdivision Ordinance.   
 
21
 
22
We will reverse the part of the circuit court’s judgment 
holding that Logan was entitled to seek a declaratory judgment 
regarding the subdivision agent’s application of the former 
Subdivision Ordinance to the proposed Wilton subdivision, and 
we will enter final judgment in favor of the defendants on this 
part of the circuit court’s judgment.  Accordingly, we also 
will vacate the part of the circuit court’s judgment regarding 
the subdivision agent’s application of the former Subdivision 
Ordinance, and we will dismiss the portion of Logan’s appeal 
addressing that part of the circuit court’s judgment. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
vacated in part, dismissed in part, 
    and final judgment.