Title: State Transp. Com'n of Wyoming v. Ford

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State Transp. Com'n of Wyoming v. Ford1992 WY 187844 P.2d 496Case Number: 92-51Decided: 12/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE 
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION OF WYOMING, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
Vince FORD, 
d/b/a Quality Signs, Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofNiobraraCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen.; Michael L. Hubbard, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen.; and Sleeter C. 
Dover, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellant.

 
 
George A. 
Clarke, Lusk, and George Santini of Graves, Santini & Villemez, Cheyenne, for appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and GOLDEN, JJ. 

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the district court's order reversing the actions taken by the State 
Transportation Commission of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶2.]     We vacate the district 
court's order and remand.

 
 

[¶3.]     Vince Ford, who 
conducted his business under the name of Quality Signs, poses this 
issue:

 
 
     Absent a showing to 
the contrary, does use of separate personnel from the office of the Attorney 
General as prosecutor and hearing officer in administrative contested cases 
result in a per se biased hearing tribunal?

 
 

[¶4.]     On June 12 and 13, 
1991, the Department of Transportation (formerly the State Highway Department) 
issued written notices to Mr. Ford, apprising him that he had installed four 
outdoor advertising signs without obtaining an advertising permit. Wyo. Stat. § 24-10-107 
(1977). The notices also informed him that he would have to obtain a permit or 
the Department would remove the signs. Wyo. Stat. § 24-10-109 (Supp. 1992). They 
advised him that he could request a hearing before the Commission within fifteen 
days. Section 24-10-109(b). Mr. Ford requested a hearing, and it was scheduled 
for three o'clock in the afternoon on August 14, 1991. The hearing notice stated 
that the hearing would be held before the Commission and that Lawrence A. 
Bobbitt III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, would act as the hearing 
officer. It also stated that time constraints required that Mr. Ford's 
presentation be succinct and limited to the signs at issue. The notice did not 
specifically limit the time allowed for presentation of evidence other than 
indicating the time the hearing would begin. Mr. Ford sent the following 
correspondence to the Department:

 
 
     This is to formally 
enter the following objections to the matters as stated in your letter of July 
24, 1991.

 
 
     1. I object to Larry 
Bobbitt acting as Hearing Officer when he is also the attorney representing the 
Highway Commission.

 
 
     2. I strenuously 
object to the time of day and the length of time as stated in your 
letter.

 
 
     3. I specifically 
requested that the hearing be held before the full commission itself and I 
repeat that demand. I want the [c]ommission to be informed first hand as to what 
has transpired on these four signs.

 
 
     4. I specifically 
requested that I be given one and one-half (1 1/2) days in order that I may 
fully and properly outline my case. Any less will not give me due process. I 
again demand that the matter be heard by the full commission 
itself.

 
 
     Let me inform you 
that, if these conditions are not met, I will proceed on the assumption that the 
signs are legal, which they certainly are.

 
 

[¶5.]     By return 
correspondence, Mr. Ford was informed that Larry Donovan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, would act as the hearing officer instead of Mr. Bobbitt. The 
hearing was held as scheduled but Mr. Ford did not appear. The hearing was 
called to order by the Commission's chairman with five members being present. 
Mr. Donovan was the hearing officer, and Milo Vukelich, Assistant Attorney 
General, acted as the prosecutor for the Department. As disclosed by the 
transcript of the hearing, the Department presented its evidence, and, since Mr. 
Ford made no appearance, the hearing was closed.

 
 

[¶6.]     On September 11, 1991, 
the Commission issued findings of fact and conclusions of law which found that 
the signs were unlawful and ordered that the signs be removed within thirty days 
or they would be removed by the Department. On September 25, 1991, Mr. Ford 
filed a petition for review in the district court. The district court reversed 
the Commission on the basis that members of the Attorney General's staff could 
not serve as both the prosecutor and the "Administrative Hearing Officer." The 
Commission contends that the procedures used at its hearing comported with due 
process and seeks review of the district court's order.

 
 

[¶7.]     The district court was 
correct in its ruling to the extent that it stated that the strictures of due 
process require a fair hearing before a forum which is free from bias and 
prejudice. Armed Forces Cooperative Insuring Association v. Department of 
Insurance, 622 P.2d 1318, 1326-27 (Wyo. 1981). In Armed Forces Cooperative 
Insuring Association, we held that the appellant had the burden to prove 
impropriety on the part of the hearing body. Id. at 1327. See also Ririe v. Board of 
Trustees of School District No. One, Crook 
County, Wyoming, 674 P.2d 214 
(Wyo. 1983). 
Since Mr. Ford did not appear at the hearing, he did not make any effort to test 
the impartiality of the hearing body. Absent anything in the record to the 
contrary, we can conclude only that the Commission acted 
impartially.

 
 

[¶8.]     While we are not 
troubled with the conclusion that Mr. Ford failed to demonstrate bias or 
prejudice which required reversal, we do perceive the Attorney General's 
multiple roles in this hearing process as being problematic. The Attorney 
General is obligated to provide agencies with such services "as may be necessary 
in order for the agency to properly investigate, prepare, present and prosecute 
the contested case before the agency." Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-112(c) (1990). Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-112(e) (1990) authorizes an "independent administrative hearing officer" in 
certain circumstances, but Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-107(k) (1990) contains this 
prohibition:

 
 
Any person 
representing an agency at a hearing in a contested case in which the agency is a 
party shall not in the same case serve as presiding officer or provide ex parte 
advice regarding the case to the presiding officer or to the body or any member 
of the body comprising the decision makers.

 
 

[¶9.]     In this case, the 
Commission chairman was the presiding officer. See Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-112 
(1990). The Attorney General did not purport to act as the presiding officer 
but, rather, acted as a hearing officer or hearing advisor. The record also 
demonstrates that the Commission reached its decision on the basis of the 
evidence presented to it. Absent an on-the-record demonstration of prejudice of 
some sort or that the Attorney General provided ex parte advice to the presiding 
officer or the Commission, we are compelled to hold that the hearing conducted 
by the Commission was not fatally flawed, per se, by the use of the Attorney 
General's personnel in the capacities of prosecutor and hearing officer under 
the circumstances of this case.

 
 

[¶10.]  The appearance of impropriety, or 
certainly the occasion for concern, exists if the Attorney General prepares the 
case for an agency and then also has a pipeline to the hearing body by serving 
as the hearing officer or hearing advisor. See Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-111 (1990). The Legislature 
recently created the office of administrative hearings, and that should serve to 
relieve the concerns we have expressed above, as well as the need, or the 
perceived need, for the Attorney General to perform the functions of the hearing 
officer or hearing advisor. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-2-2201 to -2203 (Supp. 
1992).

 
 

[¶11.]  The district court's order is vacated, 
and the matter is remanded to the district court with directions that an order 
be entered affirming the Commission's decision.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
concurring, in which GOLDEN, 
Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶12.]  I concur in the decision of the court, 
but write further to explain that I would have decided this appeal based on a 
somewhat different analysis. The majority determines that a reversal cannot be 
secured because the record fails to establish any issue of impartiality. My 
concern with that approach is that the essential issue is a factual matter of 
the record. The office of the Attorney General provided both the prosecutor and 
the "independent administrative hearing officer."

 
 

[¶13.]  I would affirm the decision on the basis 
of waiver by the appellee. The hearing was regularly scheduled before the State 
Transportation Commission of Wyoming. Appropriate notice was given to appellee 
of the time and place. I would conclude that the appellee either had to appear 
at that hearing to make his objection known at that time regarding the status of 
the independent hearing officer or, by failing to appear, he waived the 
objection.

 
 

[¶14.]  The principle I espouse is that advance 
notice of a challenge to impartiality is appropriate and certainly desirable, 
but the formal ruling must be made by the deciding commission. Consequently, the 
contestant is required to appear at a scheduled hearing addressing objection on 
the record. Otherwise, in failing to appear when the challenge can be properly 
presented and decided, the right to require a decision on the challenge is 
waived.

 
 

[¶15.]  I reach the same point of departure as 
does the majority in its analysis of failure of proof, but mine is emplaced in 
waiver since the essential status from which the challenge was made results from 
uncontested facts found in this record. Consequently, I agree with the majority 
in its decision on the issues presented, except I apply a waiver impedance to 
the right of appellee to secure a reversal of the action of the commission. 
Armed Forces Co-op. Insuring Ass'n v. Department of Insurance, 622 P.2d 1318, 
1327 (Wyo. 1980); Board of Trustees, Laramie 
County School Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1976). See also Gold 
v. Board of County Com'rs of TetonCounty, 658 P.2d 690, 696 (Wyo. 
1983).

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶16.]  This must indeed have been a strange 
administrative agency hearing. There was a prosecutor from the attorney 
general's office, a hearing officer from the attorney general's office, a 
presiding officer from the commission, and the commission which was the fact 
finding and decision-making body. One wonders how the hearing officer and the 
presiding officer functioned - where did they sit, who ruled on evidentiary and 
testimonial questions and on procedure.

 
 

[¶17.]  The hearing, likened to a jury trial, was 
that the prosecutor was an attorney general; the presiding judge was an attorney 
general; the jury was the commission. The essence of the court's decision is 
that as long as the members of the commission do not also come from the office 
of the attorney general, the hearing satisfies due process and all other 
constitutional guarantees to a fair hearing. With this I cannot 
agree.

 
 

[¶18.]  I discern the issue to be not whether 
there was a waiver or whether the presiding officer and the commission were 
impartial, but whether both the prosecutor and hearing officer can be the same 
person, i.e., from the same state agency. I would hold they cannot be the same. 
I do not believe appellant must appear at a hearing before an officer who is not 
authorized to conduct the hearing, nor must he establish the bias or prejudice 
of an officer not allowed to conduct the hearing. Had appellant appeared at the 
hearing, he would have established no more than what is now in the record before 
us - that is, that the attorney general acted both as prosecutor and hearing 
officer (at least quasi-judge). Had appellant appeared at the hearing and been 
unable to show that the hearing officer was partial, biased, or prejudiced, I 
still would not allow a hearing in which the attorney general acted as both 
prosecutor and judge. This for the same reason that we do not allow the 
prosecutor and judge in our court system to be the same person or even from the 
same branch of government. Thus, the prosecutor is in the executive branch and 
the judge in the judicial branch.

 
 

[¶19.]  My writing here does not portend much for 
the future of law since, as the court points out, the establishment of the 
office of independent hearing examiner will avoid this problem arising in the 
future. However, I felt it necessary to express my views which differ from those 
of the court as stated in the court's opinion. I, therefore, 
dissent.