Title: McKinley v. Casson

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROBERT SCOTT McKINLEY and
§
DEBORAH McKINLEY, h/w,
§
No. 465, 2012
§
Plaintiffs Below,
§
Court Below:
Appellants,
§
 
 
§
Superior Court of the
v.
§
State of Delaware, in and
§
for New Castle County
 
MICHELE CASSON,
§
§
C. A. No. N10C-09-192
Defendant Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted:  August 28, 2013
Decided:  October 31, 2013
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Matthew M. Bartkowski, Esquire (argued), Kimmel, Carter, Roman & Peltz, P.A.,
Newark, Delaware for Appellants.
Beth H. Christman, Esquire (argued), Rachel D. Allen, Esquire and Deborah L.
Cuoco, Esquire, Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom and Doss, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware for Appellee.
BERGER, Justice:
In this appeal we consider several evidentiary rulings in a personal injury
action arising from a motor vehicle accident.  Among other things, appellant1
complains that the trial court erred in denying him access to appellee’s medical
records, and that the jury should not have been allowed to learn that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time of the accident.  We agree, and reverse and remand
for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural Background
On the evening of October 3, 2009, Robert McKinley and Michele Casson
were involved in a motor vehicle accident near the base of the Summit Bridge in
northern Delaware.  Casson had been driving her SUV north on Route 896 and was
preparing to cross the Summit Bridge when she became anxious due to her fear of
bridges and confined spaces.  Construction work was being done on the bridge, and
reflective orange barrels had been placed on the road to merge traffic from two
northbound lanes into one.  Casson slowed down and attempted to pull between the
construction barrels to stop on the right-hand shoulder.  Casson claims to have
slowed down gradually, whereas McKinley testified that she came to a sudden
stop.  In either event, McKinley’s motorcycle collided with the back of Casson’s
SUV.  McKinley, who was not wearing a motorcycle helmet, sustained serious
injuries.  
1 Both Robert Scott McKinley and Deborah McKinley are appellants.  But, Deborah’s claim is for
loss of consortium and is not the subject of this appeal.  Thus, we refer to appellants in the singular.
2
At the scene of the accident, Delaware State Police Corporal Robert
Downer, Jr. interviewed Casson.  He asked her, among other questions, whether
she was taking any medication at the time of the accident.  She told him that she is
afraid of bridges and takes medication for anxiety.2  Casson also said that she had
an anxiety attack and abruptly stopped at the foot of the bridge.3  Downer issued
Casson a citation for careless driving.4 
In September 2010, McKinley filed this negligence suit against Casson,
seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the collision.  Based on Casson’s
statements about her anxiety attack and medication, McKinley subpoenaed
Casson’s medical records from Dr. William Sommers, a physician who had
prescribed Casson anti-anxiety medication.  Casson moved for a protective order to
compel the return of the records and to exclude evidence of Casson’s medical
history.  The Superior Court granted her motion, finding that the records were
protected by the physician-patient privilege.  Casson then moved for summary
judgment, which the court denied.
In anticipation of trial, both parties filed motions in limine.  McKinley
moved to exclude references to his non-use of a helmet at the time of the accident. 
The court denied that motion, finding that evidence of non-use of a helmet was
2 Appellant’s Appendix, A-24.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
3
relevant to secondary assumption of the risk and mitigation of damages.  Casson
then moved to exclude all references to her prescriptions for, and use of,
medication, arguing that McKinley had improperly obtained Casson’s medical
records, and that the evidence of Casson’s medication lacked probative value.  The
court granted the motion.5  In addition, Casson  moved to allow Brandon Thomas,
an EMT who had arrived at the accident scene shortly after the collision, to testify
about the statements he had gathered from bystanders at the scene.  The court
granted that motion, finding that the bystanders’ statements are admissible under
the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay.  
At trial, McKinley called Downer to testify about his investigation of the
accident.  On cross-examination, Casson’s counsel asked Downer for his opinion
as to the point of impact based on the damage to McKinley’s motorcycle. 
McKinley objected to the question, arguing that it called for speculation and that
Downer was not qualified as an accident reconstruction expert.  The court
overruled the objection.
At the end of trial, the Superior Court issued a jury instruction on secondary
assumption of the risk and riding a motorcycle without a helmet.  The instruction
5 The court’s basis for its exclusion of references to medication is unclear from the record.  Casson
argued for exclusion both on relevance grounds and based on her assertion that McKinley had
obtained her medical records improperly.  On appeal, the parties dispute only the relevance of the
evidence of medication.  Therefore, we do not address whether the records were improperly
obtained.
4
stated:
Michele Casson has alleged that Robert McKinley voluntarily
assumed a known risk when he drove a motorcycle without a helmet. 
Michele Casson must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Robert Scott McKinley voluntarily assumed a known risk when he
drove a motorcycle without a helmet.  
If you find that Robert Scott McKinley chose to take a risk and
understood or should understand the danger associated with that risk,
then you may take that into account when considering what damages
were proximately caused by the accident.6
The jury found that Casson had not engaged in negligent conduct that proximately
caused the accident.  McKinley appealed various evidentiary rulings.  Casson
cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion for summary judgment.
Discussion
McKinley argues that the trial court erred in:  1) denying access to Casson’s
medical records; 2) granting Casson’s motion to exclude all references to her
medical condition; 3) allowing Thomas to testify about the bystanders’ statements;
4) denying McKinley’s motion to exclude all references to his failure to use a
motorcycle helmet; 5) allowing Downer to give an expert accident reconstruction
opinion; and 6) giving a jury instruction on assumption of the risk based on
McKinley’s failure to wear a helmet.  
6 Appellant’s Appendix, A-275.
5
 
Generally, this Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse
of discretion.7  If the decision turns on a question of law, however, our review is de
novo.8  
I. Medical Records
After McKinley obtained Casson’s medical records, the Superior Court
granted Casson’s motion for a protective order on two grounds.  First, the court
found that it would be unfair to invade Casson’s privacy for the purpose of
impeachment.  Because Casson denied having told Downer that she takes
medication for her fear of bridges, the jury was going to hear two versions of what
Casson told Downer.  The trial court ruled that McKinley could impeach her,
without medical records, by focusing on those inconsistencies.  Second, the trial
court found that the medical records were irrelevant because, without an expert,
McKinley could not use those records to establish that Casson had a panic attack
and stopped suddenly.  
Rule 503(b) of the Delaware Rules of Evidence (D.R.E.) establishes a
physician-patient privilege that protects a patient from having to disclose medical
records.  But there are exceptions, including the following:
There is no privilege under this rule for a communication relevant to
an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condition of the patient
in any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an
7 Wright v. State, 25 A.3d 747, 752 (Del. 2011).  
8 Ibid.
6
element of the patient's claim or defense . . . .9
The question is whether Casson relied on her anxiety as an element of her defense.
McKinley claimed that Casson negligently slammed on the brakes because
she feared bridges and had a panic attack.  According to Downer’s police report,
Casson told him that:  1) she “suddenly stopped,” 2) she has a “fear of bridges for
which [she] takes prescription medication,” and 3) she had “an anxiety attack.”10 
Casson defended against that claim by downplaying her anxieties.  At her
deposition, she specifically denied ever being prescribed medication for her fear of
bridges.11  She explained that she takes medication for epilepsy, and that she takes
valium as needed when flying because she is uncomfortable in confined spaces.12 
Casson acknowledges that her anxiety was a central issue at trial.  Yet she
argues that she did not rely on her medical condition as an element of her defense.
Generally, the mere “denial of an allegation cannot constitute a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege.”13  But Casson did not merely deny McKinley’s claim
that she has a fear of bridges.  She agreed that both bridges and confined spaces
make her nervous.  Casson also relied on her anxiety to explain why, at the time of
the accident,  she was looking for a place to pull off of the road.  At the same time,
9 D.R.E. 503(d) (3).
10 Appellant’s Appendix, A-24.
11 Id. at A-38.
12 Id. at A-154-55.
13 Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 63 (Mo. 1999); see also Dillinbeck  v. Hess, 73
N.Y.2d 278, 288 (N.Y. 1989).
7
Casson minimized the extent of her fears in an effort to refute Downer’s report that
she stopped suddenly.  In other words, Casson was affirmatively relying on facts
about her mental/emotional condition, for which she received medical treatment, as
an element of her defense.  
These circumstances support a finding that Casson waived the physician-
patient privilege.  Fairness requires this result as well.  In addressing the attorney-
client privilege, this Court noted:
[W]aiver rests on a rationale of fairness, i.e., disclosure of otherwise
privileged information by the client under circumstances where it
would be unfair to deny the other party an opportunity to discover
other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter.  The courts of
this State have refused to allow a party to make bare, factual
allegations, the veracity of which are central to resolution of the
parties’ dispute, and then assert the . . . privilege as a barrier to
prevent a full understanding of the facts disclosed.14
Here, Casson made factual assertions about the extent of her fear of bridges – not
simply to deny McKinley’s claim, but also to explain her own conduct.  By then
invoking the physician-patient privilege, she prevented McKinley from gaining “a
full understanding of the facts” of that condition.  Casson should not have been
allowed to downplay her condition to defend herself against McKinley’s
allegations and then prevent McKinley from gaining access to the only information
that could shed light on the truth of her assertions.
Even with access to Casson’s medical records, however, McKinley will need
14 Tackett v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 259 (Del. 1995) (Citations omitted).
8
an expert if he decides to use those records at a new trial.  As the trial court noted,
the jury cannot be left to speculate what a certain dosage of a specific medication
indicates about the severity of one’s anxiety.  Without the records, however, an
expert would have no basis on which to form an opinion.  In sum, the trial court
abused its discretion in denying McKinley access to the limited medical
information he requested.
II. References to Medication
McKinley next argues that the Superior Court erred in granting Casson’s
motion in limine to exclude all references to her medication at trial.  Had such
references been permitted, McKinley would have asked Downer to testify that, at
the accident scene, Casson told him she had been prescribed medication for her
fear of bridges.  Casson defends the Superior Court’s ruling by arguing that
Downer’s proposed testimony is irrelevant and prejudicial.  It may be prejudicial,
but Casson’s admission is relevant, and its probative value outweighs any
prejudice. 
Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact at issue more
probable than not.15  If Casson needs and/or takes medication to control her fear of
driving over bridges, it means that her anxiety level is higher than that of an
15 D.R.E. 401.
9
average person.16  The higher Casson’s anxiety level as she approached the bridge,
the more likely it is that she panicked and slammed on the brakes rather than
slowly pulling off to the side of the road.  Thus, the evidence is relevant.
Evidence that is relevant may be excluded, nonetheless,“if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”17  Casson says
that Downer’s testimony would have confused the jury and caused it to speculate
about the effect medication may have had on Casson’s driving.  But Casson could
have addressed any such confusion through cross-examination, thereby mitigating
any potential unfair prejudice.  McKinley’s claim turned on the jury’s
determination as to whether Casson stopped slowly or rapidly.  By excluding
evidence that Casson took medication for her fear of bridges, the trial court
severely limited McKinley’s ability to prove his claim, and abused its discretion.
III.  EMT’s Testimony
McKinley next argues that the trial court should have excluded EMT
Brandon Thomas’s testimony about bystanders’ statements made to him at the
accident scene.  Thomas testified that when he asked bystanders what had
happened, they told him that McKinley’s motorcycle had driven into the back of
Casson’s car, and that both vehicles were moving at a slow rate of speed (around
16 The jury does not need an expert to know that people generally do not need prescribed anti-anxiety
medication in order to drive over bridges.
17 D.R.E. 403.
10
ten miles per hour ) at the time of impact.18  McKinley contends that Thomas’s
testimony was inadmissible hearsay.  The trial court admitted the testimony under
the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. 
Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible.19  But, under D.R.E. 803(1),
a court need not exclude “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter.”20  A hearsay statement is admissible under this “present
sense impression” exception if it meets the following requirements:
[T]he declarant must have personally perceived the event described;
the declaration must be an explanation or description of the event,
rather than a narration; and the declaration and the event described
must be contemporaneous. The statements, however, need not be
precisely contemporaneous with the triggering event but must be in
response to it and occur within a short time after the stimulus.21
The theory underlying the exception is that “spontaneous statements
describing an event are trustworthy because the declarant has no time to fabricate
the statements and because there is less concern that the statements reflect a defect
in the declarant's memory.”22  Because such statements are deemed trustworthy
enough to admit into evidence without an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant, “corroborating evidence may be required to determine whether the
18 Appellant’s Appendix, A-226.
19 D.R.E. 802.
20 D.R.E. 803(1).
21 Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 251-52 (Del. 2001).
22 Id. at 252.
11
declarant made the statement at the time of the triggering event or whether the
declarant actually perceived the triggering event.”23
The problem here is that Thomas gathered information, and then wrote a
report describing the substance of what he had been told by all the bystanders he
interviewed.  Thomas did not write down what any one bystander said.  As a result,
Thomas did not know whether the information he obtained came from a bystander
who actually witnessed the accident, or a bystander who had heard about the
accident from someone else.  At his deposition, Thomas could not remember how
many people he spoke to at the scene, nor could he recall any of their personal
characteristics (age, race, gender, etc.).  He stated only:  “Well, one guy – well,
from what I was informed by them, they had witnessed the incident.”24  This vague
statement, on its own, is not enough to show that the declarants personally
perceived the accident.25  
No other hearsay exception applies to Thomas’s testimony.  The “medical
diagnosis or treatment” exception26 is inapplicable because, although Thomas did
ask for information from bystanders for the purpose of treating McKinley’s
injuries, the bystanders did not give their statements for the purpose of receiving
23 Ibid.
24 Appellant’s Appendix, A-128.
25 See Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d. Cir. 1985) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence of the
declarant’s personal perception must not be so scanty as to forfeit the ‘guarantees of trustworthiness’
which form the hallmark of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.”). (Citation omitted).
26 D.R.E. 803(4).
12
medical treatment themselves.  The rationale behind the exception is that “a person
seeking medical treatment is unlikely to lie to a doctor she wants to treat her, since
it is in her best interest to tell the truth.”27  That rationale does not apply to these
facts.  Finally, the residual exception does not apply because, for reasons stated
above, the hearsay statements do not have “circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.”28  Therefore, Thomas’s testimony constituted hearsay not within
any exception and should have been excluded.
IV.  References to Helmet Use
McKinley challenges the Superior Court’s decision to allow evidence that he
was not wearing a helmet when the accident occurred.  The Superior Court found
that evidence of the failure to use a helmet is relevant to secondary assumption of
the risk and mitigation of damages.  We disagree.
Secondary assumption of the risk “consists of voluntarily encountering a
known unreasonable risk which is out of proportion to the advantage gained.”29 
The doctrine is “totally subsumed within comparative negligence.”30  For
comparative negligence to apply, the trier of fact must find that “each [party] failed
to satisfy the requisite standard of care and was a proximate cause of the resultant
27 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 624 (Del. 2001) (Citations omitted).
28 D.R.E. 807.
29 Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 397-98 (Del. 1992). 
30 Id. at 398.
13
injury.”31 
In Delaware, motorcyclists over 19 years of age may ride without wearing a
helmet.32  Thus, by statute, an adult does not violate a duty to exercise reasonable
care by failing to wear a helmet.  There being no statutory requirement to wear a
helmet, the remaining question is whether there is a common law duty.  We are
aware of none, and we follow the numerous other jurisdictions that have declined
to adopt a common law duty to wear a helmet.33   Thus, the failure to wear a helmet
is not relevant as a matter of comparative negligence.
Casson contends that our decision in Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores34 supports
the Superior Court’s finding that secondary assumption of the risk applies to these
facts.  In Spencer, the plaintiff was injured when she walked through a stream of
water in the defendant’s parking lot and purportedly slipped on some ice that had
formed under the stream.35  We held that the plaintiff had secondarily “assumed the
risk of proceeding through the water” when she walked through the stream instead
31 Moffitt v. Carroll, 640 A.2d 169, 175 (Del. 1994).
32 21 Del. C. § 4185(b).  This section requires that all motorcyclists possess a helmet while riding. 
Only those aged 19 and under must wear a helmet while riding.
33 Our reasoning is in accord with the majority of state high court decisions, which have declined
to create a common law duty to wear a motorcycle helmet where no statutory duty existed.  See, e.g.,
Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 844 P.2d 670, 676-77 (Haw. 1993); Meyer v. City of Des Moines, 475
N.W.2d 181, 191 (Iowa 1991); Hukill v. DeGregorio, 484 N.E.2d 795, 796 (Ill. 1985); Dare v.
Sobule, 674 P.2d 960, 963 (Colo. 1984); Burgstahler v. Fox, 186 N.W.2d 182, 183 (Minn. 1971);
Rogers v. Frush, 262 A.2d 549, 552 (Md. 1970).
34 Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 930 A.2d 881 (Del. 2007).
35 Id. at 886.
14
of using the sidewalk.36  The plaintiff in Spencer was aware of the defendant’s
breach of duty and unreasonably chose to encounter the risk.  Here, by contrast,
McKinley made no “deliberate and unreasonable choice to encounter a risk created
by another's breach of duty.”37  Spencer is inapposite.
Casson also argues the helmet evidence is admissible under Delaware’s
motorist safety statutes.  Delaware’s seatbelt laws expressly prohibit evidence of
non-use of a seatbelt to prove contributory negligence.38  No similar provision
appears in the motorcycle statute.39  Casson argues that this was an intentional
omission by the General Assembly, and that, by negative inference, non-use of a
helmet is admissible to prove contributory negligence.  Casson’s analysis ignores
the fact that the seatbelt statute contains a requirement that all car occupants wear
seatbelts at all times, whereas no requirement for helmet use exists for adult
motorcyclists.  Without a statutory duty, there is no need to create a statutory rule
of evidence concerning that duty.   
Finally, the helmet evidence cannot be used to argue that McKinley failed to
mitigate  damages.  The duty to mitigate damages generally arises after a defendant
has breached its duty to a plaintiff.40  There was nothing McKinley could have
36 Ibid.
37 Koutoufaris, 604 A.2d at 397.
38 21 Del. C. § 4802.
39 21 Del. C. § 4185.
40 See Piche v. Nugent, 436 F. Supp. 2d 193, 204 (“‘A plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages arises
after he or she has suffered an injury or loss . . . .’”) (D. Me. 2006) (quoting Searles v. Fleetwood
Homes of Pa., Inc., 878 A.2d 509, 521 (Me. 2005) (emphasis added)).
15
done to mitigate damages after the accident. 
V.  Jury Instruction on Assumption of the Risk
In light of our holding that no evidence should have been admitted regarding
McKinley’s non-use of a helmet, it follows that no jury instruction should have
been given on assumption of the risk and/or riding without a helmet.  Thus, we
decline to address whether the instruction was substantively deficient.
VI.  Allowance of Downer’s OpinionTestimony
McKinley argues that the Superior Court erred by allowing Downer to
speculate about McKinley’s actions in the moments before his motorcycle struck
Casson’s car.  Downer testified as follows:
Q:  . . . It looks like he struck the rear of her vehicle, given the
damage to the right fender on his bike.  Is that correct?
A: . . . As for what he was doing, I don’t know.  From the
damage, it looks like it’s possible that he could have taken an
emergency maneuver to the left to get around, I don’t know.41
McKinley says that this testimony amounts to an inadmissible expert opinion, and
that the Superior Court erred in allowing it.  We disagree.
D.R.E. 701 prohibits non-expert witnesses from giving technical testimony
requiring specialized knowledge.  The rule states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
41 Appellant’s Appendix at A-212.
16
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue and (c) not based on
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Rule 702.42
A police officer violates Rule 701 when, without being qualified as an expert in
accident reconstruction, he testifies as to the primary cause of an accident.43  But
Downer never testified about the cause of the accident.  He was asked to give a lay
opinion, based on the damage to the right side of McKinley’s motorcycle, that
McKinley was moving to the left at the time of impact.  Downer’s response barely
qualifies as any type of opinion, since he began and ended his statement with “I
don’t know.”  To the extent that his statement had any substantive value, it was a
lay opinion within the meaning of Rule 701.  The trial court correctly allowed the
testimony.  
VII.  Denial of Summary Judgment
Casson argues on cross-appeal that the Superior Court erred in denying
summary judgment.  She contends that, even if she slammed on the brakes,
McKinley had a duty to maintain a safe distance behind her; reduce his speed in a
construction zone; and drive at a speed that would have allowed him to stop
without colliding with the vehicle in front of him.  The fact that he hit her car
establishes that he violated those duties.  Casson concludes:  “[g]iven the number
42 D.R.E. 701.
43 Lagola v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2005); Alexander v. Cahill, 829 A.2d 117, 121-22
(Del. 2003).
17
of duties attributable to Plaintiff, as opposed to those incumbent upon Defendant,
summary judgment should have been granted.”44
This case turns on a factual dispute as to whether Casson drove her vehicle
in a negligent manner, thereby causing the accident.  McKinley should have been
traveling at a speed and distance behind Casson that would have avoided the
accident.  But that fact does not end the matter.  Casson’s operation of her vehicle
may have been so unreasonable under the circumstances that she is more than 50%
responsible for the collision.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
McKinley, he was driving properly; Casson knew she had a fear of bridges; she
took medication for that fear; and she slammed on the brakes because she had a
panic attack.  A jury could find that Casson failed to exercise reasonable care when
she operated her vehicle in a dangerous manner in an effort to avoid going over the
bridge.  The trial court correctly denied Casson’s motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
Base on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s evidentiary errors
deprived McKinley of a fair trial.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new
trial.  Jurisdiction is not retained.   
44 Appellee’s Answering Brief, p. 39.
18