Title: NEUMANN v. ARROWSMITH

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

NEUMANN v. ARROWSMITH  NEUMANN v. ARROWSMITH 2007 OK 10 164 P.3d 116 Case Number: 101650; Consol. w/101684 Decided: 02/27/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA JOY NEUMANN, surviving spouse of ROBERT NEUMANN, deceased, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. D.L. ARROWSMITH, D.O., and RADIOLOGICAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant/Appellants, and JANE PHILLIPS MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV Honorable Janice P. Dreiling, Trial Judge ¶0 After Robert Neumann (Neumann) died, his wife, the appellee, Joy Neumann (wife), on behalf of her deceased husband, brought a medical malpractice action against the appellants, D.L. Arrowsmith (doctor) and his employer, Radiological Services, Inc. (employer). The jury returned a unanimous verdict for the doctor and his employer. The wife filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct. The trial court granted the motion and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We hold that under the facts presented, the motion for a new trial was the functional equivalent of a timely motion to vacate and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating its judgment and granting a new trial. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. Anthony M. Laizure, Scott Allen, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee. Brian J. Goree, Douglas E. Stall, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellants Arrowsmith, and Radiological Services. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The issues presented are: 1) whether, under the facts presented, the motion for new trial filed eleven days after the judgment was filed was timely; and 2) if so, whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. We hold that under the facts presented, the motion for new trial was the functional equivalent of a timely motion to vacate and the trial court did not abuse its discretion vacating its judgment and granting a new trial. FACTS ¶2 On April 9, 1999, Robert Neumann (Neumann) went to Dr. Gerald Reed, D.O., for a routine physical examination to establish a relationship with Dr. Reed (physician) as a primary care physician. During the examination, the physician ordered x-rays. The appellant, Dr. Arrowsmith, D.O. (doctor), examined the chest x-rays, but made no recommendations for treatment or for further testing. Six months later, on November 11, 1999, Neumann was in an automobile accident, and an x-ray taken incident to the accident indicated that Neumann had a 2.5 cm tumor on his left lung. In December of 1999, Neumann was advised that the cancer had spread to his brain. Neumann died on March 11, 2001. ¶3 On November 14, 2001, the appellee, Neumann's wife, Joy Neumann (wife), commenced an action for medical negligence on behalf of her deceased husband against the doctor and his employer, Radiological Services, Inc. (employer). ¶4 After the trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for the doctor and his employer. The journal entry of judgment was entered in favor of the doctor and his employer and filed on June 16, 2004. The certificate of service indicates that a copy of the judgment was sent to the wife by both facsimile and by regular mail on June 21, 2004 -- which was within three days of the filing of the judgment. ¶5 On July 1, 2004, the wife filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the jury foreperson, Keith McNickle (McNickle), provided untruthful and incomplete answers during voir dire. During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury panel whether any juror had been a party to a lawsuit other than a divorce proceeding. McNickle replied that he had been a plaintiff in a minor personal injury claim which had been settled out of court to his satisfaction. After the verdict, the wife produced documents which revealed that McNickle was the non-prevailing party in another lawsuit, McNickle v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ¶6 The doctor and his employer argued that the new trial motion was untimely under ¶7 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A MOTION TO VACATE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN VACATING ITS JUDGMENT AND GRANTING A NEW TRIAL. ¶8 The wife's argument that the Court should treat her motion as a timely motion to vacate under ¶9 Trial courts retain plenary control, or "term-time authority," over terminal decisions for a limited time period. ¶10 The doctor and his employer argue that the trial court erred in granting the wife's motion because McNickle was not untruthful in his answers during voir dire, and was not guilty of misconduct. ¶11 A material omission can be just as powerful an untruth as an affirmative material misstatement. In Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn. v. Masterson, ¶12 We noted that the false answers deprived the parties of an opportunity to delve deeper into the juror's qualifications, including possible prejudice during voir dire, thereby depriving counsel of an opportunity to question the juror about the effect of previous lawsuits and whether the juror could impartially consider the case to determine whether the juror should be challenged either peremptorily or for cause. Consequently, we held that an omission, even if accidental concerning a juror's possible bias, entitled the moving party to a new trial. ¶13 Here, the jury was asked by the trial court if any member had been involved in a lawsuit other than a divorce. ¶14 In Stillwell v. Johnson, ¶15 Likewise, McNickle's inaccurate answer prevented the wife from making further inquiry into McNickle's attitude. We find that McNickle's failure to mention that he was the unsuccessful plaintiff in an action for damages constituted sufficient grounds for the trial court to grant the new trial. CONCLUSION ¶16 The trial court granted the wife's timely motion to vacate. A trial court has wide discretion as to whether to grant a motion to vacate, and we will not disturb such a ruling absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. There is no error in the instant cause. The trial court properly granted the widow's motion to vacate based on juror misconduct. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. EDMONDSON, V.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, COLBERT, JJ., concur. HARGRAVE, J., concurs in result. WINCHESTER, C.J., LAVENDER, TAYLOR, JJ., dissent. FOOT