Title: Citizens Against Slots At The Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 154
September Term, 2009
_________________________________________
CITIZENS AGAINST SLOTS
AT THE MALL, et al.
v.
PPE CASINO RESORTS
MARYLAND, LLC, et al.
__________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
        Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   October 24, 2012
1
Prior opinions and orders involving the Anne Arundel County facility include Stop Slots v. State
Board of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 34 A.3d 1164 (2012); Citizens Against Slots v. PPE Casino, 415
Md. 117, 999 A.2d 181 (2010); Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 978 A.2d 687 (2009); Laurel
Racing v. Video Lottery, 409 Md. 445, 975 A.2d 894 (2009); Stop Slots v. Board of Elections, 406
Md. 135, 956 A.2d 715 (2008); Smigiel v. Franchot, 403 Md. 637, 943 A.2d 1260 (2008).
This is the latest in a series of opinions and orders by this Court involving the
constitutional provision and the implementing legislation authorizing a limited number
of “video lottery terminals,” commonly known as “slot machines,” at specified
Maryland facilities, including a facility in the area of northern Anne Arundel County.1
See Ch. 5 of the 2007 Special Session of the General Assembly proposing new Article
XIX of the Maryland Constitution, ratified at the general election in November 2008;
Ch. 4 of the 2007 Special Session of the General Assembly, codified in Maryland Code
(1984, 2009 Repl. Vol., 2012 Supp.), §§ 9-1A-01 through 9-1A-36 of the State
Government Article.  See also Ch. 1 of the 2012 Second Special Session of the General
Assembly, approved by the Governor August 15, 2012, which proposes an expansion
of commercial gaming and which provides, inter alia, for a referendum on such
expansion in November 2012, pursuant to Article XIX, § 1(e) of the Maryland
Constitution.
The principal issues in these appeals are whether the Circuit Court’s judgment
was appealable and whether an Anne Arundel County zoning ordinance, authorizing
video lottery facilities in certain areas of Anne Arundel County, was subject to
2
Section 308(a) of the Anne Arundel County Charter states (emphasis added):
“Sec. 308.  The Referendum.
(a)
Scope of the Referendum.  The people of Anne Arundel County
reserve to themselves the power known as “The Referendum,” by
petition to have submitted to the registered voters of the County, to
approve or reject at the polls, any ordinance or part of any ordinance
of the County Council.  The referendum petition against any such
ordinance shall be sufficient if signed by ten per centum of the
qualified voters of the County calculated upon the whole number of
votes cast in the County for Governor at the last preceding
gubernatorial election.  Such petition shall be filed with the Board of
Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County within forty-five
days after the ordinance becomes law.  If such a petition is filed as
aforesaid, the ordinance or part thereof to be referred shall not take
effect until thirty days after its approval by a majority of the qualified
voters of the County voting thereon at the next ensuing election held
for members of the House of Representatives of the United States;
provided, however, that if more than one-half but less than the full
number of signatures required to complete any referendum petition
against such ordinance be filed within forty-five days from the date
it becomes law, the time for the ordinance to take effect and the  time
for filing the remainder of signatures to complete the petition shall be
extended for an additional thirty days with like effect. Any
emergency ordinance shall remain in force from the date it becomes
law notwithstanding the filing of such petition, but shall stand
repealed thirty days after having been rejected by a majority of the
qualified voters voting thereon.  No ordinance making any
appropriation for current expense for maintaining the County
government, or for maintaining or aiding any public institution, not
exceeding the next previous appropriation for the same purpose, shall
be subject to rejection or repeal under this section.  The increase in
any such appropriation for maintaining the County government or for
maintaining or aiding any public institution shall only take effect as
in the case of other ordinances, and such increase, or any part thereof,
specified in the petition may be referred to a vote of the people of the
County upon petition as above provided.”
-2-
referendum under § 308(a) of the Anne Arundel County Charter.2  The zoning
ordinance, which was Bill No. 82-09, authorized video lottery facilities as a
“conditional use” in a “W-1 Industrial Park zoning district” and in a “Regional
3
It should be noted that the majority of the Anne Arundel County voters approved Bill No. 82-09
at the November 2010 election.  Accordingly, the Bill is now part of the Anne Arundel County
Code.
-3-
Commercial Complex ” of Anne Arundel County.  The authorized area under Bill No.
82-09 would encompass the particular area of northern Anne Arundel County where the
video lottery facility was tentatively to be located.
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in this case filed a judgment
declaring “that Bill No. 82-09 is an interdependent and legally inseparable piece of an
appropriation package for maintaining State and local government and, therefore, is not
subject to referendum . . . .”  The Circuit Court, however, rejected all other challenges
to a referendum on Bill No. 82-09.  Both sides took appeals from the Circuit Court’s
judgment, and both filed in this Court petitions for writs of certiorari which we granted.
Citizens Against Slots v. PPE Casino, 415 Md. 114, 999 A.2d 179 (2010).  
On July 20, 2010, after the filing of briefs and oral argument, this Court issued
an order which (1) denied a motion to dismiss the appeals, thereby holding that the
Circuit Court’s judgment was appealable, and (2) reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment
and remanded the case to that court with instructions to order that Bill No. 82-09 “be
placed on the ballot at the November 2010 general election,” in accordance with the
referendum provisions of the Anne Arundel County Charter.  See Citizens Against Slots
v. PPE Casino, 415 Md. 117, 999 A.2d 181 (2010).  This opinion gives the reasons for
the Court’s order.3  
-4-
I.
The constitutional amendment and implementing legislation authorizing video
lottery facilities in various Maryland locations has been described in several recent
opinions of this Court, and we shall not here repeat in detail what was set forth in those
opinions.  See Stop Slots v. State Board of Elections, 424 Md. 163, 34 A.3d 1164
(2012); Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 978 A.2d 687 (2009); Laurel Racing v.
Video Lottery, 409 Md. 445, 975 A.2d 894 (2009).  Of particular importance in the
present case are two provisions of Article XIX of the Maryland Constitution.  They are
Article XIX, § 1(c)(3)(i), authorizing a video lottery facility in “Anne Arundel County,
within 2 miles of MD Route 295,” and Article XIX, § 1(c)(5), stating that “[a] video
lottery facility shall comply with all applicable planning and zoning laws of the local
jurisdiction.”
Prior to the enactment of Bill No. 82-09, video lottery facilities were not
permitted uses under Anne Arundel County zoning law.  On December 7, 2009, the
Video Lottery Facility Location Commission “award[ed] a Video Lottery Operation
License for 4,750 video lottery terminals to [appellee] PPE Casino Resorts Maryland,
LLC, contingent on zoning approval.”  The license was for a video lottery facility “to
be located at the intersection of Route 100 and Arundel Mills Boulevard, located within
two miles of Route 295, at Arundel Mills Mall in Hanover, Maryland.”  Anne Arundel
County Bill No. 82-09, permitting video lottery facilities in certain areas, including the
above-described location at Arundel Mills Mall, was passed by the Anne Arundel
4
Hereafter in this opinion, the appellant and cross-appellee Citizens Against Slots at the Mall,
and the other appellants and cross-appellees opposed to a video lottery facility at Arundel Mills
Mall, will collectively be referred to as “Citizens Against Slots.”  The appellees and cross-appellants
will collectively be referred to as “PPE Casino Resorts.”
-5-
County Council on December 21, 2009, and signed by the County Executive on
December 22, 2009.
Upon the enactment of Bill No. 82-09, the appellant Citizens Against Slots at the
Mall, along with others opposed to a video lottery facility at Arundel Mills Mall, began
a petition drive to place Bill No. 82-09 on the ballot, pursuant to the referendum
provisions in § 308(a) of the Anne Arundel County Charter.4  See n.2, supra.  On
February 4, 2010, the first group of petition signatures was filed with the Anne Arundel
County Board of Elections.  Also on February 4, 2010, counsel for PPE Casino Resorts
wrote to the County Board of Elections, contending that Bill No. 82-09 “may not be
submitted to a referendum under Section 308 of the Anne Arundel County” Charter
because it is an “ordinance[] making an appropriation for the maintenance of the
County government.”  Counsel for PPE Casino Resorts argued that, “because Bill 82-09
was enacted pursuant to a statewide initiative and because its rejection could undermine
the implementation of that initiative, it may not be submitted to a public referendum at
the County level.”  The Anne Arundel County Board of Elections, after being advised
by its counsel that “Bill 82-09 addresses only zoning issues, [and] does not make any
appropriation of funds,” rejected the contentions of PPE Casino Resorts and decided
that Bill No. 82-09 was subject to referendum under § 308 of the Anne Arundel County
Charter.  On April 1, 2010, the Anne Arundel County Board of Elections certified that
5
See n.2, supra.  The Maryland Constitution, in Article XVI, Section 2, contains a somewhat
similar provision with regard to a “law enacted by the General Assembly,” although the wording of
the provision is not the same.
-6-
enough valid signatures in favor of the referendum on Bill No. 82-09 had been filed
with the Board and that Bill No. 82-09 “qualifies to be placed on the ballot for the 2010
Gubernatorial General Election ballot.”
While the petition drive was taking place, the appellee PPE Casino Resorts,
which opposed the referendum, along with other appellees opposed to the referendum,
commenced the present action by filing in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
a complaint for a declaratory judgment against the Anne Arundel County Board of
Elections, challenging the Board’s review of the petitions and the signatures.  Citizens
Against Slots filed a motion to intervene, and the motion was granted.  On April 7,
2010, after the Board of Elections’ certification, PPE Casino Resorts filed a second
amended complaint, and later a third amended complaint, seeking both judicial review
of the certification by the Anne Arundel County Board of Elections and a declaratory
judgment.  Also, the State Board of Elections was added as a defendant.
Hearings before the Circuit Court took place at various times during the latter
part of May 2010 and early June 2010.  PPE Casino Resorts argued that Bill No. 82-09
was not subject to a referendum under § 308(a) of the Anne Arundel County Charter
because it was a component of an appropriation package, and § 308(a) stated: “No
ordinance making any appropriation for current expense for maintaining the County
government . . . shall be subject to rejection or repeal under this section.”5  PPE Casino
Resorts also claimed that the circulator’s affidavit on the pages of the petition was
-7-
defective.  Finally, PPE Casino Resorts sought to introduce in the Circuit Court what
it described as evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, and forgery in the Petition and
Petition signature-gathering process.”  Citizens Against Slots objected to the evidence,
and the Circuit Court sustained the objection because the evidence was not presented
to the administrative agency, i.e. the Anne Arundel County Board of Elections,  and
was not contained in the administrative record.
The Circuit Court on June 25, 2010, filed an extensive opinion and declaratory
judgment dealing with the various issues raised by the parties.  As previously
mentioned, the Circuit Court held that Bill No. 82-09 was not subject to referendum
because the Bill was “interdependent and legally inseparable from a larger
appropriation package.”  The court explained:
“The Maryland Education Trust Fund Act generates revenue for a
constitutionally mandated purpose and will maintain State and
local government.  To further its purpose, it establishes the process
for collecting and depositing revenue into a trust fund account.
VLT [Video Lottery Terminals] facilities are a necessary element
to this revenue raising measure.  The State Gaming Commission
awarded a VLT license to PPE, conditioned on the location
receiving the proper zoning.  Subsequent to the preliminary award,
the County Council passed Bill 82-09, specifically conditioning the
VLT use on a property being in compliance with the location
requirements specified under Article XIX.  If Bill 82-09 was
subject to referendum, the constitutional and legislative purposes
set forth under Article XIX and the Maryland Education Trust Fund
Act would be delayed and thwarted, if not fatally undermined.
Therefore, given Bill 82-09's interdependent and legally
inseparable nature from a constitutionally mandated appropriation
law to maintain public education, Bill 82-09 is not subject to
referendum.”
6
Maryland Rule 8-202(a) provides in relevant part as follows: “Generally.  Except as otherwise
provided in this Rule or by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the
judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.”
Title 6 of the Election Law Article of the Code, concerning “Petitions,” in § 6-209 relating to
judicial review, does not refer to “appeals.”  See Maryland Code (2002, 2010 Repl. Vol.), § 6-209
of the Election Law Article.  Title 12 of the Election Law Article in §§ 12-202 and 12-203,
authorizing judicial review of decisions relating to an election where no other adequate remedy is
available, provides for direct appeals to the Court of Appeals within five days of a circuit court’s
decision. 
-8-
The principal authority relied upon by the Circuit Court was Kelly v. Marylanders For
Sports Sanity, 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987).
Citizens Against Slots filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals
on June 28, 2010, and filed a “precautionary” notice of “direct appeal” to the Court of
Appeals on June 30, 2010.6  PPE Casino Resorts filed timely notices of cross-appeal,
and both sides filed certiorari petitions which this Court granted.  PPE Casino Resorts
also filed a motion to dismiss Citizens Against Slots’ appeal.
II.
PPE Casino Resorts’ motion to dismiss is based on Maryland Code (1974, 2006
Repl. Vol., 2012 Supp.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
which provides that the general appeals statute (§ 12-301of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article) does not apply to certain types of cases and that the right to appeal
in such cases must be granted by some other law.  Section 12-302(a) states:
“(a) District Court, administrative agency, or local legislative
body. – Unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-
301 of this subtitle does not permit an appeal from a final judgment
of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
-9-
in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative
agency, or a local legislative body.”
The phrase in § 12-302(a), referring to “the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in
reviewing the decision of . . . an administrative agency, or a local legislative body,” has
been construed to mean “ordinary statutory judicial review of adjudicatory decisions
by administrative agencies and local legislative bodies,” Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections
Board, 345 Md. 477, 492, 693 A.2d 757, 765 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 118
S.Ct. 702, 139 L. Ed.2d 645 (1998).  For discussions of § 12-302(a), including its scope
and history, see, e.g., Dvorak v. Anne Arundel County Ethics Commission, 400 Md.
446, 450-459, 929 A.2d 185, 187-193 (2007); Murrell v. Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 184-
196, 829 A.2d 548, 556-564 (2003); Kant v. Montgomery County, 365 Md. 269, 272-
279, 778 A.2d 384, 386-389 (2001); Prince George’s County v. Beretta, 358 Md. 166,
173-183, 747 A.2d 647, 651-656 (2000); Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, supra,
345 Md. at 485-500, 693 A.2d at 761-768; Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381, 415-424,
644 A.2d 11, 28-32 (1994) (dissenting opinion, which was later adopted by the Court
in State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 75-79, 785 A.2d 1275, 1283-1285 (2001)).
PPE Casino Resorts argued that the present case, involving judicial review of a
decision by an administrative agency, namely the Anne Arundel County Board of
Elections, fell within § 12-302(a).  Consequently, the argument continued, § 12-301 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article did not authorize an appeal.  PPE Casino
Resorts further argued that no other statute authorized an appeal in the case and that,
therefore, there was no appellate jurisdiction.  More specifically, PPE Casino Resorts
7
In Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 693 A.2d 757 (1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1053, 118 S.Ct. 702, 139 L.Ed.2d 645(1998), this Court discussed § 12-302(a) at length but
held that the statute was inapplicable because the action was, in substance, a common law
mandamus action.  Moreover, the Gisriel case involved a municipal election board and not a county
or state board, and the Court noted, 345 Md. at 508 n.20, 693 A.2d at 772-773 n.20, that “municipal
elections are generally not covered by the” Election Code.  See Maryland Code (2002, 2010 Repl.
Vol.), §§ 1-101(v)(3), 101(cc) and 2-202 (a) of the Election Article, generally exempting municipal
election boards, except in Baltimore City, from the Election Article of the Code.  See also Hanna
(continued...)
-10-
pointed to Title 6 of the Election Article, relating to “Petitions,” and § 6-209 of Title
6 which provides for judicial review in a circuit court.  Title 6, however, contains no
express provision for an appeal from a circuit court’s judgment to either the Court of
Special Appeals or the Court of Appeals.
The principle reflected in § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, that the general appeals statute does not authorize an appeal from a trial court
judgment reviewing, inter alia, the decision of an administrative agency, originated as
part of a judicially created doctrine in 1837.  See Wil. & Susq. R. R. Co. v. Condon, 8
G. & J. 443, 448-449 (1837).  The principle, as applied to administrative agencies and
local legislative bodies, was embodied in a statute with the enactment of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article in 1973.  
During the period from 1837 until the present, there have been literally hundreds
of cases decided by this Court involving appeals from trial court judgments in actions
for judicial review of decisions by state and county election officials or agencies.  None
of these cases, as far as we are aware, has applied the jurisdictional principle embodied
in § 12-302(a) to appeals from judgments reviewing the decisions of state or county
election officials or agencies.7  As the State Board of Elections and the Anne Arundel
7
(...continued)
v. Young, 84 Md. 179, 182, 35 A. 674, 675 (1896) (“‘It is sufficient to say that no municipal
elections, except those held in the city of Baltimore, are [generally] within the terms or meaning of
[Article I of] the Constitution,’” quoting Smith v. Stephan, 66 Md. 381, 388, 7 A. 561, 562 (1887)).
But cf. Gisriel, 345 Md. at 502-508, 693 A.2d at 769-772.  Whether § 12-302(a) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article applies to municipal election agencies (other than in Baltimore City)
is not presented by this case.  It is an open issue to be resolved in a future case where it is presented.
-11-
County Board of Elections pointed out in the present case, if PPE Casino Resorts’
motion to dismiss were meritorious, “several seminal decisions of this Court never
should have been decided.” (Joint brief of Election Boards at 4, n.3).  More
importantly, if there were no appellate jurisdiction in numerous election cases decided
by this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, the ramifications could be extremely
disruptive. A “judgment made by a court lacking jurisdiction to enter it is void.”
County Commissioners v. Carroll Craft, 384 Md. 23, 44, 862 A.2d 404, 417 (2004).
See also Tshiwala v. State, 424 Md. 612, 621-622, 37 A.3d 308, 313 (2012); Carey v.
Chessie Computer, 369 Md. 741, 755-757, 802 A.2d 1060, 1068-1069 (2002).
Where, over a long period of time, there have been many opinions of this Court
concerning a particular subject matter, and a legal principle or statute may arguably
appear to be applicable to that subject matter, but none of our opinions have applied the
principle or statute to the subject matter, it is reasonable to infer that the principle or
statute was not intended to apply.  See Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 734, 580 A.2d
176, 185 (1990) (“Despite the many cases in this Court involving [the criminal statute
at issue], none has been a prosecution based on [the type of conduct before the Court]
. . . .  This is a strong indication that such conduct is not within the contemplation of
[the statute]”).  Similarly, the absence in this Court’s election opinions of any
-12-
discussion of the principle created in 1837, and embodied in § 12-302(a), is a strong
indication that the principle does not apply to such cases.
Title 12, subtitle 2, of the Election Article of the Code furnishes additional
confirmation that the non-appealability principle of § 12-302(a) was not intended to
apply to decisions of county election boards.  Sections 12-201 and 12-202(a) of the
Election Article provide as follows:
“Subtitle 2. Judicial Review of Elections.
“§ 12-201. Scope of subtitle.
This subtitle applies to an issue arising in an election conducted
under this article.
“§ 12-202.  Judicial challenges.
(a) In general. – If no other timely and adequate remedy is
provided by this article, a registered voter may seek judicial relief
from any act or omission relating to an election, whether or not the
election has been held, on the grounds that the act or omission:
(1) is inconsistent with this article or other law applicable
to the elections process; and
(2) may change or has changed the outcome of the
election.”
Section 12-203 deals with the judicial review procedure and expressly authorizes an
appeal.  The section states:
“§ 12-203.  Procedure.
“(a) In general. – A proceeding under this subtitle shall be
conducted in accordance with the Maryland Rules, except that:
(1) the proceeding shall be heard and decided without a
jury and as expeditiously as the circumstances require;
-13-
(2) on the request of a party or sua sponte, the chief
administrative judge of the circuit court may assign the case to a
three-judge panel of circuit court judges; and 
(3) an appeal shall be taken directly to the Court of
Appeals within 5 days of the date of the decision of the circuit
court.
(b) Expedited appeal. – The Court of Appeals shall give priority
to hear and decide an appeal brought under subsection (a)(3) of this
section as expeditiously as the circumstances require.”
Consequently, to the extent that the other provisions in the Election Article fail
to provide for judicial review of a county election board’s decision on “an issue arising
in an election conducted under” the Election Article, § 12-202 of that Article authorizes
judicial review.  Where a provision in the Election Article authorizes judicial review
but fails to authorize an appeal, such as in Title 6, and if it were assumed, arguendo,
that the general appeals statute would not authorize an appeal, the “remedy” would not
be “adequate” in the words of § 12-202(a).  In that hypothetical situation, § 12-
203(a)(3) would authorize an appeal.
Sections 12-202(a) and 12-203(a)(3) of the Election Article, by broadly
authorizing judicial review and an appeal under the Election Article in any case where
no other adequate remedy was provided by the Article, show that the Legislature had
no intention of applying the non-appealability principle of § 12-302(a) to cases under
the Election Article.
Moreover, county election boards are significantly different from the local
government administrative agencies involved in the cases applying the non-
appealability principle embodied in § 12-302(a). One difference between a county
-14-
election board and most other local administrative agencies is that a county election
board is a state agency and not an agency of the county.  State Ethics Commission v.
Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 448 n.11, 780 A.2d 1154, 1166 n. 11 (2001); Rucker v. Harford
County, 316 Md. 275, 284, 558 A.2d 399, 403 (1989).  Each county election board “is
subject to the direction and authority of the State Board and is accountable to the State
Board for its actions in all matters regarding” the election law.  Maryland Code (2002,
2010 Repl. Vol.), § 2-201(a)(2) of the Election Article. See also County Council v.
Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. 52, 62, 333 A.2d 596, 602 (1974) (The “pervasive state
administrative control of the election process, on both the statewide and local levels,
is a compelling indication that the General Assembly . . . intended that the conduct and
regulation of elections be strictly a state function”). Consequently, in circuit court
actions to review administrative decisions under the election laws, ordinarily the
administrative decisions are effectively those of both the county election boards and the
State Board.  Moreover, § 2-105 of the Election Article grants to the State Board the
right to “join as a party” in “any judicial proceeding in which a local board is a party.”
Circuit court judgments in actions for judicial review of decisions by the State Board
are appealable under the State Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984,
2009 Repl. Vol.), § 10-223 of the State Government Article.
We hold, therefore, that § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article has no application to cases arising under the Election Article.  Where the
Election Article authorizes judicial review but is silent regarding an appeal, such as in
Title 6, the general appeals statute, § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
8
There are additional reasons which may support the conclusion that the General Assembly had
no intention of applying the non-appealability principle of § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article to Title 6 cases like the present one.  
Section 6-209(a) of the Election Article provides for a “judicial review” action by a “person
aggrieved by a determination made under” Title 6, to be filed in a circuit court.  Section 6-209(a)(3)
states: “Judicial review shall be expedited by each court that hears the cause . . . .” (Emphasis
added).  The reference to “each court” obviously refers to one or more courts other than the circuit
court, and the only such courts are the two appellate courts.  If the non-appealability principle were
intended to apply, the statute would not have used the phrase “each court.”
While § 6-209(a) of the Election Article authorizes a judicial review action by an aggrieved
person, § 6-209(b) provides that “any registered voter” may bring an action “[p]ursuant to the
Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act” for “declaratory relief as to any petition with respect
to the provisions of this title or other provisions of law.”  For a discussion of § 6-209 of the Election
Article, see Doe v. Board of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 713-716, 962 A.2d 342, 351-354 (2008). While
the Declaratory Judgments Act contains no provision for appeals, final judgments in declaratory
judgment actions have consistently been treated as appealable by this Court, presumably under the
general appeals statute.  This Court’s opinions have not discussed the appealability of a declaratory
judgment in the context of § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and under
circumstances like those in the present case.  
In Bowen v. Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 937 A.2d 242 (2007), retired municipal employees sought
judicial review of a municipal agency’s decision concerning the retirees’ pension benefits, although
there was no statutory right of judicial review applicable to the issues relating to the retirees’
pension benefits.  The retired employees also sought declaratory and injunctive relief.  The Circuit
Court reversed the agency decision, and the municipality appealed. The retirees moved to dismiss
the appeal, but the Court of Special Appeals denied the motion and reversed the Circuit Court.  This
Court granted certiorari and, in recounting the arguments made in the Court of Special Appeals, said
that the retirees in that court relied on § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and
that the Court of Special Appeals held that the action was in substance a common law mandamus
action and thus appealable. Bowen, 402 Md. at 602, 937 A.2d at 251.  This Court did not thereafter
mention § 12-302, although the retirees, in their brief in this Court, made an extensive argument
based on § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  (Briefs, September Term 2007,
No. 34, petitioners’ brief at 9-16).  This Court held that the “Court of Special Appeals . . . had the
jurisdiction . . . as, under our jurisprudence, actions for declaratory and injunctive relief . . . are
reviewable on appeal.” Bowen, 402 Md. at 607, 937 A.2d at 254.  See South Easton v. Easton, 387
Md. 468, 476-478 n. 3, 876 A.2d 58, 62-64 n. 3 (2005).  See also County Commissioners v. Carroll
Craft, 384 Md. 23, 862 A.2d 404 (2004).
-15-
Article, authorizes an appeal.  Where the Election Article does not provide for judicial
review, §§ 12-201 through 12-203 of the Election Article authorize judicial review and
an appeal.8
9
See n.2, supra.
-16-
III.
The Anne Arundel County zoning ordinance known as Bill No. 82-09, which
permitted video lottery facilities in certain areas, was clearly not an “ordinance making
any appropriation for current expense for maintaining the County government” within
the meaning of § 308(a) of the Anne Arundel County Charter, authorizing a referendum
on ordinances except those making an appropriation.9  Bill No. 82-09 was simply not
an appropriation ordinance.  It contained no financial provisions.  Instead, Bill No. 82-
09 was a typical zoning enactment and, therefore, was subject to a referendum under
the Anne Arundel County Charter.
Just recently, in Doe v. Maryland State Board of Elections, ___ Md. ___, ___,
___ A.3d ___, ___ (2012), this Court reiterated that an appropriation act, within the
meaning of the state constitutional referendum provision which is similar to § 308(a)
of the Anne Arundel County Charter, is “‘a lawful legislative act whose primary object
is to authorize the withdrawal . . . of a certain sum of money for a specified public
object or purpose,’” quoting Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 245, 13 A.2d 630, 637-
638 (1940).  An appropriation act, for referendum purposes, also includes a tax statute.
See Baltimore County C. A. U. T. v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 201, 582 A.2d
510, 518 (1990) (“the flat holding of our cases [is] that a law imposing or providing for
a tax levy for maintaining the government is not referable to the voters”).  See also,
e.g., Kelly v. Marylanders For Sports Sanity, supra, 310 Md. at 457, 530 A.2d at 254.
(The appropriation “‘exception was intended to include all laws providing revenue for
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and/or appropriating monies to any organized department of the State’” for “‘the
exercise of State functions,’” quoting then Attorney General Robinson, 12 Op. Att’y
Gen. 228, 236 (1927)); Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 570, 392 A.2d 67, 72
(1978); Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 10-11, 192 A. 777, 781-782 (1937); Winebrenner v.
Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 567, 142 A. 723, 724-725 (1928).
Neither the Circuit Court nor PPE Casino Resorts disputed the conclusion that
Bill No. 82-09 itself was not an appropriation act.  The Circuit Court stated that “it
agrees with all parties that Bill 82-09 is not an appropriation bill . . . .”  Nevertheless,
as earlier pointed out, the Circuit Court viewed the zoning ordinance as “interdependent
and legally inseparable from a larger appropriations package.” The “larger
appropriations package,” according to the Circuit Court, consisted of Article XIX of
the Maryland Constitution, which was proposed by the General Assembly in 2007 and
ratified by the voters in 2008, and statutes enacted by the General Assembly in 2007
to implement Article XIX.  Article XIX provided for licenses to operate video lottery
terminals at five locations within the State “for the primary purpose of raising revenue
for (i) Education for the children of the State in public schools . . ., (ii) Public school
construction and public school capital improvements . . .,” as well as other programs.
The implementing legislation, inter alia, established the Education Trust Fund
consisting of certain revenues anticipated from the video lottery terminals.  In addition,
as the Circuit Court pointed out, the awarding of licenses for video lottery terminals
was “conditioned on the location receiving the proper zoning.”  See Article XIX, §§
1(c)(1) and 1(c)(5).  The Circuit Court reasoned that, if “Bill 82-09 was subject to
10
For a recent review of the Kelly case, see Judge Greene’s opinion for the Court in Doe v.
Maryland State Board of Elections, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2012).
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referendum, the constitutional and legislative purposes set forth under Article XIX and
the Maryland Education Trust Fund Act would be delayed and thwarted, if not fatally
undermined.”  
Accordingly, the Circuit Court concluded that Bill No. 82-09 was “legally
inseparable . . . from a constitutionally mandated appropriation law to maintain public
education . . . .” As mentioned earlier in this opinion, the Circuit Court chiefly relied
on Kelly v. Marylanders For Sports Sanity, supra, 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245, where
a statute, which itself was not an appropriation act, was considered with two other
related statutes, and the three were deemed a single package constituting an
appropriation.  PPE Casino Resorts’ position in this Court essentially reflected the
reasoning of the circuit judge.
The Circuit Court’s and PPE Casino Resorts’ reliance upon the Kelly case, and
the reasoning of Kelly, is misplaced.  The circumstances of the present case are quite
different from those in Kelly. Bill No. 82-09 did not have a similar relationship to
Article XIX of the Constitution and its implementing legislation that the interrelated
bills in Kelly had to each other.10
The Kelly case involved three bills recommended by the Maryland Stadium
Authority.  The Maryland Stadium Authority was created by Ch. 283 of the Acts of
1986 as an instrumentality of the State and was “empowered to determine the location
of, and construct and maintain” sports facilities which included, “in addition to the site,
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‘stadiums for the primary purpose of holding professional football games, major league
professional baseball games, or both, in the Baltimore metropolitan area.’” Kelly, 310
Md. at 439, 530 A.2d at 246. The “Authority was permitted to issue bonds in
connection with its acquisition and construction of facilities,” and “was empowered,
by gift or purchase, to acquire any property needed ‘to construct or operate any
facility.’” Kelly, 310 Md. at 440, 530 A.2d at 246.  After studying the matter, “the
Authority recommended an 85-acre tract in Baltimore City, known as Camden Yards,
as the most appropriate site” for a baseball stadium and a football stadium.  Kelly, 310
Md. at 440-441, 530 A.2d at 246.
Upon the Authority’s recommendation, three bills were introduced in the 1987
session of the General Assembly on behalf of Governor Schaefer’s administration.  The
three bills were passed by the General Assembly and, upon the Governor’s signing all
three bills on April 29, 1987, they became Chs. 122, 123, and 124 of the Acts of 1987.
Ch. 122 authorized the Authority to acquire the 85-acre site known as “Camden Yards”
and to “construct or enter into a contract to construct the [sports] facility on that site.”
Ch. 123 authorized the Authority to acquire the Camden yards site by ordinary
condemnation or by quick-take condemnation.  Ch. 123 provided that any receipts of
the Authority be deposited in its “Financing Fund,” and required the Authority to
submit annually a budget to the Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning. Ch. 124
related to the financing of the Authority’s site acquisition and construction of stadiums.
It provided that the Authority should solicit funds from private investors in order to
minimize its use of state lottery funds.  Ch. 124 contained provisions relating to the sale
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of the Authority’s bonds, and required that Baltimore City pay one million dollars
annually into the Authority’s Financing Fund.  Ch. 124 contained other provisions
relating to the Authority’s financing.
Opponents of the above-described enactments undertook to petition Chs. 122
and 124 to referendum under Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution.  When
referendum petitions were submitted, the state officials refused to accept them on the
advice of the Attorney General that neither statute was referable.  The opponents
brought a mandamus action which culminated in this Court’s Kelly decision.  The trial
court in Kelly had held that the Acts were referable on the ground, inter alia, that
neither made “any appropriation for maintaining the State Government,” and thus they
were not within the appropriation exception in Article XVI of the Constitution.  This
Court, in an opinion by former Chief Judge Robert Murphy, reversed, holding that the
Acts fell within the appropriation exception.
With regard to Ch. 124, Chief Judge Murphy, quoting Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md.
at 244, 13 A.2d at 637, emphasized “‘that revenue measures to raise the public funds
to pay the appropriations’” in an appropriation bill “‘are excepted from the operation
of the Referendum Amendment, although the revenue thus procured is disbursed by . . .
[a different bill] without any express authorization in the money bill for its
disbursement.’” Kelly, 310 Md. at 459, 530 A.2d at 255-256.  On the issue of whether
Ch. 124 was an appropriation bill, Chief Judge Murphy concluded (Kelly, 310 Md. at
460-461, 530 A.2d at 256-257):
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“Chapter 124 is, therefore, a finely tuned law containing an intricate
financing mechanism to permit the State to receive and expend public
monies required to obtain a site and to construct the contemplated sports
facilities in the public interest.  Specifically, it authorizes the borrowing
of funds through the issuance of bonds, the disbursement of those funds
through the Authority’s Financing Fund, and the payment of the
Authority’s bonded indebtedness through monies directed to be paid by
the State to the Authority through annual appropriations in the Budget
Bill, by the City of Baltimore, and through the Authority’s own revenues
included in its Financing Fund . . . .  [C]h. 124 is a type of revenue raising
and spending measure intended to be embraced within the exclusionary
provisions contained in the Referendum Amendment.”
Turning to Ch. 122, which designated Camden Yards as the stadium site, Chief
Judge Murphy for the Court recognized that, by itself, Ch. 122 was not an
appropriation act.  Nevertheless, the Court in Kelly, 310 Md. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263,
held that Ch. 122 could not be considered separately and that the three acts together had
a single 
“dominant purpose – to finance the acquisition of a site upon which
to construct sports stadiums. As this legislative purpose constitutes,
in effect, a single, inseparable ‘law’ making an appropriation for
maintaining the State government, none of the individual parts of
the package is referable under Art. XVI to a vote of the people.”
The Kelly opinion relied on various circumstances regarding the three acts,
pointing out that “the three stadium bills were introduced and considered by the
Legislature as a single ‘package’ of bills” (310 Md. at 469, 530 A.2d at 261), that,
according to the affidavit of the Director of the Department of Fiscal Services, “the
three bills were treated in each house as a unit or package”(310 Md. at 470, 530 A.2d
at 261), and that they were treated as a single package at the committee hearings in each
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house, in the committee reports, and at the voting sessions.  This Court in Kelly
continued (310 Md. at 472, 530 A.2d at 262):
“We have held time and again that statutes dealing with the
same subject matter, particularly when enacted at the same session,
being in pari materia, must be read together in order to determine
their proper construction. * * *  In interpreting Art. XVI, § 2 of the
Constitution, the same principles govern what comprises an
appropriation ‘law.’ The provision in Art. XVI under which ‘[n]o
law making any appropriation for maintaining the State
Government . . . shall be subject to’ referendum has as its
constitutional purpose protecting from referendum the purpose or
object of the legislative appropriation.”
Finally, the Court in Kelly held that “[t]o sever Ch. 122 . . . would not just thwart the
legislative design but . . . would scuttle the entire project by fatally undermining its
dominant purpose – to finance the acquisition of a site upon which to construct sports
stadiums.”  (310 Md. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263).
The types of circumstances relied on in Kelly to treat the three stadium acts
together as a single package, and deem the package to constitute an appropriation, were
absent in the case at bar.  The three bills in Kelly were introduced in the same
legislative body (the General Assembly) at the same time and considered by that
legislative body as a single package.  In the present case, however, the pertinent acts
relied on by the Circuit Court and PPE Casino Resorts involved different “legislative”
bodies, were not “enacted” at the same time, and were never treated as a single
package.  Article XIX of the Maryland Constitution, although proposed by the General
Assembly, was enacted by the voters of Maryland at the general election in November
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2008.  The statutory provisions creating the Education Trust Fund were considered by
and enacted by the General Assembly in 2007.  Bill No. 82-09, re-zoning one area of
Anne Arundel County, was considered by and enacted by the Anne Arundel County
Council in December 2009.
The three statutes in Kelly all affected the same area of the State, i.e., an 85-acre
parcel in Baltimore City.  In the present case, however, Bill No. 82-09 affected a
particular area of Anne Arundel County, whereas Article XIX and the implementing
legislation affected, in addition to the area in Anne Arundel County, areas in Baltimore
City, Worcester County, Cecil County, and Allegany County.
Moreover, in contrast to the situation in Kelly, 310 Md. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263,
a referendum defeat of Bill No. 82-09 would not “scuttle the entire project” and “fatally
undermin[e] . . . [the] dominant purpose” of Article XIX of the Constitution and its
implementing legislation.  There would remain four other video lottery facilities in the
State to produce revenue for, inter alia, the Education Trust Fund.  Furthermore, as
shown by Ch. 1 of the 2012 Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
proposing, inter alia, a video lottery facility in Prince George’s County, Article XIX
of the Constitution contains a procedure, culminating in a vote by the electorate, for
adding more video lottery facilities in various areas of the State.
The status of Bill No. 82-09, in relation to Article XIX of the Constitution and
the Education Trust Fund law, is no different than it would have been if the local
zoning law had been enacted many years before the enactment of Article XIX and the
Education Trust Fund law.  Thus from 1943 until 1968, slot machines, as well as any
11
Under § 308(a) of the Anne Arundel County Charter, a referendum petition must be filed within
45 days after the ordinance becomes law.
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other “amusement devices,” were lawful in Anne Arundel County and were  present in
commercial establishments throughout the County.  Presumably, slot machines were
not prohibited under any local zoning ordinances.  The pertinent history was set forth
by this Court in State v. 158 Gaming Devices, 304 Md. 404, 499 A.2d 940 (1985), and
Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park, 251 Md. 657, 248 A.2d 479 (1968).  See also Ch. 321
of the Acts of 1943 (legalizing slot machines in Anne Arundel County), and Ch. 551
of the Acts of 1943 (authorizing, for the first time, zoning regulations in Anne Arundel
County).  Assuming, hypothetically, that there was an Anne Arundel County zoning
ordinance allowing slot machines and slot machine facilities during the 1943-1968
period and that the ordinance has remained in effect, clearly that hypothetical zoning
ordinance could not at the present be petitioned to referendum.11  Nevertheless, for
purposes of the requirement in Article XIX, § 1(c)(5), of the Constitution, that a “video
lottery facility shall comply with all applicable . . . zoning laws of the local
jurisdiction,” it makes no difference whether the relevant zoning law had been in place
for several years or was just enacted.  Consequently, it would be unreasonable to treat
Article XIX, plus the state implementing legislation, and the local zoning ordinance as
“a single, inseparable ‘law’” (Kelly, 310 Md. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263).
While the motivation underlying Bill No. 82-09 may have had a connection with
Article XIX of the Constitution, the motivation underlying many local zoning
ordinances may have had a connection with a program under State law involving
12
In addition to the two principal issues raised on this appeal, concerning the appealability of the
Circuit Court’s judgment and whether Bill No. 82-09 could be petitioned to referendum, PPE Casino
Resorts has also raised an issue concerning the sufficiency of the circulators’ affidavits and an issue
regarding the trial judge’s refusal to permit, based on PPE Casino Resorts’ proffer, an expert’s
testimony about possible “fraud, misrepresentations, and forgery in the petition process,” (PPE
Casino Resorts’ brief at 52).  With regard to the circulators’ affidavits, it is undisputed that they
complied with § 6-204 of the Election Article and the State Board’s regulations thereunder.  PPE
Casino Resorts argues, however, that the affidavits failed to comply with an additional requirement
contained in Anne Arundel County law.  The trial judge correctly rejected this argument, pointing
out that, to the extent of any conflict, the State Election Article controlled.  See §§ 1-101(v), 2-
202(a) and (b), and 6-102 of the Election Article, indicating that the state law applies to state and
county elections but not municipal elections. See also County Council v. Montgomery Ass’n, 274
Md. 52, 62, 333 A.2d 596, 602 (1974 & 1975).  As to the proffer of expert testimony regarding
fraud, misrepresentation, etc., it was in terms of general conclusions, without any supporting facts.
The failure to permit the expert testimony was not reversible error.
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appropriations.  This is insufficient to render a local zoning ordinance and the State law
a single “package” for purposes of the referendum exception for appropriation acts.
Bill No. 82-09, regardless of the motivation for its passage by the County Council, was
simply a local ordinance re-zoning an area.  As such, it was not exempt from a
referendum.12