Title: Murray v. St. Michael's College

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

MURRAY_V_ST_MICHAELS_COLLEGE.94-538; 164 Vt 205; 667 A.2d 294

[Filed 08-Sep-1995]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                     No. 94-538


Barbara and Michael Murray                             Supreme Court

                                                       On Appeal from
    v.                                                 Chittenden Superior Court


St. Michael's College and
Donald Sutton                                          June Term, 1995



Linda Levitt, J.

       David H. Greenberg, Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants

       Paul K. Sutherland and Michael J. Harris of Sutherland & Collins,
  Inc., Burlington, for defendants-appellees

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Seth A. Steinzor, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for amicus curiae State of Vermont


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff Michael Murray, a former security officer for
  St. Michael's College, and his wife, Barbara Murray (FN1), appeal the
  superior court's order granting defendants summary judgment on their claims
  that the College and plaintiff's supervisor (1) discriminated against
  plaintiff in retaliation for his filing a workers' compensation claim, (2)
  violated a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in his
  employment contract, and (3) intentionally caused him to suffer emotional
  distress.  Plaintiff also contends that the court failed to address his
  claim that his supervisor tortiously interfered with his contractual
  relations with the College.

 

  We reverse in part and affirm in part.

                                   I.

       From 1985 to 1993, plaintiff worked for defendant College as a
  security officer under the supervision of defendant Donald Sutton, the
  Director of Safety and Security.  For the last four years of his employment
  with the College, he held the rank of Sergeant.  In May 1991, while working
  overtime during commencement events, plaintiff experienced swelling and
  discomfort in his left knee.  As the result of that injury, he filed a
  workers' compensation claim and was out of work from late May until early
  September 1991.  After conducting an investigation, the College's workers'
  compensation carrier denied plaintiff's claim in August 1991.  Plaintiff
  appealed the denial to the Department of Labor and Industry and obtained a
  decision entitling him to workers' compensation benefits.  Plaintiff
  alleges that during and after the period in which he applied for and
  received the benefits, defendants discriminated against him by badgering
  him to come back to work, changing his employment duties and
  responsibilities, requiring him to work night shifts in breach of a
  previous agreement, changing his work hours, giving him unfairly low job
  evaluations, and challenging his right to receive workers' compensation
  benefits.

       In May 1992, an incident between plaintiff and a graduate student led
  to disciplinary action against plaintiff.  The student asked plaintiff, who
  had some experience repairing cars, if he was interested in repairing and
  possibly buying the student's car, which was not running. After working on
  the car, plaintiff told the student that it needed major repairs.  He
  offered to help the student junk the car, saying he would need the title to
  dispose of the vehicle.  After obtaining the title, plaintiff arranged to
  sell the car for $200.  When the student heard about the sale, he
  complained to plaintiff's supervisor, who suspended plaintiff pending
  further decision. Four days later, Sutton demoted plaintiff from sergeant
  to patrol officer and placed him on probation for six months.  Plaintiff
  appealed the decision, first to the Vice President of Administration and
  then to the President of the College, who upheld the demotion but ruled
  that it would run only for one year, at which time plaintiff would be
  eligible to be reappointed to

 

   sergeant.

       Plaintiff never returned to work following his demotion.  During the
  second half of 1992, plaintiff submitted letters from various doctors and
  psychiatrists stating that stress-induced depression prevented him from
  working.  Plaintiff was fired as of March 5, 1993, after his short-term
  disability benefits ran out.

       The Murrays filed suit against defendants in March 1993.  On July 11,
  1994, the superior court granted defendants' summary judgment motion,
  ruling that (1) plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his demotion was
  retaliatory in nature, (2) defendants had come forward with sufficient
  evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the demotion, (3)
  plaintiff's remaining allegations of discriminatory treatment were
  insufficient to establish a discrimination claim, and (4) plaintiffs' other
  claims arose directly from the discrimination claim and thus could not
  stand on their own.  On July 22, 1994, plaintiffs filed a motion for
  reconsideration, which was denied on September 9, 1994.  Plaintiffs filed a
  notice of appeal on October 5, 1994.

       On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in granting summary
  judgment to defendants because (1) his pleadings and affidavits demonstrate
  the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants
  discriminated against him; (2) his claims of intentional infliction of
  emotional distress and of a violation of an implied covenant of good faith
  and fair dealing stand independently of the discrimination claim; and (3)
  the court failed to address his claim of intentional interference with
  contractual relations.  Defendants counter by arguing that (1) this Court
  lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's July 11, 1994 ruling because
  plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was, in effect, a V.R.C.P. 60(b)
  motion, which does not toll the thirty-day period for filing a notice of
  appeal; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's
  motion for reconsideration; and (3) in any event, the court did not err in
  granting their motion for summary judgment.  The Attorney General has filed
  an amicus curiae brief, in which he takes no position on the merits of
  plaintiff's claims, but urges this Court to recognize that employees have a
  private right of action to bring suit alleging that their employer
  discriminated

 

  against them in retaliation for their filing a workers' compensation
  claim, in violation of 21 V.S.A. Sec. 710.

                                  II.

       At the outset, we reject defendants' argument that plaintiffs' appeal
  is untimely filed. Both the timing and contents of plaintiffs' motion for
  reconsideration indicate that it was, for all intents and purposes, a
  motion to alter or amend the judgment under V.R.C.P. 59(e), not a Rule
  60(b) motion for relief from judgment.  The motion was timely filed.  See
  V.R.C.P. 59(e) (motion to alter or amend must be filed within ten days of
  judgment); V.R.C.P. 6(a) (when period prescribed is less than eleven days,
  intermediate Saturdays and Sundays are excluded from computation). 
  Therefore, the time period for filing an appeal of the July 11, 1994 order
  was tolled pending a ruling on the motion.  V.R.A.P. 4; see Osborn v.
  Osborn, 147 Vt. 432, 433,