Title: State v. White

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12, 2008-Ohio-1623.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WHITE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12, 2008-Ohio-1623.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Mental retardation — Death penalty — 
Abuse of discretion — Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2006-0295 — Submitted May 1, 2007 — Decided April 9, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
No. 22591, 2005-Ohio-6990. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal involves a claim by petitioner-appellant, Clifton White 
III, that he is mentally retarded and therefore constitutionally ineligible for the 
death penalty. 
{¶ 2} In 1995, White broke up with his girlfriend, Heather Kawczk.  
Weeks later, White killed Kawczk’s mother and Deborah Thorpe, who was the 
mother of Kawczk’s new boyfriend, Michael Thorpe.  During a subsequent 
confrontation at Kawczk’s place of employment, White attempted to kill Michael 
Thorpe.  See State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 433-434, 709 N.E.2d 140. 
{¶ 3} White was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of 
Deborah Thorpe.  On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction and death 
sentence.  Id.  The trial court dismissed White’s initial petition for postconviction 
relief in March 1998, and the court of appeals affirmed.  State v. White (June 16, 
1999), Summit App. No. 19040, 1999 WL 394938.1   
                                                 
1.  On January 6, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
White’s federal habeas corpus appeal in abeyance pending resolution of his mental-retardation 
claim in state court.   
 
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{¶ 4} On June 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing to death persons who are mentally 
retarded.  Atkins v. Virginia (2002), 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 
335.  On July 22, 2002, White commenced the instant litigation by filing a 
successor petition for postconviction relief.2  In that petition, White asserted that 
he was mentally retarded and hence, under Atkins, could not be executed. 
I. The Legal Definition of Mental Retardation 
{¶ 5} In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, fn. 3, 
the United States Supreme Court quoted the definitions of mental retardation 
promulgated by the American Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) and 
the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”). 
{¶ 6} The AAMR defines mental retardation as “ ‘substantial limitations 
in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the 
following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional 
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.’ ”  
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, fn.3. 
{¶ 7} The APA’s definition is similar: “ ‘The essential feature of Mental 
Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning * * * that 
is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of 
the 
following 
skill 
areas: 
communication, 
self-care, 
home 
living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional 
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety * * *.  The onset must occur 
                                                 
2.  The state postconviction procedure, R.C. 2953.21 et seq., is the proper vehicle for the 
assertion of an Atkins claim by a person sentenced to death on or before December 11, 2002.  State 
v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 13. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
before age 18 years * * *.’  ‘Mild’ mental retardation is typically used to describe 
people with an IQ level of 50 to 55 to approximately 70.”  Id. 
{¶ 8} In State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 
1011, ¶ 12, we held: “Clinical definitions of mental retardation, cited with 
approval in Atkins, provide a standard for evaluating an individual’s claim of 
mental retardation. * * * These definitions require (1) significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, 
such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age 
of 18.” 
II. The Proceedings Below 
A. White’s Evaluation 
{¶ 9} At White’s request, the trial court appointed Dr. David Hammer, a 
psychologist, as the petitioner’s expert in mental retardation.  The state retained as 
its expert Dr. John M. Fabian, a clinical and forensic psychologist. 
{¶ 10} Drs. Hammer and Fabian jointly conducted testing to determine 
whether White was mentally retarded.  They administered the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, Third Edition (“WAIS-III”), a standard IQ test; the Wide 
Range Achievement Test, Third Edition (“WRAT-III”), which measures 
academic achievement; and the Scales of Independent Behavior - Revised (“SIB-
R”), which measures adaptive skills.  They also interviewed White to obtain 
information for the SIB-R.  Finally, they reviewed White’s educational, medical, 
correctional, and children-services records, along with earlier psychological 
evaluations performed in connection with White’s aggravated-murder trial. 
1. Intellectual Functioning 
{¶ 11} Drs. Fabian and Hammer administered the WAIS-III on July 28, 
2003.  White’s IQ, as measured by that test, was 52. 
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{¶ 12} Drs. Fabian and Hammer also administered the WRAT-III.  
White’s WRAT-III scores “indicate very poor academic abilities * * * equivalent 
to about the second-grade level.”  This result was consistent with White’s score 
on the WAIS-III. 
2. Adaptive Skills 
{¶ 13} “[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only 
subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive 
skills * * * that became manifest before age 18.”  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 122 
S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335.  Adaptive skills are those skills that one applies to 
the everyday demands of independent living, such as taking care of oneself and 
interacting with others.  Adaptive behavior tests are designed to assess how a 
person applies those skills in the tasks of everyday life. 
{¶ 14} Drs. Hammer and Fabian used the SIB-R to assess whether White 
had significant limitations in adaptive skills.  The SIB-R consists of 259 
questions.  Each question seeks to measure how well the subject can perform a 
particular task.  The questions are divided among 14 “scales” or “domains.”  Each 
scale contains between 16 and 20 questions designed to evaluate the subject’s 
skills in one of 14 categories: gross motor skills, fine motor skills, social 
interaction, language comprehension, language expression, eating and meal 
preparation, “toileting” (i.e., using the toilet), dressing, “personal self-care” (i.e., 
health and hygiene), domestic skills, time and punctuality, money and value, work 
skills, and “home/community orientation.”  The 14 scales are grouped into four 
“clusters”: motor skills, social/communication, personal living, and community 
living. 
{¶ 15} To administer the SIB-R, the examiner interviews “informants” – 
for example, parents, other relatives, or teachers – who are well acquainted with 
the person being evaluated.  The informants provide the examiner with 
January Term, 2008 
5 
information about the subject’s abilities.  The examiner then uses this information 
to score the SIB-R. 
{¶ 16} Each question on the SIB-R is scored on a scale of zero to three.  
According to Dr. Hammer, a zero means that the subject either cannot perform a 
particular task “or has not really had a chance to do something like that.”  A “1” 
means the subject “can’t do [the task] very well.”  A “2” means he can “do it 
fairly well most of the time, but they might have to be asked to do it; they don’t 
necessarily initiate on their own.”  A “3” means that the subject can routinely 
perform the task “very well and do it independently without being asked.” 
{¶ 17} The examiner explains this rating system to the informants, then 
asks them to rate how well the subject can perform each task.  If the informant has 
never seen the subject attempt a particular task, or if the subject has never had an 
opportunity to perform it, the informant is asked to estimate the subject’s ability 
to perform it.  If the informants cannot make an estimate, the examiner makes his 
own estimate, based on his observations of the subject and any other information 
he can obtain. 
{¶ 18} When all questions have been scored, the points on each scale are 
added, yielding a raw score.  A computer program converts the raw score into a 
scaled score for each scale.  These scaled scores are averaged to yield a score for 
each cluster, and the cluster scores in turn are averaged to yield an overall “broad 
independence” score.  The cluster scores can be used to cross-check the broad 
independence score for consistency. 
{¶ 19} On July 28, 2002, after Dr. Fabian administered the WAIS-III to 
White, Drs. Hammer and Fabian together interviewed White for approximately 
one hour to evaluate his adaptive functioning.  Dr. Hammer later used information 
from this interview in scoring White’s SIB-R.  However, he did not use White’s 
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information as his sole basis for scoring any question, and he estimated that 
“probably less than 10 percent” of his information came from White. 
{¶ 20} On October 20, 2003, Drs. Hammer and Fabian together 
interviewed White’s mother, his sisters Keisha and Erica, and his brother Eric.  
White’s mother and Erica provided most of the information for Dr. Hammer’s 
scoring of the SIB-R.  Dr. Hammer later scored each question on the SIB-R, 
based on the family’s responses and other information, including information 
obtained from White and his own observations of White. 
{¶ 21} In Dr. Hammer’s opinion, White had significant limitations in 
more than two of the ten adaptive-skill areas covered by the AAMR definition of 
retardation.  In Dr. Fabian’s opinion, White was deficient in 12 of the 14 areas 
measured by the SIB-R.  Dr. Fabian considered White’s overall adaptive skills 
comparable to those of an average person age 11 years, ten months. 
{¶ 22} White’s “broad independence” score on the SIB-R was 55.  
According to Dr. Hammer, a broad independence score below 70 indicates 
significantly subaverage functioning.  White’s overall score was consistent with 
the WAIS and WRAT results and was in the lowest percentile for White’s age 
group. 
3. Onset before Age 18 
{¶ 23} White had not taken either an IQ test or an adaptive-skills test 
before age 18.  To determine whether White’s subaverage functioning began 
before 18, Drs. Hammer and Fabian reviewed White’s school records.  These 
records show that White’s academic performance was poor.  He failed numerous 
courses, repeated seventh grade, and was in tenth grade for three years before 
leaving school.  In eighth grade, White was reading at a fourth-grade level and 
was doing mathematics at about a sixth-grade level. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 24} Although White’s pre-18 adaptive skills had not been tested, Dr. 
Fabian testified that White’s poor academic record supported a finding that his 
adaptive deficits had their onset before age 18.  According to Dr. Fabian, there is 
a correlation between intellectual and adaptive abilities.  Moreover, White’s 
records suggest a deficit in “functional academics,” which is itself one of the 
adaptive skills relevant to a diagnosis of retardation. 
{¶ 25} Additionally, the experts agreed that White’s current adaptive 
deficits support their finding of onset of retardation before age 18.  The experts 
testified that a person’s developmental level is generally determined by 
approximately age ten.  Thus, absent a severe brain injury or medical condition – 
of which there was no evidence in White’s case – a person who has intellectual 
and adaptive deficits as an adult probably has had them since childhood. 
B. The Hearing on White’s Petition 
{¶ 26} On December 10, 2003, January 26 and 27, 2004, and April 19, 
2004, the trial court held a three-part evidentiary hearing on White’s 
postconviction Atkins claim.  The state presented no expert testimony at the 
hearing, but did present the testimony of Heather Kawczk, who had been White’s 
girlfriend from 1992 to 1995. 
{¶ 27} Kawczk testified that White was popular in school and participated 
in activities with others.  She testified that he worked, rented an apartment, bought 
a truck, and helped her when she bought a car.  She also testified that White could 
cook, drive, and play games that required coordination. 
{¶ 28} White presented the testimony of Dr. Hammer and the state’s 
expert, Dr. Fabian.  Additionally, Dr. Hammer was deposed in February 2004, 
and his deposition was admitted into evidence. 
{¶ 29} Drs. Hammer and Fabian agreed that White meets the definition of 
mental retardation.  Neither expert thought this conclusion was a “close call.”  Dr. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
Hammer testified that his opinion was confirmed by the “convergent validity” of 
the test results.  In other words, White’s current WAIS, WRAT, and SIB-R scores 
are consistent with his scores on previous intelligence and achievement tests and 
with his academic record, and all point to a diagnosis of mild mental retardation. 
{¶ 30} Finally, at the trial court’s request, Bradley K. Hill, a co-author of 
the SIB-R, testified as an expert witness to explain how the SIB-R was developed 
and how it is used to diagnose mental retardation. 
C. Decision and Findings of the Trial Court 
{¶ 31} On February 28, 2005, the trial court denied White’s petition for 
postconviction relief. 
{¶ 32} The trial court found that White had established, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the first of Lott’s three criteria: significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning.  Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 
779 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 12.  The trial court noted that White’s IQ of 52 “easily 
satisfies” the intellectual-functioning portion of the legal test for mental 
retardation. The trial court also found “ample corroborative evidence” that 
White’s IQ was below 70. 
{¶ 33} However, the trial court found that White had failed to establish, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of Lott’s two other criteria: 
“significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills” and “onset before the age 
of 18.”  Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 12. 
1. Adaptive Skills 
{¶ 34} Even though White’s SIB-R results indicated that he suffered from 
significant limitations in adaptive skills, the trial court found that “a number of 
flaws * * * tend to dilute and compromise the probative value of the adaptive 
behavior test score.” 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 35} The trial court questioned the manner in which Drs. Hammer and 
Fabian administered the SIB-R.  Dr. Fabian did not personally participate in 
scoring the SIB-R, and the trial court found that Dr. Fabian’s diagnosis “relied 
heavily on Dr. Hammer’s judgment.” 
{¶ 36} The trial court also questioned the reliability of the information 
used in scoring the SIB-R.  White’s mother and sister were Dr. Hammer’s 
principal informants.  Thus, White’s SIB-R scores were based largely on 
information provided by his family.  The trial court found that White’s relatives 
“have reason to exaggerate in favor of a positive diagnosis of [mental 
retardation].”  The trial court also noted that White’s mother had once told 
psychiatrists that her son’s teachers described him as “pretty smart if he put his 
mind to it.” 
{¶ 37} The trial court was troubled as well by Dr. Hammer’s use of 
information provided by White himself.  Citing Dr. Fabian’s testimony, the trial 
court observed that “the recommendation of the AAMR is to use ‘somebody other 
than the person [being graded]’ ” as an informant for the SIB-R. 
{¶ 38} The trial court also found that some of White’s low scores on SIB-
R tasks were based on conjecture.  For example, in several instances, Dr. Hammer 
assigned zeroes “for tasks that [White] never had an opportunity either to learn, or 
to perform.” 
{¶ 39} Finally, the trial court found that the testimony of Heather Kawczk 
demonstrated that White possessed social, conceptual, and practical adaptive 
skills inconsistent with retardation.  While recognizing Kawczk’s possible bias, 
the trial court found her testimony credible. 
{¶ 40} Moreover, the trial court found, White was not perceived by those 
who knew him as having significant adaptive disorders.  Kawczk’s testimony 
provided “credible anecdotal evidence * * * to demonstrate a level of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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performance perceived by [White’s] closest companion to be reasonably 
sophisticated, other than retarded, and fairly well mainstream.  In fact, not a single 
anecdote has been supplied to the experts, and restated to this court by anyone, of 
any incongruent behavior – something bizarre, something out of the ordinary – 
anecdotes which demonstrate that his family and peers considered him 
significantly deficient in adaptive behavior skills.” 
2. Onset before Age 18 
{¶ 41} Finally, the trial court found that White had failed to prove that he 
had significant adaptive deficits before reaching age 18.  No adaptive-skills test 
had ever been conducted on White before the 2003 SIB-R.  Although Dr. 
Hammer opined that White would have shown deficits on such a test, the trial 
court found this opinion conjectural. 
D. Proceedings on Appeal 
{¶ 42} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that White had 
failed to satisfy the second prong of the Lott standard by proving lack of adaptive 
skills.  Having so held, the court of appeals declined to address the third prong, 
onset before age 18.  State v. White, Summit App. No. 22591, 2005-Ohio-6990, ¶ 
23. 
{¶ 43} White’s discretionary appeal is now before us. 
III. The Merits of the Appeal 
A. The Standard of Review 
{¶ 44} In Lott, we held that “[t]he procedures for postconviction relief 
outlined in R.C. 2953.21 et seq. provide a suitable statutory framework for 
reviewing” an Atkins claim by a defendant sentenced to death before Lott.  97 
Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 13. 
January Term, 2008 
11 
{¶ 45} Recently, in State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-
6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, we considered the standard for appellate review of 
postconviction proceedings.  We held that abuse of discretion is the appropriate 
standard: “[A] trial court’s decision granting or denying a postconviction petition 
filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion; a 
reviewing court should not overrule the trial court’s finding on a petition for 
postconviction relief that is supported by competent and credible evidence.”  Id.3  
{¶ 46} “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * implies that the court’s 
attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  State v. Adams (1980), 62 
Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144, citing Steiner v. Custer 
(1940), 137 Ohio St. 448, 19 O.O. 148, 31 N.E.2d 855; see, also, Blakemore v. 
Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140. 
B. The Trial Court’s Treatment of the Expert Testimony 
{¶ 47} A capital defendant raising an Atkins claim “bears the burden of 
establishing that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, ¶ 21.  In Lott, we 
instructed trial courts to “rely on professional evaluations * * * and consider 
expert testimony * * * in deciding” whether a capital defendant is mentally 
retarded.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 48} In this appeal, White contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by refusing to find that he had established retardation by a 
preponderance of the evidence, despite the testimony of two expert witnesses that 
he is mentally retarded and the lack of any expert testimony to the contrary.  For 
the reasons that follow, we agree. 
1. Adaptive Deficits 
                                                 
3.  In his brief, filed before our decision in Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-
6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, White argued that abuse of discretion is not the appropriate standard of 
review.  At oral argument, however, he conceded that Gondor establishes abuse of discretion as 
the standard. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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a. The Trial Court’s Rejection of the SIB-R 
{¶ 49} The expert opinions of Drs. Hammer and Fabian were based 
substantially on the SIB-R.  Both experts considered the SIB-R to be a valid tool 
for measuring adaptive skills.  In their testimony, Drs. Hammer and Fabian 
described the SIB-R as “well developed,” “mainstream,” well standardized, 
useful, and reliable. 
{¶ 50} Undisputed evidence at the hearing showed that the SIB-R was 
based on extensive empirical research.  Hill testified that in deciding what skills to 
include on the test, the authors of the SIB-R used standard test-development 
procedures. 
 
The 
test 
developers 
interviewed 
a 
randomly 
selected, 
demographically representative group of 2,182 nonhandicapped persons.  Their 
responses were used to determine which questions were most useful in 
distinguishing between persons who are mentally retarded and those who are not. 
{¶ 51} According to Hill, standard measures of reliability show that the 
SIB-R is a reliable test.  Although an SIB-R evaluation is not completely free of 
subjectivity, Hill testified that the SIB-R is “as objective as we could make it” and 
“one of the most objective ways to measure adaptive behavior that there is.” 
{¶ 52} Nevertheless, the trial court rejected the results of the SIB-R.  The 
trial court questioned the results in part because in scoring the test, Dr. Hammer 
had utilized information provided by White himself.  However, Dr. Hammer 
estimated that “probably less than 10 percent” of his information came from 
White.  Moreover, he did not use information provided by White as his sole basis 
for scoring any of the items on the SIB-R. 
{¶ 53} Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that it is necessarily 
improper to use the person being evaluated as an informant on the SIB-R.  Dr. 
Fabian, whose testimony on this issue was cited by the trial court, testified: “I 
think that they recommend as a[n] SIB-R collateral [informant] individuals other 
January Term, 2008 
13 
than the person [being evaluated].”  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, Mr. Hill – a co-
author of the SIB-R – testified only that “[t]here’s some caution in the manual” 
about using the subject as an informant.  “I don’t think it says you can’t interview 
a person directly that you suspect is retarded, but it’s unlikely that you would 
want to rely on them solely for the information.” 
{¶ 54} More important, the trial court failed to consider why the SIB-R 
manual discourages using the subject as an informant.  Dr. Hammer and Mr. Hill 
both explained that using the subject as an informant is discouraged because 
mentally retarded persons tend to overestimate their own abilities.  As Mr. Hill 
testified: 
{¶ 55} “There’s some * * * research literature, that shows that if you 
interview a retarded person directly about themselves, that they often 
overestimate their abilities, that * * * they want to brag about the abilities they 
have or that they’re not always a reliable respondent. 
{¶ 56} “There’s never been any research to my knowledge cautioning 
people not to interview a retarded person directly because they underestimate 
their score.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 57} Hence, the record lends no support to the trial court’s apparent 
belief that using White as an informant for the SIB-R compromised the validity of 
the diagnosis of mental retardation reached by the experts in this case. 
b. The Trial Court’s Reliance on Anecdotal Lay Testimony 
{¶ 58} The trial court relied heavily on the testimony of White’s ex-
girlfriend, Heather Kawczk, in reaching its conclusion that White failed to prove 
significant adaptive limitations. 
{¶ 59} Kawczk testified that she met White in the fall of 1992, when they 
attended high school together.  She dated him until November 1995 and lived 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
with White and his mother for over a year.  In the fall of 1995, White and Kawczk 
shared an apartment for one and one-half to two months. 
{¶ 60} Kawczk testified that White was popular in school, “got along with 
a lot of people at school,” and participated in activities with others.  White and 
Kawczk went driving together.  He took her to the homecoming dance, double-
dating with another couple, and to a party afterward where they “hung out” with 
other students.  They attended high-school sporting events together. 
{¶ 61} Kawczk testified that White purchased a used truck and helped her 
when she purchased a used car.  When he drove, White obeyed traffic rules.  
When White decided to rent an apartment, he signed a lease and made a deposit.  
White also directed Kawczk to conceal from the landlord that she was living there 
with him. 
{¶ 62} Kawczk testified that White had taught her to play spades, a card 
game, and a fast-moving card game called “speed.”  He also played basketball 
and “Mortal Kombat,” a fast-paced video game, which he won about half the 
time.  He could cook bacon and eggs and heat refrigerated chicken wings in the 
oven. 
{¶ 63} Dr. Hammer was present in the courtroom during Kawczk’s 
testimony.4  Dr. Hammer testified that White’s family had already told him, in the 
October 2003 interview, many of the facts Kawczk related in her testimony. 
{¶ 64} Nevertheless, after Kawczk testified, Dr. Hammer rescored the 
SIB-R to reflect information gleaned from her testimony.  As a result, Dr. 
Hammer increased White’s scores on five of the 259 items.  This revision did not 
significantly improve White’s overall score, which rose only two points, from 55 
                                                 
4.  Ordinarily, White, as the party bearing the burden of persuasion, would have 
presented his evidence first.  However, the parties and the trial court agreed to let the state present 
Kawczk as the first witness so that Dr. Hammer could hear her testimony. 
January Term, 2008 
15 
to 57.  Hence, rescoring the test did not alter Dr. Hammer’s opinion that White is 
mentally retarded. 
{¶ 65} According to the undisputed testimony of the expert witnesses in 
this case, the facts stated in Kawczk’s testimony are in no way inconsistent with 
mild mental retardation.  The mentally retarded are not necessarily devoid of all 
adaptive skills.  Indeed, “they may look relatively normal in some areas and have 
certain significant limitations in other areas.”  Mildly retarded persons can play 
sports, write, hold jobs, and drive.  Dr. Hammer testified that in determining 
whether a person is mentally retarded, one must focus on those adaptive skills the 
person lacks, not on those he possesses. 
{¶ 66} The trial court’s analysis appears to disregard this testimony.  For 
example, the trial court’s opinion mentions twice that White was a licensed driver.  
However, Dr. Hammer testified that a mildly retarded individual can qualify for a 
driver’s license and that licensed-driver status is not a good criterion for 
distinguishing between people who are and are not retarded. 
{¶ 67} Similarly, the trial court found that White “was adept at video 
games, including * * * ‘Mortal Kombat.’ ”  It is not clear, however, what 
relevance White’s video-game skills have to mental retardation.  Dr. Hammer 
testified that Mortal Kombat “doesn’t require a lot of planning [or] strategizing” 
and can be played by children younger than ten. 
{¶ 68} The trial court’s analysis was also misdirected in stressing that 
White’s family and peers did not perceive White to be lacking in adaptive 
behavior skills.  Both experts testified that laymen cannot easily recognize mild 
mental retardation.  Likewise, the trial court erred in focusing on whether White 
had exhibited behavior that was “bizarre” or “out of the ordinary.”  There was no 
evidence that bizarre behavior is a necessary attribute of the mentally retarded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 69} Especially relevant here is Dr. Hammer’s already cited observation 
that retarded individuals “may look relatively normal in some areas and have * * 
* significant limitations in other areas.”  (Emphasis added.)  In light of that 
unrebutted testimony, the impressions of White’s peers as relayed by Kawczk 
lend no support to the findings of the trial court. 
{¶ 70} We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
determined that White had failed to prove the existence of significant adaptive-
skills limitations.  In this case, the trial court failed to set forth any rational basis 
grounded in the evidence for rejecting the uncontradicted testimony of two 
qualified expert witnesses in the field of psychology. 
{¶ 71} A trial court is not required to automatically accept expert opinions 
offered from the witness stand, whether on mental retardation or on any other 
subject.  See State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 210, 543 N.E.2d 1250 
(expert 
testimony 
is 
not 
necessarily 
conclusive); 
Ex 
parte 
Briseno 
(Tex.Crim.App.2004), 135 S.W.3d 1, 9 (although experts may offer insightful 
opinions, ultimate issue of mental retardation is for the trier of fact).  
Nevertheless, expert opinion “may not be arbitrarily ignored, and some reason 
must be objectively present for ignoring expert opinion testimony.” (Emphasis 
added.)  United States v. Hall (C.A.5, 1978), 583 F.2d 1288, 1294.  See also State 
v. Brown (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 133, 134-135, 5 OBR 266, 449 N.E.2d 449 (trial 
court erred by disregarding expert opinions that defendant was insane, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary). 
{¶ 72} In this case, the anecdotal evidence on which the trial court 
focused its attention was largely irrelevant.  Moreover, to the extent that the 
anecdotal evidence was relevant, Dr. Hammer took it into account in scoring the 
SIB-R.  There was no evidence calling into doubt the reliability of the SIB-R. 
January Term, 2008 
17 
{¶ 73} Nor did the trial court make any finding that the expert witnesses 
before it lacked either credentials or credibility.  On the contrary, the court 
described Dr. Hammer as “a distinguished expert” with “impressive” credentials.  
And the trial court’s rejection of the expert testimony was not based on any 
credibility determination.  The trial court stated: “It is not so much that Dr. 
Hammer’s testimony lacks credibility, as * * * that the ingredients for the [SIB-R] 
test are patently at odds with the credible testimony of Ms. Kawczk.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 74} While the trial court is the trier of fact, it may not disregard 
credible and uncontradicted expert testimony in favor of either the perceptions of 
lay witnesses or of the court’s own expectations of how a mentally retarded 
person would behave.  Doing so shows an arbitrary, unreasonable attitude toward 
the evidence before the court and constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
2. Onset before Age 18 
{¶ 75} The trial court also determined that White had failed to prove that 
his adaptive-skills limitations began before age 18.  Whether the trial court’s 
determination of this issue was correct was necessarily raised by appellant’s 
assignment of error in the court of appeals.  However, it was not addressed in the 
appellate court’s opinion.  Apparently, the court of appeals believed that its 
review of the “pre-age 18 onset” issue was unnecessary because it was upholding 
the adaptive-skills finding of the trial court.  Because we have determined that the 
trial court erred in making this finding, however, we must now address the “pre-
age 18 onset” issue.  In the interest of judicial economy, we will address that issue 
today, in order to make a complete and final resolution of this matter while the 
record is before us. 
{¶ 76} A finding that White’s adaptive-skills limitations began after age 
18 would preclude a finding of mental retardation under Lott.  However, White 
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claims that the trial court’s determination in this regard was also an abuse of 
discretion.  Upon our review of the record, we must agree. 
{¶ 77} Although no adaptive-skills tests had ever been conducted on 
White before he reached the age of 18, Dr. Hammer believed that White would 
have attained a low score had such testing been conducted.  The state introduced 
no evidence to the contrary.  Yet the trial court found that Dr. Hammer’s opinion, 
in the absence of any actual pre-18 adaptive-skills testing, was “conjectur[al]” 
and did not establish the existence of adaptive deficits before the age of 18. 
{¶ 78} In our view, the trial court’s finding on this issue does not comport 
with the evidence in the record.  Although White had taken neither an IQ test nor 
an adaptive-skills test before age 18, Drs. Hammer and Fabian were able to 
review White’s academic records.  These records strongly support the experts’ 
conclusion that White’s intellectual and adaptive deficits had their onset before 
age 18. 
{¶ 79} White’s academic records attest to his poor performance in school.  
When White was in seventh grade, during the 1985-1986 school year, he failed 
seven of ten subjects.  The next year, he repeated seventh grade and failed four of 
nine subjects.  In eighth grade, White failed two of eight subjects. 
{¶ 80} During his eighth-grade year, White took the California 
Achievement Test (“CAT”), described by Dr. Fabian as “an academic 
achievement test similar [to] or [the] same as the WRAT.”  White’s CAT scores 
reflect a performance well below the eighth-grade level.  CAT scores indicated 
that his reading abilities were at the fourth-grade level and his language abilities 
at the third-grade level.  His best subject on the CAT was mathematics, but even 
there, he reached only a sixth-grade level. 
{¶ 81} In 1988, the 15-year-old White was placed in an alternative school, 
but continued to perform poorly.  In ninth grade, his grade-point average was 
January Term, 2008 
19 
1.625.  In tenth grade, White failed six of the seven courses in which he was 
awarded a grade.  At 17, he repeated tenth grade and failed every course in which 
he received a grade.  At 18, he repeated tenth grade again, this time failing six of 
seven courses.  At 19, he was placed in the tenth grade for a fourth time, but 
school authorities later removed him because he was too old. 
{¶ 82} Dr. Hammer’s interviews with White’s family corroborated the 
picture that emerges from White’s records.  The family told Dr. Hammer that 
White “was having trouble with schoolwork, that he oftentimes would not let 
people * * * help him, he would become easily frustrated when people would try 
to help him * * * with the academic things.”  White’s childhood academic 
performance, as reflected in both school records and family interviews, “was 
basically consistent with mild mental retardation,” according to Dr. Hammer. 
{¶ 83} Finally, there was no evidence to suggest that White’s current 
impairments could be explained by anything that happened after he turned 18, 
such as a brain injury.  Dr. Hammer testified that White’s records contained no 
evidence of any such event.  Nor does anything in White’s history indicate that he 
functioned at a higher level before age 18 than he does today. 
{¶ 84} As Dr. Hammer explained, the purpose of the “onset before age 
18” requirement is to distinguish true retardation from cognitive impairments 
acquired later in life and caused by brain injuries or mental conditions.  Both 
expert witnesses testified that a person’s mental-retardation status does not change 
over his lifetime.  Hence, if an adult is found to have intellectual and adaptive 
deficits not caused by a brain injury or illness, it can be inferred that those deficits 
have existed since childhood. 
{¶ 85} We think that the trial court, by rejecting well-supported expert 
opinion regarding pre-18 onset without any evidence to the contrary, abused its 
discretion.  The trial court gave too much weight to the fact that White’s adaptive 
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skills were never tested before age 18.  As Dr. Hammer explained in his 
testimony, such testing will often not have taken place, particularly in cases of 
mild mental retardation. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 86} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’TOOLE, O’DONNELL, 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, J. 
__________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
David Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Kathryn L. Sandford and 
Richard J. Vickers, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Michael Kirkman and Jane P. Perry, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio 
Legal Rights Service and The Arc of Ohio. 
______________________