Title: Champion v. Commonwealth

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

CORRECTED: JUNE 23, 2017
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2017
‘TO BE PUBLISHED

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DENNIS CHAMPION APPELLANT

‘ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2015-CA-000886
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-M-20356 AND 2015-XX-00006

 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE,

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
REVERSING AND REMANDING
‘The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government adopted Ordinance
14-5 prohibiting all begging and soliciting from public streets or intersections
within the urbiari-county area.t Dennis Champion was arrested and charged
with violating this ordinance. He appeals the judgment of conviction and
sentence that followed his conditional guilty plea to that charge in district
court. We granted Champion's motion for discretionary review of the circuit-
court judgment affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence on appeal.
We now reverse the circuit-court’s decision and remand the case to district,

court for dismissal of the charge against Champion because we hold that’

2 See LFUCG Ordinance 14-5.
Ordinance 14-5 is a content-based regulation of expression that
unconstitutionally abridges freedom of speech under the First Amendment.

1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

In 2007, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government enacted

Ordinance 14-5, a blanket prohibition against all “begging and solicitation of
alms.” Precisely, the ordinance criminializes the following behavior:

(1) No person shall beg or solicit upon the public streets or at the
intersection of said public streets within the urban county area.

(2) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) or be
imprisoned not less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty (30)
days or both for each offense.

According to the text of the ordinance, any person in the city streets or at city
intersections seeking any form of financial contribution may suffer criminal
liability despite the ordinance’s title suggesting this prohibition is limited only
to solicitation of “alms.”
"Dennis Champion was standing with a handmade sign at a prominent
Lexington intergection begging for financial assistance when he was epotted by
Jaw enforcement. The officer apprehended him and cited him for violation of
Ordinance 14-5. Champion failed to appear at his designated court date in
district court, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He was later:
arrested and arraigned, at which time he was offered a three-day jail sentence
with credit for jail-time served in exchange for a guilty plea. Champion entered
a conditional guilty plea, and the district court entered judgment accordingly.
Champion appealed the judgment to circuit court.

On appeal, Champion challenged the constitutionality of Lexington’s
ordinance, reising fwo primary arguments, First, he questioned the legitimacy

2

 
of Ordinance 14-5 as a valid exercise of local governmental power to criminalize
articular behavior.? And second, hé challenged the ordinance as an
unconstitutional abridgement of his freedom of speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The circuit court rejected
Champion's arguments and affirmed the district court conviction. Champion
then sought discretionary review in the Kentucky Court of Appeals, but the
appellate court declined to take his case.

IL, ANALYSIS,

A. First Amendment Standards of Review.
‘The First Amendment to the United States Constitution boldly declares

that “Congress shall inake no Law...abridging the freedom of speech.”® This
reflects, congruently with other First Amendment freedoms, the fundamental
‘American principle that “each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”*
Indeed, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
it finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."® Under the Free Speech
Clause, a government is powerless to restrict an expression because of its
“message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”

 

2 Because we hold that the ordinance is unconstitutional under the First
‘Amendment, it doee not matter whether the city had the power to enact it or not. So
‘we will not address that issue in today’s opinion.

9U.S, Const. amend. I

+ Agency for Intern. Development v. Aliiance for Open Society, Intern., Inc., 183
8.Ct 2321, 2327 (2013) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 US.
622, 641 (1994).

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

3
CORRECTED: May 15, 2017

© This maxim applies equally to federal, state, and municipal
‘governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Panhandling itself can simplistically be defined as “any in-person
solicitation for immediate charitable giving of either cash or goods for the
purpose of benefiting the person doing the solicitation.”* But despite the
societal stigma associated with panhandling, this form of expression is widely
considered to be constitutionally protected speech. In Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, the Supreme Court reviewed a statute requiring that
any charity engaging in door-to-door solicitation must dedicate at least
seventy-five percent of its proceeds to charitable purposes. But the Court
ruled that solicitation intrinsically contained both political and economic
expression, and held that it would not engage in the process of determining
which aspects of a particular charitable éolicitation were constitutionally
Protected speech and which were not.10 So Schaumburg appears to stand for
the proposition that solicitation on behalf of charitable organizations is.
constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment.

‘ Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

7 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Notably, the Kentucky
Constitution also protects both “the right of freely communicating their thoughts and
opinions” and “the right of acquiring and protecting property.” Ky. Const. § 1. Because
‘Champion only argues against Ordinance 14-5 under the federal Constitution, we
need not determine today whether Section 1's free-speech provision affords a greater
protection independent of the First Amendment,

* Anthony D. Lauriello, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
116 Colum. L: Rev. 1105, 1107 (2016).

9 444 U.S, 620 (1980).

18 Id. at 632.
‘The Supreme Court has yet to extend fully this protection to individuals
soliciting for their own weli-being, But the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did
embrace this rule in Loper v. New York City Police Dept.!! The reviewing court
labeled panhandling ‘communicative activity,” and, in light of Schaumburg,
held there is “litte difference Between those who solicit for organized charities

and those who solicit for themselves."!2 This position has been adopted by a
So

 

host of other circuits, including our own Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
wwe are confident that case law and ‘normative considerations'* support the
‘ultimate conclusion that panhandling is constitutionally protected speech.
Accordingly, because this form of expression is not, in and of itself, treated
differently under the First Amendment, we must review panhandling

19 999 F.2d 699 (2nd Cir. 1993).

12d. at 704.

13 Soe Speet v. Schuette, 867 (6th Cir. 2013) (validating Michigan statute
‘against begging because “begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment

protects.") Id. at 875. For a survey of other circuit courts of appeal, see Reynolds v.
Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir, 2015); Gresham v. Pereson, 225 F.3d 899, 904
(7th Cir, 2000); ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F. 3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2006); and
‘Smith v. Cty of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 955-56 (11th Cir, 1999}.

It should also be noted that each of these decisions predates the
Court's ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 8,Ct. 2218 (2018), The Reed decision.
may have further insulated this position within the lower federal courts because ofits
impact on a reviewing court's determination of whether a regulation of specch is
content-based. See infra. This has already ect off a chain reaction of lower federal

courts invalidating state or local panbandling laws. See Norton v. City of Springfield,
{806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J) (reversing earlier decision relating to
panhandling regulation following Reed) and Thayer v. City of Worcester, 135 S.Ct.
2887 (2015) (remanding for consideration in light of Reed).

4 See Lauriello, supra note 8 at 1121 (academia has suggested panhandling
hhas First Amendment value for raising awareness to societal ills such as homelessness
‘and poverty, it may inform voter choices in the ballot box, it forces passersby to
evaluate their own thoughts on giving alms to the needy, and it allows beggars the
self-realization to express their values and share their plight with society in general.)
‘See also Helen Hershkof & Adam 8. Cohen, Commentary, Begging to Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 896, 898 (1991).

5
regulations under the same standard we would review any other regulation of
Protected speech.

Critical to any First Amendment analysis is, as a threshold matter, the
type of forum implicated in any governmental speech regulation. Public streets
‘and intersections are paradigmatic examples of traditional public forums—
areas that serve an important function for ‘purposes of assembly,
‘communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”!5
Public forums enjoy a “special position in terms of First Amendment
protection” because of the critical role they play in fostering public debate,
expression, and assembly.16 And as such, any content-based laws—those that
target particular speech based on its communicative content—are
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”!7

In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
an Arizona sign code as an unconstitutional content-based regulation of free
speech. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, wrote that “Government
regulation of speech is content based if @ law applies to particular speech
because of the topic discussed or the idea the message expressed.”!8 As matter
of common sense, this requires a reviewing court to “consider whether a
regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message it

‘Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1938).
48 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 8.Ct. 1207 (2011) (quoting United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
1 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 195 8.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
18 id. at 2297. .
6
conveys.”!9 This analysis is independent of whether the government intends to
favor or disfavor the type of speech in an underlying regulation; such laws
‘must still survive strict scrutiny.

‘The circuit court affirmed Champion’s conviction because it determined
Lexington’s Ordinance 14-5 is a content-neutral regulation of speech, thereby
requiring a less-exacting standard of scrutiny to remain constitutionally viable.
But this opinion was issued before the Supreme Court's decision in Reed. So
‘we must now review Ordinance 14-5's constitutionality in light of this most
recent addition to First Amendment jurisprudence.

B. Ordinance 14-5 is a Content-Based Regulation of Speech.

As the initial prong in his constitutional challenge, Champion argues
that Ordinance 14-5 is a content-based regulation of speech, which would
accordingly trigger strict-scrutiny review. The circuit court disagreed and.
declared the ordinance content-neutral. But Lexington now concedes, in light
of Reed, that its ordinance distinguishes speech based on the underlying
message. Because of evolving Supreme Court precedent, we agree that
Ordinance 14-5 is content-based.

‘The Supreme Court’s ruling in Reed can’be seen as a paradigm shift in
speech legislation. To be sure, long before Reed, the

 

the interpretation of public-
Court took strong positions in determining whether a statute engaged in
content-based regulation. In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court
reviewed a picketing statute that barred picketing within 150 feet of schools

 

id.
29 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
7
during the school day, notably excluding labor disputes from its strictures.2!
‘The ordinance was found unconstitutional as an unacceptable content-based
regulation of speech. To engage in such discrimination, the Court held,
“completely undercuts] the ‘profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open."22
But over time, court precedent chiseled away at this bright-line
understanding of regulation on the basis of conteiit—particularly in cases
involving sexually explicit entertainment. The Supreme Court upheld
regulations specific to adult theaters by determining that such laws may be
‘ustified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” because of
the “secondary effects” of conduct surrounding those enterprises.2° And later,
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court adopted a new standard for content
neutrality, stating that the “principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality...is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”2" So following Ward, an
otherwise content-based regulation of speech may be content-neutral (and
subject to less-exacting scrutiny) simply if the purpose and justification for the

law are neutral.

21 408 U.S. 92 (1972).

22 Id at 96. See also Brenoznik u. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (the
government has no power to “selectively...shield the public from some kinds of speech
fon the ground that they are more offensive than others.”

2 City of Reriton v, Playtime Theaters, Inc, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).

2 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) The Court elaborated, saying “The government's

purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated
to the content of the expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect

‘on some speakers or messages but not others.” Id.
8

 
‘The Reed Court rejected this approach. The government's purpose is only
relevant to this analysis after concluding that the regulation is facially content-
neutral.25 “Strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face
or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based.”26 And

accordingly,
Jaw is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of review."2” Ward's

court must evaluate each question before it concludes that the

 

framework, and in turn, the government's intent, only matter if the statute is
facially neutral;
distinguishes different forms of constitutionally protected speech, offering a
different set of nules for each.2® In essence, content neutrality is determined by
two separate and unique questions. So if we conclude Lexington’s Ordinance
14-5 discriminates against the content of speech on its face, it matters not
whether Lexington imposed this regulation to target certain views or because it
disfavored those engaged in begging.

‘As noted earlier, panhandling typically refers to immediate in-person
charitable giving, This is actually more limited than Ordinance 14-5's

offers no relief to government censorship when it blatantly

 

prohibition of all begging or soliciting in public streets. The Lexington
ordinance contemplates far more activity than individual immediate

2 Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2228.

% Id. (emphasis added).

mu.

28 Indeed, “Innocent motives do riot eliminate the danger of censorship
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one
Gay wield sich statutes to suppress disfavored speech.” id. at 2229. See also Hil v.
Colorado, §30 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The vice of content-based
legislation...is not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but
that i lends itself to use for those purposes").

® See Lauriello, supra note 8.

 

9
solicitations, and these expressions in particular have traditionally employed
constitutional protection in courts of law. But make no mistake, the ordinance,
on its face, prohibits a specific type of message from display in public streets
where all other forms of speech remain legal.

On its face, Ordinance 14-5 singles out speech for criminal liability based
solely on its particularized message. Only citizens seeking financial assistance
on public streets and intersections face prosecution. For example, someone
standing at a prominent Lexington intersection displaying a sign that reads
“Jesus loves you,” or one that says ‘Not my President” has no fear of criminal
liability under the ordinance. But another person displaying a sign on public
streets reading “Homeless please help” may be convicted of a misdemeanor.
‘The only thing distinguishing these two people is the content of their messages.
‘Thus, to enforce Ordinance 14-5, law enforcement would have to examine the
content of the message conveyed to determine whether a violation has
occurred. This then, in effect, prohibits public discussion in a traditional public
forum of an entire topic. And as a result, this ordinance is unambiguously
content-based and is presumptively unconstitutional.

‘The true beauty of the First Amendment is that it treats both Cicero and
the vagabond as equals without prejuidice to thieir message. Freedom of speech
does not exist for us to talk about the weather; to accept this liberty is to
welcome controversy and to embrace discomfort, Just as the government may
not ban Lolita because it is Lolita, it likewise may not criminalize the beggar for
begging—no matter how noble or altruistic its intentions may be.

‘There is rarely a constitutionally valid reason for the government to filter

the topics for public discourse, We cannot accept different rules and different
10
procedures for different forms of protected speech without at least
subconsciously injecting our own subjective values and without implicitly
‘engaging in censorship. So it follows that any law regulating speech by its
content—as we have just declared Ordinance 14-5 does—is only law if it
satisfies our most engaging form of scrutiny. And we now turn our attention to
address that question.
©. Application of Strict Scrutiny.

Now that we have conclusively determined that Ordinance 14-5 regulates

particular speech on the basis of its content, Lexington bears the burden of
establishing that this limitation survives strict scrutiny.® For the ordinance to
remain in effect, the government must satisfactorily prove to us that
criminalizing begging and solicitation alone on public streets and intersections
furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that end.*? It is clear
to us that Lexington cannot offer evidence of a compelling interest, and it most
certainly cannot say this law is adequately structured to satisfy the interest it
asserts in its defense.

‘As a presumptively invalid statute, Lexington now bears the burdén of
showing that its content-based regulation of speech exists to safeguard
Individual rights rather than to inhibit them. And this is an admittedly
challenging burden to meet. But when a lawmaking body threatens an
individual's rudimentary fundamental right, it should do so only out of
absolute necessity and by the least-restrictive means possible. If government
‘wishes to restrain an individual right in effort to remedy a societal problem, we

 

% See Reed, 195 8.Ct. at 2231.
31 See id,
W
do not presume the problem exists; the governing body must prove and justify
that the behavior in question actually harms society.

‘Lexington’s primary justification for Ordinance 14-5—a reason it
declares satisfies even strict scrutiny—is the city’s desire to ensure public
safety and to ensure the free flow of traffic. And no doubt, this is something the
‘Supreme Court has recognized as a legitimate governmental goal in regulating
activities in its streets and sidewalks.*? More particularly, Lexington claims the
city has a compelling interest in regulating interactions between pedestrians
and people driving vehicles. According to the city, the act of stepping into the
‘streets to get money from the motorist and then proceeding to the next vehicle
in line impedes traffic and risks the pedestrian’s safety.

But the problem with Lexington’s rationale is the total lack of evidence
that prohibiting panhandling furthers this governmental interest. We have been.
offered no evidence of traffic delays or auto accidents resulting from
pedestrians—panhandlers in particular—approaching stopped motorists. Just
because public safety is recognized as a compelling government interest does
not empower the government to enact any measure or target particularized
behavior in its name without justification. And invocation of that interest in
this instance is disingenuous at best. Adding insult to injury, this was not the
particular behavior for which Champion was cited; law enforcement cited
(Champion for holding a sign at an intersection, not approaching stopped

% See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (recognizing “the
imacy of the government's interests in ensuring public safety and order promoting
the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks...)
12
vehicles. Without additional information, we have no proof he even targeted
stopped motorists with this speech.

Bren if we accept Lexington's assertion that Ordinance 14-5 furthers its
compelling interest to promote public safety and free traffic flow, this law is
hopelessly under and overinclusive. The ordinance is underinclusive because
Lexington has not bothered to explain why panhandling poses a greater risk to,
public safety than other forms of speech. We have been given no reason to
believe that begging presents substantially greater risks than similar conduct,
such as street performances or simply asking for directions. And the ordinance
is overinclusive because it chills speech otherwise unrelated to interfering with
traffic. A person targeting only pedestrians for in-person donations is equally
culpable under this ordinance that is allegedly designed for traffic safety. The
law does not justify why signage seeking help is inherently more dangerous
that one directing motorists to a nearby car-wash fundraiser.

This is not to say we categorically reject the city’s interest in ensuring
safe and efficient roadways; there is just simply no indication only one form of
expression has actually served to make city streets less safe. And there remain
a number of content-neutral ways the city could achieve the same goals
without unjustifiably abridging individual rights to free speech. For instance,
Lexington could prohibit all individuals from approaching stopped motorists—
this more directly targets the behavior the city seeks to alleviate and does so
without regard to why an individual steps into traffic. Laws that promote
public safety reflect a fundamental government purpose when precisely enacted
and not invoked as pretext to achieve other social interests.

13,
‘So under a close and careful review of First Amendment precedent and
Principles, we must unavoidably hold that Lexington Ordinance 14-5 is an
‘uncoisstitutional regulation of speech.

I, CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and
hold that Lexington’s Ordinance 14-5 is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case
is remanded to the Fayette District Court with direction that the charge against
Champion be dismissed.

All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Hughes, Keller, Venters, and Wright, JJ.,
concur. Cunningham and VanMeter, JJ., concur in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy

‘COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear
‘Attorney General of Kentucky

Raymond M. Larson
‘Commonwealth Attorney

John Jason Rothrocl
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE: THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(ACLU):

William Ellis Sharp
ACLU of Kentucky
‘Tad Thomas
‘Thomas Law Offices
Lindsy Lopez
‘Thomas Law Offices
14
Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000570-DG
DENNIS CHAMPION APPELLANT

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
v. CASE NO, 2015-CA-000886
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-M-20356 AND 2015-XX-00006

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
ORDER CORRECTING

‘The Opinion of the Court rendered February 16, 2017 is corrected on its
face by substitution of the attached Opinion in lieu of the original Opinion.

‘Said correction does not affect the holding of the original Opinion of the
Court.

ENTERED: June'23, 2017

IEF JUSTICE