Title: Jahnke v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jahnke v. State1984 WY 114692 P.2d 911Case Number: 83-121Decided: 12/12/1984DEBORAH ANN JAHNKE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
DEBORAH ANN JAHNKE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
Terry W. Mackey 
and Robert W. Tiedeken of Terry W. Mackey, P.C., and Jeff Brinkerhoff, Legal 
Intern for Terry W. Mackey, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Dennis C. Cook, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Carroll, Dist. Atty., 
and Jon Forwood, Deputy Dist. Atty., Laramie County, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The critical question 
to be resolved in this case is whether voluntary manslaughter is a 
lesser-included offense when the charged offense is murder in the first degree; 
more specifically, whether the offense of aiding and abetting voluntary 
manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting first degree 
murder. Other issues presented relate to the denial of the suppression of the 
teenage defendant's statement to sheriff's officers; the constitutionality of 
vesting discretion in the prosecuting attorney to determine whether charges 
should be filed in juvenile court or in the district court where the defendant 
is treated as an adult; and the legality of the sentence imposed when appraised 
in the light of the state constitution.

[¶2.]     Deborah Ann Jahnke was 
charged by Information with aiding and abetting her brother in the first degree 
murder of their father, and with conspiracy to commit first degree murder.1 A motion to transfer the case from 
district court, where Deborah Jahnke was charged as an adult, to juvenile court 
was denied. At her trial the district court admitted her statement to the 
officers of the sheriff's department into evidence and instructed on the 
lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter. After her 
conviction of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter and her acquittal of 
other charges the district court sentenced her to serve not less than three nor 
more than eight years in the Women's CorrectionalCenter. We affirm the district 
court.

[¶3.]     In her brief in this 
appeal Deborah Jahnke states the issues as follows:

"I.

"THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 13, 21, and 22, BY 
WHICH THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED THAT THEY COULD FIND THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF AIDING AND ABETTING VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER UPON A 
SUDDEN HEAT OF PASSION.

"II.

"THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HER STATEMENT AND IN 
PERMITTING HER STATEMENT TO BE USED AGAINST HER AT TRIAL.

"III.

"THE DISCRETION VESTED IN 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY BY SECTION 14-6-203(c), W.S. (1977) (CUM.SUPP. 1983), 
WHICH PERMITTED THE APPELLANT, A JUVENILE, TO BE CHARGED AS AN ADULT IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE.

"(a) Section 14-6-203(c) 
W.S. (1977) (Cum.Supp. 1983) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation 
of powers by placing judicial power in the hands of an executive officer as 
proscribed by Art. 2 Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution.

"(b) Section 14-6-203(c) 
W.S. (1977) (Cum.Supp. 1983) violates Appellant's right to due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1 Section 6 
of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

"(c) The discretion 
vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) W.S. (1977) (Cum.Supp. 
1983) deprived Appellant of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the 
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by Art. 1 Section 2 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution.

"IV.

"THE SENTENCE IMPOSED 
UPON APPELLANT VIOLATED ART. I SECTION 15 OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION."

[¶4.]     The brief of the State 
of Wyoming 
rephrases the same issues in this manner:

"I. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
MANSLAUGHTER?

"II. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HER STATEMENTS OR 
CONFESSIONS?

"III. DOES SECTION 
14-6-203(c) PASS MUSTER UNDER BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
HAVING TO DO WITH THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW?

"IV. DOES APPELLANT'S 
SENTENCE VIOLATE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 15 OF THE WYOMING CONSTITUTION?"

[¶5.]     The facts surrounding 
the killing of the Jahnke children's father have been reviewed in the case of Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 
(1984). They can be reiterated briefly. Following years of both physical and 
psychological abuse of the children by the father, matters came to a head on the 
evening of November 16, 1982. After an altercation between the deceased father, 
Richard Chester Jahnke, and Deborah Jahnke's brother, Richard John Jahnke, which 
included the father's striking the brother with his fists, the Jahnke children's 
parents went out to dinner. While they were gone Richard made elaborate 
preparations for confronting his father. These preparations included loading 
firearms and placing them at several "back-up" locations throughout the house; 
putting the family pets in the basement for their safety; and waiting in a 
darkened garage with a shotgun loaded with slugs for the parents to return. When 
the parents did return Richard Jahnke shot six times through the garage door, 
with four of the slugs striking the father and killing him almost 
instantly.

[¶6.]     Deborah Ann Jahnke's 
role in these events began on that evening when she observed the assault upon 
her brother, Richard, and heard her father tell her brother, "We're going to get 
rid of you, we don't know how we're going to, but we're going to get rid of 
you." Deborah Jahnke stated that where her brother went she also went, but she 
was rebuffed by the father, who told her, "Shut up, you slut" and sent her back 
into her own room. From her bedroom Deborah Jahnke heard the events of still 
another verbal and physical assault upon the brother. Just before the parents 
left, the father returned to the house and shoved the brother, Richard, against 
the wall, stating "I'm really disgusted with the shit you turned out to be. I 
don't want you to be here when I get back."

[¶7.]     Deborah Jahnke watched 
as her brother changed the ammunition in a modified .12 gauge shotgun, the death 
weapon, from what their father referred to as "candy-cane mix" to the fatal 
slugs. While the brother, Richard, was placing loaded weapons in "back-up" 
positions in the family room and the basement, he told Deborah to get her shoes 
on because he wanted to get her out of the house before the parents returned. 
Deborah put her shoes on, but she made no further preparations to leave because 
she began experiencing feelings of guilt about leaving her brother there alone. 
She decided not to leave but that instead she would stay to help her 
brother.

[¶8.]     After this decision 
Richard demonstrated the use of two of the weapons, a 30.06 rifle in the 
basement and an M-1 carbine, to Deborah. Deborah explained that the M-1 carbine 
was selected for her to use because it kicked less than the other weapons. Other 
preparations made by the Jahnke children included turning on a number of lights 
in the house for the purpose of creating temporary night blindness for the 
father if he was able to enter the house; shutting off most of the exterior 
lights with the exception of those which illuminated the driveway outside of the 
garage; and placing the family pets in the basement to prevent them from being 
harmed or getting in the way. These latter two steps were accomplished at 
Deborah's suggestion. Deborah stated that she perceived her role as a type of 
backup in the event something went wrong.

[¶9.]     After Richard had 
stationed himself at his place of waiting in the garage, appellant on one 
occasion went into the garage and was escorted back into the family room by her 
brother, who told her to stay away. As he was returning to the garage Deborah 
asked Richard whether he intended to kill their mother also. Richard testified 
that Deborah was upset when he told her, "no," and she asked him to kill 
"Mom."

[¶10.]  The parents returned at approximately 
6:15 p.m., and as the father approached the garage from his parked vehicle 
Richard fired the fatal shots. In the statement that she furnished, Deborah said 
that she knew Richard was angry and would do something. She thought he would be 
active, but she did not expect "that he would just, you know, blow my father 
away." She heard the shots from the garage and wondered whether she should pick 
up the M-1 carbine. While trying to decide whether to grab the weapon, Deborah 
heard footsteps and her brother came down the hall from the garage area. Deborah 
ascertained that her mother was not shot, and went into her room, shut off her 
stereo, obtained a coat and book, and then fled with Richard through an open 
window from the master bedroom. They separated soon after they left the house, 
and she went out into the hills and plains adjacent to their 
home.

[¶11.]  After fleeing the house, Deborah 
proceeded toward a shopping mall, and from there to the area of a roller rink, 
where she spoke with two of her friends. She then went to the clubhouse of a 
large apartment complex, where she spent the night. When she awoke the next 
morning she borrowed a newspaper from the doorway of one of the apartments. She 
read the article about the events of the prior evening, replaced the newspaper, 
and went from the apartment complex to a nearby park which she was seen entering 
at about 6:30 a.m. Then Deborah was picked up by a deputy sheriff, and she 
agreed to accompany the sheriff's officers to their office to 
talk.

[¶12.]  Two days after the father's death, on 
November 18, 1982, a formal complaint was filed charging Deborah Jahnke with 
aiding and abetting her brother, Richard, in the commission of first degree 
murder and with conspiracy to commit first degree murder. She appeared before a 
county court judge and waived her right to a preliminary hearing, and she was 
bound over to the district court. On December 1, 1982, the Information, charging 
the same offenses as those included in the complaint, was filed in the district 
court. Deborah Jahnke was arraigned on December 3, 1982, at which time she 
entered pleas of not guilty to both counts of the Information. A Motion to 
Transfer to Juvenile Court System was filed on her behalf, and following a 
hearing this motion was denied on February 23, 1983. Deborah Jahnke also 
presented a motion to suppress her statements, which was denied after the court 
found those statements to have been obtained after a knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary waiver of her right to remain silent.

[¶13.]  The trial in this case began on March 7, 
1983, three weeks after the trial in the case of the brother, Richard. Following 
the close of the evidence the district court did instruct the jury on the 
lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter. On March 
10, 1983, the jury returned its verdict, finding the appellant guilty of the 
offense of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter and acquitting her of the 
other charges. The Judgment and Sentence on that verdict was entered on May 23, 
1983. Deborah Jahnke was sentenced to serve not less than three nor more than 
eight years in the Women's CorrectionalCenter for her participation in the 
patricide. Additional facts essential to the justification of our disposition of 
the appeal will be presented in connection with the discussion of the several 
issues.

[¶14.]  The first issue to be addressed is the 
propriety of the trial court's instructions to the jury with respect to the 
lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter. Those 
instructions were:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 13

"If you are not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, 
she may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which 
is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to 
establish her guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt."

"The offense of aiding 
and abetting first degree murder with which the defendant is charged, includes 
the lesser offense of aiding and abetting second degree murder and also includes 
the lesser offense of aiding and abetting voluntary 
manslaughter."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 21

"Pertinent portions of 
the Wyoming 
statutes provide as follows:

"`Whoever unlawfully 
kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, . . . voluntarily, 
upon a sudden heat of passion . . . is guilty of 
manslaughter'."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 22

"The necessary elements 
of voluntary manslaughter are: 

"1. The crime occurred 
within the county 
of Laramie on or about the 
date of November 16, 1983; and

"2. The principal killed 
a human being; and

"3. The principal acted 
voluntarily

"4. Upon a sudden heat of 
passion."

[¶15.]  The first aspect of Deborah Jahnke's 
argument is that voluntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense with 
respect to the charge of murder in the first degree. Traditionally, with the 
exception of a charge of felony murder,2 voluntary manslaughter has been 
considered a lesser-included offense to the charge of murder. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 (1896); State v. 
Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786; Searles v. 
State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 386 (1979); State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 276 P.2d 434 (1954); Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 
167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942); Espy v. 
State, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549 (1939); State v. Lantzer, 55 Wyo. 230, 99 P.2d 73 (1940); Flory v. State, 40 Wyo. 
184, 276 P. 458 (1929); State v. 
Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 34 A.L.R. 1477 (1924), reh. denied 31 
Wyo. 499, 228 P. 283, 34 A.L.R. 1487 (1924); Meldrum v. State, 23 Wyo. 12, 146 P. 596 (1915); Nicholson v. State, 18 Wyo. 298, 106 P. 929 (1910); and Cook v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 110, 4 P. 887 
(1884). See also Evanson v. State, 
Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 (1976); State v. Gonzales, 46 Wyo. 52, 23 P.2d 354 (1933); Ivey v. State, 24 Wyo. 1, 154 P. 589 (1916); and Brantley v. State, 9 Wyo. 102, 61 P. 139 
(1900). In Brantley v. State, supra, 
61 P.  at 139-140, the relationship between the several degrees of homicide was 
described in this way:

"* * * [I]t is evident 
that in charging an intent to commit murder in the first degree there is 
necessarily included a charge of intent to commit murder in the second degree 
and voluntary manslaughter.

"Under our statute murder 
in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter each involves 
a felonious killing; to constitute the first it must be done with premeditated 
malice; the second is a killing with malice, but with the element of 
premeditation omitted, while in the case of voluntary manslaughter there is an 
intentional killing but without any element of malice or premeditation. It is 
therefore evident, we think, that the intent to commit murder in the second 
degree is specifically and sufficiently charged in the information and proof of 
such intent fitted the allegation. And so of intent to commit manslaughter. 
Proof can not be made of assault with intent to commit murder in the first 
degree which does not at the same time furnish appropriate and sufficient 
evidence to sustain a verdict for the lower, or included offenses of assault 
with intent to commit murder in the second degree and 
manslaughter."

[¶16.]  Despite this impressive historical array, 
Deborah Jahnke contends that a proper analysis of our recent decisions in Balsley v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 1324 (1983); Stamper v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 82 (1983); and State v. Selig, Wyo., 
635 P.2d 786 (1981), teaches that voluntary manslaughter cannot be a 
lesser-included offense when the charge is murder. She argues that the offense 
of voluntary manslaughter contains elements not found in the offense of first 
degree murder. The element which Deborah Jahnke contends is not included is that 
the killing must be "upon a sudden heat of passion" in order for voluntary 
manslaughter to be found. She compares the elements of the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter as given by the court with the elements of first degree murder and 
then applies the rules of the cases she relies upon to the end that there is a 
different and additional element.

[¶17.]  In State v. Selig, supra, 635 P.2d  at 790, 
we quoted the test for instructing on a lesser-included offense from United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294-1299 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 446 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 2947, 64 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1980) as follows:

"This Court has held that 
a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when the 
following five elements are present: (1) a proper request is made; (2) the 
elements of the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of the 
greater offense; (3) there is some evidence that would justify conviction of the 
lesser offense; (4) the proof on the element or elements differentiating the two 
crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the 
defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser-included offense, and 
(5) there is mutuality, i.e., a charge may be demanded by either the United 
States or the defense. * * *"

[¶18.]  Deborah Jahnke argues that in applying 
that test in her case three of the five factors are missing, but her particular 
focus is upon her argument that the second factor is not satisfied in this 
instance. She urges that the elements of the lesser offense are not identical to 
part of the elements of the greater offense because as voluntary manslaughter is 
defined the homicide must be "without malice" and "upon a sudden heat of 
passion," which elements are not present in the charged offense of murder in the 
first degree. Deborah Jahnke then points to the following language in Balsley v. State, supra, 668 P.2d at 
1329:

"In summary, we hold that 
a crime described by statute may not be necessarily included within another 
statutory offense unless all of the elements within the claimed lesser offense 
are to be found in the greater, and unless the greater offense cannot be 
committed without also committing the putative lesser 
offense."

[¶19.]  Rule 32(c), W.R.Cr.P., justifies the 
giving of lesser-included offense instructions at trial. It 
provides:

"Conviction of lesser offense. - The 
defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense 
necessarily included therein if the attempt is an 
offense."

This rule is 
identical to Rule 31(c), F.R. Cr.P., and federal cases which interpret the 
counterpart of our rule are highly persuasive. Balsley v. State, supra; Richmond v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1217 (1976); and Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 
(1976). The basic principles governing the giving of lesser-included offense 
instructions under the federal rule have been articulated by the Supreme Court 
of the United 
States in this way:

"* * * Rule 31(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant part, that the 
`defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged.' Thus, `[i]n a case where some of the elements of the crime charged 
themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the evidence justifie[s] 
it * * * [is] entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt 
of the lesser offense.' Berra v. United 
States, supra [351 U.S. 131, 76 S. Ct. 685, 100 L. Ed. 1013]. See Stevenson v. 
United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980. 
But a lesser-offense charge is not proper where, on the evidence presented, the 
factual issues to be resolved by the jury are the same as to both the lesser and 
greater offenses. Berra v. United 
States, supra; Sparf v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51, 63-64, 15 S. Ct. 273, 277-278, 39 L. Ed. 343. In other 
words, the lesser offense must be included within but not, on the facts of the 
case, be completely encompassed by the greater. A lesser-included offense 
instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury 
to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the 
lesser-included offense. Berra v. 
United States, supra; Sparf v. United States, supra, 156 U.S.  at 63-64, 
15 S. Ct.  at 277-278. * * *" Sansone v. 
United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-350, 85 S. Ct. 1004, 13 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1965).

[¶20.]  The fallacy in Deborah Jahnke's argument 
that it was error to instruct on the lesser-included offense is the assumption 
that killing "upon a sudden heat of passion" is truly an element of the offense 
of voluntary manslaughter. The statute in effect at the time of the homicide in 
this case adopted the common-law definition of the crime of voluntary 
manslaughter by declaring in pertinent portion that "[w]hoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, express or implied, * * * voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion * * * is guilty of manslaughter * * *." Section 6-4-107, 
W.S. 1977; State v. Lantzer, supra. 
The common-law offense of manslaughter was distinguished from the common-law 
crime of murder by the absence of malice in the commission of the homicide. 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries [*]190-201; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 151, p. 223 
(14th ed. 1979). At common law all voluntary homicides were presumed to be 
malicious unless there was a showing of adequate provocation to mitigate to 
voluntary manslaughter what otherwise would be murder. 4 W. Blackstone, supra, 
at [*]201; 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 455 (1st Am. ed. 1847); and 2 Wharton's 
Criminal Law § 153, p. 237. Accordingly, voluntary manslaughter was deemed to be 
a lesser-included offense of murder at common law. 1 Hale, supra, at 449; 2 W. 
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 619-620 (8th ed. 1824); and 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 
795, p. 567 (9th ed. 1923). The relationship between murder and manslaughter was 
summarized by Lord Hale as follows:

"Murder and manslaughter 
differ not in kind or nature of the offense, only in the degree, the former 
being the killing of a man of malice prepense, the latter upon sudden 
provocation and falling out." 1 Hale, supra, at 449.

[¶21.]  Following these precepts of the common 
law, the phrase "upon a sudden heat of passion" as used in § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, 
is descriptive of the provocation or lack of malice which makes a homicide 
manslaughter instead of murder. In State 
v. Helton, supra, 276 P.2d  at 442, this court stated:

"Our laws recognize an 
intermediate crime lying someplace between the excusable, justifiable or 
privileged killing of a human being, and the unlawful taking of a life with 
malice. This is an unlawful type of voluntary homicide which is not legally 
excused, privileged or justified, but wherein there is an absence of express 
legal, implied, or constructive malice. So we find in our law, that the 
intentional (i.e. voluntary) doing of the wrongful act, `upon a sudden heat of 
passion', although completely free of express, implied, constructive or legal 
malice, but committed without legal excuse, privilege or justification, is a 
punishable crime which we call voluntary manslaughter. This simply recognizes 
that there may be circumstances surrounding a killing which cannot be justified 
under the law of self-defense, and while not producing that degree of mental 
disturbance or aberration of the mind which is necessary in law to excuse the 
homicide, still leaves the mind devoid of that wicked, evil and unlawful 
purpose, or of that wilful disregard of the rights of others which is implied in 
the term `malice'. Such circumstances mitigate or extenuate the act and make the 
homicide a crime of lesser degree. The `sudden heat of passion' contemplated by 
our voluntary manslaughter statute is descriptive of just such a state of mind, 
and it may occur from any emotional excitement of such intensity that it 
temporarily obscures reason, or leaves the mind bereft of 
reason."

[¶22.]  We conclude that the descriptive phrase 
in the statute is simply a way of saying that the element of malice required for 
murder in the second degree and also murder in the first degree is not required. 
Consequently it is not a true element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, 
and we reaffirm prior decisions that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included 
offense with respect to charges of murder in the first degree and murder in the 
second degree under the statutes which were in effect at the time of this 
homicide.

[¶23.]  Deborah Jahnke also invokes the third 
factor of the test in United States v. 
Chapman, supra, as adopted by this court in State v. Selig, supra. She correctly 
asserts that there must be some evidence which would permit the jury rationally 
to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater 
offense before a lesser-included offense instruction is appropriate. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973); Stamper v. State, 
supra, 662 P.2d  at 93; Jones v. 
State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150 (1978); State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865 
(1945); and State v. Gonzales, supra. 
We have uniformly held that "the trial court should only give such instructions 
as arise from the evidence and that when the evidence shows that the defendant 
is either guilty or not guilty of the higher grade of the offense, the court is 
not required to instruct on the lesser offense." Oldham v. State, Wyo., 534 P.2d 107, 109 
(1975). See also Stamper v. State, 
supra, 662 P.2d  at 92; State v. 
Selig, supra, 635 P.2d  at 791; Neilson v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1326 
(1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980); and 
Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 P. 299, reh. denied 94 P. 217 (1908). In State v. Selig, supra, 635 P.2d  at 791, 
the significance of the evidence in a determination with respect to the giving 
of a lesser-included offense instruction was said to be:

"The third and fourth 
conditions prerequisite to the giving of lesser-included offense instructions 
necessitate consideration of the evidence in the given case. The evidence must 
be considered to determine whether or not there is evidence upon which a 
conviction for the lesser offense can be founded, and to determine whether or 
not there is sufficient dispute as to such evidence to justify a conviction on 
the lesser offense rather than the greater."

The 
determination of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 
evidence are questions to be resolved by the jury, and it follows that if there 
is any evidence which would permit the jury rationally to acquit a defendant of 
the greater offense and convict of the lesser, upon proper request the trial 
court must instruct on the lesser offense. United States v. Keeble, supra, 412 U.S. 
at 208, 93 S. Ct.  at 1995; Stevenson v. 
United States, supra, 162 U.S.  at 314-315, 16 S.Ct. at 839-40; Stamper v. State, supra, 662 P.2d at 
92-93; State v. Selig, supra, 635 P.2d  at 791; and Goodman v. State, 
Wyo., 573 P.2d 400 (1977).

[¶24.]  Deborah Jahnke contends in this regard 
that the evidence was not sufficient to support the giving of the 
lesser-included offense instructions on the charge of aiding and abetting 
voluntary manslaughter. In her view there was no evidence from which the jury 
rationally could conclude that her participation in the patricide was "upon a 
sudden heat of passion" which represents the intent or mental state required for 
the commission of voluntary manslaughter. Her argument in this regard is 
consistent with her contention that a "sudden heat of passion" is an element of 
the crime separate and apart from the requirement that the killing be done 
voluntarily but without malice. We have disposed of that contention. 
Nevertheless we must resolve Deborah Jahnke's claim that as an "accessory before 
the fact" it is incumbent upon the State to prove that her association and 
participation in the crime encompassed the state of mind required for the 
substantive offense of which she was convicted.

[¶25.]  Wyoming has abrogated the common-law 
distinctions between principal, aider and abettor, and accessory before the fact 
to felonies. At common law, the parties to a felony were divided into four 
categories: (1) principals in the first degree - the actor, or actual 
perpetrator, of the offense; (2) principals in the second degree - those who are 
present, aiding and abetting the commission of the offense; (3) accessories 
before the fact - those who are not present at the commission of the crime, but 
who have counseled, procured or commanded another to commit it; and (4) 
accessories after the fact - those who, knowing a felony has been committed, 
receive, relieve, comfort, or assist the felon. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 
[*]34-40; Annotation: Acquittal of Principal, or His Conviction of Lesser Degree 
of Offense, As Affecting Prosecution of Accessory, or Aider and Abettor, 9 
A.L.R. 4th 972 (1981); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, §§ 167-175, pp. 320-332; and 
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 81, p. 239. Our statute with respect to the first 
three categories provides that each "may be indicted, informed against, tried 
and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal." Section 6-1-114, 
W.S. 1977; Hawkes v. State, 
Wyo., 626 P.2d 1041 (1981); and State v. Weekley, 40 Wyo. 162, 275 P. 122, 64 
A.L.R. 420 (1929). The result is that differences in the manner of participation 
by the parties to the commission of a felony do not affect their individual 
culpability for the crime. Each, whether he is the principal, an aider and 
abettor, or an accessory before the fact, is treated as a principal for purposes 
of punishment. Section 6-1-114, W.S. 1977.3

[¶26.]  The Information charged Deborah Jahnke 
with participation in murder in the first degree by alleging that she "did 
unlawfully and feloniously aid and abet Richard John Jahnke in the commission of 
first degree murder." The State's trial theory was consistent with this charge, 
that is, that the appellant actively participated and assisted her brother in 
what she later described as an "execution" of their father. Deborah Jahnke, on 
the other hand, by cross-examination and argument, proceeded on dual theories: 
(1) that it was impossible to convict her of aiding and abetting a felony 
because the underlying homicide was justified under the law of self-defense; and 
(2) that even if the homicide was not justified as an act of self-defense, 
Deborah Jahnke was blameless because she did not actively participate in or 
associate with her brother's criminal venture.

[¶27.]  The classic statement of the requisite 
involvement to justify convicting an accused of aiding and abetting the 
commission of a criminal offense is that of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 
402 (2nd Cir. 1938), in which he stated that the accessory must "in some sort 
associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something 
that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed." 
In a similar vein, we said in Haight v. 
State, Wyo., 654 P.2d 1232, 1238 
(1982):

"* * * To convict one of 
aiding and abetting the commission of a substantive offense, the prosecution 
must prove that the substantive offense was committed by someone and that the 
person charged as an aider and abettor associated himself and participated in 
the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture. * * 
*"

The prosecution 
must demonstrate that a defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal if 
he is to be found guilty as an aider and abettor. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S. Ct. 766, 93 L. Ed. 919 (1949); United 
States v. Peoni, supra; United States 
v. Winstead, 708 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441 (7th 
Cir. 1980); Bosnick v. State, 248 
Ark. 846, 454 S.W.2d 311 (1970); People v. 
Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335, appeal dismissed 
and cert. denied 429 U.S. 805, 97 S. Ct. 38, 50 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1976); Harper v. State, 155 Ga. App. 764, 272 S.E.2d 736 (1980); State v. McAllister, 
La., 366 So. 2d 1340 (1978); State v. 
Grebe, Mo., 461 S.W.2d 265 (1970); State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.2d 80 
(1938); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 448 
Pa. 146, 292 A.2d 358 (1972); Red v. 
State, 39 Tex.Crim. 667, 47 S.W. 1003, 73 Am. St.Rep. 965 (1898); State v. Boast, 87 Wn.2d 447, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 171, p. 329; and 22 C.J.S. Criminal 
Law, § 87, p. 255. The law does not require, however, that the defendant possess 
the identical intent as the principal. United States v. Beck, supra, 615 F.2d  
at 448-449. In other jurisdictions which have statutes similar to § 6-1-114, 
W.S. 1977, the courts have held that one who aids and abets in a homicide can be 
charged with and convicted of a greater or a lesser degree of offense than the 
principal, depending upon the mental set established at trial. Bosnick v. State, supra, 454 S.W.2d at 
314-315; State v. McAllister, supra, 
366 So. 2d  at 1343; State v. Lord, 
supra, 84 P.2d  at 92; and Red v. 
State, supra, 47 S.W.  at 1004. See also LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, § 
64, p. 507 (1972). Individual culpability of the several parties to the crime is 
determined by the intent of each of them. In this case, for example, although 
Deborah Jahnke's brother earlier had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, 
that would not have foreclosed a verdict that Deborah Jahnke aided and abetted 
first degree murder if the jury had found that she associated herself with and 
participated in the killing of her father acting purposely and with premeditated 
malice.

[¶28.]  The jury in this case rationally could 
find Deborah Jahnke guilty of voluntary manslaughter while acquitting her of the 
greater charged offense of murder. When he testified, Richard Jahnke 
characterized Deborah Jahnke as being very upset and crying after their parents 
had left and he had stated his intentions. He described her as looking like she 
was losing it, murmuring, shaking, and walking around the house nervously 
running her fingers through her hair as they prepared for their parents' return. 
Deborah Jahnke was very upset when her request to "kill Mom" was refused. 
Deborah Jahnke's statement and Richard Jahnke's testimony both established that 
she had been directly involved in a violent family confrontation that evening, 
and that both had been victims of prior abuse at the hands of their father. From 
this testimony the jury could have found that Deborah Jahnke was acting "upon a 
sudden heat of passion" aroused by the earlier incidents which continued through 
her participation in the planning and accomplishment of what she characterized 
as the father's execution. See Helton v. 
State, supra, 276 P.2d  at 443; and State v. Flory, supra, 40 Wyo. at 204-206, 276 P. 458.

[¶29.]  All that is required in order to support 
the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction is that there be some 
evidence which would permit the jury rationally to find the accused guilty of 
the lesser offense while acquitting of the greater. Stamper v. State, supra. The effort by 
the State to prove that Deborah Jahnke aided and abetted first degree murder 
does not preclude the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction if the 
proof offered by the State arguably failed to establish an element of the 
charged offense. This is the purpose for which the lesser-included offense 
doctrine originally was propounded. Keeble v. United States, supra, 412 U.S.  at 208, 93 S. Ct.  at 1995. The 
essence of the doctrine of lesser-included offenses is the universally 
recognized maxim of our jurisprudence that disputed questions of fact must be 
submitted to the jury for their resolution. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895). Questions concerning intent or mental state are 
among those which uniquely are suitable for determination by the 
jury.

[¶30.]  We also note that over the objection of 
the State the appellant insisted upon introducing the verdict in the prior trial 
of her brother into evidence. The jury would not have found Deborah Jahnke 
guilty of first degree murder once its members knew that her brother had been 
acquitted of that offense, and this explains her effort to have the jury's 
consideration limited to first degree murder. As we have said, this is not the 
law, and the evidence of her brother's conviction, coupled with other evidence 
of Deborah Jahnke's intent which was sufficiently in dispute, justified the 
giving of the lesser-included offense instructions by the district court. Under 
all the circumstances the submission of the instruction on the lesser-included 
offense in this case was proper, and no error can be found based upon that 
action by the district court. 

[¶31.]  Next Deborah Jahnke contends that the 
district court erred in denying her motion to suppress a statement given by her 
to sheriff's deputies on the morning following the killing of her father. The 
statement was admitted into evidence at trial over her objections. She argues 
that the statement was obtained in violation of her right to remain silent and 
her right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.4 In addition, Deborah Jahnke argues 
that the statement was obtained in contravention of the policy of the State of 
Wyoming 
promulgated in § 14-6-206(b), W.S. 1977, which provides as 
follows:

"Any person taking a 
child into custody shall as soon as possible notify the child's parent, guardian 
or custodian. * * *"

Essentially her 
argument is that a purported written waiver of her rights obtained prior to the 
initiation of questioning was ineffectual because as a juvenile she was 
incapable of voluntarily making a knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish 
those rights under the totality of the circumstances present at the time. She 
also urges that the failure to comply with § 14-6-206(b), W.S. 1977, if it did 
exist, deprived her of an opportunity to consult with 
adults.

[¶32.]  In several cases this court has 
considered the admissibility of custodial statements by minors. Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127 (1980); Mullin v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 305 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 245, 38 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1973); Jarrett 
v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 1027 (1972); and 
Mortimore v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 161 P. 766 
(1916). We have stated the test of admissibility to be whether under the 
totality of the circumstances at the time the waiver of constitutional rights 
and subsequent statements were given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 
Mayer v. State, supra. In these cases 
we have held that the fact that the individual being questioned is a juvenile is 
simply a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances in order 
to determine whether the waiver was efficacious. This view is consistent with 
that espoused in Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, reh. denied 444 U.S. 887, 100 S. Ct. 186, 62 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1979), in which the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States said:

"This totality-of-the 
circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver 
even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no persuasive 
reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a 
juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The 
totality approach permits - indeed, it mandates - inquiry into all the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the 
juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into 
whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of 
his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 
[Citation.]"

[¶33.]  In other cases the Supreme Court has 
admonished that the greatest care must be exercised to assure that the giving of 
a statement by a juvenile was in fact voluntary and not the product of 
immaturity, ignorance or coercion. In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967); Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 87 A.L.R.2d 614 (1962), reh. denied 370 U.S. 965, 82 S. Ct. 1579, 8 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1962); and Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 
(1948), cert. denied 337 U.S. 945, 69 S. Ct. 1501, 93 L. Ed. 1748 (1949) 
(plurality opinion). Giving of the warnings required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), reh. denied California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121 
(1966), does not suffice in the instance of a juvenile to demonstrate a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. The totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation during which statements 
are obtained is to be examined to determine that in fact, and not merely in 
form, the accused knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to silence and to 
have the assistance of counsel. Fare v. 
Michael C., supra, 442 U.S.  at 724-725, 99 S.Ct. at 2571-72; North Carolina 
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979); and Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, 384 U.S.  at 475-477, 86 S. Ct.  at 1628-29.

[¶34.]  The district court complied with the 
prior decisions of this court and held a full evidentiary hearing for the 
purpose of determining whether the appellant's statement should be suppressed. 
See Hernandez v. State, Wyo., 577 P.2d 643 (1978); Raigosa v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1009 (1977); and Dodge v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 303 
(1977). After considering all the evidence introduced at the suppression 
hearing, the district court ruled in a letter opinion which was incorporated by 
reference in its written Order that "based on all of the testimony, including 
that of the psychiatrist and psychologist who interviewed her sometime 
afterwards, that the State has carried its burden of proving beyond a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did voluntarily, after advice 
of her constitutional rights, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 
these rights, and therefore the Court finds and rules that the statements are 
admissible." Our review of the evidence introduced during the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, which is essential to the consideration of this claim of 
error by Deborah Jahnke, leads to the conclusion that the trial court did not 
err in refusing to suppress her statement and in allowing its introduction 
against her at trial.

[¶35.]  At approximately 6:40 a.m. on the morning 
following the killing of Deborah Jahnke's father, a deputy sheriff approached 
her on foot in a park and, after identifying her, advised her that he was a 
deputy sheriff and that there were a couple of officers who wanted to talk with 
her. Deborah Jahnke agreed to accompany the deputy sheriff to his vehicle, and 
she waited in the car with him for the other officers to arrive. She said that 
she was sleepy, and her hair appeared as if she had been out in the wind. There 
was nothing else about her appearance that was unusual or remarkable. Deborah 
Jahnke asked whether her brother had been found, and she said she had read about 
the events of the previous evening in that morning's newspaper. She did not 
indicate at any time that she did not want to speak with the officers or that 
she wanted to leave.

[¶36.]  Within minutes of the time that Deborah 
Jahnke was located, one of the officers who actually conducted the interview 
arrived at the park. He came to the vehicle where Deborah Jahnke sat and 
identified himself by displaying his credentials. He asked Deborah Jahnke if she 
would accompany him to the station house and talk with him, and she indicated 
she would not mind going to the sheriff's office and that she wanted to talk 
with the officers. Deborah Jahnke was then taken to the sheriff's office, 
arriving at approximately 7:00 a.m., and she was escorted into a patrol room 
where she was given a cup of coffee. While they were waiting for another officer 
to arrive, Deborah Jahnke told the sheriff's officer that she was 
scared.

[¶37.]  The officer and Deborah Jahnke engaged in 
general conversation not related to the events of the prior evening while they 
waited approximately twenty minutes for a second officer to arrive. The 
conversation took place in the patrol lieutenant's office, a large room with 
windows on two of the walls. The appellant and the officer sat on opposite sides 
of a desk approximately six feet from each other. When the officer asked if 
Deborah Jahnke had an English accent, she told him that he was the one with the 
accent. At that time she appeared very calm and collected, was speaking in 
normal tones, and was being very responsive to conversation. She did not 
indicate any desire to leave nor did she complain of being tired or hungry. She 
appeared to be intelligent and well versed in the English language, conversing 
in complete intelligible sentences. At that time Deborah Jahnke was seventeen 
years old and a senior in high school.

[¶38.]  At approximately 7:24 a.m. the second 
officer arrived and he sat at the far end of the desk about eight feet from 
where Deborah Jahnke was seated. She was asked whether she could read and write 
the English language, and she gave an affirmative response. A written waiver of 
her constitutional rights form was given to her. The officer read each of the 
rights appearing on the form aloud while Deborah Jahnke read along on the form 
which had been provided for her. After these rights had been read to her, the 
officers asked that she indicate in the appropriate block on the form whether 
she understood the rights or not. She was told she could check the block any way 
that she desired. Deborah Jahnke checked the yes block, indicating that she 
understood her rights as outlined in the form. She then checked the appropriate 
block on the form and signed the form, thereby representing that she had the 
constitutional rights in mind and that she wanted to talk to the officers. The 
form was signed by both of the officers prior to any questioning. They explained 
to Deborah Jahnke that before any questioning took place they had to ensure that 
she did understand her rights.

[¶39.]  Only then did the officers begin 
interviewing Deborah Jahnke about the events of the night before. During the 
initial portion of this interview one of the officers made notes of what Deborah 
Jahnke told them. The notes could not be produced at trial because after a 
complete and thorough search they could not be located. At the end of the 
initial stage of the interview the officers then asked Deborah Jahnke if she 
would consent to recording on tape the remainder of the interview, and she 
agreed to that. The officer testified that Deborah Jahnke appeared calm 
throughout the interview and was not threatened in any way nor were any promises 
made to secure her cooperation. There was a break of approximately fifteen 
minutes while the necessary equipment to record the interview was set up. The 
record discloses that during this time Deborah Jahnke's mother came to the jail 
and asked to see her, but she was denied permission to see her daughter at that 
time. Deborah Jahnke again was advised of her rights and given the opportunity 
to reconsider her alternatives. The recorded portion of the interview began at 
8:28 a.m. and lasted for nearly an hour and a half. The officer who had earlier 
taken notes testified that he referred to them periodically during the recorded 
interview to be sure that they had covered all the information included in the 
earlier unrecorded portion of the interview. At the conclusion of the recorded 
interview Deborah Jahnke was informed that she was under arrest and that charges 
would be filed against her. The record also discloses that at about 8:00 a.m. a 
teacher who was a friend of Deborah Jahnke had spoken with one of the officers 
and asked if she could see her, and permission was denied.

[¶40.]  Prior to the advice that she was under 
arrest Deborah Jahnke had not been informed that she was a suspect in a crime or 
that her mother and a teacher had asked to speak with her. During the course of 
the interview she told the officers that she had slept the previous night in a 
clubhouse of a large apartment complex and had eaten the evening before. She 
stated that she felt fine and she did not appear nervous. The officer stated 
that he notified the sheriff's dispatch center when Deborah Jahnke was taken 
into custody earlier that morning, but he did not contact anyone further until 
after her statement had been concluded. Deborah Jahnke did not at any time 
during the interview request to speak to an attorney or ask to speak to any 
other adult. She did not ask to leave the interview. The officer testified that 
by the conclusion of the interview he believed that Deborah Jahnke was very 
intelligent and analytical in her answers to their questions. During the 
suppression hearing a transcript of the tape-recorded interview was introduced 
into evidence.

[¶41.]  A clinical psychologist and a forensic 
psychiatrist testified on behalf of Deborah Jahnke at the suppression hearing. 
The psychologist, who had interviewed Deborah Jahnke on two separate occasions 
for a total of approximately two hours while she was in custody in the county 
jail, said that he believed that she was emotionally instable as a result of the 
history of abuse in her home. He based that opinion upon the interview he 
conducted on November 18, 1982, immediately following the funeral of the father, 
and a second interview two days later. It was his opinion that Deborah Jahnke 
suffered from a mixed personality disorder and was not capable of knowingly and 
intelligently waiving her rights at the time that he spoke with her. This 
witness also testified that Deborah Jahnke appeared to be at least average in 
intelligence but immature. He conceded that he had conducted no diagnostic 
testing and was relying wholly upon impressions he had formed in the two brief 
interviews with Deborah Jahnke.

[¶42.]  The forensic psychiatrist testified that 
in his opinion Deborah Jahnke was of average to above average intelligence but 
that she was very immature and suffered from emotional instability. It was his 
opinion that Deborah Jahnke was not capable of making an effective waiver of her 
rights at the time she was interviewed by the sheriff's officers. On 
cross-examination the witness conceded that Deborah Jahnke, although given to 
extensive fantasizing, was without a doubt capable of distinguishing fantasy 
from reality. He further testified that he was sure that Deborah Jahnke fully 
understood what the officers were saying when they advised her of her rights in 
accordance with the Miranda decision. 
He further testified that in his opinion at the time and place she gave her 
statement to the officers she understood the questions being asked of her and 
that she could request an attorney if she desired to. He said, however, that she 
was incapable of making that decision on her own due to many 
factors.

[¶43.]  Our review of the record, including the 
particular evidence outlined above, persuades us that under the totality of the 
circumstances Deborah Jahnke made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of 
her rights prior to being questioned by the sheriff's officers. We agree with 
the trial judge that there was no reason demonstrated to suppress the statement. 
From her first contact with the deputy sheriff in the park throughout the 
interview with the other officers, Deborah Jahnke was willing to speak with 
them. She was given complete advice of her rights, and was capable of 
comprehending what was being asked her. At no time did Deborah Jahnke indicate 
any desire not to talk with the officers or to consult with any other person 
prior to or during the questioning. She responded readily and at length to all 
of the questions. Deborah Jahnke was of at least average intelligence and she 
understood her right to remain silent and her right to consult with the 
attorney. We can discover in this record no overreaching on the part of the 
officers or any manner of coercion in the obtaining of the waiver of Deborah 
Jahnke's rights to remain silent and to consult an attorney. The fact that 
Deborah Jahnke was a juvenile and was not given an opportunity to consult with 
an adult prior to waiving those rights does not make her waiver ineffective as a 
matter of law. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael 
C., supra, 442 U.S.  at 
725, 99 S. Ct.  at 2572; United States v. 
Palmer, 604 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1979); State v. F.L.A., Alaska, 608 P.2d 12 (1980); State v. Rodriguez, 113 Ariz. 409, 555 P.2d 655 
(1976); People v. Terry, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, cert. dismissed 406 U.S. 912, 92 S. Ct. 1619, 32 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1972); State v. Turcio, 
178 Conn. 116, 422 A.2d 749 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S. Ct. 661, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1980); Matter of 
D.A.S., D.C., 391 A.2d 255 (1978); Arnold v. State, Fla.App., 265 So. 2d 64 
(1972); Lane v. State, 247 Ga. 19, 
273 S.E.2d 397 (1981); Edwards v. 
State, 227 Kan. 723, 608 P.2d 1006 (1980); People v. Baxtrom, 81 Ill. App.3d 653, 
37 Ill.Dec. 437, 402 N.E.2d 327 (1980); State v. Thomas, 305 Minn. 513, 232 N.W.2d 766 (1975); Commonwealth v. 
Veltre, 492 Pa. 237, 424 A.2d 486 (1980); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); K.W.M. v. State, 
Tex.Civ.App., 598 S.W.2d 660 (1980); Green v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 706, 292 S.E.2d 605 (1982); State v. Laws, W. 
Va., 251 S.E.2d 769 (1978); and State v. 
Jones, 95 Wn.2d 616, 628 P.2d 472 (1981); contra, People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235, 571 P.2d 305 (1977) (statutory); Lewis v. 
State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974); and In re E.T.C., 
141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937 (1982) (state constitutional 
grounds).

[¶44.]  Deborah Jahnke also argues some special 
application of § 14-6-206(b), W.S. 1977, which requires that notification be 
given as soon as possible to a child's parent, guardian or custodian when a 
juvenile is taken into custody. The implication of this argument is that the 
failure to furnish such notification would make Deborah Jahnke's statement 
inadmissible. It is clear from the record that the officer who arrested Deborah 
Jahnke at the conclusion of her interview did not personally notify her mother 
that she had been taken into custody. What the record does reflect, however, is 
that another officer of the Laramie County Sheriff's Department who was at the 
Jahnke home on the morning following the killing told Deborah Jahnke's mother 
that she had been found and was being taken to the sheriff's department office, 
and this advice occurred within minutes after Deborah Jahnke was initially 
approached in a park and identified. We have noted that permission was denied 
her mother to speak with her during the course of the interview, and that is a 
factor in the totality of the circumstances which we already have considered. 
Under these circumstances we can perceive no prejudice to Deborah Jahnke under 
these circumstances arising out of any asserted failure to comply with the 
notification statute. In fact, it would appear that timely notification was 
given to her mother by the officers of the law enforcement agency which took her 
into custody.

[¶45.]  In her third claim of error Deborah 
Jahnke attacks the constitutionality of § 14-6-203, W.S. 1977. Specifically the 
claimed error relates to § 14-6-203(c), W.S. 1977, which provides in pertinent 
part as follows:

"The jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court is not exclusive. If a minor is alleged to have violated a 
municipal ordinance, a complaint may be processed in the municipal court in the 
manner provided by general law or the complaint may be referred to the county 
and prosecuting attorney for disposition as provided in this subsection. All complaints alleging misconduct of a 
minor other than violation of a municipal ordinance, of W.S. 12-6-101 or a 
misdemeanor violation of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, must be 
referred to the county and prosecuting attorney who shall determine the 
appropriate action to be taken and the appropriate court in which to prosecute 
the action. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

Deborah Jahnke 
contends that this statute is unconstitutional on its face because it violates 
the separation-of-powers doctrine by placing a decision as to the appropriate 
court in which to prosecute within the discretion of an officer of the executive 
branch when that decision properly should be made by the judiciary; that due 
process requires that there be appropriate guidelines established with respect 
to the decision as to which court the case should be prosecuted in, and that the 
decision be made only after an opportunity for a hearing; and that the failure 
to establish guidelines for the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion results 
in a denial of equal protection. These arguments were not presented to the trial 
court. In fact, Deborah Jahnke's attorney stated in argument during a hearing on 
her pretrial motion to transfer proceedings to the juvenile 
court:

"Now, I have not raised 
any constitutional questions because I believe that under appropriate 
circumstances that kind of discretion may be appropriate, but it would only be 
appropriate if there are some standards by which this court can review that 
discretion on the part of the district attorney."

[¶46.]  This court well might be justified in not 
considering this contention. Our rule is that in the absence of fundamental 
error affecting a substantial right of the appellant or involving the 
jurisdiction of the court, we do not consider questions sought to be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Hopkinson v. 
State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43 (1983), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983); Nickelson v. People, 
Wyo., 607 P.2d 904 (1980); and Nisonger v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1094 
(1978). Furthermore, unless plain error is present, questions concerning the 
constitutionality of a statute are not considered on appeal if the party 
presenting them failed to present or argue the contentions in the trial court. 
Hopkinson v. State, supra, 664 P.2d  
at 50; Jackson v. State, Wyo., 624 P.2d 751, cert. denied 451 U.S. 989, 101 S. Ct. 2327, 68 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1981); and Hampton 
v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 (1977). There is no 
jurisdictional question present in this case. Our statutes vest concurrent 
jurisdiction in the juvenile court and district court for purposes of criminal 
prosecution of minors for felonies. Wyoming Constitution, Art. 5, § 10, and § 
14-6-203(c), W.S. 1977. Deborah Jahnke must rely upon plain error in order to 
present her argument on the merits to the court. See Rule 49(b), 
W.R.Cr.P.

[¶47.]  In Hampton v. State, supra, 558 P.2d  at 
507, this court stated the criteria for applying the doctrine of plain 
error:

"While this Court has 
recognized that the plain error concept must be applied to each case on its own 
particular facts, and any attempt to define the term `plain error or defects 
affecting substantial rights' is unlikely to be helpful (Hays v. State, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1004 
(1974)), still there are some accepted criteria which we invoke when a claim of 
plain error is presented. When review is sought under the plain error doctrine 
the Court must be able to discern from the record, without resort to speculation 
or equivocal inference, what occurred at trial, that is we are entitled to know 
the particular facts. [Citations.] Further, the proponent of plain error must 
demonstrate the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the 
particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. 
[Citations.] If these criteria are met, the error or defect must adversely 
affect some substantial right of the accused in order to avoid the application 
of the harmless error concept procedurally expressed in Rule 49(a), W.R. Cr.P. 
[Citations.] The assertion of a constitutional ground of error will not avoid 
the application of these criteria, and if they are not satisfied any claim for 
review under the plain error doctrine must fail. 
[Citations.]"

See also Hopkinson v. State, 
supra.

[¶48.]  We cannot discern in this case the 
existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. The discretion which is vested 
in the prosecutor by our statute to proceed against a juvenile in either the 
juvenile court or as an adult in the district court does not violate any 
constitutional requirements. There is no constitutional right to be tried as a 
juvenile. United States v. Quinones, 
516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 852, 96 S. Ct. 97, 46 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1975); Cox v. United 
States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 869, 94 S. Ct. 183, 38 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1973); Woodward v. 
Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S. Ct. 1285, 55 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1978); Russel 
v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Haynes, 590 F.2d 309 
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Bland, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 472 F.2d 1329 (1972), cert. denied 412 U.S. 909, 93 S. Ct. 2294, 36 L. Ed. 2d 975 (1973); Bailey v. State, 269 Ark. 397, 601 S.W.2d 843 (1980); People v. Thorpe, 
Colo., 641 P.2d 935 (1982); Johnson v. 
State, Fla., 314 So. 2d 573 (1975); State v. Purdy, 228 Kan. 264, 615 P.2d 131 (1980); People v. Sprinkle, 56 Ill. 2d 257, 307 N.E.2d 161 (1974), cert. denied 417 U.S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 2650, 41 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1974); State v. Doe, 91 
N.M. 506, 576 P.2d 1137 (1978); Vega v. 
Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454, 393 N.E.2d 450 (1979); State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974); Jones v. State, 
Okla. Crim. App., 654 P.2d 1080 (1982); State, in the Interest of Atcheson, 
Utah, 575 P.2d 181 (1978); and State v. 
Hodges, 28 Wn. App. 902, 626 P.2d 1025 (1981). Any decision to initiate 
criminal proceedings is vested in the prosecuting attorney, and the decision is 
discretionary. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 
(1869); State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 
660 P.2d 368 (1983) (Thomas, J., concurring). Since one does not have an 
inherent right to be prosecuted as a juvenile but that is a privilege granted by 
the legislature, the legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as it 
sees fit, so long as there is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory 
classification. Woodward v. Wainwright, supra, 556 F.2d  at 785. See, 
e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 
(10th Cir. 1972).

[¶49.]  The legislature of the State of 
Wyoming has 
chosen to vest in the prosecuting attorney the discretion with regard to what 
charges to file and in what court they should be filed. There may be 
circumstances which would justify judicial review of the prosecutorial 
discretion, but in the absence of such suspect factors as race, religion or 
other arbitrary classification, the exercise of discretion by the prosecutor in 
deciding whether to charge as a juvenile or adult involves no violation of due 
process or equal protection of the law. United States v. Bland, supra, 472 F.2d  
at 1337; People v. Thorpe, supra, 641 P.2d  at 939. As the Court of Appeals for 
the District of 
Columbia said in United States v. Bland, supra, 472 F.2d 
at 1337:

"We cannot accept the 
hitherto unaccepted argument that due process requires an adversary hearing 
before the prosecutor can exercise his age-old function of deciding what charge 
to bring against whom. Grave consequences have always flowed from this, but 
never has a hearing been required."

[¶50.]  Lastly on this point, even if we could 
accept Deborah Jahnke's argument that she had some right to be charged initially 
as a minor in the juvenile court, we would have to conclude that she has not 
demonstrated any prejudice in this case. Although she was initially charged in 
the district court as an adult, a full evidentiary hearing was held on her 
motion to transfer her case to the juvenile court. The district court considered 
the matter in all its aspects and concluded that it was appropriate that the 
charge continue to be prosecuted in the district court. In doing so it applied 
the criteria suggested in Kent v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). Deborah Jahnke 
does not argue that the court erred in its ruling, and therefore no error can be 
found arising out of the prosecutor's initial decision in this regard. We hold 
that the statute which vests authority in the prosecuting attorney to decide in 
the first instance whether charges against a juvenile should be presented to the 
district court treating the person as an adult or in the juvenile court is 
constitutional as against the concepts urged by Deborah Jahnke, and the decision 
of the district court that the case appropriately was prosecuted in the district 
court is correct.

[¶51.]  The final point of error urged by Deborah 
Jahnke is that the sentence imposed upon her of not less than three nor more 
than eight years in the Women's Penitentiary violates Art. 1, § 15, of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution. That constitutional provision provides as 
follows:

"The penal code shall be 
framed on the humane principles of reformation and 
prevention."

[¶52.]  At the sentencing hearing the district 
judge stated that he had reviewed the case extensively and had considered all of 
the relevant factors and the commonly used reasons for sentencing which he 
identified as rehabilitation, deterrence, punishment and removal from society 
for its protection. He then eliminated rehabilitation, at least in the usual 
context that that principle is applied. He noted that incarceration was not 
required to protect society. He then stated that the concept of deterrence 
requires a sentence of incarceration in this particular case. Finally he noted 
that punishment was an appropriate justification for incarceration. Deborah 
Jahnke's position is that since the justifications relied upon by the district 
court for imposition of a sentence of incarceration are not included in Art. 1, 
§ 15 of the Wyoming Constitution, the sentence imposed evidences a clear abuse 
of discretion and must be reversed.

[¶53.]  Initially the State meets this argument 
by relying upon Apodaca v. State, 
Wyo., 571 P.2d 603 (1977), in which the court followed the traditional rule of 
not considering questions of a constitutional magnitude which were not presented 
to or raised in the trial court. Continuing in its brief to meet the claim on 
its merits, the State contends that the sentence does not manifest an abuse of 
discretion.

[¶54.]  While the focus of the claim of abuse of 
discretion presented by Deborah Jahnke is somewhat different, still much of what 
we said in the case of her brother, Richard, Jahnke v. State, supra, is applicable. 
There we reaffirmed the rule that a sentence within the statutory limits will 
not be disturbed upon appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion and cited a 
number of cases supporting that proposition. In this case, as in the case of 
Richard Jahnke, the record discloses that the trial judge had considered very 
carefully the matter of an appropriate sentence, including a proposal by Deborah 
Jahnke through her counsel, the presentence report of the Department of 
Probation and Parole, and the pertinent factors to be considered in sentencing. 
The sentence which was imposed was within the statutory limits, and we can 
discern no abuse of the sentencing judge's discretion. The constitutional 
provision upon which Deborah Jahnke relies is not so narrowly drawn that we 
would be justified in concluding that the only factors which the court may 
consider in the imposition of sentence are prevention and rehabilitation. The 
provision speaks to the penal code, not to sentencing, and we are unable to 
detect any intent on the part of the Constitutional Convention to so limit the 
discretion of sentencing judges in criminal cases.

[¶55.]  There is no error in the proceedings in 
the district court. The judgment and sentence of the district court are 
affirmed.

1 At the time of the 
commission of the homicide the respective statutes 
provided:

Section 
6-4-101:

"(a) Whoever purposely 
and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate any rape, sexual assault, arson, robbery or burglary, or by 
administering poison or causing the same to be done, kills any human being, or 
whoever purposely and with premeditated malice kills any peace officer, 
corrections employee or fireman acting in the line of duty, is guilty of murder 
in the first degree.

"(b) A person convicted 
of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or life imprisonment 
according to law."

Section 6-1-114, W.S. 
1977:

"Every person who shall 
aid or abet in the commission of any felony, or who shall counsel, encourage, 
hire, command, or otherwise procure such felony to be committed, shall be deemed 
an accessory before the fact, and may be indicted, informed against, tried and 
convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal, and either before or 
after the principal offender is convicted or indicted or informed against; and 
upon such conviction he shall suffer the same punishment and penalties as are 
prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal."

Section 6-1-203, W.S. 
1977:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons to 
commit a crime and he or another person does an overt act to effect the object 
of the agreement.

"(b) A person is not 
liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy 
under circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his 
criminal intention.

"(c) A conspiracy may be 
prosecuted in the county where the agreement was entered into, or in any county 
where any act evidencing the conspiracy or furthering the purpose took 
place."

2 In Richmond v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1217 
(1976), this court held that where the charged offense is first degree felony 
murder the giving of instructions on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included 
offense would be improper.

3 The fourth common-law 
classification, accessories after the fact, was treated as a separate offense 
under the statutes applicable at the time of the present offense. Section 
6-4-115, W.S. 1977. The statutory scheme of treating accessories after the fact 
as committing a separate offense and all other parties as principals has carried 
over into the revised Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982. Section 6-5-202, W.S. 1977 
(June 1983 Replacement).

4 In this appeal Deborah 
Jahnke does not rely upon the analogous provisions of our state constitution, 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, Art. 1, Sections 10 and 11. See Dryden v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 483 
(1975).

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
concurring.

[¶56.]  I concur with the majority opinion, but 
believe that a few things must be said with reference to that contained in the 
dissenting opinion.

I.

[¶57.]  In the dissenting opinion, and in much 
that has been said and written otherwise about this case, great concern is 
evidenced about the abuse and beatings administered by the appellant's father to 
her and to her brother all of which engendered a mental and emotional condition 
in them, which, in turn, resulted in a climax of hate, fear and desperation, 
which, again in turn, caused the homicide. The legal problem with using this as 
a ground for a finding of not guilty or for a reversal on appeal is that it was 
not put forth as a defense. If appellant or her brother had pled not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency, temporary or otherwise, the jury may 
well have acquitted them. Appellant and her brother did not do so, but opted to 
rely on self-defense. A court cannot properly find self-defense when the 
homicide is committed from ambush. All of the recital of past bad acts by the 
victim-father may evoke sympathy and compassion for appellant and it may evoke 
condemnation of the victim-father, but it was not represented to the court as 
having "snapped the mind" of the appellant or having resulted in temporary 
insanity. The plea was otherwise. The request to the jury for a finding of not 
guilty was founded on the theory of self-defense. The jury could not find 
self-defense on the part of one attacking from ambush.

II.

[¶58.]  The dissenting opinion refers to an 
objection to testimony of one of the interrogating officers concerning a 
statement made by appellant on the grounds that the statement itself was the 
best evidence and because it was hearsay, and the dissenting opinion contends 
that the objection was valid and it should have been sustained. The dissenting 
opinion would seem to imply that an oral admission or confession is not 
admissible evidence and that only that part of a confession or admission which 
is reduced to writing, or recorded, is admissible. The general rule is 
that:

"* * * [C]onfessions are 
competent evidence, possessing considerable probative value, and are not in and 
of themselves inadmissible. The securing of voluntary confessions from guilty 
persons is desirable and should be allowed in the interests of public welfare 
and safety. * * *" 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 817(1), p. 158 
(1961).

"* * * [I]t [a 
confession] may be oral or written in whole or in part; and there is no 
requirement that an oral confession be reduced to writing or that the oral 
statement, after transcription by another, be signed by accused. * * *" 23 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 816(a), p. 154 (1961).

[¶59.]  That confessions and admissions are not 
within the hearsay rule is recognized in Rule 801(d), W.R.E., which provides 
that:

"(d) * * * A statement is 
not hearsay if:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) * * * The statement 
is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, * * 
*."

And in Rule 
801(a), W.R.E., which provides:

"(a) * * * A `statement' 
is (1) an oral or written assertion * * *." (Emphasis added.)1

[¶60.]  The dissenting opinion would infer that 
the court refused to allow the tape of the interview of appellant into evidence. 
It was never offered. Appellant could have offered the tape if she believed it 
to be the best evidence of her confession. She did not do so. The testimony of 
the witness was not for the purpose of proving the content of a writing or 
recording. It was simply to recite a confession.

III.

[¶61.]  The majority opinion sufficiently refutes 
the other contentions in the minority opinion.

1 Of course, there are a 
number of other reasons for excluding a confession or admission, such as being a 
product of illegal arrest, Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); not voluntary, 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978); not warned of right to counsel and to remain 
silent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 
(1966).

BROWN, 
J., 
specially concurring.

[¶62.]  The Jahnke cases are reminiscent of the 
apocryphal accused who murdered his parents and then appealed to the court for 
mercy because he was an orphan. The news media latched on to these cases and 
carried a preposterous story of self-defense to the public with missionary 
zeal.

[¶63.]  The court's opinions here and in Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 
(1984), describe the elaborate plans made for the execution of the senior Mr. 
Jahnke. I do not recall that the newspapers said much about those elaborate 
plans. They delineated only a few circumstances surrounding the killing, then 
like a "refiner's fire and Fuller's soap" purified and sanctified Richard and 
Deborah Jahnke, who emerged heroes, worthy of praise. We have witnessed a 
remarkable feat of image building. The Richard Jahnke and Deborah Jahnke 
perceived by the public are an invention of the news media, and bear little 
resemblance to the persons who executed and aided in executing their father. The 
news media should bear a heavy burden for what they have 
done.

[¶64.]  Juries and courts in this state will not 
buy into any story of self-defense as justifiable homicide when it is so 
patently unbelievable. Richard Jahnke, according to a jury of twelve citizens, 
was culpable. Deborah Jahnke was no less culpable than Richard. She did not pull 
the trigger, but she participated in the planning and was a backup if Richard 
failed in the execution. In one sense Deborah Jahnke was more culpable than 
Richard; she wanted to kill the mother also.

[¶65.]  I therefore agree that this case should 
be affirmed. I differ slightly with the majority in its disposition of the 
lesser included offense issue. To be compatible with Balsley v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 1324 
(1983), the majority had to determine that killing upon a sudden heat of passion 
"is not a true element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter." The voluntary 
manslaughter statute, § 6-2-105, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), formerly § 
6-4-107, W.S. 1977, seems to provide that (killing) "upon a sudden heat or 
passion" is an element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. The committee 
which drafted the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions thought "upon a sudden heat 
of passion" was an element of voluntary manslaughter and set it out as element 
No. 4 of WPJIC, 7.502. District court judges traditionally instruct the jury 
that (killing) "upon a sudden heat of passion" is an element of voluntary 
manslaughter. The majority's reasoning on this issue is logical, but I would 
prefer that the legislature determine the elements of a criminal offense rather 
than this court.

[¶66.]  I agree that voluntary manslaughter is a 
lesser included offense in the crime of first degree murder; however, I would 
modify this court's holding in Balsley. In that case the majority 
said:

"In summary, we hold that 
a crime described by statute may not be necessarily included within another 
statutory offense unless all of the elements within the claimed lesser offense 
are to be found in the greater, and unless the greater offense cannot be 
committed without also committing the putative lesser offense." Id., at 1329.

[¶67.]  In my concurring opinion in Balsley I 
attempted to point out that the "inherent relationship" test was a better test 
to determine lesser included offenses. I am concerned that the inflexible rule 
of the Balsley case will continue to plague us. I fear that in other criminal 
matters traditional lesser included offenses will not pass the Balsley test. In 
the case before us I would simply modify what the court said in Balsley and 
adopt the inherent relationship test as an additional test to determine lesser 
included offenses. Under the inherent relationship test I would find that 
voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense in the crime of 
first-degree murder.

[¶68.]  The Jahnke juries found evidence of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, I hope the majority opinion and this 
concurrence sound a warning to those who would emulate the 
Jahnkes.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶69.]  Sixteen-year-old Richard Jahnke shot and 
killed his father in the driveway leading to the family home. His sister, 
Deborah Jahnke, then seventeen years of age, was in the living room at the time. 
Immediately after the shooting she and her brother fled the home, then 
separated. Deborah wandered aimlessly until she found a vacant building where 
she stayed the night. The next morning, at approximately 6:30 a.m., she was 
apprehended at FrontierPark in Cheyenne, Wyoming. She was taken to the sheriff's office 
where she was isolated and held incommunicado although her mother was in the 
outer room asking to see her and one of her teachers called repeatedly asking to 
see her. She was in custody for four hours and interrogated for about three of 
those hours by two officers who ultimately secured her tape-recorded statement. 
Upon completion of her statement, she was placed in jail and charged with aiding 
and abetting first-degree murder. The taking of her statement and the testimony 
relating to the statement were critical to the State's case and Deborah's 
conviction of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter.

[¶70.]  It is surprising how often good, honest 
men, acting in utmost good faith, can look at the same facts and circumstances 
and see them so differently. Thus, some of my brothers on the court see Deborah 
as a mature, intelligent, knowledgeable, mentally alert and sound, capable child 
who knowingly confessed to aiding and abetting manslaughter. I see Deborah as a 
frightened child who, after a lifetime of beatings, abuse, molestation, and 
humiliation, had been so affected mentally that at various times she was in a 
severe state of depression, frightened, contemplated suicide, was out of touch 
with reality, fantasized, and was frequently unable to rationally control her 
emotions.

[¶71.]  The reasons for providing that special 
provision should be made for protecting the constitutional rights of children 
are illustrated so clearly by the facts of this case. Let us examine the record. 
Dr. MacDonald, testifying at the suppression hearing, found Deborah having, "* * 
* an almost unbelievable history of parental abuse, including sexual assaults 
upon her * * *." He testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress her 
statement that she was beaten by her father as far back as she could remember, 
somewhere around the age of four and that the beatings took place about twice a 
week until she was thirteen years of age. After the age of thirteen, she was 
beaten once a week. Her father would punch her, grab hold of her hair, throw her 
against the wall and shake her so that her head was bobbing back against the 
wall. She was beaten for failing to spell her name correctly on her lunch sack, 
for leaving crayons laying around, for making noise, for not cleaning her room, 
or for being disrespectful to her mother. She was beaten with a belt, shoes, 
with fists, hands, and a paddle. She would have welts and bruises and black 
marks on her arms and head. She has memories of her brother and mother being 
beaten, of her father kneeling on her mother's head and her mother pleading and 
sobbing and her father beating her with his fists and saying "I'll give you 
something to complain about."

[¶72.]  Maria Jahnke testified that her husband 
was violent and became enraged over little things. She begged him not to beat 
the children because they were small, but he would go into a rage, grab her, 
shove her against the wall and the furniture and beat her. When Deborah was four 
years old, he beat her with a strap; but when the children were older, he beat 
them with his fists. Mrs. Jahnke testified that in Phoenix, Arizona, he pinned her down on the couch, 
and

"* * * hit me on the 
sides of my face. He was like a madman. And I know Richard, he was small, and he 
came into the room and said, `Please leave my mother alone.' And then he went 
after him.

* * * * * 
*

"And he let go of me and 
then he went after him in the living room, and at that time I could hear that he 
was punching him."

[¶73.]  And, with respect to Deborah, Mrs. Jahnke 
testified, if she didn't brush her teeth correctly, he would explode and, "he 
would grab her by the hair and go into the bathroom and brush her teeth for her 
and scrub her face," until, as Deborah stated, they would bleed and she had 
trouble eating.

[¶74.]  How had this kind of abuse affected her? 
What was her mental state when she was taken into custody at FrontierPark and during interrogation? Deborah 
talked frequently to one of her high school teachers who said to 
her:

"There is something about 
you and what I think it is, there is a very big conflict between what you show 
on the outside and what you really feel on the inside."

The teacher 
testified that,

"She told me that things 
were horrible at home, mostly in terms of her father.

* * * * * 
*

"I asked her if there was 
physical abuse and she said yes.

* * * * * 
*

"[S]he was so dramatic 
with her friends and loud. She had a laughter which is not a laughter at all; 
it's a not so loud scream, a hysteria. She would go into uncontrolled laughter 
and the students would roll their eyes and say what is the deal 
here.

* * * * * 
*

"I told her that I 
thought she needed some counseling. She said everybody always wants me to have 
counseling. * * * `[E]verybody thinks I am insane.' `I don't think you're 
insane. I just think you need to find some way to tie up the loose ends 
together. You are really fragmented.'"

Then finally, 
between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock November 16, 1982, the afternoon of the day 
Richard Jahnke shot and killed his father, this teacher said to Deborah, "I have 
got enough time. * * * You have got to have counseling, you're about to explode. She did not 
resist. We walked in to see [the counselor]." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶75.]  When the deputy sheriff took Deborah into 
custody the next morning at approximately 6:30 a.m., she said she was sleepy. 
The deputy observed that she appeared tired and her hair was not 
combed.

[¶76.]  At the sheriff's office, in the 
interrogation room at 7:00 o'clock that morning, Deborah told the deputy she was 
scared. He noted that she was speaking with an English accent, but she said he 
was the one with the accent. (She often fantasized she was from 
Ireland and spoke with an accent.) A 
witness testified:

"[S]he tells people that 
she was born in Ireland. She has been in 
Ireland but never got off the 
airplane, and she effects what I think she thinks is an Irish 
accent."

Then she was 
read her "Miranda rights" and signed a standard form waiver of those 
rights.

[¶77.]  At the time the officers were concluding 
her interrogation that morning, there was a question about whether she might be 
suicidal. The deputy who conducted the interrogation 
testified:

"At approximately 10:30 
that morning after she was placed under arrest, I did have a question by one of 
the jailers - I don't recall who - as to the effect that she might be suicidal. 
And as I indicated, I did not know. They were trying to determine whether she 
should be placed under watch - place a watch on her while she was staying in the 
sheriff's office. I indicated it might not hurt to have somebody periodically 
watch her."

[¶78.]  A psychologist from the SoutheastWyomingMentalHealthCenter was immediately 
called and interviewed Deborah at the jail. He found her emotionally unstable 
and recommended that she be continued under a twenty-four hour surveillance. He 
concluded that she would have been incapable of knowingly and intelligently 
waiving her rights because of her fantasies and romanticizing, because she was 
frightened, tired, without sleep, needed a tremendous amount of reassurance and 
her general instability would have prevented her from doing 
that.

[¶79.]  Here, then, was a scared little girl, 
fragmented, out of touch with reality, frequently fantasizing, who in the 
interrogation room was speaking with an "English accent," and who appeared 
suicidal to the extent that a psychologist from the mental health center was 
called and interviewed her shortly after the interrogation ended. He was of the 
opinion that in her state she could not have knowingly, understandingly and 
intelligently waived her constitutional right to counsel and privilege against 
self-incrimination.

[¶80.]  In Dryden v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 483, 491 
(1975), we stated:

"The privilege against 
self-incrimination and the right to advice of counsel are firmly established in 
this state * * * [and]

* * * * * 
*

"The question is not 
whether the examining officers have been `unfair' to the accused; it is whether 
the State has proved that the statements were freely made by an informed and knowledgeable accused after 
full and proper warning as to his constitutional rights." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶81.]  To be admissible, a confession must be 
voluntary and that must be determined upon the particular facts of each case. Mullin v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 305, cert. denied 414 U.S. 940, 94 S. Ct. 245, 38 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1973); Jarrett v. 
State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 1027 (1972). Incommunicado 
custodial interrogation can result in an overpowering psychological disadvantage 
such that an accused will often succumb to the pressures and urgings of the 
interrogators. Thus, in the interrogation of a child without counsel present or 
an opportunity to consult with an adult, great care is required to assure that a 
statement made by the child is not a product of fantasy or fright. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 
(1967). We have said that whether a child's statement, the product of custodial 
interrogation, is voluntary depends upon the facts of the particular case and 
that factors to be considered are age, intoxication, physical injuries, lack of parental contact, or mental trauma, any one of which would be 
sufficient to render the statement involuntary. Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127, 130 
(1980). Without more, I believe that Deborah's statement was not by an "informed 
and knowledgeable accused"; and, therefore, it was inadmissible for this reason 
alone. But there is more. It was inadmissible also for a failure to comply with 
the requirements of law concerning juveniles.

[¶82.]  The constitution of the state of 
Wyoming 
provides in Art. 1, § 11, that "[n]o person shall be compelled to testify 
against himself in any criminal case * * *," and in Art. 1, § 10, that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and 
by counsel * * *."

[¶83.]  Legislative enactments in effect at the 
time1 concerning children required that 
law enforcement authorities advise not only the child but also his parents, 
guardian, or custodian of his right to counsel and to remain 
silent.

[¶84.]  Section 14-6-206(b), W.S. 1977, relating 
to children, provides in part:

"(b) Any person taking a 
child into custody shall as soon as possible notify the child's parent, guardian 
or custodian."

[¶85.]  Section 14-6-209, W.S. 1977, provides 
that a child detained without a court order must be afforded a hearing within 72 
hours and,

"(b) At the commencement 
of the hearing the judge shall advise the child and his parents, guardian or custodian 
of:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) The right to counsel as provided in W.S. 
14-6-222;

"(iii) The child's right to remain silent with respect to 
any allegations of a delinquent act;

* * * * * 
*

"(vii) All other rights 
afforded a criminal defendant." (Emphasis added.)

Section 
14-6-222(a), W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) At their first 
appearance before the court the child and 
his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the court of their 
right to be represented by counsel at 
every stage of the proceedings including appeal, and to employ counsel of 
their own choice." (Emphasis added.)

[¶86.]  The clear intent of the legislature in 
adopting these statutes is to insure that rights guaranteed by the constitution 
to adults are also secure for children by requiring that the child and his parents be advised of those 
rights. Sections 14-6-209(b) and 14-6-222(a), W.S. 1977, supra, require that the court inform both the child and his parents, guardian or 
custodian of the right to counsel and to remain silent but do not in 
specific terms impose a similar requirement upon law enforcement officials. Does 
that mean the child is fair game before he gets to court; that law enforcement 
officials are permitted to do what the courts are prohibited from doing, i.e., 
hold the child incommunicado, keep the parents at bay, not inform the parents of 
the right to counsel, to silence, to employ counsel and to consult with the 
child? If the court must advise the child 
and his parents of the right to counsel and to remain silent, surely law 
enforcement officials must do the same. This was the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), with respect to adults, the Court 
stating:

"Today, then, there can 
be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal 
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their 
freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to 
incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the 
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime 
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused 
must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of 
those rights must be fully honored." 86 S. Ct.  at 1624.

The Fifth 
Amendment privilege and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel provided in court 
are protected outside of court for adults by informing the adult of those 
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. By 
analogy, it is clear that the same rights afforded children in court must be 
afforded out of court by requiring that the child and his parents, guardian or 
custodian be advised of these rights provided by the 
constitution.

[¶87.]  This child then, more than any other, 
desperately needed the help and advice of an adult to which she was entitled by 
statute. Being deprived of that help and advice, her confession was inadmissible 
as evidence not only because it was unreliable, but also because there was no 
valid waiver of her right to counsel and to remain silent. This result, i.e., 
that her statement be suppressed for failure to comply with the requirements of 
§§ 14-6-206, 14-6-209, and 14-6-222, W.S. 1977, supra, flows from 
a

"* * * deep-rooted 
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the 
end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to 
convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." 
Spano v. People of the State of 
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 1205-1206, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1265 (1959).

[¶88.]  I would hold, therefore, that before a 
child is interrogated in circumstances such as here presented, both the child 
and his parents, guardian or custodian must be informed of the constitutional 
right to remain silent, to be represented by counsel, to employ and consult with 
counsel, and all other rights afforded a criminal defendant both by our 
constitution and statutes. This requirement will accomplish the clear intent of 
the legislature. Constitutional rights guaranteed to adults will also be secure 
for children and not lost because the child was deprived of the counsel of an 
adult.

[¶89.]  Protecting the constitutional rights of 
children by affording the help and advice of an adult is not new. Thus, in the 
absence of a statute providing for consultation with an adult, a confession was 
held inadmissible where a seventeen-year-old defendant was subjected to a 
continuous stream of interrogation at a time when his mother was desperately 
trying to be in touch with him. It was said that, in the course of extracting 
the confession, the seventeen-year-old defendant was sealed off by means of 
deception and trickery from the most likely avenue by which assistance of 
counsel might reach him. People v. 
Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 347 N.Y.S.2d 187, 300 N.E.2d 722 
(1973).

[¶90.]  The importance of securing for a child 
under interrogation, the advice and consultation of a parent, guardian, 
custodian or lawyer was recognized by the National Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Justice, Standards and Goals (1976), in the adoption of Standard 5.8 
which provides in part: 

"When police are 
conducting a custodial investigation of an individual who is legally a juvenile, 
they should take care not to allow that juvenile to waive the right against 
self-incrimination without the advice of counsel." P. Hahn, The Juvenile 
Offender and the Law, p. 384 (2nd ed. 1978),

and by the 
Institute of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice 
Standards, Standard 3.2 which provides in part:

"For some investigative 
procedures, greater constitutional safeguards are needed because of the 
vulnerability of juveniles. Juveniles should not be permitted to waive 
constitutional rights on their own." Police Handling of Juvenile Problems, p. 6 
(Ballinger Publishing Co. 1980),

and Standard 
5.3(C), which provides:

"C. Presence of attorney. 
The right to have an attorney present should be subject to knowing, intelligent 
waiver by the juvenile following consultation with counsel. If the police 
question any arrested juvenile concerning an alleged offense in the absence of 
an attorney for the juvenile, no information obtained thereby or as a result of 
the questioning should be admissible in any proceeding." Release, Control, and 
Detention of Accused Juvenile Offenders Between Arrest and Disposition, p. 67 
(Ballinger Publishing Co. 1980).

The standards 
take account of the fact, as was noted in Application of Gault, supra, 87 S. Ct. 1428, that

"`[W]e cannot believe 
that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs 
counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of 
panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the 
law, as he knows it, crush him. No friend stood at the side of this 15-year-old 
boy as the police, working in relays, questioned him hour after hour * * *.'" 87 S. Ct.  at 1453 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 
332 U.S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 
(1948)).

And later in 
that opinion, quoting from In the Matter 
of Four Youths, Nos. 28-776-J, 28-778-J, 28-783-J, 28-859-J, Juvenile Court 
of the District of 
Columbia, April 7, 1961, the Court noted that statements 
of children are generally untrustworthy:

"`[T]he Court's decision 
* * * rests upon the considered opinion - after nearly four busy years on the 
Juvenile Court bench during which the testimony of thousands of such juveniles 
has been heard - that the statements of adolescents under 18 years of age who 
are arrested and charged with violations of law are frequently untrustworthy and 
often distort the truth.'" 87 S. Ct.  at 1458.

[¶91.]  Our sister state of Colorado recently 
adopted a statute which provides that statements or admissions of a child are 
not admissible against that child unless a parent, guardian, or legal custodian 
of the child is present and advised of the child's right to remain silent, to be 
represented by counsel, to have counsel present, to have counsel appointed, 
unless the public defender or counsel is representing the child and present at 
the time. People v. Maes, 194 
Colo. 235, 571 P.2d 305 (1977).

[¶92.]  After the adoption of legislation 
providing that a statement of a child over the age of sixteen years is 
inadmissible unless a good-faith effort is made to notify the parent, guardian 
or custodian of the child of certain rights including the right to visit and 
confer with the child, it was held that notifying a parent that a child was in 
custody, without more, did not meet the good-faith requirements of the statute 
and the statement was suppressed. State 
v. Walker, Iowa, 
352 N.W.2d 239 (1984).

[¶93.]  The legislature in our state has wisely 
adopted legislation requiring that both the child and his parents, guardian or 
custodian be informed of the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and 
other constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants.

[¶94.]  In this case Deborah's mother was not 
advised before interrogation of her daughter's right to counsel or right to 
remain silent. Thus, the interrogating deputy was asked:

"Q. Did you tell her 
parents or an attorney or some other person responsible for Miss Jahnke about 
[her being in custody]?

"A. No, 
sir.

"Q. Did you cause that to 
be done?

"A. No, sir, I did 
not.

"Q. To your knowledge, 
was it done by anyone?

"A. Not to my 
knowledge."

[¶95.]  When her teacher called the sheriff's 
office at 8:00 a.m. that morning, she was told:

"`No, she is being held. 
She isn't allowed to have any visitors.'"

And when Maria 
Jahnke arrived at the sheriff's office at 8:30 a.m. she was not allowed to see 
her daughter. When she suggested that Deborah should have an attorney, she was 
told an attorney would be appointed for her.

[¶96.]  Deborah's statement should have been 
suppressed at trial, but it was not. Then the error was compounded, for the 
manner in which it was used against her was so utterly unfair and devastating 
that Deborah did not receive a fair trial. When the prosecution refused to offer 
into evidence the transcript of her statement which the court had ruled was 
admissible, defense counsel stated:

"I don't know why they 
are afraid of the tape, Your Honor, but it is, in fact, the best evidence, and I 
would renew that objection that this witness' testimony is not the best 
evidence."

[¶97.]  Where a writing is the best evidence of 
the matter sought to be established and the writing is available, evidence which 
is secondary or substitutionary should not be received. Harned v. Credit Bureau of Gillette, Wyo., 513 P.2d 650 (1973); Truck Terminal, Inc. v. 
Nielsen, 80 Wyo. 223, 339 P.2d 413 (1959). Especially is 
that so when production of the original writing is essential to any accurate 
determination of the issues involved. Edwards v. State, Wyo., 577 P.2d 1380 
(1978). Nevertheless, one of the interrogating officers began testifying to his 
opinions and conclusions about what Deborah had said in her statement. Defense 
counsel renewed his objection that the statement itself was the best evidence. 
The objection was overruled, the court granting counsel a continuing objection 
to all of the testimony of the witness. The objection was valid. It should have 
been sustained.

[¶98.]  The interrogating officer first testified 
that he had interrogated Deborah Jahnke for an hour making notes of the 
interrogation before he began to take her recorded statement. Then he turned on 
a tape recorder and, from the notes taken, began to take her tape-recorded 
statement which lasted something over one and one-half hours. The notes made 
before the tape-recorded statement were shredded by the department and not 
available for the trial. The interrogating officer testified that everything 
Deborah Jahnke said was contained in the recorded statement. The trial court, in 
ruling on a defense motion, stated:

"I am at a loss to 
ascertain how the defendant could have in any way been prejudiced by the failure 
to be able to produce these [shredded] notes which were fragmentary, and all 
covered in any event by the taped interview * * *."

The recorded 
statement was reduced to writing and offered as an exhibit in the suppression 
hearing. Since the recorded statement itself was complete, there was no reason 
for the court to receive the officer's opinions and conclusions about what 
Deborah Jahnke had said. The statement was the best evidence and should have 
been all that was received in evidence.

[¶99.]  The extreme prejudice in permitting the 
officer to paraphrase and interpret Deborah Jahnke's statement for the jury is 
demonstrated by comparing his testimony with excerpts from the 
statement:

Detective's 
testimony:

"Q. The weapons were 
supports. Did she state she was to be there in any particular capacity? 

"A. Yes, sir, she did. 
She told me that her capacity that night was to be as a support, as a backup to 
Richard."

Excerpt from 
Deborah Jahnke's statement:

"Okay. My intentions were 
just very simply, um, I'm not a violent person, the only time I would ever 
strike anybody or do anything like that, actively, is if it is in either self 
defense, or to defend somebody else. My father, in the past, extensively, 
carried a firearm with him, almost wherever he went. Or like he would have 
something in the glove compartment of his car and that was my concern. Because, 
if my father, like I felt that he was going to chicken out, that it was a scare 
tactic etc., my father has a very very short temper, he's very irrational, he's 
very irate. And, I, I've seen him, you know, just get hysterical over just 
teeny, tiny little things, you know. And he would just get hysterical and beat 
up on people, you know, beat up on all three of us, my mother, and my brother 
and me, just over the teeniest things because he just had a bad day at work. I 
thought, oh my God, what if he's armed. What if he pulls it out on my brother, 
what if he shoots him. What if he goes after me? At that point, definitely, yes, 
I would have shot him. But only as a very last resort. If he just came at me and 
he didn't have any firearms or something like that, I would have just put the 
weapon down and just took off you know."

With respect to 
an escape route, the detective testified:

"A. Deborah told me that 
she recommended to her brother that he escape through the back door, as she put 
it, which was between the garage and the kitchen area. Her concern was that her 
brother may become trapped in the garage area, and that that would be the 
easiest route to travel, the easiest escape route, as she told me 
later."

Excerpt from 
Deborah's statement:

"[Detective]: Did you get 
the impression that, uh, anytime or maybe throughout the whole, whole thing 
before your parents got home, that the incident that would happen would take 
place in the garage area? Was that the impression that you 
had?

"D.A. Jahnke: It didn't 
occur to me.

"[Detective]: Did he ever 
mention that that's where it was going to be?

"D.A. Jahnke: 
No.

"[Detective]: Okay. Then 
if I understand what you told me correctly, then, he was going, one of his ideas 
was to escape through the garage area?

"D.A. Jahnke: Maybe, I 
don't know."

And with respect 
to knowing her brother's intentions, the detective 
testified:

"* * * yes, she knew what 
her brother's intentions were that evening."

Deborah 
testified:

"[Detective]: In regards 
to your brother, after your parents left to go eat, I believe you said that 
Richard stated something to the effect that, I have to do 
this.

* * * * * 
*

"D.A. Jahnke: Okay. I, I 
interpret it as, that, well he's going to do something. Uh, well, he's going to 
be active, he's actually going to do something. I didn't think that he would 
just, you know, blow my father away. But simply, that this was something, that 
he was, that was bothering him intensely. Like, I remember in conversations, you 
know, he just, bring back all these really bad memories and things that I'd 
blocked out, or just choose not to remember or for whatever reasons and my 
brother always felt really, really bad and guilty because my father used to beat 
up on me. And he used to get sexual with me too. And I couldn't defend myself 
and he was like, like this high, he was younger than me, he couldn't defend me, 
you know. And, it just got to the point that he just couldn't take it 
anymore."

"D.A. Jahnke: Okay, well 
I felt that he was playing a role, that he was playing a role and that maybe if 
he just went through these steps, he'd just get out all of his bad feelings and 
just forget about it. Me, I was not playing a role. I was torn between, I did 
not want to be like this, and I just said, oh my God, I just wish that I wasn't 
here, you know, and I told him, you know, I'm really scared. And, you know, this 
is terrible, I just, this doesn't seem real. But also I just felt kind of 
indebted to my brother, because he has been, he's always been very kind to me, 
very protective of me. And, you know, at first saying yes and then opting 
out."

"Nothing seemed real to 
me. I occasionally get into a state of mind that well, you know, this is, that 
this isn't, you know, real, and, you know, like I'm living in a movie or 
something. I felt it was a role. That my brother was just going through these 
steps, you know. I just thought, well, uh, it's something that. It's like 
sometimes, children when they play. You know, like I remember when I was little, 
when I used to . . .

"[Detective]: Okay, 
excuse me. Were you playing a role?

"D.A. Jahnke: 
No.

"[Detective]: Did you see 
it as that? Or were you, were you serious about what you were 
doing?

"D.A. Jahnke: I didn't 
know what I was doing."

And with respect 
to an agreement to kill, the detective testified as 
follows:

"She told me also that 
her brother didn't verbalize anything specifically but that there was a tacit 
agreement between the two of them. She agreed with that 
concept."

Miss Jahnke's 
actual words in giving her statement follow.

"D.A. Jahnke: Okay, you 
know, just very simply, when he just told me that he couldn't take it anymore, 
he said uh, I really don't want you here, so I'll take you someplace. I'll look 
for the keys. And I put on my shoes, you know, thinking, you know, I really 
didn't want to be here, you know. I didn't know what to expect. I just felt 
really guilty, you know, because I'm really close to my 
brother.

"[Detective]: About, 
guilty about leaving him there alone?

"D.A. Jahnke: Leaving him 
there alone.

* * * * * 
*

"[Detective]: At that 
time, let me ask you okay, at that time, when he said that did you have any indication of what he had in 
mind or what he might do?

"D.A. Jahnke: No.

"[Detective]: The reason 
I ask that Deborah, is because, I guess I don't understand why you would feel 
guilty, leaving him there to face whatever it was that you . . 
.

* * * * * 
*

"D.A. Jahnke: I've, I 
don't know, I've always been protective of my brother, especially recently. 
Like, I remember, there were these kids and we were really little going to 
grammer school, and they used to tease my brother and they would beat him up, 
you know, and I'd be there flinging them off, because I was bigger than they 
were, you know.

"[Detective]: Sounds like 
my sister.

"D.A. Jahnke: That's 
great, that's great you know.

"[Detective]: The stories 
I could tell you about my sister.

"D.A. Jahnke: But, 
basically, that's how I felt that if 
something was going to happen I should at least be there to explain what was 
going on, and my brother shouldn't be left all alone." (Emphasis 
added.)

With respect to 
what happened being a execution, the detective testified:

"She at one time told me 
that it was her assessment of the entire situation for that evening, that what 
had happened that evening was an execution; that's how she described 
it."

The following is 
from Deborah's statement:

"[Detective]: Where you 
indicated that you interpreted, wait I guess I should restate this. That you 
felt that your brother interpreted that action as an execution and then you had 
some, some other statements * * *. 

"D.A. Jahnke: Okay. It's 
just a hypothesis, my brother did not just, did not say to me, well you know, 
this is an execution * * *."

With respect to 
Mrs. Jahnke, the following was said:

"[Detective]: * * * you 
had asked him in reference, what about mother?

"D.A. Jahnke: Yeah. And, 
and he said that, you know, that she was going to be okay, that he wasn't going 
to do anything. Because his hostility, you know, even though she was an awful 
pain * * *, there is no way in the world 
that my brother or me would ever want to hurt her, 
ever."

With respect to 
Deborah fleeing after the shooting and hiding from police, the detective 
testified:

"I asked her why she did 
that. She said she did not want to be picked up. She did not want to be 
caught."

What Deborah 
told the detective in her statement was the following:

"[Detective]: Would you 
at this time tell me why it was that you did not want to be picked 
up?

"D.A. Jahnke: Okay, um, 
it was just very simply, if I was, okay now, the police they were there within 
five minutes. I didn't want to be there at that time to say my brother did it. 
Also I didn't want to say that my brother did it, I didn't do anything, I'm 
innocent whatever, because that would be betraying him. I felt very strongly 
about that. * * *"

[¶100.]            
The statement is thirty pages in length. It may be subject to different 
interpretations. But, it is the province of the jury to consider and interpret 
the words of the statement and to resolve conflicts therein, to draw such 
inferences as it sees fit, to give it such weight as the jury thinks it 
entitled, and determine the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Ditrich v. United States, 243 F.2d 729 
(10th Cir. 1957). The jury is the finder of fact. That is their function. 
Taylor v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1294 
(1982); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1118. In this case it was grievous, 
prejudicial error to permit the detective to inform the jury of his opinions and 
conclusions of what Deborah had said in her statement. Only the jury had a 
lawful right to decide the meaning of, inferences to be drawn, and effect to be 
given Deborah Jahnke's statement.

[¶101.]            
Conclusions drawn from facts are inadmissible in cases in which the 
normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors enable them to draw proper 
conclusions from those facts, and only in those cases in which such experience 
does not enable laymen to draw correct conclusions may experts be called upon. 
Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 
(10th Cir. 1958).

[¶102.]            
It is true that opinion testimony by an expert with specialized training 
and knowledge about a subject not ordinarily understood by lay persons may be 
admissible if the expert is qualified and his opinion would be helpful to the 
jury. Krahn v. Pierce, Wyo., 485 P.2d 1021 
(1971). No one contended the detective was an expert in interpreting the meaning 
to be placed upon and the effect to be given the oral statement of another 
person. There was no attempt to establish a foundation for the testimony, nor 
any attempt to satisfy the requirements of Rule 703, W.R.E., for its admission. 
Neither was the testimony of the detective admissible as an opinion by a lay 
witness, for it is generally held that "the nonexpert witness may not give his 
opinions or conclusions, but must confine his testimony to a report of facts," 
31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 14; and where an opinion of a 
nonexpert witness is received, it is because it was "found necessary to admit 
the opinions or conclusions of nonexpert witnesses where the facts could not 
otherwise be adequately presented or described to the jury." 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert 
and Opinion Evidence § 14.

[¶103.]            
Rule 701, W.R.E., provides:

"If the witness is not 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."

The testimony of 
the detective was not based upon his perception (what he saw), but upon what he 
heard, and a review of what Deborah actually said in response to his questions 
makes clear that it was not helpful to a clear understanding of her 
testimony.

[¶104.]            
In Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 
Mass. 445, 466 N.E.2d 828 (1984), an indictment was dismissed because it resulted from the 
inaccurate and incomplete testimony of a detective who was asked by a 
juror:

"`What about the driver, 
was he supposed to be involved in this thing or not?' The detective answered, 
`We believe he was. He was the driver of the getaway van or the car.'" 466 N.E.2d  at 830.

In fact, the 
detective's report showed that the driver had denied knowledge of the robbery; 
and the court stated,

"[P]resentation of the 
defendant's edited statement tended to distort the meaning of that portion of 
the defendant's statement that was repeated * * *." 466 N.E.2d  at 
830,

and the court 
found that:

"It is possible, and 
perhaps likely, particularly in view of the responses of the detective and the 
assistant district attorney to one juror's questions, that the grand jurors, 
being untrained in the law and uninformed that the defendant had denied having 
knowledge of Preston's criminal intent, incorrectly interpreted the defendant's 
statement as a confession that he was a willing participant in the crime. 
Clearly, the defendant's full statement was not such a confession, however." 466 N.E.2d  at 830.

The court held 
it necessary to dismiss the indictment because of the impropriety of the 
detective's testimony. What occurred in this case was far more serious and 
should result in a reversal of the judgment entered.

[¶105.]            
The testimony was patently inadmissible. A proper objection was made and 
overruled, and that was error. That error would not have been cured by later 
receiving the statement into evidence, for then the jury would be in a position 
of having to resolve conflicts in the detective's testimony (which was 
inadmissible) and the statement itself. In any event, the statement was not 
received in evidence. There was cross-examination, but that could not overcome 
the prejudice created by the officer's inadmissible testimony. Finally, 
appellant should not have been put in the position of having to overcome 
inadmissible evidence.

[¶106.]            
The overwhelming prejudice resulting from that error is apparent. Had the 
detective's testimony been excluded and the jury permitted to receive Deborah's 
statement as they should have after the court ruled it "admissible in evidence," 
they could, in considering and weighing and resolving conflicts in the evidence, 
have determined: that Deborah Jahnke did not plan with her brother to kill their 
father; that she did not act as a backup but was given a gun which she would 
have used only to defend herself; that Richard did not need her help and wanted 
her to leave and was going to take her away and looked for the car keys; that 
she stayed, not to help him, but because, "if something was going to happen I 
should at least be there to explain what was going on"; that she did not plan 
his escape route or load or place the guns or even know how to shoot them (with 
respect to the guns involved - rifles and shotguns - she said in her 
statement:

"And, I guess it's the 
one he gave to me, because, it seemed to be the smallest. It was also the most 
attractive one there, probably. And, I've never, I don't recall ever firing a 
rifle or a shotgun or a riot gun or anything like, related to 
that.");

that the matter 
of the dogs and cats and lights were Richard's ideas and, in any event, 
insufficient; and finally that she was merely present when the incident occurred 
and was not an active participant. We have held that mere presence at the scene 
of a crime without more is insufficient to establish guilt of the crime of 
aiding and abetting. Haight v. State, 
Wyo., 654 P.2d 1232 (1982). Thus, it is said that:

"The mere fact that a 
person with knowledge that another intends to commit a crime acquiesces in the 
commission will not, provided he does nothing to procure or to bring about the 
commission of the crime, render him an accessary before the 
fact.

"The mere fact that the 
accused had knowledge of an intended crime on the part of another and concealed 
the same or failed to prevent it will not render accused an accessary before the 
fact. Mere approbation of a proposed crime to be committed by another will not 
render one an accessary before the fact." (Footnotes omitted.) 22 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 93.

And so the jury 
might have found Deborah Jahnke not guilty of any crime at 
all.

[¶107.]            
I hasten to add that even if Deborah Jahnke's statement had been put in 
evidence and the detective had not testified, the jury might still, under the 
rules adopted in the opinion of this court, have found Deborah guilty of the 
same crime. But if she is to be found guilty and sentenced to prison, it ought 
to be in a fair trial, upon proper, legally admissible evidence; and if she is 
to be convicted by words from her own mouth, they ought to be her words, not 
those of someone else.

[¶108.]            
Finally, I would hold that, in any event, there is not, as a matter of 
law, evidence that will support this conviction of aiding and abetting voluntary 
manslaughter and that reversal is required.

"Since manslaughter was a 
killing without premeditation, at common law, there could be no accessary before 
the fact to manslaughter, and this remains the law today in some jurisdictions." 
(Footnotes omitted.) 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 30.

[¶109.]            
The reason for the common-law rule is apparent for there is some 
difficulty in accepting the proposition that one can aid and abet a crime that 
occurs suddenly and in a heat of passion. And, even more difficult is the 
proposition that one not present at the scene of the killing could aid and abet 
the killing by acting hours beforehand suddenly and in a heat of passion. 
Section 6-1-114, W.S. 19772 makes aiding and abetting the 
commission of a felony a crime. Under similar statutes there is considerable 
authority holding that in some types of cases there can be an aiding and 
abetting of voluntary manslaughter. 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 30. There may be 
cases in which that occurs. The problem is that this is not one of those 
cases.

[¶110.]            
Here, the court states in its opinion: "The jury in this case could 
rationally find Deborah Jahnke guilty of voluntary manslaughter * * *." I am at 
a loss to understand how that can be so. The court correctly affirms that "it is 
incumbent upon the State to prove that her association and participation in the 
crime encompassed the state of mind required for the substantive offense of 
which she was convicted." The "substantive offense of which she was convicted" 
is aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter, and the state of mind required is 
that she acted "upon a sudden heat of passion," § 6-4-107, W.S. 
1977.

[¶111.]            
An aider and abettor

"* * * must do some act 
at the time of the commission of the crime that is in furtherance of the 
offense." 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 168.

[¶112.]            
The acts charged to Deborah are that she put a cat in the basement, 
suggested that the outside lights be turned off, and acted as a backup to 
accomplish the killing in the event Richard failed. If we assume arguendo that 
she committed the acts charged, there is no evidence that she put a cat in the 
basement or suggested lights be out, or acted as a backup as she sat on a sofa 
"suddenly" and in a "heat of passion." This court states that the fact that 
there had been a family fight earlier in the evening, that Deborah was upset and 
crying, and that she had been a victim of abuse was sufficient for the jury to 
find that in committing the acts charged, she acted "suddenly" and in "a heat of 
passion." Cases cited for this proposition are State v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92, 276 P.2d 434 (1954), and State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458 
(1929). In each of these cases the "sudden heat of passion" was claimed to have 
occurred at the time of the killing by the defendant who, seized at the moment 
by a heat of passion, fired the gun. Here the "sudden heat of passion" is said 
to have occurred sometime before the killing by one with time for cooling off 
and presenting no indication of acting "suddenly" or "heatedly" or 
"passionately." It is, thus, generally held that:

"The absence of malice 
and the influence of sudden passion are the general characteristics of this 
offense, both at common law and under statutory definitions. Most courts agree 
that there must be sufficient cause of provocation and a state of rage or 
passion, without time to cool, placing the accused beyond the control of his 
reason, and suddenly impelling him to the deed. If any of these are wanting - 
that is, if there is provocation without passion, or passion without a 
sufficient cause of provocation, or there is time to cool and reason has resumed 
its sway - the killing will, as a rule, be murder." (Footnotes omitted.) 40 
Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 56.

[¶113.]            
The State having failed to carry the burden of producing any substantial 
evidence to establish that Deborah acted suddenly and in a heat of passion, her 
conviction of the crime of aiding and abetting voluntary manslaughter should not 
be allowed to stand.

[¶114.]            
For all the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of conviction in 
this case.

1 The applicable statutes 
were extensively revised in 1984, but retained the requirement that the child 
and his parents, guardian or custodian be informed of the right to counsel and 
to remain silent, §§ 14-6-222 and 14-6-223, W.S. 1977.

2 Section 6-1-114, W.S. 
1977, in effect at the time of commission of this offense, 
provided:

"Every person who shall 
aid or abet in the commission of any felony, or who shall counsel, encourage, 
hire, command, or otherwise procure such felony to be committed, shall be deemed 
an accessory before the fact * * *."