Title: State v. Judith L. Kiernan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2449-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Judith L. Kiernan,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 126, 584 N.W.2d 203 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 8, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 6, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
John B. Murphy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Croooks, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Chad A. Lanning and Barry S. Cohen, S.C., Elkhart Lake, with oral 
argument by Dennis M. Melowski. 
 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2449-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Judith L. Kiernan,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The State of Wisconsin seeks 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing 
the convictions of Judith Kiernan for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of an intoxicant and operating a motor 
vehicle while having a prohibited breath alcohol concentration.1 
 The State maintains five prospective jurors did not need to be 
removed for cause even though those prospective jurors had been 
part of a jury that two days earlier returned a verdict of 
guilty in a case involving the same defense attorney, similar 
facts, and the same defense theory.  Because we conclude that 
reasonable 
jurors 
under 
these 
circumstances 
could 
not 
objectively set aside their opinion or prior knowledge so as to 
                     
1 State v. Kiernan, 221 Wis. 2d 126, 584 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (reversing judgment of Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, John B. Murphy, Judge).  
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
2 
fairly and impartially decide Kiernan’s case, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Kiernan was arrested in rural Sheboygan County and 
charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of an intoxicant and operating a motor vehicle while having a 
prohibited breath alcohol concentration, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a), (b) (1997-98).2  Kiernan pled not guilty and 
requested a jury trial.   
¶3 
Sheboygan County calls its residents for jury duty 
from a computer randomized list created for that purpose.  This 
relatively large group called for jury duty is collectively 
assigned to a particular branch of the circuit court for a one-
month period.  See Wis. Stat. § 756.28(2).  Every case called in 
that branch during that month has its jury selected from the 
large group of jurors.  Apparently this system generally works 
well, but problems with such a system are revealed in the unique 
facts of this case.3 
¶4 
The morning of Kiernan’s trial began with jury 
selection. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
randomly 
selected 
twenty 
prospective 
jurors 
from 
its 
monthly 
allocationtwelve 
to 
ultimately serve on the jury and eight extra persons to account 
for the four peremptory strikes both the State and Kiernan were 
allotted.  As the pool of twenty prospective jurors made its way 
                     
2 All further references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted.  
3 Kiernan does not challenge the method that Sheboygan 
County employs to select its jurors. 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
3 
into the courtroom, Kiernan’s attorney recognized five members 
from the jury of a case he had lost two days earlier in the same 
branch of the circuit court.   
¶5 
Ordinarily, as defense counsel later admitted, the 
reappearance of “veteran” jurors in another case tried by the 
same attorney would cause little, if any, concern.  Here, 
however, Kiernan’s case essentially was “deja vu all over 
again.”  It was a carbon copy of the earlier case.   
¶6 
In both cases the State prosecuted a person for 
driving an automobile while intoxicated with a breath alcohol 
content of 0.11.  In both cases the State’s strongest evidence 
was a reading from a breathalyzer machine, the Intoxilyzer 5000, 
showing that the defendants’ breath alcohol was in excess of the 
permitted legal limit.  Most importantly, in both cases the 
theory of defense was to discredit the breath alcohol reading 
given by the Intoxilyzer 5000.   
¶7 
The theory advanced in both trials was that objects in 
the mouth would absorb alcohol thereby rendering breathalyzer 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
4 
readings inaccurately high.4  While this concern has been most 
commonly associated with chewing gum or tobacco, both defendants 
wore dentures and asserted that the adhesive used to secure 
their dentures absorbed alcohol in a similar manner. 
¶8 
Kiernan’s counsel, upon recognizing the five veteran 
jurors, immediately alerted the circuit court of his concern and 
requested that the five veteran jurors be replaced with five 
other prospective jurors.  The circuit court apparently took his 
protestations under advisement and continued with voir dire.  
Unfortunately, it is unknown what exactly took place at voir 
dire because it was not recorded.   
¶9 
However, based on recorded conversations between the 
court and defense counsel that occurred after the jury was 
selected but before the trial began, we are able to discern the 
following information.  First, defense counsel quizzed the five 
veteran jurors about their reliance on the Intoxilyzer 5000.  
One veteran juror indicated that she would trust the results of 
the machine unless it was shown that the breath test was 
                     
4 Apparently it is commonly known among operators of 
breathalyzer machines that items placed in the mouth, such as 
chewing gum or tobacco, can absorb alcohol and potentially skew 
upward the breath alcohol reading.  See Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, Basic Training Program for Breath Examiner 
Specialist F-1 (1979) (discussing residual alcohol in the 
mouth).  From the discussions in this case between Kiernan’s 
counsel and the court, it appears as though at the first trial 
the officers that operated the breathalyzer machine testified 
that chewing gum or tobacco could affect the accuracy of the 
test results.  Those officers indicated that to remedy this 
potential problem, they would not administer the test until 20 
minutes had expired from the time the object was removed from 
the mouth. 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
5 
administered by an unqualified person or the machine failed its 
own diagnostic check.  Three of the other four veteran jurors 
agreed with that assessment.  Second, the circuit court declined 
to remove any of the veteran jurors for cause.  Third, Kiernan 
exhausted all of her peremptory strikes to remove the four 
veteran jurors who concluded that the breathalyzer machine, 
absent the extraordinary circumstances above, would render an 
accurate reading.  Fourth, if the court would have removed the 
veteran jurors for cause, Kiernan would have used her peremptory 
strikes to remove other prospective jurors who ultimately ended 
up sitting on the jury that heard the case.5 
¶10 The circuit court, in declining to remove the veteran 
jurors, noted that the jury selection methodology used in 
Sheboygan County was lawful and that Kiernan had not shown any 
improper discriminatory exclusion of a person or group of 
persons.  It then expressed confidence in the ability of the 
citizens of Sheboygan County to be fair and impartial jurors.  
The court reasoned that the veteran jurors were not biased 
merely because they rejected the defense theory at the first 
trial and would likely do so again at this trial.  According to 
the circuit court, the veteran jurors’ rejection of the defense 
theory spoke not to their biases but to the deficiency of the 
                     
5 Kiernan’s attorney identified two prospective jurors whom 
he would have removed with peremptory strikes had he not used 
them to remove the veteran jurors.  The first was a person who 
had a close relative injured by a drunk driver.  The second was 
a social worker who knew and worked with law enforcement 
officers in Sheboygan County. 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
6 
theory and to the manner in which it was advanced at trial.6  
Quite simply, the circuit court reasoned that from the evidence 
produced at the first trial, the veteran jurors could do nothing 
but believe the breath alcohol reading from the Intoxilyzer 5000 
was accurate.   
¶11 The jury as selected ultimately convicted Kiernan on 
both counts.  Kiernan appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed.   
¶12 The court of appeals concluded that reasonable jurors 
in the veteran jurors’ position could not set aside their 
opinions or prior knowledge and should have been removed for 
cause.  See State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 498-99, 579 N.W.2d 
654 (1998).  It reasoned that based on the record the veteran 
                     
6 At the first trial, defense counsel did not call any 
expert to testify to the denture adhesive theory.  He attempted 
to introduce some sort of report that supported his contention 
that denture adhesive can cause the Intoxilyzer 5000 to produce 
an errant reading.  The court refused to allow that report to be 
introduced as evidence concluding that it was inadmissible 
hearsay.   
Without the report, defense counsel advanced his theory 
mainly by cross-examining the officers who administered the 
breathalyzer test.  He questioned them about their knowledge of 
the effects of chewing gum and tobacco as well as denture 
adhesive on the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 5000’s reading.  
While the officers indicated that they were aware of the effect 
that gum and tobacco could have on the reading, they were not 
aware that denture adhesive could have the same effect.   
As a result, the “proof” consisted of inviting the jury to 
conclude that denture adhesive logically could have the same 
effect on the breathalyzer’s results as chewing gum or tobacco. 
 Defense counsel utilized the same methodology in Kiernan’s 
trial. 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
7 
jurors expressed their disbelief of the theory advanced by the 
defense before they had heard the evidence in Kiernan’s trial.  
Because they had formed opinions on the subject matter of the 
trial, the veteran jurors were biased and should have been 
removed for cause.  Kiernan, 221 Wis. 2d at 139.  Since they 
were not, Kiernan was forced to exercise all of her peremptory 
strikes to correct the circuit court’s error.  Under State v. 
Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 24-25, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), this act 
entitled her to a new trial, even though the jury that found her 
guilty was fair and impartial.  The State petitioned this court 
for review. 
¶13 Two years ago, this court concluded that a defendant 
forced to exercise peremptory strikes in order to correct a 
circuit court’s error in voir dire impermissibly deprived the 
defendant of an important statutory right.  Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 
at 24-25.  The deprivation warranted reversal of the conviction 
and a new trial even though the jury that ultimately heard the 
case was in all respects impartial.  Id.  Since that time, this 
court has faced a number of juror bias cases where the issue has 
not been whether the defendant was convicted by an impartial 
jury but whether court errors in the jury selection process 
entitled the defendant to a new trial.  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 
498-99; State v. Erickson, No. 98-0273-CR, op. at 7 (S. Ct. July 
8, 1999); State v. Mendoza, No. 97-0952-CR, op. at 7 (S. Ct. 
July 8, 1999).  This is another such case. 
¶14 We recently noted that three types of bias can exist. 
 State v. Faucher, No. 97-2702-CR, op. at 13-14 (S. Ct. July 8, 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
8 
1999).  The first and least common is statutory bias.  This 
category of bias derives from Wis. Stat. § 805.08 and declares 
as a matter of law that certain categories of persons shall be 
removed as jurors "regardless of his or her ability to be 
impartial.”  Faucher, op. at 15.  Statutory bias is a conclusion 
of law premised on the belief that certain relationships are so 
inherently prone to partiality that an individual case-by-case 
inquiry is not worth the time or effort.  See Dennis v. United 
States, 339 U.S. 162, 181 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“if the circumstances of that class in the run of instances are 
likely to generate bias . . . it would be a hopeless endeavor to 
search out the impact of these circumstances on the mind and 
judgment of a particular individual”). 
¶15 The second type of bias is termed subjective bias.  
This category of bias inquires whether the record reflects that 
the juror is a reasonable person who is sincerely willing to set 
aside any opinion or prior knowledge that the juror might have. 
 Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 498; see also Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 
282.  Discerning whether a juror exhibits this type of bias 
depends upon that juror’s verbal responses to questions at voir 
dire, as well as that juror’s demeanor in giving those 
responses.  These observations are best within the province of 
the circuit court.  On review, we will uphold the circuit 
court’s 
factual 
findings 
regarding 
a 
prospective 
juror’s 
subjective bias unless they are clearly erroneous.   
¶16 The third and final category of bias is objective 
bias.  In some circumstances, bias can be detected “from the 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
9 
facts and circumstances surrounding the . . . juror’s answers” 
notwithstanding a juror’s statements to the effect that the 
juror can and will be impartial.  Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 283.  
This category of bias inquires whether a “reasonable person in 
the juror’s position could set aside the opinion or prior 
knowledge.”  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 498.  We give weight to the 
circuit court’s conclusions that a prospective juror is or is 
not objectively biased.  We will reverse its conclusion only if 
as a matter of law a reasonable court could not have reached 
such a conclusion.  Faucher, op. at 32. 
¶17 Should bias exist in this case, it will rest either in 
the subjective or objective categories.  There is no suggestion 
that any of the jurors should have been removed for cause 
because they fell into one of the classes of statutory bias 
delineated by Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).   
¶18 Kiernan’s contention that the veteran jurors should 
have been removed for cause because they displayed subjective 
bias is also problematic largely for one reason:  the voir dire 
proceeding was not recorded.  As noted above, subjective bias is 
based on the juror’s responses and demeanor at voir dire.  Even 
with a transcript, an appellate court is at a disadvantage to 
gauge subjective bias because the demeanor and sincerity of the 
juror are difficult to convey in the paper record of a 
proceeding.  Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 509-10 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  Take away the transcript and an appellate court’s 
disadvantage increases exponentially.   
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
10
¶19 Without a transcript this court has no way of knowing 
exactly what was said at voir dire and, absent specific findings 
by the circuit court, has no way of knowing that court’s 
impression of the jurors.  Here, the circuit court’s and 
Kiernan’s summaries of the events at voir dire, while helpful to 
paint 
a 
picture 
of 
the 
voir 
dire 
in 
broad 
strokes, 
insufficiently 
furnish 
the 
detail 
necessary 
to 
undertake 
effective appellate review on subjective bias.   
¶20 As a result, the outcome of this case will hinge on an 
objective 
determination, whether the 
record 
reflects 
that 
reasonable people in the position of the veteran jurors could 
set aside their prior opinions or knowledge and judge Kiernan’s 
case solely on the evidence presented at her trial.  Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d at 498.  Answering this question requires us to decide 
essentially two issues.   
¶21 First, must veteran jurors categorically be removed 
for cause as a matter of law from subsequent trials with facts 
and issues that are nearly identical to the initial trial?  We 
conclude that they do not need to be removed for cause as a 
matter of law.  Second, even though veteran jurors as a class 
need not be removed for cause, did the circuit court err in not 
removing these jurors for cause because the record reflects that 
these particular veteran jurors were objectively biased?  In 
this case, the circuit court could reach only one conclusion.  
We must reverse the decision of the circuit court because we 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
11
determine as a matter of law the court could conclude only that 
the veteran jurors were objectively biased.7 
¶22 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, both state 
and federal, have concluded that jurors who serve on another 
jury involving similar facts and issues need not categorically 
be removed for cause solely on that basis.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Carranza, 583 F.2d 25, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Riebschlaeger, 528 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam) (collecting cases); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 
816, 819 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); 
Ramos v. United States, 12 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1926); Kirkland v. 
State, 786 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. App. Ct. 1990).  This court has 
concurred with this position insofar as veteran jurors need not 
be removed for cause when called to decide multiple cases with 
                     
7 The State contends that the lack of a voir dire transcript 
means that we must assume that the veteran jurors maintained 
that they could be impartial and the circuit court believed 
them.  We agree and have done so.  However, the State seems to 
imply that this ends the inquiry.   
The State fails to appreciate, however, that our objective 
analysis presupposes that such assurances are present.  The 
purpose of the objective analysis is to probe beyond what a 
juror asserts in order to examine whether reasonable jurors 
could actually act in the manner the jurors stated they would 
act. 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
12
similar issues and identical witnesses.8  State v. Boutch, 60 
Wis. 2d 397, 403-04, 210 N.W.2d 751 (1973).   
¶23 Moreover, we have been quite hesitant to create 
classes of persons that are per se excluded from jury service.  
Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 479 (law enforcement officers); McGeever 
v. State, 239 Wis. 87, 96-97, 300 N.W.2d 485 (1941) (part-time 
employee under the supervision of the district attorney and 
sheriff); State v. Olson, 179 Wis. 2d 715, 720, 508 N.W.2d 616 
(Ct. App. 1993) (victims of sexual abuse).  See also Nolan v. 
Venus Ford, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 215, 225, 218 N.W.2d 507 (1974); 
Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 626, 79 
N.W.2d 249 (1956); Good v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 596, 
598-99, 62 N.W.2d 425 (1954); but see State v. Gesch, 167 
Wis. 2d 660, 666-67, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992) (relatives of 
witnesses categorically excluded from sitting on the jury).  As 
a result, we will not categorically conclude that a veteran 
                     
8 This is to be contrasted with the same juror serving on a 
subsequent jury involving the same defendant where the same 
issues are at issue.  French v. State, 85 Wis. 400, 406-08, 55 
N.W. 566 (1893) (multiple service a “very grave error”); but see 
Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 378-80, 99 N.W. 593 (1904) 
(multiple service constitutionally permissible), overruled in 
part on other grounds, Boehm v. State, 190 Wis. 609, 209 N.W. 
730 
(1926). 
 
We 
note, 
however, 
that 
even 
among 
those 
jurisdictions that do not require a juror to be removed for 
cause when called to serve on a similar case involving a 
different defendant, many reach a contrary result when the 
additional case involves the same defendant.  See Annot., 
Juror’s Presence at or Participation in Trial of Criminal Case 
(or Related Hearing) as Ground of Disqualification in Subsequent 
Criminal Case Involving Same Defendant, 6 A.L.R.3d 519, §§ 9-13 
(1966).  
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
13
juror is objectively incapable of being fair and impartial in a 
subsequent case where the issues and facts are similar.   
¶24 Rather, a party seeking to have that veteran juror 
removed for cause will need to make an individualized showing 
that the particular juror is objectively biased.9  Here, Kiernan 
has made such a showing.  We must reverse the circuit court 
because as a matter of law a circuit court acting reasonably 
could not arrive at the conclusion that these veteran jurors 
were fair and impartial.  
¶25 We arrive at this conclusion based on the veteran 
juror’s statement at voir dire, as summarized by defense counsel 
and the circuit court.  In the discussion on the record of 
Kiernan’s motion to the court, defense counsel summarized what 
one of the veteran jurors had stated in voir dire.  The gist of 
the statement was that the juror believed that the Intoxilyzer 
5000’s readings would be correct unless it could be shown either 
that the machine was operated by an unqualified person or that 
the machine failed its self diagnostic check.  Three other 
veteran jurors concurred in this judgment.   
                     
9 The State contends that the court of appeals' opinion 
obligates a circuit court to remove a juror to “avoid[] the 
appearance of juror bias.”  Kiernan, 221 Wis. 2d at 142.  We are 
not convinced that the pertinent court of appeals' language 
needs be read as a departure from our well-settled law.  While 
circuit courts may remove jurors to avoid the appearance of 
bias, the circuit courts are obligated to remove for cause only 
those jurors who are indeed biased.  State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 
12, 29-30, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) 
(citing Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 
627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956)). 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
14
¶26 Due process requires that a defendant be judged solely 
on the evidence adduced at the trial.  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 
717, 722 (1961); Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 
1994).  This requirement means that the jury’s verdict must be 
supported by the evidence at trial, Thompson v. City of 
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), may not be based on information 
learned about the defendant that was not produced at trial, 
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725-26, and may not be based on pre-existing 
opinions on the issue put before the jury in the case, see 
Haynes, 398 F.2d at 985-87.   
¶27 Here the veteran jurors opined that they would 
conclude that the Intoxilyzer 5000 gave an accurate reading 
unless one of two extraordinary scenarios was presented.  Their 
candor at voir dire should be commended; however, their candor 
also reveals that they had decided the case without hearing the 
evidence.   
¶28 The 
crux 
of 
Kiernan’s 
defense 
was 
that 
the 
breathalyzer rendered an inaccurate reading for reasons other 
than operator error or machine malfunction.  By their own 
statements at voir dire, the veteran jurors had reached a 
conclusion on that very issue before they heard one sentence of 
testimony.10  Those jurors had formed a steadfast opinion outside 
                     
10 We note, however, that a juror is not required to “give 
unequivocal assurances” that they would be able set aside any 
opinion or prior knowledge.  Kiernan, 221 Wis. 2d at 125-26.  To 
the extent that the court of appeals' opinion can be read to 
require such assurances, it is in error.  State v. Erickson, No. 
98-0273-CR, op. at 18-19 (S. Ct. July 8, 1999); Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d at 502 n.9. 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
15
the confines of Kiernan’s trial on the very issue they were 
being called upon to decide at her trial.  This is the essence 
of bias.  
¶29 While we normally defer to the conclusions of the 
circuit court in objective bias instances, we cannot do so here. 
 On this record, as a matter of law, the circuit court could not 
reasonably reach the conclusion that it reached in this case.  
The circuit court was obligated to remove those jurors for 
cause.  It did not, requiring Kiernan to remove them with her 
peremptory strikes.  Under the rule of Ramos, a defendant cannot 
be required to use peremptory strikes to correct a circuit court 
error because such action grants the defendant fewer strikes 
than the State and effectively grants the defendant fewer 
strikes than permitted by statute.  Erickson, op. at 15.  
¶30 In sum, veteran jurors cannot be removed for cause 
solely on the basis of their having served as jurors in a 
similar case.  Rather, such veteran jurors must be shown 
individually to have exhibited bias in the case they are called 
to hear.  We conclude that these veteran jurors did exhibit 
bias, in that reasonable jurors in their position could not set 
aside expressed opinions and prior knowledge relating to the 
veracity of breathalyzer results.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
97-2449-CR 
 
16
97-2449.awb 
 
1 
¶31 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   The dissent, 
having declared "great respect" for stare decisis, then ignores 
it.  It attempts to justify this contradiction by explaining 
that 
all 
it 
wants 
overruled 
is 
the 
automatic 
reversal 
requirement of Ramos.  The automatic reversal rule, however, is 
the essence of Ramos.  I write separately to address this 
contradiction and to acknowledge the limitations of the Ramos 
decision.  
¶32 The dissent maintains that it has “great respect for 
the principle of stare decisis” while in the same sentence 
arguing that the “automatic reversal requirement” of State v. 
Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), should be 
overruled.  Dissent at 2.  I interpret the dissent as saying 
that only the “automatic reversal requirement of Ramos should be 
overruled” and by implication suggesting that the rest of Ramos 
remain good law.  The difficulty with such a proposal, of 
course, is that if the automatic reversal rule of Ramos is 
reversed, there remains no meaningful shred of the decision that 
has precedential value.  Ridding this state of the automatic 
reversal rule can only be accomplished by ridding this state of 
Ramos. 
¶33 A discussion of stare decisis was recently articulated 
in State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 486, 504-05, 579 N.W.2d 654 
(1998): 
 
Because we discern no sound reason either in law 
or public policy to do so, we also decline the State's 
invitation to overrule our decision in Ramos. 
 
97-2449.awb 
 
2 
. . . . 
 
Put simply, the ink has yet to dry on our 
decision in Ramos.  Were we to overrule Ramos, we find 
it no great leap of faith to suggest that public 
confidence in the judiciary would be diminished. 
 
. . . . 
 
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it 
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process . . . .   
 
 
[A]ny 
departure 
from 
the 
doctrine 
of 
stare 
decisis demands special justification . . . .   The 
path upon which the State would have us travel is 
uncertain and precarious.  (citations omitted)  
 
¶34 I joined the dissent in Ramos.  I continued that 
dissent in Ferron, a case that followed quickly on the heels of 
Ramos.  I acknowledge that Ramos is now binding precedent.  
However, today’s opinions more clearly delineate, and in doing 
so circumscribe, the significance of Ramos.  We apply an 
appellate standard of review that is deferential to the 
determinations of the circuit court, majority op. at 8-9, and 
have narrowly defined the rule of Ramos.  See State v. Erickson, 
No. 98-0273-CR, op. at 14-15 (S. Ct. July 8, 1999).  
¶35 The dissent should refrain from parsing stare decisis 
in an attempt to avoid the rule of Ramos.  The automatic 
reversal rule is Ramos and cannot be separated from it.  The 
dissent should acknowledge that a court cannot overrule the 
automatic reversal rule without overruling Ramos and affirm 
today's limitation of that decision.  Accordingly, I concur. 
97-2449.awb 
 
3 
  
 
No. 97-2449.npc 
 
1 
 
¶36 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Dissenting).    I dissent for 
the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 
12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), since this case presents a somewhat 
similar fact situation and is clearly controlled by the Ramos 
decision.11 
¶37 I concluded in Ramos, and I conclude here, "that by 
using a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have 
been excused for cause" the defendant, Kiernan, "effectively 
exercised this challenge for the purpose it is intendedto 
impanel an impartial jury."  Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 30. 
¶38 In this case, as in Ramos, there is no claim that the 
defendant, Kiernan, did not receive a fair trial by an impartial 
jury.12  The automatic reversal rule adopted by the majority in 
                     
11 The facts in State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d  
 328 (1997), are as follows: 
During voir dire, a prospective juror responded to a  
question from defense counsel by stating:  "Just knowing that 
the child was suffocated, I guess I couldn't be fair."  Ramos, 
211 Wis. 2d at 14.  The juror later, unequivocally, indicated 
that she could not be fair.  Id. 
The defense attorney moved to strike the juror for cause, 
and three times requested that the court have the reporter read 
back the juror's answers, in order to clear up confusion as to 
her responses.  Id. at 14-15.  The judge declined to do so, and 
denied the motion to strike the juror for cause.  Id. at 15. 
12 The majority opinion makes it clear that the jury that 
found the defendant guilty "was fair and impartial."  Majority 
op. at 7.  The attorney for Judith Kiernan conceded that fact at 
oral argument. 
No. 97-2449.npc 
 
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Ramos, and continued by the majority here, is contrary, I 
believe, to a common-sense approach.  See id. at 24-25. 
¶39 Where a defendant receives a fair trial with an 
impartial jury, why should there be a new trial?  That is a 
penalty for trial court error which is much too severe, where 
there has been no violation of any constitutional right of the 
defendant. 
¶40 While I have great respect for the principle of stare 
decisis,13 the automatic reversal requirement of Ramos should be 
overruled.  There should be a new trial only where an erroneous 
ruling on a challenge for cause actually resulted in prejudice 
to a defendant. 
¶41 If a biased juror actually sat on the jury, so that 
there was not a fair trial with an impartial jury, then a new 
trial is indeed appropriate.  But there should not be an 
                                                                  
The majority also points out that since the decision in 
Ramos, this is the fourth case where this court has faced the 
issue as to whether judicial errors in the process of jury 
selection required a new trial, even though the question of 
whether an impartial jury had decided the defendant's guilt was 
not involved.  See majority op. at 8. 
13 In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d  1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105 
(1962), this court recognized that stare decisis is not a 
straitjacket preventing a court from overruling itself, but 
rather 
a 
principle 
that 
allows 
change 
upon 
sufficient 
justification: 
Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle 
which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet 
changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, 
which, if correctly understood, was not static and did 
not 
forever 
prevent 
the 
courts 
from 
reversing 
themselves or from applying principles of common law 
to new situations as the need arose. 
No. 97-2449.npc 
 
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automatic reversal and a new trial as a result, unless that has 
occurred. 
¶42 We should return to the approach taken by this court 
in Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891), Pool v. 
Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Company, 94 Wis. 447, 69 N.W. 65 
(1896), Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 
(1900), and also taken by the court of appeals in State v. 
Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 489 N.W. 626 (Ct. App. 1992), review 
denied, 491 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. 1992). 
¶43 In Traylor, the court of appeals relied on Carthaus 
and Pool when it concluded, "Wisconsin's longstanding rule is 
that where a fair and impartial jury is impaneled, there is no 
basis for concluding that a defendant was wrongly required to 
use peremptory challenges."  Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d at 400. 
¶44 In the Ramos dissent, we analyzed the holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in a case involving peremptory 
challenges that arose in Oklahoma. 
 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
considered 
an 
analogous Fourteenth Amendment challenge in Ross v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). The Court indicated:  
"Because peremptory challenges are a creature of 
statute and are not required by the Constitution, it 
is for the State to determine the number of peremptory 
challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the 
manner of their exercise."  Id. at 89 (internal 
citations omitted).  Accordingly, the Court determined 
that a defendant's right to due process is violated 
"only if the defendant does not receive that which 
state law provides."  Id.  Applying Oklahoma law, the 
Ross Court concluded that the petitioner was required 
to exercise his peremptory challenge to remove the 
juror, and that the trial court's error constituted 
"grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts 
No. 97-2449.npc 
 
4 
all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is 
forced upon him."  Id.  Since a biased juror was not 
forced upon the petitioner, the Court held that Ross 
has received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and 
therefore his Fourteenth Amendment challenge failed.  
Id. at 89-91. 
 
Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 31-32 (1997) (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
¶45 We noted, in the Ramos dissent, that the Ross Court 
had also considered whether there was a Sixth Amendment 
violation.  The United States Supreme Court held:  "So long as 
the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had 
to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not 
mean the Sixth Amendment was violated."14  Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. 
¶46 Where there is no constitutional violation, automatic 
reversal and a new trial are uncalled for, unless the erroneous 
                     
14 I note that the United States Supreme Court granted a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in United States of America v. 
Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 
1999 WL 59872 (1999).  In Martinez-Salazar, a majority of the 
Ninth Circuit court of appeals held that a defendant who was 
forced to cure a trial court's erroneous failure to remove a 
juror for cause by using a peremptory challenge, and who 
ultimately exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, had been 
deprived of his Fifth Amendment due process rights and is 
entitled to the automatic reversal of his conviction.  See 
Martinez-Salazar, 146 F.3d at 658-59.  Apparently, there is a 
split among the courts of appeals as to whether reversal is 
required in such circumstances, absent a showing of prejudice.  
Compare id. and United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 408 (5th 
Cir. 1998) with United States v. Gibson, 105 F.3d 1229, 1233 (8th 
Cir. 1997), United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 698 n.7 
(10th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1566 
 n.20 (11th Cir. 1991).         
No. 97-2449.npc 
 
5 
ruling on a challenge for cause actually resulted in prejudice 
to a defendant.15  There was no actual prejudice in this case. 
¶47 For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
  
                     
15 I recognize that dictum in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202, 219 (1965), suggests that no actual prejudice is needed.  
Consistent with my dissent in Ramos, I conclude that whatever 
the import this dictum might arguably have had, it has been 
essentially nullified by Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).  
See Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 36-37 & n.4 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
  
No. 97-2449.npc 
 
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