Title: Condos v. Trapp

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Condos v. Trapp1986 WY 92717 P.2d 827Case Number: 84-62Decided: 04/22/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ronald A. 
CONDOS and Arlys K. Condos, Appellants (Plaintiffs and 
Counter-Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
William 
Ernest TRAPP and Deborah Gaye Trapp, Appellees (Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
Paul A. 
GRANGER and Rosalind J. Granger, husband and wife, John D. Lettz and Bonnie 
Lettz, husband and wife, Jerry A. Wilson and Susan J. Wilson, husband and wife, 
Waldo A. Ballhorn and Lavonne M. Ballhorn, husband and wife, (Third-Party 
Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County, Leonard McEwan, J.

 
 
Robert W. 
Brown, Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appellants.

 
 
Robert W. 
Koester, Sheridan, for appellees 
Trapps.

 
 
Micheal K. 
Shoumaker, Sheridan, for third-party 
defendants Lettz and Wilson.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., ROSE*, ROONEY** and CARDINE, JJ., and RAPER, J., 
Retired.

 
 

* Retired 
November 1, 1985.

 
 
** Retired 
November 30, 1985.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The sole question which 
we must resolve in this appeal is whether the last grantee, whom the parties 
agree must bear the loss attributable to a deficiency in a tract of land 
conveyed in separate grants by a common grantor, is to be determined according 
to the order of the deeds or according to the order of recording the deeds 
pursuant to § 34-1-120, W.S. 1977. Section 34-1-120, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

 
 
"Every 
conveyance of real estate within this state, hereafter made, which shall not be 
recorded as required by law, shall be void, as against any subsequent purchaser 
or purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real 
estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly 
recorded."

 
 
The 
district court granted a summary judgment in this case based upon application of 
the recording statute. We agree with that conclusion and affirm the district 
court.

 
 

[¶2.]     In the Appellants' 
Brief, the issues presented for review are stated to be the 
following:

 
 
"I. Where 
real estate is subdivided into smaller parcels without reference to a plat or 
plan, and there is insufficient land to satisfy the legal descriptions of all 
parcels, which Grantee must bear the deficiency?

 
 
"II. 
Whether the trial Court properly applied the Wyoming Recording Statute, W.S. § 
34-1-120 in determining who was the last Grantee who should bear the 
deficiency.

 
 
"III. 
Whether the affidavits presented by Defendants were sufficient to permit the 
trial Court to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and grant 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment."

 
 
In the 
Appellees' (Trapps') Brief, the only issue articulated is this 
one:

 
 
"The sole 
issue presented for review is whether a deficiency of real property within a 
specified tract should be borne by the grantees of a Warranty Deed executed last 
or by the grantees of a Warranty Deed filed of record last. The other points 
raised by the Appellants as issues are irrelevant and shall be addressed in the 
Appellees' arguments."

 
 
In the 
Brief for John D. Lettz, Bonnie Lettz, Jerry A. Wilson and Susan J. Wilson, 
Third-Party Defendants, the issue which is stated is this:

 
 
"The only 
issue is whether the party to bear the land deficiency of 28.8 feet is the first 
grantee or the grantee to record his deed first."

 
 
In the 
dissenting opinion the question raised is whether there is any need to identify 
the last grantee among the parties to this appeal because of a factual 
conclusion that the only conflict in deeds occurred between the appellees Trapps 
and the Ballhorns who are not parties to this appeal.

 
 

[¶3.]     A number of years prior 
to the conveyances which are in question in this case, R.W. McNally and Lois M. 
McNally executed a Certificate of Dedication for McNally Third Subdivision 
located in Sheridan County. Tract 19 is an irregularly shaped tract of realty, 
but its southern border is a straight line. The certificate of location shows 
the southern boundary of Tract 19 to be 1229.3 feet long. Subsequently, the 
McNallys sold the entire tract to common grantors of the several parties in this 
litigation. The common grantors of all of these parties are the Grangers who 
conveyed lots in Tract 19 in the following order: (1) Hammonds (the common 
grantor of the Lettzes and Wilsons) on June 12, 1975; (2) the Ballhorns on March 
31, 1977; (3) the Condoses on March 1, 1978; and (4) the Trapps on March 2, 
1978. The following schematic diagram does not reflect the true shape of the 
land, but it does generally show the relationship of the parties' 
properties.

 
 
 
 
B

A

L

L

H

O

R

N

S

 
 
T

R

A

P

P

S

C

O

N

D

O

S

E

S

LETTZES

HAMMONDS

WILSONS

 

The deeds 
to the several parties were recorded in this order: (1) Ballhorns on March 31, 
1977; (2) Trapps on March 3, 1978; (3) Condoses on March 16, 1978; (4) the 
Hammonds on August 17, 1978.

 
 

[¶4.]     This dispute arose when 
the Trapps placed a fence between their property and the Condoses'. The Condoses 
filed a complaint against their neighbors alleging that the Trapps had misplaced 
the fence and praying for repossession of their land and for rents on the land 
wrongfully withheld from them. The Trapps answered, and filed a counterclaim 
against the Condoses, together with a third-party complaint against the other 
landowners in the tract: the Lettzes, the Wilsons, and the Ballhorns, seeking to 
quiet their title in the disputed property. Only after the litigation was 
commenced did any of these landowners seek a survey of the property. At that 
time it was discovered that the southern boundary of Tract 19 is only 1200.5 
feet long. The only question to be resolved was who was to bear the loss of the 
28.8 feet not contained in the property.

 
 

[¶5.]     After issue was joined, 
the Condoses filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and that was followed 
by a Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues filed by the Trapps. In support 
of their positions both the Condoses and the Trapps argued that the last grantee 
must bear the loss. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Trapps and denied the partial summary judgment sought by the Condoses. The 
effect of the summary judgment was that the Lettzes and Wilsons were required to 
quitclaim a 28-foot strip of land to the Condoses, and the Condoses were 
required to quitclaim a 28-foot strip of land to the Trapps. While the Condoses 
then held a different tract of land from that which they previously had believed 
they owned, the tract is of the same size. Ultimately, the loss because of the 
shortfall in the area of Tract 19 must be borne by the Lettzes and Wilsons 
according to the judgment of the district court. The Condoses, Lettzes and 
Wilsons have appealed from that judgment.

 
 

[¶6.]     The parties to this 
case are in accord that in circumstances such as this, in which there is no 
other way to determine who actually received a conveyance of a deficient area of 
land, the last grantee must bear the loss. The contention of the dissenting 
opinion is that the record supports another way of determining who actually 
received a conveyance of a deficient area of land, and for that reason we need 
not decide the case which the parties have presented.

 
 

[¶7.]     In their memorandum 
with respect to the summary judgment motions the Trapps contended that the last 
grantee to record is identified as the last grantee. The memorandum which the 
Condoses presented advanced the same rule, but the Condoses contended that the 
last grantee to receive his deed is the last grantee. In this appeal, the 
Condoses, as appellants, maintain their original position that the last grantee 
is the last to receive a deed. The Trapps, as appellees, now contend that the 
recording statutes "constitute a comprehensive statutory scheme" which mandates 
that the last person to record must bear the loss resulting from the deficiency 
in the land. The dispute of the parties still is only over the method of 
determining the last grantee, and this is the question submitted to the court 
for resolution.

 
 

[¶8.]     The Trapps were the 
last grantees to receive a deed, and the other parties contend that they should 
bear the loss. This also would be the resolution proposed by the dissenting 
opinion. The Hammonds, who were the predecessors in interest of the Lettzes and 
the Wilsons, recorded their deed last, and the Trapps contend that the loss in 
area must be taken from their grant. Authority addressing the question is not 
plentiful. Holmgren v. Bondhus, 311 Minn. 157, 247 N.W.2d 608 
(1976).

 
 

[¶9.]     In many respects this 
case appears to be unique. It does not involve any of the peculiarities which in 
part were found dispositive in other cases. No deed in this instance is clearly 
erroneous. Compare Hughes v. Yates, 228 Ark. 860, 311 S.W.2d 179 (1958). All the 
deeds described the property in metes and bounds. Compare Holmgren v. Bondhus, 
supra; Waldorf v. Cole, 61 Wn.2d 251, 377 P.2d 862 (1963). No reference is made 
in any of these deeds to the property described in the other deeds. Compare Long 
v. Ragan, 94 Md. 462, 51 A. 181 (1902); Howe v. Cornish, 146 Misc. 799, 262 N.Y.S. 830 (1933). No deed in this case refers to monuments (the Ballhorn deed 
makes reference to the road on the west, but the monument-over-distance rule, as 
applied to the Ballhorn deed, is not helpful in disposing of this dispute). 
Compare Bloch v. Pfaff, 101 Mass. 535 (1869). None of the deeds uses uncertain 
language as respects the south boundary. Compare Long v. Ragan, supra. The 
grantees in this instance did not rely on several surveys. Compare Adams v. 
Wilson, 137 Ala. 632, 34 So. 831 (1903). The problem is that the original 
description of Tract 19 was erroneous, and that erroneous description was relied 
upon in the deeds from the Grangers to the several 
grantees.

 
 

[¶10.]  It is readily apparent that no grantee in 
this case would have any notice of the deficiency of land in the tract absent a 
survey. None of the deeds conflicted, and, even if recorded, they would not 
provide notice of the shortfall in the tract. A survey of any individual parcel 
of land would not necessarily have revealed a discrepancy between the total 
footage conveyed and the actual footage contained in the tract. Because of these 
factors, the common law developed an exception to the general rule that a 
shortfall or excess in land in a tract should be divided equally among the 
grantees. 12 Am.Jur.2d, Boundaries, § 63, pp. 600-601. The exception is that 
when there is no reference to a plat or plan, the last grantee is the one who 
must bear the shortfall or alternatively is benefitted by receiving the excess. 
Often situations arise in which some peculiar fact or description is dispositive 
of the question, and the courts do not have to invoke the last grantee rule. No 
such argument or circumstance was submitted to the trial court or this court in 
this case, however. The issue submitted for the court to decide was premised 
upon the last grantee rule and simply asks how the last grantee will be 
identified. Is it the last to receive a deed under the common law, or is it the 
last to record under our recording statute?

 
 

[¶11.]  Essentially the Condoses depend upon a 
simple application of the common-law proposition that a grantor cannot convey 
what he does not own, and they urge that concept to be dispositive of this case. 
According to their argument, when a common-law grantor did not have sufficient 
land left to satisfy the last executed deed (the one to the Trapps in this 
instance), the last deed is operative to convey only what the grantors had left, 
and it follows that the Trapps should bear the loss. This argument accurately 
reflects the common-law rule that a second conveyance of land already conveyed 
was not possible because the grantor had nothing left to convey. Hruby v. 
Lonseth, 63 Wn. 589, 116 P. 26, 27 (1911); Nattin v. Glassell, 156 La. 423, 100 So. 609, 610 (1924); Mechler v. Dehn, 203 App. Div. 128, 196 N.Y.S. 460 (1922), 
aff'd mem., 236 N.Y. 572, 142 N.E. 288 (1923). We accept the common-law 
principle that the last grantee must bear the loss because the common law still 
is the law in Wyoming unless abrogated by statute. State ex Rel. State Highway 
Commission v. Meeker, 75 Wyo. 210, 294 P.2d 603 (1956). See also Torgeson v. 
Connelly, Wyo., 348 P.2d 63, 72 (1959); Low v. Sanger, Wyo., 478 P.2d 60, 63 
(1970).

 
 

[¶12.]  While as we have noted the recording 
statute would not provide protection in this instance because the deeds do not 
conflict, we conclude that the policy of the recording statute (to protect those 
who record first, to establish certainty in records, and to avoid losses such as 
this) ought to be invoked. Even though the predecessors in title of the Lettzes 
and the Wilsons were the first grantees, the Ballhorns, the Trapps and the 
Condoses all recorded their deeds before the predecessors of the Lettzes and the 
Wilsons.

 
 

[¶13.]  In such a situation the Trapps would have 
been entitled to have their deed reformed on grounds of mutual mistake to 
include an additional 28 feet had they discovered the error before the Condoses 
or the Hammonds recorded. Crompton v. Bruce, Wyo., 669 P.2d 930 (1983); Waters 
v. Trenckmann, Wyo., 503 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1972); Tucker v. Reynolds, Wyo., 429 P.2d 326, 328 (1967); Russell v. Curran, 66 Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159, 1163-1167 
(1949). Compare Peterson v. First National Bank of Lander, Wyo., 579 P.2d 1038, 
1041 (1978); Cady v. Slingerland, Wyo., 514 P.2d 1147, 1150 (1973); Pfister v. 
Brown, Wyo., 498 P.2d 1243, 1244 (1972); Holland v. Windsor, Wyo., 461 P.2d 47, 
50 (1969). The Condoses, under the same assumption, then would have been 
permitted to have their deed reformed to insure that they received the area 
which had been deeded to them. The Hammonds, the last in line, would not have 
been entitled to have their deed reformed because at that juncture the Grangers 
would have had no land with which to make up the deficit.

 
 

[¶14.]  The Arkansas Supreme Court in Hughes v. 
Yates, supra, applied these equitable principles in conjunction with the 
recording statute. In that case the common grantor mistakenly believed that he 
owned a tract of land that was a perfect rectangle. The north line of the tract 
did not run exactly east and west but instead the angle deviated one degree so 
that the north line moved southward by one degree as it was followed from west 
to east. The common grantor executed a deed to Hughes which was recorded before 
the deed to Yates was executed. The Hughes deed relied upon a property line 
between Rogers and a neighbor to the north. That line described the north 
boundary of the Hughes tract. It was this line that had a southward deviation of 
one degree. In the deed to Yates a metes and bounds description was used which 
commenced at a point 200 feet south of the northwest corner of the original 
tract. The result was that because of the southward deviation a wedge-shaped 
area of land some 12.22 feet wide at its base overlapped in the two deeds. The 
Arkansas court resolved the dispute by according to the first deed the 
construction it would have received in a controversy with the grantor, and it 
then corrected the first deed according to those principles. Because the 
descriptions in the two deeds actually conflicted the second grantee was left 
"in the unfortunate position of having received a deed to property that his 
grantor had already sold to someone else." Hughes v. Yates, supra, 311 S.W.2d  at 
181. The Arkansas court gave to the first deed the construction it would have 
received in a controversy between the grantor and the grantee because there was 
no plat or plan of record. The court held that the legal effect of that first 
deed could not be altered by the extraneous fact that the grantor later executed 
an independent deed which contained an overlapping 
description.

 
 

[¶15.]  Similarly in this instance we must 
address the question of who is the last grantee because of the mistake as to the 
amount of land owned by the common grantor. In resolving that question we must 
consider whether the common law rule which identified the last grantee as the 
one who last received his deed has been changed by our recording statute, § 
34-1-120, W.S. 1977. This statute appropriately has been identified as a 
race-notice statute. It speaks for itself (Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 P. 475, reh'g denied, 35 P. 1025 (1894)), and it means that a subsequent deed, 
recorded first, is given priority over the prior deed to the same property 
recorded last. Hawkins v. Stoffers, 40 Wyo. 226, 276 P. 452, reh'g denied, 40 
Wyo. 245, 278 P. 76 (1929); Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959). 
It protects subsequent purchasers who first record their 
deed.

 
 

[¶16.]  It is the primary purpose of a recording 
statute such as ours to secure certainty of title by publicity of other 
conveyances, and a grantee should seasonably record the instrument conveying 
property to him in order to effectuate this purpose. Hawkins v. Stoffers, supra; 
Frank v. Hicks, supra.

 
 

[¶17.]  The predecessors in interest of the 
Lettzes and Wilsons delayed the recording of their conveyance for some 38 
months. Since they did not seasonably record, they cannot claim the protection 
of the recording statute. Those predecessors in interest, the Hammonds, had an 
opportunity to avoid the loss which now must be attributed to their grantees by 
seasonably recording; and, since they failed to take advantage of that 
opportunity, they and their subsequent grantees must bear the loss attributable 
to the shortfall in this instance. Absent presentation and argument of 
alternative grounds for resolution, we hold that in an instance in which a tract 
of land is conveyed by separate deeds to several grantees and later is 
discovered to contain less land than was conveyed, the impact of the loss must 
fall upon a dilatory grantee who fails to record an earlier deed. This holding 
is consistent with a policy espoused by our recording statute, and does 
effectuate the purpose of that statute. Responding to the issue raised by the 
parties, this resolution identifies the last grantee as the one who last records 
a deed.

 
 

[¶18.]  The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed.

 
 

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, 
Retired, joins.

 
 

[¶19.]  I dissent.

 
 

[¶20.]  In this case there are four deeds which 
are relevant.

 
 

[¶21.]  The only conflict in the four deeds is 
between the Trapp and Ballhorn deeds as shown by the crosshatched area above. 
The Trapp deed states that it is a conveyance of land beginning 643 feet west of 
the SE corner of tract 19 and includes 297.45 feet along the south border west 
from the beginning point. This in no way conflicts with the Hammond or Condos 
deeds because those deeds grant a total of 643 feet of the south border, west 
from the SE corner. The Trapp deed does conflict with the Ballhorn deed. The 
Ballhorn deed is measured from the NW corner of the tract (contrary to the other 
deeds) and conveys 288.8 feet of the south border from a road bordering on the 
west of tract 19. Because the tract contains 28.8 feet less on the south border 
than was assumed, the Trapp and Ballhorn deeds attempt to convey the same strip 
of land, i.e. the strip between 911.6 and 940.4 feet from the SE 
corner.

 
 

[¶22.]  As between the Ballhorns and the Trapps, 
the Ballhorns' conveyance was first made and first recorded; it should prevail, 
and the west 28.8 feet of the Trapp conveyance should be held void and pass no 
title to the Trapps.

 
 

[¶23.]  This result, based on the conflicting 
deeds, obviates any need for us to rely on the "last grantee rule" argued by the 
parties. We are at liberty to adopt this approach, which the parties do not 
argue, although we are not required to do so. State Highway Commission v. 
Triangle Development Company, Wyo., 371 P.2d 408 (1962). As Chief Justice Blume 
stated in Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 119, 247 P.2d 660, 663 (1952),

 
 
"were we 
to limit our decisions strictly and literally to the arguments advanced by 
counsel in a case, the law in this jurisdiction would be in a sorry state." 
"There is no reason to keep secret the proper law applicable to a case just 
because overlooked." Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada LTD v. Y-Tex 
Corporation, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1979).

 
 

[¶24.]  Even if the majority and the parties were 
correct that the "last grantee rule" applies, the Trapps, the last to purchase, 
should be considered the last grantees and should suffer the loss. The majority 
places the burden of the shortage upon the successors to the Hammonds by 
identifying the Hammonds as the last grantees under the recording statute, § 
34-1-120, W.S. 1977. But the recording statute should not have been applied as 
between the Trapps and Condoses or the Trapps and Hammonds. Section 34-1-120, 
W.S. 1977, provides:

 
 
"Every 
conveyance of real estate within this state, hereafter made, which shall not be 
recorded as required by law, shall be void, as against any subsequent purchaser 
or purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate or any portion 
thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
The 
statute only voids conveyances of "the same real estate or any portion thereof" 
as against subsequent purchasers who record first. By placing the burden upon 
the Hammonds, the court has used the statute to void a portion of a conveyance 
which was never one of a number of conveyances of "the same real estate." The 
strip of land between the Trapps and Ballhorns, described above, is the only 
real estate which was conveyed twice. As to this strip, the Trapps were actually 
subsequent purchasers who recorded their deed after the Ballhorns (i.e. prior 
purchasers of the same strip).

 
 

[¶25.]  The opinion of the court states that 
placing the shortage upon the Hammonds' successors is fair because the Hammonds' 
failure to record their deed prevented the other three grantees from determining 
that there was insufficient land to satisfy all conveyances. This opinion is 
incorrect. The Trapp deed describes a beginning point 643 feet west of the SE 
corner and encompasses another 297.45 feet further west. Recording the two deeds 
east of the Trapp conveyance would have told them no more than they already 
knew, i.e. that their property began 643 feet west of the SE corner and 
proceeded west another 297.45 feet. A review of these deeds would have disclosed 
no conflict or conveyance of the same real estate. On the other hand, if the 
Trapps had reviewed the Ballhorn deed and had commissioned a survey of the 
tract, they would have discovered that the Ballhorn deed conflicted with their 
deed and involved a conveyance of the same parcel of land. The Trapps' surveyor 
would have begun his measurements at the SE and NW corners of the entire tract, 
the starting points of the descriptions in the deeds, and he would have caught 
the error.

 
 

[¶26.]  While the majority concedes that the 
recording act, by its terms, does not fix the priorities between the Trapps' and 
the Hammonds' successors, the majority nevertheless concludes that the policies 
of the recording act are advanced if the Hammonds' successors are punished. One 
of the policies offered by the majority is "to avoid losses such as this." But 
this policy would not be advanced in this case because everyone concedes that a 
timely recording by the Hammonds could not have changed the Trapps' decision to 
purchase and therefore would not have avoided this loss.

 
 

[¶27.]  Another policy offered by the majority is 
"to protect those who record first." One must ask, however, who is this "first" 
recorder protected from? The recording act is merely intended 
to

 
 
"impart to 
a subsequent purchaser notice of instruments which affect the title to a specific tract of land in which the 
subsequent purchaser is interested at the time." (Emphasis by the Kansas Supreme 
Court.) Luthi v. Evans, 223 Kan. 622, 576 P.2d 1064, 1070 
(1978).

 
 
"[A]s to 
priority between competing interests 
to the same property from the same 
grantor, the constructive notice afforded by the deed's recordation is 
sufficient to give that deed priority over any competing but after-acquired 
interests." (Emphasis added.) 6A R. Powell, Powell on Real Property ¶ 904[3], at 
82-13 to 82-14 (1984).

 
 
Those who 
record first are only to be protected from others who have acquired a competing 
interest in the same 
land.

 
 

[¶28.]  Finally, the majority states that the 
recording act is designed to establish certainty in records and that this 
purpose is advanced by the holding in this case. While certainty in records is a 
purpose of the act, we should not create extra-statutory sanctions to advance 
that purpose. Our recording act creates a forfeiture sanction which is to be 
applied only in limited circumstances. Until a conflicting transaction has 
occurred involving the same piece of land, the grantee has perfectly valid title 
and should not be forced to relinquish any of his property even if he does not 
immediately record.

 
 
"Notwithstanding 
the important benefits achieved by recordation, title to real property may be 
transferred by delivery of a deed without recording." 6A Powell, supra, at 
82-14.

 
 
The act 
does not force a purchaser to forfeit some of his tract just because he records 
late, and we should not create such a novel rule. Even under the majority's 
"last grantee" rule, the recording act should not be applied. The Trapps were 
the last to purchase as against all the other parties and should lose under the 
theory of "first in time, first in right."

 
 

[¶29.]  I would reverse.