Title: State ex rel. Meyer v. Warren County Board of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Meyer v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4863.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance 
sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to promptly notify the 
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, 
Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that 
corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4863 
[THE STATE EX REL.] MEYER v. WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Meyer v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4863.] 
Elections—Prohibition—Writ of prohibition sought to prevent board of elections 
from placing tax-levy-reduction measures on the November 2020 ballot—
Relator failed to prove that tax-levy-reduction measures did not satisfy the 
requirements of R.C. 5705.261—Board of elections did not abuse its 
discretion or disregard applicable law when it denied relator’s protest of 
its decision to place tax-levy-reduction measures on the ballot—Writ 
denied. 
(No. 2020-1149—Submitted October 6, 2020—Decided October 9, 2020.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, John Meyer, seeks a writ of 
prohibition to bar respondent, the Warren County Board of Elections, from placing 
nine tax-reduction measures on the November 2020 ballot.  Meyer has requested 
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oral argument.  For the reasons set forth below, we deny the writ and deny Meyer’s 
request for oral argument. 
The evidence in the record 
{¶ 2} On June 15, 2020, the board received nine separate petitions to reduce 
nine tax levies.  The nine tax levies in question all support the Mason City School 
District.1  The petitions sought to reduce each levy by .01 mills. 
{¶ 3} Meyer filed with the board a protest against placing the tax-reduction 
measures on the ballot.  On August 14, 2020, the board held a hearing on the protest. 
{¶ 4} In his protest letter, Meyer asserted that the proposed tax reductions 
were an effort “to manipulate the system” to prevent voters from enacting “a 
meaningful tax reduction.”  Meyer’s counsel elaborated at the protest hearing, 
claiming that the nine levies, which total 79.74 mills, would be reduced by a 
“paltry” 0.11 percent.  Further, his counsel asserted that because R.C. 5705.261 
limits levy-reduction petitions to one every five years, if the board authorized the 
proposed ballot measures, voters would have to wait five more years before they 
could place another, more significant reduction on the ballot.  In other words, 
Meyer suggested that the school district itself was promoting a miniscule reduction 
in order to shield itself for another five years from the possibility of a substantial 
reduction. 
{¶ 5} The board unanimously denied the protest on August 14, 2020.  One 
board member expressed skepticism about the motives of those filing the petitions, 
“agree[ing] that it’s gaming the system and it stinks,” but ultimately concluding 
that “the motives are outside the scope of our authority.”  The board’s chairman 
elaborated on the latter point, stating that pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(K)(1), the 
                                                 
1.  The nine levies are (1) a 1968 levy for 16.1 mills, (2) a 1969 levy for 4.9 mills, (3) a 1977 levy 
for 4.0 mills, (4) a 1978 levy for 6.5 mills, (5) a 1988 levy for 8.6 mills, (6) a 1996 levy for 9.79 
mills, (7) a 2001 levy for 9.95 mills, (8) a 2005 levy for 9.94 mills, and (9) a 2020 levy for 9.96 
mills. 
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board’s job was only to “review, examine, and certify the sufficiency and validity 
of petitions.” 
Procedural history 
{¶ 6} On September 24, 2020, Meyer filed his complaint for a writ of 
prohibition in this court.  Because the case was commenced within 90 days of the 
November 3, 2020 election, it was automatically subject to an expedited briefing 
schedule.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(1) and (2).  However, along with his complaint, 
Meyer filed a motion to expedite the already-accelerated briefing schedule, which 
we granted.  __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-4587, __ N.E.3d __.  In addition to the 
briefs and evidence of the parties, we received an amicus brief in opposition to the 
writ from Casey Moran and Kirsten Lupinski, who reside in Mason and circulated 
petitions in support of the nine ballot measures. 
{¶ 7} On September 29, 2020, Meyer filed a request for oral argument that 
was not opposed. 
Legal analysis 
{¶ 8} Prohibition is the appropriate remedy by which to challenge a board 
of elections’ decision to place a candidate or measure on the ballot.  State ex rel. 
Emhoff v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 153 Ohio St.3d 313, 2018-Ohio-1660, 106 
N.E.3d 21, ¶ 13-14.  To obtain a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish “the 
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, the lack of legal authority for the 
exercise of that power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law.”  State ex rel. Barney v. Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 159 Ohio St.3d 50, 
2019-Ohio-4277, 147 N.E.3d 595, ¶ 11.  When reviewing the decision of a board 
of elections, we consider “whether the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused 
its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.”  Emhoff at 
¶ 14. 
{¶ 9} The first and third elements of the prohibition analysis are not in 
dispute.  “A board of elections exercises quasi-judicial authority when it [decides] 
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a protest after a mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony.”  Barney at ¶ 12.  
“R.C. 3509.39(A) requires a board of elections to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing 
on a petition protest.”  Id.  The board concedes that it exercised quasi-judicial 
authority when it conducted an evidentiary hearing on Meyer’s protest and denied 
it.  Likewise, the board concedes that given the proximity of the election, Meyer 
does not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
{¶ 10} The remaining question, then, is whether the board lacked legal 
authority for its actions.  Meyer has not alleged fraud or corruption.  Instead, he 
alleges that the board exercised its power without legal authority when it interpreted 
R.C. 5705.261 in a manner that allowed the levy-reduction measures to be placed 
on the ballot. 
{¶ 11} We have recognized that R.C. 5705.261 establishes five 
requirements for petitioners seeking to submit levy decreases to the voters: (1) the 
petition must propose the question of a decrease of an increased rate of levy 
approved by the voters for a continuing period of time, (2) the petition must be 
timely filed, (3) the petition must state the amount of the proposed decrease, (4) the 
petition must be signed by a sufficient number of qualified electors, and (5) only 
one petition may be filed during each five-year period after the election at which 
the voters approved the rate increase for a continuing period.  State ex rel. Choices 
for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 
N.E.2d 582, ¶ 37.  Meyer has not challenged the timeliness of the petition, the 
sufficiency of the signatures, or the adequacy of the information in the petitions.  
Nor does he allege that more than one reduction petition has been filed regarding 
any of the levies during the relevant five-year period. 
{¶ 12} His objection concerns the first requirement of R.C. 5705.261 that a 
petition propose a levy decrease.  In Anthony, we applied “the rules of grammar 
and common usage” to conclude that a 100 percent reduction of a levy—“to 0.0 
mills from 9.7 mills”—would not be a decrease, but rather a repeal.  Id. at ¶ 38-41.  
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But while there is a maximum amount that a reduction cannot exceed without 
becoming a repeal, the statute does not create a minimum threshold that a reduction 
must satisfy.  The plain language of R.C. 5705.261 requires only that a petition call 
for some designated reduction, which these petitions do. 
{¶ 13} Meyer concedes that the proposed decreases of .01 mills satisfy the 
strict language of R.C. 5705.261, but he contends that construing the statutory 
language in a way that allows for a miniscule decrease would lead to absurd results 
that the General Assembly never intended.  Specifically, he asserts that a ruling in 
the board’s favor would make it possible for a school board to shield its tax levies 
from reduction in perpetuity by instituting regular slight reductions.  And he asserts 
that courts have an obligation to construe statutes in such a way as to avoid absurd 
results. 
{¶ 14} Meyer’s reliance on the absurdity doctrine is unavailing.  “The 
absurd-result exception to the plain-meaning rule of [statutory] construction” 
applies “only [to] those cases in which the plain language of a statute results in an 
obviously unintended result.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, 
¶ 26 (plurality opinion).  Moreover,  
 
even if the plain-language application of a statute would yield an 
absurd result, the absurdity doctrine does not permit a court to 
correct the absurdity unless it is “reparable by changing or supplying 
a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was 
obviously a technical or ministerial error * * *.  The doctrine does 
not include substantive errors arising from a drafter’s failure to 
appreciate the effect of certain provisions.” 
 
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(Ellipsis added in Parker.)  State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, 
137 N.E.3d 1151, ¶ 28 (lead opinion), quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 238 (2012). 
{¶ 15} Thus, the absurdity doctrine does not apply in the present case for 
two reasons.  First, the existence of an undesirable application of a statute is not 
necessarily evidence of absurdity.  And second, the problem that Meyer complains 
of, assuming it exists, may be corrected only by the legislature.  His position is that 
a board of elections should decide whether a proposed tax-levy reduction is large 
enough to be meaningful, and hence, qualify for the ballot.  But the statutory duties 
of a board of elections, as spelled out in R.C. 3501.11(K), do not include reviewing 
and rejecting petitions on such grounds.  Likewise, it is not the judiciary’s role to 
decide what is essentially a policy question.  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 
Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 113 (“the General Assembly 
is responsible for * * * making policy decisions”). 
{¶ 16} Meyer has repeatedly conceded that he has no legal basis beyond the 
absurdity doctrine to challenge the board’s decision to place the measures on the 
ballot.  In his protest letter, he wrote, “I do understand that the board is not permitted 
to disallow the ballot issues from being put on the ballot.”  And at the protest 
hearing, his counsel assured the board that “[n]o one’s suggesting” the statutory 
requirements for ballot access were not met.  Because the statutory requirements 
were met, as Meyer concedes, the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard 
applicable law by placing the petitions on the ballot. 
{¶ 17} We therefore deny the writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 18} In addition, we deny Meyer’s request for oral argument.  We will 
exercise our discretion to grant a request for oral argument when a case “involves 
a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial 
constitutional issue, or a conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals.”  State ex rel. 
Ullmann v. Klein, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-2974, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21, citing 
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7 
 
State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-
5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15.  Meyer has offered no reason for this court to schedule 
oral argument.  The facts of the case are straightforward and undisputed.  The case 
does not present any novel questions of law.  And finally, the urgency of the 
election calendar militates against further delay.  For these reasons, we deny the 
request for oral argument. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 19} For the reasons discussed, we deny the writ of prohibition and deny 
the request for oral argument. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J., and joined 
except for paragraph 21 by FISCHER, J. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by FISCHER 
and DONNELLY, JJ. 
____________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring. 
{¶ 20} What happened here is outrageous.  A group put a series of tax-levy 
“reductions” on the ballot not for the purpose of lowering taxes in any meaningful 
way, but instead for the purpose of preventing a future attempt to reduce taxes.  The 
so-called tax reduction here is trivial: the owner of a $250,000 home will save $7.08 
in taxes.  But by placing this sham tax reduction on the ballot, the group seeks to 
exploit a provision of Ohio law that allows only one tax-reduction measure to be 
proposed every five years.  R.C. 5705.261.  Though the majority dances around the 
issue, we ought to call this what it is: a cynical contrivance to deprive the voters of 
their right to control local property-tax levels. 
{¶ 21} The majority is right, however—there is no law against what the 
group did, though there probably should be.  This court does not have the authority 
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to issue a writ of prohibition in this case because the Warren County Board of 
Elections did not violate a clear legal duty when it voted to put the measures on the 
ballot.  Thus, I must reluctantly concur in the majority’s judgment.  Our job is to 
apply the law as it is written, not as we think it should be written. 
{¶ 22} So if voters want a remedy for this ploy, they must look elsewhere 
than the court system.  They might ask the legislature to close the loophole in R.C. 
5705.261 that is being exploited here.  Or if they agree with relator’s claim that the 
school board is behind this attempt to disenfranchise future voters, they can seek 
their remedy at the next school-board election. 
{¶ 23} This is an opinion that I have to close by just saying, sorry, I wish 
we could do more here, but the law just won’t let us. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion except for paragraph 21. 
_______________ 
FRENCH, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 24} I agree with the majority’s judgment denying the request of relator, 
John Meyer, for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent, the Warren County 
Board of Elections, from placing nine tax-reduction measures on the November 3, 
2020 ballot.  But I would reach that outcome for reasons different from the ones 
relied upon by the majority.  I would conclude that laches bars Meyer’s claim 
because he waited too long to file his complaint.  In election cases, “relators must 
act with the utmost diligence.”  State ex rel. Syx v. Stow City Council, __ Ohio St.3d 
__, 2020-Ohio-4393, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 11.  By waiting over five weeks after the 
board denied his protest to file his complaint, Meyer failed to act with the requisite 
diligence. 
{¶ 25} “The elements of a laches defense are (1) unreasonable delay or 
lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the 
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9 
 
other party.”  State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard City Council, 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 
2016-Ohio-155, 45 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 26} The record here establishes that Meyer’s delay was unreasonable.  
The board denied Meyer’s protest on August 14, 2020, affirming its decision to 
place the nine challenged tax-reduction measures on the ballot.  Meyer filed his 
complaint 41 days later, on September 24.  We have found unreasonable delay in 
other election cases in which the relators filed their complaints with much greater 
promptness than Meyer.  See, e.g., Syx at ¶ 11 (22 days); State ex rel. Landis v. 
Morrow Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 187, 189, 724 N.E.2d 775 (2000) (22 
days); State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 
656 N.E.2d 1277 (1995) (17 days). 
{¶ 27} Moreover, Meyer’s filing delay resulted in prejudice to the board by 
shortening its time to respond to Meyer’s claims.  We have held that the element of 
prejudice is satisfied when the delay causes the case to become an expedited 
election case, which restricts the time the board of elections has to prepare and 
defend the case.  State ex rel. Chillicothe v. Ross Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 439, 2009-Ohio-5523, 917 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 15-16.  By operation of S.Ct.Prac.R. 
12.08, this court expedites the briefing schedule for election cases filed within 90 
days before the election.  The 90th day before this year’s election was August 5, 
2020.  Thus, even if Meyer had filed his complaint immediately following the 
board’s decision, the court would have automatically expedited the briefing in this 
case.  But given the late date of his filing, even Meyer recognized that the normal 
expedited briefing schedule might not be sufficient to ensure a timely decision in 
the case.  He therefore requested and received an acceleration of the briefing 
schedule.  As a result, the board had one and a half days to file its merit brief instead 
of the customary three days.  See __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-4587, __ N.E.3d __. 
{¶ 28} Meyer argues that this court should excuse his delay because he 
waited for the board to provide a hearing transcript—which he claims was 
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“indispensable”—before filing his complaint.  In his brief, Meyer states that after 
the August 14 hearing, he promptly requested copies of the hearing transcript and 
the nine challenged ballot measures, but that despite multiple follow-up calls, he 
did not receive the materials until September 22.  Meyer filed suit on September 
24.  Meyer argues that the board cannot invoke an equitable defense such as laches 
due to its own delay.  But aside from the assertions in his brief, Meyer has submitted 
no evidence to prove his chronology of events. 
{¶ 29} Even assuming the truth of Meyer’s assertions as to the timing of 
events, waiting for the transcript does not excuse his delay.  We have consistently 
held that waiting for a transcript of a board-of-elections hearing before filing suit 
does not justify a relator’s delay in seeking extraordinary relief in an election case 
absent a showing that the transcript was necessary.  See Chillicothe, 123 Ohio St.3d 
439, 2009-Ohio-5523, 917 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 11 (finding “no legitimate excuse” for 
filing delay because the relator did not “need to wait for the completion of a 
transcript of the board hearing” to file its action); Polo, 74 Ohio St.3d at 145, 656 
N.E.2d 1277 (“There is no indication that [the relator] needed to wait for a hearing 
transcript prior to seeking a writ of prohibition”). 
{¶ 30} Here, Meyer did not need the transcript in order to file his action.  
The fact that the board denied the protest was not in dispute.  Meyer and two of his 
attorneys attended the protest hearing and therefore did not need the transcript to 
review the basis for the board’s decision.  And Meyer could have established the 
board’s stated reasoning for rejecting his protest by affidavit testimony from people 
who attended the hearing.  Given the urgency of this matter, Meyer should have 
realized that it was unreasonable to continue waiting for more than five weeks and 
should have filed his action without the transcript. 
{¶ 31} In State ex rel. Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 136 Ohio 
St.3d 371, 2013-Ohio-3867, 995 N.E.2d 1194, we held that laches did not bar the 
relator’s claim and noted that there may be circumstances in which a delay in filing 
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is reasonable if a relator is “diligently trying to obtain documents from a board of 
elections.”  Id. at ¶ 13.  In that case, the relator requested the transcript the day after 
the board’s hearing, and the board provided the transcript roughly two weeks later.  
Id. at ¶ 14.  But our laches analysis in Coughlin did not focus on the time span 
between the board’s hearing and the filing of the relator’s complaint.  Rather, the 
board argued that laches barred the relator’s claim because he waited five business 
days after receiving the transcript to file suit.  Id. at ¶ 10.  He picked up the transcript 
on August 2, 2013, but did not file suit until August 8, 2013, which was the 90th 
day before the November 5, 2013 election.  Id.  The board claimed that it suffered 
prejudice because the relator, by waiting five business days to file his complaint, 
caused the case to become an expedited-election matter.  Id. at ¶ 11.  In those 
specific factual circumstances, we concluded that laches did not bar the relator’s 
claim because he “acted with diligence by promptly demanding a certified 
transcript and filing suit five business days after the transcript became available.”  
(Emphasis added).  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 32} Coughlin therefore does not stand for the proposition that waiting on 
a transcript from the board of elections will excuse a relator’s delay in filing a 
complaint in an election matter.  And our longstanding precedent does not support 
Meyer’s attempt to shift the blame to the board of elections for his filing delay.  
Rather, as we stated in Polo and Chillicothe, waiting for a transcript of the board 
hearing before filing suit does not justify a relator’s delay in seeking extraordinary 
relief in an election case absent a showing that the transcript was necessary.  While 
I acknowledge this court’s preference to resolve cases on their merits, Coughlin at 
¶ 15, Meyer asks too much in demanding an expedited resolution to his claim after 
sitting on his rights for over five weeks.  I would therefore deny Meyer’s complaint 
for a writ of prohibition as barred by laches. 
FISCHER and DONNELLY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
________________________ 
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Jack A. Pook, Joseph Paley, and Timothy A. Campbell, for relator. 
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith W. 
Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., and Brodi J. Conover, urging denial of the writ 
for amici curiae, Casey Moran and Kirsten Lupinski. 
_________________________