Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Shaman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. SHAMAN. 
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Shaman (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 196.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Failure to fulfill 
responsibilities as a lawyer. 
(No. 97-871 — Submitted September 9, 1997 — Decided November 5, 1997.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-78. 
 
On December 5, 1994, relator, Dayton Bar Association, filed an eleven-
count complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
of the Supreme Court (“board”) against respondent, Theodore R. Shaman, Jr., of 
Dayton, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0022633.  In the complaint, relator 
charged respondent with violating DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 2-110(A)(2) (failing to 
take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his clients 
before withdrawing from employment), 6-101(A)(1) (handling legal matters which 
he knew he was not competent to handle), 6-101(A)(2) (handling legal matters 
without adequate preparation), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting legal matters entrusted to 
him), 7-106(A) (disregarding the ruling of a tribunal), 9-102(B)(1) (failing to 
promptly notify a client of funds owed to the client), and 9-102(B)(4) (failing to 
pay or deliver funds to clients which they were entitled to receive).  Relator also 
charged respondent with violating Canon 1 (failing to maintain the integrity and 
competence of the legal profession), 6 (failing to represent clients competently), 
and 9 (failing to avoid the appearance of professional impropriety) of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  The facts giving rise to these charges, as set forth in 
relator’s complaint, are summarized as follows. 
 
2
 
In May 1993, relator received a complaint from Michael J. Kepler.  Kepler 
employed respondent to transfer a Colorado divorce proceeding to Ohio.  
Respondent was unable to complete the transfer after assuring Kepler that it would 
be a simple process.  In addition, respondent improperly advised Kepler with 
respect to certain matters pertaining to Kepler’s bankruptcy case.  Respondent also 
failed to keep appointments with Kepler, did not return Kepler’s telephone 
messages, and refused receipt of a certified letter from Kepler. 
 
On March 20, 1993, relator received a complaint from Sandra L. Ouimet 
concerning a $600 retainer paid by Ouimet to respondent.  In November 1989, 
Ouimet met with respondent for purposes of obtaining a divorce.  Ouimet was told 
by respondent that the initial consultation was free.  Ouimet decided not to pursue 
a divorce at the time and she did not meet again with respondent until December 
1992.  At this meeting, Ouimet became offended and left when respondent made a 
comment to her regarding her husband.  Ouimet asked that the $600 retainer be 
returned but was told by respondent that it would take a short while to retrieve the 
file.  Later, respondent contacted Ouimet and informed her that he had drafted a 
complaint for divorce.  Ouimet never authorized respondent to draft the complaint 
and he did not return Ouimet’s telephone calls.  Eventually, respondent returned to 
Ouimet $275 of the $600 retainer. 
 
In May 1993, Colonel Joe N. Rogers contacted relator concerning 
respondent’s misconduct in handling a domestic relations matter for him.  In April 
1992, respondent was retained by Rogers for purposes of terminating alimony and 
insurance payments owed by Rogers under a divorce decree.  Respondent falsely 
told Rogers that a hearing in the matter had to be continued because the referee 
assigned to the case had been disqualified when in fact the referee was no longer 
associated with the court and had never actually been assigned to the case.  
 
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Respondent also falsely told Rogers that a scheduled hearing had to be continued 
because the clerk had failed to obtain proper service.  The clerk, however, did not 
obtain service in the case because respondent had never filed the necessary papers 
in the first instance.  Respondent did not return Rogers’s telephone calls, and 
respondent also refused to cooperate with relator’s investigation of the allegations 
made by Rogers. 
 
On August 26, 1993, relator received a complaint with respect to a matter 
involving Robert Madewell.  In 1992, respondent falsely informed Madewell that 
a settlement conference had occurred in his wrongful discharge case and that 
nothing meaningful had occurred.  Respondent also falsely told Madewell in 1992 
that the defendant was attempting to have a new trial date set and that a potential 
conflict existed with respect to the judge assigned to the case.  In actuality, 
Madewell’s case had been dismissed with prejudice by the trial court in November 
1991 for failure by respondent to comply with discovery requests. 
 
In January 1994, Candice Goldflies contacted relator about respondent.  In 
April or May 1992, Goldflies gave respondent a $2,000 retainer to handle a 
lawsuit in Waynesville, Ohio.  After paying the retainer, Goldflies never received 
any correspondence from respondent regarding the litigation.  Goldflies sent 
respondent two letters requesting that the retainer be refunded.  Respondent did 
not reply to either letter.  Respondent also failed to cooperate with relator’s 
investigation of the matter. 
 
On August 11, 1994, Larry and Phyllis Blakeley contacted relator about 
respondent’s misconduct with respect to two situations.  In June 1991, the 
Blakeleys employed respondent to represent them concerning an automobile 
accident involving Phyllis.  The day before trial, and without prior notice, 
respondent withdrew from the case.  In a separate matter, Larry hired respondent 
 
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to represent him with respect to a drug test that had been administered to Larry 
when he was a truck driver.  Respondent informed Larry that he would file a 
lawsuit regarding the matter.  Respondent never filed the suit and, despite Larry’s 
request, respondent failed to turn over the file to Larry’s new attorney. 
 
On August 16, 1994, relator received a complaint from Ruth Slone-Stiver.  
She informed relator that respondent had improperly received and accepted 
$31,403.07 in legal fees from a bankruptcy estate.  Respondent represented the 
debtor, but he failed to file a fee application or obtain court approval before 
accepting the fees.  Slone-Stiver wrote respondent a letter demanding that the 
money be repaid with interest so that it could be given to creditors.  Respondent 
failed to repay the money, and he did not provide Slone-Stiver with certain 
documents that she had requested. 
 
On August 22, 1994, Todd Williamson filed a complaint with relator.  In 
November 1993, Williamson paid respondent a $650 retainer to file a bankruptcy 
petition for him.  Later, in March 1994, Williamson paid respondent an additional 
$20 to amend the petition and add his house to the proceedings.  Respondent did 
not timely file the petition, and he did not file necessary papers in the case.  As a 
result, there was an enforcement of a lien on Williamson’s home, and he was also 
forced to incur additional utility payments on the foreclosed residence.  
Respondent also failed to appear at a scheduled Section 341 hearing. 
 
On September 1, 1994, Jean Rogers filed a complaint with relator.  Rogers 
hired respondent to obtain a support order against her former husband.  She paid 
respondent a $400 retainer.  Rogers’s former husband died before respondent took 
any action on the matter.  Respondent did not file anything with the trial court, and 
he did not refund Rogers’s retainer. 
 
5
 
Respondent filed an answer to the allegations contained in relator’s 
complaint.  Thereafter, relator and respondent filed a stipulation in which 
respondent withdrew his answer and admitted to much of the misconduct with 
which he had been charged.  With respect to the allegations involving Kepler, 
Colonel Rogers, Madewell, Goldflies, Williamson, and the Blakeleys, respondent 
stipulated that his misconduct was “in violation of Canon No. 6 of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and Disciplinary Rules.”  Respondent also stipulated 
that he would make restitution to Goldflies in the amount of $1,200.  As to the 
allegations concerning Ouimet and Jean Rogers, respondent stipulated that his 
actions were “in violation of Canon No. 9 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and Disciplinary Rules.”  Respondent further stipulated that he 
would make restitution to Ouimet in the amount of $325 and that he would return 
$200 to Rogers.  Additionally, with respect to the Slone-Stiver matter, respondent 
agreed to “comply with the order of the Bankruptcy Court.”  The parties also set 
forth in the stipulation that the appropriate sanction should be an indefinite 
suspension from the practice of law. 
 
On April 26, 1996, a three-member panel appointed by the board held a 
hearing with respect to relator’s complaint.  At the hearing, respondent did not 
dispute the allegations contained in the complaint.  Rather, the testimony focused 
mainly on matters of mitigation. 
 
Respondent stated that he has always considered himself to be an 
“honorable” and “decent” lawyer and that he has “served in public trust positions 
for years.”  Respondent testified that he had improperly relied on a secretary who 
had problems and quit, that the daily rigors of private practice as a sole 
practitioner became too much for him to handle, that he went through a period of 
severe depression, and that he is currently taking medication for his illness.  
 
6
Respondent expressed remorse for the problems that he caused his clients and 
family.  Except for one or two pending criminal matters, respondent has left the 
practice of law and is currently working for his wife, who owns a retail floral 
shop.  Respondent’s immediate goal is to secure employment in the area of 
teaching and to obtain a Master’s degree in English. 
 
Upon consideration of the evidence, a majority of the panel rejected the 
joint recommendation of the parties, that respondent be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law, and instead found that respondent should be permanently 
disbarred.  One member dissented and agreed with the parties that the sanction 
should be indefinite suspension.  The board adopted the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation of the majority of the panel.  The board 
further recommended that costs be taxed to respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas P. Whelley II, for relator. 
 
William I. Shaman, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Respondent and relator in this case agreed that respondent’s 
misconduct warranted an indefinite suspension from the practice of law in this 
state.  Two of the three panel members and the board disagreed, concluding that 
the proper sanction under the circumstances was permanent disbarment.1  We 
accept the findings of the board and agree that respondent failed miserably in his 
responsibilities to his clients.  However, we do not agree with the board’s 
recommendation that respondent be permanently disbarred from the practice of 
law. 
 
In Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Rea (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 71, 676 N.E.2d 514, 
when an attorney neglected numerous legal matters entrusted to her, improperly 
 
7
retained retainers which she did not earn or return, and lied to various clients, we 
ordered an indefinite suspension.  We also ordered an indefinite suspension in 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Snyder (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 57, 676 N.E.2d 504, where, 
among other things, the attorney neglected several legal matters entrusted to him, 
failed to pay or deliver funds owing to clients, failed to deliver files to which a 
client was entitled, and failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation.  See, 
also, Disciplinary Counsel v. Palmer (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 174, 642 N.E.2d 1087 
(indefinite suspension for lying to several clients and neglecting their interests), 
and Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 18, 562 N.E.2d 1386 
(indefinite suspension for accepting numerous retainers and not performing work 
requested, failing to return unearned fees, and failing to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigation).  Respondent’s misconduct in this case is substantially 
similar to what occurred in Snyder, Palmer, and Chavers.  Also, compare, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Trumbo (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 369, 667 N.E.2d 1186 
(indefinite suspension for attorney’s neglecting several legal matters entrusted to 
her, continually lying to her clients, lying to the court, and lying to Disciplinary 
Counsel in the attempt to investigate her actions).  Clearly, respondent’s actions, 
while outrageous and inexcusable, are not any more egregious than what occurred 
in Snyder, Palmer, Chavers, and Trumbo. 
 
Further, when imposing a sanction, we will consider not only the duty 
violated, but the lawyer’s mental state, the actual injury caused, and whether 
mitigating factors exist.  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Boychuk (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 93, 97, 679 N.E.2d 1081, 1084.  In this case, we note respondent’s personal 
problems that existed at the time of the violations and the fact that he has taken 
steps to resolve his problems.  Respondent is currently receiving treatment for his 
depression and he has agreed to provide restitution to aggrieved clients.  We also 
 
8
note that respondent has shown genuine remorse for the problems that he has 
caused his clients and family. 
 
Accordingly, we believe that the appropriate sanction under the 
circumstances for respondent’s failure to fulfill his responsibilities as a lawyer is 
an indefinite suspension.  Pursuant to the penalty of indefinite suspension, 
respondent is, of course, precluded from filing a petition for reinstatement until a 
period of at least two years has expired subsequent to the entry of our order 
suspending him from the practice of law.  See Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B).  Moreover, 
respondent’s reinstatement, if ever, will be subject to the conditions of Gov.Bar R. 
V(10)(B) et seq.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
In the stipulation, relator and respondent agreed that any “disciplinary 
action taken against the Respondent should be in the form of an indefinite 
suspension of his privileges and right to practice law in the State of Ohio.”  
However, “[n]othwithstanding the agreement of Relator and Respondent on a 
recommended sanction for Respondent, the hearing panel and the Board are not 
bound by the joint recommendation and retain sole power and discretion to make a 
final recommendation to the Ohio Supreme Court on the appropriate sanction.”  
Section 3(D) on the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedures on Complaints 
and Hearings before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of 
the Supreme Court. 
__________________ 
 
9
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the recommendation of the board that 
respondent be permanently disbarred.  I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the 
decision of the majority to indefinitely suspend this respondent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and F.E. SWEENEY, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion.