Title: Hills v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
DAVID LEE HILLS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 010193 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.  
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 115, 532 S.E.2d 
629, 634 (2000), we established a new rule requiring trial 
courts to instruct juries on the abolition of parole for non-
capital felony offenses committed on and after January 1, 1995.  
In this appeal, we determine (1) whether the appropriate remedy 
for a Fishback error is a remand of the case for a new 
sentencing hearing only, and (2) whether Fishback requires a 
trial court to permit voir dire examination of prospective 
jurors concerning their knowledge of parole ineligibility. 
I 
 
In a bifurcated jury trial in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County, David Lee Hills was convicted of raping Patricia 
McKendry on November 7, 1997.  The jury fixed Hills' punishment 
at six years in prison.  Thereafter, the trial court sentenced 
Hills in accordance with the jury's verdict. 
 
The Court of Appeals awarded Hills an appeal, and, on May 
23, 2000, a panel of the Court affirmed the trial court's 
judgment.  Hills v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 479, 528 S.E.2d 
730 (2000).  On July 18, 2000, a panel of the Court granted 
Hills' motion for a rehearing, which included issues raised by 
our decision in Fishback.  On September 26, 2000, the panel of 
the Court issued a new opinion, reversing the trial court's 
judgment in part and remanding the case to the trial court for 
resentencing.  Hills v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 442, 534 
S.E.2d 337 (2000). 
 
We awarded Hills this appeal to consider his assignment of 
error claiming that the Court of Appeals erred "in remanding the 
case to the trial court only for resentencing instead of a new 
trial."  We also agreed to consider the Commonwealth's 
assignment of cross-error claiming that the Court of Appeals 
erred "by holding that Fishback . . . requires the trial judge 
to allow voir dire examination of prospective jurors concerning 
their understanding of the status of parole in Virginia." 
II 
 
The facts relevant to the issues presented in this appeal 
are undisputed and may be briefly stated.  During jury voir 
dire, Hills' counsel attempted to ask potential jurors whether 
they had "any knowledge or expectation as to the parole rules in 
Virginia."  The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's 
objection to the question. 
 
During the jury's deliberations in the penalty phase of the 
trial, the jury submitted the following written question to the 
 
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trial court:  "Is parole available to the person convicted of 
the crime of rape in the Commonwealth of Virginia?"  Hills' 
counsel requested that the jury be instructed that "parole is no 
longer available in Virginia, that a person serves a minimum of 
eighty-five percent of any sentence which is imposed."  The 
trial court refused to grant the requested instruction; instead, 
the court told the jury that "[y]ou should not concern yourself 
with this.  You should sentence in accordance with the 
instruction given to you."  Thereafter, the jury returned its 
verdict, fixing Hills' punishment at six years in prison. 
III 
A 
 
In 1994, the General Assembly enacted Code § 53.1-165.1, 
which provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person sentenced 
to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or 
after January 1, 1995, shall not be eligible for parole upon 
that offense."  As a consequence, on June 9, 2000, in Fishback, 
we established the new rule and directed that "henceforth juries 
shall be instructed, as a matter of law, on the abolition of 
parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on or after 
January 1, 1995."  260 Va. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634.  We also 
held that this new rule of criminal procedure "is limited 
prospectively to those cases not yet final" on June 9, 2000, the 
date of the decision.  Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634. 
 
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In the present case, Hills committed the felony offense 
after January 1, 1995, and his case was not final when Fishback 
was decided.  Therefore, the rule established in Fishback 
applies, and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial 
court erred in failing to instruct the jury in the penalty phase 
of the trial that parole had been abolished. 
B 
 
Hills contends that, although the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that Fishback requires a reversal of the trial 
court's judgment, the Court erred in failing to remand the case 
to the trial court for a new trial.  He asserts that he is 
entitled to a new trial "because all of the evidence introduced 
at trial is relevant to sentencing." 
 
To decide this issue, we look first to Code § 19.2-295.1, 
which provides, in pertinent part, that, "[i]f [a] sentence on 
appeal is subsequently set aside or found invalid solely due to 
an error in the sentencing proceeding, the court shall impanel a 
different jury to ascertain punishment."  In the present case, 
the error in question occurred in the sentencing proceeding; 
therefore, the statute requires only a new sentencing hearing. 
 
Additionally, we previously have remanded cases limited to 
a new sentencing hearing for an error in the penalty phase of a 
bifurcated trial.  Indeed, that was the precise remedy mandated 
in Fishback.  Id. at 117, 532 S.E.2d at 635.  We also ordered 
 
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that remedy in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 375, 519 
S.E.2d 602, 617 (1999), a capital-murder case. 
 
As previously noted, Hills asserts that all evidence at 
trial is relevant to sentencing and that much of the evidence in 
the guilt-determination phase of the trial would not be 
admissible at a new sentencing hearing.  We have held, however, 
that, at a resentencing hearing, 
the physical evidence admitted and marked as exhibits 
in the first trial may be considered, so much of the 
transcript of the testimony and proceedings in the 
first trial as may be necessary to show the nature of 
the offense charged and the circumstances under which 
it was committed may be read in open court, and such 
additional evidence as may be competent and relevant 
to the issue of punishment may be adduced. 
Huggins v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 327, 329, 191 S.E.2d 734, 736 
(1972).  Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly 
remanded Hills' case to the trial court only for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
IV 
In its assignment of cross-error, the Commonwealth contends 
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Fishback 
requires a trial court to permit voir dire examination of 
prospective jurors concerning their understanding of the status 
of parole.  We agree. 
 
We decided this very issue in Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 
Va. 558, 567, 499 S.E.2d 522, 529-30 (1998), rev'd on other 
 
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grounds, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).  In that case, Lilly claimed that 
the trial court erred in not allowing him to question 
prospective jurors on the matter of parole ineligibility of 
defendants who are given life sentences in capital-murder cases.  
Lilly asserted that he was entitled to so question prospective 
jurors because the Supreme Court, in Simmons v. South Carolina, 
512 U.S. 154, 162, 169 (1994), mandated that trial courts 
instruct juries on parole ineligibility in capital-murder cases.  
In rejecting Lilly's contention, we said the following: 
The clear import of Simmons is that, once a 
defendant is convicted of a capital crime, he has, as 
a matter of due process, the right to have the jury 
informed of his ineligibility for parole in order that 
this factor may be weighed by the jury against the 
finding of his further dangerousness to society.  
Nothing in Simmons even remotely suggests that 
knowledge of parole ineligibility rules and 
exploration of potential jurors' opinions on that 
subject would be a proper topic for voir dire.  The 
probable confusion and prejudice such an inquiry would 
cause in the minds of jurors is self-evident. 
255 Va. at 567, 499 S.E.2d at 529-30 (footnote omitted). 
 
We adhere to our ruling in Lilly and hold that voir dire 
questions about parole are improper and are not to be allowed by 
trial courts.  Thus, in the present case, the Court of Appeals 
erred in ruling that Fishback required the trial court to permit 
such voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. 
V 
 
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In sum, we will reverse that part of the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals requiring voir dire questioning of prospective 
jurors concerning their knowledge of parole ineligibility.  We 
will affirm that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
remanding this case to the trial court for only a new sentencing 
hearing, and we will remand the case to the Court of Appeals 
with directions that it, in turn, remand the case to the trial 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
        and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER concurring. 
 
I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion with 
regard to the two limited issues presented in this appeal.  
Nevertheless, I write separately to reiterate the views that I 
expressed in Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 118-22, 532 
S.E.2d 629, 635-38 (2000) (Kinser, J., dissenting).  Although I 
continue to disagree with the result in Fishback, I cannot say 
that the decision was a “flagrant error or mistake.”  Selected 
Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 
(1987); accord Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 276, 280, 552 S.E.2d 
73, 75 (2001).  Thus, in accordance with the principles of stare 
decisis, I am bound by the decision in Fishback. 
 
 
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