Title: In Interest of FT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In Interest of FT1993 WY 104856 P.2d 1128Case Number: C-93-3Decided: 07/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Interest of FT, a Minor Child: BLT,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v. 

The STATE of Wyoming; and 
Department of Family Services, 

Appellees (Petitioners). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

Barbara Thorpe, 
appellant pro se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Richard Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      We affirm the 
juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency and placement of the delinquent 
child on probation for a period of one year under specified terms and conditions 
because the pro se appellant's brief violates several of the provisions of the 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and fails to identify and articulate an 
issue which could serve as grounds for reversal.

[¶2]      At a hearing on 
May 11, 1992, in the juvenile court of Albany County on the amended petition of 
the county and prosecuting attorney for Albany County, F.T., a minor, after 
having consulted with appointed counsel and after having been properly advised 
of his rights and in all other respects, admitted to the amended petition. In so 
doing, he admitted that he had intentionally set one fire in a vacant field near 
23rd Street and Grand Avenue in Laramie, Wyoming, on or between April 10 and 11, 
1992. The court ordered the preparation of the requisite predisposition study 
and report.

[¶3]      The court 
convened a final hearing on October 28, 1992, at which time the court, F.T., 
F.T.'s appointed counsel, and F.T.'s mother, B.T., reviewed the predisposition 
study and report and an addendum to that report. At this hearing it was evident 
that of paramount concern to B.T. was that F.T. have the opportunity to receive 
a seven-day stabilization treatment at the Denver Children's Hospital in Denver, 
Colorado, as soon as that could be arranged. Addressing that concern, the court 
informed B.T. that, in its judgment, if it ordered such stabilization treatment, 
the federal officials administering Title XIX would not pay for it. The court 
maintained that federal payment would be available if B.T., as parent, initiated 
the effort to secure the stabilization treatment by securing a referral from the 
appropriate health-care provider who had been seeing F.T. After further 
discussion, the court expressed its concern to B.T. that perhaps B.T. would not 
make a commitment to follow the after-care treatment recommendations which might 
be the product of the stabilization treatment. Responding to the court's 
concern, B.T. promised the court that she would abide by the after-care 
recommendations following the stabilization treatment.

[¶4]      At the conclusion 
of this final hearing, the court announced its disposition by adjudicating F.T. 
to be a delinquent child and placing him on one year's probation. Included in 
the terms and conditions of the probation was the requirement that the 
Department of Family Services provide limited supervision to insure compliance 
with the order and also participate in B.T.'s petition to Title XIX officials 
for stabilization for F.T. at the Denver Children's 
Hospital.

[¶5]      On November 18, 
1992, B.T. and F.T., pro se, filed a notice of appeal. In relevant part, the 
notice of appeal reads:

The specificly [sic] 
designated issue for appeal is prohibition of the District Judge to order a 
comprehensive evaluation at the Denver Childrens' [sic] Hospital, by the Albany 
County Family Services, of the scope and duration needed, under Medicaid 
(particularly through Epsdt program) funding or any other Social Services 
program because the latter unjustly claim they cannot assist with payment, even 
under District Court order, although all technical criteria have been fulfilled 
to ensure authorization should be given.

       Because this is erroneous, appeal is made 
apon [sic] a failure to be able to institute an order to remedy an acute 
condition for a developementally [sic] disabled child because his condition is 
being discriminated against by the Family Services. The condition interferes 
with every aspect of [F.T.'s] life and further removes [F.T.] from hope for a 
fair chance at life and a fair legal status, and unjustly extenuates his role in 
the Juvenile Court system along with extensive suffering and lack of wellbeing 
[sic] as well as that of his family.

[¶6]      Subsequently B.T. 
filed her appellant's brief which consists of eleven typewritten pages including 
a table of contents. The brief is divided into seven parts: issues presented for 
review, statement of case, statement of facts, argument, contentions with 
respect to issues and reasons therefor, conclusion, relief sought and 
justification. The signatures of B.T. and F.T. appear in two places in the 
brief.

[¶7]      Having carefully 
and closely read appellant's pro se brief, we can describe it only as a prolix, 
unintelligible rambling narrative. To borrow the apt phrasing of the assistant 
attorney general in appellee's brief, this court is "frankly mystified as to 
[the appellant's] objective on appeal, past the desire for some sort of 
declaration that F.T. should be admitted to the Denver Children's Hospital for 
evaluation." That declaration was embodied by the juvenile court's order of 
final disposition. Given appellant's failure to delineate an appellate issue, 
much less support it with legal authority and cogent coherent argument, we are 
unable to fathom what it is about the juvenile court's order that appellant 
maintains is erroneous.

[¶8]      Recognizing the 
obvious shortcomings of appellant's brief, appellee urges this court to affirm 
the juvenile court's order in light of the manifest absence of error in those 
proceedings. Appellee's urging is well-taken; we affirm the juvenile court's 
order of final disposition. We have said many times that we expect pro se 
litigants to "handle this professional, technical work in compliance with 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure in the same way that trained lawyers are 
expected to perform." Korkow v. Markle, 746 P.2d 434, 435 (Wyo. 1987). We have 
commented before about our disapproval of a litigant's failure to furnish us a 
succinct statement of the issues to be decided. Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82, 85 n. 1 (Wyo. 
1986); Cline v. Safeco Ins. Companies, 614 P.2d 1335     
         (Wyo. 1980). 
We have affirmed the lower court before when appellant's brief raises no issue 
which would support reversal. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. v. Barbe, 764 P.2d 274, 
276 (Wyo. 1988). When a brief fails to present a valid contention supported by 
cogent argument or pertinent authority, "we have consistently refused to 
consider such cases, whether the brief is by a litigant pro se or is filed by 
counsel." Cates, at 276 (citation omitted). Appellant's brief does not conform 
to Wyo. R.App.P. 7.01. It contains no proper statement of the issue presented 
for review; no statement of the facts relevant to the issue; no reference to the 
record; and no coherent, intelligible argument with citations to the legal 
authorities and parts of the record relied on.

[¶9]      We 
affirm.