Title: Cantrell v. Crews

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
TIMOTHY L. CANTRELL, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 990224 
January 14, 2000 
 
DEBORAH W. CREWS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 
J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This is the appeal of a judgment in a tort action for 
damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  The dispositive 
issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike for 
cause a prospective juror. 
 
In January 1995, appellee Deborah W. Crews was operating an 
automobile that was stopped on a street in the City of 
Lynchburg.  Her vehicle was struck from the rear and she was 
injured as a result of the negligence of appellant Timothy L. 
Cantrell, who was operating a truck owned by his employer, 
appellant Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.  The plaintiff sustained a 
"soft tissue" injury that was diagnosed as a cervical sprain, 
for which she brought this action against defendants seeking 
recovery in damages. 
 
In an October 1998 trial, the defendants admitted liability 
and the case was tried on the issue of damages only.  A jury 
found in favor of the plaintiff and fixed her damages at 
$108,812.87.  The trial court overruled the defendants' motion 
to set the verdict aside and entered judgment on the verdict.  
We awarded defendants an appeal limited to consideration of four 
assignments of error. 
 
An issue raised by a portion of one of those assignments of 
error is dispositive of this appeal.  The issue is whether the 
trial court erred in refusing to strike for cause a prospective 
juror who, at the time of trial, was a client of the law firm 
representing the plaintiff. 
 
There is no dispute in the facts relevant to the issue we 
decide.  The motion for judgment was on stationery of "Law 
Office / Overbey, Hawkins & Selz / Rustburg, Virginia."  The 
pleading was signed by Mr. Hawkins as "Of Counsel" for "Overbey, 
Hawkins & Selz."  Hawkins appeared at trial as attorney for the 
plaintiff. 
 
During jury voir dire, after asking whether "anybody" knew 
the plaintiff's trial attorney, the trial court specified the 
name of Hawkins' law firm and identified by name each member of 
the firm, including "Bryan Selz."  The court then asked, "Does 
anybody know any of those individuals or been represented by 
them or this firm or have any contact with them?" 
 
Responding, prospective juror Holly Clingempeel stated that 
she knew Selz and said, "He's representing me."  When the court 
asked, "How long ago?", the juror responded, "It's still going 
on." 
 
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Later during voir dire, while being questioned by 
defendants' attorney, Clingempeel revealed that her 
representation by Selz arose from "a car accident" and stated 
that she sustained "[n]eck and back" injuries.  She said that 
she had filed a "lawsuit"; that the suit "is continuing right 
now"; and that Selz is representing her "in that." 
 
Upon being asked by the court whether the fact that Hawkins 
or a member of his law firm was "currently" representing her 
would have "any bearing" on her judgment, Clingempeel responded, 
"No."  She further stated that she could "assure" the court 
"under oath" that she could "ignore" her representation by the 
plaintiff's law firm "and be totally fair to both sides." 
 
The trial court denied defendants' motion to strike for 
cause Clingempeel, as well as two other prospective jurors.  In 
ruling on the motion, the court stated it believed the three 
jurors "can ignore any personal sort of contact or relationship 
or association they have with Mr. Hawkins, his firm, . . . and 
the like and be fair and that's the only test." 
 
Elaborating, the trial court stated:  "Campbell County is 
of such a nature that in this community people are going to know 
each other and have some kind of association and the association 
as described to me by the three folks to whom you objected to 
was not such that in and of itself prejudiced them or made an 
 
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obvious bias or would lend itself to an obvious bias on their 
behalf." 
 
Concluding, the trial court said:  "I was impressed with 
their answers and I believe them to be truthful and I found 
nothing wrong with them sitting as jurors . . . ." 
 
The plaintiff contends the trial court correctly refused to 
strike Clingempeel for cause.  We disagree. 
 
Parties to litigation are entitled to a fair and impartial 
trial by a jury of persons who "stand indifferent in the cause."  
Code § 8.01-358.  "[T]he right to a fair and impartial trial in 
a civil case is as fundamental as it is in a criminal case.  The 
civil courts constantly strive to protect this right.  It lies 
at the very basis of organized society and confidence in our 
judicial system."  Temple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, 336, 8 S.E.2d 
262, 268 (1940). 
 
Upon review, the appellate court gives deference to the 
trial court's decision whether to retain or exclude prospective 
jurors.  Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, ___, ___ S.E.2d 
___, ___ (1999).  And, a trial court's decision on this issue 
will be affirmed unless there has been manifest error amounting 
to an abuse of discretion.  Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 
 
Recently, we considered in a condemnation case an issue 
almost identical to the present one.  In City of Virginia Beach 
v. Giant Square Shopping Center Co., 255 Va. 467, 498 S.E.2d 917 
 
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(1998), one ground of a condemnor's objection to the seating of 
a prospective commissioner was that the commissioner, at the 
time of trial, was a client of the landowners' counsel. 
 
There, we noted that, by statute, the issue of just 
compensation is to be determined by a commission of 
"disinterested freeholders," and that, regarding the 
disqualification of commissioners for cause, the eminent domain 
statutes must be administered in a manner that promotes 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.  Id. at 
470, 498 S.E.2d at 919. 
 
Thus, we held the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to dismiss the commissioner for cause, stating that "it 
is extremely unlikely the public would have confidence in the 
integrity of the process when a commissioner has the identity of 
interests demonstrated by this prospective commissioner."  Id. 
at 471, 498 S.E.2d at 919.  We said, "This is true even though, 
as the record shows, the commissioner is a 'respected member of 
the community' and 'known to be a man of integrity,' who may be 
determined to discharge his duties in a forthright and unbiased 
manner."  Id.
 
The same reasoning will be applied to this case.  There is 
no meaningful difference regarding the interest factor under 
these circumstances between the statutory requirements for a 
trial by jury of persons who "stand indifferent in the cause" 
 
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and for just compensation to be determined by a commission of 
"disinterested freeholders."  Public confidence in the integrity 
of the process is at stake.  It cannot be promoted when a 
sitting juror is, at the time of trial, a client of the law firm 
representing one of the parties to the litigation as a result of 
a similar occurrence. 
 
This is true even though, as the record shows, the juror 
states that the circumstances of her representation would have 
no "bearing" on her judgment as a juror and that she could "be 
totally fair to both sides."  We have no doubt that Clingempeel 
was sincere in her beliefs and that she was determined to 
discharge her duties in a forthright and unbiased manner. 
 
And, the fact that the venue is a community where "people 
are going to know each other and have some kind of association," 
as the trial judge noted, does not diminish the court's 
obligation to assure that a litigant's case will be heard and 
decided by a fair and impartial jury. 
 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to dismiss the juror for cause and that 
this constitutes reversible error. 
 
Because the case will be remanded and the evidence may be 
different upon a new trial, we shall address only one of the 
remaining issues presented on appeal.  The defendants contend 
that the trial court erred in limiting their cross-examination 
 
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of the plaintiff's treating orthopedic physician, who testified 
by deposition. 
 
Upon direct examination, the physician, after concluding 
that the plaintiff sustained a soft tissue injury amounting to a 
cervical sprain, opined she had a ten percent permanent 
disability and would require future medical treatment.  On 
cross-examination, defendants elicited from the physician that 
he had written in his notes that, in his experience, many 
patients involved in litigation stemming from soft-tissue 
injuries frequently cease medical treatments "when the 
litigation is resolved."  The physician stated he "certainly 
considered that" in his evaluation of the plaintiff's 
complaints. 
 
The trial court excluded this portion of the deposition 
testimony, over defendants' objection.  The court reasoned the 
physician "was too equivocal"; "[h]e merely said I certainly 
considered that"; and, the testimony "was too speculative." 
 
Based on the state of this record, we cannot say that the 
trial court abused its discretion and thus erred in refusing to 
permit the defendants to offer this evidence to discredit the 
physician's opinion on permanency and on the plaintiff's need of 
future medical treatment. 
 
Thus, if the state of the record does not change upon a new 
trial, this equivocal and speculative testimony should not be 
 
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allowed.  But see Mastin v. Theirjung, 238 Va. 434, 437-38, 384 
S.E.2d 86, 88 (1989) (medical testimony admitted that in people 
with personalities like the plaintiff's "there is a definite 
potential for motives of secondary gain, arising out of the 
possibility of recovery of money damages in a lawsuit"). 
 
Therefore, the judgment below will be affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for a new trial, 
limited to the issue of damages only. 
 
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
   and remanded. 
 
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