Title: State v. Nichols. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama, with whom C.J. Moon, joins [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 12/29/2005 [pdf], 111 Haw. 436. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/07/2006 [pdf], 109 Haw. 578. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 08/25/2006 [pdf]. Dissent by J. Nakayama in which C.J. Moon, joins.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

~o00---

 

 

STATE OF HAWAT'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appelled} 3
vs Ze os

ez

S

x

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 03-1-0493(2))
JOLY 12, 2006
Jey CONCURRING

LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ. WITH NAKAYAMA,
SEPARATELY AND DISSENTING, WITH WHOM MOON, 'C.J., JOTNS

QPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

on January 30, 2006, petitioner/defendant-appellant
Tracy Nichols filed an application for a writ of certiorari,

requesting that this court review the published decision of the

Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Nichols, No.

26870 (Haw. App. December 29, 2005) [hereinafter, ICA‘s Opinion],

affirming the September 7, 2004 judgment of conviction and
sentence of five years’ probation of the Circuit Court of the

Second Circuit? against Nichols for Terroristic Threatening in

| the Honorable Shackley F. Raffetto presided over the trial and the
Honorable Reinstte W. Cooper presided over sentencing.
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the First Degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 707-716(1) (c) (1993) *

in his application, Nichols asserts that the ICA
gravely erred by: (1) concluding, based on a misinterpretation
of State v. Kuhia, 105 Hawai'i 261, 96 P.3d 590 (App. 2004), and
the record below, that conviction of terroristic threatening in
the first degree does not require a nexus between the alleged
threat and the complainant's official status or duties as @
public servant; (2) refusing to exercise its “remedial
discretion” to reverse the conviction where the ICA concluded
that failure to instruct the jury to consider the “relevant
attributes” of the parties in determining whether the defendant's
remarks constituted a “true threat,” as required under State v,
Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i 465, 24 P.3d 661 (2001), was plain error
that affected Nichols’ substantial rights: (3) improperly

diminishing the trial court’s responsibilities to be limited to,

# Rs § 707-716(1) (e) provides:
A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the

fiket degree if the perton commits Cerroristic threatening
(sigainst 6 public servant (<1

 

terroristic threatening in the first degree is a class C felony. RS § 707~
THEia) «ams § 107=715(2) (1993) in torn defines terrorictic threatening in
Felevant part as follows

A person conmite the offense of terroristic threatening if the
Person threatens, by wore or conduct, to cause bodily injury to
Shother person of serious damage to property of another or to
Sonat a felony... with the intent to terrorize, or in reckless
Gisregard of the risk of terrorizing, ancther person{.)

 

 

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in the absence of any objection, avoiding “only plain erfor
rather than all non-harmless error"; and (4) concluding that the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the included
offense of Terroristic Threatening in the Second Degree, HRS

§ 107-717 (1993),? was not reversible error based on a
misapplication of State v. Heanio, 94 Hawai'i 405, 16 P.3d 246
(2001), and a misreading of the record below where the
instructions on the charged offense were incomplete and
deficient.

We granted certiorari primarily to address Nichols’
contention that the ICA misstated the standard of review for *
erroneous jury instructions in this jurisdiction. We agree with
Nichols that the standard of review as set forth by the ICA
misstates this jurisdiction's controlling precedents, and we
reject it. We hold that an appellate court will reverse for
plain error in jury instructions where the error cannot be said
to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., considering the
record as @ whole, there is a reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to the defendant’s conviction). Applying that
standard to the instant case, we hold that the circuit court's

failure to instruct the jury that “it could consider relevant

> RS § 107-717(1) provides that “{a] person comits the offense of
terroristic threatening in the second degree if the person comits terroristic
Ehestening other than az provided is section 207-116." Second degree
terroristie threatening is 8 missenesnor. HRS § 707=717(2),

 

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attributes of both the defendant and the subject of the allegedly

threatening utterance in determining whether the subject's f

 

of bodily injury, as allegedly induced by the defendant’ s
threatening utterance, was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances in which the threat was uttered,” Valdivia, 95
Hawai'i at 479, 24 P.3d at 675, was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because there is a reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to Nichols’ conviction. Accordingly, we
reverse the ICA's Opinion, vacate the Septenber 7, 2004 judgment
of conviction, and remand this matter to the circuit court for a
new trial.
I. BACKGROUND

The facts of the instant case were recited by the ICA

as follows:

‘on September 26, 2003, in the County of Maul, state of
Hawai's, Nichols was indscted by a Maul Grand Jury charging him as
fellow

 

‘That on oF about the 16th day of September, 2003, in
the County of Mavi, State of Hewail, TRACY NICHOLS, with
Intent co terrorize, or in reckless disregard of the risk of
terrorizing Nicholas Krau, a public servant, did threaten,
by word of conduct, to cause bodily injury to Nicholas Kray,
thereby committing the offense of Terroristic Threatening in
the Fitst Degree in violation of Section 707-716(1) (e) of
the Hawait Revised Statutes.

 

 

 

Nichols! first trial in the Circuit Court of the Second
Circuit commenced on March 25, 2004 and ended in a mistrial on
March 33, 2004 because the Jury was unable to reach ® unanimous
verdict. The second Jury trial commenced on July 6, 2004.

‘At the second trisl, evidence was presented that, on
Septenber 1, 2003, at approximately 12:00 p.n., Officer Nicholas
Krau (officer Keau) of the County of Maui Police Department and 2
Team of other police officers conducted s felony investigation of
fatrieie Beker’ (aker) in the Kine! area of the County of Mout

Baker had rented @ vehicle from a car company, the rental period

 

 

‘
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hed expired, and the police were looking for the vehicle, Officer
Krav knew that Nichols and Saker previously hac been in a
Telationship together and were the parents of « child in the
Custody of Nichole. Acting upon this information, Officer Krav,
Se petice uniform, and the other members of the police team went
£6 Bichols’ residence to ask if Nichols knew of Baker’ s
Woeresbouts. they were unable to procure any information from
Nichols.

Departing from Nichols’ residence, Officer Krau saw and
recognized, by its looks and license plate nunber, the overdue
Tentsl vehicle. It was being driven by a fenale paned Sumer
Flank (Plunk). officer Krauwas familiar with Plunk from his
prior dealings with her, Officer Krau then conducted traffic
Stop approximately 80°20 yards from Nichols’ (mother’s)
fesldehee to ceternine if someone was concealed in the overdue
Fental vehicle and to atk Plunk if she knew of Baker's
thereaboote.

 

 

 

 

While Officer Krau was speaking to Plunk, who was being
cooperative, tichels arrived at the location of the traffic stop.
AeGbSSing to Officer Keau's testimony, Nichols was upset and began
Uoeerfering with ene police investigation by instructing Plunk not
AS'give eny Information to the police. In response, Officer Kxau
devised Nichola that they were conducting an investigation ang
{Satracted Nichols to "step back” and “stay away.” Despite these
{Ganinds, Wichols continued te approach Piunk’s location and to
SRatruct’ Plunk not to provide any further information to Officer
frau As a result of Nichols’ noncompliance and persistent
‘Steiserence, Officer Krav handcuffed Nichols and detained Nichols
[nthe beck seat of Officer Krau"s patrol vehicle.

 

 

ite Wichols was in the back of the patrol vehicle, it
appeared to Officer Krav that Nichols was having e seizure.
BEeicee nrau inmediately called for the paramedics. They arrived
Within five to ten mintes, treated Nichols, and released him back
Yelthe police ust az the police were completing their
[avertigetion. the police cited Plunk for driving without a
{lense end released both Michols and Plunk at the scene. The
police called the car rental company to send 2 representative to
Poke possession of the rental car and its keys.

Approximately to weeks later, on Septenber 16, 2003, at
about 10:40 poms, Officer Krav went to the Tesoro Gas Express in
Kine! to purchase beer and chewing gum. At the tine, Officer Krav
fas off-duty and not in uniform. While exiting the store, Officer
Heau noticed a white pickup truck parked by the entrance of the
Wore"and cbserved tichols walking towards hin at a fast pace
ith questions emitted, the following 1s Officer Krau's testimony
fs tovtne events and verbal exchanges with Nichols that
Enmesiately ensued:

 

 

 

 

 

A And he tells me where is your 1D, I want to see
your 1D for that beer.
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A Iwas Kind of in shock because this gentleman
was talking tome. So T'was like, so.” So T told him
Tam 21, 1 showed my ID to the cashier in the store,
just on'ny way hone to have a few beers:

A He then kept coming at me, he got into ay face,
geal close to me, and he is like, yéah, you punk
Biten, what you going te do.

A He is in my face, he is Like within 2 foot from
Be, his fists are clenched, just slightly raised above
RIS hips, he hae got his chest sticking out and he ie
Fight on’ [sic] my face, yeah, punk biteh, what are you
going to do. He was very angry, angry upset. Mis
Solce was raised,

  

A At that tine I felt threatened, 2 thought this
Guy ie going to hit me or something,

A So then I told him, you know, I'm off duty, it's
By day off, Just txying to enjoy ay day off, T Just
want to go heme and relax, Idon't want to deal with
you

A He then tells me, hey, you punk bitch, you're
fot shit without your gun and your badge and 211 your
Boys. He goes, I'am going to kick your a

 

A 1 thought he was going to kick ay ass. 1
thought, well, he was going to assault me.

 

A So then I have all this beer in ay hand
Snd my cell phone, my gum, ny wallet, so I'am trying
to get to my vehicle. 1 just wanted to leave. I
ented to get out of the ares. I didn't want co deal
with'hin. P'aign'e want to = it was my day off. Iwas
Just trying to enjoy my day off.

 

A So 1 am side-stepping. I don’t want to turn
around and walk away from Rin and give him an
opportunity to strike me from Behind. So T am kind of
Keeping ny eyes cn hin and I'am sidestepping to my

«
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vehicle, trying te get to ay vehicle so I can, you
know, Jost go.

A te is following, walking, mirroring as =~ he is

atking alongside ast am walking, staying right in my

Teco, "sane aggression, Just fists clenched, he is
ive, he is speaking loudly, aggressive

 
 

a = [leaky he continued calling me a punk
Bitch, ‘tenling me he is going to fuck me Ue ws

A 1 was totally convinced 1 was going to get
2esauited. This guy wae ~ he was going to attempt to
Kick my 968.

AT continue sidestepping to ay vehicle. am not

  

frying to provoke (Nichols) in any way, T am not
Saying anything, Iam just going to my vehicle.

finen officer Krau reached his vehicle, Nichols stopped
following Officer Krav and returned to and entered the white
fitkap Cluck. “officer Krav did not know who else was in the white
Pluck ang had the foliowing concerns: "There could have been
Other people sn the vehicle Just waiting for an opportunity to
Sump cut and acteck mer assault me. If they had weapons in there,
2 'Mherno idea what wos going to happen." As Nichols departed from
the Tesoro Gas Express, he continued to yell, “punk BeI-T-c-H" at
Officer Krau. Officer Krau was never touched by Nichols:

 

officer Krau departed in the opposite direction fron his
hone because he did not. know if Nichols was “waiting, trying to
Set me up, waiting for me to leave,  - « follow ne to my house,
Gr unether [Nichols] wae going to Jump out oF, you know, arm me
SE ny family." officer Krau then placed a call to his residence,
Spoke to his father, informed his father of his encounter and
PEiot dealings with Nichols. Officer Keau also advised hia fathe
Eo watch cut for s white picksp truck. Officer Krau then called 2
few covnorkers, including his brother, to notify them of what had
SSlurred betneen Nichole and himself in order to establish Nichols
The prine sugpect should “something happen” to Officer Krav or
fls‘fanly mesbers, Officer Krau acknowledged that he should have
hotified central digpatch innediately to report the incident per
Proper pelice procedure, but, in fact, did not do s0 until
Ekeursing to work three days Laver on Septenber 19, 2003)

 

 

Nichols did not testify

fon July 7, 200¢, during the in-chanbers settlenent of jury
instructions: the following disevssion regarding the offense of
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Terroristic Threatening in the Second degree took place, in
yelevant part:

[PROSECUTOR]: Perhaps we could put something on the
Fecord, Your Honor, regarding the Court's finging
[sie] thet there 19 no lesser included offense of TT
[Terroristic threatening) 2 in this case. We did that
the last trial. the only difference between the TT 1
and the TT 249 whether ox not the [victin] was 8
police officer, public servant. And I don’t think
Enere has been eny evidence indicating thet [Officer
Kraul was ==

 

‘THE COURT: To the contrary.
IPROSECUTOR]: Yes.

(DEFENSE CONSEL}: T agr

 

THE COURT: So we will make ® finding [sic] that there
fs no included Offense.

Without objection, the court instructed the jury, in
relevant part, as fellows

+ In the Indictment, the defendant,
of

Number 1
Tracy Nichols, is chargee with the off
Terroristic Threatening in the First. Degr

 

 

 

A person commits the offense of Terroristic
Threatening in the First cegree if, with the intent to
ferrorize or in reckless disregard’ of the risk of
terrorizing a public servant, he threatens, by word oF
conduct, to cause bodily injury to's public servant

 

 

There are four elenente of the offense of
rroristic Threatening in the First Degree, each of
hich the prosecution must prove beyond « resonable
soubt

 

These four element (s] are: One, that on oF
about the 16% day of Septenber, 2003, in the county
Sf Maul, State of Hawall, the defendant, Tracy

Nichols, intentionally threatened or recklessly
Gleregatded the risk of threatening, by word oF
Conduct, te cause bodily injury to another person, to
Wit, Mcholas Krau; and, two, that the defendant,
Tracy Nichols, intended, knew or recklessly
disregarded a’ substantial and unjustifiable risk, that
the person threatened ues a public servant? and,
three, that the defendant, Tracy Nichols, did so with
the intent to terrorize of in reckless disregard of
the risk of terrorizing Nicholas Krau; and, four, chat
Nicholas Keay was a public servant

 

 

 

 

 

Nunber 17: A threat does not include any
statement which, vhen taken sn context, ie neta true
Ehrest becouse it is conditional or made an seat.
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An alleged true threat is one that is
objectively capable of inducing @ reasonable fear of
Bodily injury in the person at whom the threat wa
Cirected and who wes ware of the circumstances under
hich the remarks were uttered

 

Teve threats must be 20 unambiguous and have
such inmesiaey that they coavincingly express an
Intention of Being carried out.

A threat is, on its face and in the
circumstances in which 1¢ ie made, 30
Gneonditionsl, inmediate and Specific az to the person
theeatenes, a& to convey @ gravity of purpose and
[eminent prospect of execution.

 

 

Munber 18; Terrorize means to cause another
person to have serious slarn for his or her personal
ety.

 

Number 19: Actual terrorization is not #
material clement of terroristie threatening, although,
Tele evidence of the occurrence of its matériel
clenenes

 

Nonber 20; Law enforcement officer includes
police officer.

Doring its deliberations, the jury did not submit any
questions to the trial court. The jury found Nichols guilty as
charged.

4‘ wichols! counsel did in fact cbject te instruction No. 20, stating, “I
an aluays afraid of giving a partial piece of a statute, since it’s purely
from (HRS §) 710-1013 (aie). (i}f we are te quote the statute,

{Rous quote all of it: At the dane tine, Nichols” counsel did agree that
Ehere was absclutely no dispute in this case “as to what a lew enforcement
officer is."

 

 

HRS $ 120-1000 (1993) states An relevant part:

(23) “haw enforcement officer” means any public servant, whether
employed by the State of subdivisions thereot or by the
United states, vested by law with a duty to maintain public
order or, te make arrests for offenses or to enforce the
Grimins! laws, whether that duty extends to all offenses or
{5 limited to's specific class of offenses;

(25) “public servant” means any officer or employee of any branch
Of government, whether elected, appointed, or otherwise
Snpioyed, and any person participating as' advisor,
Consultant, or otherwise, in performing a governnontal
fonction, but the term does net include jurors or
Nitneases(.)

 
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ICA’s Opinion at 2-9 (footnote omitted). Judgment and sentence
were entered on September 7, 2004, and Nichols timely appealed
therefrom.

on appeal, Nichols argued that the circuit court’s jury
instructions were plainly erroneous in that the circuit court
failed to: (1) (a) specify that the prosecution must prove that
officer Krau was a public servant at the time the threat was nade
and instruct the jury to consider whether the threat was related
to, or the result of, Krau's performance as a public servant; (b)
define the term “public servant”; (c) instruct the jury that it
could consider whether Krau’s fear of bodily injury induced by
the threat was objectively reasonable under the circunstances,
based on the attributes of the defendant and the subject of the

threat; and (2) instruct the jury that it could consider the

 

x included offense of terroristic threatening in the second
degree.

on December 29, 2005, the ICA issued its opinion
affirming the judgment of the circuit court. In its opinion, the
ICA engaged in a lengthy meditation on the standard of review for
erroneous jury instructions, at the end of which it concluded
that
in Hawas's, absent an objection in accordance with HRPP (Hawal't
Rules of Penal Procedure) Rule 30(f}, “[nlo party may assign 2s
error the giving or the refusal to give, or the modification of,
Gn instruction.” However, even whens party faile to object to\an
instruction in accordance with HRFP Rule 30(f), appellate courts
shall apply the #APP Aule 52(b) “plain error” standard of review.

Me leave open the question of whether that standard is that (a) we

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may recognize plain error when the error committed affects
Substantial sents of the defendant, er (b) we will apply the
Plain error stonderd of review to correct errors which seriously
Retect the fairness, intesrity, or public reputation of Juaicial
Proceedings, to serve the ends of Justice, and to prevent the
Genial of fundamental rights, or (@) both. We further conclude
that, absent an cbjection sy'a party in accordance with HREP Rule
Sit}, the trial court's duty “either to correct any defects [in
the" Lequested instructions] or to fashion its own instructions” is
[insted to the duty to avoid only plain error father than all ron
harmless error.

 

 

 

ICA's Opinion at 22-23.
Applying the standard of review it had set forth, the
ICA first analyzed whether error had been committed at all with
respect to the four points assigned by Nichols, concluding: (1)
the circuit court erred ‘when it failed to tell the jury [in
instruction No. 20) that a finding that Officer Krau was @ ‘lew
enforcement officer’ /*police officer’ was a finding that officer
Krau was a ‘public servant,’ id. at 257 (2) the circuit court did
not err in failing to instruct the jury that it “must determine
that the threat by Nichols was related to, or the result of, the
performance of Officer Krau’s official duties,” id at 25-26
(citing Kubia, 105 Hawai'i at 269-70, 96 P.3d at 598-99); (3) the
circuit court “erred when it failed to provide the jury with the
‘relevant attributes’ instruction as required by Valdivia,” id.
‘at 28; and (4) Nichols’ assertion that the circuit court erred
when it failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of terroristic threatening in the second degree lacked

merit, id. at 29.

 
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‘The ICA next considered the severity of the errors it
had found, concluding: (1) “(t]he ‘public servant’ error was not
a plain error,” id. at 28; (2) “[a]ssuming the ‘relevant
attributes’ error was a plain error, we decline to exercise our
remedial discretion,” id.; and (3) the failure to give a lesser
included offense instruction either (2) was not error because,
although Officer Krau was off duty when the alleged threatening
occurred, evidence that the alleged threats were unconnected to
Krau’s duties as a police officer would have been irrelevant, or
(b) it was harmless error because the jury convicted Nichols of
the charged offense and so it would never have reached the lesser
included offense, id, at 29 (citing Haanic, 94 Hawai'i at 415-16,
16 P.3d at 256-57, for the latter proposition). Accordingly, the
ICA affirmed the judgment below. Id, at 29.

In response to the ICA’s decision, Nichols filed the
instant application for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the
TCA gravely erred in “refus(ing] to conduct a harmless error
analysis” and “declin{ing] to reverse the conviction once the
error is shown to not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
After Nichols’ application was granted, the State of Hawai'i
thereinafter, the prosecution) filed a supplemental brief with
Leave of this court, in which it agreed with Nichols that the
correct standard of review is whether the alleged error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but argued that the failure

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to give a “relevant attributes” instruction was in fact harmless

11, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Ins nd Plain

 

men jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue on
ippeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and .
Considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudictally
ineufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, oF misi Erroneous
instructions ere presumptively harmful and are

reversal unless it affirmatively appears. from th
whole that the error vas not prejudicial. (However,
tovbe viewed in isolation and considered purely in ¢)
3 must be examined in the Light of the proc
Given the effect unich the whole record shows it to be
$n’ that context, the real question becones whether there is 3
Heasonable possibility that error might have contributed to
Conviction. If there is such @ reasonable possibility in a
Eriminal case, then the error is not harmless Beyond 2 reasonable
Soubt, and the Judgment of conviction on which it may have been,
based’ must be set aside,

 

 

     

 

 

 

    

 

vy, alves, 108 Hawai'i 289, 292-93, 119 P.3d 597, 600-01

(2005) (internal citations, quotation marks, indentations, and

 

paragraphing omitted; bracketed material added). See also State
‘wa Shinvama, 101 Hawai'i 389, 395, 69 P.34 517, 523 (2003)
(sane) .

HRP Rule 30(f) (2000), entitled “Instructions and

objections,” provides in relevant part

 

tio party may assign as error the giving or the refusal to give, or
the sedi fiestion of, an instruction, whether settled pursuant to
Subdivision (6) of evbdivision (c), of this rule, unless the party
Gbjects thereto before the Jury retires to consider its verdict,
Stating cistinetly the matter to wich the party objects and tne
grounds of the objection.

 

With respect to the review of errors in light of whether timely
objection was or was not made, HRPP Rule 52 (2000) provides:

(a) Marmiess error, Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which Goes not affect substantial rights shall be diSregaraed

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(b) Plain error. Plain errors oF defects affecting substantial
Eights ney be notices although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.

 

In line with HRPP Rules 30 and 52, this court has held that:

As 2 general rule, jury instructions to which no objection has
Deen Sade at trisi will be reviewed ooly for glain ersor. [State
75 Baw. [282,} 251-2, 859 Pr28_(2960,) 1374 (95a
Frlihe sobstantiel rights of the’ defendant have been affected
adversely, the exzor will be Joened plain ervor~ ide” Further,
this Court will apply the plain eecor stondara of Feview to
SSrfect exzces which seriovely aftect the fairness, integrity, oF
foblic reputation of judicial proceedings, to serve the ends. of
Bietice, and co grevest the deniel of fundemental rights, date
So egy 70am, f6, 56, 760 20 670, 676 (1908) 7 see alee
EeeRrewads Se Hau. de), 48, $41 F.20 1020, 1028 978).

State v. Sawyer, 68 Hawai' 325, 330, 966 P.2d 637, 642 (1998).
‘The use of the HRPP Rule 52(b) plain error standard of

 

   

   

review for erroneous jury instructions was recently reaffirmed’ in

State v. Eberly, 107 Hawai'i 239, 112 P.3d 725 (2005), a case
decided six months before the ICA’s opinion in the instant case.

In Eberly, we observed that

notwithstanding #RPP Rule 30((f)], erzonecus (Jury) instructions
ay be grounds for reversal despite counsel's Zailure to cbject at
Erlal, “Where instructions were not objected to at trial, if the
appellant overcones the presumption that the instructions were
Correctly stated, the Fuie is that such erroneous instructions are
presumptively harmfvl ond are 2 ground for reversal unless it
Sefirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error
was not prejudicial.

 

 

 

 

Id. at 250, 112 P.3d at 736 (internal citations and quotation
narks omitted) (emphasis in original). We also reaffirmed our
previous cases holding that it is ultimately the trial court that
is responsible for ensuring that the jury is properly instructed.
Id. Nichols argues that in Light of our consistent precedent

regarding the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury, the

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ICA gravely erred in concluding that the duty of the trial court
Ag Limited to avoiding plain error. We agree and reject the
ICA's conclusion to the contrary.

Given that the duty to properly instruct the jury 14

 

with the trial court, Nichols argues that “the real question for
review of jury instructions, whether as plain error or otherwise,
is whether there is @ reasonable possibility the error
contributed to the verdict. . . . If there is such a reasonable
possibility in a criminal case, the error is not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the judgment must be reversed.” Nichols
continues:

the extensive body of Lau establishing the standard of review for
Jury instructions in this Jurisdiction does not allow for the
2xetcine of “remedial discretion” once prejudicial error is
SGeneafies ‘The ICA [thus] gravely erred in concluding that
Et'had the option to decline to exercise its “remedial discretion”
of that it had any Yenedisi discretion at all in regards to such

 

We first note that Nichols is correct in asserting that
there is no case in this jurisdiction referring to “remedial
discretion” in connection with plain error, nor can we discover
any reported criminal case in which this court has found plain
error but refused to reverse in the exercise of discretion.
While such discretion may exist in the federal courts, we have
never employed the four-pronged plain error standard of review
set forth in United states v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), and we
decline to do so now. See State v. King, 555 N.W.2d 189, 194
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to follow Olano on state law

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grounds even though the language of its ovn plain error rule vas
substantially identical to that of the federal rule).

We disagree with Nichols, however, to the extent his
argument can be taken as the assertion that plain error review
has no discretionary component. In State v, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i
17, 25 P.3d 792 (2001), we stated:

 

IWphether to recognize error that has not been raised by trial
ESunsely appellate counsel, of both, ae plain error warranting
feversai fe, ultimately, discretionary. "See HREP Rule 52(b)
{200} (Plain errors of defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although mot brought to the attention of the court.”
(Emphasis sdded.)). Accordingly, we have observed that

our power to deal with plain error is one to be exercised
Sparingly and with caution beceuse the plain error rule
Eepresente a departure from a presupposition of the
adversary system ~~ that a party most look to his or her
Counsel for protection and bear the cost of counss
mistakes,

State vi Kelekolio, 74 Haw, 479, $15, 849 P.26 58, 74-75 1993),
(cited in State t. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 3¢, 928 P.24 643, 876

(i9se) Glakayama, J-- discenting}). in this vein, we will deem
formless beyond 2 reasonasle doubt, and therefore’ disregard, "any
error, defect, irregularity|,] oF variance” that “does not affect
[ihe] substantial rignee” of a defenaane. HREP Role #2(2) (2000)

 

   

 

 

    

 

Ida at 22, 25 P.2d at 797, In effect, we employ our HRPP Rule
52(b) discretion to correct errors that are not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and to disregard those errors that are harmless
beyond 2 reasonable doubt.

However, the necessary inplication of this approach is
that the same standard of review is to be applied both in case:
in which a timely objection to a jury instruction was made and

those in which no timely objection was made. The ICA in this

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case correctly recognized that the merger of the plain error and
harmless error standards of review in the case of jury

instructions flows from this court's holding in Haanio* that the

 

* tn Haanic, we held that “the trial courts, not thé parties, have the
uty and ultimate responsibility to insure that juries are properly instructed
fon issues of criminal Lisbility.” Haanig, 94 Hawai'i at 415, 16 P.3d at 256
(citations omitted), In-s0 doing, We Feexamined our decision in State vw.

‘Je Hawai'i 307, 879 P.24 492 (1994), and rejected the ICA's view that
EBeEkaant’s sufficient underatanding of the consequences of the waiver of the
Hight to have a lesser included offense instruction should measure a trial
Court's decision to give of not give an otherwise proper included offense
GRetruction. Id. at 412-13, 16 P.3d et 254-58." In so doing, we also rejected
the view that the parties, a# a matter of triai strategy or constitutional
Seu, Rave eny Fight to forego such an instruction. Lg. ae Alé-15, 16 23d at
2eS-se. As a consequence, we find misplaced the dissent’s contention that
Stactice or strategies in the interests of the client,” Dissent at 15, have
any relevence to s determination of the existence of instructional error.

‘At the same tine, the parties are by no means precluded from taking part
in the settling ef jury instructions. We wore careful to note in Hasna that
Sthe prosecution and the defense may, a9 they do in the ordinary course,
propose particular included offense instructions, and cur holding 1s not to be
Eiken ac discouraging of precluding their desire cr felt cbligstion te do 59.”
be tlawal'd at 415, 16 P-3d at 256. We reaffirm that statenent and also add
that nothing said in Esanig precludes the trial court from requiring the
parties to submit relevant instructions for its review. Sea HREF Rule 30(b)
Sat such reasonable tine as the court directs, the parties shall file written
fequests that the court instruct the Jury on the lav.")

Th this connection, we slso consider the dissent’ fears of ganesmanship
and manipelation in the arens of jury instructions, and find that they are, at
Bese, pr int at 9-12, Although the dissent cites various
provisions of the Sawai'i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC) in support of
Ets view, we Believe that it ss those very rules which facilitate and support
cur decision £0 allocate vltinate instructional responsibility in Haanie and
Rere. In particular, we enphasite the point that attorneys have a duty of
Condor toward the tribunal. gag Dissent at 147 HRFC Rule 3.3. Under HEREC
Role 3.3(0) (1) (providing that an attorney shall not knowingly make a false
Statenent of law to the tribunal], attorneys who knowingly suumit erroneous
Sory instesctions, see Dissent at'12, risk sanctions end disciplinary
Proteedings, Furthermore, under HAPC Rule 3.3(a)(3) {providing that an
Eftorney shall not knowingly £211 to disclose adverse, controlling authority
fo the tribunal), attorneys who cnit to point out erroneous instructions, sa
1G.) "face the same consequences. Horeover, attorneys contemplating
{netractional skoiduggery would be well advised to consider the risk of a
civil suit for legal salpractice by a dissatisfied client (e.a., suppose that
Gn attorney intentionally fails te request a proper instruction or object to
Gn erroneove instruction, the client is convicted, prevails on appeal, and,
Gthogsy efter having served two years of incarceration while the sppeal was
pending, sues, arguing that if counsel had net acted in a deceptive manner in

   

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

Eke fivst place, the client would not have been convicted). While we are not
Unaware of the proof probiens and attorney-client privilege issues attendant
(continued...)

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duty to instruct the jury ultimately lies with the trial

court:

If the duty to give the right jury instructions, is assigned to the

trial court, (a) the standard of review for an erroneous jury

Snsteuction will always be the harmless error non-discretionsry

standard, and will never be the plain error discretionary

Standarg, and mach uncertainty will be avoided: (b) an efroneous

Jury instruction will never be a basis for a defendant's assertion

That he/she nas ceen the victim of the ineffective acsistance of

Counsel; and (c) abuse of the plaia error discretionary standard

of review will be avoided.
ICA's Opinion at 19-20.

The ICA previously attempted to implement its view of
the consequences of the allocation of ultimate responsibility for
jury instructions to the trial court in State v. Astronomo,

95 Hawai'i 76, 18 P.3d 938 (App. 2001), concluding that “with
respect to jury instructions, the distinction between ‘harmless
error’ and ‘plain error’ is a distinction without a difference.”

Id. at 82, 18 P.3d at 944. Accord State v, Fields, No. 25455,
2005 WL 1274539, at *19.n.7 (App. May 31, 2005) (“Now that this
duty [to properly instruct the jury] has been imposed on the
trial court, it is logical to conclude that erroneous
instructions should be examined for HRPP Rule $2(a) ‘harmless

error! rather than HRPP Rule 52(b) ‘plain error.’”), cert

5{.- continues)
to disciplinary and civit proceedings in such cases, we consider the risks of
these proceeding and appellate sanctions to be adequate deterrence to
‘Sanesmsnehip-

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granted 108 Haw. 1, 116 P.3d7 (Haw. July 6, 2005). Based,
however, on the perceived failure of this court in State v. Iuli,
101 Hawai'i 196, 203-04, 65 P.3¢ 143, 190-51 (2003), to approve
Astronono or affirmatively cite the duty of the trial court to
properly instruct the jury, the ICA in the instant case took the
view that the ultimate responsibility for jury instructions does
not lie with the trial court and that it should thus apply a
discretionary plain error standard of review to erroneous jury
instructions. ICA's Opinion at 22-23.

We now acknowledge that the ICA's earlier view was
correct and adopt the substance of Chief Judge Burns’ analysis in
Astronono and Fields. Consequently, we hold that, although as a
general matter forfeited assignments of error are to be reviewed
under the HRPP Rule 52(b) plain error standard of review, in the
case of erroneous jury instructions, that standard of review is
effectively merged with the HRPP Rule 52(a) harmless error
standard of review because it is the duty of the trial court to
properly instruct the jury. As a result, once instructional
error is demonstrated, we will vacate, without regard to whether
timely objection was made, if there is a reasonable possibility

that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction, ie,

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that the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless beyond &

reasonable doubt.¢

 

 

‘the dissent argues that the implied consequence of our holding today
Ag chat “the appellate courts shel] seek out exroneoue jury inatructione
within the record, either when called upon by the parties or gua sponte, and
Shall reverse the trial coure unless it can be proven that the instreet ional
error wos harmless beyond a reaconable doubt.” Gissent at S-é (emphasis
added). the fear that appellate discretion has been eviscerated 15 unfounded:
Wwe enphasize that the phrase “once instructional error is denonstrated” in our
holding is not to be taken lightly. Av already noted above, this point was
Bade clear in gberly: “where instructions were not objected to at trialy if

 

 

Ehe_aposllant crerccnes the cresunntion that the instructions were correctly
Aigied, the role is that such erroneous instructions are presuspetvely hesmful
ang are 3 ground for reverss! unless it affirmatively appears trom the record

‘ivhele that the error was not prejudiciale” 10? lawei at 220, 112 B30
at 936 Cinternat citations and quotation marks omitted) lenphasis added). Th
ther words, there vas and renains « presumption that ncejectedsto Jury
instructions are correct; hence, the appellate court is under ne duty te scour
the record for ezfor gua ghaate. Accordingly, we cacve cut cous) no
Minvisibie exceptions, “otesent at"12, to the rules of appeliste procedure
(Liss Hawai'i Roles of Appellate Procedure Rules 26(0) (f) and 40.1 {0)11)) oF
penal’ procedure RP? Rilea 30 and Sd) regerding appeilote diactecicn vo
Rotice forfeited assignnents of error generally of instroctional efter in
particular,

heed we part company with the dissent, hovaver, is with regard to the

question uhether an appellant, if he or sho can overcome the initial
Presumption against efter, haa an ecditionsl burden of Genonstrating the
harafuiness of the error in the sbeence of a tisely sojecticn below, Our
Precedent compels the conclusion that no auch burden eniste, he che diasent
grees, Dissent at 2, we nave a long Line of precedent stating that the
harafuiness of instructional error is prestned. Even Gaxgax, cited by the
Gissent for the proposition that we review forested cleine cf instraccional
error only for plain erfor, Sissent st ty invokes the tent iise incantation
“erroneous instructions are presunptively harmful and area ground for
reversal unless it affirmatively appesrs from the record ag a whole that the
error was not prejudicial.” $6 sawerl at 950,. 966 Fold at 12, (eltation
omitted! "see aise E5erly, 107 Hawai'i at 250°51, 192 P30 at 736-37
(applying che presumption of harfuineas in the context of plain error
Feview); State Vanstory, 91 Havas 33, 42-43, 979 F.2d 1059," 2066-89
(1955) (sane), the holding here i= nore explicitly compelled by axcaa~
There, in light Of the presumption of hasmfUlness, we rejected. Sere
proposition that an erroneous jary instruction is (per ee), sharmiess’ if ‘the
Serengant. never objected to’ of “requested his own natrectionte]@™, 8
Mawar st Iz n-€, 328 F.2d at O54 n-8. Instead, we flatly seated that the
Lack of '& timely objection ‘a. Yot no consequence” in detesmining whether
instructional efzer is harmful, ano ated thst swe have long since ported
company with the view" thats standard of Feview nore stringent than sharaless
Beyond 2 ressonable doubt” nay be applied. “La.” Accordingly, we believe ehee
cur holding today, far fron doing viclence te precedent, sag Olseent a0 7s de
in'eact the natural and inevitable culmisstion of sur insticeienal efor
Surisprodence, ss well as the only way faltheully te recencile the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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B. Included offenses

“(t)rial courte must instruct juries

 

to any included

offenses when ‘there is a rational basis in the evidence for a

 

verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting the defendant of the included offense{.1’” Haanio, 94
Hawai'i at 413, 16 P.3d at 254 (quoting HRS § 701-109(5) (1993)).
IIT. DISCUSSION

In addition to his allegation of error with respect to
the standard of review, Nichols repeats three of the four points
he pressed before the ICA, arguing that the failure to give a
“relevant attributes” instruction, lesser included’ offense
instruction, and nexus instruction (ices, instruction that the
jury must find that the threat by Nichols was related to, or the
result of, the performance of Officer Krau's official duties)
were each instances of reversible plain error. The prosecution,
as the ICA noted, concedes that the failure to give the “relevant
attributes” instruction was error but argues that it was not
plain error. On the other hand, the prosecution contends that
the circuit court did not err at all in failing to give a nexus
or lesser included offense instruction. For the reasons set
forth below, we hold that: (1) the circuit court's failure to

give a “relevant attributes” instruction was plain error; but (2)

"Lo .scontinved)
simultaneous application of a presumption of harmfulness with plain error

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the circuit court's failures to give nexus and lesser included
offense instructions were not error.

A. The Circuit Court's Failure to Issue a “Relevant Attributes”
Instruction Was Not Harmless Bevond a Reasonable Doubt,

Nichols argues that the circuit court plainly erred in
failing to instruct the jury, pursuant to Valdivia, “that the

attributes of the defendant and the complainant could be taken

 

into consideration in assessing whether, under the circumstanc
Nichols’ remarks were a ‘true threat.’” Specifically, Nichols
argues that because Krau was “trained as a police officer to a
professional standard of behavior to handle physical
confrontations that ordinary citizens might not be expected to
equal,” the sane allegedly threatening utterances of Nichols that
might have induced “a reasonable fear of bodily injury” in an
ordinary citizen might not have had the same effect on someone
with Krau’s training. Nichols further argues that, based on
Krau’s testimony tending to show that he “dealt with the
situation in @ calm, rational manner,” there was evidence from
which a jury could reasonably have concluded, had it been
properly instructed, that Krau did not have 2 reasonable fear of
bodily injury. Based on this reasonable possibility that the
error contributed to his conviction, Nichols asserts that the
“error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the ICA
erred in failing to so find.” The ICA assuned the error was
plain, but refused to exercise its “remedial discretion” to set

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aside the conviction. ICA’s Opinion at 28. Applying the correct
standard of review set forth above in Section II.A, we hold that:
(2) the failure to give a relevant attributes instruction was
erroneous, and (2) there is a reasonable possibility that the

error contributed to Nichols’ conviction, the error vas not

 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. The Failure to Give a Relevant Attributes
Instruction Was Erroneous.

Because the prosecution's confession of error is not
binding upon the appellate court, we must still first determine
whether the circuit court erred in failing to give a relevant
attributes instruction. State v, Solomon, 107 Hawai'i 117, 126,
111 p.3d 12, 21 (2008). In Valdivia, the defendant was arrested
while attempting to flee from police, handcuffed, and taken to
the hospital. Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i at 470, 24 P.3d at 666.

While seated and awaiting treatment, still handcuffed, and
flanked by two police officers, the defendant turned to one
officer and said, “I’m gonna kill you and your police uniform.”
Id. at 471, 24 P.3d at 667. The officer testified that this
statement “worr[ied]” him. Id. The defendant was subsequently
charged with terroristic threatening in the first degree against
a public servant. Id, On appeal after conviction, the defendant
argued that the trial court erroneously failed, over his

objection, to instruct the jury that “[w)here a threat is

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directed at @ police officer, you may consider that police
officers are trained to a professional standard of behavior that
ordinary citizens might not be expected to equal.” Id. at 479,

24 P.3d at 675. This court agreed that the failure to instruct
the jury that the threatened person's status and training as 2

police officer was relevant was reversible error, holding:

[Zin order for an utterance to constitute “true threat," it must
be cbjectively susceptible to inducing fear of bodily injury in @
Eeasonable person at whom the threat is directed and who is
Familiar with the circumstances under which the three i st
That being the case, the particular ateributes of the
‘the subject of the threatening utterance sre surely
fing whether the indices fear of bodily injury,

 

  

red.

     

fendant_ a1
rant in,

 

AE any, is objectively reasonable,

 

Id. This holding was based on our decision in In re Doe, 76
Hawai'i 95, 869 P.2d 1304 (1994), where we reasoned that in
considering whether the offense of harassment has been conmitted
against @ police officer, the fact that the “object of the
[allegedly harassing utterances] is a trained and experienced
police officer” maintaining a “professional standard of
restrained behavior” is a factor. Id, at 96, 969 P.2d at 1315.

As set forth above, the trial court in this case gave
the following true threat instruction without objection:

A threat does not include any statement which, shen taken in
context, 1g not a true threat because it is conditional or made in

   

est.

lesed true threat is one that is obtectively capable of
Anducina-a Leasonable fear of badily iniury-in the peraon at shen
ihe shreat she wae Ee

under which the remarks were uttered.

True threats must be so unambiguous and have such immediacy
tnat they convincingly express an intention of being carried outs

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A threat Le, on ite face and in the circumstances in which
At is made, "so unequivocal, ‘unconditional, inediate and specific
as to the person threatened, as to convey'a gravity of purpose and
imminent prospect of execution:

 

(Emphasis added.) We agree with the parties thet. this
instruction 1s defective under Valdivia because it does not make
clear to the jury that Nichols’ and Krau's particular attributes,
including their relative size and weight, Nichols’ apparent
capacity and inclination to carry out his threat, and Kraus
status and training ae @ police officer, were relevent in
determining whether Nichola’ alleged threats were objectively
capable of inducing reasonable fear of bodily injury under the
circumstances. .

2. There is a Reasonable Possibility that the Failure

to Give a “Relevant Attributes” Instruction
Contributed to Nichols’ Conviction.

 

The prosecution argues that the circuit court’s failure
to give @ “relevant attributes” instruction was harmless on four
grounds: (1) unlike the defendant in Valdivia, Nichols did not
request the proper instruction; (2) the cases are distinguishable
on the facts because the officer in Valdivia was on duty while
Krau was off duty and did not have a weapon, back-up, or radio:
(3) An the defense’s closing argument, trial counsel “essentially
conceded that [Nichols'] words exacerbated the risk that Officer
Krau's training and professional standard of restrained behavior
would be overcome”; and (4) the prosecution cured the error in

its closing argument by “urg[ing] the jury to consider, as a

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matter of common sense, the relevant attributes of officer
Krau.”

First, it is true that the defendant in Valdivia,
unlike Nichols, objected to the erroneous instruction at trial.
However, as explained above in Section II.A, this distinction ig
irrelevant because it is the duty of the trial court to see that
the jury is properly instructed. As also set forth above,
erroneous jury instructions are presumptively prejudicial unless
it affirmatively appears from the record as 2 whole that the
error vas harmless beyond @ reasonable doubt. Nichols argues
that the record does not in fact affirmatively demonstrate
harmlessness, referring us to evidence that Officer Krau vas calm
in departing the scene and did not immediately report the threat
to central dispatch according to police procedure. He suggests
that, had the jury been properly instructed, it could reasonably
have concluded based on this evidence that Nichols’ alleged
threats were not objectively capable of, and did not in fact,

* the prosecution also argues that the failure of Nichols’ counsel to
propose 2 "yelevant attributes” instruction was the reevlt of ganecnanship,
ind thus “in order to protect the integrity and public reputation of Judie,
Proceedings, [Nichols] should now be precluded fron unfairly invoking the
Plain error doctrine, where under the facta of this case, t¥ial counsel
Spparently had knowledge of the exror, but chose to rensin silent.” This
Court has acknowledged that, as 2 general rule, invited errors are not
Eeversible, Seate w.Jones/ 96 Hawaii 161, 166, 29 P34 391, 386. (2001);
‘State v.Puaoh, Te Wowari 185, 169, 891 P.od 272, 276 (1998) stare v, Smith,
56 fav. 304, 313-14, 712 .26 496, ‘S02 (1986). However, we have alse noted
that the general rule is inapplicable where an invites error 2s so presudicial
a2 to be plain error of to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
Smith, eHow. st 1¢, 712 P26 at S02. See glee Haanio, 94 Hawai'i ot 415,
36 P-id at 256 ("Our Courte are not gambling halls but forune for the

Glecovery of truth.” (Citation onitted.))-" In other words, we are cycled
Back to cur original inquiry.

   

 

 

 

 

 

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induce a reasonable fear of bodily injury in a trained police
officer like Krau.

The prosecution counters that this case is
distinguishable from Valdivia on the facts, with the result that
there is no reasonable possibility here that the failure to give
an attributes instruction contributed to the conviction. In
Valdivia, on the one hand, the defendant was seated, handcuffed,
surrounded by two on-duty officers in uniform, and the threatened
officer testified only that the allegedly threatening statement
“worried” him. Here, on the other hand, the evidence showed,
inter alia, that: (1) Krau was off duty, alone, weaponless, and
caught off-guard; (2) Nichols was not seated and restrained in
handcuffs, but was instead standing within a foot of Krau’s face
with his fists clenched; and (3) Krau was not merely worried, but
(2) “was totally convinced [he] was going to get assaulted [and
that Nichols] was going to attempt to kick [his] ass,” (b) drove
off in the opposite direction from his home to avoid being
followed, (c) warned his father to watch out for Nichols’ truck,
and (d) called a few friends and his brother to establish Nichols
as the prime suspect in the event something should happen to him
or his family members.

While the distinctions drawn by the prosecution have
some merit, we are unwilling to speculate as to what the jury

would have done had it been given a proper “relevant attributes”

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instruction. In the absence of such an instruction, we cannot
know whether, under the evidence here, the jury would have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Nichols’ threats were
objectively capable of inducing a reasonable fear ‘of bodily
injury in a police officer, as opposed to an ordinary person, in
Krau’s circumstances. Based upon our review of the record as a
whole, we thus conclude that there is a reasonable possibility
that the jury might have weighed the evidence differently had it
been properly instructed. Therefore, we hold that the circuit
court’s failure to provide a “relevant attributes” instruction
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.* .
8. Michols’ Remaining Points of Error Are Without Merit.
Because we vacate the judgment below and remand for a
new trial due to the plain error discussed in Section III.A, we
need not consider Nichols’ remaining points of error. We
nevertheless address then in order to provide guidance to the
circuit court on remand. See, @.d., KNG Corporation v. Kim, 107

Hawai'i 73, 80, 110 P.3d 397, 404 (2005) (analyzing the

 

with respect to the pros
of a “relevant attributes” instruction was cured
Bastion in closing argunente, we note thet just as argunents of counsel cannot
Substitute fer evidence, state iB hawai'i 128, 144, 938 F-20553,
S15 (1939), so too may they not core defects in jury instructions

lution’ s additional contention that the Lack
statements mage by the

 

  

       

 

Argusents by counsel cannot substitute for an instruction by the
2obre. “Arguments by counsel are Likely to be viewed aa statenents
Sf advocacy, whereas 2 jury instruction is a definitive and
Binding statement of Law.

tate v. Perkine, 626 N.W.24 762, 773 (Wis, 2002).
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constitutionality of a statute for the benefit of the court on
remand); Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 341-43,
104 P.3d 912, 928-30 (2004) (offering guidance on remand as to

‘State v. Reanon, 97 Hawai's 299, 303, 36

P.3d 1269, 1273 (2001) (providing guidance on remand regarding

appropriate sanctions!

 

the propriety of certain jury instructions). Based on the record
presently before us, we conclude that the court on remand is not
required to give either @ nexus instruction or lesser included

offense instruction.

 

The Trial Court Is Not Required to Issue a Nexus
Instruction on Remand Because Terroristic
Threatening in the First Degree Does Not Require a
Nexus Between the Threat and the Official Duties
of the Public Servant if the Threatened Person Is
a Governnent Officer or Employee.

 

Nichols contends that persons not actively performing a
governmental function at the time they are threatened should not
be considered “public servants” within the meaning of HAS § 710
1000(15). He further argues that because Officer Krau was off
duty and in plain clothes at the time of the alleged threatening
in this case, he was not a public servant and thus there was “a
question of fact as to whether there was a nexus between the
alleged threat and the complainant's official status or duties”
requiring that the trial court so instruct the jury. We, Like
the ICA, disagree on the basis that the offense of terroristic

threatening in the first degree does not require a nexus between

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the alleged threat and the threatened person's status as a public
servant where the threatened person is a government officer or
employee, and thus hold that the circuit court did not err in
failing to give a nexus instruction.

HRS § 710-1000(15) does not necessarily require that a
person be actively performing @ governmental function (unlike,
ecae, HRS § 707-701 (b) (1993 and Supp. 2001), which requires that
a law enforcenent officer's death “aris(e] out of the performance
of official duties”) and acting within the scope of his or her
employnent in order to qualify as a public servant. In Kuhiay
the ICA rejected a contrary reading of the statute, reasoning a8
follows:

‘The definizion of “public servant” in HRS § 710-1000(15)
contains three clauses, as diagranned belo

 

“public servant” means (1) any officer or employes of any
branch of government, whether elected, sppcinted, oF
otherwise enpicyes, and (2) any person participating as
Savisor, consultant, oF otherwise, in certorming a

but [3] the term does nor include
eet)

 

Jurors oF withe

 

8 added.) The term “governmental function”
HRS $720-1000(6) (1983) as including any
Sctivity whieh a public servant is legally authorized to undertake
on behalf of the government.”

  

 

Kuhsa apparently reads the phrase “in perforning a
government function” a modifying both clause [1] and clause (2)
He believe a far more natural reading of the statute is that this
phrase only modifies clause [2]. Accordingly, we conclude that
Snder HRS § 710-1000(15) any “officer or employee of any Branch of
Government” qualifies ag a public servant~

Kubia, 105 Hawai'i at 270, 96 P.3d at 599 (emphases in original).
We agree that HRS § 710-1000(15), properly read, distinguishes

between two categories of people: (1) government employees or

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officers, for whom there is no requirement that they be
performing a governmental function at a given time in order to
qualify as a public servant; and (2) private persons, who must be
performing a governmental function in order to qualify as a
public servant. We therefore adopt the analysis of the Ica in ,
Kuhia and hold that: (1) a threatened person, such as Officer
Krav here, who is 2 government employee and thus falls under the
first clause of HAS § 710-1000(15),” need not be actively
performing 2 governmental function at the time he or she is
threatened in order to qualify as a public servant for purposes
of the terroristic threatening in the first degree offense; and
(2) consequently, there is no requirement of a nexus between the
alleged threats and the threatened person’s official status or

duties.* Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court on remand

 

+ We note that we are not presented here with a person falling under the
second clause of SRS $ 710-1000(18) and thus expressly reserve ovr opinion on
the question whether a nexus instruction (and, if 20, of what sort) might be

required in such a case.

 

© Nichols nevertheless maintains that “the absence of = nexus
[requirenent] could render application of the (terroristic threatening]
‘Statute unconstitutional [1y vague].” This contention is without merit. A
Cardinal rule of criminal law 1 that a defendant must have the required state
Gf mind with ceapect to each elenent of the charged offense, including che
Sttendant circumstances. Sez ARS § 702-204 (1993) (providing that "a person
{s pot guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, ax negligently, ao the lew specifies, with respect to each element
Of the offense”); HRS § 702-205 (1993) (providing that the elenents of an
Sftense include attendant circumstances). HRS § 707-115(1) proviaes that the
fequired state of ming for terroristic threatening generally is that the
Sileged threats be made “with the intent to terroriee, or in reckless,
Gisregard of the risk of terrorizing.” As set forth shove, terroristic
threatening in the first degree onder HRS §707-116(1) (e), aupea nove 2,
Fequires that the threat is nade against # public servant. “Because the
Offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree includes the attendant
ce "against a public servant,” a defendant must have the requisite
[cont anes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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is not required to give @ nexus instruction.

2. Assuming the Sane Evidence Ts Presented at a Subsequent
trial, the Trial Court Is Not Required to Give a Lesser
Included Offense Instruction.

Nichols also argues that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
terroristic threatening in the second degree. tn Haanio, this
court hield that @ trial court is obligated to give a lesser
included offense instruction when there is a rational basis for
it in the evidence, even if, as in this case, no request or
objection is made by the parties. Haanic, 94 Hawai'i at 415, 16
P.3d at 256. Thus the sole question is, assuming the same .
evidence is presented at a subsequent trial, whether there is a
rational basis in the evidence for a jury to conclude that

Nichols committed terroristic threatening in the second degree.

 

upon reviewing the evidence in the record before us in

this case, we believe that there is no rational basis in the
evidence on which a jury could conclude that Nichols did not have

the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant

™(., seontinued)
mental state with respect to that circumstance, igs, the defendant must
Thtend, know, Or recklessly disregard the risk that he or she is threatening @
person who 1s a public servant, therefore, there is no vagueness problem
EScasse’e defendant. wno threstens a stranger dressed in pejanas could not be
Convicted of terraristic threatening in the first degree even if it
Subsequently cones to light that, unbeknownst to the defendant at the time,
the pajana-clad figure 1s, soy, & police officer

 

 

 

 

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circumstance of “public servant.” In particular, we note Office
Krau’s uncontradicted testimony that: (1) in the course of his
official duties as a police officer, Krau had been involved in a
confrontation with Nichols on September 1, 2003; and (2) during
the course of the alleged threatening that took place fifteen
days later, Nichols stated, “You're not shit without vour aun and
vour badge and all your boys.” (Emphasis added.) The only
rational inference that could be drawn from this evidence,
assuming that the trier of fact finds it credible, is that
Nichols knew that he was threatening a police officer."
Accordingly, unless Nichols presents evidence at a future trial
that would allow some other rational inference to be drawn, we
hold that the trial court is not required to instruct the jury on
the lesser included offense of terroristic threatening in the
second degree.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the ICA’s Opinion,

vacate the circuit court’s September 7, 2004 final judgment, and

8 Although Nichols does not press the point in his application, we note
for the benefit of the court on remand that we agree with the ICA both thet
(2) the trial court erred, “when it failed to tell the jury that a finding
that Officer Krav was a ‘law enforcement officer! police officer’ was a
Finding that Officer Krau was a ‘public servent,'” TCR's Opinicn at 2

(2) the error was Rarnless because it favored the defense in failing to
complete for the jury the chain of equivalence that “police officer = law
enforcement officer = public servant.” ICA's Opinion at 28.

 

‘but

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remand this matter to the circuit court for a new trial

consistent with this opinion.

on the application and

supplemental briefs: Guess:
Deborah L. Kim,
Deputy Public Defender, a AA

for petitioner /defendant-

or y Yon e Dostys Ov

Peter A. Hanano,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for respondent /plaintiff-
appellee State of Hawai'i

o