Title: State v. Lucas

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1925 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ERIC LUCAS,  
Respondent. 
 
[January 28, 2016] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
The State seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in Lucas v. State, 147 So. 3d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), on the ground that it 
expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this Court, Nelson v. State, 875 
So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2004), on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V,      
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  The question before the Court is whether a postconviction 
movant filing a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging 
that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consult and present an expert in a 
particular field must always identify that witness by name and allege that the 
witness would have been available to testify at trial—and whether failure to do so 
 
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will render the claim legally insufficient.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
answer this question in the negative and approve the district court’s decision in 
Lucas.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The background facts of this case and the original convictions are set forth in 
Lucas v. State, 67 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).  Lucas was convicted of 
burglary of a dwelling with a battery and aggravated battery.  Id. at 334.  The 
district court explained: 
At trial, a witness, Lewisha Freeman, testified to hearing a 
woman banging on doors and screaming, “[S]omebody help me, he is 
going to kill me.”  Freeman stepped outside her apartment and saw 
appellant yelling at a woman and grabbing the woman by her throat.  
Appellant released the woman, later identified as appellant’s girlfriend 
Lauren Glushko, who then went into Freeman’s apartment. 
Appellant yelled through the door of Freeman’s apartment and 
threatened, “I will fight you like a man.”  Freeman called the police, 
but before they could arrive, appellant broke into Freeman’s 
apartment by “busting” through the door.  Appellant then hit Freeman 
on her face and body.  Appellant ceased hitting Freeman only when 
the apartment manager entered the apartment, and appellant then fled. 
 
Id.  The opinion further stated that victim Freeman “sustained two fractures around 
her eye and was hospitalized for three days.”  Id.  Lucas was convicted and 
sentenced to life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender.  Id. at 335.  On appeal, 
the Fourth District affirmed the convictions and sentence.  Id. at 337. 
 
On January 22, 2013, Lucas filed a postconviction motion under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 raising four grounds for relief.  Ground One, the 
 
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only claim at issue here, alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
consult and hire an ophthalmologist expert to rebut the State’s claim that the victim 
suffered permanent eye damage as an element of aggravated battery.1  The motion 
alleged that the victim testified at trial that she had to wear an eye patch and could 
not see with both eyes open at one time—and that she needed surgery but could not 
afford it.  The motion further alleged that the State’s witness, Dr. John Clark, an 
oral maxillofacial surgeon, testified that an ophthalmologist would be better suited 
to examine Freeman, but that eye sockets fracture easily and Freeman did not need 
eye surgery.  The motion alleged that an ophthalmologist had examined Freeman 
and stated in a report, which was reviewed by Dr. Clark, that Freeman would be 
“okay” but should see a specialist if she had further visual difficulty, and that she 
could be referred to a specialist who could treat her with medication.  Lucas 
contended that the prosecutor used this testimony to argue for permanent injury to 
support the crime of aggravated battery.   
 
Lucas also argued in his motion that trial counsel had a duty to present an 
expert in the field of ophthalmology to rebut the presumption of permanent injury 
as an element of aggravated battery—and that if trial counsel had done so, the jury 
                                          
 
 
1.  Section 784.045, Florida Statutes (2015), provides that a person is guilty 
of “aggravated battery” if, in committing a battery, the person “[i]ntentionally or 
knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent 
disfigurement.”  § 784.045(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2015). 
 
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would have heard testimony that the injury was not permanent and could be 
corrected by surgery or medication.  The motion did not name a specific expert and 
thus, did not state that any specific expert would have been available to testify at 
the trial. 
 
The State’s response to the 3.850 motion contended that the claim in Ground 
One—the issue concerning counsel’s failure to present an expert 
ophthalmologist—was insufficiently pled because it did not name the witness that 
should have been called, did not set forth the testimony that the witness would 
present, did not allege that the witness would have been available to testify at trial, 
and did not set forth the prejudice to the defendant.2  In support of its arguments, 
the State cited Nelson, 875 So. 2d 579, and focused mainly on the failure to 
specifically name a witness and allege that such a witness would have been 
available to testify.  The State argued that Nelson’s requirement to identify a 
witness applied equally to a fact witness and an expert witness.     
 
Without holding a hearing and without an explanation, the trial court issued 
an order striking the motion and allowing Lucas thirty days to file an amended 
motion.  Lucas then filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied.  He did not 
file an amended 3.850 motion, but filed his pro se notice of appeal to the Fourth 
                                          
 
 
2.  The State’s response did not address the other three claims in the 3.850 
motion. 
 
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District Court of Appeal.  The district court, relying on Terrell v. State, 9 So. 3d 
1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), reversed the trial court’s order.  Lucas, 147 So. 3d at 
612.  Quoting Terrell, the district court held: 
Although the defendant is usually required to identify fact witnesses 
by name, we are aware of no authority requiring the defendant to 
provide the name of a particular expert where the defendant claims 
that trial counsel failed to secure an expert in a named field of 
expertise.  We thus do not agree that the defendant’s postconviction 
claim was facially insufficient. 
 
Id.  The district court concluded that Lucas’s postconviction motion was facially 
sufficient because it explained the relevance and substance of the expected 
testimony from an expert ophthalmologist and alleged that, but for the error of 
counsel, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.  Id.  The State 
sought review of the district court’s decision in this Court, arguing that it conflicts 
with our decision in Nelson.  We granted review and appointed counsel to 
represent Lucas.   
II.  ANALYSIS 
In this analysis, we must determine whether a 3.850 motion is sufficient if it 
sets forth a factual basis demonstrating that trial counsel knew or should have 
known that an expert in a specific field of expertise could have offered testimony 
that would reasonably have resulted in a different outcome.  Our review of this 
question of law is de novo.  Nelson, 875 So. 2d at 581.   
 
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We turn first to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(c), which states 
the required contents of a postconviction motion and provides: 
(c)  Contents of Motion.  The motion must be under oath 
stating that the defendant has read the motion or that it has been read 
to him or her, that the defendant understands its content, and that all 
of the facts stated therein are true and correct.  The motion must also 
include an explanation of: 
(1)  the judgment or sentence under attack and the court that 
rendered the same; 
(2)  whether the judgment resulted from a plea or a trial; 
(3)  whether there was an appeal from the judgment or sentence 
and the disposition thereof; 
(4)  whether a previous postconviction motion has been filed, 
and if so, how many; 
(5)  if a previous motion or motions have been filed, the reason 
or reasons the claim or claims in the present motion were not raised in 
the former motion or motions; 
(6)  the nature of the relief sought; and  
(7)  a brief statement of the facts and other conditions relied on 
in support of the motion. 
 
We also reiterate the requirements for proving a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel that were set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Strickland held that a defendant must show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense, which requires a showing that the errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of “a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id. at 687. 
With the requirements of rule 3.850 and the legal standard set forth in 
Strickland in mind, we turn to the State’s arguments.  The State contends that in 
making a sufficient claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to consult 
 
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or call an expert, in addition to the express requirements of rule 3.850, we required 
in Nelson that the motion name the expert witness and attest that the witness would 
have been available to testify at trial.  In Nelson, the defendant claimed in pertinent 
part that counsel was ineffective for failing to call several witnesses to testify.  
Nelson, 875 So. 2d at 581.  Three of the four witnesses at issue in Nelson were 
named in the motion, and one was an unnamed blood spatter expert.  Id. at 581 n.1.  
The trial court in Nelson dismissed the claim as insufficient because the motion did 
not allege the witnesses would have been available to testify at trial.  Id.  On 
appeal, the Fifth District in Nelson v. State, 816 So. 2d 694, 695-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2002), affirmed and held that a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to call 
certain witnesses must allege that the witnesses would have been available for trial.  
The district court’s decision in Nelson did not address any failure to identify a 
specific expert witness.   
We granted review of the Fifth District’s decision in Nelson to resolve the 
conflict issue of “whether a defendant alleging that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to call, interview, or investigate witnesses at trial must specifically allege in 
his or her postconviction motion that the witnesses would have been available to 
testify at trial had counsel called them.”  Nelson, 875 So. 2d at 581 (emphasis 
added).  We mentioned the identity of witnesses only in passing, stating: 
As noted by the parties in this case, in Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 
2d 509, 514 n.10 (Fla. 1999), this Court stated in a footnote that a 
 
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defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call 
certain witnesses is not required under rule 3.850(c) to allege the 
names of witnesses, the substance of their testimony, or their 
availability to testify at trial.  This statement was overbroad in respect 
to the requirement to plead what a witness’s testimony would have 
been and the witness’s availability to have testified at trial. . . .  To the 
extent that the footnote in Gaskin is inconsistent with this opinion, we 
recede from it. 
 
Id. at 582-83 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  Thus, our decision in Nelson 
turned on the requirements that the motion allege what the witness’s testimony 
would have been and the fact that the witness would have been available to testify 
at trial.  Nelson was silent on whether the motion must name a specific expert 
when counsel is alleged to have been ineffective for failing to consult or present an 
expert.   
 
Justice Lewis dissented in Nelson and concluded that although availability to 
testify is relevant to the merits of the motion, an allegation containing such “magic 
words” should not be required to render the motion legally sufficient.  Nelson, 875 
So. 2d at 585 (Lewis, J., dissenting).  Justice Lewis stated: 
Subsumed within the allegation of the failure to present a witness at 
trial of which counsel was aware is the underlying premise that a 
witness was available for trial and would have testified if presented.  
Unquestionably, if a witness was not available, the petitioner will fail 
to demonstrate the requisite prejudice prong of Strickland.  However, 
mandating that a petition include the four “magic words”—“was 
available for trial”—most assuredly creates an additional pleading 
element, not required by the applicable rule. 
Id.  Justice Pariente joined in this dissent.   
 
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There is no question that when the ineffective assistance claim alleges trial 
counsel should have presented a fact witness, such witness must be named and his 
or her availability attested to.  See Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2007).  
However, rule 3.850 does not expressly call for the name of a specific expert 
witness, and the issue in Nelson was not whether a specific expert must be named.  
Thus, we must decide if we have construed Nelson to require that when a claim is 
made that counsel should have consulted or called an expert in a specific field of 
expertise, that expert must be specifically identified and shown to have been 
available to testify at trial.   
The State also relies on Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2005), to argue 
that the postconviction motion must specifically name the expert and allege that 
the expert would have been available to testify at trial.  In Bryant, where the issue 
concerned counsel’s failure to obtain a false confession expert, we cited Nelson 
only for the proposition that a defendant is required to allege what testimony 
defense counsel could have elicited and how the failure to consult or call the 
witness prejudiced the case.  Id. at 821.  Even though the “false confession expert” 
was not a named witness in Bryant, we did not rely on that as a ground to find that 
the claim was legally insufficient.  Id.  To clarify the deficiency in the motion in 
Bryant, we explained, “Without more specific factual allegations, such as proposed 
testimony, this claim is insufficient.”  Id. at 822.  Therefore, in Bryant we did not 
 
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hold that the motion must allege that a specific witness has been obtained, or even 
that the claim must name a specific witness, but that the motion must provide 
specific factual allegations about the proposed testimony to be sufficient.   
Similarly, in Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1122 (Fla. 2013), one of the 
issues was whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call any witness to 
challenge the forensic evidence at trial.  We found the claim legally insufficient 
because it did not allege “what specific information other experts would have been 
able to offer or how this presentation would have impacted the case.”  Id. at 1123.  
We added, “[w]ithout more specific factual allegations about how further 
investigation or challenge of the State’s evidence would have benefitted Jennings, 
trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient.”  Id.  In reaching this holding, we cited 
Bryant and Nelson, and did not find the failure to identify a specific forensic expert 
as a reason to find the claim legally insufficient.  Id.   
Thus, the main concern we have voiced regarding postconviction claims 
based on uncalled and unnamed expert witnesses has been the failure to allege 
sufficient facts concerning the necessity of the uncalled expert and the testimony 
the expert could have provided at trial.  In that same vein, the Fourth District 
concluded that “[a]ppellant’s motion sufficiently explained the relevance and 
substance of the expected testimony and alleged that the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different.”  Lucas, 147 So. 3d at 612.  We agree.   
 
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As noted earlier, Lucas’s postconviction motion claimed that counsel was 
ineffective in failing to consult or hire an expert witness in the area of eye 
injuries—an ophthalmologist—to rebut the State’s claim of “permanent damage” 
as an element of aggravated battery.  Lucas based this claim in part on the victim’s 
testimony that she needed surgery but could not afford it, and on the testimony of 
the State’s expert, Dr. John Clark, an oral maxillofacial surgeon, who attested to 
the victim’s eye socket fractures.  According to the motion, Dr. Clark concluded 
that the victim did not need eye surgery because the eye was functioning and 
moving, but noted that an ophthalmologist would be better suited to examine the 
victim.  The motion set forth evidence showing that Dr. Clark also reviewed the 
report of an attending ophthalmologist who examined the victim, which indicated 
the victim would “be okay,” but recommended a specialist if she encountered 
difficulties.  According to the motion, the ophthalmologist also stated in his report 
that if the victim suffered further blurred vision he would refer her to another 
doctor to treat with medication.  Lucas argued that this report sufficiently apprised 
counsel that a consultation was in order as nothing conclusively established the 
element of permanent injury.  Moreover, the motion alleged that the prosecutor 
presented Dr. Clark’s testimony in support of the argument that there was 
“permanent injury” or “disfigurement.”  Based on these alleged facts, Lucas 
contended that counsel had a duty to present an expert ophthalmologist to rebut 
 
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any presumption of a permanent injury that could not be repaired through surgery 
or medication.  Lucas claimed that if the jury heard expert testimony that the injury 
could be corrected, and thus was not permanent, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different.   
These allegations of fact demonstrate the specificity required to show why 
an ophthalmology expert was said to be necessary based on the elements of the 
aggravated battery charge, the expert testimony presented by the State, and the 
portions of the record that supported a claim that an ophthalmology expert could 
have shown that the eye injuries were not permanent or disfiguring.  We are hard 
pressed to find that a motion could be any more specific in alleging facts 
supporting why an expert should have been called, what the expert could have 
testified to, and the prejudice resulting from the failure to present such a witness.   
Fact witnesses and expert witnesses are distinguishable.  An expert witness 
is used “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.”  See 
§ 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2015).  However, a fact witness is used if that witness has 
personal knowledge of the facts of a case.  See § 90.604, Fla. Stat. (2015).  If a 
defendant alleges in a rule 3.850 motion that a fact witness should have been called 
by counsel because he or she could have testified as to certain personal knowledge 
of a matter, it logically follows that the defendant can and must identify that fact 
 
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witness and allege that the witness would have been available to testify at trial.  
However, the same conclusion is not applicable to an expert witness.  If a 
defendant alleges that an expert witness should have been called by counsel 
because he or she could have testified about certain scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge, that testimony could be provided by any number of expert 
witnesses in that field.  Accordingly, we cannot hold that a defendant is always 
required to name a specific expert witness and show that the specific expert 
witness would have been available to testify at trial in order to render a rule 3.850 
motion legally sufficient.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we approve the decision of the Fourth District in 
this case and hold that a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850 alleging that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to consult or present an expert in a named field 
of expertise need not, in every case, name a specific expert and attest that the 
specific expert would have been available to testify at trial.   
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
 
 
 
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CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
Although I originally voted to grant jurisdiction in this case, I have now 
concluded that there is no conflict between the case on review and our decision in 
Nelson.  Accordingly, I would discharge this case. 
The holding in Nelson was that “a facially sufficient postconviction motion 
alleging the ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to call certain witnesses must 
include an assertion that those witnesses would in fact have been available to 
testify at trial.”  875 So. 2d at 584.  But the decision of the Fourth District in Lucas 
contains no holding on that issue.  Regarding the disputed claim, the only error 
identified in Lucas is the trial court’s failure “to follow” the Fourth District’s 
“binding precedent” that there is no requirement for a “ ‘defendant to provide the 
name of a particular expert where the defendant claims that trial counsel failed to 
secure an expert in a named field of expertise.’ ”  147 So. 3d at 612 (quoting 
Terrell v. State, 9 So. 3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).  Although the Fourth 
District’s opinion mentions the trial court’s determination that the motion was 
facially insufficient because it did not “allege that the witness was available to 
testify at trial,” id. (citing Nelson, 875 So. 2d at 583), it contains no discussion of 
that determination.  Thus, there is not a sufficient basis to determine that conflict 
exists between Lucas and Nelson. 
 
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If the majority believes that Lucas contains a holding relating to the failure 
to allege availability to testify at trial that is in conflict with Nelson’s holding on 
that issue, the majority should either quash Lucas or expressly recede from 
Nelson’s holding to the extent that it applies to expert witnesses.  It is illogical for 
the Court to exercise conflict jurisdiction based on a conflict with one of our prior 
decisions, then approve the decision on review but fail to recede at least in part 
from our prior decision.  If there is conflict between the holdings of two decisions, 
there must be an error in one of the two decisions.  The Court should identify 
which decision contains the error. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D14-172 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Consiglia Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, Monique Rolla, Assistant Attorney General, and Luke Robert 
Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Michael March Brownlee of Fisher Rushmer, P.A., Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent