Title: American National Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86215-Agenda 14-November 1999.
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Special Adm'r for the Estate of Renee Kazmierowski, Deceased,
								 Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiff, American National Bank and Trust Company,
as special administrator of the estate of Renee Kazmierowski,
brought the present action in the circuit court of Cook County
against the defendants, the City of Chicago and two of its
paramedics, John Glennon and Kevin T. O'Malley. Raising
several theories of liability, the plaintiff sought recovery for the
defendants' alleged failure to respond properly to an emergency
call by the decedent for medical assistance. The circuit court
granted the defendants' motion for dismissal of the complaint. The
appellate court affirmed that judgment in an unpublished order.
No. 1-97-1212 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). We allowed the plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
	The following factual summary is derived from the allegations
in the plaintiff's amended complaint and from the information
contained in its accompanying exhibits, which include a transcript
of the decedent's emergency call and the paramedics' report. At
around 7:55 a.m. on April 24, 1995, the decedent, Renee
Kazmierowski, suffered an asthma attack while at home at her
apartment in Chicago. She called 911 to request help. She
provided her address and telephone number and said that she lived
on the third floor of the building. The 911 operator replied that
paramedics were on the way; the operator did not attempt to keep
the decedent on the telephone while the paramedics were
responding to the call.
	Two paramedics, John Glennon and Kevin T. O'Malley, were
directed to respond to what they were told was a "heart attack"
victim. They were allowed into the decedent's apartment building
by a neighbor in the building and went to the third floor. They
asked the neighbor whether he had summoned help, and the
neighbor replied that he had not. The paramedics then knocked on
the door of the only other apartment located on the third floor, but
they received no response. The neighbor escorted a firefighter,
who had also responded to the call, through his apartment to the
back of the building. The firefighter knocked on the back door, but
he received no response and was not able to see into the apartment.
While the firefighter was checking the back of the building, the
paramedics called the dispatcher, who confirmed that they were at
the correct address. In response to the paramedics' questions, the
dispatcher also said that the caller had not provided her age, and
that an attempt to return the call had reached an answering
machine. The neighbor told the paramedics that the apartment was
occupied by a young couple, who did not appear to have any
medical problems. The paramedics concluded that they were not
needed at the address in question, and they left the scene. That
afternoon, the same paramedics returned to the apartment, again
in response to an emergency call. On this occasion, a man let the
paramedics into the apartment, and they found the decedent lying
dead on the floor.
	The plaintiff's amended complaint comprised a total of 11
counts. These alleged negligence and willful and wanton
misconduct, and sought recovery from the City and the two
paramedics under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act.
An additional count sought to impose liability on the City under a
federal civil rights provision. The complaint alleged that the 911
operator acted negligently, willfully, and wantonly in failing to
keep decedent on the phone while the paramedics responded. The
complaint further alleged that the front door of decedent's
apartment was unlocked when the paramedics responded to her
call, and that the paramedics acted negligently, willfully, and
wantonly in failing to try the unlocked door and enter the
apartment.
	The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint
under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 1994)). The defendants argued that they were
immune from liability for the decedent's death under the
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS Act) (210
ILCS 50/1 through 33 (West 1994)). The defendants further
contended that the plaintiff had failed to adequately allege that
they owed the decedent a special duty of care or engaged in willful
and wanton misconduct. The circuit court granted the defendants'
motion, ruling that the defendants were immune from liability
under the EMS Act and that the plaintiff had failed to adequately
allege a special duty or willful and wanton misconduct.
	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment in an
unpublished order. No. 1-97-1212 (1998) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court rejected the
defendants' contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that
section 5-101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS
10/5-101 (West 1994)) granted immunity to the defendants. The
appellate court concluded, however, that section 17 of the EMS
Act (210 ILCS 50/17 (West 1994)) immunized the defendants
from liability for the decedent's death. The appellate court also
held that the plaintiff had failed to adequately allege that the
defendants owed the decedent a special duty or that their conduct
was willful and wanton. We allowed the plaintiff's petition for
leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We later granted leave to the
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and to the Illinois
Governmental Association of Pools and the Illinois Municipal
League to submit briefs as amici curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. For the
reasons that follow, we now affirm in part and reverse in part the
judgment of the appellate court, and we remand the cause to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	Before this court, the plaintiff does not challenge the
dismissal of counts I, II, and XI of the amended complaint; counts
I and II charged the City with negligence, and count XI alleged a
violation of the decedent's civil rights. Among the counts that
remain, counts III and IV allege willful and wanton misconduct by
the City for its failure to implement and enforce proper training for
paramedics and for its failure to train and supervise the
paramedics; count V seeks to recover from the City for its
vicarious liability for the willful and wanton misconduct of the
two paramedics in this case. Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX are
directed against paramedics Glennon and O'Malley; these counts
allege negligence by the paramedics and seek recovery under the
Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act. The final count
remaining for our consideration is count X, which alleges willful
and wanton misconduct by the two paramedics.
	A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-615 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)) attacks
the legal sufficiency of a complaint. In ruling on a section 2-615
motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
the complaint. The court is to interpret the allegations of the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. A cause of
action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly
appears that no set of facts can be proved under the pleadings that
will entitle the plaintiff to recover. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 90 (1988).
	The plaintiff initially argues that the defendants' section
2-615 motion to dismiss should not have been considered by the
trial court because portions of the motion instead should have been
included in a motion brought under section 2-619 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994)), which permits
the dismissal of an action because of certain affirmative defects or
defenses. We believe that the plaintiff has waived this objection,
however, for the plaintiff failed to raise it in the circuit court. See
Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). We
now turn to the merits of the present appeal.
	In support of the appellate court's and circuit court's rulings,
the defendants contend that the present action is barred by the
immunity provision found in section 5-101 of the Tort Immunity
Act (745 ILCS 10/5-101 (West 1994)). The defendants did not
raise this contention in the circuit court, but they argued the point
before the appellate court in support of the circuit judge's
favorable ruling. The appellate court disagreed with the
defendants, who renew the contention before this court, arguing
that section 5-101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to this case
and grants them immunity in these circumstances. Section 5-101
provides:
			"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is
liable for failure to establish a fire department or
otherwise to provide fire protection, rescue or other
emergency service.
			As used in this Article, 'rescue services' includes, but
is not limited to, the operation of an ambulance as defined
in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act."
745 ILCS 10/5-101 (West 1994).
	The appellate court ruled that section 5-101 provides
immunity "only where a public entity chooses not to provide any
fire protection, rescue or emergency services at all, and not where
a public entity offers these services in general but fails to provide
them in a particular case." The defendants challenge the appellate
court's interpretation, arguing that the statute immunizes a local
public entity that establishes a rescue service but fails to
competently use that service when summoned by a particular
plaintiff. We do not agree.
	We believe that section 5-101 immunizes only a local public
entity that has not established a fire department or rescue service,
or has not instituted a system for otherwise providing fire or rescue
services. This result is clear from a reading of section 5-102,
which immediately follows section 5-101. Section 5-102
immunizes "a local public entity that has undertaken to provide
fire protection service" from liability for injuries "resulting from
the failure to suppress or contain a fire." 745 ILCS 10/5-102
(West 1994). Because section 5-102 applies to municipalities that
have "undertaken to provide" fire protection service, it was clearly
meant to contrast with section 5-101, which governs
municipalities that have not undertaken to provide such service.
Further support for this interpretation comes from section 5-101
itself, which defines "rescue services" as including the "operation
of an ambulance." 745 ILCS 10/5-101 (West 1994). Under section
5-101, public entities that have not provided for the "operation of
an ambulance" are thus immune from liability for that omission,
while public entities that do provide for the "operation of an
ambulance" are not covered by the statute-they are covered by the
provisions of the EMS Act instead. Because the complaint in the
instant case alleged that the City of Chicago has established a
system for providing emergency rescue services, section 5-101
does not apply in these circumstances.
	We next consider the provisions of the EMS Act and the
immunity afforded by it. As an initial matter, the plaintiff argues
that the provision is not applicable at all to this case. At the time
of the decedent's death, in April 1995, section 17(a) of the EMS
Act provided as follows:
			"Any person, agency or governmental body licensed or
authorized pursuant to this Act or its rules, who in good
faith provides life support services during a Department
approved training course, in the normal course of
conducting their duties, or in an emergency shall not be
civilly or criminally liable as a result of their acts or
omissions in providing those services unless the acts or
omissions, including the bypassing of nearby hospitals or
medical facilities for the purpose of transporting a trauma
patient to a designated trauma center in accordance with
the protocols developed pursuant to section 27 of this Act,
are inconsistent with the persons's training or constitute
willful or wanton misconduct." 210 ILCS 50/17(a) (West
1994).
Section 17(b) of the EMS Act similarly provided immunity for
acts or omissions "in connection with administration, sponsorship,
authorization, support, finance, or supervision of emergency
medical services personnel, where the act or omission occurs in
connection with their training or with services rendered outside a
hospital unless the act or omission was the result of gross
negligence or willful misconduct." 210 ILCS 50/17(b) (West
1994). We note that both provisions have been amended since the
decedent's death. The legislature has now omitted, from section
17(a), the reference to acts or omissions "inconsistent with the
person's training," and has reformulated, in section 17(b), the
standard of non-immunized conduct to be that involving "willful
and wanton misconduct." See 210 ILCS 50/3.150(a), (b) (West
1996). The parties agree that the operative provisions in this case
are the ones that were in force at the time of the decedent's death.
	The plaintiff contends that section 17(a) applies only when
paramedics have actually rendered life support treatment to a
patient; the plaintiff maintains that the failure of the responding
paramedics in this case to administer any treatment at all to the
decedent means that the provision has no application here. In
support of this interpretation, the plaintiff cites the provisions
appearing in sections 4.02, 4.06, and 4.20 of the EMS Act, which
respectively define the terms "Advanced Life Support-Mobile
Intensive Care Services," "Basic Life Support Services," and
"Intermediate Life Support Services." 210 ILCS 50/4.02, 4.06,
4.20 (West 1994). The plaintiff notes that each of these levels of
life support treatment involves the performance of acts or
procedures directly involving patient care. The plaintiff thus
construes these definitions as signifying that the reference to life
support services in the immunity provision of section 17(a) must
refer to the actual rendition of medical treatment, and not to the
conduct at issue in this case, in which no treatment was ever
administered.
	We do not believe that the scope of section 17(a) is as narrow
as the plaintiff believes it to be. We conclude that the provision
applies to this case, even though the acts and omissions alleged
here do not relate to the actual rendition of life support treatment.
Although the EMS Act does not define the general term "life
support services," we do not believe that we are limited, in
interpreting section 17(a), by the specialized meanings assigned to
the terms "advanced life support-mobile intensive care services,"
"basic life support services," and "intermediate life support
services." Those definitions are designed to distinguish one level
or form of care from another, and the legislature could reasonably
have decided to omit from the definitions conduct that is common
to them all or, though preparatory to the actual rendering of
medical care, is no less an integral part of providing life support
services. Moreover, section 17(a) also refers to the transportation
of patients. If transporting a patient to a hospital is an aspect of life
support services, then so too should locating a patient in the first
place. Other provisions in the EMS Act also demonstrate that the
immunity provisions of section 17 apply in these circumstances.
Elsewhere, the Act regulates matters such as communications,
response time, and standards for ambulance operation. 210 ILCS
50/7, 7.1, 9 (West 1994). These additional measures are evidence
of the Act's broad scope, and of the equally broad meaning we
believe must be given to the term "life support services" in the
immunity provisions.
	The parties also dispute the scope of the immunity provided
by section 17(a) of the EMS Act. That provision, by its terms,
affords immunity to two distinct types of activity: conduct that is
"inconsistent with the person's training" as a paramedic, and
conduct that is willful and wanton. The parties do not agree on the
reach of the former category, involving conduct that is
"inconsistent with the person's training." The plaintiff insists that
the provision does not afford immunity for conduct that is contrary
to or violates training received by a paramedic. The defendants, in
contrast, construe this exception more narrowly, contending that
it withholds immunity merely for conduct that is beyond the level
of a paramedic's training; the defendants maintain that the
provision otherwise provides complete immunity for negligence.
	We agree with the defendants' interpretation. We believe that
this portion of section 17(a) means that conduct that is beyond the
level of a paramedic's training is not immunized, while conduct
that merely deviates from a paramedic's training and constitutes
negligence is subject to immunity. The appellate court has adopted
this interpretation in a series of cases. Bowden v. Cary Fire
Protection District, 304 Ill. App. 3d 274, 280 (1999); Brock v.
Anderson Road Ass'n, 287 Ill. App. 3d 16, 23-24 (1997); Gleason
v. Village of Peoria Heights, 207 Ill. App. 3d 185, 188-89 (1990).
We believe that that construction of the statutory language better
effectuates the legislative intent. Under the plaintiff's broad
reading, which would withhold immunity for conduct that violates
a person's training, the exception would threaten to supplant the
immunity rule, for virtually any negligent act could be said to be
inconsistent with or in violation of a person's training. The
plaintiff has not alleged that the actions of the paramedics were
beyond their level of training, and therefore we conclude that
section 17(a) operates to immunize them for their conduct, unless
it rises to the level of willful and wanton misconduct.
	We next consider whether the plaintiff's amended complaint
sufficiently alleges willful and wanton misconduct. The circuit
court believed that the allegations were merely conclusory, and the
appellate court agreed. The defendants argue that the lower courts'
determinations were correct.
	It is the plaintiff's duty to sufficiently allege conduct that falls
within the scope of a recognized cause of action. Moreover, mere
conclusory allegations are not sufficient. We believe, however,
that the allegations contained in the plaintiff's amended complaint
are sufficient to withstand the defendants' motion to dismiss.
	This court has previously defined "willful and wanton
misconduct" in the following terms:
			" 'A wilful or wanton injury must have been intentional
or the act must have been committed under circumstances
exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others,
such as a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to
exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure to discover
the danger through recklessness or carelessness when it
could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary
care.' "  Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 273
(1994), quoting Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines,
Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 583 (1946).
	We believe that the allegations in the plaintiff's amended
complaint are sufficient, creating a question for the trier of fact to
determine whether the defendants' conduct was willful and
wanton. According to the complaint, the decedent, Renee
Kazmierowski, called 911 on the morning of April 24, 1995, and
requested help, explaining that she was having an asthma attack.
She provided her address and telephone number and said what
floor she lived on. She also told the dispatcher, "I think I'm going
to die. Hurry." The dispatcher did not attempt to keep Renee on
the line, however, as required by applicable standards.
	Moreover, according to the allegations in the plaintiff's
amended complaint, paramedics routinely receive instruction on
how to respond to calls and, in particular, on how to locate persons
in need of emergency medical treatment. The plaintiff alleges that
training given to paramedics in Chicago, like training given to
paramedics everywhere else, includes the following:
			"[I]nstruction, training and enforcement of the standard
'Try Before You Pry' which dictates that firefighters,
paramedics and other rescue personnel should always
attempt to open a shut door by turning the door knob
before engaging in destructive methods to gain access, or
before exiting the scene altogether, without gaining access
in order to ensure delivery of emergency health care
services to the critically ill caller."
	In the present case, the victim's door was unlocked. If the
paramedics had been following these vital and basic precepts of
their training, as alleged, they would have found the victim inside
the residence, and perhaps then they could have saved her life.
Locating a person in need of emergency medical treatment is the
first step in providing life support services. Not even that first step
was taken here. We believe that the portions of the amended
complaint that allege willful and wanton misconduct by the
defendants are sufficient to withstand the defendants' motion to
dismiss, and we therefore remand the action to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to
the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
	On April 24, 1995, Renee Kazmierowski (decedent) suffered
an asthma attack at her apartment in Chicago. Decedent called 911
and stated: "I need help. I'm having an asthma attack. I think I'm
going to die. Please hurry." The 911 operator told decedent that
paramedics were on the way, but failed to keep decedent on the
phone while the paramedics were responding. When the defendant
paramedics arrived at the reporting apartment, they knocked loudly
but received no response. A next-door neighbor escorted one of
the responding officers through his apartment to check the back
door of the reporting apartment, but the officer received no
response there either. The neighbor told the paramedics that in the
apartment lived a young couple who appeared to have no medical
problems. The paramedics called the dispatcher, who confirmed
that they were at the correct address. Concluding that there was no
indication that they were needed at the address, the paramedics
reported back in service. Later that day, the defendant paramedics
were again called to the same apartment. This time, a man let them
into the apartment and showed them on the floor the dead body of
his girlfriend, who had died of an asthma attack.
	The majority holds that the complaint filed by the
administrator of decedent's estate adequately alleged willful and
wanton misconduct under section 17(a) of the Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS Act) (210 ILCS 50/17(a)
(West 1994)). Contrary to the majority's holding, this statutory
section does not even apply to this case.
	Section 17(a) states that a person who "provides life support
services" shall not be liable for the results of their acts or
omissions unless those acts or omissions are "inconsistent with the
person's training or constitute willful or wanton misconduct." 210
ILCS 50/17(a) (West 1994). The majority errs in holding that the
defendants in this case provided life support services within the
meaning of the statute. The statute defines life support services as
"emergency medical care," and lists as examples of such services
"airway management, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, control of
shock and bleeding and splinting of fractures." 210 ILCS 50/4.02,
4.06, 4.20 (West 1994). According to the allegations of the
complaint, the defendant paramedics provided no life support
services to the decedent. Although the 911 dispatcher promised to
provide such services, the services were never provided because
the paramedics did not locate the decedent. The majority seems to
believe that because the statute applies to the transportation of
patients, it necessarily applies to the locating of patients as well.
There is absolutely nothing in the statute to support such a reading.
Defendants never even began to provide life support services,
because they did not even see the patient. Because the statute
immunizes only "acts or omissions in providing [life support]
services," the statute does not apply to any acts or omissions of the
instant defendants, whether willful and wanton or otherwise. 210
ILCS 50/17(a) (West 1994).
	The City argues, however, that even if this immunity statute
does not apply, it is still immune from liability in the instant case
under the common law "public duty" rule. The public duty rule
prevents units of local government from being held liable for their
failure to provide adequate governmental services such as police
and fire protection. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.
Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1998); Leone v. City of
Chicago, 156 Ill. 2d 33, 37 (1993); Burdinie v. Village of Glendale
Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 509 (1990). The rationale for the rule is
that the duty of government to provide such protective services is
owed to the public at large and therefore takes precedence over
any duty owed to a particular plaintiff. Zimmerman v. Village of
Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 44 (1998); Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 345. The
public duty rule exists independently of any statutory immunities
and notwithstanding the abolition in Illinois of common law
sovereign immunity. Zimmerman, 183 Ill. 2d at 45-46; Harinek,
181 Ill. 2d  at 345, 347; Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 363
(1968). Under the public duty rule, then, the City is presumptively
immune from liability for its failure to promptly locate and treat
the decedent.
	This court has recognized, however, an exception to the
public duty rule known as the "special duty" doctrine. Under this
doctrine, a municipality may be held liable for its failure to
provide adequate governmental services if the legislature has not
granted immunity to the municipality. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 347.
To invoke the special duty doctrine, a plaintiff must prove the
following elements:
			(1) that the municipality was uniquely aware of the
particular danger or risk to which the plaintiff was
exposed;
			(2) that the municipality engaged in specific acts or
omissions that were affirmative or willful in nature; and
			(3) that the injury occurred while the plaintiff was under
the direct and immediate control of municipal employees
or agents.
See Leone, 156 Ill. 2d  at 37; Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d  at 508. For
example, in Leone v. City of Chicago, 156 Ill. 2d 33 (1993), this
court found a special duty where a police officer directed the
plaintiff to stand between her car and his police car, which was
then struck from behind, injuring her.
	Assuming arguendo that the complaint in the instant case
satisfies the first of the requirements for a special duty, I would
hold that it fails to satisfy the remaining elements. The complaint
fails to establish that the City or its employees engaged in
affirmative or willful acts or omissions in connection with
decedent's death. The complaint simply alleges that the 911
dispatcher failed to keep decedent on the phone while the
paramedics were responding and that the paramedics failed to try
the doorknob in order to enter decedent's apartment. At most,
these allegations show that the city employees neglected to
perform certain tasks. There is no indication of a conscious
decision by the employees not to perform the tasks. Rather, the
employees attempted to locate decedent but neglected to try the
doorknob to gain entry to her dwelling. This conduct was neither
affirmative nor willful.
	Furthermore, the complaint fails to adequately allege that
decedent was under the direct and immediate control of the City.
Although decedent called 911 for assistance, the paramedics had
not located her and were not physically in her presence at the time
of her death. In Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994), this
court refused to find a special duty where police officers failed to
enter an apartment to prevent a violent crime that was occurring.
Doe, 161 Ill. 2d  at 387. We held that because the officers had not
initiated the circumstances that brought harm to the victims, the
victims were not under the officers' direct and immediate control.
Doe, 161 Ill. 2d  at 387. Similarly, in the instant case the City had
no part in initiating the harm that befell decedent. Although the
complaint may establish that the City employees performed their
duties incompetently, it fails to establish that they owed decedent
a special duty. The public duty rule therefore immunizes the City
from liability for her death.
	For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICES BILANDIC and RATHJE join in this dissent.