Title: Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Board of Education of Prince George’s County, et al. v. Stephanie Lynn Marks-Sloan
No. 117, September Term 2011, Opinion by Greene, J.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
ARTICLE § 5-518
To interpret a statutory provision, we first look to the plain meaning of the language.  If the
language is ambiguous, we review the legislative history of the statute for guidance with
respect to the Legislature’s intent.  We also read the statute as a whole so as to avoid an
interpretation that is illogical or inconsistent.  On its face, Md. Code (1990, 2006 Repl. Vol.),
§ 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is ambiguous as to whether it affords
indemnification or immunity to county board of education employees.  The statutory scheme,
read as a whole, and the legislative history indicate that the General Assembly intended the
statute to operate as an indemnification provision.  In a tort suit against a negligent county
board of education employee, acting in the course of employment without malice or gross
negligence, the county board of education shall be joined as a party.  Any judgment entered
against the negligent county board employee shall be satisfied by the county board and may
not be collected from the employee.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT
EXCLUSIVITY RULE
The Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity rule, contained in Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl.
Vol.), § 9-509 of the Labor and Employment Article, provides that, with certain limited
exceptions, the exclusive remedy against an employer by an employee who has sustained an
accidental personal injury during the course of employment is recovery under the Workers’
Compensation Act.  The purpose of this provision is to ensure swift compensation for injured
employees, regardless of fault, and to prevent double recovery from an employer.  In
Maryland, injured employees may file a tort claim against a negligent co-employee to recover
damages for the injury sustained, pursuant to Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9-902 of
the Labor and Employment Article.  If an employee recovers damages from the tortfeasor
who caused the injury, the employer has a right of subrogation and is entitled to
reimbursement for the amount of workers’ compensation paid or awarded to the injured
employee as of the date of the tort judgment.  The statutory requirement, in Md. Code (1990,
2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, that a county board
of education indemnify its negligent employees acting in the course of employment does not
violate the exclusivity rule.  An employer who has indemnified a negligent employee and is,
thus, required to pay both workers’ compensation benefits and tort damages to an employee
injured during the course of employment by the negligent employee is entitled to offset the
amount paid or awarded under workers’ compensation from the amount of the tort judgment.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2011
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY, ET AL.
v.
STEPHANIE LYNN MARKS-SLOAN
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins 
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Filed:   August 21, 2012
 
1 Although the trial court’s Amended Order, issued on June 4, 2010, included a
stipulation by the parties that Mr. Iglehart was dismissed from the action, the judgment of the
Circuit Court as entered on the record is against both Mr. Iglehart and the Board.
In the instant case, Stephanie Marks-Sloan (Respondent) was injured in an automobile
collision involving Norman Iglehart on September 26, 2007, while both were acting within
the scope of their employment with the Board of Education of Prince George’s County (the
Board).  In the discussion that follows, we will refer to Mr. Iglehart and the Board,
collectively, as Petitioners.1  Respondent thereafter applied for workers’ compensation
benefits.  The Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded her compensation for medical
expenses, temporary total disability, and attorney’s fees after determining that Respondent
had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment.  The
Board, as a self-insured employer, began making the required payments to Respondent.
Subsequently, Respondent filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, naming Mr. Iglehart, the Board, and Prince George’s County (the County) as
defendants.  In her Complaint, Respondent sought damages for her injuries as a result of Mr.
Iglehart’s alleged ordinary negligence and the respondeat superior liability of the Board and
the County.  The parties ultimately stipulated to the dismissal of the County as a party to the
case.  Petitioners, as the remaining defendants in the tort suit, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.  In their Motion,
Petitioners contended that, pursuant to Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9-509 of the
Labor and Employment Article (LE), Respondent’s exclusive remedy against the Board, her
employer, was through the Workers’ Compensation Act.  According to Petitioners, because
2 Pursuant to Md. Code (1990, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-518(c) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, the parties agree that Board of Education has sovereign immunity for
damages in excess of $100,000.  
2
Respondent had received an award from the Workers’ Compensation Commission, she was
prohibited from pursuing a tort suit against the Board.  In addition, Petitioners claimed in
their Motion that Md. Code (1990, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article (CJ) provided immunity for Mr. Iglehart as a county board of education
employee acting within the scope of his employment and without malice or gross negligence;
thus, Petitioners asserted that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.  
After consideration of Petitioners’ Motion, and Respondent’s opposition thereto, the
trial judge denied the Motion with regard to Mr. Iglehart but granted the Motion with regard
to the Board.  The judge concluded that the Board was dismissed; however, he directed that
it “remain a party in this case for the purposes of any potential indemnification [of Mr.
Iglehart] required under Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518(h)
(2006).”  Following a series of motions and responses filed by the parties, the trial judge
issued an Order entering judgment on behalf of Respondent in the amount of $100,000
against the Board.2  The judge’s Order also indicated that the parties agreed that Petitioners
had not waived their rights to pursue post-judgment relief or to file a timely appeal.  In an
attempt to further clarify the respective positions of the parties in the suit, the judge later
issued an Amended Order, which ordered that judgment be entered against Mr. Iglehart and
3
the Board and added the stipulation that Mr. Iglehart was dismissed from the action.
The trial judge denied Petitioners’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.  Petitioners
then noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan, 202
Md. App. 59, 30 A.3d 1026 (2011).  The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court, concluding that, similar to the Local Government Tort Claims Act, CJ § 5-
518 contains an indemnification provision, rather than an immunity provision, that allows
a tort suit to be brought against Mr. Iglehart and requires that the Board be joined as a party.
Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 69-70, 30 A.3d at 1031-32.  The Court of Special Appeals
interpreted CJ § 5-518 as requiring the Board to indemnify Mr. Iglehart by paying any
damages entered against him in the negligence suit.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 70, 30
A.3d at 1032.  In addition, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Legislature’s
decision to require the Board to indemnify Mr. Iglehart does not violate the exclusivity rule
in the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 67-68, 30 A.3d at 1031.
We granted Petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari, Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan,
424 Md. 628, 37 A.3d 317 (2012), to address the following issues:
1. Can an employee of a county board of education who receives
workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the
course and scope of her employment circumvent the exclusivity
rule and sue her co-worker in a negligence action?
2. Does CJ § 5-518 grant employees of county boards of
education immunity from suit and judgment absent malice and
gross negligence?
3. Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly rely upon the
Maryland Tort Claims Act and the Local Government Tort
3 We note that LE § 9-902 allows for a suit in tort to be brought against a third party
tortfeasor by the injured employee, the employer, the employer’s insurer, the Subsequent
Injury Fund, or the Uninsured Employers’ Fund.  Because the Board of Education of Prince
(continued...)
4
Claims Act to determine that an employee of a county board of
education may be sued in his individual capacity in a negligence
action?
We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that CJ § 5-
518 contains an indemnification provision that allows an injured party to bring a tort suit
against the county board of education employee who caused the injury.  In accordance with
the statute, the injured party must join the employer county board of education as a defendant
in the action.  Any damages awarded may be executed and levied against the county board
of education only and may not be collected from the negligent employee.  Furthermore, we
hold that, as it pertains to the case sub judice, this statutory scheme does not violate the
exclusivity rule in LE § 9-509, which states that an injured employee’s sole remedy against
his or her employer for an accidental personal injury sustained during the course of
employment is through the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The purpose of the exclusivity rule
is to ensure swift compensation to the injured employee and to prevent a double recovery,
through a workers’ compensation award and a tort judgment, from an employer by an injured
employee.  
The Workers’ Compensation Act, Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9-902 of the
Labor and Employment Article, provides that in a suit against a third party tortfeasor,
brought by an employer or injured employee,3 the employer is entitled to reimbursement in
3(...continued)
George’s County is a self-insured employer, we limit our discussion to the rights and
responsibilities of employees and self-insured employers.
5
the amount of any workers’ compensation paid or awarded to the injured employee.  Thus,
in a situation where, as here, an injured county board of education employee brings a suit in
tort against a negligent co-employee, and the county board of education is joined for
purposes of indemnification, the county board may set off the amount of workers’
compensation paid or awarded to the injured employee from the amount of damages awarded
in the tort action.  Such a procedure satisfies the letter and spirit of the statutory provisions
at issue by protecting the county board of education from the unfairness of double recovery,
while allowing the injured employee to obtain his or her entitlement to compensation for
workplace injuries.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the instant case are relatively simple and undisputed by the parties.  On
September 26, 2007, Respondent, while acting in the course and scope of her employment
with the Board, was driving a motorcycle on the access road from a school bus lot in Prince
George’s County.  At the same time, Mr. Iglehart, also acting in the course and scope of his
employment with the Board, was operating a school bus and traveling in the opposite
direction on the access road.  Due to Mr. Iglehart’s negligent operation of the bus,
Respondent was forced off the road and suffered injuries.
Respondent filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission for injuries
6
she sustained as a result of the incident.  The Commission determined that Respondent had
sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with the
Board.  On February 25, 2008, the Commission awarded Respondent compensation for
medical expenses, temporary total disability, and attorney’s fees.  At the time of the incident,
the Board was a self-insured employer, and it began paying compensation to Respondent in
accordance with the Commission’s award.
On October 31, 2009, Respondent filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, naming Mr. Iglehart, the Board, and Prince George’s County as
defendants.  In her Complaint, Respondent sought damages based on Mr. Iglehart’s
negligence and the respondeat superior liability of the Board and the County.  Ultimately, the
parties stipulated to the dismissal of the County as a party to the suit.  Petitioners, the
remaining defendants, filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment.  With regard to the claims against Mr. Iglehart, Petitioners
asserted that CJ § 5-518(e) provided immunity for Mr. Iglehart as a county board of
education employee acting within the scope of his employment, without malice or gross
negligence.  Thus, Petitioners claimed that suit could not be brought against Mr. Iglehart
under the circumstances alleged by Respondent.  With regard to the claims against the Board,
Petitioners contended that LE § 9-509 prohibited Respondent from pursuing relief from the
Board, her employer, after she sought and received an award from the Commission under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.  Therefore, according to Petitioners, they were entitled to have
the Complaint dismissed or, in the alternative, to have a judgment entered in their favor as
7
a matter of law.  In her opposition to Petitioners’ Motion, Respondent argued that Maryland
law allowed her to pursue a tort claim against Mr. Iglehart, her co-employee.  In addition,
Respondent asserted that the Board’s statutory requirement to indemnify its employee in a
tort suit does not preclude a negligence action against the employee who caused the injury
and does not violate the principles of the exclusivity rule for workers’ compensation benefits.
After considering Petitioners’ Motion and Respondent’s opposition thereto, the trial
judge denied the Motion as to Mr. Iglehart and granted the Motion as to the Board.  The trial
judge dismissed the Board but required that it remain a party in the case for “purposes of any
potential indemnification[.]”  Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Leave to Refile Motion
for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon the same
arguments it had previously submitted, and the trial judge denied both motions.  Petitioners
then filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment.  In their Motion, Petitioners stipulated that
Respondent and Mr. Iglehart were employees acting within the scope of their employment
with the Board at the time of the motor vehicle collision.  Petitioners requested that the trial
court issue an order dismissing the suit with prejudice and declaring that county boards of
education cannot be held liable for the tortious conduct of their employees in a situation
where the injured plaintiff co-employee has already received workers’ compensation benefits
from the county board of education as a result of the same incident.  Petitioners also
contemporaneously filed a Motion to Stay Trial.  The trial judge issued an Order denying
Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Trial and ruling that Petitioners’ Motion for Declaratory
Judgment could be resolved after the trial, if necessary.
8
The trial judge issued an Order on April 23, 2010, entering judgment on behalf of
Respondent in the amount of $100,000 against the Board, pursuant to CJ § 5-518.  The Order
also indicated that the parties agreed that Petitioners would withdraw their Motion for
Declaratory Judgment, without prejudice, and that Petitioners had not waived their rights to
pursue post-judgment relief or to file a timely appeal.  On June 4, 2010, the trial judge issued
an Amended Order that entered judgment against Mr. Iglehart and the Board and also
included a stipulation by the parties to dismiss Mr. Iglehart as a party to the action.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, requesting that the judge enter
judgment against the Board only, which the trial judge denied.
Petitioners noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Bd. of Educ. v.
Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. 59, 30 A.3d 1026 (2011).  The intermediate appellate court
reviewed the questions posed by Petitioners as issues of statutory construction.  Marks-Sloan,
202 Md. App. at 61, 30 A.3d at 1027.  To interpret the provisions of CJ § 5-518, the Court
of Special Appeals turned to the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code (2009 Repl. Vol.), §
12-101, et seq. of the State Government Article (MTCA), and the Local Government Tort
Claims Act, Md. Code (1987, 2011 Supp.), § 5-301, et seq. of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article (LGTCA), for guidance.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 65, 30 A.3d at
1029.  Interpreting the MTCA as an immunity statute and the LGTCA as an indemnification
statute, the intermediate appellate court determined that the statutory scheme in CJ § 5-518
was analogous to the LGTCA.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 66-70, 30 A.3d at 1029-32.
According to the Court of Special Appeals, the LGTCA includes similar language to CJ §
9
5-518, providing that a judgment may be entered against an employee, but the employer
bears the responsibility for satisfying the judgment.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 66, 30
A.3d at 1029-30.  In contrast, under the MTCA, claims must be brought directly against the
State.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 67, 30 A.3d at 1030.  The court reasoned that, under
Maryland law, Respondent was entitled to bring a tort suit against her co-employee, Mr.
Iglehart, even though she was prohibited from bringing a similar suit against her employer,
the Board.  Id.  With regard to the statutory requirement that the Board indemnify its
employee in a negligence suit, the intermediate appellate court concluded that “the
exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy does not prevent a contractual obligation
to indemnify.  Similarly, we see no impediment to the legislature’s ability to provide for
indemnification.”  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at 67-68, 30 A.3d at 1031.  Thus, the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Marks-Sloan, 202 Md. App. at
70, 30 A.3d at 1032.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The facts leading to Respondent’s injury, as stated above, are undisputed by the
parties.  The parties agree that Mr. Iglehart and Respondent were both acting within the
scope of their employment with the Board at the time of the incident.  The parties also agree
that Mr. Iglehart was not acting with malice or gross negligence in causing Respondent’s
injuries.  It is not disputed that the Board has statutory immunity, pursuant to CJ § 5-518(c),
for damages in excess of $100,000.  In addition, neither party has asserted that Respondent
was entitled to bring suit against the Board directly, as the exclusivity rule prohibits an
10
injured employee from instituting a tort suit against an employer who has complied with the
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and has not acted to deliberately cause the
injury.  Therefore, the only issues before us involve questions of statutory interpretation.
The proper interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law, and, thus, we
review determinations by lower courts involving statutory construction non-deferentially.
Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); Collins v. State, 383 Md.
684, 688, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004).  With respect to statutory construction, we stated in Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676, 4 A.3d 946 (2010):
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.  A
court’s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to
discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or
the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under
scrutiny. 
To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we
begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the
statute.  If the language of the statute is unambiguous and
clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our
inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the
statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction.
We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not
evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute,
and we do not construe a statute with “forced or subtle
interpretations” that limit or extend its application.
We, however, do not read statutory language in a
vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a
statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.  Rather, the
plain language must be viewed within the context of the
statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose,
aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.  We
presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate
11
together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus,
we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the
extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.
Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words
are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but
become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory
scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for
legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the
legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the
legislative process.  In resolving ambiguities, a court considers
the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its
general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of
various competing constructions.
In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable
interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible
with common sense.
Marcas, 415 Md. at 685-86, 4 A.3d at 951-52 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257,
274-76, 987 A.2d 18, 28-29 (2010)).
Regarding the Workers’ Compensation Act specifically, we have recognized that the
Act is a remedial statute.  Montgomery Cnty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 61, 31 A.3d 191, 195
(2011); Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 724, 882 A.2d 817, 821 (2005).
This Court has held that the Act must be “‘construed as liberally in favor of injured
employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’”
Deibler, 423 Md. at 61, 31 A.3d at 195 (quoting Lagos, 388 Md. at 724, 882 A.2d at 821);
Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 21, 57, 825 A.2d 365, 387 (2003).  Importantly, we have also
noted that, in construing the provisions in the Act, we “may not stifle the plain meaning of
the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail.”  Breitenbach v. N.B.
12
Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 473, 784 A.2d 569, 573 (2001).
DISCUSSION
I. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518
Petitioners and Respondent disagree over the proper interpretation of Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518.  The statute, on its face, is ambiguous with regard to
whether it provides for indemnification or immunity for county board of education
employees.  Thus, we look to the legislative history of the statute to determine the
Legislature’s intent.  We also consider the statutory scheme as a whole so that our
interpretation of a particular provision, in isolation, is not irrational or illogical.
Additionally, similar to the analysis conducted by the Court of Special Appeals, we find it
helpful to compare CJ § 5-518 to the MTCA and the LGTCA.  Viewing the statute in this
manner, we conclude that CJ § 5-518 contains an indemnification provision that allows for
a negligence action to be brought against a county board of education employee and for a
judgment to be entered against that negligent employee; however, the statute expressly
provides the circumstances under which an employee may not be held personally liable for
damages.  The statute also requires the county board of education to be joined as a party in
the suit to satisfy any judgment entered against the employee.
Petitioners contend that CJ § 5-518 is an immunity statute that precludes any tort suit
against a county board of education employee acting within the course and scope of
employment, without malice or gross negligence.  According to Petitioners, the purpose of
CJ § 5-518 is “to limit liability for simple negligence solely against a county board of
13
education [employee] and the lower court erred in not dismissing Mr. Iglehart with
prejudice.”  Petitioners assert that if the Legislature had intended to provide indemnity for
county board of education employees, as opposed to immunity, there would be a clear
indication of such an intention in the statute; in Petitioners’ view, because there is no express
mention of “indemnification” in the statute, the Legislature clearly intended that county
board of education employees receive immunity for their negligent acts committed in the
course and scope of their employment.  Additionally, Petitioners claim that the language and
legislative history of Education Article § 4-106 support their position that CJ § 5-518(e),
offering protection for county board of education employees, is an immunity provision.
Petitioners also claim that the Court of Special Appeals improperly relied upon the MTCA
and the LGTCA in its interpretation of CJ § 5-518, stating that “[t]he appellate court’s focus
on statutory provisions that have no application to county boards of education to support its
conclusion was neither necessary nor appropriate.”
In contrast to Petitioners’ assertions, Respondent contends that CJ § 5-518 contains
an indemnification provision that requires a county board of education to be joined in an
action alleging negligence of its employee acting in the course and scope of employment.
According to Respondent, the reason for requiring a county board of education to be joined
is to secure indemnification of the employee against any damages awarded to the injured
party in the same action.  Respondent claims that an interpretation of CJ § 5-518 allowing
for complete immunity from liability for county board of education employees is contrary
to the plain language and meaning of the statute.  Respondent reads the statute to mean that
14
“although County Board employees can be held liable in tort for their negligent acts, the
County Board of Education is responsible for the payment of such awards.”  In other words,
“the County [Board of Education] shall be joined as [it is] the party who will be responsible
for the payment of any judgment levied against an employee who commits a tortious act
without malice and gross negligence.”
Several statutory provisions in the Education Article of the Maryland Code, discussing
protection for county boards of education and county board employees, direct us to Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-518.  Maryland Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 4-
105(d) of the Education Article provides, “[a] county board shall have the immunity from
liability described under § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”  Similarly,
Md. Code (1985, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 4-106(a) of the Education Article provides, “[a] county
board employee shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-518 of the Courts
Article.”
Md. Code (1990, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article provides:
(a) (1) In this section the following words have the meanings
indicated.
(2) “Compensation” does not include actual and
necessary expenses that are incurred by a volunteer in
connection with the services provided or duties
performed by the volunteer for a county board of
education, and that are reimbursed to the volunteer or
otherwise paid.
(3) “County board employee” means:
(i) Any employee whose compensation is paid in
whole or in part by a county board of education;
15
or
(ii) A student teacher.
(4) “County board member” means a duly elected or
appointed member of a county board of education.
(5) “Volunteer” means an individual who, at the request
of the county board and under its control and direction,
provides services or performs duties for the county board
without compensation.
(b) A county board of education, described under Title 4,
Subtitle 1 of the Education Article, may raise the defense of
sovereign immunity to any amount claimed above the limit of its
insurance policy or, if self-insured or a member of a pool
described under § 4-105(c)(1)(ii) of the Education Article, above
$100,000.
(c) A county board of education may not raise the defense of
sovereign immunity to any claim of $100,000 or less.
(d) (1) The county board shall be joined as a party to an action
against a county board employee, county board member,
or volunteer that alleges damages resulting from a
tortious act or omission committed by the employee in
the scope of employment, by the county board member
within the scope of the member’s authority, or by the
volunteer within the scope of the volunteer’s services or
duties.
(2) The issue of whether the county board employee
acted within the scope of employment may be litigated
separately.
(3) The issue of whether the county board member acted
within the scope of the member’s authority may be
litigated separately.
(4) The issue of whether the volunteer acted within the
scope of the volunteer’s services or duties may be
litigated separately.
(e) A county board employee acting within the scope of
employment, without malice and gross negligence, is not
personally liable for damages resulting from a tortious act or
omission for which a limitation of liability is provided for the
16
county board under subsection (b) of this section, including
damages that exceed the limitation on the county board’s
liability.
(f) (1) A county board member, acting within the scope of the
member’s authority, without malice and gross
negligence, is not personally liable for damages resulting
from a tortious act or omission for which a limitation of
liability is provided for the county board under
subsection (b) of this section, including damages that
exceed the limitation on the county board’s liability.
(2) In addition to the immunity provided under paragraph
(1) of this subsection, a county board member is immune
as an individual from civil liability for an act or omission
if the member is acting:
(i) Within the scope of the member’s authority;
(ii) Without malice; and
(iii) In a discretionary capacity.
(g) (1) The provisions of this subsection apply only to a
volunteer.
(2) A volunteer who acts within the scope of the
volunteer’s services or duties is not personally liable for
damages resulting from a tortious act or omission beyond
the limits of any personal insurance the volunteer may
have unless:
(i) The damages were the result of the volunteer’s
negligent operation of a motor vehicle; or
(ii) The damages were the result of the
volunteer’s willful, wanton, malicious, reckless,
or grossly negligent act or omission.
(3) The limitations on liability contained in this
subsection may not be construed or applied to affect any
immunities from civil liability or defenses established by
any other provision of the Code or available at common
law to which the volunteer may be entitled.
(h) Except as provided in subsection (e), (f), or (g) of this
section, a judgment in tort for damages against a county board
employee acting within the scope of employment, a county
board member acting within the scope of the member’s
17
authority, or a volunteer acting within the scope of the
volunteer’s services or duties shall be levied against the county
board only and may not be executed against the county board
employee, the county board member, or the volunteer
personally.
The statutory provision at issue, namely Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-
518, is ambiguous with regard to the protection given to county board of education
employees.  A plain reading of the statute does not clarify, for us, the issue of whether the
Legislature intended to afford immunity or indemnity to county board of education
employees.  Therefore, to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, we look to the legislative
history of this statutory scheme.  We also read the statute as a whole, and in conjunction with
the relevant provisions in the Education Article, so that our interpretation is not inconsistent
or illogical.
In 1978, Senate Bill 222 was signed into law, creating the Education Article (ED) of
the Maryland Code.  1978 Md. Laws, ch. 22.  When originally enacted, ED § 4-105,
governing the ability of County Boards of Education to raise the defense of sovereign
immunity, included substantially the same language as the current statute.  1978 Md. Laws,
ch. 22.  In 1985, House Bill 940 created ED § 4-105.1, which contained provisions regarding
protection for county board of education employees.  1985 Md. Laws, ch. 666.  House Bill
940 contained language in the purpose clause indicating the following: “requiring a county
board of education to be joined in any tort claim against a county board of education
employee; providing that certain issues may be tried separately in certain actions against a
county board employee; providing that a county board employee is not liable for damages
18
in certain situations; and generally relating to the tortious acts or omissions of employees of
county boards of education.”  1985 Md. Laws, ch. 666.  The language that appeared in
former ED § 4-105.1 is the functional equivalent of the portion of current CJ § 5-518
addressing protection for county board of education employees.  
A letter submitted by Prince George’s County Public Schools in support of House Bill
940 stated, “This bill seeks to provide a needed protection for employees of public school
systems by bringing them under the Board’s limit of liability provision.”  A letter submitted
by The Mayor’s Task Force for Liaison with the General Assembly claimed, “The essence
of this bill is to provide indemnification of employees of county boards against damages for
tort liability provided that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment and
without malice or gross negligence.”  Montgomery County submitted a statement in support
of House Bill 940 expressing concerns about exposing local boards of education to liability
for damages in excess of $100,000.  The statement posited that “it was the intention of the
General Assembly that the entity, Board of Education[,] and its employees both be covered
by the $100,000 limitation of liability.”  In its statement, Montgomery County representatives
asserted that the statute’s “policy of indemnification” for county board of education
employees “is good public policy and should not be discouraged.”  In response to the
statement, House Bill 940 was amended to include a provision that the statute did not waive
sovereign immunity for local boards of education above $100,000.  A Summary of
Committee Report drafted by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee indicated that
House Bill 940 was proposed to address the issue of board of education employees who are
19
“fully exposed to tort liability without limit.”  The Summary included the following language
with regard to legislative intent behind the Bill: “The intent of House Bill 940 is to provide
a needed protection for employees of public school systems by bringing them under the
Board’s limit of liability provision and consolidating the employees[’] position with that of
the present position of the Boards of Education.”  A Bill Analysis by the Committee Report
System noted that House Bill 940 “[p]rohibits a judgment in tort from being executed against
the county employee individually.”
In 1990, House Bill 206 was signed into law, creating CJ § 5-353.  1990 Md. Laws,
ch. 546.  Thereafter, much of the language in ED § 4-105.1 was moved to CJ § 5-353.  In
1996, Senate Bill 11 was signed into law and redesignated ED § 4-105.1 as ED § 4-106.
1996 Md. Laws, ch. 10.  In 1997, Senate Bill 114 renumbered CJ § 5-353 to its present
codification at CJ § 5-518.  1997 Md. Laws, ch. 14.  Today, ED §§ 4-105 and 4-106 direct
the reader to CJ § 5-518 for an explanation of the protection given to county boards of
education and county board of education employees.
The intent of the Legislature in enacting ED § 4-106 and CJ § 5-518 was to offer some
protection from tort liability to county board of education employees.  When these statutory
provisions are read together, in their entirety, taking into consideration legislative history,
it becomes clearer that the protection given to county board employees is in the form of
indemnification, not complete immunity from liability.  ED §§ 4-105 and 4-106 contain
nearly identical language, indicating that CJ § 5-518 describes the “immunity from liability”
given to county boards of education and county board employees, respectively.  The
20
immunity given to county boards of education under CJ § 5-518(c) is an immunity from
damages in excess of $100,000.  The similar language and structure of ED § 4-105 and ED
§ 4-106 lead us to conclude that the protection given to county board of education employees
is also an immunity from damages, which is distinct from the concept of complete immunity
from liability. 
Petitioners argue that the protection given to county board employees is complete
immunity that does not allow for a tort suit to be brought against a county board employee
acting within the scope of employment without malice or gross negligence.  In Petitioners’
view, CJ § 5-518 precludes not just recovery from such an employee, but the initiation of any
tort action.  The language in the statute does not support Petitioners’ interpretation.  Section
5-518(e) provides that “[a] county board employee acting within the scope of employment,
without malice and gross negligence, is not personally liable for damages resulting from a
tortious act or omission[.]” CJ § 5-518(e) (emphasis added).  Section 5-518(h) discusses the
process for entering “a judgment in tort for damages against a county board employee acting
within the scope of employment[.]”  CJ § 5-518(h).  Subsection (h) further provides that such
a judgment “shall be levied against the county board only and may not be executed against
the county board employee[.]”  
The statute does not define the terms “levied” and “executed[.]” To determine the
ordinary meanings of those words, we find it helpful to consult their dictionary definitions.
See Montgomery Cnty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 67, 31 A.d 191, 198 (2011) (determining that
“[a]lthough dictionary definitions do not provide dispositive resolutions of the meaning of
21
statutory terms, it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and
popular meaning” (internal quotations omitted)).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “levy” as
“[t]o take or seize property in execution of a judgment[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 927 (8th
ed. 2004).  The term “execute” is defined as “[t]o enforce and collect on (a monetary
judgment)[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 609 (8th ed. 2004).  The import of these words, read
in connection with CJ § 5-518(h), is that a judgment may be entered against a county board
employee, but the collection of that judgment may be against the county board only.  That
interpretation is consistent with CJ § 5-518(e), which indicates that a county board employee
is not personally liable for damages in tort.
Furthermore, CJ § 5-518(d) requires that a county board of education must be joined
as a party to an action against a county board employee who has committed a tortious act or
omission within the scope of his or her employment.  If we interpret the statute as Petitioners
suggest, a negligence action could not be brought against a county board employee, as the
employee would be entitled to complete immunity from liability.  It would be irrational for
us to conclude that the statute requires a county board of education to be joined as a party to
a suit that could never be filed. It is a more logical interpretation of the statutory provisions
at issue to conclude that the statute allows a suit in tort to be brought against a county board
employee, and if the employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment without
malice or gross negligence, the county board must be joined as a party.  A judgment may
then be entered against both the employee and the county board of education, but the
judgment may be levied and executed against the county board of education only.
22
We also find it useful to compare CJ § 5-518 to the MTCA and the LGTCA for
guidance in the proper interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue.  Prior to the
enactment of the MTCA, “‘the State and its agencies could not be sued unless the General
Assembly authorized suit and enabled State agencies to obtain funds necessary to satisfy
judgments.’” Proctor v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 412 Md. 691, 711, 990 A.2d 1048,
1059 (2010) (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 492, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993)).  In
1981, the Legislature enacted the MTCA with the purpose of “ensur[ing] that an individual
who is injured by the tortious conduct of the State or state employees has a remedy for his
or her injury.”  Proctor, 412 Md. at 710-11, 990 A.2d at 1059 (citation omitted).  The MTCA
was intended to serve as a “‘gap-filler’ to waive the immunity of State agencies in tort when
no other statute expressly waived the agency’s immunity.”  Proctor, 412 Md. at 712, 990
A.2d at 1060.  
Md. Code (1985, 2009 Repl. Vol.), § 12-105 of the State Government Article provides
that “[s]tate personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”  Md. Code (1990, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-522(b)
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: 
State personnel . . . are immune from suit in courts of the
State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that
is within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel
and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which
the State or its units have waived immunity under Title 12,
Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article, even if the damages
exceed the limits of that waiver.  
In general, the MTCA “provides statutory immunity ‘to insulate State employees generally
23
from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and without malice or
gross negligence.’” Higginbotham v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 412 Md. 112, 130-31, 985 A.2d
1183, 1193 (2009) (quoting Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261, 863 A.2d 297, 307 (2004)).
Thus, “[w]here state personnel are negligent, the statute generally waives sovereign or
governmental immunity and substitutes the liability of the State for the liability of the state
employee committing the tort.”  Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 752, 12 A.3d 153, 160
(2011) (internal quotation omitted).  The immunity provided to State employees under the
MTCA also encompasses immunity for constitutional torts and intentional torts.
Higginbotham, 412 Md. at 131, 985 A.2d at 1193. 
Prior to enactment of the LGTCA, “local governments enjoyed immunity from tort
liability only with respect to non-constitutional torts based on activity classified as
‘governmental,’ and such immunity could be waived by the General Assembly or local
enactments.”  Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 125, 872 A.2d 1, 13 (2005).  In 1987,
the General Assembly enacted the LGTCA, 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 594, with the purpose of
“afford[ing] a remedy to those injured by acts of local government officers and employees,
while ‘ensuring that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local government
ultimately responsible for the public officials’ acts.’” Rios, 386 Md. at 125-26, 872 A.2d at
13 (quoting Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 108, 660 A.2d 447, 466 (1995)).  In general, “[t]he
LGTCA limits liability, provides for indemnification, and establishes procedural
requirements relating to suits against officials of local government employees.”  Houghton
v. Forrest, 412 Md. 578, 591, 989 A.2d 223, 231 (2010).  Md. Code (1987, 2006 Repl. Vol.),
24
§ 5-302(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a
person may not execute against an employee on a judgment
rendered for tortious acts or omissions committed by the
employee within the scope of employment with a local
government.
(2) (i) An employee shall be fully liable for all damages
awarded in an action in which it is found that the
employee acted with actual malice.
(ii) In such circumstances the judgment may be executed
against the employee and the local government may seek
indemnification for any sums it is required to pay under
§ 5-303(b)(1) of this subtitle.
Md. Code (1987, 2011 Supp.), § 5-303(c)(2)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
provides that “a local government may indemnify an employee for a judgment for punitive
damages entered against the employee.”  
Thus, “the General Assembly has waived the local government’s ability to avoid
responsibility for the defense and indemnification of employees under the LGTCA[.]”  Rios,
386 Md. at 137, 872 A.2d at 20.  The LGTCA “legislatively permits plaintiffs to enforce
judgments obtained from suit against the employee against the local government.”  Rios, 386
Md. at 139, 872 A.2d at 21.  In contrast to the complete immunity from suit given to State
personnel under the MTCA, local government employees are granted only an immunity from
damages under the LGTCA.  Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 129-30, 928 A.2d 795, 814
(2007).  Thus, local government employees “may be sued, and judgments may be entered
against them.”  Smith, 400 Md. at 130, 928 A.2d at 814.  A plaintiff who recovers in a suit
against a negligent local government employee may collect the amount of any judgment from
25
the local government entity only, and not from the employee individually.  Id. (explaining
that “unless the employee is found to have acted with actual malice, the plaintiff may not
execute on a judgment recovered against the employee, but, rather, subject to certain limits,
the local government is liable on the judgment” (internal citation omitted)).
In our view, the statutory language in CJ § 5-518 is more analogous to the language
governing the protection of local government employees under the LGTCA.  Similar to the
protection afforded to local government employees under the LGTCA, we conclude that
county board of education employees are entitled to indemnification from tort damages by
county boards under CJ § 5-518.  Tort suits may be brought against county board employees
and judgments may be entered against them.  The county board of education must be joined
as a party to the tort action in situations where the employee has acted within the scope of
employment without malice or gross negligence.  If a judgment is entered against the
employee and the county board, the county board alone is responsible for satisfying the
judgment, as county board employees may not be held personally liable in tort for damages.
Therefore, it was not improper, in the case sub judice, for Respondent to bring a negligence
action against Mr. Iglehart and to join the Board as a party, in accordance with CJ § 5-518.
Pursuant to the statutory indemnification afforded to Mr. Iglehart under CJ § 5-518, any
judgment entered on behalf of Respondent may be levied and executed against the Board
only, and not against Mr. Iglehart individually.
Petitioners express concern that the comparison made by the Court of Special Appeals
to the MTCA and the LGTCA was improper because the Board is clearly not covered by the
26
LGTCA.  We note that, by analogizing CJ § 5-518 to the LGTCA, the intermediate appellate
court was not suggesting that the LGTCA is applicable to the circumstances of the instant
case.  Rather, in light of the ambiguous text and legislative history for the statutory
provisions at issue, the Court of Special Appeals sought guidance from other liability
protection statutes.  As we have done in our analysis, the intermediate appellate court merely
located and analyzed similar language in the LGTCA to conclude that the General Assembly
likely intended that CJ § 5-518 be construed as an indemnification statute, as opposed to an
immunity statute.  We see no problem with this approach to statutory interpretation.  See
Deibler, 423 Md. at 69, 31 A.3d at 200 (interpreting the meaning of the term “wage” in
Labor and Employment Article § 9-615 “by examining other instances in the Maryland Code
when the Legislature has defined ‘wage’”).
II. Workers’ Compensation Act Exclusivity Rule
We next determine whether mandating that the Board be joined as a party to the
negligence suit against Mr. Iglehart and requiring the Board to satisfy any judgment entered
against Mr. Iglehart violates the exclusivity rule of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The
parties do not dispute that the exclusivity rule prohibits Respondent from instituting a tort
action against the Board directly, in light of her award from the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.  The Workers’ Compensation Act, however, allows an injured employee,
pursuant to LE § 9-902, to institute a tort action against a third party tortfeasor who caused
the injury.  If the injured employee receives a tort judgment, the employer is entitled to
reimbursement for any workers’ compensation paid or awarded to the employee as of the
27
date of the tort judgment.  In accordance with Maryland law, a co-employee is considered
a third party against whom a suit for tort damages may be brought; thus, Respondent was
permitted to bring a negligence action against Mr. Iglehart, in accordance with LE § 9-902.
With regard to the impact of the exclusivity rule, we note that an employer who has
complied with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not prohibited from
entering into an indemnification contract with the third party tortfeasor; similarly, we
conclude that the statutory indemnification required of the Board under CJ § 5-518 does not
violate the provisions of the exclusivity rule.  Consistent with the statutory schemes at issue,
in a situation where an employer is required to pay workers’ compensation to an injured
employee and the employer is also responsible for indemnifying the third party tortfeasor,
the employer is entitled to offset the amount of workers’ compensation paid or awarded from
the amount of the tort judgment.  See, e.g., Parry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 130, 136, 968
A.2d 1053, 1057 (2009) (concluding that “[i]n those situations in which the person injured
on the job brings an action against and recovers damages from the third-party tortfeasor,
following a workers’ compensation award or payment of compensation, [Labor and
Employment Article] § 9-902 prevents the person from receiving a windfall recovery from
both sources for the same damages”); Podgurski v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 374 Md. 133, 140,
821 A.2d 400, 405 (2003) (determining that an employer has a subrogation interest that acts
as a statutory lien on any recovery from a third party tortfeasor); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Imbraguglio, 346 Md. 573, 589, 697 A.2d 885, 893 (1997) (holding that where an insurer
is responsible for payment of workers’ compensation and tort damages, stemming from the
28
same incident, the insurer is “entitled to offset any judgment entered against it for amounts
already paid pursuant to its obligation as the workers’ compensation insurer”); Gray v. State
Roads Comm’n, 253 Md. 421, 426, 252 A.2d 810, 813 (1969) (explaining that an employer
is entitled to reimbursement from a judgment against a third party tortfeasor for any workers’
compensation already paid or awarded).  Thus, in the instant case, the Board is entitled to
offset the amount of workers’ compensation paid or awarded to Respondent from the amount
of the tort judgment, so as to avoid the unfairness of double recovery. 
Petitioners contend that, except in accordance with limited exceptions not applicable
in the instant case, the exclusivity rule in the Workers’ Compensation Act prohibits suits
against employers by employees for injuries sustained during the course of employment.
Petitioners claim that requiring the Board to pay Respondent workers’ compensation and the
amount of a tort judgment for the negligent acts of Mr. Iglehart “is incompatible with the
intent of the Legislature that an employee may not receive a double recovery from her
employer for injuries sustained in the course and scope of her employment.”  According to
Petitioners, Mr. Iglehart is not distinct from the Board and, thus, he is not a third party that
can be subjected to a tort suit, as contemplated by the Workers’ Compensation Act.  In
Petitioners’ view, “[i]f [Respondent] is allowed to collect the judgment entered against the
Board and/or Mr. Iglehart, county boards of education in the future would not have a viable
recourse for recouping their losses in workers’ compensation cases.”  Rather, Petitioners
assert, “[t]he Court would be creating an exception that places legal and financial liability
on just one type of employer (county boards of education) for payment of both workers’
29
compensation benefits and a judgment against a board employee for injuries arising from an
on-the-job accident.”
Respondent argues that employers in Maryland are entitled to rely on the assumption
that they will not be liable to employees injured during the course of employment, beyond
workers’ compensation benefits, unless they expressly waive immunity by agreeing to
assume responsibility for contribution or indemnification.  Respondent takes the position that
CJ § 5-518 creates such an express waiver of the Board’s immunity in the instant case.
According to Respondent, the tort suit at issue was a direct action against Mr. Iglehart, not
against the Board, even though the Board was statutorily required to satisfy any monetary
judgment entered.  Respondent contends that such a suit, against a negligent co-employee,
is allowed under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Thus, Respondent asserts that her actions
were not in violation of the relevant statutory provisions.
A. Workers’ Compensation Statute Generally
The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act was first enacted by Chapter 800 of the
Acts of 1914.  The Act, currently codified under Maryland Code, sections 9-101 to 9-1201
of the Labor and Employment Article, generally requires an employer “to pay workers’
compensation benefits to an employee who suffers an accidental personal injury in the course
of employment, regardless of whether the employer is at fault for the injury.”  Franch v.
Ankney, 341 Md. 350, 357-58, 670 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) (citation omitted).  The preamble
to the original Act indicated that “the then subsisting law with respect to injuries sustained
by workmen in the course of their employment was inadequate, unsatisfactory, and
30
uneconomic from the standpoint of the best interest of the workmen, the employer and the
State[.]”  Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 373, 128 A. 635, 636
(1925).  The Act was designed to effectuate the following balance: “on one hand, the Act
took away employees’ rights to sue employers for negligence, yet, on the other hand it
ensured employees the ‘right to quick and certain compensation for injuries sustained during
the course of their employment, regardless of fault.’”  Rodrigues-Novo v. Recchi Am., Inc.,
381 Md. 49, 56, 846 A.2d 1048, 1052 (2004) (quoting Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md.
486, 496, 520 A.2d 717, 723 (1987)); see Parry, 408 Md. at 144, 968 A.2d at 1061
(explaining that “the Act provides employees suffering from work-related accidental injuries,
regardless of fault, with a certain, efficient, and dignified form of compensation.  In
exchange, employees abandon common law remedies, thereby relieving employers from the
vagaries of tort liability” (quoting Polomski v. Mayor of Balt., 344 Md. 70, 77, 684 A.2d
1338, 1341 (1996))); Imbraguglio, 346 Md. at 582, 697 A.2d at 889-90; Victory Sparkler,
147 Md. at 376-77, 128 A. at 638 (noting that “the statute has given to labor what it never
had before, and has taken from capital what it had always enjoyed, and has compensated the
latter by limiting its liability, while . . . conforming to the act, to the payment of
compensation only to those who sustain an injury, arising out of and in the course of their
employment, that is compensable under the act”).
With certain limited exceptions, the Workers’ Compensation Act “is a substitute for
the employer’s common law liability for negligence, subject to his common law defenses,
and creates an absolute, but limited, liability regardless of fault, such liability upon a
31
conforming employer being exclusive.”  Flood v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 377,
187 A.2d 320, 322 (1963) (citing Cox v. Sandler’s, Inc., 209 Md. 193, 198-99, 120 A.2d 674,
677 (1956)); Hart v. Sealtest, Inc., 186 Md. 183, 193, 46 A.2d 293, 297 (1946) (concluding
that “the Workmen’s Compensation Act substitutes for the common law liability of the
[employer] for negligence, subject to common law defenses, an absolute, but limited, liability
regardless of fault, and makes that liability exclusive, in the case of a conforming employer”
(citations omitted)).  In Suburban Hospital, Inc. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 172, 763 A.2d 185,
202 (2000), we explained that “[t]he only exceptions in the Labor and Employment title
permitting a right of action against the employer deal with the failure to secure compensation,
LE § 9-509(c), and deliberate acts by the employer[,] LE § 9-509(d).” 
With regard to exclusivity of compensation from an employer under the Act, Md.
Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9-509 of the Labor and Employment Article provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the liability of an
employer under this title is exclusive.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the compensation
provided under this title to a covered employee or the
dependents of a covered employee is in place of any right of
action against any person.
(c) (1) If an employer fails to secure compensation in
accordance with this title, a covered employee who has
sustained an accidental personal injury, compensable
hernia, or occupational disease or, in case of death, the
personal representative of the covered employee may:
(i) bring a claim for compensation under this title;
or
(ii) bring an action for damages.
(2) In an action of a covered employee or personal
32
representative under this subsection, an employer may
not plead as a defense that:
(i) the covered employee assumed the risk of
employment;
(ii) the covered employee was contributorily
negligent; or
(iii) the negligence of a fellow servant caused the
accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or
occupational disease.
(d) If a covered employee is injured or killed as the result of the
deliberate intent of the employer to injure or kill the covered
employee, the covered employee or, in the case of death, a
surviving spouse, child, or dependent of the covered employee
may:
(1) bring a claim for compensation under this title; or
(2) bring an action for damages against the employer.
The rationale behind the exclusivity rule is that “the employer has undertaken the
burden of supplying workmen’s compensation insurance in return for immunity from suit.”
Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 127, 453 A.2d 1207, 1211 (1983) (citations omitted).  The
Act, thus, “recognizes the need to protect employers from the unpredictable nature and
expense of litigation, and the public from the overwhelming tax burden of caring for the
helpless human wreckage found [along] the trail of modern industry.”  Parry, 408 Md. at
143, 968 A.2d at 1061 (quoting Polomski, 344 Md. at 76, 684 A.2d at 1341).  The provisions
of the Act “reflect[] a compromise between employees’ rights to pursue common law and
other statutory damages for their injuries, and the burden to employers of having to provide
workers’ compensation benefits.”  1 Clifford B. Sobin, Maryland Workers’ Compensation
§ 20:4, at 651 (2011). 
B. Recovery from Third Party Tortfeasors
33
If a compensable injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act “was caused under
circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay
damages in respect therefor[e], the [Act] gives to the parties specifically designated therein,
under the conditions therein set forth, a right of action against a third party, the tort-feasor.”
Clough & Molloy, Inc. v. Shilling, 149 Md. 189, 195, 131 A. 343, 345 (1925); Franch, 341
Md. at 358, 670 A.2d at 954.  As explained by the scholar Arthur Larson, “[t]he basic
concept underlying third party actions is the simple moral idea that the ultimate loss from
wrongdoing should fall upon the wrongdoer.”  2 Arthur Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law
§ 71.10, at 165 (1997). When the statutory scheme was originally enacted, it “forced
employees to choose between filing suit against a third party tort-feasor and filing a claim
under the Act; the employee could do one or the other, but not both.”  Podgurski v.
OneBeacon Ins. Co., 374 Md. 133, 146, 821 A.2d 400, 408 (2003) (citing Hubbard v.
Livingston Fire Prot., Inc., 289 Md. 581, 587, 426 A.2d 901, 904-05 (1981)).  Thus, after
workers’ compensation benefits were awarded to the injured employee, only the employer
or insurer could bring suit against a third party tortfeasor.  Id.  
The Act was subsequently amended to allow injured employees to both claim
workers’ compensation under the provisions of the Act and to bring suit against a third party
tortfeasor.  Podgurski, 374 Md. at 146-47, 821 A.2d at 408; see Collins v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 315 Md. 141, 145, 553 A.2d 707, 708 (1989) (contemplating that under the current
version of the statute “a claimant does not lose the right to proceed against a tort-feasor by
accepting workers’ compensation benefits”).  This Court explained the procedure under the
4 We note that, for purposes of third party suits brought pursuant to LE § 9-902, the
applicable statute of limitations for the tort action, governed by statute or common law,
controls the time period during which an injured employee may file suit against the tortfeasor
responsible for causing his or her workplace injury.  Thus, while an employer or insurer has
the exclusive right to file suit against a third party tortfeasor for the two months following
a workers’ compensation award, a third party suit brought by an injured employee must, in
any event, be filed within the applicable limitations period, which begins to run on the date
of accrual.  See Turner v. Smalis, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 248, 251 (D. Md. 1985) (explaining that
the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act “does not postpone the accrual of an injured
employee’s cause of action against a third party until two months after his first award of
compensation, but, rather, merely interrupts the running of limitations for a period of two
months after his first award of compensation” (citing Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 303
Md. 213, 228-30, 492 A.2d 1286, 1293-94 (1985)); Hayes v. Wang, 107 Md. App. 598, 600,
669 A.2d 771, 771 (1996) (holding that, in an action by an injured employee against a third
party tortfeasor, “§ 9-902(d) of the Labor and Employment Article, adds a two month tolling
period to the general three year statutory limit”).
34
Act in Anne Arundel Cnty v. McCormick, 323 Md. 688, 594 A.2d 1138 (1991), stating that
“[f]or two months after compensation is awarded or paid, the employer has the exclusive
right to sue the third party . . . [and] [t]hereafter, the employer and employee have concurrent
rights to do so.”  McCormick, 323 Md. at 692, 594 A.2d at 1140; see also Podgurski, 374
Md. at 140, 821 A.2d at 404-05; Imbraguglio, 346 Md. at 583, 697 A.2d at 890; W. Md. Ry.
Co. v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 Md. 97, 101, 161 A. 5, 7 (1932).  We recognized
in Collins that “[t]he legislature clearly gave the claimant the unfettered right to bring the
third party action at any time after two months following the award of compensation.”
Collins, 315 Md. at 151, 553 A.2d at 712.4  
Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9-901 of the Labor and Employment Article
provides:
When a person other than an employer is liable for the
35
injury or death of a covered employee for which compensation
is payable under this title, the covered employee or, in case of
death, the personal representative or dependents of the covered
employee may:
(1) file a claim for compensation against the employer
under this title; or
(2) bring an action for damages against the person liable
for the injury or death or, in case of joint tort feasors,
against each joint tort feasor.
Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 9-902 of the Labor and Employment Article
provides:
(a) If a claim is filed and compensation is awarded or paid under
this title, a self-insured employer, an insurer, the Subsequent
Injury Fund, or the Uninsured Employers’ Fund may bring an
action for damages against the third party who is liable for the
injury or death of the covered employee.
(b) If the self-insured employer, insurer, Subsequent Injury
Fund, or Uninsured Employers’ Fund recovers damages
exceeding the amount of compensation paid or awarded and the
amount of payments for medical services, funeral expenses, or
any other purpose under Subtitle 6 of this title, the self-insured
employer, insurer, Subsequent Injury Fund, or Uninsured
Employers’ Fund shall:
(1) deduct from the excess amount its costs and expenses
for the action; and
(2) pay the balance of the excess amount to the covered
employee or, in case of death, the dependents of the
covered employee.
(c) If the self-insured employer, insurer, Subsequent Injury
Fund, or Uninsured Employers’ Fund does not bring an action
against the third party within 2 months after the Commission
makes an award, the covered employee or, in case of death, the
dependents of the covered employee may bring an action for
damages against the third party.
(d) The period of limitations for the right of action of a covered
36
employee or the dependents of the covered employee against the
third party does not begin to run until 2 months after the first
award of compensation made to the covered employee or the
dependents under this title.
(e) If the covered employee or the dependents of the covered
employee recover damages, the covered employee or
dependents:
(1) first, may deduct the costs and expenses of the
covered employee or dependents for the action;
(2) next, shall reimburse the self-insured employer,
insurer, Subsequent Injury Fund, or Uninsured
Employers’ Fund for:
(i) the compensation already paid or awarded; and
(ii) any amounts paid for medical services, funeral
expenses, or any other purpose under Subtitle 6 of
this title; and
(3) finally, may keep the balance of the damages
recovered.
(f) In an action brought by a covered employee or the
dependents of the covered employee under subsection (c) of this
section, the covered employee or the dependents of the covered
employee, the self-insured employer, the insurer, the Subsequent
Injury Fund, and the Uninsured Employers’ Fund shall pay court
costs and attorney’s fees in the proportion that the amount
received by each bears to the whole amount paid in settlement
of any claim or satisfaction of any judgment obtained in the
case.
As we stated in Parry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 130, 136, 968 A.2d 1053, 1057
(2009), “[i]n those situations in which the person injured on the job brings an action against
and recovers damages from the third-party tortfeasor, following a workers’ compensation
award or payment of compensation, [LE] § 9-902 prevents the person from receiving a
windfall recovery from both sources for the same damages.”  Rather than allowing an injured
employee to keep the entire amount of a compensation award and tort damages, the proper
37
“disposition of the matter is to give the employer so much of the negligence recovery as is
necessary to reimburse him for his compensation outlay, and give the employee the excess.”
Gray v. State Roads Comm’n, 253 Md. 421, 426, 252 A.2d 810, 813 (1969) (quotation
omitted); Collins, 315 Md. at 145, 553 A.2d at 709 (explaining that “[i]f the claimant brings
the action, the claimant must first satisfy the subrogated interest of the insurer out of the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment”); W. Md. Ry. Co., 163 Md. at 104, 161 A. at 8.  An
injured employee who recovers in tort, following an award of workers’ compensation, is “in
no event . . . entitled to more than the balance remaining after the insurer [or self-insured
employer is] reimbursed for the amounts paid by it under the award, and costs and expenses.”
Shilling, 149 Md. at 198, 131 A. at 346.  Such a reimbursement requirement “precludes
‘double dipping’ by the claimant and preserves his right to reopen his case after the third-
party recovery is depleted.”  Podgurski, 374 Md. at 154, 821 A.2d at 413 (quotation omitted).
With respect to an employer’s right to bring a negligence action against the third party
tortfeasor, the Workers’ Compensation Act “does not create a cause of action in the employer
but rather subrogates it to the claim of its injured employee against the responsible third
party.”  McCormick, 323 Md. at 693, 594 A.2d at 1140 (citing Smith v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 303 Md. 213, 222, 492 A.2d 1286, 1290 (1985)); Franch, 341 Md. at 358, 670 A.2d
at 955 (concluding that “[t]he employer’s rights in the claim against the third party are only
those derived through the employee” (citing Johnson v. Miles, 188 Md. 455, 459, 53 A.2d
30, 32 (1947))); Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. Salvo, 231 Md. 262, 264, 189
A.2d 638, 639 (1963) (stating that “the Compensation Act . . . expressly confers a right of
38
subrogation on the insurance carrier, to sue and recover from a negligent third person”
(internal citation omitted)); Barrett v. Indem. Ins. Co., 152 Md. 253, 259-60, 136 A. 542, 544
(1927).  The employer’s subrogation interest “acts as a statutory lien on any recovery the
employee may obtain from the third-party.” Podgurski, 374 Md. at 140, 821 A.2d at 405
(quotation omitted); Franch, 341 Md. at 358, 670 A.2d at 955.  Thus, “[t]here is only one
claim, and that is of the one injured, or his dependents in case of his death, and one judgment,
the division of which is fixed by statute.”  W. Md. Ry. Co., 163 Md. at 104, 161 A. at 8. 
Employees injured during the course of their employment by a negligent co-employee
are entitled to bring suit against that co-employee, pursuant to LE § 9-902.  As expressed by
Maurice J. Pressman, “[a] negligent co-employee is a third party within the meaning of the
Compensation Act.”  Maurice J. Pressman, Workmen’s Compensation in Maryland § 6-2, at
527 (2d ed. 1977); Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’
Compensation Handbook § 16.02 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Gilbert & Humphreys] (asserting
that “[t]hird parties subject to civil suit for injuries caused to a workers’ compensation
claimant include . . . co-employees” (citation omitted)).  This Court observed in Hutzell v.
Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 233, 249 A.2d 449, 452 (1969), “Although there are no decisions in this
Court involving a tort action by an employee against a co-employee, we note the fact that for
over 50 years the Workmen’s Compensation Law of this State has contained no express
prohibition against such a suit.”  More recently, in Hill v. Knapp, 396 Md. 700, 711, 914
A.2d 1193, 1199 (2007), we stated that “[i]t is well established that the Maryland Workers’
Compensation Act does not exclude tort actions between co-employees[.]”  We recognized
39
in Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 177, 763 A.2d 185, 205 (2000), that “[i]n
Maryland, a co-employee, as such, does not partake of the employer’s immunity under the
[Workers’ Compensation] Act.”  As we stated in Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 128, 453
A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (1983) (citation omitted), “[t]he rationale for precluding employee-
employer suits . . . does not apply in actions by employees against fellow employees.”   We
noted in Kirson that there are certain circumstances, not applicable in the instant case, where
a supervisory co-employee is not contemplated as a third party subject to a tort suit because
the supervisory co-employee enjoys the employer’s immunity.  Kirson, 362 Md. at 177-78,
763 A.2d at 205. 
Respondent, in the case sub judice, brought a negligence action against Mr. Iglehart
on the theory that, while both were working in the scope of their employment with the Board,
Mr. Iglehart acted in a negligent manner that resulted in injury to Respondent.  It is not
contended that Mr. Iglehart was acting in a supervisory capacity at the time of the incident.
As stated above, Maryland law allows a third party tort suit to be brought against a negligent
co-employee who is not a supervisor.  Therefore, Mr. Iglehart, as a negligent co-employee
of Respondent who caused her injury, was a proper defendant in a third party tort suit
brought pursuant to LE § 9-902.
C. Indemnification by County Boards of Education
Having concluded that Mr. Iglehart was a proper defendant in Respondent’s
negligence action, we next address the issue of whether joining the Board as a party in the
tort suit and requiring the Board to pay any judgment entered violated the exclusivity rule
40
of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  While we have not specifically addressed a situation
involving statutorily required indemnification of a tortfeasor by an employer who has paid
compensation to an injured employee under the Workers’ Compensation Act, we have
confronted a case where an employer responsible for paying compensation under the Act was
contractually obligated to indemnify the third party tortfeasor.  In State ex rel. State Accident
Fund v. N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co., 141 Md. 305, 307, 118 A. 795, 796 (1922), we
addressed the issue of “whether the agreement of the employer of the deceased workman to
indemnify the present defendant [tortfeasor] against any liability for the incident, which
caused his death, [was] a bar to [the tort] suit brought under the terms of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.”  While employed by George U. McAllen, and working on the property
of the New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company (the Railroad Company),
Frank M. Johnson was killed by an electric current.  N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co., 141
Md. at 306, 118 A. at 796.  The State Industrial Accident Commission ordered that McAllen,
the employer, and the State Accident Fund, the insurer, pay compensation to Johnson’s
widow.  Id.  Subsequently, the State, for the use of the State Accident Fund and Mrs.
Johnson, brought suit against the Railroad Company, alleging that the uninsulated wire that
had caused the decedent’s death had been negligently maintained by the Railroad Company.
N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co., 141 Md. at 306-07, 118 A. at 796.  As a defense to the suit,
the Railroad Company claimed that it had a license agreement with McAllen containing a
provision that McAllen would indemnify it from all claims for damages under circumstances
covered in the terms of the agreement.  N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co., 141 Md. at 307, 118
41
A. at 796.
On review in this Court, we observed that the contract of insurance between the
employer and its insurer, and the agreement of indemnification between the employer and
the Railroad Company, were different in terms of their purposes and effects.  N.Y., Phila. &
Norfolk R.R. Co., 141 Md. at 309, 118 A. at 797.  The former “assure[d] the payment of
compensation to injured employees of the insured or their dependents, which may be claimed
from the employer, regardless of any question of fault or negligence, while the other . . .
[was] an undertaking of the employer to save harmless the defendant from a liability asserted
upon a theory which the contract of insurance disregards.”  N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co.,
141 Md. at 309-10, 118 A. at 797.  The negligence action was brought for the benefit of the
insurer and the decedent’s widow.  N.Y., Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co., 141 Md. at 310, 118 A.
at 797.  After the insurer had been reimbursed, if there was any excess judgment, Mrs.
Johnson was entitled to receive it.  Id.  Thus, we held that “the agreement [of
indemnification] pleaded by the defendant [tortfeasor] should not be treated as an effective
bar to the action.”  Id.  
This Court later affirmed in Balt. Transit Co. v. State ex rel. Schriefer, 183 Md. 674,
678, 39 A.2d 858, 860 (1944) (citation omitted), that a negligence action against a third party
tortfeasor, resulting from a workplace injury, “is not barred by an agreement of the employer
to indemnify the negligent third party.”  We also stated in Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. v. Mark Eng’g Co., 230 Md. 584, 590, 187 A.2d 864, 867 (1963), “Since 1948 . . .
employers in Maryland have been entitled to rely on the assumption that they would not be
42
liable for or on account of an injury to an employee, beyond payment of compensation,
unless they expressly waived immunity by agreeing to assume an obligation for contribution
or indemnity.”  Similarly, the authors of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook
note that “[n]othing in the statute forbids an employer to waive his or her immunity under
the Workers’ Compensation Act by entering into an indemnity agreement.”  Gilbert &
Humphreys, § 15.01 (citing Mason v. Callas Contractors, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 782, 784 (D.
Md. 1980)).
In accordance with Maryland law, therefore, an employer who is responsible for
payment of workers’ compensation, either directly or through an insurance carrier, may enter
into an indemnification contract with a third party tortfeasor.  In our case law on the subject,
we have determined that such a contractual obligation does not offend the principles of the
exclusivity rule contained in LE § 9-509.  Rather, a contractual obligation to indemnify a
third party tortfeasor creates an exception to the limitation on recovery from an employer by
an injured employee under the exclusivity rule of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  In our
view, the statutory obligation of county boards of education to indemnify their negligent
employees, under CJ § 5-518, similarly does not offend the exclusivity rule.  The statutory
obligation to indemnify provides, in effect, an exception to the exclusivity rule, whereby an
injured board of education employee may maintain a tort action against a negligent co-
employee, who is entitled to indemnification from tort damages by the county board, the
employer.  Thus, in the instant case, the Board’s statutory requirement, pursuant to CJ § 5-
518, to indemnify Mr. Iglehart, its employee, does not violate the exclusivity rule.  It was not
43
improper for Respondent to initiate a third party tort action against Mr. Iglehart, in
accordance with LE § 9-902, and to join the Board as a party for purposes of indemnification.
The Board’s corresponding obligation to satisfy any tort judgment recovered by Respondent
is not inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
Furthermore, in support of our conclusion, we again find it useful, for the sake of
comparison, to refer to certain provisions in the LGTCA.  We note that, under Md. Code
(1987, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the
Legislature placed a limitation on the remedies available to a local government employee
injured by a negligent co-employee during the course of employment, stating, “If the injury
sustained is compensable under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee may
not sue a fellow employee for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of
employment.”  Subsection (c) of the statute, therefore, prohibits an injured local government
employee from suing a negligent co-employee, an individual who would be entitled to
indemnification by the local government under the LGTCA.  The statute expressly limits the
recovery available to a local government employee injured by a negligent co-employee
during the course of employment to workers’ compensation benefits.  In adopting this
provision, the General Assembly likely contemplated the possibility of a situation where a
local government employee was injured by a negligent co-employee during the course of
employment, and the local government was thereby responsible both for compensating the
injured employee under the Workers’ Compensation Act, as an employer, and for paying the
amount of any tort judgment entered against the negligent co-employee, as an indemnitor.
44
In addressing that situation, the Legislature decided to prohibit injured local government
employees from suing their negligent co-employees for acts or omissions committed during
the course of employment – a situation that would have resulted in the local government
being responsible for satisfying a workers’ compensation award and a tort judgment.  The
Legislature must have been aware of the potential for a similar situation to arise in the
context of CJ § 5-518, where a county board of education employee negligently injures a co-
employee.  With this knowledge, the General Assembly declined to establish a prohibition
against an injured county board of education employee suing a negligent co-employee,
similar to the prohibition provided in CJ § 5-302(c).  Even if we were to assume that this was
an oversight on the part of the Legislature, it is not our province to rewrite a statute in order
to cure a legislative oversight.  See McGlone v. State, 406 Md. 545, 559, 959 A.2d 1191,
1199 (2008) (indicating that “[w]e interpret the words enacted by the Maryland General
Assembly; we do not rewrite the language of a statute to add a new meaning” (citation
omitted)); Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94
(2005); Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 223, 592 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1991) (concluding that
“a court is not wholly free to rewrite a statute merely because of some judicial notion of
legislative purpose” (quotation omitted)). 
D. Recoupment of Losses
Lastly, we address Petitioners’ concern that, if we allow recovery against the Board
for tort damages stemming from Mr. Iglehart’s negligence, the Board, as a self-insurer, will
have no method for recouping its losses from the amount of workers’ compensation paid or
45
awarded.  As we have consistently held, the Workers’ Compensation Act, under LE § 9-
902(e), provides that in a suit against a third party tortfeasor, any recovery obtained by the
employer or the injured employee shall be used to reimburse the employer for any amount
of workers’ compensation paid or awarded.  Collins v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 315 Md. 141,
145, 553 A.2d 707, 709 (1989); Gray v. State Roads Comm’n, 253 Md. 421, 426, 252 A.2d
810, 813 (1969); W. Md. Ry. Co. v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 Md. 97, 104, 161 A.
5, 8 (1932); Clough & Molloy, Inc. v. Shilling, 149 Md. 189, 198, 131 A. 343, 346 (1925).
This Court explained in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Imbraguglio, 346 Md. 573, 589, 697
A.2d 885, 893 (1997), that “[u]nder [LE] § 9-902(e), a successful [tort] judgment against the
insurer simply means that the insurer is entitled to offset any judgment entered against it for
amounts already paid pursuant to its obligation as the workers’ compensation insurer.”
Therefore, in the case of a self-insured employer, who is required to indemnify the third party
tortfeasor, any amount of damages recovered by the injured employee in the tort suit may be
offset by the amount of workers’ compensation paid or awarded to the injured employee.  As
we explained, the Workers’ Compensation Act is designed to guard against double recovery
from an employer and a windfall recovery by an injured employee.  The employer is entitled
to recoup its losses from payment of a workers’ compensation award with the proceeds of
a monetary judgment recovered from a tortfeasor liable for the injury.  That fundamental
principle of Workers’ Compensation law is not eroded when the employer is both the
provider of workers’ compensation benefits and the source of recovery in a tort claim.
Therefore, in the instant case, the Board is entitled to a setoff from the tort judgment entered
46
against it in the amount of workers’ compensation paid or awarded to Respondent as of the
date of the tort judgment. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID
BY PETITIONERS.