Title: Alcohol Beverage Control v. Gordon J. Boyd Suspension of license

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36124 
 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
GORDON J. BOYD, licensee d/b/a SHOT  
GLASS, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent.                                                              
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Lewiston, April 2010 Term 
 
2010 Opinion No.  42  
 
Filed:  April 23, 2010 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Clearwater County.  Hon. John H. Bradbury, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded  
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant.  Jenny  
Grunke argued. 
 
John R. Hathaway, Orofino, for respondent.  Christopher S. Lamont argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
 
This is an appeal from a district court‟s order reversing an administrative hearing 
officer‟s decision to suspend Gordon Boyd‟s retail alcohol license.  We reverse the decision of 
the district court.    
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  Between the late evening of September 15, 
2006, and the early morning of September 16, 2006, two undercover Alcohol Beverage Control 
(ABC) officers, Corporal Tim Davidson and Sergeant Greg Harris, who are trained to identify 
intoxicated people, arrived at the Shot Glass bar in Orofino, Idaho.  Boyd is the owner and 
operator of the Shot Glass.  Davidson and Harris observed an individual at the Shot Glass who 
was getting too close to people and being so loud and boisterous that people were moving away 
from him.  The individual smelled of alcohol and had a flushed face, bloodshot eyes, and slurred 
speech, and was swaying, staggering, and stumbling into people and furniture and knocking 
things off the bar.  After witnessing this behavior, Davidson and Harris further observed Dawn 
 
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Moler, one of the Shot Glass bartenders, serve alcohol to the individual.  Davidson and Harris 
identified the customer as Justin Anderson.  Harris made contact with Anderson, who was 
argumentative and unable to comprehend Harris‟ questions.  Davidson cited Moler for a 
misdemeanor violation of I.C. § 23-615 for serving an obviously intoxicated person.1       
Based upon the events described above, ABC filed administrative violation notice 
06ABC-COM077, along with a complaint seeking suspension of Boyd‟s license under authority 
of I.C. § 23-933, alleging that I.C. § 23-615 was violated when Moler served alcohol to 
Anderson, who was obviously intoxicated.2  Boyd moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds 
that I.C. § 23-615 is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.  The hearing officer declined to rule 
on the motion to dismiss because the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA) 04.11.01.415 
precludes a hearing officer from determining the constitutionality of a statute.   
A hearing was held on November 15, 2007, at which Moler testified that from her 
bartending experience she was very familiar with the way Anderson would act whenever he was 
intoxicated, including his taking on a “cocky attitude” and his failure to “walk normal.”  The 
hearing officer noted that although Moler testified that she did not believe Anderson to be 
intoxicated at the time she admittedly served him two beers, Harris and Davidson testified that 
they observed Anderson at the time Moler served him exhibiting the very characteristics that 
Moler described.  The hearing officer also considered the testimony of Orofino Sheriff Deputy 
Carson, who observed that Anderson had bloodshot eyes and was belligerent towards Harris.  
The hearing officer concluded, based on the testimony of Moler, Davidson, Harris, and Carson, 
that Anderson was apparently or obviously intoxicated when Moler served him, and thus issued a 
preliminary order suspending Boyd‟s retail alcohol beverage license.  Boyd did not seek agency 
review, and the order became final on December 18, 2007.   
Boyd appealed to the district court and moved for a stay of the suspension, which the 
district court granted.  The district court concluded that the hearing officer did not err in 
concluding that Anderson was obviously intoxicated when Moler served him, yet ultimately 
concluded that I.C. § 23-615 is facially unconstitutional for overbreadth and vagueness.  The 
                                                 
1  ABC referred the case to the city attorney, who in turn referred it to the county prosecutor.  The prosecutor 
dismissed the charge. 
2  ABC filed a second notice of violation and complaint for suspension based upon events observed by the same 
officers at the Shot Glass on the evening of September 16, 2006; however, the hearing officer found that there was 
an insufficient showing of the state of intoxication of the patron who was allegedly overserved.  Accordingly, this 
second alleged violation did not come before the district court. 
 
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court reversed the hearing officer‟s decision and remanded the case.  ABC timely appeals the 
district court‟s decision regarding the statute‟s constitutionality.  Boyd does not challenge the 
district court‟s conclusion that substantial competent evidence supported the hearing officer‟s 
determination that Moler served alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person.          
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Generally, “[w]here a district court acts in its appellate capacity pursuant to the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA), this Court reviews the agency record independently of 
the district court‟s decision.”  Cooper v. Bd. of Prof’l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 
Idaho 449, 454, 4 P.3d 561, 566 (2000) (citations omitted).  In this case, however, the agency 
was unable to consider the constitutionality of the statute in question, because “[p]assing on the 
constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactments with political overtones, is a 
fundamental responsibility of the judiciary, and has been so since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137.”  Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 640, 778 P.2d 757, 762 (1989) 
(citations omitted).  Therefore, we directly review the district court‟s decision regarding the 
constitutionality of I.C. § 23-615. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law.  The party 
challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing 
the statute is unconstitutional and “must overcome a strong presumption of 
validity.” Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 
(1990). 
This Court exercises free review over the trial court‟s conclusions of law 
to determine if the trial court correctly stated the principles of law and if the legal 
conclusions are supported by the facts as found.  The Court is “free to draw its 
own conclusions from the facts presented.”  Kootenai Elec. Coop. v. Washington 
Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432, 435, 901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995).    
 
BHA Invs, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 351, 63 P.3d 474, 477 (2003) (citations omitted).  
Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its 
constitutionality.  State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 13, n.12, 696 P.2d 856, 864 n.12 (1985). 
“The Court will defer to the agency‟s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous and unsupported by evidence in the record.”  Cooper, 134 Idaho at 454, 4 P.3d at 566.  
“This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence on factual matters.  I.C. § 67-5279(1).”  Id.   
A strong presumption of validity favors an agency‟s actions.  The 
agency‟s action may be set aside, however, if the agency‟s findings, conclusions, 
or decisions (a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the 
 
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agency‟s statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  I.C. § 67-5279(3).  In addition, this Court 
will affirm an agency action unless a substantial right of the appellant has been 
prejudiced.  I.C. § 67-5279(4). 
 
Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The district court held that I.C. § 23-615 is facially unconstitutional because it is both 
overbroad and vague.  We consider each issue in turn. 
A. The district court erred in holding that I.C. § 23-615 is unconstitutionally overbroad on 
its face. 
 
 
In considering whether I.C. § 23-615 is constitutionally overbroad, the district court 
stated that “Idaho Code section 23-615 directly affects the constitutionally protected property 
right to continue to operate a business.  The statute is, therefore, overbroad.”  Boyd makes the 
same assertion on appeal.  This conclusion, however, represents a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the law. 
 
The district court‟s conclusion that the business of retailing alcohol is a “constitutionally 
protected property right” is incorrect.  The United States Constitution states in relevant part that 
“[t]he transportation or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States for 
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited.”  U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.  In turn, the Idaho Constitution states in relevant part 
that “the legislature of the state of Idaho shall have full power and authority to permit, control 
and regulate or prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and transportation for sale, of 
intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.”  Idaho Const. art. III, § 26.  Since this section in 
Idaho‟s constitution gives the Legislature full power and authority to regulate intoxicating liquor 
for beverage purposes, the judicial department of the State may not deprive it of such power.  
Taylor v. State, 62 Idaho 212, 219, 109 P.2d 879, 881 (1941).  The district court‟s statement that 
there is a protected property right in the business of selling alcohol attempts just such a 
deprivation and would, if given effect, violate both the United States and Idaho constitutions.   
Instead of a protected property right, 
[a] liquor license is simply the grant or permission under governmental 
authority to the licensee to engage in the business of selling liquor.  Such a license 
is a temporary permit to do that which would otherwise be unlawful; it is a 
 
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privilege rather than a natural right and is personal to the licensee; it is neither a 
right of property nor a contract, or a contract right.   
 
BHA Invs, Inc., 138 Idaho at 354-55, 63 P.3d at 480-81 (quoting Nampa Lodge No. 1389, Benev. 
and P.O. of E. of U. S. v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 215-16, 229 P.2d 991, 993 (1951)).  “[T]hus one 
who procures a state . . . license takes it subject to the provisions of the statute under which the 
license is granted.”  Nampa Lodge, 71 Idaho at 216; 229 P.2d at 993.  Idaho Code § 23-102 
explains the reason for such regulation:     
This act is passed in the exercise of the police power of the state.  It is not 
designed to abridge the personal privilege of a responsible adult to consume 
alcoholic liquor as a beverage, except in cases of the abuse of that privilege to the 
detriment of others.  The public interest requires that traffic in alcoholic liquor be 
regulated and controlled by the state, through the medium of a state liquor 
division vested with exclusive authority to import and sell such liquor, with 
certain exceptions, which are subject to its regulation. 
 
I.C. § 23-102.  This Court has similarly recognized that “the selling of intoxicating liquor is a 
proper subject for control and regulation under the police power.”  Gartland v. Talbott, 72 Idaho 
125, 131, 237 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1951).  Put another way, “[i]t is . . . universally accepted that no 
one has an inherent or constitutional right to engage in the business of selling or dealing in 
intoxicating liquors.”  Id.  The district court failed to understand the constitutional parameters of 
a license to sell alcohol.   
The district court further misunderstood Idaho‟s statutory regulations.  Contrary to the 
district court‟s statement, it is not I.C. § 23-615 that directly affects whether a licensee may or 
may not continue to operate as a retail seller of alcohol.  Rather, this provision places restrictions 
upon how the licensee may operate his retail alcohol business, stating in relevant part that: 
No person licensed pursuant to title 23, Idaho Code, or his or its employed 
agents, servants or bartenders shall sell, deliver or give away, or cause or permit 
to be sold, delivered, or given away, or allowed to be consumed, any alcohol 
beverage, including any distilled spirits, beer or wine, to: 
. . . .  
(2) Any person actually, apparently or obviously intoxicated. 
 
The statute that does directly affect whether a licensee may or may not continue to operate as a 
retail seller of alcohol is I.C. § 23-933, which states in relevant part that: 
(1) The director may suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew a license issued 
pursuant to the terms of this chapter for any violation of or failure to comply with 
the provisions of this chapter or rules and regulations promulgated by the director 
or the state tax commission pursuant to the terms and conditions of this chapter. 
 
 
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In other words, when the State grants a licensee the privilege of selling alcohol, the licensee must 
accept the limitations on that privilege as set out in I.C. § 23-615.  If the seller abuses the 
privilege by violating the limitations, the director may suspend his license pursuant to I.C. § 23-
933.  In any case, such regulation does not infringe upon any constitutionally protected activity.  
Consequently, neither of these statutes may be considered facially unconstitutional for 
overbreadth, because “[i]n a facial challenge to the overbreadth . . . of a law, a court‟s first task is 
to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct.  If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.”  Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) (footnotes omitted).     
In sum, selling alcohol is not constitutionally protected conduct, and thus, statutes that 
regulate the sale of alcohol, such as I.C. § 23-615 and I.C. § 23-933, cannot be challenged as 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  The district court therefore erred in determining that I.C. § 23-615 
is facially unconstitutional for overbreadth.   
B. The district court erred in concluding that I.C. § 23-615 is unconstitutionally vague. 
 
Boyd argues that I.C. § 23-615 is impermissibly vague on its face.  He argues that when 
examining the physiological effects of alcohol consumption, there is no standard by which to 
measure when a person is “actually,” “obviously,” or “apparently” intoxicated, because the 
common person is not trained to recognize symptoms that a police officer or ABC investigator 
might notice.  Despite determining that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer‟s 
determination that Moler served alcohol to an apparently or obviously intoxicated person, the 
district court embraced Boyd‟s legal reasoning and determined that I.C. § 23-615 is 
unconstitutionally vague.   
 
Although the district court repeatedly cited Hoffman in support of its legal conclusion, the 
district court either ignored or misunderstood the Supreme Court of the United States‟ analysis 
regarding vagueness.  “A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore 
satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague, in 
violation of due process.  To succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.”  Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 497.  “[T]he challenger 
must show that the enactment is invalid in toto.”  State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 
126, 132 (2003) (citing Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 497).  Hoffman explicitly cautioned that one “who 
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law 
 
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as applied to the conduct of others.”  455 U.S. at 495.  Hoffman then reiterated this proposition in 
an accompanying footnote:  “„One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not 
successfully challenge it for vagueness.‟”  Id. at 495 n.7 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
756 (1974)).  Simply put, “the traditional rule of standing for facial attacks provides that one to 
whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on grounds that it might 
be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations.”  16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional 
Law § 137 (2009).   
In this case, the hearing officer found that “[Moler] thought that she was familiar enough 
with [Anderson] that she knew when he was under the influence . . . .  [Moler] indicated that 
when [Anderson] had too much to drink he became belligerent, cocky, and talked with an 
attitude.”  The hearing officer also stated that 
[Harris] observed [Anderson] to resent his efforts to identify [Anderson] with 
[Anderson] being belligerent, obnoxious, and confrontational. . . . [Harris‟] 
observation is consistent with how [Moler] described she had seen [Anderson] 
when he was under the influence.  Orofino Sheriff Deputy Carson, who at the 
time worked for the City of Orofino, also observed [Anderson] outside the bar and 
observed blood shot eyes, and [Anderson] being belligerent and appearing 
unwilling to follow [Harris‟] directions.  
 
Id.  The hearing officer continued that Davidson “observed [Anderson] approach the bar, push 
items off of the bar and reach across the bar to shake someone‟s hand who did not appear to want 
to shake [Anderson‟s] hand.”   
 Finally, the hearing officer concluded that Moler‟s 
observations of what [Anderson] looks like when he is intoxicated are consistent 
with the observations of [Harris], [Davidson], and Deputy Carson.  Even though it 
was a busy evening [Moler] had sufficient opportunity to determine whether it 
was appropriate to serve beer to [Anderson].   
 
[Boyd‟s] bartender sold an alcoholic beverage to an apparently intoxicated 
[Anderson] in violation of Idaho Code § 23-615. 
 
The district court upheld the hearing officer‟s factual determination on this issue.3   
                                                 
3 The district court upheld the hearing officer‟s conclusion on this issue, albeit upon a mischaracterization of the 
hearing officer‟s memorandum decision.      
 
The district court stated that “[i]n rendering his decision, the Hearing Officer concluded that the 
observations of „Ms. Molar [sic], Corporal Davidson, Sergeant Harris and Deputy Carson‟ indicated that Mr. 
Anderson was apparently or obviously intoxicated.”  The court then included the following footnote:  “Presumably, 
the inclusion of Ms. Moler‟s name was inadvertent, as the Hearing Officer referred earlier in the decision to Ms. 
Moler‟s belief that Mr. Anderson was not intoxicated.”  The district court continued that: 
Although Ms. Moler did not testify that she observed [Anderson] exhibiting behavior consistent 
with intoxication, the Hearing Officer determined that the observations of the officers were 
 
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The district court‟s decision that there was substantial evidence supporting the factual 
finding that Moler violated I.C. § 23-615 simply cannot be reconciled with the district court‟s 
legal conclusion that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.  Indeed, during oral argument, 
Boyd‟s attorney acknowledged that the district court‟s resolution of this constitutional question 
was “utterly inconsistent” with its decision on the factual question of whether Moler served 
alcohol to an apparently or obviously intoxicated person.  As Boyd‟s bartender engaged in 
“conduct that is clearly proscribed,” the statute is not vague as applied in this case, and Boyd 
“cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”  Hoffman, 455 
U.S. at 495.  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in its determination that I.C. § 
23-615 is unconstitutionally vague.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in concluding that I.C. § 23-615 is unconstitutional.  The decision 
of the district court is reversed, this case is remanded, and the district court is instructed to vacate 
its order staying the suspension of Boyd‟s license.  Costs are awarded to ABC.   
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and Justice Pro Tem TROUT 
CONCUR. 
                                                                                                                                                             
consistent with Ms. Moler‟s testimony of Mr. Anderson‟s behavior when he was intoxicated 
before this particular episode.   
 
In any event, the Hearing Officer was apparently persuaded by the weight of the officer‟s 
testimony.  The testimony of the three law enforcement agents trained to recognize signs of 
intoxication was substantial enough to support the Hearing Officer‟s decision that the police 
officers concluded Mr. Anderson was obviously intoxicated.  
This characterization of the hearing officer‟s decision makes it seem as though it was the testimony of law 
enforcement and law enforcement alone that persuaded the hearing officer that Anderson was apparently or 
obviously intoxicated.  In fact, as discussed above, it was this testimony combined with Moler‟s testimony that she 
was familiar with Anderson‟s behavior when he is intoxicated that persuaded the hearing officer.