Title: Auerbach v. Samuels

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

9 Utah 2d 261 (1959) 342 P.2d 879 BESSIE AUERBACH, MADELEINE A. WERNER AND SELMA A. MOHR, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, v. FANNIE F.A. SAMUELS, L.R. SAMUELS, FREDERICK FOX AUERBACH AND WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. No. 8979. Supreme Court of Utah. July 20, 1959. Reichman, Vernon & Bennett, C.M. Gilmour, Salt Lake City, for appellants. Fabian, Clendenin, Mabey, Billings & Stoddard, Albert J. Colton, Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for respondents. CALLISTER, Justice. Appeal from a ruling of the lower court construing the will of the late Frederick S. Auerbach. The ruling was made upon motions for summary judgment by each party. Appellants are the surviving sisters of the deceased. Respondents Fannie F.A. Samuels (Widow of deceased and since remarried) and Frederick Fox Auerbach (decedent's son) are trustees and beneficiaries under the will. Respondents L.R. Samuels (Fannie's present husband) and Walker Bank and Trust Company are trustees under the will, having been nominated by Fannie F.A. Samuels pursuant to a power given her in the will. Frederick S. Auerbach died on May 28, 1938, at Salt Lake City, Utah. His will was duly admitted to probate and the final decree of distribution was entered on May 29, 1940. Under the terms of the will the residue of the testator's estate was placed in trust as follows: Appellant's complaint asked for a declaratory judgment construing the terms of the trust and for injunctive relief. The question presented below, and now before this court, is whether or not a release by Fannie F.A. Samuels of her life estate would accelerate the son's right to receive income and principal from the trust estate. We affirm the lower court by holding that the release would effectuate an acceleration. A rule for the interpretation of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that the intention of the testator must control.[1] This intent must be ascertained from the four corners of the will, unless it is ambiguous.[2] The will before us is carefully drawn, clear and unambiguous. After certain specific legacies, it provides for a trust of the residue, with the income therefrom to the wife for life. Upon the death of the wife, or in the event she predeceased testator, then the son is to receive the income for his natural life and receive payments of principal upon attaining the ages of 30 and 45. Provision is also made to permit the trustees to anticipate the payments of principal to the son. Appellants argue that the will specifically provides and shows the clear intention of the testator that there can be no invasion of principal by the son (who is now in his thirties) and no termination of the trust in whole or in part during the lifetime of the mother, regardless of whether or not she relinquishes her life interest in the income from the trust prior to her death. Confining ourselves to the terms of the will, which we must, we are constrained to disagree with appellants. It was clearly the intention of the testator to provide a suitable income for his wife during her lifetime. This was the reason for the postponement of the son's right to receive either the income or the principal of the trust. Had it been otherwise, the deceased would not have provided for the son's immediate enjoyment of the trust in the event testator was predeceased by his wife. According to appellants, the effect of the lower court's interpretation would be to extinguish and destroy the rights of appellants and any unborn issue of the son in and to two-thirds of the trust estate. We think that the provisions as to distribution after the wife's death was not for the purpose of determining beneficiaries at the time of such death, because the testator provided that the distribution of principal to the son should not occur until he attained the ages of 30 and 45. He obviously contemplated that this would occur after the wife's death. Provision for appellants or the unborn issue of the son, should he predecease the widow, were remote contingencies only to be fulfilled if the testator's main objective failed, namely to adequately provide for his wife and son. Furthermore, the trustees are specifically granted the authority upon death of the wife to anticipate payment of the principal to the son prior to his attainment of the specified ages. This is indicative that the postponement of the son's enjoyment was to adequately provide for the wife. Appellants further contend that phrases within the will such as, "at the time of the death of my said wife" and "the income to be paid for and during the term of her natural life," express an intent of the testator to create a long term trust which must continue throughout the lifetime of his wife. Such expressions undoubtedly refer to the time of the death of the holder of a prior interest, but such phrases do not manifest an intent contrary to acceleration upon renunciation by the holder of such prior interest. Such words are generally employed in a manner that does not manifest an intent to create a condition precedent, but rather refers to the course of events which is to be significant if the attempted prior interest takes effect.[3] From the language of the will it seems reasonable to conclude that the possessory rights of the subsequent beneficiaries under the trust were merely postponed for the benefit of the prior life taker of the income and can be accelerated by the premature termination of that interest. Realizing that there is some authority apparently in conflict,[4] we hold that a will creating a testamentary trust, which provides for a life estate followed by a remainder payable upon the death of the life tenant, may be accelerated upon the release and termination of the precedent life estate if consistent with the terms of the will and not contrary to the intent of the testator.[5] Affirmed. Costs to respondents. CROCKETT, C.J., and HENRIOD and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur. WADE, Justice. I concur, except that I do not agree that this will is unambiguous. Generally the will is clear and leaves no doubt of the testator's intentions, but on the question presented in this case, whether a release by the wife of her life interest would accelerate the son's right to receive the income and principal from the trust estate, the will is ambiguous for there is no express provision thereon. However, I agree with the prevailing opinion that the trial court correctly construed the instrument. [1] 74-2-1, 74-2-2, U.C.A. 1953. [2] 95 C.J.S. Wills § 591. [3] Equitable Trust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d 422; see also 2 Restatement of the Law of Property, Sec. 233, comment c. [4] E.g., In re Hamburger's Will, 185 Wis. 270, 201 N.W. 267, 37 A.L.R. 1413; Hills v. Travelers Bank & Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A.2d 652, 123 A.L.R. 1419. [5] Bennett v. Fidelity Union Co., 123 N.J. Eq. 198, 196 A. 375; Simpkins v. Simpkins, 131 N.J. Eq. 227, 24 A.2d 821, and cases cited therein.