Title: E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. v. Barbe

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. v. Barbe1988 WY 142764 P.2d 274Case Number: 87-239, 87-240Decided: 11/18/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
E.C. CATES AGENCY, INC., 
AND EARL C. CATES, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT),

v.

KEN BARBE, ROY NAGEL, 
MRS. VIVIAN (JERRY) CRANK AND VIVIAN CRANK, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 
GERALD ELON CRANK, DECEASED, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS AND THIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFF).

E.C. CATES, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

K.J.R. DEVELOPMENT CO., 
INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, of NatronaCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

E.C. Cates, pro se. 

Donald J. 
Rissler, Brown, Raymond & Rissler, P.C., Casper, for appellant.

Barry G. 
Williams, Frank D. Neville, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, 
for appellees, Barbe and 
Nagel.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS and MACY, JJ., and 
BROWN and GUTHRIE, JJ., Retired.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The core of the 
problems presented in these appeals is confusion on the part of a layman with 
respect to rights and obligations flowing to and from individuals and 
corporations which the individuals control. The difficulty is exacerbated by the 
efforts of E.C. Cates to represent himself and his corporation. The district 
court ruled that Cates' pleadings did not state a claim for which relief could 
be granted because of the misalignment of parties. In addition, the district 
court ruled that Cates could not represent E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. as its 
attorney since he was not admitted to the practice of law. The claims asserted 
by Cates were dismissed. We affirm the district court because this appeal raises 
no issues which could serve as grounds for reversal.

[¶2.]     E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. 
seeks review and reversal of the dismissal by the district court in Case No. 
87-239 raising these issues:

"A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY FAILING TO TELL PLAINTIFF HE COULD NOT REPRESENT HIS OWN CORPORATION UNTIL 
THE MORNING OF TRIAL.

"B. THE JUDGE ERRED BY 
HAVING UNFAIR EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH OPPOSING 
COUNSEL.

"C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY ENTERTAINING TWO MOTIONS TO DISMISS, BY AMBUSH.

"D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH W.R.C.P. RULE 56 FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR JUDGMENTS 
ON THE PLEADINGS.

"E. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AUGUST 6, 1987, DECISION LETTER IS UNCLEAR, MISLEADING, AND DOES NOT ADEQUATELY 
SPELL OUT THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION."

E.C. Cates, as 
the appellant in case No. 87-240, also demands reversal stating the issues a bit 
differently:

"A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY FAILING TO HAVE A JURY AVAILABLE ON THE DATE SET FOR 
TRIAL.

"B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY HAVING EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL.

"C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY ENTERTAINING TWO MOTIONS TO DISMISS, BY AMBUSH.

"D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH W.R.C.P. RULE 56 FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR JUDGMENTS 
ON THE PLEADINGS.

"E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY ERRONEOUSLY FINDING THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR COMMISSIONS ARE CLAIMS OF E.C. CATES 
AGENCY, INC., NOT EARL C. CATES.

"F. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
HARSH AND ERRONEOUS DECISION HAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AND REWARDED THE APPELLEES 
FOR THEIR FRAUD.

"G. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AUGUST 6, 1987, DECISION LETTER IS UNCLEAR, MISLEADING, AND DOES NOT ADEQUATELY 
SPELL OUT THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION."

[¶3.]     In the district court, 
E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. filed a complaint, through E.C. Cates, naming as 
defendants Ken Barbe and Roy Nagel. It is manifest from the complaint that any 
claim which might exist would lie only against K.J.R. Development Co., Inc. 
Barbe and Nagel, it would appear, are stockholders in that corporation, but the 
complaint failed to name the corporation as a party. In another case in which 
E.C. Cates was sued, he filed a counterclaim seeking the payment of real estate 
commissions due, stock in K.J.R. Development Co., Inc., and an accounting of 
profits due from K.J.R. Development Co., Inc. Again, it is manifest from Cates' 
pleading that he, as an individual, had no claim against K.J.R. Development Co., 
Inc., even though E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. may have had a 
claim.

[¶4.]     We affirm the order of 
the district court in these consolidated cases because the briefs raise no 
issues which would support reversal. Neither brief presents a valid contention 
supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority, and we consistently have 
refused to consider such cases, whether the brief is by a litigant pro se or is 
filed by counsel. Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 1988). We also note that these briefs do 
not conform to Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P. They contain no proper statement of the case 
as prescribed by that rule but, rather, simply a recitation of the view of the 
appellant of facts unsupported by the record. While each brief does contain an 
argument section, it is in this respect that the failure to present cogent 
argument or citation of pertinent authority is present. Furthermore, the 
mandatory appendix is not included in either brief.

[¶5.]     While it is not 
necessary to the disposition of this case, we support the ruling of the district 
court that E.C. Cates could not be permitted to appear in the case on behalf of 
E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. It is well established that a person who is not an 
attorney is not entitled to appear in court for a corporation regardless of his 
interest or association with the corporation. Aviation Maintenance Publishers, 
Inc. v. Capital Corporation, 740 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶6.]     Similarly, while it is 
not necessary to our disposition of this case, we find it appropriate to comment 
on the determinations by the district court that K.J.R. Development Co., Inc. 
should have been the defendant in the first case; that E.C. Cates Agency, Inc. 
owned the claims asserted in the counterclaim in the second case; and that E.C. 
Cates, as an individual, could not be a proper party because none of his rights 
as an individual were asserted in the pleadings. No other conclusion can be 
reached from the pleadings which were filed. Cates vehemently disputes the 
validity of the conclusion that he had asserted no right as an individual. 
However, the only support for those claims of Cates is a recitation of facts 
which are extraneous to and completely unsupported by what is in the record. 
From the record, no other conclusion can be reached than that Cates had no 
personal interest in the matters in litigation.

[¶7.]     Lastly, we find it 
appropriate to comment upon Rule 5.5(b), Rules for Professional Conduct, which 
prohibits a lawyer from assisting a person who is not a member of the Bar in 
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. See Annotation, 
Disciplinary Action Against Attorney Aiding or Assisting Another Person in the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 41 A.L.R.4th 361 (1985); Geibel v. State Bar of 
California, 11 Cal. 2d 412, 79 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 653, 
59 S. Ct. 248, 83 L. Ed. 423 (1938), reh. denied 305 U.S. 676, 59 S. Ct. 361, 83 L. Ed. 438 (1939). In our view, grave risks do attach to the 
affixing of his signature by an attorney as counsel on a brief prepared by a pro 
se litigant. In this instance, all briefs filed on behalf of appellants are 
signed by E.C. Cates, Pro Se, and, in addition, they are signed by counsel 
appearing on behalf of appellants. In Case No. 87-239, however, all arguments 
other than the initial one, identified as "A," are preceded by this 
disclaimer:

"Note: The next four 
stated issues are written in the first person as coming directly from Mr. Cates. 
He is the only one aware of the events. This attorney had no first-hand 
knowledge of what transpired. The issues are relevant to this case because they 
are pertinent to the companion, consolidated case."

In Case No. 
87-240, the entire argument portion of the brief is preceded by this disclaimer: 

"* * * The argument is 
written as coming from Mr. Cates, the only one aware first-hand of the 
events."

[¶8.]     It would appear that 
these briefs are largely, if not wholly, Mr. Cates' work. Since they are signed 
by counsel, however, we are reluctant to dismiss them because of Cates' 
appearance in this court on behalf of his corporation despite the clear 
admonition to him by the district court of such 
impropriety.

[¶9.]     Because these briefs 
provide no cogent argument nor citation of pertinent authority which would 
justify reversal, the order of the district court dismissing the action and the 
counterclaim is affirmed.