Title: 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v. Cass Cty. Treas. (Opinion on Application)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

2 CROOKED CREEK, LLC v CASS COUNTY TREASURER
 
Docket No. 159856.  Argued on application for leave to appeal October 7, 2020.  Decided 
March 16, 2021. 
 
 
2 Crooked Creek, LLC (2CC) and Russian Ferro Alloys, Inc. (RFA) filed an action in the 
Court of Claims against the Cass County Treasurer, seeking to recover monetary damages under 
MCL 211.78l of the General Property Tax Act (the GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., in connection with 
defendant’s foreclosure of certain property.  In 2010, 2CC purchased property for development in 
Cass County.  2CC failed to pay the 2011 real-property taxes and, in 2013, forfeited the property 
to defendant.  From January through May 2013, defendant’s agent, Title Check, LLC (Title 
Check), mailed via first-class and certified mail a series of notices to the address listed in the deed.  
These notices apprised 2CC of the unpaid property taxes, forfeiture, and possibility of foreclosure.  
The certified mail was returned as “Unclaimed—Unable to Forward,” but the first-class mail was 
not returned.  Meanwhile, 2CC constructed a home on the property, obtaining a mortgage for the 
construction from RFA.  On June 18, 2013, Katelin MaKay, a land examiner working for Title 
Check, visited the property; determined it to be occupied; and being unable to personally meet 
with any occupant, posted notice of the show-cause hearing and judicial-foreclosure hearing on a 
window next to the front door of the newly constructed home.  Title Check continued its notice 
efforts through the rest of 2013 and into 2014, mailing various notices as well as publishing notice 
in a local newspaper for three consecutive weeks.  After no one appeared on 2CC’s behalf at the 
January 15, 2014 show-cause hearing or the February 18, 2014 judicial-foreclosure hearing, the 
Cass Circuit Court, Michael E. Dodge, J., entered the judgment of foreclosure.  The property was 
not redeemed by the March 31, 2014 deadline, and fee simple title vested with defendant.  2CC 
learned of the foreclosure a few weeks later.  In July 2014, 2CC moved to set aside the foreclosure 
judgment on due-process grounds.  These efforts failed, however, because the circuit court 
concluded that defendant’s combined efforts of mailing, posting, and publishing notice under the 
GPTA provided 2CC with notice sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.  2CC 
appealed.  In an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on March 8, 2016 (Docket No. 324519), 
the Court of Appeals, METER, P.J., and BOONSTRA and RIORDAN, JJ., affirmed.  At the same time 
2CC moved to set aside the foreclosure judgment, it filed a separate action in the Court of Claims 
for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1), alleging that it had not received any notice required 
under the GPTA.  Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).  The Court 
of Claims, MICHAEL J. TALBOT, J., denied the motion and held a bench trial.  At the close of 2CC’s 
proofs, the court granted an involuntary dismissal in favor of defendant, holding, in relevant part, 
that 2CC had received at least constructive notice of the foreclosure proceedings when MaKay 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
posted notice on the home at a time when 2CC “was exercising dominion and control over the 
property by contracting for the construction of a home on the property.”  2CC appealed as of right, 
and the Court of Appeals, SAWYER, P.J., and CAVANAGH and K. F. KELLY, JJ., affirmed.  329 
Mich App 22 (2019).  2CC sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court 
ordered oral argument on the application limited to 2CC’s claim for monetary damages under MCL 
211.78l(1).  505 Mich 865 (2019). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice MCCORMACK and Justices 
BERNSTEIN, CLEMENT, and CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, 
held: 
 
 
MCL 211.78l(1) provided that if a judgment for foreclosure was entered under MCL 
211.78k of the GPTA and all existing recorded and unrecorded interests in a parcel of property 
were extinguished as provided in MCL 211.78k, the owner of any extinguished recorded or 
unrecorded interest in that property who claimed that he or she did not receive any notice required 
under the GPTA was not permitted to bring an action for possession of the property against any 
subsequent owner but could only bring an action to recover monetary damages.  By using the term 
“any,” the Legislature intended to encompass all types of notice required under the GPTA, not just 
actual notice.  The use of “actual notice” in other provisions as opposed to the use of “any notice” 
in MCL 211.78l(1) indicated that the Legislature likely intended to differentiate between “actual 
notice” and “any notice.”  Further, the legal definition of “notice” is not constrained to situations 
in which a person receives actual notice; a person may be deemed to have received notice 
regardless of whether actual awareness exists.  The Court of Appeals erred by suggesting that the 
remedy recognized in In re Treasurer of Wayne Co for Foreclosure (Perfecting Church), 478 Mich 
1 (2007), of setting aside a foreclosure judgment on due-process grounds was mutually exclusive 
from the monetary-damages remedy provided in MCL 211.78l(1).  MCL 211.78(2) specifically 
sets forth the Legislature’s intent to comply with the minimum requirements of due process 
without granting additional rights that might interfere with the foreclosure process, while MCL 
211.78l(1) represented the Legislature’s attempt to limit all remedies available under the GPTA to 
monetary damages.  Reading these two provisions together, the Legislature, in enacting the 1999 
amendments of the GPTA, intended to provide monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1) only to 
those former property owners who did not receive constitutionally adequate notice.  Although 
MCL 211.78l(1) provided “a damages remedy that [was] not constitutionally required,” a due-
process violation for lack of notice still served as a necessary predicate for such a claim.  
Accordingly, property owners who received constitutionally adequate notice sufficient to satisfy 
the minimum requirements of due process under the GPTA would have necessarily received the 
notice required under the GPTA and, thus, could not sustain an action for monetary damages under 
MCL 211.78l(1).  In this case, because 2CC had already been adjudicated to have received such 
notice, 2CC could not establish that it did not receive any notice required under the GPTA.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed 2CC’s action for monetary damages under 
MCL 211.78l(1), albeit for the wrong reasons. 
 
 
Affirmed. 
 
 
Justice VIVIANO, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the majority that plaintiffs could 
not invoke MCL 211.781(1), but he would not have decided the question whether a plaintiff who 
received constitutionally sufficient notice has thereby received “any notice required under this act” 
for purposes of MCL 211.781(1).  To decide whether plaintiffs failed to receive “any notice 
required under this act” would involve determining whether plaintiffs received the notice required 
under the GPTA’s numerous notice provisions, and if any of those provisions required actual 
notice and that notice was not received, then the failure to receive actual notice might have satisfied 
MCL 211.781(1), enabling a monetary-damages claim.  However, plaintiffs did not present that 
argument.  Plaintiffs therefore failed to show that MCL 211.781(1) allowed claims whenever 
taxpayers did not receive “actual notice.” 
 
 
Justice WELCH did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 
considered it before she assumed office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  March 16, 2021 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
2 CROOKED CREEK, LLC, and RUSSIAN 
FERRO ALLOYS, INC., 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 159856 
 
CASS COUNTY TREASURER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except WELCH, J.) 
 
ZAHRA, J. 
In this appeal, we address the monetary-damages provision of the General Property 
Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., which, until recently, permitted an owner of an 
interest in real property extinguished by tax foreclosure to recover monetary damages upon 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
a showing “that he or she did not receive any notice required under [the GPTA] . . . .”1  
Plaintiff 2 Crooked Creek, LLC (2CC) contends that the phrase “any notice” means “actual 
notice” and that the statute permitted recovery of monetary damages for anything short of 
receiving actual notice.2  We conclude that the phrase “any notice” as it was used in MCL 
211.78l(1) was not limited to actual notice but, instead, encompassed all constitutionally 
sufficient notice.  Thus, while we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we 
clarify that the monetary-damages remedy in MCL 211.78l(1) provided an alternative 
avenue of relief available only to those former property owners and interest holders who 
did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the foreclosure proceedings as required 
under the GPTA.3  Therefore, in order to bring a claim for monetary damages under MCL 
211.78l(1) for not having received “any notice” under the GPTA, the claimant must first 
establish that notice did not satisfy the minimum requirements of due process. 
 
                                              
1 MCL 211.78l(1).  The Legislature recently amended the GPTA and, in doing so, 
eliminated the relevant language at issue in this appeal.  See 2020 PA 256, effective 
December 22, 2020.  This opinion only interprets the preamendment version of the GPTA, 
and all citations of the GPTA are to the former version of the act. 
2 We limit our review in this case to 2CC’s claim for monetary damages under MCL 
211.78l(1).  2 Crooked Creek LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, 505 Mich 865 (2019).  We agree 
with the lower courts’ resolution of the claim for monetary damages advanced by plaintiff 
Russian Ferro Alloys, Inc. (RFA), the holder of a mortgage on the property recorded after 
the certificate of forfeiture was recorded, and we decline to address it further.   
3 We recognize that this remedy was not exclusive to the former owner of the tax-foreclosed 
property but also included “the owner of any extinguished recorded or unrecorded interest 
in that property . . . .”  MCL 211.78l(1).  For ease of reference, however, we refer to a 
person bringing a claim for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1) as a claimant. 
 
 
 
 
3
I.  BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In 2010, 2CC purchased property for development in Cass County.  2CC failed to 
pay the 2011 real-property taxes and, in 2013, forfeited the property to defendant, the Cass 
County Treasurer.  From January through May 2013, defendant’s agent, Title Check, LLC 
(Title Check), mailed via first-class and certified mail a series of notices to the address 
listed in the deed.  These notices apprised 2CC of the unpaid property taxes, forfeiture, and 
possibility of foreclosure.  The certified mail was returned as “Unclaimed—Unable to 
Forward,” but the first-class mail was not returned.4  Meanwhile, 2CC constructed a home 
on the property, obtaining a mortgage for the construction from Russian Ferro Alloys, Inc.5   
On June 18, 2013, Katelin MaKay, a land examiner working for Title Check, visited 
the property; determined it to be occupied; and being unable to personally meet with any 
occupant, posted notice of the show-cause hearing and judicial-foreclosure hearing on a 
 
                                              
4 The address listed on the property’s deed is the resident address of 2CC’s representative, 
Sergei Antipov.  2CC is managed by KAVA Management Company, LLC, which is, in 
turn, managed by Antipov.  The recorded deed listed 2CC’s address as 36 Bradford Lane, 
Chicago, IL 60523.  Although this zip code is correct, the city should have been identified 
as Oak Brook, not Chicago.  Title Check mailed the first notice to the Chicago address, but 
it was later delivered to the correct address in Oak Brook.  All subsequently mailed notices 
were sent to the correct address in Oak Brook.  Antipov, however, had apparently moved 
in June 2011, and he claims that he never received the mailed notices. 
5 While RFA obtained its mortgage on May 28, 2013, it did not record that mortgage until 
July 10, 2013—after defendant recorded the certificate of forfeiture on April 12, 2013, and 
after Title Check completed its title search on June 3, 2013.  Title Check’s title search 
revealed only the deed, the real estate agreement, an easement, and the certificate of 
forfeiture. 
 
 
 
 
4
window next to the front door of the newly constructed home.6  Title Check continued its 
notice efforts through the rest of 2013 and into 2014, mailing various notices as well as 
publishing notice in a local newspaper for three consecutive weeks.  After no one appeared 
on 2CC’s behalf at the January 15, 2014 show-cause hearing or the February 18, 2014 
judicial-foreclosure hearing, the Cass Circuit Court entered the judgment of foreclosure.  
The property was not redeemed by the March 31, 2014 deadline, and fee simple title vested 
with defendant.  2CC learned of the foreclosure a few weeks later. 
In July 2014, 2CC moved to set aside the foreclosure judgment on due-process 
grounds.  These efforts failed, however, because the circuit court concluded, and the Court 
of Appeals agreed, that defendant’s combined efforts of mailing, posting, and publishing 
notice under the GPTA provided 2CC with notice sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
due process.7  At the same time 2CC moved to set aside the foreclosure judgment, it filed 
 
                                              
6 MaKay took a photograph of the posted notice and attached the photograph to her 
inspection worksheet.  James Frye, the president of the development company working on 
the home, later submitted an affidavit stating that he had seen the notice and had contacted 
a representative of 2CC.  Antipov and Douglas Anderson, 2CC’s registered agent and 
president of RFA, filed affidavits refuting Frye’s affidavit.  Each averred that Frye knew 
Antipov and Anderson were 2CC’s only representatives and that Frye never contacted 
either of them about the posted notice.  Further, 2CC filed a lawsuit against Frye, alleging 
that he removed the posted foreclosure notice and failed to inform 2CC of the foreclosure.  
Frye was granted summary disposition in that case.  See 2 Crooked Creek LLC v Frye, 
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 12, 2020 (Docket 
No. 341274) (affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Frye and 
the company that constructed the home for 2CC).   
7 In re Petition of Cass Co Treasurer for Foreclosure, unpublished per curiam opinion of 
the Court of Appeals, issued March 8, 2016 (Docket No. 324519), pp 1, 8-9, lv den 500 
Mich 882 (2016), cert den ___ US ___; 138 S Ct 422 (2017). 
 
 
 
 
5
this separate action in the Court of Claims for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1), 
alleging that it had not received any notice required under the GPTA.  After denying 
defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (prior judgment),8 
the Court of Claims held a bench trial.  At the close of 2CC’s proofs, the court granted an 
involuntary dismissal in favor of defendant, holding, in relevant part, that 2CC had received 
at least constructive notice of the foreclosure proceedings when MaKay posted notice on 
the home at a time when 2CC “was exercising dominion and control over the property by 
contracting for the construction of a home on the property.”9  2CC appealed as of right, 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion later approved for publication.10  2CC 
filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court.  In lieu of granting leave, we ordered 
oral argument on the application limited to the issue of 
 
                                              
8 The Court of Claims concluded that 2CC’s action was not barred by principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel because whether a claimant seeking monetary damages 
under MCL 211.78l(1) received any notice required under the GPTA was a “separate 
inquiry from whether the foreclosing governmental unit satisfied due process in giving 
notice of the foreclosure.”  2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, unpublished 
opinion of the Court of Claims, issued June 29, 2017 (Docket No. 14-000181-MZ), pp 3-5.  
Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals, which declined to address it.  2 
Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, 329 Mich App 22, 27 n 1, 57; 941 NW2d 88 
(2019).  For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that defendant was entitled to 
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).  See p 18 & note 47 of this opinion. 
9 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co Treasurer, unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, 
issued January 22, 2018 (Docket No. 14-000181-MZ), p 16.  The Court of Claims found 
incredible Antipov’s claim that he did not receive any of the mailed notices.  The court also 
concluded that 2CC provided no evidence of its damages.  The Court of Appeals did not 
address these alternative grounds for dismissal and neither do we.  
10 2 Crooked Creek, 329 Mich App 22. 
 
 
 
 
6
whether [2CC] (an owner of a property interest that was extinguished by tax 
foreclosure after being accorded notice sufficient to satisfy minimum due 
process requirements) can sustain an action to recover monetary damages 
pursuant to MCL 211.78l(1) by claiming that it “did not receive any notice 
required under this act” due to a lack of actual notice and, specifically, 
whether constructive notice is sufficient to fall within the confines of “any 
notice” under MCL 211.78l(1) such that 2CC can be charged with knowledge 
of the notice that was posted to the subject property during a time when 2CC 
was exercising control and dominion over it.  See In re Treasurer of Wayne 
Co for Foreclosure (Perfecting Church), 478 Mich 1[; 732 NW2d 458] 
(2007).[11] 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this 
Court reviews de novo.12  This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to 
“ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a 
statute.”13  “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a 
statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a 
statute.”14  “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded 
its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are 
 
                                              
11 2 Crooked Creek, 505 Mich at 865.   
12 Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 515; 821 
NW2d 117 (2012). 
13 People v Couzens, 480 Mich 240, 249; 747 NW2d 849 (2008). 
14 Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 57; 860 NW2d 67 (2014) (quotation marks, 
citation, and brackets omitted). 
 
 
 
 
7
used.”15  “When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is 
not permitted and the statute is enforced as written.”16 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE GPTA AND MCL 211.78l 
The GPTA authorizes a foreclosing governmental unit to seize tax-delinquent 
property through foreclosure and to then sell it to recoup unpaid real-property taxes, 
penalties, interest, and fees.  Before the foreclosure judgment is entered, the GPTA 
provides various procedural safeguards to afford those with an interest in the property 
notice of the foreclosure by mail, by publication, and by a personal visit to the property,17 
and it provides an opportunity to be heard via a show-cause hearing and a judicial-
foreclosure hearing.18  Once the foreclosure judgment enters and the redemption and appeal 
periods expire, fee simple title to the property vests in the foreclosing governmental unit.19  
Once entered, circuit courts generally may not alter a judgment of foreclosure.  
 
                                              
15 Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 156; 802 NW2d 281 (2011) (citations 
omitted).  
16 Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich 191, 199; 895 NW2d 
490 (2017).  
17 See MCL 211.78i.  Of course, the GPTA also requires that various notices be sent to the 
property owner when taxes are returned as delinquent and when the property is forfeited to 
the county treasurer.  See MCL 211.78a through MCL 211.78c; MCL 211.78f. 
18 See MCL 211.78j; MCL 211.78k.  See also MCL 211.78k(5)(f) (requiring the circuit 
court to make “[a] finding that all persons entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard 
have been provided that notice and opportunity”). 
19 MCL 211.78k(6).  
 
 
 
 
8
Nonetheless, MCL 211.78l(1) provided divested property owners and interest holders who 
claim they did not receive any notice required under the GPTA an action for monetary 
damages: 
If a judgment for foreclosure is entered under section 78k and all 
existing recorded and unrecorded interests in a parcel of property are 
extinguished as provided in section 78k, the owner of any extinguished 
recorded or unrecorded interest in that property who claims that he or she did 
not receive any notice required under this act shall not bring an action for 
possession of the property against any subsequent owner, but may only bring 
an action to recover monetary damages as provided in this section.[20] 
2CC argues that it is entitled to monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1) because 
“any notice” means “actual notice,” such that the statute provided relief when a claimant 
received anything less than actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings.  By using the term 
“any,” however, it is clear that the Legislature intended to encompass all types of notice 
required under the GPTA, not just actual notice.21  Indeed, a review of other provisions of 
 
                                              
20 MCL 211.78l(2) provided the Court of Claims with original and exclusive jurisdiction 
for a claim of monetary damages.  MCL 211.78l(3) set out a two-year statutory period of 
limitations after the foreclosure judgment is entered.  MCL 211.78l(4) limited the amount 
of monetary damages recoverable to the fair market value of the interest held in the 
property as of the date the judgment of foreclosure is entered, less any taxes, interest, 
penalties, and fees owed on the property as of that date.  Finally, MCL 211.78l(5) 
prohibited the transfer of the right to sue for monetary damages except by testate or 
intestate succession. 
21 See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1999) (defining “any” as “1. one, a, 
an, or some; one or more without specification or identification[.] . . .  2. whatever or 
whichever it may be[.] . . .  3. in whatever quantity or number, great or small; some[.]  4. 
every; all[.]); People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 131; 845 NW2d 477 (2014) (explaining that 
“ ‘any’ is commonly understood to encompass a wide range of things” such that “it is 
difficult to imagine how the Legislature could have cast a broader net given the use of the 
word[] ‘any’ ”), citing People v Lively, 470 Mich 248, 253-254; 680 NW2d 878 (2004). 
 
 
 
 
9
the GPTA demonstrates that the Legislature did refer to “actual notice” in some instances.22  
The use of “actual notice” in other provisions as opposed to the use of “any notice” in MCL 
211.78l(1) indicates that the Legislature likely intended to differentiate between “actual 
notice” and “any notice.”23  Further, the legal definition of “notice” is not constrained to 
situations in which a person receives actual notice; a person may be deemed to have 
received notice regardless of whether actual awareness exists.24   
2CC tries to rebut these commonsense conclusions by focusing on the word 
“receive,” arguing that because other forms of notice act as a substitute for actual notice, 
only actual notice can be received.25  The word “receive” is defined as follows: 
 
                                              
22 See, e.g., MCL 211.78k(5)(f)(i) and (iii) (specifically using the terms “actual notice” and 
“constructive notice” in describing when a person is considered to have been provided 
notice and an opportunity to be heard).   
23 “When the Legislature uses different words, the words are generally intended to connote 
different meanings. . . .  If the Legislature had intended the same meaning in both statutory 
provisions, it would have used the same word.”  US Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Mich 
Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 14; 795 NW2d 101 (2009). 
24 Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “notice” as “1. Legal notification required 
by law or agreement, or imparted by operation of law as a result of some fact (such as the 
recording of an instrument); definite legal cognizance, actual or constructive, of an existing 
right or title . . . .  2. The condition of being so notified, whether or not actual awareness 
exists . . . .  3. A written or printed announcement”) (emphasis added).  Resort to a legal 
dictionary is appropriate when the term in need of interpretation is “a legal term of 
art . . . that has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law.”  Hannay, 497 
Mich at 68-69, citing MCL 8.3a.  In any event, we recognize the lay definition of “notice” 
tracks its legal definition.  See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1999) 
(defining “notice” as “1. information, warning, or announcement of something impending; 
notification . . . .  2. a written or printed statement conveying such information or 
warning[.] . . .  7. to become aware of or pay attention to; take notice of; observe”). 
25 See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed), p 1277 (defining “actual notice” as “1. Notice 
given directly to, or received personally by, a party. . . .  2. Property.  Notice given by open 
 
 
  
10 
1. to take into one’s possession (something offered or delivered) . . . .  2. to 
have (something) bestowed, conferred, etc. . . . .  3. to have delivered or 
brought to one . . . .  4. to get or be informed of . . . .  5. to be burdened with; 
sustain . . . .  6. to hold, bear, or contain . . . .  7. to take into the mind; 
apprehend mentally . . . .  8. to accept from another, as by hearing . . . .[26]   
Clearly then, the plain meaning of “receive” is not limited to actual, physical 
possession as 2CC suggests; a person can be said to “receive” notice when he or she is 
“informed of” or “apprehend[s]” the notice.27  Accordingly, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals that 2CC’s interpretation of MCL 211.78l(1) conflicts with the plain language of 
the statute.   
B.  PERFECTING CHURCH 
2CC contends that this Court’s decision in Perfecting Church28 supports its position 
that MCL 211.78l(1) permitted recovery of monetary damages for anything less than actual 
notice.  MCL 211.78l was enacted as part of the 1999 amendments of the GPTA.29  These 
 
                                              
possession and occupancy of real property,” while defining “constructive notice” as 
“[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that 
a party had a duty to take notice of . . . ; notice presumed by law to have been acquired by 
a person and thus imputed to that person”). 
26 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1999).   
27 Id.  See also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “notice”) (“A person has notice 
of a fact or condition if that person (1) has actual knowledge of it; (2) has received 
information about it; (3) has reason to know about it; (4) knows about a related fact; or (5) 
is considered as having been able to ascertain it by checking an official filing or 
recording.”). 
28 Perfecting Church 478 Mich 1. 
29 1999 PA 123. 
 
 
  
11 
amendments reflect a legislative effort to streamline the tax-foreclosure process, “to 
provide finality to foreclosure judgments and to quickly return property to the tax rolls.”30  
Two provisions of the GPTA were key in effectuating this scheme: MCL 211.78k(6), 
which deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction to set aside a foreclosure judgment after the 
redemption and appeal periods expire, and MCL 211.78l, which limited all aggrieved 
property owners and interest holders to the single remedy of monetary damages.  In 
Perfecting Church, we explained how these provisions worked together: 
If a property owner does not redeem the property or appeal the judgment of 
foreclosure within 21 days, then MCL 211.78k(6) deprives the circuit court 
of jurisdiction to alter the judgment of foreclosure.  MCL 211.78k(6) vests 
absolute title in the foreclosing governmental unit, and if the taxpayer does 
not redeem the property or avail itself of the appeal process in [MCL 
211.78k(7)], then title “shall not be stayed or held invalid . . . .”  This 
language reflects a clear effort to limit the jurisdiction of courts so that 
judgments of foreclosure may not be modified other than through the limited 
procedures provided in the GPTA.  The only possible remedy for such a 
property owner would be an action for monetary damages based on a claim 
that the property owner did not receive any notice [under MCL 211.78l].  In 
the majority of cases, this regime provides an appropriate procedure for 
foreclosing property because the statute requires notices that are consistent 
with minimum due process standards.[31] 
 
                                              
30 Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 4; MCL 211.78(1) (“The legislature finds that there 
exists in this state a continuing need to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state 
and its municipalities by encouraging the efficient and expeditious return to productive use 
of property returned for delinquent taxes.”).  See also Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, 505 
Mich 429, 442 n 10; 952 NW2d 434 (2020) (“The former foreclosure process could extend 
many years, causing properties to deteriorate and become clouded with poor title, which 
often led to title-insurance companies refusing to insure these properties.  As a result, the 
Legislature overhauled the GPTA in 1999.  The current scheme expedites the foreclosure 
process, thereby reducing the amount of abandoned, tax-delinquent properties within the 
state.”) (citation omitted). 
31 Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 8 (emphasis altered). 
 
 
  
12 
We further recognized that the monetary-damages remedy in MCL 211.78l was the only 
remedy available to property owners after the redemption and appeal periods expired and 
that the GPTA did not provide an exception for property owners deprived of notice 
sufficient to satisfy due process.   
Through these provisions, the Legislature attempted to insulate foreclosure 
judgments from becoming undone by eliminating a property owner’s ability to recoup the 
property after the judgment was finalized and by limiting the owner’s remedy to monetary 
damages.  Our decision in Perfecting Church held that this attempt was unconstitutional as 
applied to those property owners deprived of due process, explaining:  
[T]he statute permits a foreclosing governmental unit to ignore completely 
the mandatory notice provisions of the GPTA, seize absolute title to a 
taxpayer’s property, and sell the property, leaving the circuit court impotent 
to provide a remedy for the blatant deprivation of due process.  That 
interpretation, allowing for the deprivation of due process without any 
redress would be patently unconstitutional.  Unfortunately, as noted above, 
the plain language of the statute simply does not permit a construction that 
renders the statute constitutional because the statute’s jurisdictional 
limitation encompasses all foreclosures, including those where there has 
been a failure to satisfy minimum due process requirements, as well as those 
situations in which constitutional notice is provided, but the property owner 
does not receive actual notice.  In cases where the foreclosing governmental 
unit complies with the GPTA notice provisions, MCL 211.78k is not 
problematic.  Indeed, MCL 211.78l provides in such cases a damages remedy 
that is not constitutionally required.  However, in cases where the foreclosing 
entity fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice, MCL 211.78k 
permits a property owner to be deprived of the property without due process 
of law.  Because the Legislature cannot create a statutory regime that allows 
for constitutional violations with no recourse, that portion of the statute 
purporting to limit the circuit court’s jurisdiction to modify judgments of 
 
 
  
13 
foreclosure is unconstitutional and unenforceable as applied to property 
owners who are denied due process.[32] 
While our analysis in Perfecting Church described the GPTA’s constitutional infirmity 
only in terms of the jurisdictional limitation on circuit courts provided in MCL 211.78k(6), 
the limited monetary-damages remedy provided in MCL 211.78l(1) was an indispensable 
part of the Legislature’s unconstitutional scheme.33   
Citing Perfecting Church, 2CC argues that this Court has previously recognized that 
a former property owner who receives constitutionally adequate notice, but not actual 
notice, may sustain an action for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1) for not having 
received “any notice” under the GPTA.  Admittedly, Perfecting Church is not a model of 
clarity as to when an owner could have made a claim for those monetary damages.  But 
that issue was not squarely before us in Perfecting Church.  Unlike 2CC, the property 
owner in Perfecting Church only sought the return of its property by filing a motion for 
 
                                              
32 Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
33 See Rafaeli, 505 Mich at 452-453 n 50 (“The GPTA, at one point, limited property 
owners to a damages action under MCL 211.78l . . . .  Once the judgment of foreclosure 
was entered and the former property owner’s interest in the property was extinguished, the 
former owner could not bring an action for possession.  But, in [Perfecting Church], this 
Court held that limitation unconstitutional.  Thus, property owners can now file a motion 
to set aside their judgment of foreclosure if the foreclosing governmental unit failed to 
comply with due process when providing notice to owners.”).  See also Smith, Foreclosure 
of Real Property Tax Liens Under Michigan’s New Foreclosure Process, 29 Mich Real 
Prop Rev 51, 52 (2002) (“The legislature sought to address th[e] problem [created by the 
former tax-foreclosure process] by limiting the remedy available to former owners who 
lost property through tax foreclosure to an action for money damages in the Court of 
Claims.  This remedy is at the heart of the legislative plan to make title to foreclosed 
property insurable by eliminating the possibility of foreclosed property being reacquired 
by the delinquent former owners or interest holders through the courts.”). 
 
 
  
14 
relief from the foreclosure judgment entered in the circuit court; it did not file an action in 
the Court of Claims seeking monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1).  The sine qua non 
of our holding in Perfecting Church was that the jurisdictional limitation on a circuit 
court’s ability to set aside finalized foreclosure judgments in MCL 211.78k(6), together 
with the GPTA’s limited avenue of relief in the form of monetary damages in MCL 
211.78l(1), rendered these provisions unconstitutional as applied to those property owners 
deprived of due process.  Because the property owner in Perfecting Church was deprived 
of notice sufficient to satisfy due process, it was permitted to set aside the foreclosure 
judgment.34  Thus, our brief discussion in Perfecting Church regarding the type of notice 
required to sustain an action for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1) is obiter dicta.35  
To the extent this Court in Perfecting Church opined on the meaning of “any notice” in 
MCL 211.78l(1), it was unnecessary to the determination of the matter at hand.   
C.  ALTERNATIVE REMEDY  
Having clarified that the phrase “any notice” as it was used in MCL 211.78l(1) was 
not limited to actual notice, we further specify when a claimant may sustain an action for 
monetary damages under the GPTA for not having received “any notice.”  As an initial 
matter, the Court of Appeals below erred by suggesting that the remedy recognized in 
 
                                              
34 Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 8-11. 
35 People v Peltola, 489 Mich 174, 190 n 32; 803 NW2d 140 (2011) (“Obiter dicta are not 
binding precedent.  Instead, they are statements that are unnecessary to determine the case 
at hand and, thus, lack the force of an adjudication.”) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
 
  
15 
Perfecting Church of setting aside a foreclosure judgment on due-process grounds is 
mutually exclusive from the monetary-damages remedy provided in MCL 211.78l(1).36  
This Court in Perfecting Church did not find the GPTA’s scheme unconstitutional as a 
whole, and we did not strike MCL 211.78l(1) as an available remedy.  Instead, former 
property owners and interest holders who did not receive constitutionally adequate notice 
of a foreclosure had two alternative remedies available to them after the judgment of 
foreclosure entered and the redemption and appeal periods expired: they could either (1) 
bring an action in the circuit court to set aside the judgment of foreclosure according to 
Perfecting Church37 or (2) bring an action for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l to 
recover “the fair market value of the property” as of the date the judgment of foreclosure 
was entered, “less any taxes, interest, penalties, and fees owed on the property as of that 
date.”38 
For either remedy to apply, however, the former property owner must have 
established that he or she did not receive constitutionally adequate notice sufficient to 
satisfy the minimum requirements of due process.  Again, to sustain an action for monetary 
damages under MCL 211.78l(1), the claimant was required to show “that he or she did not 
 
                                              
36 See 2 Crooked Creek, 329 Mich App at 49 (“Plaintiffs received due process; had they 
not, they would not be proceeding for a claim of damages under MCL 211.78l.  The only 
issue is whether 2CC received any notice.”). 
37 Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 10-11.  Of course, the remedy recognized in Perfecting 
Church, which is one of constitutional dimensions, remains available to those property 
owners and interest holders deprived of constitutionally adequate notice.  Id. 
38 MCL 211.78l(4). 
 
 
  
16 
receive any notice required under [the GPTA] . . . .”  A plain reading of the phrase “any 
notice” certainly encompasses notice sufficient to satisfy due process.39  This 
understanding is entirely consistent with MCL 211.78(2), which provides: 
It is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of this act relating 
to the return, forfeiture, and foreclosure of property for delinquent taxes 
satisfy the minimum requirements of due process required under the 
constitution of this state and the constitution of the United States but that 
those provisions do not create new rights beyond those required under the 
state constitution of 1963 or the constitution of the United States.  The failure 
of this state or a political subdivision of this state to follow a requirement of 
this act relating to the return, forfeiture, or foreclosure of property for 
delinquent taxes shall not be construed to create a claim or cause of action 
against this state or a political subdivision of this state unless the minimum 
requirements of due process accorded under the state constitution of 1963 or 
the constitution of the United States are violated. 
“As an overall principle, MCL 211.78(2) provides that the adequacy of notice under 
the [GPTA] is governed by state and federal due process standards, rather than by specific 
provisions of the act.”40  Indeed, we have declined to address a plaintiff’s allegations that 
a foreclosing governmental unit violated specific provisions of the GPTA because, “[a]s a 
practical matter, any remedies available to [a] plaintiff are contingent on her constitutional 
 
                                              
39 See pp 8-10 & notes 21-27 of this opinion.  See also Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer, 481 
Mich 503, 509; 751 NW2d 453 (2008) (“A fundamental requirement of due process in [tax-
foreclosure] proceedings is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections. . . .  [T]he means employed to notify interested parties must 
be . . . means that one who actually desires to inform the interested parties might 
reasonably employ to accomplish actual notice.  However, due process does not require 
that a property owner receive actual notice . . . .”) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets 
omitted).   
40 Republic Bank v Genesee Co Treasurer, 471 Mich 732, 737; 690 NW2d 917 (2005). 
 
 
  
17 
claim.”41  2CC dismisses the significance of MCL 211.78(2), arguing that because MCL 
211.78l(1) provided a postforeclosure cause of action separate from “the provisions of [the 
GPTA] relating to the return, forfeiture, and foreclosure of property for delinquent taxes,”42 
a claim for monetary damages under the GPTA was not limited to claims of a lack of 
minimum due process.  2CC’s interpretation of these provisions is overly broad.  MCL 
211.78(2) specifically sets forth the Legislature’s intent to comply with the minimum 
requirements of due process without granting additional rights that may interfere with the 
foreclosure process,43 while MCL 211.78l(1) represented the Legislature’s attempt to limit 
 
                                              
41 Sidun, 481 Mich at 510 n 4, citing MCL 211.78(2).  See also Sidun, 481 Mich at 510 n 4 
(“ ‘The failure of the foreclosing governmental unit to comply with any provision of this 
section shall not invalidate any proceeding under this act if the owner of a property interest 
or a person to whom a tax deed was issued is accorded the minimum due process required 
under the state constitution of 1963 and the constitution of the United States.’ ”), quoting 
MCL 211.78i(10).  Given the statement in Sidun that any remedies are contingent on the 
plaintiff’s constitutional claim and given our holding today, we disavow the Court of 
Appeals’ statement in Gillie v Genesee Co Treasurer that “statutory notice rights can be 
violated, giving rise to an action for money damages, yet minimum due process may have 
been satisfied.”  Gillie, 277 Mich App 333, 353 n 10; 745 NW2d 137 (2007), citing 
Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 10.  And given the foregoing, we disagree with the 
concurrence’s suggestion that a claimant could sustain an action for monetary damages 
under MCL 211.78l(1) by showing that any of the GPTA provisions require actual notice 
and that the claimant failed to receive such notice. 
42 MCL 211.78(2). 
43 See Republic Bank, 471 Mich at 737.  See also Michigan’s New Foreclosure Process, 
29 Mich Real Prop Rev at 59-60 (explaining that in enacting the 1999 amendments of the 
GPTA, the Legislature “specifically stated that its intent was to require compliance with 
the minimum requirements of due process for interest holders of tax delinquent property 
without creating any additional rights that may interfere with the foreclosure process”).  
 
 
  
18 
all remedies available under the GPTA to monetary damages.44  Reading these two 
provisions together, it is clear that the Legislature, in enacting the 1999 amendments of the 
GPTA, intended to provide monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1) only to those former 
property owners who did not receive constitutionally adequate notice.  Although MCL 
211.78l(1) provided “a damages remedy that [was] not constitutionally required,”45 a due-
process violation for lack of notice still served as necessary predicate for such a claim.46   
Accordingly, property owners who received constitutionally adequate notice 
sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process under the GPTA would have 
necessarily received notice required under the GPTA and, thus, could not sustain an action 
for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1).  In this case, because 2CC has already been 
adjudicated to have received such notice, 2CC cannot establish that it did not receive any 
notice required under the GPTA.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed 
2CC’s action for monetary damages under MCL 211.78l(1), albeit for the wrong reasons.47   
 
                                              
44 See Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 8; Michigan’s New Foreclosure Process, 29 Mich 
Real Prop Rev at 52.   
45 Perfecting Church, 478 Mich at 10. 
46 2CC argues that this conclusion renders MCL 211.78l a dead letter because former 
property owners deprived of due process will always move to set aside the foreclosure 
judgment rather than make a claim for monetary damages.  Yet there may be instances in 
which an event occurs on the property after foreclosure, such as a flood, fire, or unforeseen 
circumstance, that causes the property’s value to decrease.  In that case, a former property 
owner denied constitutionally adequate notice may wish to cut his or her losses and seek 
monetary relief.  Thus, returning the property to the former owner is not always a superior 
remedy to monetary damages as 2CC suggests.   
47 Our holding today implicates principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  See Adair 
v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 121; 680 NW2d 386 (2004) (“The doctrine of res judicata is 
 
 
  
19 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals but clarify that the monetary-
damages provision of the GPTA provided a remedy available only to former property 
owners and interest holders who did not receive constitutionally adequate notice sufficient 
to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process.  Because 2CC received such notice, 
it cannot sustain an action under MCL 211.78l(1). 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
 
                                              
employed to prevent multiple suits litigating the same cause of action.  The doctrine bars a 
second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both 
actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in the second case was, 
or could have been, resolved in the first. . . .  [The doctrine] bars not only claims already 
litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising 
reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.”); Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 
Mich 679, 682-685; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (“Generally, for collateral estoppel to apply 
three elements must be satisfied: (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment must have 
been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties 
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be 
mutuality of estoppel.”) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).  As stated 
earlier, in In re Cass Co Treasurer, unpub op at 1, 8-9, the Court of Appeals held that 
defendant’s efforts to notify 2CC of the foreclosure under the GPTA were sufficient to 
satisfy the minimum requirements of due process.  See p 4 & note 7 of this opinion.  
Therefore, because we conclude that the phrase “any notice” as it was used in MCL 
211.78l(1) encompassed all constitutionally sufficient notice and that the statute provided 
relief only if a property holder’s due-process rights were violated, defendant was entitled 
to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (prior judgment). 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
2 CROOKED CREEK, LLC, and RUSSIAN 
FERRO ALLOYS, INC., 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 159856 
 
CASS COUNTY TREASURER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
VIVIANO, J. (concurring in judgment). 
I concur in the judgment.  The only question we must answer in this case is whether 
plaintiffs, 2 Crooked Creek, LLC, and Russian Ferro Alloys, Inc., are correct that MCL 
211.78l(1) allowed them to bring a claim for monetary damages if they failed to receive 
“actual notice.”1  They assert, in essence, that defendant, the Cass County Treasurer, was 
obligated under this statutory provision to provide them with “actual notice.”  The majority 
rejects this argument, concluding that the statute allowed monetary claims only if the 
plaintiffs failed to receive constitutionally adequate notice.  That is, the majority concludes 
that if the plaintiffs received all the notice our federal and state Constitutions require, they 
                                              
1 Amendments of the statute in 2020 removed the “actual notice” language at issue here.  
See 2020 PA 256.  All references in this opinion to MCL 211.78l(1) are to the version in 
effect before the 2020 amendment of the statute. 
 
 
2
cannot sue for monetary damages even if they did not receive all the notice the statute 
required. 
While I harbor doubts the majority is correct that the version of the statute applicable 
to this case permitted monetary-damages claims only when the notice was constitutionally 
insufficient, I believe it is unnecessary to resolve that question here.  Even assuming 
plaintiffs are correct that MCL 211.78l(1) allowed claims to be brought when 
constitutionally adequate notice has been given, plaintiffs have failed to show that the 
provision allowed claims whenever taxpayers did not receive “actual notice.”  This is 
because MCL 211.78l(1) did not establish a separate notice requirement but instead simply 
incorporated the notice provisions set forth elsewhere in the General Property Tax Act, 
MCL 211.1 et seq.  A plaintiff could sue for monetary damages if “he or she did not receive 
any notice required under this act . . . .”  MCL 211.78l(1) (emphasis added).  Thus, to 
determine whether plaintiffs failed to receive “any notice required under this act,” we 
would need to examine what notice the act required.  This would involve determining 
whether plaintiffs received the notice required under the act’s numerous notice provisions.  
See, e.g., MCL 211.78i(3) (requiring, in certain circumstances, that the occupant be 
personally served with notice of the foreclosure or verbally informed of it or that notice be 
placed in a conspicuous manner on the property).  If any of these provisions require actual 
notice and that notice was not received, then the failure to receive actual notice might have 
satisfied MCL 211.781(1), enabling a monetary-damages claim.2 
                                              
2 For this reason, In re Wayne Co Treasurer Petition, 478 Mich 1, 10; 732 NW2d 458 
(2007), may have been at least partially correct in suggesting that the failure to receive 
actual notice could lead to a damages claim.  But this question need not be decided in this 
case because plaintiffs have not raised this argument. 
 
3
This is not, however, the argument plaintiffs have presented to this Court.  Instead 
of identifying what notice required by the act they did not receive, plaintiffs broadly 
contend that MCL 211.781(1) imposed a separate “actual notice” requirement.  Plaintiffs’ 
failure to address the act’s relevant notice provisions means they have fallen short of 
showing they did not receive “any notice required under this act . . . .”  Id.  Thus, even 
assuming that MCL 211.781(1) permitted monetary-damages claims for statutory 
violations that did not amount to constitutional violations, plaintiffs would still lose 
because they have failed to argue that any of the act’s actual-notice provisions were 
violated.  I therefore agree with the majority that plaintiffs cannot invoke MCL 211.781(1), 
but I would not decide, as the majority does, whether a plaintiff who received 
constitutionally sufficient notice has thereby received “any notice required under this act” 
for purposes of MCL 211.781(1).  Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 
 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
WELCH, J. did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 
considered it before she assumed office.