Title: Nelson Serrano v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1434 
____________ 
 
NELSON SERRANO,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 17, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Nelson Serrano appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and 
sentences of death.1  For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 17, 2001, Nelson Serrano was indicted under seal on four counts of 
first-degree murder for the deaths of George Gonsalves, Frank Dosso, Diane 
Patisso, and George Patisso.  The murders occurred on December 3, 1997, at Erie 
Manufacturing and Garment Conveyor Systems in Bartow.  George Gonsalves was 
one of Serrano‘s business partners.  And Frank Dosso, Diane Patisso, and George 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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Patisso were respectively the son, daughter, and son-in-law of Serrano‘s other 
business partner, Felice (Phil) Dosso.  Serrano, a dual citizen of the United States 
and Ecuador, was arrested in Ecuador on August 31, 2002, and brought to the 
United States.   
At the guilt phase, which occurred in 2006, the State presented the following 
evidence.  In the 1960s, Phil Dosso and George Gonsalves started a tool and die 
business, Erie Manufacturing Cooperative, in New York.  Their business provided 
parts to support the garment industry.  In the 1980s, Phil Dosso and George 
Gonsalves met Nelson Serrano, who was working for a New Jersey company 
selling slick rail systems for the garment industry.  In the middle of the 1980s, the 
three men created a separate company, Garment Conveyor Systems.  Serrano was 
responsible for designing, selling, and installing slick rail systems, while Dosso 
and Gonsalves built the parts.   
In the late 1980s, the partners moved the business to Bartow, Florida.  At 
that time, they closed Erie Manufacturing Cooperative and transferred all the assets 
to Erie Manufacturing, Inc.  As part of their oral agreement, Serrano bought into 
the Erie partnership and agreed to pay Phil Dosso and George Gonsalves $75,000 
each.  Therefore, all three men were equal partners in both Garment Conveyor 
Systems and Erie Manufacturing.  Garment moved to Bartow as well.  Serrano‘s 
son, Francisco Serrano, began working at the business soon after they relocated to 
 
- 3 - 
Bartow, and Phil Dosso‘s son, Frank Dosso, began working there at a later date.  
Phil Dosso‘s son-in-law, George Patisso, was also an employee of the business. 
 By the early 1990s, the business was doing well.  However, friction 
between the three partners had developed.  Nelson Serrano had failed to pay the 
$75,000 to each of his partners.  Further, there were disagreements about the 
distribution of assets and accusations that there were two sets of books.  Then, in 
the summer of 1997, Phil Dosso and George Gonsalves fired Francisco Serrano.  
Also in the summer of 1997, Nelson Serrano opened a separate business checking 
account with a different bank and deposited two Erie checks totaling over 
$200,000.  And Serrano instituted a civil suit against his partners.  Ultimately, 
Serrano was removed as president by a vote of the other two partners, and the 
locks were changed on the building.   
Numerous Erie employees testified to the strained relations between Serrano 
and the other two partners, particularly Serrano‘s dislike of Gonsalves.  Serrano 
made statements indicating that he wished Gonsalves were deceased.  
Additionally, Phil Dosso testified to hearing Serrano state that he felt like killing 
Gonsalves. 
On the evening of the murders, most Erie employees left work at 5 p.m. or 
shortly thereafter.  However, as was his usual practice, George Gonsalves worked 
late.  David Catalan, an employee at Erie, testified that when he left with another 
 
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employee shortly after 5 p.m. George Gonsalves‘ car was the only car in the 
parking lot.  Although George Patisso and Frank Dosso remained at Erie with 
Gonsalves, they did not have a car parked in front because George Patisso‘s wife, 
Diane Patisso, had plans to pick them up and take them to Frank Dosso‘s home for 
a family birthday party.   
When family members began calling Frank Dosso and could not get an 
answer, Phil Dosso and his wife decided to drive to Erie.  As Phil and Nicoletta 
Dosso entered Erie‘s unlocked front door, they discovered the deceased body of 
their daughter, Diane Patisso.  Phil Dosso called 911 and ran to Frank Dosso‘s 
office, where he discovered the bodies of George Gonsalves, George Patisso, and 
Frank Dosso.    
When the first law enforcement officers arrived at the scene at 7:36 p.m., 
there were only three cars parked in front of the entrance:  Phil Dosso‘s car, Diane 
Patisso‘s car, and George Gonsalves‘ car.  Inside Erie, law enforcement discovered 
twelve shell casings, eleven from a .22 and one from a .32.  All of the victims had 
been shot in the head with .22 bullets, and Diane Patisso was also shot once with a 
.32 bullet.  The three men were shot execution-style.  While neither murder 
weapon was ever located, the State introduced evidence that Serrano possessed and 
owned multiple .22 and .32 caliber firearms.   
 
- 5 - 
In the office containing the three male victims, officers discovered a blue 
vinyl chair with shoe impressions on the seat.  Directly above the chair, a ceiling 
tile had been dislodged.  Although this office was Frank Dosso‘s office at the time 
of the murders, it had been Nelson Serrano‘s office when he worked at Erie.  David 
Catalan testified that on one occasion, he saw Serrano in his office with a gun.  
Serrano was standing on a chair, moving a ceiling tile, and taking papers out of the 
ceiling.  Further, Erie employee Velma Ellis testified that the blue chair in Frank 
Dosso‘s office was never used and always remained under a desk in the office and 
that there were papers and a box piled on top of the chair‘s seat.  Ellis testified that 
the chair was in its usual position under the desk when she left work on December 
3, 1997, at 5 p.m.  Crime analysts tested the shoe impressions on the dusty seat of 
the blue vinyl chair and found that the class characteristics and wear pattern were 
consistent with a pair of shoes Serrano owned and later loaned to a nephew.   
The State‘s theory at trial was that Serrano kept a .32 caliber firearm hidden 
in the ceiling of his office.  Once he was ousted from the company and the locks 
were changed he was unable to retrieve the gun until the night of the murders.  
After Serrano had shot the three male victims in his former office and was leaving 
the scene, Diane Patisso entered the building and was shot with both a .22 and the 
retrieved .32.  An FDLE agent testified that Serrano told the agent that he would 
 
- 6 - 
hide a gun in the ceiling of his office when he was out of town on business.  
However, Serrano‘s fingerprints and DNA were not discovered at the crime scene. 
When officers first discovered the four victims at Erie, their investigation 
immediately focused on Serrano.  As soon as Serrano returned to his home from a 
business trip to Atlanta on December 4, 1997, detectives requested that he come to 
the police station for an interview.  At the police station, Serrano told law 
enforcement about his problems with his partners and explained to the detective 
that he had learned of the murders the previous evening when he had called his 
wife from his Atlanta hotel.   
During his interview with law enforcement, Serrano detailed his business 
trip itinerary, which included leaving Lakeland early on the morning of December 
2, flying from Orlando to Washington, D.C., and, on the evening of December 2, 
flying from Washington to Atlanta.  Serrano indicated that he remained in Atlanta 
until December 4, 1997.  When asked by the detective what he thought may have 
happened at Erie, Serrano replied that ―
somebody is getting even; somebody they 
cheated, and George is capable of that.‖  Thereafter, the detective took Serrano‘s 
taped statement, which was played for the jury.  During his taped statement, 
Serrano stated that maybe Diane Patisso ―
walked in the middle of something.‖   
Officers traveled to Atlanta to investigate Serrano‘s alibi and met with Larry 
Heflin of Astechnologies regarding his business meeting with Serrano.  Heflin 
 
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testified that he met Serrano in Atlanta on December 3 at about 9:45 a.m., and the 
meeting lasted approximately one hour.  Investigators also obtained the La Quinta 
Inn airport hotel‘s surveillance videotapes.  The video showed Serrano in the 
Atlanta hotel lobby at 12:19 p.m. on December 3.  Ten hours later, at 10:17 p.m., 
Serrano was again seen on the video, entering the hotel lobby from the outside, 
wearing the same sweater and jacket as earlier in the afternoon.  
Alvaro Penaherrera, Serrano‘s nephew, testified that on two separate 
occasions Serrano asked Penaherrera to rent a car for him so that Serrano‘s wife 
would not find out about the rentals.  On October 29, 1997, Serrano drove 
Penaherrera to the Orlando airport, where Penaherrera picked up a rental car.  
Penaherrera then drove the car and left it at a nearby valet lot.  Thereafter, Serrano 
drove Penaherrera back to his apartment.  Penaherrera had no further contact with 
the rental car and did not know who returned it on October 31, 1997, at 7:30 p.m.    
 
Around Thanksgiving 1997, Serrano again asked Penaherrera to rent a car 
for him under Penaherrera‘s name because Serrano had a girlfriend from Brazil 
coming into town.  On November 23, 1997, Penaherrera made a telephone 
reservation for a rental car for December 3, 1997.   On December 3, 1997, at 7:53 
a.m., Serrano called Penaherrera from Atlanta and asked him to call to confirm the 
rental car reservation.  Serrano called Penaherrera back at 8:06 a.m. to verify that 
the rental car would be ready.  Penaherrera then drove to Orlando‘s airport and 
 
- 8 - 
parked his car in the parking garage, rented the car from the terminal dealership, 
and drove the rental car back to the Orlando airport parking garage, where he left it 
as his uncle requested.  Later that day, Serrano called Penaherrera, and Penaherrera 
told Serrano where the car was located and where the keys were hidden.    
As on the previous occasion in October, Penaherrera did not expect to have 
any further involvement with the rental car after he left it at the Orlando airport 
parking garage on December 3.  However, Serrano called Penaherrera the next day, 
December 4, to tell Penaherrera that the rental car was in Tampa, not Orlando, and 
that Penaherrera needed to drive to Tampa and return the car there.  Serrano told 
Penaherrera if he went to Tampa and returned the car, Serrano would pay off 
Penaherrera‘s credit card bill and Penaherrera could pay him back without interest.   
Penaherrera agreed to this arrangement and returned the rental car in Tampa at 
2:10 p.m. on December 4, 1997.  Gustavo Concha, Serrano‘s friend and 
Penaherrera‘s godfather, subsequently paid Penaherrera‘s Visa bill.     
Penaherrera next saw Serrano when he was visiting relatives in Ecuador for 
Christmas of 1997.  Serrano informed Penaherrera of the murders at Erie and told 
Penaherrera that he could not say anything about the rental cars because it would 
jeopardize his marriage and the police would frame him for the murders.   
In June 2000, Penaherrera, his girlfriend, and his brother were subpoenaed to 
testify before the grand jury.  The three spent the night at Serrano‘s house the night 
 
- 9 - 
before their testimony.  That night Serrano asked Penaherrera to tell the grand jury 
that he had rented the car for a friend with whom he had subsequently lost contact.  
Serrano also gave Penaherrera and his brother suits and dress shoes to wear to 
court.  The pair of shoes that Serrano gave Penaherrera were seized by law 
enforcement, and subsequent testing indicated that the right shoe was consistent 
with the impression on the seat of the blue chair at the murder scene.     
Also in June 2000, Penaherrera spoke for the first time with law enforcement 
regarding the December 1997 rental car transaction.  And after his testimony and 
discussions with law enforcement,  Penaherrera returned home to Orlando, where 
Serrano contacted him to find out what information he had given to the grand jury 
and law enforcement.  After Penaherrera testified before the grand jury, Serrano 
sold his home, car, and other assets and moved to Ecuador.     
The State introduced evidence regarding Serrano‘s air travel for his 
December 1997 business trip.  As explained previously, Serrano flew from 
Orlando to Washington, D.C., and then to Atlanta, on December 2, 1997.   
However, contrary to his statements to law enforcement, the State also introduced 
evidence that Serrano traveled back to Florida on the day of the murders using two 
aliases.  The State theorized that on the day of the murders Serrano flew from 
Atlanta to Orlando under the name Juan Agacio.  Serrano then drove the car rented 
by Penaherrera on December 3 from the Orlando airport to Bartow, where he killed 
 
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the four victims.  Thereafter, he immediately drove the rental car to the Tampa 
airport, where he departed on a flight back to Atlanta using the alias John White.  
To support its theory and timeline of Serrano‘s activities on the day of the 
murders, the State introduced the videotape evidence demonstrating that Serrano 
was in the La Quinta Inn‘s lobby in Atlanta shortly after noon on December 3, 
1997.  According to Serrano, he returned to his hotel room for the next ten hours 
because he was suffering from a migraine headache.  However, the State 
introduced evidence that at 1:36 p.m. on December 3 a passenger calling himself 
Juan Agacio boarded Delta flight 1807 in Atlanta, scheduled to depart at 1:41 p.m. 
for Orlando.  At 3:05 p.m., the passenger purporting to be Juan Agacio arrived in 
Orlando on flight 1807, and at 3:49 p.m., the rental car that Penaherrera had rented 
exited the Orlando parking garage.   
Serrano‘s fingerprint was located on the parking garage ticket, indicating 
that Serrano departed from the Orlando airport garage at 3:49 p.m on December 3, 
1997.  And Serrano has a son, who was named Juan Carlos Serrano at birth and 
whose mother‘s maiden name is Gladys Agacio.  Additionally, the round-trip ticket 
for the Atlanta-to-Orlando flight of the passenger flying under the name Juan 
Agacio was purchased with cash at the Orlando airport on November 23, 1997, 
which is the same date that Penaherrera reserved the rental car for December 3, 
1997.  The State also introduced evidence that Serrano‘s vehicle left the Orlando 
 
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airport‘s parking garage about twenty minutes after the passenger traveling under 
the name Juan Agacio purchased his ticket.  The return portion of the flight was 
never used.    
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on December 3, 1997, a person was seen 
standing off the side of the road near Erie‘s building.  When John Purvis left work 
on December 3, 1997, he noticed the man wearing a suit standing in the grassy area 
with no car in the vicinity.  The man was holding his coat and hands in front of his 
face as if he were lighting a cigarette.  Both Alvaro Penaherrera and Maureen 
Serrano testified that Serrano smoked, but they did not testify that he specifically 
smoked cigarettes.  Purvis described the man, and law enforcement made a 
composite sketch that was shown to the jury.      
Approximately two hours after the murders, at 7:28 p.m., the passenger 
flying under the name John White arrived at Tampa International Airport and 
checked into Delta Airlines for flight 1272 to Atlanta.  Similar to the purchasing 
process for the ticket in the name of Juan Agacio, the purchaser paid for a round-
trip ticket at Tampa International Airport on November 23, 1997, and never used 
the return portion of the ticket.  Flight 1272 was scheduled to arrive in Atlanta at 
9:41 p.m.   
At 10:17 p.m., Serrano was observed in Atlanta on videotape walking into 
the La Quinta Inn airport hotel lobby from the outside, wearing the same clothes he 
 
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had been wearing ten hours earlier.  After being observed in the hotel lobby, 
Serrano used his cell phone to call various individuals, including his wife.  The 
next morning he made multiple calls to Alvaro Penaherrera telling him he had to 
return the rental car that was now located at Tampa airport.   
Furthermore, the State presented evidence that the car rented by Penaherrera 
on December 3 had been driven 139 miles.  The distance from the Orlando airport 
to Erie is eighty miles, and the distance from Erie to the Tampa airport is fifty 
miles, totaling 130 miles.   
While incarcerated awaiting trial, Serrano spoke to fellow inmate and 
―
jailhouse lawyer,‖ Leslie Todd Jones, about his case.  Serrano denied any 
involvement in the murders, telling Jones that he believed a mafia hitman may 
have committed the murders, or alternatively, that Frank Dosso wanted to take 
over the business from George Gonsalves.  The main theory Serrano described 
involved a hitman Serrano knew only as John, who was owed a substantial amount 
of money by the Dosso and Gonsalves families.  Serrano explained to Jones that he 
and the hitman drove to the airports in Tampa and Orlando and that John 
purchased tickets under the names of Todd White and Juan Agacio.  Serrano told 
Jones that the hitman had planned to approach the business partners on Halloween 
night, but it was raining and the business was closed.   Serrano also told Jones 
 
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about his fingerprint being found on a parking ticket in Orlando, but Serrano 
claimed that an FDLE agent had planted his fingerprint.     
After law enforcement learned about the Halloween incident from inmate 
Jones, they began investigating and discovered almost an identical pattern of travel 
as the travel surrounding the December 3, 1997, murders.  Serrano once again was 
traveling on a business trip from Orlando to Charlotte from October 30 to 
November 2, 1997.  And as previously discussed, on October 29, Serrano took 
Alvaro Penaherrera to the Orlando airport, where Penaherrera rented a car for 
Serrano and left it at a nearby valet lot.  The next morning, October 30, 1997, 
Serrano flew from Orlando to Charlotte with his flight arriving in Charlotte at 8:34 
a.m.  The following day, Halloween, someone traveling under the name Juan 
Agacio took a flight departing from Charlotte at 1:40 p.m. and arriving in Orlando 
at 3:07 p.m.  At 7:30 p.m., a passenger identified as John White was scheduled to 
depart on a flight from Tampa to Charlotte.    
During the guilt phase, the defense maintained that Serrano had been in an 
Atlanta hotel room with a migraine at the time of the murders.  The defense 
emphasized that no forensic evidence linked Serrano to the scene of the crimes.  
The defense also pointed out that there was evidence of robbery at the scene as 
several offices were in disarray, Frank Dosso‘s Rolex watch was missing, and 
 
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George Patisso‘s gold chain was missing.  However, the jury returned a verdict 
finding Serrano guilty on four counts of first-degree murder. 
At the penalty phase, the State presented victim impact statements, and the 
parties stipulated that Serrano was fifty-nine years of age at the time of the murders 
and that Serrano had no prior criminal history.  The defense presented evidence 
that Serrano never received any disciplinary reports while incarcerated awaiting 
trial.  The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of nine to three for each 
of the four murder counts.   
At the Spencer2 hearing, Serrano presented numerous witnesses, some of 
whom testified by videotape from Ecuador.  Then, on June 26, 2007, the trial court 
sentenced Serrano to death for each of the four murders.  The trial court found the 
following aggravators in regards to all four murders:  (1) the murders were 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (great weight); and (2) 
Serrano was convicted of other capital felonies (the contemporaneous murders) 
(great weight).  The trial court also found that the murder of Diane Patisso was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest (great weight).  Additionally, the trial 
court found the following mitigators:  (1) Serrano had no significant history of 
prior criminal activity (great weight); (2) Serrano was in his late fifties at the time 
of the crimes (some moderate weight); (3) Serrano performed well in school 
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  
 
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(moderate weight); (4) Serrano has a good social history (moderate weight); (5) 
Serrano had no history of drug or alcohol abuse (some weight); (6) Serrano was a 
successful Hispanic immigrant (moderate weight); (7) Serrano displayed positive 
behavior during his pretrial incarceration (some weight); (8) Serrano displayed 
positive behavior during his court appearances (some weight); (9) Serrano 
expressed remorse regarding the death of Diane Patisso (slight weight); (10) 
Serrano had a good employment history (some weight); (11) Serrano was a good 
husband (some weight); (12) he was a good father (some weight); (13) Serrano was 
positively involved in his religion (some weight); and (14) he had a significant 
history of good works (moderate weight).   
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Serrano raises nine issues on appeal:  (1) whether the circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether Serrano‘s statements 
to FDLE Agent Tommy Ray were admissible; (3) whether the trial court properly 
denied Serrano‘s motions to dismiss the indictment and divest itself of jurisdiction; 
(4) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that entitles Serrano to relief; (5) 
whether the trial court properly denied Serrano‘s motion for a change of venue; (6) 
whether the testimony of the State‘s bloodstain pattern expert was admissible; (7) 
whether the State improperly cross-examined Serrano‘s character witnesses about 
collateral crimes at the Spencer hearing; (8) whether the avoid arrest aggravator 
 
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was properly submitted to the jury and found by the trial court; and (9) whether 
Serrano‘s death sentence is constitutional.  We also review whether Serrano‘s 
death sentences are proportionate.  However, as explained below, none of these 
issues warrants relief. 
(1) Sufficiency of Evidence 
Serrano argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for 
judgment of acquittal in this circumstantial evidence case.  We disagree. 
 
―
In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of 
review applies.‖  Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1145 (Fla. 2007) (citing 
Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2003)).  ―
[C]ourts should not grant a 
motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which 
the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained 
under the law.‖  Id. (quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974)).  
―
However, ‗
where a conviction is based wholly upon circumstantial evidence, a 
special standard of review applies.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 
155 (Fla. 2002)).   
―
[A] motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a case based 
wholly upon circumstantial evidence if the [S]tate fails to present evidence from 
which the jury could exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.‖  Id. 
at 1146.  However, ―
[t]he [S]tate is not required to ‗
rebut conclusively every 
 
- 17 - 
possible variation‘ of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to 
introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant‘s theory of 
events.‖  Darling, 808 So. 2d at 156 (quoting State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 189 
(Fla. 1989)).  ―
Once the State meets this threshold burden, it becomes the jury‘s 
duty to determine ‗
whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses 
of innocence . . . , and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support 
the jury verdict, [the Court] will not reverse.‘ ‖  Reynolds, 934 So. 2d at 1146 
(quoting Law, 559 So. 2d at 188). 
In this case, Serrano‘s hypothesis of innocence was that he was in his hotel 
room in Atlanta suffering from a migraine when the murders took place.  But the 
State introduced competent evidence that is inconsistent with Serrano‘s alibi.  Most 
significantly, the State produced fingerprint evidence placing Serrano at the airport 
in Orlando during the time he claims he was in Atlanta.  His fingerprint was 
discovered on a parking ticket, indicating that Serrano departed from the Orlando 
airport at 3:49 p.m on December 3, 1997.   
Because the State met its burden of rebutting Serrano‘s alibi hypothesis, it 
became the jury‘s duty to determine whether the evidence failed to exclude all 
reasonable hypotheses of innocence.  See Reynolds, 934 So. 2d at 1146.  And there 
is competent substantial evidence to support the jury‘s determination in this case.  
See id.  
 
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First, the State introduced circumstantial evidence of an elaborate plan to 
establish an alibi, a plan Serrano developed and began to implement ahead of time.  
Using Serrano‘s travel itinerary, the travel itineraries of the person flying under the 
names of Juan Agacio and John White, and Alvarro Penaherrera‘s car rentals, the 
State demonstrated that on the day of the murders Serrano flew from Atlanta to 
Orlando under the name Juan Agacio, drove the car rented by Penaherrera to 
Bartow, and then drove the car to Tampa, where he flew back to Atlanta as John 
White.  Then, once he returned to Atlanta and was visible on his hotel‘s 
surveillance system, Serrano began using his cell phone.   
Second, the State introduced circumstantial evidence to place Serrano at Erie 
at the time of the murders.  Specifically, the State presented evidence of a 
dislodged ceiling tile in Serrano‘s former office, testimony that Serrano would hide 
items in the ceiling by dislodging a ceiling tile in his office, and testimony that a 
shoe impression on a chair below the dislodged ceiling tile was consistent with a 
shoe that Serrano owned.  The State also introduced a composite sketch of a male 
seen outside the crime scene near the time of the murders.  The jury was able to 
view the composite sketch and compare it to Serrano‘s appearance on the day of 
the murders as depicted in the Atlanta hotel‘s surveillance video.  Finally, the State 
presented evidence regarding Serrano‘s statements to police the day after the 
murders.  The jury heard Serrano‘s taped interview with police from the day after 
 
- 19 - 
the murders where Serrano stated that Diane Patisso must have ―
walked in the 
middle of something,‖ a fact that had not been released to the public.         
Furthermore, there is evidence that Serrano had motive to kill Gonsalves, 
namely testimony regarding business problems between the partners and testimony 
that Serrano had expressed animosity towards Gonsalves and had even stated that 
he wished Gonsalves were deceased.  There is also evidence that Serrano had 
access to the caliber of firearms used to shoot the victims.   
Given this competent substantial evidence supporting an inference of guilt to 
the exclusion of all other inferences, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 
support Serrano‘s convictions.  The trial court properly denied Serrano‘s motion 
for judgment of acquittal.   
(2) Statements to Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Agent 
Next, Serrano argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the statements he made to FDLE Agent Ray while traveling from Ecuador 
to the United States.  After Serrano was placed on an airplane with Agent Ray to 
travel to Florida, he was read his Miranda rights.  The FDLE agent then asked 
Serrano if he wished to make a statement.  Serrano responded that he did not wish 
to say anything ―
at this time.‖  Less than two hours later, Serrano asked the FDLE 
agent how much they had paid the police in Ecuador to capture him.  After 
answering that they had not paid the Ecuadorian police anything, the FDLE agent 
 
- 20 - 
began asking Serrano questions.  Agent Ray did not readvise Serrano of his rights 
or obtain a waiver.  This conversation lasted approximately thirty minutes.  
Eventually, Serrano told the FDLE agent that the agent was starting to talk 
business and that he did not want to talk business.  The questioning stopped at that 
point. 
Agent Ray testified that Serrano stated the following during their 
conversation on the plane:  (1) Serrano did not return to the United States to attend 
a civil hearing in his lawsuit against his Erie partners because he thought the 
hearing was a trick; (2) he had deposited the checks in the other bank to stop his 
partners from stealing the funds; (3) Gonsalves ―
was nothing but a liar, a swindler, 
and a thief‖; (4) Frank Dosso was connected to the mafia, and the murders were 
the result of Frank Dosso hiring a hitman that he had never met before; (5) 
Penaherrera had rented a car on December 3, 1997, for Serrano‘s Brazilian 
girlfriend; (6) Serrano was not in Florida on the date of the murders; (7) he had a 
son named Juan Carlos; and (8) when he worked at Erie he would hide his .357 
revolver in the ceiling of his office or behind his computer. 
As this Court has explained, 
[a]ppellate courts should continue to accord a presumption of 
correctness to the trial court‘s rulings on motions to suppress with 
regard to the trial court‘s determination of historical facts, but 
appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law 
and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues.  
 
- 21 - 
Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206, 214 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So. 
2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001)).   
When faced with a defendant who was advised of his rights, initially 
exercised his right to remain silent, and then initiated a conversation with law 
enforcement and eventually confessed, this Court in Welch, 992 So. 2d at 214, 
generally stated the following: 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments‘ prohibition against self-
incrimination requires advising a prospective defendant that he has the 
right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of counsel.  
384 U.S. at 479; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981).  
After being advised of his rights, if an accused indicates that he 
wishes to remain silent, ―
the interrogation must cease.‖  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 474; see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482. 
Then, when determining the admissibility of the defendant‘s confession, this Court 
applied the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).   
 
In this case, we do not determine whether the admission of Serrano‘s 
statements to Agent Ray was erroneous under Bradshaw, because any possible 
error here was harmless.  The evidence was generally cumulative of other evidence 
presented.  For example, an Erie employee testified to seeing Serrano with a gun in 
his office while Serrano was standing on a chair removing something from the 
ceiling.  A bank employee testified to the fact that Serrano had opened a separate 
checking account to deposit Erie funds.  Additionally, a fellow inmate testified that 
 
- 22 - 
Serrano had told him that the murders may have been the result of a mafia hitman 
or the result of Frank Dosso wanting to take over the business.  And Penaherrera 
testified that he rented the car for Serrano and that Serrano stated that he needed 
the car for his Brazilian girlfriend.  Basically, the only statement that was not 
cumulative of other evidence was Serrano‘s statement that he did not return to the 
United States for the hearing in his civil case because it was a trick.  However, 
there is no reasonable possibility that this statement about the civil hearing affected 
the verdicts in this case.  Therefore, Serrano is not entitled to relief.   
(3) Jurisdiction 
Serrano argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he claims he 
was illegally kidnapped from Ecuador to stand trial in Florida in violation of the 
extradition treaty between the United States and Ecuador and in violation of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution.  Serrano also claims that the actions of FDLE in bringing 
Serrano to Florida were so outrageous that the due process clauses of the U.S. and 
Florida Constitutions required the trial court to divest itself of jurisdiction.  In 
support of this argument, Serrano‘s brief quotes his motion in the trial court as well 
as a report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the 
Organization of American States, which was attached to that motion.  The quoted 
motion alleges that FDLE agents ―
collaborated with Ecuadorian Police to seek the 
deportation of Mr. Serrano from Ecuador.  Such action was illegal because the 
 
- 23 - 
Defendant was also an Ecuadorian Citizen and not subject to lawful deportation.‖  
The quoted motion also claims that Serrano ―
was arrested with no other process, in 
Ecuador.  He was physically restrained, thrown into an animal cage, held 
incommunicado and the next day surreptitiously flown to the State of Florida.‖  
Serrano‘s brief states that he was physically abused and suffered bruises and 
abrasions.   
At an evidentiary hearing, Agent Ray testified that Ecuadorian national 
police officers captured Serrano in Ecuador.  Then, after Serrano was deported, the 
Ecuadorian police turned Serrano over to FDLE.  Agent Ray also testified that 
Serrano was never housed in an animal cage but instead was housed in an office 
complex located at a police canine unit.  Additionally, an ombudsman from 
Ecuador testified that he had concluded that Serrano held dual citizenship and, 
therefore, was improperly deported from Ecuador following a hearing before an 
Ecuadoran official.   
We affirm the trial court‘s denial of Serrano‘s motion to divest jurisdiction 
and dismiss the indictment.  In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 
657 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that ―
a criminal defendant, 
abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, 
[does not] thereby acquire[] a defense to the jurisdiction of this country‘s courts.‖  
Specifically, Alvarez-Machain involved a citizen and resident of Mexico who was 
 
- 24 - 
forcibly kidnapped at the behest of DEA agents to stand trial in the United States.  
Id.  And Alvarez-Machain cited and relied upon Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 
522 (1952), a case which involved a U.S. citizen defendant who had been 
kidnapped in Chicago by Michigan officers to stand trial in Michigan.  In Frisbie, 
the United States Supreme Court upheld the defendant‘s conviction against claims 
alleging violations of the due process clause and the federal kidnapping statute.  
Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522-23.  In doing so, the United States Supreme Court stated 
the following: 
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker 
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 [1886], that the power of a court to try a 
person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought 
within the court‘s jurisdiction by reason of a ―
forcible abduction.‖  No 
persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of 
cases.  They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied 
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been 
fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in 
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards.  There is 
nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty 
person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought 
to trial against his will.  
Id. at 522 (footnote omitted). 
 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Toscanino, 500 
F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), recognized an exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in 
some cases of extreme government misconduct.  In Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 268, the 
defendant alleged ―
the court acquired jurisdiction over him unlawfully through the 
conduct of American agents who kidnapped him in Uruguay, used illegal 
 
- 25 - 
electronic surveillance, tortured him [in Brazil for seventeen days,] and abducted 
him to the United States for the purpose of prosecuting him here.‖  However, even 
if there is an exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,3 there are no allegations in this 
case of misconduct similar to the level of misconduct present in Toscanino.      
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Serrano‘s claim that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over him because he was illegally deported from Ecuador is without 
merit.   
(4) Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Serrano also argues that the impact of the following prosecutorial 
misconduct requires reversal of his convictions and sentences:  (a) commenting on 
Serrano‘s right to remain silent, (b) vouching for the credibility of State witnesses, 
(c) eliciting testimony to demonstrate lack of remorse, (d) eliciting testimony to 
demonstrate bad character, (e) labeling Serrano as diabolical and a liar, and (f) 
                                          
 
 
3.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ―
refused to recognize . . . the 
second circuit‘s exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in cases of extreme 
governmental misconduct.‖  United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 
1991) (footnotes omitted) (rejecting defendant‘s claim that court lacked 
jurisdiction because he was illegally kidnapped from Hondorus and tortured before 
transport to the United States).  Moreover, other circuits have expressed doubts 
regarding the validity of the Second Circuit‘s exception in light of subsequent 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court.  See, e.g., United States v. Best, 304 
F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 763 
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mitchell, 957 F.2d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 874 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979).  
 
- 26 - 
improperly shifting the burden of proof.  However, we conclude that relief is not 
warranted. 
(a) Right to Remain Silent 
 
―
A defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify against himself 
in a criminal proceeding.‖  Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 37 (Fla. 2000).  
Therefore, this Court has explained that ―
any comment on, or which is fairly 
susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant‘s failure to testify is 
error and is strongly discouraged.‖  Id. (quoting State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 
153 (Fla. 1985)).  ―
However, it is well settled that such erroneous comments do not 
require an automatic reversal.‖  Id. at 39.  Furthermore, a trial court‘s ruling on a 
motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.  See id.  
―
[A] motion for mistrial should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as 
to vitiate the entire trial.‖  Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 372 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006)). 
 
Serrano contends that the State improperly commented on his right to remain 
silent three times.  First, the State asked FDLE Agent Ray, ―
Did Mr. Serrano 
appear before the Polk County Grand Jury?‖  Immediately after this question, 
Serrano‘s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial.  The trial court sustained the 
objection, but denied the mistrial.  However, because the trial court sustained the 
objection before the agent had answered the question, the jury never heard that 
 
- 27 - 
Serrano did not appear before the grand jury.  And the trial court instructed the jury 
to disregard the prosecutor‘s question.  Thus, any error was not so prejudicial so as 
to deny Serrano a fair trial.  Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Serrano‘s motion for a mistrial.   
 
Serrano also argues the State improperly commented on Serrano‘s right to 
remain silent during opening arguments when the prosecutor stated that Serrano 
―
had to come up with a story to tell a jury about how his fingerprint got on that 
ticket.‖  The trial court overruled Serrano‘s objection and denied his motion for 
mistrial.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making these ruling as the 
prosecutor explained that fellow inmate Leslie Todd Jones would testify at trial 
that Serrano told him that he needed to come up with a way to explain the 
fingerprint evidence and Leslie Todd Jones in fact testified that Serrano claimed 
that FDLE planted the fingerprint evidence.  Furthermore, any possible error in 
allowing this statement was harmless given that it could not have affected the 
verdicts.  See Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 38 (stating that the proper standard of 
review for an overruled objection is a harmless error standard). 
 
In addition, Serrano contends that the State improperly commented on his 
right to remain silent when the prosecutor stated during opening statements that the 
day after the murders was ―
Mr. Serrano‘s opportunity to tell the police what 
happened at Erie Manufacturing.‖  After this statement, the trial court sustained 
 
- 28 - 
Serrano‘s objection, but denied his motion for mistrial.  The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Serrano‘s mistrial motion because, factually 
speaking, Serrano‘s first opportunity to speak to the police was the day after the 
murders when he voluntarily went to the police station upon his return from 
Atlanta.  Moreover, at the close of evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury that 
Serrano had the absolute right to remain silent.         
(b) Vouching for Credibility of Witnesses 
 
It is improper for the State to place the government‘s prestige behind a 
witness or to indicate that information not presented to the jury supports a 
witness‘s testimony.  Spann v. State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1067 (Fla. 2008). 
Serrano alleges that the State improperly vouched for the credibility of its 
witness when it asked Erie employee David Catalan the following:  ―
And did I tell 
you the most important thing to do was to tell the truth?‖  David Catalan 
responded, ―
Yes, sir.‖  Thereafter, defense counsel objected and moved for a 
mistrial.  The trial court sustained the objection, denied the mistrial, and gave a 
curative instruction.  While improper, this question and answer was not so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, particularly since the trial judge gave a 
curative instruction.  Specifically, the trial judge informed the jury that ―
it is 
improper for a lawyer to vouch for the credibility of a witness.‖  Therefore, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Serrano‘s motion for mistrial. 
 
- 29 - 
Next, Serrano contends that the State improperly bolstered the testimony of 
inmate Leslie Todd Jones by eliciting from him that, if he was untruthful, his 
probation would be revoked.  The trial court sustained Serrano‘s objection, but 
denied his motion for mistrial.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the mistrial motion.  First, the State asked the question on redirect after 
Serrano impeached Jones regarding his plea agreement.  Moreover, the trial court 
instructed the jury that they had to decide for themselves whether Jones was telling 
the truth.  Specifically, the trial court told the jury, ―
And in regard to this witness, 
it [is] your job, it is you who are to decide who is telling the truth.‖  Under these 
circumstances, a mistrial was not needed.   
(c) Lack of Remorse 
 
This Court has explained that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a witness 
in a capital case if the defendant exhibits a lack of remorse.  See Randolph v. State, 
562 So. 2d 331, 337-38 (Fla. 1990). 
 
Serrano alleges that the State improperly elicited that Serrano lacked 
remorse by asking Detective Parker if Serrano cried when he was interviewed the 
day after the murders.  Detective Parker responded, ―
No.‖  However, the trial court 
sustained Serrano‘s objection, denied Serrano‘s motion for mistrial, and instructed 
the jury to disregard the question and answer.  Particularly given the curative 
instruction, this question and answer were not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire 
 
- 30 - 
trial.  Additionally, while the prosecutor in this case asked if Serrano cried, he did 
not argue to the jury that Serrano lacked remorse for these murders.  Cf.  Robinson 
v. State, 520 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1988).  Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.   
(d) Bad Character 
 
Section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that generally 
―
[e]vidence of a person‘s character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove 
action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.‖  See also Young v. State, 
195 So. 569, 569 (Fla. 1939) (―
[A] defendant‘s character may not be assailed by 
the State in a criminal prosecution unless good character of the accused has first 
been introduced.‖).  Moreover, section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes, explains that 
―
[s]imilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . is inadmissible when 
the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.‖ 
 
Serrano contends that the State improperly made comments and elicited 
evidence for the sole purpose of demonstrating Serrano‘s bad character.  First, 
Serrano points to the prosecutor‘s statement during opening argument that Serrano 
decided to ―
take some money owed to the two corporations and open up his own 
bank account‖ and that the banker at the new bank ―
knows something ain‘t right.  
You can‘t open corporate accounts by yourself.‖  Defense counsel objected and 
moved for a mistrial.  The trial court sustained the objection, denied the mistrial 
 
- 31 - 
motion, and instructed the jury to disregard these comments.  However, the State 
was not making this argument for the sake of demonstrating Serrano‘s alleged bad 
character.  Instead, the State was making this argument, and later elicited testimony 
consistent with these statements, for the relevant purpose of establishing that 
Serrano had a motive to kill his business partner because there were disagreements 
about the distribution of company assets and income.  Furthermore, these 
comments are not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, particularly since the 
trial judge instructed the jury to disregard them. 
 
In addition, Serrano argues that the State improperly elicited evidence that 
Serrano owned multiple guns for the purpose of implying that since Serrano owned 
a lot of guns, he must have been the killer in this case.  Although general 
ownership of guns does not provide evidence that one committed a murder, the 
evidence introduced in this case demonstrated that Serrano was familiar with and 
owned the caliber of firearms used to commit these murders.  Moreover, even if 
the admission of this gun evidence were considered error, the error would be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579, 585 
(Fla. 2001) (upholding admission of photos of defendant with guns that were 
similar to guns used in the murder and concluding that even if the admission of the 
photos were considered to be error, it was harmless error).   
 
- 32 - 
 
Serrano also argues that the State elicited bad character evidence based upon 
inmate Jones‘ comment that he and Serrano met when they were both housed in Q 
Dorm, which is protective custody.  Jones explained that protective custody is a 
section where people accused of murder and sex crimes are housed.  The trial court 
sustained Serrano‘s objection to this protective custody comment, denied his 
motion for mistrial, and instructed the jury to disregard it.  However, as the trial 
court noted, the jury was aware that Serrano was accused of murder.  
Consequently, any prejudice from Jones‘ comment did not deprive Serrano of a 
fair trial. 
(e) Diabolical Liar 
 
Serrano alleges that the State improperly called Serrano diabolical and a liar 
during closing arguments.  This Court has stated that closing arguments ―
must not 
be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects 
an emotional response to the crime or the defendant.‖  King v. State, 623 So. 2d 
486, 488 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985)).  
And in Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1998), this Court stated that ―
[i]t 
is clearly improper for the prosecutor to engage in vituperative or pejorative 
characterizations of a defendant or witness.‖  However, because Serrano failed to 
contemporaneously object, this claim is not preserved for appellate review.  See 
Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 1112, 1116-17 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that claim based 
 
- 33 - 
on State‘s reference to defendant as a liar was not properly before the appellate 
court without an objection).  Moreover, if there was error, it does not rise to the 
level of fundamental error.   
(f) Shifting Burden of Proof 
 
Serrano argues that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof by 
stating the following during closing arguments:  (1) ―
You can‘t come up with any 
other theory that fits that anybody else would have done it‖; (2) ―
He talks about 
this being a professional hit.  There is no evidence.  There is no evidence that these 
crimes are any kind of professional hit.‖  However, like Serrano‘s liar claim, this 
claim is not preserved for appellate review because defense counsel failed to 
contemporaneously object.  It also does not rise to the level of fundamental error as 
it does not ―
reach[] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a 
verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged 
error.‖  Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1205 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Kilgore v. 
State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1997)). 
 
Given the above, we deny Serrano‘s claim that the cumulative impact of the 
prosecutorial misconduct in this case warrants reversal. 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
(5) Change of Venue 
 
Serrano contends that the trial court abused its discretion when denying 
Serrano‘s motion for a change of venue because of the publicity surrounding this 
case.  We affirm the trial court‘s denial of the motion. 
In Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 245 (Fla. 1996), this Court stated the 
following when upholding a trial court‘s ruling denying a motion for change of 
venue based upon pretrial publicity: 
In McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1977), we 
adopted the test set forth in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), 
and Kelley v. State, 212 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), for 
determining whether to grant a change of venue: 
Knowledge of the incident because of its notoriety 
is not, in and of itself, grounds for a change of venue.  
The test for determining a change of venue is whether the 
general state of mind of the inhabitants of a community is 
so infected by knowledge of the incident and 
accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived opinions 
that jurors could not possibly put these matters out of 
their minds and try the case solely upon the evidence 
presented in the courtroom. 
[344 So. 2d at] 1278 (quoting Kelley, 212 So. 2d at 28).  See also 
Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 
1147 (1995).  In Manning v. State, 378 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1980), we 
further explained: 
An application for change of venue is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, but the defendant 
has the burden of . . . showing that the setting of the trial 
is inherently prejudicial because of the general 
atmosphere and state of mind of the inhabitants in the 
community.  A trial judge is bound to grant a motion for 
a change of venue when the evidence presented reflects 
 
- 35 - 
that the community is so pervasively exposed to the 
circumstances of the incident that prejudice, bias, and 
preconceived opinions are the natural result.  The trial 
court may make that determination upon the basis of 
evidence presented prior to the commencement of the 
jury selection process, or may withhold making the 
determination until an attempt is made to obtain impartial 
jurors to try the cause. 
Id. at 276 (citation omitted).  Ordinarily, absent an extreme or unusual 
situation, the need to change venue should not be determined until an 
attempt is made to select a jury. 
 
Similar to the prospective jurors in Henyard, the prospective jurors in this 
case were questioned extensively during voir dire about their ―
exposure to the 
pretrial publicity surrounding the case.‖  Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 245-46.  These 
voir dire proceedings indicate that a large number of the venire had never heard 
any of the details of the case.  And a number of potential jurors who were familiar 
with the case were struck for cause.  The other jurors who had heard something 
about the case stated that they could be fair and impartial or that they had not 
formed an opinion and would base any opinion on the evidence presented.  See id.; 
see also Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1997) (―
[I]f prospective jurors 
can assure the court during voir dire that they are impartial despite their extrinsic 
knowledge, they are qualified to serve on the jury, and a change of venue is not 
necessary.‖).  Therefore, the record here ―
demonstrates that the members of 
[Serrano‘s] venire did not possess such prejudice or extensive knowledge of the 
case as to require a change of venue.‖  Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 246.   
 
- 36 - 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Serrano‘s 
change of venue motion. 
(6) Bloodstain Pattern Expert 
Serrano claims that his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against 
him was violated when the State‘s bloodstain pattern expert testified based upon 
tape measurements taken by another law enforcement officer.  As this Court has 
explained, ―
testimonial hearsay that is introduced against a defendant violates the 
Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a 
prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine that witness.‖  State v. Johnson, 
982 So. 2d 672, 675 (Fla. 2008) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004)).  However, here, the officer who took the tape measurements at issue 
testified at trial and was actually cross-examined by defense counsel.  Therefore, 
Serrano‘s claim that he was denied the opportunity to confront this witness is 
without merit. 
(7) Cross-Examination of Character Witnesses 
During the Spencer hearing, several character witnesses testified for the 
defense.  On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach these 
witnesses by inquiring as to whether their opinion of Serrano‘s character would 
change if they knew he had molested his fifteen-year-old daughter.  Serrano‘s 
 
- 37 - 
daughter had filed a police report about the incident, but Serrano had never 
actually been charged with a crime.   
In Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382, 393 (Fla. 2008), this Court explained that 
―
the State cannot introduce inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation under the guise 
of impeachment.‖  See also Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1996) 
(―
[T]he State is not permitted to present evidence of a defendant‘s criminal history, 
which constitutes inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation, under the pretense that it 
is being admitted for some other purpose.‖).  Nevertheless, we deny this claim 
because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as there is no 
reasonable possibility that Serrano was prejudiced by the prosecution‘s 
questioning.  See generally Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 2009).   
Serrano contends that these cross-examinations took place in front of the 
jury, that they were a guise for introducing testimony of an unverified collateral 
crime, and therefore the cross-examinations were unduly prejudicial to him 
because they affected the jury‘s weighing whether to recommend a sentence of 
death.  However, the cross-examinations of Maria Serrano, Alfredo Luna, and 
Serrano‘s son took place during the Spencer hearing, not during the penalty phase.  
Because the jury was not present at the Spencer hearing, there is no possibility that 
this questioning affected the jury‘s decision whether to recommend sentencing 
Serrano to death.   
 
- 38 - 
 
Furthermore, it is clear from the trial court‘s sentencing order that the trial 
judge was not influenced by the prosecution‘s line of questioning.  Nothing 
regarding any prior bad acts is even alluded to in the sentencing order.  To the 
contrary, in the trial court‘s sentencing order, the trial court found that Serrano had 
no prior criminal history, that he had a good social history, and that he was a good 
husband and a good father.  The trial court would not have stated that Serrano ―
was 
a good father in that he loved and cared for his children and they for him‖ if it had 
been influenced by the line of questioning put forth by the prosecution.   
 
Accordingly, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(8) Avoid Arrest Aggravator 
 
Serrano contends that the trial court erred when finding the avoid arrest 
aggravating circumstance with regard to the murder of Diane Patisso.  We 
disagree. 
―
[I]t is not this Court‘s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt—that is the trial court‘s job.‖  Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 
1997).  Rather, ―
[i]n reviewing an aggravating factor challenged on appeal, this 
Court‘s task ‗
is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied 
the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether 
competent substantial evidence supports its finding.‘ ‖  Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 
 
- 39 - 
3d 642, 667 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla. 
2004)).  In order to establish the avoid arrest aggravator ―
where the victim is not a 
law enforcement officer, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a witness.‖  Id. at 
667 (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 610 (Fla. 2001)).  ―
In such cases, 
proof of the intent to avoid arrest or detection must be very strong.‖  Id. (citing 
Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978)).   
 
―
[T]his Court has approved the finding [of the avoid arrest aggravator] based 
on circumstantial evidence, without any direct statements by the defendant 
indicating a motive to eliminate witnesses.‖  Id. at 667 (citing Swafford v. State, 
533 So. 2d 270, 276 (Fla. 1988)).  ―
[E]ven without direct evidence of the 
offender‘s thought processes, the arrest avoidance aggravator can be supported by 
circumstantial evidence through inference from the facts shown.‖  Id. (quoting 
Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 276 n.6).  Circumstantial evidence generally relied upon to 
prove this aggravator includes ―
whether the victim knew and could identify the 
killer and ‗
whether the defendant used gloves, wore a mask, or made incriminating 
statements about witness elimination; whether the victims offered resistance; and 
whether the victims were confined or were in a position to pose a threat to the 
defendant.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 2001)).   
 
- 40 - 
 
Here, although it is circumstantial, competent substantial evidence in the 
record supports that the murder of Diane Patisso was committed to avoid arrest.  
First, according to the statement Serrano gave to law enforcement, Diane Patisso 
was personally known to Serrano.  Therefore, Diane Patisso would have been able 
to identify him as the person who killed George Gonsalves, Frank Dosso, and 
George Patisso.  Second, Serrano made comments to detectives indicating that 
Diane Patisso probably walked into the middle of something.  In other words, 
Serrano speculated that Diane Patisso was not the target of the crime, but rather a 
witness who had to be eliminated.  Third, the record does not indicate that Diane 
Patisso offered any resistance or that she was in any position to pose a threat to 
Serrano.  Therefore, it was not necessary for Serrano to kill Diane Patisso in order 
to complete his crime.  Instead, the only possible motive for killing Diane Patisso 
was to avoid arrest.  Indeed, the circumstances of this crime indicate an elaborate 
plan to commit a capital crime and avoid being caught.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the trial court did not err in finding the avoid arrest aggravator. 
(9) Constitutional Claims 
In order to preserve the issues, Serrano submitted various constitutional 
claims regarding his death sentences.  However, this Court has repeatedly rejected 
arguments that Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 
 
- 41 - 
(Fla. 2002).  In fact, this Court need not even address Serrano‘s Ring4 claims 
because the trial court found the aggravating circumstance of prior violent felony 
for the contemporaneous murders.  See Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 
2003). 
Additionally, this Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of 
Florida‘s lethal injection procedures.  See Power v. State, 992 So. 2d 218, 221 (Fla. 
2008); Sexton v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1089 (Fla. 2008); Henyard v. State, 992 
So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008); Woodel v. State, 985 So. 2d 524, 533-534 (Fla. 2008); 
Thompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 
969 So. 2d 326, 353 (Fla. 2007); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007).  
And this Court has previously rejected challenges to this Court‘s proportionality 
review.  See Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052, 1073 (Fla. 2008).  This Court has also 
rejected the claim that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shift the burden of 
proof.  See Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 876-77 (Fla. 2006). 
 
Accordingly, we reject Serrano‘s constitutional arguments that were 
submitted for preservation purposes. 
(10) Proportionality 
This Court performs a proportionality analysis in death cases to prevent the 
imposition of unusual punishments under the constitution.  See Tillman v. State, 
                                          
 
 
4.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).   
 
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591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991).  ―
The death penalty is reserved ‗
for the most 
aggravated and unmitigated of most serious crimes.‘ ‖  Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 
513, 516 (Fla. 1992) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973)).  
―
Proportionality review is not simply a comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 846 
(Fla. 2007) (quoting Connor, 803 So. 2d at 612).  Instead, in deciding whether 
death is a proportionate penalty, the Court considers the totality of the 
circumstances of the case and compares the case with other capital cases.  See 
Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 417 (Fla. 1998).   
 
Here, Serrano was convicted of killing multiple people in a premeditated, 
execution-style manner.  Following the Spencer hearing, the trial court concluded 
that the aggravating circumstances of cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) and 
prior capital felony applied to all four murders and that the additional aggravating 
circumstance of avoid arrest applied to the murder of Diane Patisso.  The trial court 
also found the following statutory mitigating factors:  (1) Serrano had no 
significant history of prior violent activity (great weight); and (2) his age (fifty-
nine) at the time of the crime (moderate weight).  In addition, the trial court 
considered thirteen nonstatutory mitigating factors, giving each of them slight to 
moderate weight.       
 
- 43 - 
 
This Court has found the death penalty proportionate in cases where the 
totality of the circumstances is similar to the totality of the circumstances here.  
See, e.g., Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2009) (death sentence proportionate 
where victims were shot execution-style and aggravating circumstances included 
previous conviction of another capital felony, CCP, and avoid arrest and the 
statutory mitigating circumstances were that the offense was committed under 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, impaired capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of conduct or conform conduct to the requirements of the law and 
defendant‘s age at the time of the crime; and the trial court found nine nonstatutory 
mitigating factors); Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2006) (death sentence 
proportionate where the aggravating circumstances were that defendant was on 
felony probation at the time of the crime, had committed a prior violent felony, and 
committed the murder for pecuniary gain and the trial court considered thirteen 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances such as employment history, substance 
abuse, and childhood abuse); Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2003) (death 
sentence proportionate for double murders where the aggravating factors were 
CCP for one of the victims, heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) for the other victim, 
prior violent felony, and commission in the course of another felony and the trial 
court considered mitigating circumstances of mental disturbance, remorse, 
substance abuse, and childhood abuse); Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002) 
 
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(death sentence proportionate where prior violent felony, commission in the course 
of armed robbery, and CCP aggravators applied and one statutory and several 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances existed); Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324 
(Fla. 2001) (death sentence proportionate for double murder with commission 
during robbery, avoid arrest, and CCP aggravators for both murders and HAC and 
prior felony conviction for second murder and where trial court considered 
mitigating circumstances of defendant‘s age, lack of prior criminal history, 
cooperation with police, and difficult family history).  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the death penalty is proportionate here. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Serrano‘s convictions for first-degree 
murder and his sentences of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
Susan W. Roberts, Judge – Case No. CF01-03262A-XX 
 
Marcia J. Silvers, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee