Title: Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Company, LLC

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

SHEFFER v. CAROLINA FORGE COMPANY, L.L.C.2013 OK 48Case Number: 109199Decided: 06/25/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

CHARLES SHEFFER; JENNIFER SHEFFER; and J.S., a minor by and 
through his parents and next friends, Charles Sheffer and Jennifer Sheffer, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.CAROLINA FORGE COMPANY, L.L.C., 
Defendant-Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTTAWA COUNTY,STATE OF 
OKLAHOMA,HONORABLE ROBERT G. HANEY
¶0 Charles Sheffer, Jennifer Sheffer, and their minor son, J.S., were injured 
when their 18-wheeler tractor trailer collided with a rental vehicle leased to 
William Garris and driven by David Billups, both employees of Carolina Forge 
Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat 
superior and negligent entrustment. The trial court granted summary judgment to 
Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law that Carolina Forge was not liable 
for its employees' actions under a theory of respondeat superior and did not 
negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. Upon review of the 
record, we find reasonable minds could differ on the questions of whether 
employees of Carolina Forge were in the course and scope of their employment at 
the time of the accident and whether Carolina Forge negligently entrusted the 
rental vehicle to its employees. As such, the trial court improperly granted 
summary judgment to Carolina Forge. 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISREVERSED; 
CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S 
PRONOUNCEMENT
Ed Hershewe, Joplin, Missouri, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs-AppellantsTrevor Hughes & J. Christopher Davis, 
Johnson & Jones P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-AppellantsRichard L. Yohn, McAlester, Oklahoma, Attorney 
for Plaintiffs-AppellantsF. Thomas Cordell, Jr., Rochette Wurth, Ryan L. 
Dean, Frailey, Chaffin, Cordell, Perryman, Sterkel, McCalla & Brown 
L.L.P., Chickasha, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Carolina Forge 
Company, L.L.C.
GURICH, J.
Facts & Procedural History
¶1 On August 24, 2006, William Garris III and David Billups flew from 
Raleigh, North Carolina, to Joplin, Missouri, on a business trip for their 
employer, Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Garris was the quality manager for 
Carolina Forge, and Billups was a customer service representative. The trip was 
scheduled to take place from August 24, 2006, to August 27, 2006, in Joplin, 
Missouri. Normally, William Casella, the corporate representative and plant 
manager for Carolina Forge, accompanied Garris to Joplin to call on customer 
F.A.G. Bearings. But Mr. Casella had another commitment, so Billups accompanied 
Garris on this particular trip. The primary purpose of the trip was to 
participate in a golf outing at the invitation of F.A.G. Bearings. 
¶2 Carolina Forge paid for Garris and Billups' airline tickets and rental car 
in advance of the trip.1 Carolina Forge also gave Garris and Billups $600.00 
cash to pay for expenses incurred during the trip. Helen Mixon, human resource 
administrator for Carolina Forge, testified in her deposition that the $600.00 
was intended to pay for entertaining customers and for gas in the rental car. 
Carolina Forge also reimbursed employees for additional out of pocket expenses 
during business trips, including meals, snacks, and alcoholic beverages. 
¶3 Garris and Billups arrived in Joplin on the evening of August 24, 2006, 
and checked into their hotel. On the morning of August 25, 2006, another 
employee of Carolina Forge met Garris and Billups at a Bob Evans Restaurant in 
Joplin, which was adjacent to their hotel, before visiting the F.A.G. Bearings 
headquarters. Next, Garris and Billups arrived at the customer's facility, where 
they took a tour and then delivered a presentation to company 
representatives.
¶4 Following the presentation, Garris and Billups toured another portion of 
the facility. Garris and Billups then took three F.A.G. Bearings representatives 
to lunch at the Rib Crib in Joplin. After lunch, Garris and Billups went back to 
their hotel rooms to change clothes and then met F.A.G. Bearings representatives 
for golf at the Briarbrook Golf Course just outside Joplin. 
¶5 After playing golf, Garris and Billups went back to their hotel, stopping 
on the way to purchase toiletries and other necessities. Garris and Billups then 
had dinner at Timberline Steakhouse in Joplin. No F.A.G. Bearings 
representatives joined Garris and Billups for dinner at the Timberline 
Steakhouse. After dinner, Garris and Billups went to the Buffalo Run Casino. No 
representatives from F.A.G. Bearings accompanied Garris and Billups to the 
casino. The Buffalo Run Casino, located in Miami, Oklahoma, is approximately 30 
miles west of the Timberline Steakhouse in Joplin, Missouri. 
¶6 According to Garris' affidavit, upon arriving at the casino, Garris and 
Billups went "separate ways, rarely speaking with one another."2 Garris' affidavit states 
he "participated in activities associated with the casino, using [his] own 
money."3 After spending several hours at the casino, Garris and 
Billups decided to return to their hotel. Upon leaving the casino, Billups drove 
the rental car, which was rented in the name of the passenger, William 
Garris.
¶7 Billups and Garris intended to return to Joplin traveling on Interstate 
Highway 44. However, while leaving Miami, Billups missed the eastbound ramp 
which would have taken them back to Joplin and instead drove west on Interstate 
Highway 44 toward Tulsa. Billups turned around in a lane barricade opening.4 Billups' vehicle collided 
with Plaintiffs' vehicle, an 18-wheeler tractor trailer, resulting in injuries 
to all three passengers.5 
¶8 Plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court of Ottawa County against 
Carolina Forge, alleging negligence under the doctrines of respondeat superior 
and negligent entrustment.6 Carolina Forge moved for summary judgment, which the 
trial court granted, finding Garris and Billups were not in the course and scope 
of their employment at the time of the accident and Carolina Forge did not 
negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. 
¶9 Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's Journal Entry granting summary 
judgment to Carolina Forge, filing a Petition in Error on February 18, 2011. 
This Court retained the case. We find reasonable minds could differ on the 
questions of whether employees of Carolina Forge were in the course and scope of 
their employment at the time of the accident and whether Carolina Forge 
negligently entrusted the rental vehicle to its employees. 
Standard of Review
¶10 An order sustaining summary judgment in favor of a litigant presents 
solely a legal matter. Feightner v. Bank of Okla., N.A., 2003 OK 20, ¶ 2, 65 P.3d 624, 626. Questions of law mandate a de novo 
standard of review, which affords this Court with plenary, independent, and 
non-deferential authority to examine the issues presented. Martin v. Aramark 
Servs., Inc., 2004 OK 38, ¶ 4, 92 P.3d 96, 97. 
¶11 When examining an order sustaining summary judgment, this Court must 
determine whether the record reveals disputed material facts. Cranford v. 
Bartlett, 2001 OK 
47, ¶ 3, 25 P.3d 918, 920. Even if basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment 
should be denied, if from the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different 
inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. Phelps v. Hotel Mgmt 
Inc., 1996 OK 
114, ¶¶ 6-7, 925 P.2d 891, 893. All facts and inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing summary adjudication. Estate of Crowell v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm'rs of Cnty. of Cleveland, 2010 OK 5, ¶ 22, 237 P.3d 134, 142. 
Negligent Entrustment
¶12 Negligent entrustment of an automobile occurs when the automobile is 
supplied, directly or through a third person, for the use of another whom the 
supplier knows, or should know, because of youth, inexperience, or otherwise, is 
likely to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm to 
others, with liability for the harm caused thereby. Green v. Harris, 
2003 OK 55, n.5, 70 P.3d 866, 868 n.5. See also 
Shoemake v. Stich, 1975 OK 55, ¶ 13, 534 P.2d 667, 669-70. This Court has long held that 
intoxication and the "propensity for becoming intoxicated" can result in 
liability for the supplier of the automobile if the supplier knows or has reason 
to know of such intoxication or propensity for becoming intoxicated.7 Nat'l Trailer Convoy, 
Inc. v. Saul, 1962 OK 
181, ¶ 10, 375 P.2d 922, 928-29; Shoemake, 1975 OK 55, ¶ 12, 534 P.2d  at 669-70. 
¶13 The record indicates Carolina Forge reserved and paid for the rental car 
for Garris and Billups for this particular business trip to Joplin.8 Ms. Mixon testified the 
airline tickets and the rental car were purchased by the company before the men 
left for the trip.9 The record also indicates the purpose of this 
particular business trip to Joplin was to entertain a customer of Carolina 
Forge.10 Carolina Forge representatives had participated in this 
particular golf outing in previous years and expected its representatives 
to entertain its customers on business trips such as this one.11 Entertainment often included taking customers out for 
drinks.12 In fact, Carolina Forge encouraged such behavior on all 
business trips through its limitless reimbursement policy.13 Carolina Forge employees, including Garris, had been 
reimbursed by Carolina Forge for numerous alcoholic beverages they consumed on 
prior business trips. Receipts provided by Carolina Forge showed past 
reimbursements included alcoholic beverages at lunch, in the airport, in the 
afternoon and evening, at restaurants, at golf outings, and at bars and other 
establishments such as the "Thirsty Pony."14 Employees of Carolina Forge were permitted to include 
alcoholic beverage expenses on their expense itemization reports for 
reimbursement by Carolina Forge regardless of whether the drinks were 
with customers.15 
¶14 Although Carolina Forge reimbursed employees for all money spent on 
alcoholic beverages, Carolina Forge maintained no written corporate procedure, 
guideline, policy, or protocol regarding drinking and driving rental vehicles 
paid for by Carolina Forge.16 Ms. Mixon was specifically asked: "As a matter of fact, 
there was never any prohibition on [Garris] eating and drinking and then getting 
in a rental car and driving, was there?" She answered, "[t]here was no written 
policy."17 Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiffs, a reasonable person could conclude that Carolina Forge knew or had 
reason to know that its employees had the propensity to become intoxicated on 
business trips and that Carolina Forge acted negligently when it rented a car 
for Garris and Billups without any corporate protocol regarding driving a rental 
car while intoxicated.18 
¶15 Carolina Forge argues it cannot be liable for negligent entrustment 
because it did not have possession or control over the rental car at the time of 
the accident. "The rationale underlying imposition of negligent entrustment 
liability on suppliers of chattels is that one has a duty not to supply a 
chattel to another who is likely to misuse it in a manner causing unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to the entrustee or others." Casebolt v. Cowan, 
829 P.2d 352, 360 (Colo. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 390). If Carolina Forge, at the time it paid for the rental car for its 
employees, knew or should have known its employees were likely to drive the 
rental car while intoxicated, Carolina Forge had a duty to take reasonable 
actions to prevent such risks. Control at the time the automobile is 
supplied--the initial moment of entrustment--determines a supplier's negligence. 
Id. 
¶16 In the same vein, Carolina Forge argues it did not entrust the vehicle to 
Billups because the vehicle was rented in Garris' name and the company didn't 
know Billups was going to drive the car. However, Carolina Forge maintained no 
policy on who could drive the rental car.19 In fact, Mr. Casella testified that had Garris allowed 
Billups to drive, that would have been acceptable to the company.20 
¶17 Finally, Carolina Forge argues it cannot be held liable for negligent 
entrustment unless the Plaintiffs can first prove Garris and Billups were acting 
within the course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident. 
Liability for negligent entrustment arises from the act of entrustment, 
not the relationship of the parties. Casebolt, 829 P.2d  at 360 
("Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile 
is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the 
act of entrustment of the motor vehicle."). As such, when an employer provides 
an employee with a vehicle, whether the negligent act was done during the course 
and scope of an employee's employment is not relevant to the negligent 
entrustment analysis.21 The evidence in the record does not support a 
determination as a matter of law that Carolina Forge did not negligently 
entrust the rental car to Garris and Billups. The issue is a question of fact 
for the jury. Summary judgment was improper.
Respondeat Superior
¶18 "To hold an employer responsible for the tort of an employee, the 
tortious act must be committed in the course of the employment and within the 
scope of the employee's authority." Baker v. Saint Francis Hosp., 
2005 OK 36, ¶ 10, 126 P.3d 602, 605. "Under the theory of respondeat 
superior, one acts within the scope of employment if engaged in work 
assigned, or if doing that which is proper, necessary and usual to accomplish 
the work assigned, or doing that which is customary within the particular trade 
or business." Tuffy's Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 2009 OK 4, ¶ 7, 212 P.3d 1158, 1163. More specifically, in determining 
whether an employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of an 
automobile accident, this Court has looked to whether, taking into consideration 
the purpose of the mission and the distance traveled, it could be said that the 
employee was stepping aside in some marked or unusual manner for some purpose 
wholly disconnected with his employment.22 Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Peterman, 
1940 OK 49, ¶ 11, 99 P.2d 130, 132. 
¶19 In some cases, the deviation may be so marked or slight that, as a matter 
of law, only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts, and the 
issue of whether an employee was within the scope of employment may be decided 
by the court. Id.23 However, when the degree and extent of the deviation is 
so uncertain that reasonable contrary inferences may be drawn, the 
issue must be sent to the jury. Id. See also 
Baker, 2005 OK 
36, ¶ 16, 126 P.3d  at 607. This Court has long held that the question of 
whether an employee has acted within the course and scope of employment at 
any given time is a question for the trier of fact. Baker, 
2005 OK 36, ¶ 16, 126 P.3d  at 606 
(citing Chicago, R. I. & P. RY. Co., 1913 OK 7, ¶ 11, 129 P. 834, 838). 
¶20 In Oil Daily Inc. v. Faulkner, 282 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1960), a 
case decided under Oklahoma law by the Tenth Circuit, Oil Daily's employee was 
an advertising manager in 19 southwestern states. Id. at 15. His duties 
required him to travel throughout the southwest soliciting business for his 
employer and acting as a public relations representative. Id. He was free 
to arrange his trips and to travel by any means he saw fit. Id. Oil Daily 
paid all expenses, and he was allowed mileage for the use of his personal 
automobile. Id. On one particular trip, he left his headquarters in 
Dallas, in his own automobile, for a business trip to Kansas City, via Tulsa. 
Id. He transacted company business in Tulsa and proceeded on to Kansas 
City by plane. Id. He returned to Tulsa in the afternoon and left that 
evening in his automobile for the return trip to Dallas. Id. He arrived 
in Durant, Oklahoma, late in the evening and stopped at a roadside café and 
private club, where he remained for some time. Id. He then proceeded to 
Denison, Texas, where he stopped for a meal. Id. Too tired to continue, 
he returned to Durant, which was approximately 21 miles from Denison, to spend 
the remainder of the night with a friend. Id. He was unable to locate the 
friend, had difficulty with his automobile, and decided to sleep in his car 
until morning. Id. He then resumed his trip to Dallas; however, just 
prior to reaching Denison, he fell asleep and his automobile collided with the 
plaintiff's vehicle. Id. 
¶21 The Eastern District of Oklahoma found the employer, Oil Daily, liable 
under the respondeat superior doctrine. Id. at 14. Oil Daily appealed, 
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that whether, under Oklahoma law, the 
employee's actions constituted a departure wholly disconnected from employment 
relieving the employer from liability for negligent operation of the automobile 
by its advertising manager was a question of fact for the district court. 
Id. The Tenth Circuit could not say as a matter of law "that such trip 
was a departure wholly disconnected from the company's business which would 
relieve it from its liability as an employer," relying in part on the fact that 
Oil Daily gave its employee discretion to "exercise his own judgment in 
traveling, in time spent on the road, in selecting hotels or other living 
quarters, and when he should return to his headquarter." Id. at 16. 
¶22 In the present case, the record indicates the Buffalo Run Casino was 
about 30 miles from Garris and Billups' hotel.24 The men had unlimited use of the rental car, and 
Carolina Forge put no limitations on where Garris and Billups could drive the 
rental car during the business trip to Joplin. When asked if Carolina Forge gave 
Garris and Billups instructions not to leave Joplin, Mr. Casella answered, "No 
sir. We did not."25 When asked if there were any company limitations on 
where they could go on this trip, Mr. Casella replied, "No. There was not--that 
I recall anyway."26 When asked whether the men would have been reimbursed 
had they purchased gasoline in Oklahoma, Mr. Casella answered "Probably."27 
¶23 The record also indicates the business trip for Carolina Forge was the 
only reason the men were in Joplin.28 Mr. Casella testified that the trip to Joplin "was a 
business trip" to entertain customers and to participate in the golf outing.29 Mr. Casella testified he believed there were personal 
portions of the trip and the trip to the casino was a personal trip.30 However, the record indicates that while there may have 
been personal portions of the business trip, Carolina Forge routinely reimbursed 
employees for expenditures during personal portions of business trips. When 
asked if Carolina Forge paid for employees' expenses for meals and drinks when 
the employees were on personal time, Mr. Casella answered, "Okay. Now, I 
understand. Yes, we would pay for their meals and drinks. We would pay for 
that."31 
¶24 In fact, Carolina Forge reimbursed employees for all expenses 
incurred on business trips. Both of Carolina Forge's corporate representatives 
testified they could not ever recall refusing to reimburse an employee for an 
expense documented with receipts and claimed on the employee's expense report.32 At the time of the accident Carolina Forge had no 
written corporate procedure, guideline, policy, or protocol as to what expenses 
were and were not paid for or reimbursed by Carolina Forge.33 According to Mr. Casella, if the men had driven to 
Oklahoma to purchase a meal that probably would have been okay with the company, 
and the company would have reimbursed it.34 Mr. Casella also testified Carolina Forge would have 
paid for Garris and Billups' meals, including alcohol, regardless of 
where they ate and regardless of whether they were entertaining 
customers.35 
¶25 As in Oil Daily, Carolina Forge gave its employees unrestricted 
discretion on business trips to decide how to spend their time. Carolina Forge 
provided blanket reimbursements for food, alcohol, and gas on past business 
trips regardless of whether employees were entertaining customers or were on 
personal time. A reasonable person could find these facts relevant in 
determining whether Garris and Billups' trip to the casino was authorized by 
Carolina Forge and whether the trip to the casino was included within the course 
and scope of their employment with Carolina Forge. The record does not support a 
determination as a matter of law that the men were not in the course and 
scope of their employment when the accident occurred. The issue is a question of 
fact for the jury. Summary judgment was improper.36 
Plaintiffs' Request for Additional Discovery 
¶26 The record indicates Plaintiffs requested additional discovery from 
Carolina Forge after the depositions of Mr. Casella and Ms. Nixon. At the time 
Plaintiffs' response to summary judgment was filed, Carolina Forge had not yet 
furnished the discovery responses. In their brief, Plaintiffs stated to the 
trial court: "Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that Carolina Forge's 
motion be denied at this time so that Plaintiffs have the opportunity to at 
least obtain the discovery they have recently requested to show the existence of 
disputed material facts regarding both the scope of Defendants' agency, as well 
as the negligent entrustment and supervision claims at issue."37 
¶27 Plaintiffs learned during the deposition of Defendant's corporate 
representatives that Garris made prior trips to Joplin, Missouri, for the same 
golf outing as he and Billups attended during this particular trip. Based on 
this newly acquired information, they sent a Request for Production to counsel 
for Carolina Forge requesting "business expense reports and receipts for William 
Garris, III for all trips he made to Joplin, Missouri prior to the trip he was 
on at the time of the accident."38 Plaintiffs also learned Mr. Casella made the trip to 
Joplin with Garris in previous years, and as such, requested the business 
expense reports and receipts for Mr. Casella for all trips he made to Joplin. 
Plaintiffs argue in their brief to this Court that the reports and receipts for 
Garris and Casella for prior trips to Joplin for a similar golf outing 
demonstrate what constituted acceptable employee behavior on business trips and 
is relevant for a jury in determining whether the trip to the casino was in the 
course and scope of Garris and Billups' employment. 
¶28 Additionally, Plaintiffs argue the trial court should have allowed 
additional discovery before granting summary judgment because neither Garris nor 
a representative of Billups' estate had testified at the time Carolina Forge 
moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue these depositions are relevant to 
determine what activities Garris and Billups believed were or were not 
authorized by Carolina Forge during the business trip to Joplin. 
¶29 The trial court did not address Plaintiffs' request for more time to 
obtain discovery and presumably denied any such relief when it granted summary 
judgment to Carolina Forge. Because the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on both the respondeat superior and negligent entrustment claims, we 
need not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
the Plaintiffs more time to obtain additional discovery.39 But on remand Plaintiffs should be allowed to conduct 
additional discovery as they have shown such discovery is relevant to both the 
respondeat superior and negligent entrustment claims. 
Conclusion
¶30 Reasonable minds could differ on whether the employees of Carolina Forge 
were in the course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident and 
whether Carolina Forge negligently entrusted the rental vehicle to its 
employees. Summary judgment was improper. 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISREVERSED; 
CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S 
PRONOUNCEMENT
¶31 Colbert, C.J., Reif, V.C.J., Watt, Winchester, Edmondson, Taylor, 
Combs and Gurich, JJ., concur;
¶32 Kauger, J., concurs in parts, dissents in part;
¶33 Taylor, J., concurring
When an employer sends an employee on a business trip with cash, credit cards 
and rent car along with a company history of encouragement and payment for 
alcohol consumption, this personal injury accident is a foreseeable result and 
should be decided by a fact-finder.
FOOTNOTES
1 Carolina Forge also 
reserved hotel rooms for the men in advance of the trip. The record indicates 
the men paid for the hotel and then were reimbursed by Carolina Forge upon 
return. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. B at 64. 
2 Defendant Carolina Forge Company L.L.C.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. A. 
3 Id. Mr. Casella testified in his deposition that 
he could not recall whether Garris had ever indicated he had been drinking while 
at the casino. Garris' statement to Carolina Forge's workers' compensation 
carrier provides: 
Q: Okay, Ah, all right. So, you guys left the. . I'm sorry, you said between 
12:15 to 12:30?R: Yeah, yeah.Q: Okay. At that point in time, when you 
hooked up at that point in time, did both of you guys still have a drink with 
you?R: Hmm, no, no. When we got ready to leave to go to the car.Q: When 
you get ready to leave to go to the car, who's driving?R: The last thing I 
remember is David telling me he was okay to drive and I agreed and that's the 
last thing I remember.. . . Q: Okay. All right. Let me back up here a 
little bit, okay? Would the money that you were spending in the casino to gamble 
and purchase whatever beers you were drinking, you . . you paid for that credit 
card or cash?R: That was cash out of my pocket.
Defendant Carolina Forge Company's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant 
Carolina Forge Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. A 
at 21-22.
Ms. Mixon's deposition also indicates a toxicology report was done on Billups 
after the wreck, but the toxicology report is not included in the record. 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. B at 65-66. Ms. Mixon's deposition also 
indicates Garris and Billups had dinner and drinks at the Timberline Steakhouse 
and then drove to the casino. Id. Ex. B at 53-54. 
4 This portion of Interstate Highway 44 is the Will 
Rogers Turnpike, which is a toll road and four-lane limited access highway 
extending from Tulsa to the Oklahoma-Missouri state line. Defendant Carolina 
Forge Company L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. I. 

5The collision also caused injuries to Garris and 
resulted in Billups' death.
6 Plaintiffs also asserted a claim for negligent hiring 
and training, which was disposed of in the trial judge's order granting summary 
judgment. However, they did not appeal the negligent hiring claim. 
7 OUJI No. 10.16 states: "An owner [or provider] of a 
vehicle [or other dangerous instrumentality] has a duty to use ordinary care to 
avoid lending it to another person whom he knows [or reasonably should know] is 
[intoxicated/careless/reckless/incompetent to drive]."
8 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. B at 33.
9 Id. Ex. B at 35-36.
10 Id. Ex. A at 16; Ex. B at 24.
11 Id. Ex. B at 47. 
12 The following exchange took place during Ms. Mixon's 
deposition:
Q: Thank you. A customer service representative, are they expected to 
entertain clients?A: Yes. When they would go on these trips, yes.Q: What 
type of entertainment is allowed?A: We would expect dinner: for them to take 
them out to dinner. I mean, that's what we would expect them to do. I don't know 
of anything other than that they would be needing. Q: Would that include 
drinks at dinner?A: Yes.Q: Would a customer service representative and 
quality manager be expected to take a customer out or customer representatives 
out for cocktails, for example?A: It's possible.Q: Have you reimbursed 
your customer representative, Mr. [Garris], and/or Mr. Billups, your quality 
manager, for alcoholic beverages that they consumed and customers 
consumed?A: Yes, we have. 
Id. Ex. B at 47-48.
13 Id. Ex. A at 22; Ex. B at 48-49. 
14 Id. Ex. B at 76 ("Q: On the other side, Labatt 
at the Thirsty Pony in Sandusky, Ohio[?]"). Approximately nine pages of Ms. 
Mixon's deposition testimony included questions regarding past expense receipts 
that were reimbursed by Carolina Forge. One exchange went as follows:
Q: Then there's an [sic] Max & Ernst Concourse C at the Hopkins 
International Airport in Cleveland. There was a charge for a Bud Light that was 
reimbursed; is that correct?A: It was on the expense so it would have been 
reimbursed. Q: Then there's a Fox Sports Bar, Detroit Metro, a large Bud 
draft and side-shot--no side-shot, I guess--and the charge was, for the draft, 5 
dollars and 29 cents. With tax, it was 5 dollars and 61 cents. A: (no 
response)Q: Is that correct?A: I see it, yes.Q: Then it appears in 
the middle there's a Carolina Varsity. It says one premium 22 ounce. Do you know 
if that's alcohol?A: I do not know.Q: Then under that, Bates Stamp 124, 
it's a Webster's Inn, and it shows that there was--the two drinks at the top, do 
you know if those are alcoholic beverages?A: I don't know.Q: Three 
drinks at the top.A: I do not know.Q: Bates Stamp 125, again, it's a 
place called Fox something in Detroit. It's a large Bud Light, Bud draft, for 5 
dollars and 29 cents.Ms. Wurth: Object to form.Q: (By Mr. Hershewe) Do 
you see that?A: I see it. Q: That would have been paid for?A: Yes. 
It was turned in with the expense, yes. 
Id. Ex. B at 80-81.
15 Id. Ex. A at 42. 
16 Id. Ex. B at 33-35; Defendant Carolina Forge 
Company's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Carolina Forge Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. B at 29-30. 
17 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. B at 54.
18 This Court has determined that evidence of the 
propensity for becoming intoxicated is sufficient to submit a negligent 
entrustment question to the jury. Nat'l Trailer Convoy, 1962 OK 181, ¶ 10, 375 P.2d  at 928.
19 Garris' statement to Carolina Forge's workers' 
compensation carrier indicates he allowed Billups to drive upon leaving the 
casino. Defendant Carolina Forge Company's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendant Carolina Forge Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in 
Support, Ex. A at 21-22.
20 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. A at 34.
21 See Blagg v. Line, 09-CV-0703-CVE-FHM, 
2012 WL 263034, at *4 (N.D.Okla. Jan. 30, 2012) (finding plaintiff was not 
required to prove an employment relationship between owner and person entrusted 
with vehicle because employment relationship is not an element of negligent 
entrustment). See also Am. Jur. Negligence § 319. 
22 OUJI 6.7 states:
An employee is acting within the scope of [his] employment if [he] is engaged 
in the work which has been assigned to [him] by [his] employer, or is doing that 
which is proper, usual and necessary to accomplish the work assigned to [him] by 
[his] employer, or is doing that which is customary within the particular trade 
or business in which the employee is engaged.
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 6.7-Scope of Employment. 
OUJI 6.12 goes onto state:
An [employee] is acting outside the scope of [his] [employment] when [he] 
substantially departs from [his] [employer's] business by doing an act intended 
to accomplish an independent purpose of [his] own or for some other purpose 
which is unrelated to the business of [his] [employer] and not reasonably 
included within the scope of [his] express or implied [employment]. Such 
departure may be of short duration, but during such time the [employee] is not 
acting within the scope of [his] [employment].
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 6.12-Scope of Authority or 
Employment-Departure. 
23 See also Carswell v. Okla. State 
University, 1999 OK 
102, ¶ 19, 995 P.2d 1118, 1123 ("Except in cases where only one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn, the question of whether an employee has acted within the scope of 
employment at any given time is a question for the trier of fact."). 
24 Defendant Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C.'s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support at 8.
25 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. A at 15.
26 Id. Ex. A at 20.
27 Id.
28 Id. Ex. A at 15.
29 Id. 
30 Id. Ex. A at 52.
31 Id. Ex. A at 18-19.
32 Id. Ex. A at 24; Ex. B at 27.
33 Id. Ex. A at 22.
34 Id. Ex. A at 21. 
35 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Carolina Forge 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Ex. A at 42.
36 We note that Carolina Forge paid a settlement to the 
Estate of David Billups under its workers' compensation policy. At the hearing 
on summary judgment Plaintiffs' counsel argued:
Mr. Hershewe: Okay. Now, I want to address the issues on--
The Court: Employer/employee.
Mr. Hershewe: Employer/employee. The biggest issue I find in there is, your 
Honor, is that there was a work[ers'] comp claim that was filed and was settled 
by Carolina Forge, and they now claim a subrogation interest in that case. And 
if there was not an employer/employee relationship and a settlement in that 
case, they are not entitled to any subrogation. Any they put us on--on--
The Court: Put us on what?
Mr. Hershewe: They put us on notice that they want to be repaid for the 
work[ers'] comp benefits that they paid in this case. 
The Court: Well, how are they going to get repaid for the benefits they paid 
in this case as against your clients?
Mr. Hershewe: That's evidence because we've got a claim against Buffalo Run, 
your Honor. 
Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Proceedings at 10 (Jan. 7, 
2011).
Under North Carolina law, "for a claimant to recover workers' compensation 
benefits for death, he must prove that death resulted from an injury (1) by 
accident; (2) arising out of his employment; and (3) in the course of the 
employment." Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 582 (N.C. 1988). 

37 See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Carolina 
Forge Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support at 15.
38 Id. at 14. 
39 A trial court's refusal to allow additional discovery 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Scott v. Peterson, 2005 OK 84, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 1232, 1236.