Title: Johnson v. Johnson

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

654 A.2d 1212 (1995) Carole J. JOHNSON v. Clifford W. JOHNSON, Jr. No. 92-576-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. February 23, 1995. *1213 J. Ronald Fishbein, Providence, for plaintiff. Joseph Keough, Keough & Gearon, Pawtucket, for defendant. WEISBERGER, Acting Chief Justice. This case comes before us on appeal by the defendant, Clifford W. Johnson, Jr. (defendant) from a judgment entered in the Superior Court in favor of his former wife, Carole J. Johnson (plaintiff) awarding her compensatory damages of $5,000 plus interest and punitive damages in the amount of $20,000 for allegedly slandering the plaintiff in a public place on the evening of August 29, 1986. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part. The facts of the case as stated succinctly in the plaintiff's brief are as follows. On the evening of August 29, 1986, plaintiff entered Twin Oaks Restaurant in Cranston and proceeded to walk to the podium. While at the podium, plaintiff saw defendant approach and ask her how her "[epithet] lawyer Fishbein" was. The defendant then drew nearer plaintiff who was standing with her then boyfriend now husband Philip Caliri. At a distance of about four feet, in a loud voice, defendant screamed, "Phil, you are a * * * [epithet]. You could have prevented this case." The defendant then pointed his finger in the face of plaintiff, while talking to Philip Caliri but screaming for all to hear, "You and that [obscenity] whore are costing me a lot of money." These defamatory remarks were made in the presence of between fifty and seventy-five people in the foyer of the restaurant. After the remarks were made, the noise level changed from loud to very quiet. The sole issue that has been preserved on appeal is the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. Although defendant raises a number of constitutional issues relating to the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, these issues were not raised below and consequently cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. Ferland Corp. v. Bouchard, 626 A.2d 210 (R.I. 1993); Bouchard v. Clark, 581 A.2d 715 (R.I. *1214 1990). It should be noted that defendant did not object to the instructions given by the trial justice and therefore those instructions are not before us for review. The question presented to us is whether the evidence in this case supports a determination by the trial justice to deny a motion for new trial in respect both to compensatory and punitive damages. In considering this question, it is helpful to note the specific findings of fact made by the trial justice in his review of the evidence and in the exercise of his independent judgment. The transcript discloses the following factual recitation: Without question the trial justice in his determination regarding the law of slander and libel bore in mind the provisions of article 1, section 20, of the Rhode Island Constitution as well as the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-6-9 which provides: Although we are of the opinion that defendant has not preserved the federal constitutional issues that are mentioned in his brief, it is appropriate to set forth the legal framework underlying actions for defamation as that framework has been construed over a period of time by this court and by the Supreme Court of the United States. In DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980) we considered in a libel action the developments that had taken place by way of federal constitutional limitations since the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) and its extensive progeny. We summarized the state of law as it existed in 1980 in the following excerpt: That summary though accurate at the time has been further modified and explicated by a more recent case, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1985). In that case, in an opinion written by Justice Powell and joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, the plurality expressed the doctrine that in defamation cases wherein the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require a showing of "actual malice" for either compensatory or punitive damages may be that the award of such damages may be made in accordance with state law. This plurality opinion was buttressed by concurring opinions issued by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White. These Justices concurred that Gertz did not apply to actions for defamation arising out of statements or publications that were of no public concern. There seems little question that the evidence in this case clearly establishes that the defamatory statements made by defendant were not matters of public concern.[1] The term "whore" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1597 (6th ed. 1990) as: The trial justice cited similar definitions from Webster's Dictionary in his instructions to the jury. Factually, this is indeed a close and difficult case. The findings of fact made by the trial justice are clear and unequivocal that the plaintiff fit the definition of the defamatory term applied to her. Thus the only question to be decided was whether the statement was uttered maliciously. This does not mean First Amendment constitutional "actual malice" but refers to common-law malice "arising from spite or ill will, or culpable recklessness or willful or wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed." DeCarvalho, 414 A.2d at 810; McDonald v. Brown, 23 R.I. 546, 51 A. 213 (1902). The findings of fact of the trial justice would lead us to the inevitable conclusion that this defendant had been sorely provoked and misused by plaintiff in the course of her marital and extramarital relationship with him as well as her unsuccessful litigation in the Family Court to establish a common-law marriage. When defendant uttered the defamatory statement, he was certainly angry. We cannot say that the trial justice was clearly wrong when he confirmed the probable finding of the jury (although no special interrogatories had been submitted) that defendant acted out of spite and ill will. In this case some spite and ill will might be understandable. Nevertheless, the finding of the trial justice on this issue may not be disturbed since he did not misconceive or *1217 overlook material evidence nor was he otherwise clearly wrong. Marcotte v. Harrison, 443 A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1982); Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 A.2d 903 (R.I. 1981). However, on the issue of punitive damages, we have a somewhat different question to resolve. Punitive damages, though allowed in defamation cases, Bosler v. Sugarman, 440 A.2d 129 (R.I. 1982), are severely restricted under Rhode Island law as recently enunciated in Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993). In that case we stated that the party seeking punitive damages has the burden of producing "`evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amount[s] to criminality, which for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought to be punished.'" Id. at 318 (quoting Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R.I. 107, 109, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974)). We went on to observe: The case at bar is somewhat unique in respect to defamation cases, since there is a finding by the trial justice that the statement is essentially truthful. We are then confronted with the question concerning whether a truthful statement, but one issued with a supportable finding of spite or ill will under enormous provocation may meet the rigorous standard which we set for punitive damages. We believe that it does not. In the case at bar, we are constrained to hold that the trial justice was clearly wrong in upholding the award of punitive damages. To a great extent defendant was the victim of a long course of reprehensible behavior committed against him by plaintiff. Unfortunately, his unrestrained vituperation would, under Rhode Island law, support a judgment for compensatory damages. The defamatory statement made under extreme provocation does not meet the rigorous standard set forth in Palmisano, 624 A.2d at 318. Even a finding of spite and ill will in the circumstances of this case cannot warrant punishment in the form of a $20,000 punitive damage award being imposed upon a defendant who was probably more a victim over a longer period of time than was plaintiff. We note that had the parties and behaviors been reversed, wherein the former wife under similar circumstances called her former husband a "male whore," our holding would be the same. Ordinarily, when this court sustains an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial, it remands the case to the Superior Court with direction that a new trial be afforded to the appealing party. In this case, however, we hold that the award of punitive damages is sufficiently unconscionable that a new trial would be an exercise in futility. The plaintiff's evidence in this case was virtually uncontradicted, although she herself admitted that she lied on the witness stand. No evidence that might be adduced in the course of a new trial could warrant the sustaining of a punitive damage award. For the reasons stated, we sustain the defendant's appeal in part in respect to the award of punitive damages and remand the case to the Superior Court with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff for compensatory damages only together with interest and costs and to expunge the award of punitive damages. [1] The constitutional and statutory provisions in force in Rhode Island are similar to the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute considered in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964). Under the Louisiana statute, a district attorney was convicted of criminal defamation by issuing a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of eight criminal district court judges of Orleans Parish. The Louisiana statute provided for criminal sanctions even for true statements made with "actual malice" in the common law sense of spite or ill will. Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that at common law, truth was no defense to criminal libel. Id. at 67-68, 85 S. Ct. at 212, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 129. The Court held pursuant to the principles of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), that the Louisiana statute incorporated constitutionally invalid standards in the context of criticism of the official conduct of public officials. In sum, the Court held that the New York Times rule absolutely prohibits punishment of truthful criticism of public officials and, therefore, it was constitutionally impermissible to direct punishment for true statements made as a result of "hatred, ill will or enmity or a wanton desire to injure * * *." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78, 85 S. Ct. at 217, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 134-35. The opinion in Garrison is not applicable to the case at bar because we are not dealing with public officials, public figures, or even matters of public concern.