Title: LONG-RUSSELL v. HAMPE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LONG-RUSSELL v. HAMPE2002 WY 1639 P.3d 1015Case Number: 00-310Decided: 02/04/2002
 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
   

 

SHARON 
LONG-RUSSELL, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

ROBERT 
A. HAMPE, 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Certified 
Questions from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Walter 
Urbigkit of Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Urbigkit.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Curtis 
B. Buchhammer of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Buchhammer.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      In this matter we are 
asked to answer questions certified to this Court in accordance with W.R.A.P. 
11.  Appellant, Sharon Long-Russell 
(Long-Russell), seeks an opinion of this Court which 
would resolve the question of whether damages for emotional suffering may be 
awarded in the context of a legal malpractice case wherein mere negligence on 
the part of the attorney is the basis for the claim of emotional damages.  Appellee, Robert A. Hampe 
(Hampe), Attorney-at-Law, asks that those questions be answered in the 
negative.

 

[¶2]      We will answer the 
certified questions in the negative.  
Such emotional damages may be an element of a claim for damages, in the 
context of a legal 
malpractice action, under certain limited circumstances, but not the 
circumstance of mere negligence.

 

THE 
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

 

[¶3]      The issues certified to 
this Court, by the district court, are:

 

            
1.  Are damages for emotional 
suffering available in a legal malpractice case which alleges that an attorney 
negligently failed to properly assert property claims in a divorce, or 
negligently gave bad advice resulting in a client's eviction from her place of 
residence?

 

            
2.  Are damages for emotional 
suffering available in a legal malpractice case which alleges that an attorney 
negligently gave incorrect legal advice about a child visitation 
order?

 

FACTUAL 
BACKGROUND

 

[¶4]      We are asked to settle a 
question of law that has not been directly presented to this Court before, but which 
is somewhat clouded by decisions of this Court that appear to be in conflict 
with each other.  The facts of this 
case are not a factor in our resolution of the questions of law at issue, but we 
will provide a brief outline of those facts so as to provide a 
structural background for our decision.  
The certified questions assume a factual circumstance wherein an attorney 
is alleged to have been negligent in the performance of his services for a 
client.

 

[¶5]      Long-Russell was divorced 
from her second 
husband, Gary Long (Long), in September, 1982.  The property settlement agreed to in 
that divorce made no mention of the parties owning a home.  Hampe played no role in that 
divorce.  At the time of that 
divorce, Long-Russell and Long were apparently renting a home 
from Long's parents and completing repairs on that home with a view to 
ultimately buying it from Long's parents.  
Some time after that divorce was final, Long obtained title to the home 
from his parents.  The most 
significant complicating factor in this 
case is that Long-Russell continued to live in that house, apparently without 
paying rent, until Long had her evicted in 1995.  Hampe did not represent Long-Russell in 
the eviction action either.  
However, Long-Russell did hire Hampe in 1995 to try to undo 
the eviction.  At the time Hampe 
began representing Long-Russell, she was still residing in the home but was 
forcibly evicted pursuant to court order shortly after retaining Hampe as her 
lawyer.

 

[¶6]      At the time of her 
divorce from Long, 
Long-Russell was pregnant with Richard Russell's (Russell) child.  Long-Russell then married Russell, and 
the two of them (and eventually their two children) continued living in Long's 
house, with the Russell family living in the upstairs portion of the house and Long 
living in the basement.  In January, 
1995, Long-Russell was divorced from Russell.  The decree of divorce in that case made 
no reference to Long-Russell or Russell owning any interest in Long's home.  During this divorce and even after the divorce was final, 
custody of the children born of Long-Russell's marriage to Russell was in 
dispute.  Hampe did not represent 
Long-Russell during this divorce or in the child custody proceedings which 
resulted in her temporary loss of the custody of the children.  However, Long-Russell did hire Hampe to 
attempt to undo the loss of the custody of her children.  Eventually, Russell was given permanent 
custody of the children and Long-Russell was accorded liberal visitation.  The record extant suggests that all parties continue 
to reside in 
Cheyenne.

 

[¶7]      The essence of 
Long-Russell's malpractice claim against Hampe is that he accepted her payment 
of attorney's fees in the approximate amount of $9,500.00 and did no meaningful 
work for her, gave her bad advice which complicated 
her legal problems, pursued hopeless claims and failed to pursue hopeful ones, 
and made promises of success in the legal arena that were irresponsible and, of 
course, they did not come to pass.  
In addition to the loss of the $9,500.00 in attorney's fees, 
Long-Russell sought damages for loss of her alleged interest in Long's home, 
emotional damages for the emotional upheaval that attended her eviction from 
Long's home, and the loss of the custody of her children.  It is the claim of emotional damages that is 
our sole concern in this matter.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      In the case 
Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Wyo. 1993), we stated 
that Wyoming's comparative negligence statute is limited to those actions based 
on negligence only, and that it could not be extended to actions based on 
contract.  Continuing, we stated 
that the comparative negligence statute would not bar recovery in a legal 
malpractice action, "which necessarily is based on claims of breach of contract 
and breach of fiduciary duty."  We 
did not further develop the reasoning behind the quoted sentence and, 
furthermore, we did not cite pertinent authority to substantiate it.  Although we do not call into question 
the result reached in the Jackson State Bank case, from today's 
perspective it cannot be said to resolve any of the issues at large in the 
instant matter.

 

[¶9]      In the case 
Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Wyo. 1993), we adopted a 
standard well known to the area of medical malpractice as applicable also to the 
area of legal malpractice.  This is 
a negligence standard, rather than a contract standard.  In Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 516 (Wyo. 1995), we continued to discuss legal malpractice as an action 
sounding in negligence.  Also 
see Peterson v. Scorsine, 898 P.2d 382, 388 (Wyo. 1995) (wherein 
it is suggested that legal malpractice claims may sound both in contract and in 
negligence).

 

[¶10]   In Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1995), we held that a claim for emotional damages stemming from a 
tort arising out of an automobile accident is properly assigned to a jury.  In Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, 
Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275-77 (Wyo. 1997), we held as 
follows:

 

In 
Wyoming, our decisions have restricted recovery for emotional distress damages 
without accompanying physical injury.  
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo.1986).  We have recognized the torts of 
intentional and negligently inflicted emotional distress but their application 
is narrowly construed to allow recovery for emotional distress only under 
limited circumstances.  
Gates, 719 P.2d at 195;  
Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1066 
(Wyo.1986).  We have permitted 
recovery for emotional distress as an element of damages in certain underlying 
actions:  1) some intentional torts, 
Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875, 877-878 (Wyo.1972) (false 
imprisonment);  Cates v. 
Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 921 (Wyo.1983) (malicious prosecution);  2) violation of certain constitutional 
rights, Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 549 (Wyo.1992);  and 3) breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 833 (Wyo.1994).  Outside 
of these few instances, we have adhered to the general concept that negligence 
permits recovery for personal injury or property damage but usually will not 
result in liability for emotional distress.  Gates, 719 P.2d at 195;  Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 
540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (1982);  W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 54, at 359-60 (5th ed.1984) 
(few courts permit compensation for negligence which causes fright, shock, or 
mental disturbance).  In a 
negligence action for personal injury, Wyoming permits recovery for emotional 
distress accompanying physical injury, but has not yet answered whether 
emotional distress damages are compensable where the defendant negligently 
damages or destroys real property.

 

            
The Blagroves contend that Daily provides authority for permitting 
recovery of their emotional distress damages under a negligence theory.  In Daily, Bone drove his 
snowmobile through a stop sign onto a major highway causing a collision with 
Daily's vehicle and killing Bone.  
Daily, 906 P.2d  at 1042.   Daily was not physically injured 
but her witnessing Bone's impact and death caused her mental suffering of post 
traumatic stress disorder, depression, and agoraphobia. Id. Daily sued 
Bone's estate for emotional distress caused by Bone's negligence and we decided 
that, under the circumstances of the case, she was entitled to a trial to 
determine if Bone's negligence had caused her emotional distress damages.  Id. at 
1044.

 

            
Daily is not helpful to the Blagroves because it has the limited 
scope of allowing recovery for mental injury absent physical injury in an 
automobile collision case.  Under 
the general rule, if Daily had been physically injured in the automobile 
collision she could have recovered damages for pain and suffering associated 
with her physical injuries and she could have recovered for the emotional 
distress of witnessing Bone's death.  
Id. at 1043.   
But because the general rule linked physical injury to an emotional 
distress claim, that rule would not permit Daily to recover for the emotional 
distress of witnessing Bone's death if she was not physically injured in the 
collision.  Id. We determined 
that the absence of a physical injury should not prevent her from recovering for 
her mental injury under a negligence theory.  She alleged sufficient facts to create a 
question for the jury and we remanded it for trial.  Id. at 1044.   Our decision in Daily 
resulted from the particular facts involved, did not generally establish that a 
claim for negligence alleging only mental injury had been recognized in Wyoming, 
and does not provide an analysis which would extend its result to a property 
damage situation.

 

            
Emotional distress is not usually recoverable as an element of property 
damages unless an improper motive is involved.  Valley Development Co. v. Weeks, 
147 Colo. 591, 364 P.2d 730, 733 (1961); see Towns v. Anderson, 39 
Colo.App. 332, 567 P.2d 814, 815 (1977), reversed on other grounds, 195 
Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978).  It 
is generally agreed that mere sorrow, anger, worry and fear are not compensable 
and recovery for more serious emotional distress is restricted because of the 
burden for the judicial system and defendants.  The likelihood that courts will be 
burdened with either fraudulent claims or those of a temporary or trivial 
nature, and the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportionate 
financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for 
consequences which appear remote from the wrongful deed usually act to restrict 
recovery.  Rodrigues v. 
State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970);  Keeton, supra § 54 at 
360-61.

 

            
In deciding whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal 
protection against the defendant's conduct, we must balance the interest of the 
injured parties against the view that a negligent act should have some end to 
its legal consequences.  
Gates, 719 P.2d  at 196.   We are persuaded that the concerns 
which have acted to prevent recovery for emotional distress when property is 
damaged remain relevant and weigh against permitting recovery.  While we do not doubt that the Blagroves 
were justifiably and seriously distressed over the damage to the home they had 
built together with their families, adopting a rule allowing trial on the issue 
and recovery if proved would result in unacceptable burdens for both the 
judicial system and defendants.  We 
therefore hold that emotional distress damages in connection with property 
damages are not compensable.

 

[¶11]   These precedents establish an 
apparent and predictable framework for the resolution of the matter before 
us.  We are persuaded that the 
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the case Lickteig v. Anderson, 
Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996), comports well 
with our previous decisions with respect to many aspects of the matter before 
us, and we will adopt its decision in that case, to govern in similar cases in 
Wyoming.  Lickteig was injured in an 
automobile accident, and the attorneys who represented her admitted their 
negligence in their representation of her.  
The issue of damages was submitted to binding arbitration, and a claim 
for emotional damages in the amount of $45,000.00 was awarded.  Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d  at 559.  The decision of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court is as follows:

We first consider the issue of emotional distress 
damages. We have not been anxious to expand the availability of damages for 
emotional 
distress. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995); Hubbard 
v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437-38 (Minn. 1983). This 
reluctance has arisen from the concern that claims of mental anguish may be 
speculative and so likely to lead to fictitious allegations that there is a 
potential for abuse of the judicial process. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d  at 438. 
Thus, we have been careful to limit the availability of such damages to "those 
plaintiffs who prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending 
to guarantee its genuineness." Id. at 437.

In tort cases, 
emotional distress may be an element of damages in only three circumstances. 
First, a plaintiff who suffers a physical injury as a result of another's 
negligence may recover for the accompanying mental anguish. Langeland v. 
Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Minn. 1982).  Second, a plaintiff may recover for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress when physical symptoms arise after 
and because of emotional distress, if the plaintiff was actually exposed to 
physical harm as a result of the negligence of another (the "zone-of-danger" 
rule). K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d  at 559; Langeland, 319 N.W.2d  at 31; 
Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980). Finally, a plaintiff 
may recover emotional distress damages when there has been a "direct invasion of 
the plaintiff's rights such as that constituting slander, libel, malicious 
prosecution, seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious conduct." 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 368, 
122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963). See also, M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. 1992); Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 437-38; 
Langeland, 319 N.W.2d  at 31-32.

We have also 
recognized the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d  at 438.  
This independent tort differs from the "willful conduct" category above 
in that it can stand alone as a separate action, whereas in the "willful 
conduct" category, emotional distress is only an element of the damages arising 
from an intentional tort that constitutes a direct violation of the plaintiff's 
rights, such as defamation.

The respondent 
in this case did not suffer any physical injury; neither was she in any "zone of 
danger," nor is she alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Damages for emotional distress could be justified only had the appellants 
violated her rights by willful, wanton or malicious conduct. We note at the 
outset that respondent's complaint contained no allegations of willfulness or 
malice; it alleged only negligent representation and breach of contract.  Respondent's arbitration brief and 
proposed findings were similarly framed in terms of negligence. In addition, the 
stipulation entered into by the parties prior to the arbitration hearing went 
only to the issue of appellants' negligence.

Appellants argue 
that, in the absence of any allegation of willful conduct, evidence of willful 
conduct, or finding of willful conduct by the arbitrator, emotional distress 
damages were wrongfully awarded in this legal malpractice 
action.

Despite the 
absence of an allegation or finding of willful conduct, respondent contends that 
willfulness was shown and found here. In particular, she argues that an 
arbitrator need not render an account or give reasons for his or her decision, 
Hilltop Constr., Inc. v. Lou Park Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236, 239-40 
(Minn. 1982), and that in this case, it can be inferred from the arbitrator's 
finding that she suffered "compensable" emotional distress, that the arbitrator 
made the requisite finding of willfulness. Further, she points to allegations 
presented to the arbitrator in her arbitration brief which, she asserts, support 
a finding of willful conduct on the part of the 
appellants.

Our analysis is 
complicated by the hybrid nature of claims for legal malpractice. To state a 
claim for legal malpractice, one must show that the "defendant acted negligently 
or in breach of contract." Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & 
Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980) (emphasis added); Admiral 
Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. O'Connor & Hannan, 494 N.W.2d 261, 265 
(Minn. 1992). We have recognized that the two theories will frequently be 
interchangeable in legal malpractice cases.  Togstad, 291 N.W.2d  at 
693.

However, the 
availability of emotional distress damages in contract actions has been even 
more restricted than for actions in tort. In general, extra-contractual damages, 
including those for emotional distress, are not recoverable for breach of 
contract except in those rare cases where the breach is accompanied by an 
independent tort. Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1979); 
Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property and Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979); Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 
53, 114 N.W. 353, 355 (1907). The accompanying independent tort must be willful. 
Olson, 277 N.W.2d  at 388. That is, it must support the extra-contractual 
damages in its own right as a tort. See Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, 
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 52-53 (Minn. 1983). Thus, even a malicious or bad-faith 
motive in breaching a contract does not convert a contract action into a tort 
action sufficient to support an award of emotional distress damages, 
Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d  at 652, or other extra-contractual damages, such as 
punitive damages, Moore v. John E. Blomquist, Inc., 256 NW.2d 518, 518 
(Minn. 1977); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440-42, 234 N.W.2d 775, 
789-90 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902, 96 S. Ct. 1093, 47 L. Ed. 2d 307 
(1976).

Here, the breach 
of contract and tort claims are not independent: they are interchangeable. 
Appellants admitted negligence in the loss of respondent's claim against the 
other driver. From that, the trial court concluded, "An admission to negligence 
is also an admission to breach of the attorney-client relationship." Moreover, 
this will be the case in almost all legal malpractice cases. If we were to 
affirm the award of damages for emotional distress in this case, we would be 
sanctioning a similar award whenever a lawyer breached his or her contract with 
a client by negligently performing the promised legal services. This we are not 
willing to do.

Nor does the 
conduct giving rise to the purported breach of contract support an award of 
emotional distress damages on its own. The court of appeals seems to 
imply that a breach of the attorney-client contract is inherently willful. 
See Lickteig, No. C3-95-1373, slip op. at 4-5. It is simply not the case 
that professional malpractice and willful indifference to another's rights are 
always one and the same. See Admiral Merchants, 494 N.W.2d  at 267-68. 
Moreover, a willful breach of contract, in and of itself, is not enough to 
justify an award of extra-contractual damages. Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d  at 
652; Barr/Nelson, 336 N.W.2d at 52-53; Wild, 302 Minn. at 440-42, 
234 N.W.2d  at 789-90. While cases may arise where an attorney acts so 
egregiously that emotional distress damages may be appropriate, the creation of 
a per se rule for such damages in every legal malpractice case is not warranted, 
based on the longstanding limitation of such damages to those instances where 
there has been a willful violation of another's rights.

We therefore 
hold that, as in other negligence actions, emotional distress damages are 
available in limited circumstances. There must be a direct violation of the 
plaintiff's rights by willful, wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is 
not sufficient. Here, in the absence of an allegation or proof on these 
essential elements, the award of emotional distress damages was 
improper.

Lickteig, 
556 N.W.2d  at 560-62 (footnotes omitted).  
Thus, based solely on an allegation of negligence, a litigant is not 
entitled to present an emotional damages claim to a jury.

[¶12]   
The standard we have adopted above is fully consistent with the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law, The Law Governing Lawyers, §§ 48, 50, 52 and 53 
(also see comment g. to § 53) (2000); also see Hanumadass v. 
Coffield, Ungaretti & Harris, 724 N.E.2d 14, 18-20 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 
1999); Whitehead v. Cuffie, 364 S.E.2d 87, 89-90 (Ga. 1987); and 
Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 420-23 (Iowa 
1995).

[¶13]   
With specific regard to the claim relating to child custody, we view with 
favor the case McGee v. Hyatt Legal Services, Inc., 813 P.2d 754, 758-59 
(Colo.App. 1990), for the additional guidance it provides.  We take special note of that court's 
concerns about the impossibility of quantifying intangible injuries to the 
parent-child relationship, the effect recognition of damages would have on the 
district court's authority to regulate and supervise custody decisions which 
must turn on the best interests of the child, the certainty of some significant 
level of emotional disturbance in the dissolution of a marriage which includes a 
child custody component (especially one burdened with a high level of 
animosity), as well as the certainty that neither parent can reasonably expect 
full-time custody of the children because of the statutorily required liberal 
visitation with the noncustodial parent.

CONCLUSION

[¶14]   
We answer the certified question in the negative.

            
1.  Are damages for emotional 
suffering available in a legal malpractice case which alleges that an attorney 
negligently failed to properly assert property claims in a divorce, or 
negligently gave bad advice resulting in a client's eviction from her place of 
residence?
 

Our 
answer is "No," as is more fully explained above.

 

            
2.  Are damages for emotional 
suffering available in a legal malpractice case which alleges that an attorney 
negligently gave incorrect legal advice about a child visitation 
order?

Our answer is "No," as is more fully explained 
above.

[¶15]   
This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.