Title: State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Newton, Admr., et al. v. Court of Claims. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995),         Ohio St.3d        .] 
Writ of prohibition or mandamus to prevent Court of Claims from exercising 
jurisdiction in suit filed in Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas 
alleging medical malpractice, wrongful death, survivorship, and related tort 
causes of action against various defendants -- Writs denied, when. 
 
(No. 94-1769 -- Submitted June 21, 1995 -- Decided August 30, 1995.) 
 
In Prohibition and Mandamus. 
 
Relators, Tammy R. Newton and James E. Newton, the parents of Kaleb 
Newton, deceased, instituted a suit in the Montgomery County Court of Common 
Pleas alleging medical malpractice, wrongful death, survivorship, and related tort 
causes of action against various defendants, including William J. Seifer, D.O., and 
the Ohio University School of Osteopathic Medicine.  Relators sought damages 
for the death of Kaleb Newton as a result of complications in connection with his 
birth.  Relators alleged that Dr. Seifer, an obstetrician/gynecologist, negligently, 
recklessly, willfully, wantonly, intentionally and/or maliciously failed to perform a 
Cesarean section to deliver Kaleb Newton and/or failed to contact another surgeon 
# 7965 
2
to perform the Cesarean section, and that Dr. Seifer’s conduct resulted in Kaleb’s 
permanent, severe injuries which ultimately led to his death.   
 
In January 1992, the common pleas court dismissed Dr. Seifer as a 
defendant.  The court held that since Dr. Seifer had asserted that he was a full-time 
employee of defendant Ohio University School of Osteopathic Medicine, it was 
precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the case until the Court of Claims 
determined whether Dr. Seifer was entitled to personal immunity under R.C. 9.86 
and whether the common pleas court possessed jurisdiction over the action.    
Relators then filed a complaint in respondent, the Court of Claims, which named 
several defendants, including Dr. Seifer and the Ohio University School of 
Osteopathic Medicine.  In March 1993, the Court of Claims determined that Dr. 
Seifer’s conduct was within the scope of his employment, that he was entitled to 
personal immunity under R.C. 9.86, and that the common pleas court lacked 
jurisdiction “over a cause of action arising from the acts of Dr. Seifer.”   
 
While the Court of Claims’ determination was being appealed by relators, 
many of the defendants in the common pleas court case except Dr. Seifer and Ohio 
University School of Osteopathic Medicine filed third-party complaints against 
Dr. Seifer and the school, alleging entitlement to contribution and/or indemnity.    
# 7965 
3
These defendants and third-party plaintiffs claimed that if they were found liable 
to relators, their liability was secondary to the liability of the school and Dr. 
Seifer.  The remaining defendants and third-party plaintiffs subsequently filed a 
joint petition to remove the entire action from the common pleas court to the Court 
of Claims. 
 
On November 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed 
the judgment of the Court of Claims as to Dr. Seifer’s immunity and remanded 
with instructions for the Court of Claims to “enter a new order finding Dr. Seifer 
not to be immune pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and for other appropriate proceedings.”  
Newton v. Ohio Univ. School of Osteopathic Medicine (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 
703, 713, 633 N.E.2d 593, 599.  The court of appeals held that Dr. Seifer had 
engaged in reckless conduct regarding the delivery of Kaleb Newton, and that Dr. 
Seifer’s relationship with Ohio University Medical Center, Inc. took him outside 
the scope of R.C. 9.86 immunity.  Id. at 711,  633 N.E.2d at 598.   
 
After the Court of Claims failed to grant relators’ motion to remand the case 
to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, relators filed a motion for 
clarification in the Franklin County Court of Appeals seeking a directive from that 
court to order the Court of Claims to remand the case to the common pleas court.  
# 7965 
4
The court of appeals denied relators’ motion on the rationale that its prior ruling 
did not “automatically remove” the state as a party to the action and that “complete 
dismissal of the lawsuit in the Court of Claims is not necessarily appropriate.”  
The Court of Claims then filed an entry finding “[i]n accordance with the decision 
of the Franklin County Court of Appeals *** that William J. Seifer, D.O. is not 
entitled to a finding of immunity under R.C. 9.86.”   
 
On July 21, 1994, the Court of Claims dismissed the joint petition for 
removal filed by defendants and third-party plaintiffs.  The Court of Claims ruled 
that the petition for removal was not properly perfected pursuant to R.C. 
2743.03(E)(2) because a copy of the petition had not been timely filed with the 
clerk of the common pleas court.  Defendants and third-party plaintiffs filed a 
Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from the dismissal. 
 
Relators initiated this action seeking a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus 
to prevent the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over the case filed in 
the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas or over any remaining related 
claims.   
 
Following the commencement of this action, the Court of Claims, on 
September 28, 1994, granted the Civ.R. 60(B) motion and vacated its previous 
# 7965 
5
dismissal.  At the time, an appeal by the defendants and third-party plaintiffs from 
the dismissal entry was pending in the court of appeals.  According to relators, 
defendants and third-party plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their appeal.    
Relators filed a notice of appeal from the Court of Claims’ vacation of its previous 
dismissal.   
 
While relators’ notice of appeal was pending, on October 28, 1994, the 
Court of Claims refiled its entry granting defendants and third-party plaintiffs’ 
motion to vacate its previous dismissal, instructing the clerk to place the matter on 
the court’s active docket.  On February 7, 1995, the court of appeals dismissed 
relators’ appeal because of the lack of a final appealable order. 
 
We overruled the Court of Claims’ motion to dismiss relators’ action in 
prohibition and mandamus and the parties have submitted evidence.   
____________________ 
 
Dwight D. Brannon & Associates, Dwight D. Brannon and Ronald J. 
Maurer, for relators. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, James M. Harrison and Andrew I. 
Sutter, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 
____________________ 
# 7965 
6
 
Per Curiam.  Relators request a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus to 
prevent the Court of Claims from exercising further jurisdiction over the 
underlying case, to compel the Court of Claims to vacate its entries granting the 
defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ Civ.R. 60(B) motion and reinstating the case, and 
to order the Court of Claims to remand the case to the Montgomery County Court 
of Common Pleas for a trial on the merits. 
 
Relators assert in their first proposition of law that if the state is found not 
liable to a plaintiff for the reckless actions of a defendant, the state cannot be held 
liable to a third-party defendant under a claim of contribution or indemnity arising 
out of the same transaction. 
 
Neither prohibition nor mandamus will lie where relators possess an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Hunter v. Certain 
Judges of the Akron Mun. Court (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 45, 46, 641 N.E.2d 722, 
723.  In addition, neither mandamus nor prohibition may be employed as a 
substitute for an appeal from an interlocutory order.  State ex rel. Keenan v. 
Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 178, 631 N.E.2d 119, 121.  The court of 
appeals determined that the Court of Claims’ entry vacating its prior dismissal and 
# 7965 
7
instructing its clerk to place the matter on the active docket was an interlocutory 
order. 
 
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal.  
State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 
1112.  Relators contend that because the Court of Claims patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the underlying case, appeal is not an 
adequate remedy, and prohibition and mandamus will lie.  State ex rel. Moser v. 
Lewis (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 28, 647 N.E.2d 155, 157 (writ of prohibition may 
issue despite an available appeal where a court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to 
act); State ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 184, 553 
N.E.2d 650, 652 (writ of mandamus may compel vacation of court order, 
notwithstanding an available appeal, where the lower court had no jurisdiction to 
act). 
 
R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) provides that the Court of Claims “has exclusive, 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of 
immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code, exclusive jurisdiction 
# 7965 
8
of the causes of action of all parties in civil actions that are removed to the court 
of claims, and jurisdiction to hear appeals from the decisions of the court of claims 
commissioners.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
R.C. 2743.03(E) provides: 
 
“(1)  A party who files a counterclaim against the state or makes the state a 
third-party defendant in an action commenced in any court, other than the court 
of claims, shall file a petition for removal in the court of claims.  The petition shall 
state the basis for removal, be accompanied by a copy of all process, pleadings, 
and other papers served upon the petitioner, and shall be signed in accordance 
with Civil Rule 11.  *** 
 
“(2)  Within seven days after filing a petition for removal, the petitioner 
shall give written notice to the parties, and shall file a copy of the petition with the 
clerk of the court in which the action was brought originally.  The filing effects the 
removal of the action to the court of claims, and the clerk of the court where the 
action was brought shall forward all papers in the case to the court of claims.  The 
court of claims shall adjudicate all civil actions removed.  The court may remand 
a civil action to the court in which it originated upon a finding that the removal 
# 7965 
9
petition does not justify removal, or upon a finding that the state is no longer a 
party.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Relators assert that a remand of the case to the common pleas court was 
required following the determination by the court of appeals that Dr. Seifer was 
not entitled to R.C. 9.86 immunity, and that the Court of Claims thereafter patently 
and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.  However, the Court of Claims possessed 
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) over the underlying case 
when it was removed.  Further, under R.C. 2743.03(E)(2), remand to the common 
pleas court is permissive rather than mandatory.  Nease v. Med, College Hosp. 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 396, 399, 596 N.E.2d 432, 435.  The Court of Claims is not 
required to remand a case upon a finding that the state is no longer a party.  Id.  
Here, there was not even a finding that the state is no longer a party.  The cases 
relied upon by relators to support their assertion of a mandatory duty, see, e.g., 
Tschantz v. Ferguson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655, 657, are 
inapposite since they do not involve the Court of Claims’ removal jurisdiction 
under R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) and 2743.03(E). 
 
As to relators’ claim that “[t]he findings of the Court of Appeals, and 
subsequent finding by the Court of Claims, [are] res judicata and the law of the 
# 7965 
10
case,” writs of mandamus and prohibition are appropriate to require lower courts 
to comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior court.  State 
ex rel. Smith v. O’Connor (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 646 N.E.2d 1115, 1117.  
However, the Court of Claims complied with the mandate of the court of appeals 
by issuing an entry specifying that Dr. Seifer was not entitled to R.C. 9.86 
immunity.  In fact, when relators attempted to obtain a directive from the court of 
appeals to compel the Court of Claims to dismiss the case because of the appellate 
court’s decision, that court expressly held that the state was not automatically 
removed as a party to the action and that dismissal of the Court of Claims lawsuit 
was “not necessarily appropriate.”  Therefore, no court, including the Court of 
Claims, has yet determined that the state is no longer a party. 
 
Based on the foregoing, relators’ initial argument does not evidence a patent 
and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Claims, and 
relators have not established how a postjudgment appeal would otherwise be 
inadequate.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Willis v. Sheboy (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 167, 6 
OBR 225, 451 N.E.2d 1200, paragraph one of the syllabus (“Where a 
constitutional process of appeal has been legislatively provided, the sole fact that 
pursuing such process would encompass more delay and inconvenience than 
# 7965 
11
seeking a writ of mandamus is insufficient to prevent the process from constituting 
a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”).  Therefore, 
relators’ first proposition does not warrant extraordinary relief and is overruled. 
 
The Court of Claims contends that this court should not consider the merits 
of relators’ remaining propositions of law because relators “did not raise these 
arguments as *** grounds for relief in their complaint, nor did they amend their 
complaint to include such arguments as is required by [Civ.R.] 15.”  However, no 
amendment was necessary since relators’ second proposition relied on factual 
allegations contained in the complaint, and their third proposition, which was 
premised on facts occurring after the complaint, did not modify either the amount 
or nature of the relief sought in the original complaint.  See Staff Notes to Civ.R. 
15(E).  Further, we have held in mandamus actions that “a court is not limited to 
considering facts and circumstances at the time a proceeding is instituted, but 
should consider the facts and conditions at the time it determines to issue a 
peremptory writ.”  Oregon v. Dansack (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 623 N.E.2d 20, 
22.  Thus, the court should consider the merits of relators’ remaining propositions. 
 
Relators assert in their second proposition of law that a third-party claim 
against the state for contribution and/or indemnity does not vest removal 
# 7965 
12
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims where the third-party plaintiff cannot prosecute 
such claim and the Court of Claims cannot rule on the claim.  Relators contend 
that since a claim of contribution and/or indemnity does not vest until after, at 
least, the final judgment, the Court of Claims lacks removal jurisdiction.  
Contribution and indemnity claims are prevalent in third-party practice.  See, 
generally, McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 210-212, Section 
8.22.  Neither R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) nor 2743.03(E) distinguishes between “vested” 
and “contingent” third-party claims.  Consequently, for the same reasons discussed 
in our disposition of relators’ first proposition of law, jurisdiction in the Court of 
Claims is not patently and unambiguously lacking under R.C. 2743.03(A)(1) and 
2743.03(E)(2), and relators have not established the inadequacy of postjudgment 
appeal as an alternative remedy.  Relators’ second proposition is overruled. 
 
Relators claim in their third proposition of law that the Court of Claims 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to vacate its dismissal under 
Civ.R. 60(B) while appeals were pending.  When a case has been appealed, the 
trial court retains all jurisdiction not inconsistent with the reviewing court’s 
jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the judgment.  Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s 
Dept. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 43, 44, 553 N.E.2d 1354, 1355. 
# 7965 
13
 
An appeal from a judgment divests trial courts of jurisdiction to consider 
Civ.R. 60(B) motions for relief from judgment, and jurisdiction to consider such 
motions may be conferred on the trial court only through an order of the reviewing 
court.  Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty, Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio 
St.3d 141, 147, 637 N.E.2d 890, 895; State ex rel. E. Mfg. Corp. v. Ohio Civ. 
Rights Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 586 N.E.2d 105, 107.  The Court of 
Claims therefore lacked jurisdiction to render its September 28, 1994 entry 
vacating its previous dismissal judgment when the dismissal was being appealed.  
Nevertheless, after the appeal was dismissed, the court had jurisdiction to rule on 
the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, which it did on October 28, 1994 by refiling its earlier 
vacation entry. 
 
Relators claim that this reinstated entry was also entered without 
jurisdiction because their appeal from the earlier vacation entry was pending.  
However, since the mere reinstatement of the vacation entry was not an exercise of 
jurisdiction inconsistent with the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to review the first 
vacation entry, the pendency of that appeal did not divest the Court of Claims of 
jurisdiction to reinstate its Civ.R. 60(B) ruling.  See Howard and Yee, supra.  
# 7965 
14
Further, relators concede that their appeal has since been dismissed.  Relators’ 
third proposition is meritless. 
 
Since it is evident that the Court of Claims does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the underlying case and relators have not 
established that a postjudgment appeal constitutes an inadequate alternate remedy, 
relators are not entitled to extraordinary relief. 
 
Accordingly, the writs of prohibition and mandamus are denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Writs denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., concur.