Title: Hughes v. Cole Grain Company

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

Hughes v. Cole Grain Company  Hughes v. Cole Grain Company 1998 OK 76 964 P.2d 206 69 OBJ 2623 Case Number: 90189 Decided: 07/14/1998 Mandate Issued: 08/14/1998 Supreme Court of Oklahoma Darlene Hughes, Petitioner, v. Cole Grain Company and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents. [964 P.2d 207] CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT HONORABLE ELLEN C. EDWARDS, TRIAL JUDGE ¶ 0 In July 1996 claimant [Hughes] filed a Form 3 claim for lower back trauma allegedly caused by a January 1995 on-the-job accident. The trial court denied her claim. The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] reversed and remanded the cause because of the trial court's reliance on employer's medical evidence which had been admitted in error. On remand the case was submitted on the first hearing's transcript sans the earlier proffered employer's medical evidence. The trial court again denied the claim; the COCA affirmed. On certiorari previously granted, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. Michael R. Green of Stites & Green, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the petitioner. Ronald E. Hignight and Owen Evans of McGivern, Gilliard & Curthoys, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the respondents. LAVENDER, J. ¶ 1 The claimant's [Hughes] petition for review requires that we canvass the facts not to weigh conflicting proof but to ascertain whether the trial court's decision is supported by any competent evidence. I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Claimant [Hughes or employee] filed her Form 3 claim on July 9, 1996. She alleged that she suffered a personal accidental injury to her lower back on January5,1995 while lifting a 50+ pound bag on Cole Grain Company's [respondent or Cole] sweet feed line. Hughes testified that she reported the injury to her supervisor when it occurred. ¶ 3 During the first hearing employer introduced medical evidence in an attempt to controvert Hughes' testimony. The Court of Civil Appeals later held that the admission of the employer's medical evidence was error because Cole had failed to comply with ¶ 4 On remand the cause was submitted on the basis of the original hearing's transcript sans the employer's medical evidence. The trial court again found that claimant's injury did not arise out of nor occur during the course of her employment. Upon denial of her claim, Hughes timely filed her petition for review. The COCA upheld her claim's denial. Certiorari was then sought and granted. II THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 5 When this Court examines the compensation tribunal's factual resolutions, we apply the any-competent-evidence standard. III THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT HUGHES' INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF HER EMPLOYMENT ¶ 6 Extant jurisprudence imposes upon a claimant, seeking to establish a compensable work-related injury, a two-pronged pattern of proof: (1) the claimant must show by lay testimony the nature of the work performed at the time of injury and (2) there must be expert medical opinion which establishes a nexus between that activity and the disability for which compensation is sought.7 This burden has its genesis in the claimant's responsibility to prove that the injury "arises out of" employment. The arising-out-of component of a compensable injury contemplates a causal relationship between the act engaged in at the time of injury and the requirements of employment.8 ¶ 7 The parties have each focused on the absence of employer's medical evidence in the record which would controvert the fact of the claimant's on-the-job injury. The employer asserts that the dearth of competent medical evidence from itself does not undermine the trial court's denial of Hughes' claim because a respondent is not obligated to advance proof to refute the causal relationship between employment and injury. ¶ 8 The record substantiates the fact that Hughes experienced a job-related accident on January 5, 1995. Also, there is Dr. T.'s offered and admitted medical report which relates employee's injury to this particular accident. The claimant has established by competent evidence the causal [964 P.2d 209] relationship between her injury and employment. She has met her burden under the two-pronged pattern of proof outlined above. Were the record devoid of this proof, then Cole's characterization of its failure to put on any competent evidence to controvert causation might be well taken; but it is not. ¶ 9 Oklahoma's jurisprudence does not impose upon an employer an affirmative obligation to prove by competent medical evidence that a causal relationship does not exist between an alleged injury and employment. Nonetheless, if (1) there is no competent evidence in the record to refute causation and (2) the claimant has met its burden on this issue, a trial court's finding that the injury did not arise out of employment cannot be sustained. IV SUMMARY ¶ 10 Workers' compensation court decisions are reviewed under the any-competent-evidence standard. When, as here, a claimant adduces (1) competent, credible, lay testimony that she was injured on the job and (2) a doctor's narrative that her disability is related to the identified accident, the employee has met the two-pronged pattern of proof which Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence requires to prove causation. Sans any competent evidence to the contrary in the record, the trial court's denial of compensable injury on the basis that the injury was not caused by the job's requirements and hence did not arise out of employment is not sustainable on review. Hughes met her burden of proof and Cole failed to offer any evidence which controverts the facts before the tribunal. On certiorari previously granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS REVERSED; AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. ¶ 11 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, WILSON and WATT, JJ., concur. ¶ 12 HODGES and SIMMS, JJ., dissent. ¶ 13 OPALA, J., not participating. FOOT