Title: Lisa K. Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3225 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Lisa K. Alberte,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Anew Health Care Services, Inc. and Sally  
Sprenger,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
223 Wis. 2d 001, 588 N.W.2d 298 
 
 
 
 (Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 8, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 30, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Louise Tesmer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-Petitioners there 
were briefs by Arthur E. Beck, Katherine L. Williams and Beck, 
Chaet, Molony & Bamberger, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Katherine L. Williams. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
John E. Uelmen and Fair Employment Legal Services, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by John E. Uelmen. 
 
 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy G. 
Costello, Mark A. Johnson, and Krukowski & Costello, S.C., 
Milwaukee, for Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. 
 
2000 WI 7 
  
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3225 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lisa K. Alberte,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Anew Health Care Services, Inc. and Sally  
Sprenger,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The question presented in this 
case is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1994), (Title VII), and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994),1  (the 
ADA), subject employers’ agents to personal liability for their 
discriminatory acts.  In a published decision, Alberte v. Anew 
Health Care Services, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 588 N.W.2d 298 
(Ct. App. 1998), the court of appeals determined that these 
statutes subject agents to individual liability.  The defendants 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the United States Code refer 
to the statutes in effect in 1994 unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
FEB 8, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
2 
petitioned for review.  Because we conclude that Congress did 
not intend to hold agents personally liable under these 
statutes, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.   
I.  Facts and Procedural Background 
¶2 
The facts material to the narrow issue in this case 
are brief.  During 1992, Lisa K. Alberte was employed by ANEW 
Health Care Services, Inc. (ANEW), a corporation that provides 
skilled nursing services.  Alberte’s supervisor, Sally Sprenger, 
was also the President and 47.5% owner of the corporation.  On 
December 
10, 
1992, 
Sprenger 
discharged 
Alberte 
from 
her 
employment at ANEW.   
¶3 
Alberte subsequently filed a charge of discrimination 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the 
EEOC authorized her to commence a civil action.  Alberte sued 
ANEW and Sprenger, alleging that they violated Title VII and the 
ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability (a back 
condition), 
retaliating 
against 
her, 
and 
terminating 
her 
employment.  The suit specifically alleges that Sprenger was 
serving as ANEW’s agent when these actions took place and seeks 
to 
hold 
Sprenger 
personally 
liable 
for 
her 
alleged 
discriminatory actions. 
¶4 
After the defendants’ request to remove the case to 
federal court was denied, the defendants filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment in the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, Judge Louise M. Tesmer.  The motion sought to dismiss 
Alberte’s action against Sprenger as an individual on the 
grounds that Title VII and the ADA do not subject her to 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
3 
personal liability.  The circuit court granted the motion and 
dismissed Sprenger from the action.   
¶5 
Alberte appealed 
from the 
circuit 
court’s 
order 
granting summary judgment and dismissing Sprenger from the 
action.  The court of appeals certified the issue to this court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61, but this court declined to 
grant certification.  Hearing the merits of the appeal, the 
court of appeals determined that the literal language of these 
statutes subject Sprenger to personal liability and therefore 
reversed the order of the circuit court.  Alberte, 223 Wis. 2d 
at 5-6.  ANEW and Sprenger petitioned this court for review.   
II.  Standard of Review 
¶6 
The question whether an employer’s agent may be held 
personally liable for violations of Title VII and the ADA arises 
in this case in the context of a summary judgment motion.  An 
appellate court independently reviews a circuit court’s order 
granting summary judgment, applying the same standards as the 
circuit court.  Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 
312, 332, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).   
¶7 
Whether the summary judgment motion was properly 
granted in this case depends upon whether the ADA imposes 
liability on individuals, which is an issue of first impression 
in Wisconsin state courts.  Although we may of course seek 
guidance in the persuasive authority of other jurisdictions, 
only United States Supreme Court interpretations of federal law 
are binding on this court.  State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 
426 n.4, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983).  Thus, we are not bound by the 
No. 
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4 
Seventh Circuit’s determination that the ADA does not impose 
individual liability on employers’ agents.  See United States 
E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 
1282 (7th Cir. 1995).  Instead, this case presents a question of 
statutory interpretation.  Interpretation of a federal statute 
is a question of law that is subject to de novo review by this 
court.  GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 471, 
572 N.W.2d 466 (1998). 
III.  Individual Liability under the ADA 
¶8 
The statutory provisions that we must interpret are 
the provisions that create liability under Title VII and the 
ADA.  Title VII prohibits any “employer” from engaging in 
unlawful employment practices.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  “Employer” 
is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent 
of such person.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(emphasis added).  The ADA 
prohibits discrimination by any “covered entity” against a 
qualified individual with a disability.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).  
A “covered entity” includes “an employer, employment agency, 
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12111(2).  An “employer” is defined as “a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more 
employees . . . and any agent of such person.”  42 U.S.C. 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (emphasis added).  The ADA also provides 
that the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VII 
also apply to any person alleging violation of the ADA.  42 
U.S.C. § 12133.   
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
5 
¶9 
Alberte claims that inclusion of the phrase, “any 
agent of such person” in the definition of “employer” under both 
of these statutes clearly and unambiguously means that agents 
may be held liable for violating Title VII and the ADA.  She 
urges us to apply the well-established rule that “[i]n a 
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the 
language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity 
to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all 
but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.”  Estate 
of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).  
See also INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984); Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); DNR v. 
Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d 403, 408, 321 N.W.2d 
286 (1982).  Under this rule, Alberte argues that we must give 
effect to her “plain meaning” interpretation of the phrase “and 
any agent.”  
¶10 While it is true that statutory interpretation begins 
with the language of the statute, it is also well established 
that courts must not look at a single, isolated sentence or 
portion of a sentence, but at the role of the relevant language 
in the entire statute.  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
41, 51 (1987).  See also In re: Antonio M.C., 182 Wis. 2d 301, 
309, 513 N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1994).    Moreover, courts have 
“‘some “scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or 
usual 
meaning 
of 
its 
words 
where 
acceptance 
of 
that 
meaning . . . would 
thwart 
the 
obvious 
purpose 
of 
the 
statute.”’”  Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571 (quoting Commissioner v. 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
6 
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) and Helvering v. Hammel, 311 
U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941)).  When a literal interpretation 
produces absurd or unreasonable results, or results that are 
clearly at odds with the legislature’s intent, “[o]ur task is to 
give some alternative meaning” to the words.  Green v. Bock 
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)(Scalia, J., 
concurring).2   
¶11 Although there are no relevant Wisconsin cases to 
guide our interpretation in this case, there is a wealth of 
relevant federal circuit court precedent.  Because both the ADA 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) define 
“employer” almost identically to the way it is defined in Title 
VII, “[c]ourts routinely apply arguments regarding individual 
liability to all three statutes interchangeably.”  AIC, 55 F.3d 
at 1280.  The vast majority of federal circuit courts have 
                     
2  See also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 41-56 
(1994)(rejecting an “implausible” interpretation in favor of a 
more sensible one after an examination of the legislative 
history); 
United 
States 
v. 
Turkette, 
452 
U.S. 
576, 
580 
(1981)(“[A]bsurd 
results 
are 
to 
be 
avoided 
and 
internal 
inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with . . . .”); 
Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 109 (1957) (“Every 
statute must be interpreted in the light of reason and common 
understanding 
to 
reach 
the 
results 
intended 
by 
the 
legislature.”); United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 
(1926)(“All laws are to be given a sensible construction; and a 
literal application of a statute, which would lead to absurd 
consequences, should be avoided . . . .”);  United States v. 
Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868) (“All laws should receive a 
sensible construction.  General terms should be so limited in 
their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an 
absurd consequence.”); DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 372, 
366 N.W.2d 891 (1985); Connell v. Luck, 264 Wis. 282, 284-85, 58 
N.W.2d 633 (1953). 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
7 
determined that the phrase “and any agent” does not create 
individual liability under these three statutes.3  Similarly, the 
                     
3 Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 406 (6th 
Cir. 1997)(holding that Congress did not intend individuals to 
face liability under Title VII); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996)(holding that 
individual employees may not be held liable under Title VII); 
Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996)(holding 
that suits against individual supervisors in their personal 
capacities are not permitted under Title VII); Tomka v. Seiler 
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995)(holding that an 
employer’s agent may not be held individually liable under Title 
VII); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(holding 
that although supervisory employees may be named as parties in 
Title VII claims, they may not be held personally liable for 
violations of Title VII); AIC, 55 F.3d at 1282 (holding that 
individuals who do not otherwise meet the statutory definition 
of “employer” cannot be held liable under the ADA); Cross v. 
State, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding that 
individuals may not be held personally liable under Title VII); 
Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994)(holding 
that individuals who do not otherwise meet the statutory 
definition of “employer” under Title VII may not be held 
personally liable under Title VII); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993)(holding that individual 
supervisors may not be held personally liable under the ADEA). 
See also Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, Inc., 55 
F.3d 
377, 
381 
(8th 
Cir. 
1995)(interpreting 
an 
analogous 
provision of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) consistently 
with Title VII and holding that therefore an employee may not be 
held personally liable under the MHRA); Birkbeck v. Marvel 
Lighting 
Corp., 30 
F.3d 
507, 
510-11 
and 
n.1 
(4th 
Cir. 
1994)(holding that with respect to “personnel decisions of a 
plainly delegable character,” an employee may not be held 
personally liable under the ADEA).   
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp, 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th 
Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds by Paroline v. Unisys 
Corp., 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that an employer’s 
agent may be subject to individual liability under Title VII if 
evidence establishes that the company’s management acquiesced in 
the agent’s exercise of supervisory authority). 
No. 
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8 
Sixth Circuit has recently held that individual supervisors may 
not 
be 
held 
liable 
in 
a 
retaliation 
claim 
under 
the 
Rehabilitation Act because they do not meet the statutory 
definition of “employer.”  Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 547 
(6th Cir. 1999).  Like these courts, we conclude that Alberte’s 
narrow, literal interpretation of the phrase “and any agent” is 
not consistent with the entire remedial scheme of Title VII and 
the ADA, and produces unreasonable results.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that 
Sprenger is not subject to liability in her individual capacity 
under these statutes. 
A.  Unreasonable results of a literal interpretation 
¶12 Like the overwhelming majority of federal circuit 
courts, we are persuaded that Alberte’s literal interpretation 
of the phrase “and any agent” does not make sense in light of 
the entire scheme of Title VII and the ADA.   
¶13 To begin with, Title VII and the ADA both limit 
employer liability to employers who have more than 15 employees. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).4  Thus, under 
Alberte’s interpretation, although an entity that employs fewer 
than fifteen employees would be protected from liability, an 
individual supervisor would be subject to liability.  It seems 
doubtful that Congress would subject individuals to liability 
while 
at 
the 
same 
time 
protecting 
small 
employers 
from 
                     
4 Under the ADEA, liability is limited to employers who have 
more than 20 employees.  29 U.S.C. § 630(b). 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
9 
liability.  Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Miller, 991 F.2d at 
587); Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.  Such a 
result would upset the statutory framework, which strikes a 
careful balance between Congress’s desire to eradicate all 
discrimination and its desire to protect small entities from the 
burden of litigation.  AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.   
¶14 Furthermore, the remedies available to plaintiffs 
under these statutes also support the conclusion that Congress 
did not intend to impose liability on individuals.  Until the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, was enacted, a 
plaintiff suing under Title VII or the ADA could only seek back 
pay, reinstatement, and other forms of equitable relief; these 
remedies are generally recoverable from an entity rather than an 
individual.  Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1)(1990).  The fact that Congress originally only provided 
for remedies that are typically recovered from an employing 
entity rather than an individual suggests that Congress did not 
intend to impose liability on individuals.  Hiler, 177 F.3d at 
546 (citing Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314-15; 
AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.   
¶15 Alberte points out that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
amended the law to allow for compensatory and punitive damages 
and argues that individual liability is consistent with the 
amended remedial framework.  We determine that, to the contrary, 
 the 1991 amendments provide further support for the conclusion 
that Congress did not contemplate individual liability under the 
ADA.  Although compensatory and punitive remedies are remedies 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
10
that generally may be recovered from individuals, “[i]t is a 
long stretch to conclude that Congress silently intended to 
abruptly change its earlier vision through an amendment to the 
remedial portions of the statute alone.”  AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281. 
 It seems 
more likely 
that 
if Congress 
intended 
to so 
drastically amend the remedies available under Title VII and the 
ADA, it would have explicitly provided for individual liability. 
¶16 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 enacted a 
detailed scheme of statutory limits on compensatory and punitive 
damage awards, depending on the number of employees employed by 
an employer.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  For example, a damage 
award against an employer who employs between 15 and 100 
employees may not exceed $50,000.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A).  
An employer who employs between 101 and 200 employees may be 
liable 
for 
up 
to 
$100,000 
in 
damages, 
42 
U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(3)(B), while an employer who employs between 201 and 
500 employees may be liable for up to $200,000 in damages.  42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(C).  Finally, damages against an employer 
who employs over 500 employees are limited to $300,000.  42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).   
¶17 Nothing in this detailed scheme of limitations on 
damage awards refers to awards against individuals.  If Congress 
had intended to subject individuals to liability, surely it 
would have accounted for individuals in this detailed scheme of 
damages caps.  Hiler, 177 F.3d at 546 (quoting Wathen, 115 F.3d 
at 406).  Congress’s silence on the question of damage awards 
against individuals is strong evidence that Congress simply did 
No. 
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11
not contemplate individual liability.  Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406; 
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1077; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; AIC, 55 F.3d 
at 1281; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 n.2.   
¶18 Alberte rejects 
this 
reasoning and 
argues 
that, 
instead, after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
the damage award that may be recovered from an individual for 
violation of Title VII or the ADA depends upon the size of the 
employer that employs the individual.  For instance, Alberte 
contends that a supervisor who works for a business that employs 
20 people could be held liable for up to $50,000, while a 
supervisor who works for a business that employs 1,000 people 
could be held liable for up to $300,000.   
¶19 Alberte’s interpretation would mean that an individual 
who works for a large employer could be liable for $300,000 in 
damages, while a business entity that employs fewer than 99 
workers could only be subjected to $50,000 in damages.  We agree 
with the Seventh Circuit that it is “highly improbable” that 
Congress intended such inequitable results.  AIC, 55 F.3d at 
1281 n.6.  See also Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316 (“It is doubtful that 
such an anomalous result was contemplated by a Congress that 
failed even to address individual liability.”).  It therefore 
appears that Alberte’s interpretation of the phrase “and any 
agent” does not fit the overall remedial scheme of the statute 
and would produce unreasonable results. 
¶20 In sum, we conclude that Alberte’s interpretation of 
these statutes to permit individual liability rests on an 
improperly narrow reading of the phrase “and any agent.”  When 
No. 
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12
the phrase is read together with the rest of the statute, 
Alberte’s interpretation produces inconsistent, unreasonable 
results.  When a literal construction of a statutory provision 
produces unreasonable results, the court will look to the 
statute’s context, history, and purposes to determine the 
legislative intent.  Katz, 271 U.S. at 357.  See also Bock 
Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring)(“I think it 
entirely appropriate to consult all public materials . . . to 
verify 
that 
what 
seems 
to 
us 
an 
unthinkable 
disposition . . . was indeed unthought of . . . .”); Phinpathya, 
464 U.S. at 198 (“[When] a literal interpretation of a statutory 
provision may indeed lead to absurd consequences we must look 
beyond 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
provision 
to 
the 
underlying 
congressional 
intent.”)(Brennan, 
J., 
concurring)(citation 
omitted); Connell, 264 Wis. at 284-85. 
B.  Legislative History 
¶21 We conclude that an examination of the legislative 
history of the provisions at issue in this case suggests that 
Congress did not intend to impose liability on individuals under 
the ADA. 
¶22 As previously noted, the ADA adopted the phrase “and 
any agent” from the nearly identical provision in Title VII.  
AIC, 55 F.3d at 1280 n.1.  See also Gregory M. P. Davis, 
Comment, More Than a Supervisor Bargains for:  Individual 
Liability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Other 
Employment Discrimination Statutes, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 321, 327. 
 The legislative history of Title VII shows that by limiting 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
13
Title VII’s applicability to larger employers, Congress intended 
to protect small business entities from the burden of complying 
with Title VII and litigating discrimination claims.  See Tomka, 
66 F.3d at 1314 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. S. 13088, 92-93 (1964) 
(Remarks of Senators Cotton, Humphrey, and Morse)).  It 
therefore 
seems 
unlikely 
that 
Congress 
intended 
to 
make 
individuals liable.  Id.; AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.   
¶23 Alberte points out that there is also evidence that 
other factors influenced Congress’s decision to enact the size 
limitations in Title VII.  In particular, it appears that 
Congress was concerned with ensuring that Title VII was 
consistent with the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
See 
Tomka, 
66 
F.3d 
at 1322 
(J. Parker, 
dissenting).  Alberte argues that the legislative history 
therefore does not clearly support the conclusion that Congress 
intended to protect small entities from Title VII liability. 
¶24 It is true that a complex set of factors influenced 
Congress’s decision to enact the size limitations in Title VII. 
 However, this does not change the fact that nothing in Title 
VII’s legislative history suggests that Congress contemplated 
the imposition of individual liability.  Instead, Title VII’s 
legislative history is completely silent with respect to the 
issue of individual agent liability.  Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.  
See also Clara J. Montanari, Comment, Supervisor Liability Under 
Title VII: A "Feel Good" Judicial Decision, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 351, 
360-65 (1996).  Because the debate over Title VII was so 
contentious, “[i]t is difficult to accept that if supervisor 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
14
liability had been intended, it would not have been discussed 
once.  Rather, it is likely that it not only would have been 
discussed, but would have been a wellspring of vehement 
opposition.”  Montanari at 361; see also Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314. 
Congress’s failure to comment on individual liability throughout 
the long, hostile debate over the passage of Title VII indicates 
that Congress simply did not contemplate the imposition of 
individual liability.  Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.  We conclude that 
the legislative history’s silence with regard to the issue of 
individual liability, together with its express discussion of 
the need to protect small entities from Title VII liability, 
strongly suggest that Congress did not intend to authorize 
individual liability in Title VII claims. 
¶25 The history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 also 
indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual 
liability under Title VII or the ADA.  As previously discussed, 
the 1991 Act created a sliding scale of compensatory and 
punitive damage awards but did not provide for any damage awards 
for individuals.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 
1315.  There was no Senate Report about the 1991 Act; the House 
Report did not address the issue of individual liability, but 
instead focused on the goals of providing money damages, 
increasing Title VII’s effectiveness, and responding to Supreme 
Court decisions that had limited the application of Title VII.  
See Montanari at 365-66.  Nothing in the history of the 1991 Act 
suggests that Congress contemplated individual agent liability 
under these statutes. 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
15
¶26 Finally, the legislative history of the ADA confirms 
the conclusion that Congress did not contemplate individual 
agent liability under the ADA.  While the ADA was before the 
Senate, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
prepared a summary report about the anticipated regulatory 
impact of the ADA.  Davis at 325-36 (citing S. Rep. No. 116, 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1989)).  Although a Senate rule 
requires such reports to evaluate a bill’s expected impact on 
individuals as well as businesses, the report did not mention 
any anticipated impact on individuals.  Id. at 326.  It seems 
unlikely that the committee would have failed to report on the 
ADA’s anticipated impact on individuals if Congress had intended 
to impose personal liability on individual agents.  See id. 
¶27 In sum, legislative history strongly suggests that 
Congress did not contemplate the imposition of liability on 
individuals for violations of Title VII or the ADA. 
C.  Respondeat Superior Principles 
¶28 Alberte urges us to hold that the phrase “and any 
agent” plainly indicates that Congress intended to define 
“employer” to include individual agents.   
¶29 We are not convinced that the phrase “and any agent” 
in the definition of employer plainly means that Congress 
intended to impose liability on individual agents.  Instead, we 
agree with the many federal circuit courts that have concluded 
that Congress used the phrase “and any agent” to ensure that 
employer liability would be limited by the principles of 
respondeat superior.  See Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405-06; Tomka, 66 
No. 
96-3225 
 
 
16
F.3d at 1316; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281; 
Grant, 21 F.3d at 652; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.  
¶30 This conclusion finds strong support in the United 
States Supreme Court’s statement that “Congress’ decision to 
define ‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits 
on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are 
to be held responsible.”  Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 72 (1986).  Meritor held that in accordance with 
principles of agency law, Title VII does not automatically 
subject employers to liability for sexual harassment by their 
supervisors.  Id. at 72.  Subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
have confirmed the notion that by defining “employer” to include 
any “agent,” Congress intended to make clear that employers’ 
vicarious liability is subject to the limits of respondeat 
superior.  See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 763-64, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998)(“[W]e are bound by our 
holding 
in 
Meritor 
that 
agency 
principles 
constrain 
the 
imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory 
harassment.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
791-92, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998)(affirming Meritor’s conclusion 
that Congress’s use of the word “agent” means that employers are 
not automatically liable for sexual harassment by supervisors). 
¶31 Citing Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 
1995), Alberte contends that this reasoning renders the phrase 
“and any agent” superfluous, because liability against an 
employing agency would necessarily be governed by principles of 
No. 
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17
respondeat superior, whether or not this phrase was included in 
the definition of employer.  Alberte also argues that if 
traditional principles of agency law govern Title VII and the 
ADA, then agents should be held jointly and severally liable for 
their discriminatory acts.   
¶32 We are unconvinced by these arguments.  To begin with, 
Ball v. Renner itself is in uneasy tension with Sauers v. Salt 
Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993), and Haynes v. 
Williams, 88 F.3d at 901 (10th Cir. 1996), both of which held 
that Title VII does not permit actions against individual 
supervisors in their personal capacities.    
¶33 Furthermore, 
“what 
Meritor 
and 
its 
progeny 
conclusively establish is that the agent clause is not mere 
surplusage, because Congress explicitly chose to apply agency 
principles to a determination of the scope of an employer’s 
liability.”  Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316.  In other words, the fact 
that the analysis in Meritor, Burlington, and Faragher was 
guided by the “and any agent” phrase shows that the phrase is 
not surplusage.  Instead, it serves the purpose of guiding 
No. 
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18
courts in deciding whether an employer may be held liable for 
the acts of its employees.5 
¶34 Moreover, the idea that Congress added the phrase “and 
any agent” to Title VII in order to clarify that respondeat 
superior principles should apply to the definition of “employer” 
is also consistent with Meritor’s statement that common law 
                     
5 One commentator has noted that Congress’s inclusion of the 
phrase “and any agent” in Title VII’s definition of “employer” 
might be explained by the close relationship between Title VII 
and the NLRA.  See Jan W. Henkel, Discrimination by Supervisors: 
 Personal Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination 
Statutes, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 765, 774.  Title VII’s remedial 
provisions were modeled on the provisions of the NLRA.  Id.; 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75 n.1.  In 1947, Congress added the phrase 
“any person acting as an agent of an employer” to the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in response to court decisions holding 
employers liable for acts of employees outside the scope of 
their duties under an earlier version of the NLRA.  Henkel at 
774 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1947)).  This amendment was intended to clarify that employers 
should only be held liable for the actions of employees within 
the scope of their authority.  Id.  Thus,  
[b]ecause Title VII was enacted against the well 
established backdrop of the NLRA and adopted not only 
its agent language but also its remedial provisions, 
many courts find the absence of any reference to 
individual 
liability 
in 
Title 
VII’s 
legislative 
history unremarkable; having incorporated the NLRA’s 
liability scheme into Title VII, Congress simply did 
not anticipate that individual liability for agents 
would ever be an issue under Title VII. 
 
Id. at 774-75 and n.52 (citing Friend v. Union Dime Savings 
Bank, No. 79 Civ. 5450, 1980 WL 227 (S.D.N.Y 1980)(unpublished 
decision)).  See also, Low v. Hasbro, Inc., 817 F. Supp 249, 250 
(D.R.I. 
1993)(determining 
that 
the 
history 
of 
Congress’s 
amendment to the NLRA makes clear that Congress intended “‘to 
limit the employer’s liability rather than to grant a new cause 
of 
action 
against 
all 
agents 
or 
employees 
of 
an 
employer.’”)(quoting Friend, 1980 WL 227). 
No. 
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19
agency principles “may not be transferable in all their 
particulars to Title VII.”  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.  Alberte’s 
argument that the phrase “and any agent” incorporates all common 
law agency principles into Title VII and the ADA conflicts with 
this explicit statement in Meritor.  Instead, we are persuaded 
that Congress added the phrase “and any agent” merely to clarify 
that employer liability should be limited by respondeat superior 
principles. 
IV.  Conclusion   
¶35 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
better 
reasoned 
interpretation of the phrase “and any agent” in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) is that it expresses 
Congress’s intent to incorporate respondeat superior principles 
into 
the 
definition 
of 
“employer.” 
 
The 
alternative 
interpretation urged by the plaintiff produces unreasonable 
results, contravenes legislative intent, and finds no support in 
the history of the statute.  We therefore reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and join the Seventh Circuit and the 
majority of federal circuit courts in concluding that an 
individual is not personally liable under Title VII or the ADA. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
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