Title: Hall v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-LW-00660 
Johnetta Ruth Hall, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
–v–
State of Indiana, 
Appellee/Respondent. 
Argued: October 7, 2021 | Decided: December 17, 2021 
Appeal from the Jennings Circuit Court 
No. 40C01-2003-MR-1 
The Honorable Jonathan W. Webster, Judge 
On Direct Appeal 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 17 2021, 11:50 am
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David, Justice.  
A jury convicted Johnetta Ruth Hall of murder and conspiracy to 
commit murder. After finding the murder-for-hire statutory aggravator 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury recommended that Hall serve life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court adopted 
this recommendation, and sentenced Hall to life without parole (“LWOP”) 
for her murder charge and thirty-five years for the conspiracy to commit 
murder charge to be served concurrently. 
In this direct appeal, Hall makes four arguments. She challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence for her convictions; the sufficiency of the 
evidence for her murder-for-hire aggravating circumstance; the admission 
and exclusion of certain testimony at trial; and asks this Court to revise 
her concurrent conspiracy sentence.  
We affirm the trial court. 
Facts and Procedural History  
In early 2015, Bill Reynolds (“Reynolds”) and his wife, Dalene Cates 
(“Cates”) lived at their residence in Scott County on Slate Ford Road (the 
“Residence”). Throughout his life, Reynolds had amassed a substantial 
collection of NASCAR memorabilia, which was primarily located at the 
Residence.  
Reynolds petitioned for divorce in June 2015 and moved out of the 
Residence temporarily. In August 2015, the divorce court issued a 
provisional order that awarded temporary possession of the Residence to 
Reynolds and ordered Cates to vacate the premises by September 20, 2015. 
The provisional order also included a restraining order preventing the 
parties from transferring or disposing of marital property, except in the 
usual course of business while the divorce was pending. 
During this time following the divorce order, Cates, her daughter, 
Johnetta Ruth Hall (“Hall”), and Hall’s daughter, Amaris Bunyard 
(“Bunyard”), began moving some of Reynolds’ NASCAR memorabilia to 
a storage facility in North Vernon, Indiana. Hall and Bunyard also enlisted 
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the help of Kerry Heald (“Heald”), a family friend with whom Bunyard 
had an on-and-off again relationship. On at least two occasions when 
Heald was helping pack up the Residence, Hall mentioned to Heald that 
everything would be much easier if Reynolds were dead. She told Heald 
that she wanted Reynolds dead because she wanted Cates, her mother, to 
inherit Reynolds’ property as his surviving spouse. During some of their 
discussions throughout the move, Hall offered Heald that she would 
provide payment or give him items to sell if Heald would kill Reynolds. 
Heald initially declined and did not believe that Hall was serious.   
A short time later, Hall approached Heald again and asked what it 
would take for him to murder Reynolds. Heald answered that it would 
take $100,000. Hall explained to Heald that she had more than $600,000 
worth of NASCAR memorabilia that could be sold. Hall offered that in 
exchange for Reynolds’ murder, she could give Heald approximately 
between $50,000 and $100,000 worth of NASCAR memorabilia. She also 
offered Heald a third of Reynolds’ $300,000 life insurance policy. Heald 
had also expressed interest in Hall’s Nissan 300Z, and Hall agreed that 
Heald could have the Nissan in exchange for murdering Reynolds.1  
Later, Heald expressed doubts to Hall about whether he would be able 
to kill Reynolds for money. With the apparent purpose to motivate Heald 
to follow through with the plan, Hall told Heald that Reynolds had 
physically abused Cates, physically abused Hall’s quadriplegic son, and 
raped Bunyard. Following that conversation, Heald decided “at that 
moment” that he was going to kill Reynolds. See Tr. Vol. V, pp. 170-71. 
Around a month before Reynolds was murdered, Hall and Bunyard 
invited Heald to Bunyard’s apartment to discuss and plan Reynolds’ 
murder. Heald arrived and brought his friend, Jacob Mathis (“Mathis”). 
During this time, Hall said she would pay Heald to murder Reynolds. 
They also discussed the possibility and means of obtaining a murder 
weapon and ammunition. Hall also offered to provide Mathis with some 
NASCAR memorabilia and to fix his car in exchange for Mathis assisting 
 
1 Hall also provided Heald $500 for repairs on the Nissan as payment for Reynolds’ murder. 
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Heald in the murder-for-hire scheme. Hall, with Bunyard’s assistance, 
later provided Heald with a handgun to commit the murder.  
On September 27, 2015, Heald sent a text message to Hall to let her 
know that he was going to “stop by the old house to talk to Bill,” and then 
Heald would go “pick up things.” Tr. Vol. VI, p. 36. Hall and Heald also 
had a phone call that lasted approximately two minutes. Meanwhile, 
Mathis met Heald in Clarksville, Indiana, and Heald drove himself and 
Mathis in Mathis’ car to the Residence. On their way, Heald sent Hall a 
text stating, “on my way to Bill’s.” Tr. Vol. VI, p. 38. In response, Hall sent 
a text message to Heald that she would “get ready to go to storage.” Id. 
Once Heald and Mathis arrived at the Residence, Heald stepped out of 
the car and put a gun in his waistband and walked up to talk to Reynolds 
near a fence. Heald confirmed Reynolds’ identity and told Reynolds that 
Heald was sent by Hall to kill Reynolds. Heald told Reynolds he had “ten 
seconds to get right with God,” and then Heald drew the gun and shot 
Reynolds in the head. Tr. Vol. V, p. 228. 
After Heald shot Reynolds, Heald and Mathis met Hall at a storage 
facility in Austin, Indiana to gather some of the promised NASCAR 
memorabilia. Once they arrived, Hall directed Mathis to the specific boxes 
that Heald and Mathis would be receiving, and Mathis loaded several 
boxes into his car. Hall then instructed Heald to put the gun in the car she 
was driving, and the three traveled to a nearby Circle K gas station where 
Hall withdrew some money. 2 After Heald collected some of the NASCAR 
memorabilia from Hall, Heald spoke with Bunyard, and told her that he 
had shot Reynolds. Two nights after Reynolds was murdered, Bunyard 
also saw boxes of NASCAR memorabilia at Heald’s apartment.  
During the afternoon on September 27, 2015, officers with the Scott 
County Sheriff’s Department were dispatched to the Residence and 
discovered Reynolds’ body lying in the driveway. An autopsy performed 
 
2 Videotapes later obtained by law enforcement from the Austin storage facility showed 
Mathis moving boxes from the units into his car. Law enforcement also obtained surveillance 
videos from the Circle K gas station showing Hall, Heald, and Mathis interacting.  
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the following day confirmed that Reynolds died from a gunshot wound to 
the head. 
On October 5, 2015, the State charged Hall with murder, conspiracy to 
commit murder, and obstruction of justice. A mistrial was declared in the 
first trial during voir dire, and a change of venue from Scott County to 
Jennings County for the second trial was granted. 
At the second trial, Mathis and Bunyard both testified as State’s 
witnesses.3 Heald was called as a witness, but he refused to testify even 
after the trial court ordered him to testify. The trial court then found 
Heald in contempt and ordered that his prior deposition from August 3, 
2017 to be read into evidence, over Hall’s objection. In overruling the 
objection, the trial court found that Heald was unavailable under Indiana 
Evidence Rule 804(a)(2).4 In his deposition, Heald testified to Hall’s 
several offers of compensation in the form of NASCAR memorabilia, life 
insurance proceeds, and the Nissan in exchange for the murder of 
Reynolds. Heald also testified that Hall provided the gun that he used to 
kill Reynolds. He also confessed that he lied in his September 29, 2015 
statement to police. He further testified about Hall’s persistence and 
encouragement to see her plan completed, testifying that Hall apparently 
falsely told Heald that Reynolds sexually assaulted Bunyard and 
physically abused Hall’s quadriplegic son.  
In her closing argument, Hall sought to introduce a copy of an 
interview Heald conducted with police on September 29, 2015, seeking to 
impeach Heald by prior inconsistent statements under Evidence Rule 
613(B). However, the trial court, in its discretion, did not admit this 
interview for impeachment purposes. 
The jury found Hall guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder. The jury also found a murder-for-hire aggravating circumstance 
 
3 Mathis and Bunyard each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder. Their plea 
agreements required their cooperation and truthful testimony in the State’s case against Hall. 
4 “A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: . . . (2) refuses to 
testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so[.]” Ind. Evid. R. 804(a)(2).  
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beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended an LWOP sentence for 
Hall. The court sentenced Hall to LWOP for the murder charge and a 
thirty-five-year concurrent sentence for the conspiracy to commit murder 
charge.  
 
Hall brings her direct appeal to this Court.  
Discussion and Decision 
Hall raises multiple issues in her direct appeal. Hall argues that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict her for both her murder and 
conspiracy to commit murder charges, as well as the statutory murder-for-
hire aggravating circumstance. She also argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion in admitting Heald’s prior deposition in violation of 
Evidence Rule 403, and she contends that it was an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to admit for impeachment purposes a prior inconsistent statement 
that Heald made to police. Lastly, Hall argues that her concurrent thirty-
five-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder is inappropriate. We 
will address each argument in turn.  
I. 
The sufficiency of the evidence supports 
Hall’s convictions for murder and conspiracy 
to commit murder. 
 
For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative 
evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier 
of fact. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). On sufficiency 
challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. 
Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017). We will affirm the conviction 
unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.  
 
Indiana makes no distinction between the responsibility of a principal 
and an accomplice. Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (Ind. 1999). 
Accordingly, an accomplice commits the actual offense when a person 
knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to 
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commit an offense. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4; Johnson v. State, 687 N.E.2d 345, 
349 (Ind 1997). The “testimony of an accomplice, though subject to much 
scrutiny by the trier of fact, is alone enough to support a conviction.” 
Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 251 (Ind. 1997). For the murder charge, 
the State had the burden to show that Hall knowingly killed or 
intentionally aided, induced, or caused Heald to shoot and kill Reynolds. 
See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. 
 
Hall specifically argues that the “purely circumstantial evidence” used 
to convict her for murder and conspiracy to commit murder was 
insufficient. See Appellant’s Br. at 19–23. She alleges that Heald, Mathis, 
and Bunyard all had reason to potentially change and/or fabricate their 
testimony in exchange for more favorable sentencing. Through this, she 
argues that there is no “direct evidence that [Hall] was involved in the 
shooting of [Reynolds].” Id. at 22. But much of the evidence that Hall 
claims is “circumstantial evidence” is direct evidence. For example, Heald, 
Bunyard, and Mathis all testified from their personal knowledge 
regarding Hall’s offers for compensation and the subsequent agreement to 
pay Heald for killing Reynolds, which would qualify as direct evidence.5 
Hall may have credibility concerns about this testimony,6 but those 
concerns do not transform this testimony into circumstantial evidence. 
Regardless, Hall’s attempt to distinguish direct versus circumstantial 
evidence is misplaced. Moreover, a defendant may be convicted for 
murder based alone on circumstantial evidence. Green v. State, 587 N.E.2d 
1314, 1315 (Ind. 1992). 
 
 
5 Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if 
true, proves a fact without inference or presumption. Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 489 
(Ind. 2012). Circumstantial evidence is evidence based on inference and not on personal 
knowledge or observation. Id. 
6 “[J]udging the credibility of witnesses lies squarely within the province of the jury and we 
will not reassess its credibility determinations.” Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 497 (Ind. 
2001). Here, the jury heard and viewed live testimony from Mathis and Bunyard and 
apparently believed them, based on the verdict. 
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Further, the evidence favorable to the judgment shows that Hall offered 
Heald NASCAR memorabilia, a portion of Reynolds’ life insurance 
proceeds, and ownership of her Nissan in exchange for Heald to kill 
Reynolds. It also shows that Hall provided the murder weapon and 
ammunition. Mathis and Bunyard each provided live, in-court testimony 
describing Hall’s role in the scheme to murder Reynolds, and Heald’s 
deposition implicating Hall was also read in its entirety to the jury. The 
State also presented evidence that Hall exchanged text messages and other 
communications with Heald regarding Heald’s status leading up to the 
murder, and the State also presented evidence that Hall coordinated a 
meeting with Heald after the murder to exchange payment. Given all this, 
a jury could reasonably infer that Hall sought to aid, induce, or cause 
Heald to shoot and kill Reynolds. See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. Accordingly, 
there was sufficient evidence to support Hall’s murder conviction. 
 
There is also sufficient evidence to support Hall’s conspiracy to commit 
murder conviction. A conspiracy charge requires the State to show the 
defendant had intent to commit a felony, an agreement with another 
person to commit the felony, and an overt act in furtherance of the 
agreement. Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2; see Perkins v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1379, 1385 
(Ind. 1985). Here, reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence 
demonstrate that Hall agreed with Heald for Heald to murder Reynolds in 
exchange for compensation in the form of NASCAR memorabilia, life 
insurance proceeds, and the Nissan vehicle. Through this, Hall intended 
for, and later encouraged and motivated, Heald to kill Reynolds, which he 
eventually did, constituting an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
See Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient such that a 
reasonable jury could find that Hall conspired with Heald to kill 
Reynolds.  
 
 
 
 
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II. 
There is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that Hall committed the 
statutory aggravator of murder-for-hire. 
 
Under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(a), the State may seek an LWOP 
sentence by alleging at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. One 
of the aggravators is where the defendant “committed the murder by 
hiring another person to kill.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(5). A murder-for-
hire occurs when “one offers or promises compensation to another for 
performing a killing, and the other person commits the murder pursuant 
to or in response to this offer or promise.” Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 
1315, 1326 (Ind. 1990). Before a trial court may impose an LWOP sentence, 
it must find that the State has proven the existence of an alleged 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 
(Ind. 2012). In determining whether an LWOP statutory aggravator is 
supported by sufficient evidence, the Court applies the same standard of 
review that governs other sufficiency claims. Washington v. State, 808 
N.E.2d 617, 626 (Ind. 2004).  
 
Hall makes the same sufficiency challenges regarding the murder for 
hire aggravator as she did for her murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder convictions. However, the evidence shows that Hall offered Heald 
a portion of Reynolds’ life insurance proceeds and NASCAR memorabilia. 
Heald, Mathis, and Bunyard all provided testimony that Hall offered to 
compensate Heald in exchange for murdering Reynolds. Heald testified 
that he murdered Reynolds in response to Hall’s compensation offers. 
There was corroborating video surveillance footage showing Mathis 
packing NASCAR memorabilia into his car in Heald and Hall’s presence. 
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Hall 
committed the statutory murder-for-hire aggravating circumstance.  
 
 
 
 
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III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting Heald’s 2017 deposition and 
excluding his September 29, 2015 statement to 
police. 
 
Hall argues that it was an abuse of discretion to admit a section of 
Heald’s prior deposition testimony and also to exclude a prior statement 
that he made to police. A trial court has discretion regarding the 
admission of evidence and its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion. Lewis v. State, 34 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. 2015). We will reverse 
only if the trial court’s ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the 
facts and circumstances before it and errors affect a party’s substantial 
rights. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 467 (Ind. 2015). 
 
A. 
The trial court did not make any errors 
related to Heald’s August 2017 deposition 
testimony. 
 
Hall argues that Heald’s deposition’s admission was unduly prejudicial 
under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. A court “may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice . . .” Ind. Evid. R. 403. 
“Unfair prejudice . . . looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by 
illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on 
an improper basis.” Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. 2009) 
(citations omitted). Trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing 
probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, and we review that 
determination for abuse of discretion. Dunlap v. State, 761 N.E.2d 837, 842 
(Ind. 2002). 
 
In Richmond v. State, the defendant was charged with murder. 685 
N.E.2d 54, 55 (Ind. 1997). At trial, several witnesses made brief comments 
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regarding the street gang that the defendant participated in.7 Id. We 
underwent Rule 403 balancing regarding this testimony, and though we 
acknowledged that there was potential for unfair prejudice in admitting it, 
we explained that “all relevant evidence is ‘inherently prejudicial’ in a 
criminal prosecution, so the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative 
value against the likely unfair prejudicial impact that the evidence may 
have on the jury.” Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we held 
that these references to the street gang were not unfairly prejudicial in 
balancing the probative value and unfair prejudice because they were not 
introduced to “exploit[] or inflame” the jury. Id. at 54-55. 
 
Much like in Richmond, the purpose of introducing Heald’s testimony 
was not to “exploit[] or inflame the jury,” but to have the jury hear 
testimony from the shooter in Hall’s murder-for-hire scheme. 
Accordingly, Hall has failed to demonstrate that any prejudice resulting 
from Heald’s deposition was unfairly prejudicial. See Ind. R. of Evid. 403. It 
seems that Hall’s only argument regarding unfair prejudice is that because 
Heald refused to testify live at trial, it was unduly prejudicial to Hall to 
have Heald’s prior deposition transcript read to the jury because they 
were unable to assess his demeanor and make proper credibility 
determinations.8 We disagree.9 
 
7 In Richmond, the defendant’s objection was based on Evidence Rule 404(b). However, our 
Court also made an inquiry into Rule 403’s “balance of probative value against the likely 
unfair prejudicial impact” in its analysis. Richmond, 685 N.E.2d at 55-56. 
8 Hall does not challenge the trial court’s admission of Heald’s prior deposition under Indiana 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) (allowing the admission of a now unavailable witness’s prior 
testimony in the same or different proceeding where the defendant had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony).  
9 We note that Heald’s deposition’s admissibility and the relative weight the jury may assign 
to it after assessing its credibility are two separate determinations. In her unfair prejudice 
arguments, Hall appears to conflate the admissibility and the credibility determinations into 
one inquiry. However, the admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. 
Lewis v. State, 34 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. 2015). Meanwhile, “judging the credibility of witnesses 
lies squarely within the province of the jury and we will not reassess its credibility 
determinations.” Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 497 (Ind. 2001). Thus, we focus purely on 
the admissibility in our Rule 403 balancing and decline to reassess the jury’s credibility 
determinations of Heald’s deposition.  
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Heald’s deposition has very high probative value, as he was the shooter 
in Hall’s murder-for-hire scheme. In his deposition, Heald directly 
testified to Hall’s several proposals to compensate him for killing 
Reynolds. Additionally, Hall had counsel present at Heald’s deposition 
and had the opportunity to cross examine him. Though Heald’s testimony 
would have prejudiced Hall, “all relevant evidence is ‘inherently 
prejudicial’ in a criminal prosecution,” and such prejudice would not be 
unduly prejudicial against Hall given the deposition’s very high probative 
value. See Richmond, 685 N.E.2d at 55. Further, Hall has failed to show 
how Heald’s deposition sought to “persuade by illegitimate means,” or 
how it would “suggest [a] decision on an improper basis.” Camm, 908 
N.E.2d at 255. Accordingly, Rule 403 balancing weighs in favor of 
admitting Heald’s deposition because its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Consequently, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. 
 
Hall also alleges that it was reversible error to allow Heald’s 
videotaped deposition testimony to be read into the record rather than 
showing the actual deposition video. However, this argument is waived. 
Generally, to preserve a claim for review, counsel must object to the trial 
court's ruling and state the reasons for that objection. Durden v. State, 99 
N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018). Moreover, an objection must be “sufficiently 
specific to alert the trial judge fully of the legal issue.” Tapia v. State, 753 
N.E.2d 581, 588 n.13 (Ind. 2001). At trial, Hall’s counsel did not request 
that the jury watch the deposition videotape rather than have it read to the 
jury. Therefore, we specifically reject Hall’s argument that her general 
Rule 403 objection to the deposition’s admission preserved this specific 
argument regarding the form in which the deposition was communicated 
to the jury. Accordingly, Hall failed to preserve this challenge for appeal, 
and thus, it was waived.  
 
Hall also argues that it was error to deny defense counsel’s use of 
Heald’s deposition’s video footage in his closing argument. “Conduct 
during final argument is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and a conviction will not be reversed unless there has been a clear 
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abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused.” Bowles v. State, 
737 N.E.2d 1150, 1154 (Ind. 2000).  
 
Here, during closing arguments, Hall sought to introduce Heald’s 
deposition’s video footage for the first time. The State objected to Hall’s 
proposal, arguing the footage was not shown during the guilt phase of the 
trial and its introduction during closing arguments would have been 
improper because the State could not rebut this new evidence. The trial 
court agreed with the State and declined to allow Hall to introduce the 
deposition’s videotape at this time, explaining that the time for viewing 
the deposition would have been in lieu of reading it during the guilt 
phase, not during closing argument. 
 
Given the discretion we give our trial courts during closing arguments, 
Hall has failed to provide persuasive reasoning why this was a “clear 
abuse of discretion,” or how the trial court’s decision on this issue 
prejudiced Hall. See Bowles, 737 N.E.2d at 1154. Because the State would 
not have the opportunity to rebut this new mode for the jury to experience 
Heald’s deposition, the trial court’s decision declining the use of the video 
during closing arguments was not “clearly against the logic and effect of 
the facts and circumstances.” See Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 467 (Ind. 
2015). Thus, we decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the use of Heald’s deposition footage during closing arguments 
for the first time.  
 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by excluding Heald’s prior statement to 
police for impeachment purposes. 
 
Indiana Rule of Evidence 613(b) provides that “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a 
witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is 
given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse 
party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice 
so requires.” Ind. Ev. R. 613(b). However, this requirement to explain or 
deny a prior inconsistent statement may be afforded to that witness at any 
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point during the proceedings, though it is preferable to confront the 
witness with the alleged statement before seeking to admit extrinsic 
impeachment evidence of that statement. Griffith v. State, 31 N.E.3d 965, 
967 (Ind. 2015). 
 
Trial courts are given broad discretion in excluding or admitting 
extrinsic evidence under Rule 613(b). Id. at 972. Trial courts may consider 
a variety of relevant factors in making the determination to admit or 
exclude extrinsic evidence, such as “the availability of the witness, the 
potential prejudice that may arise from recalling a witness only for 
impeachment purposes, the significance afforded to the credibility of the 
witness who is being impeached, and any other factors that are relevant to 
the interests of justice.” Id. at 973. Additionally, our Court has found that 
“once a witness has admitted an inconsistent prior statement she has 
impeached herself and further evidence is unnecessary for impeachment 
purposes.” Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Pruitt 
v. State, 622 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. 1993)).  
 
In Pruitt v. State, a witness had previously given an audiotaped 
statement to police. Pruitt, 622 N.E.2d at 473. At trial, this witness 
explained that she lied when she gave her prior statement to police and 
recanted this prior statement. Id. The State sought permission to play the 
audiotape to the jury for impeachment purposes, but the trial court 
declined this request because the witness had already recanted the 
statement and admitted she was untruthful in the first statement. Id. 
Though the witness’ prior statement was later admitted for the limited 
purpose of demonstrating that the witness was not subjected to police 
duress, we held that the trial court properly prohibited the introduction of 
the prior audiotaped statement because the witness already admitted she 
was untruthful, and thus, further impeachment on this prior statement 
was unnecessary. Id.  
 
Hall argues that the court erred when it refused to allow her to 
introduce Heald’s September 29, 2015 statement to police to impeach 
Heald by prior inconsistent statement. Hall also argues that Indiana Rule 
of Evidence 613(b) required Heald to explain or deny his September 29, 
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2015 prior inconsistent statement that he made to police two days after 
Reynolds’ murder. 
 
However, Hall’s arguments are unpersuasive. As a preliminary matter, 
we note that Rule 613(b) applies to “extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior 
inconsistent statement,” where if such extrinsic evidence is introduced, the 
witness must be given an opportunity to explain or deny such prior 
inconsistent statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to 
examine the witness about it. See Ind. Ev. R. 613(b). Here, the trial court 
declined to admit extrinsic evidence of Heald’s September 29, 2015 
statement, so Rule 613(b)’s requirement to give a witness an opportunity 
to explain or deny such prior inconsistent statement is inapplicable. 
 
Regardless, much like in Pruitt, Hall’s attempt to introduce extrinsic 
evidence to further impeach Heald was unnecessary. See Pruitt, 622 
N.E.2d at 473. Here, the jury was read Heald’s deposition in its entirety 
and could hear Heald admit that he lied because he didn’t want to look 
like a “cold blooded killer.” Tr. Vol. V, p. 248. Once the jury heard Heald 
admit and explain that he lied in his first statement to police, his 
impeachment on this prior statement was complete and further extrinsic 
evidence regarding his impeachment on this statement was unnecessary. 
See Pruitt, 622 N.E.2d at 473. Further, Heald did have an opportunity to 
explain or deny this inconsistent statement during his deposition, and he 
explained that he lied to avoid or lessen his potential culpability in 
Reynolds’ murder. Given our precedent in Pruitt, the trial court’s ruling 
excluding Heald’s September 29, 2015 statement to police was not an 
abuse of discretion.  
 
C. If there was any error related to the 
admission or exclusion of evidence, it was 
harmless error. 
 
Even assuming that there was an error relating to the admission or 
exclusion of evidence, any error would be harmless. An error is harmless 
when it results in no prejudice to the “substantial rights” of a party. 
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Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). The harmless-error analysis 
is a practical one, embodying “the principle that courts should exercise 
judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for error and ignore 
errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Harbin, 250 F.3d 532, 546 (7th Cir. 2001)). Factors 
considered in a harmless error analysis “include the presence or absence 
of other, corroborating evidence on material points; whether the 
impermissibly admitted evidence was cumulative; the overall strength of 
the prosecution's case; the importance of the impermissible evidence in 
the prosecution's case; and the extent of cross-examination or questioning 
on the impermissibly admitted evidence.” Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 
745–46 (Ind. 2019). 
 
Here, the State presented cumulative and corroborating evidence 
implicating Hall in Reynolds’ murder, and thus, any error in evidence 
admission would not have affected Hall’s substantial rights. Mathis and 
Bunyard each provided live, in-court testimony regarding Hall’s role in 
the scheme to kill Reynolds. They also testified about Hall’s offers to 
compensate Heald for killing Reynolds, which would include NASCAR 
memorabilia, life insurance proceeds, and the Nissan. The State also 
presented video surveillance evidence of Hall, Mathis, and Heald 
transporting boxes full of NASCAR memorabilia from the storage unit to 
Mathis’ car. There was also video evidence of Hall, Mathis, and Heald at 
the Circle K gas station after collecting the NASCAR memorabilia. 
Accordingly, even if we assume there was error in the admission or 
exclusion of evidence, it was harmless. 
 
IV. Hall’s sentence for conspiracy to commit 
murder does not warrant 7(B) revision. 
 
Appellate Rule 7(B) enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized 
by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court 
finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 
and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). A trial court's 
findings of aggravators and mitigators does not limit this Court’s review 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-00660 | December 17, 2021 
Page 17 of 18 
under Rule 7(B). State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1195 (Ind. 2020). 
Further, “[t]he principal role of our review is to leaven outliers rather than 
achieving a perceived correct sentence.” Id. (citing Gibson v. State, 51 
N.E.3d 204, 215 (Ind. 2016)). The defendant bears the burden of 
persuading this Court that the sentence is inappropriate. McCallister v. 
State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 566 (Ind. 2018). 
Hall only requests that this Court revise her sentence for conspiracy to 
commit murder and not her LWOP sentence. She specifically alleges that 
the thirty-five-year sentence is inappropriate because the trial court failed 
to consider all of her mitigating circumstances.   
We find that Hall’s thirty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate given 
the nature of the offense and her character. The nature of Hall’s offense 
weighs heavily against a sentence revision. The record reveals that Hall 
agreed to provide value (in the form of NASCAR memorabilia, insurance 
proceeds, and the Nissan) to Heald in exchange for Heald to kill Reynolds. 
It appears that Hall began planning Reynolds’ death at least a month 
before his eventual murder. There is also evidence that Hall provided the 
murder weapon for Heald to use. She sought to motivate Heald to kill 
Reynolds by apparently falsely telling Heald that Reynolds sexually 
assaulted Bunyard and physically abused Hall’s quadriplegic son. Given 
the level of Hall’s preparation and her persistence to see her plan come 
true, the nature of the offense weighs against 7(B) revision.  
The character of the offender tends to weigh against 7(B) revision. Hall 
did not have any criminal history, she had a college diploma, and she had 
regularly been employed during her adult life. These would tend to reflect 
favorably on Hall under the character of the offender analysis. However, 
the trial court considered these as mitigating factors, but it ultimately 
found that the aggravating circumstances “somewhat outweigh” the 
mitigating factors, justifying the slightly aggravated sentence for the 
conspiracy charge. These aggravating circumstances included violating a 
protective order, that the victim was sixty-nine years old, and that Hall 
had significant time to withdraw from her plan. Given this, we see 
nothing about Hall’s character that would warrant 7(B) revision. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-00660 | December 17, 2021 
Page 18 of 18 
Accordingly, Hall’s conspiracy sentence is not an outlier appropriate for 
7(B) revision. 
Conclusion  
We affirm the trial court.  
 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
 
Jane Ann Noblitt 
Columbus, Indiana  
 
 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
 
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Samuel J. Dayton 
Deputy Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana