Title: Spicy Ladies Boutique & Jewelry, Inc. v. 627 Market LLC

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SPICY LADIES BOUTIQUE & 
JEWELRY, INC., and MOSHE NIV, 
jointly and severally,   
 
Defendants Below- 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
627 MARKET LLC, a Delaware 
Limited Liability Company, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 17, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 07C-12-015 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 13, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: December 14, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of December 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Moshe Niv, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s December 18, 2008 order granting the motion of the plaintiff-
appellee, 627 Market LLC, for summary judgment.  627 Market has moved to 
 
2 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.    
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in December 2007, 627 Market 
filed an action in the Superior Court against Niv and Spicy Ladies Boutique & 
Jewelry, Inc., jointly and severally, alleging that they were in breach of their lease 
agreement.  In February 2008, a default judgment was entered against Spicy 
Ladies.  In November 2008, 627 Market filed a motion pursuant to Superior Court 
Civil Rule 56 requesting that summary judgment be entered against Niv 
individually because he signed the lease under the line “tenant/guarantor”.  
 
(3) 
The summary judgment motion was scheduled for a hearing on 
December 18, 2008.  The attorney for 627 Market appeared at the hearing.  Niv, 
whose counsel had withdrawn from representing him several months earlier, did 
not file a response to the motion or appear at the hearing.  Noting that Niv had 
approximately four months to obtain new counsel and that he had been properly 
served with notice of the motion and hearing, the Superior Court granted 627 
Market’s motion for summary judgment.  Niv’s “motion for adjournment,” which 
was filed two days prior to the hearing and which was, in essence, a motion for a 
continuance, was denied as moot.   
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
3 
 
(4) 
We review the Superior Court’s entry of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same standard as the Superior Court.2   As such, we must determine 
whether the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3  Once the moving party 
has carried his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden is then on the non-
moving party to demonstrate the existence of a dispute of material fact.4  
 
(5) 
Niv argues in his opening brief that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion in granting the motion for summary judgment because, as a substantive 
legal matter, he is not individually responsible for any monies due under the lease 
agreement.  However, that argument was never presented to the Superior Court in 
the first instance because Niv failed to either file a response to the summary 
judgment motion or appear for the scheduled hearing on the motion.  We have 
carefully reviewed the record before us, including the transcript of the December 
18, 2008 hearing.  We conclude that, in light of Niv’s dilatory conduct, there was 
no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in granting 627 
Market’s motion for summary judgment in Niv’s absence.5  
 
                                                 
2 Berns v. Doan, 961 A.2d 506, 510 (Del. 2008). 
3 Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979). 
4 Id. at 681. 
5 We note that the Superior Court docket reflects that, in June 2009, several months after filing 
the instant appeal, Niv filed a motion to vacate the Superior Court’s judgment, which the 
Superior Court will hear after the mandate issues in the instant appeal. 
 
4 
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice