Title: Brooks v. Hobbie

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

631 So. 2d 883 (1993)
Bernest BROOKS and Rubin McKinnon
v.
Walker HOBBIE, Jr., and Billy Joe Camp.
J. Elbert PETERS, et al.
v.
James E. FOLSOM, Jr., etc., et al.
1930110.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 22, 1993.
James U. Blacksher and Leslie M. Proll, Birmingham, and Solomon S. Seay, Jr. and Terry G. Davis, Montgomery, and Edward Still, Birmingham, for Bernest Brooks and Rubin McKinnon.
William H. Pryor, Jr. of Walston, Stabler, Wells, Anderson & Bains, Birmingham, and Algert S. Agricola, Montgomery, for J. Elbert Peters, Jacob Savage, Douglas Moore, Beth Springler McDonald, Bettye Fine Collins, Donald R. Murphy, Wendy Allen and George Kingston.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Marc Givhan, Courtney W. Tarver and Mort P. Ames, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellees.
SHORES, Justice.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has certified this question:
The question certified arose out of litigation that began in March 1992, when a group of African-American plaintiffs brought an action *884 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama challenging, under federal law, the way district lines are currently drawn for the Alabama State Legislature. (Brooks v. Camp, Civil Action No. 92-T-364-N (M.D.Ala.) In February 1993, another group of plaintiffs, identifying themselves as Republicans, brought another action in a federal court, which also claimed that the legislative district lines as then drawn violated federal law. (Peters v. Folsom, Civil Action No. 93-T-124-N (M.D.Ala.). These two cases were consolidated by the United States District Court, which, without reaching the merits of the contentions of the parties, stayed further proceedings in both cases on the ground that the Alabama legislative process had not run its course with regard to redistricting the legislature.
On February 23, 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States announced its decision in Growe v. Emison, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 122 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1993), holding that federal courts are required to "defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address the highly political task itself." ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct.  at 1080. (Emphasis added.)
The Brooks plaintiffs and other African-American citizens then brought a separate action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in which they challenged the existing state legislative district lines under both federal and state law. (Sinkfield v. Bennett, CV-93-689). On May 12, 1993, at the request of all parties litigant in the Sinkfield litigation, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County tentatively approved a consent judgment adopting a plan for redistricting the state legislature for the 1994 legislative elections. The plan was submitted to the United States Justice Department and was precleared by that Department, as required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. After holding a hearing at which all of the parties to the litigation had an opportunity to be heard in regard to the plan, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County entered a final judgment on August 13, 1993, implementing the plan.
The plaintiffs in Brooks and the defendants in both Brooks and Peters moved that the federal court dismiss both cases in the federal court and defer to the final judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. Only the plaintiffs in Peters oppose the dismissal of the cases in the federal court. They contend that the Alabama state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to redistrict or reapportion the State Legislature.
A three-judge federal panel,[1] noting "the important and determinative issue of Alabama law as to whether the Montgomery County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to enter its order adopting a plan for the reapportionment of the State Legislature," has certified that question to this Court. We have expedited the matter, because trial of these consolidated federal cases has been set for January 4, 1994.
We answer the question in the affirmative.
It is understandable that counsel for Peters would base his argument upon our old cases of Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala. 441, 51 So. 2d 869 (1951), and Ex parte Rice, 273 Ala. 712, 143 So. 2d 848 (1962), decided at a time when our Alabama state courts, like other state courts, stayed out of "political" issues such as re-districting of the legislature. Waid v. Pool held that an earlier lawsuit challenging the Alabama legislature's failure to redistrict was properly dismissed:
At the time of Waid v. Pool, indeed until the United States Supreme Court spoke in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), both state and federal courts considered legislative redistricting as an area peculiarly political and, thus, nonjusticiable in the courts. The United States Supreme Court often sanctioned the action of the lower federal courts in declining to exercise their jurisdiction in cases considered "political."
The pre-Baker v. Carr attitude is reflected in Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946), in which the majority refused to reach the merits of a federal court challenge to a congressional apportionment plan in Illinois. Justice Frankfurter urged the court not to enter "this political thicket":
328 U.S.  at 553-54, 66 S. Ct.  at 1200; see South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 S. Ct. 641, 94 L. Ed. 834 (1950).
Then, in 1962, in Baker v. Carr, supra, a case challenging the malapportioned Tennessee legislature, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition that such cases were nonjusticiable because they presented "political questions." The Court, reversing the federal district court's dismissal of the complaint, stated:
369 U.S.  at 209, 82 S. Ct.  at 706. The holding in Baker v. Carr was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection:
369 U.S.  at 237, 82 S. Ct.  at 720.
Within a year of Baker v. Carr, actions challenging state legislative apportionment plans were instituted in over 30 states.[2] One of these was Alabama, where, in Ex parte Rice, supra, this Court declined to consider an equal protection challenge to legislative districting. As noted above, this Court summarily affirmed on the authority of Waid v. Pool, despite the holding in Baker v. Carr.
Two years later the "one person-one vote" decision of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964), answered a challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama legislature. In Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Baker v. Carr:
377 U.S.  at 566-68, 84 S. Ct.  at 1384-85. The Court further stated:
377 U.S.  at 577-78, 84 S. Ct.  at 1390.
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, on the equal protection principles articulated in Reynolds v. Sims, invalidated districting plans in Colorado, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S. Ct. 1459, 12 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 84 S. Ct. 1418, 12 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 84 S. Ct. 1429, 12 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 84 S. Ct. 1441, 12 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 84 S. Ct. 1449, 12 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1964). It is interesting that the Colorado districting scheme had actually been approved by a statewide referendum. Chief Justice Warren's opinion explained that the fact that a challenged legislative apportionment plan was approved by the electorate was without federal constitutional significance if the scheme adopted failed to satisfy the basic requirements of equal protection as delineated in Reynolds v. Sims. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, supra, 377 U.S.  at 734-35, 84 S. Ct.  at 1473.
In light of Baker v. Carr and its progeny, it is no longer legitimate for a court to decline to enforce the right of every citizen to a vote with a weight equal to the weight of every other citizen's vote. The "one person-one vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, was based upon equal protection. The United States Supreme Court expanded that principle in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 526, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964), which struck down Georgia's congressional districting statute. The Court held "that, construed in its historical context, the command, of Art. I, § 2 of the United States Constitution that Representatives be chosen `by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." 376 U.S.  at 8-9, 84 S. Ct.  at 530 (footnote omitted).
Since Reynolds v. Sims, state courts have shown little reluctance to entertain cases involving "political" issues where there is a *887 constitutional right at issue. Federal courts have a long history of entertaining such cases.[3] Federal and state courts entertain them because the Constitution of this country, as construed by the United States Supreme Court, requires judicial intervention to ensure that the constitutionally protected right of every citizen is observed.
This Court has said that, when it considers a difficult constitutional question, its task will be "facilitated by reference to the substantial body of case law that has evolved from constitutional challenges brought in the highest courts of other states [on related issues]." Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 158 (Ala.1991). Two state supreme courts (those of Texas and Tennessee) have entertained cases involving the "political" issue of redistricting. The Supreme Court of Texas explained that its responsibility to protect constitutional rights compelled the court to consider a party's constitutional challenge to redistricting:
Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex.1991). While the power to redistrict in Texas has generally been exercised by the state's highest court, the Texas Supreme Court stated, "[W]e see no constitutional reason why it does not also reside in a trial court of general jurisdiction." 829 S.W.2d  at 718. In Terrazas v. Ramirez the Texas Supreme Court spoke to the power of the lower state courts in redistricting cases:
829 S.W.2d  at 717-18.
During the 1970's, the federal courts handled legislative redistricting in Tennessee, but in the 1980's the state courts took it over. In Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn. 1982), the Tennessee Supreme Court spoke to the justiciability of the issue of redistricting:
631 S.W.2d  at 705-06.
To suggest that anything in the Alabama Constitution denies a circuit court in Alabama jurisdiction to entertain an action like the Sinkfield case is to misread that constitution. The question is not whether circuit courts in Alabama have jurisdictionthe question is whether the redistricting issue is a justiciable one. Alabama's circuit courts possess general subject-matter jurisdiction to decide all justiciable issues of federal and state constitutional and statutory law. These courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power and responsibility to enforce constitutional rights under both the federal and the state Constitution. Art. VI, Ala. Const. 1901 (Amend. 328).
Alabama has recently shown a willingness to enforce both state and federal constitutional rights in areas where both state and federal courts had abstained for many years.[4] In Alabama and elsewhere, state courts are now equally willing with the federal courts to enter these sensitive areas when compelled to do so by the constitutions of the United States or of the state, and it is no longer open to debate as to whether Reynolds v. Sims and Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D.Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942, 93 S. Ct. 290, 34 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1972), compel the Alabama legislature to redistrict itself at least after every decennial census.
The law is now clear that "legislative reapportionment cases are justiciable, and judicial relief becomes appropriate when the legislature fails to reapportion according to constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having adequate opportunity to do so, or where there is no effective political remedy to obtain relief." 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 178 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
We have abundant examples of the willingness of Alabama state courts to adjudicate state and federal constitutional claims. See: Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala.1993); Hunt v. Hubbert, 588 So. 2d 848 (Ala.1991); Terrell v. City of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d 337, 340 (Ala.1981); Dothard v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Resources, 613 So. 2d 353 (Ala.1993); Scott v. City of Mountain Brook, 603 So. 2d 1030 (Ala.1992); Holland v. Hunt, 600 So. 2d 233 (Ala.1992); Nelson v. University of Alabama System, 594 So. 2d 632 (Ala.1992); Roberts v. Joiner, 590 So. 2d 195 (Ala.1991); Point Properties, Inc. v. Anderson, 584 So. 2d 1332 (Ala.1991); George v. McIntosh-Wilson, 582 So. 2d 1058 (Ala.1991).
The circuit courts of Alabama, as courts of general jurisdiction, have the same power and duty to provide relief for violations of federal law as do the federal courts. Indeed, when the rights provided by a state constitution mirror rights of the United States Constitution, the state court system may be a more appropriate forum for protecting those rights, because, in many instances, the individual rights provisions under the state constitution are as broad as, if not broader than, those in the federal Bill of Rights.
Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 271, 292 So. 2d 651, 654-55 (1974) (footnote omitted). As we recognized in Moore v. Mobile Infirmary, "State courts, in determining the scope of rights guaranteed by their own constitutions,... may, in fact, provide more protection for private rights than the United States Constitution requires." 592 So. 2d  at 170. See also Ex parte Boykin, [Ms. 1921336, Oct. 8, 1993], 1993 WL 394750 (Ala. 1993) ("the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state may confer procedural protections of liberty interests that extend beyond those minimally required by the Constitution of the United States"); Ex parte Love, 513 So. 2d 24, 30 (Ala.1987); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300, 102 S. Ct. 2442, 2449, 73 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1982).
The plaintiffs in these consolidated federal cases sought redress first in the federal court. Before the federal court reached the merits of their claims, indeed while all further proceedings had been stayed by order of the federal court, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Growe v. Emison, supra, which required that federal courts abstain from entering this area until the state legislature and state judiciary had demonstrated an inability or disinclination to act in the peculiarly sensitive area of re-districting the state legislature.
In answering this certified question in the affirmative, we defer to the wisdom of the United States Supreme Court in Growe v. Emison.
___ U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct.  at 1081. (Emphasis added.)
Redistricting is both a sensitive and a political issue. There is no dispute that the *890 legislature has the initial responsibility to act in redistricting matters. Ala. Const., Art. IX, §§ 198, 199, 200. However, in the event the legislature fails to act, the responsibility shifts to the state judiciary.[5] In his often quoted dissent in Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So. 2d 830 (1974), Chief Justice Heflin recognized that when the other branches of government are remiss in their constitutional duties the judiciary must act. 292 Ala. at 319, 293 So. 2d  at 847. While in Powell he focused on the inherent power of the judiciary to provide for an orderly and efficient court system when a legislative body fails or refuses to act, the situation he was there writing to is analogous in many ways to the situation before us in which the legislature likewise has failed or refused to act.
The United States Supreme Court in Growe wisely recognized that action by the state judiciary is preferable to federal intervention in this sensitive state matter. It is gratifying to know that the United States Supreme Court appreciates that the public will more readily accept state court intervention, brought in the context of litigation, than it will accept federal intervention in matters of state government. It is equally gratifying to have this outstanding three-judge panel of United States district judges recognize that it is appropriate that judges elected by the people of Alabama be given the opportunity to resolve this question. In answering this question in the affirmative, we accept the duty of the state judiciary to share responsibility with the federal judiciary for the resolution of often unpopular, but critical, constitutional issues.
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur.
[1]  The Honorable Myron Thompson, the Honorable W. Harold Albritton, and the Honorable Joel Dubina.
[2]  Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law at 1621 (11th ed. 1985).
[3]  "One striking aspect of the Warren Court's activism was its dramatic expansion of federal judicial intervention into state affairs in the name of individual rights." Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324, 1349 n. 82 (1982) (citing Reynolds v. Sims and other case examples).
[4]  The author of a series of law review articles on state constitutional law notes: "In recent years, there have been striking developments in state constitutional law. Indeed, since the early 1970s we have been experiencing a `constitutional revolution' in the judicial interpretation of individual-rights provisions of state constitutions." Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J.Legal Educ. 243, 244 (June 1991). (Footnote omitted.)
[5]  Assuming, of course, that a citizen of this state properly invokes the state court's jurisdiction in an adversary proceeding.