Title: Christine M. Jones v. Jerry A. Jones

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Christine M. JONES v. Jerry A. JONES

97-212                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered April 7, 1997


1.   Prohibition, writ of -- petitioner's remedies must be sought
     below -- writ of prohibition denied. -- Petitioner's petition
     for writ of prohibition, stating that the chancery court is
     wholly without jurisdiction to rehear the custody issue
     already decided by the supreme court, was denied; res judicata
     is an affirmative defense to be raised in the trial court and
     presents no question of jurisdiction; absent a showing that
     the trial court is acting without or in excess of its
     jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition may not be granted.  

2.   Civil procedure -- ARCP Rule 11 sanctions may be requested at
     trial or on appeal -- frivolous proceedings will be
     sanctioned. -- ARCP Rule 11 sanctions may be requested at
     trial and on appeal if the attorney or party initiates a
     frivolous proceeding or appeal in violation of the dictates of
     those rules.  

3.   Appeal & error -- cases remanded to chancery court with
     directions -- chancery court must act as directed. -- When the
     supreme court remands a case to chancery court with
     directions, the chancery court has no power to enter any
     decree except that directed, and it has no power to change or
     extend the court's mandate.  
4.   Parent & child -- de novo review of custody matter already
     made by supreme court -- only facts arising since last custody
     order may be considered by chancellor in reviewing
     respondent's petition for modification. -- In the appeal
     decided November 4, 1996, the supreme court conducted a de
     novo review of the chancellor's custody decision, and in doing
     so, the court specifically stated that child custody was
     determined by what was in the "best interests" of the child,
     and absent a material change in circumstances, the court
     concluded that the chancellor's decision to change custody to
     respondent was clearly erroneous; in deciding the respondent's
     petition for modification, the chancellor should only consider
     facts arising since the last custody order, or evidence that
     has not been previously presented to the chancellor. 


     Petition for Writ of Prohibition denied.
     McNutt Law Firm, by:  Mona J. McNutt, for petitioner.
     Lueken Law Firm, by:  Patty J. Lueken, and Helen Rice Grinder,
for respondent.


     Per Curiam.
     On November 4, 1996, this court held that the chancellor erred
in finding material changes in circumstances existed that warranted
the modification of the parties initial custody order.  We reversed
the chancellor's order changing custody of the parties' child to
Dr. Jones and remanded with instructions to reinstate the original
custody order which awarded Christine Jones custody of the child. 
See Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996).  The
court's mandate in Jones was issued on November 22, 1996, but for
some reason, the chancery court delayed reinstating the original
custody order, prompting Ms. Jones's filing a petition on December
12, 1996, requesting enforcement of this court's mandate.  On
December 13, 1996, we issued a per curiam directing the chancery
court to reinstate the original custody order forthwith.  Jones v.
Jones, 326 Ark. 828, 933 S.W.2d 810 (1996).  The chancery judge
reinstated the order.
     Subsequently, the parties entered a consent order establishing
certain, but not all, visitation rights sought by Dr. Jones.  A
hearing on the disputed visitation matters was held on February 11,
1997.  However, before the February 11 hearing commenced, Dr. Jones
filed a petition for change of custody and served it on Ms. Jones. 
The petition largely rehashed the custody-dispute history between
the parties beginning in the early 1990's to this court's decisions
on November 4, 1996, and December 13, 1996.  Dr. Jones's petition
added the following:
          That since custody has been reinstated to the [Ms.
     Jones] as per the original custody order, [Dr. Jones] has
     attempted to contact the minor child by telephone, to no
     avail on many occasions.  When Dr. Jones does reach the
     child, the child acts totally out of character in the
     conversation either by being reluctant to talk with Dr.
     Jones or simply putting the telephone down.
     Dr. Jones's petition concluded, asking for his petition to be
heard by a judge who will apply the proper standard of proof so the
minor child's best interest will be addressed and Dr. Jones would
be afforded due process.  He further asked that a neutral expert
and attorney ad litem be appointed and that Ms. Jones's mental
health and stability be addressed.
     During the February 11, 1997 visitation hearing, Ms. Jones
asserted the chancellor revealed that he had already set a hearing
to consider Dr. Jones's custody petition.  Ms. Jones also
complained that, during the visitation hearing, Dr. Jones's expert
witness, Dr. Becky Porter, was permitted to testify at the
visitation hearing to opinions she had formed and related at the
parties' earlier custody proceeding.  While the chancellor
indicated he did not want to go through and rehash everything right
now ("We'll have to do that at some point in the future"), the
chancellor permitted Porter to opine her views on the parties'
child and Ms. Jones's instability.
     Ms. Jones brings this petition for writ of prohibition,
stating that the chancery court is wholly without jurisdiction to
rehear the custody issue already decided by this court.  She
further argues that the chancery court has no power to redetermine
the "emotional needs" issue previously decided.  Basically, she
suggests that Dr. Jones intends to retry and appeal the same
custody issue a third time.
     Dr. Jones responds, asserting that whatever errors this court
found occurred at the parties' last (and second) custody hearing
resulted from the chancellor's actions, not Dr. Jones's.  He says
he should not be punished because the chancellor erred in
improperly imposing the burden of proof on Ms. Jones and that he
should now be allowed to have a chancellor correctly address the
"emotional needs" and "best interests" of the child issues not
correctly tried by the prior chancellor.  Finally, Dr. Jones cites
Earney v. Brantley, 309 Ark. 190, 828 S.W.2d 832 (1992), for the
proposition that res judicata is an affirmative defense to be
raised in the trial court and presents no question of jurisdiction. 
Further, absent a showing that the trial court is acting without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, Dr. Jones claims a writ of
prohibition may not be granted.  
     We agree with Dr. Jones that Earney controls here and that Ms.
Jones's remedies must be sought below.  We add that Rule 11
sanctions may also be requested at trial and now on appeal if the
attorney or party initiates a frivolous proceeding or appeal in
violation of the dictates of those rules.  See ARCP Rule 11 and
Ark. R. App. P.--Civil 11 (326 Ark. Appx.).
     While we deny Ms. Jones's petition, we are obliged to
underscore certain matters contained in this court's previous
decision handed down on November 6, 1996, especially since this
court had to take the extraordinary step to enforce its mandate by
a subsequent per curiam.  That per curiam was necessary because,
for whatever reason, the chancery court failed to reinstate the
parties' original custody order.  Because we believed that this
court's opinion and instructions were perfectly clear, we issued a
simple "forthwith" order directing the chancery court's compliance. 
The chancery court then complied.  
     Because of the continuing controversies involving this matter,
we reiterate the well-established rule that when this court remands
a case to chancery court with directions, the chancery court has no
power to enter any decree except that directed, and it has no power
to change or extend this court's mandate.  See Ferguson v. Green,
266 Ark. 556,