Title: State v. Ervin Burris

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 91 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1425 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Ervin Burris: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
 
Ervin Burris,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 262 
Reported at: 258 Wis. 2d. 454, 654 N.W.2d 866 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Beloit   
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Joseph L. Sommers, Madison, and oral argument by Joseph L. 
Sommers. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 91 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1425   
(L.C. No. 
96 CF 1436B) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Ervin Burris: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ervin Burris,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Burris, 2002 WI App 
262, 258 Wis. 2d 454, 654 N.W.2d 866, which affirmed the circuit 
court's revocation of petitioner's supervised release under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1997-98).1  The principal issue presented is 
whether a circuit court is required to expressly consider 
alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually violent 
person's supervised release when the court makes a determination 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted.   
No. 00-1425 
 
2 
 
that 
"the 
safety 
of 
the 
public 
requires 
[the 
person's] 
commitment to a secure facility."  This issue implicates due 
process, statutory interpretation, and public policy.  The 
petitioner also contends that his revocation proceeding was 
"arbitrary and unfair" because it violated basic due process 
safeguards and that his revocation was not supported by the 
evidence. 
¶2 
We conclude that a circuit court is not required to 
expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a 
sexually violent person's supervised release when the court 
determines that the safety of the public requires the person's 
commitment to a secure facility.  Such a finding mirrors a 
finding that "the safety of others requires that supervised 
release be revoked."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d).  We further 
conclude that the proceedings in this matter were neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.  Consequently, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
In September 1989 Ervin Burris was convicted of first-
degree sexual assault of a nine-year-old child.2  He was 
sentenced to prison for 10 years.  This sentence was the fourth 
time Burris had been sent to prison for felony convictions, some 
of which had a sexual component. 
                                                 
2 "Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a 
Class B felony."  Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1987-88).  The 
requirements for first-degree sexual assault are identical 
today.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2001-02).   
No. 00-1425 
 
3 
 
¶4 
In September 1996, shortly before Burris's mandatory 
release date, the Rock County District Attorney's office 
petitioned the circuit court to detain Burris as a sexually 
violent person under Chapter 980.  The case was tried to the 
court in April 1997.  Rock County Circuit Judge James E. Welker 
found Burris to be a sexually violent person,3 and committed him 
to the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) with 
instructions that DHFS prepare a plan for the defendant's 
supervised release.  The State appealed the court's placement 
decision but the circuit court was affirmed.4 
                                                 
3 "'Sexually violent person' means a person who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated 
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not 
guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by 
reason of insanity or mental disease, defect or illness, and who 
is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder 
that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage 
in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (1997-98).  
The 
same 
language 
appears 
in 
current 
law.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (2001-02). 
4 Following Judge Welker's decision to place Burris on 
supervised release rather than in an institutional setting, the 
State appealed, arguing that Burris belonged in a confined 
setting.  In re the Commitment of Burris, No. 97-3153, 
unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 1999).  Burris 
cross-appealed on the theory that the court had insufficient 
evidence to conclude that he had a "mental disorder" or that it 
was "substantially probable that [he] will engage in acts of 
sexual violence."  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's decision.  Id. at 7. 
No. 00-1425 
 
4 
 
¶5 
In October 1998 Burris was placed in the Rock Valley 
Community Corrections Program (the halfway house) in Janesville5 
at which time DHFS imposed certain "supervised release rules."  A 
year later, in October 1999, DHFS amended the supervised release 
rules, and Burris acknowledged in writing that he had received a 
copy.  The revised rules contained the following restrictions:  
1. 
You shall avoid all conduct that is a 
violation of federal or state statute, municipal or 
county ordinances or that is not in the best interest 
of the public's welfare or your rehabilitation.  
 
. . . .  
4. 
You 
shall 
inform 
your 
agent 
of 
your 
whereabouts and activities as she/he directs.  
 
. . . .  
13. You 
shall 
provide 
true 
and 
correct 
information orally and in writing in response to 
inquiries by the agent. 
 
. . . .  
15. . . . The specific rules imposed at this 
time are:  
                                                                                                                                                             
Following a 1999 amendment to Chapter 980, a circuit court 
is now required to order that an individual who is found to be a 
sexually violent person be "placed in institutional care."  See 
1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3223h; see also State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 
¶68, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 (concluding that this 
amendment to Chapter 980, limiting a sexually violent person's 
ability to seek supervised release, did not render Chapter 980 
unconstitutional). 
5 Burris's community placement was delayed because it took 
the court until October 25, 1998, to find a supervised release 
setting that could adequately treat Burris and adequately 
protect the public.    
No. 00-1425 
 
5 
 
a) 
You shall not consume or possess alcohol, 
illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia.  
. . . .  
18. You 
shall 
notify 
your 
agent 
of 
any 
involvement 
in 
an 
intimate 
relationship 
at 
its 
beginning and you shall introduce the person to your 
agent to disclose your past sexual offenses prior to 
engaging in any type of sexual activity with that 
person. 
¶6 
In December 1999 DHFS filed a petition for revocation 
of supervised release, charging that Burris had violated the 
terms and conditions of his release as set forth in the 
supervised release rules.  This petition was later amended 
twice.  
¶7 
The initial petition, dated December 10, 1999, alleged 
that Burris violated Rule 1 in two respects: (1) Burris obtained 
a prescription for Viagra without his supervising agent's prior 
knowledge or consent; and (2) Burris refused to sign a release 
form allowing the department to interview the prescribing 
physician about the Viagra prescription.   
¶8 
The first amendment to the petition contained two 
additional allegations, namely: (3) Burris violated Rules 1, 4, 
and 13 by refusing to provide his supervising agent with a 
written statement about the events leading to Burris obtaining 
the Viagra prescription; and (4) Burris violated Rules 1, 4, and 
18 by engaging in a consensual intimate relationship with a 
woman between October 25, 1998 and December 10, 1999, without 
informing his supervising agent.  Although the date of this 
first amendment is not clear, Burris knew of the amendment as of 
No. 00-1425 
 
6 
 
December 28, 1999, because the parties discussed the amendment 
during a motion hearing that day. 
¶9 
On December 30 DHFS amended the petition a second 
time, charging that: (5) Burris violated Rules 1 and 15a by 
consuming alcohol and sharing it with another resident at the 
halfway house between November 3 and November 24, 1999.  This 
second amendment also shortened the time frame within which 
Burris 
allegedly 
engaged 
in 
the 
unauthorized 
intimate 
relationship, asserting that the period began on October 25, 
1999, rather than October 25, 1998, as originally claimed.  
¶10 On January 8, 2000, the circuit court held a hearing 
to determine whether Burris's supervised release should be 
revoked.  Based on the evidence presented, Judge Welker made the 
following factual findings that outlined the manner in which 
Burris had engaged in "deceitful activity."  
¶11 Judge Welker found that while Burris resided at the 
halfway house, he continued a relationship with a named married 
woman with children, despite his supervising agent's admonition 
against further contact with her.  Burris not only failed to 
abide by the agent's instruction but also went so far as to meet 
the woman in a motel to have sexual intercourse.  In order to 
meet with the woman, Burris violated the conditions of a pass 
provided to him, leaving the area where he was permitted to 
travel.  Furthermore, Burris did not meaningfully participate in 
the sex offender treatment program as he was "secretive about 
what was going on in his life." 
No. 00-1425 
 
7 
 
¶12 Judge Welker also found that Burris obtained a 
prescription for Viagra.  While Judge Welker declined to decide 
whether Viagra was a prohibited substance for a sexually violent 
person, he indicated that Burris's reaction to being caught with 
the substance indicated that Burris believed his action was 
prohibited.  Burris thus engaged in a course of deceitful 
conduct regarding the Viagra prescription.  Furthermore, Burris 
was secretive and failed to cooperate with his supervising agent 
after 
the 
halfway 
house 
staff 
discovered 
the 
Viagra 
prescription. 
¶13 In addition, Judge Welker found that Burris drank 
alcohol and arranged meetings outside the halfway house to 
exchange cigarettes in a way designed to avoid detection by 
surveillance cameras.  The court noted the significance of this 
conduct in light of Burris's history of drug and alcohol abuse. 
¶14 Based 
on 
the 
conduct 
involved 
in 
these 
rule 
violations, Judge Welker revoked Burris's supervised release, 
saying:   
Mr. Burris's conduct represents an example of 
rather extreme compulsive behavior[.]  [G]iven the 
fact that he was released under the conditions that he 
was, he had the strongest incentive to follow every 
rule, dot every I, cross every T, do what he was 
supposed to do, and he did not do that.  He engaged 
in, as I say, deceitful activity.  He skirted the 
rules as best he could, and his history with that 
compulsive behavior, his history makes him an extreme 
risk 
for 
harm to the 
public if 
there 
is not 
significantly 
more 
control 
exercised 
over 
his 
activities than have been exercised in the past.   
He's had a history of drug and alcohol abuse.  
He's had a history of forcible sexual activity.  He's 
No. 00-1425 
 
8 
 
had a history of sex with children.  And he has mixed 
all of those elements, and he clearly does not have 
the ability to control his own antisocial urges and 
desires, based upon what I conclude to be an extremely 
compulsive behavior, compulsive personality. 
I conclude that this compulsive behavior which 
makes him unable to control his own action coupled 
with the fact that he has this history of violent 
sexual activity and sex with children creates a high 
likelihood that his compulsive behavior will manifest 
itself in sexually violent behavior which is harmful 
to the public in the future if there are not 
significant more controls imposed upon him.  And I do 
not think that the public can be protected in his 
present placement because of his, number one, refusal 
to obey the directives of his agent; number two, his 
refusal to be candid in sex offender treatment; number 
three, 
his 
refusal 
to 
follow 
the 
rules 
during 
temporary releases which were designed to transition 
him into the community; and, number four, his refusal 
to be candid with his agent particularly involving 
matters of his sex life.   
. . . . 
I believe that the safety of the public requires 
his commitment to a secure facility, and I am going to 
order that the prior order of this Court is modified 
to provide that he is committed to the Wisconsin 
Resource Center for commitment and treatment until 
such time as it's safe to release him into the public.  
(Emphasis added). 
¶15 The circuit court rejected Burris's post-revocation 
motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate 
notice.  Burris appealed the revocation of his supervised 
release, arguing that Rule 1 of his supervised release rules was 
unconstitutionally vague, that the petition to revoke his 
supervised 
release 
provided 
insufficient 
notice 
of 
the 
allegations against him, and that Judge Welker erred because he 
did not consider alternatives to revocation before revoking his 
No. 00-1425 
 
9 
 
supervised release.  Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶1.  The court of 
appeals affirmed.  Id.  We accepted Burris's petition for review 
and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
ANALYSIS 
 
¶16 Chapter 980 creates statutory civil procedures for a 
court to commit a sexually violent person to the custody of DHFS 
"for control, care and treatment until such time as the person 
is 
no 
longer 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1).6  Until the law was changed in 1999,7 the 
court was authorized to place a sexually violent person on 
supervised 
release 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
person's 
initial 
commitment.  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).  When this occurred, the 
person was placed in the custody and control of DHFS and was 
"subject to the conditions set by the court and to the rules of 
the department."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d).8  Supervised release 
also came into play when a sexually violent person was committed 
to an institution under § 980.06 and, after a period of 
confinement, 
petitioned 
for 
supervised 
release.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.08.  This latter feature is still part of the 
law.9 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 980.06 (2001-02). 
7 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3223L. 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) (2001-02). 
9 See Wis. Stat. § 980.08 (2001-02). 
No. 00-1425 
 
10 
 
 
¶17 Understandably, Chapter 980 also provided procedures 
for 
the 
revocation 
of 
supervised 
release. 
 
Former 
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) read in part: 
The state has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that any rule or condition of 
release has been violated, or that the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked.  
If the court determines after hearing that any rule or 
condition of release has been violated, or that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be 
revoked, it may revoke the order for supervised 
release and order that the released person be placed 
in an appropriate institution until the person is 
discharged from the commitment under s. 980.09 or 
until again placed on supervised release under s. 
980.08.10 
¶18 Under 
§ 980.06(2)(d), 
the 
court 
could 
revoke 
a 
person's supervised release if it determined that (1) any rule 
or condition of release had been violated; or (2) the safety of 
others required that supervised release be revoked. 
¶19 Two terms ago, in State v. Keding, 2002 WI 86, ¶1, 254 
Wis. 2d 334, 
646 
N.W.2d 375, 
this 
court 
considered 
as 
a 
certified question, "whether a circuit court is required to 
consider alternatives to revocation before revoking a sexually 
violent person's supervised release under Chapter 980."  The 
court split evenly on this issue, but it affirmed Lenny Keding's 
revocation because a majority agreed that the circuit court had 
investigated alternatives to revocation before revoking Keding's 
supervised release.  Id., ¶¶2-3.   
                                                 
10 See Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) (2001-02). 
No. 00-1425 
 
11 
 
¶20 In this case, the issue is narrower than the issue in 
Keding.  See Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶19.  Judge Welker revoked 
Burris's supervised release on grounds that the "safety of the 
public required [Burris's] commitment to a secure facility."  
This finding mirrored the second ground for revoking supervised 
release, namely, "that the safety of others requires that 
supervised release be revoked."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d).  
Hence, the specific issue presented in this case is whether the 
court must, for any reason, expressly consider alternatives to 
revocation before revoking supervised release when the court 
determines that the safety of others requires revocation, or 
when the safety of others requires a person's commitment to a 
secure facility. 
A. 
Due Process 
¶21 Burris contends that due process required the circuit 
court 
to 
expressly 
consider 
and 
reject 
alternatives 
to 
revocation before revoking his supervised release.  He relies on 
State ex rel. Plotkin v. Department of Health & Social Services, 
63 
Wis. 2d 535, 
217 
N.W.2d 641 
(1974), 
to 
support 
this 
contention. 
¶22 An 
alleged 
sexually 
violent 
person, 
subject 
to 
commitment under Chapter 980, is not a criminal defendant but 
has the same constitutional rights as a criminal defendant at 
trial.  State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶12, 244 
Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881, as revised in State ex rel. Seibert 
v. Macht, 2002 WI 12, ¶2, 249 Wis. 2d 702, 639 N.W.2d 707; 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  Moreover, the court of appeals has 
No. 00-1425 
 
12 
 
concluded that procedural due process protections afforded to 
persons in probation and parole revocation proceedings also 
apply in supervised release revocation proceedings under Chapter 
980.  See State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶9, 247 
Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236. 
¶23 Burris asserts that due process protections afforded 
in probation and parole revocation proceedings include a 
requirement that the decision-maker consider alternatives to 
revocation.  For this proposition, he points to Plotkin.  This, 
however, is where his analysis breaks down. 
¶24 The law has evolved as follows: In Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether due process required a state to afford an 
individual some opportunity to be heard before revoking his 
parole.  The Iowa Board of Parole had revoked the parole of two 
parolees without providing them an adversary hearing.  The Court 
stated that the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding did not apply to parole revocation, id. at 
480; rather, the minimum requirements of due process required 
the following: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence 
against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and 
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral 
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional 
parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by 
No. 00-1425 
 
13 
 
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and 
reasons for revoking parole. 
Id. at 489. 
¶25 These 
due 
process 
protections 
were 
extended 
to 
probation revocation hearings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 782 (1973), along with a recognition that the state must 
provide counsel to probationers in some revocation proceedings. 
¶26 Twelve years later, the Supreme Court confronted the 
question whether Morrissey and Gagnon required a court to 
consider 
alternatives 
to 
incarceration 
before 
revoking 
probation.  The Court concluded that due process did not require 
the trial court to consider alternatives to revocation and 
indicate on the record that it had done so.  Black v. Romano, 
471 U.S. 606 (1985).  The Court said: "One point relevant to the 
present case is immediately evident from a review of the minimum 
procedures set forth in some detail in Gagnon and Morrissey: the 
specified procedures do not include an express statement by the 
factfinder that alternatives to incarceration were considered 
and rejected."  Id. at 612 (emphasis added). 
¶27 The Court acknowledged the desirability of considering 
possible 
alternatives to 
imprisonment 
before 
probation is 
revoked, id. at 613, but it emphasized that the "decision to 
revoke probation is generally predictive and subjective in 
nature," id., and "a general requirement that the factfinder 
elaborate upon the reasons for a course not taken would unduly 
burden the revocation proceeding without significantly advancing 
the interests of the probationer."  Id. 
No. 00-1425 
 
14 
 
¶28 There is an exception to this rule.  In Bearden v. 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the Supreme Court held that in 
probation 
revocation proceedings, a 
sentencing 
court 
must 
inquire into the reasons for failure to pay a fine and 
restitution if that failure is the ground for revocation.  "If 
the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide 
efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must 
consider 
alternative 
measures 
of 
punishment 
other 
than 
imprisonment."  Id. at 672.  The Court added that only if 
alternative measures are not adequate to meet the state's 
interests "may the court imprison a probationer who has made 
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay."  Id.  The Court later 
explained that the decision in Bearden "did not rest on the view 
that Gagnon and Morrisey generally compel consideration of 
alternatives to incarceration."  Black, 471 U.S. at 614 
(emphasis added).  Rather, it indicated that such consideration 
"is required only if the defendant has violated a condition of 
probation through no fault of his own."  Id. 
¶29 In Plotkin, decided in 1974 after the State of 
Wisconsin lost the Gagnon case in the Supreme Court, this court 
approved 
and 
adopted 
Section 
5.1 
of 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association's Standards Relating to Probation.  63 Wis. 2d 544-
45.  Section 5.1 established "[g]rounds for and alternatives to 
probation revocation."  Id. at 544.  The section provided these 
grounds for revocation: 
No. 00-1425 
 
15 
 
 
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the 
public from further criminal activity by the offender; 
or  
 
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional 
treatment which can most effectively be provided if he 
is confined; or 
 
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness 
of the violation if probation were not revoked. 
Id.  More important for this case, the standards provided that 
the court find one of these three grounds for revocation after 
considering various intermediate steps as an alternative to 
revocation.  Id. at 544-45. 
¶30 In Plotkin, this court adopted these standards for 
probation revocation, not as a requirement of due process but as 
a prescription of good policy.11  Thus, reasoning by analogy, we 
conclude that due process does not require that a court 
expressly consider and reject alternatives to revocation before 
revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release when the 
court determines that the public safety requires the person's 
commitment to a secure facility. 
B. 
Statutory Interpretation 
¶31 Burris contends that Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d), now 
§ 980.08(6m), requires the court to consider alternatives to 
revocation in every case prior to revoking a sexually violent 
person's supervised release.  This presents a question of 
                                                 
11 The court adopted similar standards for parole revocation 
in Van Ermen v. Department of Health & Social Services, 84 
Wis. 2d 57, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978). 
No. 00-1425 
 
16 
 
statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  Keding, 254 
Wis. 2d 334, ¶13.   
¶32 This 
court 
has 
been 
wrestling 
with 
statutory 
interpretation in recent years, culminating in our decision in 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 
58, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  The purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what a statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.  Id., ¶44.  
We understand our obligation to faithfully give effect to the 
policy choices enacted into law by the legislature.  Id.  To 
achieve this end, we look first to the language of the statute.  
Id.  If the language is ambiguous, even after considering its 
intrinsic context, scope, and purpose, we may turn to extrinsic 
sources such as legislative history.  In this instance, the 
statute is not ambiguous, but after stating our conclusion, we 
turn to the history of similar legislation to confirm our 
interpretation of the statutory language.   
¶33 Under the former statute applicable in this case, the 
court was directed to commit a sexually violent person to the 
custody of DHFS for control, care, and treatment until such time 
as the person "is no longer a sexually violent person."  
§ 980.06(1).  An order for commitment was to specify either 
institutional care or supervised release.  § 980.06(2)(b).  DHFS 
was directed to "arrange for control, care and treatment of the 
person in the least restrictive manner consistent with the 
requirements of the person and in accordance with the court's 
commitment order."  Id. (emphasis added).   
No. 00-1425 
 
17 
 
¶34 The "least restrictive manner" language conforms to a 
provision in the patients rights statute, which applies to 
Chapter 980 patients: Each patient shall "have the right to the 
least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes 
of . . . commitment."  Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(e).  It is also 
consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982), 
where the Supreme Court said that "[p]ersons who have been 
involuntarily 
committed 
are 
entitled 
to 
more 
considerate 
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 
conditions of confinement are designed to punish." 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) was cited by this court 
in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 266, 541 N.W.2d 105 
(1995), as part of the rationale for upholding Chapter 980 as a 
remedial, treatment-oriented statute.   
¶36 This discussion, grounded in the statutes, provides 
the 
policy 
backdrop 
against 
which 
Chapter 
980 
must 
be 
implemented and interpreted.  We are fully cognizant that 
Chapter 980 is not intended to be a punitive statute.  At the 
same time, the purpose of the chapter is to protect the public 
from sexually violent persons who have a mental disorder and 
whose mental disorder creates a substantial probability that 
they will engage in acts of sexual violence.  The statute allows 
and common sense requires that the department and the court have 
reasonable latitude in trying to achieve these two objectives.  
"A person on supervised release is subject to the conditions set 
by 
the 
court 
and 
to 
the 
rules 
of 
the 
department."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(d). 
No. 00-1425 
 
18 
 
¶37 Burris contends that to comply with the "least 
restrictive" language in the statutes, the court is required, in 
every case, to expressly consider alternatives to revocation 
before revoking a sexually violent person's supervised release.  
We disagree.   
¶38 When a person is placed on supervised release, DHFS 
must develop a plan that identifies treatment and services the 
person will receive and specify who will be responsible for 
providing 
the 
treatment 
and 
services.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(c).  The plan is then presented to the 
court for approval.  Id.  Thereafter, DHFS has latitude to 
control the person, care for the person, and treat the person 
"in 
the 
least 
restrictive 
manner 
consistent 
with 
the 
requirements of the person and in accordance with the court's 
commitment order."  § 980.06(2)(b).  As the requirements of the 
person change, the manner of control, care, and treatment may 
change, so long as the change does not conflict with the court's 
commitment order.  If the court-approved plan is so restrictive 
that it deprives DHFS of reasonable flexibility in responding to 
the changing circumstances of the person, DHFS may seek added 
flexibility from the court.  Hence, revocation of supervised 
release is not the only option DHFS has when a sexually violent 
person violates conditions or rules. 
¶39 When the department moves to revoke supervised release 
on grounds that the released person has violated one or more 
conditions or rules, "or that the safety of others requires that 
supervised release be revoked," the state has the burden of 
No. 00-1425 
 
19 
 
proving 
its 
case 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence.  
§ 980.06(2)(d). 
¶40 The statute does not state explicitly what the court 
must consider.  We think it is self-evident, however, that when 
the court determines, on the evidence after a hearing, that "the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked," 
the court has found that there is clear and convincing evidence 
that it has no alternative but to revoke to assure the safety of 
others.  Put another way, the court has found that the safety of 
others requires the person's commitment to a secure facility 
because supervised release will not be adequate. 
¶41 The 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
the 
word 
"require" 
contains such phrases as: "To have as a requisite," "To call for 
as obligatory," "To impose an obligation on; compel."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1533 (3d 
ed. 1992).  If the court finds that the safety of others compels 
that supervised release be revoked, the court need not provide 
an explicit statement why alternatives to incarceration were 
considered but not selected.  If the court ever has question 
about the need to revoke on this ground, it can find that the 
state has not satisfied its burden of proof, or it can 
proactively explore alternatives to revocation.   
¶42 The court of appeals offered a slightly different 
interpretation of the statute.  It noted that under the statute, 
the court must first determine whether any rule or condition of 
release has been violated or whether the safety of others 
requires revocation.  Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶22.  "If either 
No. 00-1425 
 
20 
 
of these conditions is met, the circuit court 'may' revoke an 
order for supervised release."  Id.  "However, upon a finding 
that the safety of others requires revocation, the plain 
language of the statute removes any discretion from the circuit 
court.  Simply stated, it is irrational to require consideration 
of alternatives to revocation after a court has found that the 
safety of others requires revocation."  Id.  We do not dispute 
this interpretation.   
¶43 In examining this issue, the statutory scheme must be 
understood.  Under the old law and under the current law, the 
court makes the decision whether to place a person on supervised 
release.  When the department seeks to revoke supervised 
release, the court serves as a check on the department.  The 
court cannot be expected to automatically rubber-stamp a 
petition to overturn its own previous determination and find 
that the safety of others requires revocation, unless the state 
has adduced clear and convincing evidence. 
¶44 As noted, the statute also provides that if "the court 
determines after hearing that any rule or condition of release 
has been violated . . . it may revoke the order for supervised 
release and order that the released person be placed in an 
appropriate institution."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) (emphasis 
added).  Here again, the statute does not state explicitly what 
the court must consider or what the court must explain.  
However, given the wide range of potential rule violations, 
including the failure to pay fines and restitution, we expect 
courts will recognize that revocation of supervised release 
No. 00-1425 
 
21 
 
based upon violation of one or more conditions or rules is 
likely to receive much closer scrutiny than revocation based on 
a finding that "the safety of others requires" revocation.  In 
such a case, a court should explore alternatives or fully 
explain why some step short of revocation would not be adequate. 
¶45 We stated in Keding, 254 Wis. 2d 334, ¶13, that "the 
revocation decision itself is a discretionary one, subject to a 
deferential standard of review.  We will uphold a circuit 
court's exercise of discretion if the court employs a process of 
reasoning based on the facts of record and reaches 'a conclusion 
based 
on 
a 
logical 
rationale 
founded 
upon 
proper 
legal 
standards'" (quoting State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2000 WI 30, ¶21, 233 
Wis. 2d 428, 608 N.W.2d 679).  "Discretion not only entails the 
process of decision making on the basis of the relevant facts 
but also requires that the decision be consonant with the 
purposes of the established law or other guides to discretion."  
Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 545.  One of the purposes of the law is 
to control sexually violent persons "in the least restrictive 
manner 
consistent 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
the 
person."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).  When supervised release is revoked 
on the basis of the violation of a rule or condition of release, 
the court should explain its decision and square that decision 
with the treatment-oriented purposes of the law. 
¶46 It must be acknowledged that the phrase "may revoke" 
follows a finding of a rule violation as well as a finding that 
"the safety of others requires that supervised release be 
No. 00-1425 
 
22 
 
revoked."  This poses the question whether the word "may" has 
different applications as it is tied to different clauses in the 
same sentence.  We believe that it does. 
¶47 Parallel 
legislative 
history 
provides 
assistance.  
There is little doubt, because of consistent organization and 
use of language, that parts of Chapter 980 are modeled after 
Wis. Stat. § 971.17 entitled "Commitment of persons found not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect."  In the 
1987 statutes, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3) speaks of revoking the 
conditional release of a person found not guilty because of 
mental disease or defect: "If . . . the court determines after a 
hearing that the conditions of release have not been fulfilled 
and that the safety of the person or the safety of others 
requires that his or her conditional release be revoked, the 
court shall immediately order the person recommitted to the 
department."  (Emphasis added.). 
¶48 In 1990 the legislature approved 1989 Act 334, a bill 
drafted by the Insanity Defense Committee of the Judicial 
Council.  In that act, Wis. Stat. § 971.17 was repealed and 
recreated.  Subsection (3)(a) provided that after a person was 
found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or 
mental defect, "an order for commitment . . . shall specify 
either 
institutional 
care 
or 
conditional 
release."  
Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(a) (1991-92).  Subsection (e), which 
closely parallels § 980.06(2)(d) (1997-98), then provided for 
revocation of conditional release.  Part of the text reads: 
No. 00-1425 
 
23 
 
The state has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that any rule or condition of 
release has been violated, or that the safety of the 
person or others requires that conditional release be 
revoked.  If the court determines after hearing that 
any rule or condition of release has been violated, or 
that the safety of the person or others requires that 
conditional release be revoked, it may revoke the 
order for conditional release and order that the 
released 
person 
be 
placed 
in 
an 
appropriate 
institution. 
¶49 An early draft of this legislation provided, in part, 
that: "If the court determines after a hearing that any rule or 
condition of release has been violated, it may revoke the order 
for conditional release."  Judicial Council Insanity Defense 
Committee File 4 of 5 (1988-1991), Document 67 (LRB 0902/1 draft 
dated 11/14/88).  At the urging of the Department of Health and 
Social Services, Judge Mark Frankel asked the Insanity Defense 
Committee to provide more discretion to revoke the conditional 
release of defendants under the statute.  The December 15, 1989, 
minutes of the committee read in part as follows: 
 
Ms. Greenley pointed out that proposed par. 
(3)(c) allows the person to be taken into custody if 
he or she "violates any condition or rule."  This does 
not include the broader language suggested by Judge 
Frankel earlier in our deliberations, allowing the 
person to be taken into custody if he or she is 
becoming dangerous again, notwithstanding no rule or 
condition of supervision has been violated.  Last 
month, a draft was circulated which includes the 
concept Judge Frankel suggested (LRB-2701/4).  It 
allows a conditional released person to be taken into 
custody "if the safety of the person or others 
requires revocation of conditional release." 
 
Chairman Pappas said that one of our original 
goals in this committee had been to address that 
situation.  He asked if there were objection to 
including this alternative standard for revocation.  
No. 00-1425 
 
24 
 
Ms. Greenley said she had no objection.  The committee 
agreed to make this change. 
 
. . . .  
 
The 
committee 
continued 
reviewing 
sub. 
(3)(c). . . . It 
agreed 
to 
add 
the 
alternative 
"Frankel" standard to the judicial findings which 
support an order for revocation.  When conditional 
release is revoked, the person must be placed in a 
state treatment facility. 
The committee's vote led to the current language, "the safety of 
the person or others" being shoehorned into one sentence, with 
the resulting statute embodying two different grounds for 
revocation that are not wholly consistent.  The inconsistency in 
§ 971.17 was carried over, years later, to the revocation 
provision in Chapter 980, which explains why the word "may" in 
§ 980.06(2)(d) (1997-98) and § 980.08(6m) (2001-02) may be read 
differently depending on context. 
C. 
Other Due Process Claims 
¶50 In addition to arguing that due process requires the 
circuit 
court 
to 
consider 
alternatives 
to 
revoking 
his 
supervised release, Burris asserts that his due process rights 
have been violated because his revocation proceedings were, in 
his words, "arbitrary and fundamentally unfair."  Burris's 
perception appears to originate in large part from his belief 
that he was entitled to a due process right to have the court 
consider and reject alternatives to revocation.  However, he 
weaves in other concerns that require discussion.  He raises 
issues related to (1) the alleged vagueness of Rule 1 of his 
supervised release conditions; (2) the alleged inadequate notice 
No. 00-1425 
 
25 
 
of the alcohol violation; and (3) the circuit court's alleged 
improper reliance on uncharged halfway house rules violations.  
We address each of his arguments in turn. 
¶51 First, Burris asserts that Rule 1 of his supervised 
release, which states, "[y]ou shall avoid all conduct that is a 
violation of federal or state statute, municipal or county 
ordinances or that is not in the best interest of the public's 
welfare or your rehabilitation," is unconstitutionally vague.   
Burris argues that Rule 1 is vague and all encompassing, that 
"any ordinary human" would have a few minor rule violations, and 
that the rule provides "little in the way of guidance but a lot 
in the way of snares."  Burris concludes that he was "set up to 
fail." 
¶52 The court of appeals declined to address the breadth 
of the rule because "[Burris's] behavior so plainly falls within 
the language of the rule."  The court reasoned that, in light of 
Burris's history of serious sex offenses, "an ordinary person 
would have been cognizant that obtaining a prescription for a 
sexual-performance-enhancing drug would not be in the public's 
or in Burris's best interest."  Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶6. 
¶53 Like a probation condition, a rule regulating the 
conduct of a sexually violent person on supervised release 
satisfies the procedural due process requirement of adequate 
notice if it is sufficiently precise for the probationer to know 
what conduct is required or prohibited.  State v. Lo, 228 
Wis. 2d 531, 535, 599 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1999).  In the 
context of criminal statutes, we have stated that "when the 
No. 00-1425 
 
26 
 
alleged conduct of a defendant plainly falls in the prohibited 
zone, the defendant may not base a constitutional vagueness 
challenge on hypothetical facts."  State v. Pittman, 174 
Wis. 2d 255, 
277, 
496 
N.W.2d 74 
(1993) 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 713, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976)).  We find 
the logic of this principle to apply with equal force in a 
challenge to the rules and conditions of supervised release 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.   
¶54 Burris does not allege that he was unaware that his 
actions were prohibited.  Judge Welker found that it was 
Burris's deceptive actions, and not the Viagra prescription per 
se, that violated Rule 1.  Burris obtained the prescription 
without discussing the matter with his supervising agent or 
anyone else in authority.  He became angry when he found out 
that his courier——a woman he had been warned not to contact——
gave the prescription to a halfway house staff member instead of 
to him.  When the staff member attempted to pass the 
prescription on, he refused to accept it.  After the incident, 
he refused to discuss the matter and refused to cooperate with 
his supervising agent.   
¶55 It was clear to the court of appeals that a reasonable 
person would know that a sexually violent person in the custody 
of DHFS should avoid surreptitiously obtaining a prescription 
for a drug designed to enhance one's ability to have sexual 
intercourse.  Although Burris asserts that "it is difficult to 
see why the court [of appeals] believed Burris'[s] conduct so 
plainly violated Rule 1," Judge Welker's factual findings 
No. 00-1425 
 
27 
 
indicate that Burris himself realized the impropriety of 
obtaining the Viagra prescription.  His secretive actions before 
and during the incident, as well as his uncooperative reaction 
when his actions were discovered, show that he knew his conduct 
was not permitted.   
¶56 We agree with the court of appeals that Burris's 
conduct fell squarely within the prohibited zone of Rule 1.  
Burris cannot complain that Rule 1 is vague by arguing that he 
did not know what was prohibited because his own actions and 
reactions point to a contrary conclusion.  Burris is therefore 
prohibited from challenging the rule on vagueness grounds 
because he himself was aware that, as a sexually violent person, 
his secretive conduct regarding his sex life was conduct not in 
the best interest of the public welfare or his rehabilitation. 
 
¶57 Second, Burris asserts that he did not receive the 
second amended complaint that contained the alcohol violation 
until the day before his revocation hearing.  This contention is 
not supported by the record.  Burris filed a motion on January 
7, 2000, stating: "On December 30, 1999, the Department filed a 
Second Amended Statement of Probable Cause for Detention and 
Petition for Revocation of Supervised Release," asserting the 
alcohol violation.  There was no allegation in that motion that 
the amended complaint had not been timely received.  On January 
8, 2000, during the revocation hearing, Burris's attorney 
stated: "I think it was December 30th that the department filed 
another amended statement of probable cause and the second or 
third event of statement of probable cause is the one alleging 
No. 00-1425 
 
28 
 
that Mr. Burris consumed alcoholic beverages while at Rock 
Valley."  At a hearing on January 9, 2001, Burris's appellate 
attorney grilled Burris's trial attorney: 
Q 
Okay.  Now, at the time that you drafted 
Attachment C [dated January 3, 2000], were you 
aware of the allegation that Ervin Burris had 
been drinking on the grounds of the halfway 
house? 
A 
I don't think so.  Or, wait, well, let me just 
see here.  Well, I'm not sure, to tell you the 
truth.  I'm looking at -- part of my file 
indicates 
that 
the 
drinking 
allegation 
was 
received on December 30th, so it's possible that 
I was aware. 
¶58 We find the claim that Burris did not receive notice 
until the day prior to the hearing has no factual basis.  He 
received notice nine days before the hearing and he fails to 
specify how that notice prevented him from mounting a defense.  
Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶13. 
 
¶59 Third, Burris contends that he did not receive notice 
that the State intended to introduce evidence that he violated 
the rules of the halfway house and that the circuit court 
erroneously relied on this information.  In his brief, Burris 
argues that the court of appeals "failed to come to terms with 
how the circuit court made much to do over Burris'[s] alleged 
violations of the half-way house rules, and how these violations 
supposedly proved that neither Burris nor anyone else could be 
adequately supervised by the half-way house.  In that Burris'[s] 
alleged violations of the half-way house rules appeared to go to 
the crux of the circuit court's determinations, the 'harmless 
No. 00-1425 
 
29 
 
error' analysis was cursory and erroneously utilized by the 
court of appeals."   
 
¶60 Burris offers mere conclusions that the court of 
appeals did not realize the extent to which the circuit court 
relied on the halfway house rules and that its harmless error 
analysis was "cursory and erroneous."  However, Burris has not 
referenced the record as to how the circuit court "made much to 
do" of the halfway house violations, nor has he pointed to any 
flaw in the court of appeals harmless error analysis.   
¶61 As the court of appeals noted, the State introduced 
evidence that Burris violated the halfway house rules in order 
to prove the allegations contained in its revocation petition.  
Burris, 
258 
Wis. 2d 454, 
¶14. 
 
For 
instance, 
the 
State 
introduced evidence that Burris deviated from the conditions of 
a pass he received when he went to a motel to have sex with a 
married woman.  Whether Burris violated halfway house rules by 
violating the terms of the pass is only incidental to the more 
critical fact that Burris used the pass for an unauthorized 
sexual liaison.  In another instance, the State presented 
evidence that Burris had been found in the parking lot of the 
halfway house with alcohol.  The court of appeals indicated that 
this demonstrated that the "halfway house staff could not always 
monitor whether Burris had been drinking or been having 
unauthorized intimate relations."  Id. 
¶62 While Burris may be correct that conduct violating the 
rules of the halfway house was at the heart of the reasons for 
revocation, Judge Welker relied upon Burris's conduct itself, 
No. 00-1425 
 
30 
 
not the halfway house rules, to make his decision to revoke.  
The rules of a regulated community placement facility are likely 
to overlap the rules and conditions of supervised release.  It 
was a minor indiscretion at most for the State to present 
evidence, without prior notice, that conduct charged in the 
revocation petition violated two sets of rules instead of only 
one. 
¶63 Burris states no legal reason why he believes the 
court of appeals harmless error analysis was "cursory and 
erroneous."  Although the court of appeals, in the interest of 
being thorough, undertook a harmless error analysis to support 
its determination, the harmless error analysis was not the sole 
basis for its rejection of Burris's claim.  The court of appeals 
indicated that even if the circuit court used the halfway house 
rules in its decision, that reliance would not have mattered.  
Burris does not allege that the court of appeals used an 
improper legal standard, or misapplied that legal standard.  We 
see no reason to disturb the court of appeals harmless error 
analysis inasmuch as it was not vital to the court of appeals' 
holding. 
D. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
¶64 Finally, Burris alleges that the underlying evidence 
does not support the circuit court's finding that the safety of 
others required revocation.  He states, "the circuit court, when 
rendering its decision, outside of its arbitrary and capricious 
conclusion that Mr. Burris needed to be committed to a secure 
facility for the safety of the public, likewise made no real 
No. 00-1425 
 
31 
 
attempt to explain how Mr. Burris'[s] minor rule violations 
justified any conclusion that he had become a higher risk to re-
offend than he was when placed initially on supervised release."  
Burris goes on to allege that "the circuit court deemed Mr. 
Burris a danger to the public safety primarily, if not 
exclusively, due to Mr. Burris'[s] past behaviors that resulted 
in his criminal convictions.  In other words, once a sexual 
offender, always a sexual offender."  At base, Burris asserts 
that the only reason Judge Welker found that the safety of 
others required revocation of supervised release was Burris's 
past criminal convictions, and therefore his revocation of 
supervised release was punishment for Burris's previous crimes. 
We do not agree. 
¶65 Before we address the merits of Burris's claim, we 
must address again the standard of review.  In most instances, 
the decision to revoke supervised release is a discretionary 
decision.  See ¶45 above.  When a judge makes a determination 
that the safety of others requires that supervised release be 
revoked, however, the plain language of § 980.06(2)(d) does not 
afford the decision-maker discretion in the same way that a 
court or administrative body exercises discretion in the context 
of probation. 
¶66 "The question of judicial authority is a question of 
law that we review de novo."  City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 
Wis. 2d 738, 747, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (citing In Interest of 
E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986)).  Likewise, 
the interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we 
No. 00-1425 
 
32 
 
review de novo while benefiting from the analysis of the court 
of appeals and the circuit court.  Smith v. General Casualty 
Insurance Co., 2000 WI 127, ¶7, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882. 
¶67 The relevant language of Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d) is 
as follows: 
The state has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that any rule or condition of 
release has been violated, or that the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked.  
If the court determines after hearing that any rule or 
condition of release has been violated, or that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be 
revoked, it may revoke the order for supervised 
release and order that the released person be placed 
in an appropriate institution. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d). 
¶68 As we have previously stated, there are two predicate 
circumstances that might persuade a circuit court to revoke 
supervised release: a finding that a "rule or condition of 
release has been violated" or a finding that "the safety of 
others 
requires 
that 
supervised 
release 
be 
revoked."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(d).  Because Judge Welker relied on the 
second of these predicate circumstances when he concluded that 
"the safety of others requires his commitment to a secure 
No. 00-1425 
 
33 
 
facility,"12 we focus our analysis on the process dictated by 
this standard.  
¶69 In 
Morrissey, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
envisioned 
a 
revocation decision with two discrete steps.  First, the 
decision-maker 
must 
establish 
the 
underlying 
facts 
that 
constitute the basis for revocation.  Second, the decision-maker 
must properly exercise discretion and decide whether or not 
underlying 
circumstances 
warrant 
revocation. 
 
The 
Court 
described the process as follows: 
The first step in a revocation decision . . . involves 
a wholly factual question: whether the parolee has in 
fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of 
his parole.  Only if it is determined that the parolee 
did violate the conditions does the second question 
arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or 
should other steps be taken to protect society and 
improve chances of rehabilitation?  The first step is 
relatively simple; the second is more complex.  The 
second question involves the application of expertise 
by the parole authority in making a prediction as to 
the ability of the individual to live in society 
without committing antisocial acts.  This part of the 
decision, too, depends on facts, and therefore it is 
important for the board to know not only that some 
violation was committed but also to know accurately 
how many and how serious the violations were.  Yet 
this second step, deciding what to do about the 
                                                 
12 We note that nothing in § 980.06(2)(d) purports to limit 
a court that finds rules violations to rely upon only the first 
predicate as the ground for revocation.  If a court finds that 
one or more rule violations demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that the safety of others requires revocation, it may 
revoke under the second predicate condition.  Thus, it was 
proper for Judge Welker to reach a conclusion that the safety of 
others required revocation based on findings that Burris had 
violated several rules of his supervised release. 
No. 00-1425 
 
34 
 
violation once it is identified, is not purely factual 
but also predictive and discretionary. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80. 
¶70 Our legislature set forth a somewhat different test 
for revocation under § 980.06(2)(d) when the revocation is based 
on the "safety of others" clause.  This test departs from the 
Court's discussion of a two-part revocation decision.  When a 
court revokes under the "safety of others" rationale, the court 
is charged with making a much more specific finding than a court 
does when it is determining whether a rule or condition of 
release has been violated.  While the court must first find 
underlying evidentiary facts as contemplated by Morrissey, the 
court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that these 
underlying facts demonstrate that "the safety of others requires 
that supervised release be revoked."  Only after this ground has 
been proved by the state and determined by the court is the 
court given authority to revoke supervised release.  The second 
step 
described 
by 
Morrissey 
as 
factual, 
predictive, 
and 
discretionary is no longer discretionary when the court makes 
the determination on "safety of others." 
¶71 Thus, we view the finding that the safety of others 
requires revocation as a mixed question of fact and law because 
the circuit court is vested with no discretionary power.  
Instead, the statute directs the circuit court to apply its 
factual finding to a statutory standard.  See Wassenaar v. 
Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 525, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983) ("Whether the 
facts fulfill the legal standard . . . is a determination of 
No. 00-1425 
 
35 
 
law.").  When determining whether the safety of others requires 
that supervised release be revoked, the circuit court first 
evaluates the evidence presented at the revocation hearing and 
renders factual findings.  We uphold these factual findings 
unless clearly erroneous.  State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶18, 
231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  The circuit court then 
determines whether the facts as found meet the particular legal 
standard 
set 
forth 
by the 
statute. 
 
Whether 
the 
facts 
ascertained by the circuit court prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that "the safety of others requires that supervised 
release be revoked" is a question of law.  Normally, an 
appellate court reviewing determinations of law does so without 
deference to the circuit court.  Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 525.  
Because the factual findings on "safety of others" under 
§ 980.06(2)(d) are so closely intertwined with the court's 
determination that, as a matter of law, the safety of others 
requires that supervised release be revoked, a reviewing court 
"should give weight to the trial court's decision, although the 
trial court's decision is not controlling."  Id.    
¶72 Burris does not allege that Judge Welker's factual 
findings are clearly erroneous, and therefore we will assume 
that the evidence supports his findings.  Instead, Burris 
challenges Judge Welker's conclusion based on the findings that 
the evidence did not indicate that Burris was a high risk to 
commit violent acts against others.  He reasons that his conduct 
was not dangerous in and of itself, and therefore it is 
impossible to infer from that conduct that he presented a danger 
No. 00-1425 
 
36 
 
to others.  We disagree.  Contrary to Burris's claim, one need 
not threaten violent acts, as in State v. Jefferson, 163 
Wis. 2d 332, 336, 471 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1991), for a court to 
find that an individual presents a danger to others.  A court is 
not forced to wait until overtly dangerous acts have been 
committed; it is not required to ignore indications that a 
sexually violent person has disregarded the rules repeatedly in 
the past and will do so in the future.  If the court finds that 
the state has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the 
safety of others requires revocation, the statute authorizes the 
circuit court to revoke supervised release. 
¶73 Judge Welker found that Burris disregarded the rules 
of his supervised release in order to satisfy his compulsive 
urges.  Burris consumed alcohol, a drug that lowers inhibitions.  
He abused the privileges provided to him in order to meet a 
married woman and have sex with her, in derogation not only of 
the rules and conditions of his supervised release but also in 
direct contradiction of his supervising agent's warning not to 
contact the woman.  Without the permission of his supervising 
agent, Burris secretly sought out a drug designed to enhance his 
sex life.  Upon discovery of this secret, Burris became angry 
and refused to accept the prescription, demonstrating that he 
knew his conduct was improper.   
¶74 The court concluded that these repeated violations of 
the rules of his supervised release involving sex and alcohol 
demonstrated that written rules and conditions and verbal 
admonitions were inadequate to protect the public.  While these 
No. 00-1425 
 
37 
 
major transgressions did not specifically injure others through 
violence, they demonstrated that Burris was unable to conform 
his conduct to the rules and conditions of supervised release 
when he sought to satisfy his physical urges.  In addition, 
Burris was not meaningfully participating in his sex offender 
treatment.  Hence, Burris had become a clear risk to the 
community.  The court determined there was no option short of 
revocation that would ameliorate the risk to the community 
because the serious nature of written rules, the verbal 
warnings, and the importance of treatment were lost on Burris.  
We conclude that the evidence supports Judge Welker's conclusion 
that the safety of others required that his supervised release 
be revoked.   
CONCLUSION 
¶75 In conclusion, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  As a general rule, sexually violent persons on 
supervised release under Chapter 980 are not entitled to a due 
process right to have the circuit court consider and reject 
alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release.  
This is especially true when the court determines that the 
safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked.  
We also conclude that there was no constitutional "unfairness" 
in Burris's revocation proceedings, and hold that the evidence 
supports the circuit court's conclusion that revoking Burris's 
supervised release was required for the safety of others. 
 
No. 00-1425 
 
38 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  00-1425.npc 
 
1 
 
¶76 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  The majority 
concludes that in a situation where the basis for the revocation 
of a sexually violent person's supervised release is violation 
of one or more conditions or rules, "a court should explore 
alternatives or fully explain why some step short of revocation 
would not be adequate."  Majority op., ¶44.  However, I believe 
that the language used by the majority does not go far enough.  
Therefore, I conclude that, in a situation where the basis for 
the revocation of a sexually violent person's supervised release 
is a rules violation, rather than a determination based on 
public safety, a court must consider alternatives to revocation 
on the record.   Such consideration is required as a matter of 
good policy, as outlined in State ex rel. Plotkin v. Department 
of Health & Social Services, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 217 N.W.2d 641 
(1974), and Van Ermen v. Department of Health & Social Services, 
84 Wis. 2d 57, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978), and because an appropriate 
application of Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) calls for it. 
¶77 In Plotkin, we found that alternatives to revocation 
should be considered prior to the revocation of probation, and 
adopted Section 5.1 of the American Bar Association's Standards 
Relating to Probation as guidelines for Wisconsin courts to 
follow in such situations.  Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 544-45.  See 
also majority op., ¶29.  In Van Ermen, this court reached a 
similar conclusion, but with regard to the revocation of parole.  
Van Ermen, 84 Wis. 2d at 66.  These two decisions are applicable 
to this case, because, as the majority notes, allegedly sexually 
violent persons have the same constitutional rights as criminal 
No.  00-1425.npc 
 
2 
 
defendants at trial, and the procedural due process protections 
of "probation and parole revocation proceedings also apply in 
supervised release revocation proceedings under Chapter 980."  
Majority op., ¶22.  See also State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 
190, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236.  Using Section 5.1, 
Plotkin 
outlines 
several 
alternatives 
that 
"'should 
be 
considered 
in 
every 
case 
as 
possible 
alternatives 
to 
revocation.'"  Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 545 (citation omitted).  
Van Ermen stated that discretion should be exercised "by at 
least 
considering 
whether 
alternatives 
are 
available 
and 
feasible."  Van Ermen, 84 Wis. 2d at 67.  Thus, requiring 
consideration of alternatives to revocation of a sexually 
violent person's supervised release in situations where the 
basis for the revocation is the violation of the conditions or 
rules of release is necessary in order to comply with prior 
decisions of this court and the court of appeals. 
¶78 The language of Chapter 980 states that "[t]he 
department shall arrange for control, care and treatment of the 
person in the least restrictive manner consistent with the 
requirements of the person . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).  
The language of § 980.06(2)(b) ties the statute to this court's 
decisions 
in 
Plotkin 
and 
Van 
Ermen. 
 
To 
comply 
with 
§ 980.06(2)(b), the least restrictive manner for control, care 
and treatment of a sexually violent individual must be utilized.  
In order to determine the least restrictive manner, it follows 
that alternatives to revocation must be considered and such 
consideration must be on the record for purposes of review. 
No.  00-1425.npc 
 
3 
 
¶79 While I concur for the reasons noted, I join the 
majority in affirming the court of appeals' decision, since here 
the circuit court based its revocation order on the need to 
protect the safety of others.  See majority op., ¶14. 
¶80 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority summarily and without analysis concludes that "the 
proceedings 
in 
this 
matter 
were 
neither 
arbitrary 
nor 
fundamentally unfair."13  I conclude that the minimum due process 
requirement of notice was violated in the present case.  
¶83 Furthermore, the majority upholds the circuit court's 
decision to revoke supervised release on the ground that 
revocation of supervised release is necessary for the safety of 
others.  I conclude that the State failed to prove this ground 
for revocation by clear and convincing evidence. 
¶84 Finally, I reach the question of whether a circuit 
court must consider alternatives to revocation.  As to rules 
violations cases——I agree with Justice Crooks' concurrence that 
alternatives to revocation must be considered before a circuit 
court exercises its discretion to revoke supervised release in  
cases of rules violations.  Alternatives to revocation must be 
considered after a circuit court finds that rules have been 
violated and a circuit court is exercising its discretion about 
revocation.  Unfortunately, the majority opinion is fuzzy on 
this point.14   
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶2.  See also id., ¶75. 
14 The majority opinion states that a circuit court "should 
explore alternatives or fully explain why some step short of 
revocation would not be adequate."  Majority op., ¶44.  At 
another point the majority opinion states, "When supervised 
release is revoked on the basis of the violation of a rule or 
condition of release, the court should explain its decision and 
square that decision with the treatment-oriented purposes of the 
law."  Majority op., ¶45.  In ordinary usage and dictionary 
definition the word "should" means "is obliged to" or "has a 
duty to."  Justice Crooks, however, does not read the word 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶85 I also conclude that alternatives to revocation must 
be considered when the State and circuit court are resting on 
the second ground of revocation, that is, that the safety of 
others requires revocation.  Inherent in a determination that 
the safety of others requires revocation is the determination 
that alternatives to revocation will not protect the safety of 
others.15  After a circuit court has considered the evidence and 
alternatives to revocation, the circuit court decides whether 
                                                                                                                                                             
"should" as used in the majority opinion to mean "must."  See 
Justice Crooks's concurrence, ¶1.   
 
Rather than force litigants and courts to guess at the 
meaning of the majority opinion's dicta regarding consideration 
of alternatives to revocation in rules violations cases, the 
majority opinion should state clearly that alternatives must be 
considered in rules violations cases or that alternatives need 
not be considered in rules violations cases but that such 
consideration of alternatives is good practice, or that it is 
not addressing the issue of alternatives in rules violations 
case because this case involves the second ground, public 
safety.  
 
The majority opinion's concluding paragraph appears to 
decide the due process issue for both grounds for revocation, 
stating broadly as follows: "As a general rule, sexually violent 
persons on supervised release under Chapter 980 are not entitled 
to a due process right to have the circuit court consider and 
reject alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised 
release."  Majority op., ¶75.  The majority opinion does not 
explain why this proposition is stated with the weasel words "as 
a general rule" and does not provide any hints about the 
exceptions to this general rule.    
 
15 The majority opinion makes this point clearly as follows: 
"We think it is self-evident, however, that when the court 
determines, on the evidence after a hearing, that 'the safety of 
others requires that supervised release be revoked,' the court 
has found that there is clear and convincing evidence that it 
has no alternative but to revoke to assure the safety of 
others."  Majority op., ¶40. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
3 
 
the safety of others requires revocation.  If the circuit court 
decides 
that 
the 
safety 
of 
others 
requires 
revocation, 
revocation is mandated by the statute. 
I 
¶86 I agree with the majority opinion that procedural due 
process protections apply in supervised release revocation 
proceedings under chapter 980.16  As the majority opinion 
acknowledges, due process requires at a minimum written notice 
of the claimed violations and disclosure of the evidence against 
the person.17  "There is no principle of due process more 
important or firmly established than notice of the specific 
charge so that the accused can make a defense."18  These basic 
procedural due process protections were not afforded Burris. 
¶87 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.06 
(2)(b) 
(1997-98)19 
is 
unequivocal in requiring that the State prove by clear and 
convincing evidence either that the rules or conditions of 
release had been violated or that the safety of others requires 
revocation.20  
¶88 The 
majority 
opinion 
explicitly 
recognizes 
the 
distinction between the two "predicates" of revocation, going so 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶22. 
17 Id., ¶24. 
18 In re Commitment of VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶15, 
247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236 (citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 
U.S. 196, 201 (1948)). 
19 This statute has been renumbered Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
(2001-02). 
20 Majority op., ¶68. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
4 
 
far as to declare that a circuit court has discretion to revoke 
if the first ground is charged (the statutory word "may" means 
"may") but is required to revoke if the second ground is charged 
(the statutory word "may" means "shall").21   
¶89 Due process requires the State to notify Burris under 
which ground (or grounds) it is proceeding so Burris may defend 
himself.  Furthermore, Burris and the circuit court must know 
under which ground (or grounds) the State is proceeding because 
each must know whether revocation is discretionary or mandatory 
with the circuit court.  
¶90 Burris had a list of 57 rules or conditions to follow.  
The State filed a petition (and two amendments thereto) alleging 
five violations22 of four rules or conditions.23  Two violations 
                                                 
21 Majority op., ¶¶46, 49. 
22 The State alleged the following violations: 
1. 
Burris obtained Viagra in violation of Rule 1. 
2. 
Burris did not sign a confidentiality release form for 
an agent to contact his physician in violation of Rule 1. 
3. 
Burris refused to provide his agent with a written 
statement in violation of Rules 1, 4 and 13. 
4. 
Burris involved himself in an intimate relationship 
and failed to notify his agent in violation of Rules 1, 4, and 
18. 
5. 
Burris possessed and consumed alcoholic beverages and 
offered them to another in violation of Rules 1 and 15a. 
23 The four rules Burris is alleged to have violated are as 
follows: 
Rule 1: You shall avoid all conduct that is a 
violation of federal or state statute, municipal or 
county ordinances or that is not in the best interest 
of the public's welfare or your rehabilitation. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
5 
 
were charged only as violations of the catch-all provision of 
Rule 1 that states that Burris shall avoid all conduct "that is 
not in the best interest of the public's welfare or your 
rehabilitation."  Each of the other alleged violations was 
charged as a violation of the catch-all provision of Rule 1, as 
well 
as 
another 
rule. 
 
Burris 
asserts 
Rule 
1 
is 
unconstitutionally vague.  Constitutional or not, I believe a 
circuit court should treat an allegation of a breach of this 
catch-all Rule 1 with a healthy dose of skepticism.  Any conduct 
of which the State does not approve falls within Rule 1, making 
it almost impossible for Burris to know how to conform his 
conduct to comply with the rules.   
¶91 The State has the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that a rule or condition has been violated. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).  The parties disputed each alleged 
rule violation.  The circuit court lumped the alleged violations 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rule 
4: 
You 
shall 
inform 
your 
agent 
of 
your 
whereabouts and activities as she/he directs. 
Rule 
13: 
You 
shall 
provide 
true 
and 
correct 
information orally and in writing in response to 
inquiries by the agent. 
Rule 15: The specific rules imposed at this time are: 
A. 
You shall not consume or possess alcohol, 
illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia. 
Rule 
18: 
You 
shall 
notify 
your 
agent 
of 
any 
involvement 
in 
an 
intimate 
relationship 
at 
its 
beginning and you shall introduce the person to your 
agent to disclose your past sexual offenses prior to 
engaging in any type of sexual activity with that 
person. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
6 
 
together as demonstrating a "course of deceitful conduct," 
making Burris dangerous, but did not necessarily make findings 
regarding whether Burris had violated each rule.  The majority 
opinion engages in serious overstatement when it characterizes 
the record as demonstrating that Burris engaged in "major 
transgressions."24  Hardly!25 
¶92 After all the testimony was presented regarding the 
rules violations (testimony was not offered relating to Burris's 
jeopardizing the safety of others), the circuit court asked the 
assistant district attorney whether the court was limited to 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶74. 
25 For example, the circuit court never found that Burris's 
conduct relating to Viagra was a rule violation.  Rather the 
circuit court found that Burris thought his conduct was a rule 
violation.  By the way, Burris never obtained any Viagra, nor 
did he ever obtain the prescription.  A prescription slip for 
the Viagra was delivered to the halfway house, and the director 
of the house authorized another staff member to deliver the slip 
to Burris, who refused it.   
No rule required Burris to voluntarily release confidential 
medical information.  
The violation repeatedly stated by the circuit court was 
Burris's failure to tell his agent.  For example, the circuit 
court said that Burris did not advise his agent of an "intimate 
relation."  The circuit court did not determine whether a 
consensual adult one-night sexual encounter was an intimate 
relationship.  Indeed the circuit court declared that Burris 
would benefit from a normal sexual relationship with an adult 
woman.  The circuit court stated that sex with a married woman 
violated the criminal adultery statute but then conceded that no 
one is prosecuted for adultery. 
Although there was testimony that Burris was seen drinking, 
there was also evidence that Burris had been given several 
random urine and breathalyzer tests; none showed any sign of 
alcoholic beverage consumption. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
7 
 
determining whether there was a rule violation or whether it 
could base its revocation decision on the second ground that 
public safety required revocation.  The assistant district 
attorney advised the circuit court to rule on either ground as 
it saw fit.  Defense counsel argued that the State had to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the rules violations 
occurred.   
¶93 The circuit court did not make express findings 
regarding each allegation of rules violations, as required.26  
The circuit court and the majority opinion improperly conflate 
the two grounds (referred to as "predicates" in the majority 
opinion) for revocation of supervised release:  rules violations 
and public safety.  The two are, however, related.  For example, 
a circuit court may find rule violations and conclude that these 
violations demonstrate that the safety of others requires that 
it exercise its discretion to revoke supervised release.27  In 
the present case, however, the circuit court did not so proceed.  
The circuit court "relied upon Burris's conduct itself, not the 
halfway house rules" in deciding to revoke.28     
 
¶94 When 
the 
State 
relies 
on 
allegations 
of 
rules 
violations, the second step the circuit court must take after 
determining whether any rule was violated is to determine 
whether the rules violations justify revocation of supervised 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶10. 
27 Id., ¶68 n.12. 
28 Id., ¶62. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
8 
 
release or whether some measures short of revocation satisfy 
rehabilitation and safety considerations.29     
¶95 Violation of a rule may be a permissible basis for 
revocation, but revocation does not necessarily or automatically 
follow the establishment of a violation.30  The circuit court did 
not, in this rules violation case, "explore alternatives or 
fully explain why some step short of revocation would not be 
adequate."31  The circuit court did not "explain its decision and 
square that decision with the treatment-oriented purposes of the 
law," including the purpose of controlling sexually violent 
persons "'in the least restrictive manner consistent with the 
requirements of the person.'  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b)."32       
¶96 Instead the circuit court ignored the alleged rules 
violations and ruled on the second ground, safety of others.  It 
reached this conclusion upon finding that "Mr. Burris has 
engaged in a deceitful course of conduct with his agent," that 
the facility in which Burris was placed "is not a proper 
facility for any person who is committed under a 980 placement," 
and that "his history makes him an extreme risk for harm to the 
public if there is not significantly more control exercised over 
his activities than have [sic] been exercised in the past."  
Although Burris' history is an important consideration, the 
                                                 
29 Id., ¶69. 
30 Id., ¶¶38, 69. 
31 Id., ¶44. 
32 Id., ¶45. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
9 
 
issue at this revocation hearing in which rules violations were 
alleged is whether the rules violations justified the conclusion 
that Burris should be returned to institutional care because he 
had become a higher risk to re-offend than when he was initially 
placed on supervised release.  
¶97 Burris came to court to defend against allegations 
that he violated the rules of his supervised release with the 
expectation that the circuit court could exercise its discretion 
to revoke supervised release.  The circuit court concluded that 
Burris's placement in the half-way house in which he was placed 
was not suitable for any chapter 980 person, but it made no 
attempt 
to 
explore 
whether 
any 
other 
supervised 
release 
placement was suitable for Burris, considering both public 
safety and rehabilitation.  Burris left court with the circuit 
court having found that public safety requires revocation of his 
supervised release and that revocation was, according to the 
majority opinion, mandated by statute.       
¶98 Thus Burris received notice that the State was 
proceeding on the basis of one ground for revocation of 
supervised release but was tried on the second ground for 
revocation of supervised release.  Yet Burris had no notice of 
the change of charges and had no opportunity to defend.  This 
failure to give Burris notice cannot be characterized as "a 
minor indiscretion" on the part of the State, as the majority 
opinion characterizes other problems in the record.33   
                                                 
33 Id., ¶62. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶99 Due process requires, at a minimum, written notice of 
the claimed violation and disclosure of the evidence against the 
person.  Burris received neither in regard to the claim that he 
was jeopardizing the safety of others.  The circuit court never 
made clear whether its ruling was a discretionary one or not, 
yet the majority opinion concludes that the circuit could not 
have exercised discretion.  Nor can this court exercise the 
circuit court's discretion on review; the record is not 
sufficient. 
¶100 The core of the process due Burris, the opportunity 
for a meaningful hearing on the alleged violation and the 
appropriate disposition, was not available to him.  The 
proceedings were arbitrary and fundamentally unfair.   
II 
¶101 The majority opinion concludes that supervised release 
must be revoked upon a circuit court's finding that the safety 
of others requires revocation of supervised release.34  That 
makes sense!   
¶102 The majority opinion fails, however, to explain how 
the State by clear and convincing evidence proved that the 
safety of others required revocation of Burris's supervised 
release.  The State offered no proof of how or why Burris's 
conduct justified the conclusion that he had become a higher 
risk to re-offend than he was when initially placed on 
supervised release.   
                                                 
34 Id., ¶¶71-74. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶103 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) does not explicitly 
articulate what a circuit court must consider in determining 
whether public safety requires a chapter 980 person to be 
institutionalized.35  I think it self-evident that to succeed in 
its petition for revocation of supervised release on the ground 
that public safety requires revocation, the State must make 
substantially the same proof as the statutes require the State 
to make when the State opposes a petition for supervised 
release.  In opposing such a petition, the State must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a 
sexually violent person and that it is substantially probable 
that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the 
person is not committed to institutional care.36  
¶104 Inherent in a determination that the safety of others 
requires revocation is the determination that alternatives to 
revocation will not protect the safety of others.  The majority 
opinion states this principle clearly:  "We think it is self-
evident, however, that when the court determines, on the 
evidence after a hearing, that 'the safety of others requires 
that supervised release be revoked,' the court has found that 
there is 
clear and convincing evidence that 
it has no 
alternative but to revoke to assure the safety of others.  Put 
another way, the court has found that the safety of others 
                                                 
35 See id., ¶40. 
36 See Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
12 
 
requires the person's commitment to a secure facility because 
supervised release will not be adequate."37     
¶105 It is only after a circuit court has considered the 
evidence relating to the chapter 980 individual's conduct and 
alternatives to revocation that the circuit court can decide 
that the safety of others requires revocation.  If the circuit 
court decides that the safety of others requires revocation, 
then revocation is, of course, mandated by the statute. 
¶106 The State did not prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that Burris was still a sexually violent person and 
that it was substantially probable that he would engage in acts 
of sexual violence unless he was committed to institutional 
care.  The circuit court's proclamation that Burris's conduct 
demonstrated that Burris suffered from "compulsive personality" 
and therefore public safety required revocation is unsupported 
in the record.  A "course of deceitful conduct," as found by the 
circuit court, may not be desirable behavior from a chapter 980 
individual, but it is certainly not clear and convincing proof 
that Burris is still a sexually violent person and that it is 
substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual 
violence if he is not committed to institutional care.  The 
State failed to offer any proof that no alternative to 
revocation would be sufficient to protect the public safety.  
Indeed the circuit court did not consider any alternative 
placements, even though the circuit court determined that the 
                                                 
37 Majority op., ¶40.  See also part III of this dissenting 
opinion. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
13 
 
placement in this half-way house was unsuitable for all chapter 
980 individuals. 
III 
¶107 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.06(2)(b) mandates that a circuit 
court must consider alternatives to revocation of supervised 
release in both grounds for revocation of supervised release.  
¶108 As to rules violations cases——I agree with Justice 
Crooks' concurrence that alternatives to revocation must be 
considered before a circuit court exercises its discretion to 
revoke 
supervised 
release 
in 
cases 
of 
rules 
violations. 
Revocation of a particular supervised release may be appropriate 
but another type of supervised release may also be appropriate 
considering the changing circumstances of the person and the 
needs of public safety.38  
¶109 As to the safety-of-others cases--alternatives to 
revocation must be considered before a court can make the 
predicate determination that the safety of others requires 
revocation.  A finding that public safety requires revocation by 
definition requires a finding that supervised release is 
inappropriate.  If a circuit court fails to consider whether the 
safety of others can be protected by some form of supervised 
release, a circuit court's ruling that revocation is required to 
protect the safety of others is not supported by the record.39   
¶110 The record in the present case demonstrates that the 
real basis for the circuit court's decision to revoke supervised 
                                                 
38 See majority op., ¶38. 
39 See ¶¶104-106, supra. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
14 
 
release was that placement in this half-way house was not 
suitable for any chapter 980 committee.  The clear inference 
from the record is that a different placement might have been 
satisfactory for Burris and for public safety.  But, as the 
circuit court was well aware, the State has had great difficulty 
in 
finding 
or 
establishing 
placements 
for 
chapter 
980 
individuals.40 
¶111 Furthermore, the legislative policy underlying chapter 
980 requires a circuit court to consider alternatives to 
revocation.   
¶112 "[T]he constitutionality of a Chapter 980 commitment 
hinges on treatment,"41 and the state must focus on appropriate 
treatment for chapter 980 individuals as well as protecting the 
public.  Without such a focus, our repeated exhortations that 
chapter 980 is constitutional as a "treatment-oriented statute"42 
are meaningless.   
¶113 Chapter 
980 
individuals 
are 
committed 
to 
the 
Department of Health and Family Services "for control, care and 
treatment"43 in the "least restrictive manner consistent with the 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., majority op., ¶5 n.5; State v. Morford, 2004 
WI 5, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349; State v. Keding, 2002 WI 
86, 254 Wis. 2d 334, 646 N.W.2d 375; State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 
81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 (Bradley, J., concurring); 
State v. Schulpius, 2004 WI App 39, ¶9, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 678 
N.W.2d 369. 
41 State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶38, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
42 Majority op., ¶35. 
43 See Wis. Stat. § 980.0(1). 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
15 
 
requirements of the person and in accordance with the court's 
commitment order."44  As Justice Crooks correctly points out, "to 
determine 
the 
least 
restrictive 
manner, 
it 
follows 
that 
alternatives 
to 
revocation 
must 
be 
considered 
and 
such 
consideration must be on the record for purposes of review."45  
¶114 Chapter 
980 
individuals 
are 
not 
prisoners, 
but 
patients of the state.46  As such, they are entitled to the same 
rights as patients under chapter 51, the Mental Health Act, 
including the right to "receive prompt and adequate treatment, 
rehabilitation and educational services appropriate for [their] 
condition."47 
¶115 The crux of chapter 980 is that commitment is not 
punishment but a measure for the protection of community and the 
treatment of chapter 980 individuals.48  Unless both of these 
objectives are given weight in dealing with chapter 980 
individuals, the state is doing nothing more than indefinitely 
warehousing chapter 980 individuals.  
¶116 In considering the needs of public safety and the 
treatment needs of the chapter 980 individual, a circuit court 
                                                 
44 See Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b). 
45 Concurring op., ¶3 
46 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 313, 541 N.W.2d 115, 126 
(1995). 
47 Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(f); Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 313-14.  
Patients are entitled to facilities that are "designed to make a 
positive contribution to the effective attainment of the 
treatment goals of the hospital."  Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(m); 
Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 314. 
48 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 313. 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
16 
 
must, under chapter 980, consider alternatives to revocation 
before revoking a particular supervised release under either 
grounds for revocation.  
¶117 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
No.  00-1425.ssa 
 
 
 
1