Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Mansour-Ismail

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. MANSOUR-ISMAIL. 
[Cite as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Mansour-Ismail (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 27.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Public reprimand — Communicating directly 
with adverse parties represented by counsel about the subject of the 
representation without their counsel’s consent. 
(No. 99-380 — Submitted April 14, 1999 — Decided June 16, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-16. 
 
On February 18, 1997, relator, Toledo Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging respondent, Linda Mansour-Ismail of Toledo, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0033929, with violating a Disciplinary Rule.  After respondent 
answered, the matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
Based on the stipulations, exhibits, and testimony, the panel found that 
Leslie and Darla Vanderhorst leased a home in Toledo from respondent’s father, 
Dr. N.A. Mansour.  In April 1996, respondent, on behalf of her father, filed a 
complaint in the Toledo Municipal Court against the Vanderhorsts, setting forth 
claims for forcible entry and detainer due to nonpayment of rent, and for past-due 
rent and other money damages. Respondent subsequently filed an amended 
complaint containing the same claims.  The Vanderhorsts were represented in the 
case by an attorney from the Toledo Legal Aid Society.  In May 1996, the claim 
for forcible entry and detainer was dismissed, and trial on the remaining claim for 
back rent and damages was continued for further proceedings. 
 
In June 1996, respondent filed a new complaint in municipal court for 
forcible entry and detainer, past-due rent, and other money damages, on behalf of 
her father and against the Vanderhorsts.  The claims in the new complaint were 
virtually identical to the claims in the previously continued case, and on the 
 
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municipal court’s designation form, respondent referred to the new complaint as a 
refiling rather than a new case. 
 
On June 24, 1996, Mr. Vanderhorst spoke to an attorney from the Toledo 
Legal Aid Society about him and his wife settling the cases themselves by meeting 
directly with Dr. Mansour. Despite the attorney’s advice against it, the 
Vanderhorsts met with Dr. Mansour.  Upon being called thereafter by her father, 
respondent met with the parties and they reached a settlement.  Respondent drafted 
a written settlement agreement, which was presented to the municipal court.  
Respondent did not contact the Toledo Legal Aid Society for the meeting, instead 
claiming to rely on her father and the Vanderhorsts’ representation that the 
Vanderhorsts were no longer represented by counsel.  However, according to the 
Vanderhorsts, they never advised respondent or Dr. Mansour that they were not 
represented by counsel on the claims being settled. 
 
The panel further found that respondent knew that the settlement agreement 
she drafted was intended to resolve the damages issues in the previously continued 
case in which the Vanderhorsts were represented by the Toledo Legal Aid Society, 
as well as in the new case.  Nevertheless, respondent never received permission 
from the Toledo Legal Aid Society to talk directly to the Vanderhorsts regarding 
Dr. Mansour’s claims.  The panel determined that because the claims in the two 
cases were virtually identical and the payments tendered to Dr. Mansour by the 
Vanderhorsts were intended to settle the damage issues in both cases, respondent 
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the Vanderhorsts were still 
represented by the Toledo Legal Aid Society when she met with them. 
 
The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct in meeting directly with the 
Vanderhorsts when she knew or should have known that they were represented by 
counsel violated DR 7-104(A)(1) (communicating on the subject of representation 
with a party known to be represented).  The panel recommended that respondent be 
 
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publicly reprimanded. The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
David M. Mohr and Guy T. Barone, for relator. 
 
James D. Caruso, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of 
the board.  Respondent violated DR 7-104(A)(1) by communicating directly with 
adverse parties represented by counsel about the subject of the representation 
without their counsel’s consent.  As in comparable cases involving a violation of 
DR 7-104(A)(1), a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction.  See Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. Rossi (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 195, 690 N.E.2d 501; Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. 
v. Makridis (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 73, 671 N.E.2d 31; Toledo Bar Assn. v. Savage 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 183, 657 N.E.2d 507.  Accordingly, respondent is hereby 
publicly reprimanded.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., not participating.