Title: Ari Miller v. Gina Mendez

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-2096
____________
ARI MILLER,
Petitioner,
vs.
GINA MENDEZ, et al.,
Respondents.
[December 20, 2001]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in
Miller v. Mendez, 767 So.  2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), which certified conflict
with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Miller v. Gross, 788 So. 2d
256 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 770 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2000), on the issue of
whether residence under the election laws refers to residence at the time of
qualifying or residence at the time of assuming office.  We have jurisdiction.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons, we approve the Third
1   Ari Miller is the husband of Terri-Ann Miller who, while a county court judge
in Dade County in 2000, decided to seek judicial office in Broward County for the
term beginning in January 2001.  A voter of Broward County sought a declaratory
judgment on the issue of Miller’s eligibility to run in Broward County while an active
judge in Dade County.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Miller v. Gross, 788
So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), found Miller was not qualified to run in Broward
because her legal residence was Dade County. 
2  Section 105.031(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: 
(b) All candidates for judicial office shall subscribe to an oath or
affirmation in writing to be filed with the appropriate qualifying officer
upon qualifying. A printed copy of the oath or affirmation shall be
furnished to the candidate by the qualifying officer and shall be in
substantially the following form:
State of Florida
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District’s decision in Miller v. Mendez, and disapprove the Fourth District’s
decision in Miller v. Gross.
Factual Background
On September 8, 2000, Ari Miller (Miller)1 sued Gina Mendez (Mendez), a
judicial candidate, Katherine Harris as Secretary of State, and David Leahy as
Supervisor of Elections of Miami-Dade County for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Miller alleged that Mendez was not a qualified candidate for the office of circuit
court judge for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in Miami-Dade County because she
was not a resident of Miami-Dade County on July 18, 2000, the date she filed her
oath of candidate.2  Miller argued that article V, section 8 of the Florida
County of  _____
Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths, personally
appeared   (please print name as you wish it to appear on the ballot)  , to me well
known, who, being sworn, says he or she: is a candidate for the judicial
office of______; that his or her legal residence is ______County,
Florida; that he or she is a qualified elector of the state and of the
territorial jurisdiction of the court to which he or she seeks election; that
he or she is qualified under the constitution and laws of Florida to hold
the judicial office to which he or she desires to be elected or in which he
or she desires to be retained; that he or she has taken the oath required
by ss. 876.05- 876.10, Florida Statutes; that he or she has qualified for
no other public office in the state, the term of which office or any part
thereof runs concurrent to the office he or she seeks; and that he or she
has resigned from any office which he or she is required to resign
pursuant to s. 99.012, Florida Statutes.
3   Article V, section 8, Florida Constitution states:
No person shall be eligible for office of justice or judge of any court
unless he is an elector of the state and resides in the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.
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Constitution3 and the recent decision of Miller v. Gross, 788 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000), require a candidate to be eligible at the time the oath of candidate is
filed. 
On September 26, 2000, the trial court entered a final judgment declaring that
Mendez was eligible to be a candidate for circuit court judge in the November 2000
election.  The trial court ruled that the eligibility requirements of article V, section 8
refer to eligibility at the time of assuming office, not at the time of qualification or
election to office.
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On September 27, 2000, Miller appealed to the Third District Court of
Appeal.  On October 5, 2000, the Third District affirmed and adopted the trial
court’s order in its entirety.  The Third District then certified conflict with Miller v.
Gross.  Mendez ultimately lost the November 7, 2000, election for Circuit Judge of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Division 25.
Discussion  
In adopting the order of the trial court in its entirety, the Third District of
necessity found that the residence requirement embodied in article V, section 8 of
the Florida Constitution refers to residence at the time of assuming office.  This
holding conflicts with the Fourth District’s holding in Miller v. Gross, where the
Fourth District found that the residence requirement refers to residence at the time
of qualifying or taking the oath of candidate.  We approve the conclusion reached
by the Third District that a candidate for judicial office must be a resident of the
territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time he or she assumes office. 
On July 18, 2000, Mendez signed an oath of candidate which indicated she
was a resident of Broward County, Florida, was a candidate for a judicial office in
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and was qualified to run for the position stated.  It is
undisputed that Mendez had not established residency in Miami-Dade County (the
territorial jurisdiction of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit) at the time she filed her oath
4   The constitutional amendment was voted on by the electorate on the same
1998 ballot as the election of some county judges.  Thus, the constitutional amendment
and the terms of office of county court judges elected on that ballot became effective
on the same date.
5 The issues dealt with in both of these advisory opinions, five-year membership
in the bar and extension of the term of county court judges to six years, were changes
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of candidate for judicial office there.  Mendez did not do so because she relied on a
letter from the Division of Elections dated July 18, 2000, which stated she would
only need to establish her residency in Miami-Dade County if she won, and by the
time her term of office began.  
The position taken by the Division of Elections is supported by a number of
advisory opinions from this Court to the Governor.  For example, in In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor – Terms of County Court Judges, 750 So. 2d 610 (Fla.
1999), this Court was asked the effect of the constitutional amendment extending
the term of county court judges from four years to six years4 on the terms of
county court judges elected in 1996 and 1998.  One question presented was
whether a judge’s right to a specific term of office accrued on the date of election
to office or the date of assuming office.  In determining that a judge’s right to a
specific term accrues on the date of assuming office, we relied in part on another
advisory opinion that addressed the eligibility requirement of five years membership
in The Florida Bar.5  In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 192 So. 2d 757,
that were approved by the electorate at the same time as the judge involved was elected
to office.
6  In Perez v. Marti, 770 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), Judge Sorondo,
specially concurring, called for the Legislature to adopt specific statutory language to
clarify residency requirements for political office.  The 2001 election reform package,
however, is silent on this topic.
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759 (Fla. 1966), we said the bar membership eligibility requirements “refer to
eligibility at the time of assuming office and not at the time of qualification or
election to office.”  See also Newman v. State, 602 So. 2d 1351, 1352 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1992).6
In addition to the advisory opinions from this Court, the Division of
Elections has also consistently advised candidates that eligibility requirements need
not be satisfied until the time of taking office.  See Division of Elections Opinion
78-31 (August 3, 1978); Division of Elections Opinion 92-10 (June 24, 1992).  The
Division of Elections gave the same advice to Mendez when she inquired as to the
deadline for meeting the residency requirement for judicial office.  The Division of
Elections’ advisory opinions are binding upon any person who seeks them.  See
§106.23(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Although an advisory opinion is not binding judicial
precedent, it is persuasive, and if the Division’s opinion is reasonable, it is given
great weight.  See Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Committee, 625 So. 2d
840 (Fla. 1993).  The Division’s interpretation of the residence requirement for
7   The oath requires the candidate to attest that “he or she is qualified under the
constitution and laws of Florida to hold the judicial office to which he or she desires
to be elected or in which he or she desires to be retained.”  § 105.031(4)(b), Fla. Stat.
(2000).
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judicial office as set forth in its letter opinion to Mendez is reasonable.  Because it
is reasonable and because it is consistent with our long-standing interpretation of
the eligibility requirements for judicial office as set forth in the Florida Constitution,
we will not deviate from the principle that article V, section 8 of the Florida
Constitution requires a candidate for judicial office meet the eligibility requirements
by the date the term of office begins.  This includes the requirement that the person
elected to judicial office be a resident of the territory that encompasses the
particular court.   
The Fourth District relied on the language in the oath of candidate itself in
support of its conclusion that the residency requirement must be met at the time the
oath of candidate is filed.  The Fourth District reasoned that the present tense used
in the oath means the candidate must be presently qualified, that is, qualified at the
time the oath is completed and filed.7  
Pursuant to section 105.031(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), all candidates for
judicial office must file an oath in substantially the following form:
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State of Florida
County of ______
Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths, personally
appeared  (please print name as you wish it to appear on the ballot) , to me well
known, who, being sworn, says he or she: is a candidate for the
judicial office of _______; that his or her legal residence is _____
County, Florida: that he or she is a qualified elector of the state and of
the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which he or she seeks
election; . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, the oath of candidate requires the person seeking judicial
office to give his or her present legal residence and to attest that he or she is an
elector of both the State and the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which he or
she seeks election.  In contrast, the Florida Constitution requires a candidate for
judicial office be an elector of the state and a resident of the territorial jurisdiction of
the court to which he or she is seeking office.  Thus, under the constitutional
provision a candidate for judicial office need only be a elector of the state and not
necessarily an elector of the territorial jurisdiction for which he or she is seeking
office.  The statutory requirement of filing an oath cannot impose additional
eligibility requirements for judicial office to those set out in the Florida Constitution. 
See State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1988).  Therefore, as the Florida
Constitution provides, a judicial candidate need only be an elector of the state.
However, as noted above, the Florida Constitution also contains a residency
requirement for judicial candidates.  We have on a previous occasion construed
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other eligibility requirements as referring to eligibility at the time of assuming office. 
See Newman; In re Advisory Opinion.  We see no reason to give a different
construction to the constitutional requirement concerning residency.  Thus, we
agree with the Division of Elections’ interpretation that residency in the territorial
jurisdiction of the court means residency at the time of assuming office.  Therefore,
in order to be eligible for judicial office, a candidate need only be an elector of the
state and a resident of the territorial jurisdiction of the court on the date that the
candidate assumes office.  If a candidate is elected and does not meet the residency
requirement by the date of assuming office, the office is deemed vacant and the
Governor may appoint someone to fill the vacancy.  See § 114.01, Fla. Stat.
(2001).     
The Third District’s decision in this case, which incorporated in full the trial
court’s order, was proper.  The Third District recognized the advisory opinions
from this Court as well as the letter opinions issued by the Division of Elections, all
of which interpret the language of article V, section 8 of the Florida Constitution to
mean that the residence requirement must be met on the day the term of office
begins.  The cases and opinions upon which the Third District relied herein are
reasonable and consistent with our own long-standing interpretation of other
constitutional requirements.  See generally Krivanek, 625 So. 2d at 840.  Therefore,
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we approve the decision of the Third District finding that a candidate for judicial
office must meet the eligibility requirements, including the residency requirement, on
the date of assuming office.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which HARDING, ANSTEAD, and
LEWIS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring.
While I concur that this Court’s previous opinions indicate the result reached
by the majority, were I writing on a clean slate, I would hold the residency
requirement to be at the time of filing.  I believe the intent of the Constitution is that
electors within the territorial jurisdiction should make a choice of candidates who at
the time of the election are living within that territory.  I believe it would be
beneficial for the Legislature to define this residency requirement.
HARDING, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D00-2746
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(Dade County)
Alex T. Barak, Hollywood, Florida; and Terri-Ann Miller, Aventura, Florida,
for Petitioner
Christopher D. Brown of Bilzin, Sumberg, Dunn, Baena, Price & Axelrod, LLP,
Miami, Florida, on behalf of Gina Mendez; and Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney
General, and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, on behalf of Katherine Harris, as Secretary of State, 
for Respondents