Title: State ex rel Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA12-444 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 31 December 2012 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Randolph County 
No. 08CRS056100 
BRANDI LEA GRAINGER, 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 4 
October 2011 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Superior Court, 
Randolph County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 
2012. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Mary Carla Hollis, for the State. 
 
Duncan B. McCormick, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
 
Defendant appeals judgment convicting her of first degree 
murder, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to provide 
the jury with an instruction for accessory before the fact of 
first degree murder.  For the following reasons, we remand for a 
new trial. 
I. 
Background 
-2- 
 
 
 
The State’s evidence tended to show that in 2008, Mr. 
Phillip 
Mabe, 
Mr. 
Dylan 
Boston, 
defendant’s 
mother, 
and 
defendant planned to murder defendant’s father.  On the day of 
the murder, defendant picked up Mr. Mabe and Mr. Boston and 
drove them to her father’s home.  Mr. Boston brought a gun, and 
defendant dropped both men off near the home where defendant’s 
father was located and drove away.  Defendant later told 
Detective Ed Blair of the Randolph County Sheriff’s Office that 
she drove to a Kmart after dropping Mr. Mabe and Mr. Boston off 
near her father’s home.1  Once inside the home, Mr. Mabe shot and 
killed defendant’s father.  Mr. Mabe and Mr. Boston then went 
through a lock box and took a few items to make it appear that a 
robber had killed defendant’s father; they then left in 
defendant’s father’s car.  Mr. Boston called defendant, and she 
met them in a Food Lion parking lot a minute or two after they 
arrived.2 
                     
1  We have not found nor has the State directed our attention to, 
any evidence in the record of the distance from defendant’s 
father’s house to Kmart. 
 
2  We have not found nor has the State directed our attention to, 
any evidence in the record of the distance from defendant’s 
father’s house to Food Lion.  We realize that the trial judge 
and jurors in Randolph County may have been familiar with the 
locations of the local Kmart and Food Lion, but we cannot 
discern these distances, even by judicial notice, without 
evidence of the miles between locations, addresses or travel 
-3- 
 
 
 
Defendant was indicted for first degree murder.  During 
defendant’s 
trial, 
defendant 
requested 
that 
the 
jury 
be 
instructed on accessory before the fact of first degree murder; 
the trial court denied defendant’s request.  The jury found 
defendant guilty of first degree murder.  Defendant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  Defendant 
appeals. 
II. Requested Jury Instruction 
 
Defendant’s only contention on appeal is that 
the court erred by refusing to instruct the 
jury on the lesser included offense of 
accessory before the fact to first degree 
murder where the jury could have concluded 
that . . . [defendant] was an accessory and 
that her conviction was solely based on the 
uncorroborated testimony of Dylan Boston. 
 
Defendant requested that an accessory before the fact to first 
degree murder instruction be given, and the trial court declined 
to give it. “We review the trial court’s denial of the request 
for an instruction on the lesser included offense de novo.”  
State v. Laurean, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 724 S.E.2d 657, 660, 
disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, ___ N.C. ___, 731 
S.E.2d 416 (2012). 
A. 
Failure to Provide Requested Jury Instruction Was Error 
 
                                                                  
time between locations. 
-4- 
 
 
 
In State v. Willis, the defendant appealed and made the 
same argument as defendant here assigning error 
to the failure of the court to submit to the 
jury as a possible verdict accessory before 
the fact of murder. . . . 
 
. . . .  
[The defendant] contend[ed] that there was 
evidence from which the jury could find she 
was an accessory before the fact of first 
degree murder and the evidence against her 
consisted of the uncorroborated testimony of 
principals or accessories. If the jury had 
so found, she would have escaped the death 
penalty. 
 
332 N.C. 151, 176, 420 S.E.2d 158, 170 (1992).   
 
Our Supreme Court stated,  
N.C.G.S. § 14–5.2 provides: 
 
All 
distinctions 
between 
accessories before the fact and 
principals to the commission of a 
felony are abolished. Every person 
who heretofore would have been 
guilty as an accessory before the 
fact to any felony shall be guilty 
and punishable as a principal to 
that felony.  However, if a person 
who heretofore would have been 
guilty 
and 
punishable 
as 
an 
accessory 
before 
the 
fact 
is 
convicted of a capital felony, and 
the jury finds that his conviction 
was 
based 
solely 
on 
the 
uncorroborated testimony of one or 
more 
principals, 
coconspirators, 
or accessories to the crime, he 
shall be guilty of a Class B 
felony. 
 
. . . .  
 
An accessory before the fact 
-5- 
 
 
is one who is absent from the 
scene when the crime was committed 
but 
who 
participated 
in 
the 
planning or contemplation of the 
crime in such a way as to counsel, 
procure, 
or 
command 
the 
principal(s) to commit it.  Thus, 
the primary distinction between a 
principal in the second degree and 
an accessory before the fact is 
that the latter was not actually 
or constructively present when the 
crime was in fact committed. 
The crime of accessory before the fact to 
first degree murder is a lesser included 
offense of first degree murder. If there is 
evidence showing the commission of a lesser 
included offense, the judge must instruct on 
this offense.  If all the evidence shows the 
commission of the greater offense, the court 
should not charge on the lesser included 
offense simply because the jury might not 
believe some of the evidence. 
 
In this case, all the evidence showed 
that 
when 
the 
killing 
occurred, 
the 
defendant Cox was on the front porch of her 
house within sight of the killing, which was 
done at the end of her driveway.  If the 
jury believed this evidence, it would have 
to find the defendant Cox was at least 
constructively present as we have defined 
it.  It was not error to decline to submit 
accessory before the fact as a lesser 
included offense. This assignment of error 
is overruled. 
 
Id. at 176-77, 420 S.E.2d at 170 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Here, the State has not directed our attention to any 
evidence which indicates defendant was actually present during 
-6- 
 
 
the commission of the crime; the evidence indicated that 
defendant dropped Mr. Boston and Mr. Mabe off near her father’s 
home and then met them again after the murder was completed and 
the men had left the crime scene.  The evidence does not reveal 
the actual distance between the murder scene and the Kmart, 
where defendant claimed she waited during the murder, or the 
location of the Food Lion, where defendant met Mr. Boston and 
Mr. Mabe after the murder.  The evidence shows that Mr. Boston 
and Mr. Mabe drove defendant’s father’s car from the crime scene 
to Food Lion and indicates that it took at least a few minutes 
to drive between these two locations; the evidence further shows 
that it took defendant a minute or two longer to arrive at the 
Kmart parking lot than it did Mr. Mabe and Mr. Boston. Thus, 
considering all this evidence, even in the light most favorable 
to the State, it appears that the murder scene was not 
immediately adjacent to either Kmart or Food Lion. Thus, we must 
consider whether defendant was constructively present while her 
father was being murdered.  “A person is constructively present 
during the commission of a crime if he or she is close enough to 
be able to render assistance if needed and to encourage the 
actual perpetration of the crime.”  Id. at 175, 420 S.E.2d at 
169. 
-7- 
 
 
 
The State contends that the evidence shows defendant was 
constructively present during the commission of the crime and 
directs this Court’s attention to cases in which constructive 
presence was found on the part of the defendant; however, in all 
of these cases there was evidence the defendant actually 
remained near the crime scene with the purpose of rendering aid.  
See State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 156-59, 184 S.E.2d 866, 868-69 
(1971) (noting that the defendant waited by the corner of the 
store where a man was robbed in order to pick up the robbers and 
stating, “The remaining question is whether the evidence is 
sufficient to show that the defendant was a perpetrator of it. 
One who procures or commands another to commit a felony, 
accompanies the actual perpetrator to the vicinity of the 
offense and, with the knowledge of the actual perpetrator, 
remains in that vicinity for the purpose of aiding and abetting 
in the offense and sufficiently close to the scene of the 
offense to render aid in its commission, if needed, or to 
provide a means by which the actual perpetrator may get away 
from the scene upon the completion of the offense, is a 
principal in the second degree and equally liable with the 
actual perpetrator.  By its express terms G.S. § 14-87 extends 
to one who aids and abets in an attempt to commit armed robbery. 
-8- 
 
 
The State’s evidence, considered as above stated, is ample to 
support a finding by a jury that the defendant so participated 
in the attempt to rob Lowery.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)); State v. Pryor, 59 N.C. App. 1, 9, 295 S.E.2d 610, 
616 (1982) (“The State’s evidence was sufficient for the jury to 
find that the defendant dropped the perpetrators off, waited in 
the vicinity, was in a position to aid them by providing the 
get-away 
car, 
and 
that 
this 
aid 
constituted 
knowing 
encouragement to the commission of the armed robbery.” (emphasis 
added) (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Gregory, 37 N.C. 
App. 693, 695, 247 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1978) (“The evidence shows 
that the three planned the crime, drove to the scene in 
defendant’s car, and defendant remained waiting in the area.  
Newsome testified that ‘John (defendant) would drive his car 
there for the pickup.  When we went out of the theater, we 
proceeded to walk across the street to the parking deck.  We got 
to the parking deck and then turned and walked up towards 
Oberlin Road.  As we neared Oberlin Road, I saw John's car.  
John pulled out to meet us.’” (emphasis added) (ellipses and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Here, 
the 
evidence 
showed 
that 
defendant’s 
possible 
criminal actions occurred before the commission of the murder 
-9- 
 
 
and after Mr. Mabe and Mr. Boston had committed the murder and 
had already safely left the crime scene.  None of the evidence 
mentioned by the State shows that defendant remained “close 
enough to be able to render assistance if needed[.]”  Willis, 
332 N.C. at 175, 420 S.E.2d at 169.  Instead, this case is more 
akin to State v. Wiggins, wherein 
 
[t]he evidence . . . show[ed] that 
defendant was not actually present during 
the perpetration of the robbery but was in a 
house ten to fifteen blocks away. However, 
the actual distance of a person from the 
place where a crime is perpetrated is not 
always material in determining whether the 
person is constructively present. See for 
instance, State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900, 
10 S.E. 519, where defendant was 150 yards 
from the scene, armed with a rifle which 
would be fatal at that distance, with intent 
to use it to back up his brother, the 
perpetrator, if required. A guard who has 
been posted to give warning, or the driver 
of a get-away car, may be constructively 
present at the scene of a crime although 
stationed a convenient distance away.  One 
who procures or commands another to commit a 
felony, accompanies the actual perpetrator 
to the vicinity of the offense and, with the 
knowledge of the actual perpetrator, remains 
in that vicinity for the purpose of aiding 
and abetting in the offense and sufficiently 
close to the scene of the offense to render 
aid in its commission, if needed, or to 
provide 
a 
means 
by 
which 
the 
actual 
perpetrator may get away from the scene upon 
the 
completion 
of 
the 
offense, 
is 
a 
principal in the second degree and equally 
liable with the actual perpetrator.  A 
person 
is 
deemed 
to 
be 
constructively 
-10- 
 
 
present if he is near enough to render 
assistance if need be and to encourage the 
actual perpetration of the felony.  
 
There is no evidence in the record 
which would support a finding that at the 
time the robbery was committed, defendant 
was situated where he could give Anderson 
any advice, counsel, aid, encouragement or 
comfort, 
if 
needed, 
while 
Anderson 
was 
perpetrating the robbery. Thus, defendant 
was 
neither 
actually 
nor 
constructively 
present at the time, and he could be guilty, 
at most, of being an accessory before the 
fact. An accessory before the fact is one 
who meets every requirement of a principal 
in the second degree except that of presence 
at the time.  The evidence here would 
support a conviction for an accessory before 
the fact to armed robbery. 
 
16 N.C. App. 527, 530-31, 192 S.E.2d 680, 682-83 (1972) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Here, 
there 
was 
no 
evidence 
that 
defendant 
was 
constructively present and thus “close enough to be able to 
render assistance if needed and to encourage the actual 
perpetration of the crime.”  Willis, 332 N.C. at 175, 420 S.E.2d 
at 169.  Without evidence of defendant’s actual or constructive 
presence at the scene of the crime during the time her father 
was being murdered, the evidence against defendant showed only 
that she was “[a]n accessory before the fact . . . [in that she 
was] absent from the scene when the crime was committed but . . 
. participated in the planning or contemplation of the crime in 
-11- 
 
 
such a way as to counsel, procure, or command the principal(s) 
to commit it.”  Id. at 176, 420 S.E.2d at 170.  Accordingly, the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on accessory 
before the fact to first degree murder.  See Wiggins, 16 N.C. 
App. at 531, 192 S.E.2d at 682-83. 
B. 
Failure 
to 
Provide 
Requested 
Jury 
Instruction 
Was 
 
Prejudicial 
 
 
Citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2, defendant contends that 
the trial court’s error in failing to properly instruct the jury 
resulted in prejudice as with a proper instruction she may have 
only been sentenced to a class B2 felony rather than a class A 
felony.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2 provides, 
 
All distinctions between accessories 
before the fact and principals to the 
commission of a felony are abolished. Every 
person who heretofore would have been guilty 
as an accessory before the fact to any 
felony shall be guilty and punishable as a 
principal to that felony. However, if a 
person who heretofore would have been guilty 
and punishable as an accessory before the 
fact is convicted of a capital felony, and 
the jury finds that his conviction was based 
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of 
one or more principals, coconspirators, or 
accessories to the crime, he shall be guilty 
of a Class B2 felony. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2 (2007) (emphasis added).  The State 
contends that any error on the part of the trial court in the 
jury instructions was not prejudicial as the State presented 
-12- 
 
 
overwhelming evidence of first degree murder and the second 
sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2 is not applicable to 
defendant. 
1. 
Capital Felony 
 
The first requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2 for 
defendant to have the potential of being sentenced to a Class B2 
felony is that she was “convicted of a capital felony[.]”  Id.  
Defendant was not tried capitally; however, defendant was 
convicted of first degree murder, “a capital felony[.]”  N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2; see State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 631-
32, 536 S.E.2d 36, 58-59 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997, 149 
L.Ed. 2d 641 (2001).  Our Supreme Court has determined that the 
designation of “a capital felony” depends upon the fact that the 
death penalty is a potential punishment for the crime; even if a 
defendant is not tried capitally, first degree murder is still 
“a capital felony[.]”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2; Cummings, 352 
N.C. at 631-32, 536 S.E.2d at 58-59.  In Cummings, our Supreme 
Court addressed this issue: 
Defendant argues, therefore, that since he 
was not eligible for the death penalty by 
virtue of his plea, he was not convicted of 
a capital felony . . . .  We disagree. . . . 
 
. . . In defining a capital felony, it 
is 
necessary 
to 
interpolate 
definitions 
outlined in two different statutes. Section 
14-17 of our General Statutes provides that 
-13- 
 
 
a murder which shall be perpetrated by means 
of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, 
starving, torture, or by any other kind of 
willful, 
deliberate, 
and 
premeditated 
killing shall be deemed to be murder in the 
first degree, a Class A felony, and any 
person who commits such murder shall be 
punished with death or imprisonment in the 
State’s prison for life without parole as 
the court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 
15A-2000.  Section 15A-2000(a)(1) defines a 
capital 
felony 
as 
one 
which 
may 
be 
punishable by death.  Reading these two 
sections together, there is no question that 
first-degree murder is a capital felony, and 
that the test is not the punishment which is 
imposed, but that which may be imposed. . . 
.  
 
. . . A crime which is statutorily 
considered a capital felony maintains that 
status even if a defendant’s case is not 
tried as a capital case.  It is enough that 
if a defendant was tried capitally and 
convicted, he could have received a death 
sentence.  Therefore, although defendant 
pled guilty to first-degree murder and, 
under the now repealed N.C.G.S. § 15-162.1, 
his case was not a capital case, the crime 
of first-degree murder was still a capital 
felony. 
 
352 N.C. at 631-32, 536 S.E.2d at 58-59 (citations, quotation 
marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 14-17 (2007) (“[M]urder in the first degree [is] a Class A 
felony, and any person who commits such murder shall be punished 
with death or imprisonment[.]”); 15A-2000(a)(1) (2007) (“A 
capital felony is one which may be punishable by death.”) 
 
-14- 
 
 
Defendant was therefore “convicted of a capital felony.” 
2. 
Uncorroborated Testimony 
 
Defendant argues that Mr. Boston’s “testimony was critical 
to the first degree murder conviction.  He testified that the 
plan was to kill the father and that he and [Mr. Mabe] went to 
the home to kill the father and for no other reason.  
[Defendant] denied any such intent.”  Defendant contends that 
she was convicted based upon the “uncorroborated testimony” of a 
principal.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2.  The State argues, and we 
agree, that the record before us includes ample evidence 
corroborating the testimony of Mr. Boston.  Other witnesses and 
evidence such as surveillance cameras corroborated various 
significant aspects of Mr. Boston’s testimony.  Yet this Court 
cannot determine that “the jury” did or did not “base[]” 
defendant’s 
“conviction” 
“solely 
on 
the 
uncorroborated 
testimony” of Mr. Boston.  Id. 
 
The language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2 requires that “the 
jury” determine whether the “conviction was based solely on the 
uncorroborated 
testimony 
of 
one 
or 
more 
principals, 
coconspirators, or accessories to the crime[.]”  Id.  As the 
standard jury instruction in North Carolina Pattern Instruction 
– Criminal (“N.C.P.I.”) 101.15 states, the jury is “the sole 
-15- 
 
 
judge[] of the believability of (a) witness(es).  [It] must 
decide for [itself] whether to believe the testimony of any 
witness.  [It] may believe all, any part, or none of a witness’s 
testimony.”  N.C.P.I.-Crim. 101.15.  N.C.P.I. 101.20 provides 
that the jurors are “the sole judges of the weight to be given 
any evidence.”  N.C.P.I.-Crim. 101.20.  Accordingly, the jury 
itself must determine the credibility and weight of all of the 
evidence.  See N.C.P.I.-Crim. 101.15, .20.  Only the jury knows 
the evidence upon which it “base[d]” its verdict.  See N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-5.2.  Thus, the jury itself must determine whether 
the testimony of “principals, coconspirators, or accessories to 
the crime” is corroborated so that the trial court may properly 
sentence a defendant of a class A or a class B2 felony.  See 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2.  Failure to submit this issue to the 
jury results in prejudicial error as there is no record of 
whether the jury viewed the testimony of the “principals, 
coconspirators, or accessories to the crime” as uncorroborated.  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5.2; see State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 
173, 456 S.E.2d 789, 818 (1995) (“In the instant case, the trial 
court failed to submit the special question to the jury 
regarding the basis of its verdict. Therefore, there is no 
record as to whether the jury based its decision solely on the 
-16- 
 
 
uncorroborated 
testimony 
of 
McMillian 
or 
considered 
the 
corroborating 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
as 
well. 
This 
constitutes error on the part of the trial court.” (quotation 
marks omitted))3. 
Defendant was prejudiced as the proper instruction to the 
                     
3  We note that the Court in Larrimore concluded that the 
defendant was not prejudiced due to the failure of the trial 
court “to submit the special question to the jury regarding the 
basis of its verdict” because the sentencing structure at the 
time would result in a sentence of life imprisonment for both 
class A and class B felonies; however, the Court specifically 
noted that its holding was limited to convictions before 1994 as 
the new sentencing structure would result in different sentences 
for class A and class B felonies. See Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 
173, 456 S.E.2d at 818-19 (“In the instant case, as in Tucker, 
were we to send this matter back to the trial court for 
resentencing as a Class B felony, the outcome in terms of 
sentence would be no different. N.C.G.S. § 15A–1371(a1) provides 
that a prisoner serving a term of life imprisonment with no 
minimum term is eligible for parole after serving 20 years.  No 
distinction is made between a Class A life sentence and a Class 
B life sentence either in sentencing or in the manner in which 
the Department of Correction handles an individual.  Throughout 
the General Statutes regarding parole and other sentence 
reducing considerations, Class A and Class B are consistently 
grouped together, as opposed to Class C and lower felonies.  For 
the aforementioned reasons, we do not find that the defendant 
has been prejudiced by the trial court’s error. We note, 
however, that this holding is limited to cases tried on or 
before 1 October 1994, as the new sentencing guidelines 
effective that date create marked distinctions between Class A 
and Class B felonies.” (citations, quotation marks, and brackets 
omitted)).  Pursuant to  North Carolina General Statute  § 15A-
1340.17 
class 
A 
felonies 
subject 
a 
criminal 
to 
“[l]ife 
[i]mprisonment [w]ithout parole or [d]eath as [e]stablished by 
[s]tatute” whereas class B2 felonies subject a criminal to a 
specific number of months of imprisonment.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
15A-1340.17 (2007). 
 
-17- 
 
 
jury would have been accompanied by “the special question to the 
jury regarding the basis of its verdict” which in turn would 
have determined whether defendant should have been sentenced to 
a class A or class B felony.  Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 173, 456 
S.E.2d at 818; see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1443 (2007) (“A 
defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising 
other than under the Constitution of the United States when 
there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in 
question not been committed, a different result would have been 
reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.”), 14-5.2; 
see also N.C.P.I.-Crim. 202.30.  Accordingly, defendant must 
receive a new trial. 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we remand for a new trial. 
 
NEW TRIAL. 
 
Judge ELMORE concurs. 
 
Judge BEASLEY concurred prior to 17 December 2012.