Title: Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co.1996 WY 173929 P.2d 535Case Number: 95-62Decided: 12/30/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v. 

REPUBLIC INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION, 
a Wyoming corporation,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF AMERICA, a North Carolina corporation, formerly Royal Globe Insurance 
Company; and Safeguard Insurance Company, a Connecticut corporation, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District of 
Wyoming, Alan B. Johnson, J.

John B. "Jack" 
Speight, Robert T. McCue, and Dominique D.Y. Cone of Hathaway, Speight & 
Kunz, Cheyenne, Jack E. Stanfield of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, 
Robert N. Sayler of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., Brent Manning of 
Holme, Roberts & Owen, Salt Lake City, UT, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Attorney General; and Keith Burron, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, for Amicus Curiae State of Wyoming (in 
support of Appellant).

J. Kent Rutledge 
and Loyd E. Smith of Lathrop & Rutledge, Cheyenne, Charles K. O'Neill, James 
C. LaForge, and Timothy M. Hughes of Chadbourne & Parke, New York City, 
for Appellee Republic Insurance Company.

Thomas A. 
Nicholas of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Donald T. McMillan and Christopher 
A. Crevasse of Rivkin, Radler & Kremer, Santa Rosa, CA, for Appellees 
Royal Insurance Company of America and Safeguard Insurance 
Company.

Jon T. Dyre of 
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich Billings, MT, for Amicus Curiae 
Insurance Environmental Litigation Association (in support of Appellees). 
Of Counsel: Laura A. Foggan, Daniel E. Troy, and Edward J. Grass of Wiley, Rein 
& Fielding, Washington, D.C.

Gregory C. 
Dyekman of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, Edward Zampino and Peter 
E. Mueller of Harwood Lloyd, Hackensack, NJ, for Amicus Curiae The Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Company (in support of Appellees).

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., THOMAS, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, JJ., and KAUTZ, District 
Judge.

* Chief Justice at the 
time of oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The issues in 
this case come before the court as certified questions from the United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming. The court is called to furnish a 
definitive legal connotation to phrases in exclusions clauses of commercial 
insurance policies that preserve coverage for "sudden and accidental" discharges 
of pollutants. Our study of the problem persuades us that these words are not 
ambiguous, and as used in these policies, the phrases encompass a temporal 
aspect that must coincide with an accidental occurrence to the end that such a 
discharge must be caused by an abrupt and unforeseen event that occurs 
unexpectedly, without notice, or with very brief notice. The certified questions 
are answered more definitively in the body of this opinion, and the case is 
returned to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming for 
such further proceedings as it may deem appropriate.

[¶2]      The questions 
that were certified to this court, pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-13-104 through 107 
(1988)1 are:

1.         
Whether, in the commercial insurance policies at issue, the language of 
the exclusion clauses that preserve coverage for "sudden and accidental" 
discharges of pollutants applies to gradual and unintentional discharges of 
pollutants. In other words, whether "sudden" has a temporal meaning;

2.         
Whether the undefined phrase "sudden and accidental" is ambiguous in the 
context of the exclusion clauses in the commercial policies at 
issue.

[¶3]      The parties and 
those filing briefs as amicus curiae were faithful to these statements of 
the questions certified when setting forth the issues presented for review. In 
the plethora of materials that were filed with this court, however, they were 
not disciplined with respect to the requirements of our certification rules in 
articulating their respective statements of the facts. We emphasize the language 
of WYO. R. APP. P. 11.03 (emphasis added):

A certification order 
shall set forth:

(a) The questions of law 
to be answered;

(b) A statement of all 
facts relevant to the questions certified;

(c) The nature of the 
controversy in which the questions arose; and

(d) A designation of the 
party or parties who will be the appellant(s), i.e. the party holding the 
affirmative, in the appellate court.

[¶4]      This court has 
the opportunity to expand upon the "statement of all facts relevant to the 
questions certified" by invoking WYO. R. APP. P. 11.04, which provides in 
pertinent part:

The reviewing court may 
require the original or copies of all, or of any portion of the record before 
the certifying court, to be filed under the certification order, if, in the 
opinion of the reviewing court, the record or any portion may be necessary in 
answering the questions.

We did not, 
however, avail ourselves of that opportunity. Consequently we rely exclusively 
upon the Certification Order from the United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming to the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming, which set 
forth these facts:

Statement of 
Facts

This declaratory judgment 
action involves the question of insurance coverage for alleged pollution 
contamination damages under insurance policies issued by the defendants. The 
policies all covered the LARCO refinery operation. The refinery is located near 
Casper, Wyoming and is currently operated by Sinclair. Various entities have 
made claims against Sinclair based upon allegations the refinery operations 
resulted in pollution contamination.

Sinclair has generally 
contested the contamination claims by disputing the existence, extent, cause, 
and timing of the alleged pollution contamination. However, it has settled with 
at least one group of claimants.

Defendants Royal 
Insurance Company and Safeguard Insurance Company issued general liability 
policies. Defendant Republic issued excess umbrella liability policies. 
Republic's umbrella liability policies were excess to primary liability coverage 
provided by a nonparty to these cases. Republic's umbrella policies cover 
different years than do the Royal and Safeguard general liability 
policies.

The Republic policies all 
provide:

1.         
COVERAGES: To indemnify the Insured for all sums which the insured shall 
be obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law or 
liability assumed by him under contract or agreement for damages, and expenses, 
all as included in the definition of "ultimate net loss" because of

(a) personal 
injury,

(b) property 
damage,

(c) advertising 
liability

as defined herein and 
caused by or arising out of an occurrence anywhere in the world.

The Republic policies all 
define "occurrence" as:

(a) an accident, or (b) 
an event, or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results during 
the policy period, in personal injury, property damage, or advertising liability 
(either alone or in combination) neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured. 

Two of the three Republic 
policies contain the following exclusion:

It is agreed that this 
policy does not apply to liability for personal injury or property damage 
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, escape or seepage of smoke, 
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste 
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the 
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water, unless such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.

The third Republic policy 
contains the following exclusion:

It is understood and 
agreed that this policy does not apply to liability for personal injury or 
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, oil, petroleum substance or 
derivative, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other 
irritants, contaminants or pollutants. This exclusion does not apply to the 
pollution of the land or atmosphere if such discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape is sudden and accidental.

It is further understood 
and agreed as respects the discharge, dispersal, release, escape or seepage of 
smoke, soot, vapors, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, 
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon any 
non-navigable body of water or watercourse from the operation of an oil or gas 
pipeline by the Named Insured this policy shall apply as is [sic] such 
discharge, dispersal, release, escape or seepage had emanated into or upon land 
or the atmosphere. This clause shall apply only if such discharge, dispersal, 
release, escape or seepage is sudden or accidental.

The Royal and Safeguard 
policies provide:

The company will pay on 
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of

Coverage A, bodily injury 
or

Coverage B, property 
damage

to which this insurance 
applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty 
to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily 
injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false or fraudulent . . .

The Royal and Safeguard 
policies define "occurrence" as:

An accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or 
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.

The Royal and Safeguard 
policies contain the following exclusion:

This insurance does not 
apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, 
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse 
or body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.

The Parties' 
Contentions

The parties dispute the 
meaning and effect of the definition of "occurrence" and whether the term 
"sudden and accidental" is ambiguous.

Plaintiff contends: (1) 
under the definition of "occurrence," bodily injury or property damage which is 
the result of unintentional contamination is covered even if the alleged 
contamination occurs gradually; and, (2) the term "sudden and accidental" is 
ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor of the insured. Plaintiff 
contends the term is ambiguous because although sudden can mean "abrupt" or 
"happening quickly" it can also mean "unexpected."

Defendants contend that 
under the exclusion provisions there is no coverage for damages caused by the 
gradual discharge of pollutants. Defendants contend: (1) the word "sudden" in 
the policies' exclusion clauses is not ambiguous; (2) under its plain meaning 
sudden can not include gradual contaminant discharges; and, (3) sudden 
incorporates a temporal element.

The above certified 
questions are determinative of plaintiff's claim before this court that the 
policies provide coverage for the pollution contaminant claims against 
it.

[¶5]      The contentions 
of the parties are consistent in our court. They engage directly our 
jurisprudential rules relating to the construction and interpretation of 
contracts of insurance. Our precedent in Wyoming establishes that an insurance 
contract is to be examined in fashion similar to any other contract. If the 
language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties are presumed to 
have intended the usual definitions attaching to their language in arriving at 
their contractual relationship. Such a contract will be enforced according to 
its terms, and we make no endeavor to rewrite such a contract for the 
parties.

[¶6]      The most 
frequently cited and quoted articulation of our rules of construction is found 
in McKay v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 421 P.2d 166, 168 (Wyo. 1966), 
where we said:

It is plaintiff's 
position [McKay] that the printed words "any employer" contained in the 
deduction clause of defendant's policy set forth above create an ambiguity, 
which according to well-recognized rules of construction applicable to insurance 
contracts establish fundamental error in the proceedings below. He relies 
primarily upon a general principle recognized by this court in Wilson v. Hawkeye 
Casualty Co., 67 Wyo. 141, 215 P.2d 867 [(1950)], that where such contracts are 
so drawn as to be ambiguous and uncertain and to require construction, the 
contract will be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly 
against the insurer. Also, if the contract is fairly susceptible of two 
constructions, the one favorable to the insured will be adopted; and this in 
essence is the premise of plaintiff's argument inasmuch as it is suggested that 
the words "any employer" may be taken to mean what defendant here says they 
mean, and that is any employer of plaintiff and his dependents, or as any 
employer of the plaintiff alone. Furthermore, says plaintiff, the latter is the 
most reasonable interpretation. The rule, that the language of the policy is to 
be tested by what a reasonable insured would understand the meaning of the 
language employed to be, is also advanced.

It is true that in the 
Wilson case we took cognizance of the foregoing general principles of 
construction often stated and applied in controversies involving policies of 
insurance. However, we also took cognizance of other equally applicable general 
principles and have before and since added to that body of the law. Thus, in 
essence and in addition to the tenets advanced by plaintiff, we have said-except 
where otherwise indicated-that the parties have the right to employ whatever 
lawful terms they wish and courts will not rewrite them. Alm v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Company, Wyo., 369 P.2d 216, 217. In other words, the terms must not 
conflict with pertinent statutes or public policy. Such contracts should not be 
so strictly construed as to thwart the general object of the insurance. Miles v. 
Continental Casualty Company, Wyo., 386 P.2d 720, 722 [(1963)]. To this should 
be added the concept that the words used will be given their common and ordinary 
meaning. 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 7402 (1943). The 
intention of the parties is the primary consideration and is to be ascertained, 
if possible, from the language employed in the policy, viewed in the light of 
what the parties must reasonably have intended. Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 
supra, 215 P.2d  at 873-875. Absent ambiguity, there is no room for construction 
and the policy will be enforced according to its terms. Addison v. Aetna Life 
Insurance Company, Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 [(1961)]. Neither will the language 
be `tortured' in order to create an ambiguity. Malanga v. Royal Indemnity 
Company, 4 Ariz. App. 150, 418 P.2d 396, 399, 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice, Sec. 7384 (1943).

 

[¶7]      A reordered and 
restated version of these same principles is found in Commercial Union Ins. Co. 
v. Stamper, 732 P.2d 534, 539 (Wyo. 1987):

Basic tenets stated in 
McKay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, supra, 421 P.2d  
at 168, and applied in controversies involving insurance policies in the State 
of Wyoming are:

1.         
"[T]he words used will be given their common and ordinary meaning. 13 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 7402 (1943). * * * Neither will the 
language be `tortured' in order to create an ambiguity. Malanga v. Royal 
Indemnity Company, 4 Ariz. App. 150, 418 P.2d 396, 399 [1966], 13 Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 7384 (1943)."

2.         "The 
intention of the parties is the primary consideration and is to be ascertained, 
if possible, from the language employed in the policy, viewed in the light of 
what the parties must reasonably have intended. Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 
[67 Wyo. 141], 215 P.2d [867] at 873-875 [1950]."

3.         "Such 
[insurance policy] contracts should not be so strictly construed as to thwart 
the general object of the insurance. Miles v. Continental Casualty Company, 
Wyo., 386 P.2d 720, 722 [1963]."

"* * * [T]he parties have 
the right to employ whatever lawful terms they wish and courts will not rewrite 
them. Alm v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Wyo., 369 P.2d 216, 217 
[1962]."

4.         
"Absent ambiguity, there is no room for construction and the policy will 
be enforced according to its terms. Addison v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 
Wyo., 358 P.2d 948, 950 [1961]."

5.         "* * 
* [W]here such [insurance policy] contracts are so drawn as to be ambiguous and 
uncertain and to require construction, the contract will be construed liberally 
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Also, if the contract 
is fairly susceptible of two constructions, the one favorable to the insured 
will be adopted. [Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., supra 215 P.2d  at 
867.]"

See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Farmers Ins. v. District Court, 844 P.2d 1099 (Wyo. 1993); Eisenbarth v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1992); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co. v. Albany County School Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶8]      In addition, we 
have been consistent in holding that the usual and established rules of contract 
construction apply to insurance policies. Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of 
America, 864 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1993); First Wyoming Bank v. Continental Ins., 860 P.2d 1094 (Wyo. 1993); Albany County School Dist No. 1; Hursh Agency, Inc. v. 
Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983); State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. 
Paulson, 756 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 1988); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & 
Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1988). A corollary of this rule is that the 
interpretation of the contract is to be made by the court as a matter of law. 
Albany County School Dist No. 1; Ricci v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 721 P.2d 1081 
(Wyo. 1986); Kost v. First National Bank of Greybull, 684 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1984); 
Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc.; Shepard v. Top Hat Land and Cattle 
Company, 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶9]      While we 
approached this issue in Cravens, Dargan & Co.,2 and even quoted a similar policy 
provision, we had no occasion to resolve this issue in that case, and we did 
not. As the United States District Court concluded in certifying the cause to 
our court, the question is one of first impression in Wyoming. As is our custom, 
we consider the resolution of such a question in other tribunals to aid our 
decisional process.

[¶10]   Counsel have cited us to 
conflicting lines of authority. In accordance with one line of authority, the 
words "sudden and accidental" is deemed to be an ambiguous phrase, and the 
ambiguity leads to a construction of the contract against its drafter, the 
insurance company. In those cases, the resolution of that ambiguity imposes 
coverage upon the insurance carrier for such a loss.3 According to the other line of 
authority, the term "sudden and accidental" has a plain meaning in the world of 
the lexicographer, and demands an event that occurs quickly, unexpectedly, and 
results in the escape of the pollutant. This line of authorities clearly 
attaches a temporal significance to the word "sudden."4

[¶11]   The courts that have arrived at 
ambiguity have used several rationales. These categorizations are not absolute 
because, on occasion, a court has used more than one rationale. Some have 
treated the words "sudden" and "accidental" as synonymous, affording no 
significance to the word "sudden." E.g., Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat. 
Ins. Co. of Omaha, 126 Wn.2d 50, 882 P.2d 703 (1994); Key Tronic v. Aetna 
(CIGNA) Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 618, 881 P.2d 201, 208 (1994); 
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 
607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). In other instances the courts have found the phrase 
"sudden and accidental" to be ambiguous. Some of these courts have reached that 
conclusion because the word "sudden" has more than one dictionary definition, 
and a construction against the drafter is invoked with the result being that 
"sudden" means "unexpected and unintended." E.g., Greenville County v. Ins. 
Reserve Fund, 313 S.C. 546, 443 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1994); Claussen v. Aetna 
Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1989); Patz v. St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying 
Wisconsin law). In other cases, courts have relied upon the definition of 
"accident" found in the policy which is "continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, which result in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected 
or intended from the standpoint of the insured." These courts have reasoned that 
treating "sudden" as meaning "unexpected and unintended" is more consistent with 
the policy definition because, if it were afforded temporal significance, that 
would be contrary to the concept of "continuous or repeated exposure." E.g., 
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1091, 1092 (Colo. 
1991); City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D.Colo. 
1986). In yet a fourth approach, courts have concluded that the phrase "sudden 
and accidental" is ambiguous, and have turned to past representations made to 
the insurance regulatory authority in the state. These courts have concluded 
that the carriers represented that the exclusion clauses were not intended to 
limit or narrow the policy coverage, and they have given a broad interpretation 
to the phrase "sudden and accidental." E.g., Joy Technologies v. Lib. Mutual 
Ins., 187 W. Va. 742, 421 S.E.2d 493, 499, 500 (1992); Just v. Land Reclamation 
Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570, 578 (1990); New Castle County v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1198, 1199 (3d Cir. 1991). Because of 
the limited statement of the facts provided in this certification, we do not 
consider this latter approach.

[¶12]   In interpreting contracts, one of 
our precepts is that we afford meaning to all of the language used if a 
reasonable construction can be achieved. Smith v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 857 P.2d 320 (Wyo. 1993); Hensley v. Williams, 726 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1986); Northern Gas 
Co. v. Town of Sinclair, 592 P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1979); Bulis v. Wells, 565 P.2d 487 
(Wyo. 1977); Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1977); 
Rossi v. Percifield, 527 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1974). It is important that every word 
should be given effect. Nugget Exploration, Inc.; Rossi. The difficulty in 
adopting the reasoning of the courts that find ambiguity because the word 
"sudden" has more than one definition and is afforded the connotation of 
"unexpected and unintended" is that the word sudden is robbed of any 
significance. These cases are quite like those in which "sudden" and 
"accidental" are treated as synonymous which also afford no significance to the 
word "sudden." Essentially the same criticism must attach to those cases that 
depend upon the definition of "accident" or "occurrence."

[¶13]   We have examined and considered 
dictionary definitions of the word "sudden." In BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (6th 
ed. 1990), it is defined as:

Happening without 
previous notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; 
unforeseen; unprepared for.

In WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), it is defined as:

[H]appening without 
previous notice or with very brief notice: coming or occurring unexpectedly: not 
foreseen or prepared for * * * changing angle or character all at once: 
PRECIPITOUS * * * ABRUPT * * * come upon or met with unexpectedly * * 
*.

In NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1422 (2d ed. 1986), it is defined 
as:

Happening or coming 
unexpectedly; not foreseen or prepared for; sharp or abrupt; done, coming, or 
taking place quickly or abruptly; hasty.

In WEBSTER'S 
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1178 (1991), it is defined as:

Happening or coming 
unexpectedly; changing angle or character all at once; marked by or manifesting 
abruptness or haste; made or brought about in a short time.

[¶14]   Of these several definitions, the 
only ones that afford significance, in the context of the exclusion clause at 
issue, to the word "sudden" are the definitions that connote a temporal aspect, 
such as "abrupt," "taking place quickly," or "made or brought about in a short 
time." Our disposition is to apply our usual rules to resolve this dispute. The 
application of those rules leads us to the conclusion that the words "sudden and 
accidental" encompass a temporal aspect that requires the occurrence of an event 
to happen abruptly, without any significant notice and unexpectedly. We perceive 
that the better reasoned authorities support this construction. It is consistent 
with our usual rule that we will accord significance to every word or phrase 
included in the contract by the parties. That is the premise for our answer to 
the first certified question.

[¶15]   We answer the first certified 
question by holding that "sudden" does have a temporal meaning. The exception to 
the exclusion clauses does not preserve coverage for gradual and unintentional 
discharges of pollutants unless such discharge is caused by a "sudden and 
accidental" event as we have defined that phrase.

[¶16]   In light of our answer to the first 
certified question, we answer the second certified question "no" because the 
words "sudden and accidental" are not ambiguous in the context of the exclusion 
clauses in these commercial policies. Once a temporal connotation is attached to 
the word "sudden," the phrase is not ambiguous. The insured party claiming 
coverage must be able to identify and establish an event that occurred abruptly 
or was made or brought about in a short period of time, such as the event in 
Cravens, Dargan & Co., in order to avoid the exclusion clause. We 
acknowledge that this may be the situation even though the discharge and the 
damage may occur over a long period of time after the covered event before the 
injury is discovered.

[¶17]   We cannot ignore the fact that the 
version of the law which a court adopts in such an instance implements that 
court's view as to who, as a matter of public policy, should bear the burden of 
a catastrophic discharge of pollutants. In light of the brief of the State of 
Wyoming as amicus curiae, the choices are the state government, the insurance 
industry, or the respective business entrepreneurs. That may be a limited vision 
of the ultimate consequences. Conceptually, if the burden falls upon the State, 
the public-at-large will pay higher taxes; if the burden falls upon the 
insurance industry, the public-at-large will pay larger insurance premiums; and, 
if the burden must fall upon the business entrepreneurs, then they will have to 
charge more for their services or products in order to recoup such a loss. We 
are not insensitive to the potential of a catastrophic loss in this context 
resulting in the failure of an insurance company or a business entrepreneur. The 
government may be more hardy. Given the analysis that we have articulated, there 
seems to be no difference with respect to the ultimate burden arising out of the 
entity selected to be held responsible initially.

[¶18]   We answer both certified questions 
by holding that the word "sudden" has a temporal connotation, and by holding 
that this contract is not ambiguous in light of the interpretation of the 
meaning of the word "sudden." The case is returned to the United States District 
Court for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1           
The cited statutes provide (emphasis added):

1-13-104. Questions from 
federal courts; generally. W.S. 1-13-104 through 
1-13-107 is cited as the "Federal Court State Law Certificate Procedure 
Act".

1-13-105. Questions from 
federal courts; definitions.

(a) As used in this act 
[§§ 1-13-104 through 1-13-107]:

(i) "Certificate 
procedure" means the procedure authorized herein by which a federal court in 
disposing of a cause pending before it submits a question of state law to the 
supreme court for determination;

(ii) "Federal court" 
means any court of the United States of America including the supreme court of 
the United States, courts of appeal, district courts and any other court created 
by act of congress;

(iii) "Supreme court" 
means the supreme court of Wyoming.

1-13-106. Questions from 
federal courts; authority of supreme court. The supreme court may 
answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court when requested by the 
certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before the federal 
court questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause 
then pending in the federal court, and as to which it appears to the federal 
court there is no controlling precedent in the existing decisions of the supreme 
court.

1-13-107. Questions from 
federal courts; rules. The supreme court may 
adopt rules of practice and procedure to implement or otherwise facilitate 
utilization of certificate procedure.

2                       
In Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 
1988), the questions presented were whether the Compass policy covered an oil 
spill and, if so, whether Cravens was entitled to reimbursement from Compass. 
The oil spill was 3,000 gallons of road oil from a state highway maintenance 
yard which occurred when a trespasser opened an unlocked storage tank valve, an 
act of apparent vandalism. We held that the loss was covered by the Compass 
policy and Cravens was entitled to reimbursement even though the Cravens policy 
through which the state was reimbursed for cleanup costs included a similar 
exclusion clause to the ones in issue here. The thrust of the decision was that 
Cravens was not a volunteer, in effect, that the exclusion did not apply to the 
event.

3                       
See, e.g., Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 126 Wn.2d 50, 882 P.2d 703 (1994); Key Tronic v. Aetna (CIGNA) Fire Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 618, 881 P.2d 201, 208 (1994); Greenville County v. Ins. 
Reserve Fund, 313 S.C. 546, 443 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1994); Outboard Marine Corp. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992); 
Joy Technologies v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 187 W. Va. 742, 421 S.E.2d 493, 499-500 
(1992); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1091-92 
(Colo. 1991); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570, 
578 (1990); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1989); United Pacific Ins. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34 Wn. App. 708, 
664 P.2d 1262, 1264, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1018 (1983); New Castle County v. 
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1198-99 (3rd Cir. 1991); Patz 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1994); City 
of Northglenn v. Chevron USA, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D.Colo. 1986).

4                       
See, e.g., Mustang Tractor and Equipment Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
76 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 1996); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., 
Inc., 40 F.3d 146 (7th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432. 
(9th Cir. 1993); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 
999 F.2d 489, 492 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Kansas law); Ray Industries Inc., 
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied (Sept. 
10, 1992); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707 
(8th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied (Sept. 2, 1992); Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. 
Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law); 
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries, Inc., 938 F.2d 1423 (1st 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073, 112 S. Ct. 969, 117 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1992); 
State of New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 1991); Oklahoma 
Publishing Co. v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 905 
(W.D.Okla. 1992) (Oklahoma law); Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern 
Fidelity Corp., 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993), reh'g denied (1994); Polaroid Corp. 
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 414 Mass. 747, 610 N.E.2d 912 (1993); City of Bronson 
v. American States Ins. Co., 215 Mich. App. 612, 546 N.W.2d 702 (1996); Upjohn 
Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich. 197, 476 N.W.2d 392, 403 (1991), reh'g 
denied (Oct. 17, 1991); Board of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of 
America, 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. 
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 381-83 (1986); Hybud Equip. 
Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 597 N.E.2d 1096 (1992), 
reh'g denied (Oct 28, 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 987, 113 S. Ct. 1585, 123 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1993); TNT Bestway Transportation Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 
No. 1 CA-CV 92-0128, 1994 WL 464860 (Ariz. App. Aug. 30, 1994); Shell Oil Co. v. 
Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. App. 4th 715, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 840 (1st 
Dist. 1993), rehearing denied and opinion modified on other grounds (Feb. 22, 
1993), review denied (May 13, 1993); ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1773, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 215 (4th 
Dist. 1993), modified on other grounds (Sept. 21, 1993), review denied (Nov. 17, 
1993); Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ind. 
Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1981); Weber v. IMT Ins. Co., No. 9-437, slip op. at 7 (Iowa 
Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990) aff'd, 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990); Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Laudick, 18 Kan. App. 2d 782, 859 P.2d 410 (1993); Bentz v. 
Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 83 Md. App. 524, 575 A.2d 795 (990); 
Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Central Ins. Co., 480 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1992); Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988); County of Fulton v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 195 A.D.2d 864, 600 N YS.2d 972 (1993); Mays v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 103 Or. App. 578, 799 P.2d 653, 657 (1990), review denied (Feb 5, 
1991); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212, 214 
(1985), review denied, 301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986); Lower Paxton Township v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 383 Pa. Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393, 398 
(1989), appeal denied, 523 Pa. 649, 567 A.2d 653 (1989); Techalloy Co. v. 
Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820, 827 (1984), appeal denied, 
(Pa. Oct. 31, 1985); O'Brien Energy Systems, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. 
Co., 427 Pa. Super. 456, 629 A.2d 957 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 633, 642 A.2d 487 (1994); Gridley Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1992).