Title: State v. Cress

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Cress, 112 Ohio St.3d 72, 2006-Ohio-6501.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CRESS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Cress, 112 Ohio St.3d 72, 2006-Ohio-6501.] 
Criminal law – R.C. 2921.04(B) – Intimidation – “Unlawful threat of harm” 
construed. 
(Nos. 2005-1965 and 2005-2114 – Submitted June 7, 2006 – Decided  
December 27, 2006.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Marion County,  
No. 09-04-42, 163 Ohio App.3d 46, 2005-Ohio-4620. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C. J. 
{¶ 1} The Third District Court of Appeals has certified the following 
question in connection with the conviction of appellee, Shawn Cress, of a felony 
charge of witness intimidation of Tara Thacker:  “Does a criminal charge of 
intimidation in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B) require the state to prove that the 
defendant has made a threat to engage in unlawful conduct?”  The answer to this 
question is “no.” 
{¶ 2} The record establishes that Cress and Thacker became romantically 
involved in December 2002. Their relationship was unstable: Thacker conceded 
that they were often “on again, off again.”  She denied that Cress was ever violent 
with her, although in the past she had requested at least one protective order from 
a probate court and provided a sworn written statement that Cress had stalked her 
and threatened to kidnap her children.  After the events giving rise to this case, 
but prior to trial, they married. At trial, Thacker disavowed the allegations of 
stalking, but acknowledged that she had sought a protective order prior to the 
incident in question. 
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{¶ 3} The residences of Cress and Thacker were adjacent to each other, 
each apartment comprising one-half of a single building.  During the early 
morning of April 26, 2003, Thacker telephoned police to report an intruder, Cress, 
in her home. 
{¶ 4} The couple had argued in the hours before the incident. Cress 
wanted to speak with Thacker; she repeatedly refused and expressly denied him 
access to her home several hours before his intrusion.  Unable to enter the 
apartment with Thacker’s consent, Cress gained access by using the attic crawl 
space that connected their two apartments.  Once inside the space, Cress moved 
an access panel in the ceiling of Thacker’s bedroom closet so that he could 
descend into her home. 
{¶ 5} Later, Thacker heard noises coming from one of the bedrooms.  
She went to investigate and discovered Cress in the closet.  Thacker called police, 
and Cress returned to the other apartment.  After interviewing Thacker and other 
witnesses at the scene, the police attempted to speak with Cress.  When he did not 
respond to officers’ repeated attempts to summon him to the door of his 
apartment, the police secured a search warrant, forced entry into the home, 
arrested Cress, and transported him to a local jail. 
{¶ 6} Within hours of his arrest, Cress called Thacker from jail.  During 
that conversation, Cress stated that if Thacker would refrain from getting Cress 
“in trouble,” he, in turn, would not disseminate photographs of Thacker and 
others “smoking that bong in the basement.”  There can be no dispute that Cress 
intended to use the threat of disclosing the photographs to influence Thacker:  he 
admitted to a police officer that he was using the photographs as a “scare tactic” 
against her. 
{¶ 7} Cress was warned by authorities to cease making calls to Thacker 
while he was in custody.  Cress, however, made seven other phone calls to 
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various family members.  In several of those calls, he requested his family’s 
assistance in conveying messages to Thacker. 
{¶ 8} In his first call to his mother, Cress stated, “[G]o talk to Tara.  I 
don’t know what’s the matter with her.  But you guys can probably talk to her.  
Because of those pictures, man.  I don’t wanna see her kids get taken away, but if 
I have to bring the nude pictures up in court for a defense, she’s gonna lose her 
kids. * * * She needs to just move away and leave me alone.  But Mom, if they 
start charging me with this, I’m gonna have to show them all them pictures and 
everything else I got ‘cause I got a bunch of other stuff on her, too, I been 
collecting in case something happens.” 
{¶ 9} In a subsequent series of conversations with his brother, Cress 
directed his brother to “[j]ust tell [the Cress parents] that Tara better drop these 
charges so I can get out [of jail] today” and repeatedly stated that Thacker “better 
hurry up and drop these charges ‘cause I want out of [jail].”  He then told his 
brother to also call Thacker and tell her that she had better drop the charges that 
day so that he could be released from custody. 
{¶ 10} Later that day, Cress again spoke with his brother.  Evidently 
dissatisfied that Thacker had not yet obtained his release from custody, Cress 
dictated to his brother a list of things that he would do if Thacker did not dismiss 
charges against him and instructed him to give her the list.  Although the list was 
somewhat cryptic in parts, a jury could conclude that it indicated that Cress would 
(1) show child-protection authorities incriminating photographs of Thacker using 
illicit drugs and/or depicting her nude, (2) provide access to Thacker’s basement 
to an appliance-rental company, apparently to recover a washing machine and 
dryer that were, by implication, in Thacker’s possession improperly, (3) provide 
unspecified information to another rental company about Thacker’s stereo and 
computer, (4) make her get rid of her pet dog and live-in babysitter because they 
were not permitted by the terms of the lease, (5) reveal to one of Thacker’s family 
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members that his girlfriend was having an affair, and (6) no longer permit her to 
use his motor vehicle. 
{¶ 11} After relaying the list to his brother, Cress had another 
conversation with his mother.  She told Cress that Thacker had contacted the jail 
and told them that she wanted the charges dropped, but that she had been 
informed that she could not do so because the police had filed the charges.  In 
response, Cress repeatedly told his mother how Thacker was to secure his release: 
{¶ 12} “Cress:  I’m not staying in here any longer.  I want a lawyer now. 
{¶ 13} “Mrs. Cress:  * * *  [T]hey told her nothing could be done —  
{¶ 14} “Cress:  But it can, mom. 
{¶ 15} “Mrs. Cress:  — until Monday morning. 
{¶ 16} “Cress:  She gets a lawyer and goes up there and tells them she’s 
lying.  They call the lieutenant.  The lieutenant will let me out.  The lieutenant can 
let me out.  That’s who has to do it. * * *  
{¶ 17} “* * *  
{¶ 18} “Cress:  I gotta get out of here right now. 
{¶ 19} “* * *  
{¶ 20} “Mrs. Cress:  You’re the one that screwed up and did this. 
{¶ 21} “Cress:  I did nothing.  She lied, mom.  She has to go, alright.  One 
more time.  Get a lawyer.  Take her.  Call [the jail].  Tell them to tell the 
lieutenant she was lying.  To get me out of here right now or she’s evicted.  I’m 
sending those pictures to Children Services.  I’m calling Rent-a-Center about her 
washer and dryer.  I’m calling Rent-Way about her stereo.  Calling Rent-A-Center 
about her computer.  I am telling on her cousin for cheating on his, her husband.  
I’m getting her kids taken away. She’s getting evicted.  She losing her dog.  She’s 
out.  That’s the way it’s gonna be.  I want it done now. 
{¶ 22} “* * *  
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5 
{¶ 23} “You guys have done nothing yet.  You’ve gotta do what I say.  
You haven’t even done that yet. 
{¶ 24} “Mrs. Cress:  We can’t get a lawyer on a Saturday. 
{¶ 25} “Cress:  You can get a lawyer on a Saturday.  It just costs extra. 
{¶ 26} “Mrs. Cress:  And you better quit doing the threatening or she’s 
not even gonna go to the Prosecutor tomorrow. 
{¶ 27} Cress:  She better [profanity].” 
{¶ 28} Less than two hours later, Cress called his father.  In that 
conversation, he reiterated that Thacker “is gonna tell them she’s lying or that list 
I gave Michael [his brother] is gonna happen.” 
{¶ 29} Cress was indicted subsequently on several charges, including  
intimidation in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B).  The case was tried before a jury, 
which heard Thacker testify that no one had attempted to get her to drop the 
charges by threatening her.  The jury rendered verdicts of not guilty on all charges 
except that of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B).  Cress 
appealed, asserting various claims of error. 
{¶ 30} The Third District Court of Appeals reversed Cress’s conviction.  
The opinion of Judge Bryant concluded that “[e]very one of [Cress’s] threats 
consists of conduct that Cress had a right to engage in.  Without a showing of an 
express or implied threat of unlawful conduct, there can be no finding that Cress 
is guilty of intimidation.”  State v. Cress, 163 Ohio App.3d 46, 2005-Ohio-4620, 
836 N.E.2d 35, at ¶ 6, citing State v. Gooden, 8th Dist. No. 81320, 2003-Ohio-
2864, at ¶ 27.  Essentially, the opinion concluded that the term “unlawful threat of 
harm” in R.C. 2921.04(B) requires the state to prove that a specific threat must be, 
in and of itself, a threat to commit an unlawful act. 
{¶ 31} The appellate court thereafter certified its decision as in conflict 
with decisions of the Second District Court of Appeals, State v. Hoying, Greene 
App. No. 2004-CA-71, 2005-Ohio-1366, and the Eighth District, State v. Lutz, 
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Cuyahoga App. No. 80241, 2003-Ohio-275.  On December 28, 2005, we accepted 
discretionary jurisdiction and also determined that a conflict existed.  State v. 
Cress, 107 Ohio St.3d 1695, 2005-Ohio-6763, 840 N.E.2d 201. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2921.04 provides: 
{¶ 33} “(A) No person shall knowingly attempt to intimidate or hinder the 
victim of a crime in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges or a witness 
involved in a criminal action or proceeding in the discharge of the duties of the 
witness. 
{¶ 34} “(B) No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of 
harm to any person or property, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder 
the victim of a crime in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges or an 
attorney or witness involved in a criminal action or proceeding in the discharge of 
the duties of the attorney or witness.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 35} Significantly, a violation of R.C. 2921.04(B), involving force or an 
“unlawful threat of harm,” constitutes a felony of the third degree, while violation 
of R.C. 2921.04(A) constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree.  R.C. 
2921.04(D).  Where, as in this case, the use of force to intimidate a witness is not 
alleged, the statute distinguishes between felony witness intimidation and 
misdemeanor witness intimidation by the presence of an unlawful threat of harm. 
We must therefore determine from the words of the statute the General 
Assembly’s intent in adding the term “unlawful threat of harm” in R.C. 
2921.04(B) to describe those instances of witness intimidation properly found to 
be felonious. 
{¶ 36} In interpreting the phrase “unlawful threat of harm” in R.C. 
2921.04(B), the opinion in the Third District Court of Appeals stated, “Without a 
showing of an express or implied threat of unlawful conduct, there can be no 
finding that Cress is guilty of intimidation.”  But the word “threat” is defined as 
“an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another 
January Term, 2006 
7 
usu[ally] as retribution or punishment for something done or left undone.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 2382.  It connotes almost 
any expression of intent to do an act of harm against another person irrespective 
of whether that act is criminal.  State v. Moyer (1920), 87 W.Va. 137, 104 S.E. 
407 (“The word ‘threat’ is very broad and indefinite. It includes almost any kind 
of an expression of intention of one person to do an act against another. 
Ordinarily, it signifies intention to do some sort of harm, but the realm of injury is 
equally broad and undefined. All wrongs are not criminal offenses”). 
{¶ 37} A witness threatened with perfectly legal conduct (“I will tell your 
spouse about our affair”) may be more intimidated than a witness threatened with 
illegal conduct (“I will knock down your mailbox”).  The most intimidating threat 
of all may be an indefinite one (“You’ll be sorry”).  We therefore reject the 
contention that the General Assembly intended to differentiate between felonious 
witness intimidation and misdemeanor intimidation based on the legality of the 
threatened conduct, particularly when that construction is contrary to the rule of 
grammar that an adjective, here “unlawful,” modifies the noun that follows it, 
here “threat.”   The General Assembly did not provide a definition of the term 
“unlawful threat,” and we presume that it intended that the term be given its 
common meaning in accordance with the general rules of grammar. 
{¶ 38} The adjective “unlawful” modifies the noun “threat” in R.C. 
2921.04(B), and the statute includes no reference to unlawful conduct.  “In 
construing a statute, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used in a 
statute, not to insert words not used.  Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland 
(1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441, paragraph three of the syllabus.”   
State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319.   
  
{¶ 39} Both R.C. 2921.04(A) and (B) prohibit knowing attempts to 
intimidate a witness.  We cannot hypothesize an instance in which the act of 
threatening a witness would not also constitute intimidation. The term “threat” 
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represents a range of statements or conduct intended to impart a feeling of 
apprehension in the victim, whether of bodily harm, property destruction, or 
lawful harm, such as exposing the victim’s own misconduct.  See Planned 
Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Blake (1994), 417 Mass. 467, 474, 
631 N.E.2d 985 (defining “threat” as “the intentional exertion of pressure to make 
another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm”).  To “intimidate” means to 
“make timid or fearful: inspire or affect with fear: frighten * * *; esp.: to compel 
to action or inaction (as by threats).” (Emphasis added and capitalization 
omitted.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1184. 
{¶ 40} “Intimidation” by definition involves the creation of fear in a 
victim, and the very nature of a threat is the creation of fear of negative 
consequences for the purpose of influencing behavior.  We simply do not discern 
a meaningful difference between intimidation of a witness and the making of a 
threat to a witness.  Accordingly, both R.C. 2921.04(A) and (B) prohibit the 
threatening of witnesses. 
{¶ 41} An unlawful threat must accordingly connote more than just a 
threat, i.e., more than just a communication to a person that particular negative 
consequences will follow should the person not act as the communicator 
demands.  The word “unlawful” in R.C. 2921.04(B) must add substantive 
meaning, or it is superfluous.  Adoption of the state’s argument requires us in 
effect to rewrite R.C. 2921.04(B) by deleting the adjective “unlawful” from the 
statute.  The interpretation of the court of appeals requires us to rewrite the statute 
by construing the adjective “unlawful” as a modifier of the noun “conduct,” a 
word not even used in the statute.  We do not sanction either approach.  
{¶ 42} We hold, rather, that the statutory language in R.C. 2921.04(B), 
proscribing intimidation by an “unlawful threat of harm,” is satisfied only when 
the very making of the threat is itself unlawful because it violates established 
criminal or civil law.  For example, where the making of a threat constitutes the 
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9 
offense of coercion, in violation of R.C. 2905.12,1 a misdemeanor, that offense 
would serve as a predicate offense for the crime of witness intimidation as 
proscribed by R.C. 2921.04(B), a felony. 
{¶ 43} The court of appeals erred in holding that R.C. 2921.04(B) 
proscribes only threats of impending criminal conduct.  The court of appeals 
nevertheless correctly reversed Cress’s conviction of felonious witness 
intimidation in violation of R.C. 2901.14(B), as the state failed to prove that Cress 
made an unlawful threat of harm, i.e., it did not introduce evidence demonstrating 
the elements of any predicate offense.2     
 
{¶ 44} The state obtained an indictment charging Cress with the felony 
offense of intimidation in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B) only.  Although sufficient 
evidence may have been produced at trial to convict Cress of violating R.C. 
2921.04(A), the state did not charge him with a violation of that section, nor did it 
ask the court to submit a charge of violation of R.C. 2921.04(A) to the jury for 
consideration as a lesser included offense. 
{¶ 45} The state did not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Cress made an “unlawful” threat, a required element for conviction of 
R.C. 2921.04(B), the only intimidation crime submitted to the jury.  We therefore 
                                                          
 
1  
{¶ a} 
R.C. 2905.12(A) establishes the offense of coercion, a misdemeanor of the 
second degree.  It provides:  
{¶ b} 
“No person, with purpose to coerce another into taking or refraining from action 
concerning which the other person has a legal freedom of choice, shall do any of the following: 
{¶ c} 
“(1) Threaten to commit any offense; 
{¶ d} 
“(2) Utter or threaten any calumny against any person; 
{¶ e} 
“(3) Expose or threaten to expose any matter tending to subject any person to 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, to damage any person’s personal or business repute, or to impair any 
person’s credit; 
{¶ f} 
“(4) Institute or threaten criminal proceedings against any person; 
{¶ g} 
“(5) Take, withhold, or threaten to take or withhold official action, or cause or 
threaten to cause official action to be taken or withheld.” 
 
2  
Cress was charged with the crime of extortion, in violation of R.C. 2905.11(A)(5), but the 
jury returned a verdict of not guilty on that charge.   
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affirm the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the conviction of a violation 
of R.C. 2921.04(B) based on insufficiency of the evidence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 46} Although the majority properly finds error in the analysis of the 
Third District’s lead opinion, I dissent from its conclusion that the term “unlawful 
threat” requires the state to show that the defendant threatened to commit an act 
that was illegal per se. 
{¶ 47} As the Sixth Circuit observed in interpreting a federal threats 
statute, “To determine what type of action [the legislature] intended to prohibit, it 
is necessary to consider the nature of a threat.  At their core, threats are tools that 
are employed when one wishes to have some effect, or achieve some goal, 
through intimidation.  This is true regardless of whether the goal is highly 
reprehensible or seemingly innocuous.”  United States v. Alkhabaz (C.A.6, 1997), 
104 F.3d 1492, 1495.  The majority acknowledges that not all threats are 
necessarily criminal or illegal and that the term “threat” encompasses a broad 
array of conduct.  The General Assembly similarly was well aware of that fact 
when drafting R.C. 2921.04(B). 
{¶ 48} The context in which words are spoken is as important as the 
words themselves.  See, e.g., State v. McCornell, Cuyahoga App. No. 81581, 
2003-Ohio-2474, ¶ 8, 2003 WL 21101258 (“Although the statement is ambiguous 
standing alone, its meaning must be assessed in light of the surrounding 
circumstances”); State v. Lawson (Dec. 7, 1994), Summit App. No. 16886, 1994 
WL 687211, *2 (“Words are not scientific symbols.  Their meanings are often 
dependent upon the context and manner in which they are used”).  This is 
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particularly true in cases involving threats.  See, e.g., State v. Brunswick (1941), 
69 Ohio App. 407, 424, 24 O.O. 161, 44 N.E.2d 116, quoting 18 Ohio 
Jurisprudence (1928) 916 (a threat “ ‘may be done by innuendo or suggestion.  
Any language which conveys a threat with adequate clearness is sufficient.  In 
some instances to ascertain whether language conveys a threat, it must be taken 
with the circumstances under which it is spoken, and the relations between the 
parties must be considered’ ”); In re Burke (1899), 9 Ohio C.D. 350, 357 (“no 
precise words are needed to convey a threat. * * * [I]f it can be found [from the 
circumstances] that the purport and natural effect of the language amounts to a 
threat, then the mere form of words is unimportant). 
{¶ 49} I believe that the legislature, accordingly, wished to make the 
intimidation and retaliation statutes as expansive as possible to afford protection 
from threats to as many victims and witnesses as possible.  Indeed, in 1995 the 
General Assembly acted deliberately to expand the proscriptions against 
intimidating or retaliating against victims and witnesses.  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
88, 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 528-530, amending R.C. 2921.04(B) to prohibit 
intimidation of attorneys as well as victims and witnesses and enacting R.C. 
2921.05 to prohibit retaliation.  See, also, State v. Lambert (June 5, 1998), 
Montgomery App. No. 16667, 1998 WL 288957, *4; State v. Fuqua, Hardin App. 
No. 6-02-01, 2002-Ohio-4697, 2002 WL 31007358 (R.C. 2921.05 was designed 
“to protect the sanctity of the judicial process and those that participate within 
it”). 
{¶ 50} In so doing, however, the legislature wisely recognized that the 
statute could not be of unlimited breadth due to the constitutional protections 
afforded to speech.  See, e.g., Watts v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 705, 707, 
89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (noting that statutes proscribing threats “must be 
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.  What is 
a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech”).  
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See, also, United States v. Bowker (C.A.6, 2004), 372 F.3d 365, 380 (in affirming 
convictions for telephone harassment against an overbreadth challenge, noting 
that speech intended to invade a victim’s privacy and communicate express or 
implied threats of harm is not constitutionally protected).  The term “unlawful” 
denotes conduct that is “[c]riminally punishable,” “[n]ot authorized by law; 
illegal,” or that “[i]nvolv[es] moral turpitude,” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th 
Ed.2004) 1574, i.e., “[c]onduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality.”  
Id. at 1030 (defining moral turpitude).  I believe its use here, as a modifier to the 
term “threat,” evinces a clear legislative intent to distinguish between speech that 
is constitutionally protected and speech that is not protected because it is used for 
an unlawful means, e.g., to influence, intimidate, or hinder a crime victim.  This 
case clearly exemplifies the legislature’s wisdom in doing so. 
{¶ 51} Cress had a constitutional right to disclose the information he 
threatened to disclose, assuming that it was true.  He could report Thacker to the 
proper authorities for any conduct that was criminal or that endangered her 
children; he could distribute, within the boundaries permitted by law, 
incriminating photographs of her; he could disclose the presence of a dog and a 
residential babysitter with the intent to get her evicted for violating the terms of 
her lease; and he could reveal the details of an extramarital affair.  Simply 
disclosing that information as part of a bitter breakup might have been, in the 
words of the appellate court, “distasteful,” but it would not have been illegal.  
Cress, however, did not simply exercise his right to speak.  Rather, a rational jury 
could (and did) find that he used his lawful right to disclose the information for an 
unlawful purpose, i.e., to force Thacker to recant statements she had made to the 
police in an attempt to hinder his prosecution.  I believe that is exactly the speech 
that the General Assembly meant to reach in enacting the statute at issue here, and 
I agree with the well-reasoned opinions of those courts that have so found.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hoying, Greene App. No. 2004-CA-71, 2005-Ohio-1366, and State 
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13 
v. Lutz, Cuyahoga App. No. 80241, 2003-Ohio-275, ¶ 53 (properly finding that an 
“unlawful threat” may be one that is directed to the subject’s finances, reputation, 
or employment if it is made in an attempt to influence the subject’s participation 
in a criminal proceeding); State v. Thomas, Lucas App. No. L-02-1375, 2004-
Ohio-6458, 2004 WL 2785292 (rejecting claim that the appellant’s conviction for 
violating R.C. 2921.04(B) was against the manifest weight of the evidence when 
the “unlawful threat” he uttered to the victim during a prosecution for domestic 
violence was the statement “I will see you later”); State v. Robertson (Feb. 6, 
1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 59686, 1992 WL 19816 (affirming conviction of 
intimidation for a mother who told her 12-year-old daughter that she would love 
her more if she recanted rape charges against the mother’s boyfriend).  I would 
therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jim Slagle, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Renée Potts, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Collins & Lowther, L.P.A., and Kevin P. Collins, for appellee. 
______________________