Title: State v. Burriss

State: south-carolina

Issuer: South Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

281 S.C. 47 (1984) 314 S.E.2d 316 The STATE, Respondent, v. Clarence BURRISS, Jr., Appellant. 22060 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard January 11, 1984. Decided March 20, 1984. *48 T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., and Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia and George M. Ducworth, County Sol., Tenth Judicial Circuit, Anderson, for respondent. William Isaac Diggs, Asst. Appellate Defender, of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant. Heard Jan. 11, 1984. Decided March 20, 1984. LITTLEJOHN, Justice: Appellant was convicted of shoplifting in violation of South Carolina Code Section 16-13-110 (Cum. Supp. 1982). We affirm. The Appellant has not made the evidence submitted to the trial court a part of the record but from argument of State's counsel (which is printed) and which was not objected to it is apparent that there was evidence that the Appellant took a stack of cartons of Winston cigarettes from the shelves of a store where they were displayed and placed them in a dog food bag. He was then seen leaving the store. The bag had been ripped open and dumped of its dog food contents. The Appellant did not testify. The judge gave the jury our traditional charge to the effect that failure to testify does not create an inference of guilt and does not relieve the State of the responsibility of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's exceptions raise an issue of the constitutionality of Section 16-13-120, South Carolina Code Ann. (1976) and its application to the charge of the law. The relevant sections of the Code are as follows: Section 16-13-120 relates only to the matter of proof. It is abundantly clear that one may be convicted of shoplifting without regard to this section, and proof of guilt may be by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or a combination of the two. Intent is an element of the crime of shoplifting as indicated in the statute quoted above. The trial judge refused to hold that Section 16-13-120 was unconstitutional but did not read it to the jury. *50 In determining whether by his charge the judge relieved the State of its burden of proof and/or shifted the burden of proof to the accused, we give consideration to the charge in its entirety. He told the jury: He then gave the traditional charge on circumstantial evidence to which no objection has been raised, and then stated: The only mention of any presumption in the judge's charge is as follows: We are of the opinion that the charge when considered as a whole did not deprive the accused of any constitutional right. It did not amount to a charge that the presumption was conclusive nor did it shift the burden of persuasion. The burden of proof remained with the State throughout. While the trial judge should have held Section 16-13-120 unconstitutional, failure to do so simply was not prejudicial to the accused. In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed. (2d) 39 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by a jury instruction on the issue of intent. The judge instructed that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." The court held that "Sandstrom's jury may have interpreted the judge's instruction as constituting either a burden shifting presumption... or a conclusive presumption [and] either interpretation would have deprived defendant of his right to the due process of law." When applying Sandstrom to determine whether due process rights have been violated, courts must examine the jury charge as a whole to determine whether there has been prejudice. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 94 S. Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed. (2d) 368 (1973). See also State v. Adams, 275 S.C. 108, 267 S.E. (2d) 538 (1980). It follows that hereafter trial judges should not charge Section 16-13-120 which is hereby declared unconstitutional. When facts referred to in this Code Section are proved, the same should be considered along with all other circumstantial and/or other direct evidence. Having found the exceptions without merit the conviction and sentence is Affirmed. LEWIS, C.J., and NESS, GREGORY and HARWELL, JJ., concur.