Title: The Florida Bar v. Karen Schmid Cox

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC96217
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
KAREN SCHMID COX,
Respondent.
[May 17, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that attorney Karen
Schmid Cox be publicly reprimanded for violating several Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons
expressed below, we disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline and impose
a one-year suspension.  
The Bar charged Cox with violating four Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
while acting in her capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney in a criminal
1Neither the Bar nor Cox challenges the referee’s factual findings or
recommendations of guilt, which we approve without discussion.
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prosecution.  Following hearings on both guilt and discipline, the appointed referee
made the following factual findings.1  
FACTS
Cox was assigned to prosecute a case against James R. Sterba on an
indictment charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (solicitation of a minor to
engage in prostitution or any sexual act).  The United States Customs Service
(“Customs”) investigated the case and employed a confidential informant, Adria
Jackson, to pose as a 13-year-old girl on the Internet to assist Customs in its
investigation of child pornography and pedophiles.  Customs gave Jackson the
fictitious name of “Gracie Greggs.”  Prior to trial, the magistrate in the case ordered
Cox to provide Jackson’s name to the defense.  Cox knew Jackson’s true name
prior to trial.  However, Cox listed Jackson on the government’s witness list as
Gracie Greggs, and informed defense counsel, the court, and the venire that
Jackson’s name was Gracie Greggs.  On direct examination of Jackson, Cox
deliberately introduced the witness to the court and the jury by asking, “Are you
Gracie Greggs?” instead of the customary question, “What is your name?” 
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Jackson was a crucial witness for the government’s case against Sterba, and Cox
learned after trial that Jackson had a previous criminal history.   
Jackson’s true identity was revealed mid-trial and the United States District
Court granted Sterba’s motion for a mistrial.  See United States v. Sterba, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 1333 (M.D. Fla. 1998).  Sterba then moved to dismiss the indictment
against him on double jeopardy grounds and the federal district court agreed that
Sterba had been “goaded” into requesting a mistrial:  
Specifically, I have found that the intent of the prosecutor in this
case was to succeed in palming off Adria Jackson and her
biographical baggage as Gracie Greggs, an operative of law
enforcement. . . . 
As a result of the prosecutorial plan in this case, the
United States required the defense to present its case, forced
the defendant to make his constitutional election whether to
testify, secured the right to cross-examine the defendant under
oath, and otherwise leveraged the defendant into the position of
revealing his strategy, his theories, his evidence, and his cross-
examination.  All the while, the prosecutor [Cox] harbored a
secret.  Viewed one way, the secret was that she had withheld
so-called Giglio and other information that, if ever known to the
defense, might discredit her featured witness.  Viewed
differently, the secret was that the prosecutor at any time could
prompt a defense motion for a mistrial (and thereby accrue
another chance at conviction) by revealing to the defense the
truth about “Gracie Greggs.”  In either event, the trial was not
conducted on equal footing because the prosecutor had a lie at
her disposal.
. . . .
By a course of intentional misconduct, discovered
serendipitously by the defense during trial, the prosecution
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goaded the defense into moving for a mistrial.  The defendant’s
fifth amendment immunity from double jeopardy precludes
another trial and, therefore, requires the dismissal of the
indictment.  
Id. at 1341-43.  Although the referee in this case disagreed with the district court’s
determination that Cox planned to deprive Sterba of his constitutional rights, the
referee did conclude that Cox “was a seasoned prosecutor and fully aware of the
requirements of candid disclosure to the court and defense counsel and the reasons
in justice for that candor.”  
Based on his factual findings, the referee recommended that Cox be found
guilty of violating the following Rules Regulating the Florida Bar:  4-3.3(a)(1)
(lawyer shall not knowingly make false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal); 4-3.3(a)(4) (lawyer shall not knowingly permit any witness to offer
testimony that the lawyer knows to be false); 4-3.4(a) (lawyer shall not unlawfully
obstruct another party’s access to evidence or otherwise conceal other material that
the lawyer knows or should know is relevant to pending proceeding, nor assist
another person to do such an act); and 4-3.4(b) (lawyer shall not fabricate
evidence, or counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely).  
-5-
As to discipline, the referee initially concluded that the presumptively
appropriate sanction was suspension under Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions 6.12, which provides:   
Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or
documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is
improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action.  
The referee found that Standard 6.11, which provides for the presumption of
disbarment, was not the proper starting point for the analysis of this case because
“the evidence indicates that [Cox] did not intend to deceive the United States
District Court before which she was practicing on any matter of substantial justice.” 
The referee found that Cox believed Jackson had a clean criminal record and that
the use of an assumed name for the witness would not be any impediment to justice
in the case.  
The referee found only one aggravating circumstance--that Cox had
substantial experience in the practice of law.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs.
9.22(i).  In mitigation, the referee found that Cox had no prior disciplinary record,
lacked a selfish or dishonest motive, and made full and free disclosure during the
proceedings.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.32(a), (b), (e).  The referee
also found that Cox would be subject to additional penalties as a result of her
misconduct, see Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.32(g), because “[s]he has been
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investigated by the Office of Professional Regulation for this conduct and
anticipates receiving a penalty of two weeks without pay.”  The referee found that
Cox’s reputation was “excellent” and “unsullied except for this instance.”  See Fla.
Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.32(g).  The referee relied on Cox’s “impressive list
of state and federal judges, law enforcement officers, and associates who willingly
testified that she is intelligent, candid, hardworking, always well-prepared,
courteous, professional, admired, respected, and dedicated to our system of
justice,” and the testimony of several of these witnesses that the instant conduct
“was a mistake and an aberration.”  The referee also found that Cox was sincerely
remorseful, see Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.32(l), and that Cox
“comprehends or fully grasps the serious import of her conduct and truly regrets
her actions.”  The referee observed:  “I believe her when she says that her remorse
stems not only from the embarrassment it has caused her personally but also from
the embarrassment it has caused to her profession as a lawyer and prosecutor.”       
The referee concluded that the many mitigating circumstances, when weighed
qualitatively against the one aggravating circumstance, “seem to call for a reduction
of the discipline” from the presumption of suspension, and recommended that Cox
receive a public reprimand and be placed on probation.   Although the referee did
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not specifically rely on any one case in making this recommendation, the referee
explained that such a sanction “seem[ed] to be proportional with other similar
disciplinary cases,” and noted that several cases involving false testimony lacked
the substantial mitigation found in the instant case.  The referee commented that
“[p]rosecutors as a class are accustomed to demanding punishment of others . . .
[and] to assuming an attitude of righteous indignation on behalf of society,” and
therefore concluded that Cox “is one of those lawyers whose sense of justice is
sufficient that she will truly suffer as a result of a public reprimand.”
THE BAR’S PETITION FOR REVIEW
The Bar seeks review of the referee’s recommended sanction, arguing that a
public reprimand is inappropriate under the facts of this case and that a three-year
suspension is in order.  Although a referee’s findings of fact are given deference,
our review of a referee’s recommended discipline is more extensive, because this
Court has the ultimate responsibility to determine the appropriateness of a
recommended sanction.  See Florida Bar v. Niles, 644 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1999). 
However, we typically will not disapprove a referee’s recommended discipline so
long as the referee’s recommendation has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw.
See Florida Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 1997).  In this case, we
conclude that in light of the duty violated and the injury caused by the misconduct,
2The referee did not rely on any one case in support of the recommended
public reprimand and probation, and instead distinguished several cases in which
rehabilitative suspensions were imposed.  The referee distinguished Florida Bar v.
Broida, 574 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1991), in which we imposed a one-year suspension,
because the attorney was found to have engaged in many violations, including
“continuously misrepresenting facts to the court,” and “personally attacking the
integrity of multiple lawyers and judges” with whom the attorney had contact.  The
referee also found Florida Bar v. Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1998), inapposite,
noting that the attorney “lied to the court about his annual income fully intending to
thwart the administration of justice and personally benefit therefrom,” and despite
the lack of mitigating facts, the attorney was suspended for 91 days.  Likewise, the
referee distinguished Florida Bar v. Kravitz, 694 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1997), in which
the attorney “lied to the court and tried to extort money from his client,” and was
suspended for 30 days.
3See Florida Bar v. McLawhorn, 535 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1988) (lawyer publicly
reprimanded for, among other things, misstating true owner of certain real property
in traverse in post-dissolution proceedings where opposing counsel was told of
misstatement prior to hearing and the court was informed at hearing).
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the referee’s recommended discipline of a public reprimand does not have a
reasonable basis in existing caselaw, and we therefore disapprove the
recommended discipline.   
Cox argues that the referee’s recommended sanction is supported by many
cases involving misrepresentations in which public reprimands were imposed.2 
Having reviewed the cases cited by Cox, we find that these cases are
distinguishable because the misrepresentations at issue in these cases either did not
have a dramatic effect on the proceedings,3 were less severe or less culpable than
4See Florida Bar v. Fatolitis, 546 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1989) (attorney publicly
reprimanded for signing his wife’s name as witness to a will where wife was present
at will signing but was physically unable to sign due to having burned her hand);
Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1989) (two attorneys disciplined for
making factual misrepresentations in appellate brief, with less culpable attorney
receiving public reprimand and lead counsel being suspended for 30 days); Florida
Bar v. Hagglund, 372 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1979) (public reprimand imposed where
attorney filed affidavit that attorney “knew or should have known” was false in
lawsuit against former client and owner of business in which attorney had invested).
5See Florida Bar v. Sax, 530 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1988) (attorney publicly
reprimanded following uncontested referee’s report for submitting a notarized
pleading containing a statement attorney “knew or should have known” was not
true); Florida Bar v. Pearce, 356 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1978) (attorney publicly
reprimanded following uncontested referee’s report for participating in plans for
witnesses to testify falsely); Florida Bar v. Brooks, 336 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1976)
(attorney publicly reprimanded following conditional guilty plea for testifying falsely
in inquest). 
6See Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965) (public reprimand
imposed in lieu of disbarment on attorney who testified falsely and failed to
dissuade other witnesses from testifying falsely before grand jury investigating
bribery in attorney’s senatorial campaign where delay of nine years in the
proceeding, subsequent exemplary conduct, and other unique circumstances of the
case mitigated against disbarment).
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the instant case,4 arose in uncontested disciplinary cases,5 or were mitigated by
unusual circumstances.6 
Cox also relies on our recent case of Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So. 2d
933 (Fla. 2000), in which we publicly reprimanded an Assistant State Attorney for
making false statements to defense counsel and for having direct contact with a
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defendant who was represented.  We find that case distinguishable because
Feinberg involved misrepresentations induced when “a somewhat clever defendant
indicated to Feinberg that he had discharged (or would be discharging) his
attorney,” and the defendant “requested that Feinberg not reveal these
conversations to his counsel based upon an alleged fear for the defendant’s safety
(due to the attorney’s alleged contacts with the ‘drug community’).”  Id. at 939. 
Although Feinberg involved misrepresentations to opposing counsel, that case
notably did not involve misrepresentations to the court or the knowing presentation
of false testimony to a jury.  Feinberg and the other cases cited by Cox do not
support a public reprimand.
The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide a starting
point for determining, in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, an
appropriate discipline based on the duty violated and the potential or actual injury
caused by the violation.  As discussed above, the referee in this case initially
determined that suspension was the presumed discipline under Standard 6.12;
however, the Bar argues that Standards 6.11 and 7.1, which presume disbarment,
apply in this case.  Standard 6.11 provides:
Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer: (a) with the intent to deceive 
the court, knowingly makes a false statement or submits a false document; 
or (b) improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or 
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potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially 
significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
The Bar concedes that subsection (a) was not presumptively appropriate because
the referee found that Cox “did not intend to deceive the United States District
Court on any matter of substantial justice.”  The Bar instead argues that the referee
did not give sufficient weight to subsection (b) of this standard and that Cox’s
improper withholding of material information posed a potentially serious injury to
the defendant in the case.  Furthermore, the Bar maintains that, the actual result,
dismissal with prejudice, was a significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.  
The Bar additionally contends that Standard 7.1 constitutes a proper starting
point, insofar as it provides that
[d]isbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in 
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to 
obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.  
The Bar argues that Cox either acted for her own benefit to ensure the availability of
a reluctant witness, or for the benefit of Jackson to ensure Jackson’s anonymity
and conceal her involvement in the case from her former husband.  The Bar
contends that the dismissal with prejudice of the criminal case constitutes a serious
injury to the legal system.  We agree that Standards 6.11 and 7.1 apply in this case
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and that, accordingly, disbarment and not suspension was the presumptive
sanction. 
The referee found that, although Cox knew Jackson’s real name, she
introduced her to the court, jury, and defense counsel as Gracie Greggs; assisted
the witness in concealing her true name from the court, jury and defense counsel;
and assisted Jackson to testify falsely.  These findings indicate that Cox
“improperly with[held] material information” as described in Standard 6.11. 
Further, the indictment against Sterba was dismissed with prejudice and no appeal
was taken.  We can think of no greater “significant . . . adverse effect on the legal
proceeding” than a dismissal with prejudice of a criminal indictment due to a
prosecutor’s misconduct.  Equally important, Cox’s misconduct involved
“potentially serious injury to a party,” namely the criminal defendant, Sterba, whose
rights to a fair trial, confrontation, and due process would have been denied had
Cox’s misconduct not been revealed.  As the United States District Court observed
in dismissing the indictment, Cox  
either manufactured or accepted a plan to employ a fictitious name for
Jackson and deploy that name in the service of the prosecution both before
and during trial to further the prosecutorial goal of a conviction. The
expectation was to proceed with the plan without the knowledge of the
defense and without the knowledge or consent of the court. By that means,
the AUSA [Cox] could secure for the prosecution the presumed benefit of a
conviction of Sterba, while avoiding any presumably unnecessary and
7The Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar provides in part that an attorney
“will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of
fact or law.” 
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bothersome little entanglements with whatever lingering facts might impinge
the credibility of her featured witness.
. . . [T]his plan was hatched with the notion that it would succeed,
undetected and unimpaired.  In this instance, success means jail for Sterba
and a readily repeatable template for renewal in future occasions.  The
conception and implementation of this plan was intentional and calculated to
deprive the defense of its right of confrontation.  It almost succeeded.  
Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.   
We also deem application of Standard 7.1 appropriate under the facts as
found by the referee.  The referee found that Jackson was reluctant to return to
Florida for trial because of a custody dispute with her former husband, and that
Customs had assured Jackson that she would not have to testify at trial.  The
referee found that Cox “listed the name Gracie Greggs for the confidential
informant because of concerns for the witness,” and “acted (albeit without
reflection) in what she thought was the best interest of her witness.”  Knowingly
presenting false evidence is a violation of an attorney’s professional duty,7 and
Cox’s intent in doing so was “to obtain a benefit for . . . another,” namely the
witness, Jackson.  As discussed, such conduct caused serious injury to the legal
system and potentially serious injury to the defendant, Sterba.  Thus, under the
Standards, we view disbarment as the presumptive penalty in this case.  
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Likewise, we also find disbarment to be the presumptive sanction under this
Court’s caselaw.  Of all the cases cited by the parties, Florida Bar v. Agar, 394 So.
2d 405 (Fla. 1980), is the most instructive on the conduct at issue here.  In Agar,
the attorney knowingly elicited and presented false testimony as to the identity of a
witness during a court proceeding.  Although the witness in Agar was the wife in an
uncontested divorce proceeding and the substance of her testimony was to prove
an apparently uncontested and minor issue in those proceedings, this Court
disapproved the referee’s recommended suspension of four months and disbarred
Agar, stating that  
[n]o breach of professional ethics, or of the law, is more harmful to the
administration of justice or more hurtful to the public appraisal of the legal
profession than the knowledgeable use by an attorney of false testimony in
the judicial process.  When it is done it deserves the harshest penalty. 
Agar, 394 So. 2d at 406 (quoting Dodd v. Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla.
1960)).  Because there is no discussion in Agar of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, we conclude that Agar stands for the proposition that absent any
mitigating or aggravating factors, disbarment is the presumptive sanction for an
attorney knowingly presenting false testimony in a judicial proceeding. 
Although disbarment is the presumptive penalty, we are mindful of the 
substantial mitigation found by the referee.  However, in support of its argument for
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a three-year suspension, the Bar recommends that we consider Cox’s role as a
prosecutor in aggravation, arguing that the list of aggravating factors in Standard
9.22 is not all-inclusive.  Although we decline to formally characterize Cox’s role as
a prosecutor as an aggravating factor, we find that Cox’s failure to abide by a
prosecutor’s duty to ensure the fairness of a criminal proceeding is essential to
evaluating the gravity of the duty violated in this case.       
The tenor of the caselaw discussing the role of prosecutors makes clear that
prosecutors are held to the highest standard because of their unique powers and
responsibilities.  The United States Supreme Court observed over sixty years ago
that a prosecutor has responsibilities beyond that of an advocate, and has a higher
duty to assure that justice is served: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. . . . He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor–
indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  Thus, a prosecutor has a duty not
only “to fairly present the evidence and permit the jury to come to a fair and
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impartial verdict,” Pendarvis v. State, 752 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), but
also “properly functions in a quasi-judicial capacity with reference to the accused .
. . to see that the accused is accorded a fair and impartial trial.”  Gonzalez v. State,
97 So. 2d 127, 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957).  By the nature of their position,
prosecutors direct the power of the government against an accused person.  See
Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 1999) (reversing conviction and vacating
death sentence in part due to prosecutors’ attempt “to tilt the playing field . . . by
invoking the immense power, prestige, and resources of the State”).  Therefore,
prosecutors must “be ever mindful of their awesome power and concomitant
responsibility . . . [to] reflect a scrupulous adherence to the highest standards of
professional conduct.”  Martin v. State, 411 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982);
see also DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (prosecutor
must seek justice “with the circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for”).  A
criminal prosecution “is not a game where the prosecution can declare, ‘It’s for me
to know and for you to find out,’”  Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 1224, 1229 (Fla.
1996), and a prosecutor is duty-bound to remember that “obtaining a conviction at
the expense of a fair trial is not justice.”  Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla.
1st DCA 1984). 
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A prosecutor’s heightened duties are likewise reflected in the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar.  Rule 4-3.8 is entitled “Special responsibilities of a
prosecutor.”  Although the Bar did not charge a violation of this rule, the
commentary to the rule provides that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar
4-3.8, cmt.  Additionally, Standard 5.2 specifically provides a special set of
standards for attorney conduct where the attorney is in an “official or government
position,” Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.2, which clearly encompasses
prosecutors on both state and federal levels.  We considered these high standards
in the recent Feinberg case, discussed above, by observing that “[t]ruth is critical in
the operation of our judicial system and we find such affirmative misrepresentations
by any attorney, but especially one who represents the State of Florida, to be
disturbing.”  Feinberg, 760 So. 2d at 939.  When a prosecutor fails in these duties
and violates an individual’s constitutional rights, a prosecutor “not only may be
admonished by the trial court, but should expect to be subject to disciplinary
proceedings by The Florida Bar.”  Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla.
4th DCA 1984) (Glickstein, J., concurring specially).   
The purpose of lawyer discipline is threefold.  First, lawyer discipline must
protect the public from unethical conduct but at the same time not deny the public
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the services of a qualified attorney.  See Florida Bar v. Pahules, 233 So. 2d 130,
132 (Fla. 1970).  In this case, the referee found, based on the testimony of many
distinguished jurists, attorneys, and others that Cox is a hardworking prosecutor
who is dedicated to justice and serving the public, and that the conduct in the
instant case is an aberration in an otherwise unblemished career.  However, Cox
failed to heed her duty to represent the public fairly and justly in her role as a
prosecutor, and damaged the public by undermining the confidence in the very core
of the judicial process--the search for truth.  The public clearly deserves protection
from a prosecutor who determines on her own when and how to follow the rules. 
The United States District Court described this breach thus:  
In short, [Cox] arrogated to herself the legal and moral authority to decide
what truth became public and, thereby, what fate awaited Sterba. [Cox]
substituted herself for the judge, jury, and defense, in effect, making away
with the fact-finding machinery.
Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.  The public expects and deserves fairness and
candor from attorneys, especially from a prosecutor who has the power and
responsibility derived from representing the government.  If we are to preserve the
credibility of our self-regulated profession, we must  address breaches of that trust
in a manner that is commensurate with the severity of the breach.
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Second, the discipline must be fair to the attorney, with the object of
correcting “the wayward tendency in the accused lawyer while offering to [the
lawyer] a fair and reasonable opportunity for rehabilitation.”  State ex rel. Florida
Bar v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 1961).  Cox’s previously unsullied
reputation and this apparently isolated lack of judgment support the conclusion that
Cox must be given the opportunity to rehabilitate herself. 
Finally, lawyer discipline must operate as an effective deterrent to other
lawyers who might be prone or tempted to become involved in like violations.  See
Florida Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1983).  The only effective deterrent
to the conduct at issue in this case is a suspension with the requirement that
rehabilitation be proven prior to reinstatement.  Were we to impose a suspension
with automatic reinstatement, we would fail in our duty to deter others, because 
“[a] mere suspension for a fixed period of time, with the assurance of automatic
reinstatement at the end of the prescribed period, does not impose upon the lawyer
the responsibility of taking affirmative action during the period of suspension in
order to gain readmittance at the end of the period.”  Ruskin, 126 So. 2d at 144. 
We warn that we will not hesitate to deal harshly with such misconduct in the
future, and trust that our decision here will have the desired effect of deterring this
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type of disregard for the rules of our profession that directly impact the
administration of justice.     
CONCLUSION
Karen Schmid Cox is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of
this opinion so that Cox can withdraw from representation accordingly.  If Cox
notifies this Court in writing that she is no longer practicing or that she does not
require thirty days, this Court will enter an order making the suspension effective
immediately.  Cox shall not undertake any new cases from the date this opinion is
filed until she is reinstated.  If, following this one-year suspension, Cox is able to
demonstrate rehabilitation and is reinstated pursuant to rule 3-7.10 of the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, Cox will be on probation for a period of one year and
be required to complete fifteen hours of continuing legal education in ethics. 
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., recused.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
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LEWIS, J., dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that the discipline it imposes today is within a
permissible range, I must respectfully dissent.  Had the local referee recommended
the discipline selected today by this Court I could concur.  This Court has
generally recognized that the recommendation of a referee as to discipline is
persuasive, but we do not afford the same deference to discipline recommendations
as is afforded considerations of guilt.  However, historically this Court has been
firmly committed to the concept that, as a general principle, we do not and should
not second-guess a referee’s recommendation of discipline if the discipline has a
reasonable basis in existing law.  In my view, the majority today disregards very
important factors involved in our system of lawyer discipline of having referees in
local communities make determinations based upon the evidence presented.  In the
past, we have very clearly articulated:
As to discipline, we note that the referee in a Bar proceeding
again occupies a favored vantage point for assessing key
considerations--such as a respondent’s degree of culpability and his
or her cooperation, forthrightness, remorse, and rehabilitation (or
potential for rehabilitation).  Accordingly, we will not second-guess a
referee’s recommended discipline as long that discipline has a
reasonable basis in existing caselaw.
Florida Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 1997).
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I am concerned that this Court has recently fallen into a pattern of rejecting
recommended discipline and merely substituting this Court’s view for that of a
referee.  The standard, as I understand it to be applicable, is not whether we would
have recommended the same discipline but, on the contrary, whether that which has
been recommended has a reasonable basis in existing law.  In my view, based upon
the evidence presented to this local referee, I cannot conclude that there is no
reasonable basis in existing law.  While one may find the implementation of more
severe discipline in circumstances containing elements similar to those presented in
the instant case, one also finds reasonable authority upon which the referee, in our
system of discipline, was permitted to rely.  
This record demonstrates that the referee conducted two days of hearings
directed to the issue of the recommendation as to guilt and an additional day
concerning the appropriate discipline.  The referee here had the advantage of
personal participation in evaluating all of the key considerations involved in this
dispute.  No fewer than nineteen witnesses were presented by Ms. Cox during the
portion of the hearing directed to discipline.  The witnesses were most impressive,
including nine who were either state or federal court judges.  It was the Bar’s
position below that the appropriate discipline would be suspension for a period
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ranging from ninety-one days to two years.  However, the Bar now asserts in this
Court that a three-year suspension should be required. 
The record underlying this disciplinary dispute demonstrates that a criminal
defendant had allegedly engaged in an Internet transmission with an informant of the
United States Customs Service (Customs) which resulted in an indictment charging
violations of federal law.  Customs had come into contact with the informant, Adria
Jackson, in connection with an investigation of child pornography on the Internet. 
Although having no evidence to suggest that Jackson was involved in criminal
activity, following an interview with her, Customs requested that she act as an
informant and provide assistance in connection with the investigation of child
pornography.  The evidence indicates that Customs checked Jackson’s
background on several occasions, and these investigations revealed no criminal
history and there is no evidence to indicate that Jackson ever provided information
that would cause concern that she had prior criminal problems, nor is there any
evidence that Customs ever had any reason to believe that Jackson had a prior
criminal record.  
For purposes of identity protection, Jackson was to utilize the name “Gracie
Greggs” and she utilized such name in connection with all dealings with Customs,
including the signing of documents regarding her employment, the agreement which
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controlled the conditions of her status, and receipts for payments.  This name was
utilized in all communications with Customs and internally.
The Internet transmissions between the defendant and the informant with
which the underlying proceedings were concerned had been printed, saved, and
delivered to Customs.  The informant was living in a different state at the time trial
was approaching, and she was emotionally distraught that she might be required to
return and make a personal appearance to testify, even if it was only limited to
matters pertaining to the identification of electronic correspondence.  The informant
had expressed that it was her clear understanding that she would remain completely
anonymous with respect to the particular investigation and she did not want her
identity and real name exposed.  The record suggests that the informant’s concerns
were driven by her fear that this matter would have a negative impact upon her
personal domestic litigation problems.
Although clearly imprudent and misdirected, Cox sympathized with the
informant’s dilemma, and, in attempting to accommodate the informant’s desire for
anonymity and to avoid aggravating the domestic situation in which the informant
was involved, Cox made the decision which has brought her to this day that all
lawyers must seek to avoid.  Based upon misplaced sympathies and a cloudy
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perception as to the role of the informant in the proceedings, Cox permitted the
case to flow and be conducted inappropriately.
The majority notes that the decisions upon which Cox has relied as
reasonably supporting the determination of the referee can be distinguished, but the
cases upon which the majority relies to reject the referee’s recommendation can
also be clearly distinguished in numerous significant ways.  Here, the referee, having
the benefit of personal participation in the proceedings, found that six very
substantial mitigating factors should be applied in connection with the consideration
of the discipline to be imposed.  Further, the substantial evidence from multiple
judicial officers based upon Cox’s professional behavior cannot be so lightly
disregarded.  It must be recognized that cases involving the type of behavior for
which Cox must respond here have generated discipline covering the entire range of
sanctions from public reprimands to disbarments.  There can be no doubt that the
violation of the duty of candor undermines the system; however,  with the
previously approved discipline having such a broad range based upon the decisions
from this Court, a rejection of the determination by the referee here is, in my view,
merely substituting the personal views of those here for those of the referee, a result
which the decisions of this Court counsel against.  As very clearly noted in Florida
Bar v. Niles, 644 So. 2d 504, 506-07 (Fla. 1994):
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[A] referee’s recommendation on discipline is afforded a presumption
of correctness unless the recommendation is clearly erroneous or not
supported by the evidence.  See The Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So.
2d 1165, 1168 (Fla. 1986);  The Florida Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d
116 (Fla. 1992).
In my view, the result here does not afford proper respect to the determination of
the referee and the evidence presented.
While one may agree or disagree with the determination in Florida Bar v.
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1989), in that case, a public reprimand was
imposed in connection with conduct intended to mislead and deceive an appellate
court.  Forgery was found to exist in connection with legal proceedings in Florida
Bar v. Fatolitis, 546 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1989), which resulted in a public reprimand.
Lack of candor during the discovery process produced a public reprimand in
Florida Bar v. Wright, 520 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1988), and a public reprimand was
imposed for false statements made by an attorney who had been subject to prior
disciplinary action in Florida Bar v. McLawhorn, 535 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1988).
False testimony produced a public reprimand in Florida Bar v. Batman, 511
So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1987), as was the result in connection with the filing of a false
affidavit in Florida Bar v. Hagglund, 372 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1979).  See also  Florida
Bar v. Pearce, 356 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1978); Florida Bar re Brooks, 336 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1976);  Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d  398 (Fla. 1965).  
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It is interesting to note that this Court recently approved the issuance of a
public reprimand in connection with the actions of a judicial officer who had both
initiated a proceeding and then provided false and misleading testimony in that
proceeding, which compromised the integrity of the legal system, in In re Frank,
753 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 2000).  I agree that Florida Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So. 2d 933
(Fla. 2000), may certainly have some distinguishing features, but the underlying
principle which applies here is that a public reprimand recommended by a local
referee was recently considered by this Court to be within the range of appropriate
discipline where a governmental attorney engaged in conduct involving a lack of
candor in connection with a legal proceeding and had undermined the fundamental
attorney-client relationship in the criminal context.  
In a similar manner, the range of approved discipline in connection with these
types of cases falls far below that directed to be imposed today.  The mitigation
was far less significant in Florida Bar v. Corbin, 701 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997), but a
ninety-day suspension was imposed for deliberately misrepresenting material facts
to a court, knowingly submitting false affidavits, and deliberately attempting to
mislead the Bar where the individual involved also had prior disciplinary offenses
and possessed a dishonest motive.  See also Florida Bar v. Story, 529 So. 2d 1114
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(Fla. 1988); Florida Bar v. Morrison, 496 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1986); Florida Bar v.
Shapiro, 456 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1984).
While I do not condone that which occurred in this case and find it both
troubling and aggravating due to the nature of the circumstances, I would not
second-guess the referee, merely substitute my view for his, and reject his
recommendation, which was reached only after careful consideration of the ethical
violation, the purposes of discipline, the wide range of sanctions previously
approved in decisions from this Court, the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and, most importantly, the nature, scope, and extent of the
evidentiary proceedings upon which the referee relied in making the
recommendation of discipline.  I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Division
Director, Tallahassee, Florida; and Debra Joyce Davis, Assistant Staff Counsel,
Tampa, Florida,
for Complainant
David A. Maney of Maney, Damsker & Jones, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent