Title: ALLEN S. NELSON v. CRIMSON ENTERPRISES, INC., A Georgia Corporation, and THOMAS W. DURANT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALLEN S. NELSON v. CRIMSON ENTERPRISES, INC., A Georgia Corporation, and THOMAS W. DURANT1989 WY 151777 P.2d 73Case Number: 88-299Decided: 07/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALLEN S. NELSON, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

CRIMSON ENTERPRISES, 
INC., A GEORGIA CORPORATION, AND THOMAS W. DURANT, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Jack Gage of 
Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Paul J. Hickey 
and John M. Walker of Hickey & Evans, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and BROWN, Ret. J.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     In his wrongful 
termination action, appellant Allen S. Nelson contends that he was fired by his 
employer because he made a telephone call to the Waste, Fraud and Abuse Hotline 
at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base. Appellees state that Nelson was fired for 
insubordination. The trial court granted appellees' summary judgment and this 
appeal followed.

[¶2.]     Appellant states the 
following issues:

1. Can a Wyoming employee state a 
cause of action for wrongful termination based upon a public policy exception to 
the employment at will doctrine?

2. If the answer to No. 1 
is either "no" or in the alternative this court does not choose to decide this 
question at this time, can a civilian employee working for a United States 
Department of Defense contractor state a cause of action for wrongful 
termination based upon the language of 10 U.S.C. § 2409?

3. Assuming that the 
answer to either numbers 1 or 2 is yes, under the facts of this case, is there a 
genuine issue as to any material fact so that the trial court erred in granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment?

4. Did the trial court 
err when it failed to grant plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, on 
the question of plaintiff's wrongful termination which plaintiff contended had 
been determined by the State Unemployment Commission?

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Appellant (Nelson) was 
employed at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base by a government defense contractor, 
Crimson Enterprises, Inc. (Crimson), and worked under the supervision of Thomas 
Durant (Durant). His employment by Crimson lasted from May 1983 until his 
termination on December 30, 1987. Events pertinent to this appeal transpired on 
December 30, 1987 as follows: A considerable amount of snow had fallen by the 
time Nelson went to work. He parked his car in front of the home of a base 
resident who had cleared snow to park a personal vehicle. The base resident 
called the Crimson office and asked that the Nelson vehicle be moved from the 
shoveled-out parking place. Durant said that he would arrange to have that done. 
Durant contacted a co-worker of Nelson's to convey the message that the vehicle 
should be moved, but Nelson did not comply with that request. After the lunch 
hour, Durant found Nelson and personally directed him to move his 
vehicle.

[¶5.]     Nelson drove the 
company vehicle back to the office at a high rate of speed. He parked, shoveled 
out another area of snow, and moved his vehicle to the newly cleared area. 
Durant berated Nelson for shoveling snow on company time and Nelson retorted 
that he had shoveled snow for an hour that morning without recompense. Durant 
then directed the secretary to pay Nelson for an hour 
overtime.

[¶6.]     When Nelson moved his 
vehicle, he went in and out of the office getting parts and slamming the door. 
Durant ordered him not to slam the door anymore and, ultimately, Nelson went 
into Durant's office where they had a loud and hostile confrontation. Durant 
told Nelson to get back to work or get his tools and leave. Nelson left Durant's 
office and, using a telephone at the desk of Durant's secretary, Dee Velasquez, 
called the base information operator and asked for the Waste, Fraud and Abuse 
Hotline number.1 In his testimony, Nelson stated 
that he did call the Waste, Fraud and Abuse Hotline and talked to the answering 
service saying, "I want to report some waste, fraud and abuse, my name is Scott 
Nelson and my phone number is 634-6420."

[¶7.]     Neither Dee Velasquez 
nor Craig Hanesworth, who was also in the outer office, heard an alleged second 
call, although they heard the first call when Nelson asked for the "Waste, Fraud 
and Abuse Hotline" number.

[¶8.]     Nelson returned to work 
but was called back to the office late in the afternoon and given a letter of 
termination for insubordination. Between the time Nelson left the office and was 
called back and terminated, Durant called the Department of Labor to inquire if 
he could fire Nelson.

[¶9.]     Nelson subsequently 
filed an application with the State of Wyoming Unemployment Commission (Commission) 
which Crimson contested. Nelson's claim for unemployment payments went to 
hearing before the Commission and the Commission hearing officer determined that 
Nelson was not fired for cause. The hearing officer's decision was appealed by 
Crimson and affirmed by the Commission.

[¶10.]  An "at-will" employee may be discharged 
at any time and for any reason or for no reason. In Rompf v. John Q. Hammons 
Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 1984), this court stated: "[E]mployment 
for an indefinite period may be terminated by either party at any time and for 
any reason without incurring liability." See also Siebken v. Town of Wheatland, 700 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo. 1985); Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607, 611 (Wyo. 1967); Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 
246 (1943); Casper National Bank v. Curry, 51 Wyo. 284, 65 P.2d 1116, 1120-21 
(1937). Nelson concedes that he was an "at-will" employee.

[¶11.]  This court has recognized limited 
exceptions to the at-will relationship. However, those exceptions are not 
applicable to this appeal. Griess v. Consolidated Freightways, 776 P.2d 752; 
Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986); Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385, 
1387-89 (Wyo. 1985) and Mobil Coal Producing, 
Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶12.]  Appellant urges this court to: (1) Adopt 
a "public policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine;2 (2) adopt the doctrine of an 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment agreement;3 and (3) recognize a cause of action 
created by 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (Supp. V 1987) which states in 
part:

An employee of a defense 
contractor may not be discharged, * * * as a reprisal for disclosing to * * * 
the Department of Defense * * * information relating to a substantial violation 
of law relating to a defense contract * * *.

[¶13.]  If this court should adopt any of the 
theories urged by Nelson, appellees then urge that we adopt the doctrine of 
"dual motive," succinctly stated in Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 
Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119, 122 (1978):

[E]ven when an important 
public policy is involved, an employer may discharge an employee if he has a 
separate, plausible, and legitimate reason for doing so.

[¶14.]  In this case we need not adopt nor refuse 
to adopt any of the theories or doctrines urged by Nelson. He has not shown 
specific facts demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists under 
any of the three theories he suggests.

[¶15.]  In Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987), we held:

A motion for summary 
judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a prima 
facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to 
present specific facts showing that a genuine issue material fact does exist. 
England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-1141 (1986). We 
analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. Conclusory statements or mere 
opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's burden. Jones 
Land & Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Wyo.,733 P.2d 258, 263 
(1987).

Evidence 
opposing a summary judgment that is conclusory or speculative is insufficient 
and the trial court has no duty to anticipate possible proof. Gates v. Life of 
Montana Insurance Company, 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 
(1982).

[¶16.]  Apparently Nelson does not contend that 
Durant did not have cause to fire him; but rather contends that a later improper 
motive to fire Nelson developed. In his reply brief, Nelson 
states:

If Durant had fired 
Nelson during the confrontation, then Nelson would not have a cause of 
action.

Nelson also 
says:

[O]f course, Nelson can 
be fired for talking in a derogatory manner to Durant. If Durant had fired 
Nelson on the spot, no argument.

[¶17.]  Nelson contends, however, that there is a 
question to be resolved by the trier of fact: "Why did Durant fire Nelson?" The 
affidavits and depositions considered by the court, insofar as they touch on the 
reason for firing, indicate that Nelson was fired for insubordination and 
talking in a derogatory manner to Durant, his supervisor. No other reason is 
stated in the evidence before the district court. Appellees made a prima facie 
case showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed. The burden 
therefore shifted to Nelson to present specific facts showing that an issue did 
exist. Boehm, 748 P.2d  at 704; Gates, 638 P.2d  at 1063.

[¶18.]  Nelson speculates that he was fired 
because of his telephone call to the "hot line." There is no evidence to support 
this suspicion. There is no evidence that Durant even knew about the "hot line" 
call, only speculation that he may have known. Mr. Hanesworth was in the outer 
office when Nelson made the call. In Hanesworth's deposition he was asked about 
Durant's knowledge of the "hot line" call.

Q. [Mr. Gage] Do you 
recall any discussion between Velasquez and Durant wherein they discussed the 
fact that Scott had called for the number for Waste, Fraud and 
Abuse?

A. No, 
sir.

Q. Do you recall any 
discussion between you and Velasquez -

A. 
No.

Q. - on that same 
subject? And you do recall any discussion between Durant and you about the fact 
that he called for that number?

A. No, 
sir.

Durant's 
deposition testimony is consistent with Hanesworth's 
testimony.

[¶19.]  Nelson further speculates that Durant 
overheard his call to "Waste, Fraud and Abuse." This guess is based on the 
proximity of Durant's office to the telephone from which the call was made. The 
telephone was fifteen feet from the wall separating Durant's office from the 
desk of Ms. Velasquez. We do not know if Durant had his ear to the wall in his 
office or if he was at a more distant point in his office working. Nelson 
produced deposition testimony that people in the outer office heard Nelson and 
Durant exchanging pleasantries (actually hollering) in Durant's office. Also, 
Ms. Velasquez heard Durant make the call to the Department of Labor. Nelson 
employs a speculation upon a speculation to support the notion that he was 
improperly fired. Nelson has not met his burden by presenting specific facts 
showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Boehm, 748 P.2d  at 704. 
The trial court need not anticipate possible proofs. Gates, 638 P.2d  at 
1063.

[¶20.]  After Nelson's termination at Crimson, he 
filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Wyoming Employment Security 
Commission. On February 24, 1988, a hearing on Nelson's termination was held by 
the Commission's hearing officer. The hearing officer ruled that Nelson's 
termination was not for cause and that he was entitled to unemployment 
compensation. Crimson appealed that decision. On May 24, 1988, the Wyoming 
Employment Security Commission affirmed the hearing officer. Nelson contends 
that "the Employment Security Commission's finding is conclusive in this case 
and does not need to be relitigated."

[¶21.]  Nelson contends in his fourth assignment 
of error that the trial court erred in its failure to grant his motion for 
partial summary judgment on the question of his wrongful termination which he 
contends had been determined by the State Unemployment Commission. Appellees 
contend, among other things, that W.S. 27-3-406(c) provides that the 
Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law are not binding. The 
statute provides:

Any determination, 
redetermination, finding of fact, conclusion of law, order, decision, or final 
judgment entered or made by a deputy, appeal tribunal, special examiner, the 
executive director, the commission, or a court of competent jurisdiction 
pursuant to this act or the rules and regulations of the commission is binding 
only between the commission and all adverse parties thereto, and is not binding, 
conclusive, or admissible in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding 
between an individual and employing unit previously subject to this act, 
regardless of whether the prior action before the commission was between the 
same or related parties or involved the same facts.

[¶22.]  The action here was commenced January 27, 
1988. The hearing of the Commission was held before the effective date of the 
statute (June 9, 1988). Appellees point to language in the statute which they 
claim covers judicial action that is subsequent to proceedings before the 
Commission, notwithstanding the fact that the circumstances giving rise to the 
cause of action (termination December 30, 1987) occurred before the statute and 
the Commission's actions.

[¶23.]  We need not decide if W.S. 27-3-406(c) 
has impact on this litigation. We think the rule set out in the statute was the 
law before the legislature acted. A legislative enactment is frequently a 
codification of the common law. We think that is the case here. Nelson says in 
his reply brief:

The legislature is 
presumed to have intended a change in the existing law and the courts will 
endeavor to give effect to the change. AlbanyCounty 
Weed & Pest Control v. Board of CountyComm'r. of County of Albany, 592 P.2d 1154, 1157-58 (Wyo. 1979) 
(dictum).

[¶24.]  Appellate courts recite the above 
reasoning when they want to hold that there was a change in the law. If the 
court wants to hold that there was no change in the law, they do not attribute 
that much knowledge to the legislature. In any case, a presumption is just that 
- a presumption, and used only in the absence of better reasoning. "The 
legislature [cannot] be restrained from legislating upon any subject." Story v. 
Jersey City and 
Bergen Point Plank Road Company, 16 N.J. Eq. 13, 84 Am.Dec. 134 
(1863).

[¶25.]  In his fourth and final assignment of 
error, Nelson apparently is urging the court to apply the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel to the circumstances here. The issues before the district court were 
separate, distinct and totally 
unrelated to the limited issue before the Commission.

[¶26.]  The question of whether or not Nelson was 
discharged for misconduct so as to disqualify him for benefits is distinct from 
the question of whether or not Nelson's firing, as an at-will employee, was 
wrongful. The fact that the Commission determined that Nelson qualifies for 
unemployment benefits does not decide whether he was wrongfully terminated from 
his job. That question was never fully or fairly litigated before the 
Commission, nor was it distinctly and directly ruled upon by the Commission. See 
Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶27.]  Any notion of preclusion, based upon the 
prior Commission proceeding, requires, at a minimum, that the specific issue 
before the Commission be the same as the issue before this court. The issues in 
this case are separate and distinct from the sole and limited issue before the 
Commission. See Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1975) and Rust v. 
First National Bank of Pinedale, 466 F. Supp. 135 (D.Wyo. 1979). The doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, as that doctrine relates to findings or conclusions of the 
Commission, does not apply to the specific issues currently before this court. 
Nelson's motion for summary judgment was properly denied. The summary judgment 
in favor of appellees was properly granted.

[¶28.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Appellees here are 
defendants in criminal case 88-00091, United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming. That case involves the defendants' activities at Warren Air 
Force Base.

2 This doctrine was 
explained in Wagenseller v. ScottsdaleMemorialHospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 
1031-32 (1985) (footnotes omitted):

The public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine began with a narrow rule permitting employees 
to sue their employers when a statute expressly prohibited their discharge. See 
Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949) 
(statute prohibiting discharge for serving as an election officer). This 
formulation was then expanded to include any discharge in violation of a 
statutory expression of public policy. See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (discharge for refusal to commit perjury). 
Courts later allowed a cause of action for violation of public policy, even in 
the absence of a specific statutory prohibition. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 
536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for being absent from work to serve on jury 
duty). The New Hampshire Supreme Court announced perhaps the most expansive rule 
when it held an employer liable for discharging an employee who refused to go 
out with her foreman. The court concluded that termination "motivated by bad 
faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the 
economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment 
contract." Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 
(1974). Although no other court has gone this far, a majority of the states have 
now either recognized a cause of action based on the public policy exception or 
have indicated their willingness to consider it, given appropriate facts. The 
key to an employee's claim in all of these cases is the proper definition of a 
public policy that has been violated by the employer's 
actions.

3

A number of 
jurisdictions have recently held that at-will employment contracts, like other 
contracts, contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their 
performance or enforcement. Mitford v. de Lasala, 
Alas., 666 P.2d 1000 (1983); Gates v. Life of 
Montana Insurance Company, Mont. [196 
Mont. 178] 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Company, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 
(1977). These courts have looked at the circumstances surrounding the employee's 
dismissal and the duration of his employment in determining whether the employee 
stated a valid claim for breach of contract. In Mitford v. de Lasala, supra, and 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Company, supra, the courts held that the duty 
of good faith inherent in an at-will employment contract prohibited an employer 
from dismissing a long-term employee in order to prevent his sharing in profits 
or collecting commissions pursuant to the contract. In Gates v. Life of Montana 
Insurance Company, supra, and Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, the 
courts overturned summary judgments against employees who alleged that their 
employment contracts for indefinite terms had been terminated contrary to 
established termination procedures. * * * We will reserve a decision on the 
viability of this doctrine in this state until a proper case is before 
us.

Rompf, 685 P.2d  
at 27-28 (footnote omitted).