Title: Perez v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD PEREZ, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 341, 2010 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 30111075DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: August 10, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 10th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Richard Perez, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for modification of sentence.  
Perez’s motion sought credit toward his Delaware sentence for 210 days he 
claims he spent in a Delaware prison awaiting trial on his Delaware charges.  
The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on 
the ground that it is manifest on the face of Perez’s opening brief that his 
appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
2
(2) 
The record reflects that Perez was sentenced on September 11, 
1992 in Harford County, Maryland to a twenty-year mandatory term of 
incarceration.  Immediately thereafter, Perez was transferred to Delaware to 
stand trial on a pending rape charge.  On April 26, 1993, Perez pled guilty to 
one count of third degree unlawful sexual intercourse, and the Superior 
Court immediately sentenced him to seven years at Level V incarceration.  
After the Delaware sentencing proceeding, Perez was transferred back to 
Maryland to serve his Maryland sentence.  On January 27, 1996, Perez was 
transferred back to Delaware pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact 
Agreement to complete service of his Maryland sentence and then his 
Delaware sentence.  Perez has filed various unsuccessful motions attempting 
to receive credit for time he has served in prison, to be applied toward both 
of his respective sentences.1   
(3) 
In his latest motion, Perez argued that the 210 days that he 
spent in prison awaiting trial in Delaware, from September 1992 to April 
1993, should be applied toward his Delaware sentence.  In support of his 
argument, Perez cites to 11 Del. C. § 3901(c), which provides that “[a]ny 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Perez v. State, 2002 WL 549401 (Del. Dec. 12, 2002). 
 
3
period of actual incarceration of a person awaiting trial…shall be credited to 
the person in determining the termination date of the sentence.”2   
(4) 
Perez ignores, however, § 3901(b) and § 3901(d), which 
provide, respectively, that prison sentences may not run concurrently and 
that the sentence for a defendant who is currently imprisoned under another 
sentence shall begin to run upon the expiration of the earlier sentence.3  In 
Perez’s case, he was sentenced by the Maryland court in September 1992 
and was serving his Maryland sentence, albeit in Delaware, while awaiting 
trial on his Delaware criminal charges.  He is not entitled to credit toward his 
Delaware sentence for time he served toward his Maryland sentence.   
(5) 
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ respective 
positions carefully.  We find it manifest that the judgment below should be 
affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court’s well-reasoned decision dated 
May 18, 2010.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
2 11 Del. C. § 3901(c). 
3 11 Del. C. §§ 3901(b), (d).