Title: People v. Ganus

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Ganus, No. 82376 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 82376-Agenda 29-May 1998.
Opinion filed December 31, 1998.
JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Randolph County, defendant, 
Victor Ganus, was found guilty of first degree murder in connection with the 
death of Lucas Gonzales in October 1988. At the time of the murder, defendant 
was an inmate at the Menard Correctional Center where he was serving a natural 
life sentence for the 1985 murder of Richard Misslich. Lucas Gonzales, the 
victim in the present case, was a fellow inmate at Menard. After the jury found 
defendant guilty of the murder of Gonzales, a bifurcated hearing was held before 
the same jury to determine whether defendant should be sentenced to death. The 
jury first determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty on the 
basis of the statutory aggravating factors that defendant had been convicted of 
murdering two or more individuals (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3)) 
and also that the murdered individual was an inmate of an institution of the 
Department of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(2)). 
Thereafter, following the presentation of evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation, the jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to 
preclude the imposition of the death sentence, and the trial court sentenced 
defendant to death. This court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on 
direct appeal. People v. Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d 466 (1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1083, 122 L. Ed. 2d 362, 113 S. Ct. 1055 (1993). Defendant 
subsequently filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 
5/122-1 et seq. (West 1992)), seeking relief from his conviction and 
sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's 
petition and this appeal followed.
The victim, Lucas Gonzales, was killed in his cell at Menard in November 
1988. Defendant confessed his responsibility for the crime to Illinois 
Department of Corrections (Department) officials. According to defendant's 
statement to the Department officials, on November 5, 1988, he "thought about" 
robbing and murdering Gonzales in Cell 530. Defendant obtained a knife and 
fashioned a garrote from pieces of wood and the wire from a broom. The next 
morning, defendant told the inmates in Cell 523 to be away from their cell in 
the afternoon. Defendant went to Cell 523 after lunch, waited until Gonzales was 
alone, and then proceeded to his cell. There, defendant choked Gonzales with the 
garrote until Gonzales was unconscious. Defendant reported to authorities that 
he told Gonzales that "he [Gonzales] raped the wrong `bitch' out in the street." 
Defendant explained that he learned this information from other inmates in 
connection with his job as "cell house security" for the Latin Kings 
"organization."
Two of defendant's fellow inmates testified at trial that defendant had asked 
them to leave their cell on the day of the murder, as defendant had indicated in 
his confession. An autopsy on the victim revealed that the cause of death was 
asphyxiation due to strangulation and blood loss from stab wounds.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his claims 
seeking post-conviction relief on the based on the violation of his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Defendant argues that trial 
counsel failed to adequately develop and present mitigating evidence that 
defendant did not act entirely on his own initiative in the murder of Lucas 
Gonzales. According to defendant, a "mountain" of evidence was available to 
demonstrate that the murder was a "concerted gang hit." Defendant argues that 
the jurors might have been inclined to spare his life if they believed others 
shared responsibility for the murder. According to defendant, counsel's failure 
to show the circumstances of the murder left the jurors with the impression that 
defendant had the cunning and wherewithal to plan and carry out the Gonzales 
murder by himself. Defendant contends that because trial counsel raised the 
"gang hit" theory but failed to provide sufficient evidentiary support, the jury 
may have viewed defendant as deceitful and cowardly in attempting to shift the 
blame for the killing to others. Defendant also contends that trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to correct a misimpression created by the prosecution that 
defendant had killed his earlier victim, Richard Misslich, in the same manner 
that he killed Lucas Gonzalez. Finally, defendant faults trial counsel for 
failing to investigate mitigating evidence of defendant's mental condition.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated in accordance with 
the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In order to succeed on such a claim, 
the defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel and resultant 
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2064. To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show "that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. This entails demonstrating that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693-94, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064-65.
We will address defendant's contentions in an order different from that 
presented in his appellate brief. We begin with defendant's claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence of 
defendant's mental health and cognitive functioning. In support of his 
post-conviction petition, defendant submitted a report of a neuropsychological 
evaluation conducted by Michael M. Gelbort, Ph.D., in 1993. Based on a 
defendant's background and health history, and the results of neuropsychological 
testing, Dr. Gelbort observed that defendant was alert, oriented to person, 
place and time, and appropriate in mood and affect. However, Dr. Gelbort noted 
that defendant was easily angered and "hypervigilant" to threat, "react[ing] 
very quickly with little or no intervening thought processes." According to Dr. 
Gelbort,"[t]his emotional volatility is seen throughout his history and is 
consistent with, as well as a likely outgrowth of[,] his neurocognitive deficits 
and dysfunction." Dr. Gelbort summarized his findings as follows:
Defendant also submitted a written psychological evaluation prepared by Harry 
E. Gunn, Ph.D. Based on his examination and testing, Dr. Gunn observed that 
defendant had a tendency to be excessively absorbed with his own needs and 
insufficiently aware of the need of others. Defendant is impulsive, shows poor 
judgment and has difficulty controlling himself. Defendant yearned for personal 
relationships with others, but feared rejection and felt "unworthy." Defendant's 
demanding nature and lack of social skills compounds his difficulties in 
developing relationships. Dr. Gunn noted indications of substantial depression 
and feelings of futility. Dr. Gunn's report concludes with the observations 
that,"[d]iagnostically [defendant] shows a Severe Depression Disorder NOS with 
an underlying Borderline Personality Disorder. He is at times impulsive and 
particularly with the MMPI-2 shows `Psychopathic Deviancy.' "
Although defense counsel evidently did not enlist the services of a 
practicing psychologist or psychiatrist to evaluate defendant's condition, it is 
important to emphasize that in other respects defense counsel was extremely well 
prepared for sentencing. This is not a case where counsel essentially neglected 
to prepare for sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992). Counsel did not treat the sentencing phase as "a mere 
postscript to the trial." Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 
1989). To the contrary, the record shows that defense counsel consulted with 
attorneys experienced in the defense of capital cases, and obtained the 
assistance of David Randall, a court-appointed mitigation specialist who began 
his investigation of mitigating evidence months before trial. Although Randall 
was not a licensed psychologist, he had earned an undergraduate degree in 
psychology and was nearing completion of his studies for a Ph.D. in clinical 
psychology. Randall's training involved work in clinical settings and 
counselling students. Randall investigated defendant's background and compiled a 
social history which formed the basis of the defense's mitigation strategy.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel presented the testimony of several 
members of defendant's family who related the details of defendant's 
exceptionally troubled childhood. According to these witnesses defendant endured 
severe physical and emotional abuse and neglect at the hands of his volatile and 
domineering father, Kenneth Ganus. The evidence indicated that Kenneth Ganus 
refused to acknowledge paternity of defendant, claiming that defendant's mother 
was out "fooling around" and somebody else got her pregnant. Kenneth Ganus 
referred to defendant as "ugly" and "retarded." Kenneth Ganus also frequently 
administered severe physical beatings to defendant, his mother and his siblings. 
In the words of defendant's uncle, Kenneth Ganus "beat [the children], slapped 
them, kicked them around." Kenneth Ganus never bought gifts for any of his 
children except at Christmas, and even then defendant received nothing. Evidence 
was presented that on two occasions when defendant suffered accidental injuries, 
Kenneth Ganus neglected or only reluctantly obtained appropriate medical 
attention for defendant.
Additionally, David Randall testified regarding the results of his 
investigation of defendant's social history. Randall related information 
contained in the presentence report prepared in 1986 in connection with 
defendant's first murder conviction. Randall noted that defendant had withdrawn 
from public school in 1978 because he was placed in a juvenile facility operated 
by the Department of Corrections. Department records showed that intelligence 
testing conducted when defendant was a juvenile indicated an IQ of 81, placing 
defendant in the "dull-normal" or "low average" range. Testing also indicated 
the possibility that defendant suffered from dyslexia. According to the 
Department records of defendant's health history, defendant had once attempted 
to commit suicide by ingesting valium. Defendant also had a history of 
frequently running away from home.
Evidence was presented that defendant had a history of drug and alcohol use 
reaching back to the age of 12. During a period of incarceration in Missouri, 
defendant began to "shoot" narcotics (apparently heroin). Defendant's brother, 
Terry Ganus, picked defendant up after his release and drove him back to 
Illinois. Terry Ganus testified that defendant's physical appearance scared him: 
defendant looked "hard and mean" and had lost a considerable amount of weight. 
During the ride, defendant "bought a couple of bottles of Jack Daniels and just 
guzzled them." Forty-one days after being released from prison in Missouri, 
defendant murdered Richard Misslich, and was subsequently sentenced to natural 
life in prison. While serving that sentence, defendant killed Lucas Gonzales, 
giving rise to the present case.
Viewing counsel's performance as a whole under the particular circumstances 
of this case, while it might have been advisable to more fully investigate 
defendant's psychological or psychiatric condition, we cannot say that the 
failure to do so constitutes an error "so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. 
With respect to a defense attorney's duty to investigate, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated as follows:
Here, counsel undertook an extensive investigation of defendant's social 
history with the assistance of a court-appointed mitigation specialist trained 
in psychology. That investigation produced a promising (although ultimately 
unsuccessful) strategy to show, in human terms, the forces in defendant's life 
that contributed to his behavior. Under these circumstances, having identified a 
potentially powerful mitigation strategy,(1) 
we do not believe counsel acted unreasonably in limiting his investigation 
accordingly. Counsel could make a reasonable decision to base his mitigation 
strategy on defendant's social history, and could make a reasonable, informed 
judgment that pursuit of formal psychological and psychiatric evaluations of 
defendant would not be fruitful.
Defendant argues, however, that trial counsel's decision not to obtain a 
psychiatric or psychological evaluation was based on a misapprehension of law 
and cannot be considered a reasonable strategic decision. In our view, the 
record does not bear out this assertion. During his testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing on defendant's post-conviction petition, defendant's trial attorney was 
asked whether he considered having defendant evaluated by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist. Defendant's trial attorney responded, "Not in this particular case 
because I felt that it could have been counterproductive." Defendant now 
contends that trial counsel labored under the mistaken belief that the results 
of any evaluation by a consulting psychiatrist or psychologist would have been 
available to the prosecution. Defendant's interpretation of trial counsel's 
remark is sheer speculation. Trial counsel merely indicated that he thought such 
evaluations might be "counterproductive"; he did not explain why or how. 
Defendant could have asked trial counsel to elaborate on his answer, but 
defendant failed to do so, and we decline to adopt his speculative 
interpretation of trial counsel's testimony.
This court has acknowledged the critical importance of a defendant's 
background and mental health to the sentencing decision. See People v. 
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 537 (1995). It has been observed that 
"[p]sychiatric mitigating evidence `has the potential to totally change the 
evidentiary picture.' " Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1515 (11th 
Cir. 1995), quoting Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir. 
1988). Defendant is certainly correct in noting that the failure or alleged 
failure to investigate such evidence has figured into decisions of this court 
ordering some form of relief to defendants in capital cases. See, e.g., 
People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995) (cause remanded for 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 
(1992) (cause remanded for new sentencing hearing). However, while these 
decisions provide important guidance, our case law establishes no rigid protocol 
for case preparation applicable in every capital prosecution. To do so would run 
afoul of Strickland, which noted:
Thus, while we continue to emphasize the general importance of psychiatric 
and psychological evidence, we decline to adopt any per se rule as to 
when an attorney must conduct an investigation into such evidence. Rather, the 
appropriate inquiry remains whether the decision not to investigate was 
reasonable given all the circumstances and applying a heavy measure of deference 
to counsel's judgments. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
As noted above, trial counsel prepared an extensive case in mitigation based 
on defendant's social history. The character and extent of counsel's preparation 
for sentencing sets this case apart from the cases relied on by defendant in 
support of his argument. See People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 
(1994) (defendant was entitled to evidentiary hearing on ineffective-assistance 
claim, where trial counsel allegedly failed to contact defendant's parents, 
siblings, children and certain friends, and relied on letters from acquaintances 
and friends as evidence in mitigation); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992) (defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing where the only 
evidence submitted by counsel at sentencing was a report of a Department of 
Corrections psychologist portraying the defendant in a negative light). In light 
of all the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that counsel's performance 
was deficient.
We next consider defendant's claim that counsel's performance was deficient 
because he failed to adequately develop a mitigating strategy based on the 
theory that the murder of Lucas Gonzales was a concerted "gang hit." On direct 
appeal, defendant argued that trial counsel had been ineffective in eliciting 
prejudicial evidence of defendant's gang ties at the guilt stage in a misguided 
attempt to establish the legally unavailable defense of compulsion. People 
v. Ganus, 148 Ill. 2d 466, 470-71 (1992). This court rejected the argument, 
observing that although defendant was not entitled to assert a compulsion 
defense with respect to the question of guilt or innocence, the gang evidence 
was relevant in mitigation insofar as it might suggest that was coerced by other 
gang members to kill Gonzales and may have feared reprisals if he refused to do 
so.
Defendant now argues that trial counsel did not go far enough in effectuating 
this strategy. Defendant bases his argument on the written report summarizing 
the Department's investigation. The report implicates two inmates in addition to 
defendant-Anthony Perez and Alfredo Hernandez-in the Gonzales murder. The report 
indicated that Perez had been identified as acting in a possible "security role" 
during the attack on Gonzales and had been observed going into Gonzales' cell. 
In addition, an inmate reported that on the day of the murder, Perez asked him 
to hold on to a pair of bloodstained jeans. According to the report, Hernandez 
had been observed with defendant in Cell 523, where defendant, by his own 
admission, waited before the murder.
Notwithstanding the contents of the Department report, we are unpersuaded by 
defendant's argument. Needless to say, the possible involvement of other inmates 
in the murder does not absolve defendant of responsibility for the offense, nor 
would it necessarily preclude imposition of the death penalty. While the "gang 
hit"/compulsion theory may have been part of trial counsel's overall mitigation 
strategy to avoid a death sentence, it is not the function of this court to 
prescribe, under the auspices of the sixth amendment, the extent to which 
defense counsel should have emphasized this theory or the manner in which it 
should have been presented. Rather, these were matters requiring the exercise of 
counsel's independent professional judgment.
Defendant contends, however, that trial counsel failed to examine the 
investigation materials, and therefore, the failure to use the information 
contained therein was not an informed strategic decision. The record does not 
support this contention. Defendant's trial counsel was called to testify at the 
evidentiary hearing on defendant's post-conviction petition. During counsel's 
testimony, the following colloquy occurred:
Defendant cites the emphasized portion of trial counsel's answer as evidence 
that counsel had not investigated the circumstances of the murder. While counsel 
did not conduct an independent investigation of the murder, it is 
abundantly clear from counsel's entire answer that he was familiar with the 
extensive investigation conducted by the Department. Accordingly, defendant's 
claim is without merit.
Defendant also faults trial counsel for allowing the prosecution to give the 
jury the impression that the two murders defendant committed-the murder of Lucas 
Gonzales in the present case and the prior murder of Richard Misslich-involved 
the same modus operandi: strangulation with a wire. During trial, a 
Department investigator testified that one of the reasons defendant was 
suspected of the murder was because "[w]e checked his file for background, 
indicating he also committed a murder with a wire before, the same style of 
murder." Defendant contends that this statement was inaccurate because the 
murder of Richard Misslich involved a stabbing during an armed robbery in which 
defendant had an accomplice. According to defendant, trial counsel should have 
corrected this testimony, and the failure to do so allowed the jury to believe 
that defendant "for the second time had gone off alone and cut his victim's 
throat with a wire, when the evidence in fact showed that in the first murder he 
neither acted alone nor used a wire." Defendant's argument is meritless. The 
Department investigator did not testify that defendant acted alone in the 
earlier murder. Thus his testimony was not inaccurate in this respect. 
Additionally, a pathology report concerning Richard Misslich-which appears in 
the record as an exhibit to defendant's post-conviction petition-indicates not 
only the presence of stab wounds, but also "possible ligature 
strangulation."
Defendant also argues on appeal that the prosecution knowingly used false 
testimony to obtain defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant cites the 
trial testimony of a Department investigator that the investigation produced no 
physical evidence that anyone other than defendant was involved in the murder. 
Defendant contends that this is contrary to the Department's investigation 
report, which indicated that on the day of the murder inmate Anthony Perez had 
asked another inmate to hold on to a pair of bloodstained jeans for him.
Defendant did not assert this claim of a constitutional violation in his 
post-conviction petition, and accordingly the issue is waived. We observe that 
defendant's failure to properly raise the claim below has deprived the State of 
the opportunity to clarify the apparent discrepancy between the investigator's 
testimony at trial and the investigative report. Defendant argues that 
considerations of fundamental fairness require relaxation of the waiver 
doctrine. We disagree. With due regard for the seriousness of the charge of the 
knowing use of false testimony by the State, we do not believe that such a 
charge invariably relieves a defendant of the responsibility to present his or 
her constitutional claim in an orderly manner in compliance with basic rules of 
procedure. Moreover, the allegedly false testimony consisted of an isolated 
remark and was not so significant to the issues in the case as to implicate 
considerations of fundamental fairness. Accordingly, the claim is waived.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Randolph 
County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order 
setting Tuesday, May 11, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death 
entered in the circuit court of Randolph County is to be carried out. Defendant 
shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). 
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case 
to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and 
to the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, No. 81578 
(November 10, 1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. 
VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2). To the extent that the circuit court rejected Ganus' claim 
that he should be granted a new sentencing hearing, its judgment should 
therefore be reversed. Ganus' sentence of death should be vacated, and the cause 
should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence other than 
death.

Footnote:
1. We note that although the jury did not spare defendant from 
the death penalty, defendant's mitigation evidence did have an impact on the 
jury. Every juror signed a note to the court asking that "some kind of 
provisions be made to give Jeff Ganus [defendant's 10-year-old brother] a better 
chance at life."