Title: Allen v. State

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
PAMELA S. ALLEN and 
) 
KELLY D. ALLEN, 
 
) 
) 
Cross-Appellants, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC98929 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 32nd 
) 
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 
) 
) 
Cross-Appellant, 
) 
) 
and 
 
) 
) 
CAPE GIRARDEAU COUNTY and 
) 
CITY OF CAPE GIRARDEAU, MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondents.  
 
 
 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STODDARD COUNTY 
The Honorable Stephen R. Miller, Judge 
The State of Missouri, 32nd Judicial Circuit (“State”) appeals from a judgment 
entered in favor of Pamela Allen (“Allen”) and her husband (collectively the “Allens”) who 
sued the State, Cape Girardeau County (“County”), and the City of Cape Girardeau 
(“City”) after Allen fell down a flight of stairs in the Common Pleas Courthouse in Cape 
Girardeau (“Courthouse”).  On appeal, the State asserts the circuit court misapplied the law 
Opinion issued January 11, 2022
2 
 
regarding the waiver of sovereign immunity.  Specifically, the State claims the circuit court 
erred in: (1) overruling the State’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (“JNOV”) because there was insufficient evidence the stairs were in a dangerous 
condition; therefore, waiver of sovereign immunity was not justified; and (2) giving an 
erroneous jury instruction regarding waiver of sovereign immunity.  The State’s first claim 
lacks merit, as the Allens presented a submissible case that the stairway was a dangerous 
condition of which the State was sufficiently aware to waive sovereign immunity.  The 
State’s second claim, however, is meritorious.  Because the submitted jury instruction 
regarding waiver of sovereign immunity did not accurately state the law, this Court vacates 
the circuit court’s judgment as to the State and County.   
In a cross-appeal, the Allens also allege, among other claims, the circuit court 
erroneously applied the law of sovereign immunity.  Specifically, the Allens claim the 
circuit court erred in: (1) sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict because the City 
held an undivided one-half ownership interest in the Courthouse and this ownership interest 
was sufficient to subject the City to waiver of its sovereign immunity; (2) overruling the 
Allens’ motion for new trial because the judgment entered in the County’s favor was 
against the weight of the evidence in that the County also held an undivided one-half 
interest in the Courthouse; and (3) overruling the Allens’ motion for new trial because the 
judgment entered against Kelly Allen on his claim of loss of consortium was against the 
weight of the evidence.  The Allens’ first claim is meritorious.  Because the City possessed 
an ownership interest in the Courthouse, it was unnecessary for the Allens to introduce 
evidence that the City exercised “exclusive control and possession” over the stairwell to 
3 
 
establish the Courthouse stairwell was the City’s property.  For this reason, the Court 
vacates the circuit court judgment entered in the City’s favor.  The Allens’ second claim is 
moot.  Because the jury was improperly instructed on the law of sovereign immunity for 
the reasons claimed by the State, the State is entitled to further proceedings in which the 
liability of the State and the County is properly considered with the correct understanding 
of the law.  This Court, therefore, need not address the Allens’ claim that the judgment 
entered in the County’s favor was against the weight of the evidence.  Finally, this Court 
will not review the Allens’ third claim regarding the judgment entered against Allen’s 
husband, as this argument was never presented to the circuit court and, therefore, was not 
preserved.   
In summary, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed as to Allen’s husband’s loss of 
consortium claim.  In all other respects, the judgment is vacated.  The case is remanded for 
the circuit court to consider the liability of all three defendants in a manner consistent with 
this opinion.     
Factual and Procedural History 
The Courthouse is an historic building located in Cape Girardeau.  Built in 1854, 
the County and the City have held an undivided one-half ownership interest in the 
Courthouse since 1959.  In 1979, the City and County entered into an agreement whereby 
the County may occupy the entire space and assumes all responsibility for maintenance 
and repairs.  The agreement is still valid and preserves for the City the right to inspect the 
premises and withhold approval for any alterations.  The County made the entire space 
4 
 
available for the State’s use in 1991.1  Since then, the State has enjoyed sole occupancy of 
the Courthouse and uses it for court operations.  Pursuant to statute, however, the County, 
not the State, bears responsibility for obtaining the Courthouse space for the State and 
maintaining and repairing the Courthouse when necessary.2  
On August 26, 2013, Allen, an employee of United Land Title, visited the 
Courthouse to retrieve “a couple of judgments” for a work assignment.  These court records 
were located in the Courthouse basement.  It was not the first time Allen gathered records 
from the Courthouse basement; she had done so on 50 or more occasions during her time 
at the title company.  The circuit court clerk had the County install a lock on the door, 
making the staircase and the basement inaccessible without a key.  Allen approached the 
deputy clerk to request a key; the clerk advised her to “grab the key” and retrieve the 
documents.  Allen collected the key, unlocked the door to the basement stairway, left the 
door slightly ajar to allow additional light to illuminate the dark staircase, and began to 
descend, gripping the single handrail.  A few steps from the bottom landing, Allen’s foot 
slipped.  She fell, breaking her leg.  Allen crawled back up the stairs to call for help and 
was eventually transported to a hospital for her injuries.3  
                                                 
1 Section 478.035 requires the County to provide the State with “suitable quarters” in which 
to conduct circuit court business.  All statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
2 See § 478.035, supra n.1; see also § 49.310 (“[T]he county commission in each county 
in this state shall erect and maintain … a good and sufficient courthouse … and necessary 
fireproof buildings for the preservation of the records of the county….  In pursuance of the 
authority … the county commission may … construct, reconstruct, remodel, repair, 
maintain and equip the courthouse.”).   
3 Shortly after she was treated for a broken leg and discharged, Allen returned to the 
hospital.  She was experiencing pain and breathing difficulties and was diagnosed with a 
 
5 
 
Allen and her husband sued the State, the County, and the City in a personal injury 
action.  Allen claimed each kept the Courthouse staircase in a dangerous condition and 
should have either repaired the staircase or warned her it was hazardous.  Allen sought 
damages for her injuries, and her husband brought a claim for loss of consortium.  At the 
close of the Allens’ evidence, the City, State, and County moved for directed verdict.   Each 
argued it should not be liable for Allen’s injuries because it did not have “exclusive control 
and possession” or “control” of the stairway and was unable to remedy or warn of any 
alleged defect.4  Each further contended the stairs were not a dangerous condition rendering 
them liable for Allen’s injuries.  The circuit court sustained the City’s motion but overruled 
the State’s and County’s motions.  The Allens’ claims then proceeded against the State and 
the County.    
During the jury instruction conference, the State objected to Instruction No. 8, which 
sought a jury finding that the State “either owned or controlled” the Courthouse basement 
stairway.  The State argued “owned or controlled”—language supplied by Missouri 
Approved Instruction (“MAI”) 31.16 (8th ed.)—misstated the law, and the proper 
instruction should direct the jury to determine if the State had “exclusive control” over the 
stairway.  The circuit court overruled this objection.   
                                                 
blood clot in her left leg and a blockage in her lung artery.  As a result, part of Allen’s lung 
tissue died.  She was hospitalized for 12 days and placed on blood thinners to prevent future 
clots.  
4 At the end of its typed motion for directed verdict, the State included a brief handwritten 
note stating there was “[n]o evidence that the State controlled the property or specifically 
the Courthouse basement stairs.”  The City and the County both argued they lacked 
“exclusive possession and control” over the Courthouse. 
 
6 
 
Using two separate verdict forms, the circuit court instructed the jury to weigh the 
State, the County, and Allen’s comparative fault.5  In response to a question from the jury, 
the circuit court instructed the jurors they could find fault only for one of the defendants, 
the State or County, but not both.  The jury returned verdicts holding the County zero 
percent at fault, the State 90 percent at fault, and Allen 10 percent at fault, assessing Allen’s 
total damages at $475,000.  The jury found against Allen’s husband on his loss of 
consortium claim.  Following the jury’s verdict, the circuit court entered judgment for 
Allen against the State, for the City and County, and against the husband.   
The State moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), mirroring 
the same arguments raised in its motion for directed verdict.  The Allens also conditionally 
moved for a new trial, asking the circuit court to consider their motion in the event it found 
the State did not own or control the stairs and sustained the State’s motion for JNOV.  The 
Allens argued the judgments for the City and the County must be reversed if the court were 
to enter JNOV for the State because one of the three defendants must be liable.  The Allens’ 
conditional motion for JNOV, however, did not seek to set aside the verdict rejecting the 
husband’s loss of consortium claim.   
The circuit court overruled both parties’ motions.  The State appealed, asserting the 
staircase was not a dangerous condition and the circuit court erred in submitting Instruction 
No. 8.  The Allens sought affirmance of the circuit court’s judgment against the State but 
                                                 
5 One verdict form allowed the jury to consider the comparative fault of Allen and the State; 
the other verdict form allowed the jury to consider the comparative fault of Allen and the 
County.  
 
7 
 
cross-appealed in the event this Court grants the State its requested relief.6  After the court 
of appeals issued an opinion, this Court granted the State’s application for transfer.7   
Analysis 
I. 
The State’s Appeal 
The State raises two points on appeal.  Both involve the application of section 
537.600.1(2), which waives sovereign immunity for injuries caused by the “dangerous 
condition” of a “public entity’s property.”  Sovereign immunity is a common law judicial 
doctrine barring suit against a government or public entity.  See Metro. St. Louis Sewer 
Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 921 (Mo. banc 2016).  
“[S]overeign immunity applies to the government and its political subdivisions unless 
waived or abrogated or the sovereign consents to suit.”  Id.  Section 537.600.1(2) waives a 
public entity’s sovereign immunity from liability for compensatory damages for negligent 
acts or omissions for 
[i]njuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s property if the 
plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the 
time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous 
condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk 
of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 
course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity 
had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time 
prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous 
condition. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
                                                 
6 This Court consolidated these appeals into the present case.  
7 Article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution endows this Court with jurisdiction to 
grant transfer of an appeal after the court of appeals issues an opinion. 
8 
 
The State challenges the sufficiency of the evidence the Allens offered to 
demonstrate the “dangerous condition” of the stairs under section 537.600.  The State also 
contests the validity of Instruction No. 8 with respect to how it interpreted the words 
“public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.1(2).   
a. 
Sufficiency of Evidence Demonstrating a Dangerous Condition and Notice 
In reviewing a circuit court’s overruling of a JNOV, “[t]his Court must determine 
whether the plaintiff presented a submissible case by offering evidence to support every 
element necessary for liability.”  Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 
(Mo. banc 2010).  The State claims the circuit court erred in overruling its JNOV motion 
because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that (1) the staircase 
was in a dangerous condition (2) of which the State had actual or constructive notice.8 
                                                 
8 This Court reviews both arguments in its discretion because the State’s brief violating 
Rule 84.04(e) in that the argument goes well beyond the single error alleged in the point 
relied on.  Pursuant to Rule 84.04(e), all arguments  
shall substantially follow the order of “Points Relied On.” The point relied 
on shall be restated at the beginning of the section of the argument discussing 
that point. The argument shall be limited to those errors included in the 
“Points Relied On.”  
(Emphasis added).  The argument section accompanying the State’s point relied on pursues 
two separate and independent claims: (1) the staircase was not a dangerous condition; and 
(2) even if it was a dangerous condition, the State lacked actual and constructive notice of 
its existence.  Either claim, if accepted, would warrant reversal.  The first of these 
arguments does not conform to the State’s point relied on, however, which is concerned 
only with the latter argument.  The point relied on states: 
The trial court erred in not entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
prejudicing the State, because there was insufficient evidence to show that 
the State knew that the stairs to the basement were a dangerous condition, in 
that the evidence showed that the stairs were functional and were used 
regularly by State and County personnel, that no one, including Pamela, had 
 
9 
 
This Court reviews the evidence “in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 
giving the plaintiff all reasonable inferences and disregarding all conflicting evidence and 
inferences.”  Id.  A jury verdict cannot be reversed because of insufficient evidence unless 
“there is a complete absence of probative fact to support the jury’s conclusion.”  Tharp v. 
St. Luke’s Surgicenter-Lee’s Summit, LLC, 587 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Mo. banc 2019).  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, permitting Allen all 
reasonable inferences and disregarding all conflicting evidence and inferences, the 
evidence was sufficient to show the stairs were in a dangerous condition of which the State 
had actual or constructive notice.   
Under section 537.600, a “physical defect in the sovereign’s property and injuries 
directly stemming from that defect will subject the sovereign to tort liability.”  State ex rel. 
Div. of Motor Carrier & R.R. Safety v. Russell, 91 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Mo. banc 2002); see 
also Maune ex rel. Maune v. City of Rolla, 203 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Mo. App. 2006).  A 
sovereign may also be subject to liability if the plaintiff was harmed by a “physical 
deficiency in the state’s property which constituted a ‘dangerous condition.’”   Alexander 
                                                 
complained about the condition of the stairs, and prior to Pamela no one had 
fallen on the stairs. 
“Rule 84.04(e) requires the argument to be limited to the errors included in the point relied 
on. [A]n argument not set out in the point relied on but merely referred to in the argument 
portion of the brief does not comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04(d) ... [and] is 
considered abandoned in this Court.”  Holmes v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 617 S.W.3d 853, 
859 n.2 (Mo. banc 2021) (alterations in original) (internal quotation omitted).  When a 
defective point does not impede a full consideration of the merits and gives adequate notice 
to this Court and the other parties of the contested issues, this Court may exercise its 
discretion to review the point.  Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 
1997).  Though this Court considers both of the State’s arguments, it does so pursuant to 
this discretion.   
10 
 
v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Mo. banc 1988).  The Allens introduced evidence of 
multiple physical defects and deficiencies.  The staircase was illuminated by a single bulb 
and had limited headroom because of pipes and wires running overhead.  The concrete 
stairs were painted, and on some, the edges of the steps were chipped.  The steps were not 
level, sloped downward as much as 9 percent, and were narrower than those of modern 
stairs.  The steps also varied in length.  None provided a sufficient surface to fit an adult 
foot, causing Allen to descend with her feet at an angle, gripping the single handrail.  Such 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the existence of physical defects and 
deficiencies tantamount to a dangerous condition. 
The State contends the stairs did not constitute a dangerous condition because they 
were an “open and obvious condition” of which Allen knew and appreciated.  This Court 
disagrees.  True, a “landowner is entitled to expect that invitees will exercise ordinary 
perception, intelligence, and judgment to discover open and obvious conditions, appreciate 
the risk they present, and take the minimal steps necessary to protect themselves.”  Maune, 
203 S.W.3d at 805.  But even if Allen was familiar with the condition of the staircase, that 
awareness does not preclude a finding that the condition, nevertheless, was dangerous.  
“[W]hen the dangerous condition is so open and obvious that the invitee should reasonably 
be expected to discover it and realize the danger, a possessor of land does not breach the 
standard of care owed to invitees ‘unless the possessor should anticipate the harm 
despite such knowledge or obviousness.’”  Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. 
11 
 
banc 1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A(1) (1965));9 
see also Huxoll v. McAlister’s Body & Frame, Inc., 129 S.W.3d 33, 36-37 (Mo. App. 2004); 
Holzhausen v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 414 S.W.3d 488, 498 (Mo. App. 2013); Hellmann v. 
Droege’s Super Mkt., Inc., 943 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. App. 1997) (finding that, while an 
icy parking lot was an open and obvious condition, the defendant supermarket should have 
anticipated risk to customers and had a duty to warn or remedy the situation).  
                                                 
9 Comment f to § 343A recognizes:  
There are … cases in which the possessor of land can and should anticipate 
that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee 
notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is 
not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for 
his protection. This duty may require him to warn the invitee, or to take other 
reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or obvious condition or 
activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will nevertheless 
suffer physical harm.  
 
Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers 
may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the 
invitee[ ] … [may] fail to protect himself against it…. In such cases the fact 
that the danger is known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether 
the invitee is to be charged with contributory negligence, or assumption of 
risk. (See §§ 466 and 496D.) It is not, however, conclusive in determining 
the duty of the possessor, or whether he has acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. 
The illustration following Comment f is also instructive:  
5. A owns an office building, in which he rents an office for business 
purposes to B. The only approach to the office is over a slippery waxed 
stairway, whose condition is visible and quite obvious. C, employed by B in 
the office, uses the stairway on her way to work, slips on it, and is injured. 
Her only alternative to taking the risk was to forgo her employment. A is 
subject to liability to C.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. f, illust. 5 (1965). 
 
12 
 
While the condition of the stairway may have been open and obvious, the State 
should have anticipated the harm that befell Allen.  Neither party indicates there was a 
reasonable alternative path to access the court records in the Courthouse basement.  This 
fact makes the present case distinguishable from others in which courts have declined to 
find dangerous a condition that was open and obvious because the plaintiff’s path was not 
limited to a single point of entry or exit.10  Because there was no evidence to suggest Allen 
had an alternative route to access the files, the State had reason to anticipate the defective, 
deficient stairs could harm Allen despite her familiarity with them.  Ultimately, whether 
the condition of the stairs was open and obvious is not dispositive to liability but rather is 
a factor to weigh in determining whether she exercised due care and shared comparative 
fault.  See Hellmann, 943 S.W.2d at 659; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts,  
§ 343A(1), cmt. f (1965).  For these reasons, the Allens presented sufficient evidence to 
establish the stairway was a dangerous condition under section 537.600.    
The evidence was also sufficient to demonstrate the State had sufficient notice of 
the dangerous condition of the stairwell.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the jury’s verdict, the Allens introduced evidence of an April 2013 e-mail exchange 
between a county commissioner and the secretary to the presiding judge of the 32nd circuit 
                                                 
10 In Huxoll, 129 S.W.3d 33, for example, the court of appeals found a pile of scrap metal 
behind a locked exit door was an open and obvious danger as a matter of law and the 
business owner had no duty to protect invitees like the plaintiff.  The court reasoned there 
was no reason the business should have anticipated the invitee would exit through a locked 
door and walk over a pile of sheet metal when he could have exited through other obvious 
doors or simply could have asked an employee to move cars that were blocking other exits.  
Id. at 36. 
13 
 
in which the commissioner stated he believed it would be “unsafe” to allow a group to tour 
the basement.  Other evidence demonstrated State employees referred to the basement as 
“the dungeon.”  Such evidence suggests the State had actual notice that the stairs to the 
basement could be hazardous.   
Even assuming the State lacked actual notice of the condition of the staircase, this 
Court has previously found similar facts sufficient to establish constructive notice.  See 
e.g., Hensley v. Jackson Cnty., 227 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. banc 2007).  In Hensley, this Court 
found Jackson County lacked sovereign immunity from a suit initiated by a plaintiff injured 
in a car accident caused by a downed stop sign.  Id. at 497.  The plaintiff introduced 
evidence showing the stop sign had been leaning at a 45-degree angle for the duration of 
the month leading up to the accident, was down completely in the three days before the 
accident, and the county’s employees frequented the area while the stop sign was in such 
condition.  Id.  
Here, the State has occupied the Courthouse since 1991.  The State stored hundreds 
of boxes of its own records in the basement.  Presumably, the State used the staircase to 
put the court records in the basement and to access the records when necessary.  Aside 
from its own use, the State directed some of its visitors, like Allen, to use the stairs 
themselves.  The State had sufficient time and opportunity to become aware of the 
14 
 
condition of the stairs, and it is reasonable to charge the State with constructive notice.  
This point is denied.11 
b. 
Instructional Error and the Meaning of “Public Entity’s Property” Under 
Section 537.600 
The State further contends the circuit court erred in giving Instruction No. 8 because 
that instruction—using the language from the pattern MAI instruction—misstated the law 
regarding the waiver of sovereign immunity under section 537.600 for injuries caused by 
dangerous conditions on a public entity’s property.  The instruction as given stated:  
In your verdict, you must assess a percentage of fault to defendant 
State of Missouri, 32nd Judicial Circuit whether or not plaintiff was 
partly at fault if you believe:  
 
First, defendant State of Missouri, 32nd Judicial Circuit either owned 
or controlled the Common Pleas Courthouse basement stairway, and 
  
Second, the basement stairway was in a defective condition, and as a 
result the stairway was not reasonably safe, and  
 
Third, defendant State of Missouri, 32nd Judicial Circuit knew or by 
using ordinary care could have known of this condition in time to bar 
use or remedy or warn of such condition, and  
 
Fourth, defendant State of Missouri, 32nd Judicial Circuit failed to 
use ordinary care to bar use or remedy or warn of such condition, and  
 
Fifth, as a direct result of such failure, plaintiff sustained damage. 
 
                                                 
11 This opinion does not decide whether the Allens presented a submissible case as to the 
other elements of section 537.600.1(2), particularly whether the Allens submitted sufficient 
evidence to establish the State had exclusive control or possession of the stairway.  See 
infra Part I.b.  
 
15 
 
(Emphasis added).  The State avers “owned or controlled” is inadequate because the case 
law suggests the proper standard was whether it owned or held “exclusive control and 
possession” of the property.12   
“Whether a jury was instructed properly is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo.”  Kader v. Bd. of Regents of Harris-Stowe State Univ., 565 S.W.3d 182, 186 (Mo. 
banc 2019).  Instructional error does not warrant vacating the judgment unless the 
challenging party also shows: “(1) the instruction as submitted misled, misdirected, or 
confused the jury; and (2) prejudice resulted from the instruction.”  Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d 
at 90-91.   
Because the validity of Instruction No. 8 hinges on whether it accurately interpreted 
“public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.1(2), principles of statutory 
interpretation govern the analysis.  “The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.”  Kehlenbrink v. 
Dir. of Revenue, 577 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Mo. banc 2019).  Statutory provisions waiving 
                                                 
12 The Allens contend the State’s instructional error claim was not properly preserved for 
appellate review.  Specifically, the Allens contest the adequacy of the State’s objection to 
the instruction, asserting it lacked the requisite specificity to enable the circuit court to 
understand and consider the complaint it lodged.  This Court disagrees.  Rule 70.03 
provides “[n]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give instructions unless 
that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.”  The Rule further states, “[c]ounsel 
shall make specific objections to instructions considered erroneous.” Id. During the 
instruction conference, the State contested the jury instruction claiming it failed to follow 
the caselaw indicating the standard was “exclusive possession and control.”  Such an 
objection gave the circuit court a clear, distinct idea of the basis for the objection as well 
as the alternate language requested.  Accordingly, the objection was sufficient to preserve 
the issue for review.   
16 
 
sovereign immunity are strictly construed.  See Bartley v. Special Sch. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 
864, 868 (Mo. banc 1983), superseded on other grounds by § 537.600.  This Court, 
therefore, interprets the language of section 537.600 by “presum[ing] nothing that is not 
expressed.”  Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 381 (Mo. banc 2014). 
In determining the scope of the phrase “public entity’s property” in section 
537.600.1(2) when the public entity lacks actual ownership but has possession of the 
property, the court of appeals has noted: “The appropriate question is whether the 
[defendant] exercised possession and control rising to an ownership interest[.]”  Thomas v. 
Clay Cnty. Election Bd., 261 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Mo. App. 2008); see also Dorlon v. City of 
Springfield, 843 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Mo. App. 1992) (stating a public entity’s property for 
purposes of sovereign immunity “clearly refers to ownership of a property interest”). This 
Court agrees.   
When the public entity does not own the property at issue, the inquiry must focus 
on whether the public entity had possession and control over the property equal to the 
possession and control of a property owner.13  The plain meaning of the phrase “public 
                                                 
13 In James v. Farrington, 844 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. 1992), the court of appeals rejected 
the argument that only legal ownership would satisfy the phrase “public entity’s property” 
in section 537.600.1(2).  In James, a board of elections occupied a church temporarily to 
conduct an election.  Id. at 517-18.  Pursuant to statute, board employees “actually occupied 
the polling premises and were provided the authority to make this possession exclusive to 
the voting public and authorized personnel” and had “exclusive control over the part or the 
area of the church contracted for during the election process” including the right to inspect 
and make non-invasive alterations to better suit the premises to its purposes.  Id. at 519 
(“Section 115.409, RSMo states that only election authority personnel, election judges, 
watchers and challengers or law enforcement officials at the request of election officials 
who were in the line of duty, and registered voters ‘shall be admitted to the polling 
 
17 
 
entity’s property” in section 537.600.1(2) encompasses both actual legal ownership and a 
functionally equivalent degree of possession and control.  See Moore v. Bi-State Dev. 
Agency, 609 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Mo. banc 2020) (“When the words are clear, there is nothing 
to construe beyond applying the plain meaning of the law.”).   
In the present case, the jury instruction failed to state this law accurately.  Instruction 
No. 8 directed the jury to determine if the State “owned or controlled the … Courthouse 
basement stairway[.]”  This Court is unpersuaded the use of the word “control” alone and 
unmodified in the instruction was sufficient to meet the requirement of “possession and 
control rising to an ownership interest[.]”  Thomas, 261 S.W.3d at 580.  
Of course, not every level of control over the property renders it the “public entity’s 
property” for purposes of sovereign immunity waiver under section 537.600.1(2).  In 
Russell, for example, this Court found the defendant public entity tasked with regulating a 
railroad crossing did not exercise the requisite level of control over the property to qualify 
for the waiver of immunity under section 537.600.1(2).  91 S.W.3d at 616.  Specifically, 
this Court held property “merely regulated by a government agency or entity is not ‘public 
                                                 
place.’”).  Observing that the definition of the word “property” includes both ownership 
and possession, the court of appeals interpreted the phrase “public entity’s property” as 
used in section 537.600 to include both legal ownership and, if the public entity is not the 
legal owner, then exclusive possession and control. Id. at 519-20. The court of appeals 
found the board of elections “had full and total control of the church used for the election 
while the election was being conducted.”  Id. at 518.  “Under the facts of the present case, 
a definition of the term ‘public entity’s property’ includes the exclusive control and 
possession of a polling place.”  Id. at 520.  As the court of appeals found in James, even a 
temporary possessor holding both exclusive possession and control over the property it 
occupies can satisfy the phrase “public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.1(2).  
Id.   
18 
 
property’ and, accordingly, is not within the statutory exception to sovereign immunity.”  
Id.   
Instead, when the public entity does not own the property, it must have “exclusive 
possession and control” over it for section 537.600.1(2) to apply.  Summitt by Boyd v. 
Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Mo. App. 1995) (property containing an allegedly 
dangerous condition was not owned or under exclusive control or possession of any public 
entity; therefore, the dangerous condition waiver of sovereign immunity was not 
applicable); Tillison v. Boyer, 939 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. App. 1996) (“‘[T]he term of the 
property’ includes having exclusive control and possession of the property.”); Sisk v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 138 S.W.3d 799, 807 (Mo. App. 2004) (“Jackson County … is not liable for 
allegedly dangerous conditions on adjacent property that it does not own or exclusively 
possess or control.”); Thomas, 261 S.W.3d at 576 (“In the context of a waiver of sovereign 
immunity [under section 537.600], an Election Board’s ‘property’ includes the exclusive 
control and possession of a polling place.”); Randel v. City of Kan. City, 467 S.W.3d 383, 
388 (Mo. App. 2015) (“Missouri cases do indeed hold that where a public entity exercises 
‘exclusive control and possession’ over property, the property will be viewed as ‘a public 
entity’s property’ for purposes of section 537.600.1(2).”).  This Court too adopted 
“exclusive possession and control” in interpreting the phrase “public entity’s property” 
under section 537.600.  See Russell, 91 S.W.3d at 616.  In Russell, in which the public 
entity did not own the subject property, this Court held, “for property to be considered that 
of the sovereign for the purpose of waiver immunity under section 537.[6]00[ ], the 
sovereign must have the exclusive control and possession of that property.”  Id.  
19 
 
Accordingly, it was erroneous for Instruction No. 8 to refer to “ownership and control” 
rather than “ownership or exclusive possession and control.”    
Generally, an applicable MAI instruction must be given to the exclusion of other 
instructions.  Rule 70.02(b).  But an MAI instruction containing an inaccurate statement of 
the substantive law should not be given.  Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 376.  Here, the 
language in MAI 31.16—which Instruction No. 8 uses—fails to require “exclusive 
possession and control” as set out in Russell; therefore, it did not comport with the plain 
and ordinary meaning of “public entity’s property” as that phrase is used in section 
537.600.1(2).  Rather, the instruction should have directed the jury to hold the State liable 
only if it owned or had “exclusive possession and control” over the Courthouse stairs at 
the time of Allen’s accident.  As given, Instruction No. 8 “misled, misdirected, or confused 
the jury,” entitling the State to a reconsideration of the issues in the circuit court if 
“prejudice resulted from the instruction.”  Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 90-91.   
Without a doubt, the State was prejudiced by Instruction No. 8.  Because the 
evidence clearly established the State did not legally own the Courthouse, Instruction  
No. 8 permitted the jury to find the State liable if the State had mere “control—but not 
“exclusive possession and control”—over the Courthouse stairs.   
This prejudice was compounded by other instructions given to the jury.  In addition 
to Instruction No. 8, Instruction No. 7 likewise misdirected the jury to assign the County 
fault if the jury found it “owned or controlled” the staircase.  The jury was also orally 
20 
 
instructed it could find one defendant at fault, the State or the County, but not both.14  These 
instructions required the jury to weigh liability between the State and the County using an 
incorrect standard.  While this Court takes no position as to whether sufficient evidence 
was presented to establish the State possessed exclusive possession and control of the 
stairway, it is likely a properly instructed jury would come to different conclusions 
regarding the liability and/or comparative fault of the State and the other defendants.  The 
State is entitled to further proceedings in which liability is fairly considered among all the 
remaining parties utilizing a proper construction of the phrase “public entity’s property” as 
used in section 537.600.1(2).  This Court, therefore, vacates the judgment to the extent it 
was entered against the State and in favor of the County and remands the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
II. 
The Allens’ Appeal  
The Allens raise three points on cross-appeal.  The Allens argue the circuit court 
erred in: (1) sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict because the City was a  
co-owner of the Courthouse; (2) overruling their motion for a new trial as the verdict for 
the County was against the weight of the evidence; and (3) overruling their motion for a 
                                                 
14 After the jury began its deliberations, it presented the circuit court with the following 
question: “If we find all three at fault, the Defendants and Plaintiff, may we assign 
percentage to each?”  After conferring with attorneys for the County and the State, the 
circuit court gave the following instruction to the jury: 
THE COURT: All right. The record will show that the question is answered: 
“Percentages of fault may be assigned to Plaintiff and either Defendant, but 
not both Defendants.”  
This Court takes no position whether the Court’s oral instruction requiring exclusive 
liability was properly given. 
21 
 
new trial because the verdict rejecting the husband’s loss of consortium claim was against 
the weight of the evidence.  The Allens’ three claims are all conditioned on this Court’s 
finding for the State on either of the claims the State raised on appeal.  Because this opinion 
grants the State relief on its claim of instructional error, discussed supra, this Court reviews 
the Allens’ first and third claims.  The validity of the jury’s verdict in favor of the County, 
however, need not be examined.  As discussed supra, the judgment is vacated to the extent 
it was entered in favor of the County; therefore, the Allens’ second claim is moot.      
a. 
The City’s Motion for Directed Verdict 
The Allens’ first point on cross-appeal asserts the circuit court erred in sustaining 
the City’s motion for directed verdict because the City was a co-owner of the Courthouse.  
“A case may not be submitted unless legal and substantial evidence supports each fact 
essential to liability.”  Tharp, 587 S.W.3d at 652.  The Allens contend the circuit court’s 
ruling was erroneous because the Courthouse was the City’s property under the meaning 
of “public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.  The City counters it lacked 
“exclusive possession and control” over the basement stairway; thus, sovereign immunity 
was not waived under section 537.600.1(2) despite the City’s undivided one-half 
ownership interest in the Courthouse.  This Court agrees with the Allens.  The phrase 
“public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.1(2) applies to public entities that 
legally own the property where the accident occurred or that lack legal ownership but have 
exclusive possession and control over the property.    
The circuit court’s stated reason for sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict 
was that the City lacked “exclusive control and possession” over the basement stairway.  
22 
 
This finding is clearly erroneous.  The Allens introduced evidence of an agreement between 
the City and the County showing each held an undivided one-half interest in ownership of 
the Courthouse.  For purposes of establishing that a building is a “public entity’s property,” 
the analysis stops upon a showing of actual or legal ownership by a public entity.  A 
plaintiff seeking to establish injury on a “public entity’s property” under section 537.600 
need only introduce evidence the public entity had “exclusive possession and control” of 
the property when the public entity does not have actual or legal ownership of the property.  
Because the Allens produced evidence showing the City was a legal owner of the 
Courthouse, the circuit court erroneously entered directed verdict as to the City. To the 
extent the judgment was entered in the City’s favor, it is vacated.15 
b. 
The Husband’s Loss of Consortium Claim 
The Allens last argue the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for new trial 
because the jury’s adverse determination that Allen’s husband sustained no damages 
                                                 
15 In its appellate brief, the City cites extensively to Ford v. Cedar County, 216 S.W.3d 
167, 168 (Mo. App. 2006), to support its position that the legal owner of a property still 
must possess exclusive possession and control over the property to trigger the waiver of 
sovereign immunity under section 537.600.  In Ford, the plaintiff sued Cedar County 
following an accident on County Road 1415 in Cedar County.  Id. at 168-69.  It is unclear 
from the court of appeals opinion whether the County actually owned the road in question.  
Id.  The court of appeals affirmed a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for Cedar 
County, finding it lacked “exclusive possession and control” over the road.  Id. at 171-72.  
To the extent the court of appeals decision held a public entity legally owning property 
containing a dangerous condition would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of 
sovereign immunity because the property was not a “public entity’s property” as 
contemplated under section 537.600, that case and reasoning should no longer be followed.  
A plaintiff need not demonstrate the public entity possesses “exclusive possession and 
control” of the property to satisfy the “public entity’s property” element of section 537.600 
if the public entity is the legal owner of the property.  See supra Part I.b.”  
23 
 
pursuant to his loss of consortium claim was erroneous.  This opinion declines to reach the 
merits of this claim, as the Allens failed to include it in their motion for new trial and, as 
such, it was not preserved.  See Rule 78.07(a); see also State v. Walter, 479 S.W.3d 118, 
123 (Mo. banc 2016) (“Including a claim of error in a motion for new trial is a requirement 
of preserving an issue for review[.]”).  This final point is denied.  
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed as to the husband’s loss of consortium 
claim.  In all other respects, however, the judgment is vacated because the circuit court 
erred in its interpretation of the phrase “public entity's property” in section 537.600.1(2).  
The case is remanded for further proceedings so the circuit court may consider the liability 
of all three defendants consistent with this opinion. 
  
 
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
All concur.