Title: BRANDENBURGER v TOYOTA MOTOR SALES

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12349 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 KUBY BRANDENBURGER, Administratrix of t h e Estate of CLARENCE R. BRANDENBURGER, deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, T O Y O T A M O T O R SALES , U. S .A. , I N C . , and T O Y O T A MOTOR CO. , LTD. , Defendants and Appellants, TAFFORD OLTZ, Defendant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W . Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Berg, ~ ' C o n n e l l , Angel and Andriolo, Bozeman, Montana. Charles F. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana For Tafford Oltz: Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana. Lyman H. Bennett, Jr. , argued, Bozeman, Montana. For Respondent : Landoe, Gary and White, Bozeman, Montana. Hjalmar B. Landoe and Donald E. White argued, Bozeman, Montana. Filed : *tiJb '/ - T $ 3 Submitted: June 18, 1973 Decided : A1-G 7 - 7973 Clerk M r . Justice John C. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment and denial of a motion for judg- ment in accordance with motion for directed verdict or for new t r i a l in an action tried i n the d i s t r i c t court of the eighteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , county of Gallatin. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Ruby Brandenburger, administratrix of the estate of Clarence R . Brandenburger, deceased. Defendants i n the action were Tafford Oltz, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. Tafford Oltz did not appeal the judgment, but appeared on appeal as a cross-com- plainant against the remaining defendants for any sums he might be required to pay plaintiff. The jury verdict i n d i s t r i c t court was against a77 de- fendants in the amount of $125,000. The accident i n question occurred in the l a t e afternoon of August 3, 1970. Tafford Oltz and his friend and fishing partner, Clarence R. Brandenburger, were driving south from Bozeman, Montana on U.S. Highway 191 t o do some fishing. Oltz was driving his 7969 Toyota Land Cruiser which he had purchased in February 1969 a t Rochester, Minnesota. The weather was clear, visibility good and the road was dry. Approximately eight miles south of Bozeman, according to the testimony of Oltz, Brandenburger yelled a t him t o look out for rocks on the road which Oltz described as about f i s t sized and scattered over the road. H e swerved t o the right to avoid hitting rocks, his vehicle l e f t the highway, overturned, and the top of the vehicle came off. Both men were thrown out of the car through the opening created by the top coming off. Brandenburger was crushed by the rolling car; Oltz was injured. There was conflict i n the testimony as t o what happened when the vehicle l e f t the road and went onto the soft graveled shoulder. A t the time of the accident Oltz estimated he was traveling between 50 and 60 miles per hour. The investigating highway patrolman's measurements indicated the 01 t z vehicle traveled w i t h the l e f t wheels on the pavement and the right wheels off the pavement some 129 feet, 8 inches, whereupon the l e f t wheels a1 so dropped onto the shoulder and the vehicle traveled down the barrow p i t parallel to the road another 83 feet, 7 inches. A t this point, the vehicle made a sharp l e f t turn in an attempt to regain the road, skidded sidewards and overturned. The vehicle rolled on the passenger side f i r s t , and as i t continued t o roll, assumed an upright position a t which time the roof "popped" off, and the eyewitnesses observed the bodies of the passengers flying out. The vehicle continued to roll and i t was apparently a t this time that i t crushed Brandenburger. The vehicle was equipped with seat be1 t s , b u t neither m a n was wearing one a t the time of the accident. The roof panel of the Toyota Land Cruiser was constructed of several layers of laminated fiber glass, riveted to a steel r a i l , which in turn was bolted to the steel body of the cab. The rivets were spaced approx- imately 4 inches apart around the roof and were 1/8 inch in diameter. Oltz testified when he purchased the Land Cruiser he was aware of the fiber glass top and that i t had no roll bars or supports of steel. This ,is a products liability case. Plaintiff maintained the fact the roof "popped off" was a result of defective design. The respondent conceded the allegedly faulty design did not cause the accident b u t contended such design greatly increased the chances of death in an accident. The issue here i s the liability of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. Appellants present four issues for this Court's consideration which w e summarize in this manner: 1 . Mhether s t r i c t liability in tort should have been submitted to the jury? 2 . Whether there was substantial evidence showing negl igence on the part of the manufacturer, and if so, was the defect resulting from such negligence a proximate cause of Clarence R. Brandenburger's death? 3 . Whether there was an irregularity in the proceedings which prevented the manufacturer and distributor from having a fair trial when plaintiff and defendant Oltz settled the matter between themselves during the t r i a l ? Before discussing the issues, w e reiterate the rules stated in Strong v. Williams, 154 Mont. 65, 68, 460 P.2d 90: "It i s well settled in this jurisdiction that wherever there i s a conflict in the evidence this Court m a y only review the testimony for the purpose of determining whether there i s any substantial evidence in the record t o support the verdict of the jury, and w e must accept the evidence there found as true, unless that evidence i s so inherently impossible or improbable as not to be entitled to be1 i ef. Where the evidence i s conf 1 icting , b u t substantial evidence appears in the record to support the judgment, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal, and this i s especially true when the district court, as here, has passed upon the sufficiency of the evidence on motion for a new trial and upheld i t s sufficiency. Batchoff v. Craney, 119 Mont. 157, 172 P.2d 308; Wallace v . Wallace, 85 Mont. 492, 279 P. 374, 66 A.L.R. 587. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. If that evidence sustains the verdict then w e must sustain the action of the trial judge. " See also: State Highway Commission v. Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 470 P.2d 967; Knudson v. Edgewater Automotive Division, 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596. Issue 1. Whether s t r i c t liability in tort should have been sub- mitted to the jury? Counsel for all parties recognize that this Court has not previously squarely faced the proposition as to whether or not s t r i c t liability i s the applicable law in Montana. I t was considered in Jangula v. United States Rubber Company, 147 Mont. 98, 410 P.2d 462, 149 Mont. 241, 425 P.2d 319, b u t under the facts there i t was deemed not applicable. Appellants argue this Court has refused to apply the doctrine of s t r i c t liability in three recent cases, therefore i t i s not the law of Montana and the trial court erred in i t s instructions to the jury. W e will consider each of the cases cited by appellants to show that in each instance the case was decided on grounds other than s t r i c t liability. Knudson v . Edgewater Automotive Division, 157 Mont. 400, 486 P.2d 596: There we held that the trial court did not insert s t r i c t liability into the case, under the instructions given. A s to the instructions given, w e noted an instruction that a manufacturer of "a product that i s reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, testing, inspection and manufacture of such product so that the product may be safely used in a manner and for the purpose for which i t was made", when considered with the other instructions, and the instruc- tion to consider all the instructions as a whole, did not improperly imply s t r i c t liability on the manufacturer. Duchesneau v . Silver B o w County, 158 Mont. 369, 378, 492 P.2d 926: In this case the Court said: "The gist of the claim by Wilson Motors and i t s property damage insurer against Roberts and Mack Trucks i s negligent design and instal lation of the powering steering unit, con- stituting the proximate cause of the accident." B u t , this case was argued on negligence and not s t r i c t liability. However, Justice Haswell noted and i t i s of interest here, that: "The foregoing testimony indicates the power steering unit was purchased in 1967 from Mack Trucks, and if i t was in fact negligently designed, there i s a possible basis for s t r i c t liability against Mack Trucks." Ford v. Rupple, Mont . , 504 P.2d 686, 691, 29 St.Rep. 1081: This case involved an action against General Motors and others for injuries sustained by a passenger riding in a 1968 Corvette involved in a sideswipe which col 1 ision ./went out of control and coll ided headon with another vehicle. Under the facts presented, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of General Motors and plaintiff appealed. This Court upheld the district court Is ruling. M r . Justice Daly, after thoroughly reviewing the cases cited and text writers , concl uded : "In Mang v. Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431, 458 P.2d 777, this Court rejected any doctrine of abstract foreseeabil i ty and affirmed the doctrine of reasonable foreseeabi 1 i ty , b u t in that case found no necessity to reach the law of 'causation ' absent a finding of duty. However, causation was most recently discussed in terms of proximate cause and the 'but for' rule affirmed in DeVerniero v. Eby, Mont. , 496 P.2d 290, 293, i n this language: " 'Proximate cause i s a twofold legal concept which may limit liability depending upon the existence of (1 ) an intervening act and (2) the unforeseeability of that intervening act. This Court stated in Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry., 147 Mont. 185, 195, 411 P.2d 379, 385: ""'Causation i s a fact. I t i s important to determine causation f i r s t to avoid i t s confusion with the issues to follow. This i s not a re1 atiorlship between negl igence and injury, b u t rather a causal relation between conduct and hurt, both of which are factual concepts. I t i s only after the causal relationship, duty, and i t s scope are found that the negligence issue i s reached. 61 Co1.L.R. 1401. ""'The test most generally employed in determining causation i s the 'but f o r y e s t . Montana has adopted this test in numerous cases. ""'Proximate cause i s one 'which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken b y any new, independent cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would n o t have occurred.' Stroud v. Chicago M . [&I St. P . 8 P. Ry. Co., 75 Mont. 384, 393, 243 P. 1089, 1092." (Emphasis added.) ' "The principle urged by plaintiff under the facts of this case falls into the area of 'abstract foreseeability' con- demned in Mans and fai 1 s to meet the law in re1 ation to causation as i t exists in Montana." This brings us to the instant case and the question of whether Montana should adopt the doctrine of s t r i c t liability. W e note here that both the federal district court of Montana and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have considered Montana case law and have anticipated action by this Court, in cases heard in those courts recently. Federal Judge Russell E. Smith in Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F.Supp., 183, 184, held: "The tort limitation i s applied to the warranty count for these reasons: In the absence of a control1 ing decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the federal courts in Montana sitting in diversity cases have looked to and adopted as the applicable rule of law i n Montana the Restatement of the L a w of Torts, Second, and the s t r i c t liability rule announced therein. The s t r i c t liability rule will be applied in this case." The Ninth Circuit Court noted in the Sabin oral vaccine case, Davis v . Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 127: " W e can find no Montana decision in point on the issue of a drug manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers inherent in i t s product. Privi ty of contract between buyer and seller as a prerequisite to recovery in an implied war- ranty action has long been abolished i n that state in cases involving food, and s t r i c t liability has been imposed on those who sold i t . I t would seem that the same approach would be adopted by the Montana Supreme Court i n cases involving drugs meant for internal use. Faced with the absence of controlling state precedent, w e choose to assume that Montana would follow the major- ity of other states in finding that liability can attach to the sale of drugs, in either tort or warranty, despite lack of privity, and would adopt the views set forth below on the manufacturer's duty t o warn o f dangers i n 'nondefective' but p o t e n t i a l l y harmful products. * * * "The clearest statement o f the law as i t exists today i s i n our view t h a t s e t f o r t h i n the Restatement (Second) o f Torts (1965). Relevant t o our case are Section 402A and comments j and k. * * *" The trend seems t o be t o adopt the theory o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y and i t has now been adopted by a m a j o r i t y o f the states. I n consideration o f the i n s t a n t case as t o the adoption o f the doctrine o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y , we f i r s t look t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t theory. W e adopt the d e f i n i t i o n , as other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have, set f o r t h i n 2 Restate- ment o f Torts 2d S402A: "(1) One who s e l l s any product i n a defective condition unreasonably dangerous t o the user o r consumer o r t o h i s property i s subject t o l i a b i l i t y f o r physical harm thereby caused t o the ultimate user o r consumer, o r t o h i s property, i f "(a) The s e l l e r i s engaged i n the business o f s e l l i n g such a product, and "(b) i t i s expected t o and does reach the user o r consumer without substantial change i n the condition i n which i t i s sold. "(2) The r u l e stated i n Subsection (1) applies although "(a) the s e l l e r has exercised a l l possible care i n the preparation and sale o f h i s product, and "(b) the user o r consumer has not bought the product from o r entered i n t o any contractual r e l a t i o n w i t h the s e l l e r . " I n Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256, 261, Judge Jacobson i n a concurring opinion discussed the reasons f o r the applica- t i o n o f the doctrine o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y t o t h a t case: "It i s apparent from a reading o f the Restatement, and the leading cases on t h i s subject, t h a t the doctrine o f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was evolved t o place l i a b i l i t y on the party p r i m a r i l y responsible f o r the i n j u r y occurring, t h a t i s , the manufacturer o f the defective product. This, as Justice Traynor stated i n h i s concurring opinion i n Escola v. Coca Cola B o t t l i n g Co. o f Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), i s based on reasons o f public policy: " ' I f public p o l i c y demands t h a t a manufacturer o f goods be responsible f o r t h e i r q u a l i t y regardless o f negligence there i s no reason not t o f i x t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y openly. ' 150 P.2dY a t 441. "These pub1 ic pol icy considerations have been variously enumerated as follows: "(1 ) The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against their recurrence, which the consum- er cannot do. Restatement, supra, comment c. " (2) The cost of injury m a y be overwhelming t o the person injured while the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and be distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. Greenman v . Yuba Power Products, Inc. [59 Cal.2d 571 , 27 Cal . Rptr . 697, 377 P .2d 897 (1 962). '(3) It i s in the public interest t o discourage the market- ing of defective products. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra. "(4) I t i s in the public interest to place responsibility for injury upon the manufacturer w h o was responsible for i t s reaching the market. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra. "(5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer and wholesaler of the defective product in order that they m a y act as the conduit through which liability may flow to reach the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility 1 ies. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. [61 Cal.2d 2561, 37 Cal .Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964). " (6) That because of the complexity of present day manu- facturing processes and their secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent conduct by the injured plaintiff i s almost impossible. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, supra. "(7) That the consumer does not have the ability to in- vestigate for himself the soundness of the product. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1 965). "(8) That this consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing devices and trademarks. Concurring opinion, Lockwood, J . , Nalbandian v . Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965). "Inherent in these policy considerations i s not the nature of the transaction by which the consumer obtained posses- sion of the defective product, b u t the character of the defect itself, that i s , one occurring in the manufactur- ing process and the unavailability of an adequate remedy on behalf of the injured plaintiff." W e recognize this Ss a major change i n Montana's tort law by way of judicial decision, b u t as'Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the N e w Jersey Supreme Court said in State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715, 721, cert. denied 354 U.S. 925, 77 S.Ct. 1387, 1 L ed 2d 1441: "One of the great virtues of the common law i s i t s dynamic nature that makes i t adaptable to the require- ments of society a t the time of i t s application in court." Issue 2. Whether there was substantial evidence showing negli- gence on the part of the manufacturer, and if so, was the defect resulting from such negligence a proximate cause of Clarence R . Brandenburger's death? The adoption of the doctrine of s t r i c t liability does not relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving his case. Vital to that proof i s the necessity of proving the existence of a defect in the product and that such defect caused the injury complained of. Inasmuch as this i s a "second collision" case, w e recognize that the design defect in the vehicle did not cause the accident. Generally injury to car occupants results not from the immediate accident of one car hitting another, commonly called "first collision" b u t from the ensuing impact upon persons being tossed around the interior of the car, or as here, being thrown through the roof, or "second collision". While the construc- tion of the vehicle i s not the cause of the accident, i t i s most often the contributing factor in the case of "second collision" injuries. In the recent years courts have held that where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of i t s pro- ducts, the manufacturer should be liable for the injury caused by i t s failure to use reasonable care in design. These injuries are readily forsee- able as an incident to the normal and expected use of the car. While auto- mobiles are not made for the purpose of coll iding with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts. In Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495, the court speaking concerning the "second collision" said: " * * * N o rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was a causative factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called 'second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all are forseeable. Where the injuries or enhanced injuries are due t o the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of i t s products to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence principles should be applicable * * *". See too: Ford Motor Company v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729; Carpini v. Pittsburgh and Meirton B u s Company, 216 F.2d 404. Accordingly the duty of Toyota to provide a safe roof i s not eliminated simply because the defective roof did not cause the accident. Accepting this case as a "second collision" case, i t must be determined whether there can be liability for the alleged defective con- struction of the vehicle. Appellants contend, relying on Ford, that respondent Is position i s that appellants owed a duty to manufacture a "crash proof" vehicle. Not so! The law does not require such an obligation. Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 407 F.2d 87. I t * i s of' import here to set forth the evidence needed to prove the defect. Although appellants do not directly make the claim that res- pondent had to introduce direct evidence that the design of the roof of the Land Cruiser was faulty, i t i s clear that they would have us adopt this standard. However, the better rule i s to permit proof of defect to be establ i shed by circumstantial evidence and inferences therefrom, as we1 1 as by direct evidence. The essential rationale for imposing the doctrine of s t r i c t liability in tort i s that such imposition affords the consuming public the maximum protection from dangerous defects in manufactured products by re- quiring the manufacturer to bear the burden of injuries and losses enhanced by such defects in i t s products. If this be so, i t requires l i t t l e imag- ination to see that if a s t r i c t rule of direct evidence was required, the supposed benefit of the theory of s t r i c t liability would be lost to the consuming public. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said i n Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639: "There would be l i t t l e gain to the consuming public if the courts would establish a form of recovery with one hand and take i t away w i t h the other by establishing impossible standards of proof. The proof required i n a s t r i c t lia- bility case must be realistically tailored t o the circum- stances which caused the form of action to be created." Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 352 F.Supp. 633. W e adopt the following standard of proof, as set forth by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240, 243, as the acceptable type of evidence to be used by a plaintiff to prove a defect in a manufacturer's or distributor's product, i n a s t r i c t liability case: "The .nature and qua1 ity of evidence used in products liability cases to show the defect and the nexus between the defect and accident naturally varies. The most con- vincing evidence i s an expert's pinpointing the defect and giving his opinion on the precise cause of the acci- dent after a thorough inspection. If an accident suffi- ciently destroys the product, or the crucial parts, then an expert's opinion on the probabilities that a defect caused the accident would be helpful. If no such opinion i s possible, as in the present case, the user's testimony on what happened i s another method of proving that the product was defective. If the user i s unable to testify, as where the accident killed him or incapacitated him, no other witness was present a t the time of the accident, and the product was destroyed, the fact of the accident and the probabilities are all that remain for the party seeking recovery. A t this point the plaintiff can attempt to negate the user as the cause and further negate other causes not attributable to the defendant. These kinds of proof introduced a1 one or cumulatively are evidence which help establish the presence of a defect as the cause of the damage." See also: Franks v . National Dairy Products Corporation, 414 F.2d 682; Reader v. General Motors Corp., 107 Ariz. 149, 483 P.2d 1388; Brownell v. White Motor Corp. , 260 Ore. 251 , 490 P .2d 184- Prosser, L a w of Torts, -3 , @+ ' ; Y mi&t.-* 4th Ed,, g 103. 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791; 2 Frumer, Products Liability, s 16A [41 [el . Turning n o w to the record, w e find appellants failed to intro- duce expert testimony contradicting that oQ respondent instead of contenting themselves with cross-examination of respondent's witnesses. Hence, there was no expert testimony, indeed no testimony a t a l l , to offset that introduced by respondent. Respondent's expert witness, Prof. Ralph Challender of the engineer- ing school a t Montana State University, testified a t length as to two defects in the Land Cruiser manufactured by Toyota; (1) that the vehicle was unstable and had a tendency to roll, (2) that the roof was not safe. In giving his testimony Prof. Challender compared the Toyota Land Cruiser with the Willys Jeep, the International Scout, Ford Bronco and the British Land Rover. Summarizing his testimony he noted that in comparison to conventional auto- mobiles, because of the short wheel base of such vehicles, all four wheel drive vehicles are less stable in an exposure condition, such as sitting on a sidehill, and rounding corners, where the centrifugal force effect be- comes more pronounced making the tendency to t i p greater. H e noted that manufacturers of such vehicles should have anticipated this facet, due to the type of use contemplated, and advertised accordingly. In assessing the various vehicles compared as to the structure above waist 1 ine, he noted only one other had a fiber glass top, the Chev Blazer--but that vehicle has in addition a fiber glass liner inside, and the structural parts were sandwiched in between the inner and outer faces. All other vehicles compared had steel tops. Concerning the Toyota Land Cruiser top, Chall ender testified that because of the method of construction when a force, such as was appl ied during the accident, hit the roof panel the roof would not tend to crumple, as in the case of a steel roof, but would simply blow up and out, either shearing or pulling the rivets through the roof. H e further testified that a steel top can withstand greater force than fiber glass, particularly where there are reinforcing members across the roof to absorb the impact energy. The other vehicles compared, except the Chev Blazer, have steel tops with reenforcing structural members in the roof, whereas the Toyota Land Cruiser had no such reenforcement, only a mere fiber glass she1 1 . The testimony of Challender was corroborated by witness Donald J , Thiesen, a mechanic hired t o repair the Land Cruiser. H e noted that the upper structures were damaged severely; that the top panel was completely severed from the vehicle; that the sides were crushed from the roll ; and that the rivets that attached the fiber glass top to the steel rail upon which the roof sat, were sheared and some pulled through and remained with the top. H e further noted that the bolts used in the Land Cruiser, compared with American bolts, were softer and seemed to shear off easier. considering this testimony in the light of the testimony of the eyewitness Bruce Leeson that " i t turned over and hit the passenger side f i r s t , made a complete turn, and upon approaching a position in which you would refer to as upright the top came off of the vehicle as i t was coming up to an upright position, and i t flew up in the air. Silhouetted between the top and the vehicle were two bodies." and the deposition testimony of Mrs. Bundy, another eyewitness, " M y distinct impression was that i t looked so much like a child's toy car t h a t was falling apart in the a i r , that the roof was coming off.", the jury could well have come to the conclusion that the roof and superstructure of the Land Cruiser was unreasonably dangerous. The top itself was submitted into evidence for the jury's inspection. W e find there was substantial evidence submitted to the jury for i t t o find that the Toyota Land Cruiser's defective design proximately con- tributed to the death of Brandenburger. Issue 3. Whether there was an irregularity in the proceedings which prevented the manufacturer and distributer from having a f a i r trial when plaintiff and defendant Oltz settled the matter between themselves. W e find no merit to this contention. Appellants contend that dur- ing the course of trial a settlement was made between respondent and defend- ant 01 tz, whereby there was an agreement that the sum of $50,000 would be paid to respondent on behalf of Oltz. Not so! An affidavit was filed by counsel for appellants to this effect in support of the motion for a new t r i a l . Counsel for Oltz appeared and quite competently represented his client throughout the entire t r i a l . In his brief and argument to this Court he set forth the fact that no settlement was reached during trial and that i t was not until after the jury verdict that agreement was reached. Judgment i s affi / ~ h % f Justice ........................................ Justices M r . Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I do not disagree with the s t r i c t liability rule. What I disagree w i t h i s i t s application to a "second collision" situation such as here. The defect here under discussion was the defective top. I t had nothing to do with the cause of the accident. If the vehicle had no top, as in a convertible, nothing would have Mont .-, - changed as to the causation. I believe under Ford v. Rupple,/504 P.2d 686, 691, 29 St.Rep. 1081, this Court rejected the applicability of s t r i c t liability i n "second collision" cases; that i s where the initial accident i s not caused by any breach of duty of a manufacturer; b u t i t i s contended, as here, that the damages are enhanced by some defect in construction or design. I would reverse and grant a new t r i a l .