Title: Commonwealth v. Williams

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12378 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JESSIE WILLIAMS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 14, 2020. - January 20, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and 
jurors, Deliberation of jury, Fair trial, Motion to 
suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement.  Constitutional Law, Jury, Fair trial, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Waiver of constitutional rights.  Fair Trial.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 15, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kathe 
M. Tuttman, J., and the cases were tried before Laurence D. 
Pierce, J. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On July 3, 2013, Joseph Puopolo was shot and 
killed and Mario Fiume was shot and seriously injured.  A jury 
convicted the defendant, Jessie Williams, of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of felony-murder for the killing of Puopolo, 
with the predicate offense being armed robbery and armed assault 
in a dwelling.  The defendant also was convicted of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily 
injury to Fiume and possession of a firearm.  On appeal, the 
defendant argues that (1) the motion judged erred in denying his 
motion to suppress statements; (2) the trial judge erred in 
declining to conduct a voir dire of an allegedly sleeping juror 
and subsequently allowing that juror to deliberate; and (3) the 
trial judge abused his discretion in excusing a juror who 
professed an inability to begin deliberations anew after the 
discharge of another juror.  We conclude that the motion judge 
properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress where the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
multiple times and did not unambiguously invoke his right to 
counsel.  We further conclude that the juror was dismissed for 
reasons not entirely personal to him and that the juror's 
dismissal was prejudicial, and we therefore vacate the judgments 
entered against the defendant.  Accordingly, we do not reach the 
sleeping juror issue, as it is unlikely to arise on retrial. 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving pertinent facts for the discussion of the 
defendant's arguments.  In addition, we reserve the facts that 
the motion judge found, as well as the facts we found from our 
own review of the defendant's recorded interview, for the 
discussion of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
a.  The murder.  On the evening of July 2, 2013, the 
defendant's cousin, Eugene Tate, had arranged to buy marijuana 
from dealer Mario Fiume.  Tate went to Fiume's home to make the 
purchase, but the deal did not occur.  Later that night, Tate 
called Steven Piro, a friend of Fiume's and often the middleman 
in his marijuana sales, and told Piro that he wished to complete 
the sale.  Piro, accompanied by another associate, George Tecci, 
picked up Tate and the defendant at a gasoline station near 
Fiume's house.  Piro drove the men to Fiume's house in his car. 
 
On arrival at Fiume's house, the defendant entered the 
garage, where Fiume conducted his drug sales, with Piro.  Fiume 
was present with his friend Joseph Puopolo.  After examining the 
marijuana, the defendant told Fiume that Tate, whom he referred 
to as his cousin, also would like to see the marijuana before 
they purchased it.  Piro brought Tate and Tecci into the garage 
from the car; the defendant then left the garage and reentered 
with money in hand.  Fiume, who also was holding money, told the 
defendant to pay or leave.  The defendant then asked Tate if 
4 
 
 
they should "do it," and both men brandished guns.  The 
defendant pointed his gun at Fiume and demanded that he turn 
over the money and marijuana. 
 
After Fiume attempted to strike the defendant, the 
defendant forced him into a corner of the garage and shot him at 
close range.  At around the same time that the defendant shot 
Fiume, Tate shot Puopolo.  The defendant and Tate fled on foot 
with the marijuana.  Puopolo went upstairs to get help, where he 
collapsed.  When police arrived, Puopolo had no detectable 
pulse. 
 
In the days following the murder, police recovered 
surveillance video from the gasoline station where Piro and 
Tecci had picked up the defendant and Tate before driving them 
to Fiume's house.  The video footage showed the defendant 
getting into Piro's car.  A detective familiar with the 
defendant identified him in the video recording.  Additionally, 
police recovered surveillance video from outside Fiume's home.  
The video footage captured the defendant and Tate arriving at 
Fiume's home in Piro's car at around midnight and fleeing on 
foot shortly after. 
 
Both the defendant's and Tate's fingerprints were found on 
separate interior door handles of Piro's car, which was left at 
Fiume's house after the murder.  Additionally, a cigarette butt 
with the defendant' deoxyribonucleic acid on it was recovered 
5 
 
 
from Fiume's driveway.  The defendant was arrested in the East 
Boston section of Boston on July 7, taken to the State police 
barracks at Logan International Airport, and later transported 
to the Stoneham police department. 
 
b.  The interrogation.  The defendant was interviewed at 
the Stoneham police station.  Before the start of the interview, 
police read the defendant a Miranda form and video recording 
consent form.  After the defendant agreed to the videorecorded 
interview, police again advised him of his Miranda rights, this 
time on video, and the defendant signed and initialed the 
Miranda form, indicating that he understood.  The defendant 
agreed to speak with police. 
 
Police then began interrogating the defendant.  Initially, 
the defendant denied having any involvement in the murder.  
Eventually, the defendant admitted to being in the car with 
Tate.  The defendant told police that he and Tate had planned to 
steal the drugs that night but it did not go as intended.  
Finally, he admitted to shooting Fiume during the course of the 
robbery. 
 
c.  Jury deliberations.  After one day of deliberations, a 
juror was excused for health reasons.  An alternate juror was 
selected randomly, and the jurors began deliberations anew.  The 
next day, another juror was absent due to difficulty commuting 
to court in a snowstorm.  Over the defendant's objection, the 
6 
 
 
trial judge excused that juror, and a second alternate juror was 
selected.  The judge instructed the jury, for the second time in 
two days, "to set aside and disregard all your past 
deliberations and to begin deliberations anew."  The defendant 
moved for a mistrial, arguing that, during those instructions, 
"[a]t least four [jurors] put their heads down, shook their 
heads, put their hands to their foreheads, shaking their heads 
in a 'no' fashion."  The defendant argued that their 
frustrations would affect their ability to be fair.  The judge 
denied the motion. 
 
After the jurors began deliberations again, juror no. 11 
submitted to the trial judge a note stating: 
"I fully feel at this point I am not capable of starting 
over the deliberations with an unbiased opinion nor able to 
engage in a discussion with any of the fellow jurors.  
There are still charges that need to be reviewed and I 
don't feel as though I can fairly make a decision based on 
the firm belief I currently hold.  Also, at this point I 
know the other members are waiting on me so I don't think I 
would be able to have an open discussion without feeling 
[j]udged." 
 
The defendant argued that the sentiments expressed in the note 
were not unique to this particular juror, and that the jury 
could not begin anew without bias.  Therefore, he argued, there 
was manifest necessity for a mistrial; the prosecutor said that 
he did not "disagree completely." 
 
The trial judge inquired of the juror in the presence of 
both parties.  The juror said, "I can't . . . start over and do 
7 
 
 
this.  I've already made up my decision.  I already know 
specific jurors in there that I disagree with, so going in there 
with a new person who has to start over. . . .  I already know 
what I'm going to say and it's going to be biased and it's not 
fair for me to be in there."  He also indicated that he could 
not "fully look at everything" and make his decision again.  The 
judge reminded the juror that he had taken an oath, but the 
juror insisted that he could not carry it out because he had 
"already done it and [he did not] want to go in there and talk 
to anyone."  The judge repeatedly pressed the juror as to why he 
could not carry out his oath; the juror repeatedly said that he 
could not start over and he had already "made up [his] 
decision."  The judge informed the juror that he did not have to 
"completely erase everything from [his] mind," but the juror 
continued to stress his inability to deliberate anew. 
 
The following colloquy occurred between the juror and the 
trial judge: 
The juror:  "And I know how it goes in there and I don't 
think I can, you know, fairly go in there and have a 
discussion with all these people when I've already done one 
part.  There's more I need to do and I already know what 
I'm going to do so I just don't think it would be just for 
me to go in there and do that." 
 
The judge:  "Part of my instructions . . . was that you 
should determine the facts based solely on a fair 
consideration of the evidence.  Sir, do you feel you could 
do that?" 
 
The juror:  "I guess." 
8 
 
 
 
The judge:  "You feel that you could be fair and 
impartial?" 
 
The juror:  "I mean, I don't exactly, like, in terms of 
fair and impartial, I mean, yes, I'm obviously fair, but I 
just don't think I can go in there and do this and look at 
everything again and go through and read everything because 
. . . I already know what I'm going to decide." 
 
The judge:  "Do you feel you could engage in deliberations 
and not be swayed by prejudice or sympathy by personal 
likes or dislikes, sir?" 
 
The juror:  "Yes." 
 
The judge:  "And you could consider the evidence in a calm 
and a dispassionate and analytical manner?" 
 
The juror:  "I wouldn't say calm." 
 
The judge:  "Do you have a conflict today?  Do you need to 
be someplace else today?" 
 
The juror:  "No." 
 
 
The defendant then reiterated his motion for a mistrial.  
The defendant argued that the juror could not remain on the jury 
due to lack of impartiality, but the juror also had expressed 
that he held a minority view among the jurors and so could not 
be excused from the jury.  The trial judge denied the motion, 
and the defendant subsequently requested that the juror remain 
on the jury.  The judge then further inquired of the juror, who 
again said that he was unable to begin deliberations anew, and 
indicated that he had shared his concerns with the foreperson.  
The juror stated that he would "try [his] best" to follow the 
judge's instructions, but was not "a hundred percent" confident 
9 
 
 
he would be successful.  The juror also said, "[N]ow I'm the guy 
that's stalled this process."  He further stated, "[T]hey're 
sitting in the room and they know that there's one juror missing 
which is myself . . . .  And that's just a side issue aside from 
what I said before."  Based on this conversation, the judge 
excused the juror and a third alternate was selected.  The jury 
returned a verdict later that day. 
 
2.  Discharge of deliberating juror no. 11.  a.  Standard 
of review.  "The discharge of a deliberating juror is a 
sensitive undertaking and is fraught with potential for error.  
It is to be done only in special circumstances, and with special 
precautions."  Commonwealth v. Tiscione, 482 Mass. 485, 489 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 843 
(1984).  General Laws c. 234, § 26B, provided for the 
substitution of a deliberating juror if "a juror dies, becomes 
ill, or is unable to perform his duty for any other good cause 
shown to the court."2  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 20 (d) (3), 378 
Mass. 889 (1979).  "[A] juror properly may be discharged 'only 
[for] reasons personal to [that] juror, having nothing whatever 
to do with the issues of the case or with the juror's 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 234, § 26B, was repealed by St. 2016, 
c. 36, § 1, effective May 10, 2016, several months after the 
defendant's trial occurred.  In any event, this court has 
interpreted the current applicable statute, G. L. c. 234A, § 39, 
to be synonymous.  See Tiscione, 482 Mass. at 489 & n.5 (2019). 
10 
 
 
relationship with his [or her] fellow jurors.'"  Tiscione, supra 
at 489, quoting Connor, supra at 844-845.  "Allowing discharge 
only for personal reasons ensures that such action will not 
'affect the substance or the course of the deliberations.'"  
Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 336 (2004), quoting 
Connor, supra at 845 n.4. 
 
To determine whether good cause exists for dismissal, "a 
judge must hold a hearing with the juror in question."  
Tiscione, 482 Mass. at 490.  "At the hearing, the issues of the 
case and the juror's relationship to his fellow jurors are not 
to be discussed.  If the 'problem' juror is questioned, the 
judge should preliminarily inform him that he cannot be 
discharged unless he has a personal problem, unrelated to his 
relationship to his fellow jurors or his views on the case.  
Unless the juror indicates a belief that he has such a problem, 
all questioning should cease" (citation and footnote omitted).  
Connor, 392 Mass. at 845.  We defer to the judge's factual 
findings where they are not clearly erroneous.  See Commonwealth 
v. Tennison, 440 Mass. 553, 560 (2003). 
 
b.  Analysis.  Here, the trial judge properly held a 
hearing to question the juror in both parties' presence.  During 
the hearing, the juror repeatedly stated he was not able to 
begin deliberations anew.  Although the juror indicated that his 
decision-making process remained fair and impartial, he claimed 
11 
 
 
to be "biased" in that his decision already was made and he 
would not be able to start the deliberative process again.  
Ultimately, the judge dismissed the juror because he found that 
the juror was unable to follow the judge's instructions.  We 
conclude that the juror's inability to begin deliberations anew 
was at least in part colored by his relationship with the other 
jurors and was not entirely personal to him.  Accordingly, 
dismissal of the juror was error. 
 
In determining whether a reason is personal to a specific 
juror, we previously have considered whether the reason relates 
to burdens in a juror's life outside of deliberations, or 
whether a juror exhibits abnormal idiosyncratic behavior or 
extreme emotional distress such that the juror cannot fulfill 
his or her duty.  See Swafford, 441 Mass. at 337; Commonwealth 
v. Leftwich, 430 Mass. 865, 873-874 (2000).  In some cases, 
extreme emotional distress, even if in part due to 
deliberations, may be considered a personal problem if it 
exceeds the level of distress that typically accompanies 
deliberations.  See Leftwich, supra.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 788 n.10 (2004) (dismissal of juror 
proper where judge found juror was "enormously upset" and unable 
to give defendant "fair and impartial and reasoned evaluation of 
evidence").  Similarly, if a juror's conduct has roots in 
interactions with other jurors during the course of 
12 
 
 
deliberations but the juror's response is idiosyncratic, such 
behavior may constitute a reason for dismissal that is personal 
to that juror.  See Swafford, supra. 
 
In the present case, the juror first alluded to his 
relationship with other jurors in his note and then on multiple 
occasions during the colloquy.  In his note, he wrote that he 
did not feel "able to engage in a discussion with any of the 
fellow jurors."  He also wrote, "I know the other members are 
waiting on me so I don't think I would be able to have an open 
discussion without feeling [j]udged."  During the colloquy, the 
defendant said, "I already know specific jurors in there that I 
disagree with."  He also stated:  "I don't think I can . . . 
fairly go in there and have a discussion with all these people 
when I've already done one part."  The juror repeatedly framed 
his inability to begin anew in the context of his relationship 
with other jurors.  He expressed a concern for what other jurors 
would think of him when he said he would feel "judged" if he 
resumed deliberations.  He also expressed some concern, although 
it is unclear of what nature, about the fact that several jurors 
disagreed with him.  Finally, he expressed his hesitancy to 
"have a discussion with all these people."  These statements, 
when considered together, suggest that the juror's refusal to 
begin anew was influenced by his relationship with his fellow 
jurors. 
13 
 
 
 
After defense counsel expressed concern about whether the 
juror could be a minority in the jury room based on his initial 
note and his references to the other jurors during the colloquy, 
the trial judge held the second colloquy.  The judge 
specifically addressed the juror's note where he expressed 
concern that the other jurors were "waiting on him" and wrote, 
"I don't think that I would be able to have an open discussion 
without feeling [j]udged."  During the second colloquy, the 
juror continued to speak about his refusal to begin 
deliberations anew in the context of his relationship with other 
jurors.  He stated, "[T]hey're all waiting for me so it's just 
going to be hard for me to go in there and feel comfortable 
having a conversation with anyone in that room." 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the juror's comments relating 
to the other jurors did not preclude the trial judge from 
determining that the juror's inability to follow instructions 
was personal to him.  In these circumstances, we disagree.  The 
Commonwealth's reliance on Leftwich and Swafford in support of 
this argument is misplaced.  In both Leftwich and Swafford, the 
juror was unable to perform his or her duties because of a 
problem that was personal to that juror.  See Swafford, 441 
Mass. at 337; Leftwich, 430 Mass. at 873-874. 
 
In Leftwich, 430 Mass. at 873-874, a juror properly was 
dismissed after she informed the judge that she was having 
14 
 
 
difficulty breathing due to stress.  There, the judge found that 
physical manifestations of stress would prevent the juror from 
continuing to deliberate fairly.  Id. at 872.  Although there 
was some indication that the juror's extreme emotional distress 
was, at least in part, due to deliberations, the stress the 
juror was feeling far exceeded the normal hardships of serving 
on the jury.  Id.  Her physical manifestation of that stress 
likely would prevent her from properly carrying out her duties.  
Id.  Further, there was "nothing in the record to indicate that 
the jury were at an impasse, or that the juror's statements were 
'euphemisms' for the fact that the juror was 'persistent in 
asserting a minority position during deliberations.'"  Id. at 
874, quoting Connor, 392 Mass. at 846. 
 
Similarly, in Swafford, 441 Mass. at 337, we concluded that 
it was proper to dismiss a juror where she displayed reclusive 
behavior and repeated statements that she could not be fair and 
impartial.  There, the combination of the juror's abdicatory 
behavior and her professed inability to be fair was not "in any 
normal sense the product of her relationship to her fellow 
jurors."  Id. 
 
Here, the juror did not allege any outside stress.  He did 
not have any apparent health issues that prevented him from 
carrying out his duties, nor did he exhibit idiosyncratic 
behavior or extreme emotional distress.  When asked if there 
15 
 
 
were any outside reasons why he did not want to be there, he 
unequivocally said no.  Although the juror claimed that he was 
biased because he could not erase the conclusions he already had 
made and begin deliberations anew, he also stated that his 
decision-making process was, and would continue to be, fair and 
impartial.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 804 & 
n.5 (1995) (juror's statements that he "would hope" he could be 
fair to Cambodian defendant indicated ethnic bias and judge's 
failure to excuse juror for cause was reversible error).  Most 
importantly, the juror repeatedly explained his inability to 
begin deliberations anew in the context of his relationship with 
the other jurors. 
 
Our rationale here is akin to our decision in Tiscione, 482 
Mass. 485.  There, we concluded that if a juror's refusal to 
continue deliberations even in part is based on events that took 
place in the jury room, it is error to discharge that juror.  
Id. at 490.  The juror explained several of her outside sources 
of stress, such as her father's dementia.  Id. at 487.  
Nonetheless, the juror's initial statement that she did not want 
to return to deliberation because other members of the jury were 
being argumentative and it upset her was sufficient to conclude 
that her distress was not based on personal issues alone.  Id. 
at 490.  Similarly, in this case, because we conclude that the 
juror's inability to follow instructions was at least in part 
16 
 
 
rooted in his relationship with other jurors, we cannot say that 
the juror was unable to perform his duties because of a problem 
that was personal solely to him. 
 
We briefly address the defendant's argument that the 
juror's professed inability to start deliberations anew was "a 
mere assertion of [his] inability to abide by his oath," and, 
therefore, was not a ground for his dismissal.  See Connor, 392 
Mass. at 846 ("A juror's mere assertion of inability to abide by 
his oath does not establish the 'good cause' required by the 
statute").  The Commonwealth counters that the trial judge held 
multiple hearings with the juror and articulated a compelling 
reason for the juror's dismissal that was beyond just his mere 
refusal to carry out his duty.  We note that whether the juror's 
assertion that he was unable to abide by his oath was "mere 
euphemism[] for the truth," id. at 846, goes to the question of 
prejudice, addressed infra.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 453 
Mass. 722, 732 (2009).  See also Connor, supra at 843 ("Great 
care must be taken to ensure that a lone dissenting juror is not 
permitted to evade his responsibilities"). 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth, however, that this case is 
distinguishable from Connor, 392 Mass. at 846, where the trial 
judge erred in discharging a juror after he stated he could not 
abide by his oath.  There, the judge failed to conduct any 
inquiry of the juror to determine whether he may have been a 
17 
 
 
lone dissenting juror attempting to evade responsibilities.  Id.   
Nonetheless, the fact that the trial judge thoroughly inquired 
of the juror in this case is not dispositive where the substance 
of the colloquies failed to prove that the juror's problem was 
personal to him.3 
 
Connor is, however, instructive as to how a judge should 
conduct an inquiry of a "problem" juror.  See Connor, 392 Mass. 
at 845.  We reiterate that before the "'problem' juror is 
                     
 
3 It is a difficult question whether a juror's professed 
inability to start deliberations anew by itself would constitute 
a reason personal to him or her rather than a mere frustration.  
As we have acknowledged repeatedly, frustration does not equal 
bias.  Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 819 (1975) 
("Despite his good will, maturity, acumen and sense of civic 
responsibility and despite his willingness to accept and his 
efforts to apply judicial instructions, the juror comes to the 
court room complete with that knowledge and those experiences, 
expectations, fears and frustrations which have shaped his 
character and attitudes.  Quite apart from questions of obvious 
bias or admitted prejudice, no juror enters into his temporary 
judicial service stripped of his background and emotions.  To 
hold otherwise would be to defy human experience").  It is not 
entirely clear that the juror was unable to perform his duties.  
Although the juror was resolute in the fact that he could not 
follow instructions, he also indicated that his decision-making 
process would remain fair and impartial. 
 
 
Given the facts of this case, it is not surprising that a 
juror would be frustrated with the prospect of beginning 
deliberations anew for the second time.  In fact, defense 
counsel noted that several other jurors appeared exasperated 
when the trial judge informed them they would be required to 
start anew.  In any event, because this juror's inability to 
follow instructions was couched in his relationship with the 
other jurors, we need not consider whether his reluctance to 
start deliberations anew in and of itself was a mere frustration 
that would not be considered "good cause" for dismissal. 
18 
 
 
questioned, the judge should preliminarily inform him that he 
cannot be discharged unless he has a personal problem, unrelated 
to his relationship to his fellow jurors or his views on the 
case.  Unless the juror indicates a belief that he has such a 
problem, all questioning should cease."  Id.  Here, the trial 
judge conducted two thorough colloquies but failed to inform the 
juror preliminarily that he could not be discharged unless he 
had a personal problem. 
 
We acknowledge the difficulty a judge often faces in 
determining how to deal with a "problem juror."  It is not 
always clear at the outset whether a juror's problem is of a 
personal nature.  It is no easy task for a judge to "discuss the 
juror's concerns generally," and do so "without delving into 
deliberations."  Tiscione, 482 Mass. at 492, citing Commonwealth 
v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 487-489 (2010).  The preliminary 
inquiry seeks to remedy this problem.  We take this opportunity 
to provide some additional guidance for a judge who must speak 
with a juror alone during deliberations.  We suggest that in 
addition to posing the preliminary inquiry previously discussed, 
the judge also tell the juror that the judge cannot speak with 
the juror regarding the deliberations or regarding the juror's 
relationship with the other jurors during deliberations.  For 
example, in this case, the judge might say, "I am going to ask 
you a question.  I cannot ask you, and you cannot tell me about 
19 
 
 
your deliberations or relationship with the other jurors during 
deliberations.  If you answer my question referencing either, I 
will have to interrupt you."  We emphasize that the moment a 
juror suggests that there may be a disagreement among the 
jurors, the judge must interrupt the juror and firmly reiterate 
that the juror must not reveal any information regarding 
deliberations.  The judge may need to interrupt the juror 
multiple times to give the same instruction. 
 
In any event, the trial judge's failure to give the juror 
any such preliminary advisements in this case does not affect 
our decision today.  The question whether the juror was seeking 
to evade his duties as a potential minority juror, of course, 
remains relevant to our prejudice analysis. 
 
c.  Prejudice.  Having concluded that the discharge of the 
juror was error, we now consider whether the error was 
prejudicial to the defendant.  General Laws c. 234A, § 74, 
provides that any "irregularity" with respect to discharging or 
managing jurors will not lead to vacatur unless the error is 
preserved by objection and the "objecting party has been 
specially injured or prejudiced thereby."  Here, the error is of 
constitutional dimension and was preserved by a timely 
objection.  Accordingly, we review to determine whether it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Tiscione, 482 Mass. at 
20 
 
 
493, citing Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163, cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998). 
 
Considering the events that took place before and after the 
juror's replacement, and the substance of the colloquies and of 
the juror's initial note, we conclude that discharging the juror 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although the trial 
judge was satisfied that the juror's comments did not indicate 
that he was a minority opinion on the jury or that the jury was 
at an impasse, we are not.  The judge found that the juror's 
comments with regard to the other jurors related only to the 
fact that he currently was stalling deliberations by speaking 
with the judge, and had nothing to do with his initial inability 
to continue deliberations.  We disagree. 
 
In the initial note that juror gave to the trial judge, he 
wrote that he was not "able to engage in a discussion with any 
of the fellow jurors" and that other jurors were "waiting on 
[him]" such that he would not "be able to have an open 
discussion without feeling [j]udged."  Because this note was 
passed immediately after the jurors were sent to deliberate and 
before the juror substantially had delayed the deliberation 
process, it is not entirely clear that the juror merely was 
referring to stalling the deliberations at that time. 
 
Without question, the trial judge tried to get to the root 
of this issue.  After defense counsel expressed concern over 
21 
 
 
whether the juror could be a minority in the jury room based on 
his initial note and his references to other jurors during the 
colloquy, the judge held the second colloquy.  During the 
colloquy, the juror stated, "They're all waiting for me so it's 
just going to be hard for me to go in there and feel comfortable 
having a conversation with anyone in that room."  He further 
protested, "[N]ow I'm the guy that's stalled this process."  The 
judge asked the juror to clarify what he meant by "stalling this 
process" and the juror said, "[T]hey're sitting in the room and 
they know that there's one juror missing which is myself . . . .  
And that's just a side issue aside from what I said before." 
 
Although we "defer to a judge's assessment of a juror's 
demeanor," Swafford, 441 Mass. at 336, we also emphasize that a 
trial judge "has at most a limited discretion to determine that 
the facts show an inability to perform the functions of a juror, 
and that inability must appear in the record as a demonstrable 
reality" (citation omitted).  Connor, 392 Mass. at 846–847.  
While the juror may well have been concerned about stalling the 
process, he also stated that this was just a "side issue."  We 
cannot for certain, from this record, discern whether the 
defendant was taking a minority position on the jury.  It is, 
however, apparent that he disagreed with at least some of the 
jurors, where he stated, "I already know specific jurors in 
there that I disagree with." 
22 
 
 
 
In Torres, 453 Mass. at 733, this court concluded that a 
juror's reported inability to deliberate was not a "mere 
euphemism" for the assertion of a minority position.  There, the 
juror repeatedly stated that she wanted to go home, refused to 
consider certain evidence, and said that she believed the 
criminal justice system was corrupt.  See id. at 727, 728-729.  
Moreover, in Torres, the foreperson gave the judge a note 
regarding the juror's behavior only forty-five minutes into the 
deliberations, making it "unlikely that the jury were at an 
impasse."  Id. at 733, quoting Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 
Mass. 353, 369 (2000).  "[T]here was no danger that a dissenting 
juror was allowed to evade her responsibilities."  Commonwealth 
v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 431 (2002).  Unlike in Torres, the 
juror in this case had spent a relatively significant amount of 
time deliberating.  The jury had deliberated for one full day, 
not including the full day before the jury were reconstituted 
for the first time and deliberations began anew.  Because we 
conclude that the juror's reluctance to begin deliberations anew 
was at least in part influenced by his relationship with the 
other jurors, and because we know he disagreed with at least 
some of the jurors, it is possible that the juror held a 
minority view or the jury were at an impasse.4  Accordingly, "in 
                     
 
4 As in Tiscione, 482 Mass. at 492, "[w]e acknowledge that, 
had the juror rejoined the deliberations, the end result well 
23 
 
 
view of all the circumstances," vacatur of the convictions is 
required.  Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 770 (1979). 
 
3.  Motion to suppress statements.  The defendant argues 
that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress 
statements because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that 
the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and 
voluntarily made a statement.  During the interview, the 
defendant admitted to planning to steal the drugs with Tate.  He 
also admitted to shooting Fiume.  We conclude that the motion 
judge did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, 
and the admission of those statements at trial was not error. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing the denial of a 
motion to suppress, we defer to the motion judge as to the 
weight and credibility of the evidence.  We accept the motion 
judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and 
assess the correctness of the judge's legal conclusions de 
                     
might have been mistrial."  While it is possible that the jury 
may have been at an impasse, the trial judge also may have 
concluded that the defendant would be prejudiced by forcing the 
juror to continue deliberations.  "[T]he law has invested Courts 
of Justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving 
any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the 
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity 
for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be 
defeated."  Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 410 Mass. 174, 177 (1991), 
quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).  Here, 
a mistrial may have been the proper course, where the juror 
refused to deliberate anew and the judge's colloquy did not 
confirm that the juror's reasons for his refusal were entirely 
personal to him. 
24 
 
 
novo."  Commonwealth v. Weidman, 485 Mass. 679, 683 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 138 (2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016).  "To the extent that the motion 
judge's findings are based entirely on documentary evidence, 
including video recordings, that are equally available to a 
reviewing court, no deference is owed because the reviewing 
court is 'in the same position as the [motion] judge.'"  
Weidman, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 
(2004). 
 
b.  Voluntariness of waiver.  "Although the voluntariness 
of a Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of a particular 
statement made during custodial interrogation 'are separate and 
distinct issues,' the 'test' for both is 'essentially the 
same.'"  Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 Mass. 222, 229 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 670 (1995).  "A 
waiver of Miranda rights is valid only if made 'voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently.'"  Weidman, 485 Mass. at 688, 
quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  "A 
voluntary statement is one that is 'the product of a "rational 
intellect" and a "free will," and not induced by physical or 
psychological coercion.'"  Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 
461, 468 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 
199, 207 (2011).  "The initial burden is on the defendant to 
produce evidence tending to show that his statement was 
25 
 
 
involuntary; if he satisfies this burden, the Commonwealth is 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement 
was voluntarily made."  Commonwealth v. Montoya, 464 Mass. 566, 
577 (2013).  See Edwards, supra at 669-670 (applying same 
standard to voluntariness of Miranda waiver). 
 
We review the totality of the circumstances, considering 
factors such as "promises or other inducements, conduct of the 
defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and 
emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice 
system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the 
discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the 
police), and the details of the interrogation, including the 
recitation of Miranda warnings."  Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 
Mass. 410, 413 (1986).  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 458 Mass. 
684, 692 (2011) (court considers totality of circumstances when 
determining voluntariness). 
 
i.  Diminished mental capacity.  The defendant argues that 
his diminished mental capacity also was a factor to which the 
motion judge should have given special attention.  We give 
"special attention to whether a person of low intelligence 
waived Miranda rights and voluntarily and knowingly made a 
statement to the police" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 281 (2002).  "People with low 
intelligence can, however, waive their rights."  Id., citing 
26 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86 (2000).  Here, the 
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights at the time he was 
arrested, after he was booked at the Logan Airport State police 
barracks, after he was booked at the Stoneham police department, 
before he was interviewed, after the police began recording the 
interview, and once during the interview.  The defendant 
submitted school records showing that he had a language-based 
learning disability.  Although the defendant dropped out of 
school after the eleventh grade, he did so not because of 
academic failure, but rather for family reasons.  When the 
defendant was advised of his rights during the interview, he 
appeared to have no difficulty comprehending and responded 
appropriately.  Throughout the interview he appeared calm, 
cooperative, and responsive. 
 
The defendant also suggests that he had diminished capacity 
because he was under the influence during the interview.  The 
defendant stated that he had smoked marijuana about two and one-
half hours before the interview, but the marijuana only affected 
him for fifteen minutes or less.  He also said that he had 
sipped on two shots of brandy earlier that day, but the alcohol 
was not affecting him during the interview.  The trooper who 
interviewed the defendant saw no indicia of intoxication, such 
as glassy or watery eyes, slurred speech, or any other physical 
mannerisms.  Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on 
27 
 
 
the motion to suppress and our independent review of the 
recorded interview, the motion judge properly concluded, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant made his statements 
voluntarily after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
Miranda rights. 
 
ii.  Promise of leniency.  The defendant further argues 
that police interviewers made assurances to him that rendered 
his statements involuntary.  We disagree.  At no time during the 
interview did police improperly provide "an assurance, express 
or implied that [a confession would] aid the defense or result 
in a lesser sentence."  Commonwealth v. Colon, 483 Mass. 378, 
390 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 564 
(1979).  "[A]n officer is not prohibited from 'suggest[ing] 
broadly that it would be "better" for a suspect to tell the 
truth, [and] may indicate that the person's cooperation would be 
brought to the attention of public officials or others involved, 
or may state in general terms that cooperation has been 
considered favorably by courts in the past.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Santana, 477 Mass. 610, 619 (2017), quoting Tremblay, 460 Mass. 
at 209. 
 
Here, police suggested that "there is a little bit more 
here and we don't know the whole story."  They stated:  "We'd 
like to help you and just wrap this up and get your side of it 
honestly."  They also stated:  "I think it would really help you 
28 
 
 
out."  They encouraged the defendant to "help [himself] out" by 
telling the truth.  Police did not, however, assure the 
defendant in any way that his confession would aid in his 
defense; in fact, they explicitly informed him that it would 
not.  See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 439 Mass. 47, 53 (2003).  They 
told him, "[W]e said that we're trying to have you tell us the 
truth because we want to know the truth.  We're not here making 
you any promises or making you any or saying that if you help us 
or tell us anything, we can offer you anything because that is 
not the case."  Statements encouraging the defendant to be 
truthful without a direct or implicit promise of leniency, such 
as the ones at issue here, are not improper. 
 
c.  Invocation of right to counsel.  The defendant argues 
that he invoked his right to counsel during the interview and 
that questioning should have ceased.  During custodial 
interrogation, "[i]f the accused indicates that he wishes to 
remain silent, 'the interrogation must cease.'  If he requests 
counsel, 'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 
present.'"  Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 285 (2012), 
quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 
 
Here, the defendant's statement was not an unambiguous 
request for counsel.  The defendant stated, "[T]his is where the 
lawyer thing come in."  The trooper responded, "If you're saying 
the lawyer thing, does that mean you want to have a lawyer?  Do 
29 
 
 
you want to stop?"  To which the defendant responded, "No, I 
definitely, I'll definitely, like I'll talk."5  "When a suspect's 
statement . . . simply reflects his musing about the possibility 
of stopping the questioning until he has spoken with an 
attorney, we have consistently found the statement to be too 
ambiguous to constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right 
to counsel."  Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 295 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 398 (2009), 
S.C., 467 Mass. 96, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 933 (2014).  Even 
though the defendant responded in the negative, the trooper 
attempted to clarify further the defendant's ambiguous 
statement.  See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 352 
(2012) ("Although we do not today mandate it, such 
clarification, the intuitively sensible course, has the benefit 
of both ensuring protection of the right if invoked and of 
minimizing the chance of suppression of subsequent statements at 
trial if not" [quotation and citation omitted]).  The trooper 
further stated, "[I]t's very important if you said something 
about an attorney, if you're saying you want a lawyer, I want to 
stop, but if you want to talk I'm glad to listen.  Do you 
                     
 
5 A transcript of the interview included in the record of 
this case differs slightly from what we hear in the recording 
and from what the motion judge quoted in her decision.  The 
transcript version of the defendant's response is, "No, that's, 
like I'll talk."  The difference does not affect our conclusion. 
30 
 
 
understand what I'm saying?"  In response, the defendant stated, 
"Mm-hmm," and affirmatively nodded his head up and down.  Both 
the testimony at the motion hearing and the recorded interview 
reflect the defendant's desire to go forward with questioning 
without an attorney. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to suppress is affirmed.  We vacate the judgments entered 
against the defendant and remand this matter to the Superior 
Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.