Title: Garriffa v. Taylor

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Garriffa v. Taylor1984 WY 16675 P.2d 1284Case Number: 83-105Decided: 02/03/1984BRIAN P. GARRIFFA AND MARLA J. GARRIFFA, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

JAMES M. TAYLOR AND CATHRYN TAYLOR, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
BRIAN P. GARRIFFA AND 
MARLA J. GARRIFFA, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

JAMES M. TAYLOR AND 
CATHRYN TAYLOR, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, J. 

Hardy H. Tate, 
Sheridan, for 
appellants.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an action to recover damages for breach of an express warranty. Judgment was 
entered in favor of plaintiffs-appellees in the amount of $1,650, the cost of 
installing a septic tank, plus court costs, for a total judgment of 
$1,692.75.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

FACTS

[¶3.]     The appellants sold a 
house to the appellees. Approximately nineteen months after appellees had moved 
into the house, they replaced the septic tank and sent the bill for the cost of 
replacement to appellants with a request for payment. Appellants refused payment 
and this suit was initiated.

[¶4.]     Appellants had lived in 
the house for five years prior to the time of sale. Prior to that time, 
appellant, Marla Garriffa, had lived in the house for ten years with her 
parents, the previous owners. The house was at least forty years old. The 
preprinted real estate listing form had a category entitled sewerage. Above this 
the real estate agent had typed "Septic." These forms are prepared from 
information provided by the sellers. While the appellees were looking at the 
property, Mrs. Taylor asked Mrs. Garriffa where the septic tank was located. 
Mrs. Garriffa indicated that the tank was located north of the house. Mrs. 
Taylor also asked Mrs. Garriffa if the tank had been pumped; Mrs. Garriffa 
replied that they had not pumped the tank but that they had used chemicals to 
keep the system working properly. Appellees testified that there were some 
problems with the sewerage system several months after they moved into the 
house, but nothing was done.

[¶5.]     Nineteen months after 
taking possession and occupying the house, the appellees contacted a septic tank 
sales and service company to pump the tank. When they dug into the area north of 
the house, they did not find a septic tank. However, they found two pipes 
running out of the house. At the end of the pipes appellees testified that there 
was an accumulation of rocks, dirt, and debris. The appellees then employed a 
contractor who installed a new septic tank. Appellees did not notify appellants 
concerning any of this until after the installation of the septic tank. They 
then forwarded them the bill, which appellants refused to pay. Appellees contend 
that there was an express warranty by the appellants that the property had a 
septic sewer system and that this warranty was breached because no septic system 
existed. Therefore, they contend that appellants are liable for the cost of 
installing the septic tank.

[¶6.]     Appellants raised 
several issues for review, however, we need only address one to dispose of this 
case - whether or not there was an express promise or warranty enforceable 
against the appellants regarding the existence and durability of a septic 
system.

[¶7.]     Contracts for the sale 
and purchase of land may include an express warranty on the sellers' part as to 
the physical quality or condition of the property.

"* * * It has been held 
that such an express warranty of quality is governed by the commonlaw principles 
applicable to warranties of quality in the sale of goods. * * *" 77 Am.Jur.2d 
Vendor and Purchaser § 336.

An express 
warranty is created by any affirmation of fact made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain. 67 
Am.Jur.2d Sales § 442. The primary question is whether there were any 
affirmations of fact or promises which amounted to an express warranty or 
whether the representations were merely opinions. General Supply and Equipment Co., Inc. v. 
Phillips, Tex.Civ.App., 490 S.W.2d 913 (1972). The standard generally used 
is that:

"* * * [W]hen a seller 
asserts a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, and the buyer relies on the 
assertion, the seller makes an express warranty; but, when the seller merely 
states his opinion or his judgment upon a matter of which the seller has no 
special knowledge, * * * then the seller's statement does not constitute an 
express warranty. * * *" Lovington Cattle 
Feeders, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 97 N.M. 564, 642 P.2d 167, 170 (1982). See 
also, Scovil v. Chilcoat, Okla., 
424 P.2d 87 (1967).

[¶8.]     In order for an express 
warranty to exist, there must be some positive and unequivocal statement 
concerning the thing sold which is relied upon by the buyer and which is 
understood to be an assertion concerning the items sold and not an opinion. Maupin v. Nutrena Mills, Inc., 
Okla., 385 P.2d 504 (1963). A representation which expresses the seller's opinion, belief, 
judgment, or estimate does not constitute an express warranty. Scheirman v. Coulter, Okla., 624 P.2d 70 
(1980). It is important to consider whether the seller asserts a fact about 
which the buyer is ignorant or whether he merely states an opinion or judgment 
upon a matter of which the seller has no special knowledge and upon which the 
buyer might be expected to have an opinion or to exercise his own judgment. Carpenter v. Alberto Culver Co., 28 
Mich. App. 
399, 184 N.W.2d 547 (1970). All the circumstances surrounding a sale are to be 
considered in determining whether there was an express warranty or merely an 
expression of opinion. Lovington Cattle 
Feeders, Inc. v. Abbott Lab, supra; Price Brothers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear 
Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1099, 102 S. Ct. 674, 70 L. Ed. 2d 641.

[¶9.]     The question of whether 
an express warranty exists is for the trier of fact. Scheirman v. Coulter, supra. In the 
absence of special findings of facts, the reviewing court must consider that the 
judgment carries with it every finding of fact which is supported by the 
evidence. Hendrickson v. Heinze, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1975). However, where 
nonconflicting evidence admits of only one conclusion, a contrary conclusion 
cannot stand. Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507 
(1967).

[¶10.]  In this case there is not a conflict in 
evidence; therefore, we must look at the undisputed facts in relation to the 
requirements necessary for an express warranty. There was uncontradicted 
testimony by the real estate agent that the phrase, "Septic" on the real estate 
listing agreement is interpreted as meaning that it does not have city sewer, 
"[i]t has some sort of a septic system." There was also testimony by appellee 
that appellant had stated that there was a septic system located north of the 
house and that they had not had any difficulty with the system. There was no 
testimony presented that they had had problems with the system, knew of any 
present difficulties, or that they had information which they did not disclose. 
Appellee testified concerning the septic system:

"Q. (By Mr. Tate) You 
said on your direct examination you didn't look at the system when you bought 
it; is that correct?

"A. We looked at what we 
could see.

"Q. You can't look at a 
sewage system when you buy an old house.

"A. That's 
true.

"Q. It would be pretty 
impractical.

"A. That's 
right.

"Q. And if the Garriffas 
never dug that system up, they really wouldn't know what was under there 
themselves either.

"A. They wouldn't know 
what was under the ground, no."

We do not find 
that these statements were sufficient to form an express warranty concerning the 
septic sewerage system. The house was at least forty years old. Appellants 
stated that they had never had any problem with the septic system and that the 
tank had not been pumped. There was no testimony contradicting these statements. 
The statements were very general. They related to appellants' experience in the 
house. Appellants were not dealers of septic systems, nor were they people who 
had a special knowledge about these matters. Guess v. Lorenz, Mo. 
App., 612 S.W.2d 831 (1981). Representations of fact which are capable of 
determination are warranties, but the mere expression of an opinion is not. 
Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 
(1974).

[¶11.]  We find that these statements merely 
expressed the sellers' opinions and beliefs concerning the septic system and did 
not constitute an express warranty. If both parties are free from fault, there 
is no compelling reason to require the seller, instead of the purchaser, to bear 
the loss. Cook v. Salishan Properties, 
Inc., 279 Or. 333, 569 P.2d 1033 (1977). Appellees purchased a 
forty-year-old house not connected to the city sewer. Sewage was moved from the 
house by a septic system installed forty years earlier. What kind of system was 
installed forty years earlier we do not know. We do know that these systems do 
not last forever. When, more than a year after purchase of the house, this 
system did not function as expected, appellees, without demand or notice to 
appellants, employed a contractor of their choice and installed a new septic 
tank. They now ask that appellants be required to pay for that new septic tank. 
That was not their bargain. Because appellants' statements did not constitute an 
express warranty, we will reverse with instructions to the trial court to enter 
a judgment in accordance with this opinion.