Title: Matter of EB

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of EB1990 WY 82795 P.2d 1212Case Number: C-90-1Decided: 08/20/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO EB. ATB, 

APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, SHERIDAN, WYOMING, 

APPELLEE (PETITIONER). 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sheridan County, James N. Wolfe, J.

J. John Sampson, 
Sheridan, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Dixon, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Mark J. Murphy, 
Sheridan, guardian ad litem.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, 
MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal we 
address the question, posed by appellant, ATB (father), whether the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS), upon its petition to terminate 
the father's parental rights vis-a-vis his son, EB (child). DPASS premised its 
petition to terminate the father's parental rights on allegations that the child 
had been left in the care of DPASS without provision for child support and 
without communication from the father for a period of at least one year.1 We reverse because the evidence in 
the record does not support the district court's entry of summary 
judgment.

[¶2]      Father states his 
issues thus:

I. The court erred in 
finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact on whether or not the 
minor child, [EB], had been left in the care of another person without provision 
for support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of one 
year, pursuant to Wyoming statute, Sec. 14-2-309(a)(i).

     A. Did the appellant 
leave the minor child in the care of another person without provision for 
support and without communication from the appellant for a period of one year, 
as that standard is articulated in Wyoming statute, Sec. 
14-2-309(a)(i)?

     B. Did the court err 
in employing the standard for adoption without consent in a termination action 
against a non-custodial parent?

[¶3]      In response to 
these claims of error, DPASS asserts that occasional and trifling contributions 
to the support of a child do not create a genuine issue of material fact which 
precludes summary judgment. Further, DPASS asserts that the two telephone calls 
made from the father to the child's mother during the course of two years does 
not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the contention that the father 
left his child without communication for a period of at least one 
year.

[¶4]      The record 
reveals the following: A petition for termination of parental rights was filed 
in the district court on September 1, 1989, alleging that the child was left in 
the care of DPASS2 without provision for support of 
the child by the natural father and without communication from the natural 
father for a period of at least one year. On September 26, 1989, counsel was 
appointed to represent the father because he was indigent and incarcerated in 
the Hayes County Jail, San Marcos, Texas. On November 2, 1989, DPASS filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The motion asserted that the affidavit of the 
mother established there was no genuine issue of material fact. We quote the 
affidavit in its entirety:

I

That I reside at 314 
South Linden # 2, Sheridan Wyoming.

II

That I have never 
received any child support from my ex-husband, [ATB]. [He] last saw our son, 
[EB], in October 1987. The only gift [ATB] has ever given [EB] is a sweatsuit 
for Christmas, 1987.

On June 16, 1989 I sent 
relinquishment forms by certified mail to [ATB] and requested that he 
voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. No answer has yet been 
received.

Further the Affiant saith 
[sic] not [sic].

The affidavit 
was signed on June 20, 1989.

[¶5]      In response to 
this affidavit, the father submitted his own affidavit which we shall summarize. 
The father was born on February 23, 1969. In October 1987, the mother left Texas 
with their child and went to Wyoming. The father did not become aware of the 
divorce decree, which required him to make child support payments, until 
November 1989. He claimed to have communicated with his wife about support of 
the child, but that on two occasions she told him not to send money and, that 
when he sent her $200 in February 1989, she returned the money to him. The 
father also claimed to have provided the child with a jacket and clothing, 
though no date for this contribution to the child's support is included in the 
affidavit which was signed by the father on December 4, 1989. The father also 
claimed that the mother called his employer in Texas and made false accusations 
against him which resulted in him losing his job. The record also contains a 
social study done by DPASS, but that document contains only self-serving and 
likely inadmissable hearsay information received by DPASS from the mother, which 
has no value in testing the validity of the summary judgment. The evidence does 
not demonstrate the age of the child, but we are able to glean from the record 
that he was just eleven days short of being three years old when the petition 
was filed.

[¶6]      In determining 
the propriety of any summary judgment, this court examines the record in the 
light most favorable to the respondent, giving him or her the benefit of all 
inferences which can properly and reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Smith 
v. Ensley, 752 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1988); Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 640 
(Wyo. 1986). This case presents something of a mixed case under the Cordova, 
six-stage, summary judgment analysis. Id. at 634. However, our initial concern 
is with stage three and the substantive sufficiency of the mother's affidavit 
which was the only evidence filed in support of the motion. That affidavit does 
not contain the sort of grist that the termination of parental rights mill 
requires. See Matter of SKJ, 673 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1983). The affidavit says 
only that the mother never received any support from the father, but it does not 
say that none has ever been offered. It says that the father has not seen the 
child since October 1987, but it does not say that the father has refused and/or 
neglected to see his child despite knowing his whereabouts or that the father 
was able to visit his child and did not do so. In summary, when viewed most 
favorably to the father, the mother's affidavit fails to establish any of the 
elements necessary for termination of a parent's rights under W.S. 
14-2-309(a)(i).

[¶7]      More importantly, 
under Cordova's stage six analysis, the father's affidavit raises a number of 
factual issues, the resolution of which is necessary to the termination of 
parental rights. For instance, the father claims that he did not see the divorce 
decree until November, 1989. He claims that the mother asked him not to send 
money for the support of the child and, when he did send money, she returned it 
to him. The social study suggests that the mother was informed that if she 
received any support it would have to be reported to DPASS and would reduce her 
public assistance benefits. It is possible that the mother asked the father not 
to send money since she may have viewed the contributions to support of the 
child as merely complicating her status with DPASS without adding any real 
benefit to her and her child's life. Finally, there is no evidence to 
support DPASS's claim that the child was in its custody for any time period 
whatsoever (except for the social study which is not evidence in this case).3 A close examination of the record 
reveals that one can only piece together what may have happened in this case by 
reference to the pleadings, correspondence in the file, the social study, and 
other extraneous nonevidentiary sources. One cannot discern much of anything 
about the case from the evidence.

[¶8]      Not only was the 
mother's affidavit insufficient on its face to justify a termination under W.S. 
14-2-309(a)(i), but the father's affidavit put in issue virtually all the facts 
contained in the mother's affidavit. We note that this seems to be a case where 
the family left the father, not where the father left the family. The record 
indicates the father is incarcerated in Texas for serious crimes and that other 
serious criminal charges are still pending against him.4

[¶9]      Justification for 
a decision to terminate the parental rights by summary judgment encounters rules 
including the strict scrutiny standard because the fundamental liberty of 
familial association is first presented. In Interest of J.G., 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 
1987); TR v. Washakie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services, 736 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1987). Consequently, clear and convincing evidence is required 
which cannot be found to be detailed within the two paragraphs for sentence 
assertions for summary judgment of the affidavit with which we are presented 
here. RW v. State ex rel. Laramie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, 766 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1989), Thomas, J. and Urbigkit, J., specially 
concurring; DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980). Furthermore, since this is a summary judgment, the review in 
the most favorable light standard is not available for affirmation of the 
district court decision. Matter of Christina T., 590 P.2d 189 (Okla. 1979). Cf. 
Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting.

[¶10]   The judgment of the district court 
is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1              
(a) The parent-child 
legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following 
facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:

(i) The child has been 
left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and 
without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) 
year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications;

* * * * * *

(iv) The parent is 
incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is 
unfit to have custody and control of the child.

W.S. 
14-2-309.

2 The mother apparently 
intends to relinquish voluntarily her parental rights to the child, thus paving 
the way for adoption of the child. The record does not reflect that she has done 
so as of this writing. The mother placed the child with DPASS which subsequently 
placed the child in foster care.

3 The written but unsworn 
social study was "filed" by DPASS on the day of the hearing for the summary 
judgment, December 11, 1989. Neither litigant argues that it had evidentiary 
weight in the district court's decision since it was neither timely nor in 
admissible form as testimony under oath. Matter of Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272 
(Wyo. 1988); Low v. Sanger, 478 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1970).

4 An allegation made 
pursuant to W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iv) (incarceration after conviction of a felony) 
was included in an amended petition filed on October 31, 1989, but was not 
adjudicated in the district court.