Title: Johnson v. Johnson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-571


 Diana K. Johnson                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Lamoille Family Court

 Alan Barry Johnson                           September Term, 1991


 Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

 Robert P. Davison, Jr., Stowe, for plaintiff-appellant

 Oreste V. Valsangiacomo, Jr., of Valsangiacomo, Detora, McQuesten, Rose &
   Grearson, Barre, for defendant-appellee and cross-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff wife appeals from provisions of a divorce
 decree of the Lamoille Family Court dividing the marital estate and awarding
 defendant husband maintenance.  Defendant cross-appeals the division of
 marital assets and the limitation of maintenance to the life of plaintiff.
 The portion of the decree granting the divorce is affirmed, but we reverse
 and vacate the remainder of the judgment based on grounds raised in the
 cross-appeal, and remand for reconsideration of the valuation of certain
 marital assets.
      The parties were married in 1957 and separated in 1988.  Plaintiff
 brought into the marriage a considerable portfolio of securities derived
 from her parents, the income from which was reinvested in part and used in
 part to enhance the family's already secure circumstances.  Plaintiff later
 inherited more securities and interests in two family partnerships, giving
 her an individual net worth in excess of $3,000,000 in 1988.  Defendant has
 an electronic engineering degree and was successfully employed through most
 of the marriage.  The court found that his retirement after 1982 resulted
 from a joint decision of the parties.
      The court did not assign specific fault for the breakdown of the
 marriage, finding that the actions of each were contributing factors and
 that after a move to Stowe they "ceased to share the same interests."
      Plaintiff filed for divorce in 1988, and a final hearing was held in
 April and May 1990.  The court found that certain stocks "held at the
 beginning of the marriage" and carried in plaintiff's name were "joint
 property," to be divided equally between the parties, including IBM stock
 valued at $765,000.  Also divided equally were certain bonds totalling
 $135,000 in value, $81,534 in notes receivable, $12,000 in cash, and a
 house in Stowe, valued at $655,000.  The aggregate value of the assets
 divided equally was $1,661,125.
      Plaintiff was the sole recipient of other assets that included stocks,
 bonds, two limited partnership interests (Drexelbrook and Dominion), cash,
 and personalty, valued at $2,479,220.  Defendant was the sole recipient of
 bonds, cash, separate real estate, and personalty with a total value of
 $222,300.
      The trial court awarded defendant maintenance as follows:
         Annual maintenance in the amount of $52,725 to be paid
         to the defendant in four quarterly payments will assure
         equal distribution of the income at its present rate of
         return.  As the plaintiff is receiving the greater share
         of the assets, it is her responsibility to pay this
         amount even if the actual income decreases and even if
         it requires liquidation of capital.

      Plaintiff appeals principally over the grant of maintenance, although
 she raises numerous other issues.  Defendant concedes that he made no
 request for maintenance and argues on cross-appeal that the court awarded
 maintenance to redress a disparity in the division of marital assets.  He
 also contends that the valuation of the closely held partnerships was
 erroneous.
      In awarding maintenance under these circumstances, a trial court
 should consider the distribution of marital assets.  Cleverly v. Cleverly,
 151 Vt. 351, 357, 561 A.2d 99, 103 (1989).  The court may award maintenance
 upon evidence that the receiving spouse meets both criteria under 15 V.S.A.
 { 752(a), which states:
           (a)  In an action under this chapter, the court may
         order either spouse to make maintenance payments, either
         rehabilitative or permanent in nature, to the other
         spouse if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

                          (1)  lacks sufficient income, property, or both,
                        including property apportioned in accordance with
                        section 751 of this title, to provide for his or
                        her reasonable needs, and

                          (2)  is unable to support himself or herself
                        through appropriate employment at the standard of
                        living established during the marriage or is the
                        custodian of a child of the parties.

   We have held that a property settlement may be supplemented by an award of
   maintenance, given one spouse's greater capacity to acquire future capital
   assets and income.  Bancroft v. Bancroft, 154 Vt. 442, 445, 578 A.2d 114,
   116 (1990).  In Downs v. Downs, 154 Vt. 161, 574 A.2d 156 (1990) we held
   that there was insufficient property to fairly compensate the supporting
   spouse for contributions toward the other spouse's attainment of a degree,
   and we allowed the maintenance award to make up for the dearth in existing
   property from which to distribute.  Id. at 166-67, 574 A.2d  at 159
   ("'maintenance is not just a means of providing bare necessities, but
   rather a flexible tool by which the parties' standard of living may be
   equalized for an appropriate period of time'" (quoting Washburn v.
   Washburn,