Title: State v. Rodriguez/Buck

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 24, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
VERONICA RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
C051244CR; CA A131050; SC S055720)
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
DARRYL ANTHONY BUCK,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
04102314; CA A131973; SC S055721)
(Cases
consolidated for argument and opinion)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
November 4, 2008.
Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Legal Services Division, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review.  
Timothy A. Sylwester,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Kevin H. Kono and
Timothy R. Volpert, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, filed a brief and
reply brief on behalf of amici curiae Boys & Girls Club of Portland
and Oregon Education Association.
BALMER, J.
The decisions of the
Court of Appeals are affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgments of
the circuit courts are affirmed.
De Muniz, C. J., concurred
in part and dissented in part and filed an opinion in which Gillette and
Walters, JJ., joined.
*Appeal from
Washington County Circuit Court, Nancy W. Campbell,
Judge. 217 Or App 351, 174
P3d 1100 (2007).
*Appeal from Linn
County Circuit Court, Rick J. McCormick,
Judge. 217 Or App 363, 174
P3d 1106 (2007).
BALMER, J.
These two criminal cases, which we
consolidated for argument and disposition, require us to interpret and apply
the requirement in Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution that
"all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense."(1)
Veronica Rodriguez touched a 13-year-old
boy when, standing behind him in a room with 30 to 50 other people, she brought
the back of his head into contact with her clothed breasts for about one minute. 
Darryl Buck touched a 13-year-old girl when the girl, who was sitting next to
him while she was fishing, leaned back to cast her fishing line, bringing her
clothed buttocks into contact with the back of his hand and Buck failed to move
his hand; that happened one or two more times.  When they stood up, Buck brushed
dirt off the back of the girl's shorts with two swipes of his hand.  Each of
those touchings was unlawful because a jury in Rodriguez's case and a judge in
Buck's case found that they had been for a sexual purpose -- a fact that
brought the physical contact within the definition of first-degree sexual
abuse.  ORS 163.427(1)(a)(A).  Rodriguez and Buck were both convicted of that
crime. 
First-degree sexual abuse carries a
mandatory sentence of six years and three months (75 months) in prison, under
Ballot Measure 11 (1994).  In each of these cases, however, the trial judge
determined that the mandatory sentence was not "proportioned to the
offense" committed by the defendant and therefore was unconstitutional
under Article I, section 16.  The trial courts imposed shorter sentences -- 16
months in the case of Rodriguez and 17 months in the case of Buck.(2)  The state
appealed the trial courts' sentencing rulings, and Rodriguez and Buck
cross-appealed their convictions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions, but agreed with the state that the trial courts should have
imposed mandatory 75-month sentences.  State v. Rodriguez, 217 Or App
351, 174 P3d 1100 (2007); State v. Buck, 217 Or App 363, 174 P3d 1106
(2007).  
Defendants filed petitions for
review, which we allowed.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendants'
convictions.  However, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals as to
sentencing and affirm the sentences imposed by the trial courts.  We conclude
that the imposition of the mandatory 75-month sentence for first-degree sexual
abuse, as applied to the facts of Rodriguez's and Buck's offenses, would
violate the constitutional requirement that the penalty be proportioned to the
offense.
I.  FACTS AND
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
We first describe the conduct that
led to the convictions at issue here and the proceedings below.  We then
consider defendants' challenges to their convictions, before turning to defendants'
arguments that imposition of Measure 11 sentences in their cases would violate the
proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16.  We take the facts from
the decisions of the Court of Appeals and from the record.
A.        State v. Rodriguez
Rodriguez was an employee at the
Hillsboro Boys & Girls Club, where she worked with at-risk youth.  One of
the at-risk youths with whom she worked was a boy who was 12 years old when
Rodriguez began working at the club.  Rodriguez developed a close relationship
with the boy and his family, spending time at his home, helping him with his
homework, and giving him rides to the club and to school.  She and the boy spent
time together outside the club -- often alone -- in her car, at her apartment,
or at his home -- all in violation of club rules.  Rodriguez told the boy not
to tell anyone that they had been alone at her apartment.  Rodriguez and the
boy often hugged each other and put their arms around each other.  The boy sat
on her lap in her office and occasionally kissed her on the cheek.  Rodriguez
sent email messages to the boy in which she called him "babyface" and
said, "I love you" and "love you lots."  The boy sent
Rodriguez similar messages.  Rodriguez took the boy with her on several trips,
including overnight trips to visit a former club member and to visit her
family.  Their conduct had raised concerns among staff members and became the
subject of rumors among other children at the club.
The conduct that gave rise to this
case occurred on February 14, 2005.  Another staff member saw Rodriguez and the
boy in the game room at the club, along with 30 to 50 other youths and at least
one other staff member.  The victim, 13 years old at the time, was sitting in a
chair.  Rodriguez was "standing behind him, caressing his face and pulling
his head back; the back of his head was pressed against her breasts."  217
Or App at 354.  The staff member pointed that out to another staff member, who
"saw [Rodriguez] run her hands along the victim's face and through his
hair while the back of his head was against her breasts."  Id.  The
contact lasted approximately one minute.  
The staff member reported the
incident to a supervisor, and the police were called.  Rodriguez was eventually
charged with first-degree sexual abuse based on that conduct, and a jury found
her guilty.                   
B.        State v. Buck
Buck and a friend, Schamp, took a 13-year-old
girl and her 15-year-old sister, children of a friend of Schamp's, on a camping
trip.  Buck previously had told the girls that he thought that they were smart
and beautiful; although he knew their ages, he thought that they looked much
older.  While Schamp and the older girl collected firewood near the campsite,
the 13-year-old was fishing off a river bank.  Buck sat down next to her and,
to keep himself from sliding down the sloped river bank, placed his hands on
the rock at his sides.  His right hand was on the rock directly behind the
victim.  When the girl leaned back to cast her fishing line, the top part of
her clothed buttocks came into contact with the back of Buck's hand.  As the
Court of Appeals summarized, 
"The first time it happened, he immediately moved his
hand away, but, because the victim did not flinch or react in a way that
suggested that she was uncomfortable with the contact, he put his hand back
where it was and allowed the contact to occur one or two more times as the
victim continued to cast."  
Buck, 217 Or App at 366.  The Court of Appeals
described the other contact:
"While that was occurring, [Buck] slid down
the rock a bit.  To move himself back to where he was, he put his right hand on
the victim's lower back and pushed himself up, using her body for leverage.  [Buck]
asked the victim whether he made her uncomfortable by touching her.  She said that
he had and told him that he needed to know what his limits were.  He said that
he did, apologized, and told her, 'I have nothing but love and affection for
you.'  When the victim got up to leave, there was dirt on the back of her
shorts.  [Buck] brushed the dirt off with two swipes of the palm of his hand. 
The victim walked away and returned to the campsite, where [her sister] and
Schamp were."
Id. at 366-67.
Buck was charged with first-degree
sexual abuse.  He waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to
the court, which found him guilty.
C.        Sentencing
Because of the passage of
Measure 11 in 1994, the penalty for first-degree sexual abuse is a mandatory
sentence of six years and three months (75 months) in prison.  ORS 137.700(2)(a)(P).(3)>  Under that
statute, the trial court has no discretion to impose a lesser sentence based on
the specific facts of the case, harm to the victim, or characteristics of the
defendant.  A trial court, however, like this court, has an obligation to consider
a claim that a particular sentence is unconstitutional.  Here, the two experienced
trial judges who heard the cases each ruled that a 75-month sentence for the
conduct for which the defendant before them was convicted would violate Article
I, section 16.
In Rodriguez, Judge Campbell
applied the "shock the moral sense" test that this court first set
out in Sustar v. County Court for Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 201 P 445
(1921) -- the same test that has been followed by this court in subsequent
cases and that we follow again today.  She explained some of the reasons that
she considered the 75-month sentence unconstitutional:
"I have to first of all take a look at Ms. Rodriguez,
who has absolutely no prior criminal record of any kind.  She's lived an exemplary
life. * * * [S]he has done a tremendous amount for youth in our community and
in other communities.
"I have to look at the crime itself.  This
was a touching, and as stated apparently by everybody, in a crowded room, over
clothing, not prolonged.  And it's * * * as [the deputy district attorney]
certainly knows, because he's prosecuted many cases in this courtroom, * * *
the contact was probably the least of any I've ever had.
"* * * I think this is a case that just
cries out for shocking -- if the 75-month sentence were imposed -- being
shocking to any reasonable person, and I'm not going to impose it."
Judge Campbell imposed the sentence that Rodriguez would have
received under the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines, were it not for the mandatory
Measure 11 sentence:  16 months in prison.  
In Buck, Judge
McCormick was faced with a similar issue.  Although he found that Buck had
unlawfully touched the girl -- Buck had waived a jury trial, and the case was
tried to the court -- Judge McCormick also said, "I don't think this
should have been charged as a Measure 11 [crime]."  The 75-month mandatory
sentence, given the particular conduct, was "grossly unfair."  Like
Judge Campbell, however, Judge McCormick did not second-guess the district
attorney's decision to prosecute the case as a Measure 11 offense or the
statutory penalty for that crime.  Nonetheless, he proceeded to determine
whether the constitutional proportionality requirement was met.  He too applied
the "shock the moral sense" test and concluded, based in part on his
years as a trial judge, that a 75-month sentence would shock the moral sense of
reasonable people.  He based that conclusion on several factors.  As to the
reasonableness of the sentence, he pointed out that Buck "has never been
arrested.  He has no criminal history whatsoever."  He also emphasized that
the touching was "outside the clothes, it was without fondling, it was not
a situation where it was forced."  Judge McCormick also stated, "I
would guess that 99.99 percent of the sex abuse cases in the first degree are
worse than this."  He concluded that the sentence was "so
disproportionate as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what
a right and proper sentence should be."  Like Judge Campbell, he applied
the sentencing guidelines and concluded that Buck should serve a sentence of 17
months in prison.
D.        Appeal
As noted, the state appealed the
trial court sentencing decisions, and Rodriguez and Buck appealed their
convictions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions without discussion,
but reversed the sentences, concluding that the two trial judges had erred in concluding
that the Measure 11 sentence violated the proportionality provision of Article
I, section 16, and imposing the shorter sentences.  In each case, the court
held that a 75-month sentence for the conduct in which defendants engaged would
not shock the moral sense of all reasonable people and therefore was not
unconstitutionally disproportionate.  The court remanded the cases for
imposition of the mandatory Measure 11 sentence.  Defendants petitioned for
review, challenging both their convictions and their sentences, and we allowed
review.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions, but hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the sentences were
constitutionally permissible.  Accordingly, we affirm both the convictions and
the sentences imposed by the trial courts. 
II.  ANALYSIS --
DEFENDANTS' CONVICTIONS
It is important at the outset to
distinguish between defendants' claims that the evidence in each case was
insufficient to prove sexual abuse and their claims that, even if their
convictions are valid, the mandatory 75-month sentences for those convictions are
unconstitutional because that penalty is not "proportioned" to their
offenses.  Rodriguez and Buck both were convicted of first-degree sexual abuse
because they "subject[ed] another person to sexual contact" and the
other person was "less than 14 years of age."  ORS 163.427(1)(a). 
For purposes of that statute, "sexual contact" is defined as
"any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing
such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the
purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party." 
ORS 163.305(6) (emphasis added).  Buck admitted that the physical contact for
which he was charged occurred; Rodriguez denied the physical conduct alleged by
the state.  Both Rodriguez and Buck denied at trial that any physical contact
that did occur was for the purpose of "arousing or gratifying * * * sexual
desire."  On review, defendants argue, as they did in the Court of
Appeals, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the touchings in each
case were for any sexual purpose.  
Defendants face an uphill battle in
seeking to overturn a criminal conviction based on the alleged insufficiency of
the evidence.  We review the jury's verdict to determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of first-degree sexual abuse
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339, 768 P2d
391 (1989) (stating standard).  And, the same standard applies when, as in
Buck's case, the trial judge is the finder of fact.  See State v. Allison,
325 Or 585, 587-88, 941 P2d 1017 (1997) (applying same standard of review after
bench trial).
In Rodriguez's case, testimony
supported the jury's conclusion that she had acted with a sexual purpose in
holding the back of the victim's head against her clothed breasts, while
massaging the sides of his head.  Although the touching itself did not necessarily
demonstrate a sexual purpose, the record discloses a litany of improper
communications and conduct between Rodriguez and the boy.  A jury reasonably
could find that Rodriguez, who was employed to help at-risk youth, such as the
boy, acted wrongly in talking and writing to him in a romantic way and that she
completely failed to observe the necessary boundaries in what was supposed to
be a supportive, professional relationship.  Despite the brief, limited nature
of the touching, given the other evidence that was introduced at trial, we
cannot say that a reasonable jury could not have concluded, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the touching was for a sexual purpose.  Accordingly, we affirm
Rodriguez's conviction.(4)
Buck similarly argues that the evidence
was insufficient to find that the brief physical contact that he had with the victim
had been for a sexual purpose.  Again, however, although the limited contact
for which he was convicted certainly could have occurred without a sexual
purpose, the state also introduced other evidence, including evidence of Buck's
comments to and apparent thoughts about the girl.  Those comments and thoughts
suggested that Buck had a sexual and (given the difference in their ages)
entirely inappropriate interest in her, and the circumstances were sufficient
to permit the factfinder to infer that Buck might have been interested in
further sexual contact with her.  Thus, there was evidence from which the trial
court reasonably could have found that Buck had acted with a sexual purpose
when he touched the girl.  We therefore affirm Buck's conviction.
III.  ANALYSIS -- DEFENDANTS'
SENTENCES
That brings us to defendants'
argument that, even if their convictions are sustained, to sentence them to a
mandatory prison term of six years and three months for the conduct described
above violates the proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16.  We
therefore put to one side the issue on which the dissent focuses -- whether the
legislature (or the people, exercising their legislative power through the
initiative process) may protect children by imposing criminal penalties on the
kinds of touching that Rodriguez and Buck engaged in.  Of course they can.  The
question instead is whether there is any constitutional limit on the term of
imprisonment that can be imposed for the touchings that occurred here.  In our
view, Article I, section 16, does impose a limit.
In analyzing whether the imposition
of a 75-month sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate, we focus on the unlawful
conduct in which Rodriguez and Buck engaged.  Defendants were convicted because
the finder of fact determined that, with a sexual purpose, they engaged in the
touching described above:  Rodriguez brought the back of the boy's head in
contact with her clothed breasts, in a room of 30 to 50 other people, for about
a minute; Buck failed to move his hand to eliminate the contact between the
back of his hand and the girl's clothed buttocks that occurred when she leaned
back to cast her fishing line and, a few moments later, he brushed dirt off the
back of her shorts.  Our task is to decide whether the mandatory 75-month
sentence is an unconstitutionally disproportionate penalty for the conduct that
occurred in these cases.
A.        Legal Standard
In this court's first case articulating
a standard for applying Article I, section 16, the court held that, "[i]n
order to justify the court in declaring punishment cruel and unusual with reference
to its duration, the punishment must be so proportioned to the offense
committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as
to what is right and proper under the circumstances."  Sustar, 101
Or at 665 (emphasis added).  Although the decision in Sustar referred to
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of Article I, section 16, rather than
the proportionality clause, in later cases this court has made it clear that
the "shock the moral sense" standard also applies to proportionality
challenges.  See State v. Wheeler, 343 Or 652, 175 P3d 438 (2007)
(applying "shock the moral sense" standard to claim that sentence was
not proportioned to the offense).
In Wheeler, this court also
refined the Sustar test, noting that the "shock the moral sense of
all reasonable people as to what is right and proper" test was not
intended to be taken literally -- "that is, that a penalty for a
particular crime would meet the proportionality requirement if a single 'reasonable
person' could be found whose moral sense was not 'shocked' by that
penalty."  343 Or at 670.  Rather, as stated in Wheeler, the court
in Sustar was attempting to articulate a standard that would "find
a penalty to be disproportionately severe for a particular offense only in rare
circumstances."  Id. (footnote omitted).  The court also reaffirmed
in Wheeler the central role that the legislature plays in establishing
penalties for crimes.  Id. at 671.  It is not the role of this court to
second-guess the legislature's determination of the penalty or range of
penalties for a crime.  However, it is the role of the court to ensure that
sentences conform to requirements that have been in our constitution for 150
years.  And, when we conclude that, because of its length, a sentence is
inconsistent with Article I, section 16, as we have on at least three
occasions, we should hold that sentence unconstitutional.(5)
The difficult question posed here,
then, is whether the mandatory 75-month sentence that Measure 11 would impose in
each of these cases is so disproportionately severe that it constitutes one of
those "rare circumstances" that requires reversal under Article I, section
16.  In declaring unconstitutional a punishment that is so disproportionate, when
compared to the offense, so as to "shock the moral sense" of
reasonable people, this court has identified at least three factors that bear
upon that ultimate conclusion:  (1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty
and the gravity of the crime; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for
other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.(6) 
We turn to an examination of each of the factors and then apply those factors.
1.  The Relationship between the
"Penalty" and the "Offense"
In Wheeler, this court
examined the text of Article I, section 16, and attempted to articulate what
the framers of that provision meant when they required that a penalty should be
"proportioned" to the offense:
"The term 'proportion' indicates a
comparative relationship between at least two things.  See, e.g., 2 Noah
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 45 (1828)
('proportion' indicates a 'comparative relation').  Here, the two things being
related are 'penalties' and 'the offense,' and the provision requires that the
penalties for each particular offense be 'proportioned' -- that is,
comparatively related -- to that offense.  The strong implication of that
requirement is that a greater or more severe penalty should be imposed for a
greater or more severe offense, and, conversely, that a less severe penalty
should be imposed for a less severe offense."
343 Or at 655-56 (emphasis added).  After an extensive
discussion of the history of the proportionality requirement, the court in Wheeler
applied it to the sentences at issue there, concluding that "[the]
defendant's sentences bear a sufficient relationship to the gravity of the
crimes of which he was convicted and his prior felony convictions."  343
Or at 680.  Thus, it is apparent from Wheeler that application of the
proportionality provision requires consideration of the relationship between
the "gravity" of the offense and the severity of the penalty.  That consideration
is similar to the first step in the test used by the United States Supreme
Court in determining whether a penalty constitutes "cruel and unusual
punishment" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  See Solem v. Helm,
463 US 277, 292, 103 S Ct 3001, 77 L Ed 2d 637 (1983) (first part of test is
examining the "gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty").(7) 
It also was the first step that the Court of Appeals followed in these cases,
which that court applied based on its own precedents and Solem.  Rodriguez,
217 Or App at 360-62; Buck, 217 Or App at 370 n 6. 
These cases require us to elaborate
on the way in which a court should examine the severity of the penalty, the
gravity of the offense, and the relationship between the two.  As to the
relevant penalty, in contemporary criminal justice systems, including Oregon's,
the primary determinant of the severity of a penalty is the amount of time that
the wrongdoer must spend in prison or jail, if convicted of that offense.  
Examining the "offense" is
slightly more involved.  The state argues that the "offense," for
purposes of the proportionality requirement, is limited to the description of
the prohibited conduct in the statute.  In the state's view, the court is not
permitted to consider the specific facts of any individual case when analyzing
the gravity of the "offense."  
The state's approach is inconsistent
with this court's prior cases and defines "offense" too narrowly.  If
the state were correct, and the court could look to only the statutory
definition of the "offense" and compare it to the statutory penalty,
a defendant essentially would be limited to challenging the proportionality of
a criminal penalty on its face.  Of course, this court has rejected facial
challenges to the mandatory sentences imposed by Measure 11, State ex rel
Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 614, 932 P2d 1145 (1997), and we do not
question that decision.  However, in rejecting facial challenges to Measure 11
penalties, this court explicitly stated that a defendant could assert an as-applied
constitutional challenge, as defendants have here:  "[I]f a
sentencing court rules that a statutorily prescribed sentence (under [Measure
11] or any other statute) would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual as
applied in a given case, the court may refuse to impose the prescribed
sentence."  Id. (emphasis in original).  And an as-applied
challenge necessarily involves the consideration of the particular conduct in
which the defendant engaged and for which he was convicted, as well as other
factors, such as the defendant's criminal history.  See, e.g., Wheeler,
343 Or at 677-80 (in rejecting facial and as-applied proportionality challenges
to sentence for sexual abuse, noting that defendant was charged with 18
separate sex felonies involving three different boys as young as nine years of
age and that he had two previous felony sex convictions as well as a robbery
conviction).  
An as-applied proportionality analysis
that considers the facts of an individual defendant's specific criminal conduct
is particularly significant when the criminal statute at issue covers a broad
range of activity, criminalizing a variety of forms and intensity of conduct. 
In such a case, a harsh penalty might not, on its face, be disproportionate,
because of the fact that the statute dealt, inter alia, with some
extreme form of that conduct.  However, when a defendant is convicted for
engaging in only more minor conduct encompassed within the statute, the
defendant may plausibly argue that the mandatory sentence, as applied to the
particular facts of his or her case, is unconstitutionally disproportionate. 
To refuse even to consider defendants' as-applied challenge would not only be inconsistent
with Huddleston, but would undermine the basic proportionality concept
that more serious crimes should receive more severe sentences than less serious
crimes and vice versa.
In any event, the state offers no
cogent reason to read the word "offense" in Article I, section 16, as
limited to only the general (and, therefore, abstract) description of the conduct
prohibited in the statute.  Certainly, "offense," for purposes of the
proportionality requirement, includes the statutory definition of the
crime, but the ordinary definition of the word "offense" also
includes the specific conduct of the defendant that (because it was within the
statutory definition) led to the prosecution and conviction of that defendant.(8)  We therefore
conclude that a defendant's "offense," for purposes of Article I,
section 16, is the specific defendant's particular conduct toward the victim
that constituted the crime, as well as the general definition of the crime in
the statute.  In considering a defendant's claim that a penalty is
constitutionally disproportionate as applied to that defendant, then, a court may
consider, among other things, the specific circumstances and facts of the
defendant's conduct that come within the statutory definition of the offense,
as well as other case-specific factors, such as characteristics of the
defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, and the relationship between
the defendant and the victim.  
Having identified the
"penalty" and the "offense," Article I, section 16,
requires a court then to consider whether the former is
"proportioned" to the latter.  As discussed above, we observed in Wheeler
that the use of the word "proportioned" strongly implies
"that a greater or more severe penalty should be imposed for a greater or
more severe offense, and conversely, that a less severe penalty should be
imposed for a less severe offense."  343 Or at 656.  The state argues that,
by enacting a statute that sets a more severe penalty, the legislature (or the
people acting through the initiative process) establishes that the offense to
which the penalty is attached is, necessarily, a more severe offense.  That is
true, to a point.  But this court has an independent duty to consider whether
the specific sentences imposed pursuant to that statute are consistent with the
constitutional proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16.  Indeed,
in Huddleston, we recognized that a court's authority to hold a Measure
11 sentence unconstitutional if, based on the facts of the particular case, the
sentence violated Article I, section 16, was essential if the judicial branch were
to retain its appropriate constitutional role.  324 Or at 614.  
We acknowledge that the task of
comparing the penalty to the offense involves judgments that courts find
difficult, but it is not impossible.  The United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the court's role in making such determinations in Solem:
"Application of these factors assumes that
courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale.  In a broad sense, this assumption is justified, and courts
traditionally have made these judgments -- just as legislatures must make them
in the first instance. Comparisons can be made in light of the harm caused or
threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. * * *
[T]here are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes.  For
example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence.  
"There are other accepted principles that
courts may apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society.  The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million
dollars is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollars -- a point
recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft.  Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished more severely
than the greater offense.  Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with
intent to murder as more serious than simple assault."
463 US at 292-93 (citations omitted).
2.         Comparison of Penalties Imposed for
Related Crimes
In determining whether a penalty is
"proportioned" to the offense, it also is helpful to examine the
penalties imposed for other, related crimes.  If the penalties for more
"serious" crimes than the crime at issue result in less severe
sentences, that is an indication that the challenged penalty may be
disproportionate.  
Indeed, two of the three cases in
which this court has overturned criminal penalties as disproportionate -- State
v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 630 P2d 796 (1981), and Cannon v. Gladden,
203 Or 629, 281 P2d 233 (1955) -- involved just such a comparison between the
penalties for two different crimes.  Although both cases involved the unusual
circumstance that one crime was a lesser-included offense of the other crime,
this court in both cases rejected the argument that the state makes here --
that it is inappropriate, as part of proportionality review, to consider the
particular penalties that the legislature has imposed for other crimes.  Shumway,
291 Or at 163-64; Cannon, 203 Or at 632-33.  In Cannon, for
example, this court struck down a penalty for assault with intent to commit
rape (either statutory rape or forcible rape) that was greater than the penalty
for a completed rape (either statutory or forcible).  The penalty for assault
with intent to commit rape was life in prison, while the penalty for a
completed rape was a prison term of not more than 20 years.  This court held
the penalty for assault with intent to commit rape unconstitutional, despite
the fact that a legislature reasonably might choose to impose a greater penalty
for a brutal assault with the intent to commit a forcible rape than for a nonforcible
statutory rape.  Cannon, 203 Or at 632-33.  Thus, notwithstanding the special
circumstances of the lesser-included offense example, the fact remains that
this court has considered the penalties imposed for crimes other than
the crime of conviction when it has ruled on proportionality challenges.  Other
courts considering proportionality challenges often compare the penalty for the
crime at issue to penalties for other crimes.  See, e.g., Solem,
463 US at 298 (considering sentences imposed for other crimes in same
jurisdiction); State v. Dayutis, 127 NH 101, 104-06, 498 A2d 325, 328-29
(1985) (same).
That is not to suggest that a court
may roam freely through the criminal code, deciding which crimes are more or
less serious than others.  We have emphasized the legislature's central role in
determining which crimes are more or less serious, Wheeler, 343
Or at 671-73, and, reflecting changing societal norms, the legislature may
decide that certain crimes should henceforth be considered more serious and
subject to more severe penalties than other crimes that previously had been considered
more serious.  State v. Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or 422, 431, 41 P3d 404
(2002).  However, nothing in the concept of proportionality in criminal
sentencing suggests that the only "proportion" that should be
considered is the relationship between the crime for which the defendant was
convicted and the punishment for that crime.  Indeed, a standard that considers
the offense and the penalty at issue in the context of related offenses and
penalties provides a closer connection to the manner in which the substantive
criminal laws and the sentencing statutes work together -- and to what would,
or would not, "shock the moral sense" of reasonable people -- than
the purely abstract comparison of any single offense and the penalty for that
offense.  Our effort to determine whether a particular penalty is proportioned
to a particular offense would be wholly divorced from social and legal reality
if we were to refuse to consider the penalties imposed for other crimes that
have similar characteristics to the crime at issue. 
For those reasons, in determining
whether the penalties imposed for the crimes charged in these cases are
proportional or not, we also consider the penalties imposed for related
crimes.  Certainly, as noted above, a court would have difficulty comparing the
relative seriousness or gravity of, say, forcible rape and first-degree
robbery, or identity theft and harassment -- but that is unnecessary here. 
Oregon has an elaborate listing of sex offenses, see ORS 163.305 to
163.479, and comparing the conduct constituting the crime and the penalty here
to other sex crimes is useful in determining whether the penalty is
proportioned to the offense.(9)
3.         Criminal History and Recidivism
A third factor that this court often
has considered in proportionality cases is the defendant's criminal history. 
The idea that a penalty that might be proportional as applied to one who has
previously committed the same or other crimes but not proportional as applied
to a first-time offender is rooted in Blackstone's influential writings on
proportionality.  Blackstone, who urged more rational, proportional sentences, argued
that different standards should apply to repeat offenders.  4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 12, 15-16 (1769).  
This court emphasized the importance
of a defendant's criminal history 80 years ago when it considered a proportionality
challenge in State v. Smith, 128 Or 515, 273 P 323 (1929).  The
defendant had challenged as disproportionate a life sentence that he had received
under a habitual-offender statute.  He had been convicted of receiving stolen
goods, and, because he had been convicted of three prior felonies, he came
within the terms of the recidivism statute and was sentenced to life in
prison.  The court observed that the state has an interest in preventing repeat
offenders from engaging in further crimes and stated that "it does no
violence to any constitutional [guarantee] for the state to rid itself of
depravity when its efforts to reform have failed."  128 Or at 525
(quoting State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash 166, 168, 103 P 27, 28 (1909)
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).  The court in Smith went
on to say:
"The defendant in the instant case had
previously been convicted of burglary, but the offense for which he was
sentenced to life imprisonment * * * was a lesser crime, the crime of receiving
stolen property.  Were we to consider this penalty with reference to the
defendant's latest offense alone, we would be astounded at its severity.  But a
careful analysis of the entire record clearly indicates that the defendant is
an incorrigible criminal, a man who has heretofore been convicted at least four
times for burglariously preying upon the property and safety of others.  Add to
this fact that, throughout the history of criminal law, burglary has been
looked upon as a crime of great magnitude, and the burglar as a dangerous and
desperate criminal, and the sentence imposed in this case can be deemed a just
one."
128 Or at 525-26.  As we said of Smith in the recent
decision in Wheeler, that case "emphasized that the
[proportionality] analysis must focus not only on the latest crime and its
penalty, but on the defendant's criminal history."  343 Or at 673.
This court similarly relied upon the
defendant's criminal history in rejecting Article I, section 16, and other
constitutional challenges to an indeterminate life sentence for a sex offender
in Jensen v. Gladden, 231 Or 141, 372 P2d 183 (1962).  The
statute in that case permitted a life sentence only if the defendant had prior
convictions for sex crimes, and the court stated that determining whether the
sentence would "shock the moral sense" would "depend upon the
seriousness of repetitive sexual conduct of this kind and the
danger that it forecasts for others unless the defendant is segregated from
society."  231 Or at 144-45 (emphasis added).  Acknowledging what it
described as the dimly understood subject of sex crimes and recidivism, id.
at 145, the court upheld the sentence.
Reviewing those and other cases, this
court in Wheeler explicitly agreed that a penalty that might be
proportional for a repeat offender -- in Wheeler, the defendant,
who was sentenced to life in prison for multiple felony sex offenses, had two
prior felony sex convictions -- would not necessarily be proportional for a
first time offender.  Wheeler, 343 Or at 671 ("[T]he proportionality
provision permits the imposition of penalties for repeat offenders that might
not be permissible for a single offense.").  This court's cases firmly
establish that a defendant's criminal history -- including, necessarily, a
defendant's lack of any criminal history -- is relevant in determining whether
a particular penalty is "proportioned" to the defendant's offense.(10)
B.        Consideration of the Factors
1.  The Penalty and the Offense
We next apply the proportionality
provision of Article I, section 16, to the cases before us by considering the
factors described above.  The first factor identified above is the comparison
of the "penalty" and the "offense."  
Defendants were convicted of first-degree
sexual abuse.  The crimes of first- and second-degree sexual abuse originally
were enacted as part of the 1971 revision of the criminal code.  Former ORS
163.425 (1971) (first-degree sexual abuse); former ORS 163.415 (1971)
(second-degree sexual abuse).  First-degree sexual abuse was defined (among
other things) as sexual contact with a person less than 12 years of age.  Under
versions of those statutes that were in effect from 1971 until 1991, the
conduct at issue here would have constituted second-degree sexual abuse, which
was a Class A misdemeanor subject to a maximum sentence of one year in jail.  See
former ORS 163.415 (1971) (defining second-degree sexual abuse and
classifying crime as Class A misdemeanor); former ORS 161.615(1) (1971) (setting
maximum penalty for Class A misdemeanor of one year in jail).  First-degree
sexual abuse required that the defendant use forcible compulsion or that the
victim be under 12 years old; it was a Class C felony.  Former ORS
163.425 (1971).  In 1991, the legislature expanded the scope of first-degree
sexual abuse to include sexual contact with a person under the age of 14.  Or
Laws 1991, ch 830, § 3.  The legislature also reclassified the offense as a Class
B felony.  Id.  From 1991 until the effective date of Measure 11 in 1995,
the presumptive sentence for first-degree sexual abuse under the sentencing
guidelines was 16-18 months in prison.  Even that presumptive sentence would have
been subject to a possible "downward departure" if the court found
certain mitigating factors.  
With the passage of Measure 11, the
penalty for first-degree sexual abuse was set as a mandatory term of 75 months in
prison.  ORS 137.700(2)(a)(P).  The penalty for a first-time offender, like
defendants here, cannot be increased or decreased.(11) 
The "penalty," for purposes of the proportionality analysis, is the
mandatory prison sentence of 75 months.
As discussed above, the "offense,"
for purposes of an as-applied proportionality challenge, consists of both the
statutory definition of the crime and the circumstances of the particular crime
that led to the defendant's conviction.  That approach is particularly
appropriate here.  The statutory definition consists of the terms of the
conduct prohibited by the first-degree sexual abuse statute, ORS 163.427(1),
and few statutes criminalize such a broad range of conduct.(12) 
Measure 11 groups all acts constituting first-degree sexual abuse together and
subjects all acts that fall within the definition of that crime to the same
sentence.  As defendants point out, ORS 163.427(1) covers
"[a] wide swath of conduct when the victim is less than
14 years, including, but not limited to, momentary touching of an intimate part
without the victim's awareness or knowledge, touching that the victim
apprehends but does not appreciate as sexual, momentary touching over clothing,
prolonged hand to genital contact, prolonged skin to skin genital contact, and,
of course, forcing a person under 18 to engage in bestiality."  
Measure 11 imposes the same, mandatory prison
term for a 50-year-old man forcing a 13-year-old girl to engage in prolonged
skin-to-skin genital contact with him and a 19-year-old forcing the same
13-year-old to touch his clothed buttock for five seconds.  Because the statutory
wording -- "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person
[under 14 years of age] * * * for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of either party" -- encompasses (for example) the former
conduct, the mandatory 75-month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse does
not, on its face, violate Article I, section 16.  But because the statute also
encompasses conduct that reasonable people would consider far less harmful, defendants
are entitled, as this court held in Huddleston, to argue that the
mandatory sentence, as applied to the particular facts of their cases, is
unconstitutionally disproportionate.(13)
Thus, the "offense" at
issue here includes the specific conduct in which each defendant engaged.  That
conduct consisted of Rodriguez causing the back of the boy's head to be in
contact with her clothed breasts for about a minute and of Buck letting the
back of his hand remain when the girl leaned her clothed buttocks against his
hand several times and later wiping dirt off the back of her shorts with two
swipes of his hand.  In each case, defendant's contact came within the scope of
first-degree sexual abuse, because it was the "touching of the sexual or
other intimate parts of a person" under the age of 14 for the
"purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either
party."  See ORS 163.305(6) (defining "sexual contact").
In determining whether the penalty
here is unconstitutionally disproportionate, we cannot ignore the limited
extent of the offenses -- the physical touching -- at issue here.  There is no
evidence that any touching between Rodriguez and the boy involved fondling,
stroking, rubbing, or palpating.  And the trial court, sitting as the
factfinder in Buck, found that his contact with the girl did not involve
fondling and was "minimal."  The touchings were brief, if not
momentary.  There is no evidence of force or threats of any kind.  The
"sexual" or "intimate" body parts that were touched were
clothed.  There was no skin-to-skin contact, no genital contact, no penetration,
no bodily injury or physical harm.(14) 
In our view, comparing the statutory sentence of six years and three months in
prison to the "gravity" of the touching for which defendants were
convicted suggests, preliminarily, that that penalty is not
"proportioned" to their offenses as required by Article I, section
16.  
That view is strengthened when we
compare defendants' conduct with other conduct that ORS 163.427 explicitly
brings within its scope and that also may be prosecuted as first-degree sexual
abuse.  First, the text of the statute penalizes, to the same extent as the
conduct at issue here, the following conduct: 
"Intentionally caus[ing] a person under 18 years of age
to touch or contact the mouth, anus or sex organs of an animal for the purpose
of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of a person."
ORS 163.427(1)(b).  Reasonable people -- one is tempted to
say, all reasonable people -- would agree that the conduct in which
defendants engaged here is far less severe, wrongful, immoral, or harmful to a
victim than at least one other form of first-degree sexual abuse --
intentionally causing a person under 18 to engage in bestiality.  ORS 163.427
also makes sexual contact first-degree sexual abuse if it is the result of
"forcible compulsion" by the wrongdoer, regardless of the age of the
victim, ORS 163.427(1)(a)(B), such as by violence towards a victim, armed
threats to accomplish sexual contact, or ripping off the victim's clothes to
make sexual contact.  Again, the difference between such conduct -- punished by
the same mandatory 75-month sentence that Measure 11 would impose here -- and
defendants' conduct is obvious to any reasonable person.
Second, when one examines the conduct
here compared not just to other conduct specifically described in ORS 163.427
but to the range of possible conduct encompassed by the subsection of the
statute applied here -- sexual contact with a person under 14 -- the idea that
the same six-year and three-month sentence should be applied becomes even more
untenable.  We have reviewed all the reported first-degree sexual abuse cases
decided since the effective date of the 75-month mandatory sentence, and, although
not all opinions discuss the defendants' conduct in detail and many involve
convictions of other sex crimes as well, we are unable to find any case in
which the contact upon which the convictions were based was as limited as in these
cases.  More typical are cases like State v. Foreman, 212 Or App
109, 157 P3d 228 (2007), where the defendant was convicted of first-degree
sexual abuse for engaging in sexual contact with the three-year-old victim by
touching her vagina with his hands and penis.(15) 
In another unfortunately typical first-degree sexual abuse case, the defendant
repeatedly "rubbed his penis against" his six-year-old victim, including
one occasion where he took her clothes off, laid her on the floor, and rubbed
his penis "all over her."  State v. Reed, 173 Or App
185, 21 P3d 137 (2001).
Even the other cases involving the
least sustained or harmful conduct are easily distinguishable from the facts
here.  In State v. Cockrell, 174 Or App 442, 26 P3d 169 (2001), for
example, the defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual abuse
when, while "roughhousing" with his 11-year-old niece, he picked her
up and repeatedly "rubbed" her crotch area, rubbing that she
described as persistent and deliberate.  In State v. Acker, 175
Or App 145, 27 P3d 1071 (2001), the defendant furnished alcohol to his
stepdaughter's 13-year-old friend and touched her breasts and buttocks.  Those and
other reported cases lend credence to the comments made by the experienced trial
judges in the cases at issue here that neither had ever seen a first-degree
sexual abuse case based on such minimal physical contact.
The state consistently refers to the
Measure 11 sentence for first-degree sexual abuse as a "mandatory minimum
sentence," suggesting that a trial court could impose a greater sentence
for the crime if the facts were more egregious than they are in these cases,
thus alleviating any proportionality concerns.  That is incorrect.  The
sentencing guidelines permit a trial court to depart from a presumptive
sentence and "to impose a sentence which is proportionate to the
seriousness of the crime of conviction and the offender's criminal
history."  OAR 213-008-0003(1).  However, an upward durational departure
"shall not total more than double the maximum duration of the presumptive
prison term."  OAR 213-008-0003(2).  The presumptive sentence for
first-degree sexual abuse -- absent Measure 11 -- is 16 to 18 months in
prison.  Because no other statute authorizes the trial court to impose a greater
sentence than the mandatory 75 months set by Measure 11, that sentence becomes
the minimum and the maximum sentence for first-degree sexual abuse.(16)  Moreover,
as with other Measure 11 sentences, the trial court has no authority to reduce
a sentence for first-degree sexual abuse.  In other words, with a narrow
exception not available to these defendants, see ___ Or at ___ (slip op
at 26 n 11), exactly the same sentence is imposed whether the conduct is as
limited as it is in these cases or as extensive and gruesome as the examples
suggested by defendants or as described in other reported first-degree sexual
abuse cases, discussed above.            
Finally, although we recognize the
legislature's authority to change sentences for crimes, proportionality review
under the Oregon Constitution certainly can take into consideration the
historical fact that, before Measure 11, the sentencing guidelines established,
as the presumptive sentence for first-degree sexual abuse, a prison term of 16
to 18 months.  As noted, even if the trial court had imposed the maximum upward
departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence, based on aggravating
circumstances, the maximum sentence for first-degree sexual abuse for a
defendant with no prior convictions would have been 36 months.  Measure 11
imposed a mandatory sentence on these defendants that is more than twice as
long as the maximum sentence that could have been imposed on these
defendants under the guidelines.  Although the 75-month sentence is not
disproportionate for most of the conduct that constitutes first-degree sexual
abuse, the previously applicable guidelines sentence supports the conclusion
that the 75-month sentence is disproportionate for the conduct at issue here.
For the reasons described above, a
comparison of the penalty and the offense indicates that the 75-month Measure
11 sentence may be so disproportionate to defendants' offenses as to violate
Article I, section 16.  Not only does defendants' criminal conduct appear
insufficiently grave to justify the mandatory six-year and three-month
sentence, but it also is less severe than the conduct in the vast majority of
(and probably in all) other reported first-degree sexual abuse cases since
Measure 11 was passed.  
Despite our initial view that the
penalty that Measure 11 would impose for defendants' offenses may be
unconstitutionally disproportionate, one could imagine a regime of draconian
penalties for a wide variety of criminal offenses in which a 75-month sentence
for the conduct at issue here would not "shock the moral sense,"
because more serious crimes routinely were punished even more severely. 
Accordingly, we continue our inquiry by considering the penalty that Measure 11
would impose here in the context of the penalties imposed for related crimes.
2.  The Penalties for Related Offenses
As discussed above, courts are
ill-equipped to conduct an open-ended inquiry comparing the gravity of
disparate crimes as part of a determination of whether the penalty for one of
the crimes is disproportionate.  Courts are, however, able to reach at least
general conclusions about whether some related crimes are more serious than
others.  Defendants point out that the careful calibration of lesser and
greater sex crimes from the 1971 criminal code revision, with corresponding
gradations in punishment, was undone by later changes to the definitions of the
substantive crimes and, in 1995, by the imposition of Measure 11 sentences for
many of those crimes.  The legislature, of course, can and routinely does change
the criminal code and the penalties for various crimes.  Nevertheless, to the
extent that the structure of related sex crime statutes reflects the kinds of
considerations that lead reasonable people to conclude that one crime is more
serious than another, it is relevant to our consideration of proportionality.
Two aspects of Oregon's penalties for
sex crimes, when compared to the 75-month sentences that Measure 11 would
impose on defendants here, raise proportionality concerns.  First, as discussed
above, the conduct in these cases is at the outer edge of "sexual
contact" as that term is defined in ORS 163.305(6) -- it involved, in one
case, the back of the child's head and the clothed breasts of Rodriguez, and,
in the other, the child's clothed buttocks and Buck's hand.  The contact was
momentary; there was no fondling or stimulation.  Yet conviction for the sexual
contact in these cases results in the same sentence as would be imposed
on a defendant who anally sodomized the boy whom Rodriguez touched or the girl whom
Buck touched.  See ORS 163.395 (defining second-degree sodomy); ORS
137.700(2)(a)(M) (mandatory 75-month prison sentence for second-degree
sodomy).  And Rodriguez and Buck would have received the same sentences
if they had engaged in sexual intercourse with the children that they briefly
touched.  See ORS 163.365 (defining second-degree rape); ORS 137.700(2)(a)(K)
(mandatory 75-month sentence for second-degree rape).  They would have received
the same sentences if they had "penetrate[d] the vagina, anus or
penis [of children under the age of 14] with any object other than the penis or
mouth."  See ORS 163.411 (defining second-degree sexual
penetration); ORS 137.700(2)(a)(O) (mandatory 75-month sentence for
second-degree sexual penetration).   
We can assume that a reasonable
person would consider the mandatory 75-month sentences for the conduct just
described -- constituting second-degree sodomy, second-degree rape, and
second-degree sexual penetration -- as proportioned to those offenses.  And, we
may also assume that a reasonable person would conclude that a 75-month penalty
for a defendant who committed first-degree sex abuse by stripping a six-year-old
girl, laying her on the kitchen floor, and "rubb[ing] his penis all over
her," see Reed, 173 Or App at 188, was proportioned to the
offense.  In our view, however, that same reasonable person could not, at the
same time, conclude that the mandatory 75-month sentence for the conduct at
issue here also is proportioned to the offense, whether the conduct comes
within the statutory definition of first-degree sexual abuse or any other
criminal statute.
Another enlightening comparison, for
proportionality purposes, is that between the offense and punishment in these
cases and the offense of second-degree sexual abuse and the penalty for
that offense.  ORS 163.425 defines second-degree sexual abuse as:
"subject[ing] another person to sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse or * * * penetration of the vagina, anus or penis
with any object other than the penis or mouth of the actor and the victim does
not consent thereto."
Second-degree sexual abuse has occurred, for example, when
the defendant touched the victim's vagina and "penetrat[ed] the victim's
anus with his fingers," State v. Liviu, 209 Or App 249, 251, 147
P3d 371 (2006), and where the defendant (a nurse in a psychiatric hospital) stood
next to the bed of a bipolar, sedated patient with his pants open and an erect
penis and indicated that he wanted the patient to perform oral sex on him, and
the patient complied, State v. Neubauer, 214 Or App 130, 162 P3d 1044
(2007).  
That conduct, both in its physical and
sexual content, invasion of the body of the victim, and likely psychological
impact, seems far removed from the touchings at issue here, even when the
victim is older than 18.  Yet, a person convicted of second-degree sexual abuse
will not receive a Measure 11 sentence.  Rather, if that person has no prior
convictions, he or she will receive a guidelines sentence, presumptively of 90 days
in jail and 90 days under some other form of custodial supervision.  OAR
213-005-0011(2)(c); OAR 213-005-0013(1)(c).  Here, in other words, is a sex
crime that is closely related in terms of severity and description to
first-degree sexual abuse and which, in practice, often is based on conduct
that most people would consider far more serious than the conduct of Rodriguez
and Buck.  Nonetheless, the penalty for that crime is a fraction -- incarceration
for one twenty-fifth the time -- of the penalty that Measure 11 would impose
here.  It is another indication that Measure 11 sentences in these cases would
be disproportionate to the offense.
3.  Criminal History
The third factor on which this
court's prior cases often focus in determining whether a penalty is
proportioned to the offense is the defendant's criminal history.  That inquiry
is relevant, as discussed above, because a defendant who previously has been
convicted of and served sentences for other crimes has demonstrated, by
committing additional crimes, that the previously imposed sentences were
insufficient to prevent the defendant from returning to his or her criminal
behavior.  See Smith, 128 Or at 525 (substantial penalties for
recidivists permissible, because state may "rid itself of depravity when
its efforts to reform have failed").  As this court noted in Wheeler,
a sentence that is proportioned to an offense committed by a repeat offender
might not be proportioned to the offense if committed by a person with no
criminal history.  Wheeler, 343 Or at 672-73.  
In contrast to repeat-offender
statutes, and in contrast to the sentencing guidelines, in which criminal
history plays a major role, Measure 11's mandatory 75-month sentence for
first-degree sexual abuse applies even if the defendant has had no prior criminal
charges, arrests, or reported police contact -- as in these cases.(17)
The legislature may impose mandatory
sentences for those who commit certain crimes, despite the fact that such
sentences eliminate any consideration of the defendant's criminal history. 
However, the issue here is whether imposing these particular mandatory
sentences on these defendants violates their constitutional right
under Article I, section 16, to sentences that are proportioned to the offenses
that they committed. 
As we have noted above -- and as the
trial judge in each case emphasized in holding the 75-month mandatory sentence
unconstitutional as applied to these facts -- neither defendant has any prior
convictions.  Under the sentencing guidelines, and in the absence of Measure
11, the presumptive sentence for a person convicted of first-degree sexual
abuse would be 16 to 18 months in prison.  Even if the person had a serious
criminal record -- three or more person felonies -- the
presumptive sentence under the guidelines would have been only 41 to 45 months
in prison.  Moreover, defendants here not only had no prior convictions or
charges of any kind, but, in each case, the brief touching occurred on a single
occasion.(18) 
In the more common first-degree sexual abuse cases (at least those that have
resulted in reported opinions), the contact is not only far more physically
invasive and sexually charged, but it has occurred multiple times, rather than
only once.  In State v. Sullivan, 217 Or App 208, 174 P3d 1095 (2007),
for example, where the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree
sexual abuse, the victim testified that the defendant had abused her over a
four-year period.  Similarly, in State v. Rhodes, 149 Or App 118, 941
P2d 1072 (1997), the 15-year-old defendant was charged with one count of
first-degree sexual abuse for touching his nine-year-old sister's vagina
beneath her clothes on more than 20 separate occasions.  
Traditional understandings of
proportionality, as well as this court's cases, require us to consider whether
a defendant is a repeat offender by considering previous criminal convictions
and whether there is evidence of multiple instances of uncharged wrongful
conduct.  Here, the absence of any criminal convictions and the single occurrence
of the wrongful conduct support the conclusion that a 75-month sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the offenses committed by these defendants.
IV.  CONCLUSION
In summary, this court's cases establish
that a criminal penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offense,
in violation of Article I, section 16, when imposition of the penalty would
"shock the moral sense" of reasonable people.  In applying that
standard, this court first examines the relationship between the severity of
the penalty and the gravity of the offense, including consideration of the
particular conduct of the defendant that constituted the offense.  We also
consider the penalties imposed for other crimes and the defendant's criminal
history.  Those considerations lead us, for the reasons described above, to conclude
that these cases present the rare circumstance in which the statutorily prescribed
penalty is so disproportionate to the offenses committed by these defendants
that it "shocks the moral sense" of reasonable people.  Accordingly, 75-month
sentences, as applied to defendants here, would violate Article I, section 16,
of the Oregon Constitution.(19)
We recognize the authority of the
people, acting through the initiative process, to exercise their legislative
power and establish policy for the state by setting mandatory minimum sentences
for certain crimes.  See Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or at 425-32 (rejecting
facial challenges that Measure 11 sentences violated Oregon Constitution); Huddleston,
324 Or at 609-17 (same).  However, the Oregon Constitution represents the
fundamental expression of the people regarding the limits on governmental
power.  And it is the obligation of the courts to ensure that those fundamental
principles are followed.  We recently held another statute unconstitutional
because, as applied to the facts of that case, the statute was inconsistent
with Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution -- a provision that
protects a person's right to a "remedy" for an injury to person, property,
or reputation.  In doing so, we stated that the right to a remedy protected by
that constitutional provision was "not merely an aspirational statement,
but was intended by the framers * * * to preserve [that right] for future
generations, against legislative or other encroachment."  Clarke v.
OHSU, 343 Or 581, 606, 175 P3d 418 (2007).  Like the right to a remedy in Article
I, section 10, the proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16, is not
merely aspirational, but was intended to protect Oregon's citizens against
penalties that are disproportionate to their offenses.  
These cases are like Clarke in
another respect, because they illustrate the specific, limited circumstances in
which we may conclude that a statute that is constitutional on its face
nevertheless may be unconstitutional as applied to particular facts.  In Clarke,
we recognized that a legislatively imposed limit on injury claims against the
state did not, on its face, violate Article I, section 10.  343 Or at 604-05. 
However, considering the facts of that case, where the plaintiff's actual
damages exceeded $11 million, and the legislature had imposed a cap of
$200,000, we held that application of the legislative cap to that plaintiff was
unconstitutional.  Similarly, this court has rejected broad arguments that
Measure 11 sentences, on their face, are disproportionate, and we have
routinely upheld such sentences against constitutional challenge.  See,
e.g., Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or at 425-432 (rejecting facial challenge).  But,
as in Clarke, when the facts of a particular case demonstrate that the
application of the statute to those unique facts would be unconstitutional, it
is the obligation of this court to enforce the constitutional provision -- our
fundamental law -- rather than the statute.
The trial court in each case
correctly held that the 75-month mandatory sentence would violate Article I,
section 16, and imposed a lesser sentence.  The Court of Appeals erred in concluding
otherwise and reversing the sentences.  However, the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants'
convictions.  We therefore affirm the judgments of conviction and the sentences
imposed by the trial courts.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals
are affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgments of the circuit courts
are affirmed.
DE MUNIZ, C. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part:
In both cases before the court,
defendants were convicted of first-degree sexual abuse based on sexual contact
with victims less than 14 years of age, in violation of ORS 163.427.  Because I
agree that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support defendants'
convictions for first-degree sexual abuse, I concur with the majority's
affirmance of those convictions. 
However, I must dissent from the
majority's affirmance of the sentences imposed by the trial court in each
case.  In my view, the trial court's failure to impose the sentences mandated
by Measure 11 was error.  I would summarize my position this way:  The
legislature (and, here, the people exercising their legislative power through
the initiative process) reasonably could conclude that children need
particular, special, and vigorous protection from those who would prey upon
them.  The legislature further reasonably could conclude that, of all the harms
(short of murder) done to children, sexual harm has by far the greatest
potential for creating long-lasting psychological damage to the victims.  The
legislature further reasonably could conclude that, in light of the foregoing,
it wished to create a "zero tolerance" policy toward offenders who
sexually molested members of this protected group.  In my view, that is
precisely what the legislature has chosen to do here, and it is no office of
ours to second-guess that choice.
In affirming the trial courts'
sentences, the majority interprets Article I, section 16, in a way that allows
the judiciary to encroach on the authority of the legislature to determine the
appropriate penalties for crimes.  Although the contours of the test for
proportionality had not been precisely drawn previously, this court's cases
have demonstrated three overarching principles:  (1) the legislature has broad
authority to define crimes and to establish penalties based on its considered
judgment regarding the seriousness of those crimes; (2) only a sentence that is
grossly disproportionate compared to the offense is forbidden by Article I,
section 16; and (3) a sentence is so disproportionately severe so as to violate
Article I, section 16, in only rare and extreme circumstances.
In 1929, this court stated that the
"power to declare what punishment may be assessed against those convicted
of crime is not a judicial, but a legislative, power[.]"  State v. Smith,
128 Or 515, 524, 273 P 323 (1929).  In Jensen v. Gladden, 231 Or 141,
146, 372 P2d 183 (1962), the court reiterated that "[i]t is the province
of the legislature to establish the penalties for the violation of various
criminal statutes * * *."  Recently, in an opinion rejecting an as-applied
challenge to a Measure 11 sentence, this court stated that "the
legislature (and the people, acting through the initiative process) has broad
authority to determine which crimes [are] 'greater' and therefore deserving of
greater penalties, as long as there is some reasonable basis for that
decision[.]"  State v. Wheeler, 343 Or 652, 672, 175 P3d
438 (2007) (emphasis added).  
Wheeler also emphasized that
"the legislature's authority to set criminal penalties means that the
court's role is a limited one," id., and that the court's test for
evaluating Article I, section 16, "attempt[s] to articulate a standard
that would find a penalty to be disproportionately severe for a particular
offense only in rare circumstances," id. at 670 (emphasis
added).  The limited nature of the court's role is demonstrated by how
infrequently the court has sustained challenges to sentences under Article I,
section 16.  On two occasions, this court has held that a sentence violated
Article I, section 16, when the lesser-included offense was punished more severely
than the greater offense.  State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 164, 630 P2d
796 (1981) (lower minimum sentence for aggravated homicide than for
unaggravated homicide violated Article I, section 16); Cannon v. Gladden,
203 Or 629, 633, 281 P2d 233 (1955) (maximum of life imprisonment for assault
with intent to commit rape violated Article I, section 16, when rape carried a
maximum sentence of 20 years).  This is not one of those cases.
This court has only once invalidated
a sentence as "excessive" in an as-applied challenge.  In State v.
Ross, 55 Or 450, 474, 104 P 596 (1909), on reh'g, 106 P 1022 (1910),
a defendant convicted of larceny was fined more than $500,000 and sentenced to
five years and additional time until the fine was paid, not exceeding 288,426
days (more than 790 years).  The court concluded that the 288,426-day sentence
was "cruel and unusual within the prohibition of the constitution."  Id. 
In doing so, the court noted that
"[t]here can be no question that a sentence may be
excessive, even though within the maximum of the statute, but if excessive, it
is within the power of the appellate court to enforce this provision of the
Bill of Rights, and avoid the judgment so far as it is excessive."
Id. at 474.  On a motion for rehearing, the court also
eliminated the fine, concluding that
"[t]he fine and the imprisonment for nonpayment
thereof, adjudicated by the trial court, were within the terms of the statute
and in compliance with its direct command, but we are of the opinion that, the
fine being so great, it is apparently beyond the power of the defendant to pay
it at this time or even during a lifetime of effort, and is such a one as is
inhibited by the constitution."
Id. at 480.  
Sentencing an adult who was convicted
of sexual contact with a child under the age of 14 -- even if that contact
would be deemed "minimal" by most -- to six years and three months
does not approach the level of disproportionality seen in Ross, where a
person convicted of larceny received a sentence of approximately 790 years.  In
my view, a sentence of six years and three months for any sexual contact
with a child represents a permissible legislative choice.  Western society has
long criminalized sex with children.  Ancient Roman law was among the first to
specifically forbid sexual contact with children:  
"'The law imposed capital punishment upon those who 'ravished
a boy or a woman or anyone through force.' Successful seduction of minors, when
accomplished by persuasion and blandishments, rather than by crude force, was
also punishable by death, while an unsuccessful attempt to seduce a minor
merited the milder penalty of exile.'"
Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal
Law:  In Search of Reason, 22 Seton Hall Legis J 1, 7 (1997) (quoting James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and
Christian Society in Medieval Europe 47 (1987).  English law included
sexual crimes against children as early as the thirteenth century.  Phipps, 22
Seton Hall Legis J at 8.  American law followed suit, with sexual penetration
crimes involving children well established by the early nineteenth century.  Id.
at 12.  
Oregon's
first criminal code criminalized "carnal knowledge" of children under
the age of 14:  
"If any person shall carnally know any female child,
under the age of fourteen years, or shall forcibly ravish any woman of the age
of fourteen years or upwards, such person shall be deemed guilty of rape, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment * * * not less than
three, not more than twenty years."  
General Laws of
Oregon, Crim Code, ch 43,
§ 521, p 530 (Deady 1845-1864).  Oregon raised the age of consent to 16 in
1895, but the punishment range remained between three and 20 years'
imprisonment.  The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XIX, ch II, §
1760  (Belliner & Cotton 1901); see also Oregon Laws, title
XIX, ch II, § 1912 (1920) (same).  The rape statute remained essentially
unchanged until 1953, when the legislature enacted the Oregon Revised
Statutes.  ORS 163.210 (1953) provided:
"(1) Any person over the age of 16 years
who carnally knows any female child under the age of 16 years * * * is guilty
of rape, and shall be punished upon conviction by imprisonment * * * for not
more than 20 years.
"(2) Proof of actual penetration into the
body is sufficient to sustain an indictment for rape."
In
1970, the Criminal Law Revision Commission undertook a large scale revision of
Oregon's criminal statutes, including the statutes governing sexual offenses. 
The Commission proposed a new crime, sexual abuse, which was "intended to
cover all unconsented acts of sexual conduct which do not involve the element
of genital penetration." Commentary to
Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code §§ 115 &
116, 122 (July 1970).  The Commission also explained, 
"Under the common law such conduct would have
constituted an assault.  Most state laws do not differentiate sexual from other
assaults, except assaults with intent to rape or commit sodomy.  Assault as
defined in the draft requires the infliction of actual physical injury.  It is
contemplated that in many instances the conduct dealt with in sexual abuse
sections would not result in physical injury and, therefore, would not be
covered by the assault article."
Id. 
The
Commission drafted two statutory sections that defined two degrees of
sexual abuse.  The Commission defined first-degree sexual abuse as follows:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the first degree when he subjects another person to sexual contact;
and
"(a) The victim is less than 12 years of
age; or
"(b) The victim is subjected to forcible
compulsion by the actor."
Id. at § 116(1), 122.  The proposed statute governing
second-degree sexual abuse provided, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the second degree if he subjects another person to sexual contact; and
"(a) The victim does not consent to the
sexual contact; or
"(b) The victim is incapable of consent by
reason of being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless."
Id. at § 115(1), 121.  The Commission defined
"sexual contact" as "any touching of the sexual or other
intimate parts of a person * * * for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of either party."  Id. at § 104, 104.  The Commission
explained that "[t]he inclusion of the words 'or other intimate parts'
does not limit the touching to genitalia but is intended to include genitalia,
breasts and whatever anatomical areas the trier of fact deems 'intimate' in the
particular cases which arise."  Id. at §§ 115 & 116, 122.  
The
legislature codified those sections as ORS 163.425 (first-degree sexual abuse),
ORS 163.415 (second-degree sexual abuse), and ORS 163.305(7) (definition of
"sexual contact") in 1971.  First-degree
sexual abuse was classified as a Class C felony, which carried a maximum
penalty of five years' imprisonment.  ORS 161.605 (1971).
The
sexual abuse statutes were revised in 1991.  Or Laws 1991, ch 830. First-degree
sexual abuse was amended to raise the age of the victim from less than 12 years
old to less than 14 years old.  Id. at § 3; ORS 163.427 (1991). 
First-degree sexual abuse was also redesignated a Class B felony, which carried
a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment.  Or Laws 1991, ch 830, § 3; ORS
161.605(2) (1991).  These changes to the first-degree sexual abuse statute
reflect the legislature's permissible choice to encompass more conduct within
the first-degree sexual abuse statute and to punish that conduct more
severely.  
Felony
sentencing in Oregon also changed during this time.  Just prior to the changes
in the sexual abuse statutes, the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines,
effective in 1989, reduced the trial court's discretion in sentencing by
establishing presumptive sentences based on the seriousness of the crime and on
the defendant's criminal history.  State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 486-87,
847 P2d 834 (1993).  The sentencing guidelines include a 99-block
"Sentencing Guidelines Grid" to use in determining a presumptive
sentence.  On the grid, the court first locates the appropriate category of the
crime of conviction on the Crime Seriousness Scale on the vertical axis of the
grid, then locates the appropriate category for the convicted offender on the
Criminal History Scale on the horizontal axis of the grid, and, finally,
locates the grid block where the two categories intersect.  Id. at 487. 
Within that grid block is the presumptive sentence in the form of a range of
months of imprisonment or a term of probation.  State v. Ferman-Velasco,
333 Or 422, 426, 41 P3d 404 (2002).  Under the sentencing guidelines, a person
with no criminal history convicted of first-degree sexual abuse would receive a
sentence of 16-18 months' imprisonment.  
In 1994, the voters of Oregon chose, by adopting Measure 11, to
curtail further the ability of the judicial branch to fashion sentences.  The
sentencing policy embodied in Measure 11 requires that all offenders guilty of
criminal conduct subject to Measure 11 receive a mandatory minimum
sentence, regardless of the circumstances of the crime, the victim, or the
offender.  As this court has explained in its previous cases, that policy
choice, on its face, does not offend the Oregon Constitution.  See, e.g.,
State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 609-17, 932 P2d 1145 (1997)
(rejecting various state constitutional challenges to Measure 11).  The court
left open the possibility, however, of as-applied constitutional challenges to
Measure 11.  Id. at 612.  With regard to the cases now before us, I
disagree with the majority's methodology in assessing the as-applied challenges
asserted in these cases as well as its ultimate conclusion that the Measure 11
sentences applied in these cases would violate Article I, section 16.
The majority's test for whether a
punishment shocks the moral sense of all reasonable people so as to violate
Article I, section 16, includes an analysis of "at least three
factors":  (1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity
of the offense; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other crimes; and
(3) the criminal history of the defendant.   ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 13).  In
my view, the only relevant factor is the first, which simply sets forth the two
things that must be compared to determine whether a punishment is
"proportioned" to the offense.  See Wheeler, 343 Or at 655-56
(explaining that "proportioned" indicates a comparison between the
penalty and the offense).  Even as to that factor, however, I do not agree with
any approach that places this court in the position of factfinder.  Our role as
an appellate court does not extend to applying our own characterizations about
the defendant or the victim as a basis for answering the constitutional
question before us.  
My application of the first factor
brings me to a different result from that of the majority.  I agree with the
majority's statement outlining the applicable penalty:  a mandatory sentence of
75 months' -- six years and three months' -- imprisonment, which, under Measure
11, may not be reduced by the trial court because of mitigating factors.  I
also agree that the applicable offense in each case is the conduct that led to
the defendants' convictions for first-degree sexual abuse.  Where I disagree is
in the majority's characterization of that conduct -- the "limited extent
of the offense."  Or at ___ (slip op at 29).  It is undisputed that both
defendants were adults significantly older than their child victims, who were
both less than 14 years old.  It is undisputed that both defendants were
entrusted with the care of their child victims.  Defendant Buck's conduct
consisted of his hand touching his victim's clothed buttocks at least two
times.  Defendant Rodriguez's conduct consisted of touching the back of her victim's
head with her clothed breasts in the presence of several witnesses.  
The majority focuses on the fact that
there is no evidence of physical injury or harm in these cases.  Neither is
there evidence that the victim suffered no injury, because the statutes
defining the crime, ORS 163.427(1)(a)(A) and ORS 163.305(6), do not require the
state to prove that the victim suffered any particular harm.  Nor is the lack
of harm a defense to the crime.  Determining whether or not the victim suffered
harm is exactly the kind of determination that this appellate court is
ill-equipped to make.  The court should not rely on conjecture or its own
characterization of facts that have not been found by the factfinder below. 
For example, what if the victims here had been nine years old instead of 12 and
13 years old?  Would that change our Article I, section 16, analysis?  If so,
based on what?  The court is ill-equipped to assess the gravity of harm
suffered by the child victims in these cases based on the court's own opinions
of the facts and the gravity of the case.   
Moreover, as this court recognized in
Wheeler, 343 Or at 679-80, "[s]ex crimes may or may not result in
permanent physical injury, but the legislature is entitled to presume that they
are a serious matter in light of the potential for both physical and
psychological injury * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  The legislature has
determined that a child cannot consent to a sexual act in any circumstances,
including those circumstances that do not include evidence of harm.  See
ORS 163.315(1)(a) ("A person is considered incapable of consenting to a
sexual act if the person is * * * [u]nder 18 years of age[.]").  It cannot
be disputed that the legislature was entitled to make that determination.
The majority also focuses on the
breadth of the conduct encompassed by the first-degree sexual abuse statute,
apparently accepting defendants' argument that, "when a criminal statute
is extremely broad and the conduct in a particular case is at the margins of the
offense," a court should consider whether that conduct is less grave and
less deserving of the same punishment than is conduct at the heart of the
offense.  For example, defendants contrast their conduct -- pressing victim's
head against a woman's clothed breasts or touching victim's clothed buttocks --
with prolonged hand-to-genital contact or with forcing a child to engage in
bestiality.  The majority endorses a similar comparison, and states that,
"[r]easonable people -- one is tempted to say, all reasonable people
-- would agree that the conduct in which defendants engaged here is far less
severe, wrongful, immoral, or harmful to a victim than at least one other form
of first-degree sexual abuse -- intentionally causing a person under 18 to
engage in bestiality."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 30).  Even though that
may be true, it is just as reasonable for the legislature to conclude that any
sexual contact with a child under 14 years of age is a serious crime warranting
a minimum prison sentence in every case.  Reasonable minds may also agree that
the legislature -- or the people exercising the initiative power -- erred in
judgment, not when it included the conduct at issue in this case within a crime
that is subject to a 75-month mandatory sentence, but when it failed to impose
a sentence for bestiality or other more "grave" sexual contact with
children that was greater than 75 months.  When the legislature chooses between
reasonable options, this court should not second-guess that choice, even if, as
a policy matter, the court disagrees with the choice.
In my view, the legislature is entitled
to presume that all acts committed against children "for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party," as occurred
here, are serious offenses in light of the potential for both physical and
psychological injury.  Even if the
conduct in both cases was less grave than many other reported first-degree
sexual abuse cases, I emphasize that the factfinder in each case determined
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants acted with a sexual purpose when
they touched their victims.  When a child is
subjected to intimate touching for a sexual purpose, even if the touching is
not prolonged or occurs through clothing, that child is violated in a very
specific manner.  The legislature -- or the people exercising their
law-making authority through the initiative process -- reasonably may determine
that such behavior is sufficiently serious that it should be punishable through
mandatory minimum sentencing.  A sentence of just over six years for sexual
contact with a child less than 14 years of age is not the type of shockingly
disproportionate penalty that Article I, section 16, prohibits.  In fact, it is
even less shocking than sentences that this court has upheld in the face of
Article I, section 16, challenges.  See, e.g., State v. Teague,
215 Or 609, 611, 336 P2d 338 (1959) (a 12-year sentence for forgery did not
violate Article I, section 16).  This case is not one of those rare or extreme
cases where the constitution requires the judiciary to take action.  I agree
with the majority that Article I, section 16, is "not merely an aspirational
statement" and that Article I, section 16, does impose a limit on the
severity of punishment.  Where the legislature has overstepped its broad
authority in determining punishments, it is the judiciary's duty under Article
I, section 16, to step in.  Here, the legislature has not overstepped its
authority in mandating a sentence of six years and three months for a sexual
offense involving children under 14 years of age.  Therefore, the judiciary
need not step in.
In addition to my disagreement with
the majority's application of the first factor it lists as relevant to the
Article I, section 16, inquiry, I take issue with the application of the second
and third factors.  Those factors stray from the comparison of the penalty and
offense at issue in Article I, section 16, challenges and, instead, lead the
court to second-guess the legislature's judgment.  Comparing the penalty for
first-degree sexual abuse with the penalties assigned to other crimes -- even
other sex offenses -- oversteps the role of the judiciary.  That is especially
true, where, as the majority does here, the court offers its own opinion as to
the policy decisions of the legislature in defining the crime and assigning the
penalty.  This case does not present a special circumstance, as in Shumway
or Cannon, in which the law punished a lesser-included offense more
harshly than the greater offense.  In this case, we should not substitute our
own assessment of a crime's seriousness for that of the legislature.(1)
Similarly, reviewing a defendant's
criminal history is beyond what is necessary to determine whether the penalty
is proportioned to the offense.  If courts start looking to facts outside the
offense to determine whether Article I, section 16, has been violated, all
manner of issues arise.  How should a court decide what circumstances bear on
the analysis?  What if both defendants had a criminal history of theft or
driving while under the influence of intoxicants?  What if defendants had been
arrested for but not convicted of prior sex offenses?  How would those facts
affect the analysis and the outcome?  Opening up the proportionality inquiry to
facts beyond the offense and the penalty will lead to
inconsistent results.(2)
I
note that the legislature has exercised its authority, under Article IV,
section 33, of the Oregon Constitution, which the people adopted together with
Measure 11 in 1994, to allow for departures from Measure 11 sentences for
certain sex offenses, based on facts outside the definition of the offense
itself.(3) 
In ORS 137.712, the legislature provided for downward departures for certain
offenses in certain circumstances.  That statute provides, in part: 
"(1)(a) Notwithstanding ORS 137.700 and
137.707, when a person is convicted of * * * sexual abuse in the first
degree as defined in ORS 163.427(1)(a)(A) * * *, the court may impose a
sentence according to the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission that
is less than the minimum sentence that otherwise may be required by ORS 137.700
or 137.707 if the court, on the record at sentencing, makes the findings set
forth in subsection (2) of this section and finds that a substantial and
compelling reason under the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission
justifies the lesser sentence.
"* * * * *
"(2) A conviction is subject to subsection
(1) of this section only if the sentencing court  finds on the record by a
preponderance of the evidence:
"* * * * *
"(2)(e) If the conviction is for rape in
the second degree, sodomy in the second degree or sexual abuse in the first
degree:
"(A) That the victim was at least 12 years
of age, but under 14 years of age, at the time of the offense;
"(B) That the defendant does not have a
prior conviction for a crime listed in subsection (4) of this section;
"(C) That the defendant has not been
previously found to be within the jurisdiction of a juvenile court for an act
that would have been a felony sexual offense if the act had been committed by
an adult;
"(D) That the defendant was no more than
five years older than the victim at the time of the offense;
"(E) That the offense did not involve
sexual contact with any minor other than the victim; and
"(F) That the victim's lack of consent was
due solely to incapacity to consent by reason of being under 18 years of age at
the time of the offense."
(Emphasis added.)  That
statute demonstrates that, if the legislature had desired to create an
exception for circumstances in which no evidence of physical, emotional, or
psychological injury existed, in which the sexual contact was brief or minimal,
or in which the defendant had no criminal history, it could have done so.
Although
I and, indeed, many members of the judicial branch may prefer a more
enlightened sentencing scheme that would permit courts to sentence an offender
in accordance with evidence-based practices that, in each case, are more likely
to reduce offender recidivism and further community safety than does a
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme,(4)
the voters, exercising their legislative authority through the initiative process,
have mandated that certain crimes receive certain minimum punishments.  Even
though the guideline sentences that the trial courts imposed in each case at
issue here perhaps were sufficient to serve the criminal justice goals of
accountability, reformation, and community safety, those guidelines sentences
were contrary to the sentencing law of this state.  As this court stated in Ferman-Velasco,
"[Measure 11] represents the most recent legislative enactment
demonstrating the seriousness with which the legislative branch views Measure
11 crimes, including defendant's crimes."  333 Or at 431.  The sentences
required by Measure 11 in these cases were not grossly disproportionate to the
offenses so as to violate Article I, section 16.  I therefore dissent.
Gillette and Walters, JJ., join in
this opinion.
1. Article
I, section 16, provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed.  Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted,
but all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.  In all criminal
cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law, and the
facts under the direction of the Court as to the law, and the right of new
trial, as in civil cases." 
(Emphasis added.)
2. At
oral argument, counsel for defendants indicated that defendants had served
those sentences and been released from prison. 
3. Measure
11, adopted in 1994 and effective in 1995, provides that the penalty for
first-degree sexual abuse is a mandatory prison term of 75 months.  Or Laws
1995, ch 2, § 1.  As we describe in greater detail below, before the passage of
Measure 11, a person convicted of first-degree sexual abuse would have received
a guidelines sentence that took into account criminal history and other
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  The presumptive guidelines sentence
for a defendant with no prior convictions would have been 16 to 18 months in
prison.
4. The
brief of amici curiae Boys & Girls Club of Portland and Oregon
Education Association argues that permitting a jury to infer sexual intent from
conduct that may be entirely nonsexual is inconsistent with our prior cases.  Amici
maintain that permitting such inferences subjects those who work with
children to the constant threat that an unhappy coworker may report them for
sex abuse -- as apparently happened in Rodriguez -- leading to a
criminal investigation and possible trial and conviction.  Amici point
out that the conduct of a female teacher or mentor hugging a child
occurs hundreds of times a day and that "[clothed] breasts almost
inevitably contact the other person."  Even if that is true, however, it
does not aid Rodriguez here, because, as discussed in the text, there was other
evidence in addition to the circumstances of the touching itself that,
together with the evidence of the touching, was sufficient to permit the jury
to draw the inference that the contact was for a sexual purpose.  To the extent
amici believe that current laws permit sex abuse to be charged too
easily, they should take that issue up with the legislature.
5. As
we discussed in Wheeler, this court held sentences unconstitutionally
disproportionate in State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 630 P2d 796 (1981),
and Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or 629, 281 P2d 233 (1955).  The Court of
Appeals, following Shumway and Cannon, also held a sentence
unconstitutionally disproportionate in State v. McLain, 158 Or App 419,
974 P2d 727 (1999).  Additionally, this court struck down a sentence as
unconstitutionally excessive in State v. Ross, 55 Or 450, 104 P 596, on
reh'g, 106 P 1022 (1910), appeal dismissed, 227 US 150, 33 S
Ct 220, 57 L Ed 458 (1913).  In Ross, the court based its
decision on the prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment," but
did not indicate whether it was relying on the federal or state constitution.
6. Other
courts have considered the factors identified above, among others, in deciding
proportionality challenges under cruel and unusual punishment provisions.  See
Solem v. Helm, 463 US 277, 292, 103 S Ct 3001, 77 L Ed 2d 637 (1983)
(Eighth Amendment proportionality includes consideration of "(i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions"); People
v. Leonard, 40 Cal 4th 1370, 1426-27, 157 P3d 973, 1014-15 (2007)
(proportionality aspect of state "cruel or unusual punishment"
provision requires consideration of circumstances of offense, extent of
defendant's involvement, consequences of offense, and personal characteristics
of defendant).  However, the three factors set out above -- all of which have
been discussed in this court's precedents -- provide a sufficient basis to
decide the present cases.
7. A
comparison of the gravity of the offense with the severity of the penalty is
still an appropriate consideration for purposes of determining whether a given
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 US 957, 111 S Ct 2680, 115 L Ed 2d 836 (1991)
(seven Justices agreeing that a comparison of the gravity of the offense and
severity of the penalty is appropriate).  However, it is unclear whether a
majority of the Court would continue to apply the other two Solem factors
-- the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction and the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions -- in
all Eighth Amendment cases.  As noted below, we nonetheless find the Solem framework
a useful example of how courts approach proportionality challenges.
8. In
1823, Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language 
included, as one of several definitions of "offense:"  "3.  Any
transgression of law, divine or human; a crime; sin; act of wickedness or
omission of duty."  That definition, of course, does not tell us whether
the framers intended "offense" to include consideration of a
particular defendant's conduct or only of the crime as defined in general terms
in the statute, but it does indicate that the former meaning can be encompassed
within the term. 
9. The
dissent argues that "the only relevant factor" in applying Article I,
section 16, is the relationship between the particular crime and the penalty
for that crime, and it rejects any consideration of the penalties for related
crimes.  ___ Or at ___, ___ (slip op at 8, 12) (De Muniz, C. J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).  The dissent is incorrect.  As this court stated
in Wheeler, the concept of proportionality implies that the "strong
implication" of the proportionality requirement "is that a greater or
more severe penalty should be imposed for a greater or more severe offense,
and, conversely, that a less severe penalty should be imposed for a less severe
offense."  343 Or at 655-56.  Applying the proportionality requirement
thus necessarily involves at least some consideration of crimes other than the
crime of conviction.  And, as discussed in the text, in both Shumway and
Cannon, this court considered crimes in addition to the crimes of
conviction in holding the sentences in those cases unconstitutionally
disproportionate.
10. The
dissent rejects any consideration of a defendant's criminal history in deciding
whether a penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to that
defendant.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 12) (De Muniz, C. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  Again, however, the dissent's position is
inconsistent with this court's cases.  See Smith, 128 Or at 525-26, and Wheeler,
343 Or at 673 (both considering defendants' criminal history in deciding
whether penalty met proportionality requirement).
11. The
legislature in 2001 enacted a limited exception to the mandatory 75 month
penalty for first-degree sexual abuse by permitting the trial court to make a
downward departure from that sentence in certain limited circumstances.  See
ORS 137.712(2)(e) (providing exception).  That exception is not available
to defendants here because they were more than five years older than the
victims at the time of the offense.  The limitations on a trial court's
authority to increase a Measure 11 sentence are discussed below, ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 31-32).
12. As
set out above, that statute prohibits "subject[ing] another person to
sexual contact" when the other person is less than 14 years of age.  ORS
163.427(1).  "Sexual contact," for purposes of that statute, consists
of "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or
causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party." 
ORS 163.305(6).  The phrase "sexual or other intimate parts" is not
defined in statute, and this court has stated that the phrase includes genitals
and breasts, as well as parts that are "subjectively intimate to the
person touched, and either known by the accused to be so or to be an area of
the anatomy that would be objectively known to be intimate by any reasonable
person."  State v. Woodley, 306 Or 458, 463, 760 P2d 884 (1988).
13. The
state argues that, because the voters approved Measure 11, a majority of Oregon
citizens view a 75-month sentence as presumptively "'right and proper' for
first-degree sexual abuse, in any of its forms," including for the conduct
at issue here.  The state simply is incorrect, as a factual matter.  It is
certainly true that the passage of Measure 11 demonstrated support for specific
sentences, including for first-degree sexual abuse.  Voters, however, expressed
no opinion as to the imposition of a specific sentence in any particular
factual circumstances, much less that any sentence imposed under Measure 11
should be exempt from the usual process of judicial review to determine
compliance with constitutional limitations.  Had the people of Oregon wished to
do so, they could have expressly exempted Measure 11 from the proportionality
requirement of Article I, section 16, by amending the Oregon Constitution, as
they did when they amended the constitution to permit the death penalty for
aggravated murder.  See Or Const, Art I, § 40 ("Notwithstanding
sections 15 and 16 of this Article, the penalty for aggravated murder as
defined by law shall be death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings as
provided by law and otherwise shall be life imprisonment with minimum sentence
as provided by law."  (Emphasis added.)).
14. We
do not suggest that defendants' conduct caused no harm to their victims.  This
court has recognized the potential psychological, as well as physical, harm of
sexual abuse.  Wheeler, 343 Or at 679-80; see also State v.
Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 546-48, 920 P2d 535 (1996) (describing harm to
children from crime of purchasing child pornography).  However, in considering
the relative seriousness of the criminal conduct that comes within the
statutory definition of first-degree sexual abuse, the conduct here, which was
limited in the ways described above and involved no physical harm, is far
towards the less serious end of the spectrum. 
15. The
defendant was also convicted of first-degree sodomy for putting his penis in
the victim's mouth. 
16. If
a person convicted of a felony sex offense, such as first-degree sexual abuse,
already has two previous felony sex abuse convictions, ORS 137.719(1)
provides a presumptive sentence of life in prison.  Even that recidivism
statute, however, which this court upheld in Wheeler, permits the court
to impose a lesser sentence upon making certain findings.  ORS 137.719(2)
(authorizing a "departure" sentence from the "presumptive"
sentence).
17. Indeed,
a defendant who had been convicted of "penetrat[ing] the vagina, anus or
penis [of a child the age of the victims here] with any object other than the
penis or mouth," ORS 163.408, and who later was convicted a second
time of engaging in the same conduct with a child the same age would receive,
for that second conviction, the same sentence imposed on Rodriguez and
Buck.  Only if that recidivist committed a third felony sex offense would a
longer sentence -- such as the presumptive life sentence prescribed by ORS
137.719(1) -- be imposed.
18. Rodriguez
was charged with unlawfully touching the boy on another occasion, but the jury
deadlocked on that charge.
19. The
state's position is that the 75-month term is constitutional.  It makes no
alternative argument that, even if a 75-month sentence would violate Article I,
section 16, any prison term less than 75 months would be
constitutional.  For that reason, we do not need to consider whether some
sentence greater than the 16 months imposed on Rodriguez or the 17 months
imposed on Buck -- but less than the 75-month mandatory sentence -- would pass
constitutional muster.  The state raised no other objections to the trial court
rulings.  Moreover, although Rodriguez and Buck both appealed their convictions
-- appeals that we rejected, for reasons previously discussed -- neither argued
that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive.  Thus, we need not
consider whether the sentences imposed by the trial courts were
constitutionally permissible.
1. Again,
I point out that, contrary to the majority's assertions, reasonable minds may
disagree on whether the legislature made a bad policy decision in failing to
sentence other sexual offenses, such as second-degree rape or second-degree
sodomy, to a higher term of imprisonment than first-degree sexual abuse.  That
possible error in policy, however, does not violate Article I, section 16,
which is reserved for the most grossly disproportionate penalties.
2. I
note that the three cases relied on by the majority for its consideration of
the defendants' criminal history all involve challenges to recidivist statutes,
where naturally an evaluation of criminal history would occur.  See Wheeler,
343 Or at 654; Jensen, 231 Or at 143; Smith, 128 Or at 520.
3. Article
IV, section 33, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:
"Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 25 of this Article, a two-thirds vote of all the
members elected to each house shall be necessary to pass a bill that reduces a
criminal sentence approved by the people under section 1 of this Article."
4. See,
e.g., Michael A. Wolff and Paul J. De Muniz, Mainstream Sentencing --
The Urgent Need for Reform, Judicature 1 (Jan-Feb 2009) (arguing the state
and federal courts should adopt evidence-based practices to sentence offenders
based on concerns about public safety and public values).