Title: In re Marriage of Collingbourne

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94677-Agenda 15-March 2003.
In re MARRIAGE OF SORYIA COLLINGBOURNE, Appellant, 
 								and GEOFF B. COLLINGBOURNE, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Soryia Collingbourne, the custodial parent of the parties'
minor son Tyler, filed a petition in the circuit court of Kane
County for leave to remove Tyler from the State of Illinois to
Massachusetts. The circuit court granted the petition for removal,
finding that the best interests of Tyler would be served by allowing
him to move to Massachusetts with his mother. A majority of the
appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court's decision
to grant the petition for removal was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. 332 Ill. App. 3d 665. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Soryia and Geoff Collingbourne were married on June 13,
1985. As a result of the marriage, two children were born to the
parties: Geoffrey, born January 11, 1986, and Tyler, born January
10, 1991. The parties' marriage was dissolved on September 1,
1999. The judgment for dissolution of marriage incorporated a
marital settlement agreement, which provided that although Soryia
and Geoff were to have joint custody of the children, Soryia was
awarded sole physical custody of Tyler, and Geoff was awarded
sole physical custody of Geoffrey. The marital settlement
agreement also incorporated a joint parenting agreement. The joint
parenting agreement reiterated that although the parties were
awarded joint custody of both children, the physical custody of the
children was split between the parents. The joint parenting
agreement specifically provided that both parties were to have
equal rights and responsibilities for the major decisions in
connection with the education, recreation, health care and religious
training of the children. However, the agreement left day-to-day
decisions with respect to the children within the sole discretion of
the custodial parent. The joint parenting agreement also set forth
the visitation schedule between the parents and the children. Each
parent was to have both children every other weekend, and the
parties agreed to have the children on alternate holidays. The
agreement also allowed additional visitation, as authorized.
	On June 15, 2001, Soryia petitioned the circuit court of Kane
County for the removal of Tyler, then 10 years of age, from Illinois
to the State of Massachusetts. In her petition, Soryia alleged that
she had become engaged to Mark Rothman, who resided in
Sharon, Massachusetts. For the past 11 years, Mark had owned
and operated his own business in Sharon, Mark Rothman &
Associates, and his business prevented him from relocating from
that geographic area. Soryia also alleged in her petition that upon
moving to Sharon, she would become an employee of Mark's
business, earn an annual base salary of $75,000, and, due to a
series of incentives, had the potential to increase her income up to
$100,000 per year. Soryia stated that she was currently employed
by PetAg, Inc., with a base annual salary of $50,000. Soryia
alleged, however, that her employment with PetAg was "in
jeopardy due to the company's severe financial difficulties."
Soryia stated that PetAg plant workers "have had their pay cut up
to 50%," and that because "[c]ompany bonuses have been
terminated due to said financial problems," she did not receive her
quarterly financial bonus.
	Soryia further alleged in the petition that, in addition to the
better financial opportunity that the move to Massachusetts would
provide, she would also not be required to travel on overnight
business trips, as she was frequently required to do as part of her
employment with PetAg. Soryia also stated that in her new
position she could structure her work hours so that she could be
home with Tyler before and after school. Soryia contrasted this
with her current work arrangement, which required Tyler to spend
one hour in the morning and two hours after school in day care.
During the summer months, Tyler's time in day care increased to
nine hours per day, coinciding with Soryia's work schedule. Soryia
alleged that Tyler "expressed his displeasure" with this situation.
	In addition, Soryia alleged that under her current work
arrangement, it was difficult for Tyler to engage in extracurricular
activities. According to Soryia, if she and Tyler were allowed to
move to Massachusetts, Tyler could become involved in many
extracurricular activities, including sports, music, theater, and
dance. Soryia also alleged that Tyler would reap an academic
benefit from the move, based upon her opinion that the Sharon
school district was "significantly better" than the Hampshire
school district in which Tyler was currently enrolled.
	Soryia further alleged in the petition that Tyler's residence
and community would be enhanced, as the move would allow
Tyler to live in a three-bedroom, 3,000 square foot home,
surrounded by woods. At the time Soryia filed the petition, she and
Tyler were living in a two-bedroom apartment in Huntley, which
afforded Tyler with limited access to children of his own age.
	Soryia also alleged in the petition that Geoff "has not actively
participated" in Tyler's day-to-day life, and that on numerous
occasions Geoff has worked on Saturdays rather than spend his
entire scheduled visitation time with Tyler.
	In sum, Soryia alleged that as a result of the financial and
other opportunities offered by the move, the quality of both her
and Tyler's lives would be significantly enhanced. Soryia alleged
that bettering the quality of life for both herself and Tyler was the
only motive for her move. As evidence of her good faith, Soryia
proposed a visitation schedule that would provide Geoff with more
time with Tyler than he had under the existing visitation
arrangement, with visitation periods of an extended duration. With
respect to visitation between Tyler and his brother Geoffrey,
Soryia noted that Geoffrey was nearly 16 years old and that he and
Tyler did not share many of the same interests and did not spend
a substantial amount of time together. Nevertheless, under the
proposed visitation schedule, Soryia asserted, they would also
have an increased amount of visitation time together.
 	On July 12, 2001, Geoff filed his answer to Soryia's removal
petition. Geoff denied that he was not actively involved in Tyler's
life, and also denied that he chose to work on Saturday rather than
spend scheduled visitation time with Tyler. Geoff did admit,
however, that due to his profession as an electrician, he sometimes
had to work on Saturday mornings during the summer, and that
this conflicted with the scheduled visitation.
	It was Geoff's position that Soryia was seeking to improve
only the quality of her own life, and that Tyler's quality of life
would be adversely affected if Tyler were separated from his
father, brother, extended family, friends, and the community in
which he had been raised. Geoff also stated that both his fiancée,
Carol Lynn, and his sister, Lori Price, had offered to provide
occasional day care for Tyler. In addition, Geoff observed that the
Hampshire park district could provide Tyler with the opportunity
for several extracurricular or after-school activities. Geoff
maintained that Soryia's proposed visitation schedule would deny
him ongoing contact with Tyler, and would deny Tyler contact
with his brother. Geoff maintained that his objections to Tyler's
removal were in the child's best interests, and requested that the
court deny the removal petition. Geoff further stated that if Soryia
chose to move to Massachusetts without Tyler, Tyler's physical
custody should be transferred to him and a visitation schedule
between Tyler and his mother should be entered.
	The circuit court held a hearing on Soryia's petition over
several days during the month of August 2001. Soryia testified that
she is employed as a national sales manager by PetAg, Inc., which
is located in Hampshire. Soryia earned an annual base pay of
$50,000, which, in the past, had been increased by quarterly
bonuses pegged to the company's profits. For example, in the year
2000, Soryia earned a $6,000 bonus. However, because the
company has experienced financial difficulties, no bonuses were
paid in 2001. According to Soryia, her job routinely required her
to travel on overnight business trips. However, due to the
company's financial problems, her travel had decreased. As
examples of the company's financial problems, Soryia stated that
the corporate credit card that employees used to cover travel
expenses was discontinued due to nonpayment, merchandise
vendors required that the company pay up front for purchases, and
some plant workers experienced a 50% cut in pay. Soryia stated
that in an attempt to seek other employment she had placed her
resume on a web site. However, she also admitted that she did
nothing else to seek other employment in this geographic area.
	Soryia testified that she resided with Tyler in a two-bedroom
apartment in Huntley, and that Geoff lived with Geoffrey in a
single-family home in nearby Hampshire. According to Soryia,
upon the dissolution of their marriage the parties agreed to split
the physical custody of the boys because Geoffrey is very active in
the community and in sports, and has had a very close relationship
with his father. Soryia testified that she had exercised all of her
visitation with Geoffrey, but, that due to work commitments,
Geoff had missed a portion of between 15 and 20 Saturdays of his
visitation with Tyler in the year 2000. Soryia further stated that
Geoff's visitation with Tyler was otherwise consistent, and that the
parties often spent time with the children during the weekdays that
was in addition to that set forth in the joint parenting agreement.
Soryia testified that under the agreement, Geoff would care for
Tyler when her employment required her to make overnight
business trips, which averaged about two times per month. In
September 2000, however, Geoff accepted a new job that required
him to leave home very early in the morning. Because she did not
want Tyler to get up so early and be dropped off at day care for
several hours before school started, Soryia hired a baby-sitter to
stay with Tyler in their apartment on the nights that she traveled,
and to then take him to school in the morning. According to
Soryia, Geoff did not object to this arrangement.
	Soryia testified that she believes that Tyler's relationship with
his father is "very important," and that she has strived to further
this relationship, as well as Tyler's relationship with Geoff's
extended family. For example, Soryia stated that it was a tradition
that the children spend holidays and family events with Geoff's
family, and that if those occasions fell on her scheduled weekends,
she would nevertheless allow the children to stay with Geoff.
Soryia stressed that she does not want to limit Geoff's access to
Tyler.
	With respect to Tyler's extracurricular activities, Soryia
explained that although Tyler's school day ended at 2:30 p.m., it
was difficult for him to become involved in extracurricular
programs offered by the school or the Huntley or Hampshire park
districts because most programs ended in the early afternoon and
required that a parent pick up the child at that time. Because
Soryia's work day extended until 5 p.m., she was unable to
accommodate this time schedule. As another result of Soryia's
work schedule, Tyler had to attend day care for an hour in the
morning before school and for approximately two to three hours
after school. Soryia testified that it was only after she picked up
Tyler from day care that a period of time commenced within which
Tyler would do homework, go to the park, or participate in other
activities in which he was interested. For example, in the previous
fall Soryia was able to enroll Tyler in a dance program that held
classes in the evening. Tyler apparently enjoyed the program, and
Geoff attended the dance recitals. Soryia also testified that Tyler
had not participated in any extracurricular activities over the
summer because he had to attend day care during the hours that
she worked. According to Soryia, Tyler is unhappy in day care.
	Soryia stated that on one occasion, after the removal petition
had been filed, Tyler told her that Geoff's sister, Lori Price, had
offered to watch him periodically so that he did not have to go to
the day care center every day. Soryia stated that she did not speak
with Lori, and that she told Tyler that discussions about his care
were between her and his father. Soryia further testified that on a
different occasion Tyler informed her that Geoff's new wife, Carol
Lynn, had also offered to provide some child care. Soryia testified
that she thought it was "inappropriate" for these offers to be
relayed through Tyler, and that they should be discussed between
the parties. Soryia stated that she did not accept the offer.
	With respect to Tyler's education, Soryia stated that Tyler
attends Hampshire Elementary School and had just completed the
fourth grade. According to Soryia, in the past year Geoff had not
attended Tyler's parent-teacher conferences and rarely attended
activities at Tyler's school. Soryia confirmed that Geoff
occasionally attended such events in the past. Soryia stated that
although the Hampshire schools, in her opinion, are "adequate,"
she believed that Tyler would receive a better education in Sharon,
Massachusetts. Soryia testified that as part of her research into the
Sharon school system, she reviewed statistics which she purchased
over the Internet, contacted the Sharon schools, and spoke with the
Sharon school superintendent. Based upon her research, Soryia
was of the opinion that the Sharon school district could offer Tyler
not only a superior education, but also greater opportunities for
extracurricular activities. Soryia explained that, based upon her
research, she believed that the ACT and SAT scores earned by
Sharon students were higher than those of students in Hampshire,
that the student-teacher ratio in the Sharon schools is lower than
that in Hampshire, and that the percentage of Sharon students who
go on to attend a four-year college is higher than in Hampshire.
Soryia stated that these facts were very important to her, as her
ultimate goal is that Tyler attend college. In addition, Soryia stated
that the Sharon school system has an after-school "community
enrichment" program where students are transported from the
school to various sites to engage in activities such as videomaking,
horseback riding, and cooking. Further, if Tyler were allowed to
move, Soryia stated, the school he would attend is located seven
minutes from Mark's home. Tyler could take the bus, or Soryia
could drive or walk him there.
	Soryia also testified that although Tyler is still in elementary
school, his brother Geoffrey attends high school. Because Tyler
and his brother have a five-year age difference, they also have
different interests. According to Soryia, Geoffrey is very active in
soccer, and has played both on local teams and on teams which
have traveled to soccer meets in different cities and states over the
weekends. Soryia described the relationship between Tyler and
Geoffrey as a "love-hate relationship."
	Soryia further testified that she became engaged to Mark
Rothman earlier in the year, after a relationship of about 1½ years.
Mark resides in Sharon and, for the past 11 years, has owned and
operated his own business, Mark Rothman & Associates. Soryia
stated that Mark is a manufacturer's representative for various
companies involved in the pet supply and home decor field, and
that his territory is the New England area exclusively. According
to Soryia, she and Mark discussed the possibility of his moving to
Illinois and concluded that it would be impossible because of the
business. Mark offered to employ Soryia in his business in a
position similar to her position at PetAg, but at an increased
annual salary of $75,000. The hours of the job would be structured
so that she would work only during Tyler's school hours and be at
home with him when he returned. Soryia stated that the offices for
the business are in Mark's home, which has three bedrooms and
is located on 1.5 acres, with a large yard in a wooded area.
According to Soryia, the home is approximately 30 minutes from
the Boston, Massachusetts, and the Providence, Rhode Island,
metropolitan areas. Soryia testified that she and Mark had not yet
set a wedding date because she could not move to Sharon without
the court's permission to take Tyler with her.
	Soryia stated that she met with Geoff on three occasions to
speak with him about the enhanced opportunities offered by the
move to her and Tyler, and to attempt to arrive at an
understanding. Soryia further stated that she had also discussed a
proposed visitation schedule with Geoff, and had emphasized to
him that she would do whatever it would take to make the move
work for everyone involved. According to Soryia, the proposed
visitation would be at least as extensive as presently exists.
	Soryia testified that she proposed that Tyler would visit with
Geoff for 8 to 10 weeks during the summer, and for one week each
in February and April to coincide with two vacation breaks given
by the Sharon school system. In addition, Geoff would have Tyler
for long holiday weekends such as Memorial Day, Labor Day, and
Columbus Day, as well as for Thanksgiving and Christmas break.
Soryia stated that she wanted to continue the tradition of having
Tyler spend the holidays with Geoff and Geoff's extended family
in Illinois. Soryia testified that she would accompany Tyler on the
trips to Illinois until he got older, and that she would pay for all
transportation costs. Soryia estimated that, depending upon traffic
and other factors, the trip each way would take between 3 and 5 ½
hours. She also stated that she had no objection to Geoff's coming
to Sharon to visit with Tyler. Soryia also testified that she would
promote, at her expense, frequent phone calls and e-mails between
Tyler and Geoff, and that she would also provide Geoff with
information concerning Tyler's school events. Soryia stated that
Tyler and Mark interacted "very nicely" together, but that she had
no intent that Mark replace Geoff as Tyler's father. On cross-examination, Soryia stated that she did not believe that Tyler's
travel between Sharon and Hampshire would interfere with any
extracurricular activities in which Tyler may wish to participate.
	The next witness to testify was Mark Rothman, Soryia's
fiancée. Mark stated that he has lived in Massachusetts his entire
life, and in Sharon for the past five years. He stated that he is self-employed as a manufacturer's representative in the consumer
products industry, and that his sales territory is exclusive to New
England. Although he has owned his own business for 11 years,
Mark testified, his business is based upon 22 years of relationships
and contacts in the New England area, and, if he were to move, he
would have to completely start over in another area without the
benefit of such business connections. Therefore, Mark testified, he
is unable to move to Illinois.
	According to Mark, his business has doubled in size over the
past four to five years, and he has had trouble finding the right
people to help him grow the business. He stated that he discussed
with Soryia that if they were to get married and live in Sharon,
Soryia would be given the responsibility of running the pet
supplies division, at an annual base salary of $75,000 plus
incentives. According to Mark, Soryia would have no overnight
business trips, she would work out of their home, and she would
be able to structure her own work hours.
	Mark further testified that he gets along well with Tyler, and
that Tyler has traveled to Sharon on numerous occasions. During
those trips, Tyler visited museums and other historic and cultural
sites in Boston and Providence. Mark has also spent a great deal
of time with Tyler during Mark's visits to Illinois. Mark stated that
his home is located in a subdivision that has many children in
Tyler's age group, and described Sharon as an upscale suburban
community where "the education system is its highest priority."
Mark testified that he personally visited the school that Tyler
would be attending in Sharon, and also met with some of the
teachers as well as the superintendent. According to Mark, the
school recently added millions of dollars of physical
improvements, including a new computer lab and gymnasium.
	Mark stated that he would actively promote the relationship
between Tyler and Geoff. Mark related that he and his own father
are "the best of friends" and that he therefore understands the
value of a close relationship between a father and a son. Mark
testified that he has the financial resources to promote visitation,
computer e-mails, and telephone calls between Tyler and Geoff.
	The final witness to testify on Soryia's behalf was Amy
Conry, Tyler's fourth-grade teacher. She described Tyler as "an
above average student," a "hard worker," as "very well behaved,"
and as a "great kid." Tyler's teacher testified that her contact was
with Soryia when dealing with Tyler's academic performance, and
that Soryia would routinely call her if she had concerns or
questions with respect to Tyler's schooling. Conry stated that she
remembered Geoff attending one school open house, but that she
never discussed Tyler's academic performance with him.
	The next witness to testify at the hearing was Geoff. He stated
that he lives in a three-bedroom, single-family home in Hampshire
with his son Geoffrey, his new wife Carol Lynn, and her six-year-old son Tommy. The home has a backyard with a swimming pool
and a trampoline. According to Geoff, when Tyler stays over he
now shares a room with Tommy. Geoff stated that he is employed
as an electrician, and earns approximately $70,000 per year.
	Geoff testified that he has never missed a weekend visitation
with Tyler. Geoff did acknowledge, however, that he has, at times,
worked overtime hours during a portion of the Saturdays on which
he was scheduled for visitation with Tyler. During the time he was
working, the brothers were either alone together, or they were with
Soryia. Geoff testified that he now works overtime hours only on
those Saturdays that he does not have scheduled visitation with
Tyler. Geoff also stated that, immediately after the divorce, he had
been able to spend additional time with Tyler other than the
alternating weekends. Geoff described the situation at that time as
"very flexible," and stated that if he wanted to see Tyler and spend
time with him, he could do so. In addition, Geoff often picked
Tyler up from his after-school baby-sitter and watched him until
Soryia picked him up after work. This arrangement ended when
Soryia took Tyler out of the baby-sitter's care and placed him in
day care, about a year earlier. Geoff also stated that when Soryia
traveled overnight for her job, she at first left Tyler in his care.
This situation changed, however, when Soryia had a friend stay
with Tyler in their apartment during those trips. Geoff testified that
he no longer considers visitation time with Tyler to be as flexible
as it once was.
	According to Geoff, Tyler sees Geoff's extended family about
once a month, and also on holidays and for family events. Geoff
testified that immediately after the divorce, Soryia would let Tyler
attend all family events, but more recently Tyler has been unable
to attend events that do not fall on Geoff's visitation weekend.
Geoff stated that Tyler and his brother Geoffrey have a "very good
relationship" and that they do things together like swim and use
the trampoline. Geoff stated that he engages in many outdoor
activities with the boys, such as swimming and skiing, and that he
also has supported Tyler's interests by visiting Tyler's dance class
and attending his dance recitals. Geoff also testified that he
accompanied Tyler to his school on the orientation day at the
beginning of the year and visited his classroom, and that he also
attended an open house at Tyler's school. However, Geoff testified
that he had no opportunity to speak with Tyler's teacher on either
occasion. Geoff testified that Soryia regularly keeps him informed
about Tyler's academic progress.
	Geoff described his relationship with Tyler as "very close,
very loving," and stated that Tyler is very affectionate towards
him. Geoff said that he is opposed to the move because he believes
that it is not in Tyler's best interests to uproot him from his
immediate family, his extended family, and his friends. In
addition, Geoff expressed concern over Tyler having to travel long
distances on a regular basis, and observed that he would not be
able to see Tyler every other weekend. Geoff stated that his new
wife, Carol Lynn, has a "good" relationship with Tyler, and that
Tyler's relationship with Carol Lynn's son Tommy is "fair," but
"getting better." Geoff admitted that he made negative comments
about Mark in front of the children, and expressed regret over the
statements. Geoff also testified that he has no personal animosity
towards Soryia.
	On cross-examination, Geoff admitted that he neither
investigated nor considered any of the opportunities available to
Tyler in Sharon, and acknowledged that the move would not be in
Geoff's own best interests. Geoff also admitted that during the
upcoming weekend he planned to take Tyler to an amusement
park, and stated that Soryia allowed him to do this even though he
was not scheduled for visitation that weekend. In addition, Geoff
admitted that he did not know the names of Tyler's current or
previous teachers, and that he had not attended Tyler's parent-teacher conferences because Soryia "would always take care of
that" when they were married. Geoff also acknowledged that the
visitation schedule proposed by Soryia provided him with
visitation that exceeded the time he currently had with Tyler, and
stated that Tyler has enjoyed his previous trips to Sharon.
	The next witness to testify on Geoff's behalf was Gary
Wright, the principal of Hampshire Elementary School. Principal
Wright stated that the results of standardized testing done at the
school when Tyler was in the third grade revealed that Tyler met
state standards in all academic areas. In addition, the principal
testified that Tyler did not have any disciplinary or behavioral
problems. According to Principal Wright, the percentage of third-grade Hampshire Elementary School students who either met or
exceeded state standards was higher than both the district and state
average, that the average Hampshire student-to-teacher ratio is
approximately 23 to 1, that extracurricular activities are offered
after school, and that there is an emphasis upon computers in the
classroom. Principal Wright acknowledged that the amount of
money spent per student at Hampshire Elementary School is less
than the state average, and admitted that the school district was
experiencing financial difficulties which may result in a future
deficit.
 	The next witness to testify was Carol Lynn Collingbourne,
who stated that she and Geoff were married in July 2001. She
described the relationship between Geoff and Tyler as "very
loving," stated that they are very affectionate towards each other,
and noted that they enjoy doing many fun things together. Carol
Lynn also testified that Tyler and his brother Geoffrey are "close,"
that they "have fun" doing different activities together, and that
Tyler looks up to his older brother. Carol Lynn also stated that the
relationship between Tyler and her son Tommy is "fine." Carol
Lynn described her own relationship with Tyler as "very good,"
and stated that Tyler is a "loveable kid, very fun to be around,
happy-go-lucky." She testified that on one occasion she told Tyler
that she would be willing to watch him for the day instead of his
going to day care. On another occasion she told Tyler that, on her
days off, she would be willing to watch him. Tyler then called
Soryia to ask his mother if this arrangement would be acceptable.
Carol Lynn herself then called Soryia because Tyler seemed upset
after the conversation. Carol Lynn stated that Soryia did not accept
her offer.
	The final witness was Lori Price, Geoff's sister. She lives in
Hampshire, about four blocks from Geoff. Lori testified that Geoff
has a "very close" and "very affectionate" relationship with his
children. According to Lori, her family spends a great deal of time
with Geoff and his family, and they all get together with their
extended family for social events on a regular basis. Lori testified
that in July 2001, she told Tyler that, if it was acceptable to his
parents, she would watch him for a few days per week instead of
him going to day care. Lori testified that this was the first time she
had offered to care for Tyler, even though Tyler was in day care
for several years. Lori also acknowledged that this offer came after
Soryia filed the petition for removal, although Lori denied that the
offer was related to the petition. Lori stated that Geoff told her that
her offer would not be accepted.
	The circuit court also conducted an in camera interview of
Tyler. Tyler stated that he had accompanied his mother to
Massachusetts about four times and that he thought it was "okay."
Tyler told the judge that he has been on an airplane "a lot," and
that he usually likes traveling on them. Tyler expressed fear of
leaving his father, his family, and his friends, and stated that he
told his mother that he did not want to move to Massachusetts.
Tyler also stated that he "sometimes" gets along well with his
brother Geoffrey.
	Tyler also told the court that in the past his mother has had to
travel overnight for her job, and sometimes he stayed with his
father and sometimes with a baby-sitter. Lately, however, Tyler
stated, his mother had not been going on as many trips. Tyler
described day care as "boring" and stated that because he is one of
the older children he does not like to go to there. Tyler testified
that before his mother placed him in day care, he was watched by
a baby-sitter after school until his mother finished work.
	 On September 17, 2001, the circuit court entered a written
order granting Soryia's petition to remove Tyler from Illinois to
Massachusetts. The court stated that its ruling was guided by the
requirements of section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609 (West 2000)) as
well as this court's decision in In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988). First, the circuit court found that neither Soryia nor
Geoff had an improper motive in requesting or objecting to Tyler's
removal. In addition, the circuit court found that the general
quality of life for both Soryia and Tyler would be enhanced as a
result of the move. The court determined that Soryia met her
burden of proof on this issue "by demonstrating that the initial
disruption caused by the move would be outweighed by the
benefits resulting from the move." The court observed that
granting the petition for removal would allow Soryia to marry
Mark, and that she and Tyler would be able to live in Mark's home
in Sharon. Soryia would then obtain a job with a greater salary,
and also be able to conform her work schedule to Tyler's school
schedule. Tyler could then be enrolled in a school system that
Soryia believed offered Tyler "superior opportunities" to those
available in Hampshire. The court also noted that the existing joint
custody arrangement had already resulted in a separation of the
siblings, as they lived in separate households and attended separate
schools. Further, the court observed, Geoffrey is five years older
than Tyler, and it could be reasonably assumed that their interests
are different.
	The circuit court also considered the visitation rights of Geoff
and determined that a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule
could be reached if the move were allowed. The court stated that
the "arrangement proposed by Soryia is on balance a reasonable
and realistic method of handling an obviously disruptive event in
the life of this child." The court considered the actual visitation
time available to Geoff and Tyler under the proposed visitation
arrangement as opposed to the existing visitation schedule, and
found that the arrangements were "comparable." The court
determined that Tyler would be able to maintain a close
relationship with Geoff as a result of the extended periods of
visitation, even though the distance between them would limit the
frequency of that contact. The court also observed that Soryia
would be able to afford transportation to allow Tyler to visit his
father on a regular basis, and that Soryia offered to accompany
Tyler for visitation until he was old enough to travel alone. The
court also considered the time that would be spent by Tyler
traveling to and from Illinois, but found that the "time involved
would not be substantially greater than it would be if Soryia were
to move to Central or Southern Illinois."
	The circuit court concluded by observing that it had "tried to
make a reasoned assessment as to the best interests of this child.
In summary, this case, as in almost all removal cases, involves the
disruption of the lives of the parties and the children, in addition
to the extended family, soon after the initial turmoil and heartache
occasioned by the divorce itself. Here, the parties agreed that it
was in the child's best interests to divide residential custody from
the outset. Geoff has began a new life with his present wife and
her son; Soryia wishes to do the same. Unfortunately,
circumstances dictate that in order for her to achieve this goal, it
is necessary for her to relocate." The circuit court held that "the
weight of the evidence favors the removal in this case. The best
interests of Tyler lie in allowing Soryia to remove him to
Massachusetts, subject to the proposed visitation schedule. To do
otherwise in this case would in the court's opinion result in a
disservice to this child." Thereafter, Geoff filed a notice of appeal.
	A majority of the appellate court panel reversed the judgment
of the circuit court. 332 Ill. App. 3d 665. The appellate majority
focused upon the circuit court's finding that the evidence did not
establish that Tyler would experience a substantial direct benefit
as a result of the move to Massachusetts. According to the
appellate majority, the bulk of the evidence presented at the
hearing by Soryia "related to benefits [Soryia] would derive by
moving to Massachusetts, remarrying, and living with the man she
loves." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 671. The majority held that "it is
insufficient to focus only on the improvement of the custodial
parent's life. Rather, the improvement in the custodial parent's
quality of life is only important insofar as it increases and furthers
the child's quality of life." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 671. According to
the appellate majority, although Soryia presented evidence that she
would derive a direct benefit from the move by enjoying an
increased standard of living, residing in a larger home, and earning
a greater income working for Mark's company, "an increased
standard of living will occur in almost every case of remarriage
*** [and] cannot alone be determinative." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 671.
	The appellate majority then examined the revised visitation
schedule entered by the circuit court as a result of granting the
removal petition. The majority initially observed that Geoff "has
diligently exercised his visitation rights with Tyler," and that it
was therefore reluctant to interfere with Geoff's rights for
inadequate reasons. Although the appellate majority found that
"the proposed visitation schedule would allow substantial
visitation with [Geoff] for lengthy periods of time" (332 Ill. App.
3d at 671, 672), and was "comparable to the bimonthly/every-other-holiday visitation schedule in use" (332 Ill. App. 3d at 672),
the appellate majority determined that the modified visitation
arrangement was not in Tyler's best interest. The majority
expressed concern that the schedule would require Tyler to be
away from his Massachusetts home during every school break for
substantial periods of time, and would therefore interfere with his
family and social life in Sharon. In addition, the appellate majority
found that the 9 to 10 trips Tyler would be required to make
between Massachusetts and Illinois each year were "time
consuming" and "burdensome." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 672.
	The appellate majority concluded that "the evidence presented
at the hearing, in conjunction with the factors set forth in Eckert,
indicates that removing Tyler to Massachusetts is not in his best
interest. Although the move may provide an indirect benefit to
Tyler by virtue of the benefits that [Soryia] will experience by
marrying Mr. Rothman, we cannot conclude that this evidence
outweighs Tyler's interest in maintaining a close relationship with
his father, natural brother, and extended family in Illinois." 332 Ill.
App. 3d at 672.
	In dissent, Justice Bowman stated that, in his view, the
majority's reasons for reversing the judgment of the circuit court
"amount to nothing more than a substitution of its factual findings
for those of the trial court." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73 (Bowman,
J., dissenting). First, the dissenting justice stated, the majority
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's findings were contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence, and that, contrary to the
suggestion of the majority, "there is no indication that [the circuit
court] placed too much emphasis on the 'indirect benefit' factor."
332 Ill. App. 3d at 673 (Bowman, J., dissenting). In addition, the
dissenting justice observed that although the majority found fault
with the circuit court's determinations regarding the proposed
visitation schedule, "[t]he majority seems to forget that it is not
our job to second-guess the trial court's decisions on such matters,
but only to determine whether they are against the manifest weight
of the evidence." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 673-74 (Bowman, J.,
dissenting). Justice Bowman observed that although the proposed
visitation schedule may be considered to be more inconvenient
than the current arrangement, it nevertheless "is a reasonable and
realistic method of handling an obviously disruptive event in
Tyler's life *** [while allowing Tyler] to maintain a close
relationship with his father despite the physical distance between
them." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 674 (Bowman, J., dissenting). The
dissenting justice concluded by stating that he would "affirm the
trial court because the trial court was in the best position to
observe Tyler, his parents, and the other witnesses, and to evaluate
their temperaments, predilections and capabilities in determining
Tyler's best interest." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 674 (Bowman, J.,
dissenting).
	We granted Soryia leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.


ANALYSIS


	Section 609 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (Act) governs petitions for removal. 750 ILCS
5/609(a) (West 2000); In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316
(1988). The statute provides in relevant part:
			"The court may grant leave *** to any party having
custody of any minor child or children to remove such
child or children from Illinois whenever such approval is
in the best interests of such child or children. The burden
of proving that such removal is in the best interests of
such child or children is on the party seeking the
removal." 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000).
	Soryia contends that she has satisfied her burden of showing
that the removal of Tyler from Illinois to Massachusetts would be
in his best interests. Therefore, Soryia argues, the appellate
majority below erred in reversing the circuit court's grant of the
removal petition. Soryia maintains that the appellate majority
incorrectly required the parent seeking removal to prove that the
child would reap a direct benefit from the move, and improperly
refused to give weight to the substantial indirect benefits that flow
to a child as a result of the enhancement of the general quality of
life for the custodial parent.
	Geoff responds that the appellate majority below properly
reversed the circuit court's grant of the removal petition on the
basis that the circuit court's determination was against the
manifest weight of the evidence and allowed a manifest injustice
to occur. Geoff asserts that reversal was appropriate because
Soryia's sole reason for seeking to remove Tyler from Illinois and
move to Massachusetts was so that she could marry and live with
Mark. In his pleadings to this court, Geoff argues that there "was
no demonstration of any real benefit to Tyler" resulting from
Soryia's remarriage that would justify Tyler's removal. Indeed,
Geoff observes, "even the trial court found that there was no direct
benefit to Tyler." Geoff contends that, at best, the evidence
showed that Tyler would experience "neutral changes" from the
move. Geoff urges this court to clarify that in removal actions
"indirect benefits and direct benefits which inure only to the parent
who wishes to leave the state are not sufficient to meet the
petitioner's burden and that indirect benefits to the child, without
more, are not sufficient." Thus, Geoff urges us to require custodial
parents seeking to remove their children from Illinois to establish
that the children will experience a direct benefit from the move.
We disagree.
	In In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988), this court
addressed the issue of a custodial parent's right to remove a child
to another state. We noted in Eckert that the General Assembly
had then recently amended section 609 of the Act to clarify that
the burden of proof in removal proceedings is on the party seeking
removal to show that the move would be in the child's best
interests. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 325. Indeed, we emphasized that
the best interests of the child is the "paramount question" which
must be considered in removal actions. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 325.
We cautioned that a best interests determination "cannot be
reduced to a simple bright-line test," and held that a ruling on the
best interests of a child "must be made on a case-by-case basis,
depending, to a great extent, upon the circumstances of each case."
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 326. We also stressed that "[a] trial court's
determination of what is in the best interests of the child should
not be reversed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of
the evidence and it appears that a manifest injustice has occurred."
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 328. We explained that such deference was
appropriate because " '[t]he trier of fact had significant
opportunity to observe both parents and the child and, thus, is able
to assess and evaluate their temperaments, personalities, and
capabilities.' " Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 330, quoting Gallagher v.
Gallagher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31 (1978). Accordingly, we held
that " '[t]he presumption in favor of the result reached by the trial
court is always strong and compelling in this type of case.' "
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 330, quoting Gallagher v. Gallagher, 60 Ill.
App. 3d 26, 31-32 (1978).
	We also held in Eckert that, in determining what is in the best
interests of a child, the circuit court should hear any and all
relevant evidence. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 326. Because a child has
an important interest in "maintaining significant contact with both
parents following the divorce," we held that the "mere desire of
the custodial parent to move to another State, without more, is
insufficient to show that the move would be in the child[ ]'s best
interest." Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 325. In order to assist a circuit court
in determining a child's best interests, we suggested several
factors which should be considered by the court in making this
ruling. First, the circuit court "should consider the proposed move
in terms of likelihood for enhancing the general quality of life for
both the custodial parent and the children." Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at
326-27. Second, the circuit court should "consider the motives of
the custodial parent in seeking the move to determine whether the
removal is merely a ruse intended to defeat or frustrate visitation."
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. Third, the court should assess "the
motives of the noncustodial parent in resisting the removal."
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. In addition, we observed that because
"[i]t is also in the best interests of a child to have a healthy and
close relationship with both parents, as well as other family
members," the circuit court should "carefully consider" the
visitation rights of the noncustodial parent. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at
327. To this end, the circuit court must assess "whether, in a given
case, a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached
if the move is allowed." Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. We defined a
"reasonable visitation schedule" as one that "will preserve and
foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent."
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. We also noted that "[w]hen removal to
a distant jurisdiction will substantially impair the noncustodial
parent's involvement with the child, the trial court should examine
the potential harm to the child which may result from the move."
Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 328.
	We have subsequently emphasized, however, that in
determining the best interests of a child in a removal action, the
Eckert factors "are not exclusive." In re Marriage of Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 312, 321 (1996). Accordingly, a circuit court may validly
consider other relevant factors, as dictated by the specific
circumstances of each case, in arriving at a best interests
determination. In addition, no one factor is controlling. The
purpose of the factors set forth in Eckert are not to establish a test
in which the parent seeking removal must meet every prong;
rather, the Eckert factors are to be considered and balanced by the
circuit court in arriving at a best interests determination, "and the
weight to be given each factor will vary according to the facts of
each case." Smith, 172 Ill. 2d  at 321.
	Soryia asserts that the circuit court properly applied our
decision in Eckert in granting her petition for removal, and that the
appellate majority improperly reversed the circuit court's
judgment. We agree. In this case, the circuit court conducted a
thorough hearing, heard extensive testimony, and issued a written
opinion in which it applied the Eckert guidelines to the facts
presented and concluded that, upon balancing the various relevant
factors, removal was in Tyler's best interests. We cannot say that
the circuit court's ruling was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
	The first Eckert factor is the likelihood that the proposed
move will enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial
parent and the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 326-27. With respect to
this factor, the circuit court held that Soryia met her burden of
proof "by demonstrating that the initial disruption caused by the
move would be outweighed by the benefits resulting from the
move." The circuit court acknowledged that by allowing Tyler to
be removed to Massachusetts, Tyler would be separated from his
brother Geoffrey, would be forced to leave his friends, and would
lose the closeness of his relationship with his father as well as his
extended family. However, the court also observed that by
granting Soryia permission to remove Tyler to Massachusetts,
Soryia could marry Mark, live in his home in Sharon, obtain
employment with a greater salary, enroll Tyler in a school system
which she believed offered her son superior educational and
extracurricular opportunities, conform her work schedule to
Tyler's school schedule, and afford transportation allowing Tyler
to spend as much time with his father as before the move.
Although the circuit court found that Tyler did not derive a
"direct" benefit from the move, it also found that Tyler derived a
substantial "indirect" benefit from the enhancement of Soryia's
life should removal be allowed.
	Geoff, echoing the apparent position of the appellate majority
below, urges us to hold that a custodial parent seeking to remove
a child must show a "direct" benefit to the child in order to sustain
the removal petition. Geoff also urges us to hold that any
"indirect" benefits that may flow to the child as a result of an
enhancement in the custodial parent's quality of life are
insufficient to justify a child's removal from this state.
Accordingly, Geoff contends that because the circuit court
determined that Soryia had failed to show that Tyler would reap a
"direct" benefit from the move to Massachusetts, the circuit court
erred in granting the removal petition, and the appellate court
correctly reversed that judgment. We disagree.
	As we emphasized in Eckert, the "paramount question"
presented by removal cases is whether the move is in the best
interests of the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 325; see also 750 ILCS
5/609(a) (West 2000). In Eckert, we did not characterize the
benefits a child may experience as a result of a move as "direct"
or "indirect," and we find that such a distinction is not particularly
helpful in assisting the circuit court in making the important
determination of whether removal is in the child's best interests.
To the contrary, this distinction may divert focus from the real
issue of whether the child's general quality of life will be
enhanced by the move. See Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 326-27. We
reiterate our holding in Eckert that in conducting a best interests
inquiry in the context of a removal petition, a circuit court must
"consider the proposed move in terms of likelihood for enhancing
the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the
children." (Emphases added.) Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27; see
also Smith, 172 Ill. 2d  at 322-23. Indeed, "[i]f only the direct
benefits that affected children were considered, rarely would a
situation arise where removal would be permitted where children
were in a good environment with good schools, good parents, and
good friends." In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d 495,
499 (2000). The vast majority of cases from our appellate court
have correctly interpreted our decision in Eckert and, in
determining the best interests of a child in removal actions, have
appropriately considered the potential of the move for increasing
the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the
child, including any benefit the child may experience stemming
from the parent's life enhancement. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Shaddle, 317 Ill. App. 3d 428, 434 (2000); Ludwinski, 312 Ill.
App. 3d at 499; In re Marriage of Miroballi, 225 Ill. App. 3d
1094, 1098 (1991); In re Marriage of Carlson, 216 Ill. App. 3d
1077, 1081 (1991); In re Marriage of Roppo, 225 Ill. App. 3d 721,
728 (1991); In re Marriage of Taylor, 202 Ill. App. 3d 740, 745
(1990); In re Marriage of Zamarripa-Gesundheit, 175 Ill. App. 3d
184, 189 (1988). It follows that what is in the best interests of the
child cannot be considered without assessing the best interests of
the other members of the household in which the child resides,
most particularly the custodial parent.
	Indeed, absurd results would occur were we to accept the
contrary argument advanced by Geoff that a custodial parent
wishing to remove a child from Illinois must prove that the child
will experience a "direct" benefit as a result of the move, and that
proof the child will reap "indirect" benefits as a result of the
enhancement in the quality of life for the custodial parent is
insufficient to meet this burden. First, as stated, Geoff's position
ignores the fact that the best interests of the child cannot easily be
severed from the interests of the custodial parent with whom the
child resides, and upon whose mental and physical well-being the
child primarily depends. Because the principal burden and
responsibility of child rearing falls upon the custodial parent, there
is a palpable nexus between the custodial parent's quality of life
and the child's quality of life.
	This principle is illustrated in the case at bar. Upon
dissolution of the marriage, Soryia was awarded physical custody
of Tyler and has had to deal with all the day-to-day issues a single
parent must face, including the child's physical and emotional
well-being, the child's school performance, and the care of the
child when he is not in school and Soryia cannot be with him. In
addition, as evinced by the facts in the matter at bar, a single
parent must also face a myriad of financial, social, and scheduling
pressures, including the conflict between the parent's work
schedule and the parent's desire to have the child become involved
in extracurricular activities in which the child expresses an
interest. At the time of the hearing on the removal petition, Soryia
planned to marry a man who would provide her with love,
economic security, and a comfortable home in a desirable location,
and also be a partner and helper in rearing her child. It is in this
new family structure that Tyler's day-to-day routine and emotional
interaction would be formed and influenced. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that there is a nexus between the quality of life of the
custodial parent and the quality of life of the child.
	Second, requiring a parent seeking removal to establish that
the child would "directly" benefit from the move, to the exclusion
of any "indirect" benefits experienced by the child, would mean
that the remarriage of a custodial parent would rarely, if ever,
provide a valid basis for removal. Requiring the custodial parent
to meet such a heavy burden of proof would not only de facto
eliminate the balancing process set forth in Eckert, but also
impermissibly "allow[ ] a noncustodial parent who enjoys a good
relationship with his child[ ] to veto the good-faith and reasonable
desire of the custodial parent to remarry and move out of State
without any consideration of what have been called the 'indirect
benefits' to the child[ ]." In re Marriage of Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d
507, 514 (1995). Such a result would also contravene the intent of
the General Assembly, as expressed in section 609 of the Act,
which allows a custodial parent to remove a child from Illinois
upon a proper showing that such removal is in the child's "best
interests." 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000). We agree with those
courts that have held that the interests of the custodial parent
should not be automatically subordinated to those of the
noncustodial parent in a removal action. See Shaddle, 317 Ill. App.
3d at 435; Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 503; Eaton, 269 Ill. App.
3d at 517; In re Marriage of Branham, 248 Ill. App. 3d 898, 905
(1993). Indeed, "our society is a mobile one" (Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d
at 330) and "since a court has no power to require the noncustodial
parent to remain in Illinois, or to require members of the extended
family to remain in Illinois, some deference is due to the custodial
parent who has already determined the best interests of her child[ ]
and herself are served by remarriage and removal. The best
interests of children cannot be fully understood without also
considering the best interests of the custodial parent." (Emphasis
in original.) Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 515-16.
	Our decision today, however, should not be interpreted as
standing for the proposition that any enhancement in the quality of
life of the custodial parent automatically translates into an
improvement in the quality of life for the child, or that such
benefits will always be sufficient to warrant removal. However,
we emphasize that because there is a nexus between the well-being
of the custodial parent and the child who is in this parent's care, all
benefits afforded to the child as a result of the move must be
considered by the circuit court in making its best interests
determination. We caution, however, that in making this
determination, a circuit court should not limit its examination
solely to enhanced economic opportunities for the custodial parent.
A court must also consider other noneconomic factors resulting
from the move which are likely to contribute to, or detract from,
the well-being and happiness of the custodial parent and the child.
We reiterate our holding in Eckert that a custodial parent's mere
desire to move to another state, without more, is an insufficient
basis for removal. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 325. The burden of proof
remains upon the custodial parent to establish that the move would
be in the best interests of the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 330; 750
ILCS 5/609(a) (West 2000).
	As stated, the circuit court determined that Tyler would
experience substantial "indirect" benefits as a result of moving
with his mother to Massachusetts, and concluded that the evidence
presented on this specific factor favored the move. The court
observed that as a result of the move, Soryia would be able to
marry Mark and live in his home in Sharon. The creation of a new
family unit and the social environment of a traditional family
setting may be considered an important benefit to a child. The
circuit court also found that Soryia established that as a result of
the move she has the opportunity to become an integral part of a
family-owned business and substantially increase her income. An
improvement in the financial situation of the custodial parent will
generally benefit a child by enhancing the child's standard of
living. In addition, the circuit court found that as a result of the
move Soryia could schedule her work hours around Tyler's school
day, and be available to transport him to and from school and also
extracurricular activities. This is in contrast to the situation in
Illinois, where Tyler went from day care to school, and from
school back to day care, offering him little family life until after 5
p.m. The flexibility of Soryia's work schedule would benefit Tyler
not only by allowing his mother to spend more time with him, but
also by permitting his mother to withdraw him from a day care
environment in which he was unhappy and providing her the
opportunity to enroll Tyler in various activities that were
unavailable to him as a result of her work schedule. Soryia's new
work arrangement would afford her the time, energy and means to
be a part of Tyler's life in ways that had not been possible in the
past. In addition, the circuit court found that the move will allow
Tyler to attend a school system that Soryia believes will offer
Tyler academic opportunities superior to those available in
Hampshire. Although the circuit court found that the evidence
pertaining to the school systems in Sharon and Hampshire was
"not conclusive," the court also found that the school system in
Sharon "is at least comparable to that of Hampshire." In addition,
the circuit court found that the educational and cultural amenities
are plentiful in the area in which Soryia wishes to relocate. In
assessing whether the move to Massachusetts would enhance the
quality of Tyler's life, the circuit court also observed that the
existing joint custody arrangement "has already resulted in the
separation of the siblings in this case." The court noted that the
brothers already resided in separate households, attended separate
schools, and that the five-year age difference between Geoffrey
and Tyler underscored their different interests.
	We conclude that, on this record, the circuit court
appropriately applied Eckert. The court considered and weighed
the panoply of benefits flowing to Tyler as a result of the
improvements to the quality of life that would be realized by his
custodial parent as a consequence of the move. Based upon its
careful consideration of the evidence, the circuit court concluded
that the move to Massachusetts would enhance the quality of life
for both Soryia and Tyler. Therefore, with respect to this specific
Eckert factor, the circuit court held that removal was in the best
interests of Tyler. Because the determination of the circuit court
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate
majority below committed error in reversing the circuit court's
judgment.
	The second and third factors set forth in Eckert require the
circuit court to assess the motives of the custodial parent in
seeking the move and the motives of the noncustodial parent in
contesting the move. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. We agree with the
circuit court that "[t]he evidence as to the motives of the parties in
requesting and opposing the proposed move make it clear that
neither party has an invalid motive for his or her actions." The
record reveals that the parties are well-intentioned, concerned and
conscientious. Therefore, these two Eckert factors do not weigh
against either party.
	The final Eckert factors deal with visitation rights. In Eckert,
we stressed that because it is in a child's best interests to have a
healthy and close relationship with both parents, as well as other
family members, the circuit court must carefully consider the
effect the proposed move would have on the visitation rights of the
noncustodial parent. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. We instructed the
lower courts to assess whether, under the facts and circumstances
of a given case, a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can
be reached if the move is allowed. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 327. We
also cautioned that "[w]hen removal to a distant jurisdiction will
substantially impair the noncustodial parent's involvement with
the child," the circuit court should assess "the potential harm to the
child which may result from the move." Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at 328.
	In the case at bar, the circuit court found that in the past Geoff
had "exercised his visitation in a regular manner," but noted that
Soryia alleged that Geoff would often work on Saturday mornings
to the exclusion of his visitation with Tyler. The court also
observed that Geoff testified that "he has stopped this practice"
and is seeing Tyler for the entire weekend. The court then
compared the existing visitation arrangement with the visitation
schedule proposed by Soryia if the move were granted. Under the
existing arrangement, each of the parties has both of the children
on alternate weekends and alternate holidays. Under the proposed
visitation schedule, Tyler would visit Geoff for 8 to 10 weeks in
the summer, 1 week at winter break in February, 1 week at spring
break in April, during the Thanksgiving and Christmas breaks, and
at any other times upon the agreement of the parties. The circuit
court found that in comparing the two visitation arrangements, the
actual time that Tyler and Geoff would be together was roughly
equivalent. In addition, the court found that the visitation schedule
proposed by Soryia is "a reasonable and realistic method of
handling an obviously disruptive event in the life of this child.
Tyler will be able to maintain a close relationship with his father
even though the distance between them will limit the frequency of
the contact." We conclude that, under the circumstances presented,
the circuit court's finding with respect to this factor was not
manifestly erroneous.
	In all instances, removal will have some effect on visitation.
The pivotal question is whether a reasonable and realistic
visitation schedule can be created. The record reflects that Soryia
has cooperated in visitation and has actively fostered Tyler's
relationship with Geoff and his extended family. Although Geoff
stated during the hearing that his visitation with Tyler had recently
become somewhat less flexible, Soryia proffered unrebutted
testimony that reasonably explained the decrease in Geoff's
unscheduled time with Tyler. Significantly, there was no testimony
that Geoff had ever been denied his scheduled visitation time with
Tyler. There is no indication in the record that Soryia will not
continue to cooperate in a reasonable manner to preserve and
enhance Geoff's relationship with Tyler.
	We agree with the circuit court that the visitation schedule
proposed by Soryia is realistic and reasonable. The circuit court
found that Geoff had been diligent with respect to the exercise of
his visitation rights. Although the nature of the relationship
between Geoff and Tyler will change under the proposed visitation
arrangement, becoming a long-distance relationship, the quality of
that relationship need not be adversely impacted. "Close
relationships can continue and even be enhanced when effort is
expended to establish a reasonable visitation schedule."
Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 504-05; Eaton, 269 Ill. App. 3d at
515; Taylor, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 61-62; Zamarripa-Gesundheit,
175 Ill. App. 3d at 189-90. Under the proposed arrangement, there
is no decrease in the amount of time that Geoff and Tyler will be
able to spend together; to the contrary, the visitation time is
approximately equivalent to that under the old arrangement.
	We caution, however, that a proposed visitation schedule
which provides a noncustodial parent with the same number of
visitation days as under the prior visitation arrangement does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the quality of the
visitation between the child and the noncustodial parent will also
be the same. We emphasize that a circuit court must not only
evaluate the quantitative change in visitation, but must also
carefully assess the qualitative difference in visitation. In the
matter at bar, the former bi-monthly visitation would be replaced
with a schedule which allows for less frequent, but more extended,
contact between Tyler and Geoff. In its written opinion, the circuit
court correctly noted that although the visitation arrangements
were comparable in terms of the actual time Geoff and Tyler
would spend together, the relevant inquiry was not complete until
it also evaluated the qualitative change in Geoff and Tyler's
relationship. The circuit court determined that, under the specific
facts presented, "Tyler will be able to maintain a close relationship
with his father even though the distance between them will limit
the frequency of that contact." We conclude that, under the facts
of this case, the circuit court's holding on this issue was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. A longer,
uninterrupted period of visitation time may foster a more
meaningful relationship between father and son, and the extended
length of the summer visits may afford Tyler the opportunity to
spend more uninterrupted time with family and friends.
	In addition, both Soryia and Mark appear to be sincere in their
desire that Tyler have a continuing and meaningful relationship
with Geoff and Geoff's extended family, and to do whatever is
necessary to assure this. Mark stated that because he had a very
close relationship with his own father, he understood the
importance of Tyler's maintaining a close relationship with Geoff.
Both Soryia and Mark stated that they will have the financial
means necessary to ensure that Tyler maintains close contact with
his father and also his extended family. They stated that they
would pay for the costs of transporting Tyler to Illinois, and also
pay for long distance phone calls and e-mails so that Tyler could
have regular contact with Geoff between his visits.
	We note that although Tyler expressed a desire to remain in
Illinois and not move to Massachusetts, we believe that this a
natural response for a child of his age, and that it is not sufficient
to justify denying Soryia's petition. In addition, we observe that
Geoff harbored concerns about the length of time Tyler would
have to travel, which may extend from 3 to 5 hours each way.
However, as the circuit court observed in its written order, "the
time involved would not be substantially greater than it would be
if Soryia were to move to Central or Southern Illinois."
	In the final analysis, we adhere to our statement in Eckert that
a trial court's examination of a removal petition should be guided
by the policies of the Act, one of which is to " 'secure the
maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding
the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of the
children during and after the litigation.' " Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d  at
328, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 102(7), now 750
ILCS 5/102(7) (West 2000). We agree that policy is "best served
when, in addition to a favorable determination of all of the Eckert
factors, the court considers the aspects of cooperation of both
parents in achieving as reasonable an expectation of normalcy and
family life for the child involved as can be achieved following a
divorce, which includes adjustments to stepparents in the event of
the remarriage of one or both parents." In re Marriage of Roppo,
225 Ill. App. 3d at 732.
	We note that "it is obvious that for the child the fact of the
divorce becomes the predicate of his subsequent relationship with
both parents, and that relationship can never be the same as it
would have been had the marriage remained intact. Adjustments
and accommodations must be made as a result of the divorce, the
whole point of which was to permit each parent to go on his or her
own way. Within reason, both parties must be permitted to do so,
and the child's best interests must be served within that context."
Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 230, 476 A.2d 828, 833 (1984). We recognize the importance of preserving a child's
relationship with the noncustodial parent. However, as we set forth
in Eckert and reiterated in Smith, this factor must be weighed
against the enhancement of the quality of life for the child as a
result of the remarriage of his custodial parent and the child's
move to another state. In removal actions, the best interests of the
child are controlling. As stated, a trial court's determination of
what is in the best interests of the child should not be reversed
unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence and
it appears that a manifest injustice has occurred. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 
at 328. We conclude that, under the facts presented, the circuit
court's determination that removal was in the best interests of
Tyler was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, the appellate court erred in reversing the judgment
of the circuit court.

 CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.