Title: Charlette Ryan et al. v. John Patterson et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

rel: 02/27/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1060438
____________________
Charlette Ryan et al.
v.
John Patterson et al.
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-97-862)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Charlette Ryan appeals, and 500 other individuals ("the
listed 
objectors") 
purport 
to 
appeal, 
from 
a 
class-
certification order based on Rule 23(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.
This order was issued by the Shelby Circuit Court in
1060438
The federal district court vacated the state court's
1
conditional class certification.
2
conjunction with the settlement of litigation between John
Patterson and Sue Patterson and Wayne's Pest Control Company,
Inc. ("Wayne's"), a pest-control company that also offers
lawn-care service.  
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On October 29, 1997, the Pattersons filed a complaint
containing class allegations against Wayne's and three
individuals associated with Wayne's, in the Shelby Circuit
Court.  The same day, the Pattersons moved for a conditional
class certification, which the circuit court granted pursuant
to Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Wayne's removed
the case to federal court, which eventually remanded the case
to the Shelby Circuit Court.1
The Pattersons filed amended complaints on November 2,
1998, and June 28, 2005.  In each complaint, the Pattersons
alleged that they and a class of homeowners throughout Alabama
had contracted with Wayne's to perform termite pest control in
their homes and that Wayne's had uniformly failed: (1) to make
proper initial termite treatments; (2) to make proper termite
re-treatments; and (3) to conduct adequate inspections and
1060438
Section 2-28-9, Ala. Code 1975, requires all businesses
2
involved in "subterranean termite eradication and control
work" to "make an annual inspection of each job done during
the term of the contract." 
3
reinspections for termite damage and often to perform any
reinspections at all, even though such inspections are
required under § 2-28-9, Ala. Code 1975, and related
regulations.2
In 1998, Pestco Exterminating Company, Inc. ("Pestco"),
declared bankruptcy.  Wayne's purchased Pestco's customer
information and the files of Pestco customers from the
bankruptcy trustee.  The customer list included Ryan and the
listed objectors.  Ryan and the listed objectors had
participated in an action filed against Pestco similar to the
one filed against Wayne's by the Pattersons, and that action
ultimately resulted in a classwide pro tanto settlement
agreement.  That settlement, however, explicitly did not
discharge Wayne's of any claims the class members may have had
against Wayne's.  In January 2003, Ryan and the listed
objectors sued Wayne's in the Bessemer Circuit Court ("the
Ryan action"), alleging claims identical to those made in the
case against Pestco and by the Pattersons against Wayne's.  
1060438
4
In 
April 
2000, 
Wayne's 
filed 
its 
answer 
to 
the
Pattersons' complaint, and discovery followed.  The circuit
court referred the case to mediation in May 2005.  On December
14, 2005, the Pattersons and Wayne's entered into a classwide
"Settlement 
Agreement 
and 
Release" 
("the 
Patterson
settlement").  The circuit court entered a preliminary order
on December 27, 2005, approving the Patterson settlement and
certifying the class according to Rule 23(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ.
P. ("the Patterson class").  As to class certification, the
court stated that Wayne's had acted "in a uniform manner and
on grounds generally applicable to the class in the connection
with the provision of termite-related services and .... [a]s
a result, the issuance of final equitable, injunctive and
declaratory relief with respect to the class members as a
whole is appropriate."  According to the preliminary order,
the Patterson class consisted of
"all persons or other entities who own property in
Alabama 
who 
have 
entered 
into 
contracts 
or
agreements with Wayne's or for whom Wayne's has
taken over prior contracts of other pest control
operators for the inspection for the existence or
infestation of termites, and for the treatment,
control and/or prevention of termites for such
Alabama property, and/or for the repair of any
damage 
caused 
by 
termites 
for 
their 
Alabama
property, and/or for the renewals of any such
1060438
The final definition of the class explicitly excluded 11
3
individuals, most of whom had filed objections to the
Patterson settlement with the circuit court.  
Campbell had been the Pattersons attorney in this
4
litigation from its inception until he withdrew as their
counsel in August 1999.  The circuit court eventually barred
Campbell from appearing in this action on behalf of Ryan
because of his previous representation of the Pattersons in
5
services during the period commencing January 1,
1978 through [December 14, 2005]."3
A court-approved notice of the Patterson settlement was
mailed to 21,960 putative class members, including Ryan and
the listed objectors.  The notice informed putative class
members of the nature of the case and the terms of the
Patterson settlement.  The notice also informed putative class
members of their right to object to the terms of the Patterson
settlement and of the manner in which such an objection needed
to be presented to the circuit court and that a fairness
hearing concerning the Patterson settlement would be held on
March 8, 2006.  The notice stated that objections must be in
written form and that "[n]o individual Plaintiff Settlement
Class Member can object on behalf of other Plaintiff
Settlement Class Members." 
Thereafter, Ryan, with the aid of her attorney Thomas F.
Campbell,  filed an objection purportedly on behalf of
4
1060438
this litigation. 
6
herself, Chuck Metcalf, and "approximately 500 objectors" --
the listed objectors -- complaining that the settlement was
not appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification.  Six
other written objections were filed with the circuit court,
four of which were subsequently withdrawn in their entirety.
As a result, three objections remained before the circuit
court, representing a total of 10 individuals.  
As the notice for the Patterson settlement indicated, the
circuit court held a fairness hearing on March 8, 2006.  In
that hearing, the circuit court questioned counsel for the
Pattersons and for Wayne's extensively regarding the propriety
of certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) rather than Rule
23(b)(3).  On July 6, 2006, the circuit court issued its
"Settlement Approval Order and Final Judgment" that detailed
the provisions of the settlement and explained its decision to
certify the class action under Rule 23(b)(2).  On the same
date, the circuit court issued a corresponding "Memorandum
Opinion" that provided its reasons for finding the settlement
to be fair and adequate.  
1060438
7
The terms of the Patterson settlement provided that the
Pattersons and the members of the putative class agreed to
release all claims against Wayne's based on its "failure to
perform adequate annual termite reinspections, and the failure
to 
perform 
adequate 
termite 
treatments 
(initial
pre-construction treatments, post-construction treatments,
and/or re-treatments) from January 1, 1978, through December
14, 2005," except for "claims for personal injury not arising
out of a failure to properly conduct annual termite
reinspections."  In exchange for the release of claims,
Wayne's agreed to provide several benefits to the class
members.  
First, the Patterson settlement "enjoined and ordered
[Wayne's] to repair or (at the election of Plaintiffs) pay the
reasonable costs to repair identified termite damage on
Plaintiffs' properties which was not previously identified as
existing at the time [Wayne's] agreed to provide termite
services on such property (even for Plaintiffs whose contracts
with Wayne's do not obligate Wayne's to make repairs)."  This
"termite-repair plan" covers damage identified within two
years of the approval of the Patterson settlement.  As the
1060438
Class members had one of two types of contracts with
5
Wayne's: a repair contract or a re-treatment contract.  Every
contract, regardless of type, required annual inspections of
the subject property.  Repair contracts provided that Wayne's
would repair termite damage discovered upon inspection at no
cost to the customer, provided no defenses applied to the
damage.  Re-treatment contracts provided that Wayne's would
re-treat 
termite-damaged 
areas 
discovered 
upon 
inspection, 
but
Wayne's would not be obligated to repair said damage.  
8
language of the Patterson settlement indicates, Wayne's must
repair the termite damage or reimburse class members for the
repair of the termite damage, regardless of the type of
contract a class member had with Wayne's.5
Second, as part of the termite-repair plan, the Patterson
settlement "enjoined [Wayne's] from asserting defenses that
[it] might otherwise have to the termite damage claims of
Plaintiffs" made within the two-year window provided in the
settlement.  Those defenses included: that the termite damage
is "old damage," that class members had altered the landscape
of the subject property in such a way as to make the property
susceptible to termite damage, that live active termites had
not been identified by Wayne's, that the subject property had
suffered moisture damage, that a class member's contract
covered only re-treatment rather than damage repair, or that
a class member's contract with Wayne's had expired. 
1060438
This provision for dispute resolution is as modified by
6
the parties during the final fairness hearing, which was later
approved by a written order of the circuit court.  
9
Third, the termite-repair plan provides that a plan
administrator would process "properly supported claims within
ninety (90) days of receipt of a Proof of Loss."  If a
claimant disagrees with the amount to be paid for repairs or
is otherwise dissatisfied with the repairs, the Patterson
settlement provides for resolution of the dispute by
mediation.  If mediation proves unsuccessful, then a claimant
can have the dispute settled either through arbitration (where
the costs of arbitration are borne by the plan administrator)
or through a bench trial in the Shelby Circuit Court.6
Fourth, the termite-repair plan provides:
"[I]n the event that an applicable federal or state
agency 
with 
regulatory authority over Wayne's
termite operations issues a finding that Wayne's or
its predecessor [Pestco] has failed to treat a
covered structure as required to satisfy termiticide
label specifications or state requirements, Wayne's
agrees to make [the] specific remedial treatment ...
at no charge to said class member."  
Fifth, Wayne's agreed in the Patterson settlement to
change its future business practices.  It agreed to perform
annual 
termite 
inspections 
in 
accordance 
with 
Alabama
Department of Agriculture "regulations, recommendations, and
1060438
10
guidelines."  The Patterson settlement prohibits Wayne's from
allowing its employees to perform more than 12 inspections in
an 8-hour shift.  It requires Wayne's to monitor the amount of
time its employees spend on each inspection.  It prohibits
Wayne's employees from engaging in "booster shot" spraying of
a structure's foundation, a tactic allegedly often used to
distract customers from the inadequacy of termite inspections.
The Patterson settlement requires employees to document
whether the underside of the front porches of houses are
accessible for inspection; if the underside of a porch is not
accessible, Wayne's must create such access, if possible, at
a reduced cost to class members.  The Patterson settlement
requires Wayne's to "create and/or supplement written training
manuals, policies, procedures and guidelines to ensure that
all employees and/or representatives of Wayne's are adequately
trained to perform termite-related services."  It also
dictates that Wayne's must provide notice by mail of upcoming
inspections, and it must schedule inspections by telephone so
that the interior of structures can be inspected.
The Patterson settlement also provides class members with
certain monetary benefits related to termite services.
1060438
11
Wayne's is required to "offer to convert all its existing
liquid barrier termite customers to a termite monitoring and
baiting system and will offer each customer who is not already
on a termite monitoring and baiting system a coupon for a
below-market price" for such a system.  Wayne's must waive the
termite-inspection fee associated with the inspection during
which the upgrade is made.  Wayne's must offer customers who
have re-treatment contracts an upgrade to repair contracts
and, in conjunction with doing so, must allow such customers
a 40% discount in the cost of the re-treatment of the covered
structure.  The Patterson settlement also requires Wayne's to
provide a coupon for a $60 reduction in a one-year pest-
control services contract to all class members who are not
currently pest-control customers.  Similarly, customers who
are not lawn-care customers must be provided a coupon for a
free initial lawn service (up to a maximum value of $60) if
they enter into a one-year lawn-care contract.  
Finally, the Patterson settlement provides that Wayne's
will pay attorney fees for class counsel in an amount to be
determined by the circuit court, not to exceed $400,000.
1060438
12
Wayne's also agreed to pay a class-representative fee of
$5,000 to each class representative.  
Ryan filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the final
judgment, which the circuit court subsequently denied.  Ryan
appeals, challenging the validity of the class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2).  
II.  Standard of Review
"This Court applies an abuse-of-discretion
standard 
of 
review 
to 
a 
trial 
court's
class-certification order, but we will review de
novo the question whether the trial court applied
the correct legal standard in reaching its decision
to certify a class.
"If 
the 
[plaintiffs] 
fail 
to 
meet 
the
evidentiary burden as required by Rule 23, [Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] then the order certifying the ... class[]
constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. ...  The [plaintiffs] must establish all of
the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P., and one of the criteria set forth in Rule
23(b)."
Smart Prof'l Photocopy Corp. v. Childers-Sims, 850 So. 2d
1245, 1248-49 (Ala. 2002).
In 
examining 
the 
several 
prerequisites 
for 
class
certification contained in Rule 23, we must keep in mind that
"Rule 23 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure reads the
same as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules, and we consider federal
1060438
13
case law on class actions to be persuasive authority for the
interpretation of our own Rule 23."  Adams v. Robertson, 676
So. 2d 1265, 1268 (Ala. 1995).
III.  Discussion and Analysis
At the outset, we note that Ryan does not question the
fairness and adequacy of the Patterson settlement itself.  She
also does not dispute that the certified class meets the
requirements 
of 
Rule 
23(a): 
numerosity, 
commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation.  Ryan challenges
only the validity of the class certification under Rule
23(b)(2).  In fact, she suggests that class certification may
be proper in this instance under Rule 23(b)(3).  
Rule 23(a) provides:
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."
Rule 23(b) provides:
"An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
1060438
14
"(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or
against individual members of the class would create
a risk of 
"(A) 
inconsistent 
or 
varying
adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
"(B) adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests; or
"(2) the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the 
class, 
thereby 
making 
appropriate 
final
injunctive 
relief 
or 
corresponding 
declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
"(3) the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class
predominate 
over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action."
1060438
15
A proper understanding of the intended operation of
Rule 23(b) must take into consideration certain provisions of
Rule 23(c).  Rule 23(c)(2) provides:
"In any class action maintained under subdivision
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the
class 
the 
best 
notice 
practicable 
under 
the
circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that
(A) the court will exclude the member from the class
if the member so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if the member desires, enter an appearance
through counsel."
No corresponding provision exists allowing Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) class members to opt out of a putative class action.
"[I]n a class action brought under Rule 23(b)(3),
the members of the class are entitled to 'opt out'
of the class action and pursue a separate lawsuit.
See Rule 23(c).  Class members in a Rule 23(b)(1) or
23(b)(2) lawsuit do not have the choice of opting
out of the class action."
Adams, 676 So. 2d at 1270.  Thus, Ryan's arguments concern the
fact that this action involves a non-opt-out class under
Rule 23(b)(2).
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16
A.
Acts or Refusals to Act on Grounds Generally Applicable
to the Class
Rule 23(b)(2) requires that "the party opposing the class
[i.e., Wayne's] has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole."  
"By its terms, ... Rule 23(b)(2)[, Fed. R. Civ. P.,]
imposes two independent but related requirements.
In the first place, the defendants' actions or
inactions must be ... generally applicable to all
class members.  ...  The latter half of Rule
23(b)(2) requires that final injunctive relief be
appropriate for the class as a whole."
Shook v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of El Paso, 543
F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008).
Ryan notes that "[s]ubsection (b)(2) was 'intended
primarily to facilitate civil rights class actions, where the
class 
representatives 
typically 
sought 
broad 
injunctive 
relief
against discriminatory practices.'"  Holmes v. Continental Can
Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Penson v.
Terminal Transport Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981)).
While this is true, the Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966
Amendments following Federal Rule 23 explicitly state that
1060438
17
"[s]ubdivision (b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights
cases.  Thus an action looking to specific or
declaratory relief could be brought by a numerous
class of purchasers, say retailers of a given
description, against a seller alleged to have
undertaken to sell to that class at prices higher
than those set for other purchasers, say retailers
of another description, when the applicable law
forbids such a pricing differential."  
Thus, the common characteristic among the class members need
not be inherent, i.e., race, gender, disability, and may even
be economic in nature.  
Nonetheless, 
"Rule 
23(b)(2) 
demands 
a 
certain
cohesiveness among class members with respect to their
injuries, the absence of which can preclude certification."
Shook, 543 F.3d at 604.  
"'Injuries remedied through (b)(2) actions are
really group, as opposed to individual injuries.
...  Although the interests of the different members
of a (b)(2) class are by no means identical[,] the
substantial cohesion of those interests makes it
likely that representative members can adequately
represent the interests of absent members and that
the 
need 
for 
and 
interest 
in 
individual
representation will be minimal.'"
Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1155 n.8 (quoting Note, Notice in
Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief:  Johnson v.
General Motors Corp., 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1236, 1252-53
(1980)).  See also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d
1060438
18
402, 412 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he (b)(2) class
action ... was intended to focus on cases where broad,
class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary").
Ryan points to pronounced differences among the class
members in terms of the injuries they sustained.  Some class
members have repair contracts while others have only
re-treatment contracts; some never received proper initial
treatments while others did not receive proper re-treatments;
and some received inadequate reinspections while other
received no reinspections at all.  Moreover, some class
members sustained termite damage while others did not.
Further, some class members continue to be customers of
Wayne's while others are not.  Under such circumstances,  the
interests of these class members likely would differ in terms
of the remedies they desire.  For example, some need repairs
for termite damage while others simply need reimbursement for
a contract that was not performed.  In short, it is undeniable
that the members of the Patterson class did not suffer
identical injuries that can be remedied through classwide
injunctive relief.
1060438
19
B.
Predominance of Relief in the Patterson Settlement
Given the varying injuries and interests of the class
members, it should come as no surprise that the Patterson
settlement provides both injunctive and monetary relief.  See
Allison, 151 F.3d at 413 ("Monetary remedies are more often
related directly to the disparate merits of individual claims.
...  As a result, a class seeking substantial monetary
remedies will more likely consist of members with divergent
interests.").  "[C]lose scrutiny is necessary if money damages
are to be included in any mandatory class in order to protect
the individual interests at stake ...."  Coleman v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2002).
This 
Court 
has 
observed 
that 
"[a]s 
a 
general 
rule,
certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is improper
if the primary relief sought is money damages," Compass Bank
v. Snow, 823 So. 2d 667, 678 (Ala. 2001); it is also true that
"the fact that a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) suit may ultimately
result in a monetary recovery from a defendant does not
prevent certification under those subdivisions."  First
Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415,
423 (Ala. 1982). 
1060438
20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
observed in Allison that
"there is little discussion by appellate courts as
to what it means for a particular form of relief to
be 'predominant.'  The Advisory Committee Notes make
no effort to define or explain the concept.
Interpreting the term literally, predominant means
'controlling, 
dominating, 
[or] 
prevailing.'
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1786
(1993).  But how that translates into a workable
formula for comparing different types of remedies is
not at all clear."
151 F.3d at 411-12.  Despite the difficulty, the Allison court
devised a standard for determining which kind of relief --
injunctive or monetary -- predominates in a putative class
action certified under Rule 23(b)(2), a standard this Court
adopted in Snow, 823 So. 2d at 678, and reaffirmed in Funliner
of Alabama, L.L.C. v. Pickard, 873 So. 2d 198, 208-09 (Ala.
2003).  The Allison court concluded:
"[M]onetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class
actions unless it is incidental to requested
injunctive or declaratory relief.  By incidental, we
mean damages that flow directly from liability to
the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis
of the injunctive or declaratory relief.  See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (referring only to relief
appropriate 'with respect to the class as a whole').
Ideally, incidental damages should be only those to
which class members automatically would be entitled
once liability to the class (or subclass) as a whole
is established.  That is, the recovery of incidental
damages should typically be concomitant with, not
1060438
21
merely consequential to, class-wide injunctive or
declaratory relief.  Moreover, such damages should
at least be capable of computation by means of
objective standards and not dependent in any
significant 
way 
on the intangible, subjective
differences of each class member's circumstances.
Liability for incidental damages should not require
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits
of each individual's case; it should neither
introduce new and substantial legal or factual
issues, 
nor 
entail 
complex 
individualized
determinations.  Thus, incidental damages will, by
definition, be more in the nature of a group remedy,
consistent with the forms of relief intended for
(b)(2) class actions."
Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (some citations omitted).  In other
words, there are at least three factors to consider in
determining whether damages are incidental for purpose of
class certification: "(1) whether such damages are of a kind
to which class members would be automatically entitled;
(2) whether such damages can be computed by objective
standards, 
and 
not 
standards reliant 
upon intangible,
subjective differences of each class member's circumstances;
and (3) whether such damages would require additional hearings
to determine."  32B Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 1710 (2007).
In their briefs on appeal, the parties dispute whether
various 
upgrades 
in 
pest-control services and various
discounts constitute injunctive or monetary relief.  See
1060438
22
generally Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. 1995).  In
this case, however, we find dispositive the extent to which
the settlement requires individualized determinations of
damage.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has explained, a critical factor "in determining
whether injunctive relief predominates in a Rule 23(b)(2)
class ... is whether the compensatory relief requested
requires 
individualized 
damages 
determination 
or 
is
susceptible to calculation on a classwide basis."  Coleman,
296 F.3d at 448.  If nothing else, the mechanisms provided in
the Patterson settlement for customers to file their termite-
damage claims distinguishes this case from Adams and
demonstrates 
that 
the 
termite-repair 
plan 
constitutes 
monetary
relief.  The customer who has a claim for termite damage must
submit 
a 
"properly 
supported 
claim[]" 
to 
the 
plan
administrator, who will process the claim within 90 days.  The
plan administrator is necessary because the amount of the
claim for each customer will vary based on the extent of the
termite damage sustained by each customer's structure.  The
individualized nature of each claim for termite damage
indicates that the relief is monetary in nature and not class-
1060438
23
wide injunctive relief.  See, e.g., Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1156
(stating that "'money damages are directly related to the
disparate merits of individual claims and are not generally
applicable to the claims of the class as a whole'" (quoting
Gerald E. Rosen, Title VII Classes and Due Process:  To (b)(2)
or Not to (b)(3), 26 Wayne L. Rev. 919, 923 (1980))).
Moreover, if the customer disagrees with the plan
administrator over the amount awarded for the termite damage,
the Patterson settlement provides a system of hearings and
appeals.  Although this provision is certainly intended to
help class members receive just compensation for termite-
related property damage, the hearings and appeal system
further reflect the individualized nature of the relief
available under the termite-repair plan.  As the Allison court
observed:  "Liability for incidental damages should not
require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of
each individual's case; it should neither introduce new and
substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex
individualized determinations."  151 F.3d at 415.  Though the
Pattersons and Wayne's insist that the forfeiture of defenses
by Wayne's in the settlement means that the appeals process
1060438
We recognize that not every court has adopted the Allison
7
approach.  For example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the 
Second 
Circuit 
has 
rejected 
Allison 
because 
it
"foreclose[s] Rule 23(b)(2) certification in all actions
seeking actual damages 'even if the class-wide injunctive
relief is the form of relief in which the plaintiffs are
primarily interested.'"  Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 331
F.3d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Robinson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 2001)).  Instead,
the Second Circuit requires its courts to consider the
following in determining whether Rule 23(b)(2) certification
24
does not concern liability, the fact that individual
computations and additional hearings are required to effect
the relief provided by the termite-repair plan militates
against finding that the relief constitutes incidental damages
suitable for Rule 23(b)(2) certification.
One reason that members of classes certified under
Rule 23(b)(2) typically do not have the right to opt out of
the action is that 
"[o]pting out of a (b)(2) suit for injunctive relief
would have little practical value or effect.  Even
class members who opted out could not avoid the
effects of the judgment.  A (b)(2) injunction would
enjoin all illegal action, and all class members
would necessarily be affected by such broad relief."
Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1157.  Based on the test devised in
Allison and adopted by this Court, the relief provided in the
Patterson settlement as a whole is not of the nature
contemplated for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification.   The
7
1060438
is proper: 
"(1) even in the absence of a possible monetary
recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit
to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought; and (2) the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought would be both reasonably necessary and
appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the
merits. 
 
Insignificant 
or 
sham 
requests 
for
injunctive relief should not provide cover for
(b)(2) certification of claims that are brought
essentially for monetary recovery."  
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164.  Under these criteria, it seems
clear that the injunctive relief requiring Wayne's to improve
its 
pest-control 
inspection and treatment services 
is
reasonably necessary and appropriate, but it is far from clear
that the Pattersons would have brought this action solely to
obtain the injunctive relief, especially given the fact that
the first request in the "prayer for relief" in the original
complaint was for "[d]isgorgement of defendants' unjust
enrichment, or, in the alternative, compensatory, incidental
and consequential damages (including damages for emotional
distress) against all defendants."  In any event, this Court
finds the Allison approach to fairly reflect the interests of
class members seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2).  
25
members 
of 
the 
Patterson 
class 
as 
a 
whole 
are 
not
automatically entitled to the damages available in the
Patterson settlement.  Instead, the damages available under
the termite-repair plan are dependent upon the individual
differences between the amount of termite damage sustained by
each class member submitting a claim.  The damages claims
under the termite-repair plan will require additional hearings
1060438
Our result pretermits the need to discuss Ryan's third
8
argument concerning whether the certification of this class
violated her right to due process of law under the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
26
if the claimant and the plan administrator disagree on the
amount to which the claimant is entitled.
IV.  Conclusion as to Merits
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit
court erred in certifying the Patterson class under Rule
23(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit
court's certification of the Patterson class and remand the
case to the circuit court for further proceedings.8
V.  Motions to Strike Listed Objectors
Both the Pattersons and Wayne's have filed motions asking
this Court to strike the listed objectors as appellants in
this case because: (1) the Ryan action has not been certified
as a class action and Ryan, therefore, has not been certified
to represent the listed objectors, (2) the notice of the
Patterson settlement explicitly stated that individual class
members could not object on behalf of other class members, and
(3) an affidavit filed by an attorney for the Pattersons
indicated that three of the listed objectors were not even
aware that Ryan had filed an objection on their behalf.  The
1060438
27
circuit court observed in footnote 2 of its "Memorandum
Opinion," which accompanied its "Settlement Approval Order and
Final Judgment," that the objection in question "was
purportedly filed on behalf of Charlette Ryan and Chuck
Metcalf, along all the 'Ryan Plaintiffs' (defined as
'approximately 500 other Plaintiffs' in a separate pending
lawsuit)," and that "even if an objection had properly been
raised by an additional 500 class members, the percentage of
objectors (many of them being two family members representing
one termite contract) would still be less than 2.4% of the
nearly 22,000 class members."  (Emphasis in original.)  This
observation indicates that the circuit court did not consider
Ryan's objection to properly represent a viable objection for
the listed objectors.  Given the unequivocal language in the
notice for the Patterson settlement that each objection must
be made by the individual class member and the fact that the
circuit court did not deem the objections of the listed
objectors to be properly filed, we grant the motions to strike
the listed objectors as appellants to this action.
MOTIONS TO STRIKE GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.