Title: State v. MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SERVICE COM'N

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

418 So. 2d 779 (1982) STATE of Mississippi ex rel., Bill ALLAIN, Attorney General et al. v. MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. No. 53709. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 11, 1982. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen., Robert Frank Spencer, Larry J. Stroud, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Tim Hancock, Gay Dawn Horne, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, James K. Child, Jr. and Henderson S. Hall, Jr., Cupit & Maxey, John L. Maxey, II, Jackson, Stanley L. Taylor, Jr., Biloxi, for appellants. Bennett E. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, J. Walter Brown, Natchez, for appellee. En Banc. WALKER, Presiding Justice, for the Court: On May 28, 1980, Mississippi Power and Light Company filed a notice of intention to change [increase] rates with the Mississippi Public Service Commission in accordance with Mississippi Code Annotated section 77-3-37 (1972). The rates were suspended by the Commission, and Mississippi Power & Light Company filed a refunding bond and placed the proposed rates and charges into effect under bond on service rendered on and after July 1, 1980. On June 3, 1980, six days after Mississippi Power & Light Company filed its notice of intention to change rates, the Commission, after discussing the advisability of employing special counsel to assist in the research, preparation and presentation of the rate case, entered an order[1] employing the Honorable Walter Brown of Natchez pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 77-1-13, on a part-time basis, to assist in the case before the Commission and any court with respect thereto. Also present representing the Commission was the Honorable Bennett Smith, an assistant attorney general, assigned to the Commission on a full-time basis as required *780 by Mississippi Code Annotated section 77-3-9 (1972). This section reads as follows: Mississippi Code Annotated section 7-5-5 (1972) provides in part that: Of course, under this statute the attorney general could discharge Mr. Brown or Mr. Smith at his pleasure. The Commission has no independent authority to employ special legal counsel in any matter except with the prior consent of the attorney general as to the person employed and what he is to be paid. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-1-13 (1972). It can hardly be argued, therefore, that, among his many other duties, the attorney general, through that office, is required by law to represent the Mississippi Public Service Commission. The Commission held public hearings before the Commission on the proposed rate increase, beginning August 28, 1980, and which were concluded on November 6, 1980. An order of the Commission dated November 24, 1980, recites in part: The attorney general personally appeared on the first day of the hearing and announced to the Commission that "I am representing the Commission and the public." The attorney general participated in the examination of witnesses during the hearings although he did not call any witnesses himself. The attorney general also named a seven-member task force from his office to assist in the rate case. After the Commission heard all of the evidence and entered its order granting a part of the proposed rate increase and denying part, Mississippi Power & Light Company appealed from the denial of its proposed rate increase, and intervenors appealed from that part of the order granting a rate increase. The attorney general filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Hinds County requesting permission to intervene in that appeal on behalf of the State of Mississippi as a substantial rate payer ($7,011,824.00 in 1980), and all taxpayers of the State on the theory that they are the ones who pay the bills through taxes. He cites as authority for his right to intervene Mississippi Code *781 Annotated section 77-3-67(1) (Supp. 1981) which provides in part: The attorney general contends that the State of Mississippi and all its agencies, as substantial purchasers of electricity and all taxpayers of the State, who ultimately pay the expense of government through taxes, have a direct interest in and will be affected by the outcome of the appeal; and, that he had the authority, both at common law and by statute, to represent the State of Mississippi in all suits and proceedings and also to intervene in all suits and proceedings which are of concern to the general public, affect the public interest, or for the protection of the public. The court took the attorney general's petition under advisement and allowed him to fully participate in the appeal. However, before the court rendered its decision it first denied the attorney general's motion to intervene. The attorney general has appealed this ruling and has included in his brief assignments of error going to the merits of the rate increase. Mississippi Power & Light has now made a motion to strike those additional assignments of error dealing exclusively with the rate increase. This brings the question of the attorney general's right to intervene in the first instance squarely before us. In State v. Warren, 254 Miss. 293, 307, 180 So. 2d 293, 299 (1965), this Court outlined generally the common law duties of the attorney general, saying: See also 2 R.C.L. Attorney General § 4, pp. 915-916. Later, in Gandy v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 279 So. 2d 648, 649 (Miss. 1973), speaking to the attorney general's common law powers and authority, the Court said: Also, consistent with this Court's pronouncement with reference to the attorney general being a constitutional officer and possessed with common law duties, Mississippi Code Annotated section 7-5-1 (1972) provides in part: It is glaringly apparent from the pronouncements of this Court, cited above with reference to the attorney general's common law duties and the statute which reaffirms those duties, that he will be confronted with many instances where he must, through his office, furnish legal counsel to two or more agencies with conflicting interest or views. It is also readily apparent that in performing their duties, the agencies will from time to time make decisions, enter orders, take action or adopt rules and regulations which are, in spite of good intentions, either illegal or contrary to the best interest of the general public. Under our scheme of laws, the attorney general has the duty as a constitutional officer possessed with common law as well as statutory powers and duties to represent or furnish legal counsel to many interests the State, its agencies, the public interest and others designated by statute. Paramount to all of his duties, of course, is his duty to protect the interest of the general public. The question presented under these circumstances is whether the attorney general must abrogate his responsibility to one or the other. We think not, because, without legal counsel from his office, the agencies would have no representation. The case law and statutes make it unquestionably clear that he is the state's chief legal officer and is charged with managing all litigation on behalf of the state. Moreover, no state agency may employ legal counsel without the prior approval of the attorney general and any such special counsel appointed performs their duties under the supervision and control of the attorney general and serves at his pleasure and may be dismissed by him. The various state agencies, therefore, are dependent upon the attorney general for legal counsel either by or through his office. Although this case is one of first impression in this State, a number of other states have addressed the problems involved. In discussing the unique role of the attorney general in a dispute between two state agencies, the Illinois Supreme Court stated in EPA v. Pollution Control Board, 69 Ill. 2d 394, 14 Ill.Dec. 245, 372 N.E.2d 50, 52-53 (1977): The Court continued saying: In Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977), the Massachusetts Supreme Court was concerned with the authority of the attorney general to prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from a judgment of the district court contrary to expressed objections *783 of state officers whom he represented: The Court went on to say: In Providence Gas Company v. Burke, 419 A.2d 263 (R.I. 1980), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held: As to other jurisdictions which have addressed the question of the right of the attorney general to intervene on appeal on behalf of the State and to protect the public interest, see: Commonwealth v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1974); State v. Public Service Commission, 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594 (1955); Public Service Coordinated Transport v. State, 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580 (1950); People v. Illinois Racing Board, 54 Ill. 2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285 (1973). In Paxton, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed a lower court's ruling that the attorney general had no standing to intervene and allowed intervention in order to adequately represent the people rather that the "machinery of government." Id. at 867. See generally Connecticut Commission on Special Review v. Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, 174 Conn. 308, 387 A.2d 533 (1978); Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977); EPA v. Pollution Control Board, 69 Ill. 2d 394, 14 Ill.Dec. 245, 372 N.E.2d 50 (1977). The prevailing rule is that where the attorney general has common law powers, he has the inherent right to intervene in all suits affecting the public interest when he has no personal interest therein. However, there is a minority view as expressed in City of York v. Penn. Pub. Utility Comm'n., 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972). In that case, the Pennsylvania Court dealt with the question of respective powers of the attorney general and the state boards and commissions in holding: Considering our scheme of laws with respect to the attorney general being the chief legal officer of the State with the duty to represent the many agencies of the State and his duty to protect the public interest, we are of the opinion and hold that the majority rule will afford maximum protection to the public interest as well as afford complete legal representation to the various state agencies. The attorney general has a large staff which can be assigned in such manner as to afford independent legal counsel and representation to the various agencies. The unique position of the attorney general requires that when his views differ from or he finds himself at odds with an agency, then he must allow the assigned counsel or specially appointed counsel to represent the agency unfettered and uninfluenced by the attorney general's personal opinion. If the public interest is involved, he may intervene to protect it. We have carefully considered each of the points raised by Mississippi Power and Light Company and find them to be without merit. Therefore, the motion of Mississippi Power & Light Company to strike the assignments of error of the attorney general with respect to the merits of the rate case is overruled and he may proceed as an intervenor in this case. MOTION OF MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TO STRIKE THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WITH RESPECT TO THE MERITS OF THE RATE CASE IS OVERRULED, AND HE MAY PROCEED AS AN INTERVENOR IN THIS CASE. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG, P.J., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ., concur. *786 [1] A copy of the order appointing special counsel is attached as appendix "A."