Title: Jobin v. McQuillen

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-146


 Saffron C.B. Jobin                           Supreme Court

      v.                                      On Appeal from
                                              Chittenden Superior Court
 Eleanor McQuillen, et al.
                                              November Term, 1991


 Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

 Lori Ruple of Peterson & Ruple, Jericho, for plaintiff-appellant

 Michael J. Gannon of Pierson, Wadhams, Quinn & Yates, Burlington, for
   defendant-appellee McQuillen

 Robert L. Sand of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for defendant-appellee
   State of Vermont



 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.), Specially
        Assigned


      Gibson, J.  Plaintiff Saffron C. B. Jobin appeals from the award of
 summary judgment to defendants, Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Eleanor N.
 McQuillen and the State of Vermont.  Plaintiff claims damages for mental,
 emotional and psychological distress caused by the removal and retention of
 her son's brain in connection with an autopsy authorized by statute.  She
 challenges the superior court's conclusion that both defendants are immune
 from suit and that she has failed to make out a prima facie case.  We
 affirm.

                                     I.
      Plaintiff's 13-year-old son, Joshua Jobin, died at home on March 4,
 1986, after suffering flu-like symptoms.  He had cerebral palsy.  Because
 it appeared that the boy had died of a treatable medical condition,
 unattended by a physician, Dr. McQuillen performed an autopsy the following
 day, pursuant to 18 V.S.A. { 5205(f).  During the autopsy, she removed the
 boy's brain.  On the death certificate and a preliminary autopsy report,
 both signed March 5, 1986, Dr. McQuillen cited pneumonia as the cause of
 death, and she authorized that the body be cremated.
      Initial examination of the brain revealed no gross abnormalities, but a
 comprehensive analysis was not immediately possible because the brain had
 to be "fixed" in formalin, a stiffening agent, for approximately two weeks
 before it could be studied further.  When the brain was ready for further
 study, it revealed substantial irregularities associated with a neurologic
 disorder.  Dr. McQuillen issued a detailed autopsy report on April 21, 1986,
 in which she again concluded that the boy had died of pneumonia.  The report
 also stated, "The entire brain is saved.  Dr. Thomas Kemper,
 neuropathologist, Boston City Hospital, will be consulted when the case is
 completed as to his interest in receiving this brain for further study."
 Upon reading the report, plaintiff objected to the retention of her son's
 brain and demanded that it be returned to her.  Dr. McQuillen agreed to
 return the brain, and plaintiff retrieved it on May 12, 1986 for cremation.
 Plaintiff brought this action on March 29, 1988.
      In the course of discovery, plaintiff deposed Dr. McQuillen, who also
 submitted an affidavit with her motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiff
 presented no independent expert testimony.  Dr. McQuillen testified that it
 was essential to an accurate determination of the cause, manner and
 circumstances of the boy's death that his brain be removed and examined,
 that neuropathologists who had studied the brain had recommended that it be
 examined further, and that Dr. Kemper might have been able to explain the
 relationship of the child's cerebral palsy to his death from pneumonia.  She
 also testified, however, that further study of the brain had not been
 necessary to determine the cause of death, and that she had returned the
 brain to plaintiff because "it seemed more important to her . . . than my
 question to [Dr. Kemper]."
                                     II.
      Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party establishes that
 there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
 judgment as a matter of law.  V.R.C.P. 56(c).  In the instant case, the
 underlying facts are not disputed.  The court granted summary judgment to
 defendants, concluding that Dr. McQuillen was protected by qualified
 immunity and that the State had not waived its sovereign immunity.  The
 court also concluded that plaintiff had failed to make out a case of either
 negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  We first
 consider whether plaintiff has made out a valid claim for relief.  If she
 has failed to establish an element essential to her case, we must affirm the
 court's order.  Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 254-55, 565 A.2d 1326,
 1329 (1989).
                                     A.
      Plaintiff first sets out her common-law right to possession of her
 son's body as an independent basis for her claim.  See Nichols v. Central
 Vt. Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 16, 109 A. 905, 906 (1919).  She argues that by removing
 and retaining the brain after the cause of her son's death had been
 determined, Dr. McQuillen exceeded her authority to conduct an autopsy and
 thus violated this right.  Once pneumonia was established as the cause of
 death, plaintiff maintains, the State's interest in her son's body
 terminated, and Dr. McQuillen had no authority to retain the brain for
 further study.
      We agree that the medical examiner is not authorized to retain body
 parts solely for scientific study, absent consent from the surviving spouse
 or next of kin.  See Crenshaw v. O'Connell, 235 Mo. App. 1085, 1091, 150 S.W.2d 489, 491-92 (1941); Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis.2d 663, 679-
 80,