Title: Affeldt v. Green Lake County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2315 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
David Affeldt, Joyce Affeldt and Walter Alan 
Affeldt, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Green Lake County, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 329 Wis. 2d 271, 789 N.W. 2d 755 
(Ct. App. 2010-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2011   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT   
 
COUNTY: 
GREEN LAKE 
 
JUDGE: 
WILLIAM M. MCMONIGAL 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Attorney Kristine A. Snow, Todd A. Snow, and GRANT, SNOW, 
SNOW, S.C., Waupun, and oral argument by Ms. Snow. 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by John B. Selsing, Corporation Counsel, Berlin. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2315 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV92) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David Affeldt, Joyce Affeldt and Walter Alan 
Affeldt, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Green Lake County, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Affeldt v. Green 
Lake County, No. 2009AP2315, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
July 28, 2010), that affirmed an order of the Green Lake County 
Circuit Court1 granting summary judgment in favor of Green Lake 
County (the County).   
¶2 
David Affeldt, Joyce Affeldt, and W. Alan Affeldt (the 
Affeldts) objected to the County's removal of trees and fences 
                                                 
1 The Honorable William M. McMonigal presided. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
2 
 
along their farm property on County Highway B (Highway B) in the 
township of Green Lake.  The Affeldts sought a judgment 
declaring that the trees and fences are not within the County's 
right-of-way and enjoining their removal.  The County moved for 
summary judgment, and the circuit court granted the County's 
motion.  The circuit court determined that the Affeldts failed 
to set forth sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under 
Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2)(a) (2007-08)2 that Highway B is 66 feet 
(four rods) wide.   
¶3 
The Affeldts appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, though on different grounds. 
¶4 
The Affeldts petitioned this court for review, and we 
accepted.  We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶5 
The central issue presented in this case is whether 
the Affeldts have set forth sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning the width of Highway 
B.  More specifically: 
(1) 
Have 
the 
Affeldts set forth sufficient evidence 
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue as to 
whether Highway B is a recorded highway that has been 
laid out?   
(2) 
Assuming Highway B has been laid out but not recorded, 
have the Affeldts set forth sufficient evidence to 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
3 
 
rebut the presumption under Wis. Stat. § 82.31(1) that 
Highway B was laid out four rods wide? 
(3) 
Assuming Highway B has not been laid out and instead 
was created by user, have the Affeldts set forth 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under 
Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2)(a) that Highway B is four rods 
wide? 
¶6 
Alternatively, if we conclude that the Affeldts failed 
to set forth sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that 
Highway B is four rods wide, the Affeldts ask us to decide 
whether the presumption's retroactive application to Highway B 
constitutes a taking of the Affeldts' property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶7 
We conclude that the circuit court improperly granted 
summary judgment to the County.  The Affeldts have set forth 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the width of Highway B.  Specifically, the Affeldts 
have set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue as to whether Highway B is a recorded highway that has 
been laid out.  Moreover, assuming Highway B has been laid out 
but not recorded, the Affeldts have set forth specific facts 
that, if proven, are sufficient to rebut the presumption that 
Highway B was laid out four rods wide.  Finally, assuming 
Highway B has not been laid out and instead was created by user, 
the Affeldts have set forth specific facts that, if proven, are 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
4 
 
sufficient to rebut the presumption that Highway B is four rods 
wide. 
¶8 
Because we conclude that the Affeldts have set forth 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Highway B is 
four rods wide, we do not reach the question of whether the 
presumption's retroactive application to Highway B amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking of the Affeldts' property. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶9 
The Affeldts own two farms in the township of Green 
Lake, on opposite sides of Highway B.3  W. Alan Affeldt and his 
wife, Joyce Affeldt, live on the north side of Highway B in a 
farmhouse built by his grandparents in the early 1920s.  In 
2005, their son, David Affeldt, purchased a farm on the south 
side of Highway B.  It is undisputed that Highway B has existed 
in its same location since the late 1800s.  It is further 
undisputed that the County has maintained Highway B for at least 
the past ten years. 
¶10 In January 2008, the Green Lake County Highway 
Department scheduled a reconstruction and maintenance project on 
Highway B.  The project consisted of the resurfacing of the 
road, the clearing of ditches, and the laying of underground 
utilities.  In order to accomplish its project, the County 
deemed it necessary to remove all trees, fence line, and other 
encroachments within the County's right-of-way.   
                                                 
3 Highway B to the west of the Affeldts' property lies in 
the township of Marquette. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
5 
 
¶11 The parties dispute the time and manner in which the 
Affeldts 
received 
notice 
of 
the 
reconstruction 
project.  
Nevertheless, in early 2008, the Affeldts became aware of the 
County's intent to remove trees and fence line from along the 
sides of Highway B.  The Affeldts repeatedly objected to the 
removal, contending that the trees and fences along their 
properties were not within the County's right-of-way.  According 
to the County, the Affeldts were the only affected property 
owners on Highway B whom did not approve of the removal of the 
trees and fences. 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶12 On April 15, 2008, the Affeldts filed a complaint 
against the County, seeking a judgment declaring that the trees 
along Highway B are not within the County's right-of-way.  The 
Affeldts requested the circuit court to enjoin the County's 
removal of the trees, alleging that such removal would amount to 
an unconstitutional taking of the Affeldts' property. 
¶13 On that same date, the Affeldts moved the circuit 
court for an order temporarily restraining and enjoining the 
County from removing, cutting, damaging, or destroying any trees 
on the Affeldts' property.  The circuit court denied the 
Affeldts' 
motions, 
and 
the 
County 
proceeded 
with 
its 
reconstruction project as scheduled. 
¶14 In its answer to the Affeldts' complaint, the County 
denied that the trees were the Affeldts' property and requested 
the circuit court to dismiss the complaint. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
6 
 
¶15 On November 6, 2008, the County moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the removal of trees, fences, and other 
encroachments along Highway B lies entirely within the County's 
presumed four rod right-of-way.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 83.01(7)(a) and (b) and 86.04(1), respectively, the County 
asserted it has the duty to maintain Highway B and the authority 
to remove any encroachments within its right-of-way.  The County 
further maintained that the Affeldts are unable to present any 
documentation or facts that would rebut the presumption that 
Highway B is four rods wide. 
¶16 The County supported its motion for summary judgment 
with affidavits by Duane Prachel (Prachel), the Superintendent 
of the Green Lake County Highway Department, and Jason Ingram 
(Ingram), a registered land surveyor.  Prachel averred that 
Highway B has existed and been maintained by the County as a 
four rod right-of-way for at least 20 years.  Consistent with 
the County's established policy and practice, Prachel asserted, 
all obstacles have to be removed from the right-of-way in order 
for the County to carry out Highway B's reconstruction and 
maintenance. 
¶17 Ingram reported on and prepared a survey of Highway B 
and expressed his opinion that Highway B's existence dates back 
to the late 1800s.  Based upon his review of the statutes and 
various documents from the Green Lake County Highway Department, 
the Green Lake County Surveyor, Green Lake Register of Deeds 
Office, and the townships of Marquette and Green Lake, Ingram 
further averred that Highway B is presumptively four rods wide.   
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
7 
 
¶18 In his report attached to his affidavit, Ingram 
acknowledged "not finding any written record of [Highway B's] 
location or width" but nevertheless opined that a four rod width 
is the "best fit" for Highway B: "[T]he fact that this was a 
'major' roadway in the mid 1800's leads us to presume that 4 
rods 
is 
the 
best 
determination 
of 
the 
right 
of 
way 
width . . . ."  Ingram recognized that "ancient fences" along 
the south side of Highway B varied from zero to six feet north 
of the four rod right-of-way but dismissed the value of such 
information, explaining that the location of Highway B's fence 
line lacked consistency. 
¶19 On December 11, 2008, the Affeldts filed a brief in 
opposition to the County's motion for summary judgment.  The 
Affeldts argued that summary judgment is inappropriate because 
genuine issues of material fact preclude the circuit court from 
being able to determine, as a matter of law, that Highway B is 
four rods wide.  In the alternative, the Affeldts argued that 
the application of the four rod presumption to Highway B 
constitutes a taking of the Affeldts' property without just 
compensation 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions. 
¶20 The Affeldts attached several affidavits to their 
brief in opposition to the County's motion for summary judgment, 
including one by Dennis Steinkraus (Steinkraus), a licensed land 
surveyor, and one by each of the three Affeldt plaintiffs.  
Steinkraus reviewed Ingram's survey map and then prepared one of 
his own, in which he illustrated the fence line and several 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
8 
 
trees and tree stumps along Highway B that exist within the 
County's alleged four rod right-of-way. 
¶21 In his affidavit, W. Alan Affeldt stated that he has 
lived in the same farmhouse on Highway B since he was born on 
December 7, 1946.  He averred that the trees and fences 
identified in Steinkraus' survey map have existed in the same 
location for as long as he can remember.  In support, W. Alan 
attached to his affidavit an outdoor photograph of himself as a 
baby and another taken in 1962, both of which reveal full-grown 
trees bordering Highway B.  In addition, W. Alan attached to his 
affidavit an aerial photograph allegedly taken in the late 
1940s, which shows a fence line and several trees on either side 
of Highway B.  W. Alan averred that that particular fence line 
was the same one that existed at the time this lawsuit began. 
¶22 W. Alan also explained that as early as 1954, a 
machine shed had been located on his property, 26 feet from the 
centerline of Highway B.  In 1992, he replaced that shed with a 
new one which he asserts lies 32 feet from the centerline. 
¶23 Finally, W. Alan averred that his family has always 
mowed its lawn up to the gravel shoulder of Highway B and that 
in the 62 years he has lived at his property, he has never seen 
the County maintain the trees or fence line along Highway B, nor 
mow the lawn or plow snow to its full alleged four rod right-of-
way. 
¶24 In her affidavit, Joyce Affeldt echoed many of her 
husband's statements.  In addition, Joyce opined that Highway B 
was never laid out.  In support, she attached to her affidavit a 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
9 
 
copy of the Green Lake County Board proceedings from November 
21, 1939, which purportedly reveals the adoption of a resolution 
to add Highway B to the system of town roads maintained by the 
County. 
¶25 David 
Affeldt similarly averred that during his 
lifetime, he has never seen the County maintain Highway B beyond 
the shoulders of the highway, other than mowing the grass on the 
south side up to the fence line.  David attached to his 
affidavit a photograph from January 2008 which, according to 
David, shows that the County plowed snow only seven or eight 
feet beyond the paved portion of Highway B.  
¶26 After 
ordering 
supplemental 
briefs 
and 
hearing 
arguments, on July 22, 2009, the circuit court granted the 
County's motion for summary judgment.  Finding that Highway B, 
"a significant cross-county thoroughfare, has long since left 
the appearance of rural, has been paved for a long, long time 
and has been maintained by the [C]ounty on some basis," the 
circuit court applied to Highway B the four rod presumption 
under Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2)(a).  Distinguishing these facts from 
those in Threlfall v. Town of Muscoda, 190 Wis. 2d 121, 527 
N.W.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1994), the circuit court determined that 
the Affeldts failed to set forth sufficient evidence to rebut 
the presumption that Highway B is four rods wide.   
¶27 In 
making 
its 
determination, 
the 
circuit 
court 
acknowledged that it was "going, to some degree, slightly 
outside the bounds of summary judgement . . . ."  In particular, 
the circuit court noted the possible existence of ancient fence 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
10 
 
lines along Highway B but concluded that "those lines of 
demarcation, whatever form that they come in, fences or tree 
lines, are not sufficiently consistent."  The circuit court was 
persuaded that the four rod presumption promotes safety and 
standardized highway maintenance:  
The court believes that there is merit to the 
[C]ounty's position that every 100 foot property owner 
cannot have a different fence line[;] otherwise the 
highway system would result in chaos and not enhance 
management but undermine proper management from both 
road maintenance and safety for those who use it, so 
even though the court may be venturing slightly 
outside of the bounds, the court believes that 
granting the summary judgement is appropriate in favor 
of the [C]ounty. 
¶28 The Affeldts appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, though on different grounds.  Affeldt, No. 2009AP2315, 
unpublished slip op.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
County 
is 
entitled 
to 
summary 
judgment 
based 
upon 
the 
"undisputed" fact that Highway B is a recorded, laid out highway 
and hence has a four rod right-of-way as a matter of law.  Id., 
¶¶13-15.  According to the court of appeals, "[t]he evidence 
demonstrating that Highway B is recorded and laid out derives 
directly from Resolution No. 38 of the Green Lake County Board 
minutes dated November 21, 1939," id., ¶12, the same resolution 
relied upon by Joyce Affeldt in her affidavit, id., ¶13.  In a 
footnote, the court of appeals acknowledged, but then dismissed, 
the Affeldts' argument that the resolution is insufficient to 
establish that Highway B was laid out.  Id., ¶13 n.4 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
11 
 
(distinguishing the resolution in this case from that in 
Muehrcke v. Behrens, 43 Wis. 2d 1, 169 N.W.2d 86 (1969)). 
¶29 The court of appeals reasoned that because Highway B 
is indisputably a recorded, laid out highway, it conclusively 
has a four rod right-of-way pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1).  
Affeldt, No. 2009AP2315, unpublished slip op., ¶15.  Therefore, 
the court of appeals determined, the rebuttable four rod 
presumption in Wis. Stat. § 82.31 is not even triggered:   
We 
acknowledge 
that 
in 
some 
circumstances, 
a 
rebuttable 
presumption 
exists. 
 
However, 
the 
circumstances giving rise to a presumption are not 
present here.  The legislature provided for the 
presumption in cases where records were unavailable to 
show 
the 
road 
was 
recorded 
and 
laid 
out, 
see 
§ 82.31(1), or where the road is an unrecorded 
highway, see § 82.31(2).  Here, a record exists of the 
resolution 
to 
create 
Highway 
B, 
including 
a 
description of its location, the vote count, passage, 
and adoption of Highway B as a town highway. 
Id., ¶14. 
¶30 The Affeldts petitioned this court for review, which 
we accepted on October 27, 2010.  We now reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶31 This case comes to us on summary judgment.  Whether 
the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the 
County is a question of law that we review de novo, applying the 
same standards used by the circuit court and set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08.  See Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶22, 326 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432; Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, 
Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88. 
¶32 This case also requires us to consider the interplay 
between the modern highway statutes and those that existed at 
the time a highway was purportedly laid out.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review 
independently while benefitting from the lower courts' analyses.  
Konneker, 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶24. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶33 We conclude that the County is not entitled to summary 
judgment because the Affeldts have set forth sufficient evidence 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the width 
of Highway B.  We begin our analysis by outlining the statutory 
framework for determining the width of Highway B.  We then apply 
the summary judgment methodology to that framework. 
A. Statutory Framework for Determining 
the Width of Highway B 
¶34 As the County points out, and the Affeldts do not 
dispute, the County has the duty to maintain Highway B.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 83.01(7)(a), (b).  Furthermore, the County has the 
authority to remove any encroachment upon Highway B's right-of-
way.  See Wis. Stat. § 86.04(1).  The central issue in this case 
is the width of Highway B's right-of-way.  If Highway B is a 
full four rods wide, as the County contends, then the County was 
within its authority to remove the trees and fence line along 
the Affeldts' property. 
1. Wisconsin Stat. § 82.31 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
13 
 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 82.31 sets forth the presumptive 
width of existing highways.4  Section 82.31 distinguishes between 
"Recorded Highways" in subsection (1) and "Unrecorded Highways" 
in subsection (2).  We examine these subsections in turn. 
¶36 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 82.31(1), 
"Recorded 
Highways," 
provides:  
Any recorded highway that has been laid out under 
this chapter is a legal highway only to the extent 
that it has been opened and worked for 3 years.  Any 
laid 
out 
highway 
that 
has 
not 
been 
fully 
and 
sufficiently described or recorded or for which the 
records have been lost or destroyed is presumed to be 
66 feet wide. 
Hence, the relevant determination under § 82.31(1) is whether 
the highway is (1) a "recorded highway that has been laid out" 
or (2) laid out but not "fully and sufficiently described or 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 82 is entitled "Town Highways," but 
the legislative history informs us that § 82.31 should not be 
limited in scope to town highways.   
Wisconsin Stat. ch. 82 is the result of the legislature's 
significant reorganization of Wis. Stat. chs. 80 and 81 (2001-
02).  See 2003 Wis. Act 214, prefatory note.  As recognized by 
the 
Joint 
Legislative 
Council's 
Special 
Committee 
on 
Recodification of Town Highway Statutes, former chapters 80 and 
81 dated back to the 1800s and had been updated piecemeal, 
without regard to internal organization.  Id.  The legislature 
organized former chapters 80 and 81 by moving most of their 
provisions into a new chapter 82.  Id.  In doing so, the 
committee made clear that substantive changes were not intended 
unless specifically noted in the Act.  Id. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 82.31, in particular, is a recodification 
of Wis. Stat. § 80.01(1m)-(2) (2001-02).  2003 Wis. Act 214, 
§§ 21-23.  Former chapter 80 was entitled generally "Laying 
Highways" and was not limited in scope to town highways.  2003 
Wis. Act 214 does not indicate a substantive change between Wis. 
Stat. § 82.31 and Wis. Stat. § 80.01(1m)-(2) (2001-02).  See id.   
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
14 
 
recorded" or laid out but the records for which "have been lost 
or destroyed."  In the second instance, the laid out highway is 
presumed to be 66 feet (four rods) wide.  § 82.31(1). 
¶37 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 82.31(2) 
governs 
"Unrecorded 
Highways" 
and 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
"(a) . . . any 
unrecorded highway that has been worked as a public highway for 
10 years or more is a public highway and is presumed to be 66 
feet 
wide." 
 
Hence, 
the 
relevant 
determination 
under 
§ 82.31(2)(a) is whether the highway is unrecorded but "has been 
worked as a public highway for 10 years or more."  If so, the 
highway 
is 
presumed 
to 
be 
66 
feet 
(four 
rods) 
wide.  
§ 82.31(2)(a). 
¶38 Accordingly, in applying Wis. Stat. § 82.31 to Highway 
B, the analysis proceeds as follows:  
(1) 
Is Highway B a "recorded highway that has been laid 
out"?  See § 82.31(1). 
(2) 
Is Highway B a "laid out highway" but not "fully and 
sufficiently described or recorded" or the records for 
which "have been lost or destroyed"?  See § 82.31(1).  
If so, Highway B is presumed to be four rods wide.  
See id. 
(3) 
Is Highway B an "unrecorded highway that has been 
worked as a public highway for 10 years"?  See 
§ 82.31(2)(a).  If so, Highway B is presumed to be 
four rods wide.  See id. 
¶39 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
ch. 
82 
defines 
several 
of 
the 
aforementioned 
terms, 
including 
"[l]aid 
out," 
§ 82.01(4), 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
15 
 
"[r]ecorded highway," § 82.01(8), and "[u]nrecorded highway," 
§ 82.01(10).  Chapter 82 then outlines the procedure for laying 
out, altering, or discontinuing any highway, and then recording 
the resulting order, see §§ 82.10-82.29.  That procedure, 
however, is not determinative in cases like this, in which the 
highway at issue was purportedly laid out decades or even a 
century earlier.  In this case, in order to determine whether 
Highway B is recorded, laid out, both, or neither, we must look 
to Wis. Stat. ch. 80 (1939), the statutory procedure that was in 
force on November 21, 1939, the date on which the County 
purportedly resolved to lay out Highway B.  See Jacobosky v. 
Town of Ahnapee, 244 Wis. 640, 643, 645, 13 N.W.2d 72 (1944) 
(applying Wis. Stat. ch. 152 (1869) to a May 4, 1871, order that 
laid out the highway at issue); Town of Buchanan v. Wolfinger, 
237 Wis. 652, 656, 298 N.W. 176 (1941) (applying Wis. Stat. ch. 
19 (1858) to a May 29, 1858, order that purportedly laid out the 
highway at issue). 
2. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 80 (1939) 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.01 (1939) is an early predecessor 
of Wis. Stat. § 82.31.  See supra note 4.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 80.01(1) (1939) explained what the legislature considered to 
be a recorded, laid out highway in 1939:  
All highways which shall have been laid out by 
the supervisors of any town, the board of supervisors 
of any county, or by a committee thereof, or by 
commissioners appointed by the legislature, or by any 
other duly constituted authority, and recorded, any 
portion of which shall have been opened and worked for 
the term of three years shall be deemed to be and are 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
16 
 
hereby declared to be legal highways so far as they 
have been so opened and worked, notwithstanding the 
law may not have been in all respects complied with in 
laying out the same.  The making of an order laying 
out any highway by the proper officers and filing the 
same or a certified copy thereof in the office of the 
town clerk of the town in which such road is situated 
shall be deemed a recording of such highway within the 
meaning of this section.   
The first sentence of § 80.01(1) (1939) is substantively 
identical to the first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 82.31(1); under 
both, any recorded highway that has been laid out is deemed a 
legal highway to the extent that it has been opened and worked 
for three years.  Wisconsin Stat. § 80.01(1) (1939), however, 
went further and defined a recorded highway as "[t]he making of 
an order laying out any highway by the proper officers and 
filing the same or a certified copy thereof in the office of the 
town clerk of the town in which such road is situated . . . ." 
¶41 The order referenced in Wis. Stat. § 80.01(1) (1939) 
was further defined by Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1939), which governed 
highways laid out by the supervisors of a town, and Wis. Stat. 
§ 80.41 (1939), which governed highways laid out by the board of 
supervisors of a county.  Wisconsin Stat. § 80.07 (1939) 
provided, in relevant part:  
Whenever the supervisors shall lay out . . . any 
highway they shall make and sign an order therefor, 
incorporating therein a description of the highway so 
laid out . . . , and shall cause an accurate survey 
thereof to be made when necessary; and such order 
shall be filed and recorded in the office of the town 
clerk, who shall note the time of recording the same 
in the record.  Such order . . . shall be so filed 
within ten days after the day fixed by their notice or 
adjournment for deciding upon such application; and in 
case 
said 
supervisors 
shall 
fail 
to 
file 
such 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
17 
 
order . . . within the ten days aforesaid they shall 
be deemed to have decided against such application. 
Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 80.41 (1939) provided that when a county 
board of supervisors lays out a highway, "they shall make an 
order laying out . . . such highway or refusing so to do, which 
shall be signed by the chairman and county clerk and filed and 
recorded in the county clerk's office."  The order must 
incorporate a description of the highway and an accurate survey 
thereof, when necessary.  Id.  Notably, the county board of 
supervisors "shall also cause a copy of such order to be filed 
in the office of the town clerk of each town in which any part 
of the highway laid out . . . lies within ten days after the 
making of such order."  Id. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 80.01(1), 80.07, and 80.41 (1939) 
teach us that in 1939, a highway was recorded and laid out when 
the order laying out the highway, or a certified copy thereof, 
was filed in the office of the town clerk of the town or towns 
in which the road was situated.  Furthermore, the order laying 
out the highway had to be signed by the town supervisors, Wis. 
Stat. § 80.07 (1939), or by the chairman of the county board of 
supervisors and the county clerk, Wis. Stat. § 80.41 (1939).  In 
either case, whether the highway was laid out by the supervisors 
of a town or the board of supervisors of a county, the order 
laying out such highway had to incorporate a description of the 
highway and an accurate survey thereof when necessary.  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 80.07, 80.41 (1939). 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
18 
 
¶43 Finally, relevant to this case, Wis. Stat. § 80.08 
(1939) set forth the minimum width of highways laid out in 1939: 
"[H]ighways shall be laid out at least three rods wide, and when 
no width is specified in the order the highway shall be four 
rods wide." 
¶44 Accordingly, to determine the proper width of Highway 
B, we now apply the legislative directives for highways laid out 
and recorded in 1939 to the framework articulated by Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.31.  The analysis proceeds as follows: 
(1) 
Is Highway B a "recorded highway that has been laid 
out"?  See § 82.31(1).  That is, was an order laying 
out Highway B, or a certified copy thereof, filed in 
the office of the town clerk of the towns in which 
Highway B is situated?  See Wis. Stat. § 80.01(1) 
(1939).  Furthermore, was the order signed by the town 
supervisors or, alternatively, by the chairman of the 
county board of supervisors and the county clerk, and 
did the order incorporate a description of Highway B 
and an accurate survey thereof if necessary?  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 80.07, 80.41 (1939).  If all of the above is 
answered affirmatively, then the width of Highway B is 
the width specified in the order and, in any case, 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
19 
 
must be at least three rods.5  See Wis. Stat. § 80.08 
(1939).  If no width is specified in the order, then 
the width of Highway B is four rods.  See id. 
(2) 
Is Highway B a "laid out highway" but not "fully and 
sufficiently described or recorded" or the records for 
which "have been lost or destroyed"?  See § 82.31(1).  
If so, Highway B is presumed to be four rods wide.  
See id. 
(3) 
Is Highway B an "unrecorded highway that has been 
worked as a public highway for 10 years"?  See 
§ 82.31(2)(a).  If so, Highway B is presumed to be 
four rods wide.  See id. 
¶45 Still, as the Affeldts point out, the analysis does 
not necessarily end there.  The four rod presumptions under Wis. 
Stat. § 82.31(1) and (2)(a) are rebuttable.  See Barrows v. 
Kenosha Cnty., 8 Wis. 2d 58, 62-63, 69, 98 N.W.2d 461 (1959); 
                                                 
5 Finding that Highway B is indisputably a recorded, laid 
out highway, the court of appeals concluded that Highway B, as a 
matter of law, has a four rod right-of-way pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 82.50(1).  Affeldt v. Green Lake Cnty., No. 2009AP2315, 
unpublished slip op., ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2010).  The 
court of appeals' application of § 82.50(1) is in error.  Even 
assuming for the sake of argument that Highway B constitutes a 
town road, by the statute's plain language, § 82.50 does not 
apply to town roads existing on October 1, 1992.  § 82.50(3); 
see also 1999 Wis. Act 85, § 5 (designating October 1, 1992, as 
the effective date of rules establishing the minimum geometric 
standards for the improvement of existing town roads under Wis. 
Stat. § 86.266 (1997-98), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 82.52, 
see 2003 Wis. Act 214, § 184).  It is undisputed that Highway B 
has been in existence since the late 1800s, and thus, Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.50 does not apply in this case. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
20 
 
Threlfall, 190 Wis. 2d at 128-32.  Accordingly, in this case, if 
either (2) or (3) of the above framework applies, then Highway B 
is only presumed to be four rods wide, and the Affeldts bear the 
burden of proving otherwise. 
3. The rebuttable presumptions under  
 
Wis. Stat. § 82.31(1) and (2)(a) 
¶46 As previously described, Wis. Stat. § 82.31 sets forth 
two presumptions as to the width of highways, both providing for 
a width of 66 feet (four rods).  The first stated four rod 
presumption applies to all laid out highways that are not "fully 
and sufficiently described or recorded or for which the records 
have been lost or destroyed . . . ."  § 82.31(1).  This first 
stated presumption has existed in the statutes since 1885.  See 
§ 1, ch. 102, Laws of 1885; Barrows, 8 Wis. 2d at 62. 
¶47 The second stated four rod presumption applies to "any 
unrecorded highway that has been worked as a public highway for 
10 years or more . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2)(a).  In other 
words, the second stated presumption applies to all highways, 
including those created by user, see Barrows, 8 Wis. 2d at 62, 
so long as the highway has been "worked" as a public highway, 
that is, regularly maintained for public use,6 for a period of at 
least ten years.  § 82.31(2)(a).  This second stated presumption 
was enacted in 1951.  See ch. 380, Laws of 1951; Barrows, 8 
                                                 
6 For purposes of Wis. Stat. ch. 82, § 82.01(11) defines the 
term "worked" as "action of the town in regularly maintaining a 
highway for public use, including hauling gravel, grading, 
clearing or plowing, and any other maintenance by or on behalf 
of the town on the road." 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
21 
 
Wis. 2d at 62; Threlfall, 190 Wis. 2d at 128.  Prior to 1951, 
the conclusive width of a highway created by user was determined 
by the limits of the user.  See Nicolai v. Wis. Power & Light 
Co., 227 Wis. 83, 89, 277 N.W. 674 (1938); Stricker v. Town of 
Reedsburg, 101 Wis. 457, 462, 77 N.W. 897 (1899); Threlfall, 190 
Wis. 2d at 128. 
¶48 In Barrows, this court provided insight into the type 
of 
evidence 
that 
is 
sufficient 
to 
rebut 
the 
four 
rod 
presumptions under Wis. Stat. § 82.31(1) and (2)(a).  In that 
case, landowners, the Barrows, instituted inverse condemnation 
proceedings against Kenosha County to recover damages for an 
alleged taking of their property as a result of the county's 
improvement of Wood Road.  Barrows, 8 Wis. 2d at 60.  Kenosha 
County denied that the Wood Road improvement resulted in a 
taking of the Barrows' property, contending that Wood Road was 
four rods wide, and the acreage allegedly taken was located 
within that four rod width.  Id. at 60-61.  The circuit court 
conducted a bench trial and found that Wood Road was a highway 
created by user, and thus, under Wis. Stat. § 80.01(2) (1959),7 
its width was only presumed to be four rods.  See id. at 61-62.  
The circuit court further determined that the Barrows had 
sufficiently rebutted the four rod presumption.  See id. at 62-
63.  Kenosha County appealed, and this court reversed.  Id. at 
61, 72. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.01(2) (1959) is an early predecessor 
to Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2)(a).  See supra note 4. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
22 
 
¶49 As a preliminary matter, this court agreed with the 
circuit court that if Wood Road was in fact created by user, 
then the Barrows sufficiently rebutted the four rod presumption.  
Id. at 63.  Specifically, at trial, the Barrows testified that 
for at least the preceding 45 years, a barbed wire fence had 
existed along Wood Road on the west side of the Barrows' 
property and that such fence line established a three rod, 
rather than four rod, width of Wood Road.  See id. at 62-63.  
This court was satisfied that if Wood Road was actually a 
highway created by user, as found by the circuit court, then the 
Barrows' testimony as to the fence line would be sufficient to 
rebut the presumption under Wis. Stat. § 80.01(2) (1959) that 
Wood Road was four rods wide.  Id. at 63. 
¶50 However, this court concluded that the circuit court 
erred when it found that Wood Road was created by user, as 
opposed to laid out.  Id. at 69.  The court relied on several 
surveys kept by Kenosha County, some dating back to the late 
1800s, of land on Wood Road to the north and south of the 
Barrows' property.  See id. at 64-65.  All of the surveys showed 
Wood Road to be four rods wide.  See id.  Noting that 
continuously since 1885 a statutory presumption has existed that 
all laid roads are four rods wide, the court could find "no 
logical explanation . . . which would account for the surveyors 
in 1899 and 1909 showing Wood Road to be 4 rods wide other than 
they must have considered it to be a laid road."  Id. at 67.  
Furthermore, the court explained, if Wood Road was laid out to 
the north and south of the Barrows' property, then there was a 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
23 
 
strong inference that the entire length of Wood Road was laid 
out: "There is every indication that [Wood Road] was created as 
a unit and not piecemeal as would be the case if part had been 
created by user and the other part by the town's laying it out."  
Id.  
¶51 Finding that Wood Road was a laid out highway for 
which no town records existed, see id. at 63, this court applied 
the alternative four rod presumption in Wis. Stat. § 80.01(2) 
(1959) for laid out highways, the records for which "have been 
lost or destroyed . . . ."  See id. at 69.  The court then 
concluded that the Barrows failed to produce sufficient evidence 
to overcome that presumption.  See id. at 69-71.  The court 
acknowledged that the evidence of the barbed wire fence line, 
standing by itself, would indicate the width of Wood Road to be 
three 
rods 
along 
the 
Barrows' 
property. 
 
Id. 
at 
69.  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that such evidence was 
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Wood Road was laid 
out to be four rods wide:  
The record is barren of any evidence which would 
offer any explanation as to why the town authorities 
may have laid out the highway so as to be four rods in 
width both to the north and south of the Barrows' 
property, but have laid it out as a three-rod width 
opposite the Barrows' parcel.  All of the evidence 
must be viewed as a whole in determining whether the 
existence of the fence line, or lines, at and opposite 
the Barrows' property, raise a reasonable inference 
that Wood road was there laid out at a three-rod 
width. We do not believe that it does and, therefore, 
the statutory presumption has not been rebutted. 
Id. at 70-71. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
24 
 
¶52 More recently, in Threlfall, the court of appeals 
applied the four-rod presumption to an unrecorded highway and 
concluded that evidence of ancient fences within the four-rod 
width rebutted the presumption.  190 Wis. 2d at 126-27, 131.  In 
that case, the Town of Muscoda cut down trees and shrubs along 
Sand Branch Road, a gravel road that bisected the property of 
the plaintiffs, the Baums.  Id. at 125.  The Baums filed a 
complaint against the town, alleging that the town trespassed on 
their land and unlawfully cut down their trees and shrubs.  Id. 
at 125-26.  Much like the Affeldts in this case, the Baums 
sought a judgment declaring the proper width of Sand Branch Road 
and enjoining the town from further cutting down trees and 
shrubs or altering fences on the Baums' property.  Id. at 126.  
The circuit court granted the Baums a temporary restraining 
order.  Id.  However, after a bench trial, the circuit court 
concluded that the Baums failed to rebut the presumption under 
Wis. Stat. § 80.01(2) (1993-94)8 that Sand Branch Road, an 
unrecorded highway, was four rods wide.  Id.  The Baums 
appealed, id., and the court of appeals reversed, id. at 138.   
¶53 There was no dispute that Sand Branch Road was an 
unrecorded highway that had been used by the public and worked 
by the Town of Muscoda for more than 20 years.  Id. at 126-27.  
Thus, Sand Branch Road was presumed to be four rods wide.  Id. 
at 128 (citing Wis. Stat. § 80.01(2) (1993-94)).  Relying on 
this court's decision in Barrows, the court of appeals concluded 
                                                 
8 See supra note 4. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
25 
 
that the existence of ancient fences within two rods of either 
side of Sand Branch Road's centerline was sufficient to rebut 
the presumption that the road was four rods wide.  Id. at 129-31 
(citing Barrows, 8 Wis. 2d at 63). 
¶54 Specifically, at trial, the Baums introduced a survey 
showing that fences ran along the north and south sides of Sand 
Branch Road and that the distance between the fences was less 
than four rods.  Id. at 129-30.  Moreover, landowners previous 
to the Baums testified that the fence line had existed in 
substantially the same location as of the mid-1900s.  Id. at 
130-31.  The court of appeals acknowledged that the fence width 
varied at different points along Sand Branch Road but rejected 
the circuit court's finding that such evidence precluded the 
establishment of a boundary line:  
The fence is there, and it ranges between 17.9 and 
19.0 feet south of the center line.  Given the old age 
of the fences, the widest possible width of the road 
is determined by the location of the ancient fences 
immediately north and south of the road.  The boundary 
lines of the road can be determined by a survey on the 
basis of those locations. 
Id. at 132.   
¶55 Hence, in concluding that the Baums rebutted the four-
rod presumption, the court of appeals determined that the widest 
possible width of Sand Branch Road was that of the ancient 
fences.  See id. at 132.  The ancient fences, in turn, marked 
the limits of the user.  Id.; see also id. at 128 & n.6 (stating 
that the Nicolai rule——the width of a highway created by user is 
determined by the limits of the user——still applies when a 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
26 
 
landowner rebuts the presumption that an unrecorded highway is 
four rods). 
¶56 In summary, Barrows and Threlfall teach us that 
evidence of ancient fences within a four rod width is sufficient 
to rebut the presumption under Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2) that a 
highway created by user is four rods wide.  See Barrows, 8 
Wis. 2d at 63; Threlfall, 190 Wis. 2d at 129, 131.  If a 
landowner rebuts the presumption that a highway created by user 
is four rods wide, then the highway's width is determined by the 
limits of the user.  See Threlfall, 190 Wis. 2d at 132; Nicolai, 
227 Wis. at 89.  At the same time, that same evidence of ancient 
fences may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption under Wis. 
Stat. § 82.31(1) that a laid out highway is four rods wide.  See 
Barrows, 8 Wis. 2d at 69-71. 
¶57 Turning to the case now before this court, we are not 
yet concerned with the actual width of Highway B or even whether 
a presumptive width is rebutted.  Unlike the appeal postures of 
Barrows and Threlfall, the posture of this case is summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, in this case, we must decide only 
whether the Affeldts have set forth sufficient evidence to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact concerning the width of Highway 
B.  We conclude that they have. 
B. Application of the Summary Judgment Methodology 
¶58 The principles of summary judgment are well-defined.  
Summary 
judgment 
shall 
be 
granted 
"if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
27 
 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  Stated conversely, summary judgment should not be 
granted "unless the facts presented conclusively show that the 
plaintiff's action has no merit and cannot be maintained."  
Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶14, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 
699 N.W.2d 54 (internal quotations omitted). 
¶59 In determining whether to grant summary judgment, "the 
court decides whether there is a genuine issue of material fact; 
the court does not decide the fact."  Oracular Milwaukee, 323 
Wis. 2d 682, ¶25.  The moving party bears the burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine, that is, disputed, issue 
of material fact.  AccuWeb, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, 2008 WI 24, 
¶21, 308 Wis. 2d 258, 746 N.W.2d 447; Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  Moreover, we view 
summary judgment materials in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  AccuWeb, 308 Wis. 2d 258, ¶21.  As we have 
often stated, "summary judgment should not be granted unless the 
moving party demonstrates a right to a judgment with such 
clarity as to leave no room for controversy."  Grams, 97 Wis. 2d 
at 338; see also Konneker, 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶22; Oracular 
Milwaukee, 323 Wis. 2d 682, ¶25; Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau 
Claire Cnty., 152 Wis. 2d 453, 462, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989); 
Poynter v. Johnston, 114 Wis. 2d 439, 446, 338 N.W.2d 484 
(1983). 
¶60 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court 
improperly granted summary judgment to the County.  The Affeldts 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
28 
 
have set forth sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the width of Highway B.   
1. Recorded highway that has been laid out 
¶61 The Affeldts have set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue as to whether Highway B is a 
recorded highway that has been laid out.  Attached to Joyce 
Affeldt's affidavit was a copy of the Green Lake County Board 
proceedings from November 21, 1939, which purportedly reveals 
the adoption of Resolution No. 38, a resolution to add Highway B 
to the system of town roads maintained by the County.  The 
resolution states the following:  
BE IT RESOLVED by the County Board of Supervisors 
of Green Lake County duly assembled in regular session 
begun November 14th, 1939,  
THAT the following described road lying wholly in 
the Towns of Green Lake and Marquette be added to the 
System of Town Roads maintained by the County:  
Beginning at the center of the East 
one-half of Section 27 at its junction of 
State Highway 73 and extending west through 
Section 27, 28 to its junction to what is 
known 
as 
the 
"Danze's 
Tavern 
Road"——a 
distance of approximately one mile."   
The resolution then provides that it was "[p]assed and adopted 
this 21st day of November, 1939" and attested to by a named 
"Chairman" and a named "County Clerk." 
¶62 The Affeldts do not dispute that the description 
contained in Resolution No. 38 refers to Highway B.  However, as 
the Affeldts correctly point out, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether Resolution No. 38 constitutes 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
29 
 
an "order" laying out Highway B for purposes of satisfying Wis. 
Stat. § 80.01(1) (1939).  Indeed, the County has presented no 
evidence that Resolution No. 38, or a certified copy thereof, 
was filed in the office of the Green Lake or Marquette town 
clerk.  See § 80.01(1) (1939); Muehrcke, 43 Wis. 2d at 7 
(concluding that even an entry in the town record book and 
signed by the town clerk fell "far short of the procedural 
requirements for laying out public highways"); Wolfinger, 237 
Wis. at 656 (concluding that the town board's order purportedly 
laying out a road was deficient because it was not filed with 
the town clerk as required by statute).   
¶63 Moreover, there is a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether Highway B was laid out by the supervisors of 
the town of Green Lake or Marquette, such that Wis. Stat. 
§ 80.07 (1939) governed, or whether Highway B was laid out by 
the board of supervisors of the County, such that Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
30 
 
§ 80.41 (1939) governed.9  Resolution No. 38 was not signed by 
any town supervisor, see Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1939), and it was 
attested to, but not signed by, the chairman of the county board 
of supervisors and the county clerk, see Wis. Stat. § 80.41 
(1939).10   
                                                 
9 The 
dissent's 
analysis 
is 
based 
entirely 
upon 
an 
assumption that Resolution No. 38 qualifies as an "order" of the 
County's board of supervisors laying out Highway B for purposes 
of satisfying Wis. Stat. § 80.41 (1939).  See dissent, ¶78 
("Green Lake County, through its board of supervisors, attempted 
to lay out the highway."); dissent, ¶79 ("[Resolution No. 38] 
expresses the intent of the county board of supervisors to 
locate and lay out CTH B . . . ."); dissent, ¶88 ("In the 
present case, Green Lake County, not a town, laid out CTH B in 
1939, adhering to Wis. Stat. § 80.41 (1939)."); dissent, ¶89 
("Here, the Green Lake County Board laid out Highway B on its 
own initiative.").  That the dissent is based upon an assumption 
of facts is itself indicative of why summary judgment is 
inappropriate in this case.  "On summary judgment the court does 
not decide the issue of fact; it decides whether there is a 
genuine issue of fact."  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 
N.W.2d 473 (1980); see also Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, 
Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶25, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88. 
10 The dissent acknowledges that "not all of the procedural 
steps required by the 1939 statutes were precisely followed" in 
the alleged laying out of Highway B, see dissent, ¶82, but yet 
declines to grant the Affeldts their day in court, reasoning 
that any such defects were cured after the expiration of five 
years.  Dissent, ¶91.  At no point in these proceedings have the 
Affeldts or the County raised the issue of whether a curative 
statute applies in this case.  See State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, 
¶56 n.38, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516.  Nevertheless, we are 
cognizant of the fact that in 1943, the legislature enacted a 
curative 
provision 
that 
served 
to 
validate 
an 
otherwise 
defective resolution or order after the expiration of five 
years.  Wisconsin Stat. § 80.01(4) (1943) provided, in relevant 
part:  
Every street, highway and alley . . . attempted 
or intended to be laid out . . . by the authorities of 
any county, town, city or village shall be held to 
have been lawfully so . . . laid out . . . from and 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
31 
 
¶64 Because there is a genuine issue as to whether 
Resolution No. 38 constitutes an "order" laying out Highway B, 
                                                                                                                                                             
after the expiration of 5 years from the date of the 
deed, instrument, plat, order, resolution or other 
final proceeding had or taken to effectuate such 
purpose.  No defect, omission or informality in the 
execution of any plat or deed of dedication or in any 
proceedings, order or resolution on the part of such 
authorities for the purposes aforesaid shall affect or 
invalidate such plat, deed, order or resolution or 
proceeding, after the expiration of 5 years from the 
date 
of 
the 
plat, 
deed, 
proceeding, 
order 
or 
resolution; provided, the street or alley laid out, or 
altered by such defective, or informal plat, deed, 
proceeding, order or resolution, shall be limited in 
length to the portion actually worked and used 
thereunder. 
However, in light of Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1943), we question 
whether Wis. Stat. § 80.01(4) (1943) can cure the seemingly 
fatal defect of failing to file an order in the office of the 
town clerk.  Wisconsin Stat. § 80.07 (1943) retained the 
provision that "[i]n case the supervisors fail to file the 
order . . . within the 10 days aforesaid they shall be deemed to 
have decided against the application [to lay out a highway]."  
Deeming the supervisors to have decided against an application 
to lay out a highway is inherently inconsistent with the 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 80.01(4) (1943) that the highway be 
one that the authorities "intended to" lay out.  See Beard v. 
Lee Enters., Inc., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 591 N.W.2d 156 (1999) 
("Apparently conflicting provisions of law should be construed 
so as to harmonize them and thus give effect to the leading idea 
behind the law."). 
In support of its position, the dissent cites Jacobosky v. 
Town of Ahnapee, 244 Wis. 640, 643, 13 N.W.2d 72 (1944), and 
Zblewski v. Town of New Hope, 242 Wis. 451, 455, 8 N.W.2d 365 
(1943).  Dissent, ¶87 n.10.  However, neither case supports the 
proposition that Wis. Stat. § 80.01(4) (1943) can cure the 
defect of failing to file an order in the office of the town 
clerk.  Indeed, in both cases, the order laying out the road in 
question was filed with the town clerk.  See Jacobosky, 244 
Wis. at 641, 643; Zblewski, 242 Wis. at 453. 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
32 
 
there is likewise a genuine issue as to whether Highway B is 
four rods wide as provided in Wis. Stat. § 80.08 (1939). 
2. Highway that has been laid out but not recorded 
¶65 Assuming Highway B has been laid out but not recorded, 
the Affeldts have set forth specific facts that, if proven, are 
sufficient to rebut the presumption under Wis. Stat. § 82.31(1) 
that Highway B was laid out four rods wide.  Even assuming that 
Resolution No. 38 laid out Highway B, it is possible that 
Highway B was laid out as narrow as three rods wide.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 80.08 (1939).  The County has introduced no evidence to 
show otherwise.  To the contrary, in a report offered by the 
County, Ingram acknowledged not finding any written record of 
Highway B's width.   
¶66 The Affeldts, on the other hand, set forth specific 
facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that Highway B was laid 
out less than four rods wide.  Attached to W. Alan Affeldt's 
affidavit was an aerial photograph purportedly depicting a fence 
line and several full-grown trees that existed along Highway B 
as early as the 1940s.  Steinkraus' survey map supported W. 
Alan's averment that the fence line and trees existed within a 
four rod width of Highway B.  Indeed, even Ingram's report 
recognized that "ancient fences" along the south side of Highway 
B varied from zero to six feet north of the four rod right-of-
way.  Viewing these affidavits in the light most favorable to 
the Affeldts, there is a genuine issue as to whether Highway B 
was laid out less than four rods wide.  That is, even assuming 
Highway B was laid out in 1939, the Affeldts have raised a 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
33 
 
reasonable inference that Highway B was laid out at a width 
corresponding to that of the ancient fences.  
3. Highway created by user 
¶67 Finally, assuming Highway B has not been laid out and 
instead was created by user, the Affeldts have set forth 
specific facts that, if proven, are sufficient to rebut the 
presumption under Wis. Stat. § 82.31(2) that Highway B is four 
rods wide.  The Affeldts set forth an abundance of testimonial 
and photographic evidence tending to show that ancient fences, 
trees, and a machine shed existed along Highway B within a four-
rod width.  W. Alan, who has lived in the same farmhouse on 
Highway B since he was born in 1946, averred that the trees and 
fences have existed in the same location for as long as he can 
remember.  Steinkraus' survey map, aerial photographs, and a 
photograph of W. Alan as a child supported W. Alan's averment.  
As previously noted, the County, through Ingram, did not dispute 
the existence of such ancient fences and instead merely opined 
that such evidence was too inconsistent to be of value. 
¶68 Assuming it is proven, the evidence of the ancient 
fences and trees on either side of Highway B is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption that Highway B is four rods wide.  See 
Barrows, 8 Wis. 2d at 63; Threlfall, 190 Wis. 2d at 129, 131.  
Moreover, contrary to the County's contention, that general rule 
is not defeated simply because the distance between the fence 
lines may have varied.  See Threlfall, 190 Wis. 2d at 132. 
V. CONCLUSION 
No. 
2009AP2315   
 
34 
 
¶69 We conclude that the circuit court improperly granted 
summary judgment to the County.  The Affeldts have set forth 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the width of Highway B.  Specifically, the Affeldts 
have set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue as to whether Highway B is a recorded highway that has 
been laid out.  Moreover, assuming Highway B has been laid out 
but not recorded, the Affeldts have set forth specific facts 
that, if proven, are sufficient to rebut the presumption that 
Highway B was laid out four rods wide.  Finally, assuming 
Highway B has not been laid out and instead was created by user, 
the Affeldts have set forth specific facts that, if proven, are 
sufficient to rebut the presumption that Highway B is four rods 
wide. 
¶70 Because we conclude that the Affeldts have set forth 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Highway B is 
four rods wide, we do not reach the question of whether the 
presumption's retroactive application to Highway B amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking of the Affeldts' property. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶71 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Using a 
confusing step-by-step analysis, the majority opinion concludes 
that a genuine issue of material fact exists about whether 
County Highway B (CTH B) is a recorded and laid out highway with 
a width of four rods.  I conclude, as did the court of appeals, 
that CTH B in Green Lake County is a recorded, laid out highway 
and as a matter of law "shall" be four rods wide.1  Accordingly, 
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and hold 
that Green Lake County is entitled to summary judgment.  For the 
reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶72 Whether CTH B is a recorded, laid out highway centers 
on 1939 Resolution No. 38 of the County Board of Supervisors of 
Green Lake County.  The resolution undisputedly describes CTH B 
and resolves that CTH B be added to the system of town roads 
maintained by the County.  Resolution No. 38 was included in the 
county board proceedings, which stated the resolution was passed 
and adopted on November 21, 1939, and was attested to by the 
chairman of the Green Lake County Board of Supervisors and the 
county clerk.  
¶73 To determine whether CTH B is a "recorded, laid out" 
highway, I must first decide what statutes govern the issue. 
                                                 
1 Affeldt v. Green Lake County, 2009AP2315, unpublished slip 
op., ¶14 (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2010).  
I also agree with the circuit court that "there is merit to 
the county's position that every 100 foot property owner cannot 
have a different fence line[;] otherwise the highway system 
would result in chaos and not enhance management but undermine 
proper management from both road maintenance and safety for 
those who use it . . . ."  
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶74 Under the current statutes, Wis. Stat. § 82.01(8) 
(2007-08), the definition of "recorded highway"——which relates 
to highways laid out before January 1, 2005——provides that the 
order must be recorded in the office of the clerk of the town or 
the county in which the highway is situated:   
"Recorded highway" means a highway for which the order 
laying out or altering the highway, or a certified 
copy of the order, has been recorded in the office of 
the register of deeds in the county in which the 
highway is situated or, for highways that were laid 
out or altered before January 1, 2005, in the office 
of the clerk of the town or the county in which the 
highway is situated (emphasis added). 
 
¶75 Again, according to the current statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.01(4) (2007-08), the phrase "laid out" is defined as "any 
formal act or process by which a municipality determines the 
location of a highway."2 
 
¶76 CTH B was not laid out or recorded under the current 
statutes.  It was laid out, that is, located, by Green Lake 
County Board Resolution 38, adopted in 1939.     
 
¶77 I therefore look to the 1939 laws to resolve the 
issues presented in this case. 
 
¶78 CTH B is a highway that extends through Green Lake 
County and two townships, Green Lake and Marquette.  Green Lake 
County, through its board of supervisors, attempted to lay out 
the highway.  The 1939 procedures pertinent for a county to lay 
out and record a highway are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 80.41 
(1939).  Under that statute, when a county acts, as it did in 
                                                 
2 The 1939 statutes, the operative statutes when Green Lake 
County acted, did not define the phrase "laid out."  
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
3 
 
the present case, in contrast with the 1939 statutes governing 
when a town acts (Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1939)), the County Board 
of Supervisors  
shall make an order laying out, altering, widening or 
discontinuing such highway or refusing so to do, which 
shall be signed by the chairman and county clerk and 
filed and recorded in the county clerk's office.  When 
they shall lay out, alter, widen or discontinue a 
highway 
they 
shall 
incorporate 
in 
the 
order 
a 
description thereof and may cause, when necessary, an 
accurate survey to be made for that purpose, and shall 
also cause a copy of such order to be filed in the 
office of the town clerk of each town in which any 
part of the highway laid out, altered, widened, or 
discontinued lies within ten days after the making of 
such order.  
Wis. Stat. § 80.41 (1939) (emphasis added).3 
¶79 Resolution No. 38 was a resolution of the county board 
rather than an order.  It expresses the intent of the county 
board of supervisors to locate and lay out CTH B and incorporate 
CTH B into the system of town roads maintained by the County.  
The resolution, rather than an order, was attested to by the 
chairman of the County Board of Supervisors and the county 
clerk.  The applicable procedures for a county locating a 
                                                 
3 The majority seems to conclude that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether CTH B was laid out by the 
supervisors of either the Town of Green Lake or the Town of 
Marquette, or whether CTH B was laid out by the board of 
supervisors of Green Lake County.  Majority op., ¶63.  The 
majority points to no evidence in the record that supports a 
dispute on this issue.  I rely on Resolution No. 38, in which 
the board of supervisors of Green Lake County explicitly located 
and expressed its intent to add CTH B to the system of town 
roads maintained by the County.  Whether one of the towns 
subsequently also attempted to lay out CTH B does not create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County laid out 
CTH B in Resolution No. 38 in 1939. 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
4 
 
highway 
do 
not 
call 
for 
the 
signatures 
of 
the 
town 
representatives or a committee of the County Board.  Majority 
op., ¶62.  Resolution No. 38 was filed in the county clerk's 
proceedings.   
¶80 There is, however, nothing in the record to show that 
a copy of Resolution 38 was filed in the office of the town 
clerk of each town in which any part of the highway lies, as the 
1939 statute requires.4   
¶81 No 
survey 
appears 
in 
the 
record, 
but 
none 
is 
statutorily required.  It is undisputed that CTH B has been 
publicly traveled and worked over the same track since the 
1800s, and so it is reasonable to conclude that no survey was 
necessary to describe the highway in the resolution.   
¶82 It is clear and undisputed that not all of the 
procedural steps required by the 1939 statutes were precisely 
followed by the Green Lake County Board of Supervisors in laying 
out CTH B.  The majority opinion suggests that the failure to 
file a copy of Resolution 38 in the offices of the town clerks 
                                                 
4 Plaintiff Joyce Affeldt averred that after diligent review 
of the records of Green Lake County, the Town of Green Lake, the 
Town of Marquette, and the Green Lake Historical Society, she 
discovered three documents between 1930 and 1940 that she 
believed referenced CTH B.  One of these records was Resolution 
38, and another was minutes of the Town of Green Lake board from 
1930, in which a motion for a road (purportedly a portion of CTH 
B) was read and was voted down.  The third exhibit is the 
minutes of the annual town meeting of the Town of Marquette from 
1940, in which a motion was carried to "use some of the highway 
fund to grade and gravel the highway . . . and file petition 
with the county to the effect that said highway be placed under 
county highway supervision . . . ."  Joyce Affeldt averred that 
the description of the highway in that motion coincides with CTH 
B. 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
5 
 
is fatal to Green Lake County's attempt to lay out CTH B.5  I 
disagree.   
¶83 Procedural failures in laying out or recording a 
highway do not necessarily defeat the intended goal of the 
County to lay out the highway.  The legislature has adopted 
curative statutes.  The legislature has declared that any 
defects, irregularities, omissions, or informalities are cured 
after the expiration of five years and that no defects, 
irregularities, omissions, or informalities shall affect or 
invalidate the order or resolution after the expiration of five 
years from the date of an order or resolution.  Indeed, a 
curative statute, in one form or another, has been continuously 
a part of the statutory scheme for governmental actions on 
highways since at least 1869.6   
¶84 A curative statute, Wis. Stat. § 80.63 (1939), was in 
effect in 1939 when Green Lake County resolved to include CTH B 
within the system of town roads maintained by the county.7  A 
                                                 
5 The majority cites to Muehrcke v. Behrens, 43 Wis. 2d 1, 
169 N.W.2d 86 (1969) and Town of Buchanan v. Wolfinger, 237 
Wis. 652, 298 N.W. 176 (1941), to support its conclusion that 
failing to file a certified copy of Resolution No. 38 with the 
clerks of the Town of Green Lake and Town of Marquette was a 
fatal procedural misstep by the County in laying out CTH B.  
Both of those cases, however, presented distinct legal questions 
and 
addressed 
town 
board 
procedures, 
and 
neither 
case 
acknowledged the curative statutes, much less addressed the 
applicability of the curative statutes to resolve the unique 
questions presented.    
6 Jacobosky v. Town of Ahnapee, 244 Wis. 640, 13 N.W.2d 72 
(1944). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.63 (1939)stated in part:  
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
6 
 
similar curative statute, Wis. Stat. § 80.01(4) (1943), was in 
effect at the expiration of five years from Green Lake County's 
laying out and recording CTH B.8  And a similar curative statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
80.63 
Highways; 
streets 
and 
alleys; 
curative 
provisions. (1) Any and every street, highway and 
alley, 
pier 
and 
slip, 
heretofore 
or 
hereafter 
dedicated or attempted and intended to be dedicated in 
any plat by any person, or laid out, altered, changed, 
vacated or discontinued, or attempted or intended to 
be laid out, altered, changed, vacated or discontinued 
by the authorities of any county, town, city or 
village in this state, shall be taken and held to have 
been 
lawfully 
so 
dedicated, 
laid 
out, 
altered, 
changed, vacated or discontinued, as the case may be, 
from and after the expiration of five years from the 
date of the deed, instrument, plat, order, resolution 
or other final proceeding had or taken to effectuate 
such purpose. 
(2) No defect, irregularity, omission or informality 
in the execution of any plat or deed of dedication or 
in any proceedings, order or resolution on the part of 
the authorities of any county, town, city or village, 
whether formal or jurisdictional, for the purposes 
aforesaid, heretofore made or taken or hereafter to be 
made or taken, shall affect or invalidate such plat, 
deed, 
proceeding, 
order 
or 
resolution; 
provided, 
however, that the street or alley laid out, altered or 
changed by such defective, irregular or informal plat, 
deed, 
proceeding, order or resolution, shall be 
limited in length to the portion actually worked and 
used thereunder. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.01(4) (1943) provides as follows:  
Highways, Streets and Alleys, Piers, Plats, Curative 
Provisions.  Every street, highway and alley, pier and 
slip, dedicated or attempted and intended to be 
dedicated in any plat or laid out, altered, vacated or 
discontinued, or attempted or intended to be laid out, 
altered, vacated or discontinued by the authorities of 
any county, town, city or village shall be held to 
have been lawfully so dedicated, laid out, altered, 
vacated or discontinued from and after the expiration 
of 5 years from the date of the deed, instrument, 
plat, order, resolution, or other final proceeding had 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
7 
 
is presently in effect.9  The Affeldts presented a copy of the 
1939 curative statute in their briefs, and the parties were 
                                                                                                                                                             
or taken to effectuate such purpose.  No defect, 
omission or informality in the execution of any plat 
or deed of dedication or in any proceedings, order or 
resolution on the part of such authorities for the 
purposes aforesaid shall affect or invalidate such 
plat, deed, order or resolution or proceeding, after 
the expiration of 5 years from the date of the plat, 
deed, proceeding, order or resolution; provided, the 
street 
or 
alley 
laid 
out, 
or 
altered 
by 
such 
defective, or informal plat, deed, proceeding, order 
or resolution, shall be limited in length to the 
portion actually worked and used thereunder. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.1033 (2007-08) provides: 
(1) In this section: 
(a) "Political subdivision" means a city, village, 
town, or county.  
(b) "Public way" means a highway, street, slip, pier, 
or alley. 
(2) For proceedings taken, or for plats, deeds, 
orders, or resolutions executed before January 1, 
2005, notwithstanding s. 840.11, no defect, omission 
or informality in the proceedings of, or execution of 
a plat, deed of dedication, order, or resolution by, a 
political subdivision shall affect or invalidate the 
proceedings, plat, deed, order, or resolution after 5 
years from the date of the proceeding, plat, deed, 
order, or resolution.  The public way dedicated, laid 
out, or altered by a defective or informal proceeding, 
plat, deed, order, or resolution shall be limited in 
length to the portion actually worked and used. 
In explaining the changes to the curative statute in the 
recodification of the town highway statutes that occurred in 
2003, the Wisconsin Legislative Council stated: "after the 
effective date of the act, the new s. 66.1029 [now 66.1033], 
would cure all defects except a failure to comply with s. 
840.11." 
 
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
Report 
to 
the 
Legislature: Special Committee on Recodification of Town Highway 
Statutes, RL 2003-13, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2003).  Section 840.11 is 
not applicable here. 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
8 
 
questioned about the effect of the curative statutes at oral 
argument. 
¶85 The curative statutes clearly state that no defect, 
irregularity, omission, or informality in any proceedings, order 
or resolution on the part of a governmental entity for the 
purposes of laying out a highway shall affect or invalidate such 
resolution, order or proceeding after the expiration of 5 years.  
The majority concludes that the failure of the board of 
supervisors of Green Lake County in 1939 to cause a copy of the 
order to be filed with the clerks of the Town of Green Lake and 
the Town of Marquette is a defect or omission that is an 
exception 
to 
this 
explicit 
statement 
of 
policy 
by 
the 
legislature.  
 
¶86 The majority opinion dismisses the curative statutes 
in a footnote.  Majority op., ¶63 n.10.  The majority 
"questions" whether the 1943 curative statute can apply because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 80.07 
(1943) 
provides 
that 
'[i]n 
case 
the 
supervisors fail to file the order . . . they shall be deemed to 
have decided against [the application to lay out a highway].'"  
Id.     
¶87 The 
majority's 
footnote 
is 
in 
error. 
 
The 
"supervisors" referred to in Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1943) are town 
supervisors who are laying out a highway.  Furthermore, the 
court has declared that "[t]he purpose of [§ 80.07] is to compel 
the supervisors of the town to act upon petitions for the laying 
out of a highway and to avoid a situation where by complete 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
9 
 
inaction an appeal might be defeated[,] . . . not [to] prevent 
the operation of [the curative statute]."10   
¶88 In the present case, Green Lake County, not a town, 
laid out CTH B in 1939, adhering to Wis. Stat. § 80.41 (1939).  
Thus, Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1943), upon which the majority relies 
to find the curative statutes ineffective in the present case, 
is not applicable here.   
¶89 The language in Wis. Stat. § 80.07 (1943) deeming the 
authorities "to have decided against such application" applies 
when resident freeholders submit an application to the town 
under § 80.02 and petition the town supervisors to lay out a 
highway.  Here, the Green Lake County Board laid out Highway B 
on its own initiative.  Accordingly, the curative statute is 
applicable in the present case.   
¶90 A curative statute fosters stability in the law and 
repose of title.  The legislature has determined that a five-
year period provides the appropriate balance for allowing 
aggrieved property owners the ability to challenge defects and 
omissions in governmental action in laying out a highway.  The 
present case exemplifies the reason the legislature has adopted 
five-year 
curative 
statutes to repair procedural missteps 
regarding plats, deeds, orders, resolutions, or proceedings.  
Litigation, such as the present case, that arises 70 years after 
the government acts in laying out a highway disturbs the safety 
of title and the expectations of property owners and government.  
                                                 
10 Zblewski v. Town of New Hope, 242 Wis. 451, 455, 8 
N.W.2d 365 (1943); Jacobosky v. Town of Ahnapee, 244 Wis. 640, 
643, 13 N.W.2d 72 (1944) (citing Zblewski). 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
10 
 
Such disturbances are contrary to the public policy adopted by 
the legislature.   
¶91 Accordingly, I conclude that although there were 
defects, 
irregularities, 
omissions, 
or 
informalities 
in 
Resolution 38, any such defects, irregularities, omissions, or 
informalities were cured upon the expiration of the statutorily 
prescribed five-year period.  CTH B is, in my opinion, a 
recorded and laid out road pursuant to Resolution 38, adopted by 
Green Lake County in 1939.  Any defects, irregularities, 
omissions, or informalities in Resolution 38 have been cured.  
¶92 Having determined that CTH B is a recorded, laid out 
highway pursuant to the County Board of Supervisors of Green 
Lake County's 1939 Resolution No. 38, I still must address the 
central question of this case:  What is the width of the 
highway? 
¶93 Wisconsin Stat. § 80.08 (1939) provides the answer:  
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by section 80.13, 
highways shall be laid out at least three rods wide, and when no 
width is specified in the order the highway shall be four rods 
wide."11  No width for CTH B was specified in Resolution 38.  
Thus, by statute, CTH B is four rods wide.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment in favor of Green Lake County was appropriate.   
¶94 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.  
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
11 See also Wis. Stat. § 80.08 (1943). 
No.  2009AP2315.ssa 
 
1