Title: Zingher v. Dept. of Aging and Disabilities

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

ZINGHER_V_DEPT_OF_AGING_DISAB.94-175; 163 Vt 566; 664 A.2d 256

[Filed 16-Jun-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-175


Robert Zingher                                    Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Human Services Board

Department of Aging and                           March Term, 1995
  Disabilities


Theodore C. Kramer, Chair

Richard J. Whitaker, Vermont Protection & Advocacy, Montpelier, for
plaintiff-appellant 

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Michael O. McShane,
Assistant   Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendant-appellee 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     JOHNSON, J.   Petitioner appeals from a decision of the Human Services
Board, claiming the board erred in concluding that the services provided to
him by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation complied with the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.  701-797, and with a previous order of the
board.  We affirm. 

     Petitioner received a master's degree in business administration in
1987.  He also passed an examination to be certified as a public accountant
but has been unable to obtain employment to fulfill the two-year internship
requirement. Petitioner is a disabled individual, who had been diagnosed with
a learning disability, dysthymia and obsessive-compulsive personality
disorder, hypertension, obesity and noninsulin-dependent diabetes. As a
result of his disabilities, petitioner required five years to complete his
master's degree and twice the usual amount of time to complete the public
accountant exam. 

     Petitioner applied for the services of the Vermont Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation in April 1990.  The division determined that he was
eligible in October 1990 and provided 

  

petitioner with a rehabilitation plan.  Petitioner rejected this plan because
it did not provide remedial services for his learning disability, adaptive
equipment he feels necessary to obtain employment, or sufficient assistance
with job placement.  He appealed to the Human Services Board.  The board
concluded that the plan was inadequate and remanded the case to the division
to amend the plan by (1) accurately describing petitioner's learning
disability and the impact it has on employment; (2) offering services to
remedy limitations caused by the learning disorder; (3) offering placement
services with greater counselor assistance; and (4) assigning a counselor
knowledgeable in learning and emotional disorders.  The board denied
petitioner's request for specific computer equipment, estimated to cost
$40,000, because petitioner failed to show that it was necessary for him to
obtain and retain employment. 

     Following the board's order, the division assigned an experienced
vocational rehabilitation counselor and an accommodation team composed of
experts in computer technology, learning disabilities and accounting.  It
also amended the plan to include an overview of petitioner's learning
disability, personality disorders and medical problems.  The new plan
provided for psychological counselling, neurolinguistic sessions, interview
training, job placement and job follow-up.  Petitioner signed the new plan
with several noted reservations. 

     Between July 1992 and April 1993, petitioner received ten sessions of
neurolinguistic training, ten sessions of psychological counselling, and
forty-five hours of counselling on interview techniques and resume writing. 
In addition, the division hired a computer expert to evaluate petitioner's
need for compensatory hardware and software.  The expert concluded that
computer hardware and software should not be purchased until petitioner
obtained employment because the compensatory equipment would need to be
tailored to the individual job site.  He also recommended training and
practice on the software that petitioner already owns because petitioner
seemed unaware of its capabilities.  Finally, the expert warned against
purchasing additional software, which would require more learning time and
increase petitioner's stress level. 

  

     In February 1993, petitioner began volunteer work as an accountant with
a small business.  At that time, the division paid for a vision exam,
eyeglasses, work clothes and shoes for him.  In early April 1993, the owner
of the business hired petitioner as an accountant and financial manager.  The
division then assigned an experienced vocational evaluator to determine the
compensatory equipment and services necessary for petitioner to retain the
position.  The evaluator determined that petitioner had difficulty with
interpersonal relations; thus, the division provided ten more sessions of
neurolinguistic training. 

     At the end of April, the computer expert met with petitioner, his
employer and the site evaluator to determine petitioner's equipment needs. 
The computer system of the business was at that time inadequate, and the
employer was developing a plan to purchase a new system.  On May 25, 1993,
the expert submitted a report detailing the standard accounting hardware and
software the employer was to provide and recommended that the division
purchase compensatory equipment compatible with the job site and the new
system to be purchased by the employer. Petitioner had some objections to the
report, and a revised report was issued June 16, 1993. 

     The division attempted to set up a meeting with the employer to ensure
that he intended to purchase the computer system compatible with the
compensatory equipment requested. Petitioner objected to the meeting because
he felt that the employer knew nothing about computers.  The meeting was
therefore delayed until July 8, 1993. Thereafter, the compensatory equipment
was ordered; however, the record does not indicate whether the employer
purchased the new computer system or what specific compensatory equipment the
division ordered. 

     On July 22, 1993, petitioner returned to work after a brief absence. 
The compensatory equipment was expected by the end of the week, but
petitioner was dismissed from his position and the order was cancelled.  The
employer indicated that he dismissed petitioner because petitioner's
financial vision was "too high powered for a small business."  He explained
that petitioner wanted to conduct financial analyses that required equipment
too expensive for the 

  

business to purchase and unnecessary for financial success. 

     Petitioner filed a grievance with the board, alleging that the division
had failed to implement the board's first order.  The board dismissed the
grievance as unfounded and petitioner appeals, alleging the board erred by
failing to apply the standard set forth in 29 U.S.C.  701, and by failing
to enforce its previous order. 

                                I. 

     Before reaching the merits of petitioner's claim, we address the
division's argument that res judicata bars relitigating the necessity of
purchasing computer equipment prior to petitioner obtaining a position.  The
division maintains that the board determined in its first order that
petitioner had failed to show that computer equipment was necessary for him
to obtain or retain employment, that petitioner failed to appeal this
conclusion, and that petitioner is therefore precluded from relitigating this
issue. 

     "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a valid and final judgment
in favor of one party bars another action by the other party on the same
claim."  Delozier v. State, 160 Vt. 426, 429,