Title: State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ronan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ronan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5680.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5680 
THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, APPELLANT, v. RONAN, SUPT., 
APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ronan,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5680.] 
Court of appeals’ judgment denying request for attorney fees in public-records 
mandamus case affirmed. 
(No. 2010-0217 — Submitted November 16, 2010 — Decided 
November 24, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-090155. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a request for attorney 
fees in a public-records mandamus case.  Because the court of appeals did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the request, we affirm the judgment. 
Facts 
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{¶ 2} On February 5, 2009, a reporter for appellant, the Cincinnati 
Enquirer, a division of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., requested all 
documents submitted by prospective candidates for the superintendent position of 
the Cincinnati Public Schools.  Applicants for the superintendent position 
submitted materials to a post office box leased by the school district.  The school 
district refused the request at that time because it had not yet checked the post 
office box and would not do so until March 16: 
{¶ 3} “[Cincinnati Public Schools] plans to empty the contents of the 
P.O. Box, if any, on Monday, March 16, the first business day after the 
submission deadline.  A list of the applicants will be prepared and provided to 
[the reporter] and others on that date.  Resumes and other public records will be 
available the next day after they are reviewed for redaction as required by law.” 
{¶ 4} Before March 16, 2009, school district officials had not opened or 
looked inside the post office box, and no school district official or employee was 
aware of the contents of the box. 
{¶ 5} On March 5, 2009, the Enquirer filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Hamilton County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, 
Cincinnati Public Schools Superintendent Mary Ronan, to make the requested 
records available for inspection and copying.  The Enquirer also requested an 
award of attorney fees.  On March 16, 2009, the school district opened the post 
office box, and after redacting confidential information, it provided the redacted 
records to the Enquirer the next day.  Afterward, Ronan submitted an answer in 
which she claimed that the Enquirer’s mandamus claim was rendered moot 
because she had produced the responsive records.  The court of appeals dismissed 
the Enquirer’s complaint, including its request for attorney fees, based on 
mootness. 
{¶ 6} On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals 
dismissing the Enquirer’s mandamus claim based on mootness.  State ex rel. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 
515, ¶ 11.  Nevertheless, “because the court of appeals erred in dismissing the 
Enquirer’s request for attorney fees based on mootness, we reverse[d] that portion 
of the judgment of the court of appeals and remand[ed] the cause for further 
proceedings solely on that request.”  Id. 
{¶ 7} On remand, the court of appeals, quoting Ronan, at ¶ 16 (Lundberg 
Stratton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), denied the Enquirer’s 
request for attorney fees, holding that the school district was not obligated to 
provide copies of the documents until it had used them to carry out the school 
district’s duties and responsibilities.  The court of appeals further held that 
“[e]ven if we had concluded otherwise, any failure to comply was reasonable 
under the circumstances of this case.”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ronan 
(Jan. 27, 2010), Hamilton App. No. C-090155, 3. 
{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court upon the Enquirer’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 9} The Enquirer asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying its 
request for attorney fees because the requested records were public records the 
moment that the school district received them in its post office box, regardless of 
when it opened the box and reviewed the submitted documents.  “In an appeal of 
a judgment granting or denying fees in a public records case, we review whether 
the court abused its discretion.”  State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman (2001), 92 Ohio 
St.3d 312, 314, 750 N.E.2d 156; State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 
2009-Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 15.  “An abuse of discretion means an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable action.”  State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, 
¶ 59. 
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{¶ 10} Under the applicable test, “[a] court may award attorney fees 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43 where (1) a person makes a proper request for public 
records pursuant to R.C. 149.43, (2) the custodian of the public records fails to 
comply with the person’s request, (3) the requesting person files a mandamus 
action pursuant to R.C. 149.43 to obtain copies of the records, and (4) the person 
receives the requested records only after the mandamus action is filed, thereby 
rendering the claim for a writ of mandamus moot.”  State ex rel. Pennington v. 
Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 661 N.E.2d 1049, syllabus; see also State ex 
rel. Laborers Internatl. Union of N. Am. Loc. Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 122 
Ohio St.3d 1234, 2009-Ohio-4090, 913 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 8 (2007 amendment to R.C. 
149.43 does not preclude attorney-fee awards in public-records mandamus cases 
that have been rendered moot by the disclosure of the requested records after the 
mandamus case was filed). 
{¶ 11} We agree with the court of appeals’ decision that the school district 
properly complied with the record request by disclosing the records after it 
retrieved the documents from the post office box.  R.C. 149.011(G) defines 
“records” for purposes of the Public Records Act to include “any document * * * 
received by * * * any public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which 
serves to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, 
operations, or other activities of the office.”  We have construed this definition to 
include “ ‘anything a governmental unit utilizes to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities.’ ”  State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 
39, 550 N.E.2d 464, quoting State ex rel. Jacobs v. Prudhoff (1986), 30 Ohio 
App.3d 89, 92, 30 OBR 187, 506 N.E.2d 927. 
{¶ 12} In State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Whitmore (1998), 
83 Ohio St.3d 61, 697 N.E.2d 640, a newspaper sought a writ of mandamus to 
compel a common pleas court judge to allow access to unsolicited letters she had 
received from members of the public who were attempting to influence her 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
sentencing decision in a criminal case.  We denied the writ because the letters 
were not records for purposes of the Public Records Act.  In so holding, we 
reasoned: 
{¶ 13} “Just as R.C. 149.43(A)(1) ‘does not define a “public record” as 
any piece of paper on which a public officer writes something,’ State ex rel. 
Steffen v. Kraft (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 439, 440, 619 N.E.2d 688, 689, R.C. 149.43 
and 149.011(G) do not define ‘public record’ as any piece of paper received by a 
public office that might be used by that office.  Cf. Tax Analysts v. United States 
Dept. of Justice (C.A.D.C.1988), 845 F.2d 1060, 1068 (‘Of course, agency 
possession and power to disseminate a document are still insufficient by 
themselves to make it an “agency record.”  * * * Agencies must use or rely on the 
document to perform agency business, and integrate it into their files, before it 
may be deemed an “agency record” ’).  A contrary conclusion would lead to the 
absurd result that any document received by a public office and retained by that 
office would be subject to R.C. 149.43 regardless of whether the public office 
ever used it to perform a public function.  The plain language of R.C. 149.011(G), 
which requires more than mere receipt and possession of a document in order for 
it to be a record for purposes of R.C. 149.43, prohibits this result.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id. at 64. 
{¶ 14} In Whitmore, the judge reviewed the letters when she reviewed the 
presentence investigation report, but she did not rely on the letters in making her 
sentencing decision.  Id. at 61-62.  We held that the letters were not records for 
purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43, because the judge had not relied on 
them.  Id. at 63. 
{¶ 15} Based on Whitmore, the mere receipt by the school district of 
resumes and other materials sent by applicants for the superintendent position did 
not make these documents records for purposes of R.C. 149.43.  Although the 
Enquirer attempts to distinguish our holding in Whitmore based on the unsolicited 
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nature of the letters at issue there as opposed to the information solicited by the 
school district in this case, we do not find this distinction dispositive.  Instead, the 
dispositive fact is that “R.C. 149.011(G) * * * requires more than mere receipt 
and possession of a document in order for it to be a record for purposes of R.C. 
149.43.”  Whitmore at 64.  The Enquirer’s reliance on our decision in Kish v. 
Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, to take a narrower 
view of Whitmore is misplaced.  In Kish, we expressly held that Whitmore was 
distinguishable because there was no question that the documents submitted to the 
city’s Plans and Permit Division were relied upon, since they were used to 
calculate the tally and make decisions about the use of compensatory time.  Kish 
at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 16} Therefore, until the school district retrieved the documents from its 
post office box and reviewed them or otherwise used or relied on them, they were 
not records subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43 and the Enquirer was not 
entitled to them.  When the school district opened the post office box and used the 
documents, the documents became records subject to disclosure under R.C. 
149.43, and the school district promptly made them available for inspection and 
copying at that time. 
{¶ 17} Moreover, even were we to now agree with the Enquirer’s claim 
that it was entitled to the documents once they were delivered to the school 
district’s post office box and before they were actually retrieved and used by the 
school district in its job-selection process, the Enquirer would not be entitled to an 
award of attorney fees.  The school district’s position that it could withhold the 
documents until it picked them up from the post office box and reviewed them 
was reasonable based on our decision in Whitmore, even though some facts 
differed.  See Doe, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 10, 
37, 39 (reduction in fee award in public-records mandamus case was justified, in 
part by respondent’s reasonable, good-faith actions); see also State ex rel. Toledo 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 
899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 50, quoting State ex rel. Olander v. French (1997), 79 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 170, 680 N.E.2d 962   (“ ‘[c]ourts should not be in the practice of 
punishing parties for taking a rational stance on an unsettled legal issue’ ”).  
Although the public has “an unquestioned interest in the qualifications of 
potential applicants for positions of authority in public employment,” State ex rel. 
Consumer News Servs., Inc. v. Worthington City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 53, that interest does not compel disclosure 
until the public office retrieves and reviews the applications and other documents. 
{¶ 18} Therefore, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the Enquirer’s request for attorney fees, because the Enquirer was not 
entitled to the requested records until they were retrieved and used by the school 
district in their job-selection process.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., and John C. Greiner, for appellant. 
 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Mark J. Stepaniak, and Ryan M. 
Martin, for appellee. 
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