Title: Irwin v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

Irwin v. State1983 WY 11658 P.2d 64Case Number: 5777Case Number: 5777Decided: 02/07/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT IRWIN, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). No. 5777

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Phillip D. 
Koontz, Laramie, 
signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of 
appellant.

Steven F. 
Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen. and Allen C. 
Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., signed the brief and Mr. Johnson appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE,[fn**] and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant-defendant, 
Robert Irwin, shot and killed a dog valued at $200 which was owned by Mark and 
Rhonda Kincaid. Appellant was tried in county court without a jury and was found 
guilty of willfully destroying the property of another valued at less than $500 
in violation of § 6-10-105(a)(i), W.S. 1977.1 The district court affirmed 
appellant's conviction. On appeal to this court, appellant 
contends:

1. That the willful 
destruction of another's property requires proof of an unlawful or evil intent 
which proof is not present in this case;

2. That the requisite 
intent was nullified by appellant's reasonable and honest mistake of fact, i.e. 
that the dog was wild;

3. That the dog was not 
the property of another under Wyoming law, specifically § 11-31-211, W.S. 
1977;2 and

4. That the district 
court erred in not ruling on appellant's motion for submission of the appeal on 
the record and appellant's brief since appellee's brief was not filed 
timely.

[¶2.]     We affirm. 

[¶3.]     The Kincaids and a 
friend went on an outing in the country west of Green 
River on January 1, 1982. On their way home, they allowed their 
three dogs to run along side their truck. At one point the dogs were running 
along the crest of a hill approximately 50 feet from the Kincaids' truck. 
Appellant and a friend were on the other side of the hill approximately 80 yards 
from the dogs. Both groups of people could see the dogs but they could not see 
each other. Appellant watched the dogs for a short time through his rifle scope 
and then shot and killed one of the dogs, a Black Labrador named Pepper. At 
trial, appellant admitted that he intended to kill the dog, but stated he 
thought the dog was wild. He also brought § 11-31-211, supra, to the trial 
court's attention.

SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE

[¶4.]     The first two issues 
raised by appellant challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the element of 
intent.

"`The oft-repeated rule 
by which we test the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal matter is 
that we examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out 
of consideration entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith, 
and we give to the evidence of the prosecution every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn therefrom. Stated another way - it is not 
whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but 
rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State. [Citations.]' Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 
(1979). * * *" Grabill v. State, 
Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 (1980).

We apply this 
same standard when the case is tried to the court. Fitzgerald v. State, 
Wyo., 599 P.2d 572, 573 (1979).

[¶5.]     In Todd v. State, Wyo., 566 P.2d 597 
(1977), we considered whether the word willfully as used in § 6-10-105(a), 
supra, fn. 1, (then § 6-227.1(a), W.S. 1957, Cum. Supp. 1975), is vague and 
ambiguous and includes the necessary element of intent. We there held 
that:

"In criminal law the word 
`willfully' takes its meaning from the context in which it is used or from the 
nature of the criminal act involved, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(4), p. 112. A 
most acceptable and applicable definition of the word `willful' in such statute 
appears in the case of United States v. 
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S. Ct. 223, 225, 78 L.Ed. 
381:

"`The word often denotes 
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from 
accidental. But, when used in a criminal statute, it generally means an act done 
with a bad purpose. * * *'

"A much stronger 
statement appears in the case of Parker 
v. Sutton, 47 Ala. App. 352, 254 So. 2d 425, 431:

"`* * * The connotation 
of the word "willful" as we used it and as it appears almost invariably in legal 
phraseology is one of premeditated wrong, an act done with evil intent or bad 
motive or purpose, unlawful, and without legal justification. * * 
*'

"SeeState v. Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So. 2d 917, 
922, and Levin v. Gallman, 49 A.D.2d 434, 375 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187. Under these authorities we glean and do hold that in 
this statute the word `willfully' as used therein is not vague or ambiguous and 
does include and comprehend an unlawful and evil intent. * * *" Id. at 
599.

[¶6.]     Viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution and giving the evidence every favorable 
inference which may be reasonably drawn therefrom, it is apparent that the trial 
court could have reasonably inferred that appellant acted willfully. The dog was 
owned by Mark Kincaid. It had a shiny coat and did not look like a wild dog. 
Appellant closely observed the dog through his powerful scope. The owners had 
never had any problem with the dog chasing animals and it was not chasing any 
game or livestock when shot. From the foregoing, it was reasonable for the trial 
court to infer that appellant acted willfully, as that term is defined in Todd, supra, when he killed the 
dog.

[¶7.]     These same facts lead 
to the rejection of appellant's second contention, i.e. that he made a 
reasonable and honest mistake of fact that the dog was wild. From the testimony 
that the dog was owned by Mark Kincaid and did not look wild, the trial court 
could find that appellant did not make a reasonable and honest 
mistake.

[¶8.]     There is adequate 
evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt could be drawn by the trial court.

PROPERTY RIGHT IN 
DOG

[¶9.]     At trial appellant 
raised the defense that under § 11-31-211, a dog is not property. Section 
11-31-211 was passed as part of a comprehensive set of statutes authorizing the 
establishment of dog control districts and providing for the licensing of dogs 
and the destruction of unlicensed dogs by the sheriff. Ch. 27, S.L. of Wyoming 1933 (Special Session). That set of 
statutes was codified as §§ 11-31-201 through 11-31-211, W.S. 1977.3

[¶10.]  Had appellant shown that owners of dogs 
residing in unincorporated areas of Sweetwater County, such as the Kincaids, 
were required to license their dogs, § 11-31-211, supra, we may have been 
required to reverse appellant's conviction. However, the record indicates, and 
the trial court found, that there is no requirement that persons living in an 
unincorporated area of SweetwaterCounty are required to license their dogs. 
Therefore, we affirm the holding of the trial court and of the district court 
that the Kincaids' dog was personal property, § 11-31-102, W.S. 1977;4 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals § 6 
(1962).

APPELLANT'S 
MOTION

[¶11.]  Appellant's final contention is that the 
district court erred in not ruling on appellant's motion for submission of the 
case on the record and appellant's brief since appellee had not filed its brief 
timely. Appellant cites Rule 5.11, W.R.A.P.,5 for the proposition that appellee's 
brief should not be considered.

[¶12.]  However, there is no indication in the 
record that the district court did consider appellee's brief or that the matter 
was subject to oral argument. Appellee's brief was a two-page brief without a 
single case citation. The district court did not rule on appellant's motion, and 
appellant does not now ask for any relief. Lacking submission of cogent argument 
and supporting authorities by appellant, we will not further consider the issue. 
Jackson v. State, Wyo., 624 P.2d 751 (1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989, 101 S. Ct. 2327, 68 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1981); Weddle v. State, 
Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 (1980); Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 
(1980); and Todd v. State, 
supra.

[¶13.]  There was sufficient evidence from which 
to infer that appellant acted willfully and not under a mistaken belief of fact 
that the dog was wild. The dog was the property of another. Appellant's 
conviction is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-10-105(a)(i) 
provides:

"(a) Any person who 
willfully injures or destroys, any property of another or public property, is 
guilty of a crime:

"(i) If the cost of 
restoring injured property, or the value of the property if destroyed, is less 
than five hundred dollars ($500.00), a person violating this section may be 
fined up to one hundred dollars ($100.00), imprisoned in county jail up to six 
(6) months, or both."

2 Section 11-31-211 
provides:

"The owner of a dog has 
no property right in an unlicensed dog, nor does he have any right of action 
against any person for the destruction of the dog."

3 Sections 11-31-201 
through 11-31-210 were replaced by § 11-31-301, W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1982, 
which deals with dogs running at large. Ch. 124, § 2, S.L. of Wyoming 
1979.

4 Section 11-31-102 
provides:

"Dogs are personal 
property and the subject of larceny the same as other personal property. The 
value in any criminal prosecution shall be determined as in other cases. 
Evidence of the assessor or collector of taxes as to the amount for which dogs 
are returned is admissible in evidence as tending to show value but is not 
conclusive."

5 Rule 5.11, W.R.A.P., 
provides:

"When the party holding 
the negative has failed to file and serve his brief as is required by these 
rules, and the brief of the party holding the affirmative has been duly filed 
and served within the time required, the party holding the affirmative may 
submit the case, with or without oral argument, and the other party shall not be 
heard. A case may be placed on the term docket at any time for the purpose of 
enforcing this rule. If in any case the party holding the affirmative fails to 
file his brief within the time fixed by law or the rules herein, the case may be 
dismissed on the ground of want of prosecution."