Title: Rose v. D'ALESSANDRO

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

380 So. 2d 419 (1980)
Mary Ann ROSE, Petitioner,
v.
Joseph P. D'ALESSANDRO, Etc., Respondent.
No. 55694.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 17, 1980.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1980.
James R. Long, Fort Myers, for petitioner.
Joseph P. D'Alessandro, State's Atty., Louis S. St. Laurent, Chief Asst. State's Atty., and Radford R. Sturgis, Asst. State's Atty., Fort Myers, for respondent.
ALDERMAN, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Rose v. D'Alessandro, 364 So. 2d 763 (Fla.2d DCA 1978), which conflicts with our recent decision in Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979). The Second District, for public policy reasons, held that complaints or affidavits received by a state attorney in the discharge of his investigatory duties are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act. In Wait, however, we held that chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1975), exempts from public disclosure only those public records that are provided by statutory law to be confidential or which are expressly exempted by general or special law.
The district court in the present case expressed great concern over the critical importance to the public of keeping statements, allegations, charges, complaints, or other products of a state attorney's investigation confidential. We recognize the validity of this concern, but, as we said in Wait, courts may not pass upon the wisdom of legislative determinations.
Since our decision in Wait, the legislature has recognized the necessity for exemptions *420 from the Public Records Act for investigative police reports and has adopted chapter 79-187, Laws of Florida (1979), which amended section 119.07 to add the following pertinent exemptions:
The information that petitioner seeks is subject to the terms and conditions of this statute. Accordingly, the district court's opinion, which conflicts with our decision in Wait, is disapproved, but its action affirming the trial court's judgment is approved.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and BOYD and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., concur in result only.