Title: ESTATE OF DONOVAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13089 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1976 I N T H E M A T T E R O F T H E ESTATE O F E T H A W A N E T A DONOVAN, a l s o known a s Waneta Donovan, E. W. Donovan, and Mrs. Waneta Donovan, Deceased. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Robert Hurly argued, Glasgow, Montana For Respondent: Sherman and Anderson, Conrad, Montana Douglas Anderson argued, Conrad, Montana Submitted: February 4, 1976 Decided : FEB 2 4 1976 r . Suscicc Frank L. '-laswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from an order of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Toole Zounty, t h e Hon. R. D. ?lcPhillips, d i s t r i c t judge, denying aclaim t o jewelry allegedly passing under a w i l l . Appellant i s Viola Riordan, a legatee under t h e w i l l oi .h"lrs. Etha Waneta Donovan, deceased. Respondent i s Bernice ~ a h l Lutz, executrix of the e s t a t e . Mrs. Donovan, a r e s i d e n t of Toole County, died on June 1-2, I973 leaving a w i l l t h a t she personally drafted dated May 29, 1973. Her e s t a t e i s appraised i n excess of $340,000 and passes co numerous f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s under t h e terms of her w i l l . The dispute i n t h i s case revolves around t h e d i s p o s i t i o n or Y r s . 9onovan1s diamond engagement and wedding r i n g set, two diamond dinner r i n g s , a multistone r i n g , a diamond brooch, a s i n g l e diamond e a r r i n g and a gentleman's diamond ring. This jewelry i s valued a t approximately $8,700. M r s . Donovan a l s o possessed costume jewelry appraised a t $100 t h a t passed under her w i l l . Paragraph e i g h t of her w i l l provided: "EIGHTH: I hereby give, devise and bequeath t o Viola Riordan f i v e thousand d o l l a r s ($5,000), m y sewing t a b l e . Zenith Color Television set. t h r e e pieces of white Samsonite luggage, costum;! jewelry, c u t g l a s s vase and p i t c h e r , a l l m y personal e f f e c t s and clothes. I n the s a f e t y deposit box m y s i l v e r d o l l a r s . Also t o s a i d Viola Riordan, I give, devise and bequeath a l l m y r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t i n t h e o i l and gas r o y a l t i e s and mineral i n t e r e s t s which I own on c e r t a i n lands i n Toole and Glacier Counties, Montana. I I (Emphasis added) . Paragraph twelve of t h e w i l l authorizes t h e executrix t o s e l l a l l of the property t h a t was not bequeathed o r devised elsewhere i n t h e w i l l . O n November 16, 1973, the executrix petitioned t h e d i s t r i c t court t o determine t h a t t h e jewelry was not p a r t of t h e "personal e f f e c t s 1 ' described i n paragraph e i g h t and t h a t it should be sold pursuant t o paragraph twelve of t h e w i l l . Implicit i n t h i s p e t i t i o n i s t h e contention t h a t t h e jewelry was not bequeathed under t h e words "costume jewelry". A n order t o show cause why the jewelry should not be sold was issued on November 17, 1973. O n December 4 , 1973, appellant objected t o the proposed s a l e contending t h e jewelry was given t o her by paragraph eight of the w i l l . Then, on December 6 , 1973, the executrix f i l e d a s an exhibit an envelope found i n Mrs. ~ o n o v a n ' s safety deposit box containing t h e diamond gentleman's ring, t h a t appellant contends is one of the pieces of jewelry l e f t t o her. Mrs. Donovan had written a note on t h e envelope s t a t i n g t h a t the r i n g was t o be given t o Brian Lenz, when he reached 21 years of age. The executrix petitioned the court t o determine whether t h i s r i n g should be distributed t o Brian Lenz a s a precatory g i f t . Appellant objected and prayed t h a t t h e g i f t be found void. O n May 13, 1975, the d i s t r i c t court held t h a t the g i f t t o Brian Lenz f a i l e d f o r lack of a delivery which would complete the g i f t . The court a l s o found M r s . Donovan did not intend t o grant appellant the jewelry but instead intended t o dispose of i t by s a l e under paragraph twelve of her w i l l . The court issued an order f o r the s a l e of the jewelry from which t h i s appeal i s taken. The issue f o r review i s whether t h e d i s t r i c t court was correct i n determining t h a t the 7testa.trix- did not intend t o bequeath her jewelry t o appellant. The crux of t h i s case is the uncertainty i n determining what the t e s t a t r i x meant by the words "costume jewelry" and " a l l m y personal effects". Since the w i l l took e f f e c t p r i o r t o the adoption of the Montana Uniform Probate Code, the s t a t u t e s i n e f f e c t a t t h a t time govern the construction of t h i s w i l l . In the Matter of the Estate of Gudmunsen, Mont , - 3 - P. 2d - > 33 %.Rep. 57. Section 91-201, R.C.M. 1947, provided: "A w i l l i s t o be construed according t o the intention of the t e s t a t o r . 9 ~ * *" Section 91-202, R.C.M. 1947, provided: I I Intention t o be ascertained from w i l l . I n cases of uncertainty a r i s i n g upon the face of a w i l l , a s t o the application of any of i t s provisions. the t e s t a t o r f s intention i s t o be-ascertained from * the words of the wil1,taking i n t o view the circum- stances under which it was made. exclusive of h i s o r a l declarations . (Emphasis added. ) Words used i n a.wil-1 a r e t o be taken i n t h e i r ordinary and grammatical sense, unless there i s a c l e a r intention t o give them another meaning. Section 91-208, R.C.M. 1947. The d e f i n i t i o n of costume jewelry, given i n Websterls Third N e w International Dictionary, 1971, p. 515, is: 1 I Jewelry f o r wear with current fashions usu. made of inexpensive materials (as metal, s h e l l s , p l a s t i c s , wood) often s e t with imitation o r semiprecious stones. 11 W e hold t h e jewelry i n question i s not costume jewelry. It i s valued a t approximately $8,700 and fashioned of expensive and precious materials. W e further hold the words "costume jewelry1' were intended t o pass only the $100 worth of costume jewelry t o appellant i n accordance with the d e f i n i t i o n quoted above, and not the more valuable pieces. The maxim "expressio unius e s t exclusio a l t e r i u s " (the expression of one thing implies t h e exclusion of another) further supports t h i s construction. This r u l e of construction has been expressed i n t h i s language i n lack's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1968, p. 692: I I When c e r t a i n persons or things a r e specified i n a law. contract. o r w i l l . an intention t o exclude a l l others 'from i t s 'operation may be inferred. I I The express mention of "costume jewelry1' indicates t h a t Mrs. Donovan did not intend t o include her expensive jewelry i n her bequest t o appellant. The attempted g i f t of the gentleman's r i n g t o Brian Lenz i s a further circumstance supporting t h i s con- s t r u c t i o n . Even chough t h e attempted g i f t dccurred p r i o r ro rhe d r a f t i n g of t h e w i l l , i t nonetheless demonstrates Mrs. Donovan's usage of t h e terms involved. Next w e determine whether t h e jewelry was bequeathed i n t h e phrase " a l l m y personal effects". Appellant contends t h a t t h e phrase i s general i n scope and encompasses t h e jewelry. W e f i n d , however, under t h e doctrine of ejusdem generis, t h a t t h e g e n e r a l i t y of the phrase i n and of i t s e l f d e f e a t s t h i s argument. Ejusdem Generis i s a r u l e of construction. I n Aleksich v. I n d u s t r i a l Acc. Fund, 116 Mont. 127, 139, 151 ~ 4 0 1 6 , t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The doctrine of ejusdem generis i s a well known r u l e of construction t o a i d i n a s c e r t a i n i n g the meaning of s t a t u t e s and other w r i t t e n instruments, the doctrine being t h a t where an enumeration of s p e c i f i c things is followed by some more general word o r phrase, such general phrase i s t o be held t o r e f e r t o things of the same kind a s those enumerated. I I Under t h i s r u l e of construction the meaning of " a l l m y personal e f f e c t s " must be r e s t r i c t e d t o the same c l a s s of goods s p e c i f i c a l l y enumerated i n paragraph e i g h t of t h e w i l l , Anno. 30 ALR3d 797, 841; 80 Am J u r 2d, W i l l s , § § 1136,1255. The phrase r e f e r s only t o i t e m s of costume jewelry and cannot be expanded t o include the t e s t a t r i x ' s more expensive jewelry which i s of a d i f f e r e n t type o r c l a s s . Appellant a s s e r t s t h e bequest of personal e f f e c t s means nothing i f it does not include t h i s jewelry. This contention i s without merit a s t h e typesof personal e f f e c t s r e f e r r e d t o a r e those s p e c i f i c a l l y enumerated i n paragraph e i g h t of t h e w i l l . I n I n r e s i l v e r ' s Estate, 98 Mont. 141, 150, 38 P.2d 277, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "When a w i l l c o n t e s t i s i n s t i t u t e d , t h e contestant assumes t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e p l a i n t i f f i n a c i v i l a c t i o n , and t h e burden rests upon him t o e s t a b l i s h the f a c t s which he a l l e g e s w i l l warrant t h e s e t t i n g a s i d e of the i n t e n t i o n of t h e t e s t a t o r , o r t h e declaration t h a t t h e instrument challenged does not express t h a t i n t e n t i o n , by a preponderance of t h e evidence. 1 1 I f the contestant f a i l s t o meet t h i s burden by producing evidence t o support h i s allegations, the court must r u l e against him even i f h i s opponent has produced no evidence whatsoever. The sole concern of the t r i a l judge a t t h i s point i s the strength o r weakness of the contestant's case. 1 anc croft's Probate Practice, 2d ed. $205, pp. 494,495. Although the i n s t a n t case i s not a w i l l contest i n the s t r i c t sense of the term, it is a c o n f l i c t between the executrix of the w i l l attempting t o carry out i t s provisions and another. A s such t h e same r u l e applies and the burden of proof i s on appellant. A t the d i s t r i c t court l e v e l appellant f a i l e d t o present any expert testimony o r evidence t h a t would support her contention t h a t "costume j ewelryl' includes expensive jewelry with precious stones. N o d i r e c t evidence was offered t o show t h a t Mrs. Donovan intended t o bequeath her jewelry t o appellant. Appellant did not meet her burden of proof and the d i s t r i c t court had no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o r u l e against her. The order of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. f g/ e' J u s t i c e W e Concur: Justices. m