Title: Olinger v. Collins

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

470 So. 2d 1183 (1985)
William F. OLINGER, et al.
v.
William Robert COLLINS, et al.
83-874.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 26, 1985.
*1184 William W. Tally, Scottsboro, for appellants.
William D. Scruggs and Michael L. Brownfield, Fort Payne, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment enjoining the defendants from using certain real property for any use not permitted by the zoning ordinance of the City of Scottsboro. We shall refer to the defendants/appellants, William F. Olinger, Olinger Corporation, and Olinger Auto Sales and Rentals, as "Olinger." The plaintiffs/appellees own property bordering or near to the subject property leased by Olinger.
The trial court's judgment so succinctly states the facts, issues, and resolution of the case that we shall quote from it at length:
The trial court granted the injunction with respect to tract "Y". It was Olinger's use, or increased use, of this tract which prompted the plaintiffs, many of whom live to the south and east of the subject property, to file this action. Olinger appeals from the granting of the injunction in this respect.
Olinger's contentions are, first, that he was using all of the subject property, including tract "Y", in conjunction with his mobile home sales business at the time the 1979 ordinance went into effect; second, that even if he was not actually using tract "Y" for mobile home sales at the time the 1979 ordinance went into effect, the ordinance allows him to use the entire tract for his non-conforming use; and third, that the "dynamic" nature of his use supports a finding that he could use the entire tract.
*1186 Olinger's first contention is answered by the presumption in favor of the trial court's findings where it hears ore tenus evidence without a jury. Board of Zoning Adjustment v. Boykin, 265 Ala. 504, 92 So. 2d 906 (1957). The trial court found that Olinger did not begin using tract "Y" for mobile home sales until after the 1979 ordinance went into effect. This finding is not plainly and palpably wrong. Indeed, the record indicates that Olinger improved tract "Y" and began using it for mobile home sales in or about 1982.
Olinger next contends that section 2.2 of the 1979 ordinance allows the intended use of tract "Y" to bring it within the non-conforming use of the entire parcel. That section reads:
The word "intended" in this general definition section cannot override the general principle regarding non-conforming uses that such a use must be actual, not just intended, at the time the zoning ordinance that prohibits the use goes into effect. Green v. Copeland, 286 Ala. 341, 239 So. 2d 770 (1970). 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 161 (1979). The specific language of the non-conforming use section of the ordinance, quoted by the trial court, is in accordance with this general rule in its prohibition of enlarging, extending, or moving the non-conforming use.
Olinger's final contention, that the dynamic nature of his use requires him to use the entire lot, is aptly addressed in the trial court's judgment. With respect to tract "R", which Olinger was using for mobile home sales at the time the ordinance went into effect, the trial court held that it could not determine "the perimeters of any enlargement." Presumably this is because the actual location of mobile homes fluctuated over time. Tract "Y", however, is physically separated from tract "R" by a three-foot drainage ditch. The trial court found that Olinger has used this physically distinct portion of his leased property for mobile home sales only "since the passage of the current ordinance," which upgraded the zoning classification of the property to prohibit its use for mobile home sales. The record amply supports this finding.
Thus, the trial court properly allowed Olinger to continue using tract "R" to its full extent, because the changes in actual use of that portion of the property could not be determined. The use of the portion of the property south of the ditch (tract "Y") was clearly an enlargement, extension, or moving of the non-conforming use, however, and the trial court correctly enjoined it.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.