Title: Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: May 1, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
PATRICIA R. LOWE,
individually and on behalf of
all similarly-situated persons,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.;
RJ REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION;
LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY;
AND LIGGETT GROUP INC.,
foreign corporations,
Respondents on Review.
(CC 0111-11895; CA A123025; SC S054378)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 5, 2007.
James S. Coon, of Swanson, Thomas & Coon, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner on review.
William F. Gary, of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick PC, Portland, argued the cause
and filed the brief for respondents on review Philip Morris USA Inc., RJ Reynolds
Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and Lorillard Tobacco
Company.  With him on the brief were Sharon A. Rudnick, Roy Pulvers, of Lindsay, Hart,
Neil & Weigler, LLP, Portland, and Thomas Tongue, of Dunn Carney Allen Higgins &
Tongue LLP, Portland.
Justin M. Thorp, of Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Langslet & Hoffman LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for respondent on review Liggett Group, Inc.
Brian S. Campf, of Brian S. Campf PC, Portland, filed the briefs for amici curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association and American Cancer Society.
P. Arley Harrel, of Williams, Kastner & Gibbs PLCC, Seattle, WA, filed the brief
for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.  With him on the brief was
Hugh F. Young, Jr., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, VA.
James N. Westwood, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae
Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Property Casualty
Insurers Association of America, American Insurance Association, American Chemistry
Council, National Association of Manufacturers, and American Tort Reform Association. 
With him on the brief were Jerome A. Murphy and Natalia R. Medley, of Crowell &
Moring LLP, Washington, DC; Robin S. Conrad and Amar D. Sarwal, of the National
Chamber Litigation Center, Washington, DC; Gregg Dykstra, of the National Association
of Mutual Insurance Companies, Indianapolis, IN; Ann W. Spragens and Robert J. Hurns,
of Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, Des Plaines, IA; Donald D. Evans,
of the American Chemistry Council, Arlington, VA; Jan Amundson and Quentin Riegel,
of the National Association of Manufacturers, Washington, DC; Sherman Joyce, of the
American Tort Reform Association, Washington, DC; Lynda S. Mounts and Kenneth A.
Stoller, of the American Insurance Association, Washington, DC.
Thomas W. Brown, of Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland, filed the brief for
amici curiae Oregon Forest Industries Council and Oregon Restaurant Association.
Janet M. Schroer, of Hoffman, Hart & Wagner, LLP, Portland, filed the brief for
amicus curiae Associated Oregon Industries.
John M. Groen, of Groen, Stephens & Klinge, LLP, Bellevue, WA, filed the brief
for amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.  With him on the brief was Deborah J. La
Fetra, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and
Walters, Justices.**
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are
affirmed.
Walters, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judge. 207
Or App 532, 142 P3d 1079 (2006).
**Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
KISTLER, J.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendants' negligent manufacture
and sale of cigarettes caused her to suffer a "significantly increased risk of developing
lung cancer" and that, as a result, it was "reasonable and necessary" for her to undergo
"[p]eriodic medical screening."  She sought injunctive relief requiring the "creation of a
court-monitored program of medical monitoring, smoking cessation and education" for
her and approximately 400,000 similarly situated Oregonians.  Defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it did not allege a present physical injury
and thus failed to state a claim for negligence.  The trial court agreed and entered
judgment in defendants' favor.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Lowe v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 207 Or App 532, 142 P3d 1079 (2006).  We allowed plaintiff's petition for
review and now affirm the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment.
We take the facts from plaintiff's second amended complaint. (1)  Plaintiff
has smoked more than five "pack years" of cigarettes. (2)  Defendants negligently
manufactured and sold those cigarettes; among other things, they knew or should have
known that their cigarettes "contained toxic and hazardous substances likely to cause lung
cancer."  As a result of defendants' negligence, plaintiff and all similarly situated
Oregonians "have suffered injury in that they have been significantly exposed to proven
hazardous substances in defendants' cigarettes, and suffer significantly increased risk of
developing lung cancer."
The complaint does not allege that plaintiff has suffered any present
physical harm as a result of defendants' conduct.  The complaint alleges only that plaintiff
has suffered a "significantly increased risk of developing lung cancer" in the future.  In
describing the relief that plaintiff seeks, the complaint alleges that the exposure to toxic
substances and the resulting increased risk of lung cancer have made it "reasonable and
necessary" for her to undergo "[p]eriodic medical screening by spiral [Computerized
Tomography (CT) scans]," which provide for"[e]arly detection of lung cancer" and
"substantially increas[e] the probability of successful treatment, enhanced life expectancy,
and cure."  The complaint asked the trial court to certify a class of all Oregonians who
have smoked five pack years of cigarettes.  The complaint also asked the trial court to
"create a court-supervised program [for all class members] to provide medical monitoring
by CT scan and smoking cessation therapy, including public education concerning the
program." (3)
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a
claim.  Defendants argued that plaintiff needed to allege a present physical injury in order
to state a negligence claim and that she had not done so.  Plaintiff responded that a
present physical injury is only necessary in order to recover emotional distress damages. 
In plaintiff's view, she could state a negligence claim, at least for injunctive relief, if some
of the class members would suffer lung cancer in the future.  The trial court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss but gave plaintiff 10 days to decide whether to seek leave
to file a third amended complaint.  Plaintiff elected not to do so, and the court entered
judgment in defendants' favor. (4)  See ORCP 21 A (authorizing that procedure).  The
Court of Appeals affirmed, Lowe, 207 Or App at 534, and we allowed review to consider
whether plaintiff's complaint stated a negligence claim under Oregon law.
Before turning to the parties' arguments, we begin by noting what this case
does not involve.  This is not a case in which plaintiff has alleged that she has suffered
any present physical harm as a result of defendants' negligence and seeks damages for her
fear of developing cancer, for the increased risk of developing cancer that she faces, or
for the costs of medical care to determine the extent of her harm.  In such a case, as
defendants conceded below, a plaintiff could obtain damages for those harms upon proper
proof.  See Zehr v. Haugen, 318 Or 647, 656-57, 871 P2d 1006 (1994) (recognizing that,
when a defendant's negligence causes bodily injury, the plaintiff can recover damages for
past, present, and future medical expenses, bodily injury, and emotional distress). (5) 
Rather, plaintiff alleges only that a significantly increased risk of developing lung cancer
in the future as a result of defendants' negligence makes it reasonable and necessary for
her to undergo periodic medical monitoring.  Accordingly, the question before us is
whether those allegations state a sufficient harm to give rise to a negligence claim.
Over the course of this litigation, plaintiff has characterized the harm that
gives rise to her claim differently.  As the Court of Appeals noted, plaintiff argued before
the trial court that a significantly increased risk of contracting lung cancer in the future is,
by itself, a sufficient harm to state a negligence claim.  On appeal, she focused on an
additional harm.  She contended that, as a result of defendants' negligence, she needs to
undergo periodic medical monitoring for lung cancer and that the economic cost of that
monitoring constitutes a sufficient present harm to give rise to a negligence claim.  We
first consider whether a significantly increased risk of future physical injury is a sufficient
harm to state a negligence claim.  We then turn to whether the economic cost of
undergoing medical monitoring is sufficient.
Not all negligently inflicted harms give rise to a negligence claim.  See
Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Center, 312 Or 17, 22-23, 816 P2d 593
(1991) (psychic injury alone insufficient to state negligence claim except in limited
circumstances); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or 543, 569, 652
P2d 318 (1982) (child's distress caused by negligently inflicted harm to parent insufficient
to state negligence claim).  Rather, a plaintiff must suffer harm "to an interest of a kind
that the law protects against negligent invasion."  Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or 484, 490,
760 P2d 867 (1988).
Oregon law has long recognized that the fact that a defendant's negligence
poses a threat of future physical harm is not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute an
actionable injury.  As this court has explained, "the threat of future harm, by itself, is
insufficient as an allegation of damage in the context of a negligence claim."  Zehr, 318
Or at 656; see also Bollam v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 302 Or 343, 347, 730 P2d 542
(1986) (holding that "'[t]he threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough'")
(quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts 165 (5th ed 1984)).  As Prosser
explains,
"Since the action for negligence developed chiefly out of the old form of
action on the case, it retained the rule of that action, that proof of damage
was an essential part of the plaintiff's case.  Nominal damages, to vindicate
a technical right, cannot be recovered in a negligence action, where no
actual loss has occurred.  The threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not
enough.  Negligent conduct in itself is not such an interference with the
interests of the world at large that there is any right to complain of it, or to
be free from it, except in the case of some individual whose interests have
suffered."
Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 165 (footnotes omitted).  Accordingly, a plaintiff's
cause of action does not accrue, and the statute of limitations on that cause of action does
not begin to run, until the plaintiff has suffered an "'actual loss.'"  Bollam, 302 Or at 347
(quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 165).
The question of when negligent exposure to toxic substances causes a
sufficient harm to give rise to a negligence claim can present complex issues of science
and law.  Cf. Doe v. American Red Cross, 322 Or 502, 512, 910 P2d 364 (1996) (stating
that a person negligently infected through a blood transfusion with the human
immunodeficiency virus had suffered a harm that would give rise to a negligence claim). 
The specific allegations in the case before us do not require us to explore the outer
reaches of those issues, however.  Plaintiff has not alleged that her exposure to
defendants' products has resulted in any present physical effect, much less any present
physical harm.  Nor has she alleged that any future physical harm to her is certain to
follow as a result of that exposure.  Rather, she has alleged only that her exposure to
defendants' products has significantly increased the risk that she will contract lung cancer
sometime in the future.  It is sufficient for the purposes of this case to hold only that,
under Zehr and Bollam, the threat of future physical harm that plaintiff has alleged is not
sufficient to give rise to a negligence claim.
Plaintiff argues, however, that two of this court's cases have recognized that
an increased risk of harm is sufficient to state a negligence claim.  She relies initially on a
statement from Norwest.  In that case, a child brought an action to recover emotional
distress damages against a physician and hospital whose negligence had permanently
disabled his mother.  293 Or at 545.  The child's claim faced two potential hurdles.  First,
the only harm that the child experienced as a result of the defendants' negligence was
emotional distress.  Id. at 558.  Second, the distress that the child asserted "ar[ose] solely
as a consequence of a [physical] injury to another person."  Id. at 559.  The court
concluded that the fact that the child sought to recover only for emotional distress
"[a]rguably" did not bar his negligence action, id. at 559, but held that the second hurdle -- that the child's distress arose solely as a consequence of a physical injury to another
person -- did bar his claim, id. at 569. (6)
In discussing the first issue, the court explained that it had permitted
recovery for psychic injury alone either for certain intentional torts or when the
defendant's negligence "infringed some legally protected interest apart from causing the
claimed distress."  Id. at 558-59.  The court observed, however, that it "[h]ad not yet extended liability for ordinary negligence to solely psychic or emotional injury not
accompanying any actual or threatened physical harm or any injury to another legally
protected interest."  Id. at 559 (emphasis added).  Relying on the emphasized part of the
last sentence, plaintiff argues that "threatened physical harm," such as a risk of
developing cancer, can constitute a cognizable injury in a negligence case.
Plaintiff reads that statement for more than it is worth.  The plaintiff in
Norwest did not seek to recover emotional distress damages for any actual or threatened
physical injury to himself.  The negative implication of the sentence on which plaintiff
relies at most held open the possibility that a threat of imminent physical harm -- a
negligently driven car, for instance, that swerves off the road and narrowly misses a
bystander -- might give a bystander who suffers only psychic injury as a result an
actionable claim for negligence.  We need not decide how the statement in Norwest
relates to this court's later decision in Hammond in order to conclude that the statement
provides no support for plaintiff's position in this case.  Plaintiff's claim does not involve
a threat of an imminent physical harm.  Rather, plaintiff alleges only that defendants'
negligence may or may not give rise to physical harm at some indefinite point in the
future.  Norwest provides no assistance to plaintiff.
Plaintiff also relies on a statement from Joshi v. Providence Health System,
342 Or 152, 149 P3d 1164 (2006).  Her reliance on that case is misplaced as well.  The
issue in Joshi was whether evidence that the defendant's negligence had reduced a
patient's chance of survival by 30 percent was sufficient to prove that the defendant's
negligence had caused the patient's death.  See 342 Or at 156-57 (stating issues).  There
was no question in Joshi that the patient had suffered a physical injury:  The patient had
died.  The only question was whether the evidence was sufficient, for the purposes of the
wrongful death act, to permit a jury to find the necessary causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the patient's death.  Interpreting the word "cause" in the
wrongful death act, the court held that the evidence was not sufficient.  Id. at 164.  The
court held out the possibility, however, that "deprivation of a 30 percent chance of
survival may constitute an injury" outside the context of the wrongful death statute.  Id. 
Considered in context, the court's statement left open the question whether "deprivation
of a 30 percent chance of survival" would be sufficient proof of causation if the plaintiff
suffered an injury that did not lead to death.  That statement goes to the causal connection
necessary to prove negligence, not the type of injury necessary to state a negligence claim.
Our precedents establish that the threat of future harm that plaintiff has
alleged is not sufficient to give rise to a negligence claim.  The question that remains is
whether the other harm that plaintiff has identified -- having to undergo periodic medical
monitoring -- is sufficient.  On that question, plaintiff notes that she alleged that medical
monitoring is reasonable and necessary, and she contends that it is "perfectly reasonable
to infer that such monitoring has a cost."  We agree that the inference concerning cost is a
reasonable one and turn to the question whether the cost of medical monitoring is a
sufficient injury to state a negligence claim.
This court repeatedly has recognized that "'[o]ne ordinarily is not liable for
negligently causing a stranger's purely economic loss without injuring his person or
property.'"  Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or 329, 341, 83 P3d
322 (2004) (quoting Hale v. Groce, 304 Or 281, 284, 744 P2d 1289 (1987)).  Instead,
"liability for purely economic harm 'must be predicated on some duty of the negligent
actor to the injured party beyond the common law duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent foreseeable harm.'"  Id. (quoting Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson, 315
Or 149, 159, 843 P2d 890 (1992)).  Plaintiff has not alleged an injury to her person or
property, nor has she identified any duty that defendant owes her beyond the common-law
duty to exercise reasonable care.  Under Oregon Steel Mills and a long line of this court's
cases, the present economic harm that defendants' actions allegedly have caused -- the
cost of medical monitoring -- is not sufficient to give rise to a negligence claim. (7)
Plaintiff's argument, as we understand it, reduces to a claim that we should
modify existing negligence law to require defendants to bear the cost of medical monitoring.  On that point, the court has explained:
"This court generally will reconsider common-law doctrines in three
situations:  (1) when an earlier case was 'inadequately considered or wrong
when it was decided'; (2) when statutes or regulations have altered an
'essential legal element assumed in the earlier case'; or (3) when the earlier
rule was based on specific facts that have changed."
Juarez v. Windsor Rock Products, Inc., 341 Or 160, 168, 144 P3d 211 (2006) (quoting
G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54, 59, 757 P2d 1347 (1988)).  Plaintiff
does not argue that any of those three situations applies here.  Instead, she notes that
courts from other jurisdictions have divided over this question, and she urges us to adopt
the reasoning of the decisions allowing actions for medical monitoring. (8)
We have reviewed the decisions favoring plaintiff's position, as well as
those favoring defendants'.  The decisions from other jurisdictions are divided, and there
are well-reasoned arguments on both sides of the issue.  Compare Hansen v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co., 858 P2d 970 (Utah 1993); Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 6
Cal 4th 965, 863 P2d 795 (1993); Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 NJ 557, 525 A2d 287
(1987) (all recognizing medical monitoring claims), with Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 473
Mich 63, 701 NW2d 684 (2005); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratoriess., 82 SW3d 849
(Ky 2002); Metro-North Commuter Railroad v. Buckley, 521 US 424, 117 S Ct 2113, 138
L Ed 2d 560 (1997) (all rejecting medical monitoring claims; the last case rejecting a
medical monitoring claim seeking damages rather than injunctive relief).  We need not
decide which line of decisions we might find more persuasive if this were a case of first
impression.  Our precedents control this issue, and the differing decisions from the other
jurisdictions do not provide a basis for overruling Oregon's well-established negligence
requirements.  See G.L., 306 Or at 58-59 (declining to modify common-law precedent).
Following our precedents, we hold that negligent conduct that results only
in a significantly increased risk of future injury that requires medical monitoring does not
give rise to a claim for negligence.  The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a negligence claim, and the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court
are affirmed.
WALTERS, J., concurring.
The majority concludes, and I agree, that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a
claim for relief because plaintiff does not allege that she has suffered present physical
harm.  I write separately only to call attention to the fine point that the majority has
drawn.
First, the majority does not reject medical monitoring as a remedy in a
negligence action, and Oregon law may well permit it.  As the court illustrated in Friends
for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft, 746 F2d 816, 825 (DC Cir 1984), current tort
principles permit diagnostic testing:
"Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding
through a red light.  Jones lands on his head with some force. 
Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital where doctors recommend
that he undergo a battery of tests to determine whether he has suffered any
internal head injuries.  The tests prove negative, but Jones sued Smith solely
for what turns out to be the substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations."
Medical monitoring is simply a continuing series of diagnostic tests used to determine the
extent of the injury and the appropriateness of treatment. (9)  In Oregon, a plaintiff in a
negligence action may recover the costs of diagnostic testing, see Zehr v. Haugen, 318 Or
647, 656-57, 871 P2d 1006 (1994) (recognizing that, when a defendant's negligence
causes bodily injury, the plaintiff can recover damages for past, present, and future
medical expenses, bodily injury, and emotional distress), and there is no reason that such
a plaintiff could not also recover medical monitoring costs.   
Second, the majority does not define the term "present physical harm," nor
does it conclude that, to allege "present physical harm" and maintain a claim for medical
monitoring, a plaintiff must necessarily allege that the harm has resulted in manifest
symptoms.  In my view, a plaintiff who alleges that he or she has experienced a physical
impact or harmful physical effect has alleged sufficient present physical harm to permit
the filing of an action and recovery of medical costs, including medical monitoring costs. 
For example, a plaintiff who alleges a blow to the head has alleged present physical harm
and may bring a negligence action even though the plaintiff may not allege immediate
symptoms beyond the pain of the impact.  Plaintiffs who suffer similar impacts should
also be entitled to recover not only the expenses of immediate treatment, if any, but also
the costs of medical monitoring tests to determine the extent of the injury and whether it
is subject to treatment.  See Friends for All Children, 746 F2d at 825 (plaintiffs suffered
explosive decompression in airplane crash and had risk of Minimal Brain
Dysfunction); (10)  Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or 402, 412, 517 P2d 675
(1973) (plaintiff injured when cash register fell on her head entitled to damages, including
damages for future susceptibility to meningitis).   
Similarly, if a foreign substance that creates a risk of future harm is injected
into a plaintiff's body and causes detectable physical effects, that plaintiff also suffers
present physical harm, even if he or she does not suffer any immediate symptoms of harm
whatsoever.  See Doe v. American Red Cross, 322 Or 502, 506, 515, 910 P2d 364 (1996)
(court implicitly assumed that decedent negligently given HIV-infected blood had
suffered present physical injury and could have brought negligence action as of date he
tested positive for HIV, even though there was no indication that he suffered medical
symptoms of harm at that time); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F2d 79, 81, 83, 88
(3d Cir 1986) (jury found physical injury when plaintiff exposed to asbestos had
developed pleural thickening, even though plaintiff had no asthma or wheezing and was
under no medical treatment; court concluded that jury should have been permitted to
consider whether plaintiff was entitled to medical monitoring damages for risk of
developing cancer).
In many, if not most, of the cases in which courts have permitted negligence
actions to recover the costs of medical monitoring, the plaintiffs have alleged physical
impacts or effects such as those described in Friends for All Children, Feist, Doe, and
Herber.  See, e.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P2d 970, 973 (Utah 1993)
(plaintiffs experienced coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, chest tightness,
headaches, and severe eye irritation as a result of their exposure); Mauro v. Raymark
Industries, Inc., 116 NJ 126, 129-30, 561 A2d 257, 258-59 (1989) (plaintiff diagnosed
with pleural asbestosis); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 NJ 557, 589, 525 A2d 287,
303 (1987) (exposure to chemical caused adverse effects on genetic material within
plaintiffs' cells); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F2d 315, 317, 319, clarified
and recons den en banc, 797 F2d 256 (5th Cir 1986) (plaintiff accidentally drenched by
cancer-causing chemicals suffered dizziness, leg cramps, and persistent stinging sensation
in extremities).
The existence of a period of time between the initial impacts or effects and
the later appearance of symptoms or disease does not alone present a legal impediment to
recognizing a plaintiff's negligence claim for medical monitoring costs. (11)  Tests can
enable physicians to identify the point at which medical treatment would limit a plaintiff's
injuries, preserve life, and reduce the amount of damages a defendant could be required to
pay.  Thus, those tests would benefit all parties in appropriate circumstances.  See, e.g.,
Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber, and Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring:  The Right
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo L Rev 349, 352 (2005) (suggesting circumstances in
which medical monitoring is appropriate, including when benefits of medical monitoring
outweigh risks created by the diagnostic tests themselves).
The scientific and legal challenges that lie ahead may be difficult to address
within our current tort framework.  One particularly tricky problem is the statute of
limitations.  There is a tendency to treat the first date that determines when a plaintiff
must sue as the first date a plaintiff may sue.  If we permit a plaintiff to sue for medical
monitoring costs long before disease becomes manifest, has the plaintiff who waits to
bring an action until the disease is apparent waited too long?  The purpose of a statute of
limitations is to prevent stale claims by defining the last date upon which a case may be
brought.  See Rennie v. Pozzi, 294 Or 334, 342, 656 P2d 934 (1982) ("Those policies
[underlying statutes of limitation] are generally stated to be to prevent the presentation of
stale and vex[at]ious claims, to discourage the assertion of fraudulent ones, and to end the
possibility of litigation after a reasonable time.").  Therefore, cases that address when a
claim accrues for statute of limitations purposes are not necessarily useful in deciding
whether a plaintiff should be permitted to bring suit at an earlier date.  In a negligence
action in which the question is the earliest date upon which a plaintiff may seek relief, we
face considerations that are distinct from those that are presented when the question is
whether a claim has become too stale.  Nevertheless, how to accommodate and correctly
address both concerns is puzzling.  The statute of limitations is only one of many unique
issues presented by the "emerging complexities of industrialized society and the
consequent implications for human health."  Ayers, 106 NJ at 556.  We cannot expect that
the degree of care used in dispersing or disposing of hazardous chemicals will always be
reasonable.  In the absence of legislative guidance, we will undoubtedly be called upon to
consider how to address claims that negligence in the use of dangerous substances has
caused harm that only scientific or medical testing can disclose.
Damage, or harm, is an essential element of a negligence claim.  See W.
Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 30, at 165 (5th ed 1984) (cause of action for negligence requires
showing of resulting actual loss or damage).  A person who acts negligently without
causing damage to another does not so "interfere[] with the interests of the world at large
that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free from it."  Id.  When science and
medicine are able to identify harm before it becomes manifest, and to do so with
sufficient certainty, our precedents do not foreclose an action in negligence or the remedy
of medical monitoring.
1. In reviewing a ruling allowing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, an
appellate court assumes that all well-pleaded facts are true and gives the party opposing
the motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. 
See Caba v. Barker, 341 Or 534, 536, 145 P3d 174 (2006) (stating standard of review).  
2. Although the complaint does not define the term "pack year," one court has
explained that "pack year" refers to smoking the equivalent of one pack of cigarettes each
day for one year.  See Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F3d 127, 137 n 7 (3d Cir
1998) (explaining concept).
3. According to the complaint, the class includes approximately 400,000 members,
and the "monetary value of the benefits sought by plaintiff and class members totals no
more than $74,000 per person," or approximately $29.6 billion for the class.
4. Because the trial court ruled that plaintiff's allegations failed to state a claim for
which relief may be granted, it did not decide whether to certify a class.
5. We note that this case differs from cases such as Friends for All Children v.
Lockheed Aircraft, 746 F2d 816, 825 (DC Cir 1984), where the court allowed a medical
monitoring claim when children suffered "explosive decompression" and oxygen
deprivation during an airplane crash but manifested no apparent physical injury.  As we
understand the court's decision, it held that the oxygen deprivation and the decompression
were sufficient harms to give rise to a negligence claim for medical treatment to
determine whether those harms had resulted in brain damage.  Id. at 825-26.  In this case,
plaintiff has not alleged that she suffered any comparable present physical effects as a
result of smoking defendants' products that would require us to decide whether those
effects were sufficient to give rise to a medical monitoring claim.
6. The court recognized that, because the defendants' negligence arguably "infringed
some legally protected interest apart from causing the claimed distress," the fact that the
child suffered only emotional distress as a result of his mother's injury did not provide a
clear basis for saying that he could not state a negligence claim against the defendants. 
Norwest, 293 Or at 559.  The court accordingly focused on the other hurdle that the
child's claim faced, viz., he sought to recover for harm caused solely as a consequence of
an injury to another person. 
7. Plaintiff argues that the rule in Oregon Steel Mills should not apply to this case
because she was a direct, not a third party, victim of defendants' negligence.  Plaintiff's
argument is difficult to square with Hale and Oregon Steel Mills.  Both cases held
categorically that purely economic harm is not sufficient to state a negligence claim
without some source of duty outside the common law of negligence.  Oregon Steel Mills,
336 Or at 341; Hale, 304 Or at 284. 
8. The parties and commentators disagree over the exact number of jurisdictions on
each side of the issue.
9. Medical monitoring has been defined as "'a form of surveillance based on
repetitive use of the same test or test group to detect a specified change in the patient
indicating a change in his prognosis or need for treatment or a change in his treatment.'" 
Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber, and Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring:  The Right
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo L Rev 349, 351 (2005) (quoting Myrton F. Beeler &
Robert Sappenfield, Medical Monitoring: What Is It, How Can it Be Improved?, 87 Am J
Clinical Pathology 285, 285 (Myrton F. Beeler et al, eds., 1987)).
10. In Friends for All Children, the court stated that medical monitoring should be
available "even in the absence of physical injury[.]"  746 F2d at 825.  I am not certain
what the court meant by that.  In the hypothetical that that court used, for example, Jones
did strike his head on the pavement, causing what seems evident to be "present physical
injury," even though that injury may not have been permanent.  And the case before the
court involved children who had been in a plane crash; they had been subjected to
explosive decompression and a subsequent crash landing that shattered the plane into four
large pieces, apparently killing roughly half of the people on board.  Id. at 819.  Those
children suffered a physical impact just as serious as that caused by the striking of the
head on the pavement, and I do not understand why they would not be deemed to have
suffered "present physical injury."  Perhaps the court meant, more precisely, that medical
monitoring should be available "even in the absence of permanent injury."
11. Toxic exposure cases present particularly perplexing problems because of the long
latency period that often exists between exposure to a toxin and development of disease. 
"[T]he average latency period[s] for hazardous substances causing occupational cancers
are:  arsenic, 25 years; tar, 20-24 years; radiation, 20-30 years; asbestos, 18 years;
chromates, 15 years."  Allan T. Slagel, Medical Surveillance Damages:  A Solution to the
Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 Ind LJ 849, 852 n 15 (1988) (citing
5B Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia of Personal Injuries and Allied Specialties § 38.46h (3d
ed 1986)).