Title: Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175, 2004-Ohio-723.] 
 
 
CORYELL, APPELLANT, v. BANK ONE TRUST COMPANY N.A., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175, 2004-Ohio-
723.] 
Age discrimination — Employment discharge action — Requirements to 
establish prima facie case of violation of R.C. 4112.14(A) — 
“Substantially younger” as applied to age discrimination in employment 
cases is best determined after considering the particular circumstances 
of each case — Plaintiff may plead a prima facie case of age 
discrimination by pleading a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the party is entitled to relief” — Civ.R. 8(A)(1), applied. 
(No. 2002-1758—Submitted October 21, 2003—Decided March 3, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.  02AP-191, 2002-
Ohio-4443. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Absent direct evidence of age discrimination, in order to establish a prima 
facie case of a violation of R.C. 4112.14(A) in an employment discharge 
action, a plaintiff-employee must demonstrate that he or she (1) was a 
member of the statutorily protected class, (2) was discharged, (3) was 
qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by, or the discharge 
permitted the retention of, a person of substantially younger age.  
(Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. [1991], 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439, 
syllabus, modified and explained.) 
2. The term “substantially younger” as applied to age discrimination in 
employment cases defies an absolute definition and is best determined 
after considering the particular circumstances of each case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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3.  A plaintiff may plead a prima facie case of age discrimination by pleading “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to 
relief.”  (Civ.R. 8[A][1], applied.) 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
I.  Facts and Procedure 
{¶1} 
The facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows.  Bank One 
Trust Company N.A. (“Bank One”) employed James L. Coryell from 1992 until 
the company terminated his employment in 2001.  Coryell, who was 49 years of 
age at that time, was replaced by 42-year-old John Kozak. 
{¶2} 
Coryell sued Bank One for wrongful termination under R.C. 
Chapter 4112.  He claimed that by replacing him with someone substantially 
younger than himself, Bank One illegally discriminated on the basis of age.1  The 
trial court granted Bank One’s Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, reasoning that Coryell failed to set forth a prima facie case of age 
discrimination.  Although Coryell was replaced by a younger employee, the trial 
court held that under Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 
451 N.E.2d 807, a prima facie case can be established only if the plaintiff was 
replaced by an employee outside the class of individuals protected by R.C. 
4112.14(A). 
{¶3} 
Coryell appealed to the Franklin County Court of Appeals.  He 
argued that regardless of class membership, a prima facie case of age 
discrimination may exist if the favored employee is “substantially younger” than 
the protected employee, that he pled direct evidence of age discrimination, and 
                                                          
 
1.  Coryell also alleged age discrimination in that his termination permitted the retention of a 36-
year-old employee.  The trial court, however, determined that although the retained employee was 
outside the protected class, he was not “similarly situated in all respects,” and thus, Coryell failed 
to establish all elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.  Coryell 
January Term, 2004 
3 
that the trial court incorrectly applied a heightened standard by requiring him to 
plead detailed facts that evidenced his employer’s discrimination rather than “a 
short and plain statement of the claim” showing his entitlement to relief.  See 
Civ.R. 8(A). 
{¶4} 
Relying on our holdings in Barker and its progeny, the appellate 
court affirmed based upon Coryell’s failure to plead a prima facie case via direct 
or indirect evidence.  The court reasoned that the complaint fell short of a prima 
facie case because Coryell did not plead that he had been replaced by an 
employee who was outside R.C. 4112.14(A)’s protected class.  The appellate 
court considered the issue of a heightened pleading standard moot because 
insufficient evidence of age discrimination had been pled under either standard.  
This case is now before us as a discretionary appeal. 
II. 
Statutory and Case Law 
{¶5} 
R.C. 4112.02 sets forth unlawful discriminatory practices.  It reads:  
{¶6} 
“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:  
{¶7} 
“(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just 
cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with 
respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any 
matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” 
{¶8} 
R.C. 4112.14(A) prohibits age discrimination in employment, and 
sets forth a protected class as follows: “No employer shall discriminate in any job 
opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged 
forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the 
established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship 
between employer and employee.” 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
did not challenge this aspect of the trial court’s ruling on appeal.  Accordingly, this issue is not 
before us and will not be addressed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶9} 
This court had held that absent direct evidence, to establish a prima 
facie violation of R.C. 4112.14(A) a plaintiff “must demonstrate (1) that he or she 
was a member of the statutorily protected class, (2) that he or she was discharged, 
(3) that he or she was qualified for the position, and (4) that he or she was 
replaced by, or that the discharge permitted the retention of, a person not 
belonging to the protected class.”  Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio 
St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439, syllabus (explaining and modifying paragraph one of 
the syllabus in Barker, 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807).  This test 
is a descendant of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, in which the United States Supreme Court 
promulgated an analytical framework for claims of race discrimination. 2 
{¶10} Federal courts also have adapted the McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
framework to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 (“ADEA”), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, Section 621 et seq., Title 29, 
U.S.Code.  The ADEA, like R.C. 4112.14(A), protects persons aged 40 and older 
from age-based discrimination in employment.  Section 631(a), Title 29, 
U.S.Code. 
{¶11} In O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp. (C.A.4, 1995), 56 
F.3d 542, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 56-year-old plaintiff 
failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because he had been 
replaced by someone who was also within the protected class.  On appeal, a 
unanimous Supreme Court held, “The fact that one person in the protected class 
has lost out to another person in the protected class is * * * irrelevant, so long as 
he has lost out because of his age.” (Emphasis sic.)  O’Connor v. Consol. Coin 
Caterers Corp. (1996), 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433.  
                                                          
 
2.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. set forth evidentiary standards for demonstrating racial 
discrimination violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 
42, U.S.Code. 
January Term, 2004 
5 
Further, in the age-discrimination context, an inference that an employment 
decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion “cannot be drawn from 
the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.  
Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class 
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff 
is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the 
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., 517 U.S. at 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433. 
III. 
Analysis 
{¶12} Primarily, Coryell argues that we should adopt O’Connor’s 
holding and determine that, regardless of class membership, a plaintiff may 
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by demonstrating that the 
favored employee was substantially younger than he.  Further, Coryell asks us to 
address what allegations are necessary to plead a prima facie case of age-based 
employment discrimination. 
{¶13} Bank One counters that we have already twice rejected O’Connor 
in Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272, and 
Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 125, 672 
N.E.2d 145, and that class membership remains a necessary component of a prima 
facie claim.  Alternatively, Bank One argues that an employee is not 
“substantially younger” than another employee absent at least a ten-year 
difference in their ages. 
A. 
Barker’s viability in light of O’Connor 
{¶14} Preliminarily, Bank One errs by asserting that we have already 
rejected O’Connor.  While both Mauzy and Byrnes concerned age discrimination, 
the viability of Barker’s fourth prong was not at issue in either case. 3  
                                                          
 
3.  {¶a}  In Mauzy, we held that a plaintiff who resigned rather than accept mandatory transfer 
may satisfy Barker’s second prong by showing that she was constructively discharged.  75 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Consequently, this case presents our first opportunity to consider whether 
O’Connor’s “substantially younger” test accurately reflects Ohio law. 
{¶15} Although we are not bound to apply federal court interpretation of 
federal statutes to analogous Ohio statutes, we have looked to federal case law 
when considering claims of employment discrimination brought under the Ohio 
Revised Code.  See, e.g., Little Forest Med. Ctr. of Akron v. Ohio Civ. Rights 
Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 610, 575 N.E.2d 1164 (stating, “[T]he 
requisite burdens of proof regarding particular evidentiary issues established by 
the federal courts are relevant in determining whether there exists reliable, 
probative and substantial evidence of discrimination in violation of R.C. Chapter 
4112”).  Accordingly, we remain mindful of O’Connor as we address Coryell’s 
first proposition. 
{¶16} Coryell asserts that Barker’s fourth prong unduly limits the 
protections afforded by R.C. 4112.14(A) by arbitrarily making class membership 
a more relevant concern than age-based animus.  Coryell concedes that he cannot 
satisfy Barker’s prima facie case requirements; however, he argues that this court 
should adopt O’Connor’s reasoning and hold that a prima facie case of age 
discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.14(A) may exist if the protected 
employee is replaced by a substantially younger employee, regardless of class 
membership. 
{¶17} Prima facie tests are mechanisms by which courts may readily 
dispose of cases that cannot sustain a particular cause of action.  “ ‘To say that a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272, paragraph three of the syllabus.  In reaching our conclusion, we 
reiterated the Barker test, yet we noted that the fourth prong “is questionable in light of the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision in O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp. (1996), 517 
U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433.”   Mauzy, 75 Ohio St.3d at 582, 664 N.E.2d 1272, fn. 
2. Nonetheless, because only Barker’s second prong was at issue in Mauzy, we did not further 
discuss O’Connor or Barker’s fourth prong. 
{¶b}  In Byrnes, 77 Ohio St.3d 125, 672 N.E.2d 145, we again iterated the Barker test.  The 
applicability of the fourth prong, however, was again not at issue because the plaintiffs had 
conceded that they could not establish a prima facie case.  Id. at 129, 672 N.E.2d 145. 
January Term, 2004 
7 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case is simply to say that he has produced 
sufficient evidence to present his case to the jury, i.e., he has avoided a directed 
verdict.’ ”  Kohmescher, 61 Ohio St.3d at 505, 575 N.E.2d 439, quoting Rose v. 
Natl. Cash Register Corp. (C.A.6, 1983), 703 F.2d 225, 227.  Further, “there must 
be at least a logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and 
the illegal discrimination for which it establishes a ‘legally mandatory, rebuttable 
presumption.’ ”  O’Connor, 517 U.S. 308 at 311-312, 116 S.Ct. 1307 134 L.Ed.2d 
433, quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 
254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, fn. 7. 
{¶18} A prima facie case standard requiring evidence that an employee’s 
replacement is outside the protected class is logically disconnected from the 
employment discrimination that R.C. 4112.14(A) seeks to prevent.  Essentially, 
R.C. 4112.14(A) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age.  
Barker, 6 Ohio St.3d at 147, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807.  Thus, “the ultimate 
inquiry * * * [is] whether evidence of age discrimination is present in the case.”  
Kohmescher, 61 Ohio St.3d at 504, 575 N.E.2d 439.  Under Barker, a prima facie 
case could be established if the protected employee was age 40 and the favored 
employee was age 39.  Coryell reasonably urges that Barker be modified, as age-
based animus is no more likely under those facts than here, where the protected 
employee is age 49 and the favored employee is age 42.4  Nonetheless, the Barker 
test would permit a claim by the 40-year-old and yet preclude a claim by the 49-
year–old. 
{¶19} To acknowledge that R.C. 4112.14(A) is designed to prohibit age-
based discrimination and then to hold that a claim must fail because although 
discrimination may have occurred, it occurred in favor of a class member thwarts 
                                                          
 
4.  As the Supreme Court stated in O’Connor: “[T]here can be no greater inference of age 
discrimination (as opposed to ‘40 or over’ discrimination) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a 39-
year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.”  (Emphasis sic.)  O’Connor, 517 
U.S. at 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the statute and tacitly condones the offensive conduct that it was intended to 
prevent.  This inconsistency is remedied by replacing Barker’s fourth prong with 
a requirement that the favored employee be substantially younger than the 
protected employee.  A “substantially younger” test serves R.C. 4112.14(A)’s 
purpose because it is logically connected to the discrimination that R.C. 
4112.14(A) seeks to prevent.  See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312-313, 116 S.Ct. 
1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433. 
{¶20} Accordingly, we hold that absent direct evidence of age 
discrimination, in order to establish a prima facie case of a violation of R.C. 
4112.14(A) in an employment discharge action, a plaintiff-employee must 
demonstrate that he or she (1) was a member of the statutorily protected class, (2) 
was discharged, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by, or the 
discharge permitted the retention of, a person of substantially younger age. 
B. 
The “Substantially Younger” Factor 
{¶21} After O’Connor, federal courts have held that various age 
differences are either substantial or insubstantial.5  Most federal circuits, however, 
have not articulated an age difference that is presumptively substantial, but rather 
                                                          
 
5.  See, e.g., Dunaway v. Internatl. Bhd. of Teamsters (C.A.D.C.2002), 310 F.3d 758 (seven-year 
age difference is not substantial without more information); Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
(C.A.1, 1999), 181 F.3d 24, 32 (25-year-old, retained manager was substantially younger than 
furloughed 49-year-old manager); Byrnie v. Cromwell Bd. of Edn. (C.A.2, 2001), 243 F.3d 93 (42-
year-old was substantially younger than 64-year-old); Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. 
(C.A.3, 1999), 190 F.3d 231, 236 (employees who are eight and 16 years younger than plaintiff 
were substantially younger); Cramer v. Intelidata Technologies Corp. (C.A.4, 1998), 168 F.3d 481 
(unpublished disposition) (five-year age difference was not substantial); Barnett v. Dept. of 
Veterans Affairs (C.A.6, 1998), 153 F.3d 338, 341 (age difference between 51-year-old employee 
and employee “around 40” was substantial); Miller v. Borden, Inc. (C.A.7, 1999), 168 F.3d 308 
(age difference between employee “approaching 60” and two employees in their 40s was 
substantial); Keathley v. Ameritech Corp. (C.A.8, 1999), 187 F.3d 915, 923-924 (reasonable 
inference of age-based discrimination existed where salespersons over age 45 were replaced by 
salespersons under age 35); Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp. (C.A.9, 1996), 113 F.3d 912 (age 
difference between 54-year-old and 25-year-old was substantial); Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin 
Hosp. (C.A.10, 2000), 221 F.3d 1160, 1166 (plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case because 
his replacement was “only two years his junior”); Carter v. DecisionOne Corp. (C.A.11, 1997), 
January Term, 2004 
9 
are deciding the issue on a case-by-case basis.6  The variety of these holdings 
underscores the elusiveness of an absolute definition of “substantially younger.” 
{¶22} Like the O’Connor court, we do not define “substantially 
younger.”  We do, however, impart the following caveat.  When considering 
whether a favored employee is substantially younger than a protected employee, 
courts must keep in mind that the purpose of R.C. 4112.14(A) is to prevent 
employment discrimination on the basis of age, and that whether an employee is 
substantially younger is but a single factor in a broader analysis.  The prima facie 
case method “involv[es] the process of elimination, whereby the plaintiff may 
create an inference that an employment decision was more likely than not based 
on illegal discriminatory criteria.”  Mauzy, 75 Ohio St.3d at 584, 664 N.E.2d 
1272.  Courts must not “overlook the ultimate inquiry in age discrimination cases, 
i.e., whether [a] plaintiff was discharged on account of age.”  Kohmescher, 61 
Ohio St.3d at 505, 575 N.E.2d 439. 
{¶23} While an objective standard would arguably lend greater 
predictability and consistency to age discrimination claims, it would fall to the 
same logic that defeats Barker’s class distinction requirement.  In other words, an 
arbitrary distinction between protected and favored employees’ ages goes no 
further toward effectuating R.C. 4112.14(A) than class membership.  The term 
“substantially younger” as applied to age discrimination in employment cases 
defies an absolute definition and is best determined after considering the 
particular circumstances of each case. 
{¶24} While the “substantially younger” factor vests significant 
discretion in the trial court, it is not uncommon for trial courts to exercise such 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
122 F.3d 997 (age difference between 42-year-old and 39-year-old was substantial, citing Carter 
v. Miami [C.A.11, 1989], 870 F.2d 578). 
6.  But, see, Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc. (C.A.7, 1997), 124 F.3d 887, 893, stating, “[W]e 
consider a ten-year difference in ages (between the plaintiff and her replacement) to be 
presumptively ‘substantial’ under O’Connor.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
discretion when confronted with a discrimination claim.  The third Barker prong 
is subjective in that it requires a plaintiff to show that he was qualified for the 
position.  Even whether discharge happened is not quite absolute, as the parties 
may dispute whether the protected employee left of his own volition or was 
forced to leave.  See Mauzy, 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272,  paragraph four 
of the syllabus (“The test for determining whether an employee was 
constructively discharged is whether the employer’s actions made working 
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person under the circumstances would 
have felt compelled to resign”).  Further, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the court must exercise discretion in determining whether the employer 
articulated a nondiscriminatory ground for the discharge.  If so, the court wields 
yet more discretion in determining whether the purpose was a pretext for 
discrimination.  Each of these links in the procedural chain vests significant 
discretion in the trial court to make largely subjective decisions.  Trial courts 
make such decisions by applying the relevant factors in light of statutory 
mandates. 
C. 
Pleading Standard 
{¶25} As to the requisite pleading standard to establish an age 
discrimination case, we adopt the Supreme Court’s holding in Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema, N.A. (2002), 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1.  In 
Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court held that because McDonnell Douglas set forth 
an evidentiary standard rather than a pleading standard, a prima facie case of age 
discrimination may be established by pleading “ ‘a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 8(a)(2).  Ohio’s Civ.R. 8(A)(1) mirrors the federal rules virtually 
verbatim.  Accordingly, we hold that a plaintiff may plead a prima facie case of 
age discrimination by pleading “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the party is entitled to relief.”  Civ.R. 8(A)(1). 
January Term, 2004 
11 
IV. 
Conclusion 
{¶26} In conclusion, a plaintiff may plead a prima facie case of age-based 
employment discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.14(A) by pleading a short 
and plain statement of the claim, which includes an allegation that he was 
replaced by a person substantially younger than himself.  Trial courts are vested 
with the discretion to determine, based on the circumstances of the case, whether 
an employee is substantially younger than a protected employee. 
{¶27} The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting. 
{¶28} For the past 20 years, this court has consistently required an 
employee who is alleging age discrimination in the workplace to demonstrate that 
he or she has been discharged and replaced by, or the discharge permitted the 
retention of, someone outside the “protected class,” i.e., someone under the age of 
forty.  Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 
807, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶29} The General Assembly amended the relevant statute throughout the 
years yet never substantively modified or overruled this interpretation.  Because 
the General Assembly has not felt the need to legislatively overrule what this 
court has historically held, I believe that the law as established in Barker and its 
progeny is a clear indication of Ohio’s public policy.  “[L]egislative inaction in 
the face of longstanding judicial interpretations of [a statute] evidences legislative 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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intent to retain existing law.”  State v. Cichon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 181, 183-
184, 15 O.O.3d 209, 399 N.E.2d 1259.  “In interpreting the meaning of legislative 
language, it is not unimportant that the General Assembly has failed to amend the 
legislation subsequent to a prior interpretation thereof by this court.”  Seeley v. 
Expert, Inc. (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 61, 72, 55 O.O.2d 120, 269 N.E.2d 121. 
{¶30} I believe that if a change is warranted to modify or expand the 
criterion from a person under age 40 to “a person of substantially younger age,” 
then this change should be accomplished by the General Assembly, not the 
judiciary.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Russell A. Kelm, Joanne Weber Detrick and Brian M. Garvine, for 
appellant. 
 
Steven W. Tigges and Bradley T. Ferrell, for appellee. 
 
Frederick M. Gittes and Kathaleen B. Schulte, urging reversal for 
amici curiae American Association of Retired Persons, Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers, Ohio Employment Lawyers Association, and Ohio Civil 
Rights Coalition. 
__________________