Title: Hutch v. State. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

#**ROR PUBLICATION***
Ce

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

oo--~

 

EUGENE JAMES HUTCH, Petitioner-Appellant

vs.

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee

st

No. 25711 :

Nd 62 8

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(s.P.P. NO. 02-1-0052; CR. NO. 96-1076) ~:

  

JUNE 29, 2005

MOON, C.J.) LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY JJ.2
WITH NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND DISSENTING
OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner-Appellant pro s@ Eugene Hutch (Appellant)
appeals from a March 13, 2003 order of the circuit court of the
first circuit (the court) denying his Hawai'i Rules of Penal
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief to
vacate, set aside, or correct judgment or to release Appellant
from custody. We vacate that part of the order relating to
Appellant's “Lockdown” in a special holding facility, and remand
that aspect of the petition to the court for hearing. As to

{the Honorable Milfred K. Watanabe presided.

aan
“POR PUBLICATION***
—_— esses

Appellant’s claim that he was improperly refused access to a
prison guidebook and medically prescribed shoes, we affirm the
court’s denial of @ Rule 40 hearing but remand that part of the

petition for disposition under the civil rules.

 

In the course of Appellant's incarceration at Halawa
correctional Facility, several inmates filed paperwork requesting
approval for Appellant's legal assistance. On April 5, 2002,
prison staff confiscated “unauthorized property” from Appellant’ s
cell that consisted of legal size envelopes with the names of
other inmates Listed on them. These inmates allegedly did not
follow the procedures established by prison staff for requesting
assistance from a fellow innate, Appellant was sentenced to
fourteen days’ lockdown in the Special Holding Unit of the
facility for failure to obtain proper authorization prior to
helping these innates in their legal matters.

on June 10, 2002, Appellant filed the first of a series
of requests to the warden that he be allowed to receive gym shoes
delivered for him on the grounds that the shoes were medically
necessary. In support of his request, Appellant produced a
prison medical staff meno dated May 29, 2002, stating that he may

wear the shoes “for medical reason:

 

on June 24, 2002, Appellant received a letter from
Deborah Bezilla, an administrative assistant at a private law

office, stating that the 2002 edition of the Federal Prison
***FOR PUBLICATION***

a

Guidebook (Federal Prison Guidebook) that had been ordered, paid
for, and sent for delivery to Appellant in prison, had been
returned to the law office because it had been refused delivery
at the address given.

Appellant has filed numerous claims and appeals against
Respondent-Appellee State of Hawai‘ (the State) while
incarcerated.

on July 8, 2002, Appellant filed his Rule 40 petition,*
seeking relief on the grounds of (1) illegal punishment resulting

from (a) the application of a repealed prison rule and (b) an

 

in his Rule 40 petition, Appellant asserted six grounds to support
his claim that he wos “being held unlawfully.” First, he claimed that prion
eee eet Mhsnsered” nis eftorte to pursue e legal’ claim. . . where (the)
sens Eefse (a) ce allow (Appellant) to receive [a copy of the) 2002 Federal
yarden EGfS28 {52 Gna [nedically prescribed) gym shoes.” Second, he argued
reser Gn enough Howali Adsinistrative Rules (HAR) § 17-202-1(b), governing
ENtaI"Steiscance between inmates on legal matters, was repeaied on April 15,
sett Bo prison stsff continues to enforce the rule, Ta support of this
seecad ground, he stated that (1) the warden had approved his assisting
see Teeata, Rus Pesaro, (2) the staff went into his prison cell and

meet tgcates Legal docusente, and (3) Appellant “is now in (the) holding unit.”

HOPE CSaIEa Ground, Appellant maintained that “the above shows
retaliation herein.” As supporting facts for this third ground, he stated
Tete stron ib tene prison staff to enforce rules repealed shows misconduct s
rote on appellant’ s] cocord and [Hewai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §) 706-
[g50) TR (SPEkaw Tappeaiant] will not be considered for parole of continuous
ceeies a behavior ih prison.” Fourth, Appellant argued that the prison
SkSEEEZefanal to allow him to receive the 2002 Federal Prison Guidebook was
ShtGnsticucional because it denied him access to “tl aw," eneredy
chinderting Appellant's] efforts to pursue a legal clasn(

BPelleateen ground, Appellant asserted that even though HAR § 17-
poz-i {b) wes repesied effective April 15, 2000, Appellant wes still punished
Beer Nelpina Inmates [1° He Festated the facts used to support his second
eeinu th Seeater setall, claritying that he “is now in the Special Holding
Fe for ndiping srmates” and that “by being locked-up in the Special Holding
Geet fee BPIRIS? fiom aking classes in the Learning Center” such as parenting
ee ee ee a taR! mestings.© Finally, in his sixth ground, Appellant claimed
EAMES) Stiying nie receipe of the 2002 Federal Prison Guidebook, the prison
thie’lnindgeed [hisl efforts to pursue a legal claim[.]” He restated facts
Seatt cbly mentioned, reiterating hia concern that "what [he] do(es) in
Peleee Ti continue to hinder (his) consideration for (plarole.””
AGLEEESRaiay, 'appetiant requested that the court order the prison staff to
BeSeEoTALD geo’ the Special Holding Unit and to “expunge” ail alleged prison
Leis8Skaaces for helping inmates. try and gain adequate, effective, and
meaningful access tothe courts."

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 
=**FOR PUBLICATION***

ee

unconstitutional restriction against “helping inmates, “?

(2) denial of access to the courts,‘ and (3) retaliatory conduct
on the part of prison staff.’ Appellant requested that the court
(2) order the prison staff to release him from the Special
Holding Unit and (2) expunge all alleged instances of misconduct
for helping inmates “gain adequate, effective, and meaningful
access to the courts.”

on March 13, 2003, the court issued an order denying
the petition. The court determined that “(Appellant’s) claims
are without merit, [are] patently frivolous, and [are] without
support in either the record or evidence submitted by
{Appellant].” The court did not file any findings of fact or
conclusions of law.* Appellant filed a notice of appeal on
March 21, 2003.

on appeal, Appellant challenges the court’s decision as
wallow[ing] the (prison (s]taff to hinder{ his] access to the
courts by denying [him] up-to-date [1]aw [blooks, [glym (s}hoes
required by the (foot (doctor, and us{ing) retaliation against
[him] to enforce . . . HAR § 17-202-1(b)." He also emphasizes

that he “is now in the Special Holding Unit” and reiterates

+ This represents “Ground two" and "Ground five” as stated in
Appellant's Rule 40 petition

 

This consolidates “Ground one,” “Ground four,” and “Ground six” a=
Listed on Appellant's Rule #0 petition.

+ thie de “Ground the

 

of Appellant's Rule 40 petition.

+ sasmuch as there are no recorded findings by the court, the
azgunent by the State that Appellant aid not specificelly challenge’ the
Shirers siaplicit fingings of fact” is without merit

4
***FOR PUBLICATION"**

general arguments on “the right of access to the courts
1.
HREP Rule 40(a) (1) (2002) describes the grounds upon

which relief from judgment may be sought. It states:

(2) From Judgaent. At any time but not prior to fina
judgnent, any person may seek relief under the procedure set
Eoxin in’ this Fale fron the Judgment of conviction, on the
following grounds:

127 FEst"the judgment wae obtained or sentence imposed
in violation of the constitution of the United States or
State of Hawaii:

a} that the court wach rendered the judgment was
without jurisdiction over the person or subject matters

{ali} that the sentence is i1lega2s

(Ey) chat there ie newly discovered evidences or

(3y’ any ground which ie's basis for collateral attack
on the Judsnent.

   

 

HREP Rule 40(a) (2) (2002) outlines the grounds upon which

 

challenges to custody may be made. It state

rom Custody. Any person may seek relief under the
procedure set forth in this rule fron custody based upon &
Josgment of conviction, on the following grounds

Th) “that the sentence was fully served?

 

iL)This pecole er probation was unlawfully revoked:
(10) any other cround making the custadi. thovah oot
‘the indament, llesal-

(Emphasis added.) Additionally, HRPP Rule 40(f) (2002) provides,

in relevant part, as follows:

Hearings. If es e 2 =
Bpaaieitina which say extend onty to the issues raised

Pati etitien or answer, However, the court may deny 2

hearing if the petitioner's claim 9

‘ther evidence sobsitted by the petitioner. The court may
SHEGES Shearing on a specific question of fact when 2
full ond fair evidentiary hearing upon that question was

+ ahe State argues that Appellant's claims concerning alleged

retaliation, Inability te attend various classes, and denial of a pair of
ifSes are not argued in the opening brief and should be deemed waived
AeSeerr ve find’his opening brief to be sufficient and, in Light of our de
ASS ’Heeste, {Se Lnbeer Min] consider nis arguments as made in poth his
Diliate briefs and Rule 40 petition.

   

 

 
*#*FOR PUBLICATION***
held during the course of the proceedings which led to the

Jadgment ce custody which is the subject of the petition or
at any later proceeding.

 

(Emphases added.) Accordingly, a hearing on a Rule 40 petition
is required whenever the allegations in a petition, if taken as
true, (1) would change the verdict rendered or (2) would
establish the illegality of custody following a judgment. HRPP
Rules 40(a) and (f); see Turner v, Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 93
Hawas's 298, 310, 1 P.3d 768, 780 (App. 2000).
mt.

‘The standard of review in determining whether a court
erred in denying a petition for post-conviction relief without a
hearing is de nove. Dan v. State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 427, @79 P.2d
528, 532 (1994). Under de nove review, “the appellate court
steps into the trial court’s position, reviews the same trial
record, and redecides the issue(,]” determining whether the
court’s decision was right or wrong. Id. This court has held
that de nove review is appropriate because a denial of a petition
for post-conviction relief presents a question of law. Id. AS

this court has said,

[als @ general rule, a hearing should be held on a Rule 40
petition for post-conviction Felief where the petition
Febleclain. fo establish a colorable claim,
the allegations of the petition must show that if taken as
true the facts alleged would change the verdict, however, 2
petitioner's conclusions nesd not be regarded a9 tras.
Rhere examination of the record of the trial court
proceedings indicates that the petitioner's allegations show
Fo colorabie claim, it is not error to deny the petition,

 

 

 

Without a hearing. The question on apesa] of ¢ denial of 2
Aude 40 petition without a hearing ie whether the trial
 

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oe
Td. (quoting State vs Allen, 7 Haw. App. 89, 92-93, 744 P.2d 789,
792-93 (1987)) (some emphasis added and some in original).

WW.

AL

Appellant's first argument is two-fold. He argues that

he was illegally punished for (1) violating HAR § 17-202-1(b), @
rule that has been repealed, and (2) for assisting inmates in
gaining meaningful access to the courts. HAR 17-202-1(b) stated
that “{mlutual assistance between innates or wards on legal
matters is permitted on a case by case basis at the facility
administrator's discretion. There is no absolute right of
Inmates to mutual assistance.” The rule was repealed on
April 1, 2000. Appellant contends that the prison staff
(a) applied the rule inasmuch as it confined him in the Special
Holding facility and (2) created an illegal note of misconduct on
his prison record which will adversely impact his future chances
of parole. tn response, the State argues that Appellant cannot
denonstrate that the repealed rule was applied to him, and that
even assuming some evidence that the facility was following the
repealed rule, the rule “in and of itself is not unconstitutional
or illegal because prisons have the authority to regulate mutual
assistance” and “there is no requirement that prisons regulate by
administrative rule.”
2.

‘The United States Supreme Court case, Johnson v. Avery,
***FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
393 U.S. 483 (1969), is supportive of Appellant’s first argunent.

the petitioner in Johnson was transferred to a maximum security
building for violating a prison regulation that prohibited
inmates from advising, assisting, or otherwise contracting to aid
another inmate in legal matters." Id, at 484. He sought relief
from the disciplinary confinement by filing a “motion for law
pooks and a typewriter” in federal district court. Id. The
district court “treated this motion as a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and, after a hearing, ordered [the petitioner]
released from disciplinary confinement and restored to the status
of an ordinary prisoner.” Id. The district court “helé[, in
part,] that the regulation was void because it in effect barred
{literate prisoners from access to federal habeas corpus.” Jd.
the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding “that the regulation did
not unlawfully conflict with the federal right of habeas corpus.”
Id, at 485.

The Supreme Court bégan its opinion by reaffirming the
importance of the writ of habeas corpus, observing that “{s] ince

+ qhe regulation at seve in Johnson provided as follows:

No innate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid
Mother, either with or without a fee, to prepare Writs or
Stheriagel mecters, it as not intended that an innocent
Ban be punished. fhen a nan believes he is unlawfully held
BePOL Bally convicted, he should prepare a brief or state
Gls complaine in letter form and address it to his lawyer or
Bjuase, A formal Writ is not necessary to receive a

   

   

 

hearing. Charges oF untrue complaints may be
punished, cen ave forbidden to set themselves up a
Eractiticners for the purpose of promoting @ business of

Melting Write.

393 u.s. at al

 
 

***POR PUBLICATION

the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully
incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that
their complaints may not be denied or obstructed.” Id. (emphasis

added). Based on this tenet, the Court stated that “[t]here can

 

be no doubt that [a state) could not constitutionally adopt and
enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners
to f1le habeas corpus petitions.” Id, at 487. But, said the
Court, the state regulation at issue “effectively (did) just
that." Id

Accordingly, it was determined that the record
supported the district court’s conclusion “that for ail practical
purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of 4
\jaithouse lawyer," their possibly valid constitutional claims
will never be heard in any court.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The Court observed that

tthe initial burden of presenting a clain to post-conviction
Fellef usually rests upon the indigent prisoner hinself with
Such help 3 he can obtain within the prison walls or the
prison system. In the case of all except those who are able
ES help themselves = usuelly a few old hands or
exceptionally gifted prisoners ~~ she prisoner is, in

auilable.
Id, at 488 (emphasis added).

 

 

 

However, the Supreme Court also recognized that a state

ay Smpose reasonable restrictions and restraints upon the

acknowledged propensity of prisoners to abuse

Gisina and che seeking of eesistance in the preparation of

Spplications for relief: for example, by Limitations on the

Tike and location ef such activities and the dmposition of

punishment for the giving or receipt of consideration in
etyse

 

   
+#*FOR PUBLICATION***

z iP gay not valisiy enforce 2 ceaulee =
bere inesus, barrie inmates fron furnishing such

‘Id. at 490 (emphases added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the
sixth Circuit decision was reversed and the case remanded for

further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 1d.

v.
AL

Pursuant to Johnson, @ prisoner may not be punished for

violating @ regulation or restriction that unreasonably obstructs

the right of access to the courts. Preliminarily, however, it
should be noted that our obligation on this appeal is not to
decide the ultimate question, resolved in Johnson, of whether
Appellant was indeed illegally held in the Special Holding Unit
based upon an unreasonable regulation. Rather, we need only
determine whether Appellant made a showing of a colorable clain,

thereby entitling him to an HRPP Rule 40(f) hearing.”

+ he State contends that the Sixth Circuit in Weaver vs Tooabs, 915
F.zd 1574 (6th Cit. 1990), upheld a “prison regulation almost identical to HAR
[pi ‘viedoc‘t te). Weaver, however, is an unpublished disposition.

il Rtrmoce, 's gutticient description of the prison regulation in that case
ser eMerovided, thereby precluding a determination that it is “identical” to
Che Tegulacion at issue here.

 

% the dissent cites to @ five-to-four decision of the United states
Suprene Court in gandin 4. Connor, 5150.8. 472 (2995) (Ginsburg, J.
Sree cots ined by drevens, Je) (Breyer, J.» dissenting, Joined by Souter,
serene ding and dissenting opinion [nereinafter “Dissenting opinion”) at
Jr) ggSGle "however, concerned procedural due process rights and not the
iranttaly oi ohgbeas relief. the defendant there brought © civil riahte
Barimg against prison officials, clalming, Apter alia, “a deprivation of
ih oot jue process in connection sith (a) discaplinary hesringl,]" $25
Beeeree thes unerein the prison adjustment committee refused his request to
prbcekt Mlehessess ide at 475.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the
ESfenaant was sentenced to "20 days’ disciplinary segregation in’ the Special
Sega alee Tae ar 4)S-76, A masority of five Justices held that being

(continued...)

 

 

 

 

   

10
***ROR PUBLICATION***

a

As stated previously, a Rule 40 hearing should be held
Lf the petitioner states a colorable claim by “show[ing] that if
taken a5 true the facts alleged [in the petition] would” entitle
the petitioner to be released from custody. Dan, 76 Hawai'i at
427, 879 P.2d at $32. See Turner, 93 Hawai't at 310-21, 1 P.3¢
at 780 (holding that a Rule 40 hearing was required where the
appellant “establish[ed] a ‘colorable claim’ that the alleged
prolonged physical custody resulting from denial of his parole
request was illegal”); er v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973) ("(T}he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person
in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the

lease fror

(..continued)
GeeeneT Res “in segregated confinenent did not present the type of atypical,
a eee etse depcivacion in which a {aJtate might conceivably create a liberty
GREETS SEES cc abe, and, therefore, the defendant did not have “2
pistected’ liberty interest that would entitle him to

oeTG! at 487 (emphasis added)

fetes Appeiiant does not claim a procedural due process violation
rather, the question presented in this appeal” is whether Appellant established
Cblorable Aisin that required the court to hold a heering pursvent to HRPP
fale gett) Before ruling cn Appellant's petition. Moreover, this appeal does
Rettraise the question of whether Appellant’s “punishment was an ordinary
[etadene of prison Life,” Olssenting opinion st 7.

RT doureeensday disciplinary segregation punishment may, as the
dissent contends, conseitte “an ordinsry incident of prison life,”

eee cenceition at 1. Sut Appellant's petition raises a more specific

Tess habeas relief, He contends that he was punished by being confined
wetthe Special dolaing Unit for assisting fellow inmates in violation of not

 

 

 
 

duet an crise tulteTs Tegal and constitutionat aspect of Appellant's claim
weeete eb the instruction of Johnson, 2 habeas corpus case, ss opposed to
Sandip, @ civit rights c

Tor, if Appeliant’s allegations are true, the “discipline” imposed
‘upon him would not be tan erdinary incident of prison life” due to its illegal
ween sein onatitutional basis. Ih that connection, Johnson reversed the Sixth
seer oa twersal of a district court decision and ordered that the defendant
Se Sveledecd from disciplinary confinesent and restored to the status of an
Cleinary prisoner.” 399 U.8. at 484. This is the precise relis
Repellant seens here, Thus, with ali due respect, the di
PeeSiosing thee “In]abeas relief does not lie for’ this discipline.”
Biaseneing opinion at 7.

 

 

    

 

n
 

“FOR PUBLICATION***
a
fecal custody.” (Emphasis added.)) In his Rule 40 petition,

Appellant alleged, in relevant part, that the prison was still
enforcing the repealed HAR § 17-202-1(b) and that he was confined
to the Special Holding Unit for assisting other inmates with
legal matters where he had obtained warden permission to do 90.
taking these facts “as true,” Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at
532, Appellant would be entitled to the habeas corpus relief
granted by the district court in Johnson and released from the
Special Holding Unit.
8.
However, as previously mentioned, pursuant to HREP Rule

40(£), “the court may deny a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is

patently frivolous and is without trace of support either in the
Sm 7 sul bs titioner.”
(emphasis added.) Moreover, “[w]here examination of the record

of the trial court proceedings indicates that the petitioner’ s

allegations show no colorable claim, it is not error to deny the

 

petition without @ hearing.” Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 679 P.2d at
532. Thus, we must also consider the record before overturning
the court’s denial of the petition without a hearing.”

In support of his petition, Appellant provided numerous

exhibits, including two “NOTICE[S] OF REPORT OF MISCONDUCT AND

HEARING” and ten “INMATE COMPLAINT/GRIEVANCE” forms. According

 

"He acknowledge the Stete’s concern over additional documents
attached te Appellant's opening brief and observe that our decision rests only
Gpon consiserstion of the official record on appeal without reference to
Rppetlant’s new attachments.

2
***FOR PUBLICATION***
a

to the May 9, 2001 notice, Appellant was found “Guilty” of

 

“Refusing to obey an order of any staff member(,]" by
“assist several inmates Le: tte: nou 1

authorization.” (Emphasis added.) This same notice also
provided that Appellant was issued @ “SANCTION of “14 days

lockdown to be served in Special Holding pending the availability
of space.” According to the June 27, 2002 notice, Appellant was

found “Guilty to all charges” for, inter alia, “failing to follow

 

facility directives regarding mutual assistance|.]" (Emphasis

added.)

Appellant was again issued the “SANCTION” of “14 days
lockdown to be served in special holding pending space
availability.” As for the ten grievance forms submitted, all of
them indicated, under the heading “RESOLUTION,” that the prison
had @ policy of requiring inmates to obtain warden approval

before assisting another inmate with legal matters.” One of the

© several of Appellant's grievances were denied as follows: (1) the
resolution for the April ty 2002 grievance stated, “Inmate assistance must be
ifsrowed( 1" (2) the resolution for the May 31, 2001 grievance stated,
aereeee te ea help other inmates for legal matters will be decided on a case~
crease ResssL.[" 13) she resolution for the July 1, 2001 grievance stated,
DYoG'here sanciioned for a failure to follow rules as you were instructed on
sree reSe  obtdsions on how to seek authorization for mutual assistance(.1”

Ter the resolution for the January 30, 200) grievance stated, “Library staff
We) he Teaig procedures when it aa determined that you had unauthorized
[eSai‘sateriels in your possecsion. During that period of time you were not
1eaebved co provide mutusl assistance, therefore library staff acted in
seespaence with current program rules(,]" and (3) the resolution for the
Novenber 24, 2000 grievance stated,

  

 

 

 

A request for mutual assistance must be specific. In order
to'be considered fer authorization to receive assistance
from enother inmate, simply send a request to the Deputy
Werden’s Office ard indicate the fame of the inmate you wish
Qoraseist you. Please send your written request through

 

(continued)

B
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ten grievance forms further indicated that the prison may have
continued to operate under the repealed HAR Title 17.”

In his February 2, 2001 grievance, Appellant stated
that he submitted several inmate request forms to his counselor,
David Voyles, to give to the warden for approval to help several
inmates and that those requests were ignored. The “RESOLUTION”
in this grievance stated that the warden never received the
requests. The Ninth Circuit has determined that a state did not
satisfy its burden of demonstrating meaningful access where the
record indicated that requests for Library access were “lost or
ignored” or arbitrarily denied. Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504,
1508 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is the state's burden to provide
meaningful access and to demonstrate that its chosen method is
adequate.)

Appellant also submitted a “FOUND PROPERTY REPORT,”

documenting that envelopes addressed to other inmates, including

 

(conte)
Teguiar channels. fe advised thet mutual assistance is not
S'Fight ond will be reviewed on a case by case basis:

© ie do not agree with the State's assertion that the “grievances
appellant filed are illegible, so it cannot be determined if they concern the
‘peeled prison rejulation.” In hie August 1£, 2001 grievance, Appellant
Jepibly challenged HAR Title 17 as "no Longer in effect since April 2000" and
replaced by a nem titie, Title 23. Tt wae decided, however, that the
SRliministeation has not’ received a finalized version of Titie 23 and has been
told it is still in Graft. the rules from Title 17 were incorporated into,
Separtnencal policy. They are in effect both on your module guidelines. and
were posted in the quads.”

lie also cannot accept the State's contention that “[blecause he
attached copies of the grievances Defore the prison aduinistration submitted
ES PeSponse to then, Appellant's accusations therein have not been confirmed
and Cannot be taken ds fact." The grievances in the record show typewritten
S83 Signed responses by verious prison officials, including the warden, under
the heading “RESOLUTION.”

 

 

 

 

 

4
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one Aua Pedro, were confiscated from Appellant’ s cell during a
srandom shakedown” on April 5, 2002. According to @ “HCE
[(Halawa Correctional Facility)) INMATE REQUEST FORM,” Aua
pedro’s request that Appellant be allowed to help him with legal
matters was approved by prison staff on June 22, 2001, In the
exhibit entitled “RESULTS FOR ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE HEARING FOR
INUATE EUGENE HUTCH[,]” the committee sanctioned Appellant to
fourteen days’ segregation in the Special Holding Unit for being
in possession of and making copies of legal documents for other
inmates as follows:

the conaittes wants to make it very clear to the subject

Thache is got being charged with assist
esas cette ies ares a

Este cupject’s responsibility to make these copies

‘oeumente of other inmates for
‘Gocunenes fo tne courts: rt is
the Fesponsibitity of snmate Genare Gualdarana. The Subject
Shtuld baty be aagisting in Legel issues by discussion end
Correspondence with the innate.

  

(some emphases added and some in original.) From what we can
glean, HAR § 17-202-1(b) aside, this is the most specific
description of the mutual assistance policy being enforced
against Appellant.

‘The State has not provided the rules or policy by which
the prison decides whether to authorize mutual assistance between
inmates, but continues to assert that in sanctioning Appellant,
the prison did not implement the repealed HAR § 17-202-1(b)."*

the State maintaing that the prison need not operate by
acninistretive rules and that “[e]ven 1 section 17-202-1(b) was mistakenly
BSUS fhe basic of Appellant’ s misconduct, @ clericel mistake does not take
(continued)

1s
***BOR PUBLICATION***
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However, the reason given in the aforementioned adjustment

committee report for sending Appellant to the Special Holding

unit is cause for concern. The scope of the prison’s statement

that Appellant “should only be assisting in legal issues by
scussion an S01 with the inmate” is questionable.

(some emphasis added and sone in original.) Prohibiting the
“jailhouse lawyer” from “possessing” the legal documents of the
inmate he has been authorized to “assist,” means that the innate
must be able to read and convey what is written in the papers to
the “jailhouse lawyer” in order to obtain assistance. If the
statenent in the adjustment committee report is accurate, such a
policy, standing alone, may “effectively” “forbid{] illiterate or
poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions{,]"
running afoul of Johnson. 393 U.S. at 487. The foregoing
exhibits, then, constitute more than a “trace of support” that
Appellant was illegally and/or unconstitutionally confined to the

Special Holding Unit."

 

(conned)
away the prison’s authority to regulate mutual assistance, especially in the
Skslnce of ary punishment.» However, the record does not foreclose the
Possibility that the reascn for punishing Appellant may have beer
Eeeonseituvional, See Ban, 7 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532 (stating that
“Genial of a post-conviction motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel
Uienoot conducting an evidentiary Hearing is reviewed de novo for a
Settrsinstion cf whether the flee ang records of the case conclusively show
Chat petitioner ie entitled to gg relief” (citing United States v. Burrows,
b32 Frag 915 (Sth cir. 1968)))

 

 

 

 

me dissent differs in its application of the “adequacy of
alternatives” standard of Johnson, determining that "{iJnasmuch as (Appellant)
ihi*the other inmates have access to the law iibrary, and are pernitted to
SSoeist' each other in lagal matters through discussion and correspondence
inettucts that these alternative avenues of access to the courts
SRM Tie Feguiation." Dissenting opinion at 5, “This reasoning, however,
(contimed..)

     

   

 

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OO

‘Therefore, we hold, based upon Appellant’s Rule 40
petition and an independent examination of the record, that

Appellant has made a showing of a colorable claim that he was

 

illegally punished for providing assistance to other inmates and,
accordingly, the court should have held a hearing on the petition

as to this claim.

% continued)
overlooks the individvels sought to be protected in Johngon.

fisce, we enphesive thet our decision today does not reach the
merits of Appellant's fule 40 petition, but simply requires the court to hold
sEebfaag before rendering a decision on the petition for post-conviction
sre Nie bears repeating that the State did not explain its policy
Teliets ag autsel assistance between inmates. In Johnacn, the Supreme Court
Ree chat Tennessee hed not provided its insates wath elternatives to
Prepare petitions available in other states, such as consultation on preparing
cee re ety treined public defenders, interviews and advisement by senior law
Pelgenes, and consultation from Local bar wenbers who volunteer to visit the
sederser 395 gos. at 409; Contrary to the dissent’s contention, gee
Elocenting opinion at 6 n.3, the record does not suggest that Hawaii provides
seereee Reeeenativess Hones, the salternatives” cited by the dissent are
Speculative, without knowing precisely what the Yalternatives” were, it was
SESsasibie for the court co rule on the “adequacy” of such hypothetical
Spiternacives.”

‘hgein, the most explicit description of the State's mutual
assistance policy was provided by Appellant, as discussed gupra. Standing
inet *the Statements in the aforenentioned “RESULTS FOR ADJUSTMENT ComHTrEE
JgMihcr bose the chreat that {iliverste and poorly educated prisoners are
Uohles ackeas to hebess relief. A remand for hearing enables the State to
SEEM ‘those suspect statements, explain its policy in greater detail, and
GEA tee tnae meaningful alternatives exist’ for the illiterete or poorly
Gauceted prisoner

‘Second, assuning, az the dissent contends, that the shrouded
prison policy provides inmates access to the law library and assistance from
Eke Savinouse Lawyer via "discussion and correspondence,” such s0-called
Shaihativesn are aot “meaningful” for the illiterate or poorly educated
Pilsner ato nay not able to read materials in the law library nor communicate
Ghat Ss stated in his or her legal documents in order to facilitate any
WSiscaseisa” or “correspondences with the jailhouse lawyer. The dissent’s
fellance on these alternatives does not account for the very individuals the
Soprene Court sought to protect in Johnsan, and, thus, with all due respect,
pnast be rejected

 

 

 

 

 

 

tn Light of the fact that this matter is remanded for @ hearing,
we do not zesch the question cf an appropriate renedy.. Accordingly, it is
“necessary to discuss Appellant's request for expungenent of “all alleged
ieeTeSheLaconduces for helping inmates try and gain adequate, effective, and
meaningful access to the courte” or effect on parole.

 

”
 

**FOR PUBLICATION
oe
vt.

Appellant's final two arguments are that he has been
denied access to the courts and that prison staff have retaliated
against him for attempting to exercise his rights. Appellant's
clains rest on the contentions that prison staff prevented him
from receiving the Federal Prison Guidebook and intentionally
denied him access to his medically required shoes. In response,
the State maintains that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that
the absence of the book injured his ability to access the courts,
citing numerous legal claims filed by Appellant. Furthermore,
the state contends that Appellant did not demonstrate that he had
followed proper procedures for delivery approval and, therefore,
failed to show that the refusal to accept delivery was
retaliatory.

in the instant case, Appellant does not establish a
Rule 40(a) (1) claim challenging the judgment for which Appellant
is currently incazcerated. The lack of access to the Federal
Prison Guidebook and his shoes does not demonstrate that the
judgment against him was unconstitutional, lacking in
jurisdictional foundation, illegal, made in the absence of key
evidence, or that there is a new basis for a collateral attack.
HRPP Rule 40(a) (1). In addition, Appellant’s allegations fail to

demonstrate any claims under Rule 40(a)(2) such as an assertion

 

that the sentence was fully served, parole or probation was

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ee
unlawfully revoked, or any other ground making the custody

illegal.
However, Appellant may be entitled to relief on these
claims through a civil claim and not a petition under Rule 40.

HREP Rule 40(c) (3) (2002) states, in relevant part, that

 

Af a post-conviction petition alleges neither il1egality of
jasgmont nor illegality of post-conviction “custody” or
Aveiereint™ but instead alleges 2 c

 

   

TTPights statute or other separate cause of action, She
8 this rule
(Emphasis added.) Since Appellant's claims do not meet the

grounds outlined in Rules 40(2) (1) or 40(a) (2), and these claims
seoningly fit under the “[s]eparate [clause of action” under Rule
40(c1 (3), the court should “treat the pleading as a civil
complaint” as to these matters. In the absence of a colorable
claim, the court did not err by not convening a hearing as to
these issues. See Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532.
However, these clains should be “transferred by the court for
disposition under civil rules.” HREP Rule 40(c) (3)."”

vin.

In sunmary, Appellant has made a showing of a colorable
claim that he was illegally or unconstitutionally confined in the
Special Holding Unit and, therefore, he should have been granted
lan HREP Rule 40(£) hearing as to that claim, Appellant's
remaining clains relating to denial of access to the courts and

tn Light of our disposition, we need not address the state's

argunent that Appellant did not have standing to claim a deniel of his right
SPiidcene to the courte due to lack of injury.

 

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retaliatory behavior do not fall within the domain of HRPP Rule
40 and should have been appropriately classified and disposed of
as civil claims. Therefore, the March 13, 2003 order denying
Appellant's petition without a hearing is vacated and the case
remanded to the court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

on the briefe: Y

Eugene James Hutch, hereon
petitioner-appellant,

Pro se. aan
Lisa M. Ttomura, Deputy

Attorney General, State Voom 6. Dus the

of Hawas's, for respondent~

appellee.

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