Title: Radford v. Van Orden

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47364 
 
MARK J. RADFORD, an individual, and  
RADFORD CATTLE, LLC, an Idaho  
limited liability company, 
 
     Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- 
     Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
  
v. 
 
JAY VAN ORDEN, an individual, 
 
     Defendant-Counterclaimant- 
     Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
 
and 
 
SEVEN J RANCHES, INC., 
 
     Defendant-Counterclaimant- 
     Appellant. 
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Boise, January 2021 Term 
 
Amended Opinion filed: March 
22, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bingham County.  Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed as to Van Orden and Seven J’s 
appeal; and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded as to Radford’s cross-
appeal. 
 
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., Pocatello, for Appellant. J.D. Oborn argued. 
 
            Parsons Behle & Latimer, Idaho Falls, for Respondents. Jon A. Stenquist argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice 
 
This litigation stems from the contentious relationship between adjacent landowners over 
subjects as old as the American West: land, cattle, and fence lines. Respondent Mark Radford 
sued Appellant Jay Van Orden for damages from trespass of lands and trespass of cattle, among 
other claims, and also sued Appellant Seven J Ranches, Inc. (“Seven J”) for reimbursement for 
 
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the construction of a partition fence pursuant to Idaho Code section 35-103. The two cases were 
later consolidated. 
Upon Van Orden’s motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that 
Radford had standing to sue Van Orden for trespass, even though Radford was not the property 
owner when the trespass occurred, because the previous property owner executed an assignment 
of claims to him. After a five-day bench trial, the district court found Van Orden was liable for 
trespass and awarded damages to Radford, and required Seven J to reimburse Radford for one 
half of a constructed partition fence. The district court also found Van Orden was not liable for 
trespass of cattle and ordered Radford to construct a gate at the southern edge of his property to 
allow Van Orden to access an easement that runs across Radford’s property. The district court 
determined Radford to be the overall prevailing party and awarded attorney fees only against 
Seven J. Van Orden and Seven J appeal the district court’s standing determination on summary 
judgment, the damages awarded against Van Orden on Radford’s trespass claim, the 
reimbursement awarded on the partition fence claim against Seven J, and the prevailing party 
determination for purpose of awarding attorney fees. Radford cross-appeals the district court’s 
denial of his claim for trespass of cattle damages and the district court’s requirement that he 
construct a gate for Van Orden at the edge of his property. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background1 
In January of 2017, Mark Radford purchased property in Bingham County from the 
Thompson family. The property spans two discrete, yet contiguous tracts of land: the north 
parcel lies in the Homer Basin Unit and the south parcel lies in the Outlet Ridge Unit. The 
Homer Basin Unit is enclosed by fences, but the land inside consists of mostly open range. A 
fence also encloses the Outlet Ridge Unit. Seven J owns a large portion of the land within the 
Outlet Ridge Unit. The Outlet Ridge Unit also contains Radford’s Outlet Ridge property, most of 
Seven J’s property, and two Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) parcels. Van Orden leases land 
both in the Homer Basin Unit and the Outlet Ridge Unit from the IDL.  
                                                 
1 Most of the background facts are taken from the district court’s extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
following trial.  
 
3  
Since the 1990’s and prior to Radford’s purchase of the Thompson property, Van Orden 
had leased the property in the Outlet Ridge Unit from the Thompson family. In May of 2015, 
Ted Thompson passed away. Ted Thompson’s son, Matthew Thompson, agreed to lease the 
property to Van Orden for the 2015 grazing season. This oral lease was not renewed for the 2016 
season, the parties never spoke about leasing it again for the 2016 season, and Matt Thompson 
removed Van Orden’s name as the lessee with the respective State offices. Despite these facts, 
and the fact that Van Orden failed to pay any rent to Matt Thompson for the 2016 grazing 
season, Van Orden nevertheless assumed the lease continued.  
Figure 1. Map of Homer Basin and Outlet Ridge Units. 
 
In May of 2016, Shirlee Thompson, individually and as the personal representative of the 
Estate of Ted Thompson, entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Radford for the real 
property in the Homer Basin Unit and the Outlet Ridge Unit. The purchase was finalized in 
January of 2017. On December 29, 2016, before the sale of the property closed, Shirlee 
 
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Thompson granted the IDL an easement over her Homer Basin Unit and Outlet Ridge Unit 
properties (purchased by Radford). Throughout the litigation, the parties refer to this easement as 
the “Orange Road.” The easement is binding on Shirlee Thompson’s successors and assigns. The 
easement reads in part:  
This easement is specifically limited to ingress and egress for the control, 
management, administration, and use of [State] lands, or resources thereof, for the 
purpose of, including but not limited to, hauling logs and other forest products, 
hauling minerals, including sand and gravel, hauling agricultural products, 
moving livestock to and from [State’s] lands, agriculture uses, all commercial 
uses and leasing including energy production and transportation, for access for 
recreation, and fire prevention and control.  
(Emphasis added). Radford concedes that Van Orden had a right to use the Orange Road, and as 
a lessee of IDL lands in the Outlet Ridge and Homer Basin Unit, Van Orden used the Orange 
Road. Despite the easement, Radford placed a pole fence across the Orange Road where it enters 
his Outlet Ridge Unit property at the southern border after his purchase. It prevented access to 
the Orange Road and blocked Van Orden’s southern access point.  
In May of 2017, Radford noticed a road had been cut into a hillside in a remote location 
on his recently purchased Homer Basin Unit property. Prior to this, there was only a cow trail; no 
road existed at that location. Van Orden admitted that he cut the road on the hillside using a 
bulldozer in July of 2016, again falsely believing he was still leasing the property from the 
Thompsons. Van Orden’s cut resulted from him using his bulldozer to remove vegetation and 
flatten a path up the hillside in order to move his bulldozer up the hill. Radford hired Patrick 
Naylor with Rocky Mountain Environmental Associates, Inc., (RMEA) to determine the cost of 
repairing the property damage caused by Van Orden. 
During spring of 2017, Radford desired to build a fence between his property in the 
Outlet Ridge Unit and IDL property in the Outlet Ridge Unit, which was being leased by Van 
Orden. The planned fence was to connect to the “Whitehead Fence” and head south, separating 
the two parcels. The Whitehead Fence is a fence that runs mainly east-to-west and separates the 
IDL property in the Outlet Ridge Unit from the Homer Basin Unit. Radford reviewed a recorded 
survey for his property and checked for survey markers; he found certain ones using his non-
survey grade global positioning device. In May of 2017, near the inception of construction of the 
fence, Radford again attempted to find the survey markers between his property and the IDL land 
– this time he could not find them. Radford hired an individual to build the fence.  
 
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During construction of the fence, a confusing exchange occurred in which Van Orden 
approached Radford’s fence builder, concealed his identity by introducing himself as someone 
else, sought information about the fence, and then told the builder he had constructed the fence 
on IDL property. During the exchange, Van Orden left for a brief period of time and walked 
around the north end of where the new fence would connect with the Whitehead Fence; 
coincidentally, this was also where the survey markers had disappeared. The next day, Radford’s 
fence builder found the missing survey marker one-hundred to two-hundred feet north of the 
Whitehead Fence. It looked as though it had been moved or tampered with recently. Radford 
suspected Van Orden had moved or tampered with the survey marker, but neither he nor his 
fence builder saw anything to support this suspicion. A professional surveyor concluded that the 
survey marker was not in the correct location, which resulted in Radford’s newly constructed 
fence sitting twenty to thirty feet east of the actual property boundary line, on IDL property.  
In the summer of 2017, Radford observed Van Orden’s cattle traverse from the southern 
end of the Homer Basin Unit onto his property in the Outlet Ridge Unit through cut fences. Van 
Orden admitted that he had cut fences between property owned by Radford and the surrounding 
properties. Van Orden also admitted he cut through a chain on one of Radford’s gates and 
installed his own lock. Van Orden claimed he cut the wires or obstructions that blocked his use 
of the Orange Road.2  
In June of 2017, Radford began and completed construction on one half of a partition 
fence between his property in the Outlet Ridge Unit and Seven J’s property in the Outlet Ridge 
Unit. Radford paid $5,000.00 for his half of the fence. On October 17, 2017, Radford sent Seven 
J a notice pursuant to Idaho Code section 35-103, informing it that he intended to build the 
remaining half of the fence to complete the partition fence between his property and Seven J’s 
property. Under Idaho Code section 35-103, if adjoining properties are enclosed by a single 
fence, one party can construct one half of the partition fence between the properties, and with 
proper notice, the other party must either construct the other one half of the partition fence within 
six months, or reimburse the first party for completing the fence. Idaho Code section 35-103 
provides: 
When two or more persons own land adjoining which is inclosed [sic] by one (1) 
fence, and it becomes necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of 
                                                 
2 After a hearing before the trial court, Van Orden repaired the fences that had been cut and the parties were ordered 
to keep their respective locks on the gates at issue.  
 
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one (1) party that a partition fence be made between them, the other or others, 
when notified, must proceed to erect, or cause to be erected, one-half (1/2) of such 
partition fence; said fence to be erected on, or as near as practicable to, the line of 
said land. And if, after notice given in writing, either party fails to erect and 
complete, within six (6) months time thereafter, one-half (1/2) of such fence, the 
party giving the notice may proceed to erect the entire partition fence and collect 
by law one-half the costs of such fence from the other party, and he has a lien 
upon the land thus partitioned.  
Radford’s notice read in part:  
Radford hereby provides an additional notice to the [IDL’s] Lessee of 
fencing under Idaho Code § 35-103. There is a small strip of land on the south 
side of the Radford Property that borders between the Radford Property and 
property owned by Seven J. Ranches, Inc. The Department’s letter dated May 3, 
2017, informed the Lessee and Seven J. Ranches, Inc., that Radford intended to 
fence the Radford Property. That provided notice to Lessee and Seven J. Ranches, 
Inc., that the owner needed to build the fence under the statute along this 
unpartitioned portion of the Radford Property. There has never been any 
confusion about this obligation.  
But if, in the alternative, a court finds that this earlier notice was 
sufficient, Radford hereby again provides notice to Mr. Van Orden and to Seven 
J. Ranches, Inc., that Radford intends to fence along the border between the 
Radford Property and the property owned by Seven J. Ranches, Inc., located 
between Sections 14 and Section 23, Township 2S R41 E.B.M. A separate, more 
detailed notice will be sent to Seven 7 [sic] as well. 
(Emphasis added).  
Radford sent the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested to the Office of the 
Attorney General, IDL, Seven J in care of Todd Christiansen, Joey Christiansen, and Seven J’s 
attorney, Gary Cooper. Todd Christiansen and Joey Christiansen were two of the original 
directors of Seven J. Joey Christiansen was designated as Seven J’s registered agent. In June of 
2018, after receiving no response or observing any action by Seven J, Radford completed the 
remaining half of the partition fence between his property and Seven J’s property at a cost of 
$5,505.00.  
In May of 2018, Radford observed cattle trickling into the Homer Basin Unit. He also 
saw cattle being unloaded onto property he leases in the Homer Basin Unit. He estimated he saw 
about two-hundred and fifty head of cattle. Matt Thompson also saw cattle in the Homer Basin 
Unit in May, June, July, August, September and October of 2017. His estimate of the number of 
cattle ranged from one hundred to three hundred head. In November of 2017, Matt Thompson 
observed roughly one thousand or more head of cattle in the Homer Basin Unit. Radford 
 
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conceded that the Homer Basin Unit is open range, but he believed that Van Orden placed an 
excessive number of cattle on his leases with IDL in the Homer Basin Unit. IDL inspected the 
Homer Basin Unit bi-weekly during 2017 and did not find any over-grazing issues. However, 
Van Orden testified to placing salt licks on Radford’s property in the Homer Basin Unit in order 
to draw his cattle away from a water source. Van Orden testified that he thought he had placed 
the salt licks on IDL property he was leasing, not Radford’s. 
The record demonstrates continued contention between Radford and Van Orden. Radford 
claimed that in July of 2018, while he was driving on a twenty-eight foot wide road in Bone, 
Idaho, he saw a white Kenworth semi-truck pulling a cattle trailer coming toward him. Radford 
testified he had to drive his vehicle off the road to avoid a collision because the oncoming semi-
truck was three to three and one-half feet into Radford’s lane. After recovering from the incident, 
Radford noticed a second truck coming toward him and recognized the driver was Van Orden’s 
son. Radford then assumed the first truck had been driven by Van Orden himself. Radford called 
the police, but he did not crash his vehicle or sustain any physical, mental, or emotional injuries. 
Van Orden denied the incident. 
In 2018, Radford hoped to run cattle on his Homer Basin Unit and Outlet Ridge Unit 
properties. However, he was concerned about his fences continually being cut without reason 
and his cattle mixing with Van Orden’s. Radford therefore paid to pasture his cattle at a different 
location for the summer.  
B. Procedural History 
Radford sued Van Orden for trespass, trespass of cattle, tortious removal of survey 
markers, tortious interference with a contract, quiet title to roadway, damages to fences, assault, 
tortious interference with economic opportunity, and a request for injunctive relief. Van Orden 
asserted various counterclaims and defenses including removal of Radford’s fence in trespass on 
IDL property, and sought an injunction against Radford for interference with easement rights and 
a declaration of easement by prescription over the Orange Road. In a separate lawsuit, Radford 
sued Seven J and alleged a violation of Idaho Code section 35-103 for failing to pay its one-half 
share of the fence. Seven J contended that Radford’s fencing notice had been insufficient. Seven 
 
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J also counterclaimed for a declaration of an easement by prescription over the Orange Road. 
The district court granted a motion to consolidate the two cases.3  
Before trial, Radford filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding his trespass 
claim against Van Orden for the bulldozer cut into the hillside. In opposition to Radford’s 
motion, Van Orden argued that Radford’s trespass cause of action required Radford to own the 
property at the time the trespass and resulting injury occurred; and because the Thompson 
family, not Radford, owned the land at the time the cut was made, Radford did not have standing 
to bring suit. In his motion, Radford argued that Van Orden’s cut constituted a continuing 
trespass, or in the alternative, he had standing to bring suit against Van Orden because Shirlee 
Thompson executed a written assignment of any claims she possessed against Van Orden to 
Radford.4  
The district court agreed with Radford’s latter argument and largely relied on Idaho Code 
section 55-402 and this Court’s decision in Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber 
Co., 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407 (1934). The district court held that Radford’s claim against Van 
Orden involved damage to property, and such causes of action that arise out of an alleged 
violation of a right of property are assignable. Therefore, Shirlee Thompson’s assignment of 
claims to Radford was valid and gave Radford standing to bring suit against Van Orden. 
However, the district court still denied Radford’s motion for summary judgment because it found 
that Van Orden’s affidavit in response created a material issue of fact regarding liability for the 
damages to Radford’s property. The case proceeded to a bench trial.  
At trial, Radford called Patrick Naylor to testify. Naylor, is a partner and vice president of 
RMEA, which provides environmental site assessments and remediation, among other 
environmental services. Naylor has provided such remediation plans for thirty years. He is a 
professional engineer and geologist and has thirty years of experience in assessing environmental 
sites and providing remediation recommendations and plans. Radford hired RMEA in the 
summer of 2017 to provide a remediation plan for the property damage caused by Van Orden. 
Naylor was brought into the project in late spring of 2018. The initial part of Naylor’s process 
                                                 
3 For context as to why these two seemingly unrelated cases were consolidated, Seven J was formerly incorporated 
and owned by a group of siblings including Shelli Van Orden. Seven J has not reinstated its corporate status since it 
was administratively dissolved in 1993. Since the 1990s, Van Orden has acted as an agent for Seven J with the 
knowledge and consent of its partners.  
4 Shirlee Thompson executed a written assignment of claims, which transferred any claims, demands, causes of 
action, and rights to payment she had against Van Orden to Radford on October 25, 2017. 
 
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was to discuss remediation objectives with the client; in this case, Radford desired the land to be 
returned to its pre-disturbance and natural condition.  
At trial, Naylor estimated that remediation would cost $76,175. On top of that, Naylor 
added in a 30% contingency, which he described as common practice for any construction 
project. With the contingency, the total of the restoration cost was $99,028. This included a 
general topographical survey, retention of a vegetation expert to inspect the site and develop a 
seed mix for subsequent site restoration of the native plants, development of a project design and 
remediation plan for regrading the hill to its natural slope, implementing erosion and settlement 
controls to minimize the risk of erosion, and planning for oversight, monitoring, and weed 
control to make sure the remediation goes as planned and to ensure the natural vegetation is 
restored and not overrun by weeds. During Naylor’s cross-examination, the following exchange 
occurred:  
Q: You indicate that this opinion does not represent a bid.  
A: Yes.  
Q: What do you mean by that? 
A: A bid would require a detailed design in order to have a more precise 
assessment of cost and activities.  
Q: So if one were to develop a reasonably certain amount, that would be a 
bid? 
A: Yes.  
Q: And yours is not reasonably certain because it’s not a bid, correct? 
A: That is correct.  
 Van Orden then moved to strike the entirety of Naylor’s testimony based on his apparent 
admission that his remediation damages estimate was not “reasonably certain.” The district court 
took the motion under advisement. On re-direct examination, Naylor clarified his testimony:  
Q: Mr. Naylor, there was quite a bit of discussion in terms of the level of 
certainty to which you had to your preliminary cost opinion; and you had 
indicated a desire to further explain your answer on that point. Would you still 
like to do so? 
A: Yes. It seems that the term used by Mr. Cooper [“reasonably certain”] 
has some legal connotation which was – since I’m not certain what that means, 
it’s difficult for me to give an accurate answer. If there’s a definition of what that 
means, I don’t know.  
 
I wanted to clarify that cost estimates and cost opinions are quite typically 
done at different scales. So there’s – and often they’re designated by class from 
Class 1, which is a very precise cost estimate up to Class 5, which is – it’s a little 
better than arm waiving. This is more like – on the order of what I would call a 
Class 4 cost estimate.  
 
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Estimate meaning that site information was used to develop costs with a 
physical visit to the site, an assessment of the general issues at hand and with 
some consultation of contractors to obtain costs.  
The following day, the district court denied Van Orden’s motion to strike Naylor’s testimony and 
explained:  
 
Yesterday, Mr. Cooper, you made a motion to strike the expert testimony 
in this case. You are correct, in that the plaintiff in this case has the burden of 
proving damages within reasonable certainty. The expert used your language, 
clarified his position as to why he was offering the opinion he was offering and 
how he reached the cost analysis, and so far as his opinion, I think it’s still 
relevant.  
 
The question is whether his testimony after being considered by the Court 
as the trier of fact, that testimony and any additional that may come in, whether 
those damages have been proven to a reasonable degree of certainty. So I’m going 
to deny the motion to strike his testimony.  
 
Van Orden did not call his own expert witness to testify to the damages, but instead relied 
on his own testimony. Van Orden testified that he previously caused similar damage by cutting 
into land with a bulldozer on an IDL parcel. The IDL required Van Orden to remediate the area, 
which consisted of Van Orden scattering seed, monitoring, and spraying herbicide to control any 
weeds. Van Orden testified that this remediation only cost $530 and it is the same work that 
needed to be done to Radford’s land. However, Ricky Heath Hancock testified as a resource 
supervisor for IDL and stated that the seed mix spread by Van Orden to restore the IDL land was 
not a native species, but a different species the State thought would reestablish well in that area, 
and the State did not require Van Orden to replace any topsoil or re-grade the area.  
After trial, the district court issued its decision, which contained specific and detailed 
findings of fact that reflected the aforementioned background facts and included its conclusions 
of law. Regarding trespass and damages for restoration of property, the district court concluded 
that Van Orden trespassed on the property. The district court noted that Van Orden did not deny 
that he had entered the property in July of 2016 under the mistaken assumption that he had 
leased the property from the Thompsons for the 2016 season. Van Orden also admitted that he 
used a bulldozer to flatten and widen an existing cow trail located on a steep hill on Radford’s 
property in order to more easily move his bulldozer on the trail. Because the district court 
previously determined that Shirlee Thompson had assigned any claims owned by her against Van 
 
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Orden to Radford, it concluded that Radford had a right to recover damages for Van Orden’s 
trespass.  
The district court also determined that the evidence supporting Radford’s allegations of 
damages was reasonably certain. Restoration of the hillside required replacement of twelve 
inches of topsoil on two thousand linear feet of trail, and grading. The district court found Naylor 
to be a credible and qualified witness. The district court found Naylor’s evaluation and damage 
estimate, as presented in his remediation plan, to be logical, well-reasoned, and justified to a 
reasonable degree of certainty. However, the district court did not add in Naylor’s 30% 
contingency factor to the damages because it found it was too speculative. The district court thus 
awarded Radford $72,175 for remediation of the damages caused by Van Orden’s trespass and 
bulldozer cut.  
In Radford’s trespass of cattle cause of action, the district court concluded that while Van 
Orden has extensive knowledge and experience in the area – as he has leased property from the 
IDL since 2011 – this experience contradicted Van Orden’s testimony that the trespass was a 
mistake because he thought he was placing salt licks on IDL property. Nevertheless, the court 
determined that Radford had not adequately proven his damages. Radford tied his damages to his 
claim that Van Orden over-grazed the Homer Basin Unit area. However, the testimony from IDL 
was clear and uncontradicted that the Homer Basin Unit had not been over-grazed. Therefore, the 
district court did not award damages to Radford on this claim.  
Finally, regarding Radford’s fence claim against Seven J pursuant to Idaho Code section 
35-103, the district court ruled in favor of Radford and ordered Seven J to pay $5,000 in 
reimbursement to Radford. The district court found that the maps admitted into evidence showed 
an existing fence enclosing the Outlet Ridge Unit, which included most of Seven J’s property, all 
of Radford’s Outlet Ridge property, and three parcels of IDL land. Thus, the prerequisite to 
Idaho Code section 35-103 had been met. Furthermore, the district court found Radford’s notice 
was adequate. Therefore, the district court concluded that Radford was entitled to recoup the cost 
of building Seven J’s one-half of the fence.5 The district court entered a corresponding judgment 
and order reflecting its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
                                                 
5 The district court only awarded Radford $5,000, his cost to build the first one-half of the partition fence, not 
$5,505, the amount Radford claimed he paid to build the second one-half of the partition fence.  
 
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Radford then filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees against Seven J, which 
Seven J opposed. Radford requested fees only against Seven J pursuant to Idaho Code section 
12-120(1) because Radford had prevailed against Seven J and he had pleaded for an award of 
less than $35,000 ($5,505). Seven J argued that Radford did not entirely prevail because: (1) 
Radford’s motion in limine to declare Seven J a general partnership was denied; (2) the cases 
were consolidated so the district court should consider Radford’s failed claims against Van 
Orden; and (3) Radford’s fee request was unreasonable. The district court dismissed Seven J’s 
first argument because Radford prevailed in his only claim against Seven J and also prevailed in 
defeating Seven J’s counterclaim against him. The district court gave little weight to Radford’s 
motion in limine to declare Seven J a general partnership because it was made during the course 
of litigation and not part of Radford’s pleaded claim for relief. The district court refused to 
consider the claims lost by Radford against Van Orden as part of the prevailing party 
consideration, reasoning that the parties were separate entities and the cases were consolidated 
similarly to a multi-party lawsuit.  
The district court then turned to Seven J’s specific objections regarding the 
reasonableness of Radford’s attorney fees request. The district court examined each of Seven J’s 
twenty specific objections to billings or work performed by Radford’s attorneys. The district 
court rejected each contention except for two, in which the district court reduced the billable 
hours by one-half for excessive work performed. Next, the district court examined all of the 
requisite considerations under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) and ultimately awarded 
Radford attorney fees in the amount of $29,115.25.6  
Simultaneously with their objections to Radford’s request for attorney fees and costs, 
Van Orden and Seven J filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Among other arguments, Van Orden asserted that the district court’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to address his counterclaim for an injunction 
against Radford for interference with his easement rights; specifically, he asked the court to 
order Radford to remove the pole fence at the southern border of Radford’s Outlet Ridge Unit 
property that blocked the Orange Road. Radford opposed this motion and supported his 
argument with an interlocutory order from a different case from the Bonneville County District 
Court, which denied IDL’s request to remove the pole fence. The district court in this case did 
                                                 
6 The district court also awarded Radford costs in the amount of $1,220.72, as a matter of right.  
 
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not consider the interlocutory order of another district court because it was an interlocutory 
order, not a final judgment, and the facts presented to the other district court may not have been 
the same ones presented during the week-long trial. The district court granted Van Orden’s 
motion to reconsider because it had failed to address Van Orden’s counterclaim in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. The district court then granted Van Orden’s request for an injunction 
and required Radford to install a gate where the Orange Road meets the pole fence to provide 
access.  
Both parties appealed. Van Orden and Seven J assert four categories of error: (1) the 
district court’s determination of standing on summary judgment; (2) the award for damages on 
trespass because the damages were not proved with reasonable certainty; (3) the award for one 
half of the partition fence against Seven J; and (4) the finding that Radford was the prevailing 
party and its award of reasonable attorney fees. Radford cross-appealed the district court’s denial 
of damages for his trespass of cattle claim against Van Orden and the district court’s directive to 
Radford to install a gate to allow Van Orden to access the Orange Road. Radford also requests 
attorney fees on appeal against only Seven J.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
“ ‘Jurisdictional issues, like standing, are questions of law, over which this Court 
exercises free review.’ ” Frantz v. Osborn, 167 Idaho 176, 179, 468 P.3d 306, 309 (2020) 
(quoting In re Jerome Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012)).  
 
The applicable standard of review regarding a trial court’s factual findings and legal 
conclusions after a bench trial was explained in Caldwell Land and Cattle, LLC v. Johnson 
Thermal Systems, Inc.:  
Review of a trial court’s conclusions following a bench trial is limited to 
ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the 
findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Borah v. McCandles, 147 Idaho 
73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009) (citing Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 
488-89, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237-38 (2006)). This Court will not set aside a trial 
court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. Clear error 
will not be deemed to exist if the findings are supported by substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence. Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 50, 
408 P.3d 45, 48 (2017) (quoting Pandrea v. Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 171, 369 P.3d 
943, 949 (2016)). Substantial and competent evidence exists [i]f there is evidence 
in the record that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in making 
the factual finding challenged on appeal. . . . Id.  
 
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165 Idaho 787, 795, 452 P.3d 809, 817 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). On appeal, 
we exercise free review of the trial court’s conclusions of law. Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 
137 Idaho 703, 707, 52 P.3d 848, 852 (2002). 
This Court reviews a district court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration utilizing the 
same standard of review the lower court used when deciding the motion. Monitor Fin., L.C. v. 
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, 164 Idaho 555, 559-60, 433 P.3d 183, 187-88 (2019). Upon a 
motion for reconsideration under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), “the court may amend its 
findings, or make additional findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly.” I.R.C.P. 52(b). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Radford had standing to sue Van Orden for trespass.  
 
 
Van Orden contends that Radford did not have standing to sue because Radford was not 
the legal property owner at the time the trespass and damages occurred, and Shirlee Thompson 
could not assign the claim to him. Radford counters that the assignment was legitimate under the 
law. However, Radford argued in the alternative that the assignment was unnecessary because 
the damage caused by Van Orden’s cut amounts to a continuing trespass upon his land.7  
 
Standing, along with other concepts of justiciability, identify suitable and appropriate 
occasions for adjudication by a court. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 
187, 194 (2015). “Standing ‘focuses directly on the question whether a particular interest or 
injury is adequate to invoke the protection of judicial decision.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Standing 
is a threshold issue to be determined before reaching the merits of the case. Id. This Court has 
adopted the federal justiciability standard. Id.; see also Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 158, 
161, 177 P.3d 372, 375 (2008) (“When deciding whether a party has standing, we have looked to 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance.”). To establish standing, “a plaintiff 
must show (1) an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘like[lihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.’ ” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-58 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).  
The district court relied upon Idaho Code section 55-402 and Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. 
v. Boise Payette Lumber Co. (Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. II), 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407 (1934), 
                                                 
7 Because we are deciding this issue on the same grounds relied upon by the district court, we will not address the 
alternate grounds asserted by Radford.  
 
15  
to support its decision. In the Idaho Gold Dredging Corporation cases, Idaho Gold Dredging 
Corporation (“Dredging Corporation”) purchased “placer mining ground” on a creek from Gold 
Dredging & Power Corporation (“Power Corporation”) in April 1928. Idaho Gold Dredging 
Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co. (Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. I), 52 Idaho 766, 766, 22 P.2d 
147, 148 (1933). After purchasing the placer mining ground, Dredging Corporation discovered 
that Boise Payette Lumber Company had used grease and oil as part of its timber operations in 
that general area until 1926. Id. The grease and oil damaged the placer mining grounds, making 
it uneconomical for Dredging Corporation to extract gold from the creek. Id. The previous owner 
of the land—Power Corporation—assigned its cause of action arising out of the damage to the 
placer mining ground to Dredging Corporation. Id. Dredging Corporation then filed a complaint 
against Boise Payette Lumber Company to recover damages caused by the grease and oil. Id. 
The Court, in Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. II, held that Power Corporation’s cause of action for 
damages that occurred prior to April 1928 was assignable to Dredging Corporation under Idaho 
Code section 54-402.8 54 Idaho at 765, 37 P.2d at 409. The Court explained that Idaho Code 
section 54-402 authorizes the assignment of a cause of action arising out of the violation of a 
property right: 
[Boise Payette Lumber Company] contends that the cause of action set 
forth in the third amended complaint is not assignable, and hence that [Dredging 
Corporation] is not the real party in interest. Section 54-402, I. C. A., is as 
follows: “A thing in action arising out of the violation of a right of property, or 
out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner. Upon the death of the 
owner it passes to his personal representatives, except where, in the cases 
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, it passes to his devisees or successor in 
office.” The thing in action in this case arises out of an alleged violation of a right 
of property, and, under the section of the Code above quoted, is assignable.  
Id. (citing MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254 (1926)). In other words, Dredging 
Corporation was the real party in interest. 
 
Like Power Corporation, which had a cause of action stemming from a violation of a 
property right that occurred prior to the sale of the placer mining grounds to Dredging 
Corporation, the Thompsons had a cause of action for a violation of a property right that 
occurred prior to the sale of their land to Radford.  Further, like Power Corporation, which 
assigned its cause of action to Dredging Corporation in accordance with then Idaho Code section 
                                                 
8 When the Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. cases were decided in 1933 and 1934, Idaho Code section 55-402 was 
designated as Idaho Code Section “54-402.” 
 
16  
54-402, the Thompsons assigned their cause of action to Radford in accord with the current 
statute, section 55-402. Finally, like the assignee in Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. II that was 
deemed to be the real party in interest for the purpose of pursuing the cause of action, Radford, 
as the assignee, is the real party in interest relative to the cause of action here. Consequently, 
Radford had standing to pursue the Thompsons’ cause of action against Van Orden. 
 
We acknowledge that the “violation of a property right” in the Idaho Gold Dredging 
Corporation cases involved a nuisance action—not a trespass action. See Idaho Gold Dredging 
Corp. II, 54 Idaho at 765, 37 P.2d at 409–10; see also Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. I, 52 Idaho at 
766, 22 P.2d at 151. Nevertheless, nuisance claims and trespass claims both constitute a violation 
of a property right. “Idaho case law has defined ‘trespass’ to apply to the wrongful interference 
with the right of exclusive possession of real property, while the tort of private ‘nuisance’ applies 
to the wrongful interference with the use and enjoyment of real property.” Moon v. N. Idaho 
Farmers Ass’n, 140 Idaho 536, 541, 96 P.3d 637, 642 (2004) (citing Mock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 
F.Supp. 1545 (D. Idaho 1992)). Thus, the district court properly relied on Idaho Gold Dredging 
Corporation II to conclude that Radford had standing. 
 
Van Orden argues that the Thompsons did not have a cause of action to assign to Radford 
because Radford purchased the land from the Thompsons “as-is.” He explains his reasoning as 
follows: 
The purchase price of the property sold to Radford was not affected because of 
Van Orden’s conduct. Radford never sued the Thompsons and based on the terms 
of the Purchase and Sale Agreement he could not have because he did not provide 
written notice as required and he purchased the property “as is” after the road had 
already been cut by Van Orden. The Thompsons never paid anything to Radford 
to compensate him for the damage to the property that occurred before he 
purchased it. Thus, if the Thompsons did not suffer any damages because of Van 
Orden’s conduct, there was not a valid claim against Van Orden that could be 
assigned and then pursued by Radford. 
Van Orden’s theory misses the mark, however, because an “as-is” provision in a purchase and 
sale agreement does not negate the Thompsons’ cause of action against Van Orden. It is 
undisputed that Van Orden trespassed on the Thompsons’ land in 2016 and damaged the land by 
creating a cut. Further, the Thompsons could establish damages by showing the cost to restore 
the cut. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929(1)(a) (1979) (stating that damages can include 
the cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred); see also Weitz v. Green, 148 
Idaho 851, 866, 230 P.3d 743, 758 (2010) (stating that restoration costs can be an appropriate 
 
17  
measure of damages). Moreover, the Thompsons were entitled, at the very least, to nominal 
damages. See, e.g., Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 570, 602 P.2d 64, 68 
(1979) (citing Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 349 P.2d 556 (1960)) (“[I]n cases of trespass to 
land, the plaintiff need not prove actual harm in order to recover nominal damages.”). Thus, Van 
Orden’s argument fails on its face. The Thompsons did have a viable cause of action against Van 
Orden that could be assigned to Radford under Idaho Code section 55-402. Consequently, 
Radford had standing. 
 
Van Orden further argues that Radford never offered the assignment agreement between 
the Thompsons and Radford as evidence at trial. That argument is also unavailing. The district 
court expressly considered the assignment agreement when it ruled on Radford’s motion for 
partial summary judgment. After reviewing the assignment agreement, Idaho Code section 55-
402, and relevant case law, the district court held that Radford had standing to pursue the cause 
of action against Van Orden. Accordingly, there was no need for Radford to offer the assignment 
agreement as evidence at trial; the issue of standing had already been decided. 
 
 
B. The district court’s award of damages for Van Orden’s trespass was supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and was reasonably certain.  
 
Van Orden’s argument regarding the district court’s award of damages is two-fold. First, 
he contends the district court erred below by overruling his objection to strike Naylor’s 
testimony. Second, he contends the district court erred by finding Radford proved trespass 
damages to a reasonable certainty and awarding him $72,175 in damages. As noted, this Court 
does not set aside a trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Caldwell Land and 
Cattle, 165 Idaho at 795, 452 P.3d at 817. If the findings are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence – such that a reasonable trier of fact could reasonably conclude the same – 
this Court will not disturb those findings. Id.  
A district court’s decision to admit or exclude the testimony of an expert witness is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810 812 (2002). 
When examining discretionary decisions of a trial court, this Court applies a four-prong test to 
determine whether there was an abuse of discretion and asks whether the trial court “(1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; 
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choice available to it; 
 
18  
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 
856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). 
 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert witness testimony. It 
provides for the admission of expert testimony “if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue. . . .” I.R.E. 702. Yet, even if the testimony is admissible, it still may be excluded “if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” I.R.E. 403. Van Orden has not argued that Naylor’s 
testimony was substantially outweighed by any of the mentioned factors, nor has he argued 
which of the four Lunneborg prongs the district court violated.  
 
Here, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Van Orden’s motion 
to strike Naylor’s testimony and admit it. Naylor testified to his decades of experience in 
engineering, geology, and providing remediation plans. This type of unique and specific 
knowledge assisted the trier of fact with the specific remediation that was needed on Radford’s 
land. Naylor was tripped-up on cross-examination about his estimate of damages not being 
“reasonably certain,” but a fair review of the record discloses that this was more the result of 
Naylor’s modesty and caution while testifying. Moreover, the term “reasonable certainty” is the 
standard by which a plaintiff must prove damages at trial; it does not govern whether expert 
testimony is admissible for consideration by the trier of fact. Admissibility of expert testimony is 
determined by Rule 702. 
The record establishes that Naylor provided a detailed and specific remediation plan and 
cost estimate that was clearly based on more than mere speculation. Naylor testified extensively 
about each step of the proposed remediation plan, how it would be accomplished, and its cost. 
Naylor accounted for the specific seed that needed to be spread, how the slope would have to be 
re-graded, and how much topsoil needed to be replaced. Naylor even accounted for the minute 
details of the operation – including the cost of moving the necessary equipment to and from the 
site. Naylor’s report, which went into much further detail than his trial testimony, was the 
opposite of speculative. His report and testimony assisted with a matter outside the common 
experience and knowledge of a lay trier of fact and it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
district court to admit Naylor’s testimony and report.  
 
19  
Next, Van Orden attacks the weight the district court afforded Naylor’s testimony and 
report to find Radford proved his damages with reasonable certainty. “ ‘A district court’s award 
of damages will be upheld on appeal where there is sufficient evidence supporting the award.’ ” 
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2006) (quoting 
Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, 118 P.3d 99, 106 (2005)). Sufficient evidence means the 
damages are proven with reasonable certainty. Id. “Reasonable certainty requires neither 
absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to 
remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation.” Id. 
Van Orden would have this Court set aside the district court’s findings on Naylor’s 
specific and extensive testimony concerning the cost to repair the property damage, and instead 
adopt Van Orden’s self-serving testimony based on anecdotal evidence of his experience in 
remediating damage he had previously caused. While Naylor initially indicated that his bid was 
not “reasonably certain,” he clarified on re-direct examination that his bid was a Class 4 
estimate, which was more than a speculative estimate. The district court properly considered the 
entirety of Naylor’s testimony rather than one statement. On the other hand, Van Orden’s 
proposed remediation plan was not grounded in the same piece of land or the same damages; 
rather it concerned an IDL parcel he claimed he had similarly damaged. However, in remediating 
his damage to the IDL land, Van Orden did not account for re-grading, topsoil, or other details 
that Naylor did account for in his professional estimate.  
The competent evidence and testimony presented by Naylor at trial support the district 
court’s findings of fact on damages. To the extent that Van Orden’s argument is essentially an 
argument about credibility, the district court found Naylor’s testimony and remediation plan 
more credible than Van Orden’s. To that extent, this Court will not second-guess the credibility 
determinations of the trier of fact and affirms the district court’s award of damages for the 
trespass of lands.  
 
C. Radford’s fence notice to Seven J was sufficient under Idaho Code section 35-103 to 
require Seven J to reimburse Radford for one-half of the constructed fence. 
 
Seven J challenges the district court’s findings on Radford’s partition fence claim, 
arguing: (1) there was no evidence that a single fence enclosed both properties to trigger the 
application of Idaho Code section 35-103; (2) the district court erred by awarding $1,255 of the 
$5,000 awarded because that cost amount was incurred by Radford Cattle, LLC, not Radford; 
 
20  
and (3) the district court erred by finding Radford’s partition fence notice was sufficient to 
invoke Seven J’s duty to construct one half of the fence.  
 
Idaho Code section 35-103 provides:  
When two or more persons own land adjoining which is inclosed [sic] by one (1) 
fence, and it becomes necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of 
one (1) party that a partition fence be made between them, the other or others, 
when notified, must proceed to erect, or cause to be erected, one-half (1/2) of such 
partition fence; said fence to be erected on, or as near as practicable to, the line of 
said land. And if, after notice given in writing, either party fails to erect and 
complete, within six (6) months time thereafter, one-half (1/2) of such fence, the 
party giving the notice may proceed to erect the entire partition fence and collect 
by law one-half the costs of such fence from the other party, and he has a lien 
upon the land thus partitioned.  
We have expressly held that the plain language of the statute requires that the property must be 
enclosed by a fence in order to trigger Idaho Code section 35-103. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 
399, 406, 195 P.3d 1212, 1219 (2008).  
 
Based on our review of the record, we hold that the substantial and competent evidence 
presented at trial supported the district court’s finding that the properties were enclosed by a 
fence. Seven J asserts that the district court erred because it relied on Radford’s exhibit 47, which 
does not show that a fence entirely encloses the Seven J and Radford properties. However, when 
examining the district court’s findings of fact, it clearly cited Plaintiff’s Exhibits 11, 50, and 57, 
for the finding that the properties were enclosed by a fence. These exhibits show a fence that 
encloses the Outlet Ridge Unit, which contains Seven J’s property, Radford’s property, and the 
IDL land.9 Seven J’s contention merely disputes the specific finding of the district court, which 
was supported by substantial and competent evidence; therefore, we affirm the district court’s 
finding that the properties were enclosed by a single fence.  
 
Next, Seven J faults the district court for awarding the entire $5,000 to Radford when 
$1,255 of the fencing was paid for by Radford Cattle, LLC. Radford responds that this claimed 
error was waived because Seven J did not raise it below. Seven J replies that, “[t]he distinction 
was clearly made in the testimony elicited from Radford;” and alternatively argues that it is an 
issue of standing, which can be raised at any time. This Court rejects both assertions.  
                                                 
9 While there appears to be a small gap in the fencing on each exhibit, Radford presented testimony at trial that the 
gap area is a cliff-like area that is too rocky to construct a fence. The terrain nonetheless acts as a fence or barrier 
because it prevents cattle from crossing it.  
 
21  
 
At trial, Radford testified unequivocally that he owns 50 percent of Radford Cattle, LLC, 
and Intermountain Paper Company owns the other 50 percent. Radford also owns 100 percent of 
Intermountain Paper Company. Therefore, Radford owns 100 percent of Radford Cattle, LLC, 
and all expenses flow from him. Seven J otherwise does not support its contention with any 
authority that an individual who owns 100 percent of a company cannot be reimbursed for a 
partition fence where the company paid for a portion of it.  
 
Finally, Seven J contends that Radford’s initial notice was insufficient because the notice 
stated that Radford would send a more detailed notice later, but he never did. Therefore, he 
argues that quasi-estoppel barred Radford from relying on the initial letter. “The doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel ‘prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is 
inconsistent with a position previously taken.’ ” Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 
310, 314 (2006) (quoting C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 
P.3d 194, 198 (2003)).  
This doctrine applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position than 
his or her original position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was 
induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the 
offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has 
already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Id.  
 
Radford does not dispute that his fencing notice represented that a separate, more detailed 
notice would be sent to Seven J, but he never sent one. However, this did not evoke quasi-
estoppel because it resulted in no disadvantage to Seven J, it did not induce it to change 
positions, and it would not be unconscionable to allow Radford to take an allegedly inconsistent 
position. Indeed, where there was only ever one position asserted – that Radford constructed one-
half of a partition fence. It cannot be reasonably argued that there was a subsequent inconsistent 
position taken. Seven J asserts it was disadvantaged because it was waiting for a more detailed 
notice in order for the six month time clock to begin to run.10 But this assumes that the initial 
notice was somehow insufficient. The initial and only letter sufficiently gave notice to Seven J; 
indeed, the attorneys for Seven J and Van Orden were included as recipients of the letter. 
                                                 
10 Seven J does not clarify what additional details it expected or needed in a subsequent notice, nor does it explain 
how it could have avoided its responsibility to either build its portion of the fence or to pay Radford for constructing 
it.  
 
22  
Radford’s statement that a more detailed notice would follow does not negate the initial notice. 
The letter itself was sufficient because it stated Radford’s intent to erect a partition fence 
between the properties and it gave specific details of where the partition fence would be built and 
how much it would cost. Although Seven J states, “[t]he parties need[ed] to communicate as to 
where the fences are going to be erected,” the notice was clear and gave Seven J the section and 
township locations of the proposed partition fence. Seven J does not allege that it attempted to 
clarify with Radford when it did not receive a more detailed notice. Furthermore, by the time 
Seven J received the notice, Radford had already constructed his one-half of the proposed 
partition fence, making Radford’s position crystal clear. While Radford’s statement that a 
subsequent letter would follow may have been confusing, his letter of October 17, 2017, satisfied 
the statute and provided adequate notice to Seven J of Radford’s fencing plans pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 35-103. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Seven J is 
liable to Radford for one half of the constructed partition fence.   
 
D. The district court erred in not considering damages for trespass of cattle under 
Radford’s unjust enrichment theory. 
 
 
Radford contends in his cross-appeal that the district court misunderstood his claim for 
relief for trespass of cattle. He claims that he alleged in his second amended complaint that Van 
Orden was unjustly enriched by exceeding his animal units per month (AUM) allotment in the 
Homer Basin Unit and by intentionally driving his cattle onto Radford’s land in the Homer Basin 
Unit. However, he asserts that the district court erroneously analyzed the damage elements of his 
trespass of cattle claim as a claim for trespass damages and concluded he was entitled to no 
relief.  
 
 We begin by examining Radford’s second amended complaint. Radford generally 
labeled his fifth cause of action as “Trespass of Cattle.”  However, within that cause of action, 
Radford expressly alleged that Van Orden was unjustly enriched by the trespass of his cattle:  
74. Defendant, without permission, consent, or license willfully and intentionally 
cut fences and has entered upon the Radford Land and placed salt licks on the 
Radford land for the express purpose of grazing his cattle on the Radford Land, 
which served to unjustly enrich Van Orden. Prior to Radford fencing, Van Orden 
intentionally deposited more cattle on state lease land, Lease No G800084 than 
allowed, which caused the Van Orden cattle to expand and overgraze onto the 
Radford Land, constituting a trespass on the Radford land.  
. . . .  
 
23  
76. As a direct and proximate result of this trespass, Plaintiff’s [sic] have incurred 
damages and Van Orden gained unjust benefits in an amount to be determined at 
trial.  
 (Emphasis added). At trial, Radford’s presentation of evidence could have reasonably been in 
furtherance of a trespass damages claim or an unjust enrichment claim. For example, he 
presented evidence that Van Orden intentionally placed salt licks on his property to drive cattle 
there, and he also testified as to Van Orden exceeding his allotted AUMs in the Homer Basin 
Unit.  
Radford titled this cause of action in his closing brief as “Trespass to Land and 
Overgrazing,” without mentioning unjust enrichment. Then, Radford set out the law applicable 
to a trespass action, not an unjust enrichment action. Radford even cited the Idaho Civil Jury 
Instruction for trespass. See ICJI 4.40. Moreover, the case law Radford cited in his closing 
argument only supported damages in a trespass cause of action—not unjust enrichment. See 
Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 745 P.2d 294 (1987); Legg v. Barinaga, 92 Idaho 225, 440 P.2d 
345 (1968). Yet, Radford returned to unjust enrichment as a basis for relief in the closing 
paragraphs of his brief:  
Mr. Van Orden has been unjustly enriched by overgrazing the Homer 
Basin and by grazing Plaintiffs’ Outlet Ridge property. Mr. Van Orden should 
compensate Plaintiffs for the additional AUMS – over the amount allotted to him 
in his grazing lease – he was unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs’ property as a result 
of his unlawful actions. . . . Based on the $40 [AUM] rate, Mr. Van Orden was 
unjustly enriched by $30,200 (755 extra AUMs multiplied by $40).  
 
This Court should award Plaintiffs $30,200 damages against Mr. Van 
Orden for unjust enrichment, having utilized 755 AUMs on private ground to 
which he was not entitled. . . . 
(Emphasis added).  
The measure of damages under a theory of unjust enrichment “is not the actual amount of 
the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between the two parties it would be 
unjust for one party to retain.” Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 
463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must 
prove: “(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by 
the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would 
be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof.” Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 109, 408 P.3d 465, 
 
24  
469 (2017) (quoting Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 
827, 275 P.3d 839, 842 (2012)). See also ICJI 6.07.2 (Unjust enrichment requires a plaintiff to 
prove: “(1) [t]he plaintiff provided a benefit to the defendant; (2) [t]he defendant accepted the 
benefit; and (3) [u]nder the circumstances, it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value.”). Thus, to recover damages for unjust 
enrichment the complaining party must establish that the equities of the case would otherwise 
make it unfair for the recipient of the enrichment to receive a benefit without making 
compensation for the value of that benefit.  
 
This is an admittedly close question; we cannot fault the district court for any confusion 
as to whether Radford was pursuing an unjust enrichment theory or a trespass damages theory. 
Radford’s pleadings and arguments below were a moving target that were difficult to follow. 
Nevertheless, Radford asserted the theory of unjust enrichment throughout the litigation: he 
pleaded it in his complaint, he presented testimony and evidence concerning it at trial, and he 
asserted it as a basis for relief in his closing arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that it was 
error for the district court not to address it in its decision. Therefore, this matter will be remanded 
so that the district court can reconsider the evidence adduced at trial and determine whether 
Radford is entitled to relief under his unjust enrichment theory. Based on this ruling, we do not 
need to address the additional issue raised in Radford’s cross-appeal as to whether the district 
court erred in ruling that Radford had not proven any trespass damages related to his trespass of 
cattle claim. 
 
E. The district court did not err by requiring a gate to be installed at the southern 
end 
     of Van Orden’s prescriptive easement.  
 
Radford next contends in his cross appeal that the district court erred when it granted Van 
Orden’s motion for reconsideration in part, by requiring Radford to construct a gate where the 
Orange Road meets the pole fence at the southern border of his Outlet Ridge Unit property. 
Radford asserts two points of error in the district court’s order, which we will address in turn.  
 
Initially, Radford argues that the district court’s findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence because Van Orden could access his easement without a gate at the southern border. 
While it may be true that without a gate, Van Orden could still access the Orange Road, that is 
not what the easement provides. Radford conceded at trial that the easement granted Van Orden 
 
25  
the right to use the Orange Road where it crosses his properties in both the Homer Basin Unit 
and the Outlet Ridge Unit. Shirlee Thompson granted the IDL, its successors and assigns, an 
“easement for the purpose of using and maintaining a road in connection with the control, 
management, use and administration of State lands.” The easement reads in part:  
 
This easement is specifically limited to ingress and egress for the control, 
management, administration, and use of [State] lands, or resources thereof, for the 
purpose of, including but not limited to, hauling logs and other forest products, 
hauling minerals, including sand and gravel, hauling agricultural products, 
moving livestock to and from [State’s] lands, agriculture uses, all commercial 
uses and leasing including energy production and transportation, for access for 
recreation, and fire prevention and control.  
As the district court noted, if Radford is allowed to keep his pole fence that blocks the 
southern access of the Orange Road, it interferes with Van Orden’s use of the easement. The 
district court correctly found that the easement across Radford’s property in the Outlet Ridge 
Unit would be useless because the Orange Road would not connect to anything – i.e., the road 
would be entirely enclosed within Radford’s property with no way to enter or exit. Part of the 
purpose of the Orange Road is to move livestock from lands in the Outlet Ridge Unit, across 
Radford’s property, to lands in the Homer Basin Unit. Without access to the Orange Road at the 
southern end of Radford’s property, the easement is useless and its purpose frustrated. Although 
Radford asserts that Van Orden has not shown he has an easement over the private property 
owned by certain nonparties located south of Radford where the Orange Road continues, that is 
not at issue in this case. The private parties who own that land have not been joined in this case. 
Therefore, as to the parties named and represented in this case, we conclude that the district court 
did not err.  
 
Second, Radford alleges that the district court’s decision gave Van Orden more rights 
than the IDL, which is the grantee and holder of the easement, because a different district court 
determined the IDL does not have a right to a gate to the Orange Road at Radford’s southern 
border. Radford’s argument is summarily made and it is not clear which findings or conclusions 
he challenges. The district court here determined that the other district court’s decision finding 
the State was not entitled to a gate at the southern border across the Orange Road was 
interlocutory and, thus, was not final. The district court in this case, therefore, did not treat that 
decision as controlling. Radford does not claim this was error. Without such an assignment, this 
Court will not review the issue any further.  
 
 
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F. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining Radford was the 
prevailing party in his fencing claim against Seven J and awarding reasonable 
attorney fees.  
Seven J contends that the district court abused its discretion by determining that Radford 
was the prevailing party below and awarding Radford all the costs and fees he requested. 
Additionally, Seven J argues the amount of attorney fees awarded was unreasonable pursuant to 
the considerations set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e).  
A district court’s determination of prevailing party status is left to the sound discretion of 
that court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 
Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). Similarly, “ ‘[a]n award of attorney fees and costs 
is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.’ 
” Nye v. Katsilometes, 165 Idaho 455, 459, 447 P.3d 903 907 (2019) (quoting Ballard v. Kerr, 
160 Idaho 674, 716, 378 P.3d 464, 506 (2016)). Again, when this Court reviews a trial court’s 
discretionary decision, we apply a four-prong test to determine whether there was an abuse of 
discretion: whether the trial court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choice available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of 
reason.” Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 194. 
 
Regarding the first assertion, even though the prevailing party determination is a 
discretionary decision by the district court, Seven J has failed to assert under which of the four 
Lunneborg prongs the district court abused its discretion. Seven J reiterates the argument made 
below that Radford did not prevail on all claims. Yet Radford prevailed on his sole claim against 
Seven J and successfully defended against Seven J’s sole counterclaim. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion by finding him the prevailing party. First, the district court perceived the 
issue of prevailing party as a discretionary decision. It then acted within the bounds of its 
discretion by applying the applicable legal standards to its decision. It noted that in cases with 
separate entities, similar to multi-party lawsuits, a plaintiff may recover fees if its only action 
against one of the parties is successful. The district court considered Radford’s relief sought - 
$5,505 for one half of the partition fence – compared to the relief granted - $5,000. Radford 
succeeded in his only claim against Seven J, while also successfully defending against Seven J’s 
counterclaim for a prescriptive easement across Radford’s property. The district court reached its 
decision through the exercise of reason. 
 
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Seven J argued that because Radford did not prevail on a motion in limine, this 
demonstrates that he did not prevail. However, the district court concluded that Radford’s motion 
was not determinative in its prevailing party analysis because it was an interlocutory motion 
made during the course of litigation, it was not pleaded as part of Radford’s claim for relief, and 
it did not prevent Radford from ultimately prevailing on his claim against Seven J. Therefore, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in its prevailing party determination because it 
perceived the decision as a discretionary one, it acted within its discretion, it noted the applicable 
legal principles, and it reached its decision through thoughtful reasoning.  
 
Next, Seven J makes many of the same arguments that it made below regarding specific 
billing entries, some for as little as 0.3 billable hours, and the billing methods of Radford’s 
attorneys. Essentially, Seven J requests this Court to conduct a de novo factual review of the 
billings similar to that performed by the district court. The district court’s thoughtful and detailed 
analysis addressed each and every one of Seven J’s specific complaints and showed no abuse of 
discretion. In fact, when warranted, the district court made reasonable adjustments to the billable 
hours.  
In its final argument challenging the attorney fees awarded below, Seven J claims the 
district court erred in its consideration of each of the factors enumerated by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(3). Seven J fails to assert under which of the four Lunneborg prongs the district 
court abused its discretion. Again, Seven J essentially asks this Court to perform a de novo 
review of the work performed on this case by Radford’s attorneys and issue findings reversing 
the district court. We decline to do so. The district court’s findings and analysis of each factor 
were well-supported and not an abuse of discretion. The time and skill required for adequate 
representation was due to Seven J’s contentions on Radford’s fencing notice and their 
counterclaim for a prescriptive easement. The obvious ill will between the parties only increased 
the difficulty and the expense of the litigation. Radford’s attorneys charged reasonable hourly 
rates, even if Seven J’s attorneys charged a lesser rate. Finally, although the attorney fees were 
higher than Radford’s recovery, it is not uncommon for legal fees to surpass the amount of 
recovery, especially when an important property right has been vindicated. 
In sum, the district court perceived the reasonableness of the attorney fee award as one of 
discretion, it acted within the boundaries of its discretion, and it applied the correct legal 
authorities. It reached its decision through the exercise of reason, and addressed each and every 
 
28  
one of Seven J’s objections in a thirty-seven page order. In reviewing those objections, the 
district court properly made reductions where necessary. Seven J has failed to demonstrate how 
the district court abused its discretion in any way and this Court affirms the district court’s 
prevailing party determination and award of reasonable attorney fees.  
G. Radford, as the prevailing party on appeal in his claims against Seven J, is entitled to 
recover attorney fees and costs associated with the fence claim.  
 
Radford requests attorney fees on appeal against only Seven J pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code section 12-120(1). Section 12-120(1) provides that “in any 
action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be 
taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount 
to be fixed by the court as attorney’s fees.”  The statute further requires a written demand for 
payment at least ten days before the action is filed. Id. Seven J concedes in its briefing that if 
Radford prevails on appeal regarding the partition fencing issue against Seven J, Radford should 
be awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(1). Accordingly, because Radford 
prevailed against Seven J on appeal, we award Radford reasonable attorney fees on appeal, but 
only for time devoted to the fence claim against Seven J. Additionally, as the prevailing party on 
Seven J’s appeal, Radford is also entitled to costs as a matter of course against Seven J pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Concerning Radford and Seven J’s appeal, we affirm the district court’s rulings that: (1) 
Radford has standing; (2) Naylor’s testimony and report were admissible and Radford proved the 
trespass damages with reasonable certainty; (3) Radford’s partition fence notice to Seven J was 
sufficient and required Seven J to reimburse Radford for the fence; (4) Radford was the 
prevailing party against Seven J and was entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees against 
Seven J below. Radford, as the prevailing party on appeal in his claims against Seven J, is 
entitled to recover attorney fees and costs from Seven J associated with the fence claim.  
As to Radford’s cross-appeal, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Radford was 
required to remove his fence across the prescriptive easement or install a gate for Van Orden’s 
ingress and egress. However, we reverse the district court’s decision denying Radford damages 
for trespass of cattle against Van Orden, and remand with instructions to consider whether Van 
Orden is entitled to relief under his unjust enrichment theory. Given the mixed result on the 
appeal and the cross-appeal, costs on appeal are not awarded to either Radford or Van Orden. 
 
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Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BURDICK, BRODY and STEGNER CONCUR.