Title: In re Summers

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In re Summers1999 WY 120987 P.2d 153Case Number: 98-127Decided: 08/20/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF KIT N. SUMMERS, AN EMPLOYEE OF 
AMOCO PRODUCTION:

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

PATTI SUMMERS, as natural 
guardian and next friend of TREVOR SUMMERS, CHAYSE SUMMERS, and ANNJULEA 
SUMMERS, surviving children of KIT N. SUMMERS, deceased, Appellees 
(Petitioners).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Uinta County The Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing appellant.

Terry J. Harris 
of Terry J. Harris, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, representing 
appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and TAYLOR, Ret. J. 

TAYLOR, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Appellant, the 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the Division), claims the 
district court erred by reversing the hearing examiner's denial of benefits to 
appellee, Kit N. Summers (Summers).1 Finding that Summers supported his 
claim sufficiently under the statute in effect at the time of his injury, and 
that the Division did not raise issues of timeliness prior to appeal, we affirm 
the order of the district court reversing the denial of 
benefits.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      The issues raised 
by the Division are:

The Employee 
filed his injury report nearly three years after receiving a definite diagnosis, 
and he submitted no evidence to disprove prejudice to the 
Division.

A. Does 
substantial evidence support a denial of benefits because of the untimely injury 
report?

The Hearing 
Examiner improperly applied the mental injury exclusion of the Act instead of 
the Court's pre-exclusion decisions.

B. Does 
substantial evidence support a denial of benefits under the Court's 
pre-exclusion decisions?

The district 
court apparently ruled that benefits "should be awarded" and remanded for a 
determination of the amount of benefits.

C. In the 
alternative, should this Court remand to let the Hearing Examiner consider the 
Employee's eligibility for benefits under the proper 
standard?

Summers states 
these issues:

Issue 1: Did the 
Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) act other than in accordance 
with Wyoming workers' compensation law when it entered its September 19, 1997 
final order, retrospectively applying post-July 1, 1994 provisions of the 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, to deny Appellee Kit N. Summers' request for 
Wyoming workers' compensation benefits for his panic disorder arising out of his 
employment with Amoco Production?

Issue 2: Did 
Summers' [sic] timely file his claim for compensation?

Issue 3: Is the 
Division to be allowed to raise, for the first time on appeal, its timely 
"reporting" issue, given the fact that the Division failed to properly raise 
that issue in its Final Determination actually referred to the OAH, and in the 
underlying contested case proceeding before the OAH?

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      Summers began 
working for Amoco Production Company (Amoco) in 1980. He held progressively more 
responsible positions, culminating in his promotion to Process Foreman at 
Amoco's Whitney Canyon processing plant in 1991 or 1992. Following that 
promotion, Amoco combined the functions of plant operations and plant 
maintenance, significantly increasing Summers' responsibilities. Amoco also 
transferred many of Summers' most experienced subordinates to another plant, 
further increasing his work load. Summers was essentially doing work that was 
previously done by up to five individuals.

[¶4]      On December 13, 
1993, Summers sought psychiatric treatment from Dr. Heinbecker for 
stress-related disorders. Dr. Heinbecker diagnosed panic disorder, and continued 
to treat Summers until October 22, 1996. Summers' last day of work at the 
Whitney Canyon plant was in February of 1994, although he continued to work for 
Amoco from his home and other locations. Amoco terminated Summers on June 14, 
1994. 

[¶5]      On May 31, 1996, 
Summers filed a Wyoming Report of Occupational Injury or Disease. The Division 
responded with a letter requesting more information and medical records. On July 
26, 1996, the Division issued a Final Determination denying Summers' claim 
because Summers had provided neither medical records nor a valid explanation for 
the late filing of the claim. Summers submitted a written request for a hearing 
on August 12, 1996. On August 27, 1996, the Division referred the matter to the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for a hearing on "Denial of 
compensability of case." That same day, the Division issued a second Final 
Determination denying Summers' claim because it found there was "no specific 
incident or incidents that would determine that this is directly a work related 
injury."

[¶6]      On December 30, 
1996, the OAH issued an order setting the hearing for April 25, 1997. The order 
stated that "[t]he issues to be heard and the matter asserted are contained in 
the objections and reasons therefore, filed with the Office of the Clerk of the 
District Court, Uinta County, Evanston, Wyoming." Unfortunately, no such 
document is to be found in the record. The hearing took place in two parts on 
April 25 and May 23, 1997.

[¶7]      The OAH issued 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Benefits on 
September 19, 1997. The hearing examiner reasoned that the case should be 
decided based on the law in effect at the time Summers filed his claim, rather 
than the law in effect at the time his condition was diagnosed. Summers appealed 
to the district court, which reversed the denial and remanded the case to the 
OAH for reconsideration. The Division filed a timely notice of appeal to this 
Court.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) provides our standard of review for agency 
decisions:

(c) * * * The 
reviewing court shall:

* * 
*

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

* * 
*

(D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

We afford no 
deference to the decision of the district court; rather, we consider the case as 
if it had come directly to us from the agency. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1997). We will not disturb 
an agency's finding of fact unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 
875 (Wyo. 1994). Agency conclusions of law are affirmed only if they are in 
accord with the law. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 
1996).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Both Summers and 
the Division agree that the hearing examiner erred in applying the statute in 
effect at the time of filing rather than the one in effect when Summers' 
disorder was diagnosed. Instead of upholding the decision based on the hearing 
examiner's reasoning, the Division urges us to uphold the denial of benefits for 
lack of sufficient evidence and untimely filing.

A. SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE

[¶10]   The Wyoming worker's compensation 
statute erroneously applied by the hearing examiner excludes from coverage 
"[a]ny mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, it 
occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury * * *." Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1995). However, when Dr. 
Heinbecker diagnosed Summers' disorder in 1993, there was no such exclusion. At 
that time, a worker could recover for mental injuries developing gradually 
without an accompanying physical injury. Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
713 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1986). To collect benefits for such an injury, the 
worker was required to "show that the injury was caused by workplace stress of a 
greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other 
workers employed in the same or similar jobs." Id. at 193.

[¶11]   Because the hearing examiner 
assumed the Graves standard was inapplicable, he did not specifically determine 
whether Summers' injury was caused by greater stress than that experienced by 
others in similar jobs. However, he did make separate findings that we can 
combine to answer that question. The hearing examiner found that Summers "was 
attempting to handle responsibilities which previously had been handled by up to 
as many as 5 different individual supervisors." He further found that as process 
foreman, Summers was "actually shouldering much more responsibility than his 
predecessor, `nervous' Curtis." In addition, the hearing examiner said "[f]rom 
both the medical and lay evidence presented, the Office concludes that at least 
some of Summers' mental problems including his panic disorder arose out of the 
work effort associated with Summers' job responsibilities as Process Foreman at 
the Whitney Canyon plant site." Taken together, these findings reveal that 
Summers was under greater stress than others in similar jobs, which led to his 
mental injury. Therefore, his injury is a compensable one under the appropriate 
law.

B. 
TIMELINESS

[¶12]   The Division next contends that 
Summers' claim is barred because he did not comply with the requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 (Michie Repl. 1991):

(a) As soon as 
is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the general nature 
of the injury became apparent, an injured employee shall report the occurrence 
and general nature of the accident to the employer and within ten (10) days 
after the injury became apparent, file the report in the office of the clerk of 
court of the county in which the accident occurred. Within one (1) working day 
after receipt of the employee's report, the clerk shall transmit a copy of the 
report to the division and the employer. If the injured employee is physically 
unable to comply, a personal representative of the employee, his dependents or a 
personal representative of the dependents in case of death shall make and file 
the report. The report shall contain information prescribed by rules and 
regulations of the director.

* * 
*

(c) Failure of 
the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to report the 
accident to the employer and to file the report with the clerk of court in 
accordance with subsection (a) of this section is a presumption that the claim 
shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted if the employee establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in 
investigating the accident and in monitoring medical 
treatment.

The Division 
argues that Summers' injury became apparent on December 13, 1993, when Dr. 
Heinbecker diagnosed it. It reasons that because Summers did not file his claim 
within ten days after the diagnosis, and presented no evidence that the Division 
was not prejudiced by the late filing, his claim is barred by the 
statute.

[¶13]   Anticipating Summers' argument that 
timely reporting cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, the Division 
contends that it is a jurisdictional issue, and therefore is appropriately 
raised at any time. In support of that position, the Division cites Seckman v. 
Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 167-68 (Wyo. 1989). The Division is correct in its 
assertion that while W.R.A.P. 12.09 generally confines review to the issues set 
forth in the petition and raised before the agency, jurisdictional issues may be 
considered at any time. Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992). However, it looks in vain to Seckman for the proposition 
that timely reporting in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 is a 
prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. In that case, we said timely filing 
of a claim within the statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-12-503 (Michie 1977) (replaced by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503) was a 
prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction, but we said nothing about Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502. Seckman, 783 P.2d  at 166-67.

[¶14]   Summers does indeed argue that the 
Division's timeliness claim cannot be raised on appeal for the first time, and 
further contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 reporting is not a 
jurisdictional issue. Summers relies on a recent decision in which this Court 
refused to consider a Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 matter raised for the first 
time on appeal. Matter of Zielinske, 959 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1998). His reliance 
is misplaced, however, because that holding addressed only whether the time for 
the claimant to report an injury was tolled by the employer's failure to file 
its own injury report. Id. at 710. Holding the matter was neither jurisdictional 
nor fundamental, we declined to reach it, but did not specifically state, as 
Summers implies, that all Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 matters are 
non-jurisdictional. In truth, nothing in the statute itself or our decisions 
thereunder states that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 reporting is, or is not, a 
prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.

[¶15]   The above-cited language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(c) provides some insight into the purpose of the statute. 
It suggests that timely reporting is required to allow the employer and the 
Division an opportunity to investigate the accident or injury and monitor 
medical treatment. This purpose, while important, is not related to 
jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that timely reporting under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 is not a prerequisite to subject matter 
jurisdiction.

[¶16]   The Wyoming legislature has 
provided this guidance for interpretation of worker's compensation 
legislation:

(b) It is the 
intent of the legislature in creating the Wyoming worker's compensation division 
that the laws administered by it to provide a worker's benefit system be 
interpreted to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical 
benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to the employers 
who are subject to the Worker's Compensation Act. It is the specific intent of 
the legislature that benefit claims cases be decided on their merits and that 
the common law rule of "liberal construction" based on the supposed "remedial" 
basis of workers' benefits legislation shall not apply in these cases. The 
worker's benefit system in Wyoming is based on a mutual renunciation of common 
law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike. Accordingly, the 
legislature declares that the Worker's Compensation Act is not remedial in any 
sense and is not to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of any 
party.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-101(b) (LEXIS 1999). While this Court may no longer interpret worker's 
compensation statutes in favor of coverage, we will interpret them in a way that 
gives effect to the legislative intent and preserves the historic compromise 
between workers and employers. If the Division can "lay in the grass" and try 
out theories one by one as it did here, the compromise would be 
broken.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶17]   In its final decision letter of 
August 27, 1996, the Division said it denied Summers' claim because it was not 
work related. At the administrative hearing, the Division presented neither 
opening or closing arguments, nor did it present any witnesses or other 
evidence. Thus, the timely reporting question was never at issue until the 
appeal to the district court. While Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(c) clearly gives 
a late-filing claimant the burden to show that the Division and the employer 
were not prejudiced by the delay, the party opposing coverage must assert the 
issue or it is waived.

[¶18]   The decision of the district court 
reversing the denial of benefits is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Pursuant to 
the Notice of Appellee Kit N. Summers' Death, counsel for Summers notified this 
Court that Summers died on January 13, 1999. On August 10, 1999, counsel 
submitted a Motion to Substitute Parties, and on August 19, 1999, this Court 
entered an Order Granting Motion to Substitute Party Appellee, naming, as 
appellees, Patti Summers, as natural guardian and next friend of Trevor Summers, 
Chayse Summers, and Annjulea Summers, surviving children of Kit N. Summers, 
deceased.