Title: Ivie v. Smith

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
RICHARD E. IVIE, JIMMIE R. IVIE, 
 
) 
LADONNA SMALL, AND BERNARD IVIE, ) 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC93872 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
ARNOLD L. SMITH AND 
 
 
 
) 
SIDNEY B. SMITH, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellants.  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY 
The Honorable Benjamin Frederick Lewis, Judge 
 
Opinion issued July 8, 2014 
 
 
Arnold and Sidney Smith (collectively, "Smith") appeal the circuit court's 
judgment declaring changes to an estate plan void due to lack of testamentary capacity 
and undue influence.  Patricia Watson created a trust in 2002, which left substantially all 
of her property to her half siblings.  The trust expressly excluded Arnold Smith, her 
husband.  Several years later, after Watson's mental health had deteriorated, Watson 
signed two separate amendments to her trust, signed changes to beneficiary designations 
on her bank accounts and retirement accounts, and signed documents retitling several of 
her accounts and vehicles.  The effect was that almost all of Watson's personal property 
passed to Smith when Watson died.  Her half siblings sued and prevailed in a court-tried 
case.  Because this Court holds that the circuit court's judgment that Watson lacked 
capacity is supported by the record and is not against the weight of the evidence, there is 
no need to address the undue influence claims.  The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
Factual and Procedural Background1 
 
Watson, the decedent, was raised in Missouri.  Early in life, she took a job 
teaching elementary school in the state of California.  Despite the distance, she retained 
close ties with her half siblings, Richard Ivie, Jimmie Ivie, Ladonna Small, and Bernard 
Ivie ("the Ivies").  Watson had three previous husbands before she married Smith, and 
she had only one child, a daughter who was murdered in 1980.   
 
Watson retired from teaching in February 2002, and she married Smith on 
February 20, 2002, in California.  At the time of their marriage, Watson was 70 years old 
and Smith was 60 years old.  Watson had substantial income and approximately $1 
million in assets.  This included her home in California, several parcels of real estate in 
southeast Missouri, a pension from the California State Teachers' Retirement System 
(CALSTRS), and several bank accounts, retirement accounts, and vehicles.  Smith, on the 
other hand, had filed for bankruptcy in 1997 and had minimal income and assets.  The 
two lived together in Watson's California home until moving to Missouri in 2004. 
Watson's Original Trust 
 
Watson created her original trust on May 9, 2002, about three months after 
marrying Smith.  At the same time, Watson also created a will with a provision "pouring 
over" all of her estate's assets into the trust.  Although they were living in California at 
the time, Watson's Missouri attorney, Reginald Young, prepared the documents.   
                                             
 
1 Much is drawn from the court of appeals' opinion without further attribution. 
 
Watson wanted the trust to own all of her property so she could retain control over 
it.  Both Watson and Smith signed deeds conveying all of Watson's real estate to the trust.  
When they moved back to Missouri, they placed the proceeds from the sale of the 
California home in the trust and deeded the new Missouri home to the trust.  The trust 
also owned or was the beneficiary of several of Watson's bank and retirement accounts.   
 
The Ivies were the sole beneficiaries of the trust.  Under its original terms, the 
Ivies were to divide the trust assets and proceeds equally.  The trust also stated: "It is 
expressly the Grantor's intention that her husband, Arnold L. Smith, not receive any part 
of the Trust Estate." 
Events Leading Up to the First Trust Amendment 
 
Watson began showing signs that her mental heath was progressively deteriorating 
long before signing an amendment to the trust for the first time on July 27, 2007.  As 
early as January 2003, she saw a physician for physical ailments.  The physician noted in 
his report: "She thinks her husband is trying to poison her with rat poison.  She denies 
hallucinations, but apparently gets very angry quickly on questioning. . . . At this time the 
patient seems to have paranoia." 
 
Watson and Smith moved to Missouri in late 2004.  Around this time, Watson told 
her sister that she was having trouble remembering words and names.  According to her 
sister, Watson wanted a divorce from Smith because he had ruined her life.  Watson also 
told one of her brothers that she thought she was losing her mind, that she was afraid of 
Smith, and that she thought he was trying to poison her. 
 
3
 
Watson visited several physicians in 2005, complaining in part about memory 
loss.  Early in 2005, one of her physicians prescribed Namenda, a drug used to treat 
moderate to severe dementia.2  She persisted in her belief that Smith was trying to poison 
her.  Another physician noted that she was "perhaps somewhat paranoid" but ordered 
poisoning tests anyway.  Although she accepted that the results were within normal 
limits, she maintained that she had been poisoned for the previous four years. 
 
Watson had a neuro-psychological evaluation at the Mayo Clinic in October 2005.  
She told the physicians she had trouble with forgetfulness and that she could not think.  
She reported that, since her daughter had been killed in 1980, "I haven't been the same."  
According to the physician's report, Smith told the physician that Watson's word-finding 
abilities had gradually worsened over the prior six months.  Smith also told the physician 
that Watson had trouble following instructions and remembering things, trouble with 
misplacing things, disorganization in thinking, and loss of train of thought mid-
conversation.  In addition, Smith mentioned that Watson had trouble managing her 
checkbook and that she had allowed him to take over.  During testing procedures, Watson 
was impatient with long instructions, which often needed to be simplified so she could 
understand.   
 
The test results showed "a mild to moderate degree of cognitive impairment," 
which "likely" reflected an abnormality that had appeared on brain imaging tests.  The 
report stated that Watson would "require continued supervision and assistance with 
complex activities of daily living, including assistance with any medical, legal, or 
                                             
 
2 The medical records do not reflect whether she ever actually took Namenda. 
 
4
financial decision-making."  The Mayo Clinic physician concluded that Watson's 
condition was most consistent with a diagnosis of vascular dementia.  He recommended 
ongoing monitoring because he could not rule out a "neurodegenerative process." 
 
As time passed, it became apparent that Watson's mental condition was getting 
worse.  She began seeing a new physician in March 2006, complaining in part about 
progressive problems with short-term memory.  Although Watson's only child had been 
murdered in 1980, she apparently told the physician she had "[o]ne child, alive and well."  
The same physician diagnosed probable Alzheimer's dementia in October 2006 and stated 
without qualification in November 2006 that the diagnosis was Alzheimer's dementia.  
He prescribed her Aricept, which is used to treat Alzheimer's disease.   
 
Before Watson executed the first trust amendment, she was no longer able to care 
for herself and was dependent on help from others.  She needed help with all of her daily 
living activities, including walking, bathing, dressing, preparing meals, using the 
telephone, driving, getting in and out of the car, and walking up and down stairs.  By 
May 2007, at a family gathering, Watson did not recognize the children of one of her 
brothers and other previously known family members.   
 
Soon after, she went to the hospital for physical problems.  The hospital records 
show that on June 25, 2007, she was "confused" and "oriented to self only," that she was 
non-responsive to the nurses' attempts to orient her "to time and place," and that she made 
inappropriate statements suggesting impaired memory.  The treating physician diagnosed 
her with "[m]ild dementia, probably Alzheimer's disease" and recommended increasing 
her Aricept prescription.  He also recommended further testing and suggested 
 
5
supplementing with Namenda if the dementia worsened.  She left the hospital June 29, 
2007.  
The First Trust Amendment 
 
On July 10, 2007, Watson had a meeting with her attorney, Young, about 
executing a power of attorney.  Her sister testified that Watson understood what was 
going on at that meeting.  Apparently, Watson told the Ivies at some point that she was 
going to give them each $25,000.  Roughly one month after leaving the hospital, on July 
27, 2007, Watson signed the first trust amendment decreasing the Ivies' share of her 
property and granting Smith a share.  Each of the Ivies would now receive $25,000 upon 
her death.  Smith would receive the remainder.  The amendment also added a "no-
contest" clause, because of an apparent conflict between Smith and the Ivies, the purpose 
of which was to cause anyone challenging the trust to lose his or her share. 
 
Watson's attorney, Young, prepared the amendment.  According to Young, 
Watson had spoken with him several times in July leading up to the signing of the first 
trust amendment, both on the telephone and in person.  Young testified that Watson had 
changed her mind about not including Smith in the trust since their marriage five years 
before because she realized Smith would receive nothing when she died.  He also 
testified that Watson understood what was going on and that, by amending the trust, she 
was leaving most of her property to Smith.  However, Young did not know she had been 
 
6
diagnosed with dementia.  He admitted at trial that, had he known about the diagnosis, it 
would have caused concern.3 
Changes to Bank Accounts and Retirement Accounts 
 
Watson's mental health continued to worsen.  At some point after July 2007, she 
visited one of her neighbors and took off her own clothes in the neighbor's living room.  
She began receiving in-home nursing care in November 2007.  The nurses' reports reflect 
that Watson's dementia was uncontrolled, she answered questions inappropriately and 
changed the subject frequently, she was paranoid and became very upset when she could 
not find something, she cried at inappropriate times, and she experienced forgetfulness 
and mood swings.  At the physicians' office in early January 2008, Smith filled out the 
intake form for "thinking or memory problems."  He circled "yes" for each of these 
conditions: 
Problems with judgment (problems making decisions, bad financial 
decisions, problems with thinking, etc.); Less interest in hobbies/activities; 
Trouble learning how to use a tool, appliance, or gadget (VCR, computer, 
microwave, remote control, etc.); Forgets correct month or year; Trouble 
handling complicated financial affairs (balancing checkbook, income taxes, 
paying bills, etc.); Trouble remembering appointments; Daily problems 
with thinking or memory. 
 
 
From early December 2007 to mid-January 2008, Watson signed changes to 
several of her bank accounts and retirement accounts.  She retitled her checking account 
and money market account from the trust to her own name individually and signed 
documents to "pay on death" to Smith.  Watson transferred funds from a certificate of 
                                             
 
3 Although Young testified that Watson signed the trust amendment in his presence, Young's 
billing records do not affirmatively indicate that he was physically present on the date of signing. 
 
7
deposit (CD) owned by the trust to a new savings account opened in her name 
individually, also with a pay-on-death designation in favor of Smith.  And for two of her 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), Watson signed changes in the beneficiary 
designations in favor of Smith, which previously designated the trust (for one account) 
and the Ivies (for the other).4 
The Second Trust Amendment 
 
Watson's nurses chronicled her worsening mental condition beginning in January 
2008 and leading up to the date of execution of the second trust amendment.  The in-
home nursing staff noted that her forgetfulness continued and that she had bouts of 
confusion.  The following are a few examples.  In late January, she asked Smith, "Am I 
still your wife? Are we married?"  In late March, she was disoriented in her home and 
could not find the bathroom.  In April, she wanted her lawn hand-pulled instead of 
mowed.  In May, she was hospitalized after falling, and the "fall risk assessment" on the 
hospital reports repeatedly showed that she was "Confused/Disoriented/Senile/Irrational/ 
Non-Compliant."  On June 5, back at home, Watson said that she saw a baby while 
staring at the ceiling and that she was hearing voices. 
 
Watson lived in a nursing home from June 9, 2008, until July 2, 2008, which was 
the day she signed the second trust amendment.  The nursing home records show that 
Watson was confused and disoriented throughout her stay.  On June 9, she "seemed 
confused about where she was and about her husband, her home and finances."  The next 
                                             
 
4 In October 2008, she also transferred funds from the second of these IRAs to a new IRA, 
which also named Smith as the beneficiary.  The Court will refer to these various bank accounts 
and retirement accounts collectively, as "accounts." 
 
8
day, when the nurse performed a finger stick, Watson asked if her hand would grow back, 
which the nurse considered a sincere question.  On June 30, she was "confused to time 
and place."  On July 2, although Watson was oriented as to who she was and where she 
was, the nurse's report states that she was still "[c]onfused to time."  That same day, 
Watson signed the second trust amendment after leaving the nursing home. 
 
The second trust amendment, which Young also prepared, further reduced the 
Ivies' shares in the trust estate and increased Smith's share.  Now instead of $25,000, each 
of the Ivies would receive $5,000.  In addition, Smith's son from a previous marriage, 
Sydney Smith, was included to receive $5,000, and the step-daughter of one of Watson's 
brothers was included to receive $5,000.  Smith would receive the remainder.  Because 
Young recognized that Watson's mental health had deteriorated and because he 
anticipated controversy over the changes to Watson's estate plan, he prepared a 
memorandum for his file stating that he believed she understood what she was doing.  
However, Young had never reviewed any of Watson's medical records and did not seek a 
medical opinion before helping her finalize the amendment.5 
                                             
 
5 Young testified as follows: 
Q.  And it's also true you had not reviewed any medical records before Ms. Watson signed her 
first amendment on 7/27/07, correct? 
A.  I don't think I've ever reviewed any medical records of Patricia. 
. . . . 
Q.  Okay.  So your testimony it [sic] would not be the prudent thing to do if you had questions 
about capacity to get a doctor's opinion?  You decide that yourself? 
A.  No, I'm not saying it wouldn't be prudent, but in this case I didn't know about the dementia 
diagnosis. (Tr. 323, 329.) 
 
9
Changes to Watson's Pension and Retitling of Vehicles 
 
 
Shortly after Watson signed the second trust amendment, Smith started obtaining 
"affidavits of incapacity" signed by five physicians.  Each of the five affidavits was a 
standard form supplied by Smith, and each stated the following: 
Patricia P. Watson . . . is, by reason of advanced age, physical incapacity or 
mental weakness, incapable of managing . . . her own estate; lacks mental 
capacity to enter into a binding agreement or make decisions on . . . her 
own behalf; [and] does not have the ability to understand that a contract is 
being made and its general nature. 
 
The first affidavit was executed July 22, 2008.  The other affidavits were executed by 
four different physicians the following August, September, and February. 
 
On July 24, 2008, two days after the first affidavit of incapacity was signed, Smith 
filled out a change-of-beneficiary form for Watson's pension from CALSTRS, and 
Watson signed it.  This reduced Watson's during-life payments from her pension in 
exchange for survivor benefits for Smith. 
 
In December 2008, Watson and Smith met with a new attorney, Clayton 
Vandivort, for the purpose of retitling more of Watson's property.  Vandivort did not 
recognize that Watson had any mental impairment.  For each of her vehicles, Smith was 
added as either a joint title holder or a transfer-on-death beneficiary.6  Watson died April 
10, 2009. 
                                             
 
6 Although they also attempted to retitle her real estate, this was not accomplished. 
 
10
Circuit Court Proceedings and Procedural History 
 
After Watson's death, the Ivies filed this action seeking to set aside the trust 
amendments, beneficiary designations, and various property transfers.7  Among the many 
witnesses at trial, Smith, Young, the Ivies, and two medical experts testified.  The experts 
gave conflicting testimony.   
 
The Ivies' expert was Dr. Adam Sky, a geriatric psychiatrist.  Based on his review 
of Watson's medical records as a whole, it was his opinion, to a 90-percent degree of 
certainty, that Watson had a progressive form of dementia.  He testified that Watson did 
not have testamentary capacity at any time after July 1, 2007, and that she was 
incapacitated when each of the changes to her estate plan was made.  He also testified 
that it was possible that Watson appeared to her attorneys to have testamentary capacity 
when she actually did not. 
 
Smith's expert, Dr. Randall Huss, a medical doctor board-certified in geriatric 
medicine, also reviewed Watson's medical records.  He agreed that Watson's condition 
was progressive but testified that people with dementia can have lucid moments.  Dr. 
Huss's opinion was that Watson had testamentary capacity when she made the changes to 
her estate plan.  He based his opinion in part on the testimony of Watson's attorneys that 
Watson knew what she was doing each time she made a change. 
 
The circuit court entered judgment for the Ivies.  In its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the circuit court expressly found the testimony of Dr. Sky credible 
                                             
 
7 The Ivies filed two separate lawsuits seeking the same relief, one of which was filed in 
Smith's probate proceedings.  The two lawsuits were consolidated for trial. 
 
11
and expressly found the testimony of Smith, Young, and Dr. Huss not persuasive.  Smith 
was found not credible because he repeatedly denied the assertions about Watson's 
mental health in the physicians' and nurses' reports, even though Smith himself reported 
many of Watson's mental impairments.  The circuit court considered Young's testimony 
not persuasive because he was unaware of Watson's medical records when he assisted her 
in preparing the trust amendments.8 
 
The circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Watson lacked 
testamentary capacity with regard to all of the changes to her estate plan and (2) the 
changes were the product of Smith's undue influence.  In support of its conclusion, the 
circuit court stated the following: 
The conclusion that Patricia lacked of [sic] testamentary capacity . . . [is] 
not dependent on any one or even any number of the many facts found in 
this judgment.  The evidence of Patricia's lack of testamentary capacity was 
overwhelming . . . . 
 
The circuit court ruled that both trust amendments, the changes to beneficiary 
designations, and the property transfers were void.  Its judgment directed that the 
CALSTRS pension benefit go directly to the Ivies and directed that the other non-trust 
assets go to Watson's probate estate.  This Court ordered transfer after the court of 
appeals issued an opinion and, therefore, has jurisdiction.  See Mo. Const. art. V, § 10; 
Rule 83.04. 
                                             
 
8 The circuit court also found that Young's memory of the first trust amendment was unreliable 
and that his file, his billing records, and the estate plan documents indicated that Young was not 
actually physically present when Watson signed the first amendment to the trust. 
 
12
Standard of Review 
 
On review of a court-tried case, an appellate court will affirm the circuit court's 
judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of 
the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.  Murphy v. Carron, 536 
S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).  The same standard of review applies in all types of 
court-tried cases9 regardless of the burden of proof at trial.10  In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d 
624, 626 n.4, 631 (Mo. banc 2014).   
Analysis 
 
Smith argues that the circuit court's judgment of incapacity and undue influence is 
not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, and 
misapplies the law.11  This Court holds that substantial evidence supports the circuit 
court's judgment that Watson lacked testamentary capacity to make the changes to her 
estate plan and that the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence.  The Court 
                                             
 
9 Prior statements from this and other Courts to the effect that greater deference is paid to the 
trial court in certain types of cases (e.g., family law) than in others are incorrect and misleading.  
Those prior statements should not be read to mean anything more than that such cases often 
require the trial court to weigh a great deal of conflicting evidence before finding the highly 
subjective facts required by the applicable statutory factors. 
10 The Ivies concede that their burden of proving Watson's incapacity was proof by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence.  (Respondents' Br. at 63.)  Because the parties have not briefed 
the burden of proof issue, this Court simply presumes, without deciding, that the Ivies are correct 
that they bore the burden of proving Watson's incapacity, as contestants, and that their burden 
was proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 
11 In several instances, Smith's appellate brief combines into the same point relied on a 
substantial-evidence challenge, a misapplication-of-law challenge, and an against-the-weight-of-
the-evidence challenge. These are distinct claims.  See In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 630 n.10; 
Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. banc 2012); Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32.  They must 
appear in separate points relied on in the appellant's brief to be preserved for appellate review.  
Rule 84.04; see In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 630 n.10.  This Court will gratuitously address the 
merits of Smith's claims.  Appellate counsel should take caution to follow Rule 84.04(d). 
 
13
further holds that, although the circuit court misapplied the law regarding the level of 
mental capacity required to change beneficiary designations, the circuit court's error was 
not prejudicial because the mental capacity required to make a contract is greater than the 
"testamentary capacity" standard applied by the circuit court.  Rule 84.13(b) (stating that 
no appellate court shall reverse a judgment unless the circuit court committed an error 
"against the appellant materially affecting the merits of the action").  Because the 
findings of incapacity are sufficient to sustain the circuit court's judgment, this Court 
need not address the additional claims of undue influence.12  See Roberts v. BJC Health 
Sys., 391 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Mo. banc 2013) ("[A]ny trial court judgment[] can be 
affirmed on appeal by any appropriate theory supported by the record."). 
I. 
Standard of Review for Substantial-Evidence Challenges 
 
 
Substantial evidence is evidence that, if believed, has some probative force on 
each fact that is necessary to sustain the circuit court's judgment.  See In re K.A.W., 133 
S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. banc 2004).  Evidence has probative force if it has any tendency to 
make a material fact more or less likely.  See Kansas City v. Keene Corp., 855 S.W.2d 
360, 367 (Mo. banc 1993).  When reviewing whether the circuit court's judgment is 
supported by substantial evidence, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the circuit court's judgment and defer to the circuit court's credibility 
determinations.  In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626, 631-32 & n.14.  Appellate courts 
                                             
 
12 Smith also argues, apparently in the alternative, that if this Court were to hold that only the 
second trust amendment was void, the no-contest clause in the first amended trust would prevent 
the Ivies from recovering their specified shares of $25,000 each.  Because this Court affirms the 
circuit court's judgment that both trust amendments were void, the no-contest clause in the first 
amended trust has no effect. 
 
14
"'accept as true the evidence and inferences . . . favorable to the trial court's decree and 
disregard all contrary evidence.'"  Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 
231 (Mo. banc 2013).  In addition, this Court has made clear that no contrary evidence 
need be considered on a substantial-evidence challenge, regardless of whether the burden 
of proof at trial was proof by a "preponderance of the evidence" or proof by "clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence."  In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626 n.4, 631; In re 
Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. banc 2011). 
 
Circuit courts are free to believe any, all, or none of the evidence presented at trial.  
In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 627.  The circuit court in this case made extensive findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  In addition, Rule 73.01 provides that "all fact issues upon 
which no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found in 
accordance with the result reached."  Id. at 626. 
II. 
The Circuit Court's Finding That Watson Lacked Testamentary Capacity as 
to the Trust Amendments Is Supported by Substantial Evidence 
   
 
 
To prevail on the substantial-evidence challenge, Smith must demonstrate that 
there is no evidence in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the 
circuit court's judgment as a matter of law.  See In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626-27; In re 
K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 9.  Smith's claim fails because he has mischaracterized what 
factual findings are necessary to sustain a finding of incapacity and because he has 
ignored this Court's standard of review. 
 
The capacity required to make or amend a revocable trust is the same as that 
required to make a will—"testamentary capacity."  Section 456.6-601, RSMo Supp. 
 
15
2013; Lewis v. McCullough, 413 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Mo. 1967).  A person has 
testamentary capacity if the person is at least 18 years of age, or emancipated, and is of 
sound mind.  Section 474.310, RSMo 2000.  A person is of sound mind if he or she  
(1) understands the ordinary affairs of life, (2) understands the nature and extent of his or 
her property, (3) knows the persons who are the natural objects of his or her bounty, and 
(4) understands that, by executing the instrument, he or she is giving property to persons 
in the manner specified in the instrument.  Lewis, 413 S.W.2d at 505; Gardine v. Cottey, 
230 S.W.2d 731, 746 (Mo. banc 1950); MAI-Civil 15.01 ("Sound and Disposing Mind 
and Memory").13  A will or trust is deemed void if the person making it lacked sound 
mind at the time of execution.  See Watson v. Watson, 562 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Mo. banc 
1978).   
 
Smith argues that the circuit court's judgment cannot be sustained because the 
Ivies were required to submit evidence of some observation of Watson's lack of 
testamentary capacity that occurred on the precise date the trust was amended.  Smith has 
mischaracterized the law.  It is true that there must be evidence tending to prove that 
testamentary capacity was not present at the time the will or trust was executed.  
                                             
 
13 "The phrase 'sound and disposing mind and memory' as used in this [these] instruction[s] 
means that when a person signs a [will] [codicil] that person: 
 
 
First, was able to understand the ordinary affairs of life, and 
 
 
Second, was able to understand the nature and extent of that person's property, and 
 
 
Third, was able to know the persons who were the natural objects of that person's 
 
bounty, and 
 
 
Fourth, could intelligently weigh and appreciate that person's natural obligations to 
 
those person's [sic]." 
 
16
Ambruster v. Sutton, 244 S.W.2d 65, 72 (Mo. 1951).  In addition, this Court has held that 
a treating physician's testimony that a testator was mentally unsound most but not all of 
the time prior to executing a will is insufficient alone to sustain a finding that the testator 
lacked testamentary capacity.  Smith v. Fitzjohn, 188 S.W.2d 832, 143-44 (Mo. banc 
1945).  However, evidence of mental unsoundness either before or after execution, which 
is not too remote, is admissible to prove lack of testamentary capacity, as long as the 
evidence indicates the unsoundness existed at the time the will or trust was made.  Id. at 
143; Ambruster, 244 S.W.2d at 72.  
 
Here, the Ivies presented evidence at trial tending to prove Watson lacked 
testamentary capacity at the time both trust amendments were made.  Dr. Sky testified 
that Watson did not have testamentary capacity at any point after July 1, 2007, which was 
before the first trust amendment was signed.  The circuit court was free to believe this 
testimony and conclude that, at the time Watson executed both trust amendments on July 
27, 2007, and July 2, 2008, she did not meet any one of the four conditions required to 
have testamentary capacity: that she understood the ordinary affairs of her life, 
understood what property she owned, knew who her relatives were, and understood that 
executing a trust amendment would change the disposition of her property when she died.  
See Lewis, 413 S.W.2d at 505; Ambruster, 244 S.W.2d at 72.  Therefore, substantial 
evidence supports the circuit court's judgment that both trust amendments were void. 
 
Smith contends that the court of appeals' decisions in Hahn v. Tanksley, 317 
S.W.3d 145, 153-55 (Mo. App. 2010), and Morse v. Volz, 808 S.W.2d 424, 430-32 (Mo. 
App. 1991), "discounted" this type of evidence for proof of lack of testamentary capacity.  
 
17
The court of appeals in Morse merely "confirm[ed] the accepted rule that evidence of the 
sickness, old age and eccentric conduct of a testator, taken alone, do not suffice to 
overthrow a will on the ground of mental incapacity."  808 S.W.2d at 430.  The court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's submission of the issue of testamentary capacity to the 
jury, noting that the contestant's expert witness could not say that the testator was 
"uniformly and consistently affected by" the mental defect.  Id. at 431.  In contrast, Dr. 
Sky definitively testified in this case that Watson lacked testamentary capacity at all 
points after July 1, 2007. 
 
The court of appeals in Hahn, on the other hand, affirmed the circuit court's 
finding that testamentary capacity was present.  317 S.W.3d at 156.  It reached this 
conclusion after deferring to the circuit court's credibility determinations in accordance 
with the substantial-evidence standard of review.  Id. at 153-55.  Hahn did not hold that 
medical evidence is insufficient to prove lack of testamentary capacity as a matter of law.  
It stands only for the proposition that the appellate court defers to the circuit court's 
resolution of conflicting evidence.  See id.  
 
Although the testamentary capacity standard takes into account the ability of 
persons who have been diagnosed with some form of mental defect to make a valid will 
or trust, it is the circuit court's function and responsibility to determine the factual issue 
of whether a person had testamentary capacity at the particular time of execution.    In 
addition, if evidence of lack of testamentary capacity on the precise date of execution 
were required as a matter of law, a contestant could not prevail in the most egregious 
case—a person who has successfully concealed his or her exertion of power over the 
 
18
victim would need only to hide him or her from others on the date of execution.  The 
circuit court is in the best position to decide precisely when a person has testamentary 
capacity, and this Court defers to its findings. 
 
Smith's arguments rely primarily on the testimony of Young, which the circuit 
court found not persuasive, as well as other evidence that was contrary to the result 
reached by the circuit court.  These arguments ignore not only this Court's standard of 
review, but also the principle that the circuit court is free to believe all, part, or none of 
the evidence.  In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 631.  Smith's failure to consider this Court's 
standard of review makes his challenge to the circuit court's finding of incapacity of no 
analytical or persuasive value.  See id. at 632.  Dr. Sky's testimony that Watson lacked 
testamentary capacity at all times after July 1, 2007, has a tendency to prove Watson 
lacked testamentary capacity at the time each trust amendment was made.  Even in the 
absence of Dr. Sky's testimony, there was considerable other evidence of her incapacity 
both before and after the amendments from which the circuit court would be permitted to 
draw an inference of incapacity on the date in question.  Therefore, the circuit court's 
judgment that they were void is supported by substantial evidence. 
III. 
Contractual Capacity is Required to Create Beneficiary Designations 
 
 
Smith next argues that the circuit court erred by invalidating the various changes 
to beneficiary designations on Watson's accounts, CALSTRS pension, and vehicles 
because incapacity is not a basis for declaring a beneficiary designation void.  Because 
"beneficiary designations" are governed by the Missouri Nonprobate Transfers Law, this 
point raises a question of statutory interpretation.  Chapter 461, RSMo Supp. 2013.  This 
 
19
Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 
445, 446-47 (Mo. banc 2014). 
 
Section 461.054.1, RSMo 2000, states the following: "A beneficiary designation 
or a revocation of a beneficiary designation that is procured by fraud, duress or undue 
influence is void."  A beneficiary who willfully and unlawfully causes the decedent's 
death is also disqualified from taking.  Section 461.054.2, RSMo 2000.  Smith contends 
that, because § 461.054 does not expressly list lack of capacity, beneficiary designations 
cannot be declared void for lack of capacity. 
 
"This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue."  Parktown Imports, Inc. v. 
Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009); see also State ex rel. Jackson v. 
Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. banc 2013) ("'[W]ords should be given their plain and 
ordinary meaning whenever possible.'").  "Other rules of statutory interpretation, which 
are diverse and sometimes conflict, are merely aids that allow this Court to ascertain the 
legislature's intended result."  Parktown Imports, Inc., 278 S.W.3d at 672.  Courts look 
elsewhere for interpretation only when the meaning is ambiguous or would lead to an 
illogical result that defeats the purpose of the legislation.  State ex rel. Jackson, 398 
S.W.3d at 479.   
 
"The rules of statutory interpretation are not intended to be applied haphazardly or 
indiscriminately to achieve a desired result."  Parktown Imports, Inc., 278 S.W.3d at 672.   
"Instead, the canons of statutory interpretation are considerations made in a genuine 
effort to determine what the legislature intended."  Id.  Statutory interpretation should not 
 
20
be hyper-technical, but reasonable and logical and should give meaning to the statute.  Id. 
at 673.  In addition, when the legislature construes its own language by providing 
definitions, that construction supersedes the commonly accepted dictionary or judicial 
definition, and it is binding on the courts.  State ex rel. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 479. 
 
Smith argues in favor of invoking the canon of construction that the expression of 
one thing implies the exclusion of another—that is, the General Assembly, by stating 
several means of declaring a beneficiary designation void, intended to exclude incapacity 
as a means of voiding a beneficiary designation.  As support, Smith cites the court of 
appeals' decision, In re Estate of Goldschmidt, 215 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. App. 2006), which 
adopted this rationale.  In Goldschmidt, the court of appeals addressed whether the circuit 
court erred in not allowing an amendment to the petition.  Id. at 223.  The amendment 
would have asserted a claim of mental incapacity, among other claims.  Id.  The court of 
appeals held that "[t]he legislature's express mention of fraud, duress, undue influence, 
and murder . . . as reasons for voiding a POD account imply that it did not intend the 
additional claims in this case be deemed causes for remedial action."14  Id. at 224.   
 
Smith's argument, and the court of appeals' rationale in Goldschmidt, ignores the 
plain meaning of several provisions of the Nonprobate Transfers Law, including the 
requirement that "beneficiary designations" be governed by "applicable law."  Section 
461.005(2), RSMo Supp. 2013.  The Nonprobate Transfers Law generally allows persons 
to transfer property at death outside of probate proceedings through another person or 
                                             
 
14 The court of appeals has also held, by the same logic, that the legislature did not intend 
unilateral mistake to be a basis for challenging a beneficiary deed.  Groh v. Ballard, 965 S.W.2d 
872, 874 (Mo. App. 1998). 
 
21
entity, without some of the formalities required for wills.  Sections 461.001, 461.009, 
RSMo 2000.  A nonprobate transfer is defined as "a transfer of property taking effect 
upon the death of the owner, pursuant to a beneficiary designation."  Section 461.005(7), 
RSMo Supp. 2013.  A beneficiary designation is defined as follows: 
a provision in writing that is not a will that designates the beneficiary of a 
nonprobate transfer, including the transferee in an instrument that makes 
the transfer effective on death of the owner, and that complies with the 
conditions of any governing instrument, the rules of any transferring entity 
and applicable law. 
 
Section 461.005(2), RSMo Supp. 2013 (emphasis added).  Section 461.012, RSMo 2000, 
recognizes that "a nonprobate transfer is a matter of agreement between the owner and 
the transferring entity" in the following two circumstances, among others: (1) when the 
governing instrument requires submission of a beneficiary designation or (2) when the 
transferring entity requires registration of a transfer-on-death direction on a certificate or 
record evidencing ownership. 
 
Here, the nonprobate transfers were made pursuant to (1) beneficiary designations 
on Watson's accounts and pension and (2) transfer-on-death directions on the certificates 
of title for several of her vehicles.  Therefore, all of the nonprobate transfers and the 
beneficiary designations themselves are "matters of agreement."15  Section 461.012, 
RSMo 2000.  Accordingly, the creation of each beneficiary designation is governed by 
                                             
 
15 These agreements would have been created between Watson and the "transferring entities."  
These transferring entities were several financial institutions with respect to her accounts; 
CALSTRS with respect to her pension; and state vehicle licensing departments with respect to 
her vehicles.  See Mo. Dep't of Revenue, Miscellaneous Titling Information, § 7 at 1-2 (last 
visited June 19, 2014), available at http://dor.mo.gov/pdf/Section7.pdf.  A copy of this document 
has been placed in this Court's file. 
 
22
the "applicable law" of contracts.  Section 461.005(2), RSMo Supp. 2013.  Under the 
common law, a contract is deemed void if a party lacks the requisite mental capacity at 
the time of contracting—meaning mental capacity must be present for a contract to exist 
at all.  See McElroy v. Mathews, 263 S.W.2d 1, 10-11 (Mo. 1953).   
 
The legislature's listing of several ways in § 461.054, RSMo 2000, to declare a 
beneficiary designation void does not mean it intended to impliedly abrogate the common 
law requirement of contractual capacity for beneficiary designations.  See State ex rel. 
Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. banc 1973) (stating that this Court will not be 
persuaded that the legislature abrogated common law doctrine absent some clear 
legislative intent to do so).  To the contrary, the General Assembly specifically 
incorporated the common law and other statutes relating to property transfers by 
reference to "applicable law."  Section 461.005(2), RSMo Supp. 2013.  Mental capacity 
is required to make a contract.  McElroy, 263 S.W.2d at 10-11.  Therefore, mental 
capacity is required to make a beneficiary designation.16  To the extent In re Estate of 
                                             
 
16 This Court has reached a similar conclusion with regard to an analogous statute. "In 
construing a statute it is appropriate to take into consideration statutes involving similar or 
related subject matter when such statutes shed light upon the meaning of the statute being 
construed . . . ."  Cook Tractor Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 187 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Mo. banc 2006).  
Section 362.470, RSMo 2000, which governs joint deposits, states that making a deposit in the 
name of two or more people as joint tenants is conclusive evidence that title vests in the survivor 
"in the absence of fraud or undue influence."  One might argue, as Smith has done here, that the 
legislature intended to exclude mental incapacity as a basis for voiding a joint deposit account.  
However, this Court in Fix v. Fix, 847 S.W.2d 762, 765 & n.2 (Mo. banc 1993), stated that            
§ 362.470, RSMo 2000, was intended to incorporate a prior decision of this Court and stated that 
ownership of a joint deposit account vests in the survivor not only in the absence of fraud and 
undue influence but also in the absence of mental incapacity and mistake.  See also In re Estate 
of Meyer, 744 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Mo. App. 1988) (holding that a depositor did not create a joint 
tenancy under § 362.470 because she lacked mental capacity). 
 
23
Goldschmidt, 215 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. App. 2006), is inconsistent with this opinion, it 
should no longer be followed. 
IV. 
The Circuit Court's Error in Applying the Testamentary Capacity Standard 
to Beneficiary Designations and Other Property Transfers Was Not Prejudicial 
 
 
Because the mental capacity required to make a contract is different from that 
required to make a will or trust, the circuit court misapplied the law of testamentary 
capacity to the beneficiary designations and other property transfers.  However, the 
mental capacity required to make a contract is higher than the mental capacity required to 
make a will or trust, which is the testamentary capacity standard applied by the circuit 
court. See McElroy, 263 S.W.2d at 10 ("Greater mental capacity is required to make a 
contract when dealing at arm's length and which contract embraces matters requiring 
mature consideration and reflection, than is required to make a will or gift conveyance."); 
see also § 431.055, RSMo 2000 (stating that a person must be at least 18 years of age to 
make a contract).  Therefore, the circuit court's error was not prejudicial.  See Rule 
84.13(b) 
 
As discussed, changes to beneficiary designations are matters of contract.  The 
same is true of the other during-life property transfers.17 Accordingly, each of these 
                                             
 
17 These changes to beneficiary designations and property transfers included the following: in 
December 2007 and January 2008, Watson retitled her checking and money market accounts 
from the trust to herself individually, and Smith was named as the pay-on-death beneficiary; she 
used funds from a CD owned by the trust to create a new savings account in her own name, with 
Smith as beneficiary; and she changed the beneficiary designations on two of her IRAs in favor 
of Smith; on July 24, 2008, Smith submitted a form to CALSTRS reducing Watson's during-life 
benefits from her pension and allocating a survivor share to Smith as the sole surviving 
beneficiary; in October 2008, Watson used funds from one of her IRAs to create a new IRA, 
which also named Smith as the beneficiary; and in December 2008, for each of Watson's 
vehicles, she added Smith as either a joint title holder or a transfer-on-death beneficiary. 
 
24
transactions is governed by the standard for contractual capacity, not the standard for 
testamentary capacity.  See McElroy, 263 S.W.2d at 10 (reciting the contractual capacity 
standard); see also In re Estate of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153, 1156-57 & n.4 (Me. 2003) 
(holding that contractual capacity, not just testamentary capacity, is required for changes 
to beneficiary designations on annuity contracts and clarifying that the same is true of life 
insurance policies); SunTrust Bank, Middle Ga., N.A. v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419, 424-26 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the contractual capacity standard, not the testamentary 
capacity standard, applies to beneficiary designations on IRAs).   
 
Just as there was substantial evidence in the record for the circuit court to conclude 
that Watson lacked testamentary capacity when she signed the amendments to her trust, 
the record also supports the conclusion that she lacked capacity regarding the changes to 
the beneficiary designations and property transfers.  Dr. Sky testified that Watson lacked 
testamentary capacity at all points after July 1, 2007.  As mentioned previously, this 
testimony as well as other evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Watson 
lacked capacity after July 1, 2007.  See Lewis, 413 S.W.2d at 505; Ambruster, 244 
S.W.2d at 72.  Accordingly, the circuit court necessarily concluded that she could not 
have met the higher standard of contractual capacity each time she changed beneficiary 
designations or transferred property out of the trust in favor of Smith.  See McElroy, 263 
S.W.2d at 10.  Therefore, substantial evidence supports the circuit court's judgment that 
all changes to beneficiary designations and property transfers after July 1, 2007, were 
void.    
 
25
V. 
The Circuit Court's Judgment Was Not Against the Weight of the Evidence 
 
Smith's final claim is that the circuit court's judgment that Watson lacked capacity 
was against the weight of the evidence.  Appellate courts act with caution in exercising 
the power to set aside a decree or judgment on the ground that it is against the weight of 
the evidence.  JAS Apartments, Inc. v. Naji, 354 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Mo. banc 2011).  "[A] 
claim that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence presupposes that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the judgment."  In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 630.  In other 
words, "weight of the evidence" denotes an appellate test of how much persuasive value 
evidence has, not just whether sufficient evidence exists that tends to prove a necessary 
fact.  See White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 309 (Mo. banc 2010) (stating that 
"weight" denotes probative value, not the quantity of the evidence).  The against-the-
weight-of-the-evidence standard serves only as a check on a circuit court's potential abuse 
of power in weighing the evidence, and an appellate court will reverse only in rare cases, 
when it has a firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong.  See JAS Apartments, Inc., 
354 S.W.3d at 182.   
 
When reviewing the record in an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, 
this Court defers to the circuit court's findings of fact when the factual issues are 
contested and when the facts as found by the circuit court depend on credibility 
determinations.  See Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 43-44 (Mo. banc 2012); White, 
321 S.W.3d at 307-09.  A circuit court's judgment is against the weight of the evidence 
only if the circuit court could not have reasonably found, from the record at trial, the 
existence of a fact that is necessary to sustain the judgment.  See Pearson, 367 S.W.3d at 
 
26
43-44; White, 321 S.W.3d at 307-09.  When the evidence poses two reasonable but 
different conclusions, appellate courts must defer to the circuit court's assessment of that 
evidence.  In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626, 632 n.14; Pearson, 367 S.W.3d at 43-44; 
White, 321 S.W.3d at 307-09.   
 
This Court defers on credibility determinations when reviewing an against-the-
weight-of-the-evidence challenge because the circuit court is in a better position to weigh 
the contested and conflicting evidence in the context of the whole case.  In re J.A.R., 426 
S.W.3d at 626.  The circuit court is able to judge directly not only the demeanor of 
witnesses, but also their sincerity and character and other trial intangibles that the record 
may not completely reveal.  Id. at 627  Accordingly, this standard of review takes into 
consideration which party has the burden of proof and that the circuit court is free to 
believe all, some, or none of the evidence offered to prove a contested fact, and the 
appellate court will not re-find facts based on credibility determinations through its own 
perspective.  Id.; Pearson, 367 S.W.3d at 43-44.  This includes facts expressly found in 
the written judgment or necessarily deemed found in accordance with the result reached.  
Rule 73.01(c); In re J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626.  Evidence not based on a credibility 
determination, contrary to the circuit court's judgment, can be considered in an appellate 
court's review of an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge. 
 
Smith takes issue with the fact that the circuit court adopted the Ivies' proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  He also argues that the evidence that Watson 
lacked testamentary capacity was too remote from the dates of execution, and he argues 
that the testimony of Young and the deposition testimony of Vandivort prove that Watson 
 
27
had testamentary capacity when she made the changes to her estate plan.  "While trial 
courts must act independently in making findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is not 
error for a trial court to request or receive proposed findings and, in appropriate cases, to 
adopt those findings."  State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 522 (Mo. banc 1995).  In 
addition, whether Watson had testamentary capacity each time she made a change to her 
estate plan was a contested factual issue at trial.  The circuit court was free to draw the 
reasonable conclusion, based on the evidence presented, that Watson did not have 
testamentary capacity at each time period at issue.  With due regard and deference to the 
circuit court's credibility determinations as explained in the judgment, and having 
considered all the evidence contrary to the judgment, this Court is not firmly convinced 
that the finding of lack of capacity is against the weight of the evidence. 
 
Watson showed signs of paranoia as early as January 2003 when a physician noted 
that Watson thought Smith was poisoning her.  She persisted in this belief, and her 
mental condition progressively worsened leading up to the date of the first trust 
amendment on July 27, 2007.  Her problems with memory were recited in her medical 
records by Smith, Watson herself, and her physicians and nurses.  A physician diagnosed 
her with dementia in 2005, and by March 2006, she had forgotten even the devastating 
event of her daughter's murder.  The following November, she was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer's dementia.  By May 2007, she did not recognize her brother's children and 
other previously known family members.   
 
Hospital records showed that on June 25, 2007, roughly one month before signing 
the first trust amendment, she was "confused" and "oriented to self only."  She was non-
 
28
responsive to the nurses' attempts to orient her "to time and place," and she made 
inappropriate statements suggesting impaired memory.  The treating physician confirmed 
her dementia diagnosis and recommended increasing her medication as well as further 
treatment.  The circuit court could reasonably conclude from this evidence that Watson 
lacked testamentary capacity to make the first trust amendment. 
 
In November 2007, in-home nursing service records noted Watson's continued 
problems with paranoia, forgetfulness, and mood swings.  In January 2008, Smith noted a 
slew of mental deficiencies on an intake form at the physicians' office.  The circuit court 
was also free to conclude from this evidence that Watson lacked capacity to make each of 
the changes to her accounts in December 2007 and January 2008. 
 
Watson's medical records showed that she continued to be confused and forgetful, 
and she had mood swings and delusions leading up to the second trust amendment.  
Throughout her stay in the nursing home in June 2008, she was frequently disoriented 
about where she was and about the time of day.  And although Young again testified that 
Watson was aware of what she was doing on July 2, 2008, the day she left the nursing 
home and signed the second trust amendment, she was still disoriented as to time.  
Shortly thereafter, and before she changed the beneficiary designation on her CALSTRS 
pension or made any of the remaining changes to her estate plan, at least one physician 
stated that Watson was incapable of managing her estate, making decisions for herself, or 
understanding the nature of a contract.  Affidavits from four other physicians would 
follow.   
 
29
 
30
                                             
 
  Even after consideration of evidence not deemed to lack credibility that was 
contrary to the circuit court's determination that Watson lacked testamentary capacity at 
the time of execution, it is clear the circuit court could have reasonably concluded that 
Watson lacked capacity each time she made a change to her estate plan.  This Court 
defers to the circuit court's determinations that the Ivies' witnesses and evidence were 
persuasive and that Smith's witnesses and evidence were not.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's judgment was not against the weight of the evidence. 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court's judgment that Watson lacked capacity to make the changes to 
her estate plan was supported by substantial evidence and was not against the weight of 
the evidence.  Although the circuit court misapplied the law of testamentary capacity to 
the changes to beneficiary designations and other during-life property transfers, the error 
was not prejudicial because the applicable contractual capacity standard requires greater 
mental functioning than the testamentary capacity standard.  Therefore, this Court affirms 
the circuit court's judgment.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
 
All concur. 
 
18 Although the circuit court's judgment directed that the CALSTRS pension benefit go directly 
to the Ivies, it directed that the other non-trust assets go to her probate estate.  Assuming those 
assets should have reverted to the trust or the Ivies directly instead of passing through probate, 
the effect is harmless because of the provision in Watson's will pouring her assets over into the 
trust.  See § 456.021, RSMo Supp. 2013 (permitting pour-over wills).