Title: Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 116 Ohio St.3d 
1220, 2007-Ohio-6664.] 
 
 
CINCINNATI SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, v. 
HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; ANCHOR LYONS 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
116 Ohio St.3d 1220, 2007-Ohio-6664.] 
(Case No. 2007-1217 — Submitted November 6, 2007 — Decided  
December 19, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2005-M-1069. 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Board 
of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  Appellee Cincinnati School District Board of 
Education (“BOE”) has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the appellant, 
Anchor Lyons Limited Partnership (“Anchor Lyons”), failed to properly invoke 
the jurisdiction of this court. 
{¶ 2} In Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2007-Ohio-4007, 871 N.E.2d 602 (“Columbus”), 
we held that in a case that reaches the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) from a 
county board of revision, a party that appeals the BTA’s decision to this court 
must serve its notice of appeal, in accordance with the sixth paragraph of R.C. 
5717.04, on the “person whom the record shows to be the owner of the property 
as of the time that the BTA was required to certify its decision.”  Columbus, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 3} The motion to dismiss points out that the required service was not 
performed in this case.  Although Anchor Lyons owned the property at issue 
when the BOE filed its complaint with the board of revision, Anchor Lyons sold 
the property to Ballantrae Investments, L.L.C. shortly after the BOE appealed the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
board of revision’s decision to the BTA.  Thus, Ballantrae Investments, L.L.C. 
qualifies as the “person whom the record shows to be the owner of the property as 
of the time that the BTA was required to certify its decision.” 
{¶ 4} After the BTA reversed the board of revision’s decision, Anchor 
Lyons filed an appeal in this court.  But Anchor Lyons failed to serve its notice of 
appeal on Ballantrae Investments, L.L.C.  Accordingly, the BOE argues that 
Anchor Lyons’s appeal in this court should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 5} We recognize that if we were to apply Columbus to the facts before 
us, we would grant the motion and dismiss the case.  But we have also recognized 
that when a ruling by this court might disrupt the finality of administrative or 
judicial decisions, the potential for disruption justifies making our ruling operate 
in a purely prospective manner.  See Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 
33, 39, 22 OBR 27, 488 N.E.2d 210; OAMCO v. Lindley (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 1, 
29 OBR 122, 503 N.E.2d 1388; Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 96 Ohio St.3d 165, 2002-Ohio-4033, 772 N.E.2d 1160, ¶ 20.  Our ruling 
in Columbus construes language contained in sections of the Revised Code that 
potentially affect the finality of decisions issued by the boards of revision and the 
BTA.  See R.C. 5717.03(B) and 5715.20. 
{¶ 6} Accordingly, we hold that our ruling in Columbus, with the 
exception of our application of it in Columbus itself, shall apply only 
prospectively.  In this context, prospective application means that the ruling in 
Columbus will be applied only when the BTA decision has been issued after 
August 22, 2007, the date of issuance of the dismissal order in Columbus. 
{¶ 7} In this case, the BTA issued its decision on June 8, 2007.  Because 
that decision was issued before August 22, 2007, we will not apply the ruling of 
Columbus in this case.  Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
 
O’DONNELL AND LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 8} Respectfully, I dissent.  In my view, the facts in this case are on all 
fours with the rule of law we announced in Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2007-Ohio-4007, 871 
N.E.2d 602 (“Columbus”).  This is a matter where the required service of process 
had not been made on the “person whom the record shows to be the owner of the 
property as of the time that the BTA was required to certify its decision,” id. at ¶ 
4, a necessary prerequisite to pursuing an appeal to this court from a decision of 
the BTA.  The majority sidesteps application of our decision in Columbus and 
today announces that that decision “shall apply only prospectively.” 
{¶ 9} However, we did not make that prospective determination at the 
time we announced it to be the law in Columbus, and furthermore, the parties to 
that case did not have any advance notice of what our decision would be in that 
case.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision by the majority to 
sidestep application of what we have determined the law to be by holding that our 
decision in Columbus applies only prospectively. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
David C. DiMuzio, Inc., David C. DeMuzio, and Jennifer B. Antaki, for 
appellee Cincinnati School District Board of Education. 
 
Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co. L.P.A., Nicholas M.J. Ray, and 
Jay P. Siegel, for appellant. 
______________________