Title: Riscatti v. Prime Props. Ltd. P'ship

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4530.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4530 
RISCATTI ET AL., APPELLEES, v. PRIME PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP  
ET AL.; CUYAHOGA COUNTY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4530.] 
Final, 
appealable 
orders—Political-subdivision 
tort 
immunity—R.C. 
2744.02(C)—Denial of motion for judgment on pleadings based on 
statute of limitations not appealable. 
(No. 2012-1307—Submitted June 11, 2013—Decided October 15, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Nos. 97270 and 97274, 2012-Ohio-2921. 
____________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal arises from claims for damages caused by the 
continual flow of gasoline from a gas station’s infrastructure into a sanitary sewer 
main located on State Road in Parma.  The plaintiffs-appellees (collectively, “the 
homeowners”) are 100 current or former residents or owners of homes on State 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Road who seek damages from various private and public entities, including the 
appellant, Cuyahoga County.1   
{¶ 2} In this appeal, we decide a narrow issue:  whether a denial of a 
public subdivision’s dispositive motion asserting a statute-of-limitations defense 
pursuant to R.C. 2744.04 is a final, appealable order.  We conclude that it is not.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Because this is an appeal from a defendant’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, we are required to accept as true all the material allegations of 
the complaint, as well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the 
nonmoving parties, the homeowners.  Corporex Dev. & Constr. Mgt., Inc. v. 
Shook, Inc., 106 Ohio St.3d 412, 2005-Ohio-5409, 835 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 4} On August 28, 2009, after a heavy rainfall, the smell of gasoline 
arose in the basement of the home shared by appellees Alessandra Riscatti, 
Elisabetta Riscatti, and Laszlo Beres.  Later that day, while Alessandra was in the 
basement, flames erupted from the sewer and spread through the house.  
Alessandra and Laszlo battled the fire while waiting for the Parma Fire 
Department’s arrival; by the time the three residents escaped their home, each had 
inhaled smoke that contained toxic substances, and Alessandra required treatment 
for carbon monoxide poisoning and smoke inhalation. 
{¶ 5} The fire department extinguished the fire, but the interior of the 
home and almost all of the personal items within were damaged or destroyed. 
{¶ 6} Investigations by the Ohio Bureau of Underground Storage Tank 
Regulation (“BUSTR”), the Parma Fire Department (“PFD”), the Environmental 
                                          
 
1 Although this opinion refers to only three homeowners by name, two cases, now consolidated, 
were brought by a total of 100 plaintiffs who are or were homeowners or residents of State Road 
in Parma.  The defendants include Marathon Oil Company (which allegedly formerly owned the 
gas station), Prime Properties Limited Partnership (which allegedly operated it), the Northeast 
Ohio Regional Sewer District (which allegedly provides sewer maintenance to some 
municipalities), the city of Parma (which allegedly owns the sewer lines), and the county.   
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Protection Agency (“EPA”), and the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District 
revealed gasoline in an observation well, gasoline-contaminated groundwater, and 
the continuous flow of gasoline from a nearby gas station into the sanitary sewer 
main on State Road.  The gas station was ordered to shut down operations 
immediately. 
{¶ 7} BUSTR ordered an excavation of the tank system and discovered 
that drain pipes connected an underground storage-tank cavity under the gas 
station to the sanitary sewer main on State Road and that the connection had been 
in place since the gas station installed the pipes in 1982.  The pipes had been 
installed in order to keep the tank from floating in case of rising groundwater 
levels during rain or snowmelt.  Over the years, however, the pipes caused 
continual dumping of gasoline-contaminated groundwater into the sanitary sewer 
main, and eventually into the sewer lines of homes along State Road. 
{¶ 8} The homeowners allege that in early 2008, they and their 
neighbors, and motorists in the area, contacted PFD to report a strong odor of 
gasoline inside and outside their homes and along the road.  PFD discovered 
heavy gasoline vapors in the sewer main, and a BUSTR investigator found 
gasoline visibly leaking from a pump filter and into a catch basin at the gas 
station.  The sewer district confirmed the gas station as the source of the odors in 
State Road homes but failed to inform the homeowners. 
{¶ 9} After that discovery, BUSTR cited the owner of the gas station for 
failing to periodically inspect the equipment at the station.  Despite that citation, 
and eight prior documented gas leaks dating back to 1989, the owner of the gas 
station made no effort to determine how the toxins had made it into the homes on 
State Road. 
{¶ 10} The homeowners assert that they had smelled and complained of 
gasoline odors in their homes since 1982 but that PFD, the EPA, BUSTR, the 
sewer district, and the owners and operators of the gas station all assured them 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
that the gas odors were not coming from the gas station, but from natural sources.  
As a result, the homeowners allege, they were exposed to toxic gasoline vapors, 
without knowing the danger or origin, from 1982 until the flames burst into the 
Riscattis’ basement in 2009. 
{¶ 11} The homeowners brought suit against various defendants, 
including the county.2   Their amended complaints aver that the county’s failure to 
properly maintain and operate the sewer system constituted a tort for which it 
lacked immunity according to R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d) and 2744.02. 
{¶ 12} Before discovery was conducted, the county filed several 
dispositive motions.  The first motion sought judgment on the pleadings on the 
theory that the homeowners’ causes of action had not been filed within the two-
year statute of limitations applicable to political subdivisions.  R.C. 2744.04(A).  
The trial court denied the motion. 
{¶ 13} The trial court also considered a second dispositive motion, 
brought by the county pursuant to both Civ.R. 12(C) and 56, that is not directly at 
issue in this appeal.  In that motion, the county sought judgment in its favor based 
on “issues of immunity and causation,” including the theory that the county was 
immune by operation of R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(l) and 2744.02, which confer 
immunity on a political subdivision against liability based on its design of a sewer 
system.  The court denied the motion to the extent that the immunity claim was 
based on Civ.R. 12(C), but the court held its decision on summary judgment in 
abeyance until discovery was complete. 
{¶ 14} The county immediately appealed both judgments.  The Eighth 
District Court of Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the 
statute-of-limitations claim due to the lack of a final, appealable order.  The 
county appealed to this court and now insists that the denial of that motion is a 
                                          
 
2 The homeowners’ claims against other defendants are not at issue in this appeal, and we do not 
discuss them or intimate any opinion about them.   
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
final, appealable order over which the appellate court had jurisdiction.  We turn 
now to that question. 
ANALYSIS 
Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, R.C. Chapter 2744 
{¶ 15} R.C. Chapter 2744, Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, 
was enacted in response to the judicial abrogation of the common-law immunity 
of political subdivisions.  Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 
551, 558, 733 N.E.2d 1141 (2000).  R.C. Chapter 2744 generally shields political 
subdivisions from tort liability in order to preserve their fiscal integrity.  See, e.g., 
Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 23; 
R.C. 2744,02(A)(1).3  
{¶ 16} We previously have recognized that the General Assembly made 
clear the purpose, and importance, of this statutory scheme:   
 
“[T]he protections afforded to political subdivisions and 
employees of political subdivisions by this act are urgently needed 
in order to ensure the continued orderly operation of local 
governments and the continued ability of local governments to 
provide public peace, health, and safety services to their residents.” 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, Section 8, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733. 
 
Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 
522, ¶ 38. 
                                          
 
3 R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) states:  
 
Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not 
liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property 
allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an 
employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 17} In so doing, we also recognized that immunity determinations are 
vitally important to the parties’ interests, and to judicial economy: 
 
“ ‘[D]etermination of whether a political subdivision is immune 
from liability is usually pivotal to the ultimate outcome of a 
lawsuit. Early resolution of the issue of whether a political 
subdivision is immune from liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
2744 is beneficial to both of the parties. If the appellate court holds 
that the political subdivision is immune, the litigation can come to 
an early end, with the same outcome that otherwise would have 
been reached only after trial, resulting in a savings to all parties of 
costs and attorney fees. Alternatively, if the appellate court holds 
that immunity does not apply, that early finding will encourage the 
political subdivision to settle promptly with the victim rather than 
pursue a lengthy trial and appeals. Under either scenario, both the 
plaintiff and the political subdivision may save the time, effort, and 
expense of a trial and appeal, which could take years.’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.)  [Hubbell, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 
873 N.E.2d 878] at ¶ 25, quoting Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 
87 Ohio St.3d 188, 199-200, 718 N.E.2d 912 (Lundberg Stratton, 
J., dissenting). 
 
Id. at ¶ 39. 
Final, appealable orders and R.C. Chapter 2744 
{¶ 18} “An appellate court can review only final orders, and without a 
final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction.”  Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. 
Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-2410, ___ 
N.E.2d ___, ¶ 10.  Given the legislative intent in enacting the political-
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
subdivision-immunity statute and the important prudential considerations the 
statute serves, it is not surprising that the General Assembly enacted R.C. 
2744.02(C),4 which provides that an order denying a political subdivision the 
benefit of immunity is a final order that may be appealed immediately.  R.C. 
2744.02(C); Supportive Solutions, L.L.C., at ¶ 11; see also Sullivan v. Anderson 
Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88, syllabus. 
{¶ 19} Consistent with the legislative intent behind R.C. Chapter 2744, we 
have interpreted R.C. 2744.02(C) broadly.  We have held that R.C. 2744.02(C)’s 
scope extends to the denial of a motion for summary judgment that is based on a 
claim that the political subdivision is immune under R.C. Chapter 2744, Hubbell, 
115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, at ¶ 27, and to the denial of 
a political subdivision’s motion to amend its answer to a complaint in order to 
assert an immunity defense based on R.C. Chapter 2744, Supportive Solutions, 
L.L.C., at ¶ 23.  The breadth of our decisions in Hubbell and Supportive Solutions, 
L.L.C., is anchored in precedent and public policy, but the decisions divided the 
court and engendered spirited dissents.  See, e.g., id., at ¶ 24-26 (Lanzinger, J., 
dissenting) (stating that Hubbell was wrongly decided and that Supportive 
Solutions, L.L.C., was an unwarranted extension of Hubbell).  Here, however, we 
are of one mind.  We hold that the court of appeals properly held that an order 
denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings that is predicated on a statute-of-
limitations defense does not deny the benefit of immunity and is not a final, 
appealable order even though it arose along with a political subdivision’s 
immunity claim. 
                                          
 
4 “An order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit 
of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law 
is a final order.”  R.C. 2744.02 (C). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 20} The court of appeals correctly recognized that the county’s statute-
of-limitations theory was not a claim of immunity.  Although our prior decisions 
have interpreted R.C. 2744.02(C) broadly in favor of early appeal, they have 
always been tethered directly to the defense of immunity, not other defenses.  
E.g., Supportive Solutions, L.L.C., at ¶ 13.  Here, however, there is no such nexus 
to immunity.  R.C. 2744.04(A)5 sets forth the statute-of-limitations defense for 
actions against subdivisions, but it has nothing to do with the immunity of 
subdivisions.  As our courts of appeals have repeatedly recognized, there is a 
meaningful distinction between a claim of immunity and a defense of the statute 
of limitations.  See, e.g., Guenther v. Springfield Twp. Trustees, 2012-Ohio-203, 
970 N.E.2d 1058, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.) (recognizing that an order denying summary 
judgment based on a political subdivision’s immunity defense is a final, 
appealable order but holding the “denial of summary judgment based on a statute 
of limitations, however, does not deny the political subdivision the benefit of 
immunity”); Makowski v. Kohler, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25219, 2011-Ohio-2382 
(holding that the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred 
by the statute of limitations was not a final, appealable order because it denied the 
political subdivision only the benefit of the statute of limitations, not the benefit 
of immunity); Essman v. Portsmouth, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3244, 2009-
Ohio-3367, ¶ 10 (“because the trial court's decision to deny appellant summary 
                                          
 
5 R.C. 2744.04(A) provides: 
 
An action against a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, 
death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in 
connection with a governmental or proprietary function, whether brought as an 
original action, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or claim for 
subrogation, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues, 
or within any applicable shorter period of time for bringing the action provided 
by the Revised Code. The period of limitation contained in this division shall be 
tolled pursuant to section 2305.16 of the Revised Code. This division applies to 
actions brought against political subdivisions by all persons, governmental 
entities, and the state. 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
judgment on its statute of limitations defense does not deny appellant the benefit 
of R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity, there is no exception to the general rule that a 
denial of summary judgment is a non-final appealable [sic] order,” and 
accordingly, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of 
summary judgment on the basis of a statute-of-limitations defense). 
{¶ 21} The court of appeals in this case correctly held that the fact that a 
political subdivision is the party that raises a statute-of-limitations defense does 
not change the general rule that the ruling on that defense is not a final, appealable 
order.  2012-Ohio-2921, ¶ 17.  Because the order denying the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations was not a final, 
appealable order, the appellate court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 
to entertain that appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals properly dismissed the county’s appeal of the 
trial court’s judgment denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings because 
that order is not a final, appealable order.  We therefore affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
____________________ 
 
Landskroner, Greco, Merriman, L.L.C., Drew Legando, Jack Landskroner, 
and Tom Merriman, for appellees. 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Walter, Haverfield, L.L.P., and R. Todd Hunt, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Northeast Ohio Law Directors Association. 
________________________