Title: Commonwealth v. Jerman

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 010883   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          January 11, 2002 
TIMOTHY JERMAN 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it reversed and vacated a defendant's sentence on the 
ground that the circuit court did not instruct the jury on the 
abolition of parole pursuant to Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 104, 532 S.E.2d 629 (2000). 
 
Timothy Jerman was indicted for murder, in violation of 
Code §§ 18.2-32 and –40, and for abduction, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-47.  He was convicted in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County of second degree murder and abduction.  During the 
penalty phase of the trial, Jerman did not request a jury 
instruction on the abolition of parole.  The jury submitted two 
questions to the court during its sentencing deliberations: 
At what point in a sentence will the defendant be 
subject to parole?  In other words, what are the 
parameters for parole eligibility? 
 
Will the sentences for the two counts be served 
concurrently?  And whose decision is it? 
 
By agreement of the court, the Commonwealth's attorney, and 
counsel for Jerman, the court submitted the following answer to 
the jury: 
You have found the defendant guilty of murder in the 
second degree and abduction.  You should impose such 
punishment as you feel is just under the evidence and 
within the instructions of the Court.  You are not to 
concern yourselves with what might happen afterwards. 
 
This instruction accurately stated the law in effect on the date 
of trial.  The jury fixed Jerman's punishment at five years' 
imprisonment for second degree murder and at ten years' 
imprisonment for abduction. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, Jerman's counsel did not argue 
that the circuit court failed to respond properly to the jury's 
questions.  Instead, counsel asserted that the jury's concern 
whether Jerman would be eligible for parole prejudiced its 
sentencing deliberations.  Counsel contended that the jury's 
questions demonstrated "clearly that the jury thought or felt 
that [Jerman] was deserving of much less than the maximum 
sentences in this case and deserving of less than the 15 years 
because they assumed parole."  The circuit court sentenced 
Jerman in accordance with the jury verdict to a total of 15 
years' imprisonment. 
 
Two days later, Jerman filed a motion to set aside the 
verdict on his abduction conviction.  He noted that as of his 
trial date, the rule in Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 
646, 178 S.E. 797, 800 (1935), required that a jury not be 
informed of post-sentencing considerations that could affect the 
length of a sentence that a defendant serves.  Jerman asked the 
 
2
circuit court to apply the holding in Hartigan v. Commonwealth, 
31 Va. App. 243, 522 S.E.2d 406 (1999), which was decided after 
his trial but before his sentencing.  In Hartigan, the Court of 
Appeals held that "when evidence of prior sentences may lead the 
jury to speculate that parole is still available to the 
defendant, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury that 
the defendant, if convicted, will be ineligible for parole."  
Id. at 258, 522 S.E.2d at 413. 
 
In response to Jerman's motion, the Commonwealth argued, 
among other things, that Jerman waived his objection to the 
circuit court's instruction stating the rule in Coward because 
he agreed that the instruction should be given.  The circuit 
court denied Jerman's motion, concluding that Hartigan was 
inapplicable because Jerman did not have a prior criminal record 
and the Commonwealth did not make any statements concerning 
parole eligibility to the jury. 
 
Jerman appealed from his abduction conviction to the Court 
of Appeals, which vacated his sentence and remanded the case to 
the circuit court for a new sentencing proceeding.  Jerman v. 
Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 323, 328, 541 S.E.2d 307, 309 (2001).  
The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on the abolition of parole in 
accordance with our decision in Fishback.  Id.
 
3
 
In Fishback, we held that juries shall be instructed on the 
abolition of parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on 
or after January 1, 1995, and that this new rule of criminal 
procedure is limited to cases not yet final on June 9, 2000.  
260 Va. at 115-16, 532 S.E.2d at 634.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the decision in Fishback required that Jerman be 
awarded a new sentencing hearing on his abduction conviction 
because his appeal of that conviction was not yet final on June 
9, 2000.  34 Va. App at 325-26, 328, 541 S.E.2d at 308-09. 
 
In applying the decision in Fishback, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned: 
In this case, the question propounded by the jury and 
the response given by the court without objection from 
[Jerman] are factually similar to those in Fishback.  
The sole difference is that [Jerman], in the instant 
case, did not request an instruction regarding the 
abolition of parole until post-trial motions.  
However, [Jerman's] failure to request an instruction 
does not end our analysis.  Fishback clearly states 
that any case "not yet final," i.e., still in the 
breast of a proper trial court or appellate process, 
is subject to the new instruction requirements. . . .  
[The jury's] question clearly indicated to the trial 
court that the jury assumed that parole would be 
available to [Jerman].  This is the precise instance 
the [Virginia] Supreme Court addressed by stating that 
the jury required instruction from the court as to the 
"new rule" of law in pending cases.  The trial court's 
response in this case failed to fulfill the 
requirement of Fishback because it left the jury with 
the belief that parole would be available.  Even 
though [Jerman] failed to object or raise the issue 
during trial, the trial court had an affirmative duty 
to properly instruct the jury about the matter because 
they evidenced a need for instruction by posing the 
question to the court. 
 
4
 
34 Va. App. at 327-28, 541 S.E.2d at 308-09.  The Commonwealth 
appeals from the Court of Appeals' judgment. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that Jerman's claim is procedurally 
barred under Rule 5:25 because he did not object to the answer 
that the circuit court gave to the jury in response to its 
question concerning parole.  The Commonwealth asserts that this 
Court generally has barred challenges on appeal to jury 
instructions when defendants have not timely objected to those 
instructions at trial. 
 
In response, Jerman argues that the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that the rule in Fishback applied to his 
case because his appeal was "not yet final" when Fishback was 
decided on June 9, 2000.  He contends that his failure to raise 
a timely objection at trial did not procedurally bar appellate 
review of the instruction at issue because, at the time of his 
trial, the Coward rule was still in effect.  Jerman asserts that 
his motion to set aside the verdict properly preserved the issue 
because he made the motion after the Court of Appeals decided 
Hartigan, during the period in which the circuit court retained 
jurisdiction over his case.  We disagree with Jerman's 
arguments. 
 
In Fishback, unlike the circumstances in the present case, 
the defendant asked the circuit court to instruct the jury on 
 
5
the abolition of parole even though the rule in Coward was still 
in effect.  260 Va. at 109, 532 S.E.2d at 630.  Thus, the 
circuit court in Fishback had the opportunity to consider during 
trial whether to instruct the jury on the recent statutory 
changes concerning parole.  Although the instructions that the 
defendant proffered did not accurately reflect the statutory 
changes, we nevertheless concluded that the circuit court was 
required to correct the instructions and give them in their 
accurate form.  Id. at 117, 532 S.E.2d at 635. 
 
This holding was based on an established principle that we 
explained in Fishback: 
We adhere to the rule that the trial court is not 
required to amend or correct an erroneous instruction, 
but the rule is subject to the limitation that when 
the principle of law is materially vital to a 
defendant in a criminal case, it is reversible error 
for the trial court to refuse a defective instruction 
instead of correcting it and giving it in the proper 
form. 
 
Id. (quoting Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 
S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973)). 
 
In contrast, a circuit court ordinarily does not have an 
affirmative duty to give a jury instruction on a particular 
legal principle when a criminal defendant fails to request that 
the jury be instructed on that principle.  We have regularly 
applied this rule in criminal cases.  For example, in Cherrix v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310-11, 513 S.E.2d 642, 654, cert. 
 
6
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999), we were presented with a jury 
instruction issue that arose in a procedural posture similar to 
that in the present case.  The defendant in Cherrix did not 
request a jury instruction concerning parole eligibility and, 
during its deliberations, the jury asked the court whether a 
life sentence would include the possibility of parole.  The 
defendant agreed that the circuit court should instruct the jury 
that it was "to have no concern with parole."  Id. at 311, 513 
S.E.2d at 654. 
 
We rejected the defendant's attempt to challenge on appeal 
the circuit court's response to the jury's question.  We stated 
that the defendant's failure to state a timely objection to the 
court's instruction or to offer an alternate instruction 
"precludes us from addressing the merits of [that] assignment of 
error."  257 Va. at 312, 513 S.E.2d at 654. 
 
The consistent application of Rule 5:25 advances the Rule's 
purpose of avoiding unnecessary reversals and retrials.  See 
Reid v. Boyle, 259 Va. 356, 372, 527 S.E.2d 137, 146 (2000); 
Buck v. Jordan, 256 Va. 535, 545-46, 508 S.E.2d 880, 885-86 
(1998); Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 221, 441 S.E.2d 
342, 345 (1994).  We repeatedly have refused to consider 
challenges to jury instructions raised for the first time on 
appeal.  See, e.g., Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 467, 544 
S.E.2d 299, 308, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 481 
 
7
(2001); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 83, 445 S.E.2d 670, 
679, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994), Quesinberry v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 380, 402 S.E.2d 218, 228, cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).  Thus, we hold that Jerman's 
failure to state a timely objection to the circuit court's 
instruction bars his present challenge to that instruction.  
Rule 5:25. 
 
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that the rule in 
Coward was still in effect on the date of Jerman's trial.  The 
perceived futility of an objection does not excuse a defendant's 
procedural default at trial.  See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
130 (1982); Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va. 35, 44, 366 S.E.2d 62, 67 
(1988).  Therefore, Jerman's counsel was required to state any 
objection to the circuit court's instruction and to ask the 
court for any other instruction on the subject that he deemed 
necessary. 
 
Finally, we find no merit in Jerman's argument that a 
contrary result is required because the new rule in Fishback "is 
limited prospectively to those cases not yet final on this 
date."  260 Va. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634.   This directive 
provided only that the new rule will not be applied 
retroactively to cases already final on direct appeal, and did 
not impose any limitation on our application of Rule 5:25.  See 
Mueller v. Murray, 252 Va. 356, 361, 478 S.E.2d 542, 546 (1996). 
 
8
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court's judgment on 
the abduction conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment.
 
9