Title: Commonwealth v. Cowels

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-11630 
SJC-11631 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL COWELS. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL MIMS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 9, 2014. - February 12, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
Homicide.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Credibility of 
witness.  Witness, Credibility.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 6, 1993. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 425 Mass. 279 (1997), 
motions for a new trial, filed on February 4 and March 24, 2008, 
were considered by Thomas E. Connolly, J. 
 
Requests for leave to appeal were allowed by Cordy, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
David J. Apfel (Nicholas K. Mitrokostas & Joshua M. Daniels 
with him) for Michael Cowels. 
 
Philip G. Cormier for Michael Mims. 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney (Janis DiLoreto 
Noble, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendants, Michael Cowels and Michael Mims, 
were convicted by a Superior Court jury in December, 1994, of 
murder in the first degree in the stabbing death of Belinda 
Miscioscia.  Among the evidence presented against them at trial 
were two "bloody" towels.  The Commonwealth offered testimony 
suggesting that the defendants had used the towels to clean 
themselves after stabbing the victim.  Testing performed on the 
towels at the time of the trial indicated the presence of human 
blood.  The testing, however, was inconclusive.  Further testing 
was performed on just one of the towels; the sample on the other 
was too small to be tested.  An expert testified that the 
further testing neither identified nor excluded the defendants 
or the victim as the sources of the blood.  In June, 1997, this 
court affirmed the defendants' convictions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cowels, 425 Mass. 279, 285-293 (1997). 
 
In 2008, the defendants filed separate motions for a new 
trial, based in part on deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing 
performed on the previously tested towel by an independent 
laboratory after their convictions.  That testing revealed that 
the blood contained on the towel did not belong to either of the 
defendants or the victim, but instead to an unidentified male.  
The defendants also argued in their motions that they had been 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 
3 
 
 
After a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion judge, who was 
also the trial judge, denied the motions.  In 2011, each 
defendant filed a "gatekeeper" petition before a single justice 
of the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, seeking 
leave to appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial.  
In January, 2014, the single justice allowed both petitions, and 
the matters were entered in this court the following month. 
 
We conclude that, given the towels' role as one of the few 
pieces of physical evidence that corroborated the testimony of a 
key prosecution witness whose credibility was sharply 
challenged, the towels likely were a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.  Consequently, we believe that there is a 
substantial risk that, had the newly available DNA testing been 
available at the time of the trial and resulted in the 
inadmissibility of the towels in the Commonwealth's case, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.  The defendants, 
therefore, must receive a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Evidence at trial.  Misciosia's body 
was found in a yard behind an industrial building in Chelsea on 
the morning of Monday, June 28, 1993.  An autopsy revealed that 
she had been stabbed six times.  The fatal stab wound perforated 
her heart.  She also had been slashed several times, and 
suffered numerous bruises and defensive wounds.  Her body and 
clothing were "blood soaked."  A pair of eyeglasses was found a 
4 
 
few feet from the body, and a bag of marijuana was stuffed 
inside of her bra. 
 
The police investigation quickly turned towards the 
defendants, as they were among the last people to have seen the 
victim alive on the preceding Saturday night.  The trial 
presented the jury with two conflicting timelines of the 
defendants' activities on that night. 
 
The Commonwealth presented -- largely through the testimony 
of Robert Salie, a friend of Cowels and Mims -- the following 
timeline.  On the night of Saturday, June 26, 1993, the victim 
was in her brother's apartment in Chelsea with her brother, her 
brother's girl friend, and Peter Rowe, whom the victim was 
dating.  The victim and Rowe had plans to go to the Wonderland 
Ballroom that evening.  According to the witnesses present in 
the apartment, the victim left by herself shortly before 9 P.M. 
to purchase marijuana for the group from Cowels.  She had come 
to know Cowels while attending a course that she was required to 
take in conjunction with a conviction of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
 
The victim met Cowels a few blocks away from the apartment, 
where Cowels was attending a party along with his friend, Mims.  
After purchasing the marijuana, the victim did not return to the 
apartment.  Instead, Salie testified, Cowels, Mims, and the 
victim arrived at Salie's home, located approximately one and 
5 
 
one-half miles from the location of the party, at approximately 
9:30 P.M.  There the four smoked a marijuana cigarette, and 
Salie witnessed the victim and the defendants prepare to have 
sex in his bedroom.  Salie was invited to participate, but 
declined.  The defendants and the victim then emerged from 
Salie's bedroom and left his apartment shortly afterwards. 
 
Salie testified that the defendants returned to his 
apartment, unaccompanied by the victim, at approximately 
11:30 P.M.  After he allowed them to enter, they immediately 
went to his bathroom.  They remained in the bathroom for 
approximately twenty minutes, during which time he could hear 
the water running in the sink.  When the defendants emerged from 
the bathroom, Cowels was in his underwear and carrying a plastic 
bag containing the clothes he had been wearing that evening.  
Heading towards Salie's bedroom, Cowels asked Salie if he could 
borrow some clothes.  Cowels also held out a sneaker that he had 
been wearing, on which Salie saw a spot that he believed to be 
blood.  "[I]f you fuck with me," Cowels told Salie, "this is 
what happens."  Cowels remarked that Salie would read in the 
newspapers the following day about "[h]ow we killed her," 
adding, "she was a fucking pig and she got what she deserved."  
He told Salie that "if [he] said anything [he]'d get hurt." 
 
Salie gave clothes to both defendants.  After dressing, 
Mims told Salie to "keep [his] mouth shut," and Cowels put a 
6 
 
finger to Salie's head and reiterated that if Salie said 
anything, he would "get fucking hurt."  The defendants left 
carrying bags of their clothing. 
 
The defendants returned at approximately 1 A.M., without 
their bags, and again told Salie that he had "better keep [his] 
mouth shut."  Cowels departed, while Mims spent the night on a 
couch in Salie's apartment.  On his way out, Cowels gave Salie a 
ride to the store to purchase a pack of cigarettes. 
 
Although Salie's testimony was crucial to the 
Commonwealth's case, his credibility was extensively impeached 
during cross-examination.  In his first two interviews with 
police, Salie had not offered the account that he ultimately 
offered at trial.  Instead, he indicated that the defendants had 
come to his apartment only once on the evening of the victim's 
death, when Mims arrived to sleep over, and that the victim was 
never present in his apartment.  Salie offered the narrative to 
which he later testified at trial after he learned that he could 
be charged as an accessory after the fact for providing the 
defendants with clothing.  Salie also entered into a cooperation 
agreement with the Commonwealth under which he avoided a 
mandatory term of incarceration for several unrelated motor 
vehicle offenses, for which Cowels had been called to serve as a 
prosecution witness against Salie.  Salie had a long criminal 
history, including numerous drug-related offenses, and admitted 
7 
 
to being a recovering heroin addict.  Finally, the defense 
challenged the inconsistency between Salie's testimony that he 
was afraid of the defendants and his decision to go for a ride 
with Cowels to pick up cigarettes immediately after Cowels 
supposedly threatened him, and to watch a softball game in which 
the defendants were playing on the following day. 
 
The Commonwealth offered evidence that, it contended, 
corroborated Salie's testimony.  Approximately one month after 
the stabbing, police recovered two towels, one from inside and 
the other from behind a hamper in Salie's bathroom.  The towels 
were visibly stained; one was a large bath towel containing a 
large, rust-colored stain, covering the majority of the towel's 
surface.  Testing confirmed the presence of human blood on both.  
Salie testified that he last saw the towels on June 26, 1993, 
when they were on the rack in his bathroom and were clean.  
According to the Commonwealth's serologist, the bloodstains on 
one towel -- a small hand towel -- were too small to be tested 
without exhausting the sample.  Further testing performed on the 
other towel revealed a "weak reaction" to type A blood.  Both of 
the defendants and the victim have type O blood.  The 
Commonwealth's serologist, however, testified that the reaction 
was too weak to draw any conclusions from it, stating that the 
blood on the towel could belong to anybody. 
8 
 
 
The Commonwealth also introduced evidence that both of the 
defendants got rid of their old shoes and acquired new ones at 
approximately the same time shortly after the murder.  An 
officer who interviewed Cowels soon after the stabbing testified 
that he appeared at the police station wearing "a brand new pair 
of white high-top sneakers."  Richard Polovick, a friend of 
Cowels, testified that, sometime after the victim's death, 
Cowels stopped and asked Polovick to repair a tire on his Chevy 
Nova automobile.  When Cowels opened the trunk of the vehicle, 
Polovick saw a pair of sneakers.  Polovick asked Cowels whether 
the shoes were the "notorious sneakers that people were talking 
about."  Cowels responded, "Yes, that's them," and Polovick 
watched as Cowels threw the sneakers into some bushes.  Polovick 
later directed police to the location, where the sneakers were 
recovered several weeks after they had been left.  Testing 
revealed trace amounts of nonvisible, "occult" blood in a 
recessed portion of the sole of one of the sneakers.  The 
forensic examiner, however, testified that the sample was too 
small to determine the blood type, or even whether it came from 
a human or an animal. 
 
Similarly, the Commonwealth offered testimony that Mims 
appeared to play softball with friends on Sunday, June 27, 
wearing "green high-tech[] sneakers," which Salie testified he 
had lent to Mims the previous night.  Asked by a friend what had 
9 
 
happened to his old sneakers, which were expensive Reebok high-
tops that were in good condition the last time the friend saw 
them, Mims responded that he had thrown them out because they 
had gotten "wet and squeaky" in the rain the previous night.  
However, it had not rained that night.  Unlike Cowels's shoes, 
Mims's shoes were never recovered. 
 
Finally, the prosecution offered evidence of a vaginal 
smear swab taken from the victim.  Testing of the swab revealed 
the presence of semen.  The Commonwealth's expert, however, 
testified that she could not identify, based on her analysis of 
the swab, whether the seminal fluid came from either of the 
defendants or both, or from someone else altogether. 
 
In addition to the evidence that was introduced to 
corroborate Salie's account of the evening, the Commonwealth 
offered evidence that the defendants sought to construct a false 
alibi in the days following the murder.  Larry Bavis testified 
that the defendants and a third person named Victor Grimaldi 
urged Bavis to lie to "cover" for them by saying that he was 
playing pool with them at Triple O's, a bar in the South Boston 
section of Boston, on the night of the stabbing.  In response to 
that request, Bavis became angry, and called the police to 
report the conversation. 
 
Additionally, a police officer who interviewed Cowels 
shortly after the victim's death testified to several 
10 
 
incriminating statements Cowels made.  Cowels indicated that he 
had met the victim at "drunk driving school," and that he had 
had sex with her on several previous occasions, although he had 
not done so for "several months."  According to the officer's 
testimony, Cowels described the victim as a "dirty pig," and 
said that she was "such a dirty pig that one time he and Mims 
had had sex with her at the same time."  When the officer 
informed Cowels that the victim was dead, Cowels "began 
sobbing," and stated, "I'm only twenty-three.  I don't want to 
go to jail." 
 
The defendants offered an alternative timeline of their 
activities that evening, which was introduced at trial primarily 
through the same police officer's account of what the defendants 
had said to him during an interview.  According to this 
timeline, the victim arrived at the party in Chelsea to purchase 
marijuana at approximately 7:30 P.M., rather than 9 P.M. as in 
the Commonwealth's version.  The defendants, the victim, and 
Grimaldi then traveled to Triple O's, where they played pool and 
drank until approximately 11 P.M.  At 11 P.M they left; 
Grimaldi, who lived upstairs from Triple O's, went home; 
meanwhile, the victim accompanied the defendants to the 
residence in Revere that Cowels shared with his sister, Barbara 
Cowels.  About twenty minutes later, Barbara Cowels arrived at 
her home, where she encountered the defendants and the victim.  
11 
 
She chastised her brother for drinking, and kicked him out of 
the house.  The defendants then dropped the victim off near the 
party where they had picked her up at the beginning of the 
evening, and continued on to a bar in Revere, where they 
remained until approximately 2 A.M.  Once the bar closed, the 
defendants went to Salie's house, purportedly for the first time 
that evening.  Mims spent the night there, while Cowels went to 
his girl friend's house. 
 
The defense introduced testimony by four witnesses.  Two of 
those witnesses corroborated this alternative timeline.  Barbara 
Cowels testified that when she arrived at her home at 
approximately 11:20 P.M. that Saturday night, she encountered 
the defendants along with the victim.  She stated that, after a 
brief argument with Cowels concerning his drinking, the 
defendants and the victim left the house.  Similarly, John 
Heald, a friend and neighbor of the Cowelses, testified that on 
the evening of the stabbing, sometime between 10 and 11:30 P.M., 
he observed the defendants leaving the apartment with a young 
woman.  Because the testimony of both of these witnesses in 
conjunction suggested that the victim was still alive and in the 
company of the defendants at approximately 11:30 P.M., it 
12 
 
undermined Salie's statement that the defendants arrived at his 
apartment to clean up after the stabbing at that time.1 
 
The defense also introduced an alternative account of the 
incident when Cowels asked Polovick to repair a tire.  A 
coworker at the print shop where Cowels was employed at the time 
of the stabbing testified that he accompanied Cowels on a trip 
to purchase new sneakers.  On the way, he and Cowels stopped to 
have Polovick repair a tire.  According to the coworker's 
testimony, after Polovick repaired the tire, he and Cowels 
continued on to a shoe store.  There Cowels purchased new 
sneakers and put the old sneakers on the back seat of his 
vehicle.  The coworker also testified that workers at the print 
shop got ink and chemicals all over any clothes that they wore 
to work, and that Cowels wore his sneakers to work. 
 
Finally, the defense called a chemist at the State police 
crime laboratory.  The chemist, who was not assigned to the 
                                                        
 
1 On appeal, the Commonwealth describes Barbara Cowels's 
testimony as if it were consistent with the timeline of events 
that the prosecution presented at trial.  Robert Salie, however, 
testified that the defendants arrived at his apartment to clean 
up at 11:30 P.M.  Meanwhile, Barbara Cowels testified that she 
arrived home at 11:20 P.M., and ordered the defendants and the 
victim out of the house approximately five to ten minutes later, 
leaving the defendants at most five minutes to travel to the 
industrial park in Chelsea where the victim's body ultimately 
was found, kill the victim, and then travel to Salie's apartment 
to clean up.  To believe that Barbara Cowels's testimony was 
accurate, therefore, the jury would have had to conclude that 
Salie's testimony was inaccurate, at least with respect to the 
time when the defendants arrived at his apartment for the second 
time that evening. 
13 
 
case, testified that she believed that the laboratory could have 
performed a comparison test, using blood from the victim and the 
defendants, that could have determined whether any of them was 
the source of the blood found on the towel.  No comparison test, 
however, was ever performed.  Both defendants were found guilty 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. 
 
b.  Posttrial proceedings.  After this court affirmed the 
defendants' convictions, Commonwealth v. Cowels, 425 Mass. 279, 
285-293 (1997), Mims filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts.  Mims vs. DiPaolo, 98-CV-11203-MEL (D. Mass. 
Apr. 1, 1999).  The petition was denied, and, in an unpublished 
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit affirmed the denial.  Mims v. DiPaolo, 201 F.3d 428 (1st 
Cir. 2000). 
 
Cowels, initially proceeding pro se, moved for a new trial 
on July 3, 1998.  Cowels later filed an assented-to motion to 
stay proceedings on his motion for a new trial while his 
subsequently obtained counsel sought permission to perform DNA 
testing on certain items of evidence.  A Superior Court judge, 
who was also the trial judge, authorized Orchid Cellmark 
(Cellmark) to perform the requested testing.  DNA testing on the 
towel that had been subjected to further testing in the original 
14 
 
trial revealed that the blood found on it did not come from 
either of the defendants or the victim, but instead from an 
unidentified male.  DNA testing of the vaginal swab taken from 
the victim identified Mims as a contributor of sperm recovered 
from the victim, and excluded Cowels as a contributor.  Cellmark 
also replicated the presumptive test for blood which the 
Commonwealth had performed on the sneakers before the first 
trial.  Cellmark's test established that there was no blood on 
the parts of the sneakers that were tested. 
 
Based on the results of these tests, in February, 2008, 
Cowels filed an amended motion for a new trial.  Shortly 
thereafter, Mims also sought a new trial, pressing the same 
arguments as Cowels.  The defendants argued that they were 
entitled to a new trial based on "newly discovered" evidence, in 
the form of the DNA test results on the towel and the vaginal 
swab.  They further contended that they were deprived of 
effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed 
to conduct independent forensic testing on the sneakers; 
(2) failed to call certain witnesses whose testimony would have 
corroborated the defendants' account of their activities that 
evening; and (3) failed adequately to develop the defense that 
Peter Rowe, who had been dating the victim and had been "stood 
up" by the victim on the night of the stabbing, was the actual 
killer. 
15 
 
 
The judge2 rejected both arguments and denied the 
defendants' motions for a new trial.  The judge concluded that 
the towels would not have been admissible in light of the DNA 
testing establishing that neither the defendants nor the victim 
were the source of the blood found on one of the towels.  The 
judge determined, however, that "there is no substantial risk 
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if the 
'bloody' towels were not in evidence."  The judge also rejected 
the ineffective assistance of counsel arguments. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendants argue, as they did in their 
original motions, that they are entitled to a new trial based on 
(1) newly discovered evidence, in the form of the DNA testing on 
one of the towels and the vaginal swab; and (2) ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In reviewing a judge's decision on a 
motion for a new trial, we "examine the motion judge's 
conclusion only to determine whether there has been a 
significant error of law or other abuse of discretion."  
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  While we 
"extend[] special deference to the action of a motion judge 
who[, as here,] was also the trial judge," id., we nonetheless 
conclude that, in the circumstances here, the defendants are 
entitled to a new trial based on the DNA testing performed on 
                                                        
 
2 The judge has since retired. 
16 
 
the towel.3  Accordingly, we need not reach the defendants' 
claims based on the vaginal swab testing or their ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.4 
                                                        
 
3 The judge denied the defendants' motions for a new trial 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.  The Commonwealth 
contends that, as a result, we "should only decide whether the 
defendant[s are] entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and not 
whether [they are] entitled to a new trial."  We of course may 
remand a motion for a new trial to the Superior Court with 
instructions regarding the conduct of an evidentiary hearing.  
See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 670-671 (2011).  
The Commonwealth identifies no case, however, holding that, 
where a judge of the Superior Court denies a motion for a new 
trial without holding an evidentiary hearing, our review is 
limited to the decision not to hold the evidentiary hearing and 
does not reach the underlying denial of the motion. 
 
 
Typically, "where a substantial issue is raised [on a 
motion for a new trial] and is supported by a substantial 
evidentiary showing, the judge should hold an evidentiary 
hearing" before granting the motion.  Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82 
Mass. App. Ct. 389, 394-395 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 260 (1981).  Here, however, we have 
determined that the only issue warranting an evidentiary 
hearing -- the Commonwealth's recent contention that the 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing does not constitute "newly 
discovered" evidence -- was waived below, and cannot be raised 
on appeal.  Remand for an evidentiary hearing, therefore, is not 
warranted. 
 
 
4 The defendants argue that "the new DNA evidence pertaining 
to the vaginal swab would also probably have been a real factor 
in the jury's deliberations, at least against Cowels."  The 
defendants argue that the swab test corroborates Cowels's 
account of the evening, insofar as it establishes that he did 
not have sex with the victim, undercuts Salie's credibility, and 
undermines the Commonwealth's theory that the defendants killed 
the victim because they regarded her as a sexual object.  The 
Commonwealth counters that Salie never testified that he 
actually witnessed the defendants engaging in sexual intercourse 
and that the newly discovered evidence is broadly consistent 
with Cowels's statement to police that the victim had had some 
sexual contact with both defendants on the evening of the 
17 
 
 
Rule 30 (b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), allows a trial 
judge to "grant a new trial at any time if it appears that 
justice may not have been done."  To prevail on a motion for a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant 
must meet both prongs of a two-part test.  First, a defendant 
"must establish that the evidence was unknown to the defendant 
or trial counsel and not reasonably discoverable at the time of 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 271 (2005).  
Second, a defendant must show that the evidence "casts real 
doubt on the justice of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 
397 Mass. at 305.  The Commonwealth contends that the defendants 
have failed to satisfy either of the elements necessary to 
prevail on a motion for a new trial. 
 
a.  In its brief, the Commonwealth maintains that the DNA 
evidence identified on the towels recovered from Salie's 
bathroom does not constitute "newly discovered" evidence.  Even 
if the argument were not waived, we would find it unpersuasive, 
given that this court did not determine the admissibility of DNA 
testing of the type performed here until 1997, Commonwealth v. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
murder, but had had more with Mims.  Because we conclude that 
the towels likely were a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations, we need not reach the question whether the 
vaginal smear swab -- taken by itself -- would have been 
sufficient to give rise to a substantial risk that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different. 
18 
 
Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 789 (1997), and that the very article 
that the Commonwealth cites as establishing that DNA testing was 
available in 1993 indicates that it was then "still at the 
experimental stage."  Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of 
New Genetic Identification Tests:  Lessons from the "DNA War," 
84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 22, 30 n.36 (1993).  We need not 
reach the issue of whether the evidence is "newly discovered," 
however, since it plainly was waived.  Generally, "[a]n issue 
not raised or argued below may not be argued for the first time 
on appeal."  Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 
(2006), quoting Century Fire & Marine Ins. Corp. v. Bank of New 
England–Bristol County, N.A., 405 Mass. 420, 421 n.2 (1989).  
See Commonwealth v. LaBriola, 430 Mass 569, 570 n.1 (2000).  As 
the judge observed, in the proceedings below "[t]he Commonwealth 
d[id] not dispute that the DNA results are 'newly discovered.'" 
 
b.  To satisfy the second element of the test for a motion 
for a new trial, a defendant must establish that the new 
evidence is: 
"not only . . . material and credible[,] but also [that 
it] . . . carr[ies] a measure of strength in support of the 
defendant's position. . . .  Thus newly discovered evidence 
that is cumulative of evidence admitted at the trial tends 
to carry less weight than new evidence that is different in 
kind. . . .  Moreover, the judge must find there is a 
substantial risk that the jury would have reached a 
different conclusion had the evidence been admitted at 
trial. . . .  The strength of the case against a criminal 
defendant, therefore, may weaken the effect of evidence 
which is admittedly newly discovered. . . .  The motion 
19 
 
judge decides not whether the verdict would have been 
different, but rather whether the new evidence would 
probably have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations." (Citations omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. at 306. 
 
This case differs from many cases involving motions for a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence in one 
respect.  In such cases, a defendant generally offers newly 
discovered evidence that was not presented in the original 
trial, but that, the defendant argues, probably would have been 
a real factor in the jury's deliberations if it had been 
offered.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 447-
448 (2014) (defendant argued "that newly discovered evidence in 
the form of third-party culprit evidence warranted a new 
trial"); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 Mass. 729, 729-730 (2008) 
("The defendant alleges that the prosecution withheld the fact 
of an agreement it purportedly made with a key witness . . .").  
The defendants' motions here, however, are based less on newly 
discovered evidence that could have been admitted in evidence at 
the trial, than on newly available analysis that would remove 
from the jury's consideration evidence admitted at trial in the 
Commonwealth's case.  The judge observed that "the 'bloody' 
towels would not have been admitted in evidence had DNA testing 
shown that the blood on the towels was not that of Cowels, Mims, 
or Miscioscia."  Although the defendants suggest that they might 
20 
 
offer the DNA testing performed on one of the towels in evidence 
in a new trial, ostensibly to support an argument that Salie 
intentionally "frame[d]" the defendants, the primary value of 
the DNA testing for the defendants plainly derives from the way 
in which it eliminates the towels as evidence against the 
defendants. 
 
This distinction, however, does not raise significant 
conceptual problems for our analysis.  In the typical case, 
where a defendant argues on the basis of newly discovered 
exculpatory evidence that was not presented at the original 
trial, we ask "whether the new evidence would probably have been 
a real factor in the jury's deliberations" had it been presented 
(emphasis supplied).  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. at 306.  
In this case, where the defendants argue on the basis of a newly 
available analysis that likely would have rendered inculpatory 
evidence presented at the original trial inadmissible, we ask 
whether that inculpatory evidence "likely was a 'real factor' in 
the jury's deliberations such that its elimination would cast 
real doubt on the justice of the defendant's conviction" 
(emphasis supplied).  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 
350 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 667 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, supra (in case where 
newly available analysis undermines test results presented in 
initial trial, analyzing whether "evidence concerning the . . . 
21 
 
test results probably was not 'a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations,' and not likely to create 'a substantial risk 
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion' if it 
had not been admitted at trial").  If we conclude that the 
subsequently eliminated inculpatory evidence likely did play an 
important role in the jury's deliberations, then we must 
conclude that there is a "'a substantial risk that the jury 
would have reached a different conclusion' if it had not been 
admitted at trial." 
 
After a detailed review of the trial record, we determine 
that the towels likely were a "real factor" in the jury's 
deliberations, and that there is consequently a substantial risk 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the 
towels been excluded altogether or neutralized through expert 
testimony indicating that blood found on one of the towels 
matched neither the defendants nor the victim.  We reach this 
conclusion based on the paucity of physical evidence in the 
case, the vital importance of Salie's testimony, and the 
substantial challenges to his credibility. 
 
The case against the defendants was entirely 
circumstantial.  There were no eyewitnesses to the crime.  The 
Commonwealth never found the murder weapon.  There was no 
forensic evidence at the crime scene tying either defendant to 
the crime.  Although the victim's body showed defensive wounds, 
22 
 
a police investigator who interviewed Cowels and Mims within 
days of the stabbing observed no cuts or scratches on either 
defendant.  The only physical evidence that the Commonwealth 
offered linking the defendants to the crime was the towels, 
Cowels's sneaker, and the vaginal swab. 
 
Due to the dearth of physical evidence, the case against 
the defendants hinged, to a significant extent, on the testimony 
of Salie.  The problems with Salie's credibility, moreover, were 
numerous and significant.  In the prosecutor's own words, Salie 
was "a junkie" with a "checkered background" and a "long 
criminal record."  Indeed, he was impeached at trial with at 
least nineteen prior convictions of crimes ranging from drug 
possession to arson.  Salie originally had given an account that 
was consistent with Cowels's and Mims's claim that they only 
visited his home once on that evening, before changing his 
account to the narrative presented at trial.  Salie, moreover, 
had a motive to change his story, and to point his finger at 
Cowels specifically:  not only did Salie's testimony enable him 
to avoid prosecution as an accessory after the fact, but it also 
allowed him to avoid jail time on an unrelated motor vehicle 
offense, for which Cowels was to serve as a witness for the 
prosecution.  It is, in short, difficult to imagine a witness 
with more credibility problems than Salie. 
23 
 
To counter these issues with Salie's credibility, the 
prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the ways in which Salie's 
testimony had been "confirmed" and "verified."  He observed that 
Salie's testimony had been "validated by so many different 
people and so many different sources."  The prosecutor referred 
to the towels in the context of this discussion, as evidence 
that "substantiated" Salie's account.  Noting Salie's testimony 
that the defendants ran into his bathroom to clean and change, 
the prosecutor stated:  "And when the police do a search, what 
do they find?  They find bloody towels.  Those towels are in 
evidence, ladies and gentlemen.  Another piece confirming Mr. 
Salie." 
This court has observed that evidence likely functions as a 
real factor in a jury's deliberations where the evidence "is 
more credible than any other evidence on the same factual issue 
and bears directly on a crucial issue before the jury, such as 
the credibility of an important prosecution witness."  
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 414 (1992).  Here, the 
towels were the only physical evidence corroborating a key 
element of an important prosecution witness's testimony, and 
functioned to reinforce Salie's severely challenged credibility.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the towels likely were a real 
factor in the jury's deliberations. 
24 
 
The Superior Court judge offered several reasons for 
reaching the contrary conclusion.  First, the judge observed 
that the Commonwealth's expert testified that the testing 
performed on the towels was "inconclusive," and that defense 
counsel's closing arguments "highlight[ed] the limited 
evidentiary value of the 'bloody' towels."  The Commonwealth 
echoes that argument on appeal.  It contends that, because the 
testing performed on the towels was inconclusive, "[r]emoving 
the towel [tested by Cellmark] from the calculus of the trial, 
or adding to it the fact that neither defendant['s] nor the 
victim's blood was found on the towel, . . . does not 'carry a 
measure of strength in support of the defendant's position.'" 
There is, however, a significant difference between a test 
that fails to say whether the blood came from the defendants or 
the victim and a test that definitively establishes that the 
blood did not come from either the defendants or the victim.  
The inconclusive test results allowed the prosecutor to cite the 
"bloody towels" as physical evidence that corroborated Salie's 
testimony.  As the defendants argue, "the use of the towel at 
trial was a . . . powerful visual for the jury."  A test that 
definitively excluded the defendants and the victim, by 
contrast, would not merely have reduced the weight that the jury 
might have given the towels in substantiating Salie's testimony.  
25 
 
Rather, it would have meant that the towels would not have been 
admissible at all, at least when offered by the prosecution. 
Second, the judge concluded that, although the towels 
functioned to corroborate Salie's testimony, they likely were 
not a real factor in the jury's deliberations because "Salie's 
credibility was brought into question numerous times throughout 
his testimony," and there were "numerous reasons put forth at 
trial for finding Salie's testimony unreliable and incredible."  
But the repeated challenges to Salie's credibility increase, 
rather than decrease, the importance that the towels likely had 
in the jury's deliberations.  It is difficult to see how the 
jury could have voted to convict if the jurors had not believed 
Salie's testimony.  Much of the other evidence against the 
defendants was valuable primarily because it confirmed details 
in Salie's account:  the original testing of the vaginal swab 
smear confirmed Salie's statement that he witnessed the 
defendants and the victim preparing to have sex; Polovick's 
testimony regarding Cowels's disposal of his sneaker and the 
original testing performed on the shoe were valuable because 
they confirmed Salie's testimony that Cowels brandished a bloody 
sneaker at him after the murder.  Furthermore, Salie's testimony 
that the defendants came into his apartment, cleaned up, and 
discarded their clothing on the evening of the killing explained 
why the prosecution could not present any other physical 
26 
 
evidence linking the defendants with an especially bloody 
stabbing.  Because the jury's verdict indicates that the jury 
very likely did credit Salie's testimony, despite the challenges 
it faced, and because the towels were among the very few pieces 
of physical evidence that buttressed Salie's credibility, there 
is a real question whether the jury would have credited his 
testimony had the towels not been presented. 
Third, the judge cited case law holding that "evidence of a 
type merely tending to impeach or to corroborate credibility of 
a witness ordinarily will not be the basis for ordering a new 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Shuman, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 448 
(1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 157 (2003).  However, we have never 
adopted an inflexible rule that newly discovered evidence that 
merely corroborates or impeaches a witness's testimony is an 
insufficient basis for a motion for a new trial.  In fact, we 
have found that, in rare cases, a new trial may be warranted 
"[w]here the Commonwealth's case depends so heavily on the 
testimony of a witness" and where the newly discovered evidence 
"seriously undermines the credibility of that witness."  
Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483, 489 (1983).  
Furthermore, the DNA testing on the towel does not "merely 
impeach" Salie's testimony.  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 
340, 352 (2014).  Rather, it "negates a key piece of physical 
27 
 
evidence that the prosecution relied on in arguing that the jury 
should credit [Salie's] testimony."  Id.  In Commonwealth v. 
Sullivan, supra at 353, we affirmed a Superior Court judge's 
decision granting a defendant's motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence.  There, in the original murder trial, 
the Commonwealth had offered expert testimony indicating that a 
jacket, allegedly worn by the defendant during the commission of 
the crime, had blood on its cuffs that was "'consistent' with 
that of the victim."  Id. at 345.  There, as here, the 
prosecutor argued in closing that the jacket corroborated the 
testimony of a witness whose credibility was significantly 
challenged.  Id. at 349.  There, as here, subsequent DNA testing 
excluded the victim as the source for the genetic material 
identified on the jacket.  Id. at 349-350.  We concluded that 
"the purported blood on the defendant's cuffs and the hair in 
[the] defendant's pocket were not merely cumulative of other 
physical evidence presented at trial."  Id. at 352.  Rather, 
"[t]hey were different in kind because they served as the sole 
pieces of physical evidence indicating the defendant had been in 
the presence of the victim during the killing."  Id. 
Here, similarly, Salie testified that the defendants spent 
twenty minutes in his bathroom cleaning up after allegedly 
participating in a bloody stabbing.  Police investigators 
acquired a warrant to search Salie's apartment for "any bloody 
28 
 
clothing, hairs, any trace of blood that may be found in the 
apartment."  They searched the apartment for over one hour, 
during which time they confiscated hair from the couch and also 
performed tests for blood on the couch.  Despite this search, 
police recovered no evidence indicating that the victim had ever 
been present in Salie's apartment, and the towels were the only 
evidence seized from Salie's apartment that corroborated his 
testimony.  We think that the absence of any physical evidence 
supporting Salie's testimony likely would have carried real 
weight in the jury's deliberations. 
Finally, the judge observed that "there was other evidence 
implicating Cowels and Mims."  The Commonwealth takes this 
argument a step further.  It contends there is no substantial 
risk that the outcome of the trial would be different in the 
absence of the towels because "the Commonwealth's case against 
the defendants was . . . strong." 
To address this argument, we must clarify the proper 
approach to assessing a motion for a new trial on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence.  We have observed that "[t]he 
strength of the case against a criminal defendant . . . may 
weaken the effect of evidence which is admittedly newly 
discovered."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 (1986). 
See Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 127 (1990).  In 
considering the over-all strength or weakness of the 
29 
 
prosecution's case, however, a reviewing court must ensure that 
its focus remains on whether, in light of "a full and reasonable 
assessment of the trial record," the evidence at issue "would 
have played an important role in the jury's deliberations and 
conclusions."  Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 414.  The 
over-all strength or weakness of the evidence presented against 
a defendant is significant, therefore, because it provides the 
context within which to assess whether the newly discovered 
evidence would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.  Where a case is "a weak one for conviction," for 
instance, a jury is more likely "to pay attention to collateral 
factors and even to make them decisive," and thus a court is 
more likely to conclude that evidence relating to one of these 
factors was or would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations.  Commonwealth v. Bennett, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 
162 (1997). 
The analysis remains focused, however, on "what effect the 
omission might have had on the jury."  Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 
412 Mass. at 411.  "[O]ur inquiry is not whether the verdict may 
have been different, but whether the evidence in question 
probably served as a real factor in the jury's deliberations."  
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 353.  Where we determine 
that newly discovered evidence likely would have functioned as a 
real factor in the jury's deliberations, or (as in this case) 
30 
 
that subsequently discredited evidence likely did function as a 
real factor, we may not then assess whether the jury still would 
have reached the same conclusion.  Instead, the determination 
that the evidence likely was a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations demands a new trial.  We have justified this 
approach as "preserv[ing], as well as it can in the 
circumstances, the defendant's right to the judgment of his 
peers," since it ensures that the court's analysis turns on 
"what effect the omission might have had on the jury," rather 
than on "what . . . impact the late disclosed evidence has on 
the judge's personal assessment of the trial record."  
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, supra at 411. 
Here, although the Commonwealth asserts that its over-all 
case against the defendants was strong, it does not contest that 
Salie's testimony was the linchpin.  Without Salie's testimony, 
the case against the defendants would not have been strong.  In 
light of the unique facts presented here -- given Salie's 
importance to the prosecution's case and the towels' status as 
one of only a few items of physical evidence that bolstered his 
severely beleaguered credibility -- we determine that the towels 
likely were a real factor in the jury's deliberations.  
Consequently, there is a substantial risk that the newly 
available testing excluding the victim and the defendants as 
31 
 
possible sources of the blood on one of the towels would have 
altered the outcome. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction are vacated 
and set aside, and the matters are remanded to the Superior 
Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.