Title: STATE v HOWARD

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-424 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONWTANA 1981 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, LESLIE D. HOWARD, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert L. Stephens, Jr. argued, Billings, Montana Stephens and Cole, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Allen Chronister argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Corbin Howard argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana Filed: No\ 2 5 198; Submitted: September 17, 1981 Decided : m ! 2 5 %I r Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. L e s l i e Howard was charged i n Yellowstone County w i t h attempted homicide, aggravated kidnapping and sexual i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . H e was t r i e d by a j u r y and on A p r i l 11, 1980, c o n v i c t e d of t h e lesser included o f f e n s e s of aggravated a s s a u l t and kidnapping. H e was sentenced to c o n c u r r e n t terms of t e n and twenty y e a r s a t Montana S t a t e P r i s o n and was designated a dangerous o f f e n d e r . The dangerous d e s i g n a t i o n was removed by t h e Sentence Review ~ i v i s i o n . Howard a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n . W e a f f i r m . The testimony of t h e v i c t i m and d e f e n d a n t was con£ l i c t i n g , and t h e v e r d i c t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e j u r y believed p o r t i o n s of both stories. The v i c t i m , Debbra Aldridge, t e s t i f i e d t h a t she was working a s a p r o s t i t u t e n e a r t h e Western Bar i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, on t h e n i g h t of August 30, 1979. She met Howard, they agreed on h e r s e r v i c e s , and she went with him i n h i s c a r . I n s t e a d of stopping a t A l d r i d g e l s house t o consummate t h e agreement, Howard drove by it and stopped a t a v a c a n t l o t . Howard informed h e r t h e a c t of i n t e r c o u r s e would t a k e p l a c e t h e r e , and over h e r p r o t e s t dragged h e r o u t of the c a r . A n a l t e r c a t i o n ensued i n which Howard b e a t h e r , choked h e r , dragged h e r a c r o s s t h e l o t and attempted to r i p o f f h e r c l o t h i n g . A t one p o i n t he was s i t t i n g on t o p of h e r and p u l l i n g h e r neck backwards w i t h both hands. Aldridge t e s t i f i e d , " I t h o u g h t he was t r y i n g to b r e a k my back or m y neck." H e h i t h e r on t h e s i d e of t h e head and she l o s t consciousness. When she regained c o n s c i o u s n e s s she was i n t h e t r u n k of Howard's c a r . She had l o s t h e r purse and s h o e s i n t h e s t r u g g l e . The car stopped a t South Bridge o v e r t h e Yellowstone River. Howard p u l l e d h e r o u t of t h e t r u n k , took o f f h e r d r e s s , dragged h e r under t h e b r i d g e and raped h e r . She managed t o g e t away and r a n toward t h e car, b u t Howard stopped h e r and s t a r t e d s t r a n g l i n g h e r with h e r pantyhose. Aldridge f i n a l l y broke f r e e , dove i n t o t h e r i v e r , and made h e r way t o a road where s h e found a r i d e to t h e h o s p i t a l . She t o l d t h e p o l i c e a b o u t h e r s h o e s and p u r s e , b u t they were unable t o f i n d them. L a t e r , Aldridge and h e r husband found t h e v a c a n t l o t where h e r s h o e s and p u r s e were l o c a t e d , and t h e y n o t i f i e d t h e p o l i c e . Leslie Howard t e s t i f i e d t h a t he picked up a p r o s t i t u t e , Debbra A l d r i d g e , n e a r t h e Northern Hotel and drove h e r t o h e r home where t h e y had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e . Howard o f f e r e d to t a k e h e r downtown so she could r e t u r n to work. Aldridge t h e n demanded payment b u t Howard r e f u s e d , saying he was broke. Aldridge e x p r e s s e d concern t h a t h e r pimp would be u p s e t . Aldridge a t t a c k e d him w h i l e he was d r i v i n g and he stopped t h e car, went t o t h e p a s s e n g e r door and opened it. She g o t o u t and t h e y g o t i n t o a f i g h t . H e a d m i t s h i t t i n g A l d r i d g e b u t d e n i e s t h a t s h e became unconscious. Howard test i f i e d t h a t Aldridge had h i s g l a s s e s and h e w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t them back. H e took o f f h e r d r e s s and d r o v e away, l e a v i n g h e r i n t h e lot. H e went back to h e r house to smooth t h i n g s o v e r and g e t h i s g l a s s e s and r e t u r n h e r d r e s s . A l d r i d g e asked him to t a k e h e r downtown. H e drove h e r downtown b u t s h e t o l d him t o keep d r i v i n g and e v e n t u a l l y t o l d him to p u l l o v e r a t t h e South Bridge. She g o t o u t of t h e car, r a n down to t h e r i v e r , removed h e r d r e s s and went swimming. Howard took h e r d r e s s because A l d r i d g e still had h i s g l a s s e s , and he l e f t h e r t h e r e . A s e a r c h of Howard's r e s i d e n c e r e v e a l e d w e t , sandy j e a n s and s h o e s . The v i c t i m ' s t o r n d r e s s was found i n t h e t r u n k of t h e car Howard had been d r i v i n g . The p o l i c e found t h e v i c t i m ' s s h o e s and p u r s e and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g l a s s e s i n t h e v a c a n t l o t a f t e r b e i n g n o t i f i e d by t h e v i c t i m of t h e l o t ' s correct l o c a t i o n . The v i c t i m i d e n t i f i e d Howard from a photo l i n e - u p and also i n t h e courtroom. D r . Stephen E l l i o t t was t h e a t t e n d i n g emergency room p h y s i c i a n who examined t h e v i c t i m on t h e n i g h t of t h e i n c i d e n t . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had s t r a n g u l a t i o n marks on h e r neck, a b l u i s h t i n g e t o h e r f a c e and many p e t e c h i a e , which a r e t i n y p u r p l e s p o t s caused by hemorrhaging of c a p i l l a r i e s a s a r e s u l t of s t r a n g u l a t i o n . She a l s o had b r u i s e s and an i n j u r y to t h e eye. S e v e r a l photographs were introduced i n t o e v i d e n c e which graphi- c a l l y p o r t r a y e d h e r c o n d i t i o n . D r . E l l i o t t t e s t i f i e d he was " s u r p r i s e d t o s e e a person w i t h t h i s much i n j u r y s t i l l a l i v e ," " [ s l h e looked l i k e she should have been dead," and " i f you g e t s t r a n g l e d b a d l y you g e t [ p e t e c h i a e ] l i k e t h a t . " I n a d d i t i o n , he gave t h e following testimony: "Q. D r . E l l i o t t , based upon your examination of t h e i n j u r i e s t h a t you saw on Debbie on t h e e a r l y morning of August 31, d o you have an o p i n i o n a s t o what t h e f o r c e t h a t was a p p l i e d to h e r w a s d e s i g n e d to do? "MR. STEPHENS: W e l l , I o b j e c t , Your Honor. T h a t invades t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e jury. "THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. "A. Well, yeah, I have an o p i n i o n . I t h i n k t h a t somebody t r i e d to murder h e r . You know, I j u s t can1 t b e l i e v e t h a t you can s u s t a i n t h a t much trauma w i t h any o t h e r i n t e n t . " On a p p e a l Howard raises t h r e e i s s u e s : 1) Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n allowing t h e d o c t o r to t e s t i f y a s to t h e i n t e n t of t h e v i c t i m ' s a s s a i l a n t ; 2 ) whether t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g to i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e n e c e s s i t y of f i n d i n g a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t ; and 3 ) whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t 1 s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s on a r t i f i c i a l l y p l a c e d o r tampered e v i d e n c e . The o b j e c t i o n made by d e f e n s e counsel to t h e q u e s t i o n c a l l i n g f o r t h e d o c t o r l s o p i n i o n on i n t e n t was t h a t it " i n v a d e s t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e jury." T h i s o b j e c t i o n is not adequate to j u s t i f y e x c l u s i o n of t h e testimony. ~t is merely a n o t h e r way o f s a y i n g t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y embraces an u l t i m a t e i s s u e to be d e c i d e d by t h e jury. Rule 704 of t h e Montana Rules of Evidence p r o v i d e s : "Testimony i n t h e form of an o p i n i o n o r i n f e r e n c e o t h e r w i s e a d m i s s i b l e is n o t objec- t i o n a b l e because it embraces an u l t i m a t e i s s u e t o be decided by t h e trier of f a c t . " T h i s r u l e r e f l e c t s l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d law i n Montana. S t a t e v. P e t k o ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 229, 581 P.2d 425; McGuire v. Nelson ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 188, 536 P.2d 768; Rude v. Neal ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 520, 530 P.2d 428; S t a t e v. Campbell ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978; S t a t e v. Shannon (1933) , 95 Mont. 280, 26 P.2d 360; v. John R. D a i l y Co. ( 1 9 1 9 ) , 56 Mont. 63, 1 8 1 P. 326. Thus, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d o c t o r ' s o p i n i o n on i n t e n t went to an u l t i m a t e i s s u e is no b a s i s f o r its e x c l u s i o n . Under Rule 704 t h e t e s t i m o n y must be " o t h e r w i s e admiss- i b l e ." The a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y is governed by Rule 702, Montana Rules of Evidence: " I f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , or o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge w i l l assist t h e trier of f a c t to understand t h e e v i d e n c e or to d e t e r m i n e a f a c t i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d as an e x p e r t by knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , t r a i n i n g , or edu- c a t i o n may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n t h e form of an o p i n i o n o r o t h e r w i s e ." According to t h i s r u l e , D r . E l l i o t t was c l e a r l y q u a l i f i e d to t e s t i f y as to t h e n a t u r e and e x t e n t of t h e v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s . Whether he could t h e n e x t r a p o l a t e from t h i s d a t a and g i v e an opi- n i o n is determined by whether t h e o p i n i o n would assist t h e trier o f f a c t . S t a t e d a n o t h e r way, t h e t e s t is: " . . . whether t h e s u b j e c t is one of such com- mon knowledge t h a t men of o r d i n a r y e d u c a t i o n c o u l d r e a c h a c o n c l u s i o n as i n t e l l i g e n t l y a s t h e w i t n e s s , o r whether t h e matter is s u f f i c i e n t l y beyond common e x p e r i e n c e t h a t t h e o p i n i o n of an e x p e r t would assist t h e trier of f a c t ." S t a t e v. Campbell ( 1 9 6 5 ) r 146 Mont. 251, 258, 405 P.2d 978, 983. D r . E l l i o t t i n f e r r e d from t h e n a t u r e of t h e i n j u r i e s t h a t t h e p e r s o n who in£ l i c t e d them d i d so w i t h an i n t e n t to murder. W e f i n d t h a t under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s case, t h e j u r y was as q u a l i f i e d as t h e d o c t o r to draw an i n f e r e n c e from t h e circumstan- t i a l e v i d e n c e as to i n t e n t , and t h e r e f o r e t h e d o c t o r ' s o p i n i o n on i n t e n t w a s i n a d m i s s i b l e under Rule 702, Montana Rules of Evidence. W e f u r t h e r f i n d t h a t , f o r a number of r e a s o n s , t h e error was harmless under both t h e Montana and t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l tests. Montana s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e t h a t no cause of a c t i o n s h a l l be r e v e r s e d by r e a s o n of any error committed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t u n l e s s t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e error was p r e j u d i c i a l , s e c t i o n 46-20-701, MCA; and t h a t any error which does n o t a f f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s s h a l l be d i s r e g a r d e d , s e c t i o n 46-20-702, MCA. The f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l test f o r h a r m l e s s error is whether t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e complained of m i g h t have c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e c o n v i c t i o n , Fahy v. C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 1 1 L.Ed.2d 171; or whether t h e r e v i e w i n g c o u r t can d e c l a r e a b e l i e f t h a t t h e e r r o r was h a r m l e s s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. Chapman v. C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 1 8 , 87 S e c t . 824, 1 7 L.Ed.2d 705. F i r s t , it is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e j u r y d i d n o t r e l y on t h e d o c t o r ' s o p i n i o n because it r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and kidnapping r a t h e r t h a n g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The crime of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide r e q u i r e s an i n t e n t or purpose to cause d e a t h ; s e c t i o n 45-5-102, MCA; w h i l e n e i t h e r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t n o r kidnapping r e q u i r e an i n t e n t to cause d e a t h . S e c t i o n s 45-5-202 and 45-5-3021 MCA. See S t a t e v. Gone ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 271, 587 P.2d 1291. Second, t h e e v i d e n c e is overwhelming t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t p u r p o s e f u l l y or knowingly i n f l i c t e d b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e v i c t i m w i t h a weapon. D r . E l l i o t t t e s t i f i e d from h i s examination of t h e v i c t i m t h a t s h e had been s t r a n g l e d w i t h an i n s t r u m e n t and t h a t t h e s t r a n g u l a t i o n had been s e v e r e . D r . E l l i o t t tes t i £ ied t h a t , w h i l e t h e b r u i s e s , a b r a s i o n s and p e t e c h i a e were n o t i n and of t h e m s e l v e s " s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y " a c c o r d i n g to t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n , s e c t i o n 45-2-101(53), MCA, t h e y were " b o d i l y i n j u r y " w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n to him from s e c t i o n 45-2-101(5), MCA. Debbra Aldridge t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s t r a n g l e d h e r w i t h h e r pantyhose and t h a t when s h e was being s t r a n g l e d s h e t h o u g h t h e r l i f e was o v e r . A p a i r of pantyhose may be considered a "weapon" under t h e d e f i n i t i o n of s e c t i o n 45-2-101(65), MCA, which i n c l u d e s "any i n s t r u m e n t , article, or s u b s t a n c e which, r e g a r d l e s s o f its primary f u n c t i o n , is r e a d i l y c a p a b l e of being used to pro- duce d e a t h or s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y . " A j u r y could have i n f e r r e d from a l l t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t e d p u r p o s e l y , i.e. w i t h t h e c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t to engage i n t h e conduct; or knowingly, i.e. w i t h awareness of h i s conduct. F i n a l l y , we n o t e t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e a s s a i l a n t w a s n o t a major i s s u e i n t h e t r i a l . The major i s s u e was t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e p e r p e t r a t o r . The d e f e n s e t h e o r y w a s t h a t t h e v i c t i m ' s pimp was t h e a s s a i l a n t . W e hold t h e admission of t h e d o c t o r ' s o p i n i o n on i n t e n t was n o t p r e j u d i c i a l to t h e d e f e n d a n t , d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e substan- t i a l r i g h t s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , and was h a r m l e s s beyond a reaso- n a b l e doubt. Defendant n e x t a r g u e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e n e c e s s i t y of f i n d i n g s p e c i f i c i n t e n t as a n element of t h e crime. A t common law, c e r t a i n crimes were r e f e r r e d to as " s p e c i f i c i n t e n t crimes" because they r e q u i r e d , i n a d d i t i o n to a g e n e r a l c r i m i n a l i n t e n t , a more p a r t i c u l a r or spe- c i f ic mental state. See P e r k i n s on Criminal Law ( 2d. Ed. 19 69 ) , C h a p t e r 7, S e c t i o n 3 . For example, common l a w b u r g l a r y r e q u i r e d a n i n t e n t i o n a l or knowing breaking and e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e d w e l l i n g o f a n o t h e r w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c purpose of committing a f e l o n y t h e r e i n . The " g e n e r a l i n t e n t " of t h e d e f e n d a n t could be i n f e r r e d from t h e doing of t h e a c t , w h i l e t h e " s p e c i f i c i n t e n t " w a s r e q u i r e d to be proved by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . It is t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between g e n e r a l and s p e c i f i c i n t e n t which t h e d e f e n d a n t u r g e s upon t h i s C o u r t , a r g u i n g t h a t "purposely" and "knowingly" refer t o g e n e r a l i n t e n t and t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d to prove t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t which is an element of aggravated a s s a u l t . The f a t a l f l a w i n d e f e n d a n t ' s argument is t h a t aggravated a s s a u l t is n o t a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t crime. Aggravated a s s a u l t is de- f i n e d by s e c t i o n 45-5-202(1) , MCA, as f o l l o w s : "A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t i f he p u r p o s e l y or knowingly c a u s e s : " a ) s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y to a n o t h e r ; [ o r ] " b ) b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r w i t h a weapon . . ." The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e n d to r e q u i r e any o t h e r mental state i n a d d i t i o n to " p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly." I f it had so i n t e n d e d , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e would have d e f i n e d t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i n language similar to t h a t used e l s e w h e r e i n t h e c r i m i n a l code. For example, see t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of s o l i c i t a t i o n , s e c t i o n 45-4-101, MCA ( " w i t h t h e purpose t h a t an o f f e n s e be committed" ) ; b u r g l a r y , s e c t i o n 45-6-204, MCA ( " w i t h t h e purpose t o c o m m i t an o f f e n s e t h e r e i n " ) ; and f o r g e r y , s e c t i o n 45-6-325, MCA ( " w i t h purpose to d e f r a u d " ) . The h i e r a r c h y of mental s t a t e s used by t h e Montana C r i m i n a l Code is p a t t e r n e d a f t e r t h e Model Penal Code, and as we s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Sharbono ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 373, 563 P.2d 61; and i n S t a t e v. K l e i n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75, w a s d e s i g n e d t o a l l e v i a t e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by t h e use of numerous terms d e s c r i b i n g c u l p a b i l i t y which were l a r g e l y undefined. The Model Penal Code d r a f t e r s abandoned t h e d i s t i n c - t i o n of " g e n e r a l " and " s p e c i f i c " i n t e n t , commenting: I' . . . we can see no v i r t u e i n p r e s e r v i n g t h e c o n c e p t of ' g e n e r a l i n t e n t ' which h a s been an a b i d i n g s o u r c e of ambiguity and of c o n f u s i o n i n t h e p e n a l law." Model Penal Code 2.02. Comment ( T e n t a t i v e Draft No. 4, 1955, p. 1 2 8 ) . The c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s on " p u r p o s e l y and knowinglyv1 were s u f - f i c i e n t i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e i n t e n t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n v i c t on t h e crimes of aggravated a s s a u l t and kidnapping. D e f e n d a n t ' s f i n a l argument is t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g h i s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g to t h e def i- n i t i o n of tampered e v i d e n c e and t h e use by t h e S t a t e of a r t i f i - c i a l l y placed e v i d e n c e . The d e f e n s e t h e o r y a t trial w a s t h a t t h e v i c t i m ' s pimp was h e r a s s a i l a n t and t h a t t h e y later p l a n t e d e v i - d e n c e i n an a t t e m p t to wrongly i m p l i c a t e Howard. I t is t r u e t h a t t h e p o l i c e could n o t f i n d t h e s h o e s , p u r s e and g l a s s e s a t f i r s t . From h e r h o s p i t a l bed t h e v i c t i m had g i v e n them an i n c o r r e c t l o c a t i o n of t h e v a c a n t l o t . Later she found t h e l o t a b l o c k away, found t h e evidence t h e r e i n and n o t i f i e d t h e p o l i c e . A t b e s t , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c r e a t e d a s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e might have been p l a n t e d . Debbra Aldridge t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had n o t p l a n t e d t h e e v i d e n c e . There was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i - dence t o s u p p o r t a l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was p l a n t e d , and t h e r e f o r e i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t an i n s t r u c t i o n on t h a t t h e o r y . S t a t e v. K i r k a l d i e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 283, 587 P.2d 1298; S t a t e v. Miner ( 1 9 7 6 ) r 169 Mont. 260, 546 P.2d 252. Affirmed . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: