Title: People v. Plank

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2018 IL 122202 
IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF  
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
(Docket No. 122202) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
JOHN PLANK, Appellee. 
Opinion filed May 24, 2018. 
JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
The Illinois Vehicle Code prohibits anyone with a revoked driver’s license 
from driving a “motor vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2012). However, 
someone with a revoked license may still drive a “low-speed gas bicycle” without 
violating this statute. Id. § 1-146. The Vehicle Code defines “low-speed gas 
bicycle” as a “2 or 3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and a gasoline 
motor of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
surface, when powered solely by such a motor while ridden by an operator who 
weighs 170 pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour.” Id. § 1-140.15. 
¶ 2 
When the State charged defendant John Plank with driving a motor vehicle with 
a revoked license, he claimed that the statute did not clearly tell him which vehicles 
he could and could not drive. Specifically he argued that the Vehicle Code’s 
definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” was unconstitutionally vague in violation of 
the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The circuit 
court agreed with defendant, dismissed the charge against him, and declared 
section 1-140.15 unconstitutional on its face. The State appealed directly to this 
court. We find that the Vehicle Code’s definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” 
satisfies the requirements of due process of law, and we reverse the circuit court’s 
decision and remand for further proceedings. 
¶ 3 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
Officer Judson Wienke saw defendant John Plank riding a motorized bicycle 
down a Douglas County road at a speed of 26 miles per hour. Officer Wienke 
would later testify that he believed that “with motorized bikes they are allowed to 
go up to 19 miles per hour. Once they hit 20, they have to have a valid driver’s 
license, insurance, and registration.” He signaled to defendant to stop, and 
defendant pulled over. Defendant admitted to Officer Wienke that his license was 
revoked. 
¶ 5 
The State charged defendant with violating section 6-303(a) of the Vehicle 
Code. Generally, driving a motor vehicle on state highways with a revoked license 
is a Class A misdemeanor. However, the State alleged that defendant’s license had 
been revoked previously following a conviction for driving under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol (DUI). After that DUI conviction, defendant was convicted for 
driving without a valid license in 2011, 2012, and 2013. This background led the 
State to increase the new charge to a Class 4 felony, requiring at least 180 days’ 
incarceration. Id. § 6-303(d-3). 
¶ 6 
The circuit court did not conduct any evidentiary hearings, so Officer Wienke’s 
testimony at the preliminary hearing provides the only factual record. He described 
defendant’s bicycle as powered by “a weed-eater motor” and noted that it was not 
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registered in Illinois. Although the bicycle had pedals in addition to its gasoline 
motor, Officer Wienke testified that he did not see defendant pedaling. 
¶ 7 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the Vehicle Code’s 
definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” was unconstitutionally vague. He claimed 
both that the definition fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence with a 
reasonable opportunity to understand what is prohibited and that the definition 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The circuit court agreed and 
dismissed the charge. The court noted that the definition refers to a “paved level 
surface” but no surface is perfectly level. The definition also relies on the vehicle’s 
maximum speed with a driver who weighs 170 pounds. The circuit court criticized 
this aspect of the statute, repeating defendant’s claim that a police officer “would 
have to have a scale in their squad car in order to weigh the individual as soon as 
they pulled them over.” 
¶ 8 
The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. At the 
State’s request, the court also made explicit findings under Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). However, the court neglected to specify whether it 
found the statute unconstitutional as applied or on its face. The State appealed, and 
this court remanded to the circuit court so that it could clarify its ruling. The circuit 
court made its findings explicit, and it found section 1-140.15 unconstitutional on 
its face. This appeal followed. 
¶ 9 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 10 
When an Illinois circuit court finds a statute unconstitutional, Illinois Supreme 
Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) gives this court jurisdiction over the appeal. 
Whether a statute violates the United States or Illinois Constitution is a question of 
law, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463, 466 
(2011). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and “[t]o overcome this 
presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish that it violates 
the constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 
118599, ¶ 23. 
¶ 11 
The State alleged that defendant violated section 6-303(a) of the Vehicle Code, 
which states that “any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
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vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person’s driver’s license, 
permit or privilege to do so or the privilege to obtain a driver’s license or permit is 
revoked *** shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) 
(West 2012). The term “motor vehicle” includes “[e]very vehicle which is 
self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained 
from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved 
solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, low-speed electric bicycles, and 
low-speed gas bicycles.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 1-146. Finally, “low-speed gas 
bicycle” is defined as a “2 or 3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and a 
gasoline motor of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved 
level surface, when powered solely by such a motor while ridden by an operator 
who weighs 170 pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour.” Id. § 1-140.15. 
¶ 12 
The circuit court agreed with defendant that this definition of “low-speed gas 
bicycle” was unconstitutionally vague and, thus, violated the due process clauses of 
the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, § 2. A statutory provision can be too vague to satisfy the requirements 
of due process of law in two ways: first, the statute does not provide individuals of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct the law 
prohibits, or second, the statute does not provide law enforcement with reasonable 
standards to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. City of Chicago v. 
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Bartlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 40. By 
allowing government actors to enforce only those statutes with definite content, the 
vagueness doctrine protects the rule of law from potential abuses of discretion. 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 
71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 212-19 (1985). However, “[i]f the plain language of the statute 
sets forth clearly perceived boundaries, the vagueness challenge fails, and our 
inquiry ends.” Bartlow, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 42. 
¶ 13 
We find that the circuit court erred when it found the definition 
unconstitutional. The statute both provides sufficient notice of what it prohibits to 
individuals of ordinary intelligence and supplies law enforcement officers with 
reasonable standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. 
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¶ 14 
A. The Driver’s Weight 
¶ 15 
Initially the parties dispute whether a vehicle only qualifies as a “low-speed gas 
bicycle” when it is driven by someone who weighs 170 pounds. To reiterate, a 
“low-speed gas bicycle” is a “2 or 3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and 
a gasoline motor of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved 
level surface, when powered solely by such a motor while ridden by an operator 
who weighs 170 pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour.” 625 ILCS 5/1-140.15 
(West 2012). 
¶ 16 
Defendant argues that the definition only applies when the driver weighs 
exactly 170 pounds and that the statute is vague when drivers have different 
weights. He cites the statutory canon that courts must give effect to every provision 
of the statute and should not render any part of it superfluous. Corley v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009). Because the Vehicle Code limits the definition of 
“low-speed gas bicycle” to a vehicle “ridden by an operator who weighs 170 
pounds,” defendant argues that the court would violate this statutory canon if it read 
the definition to apply to all drivers, not solely those drivers who weigh 170 
pounds. He refers to this as the “weight component” of the statute, and he notes that 
40 other states have similar provisions in their vehicle codes that do not reference 
the driver’s weight. 
¶ 17 
The State responds that the definition refers to the weight of a driver only to 
clarify how powerful a vehicle’s engine must be for the vehicle to qualify as a 
“motor vehicle” and that an engine’s capability is the same regardless of any 
particular driver’s weight. To designate the relevant engine capability, the 
definition relies on the bicycle’s maximum speed on a paved, level surface. The 
State cites the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) 
explanation that “the speed of a low-powered, two-wheeled vehicle may vary 
considerably depending on the weight of the driver.” NHTSA, Notice of Draft 
Interpretation, 70 Fed. Reg. 34810, 34812 (June 15, 2005). According to the State, 
this explains why the relevant metric is the vehicle’s “maximum speed on a paved 
level surface *** while ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds.” (Emphasis 
added.) 625 ILCS 5/1-140.15 (West 2012). 
¶ 18 
The State’s reading is more persuasive. Defendant would be correct if the 
Vehicle Code defined “low-speed gas bicycle” as a “2 or 3-wheeled device with 
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fully operable pedals and a gasoline motor of less than one horsepower, while 
ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds.” However, the definition includes 
other phrases. The statute actually defines “low-speed gas bicycle” as a “2 or 
3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and a gasoline motor of less than one 
horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved level surface, when powered solely 
by such a motor while ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds, is less than 
20 miles per hour.” (Emphases added.) Id. As defendant suggests, the court must 
give effect to every phrase in the statute and should not render any part of it 
superfluous. These phrases mean that a defining characteristic of a low-speed gas 
bicycle is an engine that is incapable of transporting 170 pounds at 20 miles per 
hour without help from gravity or pedaling. A bicycle’s motor will either have this 
capability or not, regardless of the weight of any particular driver. 
¶ 19 
B. Difficulty Understanding the Statute 
¶ 20 
Even though a vehicle’s status as a “motor vehicle” or a “low-speed gas 
bicycle” is the same regardless of any particular driver’s weight, defendant still 
insists that the Vehicle Code’s definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” is vague 
because people of ordinary intelligence cannot determine which vehicles they can 
legally drive. Defendant states in his brief that “the sole reason [he] purchased the 
vehicle at issue in this case is because, as someone whose license was revoked, he 
knows he may not operate motor vehicles. [Defendant] bought his motorized 
bicycle to comply with the law by operating a vehicle that fell under one of the 
prescribed exceptions to a ‘motor vehicle.’ ” His brief also references two 
newspaper articles that express similar frustrations. He contends that even when 
people want to comply with the law, they cannot easily determine how to do so. 
¶ 21 
The circuit court neither conducted an evidentiary hearing nor heard defendant 
testify, so none of this information is part of the record. Regardless, these 
allegations do not change this court’s analysis. Even before he drove his new 
bicycle, defendant had an obligation to determine whether it fit the definition of 
“low-speed gas bicycle.” The Vehicle Code specifies that each “motor vehicle *** 
when driven or moved upon a highway shall be subject to the registration and 
certificate of title provisions of this” statute. Id. § 3-402. It also requires that 
“[e]very owner of a vehicle subject to registration under this Code shall make 
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application to the Secretary of State for the registration of such vehicle upon the 
appropriate form or forms furnished by the Secretary.” Id. § 3-405. An application 
for vehicle registration must accompany an application for a certificate of title. Id. 
§ 3-115(a). According to Officer Wienke’s uncontested testimony, defendant did 
not register his vehicle. Instead of assuming his vehicle was exempt, defendant 
needed to diligently determine how to satisfy the Vehicle Code’s requirements. 
¶ 22 
Although defendant rightly observes that every statute must “provide people of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it 
prohibits” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Bartlow, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 40), the 
vagueness doctrine does not invalidate every statute with a complicated standard of 
conduct. Instead, a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague if it “provides no 
standard of conduct at all” (People v. Fabing, 143 Ill. 2d 48, 55 (1991) (finding a 
provision of the Illinois Dangerous Animals Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 8, ¶ 240 
et seq.) that prohibited possessing a “life-threatening reptile” sufficiently clear to 
affirm the defendant’s conviction for possessing two Burmese pythons and an 
alligator)). A statute is not proven vague when someone misunderstands its terms. 
Rather, courts fairly “require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an 
area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.” Boyce 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). The vagueness 
doctrine also does not require that a statute’s application to a particular set of facts 
be readily apparent. The General Assembly may constitutionally require people to 
seek additional information before they engage in legally questionable behavior. 
Bartlow, 2014 IL 115152, ¶¶ 45-49. 
¶ 23 
When courts have struck down statutes under the vagueness doctrine, they have 
done so because the statutes depended on “wholly subjective judgments.” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 
(2010). For example, the United States Supreme Court found that a statute that 
prohibited grocery stores from charging “unjust or unreasonable rate[s]” was 
unconstitutionally vague. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 
(1921); Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015). 
Similarly, a criminal statute that punished “annoying” loitering denied the 
defendants due process of law. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). 
As the United States Supreme Court explained in United States v. Williams, 
“[w]hat renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be 
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difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; 
but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.” United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008). 
¶ 24 
In contrast to statutes with subjective terms, statutes that define criminal 
conduct with mathematical precision routinely survive vagueness challenges 
before state supreme courts. In People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635 (2000), this court 
upheld an enhanced penalty for selling cocaine within 1000 feet of a church. 
Whether the prohibited conduct occurred within this area was “merely a matter of 
measurement,” so the statute was not vague. Id. at 641. The Washington Supreme 
Court reached the same conclusion when it found that an increased penalty for 
selling drugs near school bus stops was constitutional. State v. Coria, 839 P.2d 890 
(Wash. 1992). Even if the defendant could not easily know whether he was within 
1000 feet of a school bus stop, the standard of conduct was clear. Id. at 897. In Burg 
v. Municipal Court, 673 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1983), the Supreme Court of California 
upheld a statute that prohibited anyone with a blood-alcohol content over 0.10% 
from driving a motor vehicle. The defendant had argued that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because typical drivers have no way to test their own 
blood-alcohol level. The California court rejected this, finding that the statute was 
sufficiently clear to convey what it prohibited. Although this California decision 
does not bind Illinois courts, Illinois has a similar statute, and this court has not 
struck it down for vagueness. See, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2012). 
¶ 25 
The Vehicle Code’s definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” resembles the 
statutes in Falbe and Burg more than those in L. Cohen Grocery Co. and Coats. 
Unlike the unconstitutionally vague statutes in L. Cohen Grocery Co. and Coats, 
the Vehicle Code does not treat the same conduct differently based on each 
person’s subjective evaluation of what is “annoying” or “unreasonable.” Instead, a 
particular vehicle either is a “low-speed gas bicycle” for everyone or it is not for 
everyone, just as a driver’s blood-alcohol content either is or is not over 0.10%. See 
Burg, 673 P.2d at 740-43. This is all that the vagueness doctrine requires. 
¶ 26 
Defendant also argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because 
police officers cannot enforce it without resorting to arbitrary considerations. To 
determine whether a particular bicycle is a “motor vehicle,” an officer would need 
to estimate the strength of the bicycle’s motor by considering the driver’s weight, 
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the vehicle’s speed on a paved, level surface, and whether the pedals function 
properly. However, defendant objects that officers cannot accurately make such 
determinations during a traffic stop. Although officers can estimate the driver’s 
speed using a radar gun, they cannot determine to what extent that speed resulted 
from the gasoline engine, the driver’s pedaling, or an inclined path. 
¶ 27 
In support of this argument, defendant points to Officer Wienke’s testimony at 
the preliminary hearing. Officer Wienke testified that “with motorized bikes 
[drivers] are allowed to go up to 19 miles per hour. Once they hit 20, they have to 
have a valid driver’s license, insurance, and registration.” Defendant suggests that 
Officer Wienke confused the Vehicle Code’s definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” 
with section 11-1516(b), which prohibits driving a low-speed gas bicycle over 20 
miles per hour. 625 ILCS 5/11-1516(b) (West 2012). According to defendant’s 
interpretation, Officer Wienke also failed to consider the driver’s weight or 
pedaling. This echoes the circuit court’s concern that the statute refers to the 
vehicle’s speed on a paved, level surface but no surface is perfectly level. 
Defendant argues that the statute asks officers to make assessments that they cannot 
possibly make and that this authorizes arbitrary enforcement. 
¶ 28 
Even if defendant is correct that an officer might have difficulty estimating 
engine power, the vagueness doctrine does not require officers to precisely gather 
sufficient data to prove all the elements of a crime at the moment of citation or 
arrest. An officer need only have probable cause to believe the suspect has 
committed a crime. People v. Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11. For example, if a driver 
swerves erratically, stumbles and sways when exiting the vehicle, and smells of 
alcohol, an officer has probable cause to suspect the driver of being intoxicated. 
People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 565 (2008). Looking for such behavior is a sensible 
way for the officer to evaluate the driver’s mental state. If the officer cannot test the 
driver’s blood-alcohol content, this inability to immediately gather precise data 
about the driver’s state does not render the statute prohibiting driving while 
intoxicated unconstitutionally vague. Similarly, if an officer sees someone driving 
a motorized bicycle at a speed well over 20 miles per hour down a level road, those 
facts support the officer’s initial conclusions that this vehicle’s motor is powerful 
enough to move someone who weighs 170 pounds over a paved, level surface at a 
speed over 20 miles per hour and that the driver needs a valid license to operate this 
vehicle. 
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¶ 29 
The vagueness doctrine is not implicated every time officers cannot 
conclusively determine at a glance whether someone has violated a particular 
statutory provision. Once the State has charged someone with violating section 
6-303(a) of the Vehicle Code, the prosecutor still has the burden of proving the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt—including that the bicycle that 
the defendant drove had a strong enough motor to qualify it as a “motor vehicle.” 
People v. Grandadam, 2015 IL App (3d) 150111, ¶ 17. As far as the vagueness 
doctrine is concerned, the Vehicle Code’s definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” 
provides both law enforcement and other law-abiding Illinoisans with definite 
criteria to determine if a certain vehicle is a “motor vehicle.” It is not so ineffective 
that it “provides no standard of conduct at all.” Fabing, 143 Ill. 2d at 55. 
¶ 30 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 31 
The Vehicle Code’s definition of “low-speed gas bicycle” satisfies the 
requirements of due process of law. We reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the 
charge and remand for further proceedings. 
¶ 32 
Reversed and remanded. 
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