Title: Mullens v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1824 
____________ 
 
KHADAFY KAREEM MULLENS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 16, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Khadafy Kareem Mullens pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree 
murder for the murders of Mohammad Uddin and Ronald Hayworth, and one count 
of attempted first-degree murder of Albert Barton.  After Mullens waived his right 
to a penalty phase proceeding by a jury, the trial court sentenced Mullens to death 
for the murders of Uddin and Hayworth and life imprisonment for the attempted 
murder of Barton.  Mullens now appeals his sentences.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Central Food Mart in St. Petersburg was a convenience store equipped 
with a visible, but inoperative videocassette recording device (VCR), as well as at 
least seven other concealed devices that recorded and captured the events that 
occurred in the store on the evening of August 17, 2008.  Spencer Peeples and 
Mullens entered the store on that evening and initiated a robbery of Uddin, the 
clerk who was working in the store that evening.  Peeples brandished a gun and 
together with Mullens, demanded money from the cash register.  At one point, 
Peeples tucked his hand into his shirt to prevent his fingerprints from being left on 
the register.  While the three men stood behind the counter as Uddin opened the 
register, Hayworth entered the store and stood quietly at the counter. 
 
After Peeples and Mullens removed cash from the register, they asked Uddin 
about the inoperative VCR equipment.  Peeples removed the equipment and 
handed it to Mullens, who placed it in a plastic bag.  Peeples returned to the 
counter, filled another plastic bag with lottery tickets, and handed a small box to 
Hayworth across the counter at Hayworth’s request.  Hayworth left the counter to 
approach the door, but did not exit the store.  Peeples and Mullens dragged Uddin 
from the counter to the entrance of the store and at gunpoint demanded the keys to 
Uddin’s car, but Uddin refused.  The three men returned to the counter where 
Peeples took a green carton of Newport cigarettes and handed it to Mullens, who 
 
 
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placed it in a plastic bag.  As Peeples continued to demand the keys from Uddin, 
Mullens walked around the store and spoke to Hayworth before returning to the 
store entrance.  Peeples eventually obtained the keys from Uddin, handed the gun 
to Mullens, and indicated that he would return shortly with Uddin’s car before he 
exited. 
 
Mullens stood in front of the door and alternatively looked outside the door 
and back at the counter at Uddin.  When Mullens opened the door and leaned 
outside, Uddin reached for a telephone and dialed a number.  Mullens saw the 
movement and ran toward him with the gun pointed at Uddin.  Mullens pushed 
Uddin back toward the phone and struggled with Uddin before shooting Uddin 
once in the head. 
 
Mullens then walked away from the counter and grabbed the arm of 
Hayworth, who had remained in the store but was not standing in front of the door 
or blocking Mullens’s exit.  Mullens pushed Hayworth to the floor and shot him in 
the head as well.  As Mullens exited the store, he placed the gun in his pocket.  
Barton then opened the door of the store, but balked as Mullens attempted to pull 
him into the store.  Barton and Mullens struggled and Mullens fired several shots at 
Barton.  Barton eventually fell to the ground and crawled away, at which point 
Mullens abandoned Barton and picked up the bag full of lottery tickets before he 
exited the store. 
 
 
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After reviewing footage from the operative surveillance equipment, officers 
issued a “Be On The Lookout” notice with a description of Peeples, Mullens, and 
Uddin’s stolen car.  Peeples was arrested driving Uddin’s car in the early morning 
of August 18, and he gave a voluntary statement to officers.  Officers also 
recovered from Uddin’s car a cylinder from a revolver and a pack of Newport 
cigarettes.  In his statement, Peeples indicated that he only intended to commit a 
robbery, not murder.  Peeples also consented to a search of his apartment, from 
which officers recovered the lottery tickets, VCR equipment, and clothing that 
matched that worn by both of the assailants in the video recordings.  Detectives 
Rodney Tower and Brian Taylor later saw Mullens in an alley and arrested him 
because they recognized him from the surveillance footage.  When Mullens was 
arrested, officers searched him and found lottery tickets with serial numbers that 
matched those taken from the store. 
 
On September 4, 2008, a grand jury indicted Mullens and Peeples on two 
counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder, 
although the joint indictments were eventually severed.  Between July and 
September 2011, a hearing was conducted to determine whether Mullens was 
competent to proceed.  Dr. Jill Poorman testified that in her opinion, Mullens was 
competent to proceed, although Dr. Scot Machlus offered an opinion to the 
contrary.  Dr. Peter Bursten, a psychologist, opined that while Mullens suffered 
 
 
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from antisocial personality disorder, he did not display any symptoms consistent 
with an Axis I disorder.  Bursten also offered an opinion that Mullens was 
malingering.  However, Dr. Machlus testified that in his opinion it would be 
difficult for someone of Mullens’s intelligence level and behavioral patterns to 
malinger.  The trial court orally found that Mullens was competent to proceed.  On 
April 29, 2013, Mullens pleaded guilty to the first-degree murders of Uddin and 
Hayworth and the attempted first-degree murder of Barton.  During the penalty 
phase, he waived the right to present evidence to a jury,1 and aggravating and 
mitigating evidence was received by the trial court. 
 
During the testimony of Detective Tower, the State introduced video 
recordings and still photographs obtained from the surveillance cameras.  Defense 
counsel objected that the State could not establish a sufficient foundation for this 
evidence to be admitted through Tower, who did not immediately respond to the 
crime scene and did not know how the footage was downloaded into an accessible 
format.  Law enforcement personnel from the City of St. Petersburg were initially 
unable to access the surveillance footage.  Tower contacted Robert Dematti of 
Able Solutions, who assisted law enforcement personnel in retrieving and 
                                          
 
 
1.  The State objected to Mullens’s waiver of a penalty-phase jury.  The trial 
court conducted a colloquy of Mullens and accepted the waiver. 
 
 
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accessing the surveillance footage.  The court admitted the material into evidence 
over the objections of defense counsel. 
 
The State also presented testimony from Detective Taylor, who interviewed 
eyewitnesses and supervised the search of Peeples’s apartment.  One witness, 
Russell Watson, informed Taylor that an individual, later identified as Peeples, had 
approached him earlier that day, indicated that Peeples was armed, and invited him 
to participate in the robbery of the Central Food Mart.  Watson declined, but 
observed Peeples enter the convenience store later that day.  Another witness 
informed Taylor that she watched a driver in Uddin’s gray Toyota Camry, which 
had been parked in front of the store that day, drive away from the store, make a U-
turn, and return to the store.  Officer Willard Smith also testified that the serial 
numbers of the lottery tickets found in Mullens’s possession matched those 
registered to the Central Food Mart.  Dr. Jon Thogmartin, the medical examiner, 
also testified that the cause of death for both Uddin and Hayworth was a gunshot 
wound to the head, and that while Uddin lost consciousness immediately, there 
was a possibility that Hayworth did not.  The State did not present testimony from 
Dematti, who assisted law enforcement with the surveillance footage, or Barton, 
the surviving witness. 
 
After the State concluded the presentation of penalty-phase evidence, 
Mullens presented various witnesses in mitigation.  Ali Sultan, another local 
 
 
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convenience store owner, testified that he knew Peeples had a reputation for 
violence and intimidation.  He stated that he and Peeples were involved in an 
ongoing dispute, and on the day of the crimes, Peeples had first come to Sultan’s 
store, looking for Sultan, but Sultan was not there at the time.  Sultan also testified 
that while he did not know Mullens well, he was a known local drug addict who 
seemed “simple” to Sultan. 
 
Several family members and friends of Mullens also testified with respect to 
Mullens’s childhood and character.  During much of Mullens’s childhood, 
Mohammad Ibrahim, his father, was incarcerated, leaving Cassandra Washington, 
his mother, to care for several children while she completed her education.  
Cassandra often relied on her oldest child, Shandra, to supervise the children while 
she worked or attended school.  Relatives described Mullens’s childhood home as 
cluttered, decrepit, and lacking food to feed the family.  At one point, Cassandra 
and her family were evicted. 
 
When Ibrahim was released from prison, he offered little support to Mullens, 
Cassandra, or the rest of the family.  He verbally and physically abused Cassandra 
in front of the children, and when Mullens observed this, he removed his younger 
sister Kendra from the room.  Ibrahim abused drugs and stole food stamps, the 
household television, and a Mickey Mouse watch from Shandra to purchase drugs.  
 
 
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Additionally, he taught both Shandra and Mullens to shoplift when they were 
children. 
 
During one of the periods of Ibrahim’s incarceration, Cassandra married 
Levi McClendon, who also had problems with substance abuse.  Cassandra 
testified that McClendon was tougher on Mullens than the rest of the children.  
Sharon Mullens, the sister of Ibrahim and aunt of Mullens, testified that she did not 
like the interactions between Mullens and McClendon.   
 
Family members and friends described Mullens as a happy, outgoing, and 
loving child who was easily manipulated and influenced, especially by his older 
brother, Wesley.  Wesley once directed Mullens to break into a neighbor’s garage 
and steal bicycles.  Mullens also cared for his younger sister Kendra and always 
attempted to make sure that Kendra would not go hungry, even if it required that 
he steal food for her.  Kenneth Mullens, the uncle of Mullens, testified that 
Mullens was fiercely protective of his family and recounted an incident in which 
Mullens physically attacked someone who had threatened his cousin during a 
football game.  Kenneth considered taking in Mullens to live with his family, but 
his wife feared that Mullens would negatively influence their own children. 
Mullens was described as an immature child, but when he grew older, he 
underwent wild mood swings and began to act inappropriately.  As a teenager, he 
asked his mother, who worked at a family planning center, to speak to his 
 
 
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girlfriend about birth control so that she would agree to have sex with him.  When 
he was fifteen, his mother eventually told Mullens that he could no longer live in 
her home, and he was arrested and incarcerated in an adult facility shortly 
thereafter.  After he was released from prison at the age of sixteen, his demeanor 
upon his return to Cassandra’s home was markedly different.  Mullens became 
angry, hostile, and paranoid.  It was difficult to maintain a conversation with him, 
due to his rapid and discordant speech.  Neighbors approached Cassandra, asking 
her to force him to leave the neighborhood, and she contemplated poisoning her 
son, “to put him out of his misery.”   
In addition to behavioral problems, evidence was presented regarding 
Mullens’s substance abuse.  Sultan testified that Mullens was one of the local 
addicts.  Cassandra testified that after Mullens was released from prison in 2007 
and returned to her home, he used marijuana, and she suspected that he also used 
cocaine.  Michael Wonka, Mullens’s roommate at the time of his arrest, testified 
that they regularly consumed drugs together.  Mullens also told Dr. Machlus that 
he began using drugs when he was eleven years old and began drinking at thirteen, 
although Dr. Machlus admitted that such reports were not necessarily reliable.2 
                                          
 
 
2.  Dr. Machlus noted that it would be unusual for an individual to begin 
using cocaine at age eleven, alcohol at thirteen, inhalants at thirteen or fourteen, 
and marijuana at fifteen, as Mullens reported.   
 
 
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Mullens also presented evidence regarding his mental health.  According to 
testimony from Cassandra Washington, several relatives in her family suffered 
from mental illness, including diagnoses of schizophrenia, depression, and 
alcoholism.  Ibrahim testified that he suffered from bipolar disorder and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Dr. Machlus testified that given this family 
history, Mullens had a genetic predisposition toward certain mental illnesses, 
which was exacerbated by his own substance abuse.  While Mullens was 
incarcerated in 2007, prior to the murders, he was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder 
and schizophrenia, Axis I disorders, as well as avoidant personality disorder and 
independent personality disorders, Axis II disorders.  When Dr. Machlus first 
attempted to evaluate his competency, Mullens acted inappropriately, but after he 
received medication, Dr. Machlus noted that he became more focused and 
cooperative.  Family members also noted that it became easier to maintain 
conversations with him.  Dr. Machlus opined that Mullens (1) committed the 
murders while under an extreme emotional or mental disturbance, and (2) acted 
under the duress of Peeples during the robbery.   
Mullens presented evidence of two other proposed mitigating circumstances.  
Dr. Machlus testified that Mullens informed him that he had been sexually abused 
by McClendon when he was a child and on eight occasions during a prior 
incarceration.  Both Cassandra and Ibrahim also testified that Mullens exhibited 
 
 
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paranoia regarding sexual abuse after he was released from prison.  Ibrahim also 
testified that he named Mullens after Muammar Gaddafi, whom he respected for 
opposing the administration of President Reagan.   
The trial court issued its sentencing order on August 23, 2013.  It found the 
existence of three aggravating circumstances with respect to each murder: (1) 
Mullens had been convicted of prior violent felonies under section 921.141(5)(b), 
Florida Statutes (including a prior conviction for aggravated battery, the 
contemporaneous murders of Uddin and Hayworth, and the attempted murder of 
Barton); (2) the capital felonies were committed during the course of a robbery, 
section 921.141(5)(d), which merged with pecuniary gain, section 921.141(5)(f); 
and (3) the capital felonies were committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful 
arrest, section 921.141(5)(e).  The court assigned great weight to each aggravating 
circumstance.   
The court found that two statutory mitigating circumstances applied.  First, 
the court concluded that the capital felony was committed while Mullens was 
under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, section 
921.141(6)(b), and assigned it moderate weight.  The court noted that while 
Mullens had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, personality disorder (not 
otherwise specified), and polysubstance abuse, there was no evidence of Mullens’s 
precise mental state during the murders because Dr. Machlus did not ask Mullens 
 
 
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about his mental state at that time.  The court also found that Mullens’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired, section 921.141(6)(f), and 
assigned it moderate weight.  This circumstance was based on the evidence 
presented by members of his family that detailed his difficult childhood, mental 
health, history of substance abuse, and the lack of protective factors that might 
otherwise insulate someone from the negative consequences of such a childhood.   
Regarding nonstatutory mitigation, the court explained that of the thirty-one 
circumstances that Mullens presented as mitigation, sixteen had been addressed as 
statutory mitigation and would not be reconsidered as nonstatutory mitigation.3  
The court consolidated the remaining factors into nine nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances: (1) Mullens was sexually abused as a child and while in prison (not 
proven and given no weight); (2) his mental illness can be successfully treated 
(some weight); (3) he is immature, impulsive, and easily manipulated (little 
                                          
 
 
3.  These sixteen factors include Mullens’s: (1) genetic predisposition to 
psychological disorders; (2) genetic predisposition to substance dependency; (3) 
exposure to parental conflict; (4) exposure to and victim of child abuse and 
neglect; (5) poor parental attachment; (6) exposure to family drug and alcohol 
abuse; (7) exposure to family criminal behavior; (8) abuse at the hands of his older 
brother; (9) residential instability; (10) impoverished childhood; (11) poor 
academic performance; (12) incarceration as a juvenile in an adult facility; (13) 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder; (14) diagnosis of polysubstance abuse; (15) 
diagnosis of a personality disorder; and (16) being taught to commit crimes when 
he was five years old by his father. 
 
 
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weight); (4) he acted under the domination and control of Peeples (some weight); 
(5) he has a low IQ and poor academic achievement scores (little weight); (6) he 
accepted responsibility for his crimes (little weight); (7) his family and friends love 
and support him (little weight); (8) he was “too far gone to be helped” at ten years 
old (not proven and given no weight); and (9) he was named after Muammar 
Gaddafi (not mitigating and given no weight).   
 
Upon review of the weight assigned to all of the established aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, the court sentenced Mullens to death for the murders of 
both Uddin and Hayworth, and life imprisonment for the attempted murder of 
Barton.  This review follows. 
DISCUSSION 
Authentication of Surveillance Video Recordings and Photographs 
 
Mullens’s principal claim is that the trial court permitted the State to enter 
into evidence DVDs and still photographs derived from the surveillance footage 
without first authenticating them.  He asserts that Detective Tower was not 
qualified to authenticate the surveillance footage because Tower did not 
immediately respond to the crime scene and was unfamiliar with the surveillance 
equipment.  Further, Mullens alleges that the State could have called either 
Dematti, the technician who assisted law enforcement with the surveillance 
footage, or Barton, the surviving witness. 
 
 
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We review conclusions by the trial court regarding authentication for abuse 
of discretion.  Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1000 (Fla. 2006).  The standard 
required to authenticate evidence first admitted during the penalty phase of a 
capital trial is a novel issue for this Court.  Generally, the proponent of 
photographic or videographic evidence bears the burden of establishing that the 
evidence is a fair and accurate representation of the events depicted.  See § 90.901, 
Fla. Stat. (2008).  The requirement of authentication is “satisfied by evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the document in question is what the proponent 
claims.”  Id.  We have indicated that authentication for the purpose of admission is 
a relatively low threshold that only requires a prima facie showing that the 
proferred evidence is authentic; the ultimate determination of the authenticity of 
the evidence is a question for the fact-finder.  Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 
678, 700 (Fla. 2013).  For example, in Gosciminski, we rejected a claim that a 
receipt was insufficiently authenticated because it did not include specific details 
regarding the cash register, cashier, or the transaction number.  Id.  Despite lacking 
these details, the receipt did contain the store’s logo and return policy, as well as 
details that were corroborated by the testimony of a witness; therefore, it was 
sufficiently authenticated to be admitted during the guilt phase of a capital trial.  
Id. 
 
 
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However, the paramount consideration in this case is the fact that 
evidentiary standards in the sentencing phase of a capital felony are relaxed: 
Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital 
felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to 
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death . . . .  In 
the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the 
court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of 
the defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances . . . .  Any such evidence 
which the court deems to have probative value may be received, 
regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of 
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to 
rebut any hearsay statements.  However, this subsection shall not be 
construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in 
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution 
of the State of Florida. 
 
§ 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).  Therefore, relevant evidence that 
does not otherwise offend the rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant by the 
Constitutions of Florida or of the United States is admissible during the penalty 
phase of a capital trial.   
  
We conclude that the State satisfied its burden to establish that the DVDs 
were relevant to the penalty phase of Mullens’s capital trial.  The surveillance 
footage depicts the events of the robbery, which escalated into the murders of 
Uddin and Hayworth and attempted murder of Barton.  Accordingly, this evidence 
was relevant to the consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
particularly the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance that is discussed below.  
Although Tower admitted that he was not present in the store during the crimes, 
 
 
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nor could he explain the operation of the surveillance footage or the transfer to 
DVDs, his testimony nonetheless provided a sufficient foundation to support their 
admission.  He testified that after he watched the footage, he was able to identify 
and apprehend Mullens and Peeples within hours.  A search of Peeples’s apartment 
yielded clothing that matched that worn by the assailants in the surveillance 
footage.  Cf. United States v. Cox, 544 Fed. Appx. 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2013) (“If, 
however, there is independent evidence of the accuracy of the tape recordings 
admitted at trial, we shall be extremely reluctant to disturb the trial court’s decision 
even though at the time that decision was made the government had not carried its 
particularized burden of going forward.” (citation omitted)).4  Tower was also 
present when Dematti from Able Solutions, the business that installed the 
surveillance footage, arrived at the store and assisted law enforcement in viewing 
the footage recorded earlier that day.  Additionally, the events depicted in the 
DVDs are internally consistent, and there are no claims that either the DVDs were 
altered, or the footage mistakenly identified Mullens. 
                                          
 
 
4.  It should be noted that the court in Cox applied the federal authentication 
standard, which requires the proponent of photographs or audio recordings to show 
“(1) the competency of the operator; (2) the fidelity of the recording equipment; (3) 
the absence of material deletions, additions, or alterations in the relevant part of the 
tape; and (4) the identification of the relevant speakers.”  544 Fed. Appx. at 912 
(citation omitted).  
 
 
- 17 - 
Admittedly, the DVDs in this record are not perfect.  The video recordings 
on several of the DVDs freeze, and the video playback of one camera recorded 
from an exterior vantage point is almost entirely frozen.  However, authentication 
does not require that the evidence in question be perfect, only that the evidence is 
what the proponent purports it to be.  See Gosciminski, 132 So. 3d at 700.  Further, 
such a problem is a problem of credibility, rather than admissibility.  Once the 
DVDs were admitted, it became the task of the fact-finder—here, the trial court—
to determine whether the problems with the playback affected the ultimate 
credibility of the evidence.  Cf. id. (“Once a prima facie showing of authenticity is 
made, the evidence comes in, and the ultimate question of authenticity is for the 
jury.” (citing Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 901.1, at 1092-93 (2013 
ed.))).   
This evidence was clearly relevant to the consideration of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  Mullens does not assert that he was denied the 
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements contained within the footage, nor does 
he suggest that the admission of the DVDs in any way violated his rights under the 
Florida or United States Constitutions, which are the only evidentiary limitations 
expressed in section 921.141(1).  In light of the relaxed evidentiary standards of a 
capital penalty phase, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
regarding the authentication of the DVDs and still photographs.   
 
 
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Avoid Arrest Aggravating Circumstance 
 
Mullens next alleges that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mullens’s sole or dominant motive to kill Uddin and Hayworth was to 
eliminate them as witnesses, thereby avoiding arrest.  This claim of error is related 
in part to the authentication of the DVDs, which we have explained were properly 
admitted into evidence.  Mullens also asserts that his behavior as depicted on the 
recordings, the timing between the shootings, and his various mental health 
problems all support a reasonable alternative theory that he acted impulsively when 
he shot and killed Uddin and Hayworth. 
 
When a defendant challenges the aggravation found by the trial court, we 
review the record to ensure that the trial court applied the correct law and that 
competent, substantial evidence exists to support the findings of the trial court.  
Calhoun v. State, 138 So. 3d 350, 361 (Fla. 2013) (citing McWatters v. State, 36 
So. 3d 613, 641 (Fla. 2010)).  Any errors regarding improper aggravation are 
reviewed for harmless error.  Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 386-87 (Fla. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1406 (2015); Calhoun, 138 So. 3d at 362. 
When the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance is found to apply to victims 
who are not law enforcement officers, this Court has explained that the State bears 
a higher burden of proof: 
[T]he State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole 
or dominant motive for the murder was witness elimination.  
 
 
- 19 - 
Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 667 (Fla. 2009); see also Connor v. 
State, 803 So. 2d 598, 610 (Fla. 2001).  In such cases, proof of the 
intent to avoid arrest or detection must be very strong, and mere 
speculation on behalf of the State that witness elimination was the 
dominant motive is insufficient to support the aggravating 
circumstance.  Id.; see also Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 
1978).  However, it is not necessary for the State to present direct 
statements by the defendant to establish a motive of witness 
elimination.  Rather, even without direct evidence of the offender’s 
thought processes, the aggravating factor can be supported by 
circumstantial evidence through inference from the facts shown.  
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 276 n.6 (Fla. 1988). 
 
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 384-85.  
 
This heightened standard of proof requires more than a simple inference that 
the defendant might have been motivated by the concern to eliminate a witness.  
See Connor, 803 So. 3d at 610.  This aggravating circumstance is not satisfied 
simply because a victim might have been able to identify the defendant.  E.g., 
Davis v. State, 148 So. 3d 1261, 1278 (Fla. 2014) (citing Farina v. State, 801 So. 
2d 44, 54 (Fla. 2001)).  We have stricken the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance 
if the evidence suggests that the defendant killed the victim because: the victim 
was screaming; the victim was on the phone; or the defendant panicked.  Cook v. 
State, 542 So. 2d 964, 970 (Fla. 1989); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 360 (Fla. 
1988); Perry v. State, 522 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1988). 
 
However, when we have concluded that this aggravating circumstance was 
properly found by the trial court, additional evidence of affirmative conduct of the 
 
 
- 20 - 
defendant to avoid detection often supports the inference that the defendant acted 
with the intent to eliminate witnesses and avoid prosecution: 
While [the fact that the victims knew and could identify the 
defendant] alone is insufficient to prove the avoid arrest aggravator, 
we have looked at any further evidence presented, such as whether the 
defendant used gloves, wore a mask, or made any incriminating 
statements about witness elimination; whether the victims offered 
resistance; and whether the victims were confined or were in a 
position to pose a threat to the defendant. 
 
Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1210 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis omitted); see Jennings 
v. State, 718 So. 2d 144, 151 (Fla. 1998) (affirming avoid arrest aggravating 
circumstances because the defendant “used gloves, did not use a mask, and stated 
that if he ever committed a robbery, he would not leave any witnesses”); see also 
Cole v. State, 36 So. 3d 597, 607 (Fla. 2010) (approving the avoid arrest 
aggravating circumstance when the defendant transported a victim before killing 
the victim); Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 676-78 (Fla. 2001) (affirming trial 
court’s finding of avoid arrest where the defendant knew the victims well and 
committed the murders after they had already completed the robbery and secured a 
getaway vehicle); Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 918 (Fla. 2000) (affirming avoid 
arrest aggravating circumstance upon evidence that a group, of which the 
defendant was a member, decided to kill the victim to prevent the victim from 
reporting the group to law enforcement); Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 792 
 
 
- 21 - 
(Fla. 1992) (concluding that evidence that the victim intended to blackmail the 
defendant was sufficient to support the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance). 
 
In Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 819 (Fla. 1996), the defendant 
challenged the trial court’s finding of the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance.  
During trial, a witness testified that Consalvo told him that he shot the victim after 
she discovered him in her home, threatened to call the police, reached for the 
phone, and began to scream.  Id.  We stated that this testimony, along with the 
facts that the defendant knew the victim and the victim pressed charges against the 
defendant for an earlier crime, supported the trial court’s finding of the avoid arrest 
aggravating circumstance.  Id.  Such facts made Consalvo’s claim distinguishable 
from Garron, where the defendant’s motive was unclear, and Cook, where the 
defendant instinctively reacted when he shot the victim.  Id. at 819-20. 
The only evidence that establishes the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance 
in this case is the surveillance footage from inside the store.  We conclude that the 
footage provides competent, substantial evidence that supports the findings of the 
trial court that Mullens acted with the sole or dominant intent to eliminate 
Hayworth and Barton as witnesses who might identify him to law enforcement.  
Regarding the murder of Uddin, the surveillance footage reveals that Mullens 
 
 
- 22 - 
quickly shot Uddin after he saw Uddin with a phone in his hand.5  We have 
stricken the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance when the only evidence in 
support of this circumstance was the fact that the defendant saw the victim with a 
phone in hand.  Garron, 528 So. 2d at 360 (“The fact that [a potential witness] was 
on the telephone at the time of the shooting hardly infers any motive on the 
appellant’s part.”).  This reaction is distinguishable from Consalvo, where the 
defendant knew the victim; the victim had intended to prosecute the defendant for 
an earlier crime; and the victim had actually threatened to call the police.  697 So. 
2d at 819-20.  We therefore conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied the law 
regarding the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance with respect to the murder of 
Uddin. 
However, Mullens’s actions following the murder of Uddin indicate that he 
acted with the primary intention of avoiding arrest and prosecution.  After Uddin 
was shot, Mullens walked away from Uddin and, instead of exiting the store, 
Mullens searched for Hayworth, who did not block Mullens’s exit.  As the trial 
court noted in its sentencing order: 
Finding him in one of the store’s aisles, the Defendant forcefully 
grabbed Hayworth’s arm and spun him about, getting him into a 
position where he could be more easily shot.  Hayworth was not 
resisting the Defendant and was pleading for the Defendant to let him 
                                          
 
 
5.  The record does not reflect whom Uddin called, or if he even successfully 
dialed any number. 
 
 
- 23 - 
live.  Ignoring Hayworth’s pleas, the Defendant raised the revolver 
and fired a shot into Hayworth’s head.  Like Uddin, Hayworth had 
been passive and submissive during the robbery and remained so up 
until his death.  He had obeyed all orders from the Defendant and 
Peeples and stood exactly where they told him to during the robbery.  
Hayworth posed absolutely no threat to the Defendant. 
 
See Farina, 801 So. 2d at 54-55 (noting that victims offered no resistance and did 
not impede the exit of the defendant in affirming the avoid arrest aggravating 
circumstance).  Further, Mullens began to exit the store and had placed the gun in 
his pocket when Barton attempted to enter.  When Barton hesitated, Mullens 
grabbed Barton, dragged him into the store, and engaged in an altercation with 
Barton that resulted in Mullens firing several shots at Barton before Mullens 
ultimately exited the store.  Additionally, Mullens took with him the inoperative 
surveillance equipment that Peeples had earlier disconnected and removed from its 
shelf, and neither Mullens nor Peeples wore masks.  See Buzia, 926 So. 2d at 1210; 
Jennings, 718 So. 2d at 151.  These actions clearly constitute sufficient 
circumstantial evidence that Mullens’s sole or dominant intent in killing Hayworth 
and attempting to kill Barton was to eliminate them as witnesses.  Therefore, we 
affirm the finding of the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance. 
Campbell Error 
 
The next error that Mullens asserts is that the sentencing order issued by the 
trial court violates the requirements established in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 
415, 419 (Fla. 1990), receded from in part by Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 
 
 
- 24 - 
1055 (Fla. 2000).  He alleges that the trial court failed to address two proposed 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) that he was protective and nurturing of 
his younger sister, and (2) he was kind and helpful to his roommate.  He also 
asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to consider some of the mitigating 
factors proposed as nonstatutory mitigation because the court concluded that such 
evidence qualified as statutory mitigation.  He also claims that the court improperly 
found that the allegations that he had been the victim of sexual abuse were not 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  We conclude that there is no merit 
to these claims. 
This Court has emphasized the need for trial courts to clearly and expressly 
delineate findings related to aggravation and mitigation in written sentencing 
orders.  Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 446 (Fla. 2012) (citing Campbell, 571 So. 
2d at 419-20).  This emphasis on procedure enables this Court to conduct a proper 
and meaningful review of a death sentence on appeal.  Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 
300, 319 (Fla. 1997).  We review findings of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances for competent, substantial evidence.  See Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 
175, 187 (Fla. 2010).  However, the weight assigned to each circumstance is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  E.g., Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 445; Ault, 53 So. 3d at 
187.  We review any errors made in the sentencing order for harmless error.  Ault, 
53 So. 3d at 187 (citing Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 661 (Fla. 2008)); 
 
 
- 25 - 
Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 977 (Fla. 2001).  An error made during the 
penalty phase is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that a lesser sentence 
would have resulted without the error.  Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 535 (Fla. 
1987) (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)).  
In Campbell, we held that a trial court must clearly consider whether each 
proposed mitigating circumstance (1) is actually mitigating in nature; and (2) has 
been established by the preponderance of the evidence.  571 So. 2d at 419; see 
Oyola, 99 So. 3d at 446.  The court then must assign weight to every established 
mitigating and aggravating circumstance and weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in determining whether the death penalty is the appropriate 
punishment.  Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 419-20.  We later clarified that the court may 
conclude that a particular mitigating circumstance exists, but assign it no weight.  
Trease, 768 So. 2d at 1055.  In this analysis, a trial court is also permitted to 
aggregate several related nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  Gonzalez v. 
State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1166 (Fla.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 193 (2014); Ault, 53 
So. 3d at 194.  Indeed, the Court indicated in Campbell that it is preferable for trial 
courts to aggregate proposed nonstatutory factors into categories of related 
conduct.  571 So. 2d at 419 n.3. 
The trial court below found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt three aggravating circumstances: prior violent felony (great weight); 
 
 
- 26 - 
committed during the course of a robbery, merged with pecuniary gain (great 
weight); and avoid arrest (great weight).  The court noted that the prior violent 
felony included both an earlier conviction for aggravated battery and convictions 
for the murders of Uddin and Hayworth and the attempted murder of Barton.  It 
also found that Mullens established two statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) 
Mullens committed the crimes under the influence of an extreme emotional or 
mental disturbance (moderate weight); and (2) his capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired (moderate weight).  The court made the following findings 
with respect to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Mullens was sexually 
abused as a child and while in prison (not established; no weight); (2) his mental 
illness can be treated (some weight); (3) he is immature, impulsive, and easily 
manipulated (little weight); (4) he acted under the domination and control of 
Peeples (some weight); (5) he has a low IQ and poor academic achievement scores 
(little weight); (6) he took responsibility for his crimes (little weight); (7) he has 
loving and supportive family and friends (little weight); (8) his family members 
considered him to be “too far gone” by the age of ten years old (not proven; no 
weight); and (9) his father named him after Muammar Gaddafi (not mitigating; no 
weight). 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
Number of Proposed Mitigating Circumstances 
Mullens asserts that the court failed to address two proposed nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances: (1) that he was protective and nurturing of his sister 
Kendra; and (2) that prior to his arrest, he was kind and helpful to his roommate 
Michael Wonka.  Relatedly, Mullens alleges an apparent inconsistency regarding 
the number of proposed mitigating circumstances that violates Campbell.  Mullens 
submitted a sentencing memorandum that proposed thirty-five nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances, but the sentencing order reported thirty-one proposed 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.6  Although the sentencing order does not 
                                          
 
 
6.  The thirty-five factors that Mullens proposed were: (1) his genetic 
predisposition to psychological disorders; (2) genetic predisposition to substance 
dependency; (3) exposure to parental conflict; (4) exposure to and victim of child 
abuse and neglect; (5) poor parental attachment; (6) exposure to family drug and 
alcohol abuse; (7) exposure to family criminal behavior; (8) abuse at the hands of 
his older brother; (9) residential instability; (10) impoverished childhood; (11) poor 
academic performance; (12) incarceration as a juvenile in an adult facility; (13) 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder; (14) diagnosis of polysubstance abuse; (15) 
diagnosis of a personality disorder; (16) low IQ; (17) low academic achievement 
scores; (18) low cognitive scores; (19) sexual abuse by his stepfather; (20) victim 
of sexual battery while incarcerated; (21) being taught to commit crimes when he 
was five years old by his father; (22) his mental illness can be successfully treated; 
(23) he took responsibility for his crimes by pleading guilty; (24) he took 
responsibility for his crimes by waiving a sentencing recommendation by a jury; 
(25) he did not initiate or plan the robbery; (26) Peeples provided the gun; (27) 
Mullens’s immaturity; (28) impulsivity; (29) he is gullible and easily manipulated; 
(30) he acted under the domination and control of Peeples; (31) he has the love and 
support of many family members and friends; (32) he was protective of and 
nurturing to his younger sister, Kendra; (33) he was kind and helpful to Michael 
Wonka; (34) by the age of ten years old, his relatives thought he was “too far gone 
 
 
- 28 - 
address the discrepancy regarding the number of proposed nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances, the trial court explained that proposed factors numbers one through 
fifteen and 21 had been considered and addressed as statutory mitigation.  The 
remaining factors were consolidated into the following nine categories: (1) the 
sexual abuse he allegedly suffered; (2) his mental illness; (3) his immaturity, 
impulsivity, and ability to be manipulated; (4) the fact that he acted under the 
influence of Peeples; (5) his low IQ and poor achievement scores; (6) the fact that 
he took responsibility for his crimes because he pleaded guilty and waived the right 
to an advisory sentence by a jury; (7) the fact that he has loving and supporting 
friends and family; (8) the fact that some of his relatives thought he was “too far 
gone” to be helped when he was ten years old; and (9) the fact that his father 
named him after Muammar Gaddafi.   
We hold that Mullens is not entitled to relief on this claim.  The trial court 
aggregated several related nonstatutory factors into general categories for its 
consideration, which was permissible.  See Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1166; Ault, 53 
So. 3d at 194.  The court did not overlook the proposed circumstance that Mullens 
was kind and helpful to Wonka, but in fact referenced the testimony of Wonka as 
part of the general nonstatutory category that Mullens has loving and supportive 
                                          
 
to be helped”; and (35) his father named him after Muammar Gaddafi, whom his 
father respected. 
 
 
- 29 - 
friends and family.  This factor was assigned little weight.  Regarding Mullens’s 
relationship with his sister, Kendra, it appears that the trial court considered this to 
be part of the statutory mitigation that Mullens’s capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was substantially impaired, although the court did not indicate that this 
circumstance was one of the sixteen circumstances already considered as statutory 
mitigation.7  In finding that this statutory mitigating circumstance applied, the 
court referenced the impoverished childhoods that Mullens and his siblings 
endured, as well as the abuse inflicted on Mullens, his mother, and his siblings by 
Mullens’s father.  Because the court did consider the effects that Mullens’s 
difficult childhood had on himself and his family as mitigation, we conclude that 
any error by the trial court in overlooking Mullens’s relationship with his late sister 
Kendra is harmless, particularly in light of the fact that the trial court found the 
existence of three aggravating circumstances and assigned great weight to each.  
See Sparre v. State, 164 So. 3d 1183, 1198 (Fla. 2015) (concluding that a 
potentially overlooked mitigating circumstance was harmless in light of the 
evidence of guilt and established aggravating circumstances).  
                                          
 
 
7.  Mullens’s relationship with Kendra was not apparently encompassed by 
the general nonstatutory category that Mullens “has loving and supportive family 
and friends” who testified that they will continue to support Mullens during his 
incarceration because Kendra had passed away before Mullens’s trial.  
 
 
- 30 - 
With respect to the discrepancy in the number of proposed nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances, we conclude that any error is also harmless.  See Merck 
v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1066 n.5 (Fla. 2007) (noting that factual errors in 
sentencing orders are reviewed for harmless error).  Other than the two allegedly 
absent factors considered above or the errors discussed below, Mullens does not 
indicate which specific nonstatutory mitigating circumstances the trial court may 
have overlooked.  Although the trial court found that two statutory mitigating 
circumstances were established, each meriting moderate weight, and seven 
established nonstatutory mitigating factors ranging from none to some weight, such 
mitigation did not outweigh the great weight assigned to each of three aggravating 
circumstances.  We therefore conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that 
a lesser sentence would have been imposed in the absence of such an error. 
Refusal to Reconsider Statutory Mitigation as Nonstatutory Mitigation 
Mullens also claims that the court improperly refused to consider sixteen 
proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  In its sentencing order, the court 
stated that it had already considered these mitigating circumstances in finding the 
existence of two statutory mitigating circumstances.  Accordingly, the court 
refused to find that those mitigating circumstances qualified as nonstatutory 
mitigation as well.   
 
 
- 31 - 
Although a trial court must evaluate established mitigating circumstances, 
Mullens offers no support for his claim that a trial court must reconsider evidence 
as nonstatutory mitigation after the court has already concluded that such evidence 
qualifies as statutory mitigation.  In Ault, the trial court rejected the defendant’s 
contention that his mental health qualified as either statutory or nonstatutory 
mitigation.  53 So. 3d at 189.  On review, this Court affirmed the rejection of this 
evidence as statutory mitigation, but concluded that the trial court erred when it 
then refused to consider such evidence as nonstatutory mitigation.  Id. at 188-90 
(“However, the rejection of statutory mental health mitigation did not require the 
trial court to reject brain damage as an independent nonstatutory mitigating 
factor.”).8   
In Oyola, this Court also held that the trial court’s mitigation analysis was 
insufficient.  99 So. 3d at 446-47.  There, the trial court concluded that Oyola’s 
mental health issues did not rise to the level of statutory mitigation, and provided 
the following analysis regarding nonstatutory mitigation: “The alleged non-
statutory mitigation included serious drug abuse, an abusive home life as a child, 
created a cycle of violence, and mental disorder.  While the evidence did establish 
such circumstances, the Court only gives such circumstances slight weight in 
                                          
 
 
8.  The Court in Ault ultimately concluded that this error, along with other 
sentencing errors, was harmless.  53 So. 3d at 196.  
 
 
- 32 - 
weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.”  Id.  
We explained that such a cursory review of the mitigating evidence failed to meet 
the specific sentencing procedure articulated in Campbell.  Id. at 447.  
However, these cases do not support Mullens’s claim that a Campbell error 
occurred below.  Unlike Ault, the trial court below accepted the proposed evidence 
as statutory mitigation and simply did not recount that evidence again as 
nonstatutory mitigation as well.  The error in Oyola emerged because the trial court 
failed to detail its conclusions regarding mitigation.  Essentially, Mullens asks this 
Court to require a trial court to “double count” mitigating evidence that has already 
been found to have established statutory mitigation as nonstatutory mitigation as 
well, something this Court has not yet mandated.   
Furthermore, we have previously indicated that the proportionality analysis 
that we perform following an appropriately detailed sentencing order by the trial 
court is not a simple matter of counting the number of aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating circumstances; rather, this is a qualitative analysis.  See 
Brown v. State, 143 So. 3d 392, 407 (Fla.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 726 (2014); 
Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 1149, 1166 (Fla. 2009).  Therefore, there is no 
purpose to be served by requiring trial courts to recount factors as both statutory 
and nonstatutory mitigation.  We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing 
 
 
- 33 - 
to find that the factors that supported Mullens’s statutory mitigation also qualified 
as nonstatutory mitigation.  
Allegations of Sexual Abuse 
 
Mullens also insists that the trial court erred when it improperly concluded 
that no competent, substantial evidence supported the nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstance that he was sexually abused as a child and as an adult in prison.  We 
disagree. 
Although a trial court must consider and weigh each established mitigating 
circumstance, it may reject a proposed mitigating factor if the record lacks 
competent, substantial evidence to support that circumstance.  Coday, 946 So. 2d 
at 1001-03.  A trial court may even reject uncontroverted expert opinion testimony 
regarding proposed mitigating evidence if that opinion is unsupported by the 
record.  Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 16-17 (Fla. 2007); Nelson v. State, 850 So. 
2d 514, 530 (Fla. 2003); Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 935-37 (Fla. 2002); 
Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996).  For example, in Philmore, this 
Court approved the rejection by the trial court that the defendant suffered from an 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the commission of the capital 
crime after the State extensively cross-examined the expert witness for the defense.  
820 So. 2d at 937; see also Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 530 (affirming rejection of expert 
opinion largely derived from defendant’s self-reporting of hallucinations and 
 
 
- 34 - 
depression).  We have also found that the omission of allegations of sexual abuse 
submitted as nonstatutory mitigation was harmless because the only evidence of 
this allegation was testimony from the defendant’s father, who indicated that he 
only learned of the alleged abuse several years later.  Caylor v. State, 78 So. 3d 
482, 497-98 (Fla. 2011) (“The appellant himself never testified regarding the 
allegation and never gave any description of the abuse or how it may have affected 
him.”).  
 
The sentencing order in this case provides the following analysis with 
respect to this issue: 
The Defendant alleges that he was sexually abused as a child by 
his step-father and that he was also sexually abused while incarcerated 
in prison.  However, no competent evidence was presented during the 
penalty phase to substantiate these claims.  Accordingly, the Court 
finds that this non-statutory mitigation has not been proven and 
therefore accords it no weight. 
 
During the penalty phase, Mullens presented testimony from Dr. Machlus, who 
informed the court that Mullens reported to him that he was sexually abused by his 
stepfather as a child and on eight separate occasions while incarcerated.  However, 
Dr. Machlus admitted during cross-examination that Mullens had failed to report 
these allegations prior to the interview, which was conducted during the course of 
Mullens’s competency evaluation.  He also admitted that Mullens may have been 
malingering, which was consistent with similar suggestions proffered by other 
experts during the competency hearing.  Thus, the record provides a basis to 
 
 
- 35 - 
question the validity of Dr. Machlus’s conclusions.  See Philmore, 820 So. 2d at 
937; Nelson, 850 So. 2d at 530.  
Additionally, although other witnesses for Mullens testified that they 
suspected that he had been sexually assaulted by his stepfather and while he was 
incarcerated, such testimony only amounted to speculation.  Indeed, one such 
witness, Mullens’s father Ibrahim, admitted that it was difficult to pinpoint exactly 
when he first suspected that Mullens had been sexually abused in prison because 
Ibrahim himself was incarcerated for much of the relevant period of Mullens’s life 
and because he was high on drugs during his intermittent periods of freedom.  We 
therefore agree with the trial court’s finding that there was no competent, 
substantial evidence in the record to support this mitigating circumstance.  
Moreover, to the extent that the trial court failed to detail the specific reasons that 
it did not find that this mitigating circumstance had been proven—i.e., the lack of 
credibility of Dr. Machlus’s conclusions and the speculative nature of the 
testimony offered by Mullens’s family members—we conclude that any error is 
harmless.  See Caylor, 78 So. 3d at 497-98.   
 
The sentencing order provided by the trial court was detailed and it 
extensively reviewed the facts of the crimes, as well as the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances before the court.  The court explained why it found that 
certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances had been established (or not), 
 
 
- 36 - 
assigned weight to each established circumstance, and weighed the aggravation 
and mitigation before it sentenced Mullens to death, as Campbell requires.  
Although sentencing orders must provide sufficient detail to enable this Court to 
conduct a meaningful review, see Ault, 53 So. 3d at 187, there is by no means a 
requirement that a sentencing order must pedantically or repeatedly address each 
individual factor proposed as mitigation.  See Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 419 n.3 
(“As with statutory mitigating circumstances, proposed nonstatutory circumstances 
should generally be dealt with as categories of related conduct rather than as 
individual acts.”).  We therefore conclude that the sentencing order satisfied the 
requirements of Campbell and reject Mullens’s assertions of error.  
Proportionality 
 
Mullens also claims that the death sentence is not proportionate for the 
crimes committed because he asserts that the murders resulted from a robbery gone 
awry.  As noted above, this is a qualitative evaluation of the reasons for the 
established aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  Brown, 143 So. 3d at 407; 
Muehleman, 3 So. 3d at 1166.  Accordingly, we consider all of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in comparison to similar cases where we have upheld the 
death penalty.  McLean v. State, 29 So. 3d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 2010).  Additionally, 
the Court accepts the weight assigned to the aggravating and mitigating 
 
 
- 37 - 
circumstances, unless there is no competent, substantial evidence to support such a 
finding.  Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 46 (Fla. 2009). 
When it appears that a murder has occurred in the course of a “robbery gone 
wrong,” we have on some occasions concluded that the death penalty is 
disproportionate.  E.g., Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539, 550-52 (Fla. 2014); Jones 
v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 187-88 (Fla. 2007) (vacating death penalty because only a 
single aggravating circumstance remained); Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 
(Fla. 1999) (noting the extensive mental health evidence presented as mitigation); 
see also Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 417 (Fla. 1998) (finding the fact that the 
defendant was a minor at the time of the crime to be “particularly compelling” 
(citing Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1988)).  Relatedly, this Court has 
indicated that where only a single valid aggravating circumstance exists, a sentence 
of death may be inappropriate.  See Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1081, 1088 (Fla. 
2008) (“[A]bsent unusual circumstances, death is not indicated in a single-
aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation.”); Jones, 963 So. 2d at 189.  
Mullens insists that this case is similar to Yacob, in which we held that the 
death penalty was not proportionate.  136 So. 3d at 550.  In that case, the defendant 
entered a convenience store and initiated a robbery.  Id. at 541.  During the course 
of the robbery, he asked the clerk if the security camera had any videotape or CD 
that recorded store activity.  Id.  The clerk answered in the negative, and as Yacob 
 
 
- 38 - 
prepared to exit the store, the clerk reached for a switch to automatically lock the 
doors of the store.  Id.  In response, Yacob shot at the clerk before ultimately 
finding a different point of exit from the store.  Id.  During sentencing, the trial 
court found the existence of two aggravating circumstances, commission during 
the course of a robbery and pecuniary gain, which merged into a single aggravating 
circumstance.  Id. at 544.  Rather than qualify as one of the most aggravated and 
least mitigated murders, the Court concluded that this murder instead was the result 
of a botched robbery and held that the death penalty was disproportionate.  Id. at 
550-52.  
However, we consider Yacob to be distinguishable for several reasons.  
First, in finding the sentence in Yacob to be disproportionate, this Court noted that 
the facts of Yacob were similar to cases that resulted from botched robberies and 
that were also found to be disproportionate.  136 So. 3d at 550-52 (citing Scott v. 
State, 66 So. 3d 923, 925 (Fla. 2011); Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla. 
1998); Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142-43 (Fla. 1995); Thompson v. State, 
647 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1994)).  Notably, Yacob and the cases upon which it 
relied involved only one count of first-degree murder.  See id.9  Likewise, in other 
cases in which we have found the death penalty to be disproportionate because we 
                                          
 
 
9.  The defendant in Thompson was also convicted of attempted first-degree 
murder.  720 So. 2d at 233.   
 
 
- 39 - 
concluded that the first-degree murders resulted from a botched robbery, the 
defendant killed only one victim.  See Jones, 963 So. 2d at 181, 184; Larkins, 739 
So. 2d at 91-92; Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 413.  By contrast, the fact that Mullens 
committed two counts of first-degree murder and attempted to commit a third 
count of first-degree murder after he and Peeples had completed the robbery 
distinguishes this case from other cases that involved “robberies gone wrong.” 
 Additionally, we reversed the sentence in Yacob in part because there was 
only a single valid aggravating circumstance.  See 136 So. 3d at 552.  Even if we 
were to strike the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance here, two aggravating 
circumstances, prior violent felony and that the murders were committed during 
the course of a robbery, would remain.  Therefore, this case is not one in which 
only a single valid aggravating circumstance exists, which might support the 
imposition of a life sentence.  See Green, 975 So. 2d at 1088. 
Rather, we conclude that this case is closer to McLean, 29 So. 3d 1045, and 
Troy v. State, 948 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2006), in which we affirmed the imposition of 
the death penalty.  In McLean, the trial court found the existence of three 
aggravating circumstances—the defendant was on felony probation at the time of 
the capital offense; prior violent felony, including both a contemporaneous 
conviction and a prior conviction for armed robbery; and the murder was 
committed during the course of a robbery.  29 So. 3d at 1049.  The court also 
 
 
- 40 - 
found the same two statutory mitigating circumstances that were found in this case, 
as well as six categories of nonstatutory mitigation, but concluded that the 
aggravation outweighed the mitigation.  Id. at 1049-50.  Similarly, we upheld the 
sentence of death in Troy, after the trial court found four aggravating 
circumstances—the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; prior 
violent felony; committed by a defendant under community control; and 
committed during the course of a sexual battery and robbery—the same two 
statutory mitigating circumstances, and sixteen nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances.  948 So. 2d at 654-55.  
Here, the trial court concluded that the great weight assigned to each of three 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the established mitigation.  We conclude 
that competent, substantial evidence supports the findings of the trial court 
regarding aggravation and mitigation.  Therefore, we affirm the imposition of the 
death penalty in this case. 
Sufficiency 
 
Although Mullens does not raise the issue, this Court has an independent 
obligation to review the record for competent, substantial evidence that supports 
his convictions.  E.g., Brown, 143 So. 3d at 407 (citing Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 
839, 850 (Fla. 2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5)).  However, when a defendant 
pleads guilty to a capital offense, this Court instead must consider whether that 
 
 
- 41 - 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 121 
(Fla. 2007) (citing Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 847 (Fla. 2005); Lynch v. 
State, 841 So. 2d 362, 375 (Fla. 2003)). 
 
After a competency hearing in 2011, in which the court found that Mullens 
was competent to proceed, Mullens was represented by counsel and pleaded guilty 
on April 29, 2013.  During a colloquy with the court, Mullens stated that he 
understood that by pleading guilty to two counts of first-degree murder, he faced 
either death or life imprisonment.  The court confirmed that Mullens understood 
that he chose to waive his right to have a jury decide his guilt and recommend an 
advisory sentence.  The State also provided a factual basis for two counts of first-
degree murder and one count of attempted murder, and the court accepted the plea.  
See Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 199-200 (Fla. 2011) (finding the defendant’s 
guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made).  Therefore, we 
conclude that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, and it 
provides competent, substantial evidence to support Mullens’s convictions. 
Written Order of Competency 
 
Finally, Mullens insists that this matter must be remanded to the trial court 
for a written order of competency.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(b) 
requires a trial court to consider a defendant’s competency before proceeding 
further.  “If the court finds the defendant competent to proceed, the court shall 
 
 
- 42 - 
enter its order so finding and shall proceed.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(b); see also 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(7) (applying identical language for competency 
determinations where a defendant has been found competent after having been 
previously committed for treatment).  The district courts of this state have 
interpreted this language to require a written order of competency; when a trial 
court has issued only an oral finding of competency, the district courts have 
typically remanded for a nunc pro tunc written order of competency.  See, e.g., 
Williams v. State, 130 So. 3d 763, 764 (mem.) (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Razuri v. 
State, 126 So. 3d 261, 261-62, n.1 (mem.) (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Molina v. State, 
946 So. 2d 1103, 1105 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); White v. State, 548 So. 2d 765, 
768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); see also Boone v. State, 805 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2002) (remanding for written order of competency, but not specifying a nunc 
pro tunc order).  Additionally, this Court recently indicated that a trial court must 
delineate its findings regarding the competency of the defendant in a written order.  
Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 676, 679 (Fla. 2014) (noting that the claim in 
that case was procedurally barred because the defendant first raised the issue in a 
postconviction proceeding nearly seven years after his initial competency 
proceeding, but reviewing the competency procedures outlined in Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 3.210-3.212). 
 
 
- 43 - 
 
The State insists that Mullens waived his right to seek a written competency 
order through his plea agreement.  We disagree.  The plea agreement entered into 
between Mullens and the State indicates that Mullens waived his “right to appeal 
the facts of the case.”  The trial court orally found Mullens to be competent on 
September 16, 2011, and neither party disputes his competency.  Mullens’s request 
that this case be remanded for a nunc pro tunc written order of competency does 
not seek to challenge the facts of this case.  Therefore, we remand this matter to the 
trial court for the entry of a written order of competency, nunc pro tunc to 
September 16, 2011.  
Hurst 
 
During the pendency of Mullens’s appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  The Court held that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Following that decision, Mullens requested leave to 
file supplemental briefing to address the effects of Hurst on his appeal, which we 
granted. 
 
We need not extensively consider the implications of Hurst to determine that 
Mullens cannot avail himself of relief pursuant to Hurst.  Hurst said nothing about 
whether a defendant could waive the Sixth Amendment right to jury factfinding in 
sentencing procedures as recognized by Ring and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
 
 
- 44 - 
U.S. 466 (2000).  In light of the fact that Mullens waived this right, his argument 
that his sentence must be commuted to life imprisonment pursuant to section 
775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2008), fails.  
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
whether a defendant can waive his or her rights to jury factfinding in the specific 
context of capital sentencing, the Court has concluded that defendants are free to 
waive the general right to jury factfinding that was recognized in Apprendi: 
[N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. . . .  
If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer 
judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead 
guilty.  Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial 
factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his 
interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial. 
 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004).  Even more broadly, it has long 
been recognized that defendants may entirely waive their right to a jury trial.  E.g., 
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 32-35 (1965); Patton v. United States, 281 
U.S. 276, 308 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78 (1970); State v. Upton, 658 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 1995). 
 
Other states have reached similar conclusions in the context of capital 
sentencing.  In states where defendants who pleaded guilty to capital offenses 
automatically proceeded to judicial sentencing, courts have held that Ring did not 
invalidate their guilty plea and associated waiver of jury factfinding.  State ex rel. 
Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 646-47 (Mo. 2011); State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 
 
 
- 45 - 
783, 803-07 (S.D. 2006) (citing Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002); Moore 
v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46 (Ind. 2002)); State v. Downs, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380 (S.C. 
2004); State v. Murdaugh, 97 P.3d 844, 852-54 (Ariz. 2004); see also Lewis v. 
Wheeler, 609 F.3d 291, 309 (4th Cir. 2010) (refusing to grant federal habeas 
corpus relief pursuant to Ring, explaining that “neither Apprendi nor Ring holds 
that a defendant who pleads guilty to capital murder and waives a jury trial under 
[Virginia’s] capital sentencing scheme retains a constitutional right to have a jury 
determine aggravating factors”).  These courts reasoned that the defendants knew 
that when they entered a guilty plea, they fully forfeited their right to a jury trial.  
Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 647-48; Colwell, 59 P.3d at 474; Moore, 771 N.E.2d at 49.  
A subsequent change in the law regarding the right to jury sentencing did not 
render that initial waiver involuntary.  Murdaugh, 97 P.3d at 853 (citing Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)).  Moreover, where defendants have 
strategically chosen to proceed before a judge alone in order to avoid a death 
sentence, their jury waivers have been upheld.  Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 647-48; 
Murdaugh, 97 P.3d at 853. 
 
Unlike the capital sentencing schemes at issue in Taylor, Piper, Colwell, 
Moore, Downs, and Lewis, in Florida, a defendant who pleaded guilty to a capital 
offense retained the right to present mitigating evidence to a jury, which, prior to 
Hurst, would issue an advisory sentence.  See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).  As 
 
 
- 46 - 
with a guilty plea, in which a defendant waives his or her right to a jury 
determination of guilt, a waiver of the right to jury sentencing will be upheld if that 
waiver is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.  Winkles v. State, 21 So. 
3d 19, 23 (Fla. 2009) (citing Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 101 (Fla. 2007)); Griffin 
v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 912 (Fla. 2002).   
 
In this case, Mullens waived his right to jury sentencing after he pleaded 
guilty to two counts of first-degree murder.  Moreover, the State contested this 
waiver, although it recognized that Mullens had that right and the trial court could, 
in its discretion, accept or reject his waiver.10  The trial court conducted a thorough 
colloquy and asked Mullens if he understood the right that he was relinquishing 
and that he was subject to sentences of either death or life imprisonment.  The trial 
court was fully cognizant of Mullens’s status and his background.  After the 
persistent questions by the trial court, the following exchange occurred: 
[MULLENS]:  Sir, it seem[s] like you keep asking the same thing like 
I’m making the wrong decision or something. 
 
THE COURT:  No.  I’m just making sure so the record’s clear that 
you’ve talked about it enough and that you’re comfortable that you’re 
making the right decision for you. 
 
                                          
 
 
10.  See, e.g., Grim, 971 So. 2d at 101 (explaining that a trial court may 
exercise discretion in convening a jury for sentencing purposes, even if the 
defendant has validly waived the right to an advisory jury) (citing Muhammad v. 
State, 782 So. 2d 343, 361 (Fla. 2001); State v. Carr, 336 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 
1976)). 
 
 
- 47 - 
[MULLENS]:  I’m absolutely positive, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  All right. . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Upon review of this record, we conclude that Mullens’s waiver 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
If a defendant remains free to waive his or her right to a jury trial, even if 
such a waiver under the previous law of a different jurisdiction automatically 
imposed judicial factfinding and sentencing, we fail to see how Mullens, who was 
entitled to present mitigating evidence to a jury as a matter of Florida law even 
after he pleaded guilty and validly waived that right, can claim error.  As our sister 
courts have recognized, accepting such an argument would encourage capital 
defendants to abuse the judicial process by waiving the right to jury sentencing and 
claiming reversible error upon a judicial sentence of death.  Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 
808 (citing People v. Rhoades, 753 N.E.2d 537, 544 (Ill. 2001)).  This we refuse to 
permit.  Accordingly, Mullens cannot subvert the right to jury factfinding by 
waiving that right and then suggesting that a subsequent development in the law 
has fundamentally undermined his sentence.  We reject his claim that his sentence 
should be commuted to life imprisonment. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that Mullens knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded 
guilty to the charged offenses.  Additionally, Mullens is not entitled to relief on 
 
 
- 48 - 
any of the errors that he alleges.  We also determine that Mullens is not entitled to 
relief pursuant to Hurst.  Therefore, we affirm his sentences and remand for entry 
of a written order of competency, nunc pro tunc to September 16, 2011.   
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which LABARGA, C.J., and 
PARIENTE, J., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
I concur in the affirmance of the defendant’s conviction and death sentence.  
The defendant entered a plea of guilty for the tragic murder of two victims and the 
attempted murder of a third victim—all of whom he shot at close range.  The grim 
sequence of the robbery and ensuing murders was documented by the convenience 
store’s security camera.  The defendant, who was twenty-four years old at the time 
of the murders, waived a penalty phase before a jury.  I agree that the defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial, and that 
therefore the defendant “cannot avail himself to relief pursuant to Hurst.”  Majority 
op. at 43. 
 
 
- 49 - 
I write only to highlight, as demonstrated through the trial court’s excellent 
sentencing order, the sentencing judge’s profound understanding of how Mullens’s 
dysfunctional upbringing influenced the person he became as an adult:  
However, while the Court firmly believes that the Defendant 
was well aware of the criminality of his actions, competent evidence 
was presented that suggests that the Defendant’s ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  In 
addition to Dr. Machlus’s testimony regarding the Defendant’s mental 
health, the Court also heard testimony from several of the Defendant’s 
family members regarding his upbringing.  The totality of their 
testimonies painted a very bleak picture of the Defendant’s childhood 
and background.  
The Defendant’s father was incarcerated in prison for the 
majority of the Defendant’s life.  However, during the periods of his 
release, his father admitted to brutally beating the Defendant’s mother 
in front of the Defendant and his siblings, and to also viciously 
beating the children themselves.  Like his father, the Defendant’s 
brother also took to inflicting violence on the Defendant, horribly 
beating him on several occasions.  In addition to these beatings, the 
Defendant’s father was constantly seeking out narcotics and abusing 
them in front of the Defendant.  His father would often steal 
household funds as well as others’ property to pay for drugs and 
alcohol.  The Defendant was no older than five when his father taught 
him how to shoplift in order to supply the family with food and other 
items they needed.  Similarly, the Defendant’s mother was an 
alcoholic who abused both alcohol and marijuana in the presence of 
the Defendant.  His parents’ addictions led to a lack of residential 
stability and inadequate resources to supply food, clothes or utilities, 
forcing the Defendant and his siblings to go without these items. 
The testimony from the Defendant’s family members made 
clear that throughout his formative years, the Defendant was exposed 
to severe physical and emotional abuse, rampant alcohol and drug 
abuse and lessons on how to commit crimes.  Compounding the 
effects of the Defendant’s childhood is the lack of any “protective 
factors.”  Dr. Machlus testified that the Defendant did not have any of 
 
 
- 50 - 
the protective factors that would typically insulate an individual from 
experiencing the negative consequences of such an upbringing.  
Additionally, when the Defendant was sixteen years old he was 
sentenced to prison. The Defendant’s mother testified that when he 
returned from prison, the Defendant was “very different,” and that he 
had become “angry” and “paranoid.”  She testified that his behavior 
worsened to the point that their neighbors were concerned enough to 
start a petition to have Defendant removed from the neighborhood.  
Having tried to convince the Defendant to seek professional help and 
failing, even the Defendant’s mother thought his condition had 
become so irrevocable that she believed he would have been better off 
dead. 
Furthermore, both Dr. Machlus and the Defendant’s mother 
testified as to the Defendant’s predisposition to psychological 
disorders and substance abuse.  It was well established that the 
Defendant’s lineage is saturated with individuals who suffered not 
only from psychological disorders, but also severely abused drugs and 
alcohol.  As previously noted, Dr. Machlus testified that individuals 
who suffer from both Bipolar Disorder and substance abuse are six 
times more likely to commit violent criminal acts as opposed to those 
individuals who suffer solely from Bipolar Disorder.  Given the 
Defendant’s mental health and substance abuse history, family 
upbringing and lack of protective factors, it is evident that the 
Defendant lacks the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
While the Court has no doubt that the Defendant was well 
aware of the criminality of his actions, it is the combination of the 
Defendant’s mental health and substance abuse issues along with his 
upbringing that indicate the Defendant lacked the capacity to conform 
to the requirements of law.  In light of the foregoing, the Court finds 
that this factor has been proven and accords it moderate weight. 
As long as we continue to have a death penalty in Florida, we will see that 
many of the defendants who sit on death row have backgrounds similar to the 
history and life of Khadafy Kareem Mullens.  While Mullens’s multiple traumas, 
 
 
- 51 - 
including his numerous adverse childhood experiences, serve as substantial non-
statutory mitigation, I cannot disagree with the trial court’s weighing of the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, nor with our 
conclusion that the death sentence in this case was proportional, and agree that this 
case is dramatically different from Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539, 550-52 (Fla. 
2014), a case we reduced to life.  Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of 
Mullens’s conviction and death sentence.  
LEWIS, J., specially concurring. 
 
I agree with the conclusions reached by the Court today.  However, I write 
to express my concern that this decision should not in any way be understood to 
eliminate or undermine the legal procedures regarding the admission of 
nontestimonial evidence.  See Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 645 (Fla. 1995) 
(“The rules of evidence may be relaxed during the penalty phase of a capital trial, 
but they emphatically are not to be completely ignored.”); see also § 921.141(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2008) (“[T]his subsection shall not be construed to authorize the 
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the State of Florida.”) 
Courts in Florida have held that authentication of surveillance footage 
during the determination of guilt is satisfied upon the testimony of an individual, 
such as an employee or business owner, who was familiar with the installation and 
 
 
- 52 - 
operation of the surveillance equipment.  Dragani v. State, 759 So. 2d 745, 746 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2000) quashed in part on other grounds, 791 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 
2001); Dolan v. State, 743 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).  Additionally, in 
Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), the First District held 
that authentication was satisfied upon testimony from a police officer who 
installed, operated, and explained the chain of custody of a video camera.  
However, no court in Florida has concluded that authentication of evidence that 
proves the guilt of a defendant can be satisfied only upon the testimony of an 
officer who was familiar with the investigation, but ultimately could not verify the 
reliability of the recording device.  I would caution trial courts against relying on 
the decision today to support such an evidentiary ruling made outside the context 
of the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 
Rather, the conclusions reached today must be considered in the relatively 
rare context that this defendant pleaded guilty to a capital offense and waived the 
right to an advisory sentence by a jury of his peers.  Additionally, there were 
absolutely no allegations that the surveillance footage was materially altered, nor is 
there any suggestion that law enforcement officers mistakenly identified Mullens 
after viewing the footage.  Many of the evidentiary restrictions in the Florida 
Evidence Code, including the requirement that evidence must be authenticated 
before it can be admitted, exist to prevent juror confusion and to guarantee 
 
 
- 53 - 
criminal defendants the right to a fair trial.  See, e.g., § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2008) 
(excluding relevant but unduly prejudicial or confusing evidence); § 90.802, Fla. 
Stat. (2008) (generally excluding hearsay evidence).  When there are no jurors to 
potentially confuse and the defendant has conceded his or her guilt, relevant, 
nontestimonial evidence that is not otherwise of questionable origin is admissible 
during a penalty phase of a capital trial.  See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. 
However, the fact that evidence need only be relevant during the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial should not be interpreted to mean that trial courts can or 
should admit evidence that is patently unreliable.  The definition of relevant 
evidence is “evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.”  § 90.401, Fla. 
Stat. (2008).  Further, authentication is central to the understanding of relevancy: 
The authentication requirement may be viewed as an aspect of 
relevancy.  In a contract action, for example, evidence in the form of a 
writing is relevant as proof of the actual terms of an alleged agreement 
only if it is shown to be the very document to which the parties 
somehow manifested their assent, or at least a true copy of that 
document.  In this sense, it is actually [Federal Rule of Evidence] 401 
and [Federal Rule of Evidence] 402 that impose the requirement to 
authenticate, for these provisions define relevancy and make it a 
condition of admissibility.   
 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 5 Federal Evidence § 9.2 (4th ed. 
2015) (emphasis added).  Therefore, it follows that evidence that is obviously 
unreliable, fabricated, or of unknown origin is necessarily irrelevant.   
 
 
- 54 - 
Accordingly, the proponent of nontestimonial, non-self-authenticating 
evidence cannot simply proffer for admission such evidence alone to establish its 
relevancy.  For example, this Court has held that in the absence of evidence linking 
a given weapon to the charged offense, the weapon itself is irrelevant and 
inadmissible.  Agatheas v. State, 77 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (Fla. 2011) (holding that it 
is insufficient to establish the relevancy of a particular gun by simply introducing it 
and instead requiring the prosecution to somehow link that gun to the crime).  
Likewise, the foundation for photographic and videographic evidence can be 
established either through the testimony of a witness with knowledge under the 
pictorial testimony theory of admission, or upon additional proof of the reliability 
of the recording under the silent witness theory.  Hannewacker v. City of 
Jacksonville Beach, 419 So. 2d 308, 311 (Fla. 1982); Bryant v. State, 810 So. 2d 
532, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citing Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 
401.2 at 114 (2001 ed.)); Dolan, 743 So. 2d at 545-46.    
In this case, the testimony of Detective Tower—who responded to the crime 
scene, arrested Mullens after viewing the surveillance footage, and testified after 
Mullens admitted his guilt—provided a sufficient foundation for the admission of 
the surveillance footage.  I therefore concur in the decision of the Court. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, J., concur. 
 
 
 
- 55 - 
CANADY, J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree with the decision to affirm the convictions and sentences.  But I 
disagree with the conclusion that the “trial court incorrectly applied the law 
regarding the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance with respect to the murder of 
Uddin.”  Majority op. at 22.  Contrary to the unelaborated assertion in Garron v. 
State, 528 So. 2d 353, 360 (Fla. 1988), when a victim is slain while attempting to 
make a phone call during the course of a robbery, a strong inference arises that the 
defendant first concluded that the phone call was likely being made to summon the 
police and then acted against the victim to thwart phone contact with the police and 
thereby to avoid arrest for the robbery.  The imputation of another motive to the 
defendant in such circumstances can only be produced by a flight of fancy.  I also 
disagree with remanding for a written order on competency, which is an 
unnecessary and useless act.   
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Philip James Federico, Judge - Case No. 522008CF018029XXXXNO 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Cynthia Jean Dodge, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Timothy Arthur 
Freeland, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee