Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Richard Bolte

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 132 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1184-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Richard Bolte, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Richard Bolte,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BOLTE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 8, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Franklyn 
M. Gimbel, Kathryn A. Keppel and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Franklyn M. Gimbel. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Paul W. 
Schwarzenbart and Lee, Kilkelly, Paulson & Younger, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Paul W. Schwarzenbart. 
 
 
2005 WI 132
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1184-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Richard Bolte, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard Bolte,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Richard Bolte appeals from a 
referee's report and recommendation issued May 26, 2004, 
concluding that Attorney Bolte engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law in violation of SCR 20:5.5(a)1 and transferred 
real estate with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud the 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:5.5(a) provides:  Unauthorized practice of law.  "A 
lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing 
so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction." 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
2 
 
rights of a judgment creditor in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).2  
The referee recommended the court suspend Attorney Bolte's 
license to practice law for a period of three months.  We adopt 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
conclude that a public reprimand is sufficient discipline for 
Attorney Bolte's misconduct in this matter. 
¶2 
Bolte was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1961.  His license to practice law in Wisconsin has remained in 
good standing and he has not been the subject of any prior 
discipline.  Since 1989, he has elected to be on "inactive" 
status in Wisconsin, which means that he is not engaged in the 
active practice of law in Wisconsin.  See SCR 10.03(3) 
(Membership). 
¶3 
The events giving rise to this proceeding occurred in 
Colorado, where Bolte was then residing.  Bolte was not licensed 
to practice law in Colorado.   
¶4 
In 1994, a Colorado resident named Carol Koscove 
(Koscove) learned that Bolte was a lawyer and asked him for 
professional assistance with a potential dispute involving 
royalty payments due pursuant to the terms of an existing 
mineral lease on her property.  Simply put, the lease gave 
Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) rights to extract, inter alia, 
carbon dioxide from her property.  Koscove suspected she was not 
receiving proper compensation under the terms of the lease.  She 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  Misconduct.  "It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
3 
 
had approached several other individuals seeking help with this 
matter.   
¶5 
Bolte advised Koscove that while he was a lawyer, he 
was not licensed to practice in Colorado.  He explained that he 
could not appear in court and that she would have to hire a 
lawyer to pursue any legal redress.  The referee stated: "[i]t 
is clear from the evidence that it was Koscove who pursued 
Bolte's services and that Bolte was initially reluctant to 
become involved." 
¶6 
However, Bolte eventually agreed to look into the 
matter and the parties negotiated an agreement, executed on 
November 22, 1994, that provided Bolte would "investigate, 
examine, copy, analyze and interpret" documents pertaining to 
the ARCO lease and the royalty payments to which Koscove claimed 
she was entitled.  The parties agreed that Bolte would be paid 
$5000 per month and he was provided with a computer and a car.  
Under the terms of the agreement Bolte was also to receive a 
percentage of monies recovered by Koscove from ARCO if Koscove's 
suspicions proved correct and she prevailed on any ensuing 
claim.   
¶7 
Bolte investigated the lease dispute.  Upon completion 
of his investigation, he advised Koscove that he believed ARCO 
had indeed underpaid her and that she should hire a lawyer to 
pursue her claims.  Koscove and Bolte met with Attorney George 
Mueller, an attorney experienced in oil and gas leases, on 
January 30, 1995.  After negotiating the terms of a retainer 
agreement, Koscove formally retained Attorney Mueller on or 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
4 
 
about April 7, 1995.  Throughout this time, Bolte continued to 
perform work under the agreement and collaborated with Mueller 
preparing the case for litigation.   
¶8 
In July 1995, ARCO filed a declaratory judgment action 
against Koscove and others regarding various oil and mineral 
leases in federal district court in Colorado.  Attorney Mueller 
filed a counterclaim on Koscove's behalf, identifying Bolte on 
the pleading as "of counsel." 
¶9 
On November 7, 1995, Bolte executed an affidavit in 
support of a motion for pro hac vice status in the Koscove/ARCO 
matter.3  On January 5, 1996, the court entered an order 
permitting Bolte to appear pro hac vice in the Koscove/ARCO 
matter.   
¶10 In 
March 
1996, 
ARCO 
sent 
Koscove 
a 
check 
for 
$1,883,816.13 in partial settlement of Koscove's claims.  On 
April 17, 1996, Koscove paid Bolte $388,013.23 in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement. 
¶11 Koscove then retained another attorney through whom 
she advised Bolte that, unless he accepted the $388,013.23 as 
full and final payment under the agreement, she would file a 
                                                 
3 This affidavit and Bolte's application for pro hac vice 
admission was the subject of one of the three disciplinary 
counts filed against Bolte.  The Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) maintained that Bolte was less than forthright about his 
inactive 
status 
in 
Wisconsin 
when 
seeking 
pro 
hac 
vice 
admission.  The referee disagreed and recommended the court 
dismiss this charge.  The OLR did not appeal that recommendation 
so the issue of Bolte's pro hac vice admission is not before the 
court. 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
5 
 
lawsuit alleging he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law.  Bolte refused, maintaining that the terms of the agreement 
entitled him to a percentage of any additional recovery from 
ARCO.   
¶12 On September 18, 1996, Koscove filed a civil lawsuit 
against Bolte in El Paso County District Court, Koscove v. 
Bolte, No. 96 CV 2233, alleging that the agreement between the 
parties was unenforceable because Bolte's services to her 
constituted the unauthorized practice of law under a relevant 
state statute.  Specifically, she sought a judgment pursuant to 
Colorado statute § 12-5-115, which provided that "[i]f any 
unlicensed person receives any money . . . as a fee or 
compensation for services rendered . . . by him as an attorney 
or counselor-at-law within this state, all money so received by 
him shall be considered as money received to the use of the 
person paying the same and may be recovered with costs of suit 
by an action for money had and received."  The matter proceeded 
to trial. 
¶13 On April 6, 1998, the El Paso County District Court 
concluded that Bolte had indeed violated the state statute, and 
entered judgment against Bolte in the amount of $388,013.23, 
plus interest and costs.  On April 13, 1998, after these 
findings were entered but prior to the issuance of a writ of 
execution, Bolte transferred the title to certain real property 
he owned in Divide, Colorado, by recording a quit claim deed to 
Bredescel Financial, Inc., a Nevada corporation (Bredescel), as 
the grantee.  The deed was transferred without consideration, 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
6 
 
and without advance notice to Bredescel, which was owned by an 
acquaintance of Bolte.   
¶14 Meanwhile, Bolte appealed the civil judgment and the 
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.  Koscove v. Bolte, 30 P.3d 
784 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).  Bolte sought further review, but 
both the Colorado Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court declined to review the matter.  Bolte also unsuccessfully 
sought relief from the judgment in federal district court. 
¶15 Meanwhile, Koscove proceeded to file a grievance 
against Bolte in Wisconsin.   
¶16 On May 1, 2003, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
filed a complaint against Bolte, alleging he (1) performed legal 
services for Koscove in the State of Colorado, which constituted 
the unauthorized practice of law in violation of SCR 20:5.5(a) 
(Count I); (2) transferred real estate with the intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud Koscove's rights as a judgment creditor 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
(Count 
II); 
and 
(3) made 
misrepresentations to a federal district court in Colorado in 
relation to his application for admission pro hac vice in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count III).  The OLR sought a nine-
month suspension of Attorney Bolte's license to practice law.   
¶17 The parties stipulated to certain facts and a hearing 
was conducted on November 12, 2003.  Post-hearing briefing was 
ordered, and the referee issued his report and recommendation on 
or about May 26, 2004.   
¶18 The referee concluded that many, if not most, of the 
activities Bolte performed on Koscove's behalf were permissible 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
7 
 
investigative services, or were protected by virtue of his 
legitimate pro hac vice admission.4  However, the referee 
concluded that some of the activities Bolte performed did 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.  He concluded 
further that Bolte's conveyance of real property in the wake of 
the civil judgment was for the purpose of minimizing the 
judgment obtained by Koscove and in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  
However, he noted that Koscove was not damaged by the transfer 
because the property in question was fully mortgaged at the 
time.  The referee recommended a three-month suspension of 
Bolte's license to practice law in Wisconsin.  This appeal 
followed. 
¶19 Bolte contends that the referee erred in concluding 
that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and also 
erred 
in 
concluding 
that 
he 
violated 
SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
by 
transferring the real estate to Bredescel.  He states his issues 
for review as follows: 
 
I. 
When 
a 
Wisconsin 
attorney 
provides 
investigative services in another state pursuant to a 
written agreement, is that attorney engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law if the attorney is 
subsequently admitted to practice pro hac vice by the 
federal court of that state? 
 
II. 
May a Wisconsin attorney be disciplined for 
transferring 
property 
with 
intent 
to 
defraud 
a 
judgment creditor when the property at issue was fully 
mortgaged and had no equity value? 
                                                 
4 As noted, the referee concluded that the OLR had failed to 
prove that Bolte engaged in conduct involving fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation in relation to his pro hac vice application. 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
8 
 
¶20 It is well settled that we will affirm the referee's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  We review 
conclusions of law de novo.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 
747.   
¶21 The first issue we consider is whether certain 
activities Bolte engaged in prior to the time Koscove retained 
Attorney Mueller constituted the unauthorized practice of law.5  
In Wisconsin, SCR 20:5.5(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not 
practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction."  
Therefore, 
the 
question 
whether 
Bolte 
engaged 
in 
the 
unauthorized practice of law must be analyzed under Colorado 
law.   
¶22 Colorado's disciplinary rule 5.5(a) provides that "a 
lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so 
violates the regulations of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction."  The Colorado rule is thus virtually identical to 
Wisconsin's rule.  In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court has 
promulgated 
rules 
of 
practice 
governing 
the 
unauthorized 
practice of law, which are investigated and prosecuted by a 
court appointed committee.  See C.R.C.P. 228 to 240.1.  
                                                 
5 The referee concluded that Bolte's activities following 
the retention of Attorney Mueller were protected by Spanos v. 
Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 1965), aff'g 
235 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 985 
(1966).  OLR does not challenge this conclusion. 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
9 
 
¶23 A Colorado court ruled that Bolte violated a Colorado 
civil statute prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law.  
However, Bolte argued and the referee agreed that the resulting 
judgment 
is 
of 
limited 
usefulness 
in 
this 
disciplinary 
proceeding because the burden of proof used in the Colorado 
civil case was lower than the "clear and convincing" evidence 
standard 
applicable 
to 
disciplinary 
matters 
in 
Wisconsin.  
Therefore, the OLR was required to independently prove that 
Bolte engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, by clear and 
convincing evidence.   
¶24 A leading case in Colorado on the unauthorized 
practice of law is Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 391 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1964).  There, the Colorado 
Supreme Court recognized that: 
There is no wholly satisfactory definition as to 
what constitutes the practice of law; it is not easy 
to give an all-inclusive definition.  We believe that 
generally one who acts in a representative capacity in 
protecting, enforcing, or defending the legal rights 
and duties of another and in counselling, advising and 
assisting him in connection with these rights and 
duties is engaged in the practice of law.  Difficulty 
arises too in the application of the definition. 
Id. at 471 (emphasis added); see also C.R.C.P. 201.3.6   
                                                 
 
6 Rule 201.3 pertains to bar admission and classification of 
applicants and its definitions are limited to the rule.  Still 
we deem it instructive that this rule defines the "practice of 
law" as follows: 
(2)  For purposes of this rule, "practice of law" 
means: 
(a) The private practice of law as a sole 
practitioner or as a lawyer employee of or partner or 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
shareholder in a law firm, professional corporation, 
legal 
clinic, 
legal 
services office, 
or 
similar 
entity; or 
(b) Employment as a lawyer for a corporation, 
partnership, trust, individual, or other entity with 
the primary duties of: 
(i)  Furnishing 
legal 
counsel, 
drafting 
documents and pleadings, and interpreting and 
giving advice with respect to the law, and/or 
(ii) Preparing, trying or presenting cases 
before 
courts, 
executive 
departments, 
administrative bureaus or agencies; or 
(c) Employment as a lawyer in the law offices of 
the executive, legislative, or judicial departments of 
the United States, including the independent agencies 
thereof, or of any state, political subdivision of a 
state, territory, special district, or municipality of 
the United States, with the primary duties of 
(i)  Furnishing 
legal 
counsel, 
drafting 
documents and pleadings, and interpreting and 
giving advice with respect to the law, and/or 
(ii) Preparing, trying or presenting cases 
before 
courts, 
executive 
departments, 
administrative bureaus or agencies; or 
(d) Employment as a judge, magistrate, hearing 
examiner, administrative law judge, law clerk, or 
similar official of the United States, including the 
independent 
agencies 
thereof, 
or 
of 
any 
state, 
territory or municipality of the United States with 
the 
duties 
of 
hearing 
and 
deciding 
cases 
and 
controversies 
in 
judicial 
or 
administrative 
proceedings, provided such employment is available 
only to a lawyer; or 
(e) Employment as a teacher of law at a law 
school approved by 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association 
throughout the applicant's employment; or 
(f) Any 
combination 
of 
subparagraphs 
(a)-(e) 
above. 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
11 
 
¶25 The referee opined that: "many of the instances of the 
alleged unauthorized practice of law cited by OLR are actually a 
combination of permissible investigative activities by Bolte and 
the impermissible practice of law by Bolte."  The referee 
specifically identified the following as examples of activities 
that he deemed to constitute the unauthorized practice of law: 
On March 30, 1995, Bolte prepared what he called 
a "Brief," a document that appears to be a combination 
of permissible document review and impermissible legal 
analysis and advice. 
On 
November 
30, 
1994, 
Bolte 
prepared 
a 
memorandum.  Again, most of the memorandum records the 
results of Bolte's investigation.  However, Bolte then 
documents his legal analysis by applying the facts he 
learned to the law.   
Sometime late in March 1995, Bolte and Koscove 
met with several witnesses.  Bolte prepared a summary 
and notes of their meeting.  The majority of the 
memorandum 
and 
notes 
simply 
record 
permissible 
investigative services rendered by Bolte.  However, 
Bolte then indicates statutes of limitation issues 
were discussed.  Laws passed by Congress were also 
discussed. 
Bolte assisted Koscove in negotiating the terms 
and conditions of the retainer agreement with Mueller. 
Bolte expressed his opinion to Koscove that she 
could pursue penalty interest or treble damages under 
Federal antitrust laws. 
Bolte sent a letter to ARCO containing a list of 
questions, along with a copy of a power of attorney 
that Bolte prepared for Koscove.   
¶26 A related question is whether Bolte's actions are 
nonetheless protected by the pro hac vice rule articulated in 
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
12 
 
1965) aff’g 235 F. Supp 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 987 (1966).  Bolte contends that the holding in Spanos 
provides that his pro hac vice admission to the federal court 
encompasses any legal services "reasonably incident" to his 
activities before the federal court in this matter.  In other 
words, he contends that it insulates an attorney from claims of 
unauthorized practice of law within the state in which the 
district court is located.  Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 
F. Supp 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).   
¶27 At the oral argument before this court there was 
discussion about the precise period of time the court should 
scrutinize 
in 
considering 
whether 
Bolte 
engaged 
in 
the 
unauthorized practice of law, and the extent to which Bolte's 
pro hac vice admission to the federal court immunized his 
earlier activities related to the Koscove/ARCO matter.   
¶28 Bolte executed the agreement with Koscove on or about 
November 22, 1994.  Attorney Mueller was interviewed on or about 
January 30, 1995.  He was not formally retained until on or 
about April 7, 1995, although it is undisputed that he performed 
legal services for Koscove while the retainer was being 
negotiated.  ARCO filed suit against Koscove in July 1996.  
Bolte's application for pro hac vice admission was filed in 
November 1995 and Bolte was granted pro hac vice status by order 
dated January 5, 1996.   
¶29 We have carefully considered Bolte's arguments, and 
the circumstances in which Bolte acted, and we must conclude 
that the record does contain clear and convincing evidence that 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
13 
 
Bolte engaged in the unauthorized practice of law with respect to 
certain of his activities.   
¶30 For example, Bolte analyzed Koscove's lease with ARCO 
and expressed his opinion as to how it should be interpreted.  
Perhaps if Bolte were a geologist or mining engineer with 
relevant technical expertise, this action would not constitute 
the unauthorized practice of law.  However, the record does not 
indicate that Bolte had such technical expertise.  The value of 
his review lay in his 
legal analysis of 
the 
document.  
Similarly, Bolte expressed opinions about various legal theories 
for recovery of damages and discouraged Koscove from pursuing at 
least one theory.  We conclude that these were direct legal 
services that constituted the unlicensed practice of law. 
¶31 Similarly, in January 1995, Bolte sent a letter to ARCO 
containing a series of questions about the lease payments, 
together with a power of attorney authorizing him to communicate 
with ARCO on Koscove's behalf.   
¶32 In the course of his investigation into the royalty 
payments due under the mineral leases in question Attorney Bolte 
evidently discovered and documented significant anomalies that 
were adverse to his client's financial interests.  In addition 
to merely recounting facts he learned, he began to consider 
possible legal remedies that might be available to the client, 
and made recommendations concerning these legal theories and 
remedies.   
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
14 
 
¶33 We are not persuaded that Spanos immunizes all of 
Bolte's activities related to the ARCO/Koscove matter.  As the 
referee observed: 
The State of Colorado obviously has an interest in 
protecting its citizens from the unauthorized practice 
of law.  That interest cannot be defeated by a claim 
that a case "might" ultimately be filed in Federal 
Court or that local counsel "might" ultimately be 
retained.  
We conclude, under the facts of this case, that Bolte's initial 
activities conducted on Koscove's behalf, investigating and 
evaluating the ARCO lease were not, as a matter of law, 
sufficiently linked to the federal court proceedings to be deemed 
"reasonably incident" to his subsequent activities before the 
federal court for purposes of Spanos.   
¶34 The second issue on appeal involves whether the OLR 
demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence that Bolte's 
quit claim deed transfer of his Colorado real property violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  
¶35 SCR 
20:8.4(c) provides that 
it is 
"professional 
misconduct 
for 
a 
lawyer 
to 
engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  Bolte contends 
that he did not violate this rule because the property in 
question had no equity at the time of the conveyance.  He 
asserts that under Colorado law, "[t]he fundamental element of a 
fraudulent conveyance is whether the debtor's estate is unjustly 
diminished and he cites Megabank Financial Corp. v. Alpha Gamma 
Rho Fraternity, 841 P.2d 318, 320 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) in 
support of his argument.  He maintains that the transfer was 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
15 
 
"the knee jerk reaction of a man who believed that the State of 
Colorado had wronged him, who wanted to leave the state and 
everything associated with it."   
¶36 However, the OLR notes that under SCR 20:8.4 it "is 
unnecessary 
to 
either 
plead 
or 
prove 
the 
tort 
of 
misrepresentation in order to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that an attorney has violated a rule of professional 
conduct, proscribing attorney conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Marks, 2003 WI 114, ¶50, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 
N.W.2d 836 (citation omitted).  The OLR points to (1) the timing 
of the transfer, a mere one week after judgment was entered 
against Bolte; (2) contemporaneous efforts to shield himself 
from the judgment including an effort to enjoin the court from 
entering final judgment; (3) the unilateral nature of the 
transfer, without the grantee's knowledge or consent; and 
(4) what the OLR deemed the "unlikely explanation" provided by 
Bolte. 
¶37 While this evidence is largely circumstantial it is 
not insufficient.  See, e.g., Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 
33-34, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975).  We deem the referee's credibility 
determinations highly relevant here.  The referee stated: 
"[w]hile Bolte may have had little or no equity in the property, 
that fact does not justify the fraudulent nature of the 
conveyance by Bolte, which was to defeat and minimize the 
judgment taken by Koscove."  We agree that the OLR has 
demonstrated that Bolte's decision to transfer the Colorado 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
16 
 
property was made with intent to interfere with Koscove's 
ability to levy on the property in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶38 We turn to the question of the appropriate discipline 
for Attorney Bolte's violations of SCR 20:5.5(a) and SCR 
20:8.4(c).  The OLR maintained that a nine-month suspension of 
Bolte's license to practice law was appropriate.  The referee 
recommended a suspension of three months.   
¶39 While this is a case implicating the parameters of the 
unauthorized practice of law, it is an unusual one.  We have no 
doubt that there are peculiar circumstances giving rise to this 
proceeding, which are not reflected in the record before us.  
What we have here is an undoubtedly skilled lawyer who was not 
lawfully entitled to render legal advice in Colorado because he 
was not licensed to practice law there.  At no time did he 
misrepresent this status to his client.  Indeed, he apparently 
took pains to try to define a permissible scope of activities 
and, when it became apparent that litigation was likely, 
promptly advised the client to retain a licensed attorney and 
assisted the client in finding appropriate counsel.  He then 
collaborated with the licensed attorney to obtain pro hac vice 
admission to federal court in Colorado so he could lawfully 
assist with the litigation, which clearly inured to Koscove's 
financial benefit. 
¶40 Ultimately, the assessment of Bolte's motives required 
a credibility determination, which is vested in the referee.  
Here, the referee observed:  "Bolte was honest, sincere and hard 
working in all the services he rendered to Koscove under the 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
17 
 
Agreement.  It was his efforts that played a major role in 
Koscove's successful result."  He adds: "I find it difficult to 
believe that this conduct by Bolte would be repeated or that he 
poses a threat to the public.  His conduct was isolated to this 
unique case.  Appropriate discipline in this case should take 
these factors into account." 
¶41 Mindful 
that 
protection 
of 
the 
public 
is 
the 
overriding concern in these matters, in this case, Koscove was 
never under any misunderstanding about Attorney Bolte's status 
as an unlicensed lawyer.  Indeed, she was sufficiently aware of 
this fact that she used the threat——successfully——to divest him 
of earnings she had contractually agreed to pay for his 
services, after he assisted her in obtaining a multi-million 
dollar recovery.   
¶42 Attorney Bolte does not reside in Wisconsin, has no 
prior disciplinary history, and has been on inactive status 
since 1989.  He has been in good standing for some 44 years.  
There is no evidence the client suffered any harm as a result of 
Attorney Bolte's actions.  Therefore, we conclude that a public 
reprimand is sufficient discipline for Bolte's misconduct in 
this matter.  We accept the referee's recommendation that Bolte 
be directed to pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding 
which presently total $23,345.64. 
¶43 IT 
IS 
ORDERED 
that 
Richard 
Bolte 
is 
publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Richard Bolte pay to the Office of Lawyer 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
18 
 
Regulation all the costs of this proceeding provided that if 
such costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within 
that time, the license of Richard Bolte to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of this court. 
 
No. 
2003AP1184-D   
 
 
 
1