Title: NORTHERN v. Evans

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed July 15, 1959.
Petition for rehearing denied September 9, 1959.
Norman K. Winslow, Salem, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was S.E. Scoville, Brownsville.
Laurence Morley argued the cause for respondent. *606 On the brief were Morley & Thomas, Lebanon, and Weatherford & Thompson, Albany.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, O'CONNELL and CRAWFORD, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
CRAWFORD, J. (Pro Tempore)
Plaintiffs are the heirs at law of Margaret C. Evans, deceased. Defendant is the widow of Fay Evans, the only child of Margaret C. Evans. Plaintiffs appeal from a decree refusing cancellation of certain deeds to real property recorded in Linn County, Oregon. The deeds were executed by Margaret C. Evans in July, 1941, naming Fay Evans and Marion Evans as grantees. They were recorded in January, 1953. Counsel agree the only question of any consequence arises from the issue of delivery. Plaintiff Elvin Northern is administrator of the estate of Margaret C. Evans, deceased. Defendant Marion Evans is administratrix of the estate of Fay Evans, deceased. Fay Evans died in an automobile accident in December, 1952, and Margaret C. Evans in January, 1953.
Plaintiffs contend there was no manual delivery of the deeds, but if so there existed no intent in Margaret C. Evans to "presently" pass title to the named grantees and rely strongly upon the "after conduct" of Margaret C. Evans. Defendant argues for manual delivery in July, 1941, with accompanying intent to then pass title.
It is defendant's position that if it is established there was actual delivery in July, 1941, any "after conduct" is unimportant save so far as throwing light on the intent of the deceased. And that, in any event, the "after conduct" is entirely consistent with defendant's position.
*607 The essential facts are these. The deeds were executed in the law office of Orval N. Thompson, attorney, Albany, who testified concerning the circumstances attending the incident. Mrs. Evans requested Mr. Thompson to prepare deeds conveying all of her property to her son Fay to avoid the necessity of probate. Mr. Thompson criticised this proposal, and explained:
This was discussed on two or three occasions.
And continuing:
J.K. Weatherford, Jr., attorney, who handled the Evans' affairs after Mr. Thompson entered the Service, testified concerning the understanding between Margaret, the mother, and Fay, the son, as to the arrangement they contemplated and were making. Fay and Marion, his wife, were to have the title to the property, Margaret was to enjoy all benefits normally resulting from unqualified ownership, to live upon the premises, handle all transactions connected therewith and retain all benefits; all with the permission of Fay and Marion.
The following is quoted from his testimony:
Shortly after the execution and delivery of the deeds they were deposited in a safety deposit box (by whom is a little uncertain), which box was prior thereto owned by Margaret C. Evans. Immediately thereafter the box was transferred to the name of Fay Evans. The box registration is a little difficult to follow through the years, there being some confusion attending payment of the fee, the listing and the bank's practice. A part of the time between 1941 and 1953 the box was recognized as being owned by Margaret C. Evans, Fay Evans, or both. At the time of death of Margaret and of Fay the box was listed in the name of the latter. However, the situation was clarified in Margaret's letter to the bank, dated November 30, 1950, marked Exhibit B, which reads as follows:
As to the "after conduct" on which plaintiffs rely as impelling the conclusion of non-delivery, we accept the factual discussion of plaintiffs, but do not find the same as sufficient impact to induce the conclusion that delivery was not effected. The possession of keys, control, management, payment of taxes, making repairs, reporting income derived therefrom, sale of the two parcels, the bank accounts and all related activities were entirely consistent with the theory of a conveyance to trusted son and daughter-in-law, with the understanding the benefits should be Margaret's, title and right to control in Fay and Marion. It is to be observed the deeds contain no reservation providing for return of title if requested. In this respect Exhibit "C" is of interest:
*611 1. Delivery is supported by the unqualified grant in the deeds with no strings attached, the handing of the deeds to the grantees and the evidence establishing the intention of the grantor to vest absolute and unrecallable title in the grantees. Title passed on delivery conforming to the intent of the decedent and this could not be, and was not, divested nor affected by any "after conduct", which we find wholly insufficient to negative intent. 16 Am Jur, Deeds, §§ 120, 121, 122, pp 504, 505.
2-4. True, the "after conduct" is of significance in testing delivery from the aspect of intention of the grantor and, as argued by counsel, may be held to be inconsistent with delivery save when the same is pursuant to and conforms with the agreement and understanding of the parties, as here. The burden was on plaintiffs to prove absence of intention. McGuigan v. Hewer, 66 ND 710, 268 NW 679, 141 ALR p 308, 56 ALR p 747; Hitch v. Hitch, 24 Cal App2d 291, 74 P2d 1098. And delivery is not rendered ineffective because of any subsequent custody in the grantor; this is merely an incident. 16 Am Jur, Deeds, § 129, p 511, 56 ALR p 315; Shaver v. Canfield, 21 Cal App2d 734, 70 P2d 507; Flinn v. Potter, 99 Cal App 106, 277 P 1060.
5. The facts in this case bring it clearly within the authorities and establish the necessary delivery. And, it may be added, the handling of this transaction was just exactly what was to be expected by mother, son and daughter-in-law entertaining such mutual affection and confidence.
Affirmed.