Title: Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13211 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 9, 2022. - May 24, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Attorney General.  Consumer Protection 
Act, Unfair or deceptive act.  Practice, Civil, Consumer 
protection case, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 24, 2019. 
 
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Karen F. Green, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Justin A. Anderson, of the District of Columbia (Patrick J. 
Conlon, of Texas, Jeremy M. Liss, of New York, & Thomas C. 
Frongillo also present) for the defendant. 
Seth Schofield, Assistant Attorney General (Richard A. 
Johnston & Christopher G. Courchesne, Assistant Attorneys 
General, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
Edward Notis-McConarty, Jennifer Grace Miller, M. Patrick 
Moore, & Clinton R. Prospere, for Francis X. Bellotti & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
KAFKER, J.  The Attorney General brought a civil 
enforcement action against Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon Mobil) 
for various alleged violations of G. L. c. 93A based on the 
company's communications with investors and consumers related to 
the impact of climate change.  Exxon Mobil contended that the 
action was motivated by its "petitioning" activity and filed a 
special motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the "anti-
SLAPP" statute (anti-SLAPP motion).1  The Attorney General 
responded that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to private parties 
but not to the Attorney General, and that even if the anti-SLAPP 
statute did apply to the Attorney General, the instant action 
was not brought in response to petitioning activities, but 
rather for unfair or deceptive practices prohibited by G. L. 
c. 93A.  A Superior Court judge denied the anti-SLAPP motion, 
finding that at least some of the activity alleged in the 
complaint was not "petitioning" within the meaning of the 
statute.  We affirm on the alternate ground that G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H, does not apply to civil enforcement actions by the 
Attorney General.2 
 
1 "SLAPP" is an acronym meaning "strategic litigation 
against public participation."  See Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 
448 Mass. 242, 242 n.2 (2007). 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by former 
Attorneys General Francis X. Bellotti, James M. Shannon, Scott 
Harshbarger, Thomas Reilly, and Martha Coakley. 
3 
 
1.  Background.  The present appeal marks the latest round 
in a years-long struggle between Exxon Mobil and the Attorney 
General that has played out before courts across the country, 
including our own.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney 
Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 313-314 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
794 (2019).  We limit ourselves to the background relevant to 
disposing of Exxon Mobil's motion. 
In October 2019, the Attorney General brought a civil 
enforcement action on behalf of the Commonwealth against Exxon 
Mobil in the Superior Court pursuant to her powers under G. L. 
c. 12, §§ 3 and 11D, and G. L. c. 93A, § 4.  After Exxon Mobil 
unsuccessfully attempted to remove the action to Federal court, 
see Massachusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 462 F. Supp. 3d 31, 34 
(D. Mass. 2020), the Attorney General filed an amended 
complaint.  The amended complaint alleged violations of G. L. 
c. 93A and related regulations for factual misstatements and 
failures to disclose information related to Exxon Mobil's 
products and their impact on the climate.  In particular, the 
first count of the complaint alleged that Exxon Mobil 
misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts to Exxon 
Mobil investors in Massachusetts related to climate change and 
its impact on Exxon Mobil's business.  The second count alleged 
that certain marketing and promotional materials misled 
Massachusetts consumers as to the climate impact of Exxon 
4 
 
Mobil's products.  Finally, the third count alleged that Exxon 
Mobil is misleading Massachusetts consumers through so-called 
"greenwashing" campaigns that wrongly imply that Exxon Mobil is 
taking steps to solve climate change and reduce carbon 
emissions, thereby influencing consumer purchasing decisions. 
Claiming that the Attorney General's complaint was based on 
its "petitioning" activity, Exxon Mobil filed a special motion 
to dismiss all counts under G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Without 
deciding the question whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied to 
enforcement actions by the Attorney General, a Superior Court 
judge denied the motion, finding that, although some of the 
activities mentioned in the complaint constituted "petitioning" 
within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, the investor 
communications and marketing efforts in question did not, and 
therefore the challenged claims were not "solely based on" Exxon 
Mobil's petitioning activity as required by the anti-SLAPP 
statute and case law.  See Blanchard v. Stewart Carney Hosp., 
Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 159 (2017), S.C., 483 Mass. 200 (2019).  
Exxon Mobil exercised its right to interlocutory review of the 
denial of its special motion.  See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 
517, 521-522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004).  This court 
granted the Attorney General's application for direct appellate 
review. 
5 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Our review is 
determined by the threshold issue whether the anti-SLAPP statute 
applies at all to civil enforcement proceedings brought by the 
Attorney General.  We conclude that it does not, and therefore 
do not analyze whether Exxon Mobil's actions constituted 
"petitioning" or whether the other requirements for dismissal 
were met. 
The question whether G. L. c. 231, § 59H, applies to the 
Attorney General is a question of statutory interpretation.  
"When interpreting a statute, our primary duty is to 'effectuate 
the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  Wallace W. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 793 (2019), quoting Matter of E.C., 
479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018).  We determine this intent "from all 
[the statute's] words construed by the ordinary and approved 
usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause 
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied 
and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the 
purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  Conservation Comm'n 
of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331 (2021), quoting 
Commissioner of Revenue v. Dupee, 423 Mass. 617, 620 (1996).  We 
must also consider that interpreting general statutes to be 
enforceable against the Commonwealth intrudes on governmental 
sovereignty, and is therefore disfavored, as reflected in 
various rules of statutory construction.  Hansen v. 
6 
 
Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 219-220 (1962).  Additionally, 
"'[t]o the extent there is any ambiguity in the statutory 
language, we turn to the legislative history' as a guide to 
legislative intent."  Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. 
Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 254 (2021), quoting Ajemian v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 182 (2017), cert. denied sub nom. Oath 
Holdings, Inc. v. Ajemian, 138 S. Ct. 1327 (2018). 
b.  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Section 59H provides: 
"In any case in which a party asserts that the civil 
claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party 
are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition 
under the constitution of the United States or of the 
commonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to 
dismiss."3 
 
3 As further defined by the case law, at the first stage of 
the process "a special movant must demonstrate that the 
nonmoving party's claims are solely based on its own petitioning 
activities" (emphasis added).  Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 159.  
Although the statute references norms under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts 
Constitution, it does not, however, rely solely on these rights, 
as defined by the United States Supreme Court or this court, to 
determine the scope of protected activity, and instead provides 
its own express -- and broad -- definition of "petitioning".  
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  See Blanchard, supra at 147-148.  The 
statute defines "petitioning" to include "any written or oral 
statement" that (i) is made before or submitted to a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
governmental proceeding; (ii) is made in connection with an 
issue under consideration or review by any governmental 
proceeding; (iii) is reasonably likely to encourage 
consideration or review of an issue by a governmental 
proceeding; (iv) is reasonably likely to enlist public 
participation in an effort to effect such consideration; or 
(v) falls within constitutional protection of the right to 
petition government. 
7 
 
The statute then provides: 
"The court shall grant such special motion, unless the 
party against whom such special motion is made shows that:  
(1) the moving party's exercise of its right to petition 
was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party's acts 
caused actual injury to the responding party."4 
The statute also addresses the Attorney General 
specifically:  "The attorney general, on [her] behalf or on 
behalf of any government agency or subdivision to which the 
moving party's acts were directed, may intervene to defend or 
otherwise support the moving party on such special motion."  
G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
Filing a special motion has an immediate and important 
effect on the litigation, short-circuiting and rerouting the 
ordinary trial and appellate process.  The court must "advance 
any such special motion so that it may be heard and determined 
as expeditiously as possible."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Filing the 
motion also stays discovery, although a court may allow 
"specified discovery" upon motion and a hearing with good cause 
 
4 Consistent with the over-all purpose of the statute to 
"distinguish meritless from meritorious claims," we have also 
held that the nonmoving party can meet its burden in this 
"second stage" by showing that the challenged claim "was not 
primarily brought to chill the special movant's legitimate 
petitioning activities" (citation omitted).  Blanchard, 477 
Mass. at 159-160.  This involves showing that the claim is 
"colorable or worthy of being presented to and considered by the 
court" (alteration omitted).  Id. at 160-161, quoting L.B. v. 
Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 474 Mass. 
231, 241 (2016). 
8 
 
shown.  Id.  A prevailing movant is also entitled to "costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the 
special motion and any related discovery matters."  Id.5 
c.  Application to civil enforcement proceedings.  The 
central question is whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to 
civil enforcement proceedings brought by the Attorney General.  
We conclude that it does not, relying on the specific statutory 
 
5 Although originally drafted with a particular purpose in 
mind -- that is, the prevention of lawsuits used by developers 
to punish and dissuade those objecting to their projects in the 
permitting process -- the anti-SLAPP statute's broadly drafted 
provisions, particularly its wide-ranging definition of 
petitioning activity, have led to a significant expansion of its 
application.  See 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC, 
483 Mass. 514, 529-530 (2019); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. 
Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161-163, 166-167 (1998).  The ever-
increasing complexity of the anti-SLAPP case law has also made 
resolution of these cases difficult and time consuming.  See 
Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 159-161.  We recognize that this case 
law may require further reconsideration and simplification to 
ensure that the statutory purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute are 
accomplished and the orderly resolution of these cases is not 
disrupted.  See Matter of Hamm, 487 Mass. 394, 395-396 (2021) 
(affirming denial of anti-SLAPP motion two years after 
underlying objection to guardianship accounting was filed); 
Blanchard, 483 Mass. at 201 (affirming second denial of anti-
SLAPP motion against complaint filed in 2013); Haverhill Stem 
LLC v. Jennings, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 627, 629 (2021) 
(affirming denial of anti-SLAPP motion two years after complaint 
filed).  We also note that other States have defined petitioning 
activity more narrowly and that bills have been filed in our 
Legislature to do the same.  See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-7-7-2 
(anti-SLAPP statute applies to "any conduct in furtherance of 
the exercise of the constitutional right of:  [1] petition; or 
[2] free speech; in connection with a public issue or an issue 
of public interest"); 2021 House Doc. No. 1504 (providing that 
protected activity under anti-SLAPP statute "shall be defined as 
those rights are defined under the U.S. Constitution or the 
Massachusetts Constitution"). 
9 
 
language, the rules of construction applicable to the 
enforcement of statutes against the Commonwealth, and the 
legislative history and purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute. 
The inquiry does not simply end, as Exxon Mobil suggests, 
with the employment of the general term "party" in the first two 
sentences of § 59H defining who can sue and be sued.  Rather, we 
conclude that the fourth sentence, specifically defining the 
role of the Attorney General, is most informative.  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H ("The attorney general, on [her] behalf or on 
behalf of any government agency or subdivision to which the 
moving party's acts were directed, may intervene to defend or 
otherwise support the moving party on such special motion").  
That the Attorney General is mentioned in connection with her 
capacity to intervene, but not in any other capacity, suggests 
that the Legislature envisioned the Attorney General's role in 
§ 59H motions as limited to such intervention. 
Indeed, interpreting the general term "party" here to 
include the Commonwealth or the Attorney General presents a 
number of problems.  As the former Attorneys General explain in 
their amicus brief, there are conceptual difficulties with 
including the Commonwealth as a "party," authorized to bring 
special motions to dismiss: 
"Does the Commonwealth have a protected right to petition 
itself?  Could someone else bring a claim that was 'based 
on' the Commonwealth's petitioning of itself?  That seems 
10 
 
unlikely given that the right to petition is vested in the 
'people.'  [First Amendment, cl. 3, to the United States 
Constitution] (protecting 'right of the people' to petition 
government for redress of grievances); art. 19 of the 
Declaration of Rights [of] the Massachusetts Constitution 
('people have [a] right' to 'request of the legislative 
body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, 
redress of the wrongs done them')." 
 
Interpreting the word "party" to include the Attorney 
General and thus to allow special motions to dismiss against her 
raises a different set of statutory and even constitutional 
concerns.  As has been explained by this court and as summarized 
by some of the foremost commentators on statutory construction, 
"[c]ourts strictly, or narrowly, construe statutes in derogation 
of sovereignty."  3 S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 62:1 (8th ed. 2020) (Sutherland), citing Hansen, 
344 Mass. at 219, and other cases.  As we have noted in a 
related context, such a rule "advances important public 
policies," Brown v. Office of the Comm'r of Probation, 475 Mass. 
675, 679 (2016), especially where application of the statute to 
the government could interfere with "the discretionary functions 
of a public official" or is necessary "to shield the public 
fisc," Randall v. Haddad, 468 Mass. 347, 358-359 (2014), quoting 
Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 
436 Mass. 144, 174 (2002).  Thus, "it is a widely accepted rule 
of statutory construction that general words in a statute such 
as 'persons' will not ordinarily be construed to include the 
11 
 
State or political subdivisions thereof" when they limit the 
capacity of the government to perform its necessary functions or 
protect public finances.  Hansen, supra at 219-220 (collecting 
cases and concluding that anti-injunction act did not apply to 
public employer).  See Sutherland, supra at § 62:1.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Dowd, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 166 (1994), citing 
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) 
("This canon of construction is scarcely limited to 
Massachusetts"). 
Limiting enforcement actions by the Attorney General is 
particularly problematic.  The Attorney General is the "chief 
law officer" of the Commonwealth, empowered by the Legislature 
to "set a unified and consistent legal policy for the 
Commonwealth" (citation omitted).  Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. 
Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 159, 163 (1975).6  The Attorney 
General has the statutory duty to "appear for the commonwealth 
and for state departments, officers and commissions in all suits 
and other civil proceedings in which the commonwealth is a party 
 
6 The importance of the Attorney General's office, as well 
as its relevance to publicly contested and politically inflected 
issues, is underscored by the fact that the Attorney General is 
separately elected by the people rather than appointed.  See 
art. 17 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as 
amended by art. 82 of the Amendments.  This constitutional 
amendment stemmed from "an attempt to give the appointing power 
back to the 'supreme power,' the people."  Secretary of Admin. & 
Fin., 367 Mass. at 161, citing Official Report of the Debates 
and Proceedings on the State Convention 704 (1853). 
12 
 
or interested, or in which the official acts and doings of said 
departments, officers and commissions are called in question."  
G. L. c. 12, § 3.  The Attorney General also appears for the 
Commonwealth in actions to recover money on its behalf.  G. L. 
c. 12, § 5. 
Importantly, she is entrusted with the enforcement of the 
Commonwealth's laws, in large part through bringing civil 
enforcement proceedings, including the enforcement of G. L. 
c. 93A.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 12, § 11D (authorizing civil, 
administrative, or criminal proceedings to enforce environmental 
laws and abate pollution nuisances); G. L. c. 12, § 11H 
(authorizing Attorney General to bring civil actions to prevent 
violation of Massachusetts Civil Rights Act); G. L. c. 93A, § 4 
(authorizing Attorney General to bring civil actions to enforce 
consumer protection laws); G. L. c. 149, § 150 ("The attorney 
general may make complaint or seek indictment against any person 
for a violation of [Wage Act]"); G. L. c. 151B, § 5 (authorizing 
Attorney General to file complaints to enforce 
antidiscrimination laws).  In such enforcement actions, the 
Attorney General may prosecute and remedy past violations and 
engage in proactive litigation to prevent ongoing harm.  See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 12, 11D; G. L. c. 93A, § 4. 
Construing the anti-SLAPP statute to apply to the Attorney 
General would place significant roadblocks to the enforcement of 
13 
 
the Commonwealth's laws.  G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Filing a special 
motion, as explained above, stays or limits discovery.  Id.  The 
motion itself is prioritized over other proceedings in the case.  
Id.  It is also immediately appealable.  Fabre, 436 Mass. at 
521-522.  The result is that the rest of the case must await 
resolution of the special motion, and often the appeal as well.  
All of this has a substantial effect on the investigation and 
enforcement of illegal activity, which is a critical function of 
the government. 
The Legislature may of course place limits on the sovereign 
authority of government, including on the authority of the 
Attorney General.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 93A, § 6 (5)-(6) 
(providing limitations on Attorney General's power to issue 
civil investigative demands to enforce G. L. c. 93A).7  This 
must, however, be done clearly and expressly or at least by 
necessary implication.  Hansen, 344 Mass. at 220 (requiring 
"clear and unequivocal language" to restrict sovereign 
functions).  Cf. Brown, 475 Mass. at 679 (waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be "expressed by the terms of a statute, or appear 
by necessary implication from them" [citation and alteration 
 
7 Legislatively imposed limitations on the Attorney General 
must also respect the constitutional separation of powers.  See 
art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See also 
Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 827, 832-833, 841 (1978), 
citing Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 617 (1939). 
14 
 
omitted]); Sutherland, supra at § 62:1 ("the rule seeks to 
preserve sovereignty, to insulate it from unclear statutory 
language that might encroach harmfully upon governmental 
affairs").8  A good example of a clear and express limitation on 
the Attorney General's powers appears in the same chapter of the 
General Laws as the anti-SLAPP statute.  General Laws c. 231, 
§§ 6E-6G, provide for "reasonable counsel fees and other costs 
and expenses" in civil actions where a "party" is found to have 
brought claims or defenses that "were wholly insubstantial, 
frivolous and not advanced in good faith."  Id.  Consistent with 
our case law's requirements, the statute expressly defines 
"party" as "any person, including any officer or agency of the 
commonwealth or subdivision thereof, or any authority 
established by the general court to serve a public purpose."  
G. L. c. 231, § 6E. 
The history and purpose of the anti-SLAPP suit also 
counsels against its application to government enforcement 
 
8 At oral argument, Exxon Mobil raised the examples of Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974).  Application of purely procedural 
rules to government parties is, however, different, as it does 
not provide independent substantive grounds for dismissal of a 
claim, provide a basis of financial recovery against the 
government, or have a substantial effect on the investigation 
and prosecution of illegal activity.  The government has no 
legitimate interest in filing complaints that do not state a 
claim for relief, or in proceeding to trial without raising a 
triable issue of fact. 
15 
 
actions.  The legislative history makes clear that the 
motivation for the anti-SLAPP statute was vexatious, private 
lawsuits, especially ones filed by developers to prevent local 
opposition to zoning approval.9  See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes 
Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161 (1998); State House News 
Service (House Sess.), Dec. 19, 1994; State House News Service 
(Advances), Dec. 19, 1994; State House News Service (Sen. 
Sess.), Dec. 29, 1994 (describing lawsuits brought by developers 
against local residents for opposing developments resulting in 
steep legal fees).  There is no suggestion in the legislative 
history that it was meant to address government enforcement 
actions.  Furthermore, unlike private litigants, government 
actors' decisions to prosecute claims are subject to the First 
Amendment and other constitutional protections.  See Wayte v. 
 
9 Exxon Mobil points to a statement by Governor William F. 
Weld returning the anti-SLAPP bill to the Legislature and noting 
his concerns.  In particular, the Governor noted, "The bill 
applies to a broad group of potential claims, sweeping in cases 
that are far beyond the types of lawsuits which the bill's 
proponents wish to control."  1994 House Doc. No. 5604.  Whether 
or not the Legislature accepted the Governor's interpretation of 
the potential scope of the broadly worded statute, see Duracraft 
Corp., 427 Mass. at 162-163 & n.11, his concerns have proved 
prescient, as parties have sought to expand the open-ended 
language of the statute, particularly its broad definition of 
petitioning activities, to apply to disputes very different from 
those that prompted its passage.  Regardless, there is nothing 
in the Governor's message to suggest that either he or the 
Legislature thought the statute would apply to government 
enforcement actions as opposed to private disputes.  1994 House 
Doc. No. 5604. 
16 
 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610-614 (1985) (discussing 
limitations imposed on prosecution by First Amendment); Mozzochi 
v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[i]t has long 
been established that certain adverse governmental action taken 
in retaliation against the exercise of free speech violates the 
First Amendment").10 
The only other court that has had to analyze a similar 
anti-SLAPP statute has also not extended it to government 
enforcement actions.11  Like § 59H, Maine's anti-SLAPP statute 
neither expressly included nor excluded government enforcement 
 
10 Exxon Mobil has vigorously and, so far, unsuccessfully 
pursued these constitutional rights and remedies in Federal and 
State court.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 
F. Supp. 3d 679, 687-694 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff'd, 28 F.4th 383 
(2d Cir. 2022). 
 
11 The Supreme Court of California has rejected the argument 
that there was an implied exemption for all enforcement actions 
under that State's anti-SLAPP statute.  Montebello v. Vasquez, 1 
Cal. 5th 409, 416-420 (2016).  However, this was based on the 
statute's express, limited exemption for actions "brought in the 
name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney 
General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public 
prosecutor."  Id. at 416, 419-420, quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 425.16(d).  Consequently, there was a statutory basis to hold 
that municipal enforcement actions were not exempt, albeit by 
negative implication.  Cf. Reuter v. Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 474 
(2022), citing Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628 (2010) 
(emphasizing that Massachusetts courts generally disfavor 
negative implication arguments).  No such statutory language 
related to government enforcement appears in § 59H. 
 
17 
 
actions.  Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 556.12  The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine concluded that a municipal enforcement action for 
a zoning violation, allegedly brought in retaliation for 
petitioning activity, was not "an appropriate occasion for 
application of the anti-SLAPP statute."  Madawaska v. Cayer, 
2014 ME 121, ¶¶ 14-16.  Like the Attorney General, the officer 
who brought the action was exercising a statutory mandate to 
enforce the law.  Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.  See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30-A, 
§ 4452. 
Our decision in Hanover v. New England Regional Council of 
Carpenters, 467 Mass. 587 (2014), is not to the contrary, even 
though there we reversed the denial of a special motion to 
dismiss against a town.  First, the issue whether government 
entities were subject to the anti-SLAPP statute was not raised, 
as the question under appeal was whether "support of litigation" 
by a nonparty counted as petitioning.  See id. at 588.  Second, 
the challenged lawsuit was not a statutorily authorized 
enforcement action as in Madawaska or the present suit, but 
rather an abuse of process suit.  Id. at 589.  In fact, the town 
had been subject to a government enforcement action by the 
Attorney General concluding that its town bidding process had 
 
12 Maine's anti-SLAPP statute is "substantively identical" 
to our own.  Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC, 2017 ME 87, ¶ 14 
n.2. 
18 
 
been fraudulent.  Id. at 588.  When the town continued to 
enforce its contract with the winning contractor despite the 
fraud, ten taxpayers, supported by the defendant union, brought 
suit.  Id. at 588-589.  The town then sued the union for its 
support of the litigation, which led the union to bring the 
special motion to dismiss.  Id. at 589.  In sum, this was not a 
case where the anti-SLAPP statute was applied to prevent a 
government enforcement action, but rather a case where a local 
government attempted to retaliate against a private party with 
litigation for seeking compliance with a State government 
enforcement action.  Thus, nothing in Hanover supports the 
contention that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to enforcement 
actions brought by the Attorney General.13 
3.  Conclusion.  We affirm the dismissal of Exxon Mobil's 
special motion.  The anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to 
government enforcement actions brought by the Attorney General. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
13 We note that the union in Hanover was not seeking to 
employ the anti-SLAPP statute to prevent local government 
enforcement of laws.  As the issue was not raised in that case, 
and is not raised here, we need not decide whether any or all 
local government enforcement actions are beyond the scope of the 
anti-SLAPP statute.  Compare Madawaska, 2014 ME 121 ¶¶ 14-16, 
with Montebello, 1 Cal. 5th at 416-420.