Title: Wilkerson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GARY L. WILKERSON, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 68, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9603005035  
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 13, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    March 28, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 28th day of March 2006, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Gary L. Wilkerson, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 11, 2005 order denying his motion for 
sentence modification.  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we 
AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In March 1996, Wilkerson was charged with Unlawful Sexual 
Intercourse in the First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the Third 
Degree, and two counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree.  
 
2
On July 3, 1996, Wilkerson pleaded guilty1 to one count of Unlawful Sexual 
Intercourse in the Second Degree.  On the same date, Wilkerson was 
sentenced to 20 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 10 
years for 4 years of probation.  The Superior Court’s sentencing order did 
not expressly require that Wilkerson register as a sex offender upon his 
release from prison and the judge did not mention the requirement at the 
sentencing hearing.   
 
(3) 
In late November 2004, prior to Wilkerson’s release date of 
January 2005, officials from the Delaware Department of Correction 
informed Wilkerson that he was required to register as a sex offender.  
Wilkerson objected on the ground that he had never been notified of that 
requirement.  However, Wilkerson finally did register as a Tier III sex 
offender so as not to jeopardize his timely release from prison.   
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Wilkerson claims that: a) the Superior Court 
abused its discretion by not assigning him to a Tier II sex offender 
designation, in accordance with the statute in effect at the time he was 
sentenced; b) the sentencing judge improperly failed to notify him that he 
was required to register as a sex offender; and c) the Superior Court violated 
                                                 
1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e) (1) (C). 
 
3
his due process rights by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his Tier III 
sex offender designation.  
 
(5) 
Under Delaware’s sex offender registration statute, Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 4120 et seq.,2 any person convicted of an offense designated 
in Section 4121(a) (4) is required to register as a sex offender upon his 
release from a Level V or Level IV facility.  There are three “Risk 
Assessment Tiers,” each of which has a particular set of registration 
requirements.  Under Section 4121(e), the offender is to be assigned to one 
of the tiers in accordance with the offense of which he has been convicted 
without regard to the facts or circumstances of the particular case.3  There is 
no right to a prior hearing on the eligibility determination.4  Pursuant to 
Section 4122(a), offenders convicted after June 21, 1996 and before March 
1, 1999 are subject to the provisions of Section 4121.5  Under Section 
4121(e), which sets out the Risk Assessment Tiers, Unlawful Sexual 
Intercourse in the Second Degree is classified within Tier III.6   
 
(6) 
Wilkerson’s first claim is that he should have been designated a 
Tier II sex offender.  Under Section 4122(a) of the amended sex offender 
                                                 
2 The statute was amended in July 1998, with an effective date of March 1, 1999. 
3 Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1066 (Del. 2001). 
4 Id. 
5 Wilkerson, who pleaded guilty on July 3, 1996, falls within that category of offenders. 
6 Among other things, the Tier III designation requires registration by the offender every 
90 days for the rest of his life.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 4120, 4121, and 4336. 
 
4
statute, Wilkerson, having been convicted after June 21, 1996 and before 
March 1, 1999, is subject to Section 4121(e), which assigns those convicted 
of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree to Tier III.  This Court 
has held that the assignment of sex offenders such as Wilkerson to Tier III in 
accordance with the amended statute does not constitute an ex post facto 
violation.7  The Superior Court, thus, correctly relied upon the amended sex 
offender statute, rather than the version in effect at the time Wilkerson was 
convicted, to assign Wilkerson to Tier III.   
 
(7) 
Wilkerson’s second claim is that the sentencing judge 
improperly failed to inform him that he had to register as a sex offender.  
While the amended statute states requires the sentencing judge to hold a 
hearing to designate a defendant as a sex offender and assign him to a tier,8 
the sentencing judge has no discretion in determining whether the defendant 
is a sex offender and to what tier he will be assigned once the defendant has 
been convicted.9  Thus, even assuming that the required hearing was not 
held in this case, we conclude that any such error was harmless.  Once 
Wilkerson was convicted of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second 
Degree, he was required by statute to be assigned to Tier III.    
                                                 
7 Helman v. State, 784 A.2d at 1075-78. 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4121(c). 
9 Helman v. State, 784 A.2d at 1066. 
 
5
(8) 
Wilkerson’s third claim is that he should have been afforded an 
evidentiary hearing to determine his tier assignment.  There is no right to 
such a hearing under the Delaware sex offender registration statute.  The 
statute provides for mandatory tier assignments based solely upon the charge 
of which the sex offender was convicted without regard to the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case.  Moreover, this Court previously has 
ruled that this “compulsory approach” to sex offender registration and 
community notification does not implicate any state or federal constitutional 
liberty or privacy interest and does not constitute a violation of either due 
process or equal protection.10 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
                                       Justice  
 
                                                 
10 Id. at 1069-76.