Title: PAXTON RESOURCES, L.L.C. v. BRANNAMAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAXTON RESOURCES, L.L.C. v. BRANNAMAN2004 WY 9395 P.3d 796Case Number: 03-143, 03-144Decided: 08/12/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

PAXTON 
RESOURCES, L.L.C.,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

DAN 
M. "BUCK" BRANNAMAN and

MARY 
C. BRANNAMAN,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

DAN 
M. "BUCK" BRANNAMAN and

MARY 
C. BRANNAMAN,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

PAXTON 
RESOURCES, L.L.C.,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Representing 
Paxton Resources, L.L.C.:

 

            
Kevin D. Huber, Richard Day and P. Craig Silva of Williams, Porter, Day 
& Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Dan M. "Buck" Brannaman and Mary C. Brannaman:

 

            
Jay A. Gilbertz and Michael K. Davis of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, 
Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the majority opinion; 
HILL, 
Chief Justice, filed a specially concurring opinion.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Dan M. "Buck" 
Brannaman and Mary C. Brannaman (the Brannamans) sued a coalbed methane gas 
developer, Paxton Resources, L.L.C. (Paxton), for damages to their real property 
and for lost income.  The complaint 
stated causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, trespass and negligence, and sought a declaratory judgment and 
punitive damages.  A jury awarded 
the Brannamans compensatory damages of $810,887.00 for Paxton's breach of 
contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Paxton appealed the judgment and the 
district court's denial of its W.R.C.P. 50 and 59 motions for judgment as a 
matter of law, for new trial, and for remittitur.  The Brannamans appealed the district 
court's dismissal of their trespass and punitive damages 
claims.

 

[¶2]      We dismiss the 
appeal and cross appeal because they were not timely 
filed.

 

ISSUES

 

            
1.         
Should this appeal be dismissed because it was not timely 
filed?

 

            
2.         
Did the district court err in refusing to give to the jury Paxton's 
proposed damages instruction?

 

            
3.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Paxton's 
expert witness to testify at trial?

 

            
4.         
Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Paxton 
breached the contract?

 

            
5.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Paxton's motion 
for remittitur?

 

6.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Paxton's motion 
for a new trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The relevant 
facts are those having to do with the chronology of procedural events after the 
jury trial:

 

            
February 7, 2003                  
Jury verdict

            
February 25, 2003                
Post-trial motions filed

            
February 26, 2003                
Judgment entered

            
March 31, 2003                     
Order setting hearing entered

            
June 9, 2003                          
Hearing on post-trial motions

            
June 27, 2003                                   
Order denying post-trial motions entered

            
July 3, 2003                           
Paxton's notice of appeal filed

July 
11, 2003                         
Brannamans' conditional notice of appeal filed

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶4]      The interplay of 
several court rules dictates the outcome of this case.  To begin with, W.R.A.P. 2.01(a) provides 
that "[a]n appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall be taken by 
filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
from entry of the appealable order . . .."  
Subsection (a)(2) of the same section goes on to provide that "[i]f a 
timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice 
of appeal within 15 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was 
filed."  Of particular significance 
to the present case is the exception to these time limitations found in W.R.A.P. 
2.02:

 

            
(a)       
The running of the time for appeal in a civil case is tolled as to all 
parties by the timely filing of a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), Wyo. R. 
Civ. P.; a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact under Rule 52(b), 
Wyo. R. Civ. P., whether or not alteration of the judgment would be required if 
the motion is granted; a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59, 
Wyo. R. Civ. P., or a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, Wyo. R. Civ. 
P.

 

            
(b)       
The full time for appeal commences to run and is to be computed from the 
entry of any order granting or denying a motion for judgment; a motion to amend 
or make additional findings of fact; or a motion to alter or amend the judgment, 
or denying a motion for a new trial.  
If no order is entered, the full time for appeal commences to run 
when any such motion is deemed denied.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶5]      W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) 
governs the district court's hearing of such motions:

 

A 
request for hearing may be served by the moving party or any party affected by 
the motion within 30 days after service of the motion.  Absent a timely request for hearing the 
court may, in its discretion, determine the motion without a hearing.  A motion not determined within 90 
days after filing shall be deemed denied.  
A party whose motion has been deemed denied shall have 10 days 
after the effective date of such denial to serve such pleadings or other papers, 
if any, as may be required or permitted.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  And finally, the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure spell out the consequences of an appeal being filed 
"too early" or "too late."  Under 
W.R.A.P. 2.04, "[a] notice of appeal filed prematurely shall be treated as 
though filed on the same day as entry of the appealable order . . .."  On the other hand, W.R.A.P. 1.03 
specifies that "[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal . . . is 
jurisdictional."

 

[¶6]      The following 
sequence of events sets the stage for our inquiry:  the motions were filed, judgment was 
entered, the order setting the motions for hearing was entered, the ninety-day 
"deemed denied" date passed, the hearing was held, the thirty-day appeal 
deadline after the "deemed denied" date passed, the order denying the motions 
was entered, the notice of appeal was filed.  There is no dispute that the appeal was 
filed more than thirty days after the "deemed denied" date.  The sole question is whether the 
district court's entry of the setting order during the ninety-day period acted 
to toll the time for appeal or acted as a determination of the 
motions.

 

[¶7]      Wyoming's case 
law in this area must be read in the context of the rules in effect at the 
time.  In Brasel & Sims 
Const. Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., 378 P.2d 501, 502-03 (Wyo. 
1963), 
this Court denied a motion to dismiss the appeal where the appellee argued that 
the notice of appeal had not been filed within the time required by former 
W.R.C.P. 59(f) (1966), which provided as follows:

 

Motions 
for new trial and motions to alter or amend a judgment shall be determined 
within sixty days after the entry of the judgment, and if not so determined 
shall be deemed denied, unless within such sixty days the determination is 
continued by order of the court or by stipulation.

 

[¶8]      Clearly, the rule 
as then incarnated provided methods for the parties and the district court to 
delay determination of such motions beyond the "deemed denied" date.  In Brasel & Sims Const. Co., 
we concluded that the district court and the parties had proceeded as if the 
court's order, issued at a party's request, extending the time for determination 
of the motion apparently was to be effective "until the matter was resolved by 
the trial court."  Id. at 
503.  We further opined, however, 
that "a lack of clarity of Rule 59(f), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, might 
well be contended because there is no provision as to what occurs after the 
continuance therein provided."  
Id.

 

[¶9]      In McMullen v. 
McMullen, 559 P.2d 37, 38 (Wyo. 1977), 
under the same version of the court rule, this Court dismissed an appeal as 
untimely because it had not been filed within thirty days after a motion for 
mistrial was deemed denied, and no extension of time for the motion's 
determination had been ordered by the district court or stipulated to by the 
parties.  A similar result obtained 
in Johnson v. Hauffe, 567 P.2d 735, 736 (Wyo. 1977), 
where we further held that "entry of a written order denying Rule 59 motions 
after they have been deemed denied does not extend the time for 
appeal[.]"

 

[¶10]   In 1978, W.R.C.P. 59(f) was amended 
to read as follows:

 

Motions 
for new trial and motions to alter or amend a judgment shall be determined 
within 60 days after the entry of the judgment, and if not so determined shall 
be deemed denied, unless within such 60 days the determination is continued by 
order of the court, but a continuance shall not extend the time to a day more 
than 90 days from the date of entry of judgment.

 

This 
new version of the rule was applied in Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208 (1983).  In Blake, the district court 
clerk, during the sixty-day period, issued a notice setting the post-trial 
motions for hearing on a date outside the sixty-day period, but within the 
ninety-day period.  Id. at 
1111-12.  The hearing was held, no 
party objected to the lack of a formal order of continuance, and the district 
court, also within the ninety-day period, issued an order denying the 
motions.  Id.  In a 3-2 split, the majority of this 
Court held that the parties and the district court treated the notice of setting 
as if it were an order of extension under W.R.C.P. 59(f), and thus, the appeal 
was timely.  Blake, 651 P.2d  
at 1113.  In separate dissents, Justice Thomas and 
Chief Justice Rose decried the use of a "legal fiction" to salvage an untimely 
appeal.  Id. at 1121-22, 
1122-29.  We relied upon and 
expanded the holding of Blake in Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 955-56 (Wyo. 1990), rev'd on other grounds by Beaulieu v. 
Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004), 
where we held that a telephone call from the district judge's secretary vacating 
a motion hearing setting, later sanctified by an order nunc pro tunc, was 
sufficient to act as an order of the court under W.R.C.P. 59(f), where the 
district court and the parties treated it as such.

 

[¶11]   Long ago, we identified the purpose 
behind the "deemed denied" concept:

 

            
Statutes of this kind in substance have been enacted in a number of 
States of the Union, and, without undertaking to be exhaustive, we may mention 
the commonwealths of Montana, California, Oregon, Wisconsin, Arizona, Alabama 
and Colorado.  The enactment of such 
laws is evidently with the idea of expediting court business and preventing 
trial judges from keeping motions for new trial under advisement for an 
unreasonable length of time.  
Statutes of this character have generally been held to be 
mandatory.

 

Board 
of Com'rs of Natrona County v. Casper Nat. Bank, 55 
Wyo. 144, 96 P.2d 564, 566 (1939).1  Undoubtedly, it is the desire to achieve 
this purpose that has caused periodic amendment of the rule.  Initially, the period for determination 
of a motion for new trial could be continued by court order or stipulation of 
the parties, and there was no apparent limit to that continuance.  The 1978 amendment added motions to 
alter or amend a judgment, thereby extending application of the "deemed denied" 
concept, deleted the provision for continuance by stipulation, and limited any 
continuance to ninety days after entry of the judgment.  The present version of the rule, now 
found at W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), in combination with W.R.A.P. 2.02, both of which are 
set forth in full hereinabove, covers motions for judgment, motions to amend or 
make additional findings of fact, motions to alter or amend a judgment, and 
motions for new trial, once again broadening the application of the "deemed 
denied" principle.  Further, the 
present rule sets the "deemed denied" date at ninety days after filing of the 
motion and contains no provision for continuance, which indicates 
a firm commitment to the rule's purpose of preventing delay in the determination 
of post-trial motions.

 

[¶12]   This is the context in which we 
must evaluate the legal effect of the post-trial events in the present 
case.  Paxton contends that its 
motions were never deemed denied because, as in Brasel & Sims Const. Co., 
Blake, and Martinez, the parties and the district court treated the 
order setting the hearing as a continuance.  Second, Paxton contends that, by not 
objecting to the setting date, the Brannamans waived their "deemed denied" 
argument.  And third, Paxton 
contends that the order of setting satisfies W.R.A.P. 2.02's provision that the 
time for appeal commences to run when a motion is deemed denied only if "no 
order is entered . . .."

 

[¶13]   We find these contentions 
unpersuasive.  To begin with, the 
present version of the "deemed denied" rule does not allow for continuances, 
making Brasel & Sims Const. Co., Blake, and Martinez 
irrelevant in that respect.  
Furthermore, while the right to object to a continuance under the former 
rules could be waived without affecting subject matter jurisdiction, the same is 
not true under the present rule, where there is no continuance provision.  In other words, under the former 
versions of the rule, the time for filing an appeal could be tolled by 
stipulation of the parties or by court order.  If such a continuance occurred because 
the movant's opponent did not object, the appeal remained timely, and subject 
matter jurisdiction was not offended.  
That process no longer exists.

 

[¶14]   Paxton's final argumentthat the 
order of setting was an order that was entered within the meaning of the last 
sentence of W.R.A.P. 2.02(b)simply defies the sense and purpose of the 
rule.  The previous sentence of 
W.R.A.P. 2.02(b) specifies orders granting or denying the subject motions.  Clearly, it is these orders to which the 
second sentence refers.  
Otherwiseif any order would sufficethe rule's purpose would be 
thwarted; the motion might never be heard or decided, yet neither the "deemed 
denied" period nor the time for appeal would ever begin.  Such an interpretation would also fly 
directly in the face of the specific wording of the "deemed denied" provision; 
that is, a motion is deemed denied if is not determined within the 
specified time.  Something is 
"determined" within the meaning of the law when a final decision has been made 
by the court.  Black's Law 
Dictionary 480 (8th ed. 2004).  The word "determine" means "to decide, 
to adjudicate, to come to a decision, to decide upon an investigation, to 
perform a judicial act."  Swift 
v. Smith, 119 Colo. 126, 201 P.2d 609, 614 (1948).2

 

[¶15]   As we stated earlier herein, the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.  W.R.A.P. 1.03.  We have steadfastedly held to that 
principle, and to the concomitant principle that dismissal must befall an 
untimely appeal.  TPJ v. State, 
2003 WY 49, ¶ 13, 66 P.3d 710, 713 (Wyo. 2003); 
Cosco v. Uphoff, 2003 WY 30, ¶ 4, 66 P.3d 702, 703 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 121 (2003); 
Harding v. Glatter, 2002 WY 124, ¶ 10, 53 P.3d 538, 540 (Wyo. 
2002); 
Tusshani v. Allsop, 1 P.3d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 2000); 
Miller v. Murdock, 788 P.2d 614, 616 (Wyo. 1990); 
Wiens v. American Motors Corp., 717 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 1986); 
State v. Berger, 600 P.2d 708, 709 (Wyo. 1979); 
Johnson, 567 P.2d  at 736; 
McMullen, 559 P.2d  at 38; 
Jackson v. State, 547 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Wyo. 1976).

 

[¶16]   Court rules have the force and 
effect of law and are construed in the same manner as statutes.  Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 
999 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Lapp v. City of Worland, 612 P.2d 868, 874-75 
(Wyo. 1980)).  Compliance with court rules is 
mandatory.  Matter of Estate of 
Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 275 (Wyo. 1988); 
Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Hickey 
v. Burnett, 707 P.2d 741, 745 (Wyo. 1985)).  In particular,

 

"[T]he 
error of the trial judge in entertaining the motions could not be validated by 
the acquiescence of the [other party].  
It is elementary that the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the 
court.

 

            
We have said that untimely motions * * * for new trial are of no legal 
significance whatsoever because the limiting language of Rule 6(b) is mandatory 
and jurisdictional and [can]not be extended regardless of excuse.'  . . .  In my view we should abide by these 
rules or amend them, rather than emasculate them.

 

            
Rules of procedure are a necessary part of an orderly system of 
justice.  Their efficacy, however, 
depends upon the willingness of courts to enforce them according to their 
terms."

 

Miller, 
788 
P.2d at 616-17 (quoting Thompson v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 389, 84 S. Ct. 397, 400, 11 L. Ed. 2d 404, 408 (1964) (Clark, J. 
dissenting)).

 

[¶17]   In other states with similar rules, 
courts are not hesitant to dismiss appeals rendered untimely by a "deemed 
denied" provision.  See, for 
example, Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Williams, 850 So. 2d 363, 364 
(Ala.Civ.App. 2002); 
Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802, 
805 (1995); 
Barker Phillips, Inc. v. Caviness, 603 S.W.2d 715, 715 (Mo.App. 
1980); 
Beneficial Finance Corp. v. Morris, 120 N.M. 228, 900 P.2d 977, 978 
(1995); 
and Minor v. Leisure Lodge, Inc., 154 Or.App. 301, 961 P.2d 915, 916-17 
(1998).  While such may seem harsh, it must be 
remembered that litigants may protect themselves against dismissal for late 
filing by filing "prematurely," a practice authorized by W.R.A.P. 2.04.  Furthermore, "[t]he first and 
fundamental question on every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this question 
cannot be waived; it is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever 
it is raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of its own 
motion.'"  Wyoming Community 
College Com'n v. Casper Community College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 12, 31 P.3d 1242, 1247-48 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Hirschfield v. Board of 
County Com'rs of County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Wyo. 
1997)).  The timeliness of an appeal being 
jurisdictional, we cannot simply enforce or ignore the rule as we 
choose.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The whole point of a "deemed 
denied" provision is that the judgment automatically becomes final 
and appealable upon passage of the specified period.  Sun Land & Cattle Co. v. Brown, 
387 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Wyo. 1964).  Therefore, an appeal that is not filed 
within thirty days after the post-trial motions are deemed denied is 
untimely.  In the present case, the 
motions were deemed denied before the district court heard and purported to 
determine them.  The judgment had 
become final and appealable at the time the motions were deemed denied and the 
district court no longer had jurisdiction to determine the motions.  Indeed, the district court's order 
denying the motions was entered one day after the thirty days allowed for appeal 
under W.R.A.P. 2.01.3

 

[¶19]   This appeal is untimely and is, 
therefore, dismissed, as is the Brannamans' conditional 
appeal.

  

HILL, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 

            
[¶20]   The application 
of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) in these circumstances is, without a doubt, harsh and 
predecessors of that rule have had similarly harsh impacts on litigants in the 
past.  There are precedents from 
which we might have tailored a less unforgiving imperative than that set out in 
the majority opinion.  See, e.g., 
Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1115 (Wyo. 1982).  However, it does appear that that was 
the clear intent of the authors of the most recent version of the "deemed 
denied" rule, and practitioners could discern that.  As written, the rule makes no mention of 
a continuance, whether in written form or as it might be gleaned from tacit 
material.

 

            
[¶21]   I concur with the 
result reached by the majority opinion because adoption of a "tacit" exception 
to the deemed denied rule would result in the same old uncertainty that used to 
exist.  I take some solace from the 
harshness of this result in my conviction that, having carefully reviewed the 
merits of all issues raised by Paxton, this Justice would have held for 
Brannaman in this appeal in any event.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Wyoming's "deemed denied" rule was 
originally enacted as a statute:

 

            
Motions for new trial shall be determined within sixty days after the 
rendition of judgment, and if not so determined shall be deemed denied, unless 
continued by order of the court, or by stipulation.

 

Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 112 at 158 (1935).

 

  2In Oregon, where a court rule 
requires similar post-trial motions to be "heard and determined by the court 
within 55 days from the time of the entry of the judgment,'" a motion is not 
determined until actual entry in the trial court register of a written order 
disposing of the motion.  Ryerse 
v. Haddock, 185 Or.App. 679, 60 P.3d 1107, 1109-10 (2003) (quoting 
ORCP 64 F); 
Matter of Marriage of Conley, 97 Or.App. 134, 776 P.2d 860, 861 
(1989).  The court in Matter of Marriage of 
Conley explained that, if a motion was determined by a mere verbal decision 
from the bench, the "deemed denied" provision would never come into effect, even 
if there was a failure to enter the final decisional order, thereby defeating 
the purpose of the rule.  Matter 
of Marriage of Conley, 776 P.2d  at 861.

 

  3The post-trial motions were filed on 
February 25, 2003, and were deemed denied on May 27, 2003.  The thirty-day appeal period ended on 
June 26, 2003, and the denial order was entered on June 27, 
2003.