Title: Davis v. Wilson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Davis v. Wilson, 100 Ohio St.3d 269, 2003-Ohio-5898.] 
 
 
DAVIS, APPELLANT, v. WILSON, WARDEN, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Davis v. Wilson, 100 Ohio St.3d 269, 2003-Ohio-5898.] 
Habeas corpus sought to compel the vacation of relator’s conviction of 
felonious assault with firearm and prior-conviction specifications and 
the dismissal of his indictment with prejudice — Court of appeals’ 
dismissal of petition affirmed. 
(No. 2003-1127 — Submitted October 20, 2003 — Decided November 19, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 2003-T-0049, 2003-
Ohio-2840. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In December 1993, the Youngstown Police Department issued a 
warrant for the arrest of appellant, Edward A. Davis, on a felony assault charge.  
In the same month, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) issued a separate 
warrant for Davis’s arrest for a parole violation.  In June 1996, Davis was arrested 
in Las Vegas, Nevada, on the APA warrant and was informed of the Youngstown 
warrant.  Davis waived extradition and was returned to Ohio. 
{¶2} 
In 1996, the Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted Davis on a 
charge of felonious assault with specifications.  In April 1998, after numerous 
continuances requested by Davis, the common pleas court convicted Davis of 
felonious assault with firearm and prior-conviction specifications and sentenced 
him to an aggregate prison term of 15 to 18 years. 
{¶3} 
In March 2003, Davis filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for 
Trumbull County for a writ of habeas corpus, naming as respondents appellee, 
Trumbull Correctional Institution Warden Julius C. Wilson, and Mahoning 
County Prosecuting Attorney Paul Gains.  Davis sought an order vacating his 
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conviction and dismissing his indictment with prejudice.  He claimed that his 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction because he was not brought to trial within the 
120-day period specified in Article IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
(“IAD”), as enacted in Ohio in R.C. 2963.30.  See, also, Article V(c) of the IAD.  
Davis further contended that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel by not raising the IAD issue. 
{¶4} 
The respondents moved to dismiss the petition, and in May 2003, 
the court of appeals granted their motions and dismissed Davis’s petition. 
{¶5} 
In his appeal as of right, Davis asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing his petition.  Davis claims that he is entitled to the writ 
because the state failed to try him under the speedy-trial requirement of the IAD.  
He also claims that Gains was not entitled to dismissal because Gains did not 
properly serve his motion on him.  For the reasons that follow, Davis’s claims 
lack merit. 
{¶6} 
First, the IAD is inapplicable to Davis, who was not serving a term 
of imprisonment in Nevada when a detainer was lodged against him.  The IAD is 
a compact among 48 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government, 
which “enables a participating State to gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in 
another jurisdiction, in order to try him on criminal charges.”  Reed v. Farley 
(1994), 512 U.S. 339, 341, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 129 L.Ed.2d 277. 
{¶7} 
As the court of appeals correctly concluded, Davis’s IAD claim is 
meritless.  “ ‘[T]he Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply to a person 
who is imprisoned awaiting disposition of pending charges and who has not been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.’ ”  United States v. Muhammad (C.A.6, 
1991), 948 F.2d 1449, 1453, quoting United States v. Roberts (C.A.6, 1977), 548 
F.2d 665, 671; Article IV(a) of the IAD (“The appropriate officer of the 
jurisdiction  in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending 
shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and 
January Term, 2003 
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who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party State made available * * *”  
[emphasis added]).  See, generally, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (1980), 98 A.L.R. 3d 160, 185-
187, Section 5[d].  Davis was not serving a term of imprisonment in Nevada for 
any conviction when the Ohio detainer was issued. 
{¶8} 
Second, the continuances granted upon Davis’s requests tolled the 
running of the 120-day period in Article IV(c).  State v. Wells (1994), 94 Ohio 
App.3d 48, 59, 640 N.E.2d 217. 
{¶9} 
Third, Davis’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective is not 
cognizable in habeas corpus.  Brown v. Leonard (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 593, 716 
N.E.2d 183. 
{¶10} Fourth, as to Davis’s appeal against Gains, Davis’s notice of 
appeal did not refer to Gains in any way, and its proof of service did not claim 
service on Gains.  In any event, despite Davis’s assertions to the contrary, the 
record establishes that appellee Gains properly served his motion to dismiss on 
him. 
{¶11} Finally, the court of appeals correctly held that Gains was not a 
proper respondent for the habeas corpus petition.  See, e.g., Tate v. Bernard (Nov. 
21, 2001), Trumbull App. No. 2001-T-0087, 2001 WL 1497206 (“the writ will lie 
only against the individual who is directly responsible for keeping the petitioner 
in custody”); Jackson v. State (Apr. 19, 2002), Cuyahoga App. No. 81007, 2002 
WL 737495 (dismissal of petition for writ of habeas corpus appropriate when 
petitioner named the state rather than the sheriff—his custodian—as the 
respondent); cf. State ex rel. Bruggeman v. Auglaize Cty. Court of Common Pleas 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 257, 258, 719 N.E.2d 543 (affirmed dismissal of habeas 
corpus petition in child-custody dispute because, among other reasons, petitioner 
did not name his former wife, who had custody of the child, as a respondent in his 
petition). 
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{¶12} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Edward A. Davis, pro se. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Thelma Thomas Price, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
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