Title: Henry v. Borushko

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES HENRY and BARBARA HENRY, Husband and Wife v. GEORGE BORUSHKO and LUCILLE BORUSHKO, Husband and Wife2012 WY 104Case Number: S-12-0028Decided: 07/31/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
JAMES HENRY and 
BARBARA HENRY, Husband and Wife,
 
Appellants
(Plaintiffs),
 
v.
 
GEORGE BORUSHKO and 
LUCILLE BORUSHKO, Husband and Wife,
 
Appellees
(Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County
The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Pro 
se.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
William L. Miller, 
Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellants, James and 
Barbara Henry, and Appellees, George and Lucille Borushko, own adjoining 
properties in Fremont County, Wyoming.  
An irrigation canal separates the properties.  In 2009, a dispute developed over the 
boundary between their properties.  
The Borushkos asserted that the boundary was the centerline of the 
irrigation canal.  The Henrys 
claimed that it was at the fence along the north bank of the canal.  Litigation 
ensued.  The district court ruled in 
favor of the Borushkos.  The Henrys 
appealed.  We will 
affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
The issue is whether 
the deed to the Borushkos’ property should be interpreted to establish the 
property boundary at the centerline of the canal or along the fence on the north 
bank of the canal.  A secondary 
issue, raised by the Borushkos, is whether there was reasonable cause for this 
appeal.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
The facts related 
here are necessarily brief.  The 
bench trial held by the district court was not reported, so none of the 
witnesses’ testimony or the parties’ arguments is available to us on 
appeal.  Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, 
the district court provided an order settling a statement of the evidence.  It lists the witnesses who testified, 
but reveals nothing about their testimony.  
It lists the trial exhibits accepted into evidence.  From these documents, particularly the 
deeds conveying the property, we glean this information.  
 
[¶4]        
In 
1977, the Henrys conveyed to the Mortensens:
 
All lands lying North 
of Midvale Irrigation District Pavillion Main Lateral which lie within and are 
portions of the S½NW¼, Section 14, Township 3 North, Range 2 East, Wind River 
Meridian, Fremont County, Wyoming; all lands lying North of the Midvale 
Irrigation District Pavillion Main Lateral which lie within and are portions of 
the SE¼NE¼, Section 15, Township 3 North, Range 2 East, Wind River Meridian, 
Fremont county [sic], Wyoming; all containing 40.1 acres more or 
less.
 
The Henrys retained 
the property south of and adjacent to the conveyed property, and still own 
it.  In 1995, the 
Mortensens conveyed their property to the Borushkos, using a functionally 
identical description of the property. 
 
[¶5]        
In 2009, a dispute 
developed between the Henrys and the Borushkos about the precise location of the 
property line, the Borushkos claiming it is at the centerline of the canal and 
the Henrys claiming it is along the north bank of the canal.  Following a bench trial, the district 
court ruled in favor of the Borushkos.  
The Henrys ask us to review that decision.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶6]        
We apply a 
well-established standard 
of review to a district 
court’s judgment after a bench 
trial: 

 
The factual findings 
of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict.  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Due regard is given 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  We review a district court’s conclusions 
of law de novo on appeal.
 
Springer 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 
944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1997) (internal citations omitted).  In this case, however, our review of the 
district court’s findings of fact is curtailed by the meager record.  The appellants bear the burden of 
providing an adequate record for us to review, and when they do not, we must 
accept the district court’s findings of fact as being based on sufficient 
evidence.  Painovich v. Painovich, 2009 WY 116, 
¶ 9, 216 P.3d 501, 504 (Wyo. 2009).1  As a practical matter, this makes it 
nearly impossible for us to conclude that the district court’s findings are 
clearly erroneous.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]        
The district court 
sought to interpret the deed language “All 
lands lying North of Midvale Irrigation District Pavillion Main Lateral” in 
order to determine the proper boundary between the 
properties.  It found that the canal 
is a “substantial manmade monument” that has “existed for many years in its 
current size and location.”  On that 
basis, the district court found that the canal “shares some attributes of a 
non-navigable stream,” and “some of the attributes of a street or highway.”  These factual determinations are not 
clearly erroneous, and indeed are not in dispute.  
 
[¶8]        
Because the canal 
shared pertinent attributes with non-navigable streams and streets, the district 
court relied on this legal guidance for use in interpreting 
deeds:
 
In the case of 
non-navigable watercourses and roads and streets as boundary calls in legal 
descriptions, the general rule is there is a rebuttable presumption that where a 
non-navigable stream or a street or road is the boundary between two parcels, 
the actual boundary is along the thread of the stream or the middle of the 
street.  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal and Power 
Co., 150 P.3d 653, 665 (Wyo. 2007).  
12 Am Jur Boundaries, § 17, § 29.  The same rules of construction hold true 
with common walls.  Coumas v. Transcontinental Garage, 230 P.2d 748, 753 (Wyo. 1951).
 
Applying this 
presumption, the district court concluded that the deed should be interpreted as 
establishing the property boundary at the centerline of the canal.  It further determined that the evidence 
presented by the Henrys “fails to rebut the presumption” that the boundary was 
at the center of the canal.
 
[¶9]        
The Henrys’ first 
argument is that the deed does not explicitly state that the boundary is at the 
“center” of the canal.  That is 
true, but it is also true that the deed does not explicitly state that the 
boundary is on the “north bank” of the canal or “along the fence north of the 
canal.”  Because no particular part 
of the canal is expressly designated as the boundary, the district court was 
correct in employing the presumption that the center of the canal was 
intended.  As we explained in Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 554-55 
(Wyo. 1992):
 
Where a deed 
describes land bounded by a non-navigable stream and names the stream as a 
monument, a presumption exists that the grant extends to the center and the 
thread of the stream is the true boundary.  
The grant will give title so far as the grantor owns, unless the bed of 
the stream is expressly reserved from the grant.  This rule is based on a presumption of 
the grantor’s intent.  

 
The presumption is 
rebuttable by any words which clearly indicate an intention of the grantor to 
restrict the grant to the edge, shore, or some point other than the thread of 
the stream.  Where the description is specific in its 
language, naming the bank of the stream as the boundary of the land conveyed, 
the grantee’s rights will not extend beyond such specified 
boundary.
 
(Emphasis added; 
internal citations omitted.)  In Glover, the deed referred to the North 
Platte River, and specifically described the boundary as “the left bank of said 
river.”  Id. at 554.  That was sufficient, the Court ruled, to 
overcome the presumption and establish the boundary at the left bank of the 
river, not the center.
 
[¶10]     
In contrast, the deed 
in this case does not specify the bank of the canal, or the “edge, 
shore, or some point other than the thread” of the canal.  It does not specify the fence on the 
north bank of the canal, which is the boundary advocated by the Henrys.  It does not expressly reserve the bed of 
the canal from the grant.  
Accordingly, the district court correctly applied the presumption and 
ruled that the boundary was at the center of the canal.
 
[¶11]     
In an effort to rebut 
the presumption, the Henrys point out that the deed purports to convey “40.1 
acres more or less.”  They argue 
that the Borushkos’ property is exactly 40.1 acres if the property boundary is 
the fence on the north bank of the canal, but is 43.3 acres if the boundary is 
the center of the canal, a difference of 3.2 acres.  These facts, they contend, demonstrate 
that they intended the boundary to be along the north fence.  
 
[¶12]     
However, the facts 
asserted by the Henrys are not sufficiently supported by the record.  One of the exhibits in the record 
appears to be a rather detailed map.  
Handwritten on the map are the names “Henry” and “Borushko,” among 
others.  There are lines on the map 
marked “Pavillion Main Lateral.”  Printed on the map is an abundance 
of very small numbers, some inside circles and 
some not.  If we assume that this is 
an accurate map depicting the properties and the canal, and if we assume that 
the uncircled numbers represent acreage, and if we assume that these numbers are 
correct, then this document would support the Henrys’ factual assertions.2  
 
[¶13]     
The record does not 
allow us to make all of those assumptions.  
We do not know which witness or witnesses discussed this document, or 
what they may have said about it.  
There is no evidence indicating whether this document is an accurate map 
or only a demonstrative exhibit illustrating the Henrys’ theory of the 
case.  There is no testimony that 
the uncircled numbers represent acreage or that they are correct.  The facts asserted by the Henrys are 
plausible, but we cannot just assume that they are true.  The record is insufficient to 
demonstrate that the district court’s findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous.
 
[¶14]     
But even if we assume 
that the Henrys are correct about the facts, the result does not change.  The Henrys rely on the recitation in the 
deed that the acreage is “40.1 acres more or less.”  They assert that the Borushkos’ property 
is 40.1 acres if the boundary is on the north bank of the canal, but 43.3 acres 
if the boundary is at the center of the canal.  In deed interpretation, however, a 
recitation of acreage or other area is treated by courts as it probably was 
meant by the parties to the deed:  
“merely an estimation 
on their 
part of the amount of acreage” conveyed by the deed.  Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74, 78 (Wyo. 
1983).  This is particularly true 
where the recitation of acreage is modified by the phrase “more or less,” 
because 
 
the “more or less” 
language indicates that the amount of land . . . was not of the essence of the 
contract.  Overly v. Treasurer and Receiver 
General, 344 Mass. 188, 181 N.E.2d 660 (1962); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 9, and 
cases contained therein.  As is 
stated in 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 100, p. 285:  
 
“* * * * The use of 
the words 'more or less’ excludes the assumption of an exact number of acres and 
makes it clear that the precise dimensions of the property are not of the 
essence of the contract * * * *.”
 
Id.  Because the recitation of acreage in a 
deed is merely an estimation, it is generally of little use in interpreting the 
deed.  See, e.g., Erickson v. Wick, 22 Wash. App. 433, 
438, 591 P.2d 804, 807 (1979) (“[T]he designated quantity of land called for is 
the least reliable of all descriptive particulars and the last to be resorted 
to.”).
 
[¶15]     
In Rouse, 658 P.2d  at 76, we interpreted an 
easement for a reservoir which recited that the high water mark of the reservoir 
would be “seventeen (17) feet above the creek bottom at the dam site,” and also 
that the area was “estimated at approximately 10 acres, more or less.”  When the reservoir was filled to 
seventeen feet above the creek bottom, the reservoir actually covered 15.2 
acres.  Id. at 77.  The underlying landowner sued to enjoin 
the reservoir owner from inundating any more than ten acres.  We concluded, however, that “the more 
precise description in the contract was the reference to the high-water line of 
the reservoir.”  The more precise 
reference controlled over the less precise “10 acres, more or less.”  Id. at 78.  We therefore ruled that the easement 
allowed the holder “to inundate as much of [the] land as is necessary to fill 
the reservoir to a level of 17 feet above the creek bottom at the dam 
site.”  Id. at 79.
 
[¶16]     
Applying these 
concepts to the case before us now, the recitation of “40.1 acres more or less” 
must be considered merely an estimation of the amount of property being 
conveyed.  The amount of property 
actually conveyed was controlled by the more precise reference to the 
canal.  The presumption that the 
reference to the canal meant the centerline of the canal is not rebutted by the 
inconsistent recitation of acreage.  
Compare Faulks v. Schrider, 99 F.2d 370, 372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (“[A] conveyance of land bordering on a road 
or street carries the title to the center of the road or street,” and “the 
specification of the area to the lot conveyed is not of itself sufficient 
evidence of the grantors’ intention to reserve to themselves title to the beds 
of the abutting streets.”).  
Similarly, we conclude that the Henrys’ conveyance of property bordering 
on the canal must be presumed to carry title to the center of the canal, and the 
specification of the acreage of the property is not sufficient evidence to 
defeat that presumption.3  We find no error in the district court’s 
decision.
 
[¶17]     
Having decided to 
affirm the district court’s ruling, we turn to the Borushkos’ contention that 
they should be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees because there was no 
reasonable cause for this appeal.  
The Court has the authority to award such fees under W.R.A.P. 10.05, but 
we will not do so in this case.  The 
Henrys’ contention that the recitation of acreage in the deed is significant is 
not without merit.  We considered 
carefully before determining that the recitation was insufficient to rebut the 
presumption that the reference to the canal meant the center of the canal.  We cannot say that the Henrys’ appeal 
was unreasonable, and we decline to award attorneys’ fees.
 
[¶18]     
Affirmed.
[¶19]     
FOOTNOTES
1The 
Henrys appeared pro se before the 
district court, as they do before us on appeal.  Pro se litigants may be afforded some 
leniency, but “[r]easonable compliance with applicable procedural rules and 
requirements is mandatory.”  Kinstler v. RTB South Greeley, LTD., 
LLC, 2007 WY 98, ¶ 12, 160 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Wyo. 2007).
2For example, the 
uncircled numbers apparently associated with the easement for the canal are 2.4, 
2.0, and 2.0.  If we add these and 
divide by two, the result is 3.2.  
This calculation would seem to support the Henrys’ assertion that placing 
the property boundary at the center of the canal results in the addition of 3.2 
acres to the Borushkos’ property.  
Similarly, there is a way to add up all of the small acreage numbers 
within the Borushkos’ property to show 40.1 acres north of the north side of the 
canal, though that calculation is too lengthy to be included 
here.
3Even if the Henrys 
subjectively intended the north bank of the canal to be the property boundary, 
the language in the deed, read objectively, did not accomplish that result.  “[O]ne party’s subjective intent or 
interpretation of a contract is not controlling; we look instead to the 
objective intent of the language used.”  
Shaffer v. Winhealth Partners, 
2011 WY 131, ¶ 37, 261 P.3d 708, 717 (Wyo. 2011) (Voigt, J., 
dissenting).