Title: Platt v. Kansas State Univ.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 110,179 
 
RACHEL K. PLATT, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When a district court has granted a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must 
accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any inferences that can 
reasonably be drawn therefrom. 
 
2. 
Retaliatory discharge is an actionable tort recognized by the common law of 
Kansas. 
 
3. 
The elements of a prima facie claim for the tort of retaliatory discharge in the 
workers compensation context are:  (1) The plaintiff filed a claim for workers 
compensation benefits or sustained an injury for which he or she might assert a future 
claim for such benefits; (2) the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff's workers 
compensation claim injury; (3) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment; and 
(4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity or injury and the 
termination. 
2 
 
 
 
 
4. 
The nature of a claim is determined from the pleadings and from the real nature 
and substance of the facts alleged therein. 
 
5. 
The Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. (KJRA), does not apply to 
the civil tort of retaliatory discharge against an administrative agency. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished modified opinion filed 
November 3, 2014. Appeal from Riley District Court; DAVID L. STUTZMAN, judge. Opinion filed 
September 16, 2016. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court and remanding with 
directions is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed. 
 
Mark Beam-Ward, of Beam-Ward, Kruse, Wilson & Fletes, LLC, of Overland Park, argued the 
cause, and Richard S. Fisk, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant. 
 
Maureen A. Redeker, assistant general counsel and special assistant attorney general, of Kansas 
State University, of Manhattan, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
NUSS, C.J.:  Rachel Platt, whose probationary employment was terminated by 
Kansas State University (University), sued the institution for retaliatory discharge. She 
alleged the University fired her as a result of her potential workers compensation claims 
for work related injuries. 
 
The district court dismissed Platt's lawsuit essentially for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. It held that Platt 
3 
 
 
 
was required under the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. (KJRA), to 
first present her retaliatory discharge claim to the University for determination. A panel 
of the Court of Appeals reversed that dismissal and remanded the case to the district court 
for further proceedings. We affirm the panel and hold Platt's tort claim is not governed by 
the KJRA. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
At the outset, we acknowledge that when a district court has granted a motion to 
dismiss, "an appellate court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along 
with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom." Cohen v. Battaglia, 296 
Kan. 542, 546, 293 P.3d 752 (2013). Accordingly, the following facts are those asserted 
by Platt in her district court petition. 
 
Platt was hired by the University as an accounting specialist in September 2011, 
and placed on an initial 6-month probationary period customary for new hires. Platt soon 
began to experience health problems that she associated with poor air quality in her 
workspace on campus in Rathbone Hall. After complaining to her supervisor, she learned 
that her predecessor also had experienced similar health issues and also complained about 
the environment of the office. 
 
Problems were indeed later determined to exist with the ventilation system in 
Platt's office. She requested that the University fix the problem, and it arranged a meeting 
between Platt and an industrial hygienist to further evaluate the issue. Platt's employment 
was terminated the same day as that meeting. The University claimed the termination was 
for excessive absences—which Platt alleged were mainly a result of her work-caused 
health issues. Her firing on March 7, 2012, came 2 weeks before the end of her 
probationary period. 
4 
 
 
 
 
Platt sued the University and argued her employment termination was wrongful 
and in retaliation for her potential claims under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act 
(KWCA). K.S.A. 44-501 et seq. She asserted she performed her job satisfactorily and that 
her firing was causally related to the University's discovery that she had an occupational 
disease connected with the air quality of her office. She sought damages exceeding 
$75,000 for loss of income, emotional distress, and costs. 
 
 
The University filed a motion to dismiss. It argued the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over Platt's suit because her claims were governed by the 
KJRA, which required her to exhaust all administrative remedies made available by the 
University before judicial review could begin. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 77-612. 
 
The court granted the University's motion to dismiss. It held the "administrative 
process could have accommodated [her] claim and granted to her the fundamental relief 
sought, reinstated employment." 
 
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the district court. In Part A of its 
opinion, the panel held that, contrary to the University's assertion, Platt was "not seeking 
a review by the court of the process by which the University—as an agency—performs, 
or fails to perform, its statutory duties, function, or activities." Platt v. Kansas State 
University, No. 110,179, 2014 WL 6090403, at *4 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion). Instead, the panel continued, "[she] seeks redress from the [district] court for a 
tortious act committed by the University unrelated to the agency's administrative function 
. . . ." 2014 WL 6090403, at *4. 
 
Consequently, the panel determined that the district court incorrectly defined 
Platt's action as one of wrongful discharge seeking reinstatement of her employment. 
5 
 
 
 
According to the panel, Platt actually claimed that the University committed the tort of 
retaliatory discharge and she sought monetary damages that the University was incapable 
of awarding. So the panel held that Platt's claims were not governed by the KJRA and 
jurisdiction was proper in the district court. 
 
In Part B of the panel's decision, it evaluated the case in the alternative, i.e., as if 
the KJRA had applied to Platt's claims. Platt, 2014 WL 6090403, at *5-8. It responded to 
the University's apparent argument that Platt should have sought relief for her termination 
from the University's Support Staff Peer Review Committee, which provides terminated 
employees an opportunity to seek redress before an impartial University committee. After 
considering the terms of Platt's employment during her probationary period and 
interpreting relevant statutes governing employment in state agencies, the panel held that 
the University's procedure was unavailable to Platt as a probationary employee. As a 
result, the panel held she was not required to show exhaustion of those remedies in order 
to pursue her tort claims in the district court. 2014 WL 6090403, at *8. 
 
After the panel reversed the district court's dismissal, it remanded the case to that 
court for further proceedings. 
 
We granted the University review of the panel's decision under K.S.A. 20-3018. 
Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 60-2101(b). 
 
More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis. 
 
6 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Issue:  Platt's tort claim of retaliatory discharge is not governed by the KJRA. 
 
 
The University argues that the panel erred by holding the University's decision in 
terminating Platt's employment was not an "agency action" as defined in K.S.A. 77-
602(b)(3) and therefore not governed by the procedural requirements of the KJRA. It 
contends Platt's claim is equivalent to wrongful termination complaints that are normally 
handled through internal agency administrative procedures. As a result, the University 
urges us to reverse the panel and uphold the district court's determination that Platt had an 
appropriate remedy through the KJRA and should have sought reinstatement of her 
employment there before bringing an action in court. 
 
 
Platt responds that her claims sound in tort and therefore are not governed by the 
KJRA. She asks us to reject the University's assertion that all employment decisions by 
administrative agencies are "agency actions" governed by the KJRA. Consequently, she 
requests we uphold the panel's determination that her complaint amounted to a suit for 
retaliatory discharge—which the University was incapable of adjudicating—and affirm 
its reversal and remand to the district court. 
 
Standard of review 
 
This is an appeal from a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss. We review 
such a legal decision under a de novo standard. Cohen, 296 Kan. at 545; Hale v. Brown, 
287 Kan. 320, 322, 197 P.3d 438 (2008). "Additionally, when a district court has granted 
a motion to dismiss . . . an appellate court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as 
true, along with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom." 296 Kan. at 
546. If those facts and inferences state a claim based on plaintiff's theory or any other 
7 
 
 
 
possible theory, the dismissal by the district court must be reversed. 296 Kan. at 546. To 
the extent that resolution of this issue requires this court to interpret the KJRA, review is 
unlimited. See Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916, 918, 349 P.3d 469 (2015). 
 
Discussion 
 
At the heart of our analysis is our conclusion that the district court misinterpreted 
the nature of Platt's claims and the relief she sought. The order of dismissal clearly 
showed the court considered Platt's claim to be one of wrongful termination which simply 
could be remedied through the University's reinstatement of her employment: 
 
"Plaintiff's foundational premises are:  (a) Defendant employed her; (b) 
Defendant terminated her employment; and, (c) Defendant should not have terminated 
her employment. For that sequence, the remedial course must focus on the administrative 
procedure, since the entity that terminated the employment had an administrative 
procedure for Plaintiff to make the case for reversing the termination decision. . . . [T]he 
remedy, restoration of employment, was well within Defendant's authority and 
experience." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Turning first to the remedy Platt seeks, her petition shows she did not seek 
"restoration of employment." Rather, she requested costs and monetary damages for loss 
of income and emotional distress "and such other and further relief as the Court may 
deem just, fair and equitable." Moreover, the court's dismissal cut off any opportunity for 
Platt to later ask the court for permission to amend her petition to add a claim for punitive 
damages—a procedural delay required by Kansas law. See K.S.A. 60-3703 ("No tort 
claim or reference to a tort claim for punitive damages shall be included in a petition . . . 
unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for 
punitive damages" after "plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim."). 
8 
 
 
 
 
Turning next to the nature of Platt's claims, she asserts the University's actions 
constituted retaliatory discharge—an actionable tort recognized in the common law of 
this state that is discrete from a general discharge of employment. See Campbell v. Husky 
Hogs, 292 Kan. 225, 227-28, 255 P.3d 1 (2011) (collecting cases); Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 
255 Kan. 513, 516-17, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994) (employer prohibited from firing employee 
because of absence caused by work-related injury and potential workers compensation 
claim). The elements of a prima facie claim for the tort of retaliatory discharge in the 
workers compensation context are: 
 
"(1) The plaintiff filed a claim for workers compensation benefits or sustained an 
injury for which he or she might assert a future claim for such benefits; (2) the employer 
had knowledge of the plaintiff's workers compensation claim injury; (3) the employer 
terminated the plaintiff's employment; and (4) a causal connection existed between the 
protected activity or injury and the termination." Campbell, 292 Kan. at 235 (citing 
Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 554, 35 P.3d 
892 [2001]). 
 
We recognize that Platt did not explicitly label her claims as retaliatory discharge. 
But her previously mentioned petition assertions lead to the conclusion that this tort 
formed the basic nature of her action against the University. See Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 
Kan. 199, 209, 929 P.2d 754 (1996) ("'The nature of a claim . . . is determined from the 
pleadings . . . and from the real nature and substance of the facts therein alleged.'"). 
 
As for whether Platt's petition has actually met the specific elements of a prima 
facie claim for retaliatory discharge, we observe she alleged that the University knew she 
was suffering from ill health as a result of the working conditions it provided. She further 
alleged that because of this ill health, and in anticipation of her possible workers 
compensation claim, the University ended her employment. We are required to assume 
9 
 
 
 
her petition allegations are true. Cohen, 296 Kan. at 546. And we conclude from these 
allegations Pratt has established a prima facie claim for this tort against the University. 
See Campbell, 292 Kan. at 235. 
 
Now that we have identified the correct nature of Platt's particular claims and 
determined she has met her prima facie obligation, our next step is to determine whether 
those claims fall within the purview of the KJRA. This determination is important 
because the KJRA "establishes the exclusive means of judicial review of agency action." 
K.S.A. 77-606. And "agency action" is defined as "(1) the whole or a part of a rule and 
regulation or an order; (2) the failure to issue a rule and regulation or an order; or (3) an 
agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any other duty, function or activity, 
discretionary or otherwise." K.S.A. 77-602(b). 
 
The University essentially argues that this language of subsection (b)(3) should be 
read to cover all agency action, even if not connected to the central purpose for which the 
agency was established—and even if the action rises to the level of tortious conduct. The 
University further argues that Kansas caselaw supports its interpretation. 
 
We disagree with the University's expansive reading of the KJRA as well as its 
interpretation of Kansas caselaw. As part of our explanation, we now analyze those 
appellate court decisions it cites. 
 
In Lindenman v. Umscheid, 255 Kan. 610, 875 P.2d 964 (1994), the plaintiffs sued 
the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) and other agencies for civil 
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and the torts of malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process. Their claims arose out of the suspension of their child day care 
center licenses. The defendants moved to dismiss by arguing that the KJRA was the 
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs who had failed to comply with the Act's procedures. 
10 
 
 
 
The district court granted the motion on that jurisdictional ground as well as ruling on 
other related motions. 
 
We reversed that court's decision, holding that the KJRA does not apply to the 
civil tort actions—malicious prosecution and abuse of discretion—against an 
administrative agency: 
 
"In accordance with K.S.A. 77-603, the KRJA establishes the exclusive means of judicial 
review of agency action. K.S.A. 77-606. Agency action is defined as '(1) The whole or a 
part of a rule and regulation or an order; (2) the failure to issue a rule and regulation or an 
order; or (3) an agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any other duty, function, 
or activity, discretionary or otherwise.' K.S.A. 77-602(b). The wrongful acts alleged by 
the plaintiffs are not licensing and inspection duties of KDHE, they are claims for 
damages for wrongful acts committed by the agency. Judicial review is not defined in the 
KJRA. Black's Law Dictionary 849 (6th ed. 1990) defines judicial review as the '[p]ower 
of courts to review decisions of another department or level of government' and as a 
'[f]orm of appeal from an administrative body to the courts for review of either the 
findings of fact, or of law, or of both.' 
 
"We conclude that the KJRA applies to all proceedings for judicial review of 
agency proceedings and civil enforcement of agency actions. Here, the Lindenmans are 
not seeking a review by the courts of KDHE's findings of fact, conclusions of law, or 
decision. They filed a combined tort and civil rights claim against KDHE and other 
defendants. When K.S.A. 77-603 and the definition of judicial review are considered, it is 
clear that the district court erred in finding the KJRA was the exclusive remedy for the 
Lindenmans' tort claim against the agency. Because the KJRA does not apply to civil tort 
actions against an administrative agency, the grounds for dismissal and summary 
judgment stated by the district court must now be reviewed." (Emphasis added.) 
Lindenman, 255 Kan. at 619-20. 
 
11 
 
 
 
The University also cites Heiland v. Dunnick, 270 Kan. 663, 19 P.3d 103 (2001), 
to support its argument that employment decisions of state agencies are "agency action" 
which makes the KJRA the exclusive remedy for employees disgruntled by such 
decisions. Heiland was an auditor employed by the Kansas Savings and Loan Department 
(KSLD) who was permanently laid off due to agency staff reductions. Because of his 
status as a laid-off employee, he was entitled to preferential rehiring treatment under an 
administrative regulation in force at the time. After his layoff, the KSLD was 
incorporated into the Office of the State Bank Commissioner (SBC). 
 
Heiland accused SBC of failing to provide him the preferential treatment required 
by the reemployment regulations applicable to SBC's predecessor, KSLD. Alleging his 
claim "[fell] outside the purview of the KJRA," he proceeded to district court with a 
declaratory judgment action against the Kansas Bank Commissioner. Heiland, 270 Kan. 
at 668. There he sought the SBC's compliance with the relevant regulations, e.g., to 
accord him preferred hiring status. 
 
Heiland's action was ultimately dismissed by the district court for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction on the grounds that his claims were governed by the KJRA and he had 
failed to follow its procedures, i.e., timely filing a petition for district court review of the 
agency's rejection of his claim. Heiland, 270 Kan. at 664-67. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal. Heiland v. Dunnick, No. 81,319, unpublished opinion filed 
February 4, 2000. 
 
This court also affirmed the dismissal and held the agency action Heiland sought 
to enforce was governed by the KJRA. But on the road to this conclusion, the Heiland 
court made two related acknowledgments that are important to our analysis of the instant 
case. 
 
12 
 
 
 
First, the court confirmed that some claims can support a separate court action 
against an agency, i.e., independent of the KJRA: 
 
"'The KJRA is the exclusive remedy for all requested relief which an agency can grant 
under its authority. Only actionable claims which fall outside the authority of an agency 
to grant can support a separate action by an aggrieved party.' Douglass v. Kansas State 
University, 22 Kan. App. 2d 171, 174, 915 P.2d 782 1996). See Reifschneider [v. Kansas 
State Lottery], 266 Kan. [338,] 341[, 969 P.2d 875 (1998)] (quoting this phrase from 
Douglass in finding that the KJRA was sole means of judicial review of acts of the 
Kansas Lottery)." (Emphasis added.) Heiland, 270 Kan. at 668. 
 
Second, the Heiland court confirmed that the particular claims contained in 
Lindenman 7 years earlier—violations of civil rights, malicious prosecution, and abuse of 
process—"were allegations that the KDHE could not administratively address. We held 
that because the claims were tort claims for wrongful acts, they did not fall under the 
KJRA." (Emphasis added.) Heiland, 270 Kan. at 668 (citing Lindenman, 255 Kan. at 
619-20). 
 
With these acknowledgments in mind, the Heiland court distinguished between (1) 
the type of claim brought by Heiland and (2) those brought by the plaintiffs in Lindenman 
and also Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 255 Kan. 990, 881 P.2d 567 (1994). As the 
Heiland court noted, Wright involved an employee's wrongful termination claim based on 
the constitutionality of legislation ordering him to be terminated, "an issue which the 
Kansas Water Office, the administrative agency involved, was not empowered to 
address." Heiland, 270 Kan. at 668-69 (citing Wright, 255 Kan. at 992-93.) So in Wright 
the court held the "plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies or 
otherwise comply with the KJRA." (Emphasis added.) 270 Kan. at 668. 
 
13 
 
 
 
The Heiland court contrasted the claims in these two cases with those of its own 
plaintiff's: 
 
"Unlike the tort and constitutional claims in Lindenman and Wright, Heiland's 
claims involve the SBC's failure to perform a statutory and regulatory duty benefiting 
state employees in Heiland's position. The SBC is a 'state agency' . . . [and] Heiland's 
claim that the SBC's failed to afford him automatic reemployment rights or properly use 
the reemployment lists involved an 'agency action' as defined by K.S.A. 77-602(b): 
. . . 
'(3) an agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any other duty, function or 
activity, discretionary or otherwise.' 
 
"Finally, Heiland's request for relief is one within a state agency's authority to 
grant. Both the SBC, as the agency involved, and the Department of Administration, as 
the agency charged by statute to perform all powers and duties prescribed by law with 
respect to civil service and personnel administration, could have addressed Heiland's 
complaint and provided him with the remedies he sought." (Emphasis added.) Heiland, 
270 Kan. at 669. 
 
As a result, the court ultimately rejected Heiland's argument that his claim fell 
"outside the purview of the KJRA." Heiland, 270 Kan. at 668. It concluded that Heiland's 
"claims are based on an agency action of a state agency and the relief requested is one 
that the agency can grant under its authority," e.g., to accord him preferred hiring status. 
270 Kan. at 669. 
 
Accordingly, both Heiland and Lindenman reveal that our previous interpretation 
of the KJRA does not support the University's position, i.e., that all complaints regarding 
state agency actions must move through the KJRA for adjudication. See also Friedman v. 
Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 287 Kan. 749, 755, 199 P.3d 781 (2009) ("'actionable 
claims which fall outside the authority of an agency to grant can support a separate action 
14 
 
 
 
by an aggrieved party'") (quoting Heiland, 270 Kan. at 668); Jones v. State, 279 Kan. 
364, 367, 109 P.3d 1166 (2005) (same); 10th Street Medical v. State, 42 Kan. App. 2d 
249, 254, 210 P.3d 670 (2010) (same). 
 
Stating this conclusion more specifically and applying its principle to the instant 
case, in Lindenman this court held that "the KJRA does not apply to civil tort actions 
against an administrative agency." 255 Kan. at 619-20. In other words, it ruled that torts 
are outside the purview of the KJRA. And retaliatory discharge is a tort, particularly 
when an employee has been fired because of a potential workers compensation claim and 
absence caused by work-related injury See Ortega, 255 Kan. at 516-17. Consequently, 
just on this simple basis, Platt's cause of action is outside the purview of the KJRA. 
 
The general conclusion that torts are outside the purview of the KJRA has been 
repeatedly confirmed in Kansas caselaw since Lindenman in 1994. See Heiland, 270 
Kan. at 668 (summarizing Lindenman, "because the claims were tort claims for wrongful 
acts, they did not fall under the KJRA"); Jones, 279 Kan. at 367 (citing Lindenman, "tort 
claims for wrongful acts could not be addressed by agency"); see also Stormont-Vail 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2015 WL 3875355, at *5 (2015) 
(unpublished opinion) (citing Lindenman, "KJRA does not apply to 'claims for damages 
for wrongful acts committed by the agency' outside that agency's usual duties"). Cf. 
Campbell, 292 Kan. at 237 ("This court has previously criticized the allocation of a 
common-law action to an administrative agency;" issue whether Act's remedies adequate 
to preclude remedies available under common-law tort of retaliatory discharge) (citing 
Hysten v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Kan. 551, 562, 108 P.3d 437 
[2004]; Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 208-10, 967 P.2d 295 
[1998]; Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 813-14, 752 P.2d 645 [1988]). 
 
15 
 
 
 
Especially illustrative of this principle is Smith v. Bates Technical College, 139 
Wash. 2d 793, 991 P.2d 1135 (2000). As in the instant case, the Smith plaintiff sued the 
college and alleged her termination of employment violated the public policy against 
discharging an employee in retaliation for exercising a right—in Smith, for pursuing a 
grievance. The trial court dismissed her claim for failure to exhaust her administrative 
remedies with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. Although stating its 
rationale in the context of remedy exhaustion, the Smith court reversed because, among 
other things, plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim was "independent" of any contractual 
agreement or statute providing administrative procedures for resolving employment 
disputes: 
 
"Bates argues that because Smith did not pursue her ULPs [unfair labor 
practices] with PERC, she did not exhaust her administrative remedies to the extent 
required by law. Due to this failure Bates asserts the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion to dismiss Smith's wrongful termination claim. But Bates' argument ignores the 
fundamental distinction between a wrongful discharge action based in tort and an action 
based upon an alleged violation of an employment contract or a CBA [collective 
bargaining agreement]. As we have explained, the tort of wrongful discharge seeks to 
vindicate the public interest in prohibiting employers from acting in a manner contrary to 
fundamental public policy. Because the right to be free from wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy is independent of any underlying contractual agreement or civil 
service law, we conclude Smith should not be required to exhaust her contractual or 
administrative remedies." (Emphasis added.) 139 Wash. 2d at 808-09. 
 
In this context, the Smith court also ruled that reversal and remand were required 
because the administrative agency had no clear authority to assess all damages that would 
be available in a tort action. 
 
16 
 
 
 
"And while RCW 41.56.160(2) authorizes 'such affirmative action as will effectuate the 
purposes and policy of this chapter, such as the payment of damages and the 
reinstatement of employees,' it does not clearly authorize all damages that would be 
available in a tort action. See Cagle, 106 Wash. 2d at 919, 726 P.2d 434 (damages for 
emotional distress recoverable in tort action based on wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy)." (Emphasis added.) 139 Wash. 2d at 810. 
 
The rationale of the Washington Supreme Court is echoed in Kansas caselaw. 
 
Like our sister court, we have often observed the important purpose embedded in 
the tort of retaliatory discharge. "The caselaw makes it obvious that Kansas courts permit 
the common-law tort of retaliatory discharge as a limited exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine when it is necessary to protect a strongly held state public policy 
from being undermined." (Emphasis added.) Campbell, 292 Kan. at 229 (collecting 
cases). And "By 'public policy,' we have referred to a principle of law which holds that no 
citizen can lawfully do that which injures the public good." Coleman, 242 Kan. at 807. 
 
As in Washington, emotional distress damages, i.e., for pain and suffering, are 
recoverable in retaliatory discharge cases in Kansas. Campbell, 292 Kan. at 237 (one 
pursuing the common-law tort of retaliatory discharge "may seek future lost wages, any 
other actual damages, and applicable remedies for pain and suffering, as well as punitive 
damages") (citing Hysten, 277 Kan. at 563). And like Washington, in Kansas the tort of 
retaliatory discharge exists independent of a collective bargaining agreement that may 
provide protective procedures and some relief to the employee. See Coleman, 242 Kan. at 
815 (employees covered by collective bargaining agreements who are wrongfully 
discharged in violation of state public policy, e.g., the policy underlying the Workers 
Compensation Act, have a tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge). 
 
17 
 
 
 
Moreover, in Coleman, "We did not wish to immunize employers with collective 
bargaining contracts from 'accountability for violations of state public policy."' Hysten, 
277 Kan. at 561 (citing Coleman, 242 Kan. at 813) (citing Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, 
Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 150, 473 N.E.2d 1280 [1985]). Accordingly, punitive damages are 
available against the retaliatory employer even in those circumstances. See Hysten, 277 
Kan. at 563 (citing Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, Syl. ¶ 7, 630 P.2d 186 
[1981]). 
 
The Midgett decision cited by Coleman explained that punitive damages were 
unavailable under the collective bargaining agreement in that case. But the Illinois 
Supreme Court concluded that punitive damages nevertheless had a valuable place in the 
employee-employer relationship—there, in instances of retaliatory discharge for filing a 
workers compensation claim: 
 
"Generally, if a union employee's grievance goes to arbitration and the arbitrator does not 
find just cause for the employer's discharge, the remedy will be simply job reinstatement 
and full back pay. [Citation omitted.] If there is no possibility that an employer can be 
liable in punitive damages, not only has the employee been afforded an incomplete 
remedy, but there is no available sanction against a violator of an important public 
policy of this State." (Emphasis added.) Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150. 
 
Kansas appellate courts frequently have acknowledged the importance of the 
availability of recovering punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering in 
retaliatory discharge cases. See, e.g., Campbell, 292 Kan. at 237. See also Murphy, 6 
Kan. App. 2d at 497. As we said in Hysten, 277 Kan. at 563, which dealt with the similar 
issue of whether the Federal Employees Liability Act provided adequate alternate 
remedies to those available under tort law: 
 
18 
 
 
 
"We also do not regard the unavailability of compensatory damages for pain and 
suffering and punitive damages as trivial. As we recognized in Coleman, a retaliatory 
discharge action, such as the one Hysten brings here, is designed to redress a violation of 
state public policy. Coleman, 242 Kan. at 813. The availability of compensatory damages 
beyond those designed to eliminate purely economic loss and particularly the availability 
of punitive damages can deter such violations. As Judge Posner said:  'It is a grave matter 
for an employer to fire an employee for exercising a legal right.' [Citation omitted.] 
Deterrence of such conduct is essential." (Emphasis added.) 277 Kan. at 563. 
 
We acknowledge that an emphasis upon the availability of these particular 
remedies could point toward satisfying the KJRA's exhaustion requirement rather than 
showing that the plaintiff's claim simply is beyond the purview of the KJRA. See, e.g., 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Beshears, 18 Kan. App. 2d 814, 821, 860 P.2d 56 (1993) 
(no exhaustion required where no administrative remedy is available or the remedy is 
inadequate to address the problem). Indeed, in 2009 the legislature amended the KJRA to 
include express language incorporating part of this exhaustion rule exception to comport 
with Beshears and other Kansas caselaw. See K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 77-612(d) ("the court 
may relieve a petitioner of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies 
to the extent that the administrative remedies are inadequate or would result in irreparable 
harm"). See also Feighny, 2009 Amendments to the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act 
and the Kansas Judicial Review Act, 78 J.K.B.A. 21, 22 (2009). 
 
After all, demonstrating to the court one's exhaustion of administrative remedies 
under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 77-612—or even demonstrating that exhaustion of those 
inadequate remedies is unnecessary under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 77-612(d)—still 
acknowledges the KJRA is in play. In other words, it recognizes that a KJRA condition 
must be met before jurisdictionally being allowed to proceed with a suit asking for court 
review of an agency action. See, e.g., Rebel v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 419, 
427, 204 P.3d 551 (2009) ("[I]f a person does not exhaust all available and adequate 
19 
 
 
 
administrative remedies before filing a petition for judicial review of an agency action, 
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the contents of the 
petition."). But we agree with Platt that such a situation is distinct from the one where the 
KJRA never had any applicability to a case in the first place. See, e.g., Heiland, 270 Kan. 
at 668 (noting in Wright, plaintiff not required to exhaust administrative remedies "or 
otherwise comply with the KJRA"). 
 
So an emphasis on remedies for exhaustion purposes would be misplaced in the 
instant case. The emphasis of our analysis instead is upon the nature of a plaintiff's claim:  
for Platt, the tort of retaliatory discharge. See Lindenman v. Umscheid, 255 Kan. 610, 
619-20, 875 P.2d 964 (1994) ("the KJRA does not apply to civil tort actions against an 
administrative agency"). See also Heiland, 270 Kan. at 668 ("'The KJRA is the exclusive 
remedy for all requested relief which an agency can grant under its authority. Only 
actionable claims which fall outside the authority of an agency to grant can support a 
separate action by an aggrieved party.'") (Emphasis added.). 
 
Our discussion of the availability of punitive damages and those for pain and 
suffering primarily demonstrates the importance under Kansas law of the tort of 
retaliatory discharge in the workers compensation context. It is a common-law tort based 
upon an employer's violation of strongly held public policy, i.e., a principle which holds 
no citizen can lawfully do that which injures the public good. Campbell, 292 Kan. at 235. 
As was explained 35 years ago by the first appellate court to recognize this tort in 
Kansas: 
 
"The Workmen's Compensation Act provides efficient remedies and protection for 
employees, and is designed to promote the welfare of the people in this state. It is the 
exclusive remedy afforded the injured employee, regardless of the nature of the 
employer's negligence. To allow an employer to coerce employees in the free exercise of 
20 
 
 
 
their rights under the act would substantially subvert the purpose of the act." (Emphasis 
added.) Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 495-96, 630 P.2d 186 (1981). 
 
The Murphy court observed that one of the primary purposes for the imposition of 
punitive damages is to deter like wrongs from being committed in the future. So it 
authorized such damages for this newly recognized tort. 6 Kan. App. 2d at 497. 
 
Accordingly, the tort of retaliatory discharge in the workers compensation context 
would be one of the least likely claims to ever be adjudicated by an administrative agency 
in Kansas, particularly an agency being asked to punish itself. 
 
The remaining authorities cited by the University are distinguishable and thus 
unhelpful to its cause. See Gaskill v. Ft. Hays State Univ., 31 Kan. App. 2d 544, 547, 70 
P.3d 693 (2003) (court rejected plaintiff's argument that the university was not a state 
agency subject to the KJRA and held KJRA was his only remedy for his breach of 
contract claim; upheld dismissal of action for failure to state a claim because of lack of 
court jurisdiction); Douglass v. Kansas State University, 22 Kan. App. 2d 171, 174, 915 
P.2d 782 (1996) (plaintiff brought breach of contract action but only sought declaratory 
judgment and mandatory injunction compelling the university to appoint him as a tenured 
professor; court upheld dismissal of petition for failing to state a claim because exclusive 
remedy was under KJRA and the university was empowered to grant all relief requested). 
 
In short, based on the caselaw cited, the KJRA does not govern a challenge to an 
agency action that claims retaliatory discharge from employment. Accordingly, the 
University's motion to dismiss should not have been granted on the basis the district court 
essentially lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. 
 
21 
 
 
 
Because Platt has demonstrated she is entitled to reversal of the dismissal of her 
petition and remand to the district court for further proceedings, we need not address the 
panel's alternative grounds for this action. See Keiswetter v. State, 304 Kan. 362, 373, 
373 P.3d 803 (2016) (alternate bases for rejecting plaintiff's relief need not be considered 
by appellate court) (citing cases). Our approach does not mean, however, that the panel's 
analysis should be considered precedential or persuasive authority. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The case is remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
STEGALL, J., not participating. 
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 110,179 
vice Justice Stegall under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616.