Title: KENT ALAN PROFFIT, SR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENT ALAN PROFFIT, SR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 114193 P.3d 228Case Number: S-07-0257Decided: 09/30/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KENT 
ALAN PROFFIT, SR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
raises five issues in the appeal of his conviction on eight counts of 
third-degree sexual assault.1  Finding numerous prejudicial errors in 
the proceedings below, we reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did plain error occur when a State 
witness testified that the appellant refused to take a polygraph test and 
terminated the interview by asking for an attorney?

 
 
           
2.   Did plain error 
occur when the prosecutor committed misconduct by:

 
 
a.   Cross-examining the appellant by 
asking whether other witnesses were lying?

 
 
b.   Cross-examining the appellant by 
improper use of prior convictions, in violation of W.R.E. 
609?

 
 
c.    Shifting the burden of proof 
to the appellant during rebuttal closing argument?

 
 
           
3.   Did the appellant's 
trial attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel 
by:

 
 
a.   Failing to make appropriate 
objections?

 
 
b.   Inviting prejudicial error by 
inquiring into the investigators' opinions as to the appellants' 
credibility?

 
 
c.    Failing to demand notice of 
uncharged misconduct evidence, and failing to object to the introduction of 
uncharged misconduct evidence?

 
 
           
4.   Did plain error 
occur in the district court's response to a jury question?

 
 
           
5.   Is the record on 
appeal incomplete?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 2, 2005, 
a teenaged boy whom we will identify as B.C. reported to the Campbell County 
Sheriff's Office that he had repeatedly been sexually abused by the appellant, 
his step-father.  During subsequent 
questioning by law enforcement officers, the appellant declined an offer to take 
a polygraph test and terminated the questioning by invoking his right to 
counsel.  The appellant later was 
arrested and charged with eight counts of third-degree sexual assault.  He was released on bond pending 
trial.

 
 
[¶4]      B.C. was murdered 
about three weeks before the scheduled trial.  Eventually, the appellant and several of 
his acquaintancesJacob Martinez, Christopher Hicks, and Michael Seiserwere 
convicted of various homicide crimes as a result of B.C.'s murder.  Jacob Martinez admitted shooting B.C. in 
the head while B.C. slept.  The 
appellant was convicted of conspiring to commit first-degree murder.  His conviction for that crime was 
affirmed by this Court in Proffit v. 
State, 2008 WY 102, 191 P.3d 963 (Wyo. 2008).2

 
 
[¶5]      The case now 
before this Court was tried in Hot Springs County, beginning on June 25, 2007, 
after the district court granted the appellant's motion for a change of venue. 
 The jury found the appellant guilty 
of all eight counts.  The district 
court sentenced the appellant to consecutive terms of imprisonment for ten to 
fifteen years on each count, and later denied a motion for a new trial.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
plain error occur when a State witness testified that the appellant refused to 
take a polygraph test and terminated the interview by asking for an 
attorney?

 
 
[¶6]      Deputy Sheriff 
Tony Seeman interviewed the appellant after he was arrested.  At trial, the following series of 
questions and answers occurred during the State's direct examination of Deputy 
Seeman:

 
 
Q.   Did you revisit the subject of the 
sexual assault allegations?

 
 
A.   Yes, I did.

 
 
Q.   How did those come 
up?

 
 
A.   We just continued.  We continued with the interview.  Like I said, Kent Proffit, Sr. continued 
to deny any of this type of activity.  
I asked Mr. Proffit if he would be willing to take a polygraph test, a 
lie detector test to broach the subject of the sexual assaults. He thought about 
that only momentarily and then stated that he would not take a polygraph 
test.

 
 
Q.   Did he provide an explanation for 
you as to why he was reluctant to [do] that?

 
 
A.   I asked him the question of if he 
did take a polygraph test what he thought it would reveal or what he thought it 
would say. At that time he told me that he was scared of a polygraph test, that 
it may become confused based on Kent Proffit, Sr. being molested as a child by a 
neighbor.

 
 
       He was 
concerned that the polygraph exam may confuse some of his homosexual behavior as 
he was molested as a child with any questions that he would be asked about the 
inappropriate behavior with [B.C.].

 
 
Q.   After learning that, what 
happened?

 
 
A.   After learning that  it was 
shortly after that that Kent Proffit, Sr. looked directly at myself and directly 
at Sergeant Leet and asked if we actually believed that he had done these 
things.

 
 
Q.   Do you recall specifically what he 
said to you?

 
 
A.   I may have quoted it in my 
report.  I can't remember if I put 
it in quotations or not.  Actually, 
that part is in Sergeant Leet's report.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  Do you recall?

 
 
A.   I have that here 
also.

 
 
Q.   Do you recall what it was that Mr. 
Proffit asked?  Let me back up a 
step.  Did he ask one question to 
the two of you collectively?

 
 
A.   No. He asked us each separately if 
we believed that this happened.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  Did he ask you first or 
second?

 
 
A.   I can't remember.  To be honest, I can't remember if I was 
first or second.  He asked both of 
us though.

 
 
Q.   When he asked you that question, 
what did you tell him?

 
 
A.   I told him that, yes, I believe he 
had possibly had done this thing.

 
 
Q.   Then what 
happened?

 
 
A.   He went  both Sergeant Leet and 
myself both stated that we believed that he had done this  that he decided to 
terminate the interview.  He said 
that he wanted an attorney so we stopped the interview and Kent Proffit, Sr. was 
placed under arrest by Sergeant Leet for breach of peace.[3]

 
 
[¶7]      Because there was 
no trial objection to this testimony, we must review it for plain error.  To prove plain error, an appellant must 
show (1) that the record is clear as to the incident alleged as error; (2) that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way; and (3) that the error adversely affected a substantial 
right resulting in material prejudice to him.  Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, 
¶ 11, 141 P.3d 690, 695 (Wyo. 2006).  
There is no dispute that the first element has been 
shown.

 
 
[¶8]      There also can be 
little dispute that Wyoming adheres to the rule that it is error 
for the State to introduce evidence that a defendant has refused to take a 
polygraph or "lie detector" test.  
Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 732-33 (Wyo. 1986).  The rationale for that rule has been 
stated as follows:

 
 
"The 
impact upon the minds of the jurors of a refusal to submit to something which 
they might well assume would effectively determine guilt or innocence, under 
these conditions, might well be more devastating than a disclosure of the 
results of such test * * *.'"

 
 

Id. 
 (quoting Mills v. People, 339 P.2d 998, 999 
(Colo. 
1959)).  Beyond that, we have 
characterized the introduction of such evidence as "overzealous 
prosecution":

 
 
            
"All too frequently this court is compelled to reverse judgments of guilt 
in important criminal cases because of overzealous prosecution.  It is the duty of prosecuting officers 
to guard against the introduction of incompetent evidence.  Overprosecution of an accused should not 
be permitted by the trial court.  In 
the instant case the district attorney insisted at great length upon 
introduction into evidence of testimony [refusal to take a lie detector test] 
which is uniformly held to be incompetent, in an unbroken line of authorities 
throughout the nation."

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Mills, 339 P.2d at 
999-1000).  The constitutional 
underpinning for this rule is that it is fundamentally unfair to assure a 
suspect that he has a right to remain silent, and then to use his exercise of 
that right against him.  State v. Gutierrez, 162 P.3d 156, 162 
(N.M. 2007).  

 
 
[¶9]      In its Brief, the 
State contends that this "brief reference" to the polygraph was nothing more 
than a "logical, narrative transition offered to give context to Appellant's 
decision to end his interview with the deputies . . . ."  That, however, is not the full context in 
which this testimony must be evaluated.  
The broader context is the multitude of errors that will be discussed in 
this opinion.  But even the more 
narrow contextthat of the interrogation, itselfis troubling because it 
includes not only this improper discussion, which was much more than a "brief 
reference," but it also includes improper declarations as to the officers' 
opinions that the appellant was guilty, plus comment upon the appellant's 
exercise of his right to counsel.  
Furthermore, evidence that the appellant was molested as a child could 
have suggested to jurors that he, too, became a molester.  The prejudicial effect of this exchange 
was exacerbated during Deputy Seeman's cross-examination when, in response to a 
question about how the "time lines" of the case were established, he responded 
as follows:

 
 
Q.   What did you decide needed to be 
done?

 
 
A.   We decided that we needed to just 
give the best approximations as could be given by [B.C.] who was the one person 
who could give us the most information.  
The information that we would have liked to get from another person would 
have been Kent Proffit, Sr. who was no longer available.  So we just had to go with the best 
approximations that we had.

 
 
This 
statement was clearly another comment upon the appellant's exercise of his right 
to silence, and was not invited by defense counsel, because it was not necessary 
information for answering the question.

 
 
[¶10]   Deputy Seeman said enough about 
what the appellant would not say to render his testimony an improper comment 
upon the appellant's exercise of his right to silence.  And it is significant that much of the 
offending testimony was directly elicited by the prosecutor, rather than being 
inadvertent.  See Hernandez v. State, 2007 WY 105, ¶ 
38, 162 P.3d 472, 481-82 (Wyo. 2007).  
Furthermore, even without the constitutional dimension, Schmunk teaches us that it is improper 
to admit evidence of the refusal to take a polygraph as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt.  Schmunk, 717 P.2d  at 
732.

 
 
[¶11]   Often, we find error in a situation 
such as this but we do not reverse the conviction because there is little 
likelihood that the verdict would have been more favorable to the appellant 
absent the error.  In this case, 
however, the State's evidence was fairly meager, being limited to three 
essentially hearsay witnesses.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the above-described 
transgressions did not contribute to the verdict.  The case was largely a credibility 
contest between the appellant and an absent witness.  The testimony about the refused 
polygraph and the appellant's exercise of his right to silence and his right to 
counsel was simply too fundamental to the central issue to be considered 
harmless.

 
 
Did 
plain error occur when the prosecutor committed misconduct by: (a) 
cross-examining the appellant by asking whether other witnesses were lying; (b) 
cross-examining the appellant by improper use of prior convictions, in violation 
of W.R.E. 609; or (c) shifting the burden of proof to the appellant during 
rebuttal closing argument?

 
 
            
Cross-Examination as to 
Whether Other Witnesses Lied

 
 
[¶12]   The appellant raises the issue of 
improper questioning techniques in regard to the questioning of his expert 
witness and in regard to his own cross-examination.  One of the State's witnesses was Dr. 
William Heineke, a licensed psychologist and licensed professional counselor 
specializing in the field of child sexual abuse.  Dr. Heineke assessed and counseled B.C., 
at the request of B.C.'s mother, between the time B.C. reported the alleged 
sexual molestation and the time he was killed.  Dr. Heineke testified at some length 
about his sessions with, and evaluation of, B.C.

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant countered Dr. 
Heineke's testimony with the testimony of Dr. Rayna Rogers, a board-certified 
general psychiatrist, child adolescent psychiatrist, and forensic psychiatrist. 
 During cross-examination, the 
following exchange took place between the prosecutor and Dr. 
Rogers:

 
 
Q.   Okay.  Do you have any  you were in the 
courtroom yesterday when Dr. Heineke testified?

 
 
A.   I was.

 
 
Q.   Did you see all of his 
testimony?

 
 
A.   Yes, I did.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  Do you have any reason to believe that 
he was lying about anything?

 
 
A.   Can you define what you mean by 
lying?

 
 
Q.   Well, when he took the witness 
stand and he testified under oath that when he first had contact with [B.C.] he 
made no assumptions.  He made no 
conclusions about what he was going to find out and he started with a blank 
slate.  Do you have any reason to 
believe that was a lie?

 
 
A.   I'm afraid it's worse than 
that.  I think he simply did not 
understand the issue.  So whether he 
was telling the truth or a lie doesn't matter, he simply didn't get 
it.

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant testified in his own 
defense.  During cross-examination, 
the prosecutor asked the appellant about the testimony of several witnesses in 
two earlier trials involving the Forquer murder and B.C.'s murder.  This exchange followed those 
questions:

 
 
Q.   And in those two trials, just like 
this trial, the only person in any of those trials that ever told the truth was 
you?

 
 
A.   I didn't make any comments, 
[Prosecutor].

 
 
Q.   No, but I'm saying today your 
comments about those two trials was Mr. Martinez' and Mr. Seiser's when they 
testified about all those events and your involvement they were 
lying?

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.   Based upon your observations about 
what happened in the first two trials and the allegations that [B.C.] 
communicated to this man right here and to a professional counselor that he went 
and saw, the only person who has told the truth in all of these proceedings is 
you?

 
 
A.   Well, [Prosecutor], I wish they 
would have tape recorded the conversation because 

 
 
Q.   Mr. Proffit 

 
 
A.    you leave out 

 
 
Q.    can you answer yes or 
no?

 
 
A.   I have not lied to you in this 
courtroom.

 
 
Q.   So the only person in this whole 
big mess where two people are dead and there's a kid that says you molested him 
and who is telling the truth is you?

 
 
A.   Yes, 
[Prosecutor].

 
 
[¶15]   There were no trial objections to 
this line of questioning, so we review for plain error under the above-outlined 
standard.  The first factor is 
satisfied because the trial transcript clearly provides a record of what 
transpired.  As to the second 
factorthe violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of lawwe quote at length 
our holding in Jensen v. State, 2005 
WY 85, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 1088, 1095-96 (Wyo. 2005):

 
 
            
Turning to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Jensen, we note, 
generally, that a defendant who testifies in a criminal case may be 
cross-examined regarding his credibility just like any other witness.  Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1152-53 
(Wyo. 1988); MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 47 
(Wyo. 1986); Porter v. State, 440 P.2d 249, 250 
(Wyo. 
1968).  In Beaugureau [v. State, 2002 WY 160, 56 P.3d 626 (Wyo. 
2002)], however, we observed that there was a limit to the cross-examination of 
a criminal defendant:

 
 
Nonetheless, 
it is likewise error and misconduct for the prosecutor to cross-examine a 
defendant using the "lying" or "mistaken" technique (i.e., well, then if "so-and-so" said 
"such-and-such," was he "mistaken" or "lying?").  Such questions are improper.  If the prosecutor merely asked 
Beaugureau about what other witnesses had to say, allowing the jury to draw its 
own conclusions, the cross-examination would not have been objectionable.  State v. Diggs, 272 Kan. 349, 34 P.3d 63, 72-73 (2001); State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84, 
100-3 (2001) ("Questions which compel a defendant or witness to comment on the 
credibility of another witness are improper.  It is the province of the jury to weigh 
the credibility of the witnesses." (collecting cases)); State v. Stevenson, 70 Conn.App. 29, 797 A.2d 1, 7-9 (2002) (Such questions are improper because they "require a 
defendant to comment on another witness' veracity . . . invade the province of 
the jury, create the risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit 
the defendant, it must find that the other witnesses lied, and distort the 
state's burden of proof.") (relying on State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 
234-39 (2002)) (collecting cases); also 
see State v. Walden, 69 Wash. App. 183, 847 P.2d 956, 959 (1993); and State v. Pitts, No. 47488-0-I, 2001 WL 
1641225 at *4 (Wash.App. Div. 1, Dec. 24, 2001) (per curiam) (use of word 
"lying" is misconduct; use of word "mistaken" merely 
objectionable).

 
 

Beaugureau, 
¶ 17.  The reasoning for prohibiting 
this type of questioning was succinctly summarized by the Iowa Supreme 
Court:

 
 
[A] 
defendant who is asked whether another person lied is commenting directly on the 
other person's credibility.

 
 
            
The issue then is whether any purpose is served in asking a defendant 
whether another witness is lying.  
We think the predominate, if not sole, purpose of such questioning is 
simply to make the defendant look bad, as implied by the Maryland court's 
observation in [Fisher v. State, 128 
Md.App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125, 1163 (1999)] that the accused's answer is 
unimportant.  * * *  The accused's answer is unimportant 
because the accused is in a no-win situation.  If the defendant says the other witness 
is lying, then the defendant is put 
in the position of calling someone a liar, a particularly unenviable state when 
the other witness is a law enforcement officer.  See [State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 
(Utah 1992)] 
(holding such questions are improper because they put "the defendant in the 
untenable position of commenting on the character and motivations of another 
witness who may appear sympathetic to the jury").  If the defendant says a contradictory 
witness is not lying, then a fair inference is 
that the defendant is 
lying.

 
 
            
But, as any trial lawyer knows, there may be many explanations for 
differing descriptions of the same event.  
People have different perceptions of the same conversation that affect 
how and what they remember.  Perhaps 
there was a misunderstanding of what was said; perhaps one person was distracted 
and did not fully or correctly hear the words uttered by the other person.  People sometimes hear what they want to 
hear.  It is unjust to make the 
defendant give an opinion as to who is lying when, in fact, it is possible that 
neither witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth.  It is also unreasonable to expect the 
defendant to sift through the variables of human communication to offer an 
alternative explanation for contradictions in witnesses 
testimony.

 
 
            
We also think the use of this tacticasking the defendant whether another 
witness is lyingis incompatible with the duties of a prosecutor.  Unfairly questioning the defendant 
simply to make the defendant look bad in front of the jury regardless of the 
answer given is not consistent with the prosecutor's primary obligation to seek 
justice, not simply a conviction.  
Nor is such questioning consistent with the prosecutor's duty to the 
defendant to ensure a fair trial, including a verdict that rests on the evidence 
and not on passion or prejudice.  
[State v. Casteneda-Perez, 61 Wash. App. 354, 810 P.2d 74, 79 (Wash.Ct.App. 1991) (holding prosecutor's 
questions asking witnesses whether other witnesses were lying was "contrary to 
the duty of prosecutors, which is to seek convictions based only on probative 
evidence and sound reason").

 
 

State 
v. Graves, 
668 N.W.2d 860, 872-73 (Iowa 2003) (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
[¶16]   The admonition against asking the 
appellant whether other witnesses lied applies equally to asking any witness 
whether another witness has lied.  
State v. Manning, 19 P.3d 
84, 100-01 (Kan. 2001).  That is because such questions invade 
the province of the jury to determine witness credibility.  Id.  
The State clearly violated an unambiguous rule of law by asking both 
the appellant and Dr. Rogers whether other witnesses had lied.  The violation was more egregious during 
the cross-examination of the appellant, where there were many such 
questions.

 
 
[¶17]   The third step in our plain error 
analysis of this issue is to ask whether the appellant was materially 
prejudiced.  In his Brief, the 
appellant identifies the resultant prejudice as violation of the prosecutor's 
duty to ensure a fair trial by attempting to inflame the jury, and by putting 
the appellant and the jury in the position of having to decide who was lying. 
 The State counters with the 
argument that, by taking the stand and purporting to give the jury the full 
truth, as opposed to what the earlier juries in the related cases had heard, the 
appellant invited this line of questioning.

 
 
[¶18]   We previously have held that an 
appellant "cannot open the door' to the type of improper questioning used by 
the prosecutor," but that an appellant's "invitation or instigation is a 
relevant consideration in assessing the prejudice element."  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d 256, 261 (Wyo. 2007).  We went 
on in Talley, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 16, 153 P.3d  at 262, to describe the factors to be weighed in evaluating the prejudice 
caused by the "were-they-lying" technique:

 
 
1) 
the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the significance of the 
misconduct to the central issues in the case;  3) the strength of the State's evidence; 
4) the use of cautionary instructions or other curative measures; and 5) the 
extent to which the defense invited the misconduct.

 
 
[¶19]   On their face, especially in light 
of defense counsel's apparent trial strategywhich was to convince the jury that 
(1) the witnesses in the two murder trials all lied and (2) the appellant would 
clear it all up by testifying as to the truth in this casethese instances of 
the "lying" cross-examination technique would not, standing alone, constitute 
reversible error.  This case is, in 
fact, quite similar to Talley, where 
we found that prejudice sufficient to require reversal had not been shown.  Id., 2007 WY 37, 
¶ 17, 153 P.3d  at 262.  On the other 
hand, the State's case was weak, consisting as it did of only three hearsay 
witnesses, and the misconduct went to the very heart of the case, which was a 
credibility contest between the appellant and B.C.  By bringing in the testimony from the 
other trials, and quizzing the appellant as to whether those witnesses were 
lying, the prosecutor was allowed improperly to bolster B.C.'s 
credibility.

 
 
[¶20]   Because these errors did not occur 
in a vacuum, we must consider them together with all of the other errors that 
occurred in the trial of this case, and in doing so, we cannot say that they did 
not contribute to the verdict.  In 
short, we are not convinced that, absent these errors, the verdict might not 
have been more favorable to the appellant.  
More will be said about this in our discussion of trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness.

 
 
            
Cross-Examination as to Prior 
Convictions

 
 
[¶21]   W.R.E. 609(a)(1) provides as 
follows:

 
 
(a)    General rule.  For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness,

 
 
(1)    evidence that a witness other 
than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 
403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one (1) 
year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the accused; . . . .

 
 
[¶22]   This rule is patterned after 
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1), which has been interpreted as follows by a leading 
commentator:

 
 
Where 
the witness is the accused in a criminal case, the Rule itself sets out a 
special discretionary standard weighted in favor of exclusion, calling for the 
court to admit felony convictions only if it determines that probative value 
outweighs prejudicial effect.  For 
all other witnesses, the Rule incorporates the discretionary standard of Fed. R. 
Evid. 403, which is weighted in favor of admissibility, allowing evidence to 
come in unless prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative 
worth.

 
 
Christopher 
B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 6:42 (3d ed. 
2007).  In Wyoming, we have given 
effect to that "presumption" in favor of exclusion where the witness is the 
accused by holding that "a testifying defendant is required to give answers only 
as to whether he had been previously convicted of a felony, as to what the 
felony was, and as to when the conviction was had."  Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 973 
(Wyo. 2000).  Given that limitation, 
it is error for a prosecutor to ask questions of the defendant seeking details 
about the prior conviction.  
Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 22, 17 P.3d 715, 723 (Wyo. 2001).  On the other 
hand, a defendant who explains his prior conviction during direct examination is 
subject to cross-examination about the details of the crime.  Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 
973.

 
 
[¶23]   With that law in mind, the 
appellant now objects to the following colloquy that occurred during his 
cross-examination by the State prosecutor:

 
 
Q.   In late October, probably around 
Halloween, there was another young man that was living in the trailer Jeremy 
Forquer?

 
 
A.   That is 
correct.

 
 
Q.   And you were sitting in a room at 
that trailer and according to some witnesses participated in a discussion with 
Christopher Hicks where you guys decided you were going to kill 
him?

 
 
A.   That is incorrect.  I offered a polygraph.  You still don't care but that's what the 
testimony is, yes.

 
 
Q.   The testimony at the trial from Mr. 
Martinez 

 
 
A.   That is 
correct.

 
 
Q.    was there was a discussion that 
took place in that trailer that you participated in where plans 

 
 
A.   I did not participate in the crime 
until after the fact.

 
 
Q.   If I can 

 
 
A.   Sorry.

 
 
Q.    finish my question.  The testimony in your trial from Mr. 
Martinez was there was a discussion that you participated in that night where 
plans were made to kill Jeremy Forquer.  
That was the testimony, wasn't it?

 
 
A.   That was the 
testimony.

 
 
Q.   And the testimony at your trial 
was, in fact, Mr. Martinez and Mr. Hicks killed Mr. Forquer, strangled him to 
death in that living room right in front of you, that was the 
testimony?

 
 
A.   Mr. Martinez strangled and killed 
Jeremy, yes.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  And you agree that those events 
happened?  He was killed in that 
trailer?

 
 
A.   Yes, that's what happened, but not 
the way he's explaining it.

 
 
Q.   Okay.

 
 
A.   The truth never came out in that 
courtroom.

 
 
Q.   The body of Jeremy Forquer was 
loaded into a vehicle?

 
 
A.   That is 
correct.

 
 
Q.   And you traveled with Jacob 
Martinez and Christopher Hicks and Michael Seiser about 35 miles west of 
Gillette and at a location selected by you?

 
 
A.   That is 
correct.

 
 
Q.   That body was placed under a tree 
beside the interstate?

 
 
A.   That is 
correct.

 
 
Q.    and went back to that trailer and 
for the next month you didn't tell anybody what happened?

 
 
A.   He threatened to kill my son.  No, I did not tell 
anyone.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  Late November of 2005  pardon me, mid 
November 2005 the testimony in the next trial was that you had numerous 
discussions with your roommates about killing [B.C.] before your trial, before 
this trial could take place.  That 
was the testimony, wasn't it?

 
 
A.   That was the testimony of Mr. 
Martinez per his agreement with you.

 
 
Q.   All right.  Now, the testimony was that you helped 
them take out some powder of some bullets so that it wasn't so loud.  That was the testimony, 
right?

 
 
A.   That was the 
testimony.

 
 
Q.   The testimony was that they went, 
they, Mr. Martinez and Mr. Hicks, went up to this trailer that we've all been 
talking about and Mr. Martinez went in and shot [B.C.] because you told them 
to.  That was the 
testimony?

 
 
A.   Testimony only, 
yes.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  The testimony was that there was a 
discussion about what to do with the gun and you, in fact, directed them to put 
the gun in Doug  pardon me, to put the bullet casing in the garage that 
belonged to [B.C.'s mother's] current boyfriend [D.H.], that was the 
testimony?

 
 
A.   That's not the current boyfriend 
but that was the testimony.

 
 
Q.   Okay.  And it was a previous boyfriend of 
[B.C.'s mother]?

 
 
A.   The baby's 
father.

 
 
Q.   There we go.  The testimony was that you had 
participated in the discussion that the fact that the gun needed to be submerged 
and that it actually got thrown into a septic tank by Mr. Hicks and Mr. Martinez 
where it was later found by law enforcement?

 
 
A.   That is correct. 

 
 
[¶24]   This testimony was followed by the 
above-discussed "lying" technique cross-examination questions.  In addition, the prosecutor based part 
of his closing argument on the prior convictions:

 
 
[The 
appellant] described for you when I was asking him questions on 
cross-examination about the allegations in those other trials that you guys 
didn't get to hear about, and it's interesting, ladies and gentlemen. It's not 
just Deputy Mooney, it's not just Bill Heineke, it's the people that he was 
associated with like Jacob Martinez and Michael [Seiser] and law enforcement 
officers and it's other witnesses who all had it all 
wrong.

 
 
            
Notwithstanding the fact a jury sat right where you are and listened to 
all of that evidence and found Mr. Proffit guilty of being involved in two 
murders, guilty of conspiring to commit those two murders, and most importantly 
his participation in the murder of [B.C.] was because he was the witness.  The witness, ladies and gentlemen, whose 
voice you don't get to hear. 

 
 
[¶25]   The astounding fact that a 
prosecutor would engage in a cross-examination and would make a closing argument 
of this nature is exceeded only by the more astounding fact that defense counsel 
did not object.  In effect, the 
prosecutor "hearsayed in" the testimony from two murder trials, told the jury 
that the other juries had convicted the appellant of those crimes, and then told 
the jury that [B.C.] was murdered because he was going to be the witness in the 
present trial.  It is hard to 
conceive of a more unfairly prejudicial presentation.  This scenario is exactly what W.R.E. 
609(a)(1), Ramirez, and Taylor are meant to 
prevent.

 
 
[¶26]   The only possible justification for 
these questions and the State's closing argument would be the statement in Ramirez that a witness who explains a 
prior conviction is subject to cross-examination about "those details."  Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 973.  The question then becomes whether the 
appellant's direct examination opened the door to the prosecutor's 
questions.  This is what the 
appellant said during his direct examination:

 
 
Q.   Did you have anything to do with 
the death of death of [sic] [B.C.]?

 
 
A.   No, I did 
not.

 
 
Q.   Did you know the people that were 
ultimately convicted of actually killing him?

 
 
A.   Yes, I do.

 
 
Q.   Did you have any contact with them 

 
 
A.   Yes.

 
 
Q.    after the 
death?

 
 
A.   Yes.  As a matter of fact when I found out, 
I'm like  one of my son's friends called and she told me what had happened and 
I didn't believe it and I had her to [sic] call to verify it and then she called 
me back.  I'd talked to other people 
after that.  I don't recall actually 
speaking to them.

 
 
       I called to 
make sure.  I called Chris Hicks and 
told him to watch out, watch my son JR and make sure he doesn't get hurt.  I did not know that Jacob was going to 
kill [B.C.].  I did ask  that's the 
big thing about the caliber of the gun because Chris Hicks allegedly had a .45 
and I specifically asked if the, what the caliber was and that's when [B.C.'s 
mother] told my family what it was.

 
 
Q.   And what was 
it?

 
 
A.   9-millimeter.

 
 
Q.   Did you have any other 
conversations with Mr. Martinez and Mr. Hicks about that?

 
 
A.   I asked them specifically if they 
had anything to do with it.  If I 
asked them once, I asked them 100 times, and every time I asked they said, no, 
because I wouldn't be here being prosecuted if I had known that Mr. Martinez 
killed my son.

 
 
Q.   Why is that?

 
 
A.   Because I would have killed him, as 
a parent, and that's God as my witness I would. 

 
 
[¶27]   We are of the opinion that this 
exchange, which actually revealed few details about the facts of the murder 
conspiracy conviction, did not give the State free rein to repeat before this 
jury the testimony presented during the murder trials.  In particular, we note that the 
appellant made no comment about the Forquer murder.  It is true that Ramirez recognizes that it may be fair 
to allow the State to cross-examine a witness on the details of a prior 
conviction, where the witness first brought up those details.  But we went on in Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 974, to limit that 
exception as follows:

 
 
"In 
such cases the defendant may be cross-examined on any facts which are relevant 
to the direct examination," [United 
States v.] Wolf, 561 F.2d [1376], 1381 [(10th Cir. 
1977)], provided however, the prosecution does not "harp on the witness's crime, 
parade it lovingly before the jury in all its gruesome details, and thereby 
shift the focus of attention from the events at issue in the present case to the 
witness's conviction in a previous case."  
[United 
States v.] Robinson, 8 F.3d [398], 410 [(7th Cir. 
1993)].

 
 
[¶28]   This is precisely what happened in 
this case.  The jury's focus was 
shifted from the facts of the present case to the facts of the two prior 
murders.  The dictates of W.R.E. 609 
were not applied in that the district court never made a determination that the 
probative value of the evidence of the prior convictions outweighed its 
prejudicial effect.  In addition, 
the prosecutor's questioning went far beyond the details of the conviction 
involving B.C.'s murder.  This was 
plain error requiring reversal.

 
 
            
Shifting the Burden of Proof 
to the Appellant

 
 
[¶29]   The appellant contends that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by shifting the 
burden of proof to the appellant by way of the following 
argument:

 
 
            
The defense would like you to make some assumptions in order to justify 
acquitting Mr. Proffit.  [Defense 
counsel] gets up here and makes a note of this bracelet and he says it was right 
next to [B.C.] on November 26th when his body was discovered.  Well, what's interesting, ladies and 
gentlemen, is you've got a picture of a bracelet and you've got testimony by the 
defendant the last time he saw it was in 2003.

 
 
            
He has no idea how [B.C.] got it, and you have no information as to where 
it was on the nightstand.  Would it 
be helpful to know if it was on the top or if it was the only thing on the 
nightstand?  That it was sitting in 
some pristine place like it was a valued treasured item or at the bottom of a 
heap of garbage that you heard a number of people described as the 15-year-old's 
bedroom?  And when officers are 
executing a search in that room when, they find his dead body, it's one of the 
many things that's photographed.  It 
would be helpful to know the circumstances of on the nightstand and what that 
means.

 
 
            
It would be helpful to know what information, work records would provide 
about where Mr. Proffit was.  He 
tells you that there's information in those records.  He tells you about doctors' visits that 
are going to back him up and verify his story and you don't see any of that, but 
what you can see and what you do see, ladies and gentlemen, is that the 
defendant will tell the same story about how he came to have power and control 
over [B.C.] and it was [B.C.] who had the courage to step up and explain what 
happened when the defendant got that power and control.

 
 
[¶30]   There was no trial objection to 
this argument, so we now analyze it for plain error.  The appellant's present argument is that 
the prosecutor improperly attempted to shift the burden to the appellant to 
explain the presence of his bracelet in B.C.'s room, and to produce employment 
and medical records to substantiate parts of his testimony.  The first element of the plain error 
test is met in that the record is clear as to the prosecutor's argument.  As to the second element of plain error, 
the appellant relies upon Lane v. 
State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1066 (Wyo. 2000), for the proposition that the burden 
of proof rests with the State and never shifts to a defendant.  Further, the appellant quotes People v. Green, 345 N.W.2d 676, 679 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983), for the holding that "a prosecutor may not imply in 
closing argument that defendant must prove something or present a reasonable 
explanation for damaging evidence because such an argument tends to shift the 
burden of proof."  Finally, the 
appellant cites State v. Tosh, 91 P.3d 1204, 1212 (Kan. 2004), where the court disapproved of the 
prosecutor's question in closing argument, "[I]s there any evidence that it 
didn't happen?"

 
 
[¶31]   This Court has previously held, 
however, that the State is within its proper bounds when a prosecutor comments 
in argument upon the state of the evidence, including a defendant's failure to 
introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses.  Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1147 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Similarly, a prosecutor may 
point out that certain evidence is uncontroverted, or that there is no evidence 
on a certain point.  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 47, 73 P.3d 1041, 1089 (Wyo. 2003).  While 
it is not proper for a prosecutor to comment upon a defendant's exercise of his 
right to silence, it is not improper for a prosecutor to point out the lack of 
evidence to support a defendant's theory of the case.  Id.

 
 
[¶32]   We cannot say in this case that the 
prosecutor's argument was so far outside the realm of appropriate argument as to 
be misconduct.  The appellant 
testified, and the prosecutor's statements were merely comments upon that 
testimony.  It does not violate an 
appellant's right to silence, or shift the burden of proof to him, merely to 
point out the holes or deficiencies contained in his testimony.  Consequently, we cannot say that the 
prosecutor clearly violated an unequivocal rule of law, and we, therefore, 
cannot say that plain error has been shown.

 
 
Did 
the appellant's trial attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel by: (a) 
failing to make appropriate objections; (b) inviting prejudicial error by 
inquiring into the investigators' opinions as to the appellant's credibility; or 
(c) by failing to demand notice of uncharged misconduct evidence, and failing to 
object to the introduction of uncharged misconduct 
evidence?

 
 
[¶33]   We have adopted the following 
standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has received effective 
assistance of counsel, a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution:

 
 
First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.  This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the 
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable.

 
 

Dickeson 
v. State, 
843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  The issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel involves mixed questions of fact and law, 
and is reviewed de novo.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007).  We are 
reluctant to reverse based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and have stated that "[i]n the usual case, ineffective assistance of 
counsel is going to be demonstrable because of a cumulation of errors with a 
determination that, in the entire context of the trial, the defendant either 
was, or was not, denied a right to a fair trial."  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 612 (citing Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 
(Wyo. 1987)). 

 
 
            
Failing to Make Appropriate Objections

 
 
[¶34]   
Although we reviewed the record in this case observing the tenet that 
trial counsel is to be given the benefit of the doubt when considering whether a 
"failure" to object is actually a strategic "decision" not to object, we simply 
cannot accept counsel's performance as adequate under the above-stated test for 
effective assistance.  The district 
court granted a change of venue for the clear purpose of allowing the 
appellant's case to be presented to a jury panel that was unaware of, or at 
least not prejudiced by, his prior convictions in the Forquer and B.C. murder 
cases.  In voir dire, opening statement, cross 
examination, direct examination, and closing argument, however, defense counsel 
canceled whatever advantage had been gained by the venue change.  In particular, defense counsel's failure 
to object to clearly objectionable testimony and evidence, patently prejudiced 
the appellant.  Examples of those 
failures include the failure to object to testimony that the appellant had 
refused to take a polygraph test, the failure to object to testimony presenting 
the two officers' opinions that the appellant was guilty, the failure to object 
to testimony that the appellant was a victim of molestation as a child (possibly 
leading to the assumption that, as a result, he had become an offender), the 
failure to object to the prosecutor's "lying" technique during 
cross-examination, the failure to object to the court's response to the jury 
question as to use of the prior conviction evidence (as is further discussed 
hereinbelow), and perhaps the most egregious failure, the failure to object to 
the prosecutor "hearsaying in" the extremely damaging testimony from the Forquer 
and B.C. murder cases.

 
 
[¶35]   We have no confidence that the 
guilty verdicts in this case were based upon the admissible evidence, and we 
cannot countenance defense counsel's failure to object or decision not to object 
to the stream of highly prejudicial and objectionable testimony that was 
admitted.  The underlying structure 
of defense counsel's apparent theory of the case makes no sense.  His premise was that, because the 
earlier juries had not heard the appellant's testimony, the convictions in the 
earlier cases were unreliable.  It 
supposedly followed that, upon hearing the "truth" from the appellant in the 
present case, this jury would acquit.  
What is wrong with that construct is that the appellant could have 
testified in this case without opening the door to all the damaging testimony 
from the earlier cases.  A bit of it 
may have come in as impeachment via W.R.E. 609, but the vast majority of it was 
objectionable.  Defense counsel 
filed, and lost, a pretrial hearsay motion directed at B.C.'s statements.  For that, counsel cannot be 
faulted.  But the adverse ruling on 
that pretrial motion did not preclude him from objecting to the deluge of 
improper testimony about the murder trials, or about his police 
interrogation.

 
 
[¶36]   It is true that this Court has 
almost invariably excused questionable decisions and actions of defense counsel 
on the ground that such may have been part of a "sound trial strategy."  See, e.g., Magallanes v. State, 2006 WY 119, ¶ 21, 
142 P.3d 1147, 1153 (Wyo. 2006) (failure to subject evidence to forensic 
testing); Sanchez v. State, 2002 WY 
31, ¶ 16, 41 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2002) (stipulation as to cause of victim's 
death); Cureton v. State, 950 P.2d 544, 547 (Wyo. 1997) (adequacy of pretrial investigation); Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1228 
(Wyo. 1997) (no limiting instruction requested as to uncharged misconduct 
evidence); McCoy v. State, 886 P.2d 252, 257 (Wyo. 1994) (decision not to call certain witnesses).  On the other hand, we have reversed 
where the "trial strategy" did not rest upon a sound legal basis.  Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶¶ 22-23, 
115 P.3d 1110, 1119 (Wyo. 2005) (trial strategy based upon defendant's 
diminished capacity, an unavailable defense); Deshazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 31, 74 P.3d 1240, 1252-53 (Wyo. 2003) (counsel admitted lack of basic knowledge 
essential to formulate trial strategy based upon defendant's lack of 
competency).

 
 
[¶37]   In the instant case, it is 
difficult even to identify what may have been defense counsel's trial 
strategy.  Apparently, that strategy 
largely consisted of the hope that the jury would believe the appellant.  Unfortunately, nearly everything defense 
counsel did, with the exception of winning the motion for a change of venue, 
appeared to be designed to thwart that end.  Garnering trust for one's client rarely 
begins by allowing the jury to hear the detailed testimony from two murder 
trials in which that client was convicted.  
Neither is the client's veracity enhanced by allowing law enforcement 
officers to testify that they believe he is guilty.  This is not trial strategy that any 
reasonable attorney would follow.  
As Mark Twain observed in evaluating the writings of James Fenimore 
Cooper, "crass stupidities [should] not be played upon the reader as the craft 
of the woodsman, the delicate art of the forest[.]'"  Mark Twain, Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses, The 
Portable Mark Twain 543 (Viking Press, 1968). Trial counsel's performance was 
ineffective.

 
 
            
Inquiring Into the 
Investigators' Opinions as to Appellant's 
Credibility

 
 
[¶38]   The appellant argues separately on 
appeal that, not only did defense counsel fail to object when the prosecutor 
elicited the investigators' opinions that the appellant was guilty, but that he 
emphasized those opinions by inquiring further about them during 
cross-examination.  For instance, 
during the cross-examination of Deputy Seeman, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 

Q.       
And 
why did you chose [sic] in this instance to say that you believed that he had 
done this?

 
 

A.      
At 
the point we were at in the interview, I felt no need to continue to strengthen 
his denials.  I believed if Mr. 
Proffit was, who was already denying the allegations that if he was given some 
type of support in those denials that it would only make the denials 
stronger.  My tactic had switched to 
attempting to get [B.C.] the help that we both agreed that he needed and that to 
properly get [B.C.] the help that he needed that we needed to come to the truth 
and that I did not believe Mr. Proffit was being 
honest and truthful.

 
 
I 
started to actually ask Mr. Proffit if he was ready to tell the truth and Mr. 
Proffit said, quote, not yet, which again strengthened our ideas that Mr. 
Proffit was not being fully honest with us with the reply of not yet when he was 
asked to tell the truth.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The deputy's response was 
not at that point objectionable because it was responsive to the question.  Thus, it was invited error.  And the error cannot be defended as 
being part of some logical defense strategy because counsel never utilized it 
strategically, such as in an attempt to show that the deputy's belief in the 
appellant's guilt had caused him to fail to follow other leads in the sexual 
assault investigation.

 
 
[¶39]   While this issue differs somewhat, 
we conclude that it is simply part of the cumulative ineffectiveness set forth 
above.  Basically, it represents an 
exacerbation of the prejudice caused by defense counsel's failure to object when 
the opinions of guilt were first elicited.  
There are few rules of cross-examination that could be said to be set in 
stone, but it is hard to conceive of a situation where sound trial strategy 
would include asking a law enforcement officer why he believed your client was 
guilty.  One reason might be where 
counsel could then go on to prove that the officer's opinion was based on 
incorrect information.  That did not 
happen here, and there is no indication that counsel's strategy was to go in 
that direction.

 
 
            
Failure to Demand Notice of or 
Object to Uncharged Misconduct Evidence

 
 
[¶40]   W.R.E. 404(b) forbids the admission 
of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove the character of a person to show that 
he or she acted in conformity with that character.  For example, the State may not introduce 
evidence that an accused earlier committed a burglary, for the purpose of 
proving that he is, by character, a burglar, and that, therefore, he committed 
the burglary at issue.  Such 
evidence may, however, be admitted for other purposes, such as to prove motive, 
intent, or identity.

 
 
[¶41]   We have stated that the 
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence should be tested before trial, 
preferably via a defendant's demand for notice of the State's intent to 
introduce such evidence, the State's identification of any such evidence, and a 
pretrial hearing.  Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 27-32, 
57 P.3d 332, 342-44 (Wyo. 2002); Howard 
v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶¶ 15-23, 42 P.3d 483, 487-91 (Wyo. 2002).  In the instant case, the State produced 
uncharged misconduct evidence at trial, without defense counsel having filed a 
pretrial demand for notice of such evidence, without defense counsel objecting 
contemporaneously with the introduction of the evidence, and without the 
evidence being scrutinized by the district court prior to its admission.  The uncharged misconduct evidence 
included (1) evidence of a sexual assault by the appellant upon B.C. outside 
CampbellCounty; (2) evidence of a 
breach-of-the-peace incident at a convenience store; (3) evidence of the 
appellant's alleged involvement in a homosexual child pornography ring; and (4) 
evidence of the Forquer and B.C. murders.

 
 
[¶42]   We must look at defense counsel's 
failure to object, or decision not to object, not through hindsight, but with 
the presumption that defense counsel had a strategic purpose for acceding to the 
introduction of this evidence.  Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 904, 908 (Wyo. 2003).  On the other 
hand, we have recognized that defense counsel's failure to pursue discovery or 
to demand notice of uncharged misconduct evidence, given "the clarity with which 
the problem' has been articulated by this Court," may constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 12 
n.9, 99 P.3d 432, 440 n.9 (Wyo. 2004).  
The first question, as with other allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, is whether, "in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts 
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance."  Keats, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 10, 115 P.3d  at 
1115.  We must answer that question 
affirmatively in this case, for the reasons already set forth herein.  It is our perception that no reasonable 
attorney in this situation would forfeit the opportunity to prevent the jury 
from learning about the different instances of uncharged misconduct noted 
above.  While the appellant may have 
been subject to an attack upon his credibility through introduction of evidence 
under W.R.E. 609 of the fact of the two murder convictions, 
there was a solid legal basis for defense counsel to attempt to prevent the jury 
from hearing the details of those crimes, or from 
hearing about the other alleged misconduct.

 
 
Did 
plain error occur in the district court's response to a jury 
question?

 
 
[¶43]   During its deliberations, the jury 
sent the judge a note asking, "do we use the evidence of State Exhibit 2, quote, 
verdict of conviction, unquote, in determining the verdict[?]"4  State's Exhibit 2 was the Judgment Upon 
Jury Verdict holding the appellant guilty of conspiracy to commit the 
first-degree murder of B.C.  After 
an informal off-the-record discussion with counsel, and with the agreement of 
counsel, the district court sent the following responsive note to the jury room, 
without bringing the jury into open court:  
"State's Exhibit 2 is a piece of evidence which should be given as much 
weight as you deem appropriate."  As 
will be further discussed below, the appellant contends that this response 
misstated the law.

 
 
[¶44]   We apply the following standard 
when reviewing jury instructions:

 
 
            
A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long 
as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the 
relevant issue, reversible error will not be found.  Instructions must be considered as a 
whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out 
and considered in isolation.  
Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant 
demonstrates that the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect 
to the proper principles of law.

 
 

Luedtke 
v. State, 
2005 WY 98, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005) (citations omitted).  Where there has been no trial objection, 
however, we review for plain error.  
Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 
9, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 2005).  
In particular regard to jury questions evidencing confusion or 
uncertainty as to applicable law, we have said that it is the trial court's duty 
to answer such questions.  Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, 
¶ 28, 170 P.3d 1227, 1235 (Wyo. 2007).  See also United States v. Duran, 133 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir 1998) (plain error where trial court fails to clarify 
law in answer to jury question, and possibility exists that the conviction is 
based on an incorrect legal basis).

 
 
[¶45]   This issue is linked by the 
appellant to two issues already discussed herein.  The appellant contends that the district 
court's response to the jury note was legally incorrect because it allowed the 
jury to use the prior conviction evidence in violation of both W.R.E. 404 and 
W.R.E. 609.  W.R.E. 404, as noted 
previously herein, limits the use of uncharged misconduct evidence to proof of 
specific facts such as motive, intent, and identity, which facts should be 
identified pre-trial by the State, and should be analyzed pre-trial by the court 
in balancing probative value against unfairly prejudicial effect.  In turn, prior conviction evidence is 
governed by W.R.E. 609(a) when offered to impeach the credibility of a witness, 
including the defendant.  Clearly, 
the district court's response to the jury note, indicating that the jury could 
give the prior conviction evidence whatever weight it deemed appropriate, was 
not consonant with these rules.  The 
State takes the position that it was not error for the district court to reply 
to the jury note as it did because defense counsel had made neither a W.R.E. 404 
nor a W.R.E. 609 objection to admission of State's Exhibit 2 when it was offered 
and admitted.

 
 
[¶46]   This issue properly is addressed 
under W.R.E. 609, and not under W.R.E. 404, because the appellant testified, and 
impeaching his credibility was the only justifiable purpose for admission of the 
exhibit.  "Once appellant became a 
witness, the admissibility of his prior convictions was governed by Rule 609(a), 
W.R.E., rather than Rule 404(b)."  
Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 368 (Wyo. 
1986).5  Defense counsel's failure to object or 
decision not to object to admission of the conviction document is 
understandable, given that the document was admissible under W.R.E. 609.  That, however, does not explain why 
defense counsel did not object to the district court's response to the jury 
question, which response allowed the jury to consider the conviction document as 
evidence of the appellant's guilt in the present case, rather than limiting it 
to impeachment under W.R.E. 609.  
The response erroneously stated the law as delineated in W.R.E. 609.  Consequently, the response can be 
justified only if defense counsel's failure or decision not to object to the 
document's admission made it admissible beyond the limited purpose of impeaching 
credibility.

 
 
[¶47]   We will not further pursue this 
issue as presented, for two reasons.  First, neither the State nor the 
appellant has cited a single case directed toward the specific issue engendered 
by this situation:  whether defense 
counsel's failure or decision not to ask for a limiting instruction at the time 
State's Exhibit 2 was introduced forecloses a subsequent objection to the jury's 
use of the exhibit as evidence of guilt in the instant case, and concomitantly, 
whether it was error for the district court to respond to the jury question as 
it did.  Second, the original 
failure to object or decision not to object, or to ask for a limiting 
instruction, along with the later failure to object or decision not to object to 
the district court's response to the jury note, is so clearly part of the 
pattern of ineffective assistance of counsel shown throughout these proceedings, 
that there is no need for this Court on its own to conduct the necessary 
research on the jury note issue.6

 
 
Is 
the record on appeal incomplete?

 
 
[¶48]   This issue is moot, given our 
disposition of the other issues.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶49]   Plain error occurred when a State 
witness testified that the appellant had refused to take a polygraph 
examination, when the State questioned the appellant and one of appellant's 
witnesses as to whether other witnesses were lying, and when the State 
improperly used prior conviction evidence in the cross-examination of the 
appellant.  Plain error did not 
occur when the State, during rebuttal closing argument, pointed out the lack of 
evidence supporting the appellant's theory of the case.  The appellant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to make numerous meritorious 
objections to evidence, when defense counsel invited prejudicial error by 
inquiring into the investigators' opinions as to the appellant's credibility and 
guilt, by failing to demand notice of uncharged misconduct evidence and failing 
to object to the introduction of such evidence, and by failing to obtain a 
limiting instruction that would have prevented the jury from using prior 
conviction evidence as substantive evidence of guilt.

 
 
[¶50]   Some trial errors are not of such 
magnitude as to require reversal.  
But where trial errors, especially when viewed collectively, "would cause 
a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and 
fairness of the judicial process," or "possess[] a clear capacity to bring about 
an unjust result," reversal is the necessary appellate response.  Heywood, 2007 WY 149, ¶ 29, 170 P.3d  at 
1235 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶51]   We reverse and remand to the 
district court for a new trial.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 6-2-304(a)(i) and 6-2-306(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 

2The 
appellant's convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder in a tangentially related second murderthat of Jeremy 
Forqueralso were affirmed by this Court in Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 103, 191 P.3d. 
974 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

3The 
appellant had been contacted at a convenience store because of an incident 
occurring there.  It was that 
incident that led to the arrest for breach of peace.

 
 

4The 
actual note from the jury is not contained in the record on appeal.  The quoted sentence recites the district 
court's reading of the note in chambers.  
Where the court used the words "quote" and "unquote," it may be logical 
to assume that quotation marks appeared in the actual 
note.

 
 

5That is 
not to say that prior conviction evidence may not be analyzed under W.R.E. 
404(b) when offered to prove some fact governed by that rule.  3 Federal Evidence §§ 6:42, 
6:57.

 
 

6See, 
however, Lyons v. McCotter, 770 F.2d 529, 533-35 (5th Cir. 1985) (failure to ask for limiting instruction, 
thereby allowing the State full use of the prior conviction in closing, may be 
ineffective assistance of counsel, even if part of an "inane" trial 
strategy).