Title: Attorney Grievance v. Roberson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 45
September Term, 2001
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION
v.
DAVID ROBERSON
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed: March 11, 2003
1
Respondent was admitted to the bar of this Court in December 30, 1976, and on April
13, 1999, he was decertified, and has remained so, for nonpayment of the annual assessment
by the Client Protection Fund, formerly known as Client Security Trust Fund. The
decertification does not affect the Court’s authority to consider reciprocal discipline because
we have held that an attorney “who has been admitted to the bar of the State and has not
tendered a resignation remains subject to the disciplinary authority of this Court,
notwithstanding being on the inactive list of attorneys, by virtue of failure to pay the Client
Security Trust Fund assessment.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 252,
798 A.2d 1139, 1147 (2002).
2
Reinstatement was conditioned upon “Roberson . . . mak[ing] full restitution to the
estate involved of all moneys he received in regard to his representation of the estate.”
This is a reciprocal discipline action arising out of disciplinary proceedings initiated
in Georgia, where the Respondent, David Roberson (hereinafter “Roberson” or
“Respondent”), a member of that bar, exclusively practiced law.1  Respondent was disbarred
from the practice of law in Georgia on April 5, 2001,2 when the Supreme Court of Georgia
determined, after the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board recommended
disbarment, that Roberson had violated the following Georgia State Bar Standards: 4 (a
lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or wilful
misrepresentation); 30 (except with the written consent of or written notice to his client after
full disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his
professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his
own financial, business, property or personal interests); 31(a)(a lawyer shall not enter into
an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee); 31(d)(2)(upon
conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the following: (i) the outcome of the matter; and (ii) if there is a recovery:
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(aa) the remittance to the client; (bb) the method of its determination; (cc) the amount of the
attorney fee; and (dd) if the attorney’s fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner
in or an associate of the lawyer’s firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and
the manner in which the division is determined); 36 (a lawyer shall not continue multiple
employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to
the extent permitted under Standard 37); 44 (a lawyer shall not without just cause to the
detriment of his client in effect wilfully abandon or wilfully disregard a legal matter entrusted
to him); 61 (a lawyer shall promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities or
other properties and shall promptly deliver such funds, securities or other properties to the
client); 63 (a lawyer shall maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other
properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and promptly render
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them); and 65(A)(a lawyer shall not commingle
his client’s funds with his own, and shall not fail to account for trust property, including
money and interest paid on the client’s money, if any, held in any fiduciary capacity) of Bar
Rule 4-102(d).
The Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred Respondent after having concluded that the
Respondent violated these Standards while providing representation in a medical malpractice
action filed on behalf of a woman who slipped into a coma after complications arose during
a routine Caesarian section performed after Roberson had been retained by the woman’s
3
Maryland Rule 16-751 provides in part:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.  Upon
approval of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition
for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.
4
Maryland Rule 16-773 provides:
(a) Duty of attorney. An attorney who in another jurisdiction (1)
is disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined, (2) resigns
from the bar while disciplinary or remedial action is threatened
or pending in that jurisdiction, or (3) is placed on inactive status
based on incapacity shall inform Bar Counsel promptly of the
discipline, resignation, or inactive status. 
(b) Duty of Bar Counsel. Upon receiving information from any
source that in another jurisdiction an attorney has been
disciplined or placed on inactive status based on incapacity, Bar
Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary or
remedial order and file it with a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 16-
751, and shall serve copies of the petition and order upon the
attorney in accordance with Rule 16-753. 
(c) Show cause order. When a petition and certified copy of a
disciplinary or remedial order have been filed, the Court of
Appeals shall order that Bar Counsel and the attorney, within 15
days from the date of the order, show cause in writing based
upon any of the grounds set forth in section (e) of this Rule why
corresponding discipline or inactive status should not be
imposed. 
(d) Temporary suspension of attorney. When the petition and
disciplinary or remedial order demonstrate that an attorney has
been disbarred or is currently suspended from practice by final
order of a court in another jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
may enter an order, effective immediately, suspending the
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common law husband in August of 1994.  In re Roberson, 273 Ga. 651, 544 S.E.2d 715
(2001).
On January 10, 2002, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (hereinafter
“Bar Counsel”), acting pursuant to Rules 16-7513 and 16-7734 of the Maryland Rules,
attorney from the practice of law, pending further order of
Court. The provisions of Rule 16-760 apply to an order
suspending an attorney under this section. 
(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not be
ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that: 
(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a
deprivation of due process;
(2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing
the misconduct as to give rise to a clear
conviction that the Court, consistent with its duty,
cannot accept as final the determination of
misconduct;
(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline
would result in grave injustice;
(4) the conduct established does not constitute
misconduct in this State or it warrants
substantially different discipline in this State; or
(5) the reason for inactive status no longer exists.
(f) Action by Court of Appeals. Upon consideration of the
petition and any answer to the order to show cause, the Court of
Appeals may immediately impose corresponding discipline or
inactive status, may enter an order designating a judge pursuant
to Rule 16-752 to hold a hearing in accordance with Rule 16-
757, or may enter any other appropriate order. The provisions of
Rule 16-760 apply to an order under this section that disbars or
suspends an attorney or that places the attorney on inactive
status. 
(g) Conclusive effect of adjudication. Except as provided in
subsections (e) (1) and (e) (2) of this Rule, a final adjudication
in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding by another court,
agency, or tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of
professional misconduct or is incapacitated is conclusive
evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding
under this Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not
preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing
additional evidence or preclude the attorney from introducing
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evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline or lesser
discipline should be imposed. 
(h) Effect of stay in other jurisdiction. If the other jurisdiction
has stayed the discipline or inactive status, any proceedings
under this Rule shall be deferred until the stay is no longer
operative and the discipline or inactive status becomes effective.
5
MRPC 8.5(a) states:
(a) A lawyer admitted by the Court of Appeals to practice in this
State is subject to the disciplinary authority of this State for a
violation of these rules in this or any other jurisdiction.
6
Maryland Rule 16-701(i) states:
(i) Professional misconduct. “Professional misconduct” or
“misconduct” has the meaning set forth in Rule 8.4 of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Rule
16-812.  The term includes the knowing failure to respond to a
request for information authorized by this Chapter without
asserting, in writing, a privilege or other basis for such failure.
7
MRPC 8.4 provides in relevant part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another;
* * *
-5-
filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Roberson to which a certified
copy of the Georgia Supreme Court’s disciplinary order was attached.  In the Petition, Bar
Counsel alleged that Respondent is subject to the disciplinary authority of this State pursuant
to Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (hereinafter “MRPC”) 8.5(a). 5  In addition, Bar
Counsel charged Respondent with engaging in misconduct as defined in Maryland Rule 16-
701(i)6 and with violating the Maryland counterparts of the Georgia State Bar Standards he
had been found to have violated, and more specifically, MRPC 8.4 (Misconduct),7 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation . . . .
8
MRPC 1.5 provides:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate
of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or
within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service
is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (d) or other law. The terms of a contingent fee agreement shall be
communicated to the client in writing. The communication shall state the
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or
appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and
whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall
provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter,
and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method
of its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
-6-
MRPC 1.5 (Fees),8 
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or
custody of a child or upon the amount of alimony or support or
property settlement, or upon the amount of an award pursuant to
Sections 8-201 through 213 of Family Law Article, Annotated
Code of Maryland; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
matter.
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by
each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the
participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
9
MRPC 1.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(c) The consultation required by paragraphs (a) and (b) shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and any
limitations resulting from the lawyer's responsibilities to another, or from the
lawyer's own interests, as well as the advantages and risks involved.
10
MRPC 1.15 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own
property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to
-7-
MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule), 9 and MRPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property).10
Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified
as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account
funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved
for a period of five years after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property
in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall
be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of
their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the
portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is
resolved.
11
On January 11, 2002, this Court issued a show cause order directing Respondent to
show cause why corresponding discipline should not be imposed in Maryland to which
Respondent, after service and receipt of an extension, responded on M ay 2, 2002.  The Court
immediately suspended Respondent from the practice of law on May 8, 2002, subject to
further order.
-8-
On May 9, 2002, we referred the case to the Honorable Philip Caroom of the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County for a hearing.11  Following the hearing on August 14, 2002,
during which the parties submitted an “extensive statement” of “Stipulated Facts and
Exhibits” and additional agreed exhibits, the hearing court made findings of fact, as follows:
I.  Findings of Fact
A.
Procedural history
Based on the stipulations and agreed exhibits, the undersigned finds the
following facts: 
1.
Roberson was admitted to practice law in Maryland by the Court of
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Appeals on December 30, 1976.  He was appointed as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia on January 3, 1978 and
was admitted to the State Bar of Georgia on November 7, 1979.1
Roberson subsequently entered private practice in Georgia.
2.
Prior to the present proceedings, Roberson never has been subject to
any disciplinary proceedings in either Maryland or Georgia.  He was
decertified on April 13, 1999, by Maryland, however, for nonpayment
of his annual Clients’ Security Trust Fund assessment.
3.
The State Bar of Georgia initiated an investigation of Roberson on
February 21, 1997, and filed its Formal Complaint (“the complaint”)
against Roberson on December 31, 1997, alleging nine (9) serious
violations of the standards set by Georgia’s Bar Rules, seeking
appropriate discipline and reimbursement of fees.  Joint Exhibit B, pp.
6 through 33.  All alleged violations related directly or indirectly to
representation of the late Julia Mae Shiggs2 and her husband, initially
in a medical malpractice claim between April 1995 and October 1996.
4.
The Supreme Court of Georgia (“the Court”), in the interim between
the investigation's initiation and the complaint's filing, by
administrative Order of June 13, 1997 and effective July 1, 1997,
changed the standard of proof for attorneys' disciplinary cases from
"beyond a reasonable doubt" to "clear and convincing evidence."
Amended Georgia Bar Rule 4-221 (e)(2); joint exhibit. 
5.
On June 13, 1997, the Court also amended the Georgia Bar Rules,
establishing the system of special master's trials, followed by a Review
Panel; then, "[a]lleged errors in the trial may be reviewed by the
[Georgia] Supreme Court when the findings and recommendation of the
Review Panel are filed with the Court." Amended Georgia Bar Rule 4-
213(a); joint exhibit 5. The latter amendment, removing the right to a
jury trial, also superseded state legislation which had provided jury
trials for disbarment actions. [Official Code of Georgia Annotated],
sec. 15-19-32; see joint exhibits 4 and 4A. 
1
The State Bar of Georgia in its Formal Complaint alleged
that Roberson was admitted in 1973, but this appears to have
been a clerical error and is immaterial to the present concerns.
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6.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, as provided by these amended rules,
appointed a Special Master to take testimony as to this matter on
November 24, 1998. The Special Master held a hearing in the matter
between April 19 and 22, 1999. Joint exhibits 6A through 6D. 
7.
The Special Master filed his 54-page report of facts and
recommendations for discipline on March 27, 2000. This included the
determination that the newly-adopted standard of proof as to "clear and
convincing evidence" should be applied, rather than the earlier standard
of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Joint exhibit B, pp.484-537. The
Special Master found that Roberson committed all nine (9) alleged
ethical violations, recommending disbarment, a public reprimand and
restitution of attorney's fees received. 
8.
The Report of the Review Panel, relying on the Special Master's
Report, was filed July 17, 2000. Joint exhibit B, pp. 726-729.  With one
exception,3 
the 
Review 
Panel 
approved 
all 
findings 
and
recommendations of the Special Master. 
9.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in its April 5, 2001, per curium
opinion, also approved the findings that Roberson had committed all
nine (9) alleged violations by "clear and convincing evidence,"4 ruling
that disbarment was the appropriate sanction and requiring "full
restitution" before any petition for reinstatement. Joint exhibit C. 
10.
The specific facts of the representation, as found by the Special Master
and approved by the Georgia Supreme Court, are not disputed by 
2
Shiggs was comatose at the outset of the litigation and
died in December 1996.
3
The one exception noted that the Special Master had
found that Roberson "more likely" inflated estimated future
medical needs for his client by over $300,000 from $1,091,909--
a figure supplied via economist Dr. Barbara Bart--to $1,425,000
--a figure for which the Special Master found inadequate
support. Joint Exhibit B, pp. 496-497 and 727. The nine member
Review Panel, nevertheless, voted 8-0 with one abstention to
accept the Special Master's findings and recommendations. The
"more likely" issue is discussed further, infra. 
-11-
Roberson in these Maryland disciplinary proceedings.5  These may be
summarized as follows: 
B. 
Facts of representation
In August 1994, Julia Mae Shiggs ("Shiggs"), a 34 year old woman,
was admitted to Savannah's Memorial Medical Center ("the hospital") to give
birth to her fourth child. Ms. Shiggs experienced complications during a
Caesarian section and slipped into a coma from which she never awoke.6
SMR2 [Special Master’s Report]. 
Shortly thereafter, Michael Mydell (“Mydell”), Ms. Shiggs’ common-
law husband, contacted Roberson to file a medical malpractice suit on behalf
of Ms. Shiggs and a loss of consortium claim for himself. Special Master
Report ("SMR") 2-3.7 An Authority to Represent agreement (the "fee
agreement") was executed on September 28, 1994, in which Mydell retained
the services of Roberson for a 40% contingent fee. 
Roberson, in November 1995, with the permission of Mydell, hired
John Thomas Woodall ("Woodall"), another experienced trial attorney to assist
4
The Court's opinion made reference to the Special
Master's findings without remarking on the "more likely"
language. 
5
Roberson's Memorandum of Law points to no specific
facts disputed, but makes the conclusory allegation in the
language of Maryland Rule 16-773( e )(2) that there has been
"such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give
rise to a clear conviction that the Court, consistent with its duty,
cannot accept as final the determination of misconduct."
6
All references are to the per curiam opinion of the
Supreme Court of Georgia (joint exhibit C), unless otherwise
indicated. 
7
The findings of fact by the undersigned refer to the
Special Master's report's findings, incorporating by reference the
more specific references to trial transcript pages and exhibits
therein. While the entire Special Master's trial transcript was not
filed herein, the parties stipulated to excerpts of passages they
considered most material, which form part of the record as
supplemental exhibits no. 6A through 6D.
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with the litigation. However, Roberson and Woodall did not execute a written
agreement as to attorney's fees. Instead, they had a "gentleman's agreement"
according to Roberson and shook hands. SMR 5.  Woodall, it was understood,
would have no personal contact with Roberson's clients and would receive
instructions only from Roberson. 
Roberson and Woodall filed suit on April 14, 1995 and alleged counts
for medical malpractice and loss of consortium. SMR 5. However, in
September 1995, Roberson informed Mydell that the case expenses were
escalating and he needed to contribute $10,000 to the costs of prosecuting the
claims. SMR 6.  Mydell and Roberson then agreed to amend their Fee
Agreement when Mydell could not pay the $10,000. SMR 6. The new contract
between Mydell and Roberson on September 1, 1995, required that Roberson
receive 50% of the proceeds of any recovery in the case. SMR 6. 
On the eve of trial after learning that Mydell had impregnated another
women while his wife was still in a coma, Roberson decided that the loss of
consortium claim could adversely impact Ms. Shiggs' medical malpractice
claim.  Mydell subsequently agreed to dismiss his loss of consortium claim
after discussing this matter with Roberson. SM R 7. 
The trial began on January 16, 1996, and ended after six (6) days with
a settlement agreement on January 22, 1996. The settlement agreement
consisted of a collective cash payment of $3, 325,000 to be paid by defendants
within 72 hours to Roberson for Ms. Shiggs' benefit. Importantly, the
settlement agreement involved the participation of trial judge Gregory Fowler:
Roberson agreed that "court approval of any valuation [of services
provided in addition to the monetary payments] would be necessary."
SMR10 & 12; emphasis in original. 
Also, as part of the settlement agreement, the defendants insisted that
Mydell's and all Ms. Shiggs' four children's inchoate wrongful death claims be
released. SMR 14. Despite Mydell's stated misgivings and refusal to
participate, Roberson agreed and arranged the releases of the children's claims,
obtaining the local Probate Court's approval for this in July 1996. SMR 14-15.
Further supplementing the monetary aspects of the settlement
agreement, the hospital agreed to provide certain future medical services to
Ms. Shiggs. SMR 12. This would include all aspects of Ms. Shiggs' care,
including certain daily respiratory therapy & treatment. A value of these future
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services was required, in part, for the purpose of determining attorneys' fees.
SMR 12. The value of future services--of respiratory treatment only– had been
calculated for trial by Dr. Bart to be $1,091,909, based on the present value of
seven year's worth of respiratory expenses. SMR 13.8  This information was
provided on January 23, 1996, by Woodall9 to Roberson. 
Roberson, nevertheless, valued the future medical services in his
submission to the trial court at $1,425,000, using this figure in the Settlement
Statement which he presented to Mydel1 and filed with the Court. SMR 13-
14.10  Later in August 1996, when Roberson was asked for his documentation
of the $1,425,000 figure, Roberson: a) told Woodall that he (Roberson) "had
lost the papers"with the $1,425,000 figure; b) contended that $1,425,000, not
$1,091,909, was the figure that Woodall supplied and c) suggested to the trial
judge that the pages may have been switched without his consent. SMR 13, 30
and 33. 
To the contrary, Woodall testified, as to the August conversation with
Roberson, 
This is the first time in my life I had heard of
$1,425,000. I knew that I had only faxed him on
January whatever it was in 1996, I had only faxed
him a figure for respiratory therapy that was
$1,091,000, and I did not know what the
difference was either." SMR 30. 
Woodall got the impression from talking with Roberson that Roberson
received the increased figure directly from Dr. Bart; however, when Woodall
8
Although Ms. Shiggs' own neurologist testified that she
could be expected to live as long as 48 years, Woodall and Dr.
Bart chose a seven year period for calculating future services
because they believed it was a more reasonable and conservative
figure. SMR 13; Tr. 517, 1140-41. 
9
Woodall, by agreement with Roberson, acted as primary
trial attorney apparently with the responsibility of gathering
documentary evidence for trial. SMR 5. 
10
In his submission to the probate court, Roberson made no
reference to the provision of future medical care. SMR 22. 
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asked her, Dr. Bart informed Woodall that she had no other calculations and
had done none for Roberson directly. SMR 31. 
Knowing that the larger figure was necessary to justify the amount of
attorney's fees already distributed from the settlement proceeds, Woodall11 on
behalf of himself and Roberson asked Dr. Bart to sign an affidavit which made
up the approximately $300,000 difference between the future medical care
figures by assuming the need for additional hospital stays, if she was
"comfortable" with this. SMR 31. 
The Special Master also considered testimony as to the source of the
$1,425,000 calculation from Karen Alston, a paralegal formally employed by
Roberson. However, he rejected Ms. Alston's testimony as inconsistent and
containing too many "memory gaps." For example, Alston testified both 1) that
Roberson was her source of the $1,425,000 figure, which he wrote for her on
a scrap of paper and 2) that Woodall was her source of the figure, which he
"had to tell her how to write." SMR 13-14, note 7. 
Roberson complains that the Special Master found it "more likely" that
the increase between the $1,091,909 future medical bill and the $1,425,000
was added on by Roberson, arguing that this phrase indicates the Master
applied a mere "preponderance" standard of proof rather than the more
stringent and legally required "clear and convincing" standard. SMR 13. 
However, the undersigned finds that the "more likely" reference has been taken
out of context and misconstrued. In context, the undersigned finds that Special
Master infelicitously used this phrase simply to indicate that he gave no
credibility to Roberson's alternate explanations of how the $300,000
discrepancy arose. Upon summarizing the entirety of the evidence on this
point, it is plain that the Special Master found clear and convincing evidence
that Roberson had violated professional standards by "maintaining dishonest,
fraudulent, and deceitful records of the settlement...which contained willful
misrepresentations." SMR 38-42. Notably, the Georgia Review Panel approved
the Special Master's report, excepting and disagreeing that the evidence on this
point was simply "more likely"; instead, the Review Panel found “the evidence
is clear and convincing that Respondent Roberson increased the amount of
future medical services from $1,091,000 to $1,425,000 in order to enlarge the
11
Woodall also was subject to disciplinary proceedings in
Georgia. SMR 1.
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amount of attorneys' fees claimed . . . .” Joint Exhibit B, p. 727. The Georgia
Supreme Court in its per curium opinion, affirmed the Review Board's "clear
and convincing" evidence finding and made no reference to the Special
Master's "more likely" language. Joint Exhibit C. 
C.
Disbursements
During the settlement discussions, Roberson decided to establish a
"special needs trust" where a portion of the settlement funds could be set aside
free of Medicare or Medicaid liens. As a result, Roberson returned a $600,000
check received from the defendant doctor to his attorney, Greg Hodges, and
had it replaced with two checks: (1) a $400,000 check for the special needs
trust; and (2) a $200,000 check for the trust belonging to Ms. Shiggs'
children.12
Roberson had Hodges retain the checks until the trusts were set up and
could be funded, but Roberson never had the trusts funded and they remained
in Hodges' drawer until a new guardian was appointed. SMR 16. 
After the settlement was completed, Roberson paid Woodall $1,100,000
on January 26, 1996, which was paid from settlement funds held in trust prior
to court approval of the settlement. SMR 18-19. This payment was made,
despite Roberson's prior oral agreement with Woodall on a “flat fee” of
$1,000,000 for Woodall's services, irrespective of the amount recovered. 
On February 26, 1996, Roberson issued a check from his trust account
to Mydell in the amount of $151,359.33. Tr. 135-37.13  Roberson also did not
seek court approval prior to making this disbursement to Mydell. SMR 20. 
Further, Roberson made a payment from his trust account on February
16, 1996, in the amount of $30,000 to Mydell's sister Ms. Loretta Barnes
("Barnes") for the estimated value of her care of Ms. Shiggs' four children.
This payment also was made before the probate court approved the
disbursement. SMR 21. 
12
This trust was to be created as a part of the agreement
where the children would release any potential claims against
the defendants.
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In addition, Roberson wrote four checks to himself from his trust
account totaling $600,000 between January 31, 1996 and February 18, 1996.
SMR 21.14  Roberson also wrote four additional checks totaling $633,112 as
payment for the purchase of a church.15 Id.  Again, all these checks written by
Roberson to himself were made without court approval. SMR 22. 
Based [on] his aforementioned increase in the figure for future medical
fees, Roberson increased the amount of contingent attorney's fee claimed from
one-half of the cash settlement of $3,325,000 – i.e., $1,662,500 – to one-half
the larger settlement $4,750,000-- i.e., over $2,000,000 total. 
Eventually, Roberson and Woodall were sued by the administrator of
Ms. Shiggs' estate for legal malpractice and other claims related to the
settlement agreement. Woodall settled the claim against him obtaining a full
release for payment of $350,000. Roberson, after the disbarment order of the
Georgia Supreme Court, settled the estate's claim against him with payment of
$449,385.26. Stipulated Facts and Exhibits, esp. exhibit 19 dismissal, dated
April 19, 1999. 
II.
Conclusions of Law 
The undersigned finds that the Georgia disciplinary proceedings have
satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 16-773, which provides that "a
final adjudication in a disciplinary . . . proceeding by another court . . . that an
13
The reason for this payment by Roberson has varied. On
October 1, 1996, Roberson told Judge Fowler that the payment
was in exchange for Mydell's agreement to dismiss his loss of
consortium claim. SMR 15. However, at a later hearing,
Roberson stated that the payment represented a "guardianship
fee." SMR 20.
14
The Special Master also noted that Roberson made
inconsistent statements as to the use of the latter funds at two
different court hearings. SMR 21. 
15
Roberson is a minister as well as an attorney. Despite an
earlier invocation of 5th Amendment rights in this regard, he
admitted at the Special Master's hearing that he "donated" this
portion of his fees to purchase the Bull Street Church of Christ
in Chatham Co., Georgia. SMR 4 & 21. 
-17-
attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct . . . is conclusive evidence
of that misconduct in any [Maryland] proceeding . . . [unless the other court's
adjudication] was so lacking in notice or the opportunity to be heard as to
constitute a deprivation of due process . . . [or] there was such an infirmity of
proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to a clear conviction that the
Court . . . cannot accept as final the determination of misconduct. Maryland
Rule 16-773(e)(l), (e)(2), and (g).
A.
Due Process issues 
Roberson's two complaints as to his due process rights relate to the
denial of: 1) his motion for application of the superseded, stricter standard of
proof; and 2) his belated16 demand for a jury trial, also superseded by the
amended Georgia Bar Rule.
Initially, the undersigned notes that Maryland Rule 16-773 does not
reference the full gamut of due process issues, but rather limits challenges of
out-of-state proceedings to "notice" and "opportunity to be heard." There has
been no contention that Roberson lacked notice. And, the undersigned finds
that he clearly had the opportunity to be heard at three court levels: the Special
Master's hearing, the Review Board proceeding and the appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court. 
In effect, Roberson asserts that a "due process" opportunity to be heard
requires a jury trial for attorney disciplinary proceedings. To the contrary,
Maryland's Court of Appeals has agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court
decision herein that, while attorney disciplinary matters require basic due
process protections, such rights are not coextensive with the rights of criminal
defendants: neither findings "beyond a reasonable doubt," nor jury trial are
required See, as to jury trials, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kerpelman,
288 Md. 341 (1980), cert. den. 450 U.S. 970 (1981); see, as to comparison
with criminal proceedings, Maryland State Bar Association v. Sugarman, 273
Md. 306, at 315(1974), cert. den. 420 U.S. 974 (1975). 
16
Roberson's Motion for Jury Trial and for Reconsideration
was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia only on February
14,2001, after the conclusion of both the Special Master's and
Review Panel's proceedings. The Court denied this motion.
Stipulated Facts and Exhibits herein, paragraphs 14 through 17.
-18-
Roberson also suggests that the Georgia Supreme Court erred by
changing the procedural rights to which he was entitled by legislation and prior
rule after the alleged misconduct but before the filing of court action against
him. The inherent authority of Georgia's Supreme Court to regulate the
practice of law and the disciplinary proceedings as to lawyers has been found
properly to supersede the efforts of the state legislature in this area. As with
other constitutional challenges to the courts' authority to regulate attorneys, the
U.S. Supreme Court has declined to intervene in such matters. Wallace v.
Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E. 2d 718, cert. den. 396 U.S. 939 (1969). This
construction of the courts' disciplinary authority is identical to the Maryland
Court of Appeal's interpretation of its own authority. Cf., Annotated Code of
Maryland, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., sec. 1-201 and Petite v. Estate
of Papachrist, 219 Md. 173 (1959). 
B. 
Application of standards as to professional misconduct
Based on the factual findings discussed, supra, the undersigned has
found no "infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to a
clear conviction that the Court . . . cannot accept as final the determination of
misconduct." Maryland Rule 16-773. 
Following is a discussion of specific violations of Georgia Bar Rules: 17
17
As noted above, the undersigned has found that Georgia
and Maryland share substantially similar standards for attorneys'
professional conduct. For ease of comparison, an appendix is
attached and incorporated by reference herein which charts the
two states’ standards of professional conduct. [The referenced
appendix reflects the following:]
-19-
Corresponding Count
Maryland Rule
Georgia Standard
Count I - Conduct Involving
Dishonesty
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to: (a) vio late or attemp t to
violate the rules of professional
conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do  so, or do so
through acts of another
* * *
(c) engage in conduct involving
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
Standard 4 
A lawyer shall not engage in
professional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud deceit, or willful
misrepresentation. A violation of
this Standard may be punished by
disbarme nt.
Count II - Conflict of Interest 
Count V - Multiple Employment
Impairing Professional Judgment
Count VI- Willfully Disregarding a
Legal Ma tter Entrusted by Client 
Rule 1.7 C onflict of Interest 
(a) A lawyer sh all not represent a
client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to
another clien t unless: 
(1) the lawyer believes the
representa tion will not adversely
affect the relationship with the
other client; and 
(2) each client consents after
consultation. 
(b) A lawyer  shall not repre sent a
client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's respo nsibilities to
another client or third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests
unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be
adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after
consultation. 
(c) The consultation required by
paragrap hs (a) and (b ) shall
include explanation of the
implications of the common
representation and any limitations
resu lting  from  the lawyer's
responsibilities to another, or from
the lawyer's own interests, as well
as the advantages and risks
involved. 
Georgia Standard 30 
Except with the written consent or
written notice to  his client after full
disclosure a lawyer shall not
accept or continue em ployment if
the exercise of his professional
judgment on behalf of his client
will be or reasonably may be
affected by his o wn financial,
business, property or personal
interests. A violation of this
Standard may be punished by
disbarme nt. 
Georgia Standard 36 
A lawyer shall not continue
multiple employment if the
exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of
a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affec ted by his
representa tion of anothe r client,
except to the extent permitted
under Standard 37. A violation of
this Standard may be punished by
disbarme nt. 
-20-
Count III - Clearly Excessive Fees 
Rule 1.5(a) F ees 
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be
reasonable. The factors to be
considered in determining
reasonableness include the
following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the
novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and  the skill
requisite to perform the legal
service pro perly; 
(2) the likelihoo d, if apparent to
the client, that the acceptance of
the particular e mployme nt will
preclude other employment by the
lawyer; (3) the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar
legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the
results obtaine d; 
(5) the time limitation imposed by
the client or by the circumstan ces; 
(6) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the
client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent. 
Standard 31(a)
A lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement for, charge, or collect
an illegal or clea rly excessive fee. 
-21-
Count IV- Contingent Fee Shared
Improperly with Another Lawyer
Rule 1.5(c) F ees 
(i) A fee may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter for which
the service is rendered, except in a
matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited by paragraph (d) or
other law. T he terms of a
contingent fee agreement shall be
communicated to the  client in
writing. The c ommunic ation shall
state the method by which the fee
is to be determined, including the
percent or percentag es that shall
accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or a ppeal,
litigation and other expenses to be
deducted from the recovery, and
whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. Upon
conclusion of a contingent fee
matter, the lawyer shall provide the
client with a written statement
stating the outcome of the matter,
and if there is a recovery, showing
the remittance to the client and the
method o f its determination. 
Standard 31(d)(2) 
(2) Upo n conclusio n of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer
shall provide the client with a
written statement stating the
following: 
(i) the outcome of the matter; and
(ii) if there is a recov ery: 
(aa) the remittance to the clien t; 
(bb) the method of its
determination; (cc) the amount of
the attorney fee; and 
(dd) if the attorney's fee is divided
with another lawyer who is no t a
partner in or an associate of the
lawyer's firm or law office, the
amount of fee received by each
and the manner in which the
division is determined.
-22-
Count VII - Promptly Notifying
Client of Rec eipt of Funds 
Count VIII - M aintain Complete
Record o f Client's Funds 
Coun t IX - No t Accou nting for  All
Trust Funds
Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Pro perty
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of
clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer's possession in connection
with representation separate from
the lawyer's own property. Funds
shall be kept in a separate account
maintained pursuant to Title 16,
Chapter 600 of the Maryland
Rules. Other property shall be
identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded.
Complete records of such account
funds and o f other prop erty shall
be kept by the lawyer and shall be
preserved for a period of five years
after termination of the
representa tion. 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other
property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer
shall promptly notify the client or
third person. Except as stated in
this Rule or otherwise permitted by
law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer sha ll promptly
deliver to the client or third person
any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled
to receive and, upon request by the
client or third p erson, shall
promptly render a full accounting
regarding su ch property. 
Standard 63 
A lawyer shall m aintain complete
records of all funds, securities, and
other properties of a client coming
into the possession of the lawyer
and promptly rende r approp riate
accounts to his client regarding
them. A violation of this Standard
may be pu nished by disbarment. 
Standard 65(A ) 
A lawyer shall not comm ingle his
client's funds with his own, and
shall not fail to account for trust
property, including money and
interest paid o n the client's mone y,
if any, held in any fiduciary
capacity. 
Count I-conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or wilful
misrepresentation- (Georgia Bar Standard 4) 
On this point, the Special Master's report stated “As to [two points]
only, the record is devoid of clear and convincing evidence of any violation by
Roberson as a matter of law.” SMR 39. Phrased in the positive, the Special
Master found clear and convincing evidence on various points as to
unprofessional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or wilful
misrepresentation as to: 
a) representing to client Mydell that the [actual] value of future
medical services for Ms. Shiggs was $1,425,000 [despite
-23-
absence of any documentation or specific evidence of this]; 
b) representing to the Chatham County Probate and State courts
that the value of future medical services was $1,425,000
[despite absence of any documentation or specific evidence of
this]; 
c) providing false and misleading assumptions to [economist]
Dr. Bart [for use in an affidavit as to estimated future medical
expenses]; and 
d) paying [Mydell and his sister] money belonging to Ms.
Shiggs [while not properly disclosing the basis for such
payments for the courts' approval]. SMR 20-21, 38-42. 
Count II-conflict of Interest - (Georgia Bar Standard 30) 
Related to the inflation of future medical bills, the Special Master found
that Roberson failed to disclose a conflict of interest when he did not tell his
client that this valuation question might result in an increase of counsel fees
in Roberson's interest and to the detriment of the client. SMR 43-44. 
Count III-clearly excessive fee - (Georgia Bar Standard 31.a. ) 
The initial contingent fee was increased from 40% to 50% of all
amounts recovered. With the inclusion of future medical services' valuation,
which were not yet provided, the attorneys' fee share of actual cash again was
boosted to 72%. SMR 44-45. 
The Georgia Supreme Court found that this percent was excessive and
Maryland similarly has held this level of contingency fee generally is
excessive. The Court of Appeals has stated that "it is generally a violation of
the rule for the attorney's stake in the result to exceed the client's stake."
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 649, 569
A.2d 1224, 1226 (1990). 
Count IV-contingent fee shared improperly with another lawyer-
(Georgia Bar Standard 31.d.) 
The Georgia standard, like the Maryland rule, as to disclosure of
contingent fee arrangements with other counsel, required a written statement
to be provided to the client of all details. This was not done. SMR 45-46. 
-24-
Count V-multiple employment impairing professional judgment- (Georgia
Bar Standard 36) 
Roberson provided multiple representation in this case by concurrent
representation of: Ms. Shiggs, her common law husband Mydell-both
individually and as Ms. Shiggs' guardian, as well as Ms. Shiggs' children,
although there was no written agreement as to representation or attorney's fees
as to the children. SMR 46-49; Stipulation, pp. 529-531. 
It is clear that Roberson's professional judgment was impaired in this
multiple representation context in that: 1) he paid Mydell and his sister a
portion of these settlement funds without prior court authorization, and 2) he
failed to complete arrangements agreed upon to deposit a portion of settlement
funds into trust for benefit of the children. Id.  The lack of court authorization
of payments to Mydell and his sister is significant in that there was no showing
required that the amounts of these-payments were proportional to any actual
services rendered, rather than being an arbitrary amount which would serve to
dissuade these witnesses from raising questions about any other settlement
issue. SMR 41, 49 and 52. 
Count VI-wilfully disregarding a legal matter entrusted by client -
(Georgia Bar Standard 44) 
During settlement discussions with defendants' counsel, Roberson
decided to ask that a "special needs" trust be established for benefit of Ms.
Shiggs' children to avoid Medicare or Medicaid liens. For this reason,
Roberson returned a $600,000 settlement check received from the defendant
doctor to his attorney, Greg Hodges, and had it replaced with two checks: 1)
a $400,000 check for the special needs trust; and 2) a $200,000 check for the
trust belonging to Ms. Shiggs' children.18  Roberson had Hodges retain the
checks until the trusts were set up and could be funded (Tr. 424-25), but
Roberson never had the trusts funded and they remained in Hodges' drawer
until a new guardian was appointed. SMR 16. This clearly constituted
abandonment of a matter for which Roberson has assumed responsibility. SMR
48-50. 
18
This trust was to be created as a part of the agreement
where the children would release any potential claims against
the defendants. 
-25-
Count VII- failure to promptly notify and deliver to the client funds
received for her - (Georgia Bar Standard 61) 
Roberson clearly violated this standard by: 1) failure to deposit the
$600,000 funds left in the hands of the defendant doctor's attorney, 2)
improper payment of the client's settlement funds to Mydell and his sister, and
3) the excessive counsel fees taken by Roberson himself and his co-counsel
Woodall. SMR 50. 
Count VIII-failure to maintain complete record of client's funds -
(Georgia Bar Standard 63) 
Roberson, beyond the original Settlement Statement, kept no records of
funds' receipt and disbursement other than bank statements and cancelled
checks. As found by the Special Master, "it is impossible to tell [from these
bank records] how much money Roberson received on [the client’s] behalf and
where it all went." SMR 51. The settlement statement falsely reflected that
Roberson received the $600,000 on behalf of the children, as he actually
returned these funds, and that Roberson paid an attorney $15,000 to set up the
children's trust, as he never actually made this payment. SMR 52. 
Count IX-not accounting for all trust funds - (Georgia Bar Standard 65.a. ) 
Roberson provided no accounting to Ms. Shiggs or her guardian for the
settlement funds which he, as her attorney, held in trust. SMR 53. 
III.
Mitigation
Initially, the undersigned notes that little attention was paid to
mitigation in the Georgia proceedings herein. Both the Special Master and the
Georgia Supreme Court refer to "non mitigating factors" based upon "the facts
found." The "facts found" all relate to the specifics as to the occurrence of the
disciplinary infractions. SMR 53; Joint Exhibit C, p. 9. 
Maryland has a somewhat broader view of mitigation, which may
include an attorney's lack of prior record and his community involvement. E.g.,
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bereano, 357 Md. 321 (2000). Maryland
Rule 16-757(b) permits an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding to provide
proof of mitigating facts by a preponderance of evidence. 
-26-
Here, the undersigned finds the following mitigating evidence:
Roberson is an attorney who practiced for nearly 25 years without a prior
report of professional misconduct. This career has included public service as
a federal prosecutor, as a volunteer attorney in Georgia's Pro Bono Project, and
as a Continuing Legal Education faculty member. He has received honors and
recognition from the NAACP, Savannah State College (now Savannah State
University), the Savannah Legal Secretaries' Association, and other
organizations. He has donated little league football uniforms and offered
$35,000 initial funding for a scholarship endowment. Joint Exhibit A. 
Of particular significance to this case, Roberson now has completed a
settlement as to restitution claims of his late client's estate with a payment of
$449, 385.26 and the estate has released its claims against him. Id., exhibits
17-19. 
Kimberly Copeland, Esq., appeared at the Maryland hearing, testifying
that she is a member of the Georgia bar and is president-elect of the Georgia
Alliance of African-American Attorneys.  In addition to praising Roberson for
his good character and his reputation as “an outstanding attorney,” Ms.
Copeland reported statistics as to a disparity of Georgia attorney disciplinary
proceedings against African-American attorneys. She related that, of
approximately 28,000 attorneys admitted to practice in the state, only about
1,500 or 5% are African-Americans. Despite this, she reported that 30% of
those disbarred are African-Americans--that is, six times the rate for other
attorneys. 
Finally, the undersigned notes that Respondent offered scant indication
of remorse at the Maryland hearing and that there is no evidence of this in the
Georgia record. 
Having reviewed this evidence, the undersigned shares questions about
the disproportionate disciplinary statistics of our sister state. Yet, Roberson's
high level of professional success suggests that he has no need of affirmative
action; the substantial quality of the evidence supporting the disciplinary
action, only peremptorily disputed, makes racial discrimination unlikely.
Despite the extensive mitigation, the undersigned concludes that the broad
array of professional misconduct in this serious matter calls for substantial
disciplinary action such as disbarment or suspension and recommends this. 
-27-
Judge Caroom, then, determined that the Respondent violated MPPC 8.4(a) and (c)
(Misconduct), MRPC 1.7(a),(b) and (c) (Conflict of Interest), MRPC 1.5(a) (Clearly
Excessive Fees), MRPC 1.5(i) (Contingent Fee), and MRPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property)
based upon his finding that the Georgia disciplinary proceeding and the adjudication of guilt
of misconduct satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 16-773 and were “conclusive
evidence” of the misconduct.
Bar Counsel took no exceptions to Judge Caroom’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law.  On December 26, 2002, Respondent filed belated exceptions in this Court, iterating
complaints which he had previously registered with the hearing court and, additionally,
professing his remorse.  Those earlier complaints involved the standard of proof applied in
the Georgia proceeding, Roberson’s rejected demand for a jury trial in the Georgia
proceeding, and the procedural rules that were adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court after
the misconduct occurred but before the action was filed.  Maryland Rule 16-773(g), by its
terms, limits challenges to the original adjudication in reciprocal discipline cases to “notice
and opportunity to be heard” or “infirmity of proof.”  This Court, even prior to the adoption
of this Rule, has recognized that Respondent is not allowed to collaterally attack either the
findings of fact or the judgment rendered by the original jurisdiction.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 81, 710 A.2d 926, 932-33 (1998).  Further, Respondent’s
remorse, although a factor that may be considered in fashioning a sanction, see Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368 Md. 419, 430, 795 A. 2d 706, 712 (2002), also does not
-28-
come within an exception to the mandate of reciprocal discipline when properly proven.
Respondent’s exceptions are, therefore, overruled.
Turning to the appropriate sanction, Bar Counsel has recommended that Respondent
be disbarred from the practice of law as he was in the State of Georgia.  Respondent has
requested that we consider a twelve-month suspension, with reinstatement conditioned upon
one or all of the following:
A.
Successfully completing a course in Legal Ethics [Course to be
approved by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
or this Court];
B.
If the Respondent re-enters the practice of law, appoint a
monitor of all trust account activity for the period of one (1) year
from the date the Respondent re-enters the practice of law [The
monitor to be appointed by this Court or the Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland]; and
C.
If the Respondent re-enters the practice of law, require him to
perform a set number of hours annually for two (2) years in pro
bono representation; such pro bono clients to be assigned by
Maryland Legal Aid or other entity engaged in indigent
representation in the State of Maryland.
This Court very recently reinforced its attitude toward imposition of sanction in a
reciprocal discipline case in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ruffin, 369 Md. 238, 253-254,
798 A. 2d 1139, 1148 (2002):
We are prone, see Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Sabghir, 350 Md.
67, 83, 710 A.2d 926, 934 (1998); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v.
Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 365-66, 712 A.2d 525, 530-31
(1998), but not required, see Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Gittens,
346 Md. 316, 324, 697 A.2d 83, 87 (1997), to impose the same
sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct
occurred.  Indeed, the Court is duty-bound to assess for itself the
propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and
-29-
that recommended by the Commission, Gittens, 346 Md. at 326,
697 A.2d at 88, to look not only to the sanction imposed by the
other jurisdiction, but to the particular facts and circumstances
of each case, the outcome being dependent upon the latter, but
with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar
misconduct.  Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217,
222, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995) (quoting Attorney Griev.
Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325, 330
(1987)); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Saul, 337 Md. 258, 267-68,
653 A.2d 430, 434-35 (1995).  We ordinarily will defer to the
sanctioning State when the two States' purpose in disciplining
counsel is the same. Id. at 327, 697 A.2d at 88 (footnote
omitted).
The State of Georgia, similar to Maryland, views the protection of the public as one
of the purposes of attorney discipline.  This view is evident in In re Calhoun, 268 Ga. 675,
677, 492 S.E. 2d 514, 515 (1997), where the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred an attorney
“in order to protect the public from improprieties that injure the public’s trust in the attorney-
client relationship.”  See also In re Allison, 267 Ga. 638, 642, 481 S.E.2d 211, 215 (1997)
(recognizing that “the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings . . . is to protect the public
from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to incompetence or unprofessional
conduct”).
As a result, deferral to the discipline imposed in Georgia is appropriate.  As we have
noted, Respondent has not demonstrated by “clear and convincing evidence” that his
defenses are within the exceptional circumstances of Rule 16-773(e), nor do the mitigating
circumstances found by the hearing judge provide sufficient bases for a lesser sanction than
was entered in Georgia.  In Sabghir, we stated:
-30-
When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of
reciprocal discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed
by the other jurisdiction but to our own cases as well. The
sanction will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of
each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for
similar misconduct.
350 Md. at 83-84, 710 A.2d at 934 (quoting Willcher, 340 Md. at 222, 665 A.2d at 1061
(quoting Parsons, 310 Md. at 142, 527 A.2d at 330)).  Respondent, although without
disciplinary blemish in Georgia or Maryland prior to these proceedings, was found guilty of
some of the most egregious misconduct, involving dishonesty, impairment of professional
judgment, charging a clearly excessive fee, wilful disregard of a legal matter, and theft of
client funds, among others.  In similar situations, we have disbarred other attorneys who have
committed such misconduct.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md.
467, 609-10, 813 A.2d 1145, 1170-71 (2002) (disbarring an attorney for professional
misconduct, including theft of client funds, charging clearly excessive fees, and self-dealing);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568-72, 810 A.2d 487, 491-94 (2002)
(disbarring attorney for theft from his real estate partners despite the attorney’s previously
unblemished twenty-eight year practice);  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md.
208, 219-225, 768 A.2d 607, 613-16 (2001) (disbarring attorney for numerous violations of
MRPC for conduct involving deceit, the failure to communicate a contingent fee agreement
in writing, and the misappropriation of client funds); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Morris,
298 Md. 299, 307-08, 469 A.2d 853, 857 (1984) (disbarring for attorney misconduct, such
as charging clearly excessive fees, misrepresenting the amount of services rendered on a
-31-
client bill, and attempting to bill a client for services rendered for another client).
We conclude that deferring to the jurisdiction where the misconduct occurred is
appropriate in this case and that the appropriate sanction in this case is that imposed by the
Supreme Court of Georgia, namely, disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761,
FOR 
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
G R I E V A N C E  
C O M M IS S I O N  
O F
M A R Y L A N D  
A G A I N S T  
D A V I D
ROBERSON.