Title: Parker v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Parker v. State1994 WY 108882 P.2d 1225Case Number: 93-37Decided: 10/12/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Glen 
M. PARKER,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Glen 
M. Parker, pro se.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Pros. Assistance Program, and 
Edna Young, Student Intern.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY** 
and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of conference.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Glen 
M. Parker (Parker), pled guilty to two counts of incest. After he had begun 
serving consecutive sentences for his admitted crimes, Parker challenged the 
legality of the sentences. Acting on a motion to correct an illegal sentence, 
the district court credited Parker with time served in presentence incarceration 
and denied all other relief. Parker claims the district court 
erred.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      The pro se brief 
Parker filed with this court generally identifies four issues on appeal: (1) 
whether the district court erred in its ruling on the motion to correct an 
illegal sentence; (2) whether the district court acted without jurisdiction 
because the victim delayed reporting the crimes; (3) whether the district erred 
in imposing consecutive sentences in violation of double jeopardy provisions; 
and (4) whether ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an illegal and 
unconstitutional sentence.

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      On February 14, 
1989, Parker pled guilty to two counts of incest. Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-402(a)(ii) 
(1977 & Supp. 1987). See Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-402 (1988 & Supp. 
1994). The district court sentenced Parker to serve a term of not less than four 
nor more than five years on each count at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The 
sentences were to be served consecutively.

[¶5]      On June 9, 1992, 
Parker filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In addition to a request 
for credit for presentence incarceration time, Parker asserted that his 
sentences were illegal. Parker claimed the district court acted without 
jurisdiction because the victim failed to make a timely report of the crimes to 
law enforcement officials. Parker also contended that his consecutive sentences 
violated double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 
Finally, he claimed his sentences were illegal and unconstitutional due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.

[¶6]      Following a 
hearing, the district court ordered that Parker receive a credit of fifty-eight 
days off the minimum and maximum terms of his sentences for time served in 
presentence incarceration. The district court denied any additional relief. In 
its order, the district court addressed the issues raised by Parker and 
found:

1. 
The Court did not lose jurisdiction over the criminal offense due to passage of 
time.

2. 
Defendant's consecutive sentencing did not violate the double jeopardy clauses 
of either the State or Federal Constitutions.

3. 
The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly before the Court 
because it is not proper to bring it under [W.R.Cr.P. 35].

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Wyoming law 
provides a procedure to correct an illegal sentence.

Rule 
35. Correction or reduction of sentence.

(a) 
Correction. - The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Additionally the court may correct, reduce, or modify a sentence within the time 
and in the manner provided herein for the reduction of 
sentence.

(b) 
Reduction. - A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may 
reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the sentence is imposed 
or probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the court of a 
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or 
within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of 
conviction or probation revocation. The court shall determine the motion within 
a reasonable time. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a 
grant of probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under 
this subdivision. The court may determine the motion with or without a 
hearing.

W.R.Cr.P. 
35 (hereinafter Rule 35). A motion to correct an illegal sentence, particularly 
one under Rule 35(b), is addressed to the sound discretion of the district 
court; however, if the sentence is ab initio illegal, discretion is 
limited. Ramirez v. State, 800 P.2d 503, 504 (Wyo. 1990); Peper v. 
State, 776 P.2d 761, 761 (Wyo. 1989); Peterson v. State, 706 P.2d 276, 278 (Wyo. 1985). The motion Parker filed with the district court was 
brought under the provision of Rule 35(a) which permits the court to correct an 
illegal sentence at any time. Therefore, the one year jurisdictional time limit 
of Rule 35(b) does not apply.

[¶8]      Inherent in the 
language of Rule 35(a) is a distinction between an "illegal sentence" and other 
potential problems in sentencing, such as a sentence which is imposed in an 
illegal manner. In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430, 82 S. Ct. 468, 472, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States addressed 
this distinction. As Hill was being sentenced for two federal convictions, the 
trial court failed to ask if Hill wished to make a statement on his own behalf. 
Id. at 425, 82 S. Ct.  at 469. See W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C). Hill 
sought relief from his sentences in a collateral attack. The court held that the 
"narrow function" of a motion to correct an illegal sentence "is to permit 
correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors 
occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of 
sentence." Hill, 368 U.S.  at 430, 82 S. Ct.  at 472 (emphasis in 
original).

[¶9]      This court has 
recognized that an "illegal sentence" is one that exceeds the relevant statutory 
maximum. Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Wyo. 1984). We have also 
recognized an illegal sentence as one which orders post incarceration 
restitution absent statutory authority. Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 
247-48 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). In Ramirez, 800 P.2d  at 504, we held that a district 
court abused its discretion by failing to grant a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. The illegal sentence resulted from the failure to grant credit for 
presentence incarceration time as required by our decision in Renfro v. 
State, 785 P.2d 491, 498-99 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶10]   The district court correctly ruled 
that Parker was entitled to fifty-eight days of credit for presentence 
incarceration time. Id. The judgment and sentences originally failed to 
award credit for presentence incarceration time. To that extent, the sentences 
were illegal under Wyoming law and correction was permitted by a motion under 
Rule 35(a). Ramirez, 800 P.2d  at 504. However, Parker contends the 
district court erred by denying additional relief.

[¶11]   Parker initially challenges the 
district court's jurisdiction to impose any sentences due to the delay between 
the criminal acts and the victim's report to the police. On April 29, 1988, the 
victim reported to the Casper, Wyoming Police Department that she had been 
sexually assaulted by Parker on numerous occasions. The most recent assault 
occurred in August of 1983. After investigating the report, Fremont County, 
Wyoming authorities filed a criminal complaint against Parker on May 26, 
1988.

[¶12]   Wyoming has no statute of 
limitations governing prosecution of criminal offenses. Story v. State, 
721 P.2d 1020, 1026-27 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 
93 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986). "Where no statute of limitations pertaining to criminal 
offenses has been adopted, prosecution for such an offense may be commenced at 
any time during the life of the offender." Id. at 1026. Therefore, under 
Wyoming law, the sentencing was not barred by any statute of limitation. 
Remaining claims of error related to non-jurisdictional defenses and objections 
to pretrial proceedings were waived when Parker changed his pleas to guilty. 
Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Wyo. 1993). Additionally, these 
claims of error could not be addressed under a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. Hill, 368 U.S.  at 430, 82 S. Ct.  at 472.

[¶13]   In Hill, the United States 
Supreme Court identified an illegal sentence as a sentence which is in excess of 
the relevant statutory provision; a sentence which violates double jeopardy 
provisions by imposing multiple terms for the same offense; or a sentence where 
the language of the sentence itself is legally or constitutionally invalid in 
some other respect. Hill, 368 U.S.  at 430, 82 S. Ct.  at 472. See 
also, 8A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 35.07[2] (2nd 
ed. 1991). The language of the former federal rule of criminal procedure at 
issue in Hill, was identical to the pertinent provision in W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a). Hill, 368 U.S.  at 430 n. 7, 82 S. Ct.  at 472 n. 7. See Mehring 
v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1107 (Wyo. 1993) (recognizing that "[i]n adopting 
rules which are substantially similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, this court has traditionally given great weight to relevant precedent 
from federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States."). 
Recently, however, in DeSpain v. State, 865 P.2d 584, 588-89 (Wyo. 1993), 
this court held that claims alleging a violation of double jeopardy were not 
cognizable under the language of W.R.Cr.P. 35. Instead, such challenges must be 
brought as a petition for post-conviction relief under Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-14-101 to 
7-14-108 (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1994). DeSpain, 865 P.2d  at 589. Parker 
filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence and this appeal prior to the 
publication of DeSpain. We need not address, however, whether 
DeSpain will be given only prospective or retrospective application. 
See Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 601-03 (Wyo. 1993) (discussing 
rules for retrospective application of decisions). Our analysis of the 
substantive challenge brought by Parker reveals no infringement of double 
jeopardy provisions.

[¶14]   Parker argues that his consecutive 
sentences violate double jeopardy provisions against multiple punishments for 
the same offense. Parker contends that since he committed two acts of sexual 
intrusion at the same time and place, the sentences imposed for those crimes 
should be merged. See Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 943-44 (Wyo. 1992). 
We disagree.

[¶15]   The Fifth Amendment provision 
against double jeopardy as enforced against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides three separate constitutional guarantees. Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). "It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And 
it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 
(1969) (footnotes omitted). Wyoming's double jeopardy provision assures the same 
guarantees as the federal constitution. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 
1129 (Wyo. 1993); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 68 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983); Wyo.Const. art. 
1, § 11.

[¶16]   "The court that exceeds its own 
authority by imposing multiple punishments not legislatively authorized violates 
the guarantee against double jeopardy." Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1131. This 
court has previously determined that the Wyoming legislature intended to define 
sexual intercourse, fellatio and other acts of sexual intrusion as "separate 
and distinct crimes * * *." Padilla v. State, 601 P.2d 189, 193 (Wyo. 
1979) (emphasis added). In Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987), 
we held that separate and distinct acts of sexual intrusion, even ones separated 
in time only by a matter of seconds, could properly be punished as separate 
crimes without violating double jeopardy provisions.

[¶17]   When Parker changed his pleas, he 
entered pleas of guilty to two separate counts of incest based on two separate 
acts of sexual intrusion that occurred in August of 1983. One count involved the 
sexual intrusion of sexual intercourse, the other count involved the sexual 
intrusion of fellatio. While both crimes involved the same situation, sexual 
intercourse and fellatio are two separate and distinct crimes. Padilla, 
601 P.2d  at 193. "As used in the Double Jeopardy Clause, `same offense' means 
`the same crime, not the same transaction, acts, circumstances, or situation.'" 
Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Black's 
Law Dictionary 1081 (6th ed. 1990)). Therefore, each act constituted a separate 
crime for which Parker could be separately sentenced without violating double 
jeopardy provisions. Baum, 745 P.2d  at 882.

[¶18]   Finally, Parker declares that his 
Sixth Amendment rights have been violated due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Parker specifically complains that his counsel failed to investigate a 
possible alibi defense. Actions commenced under Rule 35 are limited to the 
"narrow function" of correcting an illegal sentence and do not permit inquiry 
into potential errors in proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. 
Hill, 368 U.S.  at 430, 82 S. Ct.  at 472. Parker has chosen the wrong 
procedure to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before this 
court and we decline to address the issue.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶19]   The district court properly 
credited Parker with fifty-eight days of presentence incarceration time. 
However, Parker was not entitled to any other relief. The procedure by which an 
illegal sentence is corrected imposes restrictions on the district court's 
ability to consider claims of error. Rule 35 does not provide a means for 
collateral attack of a conviction and a legal sentence. Rule 35 is not a 
substitute for an appeal as of right or appropriate post-conviction relief 
measures.

[¶20]   We affirm.