Title: Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CUERVO 
ET 
AL., APPELLEES, v. CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, 
APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Insurance — Incidents of intentional acts of sexual molestation of a 
minor do not constitute “occurrences” for purposes of determining 
liability insurance coverage — Public policy precludes issuance of 
insurance to provide liability coverage for injuries resulting from 
intentional acts of sexual molestation of a minor. 
(No. 94-2404 — Submitted January 23, 1996 — Decided July 3, 1996.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franlin County, No. 93APE12-
1715. 
 
On August 31, 1989, Armando and Cathy Cuervo, the parents of 
A.C., age eight, and his sister, C.C., age six, filed suit on their own 
behalf, and on behalf of their children, naming Peter Snell, a minor, and 
his father, Stephen Snell, defendants.  The plaintiffs sought to recover 
damages from Peter based on alleged acts of child sexual abuse 
committed by him while baby-sitting A.C. and C.C. in 1985, when Peter 
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was sixteen years of age.  In addition, the plaintiffs sought recovery 
from Stephen, based on his alleged negligence in advertising Peter to 
be a competent sitter, and in failing to properly supervise his son.  The 
complaint alleged that both A.C. and C.C. had suffered physical injuries, 
and emotional and psychological damage, as a result of the defendant’s 
conduct.  It further alleged that the Cuervo parents had suffered 
compensable mental anguish and suffering.  
 
Appellant, Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”), had 
issued a homeowner’s insurance policy to Stephen which provided 
personal liability coverage to the Snells during the time of the alleged 
sexual molestation.  The Snells were duly served with a summons and 
copy of the complaint and amended complaint.  There is no evidence in 
the record that the Snells ever requested Cincinnati to provide them with 
a defense to the lawsuit filed by the Cuervos.  Instead, the Snells 
invoked the services of several Ohio attorneys to represent them in the 
suit brought by the Cuervos, one of whom appeared for the limited 
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purpose of challenging the sufficiency of the complaint.  The Snells’ 
other attorney advised them that, in his opinion, the Cuervos lawsuit did 
not fall within the coverage provided by the Cincinnati homeowner’s 
policy. 
 
Ultimately, the court entered default judgments against Peter and 
Stephen, finding them liable as alleged in an amended complaint filed 
by the Cuervos.  After the plaintiffs offered evidence of their damages, 
the court entered final judgment awarding $100,000 to A.C., $100,000 
to C.C., and $62,248.85 to the Cuervo parents.  No appeal was taken 
from the entry of this final judgment on June 7, 1991. 
 
In 1992 the Cuervos filed a new and separate action, naming 
defendant-appellant Cincinnati Insurance Company, and seeking 
satisfaction of the judgments obtained against the Snells from Cincinnati 
based on the homeowner’s policy.  Both the Cuervos and Cincinnati 
filed motions seeking summary judgment.  Cincinnati’s motion was 
based upon its contentions that (1) the Snell judgment did not fall within 
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the coverage provided by Stephen’s homeowner’s insurance policy, as it 
came under an “intended injury” exclusion; (2) the judgment was not for 
“bodily injury” or ”property damage” within the meaning of the policy; 
and (3) Cincinnati was not liable on the judgment, in that it was obtained 
without notice to it.  Cincinnati also asserted that the Cuervos did not 
seek collection from it by following the supplemental petition procedures 
established by R.C. 3929.06. 
 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati, finding 
that the policy it had issued to Stephen did not create an obligation on 
its part to satisfy the judgments entered against either Peter or Stephen. 
 
The court of appeals reversed, finding that “as to the liability of 
Stephen Snell, there is coverage since there is nothing in the evidence 
indicating that he intended any bodily injury to occur to the minor 
children” by his alleged negligent supervision of Peter.  Thus, the court 
of appeals reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Cincinnati as to the 
obligation to pay the judgment entered against Peter, finding that 
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coverage would exist if Peter had not intended to harm the Cuervo 
children, and that issues as to Peter’s intent and state of mind 
presented questions of fact which could not be resolved by summary 
judgment.  The court of appeals remanded for a determination of Peter’s 
intent. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Charles E. Brant and Terri B. 
Gregori, for appellees. 
 
Lane, Alton & Horst and Karen Krisher Rosenberg, for appellant. 
 
 
Moyer, C.J.     Cincinnati Insurance Company has abandoned its 
argument below that the Cuervos could only use the supplemental 
petition procedures established by R.C. 3929.06 to collect the amounts 
awarded to them from Cincinnati, the Snells’ insurer.  Without 
expressing any opinion concerning the merits of that argument, and 
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without condoning the procedure used by the Cuervos in filing a new, 
separate action, rather than filing a supplemental petition in the action 
brought against the insureds, we deem any error which may have 
occurred arising out of this procedural choice to have been waived. 
 
In Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1996), ____ Ohio St.3d ___, 
___ N.E.2d ___, decided this date, we held that incidents of intentional 
acts of sexual molestation of a minor do not constitute “occurrences” for 
purposes of determining insurance coverage; that intent to harm 
inconsistent with an insurable incident is properly inferred as a matter of 
law from deliberate acts of sexual molestation of a minor; and that the 
public policy of the state of Ohio, which prohibits the issuance of 
insurance to indemnify damages flowing from intentional torts, 
precludes issuance of insurance to provide liability coverage for injuries 
resulting from intentional acts of sexual molestation of a minor. 
 
Gearing’s holdings require that we reverse the court of appeals 
which remanded the instant cause for determination of Peter Snell’s 
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actual intent.  Pursuant to Gearing, it makes no difference whether 
Peter lacked a subjective intent to harm the Cuervo children (and no 
question has been raised as to Peter’s capacity, as a sixteen year old, 
to commit an intentional act.  Cf.  Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Kollstedt Estate 
[1995], 71 Ohio St.3d 624, 646 N.E.2d 816.)  Therefore, the trial court 
properly entered summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati as to its 
alleged obligation to pay the judgment awarded against Peter Snell. 
 
Similarly, the damages for which the Cuervos seek compensation 
flow from Peter’s intentional acts of sexual molestation of a minor.  
Thus, and on this record, the obligation of Cincinnati to pay  the 
judgment entered against his father, Stephen, is precluded as well.  See 
Gearing, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  See, also, Taryn v. Joshua 
(1993), 178 Wis.2d 719, 505 N.W. 2d 418; Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Norgard (N.D.1994), 518 N.W. 2d 179, 184; Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Washington v. Hembree (1989), 54 Wash. App. 195, 773 P.2d 105. 
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For the above reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, WISE and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
 
JOHN W. WISE, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, 
J. 
 
TERRENCE O’DONNELL, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
COOK, J.