Title: Rowland v. Shurbutt

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,∗ Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
LINDA ROWLAND 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 990923 
March 3, 2000 
 
EDWARD DAVID SHURBUTT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
Russell I. Townsend, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This is the appeal of an order granting a natural father's 
petition to change the surname of his minor child.  The central 
issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial 
court's ruling. 
 
The facts, considered during a March 1998 hearing, are not 
disputed.  The only testimonial evidence presented was the 
deposition of a psychiatrist, who had been employed by the 
father. 
 
The child, a male, was born in Norfolk on September 3, 
1991.  His mother, residing in Chesapeake, is appellant Linda 
Grant Rowland.  His father, residing in Virginia Beach, is 
appellee Edward David Shurbutt. 
 
When the child was conceived, the mother was not married to 
the father and was separated from her spouse.  When the child 
was born, the mother and her husband had reconciled and the 
child was given the surname "Rowland," a name he still carries. 
                     
∗ Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
 
Since birth, the child has been in the physical custody of 
his mother.  Court orders provide, however, that both parents 
have "joint legal custody" of the child.  The parents have been 
litigating issues concerning child custody, child support, and 
visitation most of the child's life. 
 
In March 1998, the father filed duplicate petitions in the 
court below to change his child's surname to "Shurbutt."  The 
father asserted that he desired to change the name in order "to 
prevent confusion and difficulty in the transaction of the minor 
child's lawful affairs" and that the name change would be in the 
child's best interest.  The mother objected to the proposed 
change. 
 
Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that the 
child's best interest would be served by granting the father's 
petition.  In a February 1999 order, from which we awarded the 
mother this appeal, the court ruled that the child's name be 
changed as requested, finding that "good cause was shown for 
this action."  The court also ruled, however, that the child's 
name remain unchanged pending appeal. 
 
On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court erred 
in ordering the name change because the evidence was 
insufficient to support the order.  The father, while contending 
                                                                  
February 2, 2000. 
 
2
the evidence was sufficient to support the order, also argues 
that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
 
We shall address the jurisdictional question first.  
Although not argued orally, the father contends on brief that 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, not this Court, has 
jurisdiction of this appeal.  He points out that Code § 17.1-
405(3)(e) provides that appeals of circuit court orders relating 
to the "control or disposition of a child" must be made to the 
Court of Appeals.  This is such a proceeding, he says, and the 
appeal should be dismissed.  We do not agree. 
 
Ordinarily, a proceeding under the change-of-name statute, 
Code § 8.01-217, is an independent civil action.  But see Code 
§ 20-121.4 (permitting divorce court to restore party's former 
name as part of final decree of divorce from bond of matrimony).  
Although the present matter, brought as a separate proceeding 
detached from any custody or support litigation, obviously 
relates to a child, it does not involve the "control or 
disposition of a child," within the meaning of Code § 17.1-
405(3)(e). 
 
An order in an independent civil action changing a name, 
including that of a child, is "a final judgment" in a "civil 
case," within the meaning of Code § 8.01-670(A)(3), which 
provides for appeal of such an order to this Court.  Thus, we 
properly have taken jurisdiction in this matter. 
 
3
 
We shall now turn to the central issue, that is, whether 
the evidence was sufficient to support the name change. 
 
As pertinent to this proceeding, Code § 8.01-217 provides 
that any person desiring to change his child's name may apply to 
the appropriate circuit court, "which shall consider such 
application if it finds that good cause exists therefor under 
the circumstances alleged."  The statute further provides that 
when both of the child's parents are living and when the parent 
who does not join in the application objects to the proposed 
change, "a hearing shall be held to determine whether the change 
of name is in the best interest of the minor."  The statute 
further provides that unless the court finds that the change of 
a minor's name "is not in the best interest of the minor," the 
court shall "order a change of name." 
 
We have interpreted these statutory provisions to mean that 
the burden is upon the petitioning parent, under the 
circumstances of this case, to prove by satisfactory evidence 
that the change is in the child's best interest.  Beyah v. 
Shelton, 231 Va. 432, 434, 344 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1986); Flowers 
v. Cain, 218 Va. 234, 237, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1977). 
 
As we examine the facts, it must be remembered that because 
the evidence before the trial court on the subject of the 
child's best interest was in the form of a deposition, and the 
court did not see and hear the witness, the court's finding of 
 
4
fact, while highly persuasive and entitled to great weight, is 
not binding on us.  Johnson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 232 Va. 
340, 345, 350 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1986); Kaplan v. Copeland, 183 
Va. 589, 593, 32 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1945). 
 
A prolonged recitation of the psychiatrist's testimony, 
submitted by the father, is unnecessary.  Prior to the March 
1998 deposition, the physician had seen the child on three 
occasions, the father on eight occasions, and the father's 
present wife once.  He had "never met" the mother or her 
husband.  Additionally, the doctor had reviewed a "Social 
Services report" resulting from a "home study" that mainly dealt 
with the issues of custody and visitation. 
 
When asked his opinion upon whether a change of name "would 
be in the child's best interest and what do you base your 
opinion on," the psychiatrist stated that he felt two issues 
were presented.  First, a child "should be able to carry the 
name of both his parents."  The "second issue," he said, relates 
to the father's role in the child's development. 
 
The witness noted that the father "has been extensively 
involved with the child . . . being very much involved in his 
care and his education and . . . also has been a very good 
provider.  He's accepted whatever economic responsibilities are 
there."  Therefore, the doctor opined, "it should be very simple 
 
5
that [the child] should carry the names of the parents that are 
biologically his parents." 
 
The witness was asked whether it would be "harmful" to 
change the child's name in view of the fact that he had carried 
the name Rowland for more than six years.  The doctor responded 
that it would not be a "problem" for the child, but that the 
"problem is going to be with the adults trying to accept 
whatever decision is made." 
 
The witness said the child "has been able to merge very 
well with both sets of parents," noting that the child "has no 
difficulty dealing with" living in the primary custody of his 
mother and having regular visitation with the father.  Noting 
that the mother and father "are very good parents," the doctor 
stated that the child is "probably the best balance[d]" of all 
the parties involved. 
 
According to the witness, the child is a "very healthy 
kid"; he is "progressing normally," "interacting appropriately," 
and "maturing" both "[s]choolwise" and "socialwise." 
 
Finally, the witness said that he did not "care" if the 
child's surname was "hyphenated," but that the father "has the 
right" for the child to carry his "last name." 
 
We hold that the psychiatrist's testimony, and the record 
as a whole, fails to establish by satisfactory evidence that the 
change of name is in the child's best interest.  The 
 
6
psychiatrist's opinions, which either were nonresponsive to the 
issue or were contradictory, focused mainly on the father's 
"rights," only tangentially addressing the child's interests.  
Actually, the testimony supports the view that the child's best 
interest will be served if his name remains unchanged.  With his 
present name, he is healthy, happy, developing normally in 
school and socially, and is the best balanced of all the 
parties. 
 
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting the name change.  Thus, the order below 
will be reversed and the father's several petitions will be 
dismissed. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s holding that this Court, and 
not the Court of Appeals of Virginia, has jurisdiction over this 
appeal.  However, because I disagree with the majority’s further 
holding that “the psychiatrist’s testimony, and the record as a 
whole,” fails to establish that the change of name in question 
is in the child’s best interest and, therefore, that the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting the natural father’s 
petition to change the surname of his child, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
7
 
The majority gives little, if any, consideration to the 
mandate of Code § 8.01-217 that unless the court finds that the 
change of a minor’s name “is not in the best interest of the 
minor,” the court shall “order a change of name.”  In the 
present case, the trial court was presented with a petition by 
the natural father to change the surname of his male child from 
Rowland, the stepfather’s surname, to Shurbutt, the father’s 
surname.  The “record as a whole,” carefully considered by the 
trial court, reflects that this father is not an “absentee” 
parent.  As a result of numerous legal proceedings since shortly 
after the child’s birth, the courts have awarded “physical” 
custody of the child to the mother and “joint legal custody” of 
the child to both parents.  At the father’s request, the child’s 
birth certificate was amended in 1996 to reflect that Mr. 
Shurbutt is the child’s natural father.  The father visits 
regularly with the child, provides regular financial support for 
him, and is active in the child’s school activities. 
 
Moreover, it is undisputed that the child is aware that Mr. 
Shurbutt is his father and that Mr. Rowland is his stepfather.  
Indeed, the child calls Mr. Shurbutt “Dad” and Mr. Rowland 
“Pop.”  While the majority is critical of the testimony of the 
psychiatrist, he very clearly testified that the child should 
have the surname Shurbutt and should have had that name “from 
the day he was born.”  The psychiatrist reasoned that “the true 
 
8
identity” of the child was important to the child, the change of 
name would be in the child’s best interest because it would 
avoid difficulty in school, and “this is the time in [his] 
psychosexual development that [he needs] to be clear” concerning 
his identity. 
 
Applying the above quoted portion of Code § 8.01-217, the 
trial court concluded that the child’s surname should be 
Shurbutt rather than Rowland.  The trial court exercised its 
discretion to make the child’s surname and his birth certificate 
reflect the child’s true identity.  I cannot conclude that such 
was an abuse of judicial discretion under the particular 
circumstances of this case. 
 
There are, however, additional reasons that prompt my 
dissent in this case.  In Flowers v. Cain, 218 Va. 234, 237 
S.E.2d 111 (1977), we acknowledged the proposition that a 
father’s interest in having his child continue to use his 
surname is relevant to a determination of the child’s best 
interest.  Id. at 236, 237 S.E.2d at 113.  While Flowers and 
subsequently Beyah v. Shelton, 231 Va. 432, 344 S.E.2d 909 
(1986), address a change of name over the objection of a father, 
they both support the reasonable conclusion that absent 
“substantial reasons” to the contrary, it is in the best 
interest of a child to have the surname of his father rather 
than the surname of his stepfather.  Although we have not 
 
9
expressly stated it, the reason should be obvious.  A surname is 
the family name, it reflects who we are, our true identity, and 
unless there are substantial reasons to the contrary a child 
should always be permitted to use his father’s family name 
rather than the family name of a stepfather.  Today the majority 
holding casts a shadow of doubt over the rationale of these 
cases. 
 
The circumstances in the present case are merely the 
reverse of those in Flowers and Beyah.  There we prohibited a 
change of name over the objection of the father; here the father 
seeks a change of name to accurately reflect the child’s true 
parentage.  In my view, the interest of this father in having 
his child use his surname is also in the best interest of his 
child and should be accorded the same consideration as the 
interests of the fathers in those cases.  Granting that 
consideration in this case, the child’s surname should not 
remain “Rowland” over the father’s objection.  In short, the 
trial court corrected what was wrong from the day the child was 
born and made it right. 
 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
 
10