Title: PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIE GLASS JR

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 12, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee,  
v  
No. 114795  
WILLIE GLASS, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
(AFTER REMAND)  
WEAVER, J.  
Following his waiver of preliminary examination, the  
defendant was bound over to Eaton Circuit Court on the charge  
of conspiracy to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine.  
Defendant, who is black, seeks to challenge the composition of  
the multicounty grand jury that indicted him, claiming that  
the selection process systematically excluded blacks from the  
multicounty grand jury.  The prosecution responds that the  
information it filed after defendant waived preliminary  
examination purged any taint in the grand jury selection  
process.  
On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals rejected  
 
 
the 
prosecution’s 
argument 
and 
directed 
further 
proceedings 
on  
the 
selection 
issue, 
including the unsealing and inspection of  
certain grand jury documents that might be relevant to the  
claim 
of 
racial 
discrimination in selection of the composition  
of the grand jury.  
We hold that this Court exceeded its criminal procedure  
rulemaking authority in People v Duncan, 388 Mich 489; 201  
NW2d 629 (1972), by creating a substantive right to a  
preliminary examination for grand jury indictees.  To the  
extent 
that 
Duncan 
exceeded 
this 
Court’s 
rulemaking 
authority,  
it is overruled and its implementing court rules are rejected.  
As to defendant’s constitutional claims, we hold that he  
has not established and cannot establish a prima facie case of  
discrimination under either the Sixth or the Fourteenth  
Amendment.  It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the  
Court of Appeals to order an in-camera inspection of the grand  
jury record.  
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part,  
and this case remanded to the circuit court for further  
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I  
Upon a petition filed by Clinton, Eaton, and Ingham  
County prosecutors, the Court of Appeals on January 13, 1995,  
formed a multicounty grand jury under MCL 767.7b et seq. The  
grand jury was given jurisdiction over the three counties.  
The Court of Appeals order provided that the grand jury would  
consist of seventeen jurors:  six from Ingham County, six from  
2  
 
    
Eaton, and five from Clinton County. 
The court’s order  
granted the prosecutors’ motion to suppress the grand jury  
proceedings.  
On April 27, 1995, the grand jury indicted the defendant  
on a charge of conspiracy to deliver 650 grams or more of  
cocaine.1  The indictment alleged that the conspiracy took  
place in Eaton County.  A felony warrant was issued by the  
circuit judge on assignment by the Court of Appeals to the  
multicounty 
grand 
jury.  Defendant was apparently arraigned on  
the indictment on May 12, 1995, and bond was set for  
$150,000.2  
On September 8, 1995, the defendant appeared in the 56th  
District Court and waived preliminary examination on the  
indictment.  Defendant was bound over to the Eaton Circuit  
Court, and his papers were filed with that court on September  
11, 1995. Defendant waived arraignment in the Circuit Court  
on September 27, 1995 or September 28, 1995.3 
 On September 29, 1995, the Eaton County prosecutor filed  
an information in circuit court.  The information was  
identical to the indictment, again alleging conspiracy to  
deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine.  Attached to the  
information was a list of witnesses. 
There is no record of  
1 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), 750.157a.  
2 Court of Appeals Order Setting Bond and Remanding Case 
to the 56-2 District Court for Further Proceedings.  
3 Two copies of what appear to be one waiver arraignment 
appear in the record with these dates stamped by the Eaton 
County Clerk.  
3  
__________________________________________________ 
a complaint and warrant or a separate preliminary examination  
or waiver in the district court before the filing of the  
information.  
Trial was scheduled and adjourned several times.  On  
February 21, 1996, the defendant moved to dismiss, alleging,  
among other things, that the composition of the grand jury  
violated his due process rights, his Sixth Amendment right to  
a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community,  
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.  As  
the Court of Appeals summarized his allegations:  
Specifically, defendant indicated that the 
population of Clinton County is 3.85 percent 
African-American and 13.8 percent of the total 
population of the three counties, the population of 
Eaton County is 3.56 percent African-American and 
21.47 percent of the total population of the three 
counties, and the population of Ingham County is 
9.87 percent African-American and 65.16 percent of 
the total population of the three counties.3  
Defendant thus contended that this Court’s order  
that five grand jurors be from Clinton County, six 
from Eaton County, and six from Ingham County 
amounted to a systematic overrepresentation of the 
counties 
with 
the 
smallest 
African-American  
population and a systematic underrepresentation of 
the county with the largest African-American  
population.
 Defendant further contended that if  
proper percentages had been used, Clinton County 
would have had two grand jurors, Eaton County would 
have had four grand jurors, and Ingham County would 
have had eleven grand jurors.4
 In addition to  
arguing for dismissal, defendant requested that the 
trial court order the prosecution to produce a copy 
of the petition for the establishment of the 
multicounty grand jury.  
3 These population figures are based on the 
1990 census.  
4 Defendant also attached to his motion two  
affidavits from witnesses at the grand jury 
proceedings who stated that there were no African­
4  
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________ 
Americans on the seventeen-person grand jury.  
[235 Mich App 455, 459-460; 597 NW2d 876 (1999).]  
On March 12 and April 2, 1997, the circuit court held  
evidentiary hearings on defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The  
Court of Appeals summarized the testimony at the hearing as  
follows:  
Those witnesses who did testify shed little 
light on how the grand jury was selected and 
whether African-Americans were excluded from the  
grand jury.5
 The Eaton County deputy clerk and 
Ingham County deputy clerk indicated that their 
juror questionnaire did not contain questions 
pertaining to race.  Both the Eaton County and 
Ingham County deputy clerks indicated that they did 
not know how the multicounty grand jury was  
selected.
 A member of the Clinton County jury 
board indicated that two panels of potential petit 
jurors from Clinton County were assigned to the 
multicounty grand jury pool.  These panels were 
formed by use of the Secretary of State’s list of 
licensed 
drivers 
in 
Clinton 
County, 
mailing 
questionnaires to the licensed drivers, and the 
jury board’s review of the returned questionnaires 
to determine who could sit on the jury panels. 
Persons excluded were those who did not have  
appropriate citizenship, had a documented physical 
disability, were over the age of seventy, lacked 
competency, were currently under conviction of a 
felony; or served on a jury within the past twelve 
months.
 The Clinton County juror questionnaire 
also did not include questions about race.  
5 We note that the Legislature requires that 
the names of grand jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner and from the same source as petit 
jurors. MCL 600.1326.  
[Id. at 460-461.]  
The 
circuit 
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on  
the basis of racial discrimination in selection of the grand  
jury, concluding that the defendant had failed to establish  
5  
 
that blacks were systematically excluded.  
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal from  
that decision, which the Court of Appeals denied.4
 The  
defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to this  
Court, and on September 25, 1997, we issued an order remanding  
the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave  
granted.  
On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant  
had 
not 
established 
a 
prima 
facie 
case 
of 
racial  
discrimination under either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment  
because he had not provided evidence regarding the racial  
composition of the grand jury venire, had not shown that  
underrepresentation of blacks was due to systematic exclusion  
during the selection process, and had not shown that the grand  
jury 
selection 
procedure was racially biased or susceptible to  
abuse.
 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals agreed with  
defendant that the grand jury records should be unsealed so  
that he might obtain evidence to support that claim.5  The  
4 Unpublished order, entered July 21, 1997 (Docket No. 
203592).  
5 The Court said that the defendant should request the 
grand jury record from the chief judge of the Court of 
Appeals, who was to conduct an in-camera inspection and, 
“certify the parts of the record bearing on the issue of 
defendant’s claim of racial discrimination in the selection  
and composition of the grand jury . . . .”  235 Mich App 473. 
The Court directed a further evidentiary hearing in the 
circuit court on defendant’s claims.  The Court also lifted  
part of the suppression order initially entered regarding the 
grand jury records so as to permit additional testimony by 
county officials or employees (some of whom had previously 
refused to testify).  
6  
   
Court of Appeals dissent concluded that any errors in the  
grand jury selection or proceedings were harmless because the  
prosecutor proceeded by information in the circuit court.  
II  
Michigan law provides that criminal prosecutions may be  
initiated in the court having jurisdiction to hear the cause  
by either indictment or information.  MCL 767.1 et seq.  
Throughout the record in this case, there is confusion  
regarding whether the defendant is in circuit court on the  
indictment or the information.6  The record does reveal that  
the prosecution filed an information in the circuit court  
after the grand jury indictment had already been returned and  
the defendant bound over.  The effect of the prosecutor’s  
decision 
to 
file 
an 
information after the defendant’s bindover  
on the grand jury indictment has raised questions involving  
the interplay of the statutes, case law, and court rules  
governing 
informations and indictments.  In our order granting  
leave, we requested that the parties brief three issues in  
addition to granting leave on the issues raised by the  
6 At oral argument before this Court, the prosecution 
indicated that no complaint and warrant had been filed and yet 
seemed to argue that the information was validly filed in 
circuit court, thus mooting any taint in the grand jury 
proceeding.
 During a July 17, 1997, hearing on the  
prosecution’s motion to endorse certain witnesses, the  
prosecutor stated that she was “not moving to amend the 
indictment.”  At that same hearing however, defense counsel 
included in a brief outline of this case’s procedural history 
an “arraignment on the information.”  
7  
 
 
 
  
 
parties.7
 A brief overview of Michigan’s two criminal  
charging procedures provides context for the discussion and  
conclusions that follow.  
A  
Criminal prosecutions may be initiated in the court  
having jurisdiction over the charge upon the filing of an  
information. MCL 767.1 et seq.; People v Simon, 324 Mich 450,  
456; 36 NW2d 734 (1949).  An information is predicated upon a  
signed complaint and warrant.  A complaint must state the  
substance of the accusation and reasonable cause to believe  
that the person accused committed the offense. MCL 764.1d.  
The accused has a right to a preliminary examination  
before the prosecutor files an information in the court having  
jurisdiction to hear the cause.  MCL 767.42. The accused and  
the state are entitled to a “prompt” examination.  MCL 766.1;.  
The primary function of a preliminary examination is to  
determine if a crime has been committed and, if so, if there  
is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it.  
People v Bellanca, 386 Mich 712; 194 NW2d 863 (1972).  As to  
the timing of the preliminary examination, MCR 6.112(B)  
7 We asked: (1) whether the prosecutor’s filing of an 
information under MCR 6.112 after the defendant waived the  
preliminary examination removed the taint of the alleged 
racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted defendant, (2) whether MCR 6.112 conflicts with MCL 
767.29, as construed in People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698; 209 
NW2d 243 (1973), and (3) whether this Court properly exercised 
its authority over criminal procedure in People v Duncan,  
supra, to grant defendants indicted by grand juries the right 
to a preliminary examination.  
8  
 
 
     
provides in pertinent part that  
[u]nless the defendant is a fugitive from justice, 
the prosecutor may not file an information until 
the defendant has had or waives preliminary 
examination.  
Once an information has been filed, the prosecutor may not  
enter a nolle prosequi “or in any other way discontinue or  
abandon the same, without stating on the record the reasons  
therefore and without leave of the court having jurisdiction  
to try the offense charged, entered into its minutes.”  
Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 120;  
215 NW2d 145 (1974).8  
Criminal 
prosecutions may also be initiated by grand jury  
indictment.  MCL 767.1 et seq.; MCR 6.112(B). Grand juries  
may be convened over two or more counties upon petition filed  
with the Court of Appeals by the Attorney General or by  
prosecuting attorneys from each county named in the petition  
and upon an order of the Court of Appeals.  MCL 767.b. The  
Court of Appeals may convene the requested grand jury if the  
petition establishes probable cause to believe that a crime,  
or portion thereof, has been committed in two or more of the  
named counties and if the petition establishes that a grand  
jury could “more effectively address” that alleged criminal  
8 
Genesee noted that MCL 767.29, which discusses  
obligations of a prosecuting attorney upon any indictment, 
also applies to prosecutions by information pursuant to MCL 
750.10, which provides “the word ‘indictment’ includes  
information.”  Further, Genesee noted that MCL 767.2 provides 
that all provisions of law applicable to prosecutions by 
indictment shall in general apply to prosecutions by 
information.  
9  
 
 
  
activity. MCL 767.7d.  
There is no state constitutional right to indictment by  
grand jury; rather, indictment by grand jury is an alternative  
charging procedure created by the Legislature. In re Palm,  
255 Mich 632; 238 NW 732 (1931). Grand juror names are “drawn  
in the same manner and from the same source as petit jurors.”  
MCL 600.1326. Indictment by grand jury establishes probable  
cause that a crime has been committed. Vasquez v Hillery, 474  
US 254; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986).  If an indictment  
is found, the foreperson presents the indictment to the court.  
MCL 767.25(1). 
The presiding judge then returns the  
indictment to the court having jurisdiction over the offense,  
where it is filed.  MCL 767.25(3), (4). 
A prosecutor is  
prohibited from entering a nolle prosequi upon an indictment  
or discontinuing or abandoning an indictment without stating  
reasons on the record and without leave of the court having  
jurisdiction over the charge.  MCL 767.29. The court to which  
the indictment is presented may issue a warrant for the arrest  
of the person indicted. MCL 767.30.  
Duncan, supra at 502, granted indictees the right to a  
preliminary 
examination.  In accordance with Duncan, MCR 6.110  
provides 
a 
preliminary examination for a defendant indicted by  
a grand jury. 
Consistent with MCL 767.2; MCR 6.112(A)  
provides, except as otherwise provided by the court rules or  
elsewhere, “the law and rules that apply to informations and  
prosecutions on informations apply to indictments and  
prosecutions 
on 
indictments.”  MCR 6.112(B) also provides that  
10  
 
 
  
when an indictment is returned and filed before a defendant’s  
preliminary examination, “the indictment may substitute for  
the complaint and commence judicial proceedings.”9
 The  
provision of subsection (B) reflects the requirement of  
Duncan, supra, that grand jury indictees be afforded a  
preliminary examination.  
B  
The confused procedural posture of this case raises  
fundamental questions regarding Michigan’s current dual  
charging procedures.  As noted above, the indictment had been  
returned to circuit court and the defendant had waived  
preliminary 
examination 
in 
district 
court 
before the  
prosecutor filed the information in Eaton Circuit Court.  
There was no complaint and warrant filed to support the  
information.  Nor did the prosecutor seek to abandon or  
9 This procedure, established by court rule and case law, 
is unique to Michigan.  While our research reveals that  
twenty-eight 
states 
generally 
allow 
prosecutions 
by 
information or indictment and four other states require 
indictment by grand jury only in cases involving the most 
serious felonies, only Michigan and Oklahoma, Okla Stat, tit 
22, § 524; see also Stone v Hope, 488 P2d 616 (Okla Crim App, 
1971), grant a defendant a right to a preliminary examination 
following indictment.  Lafave, Israel & King, Criminal 
Procedure (2d ed), § 15.1(e), (g), pp 239-240, 250-252. 
Although Oklahoma allows for a second determination of  
probable cause, the indictment remains the charging document. 
In Oklahoma, the grand jury returns the indictment to the 
trial court.  A copy of the indictment is filed with the  
magistrate for preliminary examination purposes. 
Any 
resulting bindover is on the indictment. The prosecutor may 
not replace the indictment with an information.  Cunningham v 
Tulsa Co Dist Court, 399 P2d 57 (Okla Crim App, 1965). 
Michigan thus stands alone in treating the indictment as a 
mere pleading that initiates criminal proceedings.  
11 
 
  
discontinue the indictment.10  Consistent with MCR 6.112(B),  
the prosecutor treated the grand jury indictment as nothing  
more 
than 
a 
complaint 
initiating 
criminal 
proceedings, 
despite  
MCR 6.112 (A) and MCL 767.2, which treat indictments as  
equivalent to informations.  As a result of this confusion, we  
asked the parties to brief  
whether this Court properly exercised its authority 
over criminal procedure in People v Duncan, 388 
Mich 489 (1972), to grant defendants indicted by 
grand 
juries 
the 
right 
to 
a 
preliminary 
examination. [461 Mich 1005.]  
As 
noted 
above, 
Duncan provided grand jury indictees with  
the right to a preliminary examination after indictment. The  
Court then adopted implementing court rules, MCR 6.110 and MCR  
6.112.  Pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 5, this Court has  
exclusive authority to determine the rules of practice and  
procedure. McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 26; 597 NW2d 148  
(1999).
 However, this Court’s constitutional rulemaking  
authority extends only to matters of practice and procedure:  
[T]his Court is not authorized to enact court 
rules that establish, abrogate, or modify the 
substantive law. [Id. at 27.][11]  
10   MCL 767.29 states that the prosecutor shall not 
discontinue or abandon the indictment “without stating on the 
record the reasons for the discontinuance or abandonment and  
without the leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the 
offense charged, entered in its minutes.”
 We asked the  
parties to brief “whether MCR 6.112 conflicts with MCL 767.29, 
as construed in People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698 [209 NW2d 243] 
(1973).”  Because the indictment was not abandoned in this  
case, it is not necessary or appropriate to explore the 
interplay of Curtis and MCR 6.112.  
11  Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, McDougall in no  
way limits this Court’s constitutional authority to prescribe 
procedural 
rules 
that 
vindicate 
constitutional 
rights; 
rather,  
12  
 
 
 
  
 
We now address whether Duncan and the implementing court rules  
were a proper exercise of the Court’s rulemaking authority.  
Despite 
acknowledging 
that 
indicted 
defendants  
historically did not receive a preliminary examination, and  
that no statute so provided, Duncan declared such a right on  
the basis of policy.
 Regarding the significance of  
preliminary examination Duncan opined that “[t]here may well  
be serious questions of equal protection and due process  
involved in the present Michigan procedure . . . since it  
denies to an accused indicted by a multiple-man grand jury  
what has become recognized as a fundamental right in most  
criminal cases—the right to a preliminary examination.” Id.  
at 502.  Duncan expressly declined to rely on due process  
principles in creating the right to a preliminary examination  
for indictees.  Rather than addressing those constitutional  
questions, this Court seized upon its “inherent power” to deal  
with the situation as a matter of criminal procedure and  
granted all defendants accused of a felony the right to a  
preliminary examination, even in those cases following  
indictment by a grand jury.  Id.12 
Rather than following the  
statutory scheme pertaining to prosecutions by indictment,  
Duncan instead rewrote it.  We are persuaded that Duncan and  
the implementing court rules exceed this Court’s rulemaking  
McDougall only precludes the promulgation of procedural rules  
contrary 
to 
legislative 
enactments 
that 
involve  
nonconstitutional substantive policies.  
12 Therefore, the dissent’s suggestion that Duncan relied  
on due process principles is incorrect.  
13  
   
  
authority. As this Court previously recognized:  
The measure of control exercised in connection  
with the prevention and detection of crime and 
prosecution and punishment of criminals is set 
forth in the statutes of the State pertaining 
thereto, particularly the penal code and the code 
of criminal procedure.  The powers of the courts 
with reference to such matters are derived from  
statutes. [People v Piasecki, 333 Mich 122, 143; 52  
NW 626 (1952).][13]  
The establishment of the right to a preliminary examination  
is more than a matter of procedure and beyond the powers  
vested in the Court by Const 1963, art 6, § 5; it is a matter  
of public policy for the legislative branch.  Shannon v Ottawa  
Circuit Judge, 245 Mich 220, 222; 222 NW 168 (1928); People v  
Piasecki, supra; Glancy v Roseville, 457 Mich 580, 590; 577  
NW2d 897 (1998). 
Duncan and MCR 6.112(B) are also  
inconsistent 
with 
MCL 767.2, which provides for equivalency in  
the law between indictments and informations.  
We reverse Duncan, insofar as it afforded indictees the  
right to a preliminary examination.  Additionally, we hold  
that the information filed in this case is null and void  
because it was filed pursuant to the invalid scheme set forth  
in MCR 6.112(B) that purported to allow an indictment to  
substitute for a complaint.  There was no complaint stating  
the substance of the accusation or reasonable cause to believe  
the accused committed the offense as required by MCL 764.1d,  
nor was there a preliminary examination on a complaint as  
13 Obviously, this Court’s authority regarding the rules 
of practice and procedure derives from Const 1963, art 6, § 5, 
and is not subservient to the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
McDougall, supra pp 26-27.  
14 
 
 
required by MCL 767.42.  Finally, the prosecution never sought  
to discontinue the indictment under MCL 767.29. Because the  
information is null and void, we do not address the effect a  
properly 
filed 
information might have on a previously returned  
indictment.14  This case stands filed in the circuit court on  
the grand jury indictment.  We next address the defendant’s  
constitutional challenges to the grand jury proceedings.  
III  
The grand jury was composed of seventeen people, six from  
Ingham County, six from Clinton County, and five from Eaton  
County.  Defendant alleges that this composition violated his  
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and  
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross section on the grand  
jury venire.  
A  
Defendant alleges that the seventeen member tricounty  
grand jury makeup of 6-6-5 from Clinton, Ingham, and Eaton  
Counties respectively violated his right to equal protection  
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  There is no right to have a  
particular grand jury reflect the precise racial composition  
14 Further, we asked the parties to brief:  
[W]hether the prosecutor’s filing of an  
information under MCR 6.112 after defendant waived  
the preliminary examination removed the taint of 
the alleged racial discrimination in the selection 
of the grand jury that indicted defendant . . . . 
[461 Mich 1005.]  
Because we hold the information is null and void, this 
harmless error issue is no longer relevant.  
15  
 
 
of a community. Akins v Texas, 325 US 398; 65 S Ct 1276; 89  
L Ed 1692 (1945).  Furthermore, discriminatory effect is  
insufficient to establish a violation of the Fourteenth  
Amendment; defendant must show discriminatory intent.  People  
v Ford, 417 Mich 66, 103; 331 NW2d 878 (1982); Arlington Hgts  
v Metro Housing Dev Corp, 429 US 252, 265; 97 S Ct 555; 50 L  
Ed 2d 450 (1977); Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 242-243; 96  
S Ct 2040; 48 L Ed 2d 597 (1976).  “Such an effect may permit  
an inference of an unlawful purpose, but, standing alone, it  
is not conclusive on the question whether governmental  
activity is racially discriminatory.” Ford, supra at 103.  
In order to establish a prima facie case of racial  
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury under the  
Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to showing discriminatory  
purpose, defendant must show that the grand jury selection  
procedure resulted in a “substantial underrepresentation of  
his race.”  Castaneda v Partida, 430 US 482, 494; 97 S Ct  
1272; 51 L Ed 2d 498 (1977).  Castaneda articulated three  
steps to establish substantial underrepresentation.  The  
defendant must show 1) that he belongs to a recognizable,  
distinct class singled out for different treatment under the  
laws as written or as applied; 2) that there was significant  
underrepresentation of that distinct class over a significant  
period of time; and 3) that the selection procedure was  
susceptible of abuse or that it was not racially neutral.  Id.  
at 494.  Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case, the  
burden shifts to the state to rebut the inference of  
16  
  
 
  
intentional discrimination. Id. at 495.  
We agree with the judgment of the Court of Appeals that  
defendant 
has 
not 
presented 
a 
prima 
facie 
case 
of  
discrimination 
under 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment.15 
 
We 
go 
further  
and hold that defendant will be unable to establish a prima  
facie case upon further review of the grand jury proceedings  
because he will be unable to establish a discriminatory  
purpose.  Defendant does not challenge the manner in which the  
jury impaneling was implemented.  Defendant’s claim is  
premised solely upon the allegedly disparate effect of the 6­
6-5 composition of grand jurors from the three counties chosen  
by the Court of Appeals.  Defendant does not present any  
evidence suggesting a discriminatory purpose, and nothing in  
the grand jury records could conceivably aid defendant in his  
effort to prove that the Court of Appeals acted with  
discriminatory purpose in establishing the 6-6-5 split.  
The 
possibility 
of 
an 
adverse 
effect 
on 
the  
representation of blacks resulting from the 6-6-5 composition  
is relevant to discriminatory purpose, but is insufficient  
alone to establish that it was a purposeful device to exclude  
blacks from the grand jury.  Washington, supra at 239. We  
therefore conclude that defendant will be unable to establish  
a prima facie case of a discriminatory purpose in violation of  
15 We agree with the Court of Appeals that a defendant can 
challenge the grand jury selection process on Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection grounds, notwithstanding MCL  
767.13, 767.14, which the prosecutor argued precluded such 
challenges.  
17  
  
 
 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
B  
Defendant also alleges that the 6-6-5 composition of the  
grand jury denied him his Sixth Amendment right to an  
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the  
community. To establish a prima facie violation of the fair  
cross section requirement, “a defendant must show that a  
distinctive group was underrepresented in his venire or jury  
pool, and that the underrepresentation was the result of  
systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection  
process.” 
People v Smith, 463 Mich 199, 203; 615 NW2d 1  
(2000), citing Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357; 99 S Ct 664; 58  
L Ed 2d 579 (1979).16  
A preliminary issue is whether the fair cross section  
requirement applies to state grand jury venires.  The Court of  
Appeals assumed it did, but this is the first state decision  
to hold that a defendant may challenge the grand jury  
selection process on the basis of the fair cross section  
requirement.  235 Mich App 465-466.  It is well-established  
that the Sixth Amendment fair cross section requirement  
applies to state petit jury venires. Taylor v Louisiana, 419  
16 In People v Smith, we held that no method for measuring 
whether representation was fair and reasonable should be used 
exclusively, but rather we adopted a case by case approach. 
We stated, “[p]rovided that the parties proffer sufficient 
evidence, courts should consider the results of all the tests 
in 
determining 
whether representation [on the venire] was fair 
and reasonable.” Id at 204.  
18  
 
 
US 522; 95 S Ct 692; 42 L Ed 2d 690 (1975).17  However, the  
Fifth Amendment does not require grand juries in state  
prosecutions, Hurtado v California, 110 US 516; 4 S Ct 111; 28  
L Ed 232 (1884), and the United States Supreme Court has not  
imposed the fair cross section requirement on states that  
allow indictment by grand jury.  See Castaneda, supra at 509­
510 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The Sixth Circuit has held that  
due process for the purposes of state grand jury selection  
does not include the fair cross section requirement. Ford v  
Seabold, 841 F2d 677, 687-688 (CA 6, 1988).  
We need not decide whether Michigan should apply the fair  
cross section requirement to grand jury venires in this case  
because defendant has failed to allege a cognizable fair cross  
section claim.
 Defendant contends that Ingham County  
residents were underrepresented on the basis of the 1990  
census figures.  He argues that Ingham County should have had  
eleven positions on the grand jury rather than six.  Defendant  
argues 
that 
the 
underrepresentation 
of 
Ingham 
County 
residents  
had the effect of systematically underrepresenting blacks.  
However, 
the 
fair 
cross section requirement does not guarantee  
that any particular jury chosen will literally mirror the  
community; rather, “jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or  
venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically  
exclude distinctive groups . . . and thereby fail to be  
17 The right to a fair cross section in federal grand jury 
venires is derivative of the Fifth Amendment and 28 USC 1861.  
Id. at 528-529.  
19 
 
  
 
reasonably representative thereof . . . .”  Smith, supra at  
214 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.). Because defendant’s challenge  
is relevant to the make up of his particular grand jury, he  
cannot succeed on his claim.  
C  
Next we address whether the Court of Appeals erred when  
it ordered an in-camera inspection of the record bearing on  
the claim of racial discrimination in the selection and  
composition of the grand jury and lifted part of the  
suppression order initially entered regarding the grand jury  
records so as to permit additional testimony by county  
officials or employees.  The Court of Appeals reasoned: “in  
order to establish evidence, if any, of his claim of racial  
discrimination 
under 
the 
Sixth 
or 
Fourteenth 
Amendments, 
there  
must be some access to the record or other evidence regarding  
the selection and composition of the grand jury.”  235 Mich  
App 472.  The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no  
compelling reason to suppress information relating to “the  
racial composition of the multicounty grand jury venire and  
the grand jury, and the selection procedures used that  
produced the grand jury that indicted him.”  Id. at 473. The  
Court of Appeals vacated its previous suppression order “to  
the extent that defendant’s claim . . . can be explored and  
testified about by county officials or employees (such as  
those who would not previously testify).” Id. at 474.  
Upon our review of defendants’ constitutional claims, we  
are resolved that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion  
20  
by ordering the in-camera review and lifting the order of  
suppression. As in People v Wimberly, 384 Mich 62; 179 NW2d  
623 (1970), we are faced with a conflict between the  
traditional reasons for secrecy of grand jury proceedings  and  
the 
desirability 
of 
discovery.  Because defendant cannot, upon  
further discovery, establish a prima facie case under either  
the Fourteenth or Sixth Amendment, we hold that the reasons  
for 
secrecy 
of 
grand 
jury 
proceedings 
outweigh 
the  
desirability of further discovery.  
IV  
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and  
this case is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
WEAVER, J.  
21  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee,  
v 
No. 114795  
WILLIE GLASS, JR.,  
Defendant-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant.  
TAYLOR, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Court of  
Appeals erred in ordering further proceedings regarding the  
grand jury records.  I also agree with the majority that this  
Court exceeded its criminal procedure rulemaking authority in  
People v Duncan, 388 Mich 489; 201 NW2d 629 (1972), by  
creating a substantive right to a preliminary examination for  
grand jury indictees and that Duncan’s implementing court  
rules should be rejected.  The fact that Duncan and MCR  
6.112(B) are inconsistent with MCL 767.29 supports overruling  
Duncan and rejecting the implementing court rules.  
However, 
unlike 
the majority, I would overrule Duncan and  
its implementing court rules prospectively. In my judgment,  
the prosecution was entitled to rely upon MCR 6.112(B), and  
file the information. Defendant’s subsequent waiver of a  
 
preliminary 
examination on the information purged any taint in  
the grand jury proceedings.  Because the alleged taint was  
purged,1 I find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional  
issues decided in part III of the majority opinion. Because  
I 
would 
reject 
MCR 
6.112(B) and overrule Duncan prospectively,  
I cannot agree with the majority that this case stands in  
circuit court on the grand jury indictment rather than the  
information.
 Having waived a preliminary examination  
defendant effectively conceded circuit court jurisdiction to  
hold him for trial by information.  
1 I believe this holding is consistent with Vasquez v 
Hillery, 474 US 254; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986), 
because the United States Supreme Court affirmed a lower court 
ruling that allowed defendant Hillery to stand trial, 
notwithstanding a discriminatorily empaneled grand jury, upon 
the filing of a “new charging document.”  See Hillery v 
Pulley, 563 F Supp 1228, 1252 (ED Cal, 1983). Thus, even if 
defendant Glass’ grand jury was empaneled in a discriminatory 
fashion, Glass is in the same position as Hillery was, i.e., 
facing a charge under a new charging document.  
2  
________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee,  
No. 114795  
WILLIE GLASS JR.,  
Defendants-Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
This case is yet another example of what has become a  
favored process of overruling established precedent.  By  
overruling the part of People v Duncan, 388 Mich 489; 201 NW2d  
629 (1972), that affords indictees the right to a preliminary  
examination, the majority has stripped criminal defendants of  
a necessary procedure in Michigan’s criminal process. 
In  
addition 
to 
its 
disregard for Michigan precedent, the majority  
predicts that the defendant “will be unable” to prove his  
equal protection claim if given access to the grand jury  
records, when the majority has not read the content of those  
records.  Because I would not overrule Duncan and would affirm  
the Court of Appeals decision to unseal the grand jury records  
 
so that defendant might obtain evidence to support his  
constitutional claims, I respectfully dissent.  
I  
The majority states that in Duncan, this Court exceeded  
its rulemaking authority under Const 1963, art 6, § 5.  The  
majority reasons that the right to a preliminary examination  
is substantive and policy based.  Therefore, the majority  
believes that this case involves more than a matter of  
procedure, and should be decided on the basis of the will of  
the Legislature.  Thus, the majority claims that Duncan can be  
lightly cast aside as an usurpation of legislative power.  
However, the text of Const 1963, art 6, § 5 clearly states the  
principle recognized by Duncan, that this Court has the  
exclusive power to establish rules of procedure.  
Quoting the section from Duncan that discussed the  
possible equal protection violations in Michigan’s criminal  
procedure without affording an indictee the right to a  
preliminary examination, the majority summarizes the “policy”  
concerns this Court expressed when it established the right.  
Slip op at 15.  I disagree that due process considerations are  
“policy” concerns that we may not address when invoking our  
constitutional authority to establish procedure and that must  
be left to the Legislature. Due process considerations play  
a role in both procedural and substantive aspects of the law,  
thus making it difficult to avoid balancing substantive  
concerns 
when 
we 
implement procedures.  The majority, however,  
expands its abdication of judicial authority in McDougall v  
Schanz, 461 Mich 15; 597 NW2d 148 (1999), by defining the due  
2  
 
 
 
  
 
process policy considerations we discussed in Duncan as  
substantive law and strictly within the province of the  
Legislature.
 This expansion of McDougall effectively  
eradicates our ability to weigh due process concerns when  
using our constitutional authority to establish procedure and  
shrinks the constitutional boundary that separates our  
rulemaking powers from those of the Legislature.  Thus, I  
raise the concerns I articulated in my dissent from McDougall:  
what procedures, then, may this Court establish under Const  
1963, art 6, § 5? Under the majority’s view in this case, “the  
Legislature would appear free to control any aspect of the  
judicial function it wishes, save perhaps the scheduling of  
dockets.” McDougall at 59, n 26. Moreover, the majority’s  
view raises the issue whether we must revisit all previous  
established court rules to determine whether there were  
“improper” policy considerations made behind them.1  
The valid concerns that we addressed in Duncan describe  
the substantive consequences that follow from the absence of  
a preliminary examination after a grand jury indictment.  
Thus, it seems the establishment of the right to a preliminary  
examination after a grand jury indictment effectuates  
substantive justice by dismissing equal protection concerns  
1  As I stated in my dissenting opinion in McDougall at  
59:  
So we must wonder exactly how many of our 
court rules deal with items that might evoke 
considerations other than judicial dispatch, and 
thus be subject to alteration on the basis of those 
considerations, 
evidencing 
decisions 
of  
“substantive” law by the Legislature.  
3  
 
and assuring due process for criminal defendants.  The  
majority 
fails 
to 
separate 
the 
preliminary 
examination’s 
basic  
procedural nature in Michigan’s criminal process from the  
procedure’s substantive effects and concludes that the  
establishment of a preliminary examination is more than a  
matter of procedure.  Slip op at 16.  Contrary to the  
majority’s conclusion, however, just because this Court used  
its constitutional power to establish a procedure in  
Michigan’s criminal process that has the effect of assuring  
substantive justice does not magically change the nature of  
the procedure to that of a substantive right.  
In People v Bellanca, 386 Mich 708; 194 NW2d 863 (1972),  
this Court addressed whether a criminal defendant faced with  
perjury charges before a one-man grand jury was entitled to  
the 
transcripts 
of 
witness testimony before that one-man grand  
jury.  Although the Legislature had allowed access to such  
transcripts in a traditional grand jury situation, no such  
right was established in a one-man grand jury situation.  This  
Court held that regardless of the Legislature’s failure to add  
the right to grand jury transcripts in the statute governing  
one-man grand juries, both types of grand juries are of equal  
importance, and the reasoning behind allowing the right in the  
traditional grand jury setting applied in the one-man grand  
jury setting. This Court then proceeded to discuss what the  
majority in this case would likely label as mere “policy”  
concerns behind establishment of this right: because a  
criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of  
counsel at this stage, to be truly effective, “counsel must be  
4  
 
  
 
properly prepared for cross-examination of the prosecution’s  
witnesses and thus he must have access to the testimony of  
such witnesses before the grand jury touching on matters in  
issue at the examination.”  Bellanca at 714. 
Accordingly,  
this Court held that “a defendant charged with perjury before  
a ‘one-man grand jury’ must have access to the transcripts of  
the testimony of all witnesses for or against him given before  
the ‘one-man grand juror’ in order to be accorded due  
process.” Id. at 712.  To implement this holding, this Court  
treated the establishment of the right to grand jury records  
as a procedure and created MCR 6.107.2  
Thus, in Bellanca, substantive concerns of due process  
pushed this Court to use its constitutional authority to  
establish a procedure in Michigan’s criminal process, the  
right to transcripts from the grand juror proceeding, which  
had the substantive effect of assuring due process.  I do not  
doubt that, given the proper factual scenario, the majority  
would jump at an opportunity to strip yet another right  
afforded criminal defendants and overrule Bellanca, claiming  
we 
exceeded 
our 
rulemaking authority by creating a substantive  
right that is policy based.  However, until that day, Bellanca  
2  MCR 6.107(A) states:  
Whenever an indictment is returned by a grand 
jury or a grand juror, the person accused in the 
indictment is entitled to the part of the record, 
including a transcript of the part of the testimony 
of all witnesses appearing before the grand jury or 
grand juror, that touches on the guilt or innocence 
of the accused of the charge contained in the 
indictment.  
5  
 
remains primary authority for the proposition that this Court  
may validly establish procedures, while considering the  
substantive effects of such procedures, under Const 1963, art  
6, § 5.  I, therefore, would hold that this Court was  
completely within its constitutional rulemaking authority in  
Duncan when it established that indictees are entitled to a  
preliminary examination.  
II  
I also dissent from the majority’s holding that it was an  
abuse of discretion for the Court of Appeals to order an in­
camera inspection of the grand jury record.  The purpose of  
the in-camera inspection was to allow defendant access to any  
possible evidence proving race discrimination. The majority  
denies defendant access to the grand jury record because it  
claims not only did defendant fail to prove a prima facie case  
of discrimination, but defendant will be unable to prove  
discrimination even with access to the record.  In making this  
conclusion, 
the 
majority 
correctly 
states 
the 
requirements 
for  
proving a Fourteenth Amendment violation, which I agree  
defendant has not met.  However, the majority takes its  
conclusion one step further and projects that defendant will  
be unable to prove a prima facie case because “upon further  
review of the grand jury proceedings . . . he will be unable  
to establish a discriminatory purpose.”  Slip op at 19. To  
support its prediction of defendant’s future inability to  
prove discriminatory purpose, the majority states that  
defendant’s claim is currently premised on the disparate  
impact of the 6-6-5 grand jury composition, which is  
6  
insufficient alone to prove discriminatory purpose. Slip op  
at 19-20.  
The majority’s reliance on this reason to support its  
prediction is misplaced because it is based solely on what was  
lacking in defendant’s first attempt to prove the prima facie  
case. The evidence defendant has presented thus far and why  
it fails to prove a prima facie case of discrimination is  
irrelevant to what the grand jury records may provide in the  
future to prove the same claim.  
Without 
the 
benefit 
of 
reading 
any 
additional 
information  
the grand jury record might provide, the majority hangs its  
hat on evidence that again has already been presented.  Unlike  
the majority, I refuse to speculate on what evidence the grand  
jury records may contain.  Perhaps the majority is correct and  
the record would reveal absolutely nothing to aid defendant in  
his 
constitutional 
claims. However, the majority could also be  
wrong, as the record would show how the grand jury venire was  
selected 
and 
thus 
could 
aid 
defendant 
in 
proving  
discriminatory intent behind the manner in which the grand  
jury was selected or composed.  Whatever the result may be if  
defendant could investigate the record, however, cannot be  
predicted when we have not reviewed the record ourselves.  
Contrary 
to 
the 
majority’s position, I recognize that our  
mission to rule justly, although time-consuming on certain  
occasions, should not be easily cast aside simply because the  
journey to such a result may come up fruitless.  We should not  
shut down the avenues available to a defendant seeking a just  
result, especially on the basis of an unfounded prediction  
7  
that defendant will not prevail. I, therefore, would affirm  
the Court of Appeals conclusion that, although defendant did  
not prove a prima facie case, he is entitled to a remand to  
unseal the grand jury record to obtain any evidence it may  
contain to support his constitutional claims.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
8