Title: Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12654 
 
MASSACHUSETTS FINE WINES & SPIRITS, LLC1  vs.  ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 2, 2019. - July 24, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Alcoholic Liquors, Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 
Price.  Regulation.  Administrative Law, Regulations. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 31, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Samuel M. Furgang, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Thomas R. Kiley (Meredith G. Fierro also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Damien C. Powell, for Massachusetts Package Store 
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Doing business as Total Wine & More. 
2 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Under 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.04(1) (1993), a 
regulation promulgated by the alcoholic beverages control 
commission (commission), a licensed retailer of alcoholic 
beverages shall not "sell or offer to sell any alcoholic 
beverages at a price less than invoiced cost," with "[c]ost 
. . . defined as net cost appearing on the invoice for said 
alcoholic beverage."2  Here, the licensed retailer at issue, 
Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC, doing business as Total 
Wine & More (Total Wine), sold bottles of liquor and wine at 
prices that were below the cost listed on the invoices for its 
purchase of those bottles from the wholesaler.  For this reason, 
the commission found Total Wine in violation of § 2.04(1).  
Total Wine contends that it was not in violation of this 
regulation because, after accounting for the "cumulative 
quantity discounts" (CQDs) that it obtained from its bulk 
purchases of these brands of liquor and wine -- which were 
credited in subsequent invoices -- its ultimate net cost per 
bottle was below its sales price to consumers. 
                                                          
 
 
2 Title 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.04(1) (1993) provides in 
full: 
 
"No holder of a license issued under [G. L. c. 138, § 15,] 
shall sell or offer to sell any alcoholic beverages at a 
price less than invoiced cost.  Cost is defined as net cost 
appearing on the invoice for said alcoholic beverage.  The 
use of any device, promotion or scheme which results in the 
sale of alcoholic beverages at less than invoiced cost is 
prohibited." 
3 
 
 
 
We conclude that the plain language of § 2.04(1) requires 
that the net cost of liquor or wine sold to a licensed retailer, 
including any credits applied to that sale from CQDs, be 
reflected in the invoice for that particular sale, and that it 
was reasonable for the commission to interpret the regulation in 
accordance with the regulation's plain language.  We also 
conclude that the commission's interpretation of this regulation 
is reasonable in light of both its legislative mandate and the 
administrative demands of efficient and uniform enforcement.  
Where Total Wine sold liquor and wine purchased through the 
invoiced sales in the record at prices below the net price 
reflected in those invoices, the commission was justified in 
finding that Total Wine sold the liquor or wine "at a price less 
than invoiced cost," in violation of § 2.04(1).  Accordingly, we 
reverse the Superior Court judgment allowing Total Wine's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, and remand the case to the 
Superior Court with instructions to allow the commission's cross 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and to enter judgment in 
favor of the commission.3 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the 
commission, which we conclude are supported by substantial 
evidence.  See Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts 
Package Store Association, Inc. 
4 
 
 
Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 509 (2019) (Craft), citing G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e). 
 
Total Wine is a retailer of alcoholic beverages licensed by 
the commission pursuant to G. L. c. 138, § 15, the statutory 
provision of the Liquor Control Act authorizing liquor stores to 
sell alcoholic beverages to be consumed off premises.  Craft, 
supra at 509 n.4.  In December 2015, the commission received 
numerous complaints that at least one Total Wine retail store 
was selling alcoholic beverages to consumers at prices below the 
invoiced cost to Total Wine, in violation of 204 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 2.04(1).  The commission continued to receive complaints 
about Total Wine's pricing practices regarding at least two 
retail store locations in May and June of 2016.  Pursuant to its 
authority to undertake "general supervision of the conduct of 
the business of . . . selling alcoholic beverages," G. L. c. 10, 
§ 71, and to "enforc[e] and prevent[] violation of" its own 
regulations, G. L. c. 138, § 24, the commission initiated 
investigations into Total Wine's pricing practices. 
 
When the commission's investigators obtained invoices from 
the licensed wholesalers from whom Total Wine purchased its 
liquor, they discovered that, with respect to at least four 
brands of liquor and wine sold during November 2015, and at 
least eight brands of liquor sold during May and June 2016, 
Total Wine sold bottles to consumers at a price below its own 
5 
 
 
invoiced per-bottle cost.  For example, as to one brand of rum, 
Total Wine purchased cases from a wholesaler at an original cost 
of $19.99 per bottle.  The invoice reflected a one percent 
"prompt payment" discount, because Total Wine paid for the rum 
upon delivery, which reduced the cost to $19.79 per bottle.  Yet 
Total Wine sold this brand of rum in two stores at a retail 
price of $17.99 per bottle. 
 
The wholesalers that sold these brands to Total Wine, 
however, offered CQDs under various promotional programs to 
retailers who purchased these brands in certain quantities 
during certain limited periods of time.  For instance, with 
respect to the brand of rum in the example referenced supra, 
Total Wine earned a credit of two dollars per bottle once it 
purchased 225 cases of the rum, which it could apply to future 
purchases and which was later reflected in a new credit invoice.  
Although Total Wine paid the wholesaler $19.79 per bottle upon 
delivery, Total Wine knew that it would receive the two dollars 
per bottle credit from the CQD because of the amount it had 
purchased, and therefore factored this future credit in pricing 
the rum at $17.99 per bottle, which was twenty cents above what 
it considered to be its true "net cost" of $17.79.  The CQDs 
were generally discussed between Total Wine and its wholesalers 
over electronic mail (e-mail) correspondence, and at least some 
CQDs were publicly advertised to retailers in the Massachusetts 
6 
 
 
Beverage Journal.4  But the credits arising from CQDs were never 
reflected on the original invoices at the time that the liquor 
or wine was purchased; they were reflected only on subsequent 
credit invoices and applied to future purchases. 
 
After evidentiary hearings, the commission issued written 
decisions on January 18, 2017, finding Total Wine in violation 
of 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.04(1) for selling alcoholic 
beverages at two Total Wine stores at retail prices that were 
below the net cost appearing on the invoices.  The commission 
concluded that under the plain language of the regulation, which 
provides that "[c]ost is defined as net cost appearing on the 
invoice for said alcoholic beverage," it could not factor in the 
CQDs -- which appeared on separate invoices that were issued 
later in time -- to Total Wine's net cost.  The commission did 
not dispute that, if the future credits from the CQDs were 
factored into the cost of the products, the over-all cost to 
Total Wine would fall below the prices that were being offered 
to consumers.  But it nevertheless concluded that any such 
discounts must appear on the original invoice to be considered 
in the calculation of net cost under § 2.04(1).  The commission 
thus ordered that Total Wine's license to sell alcoholic 
                                                          
 
 
4 Total Wine describes the Massachusetts Beverage Journal as 
"a periodic compendium of all [alcoholic beverage] products sold 
in . . . Massachusetts along with their supplier and wholesale 
prices." 
7 
 
 
beverages at its Everett location be suspended for eight days, 
with two days to be served; that its license for its Natick 
location be suspended for eleven days, with three days to be 
served; and that the remaining balances be held in abeyance for 
two years conditioned on no further violations of G. L. c. 138 
or commission regulations. 
 
Total Wine sought judicial review of the commission's 
decision in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  
After the parties filed cross motions for judgment on the 
pleadings, the Superior Court judge granted Total Wine's motion 
and denied the commission's motion.  The judge concluded that 
"the [c]ommission has interpreted the definition of 'invoiced 
cost' in a manner that is inconsistent with well-established 
principles of statutory construction."  The judge declared that, 
by failing to account for the CQDs in calculating the actual 
cost of goods to Total Wine, the commission "disregard[ed] . . . 
the substantive realities of transactions between alcoholic 
beverage wholesalers and their retail merchants."  The judge 
also concluded that the commission's "inflexibl[e]" 
interpretation of § 2.04(1) bore "no rational connection to the 
purpose of its governing statutory scheme" -- which, the judge 
concluded, was "to prohibit unfair competitive tactics like 
predatory pricing."  The judge therefore held that the 
8 
 
 
commission's decision was "arbitrary and capricious," and 
vacated the commission's decision and penalties. 
 
The commission appealed from the motion judge's ruling, and 
we transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  "A final agency decision may be set aside or 
modified on judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, where, 
among other reasons, it . . . is '[b]ased upon an error of law,' 
under § 14 (7) (c); or is 'arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' under 
§ 14 (7) (g)."  Craft, 481 Mass. at 511-512.  Here, the issue 
essentially is whether the commission made an error of law in 
interpreting its own regulation -- § 2.04(1) -- to prohibit 
Total Wine from selling liquor or wine at a price less than the 
net cost per bottle that appeared on the original invoice, even 
where a subsequent credit invoice reflected a CQD that, if 
applied to the liquor or wine earlier purchased, would have 
reduced the net cost per bottle below the retail price. 
 
Our review of questions of law is de novo.  Craft, 481 
Mass. at 512.  "We interpret a regulation in the same manner as 
a statute, and according to traditional rules of construction."  
Warcewicz v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 410 Mass. 548, 550 
(1991).  Two relevant rules of construction apply to this case.  
First, we look to the text of the regulation, and will apply the 
clear meaning of unambiguous words unless doing so would lead to 
9 
 
 
an absurd result.  See Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 
465 Mass. 134, 138 (2013).  Second, "we are generous in our 
deference to administrative agencies in their interpretation of 
their own regulations," ensuring only that their interpretation 
is reasonable.  Craft, supra at 525, 527. 
 
We conclude that the commission correctly interpreted the 
plain language of the regulation, and that its interpretation is 
reasonable and does not lead to an absurd result.  Section 
2.04(1) provides that a licensee may not sell alcoholic 
beverages below the "net cost appearing on the invoice for said 
alcoholic beverage."  It is reasonable for the commission to 
interpret that language to mean that a retail licensee may not 
sell liquor or wine below the net cost on the invoice reflecting 
the purchase from the wholesaler of that liquor or wine.  Total 
Wine paid the wholesaler the net cost listed on this invoice 
when it purchased the liquor or wine; the CQD granted as a 
result of this bulk purchase was credited against future 
purchases, not against the original purchase, and was nowhere 
reflected in the invoice for this purchase.  By expressly 
referencing "the invoice for said alcoholic beverage," § 2.04(1) 
contemplates the cost of goods as reflected in a single invoice.  
It is reasonable to infer that this invoice is the invoice that 
a buyer receives at the time of purchase, which -- at least in 
this record -- displays a full picture of the quantity of goods 
10 
 
 
purchased, the cost per case and per bottle, and any discounts 
received that are applied to the purchase price.  Therefore, 
because the regulation refers to one invoice, it follows that 
"net cost" refers to the net cost as appearing on that invoice.  
We thus reject Total Wine's argument that "net cost" includes 
all discounts and credits, present and future, regardless of 
whether they appear on the original purchase invoice. 
 
Total Wine's interpretation of § 2.04(1) is not only 
contrary to the plain meaning of its language but would also run 
afoul of 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.02(2) (1993), which forbids a 
retail licensee from accepting an invoice "which falsely 
indicates prices, discounts, or terms of sale," or that 
withholds information that causes the invoice to "not truly 
reflect the transaction involved."5  If the CQD truly were a 
discount for the sale of liquor or wine reflected in the invoice 
                                                          
 
 
5 Title 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.02(2) (1993) provides in 
full: 
 
"No licensee shall print, post, publish or use any false or 
fictitious price list; nor shall any invoice given or 
accepted by any licensee contain any statement which 
falsely indicates prices, discounts, or terms of sale; nor 
shall there be inserted in any invoice given or accepted by 
any licensee any statement which makes the invoice a false 
record, wholly or in part, of the transaction represented 
therein; nor shall there be withheld from any invoice given 
or accepted by any licensee any statements which properly 
should be included therein, so that in the absence of such 
statements the invoice does not truly reflect the 
transaction involved." 
11 
 
 
for that sale, it would need to be shown on that invoice, 
because otherwise the invoice would not truly reflect the net 
price of the transaction. 
 
Total Wine contends that the commission's interpretation of 
the regulation is inconsistent with the commission's enabling 
legislation, and that the commission's rigid requirement that 
all discounts appear on a single invoice is fundamentally 
unreasonable.  We disagree with both of these arguments. 
 
We construe agency regulations in a manner "consistent with 
the legislative design."  TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of N. 
Andover, 431 Mass. 9, 15 (2000).  Enacted in 1933 in 
anticipation of the end of the Prohibition era, the Liquor 
Control Act, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 138, as appearing in St. 1933, 
c. 376, § 2, gave the alcoholic beverages control commission 
broad powers to "make regulations not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter for clarifying, carrying out, 
enforcing and preventing violation of . . . all and any of its 
provisions . . . for the proper and orderly conduct of the 
licensed business."  G. L. c. 138, § 24.  See Craft, 481 Mass. 
at 512-514. 
 
Among the provisions of the Liquor Control Act that the 
commission is tasked to enforce are several statutes that 
prohibit anticompetitive practices.  For example, G. L. c. 138, 
§ 25C (f), provides that "[n]o licensee authorized to sell 
12 
 
 
alcoholic beverages at retail for off-premises consumption shall 
sell . . . any alcoholic beverages at a price less than the 
minimum consumer resale price then in effect, unless written 
permission of the commission is granted for good cause shown."  
The commission is also authorized to make rules that "are 
necessary . . . to prevent circumvention of the provisions of 
[§ 25C] by the offering or giving of any rebate, allowance, free 
goods, discount or any other thing or service of value."  G. L. 
c. 138, § 25C (g).  In enforcing § 25C, the commission is 
empowered to root out forms of predatory pricing, such as 
"below-cost" pricing, that threaten to "eliminat[e] competitors 
in the short run and reduc[e] competition in the long run," 
harming businesses and consumers alike.  Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117, 118 (1986).  See 
Kneeland Liquor, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 345 
Mass. 228, 233 (1962) ("establishment of [minimum] retail prices 
for customers of retail stores is an exercise of the police 
power in order to promote temperance, to stabilize the business, 
to avoid price wars, to instill observance of the law, and to 
protect the public"). 
 
In addition, G. L. c. 138, § 25A, forbids any licensee 
authorized to sell alcoholic beverages to wholesalers or 
retailers to "[d]iscriminate, directly or indirectly, in price, 
in discounts for time of payment or in discounts on quantity of 
13 
 
 
merchandise sold, between one wholesaler and another wholesaler, 
or between one retailer and another retailer purchasing 
alcoholic beverages bearing the same brand or trade name and of 
like age and quality."  In enforcing § 25A, the commission is 
empowered to prevent price discrimination that would allow 
suppliers or wholesalers to favor particular licensees.  See 
Craft, 481 Mass. at 514, quoting Grubb, Exorcising the Ghosts of 
the Past:  An Exploration of Alcoholic Beverage Regulation in 
Oklahoma, 37 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 289, 298 (2012) (noting need 
to counteract danger of "tied houses," that is, "reciprocal 
relationship[s] between saloon owners and manufacturers of 
alcoholic beverages that existed before Prohibition").  Through 
the promulgation and enforcement of 204 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 2.04(1), the commission prevents predatory pricing by 
forbidding a package store from selling "any alcoholic beverages 
at a price less than invoiced cost," and guards against hidden 
predatory pricing and price discrimination by requiring the net 
cost, less any discounts, to appear "on the invoice for said 
alcoholic beverage." 
 
To be sure, as Total Wine argues, the commission 
potentially could attempt to enforce its minimum price rules and 
its prohibition against price discrimination without requiring 
all discounts to be identified on the invoice for a particular 
sale.  But it would be considerably more difficult to do so.  
14 
 
 
Section 2.04(1) simplifies the enforcement of commission rules 
by permitting investigators to look at a single invoice for a 
particular sale of liquor or wine and determine whether the 
retailer is selling below minimum price, because the sales price 
cannot be below the net cost shown on the invoice.  The 
regulation also allows investigators to easily evaluate whether 
the licensed wholesaler is engaging in price discrimination 
because the price and all discounts for the sale to that 
licensed retailer must be shown on that invoice. 
 
Total Wine argues that it would be a simple matter for the 
commission merely to incorporate by reference either the CQDs 
listed on the subsequently issued invoices, or the CQDs as 
advertised in the Massachusetts Beverage Journal.  But this 
would be far from simple in practice.  A CQD is a credit that 
may be applied to any future purchase by the retailer.  How are 
the commission's investigators to know, by looking at a credit 
invoice reflecting the receipt of CQDs, whether a CQD is being 
"factored into" the price of the wine or liquor the purchase of 
which earned the CQD, or applied to a future purchase?  With 
respect to an example emerging from this record, how are the 
commission's investigators to know how to "factor" a four 
dollars per case CQD into the price of the purchase of 200 cases 
of a brand of wine, where the credit increases to six dollars 
per case if the retailer were to purchase another one hundred 
15 
 
 
cases during the promotional time period?  How are the 
commission's investigators to know how to "factor" a CQD into 
the price if the invoice for that purchase of wine reflected the 
sale of only 150 cases of wine, too few to even trigger the CQD 
of four dollars per case, but the retailer later made purchases 
during the promotional period of another one hundred cases, 
triggering the CQD of four dollars per case, and then another 
one hundred cases, triggering the CQD of six dollars per case?  
And what if, for example, a CQD is never actually applied toward 
future purchases, either by error or because a retailer or 
wholesaler goes out of business? 
 
Total Wine asserts that the commission's administrative 
challenges in enforcing § 2.04(1) can be "easily resolved" by 
simply "having the targeted retailer provide the fact finder 
with all documentation issued to it by the wholesaler regarding 
the cost of alcoholic beverages."  In other words, Total Wine 
argues that it can solve the administrability problem by 
submitting its own calculations to the commission.  But this 
would allow a retailer, after it learns it is under 
investigation, to declare -- without any regard for the 
regulatory definition of "cost" as "net cost appearing on the 
invoice for said alcoholic beverage" -- which subsequent credits 
it would apply to earlier purchases so that the sales price 
would exceed the net purchase price (emphasis added).  204 Code 
16 
 
 
Mass. Regs. § 2.04(1).  And this does not resolve the 
uncertainty regarding contingent or changing CQDs.  For example, 
in at least one instance, a wholesaler sent an e-mail message to 
Total Wine to indicate that one credit was being adjusted to 
"$4.00 not $8.00 as previously published," and another credit 
was being added to the effect of "an additional $10 case on top 
of current pricing or free good deals."  In order to effectively 
enforce its regulations, the commission must be able to account 
for these variables at the time of sale. 
 
The 1933 Report of the Special Committee on Liquor 
Legislation, which was relied upon by the Legislature in its 
enactment of the Liquor Control Act, see Connolly v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm'n, 334 Mass. 613, 617 n.1 (1956), 
recognized that "[a] law to be effective must be possible of 
reasonable enforcement."  1933 Senate Doc. No. 494, at 6.  As an 
agency "concerned with . . . setting enforcement policy," the 
commission is vested with "particularly broad" discretion to 
define how it must exercise that role.  See Levy v. Board of 
Registration & Discipline in Med., 378 Mass. 519, 525 (1979), 
quoting Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. Federal Communications 
Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 
U.S. 923 (1971).  See also Leather Indus. of Am., Inc. v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 40 F.3d 392, 403 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) ("An agency has discretion to design rules that can be 
17 
 
 
broadly applied, sacrificing some measure of 'fit' for 
administrability").  We do not think it unreasonable for an 
agency with limited resources to prioritize administrability in 
order to "avoid[ ] . . . continuing uncertainty that would 
inevitably accompany any purely case-by-case approach like the 
one [Total Wine] advocates" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 
44, 59 (2011).  Nor is it unreasonable for the commission to 
guard against its investigators needing to cobble together an 
undefined amount of paperwork in order to document the actual 
net "cost" of each and every bottle of liquor or wine.  The 
commission's interpretation of § 2.04(1), which requires all 
pricing variables to appear on the same document, avoids all of 
the uncertainties discussed supra by providing for a uniform, 
bright-line rule to guide its enforcement -- one that comports 
directly with the plain text of the regulation.  It naturally 
follows that requiring all discounts and credits to appear on 
the single invoice applicable to a sale of liquor or wine is a 
reasonable means of ensuring compliance with the statutes and 
rules the commission is obligated to enforce. 
 
The commission's interpretation of § 2.04(1) does not 
prevent retail licensees from taking advantage of CQDs or 
passing those credits on to customers in the form of lower 
prices, so long as they do not discount the price of an 
18 
 
 
alcoholic beverage below the statutory minimum price under G. L. 
c. 138, § 25C.  The CQDs need only be applied within the 
restrictions clearly set forth by commission regulations -- that 
is, like any other discount, when the credit is applied to the 
sale of any liquor or wine, the credit must appear on the 
invoice for that sale.  Contrary to Total Wine's argument, this 
outcome does not prevent the savings from CQDs from being passed 
onto consumers; the consumers will receive the same economic 
benefit if and when the CQDs are applied to a future purchase.6,7 
                                                          
 
 
6 For the same reason, we are not persuaded by Total Wine's 
assertion that the commission's interpretation of § 2.04(1) 
violates the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, as an unlawful 
restraint on trade.  See Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. 
Sullivan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47 (D. Mass. 1998), quoting United 
States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) 
("interference with the setting of price by free market forces 
is unlawful per se").  Total Wine acknowledges that "the credits 
were applied to [its] next purchase (which could be for any 
number of products)."  Therefore, whether a CQD is applied 
retroactively or passed on as a credit toward future purchases, 
the cost savings may still be passed on to the consumer by the 
retailer; all that might change is the timing of those cost 
savings. 
 
 
7 We recognize Total Wine's concern that retailers do not 
have complete control over the invoices that wholesalers issue 
to them.  However, it is the wholesalers that choose to offer 
purchase incentives, such as prompt payment discounts and CQDs, 
and it is presumably in their best interest to ensure that 
retailers can take advantage of those discounts while complying 
with the law.  That reality is demonstrated by the e-mail 
records in this case, which reveal that wholesalers routinely 
sought to reassure Total Wine that it would be issued the CQDs 
for which it qualified.  Moreover, the licensed retailer is 
legally responsible to ensure that the invoices it receives from 
the licensed wholesaler are accurate.  See 204 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 2.02(2) ("nor shall any invoice given or accepted by any 
19 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed supra, we conclude 
that, in view of the plain language of § 2.04(1), and the 
commission's need to effectively and uniformly enforce its own 
regulations in accordance with its legislative mandate, the 
commission's decision was not arbitrary and capricious or 
otherwise unreasonable.  Accordingly, the order of the Superior 
Court judge granting Total Wine's cross motion for judgment on 
the pleadings is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
Superior Court with instructions to allow the commission's cross 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and enter judgment in favor 
of the commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
licensee contain any statement which falsely indicates prices, 
discounts, or terms of sale" [emphasis added]).