Title: State ex rel. Krueger v. Appleton Area School District Board of Education

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP231 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. John Krueger, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Appleton Area School District Board of Education 
and  
Communication Arts 1 Materials Review Committee, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 370 Wis. 2d 787, 882 N.W.2d 870 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 15, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Vicki L. Clussman 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Brian McGrath, Thomas C. Kamenick, 
and Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty, Milwaukee, and an 
oral argument by Richard M. Esenberg. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by Andrew 
T. Phillips, Christine V. Hamiel, and von Briesen and Roper, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Christine V. Hamiel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Department of Justice by Anne M. Bensky, assistant attorney 
general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  There was an 
oral argument by Anne M. Bensky. 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Freedom of Information Counsel, Wisconsin Newspaper Association 
and Wisconsin Broadcasters Association by April Rockstead Barker 
and Schott, Bublitz and Engel, S.C.   
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Counties 
Association, 
League 
of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities, 
Wisconsin Association of School Business Officials, Wisconsin 
Association 
of 
School 
Personnel 
Administrators, 
Wisconsin 
Association 
of 
School 
Boards, 
Wisconsin 
Council 
for 
Administrative 
Services, 
Association 
of 
Wisconsin 
School 
Administrators, and Wisconsin Association of School District 
Administrators by Joseph L. Olson and Michael Best & Friedrich 
LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP231 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV868) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. John Krueger, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Appleton Area School District Board of 
Education and  
 
Communication Arts 1 Materials Review 
Committee, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case requires us to 
decide 
whether 
the 
Appleton 
Area 
School 
District's 
Communications Arts 1 Materials Review Committee ("CAMRC") was a 
governmental body subject to Wisconsin's open meetings law.  
John Krueger, the parent of a child who attended school in the 
District, sued CAMRC and the Appleton Area School District Board 
of Education (the "Board"), alleging that CAMRC failed to comply 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
2 
 
with the open meetings law.  The Outagamie County circuit court1 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and CAMRC, 
concluding that CAMRC was not subject to the open meetings law.  
We now review the unpublished decision of the court of appeals2 
that affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. 
¶2 
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that CAMRC met the definition of "governmental body" under 
the open meetings law and therefore was subject to its terms.  
See Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) (2011-12).3  Where a governmental 
entity adopts a rule authorizing the formation of committees and 
conferring on them the power to take collective action, such 
committees are "created by . . . rule" under § 19.82(1) and the 
open meetings law applies to them.  Here, the Board's Rule 361 
provided that the review of educational materials should be done 
according to the Board-approved Assessment, Curriculum, & 
Instruction Handbook (the "Handbook").  The Handbook, in turn, 
authorized the formation of committees with a defined membership 
and the power to review educational materials and make formal 
recommendations for Board approval.  Because CAMRC was formed as 
one of these committees, pursuant to authority delegated to it 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Vicki L. Clussman, presiding. 
2 State ex rel. Krueger v. Appleton Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 2015AP231, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 
28, 2016). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
3 
 
by the Board by means of Rule 361 and the Handbook, it was 
"created by . . . rule" and therefore was a "governmental body" 
under § 19.82(1). 
¶3 
We begin by setting forth the relevant factual 
background surrounding the District's rules governing curriculum 
review and the formation and operation of CAMRC.4  We next 
analyze the statutory criteria that an entity must meet in order 
to be a "governmental body" subject to the open meetings law.  
We then apply these criteria to CAMRC, and we conclude that it 
was a "governmental body" under Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) and 
therefore was subject to the open meetings law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The District's Rules Governing Curriculum Review 
¶4 
Under the Wisconsin statutes, a school board is vested 
with the authority to "adopt all the textbooks necessary for use 
in the schools under its charge."  Wis. Stat. § 118.03(1).  In 
the Appleton Area School District, the Board adopted Rule 361,5 
which recognized that the Board, "as the governing body of the 
                                                 
4 As the court of appeals recognized, the parties have 
agreed that there are no disputed issues of material fact.  
Krueger, unpublished slip op., ¶2 n.1. 
5 Rule 361 was adopted by the Board in 1993 and amended in 
2003.  On October 24, 2011 (after the formation of CAMRC), the 
Board amended Rule 361 again and renumbered it "Rule 361.1."  
The parties refer to Rule 361 and Rule 361.1 interchangeably.  
Because there are no differences that are material to this case, 
and because Rule 361 was in effect at the time that CAMRC was 
formed, we cite to Rule 361 in this opinion.  A full copy of 
Rule 361 as it appears in the record is attached to this opinion 
as Appendix A. 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
4 
 
School District, is legally responsible for all educational 
materials utilized within the instructional program of the 
[District]."  Rule 361 further provided that "[t]he selection of 
educational materials is delegated to the professionally trained 
and certified personnel employed by the school system."  In a 
section 
titled 
"Procedures 
for 
Selection 
of 
Educational 
Materials and Textbooks," Rule 361 provided that "[c]urriculum 
revision is an ongoing process as defined in the Board approved 
Appleton Area School District (AASD) Assessment, Curriculum, & 
Instruction Handbook.  This Handbook delineates the processes 
leading to Board approval for curriculum revision, adoption of 
new courses, and implementation of curriculum materials."  The 
Handbook had been developed by the District's Assessment, 
Curriculum, and Instruction Department (the "ACI Department") 
and presented to the Board for approval.  The Board had voted to 
adopt the Handbook on January 13, 2003. 
¶5 
By providing in Rule 361 that the selection of 
educational materials was delegated to the ACI Department and by 
adopting the Handbook to govern the performance of those duties, 
the Board directed the ACI Department to follow the Handbook 
when recommending educational materials for Board approval.  The 
head of the ACI Department, Kevin Steinhilber, acknowledged this 
in his deposition.6  Rule 361 did not prohibit the ACI Department 
                                                 
6 When Steinhilber was asked if it was correct that, "in the 
Board's rule, it tells you that when you do curriculum 
revisions, you are to follow the process in the handbook," he 
responded, "I would agree with that." 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
5 
 
from revising the Handbook or modifying Handbook procedures to 
fit different situations.7  But Rule 361 nevertheless represented 
the Board's formal authorization for the ACI Department to 
review and recommend educational materials for Board approval 
pursuant to the processes in the Handbook. 
¶6 
The Handbook provides that curriculum review is to be 
performed on a 6-year cycle, on a course-by-course basis, by 
committees formed for that purpose.8  As the Board and CAMRC 
explained in their responses to Krueger's discovery requests,  
The curriculum cycle, as set forth in the ACI 
Handbook, contemplates the formation of committees for 
program and course review, including provisions for 
the 
committee 
makeup, 
application 
process 
for 
committee membership, information to be provided to 
committee 
members, 
the 
process 
for 
conducting 
committee meetings, and the expected outcomes to be 
achieved by review committees. . . .  
Review committees are tasked with duties such as 
reviewing 
existing 
curriculum, 
reviewing 
possible 
materials/resources to support the curriculum, and 
writing course and program curriculum. . . .  
                                                 
7 "From a practical standpoint," Steinhilber explained, the 
Board "acknowledg[ed] that we have developed a handbook, and 
that we adjust the processes we feel [are] appropriate.  We also 
determine, you know, when that occurs, for which courses, what 
timelines, and we make recommendations then."  But overall, he 
testified, the "process that we follow is that we set up a 
committee that reviews present curriculum, makes modifications, 
looks for materials, educational materials, that support that.  
We bring forward our recommendations to our Board, they review 
it, they determine what other changes they may want, and then 
they do Board approve [sic] that final product." 
8 The relevant portions of the Handbook as they appear in 
the record are attached to this opinion as Appendix B. 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
6 
 
[Ultimately,] 
the 
curriculum 
recommendations 
are 
presented to the Board of Education for approval. 
Indeed, the Handbook provides that the first step when beginning 
a curriculum review cycle is to "[e]stablish a committee for 
program review."  The Handbook further provides that review 
committees are to be composed of at least 17 individuals: 
ACI Director/Coordinator; Administrators from High 
School (1), Middle School (1) and Elementary School 
(3); 
Teachers 
– 
High 
School 
Curriculum 
Support 
Specialists (3), Middle School Curriculum Support 
Specialists (4), and Elementary School (3); Special 
Education representative; and as pertinent TAG, Title 
I and ELL. 
The ACI Department is supposed to select the members of the 
review committee by soliciting and reviewing applications from 
interested persons and sending the selected members "letters of 
acceptance with information regarding [the] first meeting." 
¶7 
After a review committee is formed, the Handbook 
authorizes the committee to perform a number of functions, 
including 
"identify[ing] 
possible 
materials/resources."  
Ultimately, the "committee makes the selection" of which 
materials or resources to recommend to the Board.  The process 
culminates in presenting these recommendations to the Board for 
its approval.  The Board and CAMRC, in their discovery 
responses, provided the following summary of the duties and 
functions assigned by the Handbook to be performed by review 
committees: 
It is not until a review committee has: (1) identified 
texts/materials costs; (2) revised curriculum with 
broad representation throughout the District; (3) 
identified 
essential 
learning 
objectives; 
(4) 
identified how standards will be addressed within a 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
7 
 
course; 
(5) 
identified/developed 
district-wide 
assessments to benchmark major standards; (6) provided 
curriculum to department, administrators, and ACI 
Department for feedback; (7) made needed adjustments; 
(8) 
suggested 
implementation 
strategies 
for 
the 
following school year; and (9) curriculum documents 
[are] reviewed by the content steering committee, that 
the curriculum recommendations are presented to the 
Board of Education for approval. 
All of these provisions in the Handbook demonstrate that, as the 
Board and CAMRC put it in their discovery responses, the 
"Handbook provides the basis of authority for review committees, 
such as CAMRC," to exist. 
B.  Krueger's Request and the Formation of CAMRC 
¶8 
In July of 2011, Krueger asked the District to create 
an alternative Communications Arts 1 course that would use a 
different reading list, consisting of materials at a ninth grade 
reading level with no profanities, obscenities, or sexualized 
content.  At the time of Krueger's request, the Communications 
Arts course curriculum had not gone through the Handbook's 
review-committee process in approximately eight years.  In light 
of 
the 
standard 
six-year 
cycle, 
the 
Communications 
Arts 
curriculum was approximately two years overdue for a review. 
¶9 
District officials met with Krueger and told him that 
they 
were 
planning 
to 
begin 
the 
review 
process 
for 
Communications Arts in grades 7 through 12 in about a year and a 
half.  They hoped that the new book list that would come out of 
the upcoming review process would meet Krueger's request, and a 
new course would not be necessary.  Krueger was dissatisfied 
with the long timeline, and District officials reconsidered.  
No. 
2015AP231   
 
8 
 
They decided to go ahead and begin the review-committee process 
authorized in the Handbook, but only as to the book list for the 
Communications Arts 1 course.  The book list needed updating 
anyway, in light of the new Common Core standards.  As 
Steinhilber explained in his deposition, "we talked internally 
after that meeting" with Krueger and "determined that, well, 
knowing what we know about common core and needing those non-
fiction materials, that we could adjust and do a modified 
version now knowing that we would go through a full curriculum 
process in the future." 
¶10 Steinhilber worked with Nanette Bunnow, the District's 
Director of Humanities, to form CAMRC for this purpose.  Bunnow 
testified in her deposition that, when forming CAMRC, "We used 
the process that was in place through [Rule] 361.1 in the 
Handbook in a modified process."  Although Krueger's request was 
the impetus for forming CAMRC, it was undisputed that CAMRC was 
formed as a review committee pursuant to a modified version of 
the Handbook process.9  According to Bunnow, the process was 
modified in that "we only looked at the book list" rather than 
reviewing and rewriting the full curriculum, "because the 
concern that was brought forth was related to the materials.  We 
were not in a full curriculum cycle."  Nonetheless, Bunnow said, 
                                                 
9 For example, as Steinhilber testified in his deposition: 
Q: 
CAMRC was a Review Committee operating under the 
ACI Handbook. You agree with that, right? 
A: 
I do. 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
9 
 
"Superintendent Allinger was interested in us doing a full 
review [of the materials] because they hadn't been reviewed for 
eight years prior."  The purpose of following the Handbook 
process for review committees, Bunnow explained, is "to make 
sure that we're all following a similar process no matter which 
curriculum [is being reviewed]."  When asked to confirm that 
CAMRC derived its authority and functions from Rule 361 and the 
Handbook (and not from anywhere else), Bunnow agreed.10 
¶11 In forming CAMRC, Steinhilber and Bunnow "sought 
members the same way as we have in the past" when forming other 
review committees pursuant to the Handbook.  "In our handbook," 
Bunnow testified, "we have a process where we advertise or have 
applications that go out and say that we are currently seeking 
teachers . . . that are stakeholders in the curriculum, either 
teach it, or have taught it, or have some knowledge related to 
the intent of the committee."  As a result of Bunnow's 
solicitations, 17 people came forward and were selected for 
membership on CAMRC.  The 17 members included eleven teachers, 
three Communications Arts Curriculum Support Specialists, one 
                                                 
10 As Bunnow put it, "[Rule] 361.1 and the ACI Handbook is 
the process that we did follow because Superintendent Allinger 
asked us to address the parent concerns."  This is consistent 
with the Board's and CAMRC's discovery responses, which stated 
that "CAMRC was created pursuant to a modified 6-year curriculum 
cycle, a process which is enumerated in the ACI Handbook."  The 
Board and CAMRC further explained that "CAMRC's purpose and 
tasks are clearly enumerated by the ACI Department, and ACI 
Department policy guided CAMRC through the modified curriculum 
process, as dictated by the ACI Department."  Further, "CAMRC's 
membership was determined as set forth in the ACI Handbook." 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
10 
 
Library Media Specialist, and one high school principal.  Bunnow 
herself served as chair of the committee. 
C.  The Functions and Operation of CAMRC 
¶12 CAMRC held its first meeting on Monday, October 3, 
2011, and the full committee met a total of eight times, always 
on a Monday at 3:45 p.m. in the same location.  Although CAMRC 
did not revise the entire curriculum for Communications Arts, 
CAMRC performed many of the other functions that the Handbook 
assigns to review committees.  It identified a list of 93 
potential books for the course, it reviewed them in light of 
course standards, it put a proposed list out for public input, 
and it voted on which books to include.  CAMRC arrived at a 
final list of two dozen books to recommend to the Board.  All of 
these steps were taken in accord with duties assigned to review 
committees by the Handbook. 
¶13 At that point in the process, Bunnow testified, "[w]e 
finished up the process as designed.  We took it as an item for 
consideration to the Board."  The book list was presented to the 
Board's Programs and Services Committee, which voted to approve 
the list and bring it before the full Board.  The full Board 
voted to approve the list on April 23, 2012.  Bunnow confirmed 
in her testimony that this "process was authorized through 
[Rule] 361.1 and the ACI Handbook." 
¶14 The Board, too, understood CAMRC to be following the 
Handbook process for review committees.  Shortly after CAMRC was 
formed, 
Bunnow 
and 
Steinhilber 
had 
brought 
an 
"item 
of 
information" before the Board explaining that they had created 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
11 
 
CAMRC under a modified version of the Handbook's review-
committee process to review the book list for Communications 
Arts 1.  The Board had an opportunity to ask questions or to 
request a vote if it did not approve of the modifications to the 
review-committee process for CAMRC.  Diane Barkmeier, a member 
of the Board, testified that her understanding was that CAMRC 
was "part of the curriculum and materials review process."  
Recalling the Board's approval of CAMRC's recommendations for 
the Communications Arts 1 book list, Barkmeier testified: 
Q: 
So — But what the Board, in essence, sets up here 
is procedures under the rule and under the 
handbook that review committees like CAMRC are 
supposed 
to 
follow 
as 
they 
formulate 
the 
recommendations to the Board, correct? 
A: 
Correct.  . . .  
Q: 
And then CAMRC comes to the full Board on April 
23, 
2012, 
to 
see 
if 
you'll 
adopt 
the 
recommendations 
at 
the 
suggestion 
of 
the 
committee, right? 
A: 
Correct. 
Q: 
And you voted to adopt the recommendations of 
CAMRC as the new educational materials for the 
district, right? 
A: 
We did . . . .  As a Board. 
Q: 
And all of that process is the process set forth 
in rules 361 or 361.1 and the ACI Handbook, 
right? 
A: 
Right. 
¶15 In short, every school official involved in the 
process 
(including 
the 
Board, 
the 
Superintendent, 
and 
Steinhilber and Bunnow) understood CAMRC to have been extant 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
12 
 
pursuant to the authority of Rule 361 and the Handbook as 
approved by the Board, for the purpose of performing the 
delegated functions of 
reviewing curriculum materials and 
presenting them for Board approval. 
D.  Procedural History 
¶16 Although 
it 
was 
Krueger's 
request 
that 
spurred 
District officials to form CAMRC pursuant to a modified version 
of the Handbook process to review the Communications Arts 1 book 
list, the District did not permit Krueger to attend CAMRC 
meetings.  He asked to attend, but the District denied his 
request and informed him that CAMRC meetings were not open to 
the public.  The District took the position that the open 
meetings law did not apply to CAMRC. 
¶17 On July 29, 2013, Krueger filed a complaint in 
Outagamie County circuit court, alleging violations of the open 
meetings law.11  The Board and CAMRC moved for summary judgment, 
and the circuit court granted their motion. 
                                                 
11 A person may not sue to enforce the open meetings law 
unless the person has first filed a verified complaint with the 
district attorney.  See Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of 
Police and Fire Comm'rs, 2015 WI 56, ¶¶51-52, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 
866 N.W.2d 563 (refusing to address an open meetings claim where 
the procedures for filing suit under the open meetings law were 
not followed).  Only "[i]f the district attorney refuses or 
otherwise fails to commence an action to enforce this subchapter 
within 20 days after receiving a verified complaint" may the 
person "bring an action . . . on his or her relation in the 
name, and on behalf, of the state."  Wis. Stat. § 19.97(4).  
Here, it is not disputed that Krueger properly filed a verified 
complaint with the Outagamie County district attorney at least 
20 days before commencing this action in the name of the State. 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
13 
 
¶18 Krueger appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court of appeals considered it dispositive that CAMRC was 
created by District officials in response to Krueger's request, 
rather than by the Board directly.  Krueger, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶18-21.  The court of appeals relied on the fact that Rule 
361 did not expressly create CAMRC and that nothing in the 
Handbook mandated that CAMRC, specifically, be created.  See 
id., ¶7.  The court of appeals viewed CAMRC as an ad hoc group 
of government employees rather than as a governmental body that 
was subject to the open meetings law. 
¶19 Krueger petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on October 11, 2016. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 At issue in this case is whether the lower courts 
properly interpreted and applied the open meetings law in 
granting summary judgment to the Board and CAMRC.  This is a 
question of statutory interpretation for our independent review.  
Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police and Fire Comm'rs, 
2015 WI 56, ¶42, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563.  "When a 
circuit court's ruling on motions for declaratory judgment 
depends on questions of law, we review the ruling de novo."  
Gister v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2012 WI 86, ¶8, 342 Wis. 2d 496, 
818 N.W.2d 880.  We review questions of law "independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses."  
State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 
¶32, 309 
Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
14 
 
A.  The Definition of a "Governmental Body" 
¶21 Wisconsin's open meetings law begins by declaring that 
"the public is entitled to the fullest and most complete 
information regarding the affairs of government as is compatible 
with the conduct of governmental business."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.81(1).  Toward that end, the law requires that every 
meeting of a "governmental body" be preceded by public notice 
and kept open to the public, except where a statutory exception 
authorizes the body to meet in closed session.  See generally 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.81-19.85. 
¶22 Our focus today is on the threshold question of when 
the open meetings law applies.  An entity is subject to the open 
meetings law if it is a "governmental body" as defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.82(1).  The statute provides, in relevant part, that 
"'[g]overnmental body' means a state or local agency, board, 
commission, committee, council, department or public body 
corporate 
and 
politic 
created 
by 
constitution, 
statute, 
ordinance, rule or order . . . or a formally constituted subunit 
of any of the foregoing . . . ."  § 19.82(1).12 
                                                 
12 The rest of the definition, which we need not address in 
this case, provides that "governmental body" also includes "a 
governmental or quasi-governmental corporation except for the 
Bradley center sports and entertainment corporation; a local 
exposition district under subch. II of ch. 229; [or] a long-term 
care district under s. 46.2895."  Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1).  It 
also "excludes any such body or committee or subunit of such 
body which is formed for or meeting for the purpose of 
collective bargaining under subch. I, IV, or V of ch. 111."  Id. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
15 
 
¶23 This 
definition 
imposes 
certain 
requirements, 
including the requirement that the entity must take one of seven 
forms: a "state or local agency, board, commission, committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and politic."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.82(1).  The adjectives "state or local" modify each 
item on this list,13 indicating that the entity must be a part of 
either state or local government.  The entity must also be 
"created by constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order."  
Id.  Taken together, these provisions define a "governmental 
body" not by the purpose behind its formation or by the subject 
matter of its meetings, but simply by two criteria: (1) the form 
it takes and (2) the source of its existence in a constitution, 
statute, ordinance, rule, or order. 
¶24 First, a governmental body must take the form of a 
"state or local agency, board, commission, committee, council, 
department or public body corporate and politic."  Wis. Stat. 
                                                                                                                                                             
We also note that some entities that fit the statutory 
definition nevertheless may be exempt from the open meetings law 
for constitutional reasons.  See State ex rel. Lynch v. Dancey, 
71 Wis. 2d 287, 295-96, 238 N.W.2d 81 (1976) (holding that the 
supreme court's superintending authority over the judicial 
system preempted the application of the open meetings law to a 
body created by and under the authority of the court). 
13 "In the absence of some other indication, the modifier 
reaches the entire enumeration."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 
(2012) (citing Ward Gen. Ins. Servs. v. Employers Fire Ins., 7 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 849 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Most readers expect the 
first adjective in a series of nouns or phrases to modify each 
noun or phrase in the following series unless another adjective 
appears.")). 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
16 
 
§ 19.82(1).  We gain additional insight into what this requires 
from other parts of the open meetings law.  In particular, we 
note that a "meeting" of a governmental body is defined as "the 
convening of members of a governmental body for the purpose of 
exercising the responsibilities, authority, power or duties 
delegated to or vested in the body."  § 19.82(2).  This implies 
that a governmental body must have a defined membership, because 
without clarity as to who is and who is not a member, it could 
be impossible to determine when a sufficient number of members 
is assembled to constitute a "meeting" of the body.  See State 
ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Showers, 135 Wis. 2d 77, 102, 398 
N.W.2d 154 (1987) (holding that a meeting of a governmental body 
does not occur unless "the number of members present [is] 
sufficient to determine the parent body's course of action").  
Further, the statutory definition of "meeting" states that 
particular responsibilities, authority, power or duties must be 
delegated to or vested in the body, as distinct from the members 
individually.  Wis. Stat. § 19.82(2); see State ex rel. Lynch v. 
Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 681, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976) (noting that a 
necessary 
characteristic 
of 
a 
governmental 
body 
is 
that 
"collective power" has been conferred upon it).  
¶25 Second, the governmental body must be "created by 
constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.82(1).  In the general sense of the word, to "create" means 
to "cause to exist; bring into being."  Create, American 
Heritage Dictionary 438 (3d ed. 1992).  In light of this 
definition, there must be a constitutional provision, statute, 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
17 
 
ordinance, rule, or order that caused a governmental body to 
exist where none existed before.  In order to cause a body to 
exist, the relevant directive must confer upon it the collective 
"responsibilities, 
authority, 
power 
or 
duties" 
that 
are 
necessary to a governmental body's existence under the open 
meetings law.  See 78 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 67, 69 (1989) (OAG 13-
89) ("The board would, therefore, be creating a committee by 
order whenever it authorizes the committee and assigns the 
duties and functions of the committee.").14 
¶26 For these reasons, the creation of a governmental body 
is not triggered merely by "any deliberate meetings involving 
governmental business between two or more officials."  Showers, 
135 Wis. 2d at 98.  Loosely organized, ad hoc gatherings of 
government 
employees, 
without 
more, 
do 
not 
constitute 
governmental bodies.  See 57 Wis. Op. Atty. Gen. 213, 216 (1968) 
(explaining that "meetings between the [] head of a department 
and . . . the entire staff of a department" were not covered by 
the former version of the open meetings law "because the staff 
does not constitute a body").  Rather, an entity must exist that 
                                                 
14 "The opinions of the Attorney General are not binding on 
the courts but may be given persuasive effect."  Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶41, 341 Wis. 
2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367.  Opinions of the Attorney General 
interpreting the public records and open meetings laws have 
"special significance . . . inasmuch as the legislature has 
specifically authorized the Attorney General to advise any 
person about the applicability of the Law."  Id.; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.98 ("Any person may request advice from the attorney 
general as to the applicability of this subchapter under any 
circumstances.") 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
18 
 
has the power to take collective action that the members could 
not take individually.  See id. at 218 (concluding that the 
faculty of a state university was a body covered by the former 
version of the open meetings law, in part because, under the 
"faculty handbook, constitution and bylaws, . . . the structure 
of that faculty body does indeed provide for the taking of 
formal actions, as a body, with regard to delegated policy-
making and administrative functions.")  As this court has 
succinctly put it, "the question of whether a particular group 
of members of the government actually compose a governmental 
body is answered affirmatively only if there is a 'constitution, 
statute, ordinance, rule or order' conferring collective power 
and defining when it exists."  Conta, 71 Wis. 2d at 681. 
B.  CAMRC Was a "Governmental Body" 
¶27 Applying these principles, we conclude that CAMRC was 
a committee created by rule under Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1).  First, 
it qualifies as a "committee" for purposes of the open meetings 
law because it had a defined membership of 17 individuals upon 
whom was conferred the authority, as a body, to review and 
select 
recommended 
educational 
materials 
for 
the 
Board's 
approval. 
 
This 
authority 
to 
prepare 
formal 
curriculum 
recommendations for Board approval was not exercised by teachers 
and curriculum specialists on their own.  The Board——acting 
through Rule 361 and the Handbook——provided that the members of 
review committees would exercise such authority collectively, as 
a body.  Second, CAMRC was created by rule because District 
employees, when they formed CAMRC, relied on the authority to 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
19 
 
form review committees that was delegated to them by Rule 361 
and the Handbook. 
1.  CAMRC Was a "Committee" 
¶28 The parties appear to agree that CAMRC took the form 
of a "committee" for purposes of the open meetings law, and they 
focus their dispute instead on the second part of the 
definition.  But we are not bound by the parties' concessions.  
See State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶42 n.11, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 
N.W.2d 434.  We therefore briefly explain why we agree that 
CAMRC was a "committee" under Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1). 
¶29 First, CAMRC was formed as a collective entity with a 
defined membership of 17 particular individuals.  Although these 
individuals volunteered, and Bunnow suggested that more would 
have been welcome to join, the 17 nevertheless constituted a 
defined membership selected pursuant to the procedures set forth 
in the Handbook.  Bunnow testified that all 17 members were 
present and voting at all CAMRC meetings, except for a final 
meeting which Bunnow characterized as merely a "subcommittee" 
meeting.  
¶30 Nor was CAMRC simply a loosely organized, ad hoc 
gathering of employees meeting to share knowledge or to 
facilitate their existing job duties.  As members of CAMRC, the 
17 teachers, curriculum specialists, and others were meeting to 
fulfill a collective responsibility that Rule 361 and the 
Handbook 
had 
assigned 
to 
review 
committees, 
namely, 
the 
responsibility to review the book list for the Communications 
Arts 1 course and to recommend revisions to that book list to 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
20 
 
the Board for formal approval.  The Board-approved Handbook 
vested review committees such as CAMRC with the power to 
"identify possible materials/resources" and ultimately "make[] 
the selection" of which materials or resources should be 
recommended to the Board.  None of the teachers or curriculum 
specialists on CAMRC would have had this authority individually, 
but as members of CAMRC, they were empowered to vote on how 
CAMRC should exercise its collective authority as a body. 
¶31 That CAMRC called itself a "committee," kept minutes, 
and recorded attendance and votes are informative, but not 
dispositive, facts.  The essential elements of the form that an 
entity must take in order to be a governmental body are (1) a 
defined 
membership 
and 
(2) 
collective 
responsibilities, 
authority, power, and duties vested in the body as a whole, 
distinct from the individual members.  CAMRC met both of these 
elements, and therefore we have no difficulty concluding that it 
was a "committee" under the definition in Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1). 
2.  CAMRC Was Created By Rule 
¶32 We conclude that CAMRC was created by rule, because 
Rule 361 and the Handbook together constituted a "rule" under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) that authorized CAMRC to exist and 
conferred collective authority on it. 
¶33 The open meetings law does not define the term "rule," 
so we look to its common usage.  "Statutory language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
21 
 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  The common definition of a "rule" includes "[a]n 
authoritative, prescribed direction for conduct, especially one 
of the regulations governing procedure in a legislative body."  
Rule, American Heritage Dictionary 1577 (3d ed. 1992).15  We see 
no indication in the open meetings law that "rule" should be 
given a peculiar technical meaning instead of being "liberally 
construed" along with the rest of the open meetings law.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 19.81(4).  Therefore, for purposes of the open 
meetings 
law, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
"rule" 
includes 
any 
authoritative, prescribed direction for conduct, such as the 
regulations governing procedure in a governmental body.16 
¶34 Here, Rule 361 and the Handbook constituted a "rule" 
because they were adopted by the Board to prescribe the 
procedures for District employees to follow in reviewing 
educational materials and presenting them to the Board for 
                                                 
15 "Resort to definitions, statutory or dictionary, is 
appropriate for the purpose of determining meaning that is plain 
on the face of the statute."  State ex rel. Girouard v. Cir. Ct. 
for Jackson Cty., 155 Wis. 2d 148, 156, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990). 
16 Our recognition that the term "rule" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.82(1) should be given a common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning 
is 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
Attorney 
General's 
interpretation of the term "order" in § 19.82(1), which also is 
derived from a common dictionary definition.  See 78 Wis. Op. 
Att'y Gen. 67, 68-69 (1989) (OAG 13-89) (defining "order" to 
include "an authoritative mandate usu[ally] from a superior to a 
subordinate" and explaining that "[n]either the statute nor the 
dictionary definition require that the order be formal.  All 
that is required to create a governmental body is a directive 
creating the body and assigning it duties.") 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
22 
 
approval.  Specifically, Rule 361 provided that "[t]he selection 
of educational materials is delegated to the professionally 
trained and certified personnel employed by the school system" 
and that the Board-approved "Handbook delineates the processes 
leading to Board approval for curriculum revision, adoption of 
new courses, and implementation of curriculum materials."  The 
processes set forth in the Handbook specifically provided for 
the creation of review committees for this purpose.  As the 
Board and CAMRC stated in their discovery responses, "Review 
committees are tasked with duties such as reviewing existing 
curriculum, reviewing possible materials/resources to support 
the curriculum, and writing course and program curriculum."  
Ultimately, "the curriculum recommendations are presented to the 
Board of Education for approval." 
¶35 Therefore, Rule 361 and the Handbook authorized CAMRC 
to exist and conferred on it the collective authority to review 
curriculum materials and make a recommendation to the Board.  
Steinhilber and Bunnow simply put the Handbook process into 
action when they formed CAMRC to review the book list for 
Communications Arts 1.  As Bunnow testified, "[w]e used the 
process that was in place through [Rule 361] in the Handbook in 
a modified process."  Although Bunnow and Steinhilber modified 
the Handbook process somewhat, in that CAMRC reviewed only the 
book list "because the concern that was brought forth was 
related to the materials," Steinhilber agreed that CAMRC was a 
review committee operating under the Handbook, and Bunnow 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
23 
 
similarly agreed that Rule 361 and the Handbook provided the 
sole authority for CAMRC to exist. 
¶36 Underscoring the nature of the rule under which CAMRC 
was formed is the fact that, after forming CAMRC, Bunnow went 
before the Board to explain how the Handbook procedures had been 
modified to create CAMRC.  The Board had a chance to ask 
questions, and it permitted CAMRC to continue.  Barkmeier, a 
member of the Board, testified that she understood CAMRC to be 
"part of the curriculum and materials review process."  Bunnow 
testified that CAMRC "finished up the process as designed" when 
it ultimately presented its recommended book list to the Board 
for approval, and this "process was authorized through [Rule 
361] and the ACI Handbook." 
¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that CAMRC was created by 
Rule 361 and the Handbook, because even though it was 
Steinhilber and Bunnow who put the Handbook process into action 
when they formed CAMRC, it was the Board's Rule 361 and the 
Board-approved Handbook that authorized review committees like 
CAMRC to be created and conferred on them the collective 
authority 
to 
review 
curriculum 
materials 
and 
make 
recommendations to the Board. 
¶38 The court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion, 
reasoning that neither Rule 361 nor the Handbook "created" CAMRC 
because CAMRC "was not created based on any specific provision 
of either" Rule 361 or the Handbook.  Krueger, unpublished slip 
op., ¶7.  The court found it dispositive that CAMRC was formed 
not by a directive of the Board but by Steinhilber and Bunnow, 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
24 
 
acting "on their own initiative" and "borrow[ing] concepts from 
Board Rule 361.1 and the ACI Handbook."  Id., ¶¶7, 21. 
¶39 In light of the extensive testimony about how CAMRC 
was understood to be one of the review committees authorized by 
the Board through Rule 361 and the Handbook——albeit using a 
somewhat modified process——we do not find the court of appeals' 
distinction persuasive.  We agree with the Attorney General's 
opinion that a committee is created whenever a governmental 
body, by rule, "authorizes the committee and assigns the duties 
and functions of the committee."  See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 67, 69 
(1989) (OAG 13-89).  Here, it was the Board's Rule 361 and the 
Board-approved Handbook——not a directive from Steinhilber or 
Bunnow——that provided the legal authority for CAMRC to exist and 
set forth CAMRC's duties and functions.  Although the Handbook 
did not specifically constitute CAMRC by name, it authorized 
review committees like CAMRC to exist and to exercise the 
Board's delegated authority over curriculum review.  It was that 
authority that Steinhilber and Bunnow relied on when they formed 
CAMRC to review the Communications Arts 1 book list. 
¶40 For the same reason, the fact that CAMRC did not 
follow all Handbook procedures to the letter is not dispositive.  
For example, the Handbook provided for the members of a review 
committee to include five administrators (one each from a high 
school and a middle school and three from an elementary school).  
By contrast, CAMRC included only one high school administrator, 
and it otherwise consisted of teachers and curriculum support 
specialists, along with a library media specialist.  However, 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
25 
 
Bunnow and Steinhilber testified that the Handbook process was 
adjustable depending on the purpose of the particular review 
committee, and the membership of review committees often varied.  
Here, CAMRC was tasked with reviewing the book list for a 
particular class and making recommendations to the Board, and if 
it served that goal to have a greater proportion of teachers on 
the committee, along with a library media specialist, the 
Handbook did not prohibit such modifications.  In no way did the 
composition of CAMRC affect its authority to act as a review 
committee under Rule 361 and the Handbook. 
¶41 Krueger also argues, in the alternative, that CAMRC 
was created by "order" of Steinhilber or Bunnow.  The court of 
appeals held that this argument was forfeited because it first 
appeared in Krueger's reply brief.  On appeal, Krueger renews 
this argument, but we need not resolve it because we hold that 
CAMRC was created by rule under Rule 361 and the Handbook.  
Krueger's arguments as to why CAMRC might alternatively have 
been created by "order" do nothing to disturb our conclusion.  
¶42 Finally, the Board and CAMRC argue that subjecting 
committees like CAMRC to the open meetings law would be 
detrimental to the functioning of government.  But our task is 
to apply the open meetings law as it is written.  If the 
District "seeks change in the statutory provisions [of the open 
meetings 
law], 
it 
must 
direct 
those 
concerns 
to 
the 
legislature."  Journal Times, 362 Wis. 2d 577, ¶52.  We, 
however, "presum[e] that the legislature chose its terms 
carefully and precisely to express its meaning," Ball v. Dist. 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
26 
 
No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 
2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984), and we are not at liberty to 
exempt CAMRC from the definition of "governmental body" simply 
because government officials would find it convenient.  "Mere 
government inconvenience is obviously no bar to the requirements 
of the [open meetings] law."  Conta, 71 Wis. 2d at 678. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 For all of these reasons, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and hold that CAMRC was a "state or 
local . . . committee . . . created by . . . rule" and therefore 
met the definition of "governmental body" under the open 
meetings law.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1).  Where a governmental 
entity adopts a rule authorizing the formation of committees and 
conferring on them the power to take collective action, such 
committees are "created by . . . rule" under § 19.82(1) and the 
open meetings law applies to them.  Here, the Board's Rule 361 
provided that the review of educational materials should be done 
according to the Board-approved Handbook.  The Handbook, in 
turn, authorized the formation of committees with a defined 
membership and the power to review educational materials and 
make formal recommendations for Board approval.  Because CAMRC 
was formed as one of these committees, pursuant to the authority 
delegated from the Board by Rule 361 and the Handbook, it was 
"created by . . . rule" and therefore was a "governmental body" 
under § 19.82(1). 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
27 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
1 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
1 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP231   
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  The instant 
case traverses the Open Meetings Law and public education.  The 
Open Meetings Law1 reflects Wisconsin's deep commitment to open 
and transparent government.2  Education is a key constitutional 
function of Wisconsin government.  Wis. Const. Art. X. 
¶45 Our democratic system of government——as well as the 
well-being of each person in this state and the sound 
functioning of our economic system——depends on a well-educated 
population.  "Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an 
equal opportunity for a sound basic education.  An equal 
opportunity for a sound basic education is one that will equip 
students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed 
economically and personally."  Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, 
¶3, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388.    
¶46 Parental and public involvement in education is, in my 
opinion, indispensable, and is legislatively protected by the 
Open Meetings Law.  It is not, however, in the parents' or 
public's interest to make every collaborative decision made by 
                                                 
1 See generally Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 19, Subchapter V 
entitled Open Meetings of Governmental Bodies, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.81-98. 
2 State v. Beaver Dam Area Dev. Corp., 2008 WI 90, ¶2, 312 
Wis. 2d 84, 752 N.W.2d 295.   
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
2 
 
educators subject to the strictures of the Open Meetings Law.3 
The application of the Open Meetings Law to education (or any 
other government function) is not without limits. 
¶47 The legislative declaration of policy in the Open 
Meetings Law states in full as follows: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government of the American type is dependent upon an 
informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy 
of this state that the public is entitled to the 
fullest and most complete information regarding the 
affairs of government as is compatible with the 
conduct of governmental business.   
Wis. Stat. § 19.81(1) (emphasis added).4   
¶48 Indeed the Open Meetings Law conveys limits.  The 
legislature intended the Law to be construed liberally but not 
so that it impedes the functioning of government.  On the one 
hand, the legislature's declaration of policy explicitly states: 
The policy of the state is that the public have the fullest and 
most complete information regarding the affairs of government.  
On the other hand, the legislature's declaration of policy also 
proclaims a countervailing concern and limitation:  The Open 
                                                 
3 "Even though Wisconsin courts have not specifically 
addressed this issue, the extensive federal case law in this 
area 
establishes 
that 
parents 
simply 
do 
not 
have 
a 
constitutional right to control each and every aspect of their 
children's education and oust the state's authority over that 
subject."  Larson v. Burmaster, 2006 WI App 142, ¶39, 295 
Wis. 2d 333, 720 N.W.2d 134. 
4 See also Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (providing that the policy of 
the public records law is to ensure that the public has access 
to "the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of 
government and the official acts of those . . . who represent 
them.") (emphasis added). 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
3 
 
Meetings Law prevails "as is compatible with the conduct of 
governmental business."   
¶49 Both aspects of the legislative policy statement 
should guide this court's interpretation and application of the 
Open Meetings Law in the instant case.  Government operations 
should be open and transparent to the fullest extent possible.  
But, the Open Meetings Law should not be interpreted to apply to 
every meeting between administrators and employees and others to 
discuss how to implement specific policies or programs or how to 
do their day-to-day jobs.  These kinds of meetings take place 
routinely, and as the Department of Justice has advised:  "They 
cannot be made subject to the open meetings law because to do so 
would make it impossible to carry out the day-to-day business of 
government."5 
¶50 To distinguish between these two kinds of meetings 
under the Open Meetings Law is the difficult issue presented.   
¶51 The importance of this case to the public and to 
school officers and employees for the transparent and effective 
                                                 
5 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Mary Woolsey 
Schlaefer to Jim Pepelnjak of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
Inc. (June 8, 1998).  See also Wisconsin Department of Justice's 
Wisconsin Open Meetings Law Compliance Guide 7 (Nov. 2015) ("The 
definition of a 'governmental body' is only rarely satisfied 
when groups of a governmental unit's employees gather on a 
subject within the unit's jurisdiction."); Letter from Assistant 
Attorney General Thomas C. Bellavia to Joe Tylka (June 8, 2005) 
(the Open Meetings Law does not apply to "meetings of groups of 
government officials and employees that are not established 
pursuant to some such informal directive, but that simply meet 
together on an ad hoc basis in the interest of governmental 
efficiency . . . .)".  
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
4 
 
operations of a school system is evident from the numerous 
briefs the court has received from many stakeholders:  
• The parent (John Krueger) has submitted briefs;  
• The Appleton Area School District Board of Education 
and Communication Arts 1 Materials Review Committee 
have jointly submitted a brief;  
• The Wisconsin Department of Justice has submitted a 
non-party amicus brief;6  
• The Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council, the 
Wisconsin Newspaper Association, and the Wisconsin 
Broadcasters Association have jointly submitted a non-
party amicus brief; and  
• The Wisconsin Counties Association, the League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities, the Wisconsin Association of 
School Business Officials, the Wisconsin Association 
of School Personnel Administrators, the Wisconsin 
Association of School Boards, the Wisconsin Council 
for 
Administrative 
Services, 
the 
Association 
of 
Wisconsin School Administrators, and the Wisconsin 
Association of School District Administrators have 
jointly submitted a non-party amicus brief.     
¶52 All the briefs, including the Department of Justice's 
brief, agree that this court's guidance is needed to develop the 
                                                 
6 The Department of Justice's brief did not focus on the 
facts of the instant case.  The Department of Justice did not 
support either John Krueger or the School Board regarding the 
application of the Open Meetings Law to the instant case.  
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
5 
 
definition of "governmental body" in the Open Meetings Law.  
They agree that more clarity is needed than is currently 
provided by the Department of Justice's formal and informal 
communications.  Clarity is needed because government functions 
best when it has clearly defined and uniformly applicable 
standards.     
¶53 The briefs are, however, far from agreement as to what 
the court's guidance should be, even when they agree on the 
bottom line, that is, even when they agree whether CAMRC is or 
is not a governmental body subject to the Open Meetings Law.7  (I 
shall refer to CAMRC as the Review Committee.)   
¶54 I focus, as the majority opinion and briefs do, on the 
word "create" in Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) as the significant word 
in the instant case in determining whether the Review Committee 
fits within the definition of "governmental body" in the Open 
Meetings Law.  The definition of "governmental body" is 
important because the Open Meetings Law applies to every meeting 
of a governmental body.  Wis. Stat. § 19.83(1).  "Governmental 
body" is defined in § 19.82(1) as follows: 
(1) "Governmental body" means a state or local agency, 
board, commission, committee, council, department or 
public 
body 
corporate 
and 
politic 
created 
by 
constitution, 
statute, 
ordinance, 
rule 
or 
order . . . .  (Emphasis added.)  
¶55 Whether the Review Committee is a governmental body 
subject to the Open Meetings Law is a close call for me.  
                                                 
7 "CAMRC" is used by the majority opinion.  CAMRC refers to 
the Communication Arts 1 Materials Review Committee. 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
6 
 
Indeed, at oral argument John Krueger's counsel often stated in 
response to questions from the court posing hypotheticals:  
"Line drawing is very difficult."  
¶56 I am not persuaded by the parent's arguments that a 
rule or order created the Review Committee.  The best that can 
be said for the parent's position is that the "creation" in the 
instant case may be hazy.   
¶57 The Department of Justice's Wisconsin Open Meetings 
Law Compliance Guide (Nov. 2015) at 6 recommends that "[a]ny 
doubts as to the applicability of the open meetings law should 
be resolved in favor of complying with the law's requirements."  
I do not necessarily agree with this recommendation.  It fails 
to recognize the legislature's countervailing interests of 
transparency and effective government operations.  Furthermore, 
the parent in the instant case had access to the work of the 
Review Committee through his open records requests, and he had 
the opportunity to make his suggestions heard by the Review 
Committee.     
¶58 Moreover, and significantly, an important issue at 
this stage of the instant case is not merely the label pinned on 
the Review Committee but rather the next step should the 
majority opinion declare that the Review Committee was a 
governmental body subject to the Open Meetings Law.  The 
parent's brief does not request that the acts of the Review 
Committee be voided under Wis. Stat. § 19.97(3).        
¶59 I do not join the majority opinion for several 
reasons.  
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶60 First, the majority opinion gives short shrift to Wis. 
Stat. § 19.81(1), the legislative policy requiring transparent 
government "as is compatible with the conduct of governmental 
business."  The majority opinion seems to read this aspect of 
the legislative policy statement out of the Open Meetings Law, 
or at the least gives it little or no weight in interpreting the 
Open Meetings Law.  Majority op., ¶42.   
¶61 Yet a court looks at a statement of legislative policy 
as an intrinsic guide to meaning. Schilling v. Crime Victim 
Rights Bd., 2005 WI 17, ¶14, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623;  
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. P.S.C., 69 Wis. 2d 1, 
18, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975); Letter from Assistant Attorney 
General Mary Woolsey Schlaefer to Jim Pepelnjak of the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel Inc. (June 8, 1998); Wisconsin Bill Drafting 
Manual 2017-2018, 7.02.    
¶62 Second, 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion at ¶33 that the word "rule" in Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) 
should be given the dictionary definition that appears in the 
1992 version of the American Heritage Dictionary.  According to 
the majority opinion, the definition of "'rule' includes "an 
authoritative, prescribed direction for conduct, especially one 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
8 
 
of the regulations governing procedure in a legislative body."  
Majority op., ¶33.8      
¶63 The 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.82(1), 
defines 
"governmental body," inter alia, as a "committee" that is 
"created by constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order."9  
Each of the words in the list beginning with the word 
"constitution" is used in common parlance, but each is used in 
the statute in a technical, legal sense.  Each describes a 
written, formal document enacted as required by law.  Why would 
the legislature switch in midsentence and not use the words 
"rule or order" in their technical, legal sense?  Applying a 
generally accepted canon of statutory interpretation, I conclude 
that the legislature did not make a switch in midsentence.   
                                                 
8 A single word can have multiple definitions.  The American 
Heritage Dictionary provides well over a dozen formulations of a 
definition for the word "rule."  Likewise, the online version of 
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "rule" in over a dozen 
ways.  By choosing one definition from the American Heritage 
Dictionary without explaining why that definition applies, the 
majority opinion overlooks a court's directive in statutory 
interpretation: 
 
"Many 
words 
have 
multiple 
dictionary 
definitions; the applicable definition depends upon the context 
in which the word is used."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  See also Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 
10, ¶60, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 383, 760 N.W.2d 156 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring) ("Dictionaries usually furnish more than one meaning 
to a word, and a court has to be careful not to select a 
friendly definition it likes from the many offered without 
explaining its choice."). 
9 The Open Meetings Law applies to a "governmental body," 
which is defined as "a state or local agency, board, commission, 
committee, council, department or public body corporate and 
politic created by constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or 
order . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) (emphasis added). 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶64 The applicable canon of statutory interpretation is 
known by the Latin phrase "noscitur a sociis."  Translated, the 
phrase means "it is known by its associates."   In other words, 
the 
meaning 
of 
each 
word 
in 
the 
string 
of 
words 
of 
"constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order" may be known 
from the words accompanying it.10          
¶65 The words "constitution," "statute," and "ordinance" 
describe formal, written documents adopted in accordance with 
requirements set forth in law.  
¶66 The Wisconsin Department of Justice's Wisconsin Open 
Meetings Law Compliance Guide (Nov. 2015) at 2 corroborates that 
the words "constitution," "statute," and "ordinance" refer to 
legal documents under Wisconsin law, stating: 
The words "constitution," "statute," and "ordinance," 
as used in the definition of "governmental body" refer 
to the constitution and statutes of the State of 
Wisconsin and to ordinances promulgated by a political 
subdivision of the state.11 
                                                 
10 Although rules of interpretation serve the court, they 
are not absolute rulers of a court's interpretation.  Boardman 
v. State, 203 Wis. 173, 176, 233 N.W. 556 (1930) (quoting Benson 
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 77 N.W. 798, 799 (Minn. 
1899)). 
11 The word "ordinance" appears more than 300 times in the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 61.50 relating to 
ordinances by villages, and § 62.11 relating to ordinances by 
cities.  
The court defined "ordinances" as follows in Wisconsin 
Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶25, 373 
Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233:  "[O]rdinances are municipal 
legislative devices, formally enacted, that address general 
subjects in a permanent fashion." 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶67 The words "rule" and "order" can be interpreted in a 
number of ways.  Indeed the briefs offer several alternatives.12   
                                                 
12 Some briefs treat "rule or order" as one-and-the same; 
other briefs address "order" more specifically.  The brief of 
the Department of Justice addresses only the word "order."      
The parent's brief explains that a "rule or order" may 
include "any directive, formal or informal, creating a body and 
assigning it duties" that "come[s] from governmental bodies, 
presiding officers of governmental bodies, or certain government 
officials, such as county executives, mayors, or heads of a 
state or local agency, department or division" (that is, "a 
hierarchical top-down creation of a group"), but only if "the 
possibility exists that the real decision-making will happen at 
the committee meetings and be rubber-stamped by the governing 
board."  Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's Brief and Appendix at 
19-20 (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
The School Board's brief seems to agree that a "rule" may 
be formal or informal, but asserts that the creation must be 
done through an "explicit delegation of authority."  Defendant-
Respondents' Brief at 19. 
The brief of the Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council 
explains that the "[t]he terms 'rule or order' as used in 
Section 19.82 have been broadly construed to include any 
directive, formal or informal, that creates a body and assigns 
it duties."  The Council clarifies that this definition means 
that "the committee need only have come into being through the 
agency, participation, or authority of the [rule or order]."  
Non-Party Brief and Appendix of the Wisconsin Freedom of 
Information Council et al. at 5, 8.   
The Wisconsin Counties Association argues in its brief that 
the Attorney General's interpretation of "rule or order" that 
includes informal directives is misplaced and that "the Court 
should hold that a 'rule or order' is a directive adopted or 
issued by an existing governmental body in the normal manner by 
which it does its work.  In all [sic] most, if not all, 
situations this will be adoption by a majority vote.  And, such 
formal directives will be recorded in the minutes of the 
governmental body."  Non-party Brief of Wisconsin Counties 
Association et al. at 11-12. 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶68 It seems most reasonable to me to conclude that the 
legislature would use the words in this string uniformly in 
their legal meaning in Wisconsin law.13   
¶69 The 
majority 
opinion 
disagrees. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion's analysis of the word "rule," as well as its refusal to 
consider the legislative policy section (see ¶¶47-48, 60-61, 
supra) in interpreting the Open Meetings Law, is at odds with 
the analysis this same majority of justices recently set forth 
in Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶¶19-
20, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233.  In Wisconsin Carry, the 
majority stated:  "We are not merely arbiters of word 
choice. . . . We find [plain] meaning in the statute's text, 
context, and structure . . . ."     
¶70 I recognize that the Department of Justice has, 
without reference to the canon of noscitur a sociis or any other 
authority or rationale, interpreted the phrase "rule or order" 
in accordance with common and approved usage and as including 
"any directive, formal or informal, creating a body and 
assigning 
it 
duties."14 
 
Unfortunately, 
the 
Department's 
                                                 
13 The word "rule" for purposes of state government is 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13) (including 72 exceptions).  I 
could find no definition of "rule" regarding local governmental 
entities, but the word "rule" is used in the statutes too many 
times to count relating to rulemaking by local governmental 
entities.    
14 Wisconsin Department of Justice's Wisconsin Open Meetings 
Law Compliance Guide (Nov. 2015) at 2.  See also Letter from 
Assistant Attorney General Thomas C. Bellavia to Joe Tylka (June 
8, 2005). 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
12 
 
interpretation of the word "rule" does not, as is demonstrated 
in the briefs, provide sufficient clarity and guidance. 
¶71 Why would the legislature require anything less for a 
"rule or order" than a formal written document promulgated by an 
appropriate entity?  The Department of Justice has an answer 
that should be considered but it is not totally satisfactory.  
The Department of Justice is concerned that requiring a formal 
document would allow an entity to evade the Open Meetings Law by 
adopting 
informal 
processes. 
 
The 
Department 
of 
Justice 
explains: 
If a formal order were required, the open meetings law 
might be evaded by the creation of "informal" bodies. 
Therefore, the interpretation that the open meetings 
law does not require that the order be formal is 
consistent with the statement by the Florida Supreme 
Court that the sunshine law "should be construed so as 
to frustrate all evasive devices."   
78 Wis. Op. Atty. Gen. 67, 69 (quoting Wood v. Marston, 442 
So. 2d 934, 940 (Fla. 1983)). 
¶72 I strongly agree with the Department of Justice that 
the consequences of an interpretation matter, and a consequence 
like evasion of the Open Meetings Law should be considered and 
                                                                                                                                                             
No entity on the list of state or local bodies created by 
resolution, rule, or order in the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice's Wisconsin Open Meetings Law Compliance Guide (Nov. 
2015) at 3 seems to me to resemble the Review Committee in the 
instant case.  
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
13 
 
prevented.15  But in an attempt to prevent evasion, the 
Department of Justice's definition of "rule or order" raises two 
basic, serious problems:  The Department's definition is not 
tethered to the text and context in which the words are used in 
the Open Meetings Law and does not provide sufficient clarity or 
guidance.  There should be other ways to prevent evasion. 
¶73 When I look at the text and context in which the words 
"rule or order" are used, I conclude, in contrast to the 
majority opinion, that the word "rule" is not defined by the 
1992 version of the American Heritage Dictionary.  The words 
"rule or order" derive their meaning from Wisconsin law, not the 
dictionary.   
¶74 The third reason I disagree with the majority opinion 
is that it concludes, majority op., ¶¶33-35, that Rule 361 and 
the Handbook, taken together, created the Review Committee.  I 
agree with the court of appeals that the Review Committee was 
not created by Rule 361, the Handbook, or any other rule.16  
                                                 
15 Consequences 
are 
an 
important 
consideration 
in 
interpreting a statute.  See, e.g., Wisconsin Carry, 373 
Wis. 2d 543, ¶20 (if an interpretation results in "unreasonable 
or absurd" consequences, that interpretation may be rejected); 
Anderson v. Aul, 2015 WI 19, ¶114, 361 Wis. 2d 63, 862 
N.W.2d 304 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (asserting that the plain 
meaning analysis includes consideration of consequences of 
alternative interpretations to avoid unreasonable results).  
16 "Krueger is unable to direct us to any provision of 
either authority under which the Review Committee was created."  
State ex rel. Krueger v. Appleton Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 
No. 2015AP231, unpublished slip op. at ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. June 
28, 2016).    
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶75 Here is how the Review Committee came into existence.  
A parent requested Superintendent Allinger to create a new and 
alternative course.  Superintendent Allinger then told the 
District's 
Assessment, 
Curriculum 
and 
Instruction 
(ACI) 
Department to handle the parent's request.  The ACI Department 
head, Kevin Steinhilber, and his immediate subordinate, Nanette 
Bunnow, created the Review Committee to address the parent's 
request.       
¶76 Steinhilber 
and 
Bunnow 
decided 
that 
the 
Review 
Committee they created would consider the option of creating an 
alternative course in response to the parent's request, conduct 
an evaluation of the curriculum materials for the Communication 
Arts I course to see if different materials could resolve the 
parent's concerns, and review the course materials because a 
Communication Arts I course materials review was overdue and 
would allow Steinhilber and Bunnow to consider the impact that 
the impending Common Core requirements would have on the 
course's materials.17   
¶77 Steinhilber and Bunnow adapted some of the procedures 
set forth in Rule 361 and the Handbook for the creation and 
operation of this Review Committee.   
¶78 The Review Committee was a unique entity created to 
respond to a unique concern.   
¶79 The rule on which the majority opinion relies to 
establish creation of the Review Committee is Rule 361 adopted 
                                                 
17 See Appleton Area School District Board of Education, 
Meeting Minutes (Apr. 23, 2012).  
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
15 
 
by the Appleton Area School District Board of Education.  The 
full text of this Rule and an excerpt from the Handbook are in 
the record and fortunately are attached to the majority opinion.  
Examining these documents, a reader cannot find a reference to 
the Review Committee at issue in the instant case in Rule 361 or 
in the Appleton Area School District Assessment, Curriculum and 
Instruction Handbook.       
¶80 Rule 
361 
delegates 
the 
School 
Board's 
legal 
responsibility for all educational materials, that is, for 
curriculum 
material 
selection 
and 
revision, 
to 
District 
personnel, namely the District's ACI Department.  Rule 361 does 
not expressly create a committee that handles the selection and 
revision of educational materials. 
¶81 Pursuant to Rule 361, the ACI Department developed the 
Appleton 
Area 
School 
District 
Assessment, 
Curriculum 
& 
Instruction Handbook to guide its curriculum revision and 
materials selection.  The School Board approved the Handbook. 
The Handbook delegates authority to the ACI Department to create 
a committee that handles full curriculum reviews.   
 
¶82 The Review Committee in the instant case was not a 
full curriculum review committee and did not even review the 
full curriculum for this one course.  It reviewed the booklist 
for this one course.  In doing its work, the Review Committee 
used some curriculum selection and review procedures that it 
adapted from the Handbook.     
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶83 In addition to governing full curriculum review, Rule 
361 also sets forth a process for handling parental objections 
to educational materials.   
¶84 Under Rule 361, a process is set up to address a 
parent's complaint about educational materials.  The complaint 
would be given to a school official or staff member who is 
required to try to resolve the issue informally.  If informal 
resolution is ineffective, Rule 361 creates an Educational 
Materials Review Committee to address the parental concern and 
sets forth a procedure for the Committee to follow.  The 
Educational 
Materials 
Review 
Committee's 
recommendation 
is 
subject to the Superintendent's review before the School Board 
ultimately decides whether or not to adopt the recommendation.    
¶85 I agree with the court of appeals that the Review 
Committee at issue in the instant case did not constitute a Rule 
361 Educational Materials Review Committee and was not a 
committee created by Rule 361 or the Handbook to conduct a full 
curriculum review.18   
                                                 
18 "[H]ere, 
neither 
Board 
Rule 
361.1 
procedure 
was 
applicable, because Krueger requested creation of an alternate 
course altogether since, in his opinion, 'to review the existing 
reading list would have been a waste of time.'  There was no 
established district procedure for requesting an alternative 
course or responding to such a request. . . . [Steinhilber's and 
Bunnow's 
creation 
of 
the 
Review 
Committee 
on 
their 
own 
initiative] is similar to the second set of facts addressed in 
the Tylka letter, at 4, wherein the attorney general's office 
opined the open-meetings law would not apply."  State ex rel. 
Krueger v. Appleton Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., No. 2015AP231, 
unpublished slip op. ¶¶20-21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 28, 2016). 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶86 In sum, read carefully and liberally, neither Rule 361 
nor the Handbook created the Review Committee at issue in the 
instant case.  The majority opinion seems to agree with my wrap 
up but concludes that this omission in Rule 361 is not 
meaningful, stating: 
Although 
[Rule 
361 
and] 
the 
Handbook 
did 
not 
specifically constitute [the Review Committee] by 
name, [they] authorized review committees . . . to 
exist and to exercise the Board's delegated authority 
over curriculum review.   
Majority op., ¶39.19   
¶87 Fourth, the majority opinion, ¶41, states that it need 
not address the issue of whether the Review Committee was 
created by an order because it holds that it was created by 
rule.  The meaning of the word "order" was addressed by several 
of the briefs in this court.20 
¶88 The parent's brief submits the following regarding 
government officials creating a governmental body by order :  
                                                 
19 The majority opinion relies on depositions to interpret 
Rule 361.  Is not the interpretation of Rule 361 a question of 
law for this court, not for the deponents?  The parties' briefs 
in this court argue whether the parent's brief (and therefore 
the majority opinion) relies on a proper interpretation of the 
deponents' responses.  This is a summary judgment case and the 
circuit court concluded that no material facts are in dispute.  
I note that the majority opinion states repeatedly that the 
Review Committee was "authorized" by Rule 361, rather than using 
the statutory language that the Rule "created" the Committee.   
20 The court of appeals did not address this issue because 
the parent did not raise it in the circuit court or in his 
initial appellate brief.  State ex rel. John Krueger v. Appleton 
Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed.,  No. 2015AP231, unpublished slip op. 
¶¶22-26 (Wis. Ct. App. June 28, 2016).  See majority op., ¶41.    
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
18 
 
As a practical and legal matter, governing bodies of 
public entities . . . cannot make every decision; they 
must delegate their authority downward.  In order to 
exercise those delegated powers, government officials 
may 
choose 
to 
create 
a 
committee 
to 
gather 
information, make a recommendation, or even make a 
decision.  When an official does so, such committees 
should be subject to the Open Meetings Law . . . .21  
¶89 The School Board's brief agrees that a government 
official can set up committees as governmental bodies included 
within the Open Meetings law.  The Board's position is that the 
official must act within the scope of properly delegated or 
vested authority.  The Board's view is as follows: 
 
[I]ndividual government officials, acting within the 
scope of properly delegated authority, may create a 
committee subject to Open Meetings Law by delegating 
authority to the committee which has been lawfully 
charged to the official by the governmental body, in 
this case the school board. . . . Those committees 
then, are to be treated as if they had been directly 
charged by the school board to carry out those 
functions. . . . The mere creation of a committee by 
administrative officials is not enough.  The requisite 
conferral 
of 
power 
and 
authority 
is 
required. . . . While 
directives 
from 
lower 
level 
executive officials or employees may qualify, the 
directive must have been delegated or redelegated.  It 
is not enough for a government official to simply 
create a group to address a governmental function.  
Rather, the governmental function must have been 
delegated or redelegated by the governmental body.22   
¶90 In its non-party brief in this court, the Department 
of Justice asks the court to describe the creation of a 
governmental body by order as follows:  
                                                 
21 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's Brief and Appendix at 
43. 
22 Defendant-Respondents' 
Brief 
at 
35-37 
(citations 
omitted). 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
19 
 
A "governmental body" under Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1) can 
be created by an "order" following a directive from an 
existing governmental body or delegate that authorizes 
the creation of a body and assigns it duties.  
However, the definition of a "governmental body" is 
rarely satisfied when groups of a governmental unit's 
employees gather on a subject within the unit's 
jurisdiction.23   
¶91 The Department of Justice has also opined about an 
"order" by a government official creating a governmental body 
under the Open Meetings Law using somewhat different language, 
as follows:  
When an individual government official, acting within 
the scope of properly delegated authority, creates an 
advisory body, that body is treated as if it had been 
created 
directly 
by 
the 
governmental 
body 
with 
authority over that official.24   
¶92 The Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council argues in 
its brief that "order . . . must be broadly construed to include 
any directive, formal or informal, that creates a body and 
assigns it duties."25     
¶93 The brief of the Wisconsin Counties Association asks 
the court to hold that an official 
can create a governmental body subject to the [Open 
Meetings Law] only when the official is acting in the 
stead of the extant governmental body.  There must be 
an actual, affirmative delegation of authority.26  
                                                 
23 Non-Party Brief and Appendix of the Wisconsin Department 
of Justice Attorney General Brad D. Schimel at 13. 
24 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas C. Bellavia 
to Joe Tylka (June 8, 2005). 
25 Non-Party Brief and Appendix of the Wisconsin Freedom of 
Information Council et al. at 5. 
26 Non-party Brief of Wisconsin Counties Association et al. 
at 15. 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶94 In light of these divergent views and the facts of the 
instant case, resolving the meaning of "order" is important. The 
majority opinion's discussion of an "order" might have helped 
provide clarity and guidance on this difficult question of the 
meaning of "order."  
¶95 The fifth reason that I do not join the majority 
opinion is that its mandate is unclear.   
¶96 The majority opinion clearly reverses the decision of 
the court of appeals.  Majority op., ¶2.  It clearly holds that 
the Review Committee met the definition of "governmental body" 
under the Open Meetings Law and was subject to its terms.  
Majority op., ¶2.  And finally, the majority opinion remands the 
cause "to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion."27  Nothing in the majority opinion tells the 
circuit court what further proceedings are to be held consistent 
with the opinion.   
¶97 I agree with the parent's briefs on this topic.  The 
parent's brief states that if this court reverses the decision 
of the Court of Appeals, this court would also conclude that the 
Open Meetings Law applied to the Review Committee.28  According 
to the parent, if the Open Meetings Law applied to the Review 
Committee, it is undisputed that the School Board did not comply 
with the Open Meetings Law.  The parent's brief proposes that 
                                                 
27 Majority op., mandate line after ¶43. 
28 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's Brief (John Krueger) at 
54. 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
21 
 
this court remand the matter to the circuit court with 
directions to determine costs and attorney fees and to enter 
judgment in favor of the parent.29  I agree with this proposal 
and believe that this is the proper interpretation of the 
majority opinion's remand.   
¶98 Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the 
parent did not and does not request that the Review Committee's 
actions be voided as a remedy under Wis. Stat. § 19.97(3).30 
¶99 With regard to voiding any action taken at a meeting 
held in violation of the open meetings law, the Department of 
Justice has opined on this subject as follows:   
Under Wis. Stat. § 19.97(3) a court may void any 
action taken at a meeting held in violation of the 
open meetings law if the court finds that the interest 
in enforcing the law outweighs any interest in 
maintaining the validity of the action.  In the 
present case, the Task Force's duties were simply to 
provide recommendations . . . .  The only action that 
would be "voidable" would be the votes of the Task 
Force 
members 
adopting 
specific 
recommendations.  
Since these were only recommendations to the board and 
the board has undoubtedly accepted some and rejected 
others of those recommendations, it is unlikely that 
any court would void any action taken by the Task 
Force . . . .   
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Alan Lee to District 
Attorney Joseph F. Paulus, dated June 8, 2001.  
                                                 
29 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's 
Reply 
Brief 
(John 
Krueger) at 14. 
30 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's 
Reply 
Brief 
(John 
Krueger) at 14, n.3. 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶100 Because of the continuing need for clarity and 
guidance in the meaning of the phrase "created by rule or order" 
used in Wis. Stat. § 19.82(1), I suggest that school boards and 
school officials consider the adoption of formal rules or orders 
for the creation of governmental bodies by rule or order to be 
governed by the Open Meetings Law.  They should consider in 
their various functions whether they are acting by rule or 
order, whether they are creating a governmental body subject to 
the Open Meetings Law, and whether they are clearly delineating 
the functions and responsibilities of the entity they create.  
Their designation is, of course, not dispositive for purposes of 
the Open Meetings Law but would assist them, school employees, 
and the public. 
¶101 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurring opinion. 
No.  2015AP231.ssa 
 
1