Title: Spence v. BNSF Railway Co.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
SHERRY SPENCE, 
)
)
Respondent, 
)
)
v. 
) 
No. SC96195 
) 
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, 
)
)
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STODDARD COUNTY 
The Honorable Stephen R. Mitchell, Judge 
BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) appeals the judgment of the circuit court, 
entered upon a jury verdict, in favor of Sherry Spence (“Spence”) on her wrongful death 
cause of action for the death of her husband, Scott Spence (“Decedent”).  This Court has 
jurisdiction under article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, and the judgment is 
affirmed.  
Background 
Spence sued BNSF for the wrongful death of Decedent, who was killed in 2012 
after a BNSF train struck his pickup truck at a railroad crossing.  Spence alleged BNSF 
was negligent for failing to trim the vegetation around the railroad crossing, which 
prevented Decedent from being able to see the approaching train.  Spence also pursued a 
Opinion issued May 22, 2018
 
2 
claim of respondeat superior liability against BNSF, alleging its train crew members 
were negligent for failing to stop or slow the train because the crew members, from their 
higher vantage point, should have seen Decedent’s pickup truck as he was approaching 
the railroad crossing.  In response, BNSF alleged Decedent was negligent in driving his 
vehicle onto the railroad crossing as the train was approaching. 
 
The case went to trial in April 2015.  The jury found in Spence’s favor, assessing 
15 percent of the fault to BNSF for the conduct of its train crew, 80 percent of the fault to 
BNSF for its failure to maintain the railroad crossing, and 5 percent of the fault to 
Decedent.  The jury awarded Spence $20 million, which the circuit court reduced to $19 
million for the fault of Decedent.  After the verdict was rendered, BNSF filed a motion 
for new trial based on juror nondisclosure as well as other grounds.  The circuit court 
overruled BNSF’s motion, and BNSF appeals.  
Analysis  
On appeal, BNSF asserts the circuit court erred in overruling BNSF’s motion for a 
new trial based upon a juror’s intentional nondisclosures.  BNSF also claims the circuit 
court erred in overruling BNSF’s motion for a new trial because it should not have 
submitted (over BNSF’s objections) the verdict directors in Instruction Nos. 6 and 7 and 
the corresponding Verdict Form A.  Finally, BNSF claims the circuit court erred in 
overruling BNSF’s motion for a new trial because it should not have submitted (over 
BNSF’s objection) Instruction No. 8 dealing with BNSF’s duties and because it should 
have granted a mistrial during opening statement when Spence’s counsel referred to 
BNSF’s removal of certain sight tables from its traffic engineering instructions.  
 
3 
I. 
Juror Nondisclosure   
At the center of BNSF’s motion for a new trial is the conduct of Juror Kimberly 
Cornell (“Juror Cornell”).  Before trial, each juror received a juror questionnaire with 
their name preprinted at the top.  On Juror Cornell’s questionnaire, however, her name 
was spelled incorrectly as “Kimberly Ann Carnell.”  Juror Cornell did not correct this 
misspelling at the top of her questionnaire, but plainly wrote “Steven D. Cornell” in the 
space reserved for the name of her husband and her signature at the bottom of the 
questionnaire appears to be “Kim Cornell,” not “Kim Carnell.”  On her questionnaire, 
Juror Cornell answered Questions 14 and 15 in the negative, indicating she had never 
been a party to a lawsuit and she had never made a claim against another to recover 
money for physical injuries or damage to property.  After filling out her questionnaire, 
Juror Cornell returned it to the circuit court. 
 
Twelve days before trial, the circuit clerk’s office distributed the juror 
questionnaires, the pool selection report, and a seating chart to both sides.  On each of 
these documents Juror Cornell’s last name was misspelled “Carnell.”  Relying on these 
documents, BNSF claims it conducted a Case.net search for “Kimberly Carnell” and 
found no litigation in which she was listed as a party.  
When Juror Cornell reported for jury selection, she informed circuit court staff 
that her name had been misspelled at the top of her questionnaire.  Upon learning this, the 
court’s deputy clerk informed counsel for both parties of the correct spelling of Juror 
Cornell’s name.  The deputy clerk also made a handwritten correction to Juror Cornell’s 
name on the master list of venirepersons and provided that list to counsel on both sides.  
 
4 
The deputy clerk took these measures prior to 8:28 a.m., when the venire was seated and 
voir dire began.1 
 
Before counsel began questioning members of the venire, the trial judge explained 
how important it was for prospective jurors to be truthful and forthcoming.  The trial 
judge then asked specifically whether any member of the venire had been a party to a 
lawsuit (their “litigation history”) and not disclosed that fact on their juror questionnaire.  
Juror Cornell did not answer in the affirmative even though she had been a party to 
several lawsuits, including – most notably – a wrongful death lawsuit in which she had 
been the plaintiff.  Later, BNSF’s counsel asked whether any member of the venire, or 
any of their close friends or family members, had been involved in a motor vehicle 
accident (their “accident history”).  Juror Cornell did not answer in the affirmative even 
though her son had been killed in the accident that gave rise to her wrongful death 
lawsuit.  BNSF repeated this question at various times and in various ways,2 but each 
time Juror Cornell remained silent.   
 
Voir dire concluded at 11:23 a.m., at which time the court took a recess.  When 
court resumed, the trial judge took up the parties’ motions to strike for cause and their 
peremptory challenges, as well as other matters.  At 12:35 p.m., the jury – including Juror 
                                              
1  After the jury was chosen, but before the jury was seated and sworn, the deputy clerk also 
provided counsel for both parties a jury seating chart on which Juror Cornell’s name was spelled 
correctly. 
2   The parties argue at length whether this and other questions were sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous as to make Juror Cornell’s nondisclosures intentional or unintentional.  As 
explained below, however, that issue is immaterial to the Court’s holding.  Accordingly, it is 
assumed for purposes of this opinion that Juror Cornell’s nondisclosures were intentional and, by 
all appearances, inexcusable. 
 
5 
Cornell – was seated and sworn.3  Eight days later, the jury rendered a verdict in 
Spence’s favor.   
In its motion for new trial, BNSF claimed that immediately after trial a BNSF 
representative overheard Juror Cornell tell Spence she could relate to Spence because she 
had a son who was killed in a motor vehicle accident.4  The representative introduced 
himself to Juror Cornell, who replied with her full (and correct) name.  A Case.net search 
for “Kimberly Cornell” revealed a number of lawsuits in which Juror Cornell had been a 
plaintiff or respondent, including her wrongful death action arising out of the death of her 
son in a motor vehicle accident.  Based on this evidence, BNSF claimed Juror Cornell 
had engaged in intentional misconduct by failing to respond truthfully to questions 
concerning her litigation history and accident history. 
Spence responded that, pursuant to Rule 69.025(e), BNSF had waived any claim 
for relief based upon juror nondisclosure because it failed to conduct a reasonable 
investigation (i.e., by searching Case.net for “Kimberly Cornell”) and informing the court 
of Juror Cornell’s undisclosed litigation history prior to the jury being seated and sworn.  
BNSF claimed it had done a Case.net search for “Kimberly Carnell,” the name it had 
been given, and it had no reason to suspect her name was “Kimberly Cornell” until after 
the verdict was rendered.  At an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court received testimony 
                                              
3   Three alternate jurors were seated and sworn, at least two of whom were still serving when the 
case was submitted and the remaining alternate jurors released.  
4   These facts are taken from a proffer made concerning the BNSF representative’s testimony.  
On appeal, BNSF claims the circuit court committed reversible error in refusing to allow this 
representative to testify.  The testimony, however, was offered only to show Juror Cornell’s 
 
6 
from the deputy clerk who said she advised counsel for both parties orally of the 
misspelling of Juror Cornell’s name and provided them a master list of the venire on 
which she manually had corrected this misspelling.5  The circuit court specifically found 
this testimony credible and overruled BNSF’s motion for new trial.  On appeal, BNSF 
claims this was error requiring this Court to vacate the judgment and remand for a new 
trial.  
 “This Court will not disturb the circuit court’s ruling on motion for a new trial 
based on juror nondisclosure unless the trial court abused its discretion.”  Johnson v. 
McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 555 (Mo. banc 2010) (citation omitted).  “A trial court 
abuses its discretion if its ‘ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then 
before the court and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and 
indicate a lack of careful consideration.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  Moreover, any question 
regarding the proper construction of Rule 69.025 and its reasonable investigation 
requirement is reviewed de novo because “this Court interprets its rules by applying the 
same principles used for interpreting statutes.”  McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 447 S.W.3d 
659, 662 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation omitted).   
                                                                                                                                                  
nondisclosure was intentional. As explained below, that issue plays no part in this Court’s 
holding.  Accordingly, the Court holds the circuit court did not err in excluding this testimony. 
5   BNSF argues it was never aware of the misspelling of Juror Cornell’s name until after the jury 
returned its verdict, and that – despite the circuit court specifically finding the testimony of the 
deputy clerk about this issue credible – the circuit court did not expressly find BNSF was aware 
of this misspelling at least four hours before the jury was seated and sworn.  This Court will 
defer to the credibility findings of the circuit court, however, and where “the trial court makes no 
specific findings of fact, [this Court] must assume that all facts were found in accordance with 
the result reached.”  Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 410 S.W.3d 623, 640-641 
(Mo. banc 2013) (citation omitted). 
 
7 
Rule 69.025 provides, in full:  
(a) Proposed Questions. A party seeking to inquire as to the 
litigation history of potential jurors shall make a record of the proposed 
initial questions before voir dire. Failure to follow this procedure shall 
result in waiver of the right to inquire as to litigation history. 
(b) Reasonable Investigation. For purposes of this Rule 69.025, a 
“reasonable investigation” means review of Case.net before the jury is 
sworn. 
(c) Opportunity to Investigate. The court shall give all parties an 
opportunity to conduct a reasonable investigation as to whether a 
prospective juror has been a party to litigation. 
(d) Procedure When Nondisclosure Is Suspected. A party who has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a prospective juror has failed to disclose 
that he or she has been a party to litigation must so inform the court before 
the jury is sworn. The court shall then question the prospective juror or 
jurors outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. 
(e) Waiver. A party waives the right to seek relief based on juror 
nondisclosure if the party fails to do either of the following before the jury 
is sworn: 
(1) Conduct a reasonable investigation; or 
(2) If the party has reasonable grounds to believe a 
prospective juror has failed to disclose that he or she has been a 
party to litigation, inform the court of the basis for the reasonable 
grounds. 
(f) Post-Trial Proceedings. A party seeking post-trial relief based on 
juror nondisclosure has the burden of demonstrating compliance with Rule 
69.025(d) and Rule 69.025(e) and may satisfy that burden by affidavit. The 
court shall then conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if relief should 
be granted. 
Rule 69.025 (2011).6 
                                              
6   Foreshadowing the adoption of Rule 69.025, this Court noted in Johnson v. McCullough, 306 
S.W.3d 551 (Mo. banc 2010), that advancements in court technology and concerns over parties 
sandbagging claims of juror nondisclosure while they waited to see whether the jury’s verdict 
was favorable weighed in favor of imposing a “reasonable investigation” standard and a 
requirement that juror nondisclosure claims be presented before the jury is seated and sworn.  Id. 
at 559 (“Litigants should not be allowed to wait until a verdict has been rendered to perform a 
Case.net search for jurors’ prior litigation history when, in many instances, the search also could 
 
8 
The waiver provision of Rule 69.025(e) applies whether the juror nondisclosure 
occurred on the questionnaire or during voire dire, whether the questions to which the 
juror should have responded were clear or ambiguous, and whether the juror’s 
nondisclosure was intentional or unintentional.  In all cases, Rule 69.025 conditions the 
right of any party to seek relief on a claim of juror nondisclosure upon that party: 
(a) conducting a “reasonable investigation” (which Rule 69.025(b) defines as a “review 
of Case.net before the jury is sworn”); and (b) informing the court it has reasonable 
grounds to believe the nondisclosure has occurred.  Most significantly, in order to 
preserve its right to seek relief, the party must do both of these “before the jury is 
sworn.”  Rule 69.025(e) (emphasis added). 
Here, according to the testimony of the deputy clerk (which the trial court 
specifically found credible), BNSF had more than four hours between the time she 
informed the parties of the misspelling of Juror Cornell’s name (and provided a corrected 
copy of the master list of the veniremembers) and the time the jury was seated and sworn.  
This was ample time to search Case.net with the corrected spelling.  Because BNSF 
failed to do so, it “waive[d] the right to seek relief based on juror nondisclosure” under 
Rule 69.025(e). 
BNSF claims, even if it waived the right to seek relief for Juror Cornell’s failure to 
disclose her litigation history, Rule 69.025(e) applies only to the nondisclosure of a 
juror’s litigation history and, therefore, BNSF did not waive the right to seek relief for 
                                                                                                                                                  
have been done in the final stages of jury selection or after the jury was selected but prior to the 
jury being empaneled.”). 
 
9 
Juror Cornell’s failure to disclose her accident history.  This argument lacks direct textual 
support because, notwithstanding a number of references to “litigation history” 
throughout Rule 69.025 (including in Rule 69.025(e)(2)), the waiver language in 
Rule 69.025(e) speaks to claims for “relief based on juror nondisclosure” and is not 
limited only to nondisclosures of a juror’s litigation history.   
That said, the Court need not decide in this case whether the waiver provision in 
Rule 69.025(e) would apply to a standalone claim that a juror failed to answer truthfully a 
question concerning her accident history because BNSF’s claims that Juror Cornell failed 
to disclose her litigation history and her accident history were inseparably linked from the 
beginning.  There can be no doubt that, had BNSF searched Case.net using a proper 
spelling of Juror Cornell’s name, it would have discovered both.  Not only was one of the 
cases returned in the Case.net search plainly identified as a “wrongful death” action, the 
docket entries for that litigation referred to a payment by an automobile insurance carrier 
and the first page of the petition in that action disclosed Juror Cornell’s son had died in 
an automobile accident.  In fact, BNSF admitted in the circuit court a simple Case.net 
search of Juror Cornell’s name would have revealed both her failure to disclose her 
litigation history and her failure to disclosure her accident history.7 
                                              
7   BNSF’s suggestions in support of its motion for new trial stated:  “Had Ms. Cornell told the 
truth on her questionnaire, or had BNSF been provided accurate information so that it could have 
conducted its research on the correct prospective juror, BNSF would have learned that 
Ms. Cornell had made a claim and recovered money damages for her son’s wrongful death in an 
automobile accident.”  [Emphasis added.]  To be clear, the Court is not holding a party will be 
held to know every fact that might be disclosed in the linked litigation documents available to 
counsel through Case.net.  But, where – as here – the pertinent facts are readily apparent from 
the description of, docket entries for, and pleadings in a particular litigation, it is fair to hold a 
party to that knowledge. 
 
10 
 
Accordingly, this Court affirms the circuit court’s overruling of BNSF’s 
motion for a new trial based on juror nondisclosure.8 
II. 
Verdict Directors and Verdict Form 
Over BNSF’s objections, the circuit court submitted the following verdict 
directors: Instruction No. 6 relating to Spence’s claim BNSF was negligent for failing to 
maintain the railroad crossing to provide motorists with adequate sight lines to oncoming 
trains, and Instruction No. 7 relating to Spence’s claim BNSF was liable under 
respondeat superior for the failure of BNSF’s train crew to stop or slow the train as 
Decedent approached given their greater height and enhanced sight lines.9  The circuit 
court also submitted Verdict Form A, which states: 
                                              
8  BNSF argues the circuit court did not overrule its motion for new trial on the basis of Rule 
69.025(e).  But “appellate courts are primarily concerned with the correctness of the trial court’s 
result, not the route taken by the trial court to reach that result.  To that end, the judgment must 
be affirmed if cognizable under any theory, regardless of whether the reasons advanced by the 
trial court are wrong or not sufficient.”  Rouner v. Wise, 446 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Mo. banc 2014) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  
9   Because BNSF’s claim goes to its contention Instruction Nos. 7 and 8 should have been 
submitted in the disjunctive in a single verdict director and not to the specific language of those 
instructions, the language of Instruction Nos. 7 and 8 is not repeated here. 
 
11 
Note:  
 
Complete the following paragraph by filling in the blanks as 
required by your verdict. If you assess a percentage of fault to 
any of those listed below, write in a percentage not greater than 
100%, otherwise write in “zero” next to that name. If you assess a 
percentage of fault to any of those listed below, the total of such 
percentages must be 100%. 
On the claim of Plaintiff Sherry Spence for compensatory damages for the     
wrongful death of her husband, Scott Spence, we the undersigned jurors 
assess percentages of fault as follows: 
 
Defendant 
BNSF on sight distance 
claim 
 
                % (zero to 100%) 
Defendant 
BNSF on failure to stop or 
slow claim 
 
                % (zero to 100%) 
Decedent 
Scott Spence 
 
                % (zero to 100%) 
 
TOTAL 
 
              % (zero or 100%) 
 
Note: Complete the following paragraph if you assessed a percentage of 
fault to Defendant BNSF: 
We, the undersigned jurors, find the total amount of Plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages, disregarding any fault of the Decedent Scott 
Spence, to be $ __________.  
 
On appeal, BNSF argues the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for new 
trial on the ground that, under MAI 20.02, the circuit court should have submitted a 
single verdict director with two disjunctive acts of negligence, rather than two separate 
verdict directors setting forth two independent theories of negligence.  As a result, BNSF 
argues Verdict Form A also was improper in that it should have had only one line for its 
fault and one line for Decedent’s fault.  The Court rejects these arguments. 
 
12 
“Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.”  Edgerton v. Morrison, 280 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Mo. banc 2009) 
(citation omitted).  “An issue submitted by an instruction must be supported by the 
evidence ….”  Oldaker v. Peters, 817 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Mo. banc 1991) (citation 
omitted).  “In making this determination as to a particular instruction, this Court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to its submission.”  Edgerton, 280 
S.W.3d at 65-66 (citation omitted).  An instructional error is only grounds for 
reversal “when the instruction misdirected, misled, or confused the jury and resulted 
in prejudice.”  Id. at 66 (citation omitted).   
According to BNSF, Spence’s case was based upon two distinct acts of negligence 
and, therefore, the circuit court should have used MAI 20.02, “Multiple Negligence Acts 
Submitted,” to submit those separate acts in the disjunctive.  But Comment B to 
MAI 37.05(1) is directly on point and refutes BNSF’s argument.  This Comment states:  
If a plaintiff seeks to recover in a comparative fault case from a master or 
principal based on both respondeat superior and also based upon the 
negligent acts of the master (i.e., based on the negligent driving of the 
employee and also based on the employer’s negligence in furnishing a truck 
with defective brakes), then the jury should be asked to assess one 
percentage of fault based on the employee’s driving, a different percentage 
of fault based on the employer’s conduct in furnishing the truck with 
defective brakes, and another percentage of fault based on the conduct of 
plaintiff.  In this instance, the comparative fault verdict form would have a 
blank for the employee’s percentage of fault (which is chargeable to both 
the employee and the employer); another blank for a percentage of fault for 
the employer’s conduct as submitted in the verdict director submitting the 
employer’s conduct in furnishing the truck with bad brakes (this fault is 
chargeable only to the master); and a blank for the percentage of fault 
assessed to plaintiff.  However, in McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 
(Mo. banc 1995), the Supreme Court held that once an employer has 
admitted respondeat superior liability, it is improper to allow plaintiff to 
 
13 
submit another theory of imputed liability against the employer (as 
distinguished from another theory of independent negligence).   
 
Here, like the example in Comment B, Spence sought to recover on the basis of 
respondeat superior and on BNSF’s own (or direct) negligence, and BNSF sought to 
have the jury attribute a percentage of comparative fault to Decedent.  As explained in the 
Comment, therefore, each of these requires a separate verdict director and all three 
determinations should be recorded on separate lines in the verdict form. 
Because MAI 37.05(1) is only to be used when agency is disputed, BNSF argues 
Comment B (which follows MAI 37.05(1)) cannot apply because agency was not 
disputed in this case.  Nothing in the language of Comment B depends upon whether 
agency is or is not disputed, however, and BNSF makes no compelling argument why the 
logic of Comment B should not apply equally in both situations.  As noted above, the 
focus of Comment B is on what to do when the plaintiff makes a submissible case on 
separate claims of direct and imputed liability and the defendant makes a submissible 
case on comparative fault.  Comment B correctly states the law, and the circuit court did 
not err in submitting Instruction Nos. 7 and 8 and Verdict Form A. 
III. 
Instruction No. 8 
BNSF claims the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for new trial because 
the court should not have submitted – over BNSF’s objection – Instruction No. 8  
regarding the duties owed by BNSF.  Finding no error, this point is rejected. 
As given, Instruction No. 8 read: 
An unwavering approach by a vehicle at a railroad crossing, where the crew 
knew or should have known that a collision was imminent, is a specific, 
 
14 
identifiable hazard.  Such a hazard requires the train’s crew either to slow 
the train or stop, in addition to any other preventative measures it can take, 
to avoid the collisions.  
Circuit courts are required to follow the MAI if there is an instruction on point.  
Rule 70.02(b).  A circuit court may, however, approve “a not-in-MAI instruction if no 
MAI instruction is on point, but that instruction must ‘be simple, brief, impartial, free 
from argument, and shall not submit to the jury or require findings of detailed evidentiary 
facts.’”  Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 523 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Mo. banc 2017) (citation 
omitted).  “A not-in-MAI instruction must ‘follow[ ] substantive law by submitting the 
ultimate facts necessary to sustain a verdict.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  “This means the 
theory submitted must be one recognized under Missouri law and the ultimate facts 
necessary for recovery under that theory must be included in the instruction.”  Id. at 463-
64. 
Instruction No. 8 meets these requirements.  First, it is a correct statement of the 
law in that it is taken nearly verbatim from Alcorn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 50 S.W.3d 
226, 242 (Mo. banc 2001), overruled on other grounds by Badahman v. Catering St. 
Louis, 395 S.W.3d 29 (Mo. banc 2013).  Second, it does not constitute a roving 
commission, as BNSF claims, because it does not “assume[] a disputed fact or submit[] 
an abstract legal question that allows the jury to ‘roam freely through the evidence and 
choose any facts which suited its fancy or its perception of logic’ to impose liability.”  
Gomez v. Constr. Design, Inc., 126 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Mo. banc 2004) (citation omitted), 
overruled on other grounds by Badahman, 395 S.W.3d 29.   
 
15 
“When the plaintiff’s theory is supported by the evidence and the instruction 
submits the ultimate facts that define the plaintiff’s theory for the jury, the instruction is 
not a roving commission.”  Rinehart v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 261 S.W.3d 583, 594 (Mo. 
App. 2008) (citation omitted).  Here, Spence’s verdict directors (Instruction Nos. 6 and 7) 
are the only instructions that allowed the jury to assess percentages of fault to BNSF and 
nothing, including Instruction No. 8, allowed the jury to assess fault to BNSF for failing 
to take any other preventative measure.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in 
submitting Instruction No. 8.10  
IV. 
Opening Statement 
Spence filed her original petition in February 2013.  In December 2014, she 
amended her petition to raise additional claims that BNSF was directly negligent for 
removing the AASHTO sight tables11 from its engineering instructions.  In response, 
BNSF sought to designate an additional expert even though the time for designating 
experts had passed.  Ultimately, the circuit court ruled that, if Spence withdrew her claim 
regarding the removal of the sight tables, it would overrule BNSF’s motion for leave to 
                                              
10   Moreover, Spence only sought to have the court give Instruction No. 8 after the court 
announced it would give two similar instructions requested by BNSF regarding the duties owed 
by it and by Decedent, i.e., Instruction No. 14 (regarding the duties owed by BNSF with respect 
to maintaining the crossing) and Instruction No. 13 (regarding the duty owed by Decedent).  
Viewing the record as a whole, the circuit court’s decision to give Instruction No. 8 did not 
misdirect, mislead, or confuse the jury and, in light of Instruction Nos. 13 and 14, it did not result 
in prejudice to BNSF.  Edgerton, 280 S.W.3d at 66. 
11   “AASHTO” is the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and 
its sight tables are guidelines to determine whether the lines of sight at a railroad crossing are 
sufficient to afford motorists adequate warnings. 
 
16 
designate an additional expert.  Spence withdrew the claim, and the court overruled 
BNSF’s motion.   
At trial, Spence’s counsel referenced BNSF’s removal of the sight tables during 
her opening statement.12  BNSF objected and requested a mistrial.  The circuit court 
overruled the objection and denied the request for a mistrial.  On appeal, BNSF claims 
the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for new trial because the circuit court 
should have granted a mistrial during Spence’s opening statement.13 
In opening statements, counsel is granted wide latitude to present a good-faith 
statement of what counsel expects the evidence will show.  Buck v. St. Louis Union Tr. 
Co., 185 S.W. 208, 212 (Mo. 1916).  “The scope of opening statements is within the 
discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Thompson, 68 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo. banc 2002) 
(citation omitted).  “Review is only for abuse of discretion.”  Id.  Equally important, 
mistrial is a drastic remedy and the decision to grant or deny such relief lies in the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  Pierce v. Platte-Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 769, 
                                              
12   Specifically, Spence’s counsel said during opening statements, “In order to be in a position 
where they don’t have to improve crossings with lights and gates, BNSF has removed from their 
engineering instructions that employees use to evaluate crossings, the AASHTO sight table.” 
13   BNSF also sought to claim, in the same point relied on, that the circuit court erred in: 
(a) admitting Spence’s evidence concerning the AASHTO sight tables and the fact BNSF had 
removed them from its engineering instructions; and (b) refusing to allow BNSF to call a 
previously undesignated expert to explain why the sight tables (and the fact BNSF had removed 
them) did not mean BNSF was negligent.  A point relied on claiming the circuit court erred at 
three separate times and in three separate ways is multifarious and preserves nothing for review.  
Kirk v. State, 520 S.W.3d 443, 450 n.3 (Mo. banc 2017).  Accordingly, the Court rejects these 
latter two claims.  Moreover, these claims lack merit in that BNSF never objected to Spence’s 
evidence concerning the sight tables and the circuit court has great latitude in refusing to allow 
testimony from an undesignated expert when that testimony largely would have been cumulative 
to other expert testimony admitted into evidence.  
 
17 
778 (Mo. banc 1989)).  “Absent a manifest abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not 
interfere with the trial court’s decision.”  Id.    
In Spence’s opening statement, counsel was entitled to refer to the AASHTO sight 
tables and BNSF’s removal of them because counsel had a good-faith belief Spence’s 
experts would testify about those subjects.  The mere fact Spence was no longer claiming 
this as a separate direct negligent act (in the disjunctive with her claim BNSF was 
directly negligent for failing to maintain the crossing so as to provide motorists adequate 
sight lines), does not mean evidence of the AASHTO sight tables was not relevant to her 
existing claim of direct negligence.  Indeed, Spence’s opening statement turned out to be 
entirely accurate because Spence later called two experts who testified – without 
objection from BNSF – about these topics.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in 
overruling BNSF’s objection and request for a mistrial during opening statements and did 
not err in later overruling BNSF’s motion for new trial on these same grounds. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgement of the circuit court is affirmed.14  
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
 
 
Fischer, C.J., Draper, Russell and Breckenridge, JJ, concur;  
Powell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Stith, J., concurs in opinion of Powell, J. 
                                              
14   Spence’s motion to file a supplemental legal file is overruled as moot. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
SHERRY SPENCE,  
   
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
No.  SC96195 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,     
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
         Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  BNSF did not waive its juror nondisclosure claim related to 
automobile accident history based on Rule 69.025, as the principal opinion maintains.  By 
its plain language, Rule 69.025 is limited to claims that a juror “failed to disclose that he 
or she has been a party to litigation.”  Nothing in the text of Rule 69.025 provides it applies 
to claims of juror nondisclosure beyond litigation history, such as a juror’s failure to 
disclose a family member had been involved in an automobile accident.  The principal 
opinion’s expansive application of Rule 69.025 strays beyond the rule’s plain language and 
does not comport with this Court’s principles of interpretation. 
“This Court interprets its rules by applying the same principles used for interpreting 
statutes.”  Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Mo. banc 2011).  Therefore, the primary 
principle for interpreting a rule is to give effect to this Court’s intent as reflected in the 
2 
 
plain language of the rule.  See id.; see also Parktown Imps., Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 
S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009).  As with a statute, this Court does not look at any one 
portion of a rule in isolation when interpreting the meaning of the rule.  See Union Elec. 
Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. banc 2014).  Rather, this Court considers 
the context of the entire rule to determine its plain meaning.  See id.   
 
Pursuant to Rule 69.025, claims of juror nondisclosure may be waived unless a party 
informs the court of suspected nondisclosure before the jury is sworn.  But not all claims 
of juror nondisclosure are governed by Rule 69.025 because the text of the rule limits its 
applicability to specific juror nondisclosure claims.  The plain language of Rule 69.025 
speaks to juror nondisclosure of litigation history.  The rule does not mention or refer to 
any other juror nondisclosure claim.  Subdivision (c) of the rule requires a court to “give 
all parties an opportunity to conduct a reasonable investigation as to whether a prospective 
juror has been a party to litigation.”  (Emphasis added).  Subdivision (d) of the rule, titled 
“Procedure When Nondisclosure Is Suspected,” requires a party to inform the court before 
the jury is sworn when the party “has reasonable grounds to believe that a prospective juror 
has failed to disclose that he or she has been a party to litigation.”  (Emphasis added).  
Subdivision (e) of the rule provides a party waives a claim of juror nondisclosure if the 
party fails to inform the court before the jury is sworn of “reasonable grounds to believe a 
prospective juror has failed to disclose that he or she has been a party to litigation.”  
(Emphasis added).   
These provisions of Rule 69.025 specifically limit the application of the rule to 
claims that a juror has failed to disclose that he or she has been a party to litigation.  
3 
 
Subdivision (c) of the rule does not require a court to provide an opportunity for the parties 
to investigate anything other than juror litigation history.  Subdivision (d) of the rule does 
not require a party to inform the court of anything other than juror nondisclosure of 
litigation history.  And subdivision (e) of the rule does not provide for the waiver of a juror 
nondisclosure claim for anything other than the failure to disclose litigation history.  
Considering the context of the entire rule, Rule 69.025 applies only to juror nondisclosure 
of litigation history.1  Thus, BNSF’s claim—that the juror failed to disclose a family 
member had been involved in an automobile accident—alleges nondisclosure that is not 
within the purview of Rule 69.025. 
 
The principal opinion, however, holds Rule 69.025 applies not only to nondisclosure 
of litigation history but also to nondisclosure of “pertinent facts” that are “readily apparent” 
from a Case.net search.  Slip op. at 9, n.7.  As Rule 69.025 does not speak of such “pertinent 
facts,” this holding finds no support in the plain language of the rule.  The principal opinion 
does not suggest otherwise, as its analysis does not cite any specific language in Rule 
69.025.  Nevertheless, the principal opinion reasons “it is fair” to charge a party with 
constructive knowledge of such “pertinent facts.”  Slip op. at 9, n.7.  This reflects a policy 
preference rather than principles of interpretation.  This Court’s principles of interpretation 
“are not intended to be applied haphazardly or indiscriminately to achieve a desired result.”  
                                              
1  The text of Rule 69.025 aligns with the facts of Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 
banc 2010), which was the impetus for the rule’s adoption. In that case, the prospective juror 
specifically failed to disclose the fact she had been a party to litigation, as she did not respond 
affirmatively to the question: “Now not including family law, has anyone ever been a plaintiff or 
a defendant in a lawsuit before?”  Id. at 554-55.   
4 
 
Parktown Imps., 278 S.W.3d at 672.  “This Court is constrained by the language of [a rule] 
when construing it and may not find a meaning that is not supported by the language of the 
rule.”  Buemi, 359 S.W.3d at 20.    
If this Court believes it would be good policy for Rule 69.025 to apply to juror 
nondisclosure of any facts readily apparent from a Case.net search, then it may simply 
amend the rule to provide for such application in future cases.  See Mo. Const. art. V, § 5.  
In the meantime, this Court must apply the rule as it is written.  As written, Rule 69.025 
does not apply to a claim that a juror failed to disclose that a family member had been 
involved in an automobile accident.  Accordingly, the common law, not Rule 69.025, 
applies to this issue, and BNSF preserved its juror nondisclosure claim by raising the claim 
when it first gained actual knowledge of the nondisclosure.  See Brines by and through 
Harlan v. Cibis, 882 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo. banc 1994).  I therefore dissent. 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  W. Brent Powell, Judge