Title: Hardaway v. Wayne County (Opinion on Application)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

HARDAWAY v WAYNE COUNTY 
 
Docket No. 146646.  Decided July 26, 2013. 
 
 
Hurticene Hardaway brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Wayne 
County, seeking a declaratory judgment and claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel 
in connection with the denial of additional lifetime retirement benefits granted to certain classes 
of former employees under Wayne County Commission Resolution No. 94-903.  Plaintiff had 
been appointed and served as a principal attorney in defendant’s office of corporation counsel, a 
position that was not subject to confirmation by the Wayne County Commission.  The court, 
Michael F. Sapala, J., concluded that because it used the language “an appointee other than a 
member of a board or commission who is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant to 
Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter,” the portion of the resolution at issue covered 
appointees who were (1) confirmed by the county commission and (2) not members of a board or 
commission.  Because the county commission had not confirmed plaintiff and she did not 
otherwise qualify for additional benefits under the resolution, the court granted summary 
disposition in defendant’s favor.  Plaintiff appealed.  The Court of Appeals, JANSEN, P.J., and 
WILDER and K. F. KELLY, JJ., reversed, concluding that the resolution was ambiguous because 
the phrase was equally susceptible of more than one meaning.  Applying the last antecedent rule, 
the Court of Appeals determined that the modifying and restrictive clause “who is confirmed by 
the County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” applied 
only to the immediately preceding phrase, “other than a member of a board or commission,” and 
thus interpreted the resolution as providing benefits to any appointee, whether confirmed or not, 
as long as that appointee was not confirmed by the county commission to membership of a board 
or commission.  298 Mich App 282 (2012).  Defendant sought leave to appeal. 
 
 
In an opinion per curiam signed by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN, KELLY, 
ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, and VIVIANO, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal and 
without oral argument, held: 
 
 
The language of the resolution was not ambiguous and must be applied as written. 
 
 
1. If the language of a resolution is certain and unambiguous, courts must apply it as 
written.  The resolution’s language was not ambiguous.  The Wayne County Charter requires that 
the county commission confirm all members of boards and commissions.  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals’ construction took what is grammatically an essential clause and effectively rendered it 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
a nonessential clause, collapsing the phrase at issue to read “an appointee other than a member of 
a board or commission.”  The reading that the circuit court adopted did not suffer in this respect. 
 
 
2. There were additional indications that the Court of Appeals’ construction should be 
disfavored.  All the specific covered positions listed in the resolution were high-level 
administrative positions, and it thus made sense that the proper reading of the provision 
concerning appointees at issue in this case would limit its application to only individuals 
appointed to positions so significant that they require county commission confirmation.  
Moreover, defendant had never interpreted the language in question as providing benefits to 
appointees who were not confirmed by the county commission. 
 
 
3. The last antecedent rule should not be applied if something in the statute (or in this 
case, resolution) requires a different interpretation than the interpretation that would result from 
applying the rule.   Because the Wayne County Charter requires that the county commission 
confirm all members of boards and commissions, the Court of Appeals’ construction would 
render the confirmation requirement redundant.  Moreover, the last antecedent rule does not 
mandate a construction based on the shortest antecedent that is grammatically feasible; when 
applying the last antecedent rule, a court should first consider what the logical metes and bounds 
of the “last” antecedent are.  The last antecedent is the last word, phrase, or clause that can be 
made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence. 
 
 
Reversed; case remanded to the circuit court for reinstatement of order granting summary 
disposition in defendant’s favor. 
 
 
Justice CAVANAGH concurred in the result only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2013 State of Michigan 
FILED JULY 26, 2013 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
HURTICENE HARDAWAY, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 146646 
 
WAYNE COUNTY, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it improperly applied 
the last antecedent rule. We reinstate the opinion and order of the Wayne Circuit Court 
that granted summary disposition in favor of defendant. 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  In 1994 plaintiff, Hurticene Hardaway, 
was appointed to the position of “principal attorney” in the Office of Corporation 
Counsel for defendant, Wayne County.  Importantly, her appointment did not require 
confirmation by the Wayne County Commission.  Plaintiff served in her position for 
approximately 13 years.  After her employment ended in 2003, plaintiff submitted to the 
Wayne County Director of Human Resources three successive requests for additional life 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
 
 
2
and health insurance benefits.  Defendant denied her request.  Plaintiff brought the instant 
suit, seeking a declaratory judgment and claiming breach of contract and promissory 
estoppel. 
Plaintiff argues she is entitled to additional benefits under Resolution No. 94-903, 
adopted by the Wayne County Commission in 1994.  The resolution provides in pertinent 
part: 
2. If a person is separated from the County after January 1, 1994, 
with at least a total of eight years of County service, and has served as an 
elected Executive Officer, the Deputy Executive Officer, or an Assistant 
Executive Officer of the County, or as a County Commissioner, or as an 
appointed department head or deputy department head, or an appointee 
other than a member of a board or commission who is confirmed by the 
County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County 
Charter, or as an appointed Chief of Staff for an elected official or 
legislative body pursuant to an organizational plan, or the appointed head of 
one of the support divisions of the County Commission, that person shall 
be entitled to the same insurance and health care benefits . . . as a retiree 
from the Defined Benefit Plan 1.  [Emphasis added.] 
The circuit court granted summary disposition for defendant.  The circuit court 
interpreted the phrase “an appointee other than a member of a board or commission who 
is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne 
County Charter” as covering an appointee who was (1) confirmed by the county 
commission and (2) not a member of a board or commission.  Because plaintiff, a 
principal attorney, was not confirmed by the county commission, and because she did not 
otherwise qualify for additional benefits under the resolution, the circuit court determined 
that plaintiff was not entitled to the “same insurance and health care benefits . . . as a 
retiree from the Defined Benefit Plan 1.” 
 
 
 
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The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion.1  The Court found the 
resolution ambiguous because the phrase “who is confirmed by the County Commission 
pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” is equally susceptible of 
more than one meaning.2  According to the Court of Appeals panel, the phrase could be 
interpreted as the circuit court read it—as providing benefits to an appointee who was 
confirmed by the county commission but was not a member of a board or commission—
but it could also be interpreted as providing benefits to any appointee, whether confirmed 
or not, as long as that appointee was not confirmed by the commission to membership of 
a board or commission.  Under the latter interpretation (the “any appointee” 
construction), plaintiff would be entitled to additional benefits as an appointee who was 
not a member of a board or commission. 
The Court of Appeals resolved this alleged ambiguity by resorting to the last 
antecedent rule, a rule of statutory construction that provides that “a modifying or 
restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately 
preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different 
interpretation.”3  Applying the last antecedent rule to the resolution, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the modifying and restrictive clause—“who is confirmed by the County 
Commission pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter”—applied only 
                                              
1 Hardaway v Wayne Co, 298 Mich App 282; 827 NW2d 401 (2012). 
2 Id. at 288; see also Lansing Mayor v Pub Serv Comm, 470 Mich 154, 166; 680 NW2d 
840 (2004). 
3 Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). 
 
 
 
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to the immediately preceding phrase: “other than a member of a board or commission.”  
Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that the last antecedent rule favored the “any 
appointee” construction.  We disagree and reverse. 
If the language of the resolution is certain and unambiguous, courts must apply the 
resolution as written.4  Here, the resolution’s language is not ambiguous.5  Under the 
“any appointee” construction, the clause “who is confirmed by the County Commission 
pursuant to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” modifies the phrase “other 
than a member of a board or commission.”  But the Wayne County Charter already 
requires that all members of boards and commissions be confirmed by the county 
commission.6  Thus, the “any appointee” construction takes what is grammatically an 
essential clause—“who is confirmed . . .”—and effectively renders it a nonessential 
clause.  In other words, under the “any appointee” construction, the phrase at issue 
collapses to “an appointee other than a member of a board or commission.”  The 
alternative reading of the statute that the circuit court adopted does not suffer in this 
respect. 
There are additional indications that the “any appointee” construction should be 
disfavored.  To begin with, all the specific covered positions listed in the resolution are 
high-level administrative positions.  It thus makes sense that the proper reading of the 
                                              
4 See Turner v Auto Club Ins Assn, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). 
5 See Lansing Mayor, 470 Mich at 166. 
6 Section 4.385 of the Wayne County Charter provides, in relevant part, that “members of 
boards and commissions . . . shall be appointed by the [chief executive officer] with the 
approval of a majority of [county commissioners] serving.” 
 
 
 
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provision concerning appointees at issue here would limit its application to only 
individuals appointed to positions so significant that they require county commission 
confirmation.  Further, defendant, on whose behalf the resolution was drafted and enacted 
and which has applied the resolution for nearly 20 years, has never interpreted the 
language in question as providing benefits to appointees who were not confirmed by the 
county commission.7 
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the last antecedent rule should not be applied 
blindly.  As we have warned before, the last antecedent rule should not be applied if 
“something in the statute requires a different interpretation” than the one that would 
result from applying the rule.8  As explained, because the Wayne County Charter requires 
all members of boards and commissions to be confirmed, the “any appointee” 
construction would render the confirmation requirement redundant.9  Moreover, the last 
antecedent rule does not mandate a construction based on the shortest antecedent that is 
grammatically feasible; when applying the last antecedent rule, a court should first 
consider what are the logical metes and bounds of the “last” antecedent.10 
                                              
7 While we recognize that defendant’s interpretation of the resolution is not binding on 
this Court, defendant’s 20-year construction of the resolution should be given at least 
“respectful consideration” and should not be overruled without “cogent reasons.” In re 
Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90, 103; 754 NW2d 259 (2008) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 
8 Stanton, 466 Mich at 616; see also Duffy v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 490 Mich 198, 
221; 805 NW2d 399 (2011). 
9 See Duffy, 490 Mich at 215. 
10 See 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 47.33, pp 487-
489 (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, 
 
 
 
 
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In light of these reasons, we hold that the language “an appointee other than a 
member of a board or commission who is confirmed by the County Commission pursuant 
to Section 3.115(4) of the Wayne County Charter” extends additional insurance and 
healthcare benefits only to appointees who were (1) confirmed by the county commission 
and (2) not members of a board or commission.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred 
by reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant on 
plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim.  In lieu of granting defendant’s application for 
leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to 
the circuit court for reinstatement of its order granting summary disposition in favor of 
defendant. 
 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
CAVANAGH, J. I concur in the result only. 
                                              
refer solely to the last antecedent.  The last antecedent is ‘the last word, phrase, or clause 
that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.’”) 
(emphasis added; citation omitted).