Title: State v. Melton

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1770-CR, 2011AP1771-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Brandon M. Melton, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
343 Wis. 2d 784, 820 N.W.2d 487 
(Ct. App. – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 95     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert G. Mawdsley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
concur. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Jacob Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.    
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Kevin M. 
Gaertner and Law Shield of Wisconsin, LLC, Milwaukee, with oral 
argument by Kevin M. Gaertner. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2008CF1221 & 2009CF156) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brandon M. Melton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The issue presented in this 
case is whether a circuit court has inherent authority to order 
the physical destruction of a presentence investigation report 
(PSI).  We review a published decision of the court of appeals,1 
reversing an order of the Waukesha County Circuit Court that 
questioned whether the circuit court had authority to destroy a 
PSI and declined to do so.     
                                                 
1 State v. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, 343 Wis. 2d 784, 820 
N.W.2d 487.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The defendant, Brandon M. Melton (Melton), pled guilty 
to two felonies.  The Waukesha County Circuit Court, Richard A. 
Congdon, Judge, requested that the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections (the DOC) prepare a PSI to assist the court in 
Melton's sentencing.  When the circuit court and the parties 
received the PSI, Melton disputed some of the information in the 
report.  Judge Congdon ordered that a second PSI be prepared 
omitting the disputed information.  He also ordered that the 
first PSI be sealed and then destroyed following the expiration 
of any appellate time limits.  Judge Congdon's successor, 
Circuit Judge Mark D. Gundrum, modified the destruction order 
after Melton was sentenced.  Judge Gundrum ordered that the 
first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned 
the court's authority to remove a court document from the file 
and destroy it. 
¶3 
Melton appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the circuit court had the inherent authority to 
order the destruction of the first PSI.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that having two PSIs in Melton's file would lead to 
"confusion and injustice."  State v. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, 
¶23, 343 Wis. 2d 784, 820 N.W.2d 487.   
¶4 
We reverse.  We conclude that courts do not have 
either express or implied statutory authority to order the 
destruction 
of 
PSIs. 
 
The 
PSI 
statute, 
the 
Wisconsin 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
3 
 
Administrative Code,2 and Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules on record 
retention 
implicate 
principles 
of 
preservation 
and 
confidentiality, not destruction.  We also conclude that courts 
lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on 
the facts before us or on any of the arguments Melton has made 
because such power is not necessary to a court's efficient and 
effective administration of justice.  A court has adequate means 
of dealing with errors, omissions, or prejudicial material in a 
PSI without physically destroying the disputed report.  A court 
can strike objected-to portions of a PSI and make a record that 
the court will not use the objected-to information.  In unusual 
cases, a court can order that a corrected PSI be prepared, and 
it can seal and clearly label the superseded report. 
¶5 
To forestall further confusion on the issue presented 
and to mitigate the possibility of error, we outline procedures 
that should be followed when the bench and bar are confronted 
with disputed PSIs. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
¶6 
On September 10, 2009, Melton pled guilty to two 
felonies: second-degree sexual assault of a child for having 
sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old and theft of moveable 
property 
greater 
than 
$2,500, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
2 Effective July 1, 2013, the DOC substantially revised Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DOC 
328 
and 
removed 
language 
related 
to 
presentence 
investigation 
reports. 
 
This 
chapter 
of 
the 
administrative code was in effect during the pendency of this 
case.  The DOC's revision does not alter our holding. 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
4 
 
§§ 948.02(2)3 and 943.20(1)(a) and (3)(bf), respectively.4  Other 
pending charges were dismissed and read in.  Judge Congdon 
ordered a PSI for Melton.  The court received identical PSIs for 
each felony file on November 19, 2009.   
 
¶7 
Melton moved to strike portions of the PSIs because 
they allegedly violated DOC rules and contained "prejudicial and 
inflammatory material which should not be included in a [PSI]."  
Melton asserted that the PSIs discussed certain uncharged 
offenses under a section entitled "Description of Offenses."  He 
claimed that the PSIs included statements he gave to police 
during an interview and that the statements in the PSIs were 
hearsay.  Melton's motion concluded by asking that the disputed 
information be stricken from the reports "and . . . new [PSIs] 
be prepared deleting that information and further that the 
original [PSIs] prepared on November 19, 2009 be destroyed and 
sealed."   
¶8 
At a hearing on the motion, held weeks before Melton's 
sentencing, Melton's attorney strenuously objected to inclusion 
of the uncharged offenses and asked the court to strike these 
portions of the PSIs.  In the alternative, the attorney asked 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Melton's appeal is comprised of two cases that are 
consolidated 
for 
purposes 
of 
appeal. 
 
The 
first 
case, 
2008CF1221/2011AP1770, was the result of the charge for sexual 
assault of a child.  In the second case, 2009CF156/2011AP1771, 
Melton was charged with robbery, battery, bail jumping, and 
receiving stolen property.  The complaint was later amended to 
include theft.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
5 
 
the court to "simply strike the entire [PSI] and let us proceed 
from this point forward."  The State objected, arguing that the 
disputed information was "important for the [c]ourt to consider 
when deciding the character of" Melton.  According to the State, 
uncharged offenses like those at issue may be included in a PSI.   
¶9 
Judge Congdon quoted a letter written by the DOC agent 
who prepared the PSIs, acknowledging that "[t]he decision to 
include this [disputed] information . . . may be a deviation of 
the standard outline."  The State responded that it did not 
disagree that the information might be a deviation from the 
"standard outline," but that it was not prohibited, indicating 
that information on the defendant's "sexual behavior" may be 
included in the report.   
¶10 Judge Congdon concluded that the disputed information 
would be "of little use" to the court at sentencing.  The judge 
reasoned that the disputed information "could very well be 
prejudicial 
to 
Mr. 
Melton 
as 
he 
goes 
through 
whatever 
route . . . the Court will set for him."5  Judge Congdon 
determined that he had the authority to order the disputed 
information stricken as "inherent within the authority given to 
[him] under [Wis. Stat. §] 972.15," (the PSI statute).  
¶11 Accordingly, Judge Congdon orally granted Melton's 
motion to strike, and then said that the court would "ask for a 
new [PSI], or at least an updated one."  Melton's attorney 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals presumed that the "route" referred to 
the DOC system after sentencing.  Melton, 343 Wis. 2d 784, ¶4.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
6 
 
seconded this course of action, asking that the existing PSIs in 
the possession of the parties and the court "be stricken and 
destroyed."  Melton's attorney continued, "If it's sealed in the 
file, it's going to become available at some point.  I think the 
thing should be redone . . . without a reference to this event."   
¶12 The circuit court collected the district attorney's 
copies of the PSIs containing the disputed information, and 
Melton's attorney drafted an order for each file that read in 
part as follows:   
 
[State v. Melton] came on for hearing before Hon. 
Richard Congdon on the 25th day of March, 2010 with 
appearances by Attorney Kevin G. Keane for the 
defendant, and Deputy District Attorney Stephen J. 
Centinario for the State, upon defendant's Motion to 
strike portions of a presentence investigation report 
prepared 
on 
November 
19, 
2009. 
 
Following 
the 
arguments of counsel, and further based upon the files 
and proceedings had in this matter,  
 
It is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. 
The Department of Corrections shall prepare 
an updated presentence investigation report.  The 
updated presentence investigation report shall not 
include any reference to information obtained at a 
November 18, 2008 interrogation by the Waukesha Police 
Department of the defendant.  In particular, the 
sections of the presentence investigation report dated 
November 19, 2009 as contained on page 2 of that 
document at the last paragraph commencing [disputed 
information 
partially 
identified] 
and 
continuing 
through page 3 and the first paragraph of page 4 
ending 
with 
[disputed 
information 
partially 
identified] shall be deleted.  Additionally, any 
references contained on page 7 in the second paragraph 
under Offender's Version, commencing with [disputed 
information 
partially 
identified] 
shall 
not 
be 
included in the updated presentence investigation. 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
7 
 
2. 
The presentence investigation report dated 
November 19, 2009 shall be sealed and destroyed 
following the expiration of any appellate time limits, 
and defendant's copy shall be returned to the Court.   
¶13 After the DOC provided copies of new PSIs to the 
court, Melton's case proceeded to sentencing.  The circuit 
court, Judge Robert Mawdsley presiding, sentenced Melton to four 
years of initial confinement and eight years of extended 
supervision on the conviction of second-degree sexual assault of 
a child.  The circuit court also sentenced Melton to six months 
of incarceration on the theft conviction.  The sentences were to 
be served concurrently.   
¶14 Approximately two months after sentencing, a new 
circuit judge, Mark D. Gundrum, sua sponte ordered a hearing to 
address whether the court had the authority to destroy a PSI.  
Ultimately, Judge Gundrum concluded that a judge had no 
authority to order the destruction of a PSI.   
¶15 At the hearing, Judge Gundrum said that he reviewed 
the PSI statute, Wis. Stat. § 972.15, and concluded that 
"keeping [a PSI] confidential is what is envisioned by the 
statute."  Judge Gundrum said he believed that it would be 
"inappropriate" to destroy the first PSIs in Melton's case, 
although 
he 
did 
not 
identify 
a 
specific 
authority 
that 
prohibited destruction of a PSI.   
¶16 Consequently, Judge Gundrum entered a "Modified Order" 
that was identical to Judge Congdon's previous order, except 
that it deleted the instruction to destroy the first PSIs after 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
8 
 
the expiration of appellate time limits.  The modified order 
commanded that the disputed PSIs "be sealed" but not destroyed.   
¶17 In the two records for this appeal, Judge Gundrum's 
modified order is taped to the front of the sealed envelopes 
containing the first, disputed PSIs.6  The backs of these 
envelopes have the words "Ordered Sealed" handwritten in 
fluorescent highlighter.  The backs of these envelopes also are 
stamped with the words "Do Not Open Without Permission of the 
Court," which is the same stamp on the envelopes containing the 
second, undisputed PSIs.7   
¶18 Melton appealed Judge Gundrum's order.  Stating that 
the narrow issue on appeal was whether a circuit court had the 
inherent authority to order the destruction of a PSI, the court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
modified 
order. 
 
Melton, 
343 
Wis. 2d 784. 
¶19 The court of appeals concluded that, under the "unique 
facts"8 of this case, the circuit court had the inherent 
                                                 
6 Again, Melton's appeal is composed of two cases.  The 
circuit court ordered a PSI for Melton in each felony case.  
Therefore, the record for each case contains the first disputed 
PSI and the second corrected PSI.   
7 The record index in both cases states——in bold capital 
letters——that the disputed PSIs are "ordered permanently sealed 
by order of the court on 9/24/10."  (Emphasis added.)   
8 The "unique facts" that the court of appeals refers to 
include two PSI reports in each of Melton's files, no objection 
by the parties when the circuit court ordered the first PSIs 
destroyed, and no contention that the first PSIs were relied 
upon by the sentencing court.  Melton, 343 Wis. 2d 784, ¶11. 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
9 
 
authority to order the destruction of the disputed PSIs.  Id., 
¶11.  The court of appeals outlined the concept of inherent 
authority and reaffirmed that "[a] power is inherent when it 'is 
one without which a court cannot properly function.'"  Id., ¶13 
(quoting State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶73, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350).   
¶20 The court of appeals concluded that the primary 
purpose of a PSI is to assist a circuit court at sentencing.  
Id., ¶14 (citing Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27(1) (Dec. 2006)).  
In light of this purpose, the court of appeals held that, in 
this case, the circuit court had the inherent authority to order 
the destruction of the first PSI "to prevent confusion as to 
which PSI . . . in the file should be used" in a potential 
resentencing.  Id., ¶¶22-23.  Preventing confusion, the court of 
appeals reasoned, "is certainly a matter of efficient judicial 
administration and fairness at a potential resentencing, and as 
such, is within a circuit court's inherent powers."  Id., ¶23 
(citing Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶73).   
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 14, 2012.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶22 This case requires the court to examine the scope of 
judicial authority, if any, to order the destruction of a PSI.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Another "unique fact" pointed to by the court of appeals——
that Melton's appeal was still pending when Judge Gundrum issued 
his modified order——appears to be mistaken.  The State notes 
that Melton did not file his notice of appeal until after Judge 
Gundrum issued his modified order.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
10 
 
The scope of judicial authority is a question of law that this 
court reviews de novo.  State v. McClaren, 2009 WI 69, ¶14, 318 
Wis. 2d 739, 
767 
N.W.2d 550 
(citing 
Breier 
v. 
E.C., 
130 
Wis. 2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986)).   
 
¶23 We also must interpret the PSI statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.15.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  Id. (citing Custodian of Records 
for the LTSB v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 
N.W.2d 792).   
 
¶24 In addition, we are asked to interpret and apply 
Chapter 72 of the Supreme Court Rules.  The interpretation and 
application of Supreme Court Rules are questions of law subject 
to independent review.  Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 2001 WI 8, 
¶32, 241 Wis. 2d 110, 622 N.W.2d 436 (citing City of West Allis 
v. Sheedy, 211 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 564 N.W.2d 708 (1997)).   
III. DISCUSSION 
 
¶25 We begin with an examination of the applicable law on 
PSIs.  Next, we consider whether the law——statutes, case law, 
administrative rules, court rules, and inherent authority——
permits a court to order the destruction of a PSI.  Finally, 
after discussing various remedies and their terminology for 
disputed PSIs, we suggest procedures for litigants to follow in 
dealing with disputed PSIs. 
A. General Background on PSIs 
¶26 After a felony conviction, a circuit court has the 
discretion to order the DOC to prepare a PSI on the defendant.  
Wis. Stat. § 972.15(1) (stating that a "court may order a 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
11 
 
presentence investigation," but "only after a conviction for a 
felony").9  The primary purpose of a PSI is "to provide the 
sentencing court with accurate and relevant information upon 
which to base its sentencing decision."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.27(1) (Dec. 2006); see also State v. Washington, 2009 WI App 
148, ¶9, 321 Wis. 2d 508, 775 N.W.2d 535 (citation omitted) (a 
PSI "assist[s] the judge in selecting the appropriate sentence 
for the individual defendant").   
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15, the PSI statute, was created 
by section 63, Chapter 255, Laws of 1969.  However, PSI 
preparation predates the statute, as the note accompanying this 
section of Chapter 255 explains: 
Most judges and attorneys will be surprised to 
learn that, outside of a provision for Milwaukee 
[C]ounty (s. 57.02 (6) [repealed]), there is presently 
no statutory authority for presentence investigations.  
Wisconsin has been a pioneer in this field and 
obviously the presentence investigation is an integral 
part of the sentencing practice in this state. 
Note, § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.   
 
¶28 The PSI should contain the following information 
related to the defendant: the present offense, the defendant's 
prior 
criminal 
record, the defendant's prior correctional 
institution record, any statement by the victim(s), and the 
defendant's family information and personal history.  Wis. 
                                                 
9 In some jurisdictions, the preparation of a PSI is 
mandatory following a felony conviction.  See, e.g., Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 771.14(1) (2012) (a PSI shall be prepared after all 
felony convictions, but it is within a court's discretion after 
a misdemeanor conviction).   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
12 
 
Admin. Code § DOC 328.27(3) (Dec. 2006).10  The PSI should also 
include the PSI writer's recommendation for sentencing and the 
reasoning that supports that recommendation along with a 
tentative corrections plan, unless the writer is ordered 
otherwise.  § DOC 328.27(3)(d).   
 
¶29 After a DOC agent completes a PSI and it is received 
by the sentencing court, "the judge shall disclose the contents 
of the report to the defendant's attorney and to the district 
attorney11 prior to sentencing."  Wis. Stat. § 972.15(2).  Such 
disclosure is important because a defendant has a due process 
right to be sentenced upon accurate information.  See State v. 
                                                 
10 A relatively new provision of the PSI statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.15(1m), reads: 
Sex offenses against minors.  If a person is 
convicted for a felony that requires him or her to 
register under s. 301.45 and if the victim was under 
18 years of age at the time of the offense, the court 
may order the department to conduct a presentence 
investigation report to assess whether the person is 
at risk for committing another sex offense, as defined 
in s. 301.45 (1d)(b).  
This provision was enacted into law as a result of 2007 
Wis. Act 80, § 22.  Wisconsin Stat. § 972.15(1m) took effect on 
April 1, 2009.  Melton was convicted of sexual assault of a 
child in September 2009.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The 
circuit court did not order the DOC to prepare such an 
assessment in Melton's case.   
11 The district attorney and the defendant's attorney are 
allowed to "have and keep a copy" of the PSI, but the PSI must 
still be kept "confidential."  Wis. Stat. § 972.15(4m).  See 
also State ex rel. Office of the State Pub. Defender v. Court of 
Appeals, Dist. IV, 2013 WI 31, ¶22, 346 Wis. 2d 735, 828 
N.W.2d 847. 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
13 
 
Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.  Some 
information in a PSI "may be unverified and some of it may be 
inaccurate. . . .  [A]ffording the defendant and defendant's 
counsel an opportunity to examine the contents of the report 
permits the defendant to challenge statements and correct 
errors."  State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 194, 595 N.W.2d 403 
(1999).  A defendant has the right to challenge a PSI he or she 
believes is "inaccurate or incomplete."  State v. Greve, 2004 WI 
69, ¶11, 272 Wis. 2d 444, 681 N.W.2d 479 (citing Watson, 227 
Wis. 2d at 194).   
 
¶30 The PSI is "the single most important document that 
influences correctional decision making in Wisconsin."12  The PSI 
"is used for such things as determining levels of supervision, 
classification, program assignment, parole planning and decision 
making and in the overall correctional treatment of offenders."  
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27(1) (Dec. 2006).  See also Wis. 
Stat. § 972.15(5) (authorizing the DOC to use a PSI for 
"correctional programming, parole consideration or care and 
treatment").   
¶31 With certain narrow exceptions,13 the contents of a PSI 
"shall be confidential and shall not be made available to any 
                                                 
12 Jeffrey H. Bergman, Comment, Insuring the Accuracy of the 
Presentence Investigation Report in the Wisconsin Correctional 
System, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 613, 613 (footnote omitted).   
13 The exceptions to the general confidentiality rule, which 
do not require court approval to access and use the PSI, are 
listed in Wis. Stat. § 972.15(5) and (6).  The DOC is the most 
significant exception. 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
14 
 
person except upon specific authorization of the court."  Wis. 
Stat. § 972.15(4).  Recently, this court reaffirmed that 
maintaining 
the 
confidentiality 
of 
PSIs 
is 
an 
important 
statutory directive.  See State ex rel. Office of the State Pub. 
Defender v. Court of Appeals, Dist. IV, 2013 WI 31, ¶¶36, 39, 
346 Wis. 2d 735, 828 N.W.2d 847 (reminding parties to be 
"abundantly 
cautious" 
and 
"mindful" 
when 
dealing 
with 
information contained in PSIs).   
¶32 Finally, 
a 
PSI 
is 
different 
from 
a 
sentencing 
memorandum, which is similar in content to a PSI but has no 
"prescribed format" and is prepared by an advocate for the 
defendant.  Greve, 272 Wis. 2d 444, ¶12 (citation omitted).   
B. Whether a Court May Order the Destruction of a PSI 
 
¶33 With this background on PSIs in mind, we turn to the 
question of whether a circuit court may order the destruction of 
a PSI.  The first circuit court order by Judge Congdon was to 
seal and eventually destroy a disputed PSI and to order a second 
PSI for the court file. 
 
¶34 There are various sources of judicial power.  These 
include the state and federal constitutions and state and 
federal statutes.  Constitutional authority to act can be 
explicit, or implicit in the very nature of the judicial branch.  
The inherent authority of Wisconsin courts comes from the powers 
and duties of the judicial branch set out in the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The Wisconsin Constitution contains no explicit 
grant of authority for Wisconsin courts to destroy PSIs.    
Consequently, this opinion will examine statutory authority and 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
15 
 
inherent authority14 to determine whether courts have power to 
order the destruction of PSIs.   
1. Statutory Authority 
¶35 In considering "statutory authority," we think it 
appropriate to consider federal statutes, state statutes, state 
administrative rules, and Supreme Court rules.  In this case, we 
are not aware of any federal statutes that empower or bind 
Wisconsin courts in relation to the destruction of PSIs.   
¶36 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. 
Markel Ins. Co., 2012 WI 26, ¶26, 339 Wis. 2d 125, 810 
N.W.2d 465 (citation omitted).  Statutory interpretation "begins 
with the language of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Courts give statutory language its common, 
ordinary meaning.  Id.  Statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used, "not in isolation but as part of a 
whole."  Id., ¶46.  We must construe statutory language 
reasonably, so as to avoid absurd results.  Id. 
¶37 Courts interpret administrative rules, Orion Flight 
Services, Inc. v. Basler Flight Service, 2006 WI 51, ¶18, 290 
                                                 
14 In Breier v. E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 388, 387 N.W.2d 72 
(1986), the court cited "equitable judicial authority" among the 
possible bases of authority for a court to expunge a juvenile's 
police record.  Id. at 381.  The court later noted that 
equitable authority "is a variant of the inherent authority 
doctrine."  Id. at 388. 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 421, 714 N.W.2d 130 (citations and footnote omitted); 
State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, ¶19, 270 
Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259, and Supreme Court rules, State v. 
Henley, 2010 WI 12, ¶11, 322 Wis. 2d 1, 778 N.W.2d 853; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin, 2004 WI 116, ¶38, 275 
Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121, the same way that they interpret 
statutes.   
¶38 The PSI statute, Wis. Stat. § 972.15, does not 
authorize a court to destroy a PSI.  In fact, it implies the 
opposite.  Subsection (4) states that a PSI "shall not be made 
available to any person except upon specific authorization of 
the 
court." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Although 
this 
language 
contemplates 
confidentiality, 
it 
necessarily 
envisions 
preservation, because a court cannot authorize access to a PSI 
that it has destroyed.  The authority to destroy is inconsistent 
with the authority to make available.15  The authority to destroy 
would also tie the hands of other judges.  Melton and the State 
appear to agree that if a court has the authority to destroy a 
PSI, it does not come from Wis. Stat. § 972.15. 
 
¶39 While destruction of a PSI would help to ensure 
confidentiality, proper sealing and labeling of a PSI would also 
ensure confidentiality and fulfill the other purpose of the PSI 
statute——namely, preservation.  Although Melton argues that the 
                                                 
15 See State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶29, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 
810 N.W.2d 787 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110) 
(interpreting a statute in such a way that contravenes its 
"manifest purpose" is unreasonable). 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
17 
 
dual purposes of the PSI statute apply only to "correct" PSIs, 
Wis. Stat. § 972.15 makes no distinction between "correct" PSIs 
and "incorrect" PSIs. 
¶40 The lack of explicit guidance in the statutes on court 
authority to destroy PSIs is similar to the situation in Breier.  
In that case, this court considered whether a circuit court had 
authority to expunge police records.  Breier, 130 Wis. 2d at 
379.  The Breier court first looked to the circuit court's 
statutory authority and construed "the relevant statutes to not 
provide express or implied authority for circuit courts to 
expunge juvenile police records."  Id. at 385.  The court was 
"particularly influenced" by the fact that a statute requiring 
confidentiality of police records did not also provide authority 
to expunge these records.  Id.  Like the statute in Breier, the 
PSI statute requires confidentiality, Wis. Stat. § 972.15(4), 
but it does not provide express or implied authority to destroy 
a PSI record.   
¶41 The 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code 
also 
contains 
provisions related to PSIs, but these provisions do not 
authorize a court to destroy a PSI.  Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 
328.27(2) states that a DOC agent shall prepare a PSI, and the 
PSI must contain the information provided for under the same 
section, "unless the court orders otherwise."  Wisconsin Admin. 
Code § DOC 328.28 is titled "Modified presentence investigation 
report."  Subsection (1) of that section permits a DOC agent to 
prepare a PSI that contains only the information that the court 
orders.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
18 
 
¶42 The administrative code does not explicitly address 
deletions from or corrections to statements in PSIs, although 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.28(1) could be interpreted to cover a 
second PSI that deletes disputed information. 
¶43 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 328.30 addresses DOC 
recordkeeping, indicating that a "case record of each client 
shall be maintained" and shall include, inter alia: "(i) The 
client's court order and any court imposed conditions and 
obligations; 
(j) 
Copies 
of 
the 
client's 
presentence 
investigation report prepared under s. DOC 328.27 or 328.28."  
Hence, the administrative rules authorize the court to put a 
corrected copy of the PSI in the "case record" maintained by the 
DOC.  However, the rules do not authorize the court to withdraw 
PSIs from the case record or to destroy PSIs.   
¶44 In this case, Supreme Court Rules are important.  The 
State argues that destruction of a PSI would conflict with 
Chapter 72 of the Supreme Court Rules on record retention.  
"[I]n the exercise of the court's constitutional authority over 
all courts,"16 this court adopted Chapter 72 of the Supreme Court 
Rules, relating to the retention of court records.  S. Ct. 
Order, 136 Wis. 2d xi (issued Mar. 5, 1987, eff. Apr. 1, 1987).  
Current Chapter 72 reads in part: 
 
Except as provided in SCR 72.03 to 72.05, the 
original paper records of any court shall be retained 
                                                 
16 Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides, "The supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts." 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
19 
 
in the custody of the court for the following minimum 
time periods: 
 . . . . 
 
(15) Felony case files.  All papers deposited 
with the clerk of circuit court in proceedings 
commenced as felonies: 50 years after entry of final 
judgment; for Class A felonies, 75 years after entry 
of final judgment.   
SCR 72.01 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 
¶45 The Supreme Court Rules also contain a provision for 
disposing of court records: 
(1) A clerk of court . . . may destroy records 
in his or her custody after minimum retention periods 
under SCR 72.01 have expired . . . . 
(2) Records defined as confidential by rule or 
statute shall be destroyed in accordance with sub. (1) 
by burning, shredding, or other means that will 
obliterate the records. 
SCR 72.02 (2012) (emphasis added).   
¶46 Based on the language of SCR 72.01, the 50-year 
retention rule applies when (1) a paper is deposited with the 
clerk of circuit court, and (2) the paper is for a proceeding 
commenced as a felony.   
¶47 Ordering the destruction of a PSI would conflict with 
SCR 72.01's mandate that courts preserve paper records for 
designated periods of time.  In this case, Judge Congdon ordered 
a PSI after Melton's convictions and another after the court 
received the first PSI; these PSIs are part of the record in 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
20 
 
both of Melton's cases.17  In addition, both of Melton's cases 
were commenced as felony proceedings.  Whether a PSI is "right" 
or "wrong," "undisputed" or "disputed," "original" or "amended," 
the policy behind SCR 72.01 mandates its retention for at least 
50 years after the entry of final judgment.18 
2. Inherent Authority 
¶48 Melton argues that a circuit court has the inherent 
authority to order the destruction of a PSI because the power to 
destroy a 
PSI is 
essential to a court's existence and 
functioning.  At various times, Melton contended that (1) the 
PSIs in his cases included information that was not authorized 
to be part of a PSI by DOC administrative rules; (2) the 
improper information would be highly prejudicial to him when he 
reached the correctional system; (3) he needed protection 
against use of the prejudicial information by the DOC; (4) a 
court should never consider truly objectionable information; and 
(5) the existence of one or more disputed PSIs in a court file 
would be very confusing and lead to mistakes, especially if a 
                                                 
17 Courts are not without recourse to deal with documents 
mistakenly filed in the wrong court record.  It is perfectly 
acceptable to withdraw these misfiled documents and refile them 
in the appropriate case file.  See, e.g., Schlumpf v. Yellick, 
94 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980) (after amended 
summons and complaint were typed with wrong case number and 
misfiled, the circuit court ordered the transfer of the 
documents to the correct case file). 
18 SCR 72.01 is not the only rule disfavoring destruction of 
court records before the expiration of retention requirements.  
See also SCR 72.06 (mandating that expunged records are to be 
sealed 
but 
not 
destroyed 
except 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
provisions of the chapter).   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
21 
 
defendant like himself were ever resentenced.  He asserted that 
PSIs may contain inaccurate, incomplete, biased, or prejudicial 
information.  Judge Congdon added that the disputed information 
in the PSIs would not be "useful" to him in sentencing. 
¶49 We conclude, however, that courts do not possess the 
inherent authority to order the destruction of a PSI on any of 
these grounds because physical destruction of a PSI, as opposed 
to sealing and carefully labeling a disputed PSI, is not 
necessary for the efficient and effective functioning of a 
court.  We recognize that it would be ill-advised for the court 
to deny absolutely the existence of any inherent authority to 
destroy a PSI, regardless of the circumstances, but we cannot 
presently think of a circumstance so dire that a court would be 
unable to fashion an adequate remedy for the problem short of 
destruction of a court record. 
¶50 Inherent powers are "those that have been conceded to 
courts because they are courts.  Such powers have been conceded 
because without them [courts] could neither maintain their 
dignity, transact their business, nor accomplish the purposes of 
their 
existence." 
 
City 
of 
Sun 
Prairie 
v. 
Davis, 
226 
Wis. 2d 738, 748, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Put another way, "[a] power is 
inherent when it is one without which a court cannot properly 
function."  Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶73 (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 580, 297 
N.W.2d 808 (1980)).   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
22 
 
¶51 Circuit courts exercise their inherent authority in 
three general areas: (1) guarding against actions that would 
"unreasonably curtail the powers or materially impair the 
efficacy of the courts or judicial system"; (2) regulating 
judges and attorneys; and (3) ensuring that courts function 
"efficiently and effectively to provide the fair administration 
of justice."  Davis, 226 Wis. 2d at 749-50 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).19   
¶52 In this case, the question before the court relates to 
the third area——the efficient and effective functioning of a 
circuit court.   
¶53 In this review, Melton argues that judicial authority 
to order the destruction of a PSI is necessary for two reasons.  
First, destruction of an incorrect PSI will prevent confusion on 
the 
part 
of 
the 
DOC 
for 
use 
in 
Melton's 
correctional 
programming.  It will prevent the "wrong" PSI from being used 
against Melton "in any prejudicial manner."  Second, destruction 
of an incorrect PSI will prevent any confusion over which PSI in 
the court file is the correct one at a possible resentencing.  
Destruction of the suspect PSI will assure that it will not be 
used accidentally.  The court of appeals adopted this second 
                                                 
19 See also Lynn Laufenberg and Geoffrey Van Remmen, Courts: 
Inherent Power and Administrative Court Reform, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 
133, 135 (1975) (explaining that the concept of inherent 
authority is "found in the constitutional separation of powers" 
and that the judiciary must possess power "not only to protect 
itself from attacks by the co-ordinate branches, but also to 
take the initiative in preserving its existence when the need 
arises").   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
23 
 
conclusion.  Melton, 343 Wis. 2d 784, ¶¶22–23 (citing Henley, 
328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶73).   
¶54 As the party asserting the existence of inherent 
authority to exercise this power, Melton carries the burden of 
establishing that the power is necessary for efficient and 
effective functioning of a court.  See Davis, 226 Wis. 2d at 
751.  Melton has failed to meet this burden.   
¶55 Melton's concern about DOC misuse of the first 
disputed 
PSIs——instead 
of 
the 
second 
PSIs 
utilized 
in 
sentencing——raises several fundamental questions.  The fact that 
a court orders a second PSI that omits certain suspect 
information 
does 
not 
necessarily 
mean 
that 
the 
deleted 
information is false or irrelevant for correctional purposes.  
The deleted information here pertains to Melton's statements to 
police with respect to certain uncharged offenses.  These 
uncharged 
offenses 
may 
never 
be 
prosecuted 
because 
the 
information in the PSIs was not accurate, or was cumulative and 
did not justify additional prosecution, or would be subject to 
suppression on constitutional grounds.  Information that may be 
inappropriate for judicial consideration in sentencing might be 
relevant and valuable in correctional programming.  This is not 
the case to consider such issues.   
¶56 The DOC is required to keep a copy of its PSI/PSIs in 
its "case record."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.30(1)(j) (Dec. 
2006).  After a DOC agent authors a PSI and sends the report to 
the circuit court, the agent is likely to have access to an 
electronic copy of the PSI, and may keep a paper copy for his or 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
24 
 
her own records.  The PSI writer may also have documentary 
evidence from third parties to support information outlined in 
the PSI.  Consequently, judicial power to physically destroy 
copies of a PSI would be ineffectual in relation to the DOC if 
it did not include the power to scrub DOC computers and purge 
DOC paper files.   
¶57 Inherent authority would not sustain incursions of 
this magnitude into the operations of a separate branch of 
government.  The DOC's actions, past or future, would not 
threaten or impair the operation of the judiciary.  The DOC's 
use of the PSI would not implicate the efficient and effective 
functioning of a circuit court.  See State v. Bush, 185 
Wis. 2d 716, 722–24, 519 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1994).   
¶58 In Bush, a defendant suggested that a circuit court 
had the inherent authority to "strike" a PSI containing 
allegedly inaccurate information that the DOC relied on for 
correctional programming and order a new PSI.20  Id. at 721–22.  
The court of appeals declined to decide the issue of inherent 
authority, affirming the decision of the circuit court on other 
grounds.  Id. at 722.  However, the analysis in Bush is 
instructive on why striking and ordering a new PSI for DOC use 
does not implicate a court's inherent authority. 
                                                 
20 The defendant in Bush sought to correct the PSI long 
after the entry of judgment and original sentencing in the case.  
State v. Bush, 185 Wis. 2d 716, 720–21, 519 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 
1994).  The defendant's sole reason for striking the allegedly 
inaccurate PSI was the "adverse effects of these inaccuracies on 
his parole and program reviews in the prison."  Id. at 721.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
25 
 
¶59 The Bush court explained that the defendant 
essentially requested the court to tell [DOC] how it 
is to use its records and how it is to correct errors 
in those records.  Courts are not well-situated to 
make judgments on [DOC's] use of its own records and 
administration of its own rules. . . .  We conclude 
that policy principles and considerations of judicial 
administration dictate that courts should not exercise 
their jurisdiction to correct PSIs for reasons solely 
related to [DOC] administration. 
Id. at 723–24 (footnote omitted).  We agree with the Bush 
court's reasoning.  The power to modify——"strike" or destroy——a 
PSI for reasons related to DOC administration is not an inherent 
power of the circuit court. 
¶60 Melton and the court of appeals also argue that a 
court has inherent power to order the destruction of a PSI so as 
to prevent confusion caused by two PSIs in a defendant's court 
record.  Again, Melton fails to meet his burden of showing that 
the power of ordering PSI destruction is necessary for efficient 
and effective functioning of a court.   
¶61 When a court has justification for ordering a second 
PSI, it should be able to seal the first PSI, label it so 
unmistakably, and provide such a clear, written explanation of 
its action that the possibility of subsequent misuse is 
miniscule.  Destruction is not necessary for the fair and 
efficient administration of justice.   
¶62 Failing to destroy the disputed PSIs in this case 
results in no immediate harm to Melton in the courts; it creates 
only potential harm, at most.  Furthermore, this potential harm 
depends upon a judge disregarding the court-ordered seal on the 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
26 
 
disputed PSIs, using the disputed information from those PSIs, 
and using the disputed information in a resentencing.  We are 
not persuaded that the potential of mistakenly using disputed 
PSIs at a resentencing is sufficient for a court to justify the 
invocation of inherent authority, especially if the court 
employs proper safeguards.   
¶63 Therefore, we hold that courts do not possess the 
inherent authority to order the destruction of a PSI on any of 
the grounds argued by Melton, see supra, ¶48, because it is not 
necessary for the efficient and effective functioning of a 
court. 
C. Correcting and Preserving a Disputed PSI 
¶64 We turn now to the procedure that ought to be employed 
when a party disputes a PSI.  
¶65 A defendant has the right to challenge a PSI that he 
or she believes is "inaccurate or incomplete."  Greve, 272 
Wis. 2d 444, ¶11 (citing Watson, 227 Wis. 2d at 194); State v. 
Perez, 170 Wis. 2d 130, 141, 487 N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1992).  
"In the event the defendant wishes to contest any of the factual 
matters set forth in a PSI, the defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing where evidence regarding the issue in 
controversy may be presented by the State or the defendant."  
State v. Suchocki, 208 Wis. 2d 509, 515, 561 N.W.2d 332 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (citation omitted).   
¶66 To secure a hearing the defendant should file a motion 
with the court (1) identifying specific problems with the PSI, 
and (2) requesting specific remedies to deal with those 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
27 
 
problems.  Problems include inaccurate or objectively false 
information, incomplete information, or unfairly prejudicial 
information.  In the Suchocki case, the defendant challenged the 
entire PSI on grounds that the PSI author was biased because she 
was married to the prosecuting attorney.  Suchocki, 208 
Wis. 2d at 513.   
¶67 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 328.29(3) reads: "Arrest 
records that did not lead to conviction and not confirmed by the 
client may not be used as a source of information in a 
presentence investigation and report, except that adjudications 
under s. 961.47, Stats., and ch. 54, 1975 Stats., misdemeanant 
expunction, and pending charges may be included."  A defendant 
may object to the inclusion of information in the PSI that is 
inconsistent with DOC rules, but the validity of such an 
objection may require a judicial ruling.   
¶68 An evidentiary hearing may not be necessary if the 
parties are able to stipulate to additions or corrections to the 
PSI, with the approval of the court. 
¶69 The remedies requested in the motion should be 
tailored to the problems alleged.  Some objections may be 
addressed by striking portions of the PSI before or during the 
sentencing hearing.  Bush, 185 Wis. 2d at 724 n.1.   
¶70 "Striking," in this context, may mean different things 
to different judges.  One dictionary defines strike as "[t]o 
eliminate or expunge."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 1779 (3d ed. 1992).  Black's defines "strike" 
to mean "[t]o expunge, as from a record."  Black's Law 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
28 
 
Dictionary 1559 (9th ed. 2009).  "Strike" can also mean to 
disregard 
something 
said 
or 
presented, 
like 
a 
question, 
testimony, or evidence.  See, e.g., Jay E. Grenig 4A Wis. 
Pleading & Practice § 32A:76 (5th ed. 2009) ("There should be a 
ruling on a motion to strike evidence and to instruct the jury 
to disregard." (emphasis added)) (footnote omitted); see also 
Black's Law Dictionary 1110 (9th ed. 2009).   
¶71 We think "strike" can mean to redline21 or line through 
objected-to information, to identify and make marginal notes 
disavowing 
objected-to information,22 to redact objected-to 
information, to make a record that the court will not use 
objected-to information, and the like. 
¶72 Redaction of information in a PSI is an accepted form 
of striking available to a court.  See, e.g., State v. Parent, 
2006 WI 132, ¶45, 298 Wis. 2d 63, 725 N.W.2d 915.  "Redaction" 
means "[t]he careful editing of a document, esp[ecially] to 
remove confidential references or offensive material."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1390 (9th ed. 2009).  Courts outside of Wisconsin 
have utilized the redaction method of correcting PSIs, although 
the term seems synonymous with striking portions of PSIs.  
                                                 
21 See, e.g., State v. Molen, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 2010) (explaining that "redlining" a PSI is when "the court 
physically notes which portions [of the report] are excluded"). 
22 The Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook devotes a small amount 
of space suggesting how to correct "errors" in a PSI.  1A Wis. 
Judicial Benchbook CR36-21 (3d ed. 2012) (recommending that 
judges should "[n]ote corrections or disputes in [the] margin of 
[the] PSI and order all copies corrected"). 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
29 
 
People v. Freeman, 889 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 
(holding that certain information in a PSI "should have been 
redacted 
because 
the 
PSI 
contained 
clearly 
erroneous 
information").   
 
¶73 In our view, striking does not mean destroying the 
PSI.23  It means isolating objected-to portions of a PSI so that 
they will not be considered or used against the defendant.   
¶74 Some problems may require the preparation of a new 
PSI.  A new PSI may be ordered if problems so permeate the first 
PSI 
that 
striking 
is 
impractical 
or 
because 
substantial 
additional 
information 
should 
be 
added 
to 
the 
PSI 
for 
completeness.  
¶75 When the court orders selective striking or redacting, 
it should collect copies of the PSI from the prosecutor and the 
defendant to conform their copies to the court's agreed-upon 
changes.  When the court orders a new PSI, the court should 
collect copies of the first PSI and securely seal them with the 
court's copy. 
 
¶76 At the hearing on the defendant's motion, at the 
sentencing hearing, or in writing, the court should make a 
                                                 
23 The federal courts also have a procedure for challenging 
disputed information in a PSI.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B)–(C).  
At sentencing, a federal court must rule on any disputed portion 
of a PSI and append a copy of its determinations to any copy of 
the PSI made available to the Bureau of Prisons.  Id.; see also 
United States v. Lopez, 907 F.2d 1096, 1101 (11th Cir. 1990).  A 
federal court may also determine that a ruling is unnecessary 
because the disputed matter will not affect sentencing or the 
court will not consider it in sentencing.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 
32(i)(3)(B)–(C). 
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
30 
 
record memorializing what objections were made to the PSI and 
how the court resolved those objections.  Transcripts, written 
explanations, corrected copies of PSIs, and court orders should 
be forwarded to the PSI writer and to the DOC for incorporation 
into the "case record."   
 
¶77 We think the court is more likely to achieve success 
in dealing with the DOC by carefully explaining what it has done 
and why than by trying to order the DOC to alter its records.24 
 
¶78 Finally, 
the 
court 
should 
securely 
seal 
any 
objectionable, superseded PSIs together with all collected 
copies.  The court should clearly label a superseded PSI and 
distinguish it from a new PSI by different markings and clear 
explanations and instructions. 
 
¶79 Methodically 
following 
these 
procedures 
should 
eliminate most problems associated with a disputed PSI.     
IV. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
24 In Bush, the court was asked to correct a PSI well after 
the defendant had been sentenced.  Bush complained about 
misinformation in the PSI, but he failed to read the document 
before the sentencing hearing.  Bush, 185 Wis. 2d at 723.  The 
court stated: "While the trial court could appropriately modify 
Bush's sentence based on erroneous information in the PSI, 
because the PSI is now under the Department of Corrections' 
control, a motion to correct the information contained in the 
PSI should be directed to that agency."  Id. (emphasis added). 
There are limits to the court's authority to interfere with 
the operations of a separate branch of government.  As the Bush 
opinion suggests, however, a defendant is entitled to ask the 
DOC to correct clearly inaccurate information in a DOC-authored 
document.   
No. 
  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR 
 
31 
 
¶80 We conclude that courts do not have either express or 
implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs.  
The PSI statute, the administrative code, and Supreme Court 
Rules on record retention implicate principles of preservation 
and confidentiality, not destruction.  We also conclude that 
courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of 
PSIs on the facts before us or on any of the arguments Melton 
has made because such power is not necessary to a court's 
efficient and effective administration of justice.  A court has 
adequate means of dealing with errors, omissions, or prejudicial 
material in a PSI without physically destroying the disputed 
report.  A court can strike or redact objected-to portions of a 
PSI and make a record that the court will not use the objected-
to information.  In unusual cases, a court can order that a 
corrected PSI be prepared, and it can seal and clearly label the 
superseded report. 
¶81 To forestall further confusion on the issue and 
mitigate the possibility of error, we have outlined procedures 
that should be followed when the bench and bar are confronted 
with disputed PSIs. 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶82 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
concur with the majority and write separately to clarify that 
under the right circumstances, albeit rare, the circuit court 
has authority to destroy a PSI.  It is not unusual for a 
defendant to dispute certain contents of a PSI, and here, the 
defendant 
lodged 
very 
specific 
complaints, 
to 
specific 
paragraphs, on specific pages.  The record here, however, does 
not support destruction of the PSI.  Given these objections, a 
court typically might strike those disputed portions from the 
PSI and explain that those matters would not be considered for 
purposes of sentencing.   
¶83 Our circuit courts possess the inherent power to, 
inter alia, "'ensure the efficient and effective functioning of 
the court, and to fairly administer justice.'"  State v. Melton, 
2012 WI App 95, ¶22, 343 Wis. 2d 784, 820 N.W.2d 487 (quoting 
State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶73, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350).  I am reluctant to diminish the authority that is 
endowed to our circuit courts, which are on the front lines.  
Circuit courts do not often need to rely on their inherent 
power, but when it is absolutely necessary, they should be 
allowed to exercise that power.  Under these facts, however, I 
cannot conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its 
inherent authority in ordering the destruction of this PSI.  
¶84 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
¶85 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurrence. 
No.  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
 
No.  2011AP1770-CR & 2011AP1771-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1