Title: Thomas v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

249 Ind. 271 (1967)
230 N.E.2d 303
THOMAS
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30-723.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 16, 1967.
Rehearing denied December 21, 1967.
*272 Lewis Davis, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Wilma T. Leach, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, J.
The appellant was charged with First Degree Burglary by affidavit filed in the Marion County Criminal Court. The issues formed by the affidavit and the plea of not guilty by the appellant were determined by a jury and the verdict was guilty.
Thereafter, a petition to file a belated motion for new trial was granted and this appeal prosecuted on the overruling of the belated motion for new trial.
The affidavit, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
Specifications of error alleged are:
Under specification No. 1; that is, that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law, appellant urges that he did not have a fair trial and his Constitutional Rights were impaired because the Trial Court propounded certain questions to one of the witnesses. These questions are as follows:
The purpose of this discretionary power is to allow the trial judge to step in and aid (a) the jury, or (b) the court (in a trial without a jury), in their fact-finding responsibilities; however, he is to do this in an impartial manner and not to improperly influence the jury with his own contentions.
Although the burden is on the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of putting on the trial is the litigants' responsibility with the outcome being dependent upon their efforts only being assisted by the Court to prevent a grave injustice.
Our examination of the foregoing questions propounded by the Court and the answers given by the pawnbroker witness does not convince us that the rights of the defendant were prejudiced; in fact, we are impressed with the fact that the Court was being critical of the pawnbroker rather than the defendant. If anything, the Trial Court's criticism of the pawnbroker who was called as a State's witness would perhaps *275 affect the credibility of the pawnbroker and benefit the defendant rather than harm him.
The fruits of the questioning by the Court of the pawnbroker did not add anything of probative value with reference to the matters covered in the affidavit. The evidence in the case as a whole conclusively established that the goods accepted by the pawnbroker had been stolen and those stolen goods were tied irrevocably with the appellant. We do not believe prejudicial error was committed by the Trial Court in this interrogation. It appears from the entire record that the questioned action of the Court was not harmful to the defendant and did not prevent him from having a fair trial. Rhodes v. State, supra.
The appellant then further contends that Police Officer Rudd submitted into evidence testimony of appellant's admission concerning other burglaries. A review of the trial procedures at this point will be helpful.
Thereafter, the appellant, by counsel, moved for a mistrial, claiming irreparable harm had been done him by the foregoing testimony of Officer Rudd. It will be noted that during the whole of the testimony now objected to that the appellant failed to make any objection and the Trial Court itself finally *277 interrupted and put it at an end. The testimony concerned appellant's description of other burglaries.
The first move on the part of appellant was to seek a mistrial. A mistrial was sought after appellant had sat idly by and failed to make an objection. In Dull v. State (1962), 242 Ind. 633, 180 N.E.2d 523, this Court said:
See also Gamble v. Lewis (1949), 227 Ind. 455, 85 N.E.2d 629, Kern v. Bridwell (1889), 119 Ind. 226, 21 N.E. 664. Both of these cases are quoted with authority in Dull v. State, supra, and the whole matter was probably succinctly put by this Court in Gamble v. Lewis, supra, in this:
We are not at all convinced that the evidence complained of here may not have been admissible for the purpose of showing motive, intent, and a common scheme of plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes if the crimes are of a similar nature. Watts v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570; Shneider v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 28, 40 N.E.2d 322.
The foregoing alleged errors presented by the appellant in the argument section of his brief do not present any ground for reversible error and the judgment, therefore, is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Mote, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 230 N.E.2d 303.