Title: E W RAKESTRAW V GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 30, 2003  
E. WAYNE RAKESTRAW,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120996  
GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC.  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
Plaintiff sought, and the magistrate awarded, benefits  
under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.301  
et seq., on the basis of aggravation of the symptoms of a  
nonwork-related 
condition.  We hold that a claimant attempting  
to establish a compensable, work-related1 injury must prove  
that the injury is medically distinguishable from a  
1 As used in this opinion, a compensable, work-related 
injury is one that arises “out of and in the course of 
employment” in accordance with MCL 418.301(1).  
 
preexisting nonwork-related condition in order to establish  
the existence of a “personal injury” under § 301(1).  
Accordingly, we remand this case to the Worker’s Compensation  
Appellate Commission for further proceedings consistent with  
this opinion.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
The facts in this case are not contested. At the time  
plaintiff began working for defendant in 1996, he had a  
preexisting neck condition that was asymptomatic.2  According  
to plaintiff, his work for defendant caused his neck pain to  
return and increase.  
The magistrate awarded plaintiff benefits for the  
aggravation of his symptoms.  Of special note, the magistrate  
held that plaintiff suffered from “post surgical changes” of  
the cervical spine, but that these “conditions were not caused  
by his employment with [d]efendant.”  Furthermore, the  
magistrate held that the employment did not contribute to or  
aggravate the preexisting condition:  
Mr. 
Rakestraw’s 
pathological 
postsurgical 
changes and spondylosis of the cervical spine were 
not contributed to, aggravated or accelerated in a 
significant manner as a result of his work  
activities. The medical proofs would not sustain a  
finding of a change in pathology related to any  
work injury or work activities. [Emphasis added.]  
2 Plaintiff suffered from a herniated cervical disk that  
required surgeries in December 1991 and April 1992.  
2  
 
However, the magistrate held that plaintiff’s employment  
aggravated the symptoms of the preexisting neck condition. 3  
The magistrate determined that plaintiff was partially  
disabled as a result of the aggravated symptoms and granted an  
open award of benefits.  The WCAC reluctantly affirmed on the  
basis of Court of Appeals authority. 
However, the WCAC  
suggested that the Court of Appeals case law, which the WCAC  
was required to follow, did not properly follow this Court’s  
precedent.  The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.  
Defendant sought leave to appeal with this Court, which was  
granted.  
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court's review of a decision by the WCAC is limited.  
In the absence of fraud, we must consider the WCAC’S findings  
of fact conclusive if there is any competent evidence in the  
record to support them.  MCL 418.861a(14); Mudel v Great  
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 701; 614 NW2d 607  
(2000).  However, questions of law in a worker's compensation  
case are reviewed de novo.  DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461  
3 Justice WEAVER relies on the magistrate’s commentary 
regarding plaintiff’s symptoms, not on the magistrate’s 
finding that the employment did not cause, contribute to, or 
aggravate the preexisting condition.  Post at 2. In so doing, 
the dissent makes the same legal error as the magistrate in 
failing to recognize that symptoms that are not causally 
linked to a work-related injury are not compensable as a  
matter of law.  
3  
  
 
Mich 394, 401-402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000); MCL 418.861,  
418.861a(14).
 Likewise, questions requiring statutory  
interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.  
Frank W Lynch Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 583;  
624 NW2d 180 (2001); People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 471;  
620 NW2d 13 (2000).  
In interpreting a statute, our obligation is to discern  
the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from  
the words actually used in the statute.  White v Ann Arbor,  
406 Mich 554, 562 281 NW2d 283 (1979).  A bedrock principle of  
statutory construction is that "a clear and unambiguous  
statute leaves no room for judicial construction or  
interpretation." Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d  
435 (1993). When the statutory language is unambiguous, the  
proper role of the judiciary is to simply apply the terms of  
the statute to the facts of a particular case.  Turner v Auto  
Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). 
In  
addition, words used by the Legislature must be given their  
common, ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a.  
II. ANALYSIS  
A  
MCL 418.301(1) states in pertinent part:  
An employee, who receives a personal injury  
arising out of and in the course of employment by 
an employer who is subject to this act at the time 
of the injury, shall be paid compensation as  
4  
 
  
provided in this act. . . .[Emphasis added.]  
Under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute,  
an employee must establish that he has suffered “a personal  
injury arising out of and in the course of employment” in  
order to be eligible for compensation benefits.  
B  
Defendant 
maintains 
that 
the 
magistrate 
erred 
in 
awarding  
benefits because the pain plaintiff suffered was not a  
“personal injury” under the act.  
On several occasions, this Court has held that symptoms  
such as pain, standing alone, do not establish a personal  
injury under the statute.
 Rather, a claimant must also  
establish that the symptom complained of is causally linked to  
an injury that arises “out of and in the course of employment”  
in order to be compensable.4  
The 
difference 
between a “personal injury” under § 301(1)  
and symptoms of a preexisting injury or illness that do not  
constitute a compensable injury was explored in Kostamo v  
Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 Mich 105; 274 NW2d 411 (1979).  
4 See Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 Mich 105,  
116-118; 274 NW2d 411 (1979); Miklik v Michigan Special  
Machine Co, 415 Mich 364; 329 NW2d 713 (1982); Farrington v  
Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201; 501 NW2d 76 (1993); 
McKissack 
v 
Comprehensive Health Services of Detroit, 447 Mich 
57; 523 NW2d 444 (1994). See also Hagopian v Highland Park, 
313 Mich 608, 621; 22 NW2d 116 (1946) (“The amended act itself 
was not intended to cover aggravation of pre-existing disease 
without an accident or fortuitous event.”).  
5  
 
 
 
 
Kostamo was a consolidation of cases in which the five  
plaintiffs 
either 
suffered a heart attack or experienced chest  
pain 
and 
sought 
compensation.  Regarding plaintiffs Fiszer and  
Hannula, the board determined that they had not suffered heart  
attacks. Rather, these plaintiffs were determined to suffer  
chest pain as a result of nonwork-related arteriosclerosis.  
In 
finding 
compensation unavailable to them, the Kostamo Court  
stated:  
The workers’ compensation law does not provide 
compensation for a person afflicted by an illness 
or disease not caused or aggravated by his work or 
working conditions.  Nor is a different result  
required because debility has progressed to the 
point where the worker cannot work without pain or 
injury.  Accordingly, compensation cannot be  
awarded because the worker may suffer heart damage 
which would be work-related if he continued to  
work.
 Unless the work has accelerated or  
aggravated the illness, disease or deterioration 
and, thus, contributed to it, or the work, coupled 
with the illness, disease or deterioration, in fact 
causes an injury, compensation is not payable. [Id.  
at 116.5]  
In Miklik v Michigan Special Machine Co, 415 Mich 364;  
329 NW2d 713 (1982), the plaintiff suffered from many  
preexisting conditions, including rheumatic heart disease,  
5 Kostamo was decided before the 1980 amendment of the  
statute. 1980 PA 357 added MCL 418.301(2), which imposes a 
higher standard of contribution where an employee suffers a 
certain class of injury. 
Where an employee’s injury 
aggravates or accelerates a mental disability or a condition 
of the aging process, the employee after 1982 must show that 
the employment contributed to the nonwork-related condition 
“in a significant manner.”  
6  
 
 
diabetes, 
obesity, 
hypertension, and liver damage.  He applied  
for compensation benefits, claiming that the stress of his job  
caused hypertension and aggravated and accelerated his  
arteriosclerosis and rheumatic heart disease. 
He was  
determined to be totally disabled.  Initially, this Court  
noted that a successful claimant must “establish by a  
preponderance of the evidence both a personal injury and a  
relationship between the injury and the workplace.” Id. at  
367.  Turning to the merits of the case, this Court held that  
arteriosclerosis, 
standing 
alone, 
was 
insufficient 
to  
establish a compensable injury:  
However, even though arteriosclerosis alone 
does not justify compensation, neither does it bar 
compensation. Heart damage, such as would result 
from a heart attack, is compensable if linked by 
sufficient evidence to the workplace. . . .  
The WCAB, upon remand, accepted medical  
testimony that Miklik's health problems were job­
related, and then found them to be compensable. The 
board failed to follow Kostamo's direction that in  
order for there to be compensation there first must  
be 
an 
injury. 
It 
is 
impossible 
to 
turn  
arteriosclerosis into compensable heart damage 
merely by labeling it so.  The board's opinion, 
worded in conclusory terms, ignored this premise of 
Kostamo.
 
Testimony, 
at 
most, 
showed 
the  
progressive 
effects 
of 
arteriosclerosis, 
not  
separate heart damage. [Id. at 368-369 (emphasis 
added).]  
In Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201; 501  
NW2d 76 (1993), this Court reviewed the 1980 legislative  
amendments that added the “significant manner” test to  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
recovery 
of 
benefits 
for mental disabilities and conditions of  
the aging process.  The Court cited the Kostamo holding,  
stating that a claimant must prove “[t]hat the alleged cardiac  
injury resulting from work activities went beyond the  
manifestation of symptoms of the underlying disease. 
The  
heart injury must be significantly caused or aggravated by  
employment considering the totality of all the occupational  
factors 
and 
the 
claimant’s 
health 
circumstances 
and  
nonoccupational factors.” Id. at 216-217 (emphasis added).  
Thus, several cases from this Court have articulated the  
principle that, where an employee claims to have suffered an  
injury whose symptoms are consistent with a preexisting  
condition, the claimant must establish the existence of a  
work-related injury that extends “beyond the manifestation of  
symptoms” 
of 
the 
underlying preexisting condition. Id. at 216.  
C  
Despite the holdings in Kostamo, Miklik, and Farrington,  
plaintiff cites a body of case law developed in the Court of  
Appeals holding that aggravation of the symptoms of a  
preexisting condition alone constitutes a compensable injury  
under § 301(1).6
 The rationale of this line of Court of  
6 Johnson v DePree Co, 134 Mich App 709; 352 NW2d 303  
(1984);  Thomas v Chrysler Corp, 164 Mich App 549; 418 NW2d 96 
(1987); McDonald v Meijer, Inc, 188 Mich App 210; 469 NW2d 27  
(1991); Anderson v Chrysler Corp, 189 Mich App 325; 471 NW2d 
623 (1991); Siders v Gilco, Inc, 189 Mich App 670; 473 NW2d  
8  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Appeals cases appears to emanate from Carter v Gen Motors  
Corp, 361 Mich 577; 106 NW2d 105 (1960).  
In Carter, the plaintiff had a personality disorder that  
made him more susceptible to psychotic breakdowns.  His  
condition worsened to paranoid schizophrenia because of the  
stresses of his employment.  He was awarded benefits. This  
Court found that his benefits should have stopped on September  
11, 1957, because the plaintiff stopped showing signs of  
schizophrenia on that date.  The principal issue decided in  
Carter was whether there had to be a single incident causing  
the breakdown in order for benefits to be awarded.  This Court  
held that there did not have to be a single traumatizing event  
in order for benefits to be awarded.  
Carter should not be read to support the holding that  
mere symptom aggravation, without a change in pathology,  
constitutes a “personal injury” under § 301(1).7 
In closing  
the award of benefits, the Carter Court noted that if the  
802 (1991); Laury v Gen Motors Corp (On Remand, On Rehearing), 
207 Mich App 249; 523 NW2d 633 (1994); Mattison v Pontiac  
Osteopathic Hosp, 242 Mich App 664; 620 NW2d 313 (2000).  
7 Carter was also cited in Deziel v Difco Laboratories,  
Inc, 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978), in support of Deziel’s  
holding that a subjective standard was appropriate in  
psychiatric cases to determine whether the injury arose out of 
and in the course of employment.  However, the holding in 
Deziel was repudiated by the Legislature when it amended the 
act in 1980. 
Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531, 534; 377 
NW2d 300 (1985);  Farrington, supra at 216 n 16; Robertson v  
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732; 641 NW2d 567 (2002).  
9  
 
plaintiff’s inability to return to work was attributable to  
schizophrenia, he would be entitled to continuing benefits.  
However, because his inability to return to work was  
attributable 
to 
a 
nonwork-related 
“personality 
configuration,”  
the plaintiff was not entitled to continuing benefits. Id. at  
594.  
Thus, 
the 
plaintiff’s 
work-related 
schizophrenia, 
caused  
by “the pressure of his job and the pressure of his foreman,”  
id., was a distinct injury from the preexisting personality  
disorder.  The first case citing Carter for the principle that  
mere symptoms were sufficient to constitute a personal injury  
was promptly reversed by this Court.  Fox v Detroit Plastic  
Molding Corporate Service, 106 Mich App 749; 308 NW2d 633  
(1981); rev’d 417 Mich 901 (1983).  
Holding 
that 
the aggravation of symptoms of a preexisting  
condition 
is 
compensable 
without 
finding 
a 
work-related 
injury  
under § 301(1) is clearly inconsistent with the clear language  
of the statute as well as case law from this Court.  The  
statute requires proof that an employee suffered a personal  
injury “arising out of and in the course of employment” in  
order to establish entitlement to benefits.  To the degree  
that the Court of Appeals decisions in Johnson v DePree Co,  
134 Mich App 709; 352 NW2d 303 (1984); 
Thomas v Chrysler  
Corp, 164 Mich App 549; 418 NW2d 96 (1987); McDonald v Meijer,  
Inc, 188 Mich App 210; 469 NW2d 27 (1991); Anderson v Chrysler  
10  
 
 
 
 
Corp, 189 Mich App 325; 471 NW2d 623 (1991); Siders v Gilco,  
Inc, 189 Mich App 670; 473 NW2d 802 (1991); Laury v Gen Motors  
Corp (On Remand, On Rehearing), 207 Mich App 249; 523 NW2d 633  
(1994); Mattison v Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp, 242 Mich App 664;  
620 NW2d 313 (2000), hold otherwise, they are overruled.  
D  
We reaffirm today that an employee must establish the  
existence of a work-related injury by a preponderance of the  
evidence in order to establish entitlement to benefits under  
§ 301(1).8  A symptom such as pain is evidence of injury, but  
does 
not, 
standing 
alone, 
conclusively 
establish 
the  
statutorily required causal connection to the workplace. In  
other words, evidence of a symptom is insufficient to  
establish a personal injury “arising out of and in the course  
of employment.”9  
The text of the statute does not specifically demand that  
a 
claimant 
prove 
that 
his 
injury 
is 
“medically  
distinguishable” from a preexisting condition. However, the  
clear language of the statute does require the establishment  
of “a personal injury arising out of and in the course of  
8  “Injury” is defined as “harm or damage done or 
sustained, especially bodily harm . . . .” Random House  
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).  
9  “Symptom” is defined as “a sign or indication of 
something.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).  
11  
 
 
employment.” Where a claimant experiences symptoms that are  
consistent with the progression of a preexisting condition,  
the burden rests on the claimant to differentiate between the  
preexisting 
condition, which is not compensable, and the work­
related injury, which is compensable.10  Where evidence of a  
medically 
distinguishable 
injury 
is 
offered, 
the  
differentiation is easily made and causation is established.  
However, where the symptoms complained of are equally  
attributable to the progression of a preexisting condition or  
a work-related injury, a plaintiff will fail to meet his  
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the  
injury arose “out of and in the course of employment”; stated  
otherwise, plaintiff will have failed to establish causation.  
Therefore, 
as 
a 
practical consideration, a claimant must prove  
that the injury claimed is distinct from the preexisting  
condition in order to establish “a personal injury arising out  
of and in the course of employment” under § 301(1).  
III. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTS  
Justice WEAVER maintains that compensation is available  
“where the plaintiff’s disability is the result of symptoms  
that occur at work.” Post at 2 n 3. Justice KELLY would  
10 
An employee bears the burden of proving the  
relationship between the injury and the workplace by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Aquilina v Gen Motors Corp, 
403 Mich 206, 211; 267 NW2d 923 (1978).  
12  
 
 
apparently agree.  
Such a view is remarkable, representing a radical  
departure from the text of the statute, as well as the basic  
proposition, consistent throughout the history of the WDCA,  
that a claimant must establish a work-related injury as a  
necessary precondition to obtain benefits.11
 Under the  
11Justice KELLY accurately quotes the holding of the  
McKissack Court, which relied on the holding in Kostamo—that  
“worker’s compensation benefits may not be awarded simply 
because a worker is unable by reason of pain to continue with 
the work if the cause of the pain is illness or disease not 
caused or aggravated by the work or working conditions.” Post  
at 2 n 1.  
However, we disagree with Justice KELLY’S conclusion that  
the McKissack quotation does not differentiate between a  
symptom and an injury.  As the language in McKissack  
indicates, there is a distinction between “pain,” which is a 
symptom, and the “cause of the pain,” which is an injury, 
“illness or disease.”  
In McKissack, a work-related injury was found by the 
WCAB.  
447 Mich 60, 62.  In this case, the irrefutable truth is that 
neither dissenting opinion is able point to any holding that 
the “cause of [plaintiff’s] pain” was “illness or disease . . 
. caused or aggravated by the work or working conditions.” In 
fact, the magistrate specifically held that the workplace did 
not cause or aggravate the preexisting injury. 
Post at 2.  
Rather, plaintiff’s disability was premised on aggravated 
symptoms, without a finding of a work-related injury.  
Justice KELLY would apparently excuse plaintiff from 
having to establish a work-related injury because “[s]imilar 
to the tip of an iceberg,” pain is frequently “the only 
symptom showing that an injury was sustained,” while the 
etiology of the pain “remains submerged.” Post at 3.  
The clear language of the statute requires that a 
claimant prove the existence of an injury “arising out of and 
in the course of employment.” Simply put, a claimant must 
prove the presence of an injury as well as its cause to  
13  
 
 
 
dissents’ analyses, a claimant would not be required to  
establish the existence of a work-related injury. Rather, a  
symptom of a condition that does not arise out of and in the  
course of employment, but that fortuitously manifests itself  
during the work day, would be compensable.  However, no matter  
how diligently the dissents attempt to parse the statute, the  
statute clearly requires the establishment of a work-related  
injury, not a symptom that simply occurs in the workplace.  
MCL 418.301(1).  
The dissents justify this unusual conclusion with little  
more than invocation of the doctrine that WDCA matters are to  
be construed liberally because the statute is remedial in  
nature. Whatever the efficacy of this rule of construction,  
its application is logically justifiable only where the  
employer’s responsibility is established: where the employee  
proves the injury is work-related.12  We believe it is  
establish a compensable claim.  It is the responsibility of 
the Legislature, not this Court, to alter the language of the 
statute and relieve a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden in those 
cases where the pathological basis of the symptom is difficult 
to ascertain.  
12 Once an employee has established the existence of an 
injury that arises out of and in the course of employment, the 
“liberal construction” standard could arguably be applicable 
in determining, for example, the extent of the employee’s 
injuries 
or 
his 
ability 
to 
return 
to 
work 
after  
rehabilitation.
 Yet we note that the Legislature has 
instructed that the “liberal construction” standard be  
utilized on only one occasion in the entire WDCA. 
See MCL  
418.354(17).
 Further, conventional rules of statutory  
14  
 
inappropriate to utilize the “liberal construction” standard  
when the issue being considered is the initial qualifying  
matter of whether the claimed injury falls within the WDCA  
regime.  That decision, nearly jurisdictional in nature, is  
not to be tilted for or against either party as it is made  
solely for the purpose of determining whether the worker’s  
compensation 
system 
will entertain the claim.  Accordingly, we  
conclude that this approach to interpretation of the statute  
is inapplicable, and the resulting construction flawed.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this case, we hold that a claimant attempting to  
establish a compensable work-related injury must adduce  
evidence of the injury that is medically distinguishable from  
the preexisting nonwork-related condition in order establish  
the existence of a “personal injury” by a preponderance of the  
evidence under § 301(1).  We remand this case to the WCAC for  
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
construction are employed to resolve ambiguities, not negate 
the import of clear statutory requirements. Klapp v United  
Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).  The  
dissents identify no ambiguity at issue in this case.  In any 
event, we do not address this question, as it is not before us 
in this case.  
15  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
E. WAYNE RAKESTRAW,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120996  
GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC.  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that  
a claimant who alleges that he has suffered a work-related  
injury because of the aggravation of his symptoms “must prove  
that the injury is medically distinguishable from a  
preexisting nonwork-related condition . . . .” 
Ante at 1  
(emphasis added).  The majority’s holding reads into the  
statute a new test that the text of the statute does not  
require.1  
The 
question 
whether 
an 
aggravation 
of 
symptoms  
constitutes 
a 
work-related 
injury 
is 
a 
difficult  
determination.
 The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act  
1 MCL 418.301 requires “a personal injury arising out of 
and in the course of employment . . . .”  
 
 
 
 
  
(WDCA) is a remedial statute that should be construed  
liberally to grant benefits rather than deny benefits.  Bower  
v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 191; 312 NW2d 640  
(1981); DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605  
NW2d 300 (2000).2
 Therefore, construing the statute  
liberally, as our case law directs us to do, I would hold that  
an aggravation of symptoms may constitute a work-related  
injury that is compensable under the WDCA.  In so concluding,  
I find persuasive the well-reasoned analysis of Mattison v  
Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp, 242 Mich App 664, 672; 620 NW2d 313  
(2000), which the majority overrules.3 
Mattison, at 672,  
stated:  
Awarding 
benefits 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the  
aggravation of symptoms alone accords with policy 
underlying the [Worker’s Disability Compensation 
Act].  The objective of the WDCA is to compensate a 
claimant for the loss of an earning capacity caused 
by a work-related injury.  Kuty v DAIIE, 140 Mich  
App 310, 313; 364 NW2d 315 (1985).  Even when a  
preexisting condition was not caused or aggravated 
by employment, if an employee is unable to work  
2 I note that Justice Markman’s majority opinion in 
DiBenedetto was joined by all the justices who comprise the 
majority in this case.  If the majority now disagrees with 
this analysis, perhaps it should act to overrule DiBenedetto  
and all the cases that have so held.  
Although at one time on the Court of Appeals I was 
inclined to hold that there is no compensation where the 
plaintiff’s disability is the result of symptoms that occur at 
work, (see Laury v Gen Motors Corp [On Remand, On Rehearing], 
207 Mich App 249, 251; 523 NW2d 633 [1994]), upon further 
consideration of this issue, I have decided that I agree with 
Mattison.  
2  
3 
because work-related events have aggravated the 
symptoms of the condition to the point of  
disability, the employer should be liable for wage­
loss benefits until the symptoms subside to their 
preexisting level.  See McDonald [ v Meijer, 188  
Mich App 210, 215-216; 469 NW2d 27 (1991).]  But  
for the employee’s work for the employer, the 
employee would not be disabled.  It is therefore  
appropriate to hold the employer liable for payment 
of benefits during what is usually a limited 
period. On the other hand, because the employment 
did 
not 
cause 
or 
aggravate 
the 
underlying 
condition, the employer should not be liable  
indefinitely, but only until the symptoms return to 
their preaggravated condition. Id.  
In the present case, the magistrate specifically found  
that 
plaintiff’s 
cervical symptoms were aggravated by his work  
activities and that he was disabled as a result of those  
symptoms.4  The magistrate’s decision stated in pertinent  
part, “The Plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of  
the proofs, that he suffered a symptomatic aggravation of his  
cervical spondylosis and postsurgical cervical changes.”  
(Emphasis added.) The magistrate also stated:  
I 
find 
Mr. 
Rakestraw’s 
already 
altered  
cervical spine, the postsurgical changes, as well 
as his cervical spondylosis, were symptomatically  
made 
worse 
by 
his 
work 
activities. 
 
More  
specifically, I find that his work activities, 
through his last day of work, significantly  
4 
 Unable to dispute the magistrate’s findings, the 
majority 
instead 
attempts 
to 
mischaracterize 
these 
findings 
as 
mere “commentary regarding plaintiff’s symptoms.” Ante at 3  
n 3. One should not be persuaded by this obfuscation, which 
improperly diminishes the role of the magistrate in worker’s 
compensation cases. 
In considering the case, the WCAC 
correctly recognized that these statements are appropriately 
considered as findings of the magistrate.  
3  
 
  
 
  
 
contributed to, accelerated or aggravated his  
cervical symptoms. 
That aggravation of his  
symptoms has not abated. He remains disabled as a  
result of those symptoms. [Emphasis added.5]  
Applying the reasoning of Mattison, the aggravation of  
the plaintiff’s symptoms in this case is an injury arising out  
of and in the course of employment, and, thus, plaintiff is  
entitled 
to 
worker’s 
compensation 
benefits 
for 
the 
aggravation  
of his symptoms until such time as his symptoms return to  
their preaggravated condition.  
The majority asserts that this analysis disregards the  
requirement of a work-related injury and permits a claimant to  
recover for a “symptom that simply occurs in the workplace.”  
Ante at 14. 
Such an assertion is unfounded. 
As I have  
emphasized, 
the 
magistrate 
found 
that 
the 
plaintiff’s 
symptoms  
in this case were aggravated by work.  Thus, they cannot  
properly be considered symptoms that fortuitously manifested  
5 In its decision affirming the magistrate’s award, the 
WCAC noted that defendant did not challenge the basic factual 
findings of the magistrate.  
Pursuant to MCL 418.861a(3), “[t]he WCAC treats the 
magistrate’s findings of fact as conclusive ‘if supported by 
competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole 
record.’” Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich  
691, Appendix 732; 614 NW2d 607 (2000).  
The reviewing court treats the findings of fact made by 
the WCAC as conclusive in the absence of fraud.  Id.  “If  
there is any evidence supporting the WCAC’s factual findings,  
the 
[reviewing 
court] 
must 
treat 
those 
findings 
as  
conclusive.” Id.  Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.  
4  
    
themselves during the workday; instead, they are causally  
linked to plaintiff’s work.  
For these reasons, I would remand this case to the  
magistrate for proceedings consistent with this reasoning.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
5  
___________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
E. WAYNE RAKESTRAW,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 120996  
GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, Inc.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I join Justice Weaver in her dissent and write separately  
to comment on several aspects of the majority opinion.  
I. THE MAJORITY'S UNSUPPORTED EXTENSION OF PAST CASE LAW  
The majority concludes:  
On several occasions, this Court has held that 
symptoms such as pain, standing alone, do not  
establish a personal injury under the statute. 
Rather, a claimant must also establish that the 
symptom complained of is causally linked to an 
injury that arises "out of and in the course of 
employment" in order to be compensable.4  
4See Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 
Mich 105, 116-118; 274 NW2d 411 (1979); Miklik v  
Michigan Special Machine Co, 415 Mich 364; 329 NW2d  
713 (1982); Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442  
 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
Mich 201; 501 NW2d 76 (1993); McKissack v  
Comprehensive Health Services of Detroit, 447 Mich 
57; 523 NW2d 444 (1994).  See also Hagopian v  
Highland Park, 313 Mich 608, 621; 22 NW2d 116 
(1946) ("The amended act itself was not intended to 
cover aggravation of pre-existing disease without 
an accident or fortuitous event."). [Ante at 5-6.]  
The cases cited for this proposition conclude that an  
injury must be causally related to employment.  Their focus is  
on the causal connection between the pain and the preexisting  
condition, not on whether pain alone could constitute an  
injury absent a preexisting condition.1
 None of them  
explicitly holds that pain alone is insufficient to establish  
an injury.  Today, in its pronouncements on pain, the majority  
1For instance, the McKissack Court held:  
Clearly there is a difference between pain 
resulting from "illness or disease not caused or  
aggravated" by the work or working conditions, and 
pain resulting from a work-related injury. 
As  
indicated 
in 
Kostamo, 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits may not be awarded simply because a worker 
is unable by reason of pain to continue with the 
work if the cause of the pain is illness or disease 
not caused or aggravated by the work or working 
conditions.  But contrariwise, if the WCAB finds 
that pain is caused or aggravated by a work-related 
injury, and the worker cannot by reason of pain 
resulting from the injury continue to work, the 
WCAB can find that the worker is disabled and award  
benefits.
 [McKissack, supra at 67 (emphasis in 
original).]  
Thus, the Court focused on causation, not on the 
difference between symptoms and injuries.  Nowhere does the  
Court state that pain alone cannot establish a personal 
injury; instead, it concludes that pain not caused by a work­
related injury is not compensable.  
2  
makes new law. It does not simply return the law to a prior  
state.  
When a physician evaluates a patient's condition,  
frequently the only symptom showing that an injury was  
sustained is a complaint of pain.  Similar to the tip of an  
iceberg, pain is the sole part exposed to view, while the  
greatest part by far remains submerged. Using even the best  
medical technology, that part may not be "medically  
distinguishable 
from 
a 
preexisting 
condition." 
 
By 
discounting  
pain 
and 
redefining 
 
"injury," the majority importantly alters  
the previous definition of the word "injury" under the act and  
eliminates many compensation-worthy claims.  
Moreover, when carried to its logical conclusion, the  
majority's definition of "personal injury" may adversely  
affect 
employers, 
as 
well as employees, stripping employers of  
some 
of 
the 
protections 
of 
the 
Worker's 
Disability  
Compensation Act.  This is because the act makes the recovery  
of benefits the employee's exclusive remedy against an  
employer for a personal injury.2  No "injury" means no WDCA  
exclusivity.  If an employee suffers harm at work, but is not  
"injured" as the majority defines the word under the act, the  
WDCA would cease to be the employee's exclusive remedy. MCL  
2The act also uses the term "personal injury" at MCL 
418.301.  
3  
 
 
 
418.131.
 Hence, the employee could bring a tort action  
against the employer for money damages.  The employer would be  
subjected to the expense and uncertainty of litigation, one of  
the very eventualities that the WDCA was enacted to prevent.  
Thus, the majority alters the long-established approach  
to determining a compensable work-related injury.  This  
alteration is relevant to the very foundation of the  
Legislature's intent in enacting the WDCA and risks upsetting  
it.  
II. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WDCA  
It is also important to note the danger of the majority's  
questioning and partial disavowal of the rule that the  
Worker's Disability Compensation Act "should be construed  
liberally 
to 
grant 
rather 
than 
deny 
benefits." 
The  
pronouncement 
jeopardizes 
decisions 
that 
invoke 
the 
rule 
going  
back over seventy years.3  
3See, e.g., Hagerman v Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich 720,  
739; 579 NW2d 347 (1998); Derr v Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 
452 Mich 375, 388; 550 NW2d 759 (1996); Sobotka v Chrysler  
Corp (After Remand), 447 Mich 1, 20 n 18; 523 NW2d 454 (1994); 
(opinion by Boyle, J.) Paschke v Retool Industries, 445 Mich 
502, 511; 519 NW2d 441 (1994); Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 
412 Mich 172, 191; 312 NW2d 640 (1981); Century Indemnity Co  
v Schmick, 351 Mich 622, 626; 88 NW2d 622 (1958); Lindsey v  
Loebel, 265 Mich 242, 245; 251 NW 338 (1933)(Weadock, J., 
concurring); McCaul v Modern Tile & Carpet, Inc, 248 Mich App 
610, 619; 640 NW2d 589 (2001); James v Commercial Carriers,  
Inc, 230 Mich App 533, 539; 583 NW2d 913 (1998); Tulppo v  
Ontonagon Co, 207 Mich App 278, 283; 523 NW2d 883 (1994); Isom  
v Limitorque Corp, 193 Mich App 518, 522-523; 484 NW2d 716 
(continued...)  
4  
 
Michigan courts have always considered the WDCA and its  
predecessors to be "remedial in nature." Hagerman v Gencorp  
Automotive, 457 Mich 720, 739; 579 NW2d 347 (1998).  
Ballentine's 
Law 
Dictionary defines a remedial statute as "[a]  
statute to be construed liberally as one intended to reform or  
extend existing rights . . . ." Ballentine's Law Dictionary  
(3d ed). Accord 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, § 8, pp 234-235.  
Initially, I note that the majority misconstrues the  
dissents.  It states that we would use liberal construction of  
the WDCA to award compensation for injuries that do not arise  
out of and in the course of employment.  Ante at 15. This is  
incorrect.  The liberal construction rule simply means that if  
an injury arises out of and in the course of employment,  
courts should favor inclusion.  The rule guards against the  
rigid exclusion of claims that could go either way, and does  
not provide for inclusion of claims to which the WDCA is  
wholly inapplicable.  
A. THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION RULE APPLIES TO WHETHER AN  
INJURY IS WORK-RELATED  
Next, I disagree with the majority that liberal  
3(...continued) 
(1992); Andriacchi v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 174 Mich App 
600, 606; 436 NW2d 707 (1989); Gross v Great Atlantic &  
Pacific Tea Co, 87 Mich App 448, 450; 274 NW2d 817 (1978); 
Welch v Westran Corp, 45 Mich App 1, 5; 205 NW2d 828 (1973), 
aff'd 395 Mich 169; 235 NW2d 545 (1975).  
5  
  
 
construction should be applicable only at a secondary stage of  
the analysis.  I believe that it is applicable also at the  
"initial qualifying" stage when a determination is made  
whether a claim is covered by the WDCA.  
The majority asserts that the "work-related" question is  
resolved at the initial stage, which it terms "nearly  
jurisdictional."
 However, no mention of "work-related"  
appears 
in 
MCL 
418.131, 
the 
"nearly 
jurisdictional" 
provision.  
MCL 418.131 delineates the ambit of the WDCA and provides  
that "[t]he right to the recovery of benefits as provided in  
this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the  
employer for a personal injury or occupational disease."  
Therefore, jurisdiction is based on "personal injury" or  
"occupational disease," not on whether an injury or disease is  
"work-related."4  
Whether an injury is work-related is resolved after the  
4Obviously, the personal injury must have some relation 
to employment for the WDCA to apply.  However, the majority's 
"threshold" question, whether the injury is "medically 
distinguishable" 
for 
purposes of determining whether it is "an 
injury arising out of and in the course of employment," is not 
implicated at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings. If  
the majority were to define "work-related" in a broad sense, 
I might conclude that MCL 418.131 and MCL 418.301 were 
coextensive. It is the majority's narrow construction of § 
301 that leads me to rely on the differences in the two 
provisions.
 The point, and, implicitly, the basis of my 
entire disagreement with the majority, is that "work-related" 
can, and should, be construed to include more than the 
majority would allow.  
6  
 
  
    
jurisdictional stage, when the analysis has proceeded to the  
point of determining whether the employee is entitled to  
benefits.  MCL 418.301 then becomes relevant.  It provides  
that "[a]n employee, who receives a personal injury arising  
out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is  
subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid  
compensation as provided in this act."  Hence, the question  
whether an injury is "work-related" is not a "jurisdictional"  
question, but one directed at whether the injured employee is  
entitled to benefits from the employer in question.  
It is beyond dispute that our courts have consistently  
used the liberal construction rule to decide the question of  
entitlement to benefits. As the Bower Court stated:  
The Worker's Disability Compensation Act was 
designed to help relieve the social and economic 
difficulties faced by injured workers.  As remedial  
legislation, it is liberally construed to grant  
rather than deny benefits. 
Niekro v The Brick  
Tavern, 66 Mich App 53; 238 NW2d 537 (1975).  See  
McAvoy v H B Sherman Co, 401 Mich 419; 258 NW2d 414  
(1977).  [Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 
172, 191; 312 NW2d 640 (1981)(emphasis added).]  
Because the question whether an injury or disease is "work­
related" is directly implicated in determining entitlement to  
benefits, it follows that the question is susceptible to  
liberal construction.5  
5The majority is unable to refer us to authority for the 
proposition that the liberal construction rule should not be 
(continued...)  
7  
 
B. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO THE QUESTION OF WORK RELATION  
IS LOGICALLY JUSTIFIABLE  
The majority concludes that liberal construction is  
"logically justifiable" only after it has first been  
established that an injury is work-related. My disagreement  
with the conclusion is based in part on the fact that the  
application of liberal construction to whether an injury is  
work-related comports with the Legislature's remedial goals.  
Our courts have been relying on the liberal construction  
principle since at least 1933.6  In 1994, Justice Brickley  
provided an example of its proper application in his lead  
opinion in Nederhood v Cadillac Malleable Iron Co, 445 Mich  
234, 247; 518 NW2d 390 (1994):  
In formulating our decision . . ., we must 
also be mindful of the policies underlying the 
Worker's Disability Compensation Act. MCL 418.101  
et seq.; . . . As a preliminary matter, it must be 
remembered that the act was designed to be remedial 
and must not be unnecessarily construed so as to 
favor a denial of benefits. . . .  
* * *  
It would seem that a permanent forfeiture of 
benefits 
is 
not 
in 
accord 
with 
a 
liberal  
construction 
of 
the 
Worker's 
Disability 
Compensation Act.  
5(...continued) 
applied to determine whether an injury is "work-related."  Its  
conclusion is based on its own analysis, not on precedent.  
6Lindsey v Loebel, supra.  
8  
 
  
 
The majority seems to indicate that it is improper for  
the Court to consider legislatively derived public policy in  
making its decisions. The inference is that Michigan courts  
have been handing down improper decisions in this regard for  
decades.  I believe that is manifestly incorrect. Over the  
years, we have consistently used policy-driven principles for  
the purpose of interpreting the WDCA in line with the  
Legislature's intent.  The liberal interpretation rule is  
foremost among them.7
 This principle being so firmly  
established, I see no reason to abandon it.  
I also disagree with the majority's contention that  
utilizing the liberal construction rule to determine "whether  
the claimed injury falls within the WDCA regime" somehow  
"tilt[s]" the scales in favor of the employee.  Ante at 15.  
Construing the statute to find that claims are within its  
ambit should be in the interest of employers as well as  
7Nor do I find the fact that the Legislature has 
referenced liberal construction only once in the WDCA should 
discourage its use.  The text of a statute often does not  
indicate what construction is appropriate to it.  For example, 
the text of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 
691.1401 et seq., does not require a "narrow" interpretation 
of its exceptions.  Courts have determined that they are  
construed narrowly.  The majority has shown no difficulty 
accepting this judicially constructed principle. The "narrow 
construction" of the GTLA's exceptions resulted from judicial 
examination of the intent surrounding the act.  A similar  
analysis was employed to find that the liberal construction 
rule should be applied to the WDCA.  Reardon v Dep't of Mental  
Health, 430 Mich 398, 406-413; 424 NW2d 248 (1988).  
9  
 
employees; it prevents costly tort actions and provides  
methods of encouraging employees who recover from injuries to  
seek suitable employment. The majority treats the WDCA as a  
boon to employees and a scourge to employers, but that is not  
and never was intended to be the case.  
Moreover, the majority implies that use of the liberal  
construction rule would open the floodgates to increased  
employer liability.  However, the  implication disregards the  
fact that liberal construction of the WDCA, and not the  
approach it announced today, is the established law.  I do not  
advocate a change in the law.  On the contrary, I seek to  
maintain the approach to interpretation of the WDCA that has  
existed for the past seventy years. 
If the liberal  
construction rule opens the floodgates, then they were opened  
a very long time ago.  
III. CONCLUSION  
In my judgment, this decision implicates much more than  
the majority is willing to admit. It will be viewed by many  
in the area of worker's compensation law as a crippling blow  
to the liberal construction rule.  It will be cited for the  
proposition that the rule cannot be applied in deciding  
whether an alleged injury was work-related or even whether it  
constitutes an injury at all.  
No matter how the majority spins it, this decision shakes  
10  
the 
foundations 
of 
established 
worker's 
compensation  
jurisprudence.  Past case law does not establish that pain  
alone is never sufficient to prove a personal injury, but the  
majority so holds today.  Michigan courts have historically  
applied the liberal construction rule to the question whether  
an injury is work-related, but today the majority holds this  
illogical.  All these conclusions are drawn not from precedent  
and not from the WDCA itself.  They come unmistakably from  
this majority's conclusion that it knows better than the  
jurists who have decided these cases for the last seventy  
years.  
The majority's decision represents a serious departure  
from established law and a disavowal of established public  
policy. These changes are seriously ill-conceived. I would  
affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals, the WCAC, and  
the magistrate.  
Marilyn Kelly  
11