Title: Sasser v. Spartan Foods Systems, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

452 So. 2d 475 (1984)
Loyle Wayne SASSER
v.
SPARTAN FOODS SYSTEMS, INC., et al.
82-961.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 1, 1984.
J. Knox Argo and Laird R. Jones of Argo & Enslen, Montgomery, for appellant.
Robert A. Huffaker of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, for appellees.
EMBRY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a decision rendered in a nonjury action involving consolidated cases. The two cases, styled Sasser v. Spartan Food Systems, Inc., Civil Action No. CV-82-658-P and Aronov v. Sasser, Civil Action No. CV-82-686-P, were consolidated, since they present a single issue for resolution: whether an easement claimed by Loyle Wayne Sasser remains valid and in existence. After hearing the case without a jury, the trial court found that the claimed easement was no longer valid or in existence. We affirm.
*476 The facts of this case were submitted to the trial court by a joint stipulation which reads as follows:
As a general rule, when evidence is presented to a trial court sitting without a jury, its findings will be presumed correct and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of plain and palpable error. Ford v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 392 So. 2d 217 (Ala.1980). However, where the evidence before the trial court is undisputed, as in the present case, this court shall consider the evidence de novo, indulging no presumptions in favor of the trial court's determinations. Stiles v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 792 (Ala.1980).
The easement in question was created by express grant in an instrument of conveyance on 22 March 1949. By the terms of the instrument, the easement traverses the "Bonner" property, providing a means of ingress to and egress from the "Duffell" property. Obviously, the "Bonner" property is a servient tenement and the "Duffell" property a dominant tenement. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found the easement in question to be an easement appurtenant. See 28 C.J.S. Easements, § 4 (1941).
In order to determine whether the easement claimed by Sasser remains valid and in existence, it is first necessary to look to the terms of the conveying instrument so as to determine the intent of the parties. Financial Investment Corp. v. Tukabatchee Area Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, 353 So. 2d 1389 (Ala.1977).
The stated purpose of the conveyance is to provide a means of ingress and egress "to and from Ann Street or to and from the proposed extension of Spruce Street." (Emphasis added.) The use of the word or evidences an intent by the parties to create only one easement. Likewise, the reference to the proposed extension of Spruce Street denotes that the parties knew the extension of Spruce Street would necessarily intersect with the metes and bounds of the easement described in the instrument. Accordingly, if the proposed extension of Spruce Street was constructed, any easement running along a metes and bounds description contained in the conveyancing instrument would first intersect with Spruce Street, not Ann Street. We must conclude that the intention of the parties as evidenced by the terms of the entire conveyance was to provide a means of ingress to and egress from the "Duffell" property to the closest dedicated street to the east. Thus, when the *478 proposed extension of Spruce Street became a reality, the easement in question ran only to Spruce Street, and not to Ann Street.
Sasser contends that once the Spruce Street extension was closed, under the terms of the conveyance, an easement running from the "Duffell" property to Ann Street continued in existence. We do not agree.
As we have indicated earlier, once the contemplated Spruce Street extension was constructed, the easement in question ran only from the "Duffell" property to the closest dedicated street to the east, Spruce Street. Accordingly, the superfluous portion of the easement running from Spruce Street to Ann Street was extinguished by the terms of the conveyance as well as by operation of law.
The general rule is that an easement which is given for a specific purpose terminates as soon as such purpose ceases to exist, is abandoned, or is rendered impossible of accomplishment. See e.g., Trustees of Howard College v. McNabb, 288 Ala. 564, 574, 263 So. 2d 664 (1972). Once the Spruce Street extension was completed, the purpose of providing a means of ingress to and egress from the "Duffell" property to Ann Street ceased to exist, since Spruce Street became the closest dedicated street to the east. Accordingly, the easement extending from the "Duffell" property to Ann Street was forever extinguished. See 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses, § 114 (1966).
Similarly, once the Spruce Street extension was closed, the existing easement from the "Duffell" property to Spruce Street was forever extinguished. See Trustees of Howard College v. McNabb, supra.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.