Title: Valley Health System v. Dist. Ct.

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

427 Nev, Advance Opinion |S
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, No. 56239

D/B/A CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL

MEDICAL CENTER, A NEVADA

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Petter FILED

vs.

‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MAY 06 201

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF |

CLARK: THE HONORABLE JESSIE |

WALSH, DISTRICT JUDGE; AND THE |

HONORABLE JACK B. AMES, |
|
|
J

 

DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,

and
ROXANNE CAGNINA,
Real Party in Interest.

Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court discovery order in a tort action.

Petition denie
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC, and David P. Ferrainolo, John F. Bemis,

and Michael B. Prangle, Las Vegas,
for Petitioner.

‘The Law Offices of Neal Hyman, and Neal K. Hyman, Henderson,
for Real Party in Interest,

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

~~ 11348

 

 

 

 
OPINION
By the Court, DOUGLAS, C.J.:

In this opinion, we review our rule regarding the waiver of an
issue on appeal that is not first raised in the district court. We expand
that rule to include the situation where a party fails to raise an issue
before the discovery commissioner and, instead, raises the issue for the
first time before the district court. Further, we determine the scope of the
privilege provided by NRS 439.876.

‘This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging
@ district court’s order adopting the report and recommendation of the
discovery commissioner to grant a motion to compel production of
documents. The district court, after a hearing, adopted the discovery
commissioner's report and recommendation and ordered petitioner Valley
Health System, LLC, d.b.a. Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center to
produce the requested documents.

Valley Health argues that the district court erred in ordering
the production of the requested documents. Valley Health contends that
its petition for extraordinary relief should be granted because the district
court's order allows for discovery of material privileged under NRS
439.875, and Valley Health has no other adequate remedy at law.
However, Valley Health failed to raise its privilege argument before the
discovery commissioner; instead, Valley Health raised the issue for the
first time during the district court hearing.

While writ relief is rarely available with respect to discovery
orders, once information is produced, any privilege applicable to that
information cannot be restored. Thus, a writ petition is the proper

mechanism to seek relief in this instance, and we will consider the

petition. Based on the partial holding of this opinion, because Valley

 

 
Health failed to raise its privilege argument before the discovery
‘commissioner, that argument was waived. However, for the purpose of
this opinion and, in this instance only, we elect to entertain Valley
Health’s privilege argument on its merits. We conclude that the requested
discovery is not within the protection of NRS 439.875, and we therefore
deny this petition,

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

In May 2008, real party in interest Roxanne Cagnina arrived
at Centennial Hills Hospital for medical treatment after experiencing
seizures. During Cagnina’s stay at Centennial Hills, she was allegedly
sexually assaulted by a member of the hospital staff, Steven Farmer.!
Subsequent to the alleged assault, Cagnina commenced the underlying
civil action against Valley Health and other defendants.

During discovery, Cagnina sought to have Valley Health
produce records of other incidents or complaints of improper conduct by
employees, staff, or others, if any.* Cagnina requested records not only
from Centennial Hills, but also from other hospitals that were under

\Farmer was a certified nurse’s assistant provided to Centennial
Hills under a supplemental staffing contract by an outside vendor.

®Cagnina's discovery request states:

Please produce any and all documents or records
related to other incidents or complaints of
assaults, batteries or sexual assaults or improper
conduct by employees, nurses, nurses[]] assistants,
doctors, agents, administrators, staff or
independent contractors at Centennial Hills
Hospital Medical Center or other facility owned,
operated or managed by Defendant.

 
Valley Health's management or control. Valley Health objected to the
request. Cagnina filed a motion to compel a response. Valley Health
opposed the motion, arguing that the requested discovery was irrelevant
and was not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. The motion was heard before a discovery commissioner. ‘The
discovery commissioner recommended that Cagnina’s motion be granted in
part and that Valley Health be ordered to produce documents responsive
to the discovery request for the five years preceding the alleged sexual
assault.

Valley Health filed an objection to the discovery
commissioner's report and recommendation. See EDCR 2.34(). Valley
Health again argued that the requested documents were irrelevant to
Cagnina’s claims and, for the first time, contended that the requested
information was privileged under NRS 439.875. The district court
affirmed and adopted the discovery commissioner's report and
recommendation.

Valley Health now seeks a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to modify the discovery commissioner's report and

8Besides doing business as Centennial Hills, Valley Health owns,
operates, or manages four other hospitals in the Las Vegas area.

‘Valley Health's objection states:

OBJECTION. This Request as drafted is
overbroad in that it seeks documents from
“Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center or
other facility owned, operated or managed by
Defendant[.”] Information from other facilities
owned by Defendant is irrelevant and production
of said documents is not reasonably calculated to
lead [to] the discovery of admissible information,

 

 
recommendation to provide that Valley Health is not required to respond
to the discovery request at issue.

DISCUSSION
Whether V: showing that. warranted

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and whether
a petition for extraordinary relief will be considered is solely within this
court's discretion. Smith v. District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d
849, 851 (1991). “Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, a writ
will not issue if the petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law.” Millen v. Dist. Ct. 122 Nev. 1245, 1250-51, 148 P.3d 694, 698,
(2006). The burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that extraordinary
relief is warranted. Pan v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844
(2004).

Although we have recognized that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to compel the district court to vacate or modify a discovery order,
extraordinary writs are generally not available to review discovery orders.
Wardleigh v. District Court, 111 Nev. 345, 850-51, 891 P.2d 1180, 1183
(1995);* Clark County Liquor v. Clark, 102 Nev. 654, 659, 730 P.2d 443,
447 (1986); Clark v. District Court, 101 Nev. 58, 64, 692 P.2d 512, 516
(1985); Schlatter v. District Court, 93 Nev. 189, 198, 561 P.2d 1842, 1344
(1977). However, “there are occasions where, in the absence of writ relief,
the resulting prejudice would not only be irreparable, but of a magnitude

*Although petitioner has moved for a writ of mandamus, we note
that this court has stated that a writ of prohibition is a more appropriate
remedy for the prevention of improper discovery. See Wardleigh v.
District Court, 111 Nev. 345, 350, 891 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1996) (reaffirming

State ex rel. Tidvall v. District Court, 91 Nev. 520, 524, 539 P.2d 456, 458
(1975)).

 
‘that could require the imposition of such drastic remedies as dismissal
with prejudice or other similar sanctions.” Wardleigh, 111 Nev. at 351,
891 P.2d at 1184. In general, there have been two main situations where
this court has issued a writ to prevent improper discovery: blanket
discovery orders with no regard to relevance, and discovery orders
compelling disclosure of privileged information. See Clark County Liquor,
102 Nev. at 659, 730 P.2d at 447,

Here, Valley Health argues that issuance of a writ is
warranted because production of the requested documents would lead to
(1) a miscarriage of justice, (2) discovery of irrelevant materials, and (3)
discovery of privileged materials. We conclude that the first two
arguments offered by Valley Health are without merit.’ However, in
regard to the third argument, if the discovery order requires the disclosure
of privileged material, there would be no adequate remedy at law that

could restore the privileged nature of the information, because once such

“Miscarriage of justice is defined as “[a] grossly unfair outcome in a
judicial proceeding.” Black's Law Dictionary 1088 (9th ed. 2009). Here,
Valley Health did not establish that the discovery order would create a
grossly unfair outcome. Although Valley Health argues that requiring it
to compile the documents would amount to a miscarriage of justice, the
mere fact that a party is required to review a large amount of documents
is not, without more, a basis of denying a party's right to conduct discovery
in this instance.

 

Furthermore, we have long held that where the petitioner's claim is
only that there is no right of discovery, a writ will not issue because a
direct appeal is an adequate remedy. Clark County Liquor, 102 Nev. at
660, 730 P.2d at 447. Thorefore, a writ is not appropriate to address
Valley Health's argument that the district court’s order would lead to the
discovery of irrelevant material.

 
Hn

information is disclosed, it is irretrievable.’ Therefore, we will consider
Valley Health’s contention that the requested documents fall within the
statutory protection of NRS 439.875(5).

to raise an to the di
constitutes waiver ue

Initially, however, we must consider the fact that although
Cagnina's motion to compel was first heard before the discovery
commissioner, Valley Health did not raise its privilege argument until the
discovery commissioner's report and recommendation was before the
district court for approval. This court has held that “[a] point not urged in
the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to
have been waived and will not be considered on appeal.” Old Aztec Mine,
Inc. v, Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981); see also Wolff v.
Wolff, 112 Nev. 1855, 1363-64, 929 P.2d 916, 921 (1996). One purpose of
this rule is to allow the lower tribunal the first opportunity to decide the
issue. See Oliver v, Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1938, 1344-45,
905 P.2d 168, 173 (1995). We conclude that this principle is equally
applicable where, as here, an issue is first heard by the discovery
commissioner and then submitted to the district court for approval.

Additionally, consideration of such untimely raised
contentions “would unduly undermine the authority of the Magistrate
Judge by allowing litigants the option of waiting until a Report is issued to

 

7We note that Valley Health’s challenge to the discovery order was
not perfected pursuant to NRCP 26. Valley Health did not comply with
NRCP 26(b)(5), which requires a party claiming privilege to describe the
nature of the materials that are allegedly priviloged. However, because
the parties did not brief this issue, we do not address the effect it has on
this writ petition.

 
advance additional arguments.”* Abu-Nassar v, Elders Futures, Inc,, No.
88 Civ. 7906 (PKL), 1994 WL 445638, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1994).
A contrary holding would lead to the inefficient use of judicial resources
and allow parties to make an end run around the discovery commissioner
by making one set of arguments before the commissioner, waiting until
the outcome is determined, then adding or switching to alternative
arguments before the district court. All arguments, issues, and evidence
should be presented at the first opportunity and not held in reserve to be
raised after the commissioner issues his or her recommendation. All
objections are to be presented to the commissioner so that he or she may
consider all the issues before making a recommendation, so as not to
“frustrate the purpose” of having discovery commissioners. See Greenhow
v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 863 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that “allowing parties to litigate fully their case before the
magistrate and, if unsuccessful, to change their strategy and present a
different theory” in the district court would “frustrate the purpose” of
having magistrates), overruled on other grounds by U.S, v. Hardesty, 977
F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1992).

‘Therefore, we hold that neither this court nor the district

court will consider new arguments raised in objection to a discovery

“In the federal court system, the procedural interaction between a
magistrate judge and a district court judge is similar to the interaction
between the discovery commissioner and the district court in the instant
matter, in that a magistrate judge may be designated to conduct hearings
and to submit to a district court judge for approval proposed findings of
fact and recommendations. See U.S, v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-22 (9th
Cir. 2000).

 

 
commissioner's report and recommendation that could have been raised
before the discovery commissioner but were not.

Based on the foregoing, Valley Health's argument against
disclosure based on privilege would have been waived. However, for the
purposes of this opinion, we elect to consider Valley Health’s privilege
argument on its merits

Whether the requested documents fell within the statutory privilege
protections of NRS 439,875(5)

Although we conclude that Valley Health has waived its NRS
439.875 protection argument, writ relief would not be warranted even if
the argument was not waived. NRS 439.875(5) provides that “{tJhe
proceedings and records of a patient safety committee are subject to the
same privilege and protection from discovery as the proceedings and
records described in NRS 49.265." NRS 49,265(1) provides that

“proceedings and records” of “folrganized committees of hospital

 

responsible for the “evaluation and improvement of the quality of care”
and peer review committees are not subject to discovery.?

While we have not previously addressed the scope of the
privilege under NRS 439.875(5), given that NRS 439.875(6) explicitly
references the privilege in NRS 49.265, we conclude that NRS 439.875(5)'s
privilege has the same scope and application as NRS 49.265. We
addressed the scope of the privilege under NRS 49.265 in Columbia/HCA.
Healthcare v. Dist. Ct,, 113 Nev. 521, 936 P.2d 844 (1997). In that case,
plaintiffs sought occurrence reports arising out of the medical malpractice
at issue. Id, at 523-24, 936 P.2d at 845-46. Those occurrence reports were

*For the purpose of this discussion, “organized committees of
hospitals” refer to the patient safety committee.

 

 
reports generated by hospital staff when unusual circumstances occurred
during treatment of patients. Id, at 524 n.3, 936 P.2d at 846 n.3. The
hospital argued that the reports were privileged under NRS 49.265. Id, at
524, 936 P.2d at 846. In resolving this issue, we held that the privilege
under NRS 49.265 is extremely limited and does not protect occurrence
reports from discovery. Id, at 531, 936 P.2d at 851, A narrow
interpretation of NRS 49.265 was supported by legislative history. Id, at
529-31, 986 P.2d at 849-50. Under this narrow interpretation, the reports
were not protected because they were not generated by the medical review
committee or produced during its review process. Id. Such a result was
additionally necessary, we held, because a hospital may attempt to
immunize itself from discovery by submitting the records and documents
to the committee if the privilege is construed to include records and
documents not produced by the committee but only submitted to the
committee, which is contrary to public policy. See id, at 529, 936 P.2d at
849 (citing Lipschultz v. Superior Court, Ete, 623 P.2d 805, 808 (Ariz.
1981); May v. Wood River Tp. Hosp., 629 N.E.24 170, 174 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994),

We find the rationale stated in Columbia/HCA to be equally
applicable to NRS 439.875. Therefore, we hold that NRS 439.875(5)s
privilege only applies to protect internal documents and records of the
patient safety committee from discovery. As Cagnina is not secking
documents and records of the patient safety committee, the information

she seeks is not privileged.

10

 
     
   
 
   
 
 
 
     
     

Based on the foregoing, we deny the petition for a writ of
mandamus."?

wy hs ca.

farraguirre

WAlthough we conclude that the discovery Cagnina was seeking was
not protected by NRS 439.875(5)'s privilege, we note that the parties
should focus on discovery related to sexual misconduct. We note that the
discovery request on its face was very broad; however, disputes as to the
scope of discovery and to the discovery request are to be resolved pursuant
to NRCP 26. Furthermore, although Cagnina originally raised this issue,
she conceded at oral argument that the district court's discovery order and
the discovery request were not intended to require Valley Health to
interview all past and present employees or agents. Cagnina agreed that
discovery was sought for past records of similar incidents, such as patient
abuse, and that she was not seeking anything that was produced by the
patient safety committee, Our holding is based on these representations,