Title: State ex rel. Piotrowski v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Piotrowski v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 556, 2000-Ohio-424.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PIOTROWSKI, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Piotrowski v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 556.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s denial of change of election 
by claimant not an abuse of discretion, when. 
(No. 98-2519 — Submitted April 26, 2000 — Decided May 31, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD08-1019. 
 
Appellant-claimant, Virginia Piotrowski, was injured in an industrial 
accident in 1986, and a workers’ compensation claim was allowed for “laceration 
right forearm; epineurolysis of the radial nerve.”  An additional allowance for 
“muscle hypertrophy of the flexor carpi ulnaris near the right elbow” was 
thereafter ordered in the claim.  Claimant initially missed one month of work 
before returning to light duty work with her employer, appellee, Kennecott 
Corporation, Chase Brass & Copper Company (“Kennecott”).  The plant closed in 
1990, and claimant secured work elsewhere. 
 
Claimant sought a determination of her percentage of permanent partial 
disability, and, on or about July 1989, appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio 
found a fifteen percent permanent partial disability (“PPD”) and awarded 
compensation.  Given the option of seeking payment as impaired earning capacity 
 
 
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(“IEC”) benefits pursuant to former R.C. 4123.57(A) or receiving it as a lump sum 
permanent partial disability award under former R.C. 4123.57(B), claimant elected 
the latter.  Three and one-half years later, claimant received a four percent increase 
in her PPD.  She also received that award under former R.C. 4123.57(B). 
 
In August 1995, claimant applied to reactivate her claim.  In her application, 
she requested “temporary partial,” i.e., IEC benefits.  Payment of such benefits first 
required, however, the commission’s permission to change election. Claimant 
requested this permission on January 4, 1996. 
 
A district hearing officer (“DHO”) ruled on claimant’s reactivation request, 
and also authorized a change of election.  On April 19, 1996, a staff hearing officer 
(“SHO”) vacated the DHO order after finding “no legal authority which indicates 
that ‘unforeseen circumstances’ contemplates changes in the local economy as 
opposed to changes in physical condition.” 
 
Claimant responded with two filings.  She first appealed the SHO order.  She 
then moved that the appeal be postponed until she filed for—and the commission 
ruled on—the additional allowance of certain conditions.  Claimant, however, 
delayed in moving for additional allowance, and the commission, in the meantime, 
refused further appeal of the April 19, 1996 order. 
 
Claimant formally sought an additional allowance on June 25, 1996.  On 
July 19, 1996, a DHO ruled on all of claimant’s outstanding motions.  The claim 
 
 
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was additionally allowed for “complex regional pain syndrome, type I; reflex 
sympathetic dystrophy, right arm.”  A change of election was denied because the 
issue was deemed “res judicata as the [SHO] order dated 04-19-96 adjudicated 
such issue.”  Claimant did not appeal.  Kennecott, however, appealed the 
additional allowance. 
 
On October 22, 1996, an SHO affirmed the DHO’s order in its entirety.  
Although Kennecott appealed, claimant still declined to do the same.  Instead, she 
responded with a third motion seeking a change of election. 
 
On November 21, 1996, further appeal of the October 22, 1996 order was 
refused.  On March 31, 1997, claimant’s third election motion was denied, again 
on res judicata grounds, the DHO noting claimant’s failure to appeal the July 19, 
1996 order.  Claimant finally appealed the March 31, 1997 order, but the order was 
administratively affirmed. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, asserting that the commission abused its discretion in denying her 
a change of election.  The court of appeals denied relief, after finding that claimant 
had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, via administrative appeal, 
that she did not pursue. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
 
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Ticktin, Baron, Koepper & Co., L.P.A., and Harold Ticktin, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve and Kirk R. Henrikson, for appellee 
Kennecott Corporation. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Mandamus cannot issue when there is a plain and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle (1983), 6 
Ohio St.3d 28, 6 OBR 50, 451 N.E.2d 225.  In this case, claimant had numerous 
opportunities to appeal orders denying her a change of election.  Instead, she 
responded by repeatedly refiling the same motion, which only complicated further 
an already convoluted administrative path. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.