Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Linnen

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Linnen, 111 Ohio St.3d 507, 2006-Ohio-5480.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. LINNEN. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Linnen, 111 Ohio St.3d 507, 2006-Ohio-5480.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Illegal conduct involving moral turpitude — Conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Multiple misdemeanor 
convictions — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2006-0443 — Submitted July 18, 2006 — Decided October 25, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-021. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Stephen P. Linnen of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0071290, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999.  
On April 6, 2005, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged respondent with 
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and made findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} Respondent admitted the facts alleged in the complaint.  At the 
panel hearing, he also stipulated that his actions violated DR 1-102(A)(3) 
(prohibiting illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) and 1-102(A)(6) 
(prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  
The panel and board found that respondent had committed this misconduct based 
on the following events. 
{¶ 3} From February 2002 until November 2003, respondent shocked at 
least 30 different women throughout Franklin County, Ohio, by appearing before 
them naked and photographing their reactions.  Dubbed “The Naked 
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Photographer” by local media, respondent ran up to his solitary victims wearing 
nothing but athletic shoes and a knit stocking cap, snapped several pictures of the 
women while concealing his facial features with the camera, and then ran away.  
Although he claimed that he usually did not touch his victim, respondent admitted 
that he would sometimes tap or pinch her “rear end * * * or whatever” to focus 
the woman’s attention on him.  He also acknowledged that “maybe” he 
masturbated in front of the first couple of his victims.  After exposing himself, 
respondent would return to where he had left his clothes, dress, and flee the scene. 
{¶ 4} While engaging in these activities, respondent was employed by 
the Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives as Legal Counsel for Taxation 
and Education.  He resigned from this position approximately one month after his 
November 19, 2003 arrest, which was precipitated by his last victim’s attempt to 
catch him herself.  At the time of his resignation, respondent had been indicted by 
the Franklin County Grand Jury on one count of burglary, a felony of the second 
degree; two counts of gross sexual imposition, a felony of the fourth degree; 13 
counts of sexual imposition, a third-degree misdemeanor; and 40 counts of public 
indecency, a fourth-degree misdemeanor. 
{¶ 5} On September 13, 2004, respondent accepted a plea bargain and 
pleaded guilty to 53 misdemeanor offenses – two first-degree misdemeanor 
counts of sexual imposition, one first-degree misdemeanor count of aggravated 
trespass, 11 third-degree misdemeanor counts of sexual imposition, and 39 fourth-
degree misdemeanor counts of public indecency.  He was sentenced to 18 months 
of work release, fined $3,000, and ordered to continue counseling.  His 18-month 
sentence was suspended in October 2005 after only 12 months when the work-
release facility closed.  The Franklin County Common Pleas Court then placed 
him on probation for five years. 
{¶ 6} Since his convictions, including during the year of work release, 
respondent has been practicing on his own.  Between October 2004 and the panel 
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hearing on November 3, 2005, respondent represented seven to nine clients, 
mainly family, friends, and acquaintances he met through the work-release 
program.  He charges $75 an hour for his services. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 7} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
panel and board weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors of his case.  See 
Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 8} Explaining the impetus for his crimes, respondent testified that 
each incident was “definitely an adrenalin[e] rush or euphoria * * * very much 
like a powerful drug” and that he did not consider “what effect it could have on 
other people.”   From this, the panel and board found that respondent’s motivation 
was dishonesty and selfishness, an aggravating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b).  Also in aggravation, the panel and board found that respondent had 
committed a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(c) and (d). 
{¶ 9} Adopting the panel’s report, the board further concluded that 
respondent had not genuinely acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct or 
that his actions might have caused his vulnerable victims serious harm, both of 
which are aggravating factors under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g) and (h).  One 
of respondent’s victims told the panel that on the evening that he accosted her, she 
froze and then folded into a fetal position out of fear.  As a result of the traumatic 
encounter, she felt compelled to buy a handgun and learn to use it, and she now 
keeps the weapon accessible because she continues to fear that respondent may 
return.  The panel and board found especially egregious that respondent said 
nothing in contrition either about or to this victim even when he took the stand 
shortly after she testified. 
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{¶ 10} The panel and board agreed that respondent mainly regretted the 
adversity that his misconduct had caused in his own life, and not the impact it had 
on the lives of his victims.  The panel noted that respondent “acknowledged his 
wrongful conduct only in terms of creating a tremendous amount of trouble for 
himself.  At one point, he stated ‘I have certainly done some bad things * * * and 
the consequences are * * * almost immeasurable in the way they’ve affected my 
life, the way they’ve harmed my family.’ ”  The panel also observed that 
respondent had continued to accost women, obviously knowing it was wrong, 
rather than seek treatment: 
{¶ 11} “The fact that Respondent’s misconduct did not end until he was 
caught by his final victim is not lost on the Panel.  Instead of owning up to his 
misconduct and self-disclosing it, he could easily have continued to victimize 
unsuspecting women for a long time to come but for the courage of his final 
victim.” 
{¶ 12} In mitigation of his misconduct, respondent attempted to establish 
a medical disability.  Pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) though (iv), 
respondent offered evidence that he had been medically diagnosed with sexual 
addiction by his treating psychologist, Dr. George Mass; that this mental 
disability had contributed to cause his misconduct; that he had been successfully 
treated for his illness; and that he had been cleared as ethically and competently 
able to return to the practice of law.  The panel and board, however, were not 
convinced that Dr. Mass’s diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis were reliable. 
{¶ 13} Testifying before the panel, Dr. Mass said that he had been treating 
respondent since the time of respondent’s arrest and had determined at their first 
meeting that respondent suffered from sexual addiction, with elements of 
exhibitionism and depression.  Dr. Mass described sex addiction as a special case 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder that is characterized by a preoccupation with 
sexual thoughts and the compulsion to act out those thoughts.  According to Dr. 
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Mass, the ritual of acting out relieved respondent’s depression, which Dr. Mass 
attributed to the stressors in respondent’s life – frustration with his job, a long-
distance romantic relationship, and repayment of his debt from law school.  
Respondent escaped these stressors, Dr. Mass reported, when he performed the 
ritual of planning his next encounter and took the steps to make the encounter 
happen. 
{¶ 14} Three concerns prevented the panel and board from relying on Dr. 
Mass’s testimony as to respondent’s illness and the success of his treatment 
program.  Initially troubling were preliminary psychological testing results that 
suggested respondent was predisposed to adjust his symptoms in order to procure 
a prognosis that could work to his advantage, that is, to “look sick.”  Dr. Mass 
conceded that most other professionals in his field would not have relied on this 
test, as he did in part, to document the progress he claimed that respondent had 
made through treatment.  Because the gauge by which his recovery was measured 
was admittedly unreliable, the panel feared that respondent might have 
manipulated his diagnosis. 
{¶ 15} Second, the panel and board were skeptical of Dr. Mass’s decision 
not to refer respondent to a psychiatrist for drug therapy for respondent’s 
depression.  Dr. Mass had declined to require this treatment because his patient 
chose not to be medicated.  Given the manifestations of his claimed condition, 
respondent’s reluctance to agree to this additional form of treatment and Dr. 
Mass’s deference to his decision seemed to the panel and board a less-than-
committed approach to combating the illness. 
{¶ 16} Finally, the panel and board were troubled that Dr. Mass could cite 
nothing other than the facts that respondent was a faithful member of Sex Addicts 
Anonymous (“SAA”) and had gained insight into the stressors that triggered his 
unusual behavior to quantify and predict the chances of a relapse.  Particularly 
disturbing was Dr. Mass’s acknowledgement that stress at the levels lawyers 
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routinely experience would probably lead to regression.  In fact, Dr. Mass advised 
that someone with respondent’s diagnosis, if unable to achieve satisfaction from 
one form of acting out, is likely to seek another outlet, even stalking and rape. 
{¶ 17} For these reasons, the panel and board did not accept Dr. Mass’s 
diagnosis or attribute mitigating effect to respondent’s purported mental disability 
for the purpose of BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  Similarly, the panel and board 
did not assign much weight to the testimony of Paul Caimi, the associate director 
of the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  Caimi had monitored 
respondent’s recovery efforts, including his two years of compliance with a five-
year OLAP mental-health contract and SAA participation, and commended his 
progress.  Caimi’s relevant and considerable expertise, however, lay in treating 
alcohol and drug dependency and thus did little to confirm the claimed mental 
illness of sexual addiction. 
{¶ 18} Respondent also offered in mitigation the testimony of his ex-wife, 
who stated that he had become a better person in the aftermath of his arrest, and 
letters from a lifelong friend, a former co-worker, and three clients recommending 
his good character apart from his crimes.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  
Respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary record constituted a mitigating factor 
under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  The panel and board further found 
mitigating that respondent had cooperated completely in the disciplinary process.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d). 
{¶ 19} Relator argued that an indefinite suspension of respondent’s 
license to practice was appropriate and asked that reinstatement be conditioned, in 
part, on a mental-health examination by an independent qualified mental health-
care professional.  Respondent advocated a definite term of suspension, to be 
partially stayed on conditions.  The panel recommended an indefinite suspension 
with any reinstatement to be conditioned on an independent health-care 
professional’s evaluation of respondent’s mental health and the propriety of 
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reinstatement.  The board accepted this sanction, recommending an indefinite 
suspension with the proposed condition for reinstatement. 
{¶ 20} Respondent objects to the board’s recommendation, arguing that 
Dr. Mass’s opinion is entitled to great weight, that respondent did genuinely 
acknowledge the gravity of his misdeeds, and that an indefinite suspension is too 
harsh given the presence of these mitigating factors. 
Review 
{¶ 21} On review, we find that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and 
(6).  We further find that the panel and board justifiably suspected the validity of 
Dr. Mass’s diagnosis, legitimately discounted respondent’s expressions of 
contrition, and properly recommended respondent’s indefinite suspension from 
the practice of law, with conditions for reinstatement.  We thus overrule 
respondent’s objections and adopt the recommended sanction. 
Claimed Mental Disability and Contrition 
{¶ 22} We decline to find a mitigating mental disability based on the 
combined sex addiction, exhibitionism, and depression that Dr. Mass diagnosed, 
for the reasons cited by the panel and board.  But to clarify, our decision does not 
come so much from any deficiencies in Dr. Mass’s conclusions as it does from an 
underlying skepticism of respondent’s sincerity in claiming mental disability.  
The psychological profile suggesting that respondent might feign illness, the fact 
that he chose not to avail himself of recommended medication therapy for his 
condition, and the typical and hardly overwhelming stressors cited as compelling 
his behavior simply do not paint the usual picture of a genuinely confessed addict, 
genuinely committed to recovery.  To the contrary, we suspect that respondent 
sought Dr. Mass’s diagnosis specifically to raise it as a mitigating factor in 
defense to inevitable disciplinary and criminal charges and not solely to stop 
himself from pulling what he thought others might consider an “amusing prank.” 
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{¶ 23} Similarly, we share the panel’s and the board’s dim assessment of 
respondent’s professed remorse.  Although he repeatedly articulated his regret, his 
concern was most often and genuinely shown when he spoke of the 
embarrassment and hardship that had befallen him and his family.  In addition to 
the examples already cited, respondent explained how hard it had been for him to 
call OLAP after his arrest, as he was “completely devastated,” “had lost 
everything that [he] had worked for,” and had “lost [his] reputation.” 
{¶ 24} In fact, respondent mentioned his victims’ trauma hardly at all.  
Moreover, his indifference is unmistakable – he failed to even acknowledge the 
life-altering effect his actions had on the victim who testified before the panel.  
This conceit and callousness belie any pretense of regret for his victims’ 
suffering, and the panel and board properly so found. 
The Appropriate Sanction 
{¶ 25} In determining the appropriate sanction for professional 
misconduct, we consider the duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, 
the lawyer's mental state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Connors, 97 Ohio St.3d 479, 2002-Ohio-6722, 780 N.E.2d 567, ¶ 16, quoting 
Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 
N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  All that is left to do in this case is to review the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Ault, 110 Ohio St.3d 207, 
2006-Ohio-4247, 852 N.E.2d 727. 
{¶ 26} In State ex rel. Nebraska Supreme Court Counsel for Discipline v. 
Janousek (2004), 267 Neb. 328, 674 N.W.2d 464, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
disbarred a lawyer for outrageous acts of illegality and moral turpitude that 
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.  That lawyer had harassed and 
terrorized a former girlfriend by stalking her, sending horribly racist and obscene 
letters to her, and also sending letters designed to jeopardize her professional 
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relations with her legal counsel and her graduate school.  There, as here, the 
parties cited state precedent that each argued was similar in some respect to the 
situation at bar, but nothing came close to that lawyer’s behavior.  The court 
observed: 
{¶ 27} “To the extent that our review of case law supports any conclusion, 
it is this:  The fact that no attorney appears to have previously engaged in 
behavior like Janousek’s is indicative of just how egregious his behavior was.”  
Id. at 336, 674 N.W.2d 464. 
{¶ 28} While respondent’s actions are unprecedented, the overlapping 
offenses of committing illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that 
reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law usually demand an actual 
suspension from the practice of law in order to protect the public’s interest and the 
integrity of the legal profession.  Depending on the gravity of the misconduct and 
any extenuating circumstances, sanctions typically range from a definite period of 
suspension to disbarment.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodall, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 501, 2004-Ohio-5583, 817 N.E.2d 23 (lawyer guilty of fourth-degree felony 
committed during domestic dispute was suspended for six months with credit for 
time served under interim felony suspension); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hennekes, 
110 Ohio St.3d 108, 2006-Ohio-3669, 850 N.E.2d 1201 (lawyer suspended for 
two years after he was convicted of felony offense of conspiring to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute cocaine); and Disciplinary Counsel v. White, 109 
Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-2709, 848 N.E.2d 504 (lawyer disbarred, while 
already on indefinite suspension, for DR 1-102(A)(3) and (6) misconduct 
involving felony drug use and violation of court order prohibiting drug use). 
{¶ 29} Disbarment is required, however, when such conduct involves 
predatory sexual acts and dishonesty beyond any possible redemption.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ostheimer (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 304, 649 N.E.2d 1217 
(during a three-year period, lawyer fabricated court documents to substantiate that 
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his adopted daughter had been placed on a contrived drug-use probation program, 
the violation of which would ostensibly require her imprisonment, so that he 
could feign authority to conduct strip searches and gain the girl's submission to 
sexual activity, eventually including digital and penile penetration). 
{¶ 30} Relator does not argue that respondent’s ethical sensitivity is so 
fatally defective as to require disbarment.  Moreover, of all the cases cited by the 
parties, Disciplinary Counsel v. Pansiera (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 436, 674 N.E.2d 
1373, is the most comparable, and we did not disbar the attorney in that case 
despite reprehensible sex-related misconduct.  There, a lawyer exploited his 
relationship with a teenager, whom he had befriended through Alcoholics 
Anonymous, and was later convicted on several counts of corrupting a minor.  We 
indefinitely suspended the lawyer, admonishing that which is truly axiomatic: 
{¶ 31} “[A] lawyer ‘should refrain from all illegal and morally 
reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in society, even minor violations 
of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession.’  
EC 1-5.”  Pansiera, 77 Ohio St.3d at 437-438, 674 N.E.2d 1373, citing 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCrae (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 511, 664 N.E.2d 523. 
{¶ 32} Indefinite suspension is also appropriate here, despite respondent’s 
egregious misconduct.  As the panel and board concluded, the evidence presented 
failed to reliably establish that (1) respondent’s misconduct stemmed from a real, 
definable medical disability and not from a pretense of a medical disability 
masking serious antisocial conduct or (2) providing the mental disability exists, 
respondent is in compliance with a treatment plan that will successfully deter 
further acting out.  But on the other hand, we also have no evidence from which to 
conclude that respondent can never remedy these deficiencies or even that some 
other manageable mental illness underlies his bizarre behavior.  Thus, because the 
possibility of this proof exists and respondent may in the future be able to 
sufficiently demonstrate that he is able to return to the competent, ethical, and 
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professional practice of law, we do not disbar him.  Accord Ohio State Bar Assn. 
v. Johnson, 96 Ohio St.3d 192, 2002-Ohio-3998, 772 N.E.2d 1184 (state senator 
convicted of extorting constituents was indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law, rather than disbarred, because the possibility of rehabilitation existed); 
State ex rel. Nebraska Supreme Court Counsel for Discipline v. Hogan (2006), 
272 Neb. 19, 717 N.W.2d 470 (Nebraska Supreme Court indefinitely suspended a 
lawyer from the practice of law despite unsubstantiated claims of sexual addiction 
that he claimed had mitigated misconduct involving sexual improprieties taken 
with a girlfriend’s young daughter). 
{¶ 33} Respondent is therefore indefinitely suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B), respondent may not petition for 
reinstatement before two years from the date of our order.  In addition to the other 
requirements of that rule, respondent’s reinstatement shall be conditioned on 
submission of an independent and qualified health-care professional’s evaluation 
of his mental health and the propriety of his reinstatement.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Bradley N. Frick & Associates and Bradley N. Frick; Susan C. Walker, 
Assistant Attorney General; and Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha 
Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Geoffrey Stern, and Rasheeda Z. Khan, for 
respondent. 
______________________