Title: Linnon v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
CRAIG M. LINNON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 130179 
  
    
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 10, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a teacher had a 
custodial or supervisory relationship with a student within the 
meaning of Code § 18.2-370.1(A).  We also consider whether 
arguments relating to proposed jury instructions were properly 
preserved. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Craig Linnon taught a building trades class at a 
vocational school.  He also was assigned the responsibility of 
supervising students in the cafeteria during lunch one day each 
week and on the sidewalk outside his classroom before, after, 
and between classes each day.  His wife, Angela, was the school 
nurse.  She also occasionally monitored a cosmetology class 
when the teacher stepped out.  A.G. was a 16-year-old female 
student in the cosmetology class.  A.G. was not one of Craig’s 
students but they saw each other every day when he monitored 
the sidewalk near the bus loading zone. 
In December 2009, A.G.’s cosmetology class had a party on 
school grounds to celebrate the end of the semester.  At the 
 
2 
party, Angela invited A.G. and A.G.’s female friend to the 
Linnons’ home that night.  The two girls accepted the 
invitation and the Linnons picked them up that evening.  At 
their home, the Linnons supplied A.G. and her friend with 
alcohol in exchange for marijuana.  Craig told A.G. that Angela 
had sexual fantasies about her and that he had a video of 
Angela fellating one of his male students.  A.G. and her friend 
were disturbed by the sexual content of the conversation and 
decided to leave.  Craig drove them to the friend’s home. 
The following night, the Linnons again invited A.G. to 
their home.  A.G. returned in the company of Jared Todd, her 
ex-boyfriend, and Tyler Scott, Todd’s friend.  Both Todd and 
Scott were 18 years old.  Todd was one of Craig’s students.  
The Linnons and the teenagers drank alcohol; the Linnons, 
Scott, and A.G. also smoked marijuana. 
The group began playing a sex-themed version of Charades 
in the living room.  The game devolved into a sexual orgy when 
Angela actually fellated Todd and Scott rather than merely 
miming.  During the activities that followed, Craig inserted 
his penis into A.G.’s mouth.  Craig also inserted his fingers 
into A.G.’s vagina and anus.  He also implored her to have sex 
with Angela. 
Sometime thereafter, Todd and Scott went to the bathroom 
and decided to leave the Linnons’ home.  When A.G. realized 
 
3 
Todd and Scott had left the living room, she found her clothes 
and got dressed.  When Todd and Scott returned from the 
bathroom, they got dressed and announced that they were 
leaving.  The three teenagers departed as the Linnons continued 
having sex on the living room floor. 
Craig was subsequently indicted on three counts of taking 
indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or 
supervisory relationship, in violation of Code § 18.2-370.1(A). 
1  He and Angela were tried jointly but were represented by 
separate counsel.  At trial, he moved to strike both when the 
Commonwealth rested its case and at the close of the evidence, 
arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had a 
custodial or supervisory relationship with A.G.  The circuit 
court denied his motions.  Angela objected to three of the 
Commonwealth’s proposed jury instructions and Craig objected to 
a fourth.  The court also rejected two jury instructions Craig 
proposed.  The jury thereafter convicted Craig on all three 
counts and he was sentenced to a term of eleven years’ active 
incarceration. 
Craig appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the 
circuit court erred by denying his motions to strike, by 
                                                 
1 Craig also was indicted on additional offenses not 
relevant to this appeal.  Angela was indicted on several 
charges relating to this and other incidents but she is not a 
party to this appeal. 
 
4 
granting the Commonwealth’s four proposed jury instructions 
over defense objections, and by rejecting his proposed jury 
instructions.  The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court 
did not err in denying Craig’s motions to strike because the 
evidence showed he had a custodial or supervisory relationship 
over A.G.  It concluded that his argument about the 
Commonwealth’s proposed jury instructions was not preserved for 
the purposes of Rule 5A:18 because he failed to state any 
ground for his objection to one and he did not join Angela’s 
objections to the other three.  Finally, it determined that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing his 
proposed jury instructions because it had already adequately 
instructed the jury on one issue and the other proposed 
instruction incorrectly stated the law. 
We awarded Craig this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming 
the circuit court’s rulings on his motions to strike because, 
under its interpretation, mere employment as a teacher when a 
minor attends school establishes the relationship necessary for 
conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1(A).  We disagree. 
 
 
A motion to strike challenges whether 
the evidence is sufficient to submit the 
 
5 
case to the jury.  What the elements of the 
offense are is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Whether the evidence 
adduced is sufficient to prove each of 
those elements is a factual finding, which 
will not be set aside on appeal unless it 
is plainly wrong.  In reviewing that 
factual finding, we consider the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth and give it the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences fairly deducible 
therefrom.  After so viewing the evidence, 
the question is whether any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In sum, if there is evidence to 
support the conviction, the reviewing court 
is not permitted to substitute its 
judgment, even if its view of the evidence 
might differ from the conclusions reached 
by the finder of fact at the trial. 
 
Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 223-24, 738 S.E.2d 847, 
868, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 427 (2013) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Code § 18.2-370.1(A) provides that “[a]ny person 18 years 
of age or older who, except as provided in § 18.2-370, 
maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship over a child 
under the age of 18 and is not legally married to such child 
and such child is not emancipated who, with lascivious intent, 
knowingly and intentionally” engages in certain proscribed acts 
“shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.”  The purpose of the 
statute “is to protect minors from adults who might exploit 
certain types of relationships.”  Sadler v. Commonwealth, 276 
 
6 
Va. 762, 765, 667 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2008).  The key question in 
determining whether a given relationship falls within the 
statute is whether the defendant “had the responsibility for 
and control of the [child’s] safety and well-being.”  Krampen 
v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 163, 168, 510 S.E.2d 276, 278 
(1999); see also Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453, 459-60, 
592 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (2004) (rejecting the argument that the 
child must be specifically entrusted to the defendant’s care 
through explicit parental delegation of responsibility). 
As a general rule, primary and secondary school 
administrators and teachers meet this criterion.  We have held 
that school administrators have a responsibility “to supervise 
and ensure that students could have an education in an 
atmosphere conducive to learning, free of disruption, and 
threat to person.”  Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 671, 727 
S.E.2d 634, 643 (2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).  They have “a duty to supervise and care for” all 
students who are on school premises or engaged in school 
activities.2  Id.  This responsibility extends to those to whom 
                                                 
2 The vast majority of primary and secondary school 
students are minors.  In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 286 Va. 349, 
357, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2013), we assumed without deciding 
that a similar responsibility existed at post-secondary 
educational institutions, where many students are adults.  
Thus, the question in that case was not whether the 
responsibility existed but whether the institution had a 
 
7 
administrators assign it within the scope of the assignment, 
even those who are not teachers and have no students.3  When an 
administrator assigns this responsibility to a teacher in 
addition to the teacher’s classroom duties, it encompasses 
students not enrolled in the teacher’s classes. 
The evidence established that Craig was assigned 
responsibility for student safety and supervision in the 
cafeteria one day each week and on the sidewalk before, after, 
and between classes each day.  This assignment was beyond the 
scope of his regular classroom duties and encompassed students 
not enrolled in his classes.  He therefore had the relationship 
required by the statute with respect to A.G. even though she 
was not his student. 
However, Code § 18.2-370.1(A) also requires that the acts 
proscribed by the statute occur while the defendant “maintains” 
the required relationship.  The proscribed acts in this case 
did not occur on school premises or during any school activity.  
Accordingly, Craig’s mere status as a teacher is insufficient 
                                                                                                                                                           
specific duty to warn students about the potential for injury 
arising from the criminal acts of a third party.  Id. 
3 For example, in Guda, the defendant was a school security 
officer and assistant football coach and the victim was 15-
year-old female tenth grader.  The defendant encountered the 
victim in the hall during class.  The victim asked the 
defendant for a hall pass and he directed her to his office in 
the boy’s locker room, where he assaulted her.  42 Va. App. at 
455-56, 592 S.E.2d at 749. 
 
8 
to warrant conviction.  Conversely, the facts that the 
proscribed acts occurred at his home and were unrelated to any 
school activity are insufficient by themselves to warrant 
acquittal. 
In Sadler, we considered the case of a softball coach 
convicted of molesting a minor female on his team.  Ten days 
after a team fundraiser and three days before a softball 
tournament, the defendant visited the victim at her home, where 
he kissed her and rubbed her buttocks.  He also showed her the 
team’s new uniforms.  276 Va. at 764, 667 S.E.2d at 784.  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that he was not acting in his 
capacity as a coach during the visit and that the conduct 
therefore did not occur in the context of the relationship 
required for conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1(A).  Id. at 
765, 667 S.E.2d at 784.  We rejected that argument, holding 
that a defendant may maintain the required relationship even 
when the proscribed acts occur outside the context giving rise 
to it.  We concluded that “[w]hether such a relationship exists 
at the time of the offending conduct is a matter of fact to be 
determined on a case by case basis.”  Id. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 
785. 
That is the rule to be applied here.  Although the acts 
occurred at Craig’s home outside school hours and during the 
winter recess, school was due to resume in a few weeks and he 
 
9 
and A.G. would again see each other there on a daily basis as 
he performed assigned administrative duties.  These facts are 
materially indistinguishable from those in Sadler.  There, the 
proscribed acts took place at the victim’s home.  The required 
relationship existed several days before (during the team 
fundraiser) and several days after (during the softball 
tournament).  While the required relationship may have been 
abeyant in the interstice, it did not cease to exist.  Rather, 
it continued, with a known past and an expected, imminent 
future.  See id. at 765-66, 667 S.E.2d at 785. 
Moreover, A.G. testified that when she went back to school 
in January, Craig lay in wait for her and pursued her as she 
went to class: 
 
He was waiting on the inside of the 
building.  It was very close to the bell 
being rung, so it was weird; he would only 
be outside. . . .  I saw every other girl 
walk past him and he didn’t say a word to 
them, so I knew he was waiting for me to 
come. 
. . . . 
I kept walking and I could see his 
reflection in the glass door coming after 
me. 
. . . . 
He said, “That was the best night I 
ever had, and I hope you come over again.” 
 
This testimony establishes that Craig renewed his advances at 
school, where the relationship required by the statute 
 
10 
undoubtedly existed.  The jury could reasonably infer from 
Craig's conduct that his relationship with A.G. was the same 
whether they were on or off school grounds, and whether school 
was in or out of session.  Moreover, he chose to initiate 
predatory contact at school, where he held a position of 
authority and where A.G. was a captive audience, unable to 
resist or avoid contact with him.  This is precisely the type 
of exploitation the General Assembly enacted the statute to 
deter.  Sadler, 276 Va. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785. 
Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find that the proscribed 
acts occurred while Craig “maintain[ed] a custodial or 
supervisory relationship” for the purposes of Code § 18.2-
370.1(A). 
B.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. THE COMMONWEALTH’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The Commonwealth proposed four contested jury instructions 
that were given to the jury by the circuit court.  The first 
stated, “A custodial relationship arises when the supervising 
adult exercises care and control over the child, with the care 
including the responsibility for and control of the child’s 
safety and well being.”  The second stated, “The term ‘custody’ 
is not limited to legal custody.  It can include those standing 
in loco parentis such as teachers or babysitters who may have 
 
11 
temporary custody of children.”  The third stated, “One may 
become a person ‘responsible for the care of a child’ by a 
voluntary course of conduct and without explicit parental 
delegation of supervisory responsibility or court order.”  The 
fourth stated, the “[o]ffense of taking indecent liberties with 
a minor does not require proof of a direct nexus of any type 
between the custodial or supervisory relationship and the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.”  In his appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, Craig asserted that these proposed jury instructions 
were incorrect statements of the law. 
We focus initially on the first three proposed jury 
instructions.  The Court of Appeals ruled that only Angela 
objected to them and therefore Craig failed to preserve his 
argument for appeal under Rule 5A:18.  Craig asserts that the 
Court of Appeals erred because the circuit court understood the 
joint nature of the defense, and therefore Angela’s objections 
should be imputed to Craig even though he did not expressly 
join them.  He also argues that the purpose of the 
contemporaneous objection rule is to ensure that the circuit 
court has an opportunity to rule on the argument before it is 
submitted to the appellate court as ground for error.  He 
contends Angela’s objection was sufficient to fulfill this 
purpose.  According to him, the question is whether the circuit 
 
12 
court had an opportunity to rule on the issue, not who raised 
it.  We disagree. 
We review interpretations of the Rules of this Court de 
novo.  LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 469-71, 722 S.E.2d 
838, 840 (2012).  Although we have never before considered 
whether an objection raised by one party may be attributed to 
another party who does not expressly join it, courts that have 
considered that question have answered in the negative.  E.g., 
Barnes v. State, 310 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. App. 1983) (“If 
several parties are entitled to make an objection, and it is 
made by any number less than all, it does not inure to the 
advantage of the party or parties not joining in it.  Thus, 
where a defendant does not expressly adopt the objection of a 
co-defendant, he thereby waives that objection and may not 
utilize it to gain review.”); accord Daniels v. Yancey, 175 
S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. App. 2005); Cook Assocs. v. Warnick, 664 
P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983); Thomas v. Bank of Springfield, 631 
S.W.2d 346, 351 (Mo. App. 1982); Roskoten v. Odom, 87 P.2d 338, 
340 (Okla. 1939).  We adopt the general rule articulated in 
these cases and hold that one party may not rely on the 
objection of another party to preserve an argument for appeal 
without expressly joining in the objection. 
Craig also argues that the circuit court understood that 
the two defendants were presenting a joint defense.  His 
 
13 
argument is contradicted by the record.  Tellingly, Craig 
expressly noted his separate objection to the Commonwealth’s 
fourth proposed jury instruction, stating through counsel 
“Judge, I’d like to note an objection to the fourth one offered 
by the Commonwealth,” while remaining silent as to the 
preceding three.  Further, the record reflects at least six 
additional occasions where one of the defendants expressly 
joined in the other’s objections to preserve an argument for 
appeal.  We therefore reject Craig’s argument that this case 
calls for an exception to the general rule we adopt today.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding 
that Craig did not preserve for appeal any objection to these 
three proposed instructions. 
  We now turn to the fourth proposed jury instruction.  
Although Craig did object, the Court of Appeals again declined 
to consider his argument, determining that it was not preserved 
under Rule 5A:18 because he failed to state a basis for his 
objection at trial.  Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals 
erred because this proposed jury instruction directly relates 
to whether the Commonwealth was required to prove a direct 
nexus between the required relationship and the proscribed 
acts.  He notes that he and the Commonwealth vigorously 
contested that question in their arguments on his motion to 
strike, which preceded the circuit court’s consideration of the 
 
14 
proposed jury instructions.  He asserts the circuit court 
therefore was fully apprised of the argument relevant to this 
proposed jury instruction and intelligently ruled on it.  We 
agree. 
Craig argued on his first motion to strike that the 
Commonwealth was required to demonstrate a nexus between any 
relationship with A.G. at school and the proscribed acts.  The 
Commonwealth responded that, under Sadler, no such nexus was 
required.  The circuit court rejected Craig’s argument and 
denied the motion.  Accordingly, this argument was adequately 
presented to the circuit court to provide it “an opportunity to 
rule intelligently on the issue[].”  Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 
279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Although Craig’s motion and argument were made before he 
presented his case, he renewed them at the conclusion of all 
the evidence.  The circuit court again rejected the argument 
and denied the motion.  It then proceeded immediately to 
consider jury instructions: 
 
The motions to strike are overruled.  
Your objections are noted for the record.  
All prior motions are incorporated and the 
rulings are the same. 
We’re now ready to discuss 
instructions. 
 
 
15 
Both Rule 5A:18 and Rule 5:25 require an objection to be 
timely and Craig’s objection was.  The basis of the objection 
was encompassed by his argument on the motions to strike, which 
the circuit court had recently considered and rejected.  We 
conclude that this was sufficient to satisfy the Rules.  The 
Court of Appeals therefore erred in determining under Rule 
5A:18 that Craig failed to state a basis for his objection to 
the fourth proposed jury instruction. 
Nevertheless, the error was harmless because Craig’s 
argument on appeal is not the one he made to the circuit court.4  
On appeal, Craig argues that the instruction was misleading 
because the word “nexus” encompasses the temporal association 
suggested by the word “maintain[]” as used in Code § 18.2-
370.1(A).  As noted above, the required relationship must exist 
at the time of the proscribed acts.  Craig argues that the 
instruction that no proof of a nexus “of any type” was 
necessary for conviction therefore had a tendency to mislead 
the jury that the relationship and the proscribed acts need not 
coincide as the statute requires. 
                                                 
4 “Under the doctrine of harmless error, we will affirm [a 
lower] court's judgment when we can conclude that the error at 
issue could not have affected the court's result.”  Dorr v. 
Clarke, 284 Va. 514, 526, 733 S.E.2d 235, 242 (2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
16 
Craig did not make this argument below.  His argument on 
the motion to strike was limited solely to the issue we 
considered in Sadler and his attempt to distinguish that case 
from this one on their facts.5  He therefore did not preserve 
this argument for appeal and we will not consider it.  Rule 
5:25; see also Online Res. Corp. v. Lawlor, 285 Va. 40, 57, 736 
S.E.2d 886, 895 (2013); Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Target 
Corp., 274 Va. 341, 351-52, 650 S.E.2d 92, 97-98 (2007).  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ erroneous determination that 
Craig failed to state any basis for his objection to the 
instruction is harmless. 
2. CRAIG’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Craig proposed two jury instructions.  The first stated, 
“One who is a guest is one who decides on her own to leave the 
home, and where the host has no personal authority to direct or 
punish the guest.”  The second stated, “Only those persons who 
maintain a custodial relationship with their victim can be 
convicted of Indecent Liberties.”  The circuit court refused 
both and the Court of Appeals affirmed its rulings. 
                                                 
5 Although Craig referred to the winter break in his 
argument on the motion to strike, he did not suggest that the 
break terminated the custodial or supervisory relationship.  To 
the contrary, he argued that the fact of the break, together 
with his limited contact with A.G. at school and the lack of 
parental entrustment or knowledge with respect to her presence 
at his house, was evidence that the relationship was not 
custodial or supervisory. 
 
17 
Craig argues that the first proposed jury instruction was 
necessary “to explain the ‘hostess and guest relationship’ 
referenced in” another of his proposed jury instructions, which 
the circuit court gave to the jury.6  However, he did not make 
this argument in support of the refused jury instruction to 
circuit court.  We therefore will not consider it on appeal.  
Rule 5:25; see also Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 274 Va. at 
351-52, 650 S.E.2d at 97-98.7 
Craig argues that the second proposed jury instruction was 
necessary to correct other instructions proposed by the 
Commonwealth and given to the jury by the circuit court.  
According to those instructions, he argues, the Commonwealth 
need only prove that Craig “maintained a custodial or 
supervisory relationship over A.G.” (Emphasis added.)  He 
concludes that the use of the preterite verb form “maintained” 
indicated that the required relationship need not exist at the 
time of the proscribed acts.  Again, he made no such argument 
to the circuit court.  Furthermore, he did not object to the 
                                                 
6 That instruction stated, “For a custodial or supervisory 
relationship to exist, the custodian or supervisor must hold 
some form of legal or actual authority over the child.  Those 
who maintain [a] hostess and guest relationship do not maintain 
a custodial or supervisory relationship.” 
7 Although the record reveals that Angela argued in favor 
of the “hostess-and-guest relationship” instruction, neither 
she nor Craig offered any argument in support of this refused 
instruction he now contends was necessary to explain it. 
 
18 
proposed jury instructions containing the preterite verb form.  
We therefore will not consider his argument on appeal.  Rule 
5:25; see also Online Resources, 285 Va. at 60-61, 736 S.E.2d 
at 897; Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 274 Va. at 351-52, 650 
S.E.2d at 97-98. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring. 
 
 
I concur in the Court's judgment, except as to the 
Commonwealth's fourth jury instruction.  The Court of Appeals 
found that the argument with respect to that instruction was 
waived under Rule 5A:18.  I agree and would affirm that ruling. 
 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE MILLETTE 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
In this case, the majority takes the position that Craig 
preserved his argument with regard to whether the 
Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction was a correct 
statement of the law.  Having determined that he did preserve 
this argument, the majority then takes the position that Craig 
did not actually preserve the issue for appeal because the 
 
19 
argument he makes here is not the same as the one he made 
before the trial court and, therefore, the trial court’s 
decision to give an incorrect jury instruction was harmless 
error.  Notwithstanding the obvious internal inconsistency in 
the majority opinion regarding preservation, I believe that 
Craig’s argument to the trial court clearly encompassed the 
argument he now makes to this Court.  Accordingly, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
 
As an initial matter, I believe it is important to address 
the fact that the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed instruction 
is, in fact, a patently incorrect statement of the law. 
We review jury instructions to see that the 
law has been clearly stated and that the 
instructions cover all issues which the 
evidence fairly raises. . . .  It is error 
to give an instruction that incorrectly 
states the law; whether a jury instruction 
accurately states the relevant law is a 
question of law that we review de novo. 
Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 228, 738 S.E.2d 847, 870 
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
We have further recognized that “a jury verdict based on 
an erroneous instruction need not be set aside if it is clear 
that the jury was not misled.”  Orthopedic & Sports Physical 
Therapy Assocs. v. Summit Group Props., 283 Va. 777, 784, 724 
S.E.2d 718, 722 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
However, “it is error to give” an “instruction [that] may 
 
20 
reasonably be regarded as having a tendency to mislead the 
jury.”  Castle v. Lester, 272 Va. 591, 605, 636 S.E.2d 342, 349 
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The plain language of Code § 18.2-370.1 indicates that the 
defendant must maintain a custodial or supervisory relationship 
over the child at the time of the wrongful conduct.  In other 
words, the existence of the relationship at the time of the 
wrongful conduct must still be proven.  See Sadler v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 762, 765, 667 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2008) 
(“Whether such a relationship exists at the time of the 
offending conduct is a matter of fact to be determined on a 
case by case basis.”).  Thus, it is the fact that the existence 
of the necessary relationship coincides with the wrongful act 
that is the necessary link (i.e., nexus) allowing for a 
conviction under this statute.  Stated another way, absent a 
custodial or supervisory relationship being maintained (i.e., 
absent the nexus) at the time of the wrongful act, there can be 
no conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1. 
 
The purpose of Code § 18.2-370.1 “is to protect minors 
from adults who might exploit certain types of relationships.”  
Sadler, 276 Va. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785.  We have recognized 
that such exploitation is the result of the victim feeling 
compelled to obey the perpetrator due to the present existence 
of a custodial or supervisory relationship.  Id.  The 
 
21 
compulsion that facilitates the wrongful act is clearly 
dependent on the underlying relationship.
1  Thus, while the wrongful conduct does not have to occur at 
school or during a school-related event, see id., it still must 
occur because of the underlying relationship formed at school.  
There must exist a nexus between the relationship and the 
wrongful conduct.  Indeed, it is axiomatic that a defendant 
cannot be said to have exploited a relationship if there is not 
a nexus between that relationship and the wrongful conduct. 
 
Thus, the law is clear that the Commonwealth was required 
to demonstrate a nexus between any relationship with A.G. at 
school and the proscribed acts.  The Commonwealth’s fourth 
proposed instruction, however, takes the exact opposite view, 
stating that the “[o]ffense of taking indecent liberties with a 
minor does not require proof of a direct nexus of any type 
between the custodial or supervisory relationship and the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.”  (Emphasis added.)  This 
instruction specifically disavows the need for the Commonwealth 
to prove an element of the crime, as it strongly implies that 
the offense of taking indecent liberties with a minor does not 
                                                 
 
1 To be clear, I do not take the position that the 
wrongful act must occur during the activity upon which the 
relationship is based; our holding in Sadler specifically 
addresses this point.  However, the relationship itself must 
exist and be maintained at the time of the wrongful act-- this 
is the nexus on which the offense hinges. 
 
22 
require proof that the custodial or supervisory relationship 
was maintained at the time of the wrongful conduct.  
Accordingly, I believe that the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed 
instruction is a patently incorrect statement of the law. 
 
Furthermore, I believe that not only is the Commonwealth’s 
fourth proposed instruction an incorrect statement of the law, 
but the language also had the potential to mislead and confuse 
the jury.  Indeed, a jury could interpret this instruction to 
require that the Commonwealth only prove the wrongful conduct 
and the existence of a custodial or supervisory relationship at 
some point in time, but not necessarily at the time that the 
defendant engaged in the wrongful conduct. 
 
In stating that Craig did not preserve his argument, the 
majority focuses on the fact that, at one point, Craig 
attempted to distinguish the facts of the present case from 
those in Sadler.  In so doing the majority neglects the fact 
that, in Sadler, the issue was whether the custodial 
relationship existed (i.e., was maintained) outside of 
activities directly related to that relationship.  See 276 Va. 
at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785 (rejecting the “assertion that a 
custodial or supervisory relationship is maintained for 
purposes of Code § 18.2-370.1 only when the objectionable acts 
are undertaken in the course of performing activities giving 
 
23 
rise to that relationship”).  In other words, the issue in 
Sadler was whether the necessary nexus existed at all. 
 
Additionally, the majority neglects the entirety of 
Craig’s argument.  While arguing that the Commonwealth failed 
to prove the existence of a custodial relationship, Craig also 
argued: 
I’ll argue to you that the fact that we 
have a break here is significant.  This 
isn’t during the school year.  The school 
semester is over and there’s been no 
evidence that she’s continuing the school 
year or was at that time. 
 
The obvious implication of Craig’s argument is that, even 
if the Commonwealth proved the existence of a custodial or 
supervisory relationship, the Commonwealth has failed to prove 
that it was maintained at the time of the wrongful act.  
Indeed, Craig further argued: 
[T]he requirement of a custodial 
relationship is not merely a basis for 
enhancing punishment[;] rather . . . a 
custodial relationship maintained with 
respect to the victim is a predicate to 
guilt.  Clearly they [the Commonwealth] 
have to prove it. 
. . . . 
As we know, this didn’t occur anywhere near 
the school and [A.G.] readily admitted that 
there was no related school activity at 
all.  [Craig] was not a teacher of hers at 
all and had no real contact except at the 
bus stop.  During the school break there’s 
no evidence that she was going back at that 
time.  Looking at that case by case factor 
 
24 
analysis, even at this level, the 
Commonwealth does not satisfy [its burden]. 
 
Thus, it is clear that Craig argued that the Commonwealth 
was required to prove that there was some connection (i.e., a 
nexus) between the custodial or supervisory relationship and 
the wrongful act. 
 
Similarly, the record clearly demonstrates that the trial 
court understood this to be the argument raised by Craig.  In 
overruling the motion to strike, the trial court specifically 
addressed the issue of whether the relationship was maintained 
at the time of the wrongful act (i.e., whether there was a 
nexus between the relationship and the wrongful act).  Indeed, 
the trial court specifically stated: 
Now, the next question is: Does that 
relationship end at the sidewalk outside of 
the school or does it end at the end of the 
school day or as the Commonwealth argues, 
does it continue? 
. . . . 
If I do accept for purposes of the motion 
that there was a preexisting relationship 
of a custodial and supervisory relationship 
that when the custodian and supervisor 
seeks to engage in additional relationships 
or further relationships with the children 
outside of the venue or the context of the 
school, the other case law is clear that 
the relationship doesn’t terminate at the 
sidewalk, it doesn’t end when the bell 
rings and that relationship continues. 
If I accept the facts here as presented by 
the Commonwealth, it’s clear that everyone 
understood that Mr. and Mrs. Linnon were 
 
25 
still the teacher and the nurse and they 
stood in that relationship. 
 
Furthermore, although the majority quotes Craig’s second 
offered jury instruction,2 it ignores the fact that the trial 
court expressly stated that it considered it to be a “competing 
instruction” to the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed instruction.  
This demonstrates that the trial court clearly understood that 
these instructions were mutually exclusive.  This Court has 
specifically recognized that an “objection may also be shown 
and preserved where, in a refused instruction, the objecting 
party propounds the contrary theory to one set forth in a 
granted instruction.”  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Karcher, 217 Va. 
497, 498, 229 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1976).  Although the 
instructions in this case are structured differently, the only 
significant difference between the instructions was the use of 
the term “maintain” in Craig’s instruction and “nexus” in the 
Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction.  As such, it 
is clear that these were the terms that the trial court 
considered to be mutually exclusive. 
 
Thus, in my opinion, Craig placed the issue of whether the 
Commonwealth must prove a nexus between the custodial 
relationship and the wrongful act squarely before the trial 
                                                 
 
2 Craig’s instruction stated: “Only those persons who 
maintain a custodial relationship with their victim can be 
convicted of Indecent Liberties.” 
 
26 
court and, indeed, the trial court ruled on the argument.  
Accordingly, I believe that this issue was preserved and that 
the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction was an 
incorrect statement of the law that had a tendency to mislead 
the jury.  In my view, the verdict must be set aside and the 
case should be remanded for retrial, should the Commonwealth be 
so inclined.