Title: Commonwealth v. Carriere

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11339 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDMOND J. CARRIERE, JR. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     May 9, 2014. - October 28, 2014. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer, 
Testimonial statement, Pattern of conduct, Subsequent 
misconduct, Prior misconduct, Motive, State of mind, 
Declaration against interest.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Confrontation of witnesses, Argument by prosecutor, 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 13, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Robert C. Rufo, J. 
 
 
 
Neil L. Fishman for the defendant. 
 
Julia K. Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  On January 3, 1980, at approximately 8 P.M., the 
victim, who was the defendant's wife, was found dead on the 
bathroom floor in her home in Bourne.  She had died "quite some 
time" earlier of multiple stab wounds.  When the victim's body 
 
2 
was discovered, the defendant and his fourteen year old daughter, 
who lived with the victim, were in Florida visiting one of the 
defendant's older daughters.  In June, 2005, Steven Stewart, the 
man who stabbed the victim, was convicted of murder in the first 
degree; this court reversed his conviction in 2009 based on 
errors in the admission of testimony by a key witness.  See 
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 527-528 (2009).  The 
defendant was indicted in July, 2010, after Stewart entered into 
a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to manslaughter, 
agreed to testify against the defendant, and was sentenced to 
time served. 
 
The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant, 
who was in the midst of a highly contentious divorce from the 
victim, had engaged in a murder-for-hire scheme with Stewart and 
their mutual friend Richard Grebauski.1  Grebauski, the alleged 
middleman, arranged to hire Stewart for $5,000 after accepting 
the defendant's offer of $10,000 to kill his wife.  The 
Commonwealth's case relied heavily on evidence introduced through 
Stewart, who testified both to his own actions and to out-of-
court statements by other asserted members of the joint venture, 
including Grebauski.  The remainder of the evidence was based 
largely on out-of-court statements introduced by witnesses to 
                     
1 Richard Grebauski also was indicted for murder, but died 
in 2004, prior to his trial. 
 
3 
those statements, such as the defendant's friends and neighbors 
Russell Breault, Charles Berryman, and David Phinney.  A police 
report and a letter sent to the police, containing additional 
statements, were introduced in evidence by stipulation.  In May, 
2012, a Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See G. L. c. 265, § 1. 
 
On appeal, the defendant challenges the admission of a 
number of out-of-court statements introduced through Stewart's 
testimony under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; 
the defendant contends that the Commonwealth did not prove the 
existence of a joint venture, and also that some of the 
statements were made outside the period in which the joint 
venture allegedly occurred.  The defendant maintains further that 
errors in the admission of impermissible and highly prejudicial 
propensity evidence, the judge's decision not to allow testimony 
concerning purportedly exculpatory statements made by Grebauski, 
and improper remarks in the prosecutor's closing argument require 
a new trial.  The defendant objected to certain of the 
evidentiary rulings and to some of the prosecutor's remarks at 
trial; other asserted errors were unpreserved.  The defendant 
also requests that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to grant him a new trial. 
 
We conclude that there was no prejudicial error or 
 
4 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in any of the 
challenged evidentiary rulings, or in the prosecutor's closing 
argument.  After careful review of the record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to order a new trial or to 
reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
Trial evidence.  We recite facts the jury could have found, 
reserving additional detail for later discussion. 
 
In the months prior to the killing, the defendant and his 
wife were engaged in a hotly contested divorce.  The defendant 
told a number of his friends that his wife intended to take the 
marital home and "everything else" in the divorce.  At one point, 
he told Grebauski, in Stewart's presence, that he had offered his 
wife money to "just go away," but she refused.  Approximately two 
to three months before the victim was killed, the defendant, 
Breault, and Berryman were at Berryman's house, drinking beer, 
when the defendant asked if they wanted to "make some money."  
When Berryman responded affirmatively, thinking the defendant 
meant a job installing vinyl siding, the defendant explained that 
it was not a siding job, but that he would pay $2,000 for killing 
his wife, because she was going to take everything in the 
divorce.  The defendant also said that, "[i]f [his] wife takes a 
dime, . . . he would pay $1,000 to get it back."  Breault and 
Berryman thought that the defendant was joking.  At some point 
either during or shortly after this conversation, Phinney 
 
5 
arrived. 
 
In December, 1979, when the defendant was at Grebauski's 
house, he asked if Grebauski "knew anyone big, big and black that 
would go in there and do things to his wife that she would never 
forget" while the defendant was in Florida with his fourteen year 
old daughter, Ginger Kirby.  Both Stewart and Shannon Glover 
Grebauski, Grebauski's then girl friend,2 heard the defendant 
talking about the divorce and his desire that his wife were dead. 
 
At some point thereafter, Grebauski approached Stewart, 
saying that he "[had] a deal for" Stewart, and that the defendant 
had offered Grebauski $5,000 to kill the defendant's wife.  
Stewart initially declined the offer, but, after continued 
"prodding" by Grebauski, eventually agreed to kill the 
defendant's wife because he owed Grebauski $500 for purchases of 
cocaine.  Approximately a week before the victim was stabbed, 
Stewart told his friend Stephen Tracy that "Grebauski had 
somebody who wanted him to do his old lady." 
 
Around December 10, 1979, a week before school vacation was 
to begin, the defendant and his daughter Kirby, who lived with 
the victim, left to visit the defendant's older daughter, Linda 
McCraney, who lived in Florida.  Kirby stayed with McCraney in 
                     
2 At the time of the stabbing, Richard Grebauski and Shannon 
Glover had been living together for approximately ten years.  
They married in February, 2003. 
 
6 
McCraney's mobile home,3 and the defendant stayed with his girl 
friend and her family.  During that time, the defendant made a 
number of derogatory comments about his wife, including telling 
McCraney several times that her mother "was a whore" who was 
sleeping with everyone on Cape Cod, and that, "if [she] continued 
with the divorce she would be sorry for what she had done."  
McCraney thought that her father and sister would return to 
Massachusetts before school resumed on January 3 or 4, 1980, but, 
on January 3, they had not left and showed no signs of leaving.  
When McCraney asked the defendant about his plans, the defendant 
said that "it was none of [her] goddamn business and that he 
[would] leave whenever he[ was] ready to leave." 
 
On January 3, 1980, the day planned for the killing, Stewart 
went to Grebauski's house.  Grebauski received a telephone call 
from the defendant in Florida; the defendant said that "it had to 
be done that night" because Kirby needed to return to school.  
Grebauski gave Stewart one of two fillet knives that were kept on 
the kitchen windowsill, and a pair of gloves.  Grebauski told 
Stewart that the victim would be alone in the house, because her 
son would be working and her daughter was in Florida.  He told 
Stewart to just walk into the house and stab the victim in the 
heart. 
 
When Stewart drove to the victim's house for the first time 
                     
3 The defendant owned the mobile home. 
 
7 
that evening, no one was at home; he went to a nearby grocery 
store parking lot and returned shortly thereafter to see a 
vehicle in the driveway.  He entered as Grebauski had instructed, 
and found the victim upstairs in the bathroom.  He started to 
choke the victim, and she slipped and hit her head on the 
radiator.  Stewart then stabbed the victim in the heart and left 
her on the floor with her head leaning up against the side of the 
tub.  While he was moving the victim's body, he inadvertently cut 
her arm.  He threw the knife and gloves in the Cape Cod canal, 
then drove to his grandmother's house in Brockton, where he 
telephoned Grebauski to tell him that "it's done."  Grebauski 
came to the grandmother's house, and he and Stewart discussed 
plans for an alibi; Stewart planned to say that he had been with 
Grebauski in Brockton when the victim was killed.  Grebauski said 
that he could not pay Stewart until the defendant returned from 
Florida. 
 
That same day, Berryman telephoned the defendant in Florida, 
looking for Phinney.  Berryman and Phinney had been working on a 
vinyl siding job which was almost completed when Phinney suddenly 
departed for a week-long vacation in Florida.  When the client 
contacted Berryman, angry that the job was not finished, Berryman 
attempted to reach Phinney at the defendant's house in Florida.  
Berryman asked Phinney when he would be returning to 
Massachusetts to complete the job, and Phinney replied, "It 
 
8 
hasn't happened yet, but it's going to happen tonight.  Listen to 
your radio, watch the TV.  She's going to die tonight."4 
 
Edmond Carriere, III, the son of the victim and the 
defendant,5 contacted McCraney and Kirby in Florida to tell them 
that their mother had been killed; they flew to Massachusetts, 
while the defendant drove back.  At the victim's funeral service, 
the defendant did not go inside the church, but remained outside, 
sitting near his parked car.  Kirby testified that the family did 
not want the defendant at the funeral because they believed that 
he had harmed the victim. 
 
At some point shortly after the victim's death, Stewart and 
Grebauski were playing pool in Grebauski's house when the 
defendant telephoned to say he was coming over with the money.  
When the defendant arrived, he said he was pleased that his wife 
was dead ("the bitch was out of the way"), but was very angry 
that his son had not been killed and that the body had not been 
removed from the house so that it would not be discovered.  After 
an angry exchange during which the defendant told Grebauski he 
                     
4 At trial, David Phinney testified that he did not tell 
Charles Berryman to watch for news of the victim's death until 
after he had received notice the following day that she had been 
killed; Phinney said he told Berryman to watch the television 
news to get more information about the killing if he had not 
heard the details. 
 
 
5 Edmond Carriere, III, who was approximately twenty-two 
years old at the time of the victim's death, lived with the 
victim and his fourteen year old sister.  For simplicity, we 
refer to Edmond by his first name. 
 
9 
would not pay all of the agreed amount, the defendant and 
Grebauski resolved their differences and the defendant threw 
$10,000, in a stack of bills bound in an elastic band, onto the 
pool table.  When the defendant left, Grebauski and Stewart had a 
heated discussion about the amount Stewart would be paid.  
Stewart had believed that the full amount offered by the 
defendant was $5,000, not $10,000.  Eventually, Stewart agreed to 
accept $4,500 for the killing, representing the $5,000 Grebauski 
had discussed, minus a $500 deduction for the cocaine debt. 
 
A few months after the victim was killed, Berryman 
encountered the defendant on the driveway at Phinney's house.  
The defendant approached Berryman, put his arm around Berryman's 
shoulder, and said, "Charlie, I hear you're doing a lot of 
flapping."  When Berryman inquired what the defendant meant by 
this, he responded, "You know what I mean.  You keep it up, 
you're going to end up just like my wife." 
 
Several years after the victim's death, in 1994, the 
defendant encountered Edmond and Edmond's wife, Sharon Cope 
Carriere, at a fair in the Onset section of Wareham.  The 
defendant approached them, but Edmond refused to speak to him, 
claiming that the defendant was not his father.  The defendant 
then engaged in a loud and angry verbal confrontation with Cope 
Carriere, saying, among other things, that Edmond had had a 
sexual relationship with his mother and should have been killed 
 
10 
with her. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  The defendant 
challenges the introduction or exclusion of testimony to which 
there was an objection at trial, as well as testimony which was 
introduced without objection.  Where the error was preserved, we 
review for prejudicial error and consider "whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to 
the jury's verdict."  Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23 
(1999).  The Commonwealth "bears the risk of doubt when any 
exists as to the error being nonprejudicial."  Id.  Reversal is 
not necessary if the error "did not influence the jury, or had 
but very slight effect."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 
591 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994).  Where the error was unpreserved, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth 
v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
2.  Admission of out-of-court statements.  "Out-of-court 
statements by joint venturers are admissible against the others 
if the statements are made during the pendency of the criminal 
enterprise and in furtherance of it."  Commonwealth v. Burton, 
450 Mass. 55, 63 (2007).  See Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 
Mass. 326, 340 (1983).  Such statements of coventurers are 
considered to be reliable, and are deemed "equivalent to a 
statement by the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 
 
11 
527, 535 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 708 
(1976).  Before statements by coventurers may be admitted, the 
Commonwealth first must establish the existence of the joint 
venture (and the defendant's involvement in it) by a 
preponderance of the evidence, independent of the out-of-court 
statements.  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 844 (2000).  
See Commonwealth v. White, supra at 709 n.7.  If the judge is 
satisfied that the Commonwealth has met this burden, the 
statement may be admitted, and the jury are instructed that they 
may consider the statements only if they find that a joint 
venture existed independent of the statements, and that the 
statements were made in furtherance of that venture.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 427 (2012); Commonwealth 
v. Burton, supra; Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 693 
(2001); Commonwealth v. Cruz, supra at 844-846. 
 
Here, numerous out-of-court statements made by Grebauski, 
Stewart, and Phinney were introduced under the joint venture 
exception to the hearsay rule, the majority through Stewart's 
testimony.  The defendant argues that the Commonwealth did not 
establish the existence of a joint venture between the defendant 
and Grebauski, Stewart, or Phinney, and therefore that many of 
the out-of-court statements should not have been admitted.  The 
defendant argues also that, even if the evidence was sufficient 
to establish a joint venture between himself, Grebauski, and 
 
12 
Stewart, Grebauski's statements should not have been admitted 
because they were testimonial and introduced in violation of 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). 
 
Turning first to this later argument, the claim is 
unavailing.  A defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution to confront the witnesses against him, 
see Crawford v. Washington, supra, "does not bar the admission of 
statements that a reasonable person in the position of the 
declarant would not objectively foresee as being used in the 
investigation or prosecution of a crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Burton, supra at 63-64, citing Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 
Mass. 1, 12-13 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).  This 
inquiry looks to the intent of the declarant and the specific 
circumstances of the statement.  See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 
supra at 12. "Certainly, just after the murder, in the privacy of 
[a residence], neither [coventurer] would have reasonably 
foreseen [his] statements being used in the investigation or 
prosecution of a crime."  Commonwealth v. Burton, supra at 64.  
"Many other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion, 
holding in general that statements of joint venturers (or 
coperpetrators or coconspirators) are the type of remarks that 
the Crawford Court deemed nontestimonial."  Id.  See Crawford v. 
Washington, supra at 56 ("statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy" are not testimonial). 
 
13 
 
a.  Evidence of existence of joint venture.  The defendant 
challenges as improper hearsay testimony the introduction of 
Stewart's description of statements Grebauski made to him 
concerning the defendant's plan to kill his wife, particularly 
that, on the night of the killing, Grebauski told Stewart that 
the defendant had said during a telephone call from Florida that 
"it had to be done that night" because the defendant's daughter 
had to return to school.  The defendant also contests testimony 
by Stewart's friend Stephen Tracy describing what Stewart told 
him about someone wanting Grebauski "to do his old lady" a few 
weeks before the victim's death; Berryman's testimony regarding 
the substance of the telephone call with Phinney in Florida on 
the day of the stabbing; and State police Sergeant Paul White's 
testimony that Phinney told him that he went to Florida in part 
to provide an alibi for the defendant.  The defendant filed a 
motion in limine to exclude Tracy's testimony, and thereafter 
objected when it was introduced at trial.  Defense counsel 
objected to portions of Stewart's and Berryman's trial testimony; 
the defendant did not object to White's testimony. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that the evidence of joint 
venture was stronger in this case than in Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, supra at 534-536, in which the court concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence of a joint venture between the 
defendant, Grebauski, and Stewart, but insufficient evidence of 
 
14 
Phinney's involvement. 
 
We conclude that the evidence in this case was more than 
sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant entered 
into a joint venture with Grebauski and Stewart to kill his wife.  
Therefore, save for a few exceptions that we discuss infra, the 
statements by Grebauski and Stewart were admissible as made in 
furtherance of the joint venture to kill the defendant's wife.6  
See Commonwealth v. Bright, supra at 426-427; Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, supra.  Moreover, the defendant's own statements made in 
furtherance of the joint venture to kill his wife are not 
hearsay, and were admitted properly.  See Commonwealth v. Bright, 
supra at 426 n.8, citing Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 
365-366 (2001). 
                     
 
6 Because the testimony concerning Phinney's knowledge of 
the joint venture was scant, limited, and contradictory, however, 
and, in any event, no testimony was introduced to establish that 
Phinney shared the intent to kill the victim, the evidence was 
insufficient to establish a joint venture between the defendant 
and Phinney, or between Phinney and Grebauski or Stewart.  
Therefore, Berryman's testimony concerning Phinney's statement 
over the telephone, "It hasn't happened yet, but it's going to 
happen tonight.  Listen to your radio, watch the TV.  She's going 
to die tonight," should not have been admitted.  The objected-to 
admission of this evidence, however, did not result in 
prejudicial error.  The statement was cumulative of substantial 
other evidence of the defendant's plan to kill the victim on 
January 3, and also was cumulative of other evidence that Phinney 
unexpectedly traveled to Florida with his family a few days 
previously, inferably in part to provide an alibi for the 
defendant.  Moreover, at trial, Phinney denied having made the 
statement, and said that he had told Berryman after being 
notified of the victim's death to watch the news for further 
details if Berryman did not already know them.  See note 4, 
supra. 
 
15 
 
b.  Scope of joint venture.  We turn to consideration of 
particular statements that the defendant contends, even if we 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence of a joint venture, 
were beyond its scope.  The defendant maintains that certain 
statements were inadmissible because they were made before the 
joint venture was formed, or after it ended.  See Commonwealth v. 
Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 452 (1988) (statements of joint venturer 
not admissible after joint venture has ended).  The inquiry to 
determine if a statement is made during the pendency of the joint 
venture, however, "focuses not on whether the crime has been 
completed, but on whether a joint venture was continuing."  
Commonwealth v. Stewart, supra at 537, citing Commonwealth v. 
Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 322 (2007).  Statements made prior to the 
formation of a joint venture may be admissible if they were made 
in furtherance of a joint venture that formed thereafter.  See 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 248 (2000) ("Matters 
surrounding the history of the conspiracy, including statements 
of coconspirators, may be admissible even if they predate the 
conspiracy").  Statements made in an effort to conceal a crime, 
made after the crime has been completed, may be admissible under 
the joint venture exception because the joint venture is then 
ongoing, with a purpose to ensure that the joint venture itself 
remains concealed.  See Commonwealth v. Braley, supra at 322; 
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 211 (2005), quoting 
 
16 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 543 (1990). 
 
The defendant challenges Stewart's testimony about 
Grebauski's initial $5,000 offer, and Tracy's statement that 
Stewart said Grebauski had someone who wanted Grebauski to "do 
his old lady" as having been made before the joint venture was 
formed.  The challenged statements, however, were probative of 
the defendant's intent to kill his wife and of the defendant's, 
Stewart's, and Grebauski's actions in furtherance of that intent 
several months later.  The judge did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that these statements concerning the formation of the 
joint venture were not "too remote to be relevant."  See 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, supra; Commonwealth v. Rankins, 429 
Mass. 470, 474 (1999). 
 
The defendant also challenges Stewart's testimony regarding 
the theft of two truckloads of lumber, in which he, the 
defendant, and Grebauski were involved, as being outside the 
scope of the joint venture to kill the victim.  The testimony was 
introduced to support a finding that the three would have been 
involved in a subsequent joint venture to perpetrate the killing.  
We agree that this testimony should not have been admitted on 
this ground.  The lumber theft took place in 1977, several years 
before the defendant told his friends and acquaintances that he 
was seeking someone to kill his wife, and did not form any part 
of the later joint venture to perpetrate the killing.  The 
 
17 
testimony about another criminal enterprise in which the 
defendant was involved thus was not relevant to any issue in the 
case, and served only to suggest that the defendant was likely to 
engage in criminal activity.  Because the Commonwealth contends 
in its brief that the testimony was also admissible to show 
motive and intent, we reserve for later discussion, see part 4, 
infra, our consideration whether the admission of this 
unobjected-to testimony was error resulting in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
3.  Propensity evidence.  The defendant asserts that certain 
of his statements and testimony concerning his conduct after his 
wife's death should not have been admitted because the evidence 
was more prejudicial than probative and was introduced merely to 
paint a negative portrait of his character.  We consider each 
challenged statement in turn. 
 
a.  Statements that defendant wanted his son killed.  The 
defendant asserts error in the admission of testimony that, in 
addition to his wife, the defendant sought to have his son 
killed.  This evidence included testimony by Stewart that when 
Grebauski initially made the $5,000 offer to Stewart to kill the 
defendant's wife, Grebauski said that the defendant also wanted 
his son killed, but Stewart refused to have anything to do with 
the son or with moving the wife's body.  The evidence also 
included testimony by Stewart that, at Grebauski's house after 
 
18 
the stabbing, the defendant was reported to have been angry that 
his son had not been killed; and testimony by the defendant's 
daughter-in-law that, in 1994, she and the defendant's son 
encountered the defendant at a fair in Onset, where the defendant 
told the son that he should have been killed just like his 
mother.  The Commonwealth sought to introduce this evidence under 
the joint venture exception, maintaining that a plan to kill the 
defendant's son was part of the joint venture between Stewart, 
Grebauski, and the defendant to kill his wife.  In its brief, the 
Commonwealth asserts also that the evidence is relevant to the 
defendant's motive to kill his wife.  The defendant did not 
object to the admission of most of this testimony at trial, but 
did object to certain statements. 
 
We conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to support 
the existence of a joint venture to kill the defendant's son.  
The only evidence of the defendant's solicitation of participants 
in a joint venture to kill his son, or of others' possible 
agreement to participate in such a venture, was introduced 
through Stewart.  Stewart testified that, when Grebauski 
initially had asked him about killing the defendant's wife, 
Stewart told Grebauski that he refused to have anything to do 
with killing the son or moving the wife's body.  The plan between 
Grebauski and Stewart proceeded with the killing of the 
defendant's wife.  Stewart also testified that he "assumed" that 
 
19 
the conversation about the son meant that the defendant and 
Grebauski had discussed the matter previously.  Stewart further 
testified that, after the killing, Grebauski said the defendant 
was angry that the son had not been killed and the wife's body 
had not been moved.  Because Stewart explicitly refused to 
participate in any plan to kill the son (which apparently went by 
the wayside upon Stewart's refusal), Stewart was not a member of 
a joint venture to kill the son, and his statements about any 
such venture, if one existed, do not fall under the joint venture 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
 
Nor was there sufficient evidence independently to support 
the existence of a joint venture to kill the defendant's son.  
The only evidence of such a joint venture was the hearsay 
statements by Stewart.  The statements by the defendant at the 
fair in Onset, years after the killing, that his son should have 
been killed like the defendant's wife, do not indicate anything 
about the defendant's involvement in a joint venture years 
earlier that might have been formed with an intent to kill the 
son. 
 
The Commonwealth asserts also that the defendant's hostility 
toward his son is probative of the defendant's hostility toward 
the victim.  Evidence of a defendant's hostility towards his 
spouse may be admissible to show a defendant's motive to kill the 
spouse.  See Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 15 
 
20 
(2012).  Here, however, evidence of the defendant's hostility 
towards his son does not render the desired inference of the 
defendant's hostility toward the victim and intent to kill her 
more probable than it would have been absent such evidence 
without asking the jury to make impermissible inferences 
concerning the defendant's character.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 83 (1989).  The defendant's motive to 
kill his wife is unrelated to any motive he may have had to kill 
his son.  The two crimes were separate and distinct.  The 
evidence of the defendant's motive to kill his wife hinged on her 
refusing to give him a divorce or to accept money to "just go 
away," and the defendant's belief that his wife would take 
everything he owned in a divorce.  There was no such motive for 
the defendant to want to kill his son.  Furthermore, statements 
made years after the victim's death were not, as the Commonwealth 
argues, "part and parcel" of the plan to kill the defendant's 
wife.  We agree that the evidence that the defendant said he 
wanted his son killed was more prejudicial than probative. 
 
Moreover, the evidence was not crucial to the Commonwealth's 
case.  Although the evidence of the defendant throwing $10,000 on 
the pool table, and his argument with Grebauski about whether the 
whole amount should be paid, was part of the course of the joint 
venture, the argument also involved the defendant's expressed 
anger over the manner in which the victim had been killed, and 
 
21 
the fact that her body had not been removed from the house as he 
had told Grebauski he wanted done.  Likewise, Stewart's argument 
with Grebauski over the $5,000 he believed had been offered for 
the stabbing, and the amount of $10,000 that the defendant had 
discussed with Grebauski, did not involve the defendant's son.  
Thus, the Commonwealth could have presented its case effectively 
without statements about a hypothetical crime that never 
occurred. 
 
Nonetheless, given the extensive, properly admitted 
testimony about the defendant's statements that he wanted his 
wife killed, and his efforts to hire someone to do so; his trip 
to Florida and his statements while in Florida; and his actions 
following the victim's death, the admission of the testimony 
concerning the defendant's statements about his son was unlikely 
to have influenced the jury's verdict.  See Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 435 Mass. 569, 578-579 (2002). 
 
b.  Evidence of defendant's hostility toward victim.  The 
defendant contends also that other testimony, both objected to 
and not objected to at trial, was unduly prejudicial and 
introduced to attack his character by portraying him as what the 
defendant characterizes as an "evil" man who did not like his 
family (a "cold monster or devil . . . who cared so little about 
his wife and children").  The challenged testimony includes the 
statement by the defendant's daughter McCraney that the defendant 
 
22 
said her mother was a "whore" who was engaging in sex with 
"everyone on Cape Cod"; that while McCraney and the defendant's 
younger daughter flew back from Florida upon being told of the 
victim's death, the defendant instead chose to drive back; and 
that the defendant did not attend his wife's funeral.  The 
defendant also challenges the admission of statements by Glover 
Grebauski, Grebauski's then girl friend, that, approximately one 
month before the stabbing, the defendant had asked if Grebauski 
"knew anyone big, big and black that would go in there and do 
things to his wife that she would never forget."  The 
Commonwealth maintains that this evidence was admitted properly 
to show the defendant's state of mind and intent toward the 
victim, and that the judge's instruction on prior bad acts was 
sufficient to cure any prejudice. 
 
Evidence of a defendant's adversarial or hostile 
relationship with a spouse may be admissible to show a 
defendant's motive to kill the spouse.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 15 (2012) (evidence that defendant 
was abusive to estranged wife and children and had threatened to 
kill them prior to starting fire in wife's house was admissible 
because it "tended to show the defendant's long-standing and 
persistent anger and hostility toward" his family and thus was 
relevant to establish motive and intent); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 
441 Mass. 459, 464 (2004) (defendant's use of cocaine and 
 
23 
association with prostitutes admissible to show motive to kill 
wife, because it supported inference that defendant would seek 
money from wife's inheritance to support these habits); 
Commonwealth v. Hunter, 416 Mass. 831, 837 (1994), S.C., 427 
Mass. 651 (1998) (out-of-court statements concerning witness's 
conversation with victim admissible to show hostile relationship 
between defendant and victim, in order to establish defendant's 
state of mind and motive to kill victim); Commonwealth v. Gil, 
393 Mass. 204, 215 (1984) (evidence of hostile relationship 
between defendant and spouse may be admissible as relevant to 
defendant's motive to kill spouse). 
 
Although the derogatory statements about the defendant's 
wife were prejudicial to the defendant, they were not unfairly 
prejudicial.  The defendant's intent, and his participation in 
the planning of the killing that was carried out by Stewart and 
Grebauski, were key issues in the case, and the statements were 
clearly probative on those issues.  See Commonwealth v. Carey, 
463 Mass. 378, 387-388 (2012).  The statement concerning "someone 
big, big and black," who would do things his wife would never 
forget, is similarly relevant to the defendant's state of mind 
and his hostility toward the victim.  Although, as the defendant 
emphasizes, the statement contained both racial and sexual 
overtones, it was not of such an unduly inflammatory nature as to 
require a conclusion that the judge abused his discretion in 
 
24 
allowing its admission, where its probative value concerning the 
defendant's state of mind was strong.  See Commonwealth v. Olsen, 
452 Mass. 284, 294 (2008) (that evidence on material matter is 
"gruesome" or "inflammatory" does not necessarily render it 
inadmissible).  There was also no error in the judge's decision 
to permit the introduction of evidence that the defendant drove 
rather than flew home after being informed of his wife's death, 
and that he did not attend the victim's funeral.  Evidence of a 
defendant's behavior after a victim's death may be admissible 
where it is probative of the defendant's mental state at the time 
of the killing.  See Commonwealth v. Mendes, supra at 466-467; 
Commonwealth v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 434 (2001). 
 
4.  Prior bad acts.  Stewart testified that, approximately 
two years before the killing, he and Grebauski stole two 
truckloads of lumber from a lumberyard in Wareham, at the behest 
of the defendant, with Stewart acting as the driver, and that 
Grebauski paid him $2,500 for the job.  In addition to his 
argument that testimony concerning the theft of the two 
truckloads of lumber was beyond the scope of the joint venture, 
see part 2, supra, the defendant argues that the testimony was 
not relevant to any issue in the case, and was introduced 
impermissibly only to attack his character. 
 
Evidence of prior bad acts "is not admissible to show a 
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the charged 
 
25 
crime."  Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128 (2006).  It 
may, however, "be admissible if relevant for other purposes such 
as 'common scheme, pattern of operation, . . . identity, intent 
or motive.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 
358, 366 (2001).  See Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 80 
(2010) (evidence of misconduct or prior bad acts may be 
admissible to show defendant's motive, intent, or state of mind).  
Even if such evidence is relevant for other purposes, its 
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.  See Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 
182, 192 (2010); Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2014). 
 
We conclude that, in addition to not supporting the 
formation of a later joint venture to kill the defendant's wife, 
the testimony concerning the lumber theft also should not have 
been admitted to show motive or intent.  The lumber theft was too 
remote in time to make the formation of a joint venture between 
the defendant, Stewart, and Grebauski to kill the victim more 
likely, and bore little, if any, probative value on a motive to 
kill the victim.  It served therefore merely to paint the 
defendant as someone prone to criminal activity. 
 
Nonetheless, there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice in the erroneous admission of this 
evidence.  In the context of the other evidence at trial 
concerning the brutal killing and the victim's efforts to defend 
 
26 
herself, the theft of materials from a lumber yard was a 
relatively minor offense.  Furthermore, Stewart testified that 
Grebauski, who was "into everything," and not the defendant, paid 
him to be a driver in the lumber yard theft.  Moreover, defense 
counsel made use of the lumber theft evidence as part of his 
defense strategy.  In both opening statement and closing 
argument, defense counsel argued that Grebauski, not Stewart, 
killed the victim, and that the lumber theft gave Grebauski an 
independent motive to want the victim dead, because both the 
victim and the defendant's son Edmond were planning to testify 
against Grebauski at his upcoming trial on charges stemming from 
the lumber theft.7 
 
5.  Exclusion of statement by deceased joint venturer.  The 
defendant argues that his right to due process was violated when 
the judge denied his motion to admit, as a statement against 
penal interest, testimony from David Mello that, while he and his 
friend Grebauski were driving past the victim's house at some 
point within a month of the stabbing, Grebauski said, "See that 
white house there?  I offed the bitch.  She was getting to be too 
much trouble and I killed her.  I had to wait until her daughter 
went to Florida with her father before I could kill her." 
 
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, 
                     
7 Testimony suggested that the defendant was estranged from 
Edmond in part because of Edmond's plan to testify against 
Grebauski. 
 
27 
and to offer evidence that another person committed the crime.  
See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 404 Mass. 204, 208-209 (1989); 
Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 562 (1984).  An out-of-
court statement "is admissible under the penal interest exception 
if (1) the declarant's testimony is unavailable; (2) the 
statement so far tends to subject the declarant to criminal 
liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have 
made the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) the 
statement, if offered to exculpate the accused, is corroborated 
by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness."  
Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 677 (1999), citing 
Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 73 (1986).  A judge 
determining whether to admit such a statement "should not base 
his determination on an assessment of the proffered witness's 
credibility," but rather should consider several factors, 
including the relationship between the declarant and the witness, 
the reliability and character of the declarant, and "the 
credibility of the declarant and the credibility and probativity 
of his statement" to assess whether "there is some reasonable 
likelihood that the statement could be true" given the other 
evidence.  Commonwealth v. Drew, supra at 75-76 (citation 
omitted).  Where the question of corroboration of the declarant's 
credibility or trustworthiness is a close one, a judge should err 
in favor of allowing the statement to be admitted.  See 
 
28 
Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 Mass. 510, 516-517 (2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002) (judges should favor admission of 
statements against penal interest and leave assessments of 
credibility and weight to jury). 
 
The judge denied the motion to admit Mello's testimony on 
the ground that Grebauski's statement did not meet the third 
prong of the requirements for a statement against penal interest, 
that the statement be corroborated by circumstances clearly 
indicating its trustworthiness.  See Commonwealth v. Charles, 
supra.  The judge noted that, in addition to being Mello's 
cocaine supplier, Grebauski had engaged in a number of criminal 
ventures with Mello, including selling drugs, stealing, and 
automobile theft.  He concluded that there was no corroborating 
evidence, and that nothing in the circumstances indicated the 
proffered testimony was trustworthy.  Given a defendant's 
constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence, and that, 
in considering a statement against penal interest, "[t]he jury, 
rather than the judge, should evaluate the credibility of the 
witness," Commonwealth v. Drew, supra at 76, Mello's proffered 
testimony should have been admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Tague, 
supra. 
 
There was no prejudice, however, in the decision not to 
leave the question of Mello's or Grebauski's credibility to the 
jury.  Grebauski's statement that he "offed" the victim was not 
 
29 
exculpatory and did nothing to undermine the Commonwealth's 
theory that Grebauski participated in the killing at the 
defendant's request, while the defendant was the mastermind.  
Whether Grebauski killed the victim himself, or hired Stewart to 
do so, did not exculpate the defendant; under either theory of 
the crime, the defendant asked Grebauski to kill the victim, and 
paid him for having done so.  Given the other evidence of 
Grebauski's involvement, the statement would have "had but very 
slight effect" on the jury.  Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 
348, 353 (1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass. App. 
Ct. 437, 445 (1983). 
 
6.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that a new trial is required based on two improper aspects of the 
prosecutor's closing argument.  He maintains first that the 
prosecutor misstated the law and impermissibly shifted the burden 
of proof by several of his remarks.  The defendant maintains 
further that certain of the prosecutor's comments were highly 
inflammatory and not based on the evidence, but rather were 
inappropriate efforts to attack the defendant's character and to 
portray him as a "mastermind," a "puppet master," and the 
"architect of a murder for hire" who wished to "envelop" himself 
in "a cloak of darkness" and a "veil of secrecy." 
 
Prosecutors may not "misstate the evidence or refer to facts 
not in evidence" or "play . . . on the jury's sympathy or 
 
30 
emotions, or comment on the consequences of a verdict."  
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987).  They may, 
however, argue "forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence 
and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence."  Id. at 516.  "Remarks made during closing arguments 
are considered in the context of the entire argument, and in 
light of the judge's instructions to the jury and the evidence at 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 231 
(1992).  See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140 (2007).  
The absence of an objection at trial may be viewed as "some 
indication that the tone [and] manner . . . of the now challenged 
aspects of the prosecutor's argument were not unfairly 
prejudicial."  Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 (l995), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 360 (1985).  
"[I]nstructions may mitigate any prejudice in the final 
argument."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, supra at 517. 
 
a.  Statements concerning Commonwealth's burden.  As he did 
at trial, the defendant challenges certain of the prosecutor's 
statements that the defendant maintains were misstatements of law 
that shifted the burden of proof away from the Commonwealth, or 
that would have resulted in juror confusion as to the standard of 
proof necessary for a conviction.  He points particularly to the 
prosecutor's comment that it was the jury's duty to "determine 
what happened or what didn't happen," and "to determine what 
 
31 
version [of events] is the correct version.  What is it that 
happened?"  He also challenges the prosecutor's statement that 
"[t]he term 'verdict' comes from the Latin 'veritas,' truth; and 
'dicta,' to speak.  Speak the truth.  Thirty-two years is a long 
time; and now it's time for you, jurors, to speak the truth." 
 
Following closing arguments, the defendant sought a curative 
instruction as to these statements.  He argued that telling the 
jury that their job is to decide "which version is correct . . . 
shifts the burden," and, "They're not looking for the truth here.  
They're looking to see whether the Commonwealth has proved their 
case [beyond a reasonable doubt]."  The judge declined to give 
such an instruction.  In his final charge, however, the judge 
instructed: 
 
"[Y]our function as the jury is to determine the facts 
of this case.  You are the sole and exclusive judges of the 
facts.  You alone will determine, What evidence do I accept?  
How important any evidence is that you do accept.  And what 
conclusions you can draw from all of the believable evidence 
in this case.  After that, you must apply the law as I'm 
going to state it to you to the facts as you have determined 
them to be in order to decide whether the Commonwealth has, 
as it must, proven this particular Defendant guilty of the 
offense known as murder beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
 
"It is improper for a prosecutor to equate a guilty verdict 
with justice."  Commonwealth v. Francis, supra at 140.  See 
Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 328-329 (2000) (request to 
jury to "do your job" and, implicitly, to find defendant guilty, 
was not permissible argument).  Even assuming that certain of the 
 
32 
prosecutor's statements could be seen as implicitly urging the 
jury to do their job and find the defendant guilty, the majority 
of the prosecutor's statements that the defendant characterizes 
as burden-shifting did not suggest that the Commonwealth's burden 
was less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the jury 
could do their duty only by reaching a guilty verdict.  Indeed, 
early in his argument the prosecutor noted that the defendant's 
counsel had misspoken at one point and suggested that the burden 
of proof rested on defense counsel; the prosecutor then correctly 
stated: 
 
"But many times, he also said the burden is on the 
Commonwealth.  And folks, make no mistake about that.  That 
is absolutely 100 percent true.  The burden is on the 
government here to prove this case to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
 
The prosecutor's statement regarding the jury's duty to determine 
what happened, and to seek the truth, were not improper.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471-472 (1998) (prosecutor 
may urge jury to "do [their] duties as jurors to return a just 
verdict").  It is appropriate for counsel to "impress upon the 
jury their duty to act with . . . impartiality."  Commonwealth v. 
LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 707 (1977). 
 
A few of the prosecutor's comments were more questionable.  
The remark that the jury had to determine which of two stories 
was the true version of events did not, standing alone, inform 
the jury that their duty was to decide whether the Commonwealth 
 
33 
had proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
rather than to pick between two scenarios proffered by the 
attorneys.8  Viewed in the context of the prosecutor's entire 
closing argument, however, see Commonwealth v. Lyons, supra, 
there was no prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 
supra (prosecutor's remark that jury were courageous and that he 
                     
8 Although the defendant made no mention of this statement, 
we note that, toward the end of his closing, having summarized 
the evidence and immediately after his statement that thirty-two 
years is a long time, the prosecutor said, "Edmond Carriere, Jr. 
is guilty of murder in the first degree under the theory of 
deliberate premeditation; and he's guilty of murder in the first 
degree by extreme atrocity or cruelty."  A prosecutor may not 
"interject his personal belief in the defendant's guilt" into his 
closing argument.  See Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 206 
(2012), citing Commonwealth v. Good, 409 Mass. 612, 623 (1991).  
In the context of the surrounding statements, however, the jury 
reasonably could have understood this statement as the prosecutor 
arguing permissibly that they should find the defendant guilty 
based on the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Mamay, 407 Mass. 412, 
424-425 (1990).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 500 
(1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 277 
(1982) (jury "could be expected to take both arguments with a 
grain of salt" and would be able to sort out excessive claims 
made by prosecutor). 
 
In any event, even if the statement were improper, it 
resulted in no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  At the beginning of his closing, the prosecutor himself 
said that the jury must find the facts and that their collective 
memories alone would determine what the facts were, not the 
attorneys' views of the evidence.  Later, before summarizing the 
evidence, he argued properly, "I'm going to suggest to you, 
ladies and gentlemen, that you will be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  In addition, the closing was followed by the 
judge's forceful instructions on the attorneys' arguments being 
merely their view of the evidence, and his instructions on the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof and the jury's duty to determine 
the facts and how much, if any, of the witnesses' testimony they 
believed. 
 
34 
believed they would return truthful verdict not improper).  
Immediately before and after making this statement, the 
prosecutor informed the jury correctly that the Commonwealth had 
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it was 
their exclusive province to determine what the facts were.  The 
prosecutor's closing argument was followed by the judge's 
detailed and proper instructions that explained the 
Commonwealth's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; the instructions also emphasized that opening 
statements and closing arguments are not evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Francis, supra at 140-141 (prosecutor's statement 
that "justice delayed is justice denied" was improper, but error 
did not create substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice 
because jury knew that thirty years had passed since killing 
occurred and argument was followed by appropriate jury 
instructions); Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, supra at 232, 
and cases cited (where prosecutor made improper burden-shifting 
comments in closing, defendant must show that effect on jury was 
sufficiently prejudicial to merit reversal). 
 
b.  Inflammatory remarks.  "A prosecutor must limit comment 
in closing statement to the evidence and fair inferences that can 
be drawn from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Pearce, 427 Mass. 
642, 646 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Kelly, 417 Mass. 266, 
270 (1994).  Nonetheless, a prosecutor may argue zealously in 
 
35 
support of inferences favorable to the Commonwealth's case that 
reasonably may be drawn from the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 748-749 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 376 (1989) ("to the degree the recitation 
of the evidence was inflammatory, that was inherent in the 
odious . . . nature of the crime[] committed").  Although 
forceful, the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant 
seems to have been based properly on reasonable inferences that 
could have been drawn from the evidence.  The suggestion that the 
defendant was a "mastermind" and the "architect of a murder for 
hire" was grounded in the evidence of months of planning by the 
defendant to arrange his wife's killing in Massachusetts while he 
was with friends and relatives in Florida; the characterization 
of the defendant as a "puppet master," while perhaps hyperbolic, 
also rested on this evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Lyons, supra 
at 472-473, and cases cited ("The prosecutor's remarks were 
characteristic of 'enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and 
excusable hyperbole,' and did not cross the line between fair and 
improper argument"). 
 
Moreover, even if certain of the remarks might have been 
better avoided, there was no error giving rise to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Given the properly 
admitted evidence, the comments that the defendant wanted someone 
else to "do the dirty work" so that he could have an alibi, or 
 
36 
that he "wishe[d] to envelop" himself "in a cloak of darkness, in 
a shroud of secrecy," did not step over the line of zealous 
advocacy.  Furthermore, during his final charge immediately after 
the prosecutor's closing, the judge instructed that closing 
arguments are not evidence, but "merely an opportunity for [the 
attorneys] to sum up from their perspective what they felt the 
evidence might suggest or mean to you."  See Commonwealth v. 
Francis, supra at 140-141; Commonwealth v. Kozec, supra at 517 
("instructions may mitigate any prejudice in the final 
argument"). 
 
6.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed 
the entire record pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no 
reason to reduce the conviction of murder in the first degree to 
a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.