Title: Collins v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SOLOMON COLLINS, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 385, 2011 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§ 
ID No. 0910019961 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee, 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 19, 2012 
   Decided: November 15, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, of the Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware for Appellant. 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire (argued), Danielle J. Brennan, Esquire, of the Department 
of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2 
 
Defendant-Below/Appellant Solomon Collins appeals his convictions by a 
jury of Murder First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony, and three counts of Reckless Endangering First Degree.  
Collins was charged with the shooting death of Tommear Tinnin.   
At trial, the State offered into evidence two out-of-court statements under 11 
Del. C. § 3507 that identified Collins as the shooter of Tinnin.  The declarants—
Violet Gibson and Shakira Romeo—denied making the statements during their in-
court testimony.  The statements were admitted into evidence based upon the 
testimony of Detective Patrick Conner, the officer who interviewed Gibson and 
Romeo.   
After eleven hours of deliberation, the jury reported to the trial judge that 
they were deadlocked.  The trial judge gave an Allen charge and instructed the jury 
to deliberate further.  Two hours later, the jury returned the guilty verdicts.  
Collins raises three claims on appeal.  He argues that there was an 
insufficient foundation to admit into evidence the out-of-court statement of Gibson, 
that there was an insufficient foundation to admit into evidence the out-of-court 
statement of Romeo, and that the trial judge erred in administering an Allen charge, 
which, as administered, was coercive.    
Gibson and Romeo were classic turncoat witnesses.  We conclude that the 
testimony at trial presented a sufficient foundation for the admission of their out-
3 
 
of-court statements under § 3507.  The record shows that their out-of-court 
statements were given voluntarily, they were each subject to cross examination at 
trial, and their in-court testimony touched on both the events perceived and the 
content of their prior statements.  
We also conclude that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in 
giving an Allen charge.  The jury was considering a complex case based largely on 
circumstantial evidence.  The circumstances surrounding the inquiry into whether 
the jury was deadlocked gave the trial judge reason to believe that further 
deliberations would be helpful.  The trial judge did not commit reversible error in 
his wording of the Allen charge, and he sufficiently admonished the jury that 
individual jurors should not surrender their personal convictions simply for the 
sake of unanimity.  Accordingly, we affirm.  
Facts and Procedural History 
On October 8, 2009, at around 3:30 p.m., Tinnin was shot to death while 
sitting in the back seat of a parked car on the corner of 23rd and Washington Streets 
in Wilmington.  Tinnin, who was in the car with his two cousins, Tacarea Redden 
and Korin Redding, and Kanaiah, a 3-year-old relative, was shot to death by a tall, 
African American man wearing a brown “Roca Wear” sweatshirt with white 
lettering wielding a 9 millimeter, semi-automatic handgun.  
4 
 
The assailant fled the scene after the shooting.  As he was fleeing, the 
assailant passed Violet Gibson and Shakira Romeo, who were, independent of one 
another, outside of the same apartment building at the south corner of the 
intersection across the street from the shooting.   
Another witness, located one block away from the shooting, saw two men 
rush into a Nissan Maxima and quickly drive away.  This witness, who was aware 
of the shooting and found the men’s quick exit suspicious, called the police to 
report the activity.  The police recovered the Maxima and found a brown 
sweatshirt with white “Roca Wear” lettering.  Lab technicians later found Collins’s 
DNA on the sweatshirt, as well as gunshot residue.  
Violet Gibson met with Detective Patrick Conner of the Wilmington Police 
Department, and spoke with Det. Conner on the condition that she not be asked to 
testify at trial.  Det. Conner assured Gibson that she would not be required to 
testify.  Det. Conner then presented Gibson with a photo array, from which Gibson 
identified Collins as the shooter.  Gibson’s statements were recorded on audio tape.  
Shakira Romeo met with Det. Conner on October 12 and also identified 
Collins as the shooter from a photo array. 
At trial, Ms. Gibson testified she was on the street at the time of the shooting 
but did not see the shooting and could not identify the shooter.  Gibson confirmed 
5 
 
that she had spoken with Det. Conner, but claimed she may not have been truthful 
in her statements to him.  
Similarly, Ms. Romeo testified that she was present when the shooting 
occurred and heard the gunshots, but she could not positively identify Collins as 
the shooter.  Romeo testified that she spoke to a Detective about the shooting, but 
did not remember what she said.  Lastly, she testified that everyone in the photo 
array looked familiar.  
Gibson and Romeo’s out-of-court statements were admitted into evidence 
during the testimony of Det. Conner, over defense objection.   
After an eight day trial the case was submitted to the jury.  After eleven 
hours of deliberation, the jury foreman sent the second of two notes1 to the trial 
judge.  The second note read, “The jury believes that further discussions will not 
change the present vote of a hung jury.”   
The trial judge asked the foreman if he believed “further deliberations would 
help in this matter at all?”  The trial transcript indicates only that the foreman 
answered, “No.”  However, the trial judge, defense counsel, and prosecutor all 
commented on the record that the foreman’s response was a very “interesting” no.  
The prosecuting attorney clarified for the record that the “foreman’s answer was 
kind of a long drawn out no.”  The trial judge explained:  “That answer threw out 
                                          
 
1 The first note, which requested a magnifying glass and a transcript of a witness statement, is 
not relevant to this appeal.  
6 
 
some questions in my mind, so because of that I’m going to read the Allen charge.  
I don’t think it will hurt in this case.”   
Collins’ counsel objected generally to the giving of an Allen charge and 
made three requests to change the Court’s proposed language.  Two of those 
changes the trial judge made.  The jury was then brought back into the courtroom, 
and trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
 
Every case is important to the parties affected.  This trial has 
been time consuming to both parties.  If you should fail to agree 
on a verdict, the verdict is left open and undecided.  Like all 
cases, it must be disposed of sometime.  
 
… 
 
There are matters which, along with other and perhaps more 
obvious ones, remind us of how important and desirable it is for 
you to unanimously agree upon a verdict but only if you can do 
so without violence to your individual judgment and 
conscience. 
 
You should not surrender your conscientious convictions.  It 
is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to 
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement if you can do 
so without doing so to individual judgment. [sic] 
 
… 
 
If a much greater number of you are for one side, each 
dissenting juror ought to consider whether his or her position is 
a reasonable one, since it makes no effective impression on the 
minds of so many equally honest, intelligent, fellow jurors, who 
bear the same responsibility, serve under the same sanction of 
the same - - excuse me, serve under the sanction of the same 
oath and have heard the same evidence with, we may assume, 
the same attention  and an equal desire to arrive at the truth. 
In a like manner, the jurors who constitute a greater number 
should consider the reasons of those who take a different 
position to see whether there may be persuasive merit in that 
position.  You are not partisans, you are judges, judges of the 
facts.  
7 
 
 
… 
 
In the performance of this high duty, you are at liberty to 
disregard any comments of both the Court and counsel, 
including, of course, the remarks I’m now making. 
 
Remember at all times no juror should yield his or her 
conscientious belief as to the weight and meaning of the 
evidence.  Remember, also, that after full deliberation and 
consideration of all the evidence it is your duty to agree upon 
the verdict if you can do so without violating your individual 
judgment and conscience.  
The Allen charge was read at 10:58 a.m.  At 1:04 p.m. that same 
day, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on all charges.  
Collins was sentenced to life imprisonment for Murder First Degree and 
level V time for the remaining counts.  This appeal followed. 
Analysis 
 
There Was a Proper Foundation to Admit Each of 
the Out-of-Court Statements Under § 3507 
This Court reviews a trial judge’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion.2  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds 
of reason in view of the circumstances or so ignored recognized rules of law or 
practice to produce injustice.”3  If this Court determines that the trial judge abused 
                                          
 
2 Manna v. State, 945 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Del. 2008) (citing Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 78–79 
(Del. 1993)). 
3 Culp v. State, 766 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 2001) (internal citations omitted).  
8 
 
his or her discretion, it then determines whether the error rises to the level of 
significant prejudice sufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial.4 
Section 3507 of the Delaware Criminal Code states, in relevant part: 
(a)  In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross 
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value. 
(b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply 
regardless of whether the witness’ in-court testimony is 
consistent with the prior statement or not….5  
The draftsmen of § 3507 expressly contemplated a circumstance where a 
witness voluntarily gives a prior statement but later denies the substance of that 
statement at trial.6  In Woodlin v. State, we re-iterated the foundational 
requirements for the admission of a § 3507 statement: 
The basic procedure for admitting a statement under section 
3507 was first announced ... in Keys v. State [337 A.2d 18 
(Del.1975) ].  In [Keys], we held: “In order to offer the out-of-
court statement of a witness, the Statute requires [that] the 
direct examination of the declarant ... [touch on] both the events 
perceived or heard and the out-of-court statement itself.”  Three 
weeks later, we supplemented Keys in Hatcher v. State [337 
A.2d 30 (Del.1975) ], where we addressed another foundational 
requirement for the admission of a witness' statement pursuant 
to section 3507-voluntariness....  In Ray v. State [587 A.2d 439 
(Del.1991) ], we also explained (and cited Johnson ) in holding 
in order to conform to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an 
accused's right to confront witnesses against him, the declarant 
                                          
 
4 Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365, 372 (Del. 1999). 
5 11 Del. C. § 3507.  
6 Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 (Del. 1975).  
9 
 
must also be subject to cross-examination on the content of the 
statement as well as its truthfulness.7 
A trial judge decides whether a statement was voluntarily made under a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard.8  To find a statement voluntary, the 
declarant’s free will must be not “so overborne that the statements produced were 
not the product of [a] rational intellect and free will.”9  
The Statement of Violet Gibson 
Collins claims that Gibson’s out-of-court statement was wrongfully admitted 
into evidence, because (1) Gibson did not speak with Detectives voluntarily 
because Det. Conners’ promised Gibson she would not be called upon to testify in 
court, and (2) Gibson’s in-court testimony did not touch on the content of her out-
of-court statement.    
Gibson’s interview with Det. Conner did not occur at the police station and 
she was not in handcuffs.  She was not prevented from terminating the interview, 
and at no point did Det. Conner tell Gibson she had no choice other than to speak 
to him.   Det. Conner’s promise to Gibson—that she would not be called to testify 
at trial—did not render her statement involuntary.   
                                          
 
7 Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 616 (Del. 2010) (quoting Woodlin v. State, 3 A.3d 1084, 1087 
(Del. 2010) (internal citations omitted)).  
8 Woodlin v. State, 3 A.3d at 1087 (citing Hatcher v. State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. 1975)).  
9 Roth v. State, 788 A.2d 101, 107-08 (Del. 2001) (quoting Martin v. State, 433 A.2d 1025, 1032 
(Del. 1981).     
10 
 
Collins argues that Gibson’s in-court testimony only “touched on” her out-
of-court statement insofar as she denied making it.  Gibson testified that she was 
present on the street at the day and time the shooting occurred.  She testified that 
she spoke with Det. Conner about the shooting, that she was “not sure” about any 
questions that Det. Conner asked her and was she not sure of her responses.  
As this Court has explained, a purpose of § 3507 is to allow the admission 
into evidence the out-of-court statements of turncoat witnesses.10  Gibson’s 
testimony described her position in relation to where the shooting occurred, her 
reaction to the shooting, and her interaction with Det. Conners.  It was for the jury 
to assess the credibility of Gibson and of Det. Conners, who testified about 
Gibson’s prior statements.  Gibson’s statements were properly admitted into 
evidence under § 3507.   
The Statement of Shakira Romeo 
Romeo admitted on the witness stand that she spoke to the Detectives 
voluntarily; therefore, Collins’ only claim on appeal is that Romeo’s in-court 
testimony did not “touch on” her out-of-court statement.   
Romeo testified she was present while the shooting occurred and that she 
heard the gunshots.  She remembered speaking to a Detective, looking at a photo 
array, and recognizing several faces from the photo array, but she did not 
                                          
 
10 Blake v. State, 3 A.3d 1077, 1082 (Del. 2010) (citing Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124 (Del. 
1975)).  
11 
 
remember picking Collins out of the photo array.  She testified she would have told 
the Officer the truth.   
Collins’ entire argument rests on the claim that because Romeo denied 
making the identification of Collins, her testimony did not “touch on” her prior 
statement.  This argument is without merit.  A turncoat witness denying a prior 
statement is a classic example of § 3507’s applicability.11  While on the witness 
stand, Romeo described particularities of the shooting, her interactions with the 
police officers, and the photo array she was shown.  Romeo’s testimony, although 
inconsistent with her prior statements, sufficiently did “touch on” the content of 
her prior statements.  The trial judge did not err in admitting Romeo’s out-of-court 
statement into evidence under § 3507.  
The Trial Judge’s Allen Charge  
Generally, this court reviews a trial judge’s Allen charge under an abuse of 
discretion standard.12  “[S]upplementary instructions which encourage the jury to 
reach a verdict, sometimes referred to as an ‘Allen charge’ or ‘dynamite charge’ 
are generally proper.”13  The potential coercive effect of an Allen charge “can be 
eliminated by having the charge include an admonition that each individual juror 
                                          
 
11 Blake v. State, 3 A.3d at 1082 (citing Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124 (Del. 1975)).  
12 Papatinas v. State, 820 A.2d 372, 2003 WL 1857548 at *3 (Del. 2003); Coverdale v. State, 
637 A.2d 826, 1993 WL 557929 at *1 (Del. 1993).  
13 Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 87 (Del. 1979).  
12 
 
not surrender his or her honest convictions and not return any verdict contrary to 
the dictates of personal conscience.”14 
Where a defendant does not fairly raise a question for consideration by the 
trial judge, and raises the question for the first time on appeal, this Court reviews 
the claim for plain error.15  “Under the plain error standard of review, the error 
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize 
the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”16  “Furthermore, the doctrine of plain 
error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; 
which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly 
deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.”17 
Collins’ defense counsel lodged a general objection to giving an Allen 
charge at all.  Counsel also made three requests to change the language of the 
proposed charge, two of which were granted.  On appeal, Collins raises the 
objections rejected by the trial court, but he also raises a specific objection to the 
wording of the instruction that was not raised before the trial court.  Specifically, 
                                          
 
14 Brown v. State, 369 A.2d 682, 684 (Del. 1976).  
15 See Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”); Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) 
(quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 
16 Turner, 5 A.3d at 615 (internal citations omitted). 
17 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
13 
 
Collins now claims the trial court should not have distinguished between 
“majority” and “minority” jurors in the charge.  
Collins’ objections below were made in two stages.  His general objection 
addressed the giving of an Allen charge.  Defense counsel stated:  
I automatically object . . . I always object to Allen charges, so I 
do in this case, and especially for the record, it’s not a terribly 
complicated case and there’s only one issue, identity. 
Once the trial judge determined that an Allen charge would be given, defense 
counsel then continued to object to three portions of the charge.  He did not object 
to the use of the majority/minority distinctions, however.  We review for plain 
error any portion of the charge to which no specific objection was made.     
In determining whether an Allen charge was coercive, we consider: 
(1) the timing of the instruction, (2) the words used in the 
instruction, (3) the length of the deliberations both before and 
after the instruction, and (4) the complexity of the case.18 
 
As to timing, the charge was given after eleven hours of deliberation.  The 
jury had returned for a new day of deliberation and the Allen charge was given at 
10:58 a.m.  This timing is comparable to that in Davis v. State.  There, we found no 
coercion when, among other circumstances, the charge had been given early in the 
day.19   
                                          
 
18 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826 (Del. 1994) (citing Streitfeld v. State, 369 A.2d 674, 677 
(Del. 1977) (“Streitfeld factors”).  See also Boatson v. State, 457 A.2d 738, 743 (Del. 1983); 
Papatinas v. State, 820 A.2d 372, 2003 WL 1857548, *2 (Del. 2003).  
19 Davis v. State, 725 A.2d 441, 1999 WL 86055 at *3 (Del. 1999).  
14 
 
Collins argues that the wording of the instruction concerning jurors in “the 
majority” or “the minority” was coercive to the minority jurors.  In his instructions, 
the trial judge asked both the majority and minority jurors to re-examine their 
views.  He used different phrasing in addressing the majority jurors than he used in 
addressing the minority jurors.  Although the use of a majority/minority distinction 
was disapproved in United States v. Eastern Medical Billing, Inc.,20 the Third 
Circuit decided that case not on constitutional grounds, but on the basis of its 
supervisory power over the federal district courts.21  Of significance to this appeal 
is that the federal circuits are split as to whether the majority/minority distinction is 
coercive.   
An Allen charge that instructs the majority and the minority to re-examine 
their views has been approved in the First,22 Fourth,23 Sixth24 and Eighth25 Circuits.  
The Allen charges approved by these circuits differed in their wording, but each 
drew a distinction between majority and minority jurors and in some fashion asked 
both groups to reconsider their views.  Importantly, each of those circuits found 
repeated warnings—as was done here—that jurors not give up their individual 
convictions, diminished the risk that the majority/minority distinction might be 
                                          
 
20 United States v. Eastern Medical Billing, 230 F.3d 600 (3d Cir. 2000).  
21 Id. at 608.  
22 United States v. Hernandez-Albino, 177 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 1999).  
23 U.S. v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 1997).  
24 Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847, 850-51 (6th Cir. 1984).  
25 U.S. v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 1980).  
15 
 
coercive.  The Seventh26 and the District of Columbia27 Circuits agree with the 
Third Circuit that any majority/minority distinction is coercive.   
Although these approaches suggest that any instruction using the 
majority/minority distinction is best avoided, the divergent federal precedent 
persuades us that it was not plain error for the trial judge to make the distinction in 
his Allen charge in this case.  The error in wording—if there was one—was neither 
plain nor obvious.     
Collins next argues the Allen charge was coercive because the trial judge did 
not “instruct the jurors ‘not to render any verdict contrary to the dictates of 
personal conscience,’” as this Court required in Brown v. State.28  This objection 
was not raised at trial.  We therefore consider only whether the trial judge 
committed plain error.  The Brown decision noted that trial judge should include 
such an admonition in its Allen charge,29 but did not require that precise wording to 
be used.  Indeed, Collins’ reading of Brown runs counter to Streitfeld v. State, 
where this Court found no plain error when that admonition was not given.30  
Here, the trial judge expressly admonished the jurors that they should not do 
“violence to [their] individual judgment and conscience” and they “should not 
                                          
 
26 U.S. v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1973).   
27 U.S. v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  
28 Brown, 369 A.2d at 684.  
29 Id.  
30 Streitfeld v. State, 369 A.2d 674, 677 (Del. 1977).  
16 
 
surrender [their] conscientious convictions.”  This type of warning was given, in 
various forms, four times during the trial judge’s Allen charge.  Sufficient 
admonition was given to the jurors to maintain their personal convictions, which 
made this charge consistent with our Brown and Streitfeld decisions.   
Collins next argues that the trial judge’s statement that the jury “is at liberty 
to disregard the comments of both the Court and counsel” was improper.  This 
portion of the charge was not objected to at trial.  Therefore, we consider only 
whether the trial judge committed plain error in giving the instruction.  In Maxion 
v. State, this Court found in isolation this language “may seem inappropriate,” but 
when coupled with repeated reminders to the jury to not “surrender their 
convictions unless they believed them to be erroneous,” created no threat of 
coercion.31   
Similarly, in Smith v. State, this Court held that a similar charge which stated 
the jury could “disregard the comments of both the Court and counsel” was 
permissible.32  In Smith, we found that the trial judge was merely reminding the 
jury that it was “part of its duty to assess the credibility of all witnesses” and in 
doing so it could “disregard comments of counsel (or even the Court) that, in the 
process of weighing the evidence, it found were not credible.”33 
                                          
 
31 Maxion v. State, 612 A.2d 158, 1992 WL 183093 at *1 (Del. 1992).  
32 Smith v. State, 839 A.2d 666, 2003 WL 22931398 at *2-3 (Del. 2003).  
33 Id. at *3.  
17 
 
Finally, Collins argues that the trial court erred in highlighting how many 
Court resources were devoted to presenting this trial, and that the case “must be 
disposed of sometime.”  This portion of the instruction was objected to at trial, and 
will be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  This Court found in Papatinas v. State 
that language referencing the case “must be disposed of sometime” to be 
permissible, so long as it is accompanied by repeated reminders that the individual 
jurors should not “surrender his or her individual judgment or honest 
convictions.”34  
The length of the jury deliberations in this case does not demonstrate 
coercion.  The jury deliberated for approximately two hours more after the Allen 
charge before returning a verdict.  The case involved a violent murder, in addition 
to numerous and serious other charges, where much of the evidence was 
circumstantial.  The jury was required to weigh the credibility of witnesses who 
contradicted their own prior statements.  After considering the four Streitfeld 
factors, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in giving the Allen charge 
or in overruling the objection made at trial to its wording.  Finally, we find no plain 
error.   
 
 
                                          
 
34 Papantinas v. State, 820 A.2d 372, 2003 WL 1857548 at *1-2 (Del. 2003).  
18 
 
Conclusion 
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.