Title: Brown v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Chrisshannon BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-376                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 16, 1997


1.   Prohibition, writ of -- properly raised where trial court
     proposes to act in excess of jurisdiction -- when writ
     granted. -- Prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is never
     raised to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising
     its jurisdiction, but only where it is proposing to act in
     excess of its jurisdiction; Ark. R. Crim. P. 28 is
     jurisdictional because it requires a defendant to be brought
     to trial within twelve months or be absolutely discharged; the
     supreme court will not grant a writ of prohibition unless it
     is clearly warranted, and will only issue such a writ in a
     case where there are no disputed facts.

2.   Prohibition, writ of -- disputed facts remained in issue --
     supreme court declined to issue writ. -- Where fact questions
     remained as to whether petitioner was available for trial and
     whether the State exercised due diligence in this speedy-trial
     matter, which questions had to be decided by the trial court,
     the supreme court dismissed the petition with prejudice;
     because disputed facts were integral to deciding the case, the
     supreme court declined to issue any writ of prohibition.


     Petition for Writ of Prohibition; dismissed.
     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by:  Kent C. Krause,
Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly Terry, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for respondent.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Chrisshannon Brown petitions this court for a writ of
prohibition against the Pulaski County Circuit Court, First
Division, asserting that the court mistakenly denied her motion to
dismiss for speedy-trial reasons.  The circuit court denied Brown's
motion, finding the trial delay was attributable to Brown's
unavailability, which is excludable under Rule 28.3(e) of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
     The facts relevant to Brown's argument begin with her arrest
on November 30, 1995, at a home located at 2606 South Arch Street,
Little Rock.  Brown's arrest resulted in her being charged with
several drug crimes.  When taken to the police department, Officer
Subhash Wagh asked Brown where she lived, and Brown gave the South
Arch Street address.  In confirmation, Wagh read aloud the same
address when he mirandized her.  However, when signing the Miranda
form, she listed a different address -- 3006 Bermuda, Little Rock. 
Later, on November 30, Brown was released on $5,000.00 bond, and
the bond papers reflected her address to be 2606 South Arch Street.
     On May 29, 1996, the State filed its felony information
against Brown, and set out Brown's address as 2606 South Arch
Street.  On June 29, 1996, the court mailed a notice to Brown at
the South Arch Street address, directing her to appear for plea and
arraignment in circuit court on July 17, 1996.  The letter was not
returned to the court.  When Brown failed to appear, as notified,
on July 17, the court issued a warrant for her arrest.  However,
sometime after July 17, someone contacted the court's case
coordinator, and as a result, the case coordinator placed Brown's
plea and arraignment hearing back on the docket for July 31, 1996. 
No other notice was given to Brown, nevertheless she appeared on
July 31.  At that hearing, the court scheduled a jury trial for
September 19, 1996.
     When the September 19 trial date arrived, Brown's counsel
informed the court that a conflict of interest had arisen between
Brown and her co-defendant.  Upon agreeing to sever Brown's and her
co-defendant's cases, the court set separate dates for each.  At
that time, the court noted without objection that, for speedy-trial
purposes, Brown's actions had tolled the thirteen-day period from
July 17 to July 30.  The court then set a new trial date for
December 5, 1996.   
     Prior to the December 5 trial, Brown moved for dismissal on
speedy-trial grounds, stating that the speedy-trial rule, Ark. R.
Crim. P. 28, required that she be brought to trial within twelve
months from the time of her arrest or be absolutely discharged. 
Because her December 5 trial date was six days past the twelve-
month speedy-trial period, she asked that her case be dismissed. 
The court, however, excluded the thirteen-day period in July as it
had previously ruled, and it denied Brown's motion.  Brown then
filed her petition for writ of prohibition in this court, and makes
the same argument she made in circuit court, claiming the thirteen-
day period should not have been excluded.
     Prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is never raised to
prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising its
jurisdiction, only where it is proposing to act in excess of its
jurisdiction.  Rhodes v. Capehart, 313 Ark. 16,