Title: Greene v. Commissioner of Correction (Concurrence)

State: connecticut

Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court

Document:

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GREENE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION—CONCURRENCE
D’AURIA, J., with whom McDONALD, J., joins, con-
curring in the judgment. Like the majority, I conclude
that the petitioner, Mashawn Greene, was not deprived
of due process of law as guaranteed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. I
therefore concur in the judgment affirming the habeas
court’s denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
However, I would affirm on the alternative ground
advanced by the respondent, the Commissioner of Cor-
rection.1 Specifically, I conclude that the prosecutor in
this case discharged his duty under Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959),
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10
L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972), by
disclosing to the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel, prior
to the petitioner’s criminal trial, the full extent of any
agreement or understanding he had with the cooperat-
ing witness, Markeyse Kelly. See Beltran v. Cockrell,
294 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2002) (‘‘[g]overnment fulfilled
its duty of disclosure by supplying [the defendants]
with its recollection of the true circumstances of the
negotiations with the witness at a time when recall
[to the witness stand] and further exploration of these
matters was still possible’’ [internal quotation marks
omitted]); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105
(5th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Vice v.
United States, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S. Ct. 1700, 52 L. Ed. 2d
390 (1977); see also State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173,
186, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010) (prerequisite of any Brady,
Napue, and Giglio claim is existence of undisclosed
agreement or understanding between cooperating wit-
ness and state); State v. Floyd, 253 Conn. 700, 736–37,
756
A.2d
799
(2000)
(undisclosed,
implied
plea
agreement first predicate to due process claim regard-
ing nondisclosure of agreement); Hines v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 164 Conn. App. 712, 725, 138 A.3d
430 (2016) (‘‘agreement by a prosecutor with a cooperat-
ing witness to bring the witness’ cooperation to the
attention of the [sentencing] judge . . . must be dis-
closed to the defendant against whom he testifies, even
if the deal does not involve a specific recommendation
by the prosecutor for the imposition of a particular
sentence’’). Accordingly, although I agree with parts II
and III of the majority opinion, I do not join in part I.
I differ with the majority in that, after ‘‘careful review’’
of Kelly’s testimony, with an eye toward ‘‘its probable
effect on the jury’’; Adams v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 309 Conn. 359, 373, 71 A.3d 512 (2013); I cannot
conclude that Kelly’s answers to the prosecutor’s ques-
tions on direct examination were not misleading.2
However, as both the prosecutor and the petitioner’s
criminal trial counsel testified at the habeas trial, and
as the habeas court found, the petitioner’s counsel ‘‘was
made aware of the . . . understanding by [the prosecu-
tor] prior to trial.’’ The petitioner does not contest this
finding on appeal. He was therefore able to use this
information during cross-examination to attempt to
impeach Kelly’s credibility. To the extent that he
refrained from doing so,3 or refrained from asking the
prosecutor, through the court, to clarify any under-
standing the witness had with the state, the petitioner
also does not challenge those omissions in this appeal.
Cf. United States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737, 738 and n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (prosecutor has obligation to disclose
exculpatory
information
when
‘‘defense
counsel,
although possibly aware of the relevant information,
was unable, as a practical matter, to use it to cast doubt
upon contrary evidence proffered by the government
or its witnesses’’).
On this record, I would simply assume Kelly’s testi-
mony was misleading, but, then, I would conclude that
no due process violation resulted. My choice to make
this assumption stems from my concern that, after Kel-
ly’s testimony on direct examination, ‘‘jurors could well
have been left with the impression . . . that [he did
not have] any incentive to testify favorably for the
state.’’ State v. Jordan, 135 Conn. App. 635, 667, 42 A.3d
457 (2012), rev’d in part on other grounds, 314 Conn.
354, 102 A.3d 1 (2014). A review of Kelly’s direct exami-
nation reveals that he testified only that, after giving a
statement implicating the petitioner, he later pleaded
guilty to assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol
without a permit. The jurors were provided with no
context during Kelly’s direct examination that allowed
them to assess or determine whether he had actually
faced greater charges or whether permitting him to
plead guilty to only those charges constituted a ‘‘ ‘sweet-
heart deal,’ ’’ as the respondent refers to it. Nor was
there, during Kelly’s direct examination, any mention of
the understanding, made explicit at Kelly’s plea hearing,
that ‘‘his continued cooperation in the cases of the
codefendants [including the petitioner] will be made
known to the court at the time of [Kelly’s] sentencing
. . . .’’
Instead, Kelly answered the prosecutor’s first ques-
tion about his ‘‘understanding’’ by denying, accurately,
that there was an agreement concerning what his actual
sentence would be. He answered the prosecutor’s next
question by stating, also accurately, that he was facing
a maximum of twenty-five years incarceration on the
charges to which he pleaded guilty.4 The prosecutor
then asked, ‘‘[a]nd do you have any understanding as
to what could happen if you came in here and testified?’’
Kelly responded, ‘‘[n]ope.’’ Unsolicited, Kelly then
expounded: ‘‘When I gave that statement [to the police
implicating the petitioner], I ain’t make no deal. They
were trying to make a deal with my life. When I gave
that statement, I ain’t make no deals, no lawyer, no
nobody, no nothing, just the cop. I ain’t got no deal. I
ain’t got to hear [anybody] saying anything. I ain’t got
no deal. I could have sat here. It ain’t really matter.’’
The prosecutor then dropped this line of questioning.
The ‘‘context’’5 in which this testimony arose was
that the prosecutor asked Kelly, his own cooperating
witness, whether there was any understanding about
his sentence or about ‘‘what could happen if you came
in here and testified.’’ Cf. United States v. Harris, 498
F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir.) (‘‘[t]his is not to say that the
prosecutor must play the role of defense counsel, and
ferret out ambiguities in his witness’ responses on
cross-examination’’ [emphasis added]), cert. denied
sub nom. Young v. United States, 419 U.S. 1069, 95 S.
Ct. 655, 42 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1974). As the respondent’s
counsel admitted candidly in oral argument before this
court, the usual purpose for this line of questioning by
the prosecution is to ‘‘anticipatorily . . . take the sting
out of’’ any agreement the state has with a witness or,
in other words, to preemptively expose the bias of its
own witness. Considering the ‘‘probable effect on the
jury’’; Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
309 Conn. 373; Kelly’s responsive denials (‘‘no under-
standing’’ and ‘‘no deal’’) could well have been interpre-
ted to bolster his credibility rather than to take the
‘‘sting’’ out of any agreement or to preemptively expose
his bias. It is doubtful this was the prosecutor’s intent,6
but, the prosecutor, having decided to wade into this
area of inquiry, could have led a reasonable jury to
understand that Kelly did not ‘‘[have] any incentive to
testify favorably for the state.’’ State v. Jordan, supra,
135 Conn. App. 667.
Because, in my view, there was no undisclosed
agreement or understanding in the present case, I con-
clude that the petitioner’s due process rights were not
jeopardized. See State v. Ouellette, supra, 295 Conn.
186. As a result, I respectfully concur in the judgment.
1 I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts and procedural history.
2 A case in which a witness has clearly testified falsely or committed
perjury, whether on direct or cross-examination, may pose a different due
process question, which is not implicated here. See United States v. Sanfili-
ppo, 564 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]ue process is violated when
the prosecutor, although not soliciting false evidence from a [g]overnment
witness, allows it to stand uncorrected when it appears’’); 6 W. LaFave et
al., Criminal Procedure (4th Ed. 2015) § 24.3 (d), p. 471 (‘‘[i]f the prosecutor
knows or should have known that the [witness’] statement is untrue, it has
a duty to correct it’’).
3 As the respondent points out in his brief to this court, the petitioner’s
criminal trial counsel did not specifically ask Kelly about any understanding
he had with the state that his cooperation would be made known to the
sentencing judge. Kelly’s cross-examination instead focused on the reduced
charge to which he had pleaded guilty.
4 The following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and Kelly at
the petitioner’s criminal trial:
‘‘Q. Now, what was your understanding of what your sentence would be?
‘‘A. It wasn’t no understanding [of] what I was getting sentenced to; it
was just that.
‘‘Q. Well, what was the maximum [sentence] that you are looking at?
‘‘A. Twenty-five years.’’
5 The respondent contends, including in oral argument before this court,
that, when understood ‘‘in context’’ from Kelly’s point of view, Kelly clearly
believed the prosecutor was asking him only whether there was an
agreement about his particular sentence, and he answered accordingly.
However, our examination of whether the testimony was misleading is
undertaken not from Kelly’s point of view but from the perspective of the
jurors; Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 309 Conn. 369–73;
who are not well versed in the nuanced vagaries of leniency agreements or
the ‘‘ ‘wink and nod’ ’’ nature of such promises. See, e.g., Gilday v. Callahan,
59 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir. 1995) (disclosure of ‘‘understanding’’ between
defense counsel and prosecutor ‘‘would have permitted the jury reasonably
to infer that, even if the ‘wink and nod’ deal had not been explicitly communi-
cated to [the witness], he must have been given some indication that testi-
mony helpful to the government would be helpful to his own cause’’), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1175, 116 S. Ct. 1269, 134 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1996); see also
Note, ‘‘Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the
Prosecutor’s Role as a Minister of Justice,’’ 51 Duke L.J. 1333, 1334–35 (2002)
(describing witnesses’ ‘‘rational expectation of leniency’’ notwithstanding
absence of formal plea agreement). Although it is possible the jury under-
stood all three questions to relate only to the length of any ultimate sentence
Kelly might receive, the jury might have considered the first two questions
to relate only to promises of a specific sentence, but they might have under-
stood the last question to relate more generally to ‘‘any understanding’’ or
benefit that might flow from Kelly’s decision to ‘‘[come] in here and testif[y].’’
(Emphasis added.) For similar reasons, I do not agree that testimony—even
credible testimony—more than a decade later about what the prosecutor
understood from Kelly’s answers (or even what the prosecutor intended by
his questions) is probative of what jurors might have reasonably understood.
6 To be clear, I do not conclude that any misimpression about Kelly’s
incentive to testify, elicited on direct examination, was the product of the
prosecutor’s attempt to deceive the jury. As the respondent’s counsel can-
didly admitted in his brief and in oral argument before this court, the prosecu-
tor’s questions were ‘‘ambiguous’’ and ‘‘inartful,’’ resulting in ‘‘equally
ambiguous’’ answers. But the obligations of Brady apply ‘‘irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the [prosecutor].’’ Brady v. Maryland, supra,
373 U.S. 87; see also State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354, 370, 102 A.3d 1 (2014)
(applying Brady principle that prosecutor’s good faith intent is similarly
irrelevant in Napue and Giglio cases, including when prosecutor fails to
correct witness’ potentially misleading testimony). To attempt to avoid any
ambiguity and potential misimpression, I agree with both the majority and
the respondent that, when a prosecutor seeks to expose an understanding or
agreement between the state and a cooperating witness, the better practice
is for the prosectuor to ask leading questions that accurately describe the
nature of any agreement between the witness and the state. See text accom-
panying footnote 18 of the majority opinion.