Title: Berry et al. v. City of Montgomery et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:04/06/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
_________________________
1101435
_________________________
Ex parte City of Montgomery et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Dashad Berry et al.  
v.
City of Montgomery et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-10-251)
BOLIN, Justice.
The City of Montgomery (the "City") and its employees,
police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O.
1101435
Commander, and N.W. McMahon petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to enter a
summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted
against them by Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel
Johnson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
plaintiffs").1
Facts
I. Dashad Berry
Dashad Berry is a T-4 paraplegic, paralyzed from the
chest down.  On March 18, 2009, Jeremy Beamon and Thomas
Roberson picked Berry up at his house to go purchase
cigarettes.  Berry transferred himself from his wheelchair
into the backseat of Beamon's vehicle.  Berry's friends then
placed his wheelchair by the front door of Berry's house.  The
three left Berry's house with Beamon driving, Roberson in the
front passenger seat, and Berry in the 
backseat. Approximately
one mile from Berry's residence, the trio encountered a
driver's license checkpoint on Lower Wetumpka Road.  When
The claims arise from three separate incidents involving
1
the individual plaintiffs, which incidents are not related to
each other. Each plaintiff filed a separate complaint against
the City and the particular officers involved in his or her
incident. Apparently, the cases were consolidated in 
the 
trial
court.
2
1101435
Beamon could not produce a driver's license, he was directed
by a police officer to move his vehicle to a parking area.
Officer J.A. Kennedy got Beamon's contact information and
returned to his patrol car to determine if Beamon had a valid
driver's license and any outstanding warrants.
In the meantime, another police officer on the scene
smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and asked Beamon,
Roberson, and Berry to get out of the vehicle so that the
vehicle could be searched.  Beamon and Roberson complied and
were seated on the ground next to the vehicle.  Berry notified
the officer that he was a paraplegic and that he could not get
out of the vehicle.  Officer J.J. Oglesby, the supervising
officer on the scene, was summoned to the vehicle.  Berry
stated that Officer Oglesby asked him what paraplegic meant
and that Berry responded that it meant he had a "complete
injury" and that he could not get out of the vehicle without
his wheelchair.  Berry testified that at the time he had in
his possession catheters and lubricating jell. Beamon and
Roberson also told the officers that Berry was a paraplegic.
Berry testified that he was told by an officer –- whom he
could not identify other than as being white –- that if he did
3
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not get out of the vehicle and sit on the ground he would be
"Tased."  Berry testified that he then asked the officer if he
could telephone his mother to bring his wheelchair to the
scene and that the officer replied that "they did not want any
mama drama there."  Berry stated that he then asked Beamon to
telephone his mother and that the officers told Beamon that if
he picked up his cellular telephone he would be placed in the
back of a patrol car.  
Berry placed his hands behind his back and was
handcuffed. Berry was then removed from the vehicle by
Officers Oglesby and Kennedy and was carried a short distance
to a patrol car.  One officer was behind Berry holding him
under the armpits while the other officer was in front of
Berry holding him by the legs as they carried him to the
patrol car. Berry was placed on the edge of the backseat of
the patrol car and Officer Kennedy positioned himself in front
of Berry to support him as Officer Oglesby went around to the
other side of the patrol car to reach through the backseat to
slide Berry into the patrol car.  Berry stated that while he
was sitting on the edge of the backseat of the patrol car he
slid off the seat and fell to the ground, striking his back on
4
1101435
the bottom frame of the patrol car.  Officer Kennedy stated
that Berry slipped out of the backseat and that he caught him
and eased Berry down onto the frame of the patrol car.  Berry
was then lifted up by the officers and placed in the backseat
of the patrol car. 
Officer Oglesby testified that he did not initially
believe that Berry was a paraplegic because there was no
wheelchair in the vehicle, Berry was sitting upright in the
backseat without using his hands to steady himself, and
another officer indicated that he had seen Berry's leg moving.
Officer Oglesby stated that he did not ask Berry what
"paraplegic" meant, that he did not threaten to "Tase" him if
he did not get out of the vehicle, and that he did not
remember Berry asking to telephone his mother.  Officer
Oglesby stated that it was eventually determined that Berry
was indeed paralyzed and would have to be physically removed
from the vehicle in order for the vehicle to be searched.
Officer Oglesby stated that the safety of the officers
searching the vehicle necessitated that Berry be removed from
the vehicle.  Officer Oglesby testified that he contacted an
emergency-room nurse before removing Berry from the 
vehicle 
to
5
1101435
determine if there were any special precautions that needed to
be taken in moving a paraplegic.  Officer Oglesby stated that
Berry was handcuffed before being removed from the vehicle to
ensure that Berry could not grab the officers or their weapons
because Berry would be in close proximity to the officers
while the officers' hands were occupied carrying Berry.
Officer Oglesby stated that Berry was upset and cursing the
officers as they removed him from the vehicle and that he
refused to be placed on the ground with Beamon and Roberson.
Berry stated that the officers did not question him while
he was in the patrol car.  The search of Beamon's vehicle
revealed the presence of marijuana seeds and stems; however,
no one was arrested.  Beamon was ticketed for failing to have
a driver's license, and the three men were released.  Beamon
and Roberson moved Berry from the patrol car to Beamon's
vehicle.
Berry testified that his mother took him to the emergency
room the next day after he began experiencing pain in his
back.  Berry was diagnosed with abrasions on his back and was
told that his abrasions would take longer to heal because of
his paralysis.
6
1101435
II. Kamessa Williams
Kamessa Williams was 38 years old at the time of the
incident giving rise to her claims; she suffered from
avascular necrosis, "modecular" necrosis, arthritis, and had
had  two hip-replacement surgeries.  She testified that she
has limited range of motion and cannot move quickly.
On July 30, 2009, a police officer was patrolling in the
area of Sheldon Lane when an unknown person shot the window
out of the officer's patrol car.  The following evening police
officers were directed to work a "saturation detail" in the
area of Sheldon Lane.  The officers were directed to take a
zero-tolerance 
approach 
toward 
any 
illegal 
activity, 
including
traffic violations.  Officers M.A. Engberg and J.M. Stewart
were part of  the saturation detail.  They arrived in the area
of Sheldon Lane at approximately 9:00 p.m. and immediately
pulled a car over for a traffic violation.  The officers got
out of their patrol car and made contact with the driver of
the vehicle. At the time the officers were making the traffic
stop, a large group of people, including Williams, had
gathered at Williams's mother's mobile home, 
which 
was 
located
in close proximity to two other mobile homes approximately 100
7
1101435
yards from the scene of the traffic stop.   While the officers
2
were conducting the traffic stop, gunshots were fired in their
direction from the group that had gathered near Williams's
mother's mobile home.  Officer Engberg testified that he
actually saw the muzzle flash of the weapon.  Officers Engberg
and Stewart, along with Officer R.L. Douglas, who was also
working the saturation detail, took cover behind the patrol
car.  The three officers drew their weapons and ran toward the
group, ordering everyone to get down on the ground.  As the
officers were running toward the group and ordering everyone
to the ground, they saw several people run from behind a
sport-utility vehicle ("SUV") that was parked in the road.
Officers Engberg and Douglas ran around the front of the SUV
and saw Williams, who was squatting down beside the passenger
door, facing the door.  Officer Engberg stated that Williams
had her hands tucked between her legs.  Williams testified
that her hands were "open" and that she was telling the
officers she was disabled and could not get on the ground.  In
the meantime, Officer Stewart had ran around the back of the
SUV and saw Williams squatting beside the passenger door of
Williams lived in one of the mobile homes located in
2
close proximity to her mother's mobile home. 
8
1101435
the SUV with her back to him.  Officer Stewart stated that he
could not see Williams's hands and that, because he thought
she might have had a weapon, he placed his foot on her back
and pushed her to the ground.  Williams stated that Officer
Stewart "kicked" her in the back and then "stomped" her in the
back. 
The officers placed approximately four to eight people,
including Williams, on the ground in order to search them for
weapons and to run warrant checks on them.  The scene was
chaotic, and several members of the group were hysterical.
Williams's daughter, who witnessed the incident, became irate
and was yelling at the officers that Williams was disabled.
Williams testified that Officer Stewart replied "I don't give
a f---."  Williams further testified that a family friend who
was present told Officer Stewart that Williams was disabled
and asked why he kicked her and that Officer Stewart replied
"I don't give a f--- about her being disabled."  Officer
Stewart denied using profanity to refer to Williams or to her
being disabled.  Officer Engberg testified that while 
Williams
was on the ground she told him that she was disabled, that she
was injured, and that she was being bitten by fire ants.
9
1101435
Officer Engberg stated that once Williams was searched and it
was determined that she was not in possession of a weapon she
was helped from the ground and was seated in a lawn chair.
Officer Engberg testified that Williams was on the ground for
no longer than two minutes. Officer Engberg further stated
that he immediately radioed for an ambulance and medical
assistance for Williams and that Williams's mother 
was 
allowed
to sit with her until the paramedics arrived.
Williams testified that Officer Stewart required her to
lie on the ground for approximately 30 minutes while she was
being bitten by ants.  She stated that she was still lying on
the ground when the paramedics arrived.  Officer Douglas
testified that Williams was required to lie on the ground with
the other individuals until they were searched and the warrant
checks completed.  Officer Douglas stated that Williams
complained about being injured and being bitten by ants and
that she could have been lying on the ground for up to 30
minutes.  
Officer M.D. Chandler, a major in the police department's
communications department, reviewed a record of the radio
traffic the night in question, which indicated that Officers
10
1101435
Engberg and Stewart radioed at 2156 hours that shots were
fired and requested medical assistance for a citizen at 2202
hours. An emergency-medical-run report completed by the
paramedics indicates that they arrived on the scene at 2212
hours -- 10  minutes after the officers requested medical
assistance.
No weapon was found at the scene, and no one present was
charged or arrested.  Paramedics transported Williams to the
emergency room.  Williams's  medical records indicate that she
was 
diagnosed 
with 
scrapes, 
abrasions, 
back 
strain,
contusions, and chest-wall pain. She was prescribed  pain
medication and was discharged.  Williams testified that she
also suffered numerous ant bites and that, since the incident,
she has had difficulty performing her usual daily tasks.  
III. Miguel Johnson
At the time of the incident giving rise to these claims,
Miguel Johnson was 38 years old and weighed approximately 360
pounds.  Johnson had had previous surgeries on his knee and
hip in which screws had been placed in both, and he suffered
from a shoulder injury for which he had received treatment.
11
1101435
Johnson stated that he also suffered from spinal stenosis,
which caused him to suffer back pain.
On September 10, 2009, Johnson and his friend, Jamal
Rouse, were driving on Chapman Street during a light rain.
Johnson proceeded to make a right turn onto Heustess Street
when the tie rod in the wheel assembly of the vehicle broke,
causing the vehicle to careen into the concrete curb, damaging
both the curb and the vehicle.  Johnson testified that the
tire of the vehicle was flat and the wheel twisted toward the
curb and that he knew that he could not drive the vehicle and
that he was going to need a wrecker service. Johnson stated
that he intended to jack up the vehicle, change the flat tire,
and then twist the wheel back in line so that the vehicle
could more easily be rolled onto and off the wrecker.  Johnson
got the jack and the spare tire from the vehicle and sat on
the curb to change the tire.
Officer Q.O. Commander was dispatched to the scene.
Officer Commander asked to see Johnson's driver's license and
proof of insurance.  Johnson testified that he handed Officer
Commander his wallet, which contained his driver's 
license 
and
eight $100 bills, which were part of an insurance settlement
12
1101435
that he had received.  Johnson stated that Officer Commander
walked to his patrol car and was gone for a couple of minutes.
When Officer Commander returned he requested proof of
insurance from Johnson.  Johnson, who was busy changing the
tire, stated that he consented to Officer Commander's
searching his glove compartment for the proof of insurance. 
Officer Commander was unable to locate proof of insurance, so
he returned to his patrol car to write Johnson a ticket for
not having proof of insurance and to call a wrecker service.
The weather was inclement in Montgomery on the day of the
incident and there were several traffic accidents. Officer
Commander was working as an accident investigator at the time
and was needed at other accident scenes.  He requested a
second patrol unit to come to the scene of Johnson's accident
to wait for the wrecker.  Officer Commander testified that
while he was waiting on the second patrol unit and the wrecker
to arrive, two females walked to the scene and waited with
Johnson and Rouse.  Subsequently, the wrecker and a second
patrol unit occupied by Officers D.D. Jones and G.R. Killough
arrived at the scene.  Johnson testified that Officer
Commander handed him the ticket for failure to have proof of
13
1101435
insurance and turned to walk back to his patrol car.  Johnson
stated that at that time he realized that he did not have his
wallet and called out to Officer Commander, "[E]xcuse me, sir,
you did not give me back my wallet."  Johnson testified that
Officer Commander ignored him and walked to his patrol car and
drove off.  Johnson admitted that he then went "haywire" and
that he began "cussing" and "going off" because the wallet
contained the cash from the insurance settlement he had
received.
Officers Jones and Killough testified that Johnson was
visibly upset and was accusing a police officer of having
taken his money.  Officer Jones located Johnson's wallet on
the ground and handed it to Johnson.  Johnson stated that when
he looked in the wallet he discovered that seven of the eight
$100 bills were missing.  Johnson testified that he was
"heated."  The officers advised Johnson on how to file a
complaint with the police department.  Officers Jones and
Killough left the scene once the wrecker was ready to tow
Johnson's vehicle, and they had no further contact with
Johnson.  Officer Commander testified that he did not take any
14
1101435
money from Johnson's wallet and that the wallet was in
Johnson's possession when he left the scene.
In the meantime, Johnson and Rouse had accepted a ride to
Johnson's house from a friend of Johnson's who had happened by
the accident scene.  Johnson testified that he telephoned
emergency 911 while en route to his house to report that a
police officer had stolen his money.  Johnson stated that he
was told that a patrol unit would be sent to his house.  Once
Johnson and the wrecker reached Johnson's house, the wrecker
driver had his boss call emergency 911 because Johnson was
accusing the driver of the wrecker of having taken his money.3
Officer N.W. McMahon was the first police officer to
arrive at Johnson's residence.  Johnson admitted that after
Officer McMahon had gotten out of his patrol car Johnson
approached the officer "upset" and "angry," telling Officer
McMahon that another officer had stolen his money and that
"you can't trust the police department."  Johnson stated that
Officer McMahon told him to step back and shut up.  Officer
Although Johnson stated that he did not have any
3
discussion with the driver of the truck, the record contains
a transcript of the 911 call in which the driver's boss
requested assistance at Johnson's address after Johnson had
accused the driver of taking his money.
15
1101435
McMahon called for  backup.  Johnson testified that two or
three patrol units and "a lot of" officers soon arrived on the
scene.  Johnson testified that he approached the officers who
had just arrived on the scene while he was upset, trying to
explain to them what had happened when Officer McMahon yelled
"shoot his ass; [T]ase his ass; he [said he would] kill an
officer."  Johnson stated that the officers drew their weapons
and that his wife, who was present, jumped in front of him
stating, "[H]e did not say that."  Johnson testified that he
then turned around and placed his hands on his vehicle.
Johnson testified that the officers "roughed" him up by
bending his arm behind his back and "hooking" him around his
neck.  Johnson stated that he tried to explain to the officers
that he had called them to report a theft and that he was
disabled with "screws in [his] body."  He stated that, as the
officers were placing him in handcuffs, he told them they
would need two pair of handcuffs to handcuff him because he
had a bad shoulder.  Johnson testified that an officer whom he
could not identify responded, "[Y]ou won't get two sets today
motherf-----."  Johnson stated that the officer then kneed him
in the back and placed a single pair of handcuffs on him.
16
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Johnson stated that he screamed because of the pain in his
shoulder.  Johnson was unable to identify the officer who
placed him in handcuffs but specifically stated that it was
not Officer McMahon who, he said, was occupied with Johnson's
wife at the time.  
Johnson was led to a patrol car by an officer and was
told to get in the backseat.  Johnson testified that the front
seat of the patrol car was "back far" and that he could not
get in the backseat because of his size and limited mobility.
He stated that he asked the officer to move the front seat
forward. Johnson testified that Officer A.T. Caffey then
"football block[ed]" him into the backseat of the patrol car,
stating, "[G]et your ass on in there; ain't nobody fixing to
put up with your shit; nobody got time for this."  Johnson
stated that, when he asked the officers why he was being
treated in such a manner and explained that he had called
them, they responded, he said, by telling him to shut up. 
Officer McMahon testified that Johnson was very upset
when he arrived on the scene and that Johnson threatened to
kill police officers.  Officer McMahon stated that he felt
threatened by Johnson and requested a patrol unit equipped
17
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with a Taser. Officer McMahon admitted that he threatened to
have Johnson "Tased" but denied that he used obscene language
in doing so. However, Officer McMahon stated that he would
have been within the police department's force-continuum
standard had he done so.  Officer McMahon testified that
Johnson became compliant once the officers pointed the Taser
at him.  Officer McMahon further testified that Johnson did
inform the officers that he could not bend down to get into
the patrol car because of screws in his knee and hip.
Officer Caffey testified that he and Officer M.L. Manor
responded to a request for assistance from Officer McMahon.
Officer Caffey stated that when he and Officer Manor arrived
at the scene Johnson was "yelling" and "cursing" at Officer
McMahon and that Officer McMahon told Johnson to calm down or
he would be arrested.  Officer Caffey stated that Johnson was
eventually arrested and placed in the patrol car.  Officer
Caffey testified that two pairs of handcuffs were placed on
Johnson because of his size.  Officer Caffey further stated
that Johnson stated that another police officer had taken his
money and he advised Johnson that he needed to contact a
18
1101435
supervisor in the police department or the 
police 
department's
internal-affairs division.
Officer Manor testified that Officer McMahon radioed that
he had a subject who was being belligerent and requested a
unit with a Taser.  Officer Manor stated that when he and
Officer Caffey arrived at the scene Johnson was screaming and
a crowd was gathering.  Officer Manor stated that the officers
"had a time" trying to get Johnson to become calm but that he
eventually became compliant.  Officer Manor testified that he
placed two sets of handcuffs on Johnson because of his size
and placed him in the patrol car.  Officer Manor further
testified 
that 
Johnson 
complained 
of 
certain 
disabilities 
when
they placed him in the patrol car and that they accommodated
Johnson as best they could but that it is difficult to
transport a man of Johnson's size comfortably. Officer Manor
denied kneeing Johnson in the back when he handcuffed him and
also denied that anyone shoved Johnson into the patrol car.
Johnson was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.
He was transported to the city jail by Officers Manor and
Caffey.  Johnson testified that while en route to the jail he
told the officers that he was in pain.  Johnson stated that
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when they arrived at the jail his legs were swollen and his
pants were down below his knees.  He testified that he asked
the officers to pull his pants up and an officer replied,
"[Y]ou know how you young folks like y'all's pants to sag." 
Johnson stated that he responded that he was almost 40 years
old and did not let his pants sag.  Johnson testified that he
continued to try and explain that an officer had taken his
money.  He stated that while he was in the "booking room" he
grabbed a pair of scissors and tried to cut his wrist in
desperation.  Johnson testified that he was treated by the
jail nurse and that he suffered back, leg, neck, and shoulder
pain.  After Johnson was released from jail, he sought
treatment from his physician for his pain.  Johnson testified
that he continues to experience pain and emotional stress from
the incident.
Procedural History
In January 2010, the plaintiffs sued the City and
Officers Oglesby, Stewart, Caffey, and McMahon alleging
assault 
and 
battery, 
wantonness, 
negligence, 
negligent 
hiring,
negligent training, and negligent supervision.  On March 8,
2011, Johnson amended his complaint to assert a claim of theft
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against Officer Commander.  On April 1, 2011, Johnson amended
the complaint once again to assert a claim of negligence
against Officer Commander alleging that Officer Commander
failed to carefully safeguard the money in Johnson's  wallet
while the wallet was in Officer Commander's possession.  
On June 28, 20ll, the City and the officers moved the
trial court for a summary judgment, arguing that they were
immune from the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to § 6–5–338(a),
Ala. Code 1975, and the doctrine of State-agent immunity set
forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), and
adopted by this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala.
2000).  On July 25, 2011, the plaintiffs filed their response
in opposition to the motion for a summary judgment.  On August
10, 2011, the trial court entered an order denying the City
and the officers' motion for a summary judgment.  This
petition followed.
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the
exception is that the denial of a motion grounded on
a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for
writ of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794
(Ala. 1996) ....
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"'Summary judgment is appropriate only when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996). A court considering a motion for summary
judgment will view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama
Power Co., 675 So. 2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable
inferences from the evidence, Fuqua, supra, Aldridge
v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala.
1992); and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex parte
Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply
these same standards applicable in the trial court.
Fuqua, 
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that factual
material available of record to the trial court for
its consideration in deciding the motion. Dynasty
Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So. 2d
595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So. 2d 35 (Ala.
1992).'"
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (Ala. 2000)). A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the
petitioner can demonstrate: "'(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
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jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).
Discussion
Section 6–5–338(a) provides:
"Every peace officer, except constables, who is
employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution
or statutes of this state, whether appointed or
employed as such peace officer by the state or a
county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or
institution, 
corporate 
or 
otherwise, 
created
pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state
and authorized by the Constitution or laws to
appoint or employ police officers or other peace
officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by
the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,
include the enforcement of, or the investigation and
reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of
this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take
into custody persons who violate, or who are
lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other
lawful process, with violations of, the criminal
laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as such shall have
immunity from tort liability arising out of his or
her conduct in performance of any discretionary
function within the line and scope of his or her law
enforcement duties."
The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this
Court in Ex parte Cranman, supra, governs the determination of
whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under §
6–5–338(a).  Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904
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(Ala. 2005). This Court, in Cranman, stated the test for
State-agent immunity as follows:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) 
formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
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"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. Because the scope of immunity for
law-enforcement officers set forth § 6–5–338(a) was broader
than category (4) of the restatement adopted in Cranman, this
Court, in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309
(Ala. 2006),  expanded and modified category (4) of the of the
Cranman test to read as follows: 
"'A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"'....
"'(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace
officers under 
circumstances entitling such officers
25
1101435
to 
immunity 
pursuant 
to 
§ 
6-5-338(a), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975.'"
Hollis, 950 So. 2d at 309.  Additionally:
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a 
"burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.'  Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.' 946 So. 2d at 452.  Should the State
agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories
of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable. The exception being argued
here is that 'the State agent acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
his or her authority.' 946 So. 2d at 452. One of the
ways in which a plaintiff can show that a State
agent acted beyond his or her authority is by
proffering evidence that the State agent failed '"to
discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."'
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178)."
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 2008).
The plaintiffs contend that the defendant police officers
are not entitled to State-agent immunity because, they argue,
the officers acted beyond their authority or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law in violation of the "Law Enforcement
and Disabilities Manual."  The City and the defendant officers
state that that manual is a document used by the Alabama
Disability 
Crime 
Prevention 
Task 
Force 
in 
continuing-education
26
1101435
courses for law-enforcement officers throughout the state and
that it is not a detailed set of rules or regulations adopted
by the City.
The plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence
indicating that the Montgomery Police Department has adopted
the provisions of the Law Enforcement and Disabilities Manual
or that the manual is binding upon the defendant officers.
Although 
the 
defendant officers did testify that they received
training in the police academy on how to deal with citizens
with disabilities with whom they might come into contact, such
instruction 
or 
training could hardly be described as "detailed
rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist,"
that imposed duties to be discharged by the defendant
officers.  Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1282-83.  The
manual, itself, can best be described as a teaching tool for
law-enforcement officers in dealing with disabled persons. It
expressly states: "This manual is not intended to provide
legal advice.  Consult your department attorney for all final
decisions."  Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the defendant officers acted beyond
their authority by failing "'"to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules and regulations."'"  Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.
27
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2d at 1282-83 (quoting Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046,
1052 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d
at 178).
I. Claims Against the Defendant Officers    
A. Claims Asserted by Dashad Berry
Berry alleged in his complaint that Officer Oglesby
pulled him from Beamon's vehicle and caused him to slide off
the backseat of the patrol car, resulting in injuries.  Berry
alleged that in doing so Officer Oglesby acted intentionally
or with deliberate indifference, in bad faith, or under a
mistaken interpretation of the law. 
After reviewing the materials in support of this petition
for a writ of mandamus, we conclude that Officer Oglesby
satisfied his burden of demonstrating that at the time of the
incident giving rise to Berry's claims Officer Oglesby was
engaged in law-enforcement functions for which State-agent
immunity would be available under § 6-5-338(a) and under
Cranman, as modified by Hollis.  The evidence demonstrates:
(1) that Officer Oglesby was present at a driver's license
checkpoint and was working within the line and scope of his
duties as a police officer when the vehicle in which Berry was
a passenger was stopped; (2) that the driver of the vehicle
28
1101435
could not produce a valid driver's license; (3) that the smell
of marijuana was detected in the vehicle; (4) and that Officer
Oglesby, for the purpose of officer safety, directed that
Berry be handcuffed and removed from the vehicle so that the
vehicle could be properly searched.  These are circumstances
that would entitle Officer Oglesby to State-agent immunity
barring a showing by Berry of one of the two categories of
exceptions to immunity enunciated in Cranman.
Berry argued in the trial court, as he does in response
to this petition, that Officer Oglesby acted willfully,
maliciously, and in bad faith in removing him from the vehicle
and allowing him to fall from the backseat of the patrol car.
He points to the following as evidence of Officer Oglesby's
alleged willfulness, maliciousness, and bad faith: (1) that,
despite being informed by Berry and his friends that Berry was
a paraplegic, Officer Oglesby and a subordinate officer
threatened to "Tase" Berry if he did not get out of the
vehicle; (2) that Officer Oglesby questioned Berry as to what
paraplegia was and that Berry was denied the reasonable
accommodation of having his mother bring his wheelchair to the
scene; (3) and that Berry was "yanked" from Beamon's vehicle
29
1101435
and "thrust" into the patrol car, where he was allowed to fall
from the backseat.  
We first note that Officer Oglesby admitted the he did
not initially believe that Berry was a paraplegic because
there was no wheelchair in the vehicle, because Berry was
sitting upright in the backseat without the use of his hands,
and because another officer indicated that he had seen Berry's
leg moving.  Officer Oglesby denied that he threatened to
"Tase" Berry, and Berry himself admitted that he could not
identify the officer who he alleges threatened to "Tase" him.
Second, although the officers at the scene denied Berry's
request to have his mother bring his wheelchair to the scene,
the Law Enforcement and Disabilities Manual -- the manual the
plaintiffs contend the officers were obligated to follow --
expressly provides that a person who uses a wheelchair may be
handcuffed and transferred to a police car.  Finally, although
the plaintiffs' brief describes Berry as being "yanked" from
Beamon's vehicle and "thrust" into the patrol car, nothing in
Berry's testimony describing the incident refers to being
"yanked" from Beamon's vehicle and "thrust" into the patrol
car. Berry simply stated that he was handcuffed and that he
let Officers Oglesby and Kennedy remove him from the vehicle
30
1101435
and carry him a short distance to a patrol car. Assuming, as
we must, that the officers allowed Berry to slide off the
backseat of the patrol car to the ground, striking his back on
the car, the officers were merely negligent in doing so; Berry
has presented no evidence indicating that the officers
willfully or maliciously allowed him to fall and be injured.
After reviewing the materials submitted in this case, we
conclude that Berry has failed to satisfy his burden of
establishing 
that 
Officer 
Oglesby 
acted 
"willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his ...
authority" 
in 
handcuffing Berry and removing him from Beamon's
vehicle and placing him in the patrol car so as to deny
Officer Oglesby immunity from suit.  Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.
2d at 1282-83.  Accordingly, Officer Oglesby was entitled to
a summary judgment as to the claims against him.
B. Claims Asserted by Kamessa Williams
Williams alleged in her complaint that Officer Stewart
kicked her to the ground with his foot and forced her to
remain on the ground while she was being bitten by ants.
Williams alleged that in doing so Officer Stewart acted
intentionally or with deliberate indifference, in bad faith,
or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.
31
1101435
It is clear from the materials presented in support of
the petition for a writ of mandamus that Officer Stewart
satisfied his burden of demonstrating that at the time of the
incident giving rise to Williams's claims he was engaged in
law-enforcement 
functions 
for 
which 
State-agent 
immunity 
would
be available under § 6-5-338(a) and under Cranman, as modified
by Hollis.  The evidence demonstrates: (1) that Officer
Stewart was working a "saturation detail" in an area where
gunshots had been fired at a police officer the previous
evening; (2) that during a traffic stop gunshots were fired in
Officer Stewart's direction; (3) that Officer Stewart and
other officers drew their weapons and ran in the direction
from which the gunshots were fired; (4) that Officer Stewart
and the other officers ordered a number of individuals to get
to the ground; (5) that Officer Stewart encountered Williams
crouching behind a vehicle with her back facing him; (6) that
Officer Stewart forced Williams to the ground with his foot;
and (6) that Officer Stewart and the other officers ran
warrant 
checks 
on the individuals and searched the individuals
while they remained on the ground.  Barring a showing by
Williams that Officer Stewart acted "willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his ... authority, or under
32
1101435
a mistaken interpretation of the law," Cranman, 792 So. 2d at
405, these circumstances would entitle officer Stewart to
State-agent immunity.
 Williams presented evidence that, when viewed, as it
must be,  in a light most favorable to Williams, Ex parte
Turner, supra, indicates that after Officer Stewart forced
Williams to the ground he was advised by Williams and others
present that she was disabled; that Officer Stewart replied,
"I don't give a f---  about her being disabled"; and that
Officer Stewart forced Williams to remain on the ground for
approximately 30 minutes  after he determined that Williams
4
was not armed and had been advised that she was disabled and
was being bitten by ants.  Accordingly, we conclude that
Williams has satisfied her burden under Cranman by presenting
evidence that could be viewed as showing that Officer Stewart
Although 
Williams's 
contention 
that 
she 
was 
on 
the 
ground
4
for 30 minutes is disputed by compelling evidence offered by
the City and Officer Stewart in the form of the affidavit of
Officer M.D. Chandler, who had reviewed a transcript of radio
traffic the night in question, and a medical-run report that
indicated that only 16 minutes had elapsed from the time
Officers Engberg and Stewart radioed that shots had been fired
until the paramedics arrived on the scene, we are required to
view the evidence in a light most favorable to Williams.  Ex
parte Turner, supra. 
33
1101435
acted "willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond his ... authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law" during the above-described encounter with
Williams.  Accordingly, Officer Stewart was not entitled to a
summary 
judgment 
as to Williams's claims asserted against him.
C. Claims Asserted by Miguel Johnson
1. Officer Commander
Johnson asserted a claim of theft against Officer
Commander, alleging that he took $700 from Johnson's wallet.
Johnson 
also 
alleged 
that 
Officer 
Commander 
negligently 
failed
to safeguard Johnson's money while his wallet was in Officer
Commander's possession.  
Officer Commander argued in his motion for a summary
judgment that Johnson's theft claim was based entirely on
conjecture and conclusory allegations.  The trial court
disagreed and denied Officer Commander's motion for a summary
judgment on the theft claim.  It does not appear that Officer
Commander argued in his motion for a summary judgment that he
was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the theft claim.
Officer Commander does not argue in the petition for a writ of
mandamus that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to the
theft claim.  As stated above, the denial of a motion for a
34
1101435
summary judgment is not reviewable; however, the denial of a
motion for a summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity
is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Ex parte
Kennedy, supra.  Accordingly, the issue whether the trial
court 
properly 
denied Officer Commander's motion for a summary
judgment as to the theft claim is not before this Court in
this petition; the theft claim against Officer Commander
apparently is still pending in the trial court.  
As for the negligence claim, Johnson alleged in his
complaint that Officer Commander "had a duty to Plaintiff
Johnson to carefully safeguard the cash in Plaintiff's
Johnson's wallet, but Defendant Commander negligently failed
to do so, and negligently threw Plaintiff's wallet to the
ground."  The City and Officer Commander have offered no
argument 
in 
support of their 
contention 
that Officer Commander
was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the negligence
claim asserted against him. See Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P.  The
City and Officer Commander have neither cited facts nor made
any contentions relevant to this issue, other than to simply
say in their petition for a writ of mandamus that the "summary
judgment was due to be granted on Counts I, II, III and VIII
[the negligence claim against Officer Commander]."   Suffice
35
1101435
it to say that the City and Officer Commander have failed to
demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought, and the
petition is denied as to the negligence claim against Officer
Commander. Ex parte Nall, supra. 
2. Officers McMahon and Caffey
Johnson alleged in his complaint that Officers McMahon
and Caffey injured him when they arrested, handcuffed, and
forced him into the backseat of a patrol car.  Johnson further
alleged that in doing so Officers McMahon and Caffey acted
intentionally or with deliberate indifference, in bad faith,
or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.
Again, it is clear from the materials submitted to this
Court that both Officer McMahon and Officer Caffey satisfied
their burden of demonstrating that at the time of the incident
giving rise to Johnson's claims against them they were engaged
in law-enforcement functions for which State-agent immunity
would be available under § 6-5-338(a) and under Cranman, as
modified by Hollis.  The evidence demonstrates: (1) that
Officers McMahon and Caffey responded to Johnson's residence,
where they found him "upset" and "angry"; (2) that they
ordered him to calm down; (3) that he became compliant only
after a Taser was pointed at him; and (4) that he was arrested
36
1101435
and charged with disorderly conduct. These circumstances
entitle Officers McMahon and Caffey to State-agent immunity,
barring a showing by Johnson that the officers acted
"willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
[their] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the
law."  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.
The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to
Johnson, indicates that Johnson was very upset when Officer
McMahon arrived on the scene.  Johnson himself testified that
soon after Officer McMahon had gotten out of his patrol car
Johnson approached the officer "upset" and "angry."  Officer
McMahon stated that he felt threatened by Johnson, who is an
extremely large individual, and requested assistance from a
patrol unit equipped with a Taser.  Officer McMahon admitted
that he threatened to have Johnson "Tased" if he did not calm
down. 
Johnson 
became compliant after being threatened with the
Taser, and at no point was the Taser actually used.  Officer
McMahon did not participate in handcuffing Johnson or placing
him in the patrol car.  Considering the circumstances Officer
McMahon encountered upon arriving at Johnson's residence, we
cannot say that Johnson met his burden of showing that Officer
McMahon acted "willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
37
1101435
faith, beyond his ... authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law" so as to remove Officer McMahon
from the cloak of State-agent immunity. Cranman, 792 So. 2d at
405. Accordingly, Officer McMahon was entitled to a summary
judgment as to Johnson's claims against him. 
As for Officer Caffey, the evidence, when viewed in a
light 
most 
favorable to Johnson, indicates that, after Johnson
became compliant, was handcuffed,  and informed the officers
5
of his disabilities, he was led to a patrol car. Because of
his size and limited mobility, Johnson asked the officers to
move the front seat of the patrol car forward so that he could
more easily be placed in the backseat.  At that time, Johnson
asserts, Officer Caffey "football block[ed]" Johnson into the
backseat of the patrol car, stating, "[G]et your ass on in
there; ain't nobody fixing to put up with your shit; nobody
got time for this."   Accordingly, we conclude that Johnson
has satisfied his burden under Cranman by presenting evidence
We note that Johnson alleged that the officers did not
5
use two sets of handcuffs to handcuff him and that he was
kneed in the back by the officer who placed the handcuffs on
him. Johnson could not identify the officer who placed him in
handcuffs.  Officer Manor testified that he was the officer
who handcuffed Johnson and that he used two pair of handcuffs
on Johnson.  However, Officer Manor was dismissed from the
action by Johnson.   
38
1101435
that could be viewed as showing that Officer Caffey acted
"willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
his ... authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the
law" while placing Johnson in the patrol car.  Accordingly,
Officer Caffey was not entitled to a summary judgment as to
the claims asserted against him by Johnson. 
II. Claims Against the City
A. Assault and Battery, Wantonness, and Negligence
To the extent that the plaintiffs seek to hold the City
vicariously liable for the acts of the officers through their
claims alleging assault and battery, wantonness,  and
6
negligence, we note:
"'It is well established that, if a municipal peace
officer is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then,
pursuant to § 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is
employed 
is 
also 
immune. 
Section 
6-5-338(b)
provides: "This section is intended to extend
immunity only to peace officers and governmental
units or agencies authorized to appoint peace
officers." See Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So. 2d
936, 940 (Ala. 2000). On the other hand, if the
statute does not shield the officer, it does not
shield the city. Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875
So. 2d 1168, 1183 (Ala. 2003).'"
The plaintiffs conceded in their brief in opposition to
6
the motion for a summary judgment that, as to the City, the
wantonness claim should be dismissed.
39
1101435
City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So. 2d 944, 955 (Ala.
2005)(quoting Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 211
(Ala. 2003)).
Because we have concluded that Officers Oglesby and
McMahon were entitled to a summary judgment as to the claims
asserted against them, the City was also entitled to a summary
judgment as to the claims vicariously asserted against it
based on the liability of those officers. However, because we
have also concluded that Officers Stewart, Commander, and
Caffey are not entitled to a summary judgment as to the claims
asserted against them, the City is likewise not entitled to a
summary 
judgment 
as to the claims vicariously asserted against
it based on the liability of those officers. 
B. Negligent Hiring, Negligent Training, and Negligent
Supervision  
The plaintiffs have asserted negligent hiring,  training,
7
and supervision claims against the City.  The City relies upon
Haynes, supra, and argues that it is immune from suit as to
The plaintiffs stated in their brief in opposition to the
7
motion for a summary judgment that they "decided to drop their
case for negligent hiring, and add instead 'negligent
retention' to [their] negligent supervision and negligent
training [claims]." However, 
because 
of our resolution of this
issue, we need not determine whether they effectively changed
the claim. 
40
1101435
these claims.  We note that the City has failed to identify
the individual or individuals specifically charged with the
hiring, 
training, 
and supervision of the police officers, much
less whether 
the individual or individuals are police officers
entitled to State-agent immunity.  Therefore, the City has
failed to carry its burden under Cranman and was not entitled
to a summary judgment as to the negligent hiring, training, or
supervision claims asserted against it.  
Conclusion
Officers Oglesby and McMahon have shown a clear legal
right to the relief sought, and, as to them, the petition is
granted and the trial court is directed to enter a summary
judgment in their favor.  Officers Stewart, Commander, and
Caffey have failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the
relief sought, and, as to them, the petition is denied.  To
the extent that the City has been sued vicariously for the
acts of the defendant officers, it has shown a clear legal
right to the relief sought as to the claims asserted against
it based on the acts of Officers Oglesby and McMahon, and the
petition is granted as to those claims, and, as to those
claims, the trial court is directed to enter a summary
judgment for the City.  However, the City has failed to
41
1101435
demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the
claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart,
Commander, and Caffey, and the petition is denied as to those
claims.  Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear
legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging
negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and the petition
is denied as to those claims.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Murdock, Shaw, and
Main, JJ., concur.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
42