Title: STATE v FISHER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-140 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- WILLIAM THOMAS FISHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Lake, The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Douglas J. Wold, Polson, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard P. Heinz, County Attorney, Polson, Montana Submitted on Briefs: November 1 9 , 1980 Filed: !3/3.! yp:; M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal a r i s e s from a conviction of defendant of robbery following a jury t r i a l i n the D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Lake County. O n February 1 4 , 1979, defendant was charged i n Missoula County with t h r e e felony counts of burglary. Defendant l a t e r pleaded g u i l t y t o two counts, and t h e t h i r d was d i s - missed. P r i o r t o e n t r y of a judgment of conviction and sentencing, however, defendant escaped from t h e Missoula County j a i l . Following h i s escape, defendant was charged on J u l y 24, 1979, with robbery i n Lake County. He was convicted of t h i s charge i n November 1979 and sentenced by the D i s t r i c t Court t o a term of twenty years i n t h e s t a t e prison. The c o u r t a l s o found: "For purposes of parole, t h e Defendant i s found by the Court t o be a dangerous offender, h i s having been convicted of a felony i n Missoula County within f i v e (5) years last past." On January 7, 1980, the D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Missoula County, entered judgment and sentenced defendant f o r t h e two counts of burglary f i l e d i n February 1979. A judgment and sentence was a l s o entered a g a i n s t defendant on an escape charge. The s o l e i s s u e r a i s e d on appeal i s whether the D i s t r i c t Court i n Lake County c o r r e c t l y designated defendant a danger- ous offender f o r the purpose of parole. Section 46-23-201, MCA, provides: ". . . N o convict serving a time sentence may be paroled u n t i l he has served a t l e a s t one- half of h i s f u l l t e r m . . .except t h a t a con- v i c t designated a s a nondangerous offender under 46-18-404 may be paroled a f t e r he has served one-quarter of h i s f u l l t e r m . . ." Under section 46-18-404, MCA, the sentencing court shall designate an offender as nondangerous if: "(a) during the 5 years preceding the commis- sion of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced, the offender was neither con- victed of nor incarcerated for an offense com- mitted in this state or any other jurisdiction for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of 1 year could have been imposed; and "(b) the court has determined, based on any presentence report and the evidence presented at the trial and the sentencing hearing, that the offender does not represent a substantial danger to other persons or society. " (3) If the court determines that an of fender is not eligible to be designated as a nondan- gerous offender, it shall make that determina- tion a part of the sentence imposed and shall state the determination in the judgment. When- ever the sentence and judgment do not contain such a determination, the offender is consi- dered to have been designated as a nondangerous offender for parole purposes." Conviction is defined in section 45-2-101(9), MCA: "'Conviction' means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a guilty plea or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense rendered by a legally constituted jury or court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury." Defendant, on November 28, 1979, was found to be a dangerous offender based upon a Missoula County felony "conviction." Defendant, however, was not convicted or sentenced as to the burglary charges in Missoula County until January 7, 1980. With this being the case, we find the District Court improperly used the burglary conviction as a basis for its dangerous offender designation. The fact that defendant pleaded guilty to the burglary charges in Missoula County has no effect upon this Court's finding. The determination of a nondangerous offender s t a t u s under section 46-18-404(1)(a), MCA, i s based upon an examination of p r i o r convictions. See S t a t e v. Dahl (1980), Mont. , P.2d , 37 St.Rep. 1852, 1857. A conviction cannot be equated with a plea of g u i l t y . The case is remanded t o the D i s t r i c t Court f o r resen- tencing, i n accordance with t h i s opinion, with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o determine i f defendant, under s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, i s t o be designated a nondangerous offender f o r parole purposes. ' J u s t i c e / W e concur: n M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell, d i s s e n t i n g . I would a f f i r m Judge G r e e n ' s d e s i g n a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t as a dangerous d e f e n d e r . I n March, 1979, d e f e n d a n t plead g u i l t y to t w o b u r g l a r i e s . I n June, 1979, d e f e n d a n t escaped from j a i l w h i l e a w a i t i n g s e n t e n c i n g . I n November, 1979, d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of a rob- b e r y he committed w h i l e a t l a r g e f o l l o w i n g h i s e s c a p e , sentenced t o 20 y e a r s , and d e s i g n a t e d a dangerous o f f e n d e r by r e a s o n of h i s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n of b u r g l a r y less t h a n a y e a r p r e v i o u s l y . The m a j o r i t y remand f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g because d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e two p r i o r b u r g l a r i e s was n o t e q u i v a l e n t to a c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e o f under t h e d e f i n i t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 45-2-101(a), MCA. Thus, d e f e n d a n t could n o t be d e s i g n a t e d a dangerous o f f e n d e r on t h i s b a s i s a c c o r d i n g to t h e m a j o r i t y . I n my view, t h i s is b l i n d obedience to form o v e r s u b s t a n c e . It is c o n t r a r y to t h e i n t e n t , purpose and p o l i c y of t h e dangerous-nondangerous o f f e n d e r s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA. The i n t e n t of t h i s s t a t u t e is obvious--to restrict p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y of an o f f e n d e r who h a s committed a p r i o r f e l o n y w i t h i n 5 y e a r s of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which he is being s e n t e n c e d . A dangerous o f f e n d e r is n o t e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e u n t i l he h a s s e r v e d one-half of h i s s e n t e n c e less good time allowances; a non- dangerous o f f e n d e r becomes e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e a f t e r s e r v i n g one- f o u r t h of h i s s e n t e n c e less good t i m e a l l o w a n c e s . S e c t i o n 46-23-201(a), MCA. In d e t e r m i n i n g o f f e n d e r s t a t u s and p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y , r e c e n t p r i o r f e l o n i e s committed by t h e d e f e n d a n t are paramount. S e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA. What d i f f e r e n c e does it make whether a formal judgment of c o n v i c t i o n h a s been e n t e r e d where t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s a d m i t t e d t h e p r i o r f e l o n i e s i n open c o u r t by p l e a d i n g g u i l t y ? To ask t h e q u e s t i o n is to answer it. The d e f i n i t i o n of a c o n v i c t i o n c i t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y opi- n i o n is incomplete. The r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n of t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l s t a t u t e r e a d s : - 5 - ' I . . . u n l e s s a d i f f e r e n t meaning p l a i n l y is r e q u i r e d , t h e ?allowing d e f i n i t i o n s apply in t h e t i t l e : " ( 9 ) 'Conviction' means a judgment of conviction . . . entered upon a p l e a of g u i l t y o r upon a v e r d i c t o r f i n d i n g of g u i l t y of an offense . . ." (Emphasis added. ) S e c t i o n 45-2-101, MCA. Here a d i f f e r e n t meaning p l a i n l y is required t o c a r r y out t h e i n t e n t , purpose and p o l i c y of the dangerous-non- dangerous offender s t a t u t e f o r the reasons expressed i n t h i s d i s s e n t . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e only reason t h a t a formal judgment of c o n v i c t i o n of the p r i o r b u r g l a r i e s was not entered is t h a t defen- d a n t escaped while awaiting sentencing. It is fundamental t o our system of jurisprudence t h a t no one can take advantage of h i s own wrong; t h i s p r i n c i p l e has been enacted i n t o s t a t u t e i n Montana. S e c t i o n 1-3-208, MCA. This is p r e c i s e l y what t h e majority have permitted here. Chief Justice M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison: I concur i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t .