Title: In re Care & Protection of Walt

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12295 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF WALT.1 
 
 
 
Worcester.     May 1, 2017. - October 20, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.2 
 
 
Department of Children & Families.  Minor, Custody, Temporary 
custody.  Parent and Child, Custody of minor.  Appeals 
Court, Appeal from order of single justice.  Jurisdiction, 
Equitable. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Worcester County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on June 2, 2016. 
 
 
A hearing on continuation of an ex parte emergency order 
granting temporary custody was had before Anthony J. Marotta, J. 
 
 
A petition for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Judd J. Carhart, J.; motions for 
reconsideration and for a stay were also heard by him, and his 
order was reported by him to a panel of the Appeals Court.  The 
Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ann Balmelli O'Connor, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the father. 
                                                          
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
 
2 
 
Bryan K. Clauson (Marianne W.B. MacDougall also present) 
for the child. 
 
Richard A. Salcedo for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Evan D. Panich, Katrina C. Rogachevsky, Jessica Berry, 
Susan R. Elsen, & Jamie Ann Sabino, for Children's Law Center of 
Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  Under G. L. c. 119, § 29C, if a Juvenile Court 
judge grants temporary custody of a child to the Department of 
Children and Families (department), the judge "shall certify 
that the continuation of the child in his home is contrary to 
his best interests and shall determine whether the department 
. . . has made reasonable efforts prior to the placement of a 
child with the department to prevent or eliminate the need for 
removal from the home."  In this opinion, we resolve three legal 
issues regarding the reasonable efforts determination. 
 
First, we hold that a judge must make a reasonable efforts 
determination when issuing an order transferring custody of the 
child to the department for up to seventy-two hours at the 
emergency hearing, and must revisit that determination at the 
temporary custody hearing that must follow, commonly known as 
the "seventy-two hour hearing," if the judge continues the 
department's temporary custody of the child. 
 
Second, § 29C provides that reasonable efforts by the 
department prior to removal of a child from the home are not 
required if the judge finds that one of four exceptions applies.  
We hold that, where none of the four exceptions in § 29C apply, 
 
3 
exigent circumstances do not excuse the department from making 
reasonable efforts, but we recognize that a judge must determine 
what is reasonable in light of the particular circumstances in 
each case, that the health and safety of the child must be the 
paramount concern, and that no child should remain in the 
custody of his or her parents if immediate removal is necessary 
to protect the child from serious abuse or neglect. 
 
Finally, we hold that, where a judge or single justice 
finds that the department failed to make reasonable efforts 
before removing a child from his or her home, the judge or 
single justice has the equitable authority to order the 
department to take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the 
adverse consequences of the department's failure to do so.3 
 
Background.  According to the evidence admitted at the 
seventy-two hour hearing, in June, 2016, the department received 
a report alleging that Walt, then three years old, was being 
neglected by his mother and father at the home of Walt's 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted jointly by the 
Children's Law Center of Massachusetts; Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute, Inc.; National Association of Children's Counsel, 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice; Mental Health Legal Advisors 
Committee; Center for Public Representation; Greater Boston 
Legal Services; Juvenile Rights Advocacy Clinic; and Center for 
Public Representation.  We also acknowledge the letter submitted 
by the Chief Justice of the Juvenile Court Department "to 
provide procedural context for the Juvenile Court making a 
reasonable efforts determination upon initial removal of the 
child from the home by the Department of Children and Families 
(department) in a care and protection matter and the timing of 
such a determination." 
 
4 
paternal grandmother in Worcester, where they were then living.  
On June 1, at approximately 4:30 P.M., a department investigator  
made an unannounced visit to the home, and subsequently prepared 
a written report as required by G. L. c. 119, § 51B (§ 51B 
report).  As she went upstairs, where Walt and his parents were 
residing, she smelled the strong odor of marijuana and saw that 
the upstairs hallway was littered with trash.  She went to the 
parents' bedroom and saw a curtain hanging as a door.  After she 
knocked on the door jamb, the mother opened the curtain and the 
investigator reported the allegations to her; the father was 
lying in bed.4  The investigator asked where Walt was, and the 
mother said he was in his room, which was next to the parents' 
bedroom.  When the investigator visited Walt's bedroom, she 
observed that the floor was so covered with boxes, clothing, 
trash, and debris that there was no room to walk.  She saw items 
piled taller than the dresser and various safety hazards.  The 
investigator returned to the parents' bedroom and asked the 
parents about smoking marijuana in their bedroom with Walt in 
the next bedroom.  The mother insisted she did not smoke in 
front of Walt.  The investigator observed trash and debris 
littering the floor of the parents' bedroom, including dirty 
plates, cups, cigarette butts, and a chicken bone. 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Department of Children and Families (department) 
investigator later learned that the father was not feeling well. 
 
5 
 
The investigator informed the parents that she was going to 
call her supervisor, and that she was taking custody of Walt "as 
I was not leaving him in this mess."  The investigator 
telephoned her supervisor, who agreed that emergency removal of 
the child was necessary at that time.  The investigator then 
telephoned the Worcester police department and asked for 
assistance in removing the child from the home. 
 
After the investigator informed both parents that the 
department was taking custody of their son, the mother asked if 
she could call her aunt to take Walt rather than have him go to 
a foster home.  The investigator told her that that could not 
happen, because the department office was closed and she 
therefore could not complete the process required to determine 
whether a family member qualified as a caregiver.  The 
investigator offered to take down the name of the aunt and other 
household members to see if they would qualify. 
 
The father was upset that the department was taking custody 
of his son and grabbed Walt and walked downstairs.  The 
investigator told him that he could not leave with Walt because 
the department now had custody and, if he did, he could be 
arrested for parental kidnapping.  He remained with Walt 
downstairs. 
 
The maternal aunt then arrived and attempted to take Walt 
with her.  The investigator told her she could not take him 
 
6 
because the department had custody.  The investigator wrote down 
her identifying information and explained that, if there were no 
issues, a home study would have to be done.  The investigator 
said that Walt was going to a foster home that day and that the 
department would begin the process of evaluating the maternal 
aunt as a "resource" the next day. 
 
The investigator then spoke with the mother and father.  
The mother said that she worked at a supermarket and that the 
father worked at an automobile body shop down the street.  She 
did not have a set work schedule; the father watched Walt when 
she was working.  As to the condition of the upstairs portion of 
the house, she said it was in that condition when they moved to 
the paternal grandmother's home in October, 2015.  When the 
investigator asked why they had not cleaned the rooms, the 
mother said that the paternal grandmother would not allow it.  
The mother said that they had attempted to obtain public 
housing, but had been denied.  The mother admitted to smoking 
marijuana a few times per week, but said she usually did not 
smoke upstairs; she explained that she did that day because she 
was "stressed out."  The father said he smoked marijuana a 
"couple of times a day," but generally only at his workplace.  
The father denied having any adult criminal record, and both 
denied using any other controlled substance.  The mother 
provided the name of Walt's pediatrician, and the parents 
 
7 
reported that Walt had no health issues, except that he had a 
cold with fever, for which they were giving him Tylenol. 
 
On June 2, a care and protection petition was filed in 
Worcester Juvenile Court for emergency custody of Walt pursuant 
to G. L. c. 119, § 24, as well as a sworn affidavit in support 
of the application.  The affidavit signed by the investigator 
and her supervisor briefly summarized the investigator's 
observations regarding the condition of the two rooms and 
hallway on the second floor of the parental grandmother's home 
and noted that the mother appeared to be "high" on marijuana.  
The affiants declared that the department "believes that the 
child is at risk for neglect by his parents and requests custody 
of" Walt pending a hearing on the merits, adding that it would 
be contrary to Walt's welfare "at this time" to return home.  
The affiants also stated, "In light of the emergency 
circumstances and risk to the child's health and safety, 
reasonable efforts by the [d]epartment were attempted.  However, 
the parents have either not participated or have only minimally 
participated." 
 
That same day, a judge, as authorized under § 24, issued an 
ex parte emergency order transferring custody of Walt to the 
department for up to seventy-two hours pending a hearing as to 
whether temporary custody should continue, and ordered that 
counsel be appointed for the mother, father, and child.  Based 
 
8 
on the affidavit, the judge signed a Trial Court form entitled, 
"Reasonable efforts -- initial custody," certifying that "the 
continuation of the child in his[] home is contrary to the 
child's best interests."  The judge also checked two of the 
three boxes, reflecting her determination both that the 
department "has made reasonable efforts prior to the placement 
of the child with the [department] to prevent or eliminate the 
need for removal from the child's home," and that "the existing 
circumstances indicate that there is an immediate risk of harm 
or neglect which precludes the provision of preventive services 
as an alternative to removal; consequently, the [department's] 
efforts were reasonable under the circumstances."5 
 
During the early evening of June 2, Walt was placed in the 
home of the maternal aunt, but the department retained custody 
of the child. 
 
The seventy-two hour hearing was held on June 3 before 
another judge to determine whether the department's temporary 
custody of Walt would continue beyond seventy-two hours.  The 
mother stipulated to continued custody of Walt by the 
department, and waived her right to a hearing.  The father 
exercised his right to a hearing, which was rescheduled to June 
                                                          
 
 
5 The judge did not check the box that would reflect a 
determination that the department "has not made reasonable 
efforts prior to the placement of the child with the 
[department] to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the 
child from the child's home." 
 
9 
7 and concluded on June 9.  At the hearing, the judge heard the 
testimony of the investigator, the father, the mother, the 
maternal grandmother, and the maternal aunt, and considered the 
exhibits offered in evidence, which included the investigator's 
redacted § 51B report and photographs of the home taken by the 
investigator on June 2. 
 
The investigator admitted at the hearing that she did not 
know whether the department was able to provide families with 
homemaking or babysitting services, whether the family support 
services the department provides included "chore services," or 
whether counselling and management services were available to 
prevent the removal of children from their parents by the 
department.6  She also testified that, as an investigator, it was 
not her job to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate 
the need for removal before removing a child to the custody of 
the department.  As to Walt, she admitted that she decided to 
remove Walt within ten minutes of being in the home, before she 
spoke with the father.  She also admitted that, before she 
placed Walt in the custody of the department, she did not 
explore with the family possible alternatives to avoid the need 
                                                          
 
 
6 Each of these services are available to the department to 
support struggling parents in need of such services.  See 110 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.020-7.025 (2008) (homemaker services); 110 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.030-7.035 (2008) (family support 
services); 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.040-7.046 (2008) 
(babysitting services); 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.060-7.064 
(2008) (parent aide services). 
 
10 
for foster care.  She explained that her "job is to make sure 
children are safe," and she "did not feel the child was safe in 
the place that he was living."  She later clarified that she 
meant "physically safe"; she said she did not remove Walt from 
the home simply because it was dirty and messy. 
 
On June 9, the judge ruled that custody would remain with 
the department pending a final hearing on the merits, finding 
that the department had met its burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, if Walt were returned to the 
home, he would be in immediate risk of serious abuse or neglect.7  
The judge made no determination as to whether the department 
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for 
removal from the home before taking custody.  Instead, he found 
that the department had no obligation "to do anything other than 
remove the child." 
 
The father petitioned for interlocutory relief under G. L. 
c. 231, § 118, challenging both the judge's order that allowed 
the department's temporary custody of Walt to continue and his 
finding that the department was not obligated to make reasonable 
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove Walt from his 
parents' custody.  On August 1, 2016, a single justice of the 
Appeals Court determined that the judge erred in his June 9 
                                                          
 
 
7 The judge found that the child had been "kept and housed 
in conditions that aren't safe for an animal," and characterized 
the home as a "filthy, disgusting sewer." 
 
11 
ruling when he concluded that the department had no obligation 
to make reasonable efforts before removing the child from the 
parents' custody.  The single justice declared that the 
department had an obligation to adhere to the mandates of G. L. 
c. 119, § 29C, including the obligation to make reasonable 
efforts to eliminate the need for removal from the home where 
none of the exceptions to that obligation set forth in § 29C 
applied in this case.  The single justice further found that 
"[t]he [d]epartment did not make reasonable efforts to eliminate 
the need for removal prior to removing [Walt]; rather, it 
summarily removed the child from the premises." 
 
The single justice remanded the case to the Worcester 
Juvenile Court Department "for a further hearing as to what 
reasonable efforts will be made by the [d]epartment to eliminate 
the need to remove [Walt] from the home."  The single justice 
also ordered that (1) daily supervised visitation between the 
father and Walt, that is, parenting time, shall be permitted by 
the department; (2) the father shall be permitted to participate 
in Walt's special education meetings;  (3) the department shall 
explore alternative housing options for Walt and his parents to 
facilitate their reunification; and (4) Walt shall remain in the 
custody of the department until the father has found alternative 
housing for the family and, once he has found such housing, the 
 
12 
Juvenile Court shall determine whether Walt should be reunified 
with his parents. 
 
The department moved for reconsideration of the single 
justice's order and for a stay.  The single justice denied both 
motions but, at the request of the child's attorney, modified 
his order regarding visitation, reducing visits to four per 
week.  The single justice also reported his order to a panel of 
the Appeals Court to determine the legal issues.  We transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion.  After oral argument 
in this court, the Juvenile Court entered a guardianship decree 
with the parents' consent; the department no longer has custody 
of Walt.  Although the decree renders the case moot, we 
nonetheless decide the legal issues presented because these 
issues are of public importance, fully argued and briefed on all 
sides, very likely to arise again in similar factual 
circumstances, and might otherwise evade appellate review.  See 
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 574 (2013). 
 
Statutory framework.  To understand the legal issues 
presented on appeal, we need first to set forth the statutory 
framework governing care and protection proceedings. 
In 1954, the Legislature, through its enactment of G. L. c. 119, 
§ 1, declared it "to be the policy of this commonwealth to 
direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and 
encouragement of family life for the care and protection of 
 
13 
children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of all 
available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care 
of children only when the family itself or the resources 
available to the family are unable to provide the necessary care 
and protection to insure the rights of any child to sound health 
and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development."  
St. 1954, c. 646, § 1.  In 1999, the Legislature made clear 
that, where the interests of parents and children are in 
conflict, "[t]he health and safety of the child shall be of 
paramount concern and shall include the long-term well-being of 
the child."  St. 1999, c. 3, § 4.  The legislative policy that 
removal of a child from the family is a last resort is 
implemented through three provisions:  G. L. c. 119, §§ 24, 29C, 
and 51B.  Where the department has reasonable cause to believe 
both that "a child's health or safety is in immediate danger 
from abuse or neglect," and that "removal is necessary to 
protect the child from abuse or neglect," the department "shall 
take a child into immediate temporary custody" and "shall file a 
care and protection petition under section 24 on the next court 
day."  G. L. c. 119, § 51B (c), (e). 
 
On the day a petition is filed, a judge will conduct an 
emergency hearing which, like a hearing for a temporary 
restraining order, is usually ex parte, with the department's 
petitioner present but not the parents.  See Care & Protection 
 
14 
of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 57 (1990).  "If the court is satisfied 
after the petitioner testifies under oath that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that:  (i) the child is suffering 
from serious abuse or neglect or is in immediate danger of 
serious abuse or neglect; and (ii) that immediate removal of the 
child is necessary to protect the child from serious abuse or 
neglect, the court may issue an emergency order transferring 
custody of the child for up to [seventy-two] hours to the 
department . . . ."  G. L. c. 119, § 24.  Upon entry of this 
emergency order, notice of the seventy-two hour hearing is given 
to the parents and, where they are indigent, counsel is 
appointed to represent the parents and the child.  See G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 24, 29. 
 
The seventy-two hour hearing, like a hearing for a 
preliminary injunction, is an adversarial evidentiary hearing 
where the department and the parents have an opportunity to 
present evidence and to be heard.  See Care & Protection of 
Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 279–280 (2009) (normal rules of evidence 
apply in temporary custody hearings); Care & Protection of 
Sophie, 449 Mass. 100, 105–107 (2007) (nature of custody 
hearings adversarial).  At this hearing, the judge "shall 
determine whether temporary custody shall continue beyond 
[seventy-two] hours until a hearing on the merits of the 
petition for care and protection is concluded . . . ."  G. L. 
 
15 
c. 119, § 24.  Because temporary custody is generally 
substantially longer than emergency custody, the department's 
burden of proof to continue temporary custody is a "fair 
preponderance of the evidence," not reasonable cause.  Care & 
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass at 68. 
 
At the emergency hearing, if the judge grants custody of 
the child to the department, the judge must make both a written 
certification and a determination:  the judge "shall certify 
that the continuation of the child in his home is contrary to 
his best interests and shall determine whether the department or 
its agent, as appropriate, has made reasonable efforts prior to 
the placement of a child with the department to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal from the home."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 29C.  Under § 29C, the determination regarding reasonable 
efforts is separate and distinct from the certification 
regarding the child's best interests.  Id. ("A determination by 
the court that reasonable efforts were not made shall not 
preclude the court from making any appropriate order conducive 
to the child's best interest"). 
 
Section 29C identifies four specific circumstances where 
reasonable efforts before removal are not required:  (1) the 
child has been abandoned; (2) the parent's rights were 
involuntarily terminated or parental consent to adoption was 
dispensed with in a case involving the child's sibling; (3) the 
 
16 
parent was convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter of 
another child of the parent, or of a felony assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the 
parent; or (4) "a parent has subjected the child to aggravated 
circumstances consisting of murder of another parent of the 
child in the presence of the child or by subjecting the child or 
other children in the home to sexual abuse or exploitation or 
severe or repetitive conduct of a physically or emotionally 
abusive nature."  Id.8 
 
The department's obligation to make reasonable efforts does 
not end once the department takes temporary custody of a child, 
but the purpose of those efforts shifts from preventing or 
eliminating the need for removal from the home to making it 
"possible for the child to return safely to his parent or 
guardian."  Id. (if judge has previously granted custody of 
child to department, judge "shall determine not less than 
annually whether the department or its agent has made reasonable 
efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to 
his parent or guardian").  See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 
60 (2011) ("Before seeking to terminate parental rights, the 
                                                          
 
 
8 Under G. L. c. 119, § 29C, "conduct of an 'emotionally 
abusive nature' shall mean any conduct causing an impairment to 
or disorder of the intellectual or psychological capacity of a 
child as evidenced by observable and substantial reduction in 
the child's ability to function within a normal range of 
performance and behavior." 
 
17 
department must make 'reasonable efforts' aimed at restoring the 
child to the care of the natural parents").  See also G. L. 
c. 119, § 26 (b) (department need not petition to dispense with 
parental consent to adoption if family has not yet been provided 
"such services as the department deems necessary for the safe 
return of the child to the child's home if reasonable efforts as 
set forth in [§] 29C are required to be made with respect to the 
child"). 
 
These State statutes must be understood in the context of 
Federal legislation, first enacted in 1980, that, among other 
things, expanded Federal foster care assistance payments and 
conditioned such funding on the State's development of a plan 
for the provision of foster care in accordance with the 
requirements in the Federal statute.  See Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 
(June 17, 1980) (1980 act).  The bill established "a 
comprehensive set of child welfare services procedures and 
safeguards . . . [to] protect children and families against 
unwarranted removal of children from their homes and 
inappropriate and unnecessarily prolonged foster care payments."  
H. Rep. 96-136, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1979). 
 
Relevant for purposes of this case, Congress provided that 
"[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make 
foster care maintenance payments" on behalf of each child who 
 
18 
has been removed from the home into foster care where, among 
other requirements, there is "a judicial determination to the 
effect that continuation therein would be contrary to the 
welfare of such child and . . . that reasonable efforts of the 
type described in [42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)] have been made."  See 
42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1982).  See also Pub. L. No. 96-272, 
§ 472(a)(1) (1980).  Section 671(a)(15) provided that 
"reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a 
child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for 
removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible 
for the child to return to his home." 
 
In 1997, Congress amended the reasonable efforts 
requirement with the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 19, 1997) 
(1997 act).  The 1997 act identified various specific exceptions 
where reasonable efforts to preserve the family were not 
required:  where the parent committed murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, or a felony that resulted in serious bodily injury 
to the child or another child of the parent; where "the parental 
rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated 
involuntarily"; or "where the parent has subjected the child to 
aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which 
definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, 
torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse)."  See 42 U.S.C. 
 
19 
§ 671(a)(15)(D) (2012).  By allowing States to define the 
meaning of "aggravated circumstances," Congress gave States the 
authority to determine when reasonable efforts were not required 
to prevent removal or to make it possible to return the child to 
the parental home.  See H.R. Rep. No. 77, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. I, at 7 (1997) (requiring "States to define 
'aggravated circumstances' in State law . . . would permit the 
State to bypass the Federal reasonable efforts criterion and 
move expeditiously to terminate parental rights to make a child 
available for adoption"). 
 
In addition, the 1997 act made clear that, "in determining 
reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child . . . and 
in making such reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety 
shall be the paramount concern."  See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 105th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A). 
 
Although the State policy announced in G. L. c. 119, § 1, 
that essentially declared that removal of a child from his or 
her parents is a last resort, predates the enactment of both the 
Federal 1980 and 1997 acts, the enactment of G. L. c. 119, 
§ 29C, in 1984, see St. 1984, c. 197, § 5, and the amendments to 
§§ 1 and 24 that followed those two acts, see St. 1999, c. 3, 
§§ 4, 6; St. 2008, c. 176, §§ 82, 84; St. 2008, c. 215, § 64C, 
ensured that Massachusetts remains eligible to receive Federal 
financial assistance for foster care maintenance payments.  See 
 
20 
Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60 n.10.  The department's 
obligation to make reasonable efforts, therefore, is both a duty 
owed by statute consistent with a State policy that dates back 
to 1954, and a duty with substantial financial consequences for 
Federal reimbursement of foster care maintenance payments. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Must the judge make a reasonable efforts 
determination at the seventy-two hour hearing?  The department 
contends that, where the determination that the department made 
reasonable efforts prior to removal of the child from the home 
was made by the judge at the emergency hearing, the judge at the 
seventy-two hour hearing was not required to make such a 
determination, and the single justice erred in ruling otherwise.  
We disagree. 
 
Section 24 plainly states that, where a judge determines at 
a seventy-two hour hearing that temporary custody of a child 
shall continue beyond seventy-two hours, the judge "shall also 
consider the provisions of [§] 29C and shall make the written 
certification and determinations required by said [§] 29C."9  
                                                          
 
 
9 The relevant paragraph in G. L. c. 119, § 24, provides: 
 
 
"Upon entry of the [emergency] order, notice to appear 
before the court shall be given to either parent, both 
parents, a guardian with care and custody or another 
custodian.  At that time, the court shall determine whether 
temporary custody shall continue beyond [seventy-two] hours 
until a hearing on the merits of the petition for care and 
protection is concluded before the court.  The court shall 
also consider the provisions of [§] 29C and shall make the 
 
21 
Where the meaning of the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, and where a literal construction would not "yield 
an absurd or unworkable result," we need not look to extrinsic 
evidence to discern legislative intent.  Adoption of Daisy, 460 
Mass. 72, 76 (2011), quoting Boston Hous. Auth. v. National 
Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 162 
(2010). 
 
It is equally plain that the Legislature's imposition of 
this obligation on the judge at the seventy-two hour hearing is 
consistent with the State policy that removal of a child from 
his or her parents is a last resort, albeit one that sometimes 
is necessary because "[t]he health and safety of the child shall 
be of paramount concern."  See G. L. c. 119, § 1.  The judge at 
the emergency hearing generally receives information only from 
the department petitioner; the parents are usually neither 
present nor at that time represented by counsel.  See, e.g., 
Care & Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. at 274-275; Care & 
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. at 57.  The emergency nature of 
the hearing means that the hearing, "in the interest of 
expediency, most likely cannot be exhaustive."  Care & 
Protection of Lillian, 445 Mass. 333, 341 (2005), quoting 
Custody of Lori, 444 Mass. 316, 321 (2005).  The judge's 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
written certification and determinations required by said 
[§] 29C." 
 
22 
determination at that emergency hearing regarding the 
department's reasonable efforts therefore is generally based on 
information obtained solely from the department, whose efforts  
are the subject of the judge's evaluation, regarding a removal 
that occurred the previous day. 
 
Much as a judge deciding a preliminary injunction must 
revisit his or her findings issued upon the grant of an ex parte 
temporary restraining order, so, too, must a judge at the 
seventy-two hour hearing revisit the determination of reasonable 
efforts made earlier at the ex parte emergency hearing.  "[A] 
primary function of the seventy-two hour hearing is to discover 
and correct any errors that may have occurred during the initial 
hearing . . ." (emphasis omitted).  Care & Protection of 
Lillian, supra, quoting Custody of Lori. 
 
The circumstances of this case illustrate the Legislature's 
wisdom in requiring that the determination of reasonable efforts 
also be made by the judge who conducts the seventy-two hour 
hearing.  The judge who made the reasonable efforts 
determination at the emergency hearing wrote that she based her 
determination on the affidavit submitted by the investigator and 
her supervisor, which attested that "reasonable efforts by the 
[d]epartment were attempted; however, the parents have either 
not participated or have only minimally participated."  See 
§ 29C (reasonable efforts determination "shall include the 
 
23 
basis" for determination).  In fact, as emerged at the seventy-
two hour hearing, the investigator admitted that she had removed 
Walt from his parents' custody within ten minutes of entering 
the home, after only a brief conversation with the mother and 
before even speaking with the father.  She also admitted that 
she did not explore possible alternatives to avoid the need for 
foster care with either the mother or the father.  Therefore, it 
was simply not true that the investigator attempted to make 
reasonable efforts but was thwarted by the failure of the 
parents to participate with her in those efforts.  The emergency 
judge's determination of reasonable efforts rested on materially 
inaccurate information.  The judge at the seventy-two hour 
hearing was in a far better position, as a result of the 
adversarial evidentiary hearing, to make an informed 
determination of reasonable efforts. 
 
2.  Where none of the four exceptions in § 29C apply, may 
exigent circumstances excuse the department from making 
reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for a 
child's removal from his or her parents' custody?  The 
department concedes that none of the four statutory exceptions 
to the department's reasonable efforts obligation set forth in 
§ 29 applies to the circumstances of this case.  But the 
department claims that, where there are exigent circumstances, 
such as those it contends were present in this case, the 
 
24 
department is excused from making reasonable efforts to prevent 
or eliminate the need for removal of the child from parental 
custody.  We disagree, but we recognize that a judge must 
determine what is reasonable in light of the particular 
circumstances in each case, that the health and safety of the 
child must be the paramount concern, and that no child should 
remain in the custody of the parents if his or her immediate 
removal is necessary to protect the child from serious abuse or 
neglect. 
 
As noted earlier, the Federal 1997 act specifically 
authorized each State to define the "aggravated circumstances" 
committed by a parent against his or her child that would 
relieve the department from its obligation to make reasonable 
efforts.  When it enacted § 29C, the Legislature defined 
"aggravated circumstances" as "murder of another parent of the 
child in the presence of the child or . . . subjecting the child 
or other children in the home to sexual abuse or exploitation or 
severe or repetitive conduct of a physically or emotionally 
abusive nature."  St. 1999, c. 3, § 12.  The department 
essentially asks us to add to this definition "subjecting a 
child to serious abuse or neglect or an immediate danger of 
serious abuse or neglect," because, under § 24, a child's 
immediate removal from parental custody is required where there 
is reasonable cause to believe such removal "is necessary to 
 
25 
protect the child from serious abuse or neglect."  Where the 
Legislature did not add this to its definition of "aggravated 
circumstances" or include it as a separate exception, we decline 
to add it ourselves.10 
 
This does not mean that the department should allow a child 
to remain with his or her parents when there is reasonable cause 
to believe that doing so would subject the child's health or 
safety to immediate danger from abuse or neglect.  See G. L. 
c. 119, § 51B (c).  See also § 24.  The Legislature has made it 
crystal clear in various statutes that "[t]he health and safety 
of the child shall be of paramount concern."  See §§ 1, 26, 29B, 
29C.  We have made it equally clear in various opinions.  See, 
e.g., Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61, quoting Adoption of 
                                                          
 
 
10 We note that the Child Welfare Policy Manual, issued by 
the Children's Bureau of the Administration for Children and 
Families within the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, includes answers to frequently asked questions, one of 
which is: 
 
 
"The regulations, at 45 C.F.R. 1356.21, list the 
circumstances under which the court may determine that 
reasonable efforts are not required to prevent removal or 
to reunify the child and family.  Are there other 
circumstances under which the court may determine that 
reasonable efforts are not required?" 
 
The Children's Bureau answer to this question states, in 
relevant part, "Unless one of the circumstances at [42 U.S.C. 
§ 671(a)(15)] exists, the statute requires the State to make 
reasonable efforts."  Child Welfare Policy Manual, 8.3C.4, 
Answer to Question 4, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm 
/public_html/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy 
_dsp.jsp?citID=59. 
 
 
26 
Inez, 428 Mass. 717, 720 (1999) ("While parents have a 
constitutionally recognized interest in maintaining the family 
unit, a 'child's interest in freedom from neglect or abuse is 
absolute'"); Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. at 62 ("The 
child's interest in freedom from abusive or neglectful behavior 
. . . is absolute.  In no situation may a child be legitimately 
subjected to abusive or neglectful conditions"). 
 
What constitutes reasonable efforts, therefore, must be 
evaluated in the context of each individual case, considering 
any exigent circumstances that might exist.11  See Adoption of 
Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61 (reasonable efforts analyzed in light of 
particular needs of parent).  Where the department had prior 
involvement with the family before the exigency arose, those 
efforts may be considered in determining whether reasonable 
efforts were made.  See, e.g., Care & Protection of Isabelle, 
459 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2011) (unreasonable to continue efforts to 
develop mother's parenting skills where previous efforts 
failed).  Where there was little or no prior involvement prior 
to the exigency, reasonable efforts are still required but they 
                                                          
 
 
11 "The statute requires that reasonable efforts 
determinations be made on a case-by-case basis . . . .  In each 
individual case, the court and the State must determine the 
level of effort that is reasonable, based on safety 
considerations and the circumstance of the family."  Child 
Welfare Policy Manual, 8.3C.4, Answer to Questions 1 & 4, 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/public_html/programs/cb 
/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp.jsp?citID=59. 
 
27 
need only be reasonable in light of the exigency.  We recognize 
that there might be exigent circumstances where there is nothing 
the department reasonably could have done to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal from the home, but these do not 
excuse the department from its obligation reasonably to explore 
the possibility of reasonable alternatives to removal of the 
child; it simply means that in those circumstances, after such 
alternatives were considered, no reasonable alternatives were 
possible. 
 
This case illustrates how reasonable efforts were possible 
in a situation that the department deemed exigent.  The 
department's investigator here was so concerned about the 
sanitary conditions in the home and the mother's use of 
marijuana that she immediately took custody of the child after a 
brief conversation with the mother and before she had spoken 
with the father, who was ill but present.  As a result, apart 
from what she had seen within ten minutes of her arrival at the 
home, when she took custody on behalf of the department, she 
knew almost nothing about the relationship between the parents 
and the child, about whether the parents had obtained 
appropriate medical care for the child and acted appropriately 
to address his speech issues, about why they were living with 
the paternal grandmother, about whether there were other housing 
arrangements that could be made that day for the child, and 
 
28 
about whether there were other trusted members of the family who 
might care for Walt while the home was cleaned.  The 
investigator had already taken custody of Walt before the 
maternal aunt arrived at the home and offered to take Walt to 
her home.  As the single justice essentially found, reasonable 
efforts would have required the investigator at least to speak 
with the parents and obtain more information before making the 
decision to take custody of the child and put him in foster 
care. 
 
As we have noted, and as § 29C makes clear, the judge's 
determination regarding reasonable efforts is separate and 
distinct from the judge's certification regarding the child's 
best interests that decides whether the child should remain in 
the custody of the department.  "A determination by the court 
that reasonable efforts were not made shall not preclude the 
court from making any appropriate order conducive to the child's 
best interest."  § 29C.  See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61 
(even where department failed to meet obligation to make 
reasonable efforts, "a trial judge must still rule in the 
child's best interest").  We reiterate what we stated earlier in 
this opinion:  regardless of whether the department made 
reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal 
from the home, no child should remain in the custody of the 
 
29 
parents if his or her immediate removal is necessary to protect 
the child from serious abuse or neglect. 
 
3.  Did the single justice exceed his authority by ordering 
the department to permit the father to visit with Walt four 
times each week, to permit his participation in Walt's special 
education meetings, and to explore alternative housing for the 
family?  The department contends that the single justice's order 
regarding visitation, participation in special education 
meetings, and exploration of alternative housing exceeded his 
authority and that of any Juvenile Court judge.  We disagree.  
Where, as here, the single justice found that the department 
failed to fulfil its duty to make reasonable efforts before 
taking custody of Walt, he had the equitable authority to order 
the department to take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the 
adverse consequences of its breach of duty.  See G. L. c. 218, 
§ 59 (Juvenile Court has equity jurisdiction in all cases and 
matters arising under G. L. c. 119); Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 
Mass. 558, 566 (1993) (law leaves issuance and scope of 
equitable relief to sound discretion of judge). 
 
As noted earlier, the single justice found that "[t]he 
department did not make reasonable efforts to eliminate the need 
for removal prior to removing Walt; rather, it summarily removed 
the child from the premises."  The department contends that the 
only adverse consequence of its failure to obtain a reasonable 
 
30 
efforts determination is the potential loss of Federal 
reimbursement for the foster care maintenance payments in this 
case.12  But the single justice was entitled to conclude from the 
evidence in the record that the department's failure to make 
reasonable efforts also adversely affected Walt and his family 
and that reasonable equitable relief was needed to diminish that 
adverse impact.  When the matter reached the single justice, it 
was too late to order the department to fulfil its duty to make 
reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for removal, but it was 
not too late to ensure that the department fulfilled its duty to 
make it possible for the child to return safely to his father or 
to attempt to hasten the time when that reunification would 
become practicable.  See generally Smith v. Commissioner of 
Transitional Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 653 (2000), quoting 
Correia v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 414 Mass. 157, 170 n.14 
(1993) (judge did not abuse discretion "in ordering steps she 
could have found were necessitated by the department's 
'fail[ure] to rectify the problems with its policies and 
procedures, [such that] a more specific order, detailing 
particular steps to be taken, [was] appropriate'"). 
                                                          
 
 
12 Where a judge grants the department temporary custody but 
determines that reasonable efforts were not made by the 
department prior to removal, the department is ineligible for 
Federal reimbursement for the child's foster care maintenance 
payments for the duration of the child's stay in foster care.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 1356.21(b)(1)(ii) (2016). 
 
31 
 
When the single justice entered his initial order, the 
department was allowing the father to visit his son only twice 
each month, for one hour per visit.  We have recognized the 
critical importance of parenting time to the parent-child 
relationship: 
 
"Visitation, like custody, is at the core of a 
parent's relationship with a child; being physically 
present in a child's life, sharing time and experiences, 
and providing personal support are among the most intimate 
aspects of a parent-child relationship.  For a parent who 
has lost (or willingly yielded) custody of a child 
temporarily to a guardian, visitation can be especially 
critical because it provides an opportunity to maintain a 
physical, emotional, and psychological bond with the child 
during the guardianship period, if that is in the child's 
best interest; and in cases where the parent aspires to 
regain custody at some point, it provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate the ability to properly care for the child." 
 
L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 474 
Mass. 231, 242 (2016).  Where the department had so limited the 
father's opportunity to visit with his three-year old son as to 
imperil the father-child bond that was essential if custody were 
to be restored, the single justice did not exceed his authority 
or abuse his discretion by ordering a visitation schedule that 
would enable that bond to remain intact.  See G. L. c. 119, § 35 
(where parent is not informed where child is, court may order 
that parent be so informed and may permit parent to visit child 
"at such times and under such conditions as the court orders"); 
Adoption of Rico, 453 Mass. 749, 757 (2009) (even after 
termination of parental rights and adoption of child, judge may 
 
32 
order visitation with biological parent where child's best 
interests will be advanced by honoring child's bond with 
parent); Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 779-783 (1999) 
(although father had legal custody of child, "broad equitable 
powers" permit judge to order visitation with prior permanent 
guardian over objection of father where such visitation is in 
child's best interest).  Nor did the single justice exceed his 
authority or abuse his discretion in ordering the department to 
permit the father to participate in Walt's special education 
meetings so that he could remain involved in his son's 
education. 
 
Another adverse consequence of the department's failure to 
make reasonable efforts prior to removal was that, with Walt in 
the department's custody, the family would potentially face 
greater difficulties in securing public housing benefits, which 
might have made it harder for the family to obtain the 
alternative housing that was likely a prerequisite to family 
reunification.  The single justice did not exceed his authority 
or abuse his discretion in ordering the department to explore 
alternative housing options to facilitate that reunification. 
 
We recognize that "[w]here a court contemplates an 
injunctive order to compel an executive agency to take specific 
steps, it must tread cautiously in order to safeguard the 
separation of powers mandated by art. 30 of the Declaration of 
 
33 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution."  Smith, 431 Mass. at 
651.  We also recognize that, where the department has been 
awarded temporary custody of a child in a care and protection 
proceeding, "decisions related to normal incidents of custody" 
generally are committed to the discretion of the department, 
reviewable only for abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Adkinson, 442 Mass. 410, 418 (2004); Care & Protection of Isaac, 
419 Mass. 602, 606 (1995).  We need not here determine the full 
scope of judicial authority to issue injunctive orders where the 
department has been awarded temporary custody of a child, or the 
limitations on that authority.  It suffices here that we 
conclude that, where the department has been awarded temporary 
custody of a child after failing to fulfil its duty to make 
reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for the 
child's removal from parental custody, a judge has the equitable 
authority to take reasonable steps to attempt to remedy the 
adverse consequences on the child and the parents arising from 
the department's breach of that duty. 
 
Conclusion.  The father's appeal must be dismissed as moot 
because the department's temporary custody of the child has been 
vacated and a guardianship decree has been entered with the 
parents' consent.  We hold, however, that: 
 
(1)  Under G. L. c. 119, § 29C, a judge must make a 
reasonable efforts determination when issuing an order 
transferring custody of the child to the department for up 
 
34 
to seventy-two hours at the emergency hearing, and must 
revisit that determination at the seventy-two hour hearing 
if the judge continues the department's temporary custody 
of the child. 
 
 
(2)  Where none of the four exceptions to § 29C 
applies, exigent circumstances do not excuse the department 
from making reasonable efforts, but a judge must determine 
what is reasonable in light of the particular circumstances 
in each case; the health and safety of the child must be 
the paramount concern; and no child should remain in the 
custody of his or her parents if immediate removal is 
necessary to protect the child from serious abuse or 
neglect.  As made clear in § 29C, "A determination by the 
[judge] that reasonable efforts were not made shall not 
preclude the [judge] from making any appropriate order 
conducive to the child's best interest." 
 
 
(3)  Where a judge or single justice finds that the 
department failed to make reasonable efforts before 
removing a child from his or her home, the judge or single 
justice has the equitable authority to order the department 
to take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the adverse 
consequences of the department's failure to do so. 
 
So ordered.