Title: Dickson v. UJ Chevrolet Co., Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

454 So. 2d 964 (1984)
Charles M. DICKSON, Jr.
v.
U-J CHEVROLET COMPANY, INC., a corp.
82-1298.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 13, 1984.
John M. Tyson, Jr. of Tyson & Tyson, Mobile, for appellant.
Alex T. Howard, Jr., Richard T. Dorman, and Robin S. Brigham of Johnstone, Adams, May, Howard & Hill, Mobile, for appellee.
FAULKNER, Justice.
Charles M. Dickson, Jr., appeals from a final judgment in favor of the defendant, U-J Chevrolet Company, entered after an ore tenus non-jury hearing in an action for *965 revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code. We affirm.
The trial judge, Robert L. Byrd, Jr., stated the facts as follows in his order:
The issue presented for our review is whether the trial court's findings of fact are so clearly and palpably wrong or without supporting evidence that they should be reversed. Silverman v. Charmac, Inc., 414 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala.1982).
The trial court properly found acceptance of the truck by Dickson. Under § 7-2-606, Code of Alabama 1975, acceptance occurs when the buyer:
The evidence shows that Dickson used the truck in January 1981, and that he put over 800 miles on the truck. In fact, Dickson continued to use the truck while waiting for the new spring assembly to arrive. Thus, acceptance of the truck by Dickson was clearly shown. Rozmus v. Thompson Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa.Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966); Woods v. Van Wallis Trailer Sales Co., 77 N.M. 121, 419 P.2d 964 (1967).
Because the trial court found that Dickson accepted, rather than rejected, the truck, he must meet the requirements of § 7-2-608, Code of Alabama 1975, regarding revocation of the acceptance, if he is to recover. That section provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, in order to revoke, Dickson must show that the nonconformity is a substantial impairment of the value of the truck. Furthermore, the seller has the right to seasonably cure the nonconformity if the buyer accepted it on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured. Tiger Motor Company v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969).
Whether there is substantial impairment of value is a question for the trier of fact. Shelton v. Duncan, 385 So. 2d 1329 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). The trial court properly considered the cost and extensiveness of the repairs, the actual use and ability to use the truck, and the success of the repair in finding that there was no substantial impairment of the value of the dump truck. Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney and Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich.1977); McGilbray v. Schofield Winnebago, Inc., 221 Kan. 605, 561 P.2d 832 (1977); Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo.App. 527, 578 P.2d 668 (1978).
*967 The evidence showed that the cost of replacing the spring was $606.00. This expense was nominal or de minimis in view of the $39,849 value of the dump truck. The evidence also showed that the replacement was a basic, uncomplicated repair that required less than one half day's labor to accomplish.
Despite the defect, Mr. Dickson used the vehicle in his dirt hauling business prior to the time he returned the truck for repair on January 21, 1981. Thus, the defect did not prevent the operation of the truck.
The evidence further reflected that the truck was subsequently sold and used by another buyer in his dirt hauling business after the repairs were completed. Based upon the above factors, the trial court could find that there was no substantial impairment of value.
Section 7-2-608(1)(a), Code of Alabama 1975, addresses the seller's right to cure. This provision, in essence, states that a buyer "may revoke his acceptance... if he has accepted it ... [o]n the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured."
U-J Chevrolet cured the defect shortly after the requisite parts were obtained from the General Motors factory. This court in Tiger Motor Company v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969), recognized that "under the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, the seller has the right to attempt to `cure' any defects in the goods." U-J was notified of the defect on January 9, 1981, and by January 27, 1981, the defect was cured. Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be disputed that U-J cured the nonconformity in the truck in such a manner and time as to prevent revocation of acceptance.
After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that the evidence amply supports the trial court's finding that Dickson accepted the truck and did not properly revoke his acceptance.
Further, Dickson's claim for consequential damages in the form of loss of business was inappropriate as a matter of law and was properly dismissed by the trial court. The damages sought by Dickson are only available when the buyer rightfully rejects, or revokes acceptance, which was not done here. Cf., § 7-2-711, Code of Alabama 1975. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.