Title: State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-47.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-47 
THE STATE EX REL. ENGELHART, APPELLANT, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-47.] 
Mandamus—Prohibition—Voluntary dismissal—Civ.R. 41(A)(1)—Motion for 
voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(1) is effective immediately upon 
filing—Civ.R. 58(A)—Order granting summary judgment is not effective 
until entered by clerk upon journal—Court loses jurisdiction upon filing of 
voluntary dismissal—Judgment denying writs of prohibition and 
mandamus to prevent court from proceeding after dismissal and to compel 
court to vacate postdismissal orders reversed. 
(No. 2011-0903—Submitted November 15, 2011—Decided January 11, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 96387, 2011-Ohio-2410. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying writs of prohibition and 
mandamus against appellee, Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge 
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Nancy Margaret Russo.  Appellant, Renee Engelhart, seeks a writ of prohibition 
to prevent Judge Russo from further proceeding in an underlying civil case.  
Engelhart also seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to vacate her order 
striking Engelhart’s notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice and all other 
orders issued after the filing of the notice and to reinstate the notice of dismissal.  
Because Engelhart established her entitlement to part of the requested relief, we 
reverse the court of appeals judgment in part and affirm it in part. 
Facts 
State ex rel. Engelhart v. Brecksville-Broadview Hts. 
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-10-719533 
{¶ 2} Engelhart filed an action in mandamus in the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas that claimed that the respondents, Brecksville-Broadview 
Heights City School District Board of Education and certain district officials, had 
committed violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act.  The 
respondents in that case filed a motion for summary judgment, and Engelhart 
submitted a memorandum in opposition. 
{¶ 3} At 11:07 a.m. on January 12, 2011, a person using the password 
assigned to Judge Russo’s staff attorney prepared a proposed journal entry 
granting the school district’s motion for summary judgment.  Judge Russo signed 
the entry, and at 2:25 p.m. on January 12, transmitted the entry electronically to 
the Clerk of Court for Cuyahoga County, where it entered a queue of electronic 
documents that had been transmitted for filing.  At the same time, Judge Russo 
also updated the status of the pending motions in the case in an on-line docket, 
accessible to the attorneys in the case but not to the public, to reflect that she had 
granted the respondents’ motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 4} When Engelhart’s counsel in the underlying case, Deborah 
Carothers, became aware that Judge Russo would enter judgment in favor of the 
respondents, she filed a notice of dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1), 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
voluntarily dismissing the case without prejudice, at 3:48 p.m. on January 12, 
2011. 
{¶ 5} Minutes later, at 4:05 p.m., a deputy clerk responsible for 
processing the queue of electronically transmitted documents clicked on Judge 
Russo’s journal entry granting summary judgment in favor of the respondents, 
which had been transmitted to the clerk’s office at 2:25 p.m. earlier that day.  This 
is in accordance with the clerk’s procedure for processing electronically 
transmitted documents sent by a judge or magistrate to the clerk:  (1) the deputy 
clerk processes each document by clicking on it to enter the document on the 
court’s journal, (2) at that instant, a stamp reflecting the precise date and time is 
recorded on the document, and (3) then or shortly thereafter, a new entry will 
appear on the electronic docket of proceedings that memorializes the document.  
The certified copy of Judge Russo’s January 12, 2011 journal entry granting 
summary judgment in the school district’s favor bears a clerk’s office stamp that 
it was “received for filing” on that date at “16:05:42,” i.e., 4:05 p.m.  The court’s 
docket lists Engelhart’s notice of dismissal as having been entered on the docket 
before Judge Russo’s entry granting summary judgment. 
{¶ 6} On January 13, 2011, the respondents filed a “motion to strike—
motion to deem moot and untimely [Engelhart’s] notice of dismissal, and motion 
to show cause.”  On January 25, Judge Russo granted respondents’ motion, struck 
Engelhart’s notice of dismissal, and held that the judge’s January 12 summary 
judgment was the final judgment on the merits in the case.  Judge Russo ordered 
Engelhart and her attorney, Carothers, to appear and show cause why each should 
not be held in contempt for filing their notice of dismissal “after the notice from 
the court of the ruling on the motion for summary judgment and for her 
representations to the court that she could not file her trial brief on time due to 
weather and travel issues.” 
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{¶ 7} Judge Russo specified that the summary-judgment order was 
received for filing by the clerk’s office before Engelhart filed her notice of 
dismissal: 
{¶ 8} “The court also notes for purposes of the record that the entry of 
[summary judgment] in favor of the respondents was created at 11:07 am on 
January 12; the judge assigned to the case signed that entry at 2:25 pm, which is 
the actual time of filing by the court of its order; the relator’s notice of dismissal 
was time-stamped on 1/12/11 at 3:48 pm, after the court had updated the pending 
motion docket and signed the JE and after the clerk received it for filing.” 
{¶ 9} On January 31, 2011, following a hearing, Judge Russo granted the 
respondents’ motion for sanctions against attorney Carothers in the sum of 
$1,200.  Judge Russo determined that Carothers “was aware of the court[’]s ruling 
in favor of respondents before she filed the now stricken [notice of dismissal] and 
that she did so in [an] attempt to prejudice the respondents and perpetrate a fraud 
upon the court.” 
Prohibition and Mandamus Case 
{¶ 10} A week later, on February 7, 2011, Engelhart filed a complaint in 
the court of appeals.  In her complaint, Engelhart requested a writ of prohibition 
to prevent Judge Russo from exercising jurisdiction and further proceeding in the 
underlying case.  Engelhart also sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge 
Russo to (1) vacate her January 25, 2011 order striking Engelhart’s notice of 
dismissal, (2) vacate all other orders issued after the filing of the notice of 
dismissal, and (3) reinstate the January 12, 2011 notice of dismissal.  The parties 
filed motions for summary judgment. 
{¶ 11} In May 2011, the court of appeals denied the writs.  The court of 
appeals held that “the order granting summary judgment was journalized prior to 
the filing of the notice of voluntary dismissal.” 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 12} This cause is now before the court upon Engelhart’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
Prohibition and Mandamus: 
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal 
{¶ 13} In her appeal as of right, Engelhart asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in denying writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent Judge Russo from 
proceeding in the underlying case and to compel the judge to vacate her order 
striking Engelhart’s notice of dismissal and all of her orders thereafter in the case 
and to reinstate the notice of dismissal. 
{¶ 14} “If a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to 
proceed in a cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  “[I]n general, when a trial 
court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has been voluntarily dismissed 
under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed, and a writ * * * will issue to prevent to prevent the 
exercise of jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-
Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 15} Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) provides that, subject to certain provisions that 
are inapplicable here, “a plaintiff, without order of the court, may dismiss all 
claims asserted by that plaintiff against a defendant by * * * filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before the commencement of trial unless a counterclaim 
which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court has been 
served by that defendant.” 
{¶ 16} As we recently held, “[t]he plain import of Civ.R. 41(A)(1) is that 
once a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses all claims against a defendant, the court is 
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divested of jurisdiction over those claims.”  State ex rel. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. 
Russo, 129 Ohio St.3d 250, 2011-Ohio-3177, 951 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 17. 
Notice of Dismissal Filed Before 
Journalization of Summary Judgment 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals determined that because Engelhart had filed 
her notice of dismissal of the underlying case after Judge Russo’s entry granting 
summary judgment in favor of the respondents had been journalized, the notice 
was ineffective and did not divest the judge of jurisdiction to vacate the notice of 
dismissal and to conduct further proceedings in the case.  It is true that a notice of 
voluntary dismissal filed after the trial court enters summary judgment is of no 
force and effect and is a nullity.  Blair v. Boye-Doe, 157 Ohio App.3d 17, 2004-
Ohio-1876, 808 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 3, fn. 2; Sutton v. Kim, Trumbull App. No. 2004-T-
0061, 2005-Ohio-5866, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 18} Nevertheless, it is equally true that if a notice of voluntary 
dismissal is filed before the journalization of a summary judgment, the dismissal 
is effective.  Witt v. Lamson, Cuyahoga App. No. 87349, 2006-Ohio-3963, ¶ 7-11; 
Howard v. SunStar Acceptance Corp. (May 8, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-70, 
2001 WL 481936, *4. 
{¶ 19} The court of appeals held that journalization was complete when 
Judge Russo transmitted the signed entry to the clerk of court at 2:25 p.m. on 
January 12, 2011.  In so holding, the court of appeals relied on cases that 
construed a former version of Civ.R. 58, which provided, “A judgment is 
effective only when filed with the clerk for journalization.”  See, e.g., William 
Cherry Trust v. Hofmann (1985), 22 Ohio App.3d 100, 22 OBR 288, 489 N.E.2d 
832. 
{¶ 20} Civ.R. 58 was amended in 1989.  The current version of Civ.R. 
58(A) specifies that a judgment is effective only when entered by the clerk upon 
the journal, not when it is filed with the clerk: 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 21} “Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(B), upon a general verdict of 
a jury, upon a decision announced, or upon the determination of a periodic 
payment plan, the court shall promptly cause the judgment to be prepared and, the 
court having signed it, the clerk shall thereupon enter it upon the journal.  A 
judgment is effective only when entered by the clerk upon the journal.”  
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 22} The uncontroverted evidence submitted by the parties in the court 
of appeals establishes that although Judge Russo transmitted the signed entry 
granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment in the underlying case at 
2:55 p.m. on January 12, 2011, it was not received and entered upon the journal 
by the clerk of court until 4:05 p.m. on that date or some time thereafter.  It is not 
until the clerk’s office employee clicks on the document in the electronic queue 
that the document is entered upon the journal.  Therefore, for purposes of Civ.R. 
58(A), Judge Russo’s summary judgment could not have been effective until, at 
the earliest, 4:05 p.m. on January 12, 2011. 
{¶ 23} Engelhart had already filed her notice of dismissal of the 
underlying case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) at 3:48 p.m. on January 12, 2011.  
“The notice of dismissal is self-executing and completely terminates the 
possibility of further action on the merits of the case upon its mere filing, without 
the necessity of court intervention.”  Fifth Third, 129 Ohio St.3d 250, 2011-Ohio-
3177, 951 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 17, citing Selker & Furber v. Brightman (2000), 138 
Ohio App.3d 710, 714, 742 N.E.2d 203. 
{¶ 24} The reliance of the court of appeals and Judge Russo on Loc.R. 
19.1(B) of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division, is 
also misplaced.  That rule merely provides that “[e]lectronic transmission of a 
document with an electronic signature by a Judge or Magistrate that is sent in 
compliance with procedures adopted by the Court shall, upon the complete receipt 
of the same by the Clerk of Court, constitute filing of the document for all 
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purposes of the Ohio Civil Rules, Ohio Criminal Rules, Rules of Superintendence, 
and the Local Rules of this Court.”  Again, even if Judge Russo’s summary-
judgment entry was filed with the clerk of court before Engelhart filed her notice 
of dismissal with the clerk, the summary-judgment order was not entered upon 
the journal by the clerk of court until after the notice of dismissal was filed. 
{¶ 25} Therefore, in accordance with the plain language of Civ.R. 58(A), 
the entry of summary judgment was not effective until after Engelhart’s notice of 
dismissal, which was effective upon its filing at 3:48 p.m. on January 12, 2011.  
The attempted entry by the clerk of Judge Russo’s summary judgment at or after 
4:05 p.m. on that same date occurred too late.  Consequently, Judge Russo 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment on the 
merits of the underlying case. 
{¶ 26} Thus, the court of appeals erred in denying Engelhart’s request for 
a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from proceeding on the merits of the 
underlying case after Engelhart had filed her notice of dismissal.  The court of 
appeals further erred in denying Engelhart’s request for a writ of mandamus to 
compel Judge Russo to vacate her entry striking the notice of dismissal and her 
entry of summary judgment in the underlying case and to compel Judge Russo to 
reinstate her notice of dismissal. 
Collateral Proceeding in Contempt 
{¶ 27} In her complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus, Engelhart 
also sought to prevent Judge Russo from further proceeding in the underlying case 
and to compel her to vacate all orders she had issued after the notice of dismissal 
was filed.  These additional orders include the judge’s order to show cause and 
order imposing contempt sanctions against Engelhart’s attorney in the underlying 
case. 
{¶ 28} Insofar as these claims are concerned, “[t]rial courts may consider 
collateral issues like criminal contempt * * * despite a dismissal.”  State ex rel. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
Ahmed v. Costine, 100 Ohio St.3d 36, 2003-Ohio-4776, 795 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 5.  
Judge Russo did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to determine 
the contempt issue notwithstanding Engelhart’s dismissal of the case, and 
Engelhart and her attorney have an adequate remedy by way of her pending 
appeal from the judge’s sanctions to raise any claimed error by the judge in her 
ruling.  Fifth Third, 129 Ohio St.3d 250, 2011-Ohio-3177, 951 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 24.  
In fact, in her reply brief on appeal, Engelhart now claims that this appeal “does 
not concern collateral matters,” that it addresses simply “the trial court’s entry 
striking the dismissal notice,” and that a “separate appeal is pending concerning 
the court’s grant of sanctions.” 
{¶ 29} Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in denying Engelhart’s 
prohibition and mandamus claims insofar as they contested Judge Russo’s orders 
concerning contempt following the filing of the notice of dismissal. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals insofar as it (1) denied a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Russo from 
proceeding on the merits of the underlying case following the filing of the notice 
of voluntary dismissal and (2) denied a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo 
to vacate her order granting summary judgment, vacate her order striking the 
notice of dismissal, and reinstate the notice of dismissal.  We affirm that portion 
of the judgment denying writs of mandamus and prohibition as they relate to the 
collateral issue of contempt. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
 
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LANZINGER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 31} I concur reluctantly, for in reversing the appellate court’s judgment 
that denied the writs of prohibition and mandamus, it appears as though we are 
rewarding an attorney who used tactics that were less than forthright.  On January 
12, 2011, at 2:25 p.m., Judge Russo electronically transmitted her signed order to 
the clerk of courts of Cuyahoga County that granted summary judgment in favor 
of the respondents. Loc.R. 19.1(B) of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga 
County, General Division, provides: 
{¶ 32} “Electronic transmission of a document with an electronic 
signature by a Judge or Magistrate that is sent in compliance with procedures 
adopted by the Court shall, upon the complete receipt of the same by the Clerk of 
Court, constitute filing of the document for all purposes of the Ohio Civil Rules, 
Ohio Criminal Rules, Rules of Superintendence, and the Local Rules of this 
Court.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 33} After transmitting her order to the clerk’s office, Judge Russo also 
notified the attorneys electronically that she had granted the respondents’ motion 
for summary judgment.  And although the judge’s order had been queued at 2:25 
p.m. in the clerk’s office, it was not entered on the clerk’s journal, stamped with a 
precise time and date until 4:05 p.m.  In the meantime, Englehart’s attorney was 
able to file a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case at 3:48 p.m. 
{¶ 34} Unfortunately, the local rule conflicts with the current version of 
Civ.R. 58(A), which specifies that “[a] judgment is effective only when entered 
by the clerk upon the journal.”   Local rules may not be inconsistent with any rule 
prescribed by this court governing procedure or practice, including the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Vance v. Roedersheimer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 554, 597 
N.E.2d 153. Thus, despite the judge’s completion of all actions required of her 
and notification to the parties of her order, the deputy clerk’s delay  in “entering” 
January Term, 2012 
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the order on the journal of the clerk of courts made the order ineffective as against 
a voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A). 
{¶ 35} The language of the Civil Rule permits no alternative. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and MCGEE BROWN, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Graydon, Head & Ritchie, L.L.P., and John C. Greiner, for appellant. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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