Title: Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
SANDRA PERSON-GAINES,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 282, 2009 
 
 
Claimant/Appellant, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
PEPCO HOLDINGS, INC., 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 08A-08-11 
 
 
Employer/Appellee. 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 9, 2009 
Decided:  September 28, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Michael D. Bednash, Kimmel, Carter, Roman, & Peltz, P.A., Newark, 
Delaware for claimant/appellant. 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Saurman, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 
Wilmington, Delaware for employer/appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2 
 
Sandra Person-Gaines appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court 
affirming the Industrial Accident Board’s decision denying her petition for 
additional work-related injury compensation.1  The IAB limited Person-Gaines to 
previously accepted benefits based on a 10% permanent impairment to her lumbar 
spine and a 2.5% permanent impairment to her lower back.  Person-Gaines 
contends that the Superior Court erred because the Board’s decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Because her petition and the expert testimony 
failed to establish any additional permanent impairment related to her 1988 work 
injury, we also AFFIRM. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Person-Gaines sustained a work-related injury to her low back in March 
1988 and began receiving benefits in 1993.  In July 2007, Person-Gaines petitioned 
the Board for additional compensation for a 17% permanent impairment to her 
lumbar spine.  At the hearing, the IAB heard testimony from two medical 
experts—Dr. Pierre LeRoy and Dr. John Townsend, III.   
 Dr. LeRoy testified for Person-Gaines.  He opined that the current 
permanent impairment to her lumbar spine was 13-17% but would have been 
around 5% in 1997.  He noted that she previously had problems on the left side but 
                                                 
1   
The hearing was held on March 12, 2008 by a Workers’ Compensation Hearing Officer, 
in accordance with 19 Del. C. 2301(B)(a)(4).   
 
 
3 
was now experiencing symptoms on both sides.  He testified that her MRIs showed 
deteriorating spinal herniations, stenosis, and scar tissues and concluded the 
progressing nature of her condition merited a finding for increased benefits.  
 Dr. Townsend testified for Pepco.  At Pepco’s request, he saw Person-
Gaines on several occasions to monitor her medical status.  He concluded the 
current permanent impairment to her lumbar spine was 15%.  Although Dr. 
Townsend agreed the current rating was higher than the 1993 rating, he disagreed 
with Dr. LeRoy's conclusion that the increasing impairment correlated to her 1988 
injury.  Rather, he suggested two lines of reasoning for the impairment increase:  
(1) changes in the AMA guidelines falsely inflated Person-Gaines permanent 
impairment rating and (2) congenital, degenerative factors exacerbated the 
condition of her spine.   
 The Board accepted the opinion of Dr. Townsend, rejected the opinion of 
Dr. LeRoy, and held that Person-Gaines had not met the burden of proving that she 
sustained additional permanent impairment because of the 1988 work accident. 
Standard of Review 
Upon review of a decision, we examine the record for errors of law and 
determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's finding of fact 
 
4 
and conclusions of law.2  Substantial evidence equates to “such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”3  On 
appeal, this Court will not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, 
or make its own factual findings.4  Errors of law are reviewed de novo.  Absent 
error of law, the standard of review for a Board's decision is abuse of discretion.5  
The Board has abused its discretion only when its decision has “exceeded the 
bounds of reason in view of the circumstances.”6 
Discussion 
On appeal, Person-Gaines reiterates her position that the Board’s decision 
was not supported by substantial evidence.  Specifically, she characterizes the 
Board’s decision as inconsistent and argues that the Board erred by denying 
additional compensation while relying on the opinion of Dr. Townsend, who 
testified she had an increase in permanent impairment.   
                                                 
2   
Stanley v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 2410212, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 24, 2008) (citing 
Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993)). 
 
3   
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar.  
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). 
 
4   
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965). 
5   
Stanley, 2008 WL 2410212, at *2 (citing Digiacomo v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 507 A.2d 542, 
546 (Del. 1986). 
 
6   
Id. (citing Willis v. Plastic Materials Co., 2003 WL 164292, *1 (Del. Super.  Jan. 13, 
2003). 
 
 
5 
The only issue before us is whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the Board’s finding.  An IAB decision stands unless no substantial evidence 
supports it.7  Furthermore, the IAB may adopt the opinion testimony of one expert 
over another; and that opinion, if adopted, will constitute substantial evidence for 
purposes of appellate review.8  Similarly, the IAB may accept or reject an expert’s 
testimony in whole or in part.9   
 The issue before the Board was whether Person-Gaines had increased 
permanent impairment causally related to the 1988 work injury.  The Board 
concluded that there was an increased permanent impairment, but that that increase 
was not attributable to the 1988 injury.  In arriving at this conclusion, the Board 
relied upon the testimony of Dr. Townsend who agreed that Person-Gaines’ current 
impairment rating was higher than the 1993 rating but not because of the 1988 
work injury.  
After examining the record, we find no reason to disagree with the findings 
of the IAB or the well reasoned opinion of the Superior Court.  The record shows 
that the IAB’s decision was consistent with Dr. Townsend’s testimony.  Likewise, 
                                                 
7   
See Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1965).   
8   
Bolden v. Kraft Foods, 2005 WL 3526324, at *4 (Del. Dec. 21, 2005) (TABLE) (citing 
Reese v. Home Budget Center, 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del.1992)). 
 
9   
Lewis v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 1999 WL 743322, at *3 (Del. Super.  July 8, 2009).   
 
6 
the record shows substantial evidence supported the IAB’s conclusion that Person-
Gaines’s increased impairment was not related to the 1988 work injury.   
The Superior Court judge found that Person-Gaines’s characterization of the 
IAB’s decision failed to consider Dr. Townsend’s complete testimony.  In his 
testimony, Dr. Townsend acknowledged an increase in the permanent impairment 
of Person-Gaines’s lumbar spine; however, he attributed that increase to changes in 
the AMA guidelines or congenital, degenerative factors and not the 1988 work 
accident.  The IAB’s decision that Person-Gaines suffered from an increased 
permanent impairment not related to the 1988 work injury is entirely consistent 
with Dr. Townsend’s testimony.  
Also, the Superior Court judge pointed out that the IAB chose Dr. 
Townsend’s testimony over Dr. LeRoy’s testimony.  The IAB viewed Dr. LeRoy’s 
opinion as unreliable because he did not provide specific examples or medical 
records showing an objective change in Person-Gaines’ symptoms justifying an 
increased permanent impairment rating.  Furthermore, Dr. LeRoy opined that 
Person-Gaines had a 5% permanent impairment to her lumbar spine when she was 
already receiving benefits based on a 10% permanent impairment.  Dr. LeRoy’s 
unreliable, unsupported opinion persuaded the IAB to choose Dr. Townsend’s 
testimony as the basis for its decision; and substantial evidence supports that 
choice. 
 
7 
Conclusion 
Because the record shows the IAB’s findings of fact were based on expert 
testimony it deemed reliable and those findings were supported by substantial 
evidence, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.