Title: MARVEL BRUTE STEEL BUILDING v BASS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 1 4 8 6 7 I N THE SUPFU3MF: COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 0 MARVEL BRUTE STEEL BUILDING, I N C . , DANTON D. WIRTH AND ROBERT DOWNS, P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s , FRANK BASS, BASS AUCTION COMPANY, INC., and PARKER MONTANA COMPANY, D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , H o n o r a b l e M. J a m e s Sorte, Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t s : R o b e r t L . Johnson and T o r g e r S. O a a s , L e w i s t o w n , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t s : C a l t o n L a w F i r m , B i l l i n g s , Montana S u b m i t t e d on briefs: May 2 7 , 1 9 8 0 s i p i l lgea D e c i d e d : -- XEg 3 : I& 3 Filed: - Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendants appeal from a judgment e n t e r e d on a j u r y v e r d i c t i n Yellowstone County awarding $7,000 i n damages t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s f o r f r a u d u l e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s a l e o f a t r a c t o r . The p l a i n t i f f s , i n a d d i t i o n t o moving t o d i s m i s s t h i s appeal a s being untimely f i l e d , have f i l e d a c r o s s - a p p e a l . W e determine t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' appeal was n o t t i m e l y f i l e d and, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e appeal must be dismissed. Likewise, because t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' cross-appeal is s u b j e c t t o t h e same impediment, it, t o o , is d i s m i s s e d . J u s t b e f o r e t h e c l o s e of t r i a l on A p r i l 13, 1979, counsel f o r both p a r t i e s agreed t h a t any post-judgment motions would be decided on b r i e f s w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g . The purpose of t h i s agreement was s o t h a t t h e p r e s i d i n g judge would n o t have t o r e t u r n t o B i l l i n g s t o hear t h e motions. The d e f e n d a n t s ' a t t o r n e y claims t h e p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t a motion would be deemed submitted upon completion of b r i e f i n g and t h a t t h e judge would i s s u e a binding r u l i n g w i t h i n f i f t e e n days t h e r e a f t e r . The p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t o r n e y , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , c l a i m s t h a t t h e s t i p u l a t i o n was nothing more t h a n a mutual waiver of h e a r i n g s of post-judgment motions f o r t h e convenience of t h e judge. Whatever t h e s t i p u l a t i o n was, however, t h i s Court has no r e c o r d of it. Furthermore, assuming t h e r e t o be a s t i p u l a t i o n i n e x i s t e n c e t h a t a motion would be deemed submitted upon "completion of b r i e f i n g " , a s t h e d e f e n d a n t s c o n t e n d , t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d n o t by t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n confer j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o d e c i d e t h e c a s e beyond t h e time l i m i t a t i o n s e x p r e s s l y provided by r u l e . Here, d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l a f t e r judgment was e n t e r e d , b u t b e f o r e t h e c l e r k of c o u r t o f f i c i a l l y gave n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment. The j u r y r e t u r n e d w i t h its v e r d i c t on A p r i l 1 3 , 1979; judgment was e n t e r e d on A p r i l 20, 1979; d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l on A p r i l 23, 1979; and t h e c l e r k of c o u r t o f f i c i a l l y s e n t o u t n o t i c e o f e n t r y of judgment on A p r i l 23, 1979. P u r s u a n t t o t h e o r a l s t i p u l a t i o n ( t h e c o n t e n t s of which a r e d i s p u t e d ) , t h e p a r t i e s c o n s i d e r e d t h e m a t t e r s u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s . There was, however, no agreement a s t o when t h e b r i e f s would be f i l e d . The d e f e n d a n t s waited f o r a t r i a l c o u r t r u l i n g b e f o r e t h e y f i l e d t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l . The t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d an o r d e r on May 1 5 , 1979 denying t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l , and t h e d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d n o t i c e of a p p e a l on June 1 2 , 1979. The p l a i n t i f f s t h e n f i l e d a motion w i t h t h i s Court t o d i s m i s s t h e appeal because it had been untimely f i l e d . The i s s u e is whether t h e time p e r i o d f o r f i l i n g n o t i c e of a p p e a l e x p i r e d t h i r t y d a y s a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r of May 1 5 , o r whether it e x p i r e d t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e motion f o r new t r i a l was served--that is, t h i r t y days a f t e r A p r i l 23, 1979. Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e , it e x p i r e d t h i r t y d a y s a f t e r t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l was f i l e d , and t h u s , t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l f i l e d on J u n e 1 2 , 1979 comes t o o l a t e . Rule 5 , I'4.R.App.Civ.P. r e q u i r e s t h a t an a p p e a l from a D i s t r i c t Court judgment must be taken w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s from t h e d a t e of s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment. Although a motion f o r a new t r i a l made p u r s u a n t t o Rule 5 9 ( d ) , I'4.R.Civ.P. s t o p s t h e running of t h e t h i r t y - d a y p e r i o d , it does n o t do s o i n d e f i n i t e l y . The t h i r t y - d a y p e r i o d g e n e r a l l y s t a r t s running a g a i n a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s e n t e r e d its o r d e r denying t h e motion a f t e r a h e a r i n g . If t h e r e is a h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must e n t e r an o r d e r w i t h i n f i f t e e n d a y s a f t e r t h e m a t t e r is submitted. Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. I f he f a i l s t o r u l e by t h e f i f t e e n t h day, t h e motion is c o n s i d e r e d d e n i e d , and t h e a p p e a l time s t a r t s running. Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. Here t h e d e f e n d a n t s served p l a i n t i f f s w i t h t h e motion on A p r i l 23, 1979. A h e a r i n g on t h i s motion w a s r e q u i r e d w i t h i n t e n d a y s of t h i s d a t e of s e r v i c e u n l e s s c o n t i n u e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r a p e r i o d of n o t t o exceed t h i r t y d a y s . Rule 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. Because no h e a r i n g was h e l d ( b y agreement of t h e p a r t i e s ) , t h e t i m e f o r a p p e a l s t a r t e d running on May 3 ( t e n days a f t e r d e f e n d a n t s s e r v e d its motion f o r a new t r i a l ) . The time f o r a p p e a l e x p i r e d on J u n e 2, and t h u s , d e f e n d a n t s ' n o t i c e of a p p e a l f i l e d on J u n e 12 came t o o l a t e . Even though t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d an o r d e r on May 1 5 , 1979 denying t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r a new t r i a l , t h e o r d e r was a n u l l i t y because it was i s s u e d a f t e r t h e time had e x p i r e d under Rule 59, w i t h i n which t o r u l e on a motion f o r a new t r i a l . See L e i t h e i s e e r v. Montana S t a t e P r i s o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 343, 348, 505 P.2d 1203, 1206. W e have r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t t h e time and p r o c e d u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s f o r post-judgment motions under Rule 59 a r e mandatory. K e l l y v. S e l l & S e l l P a i n t C o n t r a c t o r s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 574 P.2d 1002, 1003; Armstrong v. High C r e s t O i l s , I n c . ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 187, 196, 520 P.2d 1081, 1086. See a l s o , S e i b e l v. Byers ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont. 39, 46, 344 P.2d 129, 1 3 3 ( d e c i d e d b e f o r e our a d o p t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e ) ; McVay v. McVay ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 128 Mont. 31, 34, 270 P.2d 393, 394 ( l i k e w i s e d e c i d e d b e f o r e our a d o p t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e ) . W e i n i t i a l l y e n t e r e d a n o r d e r s u m m a r i l y d e n y i n g p l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o d i s m i s s , b u t because t h e q u e s t i o n is j u r i s d i c t i o n a l , w e , o f c o u r s e , a r e n o t p r e c l u d e d f r o m r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s i s s u e . I t is a x i o m a t i c t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t s can be c o n s i d e r e d a t any s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . Nor does s e c t i o n 3-1-502, MCA, a s argued by t h e d e f e n d a n t s , p r e c l u d e t h e p l a i n t i f f s from renewing its motion t o d i s m i s s . T h i s s t a t u t e f o r b i d s o n l y a subsequent a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e same o r d e r t o any " o t h e r " judge, and n o t t h e renewal of a motion b e f o r e t h e same c o u r t . Accepting t h e d e f e n d a n t s 1 argument t h a t t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l was t o be c o n s i d e r e d submitted t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t , o n l y upon completion of b r i e f i n g by both s i d e s , would mean t h a t a time period f o r an appeal t o run could never be f i x e d . The p a r t i e s could c o n t r o l t h e time p e r i o d simply by n o t g e t t i n g t h e b r i e f s e x p e d i t i o u s l y f i l e d . For t h i s reason, w e d i s t i n g u i s h t h e s i t u a t i o n h e r e from t h a t which e x i s t e d i n B r i t t o n v. B u r l i n g t o n Northern, I n c . ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 601 P.2d 1192, 36 St.Rep. 1956. Furthermore, t h e d e f e n d a n t s 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would r e s u l t i n an u n t e n a b l e s i t u a t i o n extending t h e time f o r appeal t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d , whenever t h a t might be. The r u l i n g p r i n c i p l e of t h e r u l e s is t o " s e c u r e t h e j u s t , speedy, and inexpensive d e t e r m i n a t i o n of e v e r y a c t i o n . " Rule 1, M.R.Civ.P. and R u l e 6 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., e x p r e s s l y p r o h i b i t d i s c r e t i o n a r y e x t e n s i o n s of any time l i m i t s set under Rule 5 9 ( d ) . The t r i a l c o u r t s may n o t d i s r e g a r d t h e p r o c e d u r a l requirements governing a motion f o r a new t r i a l a s s e t f o r t h i n Rule 5 9 ( d ) , by i n d e f i n i t e l y extending t h e t i m e l i m i t s f o r t h e convenience of one of t h e p a r t i e s . Cain v. Harrington ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 161 Mont. 401, 506 P.2d 1375, 1377. Nor can t h e p a r t i e s a c c o m p l i s h by s t i p u l a t i o n what t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n n o t accomplish by o r d e r . For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e a p p e a l and t h e cross-appeal a r e d i s m i s s e d . Justice We concur: Justices