Title: Norris v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: OCTOBER 26, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MELVIN R. NORRIS,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
BOARD OF PAROLE ANDPOST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A85542; SC S45047)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted February 25, 1999.
	Eric M. Cumfer, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs were Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, and Andy Simrin,
Deputy Public Defender.
	Christine Ann Chute, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  Douglas F. Zier,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the briefs.  With him on
the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Judy C. Lucas, Assistant
Attorney General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**
	RIGGS, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings.
	*Judicial review from the Board of Parole and Post-Prison
Supervision.  152 Or App 57, 952 P2d 1037 (1998).
	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
		RIGGS, J.
		The issue in this case is whether, under the law in
effect in 1978, the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
(Board) had the authority to sustain petitioner's minimum terms
of confinement after an affirmative finding that petitioner was
likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision to sustain the
minimum terms and remanded for further proceedings.  Norris v.
Board of Parole, 152 Or App 57, 67, 952 P2d 1037 (1998).  For
reasons different from the Court of Appeals', we affirm the
decision of that court and remand the case to the Board for
further proceedings.   
		In 1979, a jury convicted petitioner of two counts of
aggravated murder, ORS 163.095(2)(c) (1977) (multiple victims),
and one count of attempted murder, ORS 163.115 (1977). (1)  The
convictions arose out of crimes that petitioner committed in
1978.  The trial court imposed two sentences of life without
possibility of parole for 20 years for the two aggravated murder
counts, the second sentence to be served consecutively to the
first.  For the attempted-murder count, the court imposed one 20-year sentence, to be served concurrently with the two life
sentences. 
		On September 10, 1993, after having served 15 years,
petitioner petitioned the Board for a "rehabilitation hearing"
under ORS 163.105 (1977) (set out below).  That statute provides,
in part, that, for a person convicted of aggravated murder under
ORS 163.095(2) (1977), the court must impose a minimum sentence
of 20 years without possibility of parole.  ORS 163.105 (1977)
also provides that, after 15 years of that 20-year minimum term,
such a prisoner is entitled to a rehabilitation hearing to
determine if the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable period of time.  If the Board finds that the prisoner
is capable of rehabilitation and that the terms of confinement
should be changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole, or work release, it shall enter an order to that effect. 
As a result of such a hearing in this case, on January 26, 1994,
the Board issued Board Action Form (BAF) 4, (2) in which two of the
three panel members found that petitioner could be rehabilitated
within a reasonable period of time. (3)  Those two members would
have set a firm parole release date of July 11, 2018, following
approximately 40 years of incarceration.  The Board concluded,
however, that it needed a unanimous vote on the issue of
rehabilitation and, thus, declined to set a parole release date. 
On administrative review, the Board decided that it needed only a
majority vote, not a unanimous vote.  Accordingly, the Board
firmly set petitioner's parole release date for July 11, 2018.
		On September 8, 1994, petitioner petitioned for
judicial review in the Court of Appeals. (4)  After petitioner filed
his brief in the Court of Appeals, the Board withdrew its order
for reconsideration.  See ORS 183.482(6) (1993) (permitting
agencies to withdraw and reconsider administrative orders).
"The Board unanimously sustained the judicially
imposed minimum of 20 years as to each count, finding
the term is an appropriate sanction for the criminal
conduct and necessary for the protection of the public. 
In reaching this decision the Board considered and
rejected a lesser minimum between 15-20 years as to
each count."
Finally, the Board established petitioner's projected parole
release date as August 5, 2018.  
		Petitioner sought administrative review of BAF 9.  On
June 24, 1996, the Board issued an administrative review
response, in which the Board adhered to BAF 9.  The Board
explained:
	"The Board treated this inmate the same as any
inmate with a parolable life sentence. * * * The
finding that he is capable of rehabilitation only
allows for a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole to be converted to a life sentence with the
possibility of parole.  It does not mandate parole. * * * 
	"This inmate has achieved a possibility of parole,
not a guarantee. * * *"
		Petitioner filed an amended petition for judicial
review in the Court of Appeals.  In his brief, he made two
arguments in support of his contention that the Board erred by
sustaining the 40-year period of incarceration.  First, he
claimed that the Board's order was based on an invalid sentence. 
Specifically, he argued that the trial court had no authority to
impose consecutive minimum terms of confinement.  Second, he
argued that, because the Board found that he was capable of
rehabilitation, his minimum terms were "nullified," and the Board
had to apply the matrix system in setting a release date.  In
additional assignments of error, petitioner sought reversal of
one of the Board's findings in aggravation and its failure to
find additional mitigation.  
		In response, the Board first argued that petitioner
could not attack collaterally his original sentence.  Second, the
Board interpreted ORS 163.105(4) (1977) to require two findings
before the Board could alter any minimum term:  (1) that
petitioner was capable of rehabilitation and (2) that the terms
of confinement should be changed to life with the possibility of
parole.  The Board argued that it had made the first, but not the
second, of those required two findings.  The Board concluded that
its findings of aggravation and mitigation were surplusage, and
that it had no authority to alter the 20-year minimum terms.
		In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first held that
petitioner could not attack collaterally his original sentence in
this proceeding.  Norris, 152 Or App at 62.  The court then
turned to whether the Board had erred in sustaining petitioner's
minimum terms.  After examining the text, context, and
legislative history of ORS 163.105(4) (1977), the court concluded
that proving that a prisoner is "capable of rehabilitation" under
ORS 163.105 (1977) includes proving that the terms of confinement
should be changed:  "[T]here is no 'rehabilitation,' as that term
is meant in ORS 163.105 [(1977)], if the prisoner has not proved
that the terms of confinement should be changed."  Id. at 65. 
The Court of Appeals remanded for the Board to conduct a hearing
in light of the court's interpretation of "rehabilitation."  We
allowed petitioner's petition for review. 
		We review the Board's order under ORS 183.482(8)(b)
(1993).  See Calderon-Pacheco v. Board of Parole, 309 Or 454,
457, 788 P2d 1001 (1990) (so stating).  That statute provides, in
part:
		"(b) The court shall remand the order to the
agency if it finds the agency's exercise of discretion
to be:
		"(A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to
the agency by law; [or]
		"* * * * *
		"(C) Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or
statutory provision."
		We first consider petitioner's argument that the Board
improperly relied on an invalid sentence when establishing his
parole release date.  Petitioner argues that his original
sentence is void because ORS 163.105(2) (1977) authorizes a trial
court to impose one, and only one, minimum term of confinement. 
Petitioner contends that that is so regardless of the number of
counts of aggravated murder for which a person has been
convicted.  Anticipating the Board's characterization of his
argument as an improper collateral attack, petitioner argues
that, as provided in ORS 144.335 (1993), he may challenge any
board order that relates to parole dates.  Alternatively, he
argues that, because the sentencing court had no jurisdiction to
impose consecutive minimum terms, this court may consider his
present challenge.  
		We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Board that
petitioner's argument is a collateral attack on his original
sentence, which is not cognizable in this administrative
proceeding.  See Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or 352, 362, 867
P2d 1368 (1994) (holding that, generally, petitioner must raise
issue at criminal trial or on direct appeal to obtain post-conviction relief on that ground).  Consequently, we will not
consider petitioner's argument that the trial court improperly
imposed consecutive minimum terms.
		We turn to the issues that are at the heart of this
case, the resolution of which depend on the proper interpretation
of ORS 163.105 (1977).  That statute provides:
		"Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS chapter
144, ORS 421.165 and 421.450 to 421.490:
	"(1) When a defendant is convicted of murder
defined as aggravated murder pursuant to subsection (1)
of ORS 163.095, the court shall order that the
defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 30 years
without possibility of parole, release on work release,
temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.
	"(2) When a defendant is convicted of murder
defined as aggravated murder pursuant to subsection (2)
of ORS 163.095, the court shall order that the
defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 20 years
without possibility of parole, release on work release,
temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.
	"(3) At any time after 20 years from the date of
imposition of a minimum period of confinement pursuant
to subsection (1) of this section, or at any time after
15 years from the date of imposition of a minimum
period of confinement pursuant to subsection (2) of
this section, the State Board of Parole, upon the
petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a
hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time.  The
sole issue shall be whether or not the prisoner is
likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period
of time.  The proceeding shall be conducted in the
manner prescribed for a contested case hearing under
ORS 183.310 to 183.500 except that:
	"(a) The prisoner shall have the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that he is likely to
be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time;
and
	"(b) The prisoner shall have the right, if he is
without sufficient funds to employ an attorney, to be
represented by legal counsel, appointed by the board,
at state expense.
	"(4) If, upon hearing all the evidence, the board
finds that the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation
and that the terms of his confinement should be changed
to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, or
work release, it shall enter an order to that effect. 
Otherwise the board shall deny the relief sought in the
petition.
	"(5) Not less than two years after the denial of
the relief sought in a petition under this section, the
prisoner may petition again for a change in the terms
of his confinement.  Further petitions for a change may
be filed at intervals of not less than two years
thereafter."
Petitioner argues that the only issue at a
rehabilitation hearing under ORS 163.105(4) (1977) is whether the
prisoner is capable of rehabilitation.  He contends that the
statutory phrase "and that the terms of * * * confinement should
be changed" does not refer to a separate finding, but merely
describes the relief to be given when the Board makes such a
finding.  Petitioner further argues that, in light of the Board's
finding that he is capable of rehabilitation, the Board must
convert the terms of his confinement to a parolable life sentence
and set terms according to the matrix. 
	As noted, the Board, for its part, argues that, under
ORS 163.105(4) (1977), it must make two independent and co-equal
findings before it may change the terms of a prisoner's
confinement.  Alternatively, the Board argues that, if it must
change petitioner's terms of confinement to life with the
possibility of parole or work release, then petitioner still is
subject to consecutive 20-year minimum terms.  The Board appears
to argue that it may override the minimum terms and set a release
date according to the matrix, but that it may do so only after a
parole consideration hearing, which allows the Board to consider
a variety of factors.  See ORS 144.120 (1977) (describing parole
release date hearing). 
	We first consider the finding that the Board must make
at a rehabilitation hearing under ORS 163.105(4) (1977). 
Resolving that question requires interpreting the statute, which
we do using the methodology outlined in PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (stating
that court first examines text and context of statutory provision
at issue to determine legislature's intent).
	Because the text of a statute is the best evidence of
the legislature's intent, the starting point of our analysis is
that text.  Id. at 611.  ORS 163.105(4) (1977) employs the
conjunction "and":  "If * * * the board finds that the prisoner
is capable of rehabilitation and that the terms of his
confinement should be changed * * *."  (Emphasis added).  The use
of the word "and" suggests that the legislature intended the
Board to make two separate findings.  Thus, the text of the
statute supports the Board's argument.
	We next look to context:  other provisions of the same
statute and other related statutes.  PGE, 317 Or at 611; see also
Lane County v. LCDC, 325 Or 569, 578, 942 P2d 278 (1997) ("[W]e
do not look at one subsection of a statute in a vacuum; rather,
we construe each part together with the other parts in an attempt
to produce a harmonious whole.").  The statutory provision
immediately preceding the provision at issue here, ORS 163.105(3)
(1977), describes the disputed hearing in detail:
"[T]he State Board of Parole, upon the petition of
a prisoner [confined for aggravated murder], shall hold
a hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time.  The
sole issue shall be whether or not the prisoner is
likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period
of time. * * *
"(a) The prisoner shall have the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that he is likely to
be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
	Several aspects of subsection (3) aid our analysis of
the proper interpretation of subsection (4).  First, we observe
that subsection (3) provides that "[t]he sole issue" shall be
whether the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable period of time.  (Emphasis added.)  That wording
suggests that the legislature intended the Board to make one
finding, and only one finding, at a hearing under the statute. 
Second, we note that paragraph (3)(a) provides that the prisoner
has the burden of proving that he or she is likely to be
rehabilitated.  That provision is consonant with the emphatic
wording of subsection (3) that the "sole issue" is whether the
prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period
of time.  Third, we note that subsection (3) provides that the
sole issue "shall" be whether the prisoner is likely to be
rehabilitated.  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, subsection (3) prohibits
the Board and the prisoner from raising other issues at the
hearing.  Finally, we observe that subsection (3), which, we
again note, details the procedural aspects of the hearing, refers
to rehabilitation three times, but never refers, even obliquely,
to changing the terms of confinement.
	We turn to another provision of the same statute, ORS
163.105(5) (1977).  That subsection provides:
"Not less than two years after the denial of the
relief sought in a petition under this section, the
prisoner may petition again for a change in the terms
of his confinement.  Further petitions for a change may
be filed at intervals of not less than two years
thereafter."
(Emphasis added.)  Subsection (5) suggests that the "relief
sought" is "a change in the terms of * * * confinement."  That
conclusion is reinforced by the wording of subsection (4):  "If * * * the board finds * * * that the terms of * * * confinement
should be changed * * *, it shall enter an order to that effect." 
The only meaningful function of a Board order under ORS 163.105
(1977) is whether the terms of a prisoner's confinement will
change.  Subsection (4) describes in further detail what sort of
"change" is possible:  "the terms of * * * confinement should be
changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, or
work release."  Thus, the phrase "that the terms of confinement
should be changed" in ORS 163.105(4) (1977) refers to the relief
sought, as petitioner argues. 
	Finally, and also at the first level of analysis, this
court looks to its previous case law, when that case law has
construed authoritatively the relevant statutory wording. 
Michels v. Hodges, 326 Or 538, 545, 956 P2d 184 (1998).  In
Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 176, 864 P2d 368 (1993),
this court considered an inmate's argument that the Board has the
authority, under ORS 144.785(2) (1983), to "unsum" the inmate's
consecutive minimum terms for aggravated murder. (6)  The inmate in
Severy had been sentenced, in part, under ORS 163.105(1) (1983)
and had two sentences of life without the possibility of parole
for 30 years, the second sentence to be served consecutively to
the first.  At a prison term hearing held five months after he
was sentenced, the Board applied the matrix to the inmate's
sentences, but it ultimately voted to sustain the inmate's
consecutive minimum terms.  This court held that the Board had no
authority to alter the inmate's minimum terms under ORS
144.785(2) (1983):
		"The Board's only authority to alter a 30-year
minimum imposed pursuant to ORS 163.105(1) was that
authority set out in ORS 163.105(3) to (6).[ (7)]  That is,
on a petition filed by the prisoner at any time after
20 years from the date of the imposition of the
minimum, the Board must hold a hearing to determine
whether the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated
within a reasonable time.  ORS 163.105(2).  Only if the
Board finds that the prisoner is capable of
rehabilitation may the Board change the terms of the
prisoner's confinement to life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole or work release.  ORS 163.105(4). 
Those provisions are a complete legislative policy. 
ORS 144.785(2) plays no role."
Severy, 318 Or at 179 (emphasis added).  In a footnote, the court
stated:
"We express no opinion regarding the Board's
authority to alter a minimum term of imprisonment
imposed on an aggravated murder conviction once the
Board has found that the prisoner is capable of
rehabilitation. * * *"
Id. at 179 n 8 (emphasis added).  Although the Severy court did
not confront directly the issue whether ORS 163.105(4) (1977)
requires one or two findings, the statements quoted above suggest
that the court assumed that the statute required only one
finding:  that the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation.  
		The Board argues that the Severy court's use of the
word "may" supports its position in the present case ("Only if
the Board finds that the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation
may the Board change the terms of the prisoner's confinement * * *."  Id. at 179).  Specifically, the Board argues that the
word "may" suggests that an affirmative finding on rehabilitation
permits, but does not require, the Board to change a prisoner's
terms of confinement.  Had the Severy court meant otherwise, the
Board continues, the court would have used the word "must"
instead of "may."  The Board's argument is not well taken.  The
Severy court made the statement in question in the context of
discussing the only circumstances under which the Board "may" --
that is, has the authority or permission to -- alter a minimum
term.  See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1396 (unabridged
ed 1993) (defining "may," in part, as "have permission to").  The
Board misunderstands the Severy opinion in that respect and seeks
a more expansive meaning than reasonably could have been
intended. 
		On reviewing the results of our first-level analysis of
ORS 163.105(4) (1977), we conclude that the legislative intent is
clear.  Although the text can be read to mean that the
legislature intended the Board to make two findings, we must
construe both text and context together.  The context --
particularly the phrase "the sole issue" in ORS 163.105(3) --
demonstrates that the legislature intended the Board to make only
one finding.  In light of both the text and context, the Board's
interpretation of the statute is implausible.  We therefore hold
that the legislature intended that, in a hearing held under
163.105(3) (1977), the Board must find only whether the prisoner
is capable of rehabilitation.
		We next consider the consequences of the Board's 
finding that petitioner is capable of rehabilitation.  ORS
163.105(4) (1977) requires the Board to change the "terms of * * * confinement" to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole.  That subsection does not define that phrase.  The word
"terms," as used in the subsection, could refer to the conditions
of his confinement.  See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at
2358 (defining "terms," in part, as "conditions").  Looking to
ORS 163.105(2) (1977), however, we conclude that the meaning of
"terms of * * * confinement" is clear.
		ORS 163.105(2) (1977), the subsection under which
petitioner was sentenced, provides the sentence for one murder (a
single crime):  "[w]hen a defendant is convicted of murder
defined as aggravated murder pursuant to subsection (2) of ORS
163.095 * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  ORS 163.105(2) (1977) is
specific regarding the sentence for such a murder:  "the court
shall order that the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of
20 years without possibility of parole, release on work release,
temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp."  The
imposition of that specific sentence eventually may trigger the
rehabilitation hearing described in ORS 163.105(3) and (4)
(1977).  If, at such a rehabilitation hearing, the prisoner
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the prisoner is
likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time,
then the Board must change the "terms of * * * confinement" --
that is, the sentence imposed under ORS 163.105(2) (1977) for one
aggravated murder -- to life with the possibility of parole or
work release.
		Applying that analysis to this case, we conclude that
the Board must change the first of petitioner's life sentences to
life with the possibility of parole or work release.  Petitioner
is entitled to have that change occur retroactively to January
26, 1994, the date that the Board found him to be capable of
rehabilitation.  On that date, petitioner began serving his
second life sentence with a 20-year minimum term of confinement
for his second conviction of aggravated murder.  In 2009, 15
years from the date that he began serving that 20-year minimum
term, petitioner may petition for a rehabilitation hearing, and
that hearing also will be governed by ORS 163.105(3), (4), and
(5) (1977).  Only if the Board again finds that petitioner is
capable of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time,
must the Board change petitioner's second aggravated murder
sentence to life with the possibility of parole and work release. 
Only at that point would petitioner become eligible for parole.  
		In sum, in a rehabilitation hearing under ORS 163.105
(1977), the only finding that the Board must make is whether the
prisoner is capable of rehabilitation.  If the Board finds that
the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation, then the Board must
change the prisoner's aggravated murder sentence to life with the
possibility of parole.  In this case, petitioner received two
life sentences without the possibility of parole for 20 years,
the second sentence to be served consecutively to the first. 
Given its finding regarding petitioner's capability of
rehabilitation, the Board should have changed one of those
sentences to life with the possibility of parole.  Petitioner may
petition for a second rehabilitation hearing after he serves 15
years of his second aggravated murder sentence.  ORS 163.105(3)
(1977).  Because petitioner is not eligible for parole unless the
Board finds him capable of rehabilitation at that second hearing,
we express no opinion in this case regarding either the
applicability of the matrix or whether the Board erred in its
findings in aggravation.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the Board for further
proceedings.

1. 	ORS 163.095(2)(c) (1977) defines "aggravated murder,"
in part, as murder where "[t]here was more than one murder
victim."
ORS 163.115 (1977) provides, in part:
"(1) Except as provided in ORS 163.118 and
163.125, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
"(a) It is committed intentionally by a person who
is not under the influence of an extreme emotional
disturbance[.]"
ORS 161.405(1) (1977) provides:
		"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime when he intentionally engages in conduct which
constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the
crime."

2. 	A Board Action Form is an order of the Board.

3. 	OAR 255-32-020 (1993) (renumbered as OAR 255-032-0020)
set out the following criteria for determining "whether the
inmate is likely to be rehabilitated prior to release":
		"(1) The inmate's involvement in correctional
treatment, medical care, educational, vocational or
other training in the institution will substantially
enhance their [sic] capacity to lead a law-abiding life
when released;
		"(2) The inmate's institutional employment
history;
		"(3) The inmate's institutional disciplinary
conduct;
		"(4) The inmate's maturity, stability,
demonstrated responsibility, and any apparent
development in the inmate's personality which may
promote or hinder conformity to law;
		"(5) The inmate's past use of narcotics or other
dangerous drugs, or past habitual and excessive use of
alcoholic liquor;
		"(6) The inmate's prior criminal history,
including the nature and circumstances of previous
offenses;
		"(7) The inmate's conduct during any previous
period of probation or parole;
		"(8) The inmate does not have a mental or
emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition or
disorder predisposing them [sic] to the commission of a
crime to a degree rendering them [sic] a danger to the
health and safety of the community;
		"(9) The adequacy of the inmate's parole plan
including community support from family, friends,
treatment providers, and others in the community; type
of residence, neighborhood or community in which the
inmate plans to live;
		"(10) There is a reasonable probability that the
inmate will remain in the community without violating
the law, and there is substantial likelihood that the
inmate will conform to the conditions of parole."

4. 	The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider
petitioner's claim, because he initiated the proceedings before
the 1995 amendments to ORS 144.335 (1993) took effect.  See Or
Laws 1995, ch 108, § 3 (effective September 9, 1995) (setting out
1995 amendments).  ORS 144.335(3) (1995), which the legislature
since has not amended in relevant part, bars judicial review of
any Board decision relating to a parole release date.  Quintero
v. Board of Parole, 329 Or 319, 321, 986 P2d 575 (1999).

5. 	Under the sentencing matrix system that was in effect
at the time petitioner committed his crimes, the Board determined
the duration of a prisoner's imprisonment by choosing a term of
imprisonment from a "range" established for the offense by
administrative rule, subject to variations for aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.  ORS 144.120 (1977); ORS 144.780
(1977); ORS 144.785 (1977); Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or
172, 176, 864 P2d 364 (1993).  Because petitioner elected to have
the current matrix apply to his case, the Board assigned a score
of 10 for his criminal history/risk and a score of eight for his
crime severity category.  With those scores, his matrix range is
120 to 168 months per conviction of aggravated murder, making his
summed range 240 to 336 months.

6. 	ORS 144.785(2) (1983) provides:
"When a prisoner is sentenced to two or more
consecutive terms of imprisonment, the duration of the
term of imprisonment shall be the sum of the terms set
by the board pursuant to the ranges established for the
offenses * * *; provided, however, that the duration of
imprisonment may be less than the sum of the terms if
the board finds, by an affirmative vote of at least
four of its members, that consecutive sentences are not
appropriate penalties for the criminal offenses
involved and that the combined terms of imprisonment
are not necessary to protect the community security."
(Emphasis added.)

7. 	In 1981, the legislature added a subsection to ORS
163.105 (1977), bringing the total number of subsections to six. 
Or Laws 1981, ch 873, § 4.  That 1981 addition clarified the
number of Board members that must vote affirmatively before the
Board can grant relief under ORS 163.105(4) (1977).