Title: JAMES EDWARD SCHAFER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES EDWARD SCHAFER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 149197 P.3d 1247Case Number: S-07-0175Decided: 12/17/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JAMES 
EDWARD SCHAFER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; 
David Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Messrs. Morgan and Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. 
Smith, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court.  
VOIGT, C.J., filed a separate 
opinion concurring in part; dissenting in part.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A NatronaCounty jury found James Edward Schafer 
(hereinafter "Schafer") guilty on seven of eight counts, which included various 
assault charges and multiple drug charges.  
We reverse Schafer's conviction for attempted aggravated assault and 
battery but affirm his other convictions.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Schafer presents 
three issues for review:

 
 
I.          
The trial court erred in impermissibly applying Wyoming's General Attempt 
Statute to W.S. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) which resulted in a misapplication of W.S. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii).

II.         
There was insufficient evidence to support [Schafer]'s conviction for 
attempted aggravated assault and battery of Deputy Cline.

III.        The 
trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for new trial based on 
numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
The trial court did not err in applying Wyoming's General Attempt Statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-301, to aggravated assault and battery, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii).

II.         
Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support [Schafer]'s 
conviction for attempted aggravated assault and battery.

III.        The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying [Schafer]'s motion for a new 
trial.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On January 20, 
2006, Deputy Tim Rostad of the Natrona County Sheriff's Department was 
patrolling a highway near Mills, Wyoming, when he noticed a red pickup with a 
burnt-out headlight.  Based upon 
Deputy Rostad's observation of the missing headlight, he activated his overhead 
lights in an attempt to pull over the pickup.

 
 
[¶4]      Rather than 
stopping, Schafer, the driver of the red pickup, accelerated and continued into 
Mills despite being followed by multiple sheriff's vehicles with their sirens 
and lights activated.  After one of 
the sheriff's deputies attempted to block Schafer's vehicle with his own, 
Schafer evaded the deputy and drove his vehicle into a field, where he vacated 
the truck and began to run.  After 
seeing that Schafer had a handgun, Deputy Rinker ordered Schafer to stop and 
show his hands.  Deputy Cline also 
saw Schafer's gun, and accordingly ordered him to "stop and drop the 
weapon."  Deputy Cline caught up to 
Schafer and activated his Taser, whereupon Schafer immediately fell to the 
ground.  Schafer was immediately 
placed in custody.  A few inches 
away, the deputies found the handgun.

 
 
[¶5]      Upon the 
subsequent execution of a search warrant on Schafer's truck by Special Agent 
Aaron Shatto of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, two boxes of 
liquid and crystal methamphetamine were found, as well as a scale, baggies, and 
other drug-related items.

 
 
[¶6]      After a jury 
trial, Schafer was convicted of:  
Count I, attempted aggravated assault and battery; Count Two, reckless 
endangering; Count Four, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer; Count 
Five, knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine in a powder or crystalline form; Count Six, possession with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine; Count Seven, 
possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent; and Count Eight, knowingly 
or intentionally possessing a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶7]      At sentencing, 
the trial court merged Counts Two and Seven into Count One, and Counts Five and 
Eight into Count Six.  On Count 
Four, Schafer was sentenced to 90 days in the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter, with credit for 90 days served. 
 On Count One, Schafer was sentenced 
to the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP) for seven to nine years, with credit for 
time served of 379 days.  On Count 
Six, Schafer was sentenced to the WSP for five to eight years.  All sentences are to be served 
consecutively.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Arguments 
I and II

 
 
[¶8]      In his first 
argument, Schafer claims that if this Court allows a conviction for "an attempt 
to threaten with a drawn deadly weapon" to stand under Wyoming's general attempt statute, it will circumvent this 
Court's ruling in Johnston v. State, 
747 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1987), which held 
that the mere possession of a drawn weapon does not constitute a threat.  Schafer also contends that by allowing 
his conviction to stand, this Court will expand the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007) beyond the legislature's intentions.  Schafer argues that "a perpetrator 
either threatens to use a drawn weapon, or does not."  He contends that it is not possible to 
attempt to make an actual threat of physical injury while employing a deadly 
weapon  rather, until the threat is actually made, there is no 
crime.

 
 
[¶9]      The State admits 
that because the crime of assault is traditionally described as an attempt 
itself, many courts have had difficulty with the concept of an attempted 
assault, in that such may be characterized as an attempt at attempted 
battery.  Yet, the State insists 
that there can be such a thing as "attempted attempt."

 
 
[¶10]   As we stated in Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 29, 42 P.3d 483, 492 (Wyo. 
2002):

 
 
When 
we analyze statutes, we endeavor to interpret them in accordance with the 
legislature's intent.  We begin by 
making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia so that no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous. [Internal citations omitted.]

 
 
[¶11]   In considering the first question 
presented on appeal, we first look to the statutory language.  Schafer was convicted under Wyoming's 
general attempt statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) as 
applied through Wyoming's aggravated assault and battery statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502 (LexisNexis 2007).  
The general attempt statute provides in part:

 
 

(a)     A 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

.

(i)     
  With 
the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step 
towards commission of the crime.  A 
"substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the person's intention to complete the commission of the 
crime[.]

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  The underlying crime Schafer was 
convicted of was "threatening to use a weapon" in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
In part, this statute provides that a person is guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery if he "[t]hreatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another 
unless reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to 
prevent serious bodily injury to another."  
Essentially, Schafer was convicted of attempting to threaten to use a 
drawn deadly weapon on another.

 
 
[¶12]   The ultimate question in this 
appeal is whether the Wyoming Legislature intended attempted aggravated assault 
to be a criminal offense.  The 
answer to the question, in this Court's estimation, is that the Legislature did 
not so intend.  The general attempt 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301 (LexisNexis 2007), is applicable to all 
crimes unless the specific criminal statute, in this case the aggravated assault 
and battery statute, also relates to attempts.  This Court has generally described the 
reach of the general attempt statute as follows:

 
 
[T]he 
general attempt statute is operative when applied to statutes where the 
legislature has not already spoken; and where the legislature has enacted a 
special statute making the attempt a crime, the special statute will 
prevail.  This construction gives 
effect to both statutes and a policy that ambiguity concerning the application 
of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.  It is in conformance 
with

 
 
" 
* * * the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific 
statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same 
concern, even if the general provision was enacted later.  [Citations]  This guide to statutory construction has 
special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the 
punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions.  In this context, the principle is a 
corollary of the rule of lenity, an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or 
multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive."  Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S. Ct. 909, 914, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1978).

 
 

Capwell 
v. State, 
686 P.2d 1148, 1152-53.  In this 
appeal, therefore, it is mandatory that this Court analyze the language of the 
aggravated assault and battery statute in order to determine if it covers the 
issue of attempt, thus precluding the overlay of the general attempt statute. 

 
 
[¶13]   In full, § 6-2-502 
reads:

 
 
§ 
6-2-502. Aggravated assault and battery; penalty.

(a)  A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

(i)  Causes 
serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life;

(ii)  Attempts 
to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon;

(iii)  Threatens 
to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense 
of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another; 
or

(iv)  Intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a woman whom he knows is 
pregnant.

(b)  Aggravated 
assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years.

 
 
To 
loosely summarize the statute, a person is guilty of aggravated assault and 
battery if he: 1) seriously injures someone or injures a pregnant woman; 2) 
attempts to injure someone with a deadly weapon; or 3) threatens to injure 
someone with a drawn deadly weapon.

 
 
[¶14]   As can be seen, the statute 
specifically deals with the concept of attempt.  The Wyoming Legislature has criminalized 
an attempt to injure in subsection (a)(ii).  This subsection does not speak of an 
attempt to threaten.  Neither does 
the subsection treating a threat to injure contain any reference to an attempt 
to threaten. "There is a presumption in law that an omission is intentional 
where particular words or terms appear in one provision, but not in another 
related provision."  Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1387 
(Wyo. 
1991).

 
 
[¶15]   The intent of the Wyoming 
Legislature is manifest in its inclusion of "attempt" in subsection (a)(ii) and 
the omission of "attempt" from subsection (a)(iii).  Given this specific language, we 
conclude the Wyoming Legislature did not intend for the general attempt statute 
to be applicable to the specific aggravated assault and battery statute.  This is the only construction that can 
give effect to all the provisions of the statute, and ensure the manifest 
legislative intent is carried out.  
By overlaying the general attempt statute on the aggravated assault and 
battery statute, this Court would judicially establish a crime that the Wyoming 
Legislature never intended.  See 
generally In re James M., 510 P.2d 33 
(Cal. 1973); 
Steven James Malamuth, Comment, A Final 
Assault on Attempted Assaults, 14 Santa Clara Lawyer 96 
(1973).

 
 
[¶16]   At the very least, the language 
with regard to the concept of attempt in the aggravated assault and battery 
statute is ambiguous.  This 
ambiguity calls into play the rule of lenity.  Under the rule of lenity, criminal 
defendants receive the benefit of any ambiguity.  Thus, the rule of lenity mandates the 
same result.

 
 
[¶17]   There is yet another reason that 
supports that the Wyoming Legislature did not intend the general attempt statute 
to apply to the aggravated assault and battery statute.  The Wyoming Legislature has established 
a number of crimes that punish behavior which would fall within the definition 
of "attempt to threaten."  For 
instance, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (LexisNexis 2007) criminalizes the 
possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to threaten the physical 
well-being of another.1  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504 (LexisNexis 
2007) criminalizes reckless actions, including the pointing of a firearm, that 
endanger others.2  

 
 
[¶18]   We must read statutes in pari 
materia.  In doing so, we conclude 
the Legislature never intended for the general attempt statute to be applied to 
the aggravated assault and battery statute.  The crime as charged in this case simply 
does not exist except by judicial and prosecutorial creation.  

 
 
[¶19]   In light of our determination that 
the offense with which Schafer was charged is not supported by Wyoming statutes, the 
judgment of the trial court must be reversed.  Furthermore, our resolution of this 
issue resolves Schafer's second issue as well.

 
 
Argument 
III

 
 
[¶20]   Schafer's final argument is that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred at trial, and because of the misconduct, the 
trial court should have granted Schafer's motion for a new trial.  We disagree.

 
 
[¶21]   Three claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct are alleged on appeal, the cumulative effect of which allegedly 
denied Schafer a fair trial.  We 
typically review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the 
entire record to determine whether or not a defendant's case has been so 
prejudiced as to deny him a fair trial.  
Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 
139, ¶ 27, 166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007).   However, similar to Yellowbear v. State, 2008 WY 4, 
¶ 64, 174 P.3d 1270, 1295 (Wyo. 2008), our standard of review is a bit 
different in this instance because Schafer challenges the prosecutor's conduct 
through the lower court's denial of his motion for a new trial based upon the 
alleged misconduct.  Thus, we are 
technically reviewing the denial of the motion for a new trial, as was the case 
in Yellowbear.  Consequently, our standard of review 
when reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial is for an abuse of 
discretion.  Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 12, 
141 P.3d 106, 112 (Wyo. 2006).  An 
abuse of discretion occurs wherein the district court could not have reasonably 
concluded as it did.  Yellowbear, ¶ 66, 174 P.3d  at 
1295.

 
 
[¶22]   Schafer first takes issue with the 
denial of his motion for mistrial based upon the potential for confusing Schafer 
with another man named Zachariah Cohen.  
Schafer was mentioned along with Cohen in a newspaper article which 
referred to a "dangerous gang of criminals" and related that Cohen recently had 
been convicted of numerous offenses similar to those with which Schafer was 
charged at trial.  Furthermore, at 
trial, a computer desktop file folder that was projected on a large screen at 
trial was marked "Cohen."

 
 
[¶23]   The trial court addressed these 
issues at a motions hearing and stated:

 
 
I 
would again note that the concern about the name "Cohen" being on the icon or 
the file designation from the computer projection, once again, I don't see by 
just the name Cohen being there that there was any connection whatsoever to 
anything in this case.  I don't 
recall any trial testimony referencing Zach Cohen or Armor Jolley, and the small 
icon that may or may not have been seen by the jury needed to be tied in some 
way to some type of prejudice or actual concern rather than just coming to a 
conclusion that the jurors knew who Cohen was, that they had followed the Cohen 
case, that somehow they would implicate Mr. Cohen or Mr. Jolley to the charge 
and to Mr. Schafer's situation in this case.

 
 
[¶24]   We do not find any error in the 
trial court's line of reasoning.  
That the prosecutor knew of a connection between Schafer and Mr. Cohen 
seemed unavoidable given the prosecutor's line of work.  Schafer suggests on appeal that being 
mentioned in a newspaper article with other criminals and a miniscule icon on a 
projection screen amounted to misconduct by the State in this instance.  Similar to the district court, we find 
this argument unconvincing, and based upon our review of the record, we hold 
that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

 
 
[¶25]   Schafer's next issue of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct was a comment made by the prosecutor that potentially 
and improperly shifted the burden of proof to Schafer.  In closing argument, the prosecutor 
stated, "  if there was some explanation for it, they could have put it 
on."  Defense counsel objected to 
this statement, the court admonished the State, and the proceedings 
continued.  The court also ordered 
that portion of the prosecutor's argument to be stricken from the record, and 
the judge stated to the jury, "[T]he Court has instructed you that [Schafer] has 
no burden to present any evidence in this case.  You should disregard any portions of the 
argument that went to that."

 
 

[¶26]   It is well known that this Court 
views as an error any suggestion by the prosecution that the defense carries the 
burden of proof.  Seymore v. State,  2007 WY 32, ¶ 20, 152 P.3d 401, 410 
(Wyo. 2007).  However, this Court 
assumes, without there being any indication to the contrary, that the jury 
followed the trial court's curative instruction.  Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 18, 
46 P.3d 309, 314 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schafer's motion for a new 
trial in this instance.

 
 
[¶27]   Finally, Schafer contends that the 
prosecutor made improper statements which were "designed to appeal to the jury's 
prejudice or passion."  In closing, 
the prosecutor asked the jury to consider the protection of the community in 
general, and specifically the officers involved in the arrest.  Again, the defense objected to this 
comment, counsel for both sides approached the bench and a discussion of the 
nature of the State's comments on closing ensued, out of earshot of the 
jury.  Undeniably, the trial court 
suggested to the State that it was

 
 
very, 
very close to going over the line in arguing the need for the conviction of the 
defendant based on the need to support law enforcement.

 
 
The 
court said that while it was not directly stated, it was "clearly implied."  The State never returned to that line of 
argument during closing.

 
 
[¶28]   Schafer compares his case to our 
decision in King v. State, 2002 WY 
27, ¶ 19, 40 P.3d 700, 705 (Wyo. 2002), where we cited Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo. 
1998).  In Gayler, we stated:

 
 
Arguments 
which are designed to appeal to the jury's prejudice or passion are 
improper.  The fear in allowing such 
appeals is that the accused will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to 
[his] guilt or innocence.  Jurors 
may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convincing a defendant, 
they will assist in the solution of some pressing social problem.  The amelioration of society's woes is 
far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to 
bear.

 
 
In 
Gayler, the prosecutor blatantly 
"appealed to the jury to join the government's war [against drugs] by finding 
Gayler guilty of delivering a controlled substance" in spite of the repeated 
sustained objections challenging the remarks.  957 P.2d  at 860.  Here, the prosecutor's comments do not 
rise to the level of so prejudicing Schafer that the court could not have 
reasonably concluded as it did when it denied Schafer's motion for new 
trial.  The record reflects that the 
prosecutor heeded the warnings issued by the trial court, and the trial 
continued without further incident in this regard.

 
 
[¶29]   The cumulative effect of these 
three alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct does not add up to 
reversible error.  Given the record 
on appeal, and the evidence presented at trial, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it denied the motion for new trial.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   The Wyoming Legislature did not 
intend attempted aggravated assault to be a criminal offense; therefore, 
Schafer's conviction under Count I cannot stand.  We reverse Schafer's conviction because 
the Legislature never intended for the general attempt statute to be applied to 
the aggravated assault and battery statute.  The crime as charged in this Count 
simply does not exist except by judicial and prosecutorial creation.  Furthermore, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schafer's motion for a 
new trial.

 
 
[¶31]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for resentencing.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Section 
6-8-103 states:

 
 
A person who 
knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or sells a deadly weapon 
with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being of another or 
to commit assault or inflict bodily injury on another is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more 
than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both.

 
 

2Section 
6-2-504 provides in relevant part:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of reckless endangering if he 
recklessly engages in conduct which places another person in danger of death or 
serious bodily injury.

(b)  Any person who knowingly points a firearm at or in the 
direction of another . . . is guilty of reckless endangering unless reasonably 
necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious 
bodily injury to another.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 
[¶32]   I concur in that part of the 
majority opinion that affirms the appellant's various convictions, and I agree 
that the aggravated assault and battery conviction should be reversed, but I 
would do the latter on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, as opposed to 
doing so as a matter of law.  I 
dissent from the portions of the opinion (1) that conclude that the legislature 
manifested an intent to declare that "attempt to threaten with a drawn deadly 
weapon" is not a crime, and (2) that conclude that the legislature manifested an 
intent that the general attempt statute not apply to any of the subdivisions of 
the aggravated assault and battery statute.

 
 
[¶33]   Given the existence of the general 
attempt statuteWyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301 (LexisNexis 2007)the words "attempts 
to cause" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007) are 
superfluous.1  I cannot read into that superfluity an 
intent that attempting to cause serious bodily injury under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life is not a crime, or 
an intent that attempting to cause bodily injury to a pregnant woman is not a 
crime.  Furthermore, we need not and 
should not answer those questions in the context of this case, which involves 
only Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶34]   Finally, I do not believe that this 
is one of those cases that involves the "attempt to attempt" conundrum.  To threaten with a drawn deadly weapon 
is not an attempt crime.  Moreover, 
it is not impossible to attempt to threaten someone with a drawn deadly 
weapon.  Had the appellant, in the 
instant case, succeeded in fully drawing his handgun, and begun the process of 
turning toward the officers with it drawn, and later admitted that he intended 
to yell something akin to "get back, or I'll shoot," but then tripped and fallen 
over a sagebrush, dropping the weapon in the process, it might be said that he 
attempted, but failed, to threaten the officers with a drawn deadly 
weapon.

 
 
[¶35]   Nevertheless, I agree that the 
conviction for attempted threatening with a drawn deadly weapon should be 
reversed in this case because the most that the evidence showed was that the 
appellant possessed a weapon while he ran from the police.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See 
Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte:  The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19, No. 1, 
Land & Water L. Rev. 107, 132 (1984).