Title: Whiteman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., Dept. of Employment, State of Wyo.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Whiteman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., Dept. of Employment, State of Wyo.1999 WY 61984 P.2d 1079Case Number: 97-324Decided: 05/18/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JANICE WHITEMAN, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County, W. Thomas Sullins, J.

Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, WY., Representing Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General, Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and 
Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited case conference; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Janice Whiteman 
appeals a district court order affirming the Office of Administrative Hearing's 
(OAH) denial of attorney fees. Because the attorney was never appointed by the 
OAH, denial of attorney fees was proper. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
Whiteman states the issues as:

I. Whether the 
Order entered by the hearing examiner [on] March 27, 1997[,] complies with W.S. 
§ 16-3-110 generally requiring Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
separately stated.

II. Whether the 
same Order is arbitrary and capricious.

Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Division, as appellee, states the issues 
as:

A. Was the 
language of the order denying fees proper?

B. Was the 
denial of fees within the Hearing Examiner's discretion and in accordance with 
law?

FACTS

[¶3]      While working in 
1991, Janice Whiteman was injured; and, as a result, she received worker's 
compensation benefits. On January 23, 1996, the Division notified Whiteman that 
she would no longer receive temporary total disability benefits because she had 
attained an ascertainable loss and was assigned a permanent impairment rating on 
October 30, 1995. In its Final Determination letter, the Division notified 
Whiteman that she had until February 16, 1996, to object to its determination 
and request a hearing. The record bears no indication that Whiteman objected; 
however, on February 1, 1996, Whiteman filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
with the OAH, listing Mr. Donald Painter as her attorney. The OAH never entered 
an order granting Whiteman's Motion for the Appointment of 
Counsel.

[¶4]      In a letter dated 
February 6, 1996, the Division notified Whiteman of her permanent award amount 
and informed Whiteman that she had until March 4, 1996, to object to the 
determination by requesting a hearing. Whiteman did not object to this 
determination, but rather accepted the award amount by signing and returning the 
letter to the Division on February 23, 1996.

[¶5]      In an August 8, 
1996 Final Determination letter, the Division denied Whiteman's request for 
payment of a $58.97 bill for prescription drugs. This letter notified Whiteman 
that she had until September 4, 1996, to disagree with the determination by 
requesting a hearing. On August 28, 1996, Whiteman took advantage of her right 
to contest the determination; she filed an objection and requested a hearing. 
The Division referred the matter to the OAH and requested a small claims 
hearing, notifying Whiteman that, in a small claims hearing, "[n]o attorney fees 
or other costs shall be allowed by the hearing examiner on behalf of or for any 
party. In addition, the attorney general's office shall not represent or 
directly assist the division in the preparation for a hearing under this 
statute. " Whiteman did not object to the Division's decision to use a small 
claims hearing.

[¶6]      On February 7, 
1997, Whiteman submitted a Motion for Award of Attorney's Fee in the amount of 
$480.64 for attorney services from January 4, 1996, to January 30, 1997, which 
Whiteman later amended to include fees for January 25, 1996, to September 16, 
1996, only. The OAH denied the motion for attorney fees and costs on March 26, 
1997. The district court affirmed the OAH's order, from which Whiteman now 
appeals.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      This court 
reviews agency decisions by looking at the record as a whole. Juroszek v. City 
of Sheridan Bd. of Adjustment, 948 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Wyo. 1997). Judicial review 
of an administrative decision is limited by W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) to those matters 
that are specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (Michie 1997). Matter of 
Everheart, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 1998). Section 16-3-114(c) provides 
that

the court shall 
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account 
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

* * 
*

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
[or]

* * 
*

(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

When a case 
initiated in an administrative agency comes before this court on appeal, we 
accord no special deference to the decision of the district court. Instead, we 
review the case as if it had come directly to us from the agency. Manning v. 
State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 938 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1997); Nellis 
v. Dep't of Transp., 932 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1997). However, this court will 
defer to an agency's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E); Clark v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Safety & Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo. 1997). We have defined 
substantial evidence as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can accept as 
adequate to support an agency's conclusion." Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1995). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it is 
"willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts 
and circumstances." Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 
1996).

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The applicable 
version of the Worker's Compensation Act that governs this matter is the law 
that was in effect on the date of Whiteman's injury. See Manning, 938 P.2d  at 
873; Painter v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 954 
(Wyo. 1997); State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Jacobs, 924 P.2d 982, 
984 (Wyo. 1996). The record is unclear about the exact date of Whiteman's 
injury. The Division asserts that the appropriate date to use is February 23, 
1996, when Whiteman accepted the physical impairment award, because Whiteman 
failed to establish any other injury date as required by Rodgers v. State ex 
rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 246, 249 (Wyo. 1997). In contrast, 
Whiteman believes the accurate injury date to use is 1991. Regardless of which 
version of the Act we use, the legislature has not changed the pertinent 
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d) (Michie 1997) which grants the 
hearing examiner discretion of whether or not to appoint an attorney and whether 
to award attorney fees to an appointed attorney.

[¶9]      Whiteman claims 
that the OAH acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not acting on her Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel for over a year and then relied on its own inaction as a 
basis for denying her Motion for Award of Attorney's Fee. Nevertheless, Whiteman 
did not raise the appointment issue at the agency level,1 nor did she raise that issue while 
seeking review in the district court. Therefore, we will not consider the 
argument regarding appointment. This court, however, does have jurisdiction to 
review the OAH's denial of Whiteman's Motions for Award of Attorney's Fee, 
despite the Division's argument to the contrary, because Whiteman has properly 
raised the issue of denial of attorney fees.

[¶10]   This court has examined the hearing 
examiner's discretion to appoint and award attorney fees several times. In 
Painter, 931 P.2d  at 955, we held that once the Division has issued a final 
determination regarding the compensability of an injury or claim, the hearing 
examiner has the authority to appoint an attorney and award fees to the 
appointed attorney regardless of whether a formal request for a contested case 
is filed. The hearing examiner still maintains discretion to make the decision 
on a case-by-case basis because the appointment of an attorney is not 
compulsory. Id. at 956.

[¶11]   A hearing examiner's broad 
discretion to appoint an attorney, however, is not without limitation. In 
Manning, 938 P.2d  at 873, we held that if a claim has not been filed, then the 
hearing examiner lacks discretion to appoint an attorney or award attorney fees 
on the claimant's behalf; mere inquiries by the claimant to the Division are 
insufficient. Additionally, if the hearing merely relates to the timeliness of 
filings and benefits are not at issue, then the hearing examiner lacks the 
authority to appoint counsel and award attorney fees. Sheneman v. Division of 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Internal Hearing Unit, 962 P.2d 874, 876 
(Wyo. 1998).

[¶12]   Although not raised by either 
party, the present facts illustrate another exception to the hearing examiner's 
broad discretion: the plain language of the statute indicates that the hearing 
examiner's authority does not extend to awarding fees to a non-appointed 
attorney. In her argument, Whiteman ignores the statute's discretionary language 
which gives the hearing examiner authority to grant attorney fees. Section 
27-14-602(d) states: "Upon request,2 the hearing examiner may appoint an 
attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed 
attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding." 
(Emphasis added.) Because the issue of whether the agency acted properly in 
denying Whiteman's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is not before this court on 
appeal, we must decide this case accepting as correct that Painter was not 
appropriately appointed as Whiteman's attorney.

[¶13]   Inasmuch as Painter was not 
appointed and did not meet the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d), 
the statute required the hearing examiner to deny Whiteman the award of attorney 
fees. The hearing examiner did not have the power, much less the discretion, to 
award attorney fees to a non-appointed attorney. Therefore, substantial evidence 
existed upon which the hearing examiner could base the order and which a 
reasonable mind would accept as adequate evidence to support the agency's denial 
of attorney fees.

Hearing

[¶14]   The Division argues that a hearing 
was not required because Whiteman did not request a hearing when she filed her 
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fee. Furthermore, the Division argues that 
neither the Act nor the Division rules require the OAH to grant a hearing before 
denying fees and costs. We agree.

[¶15]   The parties have not cited, nor are 
we aware of, any statutes or rules requiring a hearing in such a proceeding. If 
the matter is a contested case, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 (Michie 1997) 
requires that the claimant receive a hearing. We also have held that 
"[p]rocedural due process principles require reasonable notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before government action may substantially affect a 
significant property interest." (Emphasis added). Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 
908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Amoco Production Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 882 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 1994)). Because the matter here was not a 
contested case and Whiteman has failed to cite appropriate authority to show 
that the award of attorney fees is a constitutionally protected property 
interest, no hearing was required. If Whiteman had wanted the opportunity to be 
heard, she could have requested a hearing either on the Motion For Appointment 
of Counsel or when she filed her Motion For Award of Attorney's Fee. Because 
Whiteman did not avail herself of either opportunity, the OAH's failure to hold 
a hearing before denying attorney fees was not improper and did not violate her 
due process rights.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ § 16-3-110 (Michie 1997)

[¶16]   The purpose of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-110 (Michie 1997) is to require the articulation of basic facts from which 
ultimate findings of fact are determined in order to facilitate judicial 
review." Harris v. Wyoming State Tax Comm'n, 718 P.2d 49, 51 (Wyo. 1986). While 
the hearing examiner's order was sparse and did not have separate headings for 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the order's brevity does not rise to 
the level of being arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the hearing examiner's 
discretion. The hearing examiner provided both a factual and a legal basis in 
the order, which adequately justified denying claimant's Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fee. The hearing examiner found that the OAH had received Whiteman's 
request for appointment on January 26, 1996, and that the OAH had never entered 
an order appointing Painter as Whiteman's attorney. Furthermore, the hearing 
examiner stated the applicable language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(d), which 
authorizes the hearing examiner to appoint an attorney and award fees. 
Therefore, the order sufficiently meets the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-110, providing this court with a basis for review.

[¶17]   Whiteman relies upon Cargile v. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 965 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 1998), wherein this court held 
that the hearing examiner's order was arbitrary and capricious and violated Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110. In Cargile, the hearing examiner did not make a record, 
but merely drew lines through items he decided should not be paid on the 
claimant's itemization of the attorney fees and costs, without supplying any 
reasoning. Id. at 668. Cargile, however, is easily distinguishable from the 
present set of facts because, in this case, the hearing examiner listed the 
pertinent facts and legal reasoning supporting the denial of Whiteman's attorney 
fees.

CONCLUSION

[¶18]   Absent Painter's appointment as 
Whiteman's attorney, the OAH was deprived of both the power and the discretion 
to award attorney fees. The OAH's order was adequately supported by facts, and 
there was no abuse of discretion by the hearing examiner. Accordingly, the order 
entered by the OAH is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 The Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) (Michie 1997), and 
W.R.A.P. 12.01 expressly authorize judicial review of agency inaction. Harris v. 
Schuetz, 948 P.2d 907, 908 (Wyo. 1997). After a reasonable period of time, 
agency inaction is deemed a denial of that request. 
Id.

2 The 
Legislature added the Aupon request" language in 
1992.