Title: IN THE INTEREST OF MJS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF MJS v. STATE2001 WY 3120 P.3d 506Case Number: C-00-6Decided: 03/26/2001
 

October Term, A.D. 
2000

March 26, 
2001 

                      
IN THE INTEREST OF MJS, a           

minor:

 MJS,

 Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,

 Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Weston County:

The Honorable Terrence 
L. O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Elrod

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

 

[¶1]    Appellant MJS appeals from the order the trial court 
entered after it found MJS guilty of attempted shoplifting.

 

[¶2]    
We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]    
MJS presents two issues for our consideration:

[1]  Whether the district court erred when it 
found Appellant to have committed the crime of attempted shoplifting, when 
the prosecution had not particularly and specifically charged Appellant 
with attempted shoplifting, nor had asked the court to amend the juvenile 
petition alleging delinquent act?

[2]  
Whether the district court erred when it, sua sponte, found that 
appellant had committed the offense of attempted shoplifting, an offense that 
had not been alleged in the juvenile petition, as said sua sponte finding 
amounts to an amendment to the juvenile petition, in obvious violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine stated in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 
1?

  

FACTS

 [¶4]   
MJS and three of her friends were "cruising around town" on February 14, 
1999, in Newcastle, Wyoming.  One of 
the girls needed to find a telephone to check in with her parents.  The friends decided they would go to a 
local convenience store and use the telephone.  On the way, MJS and one of the other 
girls hatched a plan where MJS's friend would try to distract the store clerk so 
that MJS could steal a pack of cigarettes.  

 

[¶5]    
When they arrived at the convenience store, three of the girls 
entered.  One called her mother on 
the telephone, and another proceeded to the restroom in the back of the 
store.  The girl in the restroom 
summoned the clerk by telling her that the toilet was overflowing.  While the clerk was busy checking out 
this subterfuge, MJS took a pack of cigarettes.  As she did so, however, she noticed that 
someone had arrived in the parking lot and had seen her take the 
cigarettes.  This encouraged MJS to 
put the cigarettes back and to leave the store.  The customer who witnessed MJS take the 
cigarettes informed the clerk who called the police.  The State subsequently filed a Juvenile 
Petition Alleging a Delinquent Act, asserting that MJS had shoplifted a pack of 
cigarettes.  

 

[¶6]    
The case went before a judge in a bench trial.   Although the trial court did not 
find MJS guilty of shoplifting, it did find her guilty of attempted shoplifting 
and adjudged her a delinquent child.  
MJS appeals from this decision.  

  

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]    
The issue of whether the trial court's decision to convict MJS of the 
lesser-included offense was erroneous is a question of law.  Sindelar v. State, 932 P.2d 730, 
732 (Wyo. 1997).

 

Conclusions of law made by the district court under 
Rule 52(a) are not binding upon this court and are reviewed de novo.  Shores [v. Lindsey], 591 
P.2d [895,] 900 [(Wyo. 1979)]. . . .  
"Findings of fact of the trial judge can also lose the insulation of the 
clearly erroneous standard if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law, 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.  at 394, 68 S. Ct.  at 
541; and United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 ( [5th Cir.] 1968), or 
contain factual and legal conclusions that reflect the application of an 
improper legal standard."  
Shores, 591 P.2d  at 899-900.  

 

Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 928 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Hopper v. 
All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538-39 (Wyo. 1993)).  

 

 DISCUSSION

 [¶8]   
MJS limits her challenge to whether the trial court violated the 
separation of powers doctrine by sua sponte finding her guilty of 
attempted shoplifting when the juvenile petition did not include such a charge 
nor was ever amended to include such a charge.  We will confine our discussion of the 
case accordingly.

 

[¶9]    
Wyoming's Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to juvenile proceedings to 
the extent that they are not inconsistent with Wyoming's Juvenile Court 
Act:

 

(a)  
Scope.Except as provided in Rule 54, these rules govern the 
procedures to be followed in all criminal proceedings in all Wyoming 
courts.  When not inconsistent with 
the Juvenile Court Act, these rules shall also apply in delinquency 
proceedings.  In the event that a 
procedure is not established by these rules, the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure shall govern.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 1(a).   W.R.Cr.P. 54(b) further 
provides:

 

(b)  
Juvenile Proceedings.Unless inconsistent with the Juvenile Court 
Act these rules shall apply in all juvenile cases involving allegations that a 
child is in need of supervision or delinquent.

 

[¶10]   
The trial court relied heavily upon W.R.Cr.P. 31(c) in rendering its 
decision.  That provision 
reads:

 

(c)  
Conviction of Lesser Offense.The defendant may be found guilty of 
an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to 
commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if 
the attempt is an offense.

 

[¶11]   
Our review of Rule 31(c) convinces us that it is not inconsistent with 
the Juvenile Court Act.  The 
Juvenile Court Act addresses neither lesser-included nor attempted 
offenses.  We find guidance on this 
issue by comparing the circumstances of this case to the jury instruction phase 
of a jury trial.  After a jury 
trial, the jury can be instructed on lesser-included offenses despite the fact 
that those offenses may not have been formally charged.  In a bench trial, a judge obviously is 
not instructed on the law because he or she is already informed on such 
matters.  See, e.g., Johnson v. 
State, 971 P.2d 973, 973-74 (Wyo. 1998).  That difference in procedure, 
however, does not prevent a judge from being able to consider lesser-included or 
attempted offenses in making the final adjudication. 

 

[¶12]   
The Legislature intended for the rules of criminal procedure to 
supplement the Juvenile Court Act where the two were not in conflict.  W.R.Cr.P. 31(c) does not conflict with 
the Juvenile Court Act, and we find no error in a trial court's reliance on that 
provision to find juvenile defendants guilty of lesser-included or attempted 
offenses even if they were not originally charged.

 

[¶13]   
Affirmed.