Title: State v. Thomas

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

104 Ariz. 408 (1969) 454 P.2d 153 STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Carl Anthony THOMAS, Appellee. No. 1867. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. May 14, 1969. *409 Robert K. Corbin, Maricopa County Atty., H. Charles Eckerman, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for appellant. Cavness, DeRose, Senner & Foster, by Tom C. Foster, Phoenix, for appellee. HAYS, Justice. The appellee, Carl Anthony Thomas, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was convicted of first degree burglary with a prior. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial and the state brought this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1711 and § 13-1712. The trial court entered the following order: The state contends that the court abused its discretion by granting the motion for new trial, and asserts 1) that the defendant was not prejudiced by the manner in which the statements of Jerry D. Snow were admitted in evidence, 2) that said statements were legally admissible, 3) that the court instructed properly, and 4) the verdict rendered was not contrary to the law and the weight of the evidence. The record reflects that a Mr. Abair left his home at 2302 East Montebello, in Phoenix, on the evening of April 28, 1967, returning shortly after midnight. After entering the house through a door to the carport, he glanced out of a window and saw two men hurriedly leaving the house. He gave chase but was unable to catch up with them. The two men ran by a car parked across the street and one lot down from the victim's home. Mr. Abair identified the car as being a 1959 or 1960 four-door Ford. When the police arrived at the residence Mr. Abair gave a general description of the two men he saw leaving his home. The defendant fitted the description of one of the *410 men although the victim could not positively identify him in the courtroom. Less than two hours after the burglary, a police officer traveling north on 24th Street noticed a car driving slowly east on Montebello without lights. He stopped the car and asked the two occupants to explain their presence in the area. The two men fitted the description given by Abair and their explanation of their presence was suspicious. The defendant was the driver of the car and a Jerry D. Snow was the other occupant. Both men were taken into custody. The trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for new trial leaves some doubt as to the court's reasons for finding that the "rights of the defendant were prejudiced by the manner in which the statements of Jerry D. Snow were presented in testimony." The facts do not fit the usual situation where extra-judicial statements of codefendant are not admissible against a defendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968). There are two places in this case wherein the oral statements of Jerry D. Snow were admitted in evidence. The first concerns the conversation held between the officer and the occupants of the car traveling without lights. The officer was not clear in his testimony as to which of the two occupants made specific responses to his questions regarding their presence in the Montebello and 24th Street area. The defendant himself, however, took the witness stand and gave testimony which indicated that he participated fully in the conversation, and in fact made many of the statements. A person being questioned by a police officer at an investigatory stage has no obligation to speak, either to deny or affirm the statements of his companion. State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2, 401 P.2d 404 (1965). If he fully participates in the conversation however, he cannot then expect that conversation to be thrown out because his companion participated also. The spectre of the Miranda warning has been raised here with regard to the foregoing questioning. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Although the testimony is not explicit on this point it appears that the warning was given after the statements were made. When the suspects said they were looking for a party at a nonexistent address, and when they indicated they did not know the name of the person residing at that address, the officer took them into custody. Defendant's attorney asserts that the suspects were deprived of their freedom of action when they were first stopped, and that Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, requires that the warnings be given before any questioning can take place. This is not the holding of Miranda, however. The investigation had not focused on the accused at the time these statements were made. As our Court of Appeals indicated in State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967), the warning must be given when the police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, and also reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is the one who committed it. We approve of this position as being in accord with Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra. The second situation where we must consider statements made by Jerry D. Snow, arose under the following circumstances. When the two suspects were taken into custody they were interrogated at the police station in separate rooms. Both were given the required warnings. After Jerry D. Snow had made certain inculpatory statements, he was taken into the room with the defendant and asked to repeat the statements. The defendant was asked to confirm parts of the statements as they were made. A portion of the testimony of the interrogating officer reads as follows: The defendant, when he took the witness stand, denied having said some of the words attributed to him and denied that Snow confessed. It is not our task to weigh the evidence, State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 308, 376 P.2d 773 (1962), nor to choose between the contradictory versions, State v. Foggy, 101 Ariz. 459, 420 P.2d 934 (1966). The jury had to determine whether the admissions of Snow were adopted or ratified by the defendant and in so doing they apparently accepted the officer's version rather than that of the defendant. The Illinois court succinctly stated the rule in People v. Henderson, 37 Ill. 2d 489, 229 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1967): "An incriminating statement of a third person which is admitted to be true by the accused, is admissible in evidence against him as his own statement by adoption." On numerous occasions this court has expressed its reluctance to reverse a trial court for granting a new trial. In State v. Bogard, 88 Ariz. 244, 354 P.2d 862 (1960), we said: In an early case, Brownell v. Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 6 P.2d 1115 (1932) we stated: As previously pointed out, the evidence is conflicting in this case. It does not appear that the trial court abused its discretion in the granting of the motion for a new trial. Affirmed. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.