Title: Matter of ALJ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of ALJ1992 WY 74836 P.2d 307Case Number: C-90-9Decided: 06/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER 
OF THE INTERESTS OF ALJ, a Minor: ALJ, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the JuvenileCourtofBig HornCounty, the Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum, 
Judge, presiding. 

 
 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public 
Defender, and David Gosar, Appellate Counsel, of the Public Defender Program, 
for appellant. 

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General; 
Michael Lee Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Richard E. Dixon, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 

 
 
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, 
CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ. MACY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; 
URBIGKIT, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; 
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion; and CARDINE, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion in which THOMAS, J., joined. 

 
 
MACY, Justice. 

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant ALJ, a minor, 
appeals from the trial court's finding that he committed a delinquent act by 
recklessly endangering others and from the court's order of disposition 
pertaining to his probation conditions. 

 
 

[¶2.]     We affirm in part and 
vacate in part. 

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues: 

 
 
ISSUE I 

 
 
Is a person guilty of the crime of 
reckless endangering if he points an unloaded weapon at another? In other words, 
does the reckless endangering statute require that the actor place another in an 
actual state of danger? 

 
 
ISSUE II 

 
 
Are conditions J,L,N, and P of the 
appellant's probationary terms improper? More specifically, could the court 
order: A) searches of the appellant's person and abode without requiring a 
reasonable suspicion that a probationary term had been violated, B) that 
appellant's driver's license was automatically revoked should he violate any of 
the terms of probation, and C) that he pay the costs of his court appointed 
attorney without first inquiring into his ability to pay? 

 
 
ISSUE III 

 
 
Could the court place the appellant 
on three years of probation when it could only have sentenced an adult convicted 
of the same offense to one year of probation?

 
 

[¶4.]     During the evening of 
November 22, 1989, Appellant attended a party held in a gravel pit near 
Greybull, Wyoming. An estimated forty to fifty people 
attended this party, most of whom were juveniles. Many of the partygoers were 
consuming alcohol. Appellant brought a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol to this 
party, and, on four separate occasions, he pointed the gun at individuals who 
were in attendance. The police were not informed of Appellant's actions until 
several days after the party was held when the mother of one of the four victims 
told her son to notify the police. 

 
 

[¶5.]     The BigHornCounty prosecutor filed a petition, 
alleging that Appellant committed a delinquent act by recklessly endangering the 
four individuals at the party in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-504(b) (1988). On 
June 7, 1990, a jury found the allegations in the petition were true. The jury 
was not instructed to make a finding regarding whether the gun was loaded. The 
district judge sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period at the Wyoming 
Boys' School, but he suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Appellant 
on probation for three years. 

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant's 
probationary conditions, among others, were that (1) Appellant would submit to 
random chemical testing for the presence of alcohol; (2) Appellant's driving 
privileges would be temporarily revoked with further revocation to be automatic 
if Appellant violated any probation condition or was arrested or ticketed for a 
traffic violation; (3) Appellant's parents would cooperate in residential checks 
at the probation officer's discretion; and (4) Appellant would reimburse the 
Wyoming public defender for the cost of his defense. 

 
 

Reckless 
Endangerment

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
an actor can be guilty of reckless endangerment only if he actually puts the 
victim in danger. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-504 (1988) provides in pertinent part: 

 
 
(a) A person is guilty of reckless 
endangering if he recklessly engages in conduct which places another person in 
danger of death or serious bodily injury. 

 
 
(b) Any person who knowingly points 
a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the person believes 
the firearm is loaded, is guilty of reckless endangering unless reasonably 
necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious 
bodily injury to another.

 
 
Appellant's position is that a 
person is not guilty of reckless endangering under this statute when he points 
an unloaded weapon at someone, "whether or not the person 
believes the firearm is loaded." (Emphasis added.) Appellant's 
argument is that, to give effect to the word "believes," the legislature must 
have meant that anyone who points a loaded gun at another is 
guilty, whether or not he believes the gun is loaded. According to Appellant's 
interpretation, the jury should have been instructed to make a finding regarding 
whether or not the gun was loaded. 

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant relies upon 
cases from other jurisdictions to bolster his argument that, to be guilty, the 
actor must place the victim in actual danger. Like Wyoming has done, these other 
states have adopted, at least in part, the MODEL PENAL CODE'S definition of 
reckless endangering, arguably making their statutory interpretations 
relevant.1 However, none of the jurisdictions 
relied upon has adopted the same reckless endangering statute as Wyoming has adopted. 

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellant places 
emphasis on State v. McLaren, 135 Vt. 
291, 376 A.2d 34 (Vt. 1977). Vermont's reckless endangering 
statute, like the MODEL PENAL CODE, provides, "'Recklessness and danger shall be 
presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of 
another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded.'" 
McLaren, 135 Vt. 291, 376 A.2d  at 36. In McLaren, 
the court found that the presumption of danger could not be construed to make 
irrelevant the actual dangerous nature of the firearm itself. Id.McLaren is not persuasive in 
interpreting Wyoming's statute.2

 
 

[¶10.]  Our rules of statutory interpretation are 
well established: 

 
 
"All portions of an act must be read 
in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must be considered so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous," Hamlin v. Transcon 
Lines, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1139, 1142 (1985), and a statute should not be 
construed to render any portion of it meaningless, or in a manner producing 
absurd results.

 
 

Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988), after remand, 788 P.2d 617, cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 106 (1990) (citations omitted), quoted in GN v. 
State, 816 P.2d 1282, 1283 (Wyo. 1991). We also recognize that ambiguity 
in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity. Story, 755 P.2d  at 231. 

 
 

[¶11.]  We interpret § 6-2-504(b) to mean that, 
whenever an actor knowingly points a firearm at another, whether the firearm is 
loaded or not, he is guilty of reckless endangering, provided the firearm was 
not pointed for defensive purposes. The second clause of § 6-2-504(b) merely 
makes irrelevant the actor's belief as to the loaded or unloaded nature of the 
gun. While it is true that an ambiguous criminal statute should be resolved in 
favor of lenity, the rule is applicable only to the extent that an ambiguity 
exists. Wyoming's reckless endangering statute is not 
ambiguous. 

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant also argues that it would be an 
odd construction to say a person is guilty of reckless endangering 
when no one has actually been endangered by the person's actions. To the 
contrary, an unloaded gun pointed at another creates a dangerous situation. The 
unknown and frequently violent reactions of persons having guns pointed at them, 
unloaded or not, create an obvious danger. Many people are killed each year with 
guns which the handlers knew were unloaded. State v. Meier, 
422 N.W.2d 381, 385 (N.D. 1988). Nothing is odd in protecting against the 
potential harm which exists any time a person points a gun at another. 

 
 

Probation 
Conditions

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant claims that the probation 
condition requiring him to submit to random chemical testing for the presence of 
alcohol violates his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 
1, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Appellant bases his contention on 
Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1990), which involved an adult parolee. 
In Pena, we found that, while parolees have lesser Fourth Amendment 
protections than law abiding citizens have, a parole officer, before he makes a 
search, must still have a "reasonable suspicion" that the parolee committed a 
parole violation. 792 P.2d  at 1357-58. On the basis of the holding in 
Pena, Appellant argues that, since urinalysis is a search, his probation 
condition should have included a requirement that the probation officer must 
reasonably suspect that a probation violation exists before he orders a test.3

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant's argument necessarily assumes 
that: (a) urinalysis is a search; (b) Fourth Amendment protections apply to 
juveniles; and (c) adult and juvenile probationers are entitled to the same 
Fourth Amendment protections. We agree with Appellant's first assumption and 
adopt the Supreme Court's finding in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Association, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989), that 
the testing of urine is a search. For this case, we can assume, without 
deciding, that Fourth Amendment protections apply to juveniles in adjudicatory 
proceedings.4 However, the Fourth Amendment 
protections which apply to adult probationers do not necessarily 
apply to juvenile probationers. The dispositional 
phase of juvenile proceedings requires broad judicial discretion to accommodate 
the unique rehabilitative needs of juveniles. We hold that it is within the 
court's discretion to allow a probation officer to search a juvenile without 
reasonably suspecting that a probation violation exists. 

 
 

[¶15.]  Other courts have recognized that minors' 
constitutional rights available in the adjudicatory stage are not necessarily 
applicable in the dispositional stage. The Supreme Court has found that in 
adjudicatory hearings minors are entitled to those rights which comport with due 
process and fair treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967); 
Kent v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). However, the Supreme 
Court in In re Gault, recognizing the uniqueness of the disposition 
stage, specifically limited its finding to the adjudicatory stage. 387 U.S.  at 13, 31 n.48. 

 
 

[¶16.]  This difference between the adjudicative 
and dispositional phases reflects the broad discretion judges need for making an 
appropriate disposition. Wyoming requires that, when entering an order 
of disposition, the court must do what is best suited for the public safety, the 
preservation of families, and the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the 
child. See Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(a) (Supp. 1991). To 
fulfill this mandate and to address the rehabilitative needs of juveniles, the 
court must have flexibility when it is formulating the probation conditions. 

 
 

[¶17.]  Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(f) (Supp. 1990)5 sets forth what terms and 
conditions a court may impose in an order of disposition.  That section provides in pertinent part: 

 
 
(f) As a part of any order of 
disposition and the terms and conditions thereof, the court may: 

 
 
. . . . 

 
 
(vi) Impose any demands, 
requirements, limitations, restrictions or restraints on the child, and do all 
things with regard to the child that his parents might reasonably and lawfully 
do under similar circumstances; 

 
 
(vii) As a condition of permitting 
the child to live in the home, order the child . . . into counseling, treatment 
or another program designed to rectify problems which contributed to the 
adjudication.

 
 
Both of these provisions are broad 
enough to encompass chemical testing. In this case, alcohol was being consumed 
at the party. Appellant's background showed that he had previously been involved 
in an alcohol-related incident. The testing-for-alcohol condition was designed 
to avoid any future problems involving alcohol. We believe that, under these 
circumstances, the chemical-testing condition was appropriate. 

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant next contests probation 
condition (n) which states, "Said minor's parents shall cooperate in all 
respects with said minor's probation officer and allow residential checks at the 
discretion of said officer." As he did in his argument concerning the 
chemical-testing condition, Appellant argues that the probation officer must 
reasonably suspect that a probation violation exists before he searches the 
minor's residence.6 Our constitutional analysis 
regarding chemical testing is applicable to the probation condition requiring 
residential checks. Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the 
court allowing the probation officer to make residential checks without 
reasonably suspecting the existence of a probation violation. The condition was 
clearly within the court's discretion. Residential checks are an appropriate 
probation condition because they allow the probation officer to verify that the 
minor is not consuming alcohol or otherwise violating his probation conditions. 

 
 
6  

[¶19.]  Appellant's probation condition (1) 
states: 

 
 
Said minor's driving privileges are 
hereby revoked. Said minor shall not drive a motor vehicle until January 20, 
1991. Thereafter, if said minor is arrested or ticketed for a traffic violation 
or violates any condition contained herein, then said minor's driving privilege 
shall be automatically deemed revoked by virtue of this Court 
order.

 
 
Appellant contends that this 
condition is beyond the court's statutory authority. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-229(f)(v) (Supp. 1991), the court may "restrict or restrain the child's 
driving privileges for a period of time the court deems appropriate, and if 
necessary to enforce the restrictions the court may take possession of the 
child's driver's license." Appellant objects to the court using the word 
"revoke" as opposed to using the words "restrict or restrain." In the context of 
condition (1), we see no discernible difference between "revoking" and 
"restraining or restricting" the child's driving privileges. By revoking the 
child's driving privileges, the court is not revoking the child's 
driver's license. 

 
 

[¶20.]  Appellant's probation condition (p) 
requires him to reimburse the public defender for the cost of his defense. 
Appellant claims that the trial court must inquire into his ability to reimburse 
the public defender before it can order reimbursement. We agree. 

 
 

[¶21.]  The State argues that the trial judge had 
sufficient knowledge to conclude that Appellant had the capacity to reimburse 
the public defender. The basis for this claim is that, at the dispositional 
hearing, Appellant's father testified to Appellant's steady work history. This 
evidence was not sufficient to qualify as an inquiry into Appellant's ability to 
pay. 

 
 

[¶22.]  Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-235(c) (1986) allows 
the court to order the child to pay for the cost of his defense; however, the 
statute does not specifically require the court to inquire into the child's 
ability to pay. As was said in Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133 
(Wyo. 1989) 
(Urbigkit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): 

 
 
The application of restitution and 
cost repayment statutes without a judicial finding of ability to pay are 
statutes designed as debt collecting devices masquerading as penal laws and 
contravene the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for 
debt.

 
 
774 P.2d  at 143. We hold that the 
court must inquire and find that the juvenile has the ability to pay before the 
court can order reimbursement of attorney fees, and we vacate that probation 
condition requiring Appellant to reimburse the public defender. 

 
 

Equal 
Protection

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant argues that his three-year 
probation term violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions. He relies upon Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 1975), for the 
proposition that a probation term cannot exceed the maximum imprisonment term. 
Since the maximum sentence for reckless endangerment is one year, Appellant 
claims that his three-year probation term denies him equal protection under the 
law. 

 
 

[¶24.]  The right to equal protection under the 
law "'mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, both 
in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.'" Small v. 
State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1224, 84 L. Ed. 2d 356, 105 S. Ct. 1215 (1985) 
(quoting State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 602 P.2d 914, 922 (Haw. 1979)). 
When claiming an equal protection violation, the claimant must initially show 
that the classification in question treats similarly situated persons unequally. 
State v. A.M.H., 233 Neb. 610, 447 N.W.2d 40 (Neb. 1989). Adults placed on probation after 
they have been criminally prosecuted are not similarly situated to juveniles 
placed on probation after they have been adjudicated delinquents; therefore, 
Appellant's argument must fail. 

 
 

[¶25.]  By enacting a juvenile code separate from 
the criminal code, Wyoming's legislature has recognized that 
juveniles and adults are not similarly situated. Juvenile proceedings are 
designed to rehabilitate and protect the juvenile, not to punish him. These 
goals of rehabilitation and protection are reflected throughout the juvenile 
code. Proceedings in juvenile court are equitable as opposed to being criminal. 
Juveniles are not convicted; they are merely adjudicated delinquents. By 
treating juveniles more gently than it treats adults, the legislature is 
compensating for juveniles' inherent lack of experience and maturity. 

 
 

[¶26.]  Since juvenile probations and adult 
probations are not similarly situated, Appellant suffered no denial of his right 
to equal protection under the law. 

 
 

[¶27.]  Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.

 
 
THOMAS, 
J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

 
 
CARDINE, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion in which THOMAS, J., 
joined.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 

 
 

[¶28.]  For a different reason than given by 
Justice Cardine, I cannot join in concurrence with the entire majority opinion. 
Directly stated, I do not find persons to be constitutionally second-class, or 
no-class, citizens under either the federal or state constitution when younger 
than some age limit, which is from time to time readjusted by the legislature to 
establish the juvenile court jurisdictional age limit by changing the age of 
majority. 

 
 

[¶29.]  I find no constitutional basis for the 
conversion of the misdemeanor offense for an adult into a confinement sentence 
of five days in jail and three years probation for a juvenile. An adult 
convicted of reckless endangerment cannot be confined or placed on probation for 
a term to exceed one year. The same criminal offense is utilized under this 
court's decision for the appellant, the only difference being age, to be 
subjected to a criminal felony conviction penalty extended to three years. That 
divergence, even if found to be justified in state statute, is, in my opinion, 
unconstitutional under the Wyoming Constitution in violating both due process 
and equal protection. 

 
 

[¶30.]  This is not a youth-out-of-control 
juvenile court protective action. It is criminal conduct, prosecuted under the 
juvenile statute for an adult crime where, even if the youth had been prosecuted 
as an adult, see Wyo. Stat.§ 14-6-203(e) and (f) (Supp. 1991), the 
maximum confinement sentence, including periods of probation, could not have 
exceeded one year. Here, where this appellant was prosecuted as a minor under 
the juvenile code, we add judicial opportunity to confine and punish for a total 
time of three years. 

 
 

[¶31.]  This case involves punishment of 
appellant for the commission of a crime. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-201(ix) (Supp. 1991) 
states that a "'delinquent act' means an act punishable as a criminal offense by 
the laws of this state or any political subdivision thereof." Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-203(a) states that "the court has general jurisdiction in all matters and 
proceedings commenced therein or transferred to it by order of the district 
court concerning: * * * (ii) any minor alleged to have committed a delinquent 
act before attaining the age of majority." 

 
 

[¶32.]  The centrality of the criminal 
prosecutorial nature of this proceeding is reflected in the requirement for 
information to be contained in the juvenile petition, which includes: 

 
 
A statement setting forth with 
particularity the facts which bring the child within the provisions of W.S. 
14-6-203. If the basis of the petition is an alleged delinquent act or a need 
for supervision based upon a violation of the laws of the state or a political 
subdivision, the petition shall cite the alleged law 
violated.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-212(iv) (Supp. 1991). 
This requires citation to the criminal statute allegedly violated as a basis for 
the "prosecutorial" proceeding when criminal conduct, e.g. delinquent 
act, is involved. 

 
 

[¶33.]  We are presented with an explicitly 
directed criminal proceeding relating to punishment assessed by society for the 
commission of a criminal offense. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 525, 
95 S. Ct. 1779, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975). The criminal nature of the proceeding and 
the required recognition of constitutional interests surely is not in question 
in 1992. These proceedings can no longer be characterized as civil, where 
punitive disturbance of liberty interests of the individual as retribution for 
criminal conduct is presented. Chief Justice Warren Burger recognized the 
essence of the criminal nature of the juvenile proceeding in the double jeopardy 
discussion provided in Breed, 421 U.S.  at 529. He 
first observed that the United States Supreme Court's response to the criminal 
nature of the juvenile proceeding "has been to make applicable in juvenile 
proceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal 
prosecutions." Id. at 528-29 (citing 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) 
and Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967)). Chief Justice Burger then 
stated: 

 
 
We believe it is simply too late in 
the day to conclude, as did the District Court in this case, that a juvenile is 
not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has 
committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences 
include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of 
liberty for many years. For it is clear under our cases that determining the 
relevance of constitutional policies, like determining the applicability of 
constitutional rights, in juvenile proceedings, requires that courts eschew "the 
'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings," 
In re Gault, supra, at 50, and that "the juvenile process . . . be 
candidly appraised." 387 U.S.  at 21. See In re Winship, 
supra, at 365-366. 

 
 
As we have observed, the risk to 
which the term jeopardy refers is that traditionally associated with "actions 
intended to authorize criminal punishment to vindicate public justice." 
United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess, [317 U.S. 537, 548-549, 87 L. Ed. 443, 63 S. Ct. 379 (1943)].

 
 

Breed, 421 U.S.  at 529 
(footnote omitted). 

 
 

[¶34.]  The due process nature of the Wyoming juvenile code 
proceeding is statutorily recognized by the right to counsel, to be provided a 
jury trial and to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. 

 
 
At their first appearance before the 
court the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be advised by the 
court of their right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the 
proceedings including appeal, and to employ counsel of their own 
choice.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-222(a) (1986). "A 
party against whom a petition has been filed or the district attorney may demand 
a trial by jury at an adjudicatory hearing." Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-223(c) (1986). "A child 
alleged to be delinquent may remain silent and need not be a witness against or 
otherwise incriminate himself, whether before the court voluntarily, by subpoena 
or otherwise." Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-223(a). 

 
 

[¶35.]  Specific issues inculcated into the 
majority decision which remain undiscussed in the opinion include: (1) a basic 
discrimination based on age in punishment against a minor in severity of 
sentence (when he is prosecuted as a minor instead of charged under the adult 
crime status and dependent on the happenstance of being younger or older than 
the age of majority); (2) conversion of a criminal misdemeanor into a felony 
punishment status by utilization of the juvenile code in substitution of the 
adult criminal court system; and (3) continuation of the juvenile court 
inflicted punishment into adulthood from initial juvenile court sentence. 

 
 

[¶36.]  The first examination is to determine 
whether this proceeding is criminal in nature and consequently requires 
application of associative constitutional protection under both the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions. The United States Supreme Court has taken a forceful, but not 
necessarily consistent, pathway. The clearest recognition of the essential 
criminal nature of this kind of juvenile court proceeding was provided in 
Breed. Earlier recognition of the reality can be followed from Kent v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966) to 
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 and 
then continued in philosophic adaptation in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 to Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979). 

 
 
A child, merely on account of his 
minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967), 
"whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the 
Bill of Rights is for adults alone."12

                          

12Similarly, the Court said in 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976): 

 
 
"Constitutional rights do not mature 
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and 
possess constitutional rights."

 
 

Bellotti, 443 U.S.  at 633. 

 
 

[¶37.]  The exception to the constitutionally 
required protective designation is found in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1971), which considered the right to a 
jury trial for due process in juvenile court proceedings. That case has no 
Wyoming relevance since the Wyoming statute 
guarantees that right which honors the state constitutional criteria. See 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-223(c) and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10, 
"right * * * to a speedy trial by an impartial jury[.]" 

 
 

[¶38.]  In Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 86 S. Ct. 1045, the charged juvenile was subjected to a 
waiver order for adult prosecution without adequate recognition of any due 
process right. The United States Supreme Court initiated its decision by 
discussion that appellant's contentions 

 
 
suggest basic issues as to the 
justifiability of affording a juvenile less protection than is accorded to 
adults suspected of criminal offenses, particularly where, as here, there is an 
absence of any indication that the denial of rights available to adults was 
offset, mitigated or explained by action of the Government, as parens 
patriae, evidencing the special solicitude for juveniles commanded by the 
Juvenile Court Act.

 
 

Id. at 551-52. In considering rights to 
due process and assistance of counsel, the United States Supreme Court remanded 
for a proper waiver hearing to be held where due process was afforded. 

 
 

[¶39.]  Kent was followed by the landmark case 
of Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428. In thoughtfully synthesizing philosophy and 
constitutional law, Justice Fortas, in considering any criminal characterization 
of the proceeding, stated: 

 
 
The highest motives and most 
enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law 
in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this 
peculiar system is--to say the least--debatable. And in practice, as we remarked 
in the Kent case, supra, the 
results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again 
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound 
wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of 
our juvenile courts. . . ." The absence of substantive standards has not 
necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized 
treatment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle 
has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures 
from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in 
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. The Chairman of the Pennsylvania 
Council of Juvenile Court Judges has recently observed: "Unfortunately, loose 
procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars, either singly or in 
combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles of 
fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due 
process."

 
 

Application of Gault, 387 U.S.  at 17-19 
(footnotes omitted). 

 
 

[¶40.]  The United States Supreme Court revisited 
the relationship of juvenile court proceedings to constitutional rights of the 
juvenile for a requirement of proof of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068. The United 
States Supreme Court first considered the reasonable doubt standard: 

 
 
Lest there remain any doubt about 
the constitutional statute of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold 
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged.

 
 

Id. at 364. The United States Supreme 
Court then turned 

 
 
to the question whether juveniles, 
like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
when they are charged with violation of a criminal law. The same considerations 
that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply 
as well to the innocent child. We do not find convincing the contrary arguments 
of the New York Court of Appeals. * * * In effect the Court of Appeals 
distinguished the proceedings in question here from a criminal prosecution by 
use of what Gault called the "'civil' label-of-convenience which has been 
attached to juvenile proceedings." 387 U.S., at 50. But Gault 
expressly rejected that distinction as a reason for holding the Due Process 
Clause inapplicable to a juvenile proceeding. * * * We made clear in that 
decision that civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the 
need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding 
where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and 
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a 
felony prosecution." Id., at 36.

 
 

In re Winship, 397 U.S.  at 365-66. 

 
 

[¶41.]  Within the scope of decisive United 
States Supreme Court case law for application of the United States Constitution 
and the provisions of the Wyoming Constitution in conjunction with the facts of 
this case, we need to look at the relevant issues created. Those difficult 
controversial questions are presented for this appeal in what is answered so 
simply by the majority decision. I dissent in suggestion that deep-seated 
constitutional questions regarding discrimination based on age, misdemeanor 
conviction, and a felony sentence in juvenile court application to adulthood 
should author a more serious review, both in constitutional law and in practical 
societal relationships in a modern world where strong executive and legislative 
efforts to reduce even further the age of majority are underway. See, 
e.g., S.F. 103 and H.B. 203, Age of Majority, and S.F. 83, Court Ordered 
Placements of Juveniles, introduced in the 1992 Wyoming "budget" legislative session. By 
almost an afterthought, this court is faced with the principal issue of an 
unloaded gun assault and now fails to recognize and adequately analyze the real 
significance of this case for the future of Wyoming law development. See, e.g., United 
States v. R.L.C.,   U.S.  , 112 S. Ct. 1329, 117 L. Ed. 2d 559 
(1992). 

 
 

[¶42.]  Reasoned consideration of the juvenile 
court system requires recognition of the fundamental nature of the liberty 
interest to then be related to a conclusion that it does not first arise with 
attained adulthood. In 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged "the 
individual's strong interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and 
fundamental nature of this right." United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 
102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982) in discussion of equal protection 
enforcement of fundamental rights. 

 
 

[¶43.]  Thoughtfully examined principles would 
lead to the conclusion that the fundamental interest of liberty is no less real 
for a juvenile faced with incarceration or probation than is the case for an 
adult. After an exhaustive and thoughtful examination of the fundamental 
interest of liberty in general, the California Supreme Court in People v. 
Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375, 384 (1976) related 
the interest to the defendant, a minor: 

 
 
No reason has been suggested, nor 
can we conceive of any, why the concern for personal liberty implicit in both 
the California 
and federal Constitutions is any less compelling in defendant's case. We believe 
that those charters are no less vigilant in protecting against continuing 
deprivations of liberty than are their due process clauses in protecting against 
the initial deprivation of that liberty. We conclude that personal liberty is a 
fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under 
both the California and United States 
Constitutions.

 
 
That court had related: 

 
 
The origins of the personal liberty 
concept under consideration today and encompassed within the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and * * * the California 
Constitution can be traced as far back in Anglo-American legal history as the 
Magna Carta. (See Schwartz, 1 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History (1971) 
pp. 6-7; Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in 
the Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty, and 
Property," supra, 4 Harv. L. Rev. at pp. 369-374.) The declaration of 
certain basic rights within one short chapter of that instrument has come to be 
viewed as the foundation for the protections guaranteed the defendant in our 
system of criminal justice. Without a doubt, Chapter 39 of the Great Charter 
implicitly recognizes the overwhelming importance and value attached to the 
concept of personal liberty by those who secured its guarantees at Runnymede. This same concern and respect for the concept 
of personal liberty is embodied in our concept of due process and has found 
repeated expression in both this court and the United States Supreme 
Court.

 
 

Olivas, 551 P.2d  at 382-83 (footnote 
omitted). See also People v. Trevisanut, 160 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 207 Cal. Rptr. 921, 927 (1984), for application to a juvenile; In re Hop, 29 Cal. 3d 82, 171 Cal. Rptr. 721, 623 P.2d 282 (1981); and People v. 
Sandoval, 70 Cal. App. 3d 73, 138 Cal. Rptr. 609, 619 (1977) 

 
 

[¶44.]  Our sister state of Montana has similarly 
recognized the same abiding responsibility in examining its constitutional 
provisions which are similar to those found in the Wyoming Constitution: 

 
 
The preamble to the Montana 
Constitution states in part:

 
 
"We the people of Montana . . . desiring . 
. . to secure the blessings of liberty . . . do ordain and establish this 
constitution."

 
 
Article II is the Declaration of 
Rights. Article II, Sec. 3 states in part: 

 
 
"All persons are born free and have 
certain inalienable rights. They include . . . the rights of . . . enjoying and 
defending their lives and liberties. . . ."

 
 
Article II, Sec. 4, the equal 
protection clause, states in pertinent part: 

 
 
"The dignity of the human being is 
inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the 
laws."

 
 
Article II, Sec. 17, the due process 
clause, states: 

 
 
"No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

 
 

Matter of C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 683 P.2d 931, 
940 (1984). The Montana Supreme Court concluded "that the deprivation of the 
physical liberty of [the juvenile] for a period of 45 days is sufficient to 
constitute an infringement upon her right of physical liberty" and presented an 
interest that was within the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the Montana 
Constitution. Id.

 
 

[¶45.]  Constitutional protection for the liberty 
interest intrinsic within the Wyoming constitutional guarantees likewise has 
a significant recognition in our case law.1 State v. 
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938), liberty and property interest 
prosecution under the Unfair Competition Act; Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale 
Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 417 (Wyo. 1962), unconstitutionality 
of the Fair Trade Act recognizing that liberty is the right "to do all that is 
not made unlawful," and further in citation of Langley and quotation from 
the originating case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886): 

 
 
"The very idea that one man may be 
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right 
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be 
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of 
slavery itself."

 
 

Bulova Watch Co., 371 P.2d  at 418-19. 

 
 

[¶46.]  Further Wyoming cases recognizing the 
liberty interest constitutional protection include Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965), involuntary hospitalization, unconstitutionality of a 
statute superseding court rules of evidence and procedure and invading a due 
process liberty interest; Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 
1975), wrongful death statute cannot constitutionally deny illegitimate child 
rights derived from deceased parent; State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165 
(Wyo. 1981), fundamental right and strict scrutiny test where parental rights 
are questioned; Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984) and Matter of 
Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624 (Wyo. 1989), father's right in parental 
termination case; Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), equal educational 
opportunity is a fundamental interest requiring strict scrutiny to invalidate 
statutory classification; Simons v. Laramie County School Dist. No. One, 
741 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1987), right to education as a constitutional liberty 
interest invoking the strict-scrutiny criteria; State v. Shunneson, 743 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1987), right to pursue one's chosen means of livelihood; and 
Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 784 (Wyo. 1988), majority and Thomas, J., 
specially concurring, regarding medical review panel classification invoking 
equal protection and due process guarantees requiring heightened scrutiny test 
application. 

 
 

[¶47.]  In background precedent to support a 
number of state court decisions which will hereafter be discussed, authority 
from federal cases derived from application of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency 
Act is utilized. Obviously, the United States Congress did not like what the 
state courts did, and consequently, the pervasive adaptation provided for 
juveniles was to limit any incarceration to the term provided for an adult in 
violation of the underlying criminal statute. Although the most recent United 
States Supreme Court decision follows a further question to find an answer 
regarding application of sentencing guidelines to the statutory limitation to 
create a definable limit to the appropriate term for the juvenile, the recent 
case of R.L.C., 117 L. Ed. 2d 559, 112 S. Ct. 1329 is demonstrative that 
the federal system does not presently ignore preclusive rights of juveniles to 
have no more extended sentences than would be provided for adult miscreants. 
Particular note should be taken of the recognition of Justice Scalia, concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment, that "the rule of lenity * * * 
prescribes the result when a criminal statute is ambiguous: the more lenient 
interpretation must prevail." Id. at 1339. With the tidal movement 
within this nation during the last twenty years to reduce the age of majority, 
the recognition that lenity has a place regarding the juvenile courts' capacity 
to sentence for a period beyond majority cannot be casually disregarded. 

 
 

[¶48.]  We need then in current examination to 
consider three facets of the entire issue, each sequentially presented in this 
appeal: (1) the abject age discrimination for minimized punishment when 
adulthood is achieved for the identical criminal conduct invoking more serious 
responsibility for the minor; (2) conversion of a misdemeanor into a juvenile 
felony result; and (3) juvenile court jurisdictional effectiveness beyond 
adulthood. 

 
 

[¶49.]  In answering all three questions, I would 
adopt the constitutional concepts dramatized in Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 
551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal Rptr. 55 and the modern statutory structure provided by 
federal law which defines operational recognition of the juvenile's right to 
equality of treatment and constitutional protection as defined in Breed, In 
re Winship, Gault and Kent. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) provides the 
statutory criteria limiting detention to the "'maximum term of imprisonment that 
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult.'" 
R.L.C., 112 S. Ct.  at 1330. Earlier recognized is that detention for the 
juvenile, about which this appeal is enfolded, is criminal in nature. 
Breed, 421 U.S.  at 529, 530. With recognition of 
the national confinement systems now emplaced for those persons who have not 
achieved adulthood, it is too late to continue the fiction that we have a quid 
pro quo by civil detention for supervisory control of the juvenile's free 
exercise of liberty as something different than confinement for his older 
brother or sister. The compelling characterization of treatment and 
rehabilitation for the youthful offender is, in today's confinement society, an 
optimistic expectancy that has ceased to retain validity. 

 
 

[¶50.]  The Olivas court accurately 
advanced in partial quotation from the earlier California case of Ex parte 
Herrera, 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P.2d 345, 348 (1943): 

 
 
"The great value in the treatment of 
youthful offenders lies in its timeliness in striking at the roots of 
recidivism. Reaching the offender during his formative years, it can be an 
impressive bulwark against the confirmed criminality that defies rehabilitation, 
for it is characteristic of youth to be responsive to good influence as it is 
susceptible to bad." 

 
 
There remains as much wisdom in that 
observation today as it held over 30 years ago. However, we are no longer able 
to find such a generalization, standing alone, as sufficient justification for 
governmentally imposed inequality where deprivations of personal liberty are 
involved.

 
 

Olivas, 551 P.2d  at 385. 

 
 

[¶51.]  The subject is similarly addressed in 
Samuel M. Davis, Rights of Juveniles: The Juvenile Justice  System, § 6.6 at 6-22.4 to 6-22.5 (2d 
ed. 1991) (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted): 

 
 
It was reliance on the 
rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court, however, that promoted most 
courts, prior to the Gault decision, to deny application of 
constitutional safeguards to the juvenile process. As a basis for depriving 
constitutional rights, this justification was thoroughly discredited in 
Kent and Gault. Even in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania the Court 
acknowledged that the rehabilitative processes of the juvenile court had largely 
failed. 

 
 
Moreover, in light of the number of 
successful claims being brought in favor of a right to treatment for juveniles * 
* *, the evidence continues to mount that reliance on the juvenile process as 
rehabilitative rather than punitive in nature has paid more heed to rhetoric 
than to reality. 

 
 
Not all courts have swept aside 
differential treatment on the basis of the tenuous distinction between 
punishment and treatment, however. In In re Wilson the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was not persuaded that there was a rational basis sufficient to 
warrant differential sentencing according to age. The court acknowledged that 
longer commitment might be authorized in some cases if (1) the 
juvenile has notice at the outset of all factors upon which the court might base 
an adjudication of delinquency; (2) the conclusions on which a delinquency 
adjudication is based, plus all facts supporting the conclusions, are set forth 
in the court's order; and (3) it appears that the longer commitment will insure 
rehabilitative treatment and not just deprivation of liberty. If any one of 
these factors is absent, the court held, there is no constitutionally valid 
distinction between juvenile and adult offenders to warrant subjecting one class 
to a longer maximum commitment for the same offense. 

 
 
In some instances, statutory 
limitations seek to avoid the problem of differential treatment. The recently 
revised North 
Carolina juvenile code, for example, provides for 
indefinite as well as definite commitments, but it also provides that in no 
event may the period of commitment exceed what would be authorized for 
commitment of an adult.85

                          

85N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-652(c) (Supp. 
1989); see La. Code Juv. Proc. art. 89(C) (1990); Tenn. Code Ann. § 
37-1-137(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1990) (in no event may juvenile be committed for longer 
period than possible in case of adult convicted of same 
offense).

 
 

[¶52.]  There is obviously a body of law which, 
in general, predates Gault and, in particular, its successor Breed 
and more current statutory changes found in federal and some state court cases 
which consider that either the detention of the juvenile is non-criminal or the 
differentiated longer detention based on the younger age is justified. People 
ex rel. Cromwell v. Warden, 74 Misc.2d 642, 345 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1973), 
reformatory custody to educate and rehabilitate constitutes a due process 
requirement. Consequently, for that institution on RikersIsland, which has achieved infamous 
recognition in current time, a 1973 indeterminate sentence status for youthful 
offenders subject to the Parole Commission Act was constitutional. The case, 
however, determined that equal treatment to award grant of good behavior time 
was required. The case at best provides scant authority for the topic presented 
in this appeal. Coincidentally, the case was rendered while the federal law was 
in the process of transition as discussed in the 1979 change in United States 
v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnotes omitted): 

 
 
Amidon's second claimed 
constitutional error is that sentencing under the YCA [Youth Corrections Act] 
irrationally discriminates against those between the ages of 18 and 26, in 
violation of the equal protection and due process clauses. We do not reach this 
contention because we conclude that Congress has clearly evidenced its intention 
in the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 that a youth may not be sentenced to a 
term of confinement under the YCA that exceeds the statutory maximum that an 
adult could receive. 

 
 
Amidon is correct when he asserts 
that it is inequitable and unjust to permit imposition of the six year sentence 
under the YCA for offenses for which an adult, or a juvenile, could be sentenced 
to just six months. Congress has noted this inequity and recently has taken 
steps to remedy it. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96-82, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3401 (Supp. 1980). It is clear that, in doing so, Congress has rejected the 
earlier conclusions of this court and others that the rehabilitative purposes 
underlying the YCA justify a longer confinement, see, e.g., United States v. 
Leming, 532 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978, 96 S. Ct. 1485, 47 L. Ed. 2d 749 (1976); Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 
682 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc). 

 
 
This rejection is well warranted. As 
the government conceded at oral argument, the original rehabilitative purposes 
of the YCA have generally been abandoned. See Partridge, Chaset and 
Eldridge, "The Sentencing Options of Federal 
District Judges," 84 F.R.D. 175, 200 (1980).

 
 

[¶53.]  Compare, for example, United States v. 
Lowery, 726 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 469 U.S. 837, 105 S. Ct. 133, 83 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1984); Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1966); and 
Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958). Any question 
on the subject is now superseded by R.L.C., 117 L. Ed. 2d 559, 112 S. Ct. 1329.2

 
 

[¶54.]  Wisconsin, in the case of J. K. v. 
State, 68 Wis.2d 426, 228 N.W.2d 713 (1975), concluded that an indeterminate 
sentence of a fifteen-year-old which could last until age eighteen was not 
unconstitutional when compared to the potentiality of incarceration of a 
similarly situate adult. Likewise, In re State in Interest of K. V. N., 
116 N.J.Super. 580, 283 A.2d 337, 343 (1971), aff'd 60 N.J. 517, 291 A.2d 577 (1972), found that "classification based on age is not per se 
invalid." The Illinois appellate court decision of In 
Interest of T.L.B., 184 Ill.App.3d 213, 132 Ill.Dec. 534, 539 N.E.2d 1340 
(1989) demonstrates clearly definable differences. The Illinois case law is not 
comparable where recognizing that the juvenile has a right of choice to be 
prosecuted as an adult for any conduct which constitutes the criminal offense, 
id. at 1347, and no discussion is provided regarding retention past the 
age of majority as a jurisdictional concept for the juvenile court. Furthermore, 
the cases tend to relate to general delinquency rather than one single criminal 
conduct event. Id.; In Interest of T. D., 81 
Ill.App.3d 369, 36 Ill.Dec. 594, 401 N.E.2d 275 (1980); In Interest of F. L. 
W., 73 Ill.App.3d 355, 29 Ill.Dec. 387, 391 N.E.2d 1070 (1979) (see, 
however, the dissent of Justice Craven, id. at 1073); In re 
Blakes, 4 Ill.App.3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972); In re Sekeres, 48 Ill. 2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1008, 30 L. Ed. 2d 656, 92 S. Ct. 691 (1972); In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970). 

 
 

[¶55.]  The present California law has a 
structure similar to the Federal Youth Corrections Act provisions. See In re 
Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 (1979), where 
criminal term confinement provisions established the maximum for juvenile 
detention. Additionally, the California rule for misdemeanor offenses is 
finitely determined. In re Samuel C., 74 Cal. App. 3d 351, 141 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1977); In re Lyerla, 18 Cal. 3d 20, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 553 P.2d 603 
(1976). Furthermore, appellant does not present us with the dangerousness 
determinate concept in California law. People v. SuperiorCourtofLos AngelesCounty, 142 Cal. App. 3d 29, 190 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1983). 

 
 

[¶56.]  The one case cited in the majority, In 
re Interest of A.M.H., 233 Neb. 610, 447 N.W.2d 40 (1989), is not factually 
relevant including the result of the case which reversed detention commitment on 
the basis that a status offender determination had not been judicially made. The 
sentence confinement for the offense of driving without a license was 
unreasonable and reversible. The issue first raised on appeal of equal 
protection for juvenile confinement greater than the misdemeanor offense 
did violate equal protection when the juvenile offense was 
compared to the adult offense of driving without an operator's license. In 
comparison to Wyoming law, the factual situation presented 
would not have been generally handled in juvenile court. Secondly, no indication 
was given of the retentive jurisdiction of the juvenile court to sentence beyond 
majority. 

 
 

[¶57.]  This latter subject was specifically 
addressed by the Arizona Supreme Court in Appeal, in MaricopaCounty Juvenile No. J-86509, 124 Ariz. 
377, 604 P.2d 641 (1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 967 (1980), where that 
court determined that any jurisdiction for a juvenile commitment terminates at 
the age of majority and any provision of the statute extending that authority 
beyond that age was unconstitutional. In declaring the Arizona statute 
unconstitutional, the court recognized that "nowhere is there a grant by the 
Arizona Constitution of authority for persons eighteen years of age or older to 
be treated as children." Id. at 643. Obviously, an intermediate 
appellate court did not like the Arizona Supreme Court decision. Appeal in 
MaricopaCounty Juvenile Action No. 
J86843, 125 Ariz. 227, 608 P.2d 804 (1980). 

 
 

[¶58.]  The line of departure in the morass of 
the juvenile detention cases is self-evident. Those authors justifying an 
unequal system of sentencing dependent upon age speak of rehabilitation and 
training, while those who seek equality and equivalency of penal sanctions for 
criminal conduct speak of accountability, punishment and, even more quietly on 
occasion, warehousing. See, e.g., People In Interest of M.C., 774 P.2d 857, 864 (Colo. 1989), Mullarkey, J., dissenting, and 
State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982) (majority opinion and 
Dore, J., dissenting, id. at 1155). 

 
 

[¶59.]  The necessarily confined concept of 
rehabilitation as justification for discriminatory sentencing was recognized by 
the Pennsylvania court in In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614, 618 
(1970) (footnote omitted): 

 
 
There can be circumstances under 
which a longer maximum commitment may be permissible, but only if three factors 
are present: (1) The juvenile must have notice at the outset of the proceedings 
of any and all factors upon which the state proposes to base the adjudication of 
delinquency; (2) the ultimate conclusions upon which the finding of delinquency 
is based, and the facts supporting each of them, must be clearly found and set 
forth in the adjudication; and (3) it must be clear that the longer commitment 
will result in the juvenile's receiving appropriate rehabilitative care and not 
just in his being deprived of his liberty for a longer time. If all three of 
these conditions are present, a juvenile may be deprived of his liberty for a 
period in excess of the maximum sentence which he could have received if treated 
as an adult.

 
 

[¶60.]  The Connecticut court recognized the similar 
unusual circumstance case in State v. Brezina, 28 Conn.Supp. 132, 253 A.2d 676, 677 (1969): 

 
 
In the interest of achieving 
reasonable uniformity of sentencing, it is our view that, in the absence of 
highly extraordinary circumstances not present in this case, a person committed 
to the reformatory ought not to be held in confinement longer than the statutory 
maximum term for the particular offense involved.

 
 

[¶61.]  I would recognize the general substance 
of exceptional circumstances including dangerousness and general delinquency, 
but otherwise the state when properly acting in the concept of parens 
patriae should not intermix delinquency punishment and offender status. "The 
individual's right to personal liberty is a fundamental right for equal 
protection purposes." Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 842 (Tenn. 1988). Lenity 
should be applied to juvenile confinement cases resulting from criminal conduct 
equally with its application to the adult criminal structure of state law. 
R.L.C., 112 S. Ct.  at 1339, Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment. 

 
 

[¶62.]  Within the structure of law created by 
this state's constitutional precepts, the United States Supreme Court decisions 
and the general law, each defining rights of juveniles, it is necessary to first 
establish and then apply the facts of this case. The factual circumstances 
reveal appellant, born March 1, 1974, was fifteen years and eight months old on 
the date of this offense. The criminal offense for which the juvenile proceeding 
was pursued involved reckless endangerment by waiving a gun around and pointing 
it at persons present at a teenage countryside nighttime drinking bash. The 
maximum sentence for reckless endangerment under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-504(c) (1988) 
is one year. 

 
 

[¶63.]  Appellant was sentenced by order entered 
on September 27, 1990 to five days in jail and an indeterminate period in the 
WyomingBoysSchool in Worland. The BoysSchool confinement was suspended pending a 
three-year probationary term of which two years would be supervised and the 
final year unsupervised. This sentence will expire on September 27, 1993, 
although the charged individual will then have reached the age of majority, 
nineteen, on March 1, 1993. Consequently, his probation will not expire until 
nearly seven more months after he achieves adulthood. Under the sentence, until 
September 27, 1993, he will continue to be exposed to incarceration at the Boys 
School for probation violation, even though no longer a minor and no longer 
subject to the stated jurisdiction of the juvenile court (age nineteen). If the 
BoysSchool would not keep him, 
which they would not, would he then be incarcerated in the state penitentiary? 
Under the status of the law as now changed by the 1992 session of the Wyoming 
State Legislature, transfer to the penitentiary can no longer occur. 1992 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 25. Then remaining for adult punishment for any violation of probation 
as a result of the juvenile court disciplinary action is only a county jail 
sentence. 

 
 

[¶64.]  The concern I have is that the law should 
be clarified and carefully analyzed so that the district bench is, under the 
pressures to furnish answers where none exist, clearly directed to 
jurisdictional questions by specific and adequately enumerated court 
decisions.3 Defined legislative 
direction to extend juvenile court proceedings into adulthood is not found in 
present Wyoming statutes. If I were to apply either 
the legislative history of the majority opinion or the lenity of Justice 
Scalia's opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in 
R.L.C., I would find minimal authority in Wyoming's present statutory 
system to grant authority to the juvenile court which specifically is not 
provided. Where the minor is the subject matter of jurisdiction, Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-203, and the age of majority is nineteen years, Wyo. Stat. § 
2-1-301(a)(xxvi) (1980), I cannot find any possible constitutional validity to 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-231(c)(ii) (Supp. 1991) which accords to the 
juvenile court authority to continue supervision although its jurisdiction had 
ended at age nineteen. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-203(a)(ii). 

 
 

[¶65.]  I object to any adaptation of Wyoming law on 
constructional and constitutional bases which converts misdemeanors for adults 
into felony confinement offenses for minors and denies equal justice based on an 
age determinate as an attribute of our juvenile court system. I especially 
reject any construction of our law which construes juvenile court authority to 
continue past the age of jurisdiction into adulthood. Breed, In re 
Winship, and Gault should teach that a statutorily established age of 
majority should not provide a dividing line to deny constitutional rights for 
due process and liberty to juvenile offenders. 

 
 

[¶66.]  Consequently, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 

 
 

THOMAS, 
J., concurring and 
dissenting. 

 
 

[¶67.]  I agree with the disposition of this case 
as reflected in the majority opinion except for the portion addressing the 
aspect of the terms of the probation that requires reimbursement of the public 
defender for the cost of defense. As to that aspect of the case, I agree with 
the views of Justice Cardine articulated in his dissenting opinion in which I 
join. 

 
 
CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom THOMAS, Justice, joins. 

 
 

[¶68.]  I dissent from the majority's decision to 
vacate the portion of appellant's probation which required him to reimburse the 
public defender for his defense. The decision to vacate that portion of 
appellant's probation sentence is made without sufficient rationale, explanation 
or precedent. 

 
 

[¶69.]  The majority cites an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part for the proposition that "application of 
restitution and cost repayment statutes without a judicial finding of ability to 
pay are statutes designed as debt collecting devices masquerading as penal laws 
and contravene the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt." 
Maj. op. at 7 (citing Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 143 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). That proposition represents 
idealism that is not required by statute nor supported by decisions of this 
court. The concern for avoiding imprisonment for debt is satisfied in all cases, 
juvenile and adult, by the opportunity to make a showing of inability to pay 
prior to revocation. Since an opportunity to make a showing of inability to pay 
exists, there is no need to restrain judges' jurisdiction to impose 
reimbursement for defense costs or subject each of those orders to review by 
this court to determine if there was adequate inquiry into the juvenile's 
ability to pay. 

 
 

[¶70.]  When we have required an inquiry into the 
defendant's ability to pay, we have done so only when a statutory provision such 
as W.S. 7-6-106(c) requires that the court "consider the financial resources of 
the person * * *." See Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 284 (Wyo. 1991). But 
consideration of financial resources of the person does not equate to the person 
having funds in the bank to presently pay. The defendant may be highly skilled, 
employable at substantial compensation, and have a decided future ability to 
pay. The court's order to pay must be reasonable and under circumstances that 
rest upon a probability of payment. However, with respect to this case, the 
express requirement of W.S. 7-6-106(c) (1987) that the trial court inquire into 
ability to pay is not present in the juvenile statute which allows the court to 
order reimbursement for public defender services. 

 
 

[¶71.]  W. S. 14-6-235(c) provides: 

 
 
Legal services rendered to a child 
for his benefit and protection are necessities which the child's parents or any 
person obligated by law for the child's support may be held responsible. The 
court may order that all or any part of the costs and expenses 
enumerated in subsection (b) of this section except jury fees, costs and 
travel expenses, be reimbursed to the county by the 
child, his parents or any person legally obligated for his support, or 
any of them jointly and severally, upon terms the court may 
direct. [emphasis added]

 
 

[¶72.]  Although the majority neglected to do so, 
it is important to read this section in conjunction with the unique juvenile 
court jurisdictional statutes. W.S. 14-6-203(b) states: 

 
 
Coincident with proceedings 
concerning a minor alleged to be delinquent, neglected or in need of 
supervision, the court has jurisdiction to: 

 
 
* * * 

 
 
(ii) Order any party to the 
proceedings to perform any acts, duties and responsibilities the court deems 
necessary; or 

 
 
(iii) Order any party to the 
proceedings to refrain from any act or conduct the court deems detrimental to 
the best interest and welfare of the minor or essential to the enforcement of 
any lawful order of disposition of the minor made by the court. [emphasis 
added]

 
 

[¶73.]  This broad jurisdictional provision 
expresses the legislature's desire to give juvenile courts broad power for 
determining what is appropriate for a minor. These broad jurisdictional 
provisions are absent from the adult statute providing for reimbursement for 
public defender costs. Instead, the adult provision requires that the judge 
inquire into ability to pay. W.S. 7-6-106(c) (1987). When a statute requires 
inquiry into ability to pay, this court should require that district courts do 
so. However, when the statute does not contain that requirement, this court 
should refrain from engaging in judicial legislation by creating a requirement 
where none exists. Thus, we have said: "If the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we must abide by the plain meaning of the statute * * *." 
Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988); see also West v. WyomingState 
Treasurer, 822 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Wyo. 1991). 

 
 

[¶74.]  While the majority cites our rules of 
statutory construction, it does not heed them. This statute is not ambiguous. 
There is no need to resort to "construction" or "interpretation" or the addition 
of requirements under the guise of statutory interpretation. The clear and 
unambiguous plain meaning of this statute is that in a juvenile proceeding the 
district court is not required to inquire into the juvenile's ability to pay 
when ordering reimbursement of costs of legal services to the public defender as 
a condition of probation. The fear of imprisonment for debt is unfounded. 
Establishment of inability to pay prior to 
revocation is sufficient protection against imprisonment as provided in Article 
1, § 5 of the Wyoming Constitution: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt, 
except in cases of fraud." 

 
 

[¶75.]  The plain language of the statute and the 
broad jurisdictional provisions dictate that this court refrain from creating a 
"requirement" of inquiry into ability to pay not in the statute. If such 
requirement is necessary, the legislature should provide for it, not this court. 
The broad jurisdictional provisions indicate a legislative intent that we should 
afford district and juvenile courts more discretion in juvenile matters. The 
majority's creation of this requirement removes that discretion and thwarts the 
deference to which courts are entitled in juvenile 
proceedings.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 211.2 (1962) provides: 

 
 
A person 
commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may 
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessness 
and danger shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in 
the direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be 
loaded.

 
 

2Other cases 
cited by Appellant include a series of Pennsylvania cases which require the 
prosecution to demonstrate that actual danger existed. In the leading Pennsylvania case requiring the existence of actual 
danger, Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 261 Pa. Super. 109, 395 A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. 
1978), the court analyzed the Pennsylvania statute which stated, "'A person 
commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct 
which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 
injury.'" 395 A.2d  at 1340. The court went on to point out that Pennsylvania had 
not adopted the second sentence of the MODEL PENAL CODE definition which stated, 
"'Recklessness and danger shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a 
firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the 
firearm to be loaded.'" Id. at 1341. This second sentence is 
almost identical to § 6-2-504(b). The Pennsylvania court found that, had Pennsylvania adopted the 
second sentence, criminal liability would be imposed for pointing an 
unloaded weapon. Id. The Pennsylvania court's analysis merely 
reinforces our interpretation.

 
 

3Appellant 
also cites Pena for the proposition that probationers and parolees share 
the same Fourth Amendment protections. 792 P.2d  at 1357 
n.10.

 
 

4According to 
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 3.6 (2d ed. 1991), all states which have 
considered the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to juvenile proceedings 
have found that the Fourth Amendment is applicable.

 
 

5Section 
14-6-229(f)(vii) was amended by 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 196, § 1 effective March 
4, 1991. 

 
 

6We interpret 
Appellant's argument as merely going to whether the probation officer must 
reasonably suspect that a probation violation exists before he searches 
Appellant's residence. Appellant has no standing to contest a violation of his 
parent's constitutional rights. Johnson v. Schrader, 502 P.2d 371 
(Wyo. 1972), on reh'g, 507 P.2d 814 
(Wyo. 
1973).

 
 

1The concern 
expressed in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 340, 84 P.2d 767 (1938) by Chief 
Justice Blume, although involving a totally different subject, perhaps deserves 
recognition by recitation: 

 
 
The legislation now 
before us would probably not cause more than ordinary anxiety, or deserve 
greater consideration than the ordinary constitutional question, were it not for 
the times in which we live, the depression now existing, the unrest now 
prevailing, the mass of social legislation in the last few years, the wonder 
whither we are going, and the frequent queries whether courts are drifting 
merely with the tide or are rendering their decisions with that steadfast 
judgment as is their wont.

2Consistency 
in the authored standards by the United States Supreme Court for the 
constitutional protection for juveniles is certainly not found to be a smooth 
and direct pathway as illustrated by two additional United States Supreme Court 
decisions. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982), burden of proof required for termination of parental rights, 
compared to Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 81 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1984), where preventive detention before a hearing for the juvenile was 
considered.

 
 

3This is not 
a happy record. In the presentence investigation, in an extensive testimony 
provided to the juvenile court, it was revealed that between the date of this 
endangerment incident, November 22, 1989, and the sentencing hearing, September 
7, 1990, the juvenile had arguably been involved in five driving offenses. His 
record revealed three other drinking or driving offenses predating the 
occurrence. Conjunctive with the reckless endangerment charge involved here, 
appellant had initially been charged in juvenile court with a totally separate 
arson offense, which was not pursued by the prosecuting attorney. 

 
 
The 
sentence, in addition to the five-day jail sentence, the indeterminate sentence 
at the BoysSchool and the three years 
probation, provided very stringent and carefully considered supervisory controls 
and restrictions on the conduct and activities of the juvenile. At issue here is 
not the propriety of those carefully thought-out efforts of the juvenile judge, 
but rather the basic jurisdiction to be derived from criminal prosecution of 
supervision and penal restraint for a period of time which could not have 
occurred to an individual sufficiently older to have escaped the jurisdictional 
confines of the juvenile court.