Title: Sterling v. Taylor

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 3/1/07 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ROCHELLE STERLING et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S121676 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B162961 
LAWRENCE N. TAYLOR et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. SC065807 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
The statute of frauds provides that certain contracts “are invalid, unless 
they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the 
party to be charged . . . .”  (Civ. Code, § 1624.)  In this case, the Court of Appeal 
held that a memorandum regarding the sale of several apartment buildings was 
sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.  Defendants contend the court improperly 
considered extrinsic evidence to resolve uncertainties in the terms identifying the 
seller, the property, and the price. 
 
We reverse, but not because the court consulted extrinsic evidence.  
Extrinsic evidence has long been held admissible to clarify the terms of a 
memorandum for purposes of the statute of frauds.  Statements to the contrary 
appear in some cases, but we disapprove them.  A memorandum serves only an 
evidentiary function under the statute.  If the writing includes the essential terms 
of the parties’ agreement, there is no bar to the admission of relevant extrinsic 
evidence to explain or clarify those terms.  The memorandum, viewed in light of 
the evidence, must be sufficient to demonstrate with reasonable certainty the terms 
 
2
to which the parties agreed to be bound.  Here, plaintiffs attempt to enforce a price 
term that lacks the certainty required by the statute of frauds. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In January 2000, defendant Lawrence Taylor and plaintiff Donald Sterling  
discussed the sale of three apartment buildings in Santa Monica owned by the 
Santa Monica Collection partnership (SMC).  Defendant was a general partner in 
SMC.  Plaintiff and defendant, both experienced real estate investors, met on 
March 13, 2000 and discussed a series of transactions including the purchase of 
the SMC properties.  At this meeting, plaintiff drafted a handwritten memorandum 
entitled “Contract for Sale of Real Property.”1 
                                              
 
1  The memorandum may be rendered in typescript as follows: 
“Contract for Sale of Real Property 
 
“Seller Larry Taylor, & Christina Development, and Buyer Donald T. 
Sterling, Trustee of Sterling Family Trust, agree to the following terms and 
conditions;  
                                      
D.P.                                       
“1. Fox Plaza   
3 000,000 [sic]                                            
 
 
 
3,000,000 
(cash to loan) 
 
Price  $31,000,000 
 
 “2. Barrington Bldg. 
2,000,000 D.P. 
 
 
 
 
6 000,000 D.P. 
 
       Price  $12,700,000 
 
“3. 808 4th St.    }   
approx 10.468 X gross income 
“4. 843 4th St.    }  
 
income 
 
“5. 1251 14th St.}  
estimated 1.600.000,   Price  $ 16,750.00 
  
 
 
 
escrow 30 days. Brentwood scrow.  [Sic.] 
 
 
“Cash to loan.  
 “Contract to be completed within 30 days. 
 
“Date 3/13/2000 
 
 
Seller __________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Buyer         DTS” 
 
 
In the handwritten original, a single bracket links items 3, 4, and 5 (the 
SMC properties) to the notations on the right.  In those notations, though the word 
“income” appears on a separate line above “estimated 1.600.000,” it is closer to 
 
3
 
The memorandum encompasses the sale of five properties; only the SMC 
properties are involved here.  They are identified in the memorandum as “808 4th 
St.,” “843 4th St.,” and “1251 14th St.,” with an aggregate price term of “approx. 
10.468 X gross income[,] estimated income 1.600.000, Price $16,750.00.”  
Although defendant had given plaintiff rent rolls showing the income from the 
properties, neither man brought these documents to the March 13 meeting.  
Plaintiff dated and initialed the memorandum as “Buyer,” but the line he provided 
for “Seller” was left blank.  Plaintiff contends the omission was inadvertent.  
Defendant, however, asserts he did not sign the document because he needed 
approval from a majority of SMC’s limited partners. 
 
On March 15, 2000, plaintiff wrote to defendant, referring to the properties 
by street address only, and stating “[t]his letter will confirm our contract of sale of 
the above buildings.”  The letter discussed deposits plaintiff had given to 
defendant, and noted “our agreement that the depreciation allocation and tax 
benefits will be given to me no later than April 1, 2000, since I now have equitable 
tittle [sic].”  Price terms were not mentioned.  Both parties signed the letter, 
defendant beneath the handwritten notation “Agreed, Accepted, & Approved.” 
 
Plaintiff claims the March 13 memorandum was attached to the March 15 
letter, which defendant annotated and signed in his presence.  Defendant insists 
nothing was attached to the March 15 letter, which he did not sign until March 30.  
According to defendant, his signature reflected only an accomodation to 
acknowledge the deposits he had received from plaintiff. 
 
On April 4, 2000, defendant sent plaintiff three formal purchase agreements 
with escrow instructions, identifying the properties by their legal descriptions.  
SMC was named as the seller and the Sterling Family Trust as the buyer.  The 
                                                                                                                                      
 
the line below it than to the line above it, and the parties agree the intended 
phrasing was “estimated income 1.600.000.” 
 
The parties do not explain the association between defendant and Christina 
Development, or the inclusion of Christina Development in the memorandum. 
 
4
price terms totalled $16,750,000.  Defendant signed the agreements as a general 
partner of SMC.  Plaintiff refused to sign.  Defendant claims plaintiff telephoned 
on April 28, saying the purchase price was unacceptable.  Plaintiff asserts that 
after reviewing the rent rolls, he determined the actual rental income from the 
SMC buildings was $1,375,404, not $1,600,000 as estimated on the March 13 
memorandum.  Plaintiff claims he tried to have defendant correct the escrow 
instructions, but defendant did not return his calls.  Plaintiff wanted to lower the 
price to $14,404,841, based on the actual rental income figure and the 10.468 
multiplier noted in the memorandum.2 
 
Plaintiff did not ask for the $16,750.00 purchase price stated in the 
memorandum.  He admits that he “accidentally left off one zero” when he wrote 
down that figure.  Defendant also acknowledges that the price recorded on the 
memorandum was meant to be $16,750,000.3 
 
Defendant returned plaintiff’s uncashed deposit checks on May 23.  The 
parties conducted further negotiations in December 2000 and January 2001.  
Defendant provided additional rent rolls, but no agreement was reached. 
 
In March 2001 the trustees of the Sterling Family Trust sued Taylor, SMC, 
and related entities, alleging breach of a written contract to sell the properties for a 
total price of $14,404,841.  The March 13 memorandum and the March 15 letter 
were attached to the complaint as the “Purchase Agreement.”  The complaint 
included causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
                                              
 
2  The formula does not yield the plaintiff’s modified price:  $1,375,404 
multiplied by 10.468 is $14,397,729.  In a declaration filed in the trial court, 
plaintiff explained that he made two mistakes in arriving at the figure of 
$14,404,841, one in the rental income calculation and another in the multiplier he 
applied to that figure. 
 
3  Given the superscript notation employed by plaintiff when he wrote 
“$16,750.00,” it might be said that three zeros were omitted from the price.  
However, the characterization of the error is immaterial in light of the parties’ 
agreement that the intended figure was $16,750,000.  
 
5
dealing, specific performance, declaratory relief, an accounting, intentional 
misrepresentation, and imposition of a constructive trust. 
 
Defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that no contract was 
formed, the alleged contract violated the statute of frauds, and plaintiffs could not 
prove fraud.  Defendants contended the memorandum and letter did not satisfy the 
statute because they established no agreement on price, failed to sufficiently 
identify either the contracting parties or the properties, and were not signed by 
Taylor and Christina Development.  The trial court granted summary judgment.  It 
ruled that the price term was too uncertain to be enforced and the writings did not 
comply with the statute of frauds.  The court also concluded that the undisputed 
facts disclosed neither a fraudulent intent on defendant’s part nor damages to 
plaintiff, thus foreclosing the misrepresentation claim. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed as to the contract causes of action, but 
remanded for entry of summary adjudication in defendants’ favor on the fraud 
claim.  The court held that Taylor’s name and signature on the writings submitted 
by plaintiffs satisfied the statute of frauds.  It also deemed the identification of the 
properties by street address sufficient, in light of extrinsic evidence specifying the 
city and state.  Likewise, the court held that the price terms in the March 13 
memorandum, while ambiguous, could be clarified by examining extrinsic 
evidence.  It concluded that defendants’ evidence raised a triable issue as to 
whether the parties had agreed on a formula for determining the purchase price.  
The court further ruled that the fraud claim failed because plaintiffs could not 
prove damages.  Only the contract claims are at issue in this appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Defendants contend the Court of Appeal improperly considered extrinsic 
evidence to establish essential contract terms.  They insist the statute of frauds 
requires a memorandum that, standing alone, supplies all material elements of the 
contract.  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that extrinsic evidence is routinely 
 
6
admitted for the purpose of determining whether memoranda comply with the 
statute of frauds.4  
 
Both sides of this debate find support in California case law, sometimes in 
the same opinion.  Part A of our discussion explains that plaintiffs’ view is correct.  
The statute of frauds does not preclude the admission of evidence in any form; it 
imposes a writing requirement, but not a comprehensive one.  In part B, however, 
we conclude that defendants are nevertheless entitled to judgment.  The Court of 
Appeal properly considered the parties’ extrinsic evidence, but erroneously 
deemed it legally sufficient under the statute of frauds to establish the price sought 
by plaintiffs. 
 
A.  The Memorandum Requirement of the Statute of Frauds 
 
The statute of frauds does not require a written contract; a “note or 
memorandum . . . subscribed by the party to be charged” is adequate.  (Civ. Code, 
§ 1624, subd. (a).)5  In Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 321, 
                                              
 
4 Defendants’ argument is supported by amicus curiae Professor Richard A. 
Lord, current editor of the fourth edition of Williston on Contracts.  The 
Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles has also contributed an amicus 
curiae brief, urging us in cursory fashion to reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in order to discourage “dishonest dealing and sharp real estate practice.” 
 
Amicus curiae California Association of Realtors favors plaintiffs’ position, 
arguing that ambiguities are not unusual in real estate transactions and resort to 
extrinsic evidence is required to prevent parties who have second thoughts from 
escaping their contractual obligations. 
 
5  Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a) states:  “The following contracts 
are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and 
subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent[.]”  Subdivision 
(a)(3) of section 1624 includes agreements for the sale of real property. 
 
Our discussion does not apply to any other “statute of frauds” imposing a 
stricter writing requirement.  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. a, p. 334.  See, e.g., 
Fam. Code, § 852 [transmutation agreements involving separate and community 
property; In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1108-1109]; Fam. 
Code, § 1611 [premarital agreements; In re Marriage of Shaban (2001) 88 
Cal.App.4th 398, 405]; Civ. Code, § 1803.1 et seq. [retail installment contracts].)  
Nor does our discussion govern the more liberal statute of frauds provided in the 
Uniform Commercial Code.  (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2201; see Cal. Code Com., 
 
7
we observed that “[a] written memorandum is not identical with a written contract 
[citation]; it is merely evidence of it and usually does not contain all of the terms.”  
(Id. at p. 323; see also Kerner v. Hughes Tool Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 924, 934; 
1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 350, p. 397.)  Indeed, in most 
instances it is not even necessary that the parties intended the memorandum to 
serve a contractual purpose.6  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 133; 1 Witkin, Summary of 
Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 352, p. 398; see Moss v. Atkinson (1872) 44 Cal. 3, 
16-17.) 
 
A memorandum satisfies the statute of frauds if it identifies the subject of 
the parties’ agreement, shows that they made a contract, and states the essential 
contract terms with reasonable certainty.  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131; 1 Witkin, 
Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 353, p. 399.)  “Only the essential terms 
must be stated, ‘ “details or particulars” need not [be].  What is essential depends 
on the agreement and its context and also on the subsequent conduct of the parties 
. . . .’  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. g, p. 338.)”  (Seaman’s Direct Buying 
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752, 762-763, overruled on 
another point in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 
88.) 
 
This court recently observed that the writing requirement of the statute of 
frauds “ ‘serves only to prevent the contract from being unenforceable’ [citation]; 
it does not necessarily establish the terms of the parties’ contract.”  (Casa Herrera, 
Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 345.)  Unlike the parol evidence rule, 
which “determines the enforceable and incontrovertible terms of an integrated 
written agreement,” the statute of frauds “merely serve[s] an evidentiary purpose.”  
(Ibid.)  As the drafters of the Second Restatement of Contracts explained:  “The 
                                                                                                                                      
 
23A pt. 1 West’s Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code (2002) foll. § 2201, p. 172; 1 Witkin, 
Summary of Cal. Law Contracts (10th ed. 2005)  § 378, pp. 419-420.) 
 
6  There is an exception to this rule for memoranda of contracts made upon 
consideration of marriage, which are deemed to serve not only an evidentiary but 
also a cautionary function.  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 133, & com. a, p. 346.) 
 
8
primary purpose of the Statute is evidentiary, to require reliable evidence of the 
existence and terms of the contract and to prevent enforcement through fraud or 
perjury of contracts never in fact made.  The contents of the writing must be such 
as to make successful fraud unlikely, but the possibility need not be excluded that 
some other subject matter or person than those intended will also fall within the 
words of the writing.  Where only an evidentiary purpose is served, the 
requirement of a memorandum is read in the light of the dispute which arises and 
the admissions of the party to be charged; there is no need for evidence on points 
not in dispute.”  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. c, p. 335, italics added; accord, 
Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 
764-765.) 
 
Thus, when ambiguous terms in a memorandum are disputed, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to resolve the uncertainty.  (In re Marriage of Benson, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1108; Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil 
Co., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 763, fn. 2; Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining Co. 
(1955) 43 Cal.2d 769, 774-775; Searles v. Gonzales (1923) 191 Cal. 426, 431-
433.)  Extrinsic evidence can also support reformation of a memorandum to 
correct a mistake.  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. g, p. 338; Calhoun v. Downs 
(1931) 211 Cal. 766, 768-770; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, 
§§ 355, 356, pp. 403-404.) 
 
Because the memorandum itself must include the essential contractual 
terms, it is clear that extrinsic evidence cannot supply those required terms.  (See, 
e.g., Friedman v. Bergin (1943) 22 Cal.2d 535, 537-539.)  It can, however, be 
used to explain essential terms that were understood by the parties but would 
otherwise be unintelligible to others.  Two early cases from this court demonstrate 
that a memorandum can satisfy the statute of frauds, even if its terms are too 
uncertain to be enforceable when considered by themselves. 
 
In Preble v. Abrahams (1891) 88 Cal. 245, a written agreement for the sale 
of land described the property to be sold as “ ‘forty acres of the eighty-acre tract at 
 
9
Biggs.’ ”7  (Id. at p. 248.)  The court observed:  “An agreement not in writing for 
the sale and purchase of real estate is void.  And the description of the property in 
the written agreement is so entirely uncertain as to render the instrument 
inoperative and void, unless we can go beyond the face of it to ascertain its 
meaning.”  (Id. at pp. 249-250.) 
 
To give effect to the agreement, the Preble court relied on extrinsic 
evidence that another buyer had purchased one 40-acre tract and the defendant had 
agreed to purchase the remainder.  (Preble v. Abrahams, supra, 88 Cal. at p. 250.)  
“We think the evidence makes the subject-matter sufficiently certain, and that is 
all that is necessary.  Professor Pomeroy says:  ‘It is not strictly accurate to say 
that the subject-matter must be absolutely certain from the writing itself, or by 
reference to some other writing.  The true rule is, that the situation of the parties 
and the surrounding circumstances, when the contract was made, can be shown by 
parol evidence, so that the court may be placed in the position of the parties 
themselves; and if then the subject-matter is identified, and the terms appear 
reasonably certain, it is enough.’  (Pomeroy on Contracts, sec. 227, note.)”  
(Preble v. Abrahams, supra, 88 Cal. at pp. 250-251, italics in original.) 
 
In Brewer v. Horst and Lachmund Co. (1900) 127 Cal. 643, a contract was 
memorialized by two telegrams employing a form of shorthand notation so arcane 
that “[i]f there were nothing to look to but the telegrams, the court might find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the nature of the contract, or that any 
contract was entered into between the parties.”  (Id. at p. 646.)  The defendant 
contended the telegrams were an insufficient “note or memorandum” to satisfy the 
statute of frauds.  (Ibid.)  The Brewer court disagreed, stating:  “[T]he court is 
permitted to interpret the memorandum (consisting of the two telegrams) by the 
                                              
 
7  The document in question was referred to by the Preble court variously 
as an “agreement,” a “contract,” and a “memorandum.”  (Preble v. Abrahams, 
supra, 88 Cal. at p. 249.)  The brevity and informality of the writing are such that, 
at least by modern standards, it can properly be considered only a “memorandum” 
for purposes of the statute of frauds.  (See id. at p. 248.) 
 
10
light of all the circumstances under which it was made; and if, when the court is 
put into possession of all the knowledge which the parties to the transaction had at 
the time, it can be plainly seen from the memorandum who the parties to the 
contract were, what the subject of the contract was, and what were its terms, then 
the court should not hesitate to hold the memorandum sufficient.  Oral evidence 
may be received to show in what sense figures or abbreviations were used; and 
their meaning may be explained as it was understood between the parties.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Reading the telegrams “by the light of the circumstances surrounding the 
parties,” the Brewer court concluded it was clear that they referred to a contract 
for the purchase of 296 bales of hops on terms understood by the parties.  (Brewer 
v. Horst and Lachmund Co., supra, 127 Cal. at p. 647.)  The facts of Brewer were 
adapted by the drafters of the Restatements as an illustration of a sufficient 
memorandum for purposes of the statute of frauds.  (Rest., Contracts, § 207, com. 
a, illus. 8, p. 281; Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. e, illus. 7, p. 336; and see id., 
Reptr.’s Note on com. e, p. 340.) 
 
Despite this venerable authority, conflicting statements appear in other 
California cases:  “The sufficiency of a writing to satisfy the statute of frauds 
cannot be established by evidence which is extrinsic to the writing itself.  (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1973.)[8]”  (Franklin v. Hansen (1963) 59 Cal.2d 570, 573-574.)9 
                                              
 
8  Former Code of Civil Procedure section 1973 was a restatement of the 
statute of frauds, with the additional provision that “[e]vidence, therefore, of the 
agreement can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its 
contents.”  (Stats. 1937, ch. 316, § 1, p. 695.)  This section was repealed in 1965 
as an unnecessary duplication of Civil Code section 1624.  (7 Cal. Law Revision 
Com. Rep. (1965) p. 1315.)  Notably, however, the former statute did not purport 
to exclude extrinsic evidence in cases where there was a memorandum of the 
contract. 
 
9 The Franklin court attempted to straddle the two lines of authority on this 
point by also stating that when a memorandum “imports the essentials of a 
contractual obligation although it fails to do so in an explicit, definite or complete 
manner, it is always permissible to show the circumstances which attended its 
making.”  (Franklin v. Hansen, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 574.)  The court referred to 
Brewer, among other cases, as an instance in which “the memorandum itself 
 
11
“The preeminent qualification of a memorandum under the statute of frauds is 
‘that it must contain the essential terms of the contract, expressed with such a 
degree of certainty that it may be understood without recourse to parol evidence to 
show the intention of the parties.’  (5 Browne on Statute of Frauds, sec. 371.)”  
(Zellner v. Wassman (1920) 184 Cal. 80, 85-86; accord, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs 
(1910) 156 Cal. 782, 787.)  “The whole object of the statute would be frustrated if 
any substantive portion of the agreement could be established by parol evidence.”  
(Craig v. Zelian (1902) 137 Cal. 105, 106; accord, e.g., Seymour v. Oelrichs, 
supra, 156 Cal. at p. 787.)10  “Unless the writing, considered alone, expresses the 
essential terms with sufficient certainty to constitute an enforceable contract, it 
fails to meet the demands of the statute.  [Citations.]”  (Burge v. Krug (1958) 160 
Cal.App.2d 201, 207; Ellis v. Klaff (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 471, 477.)  Defendants 
rely on these and similar cases to argue that the Court of Appeal improperly 
considered extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of essential but 
imperfectly stated terms in the memorandum drafted by plaintiff Sterling. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
demonstrated the existence of a contractual intent on the part of the one to be 
charged, and extrinsic evidence was necessary only to define the limits thereof.”  
(Ibid.)  This was a stretch too far.  If extrinsic evidence is necessary to clarify or 
complete the essential terms of a memorandum, the sufficiency of the 
memorandum has been established by extrinsic evidence.  And the Brewer court 
plainly endorsed the consideration of extrinsic evidence not merely to “define the 
limits” of the parties’ agreement, but to determine in the first instance whether the 
telegrams reflected a contract with sufficient certainty to comply with the statute 
of frauds.  (Brewer v. Horst and Lachmund Co., supra, 127 Cal. at p. 646.) 
 
10  Craig presents an interesting comparison with Preble v. Abrahams, 
supra.  The description of the land to be conveyed in Craig (“ ‘a strip of land in 
front of Golden Rule Store and Stent Market’ ”) was as vague as the description in 
Preble (“ ‘forty acres of the eighty-acre tract at Biggs’ ”).  (Craig v. Zelian, supra, 
137 Cal. at p. 106; Preble v. Abrahams, supra, 88 Cal. at p. 250.)  But in Preble 
extrinsic evidence explained the description in the memorandum, whereas in 
Craig the only extrinsic aid to locating the property was a map that was not in 
evidence.  (Craig v. Zelian, supra, 137 Cal. at p. 106.)  On its facts, Craig is 
properly viewed as a case of insufficient extrinsic evidence, rather than one where 
the writing itself was necessarily deficient. 
 
12
 
To clarify the law on this point, we disapprove the statements in California 
cases barring consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the sufficiency of a 
memorandum under the statute of frauds.  The purposes of the statute are not 
served by such a rigid rule, which has never been a consistent feature of the 
common law.  Corbin observes:  “Judicial dicta abound to the effect that the 
writing must contain all of the ‘essential terms and conditions’ of the contract, and 
it is often said that these must be so clear as to be understood ‘without any aid 
from parol testimony.’  But the long course of judicial decision shows that 
‘essential terms and conditions’ is itself a term of considerable flexibility and that 
the courts do not in fact blind themselves by excluding parol testimony when it is 
a necessary aid to understanding.”  (4 Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed. 1997) § 22.2, 
pp. 706-707, fns. omitted.) 
 
“Some confusion is attributable to a failure to keep clearly in mind the 
purpose of the statute and the informal character of the evidence that the actual 
words of the statute require; some is no doubt due to differences in the attitude of 
the judges as to the beneficence of the statute and the wisdom of its existence.[11]  
Further, there are differences in the strictness of judicial requirements as to the 
contents of the memorandum.  It is believed that sometimes these apparent 
differences can be explained by the degree of doubt existing in the court’s mind as 
to the actual making and performance of the alleged contract.  The better and the 
more disinterested is the oral testimony offered by the plaintiff, the more 
convincing the corroboration that is found in the surrounding circumstances, and 
the more limited the disputed issue because of admissions made by the defendant, 
the less that should be and is required of the written memorandum.”  (4 Corbin on 
Contracts, supra, § 22.2, p. 709, fn. omitted.) 
                                              
 
11   This court has noted the criticism directed at the statute of frauds.  
(Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi (1964) 60 Cal.2d 834, 838, fn. 3; see also 1 
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 342, pp. 390-391.) 
 
13
 
Williston offers similar counsel:  “In determining the requisites and 
meaning of a ‘note or memorandum in writing,’ courts often look to the origin and 
fundamental purpose of the Statute of Frauds.  In fact, a failure to do so will often 
result in a futile preoccupation with the numerous and conflicting precepts and 
decisions involving the clauses providing for a note or memorandum, and a 
corresponding failure to see the forest for the trees. 
 
“The Statute of Frauds was not enacted to afford persons a means of 
evading just obligations; nor was it intended to supply a cloak of immunity to 
hedging litigants lacking integrity; nor was it adopted to enable defendants to 
interpose the Statute as a bar to a contract fairly, and admittedly, made.  In brief, 
the Statute ‘was intended to guard against the perils of perjury and error in the 
spoken word.’  Therefore, if after a consideration of the surrounding 
circumstances, the pertinent facts and all the evidence in a particular case, the 
court concludes that enforcement of the agreement will not subject the defendant 
to fraudulent claims, the purpose of the Statute will best be served by holding the 
note or memorandum sufficient even though it is ambiguous or incomplete.”  (10 
Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 1999) § 29:4, pp. 437-438, fns. omitted.)12 
 
The governing principle is:  “That is certain which can be made certain.”  
(Civ. Code, § 3538; Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 
774; see also, e.g., Preble v. Abrahams, supra, 88 Cal. at p. 251; Alameda Belt 
Line v. City of Alameda (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 15, 21.)  We hold that if a 
memorandum includes the essential terms of the parties’ agreement, but the 
meaning of those terms is unclear, the memorandum is sufficient under the statute 
of frauds if extrinsic evidence clarifies the terms with reasonable certainty and the 
evidence as a whole demonstrates that the parties intended to be bound.    
                                              
 
12  Williston, like this court in Franklin v. Hansen (see fn. 9, ante), has 
embraced conflicting views.  In a later section, the treatise quotes Ellis v. Klaff, 
supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 471, for the proposition that “ ‘the writing, considered 
alone’ ” must “ ‘express[] the essential terms with sufficient certainty to constitute 
an enforceable contract.’ ”  (10 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 29:8, p. 472.) 
 
14
Conflicts in the extrinsic evidence are for the trier of fact to resolve, but whether 
the evidence meets the standard of reasonable certainty is a question of law for the 
court.  (Phillippe v. Shapell Industries (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1247, 1258; Niles v. 
Hancock (1903) 140 Cal. 157, 163.)13 
 
We emphasize that a memorandum of the parties’ agreement is controlling 
evidence under the statute of frauds.  Thus, extrinsic evidence cannot be employed 
to prove an agreement at odds with the terms of the memorandum.  This point was 
made in Beazell v. Schrader (1963) 59 Cal.2d 577.  There, the plaintiff sought to 
recover a 5 percent real estate broker’s commission under an oral agreement.  (Id. 
at p. 579.)  The escrow instructions, which specified a 1.25 percent commission, 
were the “memorandum” on which the plaintiff relied to comply with the statute.  
However, he contended the instructions incorrectly reflected the parties’ actual 
agreement, as shown by extrinsic evidence.  (Id. at p. 580.)  The Beazell court 
rejected this argument, holding that under the statute of frauds, “the parol 
agreement of which the writing is a memorandum must be one whose terms are 
consistent with the terms of the memorandum.”  (Id. at p. 582.)  Thus, in 
determining whether extrinsic evidence provides the certainty required by the 
statute, courts must bear in mind that the evidence cannot contradict the terms of 
the writing. 
 
B.  The Sufficiency of This Memorandum 
 
As noted above, it is a question of law whether a memorandum, considered 
in light of the circumstances surrounding its making, complies with the statute of 
                                              
 
13  We note that a flexible, pragmatic view of the statute of frauds has deep 
roots in the common law.  In 1747, Lord Hardwicke, sitting as Lord Chancellor, 
observed:  “The meaning of the statute is to reduce contracts to a certainty, in 
order to avoid perjury on the one hand, and fraud on the other, and therefore, both 
in this court and the courts of common law, when an agreement has been reduced 
to such a certainty, and the substance of the statute has been complied with in the 
material part, the forms have never been insisted upon.”  (Welford v. Beazely 
(1747) 26 Eng.Rep. 1090 (Ch.); accord, Moss v. Atkinson, supra,  44 Cal. 3, 16; 
Clason’s Exr’s v. Bailey (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1817) 14 Johns 484; Higdon v. Thomas 
(Md. 1827) 1 H. & G. 139.) 
 
15
frauds.  (Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1258.)  
Accordingly, the issue is generally amenable to resolution by summary judgment.  
(Cf. Khan v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1004.)  We 
independently review the record to determine whether a triable issue of fact might 
defeat the statute of frauds defense in this case.  (Id. at p. 1003.) 
 
A memorandum of a contract for the sale of real property must identify the 
buyer, the seller, the price, and the property.14  (King v. Stanley (1948) 32 Cal.2d 
584, 589.)  Defendants contend the memorandum drafted by plaintiff Sterling fails 
to adequately specify the seller, the property, or the price.15 
 
The Court of Appeal correctly held that the seller and the properties were 
sufficiently identified.  The parties themselves displayed no uncertainty as to those 
terms before their dispute over the price arose.  It is a “cardinal rule of 
construction that when a contract is ambiguous or uncertain the practical 
construction placed upon it by the parties before any controversy arises as to its 
meaning affords one of the most reliable means of determining the intent of the 
parties.”  (Bohman v. Berg (1960) 54 Cal.2d 787, 795.)  The same rule governs the 
interpretation of a memorandum under the statute of frauds.  (See Rest.2d 
Contracts, § 131, com. g, p. 338; Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard 
Oil Co., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 762-763.) 16 
                                              
 
14  The traditional formulation of essential terms also included the time and 
manner of payment, factors not at issue in this case.  (King v. Stanley, supra, 32 
Cal.2d at p. 589.)  In House of Prayer v. Evangelical Assn. for India (2003) 113 
Cal.App.4th 48, 53-54, the court reasoned that because contracts for the sale of 
real property are enforceable without specification of a time of performance, that 
term is not essential under the statute of frauds. 
 
15  Defendants do not here challenge the sufficiency of Taylor’s signature 
on the March 15 letter to meet the subscription requirement of the statute of 
frauds.  Both the letter and the March 13 memorandum may be considered 
together to satisfy the statute.  (King v. Stanley, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 588.)  The 
parties’ dispute concerns only the terms of the memorandum. 
 
16  This rule of construction undermines the contention in Professor Lord’s 
amicus curiae brief that the multiple ambiguities in the memorandum before us, 
considered together in the abstract, render it insufficient under the statute of 
 
16
 
The memorandum referred to “Seller Larry Taylor, & Christina 
Development.”  Defendants argue that the omission of the actual owner of the 
properties, SMC, is fatal.  However, they do not dispute Taylor’s authorization to 
act as SMC’s agent, or his actual performance of that role.  A contract made in the 
name of an agent may be enforced against an undisclosed principal, and extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to identify the principal.  (Sunset Milling & Grain Co. v. 
Anderson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 773, 778; 2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, 
Agency, §§ 158 & 159, pp. 202-203; see also California Canneries Co. v. Scatena 
(1897) 117 Cal. 447, 449-450.)  If a term is stated in a memorandum with 
sufficient certainty to be enforced, it satisfies the statute of frauds.  (Seaman’s 
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 763.)  
Therefore, the reference to Taylor was adequate, regardless of the apparently 
mistaken inclusion of Christina Development.  (See Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, 
com. f, p. 337.) 
 
Similarly, while the properties were identified in the memorandum only by 
street address, neither party displayed any confusion over their actual location.  
The purchase agreements Taylor prepared included full legal descriptions, and 
when Sterling received those agreements he did not object that he wanted to buy 
buildings on 4th and 14th Streets in Manhattan rather than Santa Monica.  In any 
event, the better view has long been that extrinsic evidence may be consulted to 
locate property described in imprecise terms, even though a memorandum with a 
more complete description would be preferable.  (Beverage v. Canton Placer 
Mining Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d at pp. 774-775, citing cases.)  
 
As defendants forthrightly conceded in the trial court, “[t]he problem here 
is the price term.”  The Court of Appeal concluded that the lines in the 
memorandum stating “approx. 10.468 X gross income[,] estimated income 
                                                                                                                                      
 
frauds.  A skillful attorney can conjure ambiguities from nearly any document, but 
such hypothetical difficulties often disappear when the surrounding circumstances 
are considered. 
 
17
1.600.000, Price $16,750.00” were ambiguous, given the use of the modifier 
“approx.” before the multiplier, the omitted zero in the price, and the uncertain 
meaning of “gross income.”  The court then considered Sterling’s testimony that 
“approx.” was meant to modify the total price, not the multiplier; that the missing 
zero was merely an error; and that “gross income” was used by the parties to refer 
to actual gross annual income.  It decided that this evidence, if accepted by the 
trier of fact, could establish an agreement to determine the price based on a 
formula, which would be binding under Carver v. Teitsworth (1991) 1 
Cal.App.4th 845, 852.  In Carver, a bid for either a specified price or $1,000 over 
any higher bid was deemed sufficiently certain.  (Id. at pp. 849, 852-853.) 
 
In this court, plaintiffs also cite Cal. Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. 
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, to show that a price term may be calculated from a formula.  
There, a price formula was derived from industry custom and the parties’ past 
practice.  (Id. at pp. 482-483.)  Plaintiffs contend the parties here negotiated a 
10.468 multiplier to be applied to the actual gross rental income from the buildings 
in March 2000, as indicated by the fact that Taylor gave Sterling rent rolls before 
their March 13 meeting. 
 
The Court of Appeal erred by deeming Sterling’s testimony sufficient to 
establish his interpretation of the memorandum for purposes of the statute of 
frauds.  Had Taylor testified that the parties meant to leave the price open to 
determination based on a rental income figure that was yet to be determined, this 
would be a different case.  Then, the “admissions of the party to be charged” 
might have supported a reasonably certain price term derived from a negotiated 
formula.  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. c, p. 335.)  Here, however, Taylor insists 
the price was meant to be $16,750,000, and Sterling agrees that was the number he 
intended to write down, underlined, as the “Price.” 
 
18
 
$16,750,000 is clearly an approximate product of the formula specified in 
the memorandum, applied to the income figure stated there.17  On the other hand, 
Sterling’s asserted price of $14,404,841 cannot reasonably be considered an 
approximation of $16,750,000.  It is instead an approximate product of the 
formula applied to an actual income figure not found in the memorandum.  The 
writing does not include the term “actual gross income,” nor does it state that the 
price term will vary depending on proof or later agreement regarding the actual 
rental income from the buildings.  In effect, Sterling would employ only the first 
part of the price term (“approx. 10.468 X gross income”) and ignore the last parts 
(“estimated income 1.600.000, Price $16,750.00”).  He would hold Taylor to a 
price that is 10.468 times the actual rental income figure gleaned from the rent 
rolls, but only “approximately” so because of Sterling’s computational errors.  
(See fn. 2, ante.) 
 
Thus, two competing interpretations of the memorandum were before the 
court.  Taylor’s is consistent with the figures provided in the memorandum, 
requiring only the correction of the price by reference to undisputed extrinsic 
evidence.  Sterling’s price is not stated in the memorandum, and depends on 
extrinsic evidence in the form of his own testimony, disputed by Taylor, that the 
parties intended to apply the formula to actual gross rental income instead of the 
estimated income noted in the memorandum.  Even if the trier of fact were to 
accept Sterling’s version of the parties’ negotiations, the price he seeks is not 
reflected in the memorandum; indeed, it is inconsistent with the price term that 
appears in the memorandum.  Under these circumstances, we conclude the 
evidence is insufficient to establish Sterling’s price term with the reasonable 
certainty required by the statute of frauds.  (See Beazell v. Schrader, supra, 59 
Cal.2d at p. 582.)  
 
The statute of frauds demands written evidence that reflects the parties’ 
mutual understanding of the essential terms of their agreement, when viewed in 
                                              
 
17    The actual product of $1,600,000 multiplied by 10.468 is  $16,748,800. 
 
19
light of the transaction at issue and the dispute before the court.  The writing 
requirement is intended to permit the enforcement of agreements actually reached, 
but “to prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury of contracts never in fact 
made.”  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 131, com. c, p. 335.)  The sufficiency of a 
memorandum to fulfill this purpose may depend on the quality of the extrinsic 
evidence offered to explain its terms.  In Preble v. Abrahams, supra, 88 Cal. 245, 
the memorandum failed to describe the property to be sold with any certainty, but 
extrinsic evidence established that the parties could only have been referring to the 
portion of a tract that was not sold to another buyer.  (Id. at p. 250.)  Similarly, in 
Brewer v. Horst and Lachmund Co., supra, 127 Cal. 643, telegrams that were 
otherwise inscrutable demonstrated an ascertainable agreement when the court 
considered the circumstances of the transaction and the parties’ understanding of 
the terms employed.  (Id. at pp. 646-647.) 
 
Here, unlike in the Preble and Brewer cases, the extrinsic evidence offered 
by plaintiffs is at odds with the writing, which states a specific price and does not 
indicate that the parties contemplated any change based on actual rental income.  
Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to show with reasonable certainty that the 
parties understood and agreed to the price alleged by plaintiffs.  The price terms 
stated in the memorandum, considered together with the extrinsic evidence of the 
contemplated price, leave a degree of doubt that the statute of frauds does not 
tolerate.   The trial court properly granted defendants summary judgment. 
 
20
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with directions to affirm 
the trial court judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve the 
meaning of an ambiguity in a written memorandum required by the statute of 
frauds as evidence of an agreement, and that conflicts in the evidence are for the 
trier of fact to resolve.  The majority, however, goes astray when it takes it upon 
itself to resolve an existing conflict in the evidence.  In my view, the ambiguity in 
the language of the memorandum at issue should be resolved by the trier of fact. 
I. 
 
In January 2000, plaintiff Donald Sterling and defendant Lawrence Taylor, 
both of whom are experienced real estate investors, discussed the proposed sale of 
three apartment buildings in Santa Monica owned by a partnership in which 
defendant was the general partner.  On March 13, 2000, they met again.  At the 
meeting, plaintiff (the prospective buyer) prepared a brief handwritten 
memorandum entitled “Contract for the Sale of Real Property.”  As relevant here, 
the memorandum identified properties at “808 4th St.,” “843 4th St.,” and “1251 
14th St.”  This is immediately followed by “approx 10.468 X gross income [¶] 
estimated income 1.600.000, Price $16,750,000.”1  The memorandum was 
initialed by plaintiff, but was not signed by defendant.  Two days later, on March 
                                              
1  
The memorandum has the word “income” on a line above the words 
“estimated 1.600.000” and the number “$16,750,00.”  As the majority notes, the 
parties agree that the intended phrasing was “estimated income 1.600.000” and 
that the intended figure was “$16,750,000.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2, fn. 1, 4, fn. 
3.)   
 
2 
15, 2000, plaintiff sent defendant a letter that confirmed the contract of sale but 
did not mention the price.  Defendant signed the letter below the handwritten 
notation, “Agreed, Accepted, & Approved.”  The parties dispute whether the 
March 13 memorandum was attached to the March 15 letter. 
 
The issue is whether the document entitled “Contract for the Sale of Real 
Property” is a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.  That statute 
provides that contracts for, among other things, the sale of real estate are invalid 
unless evidenced by a note or memorandum signed by the party to be charged.  
(Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).)  Plaintiff here claims that the memorandum 
meets the requirements of the statute of frauds because extrinsic evidence he 
offered clarifies that the agreed price was $14,404,841 – determined by applying 
the formula in the memorandum of multiplying the actual rent times 10.468.  
Plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence includes the “Contract for Sale of Real Property,” the 
letter dated March 15, 2000 confirming the buildings’ sale signed by defendant, 
and defendant’s having given plaintiff information showing the actual rent 
received.  Defendant maintains that the price is the figure $16,750,000 expressed 
in the memorandum. 
 
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The 
Court of Appeal, concluding there was a triable issue of material fact as to whether 
the parties had agreed to a formula for determining the purchase price, reversed.   
II. 
 
The parties’ dispute here centers on whether the price description in the 
memorandum is ambiguous so that extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify its 
meaning and satisfy the statute of frauds.  Regarding price the memorandum 
states:  “approx. 10.468 X gross income [¶] estimated income 1.600.000, Price 
$16,750,000.”  Plaintiff claims that the word “approx.” modified the entire 
statement, not just “10.468 X gross income,” and that the parties understood the 
 
3 
term “gross income” to mean actual annual gross rental income.  In other words, 
plaintiff’s position is that the memorandum sets forth a formula for determining 
the actual price – 10.468 multiplied by actual annual gross rental income, which 
results in a price of $14,404,841 – and that the reference to “Price $16,750,000” is 
an estimate of the actual price, determined by application of the formula just 
mentioned, albeit using a somewhat inaccurate estimate of gross annual rental 
income.  (See e.g., Cal. Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 
474, 482 [price need not be specified if it can be objectively determined]; Carver 
v. Teitsworth (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 845, 853 [same].)  Defendant disagrees, 
contending that the memorandum’s mention of “Price $16,750,000” reflects the 
actual purchase price agreed upon by the parties.  Both have a point. 
 
As the Court of Appeal observed, the language in the memorandum is 
ambiguous; that is, it can reasonably be read as each party proposes.  (Dore v. 
Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 391 [“An ambiguity arises when 
language is reasonably susceptible of more than one application to material 
facts”].)  To accept plaintiff’s argument would give meaning to the language in the 
disputed statement of “10.468 X gross income [¶] estimated 1.600.000.”  To 
accept defendant’s argument would give meaning to the term “Price $16,750,000.”  
Which view should be accepted is a determination to be made by the trier of fact, 
based on its consideration of the extrinsic evidence presented.  (See Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 8 [“when ambiguous terms in a memorandum are disputed, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to resolve the uncertainty”].)  Either way, the trier of fact’s 
resolution would result in a specific purchase price:  one arrived at through 
application of a formula expressed in the memorandum, the other through 
acceptance of the figure $16,750,000 mentioned in the memorandum. 
 
The majority, however, simply adopts defendant’s view instead of leaving 
it to the trier of fact to resolve the conflict in the evidence.  In accepting 
 
4 
defendant’s view, the majority rejects plaintiff’s view as attempting to alter rather 
than explain the terms of the memorandum.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18-19.)  I 
disagree. 
 
Apparently based on its own evaluation of the evidence, which as discussed 
above is conflicting, the majority takes it upon itself to decide that the agreed price 
was $16,750,000 and then concludes that any extrinsic evidence presented by 
plaintiff would be inconsistent with that figure.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  The 
majority reasons that plaintiff is looking only to the first part of the 
memorandum’s price description of “approx. 10.468 X gross income,” while 
ignoring the last part stating “estimated income 1.600.000, Price $16,750,000.”  
(Ibid.)  This is both a misapprehension of plaintiff’s view and a failure to 
appreciate that defendant’s view too is not free from ambiguity. 
 
Plaintiff’s position that the memorandum sets forth a formula for 
determining the price does not ignore the memorandum’s reference to “estimated 
income 1.600.000, Price $16,750,000.”  According to plaintiff, the memorandum’s 
stated price is itself an estimate, for it is the product of the estimated income of 
1.600.000 times 10.468, while the actual price is to be determined by using the 
formula 10.468 multiplied by the actual gross income, resulting in a price of 
$14,404,841.  Defendant’s view that the actual price is $16,750,000 finds support 
in the memorandum’s mention of “Price $16,750,000” but it ignores the 
memorandum’s formula that plaintiff relies on.  Unlike the majority, I see no 
reason to reject plaintiff’s position as a matter of law when the purchase terms in 
the memorandum are ambiguous and are as reasonably susceptible to plaintiff’s 
position as to defendant’s.  I would leave it to the trier of fact to resolve the 
ambiguity.   
 
5 
 
Unlike the majority, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Sterling v. Taylor 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 113 Cal.App.4th 931 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S121676 
Date Filed: March 1, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Lisa Hart Cole 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Carl L. Grumer, Craig S. Rutenberg, Jeffrey A. Backhus; Barak Lurie; Law 
Offices of Dennis C. Tulsiak and Dennis C. Tulsiak for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
June Babiracki Barlow and Neil Kalin for California Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Jeremy B. Rosen; Buchalter, Nemer, Fields & Younger, G. Forsythe 
Bogeaus and Raquel Vallejo for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Trevor A. Grimm and Paul Gough for Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Arthur Mazirow for Richard A. Lord as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carl L. Grumer 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips 
11355 West Olympic Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90064-1614 
(310) 312-4000 
 
Jeremy B. Rosen 
Horvitz & Levy 
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor 
Encino, CA 91436-3000 
(818) 995-0800