Title: Delgado v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2030 
____________ 
 
ROGELIO DELGADO,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[May 26, 2011] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
Delgado v. State, 19 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), involving the application of 
a provision of Florida‟s kidnapping statute, specifically section 787.01(1)(a)2., 
Florida Statutes (2006), and the interplay of that provision with our decision in 
Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).  This Court‟s decision in Faison was 
intended to narrow the circumstances under which those defendants convicted of 
an underlying forcible felony would be automatically convicted of kidnapping; its 
three-part test was not intended to expand the class of defendants who could be 
subject to a kidnapping conviction or as a substitute for satisfying the elements of 
 
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the statute.  We conclude that the Third District misapplied our decision in Faison, 
and, accordingly, we have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also 
Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1040 (Fla. 2009) (identifying misapplication of 
decisions as a basis for express and direct conflict under article V, section 3(b)(3) 
of the Florida Constitution). 
Rogelio Delgado was convicted of burglary of an occupied conveyance, 
grand theft of a motor vehicle (auto theft), and kidnapping.  He received a thirty-
year sentence for the burglary of an occupied conveyance, a ten-year sentence for 
the auto theft, and a life sentence for the kidnapping.1  Delgado‟s convictions and 
sentences stem from his theft of a vehicle in which a two-year-old child was asleep 
in the backseat.  Such facts are undoubtedly enough to invoke fear in the minds of 
every parent in this state.  The child‟s presence within the vehicle served as the 
basis for Delgado‟s conviction and thirty-year sentence for burglary of an occupied 
conveyance.  However, the question here is whether Delgado committed the 
additional crime of kidnapping, subjecting him to a sentence of life imprisonment, 
if he did not know the child was in the backseat before or during his commission of 
the auto theft, which was the underlying felony used to support his kidnapping 
conviction.  We conclude that because the State failed to produce sufficient 
                                          
 
 
1.  Delgado was also convicted of grand theft for items stolen from the 
vehicle during this incident.  However, at sentencing, that conviction was reduced 
to petit theft, and Delgado was sentenced to time served for that offense. 
 
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evidence demonstrating Delgado‟s awareness of the victim before or during his 
execution of the underlying felony, critical statutory requirements for the 
kidnapping offense were not satisfied.  Therefore, the Third District‟s decision 
relying on the Faison three-part test to affirm the trial court‟s denial of Delgado‟s 
motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneous.  Accordingly, we quash the Third 
District‟s decision in this case. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The operative facts from which this case arose were presented at trial.  At 
some time around 12 p.m. on May 24, 2006, Juan Gonzalez, the owner of a two-
door, extended-cab, pickup truck with tinted windows, drove to the Flamingo Plaza 
furniture store located in Hialeah, Florida, and parked approximately ten yards 
away from the storefront.  Gonzalez‟s girlfriend, Luisa Andelia Alvarado, and his 
aunt accompanied him to the store along with Alvarado‟s two-year-old daughter, 
who was asleep and fastened into a car seat in the backseat of the truck‟s extended 
cab.   
Upon their arrival, Gonzalez and his aunt went inside the store to pick up 
pre-purchased furniture.  Gonzalez then called over to Alvarado to assist them.  
When Alvarado exited the vehicle and walked into the store to help, she left the 
keys inside the vehicle with its engine running and her sleeping child unattended in 
the backseat.  In a matter of minutes, and before Alvarado returned to the front 
 
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door of the furniture store, Rogelio Delgado and an accomplice commandeered the 
pickup truck and drove away.  A surveillance camera outside the storefront 
recorded the perpetrators and the auto theft.  
Although there were no eyewitnesses to this sequence of events, when 
Gonzalez and Alvarado realized that the truck was missing, they immediately 
called 911 to report the incident.  Within twenty to thirty minutes of this report, the 
police located the truck some distance north of Flamingo Plaza in the back of a 
business parking lot just outside of Hialeah‟s city limits.2  The truck‟s engine was 
still running, and the doors were left unlocked.  Detective Roger Hernandez, the 
first officer to arrive at the scene where the vehicle was recovered, opened the 
driver‟s side door and saw the child in the back in her car seat.  The detective 
testified that the child‟s eyes were puffy from crying, she had mucous running 
down her face, and she looked exhausted.  However, the child appeared to be 
unharmed.  In addition, the front-seat area of the truck‟s cab had been ransacked; 
the radio had been removed, tools had been taken, and the glove compartment and 
ashtray were damaged and thrown on the floor.  After police brought Alvarado to 
the recovery site, officers handed the child to her.  The mother testified that her 
                                          
 
 
2.  The furniture store where the auto theft took place was located in 
Flamingo Plaza at 901 East 10th Avenue in Hialeah, Florida.  The site of where the 
vehicle and child were later found was located approximately three miles away at 
9371 Northwest 27th Avenue.  
 
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daughter looked “[f]rightened” and was crying because she was “looking at so 
many people that she did not recognize,” including multiple officers and news 
reporters. 
Following this incident, police officers used still images captured by the 
storefront surveillance camera to search for Delgado.  Later that day, police found 
him along with his accomplice near the scene where the vehicle was recovered.  
Based on the foregoing acts, Delgado was charged with four offenses: burglary of 
an occupied conveyance, grand theft, auto theft, and kidnapping with the intent to 
commit or facilitate a felony in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes 
(2006).3  That statute defines the crime of “kidnapping” as “forcibly, secretly, or by 
threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will 
and without lawful authority, with intent to . . . [c]ommit or facilitate commission 
of any felony.”  Delgado was then tried separately from his accomplice on these 
charges. 
At Delgado‟s trial, no direct evidence was introduced that he ever became 
aware of the child‟s presence during the course of the underlying charged offenses.  
Following the close of the State‟s case, Delgado moved for a judgment of acquittal 
on the kidnapping charge, asserting a lack of knowledge and advancing reasons 
                                          
 
 
3.  The current 2010 version of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, is 
the same as the 2006 version at issue in this case. 
 
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why the Faison test was not met.  The trial court denied Delgado‟s motion and then 
charged the jury on the kidnapping charge in the following manner:  
To prove the crime of kidnapping as charged in Count 4 of the 
information, the State must prove the following elements.  1.  Rogelio 
Delgado forcibly, secretly or by threat confined, abducted or 
imprisoned M.H., a minor, against her will.  2.  Rogelio Delgado had 
no lawful authority.  3.  Rogelio Delgado acted with the intent to 
commit or facilitate the commission of grand theft auto of a motor 
vehicle. 
In order to be kidnapping, confinement or abduction or 
imprisonment must not be slight, inconsequential, or merely incidental 
to the felony.  It must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the 
felony and must have some significant independence of the felony in 
that it makes the felony substantially easier of commission or 
substantially lessens the risk of detection. 
Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against his will if 
it is done so without the consent of the parents or legal guardian. 
 
The jury subsequently found Delgado guilty on all four charges.  
With respect to his kidnapping conviction, Delgado received a mandatory 
life sentence as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(9)(a), Florida 
Statutes (2006).  As to his convictions for burglary of an occupied conveyance and 
auto theft, Delgado was sentenced to thirty years‟ and ten years‟ imprisonment, 
respectively, as a habitual offender.  Finally, in regard to Delgado‟s conviction for 
grand theft, which was reduced to petit theft, he was sentenced to time served.  All 
sentences were to run concurrently.  Delgado appealed his convictions and 
sentences to the Third District Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court‟s denial 
 
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of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge.4  The Third 
District affirmed Delgado‟s kidnapping conviction, concluding that sufficient 
evidence existed to support the jury‟s verdict.  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1056. 
ANALYSIS 
The issue we must address in this case is whether a defendant commits the 
crime of kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate an underlying felony 
where the evidence produced at trial fails to establish that he or she had knowledge 
of the victim‟s presence before or during the execution of that underlying felony.  
In resolving this issue, we first review Florida‟s kidnapping statutory scheme and 
the three-part test this Court adopted in Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).  
Next, we examine the elements of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2006).  
Then, we address the Third District‟s decision in Delgado and conclude that it 
misapplied this Court‟s holding in Faison by conflating the language of the 
kidnapping statute with Faison‟s three-part test and improperly relying on Taylor 
v. State, 879 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  Finally, we apply the correct rule 
of law to the facts of this case and hold that insufficient evidence exists to support 
                                          
 
 
4.  Delgado also challenged the trial court‟s failure to grant his motion for a 
mistrial after a State witness testified that Delgado invoked his right to remain 
silent following a reading of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 
436 (1966).  The Third District dismissed this issue as meritless without 
elaboration.  See Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1056 n.1.  Delgado does not challenge that 
issue in this Court, and it does not affect this Court‟s resolution of the present case. 
 
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Delgado‟s conviction for kidnapping. 
The Interplay between Faison and Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes 
 
In Florida, the crime of kidnapping requires a specific intent on the part of 
the defendant.  See Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 69 (Fla. 2004); Sochor v. State, 
619 So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla. 1993).  Section 787.01(1), Florida Statutes (2006), 
codifies this offense and sets forth four separate categories of specific intent, the 
establishment of any one of which will support a conviction under the statute.  See 
Justus v. State, 438 So. 2d 358, 367 (Fla. 1983).  The Legislature defines the 
criminal act of kidnapping, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by 
threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her 
or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 
 
1. Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 
 
2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 
 
3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another 
person. 
 
4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function. 
 
§ 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  Further, under section 787.01(1)(b), 
“[c]onfinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the 
meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of her or his 
 
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parent or legal guardian.”  § 787.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat.5  In this case, Delgado was 
convicted of kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate commission of the 
underlying felony of auto theft pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)2. 
 
While the statutory definition of section 787.01(1)(a)2. appears relatively 
straightforward, the inquiry into whether a kidnapping has occurred under this 
provision does not end with a plain reading and application of its elements.  
Instead, this Court has recognized that the statute‟s literal interpretation “would 
result in a kidnapping conviction for „any criminal transaction which inherently 
involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual 
battery.‟ ”  Berry v. State, 668 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Mobley v. 
State, 409 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla. 1982)); see also Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 62 
(Fla. 2008) (recognizing that “the plain text of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, 
could lead to potentially absurd results”).  Therefore, in an effort to limit the scope 
of that particular subsection so as “to prevent any crime that involves some level of 
confinement or detention from also constituting a kidnapping,” Lynch, 2 So. 3d at 
62, this Court in Faison looked beyond Florida jurisprudence and adopted a three-
part test promulgated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 
720 (Kan. 1976), wherein that court interpreted a similar, but not identical, 
                                          
 
 
5.  Delgado does not challenge whether the confinement of the child was 
against her will, and therefore, we do not discuss that issue any further. 
 
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kidnapping statute.  See Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965-66.   
Faison provided the framework for analyzing the facts of a case to determine 
whether a defendant‟s conduct amounts to a confinement crime under section 
787.01(1)(a)2. distinct from other criminal charges involving forcible felonies.  
Pursuant to Faison, 
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate 
the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting 
movement or confinement: 
 
(a)  Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to 
the other crime; 
 
(b)  Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other 
crime; and 
 
(c)  Must have some significance independent of the other 
crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of 
commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. 
 
Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731) (alteration in original).  
Since our decision in that case, we have adhered to the principle that proof of each 
factor adopted in Faison is necessary for a kidnapping conviction under subsection 
787.01(1)(a)2. to be upheld.  See, e.g., Lynch, 2 So. 3d at 62-63 (applying the 
Faison test to section 787.01(1)(a)2.); Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 183-84 (Fla. 
2005) (same); Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 764 (Fla. 2002) (same). 
However, by adopting the Buggs three-part test in Faison, we did not hold 
that the test‟s three elements would supplant, or stand in lieu of, the statutory 
 
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language of section 787.01(1)(a)2.  Rather, we recognized that because a literal 
application of section 787.01(1)(a)2. would convert any forcible felony into two 
distinct felonies—kidnapping and the underlying felony—applying the statutory 
language in addition to the three-part test would justifiably serve to limit that 
provision‟s broad scope.  Under the proper analysis, to establish the offense of 
kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)2., the State must first demonstrate that 
every element of the statute has been satisfied before turning to the three-part test 
we adopted in Faison. 
The Elements of Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes 
 
This Court has previously recognized that “[t]he Legislature is vested with 
the authority to define the elements of a crime.”  Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46, 
49 (Fla. 2002).  For that reason, we begin our analysis of whether Delgado 
committed the crime of kidnapping in order to commit or facilitate the commission 
of the underlying felony of auto theft with an examination of the plain language of 
section 787.01(1)(a)2.  See GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007) 
(“The plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory 
interpretation.”).  As stated above, section 787.01(1)(a)2. provides that “[t]he term 
„kidnapping‟ means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or 
imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, 
with intent to . . . [c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony.”  Based on a 
 
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plain reading of this statutory provision, its language can be broken down into two 
essential components: (1) a forceful, secretive, or threatening act by the defendant 
that confines, abducts, or imprisons another person against his or her will; and (2) 
engaging in such conduct with the specific intent to commit or facilitate the 
commission of an underlying felony.  Therefore, “[k]idnapping requires proof of 
both confinement and criminal intent underlying the confinement.”  Johnson v. 
State, 969 So. 2d 938, 955 (Fla. 2007).  Stated differently, to establish a 
kidnapping under this provision, “the State must also prove that the unlawful 
confinement occurred with a specific intent.”  Crain, 894 So. 2d at 73. 
Because the language of the statute requires an overt act on the part of the 
defendant, and because that act must be performed with a specific intent to commit 
or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony, clearly a defendant must first 
have knowledge of an intended victim in order to effectuate his or her intent.  See 
State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 2004) (recognizing, in the context of 
criminal offenses, that “because of the strength of the traditional rule that requires 
mens rea, offenses that require no mens rea are generally disfavored” and that the 
United States Supreme Court has “virtually created a presumption in favor of a 
guilty knowledge element absent an express provision to the contrary” (citing 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994))); see also Lovette v. State, 636 
So. 2d 1304, 1307 (Fla. 1994) (upholding kidnapping conviction due in part to the 
 
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fact that defendant “intended that the victims be confined” in a closet to complete 
the robbery of a store by leaving undetected (emphasis added)); Polite v. State, 973 
So. 2d 1107, 1113 (Fla. 2007) (interpreting Florida‟s resisting-an-officer-with-
violence statute and stating that the word “resisting” as used in the statutory 
language, by its “very nature . . . implies an element of knowledge, i.e., an 
awareness that another is exerting force and an intent to counter that force in 
opposition”).  Such knowledge should arise either before or during the commission 
of the underlying felony used to support the kidnapping charge. 
Accordingly, where a defendant is charged with kidnapping under section 
787.01(1)(a)2., the State must prove that the defendant was first aware of the 
victim‟s presence in order to kidnap that victim with a specific intent to commit or 
facilitate the commission of an underlying felony.  See § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat.  
It is only after the evidence satisfies the preceding statutory elements that courts 
may then address whether the Faison test‟s three prongs apply.  With these 
principles in mind, we turn to the Third District‟s decision in Delgado.   
The Third District’s Decision Below 
 
The Third District framed the issue in this case as “whether Delgado 
committed kidnapping when he and a co-defendant jumped into a pickup truck left 
running by its driver and drove away with a two-year-old child asleep in the truck, 
seat-belted into the back seat.”  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1056.  To resolve this issue, 
 
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the district court appears to have created a categorical rule that once a defendant 
drives away with someone else‟s child, regardless of that defendant‟s knowledge 
of the child‟s presence, the defendant “move[s] from the realm of a crime against 
property to that of a crime against persons” due in part to the “special danger” 
associated with young children helplessly confined inside car seats.  Id. at 1058.  
The Third District‟s categorical rule creates an implicit distinction in the 
kidnapping statute‟s application that is dependent upon the status of the victim as 
an adult or a helpless child. 
In reviewing the trial court‟s denial of Delgado‟s motion for judgment of 
acquittal on the kidnapping charge, the Third District bypassed an application of 
the language of section 787.01(1)(a)2. and instead focused its analysis on the 
applicability of Faison to this particular case.  Initially, the court made several 
inferences based upon the facts, first noting that it was “reasonable to infer from 
the evidence that Delgado became aware that the child was confined in the truck in 
the course of removing the radio, taking the owner‟s tools, and ransacking the 
interior of the vehicle in an obvious search for other valuables (if not at the time 
Delgado jumped into the front seat).”  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1057.  The court then 
further explained: 
Faison requires “movement or confinement,” not both.  Here 
the confinement of the child continued through the theft of contents 
within the vehicle and even after Delgado‟s abandonment of the 
unlocked, still-idling vehicle.  The continued confinement of the child 
 
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in this case was essential to Delgado‟s attempt to avoid apprehension 
for the theft of the vehicle and its contents.  Only through an 
anonymous tip of some kind or a voluntary surrender could Delgado 
have avoided the inference that his successful consummation of the 
theft of the truck and its contents was more important to him than the 
continued and dangerous confinement of the helpless child. 
 
Id. at 1057-58.  The Third District also concluded that “[t]he jury could reasonably 
and fairly infer that Delgado‟s abandonment of the confined child was to facilitate 
commission of the theft by avoiding detection and apprehension.”  Id. at 1057 n.3.   
After reaching these inferences, the Third District applied the Faison test to 
the facts by focusing its analysis on the test‟s first prong.  The district court stated 
in relevant part:  
The confinement of the child was not slight, inconsequential, and 
“merely incidental” to the theft of the truck and contents.  To the 
contrary, once Delgado drove away with someone else‟s child, he 
moved from the realm of a crime against property to that of a crime 
against persons.  The Court of Appeals of Indiana considered similar 
facts (a carjacker drove away an automobile that had been left running 
in the driveway with the front doors open and children, ages four and 
seven, in carseats in the back) and addressed the special danger to the 
children . . . . 
 
Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1058.  The district court then quoted an excerpt from Taylor 
v. State, 879 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), an Indiana appellate court decision 
explaining the “special danger” that results when automobile hijackings occur: 
We discern that the legislature had it in mind in enacting this part of 
the kidnapping statute to prevent persons from being exposed to that 
special danger, that increased probability of injury or death, which 
results when one is seized and confined or transported in a 
commandeered vehicle.  The message intended for the would-be 
 
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wrong-doer, is that if you are going to steal or commandeer a vehicle, 
let the people in it go and don‟t force people into it against their will. 
 
Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1058 (quoting Taylor, 879 N.E.2d at 1202-03).  
Analogizing the Taylor decision‟s “special danger” reasoning to this case, 
the Third District concluded that “[a]lthough the Florida statute does not include 
such language, the „special danger‟ analysis of kidnapping squares neatly with the 
„not slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental‟ element of Faison.”  Id.  In 
other words, the district court‟s decision suggests that the child‟s confinement was 
not incidental to Delgado‟s underlying auto theft, thereby meeting the first prong 
of Faison, because of the “special danger” that was imposed upon a helpless, two-
year-old child who remained fastened inside the backseat of a car after the auto 
theft reached its ending point.   
The Third District’s Misapplication of Faison 
While this Court has acknowledged in the past that the Faison test “is not an 
easy one to apply,” attributing the test‟s difficulty “not to the test itself but rather to 
the diverse factual situations to which it must be applied,” we have also cautioned 
against revising the Faison test because doing so “would lead us to stray even 
further from the language of the statute.”  Berry, 668 So. 2d at 970.  
Notwithstanding this Court‟s prior admonition, the State argues that the Third 
District‟s expansive interpretation and application of section 787.01(1)(a)2. and the 
Faison test, in particular, were proper.  We disagree and conclude that the Third 
 
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District misapplied our decision in Faison in two important aspects. 
We first conclude that the Third District‟s decision incorrectly conflates the 
language of section 787.01(1)(a)2. with the Faison test‟s three parts.  Although it is 
difficult to refute the Third District‟s reasoning that Delgado‟s abandonment of the 
child left her in a precarious state, and we too find this fact troubling, the court‟s 
rationale does not explain how Delgado‟s decision to leave the scene established 
the statutory elements of kidnapping with the intent to facilitate auto theft.  The 
crux of the district court‟s decision relies on an “infer[ence] from the evidence that 
Delgado became aware that the child was confined in the truck in the course of 
removing the radio, taking the owner‟s tools, and ransacking the interior of the 
vehicle in an obvious search for other valuables.”  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1057.  
After Delgado became aware of the child‟s presence, the district court explained, 
the child‟s “continued confinement . . . was essential to [his] attempt to avoid 
apprehension for the theft of the vehicle and its contents,” and thus supported a 
kidnapping conviction.  Id. (emphasis added).  However, under section 
787.01(1)(a)2., a defendant‟s awareness of the victim must arise before or during 
the commission of the underlying felony—auto theft in this case—and not after the 
fact, as the Third District presumes took place.  Accordingly, a victim‟s “continued 
confinement” when the defendant is unaware of the initial confinement during the 
commission of the underlying felony does not factor into this analysis.  
 
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Here, the district court‟s decision erroneously equates both “avoiding 
detection and apprehension” and “extend[ing] the time of confinement”—facts that 
are relevant to establishing the Faison test—with satisfying the essential elements 
required under the kidnapping statute, including that such actions “facilitate[d] 
[Delgado‟s] commission of the [auto] theft.”  Id. 1057-58, 1057 n.3.  Yet, as 
explained above, whether the evidence presented at trial satisfies the statutory 
elements and whether it satisfies the three parts of Faison are separate and distinct 
inquiries to be conducted independent of one another.  The Third District‟s 
decision disregards satisfying the language of the statute as an inquiry separate 
from Faison, and in doing so, misapplies the principles we announced in that 
decision. 
Under the Third District‟s decision, the State would be able to avoid its 
burden to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in section 787.01(1)(a)2. so 
long as it can establish that all three parts of the Faison test have been met.  
However, such an expansive reading of the Faison decision would actually 
exacerbate the very problem this Court in Faison sought to avoid: expanding the 
class of defendants who could be subject to a kidnapping conviction for alleged 
confinement subsumed in another criminal act.  Even if Delgado‟s acts did, in fact, 
satisfy all three Faison requirements, the Third District erred by not first 
determining whether Delgado had the requisite knowledge of the victim before or 
 
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during his execution of the auto theft as required by the statute. 
Second, we conclude that the Third District‟s reliance on Taylor by adopting 
its special-danger-to-children analysis was misplaced because that decision is 
materially distinguishable from this case in terms of both the operative facts and 
the applicable statutes at issue.  The defendant in Taylor was convicted of 
hijacking under Indiana‟s kidnapping statute6 after driving off in a car in which 
two children, ages seven and four, were already restrained in car seats.  Taylor, 879 
N.E.2d at 1201-02.  On appeal, the Indiana appellate court affirmed Taylor‟s 
hijacking conviction, first explaining that a reasonable trier of fact could have 
                                          
 
 
6.  While Indiana and Florida‟s kidnapping statutory schemes contain two 
similar provisions, Indiana‟s statute lacks a separate provision criminalizing 
confinements used to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony.  
Specifically, Indiana Code section 35-42-3-2(a) provides: 
A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person: 
(1) with intent to obtain ransom; 
(2) while hijacking a vehicle; 
(3) with intent to obtain the release, or intent to aid in the escape, of 
any person from lawful detention; or 
(4) with intent to use the person confined as a shield or hostage; 
commits kidnapping, a Class A felony. 
Taylor was charged with knowingly or intentionally confining the two children 
while hijacking the vehicle.  In Indiana, “hijacking” is judicially defined as “the 
exercise of „unlawful or unauthorized control of a vehicle by force or threat of 
force upon the vehicle‟s inhabitants.‟ ”  Taylor, 879 N.E.2d at 1202 (quoting 
Zimmerman v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 
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concluded that “Taylor knew there were children in the car as he approached it or 
almost immediately after he entered it” because the evidence showed that it was a 
sunny day, the windows of the vehicle were not tinted, the parents yelled loudly 
and repeatedly for their children as Taylor was pulling out of the driveway, and 
Taylor expressly acknowledged that he did not abandon the car the instant he 
discovered it was occupied.  Id. at 1202.  
Taylor argued that his hijacking conviction could not stand because there 
was no evidence that he used or threatened to use force as required by the Indiana 
statute.  Id.  Rejecting Taylor‟s contention, the appellate court concluded that 
Taylor‟s actions fell squarely in line with the risk the Legislature sought to prevent 
under the statutory provision at issue, reasoning as follows: 
When the victims are children, a defendant may need only 
minimal force to accomplish a hijacking.  That the victims are 
relatively helpless does not absolve the defendant of liability for 
kidnapping.  Taylor took advantage of the fact the children were 
restrained in car seats and locked in the car.  He took further steps to 
prevent their escape by driving at a high rate of speed. 
 
Id. at 1203.  The court‟s holding hinged on the fact that Taylor knew the children 
were in the car and were restrained in car seats.  Id. at 1202.  
In contrast to Taylor, where the defendant conceded that he did not abandon 
the car the moment he discovered that it was occupied, in this case, Delgado does 
not make a similar concession and actually asserts that he was unaware of the 
child‟s presence.  Further, Taylor‟s “special danger” analysis was not used to 
 
- 21 - 
interpret a kidnapping provision similar to section 787.01(1)(a)2., under which a 
separate felony is used to support a kidnapping conviction; rather, the Indiana 
court‟s assessment of special harm focused on whether Taylor applied the requisite 
level of force amounting to one, distinct felony.   
Unlike what the Third District intimates in its decision, Taylor did not make 
a connection between the level of force needed to sustain a hijacking conviction 
standing alone and the type of confinement that is slight, inconsequential, and 
merely incidental to another felony for the purposes of establishing the first part of 
the Faison test.  Moreover, the principle from Taylor quoted by the Third 
District—that “if you are going to steal or commandeer a vehicle, let the people in 
it go and don‟t force people into it against their will”—cannot logically apply when 
the defendant lacks knowledge of the victim.  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1058 (quoting 
Taylor, 879 N.E.2d at 1203).  And although we recognize that the offense charged 
in Taylor may be similar to Florida‟s provision on carjacking,7 Delgado was not 
charged with carjacking, it was not the underlying felony used to support his 
kidnapping conviction, and this Court has never extended the Faison test to that 
particular statute.  Therefore, Delgado‟s reliance on Taylor as support for its 
                                          
 
 
7.  “Carjacking” is defined by statute as “the taking of a motor vehicle which 
may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to 
permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, 
when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or 
putting in fear.” § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). 
 
- 22 - 
holding was misplaced. 
Significantly, under the Third District‟s rationale, there was nothing Delgado 
could do to avoid a kidnapping conviction once he discovered the child‟s presence 
after his completion of the auto theft.  The Third District even suggests imposing 
an additional obligation upon the defendant to submit “an anonymous tip of some 
kind” or voluntarily surrender.  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1057.  This logic would 
modify the statutory elements of Florida‟s kidnapping provision, which we decline 
to do.  See Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 2008) (“The Legislature 
did not include such language, and we cannot add it on our own.”).  
Applying the Correct Rule of Law to this Case 
Based on the foregoing, the core issue before this Court is whether there 
were sufficient facts presented from which a jury could find that Delgado knew 
there was a child in the backseat when he stole the vehicle.  On his motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge, Delgado argued there was not.  
The trial court disagreed and denied Delgado‟s motion.  The Third District upheld 
the trial court‟s denial. 
  In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court 
employs a de novo standard of review.  See McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 332 
(Fla. 2007).  “Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction that is 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.”  Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 
 
- 23 - 
1128, 1145 (Fla. 2006).  “There is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction if, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of 
fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003).  “In moving for a 
judgment of acquittal, a defendant „admits not only the facts stated in the evidence 
adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury 
might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.‟ ”  Reynolds, 934 So. 2d at 
1145 (quoting Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 657 (Fla. 2000)).  Under this 
standard, the State “is required to prove each and every element of the offense 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and when the [State] fails to meet this burden, 
the case should not be submitted to the jury, and a judgment of acquittal should be 
granted.”  Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198, 204 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Williams v. 
State, 560 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).  However, “[w]here the State 
has presented competent, substantial evidence of the crimes charged, the trial court 
does not err in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal and submitting the case 
to the jury.”  McDuffie, 970 So. 2d at 332.  
Applying the correct rule of law in this case turns on whether Delgado 
became aware of the child‟s presence before or during completion of the 
underlying felony used to support his kidnapping charge—auto theft.  Here, the 
fact that an auto theft occurred is not in dispute.  Nor is it disputed that the burglary 
 
- 24 - 
of an occupied conveyance occurred, the statutory elements of which were 
satisfied when Delgado entered the conveyance with the intent to commit an 
offense therein “and there [was] another person in the conveyance at the time 
[Delgado] enter[ed]” it.  § 810.02(1)(b)1., (3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2006).  What is at issue 
is whether the additional crime of kidnapping, which requires Delgado‟s awareness 
of the child to facilitate the commission of auto theft, was established.   
Delgado‟s theory of innocence as to the kidnapping charge was that he had 
no knowledge of the child‟s presence when he committed the underlying felony 
(auto theft) used to support the kidnapping offense.  The evidence the State 
introduced at trial can be summarized as follows.  Delgado, along with an 
accomplice, commandeered a pickup truck with a sleeping, two-year-old child 
confined to a car seat located in the truck‟s backseat.  The crime occurred in a five-
minute period during which the child‟s mother had left the vehicle unattended with 
her sleeping child inside.  Within twenty to thirty minutes, Detective Hernandez 
found the vehicle some distance north of the site of the initial auto theft, just 
outside of Hialeah‟s city limits; it was in the back of a business parking lot with its 
engine still running and the doors unlocked.   
Upon his discovery, Detective Hernandez approached the vehicle.  Because 
the truck had “darker than regular tints,” he could only see into the front seat and 
“could tell there were no adults in the car or no one in the front seat.”  Importantly, 
 
- 25 - 
from the outside, he was unable to see the child or into the complete cab of the 
vehicle.  After opening the driver‟s side door, Detective Hernandez initially 
“checked the back seat of the car.”  The prosecutor then questioned the detective 
about what he observed from this vantage point: 
The Prosecutor:  Let me stop you right there.  When you first opened 
the door of the vehicle were you able to see the child in the car? 
 
Detective Hernandez:  I had to look into the back seat, but yes, I did 
see her. 
 
The Prosecutor:  Could you see her legs in the car seat? 
 
Detective Hernandez:  No. 
 
The Prosecutor:  What did you do next? 
 
Detective Hernandez:  I looked at the baby and— 
 
The Prosecutor:  Did looking for her require you to actually get in the 
seat and look in the back? 
 
Detective Hernandez:  No.  I just moved the seat over a little bit, then 
there was a little crease and then I looked and then I could see her, 
then I folded the car seat forward because I remember having a clear 
view of the little girl. 
 
Detective Hernandez further stated that when he found her, the child‟s eyes 
were puffy from crying, she had mucous running down her face, and that she 
looked exhausted, but was otherwise unharmed.  Additionally, the vehicle‟s radio 
was stolen, tools had been removed, and the glove compartment and ashtray had 
been damaged and thrown to the floor—all of which were located in or underneath 
 
- 26 - 
the vehicle‟s front-seat area.  The State did not introduce any evidence establishing 
the approximate point in time that Delgado became aware of the child‟s presence.   
Delgado maintains that he had no knowledge that there was a child asleep in 
the backseat when he stole the vehicle, and the lack of evidence in the record 
certainly supports his argument.  Conversely, the State maintains that the evidence 
highlighted above was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that 
Delgado knew there was a child in the car before or during the commission of the 
auto theft and that his decision to abandon the vehicle in a secluded area without 
taking steps to assist in the child‟s discovery or safe placement was intentional.  
We reject the State‟s contention that these facts provide competent, substantial 
evidence of Delgado‟s awareness of the child prior to or during his theft of the 
vehicle. 
The detective‟s testimony on which the State relies demonstrates that it was 
difficult to see the child unless, once inside the vehicle, one were to look into the 
backseat or move the front seat forward.  According to the record, when examining 
the vehicle‟s interior, Detective Hernandez was already aware that he was looking 
for a child and after opening the driver‟s side door, he initially checked the 
backseat.  While evidence introduced at trial depicts the child as crying and in a 
frightened state, these observations were made twenty to thirty minutes after the 
initial auto theft, and before that time, the child was asleep.  There is simply no 
 
- 27 - 
evidence in the record that the child awoke, cried, or kicked the front seat of the 
vehicle‟s interior, thereby alerting Delgado to her presence, before or during the 
auto theft. 
In our analysis, we accept the Third District‟s conclusion that it was 
“reasonable to infer from the evidence that Delgado became aware that the child 
was confined in the truck in the course of removing the radio, taking the owner‟s 
tools, and ransacking the interior of the vehicle in an obvious search for other 
valuables.”  Delgado, 19 So. 3d at 1057.  However, these acts occurred after the 
theft of the vehicle and, as explained above, Delgado‟s awareness of the child at 
this point is not relevant to a kidnapping charge under the statute.  Given the sparse 
facts in the record, we conclude that the State did not introduce competent, 
substantial evidence demonstrating that Delgado became aware of the child‟s 
presence when he stole the vehicle. 
Accordingly, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain 
Delgado‟s kidnapping conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)2., notwithstanding the 
applicability of the Faison test to this circumstance, and the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.  Further, Delgado‟s act of 
abandoning the child following the auto theft, absent imposing an affirmative duty 
not present in the statute upon the defendant to alert other authorities to the child‟s 
presence, does not amount to the act of kidnapping as contemplated by the statute.  
 
- 28 - 
The Third District‟s decision indicating otherwise was in error. 
We note that if Delgado had left the child in the vehicle unattended after 
transporting her away from her parents and harm to the child could reasonably 
have been expected to ensue, the State could have charged Delgado with child 
abuse pursuant to section 827.03(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006),8 and the evidence 
may have been sufficient to sustain a conviction under that charge.  See Ford v. 
State, 802 So. 2d 1121, 1126, 1131 (Fla. 2001) (concluding that defendant‟s act of 
leaving a 22-month-old child strapped into her car seat in an open pickup truck in 
an isolated, wooded area for over 18 hours after murdering the child‟s parents, 
thereby exposing the child to dehydration, heat, and numerous insect bites was 
sufficient to support a third-degree felony child abuse conviction under section 
827.03).  However, Delgado was not charged with child abuse.  We further note 
that Delgado has not challenged his conviction for burglary of an occupied 
conveyance, which rests upon the fact that he entered an occupied vehicle with an 
intent to commit theft. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with our analysis above, we conclude that because the State 
failed to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating Delgado‟s awareness of the 
child before or during his execution of the underlying felony of auto theft, the 
                                          
 
 
8.  Section 827.03(1)(b) defines “[c]hild abuse” as “[a]n intentional act that 
could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a child.” 
 
- 29 - 
statutory requirements under section 787.01(1)(a)2. were not met.  The Third 
District‟s decision analyzing this claim by solely applying the Faison test‟s three 
parts, without first analyzing the issue on statutory grounds, resulted in a 
significant misapplication of the principles we announced in Faison.  Accordingly, 
we quash the Third District‟s decision in Delgado v. State, 19 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2009), and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate Delgado‟s 
conviction for kidnapping.9 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., specially concurs with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., 
concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LABARGA, J., specially concurring. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion because I agree that the district court failed 
to correctly analyze the issue in the case when it applied the Faison test without 
first determining if the State proved all the elements of a kidnapping under section 
                                          
 
 
9.  We similarly reject the State‟s alternative argument that Delgado‟s 
unsupported kidnapping conviction should be reduced to the lesser-included 
offense of false imprisonment, a general intent crime.  Without evidence 
establishing Delgado‟s knowledge of the intended victim, a conviction for false 
imprisonment would be likewise unsupported. 
 
- 30 - 
787.01, Florida Statutes.  The majority is correct that only after the evidence 
satisfies the statutory elements set forth in section 787.01 may the court then apply 
Faison‟s three-part test.  Moreover, when the first step in this process is analyzed, 
it can be seen that the only evidence offered to prove Delgado‟s awareness of the 
presence of the child in the vehicle was the testimony of Detective Roger 
Hernandez.  The detective testified that he opened the driver‟s side door and, after 
moving the seat over and looking through a “crease,” he could then see the child in 
the back seat.  He noticed that the child‟s eyes were puffy from crying, she had 
mucous running down her face, and she looked exhausted.  While this proves that 
at some point the child cried, it does not prove when the child cried or if Delgado 
heard her cry.  While evidence was presented that the child was asleep when the 
mother left her in the truck to enter the store, there was no evidence presented that 
the child awoke during the incident.  Although the truck was found only three 
miles from where it was taken, up to thirty minutes had passed before it was 
located.  Thus, Detective Hernandez‟s evidence was not inconsistent with the child 
beginning to cry after Delgado left the scene.  I therefore agree with the majority 
that under section 787.01(1)(a)(2), the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was aware of the victim‟s presence—proof that is 
necessary in order to convict Delgado of kidnapping the child with a specific intent 
to commit or facilitate the commission of the underlying felony of auto theft.  For 
 
- 31 - 
these reasons, I concur with the majority‟s decision to quash the decision of the 
Third District and remand with instructions to vacate Delgado‟s conviction for 
kidnapping.   
I write, however, to express my view that if the evidence had proven that 
Delgado became aware of the presence of the child at any time during the auto 
theft, up until the time he left the vehicle, the facts would support his conviction 
for kidnapping.  As noted by the majority, “under section 787.01(1)(a)(2), a 
defendant‟s awareness of the victim must arise before or during the commission of 
the underlying felony.”  Majority op. at 17 (emphasis added).  In my view, the auto 
theft was ongoing during the entire time that Delgado was driving the truck and 
while he was removing the items that he stole.  Because the State failed in its proof 
that Delgado became aware of the child at any point during the incident, I concur 
in vacating the conviction for kidnapping.    
 
 
LEWIS, J., dissenting. 
 
 
The decision of the Third District Court of Appeal below does not expressly 
and directly conflict with a decision of any other Florida court.  Further, the court 
below did not misapply Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983), but to the 
contrary, held true to the applicable principles of Florida law and rendered a 
decision that is eminently correct and, most assuredly, not contrary to well-
 
- 32 - 
established existing Florida law.  Here, a two-year-old child was abducted while in 
the backseat of the family vehicle and she was transported to a location some three 
miles from the place of abduction.  A surveillance camera captured most of the 
action at the scene of the abduction.  The trial judge provided the jury with proper 
instructions on the applicable law, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the Third 
District Court below correctly applied the proper law, and this Court has no proper 
jurisdictional basis to become involved with this case and no correct substantive 
legal basis to quash the decision below. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D08-1008 and 06-16939 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent