Title: Whisnant v. Holland

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed February 1, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied February 15, 1956.
*393 Hugh B. Collins, Medford, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was William F. Johnson, Grants Pass.
Samuel M. Bowe, Grants Pass, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Bowe & Martin, Grants Pass.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LATOURETTE, and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
*394 PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff, a child of the age of five years, brought suit, by her guardian, against the defendant Prince L. Holland to recover damages for personal injuries received while riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by her father, C.W. Whisnant, which was involved in a collision with the Holland motor vehicle.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff assigns error in the trial court arising from the following occurrence:
After the case had been fully submitted to the jury, and that body had retired to the jury room to deliberate, the foreman of the jury requested of the bailiff further instructions as follows: "Can you give me some instructions on the negligence of both drivers?" The bailiff answered: "I can't even talk to you. I've got to see the Judge." The bailiff at the hearing on the motion for new trial was questioned as follows:
Judge Millard, at the request of counsel, stated he had the bailiff come to his chambers "* * * and there he informed me that the jury or some member of the jury, didn't say, as I recall, whether it was the foreman or not, had asked him, but I got the idea it was the foreman, had asked him about some instructions the court had given at the conclusion of the trial. Well, perhaps rather abruptly I cautioned Mr. Swacker that *395 he didn't have any right to talk over the case with the jury, and all he could do was ask them the verdict agreed upon, and I think that some comment was made * * * to the effect that if the jury was concerned about the matter no doubt they would request further instructions or be in for instructions, and there the matter was concluded." The bailiff then returned to the jury room, advising them he (the bailiff) "couldn't give them any instructions." Sometime thereafter, without returning into open court for further instructions, the jury returned its verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiff states her contention as regards this incident as follows:
*396 To further support plaintiff's position as to the confusion, she presented the affidavits of three jurors which are to the effect that they were of the impression "that the plaintiff could not recover under any circumstances if the driver of the car in which she rode was negligent, even though the defendant was negligent."
The defendant has presented affidavits of a sufficient number of jurors to have returned the verdict as rendered in this cause, to the effect that their individual judgment in voting upon the verdict was based upon finding the defendant not negligent.
The conclusion to be drawn from the affidavits presented by the plaintiff is that some of the jurors misunderstood the instructions of the trial judge and based their verdict upon a misconception of the law.
1. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that affidavits of jurors may not be received to impeach their verdict. State v. Imlah, 204 Or 43, 281 P2d 973; Sullivan et al., v. Carpenter, 184 Or 485, 199 P2d 655, and cases cited therein. This includes attempted impeachment of a verdict based upon a juror's misunderstanding of the instructions of the trial court or his mistake as to the evidence. Ore. Cas. R.R. Co. v. Ore. S. Nav. Co., 3 Or 178.
We cannot, therefore, consider the affidavits of the jurors presented by the plaintiff.
2. The trial court expressly instructed the jury as follows:
This instruction does not in anywise conflict with the instruction given to the effect that persons need not anticipate negligence on the part of other operators upon the highway, and thus it was not negligent for the defendant to fail to anticipate the presence of the plaintiff's vehicle approaching upon defendant's side of the roadway in the absence of notice to the contrary. Each instruction bears upon a different phase of the case. The first dealing with concurrent negligence of the drivers of the automobiles, as it affected plaintiff's right of recovery; and the latter with whether or not the defendant was negligent if a given set of circumstances were found by the jury to exist.
3. The instructions cannot be considered piecemeal; they must be considered as a whole. Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or 28, 250 P2d 407; Whitehead v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 194 Or 186, 239 P2d 226.
4, 5. Should we consider what occurred as though the trial court had received and understood the request of the jury for further instructions, the trial court would not have been in error in refusing to repeat his previous instruction, which was clear and positive, because little time had passed since the giving of the instruction, and we cannot believe a juror would have forgotten the instruction in so short an interval. On the other hand, should we consider that the bailiff failed in his duty to inform the court of the jury's request, and thus the discretion residing in the court was not exercised (State v. Vaughn, 200 Or 275, 265 P2d 249), we are of the opinion that, since the instruction as given *398 was clear and positive and not subject to being confused or soon forgotten, and, also, since each juror was polled regarding his verdict, and had any doubt existed in the mind of any juror he was free at this time to so advise the court, any error in this respect was not prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff.
6. At this point, we suggest that trial courts should instruct their bailiffs that whenever a request for information is made by a jury the court should be at once informed, not as to the nature of the information desired, but merely that they desire information, and the trial court, without comment, should then bring the jury into open court and there receive the requests, thus giving the trial court a truer picture as to whether or not in the furtherance of justice he should act in accordance with his discretion and in accordance with the commands of ORS 17.325.
7, 8. The plaintiff also assigns as error the giving by the trial court of the following instruction:
for the reason that the defendant may not show that the negligence of a third party for whose negligence this plaintiff was not liable was the proximate cause of the collision, unless the same has been pleaded as a defense; relying upon Smith v. Pac. N.W. Pub. Ser. Co., 146 Or 422, 431, 29 P2d 819, where this court stated:
The court in the Smith case must have overlooked its previous holdings upon this issue of law, and the clear reasons therefor as set out in Sylvis v. Hays, 138 Or 418, 6 P2d 1098, Brown v. Jones, 137 Or 520, 3 P2d 768, and Multnomah Co. v. Willamette T. Co., 49 Or 204, 89 P 389. The holding of Smith v. Pac. N.W. Pub. Ser. Co., supra, in conflict with our previous decisions, is expressly overruled.
From a careful examination of the entire record we are satisfied no reversible error was committed.
The judgment is affirmed.