Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: YENNE-TULLY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF: YENNE-TULLY2002 WY 9048 P.3d 1057Case Number: 01-134Decided: 06/18/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 

BRETT C. 
YENNE-TULLY, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION, 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Donald L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. 
Delicath, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and VOIGT, JJ., and BRACKLEY, 
D.J. 

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from an Order Denying Benefits Nunc Pro Tunc issued by a hearing examiner from 
the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) on April 27, 2001.  Brett Yenne-Tully (the appellant) 
contended that the herniated disc he suffered in 1997 was a second compensable 
injury resulting from a work-related accident in 1989.  The Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (the Division) disagreed.  The hearing examiner concluded that the 
medical evidence indicated that the appellant's original injury was not the 
predominant cause of his subsequent disc herniation and he failed to prove that 
he was entitled to benefits under the second compensable injury rule.  We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
phrases the issue as:

 

Whether, 
when the expert opinion apportions the causation for injury as 70 percent as 
non-occupational causes and thirty percent to the subject injury, Appellant has 
failed as a matter of law to meet his burden of proof.

 

The 
Division states the issue as:

 

Whether 
the Hearing Examiner correctly determined that Appellant's herniated disc in 
1997 was not a second compensable injury resulting from his 1989 work-related 
accident.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On September 29, 
2000, this Court reversed and remanded this case to the OAH for reconsideration 
under the second compensable injury rule.  
Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., Dept. of 
Employment, 12 P.3d 170 (Wyo. 2000).  In that opinion, we cited the facts 
as:

 

            
Yenne-Tully suffered his first back injury when a snow fence fell on him 
in 1982.  He received treatment and 
missed two or three days of work.  
He had no further back problems until August 1989, when he fell down a 
flight of stairs while working as a guard at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  CT scans the 
following summer revealed a disc bulge at the L3-L4 level, as well as "some 
significant irregularity, primarily at the L5-S1, more minor at the L4-L5 
level."  An MRI in December 1991 
showed "early degenerative changes of the intervertebral dis[c] at the L5-S1 
level, without herniation."  The 
Division paid for Yenne-Tully's conservative treatment for his back through 
December 1991.  Yenne-Tully 
continued to lead an active life, but experienced constant back pain and had to 
leave work early or miss work on many occasions.  In December 1997, he awoke one morning 
and could not move due to extreme pain.  
An MRI the following month revealed a herniated disc at the L4-L5 
level.  The disc was surgically 
repaired in January 1998.

 

            
Yenne-Tully sought workers' compensation benefits for his surgery, 
believing the herniated disc to be causally related to his 1989 fall.  The Division denied benefits, stating 
that, "[t]he current condition is due to a herniation at the L4-L5 level, which 
was not effected in the original injury."  
A hearing was held at Yenne-Tully's request on September 23, 1998.  Four of his co-workers testified that 
since the 1989 accident, Yenne-Tully complained of, and exhibited symptoms of, 
back pain.  Exhibits included the 
report and deposition of a physician appointed by the Division to examine 
Yenne-Tully and review his medical records.

 

Id. at 
171.

 

[¶4]      In the second 
proceeding, the hearing examiner relied on the following stipulated facts, which 
we quote from the record:

 

1.         
Claimant is 38 years old and has been employed as a correctional officer 
by the Wyoming State Penitentiary since 1986.

 

2.         
In August 1989, Claimant sustained an injury to his low back while at 
work when he fell down a flight of stairs.

 

3.         
A CT scan taken in June 1990 revealed disc bulging at the L3-L4 
level.

 

4.         
A second CT scan taken in July 1990 showed "some significant 
irregularity, primarily at the L5-S1, more minor at the L4-L5 
level.["]

 

5.         
An MRI taken in December 1991 revealed "early degenerative changes of the 
intervertebral disc at the L5-S1 level, without 
herniation."

 

6.         
Claimant treated conservatively for the two years following his 
injury.

 

7.         
The injury was recognized by Respondent as work related and all medical 
benefits for services rendered from the date of injury to the date of last 
treatment in December 1991 were paid in accordance with the Workers' 
Compensation Law.

 

8.         
Claimant has credibly testified that, although he led a very active life 
since the date of injury, he has been suffering from various degrees of pain in 
his low back since the injury occurred in August 1989 to his low 
back.

 

9.         
In the years since his last medical treatment in December 1991, he has 
had to leave work early or take entire days off on numerous occasions because of 
low back pain.

 

10.       Four of 
Employee-Claimant's co-workers at the Wyoming State Penitentiary testified that, 
since his 1989 work-related injury to his low back, Employee-Claimant walks with 
a [limp] or rolling gait, exhibits pain behavior in the lower back when he bends 
or rises from a sitting position, uses hands or arms to brace himself when 
sitting or rising and cannot perform any heavy or aggressive duties, such as 
restraining inmates.

 

11.       Finally, in 
December 1997, he awoke in the morning to his alarm clock and could not move to 
turn if off because of excruciating pain in his low back.

 

12.       An MRI 
taken in January 1998 revealed a herniated disc at the L4-L5 
level.

 

13.       Claimant 
underwent surgery in January 1998 which successfully repaired the herniation at 
the L4-L5 level.

 

14.       The only 
medical opinion on the subject of the causation or inter-relation between the 
original August 1989 low back injury and the incident of December 1997, when 
Employee-Claimant could not move to turn off his alarm clock, is submitted in 
the deposition testimony of Dr. Nielson, which is incorporated in its entirety 
by this reference.

 

The 
hearing examiner further found:

 

15.       Since his 
1989 work injury, Yenne-Tully led an extremely active life outside work 
including being dragged by a horse which resulted in a finger 
amputation.

 

16.       Dr. Nielson 
testified that a 1991 MRI of the lumbar spine was essentially normal at the 
L4-L5 level.  In 1997 an MRI of the 
lumbar spine revealed significant abnormalities including a large herniated disc 
at the L4-L5 level.  . . 
.

 

17.       Dr. Nielson 
opined that only 30 percent of the causation of Yenne-Tully's 1997 L4-L5 level 
herniated disc was the result of the original 1989 work injury.  Dr. Nielson apportioned 70 percent to be 
related to cumulative trauma, including his activity with horses.  . . .

 

18.       Because 70 
percent of the problem was apportioned to non work-related activities, 
Yenne-Tully failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
herniated disc at the L4-L5 level was the direct result of his 1989 work injury 
to his lumbar spine at the L3-L4 level.

 

[¶5]      The Division 
retained a neurosurgeon, Dr. Karl Nielson, who performed an Independent Medical 
Examination of the appellant on March 3, 1998.  Dr. Nielson issued a report at that time 
and gave deposition testimony on September 1, 1998.  He testified that an MRI in 1991 showed 
that the appellant's spine was essentially normal at the L4-L5 level, only 
showing minor disc bulges.  He 
further testified that the herniated disc discovered in 1997 could, in small 
part, be related to the original injury in 1989, but the primary reason for 
herniation was attributable to cumulative trauma, some resulting from work, some 
from avocation, and some from daily living.

 

[¶6]      This matter came 
before the OAH on March 27, 2001, and the hearing examiner denied benefits for a 
second time.  The appellant 
petitioned the district court on May 17, 2001, for review of the OAH's 
order.  The district court certified 
review to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) on July 2, 
2001.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      When the district 
court certifies directly to this Court an administrative agency's decision, we 
review that agency's decision "under the same appellate standards applicable to 
the reviewing court of the first instance."  Matter of Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d 450, 453 (Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1091 (1997).  Our review is limited to a determination 
of the factors specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2001).  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

            
(A)       
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

            
* * *

 

            
(E)       
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii).

 

The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Wesaw v. Quality 
Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 8, 19 P.3d 500, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001).  We affirm an administrative agency's 
conclusions of law only if they are in accord with the law.  Id.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Id.  In reviewing 
findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether there is 
substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  Wesaw, ¶ 9.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Id.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  Id.  It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence.  
Id.

 

In re 
Jensen, 2001 
WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶8]      When reviewing a 
hearing examiner's decision that a worker's compensation claimant has failed to 
meet the burden of proof, we apply the following 
principles:

 

            
A claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving 
all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in 
the contested case hearing.  
Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo.1996).  When an 
agency decides that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to 
meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law" language of Wyo. 
Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990).  
City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo.1995).  On appeal the complainant . . . has the 
burden of proving arbitrary administrative action.  Knight v. Environmental Quality 
Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo.1991); Wyoming Bancorporation 
v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo.1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch, 
379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo.1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 
78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957).  
The agency, as the trier of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence 
and determining the credibility of witnesses.  Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451 . . 
..  The deference normally accorded 
to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative 
agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless 
it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. 
Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo.1994).  
Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish 
the irrationality of the ruling, but we do examine conflicting evidence to 
determine if the agency reasonably could have made its finding and order based 
upon all of the evidence before it.

 

Pederson 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); and see 
Sheth v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 11 P.3d 375, 378 (Wyo. 2000) and Lunde 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1258-59 (Wyo. 2000).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      The appellant 
argues that his 1989 injury was the cause of his herniated disc, which was 
diagnosed in 1997.  The appellant 
asserts that he is entitled to recover additional worker's compensation benefits 
because this is a second compensable injury.  He argues that an injury is compensable 
if there is a causal connection between the injury and the 
condition.

 

[¶10]   Under the second compensable injury 
rule, a worker who has received a compensable injury and received benefits for 
that injury can, regardless of the passage of time, receive more benefits for 
that compensable injury without meeting either of the time limits or increased 
burden of proof found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605 (LexisNexis 2001).  Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 1995).  In order for a second injury to be 
compensable, the original compensable injury must be the direct 
cause of the subsequent injury.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. 
Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 377 n.1 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(Michie 1997) defines a compensable injury as:

 

[A]ny 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.  "Injury" does not 
include:

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(G)       
Any injury resulting primarily from the natural aging process or from the 
normal activities of day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence 
supported by objective findings[.]

 

Any 
injury "aris[es] out of" the employment when a causal connection exists between 
the injury and the conditions under which the work is required to be 
performed.  Bruhn, 951 P.2d  
at 376-77.  An injury is not compensable if it 
cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing cause.  Id. at 377.  In the instant case, a significant 
causal connection does not exist between the appellant's initial injury in 1989 
and discovery of the herniated disc in 1997.  According to the medical evidence, the 
appellant's original injury was not the predominant cause of subsequent disc 
herniation at the L4-L5 level.  This 
resulted primarily from cumulative trauma occurring outside the 
workplace.

 

[¶12]   The appellant concedes that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) makes an exception for normal aging, but 
contends that cumulative trauma "would be anything but normal aging."  Subsection (G) excludes not only 
injuries due primarily to normal aging, but also those due primarily to the 
normal activities of day-to-day living.  
Dr. Nielson described cumulative trauma as "just day to day life" and 
"the work from daily living . . .."

 

[¶13]   This Court has stated that the 
phrase "day-to-day living," as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) 
describes those activities that a worker's employer does not have the right to 
control.  State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Sparks, 973 P.2d 507, 511 (Wyo. 
1999).  Common actions such as getting out of a 
car or bending to pick up a pen are not considered activities of day-to-day 
living when performed in the course of employment.  In re Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Keck, 985 P.2d 430, 433 (Wyo. 1999); 
Sellers v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
979 P.2d 959, 960 (Wyo. 1999).  Recreational activities, performed 
outside the workplace, or household chores are beyond the control of the 
employer and would be characterized as day-to-day living activities.  We conclude that the cumulative trauma 
responsible for the majority of the appellant's injury is attributable to 
day-to-day living, and the appellant does not have a compensable injury pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi).

 

[¶14]   The hearing examiner denied the 
appellant benefits for his herniated disc, and we conclude that there is 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's factual findings.  We agree with the hearing examiner that 
the appellant failed to prove that he was entitled to benefits under the second 
compensable injury rule.  The 
hearing examiner's decision is affirmed.