Title: Commonwealth v. Cappellucci

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13458 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN T. CAPPELLUCCI, JR. 
 
 
April 1, 2024. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Evidence, Blood 
alcohol test.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.  
Consent. 
 
 
 
The defendant, John T. Cappellucci, Jr., was charged with 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of both 
alcohol and drugs causing serious bodily injury (OUI-SBI) 
pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24L.  A judge allowed the defendant's 
motion to suppress the analysis of his blood samples based on 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e) (§ 24 [1] [e]), which conditions the 
admissibility of a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) in a 
prosecution for a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (i.e., 
"simple OUI") on the defendant's consent to conduct the 
analysis.  The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the 
defendant's blood test results are admissible because the 
consent requirement of § 24 (1) (e) applies only to the 
prosecution of simple OUI.  We agree with the Commonwealth and 
therefore reverse.   
 
1.  Facts and prior proceedings.  We summarize the 
undisputed facts from the pleadings.  On December 9, 2021, the 
defendant was involved in a head-on automobile accident in 
Wayland.  The driver of the other car told officers that the 
defendant had veered onto her side of the road causing the 
collision.  The officers noted that the defendant's eyes 
appeared bloodshot and glassy and that he smelled of alcohol.  
The defendant was arrested on the scene, and both he and the 
other driver were transported to the hospital.   
 
2 
 
Although the defendant refused to consent to a test of his 
BAC, law enforcement officers applied for and obtained a search 
warrant for blood samples that had been taken in the ordinary 
course of treatment.  The State police crime laboratory later 
determined that the defendant's BAC was .09 percent1 and that his 
blood tested positive for both fentanyl and tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC). 
 
The defendant was charged with, among other offenses, two 
counts of OUI-SBI, the first under a theory of intoxication by 
alcohol, and the second under a theory of intoxication by drugs.  
See G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2).2  The defendant successfully moved to 
suppress the results of tests performed "at the direction of 
police" on blood samples drawn at the hospital, arguing that he 
did not consent to the analysis.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e).  
The Commonwealth appealed to a single justice of this court, who 
allowed the Commonwealth's application for interlocutory appeal 
to proceed in this court.   
 
2.  Discussion.  This case is governed in all material 
respects by our decision today in a companion case, Commonwealth 
v. Zucchino, 493 Mass.     (2024), where we concluded that the 
clear and unambiguous consent requirement in § 24 (1) (e) 
applies only to prosecutions for violations of simple OUI.3  
Here, because the defendant has not been charged with a 
violation of § 24 (1) (a), the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e) 
does not come into play.  The defendant's BAC test result thus 
is admissible subject to the ordinary rules of evidence.   
 
1 A blood alcohol content of .08 percent or above is over 
the legal limit.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24L (2). 
 
2 General Laws c. 90, § 24L (2), states in pertinent part:   
 
"Whoever . . . operates a motor vehicle with a percentage, 
by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one–
hundredths or greater, or while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, or of marihuana, narcotic drugs, 
depressants or stimulant substances, all as defined in 
[G. L. c. 94C, § 1], . . . and by any such operation causes 
serious bodily injury, shall be punished . . . ."   
 
3 Because we conclude that the consent requirement of 
§ 24 (1) (e) is not applicable to the offenses with which the 
defendant has been charged, we need not address the defendant's 
secondary argument that the provision also requires a 
defendant's consent to test for substances other than alcohol.   
3 
 
 
We reverse the grant of the motion to suppress and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Melissa W. Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney (Daniel 
Bolcun, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
Mark W. Helwig for the defendant.