Title: STACEY SUE EBELING v. WILLIAM OTTO EBELING, JR.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STACEY SUE EBELING v. WILLIAM OTTO EBELING, JR.1989 WY 202782 P.2d 584Case Number: 89-76Decided: 11/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
STACEY SUE EBELING, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

WILLIAM OTTO EBELING, 
JR., APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Clay B. Jenkins 
of Badley & Rasmussen, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

Robert W. 
Connor, Jr., Sheridan, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is a divorce case. 
The wife, not being satisfied with the disposition of property made by the 
district court, raises the following issues:

"I. The district court 
abused its discretion in refusing to divide husband's pension 
plan.

"II. The district court's 
finding that husband's pension plan money was not available until he retired was 
unsupported by the evidence."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     This case went to trial 
in January 1989. The resulting divorce decree awarded the wife primary custody 
of the parties' only child, a son; child support payments; a car; her personal 
property including furniture, dishes, and clothing; and $2,000 cash to be paid 
within one year. Husband received all the real estate he owned prior to the 
marriage; the mortgages on the real property; his personal property; his pension 
and profit sharing plan (hereinafter "pension plan"); and a pickup. Husband was 
also ordered to pay all of the debts of the marriage with the exception of 
wife's attorney fees, and to maintain health insurance coverage for the parties' 
son.

DISCUSSION

[¶4.]     While appellant's brief 
frames two issues, she advances a variety of arguments all related to her 
primary assertion that she should have received a specific share of the pension 
plan awarded to husband. 

[¶5.]     First, she contends 
that she received a disproportionately small share of the financial assets of 
the parties. Appellant presents selected evidence in an attempt to show that 
husband received three times as much property as wife.

[¶6.]     Secondly, appellant 
contends that the actions of counsel "so annoyed the judge, and so taxed his 
patience, that he was unable to listen effectively." She appears to argue that 
this caused the judge to be prejudiced against her in making the property 
division. As support for this contention, she quotes selected statements made by 
the judge during the trial. When the statements are read in context, they do not 
show that the judge lost his ability to "listen effectively." To the contrary, 
they show that the judge was questioning the relevance of what he was listening 
to. The following example is illustrative:

"THE COURT: I don't know 
what you guys are arguing about, I mean, so go on. If it's something that's 
important, you better tell me about it. I don't know.

"MR. JENKINS: It's not 
important, your Honor.

"THE COURT: What's it all 
about?

"MR. CONNOR: Apparently 
he was served with a subpoena. He's here with the information, and Mr. Jenkins 
is trying to make an issue of it.

"THE COURT: Well, I don't 
understand the issue. The issue I'm concerned with is, you know, who should be 
the custodial parent and I could care less about the 
bickering."

These statements 
provide no evidence for a claim of bias or prejudice, and we do not discern any 
bias reflected in the decree itself or the remainder of the 
record.

[¶7.]     Thirdly, appellant 
argues that the court made findings about the pension plan which were contrary 
to the evidence, resulting in an incorrect valuation. In support of this 
argument, appellant offers the following statements by the 
court:

"On the pension, the 
point that counsel for the plaintiff makes is appropriate. It might be a hundred 
percent vested, but he doesn't get it until he retires. I don't know whether it 
then comes in a lump sum or whether it is paid over the period of 
time.

"If you give somebody 
some money now, it should be given on the value of it now.

"Nobody gave me any 
testimony on the values, and I guess I just reach up here and grab it out of the 
air and decide it."

[¶8.]     Appellant contends that 
this constituted a finding by the court that the pension plan money was not 
available to husband until he retired. This argument overlooks the subsequent 
exchange between appellant's counsel and the court:

"MR. JENKINS: Are you 
making a specific finding of fact that the pension and profit benefits are not 
paid until age fifty-eight and a half?

"THE COURT: No, sir. That 
is the evidence based upon the testimony given here. I am making a finding that 
he is entitled to that, and I am giving her two thousand dollars settlement on 
all of that.

"MR. JENKINS: The two 
thousand dollars is settlement for the pension plan?

"THE COURT: No, it is for everything, Counsel. I am 
taking all of this into consideration. The house is not worth, apparently, what 
is owed against it now. That is the way I settled it." (emphasis 
added)

[¶9.]     Appellant's contention 
is incorrect. The court, after considering all of the evidence, decided to award 
the pension plan to the husband. It seems clear enough that the $2000 payment to 
the wife was intended to balance the equities of the whole property division 
between the parties, rather than specifically as compensation for the pension 
plan.

[¶10.]  Finally, appellant asserts that the 
failure to divide the pension plan was an abuse of discretion, citing Broadhead 
v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1987), for the proposition that a pension 
plan is divisible in the event of divorce. Appellant heavily stresses the 
testimony which indicates that husband could have access to the money prior to 
retirement by employing the "simple artifice" of terminating his employment and 
being rehired. She appears to argue that the possibility of husband obtaining 
the money before retirement somehow entitles her to a share of the money upon 
property division.

[¶11.]  Broadhead held that a court which is 
making a property division in a divorce action may take into account the value 
of nonvested retirement benefits. 737 P.2d  at 736. The decision also recognized 
the majority rule that retirement benefits earned during the marriage should be 
considered in the equitable division of the marital property. 737 P.2d  at 737. 
Broadhead does not mandate the division of this property; rather, it identifies 
"property of the parties" which the court may dispose of pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-114. In other words, retirement benefits earned during a marriage are 
property to be considered by the court in determining property disposition, but 
the court is not required to divide that particular 
property.

[¶12.]  The decree itself shows that the court 
considered the pension plan as property of the parties. The record of the trial 
is replete with references which show that the district court was aware of the 
existence of the pension plan, and considered it along with the other property 
when determining the property distribution.

[¶13.]  Custody, child support, insurance, 
division of property and other financial matters must be considered together 
when determining whether a property disposition is just and equitable. Smith v. 
Smith, 704 P.2d 1319 (Wyo. 1985). Property awards must be viewed in 
their entirety and not considered on the basis of each item. Barney v. Barney, 
705 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1985). Little purpose would be served by 
analyzing each asset in an attempt to calculate the precise financial effect of 
the decree. Financial equality is not a prerequisite of a just and equitable 
distribution. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1989). When a 
district court disposes of property under W.S. 20-2-114, it has great discretion 
to determine what is a just and equitable division, and the disposition will not 
be disturbed except on clear grounds. Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 
(Wyo. 1989). 
We have previously recognized that a fair and equitable property division may be 
achieved without division of retirement accounts. Blanchard, 770 P.2d  at 
229-230. Review of the complete record indicates that the actual financial 
impact of the decree is not as disparate as appellant contends but is fair and 
reasonable considering the total disposition of all the claims, property, assets 
and liabilities of the parties.

[¶14.]  We find no basis for the claim of abuse 
of discretion.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.