Title: Jeffers v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GRAYSON JEFFERS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 66, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0411008406 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 3, 2007 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: September 24, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Gregory E. Smith, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
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The defendant-appellant, Grayson Jeffers, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal and Driving 
With a Suspended License.  The jury failed to reach a verdict on the 
additional charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  
Jeffers subsequently was re-tried on the weapons charge and was found 
guilty.  He was sentenced to five years of Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after three years for one year at Level III probation.  This is 
Jeffers’ direct appeal from his conviction and sentence on the weapons 
charge. 
Rule 26(c) Brief 
 
Jeffers’ counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to 
Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that arguably could support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
 
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devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1 
 
Jeffers’ counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Jeffers’ counsel informed Jeffers of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete trial transcript.  Jeffers was also informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Jeffers responded with a brief that 
raises three issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to 
the position taken by Jeffers’ counsel, as well as the issues raised by Jeffers, 
and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
Issues on Appeal 
 
Jeffers raises three issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims 
that:  first, there was no probable cause for the police to arrest him; second, 
the testimony of the police officers was inconsistent; and third, the Superior 
Court erred by imposing a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for 
possession of a firearm.   
                                          
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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Facts 
 
The evidence presented at trial was as follows.  On November 11, 
2004, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Captain James Jubb of the City of 
Wilmington Police Department was conducting a uniformed patrol of South 
Franklin Street in the Hilltop section of Wilmington, Delaware.  The area 
had been identified by the police as a “hot spot” for crime.  As he patrolled 
South Franklin Street, Captain Jubb shined his flashlight in the cars parked 
on the street.  Passing a burgundy, four-door Mercury Grand Marquis, 
Captain Jubb noticed a black, semi-automatic handgun protruding from 
under the front passenger seat.   
 
Captain Jubb radioed the police station and reported the license 
number of the Grand Marquis and arranged for surveillance.  He continued 
to watch the car until he was relieved by Officer Curtis Crawford, a 
plainclothes police officer.  After Officer Crawford had watched the car for 
about fifteen minutes, a white Ford Taurus pulled up.  A tall, African-
American man got out of the Taurus and into the Grand Marquis.   
Communicating with the police station over the radio, Officer Crawford 
learned that the man was Grayson Jeffers and that the Grand Marquis 
belonged to Jeffers’ mother.  He also learned that Jeffers had a suspended 
driver’s license as well as a prior felony conviction that prevented him from 
 
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possessing a firearm.  Officer Crawford requested a marked police car to 
follow Jeffers. 
 
Shortly thereafter, several marked City of Wilmington police cars 
arrived at the scene.  The officers driving the cars followed Jeffers and 
activated their emergency lights while Jeffers was stopped at the intersection 
of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Madison Street.  Jeffers did not pull 
over, but instead proceeded southbound on I-95, where he led police on a 
high-speed chase, with Corporal Faye Lynch in the lead.  Just north of the 
Route 141 exit, Corporal Lynch observed Jeffers slow his car to 
approximately 25-35 miles per hour, move onto the shoulder of the road, and 
accelerate again.  She also observed Jeffers reach down within his car 
several times before he slowed down near the Route 141 exit.  Jeffers finally 
stopped his car approximately a quarter of a mile from where he had slowed 
down.   
 
The police took Jeffers into custody and searched the Grand Marquis.  
When the search yielded no weapon, one of the police cars backed down the 
shoulder of I-95 to the area where Jeffers had slowed down.  There, police 
found a .45 caliber, black, semi-automatic Haskell handgun on the ground.  
The weapon was scratched in several places and the magazine and 
 
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ammunition were found among some weeds on the other side of the 
guardrail.   
 
The record reflects that, following Jeffers’ conviction of the weapon 
charge and in anticipation of sentencing, the Superior Court judge asked 
counsel to file memoranda on the issue of whether the use of the term 
“handgun” in the indictment was sufficient notice to Jeffers that he was 
being charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, thus triggering the 
sentencing provisions of Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448(e)(2).2  In its 
November 3, 2006 memorandum opinion, the Superior Court reasoned that, 
in accordance with the definitions contained in Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222, 
the definition of “deadly weapon” includes “firearm,” and the definition of 
“firearm” includes handguns, which are weapons from which shots are 
discharged.  The Superior Court concluded that the indictment provided 
notice to Jeffers that he was being charged with unlawful possession of a 
firearm and that he was, therefore, subject to an enhanced three-year 
minimum mandatory sentence.   
                                          
 
2 The statute provides for enhanced sentencing of three years of Level V incarceration if 
the prohibited person possesses a firearm within ten years of the date of conviction for a 
violent felony or the date of termination of all periods of incarceration pursuant to that 
conviction.  Jeffers did not dispute his prior October 1997 felony conviction. 
 
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Probable Cause Established 
 
Jeffers’ first claim is that the police lacked probable cause to arrest 
him.  An arrest without a warrant is lawful under Delaware law where the 
police officer “ . . . has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be 
arrested has committed a felony . . . .”3  The evidence at trial was that (1) 
Captain Jubb observed a gun in the Grand Marquis, (2) Officer Crawford 
learned through radio contact with the police station that Jeffers was the 
driver of the car and (3) Jeffers had a prior felony conviction that prevented 
him from possessing a firearm.  Thus, the police had reasonable ground to 
believe that Jeffers had committed the felony of Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon by a Person Prohibited.  As such, we conclude that Jeffers’ first 
claim is without merit. 
Jury Determines Credibility 
 
Jeffers’ second claim is that he should not have been convicted on the 
basis of the police officers’ inconsistent testimony.  Inconsistencies in 
testimony go to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility.4  “The 
jury is the sole judge of a witness’ credibility and is responsible for resolving 
[any] conflicts in the testimony.”5  In fulfilling its duty, the jury must 
                                          
 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1904(b)(1). 
4 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Del. 1997). 
5 Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982). 
 
8
consider all of the evidence, but is free to accept part of a witness’ testimony 
while rejecting other parts.6  Because there is no suggestion in the record 
that the jury failed to properly perform its function of weighing the evidence 
at Jeffers’ trial, we conclude that Jeffers’ second claim is without merit. 
Indictment Properly Amended 
 
Jeffers’ third claim is that he should not have been sentenced for 
possession of a firearm when the indictment referred only to “a handgun, a 
deadly weapon.”  We agree with the Superior Court’s reasoning in its 
November 3, 2006 memorandum opinion that, under the definitions of Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222, the indictment, which referred to a “handgun,” 
provided notice to Jeffers that he was being charged with unlawful 
possession of a firearm and that he was, therefore, subject to an enhanced 
three-year minimum sentence under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448(e)(2).  
We, therefore, conclude that Jeffers’ third claim is without merit. 
Conclusion 
 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Jeffers’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Jeffers’ counsel has made a 
                                          
 
6 Id. 
 
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conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Jeffers’ could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
The State’s motion to affirm is granted.  The judgment of the Superior 
Court is affirmed.  The motion to withdraw is moot.