Title: Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1112 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Ben Poston and Gina 
Marie Barton, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee, City of Milwaukee Police 
Department and Edward A. Flynn, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Cooper 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
PROSSER, ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, J.J., join 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) filed by Robert J. Dreps and Godfrey & Kahn, 
Madison, and oral argument by Robert J. Dreps. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) filed by Grant F. Langley, city attorney, 
Milwaukee and Melanie R. Swank, assistant city attorney, 
Milwaukee with oral argument by Melanie R. Swank. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities for League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carrie Benedon, 
assistant attorney general for Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, 
and the cause was argued by Carrie Benedon.
 
 
2012 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1112 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV15395) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Ben Poston and Gina 
Marie Barton, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, City of Milwaukee Police 
Department and Edward A. Flynn, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL of an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Thomas R. Cooper, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   Once again this court is 
asked to interpret the Wisconsin Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-.39 (2009-10).1  The issue presented is whether an 
authority2 may impose a fee on a requester of a public record for 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The word "authority" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1) 
as follows: 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
2 
 
the actual, necessary, and direct costs incurred by the 
authority (including staff time) of deleting nondisclosable 
information included within the responsive records.3  We conclude 
that it may not.4   
¶2 
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and reporters Ben 
Poston and Gina Marie Barton (collectively referred to as the 
Newspaper) seek review of an order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Thomas R. Cooper, Judge, granting the summary 
judgment motion of the defendants, the City of Milwaukee, the 
City of Milwaukee Police Department, and Milwaukee Chief of 
Police Edward A. Flynn (collectively referred to as the City).   
                                                                                                                                                             
"Authority" means any of the following having custody 
of a record: a state or local office, elected 
official, 
agency, 
board, 
commission, 
committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and 
politic created by constitution, law, ordinance, rule 
or 
order; 
a 
governmental 
or 
quasi-governmental 
corporation except for the Bradley center sports and 
entertainment corporation; a local exposition district 
under subch. II of ch. 229; a long-term care district 
under s. 46.2895; any court of law; the assembly or 
senate; a nonprofit corporation which receives more 
than 50% of its funds from a county or a municipality, 
as defined in s. 59.001(3), and which provides 
services related to public health or safety to the 
county or municipality; or a formally constituted 
subunit of any of the foregoing.  
3 We 
use 
the 
words 
"deleting" 
and 
"redacting" 
interchangeably.  
4 All Justices agree to reverse the order of the circuit 
court and remand the cause to the circuit court, but Justices 
Prosser, Roggensack, Ziegler, and Gableman do not join this 
opinion.  Justice Roggensack's concurring opinion is the 
majority opinion on the policy issue. 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The circuit court concluded that the City was entitled 
to charge the Newspaper for "the actual costs of staff time to 
review and redact confidential information included within the 
responsive records."5  This court took the appeal on the 
Newspaper's petition to bypass the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.60.  
¶4 
Wisconsin's commitment to open, transparent government 
rings loud and clear in the Public Records Law.  The Law 
reaffirms that the people have not only the opportunity but also 
the right to know what the government is doing and to monitor 
the government.  The legislature has explicitly provided that 
"all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information 
regarding the affairs of government"; mandated that the Public 
Records Law "be construed in every instance with a presumption 
of complete public access"; and declared that the "denial of 
public access generally is contrary to public interest, and only 
in an exceptional case may access be denied."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31.  In its entirety, the legislative "Declaration of 
Policy" in the Public Records Law reads as follows: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
                                                 
5 With regard to another issue raised below, the circuit 
court wrote the following:  "The Court declines to rule on the 
issue of what a reasonable time for compliance with the two 
public records requests at issue would be in this case. The 
Defendants may estimate a reasonable amount of time required to 
respond to the requests, but may not limit in advance the amount 
of time they will spend per week on these requests."  We are not 
asked to review this issue and it is not before the court.  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
4 
 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business.  The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied.6   
¶5 
This case is not about a direct denial of public 
access to records, but the issue in the present case directly 
implicates the accessibility of government records.  The greater 
the fee imposed on a requester of a public record, the less 
likely the requester will be willing and able to successfully 
make a record request.  Thus, the imposition of fees limits and 
may even serve to deny access to government records.  In 
interpreting the Public Records Law, we must be cognizant that 
the legislature's preference is for "complete public access" and 
that the imposition of costs, as a practical matter, inhibits 
access.  
¶6 
Interpreting the Public Records Law in light of the 
text of the particular provision at issue and the Declaration of 
Policy, as well as in light of prior interpretations of the Law 
by the Attorney General and appellate courts, we conclude that 
the City may not charge the Newspaper for the costs, including 
staff time, of redacting information.  Such costs do not fit 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
5 
 
within the fees set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(a)-(d).  
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for judgment to be entered 
in favor of the Newspaper.  
I 
¶7 
The facts of this case are not in dispute and revolve 
around public records requests of Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
reporters Ben Poston and Gina Marie Barton seeking records from 
the Milwaukee Police Department.  
¶8 
Reporter 
Poston 
requested 
computer-aided 
dispatch 
records and any related incident reports for fourteen crime 
categories for a two-week period in March 2010.  The City 
identified 2,312 dispatch records and 743 incident reports that 
were responsive to Poston's request.  The City asked that the 
Newspaper pay $2,081.80 in advance for locating and copying 
these records. 
¶9 
After discussing the matter with police officials, 
reporter Poston withdrew his request for the incident reports, 
and the City agreed to produce a CD containing a summary of each 
dispatch record that was responsive to Poston's request.  The 
City charged $10.00 for the CD and $100.30 for the time 
necessary to locate the records.  The Newspaper paid these 
charges, and they are not at issue in the present case. 
¶10 Reporter Poston then requested 100 incident reports, 
which the City provided without charge.     
¶11 Reporter Poston then requested an additional 100 
incident reports.  This time the City responded that it would 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
6 
 
charge the Newspaper for the City's "actual costs of complying 
with" the request.  To prepare the incident reports for 
inspection, 
City 
employees 
were 
required 
to 
delete 
nondisclosable information, such as Social Security numbers, 
financial 
account 
numbers, 
and 
crime 
victim 
and 
suspect 
identifying information.  City employees examined the printed 
records and redacted sensitive information by marking over the 
information with a black pen.  The City asked for prepayment of 
$601.80 based on the fact that it spent 15 staff hours at $40.12 
per hour to prepare the initial 100 incident reports.  
¶12 Reporter Barton requested dispatch records and related 
incident reports for all sexual assaults during the 2009 
calendar year.  In response, reporter Barton received a 
spreadsheet summarizing dispatch records in the same format as 
that received by reporter Poston.   
¶13 Reporter Barton then narrowed her request to include 
only the incident summary from each report.  The City requested 
advance payment of $3,516.75, including $126.75 for copying and 
$3,390 for staff time spent reviewing and redacting the records. 
¶14 The Newspaper refused to pay the requested charges.  
Instead it commenced action against the City seeking judgment 
compelling the City to release the records without prepayment of 
any fees assessed for redacting information.  The Newspaper 
agreed, for purposes of the summary judgment, that the City's 
estimates of the time required to review and redact the 
requested records were made in good faith and were not intended 
to generate a profit.   
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
7 
 
¶15 As noted above, the circuit court granted summary 
judgment to the City on the issue of the fees for redaction, 
authorizing the City to charge the Newspaper "for all actual, 
necessary and direct costs incurred by [the City] in complying 
with the two public records requests at issue; including the 
actual costs of staff time to review and redact confidential 
information included within the responsive records."  
¶16 The Newspaper petitioned to bypass the court of 
appeals, and this court granted the petition. 
II 
 
¶17 This case calls for the court to interpret and apply 
the Public Records Law to undisputed facts.  The interpretation 
and application of a statute to undisputed facts presents a 
question of law that this court determines independently but 
benefitting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.7 
 
¶18 The 
court 
has 
examined 
numerous 
sources 
in 
interpreting and applying the Public Records Law, including the 
text and context of the relevant provisions, the legislature's 
Declaration of Policy, and interpretations of the relevant 
statutory provisions by the Attorney General and prior cases.8  
III 
A 
                                                 
7 Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶19, 327 
Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.). 
8 See id., ¶21 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.).  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
8 
 
 
¶19 We first examine the text of the Public Records Law.  
The Law mandates the release of certain records.9  There is no 
dispute that the records requested fall within the statutory 
definition of a record to be released.  That a record custodian 
must review each record to determine whether to release the 
record is a basic, routine task of the custodian under the Law.10   
¶20 The Law requires the deletion of information not 
subject to disclosure.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(6) states that 
"[i]f 
a 
record 
contains 
information 
that 
is 
subject 
to 
disclosure . . . and 
information 
that 
is 
not 
subject 
to . . . disclosure, 
the 
authority . . . shall 
provide 
the 
information that is subject to disclosure and delete the 
information that is not subject to disclosure from the record 
before release."  The parties do not dispute that the deletions 
were necessary in the present case. 
 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(6) demonstrates that when it 
enacted the Public Records Law in 1981, the legislature was well 
aware that some requests would require an authority to delete 
information.  The requests in the present case required the City 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), (am). 
10 An informal opinion of the Attorney General states: 
"Setting redaction itself aside for a moment, reviewing records 
to determine whether or not redaction is even necessary is 
clearly within the scope of an authority's general duties to 
apply the public records law. . . . To charge requesters for the 
mere review of records is therefore tantamount to charging them 
for the cost of applying the law in its most general sense.  I 
think that is unreasonable as a general matter."  Letter from 
Wis. Ass't Att'y Gen. Lewis W. Beilin to Jim Zellmer (Feb. 4, 
2010). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
9 
 
to do exactly what the legislature envisioned in 1981, namely, 
to manually delete pieces of information from a record using a 
pen.  The City cannot claim that the legislature did not 
contemplate the need for an authority to devote time and 
resources to this task.  Nonetheless, the question at the heart 
of this case remains:  May the City pass these costs on to the 
requester?   
 
¶22 Nothing in the Public Records Law specifically states 
that a record custodian may charge for the actual, necessary, 
and direct costs of deleting information from a responsive 
record.  The City does not dispute this proposition.  Rather, 
the City argues that the Law can be interpreted to allow it to 
impose a fee on a requester for such costs.   
¶23 The Public Records Law details the tasks for which an 
authority may impose fees on a requester.  The legislature 
included four tasks: reproduction and transcription of the 
record; photographing and photographic processing; locating a 
record; and mailing or shipping of any copy or photograph of a 
record.      
¶24 The Law empowers an authority to impose a fee that 
does not exceed the "actual, necessary and direct" cost of 
performing the enumerated tasks.   
¶25 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3) provides as 
follows: 
(3) Fees. (a) An authority may impose a fee upon the 
requester of a copy of a record which may not exceed 
the actual, necessary and direct cost of reproduction 
and transcription of the record, unless a fee is 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
10 
 
otherwise specifically established or authorized to be 
established by law. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided by law or as 
authorized to be prescribed by law an authority may 
impose a fee upon the requester of a copy of a record 
that does not exceed the actual, necessary and direct 
cost of photographing and photographic processing if 
the authority provides a photograph of a record, the 
form of which does not permit copying. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided by law or as 
authorized to be prescribed by law, an authority may 
impose a fee upon a requester for locating a record, 
not exceeding the actual, necessary and direct cost of 
location, if the cost is $50 or more. 
(d) An authority may impose a fee upon a requester for 
the actual, necessary and direct cost of mailing or 
shipping of any copy or photograph of a record which 
is mailed or shipped to the requester.11 
 
¶26 Deleting 
information 
does 
not 
fit 
neatly 
into 
"reproduction 
and 
transcription," 
"photographing 
and 
photographic processing," "locating," or "mailing or shipping."  
The City contends that redacting is included in the statutory 
provisions governing "locating" and "reproduction."  The City 
argues that until a record is in a form that is properly 
disclosable, it has not truly been "located" or "reproduced."   
¶27 We reject the City's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(3).  It does not square with the text of the Public 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3) (emphasis added).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 19.35 also contains a provision allowing an authority to forgo 
or reduce fees if it is in the public interest, a provision 
allowing an authority to require prepayment if fees will exceed 
five dollars, and a provision governing allowable fees when the 
record is "produced or collected by a person who is not an 
authority pursuant to a contract entered into by that person 
with an authority . . . ."  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(e), (f), 
(g). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
11 
 
Records Law or with the legislature's Declaration of Policy in 
the Law. 
 
¶28 The Public Records Law does not define "locating" or 
"reproduction."  These words are not technical or specialized 
words.  "Locating" and "reproduction" are words with commonly 
understood meanings that should be used in interpreting and 
applying the Law.12 
 
¶29 The court often refers to the dictionary to interpret 
a statute.  A standard dictionary definition of "locate" is "to 
find by searching, examining, or experimenting."13  We agree with 
the League of Wisconsin Municipalities (which filed a non-party 
brief) that "[a] custodian who knows that a record is located 
somewhere in a large file cabinet downstairs has not 'located' 
the record."  However, we disagree with the League that "[a] 
record is not truly 'located' until it exists in a releasable 
form."  Once the custodian goes to the file cabinet (or the 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(1) provides as follows: 
990.01 Construction of laws; words and phrases.  In 
the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and 
phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated 
unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature:  
(1) General Rule.  All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage; but 
technical words and phrases and others that have a 
peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed 
according to such meaning.     
13 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1055 (3d ed. 1992). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
12 
 
computer file), removes the responsive record, and holds that 
responsive record in his or her hands (or views it on a computer 
screen), the record has been located. 
 
¶30 It is certainly true that the custodian has not 
completed its obligations under the Law once the record is 
located.  The record still needs to be reviewed in order to 
determine whether it contains information that cannot be 
disclosed.  But under an ordinary understanding of the word 
"locate," the process of reviewing and deleting parts of a 
record has nothing to do with "locating" the record.  Reviewing 
a record and deleting parts of a record are separate processes 
that begin after the record has been located. 
¶31 Moving on to the statutory provision allowing the 
imposition of a fee for the costs of "reproduction," a standard 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
"reproduction" 
is 
"the 
act 
of 
reproducing or the condition or process of being reproduced"; 
"reproduce," in turn, is defined as "to produce a counterpart, 
an image, or a copy of."14  Inherent in this definition is the 
notion that the document or record is not altered, but simply 
copied.  We read "reproduction" in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(a) to 
refer to rote, ministerial tasks that do not change the content 
of the record.  Examples of "reproduction" under the Law might 
occur when a custodian prints out a copy of a record that is 
stored electronically, or makes a photocopy of a record that is 
stored in hard copy. 
                                                 
14 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1532 (3d ed. 1992). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
13 
 
¶32 The process of redacting information from records does 
not fit within the meaning of "reproduction."  Redaction is a 
process that alters the record.  Reproduction, in contrast, is a 
process 
that 
copies 
the 
record 
to 
produce 
an 
unchanged 
counterpart.  
¶33 The 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(3) 
is 
not 
particularly complex.  The legislature provided four tasks for 
which an authority may impose fees on a requester: "reproduction 
and transcription," "photographing and photographic processing," 
"locating," and "mailing or shipping."  For each task, an 
authority is permitted to impose a fee that does not exceed the 
"actual, necessary and direct" cost of the task.  The process of 
redacting information from a record does not fit into any of the 
four statutory tasks.   
¶34 Technological advances of the past three decades have 
dramatically altered the ways in which the government creates 
and stores records, but as the Department of Justice explains in 
its non-party brief, the present case calls for the City to do 
exactly the type of redacting that the legislature likely 
envisioned when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), namely, to use 
a pen or some other rudimentary method to delete portions of the 
requested record before releasing it to the requester.  If the 
legislature contemplated the very process of deletion to be used 
in the present case and did not explicitly impose costs for 
deletion, the statutory text cannot be read to authorize the 
imposition of a fee for the costs of the deletions.   
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
14 
 
¶35 The Law allows an authority to impose fees for four 
specific tasks.  That the legislature listed four tasks for 
which fees may be imposed demonstrates that the legislature 
considered the imposition of fees and knew how to authorize 
particular types of fees.  The statutory text does not allow the 
imposition of a broad array of fees for any and every cost 
incurred by an authority. 
¶36 If the legislature had wanted to allow an authority to 
impose fees for a broad range of tasks, or if it had wanted to 
include the task of redaction as a task for which fees may be 
imposed, it would have said so.  It did not.  The most 
reasonable way to interpret the Law is to say that the 
legislature intended an authority to impose fees only for the 
tasks specified in the Law.  As the court is fond of saying in 
statutory interpretation cases, if the legislature had intended 
to accomplish what a party is urging on the court (like allowing 
an authority to impose fees for redacting records), the 
legislature knew how to draft that language and could have done 
so had it wished.15 
¶37 The 
legislature 
did 
not 
specifically 
allow 
an 
authority to impose fees for the costs of redacting information 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, 
¶76 
n.2, 
325 
Wis. 2d 135, 
785 
N.W.2d 302 
(Gableman, 
J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If the legislature 
wanted to allow only express waiver under § 421.401(2), it could 
have said so.");  In re Torrance P., Jr., 2006 WI 129, ¶44, 298 
Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623 ("If the legislature wanted the right 
to counsel to be contingent upon a parent's appearance in 
person, it could have expressly stated so."). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
15 
 
from a record, and this court must respect the text.  It goes 
without saying, of course, that the legislature may amend the 
fee provisions.  Policy decisions are left to the legislature. 
B 
¶38 It would require an unnatural reading of the statutory 
text to include the costs of redaction in one of the categories 
listed in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3).  Courts occasionally will 
entertain a somewhat unnatural or creative reading of a 
statutory text if such an interpretation is necessary to further 
a statute's purpose or is necessary to prevent an absurd result 
that the legislature could not have intended.  The instant case 
decidedly does not present either of those situations. 
¶39 As we have stressed, the purpose of the Public Records 
Law, as explicitly stated in the Declaration of Policy, is to 
provide the people of Wisconsin with "the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31.  The legislature explicitly instructed the courts that 
the Public Records Law "shall be construed in every instance 
with a presumption of complete public access."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31.    
¶40 We interpret the text of the Public Records Law in 
light of the Declaration of Policy, which is to foster 
transparent government.  In the present case, the interpretation 
prohibiting the imposition of fees for deletions is the more 
natural interpretation of the text and also comports with the 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
16 
 
public policy favoring public access to records.16  Increasing 
the costs of public records requests for a requester may inhibit 
access to public records and, in some instances, render the 
records inaccessible.  
C 
¶41 Beyond the text and policy of the Public Records Law, 
our interpretation of the statute is also informed by the 
interpretations of the Attorney General17 and appellate courts.  
The opinions and writings of the Attorney General have special 
significance in interpreting the Public Records Law, inasmuch as 
the legislature has specifically authorized the Attorney General 
                                                 
16 Examining other state laws about imposition of fees is of 
limited assistance in interpreting the Public Record Law.  Other 
states' statutes are drafted differently than the Public Records 
Law. 
Some states' legislatures explicitly allow an authority to 
charge a fee for redacting.  See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. tit. I, 
§ 408(3)(B) (2011) (allowing fees for compiling the record and 
defining "compiling" to "include[] reviewing and redacting 
confidential 
information"); 
Or. 
Rev. 
Stat. 
§ 192.440(4)(b) 
(2010) 
(allowing 
fees 
for 
"the 
cost 
of 
time 
spent . . . reviewing the public records, redacting material 
from the public records or segregating the public records into 
exempt and non-exempt records"). 
The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted a statute silent about 
charging the requester for the costs of redacting records as 
imposing costs on the requester.  See Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, 
109 P.3d 1226 (Kan. 2005).  The Georgia Supreme Court also ruled 
that a record custodian may charge the requester for the costs 
of redaction of certain records.  See Griffin-Spalding Cnty. 
Hosp. Auth. v. Radio Station WKEU, 241 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1978).   
17 Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶105 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead 
op.).  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
17 
 
to advise any person about the applicability of the Law.18  The 
opinions of the Attorney General are not binding on the courts 
but may be given persuasive effect.19     
¶42 Shortly after the Public Records Law was enacted in 
1981, the Attorney General issued an opinion addressing the 
question the court faces today.  The Attorney General quoted the 
entirety of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), which requires the authority 
to delete nondisclosable information, and then stated, "Since 
there is no provision made therein or elsewhere in the law for 
charging such separation costs to the person who requests access 
to the record, the agency must bear such costs."20 
¶43 While it is unwise to make too much of legislative 
inaction, it is noteworthy that the legislature has not added an 
additional task for which fees may be imposed in the nearly 30 
years since the Attorney General explicitly and unequivocally 
concluded that requesters may not be charged for the costs of 
                                                 
18 See Wis. Stat. § 19.39 ("Any person may request advice 
from the attorney general as to the applicability of this 
subchapter under any circumstances. The attorney general may 
respond to such a request."); Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶106 
(Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.). 
19 State v. C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d 137, 140, 434 N.W.2d 800 
(Ct. App. 1988) (citing State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 380, 
340 N.W.2d 511, 516 (1983)). 
20 72 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 99, 101 (1983) (OAG 28-83).  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
18 
 
deleting parts of records.21  The legislature has revisited the 
Public Records Law on several occasions since it was enacted, 
and it is at least arguable that it has endorsed the Attorney 
General's interpretation by not amending the fees provisions to 
include the costs associated with the task of deleting parts of 
records. 
¶44 We now reach the same conclusion the Attorney General 
reached in 1983 based on the text and purpose of the Law.  We 
must acknowledge, however, that bits and pieces of language from 
two of our cases interpreting other provisions of the Public 
Records Law have evidently caused some uncertainty regarding the 
                                                 
21 Some of our prior cases have relied on perceived 
legislative acquiescence.  See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶56, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 
("[W]e conclude that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is 
applicable here. While the doctrine is not an immutable rule, it 
is particularly relevant here because both the majority opinion 
and the dissent in Hayne invited the legislature to amend 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. if it disagreed with our interpretation of 
the statute.").   
Other cases have expressed skepticism about the meaning of 
legislative inaction.  See, e.g., Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 
103, 
¶32, 
274 
Wis. 2d 220, 
682 
N.W.2d 405 
("Legislative 
acquiescence is a familiar argument in statutory construction 
cases.  Yet, as a principle, it is subsidiary to a more 
important principle——that the goal of statutory interpretation 
is to ascertain and give effect to the statute's intended 
purpose. . . . [T]he 
'legislative 
acquiescence' 
argument 
is 
often vulnerable to rebuttal." (Citations omitted.)).  See also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
Mich. L. Rev. 67 (1988) (exploring the potential relevance and 
meaning of legislative inaction). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
19 
 
permissibility of imposing fees for deleting parts of records.22  
We take this opportunity to clarify that neither of the cases in 
question intended to expand or did expand the scope of allowable 
fees beyond those provided in the statute. 
¶45 The first case is Osborn v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System, 2002 WI 83, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 
N.W.2d 158.  The issue of whether an authority could impose a 
fee for the costs of deletion of parts of records was not before 
the court in Osborn.  Rather, the court decided whether the 
authority (the University of Wisconsin) had a duty to delete 
parts of records.  After concluding that the University was 
required to delete information and rejecting the University's 
argument that it should be relieved of its duty to delete parts 
of records because deletions were burdensome, the court made the 
following observation regarding allowable fees: 
In addition, we note that under the open records law, 
the University is not required, by itself, to bear the 
cost of producing documents in response to Osborn's 
request.  Under § 19.35(3), the University may impose 
a fee on Osborn for the location, reproduction or 
photographic processing of the requested records, but 
the fee may not exceed the actual, necessary and 
                                                 
22 See Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Wisconsin 
Public Records 
Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39, Compliance 
Outline 51 (Aug. 2010) ("It has been the position of recent 
Attorneys General that costs of separating, or 'redacting,' the 
confidential parts of records from the public parts generally 
must be borne by the authority.  A recent supreme court case has 
been relied upon by some authorities as permission to charge 
these costs to the requester." (Citations omitted.)).  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
20 
 
direct cost of complying with the open records 
requests.23 
 
¶46 A close reading of this language from Osborn reveals 
that the court did not allow the University to impose any and 
all fees.  Nor did the Osborn court explicitly allow fees for 
redacting.  Rather, the court intended to allow fees only as 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3).  The court cited the Law and 
expressly referred to three of the four tasks for which fees may 
be imposed under the Law.   
 
¶47 The City, however, focuses on a single sentence from 
Osborn in isolation rather than in the context of the opinion's 
full discussion of fees.  The sentence states, "We also note 
that the University is entitled to charge a fee for the actual, 
necessary, and direct cost of complying with these open record 
requests."24  The sentence read in a vacuum might be read to 
allow the authority to charge fees for all "actual, necessary, 
and direct" costs of complying with a public records request.  
However, viewing the sentence in context, we conclude that 
Osborn should not be read to allow any fees that are not 
expressly allowed under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3).  The Osborn court 
did not expand the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3) and the circuit 
court erred in holding otherwise. 
                                                 
23 Osborn v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2002 
WI 83, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 N.W.2d 158. 
24 See id., ¶¶3, 48. 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
21 
 
 
¶48 An informal Attorney General Opinion issued after 
Osborn agrees with our conclusion today.  The assistant attorney 
General opined as follows: 
While Osborn may afford the basis for a claim that 
redaction costs may be included as part of the actual, 
necessary and direct costs of complying with a public 
records request, the decision does not explicitly 
state as much. Moreover, the statute upon which the 
decision rests does not provide for recovery of such 
costs. In the absence of such specific authorization, 
and in light of the broad presumption under state law 
of open access to public records, I conclude that 
charging 
for 
the 
cost 
of 
redaction 
would 
be 
inappropriate.25 
                                                 
25 See 
Letter 
from Wis. Deputy Att'y Gen. Peggy A. 
Lautenschlager to Bill Lueders (June 1, 2004). 
In a later informal Attorney General Opinion to Jim Zellmer 
(Feb. 4, 2010), the Attorney General, referring to a misreading 
of Osborn and WIREdata, Inc. v. Village of Sussex, 2008 WI 69, 
310 Wis. 2d 397, 751 N.W.2d 736, opined the following about 
imposing a fee for redaction: 
There is somewhat conflicting authority on whether an 
authority may pass along to requesters the costs of 
redacting 
confidential 
parts 
of 
records 
from 
accessible parts. . . . The Attorney General's Office 
has opined that redaction costs generally must be 
borne by the authority.  See 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 99 
(1983).  However, the supreme court's Osborn decision 
has been relied on by some authorities as permission 
to charge these costs to requesters. 
For a similar statement, see Dep't of Justice, Office of 
the Att'y Gen., Wisconsin Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-19.39, Compliance Outline 51 (Aug. 2010). 
In another informal Attorney General Opinion, an assistant 
attorney general acknowledged that "[o]pinion is divided whether 
an authority may pass along to requesters the cost of redacting 
confidential parts of records from accessible parts."  Letter 
from Wis. Ass't Att'y Gen. Lewis W. Beilin to Eric Marcus (June 
22, 2011).   
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
22 
 
¶49 The second case is WIREdata, Inc. v. Village of 
Sussex, 2008 WI 69, 310 Wis. 2d 397, 751 N.W.2d 736.  Again, the 
issue of imposing a fee for the cost of deleting parts of the 
records was not before the court.  The WIREdata court stated 
that "[a]n authority may not make a profit, but an authority may 
recoup all of its actual costs."26  The WIREdata court also 
explained that "nothing in this opinion should be viewed as 
changing or modifying our prior case law that an authority may 
charge fees only as provided under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(a), 
fees that reflect the actual, necessary, and direct costs of 
providing the information."27  
¶50 We read WIREdata as allowing an authority to impose 
fees only in accordance with the tasks detailed in the Public 
Records Law.  Like Osborn, WIREdata should not be read to allow 
an authority to impose fees more freely than the Public Records 
Law allows.  Were we to read WIREdata to allow an authority to 
recover all of its actual costs in releasing records, the 
opinion would conflict with the Public Records Law, which 
provides only four tasks for which fees may be imposed, not a 
guarantee that all expenses incurred by an authority may be 
                                                 
26 WIREdata, 310 Wis. 2d 397, ¶107. 
27 Id.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(3)(a) is not the only 
provision that provides allowable fees.  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(3)(b), (c), (d). 
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
23 
 
recovered from the record requester.28  If the legislature had 
intended to allow an authority to recoup all of its actual 
costs, it could have simply said so rather than delineate four 
specific tasks for which fees may be imposed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(3).  We do not read Osborn or WIREdata to conflict with 
or alter the Law's provisions governing fees.  
¶51 The City makes a legislative acquiescence argument 
that we do not find persuasive.  The City argues that Osborn and 
WIREdata clearly held that an authority may recover all the 
actual costs of complying with a public records request, and 
that the legislature has implicitly approved such a statement of 
law because it has not amended the fee provisions of the Public 
Records Law in the 10 years since Osborn.  Our problem with the 
City's argument is twofold.   
¶52 First, as we have explained, Osborn and WIREdata did 
not clearly hold what the City claims they did.  Despite some 
                                                 
28 The present case does not call for us to examine 
WIREdata's statement that an authority may charge a fee for 
"computer programming expenses or any other related expenses."  
WIREdata, 310 Wis. 2d 397, ¶107.  We note, however, that certain 
computer programming expenses may fall within "locating" or 
"reproduction," which are allowable categories of fees.  See 72 
Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 68 (1983) (OAG 19-83).  The present case 
also does not call for us to address the attorney general's 
contention that, "in extreme cases," it may become difficult to 
"distinguish[] between redacting discrete items of confidential 
information from a larger document, and the practical necessity 
of actually creating or compiling a new record from a mass of 
collected data."  See Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y 
Gen., Wisconsin Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39, 
Compliance Outline 51 (Aug. 2010).  The City does not contend 
that the required redactions in the present case constituted the 
creation of a new record.  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
24 
 
language taken out of context, Osborn and WIREdata stand for the 
proposition that the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(a) is to be 
read as it is written.  The legislature's failure to act is not, 
as we stated before, a strong indication of the legislature's 
intent, but it is particularly weak when the cases to which the 
legislature purportedly acquiesced do not unambiguously state 
what the City urges.  
¶53 Second, if legislative acquiescence arguments are to 
carry the day in the present case, the City has no explanation 
for the legislature's long-standing acquiescence to the Attorney 
General Opinion issued in 1983 that unequivocally stated that an 
authority may not impose a fee for redacting expenses.29  
Nineteen years passed between the Attorney General Opinion and 
this court's Osborn opinion in which the legislature could have 
acted to allow authorities to recover redacting expenses, yet it 
never expanded the fee provisions.   
¶54 We make clear that Osborn and WIREdata should not be 
read broadly to allow an authority to impose fees for all 
"actual, necessary and direct" costs of complying with any 
public records request.30  The legislature carefully provided 
that an authority may charge a fee not exceeding the actual, 
necessary, and direct costs of four specific tasks: (1) 
                                                 
29 See supra ¶43.  
30 Taken to its logical conclusion, such a broad holding 
would allow an authority to charge a fee for the time an 
attorney spent reviewing a public records request to determine 
how the authority should respond.  No party contends that 
allowable fees should extend to this staff time.  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
25 
 
"reproduction 
and 
transcription"; 
(2) 
"photographing 
and 
photographic processing"; (3) "locating"; and (4) "mailing or 
shipping."  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(a)-(d).   
¶55 The 
time 
spent 
redacting 
information 
from 
the 
requested records does not fit into these four statutory tasks.  
We decline to expand the range of tasks for which fees may be 
imposed.  To do so would be in direct contravention of the text 
of the Law and our legislatively imposed duty to construe the 
Public Records Law "with a presumption of complete public 
access."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.   
 
¶56 We conclude by noting that the legislature has 
protected the interests of authorities along with its strong 
preference for public access.  For one, as we have stressed 
throughout this opinion, an authority is entitled to charge fees 
for the specific tasks set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35, which 
relieves an authority of some of the financial burden of 
complying with public records requests.  Also, for example, an 
authority may reject "a request for a record without a 
reasonable limitation as to subject matter or length of time."  
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(h).  Moreover, the Law affords authorities 
"reasonable latitude in the time frame for their responses."31  
Charging the requester for redacting expenses, however, is not 
permitted.     
* * * * 
                                                 
31 WIREdata, 310 Wis. 2d 397, ¶56.  See also Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(4)(a) 
(requiring authorities to respond to public 
records requests "as soon as practicable").  
No. 
2011AP1112   
 
26 
 
¶57 The policy animating the Public Records Law is that 
"all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information 
regarding the affairs of government."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  The 
legislature has instructed that the Public Records Law "be 
construed in every instance with a presumption of complete 
public access."  Wis. Stat. § 19.31. 
¶58 Interpreting the Public Records Law in light of the  
text of the particular provisions at issue and the Declaration 
of Policy, as well as in light of prior interpretations of the 
Law by the Attorney General and appellate courts, we conclude 
that the City may not charge the Newspaper for the costs, 
including staff time, of redacting information.  Such costs do 
not fit within the fees set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(a)-
(d).  Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for judgment to be entered 
in favor of the Newspaper.  
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.  
No.  2011AP1112.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶59 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
In 
all 
likelihood, the lead opinion reaches the correct result.  It 
strictly adheres to the terms of the statute and shows that this 
construction follows a consistent pattern of interpretation 
since the early 1980s. 
¶60 Nonetheless, 
I 
am 
joining 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence because it graphically illustrates the potential 
downside of this decision and the need for the legislature to 
reexamine the law. 
¶61 The lead opinion asserts that, "The law allows an 
authority to impose fees for four specific tasks."  Lead op., 
¶35.  "The statutory text does not allow the imposition of a 
broad array of fees for any and every cost incurred by an 
authority."  Id.   
¶62 The plain implication of this ruling is that an 
authority may not charge a fee for an unenumerated "task," no 
matter how costly that task may be.  As a result, shrewd 
requesters will be able to use government resources to obtain 
valuable information at little or no cost so long as they are 
able to minimize or avoid the "four specific tasks."  Cf. 
WIREdata, 
Inc. 
v. 
Village 
of 
Sussex, 
2008 
WI 
69, 
310 
Wis. 2d 397, 751 N.W.2d 736.   
¶63 We live in an information age.  Taxpayers are paying 
for the accumulation of vast amounts of data.  Now taxpayers may 
have to pay to give that data away so that others can make a 
profit. 
No.  2011AP1112.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶64 A 
second 
implication 
of 
the 
decision 
is 
that 
governments have been largely disarmed in dealing with large, 
demanding requests, like the request in Osborn v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 2002 WI 83, 254 
Wis. 2d 266, 647 N.W.2d 158.  The lead opinion has no answer on 
how to deal with this situation. 
¶65 There can be no dispute that public records requests 
can 
be 
highly 
salutary 
and 
may 
expose 
deficiencies 
and 
shortcomings in public performance.  But some public records 
requests may harass public officials or units of government.  
This reality is seldom acknowledged.  The ability to impose 
charges reflecting the actual cost of compliance has sometimes 
served as a brake on malicious, frivolous, or unreasonable 
requests.  To some extent, the court removes this brake. 
¶66 The court's decision changes the dynamics of the 
public records law.  I join Justice Roggensack in asking the 
legislature to revisit the law to consider the ramifications of 
the court's decision. 
¶67 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶68 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   While I 
agree with the lead opinion that there is no express provision 
in the Public Records Law that addresses an authority's ability 
to charge for the time involved in separating the confidential 
portion of a public record pursuant to the directive of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.36(6), I do not join the lead opinion, but write in 
concurrence to note that the court's decision will likely result 
in one of two scenarios:  (1) taxpayers will be required to pay 
for the statutorily required separation of voluminous public 
record requests, rather than the person who will receive and use 
the records; or (2) public record requests will go unmet due to 
a lack of necessary personnel to do the separations, while at 
the same time continuing to carry on the normal operations of 
the custodial authority.   
¶69 Fundamentally, this case implicates public policy 
choices:  whether taxpayers or record requesters should bear the 
financial burden of statutory record separations, and whether 
the costs associated with voluminous record requests should be 
addressed in a manner different from that employed for requests 
of only a few public records.  Therefore, although I am aware of 
and 
concerned 
for 
the 
significant 
costs 
and 
personnel 
deployments that voluminous record requests can impose on 
authorities who are subject to public record requests and who 
may be operating with diminished revenues and personnel, 
addressing those concerns is a legislative function, not a 
function properly undertaken by the courts.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.  
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶70 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, through two of its 
reporters, requested voluminous public records.  One reporter 
requested 2,312 records, and the other reporter requested all 
incident reports and dispatch records relating to sexual 
assaults for an entire year.  All records requested contained 
confidential information that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) required the 
Milwaukee Police Department to separate out before fulfilling 
the Journal Sentinel's record request.1   
¶71 The City estimated that it would be required to expend 
approximately $5,600 in staff time redacting the records 
requested in order to separate out confidential information in 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6).  The Journal Sentinel 
refused to pay and instead brought suit in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.   
¶72 The circuit court agreed that the City had the right 
to request payment for the staff time required to separate 
confidential information contained within the requested public 
records.  The lead opinion reverses the circuit court's decision 
because the Public Records Law is silent in regard to who is to 
bear 
the 
financial 
burden 
of 
complying 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(6) provides:   
 
Separation of information.  If a record contains 
information that is subject to disclosure under s. 
19.35(1)(a) or (am) and information that is not 
subject to such disclosure, the authority having 
custody of the record shall provide the information 
that 
is 
subject 
to 
disclosure 
and 
delete 
the 
information that is not subject to disclosure from the 
record before release. 
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
3 
 
§ 19.36(6), 
and 
because 
the 
lead 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
assessing those costs to the requester may interfere with public 
record requests.2   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶73 When the legislature enacted the Public Records Law, 
its goal was to provide public access to records that would 
assist the public in becoming an "informed electorate."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31; Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of 
Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶52, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700.  In 
order to facilitate this goal, the legislature created a 
"presumption of complete public access."  Id.  Accordingly, 
statutory interpretation in regard to a Public Records Law 
request is conducted with complete public access as the starting 
point, and any construction that limits public access is 
problematic.  Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, 
¶217, 
327 
Wis. 2d 
572, 
786 
N.W.2d 
177 
(Roggensack, 
J., 
dissenting).  
¶74 The lead opinion's decision today is driven by those 
policies that the legislature articulated in the Public Records 
Law.  However, the statutes enacted to further those policies 
indicate that the legislature did not anticipate voluminous 
public record requests such as those that the Journal Sentinel 
and others have made recently.  One notable demonstration that 
the legislature did not contemplate such requests is that the 
statutory references to the dollar amounts of the costs that 
were anticipated are very low.   
                                                 
2 Lead op., ¶5. 
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶75 For example, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3)(c) permits an 
authority to impose a fee for locating a record "if the cost is 
$50 or more," and para. (3)(f) permits an authority to require a 
requester to prepay for, "any fee or fees imposed under this 
subsection if the total amount exceeds $5."  That a cost of $50 
in staff time is sufficient to trigger a charge to a requester 
and a $5 fee is sufficient for an authority's right to require 
prepayment by a requester indicate that the legislature did not 
consider voluminous record requests such as the Journal Sentinel 
and others have made, where the costs to the custodial 
authorities are in the thousands of dollars.   
¶76 Although the legislature did give some consideration 
to costs that an authority is likely to encounter when complying 
with a public record request, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(3) enumerates 
the tasks for which an authority may charge the requester.  
However, the separation costs that are generated by Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(6)'s 
requirement 
that 
confidential 
information 
be 
deleted from public records before the records are provided to a 
record requester are not mentioned.  In addition, § 19.36(6), 
itself, does not address who is to bear the costs of separation 
that § 19.36(6) requires authorities to undertake.  
¶77 However, separation costs can be extensive.  For 
example, a review of the briefs filed in another public records 
case, Osborn v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 
System, 2002 WI 83, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 N.W.2d 158, shows that 
the public record requests made to the University required 
separation of information in 450,000 records.  In order to 
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
5 
 
provide separated University records, a University employee 
would, at a minimum, be required to copy each record and then 
redact it to block out information that is of a confidential 
nature.  If a University employee could make copies of the 
450,000 records and then do the necessary separation in 5 
minutes per record, 2,250,000 minutes or 37,500 hours or 4,687.5 
eight-hour days would be required to complete the tasks 
necessary to comply with Mr. Osborn's public record requests.   
¶78 If we assume that the University employees assigned to 
this task earn $10/hour in salary and fringes, providing the 
separated records would cost the University $375,000.3   
¶79 I don't know what occurred in Osborn after the case 
was heard here.  However, if it is still ongoing, because the 
Public Records Law is silent about who should bear the financial 
burden of the record separation that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) 
requires, and given the opinions today, it is possible that the 
University may incur $375,000 in expense in order to comply with 
Mr. Osborn's Public Records Law request.  The University will 
pass this $375,0000 on to the taxpayers of Wisconsin or to the 
students 
who 
matriculate 
at 
the 
University, 
without 
any 
                                                 
3 The example of $10/hour in salary and fringes is more than 
likely too low, but I use it as an example to give some idea 
about the costs that are arising under public record requests. 
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
6 
 
participation by the requester of the records.  This is a 
problem that the legislature needs to consider.4  
¶80 The University of Wisconsin likely could meet the 
requests Mr. Osborn made.  On the other hand, if a small 
municipality with only one employee is the authority that 
receives a voluminous public records request requiring statutory 
separation of information, it is likely that no information will 
be provided because compliance will be beyond the capacity of 
the authority.  See George v. Record Custodian, 169 Wis. 2d 573, 
578, 485 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that a custodian 
has the discretion to deny a public records request if the 
reasons for denial are sufficient to outweigh the strong public 
policy favoring disclosure).  Denial of access based on the 
substantial burden a voluminous request can create for an 
authority may be a reasonable exercise of discretion; however, a 
denial also would cut directly against the access that the 
legislature sought to achieve by the Public Records Law.  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31. 
¶81 Accordingly, it would be helpful if the legislature 
were to revisit the cost issues that have become prominent in 
public record requests and determine whether the taxpayers 
should bear the full financial burden for public record requests 
                                                 
4 The 
legislative history of the Public Records Law 
indicates that the level of demand for record access "is unknown 
and not predictable without some actual experience."  See Fiscal 
Estimate, 1981 S.B. 250 (Dep't of Admin., 6/22/81), in the 
Drafting File for ch. 335, Laws of 1981.  Therefore, it appears 
the legislature may have been aware that it would have to 
revisit the Public Records Law in regard to the costs it would 
generate for the authorities subject to it.  
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
7 
 
or whether requesters should be active participants in the cost 
involved in required record separations. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 The court's decision today will likely result in one 
of two scenarios:  (1) taxpayers will be required to pay for the 
statutorily required separation of voluminous public record 
requests, rather than the person who will receive and use the 
records; or (2) public record requests will go unmet due to a 
lack of necessary personnel to do the separations and continue 
to carry on the normal operations of the custodial authority.   
¶83 Fundamentally, this case implicates public policy 
choices:  whether taxpayers or record requesters should bear the 
financial burden of statutory record separations, and whether 
the costs associated with voluminous record requests should be 
addressed in a manner different from that employed for requests 
of only a few public records.  Therefore, although I am aware of 
and 
concerned 
for 
the 
significant 
costs 
and 
personnel 
deployments that voluminous record requests can impose on 
custodial authorities who are subject to public record requests 
and who may be operating with diminished revenues and personnel, 
addressing those concerns is a legislative function, not a 
function properly undertaken by the courts.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.  
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER, ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join 
this concurrence. 
No.  2011AP1112.pdr 
 
 
 
1