Title: JOEL RANDY FERGUSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOEL RANDY FERGUSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 157168 P.3d 476Case Number:  06-171Decided: 10/04/2007Modified: 10/05/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JOEL RANDY 
FERGUSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry Rogers, Interim Public 
Defender; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Public Defender; Donna D. 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney 
General.

                                    

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Joel 
Ferguson appeals his conviction on eleven counts of burglary.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. 
Ferguson raises the following two issues:

 
 
1.         
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, made on the basis that the State had not proven the 
elements of the crime of burglary; and

2.         
Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior 
misconduct.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Around 
midnight on July 20, 2004, someone broke into a welding business in downtown 
Cheyenne, 
gaining entry by breaking out a small window.  That person vandalized the inside of the 
premises, and took some cash and various small items of modest value, including 
four sets of welding gloves, some small tools, and several trailer hitch 
balls.  The burglar left behind 
larger items of higher value.  While 
inside the business, the burglar ate candy bars and drank soda he found 
there.

  

[¶4]           
During 
the following three weeks, a dozen more burglaries occurred in Cheyenne.  In each case, it was a business 
location, and the break-in occurred very late at night or very early in the 
morning.  In every case except one, 
the burglar gained entry by breaking a window with a rock or other small blunt 
object.  In the one exception, the 
burglar broke a piece of particle board that had been inserted in a window frame 
to replace a damaged window.  In 
every case, the burglar vandalized or "ransacked" the business, most often by 
opening files and cabinets and throwing papers and office supplies around the 
interior.  The burglar took small 
amounts of cash when it was easily found.  
In every case, he took items small enough to fit into a bag or backpack, 
items of relatively modest value such as sets of keys, key fobs, gloves (often 
with the name of a person or the business written on them), clothing and caps 
(again, often with names or business logos on them), knives and knife cases, 
flashlights, small tools, watches, and sunglasses.  In many of the cases, the burglar ate or 
drank the food and drinks he found inside the businesses, including hotdogs with 
cheese and mustard, a bowl of soup with two bottles of water, some Pepsi, some 
other soda, and a TV dinner with chips.

 
 

[¶5]           
Based on 
Mr. Ferguson's prior criminal record, which included prior convictions for 
burglaries with similar modes of operation, the Cheyenne police began to suspect him of 
committing the new burglaries.  Upon 
learning that Mr. Ferguson had recently returned to Cheyenne, and that he had 
been staying at the home of Joseph Soriano, the police began watching that 
house.  On August 10, 2004, 
police confronted Mr. Soriano, who confirmed that Mr. Ferguson was an old 
friend who had moved into his house approximately July 20, 2004.  Mr. Soriano gave the police permission 
to search the house, where they observed a backpack and other bags piled in a 
box on the kitchen floor.  
Mr. Soriano told the officers that the items belonged to 
Mr. Ferguson.  Sticking out of 
the backpack was a marked glove that the police officers recognized as being 
taken in one of the recent burglaries.  
Inside the backpack and other bags, the police found additional items 
that had been taken during the recent burglaries. 

 

[¶6]           
Mr. 
Soriano also told the police that Mr. Ferguson's car was parked a short distance 
away.  After obtaining a warrant, 
the police searched the vehicle.  In 
the trunk, they found several items that had been stolen in the 
burglaries.

 
 

[¶7]           
Mr. 
Ferguson was initially charged with thirteen counts of burglary.  Two of the charges were dismissed, one 
before trial and one during.  Mr. 
Ferguson was convicted on the remaining eleven counts.  At trial, the prosecution presented 
little in the way of physical evidence to identify Mr. Ferguson as the 
burglar.  Rather, to show that it 
was Mr. Ferguson who had committed the crimes, the prosecution relied 
heavily on the fact that he had been in possession of a significant number of 
burgled items.  This gives rise to 
Mr. Ferguson's first issue on appeal, which is, in essence, that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that he was the one who burglarized the 
businesses.

 
 

[¶8]           
The 
prosecution also presented testimony from a Cheyenne police officer concerning a break-in 
at a local restaurant back in September of 2003.  The officer testified that he responded 
to an early morning alarm at the restaurant, and saw a man exit the 
building.  The man was wearing a 
"pretty distinguishable jacket," a "hip-length black . . . parka with a 
hood."  The officer chased the man, 
but was unable to apprehend him, and so notified other officers and provided a 
physical description.  He then 
returned to the restaurant, where he determined that someone had entered the 
building by breaking a window, and then vandalized the building.  Shortly thereafter, and not far away, 
another officer stopped a car and saw a passenger inside who matched the 
description of the man who had fled the restaurant, including the 
"distinguishable" jacket.  The 
passenger was questioned, and in a bag belonging to him, police found several 
items of moderate value that had been taken during burglaries of other Cheyenne businesses.  The passenger, of course, was 
Mr. Ferguson.  This testimony 
provides the basis for Mr. Ferguson's second issue on appeal.  He contends that this evidence of other 
misconduct should have been excluded from his trial pursuant to 
W.R.E. 404(b).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶9]           
In 
considering whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Ferguson, we 
leave out of consideration any evidence in the defendant's favor, and accept as 
true the evidence for the prosecution, with all logical and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from it.  
Stanton v. State, 2006 WY 31, ¶ 11, 130 P.3d 486, 490 (Wyo. 2006).  We ask 
if that evidence forms an adequate basis for the jury to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  We do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury, but rather, determine whether a quorum of reasonable and 
rational jurors could have concluded that the defendant was guilty.  Id., ¶ 11, 130 P.3d  at 490-91. 

 

[¶10]       
Mr. 
Ferguson contends that the only evidence connecting him to the burglaries was 
his possession of items taken during the burglaries.  We have established quite specific rules 
concerning the use of evidence of the possession of stolen 
goods:

 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is 
challenged in burglary convictions, this Court examines the record, in a light 
most favorable to the State, to see if there is slight corroborative evidence, 
other than possession of stolen goods, which connects the appellant with the 
burglary.  King v. State, 718 P.2d 452, 453 
(Wyo. 
1986).  We have stated that the 
possession of stolen goods alone is not sufficient evidence to convict for 
burglary.  Id. (quoting Newell v. State, 548 P.2d 8, 13 
(Wyo. 
1976)).  However, we have also 
concluded with regard to burglary that, "[t]he most significant and material 
evidence of defendant's guilt is his possession of the stolen property.  Possession is a strong circumstance 
tending to show guilt and only slight corroborative evidence of other 
inculpatory circumstances is required'" to convict.  Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1161 
(Wyo. 1997) 
(quoting Newell, 548 P.2d at 
13).

 
 

McGarvey v. State, 2002 WY 149, ¶ 14, 55 P.3d 703, 706 (Wyo. 2002).  Notably, the 
trial court specifically instructed the jury in Mr. Ferguson's case that 
possession of stolen property was "[t]he most significant and material evidence 
of defendant's guilt," but that the prosecution was still required to present 
"slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances" to convict 
Mr. Ferguson.  Our task, then, is to 
examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and determine 
whether the jury could reasonably have found the slight corroborative evidence 
needed to connect Mr. Ferguson to the eleven burglaries.  

 
 

[¶11]       
The State 
asserts that it provided the slight corroborative evidence by demonstrating 
"amazing similarities" among the eleven burglaries with which Mr. Ferguson 
was charged, 

 
 
such as the method of gaining access 
to each business, the unnecessary vandalism of each business, and the types of 
minimally valuable property stolen from each business.

 
 
To that list we could add the 
burglar's tendency to leave larger items of greater value at the scene, and his 
habit of consuming the food and drink he found at the burgled businesses.  But while this evidence strongly 
suggests that the same person committed all of the burglaries, it does nothing 
to indicate that Mr. Ferguson was the burglar.

 
 

[¶12]       
Our 
review of the record revealed that the State also provided testimony that a shoe 
print found at one burglary site had a sole design similar to a shoe known to 
belong to Mr. Ferguson.  The 
expert witness conceded he "could not come to a definitive conclusion" that the 
impression was Mr. Ferguson's footprint.  
A definitive conclusion was not required, however, only slight 
corroborative evidence.  The State 
also points out that Mr. Ferguson came to Cheyenne and started staying at 
Mr. Soriano's house at the same time the burglaries began.  It also asserts that the sheer number of 
stolen items in Mr. Ferguson's possession indicates that he did not come by them 
coincidentally, and the odd nature and minimal value of the items made it 
unlikely that anyone but the burglar would have found them desirable enough to 
steal and collect.  Taken 
separately, each of these bits of evidence fails to prove that it was 
Mr. Ferguson who committed the burglaries.  Taken together, the evidence amounted to 
at least slight corroboration that Mr. Ferguson had burgled the many stolen 
items in his possession.  

 
 

[¶13]       
In 
addition, as discussed in detail below, the prosecution offered testimony that 
Mr. Ferguson had been involved in previous break-ins, including the one at 
the restaurant, and pointed to similarities between those incidents and the 
burglaries with which Mr. Ferguson was charged.  If this evidence was properly 
admittedthe issue we consider nextthen it, combined with the evidence noted 
previously, established a firm basis for the jury's determination that the State 
had provided the corroboration needed to connect Mr. Ferguson to the eleven 
burglaries.  

 
 

[¶14]       
We must 
ask, however, if the testimony concerning Mr. Ferguson's involvement in 
previous burglaries should have been ruled inadmissible under W.R.E. 
404(b).  We uphold a trial 
court's decision on the admissibility of evidence absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.  A trial court's 
evidentiary decisions are entitled to considerable deference, and will be upheld 
if they have a legitimate basis.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

[¶15]       
W.R.E. 
404(b) provides as follows:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 

[¶16]       
We have 
previously observed that this rule reflects the principle that a defendant in a 
criminal case "should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor 
because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the particular crime 
charged."  Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 19, 
165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 1 Christopher B. Mueller 
& Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 4:21, at 691-92 (3d ed. 2007)).  

 
 

[¶17]       
As did 
the trial court,1 we agree with Mr. Ferguson 
that evidence of his involvement in previous burglaries, and his possession of 
items stolen in those earlier burglaries, was evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts" that tended to reflect on his character.  W.R.E. 404(b) plainly applied to this 
evidence, but that does not automatically render the evidence inadmissible.  As explicitly set forth in the rule, 
such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, including that of proving 
identity.  The State contends that 
it offered this evidence of previous burglaries to prove Mr. Ferguson's 
identity as the person who committed the eleven charged burglaries, based on the 
similarities between those burglaries and the previous incidents involving 
Mr. Ferguson. 

 

[¶18]       
Identity 
is always an element of the crime charged, and must be proven by the 
prosecution.  Identity is, 
therefore, always a material issue.  
Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 
940 (Wyo. 1992); Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316, 321 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Consequently, if evidence of 
uncharged misconduct tends to prove identity of the perpetrator of the charged 
crime, it is generally admissible.  
Id.; see also McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 
752 (Wyo. 1993); Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848, 853 
(Wyo. 
1990).  However, we have cautioned 
that evidence of other misconduct used to prove identity is admissible only when 
the inference of identity flowing from it is extremely strong.  

 
 
The 
probity of evidence of other crimes where introduced for this purpose depends 
upon both the uniqueness of the modus 
operandi and the degree of similarity between the charged crime and the 
uncharged crime.  Of course, it is 
not necessary that the charged crime and the other crimes be identical in every 
detail. . . . But they must possess a common feature or features that make it 
very likely that the unknown perpetrator of the charged crime and the known 
perpetrator of the uncharged crime are the same person.

 
 

Pena, 780 P.2d  at 322 (quoting United 
States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977)).  Where similarities between the prior 
misconduct and the crimes charged "lack distinction," or appear to be "common 
components of this type of crime," their lack of probity on the issue of 
identity may render the evidence inadmissible.  
Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 607 (Wyo. 1993).  

 
 

[¶19]       
With that 
legal background, we turn to the trial court's decision to admit testimony 
regarding the prior burglaries.  
Counsel for Mr. Ferguson had filed a pretrial demand for notice of 
the prosecution's intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  The prosecution's notice of intent 
listed three such items:  evidence 
concerning the previous burglaries in which Mr. Ferguson had undisputedly 
been involved, evidence of Mr. Ferguson's prior burglary convictions, and 
evidence regarding thirty-three other recent burglaries for which 
Mr. Ferguson was not charged, but for which he was suspected based on the 
same or similar mode of operation.  
The prosecution later argued that these items of evidence were not 
actually subject to W.R.E. 404(b), but listed the evidence in its notice in an 
abundance of caution, a practice we find particularly prudent for prosecutors to 
follow.

 
 

[¶20]       
Observing 
the standards and procedures set forth in Gleason 
v. State, 2002 
WY 161, ¶¶ 18, 30, 57 P.3d 332, 340, 343 (Wyo. 2002), and its progeny, 
the trial court held a 
pretrial hearing to consider the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  With regard to Mr. Ferguson's prior 
convictions, the trial court ruled, as the parties had agreed, that the evidence 
might be admissible if Mr. Ferguson testified at trial.  With regard to the thirty-three 
uncharged burglaries, the trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible 
under W.R.E. 404(b) because the prosecution had not sufficiently established 
Mr. Ferguson's involvement.  

 
 

[¶21]       
With 
regard to the previous burglaries, the trial court 
satisfied itself that there was sufficient evidence showing that 
Mr. Ferguson had been the one who committed them.  In fact, it appears that Mr. Ferguson's 
probation was revoked based on his involvement in these previous burglaries, and 
although the trial court ruled that fact inadmissible for purposes of trial, the 
probation revocation did establish Mr. Ferguson's involvement for purposes 
of the Rule 404(b) hearing.  The 
trial court then considered the similarities between the earlier burglaries and 
the charged burglaries.  The pattern 
in both sets of burglaries, the prosecution argued, was for the burglar to break 
a window to gain entry.  Businesses 
were burgled, not homes or public buildings.  The burglaries occurred very late at 
night or early in the morning, and the businesses were vandalized.  As in the charged burglaries, the items 
taken in the previous burglaries were small and of relatively low value, items 
including keys with business logos, rolls of coins, a Liberty silver dollar, 
cigarette lighters, and a belt buckle.  

 
 

[¶22]       
The 
trial court found these similarities sufficiently distinctive so that the 
evidence of the previous burglaries was relevant and probative on the issue of 
Mr. Ferguson's identity as the perpetrator of the charged burglaries.  The trial court concluded that the 
evidence was more probative than unfairly prejudicial, largely because the 
previous burglaries were no more reprehensible than the charged burglaries, and 
the evidence would not make Mr. Ferguson any less sympathetic to the 
jury.  It concluded that the 
evidence was not unnecessarily cumulative, and for all those reasons, ruled that 
the evidence would be admissible at trial.  
When the evidence was admitted at trial, the court gave appropriate 
limiting instructions to the jury two separate times, and again a third time in 
the written jury instructions.

 
 

[¶23]       
We note 
again that the trial court's decision admitting evidence of the previous 
burglaries is entitled to substantial deference, and we uphold it if there is 
legitimate basis for it.  Sanchez, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d  at 1140.  In this case, the trial court carefully 
analyzed the evidence for admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b), and 
articulated its legitimate basis for admitting the evidence to prove 
identity.  It found the evidence 
more probative than unfairly prejudicial, and not unnecessarily cumulative.  It provided appropriate limiting 
instructions to guide the jury's consideration of the evidence.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's decision allowing the evidence.

 
 

[¶24]       
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Honorable Peter G. Arnold 
conducted the trial in this case.  
It was then reassigned to the Honorable Edward L. Grant, who entered the 
Judgment and Sentence.