Title: Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. and Service Dist. v. Brooks Water and Sewer Dist.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. and Service Dist. v. Brooks Water and Sewer Dist.1995 WY 91896 P.2d 1355Case Number: 94-52, 93-193, 93-217Decided: 06/13/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

MOUNTAIN VIEW/EVERGREEN IMPROVEMENT AND SERVICE DISTRICT, 
an Improvement and Service District formed under the laws of the State of 
Wyoming,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BROOKS WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT, a Water and Sewer 
District formed under the laws of the State of Wyoming, 

Appellee (Defendant).

 

MOUNTAIN VIEW/EVERGREEN IMPROVEMENT AND SERVICE 
DISTRICT, an Improvement and Service District formed under the laws of the State 
of Wyoming,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BROOKS WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT, a Water and Sewer 
District formed under the laws of the State of Wyoming,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

BROOKS WATER & SEWER 
DISTRICT,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

MOUNTAIN VIEW/EVERGREEN IMPROVEMENT & SERVICE 
DISTRICT,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback and Dan R. Spangler, 
JJ.

Phillip T. Willoughby, 
Casper, for Mountain View/Evergreen 
Improvement and Service Dist.

Bruce N. Willoughby and Todd 
H. Hambrick of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for Brooks Water and Sewer 
Dist.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The prime issue 
in these consolidated cases is whether Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement and 
Service District (Mountain View) can bring an action to recover damages against 
Brooks Water and Sewer District (Brooks). The trial court ruled Mountain View 
could not sue Brooks because such an action is barred by the rule promulgated in 
Carbon County Sch. District No. 2 v. Wyoming State Hosp., 680 P.2d 773 (Wyo. 
1984). Totally dependent upon the resolution of the primary question are issues 
relating to the application of the statute of limitations found in WYO. STAT. §§ 
1-39-113 and 1-39-114 (1988) and the public policy resolution of the substantive 
question of liability. In three separate cases, the district court first decided 
no action would lie; ruled the provisions of WYO. STAT. §§ 1-39-113 and 1-39-114 
would apply in any action by Mountain View against Brooks; ruled Mountain View 
was not protected from the operation of the statute of limitations because of 
its status as a political subdivision of the state; and Brooks must bear the 
expense of removing its utilities from public streets when Mountain View 
proceeded to improve the streets. We distinguish Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 
and we reverse the decision of the District Court in case No. 94-52. We affirm 
the rulings of the district court with respect to the application of the statute 
of limitations in case No. 93-193 and the obligation of Brooks to bear the 
expense of moving its utilities from the dedicated streets in case No. 
93-217.

[¶2]      In the order in 
which we resolve the three cases, the parties set forth the issues in their 
briefs in the following ways:

[¶3]      In case No. 94-52 
relating to the right of one special improvement district to sue another special 
improvement district, Mountain View states the issue to 
be:

1. Did the District Court err in finding and ordering 
that a suit against Brooks Water and Sewer District by Mountain View/Evergreen 
Improvement and Service District was barred because both entities are political 
subdivisions of the State of Wyoming and therefore should be 
dismissed.

Brooks states the issue in 
that case in this way:

1. Did the lower court correctly determine that since 
both parties in this action are political subdivisions of the state, Mtn. View 
could not sue Brooks for trespass or negligence, and the suit must therefore be 
dismissed?

[¶4]      In case No. 
93-193 concerning the application of the statute of limitations, Mountain View, 
in its Appellant's Brief, sets forth these issues:

1.         Did 
the District Court err in finding and ordering that a suit against Brooks, a 
governmental body, was barred if filed more than one (1) year after the first 
Notice of Claim, though the two (2) year period in which to make a claim had not 
run, and the appellant had renewed its claim within the two (2) year period and 
filed suit within one (1) year after the second supplemental 
claim?

2.         Did 
the District Court err in dismissing Brooks from the suit though a part of the 
claim against Brooks was discovered and noticed December 24, 1992 to Brooks less 
than seven (7) months after the discovery of the injury, and suit was then filed 
five (5) months after the claim?

3.         Did 
the District Court err in applying the statute of limitations of W.S. §§ 
1-39-113 and 114 against Mountain View, a political subdivision of the 
State?

The counterstatement of the 
issues in that case by Brooks is:

1.         Did 
the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction in the underlying 
action?

2.         Does 
the combined effect of W.S. §§ 1-39-113 and 114 allow parties to renotice claims 
in subsequent actions after the statute of limitations has already run on the 
original claims?

3.         Is 
Mountain View, a political subdivision of the state, subject to the statutes of 
limitations of W.S. §§ 1-39-113 and 114?

4.         Does 
public policy demand strict adherence to the statute of limitations by all 
parties?

[¶5]      In case No. 
93-217, which requires the resolution of the question of substantive liability 
on the grounds of public policy, Brooks states the only issue 
as:

1. In this case of first impression in Wyoming, did 
the lower court apply the correct law in light of the particular facts of this 
case?

As the appellee in that 
case, Mountain View offers this statement of the issues after acknowledging the 
presence of the underlying question of jurisdiction:

1.         Did 
the lower court apply the correct law in dismissing appellant's cause of action? 
(Appellant agrees with appellee's Statement of the Issues and this is a case of 
first impression in Wyoming.)

2.         Can a 
governmental entity or subdivision of the State of Wyoming bring suit against 
the State of Wyoming, its divisions, departments, political subdivisions and/or 
local governments?

[¶6]      The three cases 
before the court arise from a common set of facts. There is no real debate among 
the parties with respect to the material facts. The roadways where Brooks 
located its water and sewer improvements were dedicated and platted in 1923. 
Mountain View was formed on January 17, 1989 for the purpose of financing the 
payment of construction costs for sidewalk, curb, gutter, and street 
improvements in an unincorporated suburb in Natrona County. Brooks came into 
existence at some earlier date and, as early as 1963, it had developed water and 
sewer services in an area which encompassed the Mountain View special 
improvement district.

[¶7]      When Mountain 
View began to develop storm sewers, curb, gutter, and sidewalks and pave the 
roadways, Brooks had to relocate some fire hydrants, valves, and other 
appurtenances it had placed in the platted roads in the Mountain View district. 
Later, certain areas in the roads Mountain View had constructed began to 
subside. Brooks initially excavated, filled, and repaved the road in one area 
but, thereafter, it declined any responsibility for the 
damage.

[¶8]      Initially, there 
were six areas of subsidence. These were repaired, and it appeared there were no 
additional problems. On November 5, 1991, Mountain View submitted a formal claim 
to Brooks under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to 
-120 (1988). Then, in the spring of 1992, an additional six areas of subsidence 
were discovered and, on December 24, 1992, Mountain View filed a second claim 
that included the first six areas previously described in the November 5, 1991 
claim as well as the six new areas. Still later an additional area of subsidence 
was discovered and, on April 1, 1993, an action was brought to recover the 
damages asserted in the first two claims.

[¶9]      About this same 
time, additional areas of subsidence were found and, ultimately, an additional 
six areas occurred in the spring of 1993. On April 21, 1993, Mountain View 
served notice of its claim for the areas included in the first claim, the areas 
included in the second claim, and the new areas. All of these claims were 
encompassed in the action filed by Mountain View.

[¶10]   Brooks instituted an action of its 
own against Mountain View in which it sought to recover for the cost of 
relocating the fire hydrants, valves, and other appurtenances. The resolution of 
that litigation was by summary judgment with the trial court ruling Mountain 
View was within its prerogatives in requiring Brooks to remove the obstructions. 
The court held Brooks was not entitled to compensation.

[¶11]   In the litigation commenced by 
Mountain View, there are two developments that were resolved by orders of the 
district court. In the first of those orders, the court dismissed the action as 
to the first six areas of subsidence which were included in the claim filed on 
November 5, 1991. The district court ruled that action was time barred by the 
provisions of WYO. STAT. § 1-39-114 because it was not commenced within the 
one-year period after the filing of the claim as required by that statute. It is 
our understanding, and that of the parties, that this dismissal did not reach 
those claims which were filed within one year of the filing of the civil action. 
Subsequently, a third order was entered by the court in which it dismissed all 
claims by Mountain View, relying upon Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 
2.

[¶12]   Mountain View and Brooks are 
special improvement districts organized under the statutes of this state. As 
special improvement districts, they had the authority to collect revenues for 
the provision of the services for which they were responsible. The threshold 
question in dealing with the rulings of the district court is whether the status 
of Mountain View and Brooks as special improvement districts brings them within 
the rule articulated in Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 2 and its predecessor, 
State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Johnson County, 642 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1982). In 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Johnson County, we ruled Johnson County could not bring 
an action against the State of Wyoming for fees the county expended for the 
services of a public defender. In the later case of Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 
2, we held a school district could not sue the state hospital for damages caused 
by an arsonist who previously had been discharged as a patient by the 
hospital.

[¶13]   The holdings in both these cases 
are premised on the fact that counties and school districts are not 
sovereignties but, instead, are political subdivisions of the state. We stated, 
"[t]hey are part of the state itself. One cannot sue himself." Carbon County 
Sch. Dist. No. 2, 680 P.2d  at 774. We earlier said that, because a political 
subdivision is merely an adjunct to, or an arm of, the state, it cannot commence 
an action against the state as an "adverse party," because "one cannot have a 
position adverse to his own position." Bd. of County Comm'rs of Johnson County, 
642 P.2d  at 458.

[¶14]   In a case that involves analogous 
concepts, Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 By and Through Brown v. Muir, 808 P.2d 797, 802 (Wyo. 1991), we held the statute of limitations would not bar a school 
district from pursuing an action against an architect that normally would have 
been foreclosed by the general statute of limitations:

We are satisfied that the better rule is that 
immunity from the application of statutes of limitations cannot be limited to 
the state itself, or even to those state agencies with statewide authority. If a 
local agency is carrying on a function of protecting public rights that citizens 
receive under our constitution, or is otherwise fulfilling a traditional 
function of government, the statute of limitations preclusion should be 
available.

[¶15]   The rule that can be extrapolated 
from these cases is that a public entity, authorized by statute and funded from 
state coffers or other public revenues, which performs functions for the public 
at large is simply another arm of the state. Because of this affinity to the 
state, such a subdivision does not have the essential adversarial interests or 
claims against the state contemplated by a dispute arising between two or more 
persons. Furthermore, like the state, such a public entity will not be inhibited 
by the statute of limitations. The product of this rule as it might apply to the 
primary issue in this case is that the court has no subject matter jurisdiction 
to entertain a claim by a political subdivision against the state because there 
is no bona fide controversy between them. This is especially true when any 
damages awarded to one entity as against the other would have to be paid from 
one common source, that is, taxes levied upon and collected from taxpayers 
generally. A common pool for the payment of damages from one entity to another 
does not fit with an adjudicated damage award based upon an obligation existing 
"upon one party in favor of the other, the performance of which is refused." 
Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 597 (Wyo. 1978) (quoting Bruner v. Martin, 
76 Kan. 862, 93 P. 165, 166 (1907)).

[¶16]   This case is one brought by one 
special improvement district against another. Brooks was responsible for 
developing water and sewer services and Mountain View for developing streets 
with curb, gutter, sidewalks, and storm sewers. Both were furnishing those 
services on behalf of the residents in their respective districts, rather than 
in a governmental capacity. We note the areas of the districts were not 
coterminous. The area served by Brooks was substantially larger than that served 
by Mountain View. Assessments levied and collected by the county under the 
special improvement districts statute were not available for the support of 
government generally. They were dedicated for special improvements to benefit 
the property owners in the defined districts.

[¶17]   The status of such entities is 
explained in analogous cases in Wyoming. In Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 490 P.2d 1069, 1070-71 (Wyo. 1971), the 
court said:

We think it will help to understand the problem here 
involved if we keep in mind the distinction between governmental and proprietary 
functions of legal subdivisions. In Wyoming we have always recognized such a 
distinction in dealing with the matter of tort liability of municipal 
corporations.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

Without reviewing the watershed improvement districts 
law section by section, we can state categorically that the functions of such 
districts are proprietary and in the nature of special or private corporation 
purposes. The districts do not exercise delegated sovereign powers for the 
benefit of people generally.

We need to make it clear that we are not saying a 
watershed improvement district is not a governmental entity. We merely say its 
functions are primarily proprietary and not governmental.

In In re Bridger Valley 
Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289, 292 (Wyo. 1965), we said:

Insofar as appellants' reference to the project's 
being tax supported, it should be noted that this court has previously announced 
its views concerning irrigation districts by saying:

"* 
* * The Legislature has seen fit to cause such districts to be created upon 
petition of a certain number of people owning or holding lands therein, and upon 
a hearing, after due notice, upon such petition by the district court. The 
method of thus establishing the districts is, we think, constitutional. * * 
*

"* 
* * The exactions authorized to be made by such districts may, in a broad sense, 
be termed taxes, but they are distinguishable therefrom, for they are levied for 
local benefits to be spread on the property in the districts in proportion to 
the peculiar advantages accruing to each parcel therein from the improvement 
made. Whether in the form of special assessments or in the form of taxes, they 
are essentially assessments for local benefits, and not levied for general 
governmental purposes, as are the taxes contemplated in the constitutional 
provisions mentioned [including Art. 1, § 28, Wyo. Const.] * * *." Sullivan v. 
Blakesley, 35 Wyo. 73, 246 P. 918, 922.

[¶18]   Persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions supports this resolution. Early decisions exist in which a city 
sued property owners in an improvement district for nonpayment for street 
improvements constructed by the city. City of Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 
532, 89 S.W.2d 348 (1936); Altman v. Kilburn, 45 N.M. 453, 116 P.2d 812 (1941). 
In those cases, the cities were held bound by the applicable statute of 
limitations rather than being able to file suit at any time under the principle 
that a statute of limitations does not run against the state or its 
subdivisions. See Muir.

[¶19]   In City of Knoxville, 89 S.W.2d  at 
351, the reason justifying the applicable statute of limitations to run against 
that city was stated to be:

[S]tatutes of limitations do not run against a county 
when seeking to enforce a demand arising out of the exercise of its governmental functions as an arm of the 
state. However, * * * the obligation of a city to maintain its streets is a corporate obligation which it does not 
perform as a governmental agency. (Emphasis added.)

[¶20]   In Altman, 116 P.2d  at 817, the 
court applied to the City of Kilburn the appropriate statute of limitations 
explaining that special assessments are not taxes in the legal sense in which 
that term is used:

Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions 
from persons and property, levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for 
the support of government and for all public needs.

*           
*           
*           
*         
  *           
*

[A]lthough in levying these paving assessments the 
municipality was acting in a governmental capacity nevertheless such assessments 
are not levied for governmental purposes, and are, therefore, not taxes. The 
municipality exercises a governmental function in levying the tax (for otherwise 
involuntary payment of such assessments could not be exacted), but it is not for 
a governmental purpose.

[¶21]   Although the Wyoming legislature 
abolished the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary functions" 
with respect to the assertion of claims against the state or its subdivisions in 
enacting the Governmental Claims Act of 1979, these terms continue to have 
vitality in determining the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in a 
particular controversy. In Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of Equalization, 79 
Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 711 (1958), we observed there is a distinction between 
those terms:

The author, however, draws a distinction where the 
property is used for the sale of a commodity to the public. It will be seen from 
the foregoing that it does not behoove this court to construe the term 
"governmental purpose" as used in the amended constitution here in question too 
narrowly. In the case of Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726, 730, 156 A.L.R. 702, the court states as follows:

"* 
* * The line of distinction between what is governmental, and what is 
proprietary, is sometimes difficult to draw and is, in instances relating to 
parks, playgrounds and swimming pools, more or less arbitrary. In cases covering 
the operation of water works, power plants, and gas systems, there is no 
difficulty, and they are clearly proprietary. But we start with this premise: 
Any activity of the sovereign authority, or one to whom its powers are 
delegated, is presumed to be governmental; and it follows, we think, that if 
there be uncertainty as to the classification into which the particular activity 
falls, the doubt should be resolved in favor of its being governmental rather 
than proprietary, for the reason that the usual function of government is to act 
in the interest of the public as a whole. In such a case, where no profit to the municipality is 
involved, its acts are governmental. Generally speaking, it is only where it 
steps aside, and, in a sense, enters a zone of private business, or into 
activities which may be and frequently are carried on through private 
enterprises, that its activities become proprietary." (Italics in original, 
emphasis added.)

See also State Bd. of 
Equalization v. City of Lander, 882 P.2d 844, 849 (Wyo. 
1994)

[¶22]   The rationale underlying these 
decisions is applicable to the case at bar. Improvement and service districts 
are described as political subdivisions of the state in WYO. STAT. § 
18-12-103(b) (1977). However, a board of directors of such a district does not 
function in the same manner as a board of county commissioners. A county is 
authorized by the legislature to levy and collect taxes and make expenditures on 
behalf of all the residents of the county. The board of a special 
improvement district acts only on behalf of a limited group of people 
within that particular area. The primary reason for describing such districts as 
political subdivisions is to justify the collection of taxes for those local 
improvements. It is convenient to denominate such districts as "governmental 
subdivisions," in order to validate those statutory provisions which authorize 
taxation of the residents of the district. This is necessary because only duly 
elected government officials of a state, a county, or a municipality can 
authorize taxation for the public as a whole.

[¶23]   Brooks and Mountain View were 
formed by the filing of respective petitions with the county commissioners 
signed by sixty percent of the affected property owners. WYO. STAT. § 18-12-106 
(1977). Under the statute when the proposed assessment district is approved by 
the board of county commissioners, the county clerk notifies the property owners 
of the assessed amounts, and the county assessor prepares and delivers an 
assessment roll to the county treasurer, who is responsible for collecting those 
taxes. WYO. STAT. § 18-12-118 (1977).

[¶24]   As in Altman and City of Knoxville, 
the county could be described as acting in its governmental capacity when it levies 
and collects the assessed amounts from the property owners. Because the 
districts themselves were formed upon the petition of the property owners, 
rather than at the behest of the county, the county essentially serves as the 
agent of the property owners in levying and collecting the assessment monies. In 
such an instance, the county is not affording any of its governmental or 
sovereign authority to the directors of the district. Actually, the converse is 
true, since the county serves only as the agent of the improvement districts in 
levying and collecting the monies to be used in those districts. The 
improvements in such districts are made by private contractors employed by the 
directors of each district. In such instances, the county is not in any way 
providing services "in the interest of the public as a whole." The district is 
serving a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and the county's role 
is in support of that proprietary function for purposes of determining 
jurisdiction.

[¶25]   It is clear, in any event, these 
assessments are not levied for "the support of government and for all public 
needs." Instead, these monies are collected and spent to benefit specific 
property owners in the defined improvement districts. As was true in Altman, the 
levied and collected assessment monies are not being spent for a governmental purpose or a traditional 
government function. As in City of Knoxville, the duty to maintain and improve 
the properties in the special improvement district is a corporate obligation of 
the district, which is not performed by a governmental agency, in this instance, 
Natrona County.

[¶26]   We are satisfied, in this 
situation, the respective assessment districts each have a separate and distinct 
duty to improve and maintain property in their district, and claims by one 
against the other are truly adversarial. There is a "matter in controversy 
between the parties," which affords subject matter jurisdiction to the district 
court and gives it authority to adjudicate such a dispute. See McGuire v. 
McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 (Wyo. 1980). We hold special improvement districts 
are not governmental entities like a county or a school district, and Brooks and 
Mountain View should have the opportunity to resolve their disputes by having 
their day in court.

[¶27]   In the instant case, we are 
impressed by the ruling of the district court that the statute of limitations 
would be applied against Mountain View. If Mountain View were perceived clearly 
as a subdivision of the state, like Johnson County or Carbon County Sch. Dist. 
No. 2, the statute of limitations could not be invoked against Mountain View 
under Muir. We can only conclude that the rulings of the district court with 
respect to the applicability of the statute of limitations and the right of one 
special improvement district to bring an action against the other are 
antithetical.

[¶28]   The application of the 
governmental-proprietary rationale is dispositive with respect to the issue of 
whether the statute of limitations runs against a special improvement district. 
The role of the county in imposing and collecting the assessments from these 
districts was not accomplished for a governmental purpose. The county did not 
act in its sovereign capacity, and the actions of Brooks and Mountain View were 
proprietary rather than governmental in nature. As the district court ruled, 
both Brooks and Mountain View are subject to the applicable claims procedure, 
and the statute of limitations in that procedure. The pertinent provisions 
are:

(a) No action shall be brought under this act against 
a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the action is based is 
presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action 
may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged 
act, error or omission * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 1-39-113 
(1988).

Except as otherwise provided, actions against a 
governmental entity or a public employee acting within the scope of his duties 
for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall be 
forever barred unless commenced within one (1) year after the date the claim is 
filed pursuant to W.S. 1-39-113. * * * In no case shall the statute of 
limitations provided in this section be longer than any other applicable statute 
of limitations.

WYO. STAT. § 1-39-114 
(1988).

[¶29]   The chronology in this case is 
crucial with respect to which claims the district court will have authority to 
adjudicate on remand. The first six areas of subsidence of the streets paved by 
Mountain View in 1989 were discovered in the spring of 1991. The first notice of 
claim filed by Mountain View against Brooks on November 5, 1991 addressed these 
first six discovered areas of subsidence and was timely. Somewhat more than a 
year later, on December 24, 1992, the second notice of claim was filed by 
Mountain View against Brooks, and it incorporated six additional areas of 
subsidence as well as the initial six areas. The first action filed by Mountain 
View against Brooks was instituted on April 1, 1993, and it included all twelve 
areas of subsidence. Both notices of claim were timely filed within the two 
years from the date of discovery of the injury in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-113. The first notice of claim was filed approximately five months after 
discovery of the initial six subsidence areas, and the second notice of claim 
was filed approximately six months after discovery of the second set of six 
subsidence areas.

[¶30]   The first complaint, however, was 
not filed until April 1, 1993. That was almost seventeen months after the first 
notice of claim was filed. Such an action must be commenced within one year 
after the notice of claim is filed or it is "forever barred." WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-114. The time to commence the lawsuit with respect to the first notice of 
claim expired on November 4, 1992, and Mountain View did not file its action in 
time with respect to the areas covered in the first claim. Consequently, we hold 
the district court correctly ruled that the claims encompassed in the November 
5, 1991 notice of claim were barred by the statute. The inclusion of these 
barred claims with non-barred claims in the second notice of claim filed 
December 24, 1992 does not adjust this result. The plain language of the statute 
prevents a plaintiff from reviving a barred claim by including it in a claim for 
other damages that is not time barred. If claims that have been filed are 
precluded because the action to recover for those claims was not commenced 
within the mandatory one-year period, those claims, indeed, are forever 
barred.

[¶31]   The claims for damages with respect 
to the additional six areas of subsidence discovered in the summer of 1992 and 
which were included in the second notice of claim filed December 24, 1992 are 
not time barred, however. The lawsuit to recover for those claims was filed 
April 1, 1993, well within the one-year period. The same is true with respect to 
the third notice of claim filed on April 21, 1993. That claim covered 
subsequently discovered areas of subsidence, and the action to proceed upon it 
was filed on September 13, 1993. Under the plain language of the applicable 
statute of limitations, all of Mountain View's claims except the claim for the 
first six areas of subsidence were appropriately noticed, filed, and pursued by 
litigation within the time limits provided by the statute. Those controversies 
are ripe for adjudication.

[¶32]   The remaining issue is the policy 
question of whether Brooks or Mountain View should be responsible for removing 
the obstructions to the construction by the water and sewer district that were 
found to be within the dedicated streets of the subdivision. We agree with the 
rationale espoused by the district court in its decision letter of September 16, 
1993:

The applicable law is set forth at 39 Am.Jur.2d, 
Highways, Streets, and Bridges, Section 277 and 278. The public authority 
responsible for maintaining the roadway has the power to require removal of all 
obstructions which unreasonably interfere with travel. The duty to remove the 
obstructions belongs to the agency that is responsible for placing the 
obstructions there. The agency placing the obstructions can be required to bear 
the costs of relocation without compensation.

[¶33]   The streets in Mountain View 
special improvement district were dedicated and the corresponding plat was 
recorded in 1923. Brooks had record notice of where the streets in the 
subdivision were located when it proceeded to accomplish the improvements for 
the water and sewer district. It could readily have determined prior to 
construction where the public streets would be developed. It had only to look at 
the plat and perhaps do a survey. Brooks could have avoided placing fire 
hydrants or other improvements within these public rights-of-way. In our view, 
Brooks could have, and therefore should have, taken the steps to insure its fire 
hydrants and other utilities were not obstructing the public right-of-way. We 
hold, in this instance, Brooks infringed upon the public way with its 
improvements.

[¶34]   Mountain View is the special 
improvement district responsible for the construction and maintenance of the 
public streets in the subdivision. It not only could, but it probably was 
required to, proceed with those improvements and insist upon removal of the 
hydrants and remediation of the subsidence problems which "unreasonably 
interfere with the enjoyment of the public right." We hold that the "duty to 
remove an obstruction was primarily upon the person or agency who was 
responsible for its existence." Brooks as the party responsible for the 
construction of obstructions within the public way, must bear the expense of 
removing the obstructions. In addition, Brooks must respond by paying damages to 
Mountain View for any subsidence that the finder of fact may conclude was caused 
by the removal of obstructions within the public way.

[¶35]   We reverse the decision of the 
district court in case No. 94-52. We affirm the decision of the district court 
in case No. 93-193, which essentially concerned itself with the application of 
the statute of limitations, and we affirm the ruling of the district court in 
case No. 93-217, which assigned the burden of the expenses relating to removal 
of improvements and recurring subsidence to Brooks. Case Nos. 94-52, 93-193, and 
93-217 are remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance 
with this opinion, with each of the respective parties to bear their own costs 
in these appeals.