Title: Plastics Engineering Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP333-CQ 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Plastics Engineering Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 7TH CIRCUIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 29, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-cross-appellee 
there 
were 
briefs by Michael J. Cohen, Pamela J. Tillman, and Meissner 
Tierney Fisher & Nichols S.C., Milwaukee, and John C. Sullivan 
and Post & Schell, P.C., Philadelphia, Pa., and oral argument by 
John C. Sullivan. 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant 
there 
were 
briefs by Jeffrey O. Davis, Keith A. Bruett, William H. Harbeck, 
David A. Strifling, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Jeffrey O. Davis. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Heidi L. Vogt and von 
Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, and Laura A. Foggan, John C. 
Yang, Lena Mirilovic and Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, D.C. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas R. Schrimpf and 
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Susan R. Tyndall and 
CMT Legal Group, Ltd., Waukesha, on behalf of London Market 
Insurers. 
 
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by Henry J. Handzel, Todd 
Palmer and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison; Randy Paar and 
Dickstein Shapiro LLP, New York, N.Y.; Michael T. Sharkey and 
Dickstein Shapiro LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Paper Council. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Karen M. Schapiro, 
Betsy Lawton, Madison, on behalf of Midwest Environmental 
Advocates, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Paul G. Kent, Alan G. 
B. Kim, Jr., and Anderson & Kent, S.C., Madison, and Amy Back, 
San Francisco, Cal., on behalf of United Policyholders. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Sarah C. Walkenhorst 
and Heller Ehrman LLP, Madison, and Mark J. Plumer and Heller 
Ehrman LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Utilities Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William J. Mulligan, 
James E. Braza, Susan G. Schellinger, and Davis & Kuelthau, 
S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) Small Business Legal Center. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Todd A. Becker and 
Coyne, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of 
the Transportation Insurance Company and the National Fire 
Insurance Company of Hartford. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP333-CQ  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Plastics Engineering Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. 
FILED 
 
JAN 29, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of questions of law from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Certified questions 
answered and cause remanded.    
 
¶1 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   This 
is 
a 
certification of questions of law from the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 821.01 (2005-06).1  The questions certified for determination 
are: "(1) what constitutes an 'occurrence' in an insurance 
contract when exposure injuries are sustained by numerous 
individuals, at varying geographical locations, over many years; 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
2 
 
(2) whether Wisconsin Statute § 631.43(1) applies to successive 
insurance policies; and (3) whether Wisconsin courts would adopt 
an 'all sums' or pro rata allocation approach to determining 
liability when an injury spans multiple, successive insurance 
policies."  
¶2 
At the outset, we recognize that a certification 
usually, and appropriately so, contains questions of law that 
cannot be answered by controlling precedent from the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.  See Wis. Stat. § 821.01.  In 
a certification, this court does not traditionally decide the 
issues as if we were reviewing the decision of the magistrate 
judge.  The parties, however, did not brief or argue this case 
in response to the certified questions.  Rather, they briefed 
and argued this case as if we were called upon to affirm or 
reverse Judge Goodstein's decision.2   
¶3 
The certification noted that "[h]ow these [policy] 
provisions are interpreted in the context of long-tailed 
exposure claims under Wisconsin law will significantly shape the 
future of insurance litigation in the state."  Here we analyze 
the certified questions by turning to the specific policy 
language, which apparently is standard language found in other 
insurance contracts governed by Wisconsin law.3  Wisconsin case 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, when arguing before the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the parties made nearly identical arguments. 
3 See Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 514 F.3d 
651, 660 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that this contract language 
undoubtedly appears in other contracts governed by Wisconsin 
law).   
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
3 
 
law has not interpreted such a policy in light of these facts.  
Consequently, we answer these questions in a manner that could 
prove useful beyond the case now before the court.   
¶4 
We answer the three certified questions by concluding 
that under the language in this policy and the facts of this 
case, each claimant's repeated exposure is one occurrence; Wis. 
Stat. § 631.43(1) (1975-current)4 does not apply to successive 
insurance policies; and once this policy is triggered, Liberty 
Mutual must fully defend the lawsuit in its entirety and pay for 
all sums up to the policy limits that Plastics Engineering 
Company (Plenco) is obligated to pay because of the injury.  The 
policy language here does not support a pro rata allocation of 
damages. 
I. FACTS 
¶5 
Prior to filing motions for summary judgment at the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, the parties stipulated to the following facts: 
¶6 
From 
approximately 
1950 
until 
1983, 
Plenco 
manufactured and sold certain compounds that incorporated 
asbestos.  Plenco has now been named a defendant in a number of 
lawsuits because of bodily injury or wrongful death that are 
allegedly related to or have arisen from exposure to asbestos-
containing products sold by Plenco.  In general, the claimants 
                                                 
4 The language contained in Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) has not 
been revised since its creation in 1975.  Therefore, all 
subsequent references to this statute are to the 1975-current 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
4 
 
allege that they were injured by their first exposure to 
asbestos, but their asbestos-related injuries did not manifest 
until long after their exposure to the asbestos.  The claimants' 
exposures allegedly occurred at different times and at different 
geographical locations. 
¶7 
During periods of the alleged exposure and resulting 
injury, Liberty Mutual provided various insurance policies to 
Plenco.  The policies relevant to this litigation are the 
primary policies from February 9, 1968, through January 1, 1989, 
and the umbrella excess coverage policies from May 8, 1970, 
through January 1, 1984, and January 1, 1986, through January 1, 
1988.  In each of these years, Liberty Mutual was the insurer 
who issued the primary and excess policies.5  Primary policies 
beginning January 1, 1989, and excess policies beginning January 
1, 1988, contain an asbestos exclusion. 
¶8 
The policies at issue contained the following coverage 
limits: From February 9, 1968, through January 1, 1986, Liberty 
Mutual insured Plenco under a primary policy with coverage 
limits of $500,000 per occurrence and $500,000 annual aggregate.  
From January 1, 1986, through January 1, 1989, Liberty Mutual 
insured Plenco under a primary policy with coverage limits of 
$1,000,000 per occurrence and $1,000,000 annual aggregate.  
                                                 
5 While, according to the stipulated facts, Plenco purchased 
excess or umbrella excess policies from other insurers at times 
when it sold asbestos-containing products, those policies are 
not at issue in this litigation.   
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
5 
 
¶9 
From May 8, 1970, through January 1, 1984, Liberty 
Mutual also insured Plenco under umbrella excess liability 
policies.  From May 8, 1970, through December 19, 1972, the 
coverage limits under each excess policy were $1,000,000 per 
occurrence and $1,000,000 annual aggregate.  From December 19, 
1972, through January 1, 1982, the coverage limits under each 
excess policy were $5,000,000 per occurrence and $5,000,000 
annual aggregate.  From January 1, 1982, through January 1, 
1984, the coverage limits under each excess policy were 
$1,000,000 per occurrence and $1,000,000 annual aggregate.  From 
January 1, 1984, through January 1, 1986, Liberty Mutual did not 
provide Plenco with umbrella excess liability coverage.  From 
January 1, 1986, through January 1, 1988, the coverage limits 
for each policy were $10,000,000 per occurrence and annual 
aggregate.   
¶10 The primary policies issued by Liberty Mutual to 
Plenco from January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1989, contained 
the following or similar insuring clause: 
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of  
Coverage A. bodily injury or  
Coverage B. property damage  
to which this policy applies, caused by an occurrence, 
and the company shall have the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on 
account of such bodily injury or property damage, even 
if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, 
false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation 
and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
6 
 
expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to 
pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after 
the applicable limit of the company's liability has 
been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.  
¶11 The primary policies provided the following definition 
for "bodily injury": From January 1, 1967, through January 1, 
1973, the policies defined "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, 
sickness or disease sustained by any person."  From January 1, 
1973, through January 1, 1989, the primary policies defined 
"bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained 
by any person which occurs during the policy period, including 
death at any time resulting therefrom." 
¶12 The primary policies provided the following definition 
of "occurrence": From January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1973, 
the primary policies defined "occurrence" as "an accident, 
including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, 
during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage 
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured."  From January 1, 1973, through January 1, 1989, the 
primary policies defined "occurrence" using the following or 
similar language, "an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or 
property 
damage 
neither 
expected 
nor 
intended 
from 
the 
standpoint of the insured." 
¶13 The primary policies from January 1, 1967, through 
January 1, 1973, provided the following Limits of Liability 
provision: 
Regardless of the number of (1) insureds under this 
policy, (2) persons or organizations who sustain 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
7 
 
bodily injury or property damage or (3) claims made or 
suits brought on account of bodily injury or property 
damage, the company's liability is limited as follows:  
Coverage A——The limit of bodily injury liability 
stated in the declarations as applicable to "each 
person" is the limit of the company's liability for 
all damages because of bodily injury sustained by one 
person as the result of any one occurrence; but 
subject to the above provision respecting "each 
person", the total liability of the company for all 
damages because of bodily injury sustained by two or 
more persons as the result of any one occurrence shall 
not exceed the limit of bodily injury liability stated 
in 
the 
declarations 
as 
applicable 
to 
"each 
occurrence".  
. . .   
Coverages A and B——For purposes of determining the 
limit of the company's liability, all bodily injury 
and property damage arising out of continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
conditions shall be considered as arising out of one 
occurrence.  
¶14 From January 1, 1973, through January 1, 1977, the 
Limits of Liability provision was substantially the same as the 
January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1973, provision. 
¶15 The primary policies issued by Liberty Mutual from 
January 1, 1977, through January 1, 1984, contained a Combined 
Single Aggregate Limit of Liability Endorsement, and those 
policies used the following or similar language: 
COMBINED SINGLE AGGREGATE LIMIT OF LIABILITY  
Regardless of the number of (1) insureds, under this 
policy, (2) persons or organizations who sustain 
bodily injury or property damage or (3) claims made or 
suits brought on account of bodily injury or property 
damage, the company's liability is limited as follows:  
Coverage A and B——The total liability of the company 
for all damages because of all bodily injury and 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
8 
 
property damage to which this policy applies shall not 
exceed [$]500,000.  
Subject to the above provision respecting the total 
liability of the company for all Bodily Injury and 
Property Damage to which this policy applies, if an 
occurrence gives rise to Bodily Injury or Property 
Damage which occurs partly before and partly within 
the policy period the liability of the company under 
this policy for such occurrence shall not exceed 
$500,000 minus the total of all payments made with 
respect to such occurrence under a previous policy or 
policies of which this policy is a replacement.  
For the purpose of determining the limit of the 
company's liability (1) all bodily injury and property 
damage arising out of the continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general conditions 
shall 
be 
considered 
as 
arising 
out 
of 
one 
occurrence[.]  
¶16 The primary policies issued by Liberty Mutual to 
Plenco from January 1, 1984, through January 1, 1989, contained 
a Limits of Liability provision that differed from the above 
stated provisions, but neither party asserts any meaningful 
difference exists.  
¶17 The excess policies issued by Liberty Mutual to Plenco 
from May 8, 1970, through January 1, 1984, and from January 1, 
1986, to January 1, 1988, included the following or similar 
language: 
COVERAGE——EXCESS LIABILITY  
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
in excess of the retained limit which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay, or with the 
consent of the company, agrees to pay, as damages, 
direct or consequential, because of:  
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
9 
 
 
(a) personal injury, . . .  
with respect to which this policy applies and caused 
by an occurrence.  
¶18 The excess policies issued by Liberty Mutual to Plenco 
from May 8, 1970, through January 1, 1984, and from January 1, 
1986, to January 1, 1988, defined "personal injury" using the 
following or similar language: "'personal injury' means personal 
injury or bodily injury which occurs during the policy period 
sustained by a natural person . . . ."  
¶19 The excess policies issued by Liberty Mutual to Plenco 
from May 8, 1970, through January 1, 1984, and from January 1, 
1986, to January 1, 1988, defined "occurrence" using the 
following or similar language: "'occurrence' means injurious 
exposure 
to 
conditions, 
which 
results 
in 
personal 
injury . . . neither expected nor intended from the standpoint 
of the insured."  
¶20 The excess policies issued by Liberty Mutual to Plenco 
from May 8, 1970, through January 1, 1984, and from January 1, 
1986, to January 1, 1988, contained a Limits of Liability 
provision using the following or similar language: 
Regardless of the number of insureds, under this 
policy or the number of persons or organizations who 
sustain 
personal 
injury, 
property 
damage 
or 
advertising injury or damage, the company's liability 
is limited as follows:  
Each Occurrence——The limit of liability stated in the 
declarations as applicable to "each occurrence" is the 
limit of the company's liability for all damages, 
direct and consequential, because of all personal 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
10 
 
injury, property damage, or advertising injury or 
damage 
sustained 
by 
one 
or 
more 
persons 
or 
organizations as the result of any one occurrence. 
. . .  
For the purpose of determining the limits of the 
company's liability:  
(1) all personal injury and property damage arising 
out 
of 
continuous 
or 
repeated 
exposure 
to 
substantially the same general conditions . . .  
shall be considered as the result of one and the same 
occurrence.  
¶21 The excess policies issued by Liberty Mutual to Plenco 
from May 8, 1970, through January 1, 1984, and from January 1, 
1986, to January 1, 1988, included the following or similar 
language: 
Non-Cumulation of Liability-Same Occurrence-If the 
same 
occurrence 
gives 
rise 
to 
personal 
injury, 
property damage or advertising injury or damage which 
occurs partly before and partly within any annual 
period of this policy, the each occurrence limit and 
the applicable aggregate limit or limits of this 
policy shall be reduced by the amount of each payment 
made by the company with respect to such occurrence, 
either under a previous policy or policies of which 
this is a replacement, or under this policy with 
respect to previous annual periods thereof.  
¶22 Liberty Mutual has been paying all of Plenco's defense 
costs, settlements and judgments, and Liberty Mutual advised 
Plenco that through December 15, 2005, Liberty Mutual has paid 
approximately $14.3 million in asbestos claims on Plenco's 
behalf.  Liberty Mutual defended Plenco and paid settlements and 
judgments under a reservation of rights as set forth in 
correspondence sent to Plenco on or about January 6, 2004, 
(incorrectly dated January 6, 2003) and June 15, 2004.  
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
11 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶23 On September 1, 2004, Plenco filed a complaint against 
Liberty Mutual seeking declaratory judgment regarding Liberty 
Mutual's obligation to defend and indemnify Plenco for lawsuits 
that arose out of the claimants' alleged exposure to Plenco's 
asbestos-containing products.  Liberty Mutual sought declaratory 
judgment absolving it from the responsibility to pay certain 
defense and indemnification expenses.  On December 15, 2005, the 
parties stipulated to the pertinent facts regarding their 
respective summary judgment motions. 
¶24 On October 27, 2006, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Aaron E. Goodstein, 
United States Magistrate Judge, issued a written decision and 
order.6  The district court granted in part and denied in part 
each party's motion for summary judgment.  The district court 
issued a final declaratory judgment on December 6, 2006, and, in 
part, concluded the following: 
¶25 First, each person's injury resulting from exposure to 
asbestos-containing products constitutes a separate occurrence 
under Liberty Mutual's policies issued to Plenco.  Second, the 
non-cumulation 
provisions 
limit 
an 
individual 
claimant's 
recovery.  Third, Liberty Mutual is obligated to pay all sums 
arising from an occurrence and is not entitled to a pro rata 
contribution from Plenco. 
                                                 
6 Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 
F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
12 
 
¶26 Liberty Mutual appealed the district court's first and 
third conclusions, and Plenco appealed the district court's 
second conclusion.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that the three conclusions present 
important questions of unresolved Wisconsin law.  The court of 
appeals stated, "[b]ecause current Wisconsin law does not 
provide sufficient guidance as to how the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court would resolve these issues, we stay this appeal and 
certify three questions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Circuit Rule 52 and Wisconsin Statute § 821.01."  This court 
accepted the certification. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a 
question of law, which this court reviews de novo.  Danbeck v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 
N.W.2d 150.  An insurance policy is to be construed so as to 
give effect to the parties' intentions.  Id.  The contract's 
words are to be given their common and ordinary meaning, and 
when the policy language is plain and unambiguous, we enforce 
the contract as written and without resorting to the rules of 
construction or principles from the case law.  Id.  If the 
contract language is ambiguous, i.e., if it is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation, the language is 
construed in favor of coverage.  Id. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶28 As stated above, this case presents three questions 
for review.  We conclude that under the language in this policy 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
13 
 
and the facts of this case, each claimant's repeated exposure is 
one occurrence; Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) does not apply to 
successive 
insurance 
policies; 
and 
once 
this 
policy 
is 
triggered, Liberty Mutual must fully defend the lawsuit in its 
entirety and pay for all sums up to the policy limits that 
Plenco is obligated to pay because of the injury.  The policy 
language here does not support a pro rata allocation of damages. 
A. Occurrence 
¶29 First, under this policy and the facts of this case, 
we must determine what constitutes an occurrence and how many 
occurrences have taken place.  Liberty Mutual argues that 
Plenco's manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products 
without warning constitutes one occurrence regardless of the 
number of people injured.  Plenco, on the other hand, argues 
that each individual's exposure to asbestos, which results in 
injury, constitutes a single occurrence.  Under Plenco's 
argument, several occurrences have taken place because many 
people have been exposed over the span of many years.  Given the 
policy language, we agree with Plenco and conclude that each 
individual's repeated exposure constitutes an occurrence. 
¶30 At the outset we recognize that the determination of 
what constitutes an occurrence in asbestos-related claims has 
produced varying results throughout the country.  See London 
Mkt. Insurers v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 161 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (discussing the different approaches that courts have 
taken around the country).  For example, some courts have 
concluded that it is the manufacture and sale of asbestos-
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
14 
 
containing products that constitutes the occurrence.7  Some 
courts have concluded that when exposure occurs at the same time 
and place, despite the fact that many individuals are injured, 
there is but one occurrence per time and place.8  Some courts 
have concluded that the individual claimant's repeated exposure 
to asbestos-containing products constitutes the occurrence.9  In 
this court's view, it is the policy language here that controls 
the analysis.10   
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 418 
F.3d 330, 334-39 (3d Cir. 2005); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 772-74 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. 
Supp. 1515, 1524-28 (D.D.C. 1984); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 21-23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1993); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 
1257-60 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995).  
8 See, e.g., Fina, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 184 
F. Supp. 2d 547, 549-53 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 896-909 (Conn. 2001).   
9 See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 79-83 
(2d Cir. 1998); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. 
Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1212-14 (2d Cir. 1995); Commercial Union 
Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 698 A.2d 1167, 1210-11 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1997); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 588 So. 2d 376, 390-91 
(La. Ct. App. 1991). 
10 The London Market court criticizes a number of the courts 
cited above for their failure to examine the relevant policy 
language. 
 
London 
Mkt. 
Insurers 
v. 
Superior 
Court, 
53 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 161 (Ct. App. 2007).  The court states, 
"while 
we 
recognize 
that 
consistent 
interpretation 
of 
standardized 
terms 
in 
insurance 
contracts 
promotes 
clear 
understanding of future contracts, it would be foolish to state 
as a matter of law that the word occurrence has the same meaning 
in all insurance contracts."  Id.  (citing Flintkote Co. v. Gen. 
Accident Assurance Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (N.D. Cal. 
2006)) (internal quotations and ellipses removed).  
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
15 
 
1. What Constitutes an Occurrence 
¶31 The policy here defines "occurrence" as "an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which 
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured."11  In this case, 
the claimants were allegedly injured by continuous and repeated 
exposure to asbestos fibers from Plenco's asbestos-containing 
products.  Without exposure, no bodily injury takes place.  Our 
conclusion that exposure to asbestos falls within an exposure to 
conditions, 
as 
referenced 
in 
this 
policy, 
is 
the 
most 
reasonable, unstrained approach.  Furthermore, even if we were 
to 
conclude 
that 
there 
is 
more 
than 
one 
reasonable 
interpretation of this policy language, the policy is still 
construed in favor of affording coverage to the insured.  See 
Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10 (stating that "[i]f the language 
is ambiguous, it is construed in favor of coverage").   
                                                 
11 This definition, which was used in the primary policy 
from January 1, 1973, through January 1, 1989, and the following 
two definitions of "occurrence" are taken from the stipulated 
facts in this case.  The parties do not assert that the 
differences between these three definitions change the meaning 
of "occurrence"; we agree.  As stated in ¶12, the primary policy 
from January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1973, used the 
following definition of "occurrence": "an accident, including 
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the 
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither 
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."  As 
stated in ¶19, the excess policies used the following definition 
of "occurrence": "'occurrence' means injurious exposure to 
conditions, 
which 
results 
in 
personal 
injury . . . neither 
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
16 
 
¶32 Liberty Mutual urges us to adopt the conclusion that 
it is the manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products 
without warning that is the occurrence.  When looking at the 
plain language of the policy and applying that policy language 
to the facts of this case, we are not persuaded by Liberty 
Mutual's argument.   
¶33 Liberty Mutual attempts to support its argument that 
the manufacture and sale without warning is the occurrence by 
relying on the Limits of Liability provision, which is found in 
all of the policies with some variation.  In forwarding its 
"sale without warning" occurrence argument, Liberty Mutual 
asserts that the policy contemplates a single occurrence theory.  
Liberty Mutual argues that the number of people injured does not 
dictate the number of occurrences.  Liberty Mutual cites to the 
Limits of Liability provision, which provides, "all bodily 
injury and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be 
considered as arising out of one occurrence."  
¶34 We disagree with Liberty Mutual's application of the 
Limits of Liability provision.  The Limits of Liability 
provision in this case functions to limit an individual 
claimant's 
repeated 
and 
continuous 
exposure 
to 
asbestos-
containing products as being just one occurrence.  In other 
words, this provision precludes a claimant from asserting that 
each time he or she was exposed to an asbestos-containing 
product, a new occurrence arose.   
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
17 
 
 
2. Number of Occurrences   
¶35 When 
called 
upon 
to 
determine 
the 
number 
of 
occurrences, we conclude that when we apply the policy language 
to the facts of this case, each individual's repeated and 
continuous exposure constitutes an occurrence.  Wisconsin has 
adopted the "cause theory" to determine how many occurrences 
have taken place.  Olsen v. Moore, 56 Wis. 2d 340, 348-51, 202 
N.W.2d 236 (1972); see also Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & 
Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 287 (Ill. 2006) (stating 
that "the terms of the insurance policy are not always 
sufficient, standing alone, to permit a definitive determination 
as to whether a particular case involves one occurrence or 
many," and as a result, "American courts have developed two 
basic approaches for assessing the number of occurrences that 
took place within the meaning of policies"——the cause theory and 
the effect theory).   
¶36 Under the cause theory, "where a single, uninterrupted 
cause results in all of the injuries and damage, there is but 
one 'accident' or 'occurrence.'"  Welter v. Singer, 126 
Wis. 2d 242, 250, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1985).  "If the cause 
is interrupted or replaced by another cause, the chain of 
causation is broken and there has been more than one accident or 
occurrence."  Id. (citing Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 349).  Welter, 
therefore, lends further support for the conclusion that a 
separate occurrence is not found each time the same claimant is 
exposed to Plenco's product.  
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
18 
 
¶37 In Welter, Bruce Welter was riding his bicycle when he 
was struck by a car.  Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 246.  The driver 
initially stopped but then drove forward to move out of the 
intersection, which led to Welter being dragged beneath the car.  
Id.  After initially stopping, the driver moved the car forward 
a second time and then got out of the car to let someone else 
behind the wheel.  Id.  This second driver tried to free Welter 
by backing up about ten feet.  Id.  Welter brought suit alleging 
four separate causes of action with each cause of action 
corresponding to the three times the first driver put the car in 
motion and the one time the second driver put the car in motion.  
Id.   
¶38 The court of appeals concluded that under the cause 
theory, only one occurrence took place because the cause and 
result were "so simultaneous or so closely linked in time and 
space as to be considered by the average person as one event," 
and therefore, only a single occurrence had taken place.  Id. at 
251.  The court of appeals, relying on Appalachian Insurance Co. 
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., also stated: 
The general rule is that an occurrence is 
determined by the cause or causes of the resulting 
injury. . . .  
The fact that there were multiple injuries and 
that they were of different magnitudes and that 
injuries extended over a period of time does not alter 
our conclusion that there was a single occurrence.  As 
long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause 
there is a single occurrence. 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
19 
 
Id. at 250-51 (citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982)).  
¶39 In the case at hand, each individual claimant's 
injuries stem from the continued and repeated exposure to 
asbestos-containing products.  Thus, under the policy language 
and the cause theory, each claimant's repeated exposure is one 
occurrence. 
¶40 Liberty Mutual argues that the number of occurrences 
is not dictated by the numerous individuals who sustained 
injuries at varying geographical locations over many years.  In 
addition, it argues that inserting an identity-of-location 
requirement would rewrite the policies.  We, however, inject no 
such "requirement."  The occurrence in this case is the repeated 
exposure to asbestos-containing products because the policy 
states that an occurrence is the "continuous or repeated 
exposure" to conditions.  Multiple occurrences arise because 
each individual's injury stems from his or her repeated exposure 
to asbestos-containing products.   
¶41 Liberty Mutual also argues that it is inconsistent 
with Society Insurance v. Town of Franklin, 2000 WI App 35, 233 
Wis. 2d 207, 607 N.W.2d 342, to conclude that more than one 
occurrence has taken place in the case at hand.  However, the 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
20 
 
number of occurrences was not at issue in Society.  Id., ¶7.12  
Rather, in Society, the court of appeals was asked to decide 
which policies were triggered so the limits of the defendant's 
liability could be determined.  Id., ¶¶7-13 (discussing and 
applying the continuous trigger theory to determine which 
policies had been triggered).  Unlike today, the court in 
Society was not called upon to determine what constitutes an 
occurrence or how many occurrences had taken place.  In that 
respect, Society does not impact our determination. 
¶42 Lastly, Liberty Mutual argues that occurrence should 
be interpreted from the standpoint of the insured, and as a 
result, it is the sale without warning that is the occurrence.  
Again, we turn to the language of the policy, which defines 
"occurrence" 
as 
the 
"continuous 
or 
repeated 
exposure 
to 
conditions."  The exposure must, quite obviously, be exposure to 
the injured person and not exposure to Plenco. 
¶43 Accordingly, when we apply the policy language to the 
facts of this case, we conclude that each individual's repeated 
and continuous exposure constitutes an occurrence.   
                                                 
12 In Society, the parties agreed that only one occurrence 
had taken place and the court of appeals concluded that "Society 
must make good on each [triggered] policy."  Society Ins. v. 
Town of Franklin, 2000 WI App 35, ¶11, 233 Wis. 2d 207, 607 
N.W.2d 342.  This does not give rise to an inconsistency.  The 
number of policies triggered is distinct from the number of 
occurrences.  The district court, here, seemingly concluded that 
because there was only one occurrence, multiple policies could 
not be triggered.  However, under a continuous trigger theory, 
each policy from injury to manifestation may be triggered 
despite the fact that only one occurrence, the repeated and 
continuous exposure, caused the injury. 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
21 
 
B. Non-cumulation provision 
¶44 Next, we must determine whether Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) 
applies to successive insurance policies.  Section 631.43(1), 
"General," provides: 
When 2 or more policies promise to indemnify an 
insured against the same loss, no "other insurance" 
provisions of the policy may reduce the aggregate 
protection of the insured below the lesser of the 
actual insured loss suffered by the insured or the 
total indemnification promised by the policies if 
there 
were no 
"other insurance" provisions. The 
policies may by their terms define the extent to which 
each is primary and each excess, but if the policies 
contain inconsistent terms on that point, the insurers 
shall be jointly and severally liable to the insured 
on any coverage where the terms are inconsistent, each 
to the full amount of coverage it provided. Settlement 
among the insurers shall not alter any rights of the 
insured. 
¶45 Plenco asserts that by adopting Wis. Stat. § 631.43 
the legislature sought to prohibit insurers from attempting to 
reduce their coverage obligations below the aggregate limits of 
their policies.  Plenco accordingly argues that Liberty Mutual's 
non-cumulation provision does exactly what this statute was 
meant to prohibit.  Liberty Mutual, on the other hand, argues 
that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) is not applicable in the case at 
hand because the statute applies to concurrent insurance 
policies.  We agree with Liberty Mutual and conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 631.43(1) does not apply to successive insurance 
policies. 
¶46 This statute applies when two conditions are met:  
First, the policies must indemnify an insured against the same 
loss.  See Martin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 40, ¶¶13-
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
22 
 
15, 19, 23, 252 Wis. 2d 103, 643 N.W.2d 452 (discussing when 
policies promise to indemnify for the same loss and advocating a 
case-by-case determination).  
¶47 Second, this statute applies to "other insurance" 
provisions.  Section 631.43(1) refers specifically to "'other 
insurance' 
provisions" 
by 
placing 
quotes 
around 
"other 
insurance."  When the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 631.43, 
it included, in part, the following note in the Laws of 
Wisconsin:   
NOTE: This section is adapted from s. 203.11,13 
but extended to all indemnity coverage, including the 
indemnity coverages in disability insurance. . . .  
The most important objective of the law is to give the 
insured full protection with minimum difficulty and 
joint and several liability does that.  The insurers 
may then settle accounts among themselves.  They will 
usually be able to do so by agreement.  If they 
cannot, a court can do so first by interpreting the 
terms 
of 
the 
policies 
and, 
where 
they 
are 
inconsistent, 
applying 
restitutionary 
principles. . . . 
Section 41, ch. 375, Laws of 1975 (footnote added).   
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 203.11 (1973-74), "Effect of other 
policies on same risk," provided in part: 
[T]he insuring company shall not be liable for loss or 
damage occurring while the insured shall have any 
other 
contract 
of 
insurance, . . . such 
other 
or 
additional 
insurance, . . . shall 
nevertheless 
not 
operate to relieve the insuring company from liability 
for loss or damage occurring while the insured shall 
have such other contract of insurance . . . . Subject 
to all other terms and conditions of its policy, each 
insuring company shall be liable for its proportionate 
share of any such loss or damage . . . . 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
23 
 
¶48 The accepted meaning of "other insurance" provisions 
does not include application to successive insurance policies.  
In Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. Hall, 2006 WI 13, 288 
Wis. 2d 282, 
709 
N.W.2d 46, 
when 
dealing 
with 
concurrent 
policies, we stated: 
The purpose of an "other insurance" clause is to 
define which coverage is primary and which coverage is 
excess 
between 
policies. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1); 
Remiszewski v. American Family Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 
175, ¶ 29, 276 Wis. 2d 167, 687 N.W.2d 809 (citing 
§ 631.43(1)).  "'Other insurance' clauses govern the 
relationship between insurers, they do not affect the 
right of the insured to recover under each concurrent 
policy."  15 Couch on Insurance, § 219.1, at 219-8 (3d 
ed. 1999). 
Id., ¶27.  "Whenever there are two policies that apply to the 
same insured at the same time, the issue of which policy must 
pay first——or which is primary and which is excess——is dealt 
with by other insurance clauses."  Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin 
Insurance 
Law 
§ 11.2 
(5th 
ed. 
2004) 
(discussing 
"other 
insurance" clauses and referring to Wis. Stat. § 631.43); see 
also Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other 
Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 
1373, 
1376-82 
(1995) 
(discussing 
"other 
insurance" 
provisions and stating that "'[o]ther insurance' refers only to 
two or more policies insuring the same risk, and the same 
interest, for the benefit of the same person, during the same 
period"). 
¶49 In this case, neither of the requisite conditions are 
met, and therefore, Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) does not apply.  The 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
24 
 
issue is not which of two or more policies pays first because 
the Liberty Mutual policies are not concurrent policies between 
competing 
insurers 
that 
apply 
to 
the 
same 
time 
period.  
Therefore, the insured's right to recover is not affected and 
Wis. Stat. § 631.43 does not apply. 
¶50 In an attempt to limit the scope of Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43, Liberty Mutual argued to this court that this statute 
only applied in the context of automobile policies.  We disagree 
because the text of the statute does not support such a 
restriction.  Moreover, this statute falls under chapter 631 
entitled "Insurance Contracts Generally" rather than under 
chapter 632, subchapter IV, which is entitled "Automobile and 
Motor Vehicle Insurance."  Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) 
does not apply to successive insurance policies. 
C. Allocation 
¶51 Lastly, we must decide the extent of Liberty Mutual's 
duty to defend and indemnify when the claimant's alleged injury 
does not occur entirely within a policy period.  Plenco argues 
that Liberty Mutual must fully defend the lawsuits and that 
Liberty Mutual is obligated to indemnify all sums, up to the 
policy limits.  Liberty Mutual, on the other hand, argues that 
it need not defend nor indemnify for injury that takes place 
outside the policy period.  We conclude that once this policy is 
triggered, Liberty Mutual must fully defend the lawsuit in its 
entirety 
and 
that 
under 
its 
policy, 
Liberty 
Mutual 
is 
responsible for "all sums," up to policy limits, whether the 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
25 
 
compensation is for damage that occurs "partly before and partly 
within the policy period."   
¶52 Again, we acknowledge that courts across the country 
have largely taken one of two approaches.  Some courts have 
adopted a pro rata approach to allocating damages.14  Under a 
pro rata approach, the insurer is responsible for only a 
pro rata share of the damages based upon the years that it 
provided coverage relative to years when no coverage was 
purchased.  Thus, an insurer is liable for only the damages that 
accrue during a policy period.  Other courts have adopted an 
"all sums" approach.15  Under an all sums approach, the insurer 
is required to pay all sums that result from bodily injury that 
has triggered a policy. 
¶53 To determine which policies are triggered, Wisconsin 
has adopted the continuous trigger theory.  Society, 233 
Wis. 2d 207, ¶¶8-9.  This approach is especially useful in cases 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 118 (Conn. 2003); Domtar, Inc. v. 
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732-33 (Minn. 1997); 
Spartan Petrol. Co., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 
805, 812 (4th Cir. 1998); Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 
F.3d 307, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2000); Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical 
Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 371-73 
(5th Cir. 1993); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 
F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985). 
15 See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 
490-94 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 
759 N.E.2d 1049, 1058 (Ind. 2001); Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. 
B&L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Wash. 1998); 
J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 
507 (Pa. 1993); ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 
968, 974 (3d Cir. 1985).  
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
26 
 
that involve an ongoing exposure to a harmful substance with 
harm occurring over several policy periods.  Id.  A policy is 
triggered when injury occurs during the policy period.  Id., ¶8.  
Under the continuous trigger theory, all policies are triggered 
from exposure until manifestation.  Id.  Under the language of 
this policy, "bodily injury, sickness or disease" "during the 
policy period" triggers the policy.   
¶54 Once a policy is triggered, the policy requires 
Liberty Mutual to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of Coverage A. bodily injury or Coverage B. property 
damage to which this policy applies, caused by an occurrence 
. . . ."  However, in the years where no policy existed, there 
are no policy limits to be paid. 
¶55 In our analysis, we are again driven by the policy 
language.  Liberty Mutual's policy contains no language that 
limits its obligation to a pro rata share.  In fact, the policy 
obligates Liberty Mutual to pay for injury that occurs "partly 
before and partly within the policy period."  "[I]f an 
occurrence gives rise to Bodily Injury or Property Damage which 
occurs partly before and partly within the policy period the 
liability of the company under this policy for such occurrence 
shall not exceed $500,000 . . . ."  In addition, even if there 
is arguably some language to support a pro rata allocation, that 
too is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, 
and as a result, we must construe the policy language in favor 
of coverage.  See Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10.   
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
27 
 
¶56 Given Liberty Mutual's definition of "occurrence," 
which includes "continuous or repeated exposure," Liberty Mutual 
contemplated a long-lasting occurrence that could give rise to 
bodily injury over an extended period of time; nonetheless, it 
failed to specifically include a pro rata clause.  Moreover, the 
language of the aggregate liability section also reflects that 
Liberty Mutual contemplated coverage for damages that fall 
outside the policy period.   
¶57 Liberty Mutual argues that the definition of "bodily 
injury" supports its pro rata argument.  "Bodily injury" is 
defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any 
person which occurs during the policy period, including death at 
any time resulting therefrom."  As a result, Liberty Mutual 
argues that the policy only covers bodily injury that occurs 
during a policy period.  However, bodily injury during the 
policy period is what triggers the policy; the definition of 
"bodily injury" is not a limitation of liability clause.   
¶58 Liberty Mutual also argues that if Plenco did not 
purchase a policy for specific periods of time, Plenco should 
not be awarded coverage for those times that it did not pay for 
coverage.  Under the language of this policy——once a policy is 
triggered by bodily injury, Liberty Mutual is responsible for 
"all sums" that arise out of the injury, up to that policy's 
limits.  
¶59 Liberty Mutual lastly argues that by adopting an all 
sums approach, we are rewriting the contract.  This argument is 
puzzling given that no pro rata language or clause exists in the 
No. 
2008AP333-CQ   
 
28 
 
contract, and in fact, the phrase "all sums" is in the body of 
the policy.  Thus, to insert the pro rata language, we would 
have to rewrite the insurance policy.   
¶60 In addition to our conclusion that a pro rata approach 
does not apply to allocating damages here, we also conclude that 
there can be no pro rata approach to the duty to defend.  Under 
Wisconsin law, if coverage exists, an insurer must defend the 
entire suit even though some of the allegations fall outside the 
scope of coverage.  U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Good Humor Corp., 173 
Wis. 2d 804, 824-25, 496 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1993).  Here, the 
same principle applies.  We do not base the scope of a duty to 
defend upon whether some allegations fall outside of the 
complaint or whether some of the damages fall partly within and 
partly outside of a policy period.  If the duty to defend 
arises, the insurer must defend the lawsuit in its entirety. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶61 We conclude that under the language in this policy and 
the facts of this case, each claimant's repeated exposure is one 
occurrence; Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) does not apply to successive 
insurance policies; and once this policy is triggered, Liberty 
Mutual must fully defend the lawsuit in its entirety and pay for 
all sums up to the policy limits that Plenco is obligated to pay 
because of the injury.  The policy language here does not 
support a pro rata allocation of damages. 
By the Court.—Certified questions of law answered and cause 
remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶62 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified to this court the 
following three questions of law that, according to the 
certification memorandum of the federal court of appeals, are 
"unresolved by Wisconsin appellate courts and are likely to 
recur in future lawsuits:"   
(1) What constitutes an "occurrence" in an insurance 
contract when exposure injuries are sustained by 
numerous 
individuals, 
at 
varying 
geographical 
locations, over many years;  
(2) Whether Wisconsin Statute § 631.43(1) applies to 
successive insurance policies; and  
(3) Whether Wisconsin courts would adopt an "all sums" 
or 
pro rata 
allocation 
approach 
to 
determining 
liability when an injury spans multiple, successive 
insurance policies. 
¶63 This court agreed to respond to the three questions of 
law pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 821.01.1  This court's function 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 821.01 provides as follows: 
The 
supreme 
court 
may 
answer 
questions 
of 
law 
certified to it by the supreme court of the United 
States, a court of appeals of the United States or the 
highest appellate court of any other state when 
requested by the certifying court if there are  
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law 
of this state which may be determinative of the cause 
then pending in the certifying court and as to which 
it appears to the certifying court there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme 
court and the court of appeals of this state.  
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
2 
 
under certification is not to decide the case but to respond to 
questions of Wisconsin law so that the federal court may apply 
the Wisconsin law in deciding the case.   
¶64 As the federal court of appeals reminds us in its 
certification memorandum, certification is not appropriate when 
resolution of the issues has limited precedential effect.  
Certification is appropriate, according to the federal court of 
appeals, when resolution of contract questions "will be useful 
beyond the parameters of the instant dispute." 
¶65 The majority opinion correctly states that in an 
insurance coverage dispute such as this one, a court begins its 
analysis by turning to the language of the policy.  Majority 
op., ¶30.  If the common and ordinary meaning of the policy 
language yields a result, there is no occasion to turn to 
principles derived from the case law.  Majority op., ¶27.  The 
majority opinion also observes that "the terms of the insurance 
policy are not always sufficient, standing alone, to permit a 
definitive determination[.]"  Majority op., ¶35 (citing Nicor, 
Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Under this statute, the certifying court (here the federal 
court of appeals) retains jurisdiction of the case.  This 
certification process is entirely distinct from the process used 
when we accept certification from our own Wisconsin court of 
appeals under Wis. Stat. § 808.05(2).  In those cases, we accept 
jurisdiction of the entire case, and our standard practice is to 
decide all issues raised in the briefs, rather than to limit our 
response to the distinct questions of Wisconsin law raised in 
the certification memorandum of the Wisconsin court of appeals.  
See Jackson County v. DNR, 2006 WI 96, ¶¶42-48, 293 Wis. 2d 497, 
717 N.W.2d 713 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
3 
 
287 (Ill. 2006).  Here, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
clearly 
concluded 
that 
the 
policy 
language 
alone 
was 
insufficient to resolve the dispute.  If the policy language 
were sufficient or Wisconsin law were clear, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals would not have certified these questions. 
¶66 Because the majority tries so hard to limit its 
opinion to the language of the insurance policies at issue and 
the particularized facts of the instant case, I am concerned 
that the majority opinion has not responded to the certified 
questions of law but has instead decided the merits of the 
instant case.  I do not agree with this approach toward the 
certified questions. 
¶67 The majority, in my opinion, does what Liberty Mutual 
feared: Certification has allowed Plenco to get a decision on 
the merits of the case from this court instead of from the 
federal court in which Plenco brought its suit.  Liberty Mutual 
objected to certification, urging the federal court to bind 
Plenco to its chosen federal forum.2  By the majority's decision, 
Plenco has succeeded, in effect, in "removing" its federal case 
to the state court for a decision.  This is not the purpose of a 
federal court's certifying questions of law to this court.  If 
the certified questions cannot be answered by setting forth 
Wisconsin law, this court should return the certified questions 
unanswered. 
                                                 
2 Seventh 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals, 
certification 
memorandum. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶68 The parties briefed the first and third issues 
discussing separately the language of the insurance policies and 
relevant Wisconsin law.  The parties briefed the second issue 
discussing only Wisconsin law.  The majority opinion does not 
decouple its discussion of the text of the insurance policies 
and its discussion of relevant Wisconsin law, ultimately 
deciding the first and third certified questions of law on the 
basis of the language of the insurance policy and the facts of 
the instant case.3  I shall focus on Wisconsin law, as the 
certification requests.  The emphasis of this concurrence is 
therefore different from the emphasis of the majority opinion.  
I believe the concurrence is more in keeping with Wis. Stat. 
§ 821.01, 
the 
statute 
governing 
our 
answering 
certified 
questions. 
¶69 Because I write a concurrence, not a majority opinion, 
my analysis of Wisconsin law in responding to the certified 
questions is brief, citing to an explanation of Wisconsin law in 
the majority opinion whenever possible.  As I see it, the 
federal court will then have to interpret the insurance policies 
and apply Wisconsin law as set forth by this court.     
I 
¶70 I conclude as a matter of Wisconsin law, as does the 
majority opinion, that because each claimant's injury-causing 
exposure to asbestos occurred at different times, different 
locations, and under a variety of circumstances, involving 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶¶4, 29, 43, 51, 55, 59, 61. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
5 
 
different products over a 33-year period, each claimant's 
exposure must be viewed as a separate occurrence.4   
¶71 Liberty Mutual argues that thousands of disparate 
claims involving thousands of claimants alleging exposure to 
different asbestos-containing Plenco products, occurring over 
many decades and at numerous locations across the country, 
constitute one occurrence and that Plenco's insurance coverage 
for asbestos claims is limited to a single primary policy 
($500,000) for 1977-1984 and one excess policy ($10 million) for 
1971-1988.  Liberty Mutual asserts that the focus in Wisconsin 
law is on the underlying circumstance that caused the injury 
rather than on the number of persons injured.  Accordingly, 
Liberty Mutual asserts that multiple injuries with a single 
cause count as a single occurrence. 
¶72 I agree with Liberty Mutual that an occurrence under 
Wisconsin law can be ongoing and span a substantial amount of 
time but still be one occurrence within Wisconsin law.5  
¶73 Wisconsin has adopted the "cause" analysis, not the 
"effect" test, for determining the number of occurrences.  The 
focus of the "cause" analysis in a multiple injury situation is 
on the uninterrupted nature and closeness in time and location 
between the event and its consequent injuries.  Timing and 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶¶36-38, 41. 
5 See, e.g., Society Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 2000 WI App 
35, ¶7, 233 Wis. 2d 207, 607 N.W.2d 342 (parties do not dispute 
one continuous occurrence when damage was from pollution at one 
geographical site).  
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
6 
 
location are therefore critical factors in assessing whether 
there is a single occurrence or multiple occurrences.   
¶74 Our court has explained the "cause" test in Olsen v. 
Moore, 56 Wis. 2d 340, 349, 202 N.W.2d 236 (1972), as follows: 
If viewed from the point of view of a cause, it would 
appear that a 
single, uninterrupted cause which 
results in a number of injuries or separate instances 
of 
property 
damage 
is 
yet 
one 
"accident" 
or 
"occurrence."  If, however, that cause is interrupted 
or replaced by another cause the chain of causation is 
broken and more than one accident or occurrence has 
taken place.  
¶75 The instant case does not present one uninterrupted 
and continuing cause under Wisconsin law, as Liberty Mutual 
contends.  There is no basis under the Wisconsin "cause" 
analysis for aggregating events widely separated in time, space 
and circumstances into one occurrence.6  Liberty Mutual's 
position 
sweeps 
too 
broadly, 
and 
the 
result 
it 
reaches 
challenges common sense.   
II 
¶76 I conclude, as matter of law, as does the majority 
opinion, 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 631.43(1) 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
successive insurance policies.  See majority op., ¶¶44-50.   
                                                 
6 For similar analysis, see, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. 
Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Pittsburgh Corning Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 1988 WL 5302 
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 
698 A.2d 1167 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Mason v. Home Ins. Co. 
of Ill., 532 N.E.2d 526 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988). 
Other courts have concluded that placing a product in the 
stream of commerce is one occurrence.  See cases cited in 
majority opinion at note 7. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.ssa 
 
7 
 
 
III 
¶77 I agree with the majority opinion that Wisconsin 
courts would adopt an "all sums" approach to allocating damages 
and the duty to defend when an injury spans multiple, successive 
insurance policies.  See majority op., ¶¶51-54, 60.    
¶78 For the reasons set forth I write separately. 
 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶79 MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN, 
J. 
(concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).   
¶80 I concur in the majority opinion to the extent it 
holds 
that 
each 
exposed 
claimant 
constitutes 
a 
separate 
occurrence and that the non-cumulation clause is not violative 
of Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1).  However, the policies issued to 
Plenco by Liberty Mutual, by their plain language, do not apply 
to those portions of bodily injury which occurred during the 
time periods in which Plenco elected to not purchase insurance 
coverage from Liberty Mutual.  The reason the policies do not so 
apply is that no such policies were in existence during those 
periods.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part from the 
decision of the majority, authored by my learned and respected 
colleague. 
I. THE POLICY LANGUAGE 
¶81 To construe the language of the policy at issue so as 
to require Liberty Mutual to indemnify for "all sums" is to 
effectuate by judicial fiat policy coverage where none has been 
purchased and none has been provided.  It is, in effect, to 
reward the uninsured corporation for its failure to purchase 
insurance coverage by requiring its uncompensated provision, a 
condition neither supported by a fair and comprehensive reading 
of the entire policy nor contemplated by the parties.1  
                                                 
1 See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis and Cos., 986 P.2d 
924, 939-40 (Colo. 1999)(noting that the joint and several 
allocation approach "creates a false equivalence between an 
insured who has purchased insurance coverage continuously for 
many years and an insured who has purchased only one year of 
insurance coverage"). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
2 
 
¶82 This court should decline to grant coverage for 
periods in which none was bargained for by applying a time-on-
the-risk pro rata allocation of a loss between successive 
insurers and the insured when an occurrence takes place partly 
outside policy periods.  Under the time-on-the-risk pro rata 
approach, each insurer is liable only for the portion of 
occurrence taking place while that insurer is on the risk.  A 
corollary to this approach is that the insured retains the risk 
during any period for which it did not purchase insurance. 
A. Pro rata Allocation 
¶83 The majority states that the pro rata approach is 
contrary to the policies' plain language, partly because the 
words "all sums" appear in the policies and the words "pro rata" 
do 
not. 
 
However, 
courts 
in 
several 
jurisdictions 
have 
interpreted policy language essentially identical to the "all 
sums" language at issue in the present case2 and have determined 
that language to require a pro rata method of allocation. Those 
jurisdictions include the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
                                                 
2 The phrases "all sums" and "during the policy period" are 
common to the policy of all of these cases, with only slight 
variations as to whether the quoted portion of the policy refers 
to occurrences taking place during the policy period or instead 
mentions the bodily injury or property damage taking place 
during the policy period. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
3 
 
York, and Vermont.3 Many of those courts applied pro rata 
allocation in conjunction with the continuous trigger approach 
                                                 
3 Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mo. Elec. Coop., Inc., 278 
F.3d 
742 
(8th 
Cir. 
2001)(applying 
Missouri 
law); 
Sybron 
Transition Corp. v. Sec. Ins. of Hartford, 258 F.3d 595 (7th 
Cir. 2001)(applying New York law); Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 221 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2000)(applying New York law); Spartan 
Petro. Co., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805 (4th 
Cir. 1998)(applying South Carolina law); Chem. Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976 (3d Cir. 
1996)(applying New Jersey law); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos 
Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995)(applying New 
York and Texas law); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight 
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980)(applying 
Illinois and New Jersey law); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis 
and Cos., 986 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1999); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford 
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107 (Conn. 2003); E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 89C-AU-99, 1995 
Del. Super. LEXIS 488, 1995 WL 654020 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995); 
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1997); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 
N.E.2d 740 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 71 P.3d 1097 (Kan. 2003); Norfolk S. 
Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 201 (La. Ct. App. 
2003); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Utica Mut. Ins. 
Co., 802 A.2d 1070 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Arco Indus. Corp. 
v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); 
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 552 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 
1996); 
EnergyNorth 
Natural 
Gas, 
Inc. 
v. 
Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517 (N.H. 2007); Owens-
Illinois, 
Inc. 
v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 
1994); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 
N.E.2d 687 (N.Y. 2002); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., ___ A.2d ___, 
2008 Vt. 98 (Vt. 2008). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
4 
 
as followed in Wisconsin.4  Additionally, courts in Kentucky and 
Utah have required pro rata allocation in cases in which the 
opinions specify that the policy obligated the insurer to pay 
"all sums" the insured became legally obligated to pay as 
damages due to bodily injury or property damage caused by an 
occurrence, but the opinions were silent as to whether the 
policies limited coverage to occurrences, injury, or damage 
taking place "during the policy period."5  Moreover, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied pro rata 
allocation for a policy that bound the insurer to pay "those 
sums" that the insurer became obligated to pay because of bodily 
injury or property damage "to which this insurance applies."6   
¶84 Plenco uses the "all sums" label to great effect in a 
bootstrapping argument by pointing to the "all sums" language in 
                                                 
4 Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 
89 F.3d 976 (3d Cir. 1996); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis 
and Cos., 986 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1999); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford 
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107 (Conn. 2003); E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 89C-AU-99, 1995 
Del. Super. LEXIS 488, 1995 WL 654020 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995); 
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Stonewall Ins. Co., 71 P.3d 1097 (Kan. 2003); Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2002); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 934 A.2d 517 (N.H. 2007); Owens-
Illinois, 
Inc. 
v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 
1994); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., ___ A.2d ___, 2008 Vt. 98 (Vt. 
2008). 
5 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth of Ky., 179 S.W.3d 
830 (Ky. 2005); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 
931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). 
6 Gulf Chem. and Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & 
Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1993)(applying Texas law). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
5 
 
the policy as justification for adopting what it calls the "all 
sums" allocation method.7  
¶85 The plain language of the policy relieves Liberty 
Mutual from indemnifying Plenco for any portion of an occurrence 
taking place in part outside the period of a Liberty Mutual 
policy.  The Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") policy at 
issue here, like almost every other standardized CGL policy, 
provides that the insurer "will pay on behalf of the insured all 
sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay as damages 
because of . . . bodily injury or . . . property damage to which 
the policy applies, caused by an occurrence . . . ."  The policy 
definitions of both "bodily injury" and "property damage" are 
limited to that "which occurs during the policy period . . . ."  
Thus, the plain language of the policy makes clear that Plenco 
has purchased coverage only for bodily injury and property 
damage taking place during the policy period, and that there is 
no provision of coverage for periods for which no insurance has 
been purchased.  
¶86 The majority claims that the policy's limitation of 
coverage to bodily injury or property damage "which occurs 
during the policy period" is actually only a description of the 
                                                 
7 The name assigned to the allocation method cannot drive 
our analysis because there is no limit to the labels that could 
be applied to any particular allocation method.  For instance, 
one court, in rejecting joint and several allocation, referred 
to it as the "pick-and-choose" allocation method which allows 
insureds to consider an occurrence taking place over many years, 
during some of which there was no coverage, pick a year for 
which there was coverage, and then choose to assign the entirety 
of damages to that year.  See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis 
and Cos., 986 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1999).   
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
6 
 
trigger for the policy, and that it does not determine the scope 
of liability once triggered.  Majority op., ¶57.  The primary 
fault with this claim is its silence as to what then serves as 
the 
trigger 
for 
coverage 
for 
injuries 
and 
damages 
that 
indisputably took place during a time when Plenco chose to 
proceed self-insured and Liberty Mutual therefore issued no 
policies.  The phrase "which occurs during the policy period" 
cannot be merely trigger language because, under that logic, 
during any period for which there was no policy there would, by 
definition, be no such trigger phrase and, therefore, no 
coverage, yet the majority urges exactly the opposite result.  I 
maintain that injuries taking place when no policy is in effect 
cannot trigger an expired previous policy, a non-existent policy 
for the current period, or any future policy that may be 
purchased.  This position is in harmony with the continuous 
trigger approach, as illustrated by the previously cited cases 
from ten jurisdictions applying a continuous trigger analysis 
while also applying pro rata allocation to allow insurance 
coverage only for those periods for which the insured purchased 
such coverage.  See cases cited supra note 4. 
¶87 The majority incompletely quotes a portion of the 
policy's 
Combined 
Single 
Aggregate 
Limit 
of 
Liability 
Endorsement in order to claim that the policy's plain language 
supports imposition of coverage that was never requested or paid 
for. Majority op., ¶55.  The majority offers as its basis this 
first portion: "[I]f an occurrence gives rise to Bodily Injury 
or Property Damage which occurs partly before and partly within 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
7 
 
the policy period the liability of [Liberty Mutual] under this 
policy for such occurrence shall not exceed $500,000 . . . ." 
Id.  However, the majority's analysis fails to acknowledge that 
the quoted provision continues: "minus the total of all payments 
made with respect to such occurrence under a previous policy or 
policies of which this policy is a replacement."  Thus, the 
majority has cited as its basis nothing more than a statement 
that the per occurrence liability limit still applies if an 
occurrence extends across multiple policy periods.8  On its face, 
this language contemplates successive Liberty Mutual policies, 
and cannot be reasonably interpreted by the majority to mean: 
If an occurrence gives rise to Bodily Injury or 
Property Damage before this policy goes into effect 
and during a time when Liberty Mutual did not provide 
any other coverage, Liberty Mutual will fully defend 
and indemnify the insured anyway, up to the full 
amount of the loss, even for periods when no coverage 
was in place. 
To the contrary, the non-cumulation clause only means that 
Plenco cannot horizontally stack the per occurrence liability 
limits of successive policies. Put another way, this clause 
merely restricts the coverage to the limit associated with the 
policy or policies in effect at the time of the occurrence. The 
clause precludes the insured from "stacking" successive per 
occurrence limits to obtain a coverage amount which is greater 
than the coverage amount which it has purchased.  It is 
unreasonable to read into this language anything more. 
                                                 
8 In fact, this is the exact non-cumulation clause that 
resolves the second certified question regarding stacking of 
coverage limits, but it has no bearing on what allocation method 
should be applied in the present case. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
8 
 
 
1. Pro rata Allocation of Defense Costs 
¶88 I also acknowledge an insurer's duty in Wisconsin to 
defend a suit in full, even if some of a claim's allegations 
fall outside the scope of coverage, so long as coverage for some 
portion of the claim is fairly debatable.  See Doyle v. Engelke, 
219 Wis. 2d 277, 285 n.4, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998); Red Arrow 
Prods. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 233 Wis. 2d 114, 124, 
607 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 2000).  The plain language of the 
policies, however, obligates Liberty Mutual to defend suits only 
for bodily injury or property damage occurring "during the 
policy period."  For bodily injury or property damage occurring 
outside the policy period, Plenco is self-insured and should be 
required to bear its own defense costs. Here, Liberty Mutual 
does not propose to provide only a partial defense on some 
claims.  Rather, it offers to provide a full defense, per 
Wisconsin precedent, but to pay for such full defense only in 
proportion to the time it was on the risk that gave rise to the 
claim it is fully defending.  If this court were to apply the 
time-on-the-risk pro rata allocation method for indemnity, then 
the insurer could advance the cost of the entire defense, with a 
pro rata setoff applied at the end of the suit according to the 
insurer's time on the risk, thereby accounting for the insured's 
time as a self-insurer.  
¶89 While 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
held 
that 
"apportionment of responsibility for the defense is neither 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
9 
 
practical nor desirable,"9 a time-on-the-risk pro rata allocation 
of defense costs is practical, desirable, and reasonable. It 
provides the insured with a full and seamless defense, but also 
adheres to the plain language of the policies that shifts the 
risk of defense costs to the insurer only for bodily injury 
occurring "during the policy period."  If this court determines 
in the present case that indemnity liability should be allocated 
pro rata based on each policy’s time on the risk, then the court 
will have already laid the clear, certain, and consistent 
framework by which notoriously indivisible defense costs could 
be reliably and transparently allocated.  This approach is both 
reasonable 
and 
capable 
of 
efficient 
administration 
by 
mathematical calculation of the insurer's time on the risk, and 
has been adopted by several jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Gulf 
Chem. and Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals 
Corp., 1 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1993); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980); Sec. 
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107 
(Conn. 2003).  The federal district court for the eastern 
district of Michigan explained in Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. 
Ex-Cell-O 
Corp., 
685 
F. 
Supp. 
621, 
626 
(E.D. 
Mich. 
1987)(citations omitted): 
An insurer on the risk during the period of alleged 
exposure is liable for the policyholders' defense in 
the proportion that the period it was on the risk 
bears to the total period of alleged exposure.  
                                                 
9 Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 73, 496 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. 
App. 1992)(citing Engsberg v. Town of Milford, 597 F. Supp. 251 
(W.D. Wis. 1984)). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
10 
 
 . . . The policyholders must bear their own pro rata 
share of costs for any period during which they had no 
coverage or cannot identify the insurer.  
B. Joint and Several Allocation of Indemnity 
¶90 This case does not present the proper factual basis 
for the majority to apply joint and several allocation because, 
unlike many of the cases on which the majority relies,10 there 
are no successive insurers from which Liberty Mutual can seek 
contribution.  Typically the joint and several approach is 
utilized for the convenience and protection of the insured, who 
can choose one solvent insurer from which to seek payment 
quickly and with a minimum of litigation complexity.11  That 
chosen insurer then later seeks contribution, either through 
litigation or negotiation, from other insurers on the risk 
during portions of the occurrence.12  Therefore, joint and 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 764 
F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993)(citing Keene Corp. v. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982)). 
11 In the situation of several insurers on the risk during 
an occurrence, the joint and several approach best protects the 
insured by insulating it from the complex, costly, and time-
consuming litigation and negotiation that the insurers will 
engage in to determine their respective contribution. Long 
before the contribution matters will be resolved among the 
insurers, the insured will have been made whole with minimal 
disruption.  These benefits of the joint and several allocation 
approach, however, do not justify imposing coverage when such 
coverage was not purchased or was expressly rejected. 
12 See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 
1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
11 
 
several allocation is really just a two-step version of the 
pro rata allocation method because under joint and several 
allocation the insured gets paid in the first step and the 
insurers fight over contribution in the second step.  The 
biggest difference in the present case, however, is that the 
majority is imposing coverage for periods when the insured 
bargained for none, whereas a pro rata allocation would allocate 
the loss among all insurers, including self-insurers, for the 
time each was on the risk. 
¶91 In the present case, Liberty Mutual is the only 
insurer at issue, unless we treat Plenco, as we rightfully 
should, as a self-insurer for the periods during which it 
purchased no insurance.  If, during any given period, Plenco 
failed to purchase an insurance policy, thereby shifting the 
risk to an insurer, then it follows that Plenco retained that 
risk for that period.  It follows there from that Plenco should 
be held to account for damages springing from that risk during 
the uninsured period.  Under a strict application of the joint 
and several approach applied today by the majority, Liberty 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 
possibility 
of 
additional 
coverage 
can 
be 
determined consensually among insurers, or it can be 
adjudicated among insurers in a subsequent lawsuit. At 
that 
point 
the 
insurance 
obligations 
can 
be 
reallocated among all the insurers whose policies are 
found to cover a particular injury. . . . [I]f a suit 
arises 
to 
resolve 
the 
allocation 
of 
insurance 
liability, any insurance company can try to prove that 
there was no inhalation of [the insured's] asbestos 
during or before its policy period.  If an insurance 
company does so, then that company will be free of 
liability. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
12 
 
Mutual should be entitled to bring suit against Plenco for 
contribution, thereby effectuating an allocation of loss that 
precisely mirrors the allocation of risk that Plenco made when 
it chose to purchase insurance for some periods but at other 
times chose to retain the premiums and remain self-insured.13  
Such a contribution action would result in exactly the same 
outcome as if the court today applied the time-on-the-risk 
pro rata approach, but only after the filing and litigation of a 
secondary and utterly inefficient suit that could much more 
efficiently and justly be determined by applying a time-on-the-
risk pro rata allocation when the dispute centers on periods for 
which the insured purchased no coverage. 
II. ILLUSTRATIVE HYPOTHETICALS 
¶92 Two hypothetical scenarios, set forth below, may best 
illustrate the inequitable result of the majority's holding.  In 
the first scenario, after years of exposure to other firms' 
asbestos, Worker 1 was exposed to Plenco's asbestos-containing 
molding compounds for one day in 1972 while a Liberty Mutual CGL 
policy was in effect for Plenco.  If Worker 1 died of an 
asbestos-related illness ten years later and his estate were to 
sue Plenco, under the joint and several allocation method 
applied today by the majority, Liberty Mutual would be liable 
for all of the worker's damages for the entire period from 1972 
to 1982, including those stemming from his death, even if Plenco 
only purchased insurance coverage for one of those years.  This 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 
1368, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)("Self-insurance is called 'going 
bare' for a reason."). 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
13 
 
would constitute a windfall for Plenco, which purchased only one 
year of coverage but received ten years of indemnity.  From 
Liberty Mutual's perspective, it received only one year of 
premiums——which were set based upon the assumption of only one 
year of risk——but would be forced to pay for ten years of 
coverage. 
¶93 In the second scenario, Worker 2 was exposed to 
asbestos every day for 30 years during which Plenco's CGL 
policies from Liberty Mutual contained a valid exclusion for 
product hazards coverage.  If the policy containing the 
exclusion expired the day before Worker 2 retired (never to be 
exposed to asbestos again) and the new policy omitted the 
product hazards exclusion, then under the majority's decision 
Plenco would receive full indemnity and defense for all of the 
worker's damages when he or his estate sues years later.  Under 
the majority's approach, it would not matter that the worker was 
exposed during only one day of coverage, that he had been 
exposed for the previous 29 years and 364 days with no coverage, 
or that Plenco promptly cancelled the policy after the worker 
retired and never paid Liberty Mutual another premium.  This 
result is inequitable, yet unavoidable under the majority's 
approach.  The more reasonable approach under this second 
scenario would be to require the insured to pay for damages and 
defense costs for occurrences, bodily injury, or property damage 
taking place outside the period for which it purchased coverage.   
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
14 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶94 In summary, I am not opposed to holding one insurer 
liable for an occurrence's entire loss under a joint and several 
liability theory and then permitting that insurer to seek 
contribution from other insurers on the risk during the 
occurrence, including self-insurers.  However, I am opposed to 
forcing an insurer to pay for the entirety of a loss occurring 
partly or even primarily during a period for which the insured 
did not bargain to shift the risk of that loss from the insured 
to the insurer.  The illogical result of the majority's decision 
is that the insured not only keeps the insurance premiums that 
it did not pay, but also receives coverage under the insurance 
policies that it did not purchase.  In a situation such as the 
present case where the insured was self-insured for significant 
periods and thereafter purchased insurance from only one 
insurer——leaving no other insurer from which Liberty Mutual may 
seek contribution——the joint and several allocation approach 
would make sense only if we were to allow contribution from 
Plenco via a setoff for the periods of the occurrences during 
which Plenco was self-insured.  I would support application of 
such a modified or hybrid joint and several allocation method, 
but cannot support the provision of insurance coverage where the 
insured may have made a strategic business calculation to not 
purchase insurance coverage, and then, after a loss occurred, 
sought judicial imposition of the very indemnity and defense 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
15 
 
coverage that the insured previously rejected and for which it 
did not bargain or pay a premium. 
¶95 For the foregoing reasons I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
No.  2008AP333-CQ.mjg 
 
1