Title: Norman v. City of Gillette

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Norman v. City of Gillette1983 WY 12658 P.2d 697Case Number: 5727Case Number: 5727Decided: 02/08/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM D. NORMAN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

CITY OF 
GILLETTE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; LEROY A. NOECKER; JAMES D. NOECKER; AND 
NOECKER ENTERPRISES, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

William D. 
Norman and Earl R. Johnson (argued), Casper, signed the brief for appellant.

Anthony A. 
Johnson of Rector, Retherford, Mullen&Johnson, Colorado Springs, Colo., 
for appellee, City of Gillette.

John C. Brooks 
of Vlastos, Reeves & Murdock, P.C., Casper, for appellees Noeckers and Noecker 
Enterprises.

Before ROONEY, C.J.*, and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

PART 
I

[¶1.]     The issue presented by 
this appeal is whether a city and an adjoining landowner will be liable for an 
injury to a pedestrian who, because of a barricade on the sidewalk, undertakes 
to walk in the street where he slips and falls while traversing a mound of snow 
and ice. The district judge granted summary judgment for both the city and the 
parties who owned the adjoining land around whose property the barricade was 
erected. The court will affirm.

[¶2.]     The opinion of the 
court is divided into two parts because of a division on the court. Part I 
furnishes an introduction to the issues and deals with propriety of the summary 
judgment entered in favor of appellee-landowners, Noecker Enterprises, and Leroy 
A. and James D. Noecker. Part II, furnished by Justice Raper, will deal with the 
propriety of the summary judgment entered in favor of appelleeCity of Gillette.

[¶3.]     In reviewing the 
propriety of a summary judgment, we look at the record from the viewpoint most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving that party all favorable 
inferences to be drawn from facts contained in affidavits, exhibits, and 
depositions. Dubus v. Dresser 
Industries, Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 (1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 (1981); Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth 
Co., Wyo., 
598 P.2d 20 (1979). Against this standard, the relevant facts in this appeal 
show that on February 9, 1979 the appellant Norman broke his leg when he stepped into a hole in a pile 
of snow located in the gutter of a street in the City of Gillette.

[¶4.]     Mr. Norman testified 
that he was walking along a cleared sidewalk when he encountered a barricade 
which blocked the sidewalk. The barricade had been constructed for purposes of 
protecting pedestrians from danger associated with the erection of a building on 
the appellees Noeckers' property. When confronted by the obstruction, the 
appellant stepped from the curbing into the street and, in so doing, was 
obligated to step over a mound of snow some 18 inches in height, whereupon his 
foot caught in a hole or depression causing him to fall.

[¶5.]     Norman brought suit against both Leroy and James Noecker, 
Noecker Enterprises and the City of Gillette, 
alleging that the Noeckers and defendant Noecker Enterprises had negligently 
barricaded the sidewalk and that the city had failed to maintain the sidewalk 
and street so as to provide Norman with a safe alternate walkway. All 
defendants filed separate answers denying the allegations of the complaint and 
alleging negligence on the part of appellant. The case was submitted to the 
court on defendants' motions for summary judgment which were 
granted.

[¶6.]     We recently reiterated 
the rules of this court applicable to appeals from summary judgment in Dubus v. Dresser Industries, supra, 
where we said:

"We have said many times 
that when reviewing the granting of summary judgment on 
appeal

"`". . . [W]e have 
exactly the same duty as the trial judge and, assuming the record is complete, 
we have exactly the same material and information in front of us as he did. . . 
." Seay v. Vialpando and Anderson, 
Wyo., 567 P.2d 285, 287; Hunter v. 
Farmers Insurance Group, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1239, 1244, and Knudson v. Hilzer, Wyo., 551 P.2d 680, 
685. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112, 115 
(1977).

"In contemplating an 
appeal from a summary judgment we must also inquire from the viewpoint most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Timmons v. Reed, supra, 569 P.2d  at 116; 
Shrum v. Zeltwanger, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (1977); Bluejacket v. 
Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494, 497 (1976). It is settled 
that, in a summary judgment proceeding, the moving party has the burden of 
proving the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Mealey v. City of 
Laramie, Wyo., 472 P.2d 787, 792 
(1970); Kover v. Hufsmith, Wyo., 
496 P.2d 908, 910 (1972). Finally, we are reminded that negligence claims do not 
lend themselves readily to summary adjudication. See: Gilliland v. 
Steinhoefel, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1350, 1352 (1974); Forbes Company v. 
MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56, 57 (1963)." 649 P.2d  at 
201.

[¶7.]     Although there is a 
division of the court on the applicability of our previous decisions setting out 
rules covering known and obvious dangers and natural accumulations of snow and 
ice, Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 
642 P.2d 787 (1982),1 there is no disagreement that in 
order to be found negligent, in any event, it must be shown that appellees owed 
a duty of reasonable care to appellant that may have been breached. Of course, 
if neither the city nor the Noeckers owed a duty of care to Mr. Norman, then we 
must affirm the granting of the summary judgment. In order to make out a cause 
of action in negligence, a plaintiff must be able to identify a duty of 
reasonable care, the breach of which has caused his injury and attendant damage. 
See: ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981); Beard v. Brown, 
Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980); Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187 
(1979). We will now address the question of duty as it relates to the 
Noeckers.

[¶8.]     Appellant argues that 
Noecker Enterprises and Leroy and James Noecker were negligent in failing to 
provide him with a safe walkway around the barricade, or, in the alternative, 
that they negligently barricaded the sidewalk. The appellees answer these 
contentions by denying any negligence and by asserting no duty on their part to 
provide an alternative walkway. We agree with the Noeckers' position in this 
regard.

[¶9.]     In pursuing his claim 
that the Noeckers negligently barricaded the sidewalk or failed to keep the same 
safe for pedestrian travel, appellant relies on various ordinances of the City 
of Gillette. First of all, he relies on several ordinances which required the 
Noeckers, as abutting property owners, to remove snow from the sidewalk 
adjoining their property within 24 hours of the snowfall and that failure to do 
so would result in the city's undertaking the work for which it would charge the 
landowner.2 Mr. Norman then argues that this 
duty imposed an obligation upon the Noeckers to provide him with an alternative 
walkway which, by ordinance, they were obligated to keep clear of ice and 
snow.

[¶10.]  Appellant is correct in asserting that we 
have held that ordinances such as those cited impose a duty upon adjoining 
landowners to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice from sidewalks even 
though no such duty existed at common law. See: Johnson v. Hawkins, supra, 622 P.2d  at 
943. However, in the present case, the appellees had barricaded the sidewalk 
with the knowledge and permission of the City of Gillette; and once that 
occurred, they had no duty to keep the barricaded sections of the sidewalk free 
and clear of snow since the barricade was intended to prevent pedestrian traffic 
thereon. Therefore, the only question for our consideration asks whether the 
Noeckers, having barricaded the sidewalk,3 nonetheless had a duty to provide 
appellant with a safe alternate walkway. If they did have such a duty, then, of 
course, the duty to remove snow imposed by the ordinance could be applied to the 
alternate walkway which the appellees intended would be utilized by pedestrians 
during construction of the building.

[¶11.]  As a general rule, a contractor who 
undertakes a project in or near a sidewalk or street is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care for the protection of those rightfully in the proximity of the 
work. However, the duty is, for the most part, one of placing sufficient 
barricades or warning devices around a dangerous obstruction or excavation. Albright v. McElroy, 207 Kan. 233, 484 P.2d 1010, 1019 (1971). The duty is breached when the contractor is negligent in 
barricading or warning the public of danger. Notwithstanding this duty, we have 
found no cases that would support appellant's claim that the Noeckers were 
required to provide or construct an alternate walkway.

[¶12.]  In our search of the law we came upon 
several cases involving accidents or injuries occurring on temporary walkways, 
but in each instance a city ordinance required the contractor to provide the 
walkways. See: Dougherty v. Charles H. 
Tompkins Co., 99 App.D.C. 348, 240 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Gaw v. Hew Construction Company, 300 
Mass. 250, 15 N.E.2d 225 (1938); 39 Am.Jur.2d, Highways, Streets and Bridges § 
548, p. 955 and annotations noted. In the absence of an ordinance requiring the 
construction of an alternative passageway, the proper rule to be applied is that 
set out in Atkinson v. Harman, 151 W. 
Va. 1025, 158 S.E.2d 169, 174 (1967):

"It is contended by the 
plaintiffs that the defendant contractors were negligent in failing to close the 
street and sidewalk during this construction. They assert that failing to so act 
placed them under a duty to construct a temporary walkway around the obstruction 
in the sidewalk and that their failure to provide such temporary walk 
constituted a breach of that duty. In the syllabus of Nester v. United Foundation Corporation and 
Town of Ridgeley, 136 W. Va. 336, 67 S.E.2d 533, 29 A.L.R.2d 871, this Court 
said: `No duty exists on the part of a contractor to provide or maintain a 
temporary way or detour around an obstruction of a street within a municipality, 
resulting from excavation work done by the contractor with permission of the 
municipality, in the absence of a contract or special 
circumstances.'"

[¶13.]  We also find the rationale expressed by 
the Georgia appellate court in Hardin v. 
Barrett, 122 Ga. App. 156, 176 S.E.2d 455 (1970) to be persuasive. There, 
the defendants had contracted with a city to replace a portion of the sidewalk, 
and, in performing the work, barricades extending to the curbing had been 
constructed around the part of the walkway that had been removed. While walking 
down the sidewalk, the plaintiff came upon the barricade and proceeded to walk 
in the street where she fell in a hole, injuring herself. She sued the 
contractor, alleging negligence in failing to provide an alternative walkway. In 
affirming the granting of summary judgment, the court 
said:

"* * * Other 
jurisdictions have frequently held in instances where a plaintiff was injured 
after electing to walk within the street area where the sidewalk was blocked off 
that a jury question was presented as to the negligence of the city in the 
manner in which barricades were erected, or negligence of the abutting property 
owner, the contractor doing the work, or the owner of an automobile parked on 
the sidewalk in wrongfully barricading the sidewalk but, except in actions 
involving defendant municipalities, we have found no case where recovery was 
allowed unless there existed some evidence of negligence in failing to 
barricade, or in maintaining the barricade or other obstacle in a negligent 
manner." 176 S.E.2d  at 456.

The court went 
on to hold that the defendant contractor had no control over the street, nor 
could he have appropriated the street for use as an alternative walkway. 
Therefore, the plaintiff could not recover unless the contractor had negligently 
maintained the barricade, and there was no proof to support such a 
conclusion.

[¶14.]  Given these and other persuasive 
authorities, we are of the opinion that appellee-Noeckers did not owe a duty to 
appellant to provide an alternative walkway for Mr. Norman, and, since appellant 
failed to establish any negligence in maintaining or erecting the barricade, 
supra fn. 3, the granting of summary judgment in favor of Noecker Enterprises 
and Leroy and James Noecker was proper.4 

[¶15.]  Next, we reject appellant's contention 
that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant his Rule 40.1(b)(2), W.R.C.P., 
motion for removal of the trial judge for cause. Appellant failed to attach the 
necessary affidavit to his motion as required by the rule.5

FOOTNOTES

1 For other cases see: Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 
(1963), and Bluejacket v. Carney, 
Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976). We have applied this "known and obvious - natural 
accumulation" rule to affirm summary judgment in the past. See: Johnson v. Hawkins, supra, and Bluejacket v. Carney, 
supra.

2 The ordinances relied 
upon, as quoted in the record, state:

"`Section 
18-12-1:

"`The owners or occupants 
of any real estate in the city shall be required to remove the snow from the 
sidewalk adjoining such property within twenty-four hours after the lay of the 
snow; provided, that only the snow lying on the sidewalks may be pushed into the 
streets; and provided further that no accumulation of snow from privately owned 
lands or from parking areas shall be removed and pushed into the street. (Ord. 
No. 489, § 1, 2-1-65.)

"`Section 
18-13:

"`If snow or other 
obstruction is not removed from the sidewalks by the owner or occupant of 
abutting property in accordance with the provisions of sections 18-12 and 
18-12.1, such snow or other obstruction shall be removed by the city, without 
notice to the property owner or occupant, and the expense of such removal shall 
be assessed on the property abutting the sidewalk from which the snow or other 
obstruction is removed and such expense shall be certified and collected as 
other taxes; provided, that nothing in this section contained shall be construed 
to relieve the owner, occupant or other person.

"`[Sic] from any 
obligation or penalty in relation to keeping sidewalks free from accumulations 
of snow, ice, mud, waste and offensive material and removing the same under any 
provisions of this Code or other ordinance of the city.

"`It shall be the duty of 
the chief of police to carry out the provisions of this section. (C.O. 1948, §§ 
247, 249.)'"

3 As we have already 
stated, appellant also alleged in his complaint that the appellees had 
negligently barricaded the sidewalk, but the record reflects that appellant 
failed to support this claim with any evidence. In light of this, we believe the 
trial court correctly determined that there was no material issue of fact 
concerning any negligence in constructing or placing the barricade on the 
sidewalk itself, especially considering the unimpeached testimony of appellees 
that the barricade met all ordinances and was erected with the city's 
permission. Appellant attempted to support the claim by alleging that the 
Noeckers had failed to acquire the necessary permits for erecting and 
maintaining the barricade. In our review of the record we could find no 
ordinance requiring such a permit.

4 The conclusion we reach 
is supported by the record notwithstanding the question of whether or not the 
barricade could be considered a proximate cause of appellant's injury. See: 
Beltran v. Stroud, 63 Ariz. 249, 160 P.2d 765 (1945); Johnson v. Rockford, 35 Ill. App.2d 107, 
182 N.E.2d 240, 93 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1962).

5 We also note that 
appellant failed to support this argument with any cogent authority and, in 
fact, argued with respect to Rule 40.1(b)(1), W.R.C.P., rather than Rule 
40.1(b)(2), W.R.C.P., which was the subject of his actual motion filed with the 
trial court.

RAPER, 
Justice.

PART 
II

[¶16.]  We turn now to appellant's argument that 
the district court erred in granting appellee City of Gillette's motion for 
summary judgment. As to the City of Gillette, this case can be characterized as 
nothing more than the usual slip and fall case in which an unfortunate accident 
occurred in the presence of a known and obvious danger presented by a natural 
accumulation of snow and ice. This court has dealt with similar cases on 
numerous occasions. Sherman v. Platte 
County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787 (1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 
(1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 494 (1976); LeGrande v. 
Misner, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1252 (1971); Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 
(1963).

[¶17.]  In Sherman v. Platte County, supra, we 
summarized our views in regard to slip and fall cases involving the known and 
obvious danger of a natural accumulation of snow and ice when, after citing and 
quoting from Johnson, Bluejacket, 
LeGrande and Watts, supra, we 
said:

"In reality, it is 
apparent that these cases have involved two rules. First there is the rule that 
no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a 
warning of its existence. Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the 
natural accumulation of snow and ice. The latter rule broadens the protection 
accorded possessors of land under the former rule. It covers that class of cases 
where the ice and snow naturally accumulate in a fashion where there is a 
lurking danger, i.e., the ice is covered by the snow. However, for that rule to 
apply, the accumulation must be the result of natural forces and not caused by 
the possessor of the land. Nonetheless, whenever the danger is obvious or at 
least as well known to the plaintiff as it is to the defendant landowner, there 
exists no duty to remove the danger or warn the plaintiff of its existence." 642 P.2d  at 789.

The facts before 
the court in this case make it clear that the aforementioned rules apply to deny 
appellant's claim.

[¶18.]  In his deposition, appellant admitted 
that he was aware of the danger presented by the snow and ice he attempted to 
traverse. In fact, he admitted that the way into the street and around the 
barricaded portion of the sidewalk was clear within three feet of where he 
slipped and fell, yet he chose to cross the snow and ice which caused his fall. 
A photocopy of a photograph taken of the accident scene on the following day, 
included in the record by appellant, confirms the fact that the street and 
sidewalk were virtually clear everywhere except right next to the barricaded 
area. It is obvious that, apart from snow and ice being a known and obvious 
danger as a matter of law, in this case it was also a matter of fact. Appellant 
was aware of the danger presented by the snow and ice on which he slipped, and 
he consciously chose to take that more dangerous route rather than a clear 
path.

[¶19.]  As to the nature of the snow and ice 
appellant slipped on, appellant referred to it in his affidavit in opposition to 
the motion for summary judgment as a "drift" of snow. Throughout his deposition, 
appellant referred to the snow and ice in question as that snow the City of 
Gillette had failed to "clear off" or "clean off" of the street. From that, it 
can only be concluded that the snow and ice referred to were nothing more than a 
natural accumulation which had not been removed. We were unable to discover in 
the record anywhere where appellant alleged that the snow and ice he slipped on 
were anything but a natural accumulation. At one point in appellant's deposition 
grading operations by the City of Gillette were alluded to in connection with 
the snow and ice in question. That colloquy, however, did not indicate that the 
ice and snow were other than a natural accumulation. Even after examining the 
photocopy of the picture referred to earlier, we are unable to say that the snow 
in question was anything more than a natural accumulation which had not been 
cleared because of its close proximity to the barricade.

[¶20.]  In fact, appellant's complaint against 
the City of Gillette is not aimed at any negligence in creating an artificial or 
unnatural accumulation of snow. He complains that the city was negligent in 
allowing the sidewalk to be barricaded so that he was forced into the street to 
continue his journey. We have already held that there was no negligence in 
allowing the barricade. We now hold, from the undisputed evidence in the record, 
that the snow or ice he slipped on was nothing more than a natural 
accumulation.

[¶21.]  Appellant cites Bieber v. City of Newcastle, 242 F. Supp. 457 (D.C.Wyo. 1965) for the proposition that the City of Gillette had a 
duty to clear the street where he slipped and fell. That case dealt with an 
uncovered, nine-foot deep hole in a sidewalk with which the unsuspecting 
plaintiff had an unfortunate encounter. Judge Kerr, citing case law from this 
court, stated:

"In Wyoming, the 
municipal corporation owes a duty to the traveling public to keep its streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition and in reasonably good repair for 
the traveling public. * * *" 242 F. Supp.  at 458.

That case, 
however, did not deal with the particular problem presented by snow and ice 
which are natural conditions that prevail at the time of year this accident 
occurred and is, therefore, of little value here.

[¶22.]  As the court said in Lyman v. Town of Cornwall, 30 Conn. Sup. 
610, 318 A.2d 129, 131 (1973), and with which we agree, in rigorous climates - 
like ours in Wyoming - the duty of cities and towns, with respect to snow and 
ice on public ways, differs from the general duty; it is, and must out of 
necessity be, very limited.

[¶23.]  In Smith v. Town of Lander, 67 Wyo. 121, 
215 P.2d 861 (1950), this court addressed the duty of municipalities in regard 
to snow and ice on streets and sidewalks. This court held, there, that cities 
are under no obligation to keep crosswalks and streets clear of natural 
accumulations of ice, slush, or snow; to require otherwise would be impractical 
and cause severe financial hardship. The court reasoned 
that:

"* * * `It is generally 
held that a municipality or other public authority is not liable for injuries 
resulting from the general slipperiness of its streets and sidewalks due to the 
presence of ice and snow which have accumulated as a result of natural causes, 
provided the street or walk is properly constructed, and no other defect is 
shown. The reasons commonly given for so holding are that it is not one of the 
law's reasonable requirements that a municipality should remove from the many 
miles of walks the natural accumulation of ice and snow, because such a 
requirement is impracticable from the nature of things, and that when these 
conditions exist, they are generally obvious, so that travelers know of them and 
assume the risk. * * *'" 215 P.2d  at 863.

See also, Morrison v. City of Anchorage, Alaska, 
390 P.2d 782 (1964) (no liability for accumulation of slush next to curb); Nelson v. City of Tacoma, 19 Wn. App. 807, 577 P.2d 986 (1978) (slippery condition of street due to natural causes not 
actionable; city not insurer or guarantor of safety of travelers under those 
conditions); and West v. Provo City 
Corp., 27 Utah 2d 306, 495 P.2d 1251 (1972) (cities not liable for sidewalk 
injuries caused by a natural accumulation of ice and 
snow).

[¶24.]  From those decisions and our review of 
the law elsewhere, we are unable to find where the City of Gillette had a duty 
to remove the natural accumulation of ice and snow on which appellant slipped. 
It is clear that where the forces of nature combine to create the special 
problem presented by snow and ice, municipalities cannot be held to a strict 
duty to remove every potential danger caused by said snow and ice. The thrust of 
our past decisions is that the danger presented by accumulations of snow and ice 
does not generally create liability because of their natural character. We 
refuse to now make the City of Gillette an insurer for all who slip and fall on 
ice and snow accumulated on its public ways. Even if we found that the City of 
Gillette had a duty to clear a way around the barricaded sidewalk, we would have 
to say that the record shows that it admirably met any such duty. Appellant had 
to literally seek out the dangerous route he took rather than follow the 
acknowledged clear route around the barricade.

[¶25.]  Appellant's regrettable accident was, as 
we have indicated, nothing more than a slip and fall case in which our 
oft-stated rules apply to deny his recovery against the City of 
Gillette.

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

ROSE, Justice, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins, dissenting in 
part.

[¶27.]  I dissent from "Part II" of the majority 
opinion affirming the granting of the summary judgment in favor of the City of 
Gillette. In my opinion, the record supports the existence of a material issue 
of fact concerning the negligence of the City and, for the reasons contained in 
this dissent, I would have reversed the trial court's decision in that 
regard.

[¶28.]  Appellant Norman has alleged in his 
complaint that the City of Gillette was negligent in permitting the sidewalk to 
be barricaded, and in failing to maintain the street so that appellant had a 
safe alternate walkway. The City responded to this complaint by denying all 
negligence on its part and relied on appellant's deposition in support of its 
motion for summary judgment. My review of the record and the case law on the 
subject indicates that we should hold that the granting of the summary judgment 
in the City's favor was error.

[¶29.]  It is well settled that a municipality 
owes a duty to the traveling public to keep its streets and sidewalks in good 
repair and in reasonably safe condition. Bieber v. City of Newcastle, 242 F. Supp. 457 (D.C.Wyo. 1965). In discharging this duty, a municipality or its 
agents must exercise reasonable or ordinary care to see that its public ways are 
maintained in a condition which makes travel in the usual modes and in the 
customary manner reasonably safe. 19 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 54.35e, 
p. 85 (3rd Ed. 1967). Where ice and snow on the public sidewalk is concerned, 
the general rule is:

"According to most, but 
not all decisions, a municipality is liable for injuries sustained on snowy or 
icy sidewalks where the ice and snow has formed into ridges or drifts, in a 
rough or uneven condition, or where the snow or ice is permitted to remain on 
the sidewalk and to be traveled over by pedestrians for such a length of time 
that it became rough, rounded, uneven and irregular, rendering the walk 
dangerous for travel. Indeed, an early case declared that snow and ice, though 
existing for a long time, do not charge the city with negligence unless 
accumulations take the shape of ridges or hills.

"An icy ridge on the 
sidewalk, to be actionable, must be sufficiently substantial to constitute an 
obstruction dangerous to the public. Therefore, a municipality is liable only 
for unusual and especially dangerous formations of snow and ice on a sidewalk, 
while it is not liable for general conditions produced by alternate freezing and 
thawing. Where snow and ice on a sidewalk are permitted to remain until the 
surface thereof, by thawing and freezing, or by the reason of travel thereover, 
has become rough, uneven, rigid and slippery, so as to become an individualized 
and comparatively isolated obstruction to travel, and where this condition had 
existed for such a length of time that it had become known to the public 
authorities or ought to have become known to them in the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance, the municipality will be liable for damages to one injured while 
attempting, in the exercise of ordinary care, to pass over such sidewalk. 
However, no precise limit can be established to determine what height and extent 
an icy ridge must reach in order to be actionable as a defect; but there is some 
merit in the suggestion that, under this rule, the ice, in order to constitute a 
defect must, while adhering to the walk, assume a form which would be a 
structural defect if the walk were itself so constructed.

"The thickness of the 
snow or ice, it seems, is of no consequence." (Footnotes omitted.) 19 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, § 54.84e, pp. 235-237.

[¶30.]  Assuming this to be the proper rule 
identifying the municipalities' duty with respect to ice and snow on sidewalks, 
the issue here is whether the same duty is owed by the municipality when the 
pedestrian is forced, with permission of the municipality, to use the public 
street as a walkway.

[¶31.]  Appellees have devoted much of their 
briefs and oral argument to positioning this case within the boundaries of our 
prior slip-and-fall holdings. Unlike the majority, I am convinced that the facts 
at bar distinguish this case from most of these previously announced 
rules.

[¶32.]  In Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787 (1982),1 the appellant suffered an injury to 
her ankle when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a parking lot. In 
upholding the verdict of no negligence upon the part of either the plaintiff or 
the defendant, we summarized the Wyoming rules as follows:

"* * * First there is the 
rule that no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger 
or a warning of its existence. Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove 
the natural accumulation of snow and ice. The latter rule broadens the 
protection accorded possessors of land under the former rule. It covers that 
class of cases where the ice and snow naturally accumulate in a fashion where 
there is a lurking danger, i.e., the ice is covered by the snow. However, for 
that rule to apply, the accumulation must be the result of natural forces and 
not caused by the possessor of the land. Nonetheless, whenever the danger is 
obvious or at least as well known to the plaintiff as it is to the defendant 
landowner, there exists no duty to remove the danger or warn the plaintiff of 
its existence." 642 P.2d  at 789.

These concepts 
must be considered in conjunction with what was said in Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 
(1981), where we held that, in the absence of an ordinance, adjoining landowners 
have no duty to keep the sidewalks in front of their premises clear of natural 
and obvious accumulations of snow and ice. Johnson v. Hawkins, supra, 622 P.2d  at 
943. These cases stand for the proposition that injured plaintiffs in Wyoming 
can only recover for slips and falls which result from unnatural accumulations 
of snow and ice that are shown not to have been known by or obvious to the 
plaintiff.

[¶33.]  The appellees attempt to fit the facts of 
this case into the confines of the above-quoted rule by interpreting Mr. 
Norman's deposition to say that he fell only because of the snow and ice,2 that he saw the mound and that he 
knew a dangerous condition was created thereby. While the majority opinion 
embraces that contention, under the facts as developed in appellant's deposition 
I cannot agree. 

[¶34.]  The problem with the reliance by 
appellees and the majority of this court on this deposition testimony is that 
Mr. Norman also testified that he fell because he was forced into the street by 
the barricade and, while attempting to negotiate a mound of snow, his foot 
caught in a depression or hole, causing him to fall.3 The record further reveals that the 
snow in the gutter may have been piled there through plowing or grading and, 
although appellant knew from the footprints that others had traveled the same 
route, he looked but could not see the hole or depression which caused his fall. 
Given these facts, I am of the opinion that a material issue of fact was 
structured with respect to whether or not the accumulation of snow was natural 
and whether or not it presented a known and obvious danger to appellant. Unlike 
the majority, I cannot say that this case falls within the rule of Sherman v. Platte County, supra, so that 
the granting of summary judgment was appropriate.

[¶35.]  Being mindful of our previous conclusion 
having to do with the questionable application of the known-and-obvious-danger 
or natural-accumulation rules, I view the important question in this part of the 
appeal to be whether or not the City of Gillette's duty is different - given the 
fact that Mr. Norman fell in the street - than it would have been had he fallen 
on the sidewalk. There being no Wyoming case law on this point, I will look to 
other jurisdictions for my resolution to this question.

[¶36.]  In Mills v. City of Springfield, 166 Ohio 
St. 412, 75 Abs. 150, 142 N.E.2d 859 (1956), the plaintiff fell and was injured 
while attempting to traverse a large mound of snow caused by plowing activities, 
and she brought suit against the city alleging negligence. In denying recovery, 
the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the city was on notice of the 
dangerous condition, but observed that the city could be responsible for 
creating dangerous conditions hazardous to pedestrians lawfully in the streets. 
In explaining this the court stated:

"* * * After all, 
pedestrians have the right to use a street when necessity therefor arises, and 
it would seem that a city should be obligated to exercise the same degree of 
care with respect to highways over which pedestrians are required to walk as 
that which is applicable to sidewalks." 142 N.E.2d  at 864.

Similarly, in Bacsick v. Barnes, 234 Pa.Supr. 616, 341 A.2d 157 (1975), the court held that the city could be liable for an injury 
suffered by a pedestrian where, when the pedestrian was forced into the street 
because of a blocked sidewalk, he was struck by a car. The court reasoned that 
hills and ridges of snow caused by removal activities are unnatural rather than 
natural accumulations, and if allowed to remain for an unreasonable length of 
time the city is on notice of the danger posed to pedestrians. Id., 341 A.2d  at 
160-161. Finally, in Squillace v. Village 
of Mountain Iron, 223 Minn. 8, 26 N.W.2d 197 (1946), the court upheld an 
award of damages to the plaintiff who was compelled to walk in the street 
because the sidewalks were blocked by snow. The court first noted that the 
municipality had the exclusive duty to keep its streets and sidewalks safe for 
travel, and then went on to conclude that the duty to keep sidewalks safe can be 
applied to the street area when a pedestrian is compelled to travel 
therein:

"It is true, the 
foregoing decisions relate to the obligations of a city with reference to its 
walks rather than to its streets. The obligations placed upon a municipality in 
keeping its walks reasonably safe for pedestrian travel might not necessarily be 
applicable insofar as its streets are concerned. Here, however, because of the 
failure of the municipality to clear the sidewalk which plaintiff ordinarily 
would have used in going to his home, it became necessary for him to use the 
street immediately adjoining it. Under such circumstances, it would seem that 
defendant was obligated to exercise the same degree of care with reference to 
streets which pedestrians were forced to use in lieu of sidewalks as that which 
would be applicable ordinarily to sidewalks. In substance we have so held in Thoorsell v. City of Virginia, 138 Minn. 
55, 58, 163 N.W. 976, 977, where we stated: `* * * It is true that the use of 
the street outside of the sidewalk is primarily for traffic by teams and other 
vehicles, and the use of the sidewalk primarily for pedestrians, but pedestrians 
still have the right to use the street when the necessity arises. It has never been held, to our knowledge, 
that they have not such right, or that the duty of a municipality to use 
reasonable care to keep the streets in a safe condition does not extend to 
making them reasonably safe for pedestrians who have occasion to be upon that 
portion of the street ordinarily traveled by vehicles.' (Italics supplied.) 
See, also, Barrett v. City of Virginia, 179 Minn. 118, 228 N.W. 350; Mathieson v. City of Duluth, 201 Minn. 
290, 276 N.W. 222." 26 N.W.2d  at 203.

See also: Nelson v. City of Tacoma, 19 Wn. App. 807, 577 P.2d 986 (1978), citing the rule of Squillace v. Village of Iron Mountain, 
supra; Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1187.

[¶37.]  Applying these authorities to the present 
case, I am of the opinion that the record reflects material issues of fact with 
respect to the liability of the City of Gillette for appellant's injuries. The 
evidence is clear that appellant was compelled to walk into the street as a 
result of an obstruction or barricade on the sidewalk placed thereon with the 
City's permission. It is also undisputed that the weather in the area had been 
cold and snowy most of January and early February of 1979, and that the City was 
on notice that pedestrians would be compelled to enter the street to pass by the 
area enclosed by the barricade. Finally, the uncontroverted facts establish that 
the mound was possibly caused by plowing activities, and that appellant fell due 
to a hole that he alleges he did not and could not see. I can only conclude from 
all of this that there were material issues of fact concerning whether or not 
the City had breached its duty to appellant to keep the street in a reasonably 
safe condition for pedestrian travel. The granting of the summary judgment in 
favor of the City of Gillette was erroneous; there are sufficient questions of 
fact to require a trial on the matter.

FOOTNOTES

1 For other cases see: 
Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 (1963); Bluejacket v. Carney, 
Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976). We have applied this "known and obvious - natural accumulation" rule 
to affirm summary judgments in the past. See: Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 (1981), and Bluejacket v. 
Carney, supra.

2 Mr. Norman 
testified:

"Q. Did you fall because 
of the snow and ice?

"A. Yes, I did. That's 
what caused it."

3 Appellant testified as 
follows:

"Q. Bill, let me ask you 
to explain, I guess, in one sentence why you fell?

"A. Why I 
fell?

"Q. 
Yeah.

"A. Because I was forced 
to step off the - off the sidewalk into a snow, icy area with holes in it, and as I stepped off 
the curb, my foot went out from underneath me and it caught." (Emphasis 
added.)

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶38.]  I agree with the other members of the 
court that the summary judgment entered in favor of Noecker Enterprises, Leroy 
Noecker and James Noecker must be affirmed. I join with Justice Rose, however, 
in his dissent to Part II of the court's majority opinion. In addition I have a 
perspective of my own which I have concluded requires a separate 
statement.

[¶39.]  In his dissenting opinion, at footnote 3, 
Justice Rose quotes the following testimony by deposition of the 
plaintiff:

"Q. Bill, let me ask you 
to explain, I guess in one sentence why you fell?

"A. Why I 
fell?

"Q. 
Yeah.

"A. Because I was forced 
to step off the - off the sidewalk into a snow, icy area with holes in it, and as I stepped off 
the curb, my foot went out from underneath me and it caught." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶40.]  Perhaps it is simply because I am less 
discerning than my brothers on the court, but I am convinced that one could 
infer from this testimony that the holes were in the street, not in the snow. My 
perception of Part II of the majority opinion is that it depends upon a factual 
conclusion that there was no defect in the surface of the street and that the 
only obstacle encountered by the appellant was the pile of snow. My position is 
that if there were a hole in the street then there would be no question of the 
right of the appellant to a jury trial. In deciding the case as the majority 
does the court is deciding a question of fact, i.e., were the holes in the snow 
or in the street? Because of the presence of this question of fact I then rely 
upon the universal rule that a summary judgment should not be granted or 
sustained unless there is no issue of material fact. This issue of fact is 
material, and it exists. The summary judgment in favor of the City of Gillette should not be 
sustained.