Title: Wheeler v. Parker Drilling Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wheeler v. Parker Drilling Co.1991 WY 3803 P.2d 1379Case Number: 90-187Decided: 01/10/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

Josh 
WHEELER III and Kim Wheeler,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

PARKER 
DRILLING COMPANY,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from 
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.

 

William L. 
Combs and Harold F. Buck of Buck Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellants.

 

James R. 
Bell of Murane and Bostwick, Casper, for appellee.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

 

OPINION

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]  We are presented with the following 
certified question from the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming:

 

Will 
Wyoming apply the 
princip[le]s of comity and/or full faith and credit to recognize the exclusive 
remedy provisions of another state's Worker's Compensation statutes?

 

[¶2]  Although the briefs of the parties 
contain generous supplementations of the facts, we will base our decision on the 
facts contained in the certification order:

 

STATEMENT 
OF APPLICABLE FACTS

 

Plaintiff, 
Josh Wheeler, III, was hired as an hourly employee by the defendant Parker 
Drilling Co. in Casper, 
Wyoming, in May 
1988. Shortly thereafter, in the beginning of June 1988, he was temporarily 
transferred to Oregon to work on 
a drilling rig. On August 14, 
1988, the 
plaintiff was seriously injured while working for Parker Drilling in 
Oregon. He 
applied for and received Workers' Compensation benefits from the State of 
Oregon. Oregon 
Workers' Compensation paid the plaintiff's medical bills, temporary total and 
partial disability benefits until November 
30, 1989. While the 
plaintiff was working in Wyoming, Parker 
Drilling had Wyoming Workers' Compensation coverage in effect on his behalf. 
When the plaintiff was assigned to Oregon, the 
defendant discontinued its Wyoming coverage 
on his behalf, and was provided workers' compensation insurance for him through 
its workers' compensation coverage carrier in the State of 
Oregon. 
Deductions were taken from the plaintiff's pay during that period for the 
Oregon workers' 
compensation coverage.

At the time 
of the plaintiff's accident, Parker Drilling was considered by the State of 
Wyoming to be a 
non-resident employer. The plaintiff's paychecks were not generated in 
Wyoming. As of 
April 19, 
1990, plaintiff 
had not applied for nor received any benefits from the State of 
Wyoming, Workers' 
Compensation Division as a result of the accident at 
issue.

Plaintiff 
now brings this suit seeking recovery for injuries resulting from the alleged 
negligence of the defendant. The defendant has moved the Court for summary 
judgment, contending that Wyoming should 
recognize the exclusive remedies provision of the Oregon Workers' Compensation 
law, Title 51, Ore.Rev. Stat. § 656.018 (1989). The defendant argues that 
Wyoming should 
give full faith and credit to the Oregon statutes, 
and that the public policy behind the Wyoming Act demands such a result. The 
plaintiff contends that an employer who is included in the provisions of 
Wyoming's Workers' Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-14-101 et seq., but has 
not contributed to the fund on behalf of an injured employee, may be sued in 
Wyoming for negligence, notwithstanding its compliance with the Workers' 
Compensation statutes of any other state in covering the injured employee, 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-104 (1977, 1987 Supp.).

 

[¶3]  Interstate comity is commonly described 
as the recognition which the courts of one state give to the laws of another 
state as a matter of respect and courtesy. Fremont Indemnity Company v. 
Industrial Commission of Arizona, 144 
Ariz. 339, 697 P.2d 1089 (1985); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 
Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct.App. 1977). It is, however, a settled principle of law adopted many 
years ago by this Court that the doctrine of interstate comity will not be given 
effect if it is contrary to the public policy of this state. Studebaker Brothers 
Company v. Mau, 14 Wyo. 68, 82 P. 2 (1905).

 

[¶4]  Appellants Josh Wheeler III and Kim 
Wheeler contend that Appellee Parker Drilling Company is subject to a common-law 
negligence action because Parker Drilling did not comply with the provisions of 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act pertaining to coverage of a 
Wyoming employee 
temporarily working in another state. The Wheelers claim that support for their 
reasoning is found in Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-204 (1977), amended by 1989 
Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 29, §§ 1 and 2 (effective July 1, 
1989). On the 
date of Mr. Wheeler's injury, this statute provided in pertinent 
part:

 

(a) If an 
employee, while working outside of the territorial limits of this state, suffers 
an injury on account of which he, or in the event of his death, his dependents, 
would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this act had the injury 
occurred within this state, the employee, or in the event of his death resulting 
from the injury, his dependents, are entitled to the benefits provided by this 
act, if at the time of the injury:

(i) His 
employment is principally localized in this state;

(ii) He is 
working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment not 
principally localized in any state; or

(iii) He is 
working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment principally 
localized in another state whose worker's compensation law is not applicable to 
his employer.

* * * * * 
*

(c) This 
section does not apply to an employee whose departure from this state is caused 
by a permanent assignment or transfer.

 

[¶5]  The Wheelers direct our attention to the 
record, which they insist shows that Mr. Wheeler's principal employment was 
localized in Wyoming, that he was working under a contract of hire made in this 
state, and that he was injured while he was temporarily working out of the state 
for Parker Drilling, which was not contributing to the Wyoming worker's 
compensation fund as required by the Act.

 

[¶6]  Parker Drilling directs our attention to 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-301 (1977), amended by 1989 
Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 29, § 1 (effective July 1, 
1989), which 
provided:

 

Except as 
hereinafter modified, all the provisions of this act apply to nonresident 
employers and to their employees when employed in the state in the same manner 
as to resident employers and their employees.

 

Parker 
Drilling counters the Wheelers' argument by asserting that, although Mr. Wheeler 
was hired in Wyoming, he was employed in Oregon by Parker Drilling, which was a 
nonresident employer at the time of Mr. Wheeler's injury, and covered by 
Oregon's worker's compensation statutes.

 

[¶7]  The parties in effect are each asking 
this Court to make findings of fact favorable to their position to determine 
whether or not Parker Drilling is immune from a negligence action by the 
Wheelers. This is the function of the certifying court, which we will not usurp. 
Our tasks are first to determine whether the exclusive remedy provisions 
contained in Oregon's worker's compensation statutes are contrary to the public 
policy of this state and then to decide whether we will recognize such laws as a 
matter of interstate comity. These exclusive remedy provisions were:

 

(1)(a) The 
liability of every employer who satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is 
exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable 
injuries to the subject workers, the workers' beneficiaries and anyone otherwise 
entitled to recover damages from the employer on account of such injuries or 
claims resulting therefrom, specifically including claims for contribution or 
indemnity asserted by third persons from whom damages are sought on account of 
such injuries, except as specifically provided otherwise in ORS 656.001 to 
656.794.

(b) This 
subsection shall not apply to claims for indemnity or contribution asserted by a 
corporation, individual or association of individuals which is subject to 
regulation pursuant to ORS chapter 757, 760 or sections 1 to 70 of this 1987 
Act.

(c) Except 
as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, all agreements or warranties 
contrary to the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection entered into 
after July 19, 
1977, are 
void.

(2) The 
rights given to a subject worker and the beneficiaries of the subject worker for 
compensable injuries under ORS 656.001 to 656.794 are in lieu of any remedies 
they might otherwise have for such injuries against the worker's employer under 
ORS 654.305 to 654.335 or other laws, common law or statute, except to the 
extent the worker is expressly given the right under ORS 656.001 to 656.794 to 
bring suit against the employer of the worker for an 
injury.

(3) The 
exemption from liability given an employer under this section is also extended 
to the employer's insurer, the department, and the employees, officers and 
directors of the employer, the employer's insurer and the department except that 
the exemption from liability shall not apply:

(a) Where 
the injury is proximately caused by wilful and unprovoked aggression by the 
person otherwise exempt under this subsection;

(b) Where 
the worker and the person otherwise exempt under this subsection are not engaged 
in the furtherance of a common enterprise or the accomplishment of the same or 
related objectives; or

(c) Where 
the injury is proximately caused by failure of the employer to comply with the 
notice posted pursuant to ORS 654.082.

(4) Nothing 
in ORS 656.001 to 656.794 shall prohibit payment, voluntarily or otherwise, to 
injured workers or their beneficiaries in excess of the compensation required to 
be paid under ORS 656.001 to 656.794.

 

Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 656.018 (1987 ed.), amended by 1989 Or. Laws ch. 600, § 1 (effective 
July 3, 
1989). The 
exclusive remedy provisions contained in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
in effect at the time of Mr. Wheeler's injuries provided in pertinent 
part:

 

(a) The 
rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee and his dependents for 
injuries incurred in extra-hazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights 
and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, or 
his employees acting within the scope of their employment, but do not supersede 
any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any 
other person.

 

Wyo. Stat. 
§ 27-14-104 (1977), amended by 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 226, § 1 (effective July 1, 
1989). It is 
clear to this Court, in light of the facts presented to us by the certifying 
court, that the Oregon exclusive 
remedy provisions are not repugnant to and are in accord with the public policy 
of this state.

 

[¶8]  We answer the certified question in the 
affirmative by stating that we will recognize the exclusive remedy provisions 
contained in the worker's compensation statutes of the State of 
Oregon by 
applying the principles of comity.

 

[¶9]  Having answered the certified question 
by employing the principles of comity, it is neither necessary1 nor appropriate2 to determine whether we are 
required by the United States Constitution3 to give full faith and credit to 
the exclusive remedy provisions contained in Oregon's worker's compensation 
statutes.

 

Footnotes

 

1 
Constitutional questions will not be discussed if another appropriate ground 
exists for resolving the issue. State Highway Commission of 
Wyoming v. 
Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Association, 784 P.2d 588 
(Wyo. 1989); 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division v. Medina, 770 P.2d 1104 (Wyo. 1989); and 
K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 
1988).

 

2 "`[I]t is 
for federal law, not state law, to prescribe the measure of credit which one 
state shall give to another's judgment.'" Thomas v. Washington Gas Light 
Company, 448 U.S. 261, 271 n. 15, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 2655 n. 15, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 
(1980) (quoting Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to 
Judgments, 49 Colum. L.Rev. 153, 161-62 (1949)). See also Pacific Employers 
Insurance Company v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 306 U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939).

 

3 Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution 
provides:

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings 
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.