Title: State v. Hutton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Hutton, 100 Ohio St.3d 176, 2003-Ohio-5607.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HUTTON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Hutton, 100 Ohio St.3d 176, 2003-Ohio-5607.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld — Appellate 
procedure — Doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bar a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel not previously raised in an 
appeal, when. 
(Nos. 2000-0816 and 2000-1540 — Submitted June 3, 2003 — Decided 
November 5, 2003.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 51704. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bar a claim of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel not previously raised in an appeal where the 
defendant was represented on that appeal by the same attorney who 
allegedly had provided the ineffective assistance, even where the 
defendant was also represented on that appeal by another attorney who 
had not represented the defendant at the time of the alleged ineffective 
assistance. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
In 1986, a jury found that appellant, Percy “June” Hutton, 
murdered Derek “Ricky” Mitchell and attempted to kill Samuel Simmons Jr. on 
September 16, 1985.  Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death 
specifications.  After a penalty hearing, the trial court sentenced Hutton to death. 
{¶2} 
Hutton had once been a close friend of Mitchell and Simmons.  
However, Hutton became angry with the two men because he believed that they 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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had stolen from him.  On Friday, September 13, or Saturday, September 14, 1985, 
outside the house where Samuel Simmons Jr., then lived, Hutton confronted 
Simmons over the theft of a sewing machine belonging to Hutton. 
{¶3} 
Claiming that he had seen Mitchell trying to sell the machine, 
Hutton demanded its immediate return.  Simmons suggested that Hutton talk to 
Mitchell.  During this conversation, Mitchell arrived.  He and Hutton entered the 
residence and went upstairs together.  When they returned, according to Simmons, 
Hutton said that “it wasn’t what he was looking for and if he found out we had 
anything to do with what was missing or stolen he was going to kill us.”  Hutton 
also told Mitchell, “I’m tired with you f* * *ing with me and stuff like that.” 
{¶4} 
Around midnight on Monday, September 16, 1985, Hutton drove 
to Simmons’s house in a gray Chrysler Cordoba, accompanied by Bruce Laster, 
whose sister was engaged to Hutton.  Hutton asked Simmons to come with him 
and help him work on a car.  When Simmons got into Hutton’s car, he noticed a 
.22-caliber rifle lying on the back seat. 
{¶5} 
Hutton drove to Mitchell’s house, stating that he wanted to talk to 
Simmons and Mitchell.  When they arrived, Simmons went in and brought 
Mitchell outside, telling him that “June wanted to talk to him.”  Hutton then 
confronted Mitchell, demanding the return of his sewing machine and accusing 
Mitchell of stealing some tires from Hutton’s backyard.  Hutton said that he had 
hidden $750 in the sewing machine. 
{¶6} 
Mitchell denied taking the machine.  However, Hutton insisted that 
Mitchell had tried to sell it to a Mr. Evans.  Hutton demanded that Mitchell come 
with him to Evans’s house to settle the issue.  Hutton threatened to “f* * * 
[Mitchell] up” if Evans confirmed Mitchell’s guilt. 
{¶7} 
Mitchell and Simmons got into the car.  Before pulling away from 
the curb, Hutton pointed the rifle into Simmons’s side and said: “I don’t 
appreciate you all breaking in my sister’s house.” 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶8} 
Instead of going to Evans’s house, Hutton drove to a parking lot 
behind an RTA bus facility.  Hutton got out of the car and ordered Mitchell to get 
out as well.  Hutton and Mitchell then walked a short distance from the car.  
Simmons could not hear their conversation, but he saw Hutton put a pistol against 
Mitchell’s head. 
{¶9} 
Hutton and Mitchell returned to the car.  With Mitchell giving 
directions, Hutton drove to an area known as “the Projects.”  Hutton and Mitchell 
went into a building and emerged after a few minutes with a white sewing-
machine case. 
{¶10} Hutton drove to his mother’s house, took the case inside, and 
returned to the car.  He then drove to the next street and pulled into an alley where 
a Cadillac El Dorado was parked.  Hutton told Simmons that the El Dorado was 
the car he wanted to work on.  Simmons got out of Hutton’s car.  Hutton then 
moved his car to the other end of the street.  Leaving Laster and Mitchell in the 
car, he walked back to the alley, where Simmons was waiting. 
{¶11} Hutton broke into the El Dorado with a screwdriver.  When 
Simmons got inside, Hutton opened the hood and told him to try starting the 
engine.  Hutton then walked back to Simmons, shot him twice in the back of the 
head, and ran up the alley. 
{¶12} Unable to move at first, lying half in and half out of the car, 
Simmons cried for help.  He managed to get up and stagger away in search of 
assistance.  Simmons went first to the nearby home of Hutton’s mother, then to 
Mary Etta Pollard’s house next door.  He banged on Pollard’s front door and cried 
for help.  Then he heard Hutton’s car coming out of the nearby alley.  He ran into 
Pollard’s back yard and pounded on the back door, shouting that he had been shot. 
{¶13} Hutton drove up and stopped in front of Pollard’s house.  He urged 
Simmons to “come here” or “come from back there.”  Hutton noticed that 
Pollard’s son was looking out from his front door and told him to close the door.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Simmons begged Hutton to take him to the hospital.  Hutton said, “Just shut up 
and get in the car,” and Simmons obeyed.  Mitchell and Bruce Laster were in the 
car with Hutton. 
{¶14} Telling Mitchell that some unknown assailant had shot Simmons, 
Hutton drove to St. Luke’s Hospital.  Simmons asked Mitchell to go inside with 
him, but Mitchell said, “No.  We [are] going to get the mother-f* * *er that did 
this to you.” 
{¶15} At 2:30 a.m., Mitchell, Hutton, and Laster returned to Mitchell’s 
home.  They woke Mitchell’s girlfriend, Eileen Sweeney, and took her to the 
hospital, where they dropped her off.  Sweeney went into the hospital to visit 
Simmons.  Telling her that Hutton had shot him, Simmons sent her to warn 
Mitchell to get out of the car.  She went outside, but the car was gone. 
{¶16} Hospital security officer Paul Whitcomb saw a Chrysler Cordoba 
drop Simmons off and leave “in a hurry.”  About half an hour later, Whitcomb 
saw the same car drop off Sweeney.  After Sweeney went inside, Whitcomb saw 
the same car parked across the street from the hospital.  He sent security officer 
Gary Barnhard to get the license number.  As Barnhard drove past the car, he saw 
its two occupants crouch down in an attempt at concealment.  Then the car left.  A 
subsequent check of the license number disclosed that the gray Chrysler was 
registered to Hutton’s fiancée, Celeste Laster. 
{¶17} Hutton and Bruce Laster later returned to the hospital without 
Mitchell.  Sweeney was still there.  Hutton told her that Mitchell was at home and 
offered to drive her back.  However, once he had Sweeney inside the car, Hutton 
took her to a park instead.  There, Hutton and Sweeney got out of the car.  Laster 
then drove off, and Hutton proceeded to rape Sweeney.  During the rape, Hutton 
told Sweeney that “Ricky wasn’t coming back.”  According to Sweeney, Hutton 
had in his possession a small handgun with a white handle and a silver-colored 
barrel. 
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5 
{¶18} When Laster returned with the car, Sweeney saw Hutton remove 
two rifles from the trunk and put them in the rear passenger compartment.  Hutton 
then drove Sweeney home to the apartment she shared with Mitchell. 
{¶19} When they arrived, Mitchell was not there.  The door to the 
apartment had been damaged and the apartment was in disarray.  Sweeney was 
too “scared and nervous” to drive, so Hutton drove her to the home of LaWanda 
Mitchell, the sister of Ricky Mitchell.  Hutton followed Sweeney into LaWanda’s 
house.  According to Sweeney, Hutton told her that “Ricky [Mitchell] wasn’t 
coming back,” and that “if [she] told, someone would be looking for [her].” 
{¶20} On Tuesday, September 17, Hutton drove to Indianapolis to enroll 
in a course for automotive mechanics at the Lincoln Technical Institute. 
{¶21} On September 30, 1985, the body of Derek Mitchell was found 
near an intersection in Cleveland with a large tire lying on the body.  An autopsy 
disclosed that Mitchell had been shot to death.  Two .22-caliber long rifle bullets 
were recovered from the body; a firearms expert testified that these could have 
been fired from either a rifle or a handgun.  The expert testified that the bullets 
that killed Mitchell had the same class characteristics as a bullet that had been 
removed from Simmons’s head, but he could not tell whether all three had been 
fired from the same gun.  The murder weapon was never found. 
{¶22} The defense presented evidence that Mitchell was not killed on 
September 16, 1985, but at some later time while Hutton was in Indianapolis.  
Denise Richardson testified that she spoke to Mitchell at 3:00 p.m. on September 
17, 1985, the day after the state claims Mitchell was murdered.  According to 
Hutton, he was in Indianapolis at the time Richardson spoke to Mitchell.  Hutton 
claimed that he stayed in Indianapolis until October 3, except for two brief visits 
to Cleveland on September 21 and 28.  An employee of the Indianapolis YMCA 
saw Hutton there sometime after 4:00 p.m. on September 17.  The YMCA 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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employee testified that Hutton had paid rent for the period of September 17 
through October 3. 
{¶23} On October 4, 1985, Cleveland Police Detective Robert Moore 
spoke to Hutton on the telephone.  Hutton agreed to return to Cleveland and 
surrender to Moore at a prearranged time and place.  On October 5, Hutton 
surrendered. 
{¶24} Hutton and Laster were jointly indicted on two counts of 
aggravated murder for killing Derek Mitchell.  The first count charged that they 
committed the murder with prior calculation and design.  R.C. 2903.01(A).  The 
second charged them with murdering Mitchell while committing, attempting, or 
fleeing the commission or attempted commission of kidnapping.  R.C. 
2903.01(B).  Each murder count carried two capital specifications: a course-of-
conduct specification, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and a felony-murder kidnapping 
specification, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Hutton and Laster were also indicted for 
kidnapping Mitchell and Simmons, and for the attempted murder of Simmons.  
Each count carried a firearm specification. 
{¶25} Hutton was tried separately from Laster.  The jury convicted 
Hutton of all charges and specifications.  After a mitigation hearing, the jury 
recommended a death sentence.  The trial judge sentenced Hutton to death. 
Proceedings on Appeal 
{¶26} Represented by the now-deceased Floyd B. Oliver, Hutton 
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.  The court 
of appeals reversed Hutton’s convictions and sentence and remanded the cause to 
the common pleas court for retrial.  State v. Hutton (Apr. 28, 1988), Cuyahoga 
App. No. 51704, 1988 WL 39276 (“Hutton I”).  Having reversed the convictions, 
the court of appeals did not perform an independent review of Hutton’s death 
sentence. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶27} We allowed the state’s motion to certify the record.  State v. 
Hutton (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 716, 534 N.E.2d 88.  Hutton filed a cross-appeal.  
41 Ohio St.3d 704, 534 N.E.2d 1206; State v. Hutton (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 725, 
535 N.E.2d 1370.  Hutton was represented in this court by Oliver and David L. 
Doughten. 
{¶28} We sustained the state’s propositions of law, rejected Hutton’s 
propositions on cross-appeal, and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.  
State v. Hutton (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 36, 559 N.E.2d 432 (“Hutton II”).  
Following the precedent set in State v. Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 235, 
533 N.E.2d 272, we remanded the cause to the court of appeals, directing that 
court to perform an independent review of the death sentence in accordance with 
R.C. 2929.05(A).  Hutton II, 53 Ohio St.3d at 50, 559 N.E.2d 432. 
The Appeal from Remand (No. 2000-1540) 
{¶29} On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the death sentence.  State 
v. Hutton (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 348, 594 N.E.2d 692 (“Hutton III”).  Oliver 
filed a motion for reconsideration on Hutton’s behalf.  The court of appeals 
denied the motion.  Hutton did not file an appeal of that judgment to this court. 
{¶30} On August 21, 1991, Oliver died.  Since no appeal had been filed, 
no further action occurred until July 17, 1996, when we granted the state’s motion 
to set an execution date.  76 Ohio St.3d 1421, 667 N.E.2d 24.  On September 19, 
1996, we stayed execution pending completion of postconviction proceedings.  76 
Ohio St.3d 1480, 669 N.E.2d 861.  On October 18, 2000, we granted Hutton’s 
motion for a delayed appeal of the 1991 judgment of the court of appeals on 
remand.  90 Ohio St.3d 1441, 736 N.E.2d 903.  Case No. 2000-1540, which we 
decide today, is that delayed appeal. 
The Application for Reopening (No. 2000-0816) 
{¶31} On April 21, 1997, Hutton filed in the court of appeals an 
application for reopening of his direct appeal, pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  Hutton’s 
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application alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on failure to 
raise three issues in the court of appeals in Hutton I, and also because counsel had 
failed to raise other issues in this court in Hutton II. 
{¶32} The court of appeals denied the motion on March 20, 2000.  State 
v. Hutton (Mar. 20, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 51704, 2000 WL 301097 (“Hutton 
IV”).  Hutton now appeals from this judgment.  He subsequently moved to 
consolidate No. 2000-0816 with his delayed appeal in No. 2000-1540 for 
purposes of oral argument and disposition.  On July 25, 2001, we granted the 
motion to consolidate.  92 Ohio St.3d 1446, 751 N.E.2d 484.  Today, we decide 
the consolidated appeals. 
I. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
{¶33} A convicted defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel on his first appeal as of right.  Evitts v. Lucey (1985), 469 U.S. 387, 105 
S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821.  In his proposition of law in case No. 2000-0816, 
Hutton contends that his appellate counsel failed to effectively assist him in his 
original appeal in 1988. 
{¶34} In case No. 2000-1540, the appeal from Hutton III (the court of 
appeals’ proceedings on remand), Hutton asserts five claims of ineffective 
appellate assistance.  Three claims involve Hutton I, his original appeal in the 
court of appeals; one claim involves Hutton II, his 1989 cross-appeal to this court; 
and one involves Hutton III.  In case No. 2000-0816, the appeal from Hutton IV 
(the denial of reopening), Hutton includes only the claims involving Hutton I and 
II. 
A. Original Appeal in Court of Appeals (Hutton I) 
{¶35} In Parts A through C of his first proposition of law, Hutton claims 
that his counsel in Hutton I failed to raise three issues before the court of appeals.  
The state contends that Hutton’s ineffective-appellate-assistance claim is res 
judicata, and that it lacks merit as well. 
January Term, 2003 
9 
1. Res Judicata Analysis 
{¶36} In Hutton II, Hutton raised seven propositions of law on cross-
appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals.  We decided six of those 
issues—Hutton’s first and third through seventh propositions of law on cross-
appeal—adversely to Hutton.  Having sustained several of the state’s propositions 
of law, we reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and thereby reinstated 
Hutton’s convictions.  We therefore remanded this case to the court of appeals for 
the sole purpose of allowing that court to perform its statutorily mandated 
independent review.  Id. at 50, 559 N.E.2d 432. “The fact that the cause was 
remanded to the court of appeals for re-evaluation of the death sentence in no way 
implicated the finality of those convictions.”  State v. D’Ambrosio (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 141, 143, 652 N.E.2d 710. 
{¶37} Hutton’s claims in the Hutton II cross-appeal did not include any 
claim that his appellate counsel had been ineffective in Hutton I.  “Where an 
argument could have been raised on an initial appeal, res judicata dictates that it 
is inappropriate to consider that same argument on a second appeal following 
remand.”  D’Ambrosio, 73 Ohio St.3d at 143, 652 N.E.2d 710.  Accord State v. 
Gillard (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 549, 679 N.E.2d 276 (on appeal after remand, 
“new issues” are barred by res judicata).  Since Hutton’s ineffective-appellate-
assistance claims pertaining to his counsel’s performance in Hutton I could have 
been raised on his Hutton II cross-appeal, they would normally be res judicata on 
appeal from remand. 
{¶38} Similarly, since Hutton did not raise the ineffective-appellate-
assistance claim in his Hutton II cross-appeal, res judicata would ordinarily bar 
him from raising it in his application for reopening under App.R. 26(B).  See 
State v. Gillard (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 363, 365, 708 N.E.2d 708. 
{¶39} However, Hutton points out that the attorney who had represented 
him in Hutton I continued to represent him before this court in Hutton II.  We 
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have recognized that an attorney “cannot realistically be expected to argue his 
own incompetence.”  State v. Cole (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 2 OBR 661, 
443 N.E.2d 169, fn. 1.  Cf. State v. Lentz (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 
784 (claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, raised for first time in 
postconviction proceedings, is barred by res judicata where appellate counsel is 
different attorney, even though from same public defender’s office as trial 
counsel).  Since Hutton’s counsel could not have been expected to raise in Hutton 
II the issue of his own ineffective representation in Hutton I, Hutton argues that 
res judicata does not bar raising the issue now, either in the appeal from remand 
or on his motion to reopen the Hutton I appeal. 
{¶40} In Hutton II, Hutton also had one new attorney who had not 
represented him in Hutton I and was therefore free of any personal conflict. 
{¶41} Courts of appeals in Ohio have generally held that res judicata bars 
an ineffective-assistance claim not raised in an appeal, even where the defendant 
was represented on appeal by his trial counsel, so long as the defendant was also 
represented on appeal by at least one attorney who had not represented the 
defendant at trial.  See State v. Zuern (Dec. 4, 1991), Hamilton App. Nos. C-
900481 and C-910229, 1991 WL 256497; State v. Swiger (1998), 125 Ohio 
App.3d 456, 465, 708 N.E.2d 1033; State v. Broom (May 7, 1998), Cuyahoga 
App. No. 72581, 1998 WL 230425; State v. Landrum (Jan. 11, 1999), Ross App. 
No. 98 CA 2401, 1999 WL 22626. 
{¶42} However, in State v. Evans (June 19, 1998), Lucas App. No. L-97-
1134, 1998 WL 351884, the court held that, where the appellant continues to be 
represented by his trial counsel on appeal, “one additional counsel on appeal does 
not permit the application of res judicata to claims of ineffective assistance of 
[trial] counsel,” because “[i]t is unlikely that, as co-counsel with [trial counsel], 
[new counsel] would be inclined to assert a claim on appeal for ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.”  We agree with this reasoning and today hold that the 
January Term, 2003 
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doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bar a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel not previously raised in an appeal where a defendant was 
represented on appeal by the same attorney who allegedly earlier provided the 
ineffective assistance, even where the defendant was also represented on that 
appeal by another attorney who had not represented the defendant at the time of 
the alleged ineffective assistance.  Accordingly, Hutton’s claims that he received 
ineffective assistance in Hutton I are not res judicata, and we proceed to the 
merits of those claims. 
2. Merits Analysis 
{¶43} Hutton claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
his first appeal as of right (i.e., the court of appeals’ proceedings in Hutton I) by 
failing to raise three issues. 
{¶44} Appellate counsel’s effectiveness is to be judged by the standard 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  See, e.g., State v. Mitts, 98 Ohio St.3d 325, 2003-Ohio-1007, 784 
N.E.2d 698, ¶ 4.  Hence, to prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, Hutton 
must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Deficient performance 
means performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable 
representation.  “Prejudice” means a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  See, also, Williams v. 
Taylor (2000), 529 U.S. 362, 390-391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389; State v. 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of 
the syllabus. 
a. DePew issue 
{¶45} The trial court, in its penalty-phase jury instructions, listed all 
seven of the statutory mitigating factors in R.C. 2929.04(B), and the prosecutor 
discussed all seven in his closing argument, even though several were not raised 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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by the defense.  Citing State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 289-290, 528 
N.E.2d 542, Hutton contends that the trial court and the prosecutor erred in 
discussing mitigating factors on which Hutton had not presented evidence. 
{¶46} Hutton correctly contends that such comment is inconsistent with 
DePew.  “If the defendant chooses to refrain from raising some of or all of the 
factors available to him, those factors not raised may not be referred to or 
commented upon by the trial court or the prosecution. * * *  
{¶47} “[I]t is the defendant who has the right to present and argue the 
mitigating factors.  If he does not do so, no comment on any factors not raised by 
him is permissible.”  38 Ohio St.3d at 289, 528 N.E.2d 542. 
{¶48} Hutton claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by not raising the DePew issue in the court of appeals.  This claim 
lacks merit. 
{¶49} First, DePew was not available as precedent to Hutton’s appellate 
counsel.  The court of appeals issued its opinion in Hutton I on April 28, 1988.  
We did not decide DePew until four months later, on August 31, 1988. 
{¶50} “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every 
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Because attorney performance is not to be judged by hindsight, 
courts generally do not find that an attorney performs deficiently by failing to 
anticipate a future decision or development in the law.  See State v. Smith (1991), 
72 Ohio App.3d 342, 345, 594 N.E.2d 688.  See, also, Clark v. Moran (C.A.1, 
1991), 942 F.2d 24, 33; Jameson v. Coughlin (C.A.2, 1994), 22 F.3d 427, 429; 
Senk v. Zimmerman (C.A.3, 1989), 886 F.2d 611, 618; Lilly v. Gilmore (C.A.7, 
1993), 988 F.2d 783, 786; Brown v. United States (C.A.8, 2002), 311 F.3d 875, 
January Term, 2003 
13 
878; Spaziano v. Singletary (C.A.11, 1994), 36 F.3d 1028, 1039; Fretwell v. State 
(1987), 292 Ark. 96, 728 S.W.2d 180. 
{¶51} Second, Hutton contends that, had counsel raised the DePew issue 
in  the court of appeals, this court “would have had to reverse [his] death 
sentence.”  On the contrary, we find it unlikely that a DePew claim would have 
succeeded.  We have never reversed a death sentence on the ground that the trial 
court gave the jury an instruction that neutrally listed all statutory mitigating 
factors, even though the list included factors on which the defense had not 
presented evidence or argument.  Such errors have consistently been held either 
harmless or not plain error.  See State v. Benge (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-
142, 661 N.E.2d 1019; State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 481, 620 N.E.2d 
50; State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 62, 549 N.E.2d 491; State v. Cooey 
(1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 39, 544 N.E.2d 895; State v. Benner (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 301, 317, 533 N.E.2d 701.  Thus, no reasonable likelihood exists that 
Hutton would have prevailed on the DePew issue had his counsel raised it in 
Hutton I.  Part A of Hutton’s first proposition of law is overruled. 
b. Failure to Define “Aggravating Circumstances” 
{¶52} In the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury: “The 
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating circumstances, of which the Defendant was found guilty, outweigh 
the factors in mitigation * * *.”  The instructions further told the jury to 
recommend a death sentence “if you unanimously * * * find proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
factors.”  However, the trial court neglected to inform the jury that the term 
“aggravating circumstances” meant the specifications of which Hutton had been 
found guilty in the guilt phase.  Defense trial counsel did not object to the 
instructions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶53} Hutton’s appellate counsel in Hutton I did not raise the issue of the 
trial court’s failure to define “aggravating circumstances.”  In part B of his first 
proposition of law, Hutton now contends that appellate counsel’s failure to raise 
this issue constituted ineffective assistance. 
{¶54} However, because defense trial counsel had not objected to the 
instructions at trial, any error was waived.  Having been waived, the error could 
not serve as a basis for reversal unless it met the strict standard for plain error.  
See, generally, State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 
804; State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240.  Because the 
issue had been waived at trial, appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to 
try to raise it in the court of appeals.  See State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 
29, 716 N.E.2d 1126. 
{¶55} Appellate counsel need not raise every possible issue in order to 
render constitutionally effective assistance.  See Jones v. Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 
745, 750-753, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987.  “Notwithstanding Barnes, it is 
still possible to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel’s failure to raise a 
particular claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent.  
See, e.g., Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A.7 1986) (‘Generally, only when 
ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of 
effective assistance of counsel be overcome’).”  Smith v. Robbins (2000), 528 
U.S. 259, 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756. 
{¶56} Failure to raise the waived instructional issue was not deficient 
performance constituting ineffective assistance.  Part B of Hutton’s first 
proposition of law is therefore overruled. 
c. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Object 
{¶57} Although the DePew error and the trial court’s instructional error 
were waived by trial counsel, Hutton’s appellate counsel could have argued on 
appeal that trial counsel’s failure to object to these errors amounted to ineffective 
January Term, 2003 
15 
assistance.  In part C of his first proposition of law, Hutton argues that his 
appellate counsel were ineffective because they failed to raise the issue of trial 
counsel’s failure to object. 
{¶58} With respect to the DePew error, trial counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to raise the issue.  As noted supra, DePew was not decided until August 
31, 1988, and therefore was not available to trial counsel as precedent.  For the 
reasons discussed earlier, prejudice is also absent. 
{¶59} Hutton argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
assert trial counsel’s ineffectiveness regarding the trial court’s failure to define 
“aggravating factors” for the jury.  However, we do not find that this issue was 
“clearly stronger,” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 
756, than the issues Hutton’s appellate counsel actually did present.  Part C of 
Hutton’s first proposition of law is overruled. 
B. Cross-Appeal (Hutton II) 
{¶60} In part D of his first proposition of law, Hutton contends that his 
counsel before this court in Hutton II denied him effective assistance by 
misreading the court of appeals’ opinion and thereby failing to raise certain issues 
before us on cross-appeal.  See Hutton II, 53 Ohio St.3d at 44, 559 N.E.2d 432. 
{¶61} However, Hutton’s appeal from the court of appeals to this court 
was not his first appeal, but his second.  “Having no constitutional right to counsel 
on a second appeal, [Hutton] had no constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel.”  State v. Buell (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 1211, 1212, 639 N.E.2d 110.  
Part D of Hutton’s first proposition of law is overruled. 
C. 1991 Decision on Remand to Court of Appeals (Hutton III) 
{¶62} In Part E of his first proposition of law, Hutton claims that he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel when the court of appeals considered 
his case on remand from this court in 1991. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶63} Because the court of appeals in Hutton I reversed Hutton’s 
convictions, that court did not perform an independent review of Hutton’s death 
sentence.  Therefore, when our decision in Hutton II reinstated his convictions, 
we remanded the cause to the court of appeals so that court could independently 
review the sentence, as was then required by R.C. 2929.05(A).  See Hutton II, 53 
Ohio St.3d at 50, 559 N.E.2d 432.  No other issues remained for the court of 
appeals to determine on remand, inasmuch as the court of appeals had already 
addressed each of Hutton’s assignments of error in Hutton I. 
{¶64} On November 2, 1990, Hutton filed a motion asking the court of 
appeals to appoint counsel.  The court of appeals denied the motion without 
explanation on January 8, 1991.  On January 17, 1991, the court of appeals 
announced its judgment in Hutton III, affirming the death sentence on 
independent review.  On January 28, 1991, Hutton filed a motion for 
reconsideration.  On February 1, 1991, the court of appeals journalized its opinion 
in Hutton III, explaining its reasons for affirmance.  See Hutton III, 72 Ohio 
App.3d 348, 594 N.E.2d 692. 
{¶65} Hutton contends that when the court of appeals denied his motion 
for appointment of counsel, it denied him the assistance of counsel to which he 
was constitutionally entitled.  Hutton contends that he was not represented by any 
counsel during the remand. 
{¶66} However, Hutton’s claim is incorrect.  The record shows that his 
motion for reconsideration, filed January 28, 1991, was signed by the same 
attorney who had represented him during both Hutton I and Hutton II. 
{¶67} It is true that no brief was filed on Hutton’s behalf during the 
remand.  The court of appeals did not invite briefing by either party.  But there 
was no need to do so, for both parties had already had a full opportunity to brief 
the issue of the appropriateness of the death sentence during the original Hutton I 
proceedings.  Moreover, Hutton’s counsel had taken that opportunity.  In the 
January Term, 2003 
17 
Hutton I appellate brief of October 26, 1988, the third assignment of error read as 
follows: “IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. I, 
§§ 9 AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, THE APPELLANT’S 
SENTENCE OF DEATH IS INAPPROPRIATE AND DISPROPORTIONATE 
TO SIMILAR CASES.” 
{¶68} Since the parties had already briefed the sentencing issue once, 
there was no need for rebriefing or reargument.  The record had not changed since 
Hutton I.  The court of appeals could quite properly consider the case on the briefs 
that had already been filed.  Part E of Hutton’s first proposition therefore lacks 
merit and is overruled. 
II. Independent Sentence Review 
{¶69} In his second proposition of law, Hutton contends that the death 
sentence in this case is inappropriate.  This claim invokes our duty of independent 
review under R.C. 2929.05.  It is that task to which we now turn. 
{¶70} Under R.C. 2929.05(A), we independently review the death 
sentence in every capital case in which we find no reversible legal error on the 
capital conviction.  We must determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s 
finding of aggravating circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating factors, and whether the death sentence is proportionate 
to those affirmed in similar cases. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶71} Hutton was found guilty of two capital specifications.  Under R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5), he was found guilty of engaging in a course of conduct involving 
the purposeful killing of Ricky Mitchell and the purposeful attempt to kill Samuel 
Simmons.  Under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), he was found guilty of committing 
aggravated murder while committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of kidnapping. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
{¶72} The evidence supports these findings.  As we noted in Hutton II: 
{¶73} “The evidence * * * points ineluctably to Hutton as the murderer 
of Derek Mitchell.  Hutton had a strong motive: revenge for the theft of the 
sewing machine and the money hidden therein.  Hutton claimed to have been told 
by Evans that Mitchell had tried to sell Evans a sewing machine.  Hutton accused 
Mitchell of ‘breaking in my sister’s house.’   In response to Hutton’s demands, 
Mitchell actually produced a sewing machine, which he turned over to Hutton.  
Finally, Hutton carried out his threat to shoot Simmons.  On this record, it is clear 
that Hutton believed that Mitchell and Simmons stole his machine. 
{¶74} “Hutton attempted to kill Simmons with a .22 caliber revolver.  He 
also had a .22 caliber rifle in his car.  Mitchell was killed with a .22 caliber 
weapon.  Expert testimony established that Simmons could have been shot with 
the same gun.  Eileen Sweeney corroborated Simmons’s description of Hutton’s 
pistol.  Mitchell’s corpse was found with a tire lying on it—a significant fact in 
light of the evidence that Hutton believed that Mitchell had stolen tires from him. 
{¶75} “Hutton told Eileen Sweeney that ‘Ricky wasn’t coming back,’ and 
she should ‘forget about him.’   These statements clearly show that Hutton knew 
Mitchell was dead.  He later informed her that ‘if * * * [she] told[,] someone 
would be looking for * * * [her].’   This threat indicates consciousness of guilt. 
{¶76} “Events confirmed Hutton’s statement that Mitchell ‘wasn’t 
coming back.’  Eileen Sweeney * * * never saw Mitchell again after he left her at 
the hospital.  This was unusual, since Sweeney testified that, during their three-
year cohabitation, Mitchell ‘[v]ery seldom’ failed to spend the night at their 
apartment and never left home without telling her. 
{¶77} “The evidence that the murder was committed with prior 
calculation and design is, if anything, stronger.  Mitchell was shot at least twice, 
once in the head and once in the chest. * * * When this is added to Hutton’s 
January Term, 2003 
19 
repeated threats against Mitchell’s life, a rational trier of fact could hardly fail to 
find prior calculation and design.”  53 Ohio St.3d at 41, 559 N.E.2d 432. 
{¶78} Moreover, Simmons’s testimony that Hutton shot him twice in the 
head from behind supports the jury’s finding of guilty on the course-of-conduct 
specification.  Finally, the evidence supports the jury’s finding of kidnapping.  
Hutton II, 53 Ohio St.3d at 41, 559 N.E.2d 432. 
Mitigating Factors 
{¶79} The only evidence offered by Hutton in the penalty phase was his 
unsworn statement, in which he professed his innocence, and the presentence 
investigation report and psychological examination requested by the defense 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).  The only mitigating factor expressly offered by 
Hutton at trial was residual doubt.  That is not a valid mitigating factor.  State v. 
McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus.  However, the 
trial record does disclose some other mitigating factors. 
{¶80} Provocation: Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(2), we must consider 
“[w]hether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the 
fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.” 
{¶81} On the state’s theory of the case, Hutton killed Mitchell and tried 
to kill Simmons because they stole money he needed to attend school.  Hutton 
testified that his tuition for the automotive course was $9,700.  He made a down 
payment of $1,500, had taken a $5,300 student loan, and was seeking a $2,200 
grant from the state of Ohio.  This left him $700 short,1 which may explain why 
Hutton was so insistent on recovering the $750 hidden in the sewing machine. 
{¶82} Nevertheless, provocation deserves very little weight as a 
mitigating factor.  Hutton committed the murder with prior calculation and 
design; the jury so found by returning a guilty verdict on the first count of the 
                                                 
1. 
When he registered at the Lincoln Institute, however, he discovered that he 
could not use the grant there.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
indictment.  Moreover, Mitchell’s murder occurred some length of time after the 
alleged theft that may have provoked it.  Hutton clearly had time to cool off 
before resorting to murder. 
{¶83} Degree of participation: Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(6), mitigation 
exists “[i]f the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal 
offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense and the degree 
of the offender’s participation in the acts which led to the death of the victim.” 
{¶84} The jury did not make any finding in this case that Hutton was the 
principal offender.  The felony-murder specification alleged, in the alternative, 
that Hutton “either * * * was the principal offender in the commission of the 
Aggravated Murder, or, if not the principal offender, committed the Aggravated 
Murder with prior calculation and design.”  (Emphasis added.)  The verdict form 
for this specification was also phrased in the alternative.  For this reason, the jury 
cannot be said to have found that Hutton was the principal offender.2  Hence, we 
must examine “the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense and * * * 
in the acts which led to the death of the victim.” 
{¶85} Although the record does not conclusively demonstrate that Hutton 
was the actual killer, Hutton did instigate Mitchell’s murder.  Moreover, he 
played the leading role in that offense.  Hutton was driving the car and did almost 
all of the talking.  Hutton was the one who had a motive to kill Simmons and 
Mitchell, he was the one who had threatened their lives, and he was the one who 
shot Simmons.  Accordingly, we give the (B)(6) factor little weight. 
{¶86} Other factors: Hutton voluntarily returned from Indianapolis and 
surrendered to Detective Moore.  We give some weight to this fact as mitigation 
                                                 
2. 
We note, however, that the jury did unanimously find that Hutton killed Mitchell 
with prior calculation and design when it found Hutton guilty of aggravated murder as charged in 
the first count of the indictment.  See State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 197-198, 
652 N.E.2d 710. 
January Term, 2003 
21 
under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7): “Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of 
whether the offender should be sentenced to death.” 
{¶87} History, character, and background: Hutton was born on October 
28, 1953.  The presentence investigation report shows that his father died in 1963, 
when Hutton was still a child.  Although it is not clear whether Hutton’s mother 
and father were ever divorced, Hutton’s mother remarried in 1960.  However, her 
second husband abandoned the family in 1965. 
{¶88} Hutton was self-employed as an automotive mechanic.  Before he 
surrendered to Detective Moore, he was taking courses in that field at Lincoln 
Technical Institute.  He testified in the guilt phase that he had also been employed 
as a security guard and had completed a six-week, 120-hour course of “security 
[and] private police training” at Case Western Reserve University.  He had also 
been on general relief and food stamps “off and on” since 1981, and he admitted 
that he had never reported his income from repairing cars to the welfare 
authorities. 
{¶89} There was also guilt-phase testimony about Hutton’s good 
reputation.  Samuel Simmons Sr., the father of victim Samuel Simmons Jr., 
testified in the guilt phase that Hutton had a “[v]ery good” reputation for 
truthfulness.  Simmons Sr. also testified that he “would put [his] life in [Hutton’s] 
hands any day.” We give some mitigating weight to Hutton’s history, character, 
and background. 
{¶90} Nature and circumstances of the offense: Nothing mitigating 
appears in the nature and circumstances of the offense.  The murder of Derek 
Mitchell was characterized by treachery and deceit.  After he shot Simmons from 
behind, Hutton used Simmons’s shooting to lure Mitchell to his death. 
{¶91} Although Hutton’s voluntary surrender and his history, character, 
and background are entitled to some weight in mitigation, the aggravating 
circumstances here are extremely grave.  In this case, we find that the R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
2929.04(A)(5) multiple-murder aggravating circumstance carries great weight in 
aggravation.  See State v. Campbell (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 48, 58, 765 N.E.2d 
334.  The R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance in this case consists of a 
calculated murder set up by a treacherous kidnapping.  We find that these 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors in this case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Proportionality Review 
{¶92} In his third proposition of law, Hutton contends that the death 
sentence in this case is “excessive and disproportionate” to sentences in similar 
cases. 
{¶93} Hutton claims that one “similar case” we should consider is the 
case of Hutton’s co-defendant, Bruce Laster.  According to the parties, Laster 
pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 7 to 25 years.3  
Hutton argues that, because there was no proof of who actually shot Mitchell, it 
cannot be justified to sentence Hutton to death when Laster received a sentence of 
only 7 to 25 years. 
{¶94} However, we find that Laster’s case is not a “similar case” for 
purposes of R.C. 2929.04.  Laster was not convicted of aggravated murder, nor 
did he receive a death sentence.  See Gillard, 78 Ohio St.3d at 558, 679 N.E.2d 
276; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶95} The death sentence in this case is proportionate to death sentences 
we have approved in similar cases with specifications under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) 
and (A)(7).  See State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568; 
State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 543 N.E.2d 1250; State v. Hawkins 
(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 612 N.E.2d 1227; State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio 
                                                 
3. 
Although we are unable to verify this from the record, Hutton asserts it in his 
brief and the state agrees that it is true.   
January Term, 2003 
23 
St.3d 308, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 687 
N.E.2d 685; State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 751 N.E.2d 946. 
{¶96} In case No. 2000-1540, we affirm Hutton’s death sentence.  In case 
No. 2000-0816, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa 
Reitz Williamson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
James A. Draper, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Robert M. 
Ingersoll, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
__________________