Title: State v. Klunder

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Klunder (2004-356); 179 Vt. 563; 892 A.2d 927

2005 VT 130

[Filed 13-Dec-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 130

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-356

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2005

  State of Vermont	               }       APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
       v.	                           }       District Court of Vermont,
                                       }       Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit
  Steven Klunder	                     }
                                       }       DOCKET NO. 1101-8-02 WrCr
  	
                                               Trial Judges: Paul F. Hudson
                                                             Theresa S. DiMauro
                                                             Mary Miles Teachout

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant Steven Klunder appeals from the trial court's
  finding that he violated the terms of his probation, and its August 2004
  order denying his pro se request to modify the terms of his probation.  We
  affirm in part and reverse in part.

       ¶  2.  In September 2003, defendant pled no contest to felony sale of
  cocaine.  As part of a plea  agreement, the State agreed not to charge
  defendant with sexual misconduct toward a ten-year-old female, E.N., and in
  exchange, defendant agreed to a number of probation conditions designed to
  address that latter misconduct.  Specifically, he agreed to have no contact
  with E.N., or with any minor females under age sixteen, without permission
  of his probation officer, and to attend "individual mental health
  counseling with an emphasis on appropriate adult-child physical and sexual
  boundaries."  The agreement provided that defendant must participate in
  counseling as ordered by the court or his probation officer, and that he
  must participate to the satisfaction of his probation officer.  The trial
  court accepted the plea agreement, and added a curfew and residency
  restriction. (FN1)  This latter provision required defendant to reside and
  work where directed by his probation officer. 
                       
       ¶  3.  Shortly thereafter, E.N.'s family contacted defendant's
  probation officer to express concern that defendant was living with his
  mother a short distance away from E.N.'s home.  Defendant's probation
  officer informed defendant that he could not continue to live with his
  mother.  In January 2004, defendant filed a motion to amend the terms of
  his probation to allow him to continue living with his mother, asserting
  that his probation officer was acting arbitrarily.  At a hearing on the
  motion, the State presented evidence that defendant's mother lived less
  than one-half mile from E.N.'s home.  E.N. was frightened of defendant, and
  she had seen defendant in the neighborhood.  On one occasion, defendant
  waved to her.  The trial court denied defendant's request on the record,
  explaining that E.N. should not have to live in constant fear of seeing
  defendant.  The court found that defendant had agreed to the provisions in
  the probation order, and the court had included the extra conditions to
  address this type of situation.  In light of defendant's request, however,
  the court added a special condition to allow defendant to visit his mother
  on specific dates and times as approved by his probation officer. 
  Defendant did not object to this condition, nor did he appeal from the
  court's order.  

       ¶  4.  In March 2004, defendant's probation officer filed a
  complaint alleging that defendant had violated probation by failing to
  participate in mental health counseling with a counselor in the field of
  sexual abuse.  Defendant had apparently been in counseling with an
  individual at Health Care and Rehabilitative Services of Southeastern
  Vermont (HCRS).  Defendant's probation officer informed defendant that the
  counselor at HCRS was not specifically qualified to provide sexual offender
  counseling.  At a July 2004 merits hearing, the probation officer testified
  that he had given defendant the choice of three providers from whom he
  could receive mental health counseling with an emphasis on appropriate
  adult-child physical and sexual boundaries.  These individuals were chosen
  because the Department of Corrections considered them to have expertise in
  the field of child sexual abuse.  Defendant chose one of them-Mr. Kieran
  Zito-as his counselor, and he met with Mr. Zito twice to assess his
  counseling needs.  Mr. Zito informed the probation officer that he would
  not meet with defendant again because defendant adamantly stated that he
  had never done anything sexually inappropriate with a child.  Mr. Zito
  stated that he could not perform adult-child sexual boundary counseling
  with an individual who was in denial.  The probation officer discussed the
  discontinuation of counseling with defendant, and defendant repeatedly
  advised him that he had done nothing sexually inappropriate with a child. 
  Defendant stated that he was willing to continue to meet with Mr. Zito as
  long as he did not need to acknowledge that anything inappropriate had
  happened.  At the close of the hearing, the court found on the record that
  defendant had violated the terms of probation by failing to engage in
  counseling as required by his probation order.  The court continued
  defendant on probation but ordered him to engage in counseling as required
  by his probation order within sixty days.  

       ¶  5.  In July 2004, defendant filed a pro se letter asking the
  court to modify the conditions of his probation.  Specifically, he sought
  the removal of the residency and counseling conditions, as well as the
  condition restricting his visits to his mother's home.  Defendant asserted
  that the conditions had not been part of his original plea agreement and
  they were more onerous than the terms to which he had agreed.  The trial
  court denied the motion in an entry order, stating that defendant's current
  probation conditions had been set at a hearing where defendant had been
  represented by counsel.  The court explained that defendant had given no
  reason why the conditions should be changed.  Defendant appealed from this
  order, as well as the court's earlier finding that he had violated
  probation.

       ¶  6.  We turn first to the court's finding that defendant violated
  the terms of his probation.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred
  because the evidence showed that he was willing to continue to meet with
  the counselor, although he "had a problem with admitting that something
  inappropriate with a child had happened."  Defendant maintains that he was
  treated as though he had agreed to undergo sex offender treatment, and as a
  result, he was not given the opportunity to engage in the type of
  counseling that he had agreed to as part of the plea agreement.  Defendant
  asserts that he was forced into noncompliance when the counselor
  discontinued the meetings, at which point the Department of Corrections
  filed a probation violation complaint.
   
       ¶  7.  The State must establish that a probation violation has
  occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Gleason, 154 Vt.
  205, 216, 576 A.2d 1246, 1252 (1990).  "The State meets its burden by
  showing that there has been a 'violation' of the express conditions of
  probation, or of a condition so clearly implied that a probationer, in
  fairness, can be said to have notice of it."  State v. Austin, 165 Vt. 389,
  398,