Title: STATE EX REL SMART BERG v BIG T

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12705 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A STATE O F M O N T A N A , Upon t h e r e l a t i o n of C. E. SMART, Petitioner, CITY O F B I G TIMBER, M O N T A N A e t a l . , Respondents, and BEN BERG et a l . , Board of Trustees of School D i s t r i c t No. 1, of Sweet Grass County, Montana P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, T H E CITY O F BIG TIMBER, M O N T A N A e t a l e , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Conrad B. Fredricks, County Attorney, argued, Big Timber, Montana Richard Josephson, City Attorney, argued, Big Timber, Montana For Respondents: Thomas H. Mahan argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: September 18, 1974 % 7 ' ) ~ 1 5 A ! Decided: %6t' 1 5 1974 Filed : M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal arises from t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Sweegrass County, following a combined t r i a l of a condem- nation a c t i o n and a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate. Most of t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t s w e r e agreed upon and incorporated i n a p r e t r i a l order. Both cases involved proposed a l t e r a t i o n s t o S i x t h Avenue i n Big Timber, Montana. The p l a t of t h a t street shows it t o be an eighty f o o t s t r i p of land bordered by property zoned a s resi- d e n t i a l . The portion used f o r vehicular t r a f f i c is f o r t y f e e t wide, with twenty f o o t s t r i p s on e i t h e r s i d e containing sidewalks and g r a s s parking areas. Respondent C. E. Smart l i v e s on S i x t h Avenue d i r e c t l y across from t h e Big Timber Grade School, whose Board of Trustees is one of appellants here. The street i t s e l f is t h e property of t h e other appellant, t h e City of Big Timber. I n e a r l y 1971, t h e Board of Trustees determined t h a t t h e school's playground should be redesigned s o a s t o l e s s e n t h e d i s - t r a c t i o n caused by playground equipment being too near t h e c l a s s - room windows. The course chosen was t o remove t h e cottonwood t r e e s which grew between t h e playground and S i x t h Avenue, t o r e l o c a t e t h e sidewalk, and t o resurface the playground. After t h e t r e e s were removed t h e school board,with t h e approval of t h e town council, relocated t h e sidewalk moving it next t o t h e curb along S i x t h Avenue. It then applied t o t h e c i t y building inspector f o r a permit t o construct an e i g h t f o o t chain- l i n k fence next t o t h e sidewalk. The inspector denied t h e a p p l i - c a t i o n , holding t h e c i t y ' s zoning ordinance prohibited placing a fence c l o s e r than f i v e f e e t from t h e property line--the request here w a s f o r a p o s i t i o n f i f t e e n f e e t o u t s i d e t h e s c h o o l ' s property l i n e . The town council approved t h a t decision and t h e school board i n accord with t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 11-2707, R.C.M. 1947, appealed t h e r u l i n g t o t h e City Board of Adjustment. That Board refused t o allow t h e e r e c t i o n of t h e fence where re- quested, but did g r a n t a variance permitting i n s t a l l a t i o n on t h e property l i n e , r a t h e r than t h e required f i v e f e e t i n s i d e t h a t l i n e . The school board d i d not appeal t h i s decision t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , although it could have under t h e provisions of t h e zoning ordinance and s e c t i o n 11-2707, R.C.M. 1947. The school board d i d , however, f i l e a complaint seeking t o condemn t h e land between i t s property l i n e and t h e curb. Re- quired t o defend t h e c i t y i n t h e condemnation a c t i o n , t h e town council attempted t o e f f e c t a compromise which would s a t i s f y t h e needs of both p a r t i e s . After several meetings between t h e town council and t h e school board, it was agreed t h e c i t y would i n s t a l l t h e fence, with t h e c o s t of i n s t a l l a t i o n being borne by t h e school board. The location of t h e fence was t o be four f e e t from t h e sidewalk (eleven f e e t outside t h e school board's property l i n e ) . The town council passed a r e s o l u t i o n implementing t h i s compromise, but t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e meeting a t which t h e vote was taken w a s challenged. However, l a t e r t h e r e s o l u t i o n was c l e a r l y r a t i f i e d a t a l e g a l meeting. Upon learning of t h e proposed a c t i o n s of t h e town council and t h e school board, respondent C. E. Smart f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate, seeking t o compel t h e school board t o e r e c t a fence on its property l i n e and t o compel t h e town council and t h e school board t o comply with t h e provisions of t h e zoning or- dinance and s e c t i o n s 11-2707 and 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t issued a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order and an a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t of mandate. The p e t i t i o n was then com- bined with t h e condemnation a c t i o n f o r t r i a l . Motions were made to quash the petition for mandate; to dismiss the condemnation action; and, for a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties. Evidence was presented before the district court on July 20, 1973. On October 5, 1973, the district court decreed that: " * * * the relief prayed for by Petitioner, C. E. Smart, be granted; that the action of the City Council taken under the police power be nullified; that the Writ of Mandamus be granted; that a permanent restraining order be granted as to the erection of a fence any place except on school property or on the property line; that the Respondents pay Petitioner's attorneys a fee of $1,000.00." From that judgment and decree and from the denial of motions to amend findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judgment, this appeal is brought. The five issues set forth in appellants' brief can be answered by a determination of the applicability of sections 11-2707 and 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, to the facts. In pertinent part, those sections provide: "11-2707. Board of adjustment. "(8) Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjust- ment, or any taxpayer, or any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality, may present to a court of record a petition, duly verified, setting forth that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality. Such petition shall be presented to the court within thirty (30) days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board." "11-2801. Discontinuation of streets--procedure. The council, or county commissioners if the town be unincorporated, may discontinue a street or alley, or any part thereof, in a city or town or unincorporated town or townsites, upon the petition in writing of all owners of lots on the streets or alleys, if it can be done without detriment to the public interest; provided that where the street or alley is to be closed for school purposes, a pe- tition signed by seventy-five per cent (75%) of the lot owners on the whole street or alley to be closed, will be required; provided further that such vacation shall not affect the right of any public utility to continue to maintain its plant and equipment in any such streets or alleys." Section 11-2707, R.C.M. 1947, provides an avenue of appeal from decisions of the city Board of Adjustment. The school board did not appeal the decision here and respondent argues the failure to do so somehow precludes the school board from bringing the condemnation action. Had the decision of the city Board of Adjustment been illegal in some respect, there might be merit to respondent's contention. Here, however, the decision does have support in the city zoning ordinance, and it appears from the record the only complaint which could have been raised was that the Board abused its discretion. Montana law vests boards of adjustment with con- siderable discretion (Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534), and the school board might justifiably have concluded an appeal on that ground would be useless. Since the statute does not mandate an appeal from all adverse rulings, we certainly cannot require one here. But re- spondent argues that a condemnation action must also comply with the provisions of section 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, and approval must be secured from lot owners on the street before the land can be condemned. The fallacy of this argument is patent: the statute on its face purports to require approval only when "the council, or county commissioners" wish to close a street. The condemnation action was brought by the school board, not the city council. It is not argued that the school board lacks the statu- tory power to condemn. Chapter 99, Title 93, R.C.M. 1947, clearly gives the right of eminent domain to schools. Furthermore, zoning ordinances cannot limit the right to exercise the power of eminent domain. 1 Nichols1, The Law of Eminent Domain S1.141[6] (3d ed. However, s e c t i o n s 93-9904 and 93-9905, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e t h a t public property can be condemned only i f t h e u s e t o which it i s t o be applied i s a more necessary public use. W e note t h e condemnation complaint was amended t o provide a perpetual, public easement f o r t h e sidewalk and any necessary u t i l i t i e s . The amended complaint a l s o provided a r e v e r s i o n , i f t h e land should cease t o be used f o r school purposes. I n l i g h t of t h e b e n e f i t s t o be derived from t h e protec- t i o n of t h e c h i l d r e n by t h e fence, and considering t h a t t h e pub- l i c ' s pedestrian use of t h e land i n question i s not s u b s t a n t i a l l y impaired, we f i n d ample evidence t h e condemnation w i l l e f f e c t a more necessary public use. Therefore, w e hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n dismissing t h e condemnation a c t i o n . However, t h e school board was n o t pressing i t s condemna- t i o n a c t i o n a t t h e time respondent brought h i s p e t i t i o n . The compromise reached by t h e c i t y and t h e school board contemplated t h e c i t y ' s e r e c t i o n of t h e fence under i t s p o l i c e power. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ruled t h i s t o be improper. The c i t y council has power t o " a l t e r , widen, extend, grade, pave, o r otherwise improve s t r e e t s , a l l e y s , avenues, sidewalks, * * * and vacate t h e same." Section 11-906, R.C.M. 1947. Respon- e n t c o r r e c t l y suggests t h a t t h i s power is l i m i t e d i n c e r t a i n c a s e s by s e c t i o n 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, a s h e r e t o f o r e s e t f o r t h . ?he h i s t o r y of s e c t i o n 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, i n d i c a t e s it i s t h e product of enactments and amendments d a t i n g back t o 1887. H i s t o r i c a l l y , it can be divided i n t o t h r e e s e p a r a t e s e c t i o n s . The s t a t u t e o r i g i n a l l y provided t h a t a c i t y council could discontinue a s t r e e t upon p e t i t i o n of a l l t h e l o t owners on t h a t s t r e e t . Sec. 429, 5th Div. Comp. S t a t . 1887. I n 1929, a b i l l w a s introduced i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o add t h e requirement t h a t t h e discontinuance must be done "without detriment t o t h e public i n t e r e s t . " House Bill No. 39, Twenty-first Legislative Assembly, 1929. The provision for:75% approval of street closings for school pur- poses was added by the Affairs of Cities committee before the bill was passed. House Journal, Twenty-first Session, p . 125; Sec. 1, Ch. 13, L. 1929. In 1945, the statute was again amended to include the provision that vacation of a street will not affect the rights of public utilities to maintain their equip- ment there. Sec. 1, Ch. 36, L. 1945. Our reason for including the rather lengthy history of section 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947, is to demonstrate that the present statute is the amalgam of the intent of a number of legislatures. This is important when this single statute purports to deal with the "discontinuance", "closing", and "vacation" of streets. It appears that the terms were thought of by the draftsmen as being interchangeable. With this background, we turn to the facts here to deter- mine whether the erection of the proposed fence would be a dis- continuance, closing or vacation of all or part of Sixth Avenue 1947, in Big Timber, Montana. Section 11-906, R.C.M./lists a city council's powers as they relate to streets and avenues. The list includes altering, widening, extending, and improving those streets. It also includes vacating those streets, an action which was apparently thought to be different from the others listed. The record here indicates that the installation of the fence would be an alteration and improvement of Sixth Avenue, not a vacation, closing or discontinuance of it. The effect of this construction is in accord with the decision in Doull v. Wohlschlager, 141 Mont. 354, 365, 377 P.2d 758, where this Court said : " * * * In construing a statute, courts must first resort to the ordinary rules of grammar, and in the absence of a clear contradictory i n t e n t i o n disclosed by t h e t e x t , must give e f f e c t t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t according t o those r u l e s , and according t o t h e n a t u r a l and most obvious import of t h e language, without r e s o r t i n g t o s u b t l e and forced con- s t r u c t i o n t o l i m i t o r extend t h e i r operation." The n a t u r a l import of the language "where t h e s t r e e t o r a l l e y is t o be closed f o r school purposes" (section 11-2801, R.C.M. 1947) does not include the placing of a fence where it blocks n e i t h e r vehicular nor pedestrian t r a f f i c . Were w e t o construe it otherwise, t h e c i t y would be forced t o o b t a i n land- owner approval every t i m e they wished t o place a t r a f f i c sign, street l i g h t , o r f i r e plug within t h e p l a t t e d area of a street. The proposed exercise of p o l i c e power was i n accord with Montana law, and t h e d i s t r i c t court erred i n decreeing other- w i s e . For t h i s , and t h e e r r o r s previously mentioned, w e reverse t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court and remand f o r f u r t h e r a c t i o n not inconsistent with t h i s opinion. J u s t i c e W e concur: J h s t i c e s i