Title: State v. Killian

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2012-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
James P. Killian, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 451, 979 N.W.2d 569 
PDC No: 2022 WI App 43 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau   
 
JUDGE: 
Rian Radtke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Todd E. Schroeder and Schroeder & Lough, S.C., La Crosse. There 
was an oral argument by Todd E. Schroeder.  
 
 
2023 WI 52 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2020AP2012-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2019CF163) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
James P. Killian, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Killian, 
2022 WI App 43, 404 Wis. 2d 451, 979 N.W.2d 569, affirming the 
Trempealeau County circuit court's1 order dismissing a criminal 
complaint against James Killian as barred by double jeopardy.  
We reverse. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Rian Radtke presided.  
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Killian argues the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy 
Clause prohibits the State from prosecuting the present case.  
According to Killian, the State previously prosecuted him for 
the offenses charged in this case because "[t]he evidence the 
State intended to submit in the preceding trial was sufficient 
to convict [Killian] of all the charges in the current case," 
and "the State intended to amend the charges against [Killian] 
during the trial to include charges for which he is again placed 
in jeopardy here."  Because that case ended in a mistrial 
intentionally 
provoked 
by 
the 
prosecutor——a 
judicial 
determination the parties do not contest here——Killian argues 
double jeopardy bars the State's prosecuting the present case.  
Killian argues in the alternative that issue preclusion, under 
both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the common law, bars the 
present case. 
¶3 
We conclude that Killian's previous trial does not bar 
the State from prosecuting the present case because the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses 
with which he is now charged.  The scope of jeopardy is 
established by "the defendant's actual exposure to jeopardy in a 
prior prosecution."  State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶31, 390 
Wis. 2d 570, 939 N.W.2d 519.  This requires that the defendant 
faced a "risk of a determination of guilt" regarding a 
particular offense.  Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 
391-92 (1975).  Killian was never exposed to the risk of 
conviction for the offenses charged in the present case.  As a 
result, the offenses prosecuted in Killian's trial are not 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
3 
 
identical in law and in fact to the offenses charged in this 
case, so double jeopardy does not bar the present prosecution. 
¶4 
We also conclude that issue preclusion under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and common law issue preclusion do not 
bar the present prosecution.  Issue preclusion under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause requires a valid judicial determination of 
ultimate fact, and none exists in this case because Killian's 
trial ended in a mistrial.  See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 
(1970).  Common law issue preclusion also does not bar this 
prosecution. 
 
The 
circuit 
court's 
order 
dismissing 
with 
prejudice the criminal complaint in the first case did not 
decide the scope of Killian's jeopardy.  Therefore, that issue 
was never "actually litigated," and issue preclusion does not 
bar the present prosecution.  See Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, 
¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433.   
¶5 
We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court to consider Killian's unresolved argument 
regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
This case involves Killian's alleged sexual assaults 
of two minors:  Britney and Ashley.2  On March 17, 2015, the 
State charged Killian in Case No. 2015CF47 with one count of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 12 
                                                 
2 "Britney" and "Ashley" are pseudonyms used in place of the 
victims' names.  The parties used these same pseudonyms in their 
briefs.  See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.86(4) (2021-22).  All 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version 
unless otherwise noted.    
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
4 
 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02.  The complaint alleged that, 
"on or about Monday, August 18, 2014," Britney, then ten years 
old, "was laying on a bed at [a] residence and [Killian] came 
in, laid beside her and grabbed her buttocks."  The probable 
cause section further stated that during a forensic interview, 
Britney reported "that Killian had squeezed her butt on five 
different occasions starting when she was about eight years old" 
and that Killian also "touched her 'boobies' underneath her 
clothes" in 2014.    
¶7 
The State filed a second criminal complaint on 
March 15, 2016, in Case No. 2016CF38, charging Killian with 
repeated sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.025.  The complaint alleged, "from April 1994 through 
December 
1999," 
Killian 
sexually 
assaulted 
Ashley.  
Additionally, the complaint's probable cause section stated 
Ashley "had been sexually assaulted by [Killian], starting at 
the age of six and ending at 17 years of age . . . start[ing] in 
about January 1988 and end[ing] about December 1999."   
¶8 
The two cases were later joined for trial.  On 
October 5, 2016, prior to the cases being joined, the circuit 
court3 held a hearing in Britney's case on the parties' 
respective motions to admit or exclude other-acts evidence.  The 
circuit court granted the State's motion to admit evidence of 
sexual assaults against Ashley that "occurred over a period of 
time between January 1988 and December of 1999" to demonstrate 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Anna L. Becker presided.  
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
5 
 
Killian's "motive, intent, preparation, absence of mistake or 
accident, and plan."  The court also addressed Killian's motion 
to prohibit the State "from using evidence pertaining to other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts."  The State argued it planned to 
introduce evidence of Killian's past interactions with Britney 
to show Killian "groomed [Britney] by engaging in behavior that 
include[d] asking her if he could be her boyfriend," "[b]uying 
her gifts," and "[n]ormalizing the behavior of sleeping with her 
in the bed together."  Killian did not object to such evidence 
of "grooming" but only to "other acts of sexual assault."  The 
State agreed it was "not alleging that [Killian] touched 
[Britney] outside of anything that was alleged here."  The State 
then said it would not object, and the court granted Killian's 
motion to exclude evidence of other acts of sexual assault 
against Britney. 
¶9 
On June 15, 2017, four days before Killian's trial, 
the State filed a motion for leave to amend the Information.  
The proposed Amended Information included in Ashley's case one 
count of incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.06.  
The proposed Amended Information also expanded the charging 
period for Britney's case from "on or about Monday, August 18, 
2014" to "on or between January, 2014 to August 18, 2014."   
¶10 The circuit court discussed the State's motion with 
the parties in the morning on the first day of trial.  Due to 
the State's delay, the court denied the addition of the incest 
charge.  The prosecutor then commented that "maybe the proof at 
the trial will be sufficient to convince the Court that more 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
6 
 
sexual intercourse occurred which would be a basis for this 
charge."  In response, the court reiterated how "the state's 
lack of preparation should not prejudice the defendant" and made 
clear, "I'm not going to allow [the amendment]."   
¶11 As for the expanded charging period in Britney's case, 
Killian's counsel expressed concern about how "the act that's 
charged is a single act" and that the State was "attempting 
to . . . expand the date range in the hopes that it would make 
admissible evidence of other allegations that have not been 
charged."  Defense counsel also reminded the court of the other-
acts ruling in October and said, "So even if the date range were 
widened, I would argue that at this point, it would be 
inadmissible to bring in allegations of sexual contact."  He 
reiterated, "[W]e came here to defend an alleged sexual contact 
that occurred on August 18th.  And I think at the same time, 
this raises concerns that are even more broad than this one 
count."  The prosecutor responded, "I think it's quite clear 
that we do not have to prove the actual date of the allegation," 
and clarified, "[O]f course, [Killian is] correct.  We are 
charging one sole act."  He further noted the possibility of 
amending the Information:  
Interestingly, it appears to me that if more acts are 
disclosed at trial, the Information could be changed.  
And it could, in fact, I think naturally prejudice the 
defendant more.  But I don't think that's unusual.  It 
happens at trial that more facts are accused and 
Informations are changed and juries deliberate on 
multiple issues.   
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
7 
 
The circuit court clarified that the State was "not alleging 
there were additional things that happened. . . . [I]t's the 
same events or package that we've heard about all along.  
Nothing 
new." 
 
The 
prosecutor 
confirmed 
but 
nonetheless 
included, "If more facts are introduced at trial, the Court can 
amend the Information and give that instruction to the jury."   
¶12 The court allowed the expanded date range, but only 
for purposes of establishing "when exactly [the alleged act of 
grabbing Britney's buttocks] happened on the calendar."  Defense 
counsel sought clarification "that there can be no reference to 
other alleged touching that would constitute sexual assault of 
any kind," and the court agreed:  "If there were intentions to 
introduce those at trial, then those were required to have been 
addressed and they were not addressed at all.  So there's 
already been a ruling on that."  
¶13 The trial commenced later that same day.  During the 
prosecutor's opening statement, he told the jury Killian "would 
rub himself on [Britney]."  The prosecutor continued, describing 
to the jury how, on one occasion, Killian "was rubbing himself 
on [Britney].  And by himself, I mean his penis.  Erect.  
Rubbing on her. . . .  It's an unmistakable course of conduct."  
With regard to Ashley, the prosecutor told the jury they would 
hear testimony that Killian "started molesting her at about 6 or 
7 years old [1988–89] and didn't stop until she was about 17 
[1999].  So approximately 10 years." 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
8 
 
¶14 On the second day of trial, just before Britney 
testified, the prosecutor argued to the court that he could 
introduce other acts of sexual assault against Britney: 
I re-reviewed the Criminal Complaint.  What is on 
trial, the course of conduct, there was a motion in 
limine filed by the defense regarding other acts.  I 
believe we could bring all that out.  Look at the 
court minutes.  I don't think these are other acts.  I 
think they're a course of conduct.  They're relevant.  
They set the stage for our allegation of sexual 
contact.  And I think although there is one incident 
charged, the state doesn't have to charge every 
incident.  The state had discretion.  But in the 
Complaint, the course of conduct is there.  The 
different things that she says happened. 
Defense counsel objected to the State's introducing other acts 
of sexual assault and reminded the court of its previous 
ruling:  "[I]f there's an other act that would constitute sexual 
conduct, I'm going to be objecting and asking for a mistrial if 
that comes out at any point in this trial because that's been 
thoroughly litigated and decided as of yesterday again."  The 
prosecutor further argued that "the way to address this is let 
[Britney] 
speak. . . . [I]f 
there's 
more 
information, 
more 
charges can be brought.  The [I]nformation can be changed."  The 
court rejected such a possibility.  It reminded the prosecutor, 
"[T]here was a ruling on that. . . .  You're changing the game 
on them.  If you wanted to include that, then we should have 
addressed that."  The prosecutor continued, "Anything could 
happen when she testifies.  I don't know.  But if she starts to 
speak about a vagina rub or him rubbing his penis on her leg, I 
can't control that.  And if she does that, then I guess [defense 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
9 
 
counsel's] going to move for a mistrial."  The court warned the 
prosecutor, "It will be a mistrial because you didn't, again, 
prepare for trial adequately until the last moment."  The 
circuit court reminded the parties that the offense "charged in 
the 
Complaint . . . was 
the 
butt[-grab]," 
and 
the 
court 
thoroughly explained its ruling because it was "concerned about 
a mistrial": 
[T]he state can bring in anything that they would like 
to regarding other acts that are grooming type 
activities but not other sexual assaults because those 
should have been properly dealt with when we talked 
about the motions that were filed for other acts.  I 
think these are clearly allegations that were other 
acts of sexual assault that go to your concerns.  But 
that wasn't what the argument was when we had those. 
 
So I don't think at this point, it's appropriate 
to allow that in.  I think there are other ways that 
the Court has less prejudicial or the ability to make 
this less confusing for the jury so that they 
understand what the exact one is that's being accused 
here which is the one dating back to August 18th. 
¶15 After the court reaffirmed its other-acts ruling, 
Britney took the stand.  She testified first about Killian's 
grooming behaviors, such as engaging her in conversations about 
sex.  The following exchange then took place: 
Q.  So so far, we've talked about mostly conversations 
about sex, right? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Did you tell [your mother] something else relating 
to a private part of your body? 
A.  When I told her that one day when we were in bed 
he was rubbing my back and he rubbed -- he was rubbing 
my stomach.  So he rubbed up and he rubbed on my 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
10 
 
breasts.  And then when he was done, he rubbed on my 
private spot.  It was just a swift rub. 
Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, which the 
court granted.  The court later found "that the prosecutor's 
actions were intentional" and "designed to create another chance 
to convict, and was an act done so as to allow the State another 
'kick at the cat.'"  The court therefore concluded that "the 
State is barred from retrial in this matter due to prosecutorial 
overreaching," and it dismissed the case with prejudice.  The 
State did not appeal the circuit court's decision, and it does 
not dispute the circuit court's finding of prosecutorial 
overreach.  
¶16 On October 1, 2019, the State filed a new criminal 
complaint against Killian in the case now before us.  The 
complaint contained the following counts: 
Count 1:  First-degree sexual assault of a child contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1989-90) against Ashley "in or around 
1990 to 1991."  
Count 2:  First-degree sexual assault of a child contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1989-90) against Ashley "in or around 
1990 to 1991." 
Count 3:  Incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.06(1) (1989-90) against Ashley "in or around 1990 to 
1991." 
Count 4:  First-degree sexual assault of a child contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1991-92) against Ashley "in or around 
1992 to 1993." 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
11 
 
Count 5:  Incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.06(1) (1991-92) against Ashley "in or around 1992 to 
1993." 
Count 6:  Incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.06(1) (1993-94) against Ashley "in or around 1993 to 
1994." 
Count 7:  Incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.06(1) (1993-94) against Ashley "in or around 1994 to 
1995."  
Count 8:  Incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.06(1) (1995-96) against Ashley "in or around 1995 to 
1996."  
Count 9:  Incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.06(1) (1995-96) against Ashley "in or around 1996 to 
1997."  
Count 10:  Repeated acts of sexual assault of the same 
child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2011-12), "namely 
[Britney]," "in or around June 2012, and no later than 
August 17, 2014." 
¶17 Killian thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the 
State's new charges.  He argued dismissal was required because 
"this action violates Judge Becker's Order declaring that the 
mistrial in Case No. 15-CF-47 was caused by prosecutorial 
overreaching and that any retrial of this matter would violate 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
12 
 
the defendant's . . . right to be free from Double Jeopardy."4  
In an oral ruling, the circuit court observed, "In a strict 
comparison of the Complaints in 15-CF-48 (sic) and 19-CF-163 of 
the charged offenses under Blockburger,[5] the time frames and 
elements are different and would pass the Blockburger test."  
The court nonetheless concluded the second prosecution violates 
double jeopardy because "[t]he State's plan was to bring all of 
the alleged acts into trial and then seek to amend the 
Information after testimony to conform to the evidence."  The 
court also viewed the order dismissing the first prosecution as 
"meant to encompass future prosecutions involving the same facts 
alleged in 15-CF-47 where additional charges may be added in 
future prosecutions."  The circuit court therefore concluded 
Killian's scope of jeopardy, "in light of the record, which 
includes Judge Becker's order, includes all facts contained in 
the Complaints that were later joined and amended, including 
acts in the Complaints that were not specifically the basis for 
the charged offenses in 15-CF-47, and also facts raised at 
trial."   
¶18 The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court of appeals concluded "that the circuit court properly 
considered the entire record of the first prosecution to 
determine whether Killian was in jeopardy for the offenses now 
                                                 
4 Killian also has a prosecutorial vindictiveness argument 
pending in the circuit court.  The circuit court never ruled on 
that issue, and it was not raised on appeal.  
5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
13 
 
charged," and it "agree[d] with the circuit court in this case 
that Killian was, in fact, in jeopardy of being convicted of the 
offenses now charged."  Killian, 404 Wis. 2d 451, ¶4.  The State 
petitioned this court for review, which we granted.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 "The issue of whether a person's right to be free from 
double jeopardy has been violated presents a question of law 
that we review de novo."  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19, 
244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801.  "The application of issue 
preclusion to a set of facts is a question of law, which this 
court reviews without deference to the lower courts."  State v. 
Canon, 2001 WI 11, ¶7, 241 Wis. 2d 164, 622 N.W.2d 270. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶20 We begin our review by discussing general principles 
of double jeopardy and how to ascertain a defendant's scope of 
jeopardy in a previous trial.  We then examine Killian's scope 
of jeopardy in the previous trial and conclude the present 
prosecution does not place him in jeopardy for any of the same 
offenses.  Finally, we conclude issue preclusion also does not 
bar the present prosecution. 
A.  General Double Jeopardy Principles 
¶21 Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, "No person shall be . . . subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  
U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
14 
 
("[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy 
of punishment . . . .").6   
¶22 "Over 40 years ago, we held that two prosecutions are 
for the 'same offense,' and therefore violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, when the offenses in both prosecutions are 
'identical in the law and in fact.'"  Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 
¶22 (quoting State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 758, 242 
N.W.2d 206 (1976)).  Two offenses are not "identical in law" 
where "each provision requires proof of a fact which the other 
does not."  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932).  Further, offenses are not "identical in fact" where 
"allegation of substitute facts, all of which furnish the same 
legal element of the crime, . . . are either separated in time 
or are of a significantly different nature in fact."  State v. 
Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 31, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980) (footnote 
omitted).  
¶23 "[A] 
motion 
by 
the 
defendant 
for 
mistrial 
is 
ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even 
if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or 
judicial error."  United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 
(1971) (footnote omitted).  However, as the United States 
Supreme Court has held, "Only where the governmental conduct in 
question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a 
mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a 
                                                 
6 "Our tradition is to view these provisions as identical in 
scope and purpose."  State v. Davidson, 2003 WI 89, ¶18, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
15 
 
second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his 
own motion."  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).  The 
circuit court in Killian's first prosecution made a factual 
finding that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, a finding the 
State did not appeal and does not dispute here.  Therefore, any 
offenses in the present prosecution that are identical in law 
and in fact to an offense in the prior prosecution are barred by 
double jeopardy. 
¶24 Before we can analyze whether the offenses in this 
prosecution are identical in law and in fact to any offenses in 
the prior prosecution, we must first discern the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy during that prior prosecution.  It is a 
"fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy 
before he can suffer double jeopardy."  Serfass, 420 U.S. at 
393.  "The ambit of the constitutional bar to subsequent 
prosecution is coextensive with the scope of jeopardy created in 
the prior prosecution."  22A C.J.S. Crim. Proc. & Rts. of 
Accused § 618 (2023).  If the offenses now prosecuted were not 
previously 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
Killian's 
jeopardy, 
then 
prosecuting those offenses in this case could not violate double 
jeopardy.  
B.  Determining The Scope of Jeopardy. 
¶25 Related to the scope of jeopardy is the method for 
determining when jeopardy attaches.  See Crist v. Bretz, 437 
U.S. 28, 38 (1978) (quoting Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1343 
(9th Cir. 1976)) ("[T]he time when jeopardy attaches in a jury 
trial 
'serves 
as 
the 
lynchpin 
for 
all 
double 
jeopardy 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
16 
 
jurisprudence.'").  "[T]he conclusion that jeopardy has attached 
begins . . . the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy 
Clause bars retrial."  Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 
(1973).  "Jeopardy attaches when a person has been placed on 
trial on a valid indictment or information before a court of 
competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned and has pleaded, and 
a jury has been impaneled and sworn, and charged with his 
deliverance."  State v. B——, 173 Wis. 608, 617, 182 N.W. 474 
(1921).  In other words, jeopardy attaches when "an accused has 
been subjected to the risk of conviction."  Serfass, 420 U.S. at 
392.  "Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does 
not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution 
constitutes double jeopardy."  Id. at 391-92.  It follows that 
if a defendant was never subject to the "risk of a determination 
of guilt" of an offense, then jeopardy never attached for that 
offense, and it is not within the scope of jeopardy.7   
¶26 In Serfass, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
jeopardy attached where charges for "willfully failing to report 
for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces" were 
                                                 
7 We recognize that our decision in State v. Schultz 
contained a footnote stating, "The point at which jeopardy 
attaches has nothing to say about the actual scope of jeopardy."  
2020 WI 24, ¶24 n.13, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 939 N.W.2d 519.   
However, that footnote merely explained that "[t]he time at 
which jeopardy attaches does not lock in the scope of jeopardy."  
Id.  Though true the scope of jeopardy may change after the 
point in time when jeopardy initially attaches, this does not 
affect the method by which jeopardy must attach.  Jeopardy may 
expand to include additional offenses the same way it initially 
attached:  by placing the defendant at risk of a determination 
of guilt of an additional offense. 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
17 
 
dismissed, prior to trial, because the "local board did not 
state 
adequate 
reasons 
for 
its 
refusal 
to 
reopen 
[the 
defendant's Selective Service] file."  Id. at 379.  The Court 
noted that it "has consistently adhered to the view that 
jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can 
have no application, until a defendant is 'put to trial before 
the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.'"  
Id. at 388 (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479).  Because the charges 
were earlier dismissed, "[t]he District Court was without power 
to make any determination regarding [defendant's] guilt or 
innocence."  Id. at 389. 
¶27 The Court also rejected the argument that dismissal 
"was the 'functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits' 
and 'constructively jeopardy had attached.'"  Id. at 390.  
Finding this argument "divorced from the procedural context," 
the court reemphasized that jeopardy attaches when "an accused 
has been subjected to the risk of conviction" by "a trier 
'having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused.'"  Id. at 391-92 (quoting Kepner v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904)). 
¶28 The Supreme Court later doubled down on this rule in 
United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385 (1992).  The criminal 
defendant in Felix was first charged in the Western District of 
Missouri 
with 
"attempting 
to 
manufacture 
[methamphetamine] 
between August 26 and August 31, 1987," and the conduct 
underlying the charge was the defendant's "order[ing] precursor 
chemicals and equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
18 
 
to be delivered to him at Joplin, Missouri."  Id. at 380.  At 
his trial, "the Government introduced evidence that [the 
defendant] had manufactured methamphetamine in Oklahoma earlier 
in 1987" in order to prove his "criminal intent with respect to 
the items delivered in Missouri."  Id. at 381.  He was convicted 
and later charged a second time in the Eastern District of 
Oklahoma.  Id. at 381-82.  The conduct underlying some of the 
charges in the Oklahoma case was the same conduct the government 
used as evidence of intent in the Missouri case.  Id. at 382-83.  
¶29 The 
Court 
found 
no 
double 
jeopardy 
violation, 
rejecting the notion "that if the Government offers in evidence 
in one prosecution acts of misconduct that might ultimately be 
charged as criminal offenses in a second prosecution, the latter 
prosecution is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause."  Id. at 
386.  The Court's "precedents hold that a mere overlap in proof 
between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy 
violation" and have explicitly "disclaimed any intention of 
adopting a 'same evidence' test."  Id. at 386 (citing Grady v. 
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 & n.12 (1990); Gavieres v. United 
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 
342 (1990)).  Thus, the Court reaffirmed "the basic, yet 
important, principle that the introduction of relevant evidence 
of particular misconduct in a case is not the same thing as 
prosecution for that conduct."  Id. at 387.   
¶30 Recently, we also weighed in on the question of how to 
determine the scope of a defendant's jeopardy.  In Schultz, 390 
Wis. 2d 570, the defendant was charged in a criminal complaint 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
19 
 
with repeated sexual assault of a child during "late summer to 
early fall of 2012."  Id., ¶5.  No evidence at trial indicated 
any such acts of sexual assault occurred in October 2012, and 
the prosecutor in closing argument stated "the assaults started 
in July and ended in September 2012."  Id., ¶¶8-9.  The 
defendant was acquitted but later charged again, this time with 
sexual assault of a child under the age of 16 "on or about 
October 19, 2012."  Id., ¶11.  The issue was whether the scope 
of jeopardy in the trial included the offense of sexual assault 
"on or about October 19, 2012."   
¶31 In line with the Supreme Court's decisions in Serfass 
and Felix, we focused our inquiry on "the defendant's actual 
exposure to jeopardy in a prior prosecution."  Schultz, 390 
Wis. 2d 570, ¶31.  We decided "examining the entire record, 
including evidentiary facts adduced at trial," is relevant to 
discerning the scope of jeopardy in a prior trial.  Id., ¶32.  
However, in reaching this conclusion, we also clarified that the 
focus of the inquiry remains on the defendant's "actual exposure 
to jeopardy," not on the parties' subjective understandings 
concerning 
the 
scope 
of 
jeopardy. 
 
Id., 
¶¶24-25, 
31.  
"Jeopardy," as we explained, includes "the actual danger to 
which a person is exposed, as opposed to the danger a person 
fears."  Id., ¶31.  It is not based "on the criminal defendant's 
fears, beliefs, or perceptions regarding his exposure in the 
first 
prosecution." 
 
Id. 
 
Furthermore, 
we 
declined 
the 
invitation to adopt the "reasonable person" test for discerning 
the scope of jeopardy espoused by the Second Circuit in United 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
20 
 
States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006).  Schultz, 390 
Wis. 2d 570, ¶¶45-50.  The proposed test was "whether 'a 
reasonable person familiar with the totality of the facts and 
circumstances would construe the initial indictment, at the time 
jeopardy attached in the first case, to cover the offense that 
is charged in the subsequent prosecution.'"  Id., ¶46 (quoting 
Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 282).  We rejected this test as unsupported 
in the case law and contrary to the language of the Fifth 
Amendment, which contemplates actual jeopardy, not perceived 
jeopardy.  Id., ¶¶47-49. 
¶32 Killian relies heavily on the "entire-record" analysis 
we used in Schultz.  According to Killian, the present case 
violates double jeopardy because "[t]he evidence the State 
intended to submit in the preceding trial was sufficient to 
convict [Killian] of all the charges in the current case."  He 
argues this evidence established jeopardy of conviction for "a 
broad range of conduct beyond the charging document" because 
"the State presented the conduct underlying the subsequent 
prosecution not as other act evidence in the first trial but 
with the intent to include the evidence as charges in an 
amendment."  See Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2).     
¶33 We do not read Schultz to be quite so broad.  We agree 
with Killian, as we stated in Schultz, that "[i]t is the record 
as a whole . . . which provides the subsequent protection from 
double jeopardy, rather than just the indictment."  Schultz, 390 
Wis. 2d 570, ¶30 (quoting United States v. Roman, 728 F.2d 846, 
854 (7th Cir. 1984)).  However, when ascertaining the scope of 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
21 
 
jeopardy, the analysis must nonetheless focus on the defendant's 
actual jeopardy——"the actual danger" of conviction.  Id., ¶31; 
Serfass, 420 U.S. at 391-92. 
¶34 Schultz framed the question, as applied to the facts 
of that case, as "whether the initial charge for repeated sexual 
assault of a child during the timeframe of 'late summer to early 
fall of 2012' includes the date charged in the second 
prosecution for sexual assault of a child 'on or about 
October 19, 2012.'"  Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶33.  To answer 
this question, "[w]e beg[a]n our analysis with the complaint 
charging [the defendant] in the initial prosecution."  Id., ¶34.  
After analyzing the complaint's language, along with a police 
report incorporated by reference, we concluded the complaint 
"clearly identifie[d] [the defendant's] scope of jeopardy in the 
first prosecution at the time jeopardy attached."  Id., ¶36.  We 
then continued to examine the record at trial, but only "to see 
if anything suggest[ed] 'early fall' extended past mid-September 
to include October 19, 2012."  Id., ¶37.  The focus of the 
analysis was always on the defendant's actual jeopardy as 
established by the language in the criminal complaint.  The 
trial record helped inform this analysis by providing evidence 
of what exactly the complaint meant by "early fall."   
¶35 Schultz never suggested that the trial record, and the 
trial record alone, could expand the defendant's scope of 
jeopardy beyond the jeopardy created by a fair reading of the 
charging documents.  After all, "[t]he defendant cannot be 
convicted," and the court is "without jurisdiction to convict" 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
22 
 
the defendant, "of a crime for which he is not charged."  State 
ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis. 2d 547, 553, 249 N.W.2d 791 
(1977); see also Malaga v. United States, 57 F.2d 822, 825 (1st 
Cir. 1932) ("Even though the evidence warranted it, the 
respondent could not be convicted of an offense with which he 
was not charged."); State v. Rogers, 545 P.2d 930, 932 (Ariz. 
1976) ("It is basic that a person cannot be convicted of an 
offense not charged against him by indictment or information."); 
In re Hess, 288 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1955) ("A person cannot be 
convicted of an offense . . . not charged against him by 
indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence at 
his trial to show that he had committed that offense.").  Were 
we to conclude jeopardy could attach based on "[t]he evidence 
the State intended to submit in the preceding trial" alone, this 
would contravene the Supreme Court's holding in Felix "that a 
mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not 
establish a double jeopardy violation."8  503 U.S. at 386. 
¶36 The fact that the information may be amended to 
conform to the evidence presented at trial does not affect our 
analysis.   Under Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2), 
At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the 
complaint, indictment or information to conform to the 
proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the 
defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be deemed 
                                                 
8 If we ascribed a broader meaning to our holding in 
Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, it would bar subsequent prosecutions 
based simply on evidence related to uncharged crimes.  Schultz 
cannot be interpreted to bar a later prosecution based just on 
that evidence.  
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
23 
 
amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the 
relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the 
trial.  
But before the information may be amended to conform to the 
evidence, such evidence must have been admitted at trial.  
Evidence in a criminal trial is inadmissible unless it is 
relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence of a crime 
charged at the time the evidence is introduced.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.02 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."); 
cf. State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 324 N.W.2d 426 
(1982) (stating evidence "must be relevant to an issue in the 
case to be admissible").  If evidence is relevant and therefore 
admitted, then the defendant is in jeopardy insofar as that 
evidence is being used to prove the charged offense.  See Felix, 
503 U.S. at 379.  Even if that same evidence could be relevant 
to proving some other offense, jeopardy for that offense does 
not 
attach 
until 
the 
defendant 
faces 
the 
"risk 
of 
a 
determination of guilt" with regard to that offense.  Serfass, 
420 U.S. at 391-92.  Until the Information is actually amended, 
there exists no such risk, and therefore no jeopardy.    
¶37 Likewise, we disagree with Killian that a prosecutor's 
introducing evidence merely with intent to bring additional 
charges can expand the scope of jeopardy.  We similarly rejected 
analyzing the parties' states of mind as a method for discerning 
the scope of jeopardy in Schultz.  See 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶¶24-25, 
31, 49.  Just like the proposed tests in Schultz, Killian's 
proposed 
intent-based 
test 
runs 
contrary 
to 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment's requirement of actual jeopardy.  Regardless of the 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
24 
 
prosecutor's intentions, the Information could not be amended 
without leave of the court.  Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2).  
¶38 We therefore hold that, where a trial ends in a 
mistrial,9 the defendant's scope of jeopardy consists of those 
offenses for which the defendant faced actual danger of 
conviction, meaning the defendant was exposed to the "risk of a 
determination of guilt" regarding those offenses.10  Serfass, 420 
U.S. at 391-92.  The inquiry should focus on the charging 
documents, but the entire record may be examined if necessary to 
confirm the scope of jeopardy as established by those charging 
documents.  Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶¶33–40.  "[M]ere overlap 
in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double 
jeopardy violation," Felix, 503 U.S. at 386, nor does the 
prosecutor's intent.  The inquiry must always focus on "the 
defendant's actual exposure to jeopardy in a prior prosecution."  
Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶31. 
C.  Whether Killian Was Twice Put In Jeopardy. 
                                                 
9 "[F]or purposes of barring a future prosecution, it is the 
judgment and not the indictment alone which acts as a bar, and 
the entire record may be considered in evaluating a subsequent 
claim of double jeopardy."  Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶30 
(quoting United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th 
Cir. 1993)). 
10 This "risk" refers to the possibility that a jury might 
find the defendant guilty of the crime charged.  It does not 
refer to the possibility that a jury might consider conduct 
which could constitute an otherwise uncharged offense.  The 
Constitution requires that there be actual as opposed to 
hypothetical jeopardy.  Id., ¶31. 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
25 
 
¶39 We now turn to the issue of whether Killian's second 
prosecution violates double jeopardy.  We conclude it does not. 
¶40 Killian argues he was in jeopardy with regard to 
certain offenses against Britney because, "[i]n the State's 
opening in the first trial, the State explained it would present 
evidence 
regarding 
'a 
course 
of 
conduct,' 
including 
the 
defendant 'touching her inappropriately' and 'rub[bing] [his 
penis] on her."  Killian also points to the prosecutor's 
statement to the circuit court that he could present evidence of 
"a breast rub . . . alleged humping, penis rubbing . . . also a 
vaginal rub."  "With respect to Ashley," Killian argues he was 
in jeopardy because "the State explained to the empaneled jury, 
the evidence will show that [Killian] sexually assaulted Ashley 
from when she was about 6 years old until she was 17," from 1988 
to 1999.  According to Killian, the prosecutor's attempts to 
introduce this evidence, combined with his intent to amend the 
Information, constituted an "active pursuit of convictions in 
front of an empaneled jury [which] created the actual jeopardy." 
¶41 We disagree.  A review of the entire record, with a 
focus on Killian's actual exposure to jeopardy, reveals a far 
more limited scope of jeopardy than Killian contends.  Killian 
was never in jeopardy of being convicted for these offenses 
because he was never exposed to a risk of a determination of 
guilt regarding these offenses.   
¶42 The entire record demonstrates that the only alleged 
offense against Britney for which Killian faced a possible 
determination of guilt was the allegation that he grabbed 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
26 
 
Britney's buttocks.  The Amended Information included one count 
of sexually assaulting Britney "on or between January, 2014 to 
August, 2014."  The probable cause section of the original 
complaint alleged Killian "grabbed her buttocks" in that time 
period.  During the October 5, 2016 motion hearing, the 
prosecutor confirmed that the State was not alleging any acts of 
sexual assault beyond touching Britney's buttocks, and the court 
issued an order excluding evidence of other acts of sexual 
assault 
against 
Britney. 
 
While 
discussing 
the 
Amended 
Information on the first day of trial, the circuit court further 
confirmed with the prosecutor that the State was "not alleging 
there were additional things that happened."  Any other acts of 
sexual assault, the court emphasized, "were required to have 
been addressed and they were not addressed at all."  The court 
repeated this ruling before Britney's testimony, and it granted 
a mistrial when the prosecutor violated that ruling.  The 
circuit court made it abundantly clear that Killian was not at 
risk of being convicted for any act of sexual assault against 
Britney other than grabbing her buttocks.  
¶43 As for the alleged offenses against Ashley, Killian 
was in jeopardy of being convicted for committing repeated 
sexual assault "from April, 1994 through December, 1999."  The 
court denied the State's motion to include a count for incest, 
meaning that offense was never before the jury.  Though the 
prosecutor in his opening statement told the jury Killian 
"started molesting [Ashley] since she was about 6 or 7 years old 
[1988-89] and didn't stop until she was about 17 [1999]," this 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
27 
 
clearly goes beyond the date range in the Information.  In 
contrast with the Information in Schultz, there is no reading of 
"April, 1994 through December, 1999" that also includes 1988 to 
1993.  The only time period the jury could consider was that 
listed in the Information: "from April, 1994 through December, 
1999." 
¶44 Furthermore, the prosecutor's stated intention to 
amend the Information and add more charges at the close of 
evidence did not expand the scope of Killian's jeopardy.  The 
prosecutor's intent alone was insufficient to put Killian at 
risk of a determination of guilt.  The jury would have had no 
ability find Killian guilty of any additional offenses unless 
and until that amendment took place.  No such amendment ever 
took place, so jeopardy never attached.   
¶45 Accordingly, we conclude the scope of Killian's 
jeopardy in his trial included the following offenses:  sexually 
assaulting Britney by grabbing her buttocks "on or between 
January, 2014 to August 18, 2014" contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02, and repeated sexual assault of Ashley "from April, 
1994 through December, 1999" contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.025.  
¶46 Having ascertained the scope of Killian's jeopardy in 
his first prosecution, we proceed to the question of whether 
Killian's jeopardy in his second prosecution is identical in law 
and in fact.  To repeat, "two offenses are identical in law if 
one offense does not require proof of any fact in addition to 
those which must be proved for the other offense."  State v. 
Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶60, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238.  
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
28 
 
Offenses "are not identical in fact if the acts allegedly 
committed are sufficiently different in fact to demonstrate that 
separate crimes have been committed."  Id.   
¶47 In the present prosecution, counts 3 and 5 through 9 
are not identical in law to an offense in Killian's first 
prosecution.  Those counts allege Killian committed incest 
against Ashley contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.06.  To prove 
incest, the State must show the defendant "kn[ew] [the child 
victim] is related, either by blood or adoption, and the child 
is related in a degree of kinship closer than 2nd cousin."  
§ 948.06.  The crime of repeated sexual assault of a child under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025, charged in the first case, contains no 
similar element.  The crime of incest also requires proof that 
the victim "ha[d] not attained the age of 18 years."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.01(1) (defining "child").  In contrast, repeated sexual 
assault of a child requires proof that the victim "ha[d] not 
attained the age of 16 years."  Wis. Stat. §§ 948.025, 948.02.  
The statute also requires proof of "3 or more violations."  Id.  
Counts 3 and 5 through 9 charging Killian with committing incest 
against Ashley therefore do not violate double jeopardy because 
each offense "require[s] proof of a[] fact in addition to those 
which must be proved for the other offense."  Ziegler, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, ¶60; see also State v. Swanson, No. 2015AP1521-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶42 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2017) 
(concluding Wis. Stat. §§ 948.06 and 948.025 are not identical 
in law under the Blockburger test).   
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
29 
 
¶48 Counts 1 through 5 do not violate double jeopardy 
because they are not identical in fact to an offense in 
Killian's first prosecution.  Counts 1 through 5, which allege 
offenses against Ashley, are factually different because they 
cover different timeframes than the offense in Killian's first 
prosecution.  Whereas the timeframe in the first prosecution was 
"April, 1994 through December, 1999," counts 1 through 5 allege 
various offenses "in or around" 1990 to 1993.  This precedes the 
timeframe for the offenses against Ashley prosecuted in the 
previous case, making these counts not identical in fact.   
¶49 Count 10, the only count alleging an offense against 
Britney, is also not identical in fact to an offense in the 
previous case.  The State prosecuted Killian in the first case 
for grabbing Britney's buttocks "on or between January, 2014 to 
August 18, 2014."  Count 10 alleges Killian committed repeated 
acts of sexual assault against Britney "in or around June 2012, 
and no later than August 17, 2014."  Though there is some 
overlap in the time period and the complaint's probable cause 
section 
alleges 
Killian 
"grabbed 
[Britney's] 
butt," 
the 
complaint also alleges other acts of sexual assault.  It alleges 
Killian grabbed Britney's buttocks five times and that only one 
of these times was on August 18, 2014.  It also alleges Killian 
"touched her 'boobies,'" "hump[ed]" her, and "touched her 
'private part.'"  These acts "are significantly different in 
nature, involving different methods of intrusion and contact."  
Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶73.  Count 10 is therefore not 
identical in fact to an offense prosecuted in the previous case, 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
30 
 
and it does not violate double jeopardy to the extent it alleges 
acts of sexual assault other than grabbing Britney's buttocks 
"on or between January, 2014 to August 18, 2014."  
¶50 Because no count in the present prosecution is 
identical both in law and in fact with an offense charged in 
Killian's previous prosecution, the present case is not a 
prosecution for the same offense and does not violate Killian's 
right against double jeopardy.  
D.  Issue Preclusion 
¶51 Finally, 
Killian 
raises 
issue 
preclusion 
as 
a 
potential bar to prosecution in this case.  Specifically, 
Killian argues that issue preclusion, as "ro[o]ted in the Double 
Jeopardy Clause," bars the present prosecution because "the 
trials would be identical, but for the State seeking to bolster 
its case."  He also argues that issue preclusion prevents the 
State from bringing more charges because the circuit court's 
order in the first case "clearly ruled that the State could not 
bring these charges" and the State did not appeal that order.  
¶52 Killian's first argument relies largely on the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Ashe, 397 U.S. 436.  The 
defendant in Ashe was charged with robbing one of six men 
playing a poker game in a residential basement.  Id. at 437.  
"The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found that the 
[defendant] 
was 
one 
of 
the 
participants 
in 
the 
armed 
robbery . . . he was guilty under the law even if he had not 
personally robbed [the victim]."  Id. at 439.  The jury found 
the defendant not guilty.  Id.  "Six weeks later the [defendant] 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
31 
 
was brought to trial again, this time for the robbery of another 
participant in the poker game . . . ."  Id.  The Court addressed 
whether issue preclusion "is a part of the Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee against double jeopardy" and therefore "no longer a 
matter to be left for state court determination within the broad 
bounds of 'fundamental fairness.'"  Id. at 442-43.  The Court 
described the doctrine as "mean[ing] simply that when an issue 
of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same 
parties in any future lawsuit."11  Id. at 443.  The Court 
concluded issue preclusion barred the second prosecution because 
the "jury determined by its verdict that the [defendant] was not 
one of the robbers."  Id. at 446.   
¶53 The Supreme Court has recently described Ashe as 
imposing a rigorous standard: 
[Ashe's] test is a demanding one.  Ashe forbids a 
second trial only if to secure a conviction the 
prosecution 
must 
prevail 
on 
an 
issue 
the 
jury 
necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor in the 
first trial.  A second trial "is not precluded simply 
because it is unlikely——or even very unlikely——that 
the original jury acquitted without finding the fact 
in question."  To say that the second trial is 
tantamount to a trial of the same offense as the first 
and thus forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we 
must be able to say that "it would have been 
irrational for the jury" in the first trial to acquit 
                                                 
11 Ashe used the term "collateral estoppel" to describe this 
doctrine.  397 U.S. 436 (1970).  However, the Supreme Court "has 
[since] observed, 'issue preclusion' is the more descriptive 
term" as opposed to "collateral estoppel."  Bravo-Fernandez v. 
United States, 580 U.S. 5, 7 n.1 (2016).   
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
32 
 
without finding in the defendant's favor on a fact 
essential to a conviction in the second.   
Currier v. Virginia, 585 U.S.    , 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018) 
(citations omitted); see also Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 
580 U.S. 5, 12 (2016) (describing the inquiry as "what a jury in 
a previous trial necessarily decided").  We have likewise 
explained that issue preclusion applies to "an issue of ultimate 
fact that is determined by a valid and full judgment."  State v. 
Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 343, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998); Canon, 241 
Wis. 2d 164, ¶13 ("[I]ssue preclusion . . . is a doctrine to 
prevent prosecutorial misconduct and give finality to judicial 
determinations made in one criminal transaction . . . .").  We 
therefore conclude that a valid judicial determination of 
ultimate fact is necessary for issue preclusion to apply under 
Ashe.  Because the jury in Killian's trial did not reach a 
verdict, the doctrine is inapplicable to this case.12 
                                                 
12 Killian argues this conclusion "allows a prosecutor, upon 
believing the trial is going badly, to intentionally goad the 
defense into moving for a mistrial and then remain free from the 
perils of issue preclusion, which is exactly what happened in 
this case."  This argument is based on an unknowable, 
hypothetical verdict the jury might have issued, and it assumes 
all charges relating to the same conduct must be brought in the 
same prosecution.  
The 
collateral-estoppel 
effect 
attributed 
to 
the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, may bar a later prosecution 
for a separate offense where the Government has lost 
an earlier prosecution involving the same facts.  But 
this 
does 
not 
establish 
that 
the 
Government 
"must . . . bring 
its 
prosecutions . . . together."  
It is entirely free to bring them separately . . . . 
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 (1993). 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
33 
 
¶54 Killian's second argument——that the circuit court's 
order dismissing the first case with prejudice bars the present 
prosecution——fails in a similar vein.  "The [common law] 
doctrine of issue preclusion . . . is designed to limit the 
relitigation of issues that have been actually litigated in a 
previous action."  Aldrich, 341 Wis. 2d 36, ¶88.  "An issue is 
'actually litigated' when it is 'properly raised, by the 
pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and 
is determined.'"  Dostal v. Strand, 2023 WI 6, ¶24, 405 
Wis. 2d 572, 984 N.W.2d 382 (quoting Randall v. Felt, 2002 WI 
App 157, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 563, 647 N.W.2d 373).   
¶55 In the circuit court's order following Killian's 
trial, the court described the issue as "whether the Fifth 
Amendment's protection against double jeopardy bars the retrial 
of [Killian] because of prosecutorial overreaching in this 
case."  The court stated its findings as follows: 
The Court finds that the prosecutor's actions were 
intentional and the record shows that he knew his 
actions would be prejudicial to the defendant.  The 
Court finds also that the prosecutor's conduct was 
designed to create another chance to convict, and was 
an act done so as to allow the State another "kick at 
the cat" – a chance to prepare more thoroughly and 
with a better understanding of the issues, a chance to 
file different motions and obtain more favorable 
pretrial rulings, and a chance to add more charges and 
incriminating evidence into the record in the hopes of 
solidifying the State’s chances of conviction. 
The court then ordered "that the State is barred from retrial in 
this matter due to prosecutorial overreaching" (emphasis added).  
The circuit court's order addressed the issue of prosecutorial 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
34 
 
overreach.  Nowhere did the circuit court analyze the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy in his trial.  The one question before the 
circuit court, and the court's one ruling, concerned whether the 
prosecutor engaged in overreach such that double jeopardy barred 
retrial "in th[at] matter."  The circuit court never determined 
the scope of Killian's jeopardy in his trial.  Accordingly, the 
issue 
was 
not 
actually 
litigated, 
and 
common 
law 
issue 
preclusion does not apply.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶56 We conclude that Killian's previous trial does not bar 
the State from prosecuting the present case because the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses 
with which he is now charged.  The scope of jeopardy is 
established by "the defendant's actual exposure to jeopardy in a 
prior prosecution."  Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶31.  This 
requires that the defendant faced a "risk of a determination of 
guilt" regarding a particular offense.  Serfass, 420 U.S. at 
391-92.  Killian was never exposed to the risk of conviction for 
the offenses charged in the present case.  As a result, the 
offenses prosecuted in Killian's trial are not identical in law 
and in fact to the offenses charged in this case, so double 
jeopardy does not bar the present prosecution. 
¶57 We also conclude that issue preclusion under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and common law issue preclusion do not 
bar the present prosecution.  Issue preclusion under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause requires a valid judicial determination of 
ultimate fact, and none exists in this case because Killian's 
No. 
2020AP2012-CR   
 
35 
 
trial ended in a mistrial.  See Ashe, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).  
Common law issue preclusion also does not bar this prosecution.  
The circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice the criminal 
complaint in the first case did not decide the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy.  Therefore, that issue was never "actually 
litigated," and issue preclusion does not bar the present 
prosecution.  See Aldrich, 341 Wis. 2d 36, ¶88.   
¶58 We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court to consider Killian's unresolved argument 
regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  As pretrial 
rulings unfolded and trial testimony was introduced, the 
woefully unprepared State realized that things were looking 
bleak.  So instead of allowing the jury to perform its function, 
the prosecutor intentionally induced a mistrial in an attempt to 
later refile charges against James Killian.   
¶60 Importantly, the circuit court made a finding that the 
"trial was going poorly" for the prosecutor and that "[t]he 
prosecutor knew that if he retried the case, he might fare 
better 
and 
the 
defendant 
could 
face 
more 
ominous 
charges . . . ."  It further found that "the prosecutor's 
actions were intentional" and that his "conduct was designed to 
create another chance to convict, and was an act done so as to 
allow the State another 'kick at the cat.'"   
¶61 The circuit court could see right through the State's 
gamesmanship.  According to the court, the ploy was designed to 
afford "a chance to prepare more thoroughly and with a better 
understanding of the issues, a chance to file different motions 
and obtain more favorable pretrial rulings, and a chance to add 
more charges and incriminating evidence into the record in the 
hopes of solidifying the State's chances of conviction." 
¶62 Attempting to circumvent these findings, the majority 
opinion rewards the State's scheme, giving it just what it 
sought through its egregious conduct.  In the majority's view, 
double jeopardy does not bar retrial "because the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses 
with which he is now charged."  Majority op., ¶3.  In effect, 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
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the majority's decision sends a direct signal to prosecutors who 
are losing at trial:  if you want a do-over, consider throwing 
the trial. 
¶63 The majority errs in two primary ways.  First, it 
sidesteps 
the 
circuit 
court's 
detailed 
factual 
findings, 
disregarding the prosecutor's clear intent.  Second, by focusing 
singularly on the charging documents in determining the scope of 
Killian's jeopardy, rather than examining the record as a whole, 
the majority employs an analysis which this court explicitly 
rejected in a recent case.  See State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, 
390 Wis. 2d 570, 939 N.W.2d 519.   
¶64 Under a proper application of Schultz, I conclude that 
jeopardy attaches where the prosecutor's desire to amend the 
information based on the evidence at trial is clearly manifest 
in the record and where the prosecutor purposely induced a 
mistrial with the intent to later refile charges.  Any other 
result would allow the State to reap a windfall from its 
intentional wrongdoing.  
¶65 Because I would not lend judicial imprimatur to the 
State's gambit in this case, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶66 Killian was charged with sexual assaults of two 
minors, referred to as Britney and Ashley.1  Majority op., ¶6.  
The complaint regarding Britney charged Killian with one count 
of first-degree sexual assault of a child2 and alleged a single 
                                                 
1 "Britney" and "Ashley" are pseudonyms.  See Wis. Stat. 
(Rule) § 809.86(4). 
2 Wis. Stat. § 948.02. 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
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assaultive act——that Killian "laid beside [Britney] and grabbed 
her buttocks."  Id.   
¶67 About a year after the complaint regarding Britney was 
filed, the State filed an additional complaint against Killian 
concerning acts against Ashley.  Id., ¶7.  In this second 
complaint, the State charged Killian with repeated sexual 
assault of the same child,3 alleging that Killian sexually 
assaulted Ashley from "April 1994 through December 1999."  Id. 
¶68 After the cases were joined for trial, Killian brought 
a motion to exclude other-acts evidence, while the State sought 
to admit such evidence.  Id., ¶8.  Ultimately, the circuit court 
denied the State's motion to admit other-acts evidence as to 
other instances of assault against Britney.4  Id. 
¶69 As trial approached, the State tried to add additional 
charges by amending the information.  Id., ¶9.  On the day of 
trial, the circuit court denied this motion, describing the 
addition of new charges at such a late date as prejudicial.  
Id., ¶10.  As the parties and the circuit court discussed this 
motion, the prosecutor confirmed that Killian was being charged 
with "one sole act" with regard to Britney.  Id., ¶11.  But he 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 948.025. 
4 The circuit court allowed the State to present evidence of 
"grooming" behavior, but it did not allow the State to present 
evidence of assaultive behavior other than Killian grabbing 
Britney's buttocks as alleged in the complaint.  Majority op., 
¶8.  Additionally, the circuit court granted the State's motion 
to admit evidence of sexual assaults against Ashley going back 
to 1988 to demonstrate Killian's "motive, intent, preparation, 
absence of mistake or accident, and plan."  Id. 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
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reiterated his desire to later amend the information "if more 
acts are disclosed at trial."  Id. 
¶70 Despite the circuit court's admonition, from his 
opening statement onward, the prosecutor continually described 
other instances of alleged sexual assault committed by Killian 
against Britney.  Id., ¶13.  Prior to Britney taking the stand, 
the prosecutor yet again referenced the possibility that the 
information could be amended to conform with the proof offered 
and stated that "[a]nything could happen when she testifies."  
Id., ¶14.  As part of this discussion, the circuit court made 
clear that a mistrial was a distinct possibility if any excluded 
other-acts evidence surfaced.  Id. 
¶71 Britney took the stand and the prosecutor quickly 
elicited such testimony.  Id., ¶15.  Defense counsel objected 
and moved for a mistrial, which the circuit court granted.  Id.  
The circuit court later determined that the prosecutor's actions 
were intentional, with the object being to retry the defendant.  
Id. 
¶72 Consistent with that object, the State subsequently 
filed a new criminal complaint, this time charging Killian with 
10 counts, relying on the other-acts evidence that was excluded 
from the initial trial.  Id., ¶16.  Nine of these counts related 
to Ashley, and included three counts of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child and six counts of incest with a child.5  Id.  
One count related to Britney, and charged Killian with repeated 
sexual assault of the same child.  Id. 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 948.06(1). 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
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¶73 Killian moved to dismiss the new complaint on double 
jeopardy grounds.  Id., ¶17.  The circuit court agreed with 
Killian, and the court of appeals affirmed.  It concluded that 
"the circuit court properly considered the entire record of the 
first prosecution to determine whether Killian was in jeopardy 
for the offenses now charged."  State v. Killian, 2022 WI App 
43, ¶4, 404 Wis. 2d 451, 979 N.W.2d 569.  Reviewing the record, 
the court of appeals concluded that "Killian was, in fact, in 
jeopardy of being convicted of the offenses now charged" in the 
second complaint.  Id. 
¶74 The State petitioned for review, and the majority now 
reverses a unanimous decision of the court of appeals.   
II 
A 
¶75 The majority concludes that "Killian was never exposed 
to the risk of conviction for the offenses charged in the 
present case."  Majority op., ¶3.  In the majority's view, 
"Killian's 
previous 
trial 
does 
not 
bar 
the 
State 
from 
prosecuting the present case because the scope of Killian's 
jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses with which he 
is now charged."  Id. 
¶76 The double jeopardy clause provides:  "nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  At its core, 
it recognizes the State's power and serves as a check on that 
power: 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in 
at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
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is that the State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal 
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). 
¶77 This clause serves various purposes.  It protects a 
defendant from multiple trials and punishments for the same 
offense, preserves the finality and integrity of judgments, bars 
the government from a second chance to supply evidence it failed 
to provide in the first proceeding, and protects a defendant's 
right to have the trial completed by a particular tribunal.  
State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 675, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985).   
¶78 However, the double jeopardy bar does not apply in all 
situations.  When a defendant requests a mistrial, and that 
request is granted, the general rule is that the double jeopardy 
clause does not bar a retrial.  State v. Hill, 2000 WI App 259, 
¶11, 240 Wis. 2d 1, 622 N.W.2d 34 (citing State v. Copening, 100 
Wis. 2d 700, 709, 303 N.W.2d 821 (1981)).  In such a situation, 
the defendant exercises control over the mistrial decision and 
in effect chooses to be tried by a different tribunal.  Id. 
¶79 But this rule is not absolute.  Where governmental 
conduct is intended to goad the defendant into moving for a 
mistrial, double jeopardy can be raised as a bar to a second 
trial even after the defendant successfully ends the first.  
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1982). 
¶80 Here, the prosecutor plainly "goaded" the defendant 
into moving for a mistrial.  The circuit court made such a 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
determination, supported by 21 factual findings.  It observed 
that the prosecutor clearly knew that things were not going his 
way: 
 "The prosecutor had multiple reasons to believe the 
trial was going poorly even before the trial started 
(medical subpoenas, excluded expert, excluded forensic 
interview, 
improperly 
crafted 
proposal 
to 
settle) . . . ." 
The circuit court further found unbelievable the prosecutor's 
claim that he unintentionally elicited the prohibited testimony: 
 "The prosecutor claimed the error was an unintentional 
mishap yet the prosecutor had clearly educated himself 
that the only way he would be barred from retrial if a 
mistrial was declared was if there was prosecutorial 
overreaching and he discussed this research with the 
defense team moments before the child was called to 
testify.  There would be no other purpose to call in 
the defense counsel over lunch other than to lay out 
what he intended to do if they objected to the 
introduction and a mistrial was declared." 
It also noted that the prosecutor was aware that another trial 
may bring both additional charges and a better chance of 
conviction: 
 "The prosecutor knew that if he retried the case, he 
might fare better and the defendant could face more 
ominous charges 'because if she were to testify and 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
she goes and tells her story, Mr. Killian is facing 
more charges.'" 
Finally, the circuit court observed the State's failure to 
prepare and the subsequent scramble to cover it up: 
 "The State was not prepared for trial and realized 
only the week prior to trial that there were a series 
of sexual assaults alleged by the child.  It then 
requested leave to amend to include a date range, 
hoping to get the entire set of acts included, by 
sidestepping the prior ruling on [other-acts evidence] 
to which it had previously failed to object." 
¶81 Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
"the 
prosecutor's actions were intentional and the record shows that 
he knew his actions would be prejudicial to the defendant."  It 
continued:  "The Court finds also that the prosecutor's conduct 
was designed to create another chance to convict, and was an act 
done so as to allow the State another 'kick at the cat' . . . ."  
The circuit court thus determined that "the State is barred from 
retrial in this matter due to prosecutorial overreaching." 
¶82 The majority sidesteps the circuit court's findings. 
It asserts that "Killian was never exposed to the risk of 
conviction for the offenses charged in the present case" and 
that "the offenses prosecuted in Killian's trial are not 
identical in law and in fact to the offenses charged in this 
case."  Majority op., ¶3. 
¶83 This "identical in law and in fact" formulation arises 
from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  In 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Blockburger, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
"where the same act constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test under the double jeopardy clause 
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not."  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 405, 576 
N.W.2d 912 (1998).  "Under this test, two offenses are different 
in law if each statutory crime requires for conviction proof of 
an element which the other does not require."  Id.  Offenses are 
not identical in fact if a conviction for each offense requires 
proof of an additional fact that conviction for the other 
offenses does not, or if they are different in nature or 
separated in time.  Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶22.  This test is 
rather straightforward to apply, but a particular aspect of 
Wisconsin law illustrates that the application of the test is 
not without nuance. 
¶84 In 
Wisconsin 
the 
State 
may 
move 
to 
amend 
the 
information to conform to the evidence produced at trial.  Wis. 
Stat. § 971.29(2).6  Although the statute requires that any such 
amendment not prejudice the defendant, the State's ability to 
amend the information is fairly broad.  "When an amendment to 
the charging document does not change the crime charged, and 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29(2) provides:   
At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the 
complaint, indictment or information to conform to the 
proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the 
defendant.  After verdict the pleading shall be deemed 
amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the 
relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the 
trial. 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
when the alleged offense is the same and results from the same 
transaction, there is no prejudice to the defendant."  State v. 
DeRango, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 26, 599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999).  But 
this does not mean that an amendment cannot vastly expand the 
jeopardy to which a defendant is subject.  Indeed, precedent 
indicates that amendment can even result in additional counts 
that increase the maximum penalty a defendant may face.  State 
v. Wickstrom, 118 Wis. 2d 339, 349, 348 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 
1984).  
¶85 What this means in practical terms is that in some 
cases the charge or factual circumstance that is sent to the 
jury for determination may be quite different from the charge or 
factual circumstance set forth in the information at the 
beginning of the trial.  This is a key point:  the charging 
document does not reflect the definitive final charge.  It is 
subject to amendment, meaning that the jeopardy to which a 
defendant is subject cannot be defined strictly by looking at 
the charging document.  See Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶30, 
(citing United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th 
Cir. 1993) ("[F]or purposes of barring a future prosecution, it 
is the judgment and not the indictment alone which acts as a 
bar, and the entire record may be considered in evaluating a 
subsequent claim of double jeopardy."). 
B 
¶86 In its laser-focus on the charging documents, the 
majority misapplies our recent decision in State v. Schultz, 390 
Wis. 2d 570.  In Schultz, the question before the court was 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
whether a prosecution for a sexual assault "on or about October 
19, 2012" was barred by double jeopardy when the defendant had 
been previously acquitted for sexual assault in "late summer to 
early fall of 2012."  In framing the analysis, the Schultz court 
concluded that we must examine "the entire record, including 
evidentiary facts adduced at trial, in ascertaining whether a 
defendant's double jeopardy rights have been violated by a 
second prosecution."  Id., ¶32.  It emphasized that "it is the 
record in its entirety that reveals the scope of jeopardy and 
protects a defendant against a subsequent prosecution for the 
same crime."  Id.   
¶87 In applying these principles to the facts before it, 
the Schultz court rejected an approach that would merely compare 
the charging documents to determine the scope of jeopardy.  It 
explained that such an approach would insufficiently protect the 
defendant's double jeopardy rights and that we must examine the 
record to determine whether any evidence supporting the charges 
in the second case was introduced in the first: 
Limiting our review to the complaint . . . would not 
protect the defendant against double jeopardy if the 
State 
introduced 
evidence 
of 
a 
sexual 
assault 
occurring "on or about October 19" after jeopardy 
attached.  In order to ascertain whether the defendant 
was 
exposed 
to 
double 
jeopardy 
in 
the 
second 
prosecution, 
we 
examine 
the 
entire 
record 
of 
proceedings in the first case to see if any evidence 
of a sexual assault occurring "on or about October 19" 
was introduced. 
Id., ¶37.7 
                                                 
7 Setting 
forth 
the 
background 
that 
underlies 
this 
conclusion, the Schultz court wrote: 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶88 This passage from Schultz explicitly indicates that 
review of only the complaint fails to protect the defendant's 
double jeopardy rights if the State introduces evidence of a 
sexual assault outside the charging period.  Id. ("Limiting our 
review to the complaint . . . would not protect the defendant 
against double jeopardy if the State introduced evidence of a 
sexual assault occurring 'on or about October 19' after jeopardy 
attached.").  Such a scenario is just what we have in the 
present case.  Accordingly, we must look to the "entire record," 
and not merely compare charging documents.  Yet despite the 
Schultz court's admonition, the charging document is where the 
majority's singular focus lies.  See majority op., ¶35. 
¶89 The entire record here points in one direction——that 
the prosecutor repeatedly and consistently sought to amend the 
information to add additional charges.  Had this clear goal of 
the prosecution come to pass, Killian would have faced the 
possibility of conviction on those additional charges.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Even though the incorporated and attached police 
report renders the complaint unambiguous, we also 
review the record of the first trial to see if 
anything suggests "early fall" extended past mid-
September to include October 19, 2012.  We do so in 
order to safeguard the defendant's constitutional 
right against double jeopardy.  The facts alleged 
under the second complaint——a sexual assault "on or 
about October 19"——would not, if proven, support a 
conviction in the first prosecution.  The complaint in 
the first prosecution alleged repeated sexual assaults 
during "late summer to early fall[,]" which the 
attached and incorporated police report clarified to 
have concluded in early to mid-September.  
State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶37, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 939 
N.W.2d 519.  
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶90 The majority focuses on "actual jeopardy" rather than 
"perceived jeopardy."  See, e.g., majority op., ¶31.  But this 
focus fails to recognize, as the United States Supreme Court 
has, that the concept of "potential" is inherent in the double 
jeopardy clause.  Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970) 
("The 
'twice 
put 
in 
jeopardy' 
language 
of 
the 
Constitution . . . relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that 
an accused for a second time will be convicted of the 'same 
offense' for which he was initially tried.").  
¶91 In order to account for the State's ability to amend 
the information to conform to the evidence at trial, I conclude 
that in a situation as here, a straightforward application of 
Schultz indicates that where the prosecutor's desire to amend 
the information based on the evidence at trial is clearly 
manifest in the record and where the prosecutor purposely 
induced a mistrial with the intent to later refile charges, 
jeopardy attaches. 
¶92 The series of events with which we are confronted here 
is not common.  It is a thankfully rare occurrence that a 
prosecutor will purposely induce a mistrial with the intent to 
later refile charges.  But in such a situation, examination of 
the entire record dictates that a determination that jeopardy 
attaches is appropriate and even necessary to protect a 
defendant's double jeopardy rights. 
¶93 By concluding that Killian's double jeopardy rights 
were 
not 
violated, 
the 
majority 
rewards 
the 
State's 
gamesmanship.  The State purposely induced a mistrial with the 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
intent to get a chance to try again after preparing more 
thoroughly.  And it gets exactly what it wanted.  This simple 
fact alone should cause any fair-minded reader to pause.  Unlike 
the majority opinion, the application of our precedent presented 
in this dissent would not countenance such an egregious 
manipulation of the judicial machinery. 
¶94 Contrary to the majority's assertions, Killian's first 
trial placed him in jeopardy of conviction for the crimes 
charged in the second complaint with regard to both Britney and 
Ashley.  The prosecutor was clear in his intent to seek 
amendment of the information to conform with the evidence——
evidence that he hoped would contain proof of additional acts of 
sexual assault against Britney and incest against Ashley.  No 
speculation is necessary to guess at the charges the prosecutor 
would have sought.   
¶95 The intention to amend the information was clear and 
manifest in the record.  As the circuit court found, "[t]here 
were numerous Informations filed, with various charges, changing 
dates, and changing penalties up to and during the trial 
itself."  For example, several days prior to trial, the 
prosecutor filed an affidavit in support of a motion to amend 
the information to allege a series of sexual assaults over a 
period of time.  Then, on the day of trial, he again referenced 
amending the information in what the circuit court termed "an 
attempt to back door the prior ruling to which he failed [to] 
object." 
 
And 
immediately 
before 
Britney 
testified, 
the 
prosecutor raised the possibility that "if she were to testify 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
and she goes and tells her story, Mr. Killian is facing more 
charges."  The prosecutor's repeated efforts and stated intent 
to amend the information are manifest in this record. 
¶96 Also clear from the record is the prosecutor's intent 
to induce a mistrial.  The circuit court found that the 
prosecutor acted with specific intent to cause a mistrial and to 
prejudice the defendant——findings which are supported by ample 
evidence in the record.  For these reasons, the entire record 
indicates that jeopardy attached and double jeopardy bars 
retrial. 
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2020AP2012-CR.awb 
 
1