Title: In re Miller

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Miller  (96-586); 168 Vt. 585; 718 A.2d 422

[Opinion Filed 11-Jun-1998]
[Motion for Reconsideration Denied 26-Jun-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-586

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 1998

In re Timothy P. Miller         }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
                                }     Chittenden Superior Court
                                }
                                }
                                }     DOCKET NO. S862-89 CnC

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Following an adverse decision on his appeal, petitioner moves to
  disqualify the five justices that decided his case and to vacate the
  decision.  We deny the motion as untimely.

       On March 23, 1993, a jury found defendant guilty of second-degree
  murder. Subsequently, defendant moved for post-conviction relief due to
  ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied the petition,
  and this Court affirmed by decision issued March 5, 1998.  On March 19,
  1998, petitioner moved to disqualify all five justices from further
  participation in this case and to vacate the March 5 decision.  Defense
  counsel argues that, following the March 5 decision, petitioner informed
  him that the Attorney General's Office has represented the State in this
  case since 1983.  Upon further research, defense counsel discovered that
  Chief Justice Amestoy represented the State as Attorney General on appeal
  from the denial of the motion for a new trial, see State v. Miller, 151 Vt.
  337 (1989), and Justices Johnson and Skoglund were Assistant Attorneys
  General during the time that petitioner's case was prosecuted by that
  office.  He argues that, on that basis, all three justices should be
  disqualified and that Justices Dooley and Morse should be disqualified
  because, having participated with the other three justices, they have been
  tainted.

       Petitioner brings this motion under V.R.A.P. 31(e)(1), which provides
  that a motion for disqualification of a justice shall be filed at or before
  the time to file the briefs.  The rule further provides that the motion may
  be filed after the brief if (1) the motion is based upon grounds not known
  before filing the brief, and (2) the motion is filed soon after the grounds
  for disqualification are known.  V.R.A.P. 31(e)(1).  Defense counsel claims
  he did not know that the Office of the Attorney General prosecuted
  petitioner's criminal case until petitioner so informed him after the March
  5 decision by this Court.  We do not reach the merits of petitioner's
  V.R.A.P. 31(e)(1) claim (FN1) because we conclude that this is an untimely
  post-judgment motion to disqualify the judges.

       The overwhelming weight of authority concludes that a motion to
  disqualify a judge should not be entertained where the litigant knew of the
  grounds for disqualification but waits

 

  until after receiving an adverse decision before filing the motion.  See,
  e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th
  Cir. 1992) (holding motion for disqualification of trial judge filed with
  motion for new trial was untimely where litigant knew when judge was
  assigned case that judge had been partner in firm representing opposing
  party); Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 939 F. Supp. 274, 278
  (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying post-judgment motion for disqualification as
  simply attempt to get "second bite at the apple"); Kemp v. City of Grand
  Forks,