Title: STATE v DAY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-401 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . HAZEL LEE DAY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth ~udicial ~istrict, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge.presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hirst, Dostal & Withrow, Missoula, Montana John Dostal argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mary Troland argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert L . Deschamps 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Ed McLean argued, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana - - p p Submitted: September 14, 1981 Decided: October 22, 1981 Filed: OCT 2 2 598t Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. his i s an appeal by t h e defendant, Hazel Lee Day, from an order of the D i s t r i c t Court, f o r t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , denying defendant's motion t o withdraw her p l e a of g u i l t y . W e affirm. On December 17, 1979, defendant was charged i n Missoula County with having committed aggravated a s s a u l t by shooting her former husband i n t h e c h e s t , shoulder and f a c e with a C o l t . 3 2 c a l i b e r weapon. Counsel was appointed t o r e p r e s e n t t h e defendant and on January 1 0 , 1980, a f t e r consulting with counsel, t h e defendant entered a plea of g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e charged. Defendant was sentenced t o a t e r m of two years i n prison with the recommendation t h a t she be t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e L i f e S k i l l s Training Center i n B i l l i n g s ; she i s c u r r e n t l y on parole. I n May 1980, defendant moved t o withdraw her p l e a based upon t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t , a t t h e time of e n t e r i n g her g u i l t y p l e a , t h e defendant was ignorant of t h e p o t e n t i a l defense of j u s t i f i a b l e use of force. The t r i a l c o u r t admittedly d i d n o t advise defendant with r e s p e c t t o t h e defense. The a t t o r n e y who represented t h e defendant a t t h e t i m e of t h e e n t r y of p l e a , f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t s t a t i n g t h a t he had discussed t h e defense with defendant and t h a t she understood t h a t t h e defense was a v a i l a b l e t o her b u t chose t o plead g u i l t y . Hazel Day i s a 64-year-old woman, born i n W e s t V i r g i n i a , t o a c o a l mining family. She was t h e o l d e s t of seven c h i l d r e n and q u i t school i n t h i r d grade t o help c a r e f o r t h e rest of her family. When she was fourteen, her mother died of tuber- c u l o s i s and a t f i f t e e n her f a t h e r died i n a c o a l mining accident. A t s i x t e e n , t h e defendant married, adopted four of her brothers and sisters, and u l t i m a t e l y reared f i v e of her own children. I n 1959, defendant divorced her f i r s t husband and remarried. H e r second husband died i n 1966, when s t r u c k by a c a r a l l e g e d l y driven by t h e defendant. Defendant pleaded g u i l t y t o manslaughter and was sentenced t o s i x years i n t h e Maryland S t a t e Prison. H e r criminal record from 1954 t o 1970, a l s o contains four separate misdemeanor events of minor t h e f t s and d i s o r d e r l y conduct. I n March of 1976, defendant married Athol "Ted" Day; they w e r e separated a month l a t e r and divorced i n March 1979. During t h e t h r e e years of marriage, they cohabitated f o r about t h r e e months. Ted had problems with alcohol abuse. Defendant described him as seldom sober and when drunk, a v e r i t a b l e wild man. H e was p h y s i c a l l y abusive t o defendant. I n 1977, Ted Day s t r u c k t h e defendant i n the back with a telephone with s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e t o cause nerve damage i n her r i g h t hand n e c e s s i t a t i n g surgery. I n t h e same year he attempted t o p u l l defendant's tongue from her mouth r e q u i r i n g surgery. O n another occasion he threw a k n i f e a t t h e defendant. A f t e r t h e divorce Ted Day continued t o c o n t a c t t h e de- fendant, harassing her and threatening her. On Monday, November 27, 1979, defendant came home from work a t about 4:00 p.m. and found her former husband a t her t r a i l e r home. H e persuaded defendant t o d r i v e him t o Lolo, Montana, f o r t h e purpose of t r a n s a c t i n g some business. On t h e r e t u r n t r i p from Lolo, he purchased some beer and, a f t e r pushing defendant from t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t , motored t o the Rattlesnake a r e a north of Missoula, Montana. They remained t h e r e u n t i l approximately 1 1 ~ 3 0 p.m. Ted drank a l l of t h e beer and then drove t o a Missoula motel where he obtained a room. H e was drunk and t h e defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t she asked t o go home. Ted pushed her up t h e stairs t o the motel room. She was frightened. I n t h e motel room he became very abusive and t o l d her t o remove her c l o t h e s . According t o t h e defendant's version, Ted t o r e o f f most of her c l o t h e s . When he saw defendant was not drinking with him, he began throwing food and beer cans a l l over t h e room. Ted then took a p i s t o l from defendant's purse and, according t o defendant, requested her t o shoot him. H e then l a i d t h e p i s t o l down on t h e n i g h t t a b l e and began throwing defendant up a g a i n s t t h e wall. She s t a t e d t h a t af t e r she was h u r t she reached f o r t h e p i s t o l and pointed it a t Ted t e l l i n g him n o t t o come c l o s e r . Defendant s t a t e d t h a t he grabbed f o r her again and she s h o t him s e v e r a l times. Ted was taken t o t h e h o s p i t a l and u l t i m a t e l y recovered. A p u b l i c defender was appointed t o r e p r e s e n t t h e defendant. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t she talked t o her a t t o r n e y approximately t h r e e times and t h a t he advised her t o plead g u i l t y . She s t a t e d t h a t she d i d n o t remember her a t t o r n e y t a l k i n g t o her about self-defense, b u t t h i s was disputed by an a f f i d a v i t f i l e d by her attorney. The a t t o r n e y s t a t e d he advised t h e defendant more than once of her r i g h t t o self-defense and t h a t she understood t h a t t h e defense was a v a i l a b l e t o her. The a t t o r n e y s t a t e d t h a t she wished t o e n t e r a g u i l t y plea. The defendant entered a g u i l t y p l e a on January 1 0 , 1980, before Judge Jack L. Green. On t h a t day, Judge Green advised defendant of t h e charge and t h e s t a t u t o r i l y mandated punishment. H e advised her of her c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , including r i g h t t o t r i a l by jury. After t h e information was read t o her, t h e c o u r t asked defendant i f she was prepared t o plead. She s t a t e d t h a t she was and she then entered her p l e a of g u i l t y . The t r i a l c o u r t then asked defendant t o r e l a t e i n her own words what had happened j u s t p r i o r t o t h e i n c i d e n t i n question and defendant summarized the f a c t s which a r e s e t f o r t h i n t h i s opinion. The p l e a was accepted and defendant was t h e r e a f t e r sen- tenced on February 25, 1980, before Judge John S. Henson. The sentencing judge had t h e b e n e f i t of a presentence r e p o r t containing defendant's version of t h e f a c t s surrounding t h e shooting incident. After reviewing t h e presentence r e p o r t , Judge Henson sentenced defendant t o two years i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison with t h e recommendation t h a t she be t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e L i f e S k i l l s Training Center i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. The s o l e i s s u e on appeal is whether t h e defendant's p l e a was voluntary. The t r i a l c o u r t found it was. W e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . A g u i l t y p l e a must be entered v o l u n t a r i l y and with an understanding of t h e charge. Defendant must understand t h e consequences of t h e p l e a and t h e maximum penalty provided by t h e law f o r the offense. S t a t e v. Doty (1977), 173 Mont. 233, 237, 566 P.2d 1388, 1391. I n Yother v. S t a t e (1979), 14ont. , 597 P.2d 79, 83, 36 St.Rep. 1192, 1197, t h i s - - Court said: "The standard by which the v a l i d i t y of a g u i l t y p l e a i s judged i s whether t h e plea r e p r e s e n t s a voluntary and i n t e l l i g e n t choice among t h e a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n open t o t h e defendant a s a f f i r m a t i v e l y d i s c l o s e d by t h e record." The granting o r d e n i a l of a motion t o withdraw a p l e a of g u i l t y lies within t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge and w i l l be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of Mont. abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Nelson (1979), -- - I 603 P.2d 1050, 1053, 36 St.Rep. 2228, 2232. Defendant contends t h a t d i s c r e t i o n was abused i n t h a t (1) t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have recognized defendant's version of t h e f a c t s a s being i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e p l e a of g u i l t y and ( 2 ) t h e t r i a l c o u r t , under these circumstances, had a duty t o advise t h e defendant regarding self-defense. W e do n o t f i n d t h e defendant's version of t h e f a c t s t o be i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e p l e a of g u i l t y . The t r i a l c o u r t could have found, a f t e r l i s t e n i n g t o t h e f a c t s r e c i t e d , t h a t t h e defendant used excessive f o r c e under t h e circumstances. I n o t h e r words t h e jury could f i n d t h a t defendant, having a loaded weapon, could have removed h e r s e l f from the danger of t h e motel room. Furthermore, the t r i a l c o u r t had evidence before i t which tended t o c a s t doubt upon defendant's c r e d i - b i l i t y . The t r i a l c o u r t found, and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e finding, t h a t defendant, a f t e r consulting with counsel, chose t o e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y r a t h e r than s u b j e c t h e r s e l f t o t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of a t r i a l . The f a c t s i n t h i s record do n o t make it incumbent upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o advise t h e defendant regarding s t a t u t o r y defenses p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e defendant. Defendant was represented by counsel and counsel, according t o h i s a f f i d a v i t , properly discharged h i s duty by discussing these defenses with h i s c l i e n t . A discussion of defense s t r a t e g y goes beyond the realm of t r i a l c o u r t duty. I f t r i a l c o u r t s had t o d i s c u s s p o t e n t i a l defenses with an accused, t h e judge would have t o advise the accused regarding p o t e n t i a l c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l challenges, a s w e l l a s a f f i r m a t i v e defenses e x i s t i n g under s t a t u t e s . These r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s properly are vested i n defense counsel and n o t i n t h e t r i a l judge. W e f i n d t h a t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o set a s i d e defendant's p l e a of g u i l t y . ~ e f e n d a n t ' s f a c t u a l r e c i t a t i o n was given i n m i t i g a t i o n of sentence and d i d n o t c o n f l i c t with her p l e a of g u i l t y . According t o defense counsel's a f f i d a v i t , defendant was fully informed regarding the defense of "self-defense", and with a full understanding entered a plea of guilty. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to set aside defendant's plea under these circumstances. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. We Concur: Chief Justice 1 . . Justices Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a dissent later.