Title: In the Matter of a Motion to Compel

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13336 
 
IN THE MATTER OF A MOTION TO COMPEL. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     May 3, 2023. - September 18, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 
State in Criminal Proceedings.  Privileged Communication.  
Practice, Criminal, Attendance of witnesses.  Witness, 
Compelling giving of evidence, Privilege.  Evidence, 
Privileged record.  Statute, Construction.  Public Policy. 
 
 
 
 
Motion to compel attendance filed in the Superior Court 
Department on January 12, 2022. 
 
 
The motion was heard by J. Gavin Reardon, Jr., J.; a motion 
for reconsideration was also heard by him; and the case was 
reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Anthony J. Cichello (Allison Lennon also present) for the 
respondent. 
Anthony Mirenda, Laura D. Gradel, & Adam Aguirre, for 
Victim Rights Law Center & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
Andrea C. Kramer, Jamie Ann Sabino, Nicole R.G. Paquin, 
Samantha Jandl, & Tara Thigpen, for Women's Bar Association of 
Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case concerns an order issued by a 
Superior Court judge compelling the production of sexual assault 
counselling records pursuant to a certificate issued by a 
magistrate of the Rhode Island Superior Court (Rhode Island 
court or Rhode Island magistrate) under the Uniform Law to 
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in 
Criminal Proceedings, G. L. c. 233, §§ 13A-13D (Uniform Act).  
The order is challenged by the record holder, the keeper of 
records at a rape crisis center (center).  The essential 
question is whether the Massachusetts judge erred in declining 
to analyze the sexual assault counsellor's privilege, provided 
in G. L. c. 233, § 20J, when conducting his analysis under the 
Uniform Act.1  Relying on this court's decision in Matter of a 
 
1 In relevant part, the Uniform Act provides that when 
presented with a complying certificate from an out-of-State 
court, a Superior Court judge shall compel the designated 
witness to attend the out-of-State proceeding.  See G. L. 
c. 233, § 13A.  To comply with the Uniform Act, the certificate 
must certify that the witness is material and that his or her 
presence is required.  See id.; Matter of a R.I. Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 414 Mass. 104, 112 (1993).  The Massachusetts judge 
then determines (a) whether "the witness is material and 
necessary," and (b) whether it will "cause undue hardship" to 
compel the witness to attend and testify.  G. L. c. 233, § 13A.  
See Matter of a R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, supra. 
 
In the absence of a victim's "prior written consent," G. L. 
c. 233, § 20J, prevents a "sexual assault counsellor" from 
disclosing "information transmitted in confidence by and between 
a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counsellor," and 
further, it provides that such information "shall not be subject 
 
3 
R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. 104, 109 (1993) (R.I. Grand 
Jury Subpoena), the Massachusetts judge concluded that the 
privilege claim must instead be raised in Rhode Island. 
To best harmonize the Uniform Act with G. L. c. 233, § 20J, 
we deem it necessary for either the requesting State or 
Massachusetts to adjudicate a request for Massachusetts sexual 
assault counselling records in accordance with the Lampron-Dwyer 
protocol.2  See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 139-147 
(2006); id. at 147-150 (Appendix); Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 
Mass. 265, 269-270 (2004).  The Superior Court judge reached 
this same conclusion in his initial order, and but for his 
reliance on the general rule articulated in R.I. Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, he would have correctly applied the 
Lampron-Dwyer protocol in ultimately deciding the issue.  On his 
report of this issue of first impression, we clarify the 
applicable standard. 
Specifically, we hold that this Commonwealth's strong and 
clear public policy in favor of protecting victims of sexual 
assault compels an exception to the otherwise applicable general 
 
to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil 
proceeding." 
 
2 We note that certain amendments to the Uniform Act and 
G. L. c. 233, § 20J, took effect during the pendency of this 
case.  See St. 2022, c. 127, § 36; St. 2022, c. 175, §§ 48A, 55.  
Those changes are not at issue here. 
 
4 
rule of R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, that under 
the Uniform Act, privilege claims should be litigated in the 
requesting jurisdiction.  This exception is specific to records 
or testimony presumptively privileged by § 20J, and it applies 
only where an objecting party establishes a substantial 
likelihood that the protections of the § 20J privilege, as 
expressed in the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, will be abrogated in 
the requesting State.  If such a substantial likelihood exists, 
then a Massachusetts judge must ensure that records or testimony 
presumptively privileged by § 20J will receive the protections 
of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol before authorizing a subpoena 
under the Uniform Act.  Applying this standard here, we vacate 
the order of the Superior Court judge.3,4 
 
3 We are informed by the center in a postargument letter 
that the underlying Rhode Island criminal case was dismissed 
during the pendency of this appeal.  The center concedes that 
this development could be grounds to deem this matter moot.  
Nevertheless, "[i]t is within the discretion of this court to 
review a case regardless of its mootness."  Commonwealth v. 
McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 486 (2008).  While it would appear 
that this matter is moot, we exercise that discretion to decide 
the issue presented by the judge's report because it is an issue 
of significant public importance about which there is some 
uncertainty.  See id.; Brown v. Guerrier, 390 Mass. 631, 633 
(1983) ("The fact that a judge has reported the case is entitled 
to weight in deciding whether to exercise our discretion in 
favor of answering substantive questions"). 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Victim 
Rights Law Center, Jane Doe, Inc., Boston Area Rape Crisis 
Center, Center for Hope and Healing Inc., New Hope, Inc., 
Pathways for Change, Inc., Elizabeth Freeman Center, Inc., 
Independence House, Inc., and National Women's Law Center, as 
 
5 
Background.  The petitioner5 was charged by the State of 
Rhode Island with child molestation.6  The center has represented 
-- and the Superior Court judge assumed in reaching his 
decision -- that the alleged victim, a minor, was receiving 
counselling at the center, and that the alleged victim's 
counsellor there was a sexual assault counsellor.  The center 
states that this counselling is ongoing. 
A Rhode Island magistrate issued a certificate pursuant to 
the Uniform Act seeking to obtain from the center the alleged 
victim's medical records from a specific date to the present.  
The certificate described the magistrate's conclusions that the 
keeper of the records for the center was "a material witness" in 
the Rhode Island criminal case and that "the documents that []he 
will bring with h[im] are relevant to the trial . . . and 
necessary for the presentation of a defense."  In particular, 
the Rhode Island magistrate concluded that "upon information and 
 
well as the amicus brief submitted by the Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute. 
 
5 We refer to the party who sought the records as the 
petitioner, as that was the party's designation in the Superior 
Court. 
 
6 Specifically, he was charged with one count of "first 
degree child molestation sexual assault" pursuant to R.I. Gen. 
Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, as well as three counts of 
"second degree child molestation sexual assault" pursuant to 
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4. 
 
6 
belief, said witness would give evidence and testimony relating 
to an alibi," and further, that "the witness can provide 
evidence and testimony that would be material and relevant to 
the defenses of, inter alia, the alibi generally as well as 
impeachment and exculpatory evidence." 
One month later, the petitioner filed the certificate along 
with a motion to compel in the Superior Court.  A hearing was 
then held at which the center appeared and opposed the motion to 
compel.  After the hearing, the center filed a written 
opposition and the petitioner filed a supplemental memorandum in 
support of his motion to compel.  The Superior Court judge 
issued an order denying the motion to compel without prejudice.  
He noted the center's objections based on G. L. c. 233, § 20J, 
and cited a lack of information as to whether Rhode Island would 
afford protections similar to those provided in Massachusetts.  
On that basis, he concluded that requiring the appearance of the 
record-keeper would be an undue hardship.  The judge suggested 
that his concerns would be satisfied by either a hearing 
pursuant to the Lampron-Dwyer protocol in the Superior Court or 
a showing that the equivalent was held in Rhode Island. 
One month later, a second magistrate of the Rhode Island 
court issued an order that the records at issue "shall be viewed 
in camera by the Judge/Magistrate before any documents are 
turned over to counsel."  The petitioner presented this order to 
 
7 
the Superior Court in a motion for reconsideration, urging that 
it answered the Superior Court judge's concerns.  The center 
opposed the motion for reconsideration, and a hearing was held, 
at which the center argued that the Lampron-Dwyer protocol had 
not been met, either in Rhode Island or before the Superior 
Court.  The center emphasized, as it had in its prior 
opposition, that it received no notice of the Rhode Island 
proceedings.  The Superior Court judge noted his concern about 
the lack of notice to the center and expressed reservations 
about whether the requirements of Lampron-Dwyer had been met. 
Relying on this court's decision in R.I. Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, however, the Superior Court judge 
issued an order in which he concluded that the privilege issue 
must be litigated in the requesting State, Rhode Island.  
Consequently, he "limit[ed] [his] analysis to the considerations 
set forth under" the Uniform Act.  Without analyzing the 
privilege for sexual assault counselling records under § 20J, 
the Superior Court judge concluded that the showings of 
materiality and necessity as required by the Uniform Act were 
established in the certificate and that compelling attendance 
did not give rise to undue hardship.  See R.I. Grand Jury 
Subpoena, supra at 108 n.4.  He allowed the motion to compel but 
stayed his order for fourteen days.  The order subsequently was 
stayed further on the center's motion. 
 
8 
The Superior Court judge again further stayed his order and 
all proceedings, and he reported his order to the Appeals Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 111, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as 
amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), or, in the alternative, Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).  After the 
appeal had been entered in the Appeals Court, this court granted 
the center's application for direct appellate review.7 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Where a Superior 
Court judge reports an interlocutory order for determination by 
an appellate court, "the basic issue . . . is the correctness of 
his [or her] finding or order" (citation omitted).  Graycor 
Constr. Co. v. Pacific Theatres Exhibition Corp., 490 Mass. 636, 
640 (2022).  The crux of the instant dispute is a question of 
law, that is, whether and to what extent a Massachusetts court 
must consider G. L. c. 233, § 20J, in analyzing a request made 
under the Uniform Act for sexual assault counselling evidence 
located in Massachusetts.  We review de novo such questions.  
See Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 488 Mass. 449, 453 (2021). 
2.  The Uniform Act.  We begin with the overarching 
framework of the Uniform Act, which applies to requests for in-
person testimony as well as document requests.  See R.I. Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 112.  In relevant part, the Uniform 
 
7 The petitioner did not file a brief or appear for oral 
argument before this court. 
 
9 
Act requires that when presented with a complying certificate 
from an out-of-State court, a justice of the Superior Court in 
Massachusetts shall compel the designated witness to attend the 
out-of-State proceeding.  See G. L. c. 233, § 13A.  To comply 
with the Uniform Act, the certificate must, inter alia, certify 
that the witness is material and that his or her presence is 
required.  See id.; R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, supra.  In 
Massachusetts, the Superior Court judge receiving such a 
certificate is directed to hold a hearing to "determine[]" 
(a) whether "the witness is material and necessary," and 
(b) whether it will "cause undue hardship" to compel the witness 
to testify.  G. L. c. 233, § 13A.  See R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 
supra. 
3.  G. L. c. 233, § 20J.  Massachusetts State law 
privileges "information transmitted in confidence by and between 
a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counsellor."8  
G. L. c. 233, § 20J.  It provides in relevant part that "[a] 
sexual assault counsellor shall not disclose such confidential 
communication, without the prior written consent of the victim," 
and further, that "[s]uch confidential communications shall not 
be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any 
 
8 General Laws c. 233, § 20J, further defines the terms 
"victim" and "sexual assault counsellor."  The center has 
represented that those definitions are met in this case, and the 
petitioner did not dispute that before the Superior Court. 
 
10 
criminal or civil proceeding without the prior written consent 
of the victim to whom the report, record, working paper or 
memorandum relates."9  Id. 
a.  Interpretation.  The text of § 20J shows the 
Legislature's intention that the sexual assault counselling 
privilege have "the widest scope possible."  Commonwealth v. 
Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 33 (2000).  See Commonwealth v. Two 
Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 265-266 (1986).  The "demonstrated 
legislative concern for the inviolability of the privilege" 
corresponds to the importance of the public policy purposes that 
it serves.  See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 225 
(1996), overruled on other grounds by Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139.  
We have explained this "policy of the Commonwealth" in the 
following terms:  "Because victims of sexual crimes are likely 
to suffer a depth and range of emotional and psychological 
disturbance . . . not felt by the victims of most other crimes, 
the public interest lies in assisting victims of sexual crimes 
to recover from injuries" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 884 (1991).  Cf. 
G. L. c. 233, § 21B (rape shield statute); St. 1977, c. 110, 
preamble (purpose of rape shield statute is "to protect . . . 
 
9 The center represented to the Superior Court judge that 
the alleged victim objected to the request at issue. 
 
11 
victims of rape and certain other related crimes"); Commonwealth 
v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 723 (2005). 
Section 20J advances this policy.  It "reflects, among other 
considerations, the personal and intimate nature that records of 
sexual assault counselling will almost certainly possess."  
Fuller, 423 Mass. at 221.  And it permits a sexual assault 
victim to have "confidence and trust in the counsellor who hears 
[his or her] disclosures."  Id. at 222 n.4.  Without this, a 
victim "may not feel able to make full disclosure" or "may forgo 
altogether the benefits of counselling."  Id. at 221.  By 
privileging these communications and related records, § 20J 
addresses these concerns, promoting aid to sexual assault 
victims and encouraging the reporting of sexual assault crimes, 
which otherwise might go unreported.  See id. at 221-222 & n.4. 
b.  Lampron-Dwyer protocol.  "With the existence and 
strength of the privilege established by the Legislature, the 
only issue left for judges" is whether a defendant's 
constitutional rights are implicated.  Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 
at 266.  The Lampron-Dwyer protocol protects the constitutional 
rights of defendants while preserving the strength of statutory 
privileges.  It "represent[s] a careful balancing[,] . . . 
establish[ing] not only that a statutory privilege sometimes 
must yield to a defendant's need for information to mount a 
defense and thus obtain a fair trial, but also that, in such 
 
12 
circumstances, the intrusion must be made with great care and 
pursuant to exacting procedures."  Matter of an Impounded Case, 
491 Mass. 109, 118 (2022). 
Under the protocol, sexual assault counselling records are 
presumptively privileged.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 143 n.25, 
148.  To obtain access to such records, 
"[t]he party moving to [summons] documents . . . must 
establish good cause, satisfied by a showing '(1) that the 
documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are 
not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by 
exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot 
properly prepare for trial without such production and 
inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to 
obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the 
trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith 
and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."'" 
 
Id. at 140-141, quoting Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269.  The party 
must first move the court, "describing, as precisely as 
possible, the records sought," and detailing in an affidavit 
"all facts relied upon in support of the motion."  Dwyer, supra 
at 147 (Appendix); Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 
442 Mass. 1516 (2004).  We emphasize that notice to the record 
holder is an essential part of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, and 
this notice must be provided in advance of the Lampron hearing, 
as the record holder is entitled to be heard before the issuance 
of any summons not only on the question of privilege but also on 
the question of relevance.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 145; id. at 
148 (Appendix). 
 
13 
At the Lampron hearing, the judge "shall [then] hear from 
all parties, the record holder, and the third-party subject, if 
present."  Id. at 148 (Appendix).  After this hearing, the judge 
will make oral or written findings as to whether the moving 
party met its initial burden.  See id. at 148 & n.3 (Appendix).  
Moreover, the judge will make oral or written findings as to 
whether the records at issue are presumptively privileged, i.e., 
"prepared in circumstances suggesting that some or all of the 
records sought are likely protected by a statutory privilege."  
See id. at 148 (Appendix).10 
To the extent that the burden is met but "some or all of 
the requested records are presumptively privileged," id. at 149 
(Appendix), the moving party will obtain access to those records 
subject to a number of procedural safeguards.  Any summons 
issued pursuant to the Lampron-Dwyer protocol shall be limited 
to the relevant portions of the records at issue.  See Lampron, 
441 Mass. at 269 n.6.  And the presumptively privileged records 
summonsed shall be kept by the clerk under seal.  Dwyer, 448 
Mass. at 146; id. at 149 (Appendix).  Inspection is permitted 
only by "counsel of record" for the moving party, who shall sign 
a protective order "containing stringent nondisclosure 
 
10 It is understood that the judge will not have reviewed 
the records in camera before making those findings.  See Dwyer, 
448 Mass. at 148 n.3 (Appendix). 
 
14 
provisions," the violation of which subjects the attorney to 
disciplinary action.11  Id. at 146.  "Among other things, the 
protective order shall prohibit counsel from copying any record 
or disclosing or disseminating the contents of any record to any 
person, including the defendant."  Id.  Disclosure is "permitted 
if, and only if, a judge subsequently allows a motion for a 
specific, need-based written modification of the protective 
order."  Id.  The judge may modify the protective order only 
after a motion and hearing and must make oral or written 
findings that the copying or disclosure of presumptively 
privileged records is "necessary for the defendant to prepare 
adequately for trial."  Id. at 150 (Appendix).  Even so, the 
judge must "consider alternatives to full disclosure."  Id. 
Where the records are disclosed pursuant to a court order 
following this procedure, any recipient of the information must 
sign a copy of the order, which "shall clearly state that a 
violation of its terms shall be punishable as criminal 
contempt."  Id.  Such records may be introduced at trial only 
after a motion in limine, which may be allowed after a finding 
that introduction is "necessary for the moving defendant to 
obtain a fair trial" and only after consideration of 
 
11 Counsel can later bring a motion to challenge any such 
privilege designation.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 149-150 
(Appendix). 
 
15 
alternatives.  Id.  All copies of the records must be returned 
to the court upon resolution of the case.  See id. 
 
4.  Application.  In R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, this court 
explained that under the Uniform Act, privilege issues are "a 
matter for the requesting jurisdiction to rule on and are not 
appropriately addressed to the [S]tate court issuing the 
subpoena."  R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, quoting 
Tracy v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 23, 43 (1991).  Today, we 
acknowledge the continuing validity of that general rule.  
Nevertheless, we hold that this Commonwealth's strong and clear 
public policy in favor of protecting victims of sexual assault 
compels an exception to this rule.  This exception is specific 
to records or testimony presumptively privileged by G. L. 
c. 233, § 20J.  To receive the protection of the exception, the 
burden is on an objecting party to establish a substantial 
likelihood that the protections of the § 20J privilege, as 
expressed in the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, will be abrogated in 
the requesting State.  In determining whether this burden has 
been met, the Massachusetts judge may look to the law of the 
requesting State and may rely on representations in the 
certificate from the out-of-State court as to the means by which 
it will protect the information. 
If the objecting party's burden is met, the Massachusetts 
judge must ensure that the records or testimony presumptively 
 
16 
privileged by § 20J will receive the protections of the Lampron-
Dwyer protocol before authorizing a subpoena for such 
information under the Uniform Act.  To accomplish this, a 
Massachusetts judge may implement the full Lampron-Dwyer 
protocol, or relying on the applicable law and representations 
of the out-of-State court that certain parts of the Lampron-
Dwyer protocol will be fulfilled by the out-of-State 
proceedings, the judge may implement the parts of the protocol 
that will not otherwise be fulfilled.  See R.I. Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 114.  Because notice to the record holder 
is such an important part of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, 
however, we caution against reliance upon facts or conclusions 
established without such notice. 
In reaching this decision, we are persuaded by the analysis 
of the New York Court of Appeals in Holmes v. Winter, 22 N.Y.3d 
300, 316 (2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1135 (2014).  In that 
case, the court reaffirmed the principle that privilege issues 
should be litigated in the requesting State but nevertheless 
created an exception to that rule based on the strong and clear 
public policy of the State of New York, embodied in an absolute 
privilege protecting a journalist's confidential sources.  See 
id. at 303, 313-320.  The requesting State, Colorado, did not 
provide the same protection, and so in light of the public 
policy, the court found that a journalist was entitled to have 
 
17 
the privilege issue litigated in New York.  See id. at 305, 314-
316.  The Court of Appeals stressed, as we stress today, the 
limited nature of the holding.  See id. at 318, 319.  The issue 
we decide is "whether a [Massachusetts] court should issue a 
subpoena compelling a [Massachusetts rape crisis center record 
keeper] to appear as a witness in another [S]tate to give 
testimony when such a result is inconsistent with the . . . 
protection of [§ 20J].  Thus, the narrow exception we recognize 
today . . . is not tantamount to giving a [Massachusetts] law 
extraterritorial effect," and does not offend principles of 
comity.  Id.  See People v. Marcy, 91 Mich. App. 399, 405, 407 
(1979) (affirming denial of petition from out-of-State court 
seeking testimony within Michigan's statutory polygrapher 
privilege and attorney-client privilege). 
 
The State of Rhode Island does not specifically privilege 
sexual assault counselling records.  Cf. Advisory Opinion to the 
House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161, 1163, 1166 (R.I. 1983).  
Rhode Island law protects against the disclosure of health care 
records, but there are material differences between Rhode 
Island's protections and those afforded under the Lampron-Dwyer 
protocol.  See R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6.1. 
First, the Rhode Island statute provides for advance notice 
to the subject of the records and not to the record holder.  See 
id.  In Massachusetts, by contrast, "[a]s keeper of the records, 
 
18 
and the entity to whom the [request is] addressed, [a rape 
crisis center] has the obligation to assert the privilege 
provided by § 20J on behalf of its clients."  Fuller, 423 Mass. 
at 220 n.3.  Here, the center represents that it received no 
notice of any proceedings in Rhode Island, and the language of 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6.1 suggests that no such advance notice 
is required.  The Superior Court judge initially expressed 
specific concern about this lack of notice to the center.  As 
described above, advance notice to the record holder is a 
crucial part of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol.  Therefore, to the 
extent that the center did not receive notice of the Rhode 
Island proceedings, we would caution against using facts 
determined therein to satisfy the Lampron-Dwyer protocol. 
Second, in camera review is not by itself sufficient 
protection for information presumptively privileged under § 20J.  
Here, a magistrate of the Rhode Island court ordered in camera 
review by a judge or magistrate before any documents would be 
turned over to counsel.  But disclosure even to a judge is 
nevertheless a disclosure and one that our protocol strictly 
limits.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 146; id. at 148-149 & n.3 
(Appendix); Fuller, 423 Mass. at 225-226 ("disclosure, even in 
the limited form of an in camera inspection, should not become 
the general exception to the rule of confidentiality"); 
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 178 (1993), overruled on 
 
19 
other grounds by Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139.  Therefore, the 
magistrate's order providing for in camera review was not 
sufficient in itself to cure any deficiency in the Lampron-Dwyer 
protocol. 
Third and most important, Rhode Island law does not require 
the stringent nondisclosure provisions of Lampron-Dwyer.  If the 
Rhode Island court decided to release records subject to the 
privilege, Rhode Island law would not require the clerk to 
retain them under seal, would not require a protective order 
prohibiting the copying or disclosure of their contents as 
described above, and would not require that a violation be 
reported to a disciplinary authority.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 
146; id. at 149 (Appendix).  Neither would Rhode Island law 
impose the same prerequisites for further copying or disclosure, 
including the requirement that such copying or disclosure be 
found "necessary" for the defendant to prepare for trial or else 
to preserve his right to a fair trial, and the requirement that 
recipients of such further disclosures be subject to criminal 
contempt penalties for any violation of the relevant order.  Id. 
at 146; id. at 150 (Appendix). 
It does appear that a judge of the Rhode Island court has 
discretion to impose such protections, but they are not required 
as in Massachusetts.  Compare Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139-150, with 
DePina v. State, 79 A.3d 1284, 1289-1290 (R.I. 2013) (describing 
 
20 
balancing test required on third-party subject's motion to 
quash), and State v. Burnham, 58 A.3d 889, 892-893, 896-899 & 
n.10 (R.I. 2013) (noting discretionary disclosure to parties' 
attorneys of alleged victim's mental health records in child 
molestation case).  See Holmes, 22 N.Y.3d at 315 (finding out-
of-State balancing test to provide insufficient protection). 
In sum, we conclude that the protections afforded by the 
State of Rhode Island, while not insubstantial, do not ensure 
the stringent nondisclosure protections of this State's Lampron-
Dwyer protocol.  Therefore, as there was a substantial 
likelihood that the privilege would be abrogated in this respect 
under Rhode Island law, a Superior Court judge needed to ensure 
compliance with the Lampron-Dwyer protocol before ordering the 
release of Massachusetts sexual assault counselling records to 
the Rhode Island court.12 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order 
allowing the motion to compel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
12 We note with appreciation the Rhode Island court's 
willingness, expressed in the certificate, "to enter an Order 
directing compliance with all reasonable terms and conditions 
prescribed by a Court of record in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts having jurisdiction over[] [the witness] regarding 
h[is] appearance."