Title: Kuhn v. Selvocki

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JOHN M. KUHN,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
ROBERT SELVOCKI, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 569, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   C.A. No. 03C-02-048 
                      
 
Submitted: April 23, 2004  
   Decided: June 29, 2004    
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 29th day of June 2004, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, John M. Kuhn, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s November 3, 2003 order denying his motion to set aside default 
judgment.  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
The plaintiff-appellee, Robert Selvocki, a lawyer and accountant, filed 
a complaint against Kuhn in the Superior Court alleging that Kuhn owed Selvocki 
approximately $64,000 in fees for professional services rendered.  Without 
answering the complaint, Kuhn executed a document purporting to assign to 
Selvocki a portion of Kuhn’s secured claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy distribution 
 
 
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as payment of the debt.  Kuhn used a form of assignment prepared by Selvocki; 
however, after the signature line, Kuhn inserted a handwritten addendum stating  
“signature doesn’t constitute indebtedness.” 
    
(3) 
The Superior Court held two hearings on Kuhn’s motion to open the 
default judgment.  At the first hearing on October 20, 2003, Selvocki made the 
following representations concerning the assignment, which Kuhn did not dispute:  
In October 2002, Selvocki received a call from Kuhn’s office manager offering to 
pay the debt by means of an assignment of bankruptcy proceeds.  Selvocki 
consulted with the bankruptcy trustee, who approved a form of assignment.  
Selvocki sent the assignment to Kuhn twice, but received no response.  Selvocki 
then filed the complaint on February 7, 2003.   
 
(4) 
After being served with the complaint, Kuhn phoned Selvocki.  Kuhn  
told Selvocki that he had received his letters containing the assignment, but had 
refused to open the envelopes.  Selvocki’s attorney then sent Kuhn another copy of 
the assignment, stating that, if the assignment were not properly executed, 
notarized and returned on or before March 19, 2003, a default judgment would be 
entered.  Kuhn executed the assignment, with the addendum, and returned it to 
Selvocki.  When Selvocki presented the bankruptcy trustee with the executed 
 
 
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assignment and asked for payment, however, the bankruptcy trustee refused to pay 
him because of the presence of the addendum.   
 
(5) 
On March 31, 2003, Selvocki filed with the Prothonotary a direction 
to enter default against Kuhn.1  On the same date, the Prothonotary entered a 
default judgment against Kuhn in the amount of the debt.  After learning of the 
default, Kuhn filed his motion to open the judgment, which was denied by the 
Superior Court. 
 
(6) 
In this appeal, Kuhn claims that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion.  He contends that he carried his burden under 
Delaware law by demonstrating, first, that, if relief were granted, the outcome 
might be different and, second, that opening the judgment would cause no 
substantial prejudice to Selvocki.  Kuhn also claims that, because he “otherwise 
defended” Selvocki’s lawsuit against him by placing the addendum next to his 
signature on the assignment, entry of a default judgment under Superior Court 
Civil Rule 55(b) was not appropriate.   
 
(7) 
A motion to open a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) and 
(6) is addressed to the sound discretion of the Superior Court.2  In considering 
whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying a motion to open a 
                                                 
1 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 55(b) (1).  The Superior Court docket reflects that Kuhn was personally 
served with the complaint on February 27, 2003. 
2 Battaglia v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Del. 1977). 
 
 
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default judgment, this Court considers two questions---first, whether the defaulting 
party made some showing that, if relief were granted, the outcome of the action 
might be different (i.e. whether the defaulting party asserted a meritorious defense) 
and, second, whether the non-defaulting party would be caused substantial 
prejudice if the motion were granted.3   
 
(8) 
Kuhn’s claim fails because he did not assert a meritorious defense to 
Selvocki’s claim and made no showing that, if relief were granted, the outcome 
might be different.  While his attorney stated at the hearing on the motion to open 
the default judgment that Selvocki’s claim against Kuhn was “in dispute,” he did 
not provide any factual support for that statement.  Moreover, in his declaration 
attached to the motion, Kuhn stated only that he “disputed” Selvocki’s claim, but 
provided no specifics as to which charges were disputed and why.  In light of this 
as well as Kuhn’s dilatory and, at least on its face, disingenuous conduct regarding 
the assignment, the Superior Court was within its discretion to deny Kuhn’s motion 
to open the default judgment.4   
 
(9) 
Under Rule 55(b), default judgment may be entered when a party 
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to appear, plead 
or otherwise defend.  While Kuhn argues that the addendum clearly was meant to 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 As the Superior Court observed, the fact that Kuhn purported to assign Selvocki $64,000 out of 
the bankruptcy proceeds suggests that he, in fact, did not dispute the claim.  
 
 
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contest his liability and, therefore, constitutes an “appearance” for purposes of the 
Rule, the language of the addendum is too ambiguous to draw any such conclusion.     
Moreover, while Kuhn cites Delaware Sand & Gravel Company v. Bryson, 414 
A.2d 207 (Del. 1980) in support of his argument, that case is distinguishable from 
the situation presented here.  In Delaware Sand, this Court held that a stipulation 
for an extension of time filed with the Superior Court constituted an “appearance,” 
rendering default judgment under Rule 55(b) unavailable.5  In this case, there was 
nothing filed in the Superior Court in response to the complaint.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Delaware Sand & Gravel Company v. Bryson, 414 A.2d at 207-08.