Title: Holtz v. Holder

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

101 Ariz. 247 (1966) 418 P.2d 584 Robert E. HOLTZ and Cynthia Ann Holtz, his wife, Appellants, v. James E. HOLDER and Carnation Company, Appellees. No. 7880. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 28, 1966. *248 Johnston & Gillenwater, and Joseph C. Meier, Phoenix, for appellants. O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, Phoenix, for appellee James E. Holder. Jennings, Strouss, Salmon & Trask, and Chas. R. Esser, Phoenix, for appellee Carnation Co. UDALL, Justice. Plaintiffs Robert E. Holtz and Cynthia A. Holtz bring this appeal from a jury award of a general verdict, rendered in favor of defendants James E. Holder and Carnation Company in a motor vehicle action, in which it is alleged that plaintiff Cynthia A. Holtz was injured as a result of the negligence of the two defendants. On February 6, 1960, Cynthia A. Holtz was driving north on 24th Street in the city of Phoenix. She stopped for a red light, in the lane nearest the center line, at the intersection of 24th Street and Thomas Road. Defendant James E. Holder also stopped for the light in the lane immediately to the right of the plaintiff. At a short distance across the intersection, the right lane of 24th Street was partially blocked by piles of dirt, which had been placed there by a construction crew that was installing a water line along the east edge of 24th Street, thus causing the street to narrow to a single lane of traffic on the left, nearest the center line. When the light changed to green, Cynthia Holtz and James Holder both started north on 24th, but as a result of the narrowing of the street at the point of construction, there was not enough room for both cars to travel abreast, and a collision occurred between the two vehicles. As a result of the collision the automobile driven by the plaintiff was forced in a westerly direction across the center line of 24th Street and into a pickup truck, which was facing south on 24th and was stopped in a line of cars which had been waiting for the light to change. Following the impact with the truck, plaintiff's vehicle came to rest in a crosswise direction across the lane in which she had been driving. Plaintiff remained in her automobile after it came to a stop, and some five or ten minutes later a milk truck owned by defendant Carnation Company and being driven by one of its employees, turned north onto 24th Street from Thomas Road. As the driver of the truck approached the vehicle occupied by plaintiff, he became aware that there was little room for his truck to pass. He slowed down and proceeded to pass on the right, driving over a mound of dirt. In some manner, not clearly established by the evidence, the truck struck the car of the plaintiff before the passing maneuver was completed. In the lower court plaintiff sought recovery for injuries allegedly received due to the negligent operation of their vehicles by defendants Holder and Carnation. Defendant Holder alleged that plaintiff had been contributorily negligent, and defendant Carnation Company generally denied plaintiff's allegation of negligence. In the subsequent trial before a jury, an issue arose concerning the extent of injuries received in the separate collisions. Plaintiff offered testimony of her doctor to the effect it was medically impossible to determine which impact caused which injuries, *249 or whether one or the other of the collisions caused all the injuries, and that the only way to tell would have been by an examination of the plaintiff immediately after the first collision with the vehicle driven by Holder. As the case went to the jury, the evidence was in sharp conflict on the following issues: (1) was Holder negligent in the operation of his vehicle, (2) as between plaintiff and defendant Holder, had plaintiff been contributorily negligent in the operation of her car, (3) was the employee of defendant Carnation Company negligent in operating the truck, (4) were the injuries received by the plaintiff caused wholly or partially by the impact with the Holder automobile, (5) were plaintiff's injuries received wholly or partly as a result of the impact of her car with the Carnation truck? On this appeal from a general verdict in favor of both defendants, plaintiff assigns as error the giving of two instructions and the failure to give two others. The first instruction complained of was given on behalf of defendant Holder and reads as follows: The second allegedly erroneous instruction was given on behalf of defendant Carnation Company as follows: Plaintiff claims that the above instructions incorrectly state the law in a case where a plaintiff is unable to prove which defendant caused which injuries or whether all were caused by one defendant or the other. Plaintiff argues that her requested instructions No. 6 and No. 9, which were refused, contain a correct statement of the law applicable to such cases. Since we think that instruction No. 6 merely repeats the legal principles stated in No. 9, we will consider only the latter instruction. It reads as follows: In view of the errors alleged with regard to the above instructions, the precise question raised on this appeal is whether two or more independent tortfeasors may be held to a joint and several liability for the entire damages or injuries suffered by the plaintiff, because of the indivisibility of the harm caused by the separate acts of negligence; or whether the negligent actors will escape liability altogether, on an application of the general rule that an independent tortfeasor is liable only for the harm caused by his act, and that a plaintiff must carry the burden of proving the extent of damage or injury caused by each tortfeasor. The majority of courts which have been confronted with this question have found that the two or more tortfeasors involved could be held to a joint and several liability, under a theory which has come to be known as the "single injury" or "single, indivisible injury" rule (discussed infra). However, in deciding whether we should adopt the rule, we must first consider what effect the case of White v. Arizona Eastern R. Co., 26 Ariz. 590, 229 P. 101, has on the matter. Apparently neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were aware of the White case, for it has not been argued on this appeal. Nevertheless, it is pertinent because of its general statement of the law governing joint liability of tortfeasors seems to preclude plaintiff from a joint recovery, even if she would be entitled to recover the full amount of damages from each defendant separately. In the White case, this Court held: Thus it appears that this Court has adhered to the proposition that unless the negligent acts of two or more defendants are joint, by reason of a concert or concurrence of action, there is no joint liability. It will be noted that in the White case this Court referred to the Iowa case of Dickson v. Yates for its statement of the general rule that only a joint tort can result in joint liability for the entire amount of the damages. But it must also be noted that Iowa is one of the many jurisdictions which has adopted the "single injury" or "single, indivisible injury" rule, as the one applicable to the multiple collision, indivisible injury situation, and has, in such cases, permitted a joint and several recovery against independently acting tortfeasors. In 1961, in Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, *251 110 N.W.2d 321, at 324, the Supreme Court of Iowa approved the "single injury" rule and stated it as follows, without reference to Dickson v. Yates: On this appeal, plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the "single injury" rule, with its resulting imposition of joint and several liability upon independent tortfeasors. The weight of well reasoned authority supports the rule. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91; Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 453, 207 P.2d 876; Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville Inc., Ky. 1959, 330 S.W.2d 395; Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33, 100 A.L.R.2d 1; Mason v. Reynolds, 135 Neb. 773, 284 N.W. 257; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 102; Prosser, Torts (3rd ed. 1964) 250; Restatement (Second), Torts § 433(A) (i) (1965). The "single injury" rule is based on the proposition that it is more desirable, as a matter of policy, for an injured and innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages jointly and severally from independent tortfeasors, one of whom may have to pay more than his just share, than it is to let two or more wrongdoers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the respective shares of causation or because the tortfeasors have not committed a joint tort. We are in agreement with this proposition, and consequently, we adopt the "single injury" rule as the correct one to be applied in multiple collision, indivisible injury cases. In adopting the rule, we are not overruling the White case in its holding that a joint tort, as defined in that case, results in a joint and several liability. But we do modify it to the effect that a joint and several liability may also be imposed upon two or more negligent actors, notwithstanding that their tort is not a joint one in a multiple collision case, where their acts occur closely in time and place and the result is such that the injured party suffers damages or injuries which the trier of the facts determines to be unapportionable between or among the several tortfeasors. Plaintiff's instruction No. 9, which would be a proper instruction in cases of this type, clearly illustrates that the imposition of joint and several liability necessarily presupposes a finding that the conduct of the defendants was negligent. Since the jury returned a general verdict for the defendants in this case, it is possible that they did so on a finding that neither of the defendants was negligent. But it is also possible, in view of the sharp conflict in the evidence on the issue of negligence, that the jury found both defendants negligent, but, because of the erroneous instructions on the law, decided that neither was liable because the injuries could not be wholly or partially attributed to one defendant or the other. Appellees argue, on the assumption that the jury found both defendants not negligent, that the judgment should be affirmed in spite of the error in giving and refusing instructions. We cannot agree. Where an erroneous instruction has been given on the law, and a correct instruction might have produced a different result, the error is not cured by the fact that the jury might have found for the prevailing party on some basis unaffected by the error. In view of the nature of the *252 issues which went to the jury and the fact that the evidence was in sharp conflict with regard to all of them, we can only conclude that the jury might have reached a different result, but for the instructions erroneously given. In addition to the instructions considered above, we note that the trial court also erred in charging the jury with regard to the effect of appellant's alleged contributory negligence. The following instruction was given at the request of defendant Holder: In Trojanovich v. Marshall, 95 Ariz. 145, 388 P.2d 149, we held, after considering the matter on our own motion, that under the provisions of our Constitution, A.R.S. Const. Art. 18, Sec. 5, as interpreted by this Court in Layton v. Rocha, 90 Ariz. 369, 368 P.2d 444, a trial court may not instruct the jury as to what its verdict must be, as far as the defense of contributory negligence is concerned. The giving of a mandatory instruction in favor of defendant Holder constituted a fundamental and reversible error, in that it deprived appellant of a constitutional right. For the reasons indicated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and a new trial is ordered. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., BERNSTEIN, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD and McFARLAND, JJ., concur.