Title: Jaques v. Manton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Jaques v. Manton, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1838.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1838 
JAQUES, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. MANTON, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Jaques v. Manton, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1838.] 
Collateral-source rule — R.C. 2315.20 does not apply to write-offs — Evidence of 
write-offs is admissible to show the reasonable value of medical expenses. 
(No. 2009-0820 — Submitted January 26, 2010 — Decided May 4, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-08-1096, 
2009-Ohio-1468. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
I 
{¶ 1} The common-law collateral-source rule generally prevents the 
admission of evidence in a tort action showing payments made to benefit the 
plaintiff from any source other than the tortfeasor.  The General Assembly largely 
abrogated the common-law rule by enacting R.C. 2315.20.  This case asks us to 
determine the effect of R.C. 2315.20 on our holding in Robinson v. Bates, 112 
Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, that the amount accepted by a 
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medical provider as full payment for treatment of the plaintiff is admissible in a 
personal-injury action, even when that amount is less than the amount originally 
billed.  We hold that the statute does not address evidence of such “write-offs” by 
medical providers, and, therefore, our holding in Robinson controls. 
II 
{¶ 2} The plaintiff-appellee, Richard Jaques, was involved in an auto 
accident with the defendant-appellant, Patricia Manton.  Jaques brought a 
personal-injury action against Manton to recover for injuries he sustained in the 
accident.  Manton admitted liability, leaving only causation and damages to be 
determined at the jury trial. 
{¶ 3} Jaques received treatment from various medical providers for his 
injuries.  The total amount billed for those services amounted to $21,874.80.  The 
medical treatment was covered by Jaques’s insurance policy with Medical Mutual 
of Ohio, which did not pay the full amount billed.  The providers instead accepted 
reduced payments totaling $7,483.91 as payment in full pursuant to their 
agreements with Medical Mutual. 
{¶ 4} Before trial, the trial court sustained Jaques’s motion to preclude 
Manton from offering evidence of the $14,390.89 in write-offs by the medical 
providers.  At trial, the jury was able to consider only the amount billed by the 
medical providers, not the amount accepted as full payment.  The jury awarded 
Jaques $25,000 in damages, which included only $15,500 for medical bills.  The 
trial court denied Manton’s motion for a new trial.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, holding that evidence of the write-offs was 
precluded by R.C. 2315.20.  Jaques v. Manton, Lucas App. No. L-08-1096, 2009-
Ohio-1468, ¶ 9-11.  We accepted Manton’s discretionary appeal.  122 Ohio St.3d 
1478, 2009-Ohio-3625, 910 N.E.2d 477. 
III 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 5} A plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable medical expenses 
incurred for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of a defendant.  Robinson v. 
Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 857 N.E.2d 1195, at ¶ 7, citing Wagner v. McDaniels 
(1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 184, 9 OBR 469, 459 N.E.2d 561.  “Proof of the amount 
paid or the amount of the bill rendered and of the nature of the services performed 
constitutes prima facie evidence of the necessity and reasonableness of the 
charges for medical and hospital services.”  Wagner at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  “Thus, either the bill itself or the amount actually paid can be submitted 
to prove the value of medical services.”  Robinson at ¶ 7.  As we noted in 
Robinson, written bills are deemed by statute to be rebuttable evidence of the 
reasonableness of medical expenses.  Id. at ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 2317.421.  
Defendants are permitted to present evidence that the amount billed is not 
reasonable.  Id., citing Wood v. Elzoheary (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 27, 28, 11 
OBR 40, 462 N.E.2d 1243.  The issue before us is whether a defendant may offer 
evidence of a write-off, i.e., the difference in the amount submitted for payment 
by a medical provider to an insurance company and the amount the providers 
accepted from the insurance company as full payment. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals relied on R.C. 2315.20 in holding that 
evidence of write-offs is inadmissible.  That statute provides: “In any tort action, 
the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the 
plaintiff as a result of the damages that result from an injury, death, or loss to 
person or property that is the subject of the claim upon which the action is based, 
except if the source of collateral benefits has * * * a contractual right of 
subrogation * * *.” 
{¶ 7} Our decision in Robinson, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 
857 N.E.2d 1195, at ¶ 10, fn. 1, did not apply R.C. 2315.20, because the statute 
was enacted after the cause of action had accrued.  Robinson instead addressed the 
admissibility of write-offs under the common-law collateral-source rule.  The 
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common-law collateral-source rule acted as an exception to the traditional 
measure of damages for tort actions—the amount that will make the plaintiff 
whole.  “The rule prevents the jury from learning about a plaintiff’s income from 
a source other than the tortfeasor so that a tortfeasor is not given an advantage 
from third-party payments to the plaintiff.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  For example, the jury 
would not be permitted to learn of insurance coverage for injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff, because the wrongdoer is expected to bear the burden of his actions 
rather than benefit from the plaintiff’s diligence in carrying insurance. 
{¶ 8} We observed in Robinson that “[b]ecause no one pays the write-
off, it cannot possibly constitute payment of any benefit from a collateral source.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 16.  Permitting a tortfeasor to introduce evidence of write-
offs does not violate the purpose of the common-law rule, because the tortfeasor 
is not benefitting from actual payments by third parties.  Id.  The common-law 
rule does not, therefore, preclude introducing evidence of write-offs.  Id. 
{¶ 9} The general rule enacted in R.C. 2315.20 is contrary to the 
common-law collateral-source rule.  The General Assembly has expressly 
established that evidence of collateral benefits is admissible.  The statute does 
include exceptions, however, including when the source of the payment has a 
contractual right of subrogation.  It is undisputed that Medical Mutual has a 
contractual right of subrogation to recover from the proceeds of Jaques’s 
personal-injury claim the amount it paid to benefit Jaques. 
{¶ 10} The subrogation exception will generally prevent defendants from 
offering evidence of insurance coverage for a plaintiff’s injury, because insurance 
agreements generally include a right of subrogation.  The defendant would then 
be liable for the full cost of the plaintiff’s medical expenses, even though those 
expenses have been paid by insurance.  The plaintiff does not receive a windfall 
payment, however, because the insurer has subrogation rights to recover any 
expenses it has already paid.  This appropriately leaves the burden of medical 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
expenses on the tortfeasor.  If there is no right of subrogation, then any recovery 
for expenses paid by a third party that have benefitted the plaintiff would remain 
with the plaintiff, resulting in a windfall. 
{¶ 11} Jaques argues that R.C. 2315.20, not Robinson, controls in this 
case and that the statute compels us to hold that evidence of write-offs is no 
longer admissible.  We disagree.  The general collateral-source rule in R.C. 
2315.20 must apply before the subrogation exception of the statute can apply.  
The general rule pertains only to “evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to 
the plaintiff.”  This formulation is no different substantively from the common-
law rule described in Robinson, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 
1195, ¶ 16, as excluding only: “evidence of benefits paid by a collateral source.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Our common-law analysis from Robinson applies equally in the 
context of the statute. 
{¶ 12} Both versions of the collateral-source rule are concerned with 
actual payments made by third parties to the benefit of the plaintiff, but the focus 
of the statute is to prevent a double-payment windfall for the plaintiff, while the 
focus of the common-law rule was to prevent the defendant from escaping the full 
burden of his tortious conduct.  Write-offs are amounts not paid by third parties, 
or anyone else, so permitting introduction of evidence of them allows the fact-
finder to determine the actual amount of medical expenses incurred as a result of 
the defendant’s conduct.  This result supports the traditional goal of compensatory 
damages—making the plaintiff whole. 
{¶ 13} Jaques argues that R.C. 2315.20 does apply to write-offs, because 
write-offs are evidence of a payment to the plaintiff, even though they are not 
payments themselves.  If a jury knows both the gross amount billed by a medical 
provider and the amount by which that provider agreed to reduce the bill, Jaques 
contends that the jury will deduce that the plaintiff had insurance coverage and 
apply simple subtraction to determine the collateral benefit.  The jury thus, Jaques 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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argues, obtains the evidence that R.C. 2315.20 expressly prohibits, when, like 
here, the insurer has a right of subrogation. 
{¶ 14} While Jaques’s concerns may not be unfounded, we see no 
indication of those concerns in the language of the statute.  We are required to 
apply the plain language of a statute when it is clear and unambiguous.  State v. 
Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9.  A write-off 
indicates only that the provider accepted less than the amount originally billed for 
its services.  While this may typically occur due to an insurance agreement, that is 
certainly not always the case.  R.C. 2315.20 does not indicate a legislative intent 
to bar such evidence.  As we stated in Robinson, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-
6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, ¶ 19, “whether plaintiffs should be allowed to seek 
recovery for medical expenses as they are originally billed or only for the amount 
negotiated and paid by insurance is for the General Assembly to determine.” 
{¶ 15} Because R.C. 2315.20 does not prohibit evidence of write-offs, the 
admissibility of such evidence is determined under the Rules of Evidence.  A 
plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical expenses incurred 
due to the defendant’s conduct.  Robinson at ¶ 7, 17, citing Wagner, 9 Ohio St.3d 
184, 9 OBR 469, 459 N.E.2d 561.  The reasonable value may not be either the 
amount billed by medical providers or the amount accepted as full payment.  Id. at 
¶ 17.  “Instead, the reasonable value of medical services is a matter for the jury to 
determine from all relevant evidence.  Both the original medical bill rendered and 
the amount accepted as full payment are admissible to prove the reasonableness 
and necessity of charges rendered for medical and hospital care.”  Id. 
IV 
{¶ 16} The trial court and court of appeals both erred in refusing to admit 
evidence of write-offs by medical providers relating to Jaques’s care.  R.C. 
2315.20 does not apply to write-offs, and therefore, our conclusion from Robinson 
controls—evidence of write-offs is admissible to show the reasonable value of 
January Term, 2010 
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medical expenses.  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause 
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 17} The statute at issue in this case is extraordinarily straightforward 
and the issue before us exceedingly simple.  The court of appeals adequately 
covered the issue in 11 short paragraphs, yet it takes the majority opinion 16 long 
paragraphs to confuse the issue and obfuscate the law. 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2315.20(A) states, "In any tort action, the defendant may 
introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff * * * except 
if the source of collateral benefits has a * * * contractual right of subrogation * * 
*." 
{¶ 19} At issue in this case is whether a defendant may introduce 
evidence of a write-off.  In this case, Jaques was billed $21,874.80 for medical 
expenses.  The medical provider accepted $7,483.91 as payment in full, writing 
off $14,390.89.  Jaques understandably wants the jury to think that he incurred 
$21,874.80 in medical expenses; Manton understandably wants the jury to think 
that Jaques incurred only $7,483.91 in medical expenses. 
{¶ 20} R.C. 2315.20(A) answers the question before us:  evidence of the 
amount payable may not be introduced, because "the source of collateral benefits 
has a * * * contractual right of subrogation."  Jaques did not negotiate the write-
off, neither did Manton.  The provider of Jaques's medical care did not initiate the 
lesser payment.  Who is left to be the source of the collateral benefits?  It can only 
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be Jaques's insurance company.  It initiated and negotiated the write-off, and it 
has a contractual right of subrogation.  Accordingly, evidence of the collateral 
benefits may not be introduced.  It's not a very difficult question. 
{¶ 21} The court of appeals summed it up even quicker than I have:  "It is 
undisputed that this case arose after the enactment of R.C. 2315.20.  It is further 
undisputed that the source of medical payments that [Manton] attempted to 
introduce at trial were subject to a contractual right of subrogation.  Accordingly, 
the application of the collateral source rule is controlled by R.C. 2315.20, and not 
by the rule set forth in Robinson v. Bates [112 OhioSt.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 
857 N.E.2d 1195]."  Jaques v. Manton, 6th Dist. No. L-08-1096, 2009-Ohio-
1468, ¶ 9.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., Michael D. Bell, 
Russell Gerney, Theodore A. Bowman, and Kevin J. Boissoneault; and Paul W. 
Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellee. 
Marshall & Melhorn, L.L.C., and Alan B. Dills; and Ulmer & Berne, 
L.L.P., and David L. Lester, for appellant. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Martin T. Galvin, and William A. Meadows, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Academy of Medicine of Cleveland & Northern Ohio. 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., Ronald A. Rispo, and Daniel A. Richards; and 
Mann & Preston, L.L.P., and James L. Mann, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Bridget Pursue Riddell, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Hospital Association, Ohio State Medical 
Association, and Ohio Osteopathic Association. 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
Nicholas J. Schepis, urging affirmance as amicus curiae. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
Elk & Elk Co., Ltd., and Peter D. Traska, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Elk & Elk Co., Ltd. 
______________________