Title: Commonwealth v. Amado

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11914 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ADERITO P. AMADO. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     December 8, 2015. - April 19, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, 
Probable cause, Body examination.  Constitutional Law, 
Search and seizure, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 18, 2011.  
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 
Frank M. Gaziano, J., and the case was tried before Merita A. 
Hopkins, J.  
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Susan E. Taylor for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury trial, the defendant, Aderito 
Amado, was convicted of trafficking in fourteen grams or more of 
2 
 
cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b).  The Appeals 
Court affirmed the conviction in an unpublished memorandum and 
order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28.  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review to consider 
whether the search of the defendant's genital area during a 
patfrisk for weapons was a strip search and, if so, whether it 
satisfied the probable cause requirement articulated in 
Commonwealth v. Morales, 462 Mass. 334, 342 (2012).  We conclude 
that although the police properly initiated the motor vehicle 
stop, the subsequent search, which involved pulling the 
defendant's clothing away from his body, shining a flashlight 
inside the clothing, and removing an object from his buttocks, 
was an unlawful strip search on two grounds.  First, the search 
of the defendant's buttocks area exceeded the permissible scope 
of a patfrisk for weapons where it occurred after the police had 
dispelled the safety concerns prompting the exit order and 
patfrisk.  Second, the search met the criteria of a strip search 
as we have defined it, and the search was unlawful because the 
police lacked probable cause to believe the defendant was 
concealing drugs on his person and it was otherwise 
unreasonable.  Thus, the judge erred in denying the motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained during the search.  We reverse 
the denial of the motion to suppress and remand the matter to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings.    
3 
 
 
1.  Motion to suppress.  a.  Background.  On June 2, 2011, 
at approximately 9:40 P.M., four officers of the Brockton police 
department were on patrol on North Main Street, driving in an 
unmarked vehicle.  They observed a green Acura automobile 
pulling out of a nearby gasoline station.  At least one of the 
officers recognized the defendant as the front seat passenger 
and recalled that he had been arrested a few weeks earlier for 
unlawful possession of a firearm.1  The police made a U-turn in 
the gasoline station and followed the automobile.  One of the 
officers noticed that the registration plate was not properly 
affixed.  The driver of the automobile made two quick turns in 
what appeared to be an effort to avoid police scrutiny.  The 
police activated their blue lights and pulled over the 
automobile.  All four of the police officers got out of their 
vehicle and approached the automobile with two officers on each 
side.  As the police officers approached, one of them observed 
the defendant reach his left arm behind his body.  One of the 
officers, Detective George Almeida, alerted the others, stating, 
"We got movement up front."  A second officer observed the 
defendant bring his left arm back down to the front of his body.   
 
One of the police officers requested a driver's license and 
registration from the operator of the automobile; another 
                                                          
 
 
1 Aderito Amado had been arrested after the police searched 
a vehicle and found a handgun near the passenger seat where he 
was sitting. 
4 
 
illuminated the passenger compartment with his flashlight.  The 
officers noted that despite "open[]" and "engag[ing]" 
communications in the past, the defendant on this occasion was 
extremely nervous; he avoided eye contact, his hands trembled, 
and he was breathing rapidly.  Concerned for his safety, 
Detective Brian Donahue ordered the defendant out of the 
automobile.  As the defendant emerged, Donahue did not observe 
any bulges or protrusions in the defendant's clothing suggesting 
a weapon.  Donahue then conducted a patfrisk, felt what he 
surmised to be a roll of cash in the defendant's front pocket, 
and asked for the amount.  The defendant responded that the roll 
contained $500 in cash.  When Donahue continued the patfrisk by 
running his hand up the defendant's inner thigh, he felt an 
object behind the defendant's testicles.  Based on its shape and 
feel, Detective Donahue did not suspect that the object was a 
gun.  He called out to the other officers that the defendant was 
"jocking" something.2  The defendant continuously denied carrying 
anything.  Another officer pulled back the waistband of the 
defendant's shorts and underwear to view his bare backside.  The 
detectives observed a plastic bag protruding from the 
defendant's buttocks.  At the sight of the bag, the police 
handcuffed the defendant who declined to remove the bag himself. 
                                                          
 
 
2 "Jocking" refers to a suspect's attempt to hide narcotics 
in the buttocks area.  
5 
 
 
A police supervisor arrived, and he and Donahue took the 
defendant between two nearby buildings, where they once again 
pulled out the defendant's shorts and underwear, this time 
shining a flashlight on his bare buttocks.  The contents of the 
bag were not visible, but the officers ascertained that the bag 
was not inside the defendant's rectum.  The police supervisor 
pulled the bag out from the defendant's buttocks.  The drug 
laboratory later determined that the bag contained approximately 
twenty-four grams of "crack" cocaine. 
 
The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the 
plastic bag and its contents, claiming that the police (1) 
illegally stopped the automobile, (2) lacked adequate grounds to 
issue an exit order, and (3) improperly searched his person.  
After a hearing, the judge denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress the bag and its contents, ruling that (1) the police 
had the authority to stop the automobile based on the defective 
registration plate light; (2) the exit order was justified by 
safety concerns, including the high crime area of the stop as 
well as the defendant's recent arrest and movements within the 
automobile; and (3) because the exposure of the defendant's 
buttocks did not occur while the defendant was naked, it was not 
a strip search under Commonwealth v. Prophete, 443 Mass. 548, 
6 
 
557 (2005).3  Rejecting the defendant's claims, the motion judge 
concluded that the police, "[h]aving lawfully discovered the 
highly incriminating plastic baggies, . . . possessed probable 
cause to believe that it contained narcotics and to seize the 
narcotics in a noninvasive manner." 
 
The defendant reprises the argument he made in his motion 
to suppress the narcotics, namely that the exit order following 
a civil motor vehicle infraction and a patfrisk reaching his 
testicles were unreasonable.  He maintains that after the 
patfrisk, the police conducted a strip search without probable 
cause.  The Commonwealth counters that the defendant waived his 
objections to the exit order and patfrisk because he did not 
pursue these issues in the Appeals Court.  Instead, the 
Commonwealth urges this court to limit the inquiry to a 
determination whether pulling the defendant's shorts and 
underwear away from his body constituted a strip search under 
Morales, 462 Mass. at 342, and argues that the search was not a 
strip search or, in the alternative, that the search was 
reasonable because it was conducted away from the road and only 
the officers viewed the defendant's bare skin.  
  
                                                          
 
 
3 We have since determined that a strip search occurs when 
the last layer of clothing is moved -- not necessarily removed  
-- to expose an intimate area.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 462 
Mass. 334, 342 (2012).  The judge did not have the benefit of 
this decision at the time of his ruling on the motion to 
suppress.  
7 
 
 
b.  Discussion.  As an initial matter, we agree that the 
defendant failed to assert a specific challenge to the validity 
of the exit order and the scope of the patfrisk in the Appeals 
Court.  Nonetheless, we address the issues as our authority to 
do so is derived from two principles of appellate review.  
First, an inquiry into the propriety of the exit order and the 
scope of the protective search is appropriate and necessary.  
The justification for the exit order necessarily is relevant to 
and constrains the scope of the subsequent patfrisk and the 
ensuing body search.  Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 407 
(1974), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) ("search 
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible'").  Second, where an 
issue is raised below, we review claims for error creating a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Arzola, 470 Mass. 809, 814 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
792 (2016).  Thus, we now review both claims as a necessary 
predicate to our determination of the central issue underlying 
this appeal:  whether the search of the defendant's buttocks 
area was reasonable.   
 
"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining 
the weight and credibility to be given . . . testimony presented 
8 
 
at the motion hearing" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  "We review independently the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found."  
Id.    
 
 
i.  The stop.  "Where the police have observed a traffic 
violation, they are warranted in stopping a vehicle."  
Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207 (1995), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980).  The stop of 
the vehicle cannot last "longer than reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 465 (2011).  Here, the 
officers initially pursued the automobile because they 
identified the defendant as a passenger and wanted to 
investigate further based on his prior arrest for possession of 
a firearm.  During the pursuit, it happened that the police 
developed a proper basis for the stop once they noticed the 
vehicle's unlit registration plate.  Notwithstanding the 
pretextual basis for the stop, our law validates such police 
conduct so long as it is justified on independent grounds.4  See 
                                                          
 
 
4 Such stops, though lawful under our current jurisprudence, 
implicate important policy concerns about racial profiling in 
encounters between the police and persons of color.  We leave to 
another day consideration whether and how police authority 
should be limited when a stop is clearly pretextual. 
    
9 
 
Santana, supra at 209 (vehicle stops reviewed under police 
authority not pretext).  
 
ii.  Exit order and patfrisk.  Although exit orders issued 
to passengers during a routine traffic stop are permitted by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997), art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of the Rights offers greater protection to 
passengers.  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 660-661, 
668 (1999).5  There are three situations in which police officers 
may properly order a passenger from a validly stopped vehicle.  
First, an exit order is proper when "a reasonably prudent man in 
the policeman's position would be warranted in the belief that 
the safety of the police or that of other persons was in 
danger."  Cruz, 459 Mass. at 466, quoting Gonsalves, supra at 
661.  Second, an exit order is proper if the officer developed a 
reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts 
                                                          
 
 
5 It is in this context that the defendant complains that he 
was ordered from the vehicle "one minute" after the officers 
requested the driver's license and registration.  The defendant 
suggests that the rapidity of the exit order undermines its 
validity, but our cases have held that it is prolonged stops 
that often exceed police authority.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 
424 Mass. 153, 163 (1997) (continued detention of driver and 
passenger impermissible where driver had produced license and 
registration in satisfaction of the purpose of the stop).  But 
see Commonwealth v. Ciaramitaro, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 638, 643-644 
(2001) (continued detention of driver leading to plain view 
observation of illegal weapons was permissible while awaiting 
results of license and registration inquiry).  Regardless, the 
underlying issue remains the initiation and scope of the 
defendant's search. 
10 
 
that the passenger was engaged in, or about to engage in, 
criminal activity apart from any offense committed by the 
driver.  Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158-159 (1997).  
Third, an exit order is proper where the police are conducting a 
search of the automobile on other grounds, such as the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  Id. at 157.   
 
Here, the motion judge articulated a confluence of factors 
justifying an exit order based on safety:  the defendant's 
recent arrest for being in an automobile with an unlawful 
firearm; the defendant's arm movements behind his back and then 
forward again as the officers approached the automobile; the 
defendant's lack of eye contact with Detective Donahue; the 
defendant's rapid breathing; and the high crime area of the 
stop.  We discern no basis on which to disturb the judge's 
factual findings or ruling that the exit order based on safety 
concerns was justified.  See Wilson, 441 Mass. at 393.  
Accordingly, we turn to whether the scope of the subsequent 
protective search was justified.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 
433 Mass. 669, 675-676 (2001).  
 
"The scope of a Terry search cannot be general; rather, it 
is strictly tied to the circumstances that render its initiation 
permissible."  Wilson, 441 Mass. at 396, citing Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 413 Mass. 598, 601 (1992).  Where an officer has issued 
an exit order based on safety concerns, the officer may conduct 
11 
 
a reasonable search for weapons in the absence of probable cause 
to arrest.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26.  Such protective 
searches are reasonable if "confined to what is minimally 
necessary to learn whether the suspect is armed and to disarm 
him once the weapon is discovered."  Commonwealth v. Almeida, 
373 Mass. 266, 272 (1977).  See Silva, 366 Mass. at 407-408.  
"In most instances the search must be confined to a pat-down of 
the outer clothing of the suspect."  Id. at 408.  However, under 
the "plain feel" doctrine, an officer may seize contraband 
discovered during a Terry-type frisk if the officer feels an 
object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately 
known.  Wilson, supra at 396-397, citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
508 U.S. 366, 373, 375-377 (1993).    
 
Here, the officer did not see any protrusions or suspicious 
bulges in the defendant's athletic shorts.  When the officer pat 
frisked the defendant, he felt an object behind the defendant's 
testicles that he knew was not a weapon.6  At this point, the 
safety exigency justifying a search of the defendant's person 
ended as there was no remaining suspicion that the defendant 
possessed a weapon.  Silva, 366 Mass. at 408 ("Only after the 
                                                          
 
 
6 The Commonwealth asserts that the testicles and 
surrounding area cannot be declared search-free zones because 
small weapons can be hidden in the groin region.  There is no 
need to make such a declaration here, and such a declaration 
would be inapplicable, because the officer knew the bulge was 
not a weapon. 
12 
 
pat-down gives indication that a weapon is present do the police 
have the privilege to search further").  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 608 (2003) (officer justified in 
retrieving "hard object" felt during patfrisk to dispel concern 
it was weapon).   
 
Nor was a further search warranted under the "plain feel" 
doctrine, because the officer was unable to identify the 
contraband nature of the object by touch alone.  Wilson, 441 
Mass. at 397 ("plain feel" doctrine prohibits general 
exploratory search where contraband not immediately apparent on 
touch).  Although the presence of an object behind the 
defendant's testicles was certainly suspicious, and it may have 
justified additional investigation, any further searches of the 
defendant's person required probable cause that the defendant 
was committing an offense.  See Morales, 462 Mass. at 339.   
 
iii.  The strip search.  In Morales, 462 Mass. at 342, we 
determined that a strip search occurs "when a detainee remains 
partially clothed, but in circumstances during which a last 
layer of clothing is moved (and not necessarily removed) in such 
a manner whereby an intimate area of the detainee is viewed, 
exposed, or displayed."  Morales, which was decided after the 
motion to suppress hearing in this case, see note 3, supra, 
clarified the existing "definition of a strip search as one in 
which a detainee is commanded to remove the last layer of his or 
13 
 
her clothing."  Prophete, 443 Mass. at 557.  In Morales, we 
explained that, although complete nakedness was a determining 
factor in the strip search at issue in Prophete, total undress 
is not necessary to effect a strip search.  Morales, supra.     
 
Here, the trial judge did not address whether the initial 
pulling back of the defendant's clothing during the patfrisk was 
a strip search.  The Appeals Court assumed, without deciding, 
that it was a strip search requiring probable cause.  As no 
evidence was confiscated from this initial search, we do not 
address the matter.  However, the second pulling back of the 
defendant's clothing was different; it constituted a strip 
search.  In this case, when the police supervisor and the 
arresting officer opened the waistband of the defendant's 
underwear, exposed his bare skin, directed a flashlight on the 
area, and then retrieved the object, the defendant's private 
area was both viewed and exposed.  In these circumstances, the 
police conducted a strip search within the meaning of Morales.  
462 Mass. at 342.  We next determine whether probable cause 
existed to justify the strip search. 
 
Although the United States Supreme Court requires only 
reasonable suspicion to initiate strip searches under the Fourth 
Amendment, we have concluded that "probable cause is the 
appropriate standard that must be met for a strip or visual body 
cavity search to be constitutionally permissible" under art. 14.  
14 
 
Prophete, 441 Mass. at 553, citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 
Mass. 403, 407-408 (1999).  This is so because strip searches 
"by their very nature are humiliating, demeaning, and terrifying 
experiences that, without question, constitute a substantial 
intrusion on one's personal privacy rights."  Morales, 462 Mass. 
at 339-340, quoting Prophete, supra.  Such searches may precede 
formal arrest as long as probable cause existed at the time the 
search was made, independent of the results of the search.  
Commonwealth v. Clermy, 421 Mass. 325, 330 (1995), citing 
Johnson, 413 Mass. at 602.  
 
Here, the trial judge found that the police developed 
probable cause to arrest the defendant for a narcotics violation 
during the patfrisk.  As a result, the strip search was deemed a 
search incident to arrest for a suspected drug offense.  In 
urging us to uphold these determinations, the Commonwealth 
points to the Clermy case, where a defendant was arrested on an 
outstanding motor vehicle warrant while sitting on the steps of 
a known "crack" house in an area of high arrest rates for 
narcotics violations.  421 Mass. at 326.  After the patfrisk 
revealed a paging device and sixty dollars in cash, the police 
placed the defendant in a cruiser and conducted a second safety 
search, which revealed a hard object in his genital area.  Id. 
at 327.  The police retrieved a plastic prescription bottle 
containing twenty-five pieces of "crack" cocaine.  Id.  On 
15 
 
review, this court concluded that "[i]t is eminently reasonable 
to infer that a prescription bottle carried in this manner would 
contain contraband, and, most probably, a controlled substance." 
Id. at 330-331.   
 
Although probable cause may develop during a patfrisk, that 
was not the case here.  The arresting officer knew the object 
was not a weapon but only suspected it was contraband, based on 
his experience finding drugs concealed in the genital area.  
Other than a suspicious but unknown object, there existed no 
indication that the defendant was committing or about to commit 
a drug offense.  The defendant's arm movements and nervousness 
prompted the protective patfrisk but suggested no connection to 
suspected narcotics.  He was ordered out of an automobile 
stopped for a minor motor vehicle infraction, but not for 
suspected drug activity.  He was not the driver of the vehicle, 
nor was there concern about operating while under the influence.  
In addition, his clothing showed no visual clues indicating the 
presence of narcotics on his person.  Last, the vicinity of the 
stop was not identified as an area known for drug trafficking.  
In sum, the police officer's reasonable suspicion could not have 
ripened into probable cause without the additional and 
impermissible searching of the defendant's person that occurred 
here.  See Wilson, 441 Mass. at 396, citing Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
at 378-379 ("If the officer must manipulate or otherwise further 
16 
 
physically explore the concealed object in order to discern its 
identity, then an unconstitutional search has occurred").  The 
facts here placed the defendant in a probable cause "no man's 
land" as far as the police were concerned, where the police had 
reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was engaged in 
something illegal but did not have probable cause to believe 
that the suspected illegal activity involved a drug offense. 
 
The dissent posits that the police had probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was "'jocking' illegal drugs" 
essentially because "when a police officer feels a foreign 
object in a male's groin or buttocks area, it is reasonable 
inference that the object contains illegal drugs."  Post at    .  
According to the dissent, that inference "grows stronger still 
where the defendant twice denies that he is hiding anything, 
even though it is plain that he is."  Id. at    .  The specific 
facts cited by the dissent in support of probable cause, of 
course, are highly suspicious.  However, what was required here 
was that the information known to the police at the time of the 
search connected the defendant to possession of illegal drugs, 
the offense for which probable cause must be established.  Where 
the defendant is a passenger in a vehicle stopped on pretextual 
grounds to investigate the defendant because of his past arrest 
for possession of a firearm, that connection is missing.  
Furthermore, that connection cannot be established by the police 
17 
 
officer's experience with other detainees who in the past may 
have secreted contraband in the groin area.  That experience, 
without information particular to the defendant's involvement 
with contraband, did not transform the random encounter into 
probable cause to believe this defendant was committing a drug 
offense.  There is no doubt that a denial, especially an absurd 
one, may heighten an officer's suspicion.  Yet heightened 
suspicion is not probable cause, and we have rejected the 
proposition that the police require only reasonable suspicion 
before conducting a strip search.  Thomas, 429 Mass. at 408.     
 
Even where probable cause for a strip search exists, the 
search must also be reasonably conducted.  Morales, 462 Mass. at 
342.  Reasonableness is not a fixed concept.  Rather it is 
determined by considering "the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted."  Thomas, 429 Mass. at 407, quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).  See Bell, supra at 558 (finding 
visual body cavity searches of inmates constitutional).  In 
Morales we determined that the unconsented-to police observation 
and the public exposure of the defendant's intimate areas was 
unreasonable as "a significant intrusion of the defendant's 
privacy."  462 Mass. at 341.  The search in this case failed to 
meet the test of reasonableness for the same reason as in 
18 
 
Morales.  That is, the police conducted the search of the 
defendant in a public location.  Id.  The attempt to mitigate 
the public exposure by taking the defendant between two 
buildings to remove the bag from his genital area did not render 
the search private where any number of persons could have 
observed the encounter.   
 
The dissent challenges our view of the reasonableness of 
the search, asserting that "[t]his is a far cry from the strip 
search in the Morales case [462 Mass. at 338] where the 
defendant was seen 'lying face down on the sidewalk with his 
buttocks exposed.'"  Post at    .  The distinction is that the 
defendant's "buttocks and groin area were not exposed to any 
passerby," and the officers attempted "to obtain greater 
privacy."  Id. at    .  The operative fact in Morales was the 
public nature of what we deemed to be a strip search.  That is 
precisely what happened here, and reasonableness is not 
established just because, as the dissent puts it, "[t]here is no 
reason to believe that . . . anyone other than the searching 
detectives could have seen the defendant's buttocks or groin."  
Post at    .  On the record before us, that fact is speculative.  
Indeed, the "humiliating, demeaning, and terrifying 
experience[]," Morales, supra at 339-340, quoting Prophete, 441 
Mass. at 553, that is the hallmark of a strip search exists even 
where the arresting officers are the only persons to view a 
19 
 
suspect's intimate areas.  Thus, where the safety exigency had 
ended and the search could have been observed from the 
surrounding residential units, we are persuaded that the search 
was not reasonable in these circumstances. 
  
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the body search of the 
defendant constituted a strip search, that the police lacked 
probable cause to justify the search, and that it was 
unreasonable in the circumstances.  Accordingly, the motion to 
suppress the contents of the bag retrieved during the strip 
search should have been allowed.  We therefore vacate the 
judgment of conviction and remand the matter to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Spina and Cordy, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court regarding the law.  The pulling 
back of the defendant's waistband, first to observe the object 
that the defendant was "jocking," and later to retrieve it, were 
strip searches under our law.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 462 
Mass. 334, 342 (2012) ("A strip search . . . may occur when a 
detainee remains partially clothed, but in circumstances during 
which a last layer of clothing is moved (and not necessarily 
removed) in such a manner whereby an intimate area of the 
detainee is viewed, exposed, or displayed").  Probable cause was 
needed to conduct these strip searches.  See id. at 339, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Prophete, 443 Mass. 548, 554 (2005) ("A search 
of a defendant 'lawfully could progressively extend into a strip 
(or a visual body cavity) search only if such a search was 
justified by probable cause to believe that the defendant had 
concealed [drugs] on his person or his clothing that would not 
otherwise be discovered by the usual search incident to 
arrest'").  And to pass constitutional muster, the strip 
searches must have been reasonably conducted under the 
circumstances.  See Morales, supra at 342 ("For a visual body 
cavity search and a strip search to be constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] and art. 14 
[of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights], such searches also 
must be reasonably conducted").   
2 
 
 
 
 
I dissent because I disagree with the court's application 
of the law to these facts.  Based on the factual findings of the 
motion judge, which were not clearly erroneous, there was 
probable cause to believe that the defendant was "jocking" 
illegal drugs, and it was reasonable under the circumstances to 
pull the waistband of his shorts back to observe and later 
retrieve the plastic bag containing the drugs, because the only 
persons who could observe the defendant's buttocks and groin 
area in such a strip search were the detectives who conducted 
it.  See id. at 343. 
 
1.  Probable cause for the search.  Based on the judge's 
findings, when Brockton police Detective Eric Hilliard pulled 
back the defendant's waistband to look for drugs, the following 
information was known to the police: 
 As the detectives approached the vehicle in which the 
defendant was a passenger, the defendant was seen reaching 
his left arm behind his body. 
 When Detective Brian Donahue approached the vehicle, the 
defendant appeared "extremely nervous -- he stared 
straight ahead seeking to avoid eye contact, his hands 
trembled, his chest heaved, and he was breathing rapidly."  
The defendant's demeanor was different from previous 
encounters Detective Donahue had with the defendant, where 
the defendant was "engaging" and "spoke openly."   
3 
 
 
 
 The defendant had a wad of $500 in cash in his front 
pocket.  
 When Detective Donahue conducted a frisk of the 
defendant's inner thighs and crotch area, he felt a hard 
object behind the defendant's testicles that he knew was 
not "part of the male anatomy."   
 When Detective Donahue asked the defendant what he was 
hiding there, the defendant twice denied hiding anything.   
 Detective Donahue knew from his training and experience 
that drug dealers hide narcotics in the buttocks area, and 
had recovered narcotics hidden in that manner from drug 
dealers before.  He referred to this practice as "jocking 
something."    
 
Courts inside and outside of Massachusetts have recognized 
that, when a police officer feels a foreign object in a male's 
groin or buttocks area, it is a reasonable inference that the 
object contains illegal drugs.  See Commonwealth v. Clermy, 421 
Mass. 325, 327, 330-331 (1995) ("It is eminently reasonable to 
infer that a prescription bottle carried [between the 
defendant's legs in the area of his genitals] would contain 
contraband, and, most probably, a controlled substance"); 
United States v. Walker, 181 F.3d 774, 779 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 980 (1999) (seizure of plastic bag justified 
where police officer felt bulge under suspect's pants while pat 
4 
 
 
 
frisking groin and buttocks); People v. Champion, 452 Mich. 92, 
111-112 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1081 (1997) (probable 
cause to believe that pill bottle contained contraband where 
police discovered bottle in defendant's groin region).  See 
also 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(b), at 403-404 
(5th ed. 2012) ("If the package is concealed in the groin area, 
a finding of probable cause is much more likely.  And even if 
the touching does not alone supply probable cause, it may 
contribute together with other facts to a probable cause 
finding" [footnotes omitted]).  
 
This inference grows stronger where the officer has found 
narcotics hidden in that manner before and knows from his or 
her training and experience that drug dealers hide narcotics 
there.  See United States v. Ashley, 37 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1181 (1995) (probable cause 
where officer felt object in groin area during patfrisk and 
officer testified that he had previously found narcotics hidden 
in that area of the body). 
 
This inference grows stronger still where the defendant 
twice denies that he is hiding anything, even though it is 
plain that he is.  See Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 
574 (2002) ("inconsistent, false, [and] implausible" statements 
by defendant to police contributed to finding of probable 
cause).  See also United States v. Ilazi, 730 F.2d 1120, 1127 
5 
 
 
 
(8th Cir. 1984) (along with other suspicious circumstances, 
defendant's failure to explain unusual bulge in boot 
constituted probable cause to arrest for narcotics offense). 
 
The discovery that the defendant was "jocking something" 
and his false denial that he was hiding anything gave 
incriminating meaning to the earlier observation of the 
defendant reaching his left arm behind his body, which is 
consistent with his placement of something in his buttocks 
under his loose fitting athletic shorts.  It also gave 
incriminating meaning to the defendant's demeanor with 
Detective Donahue, which was different from prior encounters.   
 
I recognize that, before this encounter, there was no 
information that the defendant dealt or used controlled 
substances.  But such information would simply have gilded the 
lily of probable cause.  There was abundant probable cause 
without this information.  After all, if the object did not 
contain contraband, why would a person keep it in his buttocks 
and then, when it was felt by a police officer during a 
patfrisk, deny its very existence?1   
                                                          
 
 
1 I also recognize that this is the most pretextual of 
stops:  the detectives were looking for a legal justification to 
stop the vehicle, and found it when they saw that the license 
plate was not properly illuminated.  But even if we were, for 
this reason, to apply heightened scrutiny to our probable cause 
analysis, the facts here survive such scrutiny.   
6 
 
 
 
 
2.  Reasonableness of the strip search.  In evaluating the 
reasonableness of a strip search, "[h]ow a search is conducted 
is of the utmost importance, with the least amount of intrusion 
constituting the better practice."  Morales, 462 Mass. at 343.  
Here, the defendant's clothing was not removed, and his 
buttocks and groin area were not exposed to any passerby who 
might observe the search.  Rather, the searches in this case 
were strip searches only because a detective lifted the 
waistband of the defendant's athletic shorts and underwear, 
thereby exposing his private parts to the detectives who 
conducted the search.  There is no reason to believe that, in 
either search, anyone other than the searching detectives could 
have seen the defendant's buttocks or groin.  During the second 
search, where the detectives retrieved the plastic bag from the 
defendant's buttocks, they moved to an alley between 
residential buildings in an effort to obtain greater privacy, 
but all they ultimately did was pull back the defendant's 
waistband again, this time perhaps a bit further.  This is a 
far cry from the strip search in the Morales case where the 
defendant was seen "lying face down on the sidewalk with his 
buttocks exposed."  See id. at 338.  Certainly, if the police 
had taken the defendant to a private room to conduct a strip 
search, no one would question that it was conducted reasonably, 
because the only persons who would then see the defendant's 
7 
 
 
 
buttocks and groin would be the police officers conducting the 
strip search.  See id. at 342-343 ("Concerning the place where 
such a search is conducted, courts have indicated that, in 
order to preserve a detainee's privacy, a private room is 
preferable").  But the same is true here, because all that the 
searching detectives did was pull back the defendant's 
waistband, exposing his private areas only to the detectives 
who conducted the search.  Under these circumstances, I 
conclude that the strip searches were "perfectly reasonable in 
scope and manner and did not result in either the public 
disclosure of the defendant's buttocks or undue embarrassment 
or humiliation."  See id. at 345 (Cordy, J., concurring).   
 
3.  Conclusion.  Because I conclude that there was probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was "jocking" illegal 
drugs, and that the conduct and manner of the strip searches to 
observe and later retrieve the plastic bag containing the drugs 
were reasonable under the circumstances, I would affirm the 
motion judge's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.