Title: Wallace v. Balint

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Wallace v. Balint , 94 Ohio St.3d 182, 2002-Ohio-480.] 
 
 
WALLACE, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. BALINT;  
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE AND CROSS-
APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Wallace v. Balint (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 182.] 
Motor vehicles — Insurance — Uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage — 
Applicability of antistacking provision in multiple policy family — 
Intrafamily stacking of insurance policies does not occur, when. 
(No. 00-1572 — Submitted September 18, 2001 — Decided February 6, 2002.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
75953. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  James Wallace, Jr., died as a result of injuries sustained 
when his motorcycle collided with an automobile driven by Dennis Balint.  
Balint’s negligence was allegedly the cause of the accident. 
 
Subsequently, appellants and cross-appellees, James Wallace, Sr., 
decedent’s father, individually and as administrator of the estate of decedent, 
decedent’s mother, Wanda Wallace, decedent’s brother, Christopher Wallace, and 
decedent’s sister, Katrina Wallace, filed an action in the court of common pleas 
for personal injury and, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2125, wrongful death against 
Balint and appellee and cross-appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company. 
 
At the time of the accident, Balint was insured under a policy of liability 
insurance through State Farm with liability limits of $25,000 per person and 
$50,000 per accident.  Decedent was the named insured under two policies of 
liability insurance with State Farm, each providing uninsured/underinsured 
motorist coverage of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
James Wallace, Sr., and Wanda Wallace together were the named insured 
on four other policies of insurance with State Farm, and each policy provided 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident.  Christopher Wallace was the named insured on his own 
separate 
policy 
of 
insurance 
with 
State 
Farm 
that 
provided 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident.  Katrina Wallace was the named insured on her own 
separate 
policy 
of 
insurance, 
also 
with 
State 
Farm, 
that 
provided 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $25,000 per person and 
$50,000 per accident.  Each of these policies was for a different vehicle.  At the 
time of the accident, the Wallaces resided in the same household.  As family 
members living in the same household, each of the Wallaces qualified as insureds 
under each of their eight State Farm policies. 
 
In their complaint, the Wallaces sought, under the terms of their eight 
underinsured motorist policies with State Farm, a total recovery of $800,000.  
This amount represents the combined total of the per-accident limits of the 
Wallaces’ eight policies in addition to Balint’s $50,000 liability coverage. 
 
While the case was pending before the court of common pleas, State Farm 
agreed to pay the estate of James Wallace, Jr., $25,000, the per-person limits of 
Balint’s liability policy.  State Farm paid the estate an additional $25,000, thereby 
exhausting the $50,000 underinsured motorist coverage limit on one of the two 
underinsured motorist policies of decedent. 
 
State Farm filed two motions for summary judgment.  State Farm first 
moved for summary judgment as the provider of underinsured motorist coverage, 
arguing that the Wallaces were attempting to stack the coverage of each of the 
remaining seven policies and that each of the policies included a provision, 
pursuant to the authority granted in former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), precluding 
intrafamily stacking.  (See 1994 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 211-
January Term, 2002 
3 
212.  The authorization is now at R.C. 3937.18[F][2].)  Thus, State Farm argued, 
the Wallaces were not entitled to stack their separate underinsured motorist 
coverages on top of the underinsured motorist coverage that had already been paid 
pursuant to one of the decedent’s policies.  State Farm also argued that the 
Wallaces were not entitled to the per-accident limits of any of the underinsured 
motorist policies in question but were limited to a single claim subject to the per-
person limit, since only one person had been physically injured.  In a second 
motion for summary judgment, State Farm argued that coverage under Balint’s 
liability policy was limited the same way. 
 
Thus, it was State Farm’s contention (1) that pursuant to the antistacking 
policy provision and former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), the Wallaces were not entitled to 
coverage under their other policies, (2) that if the Wallaces are entitled to 
anything under their policies they are limited by the policies and former R.C. 
3937.18(H) to the per-person limit, and (3) that the Wallaces are limited by their 
policies and R.C. 3937.44 to a single claim subject to the per-person limit of 
Balint’s liability policy.  (See R.C. 3937.18[G], similar to former R.C. 
3937.18[H], 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 212.) 
 
As indicated, former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2) permits insurers to provide 
antistacking language in their policies.  State Farm did so.  Former R.C. 
3937.18(H) permits insurers to treat all claims against uninsured motorist 
coverage as a single claim to the per-person limit where only one person suffers 
bodily injury in an accident.  State Farm did so.  R.C. 3937.44 permits insurers to 
treat all claims under a liability policy as a single claim subject to the per-person 
limit where only one person suffers bodily injury.  State Farm did so. 
 
The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm on both of its 
motions.  The Wallaces appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Appeals. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
The court of appeals reviewed three issues.  The first was whether the 
antistacking language of each of the policies was unambiguous and valid.  The 
second was whether the Wallaces were limited to a single claim subject to the per-
person limits of their underinsured motorist coverage.  The third was whether the 
Wallaces were limited to a single claim subject to the per-person limit of Balint’s 
liability policy.  The court of appeals held that the antistacking language of the 
policies was valid and that the Wallaces were limited to one claim at the per-
accident limit of Balint’s liability policy.  The court of appeals also found, 
however, that the parents of the decedent could recover up to the per-accident 
limits of one of their four policies.  The Wallaces appealed to this court, and State 
Farm cross-appealed.  In their appeal, the Wallaces contend that the antistacking 
language of the policies is invalid and that coverage at the per-accident limits of 
each of the eight policies should be available to them.  State Farm contends in its 
cross-appeal that under the facts of this case there is no circumstance where the 
per-accident limits of any policy are available to the Wallaces.  The case is now 
before us upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
 
In answering the first issue, the court of appeals determined that pursuant 
to R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), each State Farm policy contained a valid antistacking 
provision and that the Wallaces were attempting to impermissibly stack their 
underinsured motorist coverages.  We agree that each of the policies in question 
did include a valid antistacking provision.  We do not agree that the Wallaces 
were attempting to impermissibly stack their underinsured motorist coverage as to 
all of their policies. 
 
“Stacking” is defined in former R.C. 3937.18(G).  Former R.C. 
3937.18(G)(2) provides that intrafamily stacking “is the aggregating of the limits 
of such coverages purchased by the same person or two or more family members 
of the same household.”  (Emphasis added.)  “Stacking” is also defined as “the 
ability of insured, when covered by more than one insurance policy, to obtain 
January Term, 2002 
5 
benefits from second policy on same claim when recovery from first policy alone 
would be inadequate.”  (Emphasis added.)  Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 
1403.  See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode (1982), 187 Conn. 386, 388, 446 A.2d 
1059, 1060, fn. 2, overruled on other grounds, Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon (1991), 
220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d 977, and Detroit Auto. Inter Ins. Exchange v. McMillan 
(1980), 97 Mich.App. 687, 296 N.W.2d 147, reversed on other grounds (1983), 
417 Mich. 946, 332 N.W.2d 149. 
 
“The concept of ‘stacking’ coverages * * * arises where the same claimant 
and the same loss are covered under multiple policies, or under multiple 
coverages contained in a single policy, and the amount available under one policy 
is inadequate to satisfy the damages alleged or awarded.”  (Emphasis added.)  12 
Couch, Insurance (3 Ed.1998) 169-14 to 169-15, Section 169:4.1 
 
Unquestionably, the policies at issue herein each include, pursuant to R.C. 
3937.18(G)(2), valid antistacking language.  But that is not the end of the story. 
 
In Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 506, 620 
N.E.2d 809, 814, we stated, “ ‘Intrafamily’ stacking occurs when an individual or 
an entire family is insured by several separate uninsured/underinsured policies 
insuring different vehicles.  When the individual or a family member is injured by 
an uninsured or underinsured motorist, he or she will try to combine, or stack, 
each of the policies’ underinsurance limits to compensate the injured individual.”  
(Emphasis added.)  As illustrated by Savoie, intrafamily stacking occurs when a 
single family member attempts to stack multiple coverages of the household. 
                                                          
 
1. 
In other jurisdictions, stacking has been similarly defined.  “ ‘Stacking’ occurs when a 
policy-holder suffers a single collectible loss, but claims benefits under multiple insurance 
policies.”  (Emphasis added.)  Hammer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (W.D.Ky.1996), 950 
F.Supp 192, 194.  “ ‘Stacking’ refers to the practice of allowing an insured to add or ‘stack’ the 
limits of each vehicle covered under an insurance policy to pay for damages sustained in an 
accident.”  (Emphasis added.)  Harrison v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Miss.1995), 662 So.2d 1092, 1093, at 
fn. 1.  “Stacking is the insured’s recovery of damages under more than one policy until the insured 
satisfies all of his damages or exhausts the limits of all available policies.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Continental Ins. Co. v. Shives (1997), 328 S.C. 470, 473, 492 S.E.2d 808, 810. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
We agree that decedent’s estate is attempting to aggregate the 
underinsured motorist benefits of decedent’s second policy on top of the benefits 
already paid out of decedent’s first policy.  Likewise, decedent’s parents, James 
and Wanda, seek to aggregate the underinsured motorist benefits under their four 
separate policies.  What the estate and the decedent’s parents seek clearly violates 
the antistacking language of the policies. 
 
However, given the definition of “stacking” as found in Savoie and in the 
other sources cited above, and the fact that each of the eight policies in question is 
a separate contract between State Farm and the underinsured motorist policy 
holder, clearly stacking does not occur when the estate is limited to only one of 
decedent’s two policies, the parents are limited to only one of their four separate 
policies, and Christopher and Katrina are limited to their own individual policies.  
If the estate were permitted coverage under decedent’s second policy, that would 
be stacking.  If the parents were permitted coverage under more than one of the 
four separate policies that they have with State Farm, that would be stacking.  If 
Christopher were permitted coverage under any of the other policies—in addition 
to his own separate policy—that would be stacking.  The same is true of Katrina. 
 
The definitions of “stacking” set forth in the statute and in Black’s, Couch, 
and Savoie make clear that stacking occurs when one insured seeks coverage 
under more than one policy issued to himself or other family members.  If the 
estate, the parents, Christopher, and Katrina are each permitted coverage only 
under their own policy, then stacking never occurs, and the antistacking language 
is never operative.  Herein, no individual claimant-insured is seeking to aggregate 
or access any policy other than his own. 
 
Furthermore, it would contradict the fundamental principles of the right to 
freely contract if we were to hold that each member of the Wallace family was 
somehow restricted in his or her separate contract with State Farm because of 
language in the policies of other family members.  “The right to contract freely 
January Term, 2002 
7 
with the expectation that the contract shall endure according to its terms is as 
fundamental to our society as the right to write and to speak without restraint.”  
Blount v. Smith (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 41, 47, 41 O.O.2d 250, 253, 231 N.E.2d 
301, 305. 
 
Each of the Wallaces was a named insured on a separate policy of 
insurance.  They are each claiming the underinsured motorist coverage of their 
own separately held policies.  However, the attempt of the estate and decedent’s 
parents to aggregate their policies beyond their legitimate claims under a single 
separate policy issued to them, based upon their status as family members covered 
under other policies issued to other family members, is intrafamily stacking and is 
precluded by the language in the policies, as allowed by former R.C. 
3937.18(G)(2). 
 
Accordingly, the antistacking provisions of the State Farm policy that 
preclude the “stacking of any and all coverage” do not exclude James and Wanda 
Wallace from the coverage of one of the underinsured motorist policies held 
separately in their names, but they are precluded from stacking the remaining 
three policies.  The same is true of decedent’s estate and policies.  It follows then 
that the antistacking provisions of the Wallaces’ policies do not apply to 
Christopher and Katrina Wallace, since, based upon the definition of stacking, 
neither of them is attempting to stack his or her separately held underinsured 
motorist insurance with any other coverage. 
 
To buttress our conclusion on this first issue, we look further at State 
Farm’s arguments.  State Farm cites Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 
521 N.E.2d 789, 792, as a case in which this court upheld antistacking provisions 
very similar to those in the case at bar.  While we have already resolved the issue 
with respect to the validity of State Farm’s antistacking provisions, Dues serves as 
an example of the stacking cases that have come before us.  Dues, like other 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
stacking cases before this court,2 involved a single insured attempting to 
aggregate the coverages of more than one policy.  Thus, these cases do not 
provide guidance on the antistacking issue of the case at bar.  Christopher Wallace 
and Katrina Wallace are the named insureds on separate policies of underinsured 
motorist coverage, and they do not attempt to recover under any additional 
policies.  While decedent’s estate and decedent’s parents do, in part, seek to stack 
coverages, we have dealt with the issue above. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, decedent’s estate is precluded, pursuant to the 
antistacking provisions of decedent’s policies, from recovering under decedent’s 
second policy of underinsured motorist coverage.  James and Wanda Wallace may 
recover benefits under only one underinsured motorist policy in which they are 
the named insureds and are precluded by the antistacking provisions of their 
policies from recovering under any additional underinsured motorist coverage.  
Christopher and Katrina may each recover under his or her separate underinsured 
motorist coverages. 
 
The second issue before us is whether James and Wanda Wallace are 
separately entitled to coverage up to the per-person limit of one of their 
underinsured motorist policies or whether together they are limited to a single 
claim at the per-person limit.  The court of appeals interpreted Moore v. State 
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 27, 723 N.E.2d 97, as holding that each 
                                                          
 
2. 
Saccucci v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 273, 512 N.E.2d 1160;  
Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 42, 22 OBR 63, 488 N.E.2d 840, 
overruled on other grounds, Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 639 
N.E.2d 438;  Auto-Owner’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 156, 10 OBR 490, 462 
N.E.2d 396, overruled on other grounds, Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 
789.  For examples of cases in which family members attempt to stack multiple policies under 
which they are the insured, see Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 
N.E.2d 809, superseded by statute, 1994 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 239-240, 
Sections 7 through 10;  Wood v. Shepard (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 86, 526 N.E.2d 1089;  Benson v. 
Rosler (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 41, 19 OBR 35, 482 N.E.2d 599, limited in part on other grounds, 
Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 246, 725 N.E.2d 261;  Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 27, 15 OBR 67, 472 N.E.2d 700, overruled on other grounds, In re 
Nationwide Ins. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 11, 543 N.E.2d 89. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
insured who is presumed, pursuant to R.C. 2125.02, to have suffered damages is 
entitled 
to 
separate 
coverage 
up 
to 
the 
per-accident 
limit 
of 
an 
uninsured/underinsured motorist policy.  We disagree.  In Moore we held, “R.C. 
3937.18(A)(1), as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, does not permit an insurer to 
limit uninsured motorist coverage in such a way that an insured must suffer bodily 
injury, sickness, or disease in order to recover damages from the insurer.”  Id. at 
syllabus.  The issue in Moore was whether the insured, the mother of a victim of a 
fatal car accident, was covered by her uninsured motorist insurance even though 
the deceased was not insured under her policy.  The insurer in Moore denied the 
mother’s claim.  We held that the mother could claim under her own policy. 
 
In the case at bar, State Farm has not denied coverage but argues that the 
applicable policy limits have been exhausted.  State Farm correctly states that it is 
not challenging who can recover, but rather how much they can recover.  We did 
not hold in Moore that as a result of a wrongful-death claim, the parents of a 
decedent were individually entitled to coverage at the per-accident limit of an 
underinsured motorist policy.  Thus, we reverse the holding of the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
 
Accordingly, we find that James and Wanda Wallace are together limited 
to the per-person limit of their State Farm policies.  R.C. 3937.18(H) allows 
insurers to “include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting 
from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall 
collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, 
including death, sustained by one person.”  Each policy held jointly by James and 
Wanda Wallace contained a valid limitation as authorized by R.C. 3937.18(H).  
Therefore, James and Wanda Wallace are together confined to one claim at the 
per-person limit of a single policy. 
 
The third issue before us is whether the Wallaces are restricted to a single 
claim at the per-person limit of the Balint liability policy.  Similar to R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
3937.18(H), R.C. 3937.44 permits insurers to limit coverage to a single claim at 
the per-person limit where all claims arise out of a single bodily injury.  The 
Balint liability policy provides a valid per-person limit as permitted by R.C. 
3937.44.  Accordingly, the Wallaces are restricted by valid policy language to a 
single claim at the per-person limit of the Balint liability policy. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, the decedent’s estate is precluded by the 
policy’s antistacking provisions from any recovery under the second policy. The 
same is true of decedent’s parents.  They are entitled to coverage under one of the 
four, but no more, of their underinsured motorist policies.  As to Christopher and 
Katrina Wallace, they each are entitled to coverage under their own individual 
policies.  In addition, each of the Wallaces’ claims is confined to the per-person 
limit of his or her policy.  Finally, the claim against the Balint liability policy is 
confined to the per-person limit of that policy. 
 
The Wallaces ask this court to apply the reasonable-expectations doctrine.  
This doctrine is explained in 2 Restatement of Law 2d, Contracts (1981), Section 
211(3), which provides: 
 
“Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting 
such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular 
term, the term is not part of the agreement.” 
 
Professor Keeton has described the reasonable-expectation doctrine:  “The 
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and beneficiaries regarding the 
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the 
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”  Keeton, Insurance 
Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions (1970), 83 Harv.L.Rev. 961. 
 
The Wallaces challenge the mutuality of the insurance contracts that they 
entered into with State Farm.  The Wallaces argue that they did not have an 
opportunity to negotiate the terms of their contracts, that at the time the contract 
was executed the contracts were not even available, that the contracts were not 
January Term, 2002 
11 
delivered until well after they entered into the agreement, and that the 
endorsements, that later amended the contract, substantially altered their 
expectations of the original agreement.  While the Wallaces raise compelling 
arguments, there is not yet a majority on this court willing to accept the 
reasonable-expectations doctrine. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm, albeit for different reasons, in part 
and reverse in part, the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
 and cause remanded. 
 
GORMAN AND PFEIFER, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in judgment only in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
ROBERT H. GORMAN, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for F.E. 
SWEENEY, J. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in judgment only in part and dissenting in part.  
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that Katrina Wallace is 
entitled to UIM coverage under her individual policy.  Because her policy limits 
are identical to the limits of the tortfeasor’s coverage, there is no triggering of 
UIM coverage.  See Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 287-288, 744 
N.E.2d 719, 733-734 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In 
regard to the remainder of the majority’s disposition of this case, I concur in 
judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I 
concur in the holding that the Wallaces are limited to the per-person limits of 
Balint’s liability policy and of their underinsured motorist coverage.  However, I 
must respectfully dissent from the lead opinion’s analysis of the antistacking 
provisions in the Wallaces’ eight insurance policies. 
 
The lead opinion sets forth the issue as “whether the antistacking language 
of each of the policies was unambiguous and valid.”  Yet absent from the opinion 
is the actual policy language being reviewed.  Instead, the lead opinion relies 
upon definitions of the word “stacking” taken from various sources not connected 
to the actual policies.  I find the analysis incomplete and legally inadequate, based 
as it is upon a dictionary definition of one word taken out of context with only a 
cursory reference to the contract provision itself. 
 
The lead opinion acknowledges the legality of antistacking language in the 
uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability insurance 
policy.  Former R.C. 3937.18(G) stated: 
 
“(G) Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of 
insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section may, 
without regard to any premiums involved, include terms and conditions that 
preclude any and all stacking of such coverages, including but not limited to: 
 
“(1) interfamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such 
coverages by the same person or two or more persons, whether family members 
or not, who are not members of the same household. 
 
“(2) intrafamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such 
coverages purchased by the same person or two or more family members of the 
same household.”  (Emphasis added.)  145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 211-212. 
 
The statute expressly permits insurance policies to preclude any and all 
stacking of UM/UIM coverages without regard to the number of premiums 
January Term, 2002 
13 
involved.  This includes stacking of multiple coverages purchased by family 
members of the same household, without regard to the amount of premiums that 
the family members have paid.  I believe that the lead opinion’s interpretation of 
the State Farm provisions is clearly wrong because it is contrary to the statute. 
 
Although the lead opinion acknowledges that “each of the policies in 
question did include a valid antistacking provision,” it does not give effect to 
these provisions.  At this juncture, one would expect the analysis to focus upon 
the particular antistacking language of the policies at issue.  Instead, the lead 
opinion ignores the policy language and examines the definition of the word 
“stacking” found in a dictionary and in a treatise to interpret the State Farm 
insurance provisions in order to reach a result that would permit stacking in some 
instances. 
 
The only legally sound approach would be to examine the policy 
language.  Insurance coverage is “determined by a ‘* * * reasonable construction 
[of the contract] in conformity with the intention of the parties as gathered from 
the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language employed.’ ”  
King v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 211, 519 N.E.2d 1380, 
1383, quoting Dealers Dairy Products Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (1960), 170 Ohio St. 
336, 10 O.O.2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 745, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Each of the eight State Farm insurance policies issued to the Wallace 
family contains endorsement 6093C.1,  Section 3e of which provides: 
 
“e.  The provision titled If There Is Other Similar Coverage is changed to 
read: 
 
“ ‘If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 
 
“ ‘1.  Any and all stacking of uninsured motor vehicle coverage is 
precluded. 
 
“ ‘2.  If Other Policies Issued By Us to You, Your Spouse or Any Relative 
Apply 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
“ ‘Subject to 1 above, if two or more motor vehicle liability policies issued 
by us to you, your spouse or any relative providing uninsured motor vehicle 
coverage apply to the same accident, the total limits of liability under all such 
policies shall not exceed that of the policy with the highest limit of liability.’ ”  
(Emphasis sic.) 
 
The appellate court specifically found “the subject antistacking provision 
to be unambiguous, clear and conspicuous.  In particular, the language ‘the total 
limits of liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy with 
the highest limit of liability’ in section e. of endorsement 6093C.1 can only be 
interpreted to mean that the insured may not stack coverage.”   I believe that the 
court of appeals accurately describes the antistacking language.  As permitted in 
R.C. 3937.18(G), the endorsement clearly and unambiguously prohibits “any and 
all stacking.”  As further clarification, the contracts explain that, when there are 
multiple policies among relatives that apply to the same accident, the insured’s 
“total limits of liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy 
with the highest limit of liability.”  The plain language of this provision conforms 
to R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), which allows an insurer to prohibit intrafamily stacking of 
multiple coverages purchased by family members. 
 
This court has held, “When the language of an insurance policy has a plain 
and ordinary meaning, it is unnecessary and impermissible for this court to resort 
to construction of that language.”  Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (1984), 10 
Ohio St.3d 163, 166-167, 10 OBR 497, 499, 462 N.E.2d 403, 406.  Here, the lead 
opinion agrees that each policy contained a valid antistacking provision.  The lead 
opinion makes no finding that the antistacking provision is unclear or ambiguous.  
But the opinion ignores the policy language and the appellate court’s finding that 
it is clear and unambiguous.  Instead, the lead opinion chooses to confine its 
analysis to a simple dictionary definition of one word in order to construe an 
entire contractual provision.  I do not agree. 
January Term, 2002 
15 
 
The statute and the policy language clearly contemplate the situation 
presented here, i.e., when two or more family members purchase multiple policies 
from the same insurer.  The statute allows the policies to prohibit stacking of 
multiple coverages in that situation, without regard to the number of premiums 
paid.  Although the lead opinion focuses on the fact that each named insured is 
claiming UIM coverage under his or her own separately held policies, this has no 
significance.  Full payment up to the per-person limit under each family 
member’s policy is exactly what the contract explicitly prohibits.  I believe that 
the lead opinion’s conclusion is, in fact, contrary to the statute, which expressly 
allows a policy to preclude stacking of multiple coverages without regard to the 
number of premiums paid, and contrary to the policy language as well. 
 
Because I believe that the lead opinion’s antistacking analysis is contrary 
to law, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Don C. Iler Co., L.P.A., and Don C. Iler, for appellants and cross-
appellees. 
 
Davis & Young and Henry A. Hentemann, for appellees and cross-
appellants. 
 
Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A., and Todd O. Rosenberg, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Academy of Trial Lawyers, in support of appellants and cross-appellees. 
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