Title: Cantin v. Young

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Cantin v. Young (99-267); 170 Vt. 563; 742 A.2d 1246

[Filed 3-Nov-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 1999-267

Lynn Cantin	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Essex Family Court
                                       }	
Douglas Young	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 21-8-91 Exdm
 
                                                Trial Judge: Douglas P. Cohn

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Douglas Young moves to dismiss the appeal filed by the
  Office of Child Support (OCS) because OCS has exceeded its power to act. We
  grant the motion.

       Lynn Cantin and Douglas Young were divorced in 1993. In 1998, Cantin
  petitioned the court for a modification of child support, after she was
  notified that Young was to receive a workers' compensation award. Several
  hearings were held in the matter at which OCS participated, assisting
  Cantin. After a decision was rendered in July 1998, defendant requested a
  reconsideration, which was decided by the magistrate in his favor. OCS
  appealed from that decision; Cantin did not. Defendant moved to dismiss the
  appeal because OCS was not a party, and was exceeding its statutory
  authority. The court denied the motion, and decided the appeal,
  substantially affirming the magistrate's decision. On OCS's appeal to this
  Court, defendant has again moved to dismiss the appeal, on the same
  grounds.

       We must first address the basis for the family court's decision.
  It found that defendant had failed to object to OCS's participation
  during the hearings before the magistrate, and therefore was barred from
  objecting on appeal. We do not agree that defendant waived his right to
  object to OCS participation as a party. It was not until OCS filed its
  appeal that it became apparent that OCS was not merely assisting Cantin, as
  her representative, but was acting as an independent party. Thus, we reach
  the merits of defendant's motion.

       At the outset, we emphasize that this is not a case in which the
  support obligee--Cantin--has assigned her rights to OCS. See 33 V.S.A. §
  4106. Defendant agrees that in that circumstance OCS is the party in
  interest and can appeal from an adverse decision. Here, OCS is
  acting pursuant to its responsibility to provide "[u]pon application of the
  parent of a minor child ... [a]ny ... services required to be provided
  under Title IV- D." 33 V.S.A. § 4102(c)(6) "Title IV-D" refers to Title
  IV-D of the Social Security Act, which requires that states implement
  programs to assist in obtaining spousal and child support from absent
  parents. See 42 U.S.C. § 651. The state is required to provide "all
  appropriate IV-D services" in non- assignment cases. 45 C.F.R. §
  302.33(a)(5). We have reviewed the federal statute and implementing
  regulations and can find no requirement that the state child support agency
  have the power to independently seek court action, apart from a parent it
  is assisting, except where there is an assignment of support. Indeed, the
  statutory requirement that the state have a periodic review process for
  child support orders specifically applies only to modification requests
  made by "either parent," except in assignment cases. See 42 U.S.C. §
  666(a)(10)(A).

       Assuming the power that OCS seeks is not specified or required in
  federal law, OCS suggests that it can be found in Vermont statutes. We
  agree that the Legislature could grant OCS the power to intervene in
  support establishment and modification proceedings, acting independently,
  and not for either parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 223 Ill.Dec. 647, 680 N.E.2d 380, 387 (1997) (Illinois statutes
  authorize the Department of Public Aid to intervene in support
  proceedings.). We cannot find, however, that it has done so. The most
  relevant statutes are 15 V.S.A. §§ 658(b) and 660(a). The former statute
  allows a request for support to be made "by either parent, by a guardian,
  or by the departments of social and rehabilitation services or social
  welfare, or by the office of child support, if a party in interest." OCS
  was added as a permissible party to file a support petition in 1990, see
  1989, No. 220 (Adj.Sess.), § 21, but like the departments of social welfare
  and social and rehabilitation services, its power is limited to instances
  in which it "is a party in interest." See 15 V.S.A. § 658(b). We believe
  the effect of the proviso is to limit its power to cases in which it holds
  an assignment of support rights. If it could initiate any support case, the
  proviso language would be unnecessary. See In re Lunde, 166 Vt. 167, 171,