Title: Gambrill v. Bd. of Education of Dorchester County

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Brandon Gambrill, et al. v. Board of Education of Dorchester County, et al., No. 34, 
September Term, 2021, Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION—CIVIL ACTIONS FILED AGAINST SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSIONS—INDEMNIFICATION 
BY SCHOOL BOARD FOR MONEY DAMAGES.  Under Maryland law—Maryland 
Code (2020 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 5-
518, civil claims may be filed against an employee of a county school board of education 
for negligent acts or omissions that occur within the scope of employment.  In such cases, 
the board of education must be joined as a party and is required to indemnify the employee 
for any personal liability associated with a money judgment entered against the employee.   
 
The Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7941 et seq. (2015) 
(the “Coverdell Act”), provides teachers with protection from liability for harm caused by 
a negligent act or omission that occurs within the teacher’s scope of employment.   
 
The Court of Appeals held that the Coverdell Act does not preempt CJ § 5-518.  Under the 
plain language of the Coverdell Act, the Act does not provide teachers with immunity from 
suit.  Rather, it provides teachers with liability protection for harm they cause through 
negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment.  Additionally, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 7946(b)(2) establishes an express “exception” to the preemption provisions of the Act 
for a “state law that makes the school or governmental entity liable for the acts or omissions 
of its employees to the same extent as an employer is liable for the acts or omissions of its 
employees.”  The Court of Appeals held that the state statute, CJ § 5-518, fits squarely 
within the exception set forth under § 7946(b)(2) of the Coverdell Act and is therefore not 
preempted.  
 
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CLAIMS AGAINST SCHOOL EMPLOYEES—
NOT PRECLUDED BY THE EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE DOCTRINE.  The 
educational malpractice doctrine applies when a court is asked to evaluate course of 
instruction or is called upon to review the soundness of the method of teaching that has 
been adopted by an educational institution.  Where a case falls within the educational 
malpractice doctrine, courts have almost universally held that claims of “educational 
malpractice” are not cognizable.  In Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 
292 Md. 481 (1982), the Court of Appeals adopted the educational malpractice doctrine 
and declined to recognize a cause of action based upon academic decision-making or 
educational placement.   
 
The Court of Appeals held that the educational malpractice doctrine did not apply to the 
plaintiffs’ negligence claims in this case.  Here, the plaintiffs’ negligence claims focus on 
the failure of the school employees to provide adequate supervision to their daughter, S. 
and other students who bullied S. and physically assaulted her, and to use reasonable 
 
 
measures to protect S. while on school grounds.  The plaintiffs’ negligence claims are not 
based upon academic placement or pedagogical decisions.  Rather, they involve a failure 
to provide adequate supervision and a safe learning environment.   
 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT—The Court of Appeals held that it could not affirm the circuit 
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the school board and the individually named 
teachers and administrators.  Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, the Court determined that there were material disputes of fact, and the Court 
could not affirm the circuit court’s summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Dorchester County 
Case No.: C-09-CV-18-000099  
Argued: January 6, 2022 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 34 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRANDON GAMBRILL, et al. 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
DORCHESTER COUNTY, et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Wilner, Alan M.  
   (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
Raker, Irma S.  
   (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 26, 2022 
 
* McDonald, J., now a Senior Judge, participated 
in the hearing and conference of this case while 
an active member of this Court.  After being 
recalled pursuant to Md. Const., Art. IV, § 3A, 
he also participated in the decision and adoption 
of this opinion. 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2022-08-26 13:37-04:00
 
In this case, we must determine whether a federal law, the Paul D. Coverdell 
Teacher Protection Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7941 et seq. (2015) (the “Coverdell Act” or 
“Act”), provides teacher and administrator employees of county school boards of education 
with “immunity from suit” in connection with negligent acts or omissions they commit 
within the scope of employment.  Under Maryland law, negligence claims may be brought 
against a school board employee, provided that the school board is joined as a party and 
indemnifies the employee for any personal liability or money judgment entered against the 
employee.  See Maryland Code (2020 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.), Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 5-518.  The school personnel who have been individually 
named as defendants in this litigation contend that the Coverdell Act provides them with 
“immunity from suit,” thereby providing them with greater protection than they receive 
from the indemnification provisions of CJ § 5-518.  Therefore, according to the individual 
defendants, the Coverdell Act preempts the Maryland statute.  
 
This federal preemption question arises in a case involving a series of violent and 
troubling peer conflicts between adolescents in middle school.  The Petitioners before us 
are Brandon Gambrill, Robin Gambrill, and their minor daughter, S. (collectively, the 
“Gambrills”).  The Gambrills brought a negligence action against teachers and 
administrators at S.’s middle school for injuries that S. suffered at the hands of her fellow 
students.   
 
The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which was 
affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.  Gambrill v. Bd. of Ed. of Dorchester County, 
252 Md. App. 342 (2021).  Both the circuit court and the intermediate appellate court 
2 
 
determined that the Coverdell Act preempts Maryland law, and therefore precludes the 
Gambrills from pursuing their negligence claims against the school employees.  The 
Gambrills also sued the Dorchester County Board of Education (the “Board”) for 
negligence.  With respect to the Gambrills’ negligence claim against the Board, the circuit 
court and the Court of Special Appeals determined that the claim fell within the 
“educational malpractice doctrine,” which bars claims regarding the quality of education 
provided by an educational institution.  In addition, the circuit court also determined that, 
even if the Gambrills’ negligence claim was not barred by the Coverdell Act and the 
educational malpractice doctrine, the defendants were nonetheless entitled to summary 
judgment because no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants were negligent in 
supervising S. and the other students.   
 
As we will explain, the circuit court erred in granting the motion for summary 
judgment.  We hold that the Coverdell Act does not preempt CJ § 5-518.  We further hold 
that the Gambrills’ negligence count, which asserts that the Respondents negligently 
supervised S. and the students who assaulted her, does not fall within the educational 
malpractice doctrine.  Finally, based upon the material disputes of fact that appear in the 
record, we cannot affirm the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment.  For these reasons, 
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.   
3 
 
I 
Factual Background1 
 
During the 2016–2017 school year, the Gambrills’ daughter, S.,2 was involved in 
several physical and verbal altercations with other students while in her sixth-grade year at 
Mace’s Lane Middle School (“Mace’s Lane”), a public school in Dorchester County.  In 
September 2016, student “N.” began harassing S. at school by calling her names, pulling 
her hair, and pushing her.  When S. told her parents, they went to the Assistant Principal, 
Cynthia Woolford, and told her.  Ms. Woolford told the parents that she would “handle it” 
or “take care of it.”  Early in the fall semester of 2016, the Gambrills completed two 
bullying reports concerning N.’s behavior and the school’s lack of action, which were given 
to the school’s guidance counselor.   
 
When the bullying did not stop, the Gambrills contacted Ms. Woolford, as well as 
Dr. Michael Collins, Principal, and Dr. James Bell, Supervisor of Student Services, and 
 
1 The factual background supplied by this opinion comes from the exhibits that the 
parties appended to the motion for summary judgment and response thereto.  Because the 
trial court disposed of the matter through summary judgment, we recite the factual 
background with the appropriate standard of review in mind—that is, construing the factual 
record in the light most favorable to the non-movants.  See, e.g., Newell v. Runnels, 407 
Md. 578, 607 (2009); Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 735 (2008).  Moreover, we do not 
endeavor to resolve factual disputes, but merely determine whether they exist, and if so, 
whether they are sufficiently material to be tried.  Newell, 407 Md. at 607.  Stated another 
way, we acknowledge that the Respondents dispute that that they were negligent as the 
Gambrills’ contend.  That said, it is not this Court’s role to resolve disputes of material 
fact.   
 
2 To protect their privacy, we do not identify any of the children by name.  We refer 
to the two substitute teachers by number, however, not to protect their identities but 
because their names are not disclosed by the record.   
4 
 
requested that S.’s locker be moved.  S.’s and her parents’ initial requests that S.’s locker 
be relocated were denied.3  According to the Gambrills, when they made the initial request, 
the administrators told them that it was too late in the school year to move her locker.  
 
The Gambrills contend that throughout the fall, the attacks against S. increased in 
severity.  On October 26, 2016, S. was attacked by Students 5 and 9 while in class with 
Substitute Teacher 1.  S. was physically beaten on her head and body.  According to S., she 
screamed for help, but Substitute Teacher 1 did not intervene because another student was 
distracting her.  The attack lasted approximately one minute.  According to S, she had not 
in any way initiated or instigated the attack.  S. went to Ms. Woolford’s office to advise 
her of the attack and told her who the assailants were.  Ms. Woolford completed student 
behavior reports for Students 5 and 9 and issued them in-school suspensions.  S. sustained 
a concussion from the attack and was medically ordered to stay home from school for 
several days.   
 
The Gambrills promptly reported the attack to Dr. Collins, who apologized to the 
Gambrills for the incident and admitted that “substitute teachers are not the best trained 
and cannot control the classroom.”  Ms. Woolford also met with the Gambrills the day after 
the incident.  S. informed Ms. Woolford that she was also having issues with Students 4 
and 7.4   
 
3 Mr. Gambrill testified at his deposition that the Gambrills had asked that S.’s 
locker be moved in October or November 2016, but that her locker was not moved until 
January 2017.   
 
4 As the Court of Special Appeals observed in its opinion, the morning after her 
meeting with the Gambrills, Ms. Woolford changed S.’s schedule to minimize contact with 
5 
 
 
In late November, Student 4 walked out into the hall without permission and 
verbally attacked S. who was standing in line across the hall.  Student 4 began shouting at 
S. saying, “come on and fight me” and other inappropriate words.  Ms. Woolford issued 
Student 4 an in-school suspension, and also arranged for external mediation between S. 
and Student 4, at which both S.’s mother and Student 4’s mother were present.  In early 
December, Ms. Woolford instructed S.’s teachers to change seating assignments because 
S. and Student 2 now had issues.   
 
In mid-December 2016, S. was physically attacked while in class under the 
supervision of Substitute Teacher 2.  Student 8 grabbed S. by the neck and flipped her 
backwards.  S. struck her head on a table, resulting in another concussion.  According to 
the Gambrills’ complaint, and S.’s deposition testimony, Substitute Teacher 2 had a 
headache and had put his head down on the desk.  The Gambrills kept S. home from school 
until December 19.   
 
When S. returned to school on December 19, S. and Student 8 engaged in another 
physical altercation.  S. had gone to the nurse’s office to obtain a note about her concussion 
for her gym teacher.  Ms. Woolford brought the male student to the nurse’s office and left 
him alone with S.  Student 8, who was approximately one foot taller than S., physically 
attacked S. and struck her in the face.  S. contends that she tried to defend herself and 
 
the students that S. identified.  However, the change could not be given immediate effect, 
so Ms. Woolford modified S.’s schedule to ensure that she would have limited contact with 
those students in the interim.  With the new schedule, S. had no classes with Students 4, 5, 
and 9.  Ms. Woolford was unable to move S. and Student 7 into separate classes but 
instructed S.’s teachers to “keep [S. and Student 7] away from one another, as much as 
reasonably possible, and immediately report any interaction between these students.”   
6 
 
pushed the male student away from her.  After the assault, S. had to be treated by the school 
nurse because S. had an apparent physical injury as a result of the assault.  Ms. Woolford 
completed behavior reports for both students and issued each student a two-day out-of-
school suspension.   
 
The Gambrills contend that Ms. Woolford failed to investigate the incident properly, 
never permitting S. to tell her side of the events, and instead, immediately issued the 
suspension.  At her deposition, Ms. Woolford admitted that she “would hope [she] would 
have” given S. the opportunity to tell her side of the story, but that she “didn’t recall” if she 
had done so.  S. submitted an affidavit stating that Ms. Woolford knew that S. was in the 
nurse’s office when she brought the male student down to see the nurse, and that no one, 
including Ms. Woolford, asked S. what happened that day after the assault occurred.  
According to the Gambrills, the documents that they attached to their opposition to 
summary judgment (nursing notes, Ms. Woolford’s notes, and Ms. Woolford’s deposition 
testimony) provide evidence in support of their contention that Ms. Woolford made the 
decision to suspend S. prior to investigating the situation. 
 
The Gambrills filed an administrative appeal of Ms. Woolford’s decision to suspend 
S.  In their appeal, the Gambrills explained that S. simply defended herself against the male 
student, who days before, had assaulted S., giving her a concussion.  Dr. Bell denied the 
appeal.   
 
In January 2017, Dr. Bell spoke with the administration at Mace’s Lane about the 
Gambrills’ concerns.  To ensure S.’s safety going forward, the administration issued S. a 
“flash pass” that she could use to immediately go to the guidance counselor or school 
7 
 
administration if she felt that a conflict may escalate.  The administration also changed S.’s 
locker location as the Gambrills had requested, and changed her schedule as requested.  
The administration continued to pursue external mediation as a possible solution.   
 
Despite these changes, the altercations continued.  According to the Gambrills, they 
notified Ms. Woolford and Dr. Collins on several occasions that the bullying and physical 
assaults were continuing.  S. also claims that she was falsely accused of bullying and 
harassing other students when she undertook no such behavior.  S. stated in her affidavit 
that there were “false statements made about me because I was being bullied and targeted 
by other students at Mace’s Lane,” but that she did not harass or bully the students that 
made the false reports.  In fact, according to the Gambrills, S. was under such pressure that 
she developed a coping mechanism of withdrawing and making a cat-like hissing noise to 
stay away from other students “instead of trying to say harmful stuff or anything that would 
get me in trouble.” 
 
There were other minor incidents throughout the spring semester, but the most 
serious occurred on May 8 when Student 4 ran out of her classroom and attacked S., and a 
full-blown fistfight ensued.  Student 4 was suspended with a recommendation of expulsion 
and law enforcement was notified.   
 
The Gambrills contend that they were forced to remove S. from Mace’s Lane, and 
now have to commute 45 minutes each way to transport her to a school where she is safe.   
8 
 
II 
Procedural History 
A. Circuit Court for Dorchester County 
On May 10, 2018, the Gambrills filed a five-count complaint in the Circuit Court 
for Dorchester County, naming James C. Bell, Supervisor of Student Services for 
Dorchester County; Michael Collins, the Principal of Mace’s Lane; Cynthia Woolford, the 
Assistant Principal of Mace’s Lane; Substitute Teacher 1; and Substitute Teacher 2 as 
defendants.  The Gambrills also named the Board of Education for Dorchester County as a 
defendant under a respondeat superior theory of liability.  Count I alleged violations of 
S.’s state constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” education.  Count II alleged 
violations of S.’s state constitutional right to due process.  Count III alleged a pattern or 
practice of improper conduct in violation of the Maryland Constitution.  Count IV alleged 
negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision.  Count V alleged general negligence 
against the individual teachers and their employer, the Board.  
With respect to Count V, the Gambrills alleged that: S. was in the custody and under 
the direct supervision of the defendants when the negligent acts or omissions occurred; Ms. 
Woolford, Dr. Bell, and Dr. Collins were acting within the scope of their employment with 
the Board when they failed to properly supervise students at Mace’s Lane; the defendants 
owed a duty to the Gambrills to protect S. from harm from other students and school 
personnel, and to use reasonable care when supervising students, so as to ensure S.’s 
physical safety and well-being; the defendants breached this duty and were negligent by 
9 
 
failing to properly and reasonably supervise S. and other students while the students were 
in the custody of the defendants; the defendants breached their duty of care and were 
otherwise negligent by failing to provide adequate protection to S. from the negligent 
misconduct of employees of the Board; and that as a result of this breach of duty on the 
part of the defendants, the Gambrills and S. will continue to sustain actual emotional 
injuries, including severe emotional and mental distress, and economic damages, including 
past and future medical bills and expenses.   
The Gambrills voluntarily dismissed Counts I and III.  The circuit court then granted 
summary judgment as to the remaining counts.  With respect to Count V—the sole count 
for our consideration here—the circuit court judge ruled from the bench, stating as follows:   
With regard to the negligence claim, Count [V], I find that the individual 
Defendants in this case are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
because they are entitled to statutory immunity.  They’re protected by the 
Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001. 
 
The purpose of that statute is to provide teachers, principals, and other school 
professionals the tools they need to undertake reasonable actions to maintain 
order, discipline, and an appropriate educational environment.   
 
Those defendants are entitled to summary judgment with regard to that claim 
for the reason that there are no substantive or procedural due process 
violations, therefore that Act squarely covers them and provides them with 
immunity. 
 
I find that the Board also is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  
The negligent acts at issue here that are alleged were educational decisions 
and thus within the purview of the Hunter [v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery 
County., 292 Md. 481 (1982)] and Gurbani [v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. 
Corp., 237 Md. App. 261 (2018)] cases[.] 
 
No reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendants were negligent in 
supervising [S.] and other students at Mace’s Lane [Middle School] . . . .  
10 
 
[N]o reasonable jury could find that the . . . Defendant Board . . . breached 
[its] duty to protect her from foreseeable harm.   
 
I conclude . . . that a cause of action here would create that [sword] of 
Damocles hanging over the heads of well-intentioned educators who are 
tasked with the job of resolving peer disputes among adolescents. 
 
Again, I find that there is, not just an absence of evidence to support the 
allegations that the Defendants failed to adequately respond to, investigate, 
and prevent reasonably foreseeable harassment and other harm to [S.], it’s to 
the contrary, the evidence shows that the Defendants responded and took 
action in response to the allegations of [S.’s] family. 
 
I’m not sure if it amounts to contributory negligence or assumption of the 
risk, I’m not clear on that point, but the record does establish that at times 
[S.] was engaging her classmates and that she was involved in altercations 
with other students that could have contributed to the situation.  Very much 
like the case law cited by defense counsel that ameliorated liability on behalf 
of the school board in other cases. 
 
* 
* 
*  
 
I by no means am not affected by this case or disturbed that [S.] suffered 
injuries in this case.   
 
I was also disturbed by some of the comments, whether she made them in 
frustration or not, Ms. Woolford is a, should be an administrative 
professional, and the comments she made about substitute teachers are very 
disturbing to me, that an administrator would make those comments.   
 
But, again, the fact that I’m disturbed by her comments and the fact that I’m 
not satisfied in this case with the outcome and the violence that was visited 
upon [S.], I am charged with applying the law in this case and that’s what 
I’ve attempted to do, squarely.   
 
 
After ruling from the bench, the circuit court entered an order granting the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment “for the reasons set forth on the record” at the 
June 17, 2019 hearing.  Thereafter, the Gambrills filed a timely appeal to the Court of 
Special Appeals.   
11 
 
B. Court of Special Appeals  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.  Gambrill, 252 
Md. App. 342.  With respect to the negligence claims against the individual school 
employees, the intermediate appellate court interpreted the federal Coverdell Act as 
providing individual employees with “immunity” from suit.  Id. at 356.  Based upon its 
interpretation of the Coverdell Act as providing teachers with immunity from suit, the 
intermediate appellate court observed that the Coverdell Act “‘preempts the laws of any 
State to the extent that such laws are inconsistent … except that this … shall not preempt 
any State law that provides additional protection from liability relating to teachers.’”  Id. 
at 354 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7945(a)).  The intermediate appellate court determined that the 
protections of the Coverdell Act are triggered once a state accepts federal funding pursuant 
to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”).  The court explained that under 
the Coverdell Act, a state has four options: “(1) reject federal ESEA education funding; (2) 
accept the federal ESEA funding and accept the Coverdell immunity; (3) accept the federal 
ESEA education funding and adopt its own teacher immunity statute ‘that provides 
additional protection from liability relating to teachers’; or (4) accept the federal ESEA 
funding and pass a law that explicitly refuses to adopt immunity.”  Id.  The court took 
judicial notice of the fact that the State has accepted the funds, pointed out that Maryland 
has not adopted a statute explicitly refusing to adopt Coverdell immunity, and stated that 
the issue was “whether Maryland has thereby elected Coverdell immunity or has adopted 
12 
 
a state law that provides additional protection from liability relating to teachers.”  Id. at 
355 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7945(a)).   
The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that because Maryland’s applicable 
statute—CJ § 5-518—only provides teachers “with a right of indemnification but not 
immunity from suit[,]” the Coverdell Act and “its immunity provision provides broader 
protection because it acts as a bar to a lawsuit and the accompanying discovery process, 
whereas an indemnification provision allows a plaintiff to recover, and then shifts the 
financial burden away from the liable defendant.”  Id. at 355–56.  Relying on the 
preemption clause of the Coverdell Act, set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 7945, the intermediate 
appellate court held that “federal Coverdell immunity applies and preempts the teachers’ 
state statutory right to indemnification under CJ § 5-518.”  Id. at 356. 
Observing that the Coverdell Act “does not provide immunity for employers of 
teachers or for local school boards,” the Court of Special Appeals proceeded to determine 
whether the circuit court correctly concluded that the negligent acts fell within the 
educational malpractice doctrine that this Court described in Hunter, 292 Md. 481, which 
prohibits claims alleging negligence related to academic placement or decision-making.  
Id. at 356–57.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Gambrills’ negligence 
claims fell within the educational malpractice doctrine, holding that “student discipline is 
an essential component of educational policy and that claims of negligent school discipline 
are prohibited as a matter of law under Hunter.”  Id. at 358.  The intermediate appellate 
court reasoned that Maryland no longer follows an “exclusionary model” for student 
discipline, “whereby students who caused disciplinary problems were excluded from the 
13 
 
classroom—by expulsion, suspension or just temporary removal to the principal’s office—
so that the teacher and the remaining students could focus on their lessons.”  Id. at 359.  
The court observed that Maryland law now requires “restorative discipline approaches,”5 
which include “conflict resolution, mediation, peer mediation, restorative conference, 
social emotional learning, trauma-informed care, positive behavioral interventions, and 
rehabilitation.”  Id. at 360 (citing Maryland Code (2018 Repl. Vol. 2021 Supp.), Education 
Article (“ED”) § 7-306(a)(2)).6  Citing to secondary sources, the Court of Special Appeals 
stated that “educational experts who advocate for the adoption of the restorative model 
don’t consider discipline to be separate from the program of academic instruction, but as a 
 
5 The Court of Special Appeals referenced ED § 7-306(a)(1), which defines the 
“restorative approach” as a student discipline model that:  
 
(i) 
Is preventive and proactive; 
 
(ii) 
Emphasizes building strong relationships and setting clear 
behavioral expectations that contribute to the well-being of the 
school community;  
 
(iii) 
In response to behavior that violates the clear behavioral 
expectations that contribute to the well-being of the school 
community, focuses on accountability for any harm done by 
the problem behavior; and 
 
(iv) 
Addresses ways to repair the relationships affected by the 
problem behavior with the voluntary participation of an 
individual who was harmed.  
6 Although the statute requires county school boards to adopt regulations that 
include restorative approaches, the statute recognizes that the county regulations “shall 
[also] provide alternative programs, which may include in-school suspension, suspension, 
expulsion, or other disciplinary measures that are deemed appropriate[.]”  ED § 7-
306(d)(2)(ii). 
14 
 
vital component of the educational program.” Id. at 360–61 (citations omitted).  The 
intermediate appellate court stated that it was “persuaded that student discipline is a vital 
and integral part of our educational system and must necessarily be covered by the Hunter 
line of cases.”  Id. at 361.  The court concluded by stating that it did “not diminish the 
severity or seriousness of S.’s injuries.  They are certainly upsetting.  It must be horrifying 
to have a child return from school covered in bruises and welts.”  Id. at 362.  The Court of 
Special Appeals nonetheless concluded that “[w]e are bound to [the holding in Hunter] and 
could not change it, even if we wanted to.”  Id.  The intermediate appellate court concluded 
that the rationale articulated by this Court in Hunter when it refused to acknowledge a tort 
for educational malpractice  
would also apply here: there is a lack of a workable rule of care against which 
a defendant’s conduct or the adequacy of disciplinary procedures could be 
measured; there is inherent uncertainty in computing damages; and the entire 
exercise would place unwarranted burden on the already overburdened 
resources of our schools, and the judiciary.   
 
Id. at 362–63 (citing Hunter, 292 Md. at 484).   
 
For these reasons, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the individual defendants because of “the immunity provided by the 
federal Coverdell Act” and for the Board “because Maryland law does not recognize a 
cause of action in tort for educational negligence.”  Id. at 363.  Because it affirmed the 
circuit court’s entry of summary judgment on these bases, the Court of Special Appeals 
stated that it did not need to “consider the third basis for the circuit court’s summary 
judgment, that no reasonable juror would have found any of the defendants liable.”  Id.   
15 
 
We granted the Gambrills’ petition for writ of certiorari and consider the following 
questions:7   
 
7 Although questions 3 and 4 were briefed by the parties, only questions 1 and 2 
were raised by the Gambrills in their petition for writ of certiorari.  The Gambrills similarly 
failed to raise questions 3 and 4 in their opening brief before the Court of Special Appeals, 
choosing to raise the issues in their reply brief.  Accordingly, Respondents assert that this 
Court should not consider questions 3 and 4 because the Gambrills waived them.  
Ordinarily, we would agree with Respondents.  Maryland Rule 8-131(b) provides: 
 
Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in 
reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals . . . the Court 
of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the 
petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for 
review by the Court of Appeals.  
 
We determine that this is one of those extraordinary and rare instances in which we 
should exercise our discretion and consider the issues contained in questions 3 and 4.  All 
of the issues presented were raised and decided by the circuit court as part of the proceeding 
that resulted in the entry of summary judgment in the Respondents’ favor.  On appeal, all 
the issues were briefed and argued once again (although the Gambrills raised questions 3 
and 4 for the first time in their reply brief in response to the Respondents’ briefing on the 
issues).  Although the Court of Special Appeals commented on the fact that the Gambrills 
waited until their reply brief to raise the argument that their claims are not barred by the 
educational malpractice doctrine, the intermediate appellate court nonetheless decided this 
issue in a reported opinion, which has great public importance.  In doing so, as we discuss 
more fully herein, the intermediate appellate court interpreted the doctrine of educational 
malpractice in a manner that is at odds with this Court’s interpretation.   
 
Since the intermediate appellate court’s reported opinion, we observe that there have 
been at least three federal district court cases which have discussed Maryland’s application 
of the educational malpractice doctrine as articulated in Hunter.  See Botts v. Johns 
Hopkins, 2021 WL 1561520 (D. Md. 2021); Willey v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Mary’s County¸ 
557 F. Supp. 3d 645 (D. Md. 2021); Gandy v. Howard County Bd. of Educ., 2021 WL 
3911892 (D. Md. 2021).  In the latter two cases—and unlike the Court of Special Appeals 
in this case—the federal district court has declined to apply Hunter at the motion to dismiss 
stage and has permitted the plaintiffs’ negligence claims against school boards and school 
personnel to proceed.  See Gandy at *7 (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ negligence claim as an impermissible malpractice claim where the parents 
alleged that the teachers were unfamiliar with their child’s special educational needs, which 
increased the chance that the child would suffer physical harm); Willey, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 
16 
 
1. Does the federal Coverdell Act preempt Maryland law and apply to 
preclude any liability on the part of either school personnel or boards of 
education in connection with the negligence of teachers and school 
administrators? 
 
2. Did the federal Coverdell Act shield the Individual Respondents from 
liability for their negligent actions where the Respondents failed to 
introduce any evidence at all that Maryland accepts the prerequisite 
federal funding required for the Coverdell Act to apply?   
 
3. Does the Gambrills’ negligence claim against the school personnel and 
the school board fall within the education malpractice doctrine, which 
precludes claims arising from educational decision-making or academic 
placement, which this Court recognized in Hunter v. Board of Education 
of Montgomery County, 292 Md. 481 (2018)? 
 
4. Was the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment, including 
the court’s stated reasons, legally correct?  
 
For the reasons set forth below, we answer “no” on questions one, three and four.  Given 
our answer to question one, we determine that there is no reason for us to reach question 
 
668–69 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claims filed 
against a county board of education on the basis of the educational malpractice doctrine 
where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate security and 
supervision on school grounds, causing their daughter to be killed by another student).   
 
Given that the reported opinion of our colleagues expands the educational 
malpractice doctrine to preclude litigants from bringing common law negligence actions in 
a manner not intended by this Court, we determine that it is appropriate to address question 
3.  On question 4, it appears from the record that the focus at both the circuit court and the 
intermediate appellate court was on the federal and state immunity issues and not the merits 
of the summary judgment facts.  Given our holding that the Gambrills’ claims are neither 
preempted by federal law nor barred by the educational malpractice doctrine, in light of the 
sparse and somewhat unclear reasoning expressed by the circuit court in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Respondents, we determine that the interest of justice would be 
served by remanding the case for further proceedings.  
17 
 
two.  We shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand this case 
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
III 
Standard of Review 
 
In this case, we are being asked to consider the appropriateness of the circuit court’s 
entry of summary judgment on Count V of the complaint—a general negligence count 
against the individually named teachers and administrators, and the Dorchester Board of 
Education that employs the individual defendants.  
 
Maryland Rule 2-501(a) provides, in relevant part: “[a]ny party may file a written 
motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  We review the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  We conduct an 
independent review of the record to determine whether a general dispute of material facts 
exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Md. Cas. Co. 
v. Blackstone Int’l, Ltd., 442 Md. 685, 694 (2015).  “We review the record in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences which may be 
drawn from the facts against the movant.”  Id. at 694.  We do not endeavor to resolve factual 
disputes, but merely determine whether they exist and are sufficiently material to be tried.  
Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 607 (2009).  “If no material facts are in dispute, we 
determine whether the trial judge’s ruling was legally correct.  Ordinarily, we may affirm the 
trial court only on the grounds upon which the trial court relied in granting summary 
18 
 
judgment.” Id. at 608 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Here, the circuit court’s 
summary judgment ruling was based in large part upon the court’s interpretation of a federal 
statute, as well as the court’s interpretation of Maryland case law involving claims for 
educational malpractice.  These are legal issues that we review de novo.   
IV 
 
Discussion 
 
 
As discussed above, the Court of Special Appeals held that the federal Coverdell 
Act preempts CJ § 5-518, a state statute that authorizes negligence claims to be filed against 
teachers but requires that a school board be joined as a party and indemnify the teacher for 
any personal liability or money judgment entered in connection with the negligent conduct.  
Based upon its interpretation of the federal statute, the intermediate appellate court agreed 
with the circuit court that the Coverdell Act precluded the Gambrills from pursuing 
common law negligence claims against the individual board employees named in their 
lawsuit.  Gambrill, 252 Md. App. at 363.  According to the intermediate appellate court, 
the Coverdell Act provides teachers with “immunity from suit,” and therefore preempts the 
Maryland statute because the federal statute provides teachers with greater protection.  Id. 
at 356.  As explained below, we interpret the federal statute differently and conclude that 
federal law does not preempt CJ § 5-518.   
A. 
Federal Preemption Overview 
 
 
“Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the 
National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”  
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012).  The existence of two sovereign laws 
19 
 
allows for “the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes.”  Id. at 398–99.  
The Supremacy Clause8 provides that federal law is supreme over state law, and any state 
law that stands in conflict with the federal law is preempted.  The Supreme Court has noted 
that “[t]his relatively clear and simple mandate has generated considerable discussion in 
cases where [courts] have had to discern whether Congress has pre-empted state action in a 
particular area.”  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–41 (2001).  
 
There are three widely recognized forms of preemption: “(1) express preemption, 
in which Congress expressly states its intent to preempt state law; (2) field preemption, in 
which Congress occupies a certain field by regulating so pervasively that there is no room 
left for the states to supplement federal law; and (3) conflict preemption, arising when state 
law is preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.”  Decohen v. Capital 
One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216, 223 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
 
The “ultimate touchstone” for determining whether federal law preempts state law 
is Congressional intent.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1981).  In considering 
whether the Gambrills’ negligence claims are preempted by federal law, we first start with 
the general presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law.  Columbia 
Venture, LLC v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC, 604 F.3d 824, 830 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations 
 
8 The Supremacy Clause states, in pertinent part:  
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 
U.S. Const. Art. VI, § 2.   
20 
 
omitted).  “This presumption is especially strong against ‘preemption of state remedies like 
tort recoveries, when no federal remedy exists.’”  Id. at 830 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)) (additional quotation omitted).  With these 
principles in mind, we turn to the federal and state statutes at issue.   
1. The Coverdell Act  
 
 
Congress enacted the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001 as part of 
the No Child Left Behind Act.  See 20 U.S.C. § 7941 (2015).  The stated purpose of the 
Act is to “provide teachers,[9] principals, and other school professionals the tools they need 
to undertake reasonable actions to maintain order, discipline, and an appropriate 
educational environment.”  20 U.S.C. § 7942.  The Coverdell Act applies to both public 
and private schools in states that receive funds under Chapter 70 of the Education Title.  20 
U.S.C. § 7944.   
 
The Coverdell Act provides teachers with protection from liability under certain 
circumstances.  Specifically, § 7946(a) provides:  
Except as provided in subsection (b), no teacher in a school shall be liable 
for harm caused by an act or omission of the teacher on behalf of the school 
if— 
 
 
9 Under the Coverdell Act, “teacher” is defined to include a teacher, instructor, 
principal, administrator, or educational employee who works in a school, or individual 
school board member.  20 U.S.C. § 7943(6).  The Act’s plain wording limits its 
applicability to individual teachers, principals, and other school professionals, and does not 
extend to school boards or districts.  Other courts that have interpreted the statute have 
similarly determined that school boards or school districts may be vicariously liable for 
teachers’ and administrators’ negligence even where the individual is not personally liable 
under the Act.  See, e.g., Wormuth v. Lammersville Union School District, 305 F. Supp. 3d 
1108, 1131–32 (E.D. Cal. 2018).   
21 
 
(1) The teacher was acting within the scope of the teacher’s employment 
or responsibilities to a school or governmental entity;  
 
(2) The actions of the teacher were carried out in conformity with Federal, 
State and local laws (including rules and regulations) in furtherance 
of efforts to control, discipline, expel, or suspend a student or maintain 
order or control in the classroom or school;  
 
(3) If appropriate or required, the teacher was properly licensed, certified 
or authorized by appropriate authorities for the activities or practice 
involved in the State in which the harm occurred, where the activities 
were or practice was undertaken within the scope of the teacher’s 
responsibilities;  
 
(4) The harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross 
negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference 
to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the teacher; and  
 
(5) The harm was not caused by the teacher operating a motor vehicle, 
vessel, aircraft or other vehicle . . . . 
 
(emphasis added).  The teacher liability provisions of the Act, however, do not end there.  
Subsection (b) established the following exceptions:  
If the laws of a State limit teacher liability subject to one or more of the 
following conditions, such conditions shall not be construed as inconsistent 
with this section: 
  
(1) A State law that requires a school or governmental entity to adhere to 
risk management procedures, including mandatory training of 
teachers. 
   
(2) A State law that makes the school or governmental entity liable for 
the acts or omissions of its teachers to the same extent as an employer 
is liable for the acts or omissions of its employees.  
 
(3) A State law that makes a limitation of liability inapplicable if the civil 
action was brought by an officer of a State or local government 
pursuant to State or local law.   
 
22 
 
20 U.S.C. § 7946(b) (emphasis added).  The Respondents assert that the Court of Special 
Appeals correctly interpreted the Coverdell Act.  Specifically, they argue that the Coverdell 
Act preempts CJ § 5-518 because the Coverdell Act provides public school employees with 
greater protection from liability than the state statute.  The Gambrills disagree, and point 
out that, in its preemption discussion of the Coverdell Act, the Court of Special Appeals 
equated the phrase “liability from harm” with “immunity from suit,” and contend that there 
is a difference between those legal concepts.  They also point out that, in its preemption 
analysis, the intermediate appellate court only discussed the liability protections in 
subsection (a) and made no mention of the exceptions set forth in subsection (b).10  
 
As we explain more fully below, we hold that the Coverdell Act does not preempt 
state law because the state statute—CJ § 5-518—fits squarely within the state law 
exceptions set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 7946(b).   
2. 
CJ § 5-518 
 
The procedure for asserting a tort claim against a county school board and its 
employees11 is governed by CJ § 5-518.  Under the statute,  
[a] county board employee acting within the scope of employment, without 
malice and gross negligence, is not personally liable for damages resulting 
from a tortious act or omission for which a limitation of liability is provided 
for the county board under subsection (b) of this section, including damages 
that exceed the limitation on the county board’s liability. 
 
10 In discussing the liability protection provisions set forth in § 7946(a) of the 
Coverdell Act, the Court of Special Appeals simply stated that there were “some exceptions 
not relevant here[.]”  Gambrill, 252 Md. App. at 353.  We respectfully disagree and 
determine that they are not only relevant, but dispositive.   
 
11 “County board employee” is defined as “[a]ny employee whose compensation is 
paid in whole or in part by a county board of education[.]” CJ § 5-518(a)(3)(i).   
23 
 
 
CJ § 5-518(e).  Stated another way, a county board employee who is acting within the 
scope of his or her employment is not personally liable for money damages resulting from 
negligent acts or omissions.  Id.  The statute requires that the county school board be joined 
as a party to an action against a county board employee or board member.  CJ § 5-518(d).12  
For negligent acts and omissions by an employee within the scope of employment, the 
county board must indemnify the employee for all money damages resulting from the 
tortious conduct.  CJ § 5-518(e).13  The statute states, in pertinent part, that any “judgment 
in tort for damages against a county board employee acting within the scope of employment 
. . . shall be levied against the county board only and may not be executed against the 
county board employee[.]” CJ § 5-518(h).  Subsection (b) permits a county school board 
 
 
12 CJ § 5-518(d)(1) states:   
 
(1) The county board shall be joined as a party to an action against a county 
board employee, county board member, or volunteer that alleges damages 
resulting from a tortious act or omission committed by the employee in 
the scope of employment, by the county board member within the scope 
of the member’s authority, or by the volunteer within the scope of the 
volunteer’s services or duties. 
 
(2) The issue of whether the county board employee acted within the scope 
of employment may be litigated separately. 
 
(3) The issue of whether the county board member acted within the scope of 
the member’s authority may be litigated separately. 
 
(4) The issue of whether the volunteer acted within the scope of the 
volunteer’s services or duties may be litigated separately. 
 
13 The statute also includes indemnity provisions for board members and volunteers.  
See CJ § 5-518(f) and (g).  
 
24 
 
to raise the defense of sovereign immunity for claims above $400,000 but not for claims 
under that amount.  CJ § 5-518(b), (c).14   
 
The question of whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment 
may be litigated separately.  CJ § 5-518(d)(2).  Additionally, a finding that an employee of 
a county school board acted with malice or gross negligence does not absolve the school 
board of liability.  Rather, CJ § 5-518 “contemplates the scenario where a board employee 
acts within the scope of employment and with malice or gross negligence.” Neal v. Balt. City 
Bd. of School Commissioners, 467 Md. 399, 422 (2020) (emphasis in original).  In other 
words, “it is feasible that an employee, acting maliciously in the scope of their employment, 
may be concurrently liable with the board under [CJ] § 5-518,” in which case “a judgment 
could then be levied and executed against both the employee and the board.”  Id. at 422.   
 
Two years ago, in Neal, this Court discussed the statutory process and requirements 
for bringing tort claims against school employees and school boards under CJ § 5-518.  We 
discussed and affirmed the analysis that the Court outlined in Board of Education of Prince 
George’s County v. Marks-Sloan, 428 Md. 1 (2012).  In connection with our preemption 
analysis, it is useful to discuss this Court’s statutory interpretation and holdings in these 
cases.   
 
In Marks-Sloan, we considered whether the legislative intent in enacting CJ § 5-518 
was to provide county board employees with immunity from suit, or immunity from 
 
14 CJ § 5-518(b) states: “A county board of education, described under Title 4, 
Subtitle 1 of the Education Article, may raise the defense of sovereign immunity to any 
amount claimed above the limit of its insurance policy or, if self-insured, or a member of 
a pool described under § 4-105(c)(1)(ii) of the Education Article, above $400,000.”  
25 
 
damages.  428 Md. at 25.  In concluding that the Legislature intended to establish the latter 
as opposed to the former, this Court discussed in detail the legislative history of the 
statutory scheme, as well as the applicable provisions of the Education Article15 that 
address school board immunity.  Id. at 25–27.  We concluded the legislative intent in 
enacting ED § 4-106 and CJ § 5-518 was to provide board employees with indemnification, 
or “an immunity from damages, which is distinct from the concept of complete immunity 
from liability.”  Id. at 27.   
 
This Court provided a summary of the procedure outlined in CJ § 5-518 for filing 
claims against county school boards and board employees:  
Tort suits may be brought against county board employees and judgments 
may be entered against them.  The county board of education must be joined 
as a party to the tort action in situations where the employee has acted within 
the scope of employment without malice or gross negligence.  If a judgment 
is entered against the employee and the county board, the county board alone 
is responsible for satisfying the judgment, as county board employees may 
not be held personally liable in tort for damages.   
 
Id. at 32. 
We revisited CJ § 5-518 and its legislative history in Neal v. Baltimore City Board 
of School Commissioners, 467 Md. 399 (2020).  In Neal, plaintiffs, who were parents and 
guardians of three students, brought an action against the school board and a school police 
officer for alleged assault by the school officer in the scope of his employment.  The circuit 
 
15 Statutory provisions in the Education Article discuss protection for county boards 
of education and county board employees and must be read together with CJ § 5-518.  
Maryland Code (2018 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.), Education Article (“ED”) § 4-105 provides, 
“[a] county board shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-518 of the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”  Similarly, ED § 4-106(a) provides: “[a] county 
board employee shall have the immunity from liability described under [CJ] § 5-518[.]”  
26 
 
court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment on the independent claims 
that had been filed against the board, and the board was dismissed from the case.  467 Md. 
at 409.  The plaintiffs’ counsel did not appeal the summary judgment dismissal of the 
board, nor did plaintiffs’ counsel request that the board remain in the case as a party for 
any indemnity purposes.  Id. at 404.  The case proceeded to trial against only the school 
officer.  The jury returned a verdict against the school officer and awarded money damages 
to each of the three students.  Id. at 410.  After the verdicts were entered, the plaintiffs filed 
a motion to enforce the judgments against the school board.  Id. at 411.  After the circuit 
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion, the school board appealed the judgment to the Court 
of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment.  Id. at 412.   
We granted certiorari to consider whether the board was required to be joined as a 
party in order for the judgment to be satisfied against the board.  Id. at 414.  We held that 
it did and affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment in the board’s favor.  Id. at 
403–04.  Specifically, we held that under the plain language of CJ § 5-518, even if there is 
a basis for dismissal of independent claims against a board of education (for example, 
claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent hiring), the board is 
required to remain as a party where the plaintiff ultimately seeks money damages against 
a school employee under a vicarious liability theory and the indemnification provisions set 
forth in the statute.  Id. at 426.   
Reviewing the legislative history, we stated that: 
[CJ §] 5-518 was enacted to remedy trial court confusion and expressly apply 
limited liability to both the board and board employees.  According to a 
report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, in order to remedy the 
27 
 
confusion under ED § 4-105, i.e. that “one may initiate a tort claim against a 
county board employee and not be required to join the county board of 
education,” the purpose of § 5-518 was to require that the board of education 
be joined as a party in an action against a board employee.   
 
Id. at 425.  We also observed that the Fiscal Note for the legislative bill that enacted CJ 
§ 5-518 clarified the intent of the General Assembly:  
This amended bill provides that a county board shall be joined as a party to 
a tort action against a county board employee acting in the scope of 
employment and without malice or gross negligence.  A judgment for 
damages must be made against the county board only. 
 
Id. at 426 (citing Dep’t of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, House Bill 940 (1985 Session)) 
(footnote deleted).  
 
In summary, Neal, and Marks-Sloan lay out the process in Maryland for filing a tort 
action against a county board employee that is required by CJ § 5-518, which is worth 
repeating here:  
(1) A suit may be brought directly against a board employee;  
 
(2) A county board of education must be joined as a party to an action against 
a county board employee who has committed a tortious act or omission 
within the scope of his or her employment;  
 
(3) A judgment may then be entered against both the employee and the 
county board of education; but 
 
(4) where the judgment is based upon a negligence claim (as opposed to a 
claim alleging malice or gross negligence), the judgment may only be 
levied and executed against the board.   
 
Neal, 467 Md. at 417, 422; Marks-Sloan, 428 Md. at 28–29.  As we explain below, our 
Maryland statute is entirely consistent with the Coverdell Act and is not preempted by that 
federal law.   
28 
 
B. 
The Coverdell Act Does Not Preempt State Law 
 
The Court of Special Appeals held that “the federal Coverdell Act immunity applies 
and preempts the teachers’ state statutory right to indemnification under CJ § 5-518.” 
Gambrill, 252 Md. App. at 356.  The Court of Special Appeals interpreted the plain 
language of the liability provisions of the Coverdell Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7946(a), as providing 
teachers with immunity from suit.  Gambrill, 252 Md. App. at 355–56.  Because the 
intermediate appellate court interpreted the Coverdell Act as providing teachers with 
immunity from suit, the court concluded that CJ § 5-518 was preempted by the federal 
statute because the state statute provided less protection in the form of indemnification.   
We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that the Coverdell Act 
provides teachers with immunity from suit.  Starting with the plain language of the Act, we 
note that there is nothing in the text of the Act to indicate that teachers are immune from 
suit.  Rather, the Act is couched in terms of a teacher’s liability and liability protection.  
See 20 U.S.C. § 7946(a) (stating that “except as provided in subsection (b), no teacher in a 
school shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the teacher” where certain 
conditions apply). (Emphasis added).  Liability for damages and immunity from suit, of 
course, are distinct legal concepts.  We determine that under the plain language of the 
Coverdell Act, it does not provide teachers with immunity from suit.  Rather, it provides 
teachers with protection from being liable for money damages for the harm they cause 
through negligent acts.  We further observe that federal courts and other state appellate 
courts have interpreted the statute in the same manner.  See, e.g., Dennis v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Talbot County, 21 F. Supp. 3d 497, 502 (D. Md. 2014) (agreeing with the plaintiffs that the 
29 
 
Coverdell Act does not “protect[] the individually named [d]efendants from suit in their 
individual capacities[]”);  Steffan v. Smyzer by and through Rankins, 540 S.W.3d 387, 392 
(Ky. 2018) (concluding “that based on the plain statutory language, the act provides an 
exemption from liability rather than immunity from suit[]”). 
Second, in its preemption analysis, the intermediate appellate court did not discuss 
subsection (b), which creates an express “exception” to the teacher liability provisions set 
forth in subsection (a), for “[a] state law that makes the school or governmental entity liable 
for the acts or omissions of its teachers to the same extent as an employer is liable for the 
acts or omissions of its employees.”  20 U.S.C. § 7946(b)(2).  We determine that CJ § 5-518 
fits squarely within the exception to the Coverdell Act set forth in this subsection.  CJ § 5-
518 expressly provides that teachers “[are] not personally liable for damages resulting from 
a tortious act or omission[,]” and requires that the school board be joined as a party and 
indemnify the teacher if a judgment is entered against the teacher on a negligence claim.   
To summarize, reading provisions of the federal and state statutes together, we hold 
that Maryland has enacted a statute—CJ § 5-518—that “limit[s] teacher liability” by 
“mak[ing] the school or governmental entity liable for the acts or omissions of its teachers 
to the same extent as an employer is liable for the acts or omissions of its employees.”  20 
U.S.C. § 7946(b)(2).  Where a state enacts such a law, the Coverdell Act expressly provides 
that the law “shall not be construed as [being] inconsistent with this section.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 7946(b).  The Maryland statute specifically states that a school board employee “is not 
personally liable for damages resulting from a tortious act or omission[,]” for which the 
county board is liable.  CJ § 5-518(e).  The statute further requires that the school board be 
30 
 
joined as a party and indemnify the employee for any money judgment arising from 
negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment.  The employee’s lack of 
personal liability for money damages, and the school board’s concomitant liability for the 
acts and omissions of its employees, is evident not only from the plain language of the 
statute, but also from the legislative history which this Court examined in Marks-Sloan and 
Neal.  We determine that CJ § 5-518 fits within the exception set forth in 20 U.S.C. 
§ 7946(b)(2).  Accordingly, we hold the Coverdell Act is not in conflict with, nor does it 
preempt CJ § 5-518.16 
 
16 We further determine that the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of the 
Coverdell Act as providing teachers with categorical teacher immunity from suit would be 
impossible to apply where the complaint includes alternative counts alleging intentional 
torts or gross negligence and negligence.  As previously noted, the Act does not apply 
where the teacher’s conduct involves intentional torts or gross negligence.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 7946(a)(4) (excluding from the liability protections harm that is “caused by willful or 
criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant 
indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the teacher[]”).  As we have 
observed, “a fine line exists between allegations of negligence and gross negligence.”  
Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007).  Oftentimes, a party will allege alternative counts 
of gross negligence or an intentional tort, as well as negligence.  See, e.g., Neal, 467 Md. 
at 408 (pointing out that the students brought four intentional tort claims, two constitutional 
claims, as well as claims for negligence).  Where the claims survive summary judgment 
and proceed to a jury verdict, the employee would not be personally liable for a judgment 
on the negligence count but would be liable for a judgment based upon gross negligence.  
The Coverdell Act does not prohibit a teacher from having a seat at the defense table—it 
simply precludes a teacher from being personally liable for harm caused by the teacher’s 
negligent acts or omissions under certain circumstances as outlined in the Act.  In this 
sense, the Act is no different from CJ § 5-518.  Both statutes insulate the teacher from 
personal liability for money damages arising from negligent conduct undertaken in the 
scope of employment.  
31 
 
C. 
The Gambrills’ Negligence Claims Do Not Fall Within the Educational 
 
Malpractice Doctrine   
 
 
Having determined that the Coverdell Act does not preclude the Gambrills’ 
negligence claims, we turn to the lower courts’ legal conclusion that the claims against the 
school board are barred by the educational malpractice doctrine that we recognized in 
Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 292 Md. 481, 487 (1982).  
 
The educational malpractice doctrine applies when a court is “asked to evaluate the 
course of instruction . . . [and] is similarly called upon to review the soundness of the 
method of teaching that has been adopted by an educational institution.”  Ross v. Creighton 
Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 A.D.2d 
85, 90 (N.Y. 1982) (alterations in Ross)).  Courts have described such actions as a “project 
that the judiciary is ill equipped to undertake.”  Gupta v. New Britain General Hosp., 687 
S.2d 111, 119 (Conn. 1996) (citations omitted).  “Among other problems for adjudication, 
these claims involve the judiciary in the awkward tasks of defining what constitutes a 
reasonable educational program and of deciding whether that standard has been breached.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  For this reason, courts have almost universally held that claims of 
“educational malpractice” are not cognizable.  Id.  Stated another way, courts have declined 
to recognize a cause of action or claims regarding the quality of education provided by an 
educational institution.  Hunter, 292 Md. at 487; see also Gurbani v. Johns Hopkins Health 
Systems Corp., 237 Md. App. 261, 293 (2018) (observing that there is “a broader body of 
case law that overwhelmingly favors judicial deference to academic decisions at all levels 
of education”).   
32 
 
 
In Hunter, this Court considered whether an action “can be successfully asserted 
against a school board and various individual employees for improperly evaluating, placing 
or teaching a student.” 292 Md. at 483.  A trial court concluded that the Hunters, two 
parents suing on behalf of their minor child, could not maintain such an action.  Id.   
 
The Hunters alleged that their child developed learning deficiencies because the 
local school system negligently evaluated his abilities and required him to repeat first-grade 
materials while he was physically placed in the second grade.  Id. at 483–84.  Although 
they raised multiple theories for the source of an alleged duty, the “gravamen” of their 
claim “sound[ed] in negligence, asserting [a right to] damages for the alleged failure of the 
school system to properly educate” the child.  Id. at 484.  The specific “injury” claimed 
was the child’s inability to read and write.  Id. at 485.  
 
This Court observed that “so-called ‘educational malpractice’ claims” had been 
“unanimously rejected” in other jurisdictions based on “considerations of public policy[.]”  
Id. at 484 (collecting cases).  We identified three main considerations underlying those 
decisions: (1) “the absence of a workable rule of care against which the defendant’s conduct 
may be measured”; (2) “the inherent uncertainty in determining the cause and nature of 
any damages”; and (3) “the extreme burden which would be imposed on the already 
strained resources of the public school system to say nothing of those of the judiciary.”  Id.  
Upon review of those cases, this Court concluded that “an award of money damages . . . 
represents a singularly inappropriate remedy for asserted errors in the educational process.”  
Id. at 487.  This Court emphasized that the “misgivings” other courts had expressed about 
33 
 
“the establishment of legal cause and the inherent immeasurability of damages” in an 
educational negligence action “are indeed well founded.”  Id. at 487–88. 
 
In declining to recognize a claim for educational malpractice, this Court reasoned 
that the recognition of such an action “would in effect position the courts of this State as 
overseers of both the day-to-day operation of our educational process as well as the 
formulation of its governing policies.”  Id. at 488.  This Court was reluctant to impose such 
a responsibility on the courts.  Id.17   
 
Here, the Board contends that the Gambrills’ negligence claims focus on student 
discipline,18 which the Board asserts is an integral part of the educational process 
 
17 Since this Court’s decision in Hunter, we and the Court of Special Appeals have 
applied the educational malpractice doctrine to preclude plaintiffs from bringing claims 
based upon academic decision-making.  See Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 
295 Md. 67 (1982) (concluding that the claims made by a former student against the 
defendants were based upon negligent evaluation and educational placement of the student 
in the school system, which amounted to claims for educational malpractice); Gurbani v. 
Johns Hopkins Health Systems Corp., 237 Md. App. 261 (2018) (upholding the circuit 
court’s entry of summary judgment on a physician’s negligence claim against a university 
based upon the university’s decision to end her involvement in its medical residency 
program because the decision resulted from the exercise of professional judgment); Tabor 
v. Baltimore City Public Schools, 138 Md. App. 747, 751 (2001) (upholding the circuit 
court’s dismissal of a case involving a disabled child’s complaint alleging that the city 
school board did not provide him with special education services, pointing out that 
Maryland does not recognize a tort action seeking damages based on negligent education);  
Alban v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford County, 64 Md. App. 169 (1985) (upholding directed 
verdict in favor of a school board and a teacher where the parents of a handicapped child 
brought an action to recover for injuries sustained by the child in physical education class 
where the parents alleged that the defendants were negligent in placing the child in a regular 
physical education class with no special safeguards to protect the child from injury). 
  
18 The Board and the intermediate appellate court characterize the Gambrills’ claims 
as relating to “student discipline” matters.  Gambrill, 252 Md. App. at 361–62.  We do not 
view the Gambrills’ claims through such a narrow lens.  The claims encompass more than 
simply a failure to take appropriate disciplinary measures—rather, the averments in the 
34 
 
encompassed by Hunter and that the Gambrills are asking this Court to wade into the murky 
waters of adolescent interpersonal disputes.  The Gambrills respond that the claims are not 
based on educational malpractice or educational negligence but rather are solidly rooted in 
the tort of negligence.  We agree with the Gambrills.  
 
The Gambrills are not alleging claims based upon educational placement or 
academic decisions that were made concerning S.’s educational needs.  Instead, they allege 
that the school employees and their employer had a duty to use reasonable measures to 
protect S. while on school grounds, including supervising students and taking precautions 
to protect S.’s physical safety.  We have not applied the educational malpractice doctrine 
to claims that were not based upon educational placement or pedagogical decisions and 
decline to expand the doctrine to cover the negligence claims asserted by the Gambrills in 
this case.  
 
We determine that the policy reasons against recognizing a cause of action for 
educational malpractice, as set forth in Hunter, are not present here.  Concerning the first 
justification—the lack of a satisfactory standard of care against which a teacher or 
administrator’s conduct may be measured—the standard is the same as any other 
negligence case: that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent 
teacher or administrator acting under the same or similar circumstances.  Stated another 
way, when determining whether the school employees and their employer breached the 
 
complaint repeatedly assert that the defendants failed to “properly supervise” students at 
Mace’s Lane.  According to the Gambrills, the lack of supervision resulted in students 
physically assaulting S. on several occasions.   
35 
 
applicable standard of care, the analysis of the duty of care does not require an inquiry into 
pedagogical methods, the quality of the schools’ educational program or curriculum, or an 
evaluation of S.’s progress or achievement.   
 
The second reason for refusing to recognize a claim of educational malpractice is 
the “inherent uncertainty in determining the cause and nature of any damages.”  Hunter, 
292 Md. at 484.  Here, the Gambrills allege damages that include compensation for 
physical and mental injury.  These damages do not involve “inherent uncertainty” arising 
from academic placement or pedagogical decisions.  Here, they are customary damages 
that are computed by judges and juries in many tort cases.  
 
As for the third justification—the extreme burden which would be imposed on the 
already strained resources of the public school system, id.—we similarly conclude that such 
a rationale should not form the basis for this Court to extend common law immunity to 
traditional negligence claims against school boards and their agents that are not based upon 
academic decisions.  The Maryland Legislature, as a policy matter, has decided that local 
school systems may be liable for negligent acts and omissions of their employees arising 
within the scope of employment, at least to the amount of $400,000.  See CJ § 5-518(b)–
(c).  We decline to expand the application of the educational malpractice doctrine in a 
manner that would be at odds with the Legislature’s decision to hold school boards liable 
for negligent acts and omissions of their employees involving student supervision that are 
untaken within the employees’ scope of employment.  For these reasons, we hold that the 
Gambrills’ negligence claims do not fall within the scope of the educational malpractice 
doctrine.  
36 
 
D. Taking the Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Gambrills, the Circuit 
Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of the Defendants on the 
Gambrills’ Negligence Claim  
 
 
Having determined that there is neither a statutory nor a common law impediment 
that would preclude a plaintiff from filing a negligence claim against a school board and 
its employees for negligent supervision, we turn to the claims that the Gambrills have 
asserted in their complaint, and the summary judgment pleadings and exhibits considered 
by the circuit court in connection with its summary judgment ruling.  However, before we 
turn to the specific allegations, and because we are remanding this matter to the circuit 
court for further proceedings, we determine that it is useful to reiterate the common law 
negligence principles that are set forth in our case law, including cases involving 
negligence claims arising from negligent supervision of students in schools.  
 
“In a negligence action, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving: 1) that the defendant 
was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that 
duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury 
proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of that duty.”  Steamfitters Loc. Union 
No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch., 469 Md. 704, 727 (2020).  To survive a motion for summary 
judgment, a plaintiff must show evidence on each element that is sufficient to permit a trier 
of fact to find in his or her favor.   
 
With respect to the first element, it is undisputed that a school has a duty “to exercise 
reasonable care to protect a pupil from harm.”  Lunsford v. Bd. of Ed. of Prince George’s 
County, 280 Md. 665, 676 (1977) (citing Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 123–24 (1969)).  
This Court has recognized “the doctrine that the relation of a school vis a vis a pupil is 
37 
 
analogous to one who stands in loco parentis, with the result that a school is under a special 
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a pupil from harm.”  Eisel v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Montgomery County, 324 Md. 376, 384 (1991) (quoting Segerman, 256 Md. at 123–24). 
 
Of course, simply establishing a duty does not establish a negligence claim.  In 
determining whether there was a breach of duty, we recognize that a teacher is not an 
insurer of safety of students, but rather, he or she is “held only to the standard of the 
reasonable care exercised by a person of ordinary prudence.”  Segerman, 256 Md. at 125.  
In many instances involving negligence claims against teachers and administrators, the 
plaintiffs’ claim will rise or fall on the issue of foreseeability.  In Segerman, this Court 
relied upon jurisprudence from the State of New York in considering claims against a 
teacher for negligent supervision.  256 Md. 109.  In this case, we similarly find the New 
York appellate courts’ analysis of foreseeability to be instructive: 
Schools have a duty to provide supervision to ensure the safety of those 
students in their charge and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately 
caused by the absence of adequate supervision.  In determining whether the 
duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of 
injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that 
school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the 
dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could 
reasonably have been anticipated.  Injuries caused by the impulsive, 
unanticipated act of a fellow student ordinarily will not give rise to 
negligence on the part of the School District absent proof of prior conduct 
that would have put a reasonable person on notice to protect against the 
injury-causing act. 
 
Buchholz v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 88 A.D.3d 843, 844 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  In that case, a student was assaulted by 
two other students in a hallway.  The court held that, because the school district had no 
38 
 
knowledge of prior violent conduct by the two students, it could not have reasonably 
foreseen the attack on the plaintiff.  Id.  Accordingly, the school district was entitled to 
summary judgment on a claim of negligent supervision.  Id. at 846.   
 
In another case, a gym teacher witnessed the start of a fight.  The court concluded 
that summary judgment was not appropriate because there was “an issue of fact as to 
whether the plaintiff’s injuries were a foreseeable consequence of the teacher’s alleged 
failure to respond appropriately as the events unfolded in front of him.”  Siller v. Mahopac 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 18 A.D.3d 532, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).   
 
Even assuming that the tortious conduct was foreseeable, a plaintiff must also 
establish that the negligence was a proximate cause of the student’s injuries.  “It is a basic 
principle that negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the harm 
alleged.”  Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 243 (2009) (internal citations omitted).  
“Proximate cause ‘involves a conclusion that someone will be held legally responsible for 
the consequences of an act or omission.’”  Id. at 243 (quoting Peterson v. Underwood, 258 
Md. 9, 16 (1970)).  To be a proximate cause of an injury, “the negligence must be 1) a 
cause in fact, and 2) a legally cognizable cause.”  Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 
135, 156–57 (1994) (internal citations omitted).   
 
Causation-in-fact concerns the threshold inquiry of “whether [the] defendant’s 
conduct actually produced an injury.”  Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 17 (1970).  Two 
tests have been developed to determine if causation-in-fact exists: (1) the “but for” test; 
and (2) the “substantial factor” test.  Collins, 409 Md. at 244.  The “but for” test applies in 
cases where only one negligent act is at issue.  Id.  In other words, “causation-in-fact is 
39 
 
found when the injury would not have occurred absent or ‘but for’ the defendant’s 
negligent act.”  Id.  When two or more independent negligent acts bring about an injury, 
the “substantial factor” test controls.  Id.  “Causation-in-fact may be found if it is ‘more 
likely than not’ that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the 
plaintiff’s injuries.”  Id.19   
 
Once it is established that a defendant’s conduct is, in fact, one of the causes of the 
plaintiff’s injury, the second analysis turns on whether the defendant should be legally 
 
19 This Court has adopted the substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 244 (2009); see also Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 208–09 (1992).  Section 431 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts reads as follows: 
 
The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if 
 
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and 
 
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the 
manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. 
 
Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
 
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one 
another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about harm to another: 
 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and 
the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; 
 
(b) whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which 
are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has 
created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the 
actor is not responsible; 
 
(c) lapse of time. 
40 
 
responsible for the injury.  The distinction between causation-in-fact and legal causation is 
not always a simple one.  See W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 42 (5th ed. 
1984).  “This part of the causation analysis requires us to consider whether the actual harm 
to a litigant falls within a general field of danger that the actor should have anticipated or 
expected.”  Collins, 409 Md. at 245; see also Stone v. Chicago Title Ins., 330 Md. 329, 337 
(1993).  This Court has characterized legal causation as “a policy-oriented doctrine 
designed to be a method for limiting liability after caus[ation]-in-fact has been established.”  
Collins, 409 Md. at 245 (footnote omitted); see also, Prosser & Keeton, § 42 at 273 (“Legal 
causation” depends “essentially on whether the policy of the law will extend the 
responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred.”).  For this 
reason, the question of legal causation “most often involves a determination of whether the 
injuries were a foreseeable result of the negligent conduct.”  Collins, 409 Md. at 246; see 
also Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 336 (1986) (observing that 
“[f]oreseeability as a factor in the determination of the existence of a duty involves a 
prospective consideration of the facts existing at the time of the negligent conduct.  
Foreseeability as an element of proximate cause permits a retrospective consideration of 
the total facts of the occurrence, including the criminal [or tortious] acts of a third person 
occurring after the original act of negligence of a tortfeasor[]”). 
 
In Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. at 334, Judge McAuliffe discussed 
the test of foreseeability and legal causation as follows:  
In applying the test of foreseeability . . . it is well to keep in mind that it is 
simply intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an 
acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm, and to 
41 
 
avoid the attachment of liability where, in the language of Section 435(2) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), it appears ‘highly extraordinary’ 
that the negligent conduct should have brought about the harm. 
 
Stated another way, the defendant may not be liable if it appears highly extraordinary and 
unforeseeable that the plaintiff’s injuries occurred as a result of the defendant’s alleged 
tortious conduct.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 435(2) (stating “[t]he actor’s 
conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and 
looking back from the harm to the actor’s negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly 
extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm[]”).   
 
In Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109 (1969), this Court considered a negligence claim 
against a teacher where the teacher left her elementary school classroom for a few minutes 
while her students performed calisthenic activities.  During the teacher’s absence, a student 
performed an activity improperly, and kicked the head of another student, causing the 
student to fall forward, strike her mouth on the floor, and causing her teeth to come out.  
Id. at 116–17.  The injured student’s parents filed suit, alleging that the teacher was 
negligent in leaving the classroom and that her failure to supervise the exercises was the 
proximate cause of the student’s injury.  Id. at 121.  After the jury returned a verdict in the 
plaintiff’s favor, this Court reversed the judgment.  This Court held that, even assuming 
that the teacher was negligent in leaving the room, her absence or failure to supervise was 
not the proximate cause of the injury because her “presence could not have prevented it, 
and liability could be imposed only if the injury was reasonably foreseeable.”  Id. at 123.  
In the Court’s view, the proximate cause of the student’s injury “was an intervening and 
42 
 
wholly unforeseen force,” i.e., the other student’s failure to perform the exercises as 
instructed.  Id.   
 
Although the Court determined that, under the facts of the case, as a matter of law, 
the student’s injuries were unforeseeable, this Court made some additional observations on 
teachers’ liability in the context of negligent supervision.  After reviewing case law from 
other jurisdictions, this Court observed that “[i]f a rule can be developed from the teacher 
liability cases, it is this: a teacher’s absence from the classroom, or failure properly to 
supervise students’ activities, is not likely to give rise to a cause of action for injury to a 
student, unless under all the circumstances[,] the possibility of injury is reasonably 
foreseeable.”  Id.  at 130–31.  We stated: “The point is that a teacher could be liable to an 
injured student, whether or not the teacher could have prevented the injury, if the injury is 
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of absence or failure to supervise.”  Id. at 131.  
“Under such circumstances, the intervening force does not become a superseding cause 
which breaks the chain of causation, but become[s] a part of the original tort.”  Id. (citing 
Prosser, Torts § 51 (3d ed. 1964) at 309; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 440, 441, 447 
(Am. Law Inst. 1965)).   
 
We also embraced the test of foreseeability articulated by the Supreme Court of 
Washington in the context of a case filed against a school district by a girl who was attacked 
in an unlit room: 
The harm which came to [the student] was not caused by the direct act or 
omission of the school district, but by the intervening act of third persons.  
The fact that the danger stems from such an intervening act, however, does 
not of itself exonerate a defendant from negligence.  If, under the assumed 
43 
 
facts, such intervening force is reasonably foreseeable, a finding of 
negligence may be predicated thereon. 
 
Id. at 132 (quoting McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 363 
(Wash. 1953)). 
 
We further observed that this Court had adopted “substantially the same rule”:  
If the negligent acts of two or more persons, all being culpable and responsible 
in law for their acts, do not concur in point of time, and the negligence of one 
only exposes the injured person to risk of injury in case the other should also 
be negligent the liability of the person first in fault will depend upon the 
question whether the negligent act of the other was one which a man of 
ordinary experience and sagacity, acquainted with all the circumstances, could 
reasonably anticipate or not.  If such a person could have anticipated that the 
intervening act of negligence might, in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow 
the original act of negligence, the person first in fault is not released from 
liability by reason of the intervening negligence of another. 
 
Segerman, 256 Md. at 132–33 (quoting State ex rel. Schiller v. Hecht Co., 165 Md. 415, 
422 (1933)).  Or stated another way,  
the universally accepted rule as to the proximate cause is that, unless an act, 
or omission of a duty, or both, are the direct and continuing cause of an 
injury, recovery will not be allowed.  The negligent acts must continue 
through every event and occurrence, and itself be the natural and logical 
cause of the injury.  It must be the natural and probable consequence of the 
negligent act unbroken by any intervening agency, and where the negligence 
of any one person is merely passive, and potential, while the negligence of 
another is the moving and effective cause of the injury, the latter is the 
proximate cause and fixes the liability. 
 
Id. (quoting Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Co., 179 Md. 384, 387 (1941)).  
 
 
 
We do not impose upon teachers and school systems the duty to anticipate or foresee 
the hundreds of unexpected student acts that occur daily within our public schools.  At the 
risk of stating the obvious, the foreseeability analysis in these cases is dependent upon the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case.  Although the question of foreseeability will 
44 
 
often be an issue for the jury or trier of fact, that is not always the case.  See, e.g., Segerman, 
256 Md. at 134 (determining that the injury was unforeseeable as a matter of law because 
the teacher “had no reason to apprehend that any of the children would leave his [or her] 
assigned place or that any of the children would perform the exercises improperly[]”).  In a 
similar vein, although proximate cause is usually a jury question, it can be decided by a court 
as a question of law when reasoning minds cannot differ.  Id. at 135 (determining that no one 
could conclude that the teacher’s absence was the proximate cause of the student’s injury).   
 
Returning to the Gambrills’ case, we ordinarily affirm the entry of summary 
judgment only upon the grounds on which the trial court relied in granting summary 
judgment.  Newell, 407 Md. at 608.  Here, the circuit court ruled that the Gambrills’ claims 
were barred by the Coverdell Act and the educational malpractice doctrine.  The circuit 
court then addressed the merits of the Gambrills’ claim and stated:  
No reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendants were negligent in 
supervising [S.] and other students at Mace’s Lane [Middle School]. . . . [N]o 
reasonable jury could find that the . . . Defendant Board . . . breached [its] 
duty to protect her from foreseeable harm.  I conclude . . . that a cause of 
action here would create that [sword] of Damocles hanging over the heads of 
well-intentioned educators who are tasked with the job of resolving peer 
disputes among adolescents. 
 
Again, I find that there is, not just an absence of evidence to support the 
allegations that the Defendants failed to adequately respond to, investigate, 
and prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to [S.], it’s to the contrary, the 
evidence shows that the Defendants responded and took action in response 
to the allegations of [S.’s] family. 
 
I’m not sure if it amounts to contributory negligence or assumption of the 
risk, I’m not clear on that point, but the record does establish that at times 
[S.] was engaging her classmates and that she was involved in altercations 
with other students that could have contributed to the situation.  Very much 
45 
 
like the case law cited by defense counsel that ameliorated liability on behalf 
of the school board in other cases. 
 
 
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gambrills, as we are required 
to do at this stage, we cannot say that “no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
Defendants were negligent in their supervising S. and the other the students” over the 
2016–2017 school year when it came to S.’s safety and the physical assaults that she 
endured.  The negligent acts in question do not involve one isolated incident, as was the 
case in Segerman.  Rather, the Gambrills contend that the Respondents’ negligent acts and 
omissions involved several incidents over the span of many months.  
 
We do not determine, based upon this record, that there are no genuine disputes of 
material fact and that the Respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the 
reasons stated by the circuit court in its ruling.  By way of some examples, the Gambrills 
contend that in the Fall of 2016, shortly after the bullying started, they asked for S.’s locker 
to be moved to separate her from the students who were harassing her, and the 
administration refused the initial request.  S.’s locker was not moved until January 2017.  
S. contends that, during an early assault, in the presence of Substitute Teacher 1, the assault 
lasted over one minute, she screamed during the incident and the teacher failed to intervene.  
During the assault that occurred in the presence of Substitute Teacher 2, the teacher did not 
intervene because he had placed his head on the desk as the result of a headache.  There 
appear to be factual issues (which were not discussed by the circuit court) concerning the 
span of time involved in each of the assaults and whether the substitute teachers could have 
reasonably intervened to prevent S.’s injuries.   
46 
 
 
Concerning the events that gave rise to the assault of S. in the nurse’s office on 
December 19, S. contends that Ms. Woolford was aware that S. was in the nurse’s office 
when she escorted Student 8 to the nurse’s office and left him alone with S.  This was not 
the first altercation between Student 8 and S.  A week earlier, Student 8 and S. were 
involved in an altercation that left S. with a concussion.  To be sure, the Respondents 
dispute the facts as alleged by S.  However, the circuit court did not address these facts in 
making its ruling.  Nor did the circuit court make any findings concerning whether it would 
have been foreseeable that S. and Student 8 might have gotten in a second altercation if S. 
and Student 8 were left alone in the nurse’s office as the Gambrills contend.   
 
The circuit court judge further stated that S. was contributorily negligent or assumed 
the risk of her injuries.  Questions of whether a plaintiff was contributorily negligent or 
assumed the risk are ordinarily ones that should be answered by the finder of fact, rather than 
the court.  Kasten Constr. Co. v. Evans, 260 Md. 536, 541 (1971).  S. states in an affidavit 
that she did not instigate the bullying.  The Gambrills assert that they complained and 
expressed their concerns to Ms. Woolford on multiple occasions and that neither Ms. 
Woolford nor the other employees took reasonable steps to keep S. safe.  The evidence 
presented by the Respondents demonstrates that the Respondents took steps to address the 
Gambrills’ concerns about S.’s safety, and there is evidence in the record that would indicate 
that S. may have acted in a manner that caused her peers to react to her in an adverse manner.  
However, based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that there are no material 
disputes of fact and that all the Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law for 
the limited reasons stated by the circuit court in its ruling from the bench.  
47 
 
V 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated herein, we hold: 
1. 
 The Coverdell Act does not preempt CJ § 5-518, and the Gambrills’ 
negligence claims against the individual school employees were not preempted by federal 
law;   
2. 
The educational malpractice doctrine does not apply to the Gambrills’ claims 
alleging negligent supervision; and  
3. 
There are material disputes of fact that precluded the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of all the Respondents for the limited reasons stated by the circuit court 
in its ruling from the bench.  
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.  THE 
CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT 
COURT FOR DORCHESTER COUNTY 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  
COSTS TO BE PAID IN THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AND 
IN 
THIS 
COURT BY THE RESPONDENTS.