Title: Sandy v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sandy v. State1994 WY 27870 P.2d 352Case Number: 93-143Decided: 03/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Dick 
SANDY, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

State 
Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah 
Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne.

Dick 
Sandy, pro se.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Georgia L. Tibbetts, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Dick Sandy 
appeals a jury conviction for first-degree sexual assault. Appellant, through 
appellate counsel, presents issues concerning uncharged misconduct and jury 
instructions. Appellant's pro se brief asserts he was denied effective 
assistance of trial counsel, the right to testify, the right to have witnesses 
testify in his defense, and the right to defend in person and by 
counsel.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      In his brief 
prepared by counsel, appellant presents these issues:

I. 
The trial court erred in allowing introduction of evidence concerning the 
character and prior bad acts of the appellant.

II. 
The trial court erred when it refused to give a lesser included instruction on 
assault and battery.

[¶4]      Appellant 
presents these additional issues in his pro se brief:

I. 
Appellant was denied the right to be present and to defend in person and by 
counsel.

II. 
Appellant was denied the right to testify and to have witnesses testify in his 
defense.

III. 
Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

[¶5]      The state 
rephrases the issues presented in the brief by appellate counsel as:

I. 
Was evidence of prior sexual assaults by appellant properly admitted under 
W.R.E. 404(b)?

II. 
Did the trial court properly refuse to give a lesser-included offense 
instruction relating to misdemeanor battery?

[¶6]      The state 
rephrases the issues in the pro se brief as:

I. 
Was appellant's right to be present and to defend in person satisfied by his 
presence at all critical stages of his trial?

II. 
Was appellant denied the right to testify or to have witnesses testify in his 
defense?

III. 
Did appellant receive effective assistance of counsel?

FACTS

[¶7]      Camilla Sandy is 
the former wife of appellant. She reported that on the night of December 16, 
1992, appellant sexually assaulted her in her home. Although Mrs. Sandy had 
divorced appellant because he was physically abusive to her, the Sandys had 
remained in contact after their divorce, and had occasionally dated prior to the 
sexual assault. Mrs. Sandy began dating other men. On December 16, appellant 
asked Mrs. Sandy to lunch, but she refused. He went to her place of employment 
and the two discussed his purchase of her car. Appellant again asked her out for 
the evening, and she again refused. A disruptive argument ensued and Mrs. 
Sandy's supervisor intervened, suggesting the Sandys continue talking in the 
lobby area. Wanting to avoid further disruption at her workplace, Mrs. Sandy 
agreed appellant could attend her daughter's pre-school Christmas program that 
afternoon. Following that conversation, appellant left.

[¶8]      Mrs. Sandy, her 
son and appellant attended the Christmas program. Afterwards, the Sandys treated 
the children at a local restaurant. At Mrs. Sandy's home, the Sandys again 
argued when Mrs. Sandy would not go out with appellant that evening. Angry, 
appellant left and walked home; the time was about 5:30 p.m. Concerned that 
appellant might damage her car, she moved it to a friend's home.

[¶9]      At about 8:00 
p.m. that evening, Mrs. Sandy put her children to bed and changed into a 
nightgown. Appellant returned at about 8:45 p.m. and again became angry because 
she would not go out with him and because she had moved the car. Appellant then 
physically attacked Mrs. Sandy, inflicting bruises. He dragged her to a bedroom 
and sexually assaulted her three times that night. He threatened to kill her and 
physically disfigure her with bathroom chemicals which he held over her face. 
Appellant did not leave until after Mrs. Sandy left for work the next morning. 
However, instead of going to work, she went to the Campbell County Memorial 
Hospital and reported the sexual assault to the Gillette Police Department. Mrs. 
Sandy testified that she did not agree to have sexual intercourse with 
appellant.

[¶10]   Before his arrest, appellant 
admitted the sexual intercourse, but insisted it was consensual. He maintained 
his consent defense at trial. In the prosecutor's case-in-chief, Sandy's first 
wife testified that she, too, had been sexually assaulted by appellant after she 
told him of plans to divorce him. Appellant did not testify. A jury convicted 
appellant and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

UNCHARGED 
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE

1. 
Standard of Review

[¶11]   Appellant contends admission of the 
first wife's testimony violated WYO. R.EVID. 404(b). Rule 404(b) excludes 
evidence of uncharged misconduct evidence if offered to prove bad character or 
criminal propensity, but uncharged misconduct evidence may be admissible if 
relevant for other purposes. Usually, admission of evidence is within the trial 
court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. This 
court first adopted a five-part test to determine admissibility of Rule 404(b) 
evidence in Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1986), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345. However, the 
Bishop test and WYO.R.EVID. 403 limit a court's discretion for admitting 
Rule 404(b) evidence. The five factors of the Bishop test 
are:

1. 
The extent to which the prosecution plainly, clearly, and convincingly can prove 
the other similar crimes;

2. 
The remoteness in time of those crimes from the charged offense;

3. 
The extent to which the evidence of other crimes is introduced for a purpose 
sanctioned by W.R.E. 404(b);

4. 
The extent to which the element of the charged offense, that the evidence is 
introduced to prove, is actually at issue;

5. 
The extent to which the prosecution has a substantial need for the probative 
value of the evidence of the other crimes.

Bishop, 
687 P.2d  at 246.

[¶12]   If the trial court determines the 
uncharged misconduct evidence is relevant, it must then determine whether the 
relevant evidence should be excluded because the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to appellant. 
WYO.R.EVID. 402, 403. A trial court's process for balancing probative value 
against prejudice was addressed in the recently published opinion of Dean v. 
State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶13]   Because unfair prejudice often 
accompanies evidence of uncharged misconduct, this court established a uniform, 
mandatory procedure for prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial courts to follow 
when considering admission of uncharged misconduct. Dean, 865 P.2d  at 
606. Dean also augmented the Bishop test with other factors to 
determine and weigh probative value and listed reasons proposed evidence might 
create unfair prejudice. Dean, 865 P.2d  at 809-10. Although not 
applicable for this case, the new procedure Dean mandated will become 
part of this court's standard of review. This procedure ensures the trial court 
is presented with sufficient information by counsel to determine relevance and 
unfair prejudice and ensures this court is provided with a sufficient record for 
review.

2. 
Admission of Former Wife's Testimony

[¶14]   A motion in limine hearing was held 
to consider whether the first wife's testimony was admissible. The state offered 
the first wife's testimony for the purposes of motive and victim's state of 
mind. Although critical of the state's second purpose, the trial court reserved 
ruling until he heard her testimony in chambers. Afterwards, the state 
specifically requested the testimony be admitted for the purpose of motive. The 
trial court found the testimony relevant for that purpose because consent was at 
issue, the uncharged misconduct was substantially similar to this charged act, 
the prior act was not too remote in time, and the evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial under Rule 403. The trial court agreed that defense counsel should 
prepare a limiting instruction to be read to the jury before the 
testimony.

[¶15]   At an in-chambers conference held 
before the first wife testified, defense counsel discussed a cautionary 
instruction limiting the evidence to the purpose of motive because consent was 
at issue. Although the state had not requested the evidence for the purpose of 
lack of mistake, defense counsel also discussed lack of mistake as it related to 
intent. These two purposes were included in the limiting instruction to the 
jury.

[¶16]   Appellant contends it was 
reversible error to admit the uncharged misconduct evidence because it was 
irrelevant, inadmissible under Bishop, and unfairly prejudicial. 
Appellant first argues the evidence was irrelevant because motive is not an 
element of this crime, lack of mistake was not raised as a defense, and the 
victim's state of mind could not logically be inferred from another's testimony 
without the use of an expert witness. Second, appellant contends the evidence 
failed the first, third and fifth factors of the Bishop test. Finally, 
appellant contends the probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice in 
violation of WYO.R.EVID. 403 and, since evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, 
the error in admission was not harmless.

A. 
Relevance

[¶17]   The record indicates that before 
his arrest appellant conceded intercourse had occurred, but claimed it was 
consensual. The record also indicates defense counsel discussed a limiting 
instruction with the lack of mistake wording and did not object to the final 
instruction version which included this wording. Since it was clear before trial 
that consent would be at issue, the state offered the uncharged misconduct 
evidence to show appellant's motive. Through cross-examination of the victim and 
other state witnesses, appellant maintained his consent defense at trial. The 
trial court then heard the former wife's testimony and found that since consent 
was at issue, the evidence was relevant for the purpose of showing 
motive.

[¶18]   We have previously held 
that

when 
there is no issue with respect to the fact that sexual intercourse occurred, the 
identity of the perpetrator is not disputed, and the only material dispute is 
whether the sexual intercourse occurred as a product of the victim's consent or 
was forced (and where the other evidence of force such as bruising, etc., is 
less than overwhelming) the trial court has a legitimate basis for the admission 
of evidence of prior bad acts like those presented in this case. Carey v. 
State, 715 P.2d 244, 248 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247. In Carey, this court allowed admission of 
prior sexual misconduct to show motive, knowledge, and intent. In this case, the 
jury was instructed that "motive is an emotion, desire, psychological need or 
similar impulse acting as an incitement to action." This instruction is similar 
to Carey's definition that "motive in criminal law means `that which * * 
* tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act.'" Carey, 715 P.2d  at 248 
(quoting Thompson v. United States, 144 F. 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1906)). 
See also, Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶19]   The testimony revealed that 
appellant's reaction to his first wife's divorce plans was to sexually assault 
her. His reaction to Mrs. Sandy's attempt to end her relationship with him was 
also to sexually assault her. The evidence was relevant to assist the fact 
finder on the issue of consent and admitted for a proper purpose under the 
Bishop test's third factor. We need not consider the relevance of offering the 
uncharged misconduct for the purpose of showing the victim's state of mind since 
it was not offered at trial for that purpose and was never considered by the 
jury.

B. 
Admissibility

Bishop 
Test

[¶20]   Appellant next claims there was 
neither plain, clear and convincing evidence the uncharged misconduct occurred 
nor a substantial need for the evidence. We disagree. Appellant's first wife 
testified that as a result of appellant's sexual assaults she obtained 
restraining orders against appellant and assistance from the Gillette Abuse 
Refuge Facility. She testified that she kept these papers and a calendar 
referencing the incidents. The record indicates appellant had copies of those 
records. The sexual assaults described by the first wife were substantially 
similar and almost identical to the crime charged in this case. The prior sexual 
assaults were committed under threats and with physical violence against a woman 
that appellant had previously been married to, and the assaults were committed 
after she attempted to end her relationship with appellant. Appellant did not 
challenge the testimony of his first wife. There was a substantial need for the 
probative value of this testimony because the evidence of first-degree sexual 
assault was circumstantially strong, but not overwhelming. As there were no 
other witnesses to the incident, the issue of consent was reduced to a 
credibility contest between appellant and Mrs. Sandy. Uncharged misconduct is 
admissible when such an evidentiary conflict exists and it might help resolve an 
ultimate issue. Carey, 715 P.2d  at 248; and see Mitchell v. State, 
865 P.2d 591, 598 (Wyo. 1993); Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1048-49.

C. 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence - Rule 403

[¶21]   The record indicates the trial 
court admitted this testimony only after very careful consideration and a 
specific finding that appellant was not unfairly prejudiced by the evidence. In 
the light of our past decisions, the court's consideration of the proffered 
evidence and its specific finding properly applied the separate tests required 
by WYO. R.EVID. 403 and 404(b). Elliott, 600 P.2d  at 1049. We hold that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion within the context of Rule 403. 
Dean, 865 P.2d  at 606; Mitchell, 865 P.2d  at 599-600.

LESSER 
INCLUDED INSTRUCTION

[¶22]   Appellant argues reversible error 
occurred when the trial court would not consider giving a lesser-included 
offense instruction for assault and battery. This court applies the statutory 
elements test when determining if one statute is necessarily included in another 
statute.

Under 
this test, one offense is not "necessarily included" in another unless the 
elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged 
offense. Where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the 
greater offense, no instruction is to be given * * *.

State 
v. Keffer, 
860 P.2d 1118, 1134 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶23]   To preserve this issue on appeal, 
appellant must object or have presented the proposed written instruction to the 
trial court with appropriate argument. Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1137. During 
the instruction conference at trial, appellant inquired into the possibility of 
a lesser-included offense instruction on misdemeanor battery. The trial court 
replied that the elements of battery were not included in the elements of first 
degree sexual assault. Appellant then stated that he had not offered a lesser 
included instruction in his packet, wanted only to discuss its possibility, and 
would not seek one. This verbal exchange is insufficient to preserve this issue 
for appeal, and our review is limited to noticing any plain error. 
Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1137. Although appellant did not include a plain 
error analysis, we consider its application. Plain error exists when 1) the 
record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming 
the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. 
Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236, 241 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶24]   We agree with the trial court that 
the elements of battery are not a subset of the elements of first-degree sexual 
assault. Since battery requires proof of an element not required for proof of 
first-degree sexual assault, an instruction should not have been given. 
Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1134. The elements of battery are:

(b) 
A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, 
insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily 
injury to another.

WYO. 
STAT. § 6-2-501(b) (1988).

[¶25]   The elements of sexual assault in 
the first degree are:

(a) 
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in 
the first degree if:

(i) 
The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, 
reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or 
forcible confinement.

WYO. 
STAT. § 6-2-302 (1988).

[¶26]   A plain reading of the relevant 
statutes dictates that the elements of battery should not be deemed a subset of 
the elements of first-degree sexual assault. The elements are not identical, and 
a defendant may be convicted of first-degree sexual assault without necessarily 
satisfying the elements of battery. Battery requires the intentional, knowing 
and reckless causing of bodily injury to another or an unlawful touching in a 
rude, insolent or angry manner. These are not elements of first-degree sexual 
assault.

[¶27]   Clearly, sexual intrusion may be 
accomplished without causing "bodily injury" since the statute defines that term 
as "physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition." WYO. STAT. 
§ 6-1-104(a)(i) (1988). Just as clearly, sexual intrusion can be accomplished 
through the use of force or confinement without accomplishing that intrusion in 
a rude, insolent or angry manner. Simply because the force which preceded the 
intrusion and caused the submission might be so characterized, the first-degree 
sexual assault statute does not require a showing that what followed shared that 
character. There was no plain error.

APPELLANT'S 
PRO SE ISSUES

[¶28]   In his pro se brief, appellant 
claims that he was denied the right to defend in person, the right to testify, 
the right to have witnesses for his defense and the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.

[¶29]   Appellant was present at his 
arraignment, jury impaneling, in-chambers testimony by his first wife, the 
in-chambers jury instruction conference and throughout the duration of his 
trial. He now claims it was constitutional error not to permit his presence at 
bench conferences on legal questions. Appellant's presence is not required 
during these conferences and his claim of error is without merit. WYO.R.CRIM.P. 
43(c)(3); Dean, 865 P.2d  at 614.

[¶30]   Appellant also claims he was denied 
the right to testify and have witnesses testify in his defense. Appellant must 
show that his right to testify was denied and that he would have offered 
relevant testimony had he testified. Sanchez v. State, 841 P.2d 85, 88 
(Wyo. 1992). The record indicates appellant had an opportunity to inform the 
court of his desire to testify but remained silent. There was not a denial of 
his right to testify. Additionally, appellant gives no indication of what 
relevant information he could have offered.

[¶31]   Appellant states that his counsel 
interviewed witnesses to testify in his defense but did not call them to 
testify. According to appellant, these witnesses would have testified that the 
victim and his first wife had given false testimony, their testimony would have 
supported the testimony of other defense witnesses and would have shown that the 
victim pursued appellant in hopes of remarriage. The record indicates that 
through cross-examination and defense witnesses these points were strongly made 
as part of appellant's consent defense.

[¶32]   We also find there is no merit to 
appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. There is ineffective 
assistance of counsel when trial counsel's performance was deficient because 
counsel made errors so serious counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed appellant by the Sixth Amendment. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)). Appellant must also show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense because the errors were so 
serious as to deprive appellant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable. Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145. Appellant bases his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on the errors discussed above, his late 
arrival at a jury instruction conference and a failure of counsel to consult 
with him about his defense. The record does not support these contentions of 
error, and appellant does not demonstrate he was deprived of a fair trial. We 
agree with the state that defense counsel vigorously represented appellant and 
tenaciously tested the state's evidence.

[¶33]   Affirmed.