Title: Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS, INC., PETITIONER, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL 
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. 
[Cite as Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d 
___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Subrogation — Effective date of former R.C. 4123.93 
is October 20, 1993. 
The effective date of former R.C. 4123.93, as enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, is 
October 20, 1993. 
(No. 98-1274 — Submitted March 10, 1999 — Decided May 12, 1999.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No. C2-98-0227. 
 
This matter is before us as a certified question of state law from the United 
States District Court, Southern District, Eastern Division.  In its certification order 
the federal district court states: 
 
“Plaintiff Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. (‘Laidlaw’) has asserted a 
subrogation claim against defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation (‘Conrail’) 
under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 4123.93, which grants a right of 
subrogation to a self-insuring employer for the amount of compensation and 
benefits paid to or on behalf of his employee for an injury or occupational disease 
that is compensable under the Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act against a third-
party tortfeasor if the employee is a party to an action involving the third-party 
tortfeasor.  Laidlaw alleges that, as a self-insuring employer, it paid benefits to or 
on behalf of its employees Bernard Garrett and David Gollihue, who were injured 
in the scope and course of their employment on May 6, 1994 when a Laidlaw truck 
operated by Gollihue, in which Garrett was a passenger, was involved in a collision 
with a Conrail train.  Garrett died as a result of his injuries.  Gollihue and Garrett’s 
 
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estate successfully prosecuted actions against Conrail in the Common Pleas Court 
of Union County, Ohio. 
 
“Conrail has moved to dismiss Laidlaw’s subrogation claim on the ground 
that Section 4123.93 was not in effect at the time of the accident.  Conrail argues 
that the effective date of the statute specified by the Ohio General Assembly, to 
wit: October 20, 1993, was effectively changed to July 7, 1994 as a result of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. 
Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582 (1994), as further explained in the 
case of State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 1208, 632 N.E.2d 
907 (1994).” 
__________________ 
 
Habash, Reasoner & Fraiser, Stephen J. Habash and Kirk M. Wall, for 
petitioner. 
 
Vogelgesang, Howes, Lindamood & Brunn, Phillip E. Howes and Thomas R. 
Himmelspach, for respondent. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffery S. Sutton and Nora E. 
Jones, Assistant Attorneys General, in support of petitioner, for amicus curiae 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII, the federal 
district court has certified the following question of law to this court for our 
determination: 
 
“What is the effective date of Ohio Revised Code § 4123.93, as enacted by 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, following the April 8, 1994 order issued in State ex rel. 
Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 225 [631 N.E.2d 582] (1994), and the 
April 29, 1994 order issued in State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio 
St.3d 1208 [632 N.E.2d 907] (1994)?” 
 
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We find that the effective date of former R.C. 4123.93 is October 20, 1993, 
as enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.1 
 
The Ohio Constitution mandates that “[n]o law passed by the general 
assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by the 
governor in the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided.”  Section 
1c, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  The purpose of a delayed effective date is 
to provide Ohio citizens an opportunity to accept or reject the law by referendum.  
Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  But laws that appropriate money for 
current state government expenses, tax levies, or emergency laws go into effect 
immediately and are not subject to referendum.  Section 1d, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 contained provisions that appropriated money for 
expenses of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.  It also contained provisions 
that amended substantive sections of the Ohio Revised Code pertaining to workers’ 
compensation, including R.C. 4123.93.  145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3187.  
Specifically, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 enacted R.C. 4123.93 to provide that the  
Administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and eligible employers are 
subrogated to the rights of injured employees against a third-party tortfeasor.  145 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3187-3188.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was signed into law July 
21, 1993.  145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3213-3214.  This was the effective date for the 
appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.  But the effective date of the 
non-appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, including the subrogation 
amendment to R.C. 4123.93, was stayed for ninety days, until October 20, 1993, in 
order to comply with Section 1c, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  145 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3204. 
 
On October 15, 1993, the Ohio AFL-CIO filed an action in mandamus, 
prohibition, and quo warranto in this court challenging the constitutionality of 
 
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Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, alleging inter alia that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 deprived the 
citizens of Ohio of their right to referendum.  State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. 
Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582 (“Voinovich I”).  Although 
the language in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 delayed the effective date of the non-
appropriation provisions for ninety days, the court in Voinovich I agreed with 
relator, finding that the decision in State ex rel. Riffe v. Brown (1977), 51 Ohio 
St.2d 149, 5 O.O.3d 125, 365 N.E.2d 876, effectively deprived the citizens of Ohio 
of a meaningful opportunity for referendum. 
 
In Riffe, the court addressed the effective date of laws with regard to the 
right of referendum.  In Riffe, the law in question included one provision that 
appropriated money for government spending and four provisions that dealt with 
non-appropriation issues.  The Secretary of State had determined that the single 
appropriation provision went into effect immediately, while the effective date of 
the non-appropriation provisions was stayed ninety days to allow consideration of 
a referendum as is required by the Ohio Constitution.  Relators sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to direct all county boards of elections 
to give immediate effect to the entire law.  The court granted the writ.  The Riffe 
court found that the existence of a single appropriation provision within a law 
mandates that the entire law go into effect immediately, notwithstanding that there 
are non-appropriation provisions within the law.  Id. at 154, 5 O.O.3d at 128, 365 
N.E.2d at 879. 
 
The court in Voinovich I found that the decision in Riffe “ ‘emasculate[s] the 
constitutional right of electors of Ohio to a referendum.’ ” Voinovich I, 69 Ohio 
St.3d at 236, 631 N.E.2d at 591, quoting Riffe, 51 Ohio St.2d at 162, 5 O.O.3d at 
132, 365 N.E.2d at 883 (O’Neill, C.J., dissenting).  Therefore, the court in 
Voinovich I, adopting the language in Chief Justice O’Neill’s dissent in Riffe, held: 
 
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“ ‘The language of Section 1c [Article II] providing that “such law, section 
of such law or any item in such law appropriating money be submitted to the 
electors of the state for their approval or rejection * * * ” establishes unequivocally 
that an Act need not necessarily have a single effective date.’ (Emphasis added.)”  
Id., quoting Riffe at 163, 5 O.O.3d at 133, 365 N.E.2d at 884. 
 
In other words, any provision within a law that appropriates money for 
government expenses will go into effect immediately because it is not subject to a 
referendum, while any provision that does not appropriate money for government 
spending will have its effective date delayed for ninety days to allow Ohio’s 
citizens to consider a referendum.  Accordingly, the court in Voinovich I overruled 
Riffe. 
 
Because Riffe had “foreclosed any meaningful opportunity for the citizens of 
this state to circulate a petition for referendum on Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107,” 69 Ohio 
St.3d at 236, 631 N.E.2d at 591, the court in Voinovich I stayed the effective date 
of the non-appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 for an additional 
ninety days.  The stay was issued the date of the decision, April 8, 1994, and 
expired July 7, 1994. 
 
Subsequently, this court clarified the effect of this stay in State ex rel. Ohio 
AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 1208, 632 N.E.2d 907 (“Voinovich 
II”).  In Voinovich II, the court stated: 
 
“[T]he effect of the stay granted in the court’s decision of April 8, 1994, 69 
Ohio St.3d 225, 631 N.E.2d 582 [Voinovich I], is to require the Ohio Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation and the Industrial Commission of Ohio to continue 
operations under the status quo as it existed on April 8, 1994, staying only the 
programs authorized, but not yet implemented, under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
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The effect of this stay was not to “turn back the clock” and operate as if 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was not yet in effect, a position argued for by the dissent in 
Voinovich II, but to continue the status quo, except for programs not yet in place.  
In other words, all the changes already implemented under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
would continue to operate.  But new programs were on hold.  This provided Ohio 
citizens an opportunity to file for a referendum.  If no referendum was filed or 
passed, all the many changes already undertaken would not be undone.  If a 
referendum did succeed, less dismantling would have to occur if new programs had 
not yet been undertaken.  The court in Reed v. Rhodes (N.D.Ohio 1979), 472 
F.Supp. 603, summed up the effect of a stay when it held: 
 
“A stay does not reverse, annul, undo, or suspend what has already been 
done or what is not specifically stayed.  Nor does a stay impair the force, or pass 
on the merits of the orders of the trial court.  A stay merely suspends the time 
required for the performance of the particular mandates stayed.  The sole purpose 
of a stay is to preserve the status quo pending an appeal so that the appellant may 
reap the benefit of a potentially meritorious appeal.”  Id. at 605. 
 
The issue then becomes whether the subrogation amendment to R.C. 
4123.93 had already been implemented.  “Implement” is defined as “to carry out * 
* * accomplish, fulfill * * * to give practical effect to * * *.”  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary (1986) 1134.  Accordingly, we must determine if and 
when the subrogation subsections of R.C. 4123.93 were carried into effect. 
 
During the summer months prior to October 20, 1993, the original effective 
date of the non-appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation prepared to implement the new subrogation rights set out 
in R.C. 4123.93 by researching the legal issues pertaining to these new rights.  And 
when the non-appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 went into effect 
on October 20, 1993, the bureau began pursuing subrogation claims.  Prior to 
 
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April, 8, 1994, the bureau had asserted subrogation rights in eleven cases.  Many 
other subrogation claims had been settled during this same period.  This evidence 
indicates that the new subrogation subsections of R.C. 4123.93, as provided in 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, were implemented prior to the April 8, 1994 stay issued in 
Voinovich I. 
 
Therefore, since the bureau had implemented the subrogation subsections of 
R.C. 4123.93 prior to April 8, 1994, the stay issued in Voinovich I did not delay its 
effective date.  Accordingly, the effective date of R.C. 4123.93 is October 20, 
1993, the original effective date of the non-appropriation provisions of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent and would hold that the effective 
date is July 7, 1994. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  With its decision in Voinovich I, this court 
interpreted Section 1c, Article II of the Ohio Constitution to read,  “No law passed 
by the general assembly shall go into effect until [a meaningful] ninety days after it 
shall have been filed by the governor * * * .”  The insertion of the word 
“meaningful” resulted from the conclusion that the decision in Riffe “foreclosed 
any meaningful opportunity for the citizens of this state to circulate a petition for a 
referendum on Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.”  State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 236, 631 N.E.2d 582, 591.  Though I would not wish to 
endorse the Voinovich I decision with respect to inserting a tardy “meaningful” 
overlay on the language of the Constitution, thereby creating a procedural situation 
resistant to normal prudential analysis (as shown by the oddity of Voinovich II), the 
 
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court’s decision in Voinovich I results in the nonappropriation provisions of the 
legislation at issue not being constitutionally effective until the “meaningful” 
ninety days had elapsed — on July 7, 1994. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
R.C. 4123.93 was repealed and reenacted effective September 29, 1995.  146 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3595-3597.