Title: State v. Spencer

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-54 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
DAMANI SPENCER,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 27, 2017] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Spencer v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2819, 2015 WL 9287020 
(Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 22, 2015).  In its decision, the district court certified the same 
question of great public importance that it previously certified in Moore v. State, 
114 So. 3d 486, 493-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013): 
WHEN A DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED OF EITHER 
MANSLAUGHTER OR A GREATER OFFENSE NOT MORE 
THAN ONE STEP REMOVED, DOES THE FAILURE TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON JUSTIFIABLE OR EXCUSABLE 
HOMICIDE CONSTITUTE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR NOT 
SUBJECT TO A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS EVEN WHERE 
THE RECORD REFLECTS THERE WAS NO DISPUTE AS TO 
THIS ISSUE AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
 
 
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FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND JUSTIFIABLE OR 
EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE? 
 
Spencer, 40 Fla. L. Weekly at D2819.1  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), 
Fla. Const.  Because this was an attempted homicide case, as opposed to Moore, 
which involved a homicide, we rephrase the certified question as follows: 
WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED FROM WHICH A JURY COULD FIND 
JUSTIFIABLE OR EXCUSABLE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, 
DOES FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OCCUR WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILS TO INSTRUCT ON JUSTIFIABLE OR 
EXCUSABLE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, AND A DEFENDANT 
IS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED MANSLAUGHTER OR A 
GREATER OFFENSE NOT MORE THAN ONE STEP REMOVED?  
For the reasons discussed below, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative and approve the holding of the First District.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Damani Spencer was convicted of two counts of attempted second-degree 
murder, attempted robbery, and carrying a concealed firearm.  See Spencer, 40 Fla. 
L. Weekly at D2819.  The facts were described by the First District Court of 
Appeal as follows: 
Appellant’s convictions arose out of an attempted robbery 
during a drug transaction. . . . At the time of the incident, the . . . 
victims were seated in a vehicle.  They were approached by appellant 
and another man who attempted to rob them at gunpoint.  Appellant 
                                          
 
 
1.  We previously granted review of Moore, but ultimately discharged 
jurisdiction.  See State v. Moore, 181 So. 3d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 2016). 
 
 
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later gave a statement to police admitting that he was the man who 
walked up to the passenger side of the vehicle, pulled out a gun from 
his waistband, and demanded the drugs.  As the victims drove away, 
appellant and the second man shot at their vehicle multiple times. 
 
Id.   
 
The First District affirmed Spencer’s convictions for carrying a concealed 
firearm and attempted robbery but, similar to Moore, reversed the convictions for 
attempted second-degree murder because the trial court “failed to instruct that the 
appellant could not be guilty of attempted manslaughter if the attempted killings 
were either justifiable or excusable homicide.”  Id.  Defense counsel neither 
requested this instruction nor objected to the instructions as given.  See id.  The 
First District determined that it was bound by this Court’s decision in State v. 
Lucas, 645 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1994), which held that the failure to instruct on 
justifiable or excusable homicide as part of the manslaughter instruction constitutes 
fundamental error where a defendant is convicted of manslaughter or an offense 
not more than one step removed, regardless of whether the evidence could support 
a finding of either.  See id. at D2819.  Concluding that nothing in the record 
supported justifiable or excusable attempted homicide, the First District certified 
the same question as in Moore to be of great public importance.  See id. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The rephrased certified question presents a legal question for which the 
standard of review is de novo.  See Haygood v. State, 109 So. 3d 735, 739 (Fla. 
 
 
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2013).  The trial court below read the standard jury instruction on attempted 
manslaughter by act with the exception of the underlined provisions: 
ATTEMPTED MANSLAUGHTER BY ACT 
§§ 782.07 and 777.04, Fla. Stat. 
To prove the crime of Attempted Manslaughter by Act, the 
State must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(Defendant) intentionally committed an act, which would have 
resulted in the death of (victim) except that someone prevented 
(defendant) from killing (victim) or he failed to do so. 
However, the defendant cannot be guilty of Attempted 
Manslaughter by Act by committing a merely negligent act. 
 
Each of us has a duty to act reasonably and use ordinary care 
toward others.  If there is a violation of that duty, without any 
conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence. 
It is not an attempt to commit manslaughter if the defendant 
abandoned the attempt to commit the offense or otherwise prevented 
its commission under circumstances indicating a complete and 
voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. 
In order to convict of Attempted Manslaughter by Act it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an intent to 
cause death, only an intent to commit an act which would have caused 
death and was not justifiable or excusable attempted homicide, as I 
have previously explained those terms. 
 
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 6.6 (2014).  The trial court also did not instruct the jury 
on justifiable or excusable attempted homicide.  Those instructions provide: 
JUSTIFIABLE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE 
 
An attempted homicide is justifiable and lawful if necessarily 
done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony upon the 
defendant, or to commit a felony in any dwelling house in which the 
defendant was at the time of the attempted homicide. 
 
 
 
 
 
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EXCUSABLE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE 
 
 
An attempted homicide is excusable and therefore lawful under 
any one of the three following circumstances: 
 
1.  When the attempted homicide is committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual 
ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent, or 
2.  When the attempted homicide occurs by accident and 
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient 
provocation, or 
3.  When the attempted homicide is committed by accident and 
misfortune resulting from a sudden combat, if a dangerous weapon is 
not used and the killing is not done in a cruel and unusual manner. 
 
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 6.1.  As noted by the First District, defense counsel did 
not object to these omissions.   
 
It is well established that “[j]ury instructions are ‘subject to the 
contemporaneous objection rule, and absent an objection at trial, can be raised on 
appeal only if fundamental error occurred.’ ”  State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 588 
(Fla. 2007) (quoting Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002)).  Accordingly, 
Spencer is entitled to relief only if the giving of the incomplete attempted 
manslaughter by act instruction and the omission of the justifiable and excusable 
attempted homicide instructions constitute fundamental error: 
To justify not imposing the contemporaneous objection rule, “the 
error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent 
that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.”  Brown[ v. State], 124 So. 2d [481, 
484 (Fla. 1960)].  In other words, “fundamental error occurs only 
when the omission is pertinent or material to what the jury must 
consider in order to convict.”  Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 863 
 
 
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(Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 
862, 863 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983). 
State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991).   
 
In Lucas, we addressed the same issue presented by the certified question 
here and held that fundamental error occurs when the trial court fails to explain 
justifiable and excusable homicide as part of the manslaughter instruction, and the 
defendant is convicted of manslaughter or an offense not more than one step 
removed, regardless of whether the evidence could support a finding of either 
justifiable or excusable homicide.  See 645 So. 2d at 426-27.  The First District in 
Lucas v. State, 630 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), approved, 645 So. 2d 425 
(Fla. 1994), stated that attempted manslaughter was not at issue because the 
defendant conceded an attempted second-degree murder had occurred.  Id. at 598.  
The defense at trial was that the defendant was not the perpetrator.  Id.  In Lucas, 
we expressly declined to recede from longstanding precedent with regard to 
justifiable and excusable homicide and “reiterate[d] that the failure to give a 
complete initial instruction on manslaughter constitutes fundamental reversible 
error when the defendant is convicted of either manslaughter or a greater offense 
not more than one step removed.”  645 So. 2d at 427.   
 
The mandatory giving of instructions on justifiable and excusable homicide 
in manslaughter cases arises from the statutory definition of the crime.  The 
manslaughter statute provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
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The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or 
culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification according 
to the provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing 
shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according to the 
provisions of this chapter, is manslaughter, a felony of the second 
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or 
s. 775.084. 
 
§ 782.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added).  This Court has stated with regard 
to an earlier version of the statute: 
One notes immediately that it is in the nature of a residual offense.  If 
a homicide is either justifiable or excusable it cannot be manslaughter.  
Consequently, in any given situation, if an act results in a homicide 
that is either justifiable or excusable as defined by statute, a not guilty 
verdict necessarily ensues.  The result is that in order to supply a 
complete definition of manslaughter as a degree of unlawful homicide 
it is necessary to include also a definition of the exclusions. 
Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 826 (Fla. 1965), receded from on other grounds, 
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999); see also Phillipe v. State, 795 So. 2d 
173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“The usual rule is that failure to give instructions 
and definitions of excusable and justifiable homicide in a murder or manslaughter 
case constitutes fundamental error because the trial court fails to advise the jury as 
to what constitutes lawful acts versus unlawful acts.”).   
 
Despite this requirement, Lucas recognized an exception to the one-step-
removed fundamental error analysis—that is, where defense counsel affirmatively 
agreed to or requested an incomplete instruction.  See 645 So. 2d at 427 (citing 
Armstrong v. State, 579 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1991)).  The district courts have held that 
the Lucas/Armstrong exception does not apply where defense counsel merely 
 
 
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acquiesced to jury instructions that did not provide a full instruction on justifiable 
or excusable homicide.  See, e.g., Black v. State, 695 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1997) (“Before the exception recognized in Lucas can apply, defense counsel 
must be aware that an incorrect instruction is being read and must affirmatively 
agree to, or request, the incomplete instruction.  These circumstances do not exist 
on the instant record.”); Roberts v. State, 694 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) 
(“Since defense counsel did not affirmatively agree to the omission of the 
instructions, but only acquiesced in the instructions as given, the exception does 
not apply.”); Ortiz v. State, 682 So. 2d 217, 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“As we held 
in Blandon[ v. State, 657 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)], the mere failure to 
object to the omission of a justifiable homicide charge in an attempted murder case 
does not constitute the affirmative waiver discussed in Armstrong.  It was the trial 
court’s responsibility to see that the jury was properly instructed and that the 
definition of justifiable homicide was read.”). 
 
Having considered the arguments of the parties, we decline to recede from 
Lucas even where there is nothing in the evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that a homicide or an attempted homicide was excusable or justified.  
This is because justifiable and excusable homicide are always in dispute by virtue 
of the statutory definition of manslaughter.  We have previously stated that, 
“[c]haracterized by what it is not, manslaughter is considered a residual offense.”  
 
 
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State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252, 258 (Fla. 2010).  Pursuant to section 
782.07(1), the absence of justification and excuse is fundamental to the very 
definition of this crime.  Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Lucas that the 
failure to instruct on justifiable or excusable homicide as a part of the instruction 
on manslaughter constitutes fundamental error where the conviction is for 
manslaughter or a greater offense not more than one step removed, regardless of 
whether the evidence could support either.   
 
Despite the continued validity of Lucas, we nonetheless conclude that a 
second exception to its fundamental error rule is warranted where a defendant 
expressly concedes that a homicide or an attempted homicide is not justified or 
excusable.  As noted by the State, we have previously determined that the failure to 
instruct on an undisputed element of an offense is not fundamental error, and there 
must be an objection to preserve the issue for appeal.  See, e.g., Reed, 837 So. 2d 
at 369; Delva, 575 So. 2d at 645.  We recently addressed whether the element of 
intent was undisputed such that the giving of an erroneous manslaughter by act 
jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error where the defendant was 
convicted of an offense not more than one step removed.  See Griffin v. State, 160 
So. 3d 63 (Fla. 2015).   
In Griffin, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder.  Id. at 65.  
The jury received an instruction on manslaughter consistent with that held to be 
 
 
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fundamentally erroneous in Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252.  160 So. 3d at 66.  
Although the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the manslaughter 
instruction was erroneous, it rejected the defendant’s claim of fundamental error 
because his sole defense was misidentification.  Id. at 66-67.  The district court 
reasoned that because intent was not in dispute, the erroneous instruction on the 
intent element of the lesser included offense of manslaughter did not constitute 
fundamental error.  Id. at 67.  
 
We quashed the district court’s decision and held that “a sole defense of 
misidentification does not concede or fail to place in dispute intent or any other 
element of the crime charged except identity when the offense charged is an 
unlawful homicide.”  Id.  We explained: 
 
Certainly, where a defendant expressly concedes one or more 
elements of a crime, those elements can be characterized as no longer 
in dispute for purposes of a fundamental error analysis.  In the present 
case, other than the fact that [the victim] was shot, Griffin did not 
concede any other elements of the crime charged; he simply contested 
his identity as the perpetrator.  The State’s burden still remained to 
prove that the shooting was done with a depraved mind, but without 
intent to kill, as set forth in the standard jury instructions.  Thus, we 
conclude that intent remained a matter that was pertinent or material 
to what the jury must consider in order to convict Griffin of the crime 
charged or a lesser included offense, notwithstanding his claim of 
misidentification. 
Id. at 69 (citations omitted).  Justifiable and excusable homicide were expressly 
referenced as part of our analysis:   
 
 
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In this case, once the jury determined that the homicide was not 
justifiable or excusable, the intent underlying the unlawful homicide 
was pertinent or material to what the jury had to consider in order to 
convict Griffin of second-degree murder or the lesser offense of 
manslaughter by intentional act.  Griffin’s claim of misidentification 
did not concede the element of intent as to the shooting, and he was 
entitled to an accurate instruction as to manslaughter, which he did not 
receive. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Regardless of whether justifiable or excusable homicide are 
“elements” of the crime of manslaughter, based upon our reiteration in Griffin of 
the principle that a defendant may concede an element of a crime such that it is no 
longer in dispute for purposes of a fundamental error analysis, we conclude that an 
exception to Lucas should be recognized where a defendant expressly concedes 
that a homicide or an attempted homicide was neither justified nor excusable.   
 
Here, the State played a video during trial in which Spencer stated that he 
and a codefendant attempted to rob the victims during a drug transaction.  Spencer 
also admitted that he started shooting as the victims sped away in a vehicle.  
During closing statements, counsel admitted that a crime was committed, but 
asserted that the evidence “doesn’t point to who committed it.”  Counsel contended 
that the State had not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Spencer was one of the individuals who shot at the victims.  Instead, counsel 
during trial implied that Spencer’s recorded statement was a product of his desire 
to gain “street credibility,” described as “when someone gives you a false 
 
 
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confession because they want you to act like they’re bigger and badder, so to speak 
than they are on the street.” 
 
As previously discussed, the justifiable and excusable attempted homicide 
instructions were not read to the jury, and counsel did not object to these 
omissions.  Because Spencer did not affirmatively agree to or request the 
incomplete instruction on attempted manslaughter or the omission of the justifiable 
or excusable attempted homicide instructions, we conclude that the fundamental 
error exception in Lucas and Armstrong does not apply.   
 
Further, Spencer did not expressly concede that the attempted homicides 
were neither justified nor excusable.  During closing statements, the presence or 
absence of excusable or justifiable attempted homicide was not mentioned by 
defense counsel.  Instead, he contended that the State had failed to sustain its 
burden of proof.  Therefore, the exception to Lucas we recognize today is not 
applicable, and fundamental error occurred during Spencer’s trial.  As in Griffin, 
Spencer “was entitled to an accurate instruction as to manslaughter, which he did 
not receive.”  160 So. 3d at 69. 
CONCLUSION  
 
In light of the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative, but reiterate that the Lucas/Armstrong exception to the fundamental 
error rule continues to apply in situations where defense counsel affirmatively 
 
 
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agreed to or requested an incomplete instruction.  Further, we recede in part from 
Lucas to allow a second exception to the fundamental error rule where the 
defendant expressly conceded that the homicide or attempted homicide was not 
justified or excusable.  However, because neither of these circumstances is 
applicable to Spencer, we approve the decision of the First District Court of 
Appeal reversing Spencer’s convictions for attempted second-degree murder and 
remanding for a new trial on these counts.2 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
Once again, the jury pardon doctrine rears its ugly head.  I would recede 
from State v. Lucas, 645 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1994)—a flawed opinion rooted in the 
inherent lawlessness of the jury pardon doctrine.  I therefore dissent from the 
decision here, which relies on Lucas. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Because convictions are being reversed on the basis of fundamental error 
due to the giving of incomplete jury instructions, we refer to the Supreme Court 
Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases the matter of whether 
the standard jury instructions should be clarified in light of this decision.   
 
 
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Fundamental error did not occur in this case: there is no logical way to 
conclude that the defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree murder 
occurred because of the trial court’s incomplete jury instruction on the lesser 
included offense of attempted manslaughter.  The majority orders a new trial 
simply because the trial judge did not instruct the jury as to a matter, for which 
there was no evidentiary basis, regarding a lesser included offense.  Instead of 
actively facilitating the possibility of jury lawlessness by ordering a new trial, I 
would answer the certified question in the negative, quash the district court’s 
decision, and leave the lawful conviction undisturbed.  Ordering a new trial 
damages the rule of law. 
 
This Court has previously called into question the jury pardon doctrine 
without affirmatively repudiating it.  See Sanders v. State, 946 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 
2006).  In Sanders, despite noting that the jury pardon doctrine had “become a 
recognized part of the [criminal legal] system” in Florida, id. at 959, this Court 
held that “[t]he possibility of a jury pardon cannot form the basis for a finding of 
prejudice” in postconviction claims for relief based on alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel, id. at 960.  As I have previously explained, this Court should 
repudiate the jury pardon doctrine because it “is inconsistent with the pertinent rule 
of criminal procedure, embeds contradiction in the jury instruction process, 
encourages irrational jury verdicts, and is corrosive of the rule of law.”  Haygood 
 
 
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v. State, 109 So. 3d 735, 746 (Fla. 2013) (Canady, J., dissenting); see also State v. 
Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929, 932-35 (Fla. 1986) (Shaw, J., dissenting).  But at a bare 
minimum, I believe this Court should recede from Lucas and extend this Court’s 
reasoning in Sanders to the instant case—a case in which the defendant failed to 
object to an incomplete jury instruction on attempted manslaughter, the incomplete 
instruction involved a matter for which there was no evidentiary basis, the 
defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder, and attempted 
second-degree murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
After briefly examining the jury pardon doctrine, I explain why the 
reasoning of Sanders should be applied to the instant case.  I then explain how the 
majority’s adherence to Lucas ignores the actual test for fundamental error and 
produces a nonsensical result.  Finally, I explain why the majority’s new Lucas 
“exception” should apply to this case. 
I.  The Jury Pardon Doctrine 
Lucas and the instant case are premised on Florida’s jury pardon doctrine 
and the notion that a defendant has the fundamental right to be instructed on 
certain lesser included offenses.  As this Court has explained, under Florida’s jury 
pardon doctrine, “[a] jury must be given a fair opportunity to exercise its inherent 
‘pardon’ power by returning a verdict of guilty as to the next lower crime.”  State 
v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252, 259 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Pena v. State, 901 So. 2d 
 
 
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781, 787 (Fla. 2005)); see also Wimberly, 498 So. 2d at 932 (“The requirement 
that a trial judge must give a requested instruction on a necessarily lesser included 
offense is bottomed upon a recognition of the jury’s right to exercise its ‘pardon 
power.’ ” (citing State v. Baker, 456 So. 2d 419, 422 (Fla. 1984))).   
Contrary to this Court’s jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has 
never recognized a defendant’s fundamental right to be instructed on one-step-
removed necessarily lesser included offenses.  See, e.g., Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 
605, 611-12 (1982) (“[D]ue process requires that a lesser included offense 
instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. . . .  The 
federal rule is that a lesser included offense instruction should be given ‘if the 
evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser 
offense and acquit him of the greater.’ ”) (third alteration in original) (quoting 
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)).  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
concluded in Hopper that “[a]n instruction on the offense of unintentional killing” 
was unwarranted in a case in which “[t]he evidence not only supported the claim 
that [the defendant] intended to kill the victim, but affirmatively negated any claim 
that he did not intend to kill the victim.”  Id. at 613. 
Instead of embracing Florida’s jury pardon doctrine—as the majority does 
by ordering a new trial—this Court should follow the Supreme Court’s lead.  As 
 
 
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explained below, applying the reasoning of Sanders to this case would be a 
sensible first step in that direction. 
II.  The Reasoning of Sanders Should Apply to this Case 
Sanders was a postconviction case, but this Court’s reasoning in Sanders 
should nevertheless be extended to the instant case.  Sanders addressed two 
consolidated cases involving postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel—Sanders v. State, 847 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), and Willis v. 
State, 840 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  In both cases, the defendants were 
charged with robbery with a firearm.  Sanders, 946 So. 2d at 955.  Each trial court 
instructed the jury on the charged offense and on certain permissive and 
necessarily included lesser offenses but failed to instruct the jury on the category-
one necessarily lesser included offense of robbery with a weapon.  Id.  Defense 
counsel neither requested the omitted instruction nor objected to the trial court’s 
failure to read the instruction.  Id.  Both defendants were convicted of the charged 
offense and later brought postconviction claims for relief alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on defense counsel failing to request the omitted 
instruction.  Id.  The trial courts summarily dismissed the respective motions for 
relief, and the defendants appealed—Sanders to the First District Court of Appeal, 
and Willis to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.  Id.   
 
 
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The First District upheld the trial court’s summary denial of Sanders’ 
motion, holding that counsel’s failure to request the instruction “does not create a 
reasonable probability that the jury, given the opportunity, would have returned a 
guilty verdict only as to the lesser offense.”  Id. (citing Sanders, 847 So. 2d at 508).  
Conversely, the Fourth District reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal of 
Willis’s motion, holding that counsel’s failure to request the instruction was “a 
legally sufficient ground to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”  Id. 
(quoting Willis, 840 So. 2d at 1136).  The Fourth District then certified conflict 
with the First District’s decision.  Id. 
On review, this Court held that the trial courts properly denied the 
defendants’ claims because the defendants failed to prove ineffective assistance 
under the Supreme Court’s Strickland3 test which requires a defendant to prove the 
following two elements: (1) deficient performance by counsel; and (2) that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Sanders, 946 So. 2d at 956 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  After acknowledging that a defense counsel’s failure 
to request an instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense likely satisfies the 
first Strickland prong, id. at 959, this Court primarily focused on the second 
Strickland prong—the “prejudice” prong—under which a defendant must show “a 
                                          
 
 
3.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
 
- 19 - 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different,” id. at 956 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694).  In other words, “[a]s the Supreme Court has warned, to demonstrate 
prejudice ‘[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’  Rather, ‘the defendant must 
show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.’ ”  Id. at 956 (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 
In reaching its conclusion, this Court went through a lengthy examination of 
the jury pardon doctrine, noting its numerous inherent flaws.  Namely, despite 
recognizing that the jury pardon doctrine had “become a recognized part of the 
[criminal legal] system” in Florida, id. at 959, this Court described jury pardons as 
having a “suspect pedigree,” id., and as being “without legal foundation,” id. at 
958.  This Court also noted that “[b]y definition, jury pardons violate the oath 
jurors must take before trial, as well as the instructions the trial court gives them.”  
Id.  This Court described those violations as follows: 
Although the jury also is instructed about lesser-included 
offenses, the instruction specifically allows the jury to consider a 
lesser-included offense only if it “decide[s] that the main accusation 
has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 
(Crim.) 3.4.  The United States Supreme Court restates these 
instructions as a simple duty: “Jurors . . . take an oath to follow the 
law as charged, and they are expected to follow it.”  United States v. 
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 
(1980)). 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 
Sanders eventually held that as a matter of law, “[t]he possibility of a jury 
pardon cannot form the basis for a finding of prejudice.”  Id. at 960.  In so holding, 
Sanders repeatedly noted that the defendants had not raised any issues which called 
into question the juries’ findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
charged crimes.  Id. at 957, 960. 
Although Sanders involved a claim for postconviction relief as opposed to a 
direct appeal, the reasoning of Sanders regarding prejudice is irreconcilable with 
the majority’s conclusion that fundamental error occurred in this case.  For the 
same reason that Sanders concluded that prejudice could not be established, 
fundamental error cannot be established in this case. 
Sanders itself drew a distinction between postconviction motions and direct 
appeals: 
As the First District noted below, “the test for prejudicial error in 
conjunction with a direct appeal is very different from the test for 
prejudice in conjunction with a collateral claim of ineffective 
assistance.”  Sanders, 847 So. 2d at 506 (quoting Hill[ v. State], 788 
So. 2d [315,] 318 [(Fla. 1st DCA 2001)]).  “These differences clearly 
make reversal on direct appeal for the trial court’s failure to give an 
instruction on a requested lesser included offense logical, and relief 
granted in collateral proceedings for trial counsel’s failure to request 
such an instruction illogical.”  Vickery[ v. State], 869 So. 2d [623,] 
626 [(Fla. 5th DCA 2004)] (Sawaya, C.J., concurring specially). 
 
Id. at 959.  But an examination of the context of the cited quotation from 
Hill reveals why such a distinction is not relevant here: 
 
 
- 21 - 
[T]he test for prejudice on direct appeal is the harmless error test of 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), under which trial court 
error will result in reversal unless the prosecution can prove “beyond 
a reasonable doubt” that the error did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.  Conversely, however, as explained in Strickland, prejudice 
may be found in a collateral proceeding in which ineffective 
assistance of counsel is claimed only upon a showing by the defendant 
that there is a “reasonable probability” that counsel’s deficient 
performance affected the outcome of the proceeding. 
 
Hill, 788 So. 2d at 318-19.  There is a great gulf between the direct appeal 
harmless error standard and the postconviction prejudice standard.  And there is no 
less a gulf between harmless error and fundamental error. 
In the instant case, the defendant did not object to the incomplete attempted 
manslaughter instruction.  Thus, the test here is not the harmless error standard 
referenced in Hill.  Rather, the proper test is whether fundamental error occurred.  
See majority op. at 5 (quoting State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002))).  “Fundamental error is 
that which ‘reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a 
verdict . . . could not have been obtained without [that] error.’ ”  Floyd v. State, 
850 So. 2d 383, 403 (Fla. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Archer v. State, 
673 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1996)). 
This Court has described the fundamental error standard as an “exacting 
standard” under which, in order “for error to meet this standard, it must follow that 
the error prejudiced the defendant.”  Reed, 837 So. 2d at 370 (emphasis added).  
 
 
- 22 - 
Given the “exacting” fundamental error standard involved, the distinction in 
Sanders between direct appeal (harmless error) and postconviction relief (actual 
prejudice) is not applicable here.  This Court has repeatedly held that the 
fundamental error standard is no less exacting than the Strickland prejudice 
standard.  See, e.g., Wright v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S343, S353, 2017 WL 
1064515, at *22 (Fla. Mar. 16, 2017) (“Despite the distinctions between the 
fundamental error standard and the Strickland prejudice standard, this Court has 
held that a previous finding upon appeal that statements by a prosecutor failed to 
rise to fundamental error precludes a determination of prejudice in the Strickland 
context.”); Hayward v. State, 183 So. 3d 286, 327 (Fla. 2015) (“If the issue is not 
preserved by trial counsel, appellate counsel is only deficient in failing to assert it 
on appeal if it is fundamental error . . . .”); Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 38 (Fla. 
2008) (“Because the Court found no fundamental error, Lowe fails to demonstrate 
that counsel’s failure to object to the comments resulted in prejudice sufficient to 
undermine the outcome of the trial under Strickland.”); Chandler v. State, 848 So. 
2d 1031, 1046 (Fla. 2003) (“Because Chandler could not show the comments were 
fundamental error on direct appeal, he likewise cannot show that trial counsel’s 
failure to object to the comments resulted in prejudice sufficient to undermine the 
outcome of the case under the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.”).   
 
 
- 23 - 
If an error that is not fundamental cannot be prejudicial under the Strickland 
standard, the converse is also true.  After all, Strickland prejudice requires the 
showing of “a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would 
have been different,” Sanders, 946 So. 2d at 956 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694), whereas fundamental error requires a showing that 
the “verdict . . . could not have been obtained without [that] error,’ ” Floyd, 850 
So. 2d at 403 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Archer, 673 So. 
2d at 20). 
Here, the majority offers no explanation of how the defendant was 
prejudiced or how the result logically could have been different if the jury had 
been instructed on justifiable and excusable attempted homicide.  Rather, the 
majority’s ordering of a new trial is premised on the notion that the incomplete 
instruction could have “had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding.”  Sanders, 946 So. 2d at 956 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).  
Sanders establishes that such a notion is insufficient to show prejudice under 
Strickland.  Under the reasoning of Sanders, such a notion should similarly be 
insufficient to show prejudice under the “exacting” fundamental error standard.  
Consequently, the reasoning of Sanders should be applied to this case—namely, 
that a showing of prejudice cannot be based “on the possibility of a jury pardon, 
which by definition assumes that the jury would have disregarded the law, the trial 
 
 
- 24 - 
court’s instructions, and the evidence presented.”  Id.  As explained below, the 
majority’s failure to adopt the reasoning of Sanders grossly distorts our 
fundamental error doctrine and produces a nonsensical result. 
III.  The Majority’s Adherence to Lucas Ignores the Actual Test for 
Fundamental Error and Produces a Nonsensical Result 
 
In concluding that fundamental error occurred, the majority cites the proper 
test to be employed in determining fundamental error and then inexplicably fails to 
perform an analysis under that test.  Not surprisingly, an analysis under that test 
results in an affirmance of the conviction below. 
The majority notes the test for determining fundamental error as follows: 
To justify not imposing the contemporaneous objection rule, “the 
error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent 
that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.”  Brown[ v. State], 124 So. 2d [481, 
484 (Fla. 1960)].  In other words, “fundamental error occurs only 
when the omission is pertinent or material to what the jury must 
consider in order to convict.”  Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 863 
(Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983).  
 
Majority op. at 5-6 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 
644-45 (Fla. 1991)).  The majority then offers no explanation of how the 
defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree murder “could not have been 
obtained without the assistance of [the incomplete instruction as to attempted 
manslaughter].”  Brown, 124 So. 2d at 484.  Instead, the majority simply reasons 
that manslaughter cannot be defined without an explanation of justifiable and 
 
 
- 25 - 
excusable homicide and concludes that “justifiable and excusable homicide are 
always in dispute by virtue of the statutory definition of manslaughter.”  Majority 
op. at 8.  Thus, fundamental error is determined to have occurred here because 
attempted second-degree murder is “not more than one step removed” from 
attempted manslaughter.  In other words, the majority simply relies on Lucas. 
The majority’s unarticulated explanation for finding fundamental error, of 
course, is that the jury somehow might have otherwise exercised its inherent jury 
pardon power had the complete attempted manslaughter instruction been read.  But 
such an explanation ignores the test for fundamental error and is untethered from 
the evidence, which negates a conclusion of justifiable or excusable attempted 
homicide. 
While purporting to apply our traditional fundamental error test, the majority 
effectively applies a “structural” error standard—akin to the per se reversible error 
analysis applied by this Court’s majority in Johnson v. State, 53 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 
2010).  In Johnson, this Court’s majority found that per se reversible error occurred 
where defense counsel timely objected to a trial court’s erroneous instruction to the 
jury that there would be no reading back of any testimony.  The rationale 
underpinning the majority’s decision in Johnson was that it was “impossible to 
determine the effect of the erroneous instruction on the jury without engaging in 
 
 
- 26 - 
speculation.”  Id. at 1005.  Indeed, the Johnson majority justified the use of the per 
se reversible error standard in that case by relying on a jury pardon example: 
Another circumstance in which this Court has held that an error 
is per se reversible because the reviewing court cannot conduct a 
harmless error analysis is when a jury is not instructed on a lesser-
included offense one step removed from the charged offense.  In such 
a situation, the reviewing court cannot determine the effect of the 
error on the jury because the court cannot know whether the jury 
would have convicted the defendant of the next lesser included 
offense if the jury had been given the option.  As explained by this 
Court: “If the jury is not properly instructed on the next lower crime, 
then it is impossible to determine whether, having been properly 
instructed, it would have found the defendant guilty of the next lesser 
offense.”  Pena v. State, 901 So. 2d 781, 787 (Fla. 2005) (citing State 
v. Abreau, 363 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1978)).  To conduct a harmless error 
analysis in that situation would be to engage in pure speculation. 
 
Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 1008.  The Johnson majority’s rationale is the same rationale 
underpinning the majority’s decision in this case.  And yet in this case the only 
possible issue upon which to “speculat[e],” id., is whether the jury would have 
ignored the evidence and issued an unlawful jury pardon.   
Of course, the hallmark of structural error is a “defect[] in the constitution of 
the trial mechanism.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that there are very few categories of errors which 
constitute structural error.  See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 
(2013) (“Errors of this kind include denial of counsel of choice, denial of self-
representation, denial of a public trial, and failure to convey to a jury that guilt 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 
 
 
- 27 - 
258, 263 (2010) (“ ‘[S]tructural errors’ are ‘a very limited class’ of errors . . . .”); 
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (“It is only for certain 
structural errors undermining the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole that 
even preserved error requires reversal without regard to the mistake’s effect on the 
proceeding.”).  Here, the incomplete attempted manslaughter instruction 
undoubtedly does not fall within the Supreme Court’s limited class of structural 
errors.  See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (“The error at issue 
here—a jury instruction that omits an element of the offense—differs markedly 
from the constitutional violations we have found to defy harmless-error review.”). 
Ultimately, the majority’s finding of fundamental error rests on nothing 
more than the possibility of a lawless decision by the jury.  Failing to perfectly 
facilitate a lawless result is neither a “defect[] in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism,” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309, nor an error that “reach[es] down into 
the validity of the trial itself,” Brown, 124 So. 2d at 484.  Consequently, the 
majority’s finding cannot be reconciled with either the structural error standard or 
this Court’s traditional fundamental error test—as properly applied.4 
                                          
 
 
4.  Even if it is accepted that the “right” to a jury pardon should be facilitated 
and preserved, it is absurd to believe that a jury determined to produce such a 
lawless result would have been in the slightest bit impeded by the totally irrelevant 
imperfection in the jury instruction here.  There is no line of reasoning that can 
support such a conclusion. 
 
 
- 28 - 
The majority’s distortion of our fundamental error doctrine thus ends up 
producing a nonsensical result.  On the one hand, as a matter of law, a defendant is 
unable to rely on the possibility of a jury pardon to show prejudice under 
Strickland in a case in which a requisite lesser included offense instruction was 
never even read to the jury.  See Sanders, 946 So. 2d 953.  Yet on the other hand, a 
defendant somehow is able to rely on the possibility of a jury pardon to show 
prejudice under the “exacting” fundamental error standard in a case in which the 
requisite lesser included offense instruction was read to the jury—except for a 
portion relating to a matter for which there was no evidentiary basis.  That sort of 
illogical outcome can only flow from adherence to bad precedent.  It vividly 
illustrates the jurisprudential chaos that results from adherence to the jury pardon 
doctrine.  The actual test for fundamental error requires that the conviction below 
be left undisturbed, because the “validity of the trial” was not compromised and 
there is no way to conclude that the defendant’s conviction for attempted second-
degree murder occurred because of the trial court’s incomplete jury instruction for 
the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter.  See Delva, 575 So. 2d at 
644-45. 
IV.  The Majority’s New Lucas “Exception” Should Apply to this Case 
The majority recognizes a second exception to Lucas—namely, “where a 
defendant expressly concedes that a homicide or an attempted homicide was 
 
 
- 29 - 
neither justified nor excusable.”  Majority op. at 11.  In support of this new 
exception, the majority notes this Court’s previous determination “that the failure 
to instruct on an undisputed element of an offense is not fundamental error, and 
there must be an objection to preserve the issue for appeal.”  Majority op. at 9 
(citing Reed, 837 So. 2d at 369; Delva, 575 So. 2d at 645).  The majority also notes 
this Court’s recent reiteration of that principle in Griffin v. State, 160 So. 3d 63, 69 
(Fla. 2015).  Majority op. at 11.  After recognizing this new Lucas exception, the 
majority then declines to extend its application to the instant case, relying in large 
part on Griffin. 
Griffin involved a homicide case in which the defendant was charged with 
second-degree murder and asserted the sole defense of misidentification.  Griffin, 
160 So. 3d at 65.  At trial, the trial court properly instructed the jury on second-
degree murder.  Id. at 66.  The trial court also instructed the jury on manslaughter, 
but the manslaughter instruction was the same standard jury instruction which this 
Court had previously determined to be fundamentally erroneous in certain 
instances, because the instruction implied an intent-to-kill element for 
manslaughter, even though no such element is present in manslaughter—or even in 
second-degree murder, for that matter.  Id.; see also Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 
254-60.  The defendant did not object to the manslaughter instruction.  Griffin, 160 
So. 3d at 66.  The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and appealed 
 
 
- 30 - 
on the basis that the erroneous manslaughter instruction constituted fundamental 
error.  Id.  The Second District affirmed the conviction, finding that by relying on 
the defense of misidentification, the defendant failed to dispute any of the elements 
of the offense, including intent.  Id.  This Court quashed the Second District’s 
decision and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the defendant’s sole defense 
of misidentification “did not concede the element of intent as to the shooting,” id. 
at 69, and that the jury still was required to determine “the issue of ‘intent’—either 
ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent as is embodied in the depraved mind element of 
second-degree murder or the lack of any intent to kill as in the offense of 
manslaughter,” id. at 70. 
The rationale underlying Griffin simply does not apply here.  Griffin 
involved a jury instruction that erroneously implied that intent to kill was a 
requisite element of manslaughter.  Thus, irrespective of whether the defendant 
claimed misidentification, the instruction itself was problematic because it 
misstated the law and suggested a higher degree of intent was required for 
manslaughter than for second-degree murder.  Here, the manslaughter instruction 
properly explained that manslaughter only requires an intent to commit an act 
which results in death.  The imperfection in the instruction in this case involves 
solely whether the attempted homicide was justifiable or excusable—that is, 
whether the conduct was criminal or lawful.  Indeed, Griffin itself clearly 
 
 
- 31 - 
distinguished the issue of intent from the issue of justifiable or excusable 
homicide: “[O]nce the jury determined that the homicide was not justifiable or 
excusable, the intent underlying the unlawful homicide was pertinent or material to 
what the jury had to consider in order to convict Griffin of second-degree murder 
or the lesser offense of manslaughter by intentional act.”  Id. at 69. 
The majority concludes that Spencer did not “expressly concede” that the 
“attempted homicide was neither justified nor excusable,” explaining as follows: 
“During closing statements, counsel admitted that a crime was committed, but 
asserted that the evidence ‘doesn’t point to who committed it.’ ”  Majority op. at 
11.  The majority goes on to note that Spencer argued that his recorded 
statement—in which he previously admitted to committing the shooting—was a 
false confession and the “product of his desire to gain ‘street credibility.’ ”  Id.  In 
other words, the newly recognized exception is somehow not applicable because 
although Spencer’s counsel admitted that a crime was committed, he claimed that 
the evidence did not point to Spencer as the perpetrator.  As an initial matter, it is 
unclear how Spencer’s recorded statement—or, more specifically, his 
backpedaling therefrom—has any relevance to the issue of excusable or justifiable 
attempted homicide.  Moreover, the majority references Spencer’s counsel’s 
closing statements but fails to provide a complete picture of those statements. 
 
 
- 32 - 
During closing arguments, counsel repeatedly conceded that a crime had 
been committed: 
[A]nd make no mistake, there are victims. . . .  They have proven a 
case that two people were shot.  They have proven that.  Beyond a 
reasonable doubt, no question, they have proven that. . . .  They have 
proven that they have a .45 caliber weapon here that was used in that 
crime. . . .  [E]verything you have here . . . points to a crime being 
committed.  It doesn’t point to who committed it. . . .  The question is 
has the State of Florida proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Damani Spencer did this?  Or have they just proven that someone did 
this?  And that’s the question. 
 
Spencer’s sole defense was that he did not commit the crime—a crime that was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the State.  Nothing even remotely implicates 
justifiable or excusable attempted homicide.  In an attempt to explain this away, 
the majority refers to the special nature of manslaughter as a residual offense: 
“[J]ustifiable and excusable homicide are always in dispute by virtue of the 
statutory definition of manslaughter.  We have previously stated that, 
‘[c]haracterized by what it is not, manslaughter is considered a residual offense.’ ”  
Majority op. at 8-9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 
at 258).  But the majority overlooks that this Court has described justifiable and 
excusable homicide as “defenses” to the crime of manslaughter.  See, e.g., Miller 
v. State, 573 So. 2d 337, 337 (Fla. 1991).  Indeed, justifiable and excusable 
homicide are defenses to any charge of unlawful homicide, including second-
degree murder.  As this Court recognized in Griffin, “[a] homicide found to be 
 
 
- 33 - 
unlawful is not automatically just one offense, but will be one of several possible 
homicide offenses depending upon the nature of the intent or the lack of any intent 
at the time of the homicide.”  Griffin, 160 So. 3d at 68.   
 
By repeatedly conceding that a “crime” was proven by the State, Spencer’s 
counsel “expressly concede[d]” that the conduct at issue was unlawful—that is, 
that it was neither justifiable nor excusable.  Majority op. at 11.  This concession 
by counsel, however, did not otherwise obviate the State’s burden of having to 
prove the “degree of the offense based upon the intent.”  Griffin, 160 So. 3d at 68 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, despite counsel’s repeated concessions, the State was 
still required to prove the depraved mind element of attempted second-degree 
murder.  And the State did exactly that—beyond a reasonable doubt.   
How the majority’s new Lucas exception does not apply to this case is a 
mystery. 
V.  Conclusion 
Lucas and the instant case represent this Court’s most extreme application of 
the jury pardon doctrine.  Fundamental error is determined to have occurred and a 
new trial is ordered because of an unobjected-to incomplete instruction on a lesser 
offense, even though: (1) the omitted portion of the instruction on the lesser 
offense involved a matter for which there was no evidentiary basis; (2) there was 
no error with the instruction on the charged offense; (3) the jury convicted as to the 
 
 
- 34 - 
charged offense; (4) the State proved the charged offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and (5) conviction of the lesser offense could only result from a willful 
defiance of the instruction properly given to the jury.  To describe this is to 
discredit it.  We should recede from Lucas and pave the way for abrogating the 
jury pardon doctrine entirely.  I dissent. 
POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D14-5663 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and 
Michael Schaub, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent