Title: State v. Strong

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-058


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

 Danny Strong                                 November Term, 1991


 Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

 Gary Kessler, State's Attorneys Office, Montpelier for plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   In this case we hold that the constitutional prohibition
 against double jeopardy does not bar criminal prosecution and punishment for
 driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after the suspension of
 the defendant's driver's license in a civil proceeding resulting from the
 same underlying incident.  The judgment is affirmed.
      The police stopped defendant on June 17, 1990, for driving under the
 influence.  Defendant consented to a breath test, which showed that he had a
 blood alcohol content (BAC) of .16%.  Pursuant to the civil license
 suspension procedure of 23 V.S.A. { 1205, he was warned of his rights and
 cited.
      Under the statute, unless the operator requests a hearing, the
 operator's license is summarily suspended for at least 90 days when
 analysis shows the operator's BAC to be above .08%.  23 V.S.A. { 1205(a).(FN1)
 The operator may avoid immediate suspension by requesting a hearing to
 determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person
 was violating 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a), (FN2) whether the person's rights were
 adequately explained, and if the test was properly conducted and indeed
 showed a BAC level of .08 % or higher.  23 V.S.A. {{ 1205 (f),(g).  A
 requested hearing is held in district court without a jury under the Vermont
 Rules of Civil Procedure; affidavits of law enforcement officials and
 chemists are admissible, subject to rebuttal; and the state has the burden
 to show the statutory requirements for suspension by a preponderance of the
 evidence.  23 V.S.A. { 1205(i).  Suspension commences eleven days after
 notice of the test result and notice of intention to suspend is served.  In
 cases where a hearing is requested and held, suspension commences
 immediately following a court's finding that the statutory requirements have
 been met.  23 V.S.A. {{ 1205(e), (h).  A suspended license is not reinstated
 until its holder has completed alcohol screening, and therapy or education
 requirements, if needed.  23 V.S.A. { 1209a.  The statute sets forth longer
 suspension periods for second and subsequent suspensions.  23 V.S.A. {
 1205(l).
      When notified of his impending license suspension, defendant waived his
 right to a hearing, and his suspension began July 18, 1990.  On September
 19, 1990, defendant was charged by information with driving under the in-
 fluence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2), based
 on the same incident for which his license had been suspended.  Ultimately,
 he plead guilty to the charge, and the district court sentenced him to a
 fine and suspended jail term, following its denial of his motion to dismiss
 on the ground of double jeopardy.  The plea was entered on condition of the
 allowance of this appeal.
      On appeal, defendant claims his DUI prosecution following his license
 suspension violated the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
 United States Constitution, because it constituted multiple punishment after
 multiple prosecution for the same conduct.  The amendment provides that no
 person may "be subject for the same offence or twice put in jeopardy of life
 or limb."  U.S. Const. Amend. V.  This clause protects "`against a second
 prosecution for the same offense after acquittal . . . [,] against a second
 prosecution for the same offense after conviction[, a]nd . . . against
 multiple punishments for the same offense.'"  Grady v. Corbin, ___ U.S. ___,
 ___, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 (1990) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,