Title: State v. Guillermo

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

983 P.2d 819 (1999) 91 Hawai`i 307 STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florendo GUILLERMO, Defendant-Appellant, and David K. Hashimoto, George M. Tanisue, Leo Bajo, Aurelio Barro, Alfred L. Canianes and Henry A. Alejandro, Defendants No. 21718. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. September 7, 1999. *820 Linda C.R. Jameson, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for defendant-appellant. James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellee. MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and RAMIL, JJ. Opinion of the Court by RAMIL, J. Defendant-appellant Florendo Guillermo appeals from the circuit court's denial of his motion for resentencing filed on June 4, 1998, pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 35 (1980)[1] and Rule 47 (1977).[2] Guillermo contends that the circuit court erred in (1) concluding that Guillermo's case did not fall within the purview of Act 188, Hawai`i Session Laws of 1975, and (2) failing to enter sufficient findings of fact pursuant to State v. Ortez, 60 Haw. 107, 588 P.2d 898 (1978). We agree with both contentions and, accordingly, vacate the June 19, 1998 order denying Guillermo's motion for resentencing and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[3] In mid-September 1959, Guillermo, along with co-defendants, David K. Hashimoto, George M. Tanisue, Leo Bajo, Aurelio Barro, Alfred L. Canianes, and Henry A. Alejandro, were indicted and tried in the First Circuit Court for rape, in violation of Revised Laws of Hawai`i (RLH) § 309-31 (1955),[4] and robbery in the second degree, in violation of RLH §§ 306-1 and 306-8 (1955).[5]See State *821 v. Hashimoto, 47 Haw. 185, 186-87, 389 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1963); State v. Hashimoto, 46 Haw. 183, 183-85, 377 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1962). Hashimoto, 47 Haw. at 186-89, 389 P.2d at 148-50. On September 24, 1959, Guillermo and all six co-defendants were found guilty of both rape, in Cr. No. 30865, and robbery in the second degree, in Cr. No. 30866. On October 30, 1959, Guillermo was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for robbery and life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for rape, to be served consecutively. Although it is not completely clear from this very limited record on appeal, Guillermo was released on parole in approximately 1979 or 1980. In 1991, Guillermo was convicted on an unrelated drug charge in Cr. No. 91-0910, the specifics of which are also not included in the instant record on appeal.[6] Guillermo's parole in the instant case was apparently revoked. On June 4, 1998, Guillermo moved for resentencing. Therein, Guillermo sought to reduce his sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for rape, in Cr. No. 30865, to twenty years, in conformity with the 1972 enactment of the Hawai`i Penal Code (HPC or "the 1972 Code"). Guillermo contended that Act 188 of Hawai`i Session Laws 1975 was enacted to permit courts to review the cases of "persons convicted of the same crimes ... under different sentences and serving different terms of imprisonment" and to amend such sentences in accordance with the 1972 Code. It is unclear from the record on appeal whether Guillermo's name was referred to the courts pursuant to section 2, subsection 5 of Act 188.[7] Guillermo's motion was heard on June 18, 1998. The following, in relevant part, transpired at the hearing: (Brackets added.) The circuit court's decision was reduced to a written order on June 19, 1998. The order states in part: (Brackets added.) Guillermo timely appealed. "The applicable standard of review for sentencing or resentencing matters is whether the court committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its decision." Keawe v. State, 79 Hawai`i 281, 284, 901 P.2d 481, 484 (1995) (citations omitted). In particular, a circuit court's denial of adjustment of a pre-HPC sentence, under Act 188, is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Ortez, 60 Haw. at 114, 588 P.2d at 904 (citing 1975 Haw. Sess. L. Act 188, § 2(1) at 429). "Generally, to constitute an abuse it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant." Keawe, 79 Hawai`i at 284, 901 P.2d at 484 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The circuit court's interpretation of a statute's application is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See Wilson v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., 89 Hawai`i 45, 47, 968 P.2d 647, 649 (1998). Furthermore, Id. (quoting Mendes v. Hawai`i Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 87 Hawai`i 14, 17, 950 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1998) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dang, 89 Hawai`i 8, 12, 967 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawaii v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28 (1998)) (some internal citations omitted). Guillermo contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his 1959 conviction does not fall within the purview of Act 188. We agree. Act 188 provides: 1975 Haw. Sess. L. Act 188, at 429-31 (emphases added) (footnote in original) (dagger replaced by footnote number). In this case, the circuit court concluded that Act 188 did not apply to Guillermo's pre-HPC conviction because he had "receive[d] the maximum term so that takes him outside of the statute." However, Guillermo was convicted of rape, in violation of RLH § 309-31, which provided: (Emphases added.) In 1972, the Hawai`i legislature adopted the Hawai`i Penal Code. The offense of rape in the first degree, as contained within Section 730 of the 1972 Code, stated: 1972 Haw. Sess. L. Act 9, § 1, at 90. Section 660 mandated the sentence of twenty years for a class A felony. See 1972 Haw. Sess. L. Act 9, § 1 at 79-80. As noted above, Guillermo received life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, which is more than the maximum sentence provided "under the provisions of the Hawai`i Penal Code of 1972."[9] Therefore, in this regard, the circuit court erred in concluding that Act 188 does not apply. *828 Alternatively, the circuit court mentioned that "Act 188, Section 1, subsection 1 ... talks about all convicted felons who have not been discharged from institutional custody by the State...." Guillermo was paroled in approximately 1979 or 1980. Although section 2, subsection 1, which relates to the applicability of Act 188, addressed "[a]ll convicted felons who have not been discharged from institutional custody by the state[,]"[10] the remainder of the sentence is missing. Therefore, the application section is not plain and unambiguous and requires resort beyond the plain language of the statute. The legislative history underlying Act 188 provides: Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 490, 1975 Senate Journal, at 1020. Guillermo was released on parole in 1979 or 1980; yet his parole was revoked in 1991. Considering the intent to afford "equal application of justice demanded by adherence to the highest standards of jurisprudence," it is unjust to conclude that Act 188 does not apply to the instant situation because Guillermo "has been discharged from custody." See Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai`i 1, 15, 919 P.2d 263, 277 (1996) ("[I]t is well settled that this court may depart from a plain reading of a statute where a literal interpretation would lead to absurd and/or unjust results." (citations omitted)). Insofar as Guillermo is currently not "discharged from institutional custody by the state" and has not been discharged for purposes of HRS § 706-630, we hold that Act 188 applies. Guillermo also contends that the circuit court erred in failing to (1) determine whether appellant is a danger to the public and (2) "assess what degree of [r]ape the facts and circumstances of the original [r]ape offense entailed in order to ... classify [properly] the offense in keeping with the present [c]ode." We agree. In Ortez, 60 Haw. at 115-16, 588 P.2d at 905, this court stated: *829 Act 188 requires the trial court to conduct a serious review of each case to determine whether an adjustment should be made. The Act recites a purpose "to grant equal application of justice." Act 188, § 1. The legislative history reflects an intent that where there is substantial similarity, in the essential facts, between the pre-HPC offense and the HPC offense, the sentence should be adjusted to conform to the pertinent provisions of the Hawaii Penal Code except where "the old sentence was, and continues to be, fair." 1975 House Journal 1316. As a guide to the exercise of the court's discretion in reviewing pre-HPC sentences, the legislature provided in § 2(7) of Act 188: (Emphases added.) Indeed, the sentencing standard announced in Ortez, requires "that the court [give appropriate consideration] to the history, character and condition of [the defendant], including his post-sentence conduct and present condition, in arriving at its decision." Id. at 113, 588 P.2d at 903 (brackets added). Here, the circuit court based its denial of Guillermo's motion for resentencing on the following facts: *830 It affirmatively appears from this bare record that the circuit court failed to consider: (1) whether the commitment for the term of the original sentence is necessary for protection of the public; (2) the legislative rationale in providing a lesser penalty for the same offense; (3) the circumstances of the pre-HPC offense; (4) the grounds upon which the sentencing court imposed the original sentence; (5) the manner in which the offense was committed; and (6) the present condition of the defendant. Accordingly, the circuit court failed to enter sufficient findings of fact under Ortez. Cf. State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 263, 831 P.2d 523, 525 (1992) ("Although there is no requirement for the sentencing court to state its reasons for imposing sentence, we have urged and strongly recommended that the sentencing court do so[.]" (citations omitted)). Therefore, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Guillermo's motion for resentencing. Because Guillermo falls within the purview of Act 188 and because the circuit court failed to enter sufficient findings of fact, we vacate the June 19, 1998 order denying Guillermo's motion for resentencing and remand the matter to the circuit court for the entry of new findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its discretion, the circuit court may conduct a new hearing. [1] HRPP Rule 35 provides: Correction or Reduction of Sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 90 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 90 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 90 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States denying review of, or having the effect of upholding a judgment of conviction. A motion to correct or reduce a sentence which is made within the time period aforementioned shall empower the court to act on such motion even though the time period has expired. The filing of a notice of appeal shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain a timely motion to reduce a sentence. [2] HRPP Rule 47 provides: Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It may be supported by affidavit. [3] Because a defendant is not always entitled to a hearing under Act 188, see State v. Ortez, 60 Haw. 107, 118-21, 588 P.2d 898, 906-908 (1978), the circuit court may, in its discretion, conduct another hearing. Alternatively, the circuit court may enter new findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion without conducting a new hearing. [4] See infra section III.A. [5] RLH § 306-1 provided: "Robbery is the stealing of a thing from the person of another or from his custody in his presence, by force or by putting him in fear." RLH § 306-8 provided: Robbery by one armed with a dangerous weapon with intent, if resisted, to kill, maim, wound or inflict other severe corporal injury upon the person robbed; or where being so armed, the robber in committing the offense wounds or strikes or inflicts other severe injury upon the person robbed, or any other person, is robbery in the first degree; and all other robbery is robbery in the second degree. RLH § 306-11 (1955) provided: "Penalties. Whoever commits robbery in the first degree shall be imprisoned at hard labor for life or any number of years, in the discretion of the court. Whoever commits robbery in the second degree shall be imprisoned at hard labor not more than twenty years." [6] Guillermo's counsel explained by way of affidavit that Guillermo was convicted on "a drug charge under Cr. No. 91-0910." [7] See infra section III.A. [8] "So in original, but it appears that some words are missing from this section at the place indicated by the dagger." 1975 Haw. Sess. L. Act 188, § 2, at 429. [9] Guillermo contended below and on appeal that the "maximum sentence" to which the Act referred was the maximum sentence under RLH § 309-31, i.e., life imprisonment not subject to parole. The plain language of Act 188, however, states that the Act is inapplicable to "all convicted felons ... who did not receive the maximum term of sentence upon conviction under the provisions of the Hawai`i Penal Code of 1972." Because Guillermo received more than the maximum afforded in 1972, when convicted and sentenced in 1959, Act 188 applies to Guillermo's conviction. [10] Regarding the term "discharge," HRS § 706-630 (Cum.Supp.1998) provides: Upon the termination of the period of the probation or the earlier discharge of the defendant, the defendant shall be relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the court and shall have satisfied the disposition of the court, except as to any action under this chapter to collect unpaid fines, restitution, attorney's fees, costs, or interest. Therefore, a defendant is "discharged" when the defendant "is relieved of any further obligation by operation of law." See Commentary on § 706-630. Act 188, however, addresses "defendants who have not been discharged from institutional custody by the state." (Emphasis added.)