Title: Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 11/1/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
LATRICE RUBENSTEIN, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S234269 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D066722 
DOE NO. 1 et al., 
) 
 
) 
Imperial County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. ECU08107 
 
____________________________________) 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND  
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE COURT: 
The opinion in this matter filed August 28, 2017, and appearing at 3 Cal.5th 
903, is modified as follows:   
1.   
On  page 910 of the opinion, the first full paragraph beginning, “As noted, the 
claim must be presented” is modified to read as follows: 
As noted, the claim must be presented “not later than six months after the 
accrual of the cause of action.”  (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a), italics 
added.)  A cause of action for childhood sexual molestation generally 
accrues at the time of the alleged molestation.  (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
p. 210.)  Plaintiff could have sued at that time.  We must decide whether 
the changes to section 340.1 caused her action to accrue later or to 
reaccrue at a later time.  Shirk held the changes did not do so, at least for 
 
 
 
2 
causes of action that had lapsed and been revived.  But plaintiff argues, 
and the Court of Appeal found, that a claim that had never lapsed did not 
accrue under section 340.1 until a later time. 
2. 
On page 913 of the opinion, the sentence that reads “Section 340.1 did not 
cause it to reaccrue.” is modified to read as follows: 
 
 
Section 340.1 did not delay accrual or cause the action to reaccrue. 
3. 
On page 915 of the opinion, at the end of the third full paragraph, the following 
footnote is added as footnote 2:   
We do not address any question regarding those plaintiffs whose civil 
actions would be timely under section 340.1, subdivision (a), without 
reliance on the statute’s delayed discovery provisions because they are 
brought within eight years of majority.  Specifically, we do not decide 
whether such a plaintiff may rely on judicially recognized principles of 
delayed discovery to postpone accrual for purposes of Government Code 
section 911.2.   
4.   
On page 916 of the opinion, footnote 2 is renumbered as footnote 3. 
 
These modifications do not affect the judgment.  
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
Liu and Cuéllar, JJ., are of the opinion the petition for rehearing should be 
granted.