Title: State v. Terry Griffith

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 72 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Terry Griffith, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  226 Wis. 2d 562, 596 N.W.2d 501 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 28, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emmanuel Vuvunas 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Paul G. LaZotte and the Frank Remington Center, 
Madison, and oral argument by Paul G. LaZotte. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Paul Lundsten, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 72 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0931-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Terry Griffith,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   Terry Griffith petitions for 
review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming his 
convictions for obstructing an officer, possession of marijuana, 
and escape from custody.  Griffith was convicted in the Circuit 
Court for Racine County, Emmanuel J. Vuvunas, Judge.  On appeal, 
Griffith argues that the police questioning that led to the 
obstruction 
charge 
constituted 
an 
unreasonable 
search 
or 
seizure.  Griffith contends that all of his convictions should 
therefore be reversed. 
¶2 
Griffith was convicted for obstructing an officer 
after he gave a police officer false information during a 
traffic stop.  Griffith was arrested at the scene of the traffic 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
2 
stop, but he escaped from the officers and fled from the scene. 
 He was later identified as the escaped passenger and was 
apprehended. 
¶3 
At his trial, Griffith presented a defense of mistaken 
identity, arguing that he was not the passenger who fled from 
police.  The jury found Griffith guilty. 
¶4 
In a postconviction motion, Griffith argued that he 
did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his 
trial attorney failed to raise a Fourth Amendment argument.  
Griffith's claim is that under the Fourth Amendment and Wis. 
Const. art. 1, § 11, the officer lacked lawful authority to ask 
the passenger his name and date of birth.  If the officer lacked 
lawful authority to pose these questions to the passenger, then 
the passenger did not violate Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1)(1995-96),1 
obstructing an officer.2  If the passenger was not subject to a 
legal arrest, then the marijuana was not discovered during a 
lawful search incident to arrest.  In addition, if the passenger 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 statutes unless otherwise indicated.  
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.41 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an 
officer while such officer is doing any act in an 
official capacity and with lawful authority, is guilty 
of a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
(2) In this section: 
 
(a) 
"Obstructs" 
includes 
without 
limitation 
knowingly 
giving 
false 
information 
to 
the 
officer . . . . 
 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
3 
was never legally arrested, then he did not "escape" from legal 
arrest in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.42(3)(a).3  In sum, 
Griffith contends that because the officer lacked lawful 
authority to ask his name and date of birth, all of his 
convictions must fail. 
¶5 
The circuit court rejected Griffith’s argument.  The 
court determined that Griffith's Fourth Amendment argument was 
without merit and that failure to raise a meritless argument did 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court of 
appeals affirmed, and Griffith petitioned for review.   
¶6 
We agree with the circuit court and the court of 
appeals that Griffith's Fourth Amendment argument fails on the 
merits.4  Asking the passenger his name and date of birth during 
a lawful traffic stop was not an unreasonable search or seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  We therefore affirm. 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.42(3)(a) provides: 
 
(3) A person in custody who intentionally escapes 
from custody under any of the following circumstances 
is guilty of a Class D felony: 
 
 
(a) Pursuant to a legal arrest for, lawfully 
charged with or convicted of or sentenced for a crime. 
 
4 In opposition to Griffith's petition for review, the State 
argued that because Griffith's trial counsel did not raise a 
Fourth Amendment challenge, he has waived the issue and his 
challenge can only succeed as a Sixth Amendment ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  See State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 
758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  In its brief and argument 
before this court, the State reiterates this contention.  
However, having accepted Griffith's petition for review, we 
exercise our discretion to decide his Fourth Amendment challenge 
on the merits. 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
4 
I 
¶7 
Because Griffith's trial counsel did not raise any 
Fourth Amendment challenge, no suppression hearing took place in 
this case.  Griffith also did not attempt to establish 
additional 
facts 
surrounding 
the 
traffic 
stop 
at 
his 
postconviction hearing.  Thus, the only record of the events 
surrounding the traffic stop and the questioning of the 
passenger were established through testimony at Griffith's 
trial.  The facts established at the trial are as follows.   
¶8 
On November 19, 1996, Investigators Bruce Larrabee and 
William Warmington were on patrol in the city of Racine. 
Larrabee and Warmington were detectives in the Street Crimes 
Unit of the Racine Police Department.  They patrolled in an 
undercover car and wore plainclothes.  Larrabee was driving.   
¶9 
Warmington noticed a white Pontiac Bonneville with 
Illinois plates.  Warmington knew that the Bonneville belonged 
to Tyrone Malone and that Malone did not possess a valid 
driver's license.  The Bonneville was parked with the engine 
running, and Warmington thought he saw Malone in the driver's 
seat.  The detectives therefore called for another Street Crimes 
Unit detective, intending to stop the Bonneville when it left 
the area.  Investigator Geller answered the call and said he 
would respond.   
¶10 While Warmington and Larrabee were waiting for Geller, 
the Bonneville began moving.  Warmington and Larrabee followed 
the car and radioed headquarters for a marked squad car to pull 
it over.  Before the marked squad car arrived the Bonneville 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
5 
pulled into an apartment building parking lot and stopped.  The 
detectives pulled in behind the Bonneville, blocked the exit, 
and approached the car, showing their badges. 
¶11 As Warmington and Larrabee approached, Malone started 
to exit the car through the front passenger side door.  
Warmington ordered Malone and all the other occupants of the car 
to remain inside the vehicle.  Investigator Geller and two 
uniformed patrol officers in marked squad cars soon arrived.  
Geller and the patrol officers stood behind the Bonneville while 
Larrabee and Warmington contacted the occupants of the car. 
¶12 Larrabee went to the driver's side of the car, while 
Warmington went to the passenger's side.  Warmington began 
speaking to Malone, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. 
 While speaking to Malone, Warmington looked over at the driver 
and recognized him as Damien Robinson.  He asked Robinson when 
he had obtained a driver's license.  Robinson replied that he 
had "lost them." 
¶13 At some point, apparently shortly after he spoke to 
Robinson, Warmington also noticed a third person in the vehicle, 
sitting behind Robinson.  Warmington thought he recognized the 
passenger's face but could not remember his name.  Warmington's 
testimony about what happened next was as follows: 
 
Q 
Did 
you 
ask 
the 
rear 
passenger 
for 
any 
identification? 
 
A 
Yes, I did. 
 
Q 
What occurred then? 
 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
6 
A 
He did not have any identification.  I asked him 
for his name, [he] stated his last name was Stevenson. 
 I asked him to spell it.  He spelled it Steven, S-T-
E-V-E-N.  I asked him for his first name.  He gave me 
the name of Rick.  I asked him for a date of birth.  
He gave me a date of birth . . . At that time I asked 
him okay, how old are you.  He stated he was 22.  The 
date of birth that he provided would have made him 23. 
 
 . . . . 
 
Q 
What happened next then? 
 
A 
At that up point [sic] in time, I confirmed the 
information he had given me.  I then 
 
Q 
When you say you confirmed the information? 
 
A 
I asked him again to repeat the date of birth and 
how old he was.  I then stepped back away from the car 
and said over the roof to Investigator Larrabee, who 
was on the driver's side, and advised him to remove 
the rear passenger from the left side, that the party 
was to be handcuffed, as the party was providing us 
with false information. 
Larrabee removed the rear passenger from the Bonneville and 
placed him under arrest.  While Larrabee was putting handcuffs 
on the passenger, the passenger made a move as if he was going 
to try to run.  Larrabee then brought the passenger to the back 
of the vehicle near the other officers.   
¶14 Warmington continued with the traffic stop.  He asked 
Malone and Robinson for permission to search the car.  They 
consented 
to 
the 
search. 
 
While 
Warmington 
conducted 
a 
consensual search of the car, Geller began conducting a search 
of the passenger incident to his arrest.  During this search, 
Geller 
found 
marijuana 
inside 
a 
crumpled 
tissue 
in 
the 
passenger's front jacket pocket.  Geller looked up at the 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
7 
passenger and said, "What do we have here?"  The handcuffed 
passenger immediately bolted from the scene.  Geller and the 
other officers failed to apprehend him. 
¶15 On 
December 
5, 
1996, 
a 
confidential 
informant 
identified Terry Griffith5 as the passenger who fled from the 
scene of the traffic stop.  The police arrested Griffith at his 
sister's apartment on that date.  Authorities later learned that 
Griffith had been an escapee from Kenosha Correctional Center 
since May 17, 1996. 
¶16 Griffith 
was 
charged 
with 
four 
offenses: 
 
(1) 
knowingly obstructing an officer while the officer was acting 
with lawful authority, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), 
as 
a 
habitual 
offender; 
(2) 
possession 
of 
a 
controlled 
substance, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(3g)(e)6 and 
961.14(4)(t),7 as a habitual offender; (3) escape from custody 
after a legal arrest, in violation of Wis. Stat. §946.42(3)(a);8 
and (4) theft of the handcuffs, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
                     
5 The informant actually gave the name "Terry Griffin," but 
Terry Griffith and Terry Griffin were identified as the same 
person in the police computer.   
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(3g) subsequently has been amended 
by 1999 Wis. Act 21, § 2; 1997 Wis. Act 183, § 45; and 1997 Wis. 
Act 
220. 
 
However, 
none 
of 
these 
amendments 
affects 
§ 961.41(3g)(e). 
7 1999 Wis. Act 21, § 1 amended § 961.14.  This amendment 
does not affect § 961.14(4)(t). 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.42 subsequently has been amended by 
1999 Wis. Act 9, 197 Wis. Act 283, and 1997 Wis. Act 35.  None 
of these amendments affects § 946.42(3)(a) as it applies to 
Griffith's case.   
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
8 
§ 943.20(1)(a), as a habitual offender.  Griffith pleaded not 
guilty to all of these charges.   
¶17 At Griffith's trial, the prosecution presented the 
testimony of several officers identifying Griffith as the rear 
passenger in the Bonneville.  The prosecution also presented 
evidence that Griffith had escaped from Kenosha Correctional 
Center on May 17, 1996.  Griffith presented a defense of 
mistaken identity, arguing that he was not the rear passenger.  
With regard to the theft charge, Griffith argued that whoever 
took the handcuffs did not do so with the intent to permanently 
deprive the officer of them.   
¶18 On June 11, 1997, the jury convicted Griffith on the 
first three charges but acquitted him of the theft charge.  The 
circuit court sentenced Griffith to one year for obstructing an 
officer, one year for possession of marijuana, and five years 
for escaping from the lawful arrest.  Each of these sentences 
was consecutive to the others and consecutive to the sentence 
that Griffith was serving at Kenosha Correctional Center before 
he escaped from that facility. 
¶19 Griffith sought postconviction relief on the basis 
that 
he 
had 
received 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.  
Griffith contended that his trial attorney should have raised a 
Fourth Amendment challenge to Officer Warmington's authority to 
ask the passenger his name and date of birth.  According to 
Griffith, once Robinson admitted he did not possess a valid 
driver's 
license, 
the 
investigation 
of 
suspected 
illegal 
activity was complete and Warmington had no lawful authority to 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
9 
ask these identification questions.  Griffith claimed that his 
trial counsel's failure to pursue this argument deprived him of 
the effective assistance of counsel. 
¶20 At the hearing on Griffith's postconviction motion, 
Griffith's trial attorney testified that she did not pursue this 
argument because she thought it lacked merit.  Judge Vuvunas 
agreed and indicated that even if the attorney had raised this 
argument, it would have been rejected.  The judge determined 
that trial counsel's performance therefore was not deficient.   
¶21 Griffith appealed.  The court of appeals first 
examined whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
challenge 
Warmington's 
lawful 
authority 
to 
ask 
the 
identification questions.  The court agreed with the circuit 
court that the argument was without merit.  The court then 
considered whether falsely answering identification questions 
constitutes a violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).  The court 
stated that Wisconsin law was not settled on this point, and 
that failing to raise an unsettled point of law could not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under State v. 
McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 84, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994).  
The court therefore affirmed Griffith's convictions. 
¶22 This court accepted Griffith's petition for review. 
II 
¶23 The question whether police conduct violated the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures is a question of constitutional fact.  State v. 
Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).  When a 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
10
Fourth Amendment challenge is raised at the trial court level, 
the trial court considers the evidence, makes findings of 
evidentiary or historical fact, and then resolves the issue by 
applying constitutional principles to those historical facts.  
State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶¶ 16-17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 
N.W.2d 552.  On review, this court gives deference to the trial 
court's 
findings 
of 
evidentiary 
or 
historical 
fact, 
but 
determines the question of constitutional fact independently.  
Id. at ¶ 18; Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 541. 
¶24 Because no Fourth Amendment issue was raised at the 
trial court level, there was no suppression motion at which the 
trial court considered the evidence of what occurred during the 
traffic stop and made findings of fact.  However, the parties 
agree that the trial testimony provides a sufficient record of 
the evidentiary facts surrounding the traffic stop, and there is 
no dispute of material fact.9  We therefore accept the 
evidentiary facts established in the trial testimony.  We 
independently 
determine 
whether 
under 
these 
facts 
the 
                     
9 Griffith disputes the jury's finding that he was the rear 
passenger in the Bonneville.  However, this fact is not material 
to the issue Griffith raises on appeal.  Griffith argues that 
even if he was the rear passenger, his obstructing charge is 
invalid 
because 
police 
lacked 
lawful 
authority 
to 
ask 
identification questions.  
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
11
questioning of the back seat passenger violated the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 1, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.10 
III 
¶25 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ."  Article 1, § 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution provides a nearly identical 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Griffith 
argues that Investigator Warmington committed an unreasonable 
search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and art. 
1, § 11 when he asked the back seat passenger his name and date 
of birth during the traffic stop. 
¶26 Police conduct that is not subject to the requirements 
of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is tested under 
the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  
To determine whether a search or seizure is "unreasonable," the 
                     
10 Although Griffith mentions art. 1, § 11, his argument is 
essentially based on the Fourth Amendment and the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court.  He cites only one Wisconsin 
case, State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  
In 
considering 
Griffith's 
arguments, 
we 
therefore 
refer 
primarily to decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  
However, our holding also applies to art. 1, § 11, because this 
court consistently follows the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when construing the 
related provisions of Wisconsin's constitution.  State v. Kiper, 
193 Wis. 2d 69, 80, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995).   
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
12
court first determines whether the initial interference with an 
individual's liberty was justified, and then considers whether 
subsequent police conduct was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the initial interference.  Id. at 
19-20. 
¶27 Griffith concedes that the initial interference with 
his liberty was justified in this case.  He acknowledges that 
the police acted with lawful authority when they blocked the 
Bonneville from exiting the driveway of the apartment complex, 
and that a lawful stop of a vehicle is lawful as to any occupant 
of the vehicle.  State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 260, 557 
N.W.2d 245 (1996).  He also does not challenge the officers' 
lawful authority to order the occupants of the Bonneville to 
remain inside the car as the officers approached.  See Maryland 
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997)(holding that for safety 
reasons an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to 
get out of a car).  In short, Griffith concedes that he was 
lawfully seized when the officers stopped the Bonneville and 
ordered the occupants to remain in the car. 
¶28 Griffith's argument is that this lawful seizure became 
unlawful when, having already determined that the driver had no 
valid license, Warmington asked the rear passenger his name and 
date of birth.  According to Griffith, these identification 
questions were "nonconsensual," because a reasonable person in 
the position of the passenger would not have felt free to 
disregard the officer's questions.  Griffith contends that under 
these circumstances, the identification questions transformed 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
13
the reasonable, lawful seizure into an unreasonable, unlawful 
seizure.   
¶29 In support of his argument, Griffith relies primarily 
on Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979).  We begin our 
consideration 
of 
Griffith's 
claim 
by 
examining 
Brown 
to 
determine whether its holding controls Griffith's case. 
¶30 In Brown, police officers in El Paso, Texas, were 
patrolling an area that was known to have a high incidence of 
drug traffic.  Id. at 48-49.  They observed two men walking away 
from one another in an alley at 12:45 in the afternoon.  Id. at 
48.  The officers believed that the men had been together or 
were about to meet before the patrol car appeared.  Id.  The 
officers entered the alley and asked one of the men to explain 
what he was doing in the alley.  Id. at 48-49.  The man refused 
to answer their questions and said that the officers had no 
right to stop him.  Id. at 49.  The police frisked him but 
discovered nothing.  Id.  Nonetheless, the officers arrested the 
man for violating a Texas statute that stated that "'[a] person 
commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or 
gives a false report of his name and residence address to a 
peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the 
information.'"  Id. at 49 (citing 1974 Tex. Crim. Stat. 
§ 38.02(a)).  The State of Texas argued that the officers were 
justified in stopping the defendant based on a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that some crime had just taken place or 
was about to take place.  Id. at 51.   
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
14
¶31 The Supreme Court rejected the State's argument.  The 
Court determined that none of the circumstances gave rise to any 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in criminal 
conduct.  Id. at 51-52.  The Court therefore held that the 
application 
of 
the 
statute 
to 
the 
defendant 
under 
the 
circumstances 
"violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
because 
the 
officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant 
was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct."  Id. at 53.   
¶32 Griffith contends that the holding in Brown applies to 
his case.  He argues that under Brown he cannot be punished for 
giving false answers in response to identification questions 
during the traffic stop, because the officers had already 
established that the suspected crime had occurred and they had 
no reasonable suspicion that the back seat passenger had done 
anything wrong. 
¶33 We cannot agree.  The crucial factor in Brown was that 
the defendant was never lawfully stopped.  Griffith, in 
contrast, was lawfully stopped as a passenger in a car that 
police suspected was being driven without a valid license. Thus, 
Griffith's reliance on Brown is misplaced because unlike the 
defendant in Brown, Griffith was the subject of an initially 
lawful stop. 
¶34 Griffith's challenge is more analogous to a secondary 
issue in Brown:  "whether an individual may be punished for 
refusing to identify himself in the context of a lawful 
investigatory 
stop 
which 
satisfies 
Fourth 
Amendment 
requirements."  Id. at 53 n.3.  However, this issue is not 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
15
precisely the same as the issue in Griffith's case, because 
Griffith did not refuse to identify himself; he gave false 
information.  In any case, Brown did not answer this secondary 
question.  Having determined that no lawful investigatory stop 
took place, the Supreme Court in Brown expressly declined to 
decide this issue.  Id.  
¶35 Griffith also claims that the questioning in his case 
was unlawful under Wis. Stat. § 968.24.  Section 968.24 
authorizes a law enforcement officer to stop a person when the 
officer reasonably suspects the person is involved in criminal 
activity.  Griffith notes that § 968.24 authorizes an officer to 
request identification from such a person.  He implies that 
because § 968.24 permits an officer to ask for identification 
under 
these 
circumstances, 
an 
officer 
may 
not 
ask 
for 
identification under other circumstances.  We reject this 
interpretation of § 968.24.  That statute does not prohibit law 
enforcement officers from asking individuals for identification. 
 Instead, it authorizes an officer to demand a person's name and 
address under one particular circumstancewhen the person is 
reasonably suspected of committing a crime.  Section 968.24 does 
not govern the lawfulness of the request for identification in 
this case. 
¶36 Thus, 
resolution 
of 
Griffith's 
argument 
is 
not 
controlled by Brown or by Wis. Stat. § 968.24.  Instead, we must 
make an independent examination of whether the police conduct 
subsequent 
to 
the 
initially 
lawful 
stop 
transformed 
the 
reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one.   
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
16
¶37 Brown sets forth the framework that guides our 
examination 
of 
whether 
the 
police 
conduct 
in 
this 
case 
constituted an unreasonable seizure: 
 
The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive 
than a traditional arrest depends "'on a balance 
between the public interest and the individual's right 
to personal security free from arbitrary interference 
by 
law 
officers.'" 
 
Consideration 
of 
the 
constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing 
of the gravity of the public concerns served by the 
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and the severity of the interference 
with individual liberty. 
Id. at 50 (internal citations omitted).   
¶38 When a person admits that he or she was lawfully 
seized during a traffic stop but argues that subsequent police 
conduct 
violated the Fourth 
Amendment, 
the 
reasonableness 
inquiry does not focus on the initial stop.  Instead, the focus 
is on "the incremental intrusion" that resulted from the 
subsequent police conduct.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 
109 (1977).  Thus, the issue in Griffith's case is whether the 
incremental intrusion that resulted from the identification 
questions was unreasonable.  To determine whether the intrusion 
was unreasonable, we must weigh the public interest served by 
the questioning against the incremental liberty intrusion that 
resulted from the questioning.  Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411-12; 
Brown, 443 U.S. at 50; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; and Terry, 392 
U.S. at 20-21.  
¶39 Griffith does not claim that it is always unreasonable 
for a police officer to ask a passenger his name and date of 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
17
birth during a traffic stop.  He acknowledges that the Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
not 
implicated 
whenever 
"a 
police 
officer 
approaches an individual and asks a few questions.  So long as a 
reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and 
go about his business,' . . . the encounter is consensual and no 
reasonable suspicion is required."  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 434 (1991).  In the absence of any reasonable, articulable 
suspicion, police may ask questions, request identification, and 
ask for consent to search, "as long as the police do not convey 
a message that compliance with their requests is required."  Id. 
at 434-35.   
¶40 However, Griffith argues that under the particular 
circumstances of his case, asking identification questions was 
unreasonable.  Griffith emphasizes two particular aspects of the 
surrounding 
circumstances. 
 
First, 
he 
asserts 
that 
the 
questioning went beyond the scope of the stop because at the 
time of the questioning, the driver had already admitted that he 
had no driver's license. 
 
Second, 
he asserts 
that the 
questioning was "nonconsensual," in the sense that no reasonable 
person under the circumstances would have felt free to ignore 
the questions or decline to answer.  The only case Griffith 
cites that supports his proposition that under these particular 
circumstances the questioning was an unreasonable seizure is 
Holt v. State, 487 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
¶41 We examine the facts that Griffith points to, as well 
as the rest of the surrounding circumstances, to determine 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
18
whether the questioning transformed the reasonable seizure into 
an unreasonable one.  
¶42 Warmington 
initiated 
the 
traffic 
stop 
of 
the 
Bonneville because he personally recognized the car as belonging 
to Malone, he knew that Malone had no license, and he thought he 
saw Malone in the driver's seat.  Once the car pulled into a 
parking lot, Warmington and Larrabee blocked it from exiting.  
The occupants of the car were directed to stay inside the car as 
Warmington and Larrabee approached.  At some point three 
additional officers arrived on the scene and stood nearby. 
¶43 Warmington and Larrabee approached the car and asked 
the 
driver 
and 
the 
front 
seat 
passenger 
for 
routine 
identification and licensing information.  Apparently within 
moments of speaking to Robinson and Malone, Officer Warmington 
saw the back seat passenger and thought he looked familiar. 
Almost immediately, Warmington asked the back seat passenger his 
name and date of birth.   
¶44 Although the passenger was already seized incidental 
to the lawful stop of the Bonneville, the officer's posing of 
these questions to the passenger did involve some incremental 
intrusion on the passenger's personal liberty.  To determine 
whether this intrusion was unreasonable, we must weigh the 
relevant public and private interests. 
¶45 On 
the 
public 
interest 
side, 
we 
conclude 
that 
permitting law enforcement officers to request identifying 
information from passengers in traffic stops serves the public 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
19
interest in several ways that are reasonably related to the 
purpose of a traffic stop.   
¶46 To 
begin 
with, 
there 
is 
a 
public 
interest 
in 
completing the investigation of the traffic violation that 
justified the stop in the first place.  The record does not 
support Griffith's assertion that the police had already 
completed their investigation when they asked the back seat 
passenger for his name or date of birth.  It is true that before 
Warmington asked the back seat passenger any questions, Robinson 
had already admitted that he had "lost" his license.  However, 
Robinson's 
response 
was 
ambiguous; 
it 
would 
establish 
a 
violation of either Wis. Stat. § 343.05(3)(a)11 or Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.18(1).12  There is no mention in the record that the 
officers attempted to determine Robinson's exact driving status 
at that time.  Thus, the officers may have wished to obtain 
                     
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.05(3)(a) provides: 
No person may operate a motor vehicle which is not a 
commercial vehicle upon a highway in this state unless 
the person possesses a valid operator's license issued 
to the person by the department which is not revoked, 
suspended, canceled or expired.  
 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.18(1) provides: 
Every licensee shall have his or her license document, 
including any special restrictions cards . . . in his 
or 
her 
immediate 
possession 
at 
all 
times 
when 
operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same 
upon demand from any judge, justice or traffic 
officer. 
 
§ 343.18(3) has been amended by 1997 Wis. Act 84, §§ 14 and 
15, but those amendments do not affect § 343.18(1). 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
20
information 
from 
the 
rear 
passenger 
to 
complete 
the 
investigation that justified the stop in the first place.  It is 
reasonable that they would begin by asking the passenger his 
name.   
¶47 Moreover, even if the officers had already determined 
that some particular violation had taken place, it seems 
reasonable under the circumstances that they would seek some 
additional information, such as whether anyone in the car was 
licensed to drive.  The officers knew that Malone had no 
license, and Robinson admitted that he did not have a license 
either.  Since neither the driver nor the front passenger could 
legally drive the car, there was some need to determine how the 
car would be removed from the apartment parking lot.  There is a 
public interest in determining whether a car must be towed at 
public expense or may be driven away by a private party.  
Permitting police officers to talk to passengers during a 
traffic stop will further this interest.  
¶48 We also agree with the State that there is a general 
public interest in attempting to obtain identifying information 
from witnesses to police-citizen encounters.  If witnesses are 
willing to identify themselves, they may later be able to assist 
police in locating the person who violated the law.  If 
questions later arise about police conduct during the stop, 
passengers may be able to provide information about what 
occurred during the stop.  Passengers are free to refuse to 
provide identifying information, but if they are willing to 
provide it, obtaining such information serves the public 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
21
interest. 
 
Permitting 
officers 
to 
request 
passengers 
to 
voluntarily provide identification serves the public interest.   
¶49 In sum, on the public side of the balance, we conclude 
that asking the rear passenger for identification furthered 
several legitimate public interests and was reasonably related 
to the purpose of the stop. 
¶50 On the private side of the balance, we examine the 
additional intrusion into the passenger's personal liberty that 
resulted from the officer's request for identification.   
¶51 We are not persuaded by Griffith's assertion that 
under 
the 
circumstances 
of 
this 
case 
the 
identification 
questions were so intrusive that they were "nonconsensual," in 
the sense that no reasonable person would have felt free to 
ignore the questions.  All of the events in this case took place 
in public view, in the parking lot of an apartment complex.  The 
record suggests that the entire encounter, from the time that 
the officers blocked the exit of the parking lot to the time 
that they asked the back seat passenger for identification, took 
only a few minutes.  The officers spoke with Robinson and 
Malone, received information suggesting that neither of them was 
licensed to drive the car, and then asked the passenger some 
questions about his identity.  
¶52 The passenger had every right to decline to answer, 
and his refusal to answer could not have resulted in a 
prosecution for obstructing an officer.  Henes v. Morrissey, 194 
Wis. 2d 338, 353-54, 533 N.W.2d 802 (1995)(explaining that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.41 
does 
not 
criminalize 
refusal 
to 
give 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
22
information).  His refusal to answer also would not have given 
rise to any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  Bostick, 501 
U.S. at 437 (noting that a refusal to cooperate, without more, 
does not furnish the objective justification needed for a 
detention or seizure).   
¶53 Of course, as the State acknowledges, a reasonable 
person in the position of the passenger would have felt somewhat 
less free to ignore the officer's questions than would a person 
who was not temporarily detained at the time of the questioning. 
 Griffith also emphasizes that this was an unusual traffic stop 
because it was conducted by plainclothes detectives in an 
unmarked car and three additional officers arrived at the scene. 
 However, any time that a police officer requests information 
from an individual, the individual is likely to feel some 
pressure to respond.  Nonetheless, an officer's mere posing of a 
question does not constitute a "seizure" under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.  Under the circumstances 
of this case, we are not persuaded that the simple questions 
"What is your name?" and "What is your date of birth?" were so 
intrusive that they transformed the otherwise reasonable seizure 
into an unreasonable one. 
¶54 This does not end our inquiry.  Even if the questions 
themselves are not unreasonably intrusive, questioning can 
transform a reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one if it 
extends the stop beyond the time necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of the stop.  See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
684-85 
(1985). 
 
"[I]f 
an 
investigative 
stop 
continues 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
23
indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an 
investigative stop."  Id. at 685.  To determine whether the stop 
was unreasonably prolonged, the court must consider the law 
enforcement purposes to be served by the stop and the time 
reasonably needed to accomplish those purposes.  Id.  
¶55 We have already noted that the record does not 
establish that the investigation of the traffic violation was 
complete when the questions were posed to the back seat 
passenger.  Moreover, even if the officers had already obtained 
all of the necessary information to establish the traffic 
violation, it is clear that the time needed to ask the 
identification questions was very brief.   
¶56 The court of appeals has held that the brief period of 
time it takes to ask a question does not unreasonably prolong a 
temporary detention.  State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 609, 
558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996)(holding that a detention was not 
unreasonably prolonged by the asking of one question).  We agree 
with the court of appeals that this conclusion is implied by the 
United States Supreme Court's holding in Ohio v Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33 (1996).  See Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 608. 
¶57 Robinette 
considered 
whether 
"a 
lawfully 
seized 
defendant must be advised that he is 'free to go' before his 
consent to search will be recognized as voluntary."  Robinette, 
519 U.S. at 35.  After stopping a vehicle for speeding, an 
officer issued a verbal warning, returned the driver's license, 
and then asked whether the driver was carrying contraband.  Id. 
at 35-36.  The driver answered no and then consented to a search 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
24
of his car.  Id. at 36.  The search turned up illegal drugs.  
Id.  The driver was charged and convicted of possessing a 
controlled substance.  Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court overturned 
the defendant's conviction on the grounds that under federal and 
state constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, an officer must always inform a person that he or 
she is free to go before attempting to obtain consent to a 
search.  Id. at 36 (citing State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 
696 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Robinette, 519 U.S. 33). 
¶58 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40.  The 
Court rejected a per se rule requiring officers to inform 
motorists that they were free to go before asking for consent to 
search.  Id. at 39-40.  Instead, the Court held that the 
voluntariness of consent to search is always a fact-specific 
question 
to 
be 
determined 
from 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances.  Id. at 40. 
¶59 Gaulrapp involved a situation similar to Robinette.  
The driver in Gaulrapp was stopped for having a loud muffler.  
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 603.  After obtaining identification 
and discussing the problem with the muffler, the officer asked 
the motorist whether he had any drugs or weapons inside the 
vehicle.  Id.  The motorist said that he did not, and the 
officer asked for permission to search the vehicle.  Id.  The 
motorist consented, and the search turned up drugs.  Id. at 603-
04.   
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
25
¶60 The defendant in Gaulrapp conceded that the initial 
stop was lawful but argued that the detention became unlawful 
when police went beyond the initial purpose of the stop and 
asked him about drugs and weapons and for consent to search.  
Id. at 606.  The court of appeals noted that the argument that 
consent is invalid if the request to search is unrelated to the 
scope of the initial detention is difficult to reconcile with 
Robinette's holding that the defendant's consent to search might 
have been valid under the circumstances.  Id. at 608.  The court 
therefore concluded that the questions posed to the defendant in 
Gaulrapp did not unreasonably prolong the seizure.  Id. at 609. 
¶61 Griffith makes an argument that is analogous to the 
defendant's argument in Gaulrapp.  Griffith contends that the 
identification questioning was unreasonable because it occurred 
after Robinson admitted that he did not have a license.  We 
agree with the court of appeals' conclusion in Gaulrapp that the 
length of time required to ask a question is not sufficiently 
intrusive to transform a reasonable, lawful stop into an 
unreasonable, unlawful one.  
¶62 In sum, on the private side of the equation, we find 
that the additional interference with the passenger's personal 
liberty that resulted from the identification questions was 
minimal.  The passenger was already seized pursuant to a lawful 
traffic stop.  The only change in the passenger's circumstances 
that resulted from the questioning is that rather than sitting 
silently while being temporarily detained, he had to decide 
whether to answer the officer's questions.  The passenger 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
26
probably felt some obligation to respond to the officer's 
questions, but he was under no legal obligation to do so and 
could not have been prosecuted for refusing to respond.   
¶63 Weighing the public interest served by permitting 
police to 
request 
identifying information 
from 
passengers 
against the incremental 
intrusion upon 
individual privacy 
interests, we conclude that the public interests are substantial 
and the interference with private liberty interests is de 
minimis.  We therefore hold that the identification questions 
did not transform the reasonable search into an unreasonable one 
under the circumstances of this case.13 
¶64 Griffith points to a decision of the Georgia Court of 
Appeals that contradicts this holding.  See Holt, 487 S.E.2d at 
632-33 (holding that an officer lacked authority to request 
identification from a passenger in the absence of a reasonable 
basis for believing that the passenger was engaged in criminal 
activity).  Holt is distinguishable factually from Griffith's 
case because the driver in Holt had a valid driver's license and 
the officers had already issued a citation before they began 
                     
13 In reaching this holding, we do not claim that "Griffith 
was not seized upon the questioning as to his identity," dissent 
at ¶ 85, and we do not "lower[] the [constitutional] standard to 
meet the facts in this case." Dissent at ¶ 101.  Griffith was 
seized at the time of the questioning.  This fact is what 
requires us to focus on the "incremental intrusion" that 
resulted from the questioning, rather than on the circumstances 
of the initial stop.  See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 10, 
109 (1977).  In adherence to the law, we conclude that the 
incremental intrusion that resulted from the questioning did not 
transform the lawful, reasonable seizure into an unlawful, 
unreasonable one. 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
27
asking questions of the passengers.  See id. at 630.  In 
addition, Holt's holding is based on the reasoning that a 
request for identification is an "interrogation" that is 
unreasonable in the absence of some justification beyond the 
reasonable suspicion that justifies the initial stop.  See id. 
at 632.  For the reasons already stated, we are not persuaded by 
this reasoning.   
¶65 We hold instead that when a passenger has been seized 
pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, the seizure does not become 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment or art. 1, § 11 simply 
because an officer asks the passenger for identification during 
the stop.  Passengers are free to decline to answer such 
questions, and refusal to answer will not justify prosecution 
nor give rise to any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  
However, if a passenger chooses to answer but gives the officer 
false information, the passenger can be charged with obstructing 
an officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
IV 
¶66 Griffith claims that our holding is inconsistent with 
the legitimate expectations of privacy of a free citizenry.  He 
argues that our holding will subject individuals in automobiles 
to the unfettered discretionary decisions of individual police 
officers.  He cites Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 
(1979), in which the Supreme Court held that in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, discretionary spot checks of driver's 
licenses and vehicle registration cannot be justified by the 
marginal public interest in roadway safety.  He contends that an 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
28
unreasonable seizure occurs when a police officer poses the 
question "What is your name?" to a passenger during a traffic 
stop, if the officer lacks any reasonable suspicion that the 
passenger is or has been involved in wrongdoing. 
¶67 Griffith is certainly correct that an individual 
traveling in an automobile does not lose all legitimate 
expectations of privacy.  He is also correct that individuals 
may not be subjected to selective, discretionary intrusions upon 
their legitimate expectations of privacy.   
¶68 However, we do not hold that officers may conduct 
discretionary investigative stops of vehicles in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion.  We also do not hold that officers may 
make 
selective, 
discretionary 
decisions 
to 
request 
identification based on unconstitutional considerations.  We 
only hold that neither the Fourth Amendment nor art. 1, § 11 
prohibits 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
from 
asking 
for 
identification from a passenger who has been incidentally and 
lawfully seized in a traffic stop, when, as in this case, the 
passenger is free to refuse the request. 
¶69 Any other rule would be unreasonable.  Griffith 
acknowledges that a law enforcement officer who is walking down 
the street is free to pose the question, "What is your name?" to 
any passerby, so long as the officer does not send the message 
that the passerby must answer.  Yet he seeks a rule that the 
same officer may not pose that question to a passenger during a 
lawful traffic stop, even if the officer does not require the 
passenger to answer the question.  We reject Griffith's 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
29
contention 
that 
the 
mere 
question 
"What 
is 
your 
name?" 
transforms a reasonable, lawful seizure into an unreasonable, 
unlawful one.14   
¶70 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
 
                     
14 Of course, no individual may be compelled to incriminate 
himself or herself.  U.S. Const. amend. V; Wis. Const. art. 1, 
§ 8(1).  Our holding does not impair this right to avoid self-
incrimination.  The United States Supreme Court has held that 
persons temporarily detained in ordinary traffic stops are not 
"in custody" and therefore not subject to the rule in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 440 (1984); see also State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 
449, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).  However, the Court made clear that 
if a detained motorist is treated in such a manner that he or 
she is rendered "in custody" for practical purposes, Miranda 
protections are triggered.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.  Griffith 
does not claim that the questioning in this case violated his 
right to avoid incriminating himself. 
No. 
98-0931-CR 
 
 
30
 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶71 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).   The crux of this 
case is whether a reasonable person in Terry Griffith's position 
would have felt free to disregard the officer's questions and to 
go about his business.  The majority answers this question in 
the affirmative.  I disagree. 
¶72 The facts reveal that the Bonneville, in which 
Griffith was a rear passenger, entered a residential driveway 
and stopped.  Detectives Larrabee and Warmington pulled into the 
driveway behind the vehicle to block any attempted exit.  As 
Tyrone Malone began to exit the Bonneville with the intent to 
enter the residence, the officers approached the vehicle while 
displaying their badges and ordered Malone and all other 
occupants to remain inside the vehicle. 
¶73 Investigator 
Geller, 
responding 
to 
a 
call 
for 
assistance, arrived next on the scene in an unmarked squad car. 
 On his heels followed the arrival of Patrol Officer Jackson in 
a marked squad car and Patrol Officer Waystedt in a separate 
marked squad car. 
¶74 It is against this backdrop of a blocked exit and an 
order to remain inside the car, surrounded by five police 
officers and four police vehicles, that the majority concludes a 
reasonable person in Griffith's position would have enjoyed the 
freedom to disregard Officer Warmington's questions and go about 
his business.  The test set forth in Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 437 (1991), establishes that in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion, police may ask questions of an individual 
"so long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
2 
with their requests is required."  The facts in this case fail 
to meet that test. 
¶75 I agree with the majority that the initial traffic 
stop in this case, supported by reasonable and articulable 
suspicion, constituted a lawful seizure of Griffith.  A 
reasonable seizure as to the driver of a detained car is 
necessarily reasonable as to all other occupants of the car.  
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 254-57, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).   
¶76 The request for Griffith’s identification, however, 
severed the constitutional chain stemming from the initial 
vehicle stop and was not part and parcel of one lawful 
detention.  See Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 260 n.14.15  Griffith was 
seized apart from the traffic stop when he was questioned while 
not enjoying the freedom to terminate the interrogation.  This 
seizure was unreasonable because it was not supported by either 
individualized 
suspicion 
or 
a 
legitimate 
law 
enforcement 
purpose.  Griffith’s interrogation therefore violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.    
¶77 Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
centers 
on 
the 
preservation of an "inestimable right of personal security." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).  Not all interrogations 
relating 
to 
one's 
identity 
infringe 
upon 
this 
right 
or 
                     
15  In State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 260 n.14, 557 
N.W.2d 245 (1996), this court recognized that a reasonable 
traffic stop does not foreclose the assessment of a subsequent 
detention that is subject to Fourth Amendment constraints. 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
3 
constitute seizures implicating concerns of an unconstitutional 
magnitude.  I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).  
Effective 
police 
practice 
may 
indeed 
warrant 
identity 
questioning under other facts. 
¶78 Such questioning assumes the status of a seizure only 
when the facts taken in the aggregate demonstrate a show of 
official authority such that a reasonable person would not feel 
free to walk away from the questions posed.  Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion).   Essentially, one 
is seized in the absence of freedom to terminate the encounter 
and to disregard the interrogation.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436-
37.   
¶79 The majority concedes that the questions posed to 
Griffith intruded upon his personal liberty.  Majority op. at   
 ¶44.  The majority further concedes that a person in Griffith’s 
position 
would 
feel 
"less 
free 
to 
ignore 
the 
officer’s 
questions."  Majority op. at ¶53.  Yet, the majority perpetuates 
a legal fiction by reasoning that Griffith could have chosen not 
to respond under the facts presented. 
¶80 After following the Bonneville as it entered a 
residential driveway, Detectives Larrabee and Warmington pulled 
in behind the car and blocked the driveway to prevent the car's 
exit.  Blocking a person’s path or exit constitutes conduct that 
a reasonable person would deem threatening and suggests that a 
seizure has occurred.  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 9.3(a), at 103-04 (3d ed. 1996). 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
4 
¶81 Emerging from his car and displaying a police badge as 
he approached the Bonneville, Officer Warmington then ordered 
the occupants of the Bonneville to remain inside the car.  This 
command to stay in the car represented an obvious show of force 
that precluded Griffith from walking away from the situation.  
See State v. Mendez, 970 P.2d 722, 729 (Wash. 1999) (noting that 
police officer's order for passenger to get back into the car 
constituted a seizure of passenger).   
¶82 Although 
the 
restriction 
of 
mobility 
does 
not 
necessarily lead to a determination that Griffith was unable to 
disregard the officer’s questions, it nevertheless represents a 
critical factor indicating that Griffith was seized.  "An 
unequivocal verbal command is far more likely to produce the 
perception of restricted liberty than a mere approach."  People 
v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).   
¶83 Three additional law enforcement officers arrived in 
three separate squad cars and stood next to the Bonneville as 
Griffith was questioned.  Thus, a total of five police officers 
and four police vehicles were present at the scene of the 
interrogation.  The presence of numerous law enforcement 
officers surrounding a person represents yet another factor 
indicating a seizure.  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980); LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.3(a) at 104. 
¶84 The majority seeks shelter from the length of the 
detention and presumes that Griffith’s questioning followed 
shortly after the stop of the vehicle.   Majority op. at ¶¶ 54-
56, 61.  This emphasis on the duration of the stop ignores the 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
5 
intimidating 
nature 
of 
the 
circumstances 
involved.  
Interrogation that lasts one minute under a coercive atmosphere 
lasts one minute too long. 
¶85 Taken 
together, 
the 
facts 
surrounding 
Griffith's 
interrogation compel the conclusion that a reasonable person in 
his position would not have enjoyed the freedom to terminate the 
encounter with Officer Warmington or to disregard the questions 
posed and to go about his business.16  Indeed, it is fanciful to 
claim that Griffith was not seized upon the questioning as to 
his identity. 
¶86 Once a seizure had been established, the subsequent 
inquiry centers on the reasonableness of that seizure.  The 
seizure in this case may have survived constitutional scrutiny 
if it were nevertheless reasonable.  It was not.  The touchstone 
of analysis under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness in view 
of the totality of the circumstances.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.  
                     
16 In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991), the 
United States Supreme Court suggested that the bus passenger who 
had been asked for consent to a search of his bags was not 
seized because a reasonable person in his position would have 
felt free to terminate the encounter with the law enforcement 
officers.  One of the factors upon which the Court hinged its 
determination was that the officers had conveyed to the 
passenger his right to refuse consent.  Id.  The Court mentioned 
that the passenger's knowledge of his right to refuse consent 
was a fact "particularly worth noting."  Id. at 432. 
No steadfast and blanket requirement exists mandating that 
officers advise a detained passenger of the right to refrain 
from answering questions.  However, in the circumstances of this 
case, the absence of such advisement is another factor that 
reveals the intimidating nature of Griffith’s interrogation. 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
6 
To 
be 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
a 
seizure 
ordinarily must be predicated on individualized suspicion of 
misconduct.  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997); 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.   
¶87 To that end, Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), is 
instructive.  Although the majority attempts to distinguish the 
relevance of Brown, it acknowledges the general proposition for 
which the case stands.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 29-34.  Brown 
cautions 
that 
absent 
reasonable 
suspicion 
of 
individual 
misconduct, officers may not seize a person for the purposes of 
requiring identification or questioning related to that person's 
identity.  443 U.S. at 51-52.  See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 
(discussing Brown). 
¶88 As mentioned, Griffith was seized subsequent to the 
initial traffic stop when he was questioned in circumstances 
evincing the inability to disregard the questioning.  Rather 
than reflecting any reasonable suspicion of misconduct, Officer 
Warmington's trial testimony indicates that he acted on the 
proverbial "hunch[]" that Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, explicitly 
refused to sanction:    
Q: 
Was there a third person inside that vehicle? 
A: 
Yes, there was. 
Q: 
And where was that person seated? 
A: 
To the left rear behind the driver. 
 
Q: 
What were your initial observations when you first saw 
him? 
 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
7 
A: 
Light skinned black male, square jaw, blemishes on his 
face, appeared to be somebody that to me I knew I had 
contact with.  I couldn't recall the party's name. 
 
Q: 
Did you ask the rear passenger for any identification? 
 
A: 
Yes, I did.  
¶89 No 
specific 
and 
articulable 
facts 
constituting 
reasonable suspicion can be gleaned from the record to support 
the intrusion posed by Griffith's interrogation.  A hint of 
recognition 
is 
an 
inadequate 
justification, 
absent 
individualized 
suspicion, 
for 
subjecting the 
passenger to 
questioning that infringes upon the passenger's protected right 
of privacy and that occurs in an atmosphere of intimidation. 
¶90 Absent individualized suspicion, a determination of 
reasonableness 
hinges 
on 
whether 
important 
governmental 
objectives are to be advanced by the seizure.  Limited 
circumstances may render a seizure reasonable despite the 
absence of such suspicion if the privacy interests implicated by 
the seizure are minimal, and an important governmental interest 
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a 
requirement of individualized suspicion.  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 
314 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 
U.S. 602, 624 (1989)).  Here, the actual record is devoid of any 
reference to legitimate law enforcement objectives or public 
interest concerns to justify the intrusion upon Griffith's right 
to privacy.     
¶91 There is no testimony whatsoever in the record 
supporting the majority's theory that the questions directed at 
Griffith were asked to further the investigation.  In the 
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
8 
absence of testimony to support its theory, the majority 
nevertheless imputes such motivation to the officers.  What the 
record reveals instead is that the officers confirmed the basis 
of their traffic stop when they discovered that the driver of 
the Bonneville indeed had been driving without a license.  
¶92 If, as the majority claims, any ambiguity existed 
concerning Damien Robinson's particular driving status, neither 
the majority nor the officers have adequately explained how 
requesting Griffith's name, age, and apparently his home address 
would illuminate the officers as to Robinson's driving status.  
Rather, a check with the Department of Motor Vehicles would have 
remedied any ambiguity. 
¶93 Furthermore, the officers never expressed the intent 
to inquire whether Griffith himself had a valid license so that 
he could drive the Bonneville out of the driveway.  The fact 
that the Bonneville had entered a residential driveway and that 
Malone intended to enter the residence suggests that the 
occupants had reached their destination.  Unlike a traffic stop 
on a highway, here there is nothing to suggest that the car 
needed to be removed from its location. 
¶94 People v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984), presents similar facts to this case.  The passenger in 
Spicer had been lawfully stopped based on a suspected traffic 
violation.  Upon discovering that the driver of the car was 
intoxicated and unable to drive, one officer requested a 
driver's license from the passenger.  As she searched for the 
license, the officer discovered a gun in her purse.  
No. 98-0931-CR.awb 
 
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¶95 The passenger's motion to suppress the weapon was 
granted and eventually upheld.  The court concluded that she had 
been seized when asked for her license because the encounter was 
sufficiently intimidating to preclude her refusal of the 
officer's request.  Id. at 602-03.  In the absence of 
individualized suspicion as to the passenger, the request for 
identification constituted an unlawful seizure.  Id. at 604-05.  
¶96 The Spicer court acknowledged that the officer had 
presented a legitimate basis for his request: in the event that 
the driver was arrested for drunk driving and the vehicle was 
charged to the care of the passenger, the officer wished to 
verify that the passenger possessed a valid California driver's 
license.  Id. at 601.  Nevertheless, the court determined that 
the officer's failure to convey this justification to the 
passenger contributed to the coercive nature of the request.  
Id. at 603.  
¶97 Unlike the officer's testimony in Spicer, in the 
present case there is no testimony whatsoever suggesting that 
Officer Warmington predicated his request for Griffth's name and 
age on furthering a legitimate governmental objective.  Although 
the majority imputes to the officer motives of promoting the 
public interest, the record provides no intimation of these 
laudable motives.   
¶98 What the record reveals instead is an officer acting 
on an "inarticulate hunch[]."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.  Weighing 
the unexpressed public interest against Griffith's interest in 
personal security tips the scale in favor of Griffith's right to 
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be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement under 
these particular facts.  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 878 (1975).17     
¶99 It is of course a proper police procedure to request 
identification in a myriad of situations, but not here.  
Griffith was questioned under circumstances in which he was not 
free to disregard the police questions and to go about his 
business.  This seizure was unreasonable because based on the 
record it was not supported by either individualized suspicion 
or a desire to further a legitimate law enforcement objective. 
¶100 By dismissing the significant degree of intimidation 
in this case, as well as the absence of both individualized 
suspicion 
and 
legitimate 
law 
enforcement 
objectives, 
the 
majority 
sanctions 
the 
indiscriminate 
interrogation 
of 
a 
countless number of passengers whose only transgression is their 
presence in vehicles stopped for traffic violations.  It is the 
                     
17 The majority attempts to distinguish Holt v. State, 487 
S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), but does so without success.  In 
both Holt and the present case, the basis for the initial stop 
had 
been 
confirmed 
prior 
to 
the 
interference 
with 
the 
passenger's privacy interests in the form of a request for 
identification.   
The fact that the driver in Holt had a valid driver's 
license, as well as the fact that the officer had issued 
citations prior to the unlawful questioning, represent factual 
distinctions without a difference for the purposes of the 
present analysis.  Holt stands for the proposition that an 
officer lacking reasonable and individualized suspicion of 
criminal activity is not engaged in the lawful discharge of 
official duties when inquiring about a person's identity and 
age.  487 S.E.2d at 632-33. 
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concern of sanctioning such indiscriminate interrogation that 
spurs a dissent in this fact-specific case. 
¶101 Facts 
shape 
the 
contours 
of 
our 
constitutional 
guarantees.  When the majority lowers the standard to meet the 
facts in this case, it dilutes the constitutional rights of us 
all.  Bit by bit, almost unnoticed, our constitutional freedoms 
may be eroded until one day we awaken to discover that those 
freedoms for which so many have fought and sacrificed have been 
diminished.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
¶102 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
 
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