Title: Big-O Tires, Inc. v. Santini

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Big-O Tires, Inc. v. Santini1992 WY 116838 P.2d 1169Case Number: 91-38, 91-39Decided: 09/11/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
BIG-O TIRES, INC.; Cheyenne Tire Center, Inc.; and Scott 
Stone,

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Margherita SANTINI and 
Cowboy Dodge, Inc.,

 Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Margherita 
SANTINI,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BIG-O TIRES, INC.; and 
Cheyenne Tire Center, Inc., 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District Court,    
Laramie    
County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Peter K. Michael 
and William M. McKellar of Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, for Big-O 
Tires, Inc., Cheyenne Tire Center, Inc., and Scott Stone.

Jane A. Villemez 
of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for Margherita 
Santini.

Ernest W. Halle, 
Cheyenne, for 
Cowboy Dodge, Inc.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal, as 
its major subject of attention, addresses whether the jury was suitably 
instructed in a defective retread tire case where the mix of causes of action 
included strict products liability and negligence, as well as an assertion of 
deceit and misrepresentation. The jury awarded a prorated $144,000 verdict for 
products liability and, in a separate verdict, awarded $50,000 for deceit. The 
products liability judgment was paid and this appeal addresses only the judgment 
awarded for deceit. Some of the defendants insist the instructions permitted the 
jury to award the plaintiff a double recovery of damages for her injuries. These 
same defendants also discern an abuse of discretion in the district court's 
apportionment of the award of plaintiff's costs among the various defendants. 
The plaintiff contends the district court erred in granting a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of one defendant on the deceit and 
misrepresentation cause of action.

[¶2]      We reverse the 
order granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but otherwise affirm 
the judgments of the district court.

I. ISSUES 
PRESENTED

[¶3]      In Case No. 
91-38, appellants, Big-O Tires, Inc. (Big-O) and Cheyenne Tire Center, Inc. 
(Cheyenne Tire),1 pose these issues:

I. Whether a plaintiff 
may be awarded double damages for personal injury - once based on product 
liability theories, and a second time based on a fraud theory[.]

II. Whether a district 
court abuses its discretion when it allows a defendant to pay only 3% of the 
plaintiffs costs, even though the jury has found that the defendant shared 38.5% 
of the fault ascribed to the defendants who went to trial[.]

[¶4]      In response to 
these assertions of error, appellee, Margherita Santini (Santini) poses these 
queries:

I. Whether a plaintiff is 
entitled to recover damages for her personal injuries due to defendants' fraud, 
where the jury was required to segregate plaintiff's damages due to fraud on a 
separate verdict form, and where the jury was specifically instructed not to 
duplicate damages in compensating plaintiff.

II. Whether the trial 
court properly distributed costs among defendants.

[¶5]      Appellee, Cowboy 
Dodge, Inc., responds with this query:

Whether or not the 
district court abused its discretion in its allocation of the costs to be paid 
among the several defendants[.]

[¶6]      In Case No. 
91-39, Santini states this single issue:

Whether substantial 
evidence in the record supports the jury's verdict against Scott Stone for 
deceit and misrepresentation.

[¶7]      And in response, 
Scott Stone (Stone), who was the President of Cheyenne Tire at the time Santini 
made her purchase, contends:

Whether the district 
court correctly rendered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of 
defendant Scott Stone.

[¶8]      The initial 1989 
complaint alleged Santini's purchase of two "Proform" tires from Cheyenne Tire. 
Five months and about six thousand miles later, while driving in the eastbound 
lane of I-80, west of Cheyenne, Wyoming, the tread separated from the carcass of 
one of these tires, wrapped around the axle and caused Santini to lose control 
of the car. Santini was thrust sideways into a tractor-trailer truck which she 
was passing at the time the tire failed. The car rolled on to its top and slid 
down the highway until coming to repose. Santini was seriously injured in the 
accident. Her complaint stated causes of action for strict products liability, 
violation of the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act, breach of warranty, 
negligence, negligent supervision, punitive damages and, of particular 
significance to this appeal, deceit and misrepresentation.

II. FACTS 
PRESENTED

[¶9]      We shall recite 
the evidence relating to the deceit and misrepresentation claim from a 
perspective most favorable to Santini. Its primary pertinence in this appeal is 
whether we must sustain Santini's claim that the district court erroneously 
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Stone on the deceit and 
misrepresentation claim. Santini testified she was enticed into Cheyenne Tire by 
an advertisement which touted "Proform" tires. The advertisement did not 
identify the tires as being retreads, or remanufactured tires, and Santini 
claimed this was done intentionally. While she was at Cheyenne Tire, she was 
first shown more expensive tires, but when she asked about the "Proforms" the 
salesperson showed them to her with the representation they were "good, new 
tires." No mention was made to her that they were retreads or remanufactured 
tires and her sales receipt also only listed them as "Proforms." Santini 
associated the product name "Proform" with "performance," and said she would not 
have gone to Cheyenne Tire, nor would she have bought the tires in question, if 
she had known they were retreads. Stone did not sell Santini the tires at issue, 
but he did prepare the advertisement which prompted Santini to shop at Cheyenne 
Tire. He also trained his sales personnel to avoid using the terminology 
"retread" or "recap" in selling retreaded or remanufactured tires. In addition, 
expert testimony established that the tire carcass used in the defective tire 
was of a brand which many remanufacturers would not use in the retreading 
business because they are known to be subject to the very sort of failure which 
occurred in this instance.

[¶10]   Originally, Big-O, Cheyenne Tire, 
Stone, and Norva Corporation (the manufacturer of the defective tire) were named 
as defendants. Norva Corporation reached a settlement with Santini before trial. 
On July 20, 1990, the district court entered an order permitting joinder of 
Cowboy Dodge, Inc. Cowboy Dodge had serviced Santini's car on July 19, 1988. The 
service receipt indicates the car was brought in for service because the "left 
front wheel [was] noisy when turning," and the work performed on the car by the 
dealership was described as, "adj. all eng. mounts & rotate tires - front 
tire (bad)." Santini claimed that she did not see the notation on the invoice 
and was not given any other notice of the problem with the tire, which had now 
been rotated to the rear axle of her car where a defect would be less 
noticeable.

III. ARGUMENT - DOUBLE 
RECOVERY BASED ON THE DUAL VERDICTS

[¶11]   As their first issue, Big-O and 
Cheyenne Tire challenge instructions which they assert permitted the jury to 
award Santini a double recovery: one based on the theory of fault and a second 
based on the theory of deceit and misrepresentation. The contentions of both 
parties were summarized in these instructions to the jury:

     Margherita Santini is 
the Plaintiff in this case. She has brought this action against Defendants Big O 
Tires, Inc., Cheyenne Tire, Inc., Scott Stone, and Cowboy Dodge, Inc., to 
recover for injuries that she sustained on August 8, 1988, when the left rear 
tire on her vehicle failed at highway speed on Interstate 80, west of   
             
              
             
          
                 
               
Cheyenne. Specifically, 
Mrs. Santini contends that the tread and belt separated from the tire carcass 
and wrapped around the axle, causing the wheel to stop turning. As a result, 
Mrs. Santini alleges that her vehicle veered out of control, struck the semi 
tractor-trailer that she was passing and overturned. Mrs. Santini further 
contends that the failed tire was a retread which was sold to her as a new tire, 
and that she was not advised that the tire was a retread until after the 
accident.

     Defendant Cheyenne 
Tire, Inc., is the franchised Big O Tire dealer which sold two tires to Mrs. 
Santini on March 9, 1988. Defendant Scott Stone was co-owner of Cheyenne Tire, 
Inc. at the time of this sale. Defendant Big O Tires, Inc., is a franchisor of 
retail tire stores, including Cheyenne Tire, Inc.

     Mrs. Santini alleges 
that the failed tire was defective when Cheyenne Tire, Inc., sold it to her and 
that the Cheyenne Tire, Inc., salesperson failed to advise her that it was a 
retread. She further contends that Cheyenne Tire, Inc., and its owner, Scott 
Stone, committed deceit and misrepresentation by advertising and promoting 
Proform brand tires as new, when, in fact, they were retreaded, Acut-read brand 
tires. Mrs. Santini also contends that Cheyenne Tire, Inc., breached the implied 
warranty of merchantability by selling a tire which was not fit for its intended 
use.

     Mrs. Santini further 
contends that Big O Tires, Inc., as the franchisor of the local Big O Tire 
Store, is responsible for the wrongdoings of its franchisee. She further 
contends that Big O Tires, Inc., is liable to her for its failure to properly 
supervise the advertising and sales practices of its local 
franchisee.

     Defendant Cowboy 
Dodge, Inc., serviced Mrs. Santini's car three weeks prior to the accident and 
discovered a bad tire. Mrs. Santini contends that Defendant Cowboy Dodge, Inc., 
is liable to her for failing to warn her that her tire was bad and created a 
dangerous condition, by rotating the tire to the rear of the vehicle where the 
defect was less noticeable, and for failing to correct this hazard.

     Mrs. Santini contends 
that as a result of these actions by Defendants, she suffered severe injuries 
and damage when the tire failed and caused her vehicle to wreck.

     Finally, Mrs. Santini 
contends that Big O Tires, Inc., Cheyenne Tire, Inc., and Scott Stone should be 
assessed punitive damages for their willful and wanton misconduct.

* * * * * *

     Defendants deny that 
they are responsible for the injuries and damages which Plaintiff alleges to 
have sustained.

     They contend that at 
the time of the sale, the tire was of merchantable quality and was not in a 
defective condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous. Rather, Defendants 
contend that the tire became dangerous when it was damaged due to a road hazard 
after it left the possession of Cheyenne Tire.

     Defendants contend 
that the accident was caused by a separation in the steel belts of the tire 
which was initiated due to damage caused by the road hazard and was not due to 
any defect in the tire. Defendants further contend that Mrs. Santini was 
negligent in driving on the tire in a damaged condition because she failed to 
take appropriate action after she knew or should have known of the damaged 
condition of the tire.

     Defendants also 
contend that Mrs. Santini was advised that she was purchasing a remanufactured 
tire at the time of the sale.

     Defendant Big-O 
contends that it is not responsible for the acts of its franchisees because it 
does not control the actions or conduct of the franchisees, nor the advertising 
practices of the franchisees.

     Defendants Big-O, 
Cheyenne Tire, Inc. and Scott Stone contend that they committed no willful or 
wanton misconduct and that punitive damages are not appropriate.

     Defendant Cowboy 
Dodge, Inc., contends that Mrs. Santini was in fact warned of the bad tire and 
that the tire was not defective to a point where corrective action was 
needed.

[¶12]   The jury was also instructed that, 
"[a] direct cause of an injury is a cause which in direct, unbroken sequence 
produces the injury. It is one without which the injury would not have 
occurred." Following up on that instruction, the jury learned that there may be 
more than one cause of an injury and that such causes "do not always occur 
simultaneously. One cause may be continuous in operation and joined with another 
cause occurring at a later time." The jury was instructed as to Santini's burden 
of proof if she were to establish any or all of her various claims. The jury was 
also given Instruction No. 18A, and it forms the centerpiece of this 
controversy:

     In regard to the claim 
for deceit and misrepresentation, should you find in favor [of] plaintiff on 
this theory, you may award damages directly caused by such deceit and 
misrepresentation to include:

     (a) The difference in 
value of what plaintiff received in the transaction and its purchase price or 
other value given, and

     (b) Any loss suffered 
otherwise as a consequence of plaintiff's reliance upon such deceit or 
misrepresentation.

[¶13]   The jury was then given two 
completely separate verdict forms. In answer to the questions on the first 
verdict form (products liability), the jury determined that: (1) the tire was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous and that it was a direct cause of the 
damage to Santini; (2) the implied warranty of merchantability was breached by 
Cheyenne Tire and that breach was a direct cause of the damage; (3) Cowboy Dodge 
was negligent and its negligence was a direct cause of damage; (4) Big-O was 
negligent in its supervision of its franchisee, Cheyenne Tire, and that 
negligence was a direct cause of damage. The jury also found Santini to be 
contributorily negligent and that her negligence was a direct cause of her 
injuries. Finally, the jury found that Norva Corporation was at fault in its 
retreading process and that fault was a direct cause of damage. The jury found 
Santini 10% at fault; Big-O 15% at fault; Cheyenne Tire 25% at fault; Cowboy 
Dodge 25% at fault; and Norva Corporation 25% at fault. The jury established the 
total amount of damages sustained by Santini at $144,000.

[¶14]   The second verdict form (deceit) 
provided in pertinent part:

1. Did either of the 
following defendants commit deceit and misrepresentation in the sale of the tire 
to plaintiff? (State either yes or no)

yes Cheyenne Tire, 
Inc.

yes Scott Stone

2. If you answered 
question No. 1, was such deceit and misrepresentation a direct cause of damage 
to plaintiff?

x Yes ___ No

3. Is Big O Tires Inc., 
liable in damages for the deceit and misrepresentation of its franchisee 
Cheyenne Tire, Inc.?

x Yes ___ No

4. What damages do you 
determine were directly caused to plaintiff by such deceit and 
misrepresentation. (Answer only if you find in favor of plaintiff on the deceit 
and misrepresentation theory.) Any damages which you choose to award here may 
not be duplicative of those damages which you may choose to award under the 
concept of fault in the other verdict form.

$50,000.00

[¶15]   The district court then entered two 
judgments based on the two verdicts and granted judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50 for Stone as to the deceit and misrepresentation 
verdict.

[¶16]   The essence of Big-O's and Cheyenne 
Tire's assertion of error is that Instruction No. 18A should not have included 
subsection (b) and that the damages awarded under that instruction were 
duplicative of damages awarded under the product liability verdict form. At 
trial, Big-O and Cheyenne Tire contended that only subsection (a) of Instruction 
No. 18A was pertinent to the case and that it could not be given because there 
was no evidence to support its "difference in value" language.

[¶17]   This case presents an unusual mix 
of defendants and theories of recovery, and the factual scenario is somewhat 
complex. The district court quite ably put together instructions which presented 
the jury's tasks to it in very plain and understandable language. Instruction 
No. 18A is derived from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549 (1977) and 
accurately reflects its provisions. Big-O Tires and Cheyenne Tire rely heavily 
on this court's decision in Reynolds v. Tice, 595 P.2d 1318 (Wyo. 1979) for the 
proposition that this court has recognized only two ways in which damages may be 
assessed in a deceit and misrepresentation case, i.e., "out of pocket costs" and 
the "value of the benefit of the bargain." It would be more accurate to say that 
Reynolds acknowledges that such was the status of the law at the time the case 
was decided. However, the decision quite plainly recognizes that the 
instructions which were given in that case were not adequate to avoid the real 
possibility of a double recovery and that suitable instructions must be given 
under such circumstances to avoid double recovery.      
           
Id. at 1323-26. Here, the 
district court's instructions were very clearly tailored to achieve just that 
goal.

[¶18]   Enlarging somewhat on our decision 
in Reynolds, we agree with the reasoning employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
in its decision in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mesabi Tire Co., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 180 
(Minn. 1988). That is, the "benefit of the bargain" rule and the "out of pocket 
loss" rule may each serve salutary purposes depending upon the totality of 
circumstances in a given case. However, where application of those rules results 
in leaving a loss uncompensated, a trial court may properly allow recovery of 
the economic loss sustained. Id. at 183; and see J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, "Out 
of Pocket" or "Benefit of Bargain" as Proper Rule of Damages for Fraudulent 
Representations Inducing Contract for the Transfer of Property, 13 A.L.R.3d 875 
(1967). Here, there was evidence from which the jury could readily infer what 
was the out of pocket loss. Santini paid $25.95 for the failed tire, but her 
losses extended considerably beyond the loss of her bargain. The jury had 
determined the tire was not merchantable for the purpose intended and the 
evidence was clear the tire was of no further use, so her loss could be readily 
inferred to be at least $25.95. We do not think she would have been required to 
disprove that the tire did not have some residual value as a fishing-dock 
landing buffer. Thus, her evidence of reliance on the performance promised and 
the quality of the tire were the proper subjects of a damage claim since the 
significant damage was a very real physical injury proximately resulting from 
the failed tire (wrapped around the axle). See generally 17 Am. Jur. P.O.F. 81, 
Automobile Tire Defects and Hazards, esp. §§ 33-35 and 52-56 (1966); Cody W. 
Smith, Jr., Annotation, Defective Tire, 39 Am.Jur. P.O.F.2d 209 (1984); Richard 
J. Kohlman, Annotation, Defective Tire Litigation, 34 Am.Jur. Trials 603, esp. 
§§ 20-26, 77 and 80 (1987); and Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Products Liability: 
Liability for Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Defective Tire, 81 A.L.R.3d 
318 (1977).

[¶19]   Although we perceive no particular 
problem with the instructions given under the circumstances of this case, our 
holding in Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 
334 (Wyo. 1986) is really dispositive of this controversy. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-213 
(1988). In Rialto Theatre, Inc., we held that if the jury's verdict is 
consistent with the instructions and there is a perception that the verdict is 
somehow inconsistent, then an objection is necessary. In this instance, the 
jury's verdicts were read to the parties and Big-O and Cheyenne Tire bypassed 
and, hence, waived the opportunity to further illuminate the jury's verdict, if 
there was in fact some inconsistency or duplication in the damage awards. We, of 
course, assume the jury followed the instructions absent some clear evidence to 
the contrary. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1295 n. 17 ( Wyo. 1985).

[¶20]   Since the essential appellate 
contention addressed duplicate awards of damage, their challenge came to 
directly attack the form of the two verdicts. Inevitably, if the jury found 
liability for both theories, separate total amounts were required on each 
verdict form. The form of the second verdict (deceit) was entirely explicit: 
"Any damages which you choose to award here may not be duplicative of those 
damages which you may choose to award under the concept of fault in the other 
verdict form." This admonition was followed by a space into which the jury 
inserted the handwritten $50,000 total award.

[¶21]   Clearly, as determined as it may 
be, the jury intended supplementary amounts of $144,000 through the first 
verdict and the additional $50,000 in the second document, separately designated 
in the two different instruments. We will not look beyond this clearly stated 
intent at this time because Big-O and Cheyenne Tire did not elect to pursue any 
contention of impropriety or inconsistency (or misunderstanding) before the jury 
was excused in the completed trial proceeding. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-11-213 
and 1-11-214 (1988). Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-213 provided a further deliberative 
requirement if any contended inconsistency was perceived. The responsibility, 
after rendition of a verdict, to ask for jury resubmission falls upon the 
disfavored litigant.2

[¶22]   This court has consistently imposed 
a duty upon counsel to raise objection to any claimed inconsistency or mistake 
in the verdict before the jury is dismissed. In Dewitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734 
(  
             
               
          
Wyo. 1963), 
the verdict included an injury award of only special damages without any general 
damages. The form, as signed by the jury foreman, had a blank space for general 
damages into which nothing was written. This court defined in 
resolution:

[W]e do not think it 
harsh or unreasonable to require a litigant, when an opportunity is afforded 
during the trial, timely to bring a matter such as here to the attention of the 
trial court in order that it might be corrected, and failing in this that he 
shall not be heard here to complain. To hold otherwise would seem unfair to the 
jury, to the trial court, and to the other litigants, to say nothing of the 
unnecessary loss of time and expense.

Id. at 739-40. Plaintiff's 
neglect to request jury reconsideration of claimed improper verdict at the time 
after initial rendition and before jury dismissal was fatal to appellee's later 
presentation of claimed insufficiency or omission in the verdict upon appeal. 
The court restated the same requirement to avoid claimed error in jury verdict 
rendition in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284 (Wyo. 1983) 
and then Goggins, 704 P.2d  at 1296.

[¶23]   In result, the lack of assertion by 
either party before jury dismissal about any defect in the completed jury 
verdict form has the effect of "closing the book." See    
Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-214.

[¶24]   "If the verdict was inconsistent 
with the instruction of the court [or a double recovery resulted despite the 
explicit direction to the jury], the appellant is charged with the duty of 
raising that question at the trial level before the jury's discharge." Goggins, 
704 P.2d  at 1296, Thomas, J., specially concurring. Consequently, we will not 
disturb the jury's verdict or the present contested judgment resulting 
therefrom.

IV. ARGUMENT - AWARD OF 
COSTS: JUDICIAL DISCRETION

[¶25]   Big-O and Cheyenne Tire also 
contend the district court erred in its award of costs. The district court 
awarded Santini a total of $7,098.50 as costs. Cowboy Dodge was directed to pay 
$225.63, Cheyenne Tire $4,295.54 and Big-O $2,577.33. The award of costs is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 767 P.2d 158, 168 ( Wyo. 1989).

[¶26]   The argument boils down to this: 
Cowboy Dodge is required to pay only 3.18% of the total costs awarded, although 
it was found to be responsible for 25% of the fault apportioned among the actors 
in the negligence action by the jury's verdict. The mathematical calculation 
used, i.e., dividing Cowboy Dodge's assessment by the total award of costs, does 
not accurately represent the district court's decision. The jury awarded a total 
of $194,000 as damages. Of that amount, Cowboy Dodge was responsible for 
$36,000. Cowboy Dodge's percentage responsibility for the total damages is about 
18.6%, but that does not really help to fully resolve the question either. It 
must also be taken into account that Cowboy Dodge was a late-comer to this 
litigation and only some of the awarded costs were incurred as a result of its 
role in the litigation. The case had been in progress for almost a year before 
Cowboy Dodge was joined as a party. In addition, counsel for Cowboy Dodge 
presented cogent and reasonable justification to the district court during the 
proceedings relating to the apportionment of the award of costs.

Under these 
circumstances and with a careful review of the record, we do not find any abuse 
of discretion.

V. ARGUMENT - JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT GRANTED TO THE RETAILER'S REPRESENTATIVE

[¶27]   Finally, Santini asserts the 
district court erred in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor 
of Stone. We have enunciated this as our standard of review:

In determining whether a 
motion for a directed verdict or JNOV was proper, we apply the same test on 
appeal as does the trial judge in considering the motions originally in that 
there are only questions of law. Carey v. Jackson, Wyo., 
603 P.2d 868 (1979). The test to be applied is whether the evidence is such that 
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise considering the 
weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion reasonable persons could 
have reached, and such motions should be cautiously and sparingly granted. Carey 
v.  
Jackson, 
supra.

Erickson v. 
Magill, 713 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1986). See also Fisher v. Robbins, 78 
Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957) and Morris Massey, Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict and For New Trial, 12 Wyo.L.J. 284 (1958). This court must give the 
evidence every reasonable inference in favor of the party against whom the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted. Berry v. Iowa Mid-West Land & Livestock Co., 424 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 
1967). This court has determined that the test to be applied in granting a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is essentially the same as utilized to 
justify a directed verdict. Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59 ( Wyo. 1983).

[¶28]   In analogous situations, we have 
also held:

When the facts permit the 
drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose which will be 
utilized, and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's choice will be 
held by us as conclusive.

Howell v. 
Garcia, 747 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Wyo. 1987). See Simpson v. Western Nat. Bank 
of Casper, 497 P.2d 878, 880 (Wyo. 1972) and Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp., 372 P.2d 170 
( 
Wyo. 
1962).

[¶29]   The question presented is whether 
the established conduct of Stone in managing the retail facility did or did not 
justify his inclusion within the jury decision for award of the verdict based on 
the tort of deception. In our analysis, it is recognized that the district court 
was not justified and we cannot approve judicial trespass on the fact finding 
  
              
provence of 
the jury. Cimoli, 372 P.2d  at 173. We would agree with Santini in appellate 
brief:

     The jury's verdict in 
cases of fraud or deceit is as sacrosanct as in any other case. The trial court 
cannot set aside the verdict except in the complete absence of substantial 
evidence of fraud. Simpson v. Western National Bank of Casper, 497 P.2d 878, 880 ( Wyo. 1972).

     To establish a case of 
fraudulent misrepresentation in a consumer sales transaction, the consumer must 
establish that the seller knowingly made a false representation of a material 
fact with the intent of inducing her to purchase the product, and that she was 
induced to make the purchase, to her detriment, by her reasonable reliance upon 
the seller's statements. Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 786 P.2d 855, 860 ( Wyo. 1990).

[¶30]   Credibility of the witnesses and 
the weight to be given their testimony is for the jury to determine. Cimoli, 372 P.2d  at 173.

[¶31]   We need not recite the evidence 
earlier summarized in this opinion to recognize a viable jury issue provided by 
evidence that Stone put together a bait-and-switch sales program based on low 
priced, nondesignated retread tires. If the switch did work, the advertised 
tires, without proper announcement of their real quality, would in effect be 
sold as new tires. The jury found deceit and we cannot disapprove by holding, as 
a further fact finding analysis, that inadequate evidence to support this 
decision had been presented at trial. Consequently, the entry of the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict was in error and the judgment against Stone should 
be reinstated upon remand.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶32]   Affirmed, except for the order of 
the district court granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Scott 
Stone, which is reversed, and the case is remanded to that extent for further 
proceedings in accord herewith.

FOOTNOTES

1      
        Cheyenne Tire is the local 
retailer and Big-O is the franchisor for Cheyenne Tire.

2 Those statutes 
provide:

     If a jury disagrees, 
or if when the jury is polled a juror answers in the negative, or if the verdict 
is defective in substance, the jury shall be sent out again for further 
deliberation and either party may require the jury to be polled by the clerk or 
court asking each juror if it is his verdict.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-213.

     If no disagreement is 
expressed and neither party requires the jury to be polled, or on polling each 
juror answers in the affirmative, the verdict is complete and the jury shall be 
discharged. If the verdict is defective in form only, it may be corrected by the 
court with the assent of the jurors before they are discharged.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-11-214.