Title: System Components Corporation v. Florida Department of Transportation

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1507 
____________ 
 
SYSTEM COMPONENTS CORPORATION,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 9, 2009] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
In this case, we review System Components Corp. v. Department of 
Transportation, 985 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), in which the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal certified that its decision directly conflicts with the decision of the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal in State Department of Transportation v. Tire 
Centers, LLC, 895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  We thus possess and 
exercise our discretionary jurisdiction to resolve this conflict.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), 
Fla. Const.  Here, we must consider whether an award of business damages in an 
eminent-domain action under section 73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), should 
include and account for the actual economic realities of the business‘s operations 
 
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given its relocation following a partial taking.  As more fully explained in our 
analysis, we approve the Fifth District‘s decision in System Components and 
disapprove the Fourth District‘s decision in Tire Centers because we agree that the 
actual extent of harm suffered by an affected business is the ―sine qua non‖ of any 
eminent-domain business damages awarded pursuant to section 73.071(3)(b).  Sys. 
Components, 985 So. 2d at 693.1  Due to the inherent nature of ―damages‖ in this 
context, business damages ―are not intended to be a windfall unconnected with any 
out-of-pocket loss.‖  Id. at 690.2  For these reasons, when a qualified partial taking 
destroys a business at its prior location, and the land/business owner chooses to 
relocate, the resulting business damages are measured by the ―probable‖ financial 
impact ―reasonably‖ suffered as a result of the taking.  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. 
(2004); see also Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 689-93.  Under the circumstances 
presented here, we therefore conclude that if an affected business chooses to 
                                          
 
 
1.  See also Black‘s Law Dictionary 1418 (8th ed. 2004) (―sine qua non.  An 
indispensable condition or thing; something on which something else necessarily 
depends.‖).   
 
2.  See also Frank Gahan, The Law of Damages 1 (1936) (―Damages are the 
sum of money which a person wronged is entitled to receive from the wrongdoer 
as compensation for the wrong.‖ (emphasis supplied)); Black‘s Law Dictionary 
416 (8th ed. 2004) (―actual damages.  An amount awarded to a complainant to 
compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.‖ 
(emphasis supplied)).   
 
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relocate, its business damages must be determined in light of its continued 
existence at its new location.  
BACKGROUND 
The Condemned Property and the Affected Business 
 
On May 13, 2004, the Florida Department of Transportation (―FDOT‖) filed 
an eminent-domain petition pursuant to chapters 73 and 74, Florida Statutes 
(2004).  The petition involved several parcels, which FDOT requested permission 
to condemn for purposes of expanding a road right-of-way.  The overall taking was 
necessary to widen a portion of West State Road 40 from S.W. 85th Avenue to and 
including the intersection located at 52nd Avenue in Ocala, Florida.    
A tract of real property labeled parcel 130 (6750 West State Road 40, Ocala, 
Florida) was part of this proposed taking and belonged to the petitioner, System 
Components Corporation.  The Fifth District accurately described System 
Components as ―a wholesale distributor of fluid purification control and 
instrumentation . . . , [which] has exclusive Florida distributor arrangements with a 
number of manufacturers and service customers in food processing, drug 
manufacturing, municipal water and other related areas.‖  Sys. Components, 985 
So. 2d at 688 n.1.  System Components receives fluid-purification component parts 
from manufacturers and then assembles, repackages, and ships completed systems 
to its Florida customers.  There is virtually no walk-in business; instead, System 
 
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Components‘ physical location simply functions as a point of assembly and 
distribution.  Prior to the taking, parcel 130 consisted of 1.774 acres and contained 
a 5000-square-foot, single-story building, from which System Components 
conducted its distribution and service business.  The building included front-office 
and warehouse areas.  Additionally, parcel 130 provided System Components 
sufficient land to accommodate future expansion.  In contrast, the eventual taking 
and demolition bisected System Components‘ building and reduced parcel 130 to 
.648 acres, which the parties agreed rendered the remaining land unusable and of 
nominal value due to required setback lines that precluded rebuilding. 
FDOT proceeded under the quick-take procedures provided in chapter 74, 
Florida Statutes.  See § 74.011, Fla. Stat. (2004) (―In any eminent domain action, 
properly instituted by and in the name of . . . the Department of Transportation . . . 
, the petitioner may avail itself of the provisions of this chapter to take possession 
and title in advance of the entry of final judgment.‖  (emphasis supplied)).  
Pursuant to section 74.051(2) and a stipulated order of taking entered on July 13, 
2004, FDOT deposited into the circuit-court registry a good-faith estimate of the 
―full compensation‖ due to System Components under article X, section 6 of the 
Florida Constitution (i.e., compensation for (1) the value of the land, (2) associated 
 
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appurtenances and improvements, and (3) severance damages3).  The deposited 
amount agreed to by both parties was $348,300 ($88,300 for the value of the 
condemned land, $109,400 for appurtenances and improvements, $130,900 for 
severance damages, and $19,700 to demolish a portion of the building left standing 
on the remainder). 
The taking occurred on July 22, 2004, and System Components sought and 
obtained FDOT‘s permission to remain on the property pending demolition.  
FDOT and System Components entered into a lease agreement through which 
System Components leased back its prior property at $2000 per month for a five-
month term ending in December 2004.  Subsequently, System Components entered 
into an agreement with a third party to lease separate warehouse space in another 
area of Ocala for $2068 per month for a one-year term (October 1, 2004 through 
September 30, 2005), which System Components was later forced to extend due to 
the delayed construction of its new facility ($3000 per month for an additional 
three months).  During this time, George Kirkland, System Components‘ principal, 
sought to continue the business while also obtaining a permanent relocation site.  
As part of this process, Kirkland (1) consulted commercial real-estate brokers to 
                                          
 
 
3.  See Black‘s Law Dictionary 419 (8th ed. 2004) (―severance damages.  In 
a condemnation case, damages awarded to a property owner for diminution in the 
fair market value of land as a result of severance from the land of the property 
actually condemned; compensation awarded to a landowner for the loss in value of 
the tract that remains after a partial taking of the land.‖). 
 
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obtain a suitable relocation site; (2) hired an architect and an engineer to design 
and prepare the replacement site and building (as required by Marion County); and 
(3) rehired a former employee to accomplish the eventual move to the relocation 
site.  To finance these efforts, Kirkland and System Components were forced to 
incur additional debt. 
On October 5, 2004, System Components purchased new land in an area of 
Ocala approximately eleven miles from its prior location.  Kirkland testified that 
land near his prior location had become scarce and more expensive, so he decided 
to move the business further from the I-75 corridor to a location where land was 
more plentiful and less expensive.  On December 23, 2005, the new building was 
completed, and System Components relocated from its temporary, leased location. 
The Business-Damages Trial 
 
Prior to trial, the parties agreed that System Components qualified for 
statutory business damages under section 73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), 
which are not part of the ―full compensation‖ guaranteed by the Florida 
Constitution.  See, e.g., Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. K.E. 
Morris Alignment Serv., Inc., 444 So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Fla. 1983).  The only 
remaining issue involved the proper measure of business damages in light of 
System Components‘ relocation and continued existence.   As the Fifth District 
later explained: 
 
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During the litigation, relying on section 73.071(3)(b), Florida 
Statutes, and Florida Department of Transportation v. Tire Centers, 
LLC, 895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), System Components 
filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude all evidence of what it 
terms ―off-site cure,‖ i.e., that Systems Components was continuing to 
operate in another location.  The trial court denied the motion, 
expressing disagreement with the Tire Centers decision and 
undertaking to distinguish it. 
 
Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 689. 
Specifically, System Components maintained that eminent-domain 
proceedings are solely concerned with the land taken and the resulting damages to 
the condemnee.  Therefore, in the view of System Components, it was entitled to 
the ―total-take‖ value of its business as though it had ceased to exist on the date of 
taking.  This position was consistent with the decision of the Fourth District in Tire 
Centers, which was decided on substantially similar facts and held: 
Eminent domain law focuses only on the land taken, notwithstanding 
that in a case such as this a substantial portion of lost goodwill may 
possibly be recaptured by way of a nearby relocation.  As such, the 
taking of the specific property at issue is the sole focus of business 
damages under section 73.071(3)(b).  If the legislature had intended 
business damages to be subject to mitigation by an off-site cure, it 
could have easily done so.  Consequently, we find that the trial court 
did not err by excluding any consideration of mitigated business 
damages by way of an off-site cure. 
 
Tire Centers, 895 So. 2d at 1113.  FDOT resisted the application of Tire Centers 
and asserted that it was the constitutional duty of the trial court not to apply this 
precedent because, in FDOT‘s view, the Fourth District had erroneously 
 
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―legislated‖ and thereby exceeded its authority to construe section 73.071(3)(b).4  
The trial court eventually refused to follow Tire Centers and, correspondingly, 
denied the motion in limine. 
During trial, which lasted from February 13, 2006, until February 24, 2006, 
the court permitted each side to present expert testimony concerning the extent of 
the business damages sustained by System Components and, further, charged the 
jury that it was to determine (1) the total value of the business on the date of 
taking; and (2) the business damages sustained by System Components in light of 
its relocation and continued existence.  In response, the jury returned a verdict 
determining each valuation based upon the testimony presented by System 
Components‘ experts:  (1) the business‘s total value derived from an income-based 
approach5—$2,394,964; and (2) System Components‘ business damages in light of 
its relocation and continued existence—$1,347,911.6    
                                          
 
 
4.  We agree with the Fifth District that FDOT‘s contentions in this regard 
were totally improper.  See Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 689 n.3.  In the 
absence of inter-district conflict or contrary precedent from this Court, it is 
absolutely clear that the decision of a district court of appeal is binding precedent 
throughout Florida.  See, e.g., Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).  
Consequently, a trial court may not overrule or recede from the controlling 
decision of a district court.    
 
5.  See American Society of Appraisers, Business Valuation Standards 
Glossary, available at www.bvappraisers.org/glossary/glossary.pdf (―[A] general 
way of determining a value indication of a business . . . using one or more methods 
that convert anticipated economic benefits into a present single amount.‖); Jeffrey 
M. Risius, Business Valuation:  A Primer For The Legal Professional 65 (2007) 
 
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On July 14, 2006, the trial court entered a final judgment, which awarded 
System Components the latter figure and deducted the value of the good-faith 
registry deposit to avoid the award of duplicative damages.  Cf., e.g., Glessner v. 
Duval County, 203 So. 2d 330, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967) (explaining that there 
may be some overlap between severance and business damages; if so, the 
condemnee is not entitled to double recovery).  The remaining balance of business 
damages awarded to System Components totaled $999,611.  System Components 
later sought review of this judgment in the appropriate district court of appeal. 
The Appeal to the Fifth District 
 
On appeal, System Components asserted that the trial court erred by not 
following Tire Centers, which was then-binding precedent for all Florida trial 
courts.  See, e.g., Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 666.  System Components offered two basic 
claims to support its contention that it was entitled to the ―total-take‖ value of its 
business:  (1) eminent-domain cases are in rem proceedings, which exclusively 
concern the land subject to taking and any remainder (i.e., the ―parent tract‖); and 
                                                                                                                                        
(―The general theory behind the Income Approach is that the value of the business 
is equal to the present value of the cash flows expected to be generated by that 
business in the future into perpetuity.‖). 
 
6.  The record reflects that this latter amount included damages for (a) loss 
of value due to altered capital structure (i.e., increased debt); (b) moving expenses 
and rent; (c) costs associated with obtaining a replacement property; (d) costs 
associated with constructing a replacement facility; and (e) down-time productivity 
losses.   
 
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(2) the trial court impermissibly altered the text of section 73.071(3)(b), Florida 
Statutes, by reading in a duty to mitigate damages beyond the boundaries of the 
parent tract.  See Appellant‘s Initial Brief at 5-15, Sys. Components Corp. v. Fla. 
Dep‘t of Transp., 985 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (No. 5D06-2864).  
Conversely, FDOT asserted that the trial court was not required to follow Tire 
Centers because, in that decision, the Fourth District usurped the role of the 
Legislature by excluding evidence of off-site mitigation even though section 
73.071(3)(b) is silent with regard to this issue.  See Answer Brief of Appellee at 9-
23, Sys. Components Corp. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Transp., 985 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2008) (No. 5D06-2864).  
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Fifth District refused to adopt the extreme 
positions advanced by either party.  First, the district court rejected the position of 
System Components that the Legislature intended section 73.071(3)(b) to 
compensate a fully functioning, relocated business by awarding it the total value of 
its operations as though it had ceased to exist on the date of taking: 
Application of the analysis in Tire Centers would mean that a 
fully functioning business would receive a windfall of over a million 
dollars for damages it did not suffer.  Rather than recover its business 
damages, it would recover something else, a form of compensation for 
the taking of part of its property measured by the full value of the 
business, as though it had ceased to exist.  We conclude that this is not 
what section 73.071 says or intends.  
 
 
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Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 689-90.  Second, the district court rejected 
FDOT‘s contention that the doctrine of avoidable consequences (i.e., the ―duty to 
mitigate‖ damages) requires off-site relocation whenever necessary and possible: 
Although the statute does not require relocation or a damage 
calculation based on what damages would be if the business were to 
hypothetically relocate, if a business does elect to relocate and to 
continue in existence, the business can only recover its damages—i.e., 
the amount of harm to its business resulting from the taking of its 
location.  Where, as here, the business has elected to continue in 
business in a different location, the business should be fully 
compensated for all damages done to the business caused by the 
taking, but it should not be compensated based on the fiction that it 
has been entirely lost.  
 
Id. at 692-93 (some emphasis supplied).  Supported by this rationale, the Fifth 
District affirmed the award of business damages as determined by the trial court 
and certified conflict with Tire Centers.  See Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 693. 
 
We subsequently accepted jurisdiction and now resolve this certified 
conflict.  See Sys. Components Corp. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Transp., 990 So. 2d 1060 
(Fla. 2008) (table). 
ANALYSIS 
 
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is subject to 
de novo review.  See, e.g., Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, 
LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 2008).  In particular, we must determine whether 
an award of business damages in an eminent-domain action under section 
73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), may take into consideration only the actual 
 
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damages sustained by the affected business when there is a relocation following a 
partial taking.  After reviewing the plain text of the statute7 and considering 
pertinent precedent and legal commentary, we hold that a qualifying business that 
chooses to relocate must receive a business-damages award based upon its 
continued existence and the true economic realities of the given case. 
Relevant Eminent-Domain Doctrine and an Overview of Statutory Business 
Damages 
 
Eminent Domain and “Full Compensation” 
The power of eminent domain is an inherent aspect of sovereignty vested in 
the government of Florida, ―which is circumscribed by, rather than conferred by, 
constitution or statute.‖  City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1992) (citing 
Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1947)).  While 
it remains ―[t]he central policy of eminent domain . . . that owners of property 
taken by a governmental entity [must] receive full and fair compensation,‖8 both 
this Court and the United States Supreme Court have very clearly held that 
                                          
 
 
7.  See, e.g., E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 629 (Fla. 2009) (―To discern 
[legislative] intent, the Court looks ‗primarily‘ to the plain text of the relevant 
statute . . . .‖ (citing Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 
2006))). 
 
8.  Fla. Dep‘t of Transp. v. Armadillo Partners, Inc., 849 So. 2d 279, 282 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting Broward County v. Patel, 641 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
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business damages are not a constitutionally required component of ―just‖ 9 or 
―full‖10 compensation.  See, e.g., Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. 
v. K.E. Morris Alignment Serv., Inc., 444 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 1983) (―Business 
damages . . . fall in the category where compensation is not constitutionally 
required but depends on legislative authorization.‖); Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. 
Auth. of Fort Lauderdale, 322 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1975) (―The right to business 
damages is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional imperative.  Lost profits 
and business damages are intangibles which generally do not constitute ‗property‘ 
in the constitutional sense.‖ (footnote omitted)); Mitchell v. United States, 267 
U.S. 341, 345 (1925) (substantially similar); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 
262 U.S. 668, 675 (1923) (substantially similar).  Thus, the ―full compensation‖ 
mandated by article X, section 6 of the Florida Constitution is restricted to (1) the 
value of the condemned land,11 (2) the value of associated appurtenances and 
                                          
 
 
9.  U.S. Const. amend. V (―[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.‖  (emphasis supplied)).   
 
10.  Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. (―No private property shall be taken except 
for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or 
secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.‖  
(emphasis supplied)).   
 
11.  The concept of ―highest and best use‖ applies to the valuation of 
condemned land and severance damages: 
An owner of lands sought to be condemned is entitled to their 
―market value fairly determined.‖  United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 
369.  That value may reflect not only the use to which the property is 
 
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improvements, and (3) damages to the remaining land (i.e., severance damages12).  
See, e.g., State Road Dep‘t v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1966); cf. United 
States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (―Perhaps it would be fair or 
efficient to compensate a landowner for all the costs he incurs as a result of a 
condemnation action. . . .  But such compensation is a matter of legislative grace 
rather than constitutional command.‖).  Conversely, when a governmental entity 
actually ―takes‖ or appropriates the business for its proprietary use, the government 
is constitutionally required to compensate the business owner(s) for the reasonable 
value of the appropriated business.  See generally Kimball Laundry Co. v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (involving the U.S. Army‘s wartime acquisition of a 
well-established, profitable laundry business).  
Statutory Business Damages 
Despite the general eminent-domain rule that business damages are 
intangible, consequential injuries, which the government is not constitutionally 
                                                                                                                                        
presently devoted but also that use to which it may be readily 
converted.  Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403; McCandless v. 
United States, 298 U.S. 342.  In that connection the value may be 
determined in light of the special or higher use of the land . . . . 
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943); see also Black‘s 
Law Dictionary 1577 (8th ed. 2004) (―In valuing property, the use that will 
generate the most profit.  This standard is used esp[ecially] to determine the fair 
market value of property subject to eminent domain.‖). 
 
12.  See supra note 3. 
 
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required to compensate,13 Florida has elected to provide such compensation 
through statute since 1933.  See ch. 15927, Laws of Fla. (1933); Martha L. Koval 
& Andrew B. Sasso, The Bottom Line on Eminent Domain Business Damages, 
Fla. B.J., June 1986, at 59.  However, this statutory allowance is narrow, and the 
condemnee bears the burden of specifically pleading and satisfying each of the 
requirements provided in the business-damages statute, which is currently codified 
at section 73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes.  See K.E. Morris, 444 So. 2d at 929 
(―[A]ny ambiguity in section 73.071(3)(b) should be construed against the claim of 
business damages, and such damages should be awarded only when such an award 
appears clearly consistent with legislative intent.‖); City of Fort Lauderdale v. 
Casino Realty, Inc., 313 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., specially 
concurring; adopted as majority) (holding that the condemnee bears the burden of 
proving the existence and extent of business damages); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(g) 
(―When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated.‖).   
Section 73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows (our 
bracketed numerals and altered formatting separately indicate each statutory 
requirement): 
(3)  The jury shall determine solely the amount of 
compensation to be paid, which compensation shall include:  
                                          
 
 
13.  See The Florida Bar, Florida Eminent Domain Practice and Procedure § 
9.46, at 9-61, 9-62 (7th ed. 2008).   
 
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. . . . 
(b)  Where  
 
[1] less than the entire property is sought to be appropriated,[14] 
any damages to the remainder caused by the taking [i.e., severance 
damages], including,  
 
[2] when the action is by the Department of Transportation, 
county, municipality, board, district or other public body for  
 
[3] the condemnation of a right-of-way, and  
 
[4] the effect of the taking of the property involved may 
damage or destroy an established business[15] of more than 4 years‘ 
standing before January 1, 2005, or the effect of the taking of the 
property involved may damage or destroy an established business of 
more than 5 years‘ standing on or after January 1, 2005,  
 
[5] owned by the party whose lands are being so taken,[16]  
 
[6] located upon adjoining lands[17] owned or held by such 
party, the probable damages to such business which the denial of the 
use of the property so taken may reasonably cause;  
                                          
 
 
14.  ―Business damages . . . are not compensable where . . . there is a total 
taking of real property, as opposed to a partial taking.‖  Metro. Dade County v. 
Curelli, Douglas, McClaskey & Collins, 511 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).   
 
15.  ―[T]he legislative intent is to allow business damages only to concerns 
having a physical existence for more than [the requisite number of] years at the 
location where the partial taking is alleged to have caused business damages.‖  
K.E. Morris, 444 So. 2d at 928.  Transfers in ownership of an operating business 
do not restart the clock.  See, e.g., Hicks v. Fla. Dep‘t of Transp., 541 So. 2d 1309, 
1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).    
 
16.  The statute ―has long been interpreted to include the business damage 
claim of a lessee, and not merely that of a fee owner.‖  Blockbuster Video, Inc. v. 
State Dep‘t of Transp., 714 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (emphasis 
supplied) (citing State Road Dep‘t v. White, 161 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1964), 
approving, 148 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)).     
 
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[7] any person claiming the right to recover such special 
damages shall set forth in his or her written defenses the nature and 
extent of such damages.  
 
(emphasis supplied) (formatting altered); see also Florida Eminent Domain, supra, 
§ 9.46, at 9-62 – 9-63; Koval & Sasso, supra, at 60-61.  This statute implements the 
constitutional requirement of compensating severance damages and provides for 
business damages under specified circumstances.  See Fla. Dep‘t of Transp. v. 
Ness Trailer Park, Inc., 489 So. 2d 1172, 1180-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).   
Severance and business damages are both available in appropriate cases, but 
they should not be confused.  Severance damages are part of the constitutional 
guarantee of ―full compensation‖ and reimburse the owner for the reduction in 
value the taking causes to any remaining land, while business damages are a 
creature of statute and compensate the owner for ―probable‖ reductions in business 
value, business losses, or increased business expenses ―reasonably cause[d]‖ by the 
taking.  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); see Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 690-
91 (citing Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1224); Ness Trailer, 489 So. 2d at 1181; 
Florida Eminent Domain, supra, §§ 9.34, 9.35, at 9-46 – 9-47.  Where the two 
forms of damages overlap, double recovery is prohibited.  See Mulkey v. Fla. Div. 
                                                                                                                                        
 
17.  The owner must have conducted business on the condemned land and 
the adjoining, remaining land.  See, e.g., Gateway Growers, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of 
Palm Beach County, 924 So. 2d 875, 877-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  
 
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of Admin., 448 So. 2d 1062, 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).  Business damages are not 
part of the ―full compensation‖ guaranteed by the Florida Constitution, and the 
State is not required to pay interest on these damages or to include these damages 
as part of its ―good faith‖ registry deposit.  See Behm v. Div. of Admin., 383 So. 
2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1980) (citing Div. of Admin. v. Pink Pussy Cat, Inc., 314 So. 2d 
192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)); State Road Dep‘t v. Abel Inv. Co., 165 So. 2d 832, 833-
34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). 
In more informal terms, the business-damages portion of the statute has been 
suggested to generally apply if, and only if:   
(1) a partial taking occurs;  
 
(2) the condemnor is a state or local ―public body‖;  
 
(3) the land is taken to construct or expand a right-of-way;  
 
(4) the taking damages or destroys an established business, which has 
existed on the parent tract18 for the specified number of years;  
 
(5) the business owner owns the condemned and adjoining land (lessees may 
qualify);  
 
(6) business was conducted on the condemned land and the adjoining 
remainder; and  
 
(7) the condemnee specifically pleads and proves (1)-(6).  
 
                                          
 
 
18.  ―Parent tract‖ refers to ―the single tract of land that incorporates both the 
condemned land and the owner‘s remainder portion at the time of the taking.‖  
Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1224. 
 
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See § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); Carlos A. Kelly, Eminent Domain:  
Identifying Issues in Damages for the General Practitioner, Fla. B.J., May 2009, at 
52.  The statute is thus limited in scope and completely exempts the award of 
business damages in total-taking cases.  In fact, the Legislature formerly permitted 
FDOT to totally condemn a parcel to avoid the imposition of business damages if 
the total taking (as opposed to a partial taking) resulted in a lower bottom line.  See 
Dep‘t of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n, 532 So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 
1988) (upholding the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes 
(1985)).  In 1999, the Legislature rescinded this authority, thereby prohibiting this 
type of total taking, which had become known as ―Fortune Federal takings.‖  See 
ch. 99-385, § 64, at 3882, Laws of Fla.; Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp., HB 591 
(1999) Staff Analysis 2, 18, 24, 28 (final July 16, 1999) (on file with State 
Archives); Paul D. Bain, 1999 Amendments to Florida‘s Eminent Domain Statutes, 
Fla. B.J., Nov. 1999, at 68, 70.   
Notwithstanding the narrow nature of the business-damages statute, Florida 
precedent maintains: 
The purpose of section 73.071(3)(b) is to mitigate the hardship that 
may result when the state exercises the power of eminent domain 
paying only the constitutionally required full compensation for the 
property actually taken.  The legislature in doing so has recognized 
that a business location may be an asset of considerable value . . . . 
 
 
- 20 - 
K.E. Morris, 444 So. 2d at 929.  However, section 73.071(3)(b) does not 
compensate land owners for business damages when (i) a total taking occurs, (ii) 
the condemnor is not a ―public body‖ (the Legislature has vested some private 
parties, e.g., utilities, with eminent-domain powers), or (iii) the land is taken for 
some purpose other than building or expanding a right-of-way.  Cf. Fortune Fed., 
532 So. 2d at 1270 (―[T]he legislature has created a right to business damages, so it 
may also limit that right.‖). 
 
The Legislature has not specifically defined what may constitute 
compensable ―business damages.‖  However, this Court has held: 
[S]ection 73.071(3)(b) . . . does not require the calculation of business 
damages by one mechanically applied, one-size-fits-all formula which 
would not produce proper results.  For an ongoing business, . . . 
business damages are inherently fact-intensive. . . .  Ultimately, it is 
for the fact-finder to calculate the damages.  
 
Murray v. Dep‘t of Transp., 687 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis supplied).  
Further, the Fourth District, in a widely cited opinion, explained: 
The Legislature did not define or otherwise elaborate upon what 
constitutes ―business damages,‖ but there is absolutely no indication 
that it intended this statute to be construed as allowing business 
damages for lost profits only.  The statutory language, which 
authorizes compensation for ―the probable damages to such business 
which the denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably 
cause,‖ simply does not warrant this restrictive interpretation. 
 
Matthews v. Div. of Admin., 324 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).  In a 
similar vein, the Third District has stated: 
 
- 21 - 
Where less than the entire property is sought to be appropriated, any 
reasonable damages to an established business located on adjoining 
land not appropriated are compensable by statute providing:  (1) the 
business is owned by the party whose land is being taken, and (2) the 
business has been on the adjoining property for more than [the 
requisite number of] years. 
 
Div. of Admin. v. Ely, 351 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (emphasis supplied) 
(citing State Road Dep‘t v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966); § 73.071(3)(b), 
Fla. Stat. (1975)).   
Case law has specifically identified at least three types of business 
damages—(1) lost profits, (2) moving/relocation expenses, and (3) loss of 
goodwill19—but section 73.071(3)(b)‘s plain text is not so limited.  Rather, it 
simply states that the land/business owner is entitled to receive ―the probable 
damages to such business which the denial of the use of the property so taken may 
reasonably cause.‖  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis supplied).  Each 
party is thus entitled to approach the ―inherently fact-intensive‖ task of business-
damage valuation by presenting the opinions of qualified experts ―based upon 
generally accepted accounting principles as to what should be included in the 
jury‘s calculation.‖  Murray, 687 So. 2d at 827 (emphasis supplied).  Expert 
valuation testimony must be consistent with the law and ―is impermissible if based 
merely on speculation or groundless prognostication, but can be admitted where 
                                          
 
 
19.  See Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 690. 
 
- 22 - 
necessary to explain previously admitted factual evidence tending to prove or 
disprove the existence of a reasonable probability.‖  Broward County v. Patel, 641 
So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1994); see M.J. Stavola Farms, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Transp., 742 So. 
2d 391, 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that an expert‘s opinion which is 
unsupported by the evidence or law, or is misleading because it employs an 
improper methodology, is properly excluded).  Business damages determined by 
the fact-finder must fall within the range of expert valuations presented by the 
parties.  See Patel, 641 So. 2d at 43 n.5.  A business-damages award based on the 
total cost and damages associated with relocation may not exceed the total value of 
the business as measured by the appropriate valuation method—whether an 
income-based approach (i.e., value based on current and future revenue stream 
discounted to a total present value), market-based approach (i.e., value based on 
comparison to comparable businesses existing in the particular market adjusted for 
the individual characteristics and risks associated with the specific business), or 
asset-based approach (i.e., value based on total assets net liabilities; typically used 
when the business is not profitable).  See § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); Jeffrey 
M. Risius, Business Valuation:  A Primer For The Legal Professional chs. 8, 10, 12 
(2007); American Society of Appraisers, Business Valuation Standards Glossary, 
available at www.bvappraisers.org/glossary/glossary.pdf. 
 
- 23 - 
System Components’ Business Damages 
    
 
Before trial, the parties stipulated that System Components satisfied each 
statutory requirement for business damages.  Their remaining dispute centered on 
the significance of the statutory command that the land/business owner receive 
―the probable damages to such business which the denial of the use of the property 
so taken may reasonably cause.‖  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis 
supplied).  System Components correctly highlights that section 73.071(2), Florida 
Statutes (2004), states: 
The amount of such compensation shall be determined as of the date 
of trial, or the date upon which title passes, whichever shall occur 
first. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Based on this subsection, System Components contends that 
its business-damages compensation should be determined as of the date of the 
taking, July 22, 2004, which occurred prior to trial, and further contends that all of 
its subsequent relocation efforts should not impact the result that the taking 
completely destroyed the business at its prior location.   
Unfortunately, this contention ignores several important facts and a 
significant point of law.  First, System Components continued in business at its 
prior location post-taking with FDOT‘s assent.  System Components (a) leased 
back the condemned parcel for a five-month term ending in December 2004, (b) 
later transferred to a temporary facility, and (c) finally moved to its new, 
 
- 24 - 
permanent location on December 23, 2005, approximately 1.5 months before the 
business-damages trial occurred during mid-February 2006.  Second, with regard 
to the ignored point of law, Florida‘s appellate courts have not mechanically 
applied the timing requirement of section 73.071(2) when addressing business 
damages.  For example, in Malone v. Division of Administration, 438 So. 2d 857 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1983), a case involving an established type of business damages 
(i.e., moving expenses), the Third District recognized—consistent with this Court‘s 
precedent—that ―Florida law requires . . . courts [to] take into account all facts and 
circumstances bearing a reasonable relationship to the loss occasioned an owner by 
virtue of his property being taken,‖ id. at 863, and held that ―[t]he [business-
damages] award should be based on the allowable costs incurred or that will be 
incurred as long as the move is undertaken seasonably.‖  Id. at 861 (emphasis 
supplied).  Hence, the Third District refused to strictly adhere to section 73.071(2) 
when doing so would have produced an absurd result.  Cf. K.E. Morris, 444 So. 2d 
at 929 (―[I]t is axiomatic that courts should . . . avoid giving [a statute] an 
interpretation that will lead to an absurd result.‖).  Instead, the district court 
permitted a valuation of business damages based on the actual damages suffered by 
the condemnee following the taking—which were later established at trial.  The 
court did so because the condemnee had relocated.20   
                                          
 
 
20.  Despite our general agreement with the analysis presented in Malone, 
 
- 25 - 
A similar situation exists here.  System Components relocated and never 
ceased operations.  Therefore, the jury calculated these business damages with 
reference to the ―probable‖ damages ―reasonably‖ suffered as a result of ―the 
denial of the use of the property so taken.‖  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004).  
Based upon the record, System Components received nothing more and nothing 
less.  As both the Fourth and Fifth Districts have held, business damages ―are not 
intended to be a windfall unconnected with any out-of-pocket loss.‖  Sys. 
Components, 985 So. 2d at 690 (citing Tire Centers, 895 So. 2d at 1112).  In this 
case, the jury awarded System Components business damages for (a) loss of value 
due to an altered capital structure (i.e., increased debt), (b) moving expenses and 
rent, (c) costs associated with obtaining a replacement property, (d) costs 
associated with constructing a replacement facility, and (e) down-time productivity 
losses, and the trial court subsequently deducted the amount of FDOT‘s good-faith 
deposit to avoid double recovery.  System Components did not lose any goodwill 
and its witnesses could not identify any specific loss of sales.  The company did 
                                                                                                                                        
we disagree with portions of the Third District‘s decision.  First, the Malone court 
treated moving expenses as a component of the ―full compensation‖ required under 
article X, section 6 of the Florida Constitution.  See 438 So. 2d at 859-61.  
Subsequent precedent has clarified that this conclusion was incorrect—business 
damages are a creature of statute.  See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Transp., 537 
So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. 1989).  Second, we disagree with the Malone court‘s 
conclusion that (1) fees charged by real-estate agents to determine a suitable 
relocation site and (2) damages caused by business ―down time‖ are each 
noncompensable.  See 438 So. 2d at 863-64.   
 
- 26 - 
not cease to exist on the date of taking.  Consequently, System Components 
received the ―probable‖ business damages ―reasonably‖ suffered as a result of the 
taking.  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004).   
As we will more fully explain, the decision of the Fourth District in Tire 
Centers, which awarded the total value of the affected business—rather than 
awarding actual business damages—was based upon an understandable 
misconception of Florida law. 
The Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences Does Not Require Courts to Ignore 
the Actual Business Damages Caused by a Taking in Light of Business 
Relocation 
  
 The doctrine of avoidable consequences, which is also somewhat 
inaccurately identified as the ―duty to mitigate‖ damages, commonly applies in 
contract and tort actions.  See generally 17 Fla. Jur. 2d, Damages, §§ 103-04 
(2004).  There is no actual ―duty to mitigate,‖ because the injured party is not 
compelled to undertake any ameliorative efforts.  The doctrine simply ―prevents a 
party from recovering those damages inflicted by a wrongdoer that the injured 
party could have reasonably avoided.‖  The Florida Bar, Florida Civil Practice 
Damages § 2.43, at 2-30 (6th ed. 2005) (emphasis supplied) (citing Sharick v. Se. 
Univ. of Health Scis., Inc., 780 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Graphic Assocs., 
Inc. v. Riviana Rest. Corp., 461 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)).  The doctrine 
does not permit damage reduction based on what ―could have been avoided‖ 
 
- 27 - 
through Herculean efforts.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Fla. Drum Co., 651 So. 2d 180, 
182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (―Extraordinary efforts on the part of a plaintiff to 
mitigate are not required.‖), approved, 668 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1996).  Rather, the 
injured party is only accountable for those hypothetical ameliorative actions that 
could have been accomplished through ―ordinary and reasonable care,‖ without 
requiring undue effort or expense.  Graphic Assocs., 461 So. 2d at 1014 (the 
doctrine ―prevents a party from recovering those damages inflicted by a wrongdoer 
which the injured party ‗could have avoided without undue risk, burden, or 
humiliation.‘‖  (emphasis supplied) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
305(1) (1979))); Royal Trust Bank of Orlando v. All Fla. Fleets, Inc., 431 So. 2d 
1043, 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (substantially similar). 
In Florida eminent-domain cases, severance damages are subject to the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences through a valuation concept known as the 
―cost to cure‖: 
[T]he ―cost to cure‖ is the cost of an attempt to ameliorate the damage 
to value sustained by the [remaining] property as a result of the partial 
taking by the government.  The theory is that it is more economical to 
spend additional money on a ―cure‖ to restore value to the remaining 
property because the ―cure‖ will restore more lost value than its 
―cost.‖   
 
Fla. Dep‘t of Transp. v. Armadillo Partners, Inc., 849 So. 2d 279, 285 (Fla. 2003).  
The plain text of section 73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), conveys that the 
 
- 28 - 
Legislature views business damages as an otherwise noncompensable21 subtype of 
severance damages: 
Where less than the entire property is sought to be appropriated, any 
damages to the remainder [i.e., severance damages] caused by the 
taking, including, . . . the probable damages to such business which 
the denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause . . 
. . 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  See also Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Group, 
LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244, 1257 (Fla. 2008) (―[T]he term ‗including‘ is not one of all-
embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general 
principle.‖  (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck 
Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941))).  Therefore, the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences/cost-to-cure approach may similarly apply to business damages 
when limited to a proposed, reasonably feasible restoration of the business on the 
parent tract.  See Mulkey, 448 So. 2d at 1066-67 (holding that the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences/cost-to-cure approach is limited to the parent tract).22  
However, this recognition does not alter the fact that true severance damages are a 
constitutionally required component of ―full compensation,‖ whereas business 
                                          
 
 
21.  In other words, noncompensable in the absence of a statute providing 
for such damages. 
 
22.  Restoration of the business on the parent tract was impossible in this 
case.  Due to the partial taking, System Components was forced to either (1) close 
up shop, or, alternatively, (2) relocate off-site to real property over which it 
previously had no ownership interest. 
 
- 29 - 
damages are not.  See Florida Eminent Domain, supra, §§ 9.34, 9.35, at 9-46 – 9-
47.  In addition, as stated above, severance and business damages fulfill 
substantively distinct roles:  Severance damages reimburse the owner for the 
reduction in value the taking causes to any remaining land, while business damages 
compensate the owner for probable reductions in business value, business losses, 
or increased business expenses reasonably caused by the taking.  See § 
73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d at 690-91 (citing 
Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1224); Ness Trailer, 489 So. 2d at 1181; Florida 
Eminent Domain, supra, §§ 9.34, 9.35, at 9-46 – 9-47. 
 
In Tire Centers, the Fourth District erroneously (but understandably) relied 
on Florida‘s historical limitation of the ―cost to cure‖ to the parent tract and 
overlooked the actual damages suffered by the condemnee.  Instead, the Fourth 
District awarded the total value of the condemnee‘s business ($1,738,235) as 
though it had ceased to exist on the date of taking.  See 895 So. 2d at 1112-13.  In 
reality, the tire business simply relocated within the same general vicinity and 
continued its business unabated (much the same as System Components in the case 
at bar).  See id. at 1111.  Tire Centers thus misstates and misapplies the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences, which involves hypothetical ameliorative efforts.23  It is 
                                          
 
 
23.  However, we do agree with the Fourth District that goodwill is often 
uniquely associated with a particular site (especially a retail storefront), and that 
such a location may provide much of a business‘s intrinsic, intangible value.  See 
 
- 30 - 
true that Florida precedent limits the cost to cure to the parent tract.  See Mulkey, 
448 So. 2d at 1066-67.24  Nevertheless, it is equally true that the cost-to-cure 
approach is not an independent measure of damages; it is simply a means through 
which the condemnee‘s damages may be reduced by pleading and proving 
reasonably implemented, hypothetical ameliorative efforts that are limited to the 
parent tract.  See Armadillo Partners, 849 So. 2d at 285 (―[W]hile the cost to cure 
may be relevant evidence on the issue of damages, it is not a measure of damages 
                                                                                                                                        
Matthews, 324 So. 2d at 667 (―[C]ommon experience teaches us that where the 
‗effect of the taking‘ is to totally destroy an established neighborhood-retail 
business, there is, or at least well may be, a substantial loss . . . of customer 
goodwill.‖); see also Black‘s Law Dictionary 715 (8th ed. 2004) (―goodwill. A 
business‘s reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered 
when appraising the business, esp[ecially] for purchase; the ability to earn income 
in excess of the income that would be expected from the business viewed as a mere 
collection of assets.‖); American Society of Appraisers, Business Valuation 
Standards Glossary, available at www.bvappraisers.org/glossary/glossary.pdf 
(―Goodwill—that intangible asset arising as a result of name, reputation, customer 
loyalty, location, products, and similar factors not separately identified.‖).  Here, 
due to the nature of its wholesale-distribution business, System Components could 
not establish that it lost any goodwill following its relocation. 
 
24.  The Florida Eminent Domain Practice and Procedure treatise explains 
this rule as follows: 
 
Evidence of a cure to the remainder must show that the cure can 
be constructed on the premises.  A cure cannot be admitted if it would 
require an owner to go outside the premises, to property over which 
the owner has no ownership interest, to effect the cure. 
Id. § 9.42, at 9-55 (citing Mulkey, 448 So. 2d 1062); see also Kelly, supra, at 54 
(discussing Mulkey). 
 
- 31 - 
to be separately assessed without reference to‖ other germane evidence concerning 
the actual damages suffered by the condemnee.).   
In contrast, the relocation efforts of Tire Centers and System Components 
were not hypothetical but, rather, were probative of the actual damages sustained 
by these businesses in light of their relocation and continued operation.  Cf. 
Malone, 438 So. 2d at 860-63 (permitting valuation based on actual business 
damages suffered post-taking); Mulkey, 448 So. 2d at 1067 (same).  To ignore 
planned, executed business relocations in interpreting section 73.071(3)(b) would 
lead to an absurd result (i.e., overcompensating businesses as though they ceased to 
exist on the date of taking), which this Court must seek to avoid.  Cf. K.E. Morris, 
444 So. 2d at 929.  The Legislature has authorized the award of ―probable damages 
. . . which the denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause,‖25 
and we must properly construe the statute and only award compensation when 
clearly consistent with legislative intent.  See K.E. Morris, 444 So. 2d at 929. 
Section 73.071(3)(b) is thus intended to compensate ―probable‖ business 
damages in light of actual events.  However, the statute is completely silent with 
regard to imposing an affirmative duty to relocate, which FDOT contends should 
be the rule despite the absence of any explicit statutory command.  In other words, 
if the destroyed business chooses not to relocate and, instead, to close up shop, 
                                          
 
 
25.  § 73.071(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004).   
 
- 32 - 
FDOT requests the ability to reduce the business‘s damages through the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences (i.e., introducing relocation hypotheticals beyond the 
boundaries of the parent tract to reduce business damages).  While such a rule 
might provide an economic incentive to force the reestablishment of businesses 
following condemnation, imposing an affirmative duty to relocate is a legislative, 
rather than judicial, function.  This is particularly true given that Florida eminent-
domain precedent has limited the doctrine of avoidable consequences to the parent 
tract,26 and the Legislature has been operating under this assumption for a number 
of years, during which time it has amended Florida‘s eminent-domain statutes 
without imposing an affirmative duty to relocate.  See, e.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Zota, 
985 So. 2d 1036, 1043 (Fla. 2008) (―[T]he legislature is presumed to know the 
judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version of that law and . . . is 
presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary 
intention is expressed in the new version.‖  (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 917 (Fla. 2001))); see 
generally ch. 99-385, Laws of Fla. (making several changes to Florida‘s eminent-
domain statutes).  If the Legislature wishes to impose this type of affirmative duty, 
it remains free to do so.  Cf. Idaho Code Ann. § 7-711(2)(b) (Supp. 2007) 
(imposing an affirmative duty to relocate under reasonable circumstances). 
                                          
 
 
26.  See Mulkey, 448 So. 2d at 1066-67. 
 
- 33 - 
 
This case does not involve a hypothetical relocation, and both the Fourth and 
Fifth Districts have recognized that section 73.071(3)(b) does not directly impose 
an affirmative or hypothetical duty to relocate.  See Sys. Components, 985 So. 2d 
at 692; Tire Centers, 895 So. 2d at 1112-13.  Accordingly, we defer to the 
Legislature concerning the question of whether affected businesses should be 
required to relocate to mitigate their business damages while, at the same time, we 
recognize that under the applicable statute no such requirement exists.    
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons provided in our analysis, we approve the decision of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal in System Components Corp. v. Department of 
Transportation, 985 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), and disapprove the decision 
of the Fourth District in State Department of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC, 
895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  In resolving this conflict, we conclude that 
when a qualified partial taking destroys a business at its prior location, and the 
land/business owner chooses to relocate, the resulting business damages must be 
measured by the probable financial impact reasonably suffered as a result of the 
taking.  Therefore, these business damages must be determined in light of the true 
economic realities of the given case, which, here, involved a relocated business‘s 
continued existence at its new location. 
It is so ordered.   
 
- 34 - 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result only. 
PERRY, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D06-2864 
 
 
(Marion County) 
 
Marty Smith and Ann Melinda Craggs of Bond, Arnett, Phelan, Smith and Craggs, 
P.A., Ocala, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel and Gregory G. Costas, Assistant General 
Counsel, Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent