Title: Romsa v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Transp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TODD L. ROMSA v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2012 WY 146Case Number: S-12-0005Decided: 11/20/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
TODD 
L. ROMSA,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,Appellee(Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
R. 
Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang, LLC, Laramie, 
WY.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Michael T. 
Kahler, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
HILL, Justice.
 
[¶1]      
After being arrested for driving while under the influence (DWUI) 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2011), Todd 
L. Romsa submitted a request for contested case hearing before the 
Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH).  Romsa asked the OAH to 
rule that the procedure used by the arresting officer to conduct the chemical 
breath test upon which his arrest was based did not comply with Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-6-105(a) (LexisNexis 2011) and, therefore, the proposed 
suspension of his driver’s license must be vacted.1  
The OAH hearing examiner issued an Order Upholding Per Se 
Suspension on June 9, 2011.  Romsa petitioned 
the district court to review the order of the OAH and on November 
11, 2011, that court affirmed the OAH’s 
order.  Romsa now appeals the order of the 
district court.  We affirm the order of the district court 
affirming the order of the hearing examiner that suspended the driver’s license 
of Romsa.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Romsa 
presents two issues for our consideration:
 
I.              
It is improper 
for OAH to apply a presumption that the underlying chemical test 
result is valid where the certified record establishes a failure to comply with 
Wyoming Statute § 31-6-105(a).
 
II.            
If OAH is 
allowed to apply the presumption that a chemical test is valid, then 
[Romsa] should be allowed under Rule 12.08 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to provide evidence to rebut the arresting officer’s claims 
that he complied with Wyoming Statute § 31-6-105(a), where this evidence was not 
available to [Romsa] at the time of his implied consent 
administrative proceeding.
 
FACTS
 
[3]        
On April 10, 2011 Romsa was arrested for DWUI in 
violation of § 31-5-233(b).2  
According to the Wyoming Highway Patrol officer (arresting 
officer), Romsa was observed driving approximately 80 mph in a 55 
mph zone; he failed to acknowledge the pursuing officer for one quarter of a 
mile despite the fact that the officer had activated his overhead lights, and he 
otherwise engaged in indecisive driving according to the officer’s experience 
and training.  After Romsa pulled over in his 
vehicle and stopped on the side of Interstate 80, the officer approached the 
vehicle and as Romsa rolled down his window, the officer smelled a 
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the 
vehicle.  Romsa admitted that he had been drinking 
alcohol that day and agreed to submit to field sobriety tests.  
According to the officer, “6 of 6 clues of impairment were easily 
observed in Mr. Romsa’s eyes” during the “Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus” test; Romsa failed the walk and turn test as “7 
out of 8 clues of impairment were easily observed;” and “Mr. Romsa 
exhibited 2 out of 4 clues of impairment” during the one leg stand 
test.  Romsa also agreed to blow into the 
officer’s portable breath test machine, which produced a result of 
.125.
 
[¶4]      
Consequently, the officer placed Romsa under arrest 
for DWUI at approximately 1634 hours (4:34 p.m.) and he was taken to 
the Albany County Detention Center for a breath test to determine his blood 
alcohol content.
 
[¶5]      
Pursuant to the arresting officer’s Incident Report, once at the 
detention center, Romsa was read the Wyoming Implied Consent Form at 
1725 hours (5:25 p.m.) and Romsa agreed to submit to a chemical test 
of his breath.  The Wyoming Chemical Testing 
Program Intoximeter OR/IR II With Dry Gas – Operational 
Checklist (hereinafter “Operational Checklist”) prepared by the arresting 
officer indicates that at 1729 hours (5:29 p.m.) it was discovered 
that Romsa had “chew” (chewing tobacco) in his mouth and he was 
required to “spit it out.”  At 1729 hours, the officer then 
began a mandatory fifteen-minute observation period, which is required by 
Department of Health (DOH) Wyoming Chemical Testing Program rules and 
regulations prior to chemical breath testing.  DOH 
Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, Ch. III, 
§ 1(a)(i) (2004).
 
[¶6]      
According to the Incident Report,
 
Mr. Romsa 
submitted to the first breath test (#3438) at 1749 hours [5:49 p.m.] on 
04/10/11.  Mr. Romsa blew so hard into the machine 
that it caused an alcohol abort and a new test (#3439) had to be run on the 
Intox. Machine.  
            
On the next test (#3439), Mr. Romsa provided another sample 
of his breath at 1755 hours [5:55 p.m.] and the result was a B.A.C. 
of .100.  On the second attempt, Mr. Romsa failed 
to provide a sufficient air sample by blowing to [sic] lightly into the 
machine.  On the third attempt, Mr. Romsa 
successfully provided a breath sample and the resulting B.A.C. was 
.108.  Of note, I believe Mr. Romsa was trying to 
provide a sample of his breath in all of the above instances; he was simply 
confused as to how to properly provide a sample of his breath in the 
Intox. Machine.
 
[¶7]      
By letter dated April, 20, 2011, Romsa was notified by the 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) that as a result of his 
April 10, 2011 arrest for DWUI, his driver’s license would be 
suspended.  Evidently having anticipated the driver’s license 
suspension, Romsa submitted a written request for a contested case 
hearing on April 13, 2011, and the hearing request was referred to 
the OAH “pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann § 31-7-105(b), the Wyoming 
Department of Transportation Rules and Regulations, Driver’s Licenses, 
Ch. 1 (2009) and the Rules for Contested Case Practice and Procedure before the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (2008),” and the matter was deemed 
“appropriate for contested case hearing pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-101 through 115.”
 
Contested 
Administrative Hearing
 
[¶8]      
The contested administrative hearing was set for June 2, 
2011.  In addition to the date of the 
hearing, Romsa was notified in the Notice of Evidentiary Hearing 
filed on May 10, 2011 that he would be allowed to “introduce physical evidence 
at the hearing, including documents and/or video or audio tape recordings” as 
long as he provided the evidence to the OAH prior to the 
hearing.
 
[¶9]      
Also on May 10, 2011, an entry of appearance was filed with 
the OAH by an attorney representing Romsa, and the attorney 
was notified that the discovery file had already been sent to Romsa 
when WYDOT received his request for contested hearing.
 
[¶10]   
On May 16, 2011, Romsa filed a Request for Decision on the 
Pleadings and Motion to Vacate Proposed Suspension.  
Accordingly, Romsa asked that the “matter be decided on the 
pleadings and information contained in the certified 
record in this case.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Romsa submitted no additional 
evidence and relied solely on the certified record.
 
[¶11]   
The certified record was provided by WYDOT and contained, in 
relevant part:
 
1.  The 
arresting officer’s Signed Statement,
2.  The 
Incident Report “about [the officer’s] contact with, 
investigation, arrest and chemical testing of Romsa,”
3.  The 
Wyoming Chemical Testing Program Intoximeter 
EC/IR-EC/IR II With Dry Gas Operational Checklist 
(Operational Checklist),
4.  A 
breath test record printout for test #3438 “which reflected a test at 1749 [5:49 
p.m.] and noted a Test Status: Mouth alcohol,” (Test #3438), 
and
5.  A 
breath test record printout for test #3439 (Test #3439) 
reflecting Romsa’s breath samples given at 1755 (5:55 p.m.) and 1759 
(5:59 p.m.) with results of 0.100 and 0.108 BAC.  
[Emphasis added.]
 
[¶12]   
In his written argument, Romsa stated that: “The only issue 
in this case is whether the arresting officer observed the Licensee for the 
appropriate 15 minute observation period after the arresting officer received a 
mouth alcohol abort message for the Licensee’s very first breath 
sample.”  Romsa argued:
 
In the current case, 
the Operational Checklist shows that [the arresting officer] started the 15 
minute observation period at '1729 hrs discovered Mr. Romsa had chew 
in [his] mouth, had him spit it out.’  Mr. Romsa’s 
first reading was at '17:49’ and the 'Test Status:’ at bottom of the Subject 
Test shows an abort message of mouth alcohol. … [The arresting officer] 
immediately restarted the EC/IR up again and received two valid test 
results at '17:55’ and '17:59’ respectively.  The first test 
was six (6) minutes after the mouth alcohol abort message and the second was ten 
(10) minutes after the mouth alcohol abort message.  Because 
[the arresting officer] failed to wait the required 15 minutes after receiving 
the mouth alcohol abort message, the officer failed to comply with the rules and 
regulations for admission of the chemical test result and the proposed 
suspension must be vacated.
 
[¶13]   Romsa 
relied upon the DOH Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis 
for Alcohol Testing.  This rule 
provides:
 
(i) Subject 
must be observed for a minimum of fifteen (15) minutes prior to testing to 
prevent residual mouth alcohol.  All foreign material (except 
dentures) must be removed from the mouth at the start of observation period and 
subject must not be allowed to smoke, eat, drink, or place anything in their 
oral cavity, etc.  If the subject vomits or regurgitates, the 
observation period must be restarted after rinsing the mouth with 
water.  A dry burp or belch will not affect the test; 
therefore, the observation period time can continue.  
[Emphasis added.]
 
Id., Ch. III § 
1(a)(i).
 
[¶14]   
After “consider[ing] the evidence and argument presented,” 
the OAH determined that:
 
Chapter III § 1(a) 
Procedure for Analysis is the only place where reference is made to mouth 
alcohol and contains the same language in paragraph two of the Operational 
Checklist.  This section requires a 15-minute observation 
period to prevent residual mouth alcohol.  However, the 
section also provides a dry burp or belch will not affect the test and the 
observation can continue.  In this matter, no testimony 
was provided by Romsa and the only evidence is contained in the 
certified record.  The evidence from [the arresting 
officer] reflected [that] he started the observation period at 1729 hours, at 
1749 hours Romsa 'blew so hard into the machine that it caused an 
alcohol abort…’, at 1755 Romsa provided the first breath sample on a 
new test and at 1759 Romsa provided the second usable breath 
sample.  It appears, based on the evidence presented; blowing 
too hard into the machine is similar to a dry burp or belch which does not 
affect the observation period.  The evidence presented 
in the certified record established [that the arresting officer] observed the 
required 15-minute observation period prior to testing and the breath test is 
admissible.  Since Romsa’s counsel 
stipulated to all the other issues and the certified record provided evidence 
establishing all the other issues, the proposed suspension action is 
upheld.”  [Emphasis added.]
 
Appeal to the 
District Court
 
[¶15]   
On June 10, 2011, Romsa filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
with the Second Judicial district court.  In his 
petition, Romsa set forth the issue on appeal as: “Was the 
Licensee’s breath result valid under Wyoming Statute 31-6-105(a), where the 
breath result clearly showed a 'mouth alcohol’ abort message, and the arresting 
officer failed to restart the 15 minute observation/deprivation period.” 
[sic]
 
[¶16]   
Furthermore, identical to his written argument presented to 
the OAH in his petition to the district court, Romsa 
again argued that “[b]ecause [the arresting officer] failed to wait the 
required 15 minutes after receiving the mouth alcohol abort message, the officer 
failed to comply with the rules and regulations for admission of the chemical 
test result and the proposed suspension must be 
vacated.”  Romsa requested
 
[t]hat the Court find 
that as a matter of law under the rules created for admission of chemical tests 
pursuant to § 31-6-105(a), that this Court find that the 'mouth alcohol’ 
abort message that was created in this case required the officer to restart the 
15-minute observation period under the statutory predicate, and that his failure 
to do so requires that this Court find the test was not performed in compliance 
with Wyoming’s implied consent law.
 
[¶17]   
In its Decision Letter dated October 27, 2011, the district court “having 
reviewed the [administrative] record and considered the briefs of the parties” 
found that,
 
[The arresting 
officer] had Mr. Romsa remove chewing tobacco from his mouth and 
began a fifteen-minute observation period at 1729 hours.  The 
trooper did not observe Mr. Romsa with any 
'foreign material’ in his mouth, nor did Mr. Romsa 
vomit or regurgitate, during this time.  Instead, the 
only evidence before the OAH was that the “mouth 
alcohol” error message occurred at 1749 hours because Mr. Romsa 
“blew so hard into the machine that it caused an alcohol abort[.]”  
Nothing in Wyoming law or regulations requires the start of a new 
observation period under these circumstances.  Compare 
People v. Ebert, 931 N.E.2d 279, 284 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2d Dist. 2010).  Under the facts, as presented 
to the OAH and the record in this matter, Wyoming Department of 
Health Rules and Regulations and Wyoming law do not require 
a new fifteen-minute observation period after Mr. Romsa’s first 
breath rest result aborted due to “mouth alcohol.”  [Emphasis 
in original.]
 
[¶18]   
Ultimately, the district court found “no error” on the part of 
the OAH and held that the “OAH’s Order Upholding Per Se 
Suspension [was] AFFIRMED in all respects.” (Emphasis 
added.)
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶19]   
“When we consider an appeal from a district court’s review of an 
administrative agency’s decision, we give no special deference to the district 
court’s decision.  Instead, 'we review the case as if it had 
come directly to us from the administrative agency.’”  Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 
557 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & 
Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo. 
2002)).  The standard of review of administrative actions is 
governed by W.R.A.P. 12.09 and Wyo. Stat. Ann § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2011), which provides in relevant part:
 
To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following determinations, the court 
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The 
reviewing court shall:
              
….
              
(ii)  Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and 
conclusions found to be:
(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;
….
(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of          an agency 
hearing provided by statute.
 
See Wylie v. 
Wyoming DOT, 970 P.2d 395, 397 (Wyo. 1998).
 
[¶20]   
The “substantial evidence standard will be applied any time we review an 
evidentiary ruling.”  Dale, 
¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554 at 561 (emphasis added).
 
If the hearing 
examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, 
we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s 
decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering 
whether that conclusion was contrary to overwhelming weight of the evidence in 
the record as a whole. …  Importantly, our review of any 
particular decision turns not on whether we agree with the outcome, but on 
whether the agency could reasonably conclude as it did, based on all the 
evidence before it.
 
Dale, ¶ 22, 
188 P.3d  at 561.
 
[¶21]   
However, when we review an agency’s conclusions of 
law, such as questions regarding statutory interpretation, 
we review the agency’s conclusions de novo.  
Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 561.  
See also McClean v. State, 2003 WY 17, 
62 P.3d 595 (Wyo. 2003).  “Properly promulgated 
rules and regulations have the same force and effect of law.  
We construe them as we construe statutes.”  Johnson 
v. City of Laramie, 2008 WY 73, ¶ 7, 187 P.3d 355, 357 (Wyo. 
2008).
 
When construing 
statutes
our primary 
consideration is to determine the legislature’s intent.  All 
statutes must be construed in pari materia 
and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the 
same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed 
in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of law, so 
our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to 
interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. 
 We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to 
every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute 
in pari materia.  When 
a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to statutory 
construction.  We must not give a statute a meaning 
that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible to another interpretation. 
Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to 
matters that do not fall within its express provisions.’”
 
Johnson, ¶ 7, 
187 P.3d  at 357 (quoting Muller v. Jackson Hole Mt. 
Resort, 2006 WY 100, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 2006)) 
(emphasis added).
 
[¶22]   
Furthermore, in determining whether or not a statute (or administrative 
rule or regulation) is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we look first to the 
plain language and ordinary meaning of the 
words.  McClean, ¶ 6, 
62 P.3d 597.
 
A statute is clear 
and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  We have 
said that divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be 
evidence of ambiguity.  However, the fact that opinions may 
differ as to a statute’s meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity.  
Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court.
 
McClean, 
¶ 6, 62 P.3d  at 597-98 (internal citations 
omitted).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶23]   
In his administrative hearing, Romsa stated the issue to be 
decided as, “whether the arresting officer observed the Licensee for the 
appropriate 15-minute observation period after the arresting officer received a 
mouth alcohol abort message for the Licensee’s very first breath sample.” 
 In his petition to the district court Romsa set 
forth the issue on appeal as:
 
Was the Licensee’s 
breath result valid under Wyoming Statute 31-6-105(a), where the breath result 
clearly showed a 'mouth alcohol’ abort message, and the arresting officer failed 
to restart the 15-minute observation/deprivation period. [sic]
 
[¶24]   
In his appeal to this Court Romsa states the first of his two 
issues as: “It is improper for OAH to apply a presumption that the 
underlying chemical test result is valid where the certified record establishes 
a failure to comply with Wyoming Statute § 31-6-105(a).”3
 
[¶25]   
While Romsa has stated his “issue” differently in each of the 
three proceedings (i.e., the administrative proceeding, the district court 
appeal, and his appeal to this Court), and while in his argument to this Court 
he seems to mix factual issues with interpretation of law issues, it is clear to 
this Court that the issue on appeal is a question of law.  
Accordingly, “we review the agency’s conclusions de novo.” 
 Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 
561.
 
[¶26]   
In this case, the facts are undisputed.  “In this 
matter, no testimony was provided by Romsa and the only 
evidence is contained in the certified record.” 
 (Emphasis added.)  It is undisputed 
that Romsa voluntarily submitted to a chemical breath test for 
alcohol.  At 1729 (5:29 p.m.) the arresting officer discovered 
that Romsa had chewing tobacco in his mouth and 
had Romsa “spit it out” pursuant to DOH Rules and 
Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, Ch. III § 
1(a)(i) requiring: “All foreign material … be removed from the mouth at 
the start of observation period and subject must not be allowed to smoke, eat, 
drink, or place anything in their oral cavity, etc.”
 
[¶27]   
It is undisputed that 20 minutes passed from the time 
that Romsa took the chewing tobacco out of his mouth to the time 
when he gave his first breath sample at 1749 (5:49 p.m.).  
Clearly, this timeframe comports with the language of the DOH 
rule requiring that the “[s]ubject must be observed for a minimum of 
fifteen (15) minutes prior to testing to prevent residual mouth 
alcohol.”  Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for 
Alcohol Testing, Ch. III § 1(a)(i).
 
[¶28]   Romsa 
does not dispute that he was observed for a minimum of 15 minutes prior to 
testing but, instead, takes issue with the fact that he was not asked to, nor 
did he, rinse his mouth with water after spitting out the “chew.”  
Specifically, he argues that “the arresting officer failed to follow the 
guideline for rinsing contaminants out of a mouth prior to having someone 
provide a breath sample, which became evident when the breath machine 
subsequently provided a 'mouth alcohol’ message.”
 
[¶29]   
Apparently, Romsa is relying on the portion of 
the DOH rule that states: “If the subject vomits or regurgitates, 
the observation period must be restarted after rinsing the mouth with water.” 
 Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol 
Testing, Ch. III § 1(a)(i).  
However, Romsa is ignoring the first part of that sentence, 
i.e.:  “If the subject vomits or regurgitates…”  
Nowhere in the record has it been submitted that Romsa 
vomited or regurgitated at any time. 
 
[¶30]   
Moreover, Romsa argues,
 
Given the fact that 
the officer received a mouth alcohol abort message after the arresting officer 
knew [that Romsa] had chewing tobacco in his mouth, it was incumbent on 
the officer to restart the 15-minute observation period prior to having 
[Romsa] take another chemical test.  In this case, the 
officer did not wait 15 minutes to restart the machine and received two results 
after a mouth alcohol abort message. …Chewing tobacco is a mouth contaminant in 
the same manner as vomit and requires the rinsing of the mouth in order to 
remove the contaminating material.  In this case, 
[Romsa] had chew in his mouth and he was not allowed to rinse it out, 
which explains why the machine gave a mouth alcohol reading shortly after 
[Romsa] attempted to provide a breath sample.”
 
[¶31]   
While Romsa may be correct that “[c]hewing tobacco is a mouth 
contaminant in the same manner as vomit and requires the rinsing of the mouth in 
order to remove the contaminating material,"4 (a conclusory statement 
that this Court takes no position on in this 
opinion) Romsa provided no factual evidence of 
such in his administrative hearing.  Instead, the 
only evidence before the OAH as to the question of why 
the breath machine gave a mouth alcohol reading on Romsa’s first 
breath sample was Romsa “blew so hard into the machine that it 
caused an alcohol abort[.]”  And ultimately, 
the OAH found that “the evidence presented in the certified record 
established [the arresting officer] observed the required 15-minute observation 
period prior to testing and the breath test is admissible.”
 
[¶32]   
We reiterate that the facts before the OAH in the contested 
administrative hearing were undisputed.  The issue before the 
OAH, and now this Court, is a question of statutory 
interpretation.  Specifically, we focus on the administrative 
rule relied upon by Romsa at the administrative 
hearing:  DOH Rules and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, Ch. III § 
1(a)(i).  In so doing,
 
[w]e begin by making 
an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection. … When a statute is sufficiently 
clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. … Moreover, we 
will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.
 
Johnson, ¶ 7, 
187 P.3d  at 357.
 
[¶33]   Romsa 
would have this Court disregard the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the language 
of DOH Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol 
Testing, Ch. 3 § 1(a)(i).  The rule 
specifically requires rinsing of the mouth only if the licensee 
vomits or regurgitates.  Romsa would have this 
Court “enlarge, stretch, expand or extend” the rule to require rinsing of the 
mouth after the licensee empties his mouth of chewing tobacco. 
 Johnson, ¶ 7, 187 P.3d  at 
357.  He would also have us expand the law to require a new 
15-minute observation period any time the breath test results in a reading of 
“mouth alcohol.”
 
[¶34]   
“We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature’s 
intent.” Johnson, ¶ 7, 187 P.3d  at 357.  
We find that the language of the DOH Rules and Regulations 
for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, Ch. III § 1(a)(i), 
is clear and unambiguous.  The DOH, by the authority 
granted to it by the legislature in § 31-6-105(a) clearly detailed under what 
circumstances a licensee should be required to rinse his mouth prior to testing 
and under what circumstances the 15-minute observation period must be 
restarted.  Had the DOH intended to include those 
circumstances when the licensee was found to have chewing tobacco in his mouth 
and require rinsing of the mouth prior to testing, and/or those times when the 
breath test aborted due to “mouth alcohol” and require a re-start of the 
15-minute observation period, it certainly could have done so.  
We, however, decline to substitute our judgment for that of the 
legislature and DOH in light of the unambiguous “ordinary and 
obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.”  Johnson, ¶ 7, 187 P.3d  
at 357.
 
[¶35]   
Accordingly, we find, as did the district court, that “[u]nder the 
facts, as presented to the OAH and the record in this matter, 
Wyoming Department of Health Rules and Regulations and Wyoming law do 
not require a new fifteen-minute observation period after 
Mr. Romsa’s first breath test result aborted due to 'mouth 
alcohol,’” and that the “OAH’s Order Upholding Per Se Suspension 
is AFFIRMED in all respects.”  (Emphasis in 
original.)
 
[¶36]   
In order to more precisely address Romsa’s first issue on 
appeal to this Court, and in light of our discussion, we find that the certified 
record presented by the WYDOT at the administrative hearing 
establishes that the arresting officer performed the chemical analysis 
of Romsa’s breath according to the methods approved by 
the DOH (specifically, Rules and Regulations for Chemical 
Analysis for Alcohol Testing, Ch. III, § 1(a)(i)) and as a result, it 
was proper for the OAH to apply a presumption that the underlying 
chemical test result was valid.  § 31-6-105(a).
 
[¶37]   
This brings us to Romsa’s 
second issue: 
 
If 
the OAH is allowed to apply a presumption that a chemical test is 
valid, then [Romsa] should be allowed under Rule 12.08 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure to provide evidence to rebut the arresting 
officer’s claims that he complied with Wyoming Statute § 31-6-105(a), where this 
evidence was not available to [Romsa] at the time of his implied 
consent administrative hearing.  [Emphasis in 
original.]
 
[¶38]   
The DOH Rules for Contested Case Practice and Procedure 
Before the Office of Administrative Hearings, Special Rules Relating to 
Driver’s Licenses, Ch. VI § 2(c) (2002), states:
 
            
(c)  [W]hen the Wyoming Department of Transportation presents 
evidence establishing that the chemical testing was conducted using methods 
approved under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105, it shall be presumed that the test 
result is accurate.  This presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence establishing that the specific test result is inaccurate as a result of 
equipment malfunction or improper administration.
 
[¶39]   
Having found that the OAH, and subsequently the district court, 
did not err in finding that the WYDOT presented sufficient evidence 
in the certified record to establish during the administrative hearing “that the 
chemical testing [of Romsa] was conducted using methods approved under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105,” we also find that the burden was properly shifted 
to Romsa to rebut the presumption that his breath test result was 
accurate.  The presumption can be rebutted by showing 
“equipment malfunction or improper administration” of the test. 
 Special Rules Relating to Driver’s Licenses, Ch. VI § 
2(c).
 
[¶40]   
Evidently, it is Romsa’s position that the breath test result 
was inaccurate due to “improper administration.”  He argues 
that 
 
[T]here is absolutely 
no science to support the arresting officer’s claim that blowing too hard into a 
breath machine will cause a 'mouth alcohol’ reading and the fact [that] chewing 
tobacco was observed and [Romsa] was not allowed to rinse it out, 
requires a finding that the breath test result was not valid.
 
Furthermore, Romsa 
argues that
 
There is nothing in 
the record to support the officer’s assertion that blowing too hard into the 
breath machine can create a 'mouth alcohol’ abort message,”  
and that, instead, when “someone attempts to blow too hard into the 
breath machine,” it will actually provide a 'Maximum flow exceeded’ test result 
reading.
 
[¶41]   
However, the “evidence,” that Romsa maintains supports 
his position that there was an “improper administration” of the breath test, was 
never presented to the OAH.  Again, Romsa 
submitted no evidence and, instead, relied entirely upon the pleadings and 
certified record submitted by the WYDOT.
 
[¶42]   
Nevertheless, Romsa has attached to his appellate brief to 
this Court various records that he believes support his position, including a 
scientific article regarding chewing tobacco and its relation to “mouth 
alcohol,” and various other documents obtained by Romsa’s counsel 
“[a]s a result of discovery in another DWUI case,” that purportedly 
show “that the EC/IR II breath machine has a specific message that the 
machine creates when someone blows too hard into the breath 
machine.”  Romsa argues that “[t]his message is 
'Maximum flow exceeded,’” and “this new discovery should at least allow 
[Romsa] to have a remand under Rule 12.08 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure[.]”
 
[¶43]   W.R.A.P. 
12.08 states, in relevant part, as follows:
 
Rule 
12.08.  Presentation of Evidence.
If, before the date 
set for hearing, application is made to the reviewing court for leave to present 
additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court the 
additional evidence is material, and good cause for failure to present it in the 
proceeding before the agency existed, the reviewing court, in contested cases, 
shall order the additional evidence to be taken before the agency upon those 
conditions determined by the reviewing court.
 
[¶44]   
At no time has Romsa applied to this Court for leave to 
present additional evidence as required by W.R.A.P. 
12.08.  Even if he had, however, Romsa has not 
shown “good cause for failure to present it in the proceeding before the 
agency.”  Id.
 
[¶45]   Romsa 
insists that because the “scope of discovery available to a licensee in a 
Wyoming implied consent hearing” is limited, and he “was not 
entitled to the discovery of the EC/IR II machine [breath machine] for 
the implied consent hearing in the above-entitled matter and the information 
concerning the 'maximum flow exceeded’ was provided to [Romsa’s] counsel 
as discovery in another criminal case and after the hearing for 
the above-entitled matter,” he “has set forth proof that would require a remand 
and further proceedings before OAH[.]”  (Emphasis in 
original.)
 
[¶46]   
As support for his position, Romsa references Jones v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 991 P.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Wyo. 
1999) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(c).  Section 31-6-103(c) 
provides for a contested case hearing before a 
license is suspended pursuant to our implied consent law and 
states:
 
Prehearing discovery, 
available to any interested party is limited to access to the notice of 
suspension, signed statement and any accompanying 
documentation submitted by the arresting officer. Other types of discovery 
available under other law are not available in a hearing under this 
section.
 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-6-103(c) (LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶47]   
However, even if Romsa was only afforded access to limited 
discovery, he discounts the fact that he had access to all of the documents 
contained in the certified record, including the Incident Report and the breath 
test record printout for test #3438 “which reflected a test at 1749 [5:49 p.m.] 
and noted Test Status: Mouth alcohol,” (Test #3438).  At 
that time, Romsa could have argued and submitted the 
scientific evidence that he now wants to submit, which purportedly supports his 
position that
 
[c]hewing tobacco is 
a mouth contaminant in the same manner as vomit and requires the rinsing of the 
mouth in order to remove the contaminating material.  In this 
case, [Romsa] had chew in his mouth and he was not allowed to rinse it 
out, which explains why the machine gave a mouth alcohol reading shortly after 
[Romsa] attempted to provide a breath sample.
 
He did not do 
so.
 
[¶48]   
Additionally, with regard to his argument that a “mouth alcohol” reading 
does not occur when someone blows too hard into the machine and that, rather, a 
“maximum flow exceeded” result would appear, Romsa certainly had the 
right to question the arresting officer regarding the “mouth alcohol” result, 
regardless of whether or not he was aware at the time of the hearing that a 
different reading could, or should, appear.  
Indeed Romsa was aware of Jones since he uses it to 
support his position that discovery is limited.  Yet, that 
case specifically states:
 
A 
driver’s constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine the arresting 
officer are satisfied by the driver’s ability to subpoena the officer. 
Dept. of 
Rev. & Taxation v. Hull, 751 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1988).  If the hearing officer affords the driver the opportunity 
to secure the attendance of the arresting officer, due process has been made 
available.  Id.  The notice of 
suspension and temporary license form given to Wyoming drivers by the arresting 
officer advises the driver of his right to subpoena the officer, stating 
“if you want the peace officer at the hearing, you must specifically 
request that the officer be subpoenaed and you will be liable for any 
expenses incurred because of the subpoena.”  The only 
reason Jones was not able to confront and cross-examine the officer was his own 
failure to utilize his right to subpoena the officer to secure his attendance at 
the hearing.  He was not denied due 
process.  [Emphasis added.]
 
Jones, 
991 P.2d  at 1254-55.
 
[¶49]   
Like Jones, the notice of suspension and temporary license form 
given to Romsa in this case and signed by him on April 10, 2011, 
expressly stated:  “If you want the Peace Officer at the 
hearing, you must specifically request that the officer be 
subpoenaed[.]”  However, Romsa waived his right to 
subpoena the arresting officer in this case when he requested that the case be 
determined on the pleadings and certified record alone.  We 
agree with the WYDOT in this case that Romsa’s 

 
failure to take 
advantage of the contested case hearing process does not equate to the 'good 
cause’ contemplated in Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.08.  
Accordingly, Romsa’s failure to follow the rules of procedure 
and this Court’s longstanding case law precludes considering that evidence on 
appeal.
 
[¶50]   
We hold that Romsa failed to meet the requirements set forth 
in W.R.A.P 12.08.  He has not applied to this 
Court for leave to present additional evidence, and he has not shown “good cause 
for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency.”  
Id.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶51]   
As stated in our discussion, we find that the certified record presented 
by the WYDOT at the administrative hearing establishes that the 
arresting officer performed the chemical analysis of Romsa’s breath 
“according to the methods approved by the department of health,” (specifically, 
Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, 
Ch. III, § 1(a)(i)), and as a result, it was proper for 
the OAH to apply a presumption that the underlying chemical test 
result was valid.  § 31-6-105(a); Special Rules Relating to 
Driver’s Licenses, Ch. VI § 2(c).
 
[¶52]   Romsa 
did not present any evidence at the administrative hearing to rebut the 
presumption that the breath test results were accurate (Special Rules 
Relating to Driver’s Licenses, Ch. VI, § 2 (c)), and failed to meet 
the requirements of W.R.A.P. 12.08 that would allow this Court to 
“order the additional evidence to be taken before the agency.”  
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s Order Affirming Per 
Se Suspension and we affirm the Order Upholding Per Se Suspension by 
the Office of Administrative Hearings.
 
FOOTNOTES
  
1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-105 (LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
§ 
31-6-105.  Method of performing chemical analysis; persons permitted 
to draw blood; request by arrested person for test; information made available; 
evidence of refusal to take test.
(a)                   
Chemical 
analysis of the person’s blood, breath or urine to be considered valid under 
this section, shall be performed according to methods approved by the department 
of health and by an individual possessing a valid permit to conduct the 
analysis. Permits shall be issued by the department of health for this purpose. 
The department of health may promulgate and approve satisfactory methods in 
order to ascertain the qualifications of individuals permitted to conduct the 
analysis and shall issue to qualified individuals permits which are subject to 
termination or revocation by the department of health.
 
  
2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2011) 
provides:
 
§ 
31-5-233.  Driving or having control of vehicle while under influence 
of intoxicating liquor or controlled substances; penalties, states in relevant 
part:
. . . 
.
(b)  No 
person shall drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this 
state if the person:
(i)  Has 
an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or 
more;
(ii)  Has 
an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more, 
as measured within two (2) hours after the time of driving or being in actual 
physical control of the vehicle following a lawful arrest resulting from a valid 
traffic stop; or
(iii)  To 
a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving:
(A)   Is 
under the influence of alcohol[.]
 
3The “presumption” referenced by Romsa is 
contained in the Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings Rules for 
Contested Case Practice and Procedure Before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Special Rules Relating to Driver’s Licenses, Ch. VI § 2(c) 
(2002):
 
            
(c)  [W]hen the Wyoming Department of Transportation presents 
evidence establishing that the chemical testing was conducted using methods 
approved under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105, it shall be presumed that the test 
result is accurate.  This presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence establishing that the specific test result is inaccurate as a result of 
equipment malfunction or improper administration.
 
  4In his appeal, Romsa attached an article to his 
brief as “evidence” that was not a part of the record below.  
He argues that the attached article was “reprinted” as a chapter in a 
book that is “regarded as an authoritative book on the subject of chemical 
testing and forensic toxicology” and is evidence that chewing tobacco may 
contaminate breath alcohol results.  However, because we find 
that Romsa failed to apply to this Court for leave to present 
additional evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.08, and has failed to 
show good cause as to why he did not present the evidence in this contested case 
hearing (see discussion regarding Romsa’s second issue on appeal), 
we will not consider this “additional evidence” on appeal.