Title: Bocko v. University of Maine System

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2024 ME 8 
Docket: 
Cum-22-319 
Argued: 
    June 7, 2023 
Decided: 
 January 25, 2024 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
ROBERT BOCKO 
 
v. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM 
 
 
STANFILL, C.J. 
[¶1]  Robert Bocko appeals from a Superior Court (Cumberland County, 
O’Neil, J.) summary judgment in favor of the University of Maine System (UMS) 
on all counts of his complaint and denying Bocko’s motion for partial summary 
judgment.  Bocko argues that UMS failed to timely pay him wages as required 
by 26 M.R.S. § 621-A (2021)1 and is thus liable for penalties in accordance with 
 
1  Section 621-A provides in relevant part: 
 
At regular intervals not to exceed 16 days, every employer must pay in full all wages 
earned by each employee.  Each payment must include all wages earned to within 8 
days of the payment date.  Payments that fall on a day when the business is regularly 
closed must be paid no later than the following business day.  An employee who is 
absent from work at a time fixed for payment must be paid as if the employee was not 
absent. 
 
26 M.R.S. § 621-A(1) (2021).  Section 621-A(1) has since been amended.  P.L. 2023, ch. 124 § 1 
(effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 26 M.R.S. § 621-A(1) (2023)).  26 M.R.S. § 626-A (2021) provides 
that “[w]hoever violates any of the provisions of section[] 621-A . . . is subject to a forfeiture of not 
less than $100 nor more than $500 for each violation.”  In addition, the employee may recover unpaid 
wages or benefits as well as “a reasonable rate of interest, costs of suit including a reasonable 
 
2 
26 M.R.S. § 626-A (2021).  UMS counters that Bocko is exempt under 
section 623 from the requirements of section 621-A.2  See 26 M.R.S. § 623 
(2022) (“This section and sections 621-A and 622 do not apply to family 
members and salaried employees as defined in section 663, subsection 3, 
paragraphs J and K.”).  We conclude that Bocko is exempt from section 621-A 
as an employee compensated on a fee basis as described in 26 M.R.S. 
§ 663(3)(K) (2023) and 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III (effective June 29, 2005).  
Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record, 
which this Court views in the light most favorable to Bocko.  See Chase Home 
Fin., LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 10, 985 A.2d 508. 
[¶3]  UMS employed Bocko to teach a one-credit banking law course at 
the University of Maine School of Law in the fall semester of 2019.  UMS and 
Bocko memorialized the agreement with a contract specifying that Bocko 
would receive one payment at a “monthly rate” of $1,000 for the month of 
 
attorney’s fee, and an additional amount equal to twice the amount of unpaid wages as liquidated 
damages.”  26 M.R.S. § 626-A (2021).  Section 626-A has since been amended.  P.L. 2021, ch. 404 § 2 
(effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 26 M.R.S. § 626-A (2023)). 
 
2  Title 26 M.R.S § 623 (2022) has since been amended.  P.L. 2023, ch. 124 § 4 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) 
(codified at 26 M.R.S. § 623 (2023)).  
 
3 
October 2019.  The contract further provided that the classes would take place 
on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 1:10 to 2:50 p.m., commencing on October 1, 
2019, and ending on October 24, 2019.  Bocko prepared to teach the course in 
July, August, and September 2019; prepared for the October 1 class in 
September 2019; taught the October 1 class; prepared for and taught seven 
more classes during October 2019; prepared course assignments in 
October 2019; and graded the assignments between November 25 and 
December 4, 2019.  In total, Bocko taught eight classes, consisting of thirteen 
and one-third classroom hours, for the Banking Law course and spent an 
additional eighty hours outside of class working on course-related matters.   
[¶4]  In early October 2019, prior to receiving his payment, Bocko asked 
UMS why he had not received any pay.  A UMS administrator told him that 
adjunct faculty were always paid once a month at the end of each month.  UMS 
paid Bocko $1,000 in a single lump sum on October 31, 2019.   
[¶5]  In the fall semester of 2020, UMS employed Bocko to teach a 
three-credit admiralty law course as an adjunct professor at Maine Law.  UMS 
and Bocko memorialized the arrangement in a second contract.  This contract 
specified that Bocko would receive three payments at a “monthly rate” of 
$1,333.33 for the period from October 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020.  
 
4 
The contract specified that the classroom portions of the course would take 
place on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 10:40 a.m. to 12:10 p.m., starting 
September 1, 2020, and ending December 4, 2020.  Bocko worked to prepare 
the course in June, July, and August 2020; prepared for the September 1 class 
in August 2020; taught the September 1 class; prepared and taught twenty-five 
more classes in September, October, November, and December 2020; prepared 
a comprehensive final examination in late November and early December 2020; 
and reviewed and graded the final examination between December 15 and 17, 
2020.  In total, Bocko taught twenty-six classes, consisting of thirty-nine 
classroom hours, for the admiralty law course and spent an additional 
two hundred and sixty hours outside of class working on course-related 
matters.   
[¶6]  Before he received his first payment at the end of October 2020, 
Bocko asked UMS whether it was required to pay him in conformity with 
26 M.R.S. § 621-A(1) (“At regular intervals not to exceed 16 days, every 
employer must pay in full all wages earned by each employee.”).  On October 28, 
2020, UMS’s Director of Human Resource Operations and Supervisor of the 
Payroll Team stated in an email to Bocko: 
After internal discussions and careful review of our current payroll 
practices, it was confirmed that you are not being paid in 
 
5 
accordance with Maine law that stipulates certain employees must 
be paid at a minimum interval of every 16 days.  To comply, we will 
be moving you to our biweekly payroll schedule effective 
immediately.  This essentially means you will be paid next on 
11/20 for pay period 11/01/20 to 11/14/20.  You will receive pay 
for the month of October on Friday, 10/30.   
On November 2, 2020, the employment contract for Bocko was revised, stating 
that his total pay of $4,000 would be paid in equal installments of $444.45 on 
the biweekly pay cycle from September 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020.  UMS 
paid Bocko $4,000.05 for the admiralty law course as follows: $1,333.33 on 
October 30, 2020; $888.92 on November 6, 2020; and $444.45 on 
November 20, December 4, December 18, and December 31, 2020.   
[¶7]  In May 2021, Bocko filed a complaint against UMS for breach of 
contract and remedies under 26 M.R.S. § 626-A for untimely payment of wages 
pursuant to section 621-A.  UMS timely answered, and Bocko moved for partial 
summary judgment as to UMS’s liability under section 626-A.  UMS filed a cross 
motion for summary judgment on all counts of Bocko’s complaint.   
[¶8]  On September 12, 2022, the trial court denied Bocko’s motion and 
granted UMS’s motion, entering judgment in favor of UMS.  The court concluded 
that (1) Bocko was exempt from section 621-A’s requirements for the timely 
payment of wages because he met the definition of a teacher under 12-170 
C.M.R. ch. 16, § VI(B); (2) alternatively, Bocko was exempt from the 
 
6 
requirements of section 621-A because he met the definition of a salaried 
employee under 26 M.R.S. § 663(3)(K) and 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16; and 
(3) because section 621-A did not apply to Bocko, UMS was not liable to him for 
any remedies under section 626-A.  The court declined to address UMS’s 
additional argument that Bocko was exempt from section 621-A because he 
met the definition under section 663(3)(K) of an employee receiving 
compensation on a fee basis pursuant to 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III.   
[¶9]  Bocko timely appealed the court’s adverse decision on his statutory 
wage claim under section 626-A.3  The Maine Employment Lawyers Association 
filed an amicus brief in this case, which we have considered.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶10]  In an appeal from a ruling on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, we review de novo the trial court’s decision for errors of law.  Scott v. 
Fall Line Condo. Ass’n, 2019 ME 50, ¶ 5, 206 A.3d 307.  There are no disputes 
regarding the terms of Bocko’s contracts with UMS.  The contracts call for Bocko 
to be paid in fixed amounts based on the number of credit hours assigned to the 
courses he taught and not based on actual hours worked. 
 
3  Bocko does not appeal the trial court’s decision regarding his claim for breach of contract.  The trial 
court said that because section 621-A’s pay-interval requirement does not apply to Bocko, he cannot 
establish a claim for breach of contract based on UMS paying him in a lump sum rather than on the 
section 621-A interval.   
 
7 
A. 
26 M.R.S. § 621-A 
[¶11]  When “interpreting a statute, our single goal is to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.  To achieve that goal, we first look 
to a statute’s plain language, taking into account the subject matter and 
purposes of the statute, and the consequences of a particular interpretation.”  
Dorsey v. N. Light Health, 2022 ME 62, ¶ 11, 288 A.3d 386 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  “In doing so, we consider the entire statutory 
scheme so that a harmonious result can be achieved.”  Kane v. Comm’r of the 
Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 2008 ME 185, ¶ 12, 960 A.2d 1196.   
[¶12]  As a general matter, we construe Maine’s wage payment laws 
“liberally for the benefit of employees.”  Dorsey, 2022 ME 62, ¶ 11, 288 A.3d 386.  
If the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, “we defer to the interpretation 
of a statutory scheme by the agency charged with its implementation as long as 
the agency’s construction is reasonable.”  Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Env’t Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 23, 823 A.2d 551; see also Corinth Pellets, LLC v. 
Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 2021 ME 10, ¶ 36, 246 A.3d 586 (upholding the Bureau 
of Insurance’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute within its expertise).  
“Statutory language is considered ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to 
 
8 
different interpretations.”  Manirakiza v. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 
2018 ME 10, ¶ 8, 177 A.3d 1264 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶13]  Section 621-A(1) requires employers to pay employees earned 
wages at regular intervals not to exceed sixteen days.  Title 26 M.R.S. § 623 
provides, however, that section 621-A does not apply to “salaried employees” 
as defined by 26 M.R.S. § 663(3)(K), which states the following: 
3. 
“Employee” [is] any individual employed or permitted to 
work by an employer but the following individuals shall be exempt 
from this subchapter:  
. . . . 
(K)  A salaried employee who works in a bona fide executive, 
administrative or professional capacity and whose regular 
compensation, when converted to an annual rate, exceeds 
3000 times the State’s minimum hourly wage or the 
annualized rate established by the United States Department 
of Labor under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 
whichever is higher . . . .[4] 
 
Section 663(3)(K) does not further define a “salaried employee who works in a 
 
4  Like Maine law, federal law includes a salary basis exemption from its minimum wage and overtime 
requirements.  Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 118-30), certain minimum 
wage and overtime requirements do not apply to “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity.”  The federal regulations further provide that “to qualify as 
an exempt executive, administrative or professional employee under [section 213(a)(1)], an 
employee must be compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $684 per week.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.600(a) (2022).  Before the regulations were revised, effective January 1, 2020, that amount was 
$455 per week.  29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a) (2019); Nevada v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 
520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (enjoining the department from implementing section 541.600(a) (2019) 
and leaving in place the 2004 $455 per week standard).  When annualized, the rate was $23,660 
($455 multiplied by fifty-two weeks) in 2019 and $35,568 in 2020 ($684 multiplied by fifty-two 
weeks).  These amounts are lower than Maine’s minimum wage in 2019 and 2020 multiplied by 
3,000.  See 26 M.R.S. § 664(1) (2023) (Maine’s minimum wage was $11.00 per hour in 2019 and 
$12.00 per hour in 2020).  Thus, Maine’s threshold of 3,000 times the minimum hourly wage, or 
 
9 
bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity.” 
[¶14]  Although UMS does not pay Bocko an hourly wage, the contours of 
the “salaried employee” definition are not entirely clear.  Specifically, it is 
unclear whether “salaried employee” encompasses the kind of payment 
arrangement specified in Bocko’s contracts with UMS.  Contrary to Bocko’s 
assertions, we determine the statute is ambiguous because it is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations.  See Competitive Energy Servs. LLC v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 2003 ME 12, ¶ 15, 818 A.2d 1039.  Thus, we examine the interpretation 
of the statute by the agency charged with its implementation and defer to the 
agency’s interpretation so long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable and 
valid.  See Conservation L. Found., Inc., 2003 ME 62, ¶¶ 21-42, 823 A.2d 551. 
B. 
12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III 
[¶15]  “The Maine Department of Labor is the agency charged by our 
Legislature with responsibility for enforcement of all laws regulating payment 
of wages in Maine.”  Thompson v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2004 ME 63, ¶ 7, 
847 A.2d 406 (quotation marks omitted); 26 M.R.S. § 42 (2023).  Accordingly, 
the Department “may adopt, in accordance with the Maine Administrative 
Procedure Act, rules regarding all such laws, except where [the] authority is 
 
$33,000 in 2019 and $36,000 in 2020, exceeds the United States Department of Labor’s threshold. 
 
 
10 
granted to a board or commission.”  26 M.R.S. § 42; see also 5 M.R.S. § 8051 
(2023) (outlining rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act).  The 
Department’s rules provide specific guidance on the “executive, administrative 
and professional minimum wage and overtime exemptions allowed for 
individuals who are paid on a salary basis pursuant to [section 663(3)(K)].”  
12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16 (purpose statement) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶16]  Under 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III, an employee meets the 
section 663(3)(K) exemption if the employee is “compensated on a fee basis.”5  
Fee basis arrangements “are characterized by the payment of an agreed sum 
for a single job regardless of the time required for its completion.”  Id.  The 
“payments resemble piecework payments with the important distinction that 
generally speaking a fee payment is made for the kind of job which is unique 
rather than for a series of jobs which are repeated an indefinite number of times 
and for which payment on an identical basis is made over and over again.”  Id.  
Payments that are “based on the number of hours or days worked and not on 
the accomplishment of a given single task are not considered payments on a fee 
basis.”  Id.   
[¶17]  Under the regulation, the fee paid to the employee must also meet 
 
5  We address only section III and do not reach any other sections of the rule.  See 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 
16, § III (effective June 29, 2005). 
 
11 
the annualized salary requirement in section 663(3)(K) to satisfy the elements 
of the exemption.  See id. § III(A).  To determine whether a fee payment is 
adequate, the amount the employee is paid is tested by referencing a standard 
forty-hour workweek.  Id.  Thus, a fee meets the salary requirement if, when 
converted to a yearly salary based on an hourly wage and a forty-hour work 
week, it exceeds 3,000 times Maine’s minimum hourly wage, or $33,000 in 2019 
and $36,000 in 2020.  See id.; 26 M.R.S. § 663(3)(K); 26 M.R.S. § 664(1) (2023). 
[¶18]  We conclude that UMS paid Bocko on a fee basis and that the 
amount paid under his contracts with UMS meets the applicable salary 
requirement when converted to an annual rate.  See 26 M.R.S. § 663(3)(K); 
12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III.  Thus, Bocko is exempt from section 621-A.  See 
26 M.R.S. §§ 623, 663(3)(K); 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III. 
[¶19]  As noted above, Bocko’s contracts with UMS provided that he 
would receive one payment of $1,000 in exchange for teaching the banking law 
course and $4,000, payable in three payments of $1,333.33, in exchange for 
teaching the admiralty law course.6  Both employment arrangements 
constituted compensation on a fee basis because UMS paid Bocko “an agreed 
sum for a single job regardless of the time required for its completion.”  12-170 
 
6  The fact that UMS characterized these payments as a “salary” is irrelevant to our analysis.   
 
12 
C.M.R. ch. 16, § III.   
[¶20]  The summary judgment record shows that Bocko’s compensation 
was for “the accomplishment of a given single task,” teaching a course.  Id.  
Unlike a salary, which “as ordinarily conceived, reasonably connotes an actual, 
affirmative regular payment of benefits (usually in monetary form) in exchange 
for work or services,” Bocko’s fee-basis payments were for singular jobs—
teaching the banking law and admiralty law courses—and were not expected 
to repeat indefinitely.  City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Tchrs. Ass’n, 304 A.2d 387, 
417 (Me. 1973) (Wernick, J., concurring); see 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III 
(“[G]enerally speaking a fee payment is made for the kind of job which is unique 
rather than for a series of jobs which are repeated an indefinite number of times 
and for which payment on an identical basis is made over and over again.”).   
[¶21]  We turn to whether Bocko’s fee-basis payments meet the 
salary-basis requirement when converted to an hourly and annual rate.  The 
only tangible time requirements Bocko’s contract references are the classroom 
hours.  The banking law course totaled thirteen and one-third classroom hours, 
and the admiralty law course totaled thirty-nine classroom hours.  Based on 
those classroom hours, Bocko earned $75 per hour for teaching the banking law 
course ($1,000 divided by thirteen and one-third) and roughly $102 per hour 
 
13 
for teaching the admiralty law course ($4,000 divided by 39), far exceeding 
Maine’s minimum wage and the salary-basis requirement in section 663(3)(K).  
[¶22]  Bocko argues that his compensation is based on not only the 
classroom hours but also the hours he must spend outside the classroom on 
tasks such as preparation, reading, and grading.  If those hours are counted and 
converted to an hourly rate and then annualized, his compensation would be 
less than the salary-basis requirement in violation of the statute.  We disagree 
with Bocko’s argument for three reasons.  
[¶23]  First, the number of classroom hours is the only specific time 
requirement in the contract.  The contract does not require Bocko to spend any 
particular amount of time working outside the classroom.  Second, if 
compensation included the hours spent outside the classroom, it could be 
calculated only in hindsight.  In that case, there would be no consistency or 
predictability for UMS or the adjunct professors: the amount of preparation 
time is unknown when the contract is set and will vary depending on the 
course, the adjunct professor’s substantive knowledge, and whether the 
adjunct professor is teaching a course for the first time or for the tenth time.  It 
will also change week to week; therefore, including the preparation hours could 
mean that some weeks fall under the salary-basis calculation and others fall 
 
14 
over.  Finally, although we recognize that a competent adjunct professor will 
spend some time outside the classroom in preparation, there is no requirement 
that any adjunct professor do so.  Including the preparation hours would mean 
that the parties have no ability to determine prospectively whether the 
proposed compensation is legally adequate, making the rule and statute 
impossible to administer.  
[¶24]  In sum, we use the classroom hours to convert the fee that Bocko 
was paid to an hourly wage.  As a result, we conclude that Bocko is exempt from 
section 621-A because he was paid on a fee basis in an amount that meets the 
applicable salary-basis requirement. 
C. 
Validity of 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III 
[¶25]  In light of this conclusion, we must also address Bocko’s contention 
that 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III is invalid because it contradicts the plain 
language of the statutory scheme.  See Lydon v. Sprinkler Servs., 2004 ME 16, 
¶ 15, 841 A.2d 793 (invalidating a rule promulgated by the Worker’s 
Compensation Board because it was inconsistent with the relevant statute).   
[¶26]  Title 5 M.R.S. § 8058 (2023) permits judicial review of an agency 
rule in any civil or criminal proceeding.  We adhere to the three-part analysis 
outlined in section 8058(1) to assess a rule’s validity.  See Conservation L. 
 
15 
Found., Inc., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 21, 823 A.2d 551; Cumberland Farms N., Inc. v. 
Maine Milk Comm’n, 428 A.2d 869, 874 (Me. 1981).  First, if we find “that a rule 
exceeds the rule-making authority of the agency” or is void for the agency’s 
failure to follow the procedural processes of the Maine Administrative 
Procedure Act, see 5 M.R.S. § 8057(1), (2) (2023), we must “declare the rule 
invalid,”  5 M.R.S. § 8058(1).  Second, we review any other alleged procedural 
errors, and we “may invalidate the rule only if [we] find[] the error to be 
substantial and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly 
changed if the error had not occurred.”  Id.  Finally, if a procedural error does 
not invalidate the rule, we review the rule substantively “to determine whether 
the rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.”  Id. 
[¶27]  As previously noted, the Maine Department of Labor is charged 
with enforcing and adopting rules regarding Maine’s wage-payment laws.  See 
Thompson, 2004 ME 63, ¶ 7, 847 A.2d 406; 26 M.R.S. § 42.  Bocko raises no 
challenge to the procedure used to adopt the rules.  Instead, he argues that the 
Department exceeded the scope of its authority in enacting 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 
16, § III because the rule contradicts the relevant statutory scheme.  This 
 
16 
argument is a substantive challenge to the rule.  See Conservation L. Found., Inc., 
2003 ME 62, ¶ 25, 823 A.2d 551.  Bocko has the burden to demonstrate that 
12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III is not in accordance with the law.  See id. ¶¶ 38-39; 5 
M.R.S. § 8058. 
[¶28]  Bocko argues that 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III contradicts the 
statutory scheme because sections 621-A and 663(3)(K) do not contemplate 
the payment of wages on a fee basis and only consider wages paid on a salary 
basis.  He also argues that section 623 prohibits payment on a fee basis.  We 
disagree.   
[¶29]  To begin, the fact that the statute does not use the term “fee basis” 
does not show that the rule contradicts the law.  The Department’s rule 
otherwise encapsulates the requirements of section 663(3)(K) and requires the 
employee to meet the section 663(3)(K) salary-basis requirement.  12-170 
C.M.R. ch. 16, § III.   
[¶30]  The rule also aligns with federal law and regulations.  Compare id., 
with 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 118-30), and 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.605 (2022).  This alignment is relevant because “[w]hen, as here, a term 
is not defined in either the relevant statutory provisions or in prior decisions of 
this court,” we “may look to analogous federal statutes, regulations, and case 
 
17 
law for guidance.”  Gordon v. Maine Cent. R.R., 657 A.2d 785, 786 (Me. 1995) 
(using federal law and regulations to interpret section 663(3)(K) before the 
Department enacted its rules under 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16); see Dir. of Bureau of 
Lab. Standards v. Cormier, 527 A.2d 1297, 1300 (Me. 1987) (“While in no way 
bound by these cases, federal law does provide some useful guidance in 
formulating a coherent state law concept of ‘employer’ for purposes of 
enforcing [Maine’s minimum wage law].”).   
[¶31]  Bocko also argues that fee-basis compensation is prohibited by 
section 623, which provides that “a corporation, contractor, person or 
partnership may not by a special contract with an employee or by any other 
means exempt itself from this section and sections 621-A and 622.”  26 M.R.S. 
§ 623.  We disagree.  This language does not prohibit compensation on a fee 
basis, just as it does not prohibit compensation on an ongoing salary basis.7 
 
7  It is worth noting that “[i]t is a well-accepted principle of statutory construction that when an 
administrative body has carried out a reasonable and practical interpretation of a statute and this 
has been called to the attention of the Legislature, the Legislature’s failure to act to change the 
interpretation is evidence that the Legislature has acquiesced in the interpretation.”  Thompson v. 
Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2004 ME 63, ¶ 7, 847 A.2d 406 (quotation marks omitted).  The Legislature 
has amended section 663 several times since 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III became effective in 2005, and 
the Legislature has yet to amend section 663(3)(K) to alter the interpretation that the Department 
has given it.  See 26 M.R.S. § 663 (2023).  Although not conclusive without evidence that the 
Legislature is aware of the Department’s rule, this indicates that the Legislature has acquiesced to 
the Department’s interpretation of section 663(3)(K).  See Thompson, 2004 ME 63, ¶ 7, 847 A.2d 406. 
 
18 
[¶32]  Bocko raises no other argument to suggest that the rule is 
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,” and we conclude that it is 
not.  We therefore may defer to the Department’s interpretation.  See Watt v. 
UniFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶ 27, 969 A.2d 897 (“[Appellee] has not asserted 
that the rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.  Accordingly, we defer to and will apply the standard 
adopted by the [administrative agency].”). 
[¶33]  In sum, because the Department did not exceed its rule-making 
authority and 12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § III is a reasonable construction of a statute 
by the agency that administers it, we will defer to the rule in interpreting 
section 663(3)(K).  See Conservation L. Found., Inc., 2003 ME 62, ¶¶ 21-42, 823 
A.2d 551. 
[¶34]  Notwithstanding that the trial court ruled in UMS’s favor on 
different grounds—by concluding that Bocko was an exempt employee under 
12-170 C.M.R. ch. 16, § VI(B) and 26 M.R.S. § 663(3)(K)—we affirm the court’s 
judgment under our alternative reasoning.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax 
Assessor, 2012 ME 110, ¶ 13, 52 A.3d 941 (affirming a court’s summary 
judgment order on alternative grounds).  Because we determine that Bocko is 
an exempt employee because he is compensated on a fee basis, UMS is not in 
 
19 
violation of section 621-A, and we need not address the other issues raised by 
the parties.   
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew S. Wahrer, Esq. (orally), Thompson Bowie & Hatch LLC, Portland, and 
Robert J. Bocko, pro se, for appellant Robert J. Bocko 
 
David Strock, Esq. (orally), and Valerie A. Wright, Esq., Littler Mendelson, P.C., 
Portland, for appellee University of Maine System 
 
Andrew Schmidt, Esq., and Pamela Lee, Esq., Borealis Law PLLC, Portland, for 
amicus curiae Maine Employment Lawyers Association 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2021-184 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY