Title: MATTER OF HARDY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14892 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 I N T H E M A T T E R O F STEVEN D U A N E HARDY, P e t i t i o n e r , ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; Counsel o f Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Michael J. Whalen, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : June 25, 1980 Decided: AUG 6 - 1380 - 1 '2 ' ih:' F i l e d : - - - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n August 1974 p e t i t i o n e r w a s convicted of robbery on a p l e a of g u i l t y . I n J u l y 1979 p e t i t i o n e r i n s t i t u t e d an o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court f o r post-conviction r e - l i e f , seeking leave t o withdraw h i s plea of g u i l t y . This Court remanded t h e matter t o the D i s t r i c t Court with d i r e c - t i o n s t o conduct a hearing and t o determine t h e m e r i t s of t h e p e t i t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court, af ter hearing, denied t h e r e q u e s t f o r leave t o withdraw t h e p l e a , and p e t i t i o n e r appeals. O n J u l y 2, 1974, a Kwik W a y s t o r e i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, w a s robbed. P e t i t i o n e r w a s a r r e s t e d t h e following morning. O n July 15, 1974, p e t i t i o n e r appeared with appointed counsel and entered a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y before t h e D i s t r i c t Court. O n J u l y 31, 1974, p e t i t i o n e r appeared before t h e D i s t r i c t Court and moved t o change h i s plea t o g u i l t y . A t t h a t time p e t i t i o n e r w a s n o t advised by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e nature of t h e charge, t h e r i g h t s waived by a p l e a of g u i l t y , o r p o t e n t i a l punishment. Defense counsel d i d , however, t e l l t h e c o u r t t h a t he had advised p e t i t i o n e r of t h e p o s s i b l e maximum penalty of f o r t y years i n prison. The c o u r t ac- cepted t h e p l e a and set sentencing before another d i s t r i c t judge f o r August 1 4 , 1974, which w a s l a t e r continued t o August 26. I n t h e t i m e between arraignment and sentencing, t h e sentencing judge, t h e Honorable Charles Luedke, became aware of a letter w r i t t e n by p e t i t i o n e r t o t h e county a t t o r n e y i n which p e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t e d h i s innocence. Judge Luedke, t h e r e f o r e , engaged p e t i t i o n e r i n an extended discussion of t h e n a t u r e of t h e charge, t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , and h i s reasons f o r pleading g u i l t y . P e t i t i o n e r admitted being i n t h e car with t h e robbers and sharing t h e proceeds with them. H e a l s o admitted t h a t he had p r i o r knowledge t h a t t h e robbery would t a k e place. The judge advised p e t i t i o n e r t h a t h i s p l e a c o n s t i t u t e d a waiver of s e v e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , such a s t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by jury, r i g h t t o con- f r o n t and cross-examine witnesses, and t h e r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t . The judge informed p e t i t i o n e r t h a t t h e p l e a would probably r e s u l t i n a sentence of confinement i n t h e s t a t e prison. Judge Luedke on two occasions o f f e r e d p e t i t i o n e r f u r t h e r time t o consider h i s plea, which p e t i t i o n e r refused. F i n a l l y , t h e judge advised p e t i t i o n e r t h a t he had t h e r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l and t h a t a jury might f i n d him not g u i l t y on t h e f a c t s before t h e court. P e t i t i o n e r nonetheless refused t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y plea. The s o l e i s s u e before t h i s Court is whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed e r r o r i n denying p e t i t i o n e r ' s post-conviction r e q u e s t t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . I n S t a t e v. Haynie (1980), Mont. , 607 P.2d 1128, 1131, 37 St.Rep. 415, 4 1 9 , t h i s Court held: "A change of p l e a w i l l be permitted only i f it f a i r l y appears t h e defendant w a s ignorant of h i s r i g h t s and t h e consequences of h i s a c t , o r he w a s unduly and improperly influenced e i t h e r by hope o r by f e a r i n making t h e p l e a , o r i f it appears t h e p l e a w a s entered under some mistake o r misapprehension. S t a t e v. McAllister (1934), 96 Mont. 348, 353, 30 P.2d 821, 823." This has been t h e long-standing r u l e i n Montana. I n applying it t o t h e case before us, w e f i n d t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court must be sustained. Judge Luedke provided p e t i t i o n e r every opportunity t o consider h i s a c t i o n , t h e consequences of t h e p l e a and t h e r i g h t s he could exercise. Looking t o t h e record, w e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s very c a r e f u l and e x p l i c i t i n i t s d i s c u s s i o n s with p e t i t i o n e r : "JUDGE LUEDKE: W e l l , M r . Cunningham, a r e you s a t i s f i e d i n your own mind t h a t your p a r t i c i - pation i n t h i s whole transaction was s u f f i c i e n t t h a t you a r e a c t u a l l y g u i l t y , t h a t you d i d take p a r t i n the robbery by aiding and by a b e t t i n g o r by a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g , any of them?" Further, t h e judge gave an extensive explanation t o p e t i t i o n e r regarding h i s r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l , h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , t h e r i g h t t o cross-examine and the r i g h t t o confront t h e witnesses and evidence a g a i n s t him. W e are a l s o persuaded by the f a c t t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was a s s i s t e d by l e g a l counsel a t every p o i n t i n t h e criminal procedure. Although p e t i t i o n e r bases h i s appeal i n p a r t on t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t h i s plea was t h e product of a fundamental mistake i n h i s l e g a l understanding, Judge Luedke made a s p e c i a l e f f o r t t o guarantee t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was aware of t h e consequences of h i s plea and the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of law involved. I n i t s memorandum accompanying t h e order denying t h e motion t o withdraw t h e plea, t h e District Court s t a t e d : "Assuming t h a t t h e charge a g a i n s t t h e attorney i s more than adumbration, it is apparent from t h e record t h a t t h e defendant's claim was t h e very concern t h e c o u r t had a t t h e time of sen- tencing; and i s t h e reason why defendant was queried i n t h e context of 'aiding and abet- t i n g ' ; and why it was suggested t h a t a jury could possibly f i n d him not g u i l t y ; and why he was offered on more than one occasion f u r t h e r t i m e t o discuss and consider t h e matter. I t w a s t h e conclusion of the c o u r t a t t h a t t i m e t h a t t h e defendant knew what he was doing and wanted t o do it. The new hearing has produced t h e same f a c t u a l p i c t u r e a s was before t h e c o u r t on August 26, 1974." The record r e v e a l s t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was accorded every consideration b u t declined t o reconsider h i s action. S i t t i n g without a jury, t h e t r i a l judge, as f i n d e r of f a c t , i s as f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o believe o r d i s b e l i e v e a defen- d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n s a s a jury would be. S t a t e v. Hilton (1979) - Mont. , 597 P.2d 1171, 1174, 36 St.Rep. 1314, 1319. In light of petitioner's continual insistence on a guilty plea and the evidence against him, we find a completely adequate basis for the District Court's factual conclusions. From petitioner's own testimony there is sufficient admis- sion to warrant the court's decision: "The only reason I have for participating in this crime is I needed money to get to Texas." Our view of the applicable law in this case is supported by several of our recent decisions. In re Brown (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d 185, 37 St.Rep. 65; State v . Haynie, supra; State v. Doty (1977), 173 Mont. 233, 566 P.2d 1388; and State v. Griffin (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 535 P.2d 498. The importance of these decisions, as they apply to the case at bar, is that it is the sole province of the trial court to determine whether a motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be granted. The abuse of discretion required to reverse the lower court is not present in this case. Af f irmed . We concur: ( \ f F& ' \ \ L A - - " L y /' Justices / I