Title: Page v. Palmateer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  February 5, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ROBERT J. PAGE, JR.,
Petitioner on Review,

v.
JOAN PALMATEER, Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,

Respondent on Review.
(CC 99C-11782; CA A114830; SC S50171)

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted November 4, 2003.

George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.

Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.

Thomas J. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Federal Public
Defender.

DE MUNIZ, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.

*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

Paul J. Lipscomb, Judge.

184 Or App 759, 56 P3d 965 (2002).
DE MUNIZ, J.
The issue in this case is whether the federal
constitutional right announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US
466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), applies retroactively
to post-conviction relief proceedings in Oregon.  We hold that
the right announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively and
we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to that effect. 
We draw the undisputed facts from the briefs filed in
this court and in the Court of Appeals, and from the record of
the post-conviction proceedings in the trial court.  In September
1996, petitioner was charged by indictment with two counts of
robbery in the first degree, ORS 164.415, one count of kidnapping
in the first degree, ORS 163.235, one count of assault in the
fourth degree, ORS 163.160 (1995), one count of robbery in the
third degree, ORS 164.395, one count of menacing, ORS 163.190,
and two counts of harassment, ORS 166.065 (1995).  The indictment
set out the allegations supporting each of those charges.  A jury
convicted petitioner of kidnapping in the first degree and
assault in the fourth degree.  The maximum sentence that
petitioner could have received for the kidnapping conviction was
20 years' imprisonment. See ORS 161.605(1) (20-year maximum
sentence for Class A felony).  For the assault conviction, the
maximum sentence was one-year imprisonment.  See ORS 161.545
(one-year maximum sentence for misdemeanor).
At sentencing, the trial court reviewed petitioner's
criminal history and concluded that it would be appropriate to
sentence petitioner as a "dangerous offender" under ORS
161.725(1).  That statute provides, in part:
"(a) The defendant is being sentenced for a Class
A felony, and the court finds that the defendant is
suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating
a propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the
life or safety of another."

The trial court acknowledged that determining whether petitioner
could be sentenced as a dangerous offender involved resolving
some questions of fact.  The court nevertheless sentenced
petitioner as a dangerous offender and imposed the maximum term
of imprisonment, 30 years, provided in ORS 161.725(1).
Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and
dangerous offender sentence.  State v. Page, 156 Or App 399, 967
P2d 530 (1998), rev den, 328 Or 115 (1998).  In February 1999,
petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging
that he had been denied adequate assistance of trial counsel and
due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
In June 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided
Apprendi.  In that case, the Supreme Court held, based on the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 US at 490. 
Petitioner then filed a supplemental petition for post-conviction
relief in September 2000, in which he claimed that he "was
sentenced under the Dangerous Offender Statute withou[t]
providing for indictment on the increased charge and without
submitting the increased charge to a jury and requir[ing] the
predicate facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."  Petitioner
later expanded on that claim in a supplemental trial memorandum.  
The trial court denied petitioner post-conviction
relief.  In a letter opinion, the court stated that it found "no
merit in petitioner's complaints about his trial counsel.  None
of petitioner's other claims have merit either, and are
adequately addressed in Defendant's Trial Memorandum." 
Petitioner appealed, arguing that Apprendi entitled him to post-conviction relief.  The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam,
based on its previous decision in 	Teague v. Palmateer, 184 Or App
577, 57 P3d 176 (2002) (Teague), in which it had held that 
Apprendi did not apply retroactively to Oregon post-conviction
proceedings.  We allowed review.
Petitioner argues here that, pursuant to this court's
decision in State v. Fair, 263 Or 383, 502 P2d 1150 (1972), we
are free to adopt our own rules in determining whether to apply a
newly announced constitutional principle, even a federal one,
retroactively.  Therefore, petitioner contends, we should
exercise that power and choose to apply Apprendi retroactively to
Oregon post-conviction proceedings. 
The state's response is threefold.  First, the state
contends that ORS 138.550(2) bars petitioner's challenge to his
sentence, see Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or 352, 354, 867 P2d
1368 (1994) (so holding), because petitioner could have raised
his claim at sentencing and on direct review.  Second, the state
contends that this court should not apply Apprendi retroactively
to Oregon collateral proceedings.  Finally, the state argues
that, even if the Apprendi rule should apply retroactively, it
does not apply to dangerous offender findings required by ORS
161.725(1)(a).  We address only the state's second argument,
because it is dispositive.
The state asserts that, under the Supreme Court's
decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 US 288, 109 S Ct 1060, 103 L Ed
2d 334 (1989) (Lane), this court cannot apply the federal
constitutional right announced in Apprendi retroactively to
collateral proceedings in Oregon.  As discussed below, we agree.
Because the Court of Appeals based its decision in this
case on its retroactivity analysis in Teague, we begin our
analysis with a brief discussion of that case.  In Teague, the
Court of Appeals examined en banc whether Apprendi should apply
retroactively to post-conviction proceedings in Oregon.  184 Or
App at 579.  A majority of the court concluded, based on its
application of federal retroactivity principles, that it should
not.  Id. at 592.  In reaching that conclusion, the court
observed that "Oregon courts are not obligated to follow federal
retroactivity principles in state post-conviction proceedings,
but it is well settled that we do so for prudential reasons." 
Id. at 580-81.  The court based that statement on its review of
both Oregon and federal case law, in particular, this court's
decision in Fair.
In Fair, this court addressed whether the rule that it
had announced in a recently decided case would apply
retroactively.  263 Or at 385.  The court observed that, in
determining whether to apply a new rule of law retroactively, it
most recently had followed the retroactivity rules applied by the
Supreme Court.  Id.  The court observed, however, that it had
declined to follow the Supreme Court's ruling on the
retroactivity of the rule announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
US 478, 84 S Ct 1758, 12 L Ed 2d 977 (1964), because it already
had made its own determination as to whether the Escobedo rule
should apply retroactively in Oregon and had chosen to continue
to follow its own rule.  Fair, 263 Or at 387.  The court noted
that it later conformed its rule regarding Escobedo to the rule
applied by the Supreme Court and stated that, when later faced
with determining the retroactive application of a federally
guaranteed right, it followed the federal rule.  Id.  
Based on its review of the case law, the Fair court
then stated:
"We may draw two conclusions from our recent decisions
on retroactivity.  First, we are free to choose the
degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we
believe appropriate to the particular rule under
consideration, so long as we give federal
constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the
United States Supreme Court requires.  Secondly, we
have tended to restrict the retroactive application of
newly-announced rights, giving them only the
application which the Supreme Court has adopted as a
minimum.  In the present case since we are dealing with
a new principle of law which rests entirely on our own
Constitution the determination of retroactivity or
prospectivity is for us alone.  The decisions of the
United States Supreme Court are not binding on us, but
we may look to those cases for guidance."
Id. at 387-88.  Based on that discussion from Fair, and the
Supreme Court's statement in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US 719,
733, 86 S Ct 1772, 16 L Ed 2d 882 (1966), that states are
"entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter
standards than those we have laid down and to apply those
standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this
decision," the Court of Appeals stated in Teague:
"The federal Supremacy Clause does not require
states to adhere to federal retroactivity principles in
determining whether to grant post-conviction relief to
Oregon prisoners who rely on newly announced federal
constitutional pronouncements.  Rather, states are free
to apply new federal constitutional pronouncements to a
broader range of cases--that is, to give those
pronouncements greater retroactive application--than
federal law requires of federal courts."  

184 Or App at 581.  As explained below, that statement was not
correct, because, although Oregon courts are free to apply
pronouncements of Oregon constitutional law that have a federal
equivalent to a broader range of cases than the federal
constitution requires, Oregon courts are not free to apply
pronouncements of federal constitutional law to a broader range
of cases than federal law requires. (1)  Id.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, both in Oregon v.
Hass, 420 US 714, 719, 95 S Ct 1215, 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975), and
in American Trucking Ass'ns. Inc. v. Smith, 496 US 167, 177-78,
110 S Ct 2323, 110 L Ed 2d 148 (1990), Fair's dictum regarding
this court's ability to apply federal constitutional decisions
retroactively was not correct. 
In Hass, the Supreme Court reversed a decision in which
this court had applied the Miranda rule more restrictively than
the Supreme Court had determined was appropriate in Harris v. New
York, 401 US 222, 91 S Ct 643, 28 L Ed 2d 1 (1971).  The Supreme
Court observed in Hass that, in State v. Florance, 270 Or 169,
527 P2d 1202 (1974), overruled by Oregon v. Hass, 420 US at 719,
this court previously had stated that "we can interpret the
Fourth Amendment more restrictively than interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court[.]"  Hass, 420 US at 719 n 4.  In
response, the Supreme Court explained that that was "not the law
and surely must be an inadvertent error; in any event, we reject
it."  Id.  
The Supreme Court later reaffirmed Hass in Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 US 769, 121 S Ct 1876, 149 L Ed 2d 994 (2001). 
There, the Court stated:
"The Arkansas Supreme Court's alternative holding,
that it may interpret the United States Constitution
to provide greater protection than this Court's own
federal constitutional precedents provide is
foreclosed by [Hass].  There, we observed that the
Oregon Supreme Court's statement that it could
interpret the Fourth Amendment more restrictively than
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court was not
the law and surely must have been inadvertent error. 
We reiterated in Hass that while a State is free as a
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions
on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards, it
may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter
of federal constitutional law when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them."
In light of Hass and Sullivan, it is clear that, when
interpreting the federal constitution or applying Supreme Court
rulings that are based on its interpretation of the federal
constitution, we must comply with what the Supreme Court has
stated.  See also State v. Flores, 280 Or 273, 279, 570 P2d 965
(1972) (so acknowledging); Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 52, 298
P2d 986 (1956) (same).  
With respect to the retroactive application of federal
constitutional decisions, the Supreme Court further explained in
American Trucking that
"[t]he determination whether a constitutional
decision of this Court is retroactive -- that is,
whether this decision applies to conduct or events that
occurred before the date of the decision -- is a matter
of federal law.  When questions of state law are at
issue, state courts generally have the authority to
determine the retroactivity of their own decisions. 
The retroactive applicability of a constitutional
decision of this Court, however, is every bit as much
of a federal question as what particular federal
constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they
guarantee, and whether they have been denied.  In order
to ensure the uniform application of decisions
construing constitutional requirements and to prevent
States from denying or curtailing federally protected
rights, we have consistently required that state courts
adhere to our retroactivity decisions."
496 US at 177-78 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In Fair, this court thus correctly stated that it was
free to determine the degree to which a new rule of Oregon
constitutional law should be applied retroactively.  However, the
court's statement that it also was free to determine the degree
to which a new rule of federal constitutional law should be
applied retroactively was incorrect.  Although that latter
conclusion was not necessary to the holding in Fair, we
nevertheless disavow it.
The Supreme Court based the rule announced in Apprendi
-- that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt," Apprendi, 530 US at 490 -- on its
interpretation of the protections that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution afford.  Apprendi
announced a new rule of federal constitutional law, and the
rights flowing from that rule are rooted in the federal
constitution. (2)  The Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether Apprendi applies retroactively to collateral proceedings,
see, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 US 545, 581, 122 S Ct
2406, 153 L Ed 2d 524 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing
that "[n]o Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that
Apprendi has retroactive effect").  Therefore, applying federal
retroactivity principles, we now proceed to make that
determination.  
The Supreme Court's decision in Lane sets out the
applicable rule.  In that case, the petitioner contended, among
other things, that the Supreme Court should adopt a rule
requiring that petit juries be composed of a fair cross-section
of the community, and that, in so doing, the Court also should
apply that new rule retroactively to his federal habeas corpus
case.  489 US at 299.  The Supreme Court rejected the
petitioner's argument and, in the process, adopted a new approach
for determining the retroactive applicability of newly announced
principles of constitutional law.  The Supreme Court abandoned
its previous approach, which had been based on its decision in
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US 618, 85 S Ct 1731, 14 L Ed 2d 601
(1965), in favor of the approach suggested by Justice Harlan in
his dissent in Mackay v. United States, 401 US 667, 682-93, 91 S
Ct 1160, 28 L Ed 2d 404 (1971).  In Mackay, Justice Harlan had
advocated that new rules generally should not be applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review.  Lane, 489 US at
305.  According to Justice Harlan, judgments that are final
should remain final:
"'Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy,
providing an avenue for upsetting judgments that have
become otherwise final.  It is not designed as a
substitute for direct review.  The interest in leaving
concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is,
reducing the controversy to a final judgment not
subject to further judicial revision, may quite
legitimately be found by those responsible for defining
the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or
most instances the competing interest in readjudicating
convictions according to all legal standards in effect
when a habeas petition is filed.'"
Id. at 306 (quoting Mackay, 401 US at 682-83 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)) (emphasis in original).  The Lane Court observed
further that Justice Harlan had identified two exceptions to his
proposed rule: 
"First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if
it places certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe.  Second, a new rule should be
applied retroactively if it requires the observance of
those procedures that * * * are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."
Id. at 307 (quoting Mackay, 401 US at 692-93 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Based on Justice Harlan's reasoning, the Supreme Court
agreed in Lane that the "[a]pplication of constitutional rules
not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously
undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the
operation of our criminal justice system."  Id. at 309.  "Without
finality," the Court observed, "the criminal law is deprived of
much of its deterrent effect."  Id.  The Supreme Court therefore
held that, "[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general
rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be
applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced."  Id. at 310.  The Supreme Court then
clarified further that it understood Justice Harlan's suggested
second exception "to be reserved for watershed rules of criminal
procedure," i.e., "those procedures essential to the substance of
a full hearing."  Id. at 311.  The Court noted that Justice
Harlan had identified "the right to counsel at trial[,]" which is
"a necessary condition precedent to any conviction[,]" as the
type of "bedrock procedural element[] that must be found to
vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction."  Id. at 311-12.
Based on the foregoing, we can apply Apprendi
retroactively to a post-conviction relief proceeding in Oregon 
only if we conclude that it falls within one of Justice Harlan's
exceptions.  The first exception does not apply to this case. 
The second, however, requires us to determine whether Apprendi is
a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure.
For the following reasons, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that Apprendi did not set out a watershed rule of
criminal procedure.  In Lane, the Supreme Court "limit[ed] the
scope of the second exception to those new procedures without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished."  Id. at 313.  The Court explained further that "such
procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such
components of basic due process have yet to emerge."  Id.
(emphasis added).  Because the petitioner in Lane sought federal
habeas corpus relief, a remedy that is available only on
collateral review, the Supreme Court could apply the rule that he
advocated to his case only if it concluded that the rule
satisfied one of the two exceptions to its new rule of
retroactivity.  The Court concluded that a rule requiring the
petit jury to be composed of a fair cross-section of the
community did not meet either exception.  It explained that such
a rule is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure because "the
absence of a fair cross section on the jury venire does not
undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a
conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an
accurate conviction[.]"  Id. at 315.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court thought
that a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure is one that is
fundamentally necessary to ensure that a criminal defendant is
not wrongly convicted.  The rule announced in Apprendi, on the
other hand, is one that is concerned with a criminal defendant's
sentence.  Its purpose is to ensure that, if a criminal defendant
is susceptible to being sentenced to a term of incarceration that
exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum term for a particular
crime, other than the fact of a previous conviction, the facts
supporting the criminal defendant's sentence are submitted to a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The rule, by its
terms, is not concerned with ensuring the accuracy of a criminal
defendant's conviction.  For that reason, it is clear that
Apprendi is not the sort of "watershed" rule of criminal
procedure that either Justice Harlan or the Lane Court
contemplated.

Although their decisions are not binding in this court,
see, e.g., Gillar v. Employment Div., 300 Or 672, 676 n 6, 717
P2d 131 (1986) (acknowledging that when this court interprets
federal law, only decisions of Supreme Court are binding), all
the federal circuit courts of appeals that have addressed the
question also have concluded that Apprendi did not announce a
watershed rule and that it should not be applied
retroactively. (3)
We therefore conclude that Apprendi
does not apply retroactively to Oregon post-conviction
proceedings and, therefore, does not afford petitioner relief in
this case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. 
We note also that Fair is of limited applicability to
both Teague and this case because, in Fair, the court was
determining whether to apply state law retroactively.
2. 
Because petitioner relies solely on the federal rule
announced in Apprendi, we have no occasion to determine whether
an equivalent rule exists under the Oregon Constitution. 
3. 
See United States v. Swinton, 333 F3d 481, 491 (3rd Cir
2003) (agreeing with other federal courts that "Apprendi does not
satisfy Teague's second exception to non-retroactivity");
Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F3d 55, 61 (1st Cir 2003)
(observing that Apprendi "affords an innocent defendant no
additional shield from wrongful conviction[;] the rule 'merely
limits the potential penalty to be imposed on [an undoubtedly]
guilty defendant'"); Coleman v. United States, 329 F3d 77, 82
(2nd Cir 2003) (agreeing with other federal courts that Apprendi
does not apply retroactively to collateral proceedings); United
States v. Mora, 293 F3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir 2002) (concluding
that Apprendi is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure);
San-Miguiel v. Dove, 291 F3d 257, 260 (4th Cir 2002) (same);
Goode v. United States, 305 F3d 378, 385 (6th Cir 2002)
(observing that Apprendi "merely limits the potential penalty to
be imposed on a defendant" and does not "protect the innocent
from conviction"); United States v. Ross, 279 F3d 600, 608 (8th
Cir 2002) (concluding that Apprendi is not watershed rule of
criminal procedure); Dukes v. United States, 255 F3d 912, 913
(8th Cir 2001) (same); United States v. Moss, 252 F3d 993, 997
(8th Cir 2001) (same); United States v. Sanders, 247 F3d 139, 146
(4th Cir 2001) (same).