Title: Jonesv. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jonesv. State1989 WY 75771 P.2d 368Case Number: 88-167Decided: 03/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES 
BOYD JONES, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofParkCounty, William J. 
Nicholas, J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Senior Asst. Public Defender, 
and Michael J. French, Student Intern, WPDP, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Senior 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ. 

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Charles Boyd 
Jones, in two stated issues, presents the propriety of a sentence which 
effectively gave him a minimum sentence that is longer than his maximum sentence 
as to whether:

 
 
[A] 
sentencing judge is constitutionally required to give an indigent defendant full 
credit against both his minimum and maximum sentences for time served in 
presentence confinement.

 
 
[T]he 
district court erred in concluding that it lacked discretion to credit 
Appellant's minimum sentence with the time spent in presentencing 
incarceration.

 
 

[¶2.]     The State, as appellee, 
added a third issue asking if:

 
 
[T]he 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to credit appellant's sentence with time in 
excess of that actually spent in presentence confinement?

 
 

[¶3.]     On July 22, 1987, a 
jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault, an offense which occurred on 
October 8, 1986. Appellant was then additionally adjudged to be a habitual 
criminal under W.S. 6-10-201(b)(i).1 Accordingly, on May 5, 1988, the trial 
court sentenced appellant to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a term of ten to 
eleven years and seven months, fined him $1,000, required reimbursement for the 
public defender attorney's fee, and imposed the $50 victim's compensation 
surcharge.2

 
 

[¶4.]     Noting that appellant, 
due to his indigence, had been unable to post bond and had therefore remained 
incarcerated for one year, four months and ten days prior to sentence 
imposition, the trial court did credit served time against the sentence term. 
However, the trial court struggled with uncertainty of whether, in light of the 
statutorily mandated sentencing range for habitual criminals, it could apply 
such credits to the minimum term of ten years. Thus, the trial court doubled the 
credit for time served prior to sentencing and applied that credit of 
thirty-three months against the maximum term. The final result was an 
incongruous sentence with a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of 
eight years and ten months.

 
 

[¶5.]     W.S. 7-13-2013 pertains to indeterminate sentencing and 
provides:

 
 
     Except where a term of 
life is required by law, or as otherwise provided by W.S. 7-13-101, when a 
person is sentenced for the commission of a felony, the court imposing the 
sentence shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment but shall establish a 
maximum and minimum term within the limits authorized for the statute violated. 
The maximum term shall not be greater than the maximum provided by law for the 
statute violated, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum 
provided by law for the statute violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the 
maximum term imposed. [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Initially, 
the minimum and maximum terms of the imposed sentence did not exceed the limits 
required by Wyoming's habitual criminal statute; however, 
it is obvious that the ten year minimum sentence is greater than ninety percent 
of the maximum sentence of eight years and ten months. The trial court, by 
effectively redesignating the actual minimum term as the maximum term, has 
impermissibly violated the substantial public policy underlying the state's 
indeterminate sentencing statute.

 
 

[¶6.]     The legislature added 
the "ninety percent clause" to the final sentence of W.S. 7-13-201 in response 
to decisions of this court in Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987) and 
Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986). In both of those cases, the trial 
courts had imposed sentences with negligible differences between the minimum and 
maximum terms. Such manipulation of the statute as it existed prior to amendment 
deprived the parole authorities of a valuable tool with which to perform the 
duties designated to them by the legislature. By requiring a more substantial 
difference between the minimum and maximum terms of a sentence, the legislature 
returned to the parole authorities the ability to encourage the reformation of 
prisoners and the ability to more effectively manage the size of the prison 
population through the award of good time and special good time credits against 
sentences. Essentially, the legislature sought to prevent a situation of an 
exemplary behaved prisoner serving close to his maximum sentence before he was 
eligible for parole.4 Duffy, 730 P.2d  at 761-83 (Urbigkit, J. 
dissenting).

 
 
TIME OFF 
THE MINIMUM SENTENCE

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant argues that 
the trial court is required by his indigence and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution to credit his mandatory minimum sentence with the 
presentence time served. We have repeatedly held that an indigent only has a 
constitutional right to have the maximum term of his sentence reduced by 
presentence time served. This reduction mandatorily occurs when the sum of 
presentence incarceration and post-sentence imprisonment exceeds the maximum 
term allowable by the statute under which the individual was sentenced. Heier v. 
State, 727 P.2d 707, 709-10 (Wyo. 1986); Munden 
v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 627 (Wyo. 1985); Jones 
v. State, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellant points out 
other courts have held that the denial of credit for presentence time served 
subjects an indigent to a different and more severe treatment than that suffered 
by a non-indigent, thereby violating his constitutional right to equal 
protection under the law. See Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 
1977); King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1983), applying intermediate level of scrutiny 
to denial of credit against discretionary minimum terms; Martin v. Leverette, 
161 W. Va. 547, 244 S.E.2d 39, 42 (1978), anchoring the right to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the West Virginia Constitution; and Annotation, Right to 
Credit for Time Spent in Custody Prior to Trial or Sentence, 77 A.L.R.3d 182 
(1977). In dicta, we have implicitly expressed some agreement with this view.5 

 
 

[¶9.]     Trial courts have a 
broad discretion to determine the appropriate length and conditions of 
imprisonment in a variety of situations. We recognize that within the statutory 
limits, trial courts may give consideration to a wide range of factors relevant 
to their sentencing decisions, and that few of those factors are capable of 
precise quantification when translated into the final imposition of the term for 
incarceration. This court refrains from disturbing sentencing decisions absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. Munden, 698 P.2d  at 626; Jones, 602 P.2d  at 380; 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 
241-43, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 2022-23, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970).

 
 

[¶10.]  When an indigent is incarcerated for a 
period, including the presentence time, which exceeds the maximum penalty for 
his offense, it is unquestionable that he has been punished more severely than 
one who could afford to obtain presentence release. The sentencing court in such 
an instance, by violating a defendant's right to equal protection, has clearly 
abused its discretion. Matthews v. Dees, 579 F.2d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1978). However, when a sentence is within the statutory 
range, it is difficult to say which factors formed the basis for the sentencing 
court's decision to determine whether credit was actually given for time 
served.

 
 

[¶11.]  There is division among the appellate 
courts that have encountered this difficulty as to whether they should presume 
that sentencing courts adhered to their constitutional duties and granted such 
credit. Godbold v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 n. 5 (D.Colo. 
1981). Appellant urges us to follow the lead of those courts who refuse to grant 
that presumption on review.6 We find no mandated advantage in selection 
of this application. For example, the court in Godbold, pursuant to a federal 
habeas corpus petition, declared that sentencing courts would be required to 
explicitly credit defendants with presentence time served when that 
incarceration occurred solely because of indigence. Absent an express reference 
to the credit in the sentencing orders, that court indicated it would find such 
sentences unconstitutional. That court freely admitted, however, that the 
sentencing court could, through the legitimate exercise of its discretionary 
power, merely increase sentences so as to avoid the intended effect of the 
decision. Id. 
at 1269.

 
 

[¶12.]  We anticipate that trial courts adhere to 
constitutionally limiting criteria and apply the presumption of compliance on an 
appeal challenging length of sentence. In constitutional perspective, the 
sentencing court was required separately to credit presentence time served to 
the minimum term of appellant's sentence. This is the mandatory, not 
discretional issue of confinement credit application.

 
 
JURISDICTION 
TO CREDIT AGAINST MINIMUM SENTENCE

 
 

[¶13.]  The record suggests that the trial court 
wished to fashion a sentence which would reduce the length of appellant's 
incarceration. Uncertain as to whether it had authority to credit presentence 
time served against a mandatory minimum sentence, the trial court attempted to 
avoid this jurisdictional problem by emplacing the ungainly sentence now 
presented. In order that the trial court may exercise the full range of its 
sentencing authority on remand, we clarify.

 
 

[¶14.]  This court has frequently held that, 
although it is not constitutionally required that the minimum term of a sentence 
be explicitly reduced for presentence incarceration, the power to do so dwells 
firmly within the discretion of the trial court. Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 756 (Wyo. 
1987); Heier, 727 P.2d  at 710. Those holdings might seem inconsistent with the 
plain language of our indeterminate sentencing statute7 and a number of cases in which we have 
denied the sentencing court the power where required to impose a mandatory 
minimum sentence and to substitute probation for a portion of the sentence. Cook 
v. State, 710 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 1985); Williams v. 
State, 692 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1984); Evans v. 
State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982). A substantial distinction can be 
drawn, however, between those cases and the issue presently before 
us.

 
 

[¶15.]  In those cases, the sentencing courts, 
under statutory authority which permitted them to "suspend the execution of all 
or a part of a sentence,"8 created hybrid sentences, the total terms 
of which were within statutory limits. W.S. 7-13-301 (1977). However, since 
those sentences were composed partially of probation time and partially of 
confinement for less than the mandatory minimum, we held that those sentencing 
courts had exceeded the limits of their discretionary powers. Cook, 710 P.2d  at 
825; Williams, 692 P.2d at 235-36; Evans, 655 P.2d  at 1224. Not only had those 
sentencing courts interfered with powers more properly belonging to the parole 
board, they had usurped the power of the legislature to set fitting punishments 
for the offenses it had defined. Williams, 692 P.2d  at 235-36. Similar 
considerations do not exist in the present case. Here, the trial court merely 
determined that the total time actually served by appellant would range between 
the mandatory minimum term required for a habitual criminal and eleven years and 
seven months. There was no attempt to set a punishment for a lesser period of 
incarceration than that which the legislature has determined to be minimally 
fitting. We therefore hold that it is firmly within the discretionary sentencing 
authority of the trial court to credit the mandatory minimum term of an 
indigent's sentence with presentence time served.9

 
 
DOUBLING OF 
PRESENTENCE TIME SERVED

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellee, without filing a cross appeal, 
now questions the propriety of the trial court's doubling of presentence time 
served and applying the double credit against the maximum term of appellant's 
sentence. The issue will be addressed since resentencing will be required. While 
we can find no authority clearly supporting or opposing such a practice, common 
sense and logic lead us to conclude that it is not a discretionary option for 
the trial court.10 Consideration of fairness and substantial 
justice may make it appropriate and indigence may make it necessary that the 
trial court consider credit on sentence for time spent in presentence 
incarceration, but this consideration is not extended to served sentence credit 
in excess of time actually incarcerated. If the sentencing court considers 
mitigating factors other than presentence incarceration, discretion can be 
applied within sentencing limits fashioned by the legislature. Consequently, 
doubling of presentence incarceration credit is unjustified as well as 
unauthorized and constitutes an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. In 
this posture, we agree with appellee as a resentencing 
limitation.

 
 

[¶17.]  Reversed and remanded for resentencing in 
accord with this opinion.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed 
a concurring and dissenting opinion, with whom GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 W.S. 6-10-201 
provides:

 
 
(a) A person is an 
habitual criminal if:

 
 
     (i) He is convicted of 
a violent felony; and

 
 
     (ii) He has been 
convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought and 
tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere.

 
 
(b) An habitual 
criminal shall be punished by imprisonment for:

 
 
(i) Not less than ten 
(10) years nor more than fifty (50) years; if he has two (2) previous 
convictions;

 
 
     (ii) Life, if he has 
three (3) or more previous convictions.

 
 

2 On resentencing, 
appellant should be sentenced under the law in effect at the date of the offense 
and not the more restrictive and punitive attorney's fee reimbursement and 
victim's surcharge provisions since enacted, W.S. 8-1-107 and W.S. 6-1-101. The 
proper statutory provisions relating to attorney's fee repayment to be applied 
are W.S. 7-1-110 (1977); W.S. 7-1-112 (1977); and W.S. 7-1-114 (1977). The 
victim's compensation statute in effect at the time of this offense was W.S. 
1-40-119 (1986 Cum.Supp.), which differs markedly from the present W.S. 1-40-119 
and provided for a $25 surcharge.

 
 
     If indigence is 
established, its effect on sentences should be considered under the purview of 
the law in effect at the date of the offense where subsequent changes become 
more punitive. For further discussion of indigence, see Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971); 
and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970).

 
 

3 The present W.S. 
7-13-201 is applicable to this case rather than the former law because, although 
the "ninety percent clause" became effective after May 22, 1987, it is more 
lenient. See Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1984) and W.S. 
6-1-101(c).

 
 

4 See W.S. 7-13-402 
which denies the state board of parole the authority to grant a parole unless 
the prisoner has served the minimum term of his sentence, less special good time 
granted to him.

 
 

5 In relating this 
equal protection issue to the discretionary authority of the sentencing court, 
we have held, although not phrased precisely in this manner, that the sentencing 
judge lacks discretion to deny credit for presentence time served when both 
conditions are met: (1) when presentence incarceration was due to the 
defendant's indigence, and (2) when that incarceration combined with the time to 
be served after sentencing exceeded the maximum term set by statute. Munden, 698 P.2d  at 627; Jones, 602 P.2d  at 381. Recently, however, we augmented this rule 
to deny the sentencing court authority to withhold such credit where either 
condition exists alone.

 
 
     Prior applications of 
this test have treated it as conjunctive. * * * Further reflection on Jones v. 
State, Wyo., 
602 P.2d 378 (1979), has convinced us that the test should be perceived as 
disjunctive. Different concerns are raised by each prong of the test. Indigence 
invokes the constitutional requirements of equal protection; imprisonment in 
excess of the term set by statute raises jurisdictional 
concerns.

 
 
Lightly v. State, 739 P.2d 1232, 1233-34 n. 1 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

6 For further 
discussion of this position, see Johnson, 548 F.2d  at 700 and King, 516 F.2d  at 
324.

 
 

7 "[T]he minimum term 
shall not be less than the minimum provided by law for the statute violated, * * 
*." W.S. 7-13-201.

 
 

8 W.S. 7-13-301 (1977), 
the statute at issue in those cases, was amended by Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3 
(1987), to conform with the holdings of Cook, 710 P.2d 824, Williams, 692 P.2d 233, and Evans, 655 P.2d 1214. Now codified as W.S. 7-13-301, the statute no 
longer contains the "all or a part" language.

 
 

9 The dissent's 
citation of Cook, 710 P.2d 824 and Williams, 692 P.2d 233 to the contrary is 
misplaced. A review of each of the four court records as involved in the two 
appeals has been made for historical accuracy in order to respond to the 
dissent. In each of those cases included, Cook, 710 P.2d 824; Williams, 692 P.2d 233; Garcia v. State, 692 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1984) and Harrison v. State, 692 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1984), where the issue considered on appeal was entry of a sentence 
below the statutory minimum, the trial 
court had provided a sentence equal to the statutory minimum and deducted 
therefrom a credit for pretrial incarceration. The propriety of the 
provision in each of those sentences which did give credit for that pretrial 
incarceration against a statutory minimum sentence was not raised by the State 
on appeal nor considered by this court in its opinions. No Wyoming authority which 
would invalidate what was done in those four cases can be found to the contrary. 
An analysis that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to give credit for 
pretrial incarceration invokes the imprisonment for debt prohibition enjoined by 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 5 and both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Bearden 
v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983); Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891, 
reh'g denied 351 U.S. 958, 76 S. Ct. 844, 100 L. Ed. 1480 (1956). Cf. Williams, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586.

 
 

10 This court has 
previously noted that an abuse of discretion may arise when the trial court's 
actions, under the particular circumstances, exceed the bounds of reason. Duffy, 
730 P.2d  at 757-58. Similarly denied for exercised discretion is presentence 
confinement credit given for each consecutive sentence, State v. Cuen, 158 Ariz. 
86, 761 P.2d 160 (App. 1988).

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring and dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶18.]  I agree that this case must be reversed 
and remanded for resentencing. In deciding to reduce the maximum term by twice 
the pre-trial confinement time, the sentencing judge clearly went overboard. It 
might even be said that he walked the plank. Consequently, I must agree that 
resentencing in accordance with law is appropriate.

 
 

[¶19.]  I cannot join in the holding or rationale 
of the majority with respect to the credit for pre-trial incarceration against 
the minimum sentence. In this instance, the statute clearly provides for a 
minimum term of imprisonment of not less than ten years. In the light of both 
the legislative mandate set forth in § 7-13-201, W.S. 1977, and the prior 
pertinent holdings of this court in Cook v. State, 710 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 1985), and 
Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1984), I am convinced that the trial court 
correctly concluded it had no authority to reduce the minimum term below ten 
years.1 In Williams and Cook, this court held that 
a sentencing court cannot assess punishment below a mandated minimum term. The 
reliance by the majority upon Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750 (Wyo. 1987), and Heier v. State, 727 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1986), to establish 
the discretionary authority of the trial court to do so is misplaced. In neither 
instance did the statute prescribe a mandatory minimum term. Consequently, the 
controlling authority is Williams.

 
 

[¶20.]  In its present form, § 7-13-201 perhaps 
makes the situation a bit awkward because the maximum term must be eleven years, 
one month, and ten days when the minimum term is ten years. In this instance, in 
order then to credit pre-trial confinement against the maximum term, which I 
agree the court was required to do, the maximum term had to be at least twelve 
years, five months, and twenty days. In my judgment, that becomes, by operation 
of § 7-13-201 and the requirement that Jones receive credit on his maximum 
sentence for pre-trial incarceration, the minimum maximum term which the court 
lawfully could impose.

 
 

[¶21.]  Any other result infringes upon the 
constitutional prerogatives of both the legislative department and the executive 
department of state government. There can be no question that the power to 
prescribe punishment is the prerogative of the legislative department. E.g., 
Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877 (Wyo. 1987); 
Williams, 692 P.2d 233; Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982); and Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 
446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). The imposition of a minimum 
sentence less than the mandatory minimum term established by the legislature is 
a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

 
 

[¶22.]  The question of what sentence 
appropriately may be imposed is an entirely different one from a determination 
of how much of that sentence has been served. Because the authority of the 
sentencing court is circumscribed with respect to a mandatory minimum term 
prescribed by the legislature, any effort by the sentencing court to determine 
how much of that term may already have been served infringes upon the 
prerogative of the executive department of state government. The majority, I 
believe adequately, justifies the authority of the executive department to 
determine the fact of whether a sentence has been served. If the question before 
us were whether the executive department failed to credit time already served on 
a sentence, I might well agree that the pre-trial confinement must be so 
credited. My position is that the sentencing court cannot do 
that.

 
 

[¶23.]  Consequently, while I agree that this 
case must be reversed and remanded for sentencing, I am clear that the 
sentencing court cannot impose a minimum term of less than ten years, and the 
maximum term to be imposed must, in this instance, be at least twelve years, 
five months, and twenty days. Appropriate credit for pre-trial confinement of 
one year, four months, and ten days then can be incorporated in the court 
sentence without the ten year minimum sentence being greater than ninety percent 
of the maximum sentence. The determination of how much of the sentence has been 
served would be the prerogative of the executive 
department.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In the case of 
Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1984), the district court, mistakenly in 
my view, did enter a Judgment and Sentence of the Court which provided that 
credit should be given for time served against both the minimum and maximum 
sentences. The State has no appeal in such an instance, and that fact does not 
serve to dilute the holding that the sentencing court cannot assess punishment 
below a mandatory minimum term. In Cook v. State, 710 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 1985), the 
district court entered a Judgment and Sentence which provided that the defendant 
was "to serve a term of not less than five (5) years nor more than five and 
one-half (5 1/2) years on each count with credit for 168 days already served in 
the Natrona County Jail, * * *." The file discloses that the executive 
department, through the staff of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, interpreted 
that Judgment and Sentence to the end that credit of 168 days was given off the 
maximum sentence only, and his minimum release date was computed to end at the 
expiration of the full five years of the minimum sentence. This construction of 
the Judgment and Sentence was communicated to the sentencing judge who 
apparently was satisfied with the interpretation by the penitentiary staff. The 
net result in Cook is not consistent with a conclusion that the sentencing court 
gave credit for pre-trial confinement against both the maximum and minimum 
sentence.