Title: State ex rel. Satow v Gausse-Milliken

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Satow v Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SATOW ET AL. v. GAUSSE-MILLIKEN ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Satow v. Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-
2074.] 
Taxation — Income tax — Complaint in mandamus filed involving apportioning 
Undivided Local Government Fund and Undivided Local Government 
Revenue Assistance Fund — Respondents’ motion to dismiss cause 
granted, when — Adequate remedy in declaratory judgment and 
prohibitory injunction. 
(No. 2003-0150 — Submitted March 11, 2003 — Decided May 7, 2003.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
This case challenges the apportionment and distribution of money 
from the Undivided Local Government Fund (“ULGF”) and Undivided Local 
Government Revenue Assistance Fund (“ULGRAF”) pursuant to 2002 Sub.H.B. 
No. 329 (“H.B. 329”) by respondents, who are the Columbiana County Treasurer, 
the Columbiana County Auditor, and members of the Columbiana County Budget 
Commission (“CCBC”). 
{¶2} 
R.C. Chapter 5747 established ULGF and ULGRAF to receive 
certain state tax revenues, which are transferred to counties for distribution to 
local subdivisions.  E. Liverpool v. Columbiana Cty. Budget Comm. (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 269, 270, 737 N.E.2d 44.  Under the applicable statutes, the county 
budget commission has two options to distribute funds:  (1) the statutory method 
under R.C. 5747.51 and 5747.62 or (2) the alternative method of R.C. 5747.53 
and 5747.63.  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
In a settlement of an appeal instituted by relator city of East 
Liverpool, a majority of the Columbiana County political subdivisions, the board 
of county commissioners, and CCBC adopted and approved an alternate method 
of apportioning ULGF and ULGRAF for 1990 and thereafter.  From 1991 through 
1997, CCBC apportioned and the county auditor and treasurer distributed money 
from ULGF and ULGRAF in Columbiana County according to the 1990 alternate 
formula. 
{¶4} 
In 1997, however, CCBC voted to apportion ULGF and ULGRAF 
money according to a distribution method that was not approved by the legislative 
authority of East Liverpool, the largest city in the county, as required under 
former R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63.  1999 Sub.H.B. No. 185, 148 Ohio Laws, Part 
I, 1201, 1202-1203.  East Liverpool appealed the budget commission’s actions, 
and on appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) found the commission’s action 
unlawful and ordered an allocation and distribution of the funds according to the 
1990 alternate formula.  We affirmed the BTA’s decision.  E. Liverpool, 90 Ohio 
St.3d 269, 737 N.E.2d 44. 
{¶5} 
The General Assembly enacted H.B. 329, effective August 29, 
2002, which amended R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63 to allow ULGF and ULGRAF 
“under certain circumstances to be distributed among subdivisions under an 
alternative apportionment scheme without the approval of the largest municipal 
corporation in the county.”  Title to 2002 Sub.H.B. No. 329. 
{¶6} 
Under R.C. 5747.53(C) and 5747.63(C), in certain counties, the 
legislative authorities of two or more political subdivisions that together have the 
majority of the county’s total population may now adopt resolutions eliminating 
the requirement that the legislative authority of the largest city of that county 
approve an ULGF or ULGRAF alternative apportionment method for the next 
year’s distribution of funds. 
January Term, 2003 
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{¶7} 
Notwithstanding the deadlines in the amended provisions, H.B. 
329 allowed an alternative method of apportionment to be adopted and approved 
not later than September 2, 2002, and also allowed for distributions of ULGF and 
ULGRAF money during 2003.  Section 3 of 2002 Sub.H.B. No. 329. 
{¶8} 
In August 2002, CCBC implemented the provisions of H.B. 329 
for the 2003 distributions of ULGF and ULGRAF.  According to respondents, an 
appeal by East Liverpool from CCBC’s actions is currently pending before the 
BTA.  East Liverpool alleges that the CCBC reduced the city’s general fund 
revenues by 17 percent, necessitating a severe reduction in services, including 
those provided by safety personnel, to the city’s taxpayers. 
{¶9} 
Nearly five months after CCBC’s action, relators, East Liverpool 
and its mayor, auditor, and treasurer in their unofficial capacities, filed this action 
for a writ of mandamus.  Relators ask this court to (1) declare H.B. 329 
inapplicable to the apportionment of ULGF and ULGRAF in 2003, (2) declare 
H.B. 329 unconstitutional, (3) declare the alternate method of apportionment 
adopted in Columbiana County pursuant to H.B. 329 null and void, and (4) 
compel respondents to apportion and distribute the 2003 ULGF and ULGRAF in 
Columbiana County in accordance with the 1990 alternate method of distribution 
under former R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63.  Relators assert that H.B. 329 is 
unconstitutional because it deprives taxpayers of the equal protection of the laws, 
impairs the obligation of contracts, violates prohibitions against retroactive laws, 
and does not operate uniformly throughout the state.  Relators also requested that 
this matter be disposed of in advance of its normal order on the docket under R.C. 
2503.37 because of the fiscal crisis resulting from the reduced ULGF and 
ULGRAF distributions to East Liverpool for 2003. 
{¶10} On February 13, 2003, respondents moved to dismiss this 
mandamus action.  On February 24, relators filed a memorandum in opposition to 
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respondents’ dismissal motion.  This case is now before the court for its 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination. 
{¶11} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), dismissal of the action is required “ ‘if it 
appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations 
and making all reasonable inferences in favor of [relators], that [relators are] not 
entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.’ ”  State ex rel. Rasul-
Bey v. Onunwor (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 119, 120, 760 N.E.2d 421, quoting State ex 
rel. Crobaugh v. White (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 470, 471, 746 N.E.2d 1120.  On the 
other hand, “if, after construing the material factual allegations of the complaint * 
* *, it appears that [the] complaint may have merit, an alternative writ should be 
granted, and a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs should be 
issued.”  State ex rel. C.V. Perry & Co. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Elections (2002), 94 
Ohio St.3d 442, 444, 764 N.E.2d 411. 
{¶12} Applying the foregoing standards to the mandamus claim here, it is 
evident that dismissal is appropriate for the following reasons. 
{¶13} First, “if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus 
indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory 
injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must 
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704.  In order to divine the true objects of 
relators’ mandamus action, “we must examine [their] complaint ‘to see whether it 
actually seeks to prevent, rather than to compel, official action.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 324, 
762 N.E.2d 1012, quoting State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic 
Data Processing Bd. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105. 
{¶14} Although the allegations of relators’ complaint are partially 
couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, i.e., to order respondents to 
apportion and distribute these funds in accordance with the 1990 alternate 
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formula, the essence of their claims involve declaratory judgment and prohibitory 
injunction.  That is, they request (1) a declaratory judgment:  a judgment 
declaring that H.B. 329 is inapplicable to apportionment and distribution of 
ULGF and ULGRAF in 2003 and a judgment declaring that H.B. 329 is 
unconstitutional, and (2) a prohibitory injunction:  an order enjoining respondents 
from applying H.B. 329.  Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider these claims. 
{¶15} Second, “[w]here, as here, an action in mandamus does not provide 
effective relief unless accompanied by an ancillary [preventive] injunction, it 
would appear that injunction rather than mandamus is the appropriate remedy.”  
State ex rel. Corron v. Wisner (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 160, 163, 54 O.O.2d 281, 
267 N.E.2d 308.  For example, in State ex rel. Walker v. Bowling Green (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 391, 632 N.E.2d 904, the relators requested (1) a declaration that 
ward boundaries for electing city council representatives were unconstitutional 
and that all future elections under that system were void and (2) a writ of 
mandamus compelling the city and its officials to reapportion the ward boundaries 
so that each ward contains substantially equal populations.  We held that 
mandamus was not an appropriate remedy because it would not provide effective 
relief unless accompanied by an ancillary preventive or prohibitory injunction: 
{¶16} “It is clear that were this court to find the city’s apportionment plan 
unconstitutional, mandamus would not provide effective relief unless 
accompanied by an ancillary preventive or prohibitory injunction.  Indeed, 
relators seek such injunctive relief by asking for a declaration ‘that all future 
elections under this system are void.’  Although stated in positive language, the 
essence of such a request is to enjoin the city from conducting any future elections 
under the present apportionment system.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 69 Ohio St.3d 
at 393, 632 N.E.2d 904. 
{¶17} Similarly, relators here request in part that we “declare the 
alternate method of apportionment adopted and approved in Columbiana County 
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pursuant to Sub.H.B. 329 null and void.”  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, based on 
Walker, mandamus is not the proper remedy for relators because mandamus 
would not provide adequate relief absent an ancillary prohibitory injunction. 
{¶18} Third, “[c]onstitutional challenges to legislation are generally 
resolved in an action in a common pleas court rather than in an extraordinary writ 
action filed here.”  Rammage v. Saros, 97 Ohio St.3d 430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 
N.E.2d 278, ¶ 11.  We similarly sua sponte dismissed a mandamus action 
challenging a newly enacted statute prohibiting certain municipalities from 
issuing speeding citations on interstate freeways as violative of the Uniformity 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution by holding that “an action for declaratory 
judgment is here an adequate remedy at law.”  State ex rel. Linndale v. Teske 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1415, 655 N.E.2d 736; see, also, Grendell, 86 Ohio St.3d at 
634, 716 N.E.2d 704. 
{¶19} Admittedly, some precedent might facially support relators’ claim 
that mandamus is an appropriate remedy.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Mill Creek 
Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Tablack (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 293, 297, 714 
N.E.2d 917 (“We have recognized, however, that the constitutionality of a statute 
or ordinance may in certain circumstances be challenged by mandamus”); State ex 
rel. Zupancic v. Limbach (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 130, 568 N.E.2d 1206 
(mandamus was appropriate remedy to require state Tax Commissioner to 
apportion public utility property values to taxing districts according to previously 
existing apportionment formula where relators alleged that statute containing 
currently applicable formula was unconstitutional). 
{¶20} Relators rely heavily on Zupancic to support their mandamus 
claim.  Nevertheless, contrary to Zupancic, if H.B. 329 is declared 
unconstitutional in a declaratory judgment action and a prohibitory injunction is 
issued against applying its provisions to apportion and distribute ULGF and 
ULGRAF funds, there will be no need for an extraordinary ancillary mandatory 
January Term, 2003 
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injunction ordering respondents to follow the preexisting 1990 alternate formula.  
In fact, before the challenged provisions were enacted, we already effectively 
ordered respondents to follow this alternate formula.  See E. Liverpool, 90 Ohio 
St.3d at 271, 737 N.E.2d 44.  Presumably, respondents would abide by the 
applicable law.  And R.C. 2721.09 authorizes courts to grant further relief based 
upon a previously granted declaratory judgment “whenever necessary or proper.” 
{¶21} Moreover, at one point in their memorandum in opposition to the 
dismissal motion, relators specify that “no statutory void will occur if the court 
declares Sub.H.B. No. 329 unconstitutional because former R.C. 5747.53 and 
5747.63 will be in full force and effect,” indicating relators’ belief that a 
declaratory judgment would provide them with complete, beneficial, and speedy 
relief.  Significantly, this is not an election matter, unlike some of the cases cited 
by relators in support of their proposition that mandamus is available to test the 
constitutionality of statutory provisions. 
{¶22} Based on the foregoing, we grant respondents’ motion and dismiss 
the cause.  Relators have an adequate remedy to challenge this new legislation by 
an action for declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction.  If they had acted 
expeditiously and had filed this action near the August 2002 effective date of the 
amended statutory provisions and if the action were to have proved meritorious, 
they would have received essentially the same relief that they request here: a 
declaration that the amended provisions are unconstitutional or do not otherwise 
apply to the apportionment and distribution of the ULGF and ULGRAF funds and 
an order preventing the application of the Act.  Instead, they chose to wait nearly 
five months and file this improper action for extraordinary relief.  Relators’ 
motion to advance the case on the docket is therefore moot. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK, LUNDBERG 
STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
 
John R. Varanese, for relators. 
 
Charles L. Payne, East Liverpool City Law Director, for relator East 
Liverpool. 
 
Robert L. Herron, Columbiana County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew 
A. Beech, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
__________________