Title: People v. Miller

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

No. 89408-Agenda 4-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								JOSEPH R. MILLER, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.-Modified Upon Denial of 
Rehearing April 1, 2003
 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Joseph R. Miller, appeals from the dismissal of his
post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
	In the late 1970s, defendant murdered two women and
disposed of their bodies by the side of a road. He was convicted of
these murders and sentenced to the Department of Corrections
(DOC). In April 1993, he was released from prison. Five months
later, he killed three more women and disposed of their bodies in
drainage ditches. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of
Peoria County, defendant was convicted of six counts of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1992)) for the later
crimes. The same jury found that defendant was eligible for the
death penalty because he was convicted of killing more than one
person (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992)), and that there were
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to
death. On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's convictions and
sentence. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167 (1996). The United
States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari on March 31, 1997. Miller v. Illinois, 520 U.S. 1157,
137 L. Ed. 2d 497, 117 S. Ct. 1338 (1997).
	On December 29, 1995, defendant filed a pro se petition for
post-conviction relief. In the petition, defendant argued that his
trial counsel was ineffective in two respects. First, defendant
contended that, during plea negotiations, his attorney failed to
explain to him that a sentence of natural life was the most lenient
sentence he could receive. Defendant had rejected the State's offer
of life imprisonment in exchange for his guilty plea. Defendant
claimed that, if his attorney had explained to him that natural life
was the most lenient sentence he could have received, he would
have accepted the State's offer. Defendant supported this
contention with his own affidavit. Second, defendant contended
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to cross-examine two
of the State's witnesses about their criminal involvement in the
sale of stolen property. Defendant concluded that these witnesses
must have been promised leniency in exchange for their testimony,
and the State did not disclose such a promise to the defense.
Defendant supported this claim with police reports showing that
these two witnesses admitted to being involved in the sale of
stolen property with defendant. Defendant contended both that his
due process rights were violated by the State's failure to disclose
the promise of leniency and that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to cross-examine the witnesses about the promise of
leniency.
	The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant, and
counsel filed an amended petition on defendant's behalf. The
amended petition incorporated by reference defendant's pro se
petition and added the additional claim that defendant's trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
available mitigating evidence. Defendant supported this contention
with evaluations conducted by Dr. Michael Gelbort, a clinical
psychologist, and Dr. Fred Berlin, an associate professor at Johns
Hopkins University School of Medicine. Dr. Berlin's report
concluded that defendant was a sexual sadist and that this malady
impaired his volitional capabilities. Dr. Gelbort concluded that
defendant suffered from neuro-psychological impairment and
dysfunction reflective of brain dysfunction or damage.
	The State moved to dismiss the petition without an
evidentiary hearing. In the motion, the State contended that all of
defendant's issues were waived because they could have been
raised on direct appeal. The State further argued that defendant
had failed to meet his burden of showing that he had experienced
a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. The trial court
granted the State's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that
defendant had failed to show that trial counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Defendant
appealed directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).

ANALYSIS
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition as a matter of course. Rather, a hearing is
required only when the allegations of the petition, supported by the
trial record and the accompanying affidavits, make a substantial
showing of a violation of a constitutional right. People v. Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998). Considerations of waiver and res
judicata limit the range of issues available to a post-conviction
petitioner to constitutional matters that have not been, and could
not have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997). Rulings on issues that were previously raised
at trial or on direct appeal are res judicata, and issues that could
have been raised, but were not, are waived. People v. Coleman,
168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995). Where the State seeks dismissal of a
post-conviction petition instead of filing an answer, its motion to
dismiss assumes the truth of the allegations to which it is directed
and questions only their legal sufficiency. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1999). If the circuit court determines that the petition
should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, its judgment
is subject to de novo review. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,
387-88 (1998).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Failure to Investigate and
Present Mitigating Evidence
	Defendant first argues that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel at the aggravation-mitigation phase of his
capital sentencing hearing because his attorney failed to
investigate and present available mitigating evidence. Defendant
alleges that, had this evidence been considered by the jury, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded that
sufficient mitigating evidence existed to preclude the death
penalty. This issue is moot.
	An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no
controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An
issue can become moot if circumstances change during the
pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being
able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286,
294 (2002). Subsequent to the filing of defendant's appeal, the
Governor commuted defendant's death sentence to natural life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory
supervised release. Commutation removes the judicially imposed
sentence and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed
sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566
(1913). Thus, the commutation rendered this sentencing issue
moot. See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Plea Negotiations
	Defendant next argues that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Prior to trial, the
State offered a sentence of life imprisonment in exchange for
defendant's guilty plea. Defendant rejected the offer. Defendant
claimed in his post-conviction petition that he did not have time to
make a rational decision whether to accept the offer and that his
attorney failed to tell him that life imprisonment was the minimum
sentence he could receive if convicted of the crimes. Defendant
claimed in his petition that, had he known that life imprisonment
was the most lenient sentence available, he would have pleaded
guilty. For the reasons stated above, this issue is likewise moot.

Decher-Mayes Testimony
	Finally, defendant raises two issues concerning prosecution
witnesses Mary Decher and Daniel Mayes. These two witnesses
gave testimony that placed defendant in the car believed to have
been used by the murderer. Defendant gave them conflicting
statements about how he came into possession of the vehicle.
Defendant claimed in his petition that Decher and Mayes must
have been offered leniency by the State in exchange for their
testimony and that the evidence of a deal with the State was never
disclosed to him. Defendant argues both that the State violated its
obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), to disclose the promise of leniency and
also that his attorney was ineffective for failing to cross-examine
Decher and Mayes about whether they were offered anything in
exchange for their testimony.
	We note initially that defendant's claim of a promise of
leniency is entirely speculative. The evidence that defendant
attached to his post-conviction petition in support of this claim is
a series of police reports showing that when the police questioned
Decher and Mayes, they admitted that they were involved in the
sale of stolen property with defendant. Defendant infers from this
that they must have been offered leniency in exchange for their
testimony. Because defendant has failed to provide any evidence
that there was in fact a promise of leniency, his petition was
subject to dismissal on that basis alone. However, we will briefly
address his claims on the merits.
	Under Brady, the State has an obligation to disclose evidence
that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or to
punishment. Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct. 
at 1196-97. Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 486
(1996). Assuming arguendo that Decher and Mayes were
promised leniency in exchange for their testimony and that this
agreement was not disclosed to the defense, defendant simply
cannot show a reasonable probability that the result would have
been different if his attorney would have been able to introduce
evidence of the deal. As we noted in our opinion on direct appeal,
the evidence in the case was not closely balanced, and the
evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 194-95. The testimony of Decher and Mayes was helpful in
that it tied defendant to the vehicle likely used by the murderer.
However, there was other evidence connecting defendant to the
vehicle. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 177-78. And, more importantly,
there was plenty of evidence to convict defendant even without
their testimony, including defendant's own incriminating
statements and the DNA evidence that conclusively linked him to
the crime. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d  at 174-78. Thus, assuming there
was an undisclosed promise of leniency, defendant cannot show
that he was prejudiced by not having this information. For the
same reason, defendant cannot meet the second prong of the
Strickland test on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defendant simply cannot show a reasonable probability that, had
his attorney cross-examined Decher and Mayes about promises of
leniency in exchange for their testimony, that the jury would not
have convicted him. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied
defendant an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

CONCLUSION
	Defendant's post-conviction petition, supported by the
accompanying evidence and the trial record, does not make a
substantial showing that defendant's constitutional rights were
violated. Accordingly, the court did not err in dismissing the
petition without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the
circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.