Title: Davidson v. Sherman

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Davidson v. Sherman1993 WY 38848 P.2d 1341Case Number: 92-63Decided: 03/18/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Shirley DAVIDSON; 
Kimberly Paull; and Melissa Baxter, a minor, by and through her next friend, 
Gloria Shore, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Gary SHERMAN, and/or his 
successor, in his official capacity as Director of the Wyoming Department of 
Family Services, and/or its successor,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

J. Duane Myres 
(argued), and H.B. Harden, Jr., Casper, for 
appellants.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Barbara L. Boyer (argued), Sr. Asst. Attys. 
Gen., and D. Stephen Melchior, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. 
(Retired).

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Shirley Davidson, 
Kimberly Paull, and Melissa Baxter, appellants, filed suit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the Wyoming Department of Family Services, as administrator of the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, must set the standard of need 
at a level commensurate with actual need. Appellants also, for themselves and 
others similarly situated, sought to recover the amount of child support 
payments wrongfully retained by the State when it employed the incorrect 
standard of need. The district court, citing its lack of authority because of 
separation of powers, refused to correct the standard of need and entered 
summary judgment in favor of the State.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand for further proceedings.

Appellants state the 
issues as follows:

I. Whether the trial 
court committed reversible error by granting Appellee/Defendant's (hereinafter 
Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment that dismissed Appellant/Plaintiff 
(hereinafter Plaintiff), Shirley Davidson's, individual claim when the Court's 
Decision Letter stated "The Plaintiffs ask for a finding of amounts due for the 
named Plaintiffs, however, the Court finds that the amount due, if any, turns 
upon question of fact and Summary Judgment is denied."

II. Whether the trial 
court committed reversible error by failing to grant Plaintiff, Shirley 
Davidson's, individual claim for $1000 in underpaid AFDC grant payments from 
October, 1984 through January, 1987 pursuant to stipulated agreement of the 
parties.

III. Whether the trial 
court committed reversible error by failing to declare the stipulated remaining 
issue in Plaintiff, Shirley Davidson's, individual claim. The sole issue for the 
court's determination is whether federal and state laws 42 U.S.C.A. § 657, 45 
C.F.R. § 302.51, W.S. § 20-6-106(n) and W.S. § 20-6-215(b) require Defendant to 
account for all child support collected and held in trust as current month's 
child support first and only after payment of current child support obligations 
can Defendant treat the child support collected as against the back child 
support obligation and/or Judgment. If the money collected from John's father is 
to be credited against current child support obligation first then Defendant has 
stipulated that they owe Plaintiff, Shirley Davidson, child support benefits and 
$50 child support disregard benefits in the amount of 
$3,069.20.

IV. Whether the trial 
court committed reversible error by finding that the Court has no legal right or 
authority to correct the Standard of Need (hereinafter SON) from August 4, 1986 
to October 1, 1990 to the correct and accurate SON amount of $654 for an AFDC 
family size three. V. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in 
failing to find that Plaintiffs' rights were violated by Defendant's 
confiscating and using the children's child support trust funds without accurate 
accounting in accordance with Federal and State laws is a violation of the State 
and Federal Laws Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States and the 
Wyoming Constitution Article 1, § 6.

VI. Whether the trial 
court committed reversible error in finding that Plaintiffs had failed to timely 
certify the alleged Class action claim when all evidence is that the parties 
hereto agreed not to certify the class until after the SON issue was resolved. 
Clearly, it is premature for the Court to limit this action to the three 
named-Plaintiffs when Defendant has already stipulated in two other filed cases 
that they are members of the class that is yet to be certified, if the 
certification step even becomes necessary.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶3]      When reviewing 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we examine the case in the same 
manner as the trial court. Moncrief v. Harvey, 816 P.2d 97, 102 (Wyo. 1991). Our 
task requires that we make a dual finding that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, and that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Id. When considering questions of law, we accord no special deference to 
the district court's determination. Id.; Matter of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (Wyo. 1980).

BACKGROUND

[¶4]      The Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program is one of three major 
categorical public assistance programs established by the Social Security Act of 
1935. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1118 
(1968). 42 U.S.C. § 601 outlines the program's goals:

     For the purpose of 
encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of 
relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and 
rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in 
such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom 
they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such 
parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support 
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental 
care and protection, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each 
fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this 
part.

The AFDC program 
is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism under which the states provide 
monthly or bimonthly cash grants for basic maintenance to needy families with 
dependent children and the federal government reimburses fifty to eighty percent 
of the states' program costs. King, 392 U.S.  at 316, 88 S. Ct.  at 2133; Adele M. 
Blong & Timothy J. Casey, AFDC Program Rules for Advocates: An Overview, 23 
Clearinghouse Rev. 802 (Nov. 1989). States freely elect whether to participate 
in the federally funded program, but once a state decides to participate, it 
must comply with the federal laws governing the program. King, 392 U.S.  at 
316-17, 88 S. Ct.  at 2133; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408, 90 S. Ct. 1207, 
1216, 25 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1970). Federal law requires a state to designate a single 
state agency to administer the AFDC benefits program or to supervise agencies of 
local government, usually county agencies, who administer the program. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(3), 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.100, 205.101.

[¶5]      Two basic factors 
enter into the determination of what AFDC benefits will be paid to a family. 
First, a standard of need must be established to provide a yardstick for 
measuring who is eligible for public assistance. Rosado, 397 U.S.  at 408, 90 S. Ct.  at 1216. Second, it must be decided what level of benefits will be paid to 
families in need of assistance. Id. Congress has granted the states a great deal 
of discretion in making both of these determinations. Id. Thus, diversity exists 
among the states both in their standards of need and their levels of benefits 
actually paid. Id.

[¶6]      The standard of 
need and the benefit level are separate considerations. The level of benefits 
aspect of the program is subject to different limitations than is the state's 
determination of the standard of need. State of Minn. by Humphrey v. Heckler, 
739 F.2d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 1984). The standard of need is intended to reflect 
the actual cost of a subsistence level of existence; accordingly, the states' 
discretion in establishing this standard stems from the recognition of the 
variations among the states in what qualifies as an item of need, as well as the 
valuation of those items. Id. A state may not obscure the standard of need by 
arbitrarily establishing a standard of need that does not reflect actual need. 
Rosado, 397 U.S.  at 413, 90 S. Ct.  at 1218.

[¶7]      The states' 
discretion in setting their level of benefits, however, is much broader; it is 
intended to allow states to factor in budgetary and policy concerns. Rosado, 397 U.S.  at 413, 90 S. Ct.  at 1218; Heckler, 739 F.2d  at 374. Therefore, while a 
state must set its standard of need at a level reflecting actual need, it may, 
to accommodate budgetary realities and policy considerations, reduce accordingly 
the level of benefits actually paid. Rosado, 397 U.S.  at 413, 90 S. Ct.  at 
1218.

[¶8]      In concluding 
that 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) requires states to set their standards of need at 
levels reflecting actual need, the United States Supreme Court ascribed the 
following purpose to that provision:

     It has the effect of 
requiring the States to recognize and accept the responsibility for those 
additional individuals whose income falls short of the standard of need as 
computed in light of economic realities and to place them among those eligible 
for the care and training provisions. Secondly, while it leaves the States free 
to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accomplishes 
within that framework the goal, however modest, of forcing a State to accept the 
political consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light the true extent to 
which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable. Lastly, by 
imposing on those States that desire to maintain "maximums" the requirement of 
an appropriate adjustment, Congress has introduced an incentive to abandon a 
flat "maximum" system, thereby encouraging those States desirous of containing 
their welfare budget to shift to a percentage system that will more equitably 
apportion those funds in fact allocated for welfare and also more accurately 
reflect the real measure of public assistance being given.

Rosado, 397 U.S. 
at 413-14, 90 S. Ct.  at 1218.

[¶9]      The AFDC program 
provides aid to families whose "countable income" falls below the standard of 
need. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A); Quarles v. St. Clair, 711 F.2d 691, 694 (5th 
Cir. support payments the AFDC parent received from the divorced or otherwise 
absent parent. Id. In 1975, the federal law was amended to provide that child 
support payments would no longer be included in countable income. 42 U.S.C. § 
602(a)(26); Quarles, 711 F.2d  at 694. Instead, the state could provide that, as 
a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient must assign to 
the state their rights to child support payments. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A). The 
child support payments assigned to the state are then distributed according to 
42 U.S.C. § 657.

[¶10]   The first fifty dollars of any 
monthly payment is to be paid to the family without affecting its eligibility 
for assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1). This fifty dollar payment is referred to 
as the "fifty dollar disregard." Adele M. Blong & Timothy J. Casey, AFDC 
Program Rules for Advocates: An Overview, 23 Clearinghouse Rev. 802, 808 (Nov. 
1989). Amounts remaining after the fifty dollar disregard are allocated among 
the state and federal governments and the AFDC family according to 42 U.S.C. § 
657(b)(2) through (4).

[¶11]   In 1975, when Congress enacted 
these amendments, twelve states, including Wyoming, were "gap" states. Quarles, 
711 F.2d  at 702. Gap states were those states which could not afford to fund the 
entire need of a family; a gap existed between the standard of need and the 
amount of assistance the state provided. Id. Prior to 1975, these gap states 
permitted AFDC families to fill this gap (up to the standard of need) with 
private income, including child support payments, without affecting their 
eligibility for AFDC assistance. Id. After the 1975 amendments, the child 
support payments were to be assigned to the state with as little as fifty 
dollars (the fifty dollar disregard) being returned to the AFDC family, an 
amount insufficient to fill the gap. Thus, the family suffered a loss in 
income.

[¶12]   Congress recognized this problem 
when it considered the 1975 amendments, and it therefore included an additional 
provision intended to ameliorate the harsh effect of the child support 
assignment and reimbursement provisions. Quarles, 711 F.2d  at 695. Thus, 42 
U.S.C. § 602(a)(28) provided that:

any portion of the 
amounts collected in any particular month as child support . . . which [prior to 
the 1975 amendments] would not have caused a reduction in the amount of aid paid 
to the family if such amounts had been paid directly to the family, shall be 
added to the amount of aid otherwise payable to such family. . . 
.

This payment is 
termed a "supplemental payment." Adele M. Blong & Barbara Leyser, An 
Explanation of Fill the Gap Budgeting as Used in the AFDC Program, 23 
Clearinghouse Rev. 153, 156 (June 1989).

WYOMING'S AFDC 
PROGRAM

[¶13]   Wyoming has participated in the 
AFDC program since the Wyoming Legislature first authorized the state's 
participation in 1937. See W.S. 42-2-104. The Wyoming Department of Family 
Services is the single state agency charged with administering the state's AFDC 
program. See W.S. 42-1-101 and 9-2-2006. Although the Department of Family 
Services administers the program, W.S. 42-2-104(c) provides that the legislature 
shall establish the standard of need and the payment levels within the 
department's budget appropriation.

[¶14]   Prior to the implementation of the 
1975 amendments to the Social Security Act outlined above, Wyoming was a gap 
state. Shortly after the 1975 amendments to the Act, Wyoming began setting its 
standard of need and payment levels at the same level, thereby eliminating the 
gap. It is from this practice that this dispute arises.

[¶15]   Appellants challenge this practice 
for the years 1986 to 1990. In 1986 appellee requested that the Wyoming 
Department of Fiscal Control conduct a study to determine the actual standard of 
need for Wyoming. The Department completed the study reporting $654.00 as the 
accurate standard of need amount for a family of three. Appellee reported this 
finding to the legislature who, nonetheless, set the standard of need at 
$360.00, a level equal to the state's benefit level. This practice of 
disregarding the actual standard of need, and instead setting it at a level 
equal to the benefit level, continued until 1990, when the legislature increased 
the standard of need to $734.00, with the benefit level set at $360.00. By 
eliminating the gap between the standard of need and the benefit level, the 
state eliminated the need to make supplemental payments to the AFDC families. It 
also reduced the number of families eligible for benefits.

[¶16]   We hold that appellee's practice of 
administering the AFDC program with the standard of need arbitrarily set equal 
to the benefit level violates federal law and must be discontinued. Federal law, 
specifically 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23), requires that states set their standard of 
need at a level commensurate with actual need. When the state arbitrarily 
established a standard of need at other than actual need, it violated the 
requirement of the federal law.

[¶17]   The state, in administration of its 
AFDC program in violation of this federal law, abrogated its responsibilities 
under the program. As noted earlier, when Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 
602(a)(23) requiring states to update their standards of need, it intended that 
participating states assist families who lacked income and resources sufficient 
to provide a subsistence level of existence. Rosado, 397 U.S.  at 413, 90 S. Ct. 
at 1218. To fulfill this mandate of assisting truly needy families, the state 
must determine eligibility on the basis of an accurate standard of need. If the 
state can arbitrarily choose a figure to represent its standard of need, it can 
effectively exclude families actually in need of assistance, i.e., those whose 
income and resources fall below the subsistence level of a correctly determined 
standard of need.

[¶18]   The second goal of 42 U.S.C. § 
602(a)(23), that of forcing a state to accept the political consequences of its 
failure to fund the entire need of AFDC families and that of illuminating the 
true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable, 
clearly remains unachieved if a state establishes its standard of need at a 
level lower than actual need. If a state can arbitrarily set its standard of 
need at the level it intends to fund, it can camouflage the extent to which it 
fails to fund the need of AFDC families. For example, in 1986 the actual 
standard of need, calculated after study, was $654.00. The legislature 
disregarded this figure and arbitrarily set the standard of need at the benefit 
level of $360.00. With the standard of need set at $360.00 and the benefit level 
also set at $360.00, the state could report that it had funded the entire need. 
This obviously paints a distorted picture. Not only did the state not fund the 
entire need of those families eligible for benefits, it excluded families who 
should have received assistance - those whose income fell between $360.00 and 
the subsistence level of $654.00.

[¶19]   In addition to its failure to 
achieve the goals outlined above, the state wrongfully retained child support 
dollars in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(28). If, during the years in dispute, 
Wyoming had set its standard of need at the actual level of subsistence, a gap 
would have existed between the standard of need and the state's benefit level. 
For those families whose rights to child support had been assigned to the state 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26), Congress intended this gap to be filled by 
the assigned child support payment in the form of a supplemental payment. 42 
U.S.C. § 602(a)(28); Quarles, 711 F.2d  at 695. Wyoming deflected the requirement 
to make supplemental payments by artificially closing the gap; it arbitrarily 
lowered its standard of need to the level of benefits to be paid. Consequently, 
several AFDC families were wrongfully deprived of much needed child support 
payments.

[¶20]   42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(28) requires the 
supplemental payment; 45 C.F.R. § 232.21 provides for the computation of the 
payment. The following hypothetical example illustrates the effect of Wyoming's 
failure to set an accurate standard of need and hence its failure to make 
appropriate supplemental payments. For purposes of this illustration, we assume 
total child support payments to be $250.00 per month, earned income to be $0.00 
per month, standard of need to be $654.00 and an AFDC benefit level of $360.00. 
It is helpful to first define relevant terms. They are:

Standard of 
Need: 
The dollar amount representing a subsistence level of assistance for a family 
unit.

AFDC Benefit 
Level: 
The maximum dollar amount of assistance available under the 
program.

AFDC Maximum 
Grant: 
The lesser of either the AFDC benefit level or the standard of need minus 
countable income.

Pre-1975 Countable 
Income: 
Earned income less statutory deductions plus child support less the $50.00 
disregard.

Post-1975 Countable 
Income: 
Earned income less statutory deductions. Post-1975 countable income does not 
include child support payments.

Disposable 
Income: 
Pre-1975 countable income plus AFDC maximum grant.

[¶21]   The steps in calculating the 
supplemental payment are as follows:

Step 1: Determine 
disposable income: Pre-1975 countable income plus AFDC maximum grant. 

Pre-1975 countable 
income:

 Earned Income                                                                                 
$ 0.00 

Child Support 
($250.00-50.00)                                                       
200.00 

________ 

Total                                                                                                    
$200.00

AFDC Maximum Grant: The 
lesser of:

 AFDC Benefit Level                                                                        
$360.00

                                                                                                            
________ 

or 

Standard of Need                                                                             
$654.00 

Minus countable income 
                                                                 
200.00

                                                                                                            
________ 

$454.00

                                                                                                            
________

$360.00 is less than 
$454.00, therefore, disposable income is $360.00 plus $200.00 or 
$560.00.

Step 2: Determine the 
AFDC Maximum Grant using post-1975 countable 
income:

Post-1975 countable 
income:

Earned Income                                                                                  
$ 0.00 

Child Support (post-75 
don't count it)                                             
0.00

                                                                                                            
_______

 Total                                                                                                   
$ 0.00

                                                                                                            
_______ 

AFDC Maximum Grant: The 
lesser of: 

AFDC Benefit Level                                                                         
$360.00 

_______

 or

Standard of Need                                                                             
$654.00

 Minus countable income                                                                 
0.00

                                                                                                            
________      

$654.00

                                                                                                            
________

$360.00 is less than 
$654.00, therefore, the AFDC Maximum Grant from step 2 is 
$360.00.

Step 3: Calculate the 
supplemental payment: subtract the figure in step 2, the AFDC Maximum Grant 
using post-1975 income, $360.00, from the figure in step 1, disposable income, 
calculated at $560.00.

Step 1: Disposable 
Income                                                             
$560.00

 Step 2: AFDC Maximum Grant                                                      
360.00

                                                                                                            
_______ 

Supplemental 
Payment

 $200.00

                                                                                                            
_______

[¶22]   This hypothetical family unit is 
entitled to $610.00 [AFDC Grant: $360.00, plus child support disregard: $50.00, 
plus supplemental payment: $200.00]. As Wyoming administered its AFDC program 
for the years 1986-1990, the family would have been denied the supplemental 
payment of $200.00, receiving only $410.00 [AFDC Grant: $360.00, plus child 
support disregard: $50.00].

[¶23]   We wish to emphasize that the 
$200.00 payment (to continue with our above illustration) is not money which 
originated in the state treasury. The $200.00 is that portion of the $250.00 
child support payment, paid by the absent parent and assigned to the state, 
which should have been refunded to the family in the form of a supplemental 
payment.

[¶24]   Appellants allege that the child 
support payments which should have been paid to the family in the form of 
supplemental payments have instead been used to cover the state's administrative 
expenses. The record does not clearly reveal how the state used the money. 
However, to whatever expenses the state applied the assigned child support 
payments, it did so incorrectly. The child support payments cannot be used to 
reimburse the state and federal governments for their expenses until all 
appropriate payments have been made to the family in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 
602(a)(28) and 657. Appellants are entitled to recover child support payments 
wrongfully withheld.

[¶25]   Appellee essentially admits the 
above-outlined defects in Wyoming's AFDC program, but asserts several defenses. 
Appellee first argues that it lacks the authority to alter the standard of need 
or the benefit level because W.S. 42-2-104(c) reserves this determination to the 
legislature. The department contends that it fulfilled its statutory obligation 
when it reviewed the standard of need and recommended the appropriate level of 
need to the legislature.

[¶26]   Appellee may have fulfilled its 
obligation under the state statute, but that is not at issue in this dispute. 
The mandate at issue in this case is the federal requirement that a state 
set its standard of need at a level reflecting actual need. As noted earlier, 
once a state elects to participate in the AFDC program, it must comply with the 
federal mandates. If a conflict exists between the state plan and federal law, 
the federal law preempts the state statute. King, 392 U.S.  at 333, 88 S. Ct.  at 
2141; Rosado, 397 U.S.  at 420, 90 S. Ct.  at 1222.

[¶27]   Federal law requires that a single 
state agency administer the AFDC program. In Wyoming, that agency is the 
Department of Family Services. The Department of Family Services must administer 
the AFDC program in accordance with federal law, including the requirement that 
the standard of need reflect actual need. If the agency, in administering the 
program, finds a conflict between state and federal requirements, the agency 
must choose the course of action mandated by federal law. In this instance, it 
means the department must employ an accurate standard of need when determining 
eligibility of AFDC applicants and when calculating supplemental payments, 
making adjustments elsewhere to accommodate the state legislature's budget 
appropriations.

[¶28]   Federal and state courts have 
routinely held that neither budget impasses nor the absence of state funding 
appropriations justifies a state in delaying or withholding AFDC benefits owed 
to eligible families. Sandra Hauser, Securing Continued AFDC Benefits During a 
State Budget Crisis, 26 Clearinghouse Rev. 411 (August 1992). See also Coalition 
for Basic Human Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981); Pratt v. Wilson, 
770 F. Supp. 539 (E.D.Cal. 1991); Knoll v. White, 141 Pa. Cmwlth. 188, 595 A.2d 665 (1991); Coalition for Economic Survival v. Deukmejian, 171 Cal. App. 3d 954, 
217 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1985); Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 1325 (M.D.Ala. 1977). These courts have reasoned that a state's election to 
participate in the AFDC program obligates it to comply with the federal 
statutes, and inadequate funding does not excuse failure to comply. As one court 
emphasized:

If a state could evade 
the requirements of the [Social Security] Act simply by failing to appropriate 
sufficient funds to meet them, it could rewrite the congressionally imposed 
standards at will. The conditions which Congress has laid down . . . would be 
utterly meaningless.

Alabama Nursing 
Home Ass'n, 433 F. Supp.  at 1330.

[¶29]   This same reasoning can be extended 
to the requirement that the standard of need reflect actual costs. If the 
department can bypass this requirement by simply citing the legislature's 
failure to act on its recommendations, the state can effectively rewrite this 
congressionally imposed standard. As long as the state continues to participate 
in the federal AFDC program and continues to accept federal monies for its 
program, federal law controls, and the department must make eligibility 
determinations and supplemental payment calculations using the appropriate 
standard of need.

[¶30]   Appellee next contends that 
appellants' claims have been rendered moot by the 1990 Legislature's adoption of 
an accurate standard of need. We reject this contention. We have many times held 
that we will dismiss a case when, pending appeal, an event occurs which renders 
a cause moot and makes a determination of the issues unnecessary. Mari v. 
Rawlins Nat'l Bank of Rawlins, 794 P.2d 85, 89 (Wyo. 1990); Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo. 1985). We 
recognize an exception to this principle, however, when the case presents a 
controversy capable of repetition yet evading review. Natrona County School 
Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1031 (Wyo. 1988); Arland v. State, 788 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Wyo. 1990). One need look no further than the comments of state 
legislators reported in a Wyoming newspaper with state-wide circulation, the 
Casper Star-Tribune, to discern that this controversy is exceedingly 
capable of repetition. See, e.g., Casper Star-Tribune, January 6, 1993 p. B1; 
January 16, 1993 p. C1; February 10, 1993 p. A1.

[¶31]   State lawmakers consistently target 
the standard of need when searching for ways to accommodate budgetary 
constraints. This manipulation of the standard of need evades review because the 
legislature can always establish the appropriate standard just prior to this 
court's review. For this reason, and because this case involves questions of 
compelling public interest, we will not dismiss for 
mootness.

[¶32]   Appellee next argues that the 
separation of powers provision of the Wyoming Constitution, Article 2, § 1 as 
well as Article 3, § 33, prohibits this court from interfering with the 
legislature's determination of the standard of need. Article 2, § 1 
provides:

The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted.

Article 3, § 33 
concerns revenue raising. Since the standard of need is not a revenue raising 
device, but rather may affect appropriations, we assume appellee intended to 
cite Article 3, § 35 which reads:

Except for interest on 
public debt, money shall be paid out of the treasury only on appropriations made 
by the legislature, and in no case otherwise than upon warrant drawn by the 
proper officer in pursuance of law.

[¶33]   In holding that the Department of 
Family Services must employ an accurate standard of need in administering the 
AFDC program, we do not invade the provinces of either the executive or 
legislative branches. We have not ordered the state to participate in the 
federal program; we have not ordered the department to set its standard of need 
at a particular level; nor have we even ordered the department to employ a 
particular methodology in determining the accurate standard of need. Finally, we 
have not ordered the state to maintain a particular benefit level, and therefore 
do not order an increase in appropriations. We have reviewed the federal law, 
and we have determined that appellee has failed to comply with that law. 
Interpreting law and reviewing compliance with the law are both functions 
committed to the judicial branch.

[¶34]   We next address the dispute 
surrounding the certification of the plaintiff class. The record provides no 
evidence of what the parties agreed to concerning the identification and 
certification of the class. We reverse the district court's summary denial of 
class certification and remand for a determination of the propriety of 
certification of the class.

[¶35]   In summary, we reverse the decision 
of the district court and hold that the standard of need must be set at a level 
reflecting actual need. We remand for findings of fact to determine the actual 
standard of need for the years 1986 to 1990 and for a determination of the 
monetary relief in the form of back supplemental payments to which the named 
plaintiffs, and their class, if certified, are entitled. Because we are 
reversing the district court's order, we need not address the questions 
regarding the validity of the amended order.

[¶36]   Reversed and 
remanded.