Title: Goodrich v. Stobbe

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Goodrich v. Stobbe1995 WY 207908 P.2d 416Case Number: 95-40Decided: 12/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Glenn C. GOODRICH, individually; and Glenn C. Goodrich and 
Judith A. Goodrich,

 trustees of Glenn C. Goodrich, D.D.S., 
Inc. Pension Plan, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Elizabeth A. STOBBE, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Johnson County, John C. Brackley, J.

Nancy A. Zerr of 
Kirven and Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, for Appellants.

Greg L. Goddard 
and John P. LaBuda of Goddard, Perry & Vogel, Buffalo, for 
Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Glenn 
Goodrich, individually, and Glenn Goodrich and Judith Goodrich, trustees of the 
Glenn C. Goodrich, D.D.S., Inc. Pension Plan, appeal from the summary judgment 
which quieted the title to certain property in favor of Appellee Elizabeth 
Stobbe.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The appellants 
present the following issues for our review:

1.         Did 
Appellee Stobbe possess Appellant Goodrich's property pursuant to a tax deed as 
required by Wyo. Stat. § 1-32-201?

2.         Where 
there was defective notice in a tax sale under Wyo. Stat. § 39-3-103, is 
Appellee Stobbe's failure to take possession of Appellant Goodrich's property 
ineffective to start the six-year statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. § 
39-3-106?

3.         Did 
Appellee Stobbe comply with the requirements of possession under Wyo. Stat. § 
34-2-132(a) so as to bar Appellant Goodrich's right to redeem the 
property?

4.         Did 
the court err by invoking the equitable doctrine of laches where Appellant 
Goodrich did not seek affirmative relief?

FACTS

[¶4]      In 1975, Glenn 
Goodrich purchased a tract of land located in Johnson County. Lake County 
National Bank, acting as the custodian for the Glenn C. Goodrich, D.D.S., Inc. 
Pension Plan, held the warranty deed in trust and paid the taxes on the property 
from 1975 through 1981. Neither the bank nor Goodrich paid the property taxes in 
1982 or in the following years. The property was sold to Johnson County at a tax 
sale in August 1983 for the taxes which were due on it.

[¶5]      In 1987, Johnson 
County officials mailed two separate notices to Goodrich by certified mail, 
informing him that the statutory redemption period would expire on August 26, 
1987. When Goodrich failed to redeem the property, it was transferred to Johnson 
County by a tax deed dated September 3, 1987. Johnson County subsequently sold 
the property to Stobbe, and the warranty deed which evidenced that sale was 
recorded on May 20, 1992.

[¶6]      Stobbe filed a 
complaint in the district court on November 30, 1993, seeking to quiet her title 
to the property against any adverse interest claimed by the appellants. Pursuant 
to a motion filed by Stobbe, the district court granted a summary judgment, 
effectively quieting the title to the property in her favor. The appellants 
perfected their appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard 
of Review

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kahrs v. 
Board of Trustees for Platte County School District No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 
(Wyo. 1995); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 
(Wyo. 1995). We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the 
same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the 
lower court. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995). We do not accord 
any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 406.

B. Quiet 
Title Action

[¶8]      The appellants 
contend that Stobbe could not maintain her quiet title action because she did 
not have possession of the property as is required by WYO. STAT. § 1-32-201 
(1977). Section 1-32-201 states:

An action may be brought 
by a person in possession of real property against any person who claims an 
estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the 
adverse estate or interest. The person bringing the action may hold possession 
himself or by his tenant.

[¶9]      In Hirsch v. 
McNeill, 870 P.2d 1057 (Wyo. 1994), this Court stated that, in order to maintain 
a quiet title action under § 1-32-201, "the plaintiff must have (1) possession, 
and (2) legal title or some interest in the property." 870 P.2d  at 1059. See 
also Marple v. Wyoming Production Credit Association, 750 P.2d 1315, 1318-19 n. 
2 (Wyo. 1988). "[T]he reason that possession in some degree is usually a 
prerequisite to bringing a quiet title suit is that a legal remedy is ordinarily 
available to one out of possession." 65 AM.JUR.2D Quieting Title and 
Determination of Adverse Claims § 36 at 170 (1972). When no other remedy is 
available, however, the claimant may maintain an action to quiet the title to 
the property even though he does not have possession of it. Id. Additionally, 
"[i]f the land is in a natural condition, uninclosed by fences, and vacant, the 
person holding title to the land may initiate a quiet title action even without 
allegation or proof of possession on his part." 65 AM.JUR.2D, supra, § 43 at 
175. In that instance, the title holder is presumed to have constructive 
possession of the land. Id.; see also 1 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 20 (3d ed. 1939 & Supp. 1995).

[¶10]   This Court succinctly stated these 
general principles in Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 
(1947).

[T]he rule requiring 
actual possession by plaintiff is based on the availability of full protection 
to him through an action in ejectment or its statutory substitute. If the land 
is not occupied by any one, the plaintiff having title may sue to have his title 
quieted, either because the remedy exists independent of the statute, or because 
his title gives him constructive possession.

63 Wyo. at 208, 
179 P.2d 773 (citations omitted). A district court may also use its general 
equity jurisdiction or its powers pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act to protect property rights even when the claimant has not specifically 
requested that the district court do so. 63 Wyo. at 209-10, 179 P.2d 773; see 
also Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 277, 314 P.2d 944 (1957).

[¶11]   The appellants argue that we must 
apply the definition of possession found in WYO. STAT. § 34-2-131(a)(iv) (1975) 
in determining whether Stobbe could maintain her quiet title action. Since that 
definition pertains only to WYO. STAT. §§ 34-2-131 through 34-2-135 (1975), we 
cannot apply it to a determination of whether a party has complied with the 
possession requirement under § 1-32-201. We will, therefore, apply the 
definition of possession which we applied in Ohio Oil Co.:

"We may say, however, 
speaking generally, that one is in possession of land when he is in occupation 
thereof, with the intention, actually realized, of excluding occupation by 
others, or when, although not in actual occupation, he claims the right of 
exclusive occupation, and no person is in occupation opposing his claim." 
Tiffany on Real Property, (2d ed.) § 14, (3d ed.) § 20.

63 Wyo. at 209, 
179 P.2d 773.

[¶12]   We conclude that Stobbe was 
entitled to maintain her quiet title action. The property was undeveloped when 
this controversy occurred. Although Stobbe did not physically reside on the 
property, she claimed title to it by virtue of the tax deed. Stobbe visited the 
property on a number of occasions, paid the property taxes, made efforts to 
obtain title insurance and financing so that she could develop the property, and 
discussed the development of the property with a builder/developer.

[¶13]   Goodrich did not claim that he was 
in occupation or possession of the property. It is questionable, therefore, 
whether Stobbe could have maintained an action to recover the property from 
Goodrich because she may not have been able to make the showing that Goodrich 
unlawfully kept her out of possession of the property. See WYO. STAT. § 1-32-202 
(1977); Bragg v. Marion, 663 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1983). In any event, the district 
court could have utilized its equitable powers or its powers under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act to determine the parties' respective rights in the 
property.

C. Six-Year 
Limitation Under WYO. STAT. § 39-3-106(d) (1981)

[¶14]   The district court found that 
Johnson County had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements for 
obtaining a tax deed. The district court further found, however, that "any 
defect in notice was waived by [the appellants] pursuant to the six[-]year 
statute of limitations set forth in W.S. 39-3-106."1 The appellants argue that the 
six-year limitation did not apply in this case because Stobbe failed to take 
possession of the property as is contemplated by WYO. STAT. § 39-3-106(d) 
(1981). We conclude that § 39-3-106(d)'s six-year limitation barred Goodrich's 
claim.

Section 39-3-106(d) 
provides:

(d) No action for the 
recovery of real property sold for the nonpayment of taxes shall be maintained 
unless commenced within six (6) years after the date of sale for 
taxes.

We interpreted 
this statutory provision in Electrolytic Copper Co. v. Rambler Consol. Mines 
Corp., 34 Wyo. 304, 243 P. 126 (1926). In that case, the Court held that the 
statute would not begin to run in favor of a tax sale purchaser until (1) the 
purchaser had a deed to the property or was at least entitled to have a deed and 
(2) he took possession of the property. 34 Wyo. at 314, 243 P. 126; see also 
Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308 (1937).

[¶15]   The ruling in the Electrolytic 
Copper Co. case is not dispositive of the possession issue in this case. In that 
case, the Court considered a situation where the original owner of the property 
remained in possession of the property after the tax sale. 34 Wyo. at 314, 243 P. 126. The Court held that the statute was not triggered until the tax sale 
purchaser took actual possession of the property. Id. The Court declined, 
however, to determine what the effect of the statute would be in the event that 
the land was not occupied by the previous owner after the tax sale. 34 Wyo. at 
315, 243 P. 126.

[¶16]   When the land is not occupied by 
the original owner after the tax sale:

The general rule seems to 
be that although a tax deed is valid upon its face . . ., possession under the 
deed is essential to the assertion of the bar of the statute. . . . However, it 
has also been held that when a tax deed was in due form and was recorded in the 
proper office, and the lands described therein remained vacant and unoccupied 
for a time in excess of the short period stated by the statute of limitations, a 
tax title claimant was in constructive possession of the land, the statute ran 
in his favor, and the original owner was barred from attacking its 
validity.

72 AM.JUR.2D 
State and Local Taxation § 1057 at 325 (1974). Compare Shaffer v. Mareve Oil 
Corporation, 157 W. Va. 816, 204 S.E.2d 404 (1974) (actual possession not 
required) with Scott v. Boyle, 246 S.E.2d 887 (1978) (actual possession 
required). We agree with the principle of law that, when the lands are not 
occupied after tax sales, the holders of the tax deeds have constructive 
possession of the properties and the statute of limitations commences to run. 
This determination is consistent with our earlier ruling that parties can 
maintain actions to quiet their titles in unoccupied properties by showing that 
they have constructive possession of the properties. This decision also 
recognizes that, in our modern society, many people own properties which they do 
not actually occupy.

[¶17]   The Electrolytic Copper Co. case 
also held that the statute was intended to apply only to private purchasers and 
that it did not contemplate that counties could take possession of the 
properties. 34 Wyo. at 314, 316, 243 P. 126. The Court reasoned:

When [the statutory] 
section . . . was enacted it was intended to apply only to the ordinary case of 
sale to a private purchaser. The statutes authorizing counties to "bid in" 
property at tax sales were not passed until 1899.

34 Wyo. at 314, 
243 P. 126. The Court went on to state: "The county did not take possession, and 
it is doubtful whether the statutes contemplate that it should." 34 Wyo. at 316, 
243 P. 126.

[¶18]   Although we have tried to 
understand and accept the logic employed by the Electrolytic Copper Co. Court, 
we are not able to agree with its conclusion that counties stand in a different 
position under § 39-3-106(d) than private tax sale purchasers. We are not 
convinced by the Court's conclusion that, since the statutes which allowed 
counties to "bid in" at tax sales were not adopted until after the six-year 
limitation statute had been enacted, the counties should not be allowed to 
utilize the statute in the same manner as private tax sale 
purchasers.

[¶19]   The plain language of § 39-3-106(d) 
does not exempt counties. We do not see any reason why counties should not be 
allowed to actually or constructively possess properties which they have 
acquired through tax sales. In fact, this Court has stated that a county may 
even acquire an interest in property through the doctrine of adverse possession. 
See, e.g., Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 P.2d 1264 (Wyo. 1987). We, therefore, 
overrule the Electrolytic Copper Co. case to the extent that it places counties 
in a different position under § 39-3-106(d) than private tax sale 
purchasers.

[¶20]   We do not hastily overrule that 
portion of the Electrolytic Copper Co. decision. As we recently stated in Jones 
v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692-93 (Wyo. 1995):

We consider the doctrine 
of stare decisis to be an important principle which furthers the "`evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.'" Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 
(1991)).

Nevertheless, we should 
be willing to depart from precedent when it is necessary "`to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.'" Id. (quoting Gueke 
v. Board of County Commissioners, 728 P.2d 167, 171 (Wyo. 1986)). When 
precedential decisions are no longer workable, or are poorly reasoned, we should 
not feel compelled to follow precedent. Id. Stare decisis is a policy doctrine 
and should not require automatic conformance to past decisions. Id.

[¶21]   We turn now to the application of 
our legal rulings to the facts of this case. The tax deed which transferred the 
property to Johnson County was dated September 3, 1987. The county sold the 
property to Stobbe, and the warranty deed which evidenced that sale was recorded 
on May 20, 1992. Stobbe commenced the present action on November 30, 1993. Since 
we have ruled that the county had constructive possession of the property by 
virtue of its tax deed, we conclude that the six-year limitation period had run 
when Stobbe commenced her action. Stobbe was, therefore, entitled to have the 
title to the property quieted in her favor because any claim which the 
appellants had against the property was barred under § 39-3-106(d).

D. Other 
Issues

[¶22]   The district court also found that 
the two-year limitation in § 34-2-132(a) and the equitable doctrine of laches 
prohibited the appellants from contesting Stobbe's title. We do not need to 
address these issues because our ruling that § 39-3-106(d) barred the appellants 
from challenging Stobbe's title is dispositive. We feel compelled, however, to 
comment on the parties' respective equities in this case.

[¶23]   Taxes are a burden which we all 
must endure. The appellants cannot expect to be allowed to reclaim the property 
when Goodrich failed to pay the taxes on it over an extended period of time. The 
Legislature wisely recognized equitable concepts by adopting the applicable 
statutes of limitations. We do not, therefore, need to turn to the various 
equitable principles which are available to the courts in order to decide this 
case.

CONCLUSION

[¶24]   We hold that the summary judgment 
which quieted the title to certain property in favor of Stobbe is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1           
Stobbe asserts that Johnson County complied with the statutory notice 
requirements in this case. We refuse to entertain Stobbe's assertion on appeal, 
however, because she failed to file a cross-appeal to challenge the district 
court's finding on the notice issue. W.R.A.P. 2.01.