Title: Tyson v. Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families/Division of Family Services

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALEXIS TYSON,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND 
THEIR FAMILIES/DIVISION OF 
FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
 
§  No. 400, 2022 
§   
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File No. 22-05-11TN  
§   
§  Petition No. 22-10461 
§   
§  
§   
§   
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: March 17, 2023 
Decided: 
May 18, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s brief and motion to withdraw filed by 
the appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the responses, and the 
Family Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
This is an appeal from the Family Court’s order dated October 18, 2022, 
and amended October 20, 2022, that terminated the appellant’s (“Mother”) parental 
rights as to her twin children (“Children”) born in 2021.  The Family Court’s order 
 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the appellant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
7(d). 
 
2 
also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s father, with his consent.  We 
focus on the facts in the record as they relate to Mother’s appeal. 
(2) 
Mother’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under 
Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c).  Mother’s counsel asserts that, based upon a 
conscientious review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Counsel 
informed Mother of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c) and provided her with a copy of 
the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Mother 
of her right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  Mother did not respond with any 
points that she wanted to present for the Court’s consideration.  The Department of 
Services for Children, Youth and Their Families, Division of Family Services 
(“DSCYF”) as appellee and the Children’s attorney from the Office of the Child 
Advocate have responded to the Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the Family Court’s 
judgment should be affirmed. 
(3) 
The Children were born in June 2021.  Mother’s three older children 
had been in the custody of Pennsylvania’s child welfare agency for approximately 
three years.  When Mother was pregnant with the Children, DSCYF had received 
information relating to Mother’s health or mental health concerns.  Notably, Mother 
claimed that she was in treatment for depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and 
attention deficit disorder.  Her therapist disagreed that Mother was diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder but opined that Mother struggled with post-traumatic stress 
 
3 
disorder, mood disorder, depressive disorder, as well as severe postpartum 
depression following the birth of her older children.  DSCYF referred the family to 
Children and Families First for the Family Assessment and Intervention Program, 
which assists parents with support for their children, and established a safety 
agreement under which the parents would reside with the Children at the home of 
the Children’s paternal aunt (“Paternal Aunt”). 
(4) 
In July 2021, when the Children were approximately one month old, 
DSCYF received a hotline report that Mother and Father were shoving one another 
while one of them was holding one of the Children.  Then, in August 2021, Father 
took the children to the hospital, expressing concerns that the Children were having 
breathing issues.  On or around the same day, Paternal Aunt informed DSCYF that 
Mother, Father, and the Children were no longer welcome to stay in her home.  
DSCYF filed a petition for custody of the Children, alleging that there were concerns 
about unstable housing, medical neglect, Mother’s mental health, and Father’s 
physical health relating to seizures.  The Family Court granted DSCYF’s petition for 
custody, and the Children were placed in a foster home when they were less than 
three months old. 
 
4 
(5) 
The mandated hearings ensued.2  Following the adjudicatory hearing in 
October 2021, the Family Court found that the children were dependent because 
there was domestic violence between the parents, Mother struggled with mental 
health problems, there was a lack of stable housing, Mother was not cooperating 
with the Pennsylvania agency that had custody of her older children, and for other 
reasons.  DSCYF developed a case plan for Mother, and the Family Court later found 
the case plan to be reasonable.  Mother’s case plan required her to schedule and 
consistently attend appointments for her physical health; complete a mental health 
evaluation and follow any recommended treatment; complete a substance abuse 
evaluation; complete a parenting class and exhibit appropriate parenting behaviors 
during her weekly visits with the Children; obtain and maintain consistent 
employment; work with a family interventionist to create a budget to show that she 
could support the children; secure stable housing for herself and the Children; 
cooperate with the Pennsylvania child welfare agency to complete her case plan as 
to the older children; and attend the Children’s medical appointments.  Domestic 
violence services were offered to Mother but were not a mandatory component of 
her case plan.  
 
2 See Kline v. Del. Div. Family Servs., 2023 WL 2259101, at *1 n.3 (Del. Feb. 28, 2023) (“When 
a child is removed from home by DFS and placed in foster care, the Family Court is required to 
hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute and the court’s 
rules.” (citing 13 Del. C. § 2514; DEL. FAM. CT. R. CIV. PROC. 212-19)). 
 
5 
(6) 
DSCYF requested a permanency hearing within six months because the 
Children were less than six months old when they entered DSCYF custody.3  On or 
about April 20, 2022, DSCYF filed a motion to change the permanency plan from 
reunification to concurrent goals of reunification and termination of parental rights 
(“TPR”) and adoption.  On or about April 22, 2022, DSCYF filed a petition for 
termination of parental rights.  Shortly thereafter, the Family Court changed the goal 
for the Children to concurrent goals of reunification and TPR and adoption.   
(7) 
The court continued to hold the required hearings and found that, 
although Mother had made some progress on her case plan, the Children continued 
to be dependent as to Mother.  The Children were doing well in their foster home, 
and the foster family was an adoptive resource.  On September 19, 2022, the Family 
Court held a hearing on the TPR petition.  At the hearing, Father consented to the 
termination of his parental rights.  The court heard testimony from Mother, Father, 
the DSCYF treatment worker, the DSCYF permanency worker, the Progressive Life 
worker, and the Court Appointed Special Advocate appointed for the Children.  
DSCYF also submitted evidence of Mother’s and Father’s mental health evaluations 
 
3 See 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)b (providing that the procedure for termination of parental rights may 
be initiated when it appears to be in the child’s best interest; the child is in DSCYF custody; the 
parent is not able or has failed to plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or mental and 
emotional health and development; and the “child has been in DSCYF custody or placed by a 
license agency for at least 6 months and the child came into care as an infant”).  
 
6 
and that Pennsylvania had terminated Mother’s parental rights as to her older 
children on July 21, 2022. 
(8) 
On October 18, 2022, the Family Court entered an order terminating 
Mother’s parental rights.  The court issued an amended order on October 20, 2022.  
The court held that DSCYF had established, by clear and convincing evidence, two 
of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights:  involuntary termination 
of Mother’s parental rights over another child4 and failure to plan adequately for the 
Children within the statutory timeframe.5  As to Mother’s failure to plan, the court 
found that Mother completed the parenting class, substance abuse, and physical 
health components of her case plan.  But it found that Mother did not adequately 
address her mental health needs; had not obtained a source of income or means to 
support the Children; lacked adequate housing; failed to cooperate with the 
Pennsylvania child welfare agency as to the older Children; and did not attend all of 
the Children’s medical appointments.  The court also found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.  Applying 
the best interest factors,6 the Family Court found that DSCYF had established, by 
 
4 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7). 
5 Id. § 1103(a)(5). 
6 See 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (providing that parental rights may be terminated if one of several 
statutory grounds is established and “it appears to be in the child’s best interest”); id. § 722 (setting 
forth factors that the court may consider when determining the best interests of a child). 
 
7 
clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the Children’s best interests to terminate 
Mother’s parental rights.  Mother has appealed. 
(9) 
On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as 
well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.7  We review legal 
rulings de novo.8  We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial 
court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly 
erroneous.9  If the Family Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of 
review is abuse of discretion.10 
(10) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate 
parental rights requires two separate inquiries.11  First, the court must determine 
whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.12  
When the statutory basis for termination is failure to plan, the Family Court must 
also find proof of at least one additional statutory condition.13  Second, if the Family 
Court finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, then the court must 
 
7 Wilson v. Div. of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010). 
8 Id. at 440. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000). 
12 Id. at 537. See 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (listing the grounds for termination of parental rights). 
13 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)a-e (listing additional conditions, including that the child has been in 
DSCYF custody or placed by a licensed agency for at least one year, or for six months if the child 
came into care as an infant). 
 
8 
determine whether terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the child.14  
Both of these requirements must be established by clear and convincing evidence.15   
(11) Mother has not submitted any points for this Court’s consideration on 
appeal.  Mother’s appointed counsel represents that she has determined that no 
arguably appealable issue exists.  After careful consideration of the parties’ positions 
and the record on appeal, we conclude that the judgment of the Family Court should 
be affirmed on the basis of the Family Court’s determination, as set forth in its 
thorough and well-reasoned decision dated October 20, 2022, that there was clear 
and convincing evidence that Mother had failed to plan adequately for the Children’s 
needs, that DSCYF had made reasonable reunification efforts, and that termination 
of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the Children.  Those 
conclusions are well-supported by the record.16  Thus, we affirm. 
 
 
 
 
14 Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 537.  See 13 Del. C. § 722(a) (listing factors for consideration when 
determining the best interests of the child). 
15 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008). 
16 Because the finding that Mother failed to plan adequately for the Children’s needs established 
a statutory basis for termination, we express no opinion regarding whether the statutory ground of 
prior involuntary termination, 13 Del. C.§ 1103(a)(7), was satisfied in the circumstances of this 
case. 
 
9 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice