Title: Porter County Sheriff's Department v. Rita J. and Douglas Guzorek

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
Sharon L. Stanzione 
 
 
 
 
 
Benjamen W. Murphy 
Merrillville, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Merrillville, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walter J. Alvarez 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crown Point, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 46S03-0606-CV-207 
 
PORTER COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
RITA J. AND DOUGLAS GUZOREK, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellees (Plaintiffs below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court, No. 46C01-0405-CT-144  
The Honorable Robert W. Gilmore, Jr., Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Rehearing 
_________________________________ 
 
March 6, 2007 
 
Boehm, Justice. 
A Porter County Sheriff Department (PCSD) vehicle driven by Officer Joseph F. Falatic 
struck the vehicle of Rita J. Guzorek while Falatic was acting within the course and scope of his 
employment.  The Guzoreks filed suit within the applicable limitations period, naming Falatic as 
the only defendant.  Falatic moved for summary judgment, asserting that he had no personal 
liability because the Guzoreks’ complaint failed to allege any of the conditions listed in the Tort 
Claims Act that would permit an action to proceed against an employee of a government entity in 
the employee’s individual capacity.  While this motion was pending and after the two-year 
limitations period had expired, the Guzoreks moved to leave to amend their complaint to add 
PCSD as a defendant.  The trial court granted Falatic’s motion for summary judgment and also 
granted the Guzoreks’ motion for leave to amend the complaint.  PCSD, represented by the same 
counsel who had represented Falatic, then moved for summary judgment, contending that the 
amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint and was therefore 
barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied PCSD’s motion but certified its order 
for interlocutory appeal.  The Court of Appeals reversed, but we granted transfer and affirmed 
the trial court’s denial of summary judgment.  Porter County Sheriff Dep’t. v. Guzorek, 857 
N.E.2d 363 (Ind. 2006).  Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Sullivan dissented, agreeing with the 
Court of Appeals that the amended complaint did not relate back.   
The majority of our Court held that the Guzoreks’ amended complaint related back to the 
original complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) and therefore the Guzoreks’ claim was not 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations.  Id.  Under Trial Rule 15(C)(2), the test for relation 
back of an amended complaint is that the added party knew or should have known that “but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against 
him.”  The majority in Guzorek held that a mistake as to the applicable law can qualify as a 
“mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.”  Guzorek, 857 N.E.2d at 371.  On the facts 
of this case, we held that the Guzoreks’ complaint suing an immune public employee rather than 
the governmental agency was based on such a “mistake.”  Id. at 372-73.   
Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) is the same as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) for these 
purposes.  We cited Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 95 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1996) and 
Woods v. IUPUI, 996 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993) as federal cases allowing relation back where 
plaintiffs had incorrectly named immune institutional entities rather than individual defendants. 
In its petition for rehearing, the Porter County Sheriff Department points to Hall v. Norfolk S. 
Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2006) (November 9, 2006).  This was an FELA case where an 
injured railroad worker sued only his current employer which had bought the railroad after the 
injury but did not name the former employer as a defendant.  The Seventh Circuit held that an 
amended complaint could not add the former employer after the statute of limitations had failed 
because there was no “mistake” under FRCP 15(c)(3) that allowed the amended complaint to 
relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint.  The Seventh Circuit determined that 
 
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Donald does not apply where the plaintiff has been represented by counsel through litigation.  
Hall, 469 F.3d at 597.  The Seventh Circuit also expressly rejected Woods, holding that “[a] 
plaintiff’s ignorance or misunderstanding about who is liable for his injury is not a ‘mistake’ as 
to the defendant’s ‘identity.’”  Id. at 596.  It recognized Donald and Woods may be inconsistent 
with its ruling but termed them “outliers.” 
 
We recognize that Hall represents a retrenchment and disapproval of Donald.  We think, 
however, that the original purpose of Rule 15(c) was to permit relation back where an institution 
rather than an individual public employee was initially sued because of a mistake as to the 
applicable law.  The Indiana Trial Rule was adopted only four years later and used the same 
language as the federal rule.  We recognize, however, that a recent trend in federal courts is to 
adopt a narrower view of “mistake” in FRCP 15(c)(3).  We adhere to the view that the “mistake” 
requirement of Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) is satisfied when a plaintiff mistakenly sues an immune 
party if the proper party knows of the suit and knows that an error has been made.  That is one of 
the prototypical situations FRCP 15(c) was initially designed to address.  The Advisory 
Committee’s Note of FRCP 15 (1966) makes clear that the mistake requirement in the Rule was 
designed to give relief to plaintiffs who had incorrectly named the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare rather than the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.  Guzorek, 
857 N.E.2d at 371.  There is no claim that the Department was unaware of the suit or that the 
passage of time prejudiced its defense.  We see no reason to impose a penalty on a plaintiff for a 
mistake of law that has gained no advantage for the plaintiff and caused no disadvantage to the 
defendant.  This is the situation here, where the party who was not initially named (the 
Department) was obligated by statute to defend and identify the party who was timely sued (the 
deputy) and actually conducted the defense from the outset.  Accordingly, the PCSD’s petition 
for rehearing is denied. 
Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur. 
Shepard, C.J., dissents with separate opinion in which Sullivan, J., concurs. 
 
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Shepard, Chief Justice, dissenting. 
 
The petition for rehearing in this case further demonstrates the extent to which this 
Court’s interpretation of Trial Rule 15(c)’s “mistake of identity” requirement to allow relation 
back takes us outside the mainstream of authority.  Appellant points us to the fact that the very 
authority relied on by our majority has recently been reconsidered and rejected by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the position taken by this Court’s dissenters 
represents the weight of authority and that the majority opinion essentially eviscerates the 
mistake of identity requirement.  See Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 594-98 (7th Cir. 
2006); see also Porter County Sheriff Dep’t v. Guzorek, 857 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. 2006) (citing 
Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“an error of judgment about 
whether an employer is liable for the act of its employee is not ‘a mistake’ within the intendment 
of Rule 15(c)”)); Rebecca S. Engrav, Relation Back of Amendments Naming Previously 
Unnamed Defendants Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1549, 1587 
(2001) (“When it seems likely that the plaintiff knew the additional defendant existed but failed 
to name it either through carelessness or because of poor legal advice, courts are likely to deny 
relation back.”). 
 
Arguing Rule 15(c) is intended to remedy mistakes of fact and law, the majority held 
relation back is permitted where a party’s lawyer possessing full knowledge of all potential 
defendants “mistakenly” names an immune party (or, in other words, makes a mistake of 
liability).  Guzorek, 857 N.E.2d at 371.  The majority cited two Seventh Circuit cases to support 
this proposition: Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1996), and 
Woods v. IUPUI, 996 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993).   
 
The Seventh Circuit recently reconsidered the mistake of identity requirement in Hall, 
and, consistent with the great weight of authority, held that “[a] plaintiff’s ignorance or 
misunderstanding about who is liable for his injury is not a ‘mistake’ as to the defendant’s 
‘identity.’”1  Hall, 469 F.3d at 596 (emphasis added).  In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected 
Woods as an “outlier”2 and limited the Donald holding to cases involving pro se litigants.3  Id. at 
597.  The Court went on to list a host of decisions from other circuits confirming the view that 
mistakes of liability are not the type of “mistakes” contemplated by Rule 15(c).  Id. at 596-97 
(citing cases from the D.C., First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits).       
 
In light of the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Hall, and to remain consistent with the 
federal courts’ interpretation of the mistake of identity requirement, this Court should grant 
Porter County Sheriff’s Department’s Petition for Rehearing. 
 
Sullivan, J., concurs. 
 
 
                                             
 
1 Analogizing mistake of liability cases to “John Doe” cases where relation back is not permitted, the 
Seventh Circuit said these mistakes are not mistakes concerning “identity,” but instead are mistakes as to 
whom it is proper to sue.  The Court went on to say that “[i]t is the plaintiff’s responsibility to determine 
the proper party to sue and to do so before the statute of limitations expires.”  Hall, 469 F.3d at 596. 
2 The Court noted “recent decisions have not followed [the] reasoning [in Woods] and have instead 
coalesced around the narrower view of a Rule 15(c)(3) ‘mistake.’”  Hall, 469 F.3d at 597. 
3 Although Donald permitted relation back based on plaintiff’s mistaken belief that by suing the sheriff’s 
department he was also suing the individual deputies who injured him, the holding has limited application 
“because the decision was reached in large part because of Donald’s unique impairments as a pro se 
prisoner.”  Hall, 469 F.3d at 597. 
 
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