Title: Roberta Jo W. v. Leroy W.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2753 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In re the Paternity of Roberta Jo W.: 
 
Roberta Jo W., 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Leroy W.,  
 
Respondent-Respondent, 
Portage County, a quasi-municipal corporation,  
 
Intervenor-Respondent.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 22, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 18, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Portage 
 
JUDGE: 
Frederic Fleishauer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., opinion filed 
 
 
(BRADLEY, J., joins) 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs by 
Shane J. VanderWaal and VanderWaal Law Firm, Wausau and oral 
argument by Shane J. VanderWaal. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was brief by 
Russell T. Golla and Anderson, Shannon, O’Brien, Rice & Bertz, 
Stevens Point and oral argument by Russell T. Golla. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the intervenor-respondent there was a brief 
by Brian G. Formella and Portage County Corporation Counsel, 
Stevens Point and oral argument by Brian G. Formella. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief was filed by John J. 
Prentice, Andrew T. Phillips and Prentice & Phillips, Milwaukee, 
for the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
No.  96-2753 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2753 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Paternity of Roberta Jo W.: 
Roberta Jo W.,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Leroy W.,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Portage County, a quasi-municipal  
corporation,  
 
          Intervenor-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the Circuit Court for Portage County, 
Frederic W. Fleishauer, Judge.  Affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   When Roberta Jo W. was 18 
years and eight months old and had graduated from high school, 
she filed a petition requesting determination of paternity and 
child support.  Because paternity had not been established 
during her minority, child support had never been ordered nor 
paid.  Roberta Jo appeals the order of the circuit court denying 
her child support.  The issue is whether a circuit court has 
authority to create a retroactive child support obligation 
directly for a person who is an adult at the time he or she 
commenced an action requesting support.  We hold that a court 
No.  96-2753 
 
2 
has authority to order child support directly to the person only 
if the person is less than 19 years old and is pursuing a high 
school diploma at the time she commenced the action requesting 
support.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order 
denying support. 
¶2 
This case raises an additional issue: whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
terminated court-appointed counsel upon the filing of a notice 
of appeal.  We hold that after a notice of appeal is filed, the 
case is within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals and the 
circuit court no longer has discretion to terminate court-
appointed counsel.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court 
order on this issue and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for determination of appropriate county-paid appellate attorney 
fees.  
¶3 
When Roberta Jo was born on March 12, 1976, her 
mother, JoAnn L., did not name a father on the birth 
certificate.  After JoAnn applied for Aid to Families with 
Dependent 
Children 
and 
Medical 
Assistance 
(AFDC/MA), 
the 
district attorney's office interviewed her about Roberta Jo's 
father.  JoAnn named three potential fathers including Leroy W., 
the respondent.  The district attorney’s office did not contact 
JoAnn again regarding Roberta Jo's paternity, and JoAnn did not 
receive child support for Roberta Jo from any party.1   
                     
1 Prior to the enactment of a legislative amendment, 
effective July 1, 1981, only the district attorney’s office 
could bring an action to establish paternity.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 52.21-52.45 (1977). 
No.  96-2753 
 
3 
¶4 
Roberta Jo turned 18 on March 12, 1994, and graduated 
from high school in May 1994.  On August 12, 1994, the circuit 
court appointed counsel to represent Roberta Jo in her own 
paternity action.  
¶5 
In 
November 
1994, 
Roberta 
Jo 
filed 
a 
petition 
requesting that the court determine whether one of two named 
respondents 
was 
her 
father. 
 
She 
also 
requested, 
upon 
determination of her father, that the court order child support 
and contribution to her health insurance and medical expenses.   
¶6 
In accord with the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 767.45-767.60 (1993-94)2 for determining paternity the court 
ordered blood tests of all involved parties.  See § 767.48.  The 
test results showed a 99.79 percent statistical probability that 
Leroy 
is 
Roberta 
Jo’s 
father. 
 
Because 
the 
statistical 
probability of Leroy's parentage is 99.0 percent or higher, he 
is rebuttably presumed to be her father.  See § 767.48(1m). 
¶7 
Leroy then filed a motion for declaratory judgment 
requesting that the court dismiss Roberta Jo’s claims for child 
support and contributions toward her health insurance and 
medical expenses.  On September 22, 1995, the court ordered that 
regardless of the paternity determination, Roberta Jo would not 
be entitled to past, present, or future child support, including 
educational and health care expenses.  The court later denied 
Roberta 
Jo’s 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
of 
this 
order.  
                     
2 References to Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 1993-94 
version unless otherwise noted.  
No.  96-2753 
 
4 
Thereafter, on July 15, 1996, the court determined that Leroy is 
Roberta Jo’s father.  About one month later, the circuit court 
also ordered that when Roberta Jo's time for appeal expired or 
when she filed a notice of appeal, the court-appointed counsel 
would be discharged and Portage County would no longer be 
responsible for any fees incurred.  Roberta Jo appealed the 
circuit court’s orders finding that she is not entitled to child 
support and terminating court-appointed counsel at the filing of 
a notice of appeal.  The court of appeals certified the case to 
this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. 
I. 
¶8 
It is well-established in Wisconsin jurisprudence that 
circuit courts are prohibited from retroactively creating or 
increasing child support obligations in paternity and divorce 
actions.  Divorce and paternity actions are both statutory 
proceedings.  See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 767.   The divorce 
statutes do not confer any authority on the circuit courts to 
order support of adult children.3  See O’Neill v. O’Neill, 17 
Wis. 2d 406, 408, 117 N.W.2d 267 (1962).  “The statutory 
provisions 
are 
plain 
and 
concise 
limiting 
the 
support, 
maintenance, and education of the children to the period of 
their minority.  Hence, any order awarding support money for an 
adult 
child 
in 
a 
divorce 
action 
would 
necessarily 
be 
extrajudicial, a nullity.”  Id.  This concept has been 
                     
3 An adult is a person who is 18 years or older.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 990.02(3) and 48.02(1).  
No.  96-2753 
 
5 
consistently applied in divorce actions.  See, e.g., Poehnelt v. 
Poehnelt, 94 Wis. 2d 640, 655-56, 289 N.W.2d 296 (1980); Schmitz 
v. Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d 882, 891, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975); Miller 
v. Miller, 67 Wis. 2d 435, 439, 227 N.W.2d 626 (1975); Foregger 
v. Foregger, 40 Wis. 2d 632, 645, 162 N.W.2d 553 (1968); 
Greenwood v. Greenwood, 129 Wis. 2d 388, 391, 385 N.W.2d 213 
(Ct. App. 1986); Strawser v. Strawser, 126 Wis. 2d 485, 489, 377 
N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1985); Whitwam v. Whitwam, 87 Wis. 2d 22, 
30, 273 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1978).   
¶9 
Prohibiting the creation of a child support obligation 
for an adult child has also been consistently applied in 
paternity actions.  See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 150 
Wis. 2d 563, 574-75, 441 N.W.2d 734 (1989); In re Paternity of 
P.J.W., 150 Wis. 2d 123, 130, 441 N.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1989).  
“[A] child who has reached majority does not have a cause of 
action against a parent for an award or modification of child 
support.”  P.J.W., 150 Wis. 2d at 130.  “Wisconsin case law has 
. . . consistently prohibited retroactive increases in [child] 
support payments.  This denial of authority extends to the 
creation of a support obligation.”  Gerhardt, 150 Wis. 2d at 
574-75 (internal citations and footnote omitted).4   
                     
4 Our discussion is limited to the creation of a child 
support obligation.  We in no way comment on the enforcement, in 
the child’s majority, of an already-existing child support 
obligation.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 416 
N.W.2d 612 (1987) (holding that an adult child may bring a 
contempt action to enforce a child support obligation created 
during the child's minority).  
No.  96-2753 
 
6 
¶10 Given this well-established law in Wisconsin that a 
circuit court has no authority to retroactively create a child 
support obligation directly for a person who is an adult at the 
time she commenced an action requesting support, the resolution 
of the issue presented by this case depends on whether the 
legislature has overturned this settled case law.  Both parties 
rely on Wis. Stat. §§ 767.51(3) and 767.51(4) (reprinted below)5 
to advance their respective positions.  We discern nothing in 
these statutes or their legislative history that indicates a 
legislative intent to overturn Wisconsin’s settled precedent 
that a court has no authority to retroactively create a child 
support obligation for an adult. 
¶11 This 
court 
reviews 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation independently, but benefiting from the analysis 
                     
5  Wis. Stat. § 767.51(3) provides in pertinent part: 
The judgment or order [of paternity] may contain any 
other provision directed against the appropriate party 
to the proceeding, concerning the duty of support, the 
legal custody and guardianship of the child, periods 
of physical placement, the furnishing of bond or other 
security for the payment of the judgment, or any other 
matter in the best interest of the child. . . .  The 
court shall order either party or both to pay for the 
support of any child of the parties who is less than 
19 years old and is pursuing an accredited course of 
instruction leading to the acquisition of a high 
school diploma or its equivalent.  
 
Wis. Stat. § 767.51(4) provides in pertinent part: "Support 
judgments or orders ordinarily shall be for periodic payments 
which may vary in amount if appropriate.  . . .  The father's 
liability for past support of the child shall be limited to 
support for the period after the birth of the child." 
No.  96-2753 
 
7 
of the circuit and appellate courts.  See Carlson & Erickson 
Builders v. Lampert Yards, 190 Wis. 2d 650, 658, 529 N.W.2d 905 
(1995).   
¶12 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
the intent of the legislature.  See In Interest of P.A.K., 119 
Wis. 2d 871, 878, 350 N.W.2d 677 (1984).  To determine 
legislative intent, this court must first look to the plain 
language of the statute.  See id.  If the language is ambiguous, 
the court may turn to legislative history, the context, scope 
and purpose of the statute.  See id.  A statute is ambiguous if 
it can be understood differently by reasonably well-informed 
persons.  See id. at 878-79.  Differing interpretations of a 
statute does not alone create ambiguity, but rather “equally 
sensible interpretations of a term by different authorities are 
indicative” of a statute’s ability “to support more than one 
meaning . . . ”  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 
2d 112, 122, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997) (citation omitted). 
¶13 Neither the statutory language nor legislative history 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 767.51(3) 
and 
(4) 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature intended to overturn settled law.  The legislature 
has modified § 767.51 several times since courts clarified that 
a circuit court has no authority to create a child support 
obligation after the child reaches majority.  Despite several 
opportunities, the legislature has not addressed or questioned 
this settled law.  When ascertaining legislative intent, this 
court assumes the legislature knew the laws in effect at the 
time and judicial interpretation of those laws.  See State v. 
No.  96-2753 
 
8 
Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 641, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993).  “Moreover, 
we presume that the legislature is aware that absent some kind 
of response this court’s interpretation of the statute remains 
in effect.  Legislative silence with regard to new court-made 
decisions 
indicates 
legislative 
acquiescence 
in 
those 
decisions.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).   
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.51(3) provides that “[t]he court 
shall order either party or both to pay for the support of any 
child of the parties who is less than 19 years old and is 
pursuing an accredited course of instruction leading to the 
acquisition of a high school diploma or its equivalent.”  At the 
time this statutory language was first included in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.51(3) by 1985 Wis. Act 29, § 2401, several cases had 
already established, based on statutes, that a circuit court had 
no authority to create a child support obligation after a child 
attained majority.  There is no indication that the legislature 
intended to alter this established law.  
¶15 While 
the 
legislative 
history 
for 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.51(3) is not instructive by itself, the history of the 
statute’s counterpart in the context of divorce is helpful.  
Because Wis. Stat. § 767.25(4) (reprinted below)6 is identical to 
the sentence in § 767.51(3) which limits child support to a 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 767.25(4) provides: “The court shall order 
either party or both to pay for the support of any child of the 
parties who is less than 19 years old and is pursuing an 
accredited course of instruction leading to the acquisition of a 
high school diploma or its equivalent.”  
No.  96-2753 
 
9 
child who is less than 19 years old and pursuing a high school 
diploma, we construe the two sections together.   
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.25(4) was first introduced as 
1979 Wis. Act c. 196, § 28.  In its analysis, the Legislative 
Reference Bureau (LRB) stated that the statute allows a court 
which is making an order for child support to extend the duty of 
the parents to support the child up to the child’s 19th birthday 
if the child is pursuing a high school diploma or its 
equivalent.  A representative from the Legislative Council 
stated that the intent of the sponsors of this provision was to 
allow a divorce court to order support for children still in 
high school after their 18th birthday until they graduated or 
reached 19.  Again, when § 767.25(4) was introduced in 1979, it 
was well-established that a circuit court has no authority to 
create a child support obligation after a child reaches 
adulthood.  See, e.g., Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d at 891; Miller, 67 
Wis. 2d at 439; Foregger, 40 Wis. 2d 685; O’Neill, 17 Wis. 2d at 
408; Whitwam, 87 Wis. 2d at 30.  Again, the legislature gave no 
indication that it meant to change case law. 
¶17 We discern no interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 767.51(3) 
that could be understood to overturn well-settled law that a 
court does not have authority to create a child support 
obligation for an adult.  Rather, the legislative history of 
Wis. Stat. § 767.25(4) indicates that the legislature intended 
the language (identical to that in § 767.51(3)) to establish the 
time period during which a person is eligible to receive child 
support.  A court is authorized to order child support only for 
No.  96-2753 
 
10
a child who is “less than 19 years old and is pursuing . . . a 
high school diploma . . . .”  Wis. Stat. § 767.51(3). 
¶18 The legislature also amended Wis. Stat. § 767.51(4) 
since the law has been settled that a circuit court may not 
retroactively create a child support obligation for a person who 
has reached adulthood.  The most recent substantive change to 
§ 767.51(4) was 1987 Wis. Act 27, § 2137(y), effective October 
1, 1987.  Prior to enactment of this legislation, a father’s 
liability for child support was limited to the time period after 
the petitioner commenced the action for child support.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 767.51(4) (1985-86).  1987 Wisconsin Act 27, § 2137(y) 
amended the statute to its current form, providing that a 
“father’s liability for past support of the child shall be 
limited to support for the period after the birth of the child.” 
 Wis. Stat. § 767.51(4).  On its face, § 767.51(4) provides for 
when a child support obligation begins.  However, there is 
nothing on the face of the statute nor in the legislative 
history to indicate that the legislature intended to overturn 
well-established precedent that a circuit court has no authority 
to create a child support obligation beyond the period of the 
child’s minority.  
¶19 Accordingly, because the legislature is presumed to 
know the law in effect when it creates or amends statutes, we 
conclude that the well-established precedent has not been 
altered by Wis. Stat. §§ 767.51(3) or (4) and the precedent is 
still good law.  The circuit court only has authority to create 
a child support obligation directly in favor of a person who is 
No.  96-2753 
 
11
less than 19 years old and is pursuing a high school diploma at 
the time he or she commences the action requesting support.7   
¶20 We now turn to Roberta Jo’s arguments.  She makes 
three arguments to support her position that the circuit court 
has authority to create a retroactive child support obligation 
directly in her favor even though she was an adult and had 
obtained a high school diploma when she commenced the action 
requesting child support.  First, she argues that to harmonize 
Wis. Stat. §§ 767.51 and 893.88 (reprinted below)8 to give each 
its full force and effect, we must construe the 19-year statute 
of limitations for paternity actions in § 893.88 to also apply 
to an action for child support subsequent to the judgment of 
paternity.  Second, Roberta Jo argues that § 767.51(4) requires 
Leroy to retroactively pay child support from Roberta Jo’s birth 
through her high school graduation.  Third, she asserts that she 
                     
7 We recognize the anomaly created by our holding in this 
case and the holding of Brad Michael L. v. Lee D., 210 Wis. 2d 
438, 564 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1997).  Essentially, if a child 
files a paternity action before graduating from high school, as 
Brad Michael did, under Wis. Stat. §§ 767.51(3) and (4) the 
father is liable for past support from the child’s birth until 
the child reaches age 19 or obtains his or her high school 
diploma.  However, if the child files a paternity action when 
she is less than 19 years old but after graduating from high 
school, as Roberta Jo did, under settled law the father is not 
liable for any past child support payments.  There was no 
petition for review filed in this court in Brad Michael, the 
issue in that case is not presently before us, and we do not 
decide it.  
8 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.88 
provides: 
“Paternity 
actions.  
Notwithstanding s. 990.06, an action for the establishment of 
the paternity of a child shall be commenced within 19 years of 
the date of the birth of the child or be barred.”  
No.  96-2753 
 
12
has a legislatively recognized right to child support and 
barring her action is a violation of Article I, § 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  We are not persuaded by any of Roberta 
Jo’s arguments, and we will address each in turn. 
¶21 Regarding her first argument, Roberta Jo asserts that 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.88 allows a non-marital 
child the right to seek support consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§§ 767.51(3) and § 767.51(4).  Roberta Jo relies on the 
statement in In re Paternity of James A.O., 182 Wis. 2d 166, 
181, 513 N.W.2d 410 (Ct. App. 1994) that § 893.88 “places no 
restriction on the purposes for which a child might pursue a 
paternity action.”  A person may bring a paternity action for 
unlimited purposes if the action is commenced within 19 years of 
the person’s birth.  See id.   
¶22 We disagree with Roberta Jo's argument.  The plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 893.88 provides that if an action to 
establish paternity is not commenced within 19 years of the 
child’s birth date, the paternity action is barred.  Contrary to 
Roberta Jo's assertion, § 893.88 does not refer to any action 
for any purpose other than an action to establish paternity.  
The 
statute 
of 
limitations 
of 
§ 893.88 
applies 
only 
to 
commencing an action for the establishment of paternity--not to 
any related action under Wis. Stat. ch. 767.  It is undisputed 
that because Roberta Jo filed an action to establish paternity 
before her 19th birthday the circuit court had authority to 
determine her biological father.  We do not perceive that 
§ 893.88 is out of harmony with §§ 767.45-767.60.   
No.  96-2753 
 
13
¶23 We are also not persuaded that James A.O. was meant to 
apply the 19-year statute of limitations of Wis. Stat. § 893.88 
to actions subsequent to determining paternity.  The precise 
issue before the court in James A.O. was not the realm of 
remedies available for a petitioner who successfully establishes 
paternity.  Rather, the issue facing the court was “whether, 
under Article I, sec. 9, Wisconsin’s 19 year limitation period 
is unconstitutional to the extent that it denies an adult 
‘child’ the opportunity to gain the remedy of paternity 
adjudication for nonsupport-type injuries.”  James A.O., 182 
Wis. 2d at 172 (emphasis added).  The court focused, not on the 
relationship between Wis. Stat. §§ 893.88 and 767.51, but rather 
on the constitutionality of imposing a period of limitations on 
an action to establish paternity.  The statement in James A.O. 
that a paternity action may be pursued for unlimited purposes 
does not mean that once a petitioner successfully establishes 
paternity, he or she subsequently has a right to related relief 
such as child support. 
¶24 Roberta Jo's second argument is that Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.51(4) requires Leroy to pay her past child support from 
her date of birth through her high school graduation.  As 
discussed above, § 767.51(4) provides for when a child support 
obligation begins.  The statute does not, however, overturn 
established precedent that a court may not create a child 
support obligation for an adult who has obtained a high school 
diploma.  
No.  96-2753 
 
14
¶25 Roberta Jo finally argues that denying her past child 
support is a violation of Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Article I, § 9 provides that “[e]very person is 
entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character . . . .”  It is well-established that Article I, § 9 
does not confer legal rights.  See Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland 
Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).  Rather, art. 
I, § 9 “guarantees access to the courts to enforce existing 
rights.”  Vandervelden v. Victoria, 177 Wis. 2d 243, 252, 502 
N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1993).  See also, Doering v. WEA Ins. 
Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 130-31, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995); but c.f. 
Estate of Makos v. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 54-
54, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997) (Steinmetz, J., plurality opinion); 
id. at 59-68 (Crooks, J., concurring).  Because the law is 
settled in this case that Roberta Jo, having reached adulthood 
and obtained a high school diploma, does not have a right to 
child support, she does not have an existing right enforceable 
under art. I, § 9.  Therefore, denying Roberta Jo child support 
is not a violation of art. I, § 9.   
¶26 In addition, the legislature has the right to impose 
reasonable limitations upon remedies available to parties.  See 
James A.O., 182 Wis. 2d at 175 (citing R.W.L., 116 Wis. 2d at 
158, 341 N.W.2d 685)).  The legislature reasonably limited child 
support to any child who “is less than 19 years old and is 
pursuing . . . a high school diploma . . . .”  Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.51(3).  We note that Roberta Jo did have a right to pursue 
No.  96-2753 
 
15
an action for paternity and subsequent child support since July 
1, 1981 when the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.88 to 
allow children to bring paternity actions on their own behalf.  
See Wis. Stat. § 893.88(2) (1981-82); In re Paternity of R.W.L., 
116 Wis. 2d 150, 153-54, 341 N.W.2d 682 (1984).  At the time, 
Roberta Jo was only five years old and had nearly 14 years to 
bring an action for determination of paternity and requesting 
child support.  Roberta Jo’s failure to take action during those 
14 years does not now render Wis. Stat. § 767.51(3) an 
unconstitutional violation of her right to a remedy.   
II. 
¶27 The second issue presented is whether the circuit 
court erred in terminating court-appointed counsel upon the 
filing of a notice of appeal.  We hold that after a notice of 
appeal was filed, the case was within the jurisdiction of the 
court of appeals, and the circuit court no longer had discretion 
to terminate court-appointed counsel.   
¶28 A circuit court has inherent authority to appoint 
counsel when, in the exercise of its discretion, it deems such 
action necessary.  See State ex rel. Chiarkas v. Skow, 160 
Wis. 2d 123, 137, 465 N.W.2d 625 (1991).  A court may appoint 
counsel, not necessarily as a matter of fairness to the 
litigant, but in the interest of the court itself.  See Joni B. 
v. State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996). 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.85 provides: “An attorney 
appointed by a lower court in a case or proceeding appealed to 
the court shall continue to act in the same capacity in the 
No.  96-2753 
 
16
court until the court relieves the attorney.”  The "court" in 
this statute refers to the court of appeals.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.01(4).   
¶30 Once a timely notice of appeal is filed, the court of 
appeals gains jurisdiction over the case.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.10(1)(b).  The circuit court no longer has 
discretion to exercise authority over the case.  The court of 
appeals has discretion to determine whether continuation of 
court-appointed counsel is in the interest of the court or to 
relieve an attorney from service.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.85.  Once a case is before the court of appeals, that court 
has the discretion to determine what is in its own interests. 
¶31 We note that Wis. Stat. § 808.075(3) specifies that in 
any appeal other than a felony appeal, a circuit court "retains 
the power to act on all issues until the record has been 
transmitted to the court of appeals.”  We do not read this 
section, however, to give the circuit court discretion to 
terminate 
court-appointed 
counsel 
until 
the 
record 
is 
transmitted to the court of appeals.  Rather, we follow the rule 
of 
statutory 
construction 
that 
a 
specific 
statute 
takes 
precedence over a general statute.  See Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 
193 Wis. 2d 168, 185, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 Section 808.075 is a general statute.  It gives the circuit 
court authority to act on "all issues" until the record is 
transmitted.  In contrast, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.85 governs a 
specific aspect of an appeal--whether to continue court-
appointed counsel.  Section 809.85 provides that court-appointed 
No.  96-2753 
 
17
counsel "shall" continue until the court of appeals relieves the 
attorney from his or her appointment.  This rule is specific to 
one issue and therefore takes precedence over the general 
provisions of § 808.075. 
¶32 Portage County, intervenor-respondent in this case and 
the entity responsible for paying court-appointed counsel, makes 
two arguments to support its contention that the circuit court 
did not err in terminating court-appointed counsel.  First, 
because the circuit court has discretion to appoint counsel, it 
is within the circuit court's discretion to remove such counsel. 
 Second, 
Portage 
County 
argues 
that 
Roberta 
Jo 
has 
no 
constitutional due process rights warranting the continuation of 
court-appointed counsel.  
¶33 The County asserts that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.85 
does not apply to this case because it only applies where 
counsel has not been terminated.  At oral argument the County 
asserted that § (Rule) 809.85 is instructive to counsel and not 
instructive or prohibitive to the circuit court.  The County 
misunderstands the relevance of filing a notice of appeal.  As 
discussed above, a circuit court no longer has discretion to 
terminate court-appointed counsel once a notice of appeal is 
filed.  Once such action is taken, the circuit court's authority 
is limited, and the court has no authority to terminate court-
appointed counsel.  
¶34 Regarding the County’s second argument that Roberta Jo 
has 
no 
constitutional 
due 
process 
rights 
warranting 
the 
continuation of court-appointed counsel, as a matter of judicial 
No.  96-2753 
 
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prudence this court will not decide constitutional issues if the 
issue can be resolved on other grounds.  See Kollasch v. 
Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981) (citing 
Smith v. Journal Co., 271 Wis. 384, 390, 73 N.W.2d 429 (1955)). 
 Because we resolve the issue of the circuit court's termination 
of court-appointed counsel by looking to the statutes and rules 
of appellate procedure, we need not address the constitutional 
due process concerns raised by the parties.9  
¶35 In sum, we conclude that a court does not have 
authority to create a child support obligation directly for a 
person who is an adult and has received a high school diploma or 
its equivalent at the time she commences an action requesting 
support.  We also conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it terminated court-appointed 
counsel for Roberta Jo upon the filing of a notice of appeal.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court order that denied 
Roberta Jo’s motion for child support and we reverse the order 
that terminated Roberta Jo’s court-appointed counsel upon the 
filing of a Notice of Appeal and we remand the cause to the 
circuit court for determination of reasonable appellate attorney 
fees. 
                     
9 An amicus curiae brief was filed with this court by the 
Wisconsin Counties Association.  The Association asserts that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
initially appointed counsel for the circuit court proceedings.  
It argues that although neither party specifically raised or 
briefed this issue this court should nonetheless exercise its 
discretion to review the issue.  We decline to do so.    
No.  96-2753 
 
19
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit court are affirmed 
in part, 
and 
reversed 
in 
part and 
cause 
remanded 
with 
directions. 
 
No. 96-2753.ssa 
 
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¶36 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
concur in the mandate.  I write separately to point out the 
state of disarray of the case law dealing with Wis. Const., art. 
I, § 9.  See Tomczak v. Bailey, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ 
(1998); Estate of Makos v. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 
41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  I fear that the majority opinion in 
this case will leave litigants and courts in Wisconsin more 
perplexed than ever. 
¶37 Tomczak involved a statute of repose requiring a 
negligence action against an engineer or a land surveyor to be 
commenced no later than six years after the completion of a 
survey.  The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against a surveyor 
more than six years after the completion of the survey, and the 
court barred the plaintiffs' action as untimely.  
¶38 Makos involved a statute of repose requiring medical 
malpractice actions to be commenced within one year from the 
date the injury was discovered but not later than five years 
from the date of the act or omission.  The plaintiff in Makos 
filed a medical malpractice action after the statute of repose 
had run, and the court remanded the cause for trial, allowing 
the plaintiff to pursue the medical malpractice action. 
¶39 In the case at bar the majority opinion holds that 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(4) a plaintiff may bring an action to 
recover child support only if she is less than 19 years of age 
and is pursing a high school diploma or its equivalent at the 
commencement of the action.  The plaintiff did not fulfill these 
No. 96-2753.ssa 
 
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requirements, and the majority opinion bars her action as 
untimely. 
¶40 In Tomczak and Makos the plaintiffs had a recognized 
right to recover funds for negligence; in the case at bar the 
plaintiff had a recognized right to recover funds for child 
support.  In all three cases the plaintiffs brought the lawsuits 
after the time periods set by the legislature had run.  In all 
three cases the plaintiffs relied on art. I, § 9 to recover 
monetary funds.  In two cases the plaintiffs lost; in one case 
the plaintiff won. 
¶41 Over the past 14 months the court has addressed 
challenges under art. I, § 9 in three different cases:  Makos, 
Tomczak, and Roberta Jo.  These cases have produced conflicting 
opinions with no clear pronouncement from the court interpreting 
art. I, § 9.   
¶42 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the mandate and 
write separately. 
¶43 I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley joins this opinion. 
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