Title: Reilly v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

557 So. 2d 1365 (1990)
Michael Glenn Patrick REILLY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 73571.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 8, 1990.
Rehearing Denied April 12, 1990.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and William C. McLain, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
*1366 PER CURIAM.
Reilly was convicted of the first-degree murder of Jonathan Wells. Pursuant to the recommendation of the jury, the trial judge imposed the death penalty. We review the judgment and sentence pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution.
During the course of investigation, Reilly had given a confession to sheriff's deputies. The trial judge later suppressed the confession as being involuntary because of improper promises made to Reilly, who was found to have less than average intelligence and to be emotionally handicapped.
At the trial, the following colloquy occurred during the voir dire of juror Blackwell:
Defense counsel then moved that Mr. Blackwell be excused for cause. The trial judge denied the motion. Thereupon, the defense excused Mr. Blackwell with a peremptory challenge. At the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. He requested additional peremptory challenges, noting three jurors remaining on the panel as ones he wished to excuse. The motion was denied.
Having preserved his position for appeal according to the requirements of Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1985), Reilly now contends that the refusal to remove juror Blackwell for cause was reversible error. The problem is that juror Blackwell knew that a confession had been given. This might not require disqualification if the confession were going to be introduced into evidence. Here, however, the confession had been suppressed. Thus, juror Blackwell was aware of a fact that was inadmissible which was far more damaging to Reilly than anything which was actually introduced into evidence. While Mr. Blackwell subsequently gave the right answers with respect to whether or not he could be an impartial juror, it is unrealistic to believe that during the course of deliberations he could have entirely disregarded his knowledge of the confession no matter how hard he tried. Thus, we conclude that reversible error was committed by the failure to excuse juror Blackwell for cause.
Because the case will have to be retried, there is one additional point which should be addressed. Several days after making his confession which was later suppressed, Reilly made incriminating statements to three inmates while he was in jail. He asserts that these incriminating statements should be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree because he was still under the influence of the prior involuntary confession and because he was illegally arrested. We reject this contention. Between the time that Reilly confessed and when he made these statements, he had attended a first appearance hearing, had an attorney appointed to represent him, and had been visited by his parents. Two of the statements were entirely unsolicited, and the third was volunteered in answer to a question. None of the inmates were acting on behalf of the state when the statements were made. Even if we accept Reilly's argument that his arrest was illegal because it was based on his involuntary confession, it is clear that the intervening events were sufficient to break any causal connection between the confession and the arrest and the statements which Reilly made to the inmates. See State v. Maier, 378 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Jetmore v. State, 275 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 279 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1973). The testimony of the inmates concerning Reilly's *1368 inculpatory statements was properly admitted.
We reverse the conviction and the sentence and remand the case for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.