Title: LEONARD TOMASH AND MARILYN TOMASH v. MAX T. EVANS AND THOMAS M. EVANS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEONARD TOMASH AND MARILYN TOMASH v. MAX T. EVANS AND THOMAS M. EVANS1985 WY 112704 P.2d 1296Case Number: 85-13Decided: 08/15/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEONARD TOMASH AND 
MARILYN TOMASH, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

MAX T. EVANS AND THOMAS 
M. EVANS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Ronald A. 
Kastanek, Casper, for appellants.

Michael D. 
Zwickl, Casper, 
for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal concerns 
the propriety of a district court's refusal to grant a continuance when 
appellants Leonard and Marilyn Tomash were involved in another trial in another 
state and were unable to attend the Wyoming trial. The district court refused to 
grant a continuance and judgment was subsequently rendered against 
appellants.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellants raise a 
number of issues, but we need only address their first issue regarding the 
refusal of the district court to grant a continuance. The issue 
is:

"Did the trial court err 
and/or abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for 
continuance?"

[¶4.]     The action was 
commenced by appellees, as former business partners of appellants, seeking an 
accounting of the partnership funds, contribution for partnership debts, and 
damages for the alleged removal of certain partnership property. Appellants and 
appellees originally formed a partnership to conduct a helicopter crop spraying 
service. The business was unsuccessful, resulting in a default upon a promissory 
note owed by the partnership. Appellees filed their complaint on May 9, 1983. On 
October 1, 1984, the district court set the matter for trial on October 24, 
1984.

[¶5.]     The problem arose when 
appellants were scheduled to appear as plaintiffs in a trial in Iowa on October 22, 1984. 
Apparently, the Iowa trial was scheduled before 
the Wyoming trial, but appellants claim they 
did not know this until shortly before the Wyoming trial.

[¶6.]     Appellants claim they 
believed they could attend the Iowa trial set 
for October 22, 1984, some two days before the Wyoming trial, and still attend the Wyoming trial on October 
24, 1984. On October 19, 1984, appellants' Iowa attorneys notified appellants' 
Wyoming counsel that the Iowa trial could not be postponed, but they anticipated 
appellants would be finished in Iowa around noon on October 23, one day before 
the Wyoming trial. However, on October 23, appellants' Iowa attorneys informed appellants' Wyoming counsel that 
appellants were still on the witness stand and would not be finished until 
around noon on October 24. This then made it impossible for appellants to attend 
the scheduled commencement of the Wyoming trial.

[¶7.]     Therefore, appellants' 
Wyoming 
counsel informed the district court of the problem on October 23, 1984, and 
requested a continuance. Appellants were unable to support their motion for 
continuance with formal affidavits pursuant to § 1-9-101, W.S. 1977,1 because they were in Iowa at the time. 
Appellants' Wyoming counsel did appear on their behalf at 
the scheduled trial the next day and explained to the court why appellants could 
not be present. Another motion for continuance was made. The trial court did 
postpone the commencement of the trial from 9:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. on October 
24. The court ultimately denied appellants' motion for a further continuance and 
proceeded to hold the trial in appellants' absence. As noted previously, the 
court subsequently rendered judgment against appellants. Appellants' counsel was 
limited in his representation of appellants' case due to their absence. He was 
unable to introduce any evidence by way of exhibits or 
witnesses.

[¶8.]     The granting or 
refusing a request for a continuance is generally a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to be considered given the circumstances unique to 
each case. Holly Sugar Corporation v. 
Perez, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 595 (1973); and Glover v. 
Berger, 72 Wyo. 221, 263 P.2d 498 (1953). A trial court 
is authorized by statute to grant a continuance when good cause for doing so is 
shown:

"Any court, for good 
cause shown may continue any action at any stage of the proceedings at the cost 
of the applicant, to be paid as the court shall direct." § 1-9-102, W.S. 
1977.

On the other 
hand, a trial court may not grant a continuance based upon the mere whim, 
request or convenience of counsel in the absence of substantial factual or legal 
reason for doing so. Hays v. State, 
Wyo., 522 P.2d 1004 (1974).

[¶9.]     In Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101 (1929), we upheld the district court's 
denial of a motion for continuance when the defendant in that case was in 
Iowa on 
business. The court found that the defendant had sufficient notice of the trial 
but chose to be absent on a business trip. We noted in that case that there had 
been no showing that the defendant could not return from Iowa in time for trial 
and had not shown sufficient reason for a continuance. See also Chapman v. First National Bank of Cody, 
26 Wyo. 138, 
181 P. 360, reh. denied, 26 Wyo. 138, 182 P. 91 (1919), where a district court's 
denial of a motion for continuance in a criminal case was upheld on the grounds 
of absence of a witness residing in another state where the defendant chose to 
rely on the witness' promise to attend and did not secure such testimony through 
deposition or his attendance by legal process.

[¶10.]  We think the facts and circumstances in 
the present case, however, justify a continuance. As previously noted, 
appellants planned to attend the Wyoming trial, 
but due to what appears to be an unforeseeable delay, they were on the witness 
stand in Iowa longer than planned forcing their 
absence at the Wyoming trial. Under these circumstances, we 
think a continuance should have been granted by the trial court. If the 
appellees and court personnel were inconvenienced by the delay, assessing costs 
to appellants may have been more appropriate than denying them the right to 
defend their action in court.

[¶11.]  A similar situation arose in the 
Oklahoma case of Peck v. Peard, 183 Okla. 195, 80 P.2d 614 
(1938). In that case, the defendant was unable to be present at his Oklahoma trial due to litigation in California which required 
his presence. The trial court refused to grant a continuance. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed, finding defendant showed good cause 
justifying a continuance due to his absence.

"In determining whether 
the trial court abused its discretion there are two considerations. First, did 
the defendant give a sufficient reason for not being present at the trial? and, 
second, assuming that he did, was his presence as a party 
necessary?

* * * * * 
*

"Neither party has 
referred to any cases from this jurisdiction, nor can we find any, which deal 
with the party's participation in another action as a ground for continuance. 
However in 12 Am.Jur.p. 457, § 14 the rule is stated that `a party in two court 
proceedings in different places is bound by the first notice of trial and the 
requirement of his presence at the trial affords a ground for a continuance of 
the other proceeding.' We think this rule applicable here, and therefore, 
insofar as the order denying the continuance was based upon defendant Beck's 
reason for his inability to be present, it would constitute an abuse of 
discretion." Id. 80 P.2d  at 615-616.

The Oklahoma statute, similar 
to our § 1-9-101, also required that a continuance based on a lack of evidence 
or an absent witness to file affidavits in support thereof should show why such 
evidence is material, et cetera. The plaintiffs in the Beck case alleged the 
affidavit filed by defendant in support of his motion for continuance, which was 
filed the same day as the scheduled trial, was defective in that the defendant 
did not allege why his presence was necessary. The court answered such argument 
by stating:

"But, as we have already 
pointed out, the application for continuance was not predicated on the ground of 
the absence of defendant Beck as a material witness, but rather it was based 
upon his absence as a party. Therefore it was not necessary to state in the 
affidavit that defendant was a material witness nor to set out his proposed 
testimony. * * * On the other hand, in Borman v. Geib, 1923, 94 Okla. 270, 221 P. 1006, in holding that the trial court erred in denying a continuance 
requested by a party to the action, even though his affidavit was read as a 
deposition, the court said (page 1007): `A party to the litigation is entitled 
to be present to assist in the conduct of the cause. Counsel is entitled to have 
his client present for many considerations which need not be detailed here, but 
which are familiar to all courts and legal practitioners.' * * *" Id. 80 P.2d  at 
616.

[¶12.]  The same principles are applicable here. 
Although appellants were unable to file affidavits in support of their motion 
for continuance, their presence as parties to the trial was completely essential 
to the proper presentation of their case. Without their presence, appellants' 
attorney was unable to present any evidence on their 
behalf.

[¶13.]  We find the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance in this case when appellants were 
involved in another case in another state and unable to attend the 
trial.

[¶14.]  Reversed.

1 Section 1-9-101, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"(a) A motion to postpone 
the trial of a case because of the lack of evidence shall be supported by 
affidavit showing:

"(i) The materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained;

"(ii) That due diligence 
has been used to obtain the evidence; and

"(iii) Where it is 
expected the evidence may be found.

"(b) If the postponement 
is because of an absent witness, the affidavit shall also 
state:

"(i) Where the witness 
resides, if known;

"(ii) The probability of 
procuring the testimony within a reasonable time;

"(iii) That absence of 
the witness was not procured by the act or connivance of the party seeking the 
postponement, nor by others at his request or with his knowledge or 
consent;

"(iv) The facts the 
witness is expected to prove and that affiant believes the facts as stated to be 
true; and

"(v) Such facts cannot be 
proven by any other witness whose testimony can be as readily 
procured.

"(c) If the adverse party 
consents that, on the trial, the facts stated in the affidavit will be taken as 
true, if the evidence is written or documentary, or in case of an absent witness 
that the witness will testify to the facts stated in the affidavit as true, the 
trial shall not be postponed for that cause. The party against whom the evidence 
is offered may impeach the evidence of an absent witness the same as when the 
witness is present or his deposition is used."