Title: State v. Hanson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2759-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daniel H. Hanson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 330 Wis. 2d 140, 792 N.W. 2d 203 
(Ct. App. 2010-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 1, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT  
 
COUNTY: 
KENOSHA  
 
JUDGE: 
WILBUR W WARREN, III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J. concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Chad Lanning and Lanning Law Offices, LLC, West Bend, and 
Robert R. Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Rebecca Rap St. John, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP2759-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF421) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel H. Hanson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 1, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court,2 holding Daniel H. Hanson guilty 
of fleeing a traffic officer, a felony under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3) (2007-08).3  The jury found that Hanson knowingly 
                                                 
1 State v. Hanson, 2010 WI App 146, 330 Wis. 2d 140, 792 
N.W.2d 203. 
2 The Honorable Wilbur W. Warren, III of Kenosha County 
presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007–08 version unless otherwise noted.  We employ the 2007-
08 version of the statutes because there has been no intervening 
statutory change that affects this decision. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
2 
 
fled a sheriff's deputy after a traffic stop, and that Hanson's 
"willful or wanton disregard" of the officer's signal interfered 
with or endangered the officer or the public.  The jury rejected 
Hanson's self-defense claim by which he asserted that his flight 
toward a police station was motivated by his fear that the 
traffic officer would "beat" or "kill" him.  Further, Hanson 
argues that the circuit court should have admitted evidence of 
the traffic officer's character on the theory that the officer 
was a "victim" for purposes of admitting character evidence 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b).  Finally, Hanson briefly raises 
a constitutional claim that he was deprived of the right to 
present a defense, and that a new trial is warranted in the 
interest of justice. 
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court properly instructed 
the jury on the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  
Similarly, we hold that there does not exist a subjective, good-
faith 
exception 
to 
the 
fleeing 
law, 
and 
that 
Hanson's 
opportunity to demonstrate any justification for his behavior 
was through his self-defense claim, which the jury considered 
and rejected.  Additionally, we conclude that the circuit court 
was correct to exclude testimony about the traffic officer's 
alleged confrontational character because the officer was not a 
"victim" under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b).  Finally, we conclude 
that neither the Constitution nor the interest of justice 
warrants a new trial, as no constitutional infirmities have been 
raised and the real controversy has, indeed, been tried.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On the morning of June 29, 2006, Kenosha County 
Sheriff's Deputy Eric Klinkhammer was monitoring traffic on 
Interstate 94 when his speed gun registered Hanson's vehicle as 
traveling 83 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone.4  
Klinkhammer caught up with Hanson, pulled along the right side 
of Hanson's vehicle (which was in the far left lane), and 
motioned for Hanson to pull over to the right side of the 
interstate.  Klinkhammer then activated his emergency lights and 
came to a stop behind Hanson. 
¶4 
Soon 
after 
the 
vehicles 
stopped, 
but 
before 
Klinkhammer was able to get out of his squad car, Hanson exited 
his vehicle and came toward the squad car with his license in 
hand, gesticulating, and yelling at the deputy.  Using the squad 
car's PA system, Klinkhammer told Hanson multiple times to 
return to his vehicle.  When Hanson refused, the deputy got out 
of his vehicle and demanded that Hanson return to his car.  
Hanson continued to shout at Klinkhammer, pacing back and forth, 
waving 
his 
arms, 
and 
generally 
acting 
"bizarre[ly]," 
as 
Klinkhammer later testified.  Hanson continued to refuse to 
return to his vehicle until Klinkhammer extended his baton, 
                                                 
4 The morning of the incident in question, Klinkhammer had a 
"ride-along," Ms. Randi Derby, who was then an intern with the 
Kenosha County Sheriff's Department.  Derby was interested in 
pursuing a career in law enforcement and subsequently took a 
position as a dispatcher with the Brown Deer Police Department.  
Ms. Derby's account of the events largely corresponds with 
Klinkhammer's.  As stated in the record, the two had not spoken 
since the day of Ms. Derby's eventful ride-along. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
4 
 
which he displayed beside his leg, and ordered Hanson back to 
his vehicle. 
¶5 
After 
Hanson 
finally 
re-entered 
his 
vehicle, 
Klinkhammer called for backup and walked over to the passenger-
side window of Hanson's vehicle to avoid traffic passing on the 
driver's side.  The deputy asked Hanson to roll down the 
passenger-side window and provide his license.  Klinkhammer said 
that Hanson refused to immediately comply; instead he yelled 
about the violation of rights that he said Klinkhammer was 
perpetrating.  Hanson said that when he rolled down the window 
Klinkhammer took his license "very gruffly."  Randi Derby, who 
was a "ride-along" intern with Klinkhammer, said that Hanson 
"flicked" his license out the window and it fell to the ground. 
¶6 
At that point, the deputy informed Hanson that he 
would be cited for speeding.  Klinkhammer began walking back to 
his squad car, but before the deputy could finish writing the 
ticket, Hanson had again alighted from his vehicle.  Once more, 
Hanson shouted at the deputy, pacing next to the interstate, 
and, according to both Klinkhammer and Ms. Derby, behaving in a 
disturbing manner.  Hanson said that he got out of his car a 
second time to explain that he had not been speeding.  Hanson 
said Klinkhammer "screamed" at him to "Get back in the car."  
Klinkhammer said that he again extended his baton, which he 
displayed next to his leg, and ordered Hanson back to his 
vehicle.  Recognizing the tension in the situation to be rising, 
the deputy once more radioed for backup. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
5 
 
¶7 
Klinkhammer then told Hanson that he was under arrest.  
At that point, Hanson abruptly abandoned his tirade and ran to 
his car.  As Hanson entered his vehicle, Klinkhammer reached for 
Hanson and ripped Hanson's shirt as he squirmed away from the 
deputy.  Hanson locked his car door and pulled out into traffic, 
with Klinkhammer standing approximately two feet from the 
vehicle. 
¶8 
After 
escaping 
to 
his 
car, 
Hanson 
immediately 
telephoned 911 and demanded directions to the nearest police 
station because, as he said, Klinkhammer was "endangering my 
life."  As Hanson drove down the interstate, he was in constant 
communication with the 911 dispatcher who initially directed 
Hanson to pull over, after which he informed Hanson that other 
officers were on the way, and that their presence would mitigate 
any perceived threat from Klinkhammer.  After Hanson refused 
multiple requests by the dispatcher to pull over and continued 
to demand directions to the nearest police station, the 
dispatcher began guiding Hanson to the Pleasant Prairie police 
station. 
¶9 
During the course of Hanson's flight, Kenosha County 
Sheriff's Deputy Samuel Sturino joined Klinkhammer in pursuit of 
Hanson.  As Hanson exited Interstate 94, Sturino positioned his 
fully marked squad car with lights and sirens on, where Hanson 
clearly could see him, but not in such a way as to totally block 
Hanson's travel.  Hanson ignored Sturino's directions and did 
not stop.  After Hanson briefly swerved toward Sturino and 
nearly struck the squad car, the deputy quickly pulled his 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
6 
 
vehicle ahead of Hanson's to cut him off.  Hanson was forced to 
a stop at the next red light. 
¶10 After Hanson was stopped at the light, the deputies 
exited their vehicles, approached the driver's side of Hanson's 
vehicle, and ordered Hanson to exit the car; Hanson refused.  
Klinkhammer demanded multiple times that Hanson open the door 
and exit the vehicle.  He warned that if Hanson did not comply, 
Klinkhammer would break the window to open the door.  When 
Hanson refused to open his door, Klinkhammer broke the window, 
opened the door, and he and Sturino "directed [Hanson] to the 
ground." 
¶11 Hanson was initially charged with a misdemeanor under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t), for failure to stop his vehicle after 
receiving a signal from a marked police vehicle.  Well before 
trial, however, prosecutors dismissed the misdemeanor charge and 
charged Hanson under the felony fleeing and eluding statute, 
§ 346.04(3).5  Hanson claimed he fled because he feared for his 
life due to Klinkhammer's aggressive conduct.  In response to a 
motion in limine by Hanson, the circuit court held that 
testimony about Klinkhammer's alleged confrontational character 
would not be admitted.  Hanson had argued that such testimony 
was admissible on the theory that Klinkhammer was a "victim" of 
Hanson's flight for purposes of the character evidence rule, 
                                                 
5 Hanson also was charged with two counts of violating Wis. 
Stat. § 946.41(1), obstructing an officer.  Other than the 
general challenges to his conviction on grounds of evidentiary 
infirmities and on his interest of justice claim, Hanson does 
not challenge those convictions here. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
7 
 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04.  A jury found that Hanson's actions 
constituted felony fleeing under § 346.04(3), notwithstanding 
Hanson's self-defense claim, and judgment was entered on the 
jury's guilty verdict. 
¶12 On appeal, Hanson challenged the verdict on the ground 
that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly 
fled, or that he did so with "willful or wanton disregard" of 
the officers' directions or the public's safety.  Additionally, 
Hanson has argued that the circuit court erred as a matter of 
law when it excluded evidence of Klinkhammer's character.  The 
court of appeals affirmed Hanson's conviction.  Hanson petitions 
us to overturn the jury's verdict based on insufficiency of the 
evidence to prove a violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) as he 
interprets § 346.04(3) and based on his interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(1)(b).  Hanson asserts that the circuit court's 
evidentiary 
ruling 
excluding 
evidence 
of 
Klinkhammer's 
aggressive character precluded Hanson from fully presenting his 
theory 
of 
self-defense. 
 
He 
contends 
that 
this 
is 
a 
constitutional basis for reversal, as well as the basis for a 
new trial in the interest of justice. 
¶13 We granted review and now affirm the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶14 Hanson frames part of his appeal as a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  However, as a foundational matter, 
he actually is asking us to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3). 
 
Questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
8 
 
application are questions of law that we review independently.  
See State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶8, 324 Wis. 2d 586, 782 N.W.2d 
415.  Here, we are asked to interpret and apply § 346.04(3) and 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b).   
¶15 We also independently review whether the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain a jury verdict, but in so doing, we view 
the evidence most favorably to sustaining the conviction.  Tammy 
W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶17, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 
854; State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990). 
 
Finally, 
we 
independently 
review 
Hanson's 
constitutional claim as a question of law, Randy A.J. v. Norma 
I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶12, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 630, and his 
interest of justice claim in accordance with this court's 
discretion under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.   
B.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
¶16 When we engage in statutory interpretation, we focus 
on the words that the legislature chose for the statute.  Our 
task in "statutory interpretation is to determine what the 
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Statutory language is given its "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id., ¶45.  Moreover, we examine statutory language 
with the purpose of giving "reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."  Id., ¶46. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 "Context and [statutory] purpose are important in 
discerning the plain meaning of a statute."  Jensen, 324 Wis. 2d 
586, ¶15.  We favor an interpretation that fulfills the 
statute's purpose.  Id.  "Statutory interpretation involves the 
ascertainment of meaning, not a search for ambiguity."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 
28, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  
1.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.04(3) 
¶18 Based 
on 
various arguments, Hanson asserts that 
"willful 
or 
wanton," 
as 
it 
is 
employed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.04(3), requires an evil or malicious state of mind when 
disregarding the officer's direction.  He asserts his conduct 
could not satisfy the statutory standard because he fled out of 
fear that the officer would injure him. 
¶19 Our first task then is to interpret the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  Based on that interpretation, we decide 
whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that 
willful disregard of an officer's signal was sufficient to 
support a conviction under the statute and whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the jury verdict.  Additionally, we 
must determine whether the legislature's choice of language 
provided a subjective good faith defense when an individual 
charged under the statute maintains that he acted without evil 
intent or ill will.   
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.04(3) provides:  
 
No operator of a vehicle, after having received a 
visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
10 
 
marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or attempt 
to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton 
disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the 
traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, nor 
shall 
the 
operator 
increase 
the 
speed 
of 
the 
operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of the 
vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. 
¶21 We conclude that the term "willful" as used in Wis. 
Stat. § 346.04(3) is defined by examining its use within the 
context of this specific statute.  This is so because "willful 
is susceptible of different meanings in different contexts."  
State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 210, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985). 
¶22 In 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.04(3), 
"willful" 
modifies 
"disregard."  In that context, "willful" requires a subjective 
understanding by the defendant that a person known by the 
defendant to be a traffic officer has directed the defendant to 
take a particular action, and with that understanding, the 
defendant chose to act in contravention of the officer's 
direction.  Accordingly, the purpose it serves is to require 
compliance with directions made by known law enforcement 
personnel.  Furthermore, in the nearly 150 years since this 
court's decision in State v. Preston, 34 Wis. 675 (1874), our 
interpretations of the term "willful" have demonstrated that, 
contrary to Hanson's suggestion, an act done "willfully" does 
not require a showing of "personal hate or ill will."  See, 
e.g., Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d at 212.   
¶23 In Cissell, we examined the meaning of "willful" in a 
criminal context and concluded that our earlier discussion of 
the term in Preston, in which we had equated acts done 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
11 
 
"willfully" to those done with "malice," was not intended to 
impose upon "willful" a heightened intent requirement.  See 
Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d at 210-12 (examining Preston, 34 Wis. at 
683–84).  We distinguished "malice" in its colloquial sense, 
which may imply evil intent, personal hate, or ill will, and 
concluded that, in a legal sense, "malice" does not require a 
showing of anything more than criminal intent.  See id. at 212.  
¶24 Hanson asserts that the meaning of "willful or wanton" 
in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) is ambiguous, and that a synthesis of 
various dictionary definitions provides the proper guidance.  
However, Hanson's resort to dictionary definitions for the 
meaning of "willful or wanton" in § 346.04(3) will not disrupt 
the manner in which we establish the meaning of those terms.  
Rather, our precedent instructs that we look to the context in 
which a statutory term is used, Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
Most importantly, if the language of the statute is clear on its 
face, that plain meaning is applied.  See id., ¶45. 
¶25 Hanson relies heavily on this court's statement in 
Preston, 34 Wis. at 683, that the term "willfully . . . is 
undoubtedly susceptible of different shades of meaning or 
degrees of intensity according to the context and evident 
purpose of the writer."  Pointing to Preston, Hanson argues that 
the phrase "willful or wanton" in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) is 
ambiguous, and that the term should be read to require something 
more than criminal intent, such as evil intent.  As we explained 
above, we reject this interpretation of willful, as it neither 
comports with our interpretations of willful in other contexts 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
12 
 
since Preston, nor does it support the statutory purpose of 
requiring compliance with directions from known law enforcement 
personnel. 
¶26 Hanson also asserts that Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) 
includes a good faith exception, as a sort of built-in, 
subjective self-defense claim.  In effect, Hanson claims that, 
regardless of whether the jury found his actions to be 
justifiable self-defense, he could not have violated § 346.04(3) 
because he lacked the requisite scornful state of mind to 
willfully or wantonly disregard the officer's signals.  This 
argument, similar to Hanson's argument that the trial court 
erroneously interpreted § 346.04(3), is contrary to the plain 
meaning of the fleeing statute. 
¶27 Based on the conduct necessary to show a "willful" 
disregard, we decline to read Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) as 
providing a good faith exception to compliance.  The statute 
requires:  a subjective understanding by the defendant that a 
person known by the defendant to be a traffic officer has 
directed the defendant to take a particular action, and with 
that understanding, the defendant chose to act in contravention 
of the officer's direction.  This requirement does not include a 
showing that the defendant had an evil or scornful state of 
mind.   
¶28 After hearing the testimony and viewing the evidence, 
the jury was given the jury instruction, which states that to 
satisfy the statutory elements of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), the 
State must have shown that Hanson (1) "operated a motor vehicle 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
13 
 
on a highway after receiving a visual or audible signal from a 
marked police vehicle," and (2) that he "knowingly fled or 
attempted to elude a traffic officer by willful disregard of the 
visual or audible signal so as to endanger other vehicles."6  Wis 
JI—Criminal 2630 (as modified).  Further, the jury was given the 
instruction on self-defense, which requires that an alleged 
offender show:  (1) that he believed that there existed an 
actual or imminent unlawful interference with his person; (2) 
that his actions were necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference; 
and 
(3) 
that 
his 
beliefs 
were 
objectively 
reasonable. 
 
See 
 
Wis 
JI—Criminal 
800 
(self-defense 
instruction); cf. State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 210–11, 556 
N.W.2d 701 (1996) (setting out elements of self-defense claim, 
including core elements of perceived threat, necessity, and 
objective reasonability).   
¶29 The jury concluded that Hanson was not acting in self-
defense when he fled the scene of the initial stop or when he 
attempted to elude Sturino's squad car, which was in "complete 
emergency  mode."  If we were to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3) as encompassing a good faith defense, we would, in 
effect, nullify the jury's findings that Hanson's actions did 
                                                 
6 The jury instructions define "traffic officer" as "every 
officer authorized by law to direct or regulate traffic or to 
make arrests for violation of traffic regulations."  Wis JI—
Criminal 2630. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
14 
 
not qualify as self-defense.7  The jury was properly instructed 
on self-defense. 
¶30 We also conclude that the jury was properly instructed 
when it was told that a finding of willful disregard would 
satisfy the statutory requirements.  The Jury Instructions 
Committee was correct in permitting the omission of the "or 
wanton" option from the instructions for fleeing an officer, at 
least in this case.  See Wis JI—Criminal 2630 cmt. 3 (omitting 
"wanton" unless deemed necessary in a particular case).  Either 
willful or wanton disregard is sufficient to result in a 
statutory violation.  However, including wanton would have added 
nothing here because the State's case was not that Hanson acted 
in any way other than with willful disregard of Klinkhammer's 
and Sturino's signals when he drove away after being stopped by 
                                                 
7 Moreover, it is not clear what effect a good faith defense 
would have that is not already served by a self-defense claim or 
by the application of the statutory elements.  For example, if 
the subjective defense is that Hanson intended no harm, the 
statute's criminal intent requirement controls; that is, neither 
harm nor the intent to cause harm are elements of fleeing an 
officer.  Alternatively, the argument that Hanson's fear of 
Klinkhammer precludes any violation of the statutory elements 
ignores the fundamental purpose of a self-defense instruction:  
the reasonability of Hanson's fear and his actions were 
questions properly before the jury, and were answered in the 
negative. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
15 
 
Klinkhammer and refusing to stop for Sturino.8  Hanson's asserted 
good faith cannot overcome the meaning of the statute's language 
and the jury's finding that Hanson was not proceeding in self-
defense. 
¶31 We 
therefore 
turn 
to 
whether 
the 
evidence 
was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  A conviction based on 
a jury's verdict will be sustained unless "the evidence, viewed 
most 
favorably 
to 
the state and the conviction, is so 
insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as 
a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could 
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d at 501.  
This high standard translates into a 
substantial burden for a defendant seeking to have a jury's 
verdict set aside on grounds of insufficient evidence.  See 
State v. Booker, 2006 WI 79, ¶22, 292 Wis. 2d 43, 717 N.W.2d 
676. 
¶32 Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light 
most favorable to the State, we conclude that based on the 
correct interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) there was, 
indeed, sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to 
                                                 
8 The legislature's use of the disjunctive in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3) 
provides 
that 
either 
willful 
or 
wanton 
acts 
demonstrating disregard for a traffic officer's signal will 
violate 
the 
statute——a 
showing 
of 
both 
elements 
is 
not 
necessary.  This case does not require us to interpret the term 
"wanton," and we therefore conclude that Hanson's argument 
analogizing "willful or wanton" in § 346.04(3) to the phrase 
"willful and wanton" in other contexts is inapposite, based on 
the legislature's clear choice of language. 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
16 
 
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury heard 
Klinkhammer's, Hanson's, and Ms. Derby's accounts of the initial 
traffic stop and Hanson's flight from the scene, as well as the 
accounts of passersby Anthony Bowen and Deputy Sturino, who 
attempted to stop Hanson a second time.  Hanson was given the 
opportunity to present testimony of his fear during the initial 
encounter, and he discussed how overwhelming and frightening the 
entire event was for him.  The jury considered all the evidence, 
weighed it against proper legal standards, and reached findings 
that were reasonable.  We will not disturb those findings on 
review. 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(1)(b) 
¶33 Hanson also argues that the circuit court erred by 
excluding evidence of Klinkhammer's character.  Hanson sought to 
admit a school principal's testimony that, when Klinkhammer 
served 
as 
a 
school 
liaison 
officer, 
he 
demonstrated 
a 
"confrontational, 
aggressive, 
and 
hot-tempered" 
character.  
Hanson argues that Klinkhammer, as the "object" of Hanson's 
alleged crime of fleeing, was a "victim" within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b), and therefore, evidence of the 
deputy's confrontational character is admissible to show that he 
acted in conformity with that "pertinent trait of character." 
¶34 Hanson's argument requires us to interpret the meaning 
of "victim" under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b) where a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) is alleged.  This is so because, without 
a determination that an exception under § 904.04(1) applies, 
propensity evidence is inadmissible in the context of a criminal 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
17 
 
trial.  See § 904.04(1); see also State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 
768, 783, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.  Evidence of a 
person's 
character 
or 
a 
trait 
of 
the 
person's 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
that the person acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except:  . . . . 
 
(b) Character of victim. Except as provided in s. 
972.11(2), evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered 
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor. 
¶36 Typically, where a crime involves a victim, such as in 
the case of an assault or a homicide, the defendant is given 
"[w]ide latitude" to use evidence of the victim's character to 
show action "in conformity therewith."  See 7 Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Practice Series:  Wisconsin Evidence § 404.5 (3d ed. 
2008).  But as Professor Blinka notes, where no "victim" exists, 
the general ban on propensity evidence will be enforced.  See 
id.; see also Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1).     
¶37 Therefore, the precise question we must decide is 
whether, under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b) in the context of a 
fleeing charge under Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), a traffic officer 
from whom a defendant allegedly fled is a "victim" subject to 
the character evidence exception in § 904.04(1)(b).  Although 
this court has not previously examined this specific question, 
Hanson directs our attention to State v. Haase, 2006 WI App 86, 
293 Wis. 2d 322, 716 N.W.2d 526.  Hanson contends that in Haase 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
18 
 
the court of appeals held that an officer may be considered a 
"victim" for purposes of restitution under Wis. Stat. § 973.20.  
Additionally, Hanson argues briefly that, as a constitutional 
matter, his right to present a defense requires that he be 
allowed to introduce evidence of Klinkhammer's character traits.  
We will discuss these arguments in turn. 
¶38 In Haase, the circuit court had ordered the defendant 
to reimburse the Dane County Sheriff's Department for the cost 
of a squad car that was destroyed by fire after officers pursued 
the fleeing defendant across difficult terrain.  Id., ¶4.  The 
court of appeals examined three other "victim" cases in which 
restitution had been awarded, and reaffirmed what it interpreted 
as the appropriate rule in determining to whom restitution was 
due.  Id., ¶¶8–13 (examining State v. Ortiz, 2001 WI App 215, 
247 Wis. 2d 836, 634 N.W.2d 860, State v. Howard-Hastings, 218 
Wis. 2d 152, 579 N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1998), and State v. 
Schmaling, 198 Wis. 2d 756, 543 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
¶39 In Haase, the court of appeals denied restitution for 
the destruction of the department's property.  In so doing, the 
court reasoned that a "direct victim" was required for the 
recovery of restitution, and that if there were such a victim, 
it would be the individual law enforcement officers, rather than 
the sheriff's department.  Id., ¶¶14-15.   
¶40 From the reasoning of the court of appeals in Haase, 
Hanson now argues that we should superimpose the court's 
reasoning about who may be a victim from restitution law onto 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1), an evidentiary statute.  We reject this 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
19 
 
argument.  First, we conclude that neither Haase nor any of the 
other restitution cases supports the conclusion that a traffic 
officer 
is 
a 
"victim" 
for 
evidentiary 
purposes 
under 
§ 904.04(1)(b) in the context of a fleeing charge under Wis. 
Stat. § 346.04(3).   
¶41 Second, the rationale underlying interpretations of 
the term "victim" in Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is not persuasive when 
interpreting rules of evidence.  This is so because the 
principles underlying the restitution statute are different from 
the principles of relevance and prejudice upon which evidentiary 
rules are grounded.  See Blinka, supra, § 402.01.  
¶42 Restitution is not grounded in victimhood; rather, it 
is based on the criminal's destruction of property and the 
principle that an actor should not be permitted to destroy 
others' property without being held financially responsible.  
See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(2)(b) ("If a crime considered at 
sentencing resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property, the restitution order may require that the defendant 
. . . pay the owner or owner's designee the reasonable repair or 
replacement cost."); see also Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment § 40 cmt. d (2011).  Any recovery that a 
governmental entity would have is, therefore, not grounded in 
the entity's being a "victim" under § 973.20(1r).  Instead, the 
entity's recovery is based on its ownership (or status as 
designee) of the property damaged or destroyed.   
¶43 Moreover, 
admission 
of 
evidence 
of 
Klinkhammer's 
character may have been barred under Wis. Stat. § 904.03, which 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
20 
 
addresses the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence when a 
§ 904.03 objection has been made.  In such a circumstance, the 
admissibility of evidence is determined by balancing the 
probativeness of the evidence with the danger of unfair 
prejudice upon admission.  State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶129, 255 
Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413.  Here, the circuit court did not 
rule on the basis of § 904.03.  However, admission of evidence 
of the character that the deputy exhibited as a liaison officer 
would have added little to the jury's understanding of his 
actions during the traffic stop, in that it was repetitive of 
other testimony, and it likely would have confused the jury as 
to the relevant issues.  Therefore, the circuit court properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
when 
it 
excluded 
evidence 
of 
Klinkhammer's character.  
C.  Constitutional and Interest of Justice Claims 
¶44 We 
will 
briefly 
address 
Hanson's 
remaining 
constitutional 
right-to-present-a-defense 
and 
interest 
of 
justice claims, because Hanson has addressed these arguments 
only in a cursory fashion. 
¶45 The right to present a defense is grounded in 
principles of due process and confrontation, and ensures that 
criminal defendants are not deprived of legitimate opportunities 
to challenge the State's theory, and generally to present 
evidence that could create reasonable doubt in the minds of 
members of the jury.  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
294–95 (1973).  That right is limited, though, as this court and 
the United States Supreme Court have recognized.  See, e.g., 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
21 
 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (acknowledging 
limitations on constitutional right to present a defense, 
including exclusion of evidence "inadmissible under standard 
rules of evidence"); State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 646-
47, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990) (same).  As these and many other cases 
make clear, the rules of evidence generally have been held to 
comply with the constitutional right to present a defense.  
Hanson's challenge does nothing to draw those precedents into 
question.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (discussing 
exceptions to the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation).   
¶46 Finally, Hanson asks this court to order a new trial 
in the interest of justice, on the theory that the lower courts 
were not apprised of this court's decision regarding the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  We may order a new trial in the 
interest of justice when the facts or the law so requires.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06; see also State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 
159, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  Here, because we affirm the prior 
courts' decisions as to the meaning of that statute, there 
appears no reason to permit Hanson to present his case to 
another jury.  The interest of justice would be ill-served by 
such an order. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶47 We conclude that the circuit court properly instructed 
the jury on the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  
Similarly, we hold that there does not exist a subjective, good-
faith 
exception 
to 
the 
fleeing 
law, 
and 
that 
Hanson's 
No. 
2008AP2759-CR   
 
22 
 
opportunity to demonstrate any justification for his behavior 
was through his self-defense claim, which the jury considered 
and rejected.  Additionally, we conclude that the circuit court 
was correct to exclude testimony about the traffic officer's 
alleged confrontational character because the officer was not a 
"victim" under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(1)(b).  Finally, we conclude 
that neither the Constitution nor the interest of justice 
warrants a new trial, as no constitutional infirmities have been 
raised and the real controversy has, indeed, been tried.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Although I 
agree with the majority that Hanson is not entitled to a new 
trial, I write separately because I am concerned that the 
majority's discussion of willfulness may be misconstrued in 
future cases.  
¶49 The majority begins its statutory interpretation with 
a correct statement of the law.  It acknowledges that "willful 
is susceptible of different meanings in different contexts."  
Majority op., ¶21.  It determines that "the term willful as used 
in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) is defined by examining its use within 
the context of this specific statute."  Id. 
¶50 Later, however, the majority appears to paint with a 
broader brush.  It rejects Hanson's proposed interpretation of 
the term willful, as used in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), because "it 
neither comports with our interpretation of willful in other 
contexts since Preston, nor does it support the statutory 
purpose of requiring compliance with directions from known law 
enforcement personnel."  Id., ¶25.   
¶51 This statement could be construed to imply that this 
court has uniformly interpreted the term "willful" since State 
v. Preston, 34 Wis. 675 (1874).   Such an implication would be 
incorrect.  In Cissell, a case that post-dated Preston by 90 
years, this court stated: "As a general proposition, the word 
willful cannot be defined without reference to its use in a 
specific statute.  In [Preston], we specifically noted that 
willful is susceptible of different meanings in different 
contexts."  State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 210, 378 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
N.W.2d 691 (1985).  We have stressed that the term "willful" is 
ambiguous, and that no single definition of willful will be 
applicable in all statutes.  Dep't Transp. v. Wis. Auto. & Truck 
Dealers Assn., 111 Wis. 2d 80, 87, 330 N.W.2d 159 (1983).1     
¶52 Despite my concerns with the majority's analysis, I 
agree with its ultimate conclusion in this case.  Here, Hanson 
had his day in court.  The jury was instructed that it must 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that "[t]he defendant knowingly 
fled or attempted to elude a traffic officer by willful 
disregard of the visual or audible signal so as to endanger 
other vehicles."  Hanson did not object to the instruction.   
¶53 In presenting his theory of self-defense, Hanson was 
afforded the opportunity to prove that he was justified in 
disregarding the officer's signal.  In finding Hanson guilty, 
                                                 
1 Additionally, the majority confuses the standard of 
review.  It states that an appellate court "independently 
review[s] whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury 
verdict, but in so doing, we view the evidence most favorably to 
sustaining the conviction."  Majority op., ¶15.  This stated 
standard is contrary to our well-established precedent.  See 
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) 
(concluding that an appellate court should not review the 
evidence independently, because doing so would usurp the 
function of the trier of fact).  Also, this standard is self-
contradictory. 
 
How 
can 
a 
court 
review 
the 
evidence 
"independently" and, at the same time, "most favorably to 
sustaining the conviction"?     
Later in the opinion, the majority sets forth the correct 
standard of review.  Majority op., ¶31 (quoting Poellinger, 153 
Wis. 2d at 501) ("A conviction based on a jury's verdict will be 
sustained unless 'the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
state and the conviction, is so insufficient in probative value 
and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier 
of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'").    
No.  2008AP2759-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
the jury considered and rejected Hanson's assertion that his 
action was justified.  Accordingly, like the majority, I 
conclude that Hanson is not entitled to a new trial.     
 
 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I dissent 
because the majority opinion reads the words "willful or wanton" 
out of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).  Additionally, the majority 
presents an imbalanced fact section, relying primarily on the 
law enforcement officer's version of the events rather than 
telling the whole story.  The majority's statement of the facts 
seems like a subtle attempt to make the legal reasoning more 
persuasive.  I begin by discussing the statute and then try to 
present the defendant's version of the events so that the reader 
gets a more balanced statement of the facts.  
I 
¶55 The defendant was charged with felony fleeing an 
officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), which provides 
as follows:    
No operator of a vehicle, after having received a 
visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or 
marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or attempt 
to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton 
disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the 
traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, nor 
shall 
the 
operator 
increase 
the 
speed 
of 
the 
operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of the 
vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee. (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶56 The statute is difficult to read.  The commas almost 
seem to have been dropped into the text at random, making the 
last "nor" clause especially hard to understand in relation to 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
the rest of the subsection.1  Moreover, there are two different 
scienters.  The statute uses the word "knowingly" and also uses 
the phrase "willful or wanton."  None of these words is defined 
in the statute or in the jury instructions.       
¶57 What is clear in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), however, is 
that the legislature explicitly included the words "willful or 
wanton" preceding, and thus modifying, the words "disregard of 
such [visual or audible] signal."2  The words "willful or wanton" 
cannot be disregarded.  Statutes are to be read to give effect 
to every word; surplusage is to be avoided.3 
¶58 Furthermore, the phrase takes on special importance in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), which sets forth three levels of fleeing 
offenses.  The statute defining felony fleeing, § 346.04(3), 
uses the phrase "willful or wanton."  This phrase is omitted in 
§ 346.04(2t), the statute defining misdemeanor fleeing, and is 
also omitted in § 346.04(1) and (2), the statutes defining a 
civil forfeiture.4  The three levels of fleeing offenses in Wis. 
Stat. § 346.04 reflect the legislature's intent to graduate the 
penalties based on the gravity of the fleeing offense.  The 
                                                 
1 For a published decision of the court of appeals involving 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.04(3), 
the 
proper 
instructions, and the sufficiency of evidence, see State v. 
Beamon, 2011 WI App 131, 336 Wis. 2d 438, 804 N.W.2d 706 (pet. 
for review filed). 
2 The word "knowingly" precedes and thus modifies the words 
"flee or attempt to elude." 
3 Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 2006 WI 68, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 
718 N.W.2d 38. 
4 The penalties are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.17. 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
phrase "willful or wanton" cannot be ignored in light of the 
legislative scheme of graduated penalties.5 
¶59 A heightened mental state is one factor that clearly 
separates felony feeing from the misdemeanor and civil offenses 
in Wis. Stat. § 364.04.6  Yet the jury was not instructed about 
the meaning of the word "willful."  Further, the pattern Jury 
Instructions for Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) declare that "wanton" 
"does not add anything substantial to the offense"7 and simply 
remove 
the 
words 
"or 
wanton" 
entirely 
from 
the 
jury's 
                                                 
5 For further discussion of the statutory history of the 
graduated penalties, see ¶¶76-80, infra. 
6 There are other differences as well.  The misdemeanor is 
defined as follows: "No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visible or audible signal to stop his or her vehicle 
from a traffic officer or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly 
resist the traffic officer by failing to stop his or her vehicle 
as 
promptly 
as 
safety 
reasonably 
permits." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.04(2t).  The felony statute requires fleeing or attempting 
to elude, as opposed to "resisting."  The felony statute also 
requires some sort of aggravated physical circumstances that are 
absent from the misdemeanor statute, that is, endangerment or 
interference 
with 
other 
vehicles, 
increasing 
speed, 
or 
extinguishing lights.  Thus, a heightened mental state is not 
the only factor that distinguishes misdemeanor from felony 
fleeing, but it should not be ignored. 
7 Wis JI——Criminal 2630, note 3. 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
consideration.8  Putting aside the appropriateness of ordinarily 
removing "or wanton" from the jury instructions entirely, I 
focus on the meaning of "willful."  The jury did not receive any 
instructions about the meaning of "willful," which is an element 
of the offense.  The parties argue the meaning of the word in 
the present case as a matter of law.  
¶60 The State argues that "willful" is synonymous with 
"knowing."  Thus the State views the word as redundant and 
believes the jury was properly instructed.   
¶61 The majority opinion, ¶¶22 and 27, defines "willful" 
as requiring "a subjective understanding by the defendant that a 
person known by the defendant to be a traffic officer has 
directed the defendant to take a particular action, and with 
that understanding, the defendant chose to act in contravention 
of the officer's direction."  Without saying so, the majority 
essentially 
holds 
that 
"willful" 
is 
synonymous 
with 
the 
                                                 
8 Jury instructions often include factual alternatives 
parenthetically, giving circuit courts the option to remove 
those that are irrelevant, but here "or wanton" was deleted 
entirely.  A footnote suggests that circuit courts can insert it 
when necessary, but the assumption is that "or wanton" has 
little or no meaning and will rarely, if ever, be included.  
This treatment of "wanton" is problematic because it ignores the 
plain language of the statute.  It is also problematic because 
"or wanton" helps give meaning to "willful."  Why should the 
Jury Instructions Committee assume that one of the potential 
required mental states is irrelevant?  A jury should know that 
the statute requires "willful or wanton" conduct and should be 
instructed on the meaning of those words.  The jury should then 
decide whether a defendant's conduct satisfies either.  
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
legislature's definition of the word "intentional" in the 
criminal code.9  
¶62 The 
majority's 
approach——equating 
"willful" 
with 
"intentional"——is 
immediately 
suspect 
because 
had 
the 
legislature 
meant 
for 
the 
scienter 
requirement 
to 
be 
"intentional," it would have used the word "intentional."  The 
majority's approach of equating "willful" with "intentional" 
seems particularly flimsy when the word "willful" stands next to 
the word "wanton" in the statute.  The positioning of these two 
words provides a clue that "willful" might require some sort of 
heightened mental state beyond merely "intentional."    
¶63 The defendant argues that "willful" disregard of an 
officer's signal requires more than knowledge or intent to act.  
"Willful," according to the defendant, requires a heightened 
intent requirement; it requires a purpose to do wrong without 
just cause or without a justifiable excuse.10  The defendant 
urges that a person's reason for disregarding the officer's 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23(3) defines the word "intentional" 
as used in chapters 939 to 951 (the criminal code) to mean that 
the "actor either has a purpose to do the thing . . . or is 
aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause 
that result."  The crime at issue is not part of chapters 939 to 
951. 
10 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 
14.  The defendant's brief at 15-16 argues:  "Willful or wanton 
disregard, as used in § 346.04(3), unambiguously encompasses not 
merely the knowing failure to comply with an officer's signal to 
stop, but a knowing scorn or flouting of the officer's signal 
with indifference to the results or some type of evil intent 
beyond the mere failure to comply.  In other words, in this 
Court's language in Preston, []'evil intent without justifiable 
excuse.'" 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
signal makes a difference under the statute and that he had just 
cause for disregarding the officer's signal.  The defendant 
asserts that his honest concern for his personal safety was just 
cause or a justifiable excuse, even though the jury determined 
that his belief in the need for self defense was not objectively 
reasonable.  The defendant testified that Klinkhammer, the law 
enforcement officer, had already beaten him and he feared that 
the officer would beat him again or kill him.   
¶64 The word "willful" has given courts difficulty over 
the years and still causes problems for courts.11  The word is 
frequently viewed as ambiguous.  Indeed, in a 1983 case the 
court characterized "willful" as "pregnant with ambiguity"12 and 
as "inherently ambiguous."13  No single definition of "willful" 
necessarily fits all statutes.  When a criminal statute is 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity tells us to interpret the statute 
in favor of the criminal defendant.  See, e.g., State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 59, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  In the 
present case, the rule of lenity would direct that the word 
"willful" 
means 
a 
heightened 
mental 
state 
beyond 
merely 
intentional disregard of an officer's signal.  The majority 
opinion adopts the opposite approach, selecting an undemanding 
definition of "willful."  
                                                 
11 See generally Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: 
The Meaning of "Willful" and the Demands of Due Process, 28 
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 397, 407-09 (1995). 
12 DOT v. Transp. Comm'n, 111 Wis. 2d 80, 88-89, 330 
N.W.2d 159 (1983). 
13 DOT, 111 Wis. 2d at 90. 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶65 Not only does the majority select a definition of 
"willful" that is problematic given the plain text, the context, 
and the rule of lenity, but it also selectively chooses 
precedent and then misapplies its chosen precedent to suggest 
that the defendant's preferred definition of "willful" is 
inappropriate.   
¶66 The majority correctly states that the word "willful 
is susceptible of different meanings in different contexts," 
majority op. ¶21 (quoting State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 
210, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985)).  However, the majority opinion 
appears to determine incorrectly that Cissell's conclusion 
(i.e., that "willful" can mean "intentional") applies to all 
statutes and that Cissell's analysis of "willful" cannot coexist 
with State v. Preston, 34 Wis. 675 (1874).  See majority op., 
¶¶22-25, in which the majority treats "precedent since Preston" 
as rejecting Preston.  According to the majority at ¶25, the 
defendant's definition of "willful" does not "comport[] with our 
interpretations of willful in other contexts since Preston."  
The majority errs. 
¶67 The only precedent the majority cites for its position 
that "willful" is the equivalent of "intentional" is Cissell, 
and that is slim precedent indeed compared to the multitude of 
earlier 
cases 
defining 
"willful" 
differently 
in 
various 
contexts.   
¶68 The Cissell court carefully defined the issue before 
it as "whether willful requires proof of a different state of 
mind than intentional when both terms are used in the two 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
criminal statutes under consideration."  Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d at 
211.  The Cissell court then answered the question with regard 
to these statutes, stating that although one statute used the 
word "willfully" and the other "intentionally," the two words in 
the two statutes (both governing neglecting or failing to 
support a child) carried the same meaning.   
¶69 In contrast to Cissell, the statute at issue in the 
present case does not use both "willful" and "intentional" as 
the statutes in the Cissell case did.  The application of 
Cissell to the present case is questionable.    
¶70 Further, it is inexplicable how the majority leaps 
from 
Cissell's 
determination 
that 
"willful" 
can 
mean 
"intentional" in one statutory context to a conclusion that the 
defendant's definition of "willful" is incorrect in the context 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3). 
¶71 Cissell is not, as the majority opinion would have you 
believe, the seminal case on the definition of "willful." 
¶72 Cissell is a sound case.  It seems sensible that in 
certain contexts "willful" means "intentional."14  "Willful" may, 
however, also mean something other than "intentional," as the 
Preston court explained long ago.  In 1983, the court reaffirmed 
                                                 
14 The legislature has shown, however, that it knows the 
difference between "willful" and "intentional."  See Legislative 
Council Note to § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979 (stating that the 
revision of the contempt of court statute removed the words 
"'wilful and intentional' in the definition [of contempt and 
substituted] . . . the 
word 
'intentional' . . . because 
the 
council believe[d] that although conduct must be intentional to 
constitute 
contempt, 
the 
higher 
standard 
of 
'wilful' 
is 
inappropriate" (emphasis added)).  
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
Preston, declaring that "Preston makes clear that there is no 
one and certain meaning that can be ascribed to 'wilful' which 
will in all cases convey its meaning."15  
¶73 Wisconsin case law demonstrates that the majority 
opinion, ¶25, misstates our precedent when it claims that the 
defendant's interpretation of willful does not "comport[] with 
our interpretations of willful in other contexts since Preston."   
¶74 Diverse authorities support the notion that the word 
"willful" has different meanings in different contexts, just as 
the Cissell and Preston courts declared.  "Willful" may require 
an "evil" intent.16  "Willful" may mean an intent to do a 
wrongful act.17  "Willful" may also mean, as the defendant urges, 
                                                 
15 DOT, 111 Wis. 2d at 87. 
16 See, e.g., Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, ¶19, 260 
Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 289 (holding that an exception to 
sovereign immunity that refers to "malicious and willful 
conduct . . . should only apply to ill-intentioned acts, as 
opposed to all 'intentional' actions"); Brown v. State, 137 Wis. 
543, 549, 119 N.W. 338, 340 (1909) (holding that "willfully," 
"when 
used 
to 
describe 
acts 
which 
shall 
be 
punished 
criminally . . . includes, in addition to mere purpose to do the 
act, a purpose to do wrong . . . involv[ing] evil intent or 
legal malice, according to the great weight of authority"); see 
also 15 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 239 (1926) ("'Wilful' includes, in 
addition to mere purpose to do [the] act, purpose to do wrong, 
and involves evil intent or legal malice.").  
17 See, e.g., Century Shopping Ctr. Fund I v. Crivello, 156 
Wis. 2d 227, 238, 456 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
one who acts willfully "acts volitionally and with intent to 
accomplish the unlawful result").   
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
the purpose to do a wrongful act without just cause or without a 
justifiable excuse.18  I conclude this latter meaning of 
"willful" is used in Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3).    
¶75 This meaning comports with the statutory history and 
statutory purpose of Wis. Stat. § 346.04 as a whole.  The 
majority opinion zeroes in on protecting the public from unsafe 
driving and fostering cooperation with law enforcement and 
argues that its reading of "willful" will further these goals.  
But by solely emphasizing this purpose to define "willful," the 
majority ignores the text and context of the statute and the 
legislature's creation of a three-tiered structure of fleeing 
offenses. 
¶76 The statutory history supports my interpretation of 
the word "willful."  Wisconsin § 346.04(1), enacted in 1957 Laws 
                                                                                                                                                             
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a similar 
definition of "willful" on at least one occasion.  See Ratzlaf 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994) ("To establish that a 
defendant "willfully violat[ed]" [a] law, the Government must 
prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct 
was unlawful." (emphasis added)).  A later statutory revision 
eliminated the requirement of willful violation.  See United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 (3d Cir. 1995).  
See also Black's Law Dictionary 1737 (9th ed. 2009) (noting 
that it has been said repeatedly that willful means only 
intentionally or purposely, but that "it has been stated with 
equal repetition and insistence that the requirement added by 
such a word is not satisfied unless there is a bad purpose or 
evil intent"). 
18 See First Bank Se., N.A. v. Bentkowski, 138 Wis. 2d 283, 
290 & n.2, 405 N.W.2d 764 (1987) (recognizing that "[a]n 
intentional act is not necessarily a wilful one" and that courts 
have held that willful "connotes the intentional doing of a 
harmful or unreasonable act without just cause or excuse").  
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
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of Wisconsin ch. 260, § 1, set forth a non-criminal forfeiture 
for the failure to obey "any lawful order, signal or direction 
from a traffic officer."   
¶77 Section 346.04(3), a misdemeanor statute, was first 
enacted in 1965.  See 1965 Laws of Wisconsin ch. 187, §§ 2, 3.  
This law provided as follows: 
346.04(3) No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visual or audible signal from a traffic 
officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly 
flee or attempt to elude any traffic officer by wilful 
or wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere 
with or endanger the operation of the police vehicle, 
or 
the 
traffic 
officer 
or 
other 
vehicles 
or 
pedestrians, nor shall he increase the speed of his 
vehicle or extinguish the lights of his vehicle in an 
attempt to elude or flee.   
¶78 In 1994, the Legislature increased the penalty for a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) from a misdemeanor to a 
felony.  1993 Laws of Wisconsin, ch. 189, § 1.  This change in 
penalty was explained by the Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study 
Committee Final Report, Part II.D.4.d., at 57 (Aug. 31, 1999), 
as follows:  
Until 1994 an act of fleeing that did not result in 
injury or property damage was a misdemeanor offense.  
In that year the misdemeanor was elevated to a 2-year 
felony.  Doubtless this occurred because some fleeing 
episodes, though not resulting in injury or property 
damage, nonetheless pose great threats to the safety 
of officers and others and thus deserve felony 
treatment.  
¶79 Changing Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) to a felony left a gap 
between the civil forfeiture and the felony.  The Criminal 
Penalties Study Committee recommended the gap be filled, 
observing that "[s]ome episodes are short, don't involve high 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
speed, do not seriously compromise public safety."  The Criminal 
Studies Committee concluded that "a misdemeanor fleeing offense 
should be incorporated into the fleeing statute for use in those 
cases when the defendant's behavior is appropriately addressed 
with a conviction other than at the felony level."19   
¶80 The misdemeanor statute, § 346.04(2t), was created in 
2001 Wis. Act 109, §§ 443, 445, to read as follows: 
346.04(2t) No operator of a vehicle, after having 
received a visible or audible signal to stop his or 
her vehicle from a traffic officer or marked police 
vehicle, shall knowingly resist the traffic officer by 
failing to stop his or her vehicle as promptly as 
safety reasonably permits. 
¶81 This three-tiered penalty structure——civil forfeiture, 
misdemeanor, and felony——shows that the legislature's purpose 
was not only to protect the public and foster cooperation with 
law enforcement, but also to achieve those goals while carefully 
distinguishing between varying degrees of culpability among 
offenders.  The legislature intended to reserve felony charges 
for the most culpable offenders, that is, for those who flee by 
willful or wanton disregard of a signal from an officer, and 
reading "willful" to require more than intentionality serves the 
purpose of graduated penalty for increasingly serious offenses.  
My interpretation of "willful" supports the importance of 
protecting the public and fostering cooperation with law 
enforcement without ignoring the statutory history and the 
                                                 
19 See State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee 
Final Report at 57 (Aug. 31, 1999). 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
legislature's creation of a three tiered structure of fleeing 
offenses.   
¶82 The defendant did not have the opportunity to convince 
the jury that he subjectively, honestly believed that he had 
just cause to disregard the officer's signal, even though the 
just cause was not objectively reasonable to support a finding 
of self-defense.  The majority thinks that all that the statute 
required was that the defendant had the opportunity to convince 
the jury that self-defense was objectively reasonable.  I 
disagree.     
¶83 The 
majority 
opinion 
fails 
to 
comprehend 
the 
difference between self-defense which has both a subjective and 
an objective component20 and the element of "willful" in the 
statute that has only a subjective component.  See majority op. 
¶29, n.7.   
¶84 The error here is that the jury was not given an 
opportunity to consider the evidence using the proper legal 
standards.  In this context, the error prevented the real 
controversy from being fully tried.  I would therefore reverse 
the conviction and order a new trial. 
II 
¶85 The majority omits almost entirely the defendant's 
version of the events in an effort to portray the defendant as 
bizarre, frightening, and irrational, and the law enforcement 
officer as cool-headed.  I set forth details, including those 
from the defendant's side of the story, in order to provide a 
                                                 
20 See Wis JI——Criminal 800 (2001). 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
more complete narrative of what the jury heard.21  Additionally, 
I highlight a few differences in the testimony of key witnesses, 
which undermine to some extent the majority's claim that the 
testimony of the State's key witnesses, Deputy Sheriff Eric 
Klinkhammer and Randi Derby, "largely corresponds."  See 
majority op., ¶3 n.4.  
¶86 There 
were 
three 
witnesses 
to 
begin 
with—-the 
defendant, Deputy Eric Klinkhammer, a law enforcement officer, 
and Randi Derby, an intern ride-along.  As the majority notes, 
Klinkhammer did not initiate the traffic stop by activating his 
lights.  Rather, he pulled next to the defendant's vehicle and 
motioned with his hand for the defendant to pull over.  The 
defendant testified that Klinkhammer drove beside him for about 
three minutes before "forcefully" gesturing for him to pull 
over, which he did immediately.  Klinkhammer testified that he 
activated his lights as he pulled behind the defendant and the 
defendant began to pull over.  The defendant, however, testified 
that he was stopped only by the deputy's hand motion.  
¶87 After both vehicles came to a complete stop, the 
defendant exited his vehicle with his driver's license in hand.  
Klinkhammer indicated that he used a PA microphone to tell the 
defendant three times to get back in his car, to no avail.  
Derby's initial statement did not refer to use of a PA system.  
At trial, however, she testified that Klinkhammer used the PA 
and that perhaps the defendant did not hear the PA because of 
                                                 
21 Some of the narrative is taken verbatim from the 
defendant's opening brief to this court.  
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
the traffic.  The defendant testified that Klinkhammer did not 
use a PA system.  
¶88 All agreed that Klinkhammer then exited the squad car 
and approached the defendant, telling him to get back into his 
car.  The defendant testified that it was Klinkhammer who was 
immediately "screaming at the top of his lungs. . . . 'Get back 
in the car,' really loudly and very frighteningly."  The 
defendant said he was just trying to give Klinkhammer his 
license and the deputy started "screaming bloody murder."  
Klinkhammer extended his baton.  The defendant said that the 
situation was disorienting and confusing.  He thought it was 
unusual that he was stopped with a hand motion and not lights.  
¶89 Derby testified that although she could not hear 
anything, Klinkhammer was gesturing "get back in your car" and 
the defendant appeared angry and seemed to be saying "just take 
[my] driver's license."  She did not describe the defendant as 
acting bizarrely. 
¶90 The defendant stated that he did not believe he looked 
like a threat.  He had his driver's license in his hand, both 
hands in plain view and was dressed professionally.  The 
defendant testified that he could not remember how many times he 
was told to get into his vehicle but that as soon as he realized 
that the deputy would not take his license and was angry, he got 
back in his car.   
¶91 Derby testified that while Klinkhammer was walking 
back to the squad car with the license, the defendant exited his 
vehicle a second time.  Klinkhammer originally testified to 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
these same facts.  Later, however, he admitted that it was not 
until he had entered his squad car and had begun writing the 
ticket that the defendant exited his vehicle the second time.  
¶92 The defendant testified that while he wished he had 
not, he did exit a second time to ask why he was pulled over and 
other basic questions.  The deputy then immediately started 
screaming again at the top of his lungs, "Get back in the car."  
The defendant said they did have a brief conversation in which 
Klinkhammer claimed the defendant had been speeding, although 
the defendant believed he had been driving only a little over 65 
and slower than several cars that had passed him.  Klinkhammer 
again displayed the baton and the defendant started back to his 
car.  The defendant testified that Klinkhammer did not at that 
point tell him he was under arrest.   
¶93 All agreed that as the defendant approached his car, 
Klinkhammer pursued him and grabbed the defendant's shoulder.  
The defendant's shirt was ripped as he attempted to get in his 
car and Klinkhammer grabbed him.  
¶94 The defendant further testified that as he was 
following 
the 
deputy's 
direction 
to 
return 
to 
his 
car, 
Klinkhammer grabbed him and struck him in the back of the head 
with the baton.   
¶95 Once in his car, the defendant testified that he was 
really frightened and immediately called 911.  He testified that 
he carefully drove away and began asking the 911 operator for 
directions to the nearest police station because he wanted to 
turn himself in to someone other than Klinkhammer, whom the 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
defendant believed was a threat to his physical safety.  The 911 
operator urged the defendant to pull over and told him that he 
was creating a dangerous situation.  Eventually the 911 operator 
started directing the defendant to a police station. 
¶96 There 
are 
conflicting 
statements 
regarding 
the 
defendant's driving after exiting I-94.  Klinkhammer testified 
for the first time on redirect that the defendant endangered a 
vehicle as he exited the interstate at Highway 50.  Derby 
testified that the defendant "drove his vehicle between two 
vehicles trying to maneuver through traffic" at the end of the 
off ramp.  In contrast, Klinkhammer observed no such maneuvers 
at the end of the ramp.    
¶97 Derby testified that the defendant would have struck a 
second squad car parked at the bottom of the off ramp if the 
defendant had not stopped, but he did and then went around it.  
On cross-examination, Derby admitted that her initial written 
statement noted that the defendant stopped at the bottom of the 
off ramp for 'a minute, then drove around the squad car.'  Both 
Klinkhammer and the defendant also testified that the defendant 
stopped at the bottom of the ramp. 
¶98 Deputy Sturino, who drove a second squad car, then 
testified that the next intersection was so clogged with traffic 
that the defendant had to stop.  However, he also claimed that 
he stopped the defendant short of the intersection by pulling 
his squad in front of the defendant's vehicle.  Conversely, 
Klinkhammer and the defendant testified that the defendant was 
the first person in line at the next stoplight. 
No.  2008AP2759-CR.ssa 
 
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¶99 As the defendant was stopped at the second red light, 
the law enforcement officers surrounded his vehicle and exited 
their squad cars with guns drawn.  The defendant was still on 
the phone with 911 at the time.  Although the officers claimed 
that they ordered the defendant out of his car several times and 
warned him that they would break his window if he did not 
comply, the 911 tape does not pick up any commands from the 
officers prior to Klinkhammer breaking the defendant's car 
window with his baton and pulling him from the vehicle. 
* * * * 
¶100 As I noted at the outset, the majority presents a 
skewed version of the facts in what seems like a subtle attempt 
to make its legal reasoning more persuasive.  I try to present 
the defendant's side of the story so readers are aware of what 
the jury actually heard.  Although the jury was not persuaded by 
the defendant's claim of self-defense, his version of the facts 
could support his claim that he had an honest, subjective belief 
that concern for his personal safety was just cause for his 
flight to the police station, and that his conduct was not 
"willful" disregard of the officer's signal.  The jury might 
believe the defendant or might conclude the defendant was hoping 
to game the system.  Had the jury been properly instructed, it 
could have made this decision.   
¶101 Because the jury was not given an opportunity to 
decide the appropriate legal issues in the present case, I 
dissent.
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