Title: Swann v. Marks

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES M. SWANN 
 
v.   Record No. 951761 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                       September 13, 1996 
STEVEN L. MARKS, ESQ., 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, ETC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
In this personal injury action, we consider whether a motion 
for judgment filed against the "estate" of a deceased person 
tolls the statute of limitations, and whether substitution of the 
personal representative for the "estate" is the correction of a 
misnomer under Code § 8.01-6. 
 
On March 29, 1990, James M. Swann was injured when the 
automobile in which he was riding was involved in an accident 
with another vehicle driven by William L. Wild, a resident of 
Delaware.  Wild died on January 18, 1991, from causes unrelated 
to the accident.  Swann learned of Wild's death in July 1992, and 
on December 18, 1992, filed a motion for judgment against "Estate 
of William L. Wild."
1  Almost two years later, on October 5, 
1994, Steven L. Marks qualified as the personal representative of 
Wild's Estate. 
 
On February 3, 1995, a number of events happened.  In an ex 
parte proceeding, Swann was allowed to amend his pleading and 
substitute Steven L. Marks, personal representative of the estate 
                     
    
1Swann had filed a motion for judgment on February 5, 1992, 
naming William L. Wild as the defendant.  No further action was 
taken on that motion for judgment, and it is not involved in 
this appeal. 
 
of William L. Wild, for the named defendant "Estate of William L. 
Wild."  The trial court's order indicates that the substitution 
was "to correct [a] misnomer" and that it related back to the 
filing date of the original pleading pursuant to Code § 8.01-6.  
Following the entry of this order, Swann asked for and was 
granted a nonsuit.  An hour later Swann refiled his motion for 
judgment naming "Steven L. Marks, Esq., Personal Representative 
of the Estate of William L. Wild and as Administrator C.T.A. of 
This Estate" as the defendant.  
 
Marks filed a special plea asserting that the refiled suit 
was barred by the statute of limitations.  Following a hearing 
and further proceedings, the trial court granted Marks' plea and 
dismissed Swann's motion for judgment.  We awarded Swann an 
appeal. 
 
Swann argues that his action is not barred by the statute of 
limitations because the filing of the motion for judgment against 
the "Estate of William L. Wild" was timely and tolled the statute 
of limitations; that the substitution of Marks was the correction 
of a misnomer under Code § 8.01-6; that the nonsuit was properly 
granted; and that the nonsuit order was a final judgment 
precluding reconsideration of those issues in the refiled suit.  
Swann's arguments are grounded on the proposition that a motion 
for judgment against the "estate" of a deceased person is valid 
and tolls the statute of limitations.  Because this premise is 
erroneous, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
The statute of limitations period for Swann's personal 
injury action would have expired on March 29, 1992, two years 
after the accident.  Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(a) provides, however, 
that when a party against whom a personal action may be brought 
dies before the suit is commenced, the suit will be considered 
timely if it is filed "within one year after the qualification" 
of the decedent's personal representative.  The provisions of 
§ 8.01-229(B)(6) in effect at the times relevant here, provided 
that, if the personal representative qualified more than one year 
after the death, the personal representative was "deemed to have 
qualified on the last day" of the one year period extending the 
limitations period.  Applying these provisions to the facts of 
this case, Marks is deemed to have qualified as personal 
representative on January 18, 1992, and the limitations period 
was extended until January 18, 1993.  Thus, Swann's motion for 
judgment pending on that date, the action against the "Estate of 
William L. Wild," must qualify as a valid action to avoid the 
statute of limitations bar.  
 
Marks contends that suit against an "estate" is a nullity 
and cannot toll the statute of limitations.  We agree.  To toll 
the statute of limitations, a suit must be filed against a proper 
party.  Virginia statutes do not authorize an action against an 
"estate."  Code §§ 8.01-229(B)(1) and (B)(2) direct the 
decedent's personal representative to file any personal action 
which the decedent may have been entitled to bring and to defend 
any personal action which could be brought against the decedent. 
 This limitation is further highlighted by the language of the 
statute which allows claims to be filed against the property of 
the estate, but provides that actions may only be filed against 
the decedent's personal representative.  Code §§ 8.01-229(B)(2) 
and (B)(4).  This statutory scheme is consistent with the 
principle that "suits and actions must be prosecuted by and 
against living parties."  Rennolds v. Williams, 147 Va. 196, 198, 
136 S.E. 597, 597 (1927).
2  A motion for judgment against an 
"estate" is a nullity and cannot toll the statute of limitations. 
 
Furthermore, the substitution of a personal representative 
for the "estate" is not the correction of a misnomer.  Misnomer 
arises when the right person is incorrectly named, not where the 
wrong defendant is named.  Rockwell v. Allman, 211 Va. 560, 561, 
179 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1971).  The personal representative of a 
decedent and the decedent's "estate" are two separate entities; 
the personal representative is a living individual while the 
"estate" is a collection of property.  Thus, one cannot be 
substituted for another under the concept of correcting a 
misnomer. 
 
Swann also contends that the trial court erred because the 
nonsuit order was a final order, and therefore the order allowing 
substitution was not subject to modification in the refiled 
action.  To challenge the substitution order, Swann contends that 
Marks was required to appeal the nonsuit order.  A nonsuit order, 
however, is ordinarily not considered a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal.  McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 32, 458 
                     
    
2 Swann erroneously cites McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 458 
S.E.2d 759 (1995), for the proposition that a suit against a 
dead person is not a nullity.  In that case, the plaintiff's 
suit was filed against a living person within the statute of 
limitations period.  Id. at 29, 458 S.E.2d at 760.  
S.E.2d 759, 761 (1995).  A nonsuit order is a final, appealable 
order only when a dispute exists regarding the propriety of 
granting the nonsuit.  Id.  Here, there is no dispute as to the 
entry of the nonsuit order.  The nonsuit order is not a final 
judgment as to the substitution order and did not clothe the 
substitution order with the force of res judicata.  Thus, the 
trial court's consideration of Marks' special plea of the statute 
of limitations, including consideration of the substitution 
order, was proper.  
 
For the reasons expressed, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.