Title: LUCERO v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LUCERO v. STATE2000 WY 21114 P.3d 920Case Number: 99-101Decided: 12/22/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
PABLO LUCERO, Appellant 
(Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel; and Jason McLaren, Student Extern.Representing 
Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan 
Elrod, Assistant Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The novel 
issue presented by Pablo Lucero (Lucero) in this case arises out of the failure, 
due to an electronic error in the court reporter's Stenograph machine, to 
preserve the jury instruction conference as part of the record. Lucero contends 
that the loss of the transcript of the jury instruction conference precludes 
judicial review of his claim that the district court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury on the statutory definition of the phrase "serious bodily 
injury." As additional issues, Lucero claims that the failure to instruct on the 
statutory definition of "serious bodily injury" is reversible error, that the 
State did not prove one of the elements of the charged offense, aggravated 
assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) (Lexis 
1999),1 by sufficient evidence, and that 
the prosecutor committed misconduct by implying the existence of facts that were 
not established for the jury. None of the asserted errors provide any 
justification for reversal, and we affirm the Judgment and Sentence entered in 
the district court.

[¶2] Lucero's 
appellate brief includes this statement of the issues:

ISSUE 
I

Whether the lack of a 
complete record mandates that appellant[§]s conviction should be 
reversed?

ISSUE 
II

Whether the trial court 
erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the statutory definition of an 
essential element of the criminal offense for which appellant was 
charged?

ISSUE 
III

Whether the appellant's 
conviction can stand when the State failed to prove an essential element of the 
crime?

ISSUE 
IV

Whether prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred when the prosecutor implied knowledge that was not available 
to the jury?

[¶3] The State 
presents this statement of the issues:

I. Is the record in 
Appellant's case entirely sufficient to prove the district court did not err in 
failing to instruct the jury on the definition of "serious bodily 
injury"?

II. Was the evidence 
presented in Appellant's case sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated 
assault and battery?

III. Was there 
prosecutorial misconduct in Appellant's case and did the district court abuse 
its discretion?

[¶4] On March 
21, 1998, at the end of his workday, Lucero returned to the apartment he shared 
with a roommate in Cheyenne. When he arrived he found that his roommate was 
entertaining several guests, who were drinking and playing dominoes. Lucero was 
unhappy with the impromptu party, and quarreled with his roommate. When the 
victim attempted to intervene in the quarrel to diffuse the situation, Lucero 
struck him with his fists, knocking him to the floor. Lucero was wearing his 
steel-toed work boots, and he then kicked the victim in the head and chest 
before leaving the apartment.

[¶5] The victim 
was taken to the hospital where it was determined that his jaw and nose were 
broken. In addition, the victim lost all of his upper teeth, and required two 
hours of surgery to repair the bone that had once supported 
them.

[¶6] Lucero was 
charged with aggravated assault and battery, and he pled not guilty. At trial, 
which commenced on August 10, 1998, he was convicted of the charged offense. 
Lucero appeals the Judgment and Sentence of the district 
court.

[¶7] Relying 
upon our decision in Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1990), Lucero asserts 
that we must reverse his conviction and order a new trial because the transcript 
of the jury instruction conference is not available. He asserts that we cannot 
effectively review his claim that error was committed in instructing the jury 
because he cannot support by the record his offer of an instruction on the 
statutory definition of "serious bodily injury." It is clear that no such 
instruction was given. In Bearpaw, we held that without transcripts of opening 
statements, jury voir dire and selection, the reading from a transcript of an 
in-custody interview, the instruction conference, and closing arguments, we 
could not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 78. We 
incorporated in our ruling language from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit:

See, likewise, the rule 
that a mandatory requirement for the court reporter to record all proceedings in 
a criminal case establishes a principle which cannot be overridden by any local 
practice, United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1977). That court, 
in quoting United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977), 
emphasized that "`[w]hen . . . a criminal defendant is represented on appeal by 
counsel other than the attorney at trial, the absence of a substantial and 
significant portion . . . of the record' will result in a presumption of 
prejudice sufficient to mandate reversal * * *." Brumley, 560 F.2d  at 
1281.

Bearpaw, 803 P.2d  at 79 (emphasis added).

[¶8] This case 
is distinguishable from Bearpaw because the lack of the missing transcript does 
not frustrate our review of Lucero's claim of error in failing to instruct the 
jury on the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury." See Candelaria v. 
State, 895 P.2d 434, 438 (Wyo. 1995). We assume, arguendo, that Lucero properly 
proffered the instruction he claims was necessary, and lodged a timely objection 
to its refusal, but we discern no error on the part of the district court. 
Because the missing transcript, whatever its contents, could not demonstrate 
that the refusal to give Lucero's proposed instruction was error, the absence of 
a transcript is no impediment to judicial review. The transcript, therefore, is 
not "`a substantial and significant portion . . . of the record, §" and its 
unavailability does not mandate reversal and a new trial. Bearpaw, 803 P.2d  at 
79 (quoting United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268, 1281 (5th Cir. 
1977)).

[¶9] Lucero 
contends that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the 
statutory definition of the phrase "serious bodily injury." Our standard of 
review for claimed errors in instructing the jury is:

We afford significant 
deference to the trial court in instructing the jury:

"[T]he trial judge is 
afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and 
reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a 
whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the 
issues."

Scadden v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 1987), followed in Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 1997).

Streitmatter v. 
State, 981 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶10] The 
district court instructed the jury that it should not convict Lucero unless it 
found that he caused bodily injury to the victim with a deadly weapon. The 
district court provided these statutory definitions2 of the elements of the 
offense:

"Deadly weapon" means but 
is not limited to a firearm, explosive or incendiary material, motorized 
vehicle, an animal or other device, instrument, material or substance, which in 
the manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably capable of 
producing death or serious bodily injury.

"Bodily injury" means 
physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical 
condition.

[¶11] Lucero 
claims that he offered an instruction on the definition of "serious bodily 
injury" which the district court refused. Although no such instruction is 
included in the refused instructions in the record, we will assume that one was 
presented and refused. The language Lucero claims was necessary also comes 
directly from the statute:

"Serious bodily injury" 
means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 
miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-104(a)(x) (Michie 1997).

[¶12] Jurors 
must be instructed on the technical legal meaning of a word or phrase when that 
meaning is so different from the ordinary meaning that the jury could 
misunderstand the meaning of the phrase. Streitmatter, 981 P.2d  at 925; Compton 
v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1997). We recently held, 
however:

In this case, the 
district court gave the statutory definitions for those terms that were elements 
of the charged offense. Wilson contends, however, that error must be found for 
the failure to give as an instruction the statutory definition for a term that 
is used in the statutory definition of one of the elements. The full phrase in 
the definition of a deadly weapon is "reasonably capable of producing death or 
serious bodily injury[.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(iv). The definition of 
serious bodily injury that Wilson requested would have duplicated the term 
"death" included in the instruction defining "deadly weapon." In the context of 
the charged offense, which requires only bodily injury as an element, the 
requested instruction had a definite potential for confusing the jury. As used 
in the definition of a deadly weapon, the term "serious bodily injury" does not 
have "a technical legal meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the 
jury, without further explanation, would misunderstand its import in relation to 
the factual circumstances." Compton, 931 P.2d  at 941. We conclude that the 
decision to give or refuse an instruction on the statutory definition of a term 
used in defining an element of an offense is within the latitude afforded to the 
district court to tailor the instructions to the circumstances of the case. No 
error occurred in the refusal of the district court to give this proffered 
instruction.

[¶13] Wilson v. 
State, ___ P.2d ___, ___, slip op. at 5 (Wyo. 2000) (No. 99-162, published 
12/22/00). The rule of Wilson is that the standard articulated in Streitmatter 
and Compton does not require a jury instruction on the statutory meaning of 
"serious bodily injury." The injuries inflicted by Lucero were much more serious 
than the injuries described in Wilson, and obviously amounted to "serious bodily 
injury" under any possible definition of that term. No error would exist if this 
record did demonstrate the request for such an instruction, and in this instance 
the absence of that portion of the record constitutes harmless 
error.

[¶14] Lucero's 
argument on his third issue addresses the element of causation in the charged 
offense. The district court instructed the jury that:

The elements of the crime 
of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in this case, 
are:

1. On or about the 21st 
day of March, 1998, in Laramie County;

2. The Defendant, Pablo 
Lucero;

3. Intentionally and 
Knowingly caused;

4. Bodily injury to [the 
victim];

5. With a deadly 
weapon.

[¶15] (Emphasis 
added.) Appropriately, Lucero does not dispute that his steel-toed boots can be 
considered deadly weapons. See Warren v. State, 835 P.2d 304, 308 (Wyo. 1992) 
(soft shoes held to be deadly weapons as used) and Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 782 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984) (victim killed with 
hand-held boot). Instead, the thrust of Lucero's argument is that his boots were 
the deadly weapon allegedly used, but the State did not prove that any of the 
victim's injuries were inflicted with the boots. He concludes, therefore, that 
the State failed to prove an element of the offense, and his conviction cannot 
stand.

[¶16] When 
reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we assume that the evidence favoring 
the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful 
party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference 
that we may reasonably draw from the evidence. Wentworth v. State, 975 P.2d 22, 
25 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670, 678 (1935)). 
The State presented several photographs that graphically depicted the victim's 
injuries. A physician testified that those injuries "corresponded" with a report 
he received that the victim had been "struck and kicked multiple times about the 
face and head * * *." Another prosecution witness testified that Lucero kicked 
the victim ten to twenty times in the head and chest. A witness for the defense 
testified that Lucero kicked the victim once. Lucero initially told police that 
he had kicked the victim once in the head and once in the chest. The jury also 
heard testimony that blood and skin were found on the toes of Lucero's boots, 
and that some of the blood matched the victim's blood type. Viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State, the graphic evidence presented is more than 
adequate to support a conclusion that Lucero caused bodily injury to the victim 
by kicking him with steel-toed boots. We hold that sufficient evidence supports 
Lucero's conviction of aggravated assault and battery.

[¶17] In his 
final assignment of error, Lucero challenges the district court's denial of his 
motion for a mistrial, which was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Our 
review of the denial of a mistrial motion stemming from alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct is conducted under our abuse of discretion standard. Capshaw v. 
State, 958 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1998). We have said that, in applying the 
standard:

We perceive the core of 
our inquiry as reaching the question of reasonableness of the choice made by the 
trial court. Henceforth, we will turn to a definition adopted in Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), in which we said:

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶18] The 
prosecutor's conduct to which Lucero takes exception occurred during the State's 
cross-examination of Lucero when the following exchange took 
place:

Q. But you fought after 
that?

A. I've had to fight, but 
I've never started a fight.

Q. Well, can you account 
for 50 disturbances before the city?

[¶19] Lucero's 
trial counsel immediately objected, and the district court held a hearing 
outside the presence of the jurors. The State argued that Lucero's claim that he 
never started a fight opened the door for impeachment with his record of 
involvement in fifty-one disturbances in which police officers were summoned, 
including nine assaults on police officers. The district court ruled that the 
State could ask Lucero about those incidents, but could not introduce extrinsic 
evidence of them.

[¶20] Lucero 
insists that the State's cross-examination was improper impeachment under W.R.E. 
609(a). That rule, however, governs the admissibility of evidence that a witness 
has been convicted of a crime. The prosecuting attorney did not ask about 
convictions, and W.R.E. 609(a) is inapplicable here. The only evidentiary rule 
mentioned by the district court in deciding the issue was W.R.E. 403, which 
provides that otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice * * *." The 
prosecuting attorney was engaged in cross-examination designed to provide a 
foundation for impeachment if Lucero denied such incidents. The district court's 
ruling reasonably balanced the State's right to impeach Lucero's claim that he 
never started a fight with Lucero's right to have unfairly prejudicial evidence 
excluded. The district court's ruling was reasonable under the circumstances, in 
accord with Vaughn, and we hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.

[¶21] Lucero has 
not sustained his burden of demonstrating reversible error resulting from any of 
the issues presented for review. We affirm the Judgment and Sentence of the 
district court in all respects.

Footnotes

1 In 
pertinent part, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) 
provides:

(a) A person 
is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

* * 
*

(ii) 
Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon[.]

2 These 
definitions are taken from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a) (Michie 1997), which 
provides, in pertinent part:

(a) As used 
in W.S. 6-1-101 through 6-10-203 unless otherwise 
defined:

(i) "Bodily 
injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical 
condition;

* * 
*

(iv) "Deadly 
weapon" means but is not limited to a firearm, explosive or incendiary material, 
motorized vehicle, an animal or other device, instrument, material or substance, 
which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably capable 
of producing death or serious bodily injury[.]