Title: Arner v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Arner v. State1994 WY 40872 P.2d 100Case Number: 93-69Decided: 04/01/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Dennis 
ARNER,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
J. Krampner and Donald L. Fuller (argued), Casper.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., and D. 
Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Dennis Joseph 
Arner (Arner) was convicted of two counts of obtaining property by false 
pretenses and now appeals claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that 
the prosecution's questioning of Arner concerning a prior felony conviction 
amounted to plain error.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Arner phrases the 
issues as follows: 

I. 
Was appellant denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel's 
failure to voir dire, introduction of otherwise inadmissable "bad acts" 
evidence, failure to object to the prosecutor's introduction of evidence which 
was inadmissable under Rule 609, W.R.E., failure to request a limiting 
instruction, and failure to object to the prosecutor's attempt to shift the 
burden of proof to the defense?

II. 
Was the prosecutor's questioning of the appellant about the details of a prior 
conviction plain error requiring reversal?

FACTS

[¶4]      On the morning of 
December 8, 1991, Dennis Arner discovered that two of his cars, a van and a 
sedan, and his garage had been broken into sometime the previous night. He 
contacted the police, and Officer Platt of the Casper Police Department was 
dispatched to Arner's home. Arner showed Officer Platt that the thieves had 
unsuccessfully attempted to take his van's stereo by removing the knobs and 
faceplate from the stereo. At that time, when asked if anything was missing from 
the two cars and the garage, Arner did not report anything stolen. Officer Platt 
filled out a report and told Arner to contact the department if he discovered 
anything missing.

[¶5]      According to his 
testimony, soon after Officer Platt departed that morning, Arner noticed that a 
shelf in the garage was dislodged and discovered that his snowblower and 
acetylene torch were missing. Arner did not notify the police about these 
missing items for a number of months. However, that same day, Arner telephoned 
his insurance agent and reported the items stolen. On advice from his insurance 
agent, Arner prepared a written list of the items stolen and their replacement 
value and delivered the list to his agent. On December 10, 1991, Arner's 
insurance agent issued Arner a check for his claim on the stolen snowblower and 
acetylene torch. Arner further testified that, after he cashed the insurance 
check, he purchased a new snowblower from Ideal Lawnmower Shop for 
$700.00.

[¶6]      Several weeks 
later, on the morning of December 28, 1991, Arner discovered that his van and 
garage had again been burglarized. The police were summoned, and Officer Butler 
was dispatched to Arner's home. This time the van was damaged more severely and, 
according to Arner, his new snowblower, four tires and wheels, two snowmobile 
helmets, a radial saw, and a television and video recorder/player (VCR) were all 
missing. Arner contacted his insurance agent that same day to report the second 
burglary, and the agent turned the claim over to a claims adjuster in 
Casper.

[¶7]      On December 30, 
1991, Arner filled out an inventory form describing the items allegedly stolen 
during the second break-in and gave a taped statement to the claims adjuster in 
Casper. The inventory form listed a snowblower, RCA brand VCR ac/dc adaptable, a 
television, Uniroyal tires, snowmobile helmets, a radial saw, and chrome wheels 
and hubs. During the taped statement, Arner described the items as 
follows:

Okay, 
there was a Toro snowthrowing, 4.5 horsepower, model number 38180, I have an 
appraisal from Ideal Lawnmower Shop for replacement of 
599.95[.]

* 
* * * * *

Yes, 
it was brand new, it never had oil and gas in it. An RCA VCR, that's ac 
adaptable for use in vehicle, unknown model number, it can be purchased at Radio 
Shack for 199.95[.]

* 
* * * * *

[A] 
small Sony [television], 6 [inches.]

* 
* * * * *

Okay 
there were a set of wheels and tires that I exchange over from summer to winter 
on the van, Uniroyal Radial Tigerpaws, purchased at Plains Tire and Battery, 
this summer of 91[.]

* 
* * * * *

The 
wheels were American Racing Chrome Wheels, they were purchased at the same time 
as the tires[.]

* 
* * * * *

Uh, 
two snowmobile helmets, the model number or anything like that I can't get, they 
were purchased at K-Mart, uh, $75.00 a piece[.]

On 
January 3, 1992, based on this interview and the written inventory, the claims 
adjuster issued Arner a check for coverage of the snowblower, television, VCR 
and the radial saw, all allegedly taken during the second 
burglary.

[¶8]      Ironically, also 
on December 30, 1991, Detective Burnett with the Casper Police Department began 
questioning several teenagers concerning numerous recent burglaries, including 
the two Arner burglaries. Three of the teenagers admitted to a number of thefts 
and break-ins including the Arner burglaries. All three were involved in the 
first Arner burglary, and one of the three, plus a fourth, admitted committing 
the second Arner burglary. Detective Burnett questioned the teenagers about the 
items stolen during the burglaries. Each of the teenagers related similar 
accounts of their actions during the first Arner burglary in early December 
1991, and the two teenagers involved in the second Arner Burglary in late 
December 1991, also gave similar stories to Detective 
Burnett.

[¶9]      At Arner's trial, 
all three of the admitted burglars related the same accounts of their actions 
during the first Arner burglary. Each testified that during the first Arner 
burglary: (1) they were on foot and did not have a car, (2) that Arner's garage 
door was open, (3) that they tried to take the stereo from Arner's van but could 
only remove the knobs and faceplate, (4) that one of them took a cassette tape 
but in the process knocked a number of other tapes on the floor which caused 
enough noise to scare them off, and (5) that they did not take a snowblower or 
welding equipment. Only one of the teenagers involved in the second Arner 
burglary testified at Arner's trial, and he stated that he and another teenager 
took only the stereo from Arner's van, the amplifier and several speakers. He 
specifically denied taking the new snowblower, VCR, television, or the tires and 
wheels and stated that the Arner's garage door was closed during this second 
burglary.

[¶10]   Sometime in the middle of January, 
1992, Detective Burnett and another Casper police officer spoke with Arner at 
his home. In that conversation, Arner described the items he alleged were taken 
during the second December burglary, and he stated that he had filed a claim 
with his insurance for these items. After this conversation, Detective Burnett 
inquired with Ideal Lawnmower Shop, where Arner purportedly purchased the new 
snowblower after the first burglary, and Plains Tire and Battery, where Arner 
claimed to have purchased the new tires and wheels which were allegedly taken 
during the second burglary. Neither of these retailers could locate records of 
the purported snowblower or tire and wheel sales to Arner; thus, on February 25, 
1992, Detective Burnett contacted Arner again for more information on the 
snowblower and the tires and wheels.

[¶11]   On February 27, Detective Burnett 
visited and questioned both Arner's insurance agent and the insurance adjuster. 
At that time, Detective Burnett first learned that Arner had filed a claim after 
the first burglary for items which were not yet reported stolen by Arner. After 
this meeting with the insurance representatives, Detective Burnett continued his 
investigation until Arner was arrested in late May, 1992. On November 4, 1992, a 
jury convicted Arner of two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, 
from which he now appeals.

DISCUSSION

[¶12]   In this appeal, Arner first argues 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney 
failed to conduct a proper voir dire, failed to properly handle the admission of 
evidence of a prior conviction and of a prior "bad act" and failed to object to 
allegedly improper prosecutorial questioning. In his second assertion, Arner 
argues that the admission of certain evidence surrounding his prior drug 
trafficking conviction was plain error.

A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[¶13]   Our method for reviewing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is firmly established and is comprehensively 
described in the following passage: 

The 
standard with respect to effective assistance of counsel requires the criminal 
defense to satisfy two criteria:

First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.

Strickland 
v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984).

* 
* * * * *

We 
examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in 
determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case. Strickland; Gist 
[v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo. 1987)]. We do not evaluate the efforts of 
counsel from a perspective of hindsight but, rather, we endeavor to reconstruct 
the circumstances surrounding counsel's challenged conduct and evaluate the 
professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time. 
Strickland. "We invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within the bounds of 
reasonable professional judgment." Gist, 737 P.2d  at 342 (citations 
omitted). The burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in 
light of the circumstances, the challenged action or failure of the attorney 
might be considered sound trial strategy. 
Strickland.

Dickeson 
v. State, 
843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶14]   Our first step is to determine 
whether Arner has demonstrated that his counsel's performance fell outside the 
"ambit of professionally competent assistance." Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 
609. Arner, in his brief, rests his claim of ineffective assistance on the trial 
transcript which often is sufficient in itself with no necessity of an 
evidentiary hearing under Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶15]   In his first claim of ineffective 
assistance, Arner asserts that his trial counsel failed to conduct adequate voir 
dire. During voir dire Arner's trial counsel posed very few questions to the 
potential jurors despite several jurors acknowledging relationships with police 
officers involved in Arner's case. Simply because a potential juror is related 
to or acquainted with a police officer involved in the investigation of the case 
does not establish per se bias. See Walter v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 309, 311 (W.D.Okla. 1974); State ex rel. Boso v. Hedrick, 391 S.E.2d 614, 
619 (W. Va. 1990) (effective assistance of counsel was afforded where defense 
counsel failed to further question potential jurors who acknowledged 
relationship with law enforcement because there was no proof of the jurors' bias 
and judge asked sua sponte further probing questions). In both instances in this 
case where potential jurors acknowledged their relationship to law enforcement, 
the trial judge asked each juror a series of questions concerning his or her 
ability to be impartial. Neither of the potential jurors demonstrated any bias 
in answering those questions. Without more, we cannot conclude that Arner's 
counsel's failure to further question these jurors fell below the line of 
professionally competent assistance.

[¶16]   Arner also complains that his trial 
attorney's general lack of questioning at voir dire amounted to ineffective 
assistance. The trial judge asked a number of questions of the potential jury 
which provided significant information. The trial judge questioned the potential 
jurors about pretrial publicity, experiences or relationships with all the 
parties involved, experiences with the criminal justice system, and experiences 
with insurance claims and the insurance industry. The information elicited by 
the trial judge's questioning was sufficient for Arner's trial counsel to 
utilize his challenges, four of which he exercised properly. See State v. 
Sanchez, 98 N.M. 781, 784, 652 P.2d 1232, 1235 (App. 1982) (criminal 
defendant not denied effective assistance of counsel where counsel did not ask 
many questions at voir dire because trial judge's and State's questioning were 
sufficiently revealing).

[¶17]   Voir dire and the exercise of 
challenging jurors is trial strategy. Stover v. State, 674 P.2d 566, 568 
(Okla. Cr.App. 1984) (citing Walter, 386 F. Supp. 309). In Jahnke v. 
State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984), while addressing the process and purpose of 
voir dire, we quoted the United States Supreme Court:

"`Impartiality 
is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of 
this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no 
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial 
formula.'" Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. [162] at 172, 70 S.Ct. [519] 
at 523, 94 L. Ed. 734 [(1950)], quoting from United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-146, 57 S. Ct. 177, 185[, 81 L. Ed. 78] 
(1936).

Jahnke, 
682 P.2d  at 999. Because voir dire questioning techniques are diverse, any 
alleged voir dire error must be egregious and obvious in order to fall below the 
line of competence. Having determined that Arner's trial counsel's actions at 
voir dire do not fall outside the realm of competent assistance, we need not 
address whether any prejudice resulted from the alleged voir dire 
errors.

[¶18]   Arner next asserts that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel inquired into a 
prior civil suit in which Arner was sued by a former employer. He also complains 
that his trial counsel failed to confront the prosecution's questioning of Arner 
concerning a prior conviction for distributing cocaine.

[¶19]   On direct exam of Arner, his 
counsel questioned him concerning a civil suit involving franchise fees, which 
had previously been filed against Arner by his former employer and then 
dismissed. Arner argues that the only possible strategy that his counsel could 
have had in introducing this evidence was to cushion the blow of it being 
introduced by the prosecution. He complains that the strategy (if it was a 
strategy) was misguided because the evidence was clearly inadmissible. The State 
suggests that Arner's trial counsel may have been trying to bolster Arner's 
credibility by demonstrating his honesty in admitting this prior civil suit or 
that his counsel wanted to show the jury that Arner had prevailed in a prior 
action. We do not know precisely why Arner's trial counsel questioned Arner 
about this prior civil suit but each of the potential reasons suggested by Arner 
and the State is plausible. It is a legitimate trial tactic to have a criminal 
defendant, who takes the stand, discuss his or her prior bad acts which may 
arise in cross-examination. Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 368 (Wyo. 
1986). Arner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial 
counsel was deficient when he questioned Arner concerning the prior civil suit, 
therefore we cannot conclude that it was ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

[¶20]   On cross-examination of Arner, the 
prosecution introduced evidence concerning Arner's 1985 conviction for dealing 
cocaine. The damaging testimony occurred as follows:

Q. 
But, Mr. Arner, you yourself are a convicted cocaine dealer, you were convicted 
in 1985 of three felony counts of distribution of cocaine.

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
And you never got off probation until 1989, is that 
correct?

A. 
I don't recall exactly when I got off probation, I was on probation for that, 
yes, and I served probation and I was cleared and waiting for my 
discharge.

Q. 
They discharged you from probation in 1989 after you had some difficulty paying 
restitution, four years to pay your restitution. Is that 
correct?

A. 
That could be, yes, I raised children by myself, I was divorced and had 
struggled at times. 

Q. 
So from that I gather, Mr. Arner, that you in your life had not been adverse to 
making money illegally.

A. 
Excuse me.

Q. 
You were apparently not adverse to making money from illegal 
methods.

A. 
I don't think [I] ever stated what I did with my mistakes in drugs were for 
money profiting, Mr. [Prosecutor].

Q. 
Four different sales in three different months, the last one for $600, and 
wasn't for money?

A. 
That is correct.

Arner's 
counsel did nothing to combat this potentially damaging evidence. He did not 
attempt to (1) "cushion the blow" by having Arner voluntarily discuss this prior 
conviction on direct, (2) limit the scope of the prosecution's questioning 
through an objection or through a request for a limiting instruction, or (3) 
have the court determine, pretrial, whether the evidence was admissible. It was 
as if he was unaware of the prior conviction.

[¶21]   In a similar situation, a Missouri 
Court of Appeals, applying the two-part Strickland test, held that effective 
assistance of counsel was denied, in part, because the convicted defendant's 
trial counsel failed to object when the prosecutor introduced evidence of prior 
convictions and evidence of uncharged illegal drug use. Kenner v. State, 
709 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App. 1986). That court stated:

The 
law concerning the admissibility of crimes other than those for which a 
defendant is on trial is very basic and not obscure. The knowledge of this 
principle or the acquisition thereof along with actions reasonably taken in 
accordance with that knowledge are within the expected standard of an attorney 
defending a person accused of a crime.

Id., 
at 539. We agree with this statement. Both W.R.E. 404 and 609 directly address 
the admissibility of prior convictions and have been the subject of innumerable 
opinions published by this court. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 531-33 (Wyo. 1993) (W.R.E. 404); Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 
1271-72 (Wyo. 1991) (W.R.E. 609).

[¶22]   There appears to be no strategic or 
tactical reason for the failure of Arner's trial counsel to confront this prior 
drug conviction. If he was conceding admissibility, why did he not "cushion the 
blow" by raising the conviction on direct, ask for a limiting instruction, 
and/or object when the prosecutor appeared to exceed the bounds of the 
admissibility of the evidence? See, e.g., Robinson, 716 P.2d  at 368; 
Gentry, 806 P.2d  at 1271 ("cushioning the blow" as a legitimate trial 
tactic); see also W.R.E. 104 and 105, and Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 812 (Wyo. 1980) (when timely requested, a limiting instruction should 
be given when evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by the accused are 
admitted), and see W.R.E. 609, and Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1163 n. 3 (Wyo. 1981) (limiting the scope of evidence of prior convictions 
under W.R.E. 609). On the other hand, if he was contesting admissibility, why 
not file a pretrial motion? If he was unaware of the prior conviction, was it 
not his duty to discover the conviction through reasonable investigation? See 
In the Interest of LDO, 858 P.2d 553, 557 (Wyo. 1993). The record does not 
answer these questions, and without questioning Arner's trial counsel, neither 
can we. Because, however, the record does reflect that Arner's trial counsel 
appeared to have no strategy at all, other than simply to ignore the evidence of 
a prior drug distribution conviction and hope that the jury did the same, we 
must hold that he failed to perform within the bounds of professional 
competence.

[¶23]   However, in applying the second 
prong of the Strickland test, we hold that Arner has not met his burden of 
proving prejudice. Arner is required to demonstrate "`a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.'" Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 611-12 (citing Frias v. State, 
722 P.2d 135, 147 (Wyo. 1986)). In Arner's best case scenario, the evidence of 
his prior conviction for cocaine distribution would have been held inadmissible 
either pretrial or through an objection during the trial, and the jury would 
never have known of his prior conviction. Without that evidence, however, the 
prosecution presented substantial evidence to support Arner's 
conviction.

[¶24]   Wyoming Statute 6-3-407, of which 
Arner was convicted, provides:

(a) 
A person who knowingly obtains property from another person by false pretenses 
with intent to defraud the person is guilty of:

(i) 
A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more[.]

In 
order to demonstrate a violation of § 6-3-407(a), the State had to establish the 
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) 
the pretenses;

(2) 
their falsity;

(3) 
the fact of obtaining property by reason of the pretenses;

(4) 
the knowledge of the accused of their falsity; and

(5) 
the intent to defraud.

Lopez 
v. State, 
788 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Wyo. 1990). Both elements (1) and (3) involving the 
pretenses were undisputed at trial; Arner admits he filed these insurance claims 
and that he obtained property - money - based on those 
claims.

[¶25]   The evidence demonstrating falsity 
of the pretenses, Arner's knowledge of that falsity, and his intent to defraud 
the insurance company was circumstantial yet substantial. Arner's first 
insurance claim stated that his snowblower and acetylene torch were stolen from 
his garage. To demonstrate that those claims of loss were false, that Arner knew 
they were false, and that Arner intended to defraud his insurance company, the 
prosecution provided: (1) testimony by the three admitted burglars stating, 
consistently, that they took only a cassette tape during the first burglary, (2) 
testimony by Arner that he did not report the allegedly stolen snowblower or 
acetylene torch to the police until after he became aware that he was being 
investigated despite the fact that he reported the same items stolen to his 
insurance agent the day he reported the burglary, and (3) testimony by Arner's 
insurance agent that Arner never provided any documentation for the alleged 
missing items to substantiate this claim, as was requested by the 
agent.

[¶26]   In his second insurance claim, 
Arner alleged that his new snowblower, purchased after the first burglary in 
early December, along with several other items were stolen. In an attempt to 
substantiate that he had purchased a new snowblower, Arner repeatedly asserted 
that he had purchased it from the Ideal Lawnmower Shop. At trial, the 
prosecution called the owner of Ideal Lawnmower Shop as a witness, and he 
testified that he kept meticulous records of the sales of snowblowers and that 
based on those records Arner did not purchase a new snowblower from that shop 
during the time Arner said he did. That testimony, plus the claim report Arner 
signed and filed stating that the snowblower was stolen, were strong evidence 
that Arner knew the second insurance claim was false and that he intended to 
defraud his insurance company. In addition, there was testimony from which the 
jury could infer that the VCR, the tires and wheels and the snowmobile helmets 
were not stolen during the second burglary nor ever 
existed.

[¶27]   In addition, as the State suggests, 
Arner's lengthy, confusing and often contradictory testimony was ample to 
discredit his story, which was, after all, the essence of the case. For example, 
Arner, on direct exam, testified initially that his radial saw was taken during 
the first burglary but then, after his trial counsel showed Arner his insurance 
claim letter, he changed his testimony and stated that the saw was taken during 
the second burglary. Arner's trial counsel's failure to do anything about the 
evidence concerning Arner's prior conviction was not prejudicial because the 
State presented substantial other evidence to support its 
case.

[¶28]   Arner also asserts that his trial 
counsel's failure to object when the prosecutor allegedly shifted the burden of 
proof to Arner was ineffective assistance. The questioning which Arner asserts 
was improper involved the testimony of the insurance claims adjuster who handled 
Arner's second insurance claim, and proceeded as follows: 

Q. 
And RCA VCR, you also gave coverage on that of approximately 127. What is the 
item in column 13?

A. 
That is the amount we hold until he actually replaces the items, his replacement 
cost on policy we pay him actual cash value up front, and what he actually 
replaces we include the amount.

Q. 
Did he ever prove that he purchased that item for 
$35?

A. 
No.

* 
* * * * *

Q. 
Now you indicated in Column 13 of Exhibit 8 that he was eligible for certain 
benefits totalling $139.35 upon showing replacement of those various items. 
Has he ever sent you any proof he has replaced any of those 
items?

A. 
No, he hasn't.

Q. 
Did he provide any receipt or documentation for any of the items listed in the 
claim?

A. 
No.

Q. 
Did you ask him for such items?

A. 
Yes. [emphasis added]

Arner 
argues: (1) the highlighted questions suggested to the jury that Arner had to 
prove his innocence and (2) that type of questioning is improper, and failure to 
object is ineffective assistance under Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶29]   In Stephens, we reversed 
Stephens' conviction for indecent liberties because several experts improperly 
testified that they believed Stephens was guilty. Id., at 76. Because 
that case was being remanded for potential retrial, we also addressed several 
issues which we thought might arise again during the second trial. Id. 
One of the issues we addressed as a service to the lower court but not as part 
of the reasoning for reversal, was an issue concerning the denial of the 
presumption of innocence through prosecutorial questioning. Id., at 
74-76. In dicta, we advised that the prosecutor's questions, asking Stephens why 
he had not pursued the molester of his child since Stephens testified that he 
was not the culprit, were improper and that Stephens' trial counsel was remiss 
in failing to object to these questions.

[¶30]   What occurred at Arner's trial is 
easily distinguishable. Arner, as the insured in his insurance claim, was 
required to prove to the insurer his replacement cost; and the fact that he did 
not tender proof of these replacement costs was probative of the falsity of his 
insurance claims. The testimony is clear that any proof which Arner may have 
needed to provide involved his insurance claims and had nothing to do with the 
State's burden in this criminal case. The failure of Arner's trial counsel to 
object to this line of questioning about proving replacement cost for an 
insurance claim was not ineffective assistance of counsel.

B. 
Plain Error

[¶31]   Arner argues separately that the 
trial court committed plain error by not limiting the prosecutor's questioning 
of Arner concerning his prior conviction for cocaine distribution. We will not 
find plain error unless it is demonstrated

that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law has been violated; a substantial right has 
been denied to [Arner]; and, as a result [Arner] has been materially 
prejudiced.

Farbotnik 
v. State, 
850 P.2d 594, 604 (Wyo. 1993). As we previously discussed when addressing 
Arner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Arner was not materially 
prejudiced by the evidence concerning his prior drug distribution conviction 
because it is not reasonably possible that Arner would have received a more 
favorable verdict if the evidence had been excluded. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988).

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   Arner has failed to demonstrate 
that his trial counsel's performance amounted to ineffective assistance of 
counsel and that the trial court committed plain error by not curtailing the 
prosecution's questioning concerning Arner's prior 
conviction.

[¶33]   We affirm.