Title: Mason v. Lynch

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 24
September Term, 2003
_________________________________________
CATHY MASON
v.
CHAUNCEY R. LYNCH
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        *Eldridge 
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
                Bell, C.J. and Raker, J., dissent
        
______________________________________
Filed:   July 15, 2005
* Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1
The Woodrow Wilson Bridge, which is part of Interstate Route 95, spans the Potomac River in
basically an east/west direction, and provides a road connection between the States of Maryland and
Virginia.  Most of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge is in Maryland, although small portions of the
Bridge, at the western end, are in the District of Columbia and in Virginia.  
In the Circuit Court, the plaintiff took the position that the accident occurred in Virginia.  The
(continued...)
The petition for a writ of certiorari in this negligence tort action presented a
single question as follows:
“In a personal injury case arising from a motor vehicle accident,
may a defendant place in evidence photographs showing minimal
property damage and argue [in closing argument to the jury] that
the photographs support an inference that the plaintiff was not
injured, absent expert testimony establishing a correlation between
property damage and personal injury?”
We granted the petition and shall hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the
admissibility of the photographs was within the trial judge’s discretion and that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion.  We shall further hold, in light of the admission of
the photographs and other evidence, that the closing argument by defendant’s counsel
was not improper.
I.
The motor vehicle accident giving rise to this tort suit occurred at the western
end of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, in the eastbound lanes, as the parties were
traveling from Virginia to Maryland.1  The accident involved three motor vehicles in
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1
(...continued)
plaintiff filed a notice of her intention to rely on “foreign law” and requested jury instructions based
on Virginia’s substantive tort law.  The trial judge rejected the request for jury instructions based on
Virginia law and instructed the jury in accordance with Maryland law.  No issue was raised in the
Court of Special Appeals or in this Court concerning the trial judge’s choice of law ruling.
Moreover, the sole issue raised in this Court concerns the admission into evidence of the
photographs and defense counsel’s argument based on the photographs.  This is an issue governed
by the law of the forum and not by the law of the place where the accident occurred.  See, e.g.,
Vernon v. Aubinoe, 259 Md. 159, 162, 269 A.2d 620, 621 (1970); Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale,
Inc., 222 Md. 1, 6-8, 158 A.2d 631, 634-635 (1960); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
§ 138 (1971); Robert A. Leflar, Luther L. McDougal III, Robert L. Felix, American Conflicts Law,
§ 123, at 337-340 (Fourth Edition 1986).
a rear-end chain collision.  The plaintiff-petitioner, Cathy Mason, was operating the
front automobile which was stopped, in the left eastbound lane, because of heavy
traffic.  Cathy Mason’s brother, Gregory James Mason, was a passenger in her car.
Stopped directly behind Cathy Mason’s car was an automobile operated by Warren
Goldman.  The automobile operated by the defendant-respondent, Chauncey R. Lynch,
had been in the adjacent lane of traffic.  Lynch decided to change lanes, pulling his
vehicle into the left lane behind Goldman’s car.  While Lynch was changing lanes and
looking backward, his vehicle struck the Goldman vehicle in the rear.  Even though
Goldman’s foot was on the brake pedal, the impact caused Goldman’s car to strike the
rear of Mason’s car, pushing Mason’s car forward.  During Goldman’s attempt to
control his automobile after the initial impact, Goldman’s car struck Mason’s car in the
rear a second time.  
Mason filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County this tort action
against Lynch, alleging that Mason suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident
and that these injuries were proximately caused by Lynch’s negligence.  Lynch
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answered by, inter alia, denying that he was negligent or that his actions caused
Mason’s injuries.
Prior to trial, counsel for both parties agreed not to call health care providers as
witnesses at the trial and not to conduct discovery or depositions of experts.  Instead,
they stipulated to the submission of medical records and bills, including bills and
reports from each of Cathy Mason’s treating doctors, a report of an independent
medical evaluation conducted at the request of defendant’s counsel, and reports by
Mason’s doctors rebutting the defense’s independent report.  Counsel further agreed
to a maximum jury verdict of $60,000.  The doctors’ reports submitted by Mason
supported her contention that she had been injured as a result of the accident.  One of
those reports set forth the doctor’s view that “there is no relationship between [the]
degree of vehicle damage and [the] degree of patient injury.”  The doctor who had
examined Mason at the defendant’s request concluded in his report that most of the
treatment received by her was unrelated to the collision.
Also before trial, the plaintiff’s attorney had filed a motion in limine, seeking
an order precluding the defendant’s attorney from offering in evidence at the trial
photographs showing minimal damage to the plaintiff’s automobile immediately after
the accident.  The motion also sought to preclude the defendant’s attorney from arguing
“to the jury that the limited property damage shows [that] the force of the impact was
insufficient to cause Plaintiff’s injuries.”  The plaintiff’s motion in limine relied upon
a recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Delaware, Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del.
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2001), holding that, in a motor vehicle accident personal injury case, “where liability
is conceded and the sole issue is the extent of the plaintiff’s personal injuries
attributable to the accident,” photographs showing minimal damage to the plaintiff’s
vehicle are not admissible to support an inference that the plaintiff’s personal injuries
resulting from the accident were also minimal, absent expert testimony warranting such
an inference.  Davis, 770 A.2d at 40-42.  The Delaware court also held, with regard to
a defense counsel’s argument to the jury, as follows (id. at 40, footnotes omitted):
“As a general rule, a party in a personal injury case may not
directly argue that the seriousness of personal injuries from a car
accident correlates to the extent of the damage to the cars, unless
the party can produce competent expert testimony on the issue.
Absent such expert testim ony, any inference by the jury that
minimal damage to the plaintiff’s car translates into minimal
personal injuries to the plaintiff would necessarily amount to
unguided speculation.”
Defense counsel opposed the motion in limine, arguing that, in Maryland
personal injury actions growing out of motor vehicle accidents, photographs of the
vehicles after the accidents have always been deemed admissible as relevant evidence.
The defendant’s attorney asserted “[t]hat plaintiffs routinely introduce photographs of
the vehicles that they were in when it shows substantial property damage specifically
for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff could have had the injuries that were
sustained.”  Defense attorney claimed that it is “common knowledge” that there is some
relationship between “the particular extent of vehicle damage and the likelihood of a
particular injury.”  The defense concluded:
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“That it’s also interesting to note that the parties in this case
have agreed that no experts would be called pursuant to an
agreement to allow the medical bills in for a limit on recovery.
That it’s interesting to note that once this agreement was put into
place that no experts would be called, Plaintiff now files this
Motion in Limine in part based upon the fact that no experts would
be called.  This is unfair and clearly improper.
“Finally, Maryland courts have never precluded the use of
photographs of vehicles in auto accident cases.”
The trial judge denied the motion in limine.  Later at the trial, during the cross-
examination of Cathy Mason, the witness testified to the accuracy of two photographs
showing “the damage done to your [Mason’s] car as a result of the accident.”  The
photographs were admitted into evidence over the objection of plaintiff’s counsel.  
Cathy Mason testified at trial that, although she was wearing a seat belt, she
moved forward each of the two times that her automobile was struck, although she did
not “hit anything in the car.”  Mason’s attorney asked her whether she felt “hurt at the
scene of the accident,” and Mason replied: “No.  I was not hurt at the scene of the
accident.”  Mason testified that, after the exchange of information among herself,
Goldman, and Lynch, she “went home to watch TV,” and that she had no “expectation”
that she was “going to need any medical attention.”  She testified that when she woke
up the next day, she had a headache, and that, later that day, she was having neck pain.
She left work early the day after the accident, went to an emergency room of a local
hospital, and received medication.  Later she visited her primary physician about “head
pain, the neck pain, [and] upper shoulder pain,” and her physician referred her to a
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physical therapy center where she received treatments, although she stated that the
treatments did not alleviate the pain.  Several months later, her lawyer referred her to
a neurologist and an “orthoped ic doctor” who treated her.  She was also treated by a
dentist at the time.  At the conclusion of Mason’s direct testim ony, her medical bills
totaling $13,846.60 were introduced into evidence.  Mason also claimed lost wages
amounting to $373.97.
Cathy Mason’s brother, Gregory Mason, testified that it had been “stop-and-go
traffic” when the accident occurred, and that the Mason vehicle had been stopped for
“a few seconds” when it was twice struck in the rear.  Gregory Mason stated that both
he and his sister moved forward when the car was hit.  Gregory also stated that the
vehicles were driveable after the accident.
Warren Goldman testified at the trial with regard to being struck by Lynch’s car
and, despite his foot being on the brake, striking Mason’s car in front of him.  Goldman
testified that he saw no injuries on Mason such as a “cut or bleeding” but that she “was
unhappy.”  He further testified that the property damage to his car, both in the rear and
the front, was repaired at a cost between $500 and $1,000.
Chauncey Lynch testified as to how the accident occurred.  He further testified,
without objection, that the only damage to his vehicle consisted of “paint scratches”
and that his air bag did not “deploy.”  Lynch stated that no one at the accident scene
“complained of any injury, or any pain, or discom fort.”  He testified that all of the
vehicles were driveable and that everyone drove away from the accident scene.
-7-
Following the above summarized testim ony, the plaintiff moved for a directed
verdict in her favor as to liability.  The trial judge denied the motion.  
During closing argument to the jury, defense counsel argued, inter alia, as
follows (italics represent the portion which plaintiff challenges in this Court):
“[A]s far as putting a value on the case, I want you to start at the
accident scene.  Use your common sense, draw on your every day
experiences, because one thing everybody agrees on, rush hour
traffic.  And everybody knows what rush hour traffic is like, stop
and go, stop and go, stop and go, stop and go.
“My client hits Mr. Goldman’s vehicle.  Apparently,
Mr. Goldman’s vehicle then hits Miss Mason’s vehicle.  There is
very little damage.  You will have the photographs of Miss Mason’s
vehicle back there.  And I am going to ask that you look at that
vehicle and ask you if that’s consistent with $13,000 in medical
expenses.  Again, use your common sense, draw on your every day
experiences.
“Keep in mind she is seat belted.  Keep in mind she does not hit
her head, she does not hit her jaw, she does not hit any part of her
body as a result of this accident.  Keep in mind that she’s not
claiming – wasn’t claiming any injury at the scene, was not cut or
bleeding, was not complaining of any problems, any discomfort at
the accident scene.
“And if you decide to put a value on this case – now, she does
have medical treatment the day after, June 24.  Then [she] sees
Doctor Choi, her family doctor two times in July.  Only two
appointments in July.  Then in August [she] has the physical
therapy.  Ask yourself what happens then.
“Then we have the entire month of September, the entire month
of October.  There is no medical treatment whatsoever.  What does
she do?  She goes to see a lawyer, and she goes to a lawyer to get
a referral to a doctor.  Now, again, I am not a doctor. [I] ask you to
use your common sense, draw on your every day experiences.  If
you have a medical problem, do you go to a doctor or a lawyer?  I
-8-
submit if you have a medical problem, you go to a doctor.
“You say, hey, Doctor Choi, look.  I have been through the
physical therapy.  Physical therapy, it is not working.  It is not
working.  Refer me to a doctor.  If you can’t refer me to a doctor,
I’ll go to a medical referral service, something.
“What happens when she does go to the lawyer?  A lawyer
refers her to a Doctor Macedo, and suddenly what was [a] $2,000
in medical case jumps to a $13,000 medical case.  What you have
to ask yourself is any of medical treatment by these doctors
causally related to the accident?”
The case was given to the jury with a verdict sheet prepared and submitted by the
plaintiff’s counsel, and not objected to by the defendant’s counsel.  After deliberations,
the jury returned its verdict, in pertinent part as follows:
“1.
Was Defendant Chauncey Lynch negligent in this case?
    /   Yes 
_____ No
If you find ‘yes’ to Question No. 1 go to Question No. 2.  If
you find ‘no’ in Question No. 1, go no further.
“2.
What amount do you award Plaintiff Cathy Mason:
For past medical bills
$  0   
For past lost wages 
$  0   
For non-economic damages
$  0   ”
Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff only for costs.
The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on two grounds.  First, the plaintiff
argued that 
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“it was undisputed by the defense’s own expert that Plaintiff had
sustained at least $1,983.60 in medical treatment cost damages as
a result of this accident and, therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to a
verdict in at least that amount as a matter of law.”
Second, the plaintiff repeated her earlier argument that “the photographs showing
minimal damage to Plaintiff’s vehicle” should not have been admitted into evidence
and that, “[g]iven the absence of any expert testimony in this case establishing a
correlation between vehicle damage and personal injury,” defense counsel “should have
been prohibited from inviting the jury to speculate about the existence of such a
correlation.”
In opposing the motion for a new trial, the defendant initially stated that he had
consistently taken the position that he was not negligent and that his actions did not
injure the plaintiff.  The defendant pointed out that the jury had been instructed that “‘it
will be your duty to determine what, if any, award will fairly compensate the Plaintiff
for the losses,’” and that plaintiff’s counsel had no objection to this instruction.
(Emphasis in defendant’s opposition).  The defendant further asserted that the jury was
instructed, without objection, that it was “‘not required to accept any expert’s
opinion.’” (Same).  With regard to the second ground for the plaintiff’s motion, the
defendant reiterated the reasons previously set forth in his opposition to the plaintiff’s
motion in limine.  The trial court denied the motion for a new trial without opinion.
The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court.  Mason v. Lynch, 151 Md. App. 17, 822 A.2d 1281
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(2003).  With respect to the admission of the photographs showing minimal damage to
the plaintiff’s automobile, the Court of Special Appeals distinguished the Delaware
case of Davis v. Maute, supra, 770 A.2d 36, on the ground that the defendant in Davis
admitted liability, whereas the defendant in the present case contested liability.  Mason
v. Lynch, supra, 151 Md. App. at 22-23, 822 A.2d at 1284.  The Court of Special
Appeals further pointed out that other courts considering the issue have not taken the
same position as the Supreme Court of Delaware; those other courts have treated the
admission of such photographs as a matter within the trial court’s discretion, and “have
been more willing to accept the trial court’s discretionary determination that the
photographs were relevant to the question of damages.”  Mason, 151 Md. App. at 23,
822 A.2d at 1285.
The Court of Special Appeals also held that defense counsel’s closing argument
concerning damages was not improper, Mason, 151 Md. App. at 24-27, 822 A.2d at
1285-1287.  The intermediate appellate court relied upon this Court’s opinion in Farley
v. Allstate Insurance Co., 355 Md. 34, 733 A.2d 1014 (1999), and pointed out that in
the case at bar, as in the Farley case, the trial court had instructed the jury that the
attorneys’ closing argumen ts were not evidence in the case.  In addition, the Court of
Special Appeals explained (151 Md. App. at 27, 822 A.2d at 1287):
“Like the defense counsel in Farley, appellee’s counsel attempted
to cast doubt on the reasonableness and necessity of appellant’s
medical costs by persuading the jury to disbelieve appellant and
appellant’s lay and expert witnesses regarding the seriousness of
her injuries.  Also like the defense counsel in Farley, appellee’s
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counsel attempted to cast doubt in many ways, including
commenting on the photographs showing minimal damage to the
vehicle, appellant’s testimony that she did not hit her body on the
vehicle at impact or claim any injury at the scene, and the timing
of medical treatment and lawyer referral to health care providers.
Appellee’s counsel’s comments regarding the photographs, which
were admitted into evidence while appellant was on the stand, were
general in nature, and counsel did not attempt to make specific
argumen ts that would call into play scientific principles that might
require expert testimony.”
The plaintiff filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, posing the
single question which we have set forth at the beginning of this opinion.  The defendant
did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari.  We granted the plaintiff’s petition,
Mason v. Lynch, 374 Md. 582, 824 A.2d 58 (2003), and shall affirm.
II.
As pointed out above, the Court of Special Appeals seemed to uphold the
admission of the photographs on two grounds.  First, the appellate court distinguished
the Delaware case of Davis v. Maute, supra, on the ground that liability had been
conceded by the defendant in that case, whereas the defendant Lynch in the case at bar
contested liability.  Second, the Court of Special Appeals alternately appeared to agree
with the majority of courts which have held that the admission of such photographs is
within the trial judge’s discretion.  We agree with the second ground.  Regardless of
whether liability had been conceded, the admission of the property damage photographs
was within the trial judge’s discretion, and there was no abuse of discretion in this case.
The holding of the Delaware court in Davis is not consistent with traditional Maryland
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law concerning the admission of photographic evidence, and we decline to follow the
Davis opinion.
Generally under Maryland law, in both civil and criminal cases growing out of
occurrences at particular places, photographs of these places, such as accident or crime
scenes, including photographs of things involved, injured persons, or victims, are
normally considered to have some relevance.  Along with other reasons for relevancy
in particular cases, such “photographs have also been admitted to allow the jury to
visualize the” nature of the occurrence, i.e., the “atrociousness of the crime” or the
extent of the accident.  Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502, 495 A.2d 1, 8 (1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986). Moreover, “[i]t is an
unquestioned rule that photographs may be introduced in evidence, either in a civil or
criminal proceeding, to illustrate the description of a person, place, or object so as to
explain or apply the evidence.”  Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 570, 45 A.2d 340, 346
(1946).
It is ordinarily within the discretion of the trial court to weigh the degree of
relevance against any unfair prejudice which might arise from the admission of the
photographs.  See Maryland Rule 5-403.  The trial court’s ruling on admissibility will
not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.
These basic principles concerning the admissibility of photographs have been
reiterated by this Court on numerous occasions.  Thus in Johnson v State, supra, 303
Md. at 502, 495 A.2d at 8, the Court summarized the controlling law as follows:
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“We have consistently held that whether or not a photograph is
of practical value in a case and admissible at trial is a matter best
left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. . . .  A court’s
determination in this area will not be disturbed unless plainly
arbitrary.”
In Hance v. State Roads Comm., 221 Md. 164, 172, 156 A.2d 644, 648 (1959), Judge
Prescott for the Court stated:
“[P]hotographs, if properly verified [no question of verification is
here involved] and relevant to the issues in a case, may be admitted
in evidence if they assist the jury in understanding the case or aid
a witness in explaining his testim ony; and the question of whether
they are practically helpful or instructive to the jury is left to the
discretion of the trial judge and his rulings thereon will not be
disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of the
discretion.”
In a motor vehicle accident case, with regard to various challenges relating to the
admission of photographs of the accident scene, this Court’s reasoning underscored
the admissibility of such photographs if properly verified (Consolidated Gas Co. v.
Smith, 109 Md. 186, 199, 72 A. 651, 656 (1909)):
“It does not distinctly appear from the appellant’s brief upon what
ground these exceptions were taken, but the use of photographs
‘wherever it is important to describe a person, place, or thing, in a
civil or criminal proceeding, for the purpose of explaining and
applying the evidence’ . . . is so well established and so fully
recognized in our own decisions, that we assume the objection
must have been not generally to their use in the case, but rather to
their method of introduction.  It is a matter of course that
‘photographs must be shown by some extrinsic evidence to be
correct representations of the place or subject as it existed at the
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time involved in the controversy.’”
Sun Cab Co. v. Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 136-137, 289 A.2d 804, 817 (1972),
aff’d, 267 Md. 559, 298 A.2d 391 (1973), was an action for the wrongful death of one
person and for personal injuries suffered by several other persons, arising out of a
collision between a taxicab and a truck.  After a police officer testified that several
photographs of the taxicab “accurately represented the condition of the taxicab when
he [the police officer] arrived at the scene,” the trial judge admitted into evidence, over
objections, the photographs.  15 Md. App. at 136, 289 A.2d at 817.  The trial judge also
admitted into evidence some photographs of the accident scene but excluded other
photographs of the accident scene.  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals rejected
challenges to these rulings concerning the photographs on the ground that “the
admissibility of photographs is largely within the discretion of the [trial] court.”  Ibid.
Numerous other Maryland appellate cases have upheld trial court rulings
concerning the admission of photographs, relying upon the principle that the admission
or exclusion of the photographic evidence is essentially a matter of the trial court’s
discretion.  A sampling of such cases include Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 187-188,
729 A.2d 910, 939-940, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910, 120 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 216
(1999) (Trial court’s admission of photographs of the crime scene and the victim was
not an abuse of discretion, as “‘[t]he very purpose of photographic evidence is to
clarify and communicate facts to the tribunal more accurately than by mere words,’”
quoting Johnson v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 503-504, 495 A.2d at 9); Evans v. State,
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333 Md. 660, 693, 637 A.2d 117, 133, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S.Ct. 109, 130
L.Ed.2d 56 (1994) (Admission of victim photographs upheld, as “the admission of
photographs into evidence remains soundly committed to the discretion of the trial
judge”); Sisk v. State, 236 Md. 589, 591, 204 A.2d 684, 685 (1964) (“[P]hotographs,
when properly authenticated, are as a general rule held to be admissible under two
distinct rules: one, to illustrate a witness’ testimony . . . and two, as ‘mute,’ ‘silent,’ or
‘dumb’ independent photographic witnesses”); Sanner v. Guard, 236 Md. 271, 277, 203
A.2d 885, 889 (1964) (“The admission or exclusion of photographs is a matter for the
discretion of the trial judge”); Marlow v. Davis, 227 Md. 204, 208-209, 176 A.2d 215,
217 (1961) (Automobile accident personal injury case, where trial judge admitted some
photographs of the accident scene, but excluded others which had been altered, and this
Court affirmed because “‘questions relating to the admissibility of photographs are left
largely to the discretion of the trial court’”); State, Use of Charuhas v. Heffelfinger,
226 Md. 493, 496-497, 174 A.2d 336, 338 (1961)  (Automobile accident wrongful
death case, where the trial court admitted photographs and a sketch of the accident
scene, on the ground that “‘[t]his tells how the accident happened,’” and the Court of
Appeals “fail[ed] to find any abuse of discretion”); Baldwin v. State, 226 Md. 409, 411,
174 A.2d 57, 58 (1961) (Admission of murder scene photographs was held not to be an
abuse of discretion); Kirsch v. Ford, 170 Md. 90, 94, 183 A. 240, 241 (1936) (Motor
vehicle accident case in which three photographs of the accident scene were deemed
properly admitted; two altered photographs of the scene were, according to this Court,
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improperly admitted but their “admission . . . was not ‘such an abuse of discretionary
power as to warrant the sustaining of exceptions’”); York Ice Machinery Corp. v.
Sachs, 167 Md. 113, 126, 173 A. 240, 246 (1934) (Admission into evidence of a motor
vehicle accident scene photograph “is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court”); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Biggs, 132 Md. 113, 117-120,
103 A. 426, 427-428 (1918) (Photographs of automobile accident scene held
admissible); Weiller v. Weiss, 124 Md. 461, 464, 92 A. 1028, 1028 (1915) (Tort action
arising from a collision between an automobile and a race horse, with photographs of
the injured horse held to be properly admitted, as “[t]he admissibility of photographs,
for the purpose of explaining and applying the evidence, is fully recognized by our
decisions”).  See also McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 403:5, at 582 (2d ed. 2001)
(“More frequently, photographs will be taken of the scene of the accident or the crime,
of the parties, or of the property involved, and offered as evidence of the appearance
of each of those.  The photographs are then merely demonstrative evidence, illustrative
of the . . . testim ony, and are admissible in the trial court’s discretion”).  
The discretion which Maryland law accords to trial courts, regarding the
admission or exclusion of photographs, is very broad.  Thus, in several cases where
trial judges have excluded photographs, their exercise of discretion has also been
upheld on appeal.  See cases collected in McLain, Maryland Evidence, supra, at 582-
591.  Among the scores of this Court’s opinions involving the admission or exclusion
of photographic evidence, it is extremely difficult to find cases in which this Court has
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held that the trial court’s ruling, as to the admission or exclusion of photographs,
constituted reversible error.  The very few cases finding reversible error are ones where
the trial courts admitted photographs which this Court held did not accurately represent
the person or scene or were otherwise not properly verified.  See Pearson v. State, 182
Md. 1, 9-12, 31 A. 624, 627-629 (1943) (A capital rape case in which the trial court
admitted a photograph of the victim which was not an accurate representation of the
victim at the time of the crime and was not properly verified, and this Court held that
the admission was reversible error); Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 373-374, 189 A.
248, 254 (1937) (An arson case, in which the trial judge admitted photographs of the
burned structure, and this Court held that the photographs were not “true
representations of the scene or object which they purport[ed] to represent”).  See also
Snibbe v. Robinson, 151 Md. 658, 663, 135 A. 838, 839 (1927) (Photograph of motor
vehicle accident scene, taken five months after the accident, when “the conditions of
the foliage, shrubbery, and lighting, were different at the time of the accident than
when the photograph was taken, and the photograph itself was obscure and indefinite
in its details, . . ., should not have been admitted into evidence.”  Nevertheless, the
“question [as to admissibility] was to some extent in the discretion of the trial court . . .,
and we are unwilling to reverse the judgment on that ground alone.  The judgment
appealed from will therefore be affirmed”).
As earlier mentioned, the plaintiff herself testified that the photographs at issue
accurately represented the damage done to her automobile as a result of the accident.
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2
Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502, 495 A.2d 1, 8 (1985).
3
Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 570, 45 A.2d 340, 346 (1946); Sisk v. State, 236 Md. 589, 591,
204 A.2d 684, 685 (1964).
None of the reasons for excluding the photographs recognized by Maryland law is
applicable in this case.  The photographs “allow[ed] the jury to visualize”2 the nature
of the accident.  The testim ony, which was not objected to, described the apparent lack
of personal injuries at the scene of the accident, the driveability of the three vehicles
immediately after the accident, the minimal damage to Warren Goldman’s automobile,
the fact that airbags did not deploy, and the damage to Chauncey Lynch’s vehicle
consisting only of “paint scratches.”  The photographs “illustrat[ed]” these
“description[s]” and this testim ony. 3  A holding that the trial judge abused his
discretion in admitting such photographs would represent an abrupt departure from
prior Maryland law.
Although this Court has not previously addressed the specific argument made by
the plaintiff and upheld by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Davis v. Maute, supra,
770 A.2d 36, namely that, absent expert testim ony, there is no relationship between the
personal injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident and the extent of the property
damage, other courts have addressed the argument and rejected it.  Courts have
generally held that photographs and testim ony, showing or describing vehicular damage
or the nature of the impact, are relevant with respect to the personal injuries suffered
in a motor vehicle accident and, in the trial judge’s discretion, are admissible.
For example, in Gamb rell v. Zengel, 110 N. J. Super. 377, 265 A.2d 823 (1970),
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the New Jersey appellate court held that photographs and testimony showing the
damage to the motor vehicle involved and the distance traveled were admissible and
relevant to the severity of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries.  The court explained (110
N. J. Super. at 379-381, 265 A.2d at 824-825):
“The only purpose in admitting the photographs and police
officer’s testimony was to show the force of the impact through the
damages to the vehicle and the distance traveled, which allegedly
caused plaintiff’s injuries.  Defend ants claim that it was unfair thus
to permit the jury to infer that plaintiff sustained serious personal
injury, since a heavy impact between two vehicles is an unreliable
barometer of the severity of physical injury sustained.
“It must be conceded that the force of the impact, when two
automobiles collide, does not necessarily justify an inference that
the occupants of the vehicles sustained serious physical injuries.
As defendants’ medical expert expressed it:
‘I have known people who step off a curb and break a leg
and a car can turn upside down and you can be lucky and
walk away from it without a scratch; * * *’
“At the same time it is a generally accepted rule that evidence
of the speed at which the colliding cars were traveling, the severity
of the physical impact and the manner of the happening of the
accident is admissible where there is an issue as to the seriousness
of plaintiff’s injuries.  And this, too, despite admitted liability.  See
Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal. App. 2d 133, 98 P.2d 816 (D. Ct. App.
1940); Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal. App. 2d 524, 152 P.2d 526 (D.
Ct. App. 1944); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill. App. 2d 60, 230 N. E.
2d 505 (D. Ct. App. 1967); Hall v. Bukert, 117 Ohio App. 527, 193
N. E. 2d 167 ( Ct. App. 1962); Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656
(D. C. Cir. 1963); Annotation, 80 A.L.R.2d, at 1224-1231 (1961)
and 1968 supplement thereto, citing additional cases in accord.
* * *
“The possibility of some inflammatory effect on a jury as
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compared with the relevancy of the evidence and its generally
accepted admissibility is best left to the discretion of the trial court.
We find no abuse of discretion under the circumstances herein.”
The Supreme Court of Washington reached a similar conclusion in Murray v.
Mossman, 52 Wash. 2d 885, 329 P.2d 1089 (1958), which was an action for damages
arising from an automobile collision, in which the defendant admitted liability but
contested the amount of damages.  In upholding the admission of photographs and
testimony showing the amount of vehicular damage, the Supreme Court of Washington
stated (52 Wash. 2d at 887-888, 329 P.2d at 1091):
“Five photographs of the scene of the accident were admitted in
evidence for the limited purpose of showing the force of the impact
that resulted in damage to respondent – a whiplash injury.  Certain
witnesses were permitted, over objection, to mark the exhibits and
to testify concerning the point of impact and the course appellant’s
car took after the accident.
“Our conclusion [is] that admission of the photographs and
testimony pertaining thereto did not constitute reversible error . . . .
* * *
“With minor exceptions in the testimony (the admission of
which is not sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion), the
photographs and the testimony concerning them tended to show the
force and direction of the impact that resulted in respondent’s
injury.”
See also, e.g., Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal. App. 2d 524, 527-528, 152 P.2d 526, 528
(1944) (“Defendants’ admission of liability did not render irrelevant or immaterial
evidence as to the circumstances of the accident insofar as they tended to prove the
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4
Following the Delaware decision in Davis v. Maute, supra, 770 A.2d 36, the Connecticut courts
have reaffirmed Berndston v. Annino, supra, and have disagreed with the Davis case.  See Flores v.
Jenison, 2004 WL 1559488 (2004) (“Although the plaintiff cites a Delaware Supreme Court case,
Davis v. Maute, . . . the law of this state is to the contrary,” citing Berndston); Holman v. Agostini,
2004 WL 614861 (2004) (“In our jurisdiction . . . evidence of physical impact is admissible as to the
extent of physical injury, Berndston v. Annino, . . .; but see Davis v. Maute . . .”).
degree of violence with which the automobile struck the plaintiff. * * * The force with
which a blow was struck, where it is susceptible of proof, is a fact to be considered
with other evidence in determining how severe the injuries were”); Martin v. Miqueu,
37 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137, 98 P.2d 816, 818 (1940) (“Defendants’ theory was that such
back injury was slight.  It was therefore proper for plaintiff to introduce . . . evidence
concerning the manner of the happening of the accident in order to show the force with
which defendant . . . struck the automobile of plaintiff”); Berndston v. Annino, 177
Conn. 41, 44-45, 411 A.2d 36, 39 (1979) (“The prevailing view appears to support the
proposition that, even though liability is fully admitted, evidence of speed, physical
impact, and the like is admissible as relevant to the probable extent of personal injuries.
* * * This accords with our view”); 4 Hayes v. Sutton, 190 A.2d 655, 656 (D. C. App.
1963) (“[E]vidence of the circumstances surrounding the accident, especially evidence
relating to the force of the impact, . . . [is] relevant because it bears on the extent of
plaintiff’s injuries”); Phillips v. Lawrence, 87 Ill. App. 2d 60, 63, 230 N. E. 2d 505,
507 (1967) (“Relevancy is established where a fact offered . . . renders a matter in issue
more or less probable.  To be probable it must be tested in the light of logic, experience
and accepted assumptions as to human behavior. * * * Both logic and experience
indicate that a person in a stopped car, struck by another car going at a speed in excess
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5
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Delaware has recently appeared to narrow
considerably its earlier holding in Davis v. Maute, supra, 770 A.2d 36.  In Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d
1222, 1233 (Del. 2004), the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
“Davis does not hold that photographs of the vehicles
involved in an accident may never be admitted without expert
testimony about the significance of the damage to the vehicles shown
in the accident and how that damage may relate to an issue in the
case.  Davis has been misinterpreted as a bar to the admission of
photographs without expert testimony.  It was only the disingenuous
reference to a ‘fender bender’ – after a trial judges express ruling
forbidding what that phrase implied – that prompted our holding.
Davis should not be construed broadly to require expert testimony in
every case in order for jurors to be permitted to view photographs of
vehicles involved in an accident.
“In short, Davis should be limited to its facts, recognizing that
there may be many helpful purposes for admitting photographs of the
vehicles involved in an accident where the case does not require
supporting expert opinion.”
of 65 miles per hour, is more likely to receive more serious injuries than one similarly
situated who is struck by a car going at a much slower speed”); Hall v. Burkert, 117
Ohio App. 527, 528-529, 193 N.E.2d 167, 168-169 (1962).  See also DiCosola v.
Bowman, 342 Ill. App. 3d 530, 537, 794 N.E.2d 875, 881, app. denied, 206 Ill. 2d 616,
806 N.E.2d 1065 (2003) (Personal injury motor vehicle accident case, in which the
appellate court held that the admissibility of vehicular damage photographs is within
the trial court’s discretion, and “that the trial court in this case did not abuse its
discretion” by excluding the photographs.  The appellate court, however, emphasized
that “[w]e do not hold that expert testimony must always be required for such
photographic evidence to be admissible”).5
The plaintiff’s position in the case at bar, i.e., that the photographs should not
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have been admitted and that defense counsel’s closing argument based on the
photographs was improper, is based on the plaintiff’s contention that, absent expert
testimony to the contrary, there is no “correlation between vehicle damage and the
likelihood of occupant injury.”  (Petitioner’s brief at 13).  The contention that no
correlation exists between vehicle damage and occupant injury, in turn, seems to be
partly based on the notion that sometimes accidents with little property damage result
in severe personal injuries, and sometimes accidents with great property damage result
in minor personal injuries.  The plaintiff heavily relies upon the report of one of her
doctors who wrote as follows (id. at 4):
“A further important point - studies have shown that there is no
relationship between the amount of dollar damage, physical auto
damage, or speed of impact to the amount of injury sustained by
the patient.  Metal is metal and soft tissue is soft tissue - there is no
relationship to mutual damage.  If there were, we would expect that
in every accident in which one or both vehicles were totaled, the
passengers would be either killed or severely damages - and we
know that is not the case.”  (First emphasized phrase added; second
emphasized phrase in original).
In other words, the plaintiff’s theory seems to be that, because greater vehicular
damage does not result in greater personal injuries, and lesser vehicular damage does
not result in lesser personal injuries, in every accident, there can be no correlation
between vehicular damage and personal injuries; therefore, vehicular damage evidence
is not relevant.  This, however, is not the test for relev ancy.  Maryland Rule 5-401
defines “relevant evidence” as follows:
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“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”
That there may be some automobile accidents, in which very minor impacts lead to
serious personal injuries, and vice versa, does not mean that evidence concerning the
impact is irrelevant to the extent of the injuries.  Relevancy under the rule involves
probabilities; complete certainty is not ordinarily required. As the Illinois appellate
court explained in Phillips v. Lawrence, supra, 87 Ill. App. 2d at 63, 230 N.E.2d at
506-507, “[r]elevancy is established where a fact offered . . . renders a matter in issue
more or less probable,” and that “evidence of the circumstances surrounding an
accident is admissible,” because it relates “to the probable extent of personal injuries.”
(Emphasis added).
Courts, almost uniformly, have taken the position that there is in motor vehicle
accident cases, as a matter of probability, a correlation between the nature of the
vehicular impact and the severity of the personal injuries.  As the plaintiff herself
acknowledges, “[t]here apparently exists among laypersons a belief . . . that significant
injuries are unlikely in the absence of substantial property damage.”  (Petitioner’s brief
at 10).  Courts have generally taken the position that this belief is rooted in common
sense – a position with which we agree.  Moreover, in personal injury actions based on
motor vehicle accidents, evidence, including photographs, of the accident scene and of
-25-
the damage to the vehicles, is, within the trial court’s discretion, admissible under
Maryland law.
In sum, the trial court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the photographs showing the damage to the plaintiff’s automobile.  Consequently,
defense counsel’s closing argument based upon the photographs and other evidence
concerning the collision was not improper.  See, e.g., Farley v. Allstate, supra, 355 Md.
at 56, 733 A.2d at 1025 (Closing argument by defense counsel was not improper, as,
“[c]ontrary to the [plaintiff’s] assertions, the record indicates that [defense counsel’s]
arguments as to the reasonableness and necessity of Mr. Farley’s medical bills,
treatment, and lost wages were based on facts in evidence”).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.
In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CAL01-05262
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 24
September Term, 2003
CATHY MASON
v.
CHAUNCEY R. LYNCH
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.,
 which Bell, C.J., joins. 
Filed:   July 15, 2005
* Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
Raker, J. dissenting, in which Bell, C.J., joins:
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and reverse the
judgment of the Circuit Court.  I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting Lynch, respondent, to argue in closing argument that the photographs,
depicting minimal property damage, were evidence that Mason, petitioner, was not
injured.  The photographs were not admitted improperly because the question of
liability was at issue in the case; they were not admissible, however, to support any
inference that because the property damage was minimal, the personal injury was
minimal.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
Defense counsel argued that, based on everyday experiences and common sense,
the damage on the vehicle was not consistent with $13,008 in medical expenses,
although perhaps consistent with “a couple of thousand dollars.”  In my view, the
argument is improper for several reasons.  First, the weight of scientific literature is to
the contrary.  Second, there is no way that, based merely on the extent of property
damage, a fact finder could assess the injury of a party and particularly, whether a party
had a pre-existing injury that was exacerbated by the impact.
This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Davis v. Maute, 770
A.2d 36 (Del. 2001).  The court held that absent expert testim ony, a party may not
argue that the seriousness of personal injuries from a car accident correlates to the
extent of the damage to the cars.  Id. at 40.  The rule announced by the Delaware court
is sound and is supported by the current scientific literature.  I would apply a similar
rule.
-2-
The majority characterizes a subsequent Delaware case, Eskin v. Carden, 82 A.2d
1222 (Del. 2004), as narrowing considerab ly the Davis holding.  In my view, Eskin
clarified Davis and did not narrow it.  The Eskin court did not retreat from Davis, but
rather stated as follows, “for guidance in future cases”:
“In Davis, defense counsel sought to argue that properly admitted
photographs of slightly damaged cars supported a contention that the
accident was a ‘fender bender,’ in order to persuade the jury that the
forces causing damage to the vehicles in the accident could not have
impacted the plaintiff sufficiently to have caused the injuries about which
she complained.  Before the ‘fender bender’ comment was made, the trial
judge had specifically ruled that counsel could not present that very
contention, based upon the photographs alone.  The inference suggested
by the too-clever-by-half phrase, ‘fender bender,’ inartfully attempted to
circumvent the trial judge’s ruling.  That was impermissible, because
unsupported by expert testimony, that phrase left the Davis jury in a
position to make ‘unguided empirical assumptions on issues that are
outside the common knowledge of laymen.’  Although the common
knowledge of ‘laymen’ may well include the common sense notion that the
lesser the force in an accident, the less likely the average human body
will suffer serious injury, that speculation does not account for other
circumstances, such as pre-exiting injuries or the particularly susceptible
individu al.”
Id. at 1233 (Emphasis added).  
Dr. Binderman, the only expert to testify to this issue at trial, testified that there is
no correlation between the extent of injury a person suffers and the magnitude of
physical damage to an automobile.  He testified as follows:
“A further important point—studies have shown that there is no
relationship between the amount of dollar damage, physical auto damage,
or speed of impact to the amount of injury sustained by the patient.  Metal
is metal and soft tissue is soft tissue—there is no relationship to mutual
damage.  If there were, we would expect that in every accident in which
one or both vehicles were totaled, the passengers would be either killed
or severely damaged—and we know that is not the case.  But Dr. Moses’
-3-
studies out of UCLA Facial Pain Center clearly show there is no
relationship between degree of vehicle damage and degree of patient
injury.”
Respondent presented no evidence to contradict Dr. Binderman’s opinion.  
Moreover, a review of some of the extant research studies support Dr. Binderman’s
opinion.  See, e.g., R. Evans, Some Observations on Whiplash Injuries, 10 Neurologic
Clinics 975-77 (1992); J. MacNab, Acceleration Extension Injuries of the Cervical
Spine, in The Spine 647-60 (R. Rothman & F. Simeone eds., 2d. ed. 1982); H. Parmar
& R. Raymakers, Neck Injuries From Rear Impact Road Traffic Accidents:  Prognosis
in Persons Seeking Compensation, 24 Inj. 75-78 (1993); D. Severy et al., Controlled
Automobile Rear-end Collisions, An Investigation of Related Engineering and Medical
Phenomena, 11 Can. Servs Med. J. 727-59 (1955).
For example, in Low Velocity Impact, Vehicular Damage and Passenger Injury, 16
Cranio: The Journal of Craniomandibular Practice 226, 229 (1998), David B. Miller,
D.D.S ., concluded as follows:
“There is no direct relationship between vehicular damage and injury to
and prognosis for the occupant(s) of the damaged vehicle.  Light vehicles
at low speeds can generate considerab le forces.  These forces are
sufficient to cause significant bodily injuries.  Impact resistant bumpers
and body frames are currently absorbing less force than in previous
automotive designs.  More kinetic energy is available for occupant injury.
The occurrence of injury relates primarily to the amount of kinetic energy
developed in the collision, the ability to dissipate that energy, victim
awareness, body posture at impact and a myriad of other factors.  Each
accident and each victim is unique, and each must be evaluated
objectively and individually based on the unique biomechanics and
physics of the collision.”
-4-
In L. Nordhoff, Jr., Motor Vehicle Collision Injuries, Mechanisms, Diagnosis and
Management 288 (1996), the author concludes that “[t]he assumption that injuries
relate to the amount of external vehicle damage in all types of crashes has no scientific
basis.”  In addition, the author concludes that “[t]here is little correlation between neck
injury and vehicle damage in the low-speed rear-end collision.” Id. at 290.  
A review of the scientific literature expresses the view that there can be a strong
inverse correlation between injury levels and measurab le vehicle crush, especially in
low speed, rear-impact collisions.  See, e.g., S. Foreman & A. Croft, Whiplash Injuries:
The Cervical Acceleration/Deceleration Syndrome (3d ed. 2002); Nordhoff, supra; M.
Robbins, Lack of Relationship Between Vehicle Damage and Occupant Injury, Society
of Automotive Engineers paper 970494 (1997).  Principles of physics, engineering and
medicine reveal that many factors influence the type and severity of personal injury,
including the speed of collision, vector of crash (front, side, rear, etc.), mass ratios,
vehicle “crashworthiness,” and human factors such as size, age, gender, physical
condition, and seating position of the occupant.  
In sum, there is no correlation, as the majority suggests, between vehicular damage
and personal injuries such that jurors can rely on a description of the damage to
establish the extent of any injury.  Accordingly, in the absence of expert testim ony, I
would hold that it is an abuse of discretion to permit counsel to suggest a correlation
between vehicle damage and the extent of personal injury.
Chief Judge Bell has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.