Title: Morris v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

332 N.E.2d 90 (1975)
Roy MORRIS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 273S25.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
August 14, 1975.
Rehearing Denied October 9, 1975.
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John R. O'Bryan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
*91 ARTERBURN, Justice.
Appellant, under the provisions of Rule P.C. 2 § 2, has taken this belated direct appeal from his 1967 conviction for Second Degree Murder. After an oral plea of not guilty, Appellant submitted the following "Motion."
It is to be noted that nowhere in this "Motion" does the Appellant allege that he was legally insane at any time. Appellant did not file a written plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." IC 1971, 35-5-2-1 [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-1701 (1974 Supp.)]. Had he done so the court then would have appointed two physicians to examine the defendant. IC 1971, 35-5-2-2 [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-1702 (1974 Supp.)].
In addition, the following statute, IC 1971, 35-5-3.1-1 [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-1708 (1974 Supp.)], is pertinent to the present situation.
Thus, notwithstanding the Appellant's failure to plead according to IC 1971, 35-5-2-1, we think that Appellant's "Motion" contained sufficient matter to come within IC 1971, 35-5-3.1-1, and to put the trial court on notice that it was presented with a situation involving a defendant's mental condition. Titling a document a "Motion" does not make it one. We should look to the substance rather than merely the form of a document. Especially considering the gravity of the charge against this defendant, the trial judge, after having seen the "Motion", should have discovered (1) whether the defendant intended this "Motion" as the written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity required by statute or whether the defendant now wished to plead not guilty by reason of insanity; and, (2) whether or not Defendant was competent to stand trial. Since it appears that at this late date the question of Appellant's competency to stand trial cannot be retrospectively determined, there must be a new trial. Pate v. Robinson, (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815; Dusky v. United States, (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824.
Appellant raised several other issues. Although we are ordering a new trial, we will consider some of the issues raised by Appellant, for the guidance of the trial court should such issues arise on the retrial.
Appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying without hearing his motion for bail. Although it would seem that at this time such an issue would be moot, we nevertheless proceed to the merits.
Art I. § 17 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
This provision is implemented by IC 1971, XX-X-XX-X [Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-1035 (1956 Supp.)].
This court has said:
Bozoviachar v. State, (1952) 230 Ind. 358, 366, 103 N.E.2d 680, 683. Accord, Schmidt v. Simmons, (1893) 137 Ind. 93, 36 N.E. 516; Ex parte Jones, (1876) 55 Ind. 176; Ex parte Heffren, (1866) 27 Ind. 87.
At the time of his first motion for the setting of bail (September 16, 1966) Appellant agreed to furnish authorities in support of his motion. On March 3, 1967, Appellant renewed his request for bail and cited one case as authority. We think it is evident that Appellant did not meet his burden of showing that he was entitled to bail. When a defendant submits no memorandum or affidavits purporting to show that bail should be set for the reason that the proof is not evident nor the presumption strong, there is no value in holding a hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a hearing nor in denying the bail.
*93 Appellant's next claim is that he was not given a speedy trial. Appellant was arraigned on September 9, 1966. On January 23, 1967, he requested and was granted a continuance. Trial began on April 25, 1967. Defendant was tried within six months of the date of his continuance; therefore, he was tried within the limitations of Rule 1-4D, (currently C.R. 4) which was in effect at the time of these events. Holquin v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 371, 269 N.E.2d 159; Wheeler v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 395, 264 N.E.2d 600; Walker v. Ratliff, (1970) 253 Ind. 495, 255 N.E.2d 223.
Appellant's next suggestion of error is addressed to the failure of the court to sequester the jury. Appellant made his objections only after the jury had returned from each adjournment and such an objection is not timely. Brown v. State, (1964) 245 Ind. 604, 201 N.E.2d 281; Henning v. State, (1885) 106 Ind. 386, 6 N.E. 803, 7 N.E. 4; Jarrell v. State, (1877) 58 Ind. 293. Furthermore, Appellant has not made it appear that he was harmed by the separation of the jury. Separation of jury without the consent of the defendant, express or implied, is not grounds for reversal when the defendant has not been prejudiced by the separation. Riley v. State, (1884) 95 Ind. 446; Creek v. State, (1965) 24 Ind. 151.
Appellant objected to the admission of 18 exhibits, photographs and color slides of the scene of the crime, on the ground that these exhibits were introduced in order to inflame and prejudice the jury. These pictures and slides, although repetitious, were admissible for the purpose of elucidating and explaining the oral testimony of Oscar Coombs. Cooper v. State, (1974) Ind., 309 N.E.2d 807; Leaver v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 523, 237 N.E.2d 368; Kiefer v. State, (1958) 239 Ind. 103, 153 N.E.2d 899. An additional exhibit was that of a color slide representing a picture taken at the funeral home which was apparently a post-autopsy picture of the decedent. In Warrenburg v. State, (1974) Ind., 298 N.E.2d 434, we said of post-autopsy pictures: "prosecutors and trial courts should exercise greater care and discretion to avoid allowing such irrelevant graphic portrayals into evidence." Id., at 436. However, as in Warrenburg, supra, we feel that the oral testimony was sufficient to render the error harmless.
Defendant made three (3) motions for pre-trial discovery all of which were denied. Defendant wished to discover three (3) items:
(1) copies of any written statements of witnesses whom the State expected to testify against the Defendant;
(2) a transcript of the grand jury proceedings;
(3) the names and addresses of all witnesses the State intended to call to testify at trial.
Insofar as the copies of witnesses' statements and grand jury proceedings are concerned, a defendant has a right, upon the laying of a proper foundation, to statements made by a witness to law enforcement officers and to the grand jury only after the witness has testified on direct examination. Antrobus v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 420, 254 N.E.2d 873. There is no right to a "transcript of the grand jury proceedings." The trial judge correctly denied these two pre-trial discovery motions.
In Bernard v. State, (1967) Ind., 230 N.E.2d 536, we held that unless the State makes a showing of paramount interest in non-disclosure, a defendant's request for a list of witnesses should be granted. We need not consider the question of the retroactivity of Bernard since there is to be a retrial at which time if the defendant requests *94 a list of witnesses the State must produce such a list or show a paramount interest in non-disclosure.
For the reasons stated, a new trial for appellant is hereby ordered.