Title: STATE v BLINZLER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14631 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- BRUCE R. BLINZLER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial ~istrict, Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. i Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James D. Moore, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ted 0 . Lympus, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: August 2, 1979 Filed: SE[ " 1973 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellant w a s convicted on two counts of p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a c t i c without a l i c e n s e i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 37- 12-301, MCA, following a j u r y t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable James M. Salansky p r e s i d i n g . H e was sentenced t o pay a f i n e of $200 on each count, and he appeals from t h a t judgment. Appellant i s a n a t u r o p a t h i c physician p r a c t i c i n g i n a s s o c i a t i o n with Kenneth L. P i l l e r i n K a l i s p e l l , Montana, having come t h e r e from t h e S t a t e of Pennsylvania where he had p r a c t i c e d a s a n a t u r o p a t h i c and c h i r o p r a c t i c physician f o r a period of some t e n years. I n 1977 D r . B l i n z l e r became i n t e r e s t e d i n moving t o Montana and submitted an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a Montana c h i r o p r a c t i c l i c e n s e . Before coming t o t h e s t a t e he contacted D r . Ronald R. Hoye, p r e s i d e n t of t h e National Association of Naturopathic Physicians and S t a n l e y Crowe, a Boise a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l associa- t i o n , t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e l e g a l requirements t o p r a c t i c e i n t h e S t a t e of Montana. H e was informed t h a t Montana had no requirement f o r t h e l i c e n s i n g r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r a c t i c e of naturopathy. A f t e r c o n f e r r i n g with D r . Hoye and M r . Crowe i n Idaho, a p p e l l a n t and D r . P i l l e r moved t o K a l i s p e l l where they opened up a n a t u r o p a t h i c c l i n i c . D r . Hoye advised him t h a t upon coming t o K a l i s p e l l he should c o n t a c t D r . ~ e r l i n Anderson, a K a l i s p e l l n a t u r o p a t h i c physician who had prac- ticed i n t h e a r e a some 20 years. O n December 20, 1977, informations w e r e f i l e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t , Bruce B l i n z l e r , and h i s a s s o c i a t e charging them w i t h p r a c t i c i n g medicine without a l i c e n s e and p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a c t i c without a l i c e n s e , both ~ i s t r i c t Court misde- meanors. Appellant herein was charged with two counts of chiropractic and one count of medicine. He entered pleas of not guilty to these charges. Subsequently, the information was amended on April 4, 1978, when three counts were added against appellant. Again, on July 21, 1978, the information was amended and appellant ended up being charged with a total of seven counts of either practicing medicine or practicing chiropractic without a license. To all of these charges, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial by jury followed. Prior to going to the jury, one count of practicing chiropractic without a license was dismissed. Appellant was acquitted of the four counts of practicing medicine and was found guilty on two counts of practicing chiropractic. From the verdict and judgment, appellant appeals. The issues presented for our consideration are: 1. Whether the statutes under which appellant was prosecuted violate the due process clause and equal protec- tion clause of the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution? 2. In the event the statutes are constitutional, was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions? 3. Do the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Montana Constitutions bar the convictions? The first issue before this Court is the question of whether the charges are specific enough to satisfy due process. We first note that the constitutional validity of the definition of "medicine" as set forth in section 37-3- I 102r(a), MCA, is not before the Court in this case. Much of appellant's brief concerns the practice of medicine and the statutes controlling the same; however, in this case, appel- l a n t was n o t convicted of unlawfully p r a c t i c i n g medicine under t h e s t a t u t e i n question. On t h o s e charges t h e jury r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l , and t h e r e can be no preju- d i c e shown i n t h i s case i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of s e c t i o n 37-3- i 1027a), MCA. Appellant, t h e r e f o r e , l a c k s standing t o chal- lenge i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . A s t h i s Court noted i n S t a t e ex rel. Hauswirth v. Beadle, e t al. (1931), 90 Mont. 24, 27, 300 P. 197, t h i s Court w i l l n o t consider moot p o i n t s . There, t h e Court noted : "The q u e s t i o n presented i s moot. (See S t a t e ex rel. Rankin v. Martin, 65 Mont. 323, 211 P. 210; Honstain v. Board of County Commissioners, 52 Mont. 391, 158 P. 476; Chesapeake Western Railway v. J a r d i n e , 56 App.D.C. 33, 8 F.2d 794.) This Court w i l l n o t p a s s on moot q u e s t i o n s . ( S t a t e ex rel. OIGrady v. D i s t r i c t Court, 58 Mont. 695, 198 P. 1117; S t a t e ex rel. Rankin v. Martin, supra; S t a t e v. Knilans, 69 Mont. 8 , 220 P. 91; S t a t e ex rel. S t . George v. J u s t i c e Court, 84 Mont. 173, 274 P. 495.)" Therefore, t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 37-3- 1 0 2 ( a ) , MCA, was rendered a moot q u e s t i o n by t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l on t h e counts charged under t h a t sec- t i o n . Appellant was convicted only of t h e unlawful prac- t i c i n g of c h i r o p r a c t i c , and t h e r e f o r e o n l y t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of t h a t s t a t u t e i s properly b e f o r e t h e Court, v i z . , s e c t i o n 37-12-101 ( 2 ) , MCA, d e f i n i n g t h e p r a c t i c e of c h i r o p r a c t i c . W e a r e faced, t h e r e f o r e , with t h e q u e s t i o n of whether s e c t i o n 37-12-101(2), MCA, i s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c and d e t a i l e d t o s a t i s f y t h e requirements of due process. Sub- s e c t i o n (2) of t h i s s t a t u t e reads: " ' C h i r o p r a c t i c ' i s a system of s p e c i f i c a d j u s t - ment o r manipulation of t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n s and t i s s u e s of t h e body, p a r t i c u l a r l y of t h e s p i n a l column, f o r c o r r e c t i o n of nerve i n t e r f e r e n c e and i n c l u d e s t h e use of recognized d i a g n o s t i c and treatment methods as t a u g h t i n c h i r o p r a c t i c c o l l e g e s b u t does n o t i n c l u d e surgery o r t h e p r e s c r i p t i o n o r u s e of drugs." To summarize t h e argument of a p p e l l a n t , he contends t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e p r a c t i c e of c h i r o p r a c t i c c o n t a i n s a n i n d e f i n i t e term--"specific adjustment o r mani- pulation"--which i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by e x p e r t s i n t h e f i e l d of c h i r o p r a c t i c . H e f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e p u b l i c cannot be expected t o provide t h e c o n t e n t f o r t h i s t e r m when e x p e r t s a r e unable t o a g r e e a s t o i t s meaning, and t h a t t h e s t a t u t e is t h e r e f o r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. Noting t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c h i r o p r a c t i c , a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t nowhere a r e t h e t e r m s " s p e c i f i c adjustment" o r " a r t i c u - l a t i o n s and t i s s u e s " defined. Therefore, he says, t h e s t a t u t e has an incomprehensible standard t o t h e members of t h e p u b l i c and p l a c e s a heavy burden upon a defendant. With regard t o t h e heavy burden placed on a defendant, a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h e s t a t u t e provides no a s c e r t a i n a b l e standard of conduct a g a i n s t which he might reasonably have measured h i s conduct a s a naturopath, noting: ". . . There must be a s c e r t a i n a b l e s t a n d a r d s of g u i l t . Men o f common i n t e l l i g e n c e cannot be r e q u i r e d t o guess a t t h e meaning of t h e enact- ment. The vagueness may be from u n c e r t a i n t y i n regard t o persons w i t h i n t h e scope of t h e a c t , Lanzetta v. New J e r s e y , 306 U.S. 451, o r i n re- gard t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e tests t o a s c e r t a i n g u i l t . " Winters v. New York (1948), 333 U.S. 507, 515- 516, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840. I n Winters t h e Supreme Court went on t o note: "'Where t h e s t a t u t e u s e s words of no determina- t i v e meaning, o r t h e language i s s o g e n e r a l and i n d e f i n i t e as t o embrace n o t only a c t s commonly recognized a s r e p r e h e n s i b l e , b u t a l s o o t h e r s which it i s unreasonable t o presume w e r e intended t o be made c r i m i n a l , it w i l l be d e c l a r e d void f o r u n c e r t a i n t y . ' " 333 U.S. a t 516, quoting S t a t e v. Diamond (1921), 27 N.M. 477, 485, 202 P. 988, 991. Appellant argues t h a t , based on Winters, when a s t a t u t e i s s o vague a s t o make c r i m i n a l an innocent a c t t h e convic- ; . . 1 t i o n cannot be sustained. H. &i. Clack Co. v. P u b l i c S e r v i c e Commission (1933), 94 Mont. 488, 22 P.2d 1056. A t t r i a l , witnesses Bekkedahl, Vernon, Gorder, and Strunk t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e n a t u r e and t h e e x t e n t of a p p e l l a n t ' s treatment of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e S t a t e pro- duced t h e e x p e r t testimony of D r . Loren W e i s and D r . Walter Kaye, both l i c e n s e d c h i r o p r a c t o r s i n t h e S t a t e of Montana, who i d e n t i f i e d t h e movements p r a c t i c e d on Vernon and Gorder a s s p e c i f i c adjustments. D r . Weis i n a d d i t i o n described t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s p e c i f i c c h i r o p r a c t i c adjustments and nerve i n t e r f e r e n c e . The evidence introduced by a p p e l l a n t c o n f l i c t e d w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s evidence on t h e i s s u e of s p e c i f i c i t y . D r . Hoye, a naturopath, t e s t i f i e d t h a t manipulations done by a naturo- p a t h i n h i s p r a c t i c e d i f f e r from c h i r o p r a c t i c adjustments i n t h a t n a t u r o p a t h i c manipulations l a c k s p e c i f i c i t y . Appellant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e manipulations done on Vernon and Gorder w e r e g e n e r a l r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c . On t h e b a s i s of t h e c o n f l i c t i n g evidence presented t o t h e jury, t h e jury found a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y of p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a c t i c without a l i c e n s e . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Connally v. General Construction Company (1926), 269 U.S. 385, 391-92, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322, noted: "The q u e s t i o n whether given l e g i s l a t i v e enact- ments have been t h u s wanting i n c e r t a i n t y has f r e q u e n t l y been before t h i s c o u r t . I n some of t h e c a s e s t h e s t a t u t e s involved were upheld; i n o t h e r s , d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . The p r e c i s e p o i n t of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n some i n s t a n c e s i s n o t easy of statement. But it w i l l be enough f o r t h e p r e s e n t purposes t o say g e n e r a l l y t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e c o u r t upholding t h e s t a t u t e a s s u f f i c i e n t l y c e r t a i n , r e s t e d upon t h e conclusion t h a t they employed words o r phrases having a t e c h n i c a l o r o t h e r s p e c i a l meaning, w e l l enough known t o en- a b l e those w i t h i n t h e i r reach t o c o r r e c t l y apply them, Hygrade P r o v i s i o n Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348, o r a w e l l - s e t t l e d common law meaning, not- withstanding an element of degree i n t h e d e f i n i - t i o n a s t o which e s t i m a t e s might d i f f e r , Nash v. United S t a t e s , 299 U.S. 373, 376; I n t e r n a t i o n a l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, a t 223, o r , a s broadly s t a t e d by M r . Chief J u s t i c e White i n United S t a t e s v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92, ' t h a t , f o r reasons found t o r e s u l t e i t h e r from t h e t e x t of t h e s t a t u t e s involved o r t h e s u b j e c t s w i t h which they d e a l t , a standard of some s o r t was a f f o r d e d . ' . . ." W e f i n d t h a t t h i s c a s e f a l l s w i t h i n t h e f i r s t c l a s s i d e n t i f i e d i n Connally, supra. The t e r m " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t - ment o r manipulation" i s a s c i e n t i f i c t e r m having a r e a d i l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e d e f i n i t i o n w i t h i n t h e c h i r o p r a c t i c community, and a p p e l l a n t h e r e i n , a s a c h i r o p r a c t o r l i c e n s e d i n two s t a t e s , cannot a s s e r t a l a c k of n o t i c e of t h e meaning of t h e t e r m s . Viewing t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n , i n l i g h t of t h e con- d u c t of which a p p e l l a n t was convicted, most c e r t a i n l y a p p e l l a n t was given adequate n o t i c e of t h e kind of conduct t h a t t h e s t a t u t e p r o s c r i b e s . Although no p a r t i c u l a r mental s t a t e i s i d e n t i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 37-12-301, MCA, t h e Montana Criminal Code c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e of chiro- p r a c t i c be done knowingly o r purposely t o c o n s t i t u t e an o f f e n s e . S e c t i o n 45-2-103(1), MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t i n - s t r u c t e d t h e jury i n t h e t e r m s i m i l a r t o t h e Idaho s t a t u t e r e l i e d upon i n Omaechevarria v. Idaho (1918), 246 U.S. 343, .3 38 S.Ct. 322, 62 L.Ed. 763, t h a t t h e a c t and i n t e n t must both be proved beyond a reasonable doubt t o s a t i s f y a convic- t i o n . Here, t h e testimony of two S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s , D r . W e i s and D r . Kaye, gave a d e f i n i t i o n of t h e t e r m " s p e c i f i c adjustment" upon which t h e jury could make a proper d e c i s i o n of what " s p e c i f i c adjustment" was, which was "when a person i s presented with a l o c a l i z e d c o n d i t i o n involving one o r two o r t h r e e v e r t e b r a e and i n t e n t i o n a l l y b r i n g s about a movement of these vertebrae to relieve that condition, he or she has performed a specific adjustment." The key to the query here is whether the statute in question provides a standard with meaningful differentiation between culpable and innocent conduct. Under section 37-12- 301, MCA, such a standard exists: there can be no statutory violation unless the adjustment in question is shown to be specific and intentional. It is manifest in this case that "specificity" provides a meaningful standard. In fact, a lack of specificity resulted in the dismissal of one count in this case. The United States Supreme Court in Roth v. united States (19571, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, where they quoted from United States v. Petrillo (1947), 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877, had this to say: ". . . lack of precision is not itself offen- sive to the requirements of due process. ' . . . [Tlhe Constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the prescribed conduct when measured by the common understanding and practices. . .' . . .'That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which the particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the lan- guage too ambiguous to define a criminal of- fense . . . f 11 Here appellant was a chiropractor by profession and training. Since he was unlicensed in Montana, and during the time the offense was committed had an application in to be licensed in Montana as a chiropractor, the law placed the responsibility on him to assure that his practice of naturo- pathy be performed with no chiropractic movements. The fact that the law required appellant to make a choice, and ex- tracted a penalty when his judgment proved incorrect, does not invalidate the statute. As noted in the United States Supreme Court case of Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman (1925), 266 U.S. 497, 502, 45 S.Ct. 141, 69 L.Ed. 402: "If exceptional cases may sometimes arise where opinions might differ, that is no more than is likely to occur, and does occur, in respect to many criminal statutes either upheld against attack or never assailed as indefinite." Here, appellant chose to perform a manipulation which the jury found to be specific and therefore prohibited to all except licensed chiropractors. The next issue raised is whether the record reflects substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Appel- lant argues that there is no evidence establishing that the treatment of Vernon and Gorder involved specific adjustment or that the treatments were for the purpose of relieving nerve interference. A review of the record discloses that this contention is without merit. A brief review of the facts show that Vernon testified that she went to appellant's office complaining of a "rib out." She stated that appellant told her he could put it in place. According to her testimony, appellant then placed his knee on the place indicated by her and pulled her arms back, causing pain. Gorder testified to a treatment of his lower back. He testified that he told appellant he had lower back problems. He was placed lying on his stomach, and appellant told him one of his vertebrae was lower than the other in the lower back. Appellant then pushed down on his back and it sounded like "bones moving." While appellant argues that there is no expert testimony to establish that these were specific adjustments, Dr. weis t e s t i f i e d t h a t p l a c i n g a knee and p u l l i n g back on t h e shoulders was " p r e t t y s p e c i f i c . " "When you have your knee i n one p a r t i c u l a r s p o t , l i k e a g a i n s t a r i b , o r where t h e r i b j o i n s t h e v e r t e b r a , you have a p a r t i c u l a r s p o t . " This Court has o f t e n s t a t e d t h a t a jury v e r d i c t based on s u b s t a n t i a l evidence w i l l be s u s t a i n e d on appeal. See, S t a t e v. Pankow (1959), 134 Mont. 519, 522, 333 P.2d 1017. S u b s t a n t i a l evidence was presented h e r e from which t h e jury could conclude t h a t t h e treatment of Vernon and Gorder involved s p e c i f i c adjustments f o r r e l i e f of nerve i n t e r - ference. Therefore, t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d . Appellant n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t he was subjected t o double jeopardy by t h e charges of t h e S t a t e . H e argues t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e t o elect between Counts I and 11, which charged p r a c t i c e of c h i r o p r a c t i c on Bekkedahl, J u l i a Vernon, and L e e Gorder, and Counts I V through V I , charging t h e p r a c t i c e of medicine on t h e same p a t i e n t s f o r t h e same conduct, subjected him t o double jeopardy. H e argues t h a t under t h e r e c e n t case of S t a t e ex rel. McKenzie v. District Court (1974), 165 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1211, t h i s Court adopted a so-called "same t r a n s a c t i o n " test and abandoned t h e t r a d i - t i o n a l "same f a c t s " r u l e . Since t h e counts c l e a r l y a r o s e from t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n , it is argued t h a t t h e f a i l u r e by t h e S t a t e t o elect between p r a c t i c i n g medicine and p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a t i c subjected a p p e l l a n t t o double jeopardy. W e f i n d no m e r i t t o t h i s argument. The F i f t h Amendment of t h e United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n provides t h a t no person " s h a l l be s u b j e c t f o r t h e same o f f e n s e t o be t w i c e p u t i n jeopardy of l i f e o r limb." his p r o h i b i t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e t o state a c t i o n s under t h e "due process" c l a u s e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment of t h e United *.- ' S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . North Carolina v. P k r c e (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. I t p r o t e c t s of- f e n d e r s from m u l t i p l e punishment f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . Ex P a r t e Lange (1873), 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163, 21 L.Ed. 872, and Kohlfus-2v. Warden (1962), 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626. Montana's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r providing t h a t "no person s h a l l be a g a i n p u t i n jeopardy f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . . . I ' 1972 Ilont. Const., A r t . 11, S25. I n a r e c e n t c a s e , S t a t e v . Davis (1978), Mont. , 577 P.2d 375, 377, 35 St.Rep. 381, t h i s Court considered t h e i s s u e r a i s e d h e r e and held: "This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y quoted w i t h approval t h e following holding from t h e Massachusetts c a s e of Morey v. Commonwealth (1871), 108 Mass. 433, 434: I' 1 . . . A s i n g l e a c t may be an o f f e n s e a g a i n s t two s t a t u t e s ; and i f each s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s proof of a n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t which t h e o t h e r does n o t , an a c q u i t t a l o r c o n v i c t i o n under e i t h e r s t a t u t e does n o t exempt t h e defendant from prosecution and punishment under t h e o t h e r . ' " S t a t e v. Marchindo (1923), 65 Mont. 431, 446, 211 P. 1093; S t a t e v. Lagerquist (1968), 152 Mont. 21, 30, 445 P.2d 910; S t a t e v. McDonald (1971), 158 Mont. 307, 310, 491 P.2d 711. See a l s o Blockburger v. United S t a t e s (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306; Gore v. United S t a t e s (1958), 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L ed 2d 1405." Here, t h e s t a t u t e s set f o r t h s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e designed f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of completely d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e s . Therefore, a p p e l l a n t s u f - f e r e d no v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s under e i t h e r t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t double jeopardy i s a l s o s t a t u - t o r y i n Montana. S e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, provides: "When t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e com- mission of more than one o f f e n s e , a person charged w i t h such conduct may be prosecuted f o r each such o f f e n s e . H e may n o t , however, be convicted of more than one o f f e n s e i f : " (1) one o f f e n s e i s included i n t h e o t h e r ; " Under this statute appellant suffered no violation unless he was convicted of two offenses, one of which is included in the other. The mere charging of included of- fenses involves no violation of appellant's rights, nor are his rights infringed upon if the State fails to elect or charge in the alternative as long as a defendant is not convicted of both offenses. Here, appellant was convicted of two counts of practicing chiropractic without a license involving the treatment of two different patients on dif- ferent occasions. These convictions are not subject to, nor do they violate, the double jeopardy provision. We note in closing that appellant argues that the State no longer follows "the same facts" rule but has now adopted the so-called "same transaction" test. We find this argu- ment erroneous. In the recent case of State v. Perry (1979), . . Mont. , 590 P.2d 1199, 36 St.Rep. 291, this Court - applied Montana's statutory same facts rule, section 46-11- 501(2)(a), MCA. Perry involved an issue similar to the one raised in State ex rel. McKenzie v. District Court, supra, which is fully consistent with the holding in Perry. We noted in McKenzie: "The joinder provisions of section 95- 1504, R.C.M. 1947 [now section 46-11-404, MCA], are highly flexible. Part (a) therefore permits an information to charge two or more different offenses, connected together in their commission. . ." McKenzie, 165 Mont. at 62. Appellant argues that the offenses arising from the same transaction generally must be prosecuted together to avoid double jeopardy. However, where, as here, the State prosecutes "the same transaction" offenses together, double jeopardy is implicated under section 46-11-502, MCA, only if a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one of which is included in the other. Here, appellant suffered no such dual convictions, and his double jeopardy claim is therefore without merit. Finding no prejudicial error, the convictions are affirmed. We concur: 2L-Q J. % a d 4 Chief Justice %&,&/ Justices