Title: Comcast v. Board of Supervisors

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMCAST OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, INC. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.   Record No. 080946 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
February 27, 2009 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal involves a dispute between the Board of 
Supervisors of Chesterfield County (County) and Comcast of 
Chesterfield County, Inc. (Comcast) concerning the County's 
classification of certain personal property used by Comcast in 
its cable television business as tangible personal property 
pursuant to Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2a).  The issue before the 
circuit court was whether the contested property falls under the 
"machines and tools" exception to the statutory classification 
of personal property used in cable television businesses as 
intangible, and is thereby taxable by the County. 
The County, however, asks this Court to dismiss the appeal 
as improvidently granted because the circuit court's order from 
which Comcast noted its appeal is not a final order and, thus, 
is not an appealable order.  Because we agree with the County, 
we conclude the Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the 
merits of the appeal.  Thus, we will dismiss the appeal without 
prejudice as improvidently granted. 
 
1
I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The County's Office of the Commissioner of the Revenue 
(Commissioner) conducted an audit to determine which items of 
Comcast's personal property used in its cable television 
business is taxable by the County.  Upon completion of the 
audit, the Commissioner sent Comcast supplemental tax 
assessments for tax years 2003 through 2006.  In a letter dated 
May 2, 2006 accompanying the supplemental tax assessments, a 
Deputy Commissioner explained, "[t]he property that is not 
taxable and has been identified as intangible personal property 
and exempt from local taxation is tuners, converters, 
amplifiers, power supplies, and radios."1 
Comcast paid the supplemental personal property taxes but 
requested the Commissioner to classify electronics and modems as 
intangible personal property.  In response, the Commissioner 
decided "electronics, modems, and converters are machines or 
equipment that is taxable as tangible personal property [and] 
have not been statutorily defined as intangible personal 
property."  As a result of the Commissioner's determination, the 
                     
1 The Commissioner apparently conducted what is referred to 
as a "statutory assessment" pursuant to Code §§ 58.1-3519 and -
3903, using the best available information, because Comcast had 
not responded to previous requests to produce an itemized list 
of personal property.  In the May 2, 2006 letter, the Deputy 
Commissioner stated that the County had "requested several times 
detailed asset information to include description, date of 
acquisition, and purchase cost for each item of property." 
 
2
County issued a second supplemental assessment for personal 
property taxes on Comcast's converters.  Comcast also paid these 
additional taxes. 
Pursuant to Code § 58.1-3984, Comcast filed a "Complaint 
For Correction Of Erroneous Assessments" for tax years 2003 
through 2006, alleging: (1) the County had no legal authority to 
tax Comcast's "plant electronics" and "customer premises 
equipment"2 because they are classified as intangible personal 
property under Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2a), thereby rendering the 
assessments "illegal and invalid" (Counts 1 through 8); and (2) 
the taxes assessed on certain property had already been paid 
(Counts 9 and 10).3  In its complaint, Comcast did not challenge 
the County's methodology in determining the value of the 
contested personal property or the actual valuation placed on 
the property.  
Instead, Comcast challenged the legal authority of the 
County to tax the contested business personal property and 
requested a refund of the amounts paid by Comcast for the 
County's assessment of its "plant electronics" and "customer 
                     
2 Comcast separates the contested property into two 
categories, "plant electronics" and "customer premises 
equipment."  "Plant electronics" include amplifiers, power 
supplies, receiver/transmitter pairs, and taps.  "Customer 
premises equipment" includes converters, remote controls, and 
cable modems. 
3 Comcast subsequently nonsuited counts 9 and 10. 
 
3
premises equipment."  The County in large part denied Comcast's 
allegations. 
As the case proceeded, the County served interrogatories 
and requests for production of documents asking Comcast, among 
other things, to "separately identify [for the tax years 2003 
through 2006] each and every individual component or item of 
tangible personal or business property owned by Comcast with 
situs in Chesterfield County" that falls within Comcast's 
categories of property referred to in its complaint.  Because 
the County believed Comcast did not adequately respond to its 
discovery requests, the County filed a motion to compel under 
Rule 4:12, requesting the circuit court to order Comcast "to 
produce the records and information it is required to produce 
pursuant to . . . Code §§ 58.1-3518 and –3983.1(K) and the 
County's discovery requests." 
At a hearing on its motion to compel, the County argued 
that the motion should be granted because in every erroneous tax 
assessment case filed under Code § 58.1-3984, the provisions of 
Code § 58.1-3987 require the circuit court to determine the 
correct assessed value of the property.  Continuing, the County 
argued that the information sought in its discovery requests is 
necessary for the circuit court to make that determination and 
the motion therefore should be granted. 
 
4
Comcast took the position that, since it did not challenge 
the County's valuation of the contested property, the circuit 
court was limited to the issue presented in its complaint 
concerning the authority of the County to tax the contested 
property.  Comcast conceded the valuation placed upon the 
contested property by the County was correct; therefore, Comcast 
argued, the issue of valuation, and thus the information 
requested, was irrelevant. 
At the conclusion of this hearing, the circuit court took 
the motion to compel under advisement and "bifurcated" the 
proceeding into the classification issue and the valuation 
issue, which included the motion to compel and the relevancy of 
the information requested in the County's discovery requests.  
The circuit court recognized that if it decided the contested 
property was not taxable by the County, then the valuation issue 
would be irrelevant and any information demanded in the motion 
to compel would likewise be irrelevant.  
At a subsequent hearing before the circuit court on the 
classification issue, the question whether Comcast's "plant 
electronics" and "customer premises equipment" are taxable by 
the County under Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2a) turned on the 
definition of the term "machines" under the "machines and tools" 
exception contained in the statute.  The County urged the 
circuit court to define "machines" as "[m]echanically, 
 
5
electrically, or electronically-operated device[s] for 
performing a task," or "any system or device, such as an 
electronic computer, that performs or assists in the performance 
of a human task."  The County argued that the definition of 
"machines" should be ascertained with reference to the 
provisions of Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2a) since the statute refers 
to personal property used in the cable television business. 
In response, Comcast argued that Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2a) 
must be narrowly construed in favor of the taxpayer and that the 
broad definition urged by the County "would leave virtually none 
of Comcast's property outside of the exception."  Accordingly, 
Comcast argued that the definition of "machines" should include 
only "device[s] consisting of fixed and moving parts that 
modifies mechanical energy and transmits it in a more useable 
form." 
In a letter opinion, the circuit court concluded the 
business personal property at issue is subject to taxation by 
the County.  In an order dated February 15, 2008, the circuit 
court ruled that 
the items of property at issue are "machines" under 
the plain meaning of that word and are, therefore, 
items of property properly classified as business 
tangible personal property under [Code § 58.1-
1101(A)(2a)].  
 
 
6
At a hearing before the circuit court to discuss the 
language of the above order, the parties returned to the motion 
to compel that the court had previously taken under advisement.  
The County asserted that based on the circuit court's decision 
regarding the classification issue, the court should grant the 
motion to compel so that the question of valuation could be 
decided.  Comcast argued, as it had previously, that the 
information sought by the County in its discovery requests was 
irrelevant and the February 15, 2008 order resolved all of the 
issues raised in Comcast's complaint. 
The circuit court again took the motion to compel under 
advisement and requested the parties to submit briefs on the 
question whether it was still necessary for the court to 
determine the assessed value of the contested property.  On 
February 25, 2008, Comcast filed a notice of appeal from the 
circuit court's order of February 15, 2008.  In the notice, 
Comcast stated the circuit court's order, "which construes [Code 
§ 58.1-1101(A)(2a)] as imposing taxes on certain Comcast 
property, may be immediately appealed pursuant to . . . Code 
§§ 8.01-670(1)(f) and (g)."  
II. ANALYSIS 
The County challenges the Court's jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal and moves to dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted.  
"[T]he question of jurisdiction is one for the determination of 
 
7
the appellate court only.  Before the merits of this case can be 
considered, this [C]ourt must determine whether it has 
jurisdiction."  Madison v. Kroger Grocery & Bakery Co., 160 Va. 
303, 306, 168 S.E. 353, 354 (1933); see also Todd v. Gallego 
Mills Mfg. Co., 84 Va. 586, 598, 5 S.E. 676, 681 (1888). 
"While by statute an appeal may be taken from certain 
interlocutory orders as well as from final decrees, a writ of 
error does not lie except where there has been a final order or 
judgment in the cause."  Hatke v. Globe Indem. Co., 167 Va. 184, 
188, 188 S.E. 164, 166 (1936) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also Johnston v. Johnston, 181 Va. 357, 359, 25 
S.E.2d 274, 275 (1943) ("Appellate jurisdiction presupposes 
either a final decree or an adjudication of the principles of a 
cause.  The latter may be interlocutory. . . . Until a final 
decree, or one adjudicating the principles of the cause, is 
properly brought before this [C]ourt, it is without power to 
exert its appellate jurisdiction."); Elder v. Harris, 75 Va. 68, 
71 (1880) ("Only in a case in chancery is a party authorized to 
appeal from a decree or order which is not final, and then only 
from such decree or order as is described in the foregoing 
[jurisdictional statute].").4  Thus, for the Court to have 
                     
4 The jurisdictional statute in Elder authorized 
interlocutory appeals under substantially the same circumstances 
as those set forth in current Code § 8.01-670(B). 
 
8
jurisdiction of this appeal, the order from which Comcast 
appealed must be either a final order or an interlocutory order 
from which an appeal is statutorily authorized.5 
A. Final Order 
The County asserts the February 15, 2008 order is not a 
final order.  Reiterating the position it took in the circuit 
court, the County argues that the provisions of Code § 58.1-3987 
require a trial court, when deciding an erroneous tax assessment 
action, to determine the correct assessed value of a taxpayer's 
property.  Thus, the County argues "the circuit court has yet to 
perform its duty under § 58.1-3987 to determine what property 
Comcast actually owned during each of the 2003-2006 tax years, 
decide what the fair market value of that property is and assess 
the proper tax." 
Comcast, on the other hand, reasserts its position that the 
circuit court had no power to decide the valuation issue because 
Comcast only challenged the validity of the County's 
classification of the contested property in its complaint.  
Continuing, Comcast argues that because the February 15, 2008 
                     
5 The "severable interest rule" allowing the appeal of an 
interlocutory order in certain circumstances is not applicable 
to the case at bar.  See Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 
Va. 121, 127, 540 S.E.2d 123, 126 (2001) ("An interlocutory 
order which is final as to some but not all parties may in some 
circumstances be appealed before the case is concluded as to all 
defendants under the severable interests rule."). 
 
9
order disposed of that issue, the order is final and thus 
appealable.  
We have described a final order as one 
which disposes of the whole subject[,] gives all the 
relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to be 
done by the court, is only to be regarded as final.  
On the other hand, every decree which leaves anything 
in the cause to be done by the court is interlocutory 
as between the parties remaining in the court. 
 
Dearing v. Walter, 175 Va. 555, 561, 9 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1940).  
See also James v. James, 263 Va. 474, 481, 562 S.E.2d 133, 137 
(2002) (a final order is one that " 'disposes of the whole 
subject, gives all the relief contemplated . . . and leaves 
nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend 
ministerially the execution of the order' ") (quoting Daniels v. 
Truck & Equipment Corp., 205 Va. 579, 585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 
(1964)); Ragan v. Woodcroft Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 
327, 497 S.E.2d 740, 743 (1998) ("A final order or judgment is 
one that disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all 
relief contemplated."). 
Applying these principles, we hold that the February 15, 
2008 order of the circuit court classifying the contested 
property as "machines" was not a final order.  The record 
clearly reveals matters that remained for the circuit court to 
 
10
resolve at the time Comcast filed its notice of appeal.6  See 
Dearing, 175 Va. at 561, 9 S.E.2d at 338.  The circuit court 
bifurcated the proceedings in order to decide the classification 
issue first, and if necessary, to decide the valuation issue.  
When Comcast filed its notice of appeal, the circuit court was 
awaiting briefs from the parties in order to assist the court in 
deciding whether it should grant the County's motion to compel 
and conduct a valuation of Comcast's property.  Clearly, there 
was more to be done in this case than to superintend 
ministerially the execution of the February 15, 2008 order.  See 
James, 263 Va. at 481, 562 S.E.2d at 137.  Therefore, the order 
was not a final order.7 
B. Appealable Interlocutory Order 
Since the circuit court's February 15, 2008 order was not a 
final order, the remaining question is whether it was 
nevertheless appealable as an interlocutory order.  In that 
regard, Comcast, quoting Code §§ 8.01-670(A)(1)(f) and (g), 
argues that this Court has jurisdiction of its appeal because 
                     
6 Additionally, in its notice of appeal, Comcast tacitly 
conceded that the February 15, 2008 order was not a final order 
by stating that the order "may be immediately appealed."  
7 We need not decide the County's assertion that Code 
§ 58.1-3987 requires a circuit court in every tax assessment 
case to determine the correct assessed value of the taxpayer's 
property.  It is sufficient that the circuit court in this case 
had not yet ruled on whether it had to do so when Comcast filed 
its notice of appeal. 
 
11
the February 15, 2008 order is a " 'judgment in a controversy 
concerning' . . . '[t]he right of . . . a county . . . to levy 
. . . taxes' [and regarding] '[t]he construction of [a] statute 
. . . imposing taxes,' " and "Comcast is a 'taxpayer aggrieved 
by the action' of the circuit court."  Comcast asserts that Code 
§ 8.01-670(A)(3), in contrast to § 8.01-670(A)(1)(f) and (g), 
explicitly requires a "final judgment" before appealing "any 
other civil case."  Thus, according to Comcast, the "General 
Assembly did not make finality a prerequisite for appeals under" 
Code §§ 8.01-670(A)(1)(f) and (g). 
The County responds that there is no statutory 
authorization for an interlocutory appeal in an erroneous tax 
assessment case.  The County asserts "the purpose behind § 8.01-
670(A)(1) (formerly § 8-462) was to provide a listing of cases 
that could be appealed to this Court even if the amount of 
controversy was less than the jurisdictional minimum in place at 
the time, not to grant authority for interlocutory appeals."  
The County insists that "interlocutory appeals are only 
available in chancery cases and only in those chancery cases 
prescribed by statute."  The County contends that, in an action 
at law, an order must be a final order to be appealable.  
The Court agrees with the County that the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-670(A)(1) set forth the types of controversies that 
are exempt from the amount in controversy otherwise required for 
 
12
this Court to have appellate jurisdiction over a particular 
civil case.  The statute does not authorize the appeal of 
interlocutory orders in those particular controversies. 
We begin our analysis by looking at the two relevant 
statutes, Code §§ 8.01-672 and -670.  The former provides: 
No petition shall be presented for an appeal from any 
judgment of a circuit court except in cases in which 
the controversy is for a matter of $500 or more in 
value or amount, and except in cases in which it is 
otherwise expressly provided; nor to a judgment of any 
circuit court when the controversy is for a matter 
less in value or amount than $500, exclusive of costs, 
unless there be drawn in question a freehold or 
franchise or the title or bounds of land, or some 
other matter not merely pecuniary. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
The provisions of Code § 8.01-670 state, in relevant part: 
A. 
Except as provided by § 17.1-405, any person may 
present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme 
Court if he believes himself aggrieved: 
1. 
By any judgment in a controversy concerning: 
a. The title to or boundaries of land, 
b. The condemnation of property, 
c. The probate of a will, 
d. The appointment or qualification of a 
personal representative, guardian, 
conservator, committee, or curator, 
e. A mill, roadway, ferry, wharf, or landing, 
f. The right of the Commonwealth, or a county, 
or municipal corporation to levy tolls or 
taxes, or 
g. The construction of any statute, ordinance, 
or county proceeding imposing taxes; or 
 
13
2. 
By the order of a court refusing a writ of quo 
warranto or by the final judgment on any such 
writ; or 
3. 
By a final judgment in any other civil case. 
 
B. 
Except as provided by § 17.1-405, any party may 
present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme 
Court in any case on an equitable claim wherein 
there is an interlocutory decree or order: 
1. 
Granting, dissolving or denying an injunction; 
or 
2. 
Requiring money to be paid or the possession or 
title of property to be changed; or 
3. 
Adjudicating the principles of a cause. 
 
While not explicit in the current statutory scheme, this 
Court's jurisprudence makes it clear that the amount in 
controversy requirement set forth in Code § 8.01-672 applies  
"except in cases in which it is otherwise expressly provided," 
and that the types of controversies listed in Code §§ 8.01-
670(A)(1)(a)–(g) are those cases "otherwise expressly provided" 
as exempt from the amount in controversy requirement.  See 
Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v. Smith, 193 Va. 371, 
374, 68 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1952) (recognizing that former Code 
§ 8-462, now Code § 8.01-670, enumerated the cases excepted from 
the amount in controversy requirement set forth in former Code 
§ 8-464, now Code § 8.01-672, including those involving "[t]he 
right of the State, or a county, or municipal corporation to 
levy tolls or taxes" (emphasis omitted)); Schermerhorn v. 
Commonwealth, 107 Va. 707, 709-10, 60 S.E. 65, 66 (1908) (noting 
 
14
the constitutional provision limiting this Court's jurisdiction 
allows an exception to the amount in controversy requirement for 
"controversies concerning . . . the right of the state, county 
or municipal corporation to levy tolls or taxes, [or] involving 
the construction of any statute, ordinance or county proceedings 
imposing taxes"); see also Pannill v. Coles, 81 Va. 380, 383 
(1886) (" 'It (the Supreme Court of Appeals) shall not have 
jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount in controversy, 
exclusive of costs, is less in value or amount than five hundred 
dollars, except in controversies concerning the title or 
boundaries of land, the probate of a will,' &c., setting forth 
other exceptions." (quoting former Va. Const. art. VI, § 2 
(1870)); Neal v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 511, 515 
(1871) ("[T]his court shall not have appellate 'jurisdiction, in 
civil cases, where the matter in controversy, exclusive of 
costs, is less in value or amount than five hundred dollars, 
except in controversies concerning the title or boundaries of 
land, the probate of a will, the appointment or qualification of 
a personal representative, guardian, committee, or curator; or 
concerning a mill, road-way, ferry, or landing, or the right of 
a corporation or of a county to levy tolls, or taxes, and except 
in cases of habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition, or the 
constitutionality of a law.' " (quoting former Va. Const. art. 
VI, § 2 (1870)). 
 
15
In a case involving the operation of a ferry service, this 
Court found the order at issue was final and appealable under 
former Code § 8-462(1)(a)(v), which is substantially similar to 
current Code § 8.01-670(A)(1)(e).  New York, Philadelphia and 
Norfolk R.R. Ferry Co. v. County of Northampton, 196 Va. 412, 
420-21, 83 S.E.2d 773, 778 (1954).  There, the County of 
Northampton moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that "none of 
the orders entered by the trial court was final, and for that 
reason was not appealable."  Id. at 420, 83 S.E.2d at 778.  The 
Court held that the 
order denying the Railroad Ferry Company's prayer was 
final for it disposed of the whole subject-matter then 
before the court.  Hence, the order was reviewable 
under Code, section 8-462(1), which reads: "Any person 
who thinks himself aggrieved: (a) By any judgment, 
decree, or order in a controversy concerning, . . . 
(v) A mill, roadway, ferry, wharf, or landing . . .," 
may present a petition for a writ of error.  
 
Id. at 420-21, 83 S.E.2d at 778 (citation omitted).  Certainly, 
the Court would not have needed to determine if the order 
appealed from was final if a final order was not required for an 
appeal under that Code section. 
In Smiley v. The Provident Life & Trust Co., 106 Va. 787, 
790, 56 S.E. 728, 729 (1907), the petitioners argued that, prior 
to being amended, former Code § 3454 did not require a final 
order " 'in a controversy concerning the probate of a will or 
the appointment or qualification of a personal representative, 
 
16
guardian, curator or committee, or concerning a mill, roadway, 
ferry, wharf or landing,' before there could be an appeal or 
writ of error."  Id. (quoting former Code § 3454, now Code 
§ 8.01-670(A)(1)).  The petitioners further argued that an 
amendment placed " 'controversies concerning the title to or 
boundaries of land' " in the same class of controversies, and 
therefore, no final order was required for a writ of error to 
lie in an action of ejectment.  Id. (quoting former Code § 3454, 
now Code § 8.01-670(A)(1)). 
The Court rejected the argument that a final order was not 
required for a writ of error to lie in the controversies listed 
in former Code § 3454.  Id. at 790-91, 56 S.E. at 729-30.  The 
Court stated: 
If it were true that prior to the amendment of 
section 3454 an appeal or writ of error did lie from 
or to an order or judgment in that class of cases, 
although there had been no final judgment in the 
cause, the contention of the petitioners for the 
rehearing would be clearly right.  But prior to the 
amendment an appeal or writ of error did not lie in 
any case at law until there had been a final order or 
judgment in the cause.  There was a provision in that 
section that in any case in chancery wherein there is 
a decree or order dissolving an injunction or 
requiring money to be paid, or the possession or title 
of property to be changed or adjudicating the 
principles of a cause there might be an appeal 
although no final order or decree had been entered 
therein.  But there was nothing in the section, as 
construed by this court, which authorized a writ of 
error in any case at law until there had been a final 
judgment. 
 
17
Id. at 790-91, 56 S.E. at 729 (internal quotations omitted).  
See also Dove v. May, 201 Va. 761, 763-64, 113 S.E.2d 840, 841-
42 (1960) (holding the order appealed from in a condemnation 
proceeding was not a final, appealable order). 
We note that Code § 8.01-670(B) explicitly authorizes an 
appeal in cases of equity for an interlocutory decree 
"[g]ranting, dissolving or denying an injunction," "[r]equiring 
money to be paid or the possession or title of property to be 
changed," or "[a]djudicating the principles of a cause."  Code 
§ 8.01-670(B).  Additionally, the provisions of Code § 8.01-
670.1 permit the permissive appeal of interlocutory orders that 
would not otherwise be appealable when the appellate court 
determines the required certification by the circuit court has 
"sufficient merit."  Thus, we discern that, when the General 
Assembly authorizes the appeal of interlocutory orders, it does 
so in express and unambiguous terms.  In the absence of an 
express authorization in subsection (A)(1) of Code § 8.01-670 
allowing appeals of interlocutory orders in the types of 
controversies listed there, we will not infer such 
authorization. 
We are not persuaded otherwise because the General Assembly 
used the phrase "final judgment in any other civil case" in Code 
§ 8.01-670(A)(3), but utilized in Code § 8.01-670(A)(1) the 
phrase "any judgment in a controversy."  The term "judgment" is 
 
18
defined as "[a] court's final determination of the rights and 
obligations of the parties in a case.  The term judgment 
includes an equitable decree and any order from which an appeal 
lies."  Black's Law Dictionary 858 (8th ed. 2004).  Thus, the 
General Assembly's use of the term "judgment" in Code § 8.01-
670(A)(1) denotes a requirement of finality. 
We therefore hold that Code § 8.01-670(A)(1) does not 
authorize appeals of interlocutory orders in those types of 
controversies enumerated in that subsection.  To hold otherwise 
"would allow the appeal of countless interlocutory matters, 
including orders granting continuances, orders setting trial 
dates, orders determining venue, and orders providing for bills 
of particulars or the production of documents.  Manifestly, the 
legislature did not intend such a result."  Ragan, 255 Va. at 
328, 497 S.E.2d at 743.8 
III. CONCLUSION 
The order of the circuit court dated February 15, 2008, 
classifying the contested property as "machines," is not a final 
                     
8 This holding is consistent with the Court's treatment of 
Code § 16.1-106, the statute that provides for a circuit court's 
de novo review of a judgment rendered by a court not of record.  
See Ragan, 255 Va. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743 ("when Code § 16.1-
106 refers to an appeal from 'any order entered or judgment 
rendered in a court not of record in a civil case in which the 
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty dollars,' 
this language provides for an appeal only from final orders or 
judgments"). 
 
 
19
order and is not otherwise appealable as an interlocutory order.9  
Thus, the Court is without jurisdiction of this appeal.  We will 
dismiss the appeal without prejudice as improvidently granted. 
Dismissed. 
                     
9 Comcast asserts that, since Code § 58.1-3992 provides for 
an appeal to this Court by "[a]ny locality or taxpayer aggrieved 
by the action of a court of record" regarding the assessment of 
local taxes, while, in contrast, the parallel provision for 
appeals regarding taxes assessed by the Commonwealth, § 58.1-
1828, allows an appeal from "any final order of the court," 
(emphasis added), the General Assembly authorized an appeal from 
the interlocutory order in this case.  This distinction does not 
alter our conclusion.  Given this Court's longstanding 
jurisprudence requiring a final order in a case at law, we do 
not believe the General Assembly, by enacting these statutes, 
intended to provide an appeal from an interlocutory order in a 
case involving the assessment of taxes by a locality. 
 
20