Title: Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield1989 WY 105773 P.2d 158Case Number: 88-218Decided: 05/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHARON E. FISCUS AND 
DEWAYNE WUESTENBERG, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD, A DELAWARE 
CORPORATION, FORMERLY A PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

J. Douglas 
McCalla, Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, for appellants.

Patrick R. Day, 
Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, Jane Michaels, 
Geraldine A. Brimmer, and Russell S. Jones, Denver, Colo., 
for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Our task in this case 
is to ascertain whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact which 
would prevent the entry of summary judgment against Sharon E. Fiscus and DeWayne 
Wuestenberg (Appellants) in their action to recover damages for injuries to 
Fiscus. They contend that Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) assumed affirmative 
duties with respect to safety at the Black Thunder Mine where Fiscus worked and 
that it owned the piece of heavy equipment (an earth-moving scraper) that Fiscus 
was operating when she was injured while working. Appellants insist that the 
record demonstrates genuine issues with respect to material facts from which an 
independent duty owed to Appellants by ARCO could be found. We agree with the 
conclusion of the trial court that Appellants failed to demonstrate any genuine 
issue of material fact and that ARCO was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The summary judgment entered in favor of ARCO is 
affirmed.

[¶2.]     Appellants state the 
issues in this case to be:

"I. Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment to the defendant when there existed a 
genuine issue of material fact as to defendant's assumption of affirmative 
duties with respect to safety?

"II. Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment to the defendant despite defendant's 
ownership of the device that injured Sharon Fiscus?

ARCO sets forth 
only a single issue:

"I. Did the district 
court correctly decide that plaintiff had failed to come forward with any 
material facts demonstrating that ARCO had assumed a duty to the plaintiff as a 
matter of law?"

[¶3.]     This case comes before 
the court for the second time. In the first instance, the court addressed the 
dismissal of Appellants' complaint. We held that ARCO, the parent corporation of 
Thunder Basin Coal Company (ThunderBasin) and an independent entity, was not 
immune from suit because of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. We also held 
that Appellants' allegations of independent acts of negligence were sufficient 
to state a cause of action. Consequently, the court reversed the order of the 
trial court granting ARCO's Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 742 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶4.]     In the continuing saga, 
ARCO filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ARCO supported its motion by 
affidavits and other discovery materials establishing that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and asserted it was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The district court ruled that Appellants had failed to respond sufficiently 
to the summary judgment materials of ARCO and, pursuant to Rule 56, W.R.C.P., 
granted summary judgment against them. This appeal follows from that summary 
judgment.

[¶5.]     In support of their 
claim of an independent duty on the part of ARCO, Appellants emphasize their 
record presentation of certain evidence which they assert demonstrates genuine 
issues of material facts. They point to the Wyoming Workers Compensation 
Division record showing Sharon Fiscus to be an employee of ARCO and that the 
benefits she received came from ARCO's Wyoming workers' compensation account. They 
rely upon the fact that ARCO retained a fifty percent (50%) overriding royalty 
interest in the mine, and they mark the fact that the Bureau of Land Management 
continues to refer to mining leases relating to the ThunderBasin's Black Thunder Mine as jointly held by ARCO and 
ThunderBasin. Appellants contend 
that ARCO pays all taxes on the mine. More precisely, then, they show that ARCO 
officials paid visits to the mine which would average four times a day and that 
various ARCO officials did attend safety meetings conducted by Thunder Basin at 
the mine. They place a great deal of importance upon the fact that the president 
of Anaconda Minerals, another corporate subsidiary of ARCO, had sent a 
memorandum to ThunderBasin recommending the use of seat belts by the 
employees of ThunderBasin. Furthermore, Appellants contend 
that the record shows that ARCO reviewed the qualifications of, and interviewed 
all, safety directors before they were hired by ThunderBasin. There also is reliance upon the 
fact that ARCO had two representatives at the Black Thunder Mine who worked on 
ThunderBasin's training program 
and set policy in regard to training at the mine.

[¶6.]     We have adopted as the 
legal standard for the liability of a parent corporation the requirement that 
the parent assume some independent legal duty by retaining or exercising control 
over some aspect of the operation of a subsidiary corporation which was involved 
in the incident resulting in the plaintiff's injuries. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 
752 P.2d 1363 (Wyo. 1988); Fiscus, 742 P.2d 198. Essentially, 
this is the same test that is invoked in considering an owner's liability to the 
employee of a contractor. Cf. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986); Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160 
(Wyo. 1986). 
We have rejected any doctrine of respondeat superior resulting in liability on 
the part of a parent corporation for acts of its subsidiary. Fiscus. Cf. Noonan. 
The parent company is entitled to the same legal separation from its subsidiary, 
as well as the resulting protection from liability, that any individual 
shareholder enjoys with respect to a corporation in which stock is held. 
United 
States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 
1987).

[¶7.]     In light of the legal 
standard and the actual contentions of Appellants, we must test this case 
against our summary judgment standards. The essential purpose of the summary 
judgment procedure is to eliminate the expense and burden of a formal trial when 
only questions of law are involved. Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1975); Vipont Mining Company v. Uranium Research and 
Development Company, 376 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1962). We can approve and sustain a 
summary judgment only when persuaded that there is no genuine issue with respect 
to any material fact, and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Larsen v. Hall, 770 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987); Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985); Greaser v. Williams, 703 P.2d 327 (Wyo. 1985). Because 
summary judgment forecloses a trial on the merits, we do not lightly consider 
appeals from summary judgment. Larsen; Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 (Wyo. 1985). Conversely, however, we recognize 
that the beneficial purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if cases could 
be forced to trial simply by an assertion that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Noonan; Johnson; Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 
1974).

[¶8.]     The process for 
identifying genuine issues of material fact also is familiar. The moving party 
has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material 
fact and justifying its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Jones Land 
& Livestock Company v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987). This is a significant burden, 
particularly when we note that we examine the record from the perspective of the 
party opposing the motion and grant to that party the benefit of every favorable 
inference and reasonable doubt. Wessel; England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1986); Jones; Roth 
v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 
1984). Once that showing is presented by the moving party, however, the burden 
then shifts to the party defending against the motion to present for the record 
facts in the form of admissible evidence which structure a genuine issue of 
material fact. Dubus v. Dresser Industries, 649 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1982); Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 4, 636 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1981); Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1979); Rule 56(e), 
W.R.C.P.

[¶9.]     It does not matter how 
genuine a factual issue is; if it does not relate to a material fact, it cannot 
prevent the entry of a summary judgment. Johnson, 542 P.2d 867; Gladstone Hotel, 
Inc. v. Smith, 487 P.2d 329 (Wyo. 1971). In Johnson, 542 P.2d  at 871-72, 
this court defined a material fact as:

"* * * [O]ne having some 
legal significance, that is, under the law applicable to a given case, it would 
control in some way the legal relations of the parties; as one upon which the 
outcome of litigation depends in whole or in part; as one on which the 
controversy may be determined; as one which will affect the result or outcome of 
the case depending upon its resolution; and one which constitutes a part of the 
plaintiff's cause of action or of the defendant's defense. A fair summary of 
these definitions is that for purposes of ruling upon a motion for summary 
judgment a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or 
defense asserted by the parties." (Footnotes omitted.)

Such a fact must 
in some way control, define, or modify the legal relations of the parties in 
some tangible manner and, thus, have the clear effect of establishing or 
refuting the essential element of a claim or defense asserted by the parties. 
Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10.]  We also are mindful of our duty to 
examine the evidence in the same light as it was presented to the trial court. 
Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil, 750 P.2d 1321 (Wyo. 1988). In so doing, we view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to appellants and, as we have noted, give them the 
benefit of every reasonable inference and every doubt. Wessel; 
England; Jones; 
Roth.

[¶11.]  In this context, the facts which 
Appellants contend the record will support do not directly contravene the record 
showing made by ARCO that it did not retain the right to control or exercise 
control over the safety aspects of the Black Thunder Mine, over the mining 
operations, or over the scraper that Fiscus operated at the time of her 
injuries. Appellants must rely upon inferences to be drawn from those facts in 
order to structure a genuine issue of material fact that will avoid the summary 
judgment.

[¶12.]  This court has adjusted its position over 
the years with respect to the reliance upon inferences to structure a genuine 
issue of material fact in the context of a summary judgment. In Blackmore v. 
Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 1983), 
the court quoted from Forbes Company v. MacNeel, 382 P.2d 56 (Wyo. 1963), and 
said:

"* * * [T]hat an 
inference which is contrary to direct testimony is insufficient to support a 
finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists: * * 
*."

[¶13.]  The court went on to say that, even if it 
were to assume inferences favorable to the appellants in that case, those 
inferences could not stand against uncontroverted testimony to the contrary. 
This concept was applied in Reed v. Getter Trucking, Inc., 735 P.2d 1370 
(Wyo. 1987). 
It also had been invoked in Spurlock v. Ely, 707 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1985). In Kobielusz, 
701 P.2d  at 560-61, the court recognized the Blackmore case, but appeared to 
temper it with the following language:

"* * * Although we have 
held inferences contrary to direct testimony may not ordinarily support a finding, 
Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983); Forbes Company v. 
MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56 (1963), that determination usually depends upon the 
quality of evidence creating the inference and the direct 
testimony."

[¶14.]  In Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo. 
1988), the court attempted to resolve any apparent conflict between Blackmore 
and Kobielusz, noting the following additional language from Kobielusz, 701 P.2d 
at 562-63:

"`A reasonable inference 
is as truly evidence as the matter on which it is based, and is not a mere 
presumption or guess; appropriate inferences from proved facts are not a low 
order of evidence, but are just as valid as evidence as statements of 
eye-witnesses and are to be weighed by the jury along with the other evidence 
before it and may be strong enough to outweigh positive and direct oral 
statements. Whether or not they should be permitted to overcome positive and 
direct testimony depends, in every case, on the relative strength of the one or 
the other.' 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1044."

In Roosa, the 
court considered the concept of sequential inferences in the context of summary 
judgment and adopted the Wigmore view (1A Wigmore, Evidence § 41 (Tiller's rev. 
1983)) to the effect that an inference may be drawn from a fact that itself was 
inferred when the circumstances demonstrate no other reasonable theory or 
alternative inference with respect to the initial fact. Perhaps this is simply 
another way of comparing the quality of the inferred fact with the direct 
testimony. Kobielusz.

[¶15.]  Turning then to the matters upon which 
Appellants rely, it is not possible, under the most favorable view, to infer 
that ARCO had retained or exercised control over the operation of the Black 
Thunder Mine from the part of the record demonstrating that Sharon Fiscus was an 
employee of ARCO. Furthermore, that inference would have to be based upon 
Fiscus' status as an employee of ARCO, and her claim then would be barred by the 
workers' compensation provisions, which is contrary to the law of this case. In 
Fiscus, 742 P.2d 198, we held to the contrary. The retention of an overriding 
royalty interest in the Black Thunder Mine and the continual reference by the 
Bureau of Land Management to the leases being jointly held by ARCO and 
ThunderBasin does not lend itself to an inference of a 
retention of a right of control or the exercise of control over the activities 
of ThunderBasin. Those are nothing 
more than indicia of ownership, and that is insufficient under prior cases to 
justify the inference of a duty. Much the same is true of the contention that 
ARCO pays all taxes on the mine. The record clearly demonstrates the unified 
accounting procedures which were employed by these corporations, and those do 
not infringe upon their separate identity. Visits by ARCO officials to the Black 
Thunder Mine could be for the purpose of supervising operations, but there are 
many other valid purposes for those visits so that the inference of supervision 
definitely is not exclusive. Certainly, the same thing is true with respect to 
the attendance of ARCO officials at safety meetings. Drawing the inference from 
these latter two circumstances, retention of the right of control or the 
exercise of control which, Appellants contend, is nothing more than speculation. 
Appellants' argument perhaps serves to justify the rule of Blackmore. In any 
event, the quality of such inferences does not structure a genuine issue of 
material fact, in light of the direct evidence relating to the assumption of 
affirmative duties with respect to safety. The same is true of the fact that the 
president of another subsidiary forwarded a memorandum to ThunderBasin which recommended the use of seat 
belts by its employees. With respect to ARCO reviewing the qualifications of and 
interviewing safety directors before they were hired by ThunderBasin, the sequential inference concept is 
definitely pertinent. One would have to infer from those facts that ARCO 
retained the right to hire, and then would have to infer from the retained right 
to hire the retention of the right to exercise control over these individuals in 
their work for ThunderBasin. Finally, the mere availability of 
representatives of ARCO to assist with ThunderBasin's training program does not lead to an inference 
of the retention of right of control over the safety operations of ThunderBasin. We agree with the trial court that 
the circumstances relied upon by Appellants were insufficient to structure any 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to ARCO's assumption of some 
independent legal duty.

[¶16.]  We turn then to the fact of ownership of 
the scraper. The only evidence that Appellants rely upon is the initial purchase 
of the scraper by ARCO. Appellants rely upon a transfer by bill of sale to ARCO. 
The record demonstrates that the scraper was employed exclusively at the Black 
Thunder Mine, was maintained by ThunderBasin, was in its exclusive control, 
and was, in fact, amortized as a part of ThunderBasin's expenses. Such equipment is not 
titled in Wyoming and, thus, there is no certain 
inference that it still was owned by ARCO at the time of the accident. Even so, 
the mere possession of title does not manifest the retention of, or the exercise 
of, any right of control over this instrumentality. Consequently, any inference 
to be drawn from the ownership of the scraper does not serve to structure a 
genuine issue of material fact.

[¶17.]  In light of this record, there is no 
justification for a favorable inference to be drawn on behalf of Appellants to 
structure a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any legal duty owed 
by ARCO to Appellants. The trial court correctly discerned the essence of this 
case and properly entered a summary judgment in favor of ARCO. The judgment of 
the district court is affirmed.