Title: McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2744.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2744 
MCFEE; OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, APPELLEE, v. NURSING CARE 
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA, INC., D.B.A. PATASKALA OAKS  
CARE CENTER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2744.] 
An employment policy that imposes a uniform minimum-length-of-service 
requirement for leave eligibility with no exception for maternity leave is 
not direct evidence of sex discrimination under R.C. Chapter 4112. 
(No. 2009-0756 — Submitted January 13, 2010 — Decided June 22, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 08CA3000, 
181 Ohio App.3d 632, 2009-Ohio-1107. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An employment policy that imposes a uniform minimum-length-of-service 
requirement for leave eligibility with no exception for maternity leave is 
not direct evidence of sex discrimination under R.C. Chapter 4112. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
CUPP, J. 
I 
{¶ 1} In this case, a pregnant employee who took maternity leave before 
she was eligible under her employer’s uniform minimum-length-of-service 
requirements for leave eligibility of any kind was terminated for absence from her 
job.  We are asked whether the termination of that employee for violation of the 
uniform leave policy is direct evidence of sex discrimination under Ohio law. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that a uniform minimum-
length-of-service leave policy is not direct evidence of a violation of R.C. 
4112.02(A). The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
II 
{¶ 3} Tiffany McFee was employed by appellant, Nursing Care 
Management of America, Inc., d.b.a. Pataskala Oaks Care Center (“Pataskala 
Oaks”).  Upon hire, McFee received an employee handbook that contained 
Pataskala Oaks’ employment policy.  That policy required that an employee be 
employed for a period of one year before he or she would be eligible for any leave 
for any purpose. 
{¶ 4} Approximately eight months later, McFee presented to Pataskala 
Oaks a doctor’s note that stated that she was unable to work due to conditions 
related to pregnancy.  Soon thereafter McFee gave birth.  Three days after the 
birth, McFee’s employment was terminated.  The basis for the termination was 
McFee’s absence from her employment before she had become eligible for leave 
under the written employment policy. 
{¶ 5} McFee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 
appellee, claiming that her termination constituted unlawful sex discrimination on 
the basis of pregnancy. An administrative law judge recommended that the charge 
be dismissed. Nevertheless, the Civil Rights Commission rejected that 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
recommendation and found instead that Pataskala Oaks’ policy constituted 
unlawful sex discrimination.  Pataskala Oaks appealed. 
{¶ 6} On review, the Licking County Common Pleas Court held that 
Pataskala Oaks’ leave policy did not violate the antidiscrimination laws of Ohio 
and reversed the decision of the Civil Rights Commission. 
{¶ 7} On further appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the 
judgment of the common pleas court.  The court of appeals held that the 
antidiscrimination laws of Ohio expressly require that employers provide 
employees with a reasonable period of maternity leave.  Because Pataskala Oaks’ 
leave policy did not provide maternity leave for employees with less than one 
year of service, the court of appeals held that the policy violated the sex-
discrimination laws.  The court also held that the policy was direct evidence of 
discrimination and, therefore, McFee did not have the burden to offer other 
evidence of sex discrimination.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. 
{¶ 8} Pataskala Oaks appeals here from the decision of the Fifth District. 
It asserts that (1) an employer’s uniform minimum-length-of-service leave policy 
does not constitute direct evidence of a sex-discrimination violation, even when it 
is applied to employees who require leave for reasons related to pregnancy, (2) 
the laws in question cannot be interpreted to mandate maternity leave for 
employees who are not yet otherwise eligible for any leave, and (3) the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies in cases alleging sex 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy leave, thus requiring the claimant to 
offer evidence of discriminatory intent in a claim based on an employment policy 
that is nondiscriminatory on its face. 
III 
{¶ 9} R.C. 4112.02(A) provides that pregnant employees must be treated 
the same for employment-related purposes as employees who are not pregnant but 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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who are similar in their ability or inability to work.  See also R.C. 4112.01(B).  
Because the Ohio Administrative Code Sections promulgated by the Civil Rights 
Commission must be harmonized with this policy preference of the General 
Assembly, a mandatory maternity-leave requirement is absent from Ohio 
Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G)(2).  This means that a uniform minimum-length-of-
service leave policy is not direct evidence of sex discrimination and the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis should be applied in cases involving 
such a policy. 
A.  R.C. Chapter 4112 does not prohibit uniformly applied  
minimum-length-of-service leave requirements. 
{¶ 10} McFee was terminated from employment because she took leave 
from her job before she was eligible under Pataskala Oaks’ uniform leave policy.  
Regarding termination, R.C. 4112.02(A) provides: “It shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice * * * [f]or any employer, because of the * * * sex * * * of 
any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to 
discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to 
employment.” 
{¶ 11} R.C. 4112.01(B) provides that the term “because of sex” in R.C. 
4112.02(A) “include[s], but [is] not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, any illness arising out of and occurring during the course of a 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”  The second sentence of 
R.C. 4112.01(B) directs that pregnant women “shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes * * * as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work.” 
{¶ 12} Read together, those statutes provide that it is an unlawful 
discriminatory practice for an employer to terminate an employee because of 
pregnancy or a related condition without just cause. Because R.C. 4112.02(A) 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
allows an employer to terminate an employee for any nondiscriminatory reason 
and R.C. 4112.01(B) directs that pregnant employees be treated “the same for all 
employment-related purposes * * * as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work,” the statutes do not impose a per se ban on the 
termination of every employee affected by pregnancy. 
{¶ 13} The phrase “treated the same” in R.C. 4112.01(B) ensures that 
pregnant employees will receive the same consideration as other employees “not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Thus, the statute does 
not provide greater protections for pregnant employees than nonpregnant 
employees.  Other courts that have considered this issue have also applied this 
interpretation of R.C. 4112.01(B). 
{¶ 14} The wording of the Ohio pregnancy-discrimination statute mirrors 
its federal counterpart, including the phrase “treated the same,” which appears in 
both Section 2000e(k), Title 42, U.S.Code, and R.C. 4112.01(B).  Decisions of 
federal courts provide guidance in interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act.  Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. Ohio Civ. 
Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196,  20 O.O.3d 200, 421 N.E.2d 128. 
{¶ 15} Federal courts agree that “the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does 
not require preferential treatment for pregnant employees.  Rather, it mandates 
that employers treat pregnant employees the same as nonpregnant employees who 
are similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Tysinger v. Zanesville Police Dept., (C.A.6, 2006), 463 F.3d 569, 575.  Accord, 
Mullet v. Wayne-Dalton Corp., (N.D.Ohio 2004), 338 F.Supp.2d 806, 811; 
Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc. (C.A.11, 1994), 33 F.3d 1308, 1316-1317, and 
cases cited therein. 
{¶ 16} Ohio courts have reached the same conclusion.  As stated by the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals, “Ohio courts implicitly * * * and expressly * * * 
recognize that an employer need not accommodate pregnant women to the extent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that such accommodation amounts to preferential treatment. Accordingly, to 
prevail on her pregnancy discrimination claim, plaintiff must show that defendant 
treated her differently because of her pregnancy.”  Priest v. TFH-EB, Inc. (1998), 
127 Ohio App.3d 159, 165-166, 711 N.E.2d 1070. 
{¶ 17} Pataskala Oaks’ length-of-service requirements treat all employees 
the same.  Every employee must reach 12 months of employment before 
becoming eligible for leave.  In this sense, the policy is “pregnancy-blind.”  
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co. (C.A.6, 2006), 446 F.3d 637, 640-641.  Thus, a 
pregnant employee may be terminated for unauthorized absence just as any other 
employee who has not yet met the minimum-length-of-service requirement but 
takes leave based upon a similar inability to work.  Unless there is other evidence 
of discrimination or pretext, R.C. Chapter 4112 does not prohibit termination of 
an employee affected by pregnancy under these circumstances. 
{¶ 18} The Civil Rights Commission urges us to read the “treated the 
same” clause in the second sentence of R.C. 4112.01(B) as a separate provision 
with independent force and effect from the first sentence of the statute, 
prohibiting termination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy.”  The Civil 
Rights Commission argues that the second sentence is a “narrower” application of 
the general prohibition against firing employees because of pregnancy.  We find 
this argument unpersuasive. 
{¶ 19} First, we do not agree with the premise that McFee was terminated 
on the basis of pregnancy. Instead, she was let go for taking unauthorized leave 
from her employment. The second sentence of R.C. 4112.01(B) is directly 
applicable to this situation and directs that McFee must be treated the same for 
purposes of leave eligibility as other employees who are similar in their ability or 
inability to work.  If McFee believes that the leave policy is merely a pretext for 
termination based upon pregnancy, she could have asserted that claim under the 
existing antidiscrimination framework of McDonnell Douglas. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 20} Second, the United States Supreme Court has held that the second 
clause of the Federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the treated-the-same clause) 
is an explanation and application of the first clause (the because-of-pregnancy 
clause) to provide concrete examples of prohibited practices.  See California Fed. 
S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra (1987), 479 U.S. 272, 285, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 
613, quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm. (1983), 462 U.S. 669, 678, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed. 2d 89, 
fn. 14 (“ ‘The meaning of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in 
the second clause, which explains the application of the general principle to 
women employees’ ”).  It would be contrary to this interpretation of the federal 
statute to hold that the first and second sentences of the state statute, which 
mirrors the federal statute, serve different purposes.  Although the scope of the 
second sentence is narrower than that of the first sentence, both serve the same 
goal—to ensure that employees who are pregnant are not discriminated against on 
the basis of pregnancy.  To hold otherwise would be to require that employers 
treat pregnant employees more favorably than other employees.  The statutes do 
not support such a result.  See, e.g., California Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra, 479 
U.S. at 287, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (“Congress * * * extensively 
discussed * * * its intent not to require preferential treatment”) and Armstrong v. 
Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1317 (“Statements in the legislative history 
make it clear that the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] does not require employers 
to extend any benefit to pregnant women that they do not already provide to other 
disabled employees”). 
B.  Properly construed, Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05 does not prohibit  
uniformly applied minimum-length-of-service requirements. 
{¶ 21} Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G)(2), the administrative regulation at 
issue, provides: “Where termination of employment of an employee who is 
temporarily disabled due to pregnancy or a related medical condition is caused by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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an employment policy under which insufficient or no maternity leave is available, 
such termination shall constitute unlawful sex discrimination.” 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals held that this provision requires, without 
qualification, that an employer provide maternity leave, and because Pataskala 
Oaks did not provide McFee a reasonable period of maternity leave, the leave 
policy was direct evidence of sex discrimination.  We disagree. 
{¶ 23} Appellant and its amici argue that if Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-
05(G)(2) does mandate that employers provide maternity leave to employees 
regardless of whether the employees qualify for leave under the employer’s 
uniform minimum-length-of-service leave policy, then the rule is unconstitutional, 
because the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to require 
employers to provide maternity leave, but the Civil Rights Commission does not. 
{¶ 24} If an administrative rule exceeds the statutory authority established 
by the General Assembly, the agency has usurped the legislative function, thereby 
violating the separation of powers established in the Ohio Constitution.  Burger 
Brewing Co. v. Thomas (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 377, 384-385, 71 O.O.2d 366, 329 
N.E.2d 693 (the General Assembly may not delegate lawmaking power).  Rules 
that exceed the authority of the agency will be held unconstitutional.  Id. at 384. 
{¶ 25} The General Assembly sets public policy, and administrative 
agencies, when granted rulemaking power, “develop and administer” those 
policies.  D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 
2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 41.  An agency exceeds its grant of authority 
when it creates rules that reflect a public policy not expressed in the governing 
statute.  Id.  Consistent with that principle, R.C. 4112.04(A)(4) provides that the 
Civil Rights Commission shall “[a]dopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules to 
effectuate the provisions of this chapter and the policies and practice of the 
commission in connection with this chapter.” 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
{¶ 26} Because R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.01 establish that employers must 
treat employees affected by pregnancy the same as employees who are not 
pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to work, the Civil Rights 
Commission would unconstitutionally expand the public policy set by the 
legislature if Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05 required preferential treatment for 
employees affected by pregnancy as compared to the treatment of employees who 
are not pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to work. 
{¶ 27} Under the rules of statutory construction, if an ambiguous statute is 
susceptible to two interpretations and one of the interpretations comports with the 
Constitution, then that reading of the statute will prevail and the court will avoid 
striking the statute.  E. Cleveland v. Evatt (1945), 145 Ohio St. 493, 496, 31 O.O. 
167, 62 N.E.2d 325.  We apply the rules of statutory construction to 
administrative rules as well.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Brilliant Elec. Sign Co. v. 
Indus. Comm. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 51, 54, 11 O.O.3d 214, 386 N.E.2d 1107 (the 
“ordinary-meaning 
rule” 
of 
statutory 
construction 
applies 
equally 
to 
administrative rules). 
{¶ 28} Thus, a construction of an administrative rule that is consistent 
with the public policy choices of the General Assembly preserves the rulemaking 
role of the agency and avoids constitutional conflicts. 
{¶ 29} As explained above, the General Assembly intended to ensure 
equal treatment for employees affected by pregnancy, but not to impart greater 
rights or preferential treatment to employees affected by pregnancy.  The rules 
promulgated by the Civil Rights Commission must be read, if possible, in a 
manner that effectuates the purpose of the General Assembly in enacting the 
statutes. 
{¶ 30} Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G)(2) plainly prohibits termination of 
an employee under a policy that provides insufficient leave for temporary 
disability due to  pregnancy or a related medical condition.  Ohio Adm.Code 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
4112-5-05(G)(5)1 instructs that women shall not be penalized in the conditions of 
their employment when they take time off for childbearing, if they are eligible to 
do so.  Additionally, (G)(5) provides that when an employee is entitled to 
childbearing leave, that leave must be reasonable in duration. 
{¶ 31} The tension between subsections (G)(2) and (G)(5) is apparent; 
(G)(2) appears to indicate that a policy providing no leave is discriminatory, while 
(G)(5) clearly contemplates that a uniform minimum-length-of-service 
requirement for leave eligibility is permissible.  If possible, we must resolve this 
ambiguity in a manner that gives effect to both provisions.  D.A.B.E., Inc. v. 
Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 
N.E.2d 536, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 32} Reading these rules in light of the statutory purpose, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G)(2) must mean that when an employee is otherwise 
eligible for leave, the employer cannot lawfully terminate that employee for 
violating a policy that provides no leave or insufficient leave for temporary 
disability due to pregnancy or a related condition.  Construed in this manner, 
(G)(2) effectuates the intent of the General Assembly to prohibit discrimination 
based upon pregnancy and to ensure equal treatment of employees affected by 
pregnancy.  California Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 287, 107 S.Ct. 
683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613; Reeves v. Swift Trans. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d at 643. 
{¶ 33} This interpretation of the rule harmonizes (G)(2) with (G)(5), 
which specifies that when a woman qualifies for leave, the leave provided for 
                                                 
1.  {¶ a} Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05 (G)(5) provides:  
     {¶ b} “Women shall not be penalized in their conditions of employment because they require 
time away from work on account of childbearing.  When, under the employer's leave policy the 
female employee would qualify for leave, then childbearing must be considered by the employer 
to be a justification for leave of absence for female employees for a reasonable period of time.  For 
example, if the female meets the equally applied minimum length of service requirements for 
leave time, she must be granted a reasonable leave on account of childbearing.  Conditions 
applicable to her leave (other than its length) and to her return to employment shall be in 
accordance with the employer's leave policy.” 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
childbearing must be reasonable.  Conversely, a holding that interpreted Ohio 
Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G)(2) to require maternity leave regardless of whether the 
pregnant 
employee 
satisfied 
the 
employer’s 
minimum-length-of-service 
requirements would render meaningless the phrase in Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-
05(G)(5) that “if the female meets the equally applied minimum length of service 
requirements for leave time, she must be granted a reasonable leave on account of 
childbearing.” 
C.  The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas applies in this case. 
{¶ 34} The court of appeals held that Pataskala Oaks’ leave policy was 
direct evidence of sex discrimination.  “Direct evidence of discrimination is 
evidence that proves that discrimination has occurred without requiring further 
inferences.”  Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d at 640. 
{¶ 35} As discussed above, an employer may maintain a uniform 
minimum-length-of-service leave policy consistent with Ohio law. Pataskala 
Oaks’ policy is “pregnancy-blind” in that it does not treat employees affected by 
pregnancy differently from employees “not so affected but similar in their ability 
or inability to work.”  Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d at 640-641.  An 
employment policy that imposes a uniform minimum-length-of-service 
requirement for leave eligibility with no exception for maternity leave is not direct 
evidence of sex discrimination under R.C. Chapter 4112.  Thus, the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis should be applied in cases involving such a policy.  Id. 
{¶ 36} The parties agree that McFee was terminated because she took 
leave from work even though she was not eligible for leave under Pataskala Oaks’ 
policy.  McFee has not alleged any other basis for a finding of discrimination, nor 
has she produced independent evidence that the proffered basis for the 
termination was a pretext for discrimination.  Accordingly, McFee has failed to 
make a prima facie case of sex discrimination.  The trial court properly dismissed 
the case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
IV 
{¶ 37} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause dismissed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} The facts of this case are such that an ordinary citizen would think, 
“There ought to be a law against that.”  Until today, there was. 
{¶ 39} R.C. 4112.02(A) makes it unlawful for any employer “to discharge 
without just cause” an employee because of his or her sex.  R.C. 4112.01(B) 
makes clear that the prohibition in R.C. 4112.02(A) includes discrimination and 
discharge on the basis of pregnancy and pregnancy-related illness: 
{¶ 40} “[T]he terms ‘because of sex’ and ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but 
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out 
of and occurring during the course of a pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.  Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 
{¶ 41} McFee provided a doctor’s note to Pataskala Oaks indicating that 
she had a pregnancy-related illness, pregnancy-related swelling, that rendered her 
unable to continue her job duties until six weeks after she gave birth.  Pataskala 
Oaks says that it did not fire McFee because she was ill, but because she missed 
work because she was ill.  What did the General Assembly mean when it 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
protected women from discharge based upon pregnancy-related illness?  Did it 
intend women not to treat their illness, but instead to go to work ill?  That they 
should follow their doctor’s advice for bed rest by bringing their beds to their 
place of employment?  Does not the word “illness” connote missed work time?   
{¶ 42} The Civil Rights Commission was perfectly in line with R.C. 
4112.01(B) when it promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G), establishing 
what constitutes pregnancy discrimination and including in that definition 
protections for women whose employers had no maternity leave available.  
McFee is protected under Ohio Adm.Code 4112-5-05(G)(2): 
{¶ 43} “Where termination of employment of an employee who is 
temporarily disabled due to pregnancy or a related medical condition is caused by 
an employment policy under which insufficient or no maternity leave is available, 
such termination shall constitute unlawful sex discrimination.” 
{¶ 44} Pursuant to the Pataskala Oaks employment policy, there was no 
maternity leave available to McFee.  Therefore, her termination constituted direct 
evidence of unlawful sex discrimination. 
{¶ 45} It should be noted that McFee was not asking to be paid for her 
time off, and the law does not require her to be paid.  The ironic postscript to this 
whole matter is that Pataskala Oaks called McFee three weeks after firing her and 
offered her a job.  The burden of allowing McFee unpaid leave to deal with the 
medical effects of her pregnancy had turned out to be not such a burden.  Now, as 
McFee’s child likely is graduating from kindergarten, Pataskala Oaks is finally 
emerging from litigation.  It fought the statutorily mandated decency contained in 
R.C. 4112.01(B) and 4112.02(A) and won.  Who is better for it? 
__________________ 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
Emily S. Schlesinger, Deputy Solicitors, and Patrick M. Dull, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Jan E. Hensel, and Patricia Gavigan, for 
appellant. 
Gordillo & Gordillo, L.L.C., and Gregory A. Gordillo, urging affirmance 
for amici curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association, Ohio Poverty Law 
Center, and Ohio NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Jeffrey J. Weber, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae National Federation of Independent Business Small 
Business Legal Center. 
Rolf & Goffman Co., L.P.A., Carol Rolf, and Robert C. Pivonka, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Health Care Association. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Thomas M. Tarpy, and Michael 
C. Griffaton, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Management Lawyers 
Association. 
______________________