Title: State v. Anou Lo

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 107 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0843 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Anou Lo,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  250 Wis. 2d 354, 639 N.W.2d 802 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 12, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse   
 
JUDGE: 
Ramona A. Gonzalez   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: BRADLEY, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, JJ., join Part II of the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert R. Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Joseph N. Ehmann, first 
assistant state public defender, and William J. Tyroler, 
assistant state public defender, on behalf of the Office of the 
State Public Defender. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Meredith J. Ross and 
Walter J. Dickey, Madison, on behalf of the Frank J. Remington 
Center. 
 
2003 WI 107 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0843   
(L.C. No. 
95 CF 1243) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Anou Lo,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 
of the Circuit Court for La Crosse County, Ramona A. Gonzalez, 
Judge.  State v. Anou Lo, No. 01-0843, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001). 
¶2 
The petitioner, Anou Lo, asks that we overrule our 
decision in State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 
N.W.2d 157 (1994) (Escalona), in which we held that any claim 
that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous 
No. 
01-0843 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1999-2000)1 postconviction motion is barred 
from being raised in a subsequent § 974.06 postconviction 
motion, absent a sufficient reason.  Lo also requests that we 
retroactively apply our decision in State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 
255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413, and thereby grant him a new 
trial so that a jury can be properly instructed on the elements 
of imperfect self-defense. 
¶3 
This case raises the question of whether our ruling in 
Escalona achieves a desired finality in the criminal appeals 
process and does so in a fair and efficient manner.  We are 
mindful of the important interests and values articulated by 
counsel and of the practical difficulties identified by Judge 
Deininger 
in 
his 
concurring 
opinion. 
 
Lo, 
No. 
01-0843, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶56-58 (Deininger, J., concurring). 
¶4 
Having 
considered 
the 
arguments, 
we 
decline 
to 
overrule our holding in Escalona.  We continue to believe that 
it represents the correct interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  
With the understanding that Escalona is the law, the court will 
seek opportunities to work with the State and the defense bar to 
fashion remedies that fairly address the problems identified by 
the court of appeals. 
¶5 
The petitioner contends that our decision in Head 
should be applied retroactively.  For the reasons set forth in 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
3 
 
Part IV of this opinion, we hold that Head should not be applied 
retroactively to litigants in collateral proceedings. 
I 
¶6 
Some of the facts of this case are in dispute.  In the 
summer of 1995, members of TMC, a street gang in La Crosse, were 
involved 
in 
various 
shootings 
directed 
at 
friends 
and 
acquaintances 
of Anou 
Lo.2 
 
As 
a 
result, 
one of 
Lo's 
acquaintances gave him a handgun for protection. 
¶7 
On July 6, 1995, Lo met friends with the intention of 
accompanying them to Trane Park.  While the group was in 
transit, Lo learned that several TMC members had gathered at 
Hood Park, and he asked his group to go there.  At Hood Park, 
Koua Vang, a member of TMC, and Hue Lee, a friend of Vang, were 
playing marbles with some young children.  Hue Lee observed the 
car in which Lo was a passenger circle twice around the park.  
Then Lo entered the park with one of his friends, while the 
driver of the car and other passengers stayed behind. 
¶8 
In the park, Lo yelled at Vang from a distance of 40 
to 50 feet.  An argument developed.  Lo confronted Vang about 
rumors that the TMCs were out to get Lo's stepbrother.  Vang 
claims that, during the argument, Lo asked him if he wanted to 
die.  Vang became excited and Hue Lee tried to calm him down.  
                                                 
2 An investigator for the City of La Crosse Police 
Department acknowledged that Lo was not a member of a gang at 
this time.  He was only associated with members of the street 
gang referred to as the Imperial Gangsters. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
4 
 
In time, Lo and Vang decided to back off and go their separate 
ways. 
¶9 
Lo claims that as he was attempting to leave the park, 
he saw Vang try to grab something underneath his shirt, from the 
front waistband of his pants.  Thinking that Vang was trying to 
get a gun, Lo drew his own gun and fired it in Vang's direction 
four times.  Lo and his friend then ran away.  
¶10 Vang was shot in the back of his right arm.  At the 
time of the shooting, he was in fact carrying a gun in the front 
of his pants, but he denied reaching for it, explaining that he 
was simply putting marbles in his pocket. 
¶11 Lo was 16 years old at the time of the shooting.  He 
was waived into criminal court and tried as an adult.  On 
January 12, 1996, a jury found Lo guilty of attempted first-
degree 
intentional 
homicide 
while 
armed 
and 
first-degree 
reckless endangerment while armed.  The circuit court sentenced 
Lo on February 26, 1996, to consecutive terms of 20 years 
incarceration on the attempted homicide conviction and 9 years 
on the reckless endangerment conviction. 
¶12 After his conviction, Lo acquired new counsel and 
filed postconviction motions pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.02 and 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30.  In one of these motions, he 
challenged the effectiveness of his trial counsel.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, Lo's motions were denied.  Lo appealed two 
claims that he had raised in postconviction motions, including 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction and the denial of postconviction 
No. 
01-0843 
 
5 
 
relief.  State v. Lo, No. 97-0023-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. June 25, 1998).  Lo then made an unsuccessful pro se 
attempt at federal habeas relief.  
¶13 On March 6, 2000, Lo, again pro se, requested an order 
from the circuit court asking for information he needed to file 
a § 974.06 motion.  In a Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 
16, 2000, the circuit court denied the request on grounds that 
Lo could get the information from his prior attorneys.  On 
January 17, 2001, Lo made a pro se § 974.06 motion, which was 
denied by the circuit court because the claims were barred 
pursuant to Escalona in that the issues could and should have 
been raised on direct appeal.3  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court decision.  In a concurring opinion, Judge 
Deininger 
raised 
questions 
whether 
Escalona's 
construction 
of § 974.06(4) had achieved its goal of bringing finality to 
                                                 
3 Lo's § 974.06 motion identified numerous grounds for 
relief: the trial court's failure to instruct on reckless 
endangerment as a lesser included offense of the attempted 
homicide; admission of evidence that Lo had sexually assaulted 
another youth; admission of evidence that Lo was on juvenile 
supervision; failure to identify specifically who was endangered 
under Count 2; reversal was warranted in the interests of 
justice; errors in the jury instructions and prosecutorial 
misconduct and ineffectiveness of counsel to properly object; 
failure to exclude "other acts" evidence and ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel for not properly objecting to such evidence; 
ineffectiveness of counsel for not retaining a ballistic expert; 
presence of a biased juror on the jury; and defective jury 
instructions regarding reasonable doubt and imperfect self-
defense.  For purposes of this opinion, we concern ourselves not 
with any specific substantive claim Lo addresses, but with the 
sufficient reason given by Lo for not having raised these claims 
earlier, which was ineffective assistance of both postconviction 
and appellate counsel. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
6 
 
postconviction litigation.  Lo, No. 01-0843, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶55-58. 
II 
¶14 Once again this court is called upon to review the 
proper construction of § 974.06(4).  The construction of a 
statute is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  Escalona, 
185 Wis. 2d at 175-76.  Our goal is to discern and give effect 
to the intent of the legislature.  County of Jefferson v. Renz, 
231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 
¶15 Although 
our decision in 
Escalona 
discussed the 
origins and purpose of § 974.06, see Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d at 
176-178, 181-182, we take this opportunity to augment that 
discussion and reinforce our holding that claims of error that 
could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous 
§ 974.06 motion are barred from being raised in a subsequent 
§ 974.06 motion, absent a showing of a sufficient reason. 
¶16 Section 
974.06 
was 
created 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
in 
1969 
as 
the 
first 
uniform 
postconviction 
procedure in the state's history.4  Heather M. Hunt, Note, State 
v. Escalona-Naranjo: A Limitation on Criminal Appeals in 
Wisconsin?, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 207, 210.  The decision to 
institute a uniform postconviction remedy was made by the 
Criminal Rules Committee of the Judicial Council.  Id. at 211 
The decision was influenced by a letter from Justice Myron L. 
                                                 
4 Section 974.06 was created by chapter 255, section 63, 
Wis. Laws of 1969, which was effective July 1, 1970. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
7 
 
Gordon, who expressed dissatisfaction over the time that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court spent reviewing habeas corpus matters 
and recommended that circuit courts handle such petitions.  Id. 
(citing Minutes of Meeting of the Judicial Council 2 (June 16, 
1967)). 
¶17 In establishing a uniform postconviction remedy, the 
Criminal Rules Committee set forth a procedure "under sec. 
974.06 [that] was 'designed to replace habeas corpus as the 
primary method in which a defendant can attack his conviction 
after the time for appeal has expired.'"  Escalona, 185 
Wis. 2d at 176 (citing Howard B. Eisenberg, Post-Conviction 
Remedies in the 1970's, 56 Marq. L. Rev. 69, 79 (1972)).  
Section 974.06 was modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).5  
However, subsection (4) was taken from section 8 of the 1966 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (1966 UPCPA or 1966 
Uniform Act).  Hunt, supra, at 211.  Section 974.06(4) reads as 
follows: 
All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in 
the original, 
supplemental 
or 
amended 
motion. 
                                                 
5  28 U.S.C. § 2255 was enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 
Stat. 967 (1948), and amended May 24, 1949, § 114, ch. 139, 63 
Stat. 105. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4). 
¶18 There is no dispute that the language of § 974.06(4) 
was adapted from section 8 [Waiver of or Failure to Assert 
Claims] of the 1966 UPCPA, see Unif. Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act § 8, 11A U.L.A. 375 (Master ed. 1995), even though the UPCPA 
was not adopted in its entirety by the Wisconsin legislature.  
Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d at 177-78.  The comment to § 974.06(4) 
acknowledges that subsection (4) came from the UPCPA and asserts 
that it was "designed to compel a prisoner to raise all 
questions available to him in one motion."  Comment to Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 974.06 (West Supp. 1998).   
¶19 The stated legislative intent is consistent with the 
purpose of the 1966 UPCPA.  The UPCPA was drafted to curtail the 
explosion of federal habeas corpus petitions in the federal 
courts that resulted from an absence of an "all-embracing system 
of post-conviction relief capable of affording the prisoner a 
forum for his claims based on the United States Constitution."  
1966 UPCPA Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 11A U.L.A. 269-270.   
¶20 To accomplish this goal, the Commissioners advocated 
"constructive action" at the state level to eliminate the 
"abuses" of habeas corpus.  Id. at 269.  This strategy involved 
(1) providing a single, unitary, postconviction remedy to be 
used in place of all other state remedies (except direct 
review); (2) providing a remedy for all grounds for attacking 
the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case; and 
(3) requiring a defendant to present all of his or her claim(s) 
for attack on a conviction or sentence in his or her initial 
No. 
01-0843 
 
9 
 
postconviction proceeding, unless there exists a sufficient 
reason why the claim(s) were not raised in the initial 
proceeding.  See id. at 270-271; see also Escalona, 185 
Wis. 2d at 177 n.8.   
¶21 The second objective noted above, that of providing "a 
remedy for all grounds for attacking the validity of a 
conviction or sentence in a criminal case," was embodied in 
section (1)(a) of the 1966 Uniform Act.  Section (1)(a) defined 
the scope of the remedy under the 1966 Uniform Act.6  The remedy 
                                                 
6 Section 1 of the 1966 Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures 
Act reads in part: 
§ 1. [Remedy——To Whom Available——Conditions]. 
(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced 
for, a crime and who claims: 
 
(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in 
violation of the Constitution of the United States or 
the Constitution or laws of this state; 
 
(2) that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose sentence; 
 
(3) 
that 
the 
sentence 
exceeds 
the 
maximum 
authorized by law; 
 
(4) that there exists evidence of material facts, 
not previously presented and heard, that requires 
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest 
of justice; 
 
(5) that his sentence has expired, his probation, 
parole, or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or 
he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other 
restraint; or 
 
(6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack upon any ground of 
alleged error heretofore available under any common 
No. 
01-0843 
 
10 
 
was described as "similar" to the remedy afforded by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  Comment, 11A U.L.A. 275.  In fact, however, it was a 
broader remedy than 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Wisconsin chose not to 
adopt section 1 of the UPCPA.  Instead, it adopted language 
"taken directly from 28 U.S.C. § 2255."  Comment, ch. 255, Laws 
of 1969. 
¶22 The third objective noted above was embodied in 
section 8 of the 1966 Uniform Act, and section 8 was the source 
of § 974.06(4). 
¶23 Two years after the new procedure took effect, in 
Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 195 N.W.2d 837 (1972), this 
court described the function of a § 974.06 motion: 
The postconviction motion under sec. 974.06, Stats., 
is not a substitute for a motion for a new trial.  A 
sec. 974.06 motion can be made only after the 
defendant has exhausted his direct remedies which 
consist of a motion for a new trial and appeal.  A 
sec. 974.06 motion is limited in scope to matters of 
jurisdiction or constitutional dimensions.  The motion 
must not be used to raise issues disposed of by a 
previous appeal. 
Id. at 381 (footnotes omitted). 
¶24 The Peterson decision discussed the scope of the 
§ 974.06 motion, saying that such issues as "sufficiency of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
law, 
statutory or 
other 
writ, 
motion, 
petition, 
proceeding, or remedy; 
may 
institute, 
without 
paying 
a 
filing 
fee, 
a 
proceeding under this Act to secure relief. 
Unif. Post-Conviction Procedure Act § 8, 11A U.L.A. 274-75 
(Master ed. 1995). 
No. 
01-0843 
 
11 
 
evidence, jury instructions, error in admission of evidence, and 
other procedural errors cannot be reached by a § 974.06 motion."  
Id.  It did not, however, engage in an explicit textual analysis 
addressing the issue of when a claim was barred because of some 
prior proceeding.   
¶25 In Bergenthal v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 740, 242 N.W.2d 199 
(1976) (Bergenthal II), four years after Peterson, the court 
gave § 974.06 an expansive interpretation.  Bergenthal was 
convicted of first-degree murder and endangering safety by 
conduct regardless of human life.  State v. Bergenthal, 47 
Wis. 2d 668, 741, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1970) (Bergenthal I).  At his 
trial, Bergenthal contended that certain materials enclosed in a 
brown sealed envelope possessed by the State were exculpatory 
and subject to in camera inspection.  Bergenthal II, 72 
Wis. 2d at 743.  The circuit court ruled that the evidence was 
not exculpatory.  Id. at 746. 
¶26 In his post-verdict motion, Bergenthal raised 100 
claims of error, one of which was the circuit court's failure to 
disclose the contents of the envelope.  Bergenthal I, 47 
Wis. 2d at 673-74.  Following the denial of his postconviction 
motion, all of Bergenthal's claims were raised on appeal except 
the court's failure to disclose the contents of the envelope.  
Id.  
¶27 After Bergenthal's conviction was affirmed by this 
court, Bergenthal filed a § 974.06 motion challenging the 
circuit court's failure to disclose the items in the envelope.  
Bergenthal II, 72 Wis. 2d at 742-43.  The circuit court 
No. 
01-0843 
 
12 
 
incorrectly assumed that the issue surrounding the brown sealed 
envelope had been considered and rejected by this court.  
Operating on that assumption, the circuit court concluded that 
the opinion of this court on direct appeal had disposed of the 
issue.  It denied the motion, observing that a § 974.06 motion 
could not be used as a vehicle for a second appeal on grounds 
already reviewed.  Id. at 745.  This court disagreed, stating 
that "[e]ven though the issue might properly have been raised on 
appeal, it presents an issue of significant constitutional 
proportions and, therefore, must be considered in this motion 
for postconviction relief."  Id. at 748 (citing Loop v. State, 
65 Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974)). 
¶28 The significance of the Bergenthal II holding was that 
it permitted a criminal defendant to raise a ground for relief 
in a § 974.06 motion that could have been raised on direct 
appeal but was not, without the defendant showing a sufficient 
reason why the issue had not been raised.  After Bergenthal II, 
a criminal defendant was not required to show a reason why an 
issue had not been raised until the defendant filed a second or 
subsequent § 974.06 motion.  As a result, a criminal defendant 
had the right to a § 974.02 motion after trial, followed by a 
direct appeal, plus another chance to raise claims in a § 974.06 
motion, even if the grounds claimed in the § 974.06 motion were 
available at the time of the § 974.02 motion and direct appeal.  
No. 
01-0843 
 
13 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Bergenthal II court pointed to 
§ 974.06(3)7 but it did not construe § 974.06(4). 
¶29 In Escalona, this court revisited the question of 
whether a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal was 
barred from being raised in a § 974.06 motion absent a showing 
of a sufficient reason.  The case involved Barbaro Escalona-
Naranjo, who was convicted in February 1986 of two counts of 
possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver.  
Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d at 173-74.  Prior to sentencing, Escalona-
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(3) provides: 
 
Unless the motion and the files and records of 
the action conclusively show that the person is 
entitled to no relief, the court shall: 
 
(a) Cause a copy of the notice to be served upon 
the district attorney who shall file a written 
response within the time prescribed by the court. 
 
(b) If it appears that counsel is necessary and 
if the defendant claims or appears to be indigent, 
refer the person to the state public defender for an 
indigency determination and appointment of counsel 
under ch. 977. 
 
(c) Grant a prompt hearing. 
 
(d) Determine the issues and make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  If the court finds that 
the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or 
that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or 
is otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there 
has been such a denial or infringement of the 
constitutional rights of the person as to render the 
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court 
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall 
discharge the person or resentence him or her to grant 
a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear 
appropriate. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
14 
 
Naranjo's trial counsel filed a motion to vacate the conviction 
and requested a competency hearing at which Escalona-Naranjo was 
found to be competent for sentencing.  Id. at 174.  After 
sentencing in September 1986, a notice of intent to seek 
postconviction relief was filed by defense counsel under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(b).  Id.  Postconviction motions 
requesting 
a 
new 
trial, 
competency 
redetermination, 
and 
resentencing were filed pursuant to § 974.02.  Id.  The circuit 
court denied the motions and the court of appeals affirmed.  Id. 
at 174-175. 
¶30 Escalona-Naranjo then filed a § 974.06 motion in July 
1990, which was amended in February 1991, claiming ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  Id. at 175.  In response to 
Escalona-Naranjo's § 974.06 motion, the State contended that 
Escalona-Naranjo had simply rephrased issues that had already 
been raised in the 1986 § 974.02 motion and appeal.  Id.  The 
circuit court agreed with the State and the court of appeals 
certified the case to this court.  Id. 
¶31 In affirming the circuit court's decision, this court 
overruled the holding in Bergenthal II and held that a criminal 
defendant was required to consolidate all postconviction claims 
into his or her original, supplemental, or amended motion.  Id. 
at 181-182.  If a criminal defendant fails to raise a 
constitutional issue that could have been raised on direct 
appeal or in a prior § 974.06 motion, the constitutional issue 
may not become the basis for a subsequent § 974.06 motion unless 
the court ascertains that a sufficient reason exists for the 
No. 
01-0843 
 
15 
 
failure either to allege or to adequately raise the issue in the 
appeal or previous § 974.06 motion.  Id. at 181-82.8  In reaching 
this 
holding, 
Escalona 
analyzed 
the 
plain 
language 
of § 974.06(4) and its origin, namely, the 1966 UPCPA, and found 
the legislative history to be decisive.   
¶32 Escalona correctly concluded that all grounds for 
postconviction relief under § 974.06 must be raised in the 
petitioner's original, supplemental, or amended motion.  Id. at 
181.9 
 
Further, 
the 
majority 
interpreted 
an 
"original, 
supplemental, or amended motion" to encompass both a § 974.06 
motion and the direct appeal.  Id.  The dissent argued that the 
term "motion" referred to a previous motion brought under 
§ 974.06 and was not intended to include direct review.  Id. at 
191-94 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
¶33 Lo adopts the Escalona dissent's textual analysis.  He 
also argues that the relationship between section 8 of the 1966 
                                                 
8 In State v. Klimas, 94 Wis. 2d 288, 288 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. 
App. 1979), the court of appeals "relied on the Bergenthal 
conclusion that all constitutional issues must be considered in 
postconviction relief proceedings."  State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 
185 Wis. 2d 168, 182 n.11, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).  However, this 
court overruled the language in Klimas that allowed all  
constitutional issues to be considered in postconviction motions 
regardless of whether such constitutional issues could have been 
raised earlier.  Id. 
9 Support for this conclusion can be found in the note to 
§ 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969, which reads: "Sub. (4) is taken 
from the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act and is designed 
to compel a prisoner to raise all questions available to him in 
one motion."  Note to § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969 (emphasis 
added). 
No. 
01-0843 
 
16 
 
UPCPA and two predecessor sections from the 1955 version of the 
UPCPA (1955 Uniform Act) supports the Escalona dissent's 
position that a direct appeal and a § 974.06 postconviction 
motion are to be treated differently under § 974.06. 
¶34 Lo presents a scholarly discussion of the 1955 Uniform 
Act, as well as the 1966 UPCPA, describing how language from 
section 1 of the 1955 Uniform Act was incorporated into section 
8 of the 1966 UPCPA.  Lo explains that section 1 of the 1955 
Uniform Act made postconviction relief available under the Act, 
"provided the alleged error has not been previously and finally 
litigated or waived in the proceedings resulting in the 
conviction or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has 
taken to secure relief from his conviction."  11A U.L.A. 267 
(emphasis added).  This section plainly precluded consideration 
of issues adjudicated or waived in a direct appeal.  By 
contrast, Lo argues, section 8 of the 1955 Uniform Act dealt 
with successive petitions under that Act.10 
                                                 
10 The 1955 Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act reads in 
part: 
§ 1. [Remedy——To Whom Available——Conditions].——
Any person convicted of a felony and incarcerated 
under sentence of [death or] imprisonment who claims 
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution 
or laws of this State, or that the court was without 
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or that the 
sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or 
that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore 
available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram 
nobis, or other common law or statutory remedy, may 
institute a proceeding under this Act to set aside or 
No. 
01-0843 
 
17 
 
¶35 In the 1966 Uniform Act, language from 1955 section 1 
was consolidated into the new section 8 as follows: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant 
under this Act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure 
relief 
may 
not 
be 
the 
basis 
for 
a 
subsequent 
application, unless the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application. 
11A U.L.A. 375. 
¶36 Lo contends that the phrase "any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised" is tied to the "original, 
supplemental or amended application" under the Act, not to any 
previous appeal, and that only a ground "knowingly, voluntarily 
and intelligently waived" is tied to the applicant's direct 
appeal.  This reading of the 1966 Uniform Act, he argues, 
                                                                                                                                                             
correct the sentence, provided the alleged error has 
not been previously and finally litigated or waived in 
the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any 
other proceedings that the petitioner has taken to 
secure relief from his conviction. 
 
. . . .  
§ 8. [Waiver of Claims].——All grounds for relief 
claimed by a petitioner under this Act must be raised 
in his original or amended petition, and any grounds 
not so raised are waived unless the court on hearing a 
subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted 
therein which could not reasonably have been raised in 
the original or amended petition. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
18 
 
provides the proper interpretation of current § 974.06(4), which 
reads: 
 
All grounds for relief available to a person 
under this section must be raised in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion.  Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any 
other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent motion, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in 
the original, 
supplemental 
or 
amended 
motion. 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4). 
¶37 We cannot agree with Lo's construction of the statute.  
Section 974.06(4) begins with the sentence: "All grounds for 
relief available to a person under this section must be raised 
in his or her original, supplemental or amended motion."  
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) (emphasis added).  Some grounds for 
relief are not available under § 974.06.  For instance, if a 
ground for relief does not satisfy a criterion in subsection 
(1), it is not available.  See Peterson, 54 Wis. 2d at 381.   
¶38 More important, however, the second sentence of the 
subsection spells out three additional grounds that are not 
available without sufficient reason, namely (1) grounds that 
have been finally adjudicated; (2) grounds that were not raised 
in a previous proceeding; and (3) grounds that were knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived. 
¶39 Under the plain language of subsection (4), any 
grounds "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived" are 
No. 
01-0843 
 
19 
 
waived "in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence," because there is no break between the waiver language 
and the phrase "in the proceeding that resulted in the 
conviction or sentence."  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4).  Lo concedes 
as much. 
¶40 Nonetheless, Lo contends that the phrase "any grounds 
finally adjudicated or not so raised" has no link to the phrase 
"in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence."  
If this were true, it would mean that a "ground" "finally 
adjudicated" by this court in a direct appeal from a conviction 
would be subject to a § 974.06 motion before a circuit judge.  
This is an unacceptable reading of the statute.  "The motion 
must not be used to raise issues disposed of by a previous 
appeal."  Peterson, 54 Wis. 2d at 381. 
¶41 The phrase "or not so raised" is inextricably linked 
to the phrase "finally adjudicated."  Lo cannot have one without 
the other.  This means that "not so raised" also is tied to "the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence."  Lo's 
interpretation of the subsection would permit a defendant to 
consciously skip grounds for relief on direct appeal and then 
raise them in a § 974.06 motion. 
¶42 We acknowledge that the phrase "original, supplemental 
or amended motion" could be made more clear.  The Escalona court 
interpreted the term "motion" in that phrase to include both a 
previous § 974.06 motion and a direct appeal.  Escalona, 184 
Wis. 2d at 
181. 
 
This 
interpretation 
is 
buttressed 
by 
§ 974.06(2), which provides: "A motion for such relief is part 
No. 
01-0843 
 
20 
 
of the original criminal action, is not a separate proceeding 
and may be made at any time."  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(2) (emphasis 
added).  This subsection describes a proceeding different from a 
proceeding in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which is 
regarded as an independent civil proceeding.  Heflin v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1950).  It is also different from 
a proceeding under the UPCPA, which is also regarded as civil.  
See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Iowa 1991) (applying 
Iowa's version of § 974.06).   
¶43 However, if the phrase "original, supplemental or 
amended motion" were interpreted as applying only to a motion 
under § 974.06, that would not help the defendant.   
Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence 
[e.g., 
trial, 
postconviction 
motion, 
and 
direct 
appeal] or in any other proceeding the person has 
taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a 
subsequent motion [e.g., a motion after appeal under 
§ 974.06], unless the court finds a ground for relief 
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted 
or 
was 
inadequately 
raised 
in 
the 
original, 
supplemental or amended motion. 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) (emphasis added).  In other words, a 
court may find that the defendant has asserted a ground for 
relief "in the original, supplemental or amended motion" which, 
for sufficient reason, "was not asserted or inadequately raised" 
"in the proceeding that resulted in conviction or sentence or in 
any other proceeding the person has taken to secure relief."  If 
the phrase "the original, supplemental or amended motion" were 
interpreted to mean the defendant's first motion under § 974.06, 
No. 
01-0843 
 
21 
 
then the "sufficient reason" requirement would apply to only a 
second § 974.06 motion.  This would make no sense in terms of 
either policy or grammar. 
¶44 Consequently, we reaffirm our holding in Escalona that 
all claims of error that a criminal defendant can bring should 
be consolidated into one motion or appeal, and claims that could 
have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous § 974.06 
motion are barred from being raised in a subsequent § 974.06 
postconviction motion absent a showing of a sufficient reason 
for why the claims were not raised on direct appeal or in a 
previous § 974.06 motion.  Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d 168.11 
¶45 Escalona declared that "we need finality in our 
litigation."  Id. at 185.  This statement comports with concerns 
expressed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in 1966.  The Prefatory Note to the 1966 Uniform Act 
states: 
                                                 
11 Our ruling would only be applicable in the situation 
where a criminal defendant actually filed a § 974.02 motion or 
pursued a direct appeal.  Therefore, in Loop v. State, 65 
Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974), where the defendant filed a 
§ 974.06 
motion challenging 
his conviction 
without 
having 
previously filed a § 974.02 motion or pursued a direct appeal, 
he was permitted to raise a constitutional issue not raised on 
direct appeal because no direct appeal had been sought.  We 
agree with this analysis.  However, we reaffirm Escalona's 
criticism of that part of Loop which stated: "Issues of 
constitutional dimension can be raised on direct appeal and can 
also be raised on 974.06 motions."  Loop, 65 Wis. 2d at 502; see 
also Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d at 184-85 (discussing Loop).  If, 
after a direct appeal, a § 974.06 motion was filed but it did 
not raise a constitutional claim, then that claim is barred if 
it could have been raised on direct appeal and there is no 
showing of a "sufficient reason" as to why it was not raised. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
22 
 
If a person has been unconstitutionally imprisoned 
while the numerous state remedies are pursued for from 
two to ten years, the situation is abhorrent to our 
sense of justice.  On the other hand, if the greatest 
number of applications for post-conviction relief are 
groundless, 
the 
wear 
and 
tear 
on 
the 
judicial 
machinery 
resulting 
from 
years of 
litigation in 
thousands of cases becomes a matter of serious import 
to courts and judges.  The element of expense is not 
to be ignored. 
11A U.L.A. 270. 
¶46 It is apparent that the Commissioners' concerns with 
expense and "years of litigation" reflect a goal of finality in 
the criminal appeals process.  This finality is inherently 
related to the purpose of vindicating justice via a simplified 
and adequate postconviction remedy.  Our construction of 
§ 974.06(4) furthers these mutually related concerns without 
compromising fairness.  Escalona was correct in asserting that 
the purpose of the UPCPA was "to compel a prisoner to raise all 
grounds regarding postconviction relief in his or her original, 
supplemental, or amended motion, thereby cutting off successive 
frivolous motions."  Escalona, 185 Wis. 2d at 177. 
¶47 This court's ruling in Escalona is supported by courts 
in other jurisdictions that have adopted the 1966 UPCPA in whole 
or in part.  See, e.g., Hoffman v. State, 868 P.2d 516 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1994); Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 1999); 
Gassler v. State, 590 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1999); Carter v. State, 
936 P.2d 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Drayton v. Evatt, 430 
S.E.2d 517 (S.C. 1993). 
¶48 The same result is seen in federal court decisions 
interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See, e.g., United States v. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
23 
 
Samuelson, 722 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1983); Torres v. United 
States, 469 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1972); Mixen v. United States, 
469 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973); 
Overton v. United States, 450 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967); United States v. Edmonson, 922 F. 
Supp. 505 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd 107 F.3d 22 (10th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1128 (1997). 
¶49 We 
conclude 
that 
Escalona 
correctly 
interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and remains good law. 
III 
 
¶50 In the order granting the petition for review, we 
asked the parties to address points raised by Judge David 
Deininger in his concurring opinion in State v. Lo, No. 01-0843, 
unpublished slip op.  In his opinion, Judge Deininger identified 
complications resulting from the Escalona decision.  He wrote 
insightfully: 
 
In an increasing number of appeals from the 
denial of motions brought under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, 
especially those brought by pro se inmates, we are 
seeing an assertion that the reason the newly raised 
claims 
of 
error 
were 
not 
raised 
in 
previous 
postconviction 
or 
appellate 
proceedings 
is 
that 
postconviction 
or 
appellate 
counsel 
rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to present the 
allegedly meritorious claims.  In order to determine 
whether the new claims are properly before the court, 
the circuit court and/or this court must first 
evaluate the "sufficiency" of the proffered reason, 
which, 
as 
the 
majority's 
present 
analysis 
demonstrates, will often require a consideration of 
the merits of the underlying, newly asserted claim.  
And, even if we or the circuit court conclude that the 
No. 
01-0843 
 
24 
 
claim has no merit, and thus that postconviction or 
appellate counsel's failure to raise the claim did not 
represent either deficient performance or prejudice to 
the defendant, the defendant has essentially obtained 
what § 974.06 and Escalona-Naranjo ostensibly deny: 
the consideration of the merits of the defendant's 
newly asserted claim, for which sufficient reason has 
not been shown for an earlier failure to raise it. 
 
Further complicating the analysis is the fact 
that many of the newly raised claims, as in this case, 
involve 
an 
assertion 
that 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective for failing to make some request or 
objection during trial or pre-trial proceedings, and 
that subsequent counsel were ineffective for failing 
to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Thus, on a record which contains neither a 
trial court ruling on a now disputed issue, nor a 
Machner hearing on why trial counsel failed to raise 
the issue, we or the circuit court must ponder the 
following question: Is there merit to the now raised 
issue, such that trial counsel was deficient for not 
making a request or objection regarding it, thereby 
prejudicing the defendant, and thereby also rendering 
postconviction and/or appellate counsel's performance 
and prejudicial for failing to assert trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, such that the defendant has presented 
a sufficient reason for the failure to raise the issue 
in earlier postconviction or appellate proceedings, 
which would permit him to now bring the issue before 
the court for a consideration of its merits? 
Lo, No. 01-0843, unpublished slip op., ¶¶56-57. 
 
¶51 The State supports these observations and asserts in 
its brief: "The problem is not Escalona-Naranjo's interpretation 
of § 974.06.  The problem is that courts have erroneously 
assumed that ineffective assistance of § 809.30 counsel is a 
sufficient reason to permit a defendant to raise previously 
unraised 
issues 
in 
a 
successive 
§ 974.06 
motion. 
 
That 
assumption is wrong."  The State thereafter proposes that the 
proper procedure for challenging the effectiveness of appellate 
No. 
01-0843 
 
25 
 
counsel is to petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
If 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
determines 
that 
the 
petitioner's claim is meritorious, the remedy is a new appeal. 
 
¶52 Lo and the two amici, the Frank J. Remington Center 
and the Office of State Public Defender, vigorously criticize 
this proposed remedy.   
 
¶53 Lo devoted most of his argument to the proposition 
that Escalona was wrongly decided and should be overruled.  His 
mission was not to attempt to find the best way to implement 
Escalona.  His mission was to bury the case. 
¶54 This 
court 
determined 
in 
State 
v. 
Knight, 
168 
Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992), that a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should 
petition the appellate court that heard the appeal for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  In State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 
Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996), the court of 
appeals drew a distinction between the performance of appellate 
counsel and the performance of postconviction counsel and 
directed that claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel be raised in the circuit court "either by a petition for 
habeas corpus or a motion under § 974.06, Stats."  Id. at 681.  
Among other things, the Rothering court determined that (1) 
appellate counsel is not deficient for failing to brief waived 
issues, id. at 681 n.6; and (2) postconviction counsel may be 
ineffective in failing to preserve issues that could have been 
raised on direct appeal, id. at 682.  It also raised questions 
No. 
01-0843 
 
26 
 
about what constitutes "sufficient reason" to raise an issue 
that could have been raised in a direct appeal.  Id. 
¶55 The State contends that the Rothering decision was 
erroneous.  It proposes concentrating review of ineffective 
assistance by postconviction and appellate counsel in a single 
habeas corpus petition in the court of appeals.  It also 
proposes 
standards 
for 
pleading and 
reviewing 
ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. 
¶56 Some of the answers to these issues may be more a 
matter of wise policymaking than statutory interpretation.  To 
promote reasonable finality, we are interested in the rules and 
practices in other jurisdictions, including the federal courts, 
as well as a discussion of a variety of options, before we 
attempt to fashion a solution.  We are concerned about fairness 
to both defendants and the government and potential shifts in 
workload among courts.   
¶57 We are not convinced that this case is the appropriate 
vehicle to answer the multiple questions that have been raised.  
The issues have not been fully joined.  Consequently, we defer 
judgment with the intent of seeking new opportunities to review 
the issues. 
IV 
¶58 We next address whether our decision in State v. Head, 
2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413, should be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.  If applied 
retroactively, 
Lo's 
conviction 
for 
attempted 
first-degree 
homicide would probably be reversed on the basis that the jury 
No. 
01-0843 
 
27 
 
instruction for unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-
defense) did not require the State to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Lo did not actually believe that he was in imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm. 
¶59 We pause for a moment to restate the procedural 
history.  At trial, Lo argued that he shot Koua Vang in self-
defense.  The circuit court determined that the defendant had 
adequately 
raised 
the 
issue 
and 
gave 
the 
standard 
jury 
instructions on both perfect and imperfect self-defense.  Lo's 
trial counsel offered no alternative instruction on imperfect 
self-defense and made no objection to the instruction. 
¶60 Lo's postconviction counsel filed a motion claiming 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  However, he made no 
claim about the deficiency of the jury instruction on imperfect 
self-defense.  On appeal from the conviction and the denial of 
the postconviction motion, he made no complaint about the jury 
instruction on imperfect self-defense.  Lo's appeal was decided 
by the court of appeals on June 25, 1998.  This was more than 
four years before the Head decision was released on July 11, 
2002. 
¶61 Lo filed a § 974.06 motion on January 17, 2001.  The 
motion did not raise the issue presently before the court and 
was denied.  The court of appeals affirmed the denial in a 30-
page opinion by Judge Roggensack on December 28, 2001.  We 
granted Lo's pro se petition for review on April 29, 2002, 
before the Head case was decided.  In short, Lo never challenged 
the imperfect self-defense jury instruction on the ground before 
No. 
01-0843 
 
28 
 
us now until he filed his brief in this court.  As a result, if 
we were to retroactively apply the decision in Head to this 
case, we would arguably open to collateral attack 10 years of 
homicide convictions that involved the standard jury instruction 
on 
imperfect 
self-defense. 
 
We 
decline 
to 
apply 
Head 
retroactively to cases on collateral review. 
¶62 Our decision in Head may fairly be described as a "new 
rule" because it imposes a new obligation on the State and 
because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time of 
the defendant's conviction.12  Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 
467 (1993) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).  
At the same time, we did not overrule State v. Camacho, 176 
Wis. 2d 860, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993); we modified its holding.  
Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶104. 
¶63 As we noted in State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 282, 
564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the United 
States Supreme Court set the parameters for the federal doctrine 
of non-retroactivity in collateral proceedings in its Teague 
decision.  New rules merit retroactive application on collateral 
review only in two instances.  "First, a new rule should be 
applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
                                                 
12 "[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not 
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 
conviction became final."  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 
(1989). 
No. 
01-0843 
 
29 
 
making authority to proscribe.'"  Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
"Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it 
requires the observance of 'those procedures that are implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  Id. (citing Mackey, 401 
U.S. at 693) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).  
In Graham, the Court defined the second element of retroactivity 
on collateral review as one involving a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.  Graham, 506 U.S. at 478.  
The Court explained that this retroactivity exception is meant 
to apply to only a small core of rules that are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.  Id. 
¶64 The 
statutes 
at 
issue 
in 
Head 
are 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(2)(b) and 940.05.  Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01 
provides that "whoever causes the death of another human being 
with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class 
A felony."  Subsection (2) then provides: 
 
(2) Mitigating Circumstances.  The following are 
affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section 
which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide under s.940.05: 
 
. . . .  
 
(b) Unnecessary defensive force.  Death was 
caused because the actor believed he or she or another 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
No. 
01-0843 
 
30 
 
and that the force used was necessary to defend the 
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable. 
¶65 Subsection (3) sets out the burden of proof: 
 
(3) Burden of Proof.  When the existence of an 
affirmative defense under sub. (2) has been placed in 
issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting 
the defense did not exist in order to sustain a 
finding of guilt under sub. (1). 
¶66 The 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
statute 
(§ 940.01) interacts with the second-degree intentional homicide 
statute (§ 940.05), which reads in part: 
 
(1) Whoever causes the death of another human 
being with intent to kill that person or another is 
guilty of a Class B felony if: 
 
(a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state 
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did 
not exist as required by s. 940.01(3). 
¶67 Our holding in Head modified this court's ruling in 
Camacho 
"to 
the 
extent 
that 
it 
states 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) 
contains 
an 
objective 
threshold 
element requiring a defendant to have a reasonable belief that 
she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with 
her person in order to raise the issue of unnecessary defensive 
force (imperfect self-defense)."  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶104.  
The Head court concluded that 
when imperfect self-defense is placed in issue by the 
trial evidence, the state has the burden to prove that 
the person had no actual belief that she was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, or no 
actual belief that the amount of force she used was 
necessary to prevent or terminate this interference.  
If the jury concludes that the person had an actual 
No. 
01-0843 
 
31 
 
but unreasonable belief that she was in imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm, the person is 
not guilty of first degree murder but should be found 
guilty of second-degree intentional homicide. 
Id., ¶103 (emphasis added). 
 
¶68 Head did not shift the burden of proof to the State.  
The State always had the burden of proof on imperfect self-
defense.  Instead, it required the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have an actual 
belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily harm or an actual belief that the force used was 
necessary to defend the endangered person.  Head requires the 
State to prove actual belief as opposed to reasonable belief, 
but this modification involves proof of a fairly subtle 
difference in state of mind. 
¶69 In Lo's case, the circuit court determined that Lo had 
adequately raised self-defense, and it presented perfect and 
imperfect self-defense jury instructions to the charge of 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide.13  Consequently, the 
circuit court used Wis JI——Criminal 1014, which applied this 
court's decision in Camacho and defined imperfect self-defense 
to require that Lo "reasonably believed" that, by shooting Koua 
Vang, he prevented or terminated an unlawful interference with 
his person.  The jury instruction provided: 
                                                 
13 Lo's claim of self-defense was based on the fact that 
Koua Vang was a member of the TMCs; that the TMCs had threatened 
to "get" Lo and his brothers; that there had been other 
shootings committed by TMC members prior to the incident between 
Lo and Vang; that, before Lo shot Vang, Vang had made a quick 
move to his waistband; and that Vang did in fact have a gun in 
his pants when Lo shot him. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
32 
 
[i]f the defendant intended to kill Koua Vang; his 
acts 
demonstrated 
unequivocally, 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances, that he intended to kill and would have 
killed Koua Vang, except for the intervention of 
another person or some extraneous factor; and he did 
not reasonably believe that he was preventing or 
terminating an unlawful interference with his person 
or did not actually believe the force used was 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily 
harm to himself, the defendant is guilty of attempted 
first degree intentional homicide. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶70 The new rule announced in Head does not satisfy either 
of 
the 
Teague 
tests 
for 
retroactivity 
in 
a 
collateral 
proceeding.  The first test does not apply because Lo's conduct 
was not decriminalized.  The State's proof on a claim of 
unnecessary defense force was modified.  No reasonable argument 
can be made that the old burden——an objective threshold of 
reasonableness——was or is beyond the power of the criminal 
lawmaking authority to proscribe. 
¶71 The second test does not apply because substituting 
the 
words 
"actually 
believe 
that 
he 
was 
preventing 
or 
terminating 
a 
lawful 
interference 
with 
his 
person," 
for 
"reasonably believe that he was preventing or terminating an 
unlawful interference with his person" is not a watershed rule 
of criminal procedure, implicating fundamental fairness and the 
concept of ordered liberty.  
¶72 The argument is made that the Head decision created a 
change in substantive law.  In Bousley v. United States, 523 
U.S. 614, 620 (1998), the Supreme Court drew a distinction 
No. 
01-0843 
 
33 
 
between a new procedural rule and a new rule of substance, 
reasoning that 
decisions of this Court holding that a substantive 
federal criminal statute 
does not 
reach 
certain 
conduct, like decisions placing conduct "'beyond the 
power 
of 
the 
criminal 
law-making 
authority 
to 
proscribe,'" . . . necessarily 
carry 
a 
significant 
risk that a defendant stands convicted of "an act that 
the law does not make criminal." 
Id. at 620 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 
U.S. at 692) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), and Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974), 
respectively)).  The Court concluded that changes in substance 
are not governed by the Teague decision.  Id. at 621. 
¶73 The Head case redefined the burden on the State to 
disprove mitigating circumstances in a prosecution for first-
degree intentional homicide.  The State always had the burden of 
proof on the elements of unnecessary defensive force.  It always 
had to prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
elements of the crime remain the same.  Hence, the only change 
resulting from Head, as it affects this case, is a change in the 
jury instructions as to how the State disproves the presence of 
mitigating circumstance.  We see this as different from proving 
an additional element. 
¶74 In any event, the Supreme Court observed in Wainwright 
v. 
Stone, 
414 
U.S. 
21 
(1973), 
that 
a 
state 
is 
not 
constitutionally 
compelled 
to 
make 
retroactive 
its 
new 
construction of a statute.  Id. at 24; see also United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 (1982).  To the extent that a state 
No. 
01-0843 
 
34 
 
chooses to depart from Teague principles in a collateral 
proceeding, it ought to have a clear understanding of the impact 
of its decision on finality.14   
 
¶75 In 
Teague, 
Justice 
O'Connor 
explained 
that 
"considerations of finality" are significant and compelling in 
the criminal context.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 309.  "Application of 
constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction 
becomes final seriously undermines the principle of finality 
which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice 
system.  Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much 
of its deterrent effect."  Id.  "The past cannot always be 
erased by a new judicial declaration."  Id. at 308 (quoting 
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 
374 (1940)).  These policy considerations are the foundation for 
§ 974.06. 
¶76 Writing in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
Justice Harlan wrote: 
 
Habeas corpus always 
has 
been a 
collateral 
remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments 
                                                 
14 This court has adopted the rule from Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), for retroactivity of a new rule 
of criminal procedure.  State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 499 
N.W.2d 152 (1993).  That rule provides: "a new rule for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively 
to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not 
yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."  Id. at 694.  The 
Griffith text distinguishes cases that are pending on direct 
review and are not yet final from cases on collateral review.  
This explains why there is a more stringent test for the 
retroactivity of new criminal "rules" in collateral proceedings. 
No. 
01-0843 
 
35 
 
that have become otherwise final.  It is not designed 
as a substitute for direct review.  The interest in 
leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, 
that is, reducing the controversy to a final judgment 
not subject to further judicial revision, may quite 
legitimately 
be 
found 
by 
those 
responsible 
for 
defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, 
many, or most instances the competing interest in 
readjudicating convictions according to all legal 
standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed. 
Id. at 682-83 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
¶77 Two interests that often weigh in favor of non-
retroactivity are reliance on prior law and the effect of 
retroactivity on the administration of justice.  Those interests 
clearly apply here. 
¶78 First, there is no value to the system of criminal 
justice to apply a new rule retroactively to settled cases 
against those who faithfully followed the rules in place at the 
time of a person's criminal conviction.  To illustrate, there is 
no deterrent value and no educational value in reversing a 
conviction entered by Judge Gonzalez, who relied on and followed 
to the letter the jury instruction dictated by this court's 
decision 
in 
Camacho. 
 
Consequently, 
even 
to 
consider 
retroactivity, the value to criminal defendants from the 
retroactive application of a new rule ought to substantially 
outweigh the value of upholding settled judgments. 
 
¶79 Second, the retrial of Lo and others in his position 
would impose a heavy burden on the entire system of criminal 
justice.  According to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 
there were 1333 persons convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide incarcerated in Wisconsin institutions on December 31, 
No. 
01-0843 
 
36 
 
2002.15  Every defendant who received or requested an instruction 
on imperfect self-defense after Camacho but before Head could 
argue that his or her conviction should be reconsidered and that 
he or she should be given a new trial. 
 
¶80 Third, persons convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide are sentenced to life in prison.  The State might be 
unable to retry many first-degree intentional homicide cases 
because of the passage of time and the death or unavailability 
of witnesses. 
 
¶81 Fourth, the fact that a defendant did not receive the 
revised imperfect self-defense instruction at trial does not 
mean that the State could not or did not actually meet its 
burden of proof at trial.  In Lo's case, for example, the State 
was entitled in 1996 to overcome his affirmative defense if it 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lo did not reasonably 
believe that he was preventing or terminating an unlawful 
interference with his person, or Lo "did not actually believe 
the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great 
bodily harm to himself."  The latter element has not changed.  
Lo's jury might well have noted that Koua Vang was shot in the 
back of his right arm, when he was 40 to 50 feet away from Lo. 
¶82 Errors in jury instructions often give rise to new 
rules.  But corrections in jury instructions seldom lead to 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Department of Corrections report on "Frequency 
of Each Offense by Statute and Offenses Description 12/31/2002 
Incarcerated Adult Population," (CIPIS) Monthly Report File 
(month ending 12/31/2002).   
No. 
01-0843 
 
37 
 
retroactivity in collateral proceedings.  See Gilmore v. Taylor, 
508 U.S. 333 (1993) (unconstitutionality of pattern jury 
instruction); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119-21 (1982) 
(burden of proof for self defense). 
 
¶83 In 
Lo's 
case 
the 
jury 
was 
not 
precluded 
from 
considering imperfect self-defense.  It was given two options on 
self-defense.  In addition, the jury was instructed that a 
person who provokes an attack is not allowed to use or threaten 
force in self-defense against the attack.  If the person 
provokes an attack that causes him to reasonably believe that he 
is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm then he may 
respond with self-defense.  However, this person cannot threaten 
or use force likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless 
he reasonably believe he has exhausted every other reasonable 
means to escape or avoid death or great bodily harm. 
¶84 The court's instruction was correct at the time it was 
given and it would be only slightly different today.  We 
conclude that the instructional error recognized in Head need 
not be applied retroactively to Anou Lo.  Such a result would 
disregard the State's reliance on prior law and have a 
deleterious effect on the administration of justice.  We agree 
with the sentiments of the late Justice Powell, who wrote in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),  
 
No effective judicial system can 
afford to 
concede the continuing theoretical possibility that 
there 
is 
error 
in 
every 
trial 
and 
that 
every 
incarceration is unfounded.  At some point the law 
must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been 
committed, 
that 
consequent 
punishment 
has 
been 
No. 
01-0843 
 
38 
 
imposed, that one should no longer look back with the 
view 
to 
resurrecting 
every imaginable 
basis for 
further litigation but rather should look forward to 
rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen. 
Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring). 
V 
¶85 For the reasons set forth, we affirm this court's 
ruling in Escalona and we hold that Head is not to be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.  Therefore, we 
affirm Anou Lo's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  01-0843.awb 
 
1 
 
¶86 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority opinion that 
State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 
(1994), correctly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and remains 
good law.  I therefore join Parts I and II of the majority 
opinion. 
¶87 However, I part ways with the majority opinion with 
respect to whether State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
648 N.W.2d 413, should be applied retroactively on collateral 
review.  Instead, I agree with the conclusion in Part II of 
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent that "Head represents a new 
interpretation of substantive law that, under Howard, enjoys the 
presumption of retroactive application to cases on direct review 
and cases on collateral review."  Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent, ¶119.  I therefore join Part II of the Chief Justice's 
dissent. 
¶88 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
 
 
 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶89 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I cannot join the majority opinion.  It does not address the 
difficult issues raised by the parties in this case.  The 
majority opinion does not address the procedural complications 
raised by our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) in State 
v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) 
(hereinafter Escalona), despite the court order identifying that 
issue as the primary reason for accepting review in this case.  
Moreover, I disagree with the majority opinion that Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), requires that our decision in State 
v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413, not be 
applied retroactively to the case before us.   
I 
¶90 This court's order accepting review identifies the 
primary issue 
for 
review: 
"[R]evisit 
the 
Escalona-Naranjo 
holding 
to 
consider 
whether . . . a 
meaningful 
bar 
to 
'successive motions and appeals' continues to exist under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4)."16  The court's order makes clear that 
                                                 
16  State v. Lo, No. 01-0843, unpublished slip op. ¶58 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (Deininger, J., concurring).  See also 
majority op., ¶50.  
This court's order accepting review reads as follows: 
[The 
parties' 
briefs] 
may 
also, 
to 
the 
extent 
necessary, address the majority's conclusions that:  
(1) the defendant-appellant-petitioner was barred from 
raising issues in the postconviction motion; (2) he 
failed 
to 
allege 
sufficient 
facts 
in 
his 
postconviction motion to raise a question of fact; and 
(3) the record conclusively demonstrated that the 
defendant-appellant-petitioner was not entitled to 
relief.  The parties are cautioned, however, that the 
court's primary reason for accepting review in this 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
2 
 
the parties are to address the continued vitality of Escalona in 
light of Judge Deininger's concurring opinion in the present 
case explaining that defendants are able to circumvent Escalona.     
¶91 The majority opinion's mischaracterization of this 
case as an inappropriate vehicle in which to examine the issue 
raised by Judge Deininger is thus nothing more than a decision 
not to tackle the issue for which we accepted review.  When it 
fails to address the problems identified by Judge Deininger, the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
not, 
as 
it 
may 
superficially 
seem, 
judiciously refraining from interfering with matters best left 
to other branches of government or to cases brought by other 
parties.  Rather, the court is shirking its responsibility to 
face up to the unintended consequences of Escalona.  We created 
the difficulty identified by Judge Deininger by our Escalona 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  We ought to repair it.  
¶92 To achieve finality in litigation, Escalona held that 
a defendant may not bring claims under Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) if 
the defendant could have raised the claims in his or her 
previously filed § 974.02 motion or on direct appeal unless the 
defendant presents "sufficient reason" for having failed to do 
so.  
¶93 The bulk of the majority opinion (Part II) is devoted 
to whether Escalona is correct.  The majority opinion rehashes 
                                                                                                                                                             
case 
is 
to 
consider 
the 
points 
raised 
in 
the 
concurring opinion [of Judge Deininger] . . . .  
State v. Lo, No. 01-0843, unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. 
April 29, 2002) (emphasis added). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
3 
 
at length (48 paragraphs) the same territory mined in previous 
cases——the 
language, 
legislative 
history, 
and 
purpose 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  It also briefs this court's numerous cases 
that laboriously twisted, turned, tuned, revised, and reversed 
its various interpretations of § 974.06(4), the language of 
which remained essentially the same.  The majority opinion 
ultimately concludes that Escalona correctly states the law.17 
¶94 Noticeably 
absent 
from 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
affirmation 
of 
Escalona's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) is any consideration of the complications 
resulting from Escalona posited by Judge Deininger (Part III of 
the majority opinion).  In other words, the majority opinion 
does not include in its analysis of the meaning of § 974.06(4) 
any reference to Judge Deininger's assertion that Escalona is 
not serving its purpose and that defendants have found a way 
around Escalona.   
¶95 The majority opinion cannot, with a straight face, 
ignore the problems resulting from Escalona when it interprets 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4). 
 
Such 
an 
approach 
to 
statutory 
interpretation 
contravenes 
the 
basic 
rule 
of 
statutory 
construction that a court ought to assess the results a 
particular interpretation of a statute has on courts, litigants, 
and public policy when interpreting a statute.18  It is presumed 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶15. 
18 See, e.g., State v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 101 
Wis. 2d 142, 153, 303 N.W.2d 834 (1981) ("[T[his court has often 
held that statutes should not be construed or interpreted to 
achieve absurd or unreasonable results."). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
4 
 
that the legislature would not enact a statute that leads to an 
absurd or unreasonable result.19  
¶96 The goal of finality in litigation is at the heart of 
the Escalona decision interpreting § 974.06(4) "to require 
criminal defendants to consolidate all their postconviction 
claims into one motion or appeal."20  The majority opinion here 
reaffirms Escalona, in large part, because it furthers the 
legislature's goal of finality in the criminal appeals process.21  
Thus, the point raised by Judge Deininger strikes at the heart 
of this court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4).  The 
precise issue raised by this case is whether the Escalona 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) remains correct given 
the fact that the Escalona decision does not promote finality by 
compelling a prisoner to raise all issues available to him in 
one procedure.22  
¶97 Judge 
Deininger 
writes 
that 
despite 
Escalona, 
defendants are still able to obtain review of a claimed error 
not 
previously 
raised 
in 
an 
appeal 
or 
§ 974.02 
motion.  
Defendants circumvent Escalona by asserting that the "sufficient 
                                                 
19 See State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶23, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 
657 N.W.2d 393 ("The legislature could not have intended the 
absurd result of requiring the issuance of a warrant for statute 
of limitations purposes under Wis. Stat. s. 939.74(1) for an 
individual who is already in custody."). 
20 State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 178, 517 
N.W.2d 155 (1994). 
21 Majority op., ¶46. 
22 Majority op., ¶18 (citing Comment to Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 974.06 (West Supp. 1998)). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
5 
 
reason" the issue was not raised previously is that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct 
appeal or under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  In order to determine 
whether the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim 
presents a "sufficient reason" for the defendant to be heard, 
the court of appeals, according to Judge Deininger, must often 
consider the merits of the underlying claim and assess whether 
counsel was ineffective for not raising it, thus granting the 
defendant what Wis. Stat. § 974.06 as interpreted by Escalona 
ostensibly denies: "the consideration of the merits of the 
defendant's newly asserted claim, for which sufficient reason 
has not been shown for an earlier failure to raise it."23  
¶98 Judge 
Deininger 
further 
asserts 
that 
the 
interpretation in Escalona creates an even more complex and 
difficult procedural morass when the claim is that appellate 
counsel is ineffective for not raising a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  Such a claim burdens courts and 
the State without bringing about the desired result of finality 
(and without preventing a defendant from having a court consider 
the merits of his or her claim that Escalona apparently barred).  
Judge Deininger sets forth the multi-layer, convoluted question 
the circuit court or court of appeals must ponder as follows:  
Is there merit to the now raised issue, such that 
trial counsel was deficient for not making a request 
or objection regarding it, thereby prejudicing the 
defendant, and thereby also rendering postconviction 
and/or appellate counsel's performance deficient and 
                                                 
23 Lo, 
unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶56 
(Deininger, 
J., 
concurring). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
6 
 
prejudicial for failing to assert trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, such that the defendant has presented 
a sufficient reason for the failure to raise the issue 
in earlier postconviction or appellate proceedings, 
which would permit him to now bring the issue before 
the court for a consideration of its merits?24  
¶99 Judge Deininger graphically describes the cumbersome 
task before the circuit court and court of appeals: "[T]he 
effort to peel through the layers of this onion-like inquiry 
often results in analyses that are needlessly complex, fraught 
with the potential for gaps or errors along the way, and, all in 
all, a frustrating undertaking for courts and respondent's 
counsel alike."25  Finally, Judge Deininger laments that circuit 
courts and courts of appeal have to answer this question without 
a Machner26 hearing to determine why trial counsel failed to 
raise the issue.27  
                                                 
24 Id. ¶57 (Deininger, J., concurring). 
25 Id. ¶58 (Deininger, J., concurring). 
26 See State v. Machner, 101 Wis. 2d 79, 303 N.W.2d 633 
(1981). 
27 The complicating effects of Escalona are not limited to 
review under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  Defense counsel asserts that 
because all issues must be raised on direct appeal or be deemed 
waived, cautious post-conviction or appellate counsel must 
include and litigate ineffective assistance of counsel on 
virtually any argued post-conviction motion or appeal.  
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶100 The Escalona issue this case poses is whether the 
court should stick with Escalona and continue to require this 
"onion-like" analysis, which increases the workloads of counsel 
and the courts, or should reinterpret Wis. Stat. § 906.04.  The 
majority opinion ducks the issue.  
¶101 Everyone who submitted a brief in this case——the 
State, the defendant, the State Public Defender and the 
University of Wisconsin Law School Frank J. Remington Center——
agrees that Escalona has posed a significant problem.  They 
differ only on the solution.  
¶102 To resolve the dilemma posed by Escalona, defense 
counsel suggests we overrule Escalona as contravening the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Massaro v. 
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1690 (2003), provides 
support for defense counsel's position.  In Massaro the United 
States Supreme Court held that, despite the general rule that 
claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on 
collateral 
review 
unless 
the 
petitioner 
shows 
cause 
and 
prejudice, a petitioner could raise an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
(upon which our law is based), even though the petitioner could 
have raised, but did not raise, the claim on direct appeal. 
Massaro, 123 S. Ct. at 1694.  The Massaro Court recognized that 
forcing an offender to bring an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on direct review "creates inefficiencies for 
courts and counsel."  Massaro, 123 S. Ct. at 1695.  According to 
the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel is in a 
difficult 
position 
vis-à-vis 
trial 
counsel, 
needing 
trial 
counsel's help to get familiar with a trial record on short 
notice while simultaneously combing his or her comments for 
signs of incompetence. 
Furthermore, apparently most Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motions 
are filed 
pro se 
by inmates without 
legal 
training or 
substantial legal resources. 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
8 
 
language and legislative history and the underlying policy of 
finality.  
¶103 The State says keep Escalona.  The State asserts that 
the court of appeals is wrong to assume that a defendant can 
escape the Escalona bar by a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  According to the State, appellate counsel's 
ineffective representation does not constitute a "sufficient 
reason" to allow the defendant to raise the issue on a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion.  The State concludes that State v. 
Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992), requires a 
defendant to litigate an ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claim through a habeas petition to the appellate court, 
and that the court of appeals erred in State ex rel. Rothering 
v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996), 
adopting a different procedure for claims of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel.  According to the State, 
a defendant who challenges appellate counsel's failure to raise 
a particular issue must sufficiently plead and prove deficient 
performance and prejudice through a Knight petition, not through 
a § 974.06 proceeding.28  
¶104 The Frank J. Remington Center of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School supports the defendant's position on 
Escalona but focuses on and is critical of the State's suggested 
new 
procedure. 
 
The 
Center's 
brief 
illustrates 
how 
a 
hypothetical defendant traverses the procedural morass created 
                                                 
28 The State's Brief presents a very detailed proposal, even 
suggesting standards the courts should apply to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  State's Br. at 14-23. 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
9 
 
by Escalona, Knight, and Rothering, as well as the State's 
proposal. 
¶105 The Office of the State Public Defender supports the 
defendant's position on Escalona.  It expands Judge Deininger's 
point that Escalona imposes significant costs on the courts and 
litigants.  It also asserts that the State's proposal shifts the 
pressure into habeas litigation and transfers the forum for 
hearing the defendant's claims from the circuit courts to the 
appellate courts.  The Public Defender explains the effect of 
the State's proposal and post-conviction remedies on the right 
to counsel, on the operation of its office, and on state and 
county funding.  
¶106 Putting aside textual and legislative history analysis 
about which courts and litigants have disagreed, I conclude that 
the policy of finality driving Escalona is still a good one but 
that Escalona has not accomplished what the court intended it to 
do.  The fact remains that serial litigation is allowed under 
Escalona.  Defendants are getting review of their claims of 
trial court error despite Escalona through the circuitous and 
cumbersome 
route 
of 
claiming 
"ineffective 
assistance 
of 
appellate counsel."   
¶107 I would not adopt the State's suggested procedure, 
because I think it will exacerbate the procedural complications 
already created by Escalona.  I would just overturn Escalona.29  
                                                 
29 In the interest of full disclosure, I should state that I 
dissented in Escalona, observing that the Escalona approach 
merely shifts a court's attention from the merits of the 
constitutional claim to "arcane procedural issues."  Escalona, 
185 Wis. 2d at 196 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
10 
 
I noted in my Escalona dissent that this court's original 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.06 in Bergenthal v. State, 72 
Wis. 2d 740, 242 N.W.2d 199 (1976), allowing all prisoners one 
§ 974.06 motion, had been applied for 18 years and no showing 
was made that it had "become detrimental to the administration 
of the justice system or to the coherence and consistency in the 
law."30  
¶108 In 
light 
of 
the 
practical 
difficulties 
being 
experienced with Escalona and the lack of difficulties for 18 
years with Bergenthal, I would overturn Escalona and return to 
Bergenthal.  As Justice Prosser wrote for the court in Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶106, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, stare decisis should not 
deter a court from correcting a decision when events subsequent 
to the decision demonstrate that the court has failed to provide 
"suitable direction and consistency." 
¶109 The majority opinion expends seven paragraphs (¶¶50-
57) 
complimenting 
Judge 
Deininger 
on 
his 
"insightful" 
identification of the "complications resulting from the Escalona 
decision," but then does nothing about these complications.  The 
circuit court and court of appeals are left to shoulder the 
burden Escalona imposes without any relief in sight, as the 
majority 
opinion 
never 
explains 
by 
whom 
or 
when 
these 
"complications" will be eliminated or alleviated.  It suggests 
at one point we should defer to the legislature: "Some of the 
                                                 
30 Escalona, 
185 
Wis. 2d at 
197 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
11 
 
answers to these issues may be more a matter of wise 
policymaking than statutory interpretation."31  At another point 
it suggests that this court should craft remedies via its rule-
making authority in collaboration with "the State and the 
defense bar"32 because of concerns about fairness to defendants 
and the State and shifts in workload.  Finally, it opines that 
more information is needed from other jurisdictions (readily 
available to the court through the library, the Internet, and 
other sources) before "we attempt to fashion a solution" that 
promotes reasonable finality.33   
¶110 This court has a responsibility to resolve the issues 
raised by the cases we accept for review.  The majority opinion 
neglects this responsibility without an explanation, leaving 
circuit courts, the court of appeals, the State, and many 
prisoners stuck in a procedural morass that benefits none of 
them.  This is unacceptable.  
II 
¶111 The second issue on which the majority opinion and I 
disagree is whether State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
648 N.W.2d 413, applies retroactively to cases on collateral 
review.  The majority opinion looks to federal cases to assist 
in deciding the issue and makes the federal cases sound 
consistent, easy to understand, and easy to apply.  I do not 
think retroactivity is an easy area of the law.  I agree with a 
                                                 
31 Majority op., ¶56. 
32 Id., ¶4. 
33 Id., ¶56. 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
12 
 
commentator who explained the confusing state of U.S. Supreme 
Court cases relating to retroactivity as follows: "Over the 
course of the past thirty-six years, the [U.S. Supreme] Court 
has grappled with the issue of retroactivity and has crafted a 
theoretically incoherent doctrine that has proven difficult to 
apply."34   
¶112 The majority opinion concludes that Head does not 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.  It reaches 
this 
conclusion 
by 
applying 
the 
federal 
doctrine 
of 
nonretroactivity for "new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure" announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and 
then by asserting that the "rule announced in Head does not 
satisfy either of the Teague tests for retroactivity in a 
collateral proceeding."35  
¶113 The problem with the majority opinion's conclusion is 
that Teague does not apply to the present case.  We so held in 
State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 284, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997).  
The defendant in Howard was convicted after the jury was 
instructed on the charge of possessing a dangerous weapon in 
accord with the law at the time.  This court subsequently 
                                                 
34 Christopher S. Strauss, Collateral Damage: How the 
Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug 
Prisoners' Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 
1220, 1222 (2003). 
35 Majority op., ¶70.  The exceptions to the rule of 
nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review are: (1) if the 
new rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe; and (2) if the new rule requires the observance of 
those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
13 
 
declared in another case that the instruction erroneously stated 
an element of the offense.36  On collateral review, the Howard 
court recognized that its new interpretation of the elements of 
the crime worked a substantive change in the law and accordingly 
Teague did not apply.  The Howard court concluded that there was 
a distinction between new procedural rules and new substantive 
interpretations in the retroactivity context and held that "the 
Teague retroactivity analysis is limited to procedural rules" 
and "the doctrine of nonretroactivity found in Teague does not 
apply to substantive interpretations."37  It therefore applied 
the new interpretation retroactively on collateral review to 
cases finalized before the change of the substantive law.38 
¶114 Howard is consistent with United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  The United States Supreme Court has held that Teague 
applies only to procedural rules and is inapplicable in 
situations in which a court decides the meaning of a criminal 
statute enacted by Congress.39  Changes in substantive law, in 
contrast to changes in procedural law, are presumed to apply 
retroactively to all cases (both on direct and on collateral 
review) because the holding that a substantive criminal statute 
                                                 
36 See State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994). 
37 State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 284, 564 N.W.2d 753 
(1997). 
38 Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 272. 
39 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) 
("[B]ecause Teague by its terms applies only to procedural 
rules, we think it is inapplicable to the situation in which 
this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute."). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
14 
 
does not reach certain conduct carries a significant risk that a 
defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make 
criminal.40  
¶115 The majority opinion finesses this crucial distinction 
when it concludes that Head is a new rule that does not apply 
retroactively to cases already final because it does not fit the 
exceptions to Teague.41  If one believes, as I think one must, 
that Head changed a substantive criminal law, then Teague does 
not apply and the presumption is that the "new" law applies 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.42  
¶116 The heart of the issue presented by this case is 
whether this court's decision in Head announced a new rule of 
criminal procedure or one of substantive law.43  The majority 
                                                 
40 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998); 
United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 2000) 
("While 
a 
new 
rule 
of 
constitutional 
criminal 
procedure 
generally does not apply retroactively on collateral review, a 
new 
rule 
of 
substantive 
criminal 
law 
is 
presumptively 
retroactive because a defendant may have been punished for 
conduct that simply is not illegal.") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
41 Majority op., ¶70. 
42 The majority opinion's warning to states that departing 
from the Teague principles has a significant impact on the 
finality of criminal convictions is inapposite.  Majority op., 
¶75.  Bousley makes clear that applying a new substantive 
interpretation retroactively to cases on collateral review is 
not a departure from Teague. 
43 See, e.g., Monsanto v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 2d 
273, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("In deciding whether the Richardson 
decision applies retroactively, the Court must determine whether 
the Supreme Court announced in Richardson a new rule of criminal 
procedure or one of substantive law.").  
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
15 
 
opinion closes its eyes to this issue, blindly framing the 
threshold issue as whether the decision in Head could "fairly be 
described as a 'new rule'"44 without focusing on whether the 
decision 
in 
Head 
should 
fairly 
be 
described 
as 
a 
new 
constitutional 
rule 
for 
criminal 
procedure 
or 
a 
new 
interpretation of substantive law.  The majority opinion's 
neglect of this distinction between new procedural and new 
substantive rules in the retroactivity context is particularly 
puzzling given the fact that both parties recognized the 
distinction and briefed their arguments accordingly.  
¶117 The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
Head 
provided 
a 
new 
substantive interpretation of imperfect self-defense, not a new 
constitutional rule for criminal procedure, and thus must be 
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review under 
Howard.  According to the defendant, this case is on all fours 
with Howard——he was convicted by a jury instructed in accordance 
with 
the 
law 
at 
the 
time, 
the 
law 
was 
subsequently 
reinterpreted, and he is entitled to a new trial under the 
correct interpretation of the law.    
¶118 The State, for its part, argues that Howard (and 
Bousley) do not control this case for two reasons: (1) in Howard 
this court interpreted a statute for the first time, whereas in 
Head this court merely modified an existing interpretation; and 
(2) in Howard the new interpretation involved an essential 
element of a penalty enhancer, whereas in Head the new 
interpretation involved an affirmative defense.  According to 
                                                 
44 Majority op., ¶62. 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
16 
 
the State, this latter distinction means that despite the change 
in the law, the State proved all of the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt and no previously criminal behavior 
has been decriminalized.  
¶119 I agree with the defendant.  I conclude that Head 
represents a new interpretation of substantive law that, under 
Howard, enjoys the presumption of retroactive application to 
cases on direct review and cases on collateral review.   
¶120 Head defined anew what conduct may be criminalized as 
first-degree intentional homicide.  It rejected the prevailing 
view 
that 
imperfect 
self-defense 
required 
an 
objectively 
reasonable 
belief 
of 
imminent 
threat 
and 
held 
that 
the 
legislature intended for imperfect self-defense to require a 
subjective belief of imminent threat.   
¶121 Prior to Head, a defendant who asserted imperfect 
self-defense under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) as an affirmative 
defense to first degree intentional homicide was guilty if the 
jury found the defendant's belief that he or she was preventing 
or 
terminating 
an 
unlawful 
interference 
with 
his 
person 
unreasonable.45  This objective test was based on this court's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
in 
State 
v. 
Camacho, 
176 
Wis. 2d 860, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  In Head, the same law, 
§ 940.01(2)(b), was interpreted to encompass a subjective test 
of whether the defendant "actually" believed he was preventing 
or terminating an unlawful interference with his person.46  Thus, 
                                                 
45 State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶79, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 
N.W.2d 413. 
46 Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶70. 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
17 
 
prior to Head, a person was guilty of first-degree intentional 
homicide even if the jury found that he actually believed he was 
acting in self-defense, but after Head, that same person is no 
longer guilty of first-degree intentional homicide.  
¶122 The majority opinion dramatically understates the 
import of this shift from an objective to a subjective standard, 
describing it as a "fairly subtle difference."47  Whether a 
person is to be measured on an objective or subjective standard 
is a major issue running throughout many different areas of 
law,48 and a court's decision to impose criminal or civil 
liability based on one or the other standard is often outcome 
determinative.  The shift required a reversal of the defendant's 
conviction in Head, and as the majority opinion admits: 
If [Head] applied retroactively, [the defendant's] 
conviction for attempted first-degree homicide would 
probably be reversed on the basis that the jury 
instruction for unnecessary defensive force (imperfect 
self-defense) did not require the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] did not 
actually believe that he was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm.49  
¶123 Contrary to the State's assertion, it makes no 
difference that Head modified an existing interpretation of the 
imperfect self-defense statute as opposed to interpreting that 
statute for the first time.  Either way, the defendant was 
                                                 
47 Majority op., ¶68. 
48 See, e.g., Hofflander v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 
2003 WI 77, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
49 Majority op., ¶58. 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
18 
 
convicted under an incorrect interpretation of the law.50  
Moreover, contrary to the majority opinion, it makes no 
difference that Head changed the interpretation of an element of 
an affirmative defense as opposed to an element of the crime 
itself.  
The 
State bears 
the burden 
of 
disproving the 
affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt as it does the 
elements of the offense and it is irrelevant that Head did not 
decriminalize any conduct.  There is no requirement that a 
change in the law decriminalize conduct in order to be 
substantive.51 
¶124 The failure to apply the new interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) announced in Head retroactively to all 
                                                 
50 The law presumes that jurors faithfully follow the jury 
instructions.  The instructions in the present case did not 
accurately state the law and possibly misled the jurors about 
the applicability of the defendant's claim of imperfect self-
defense.  The erroneous instruction constitutes a profound 
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights.  The incorrect 
jury instructions mean that the defendant was not tried under 
the substantive criminal laws of the State and was thus deprived 
of a fair trial under the laws of this state.  The right to a 
correct affirmative defense instruction when there is evidence 
to support an affirmative defense is especially critical when 
the defendant takes the stand to prove his affirmative defense.  
The defendant merely asks that he be convicted of attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide only if he is guilty of 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide. 
51 Monsanto, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 278 ("There is nothing in 
Davis, or in any other precedent that this Court is aware of, to 
suggest that a new decision is substantive only if it results in 
a conviction for an act that the law does not make criminal."); 
see also Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 139 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (concluding that a case interpreting a federal 
criminal statute so as to change the elements of an offense 
altered the meaning of the substantive criminal law and was 
therefore 
retroactively applicable 
to 
cases 
on 
collateral 
review).   
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
19 
 
cases is also untenable because it implies that the statute 
means one thing prior to this court's interpretation and 
something entirely different afterwards.52  Moreover, it suggests 
that this court can determine and has determined what conduct is 
criminal, or at least the degree to which certain conduct is 
criminal, in all pre-Head cases.  This is inappropriate.  The 
legislature "determines what constitutes a crime in Wisconsin 
and establishes maximum penalties for each class of crime."53  
¶125 The 
majority 
opinion 
here 
fails 
to 
apply 
Head 
retroactively because it fears that our criminal justice system 
cannot handle the potential flood of cases in which someone will 
seek a new trial if Head is applied retroactively.  The majority 
opinion admits as much when it begins its analysis, "[I]f we 
were to retroactively apply the decision in Head to this case, 
we would arguably open to collateral attack 10 years of homicide 
convictions that involved the standard jury instruction on 
                                                 
52 United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298, 299 (10th Cir. 
1995); see also State v. Benzel, 220 Wis. 2d 588, 592, 583 
N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1998) (retroactive application of a 
decision striking down an unconstitutional criminal law is 
required "because failure to do so leads to the untenable result 
that a person stands convicted for conduct which has been held 
constitutionally immune from punishment."). 
  The majority opinion's conclusion that "the court's 
instruction [on imperfect self-defense in the present case] was 
correct at the time it was given and it would be only slightly 
different today," majority op., ¶83, flatly disregards the 
language in Head concluding that "we are mindful that our 
interpretation [of Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b)] is at odds with 
the court's determination in Camacho."  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
¶92. 
53 In re Judicial Admin. Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 
Wis. 2d 198, 203, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
20 
 
imperfect self-defense,"54 and concludes its analysis by tipping 
its hat to "considerations of finality."55 
¶126 The majority opinion's concerns are appropriate.  Many 
prisoners 
may 
request 
a 
new 
trial 
if 
Head 
is 
applied 
retroactively.  These concerns, however, are no substitute for 
the burden this court has to insure that a person is not 
condemned for a crime that he or she did not commit.  "Lest 
there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the 
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged."56 
¶127 The defendant here is likely guilty of a crime.  He 
shot and wounded another person.  But he is likely not guilty of 
the crime for which he is now spending 29 years of his life in 
prison.  There appears to be substantial evidence supporting the 
defendant's testimony that he actually believed the victim was 
reaching for a gun before he pulled his own gun, and thus, that 
a jury could have reasonably concluded that he acted in 
"imperfect" self-defense under the proper interpretation of 
§ 940.01(2m)(b).  The defendant deserves a trial in which the 
State proves beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.  
 
                                                 
54 Majority op., ¶61. 
55 Majority op., ¶75. 
56 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
21 
 
III 
¶128 The majority opinion concludes that it does not have 
the 
information 
or 
arguments 
necessary 
to 
address 
the 
complications 
stemming 
from 
Escalona 
identified 
by 
Judge 
Deininger, despite a court order squarely requesting that the 
parties address these complications and four briefs responding 
to that request.  It thus defers judgment on the matter.  
¶129 The majority opinion then concludes that it has the 
information and arguments necessary to settle the complicated 
law of retroactivity without referencing the arguments presented 
and briefed by the parties or acknowledging the legal issues 
actually raised and asserts its judgment on the matter.  
¶130 I agree with the State that Wisconsin is free to 
establish and apply its own retroactivity analysis.57  This court 
has endorsed the Teague approach generally,58 even though it has 
recognized that Teague is not very well crafted or understood.  
The court has modified the Teague approach when it has thought 
adaptation necessary on policy grounds.59  
¶131 Figuring out retroactivity is a difficult matter, 
however, and should not be done without help from litigants and 
without examining what other states are doing and what does and 
                                                 
57 See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24 (1973). 
58 See, e.g., State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 282, 564 
N.W.2d 753 (1997); State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 
N.W.2d 152 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 880 (1993); State v. 
Horton, 195 Wis. 2d 280, 287,  536 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995). 
59 See, e.g., State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 
Wis. 2d 246, 257, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996) (applying a variation of 
Teague). 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
22 
 
does not work.  The majority opinion in this case overturns 
Howard sub silencio and departs from United States Supreme Court 
precedent without batting an eye and without full information 
such as the effect of retroactivity on finalized cases.  
¶132 Why the majority is comfortable with such an approach 
when 
addressing retroactivity 
but 
not 
addressing 
Escalona 
completely escapes me. 
¶133 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join Part II of this dissent. 
 
No.  01-0843.ssa 
 
 
 
1