Title: Fritz v. Johnston

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96325-Agenda 11-January 2004.
HAROLD A. FRITZ, Appellant, v. JOHN W. JOHNSTON et al., 							Appellees.
Opinion filed March 18, 2004. 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The primary issue in this case may be stated concisely: Does the
doctrine of sovereign immunity deprive circuit courts of jurisdiction over
claims that state employees engaged in civil conspiracy in the furtherance
of which unlawful acts were committed? We answer this question in the
negative; sovereign immunity does not apply. However, plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action for civil conspiracy with respect to two defendants.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment in part and reverse in
part.

BACKGROUND
	The case comes before us on appeal from the dismissal of plaintiff's
third amended complaint (complaint). The following factual background
is derived solely from the allegations contained in that document.
	Plaintiff Harold Fritz is a decorated veteran of the United States
Army, who retired with a rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Prior to 1999, he
was serving the State of Illinois as the deputy director of the Illinois
Department of Veterans Affairs (Department). He was one of three
finalists for the position of Director of Veterans Affairs when a new
director was appointed in January 1999, but that post went instead to
defendant John Johnston, and defendant continued in his position as
deputy director. Defendant Betty Bergstrom was at all pertinent times
employed as Johnston's administrative assistant. Defendants Elizabeth
Gaffney and Diane Ford were also employed by the state, as an assistant
legislative officer and as the Governor's personal legal counsel,
respectively.
	In July 1999, defendant Johnston contacted the Illinois State Police
to request that the police commence an investigation of plaintiff. Johnston
asserted that plaintiff had threatened his "physical integrity" as well as
threatening "potential damage to his personal home." Johnston informed
the police that plaintiff had also threatened Bergstrom with physical
violence. Plaintiff alleged that these charges were false and that Johnston
and Bergstrom knew them to be false at the time they were made. No
charges or action were ever brought against plaintiff as a result of the
police investigation, which concluded in December 1999.
	At some point after Johnston contacted the State Police, but before
the "official commencement" of the State Police investigation, Illinois State
Representative Ron Stephens asked plaintiff to resign his post.
Representative Stephens allegedly informed plaintiff that the Governor
wished to appoint a different person to plaintiff's post as deputy director,
and wished to secure his voluntary retirement. Representative Stephens
also allegedly informed plaintiff that the State Police investigation Johnston
had set into motion would commence unless he resigned. Plaintiff alleged
that Representative Stephens had delivered this message to plaintiff at the
behest of defendants Gaffney and Ford. Plaintiff did not resign.
	The first four counts of plaintiff's complaint were separate allegations
of civil conspiracy against each of the above four defendants. Plaintiff
contended that defendants had conspired to force him out of his job, and
alleged that he endured mental anguish and "derogation of his name and
reputation" as a result of their actions. In counts V and VI, plaintiff alleged
that through their actions defendants Gaffney and Johnston had committed
"intentional interference with employment and economic gains derivable
therefrom."
	Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West
1998)). Defendants argued that the circuit court was without jurisdiction
to hear plaintiff's claims because, under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, plaintiff's action was in reality one against the State of Illinois.
Defendants also argued that they were protected by public official
immunity. Finally, defendants contended that plaintiff failed to state a claim
for which relief could be granted, both on the conspiracy counts and on
the counts alleging intentional interference with an employment
relationship.
	The circuit court of Sangamon County granted defendants' motion
to dismiss on each of the grounds raised. The court ruled that plaintiff's
claims were barred by both the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the
doctrine of public official immunity. The court also found that plaintiff had
both failed to allege all elements of conspiracy-because he had failed to
allege an "underlying tort or crime"-and failed to allege all elements of
intentional interference with an employment relationship-because he failed
to allege any damages. Finally, the court noted that plaintiff had requested
punitive damages without first seeking leave of court, and dismissed the
complaint in its entirety.
	A divided appellate court affirmed the dismissal. No. 4-02-0033
(unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate majority found
it necessary only to reach the issue of sovereign immunity, and affirmed the
circuit court on this ground. The court explained that even though plaintiff
did not bring suit against the state in name, plaintiff's suit was in fact a
claim against the state because it had the potential to "control the State's
actions" by "limit[ing a state] employee's ability to engage in lawful activity
on behalf of the state." The majority noted that at the time Johnston filed
his complaint with the State Police, there existed an administrative order
which provided that "[a]ll incidents involving State employees which ***
involve a violation of the Illinois Criminal Code *** shall be reported to
the [Illinois State Police] without exception." See Administrative Order
No. 1, 19 Ill. Reg. 1019, 1020 (1995). Accordingly, the majority
reasoned, Johnston's report to the State Police constituted lawful activity
on behalf of the state. The majority also concluded that since it was legal
for the Governor to request a political appointee to resign, Gaffney and
Ford's actions were also legal activity on behalf of the state.
	Presiding Justice Myerscough agreed with the majority that the circuit
court properly dismissed counts V and VI, alleging intentional interference
with an employment relationship. However, she parted company with the
majority with respect to the conspiracy claims. Presiding Justice
Myerscough noted that filing a false report with the State Police is a
misdemeanor crime, and reasoned that because plaintiff alleged that
Johnston knew the reports were false at the time he filed them, those
reports could not be considered "lawful activity on behalf of the state,"
regardless of the administrative order to which the majority referred. The
dissent went on to conclude that defendants were not shielded by public
official immunity, and that plaintiff had adequately stated a cause of action.
	Plaintiff petitioned this court for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), which we granted.

ANALYSIS
	Before this court the issues have been pared down. Plaintiff does not
challenge the circuit court's dismissal of counts V and VI, which alleged
intentional interference with employment relationship. Defendants, for their
part, have affirmatively abandoned their public official immunity argument.
Accordingly, the sole questions are whether sovereign immunity applies on
the facts of this case-which determines whether the circuit court had
jurisdiction of the suit-and, if the circuit court did have jurisdiction,
whether plaintiff stated a claim for conspiracy. Because the issues arose
in the context of a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, we are required
to " 'interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.' " Van Meter v. Darien Park District,
207 Ill. 2d 359, 367-68 (2003), quoting In re Chicago Flood Litigation,
176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997). We must also accept as true "all inferences
that can reasonably be drawn in plaintiff's favor." Chicago Teachers
Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000). Our standard of review is de novo. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d  at 368.

I. Sovereign Immunity
	In the Illinois Constitution of 1970, this state abolished the defense
of sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by
law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4. In response, the legislature enacted
the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq.
(West 1998)). Section 1 of the Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1 (West
1998) provides that "the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or
party in any court" except as provided by the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1998)) or the Court of Claims
Act (705 ILCS 505/1 (West 1998)).(1)
	In the Court of Claims Act, the legislature provided that the Court of
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ll claims against the State for
damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie
against a private person or corporation in a civil suit, *** provided, that
an award for damages in a case sounding in tort, other than certain cases
involving the operation of a State vehicle described in this paragraph, shall
not exceed the sum of $100,000 to or for the benefit of any claimant."
705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 1998). This language is clear and
unambiguous; all claims against the state for damages sounding in tort must
be brought in the Court of Claims-no other tribunal, including our circuit
courts, has jurisdiction of any such claim. The question, therefore, is
whether the instant case involved "claims against the State."
	On its face, plaintiff's claim is not one against the state, as the state
is not named as a defendant. Rather, plaintiff has brought suit exclusively
against individuals. However, those individuals are state employees, and
this court has recognized that actions against state employees must
sometimes be characterized as actions against the state.
			"The determination of whether an action is in fact a suit against
the State turns upon an analysis of the issues involved and the
relief sought, rather than the formal designation of the parties.
[Citations.] An action brought nominally against a State
employee in his individual capacity will be found to be a claim
against the State where a judgment for the plaintiff could operate
to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability." Currie
v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992).
	The determination whether an action against a state employee ought
to be characterized as an action against the state, does not depend simply
upon whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment
when he committed the act in question. Rather, the applicability of
sovereign immunity turns on the source of the duty with the breach of
which the employee is charged. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 159. Where the
duty is imposed solely by virtue of the individual's employment with the
state, sovereign immunity attaches and exclusive jurisdiction lies in the
Court of Claims. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 159. Otherwise-that is, if the duty
exists independent of state employment-the individual is subject to suit in
circuit court. "In other words, where an employee of the State, although
acting within the scope of his employment, is charged with breaching a
duty that arose independently of his State employment, a suit against him
will not be shielded by sovereign immunity." Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 159.
See also Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990) ("Sovereign
immunity affords no protection, *** when it is alleged that the State's
agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his
authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit
court").

A. Johnston and Bergstrom
	Defendants' argument that plaintiff's claims against Johnston and
Bergstrom are barred by sovereign immunity is undone by plaintiff's
contention that these two defendants knew their accusations against
plaintiff to be false at the time those accusations were made. Accepting
plaintiff's contention as true, as we must, Johnston committed the criminal
offense of disorderly conduct when he made his report to the State Police.
See 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(4) (West 1998) (a person commits disorderly
conduct when he "[t]ransmits or causes to be transmitted in any manner
to any peace officer, public officer or public employee a report to the
effect that an offense *** has been committed, knowing at the time of
such transmission that there is no reasonable ground for believing that such
an offense *** has been committed"). Bergstrom committed this same
offense at the time that she falsely accused plaintiff to Johnston, who is a
"public employee." Thus, since plaintiff has alleged that Johnston and
Bergstrom acted "in violation of statutory or constitutional law," the action
may be brought in circuit court. Healy, 133 Ill. 2d  at 308.
	The appellate court relied heavily on the fact that the report to the
State Police was required by an administrative order which provided that
"All incidents involving State employees which *** involve a violation of
the Illinois Criminal Code *** shall be reported to the [Illinois State
Police] without exception." Administrative Order No. 1, 19 Ill. Reg.
1019, 1020 (1995). First, this order clearly did not require Johnston to file
a false report of a threat against himself. Second, regardless of whether
Johnston had an obligation to pass on to the State Police Bergstrom's
allegation if he knew it was false, Bergstrom committed disorderly conduct
in making a false allegation to Johnston, as noted above. Thus, regardless
of the existence and applicability of the administrative order, both these
defendants violated the criminal law, accepting plaintiff's allegations as
true.
	Finally, the administrative order is irrelevant because plaintiff is not
alleging that defendants violated that order. In other words, the
administrative order is not the source of the duty which plaintiff alleges
defendants have breached. Rather, plaintiff alleges defendants breached
a duty imposed by Illinois criminal law-which applies to all individuals, not
merely to state employees. Because the duty to obey the criminal law
"arose independently of *** State employment," sovereign immunity does
not apply. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 159.
	Defendants rely heavily on Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill. App. 3d 129
(1997), as did the appellate majority. There, our appellate court held that
a suit alleging that an acting department head had interfered with an
associate professor's employment contract by making false accusations
about him was an action against the state, covered by sovereign immunity.
In that portion of its opinion upon which the appellate majority in the
instant case relied, the Wozniak court reasoned,
		"The threat of private suits against supervisors for work-related
statements about those under their authority clearly would affect
the way supervisors communicate, allocate tasks, and make
employment decisions. Accordingly, when a supervisor for a
state department or entity is sued by an employee for statements
regarding the employee's work-related conduct and pending
personnel decisions, the suit necessarily threatens to control the
actions of the state. It does not matter if, as here, the plaintiff
alleges the statements were knowingly false. [Citation.] Instead,
the relevant inquiry is whether the supervisor would be acting
within the scope of his duties by making truthful statements of the
general type alleged." Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 133-34.
	We need not express an opinion on whether Wozniak reached the
correct result on its facts, because the case is distinguishable. As the
appellate court dissent noted in this case, Wozniak involved a state
employee in a supervisory role who merely made "work-related
statements" within the context of that supervisory role. The instant case,
by contrast, involves allegedly false reports to an independent agency-the
State Police-in direct violation of criminal law. See 720 ILCS
5/26-1(a)(4) (West 1998). Wozniak itself acknowledged that a statutory
violation would change the legal calculus, in the very next sentences after
those above quoted:
			"However, this rule-that a suit against a state employee
constitutes a suit against the state when a judgment for a plaintiff
could control the state's actions-is not without limits. Whenever
a state employee performs illegally, unconstitutionally, or without
authority, a suit may still be maintained against the employee in
his individual capacity and does not constitute an action against
the State of Illinois." Wozniak, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 134.
	Defendants also note that this court has previously upheld a circuit
court's dismissal of a complaint as barred by sovereign immunity
notwithstanding that a plaintiff's claim was based on an alleged statutory
violation. See Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges &
Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387 (1984). There, a professor filed suit against
the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities of Illinois,
alleging that the Board had constructively discharged her "in violation of
section 8(3) of 'An Act to provide for the management, operation, control
and maintenance of the State Colleges and Universities System' (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 144, par. 1008(3))." Ellis, 102 Ill. 2d  at 389. This court
held that the circuit court had acted correctly in dismissing the complaint
based on sovereign immunity, and rejected the plaintiff's argument that
sovereign immunity should not apply because her claim was based on a
statutory violation.
	Like Wozniak, Ellis is distinguishable. Although Ellis might appear
to conflict with Healy (see Healy, 133 Ill. 2d  at 308 (sovereign immunity
does not apply when a plaintiff alleges that a state official "acted in
violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority")),
the cases are reconcilable. Again, the critical question is the source of the
duty the employee is alleged to have violated-and specifically, whether
that duty exists solely by virtue of the defendant's state employment.
Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 159. The statute at issue in Ellis did not apply to the
public as a whole. Rather, it proscribed the actions of state employees in
operating the State Colleges and Universities System. Accordingly, even
though a statute was involved, the duties allegedly breached by the Board
members in Ellis arose solely by virtue of their state employment. That is
the critical question. In the instant case, by contrast, the duty not to make
false accusations of criminal conduct is imposed by the Illinois Criminal
Code, which makes no distinction between accusations by state
employees and those leveled by non-state employees. Accordingly, the
duties allegedly breached by defendants did not arise solely by virtue of
their state employment, and sovereign immunity therefore does not apply.

B. Gaffney and Ford
	Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Gaffney and Ford directly
violated any criminal statutes. He merely contends that they conspired with
defendants Johnston and Bergstrom to force him out of his position with
the state with a threat of a State Police investigation based on false claims.
We must therefore determine if the circuit court had jurisdiction over
plaintiff's claims against Gaffney and Ford, or plaintiff's causes of action
must be separated, because the claims against Gaffney and Ford are truly
claims against the state.
	We conclude that the claims against Gaffney and Ford are not barred
by sovereign immunity. Although with respect to defendants Johnston and
Bergstrom we focused on the source of the duty allegedly breached, it is
helpful now to recall the more fundamental principle that sovereign
immunity is designed to protect the state's autonomy of action and to
preserve state funds-not to protect individuals. People v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 198 Ill. 2d 87, 96 (2001); People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson,
184 Ill. 2d 245, 248 (1998). Although sovereign immunity can encompass
claims against individual state employees, that is an exception to the
general rule, and will be found only "where a judgment for the plaintiff
could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability."
Currie, 148 Ill. 2d  at 158. As the appellate majority noted, citing
Wozniak v. Conry, 288 Ill. App. 3d 129, 133 (1997), this will be found
when a verdict for the plaintiff "would limit the employee's ability to
engage in lawful activity on behalf of the State."
	The appellate majority reasoned that because there was nothing
unlawful about Gaffney and Ford's attempting to convince plaintiff to
resign his position, a verdict against them would have the effect of limiting
their ability to engage in lawful activity on behalf of the state, and
accordingly sovereign immunity applied. This conclusion might be correct,
if the actions of Gaffney and Ford in contacting Representative Stephens
and obtaining his assistance in urging plaintiff to resign his post were
considered in a vacuum, divorced from the other allegations contained
within the complaint.
	However, plaintiff contended that Gaffney and Ford's actions were
in furtherance of a conspiracy with Johnston and Bergstrom. Accepting as
true, for the moment, the allegation that Gaffney and Ford were in fact
conspiring with the other defendants-who allegedly filed false reports with
the State Police in furtherance of the conspiracy-Gaffney and Ford's
actions in furtherance of that conspiracy cannot properly be
characterized as "lawful actions on behalf of the State." The possibility that
Gaffney and Ford might be held liable for acting in furtherance of a civil
conspiracy-notwithstanding that their actions might appear innocent if
divorced from context-should not preclude or chill state employees from
engaging in lawful conduct on behalf of the state. Accordingly, sovereign
immunity should not preclude plaintiff's suit.
	Sovereign immunity is "not about fairness" (People ex rel. Manning
v. Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d 245, 249 (1998)) or efficiency. Our conclusion
regarding plaintiff's claims against Gaffney and Ford is based not on
considerations of judicial economy, but rather on the allegations in
plaintiff's complaint, taken liberally in plaintiff's favor. Although there can
be cases in which it would be appropriate to split issues between the
circuit court and the Court of Claims, due to sovereign immunity concerns
(see, e.g., Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d 245; People ex rel. Department of
Transportation v. Cook Development Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 175
(1995); People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill. App.
3d 729 (1982)), this is not such a case.

II. Failure to State a Claim
	Defendants additionally argue that plaintiff failed to state a claim for
conspiracy. They contend that plaintiff alleged no facts from which the
existence of any agreement between defendants can be inferred, and
further failed to allege any injury. We agree that plaintiff failed to allege any
facts from which the existence of a conspiracy could be inferred with
respect to defendants Gaffney and Ford, and accordingly affirm the circuit
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against those two defendants.
	The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) a combination of two or
more persons, (2) for the purpose of accomplishing by some concerted
action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means,
(3) in the furtherance of which one of the conspirators committed an overt
tortious or unlawful act. Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 62-63 (1994).
	Plaintiff's claim is not wholly deficient. Plaintiff satisfied the second
and third enumerated requirements with respect to all defendants. The
allegation that defendants were attempting to induce him to resign by filing
false reports with the Illinois State Police sufficiently charged that
defendants were pursuing a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The
allegation that Johnston did in fact file a false report with the State Police
satisfies the third element, the actual commission of an overt unlawful act
by one of the conspirators. With regard to damages, plaintiff explicitly
alleged that he suffered mental anguish as well as the derogation of his
name and reputation because of the untrue accusation that he had
threatened Johnston and Bergstrom. Defendants provide us with no
argument as to why these damages should not suffice to state a claim.
	The difficulty is with the first element of civil conspiracy, the allegation
that the persons acted in concert. We believe that plaintiff did sufficiently
allege facts from which a conspiracy between Johnston and Bergstrom
could be inferred. The fact that Johnston and Bergstrom, his administrative
assistant, allegedly simultaneously came forward with false allegations
regarding plaintiff makes reasonable the inference at this stage of the
proceedings that they were acting in concert. However, plaintiff alleges no
facts to support the bald assertion that the other two defendants, Gaffney
and Ford, conspired with Johnston and Bergstrom. As defendants note in
their brief to this court, the allegations in the complaint
		"merely indicate that the Governor's Office found out about a
complaint to the State Police that the Deputy Director of a State
agency had threatened the Director and the Director's
administrative assistant. This complaint obviously reflected a
serious conflict between the Director and the Deputy Director
that needed to be addressed. The Governor's Office sought to
solve the problem by convincing the Deputy Director to transfer
to a different State agency. There is nothing inherently
conspiratorial about this situation, even taking into account the
allegation that [plaintiff] was told that the State Police would
conduct an investigation of his purported threats against Johnston
and Bergstrom if he did not agree to be transferred. It is
reasonable that a decision by [plaintiff] to remain [in his position]
would necessitate an investigation into the charge that he had
threatened coworkers in that agency."
We agree with defendants. There are simply no facts to support the
conclusion that Gaffney and Ford conspired with Johnston and/or
Bergstrom to force plaintiff from his post, or even that they were aware
that the reports to the State Police were, as plaintiff alleges, intentionally
falsified. Plaintiff's statement that they conspired is insufficient-the
complaint must contain more than the conclusion that there was a
conspiracy, it must allege specific facts from which the existence of a
conspiracy may properly be inferred. With respect to defendants Gaffney
and Ford, no such facts were pled.

CONCLUSION
	The purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is preservation
and protection of the property and autonomy of the state. It is not
designed to shield state employees from being held accountable for their
criminal actions, and thus Johnston and Bergstrom are not immune from
plaintiff's suit. Nor is sovereign immunity intended to shield even otherwise
lawful actions by state employees, when those actions are committed in
the furtherance of a conspiracy. Accordingly, defendants Gaffney and
Ford also are not protected by the doctrine. Plaintiff did state a cause of
action for conspiracy against defendants Johnston and Bergstrom, and
accordingly the circuit court erred in dismissing counts I and II of the
complaint, which contained those claims. However, plaintiff failed to allege
any facts from which to infer that defendants Gaffney and Ford were
participants in that conspiracy, and thus the circuit court acted properly in
dismissing counts III and IV of the complaint. Accordingly, the judgment
of the appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the circuit
court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
cause remande
 
 
1.                 
   The Immunity Act was amended while this case was pending on appeal (see Pub. Act 93615, eff. November 19, 2003; Pub. Act 
93414, eff. January 1, 2004), but neither party places any reliance on the amendments or on the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.