Title: Bordley v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LATASHA BORDLEY,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 22, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0105014558 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  August 19, 2003 
Decided:  September 24, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This  24th day of September, 2003, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs, it appears to this Court that: 
1. 
A Superior Court jury convicted appellant, Latasha Bordley, of 
delivery of a narcotic schedule II controlled substance and second-degree 
conspiracy.  Bordley appeals from her convictions based upon the trial 
judge’s denial of her request for a specific accomplice testimony jury 
instruction and her motion to be sentenced outside of the mandatory 
statutory framework.   
2. 
Police arrested Bordley after a staged drug transaction.  She 
went to trial twice.  Her first trial resulted in a mistrial.  Bordley elected not 
 
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to testify at her second trial.  The State presented two civilian witnesses at 
Bordley’s second trial.  The first, Maria Davis, an un-indicted co-
conspirator, was a drug user who stole from her employer and who had 
converted marital assets to cash in order to purchase drugs.  She contacted 
the Felton Police to arrange a staged drug purchase after pressure from her 
husband.  The second, Shar’ron Donald Cry, entered a guilty plea to a 
charge of possession with intent to deliver.  The conviction subjected Cry to 
a potential Level V sentence of 10 years, but as a result of a plea agreement, 
the Court sentenced Cry to three years at Level V.   
3. 
The staged drug transaction involved Davis calling Bordley and 
arranging the purchase of $400 worth of crack cocaine.  Bordley agreed to 
the sale and instructed Davis to meet someone at the Hillis Market in Felton, 
Delaware.  Bordley then gave Cry a bag of crack cocaine to be delivered to 
Davis.  Cry went to the Hillis Market with a friend, Jesse Taylor, in Taylor’s 
red Dodge pickup truck.  When the truck arrived at the Hillis Market, Cry 
got out of the truck’s passenger side and instructed Davis to get in.  Davis  
gave Taylor $400 previously marked by the Felton Police Department.  
Immediately following the exchange of the money, the Felton Police 
surrounded the truck and seized the marked $400 from Taylor.  No physical 
transfer of crack cocaine took place, however, between Davis and Cry.  
 
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Police simply seized a yellow plastic bag containing crack cocaine from 
Cry’s pocket.     
4. 
At trial, Bordley requested a specific jury instruction intended 
to explain the significance of Davis and Cry’s accomplice testimony.  The 
instruction proposed that “the testimony of an alleged accomplice should be 
examined by you [the jury] with great suspicion and great caution.”  Bordley 
based her request on language found in Bland v. State.1  The trial judge 
denied Bordley’s request.   
5. 
A Kent County Superior Court jury convicted Bordley of 
delivery of a narcotic schedule II controlled substance under 16 Del C. § 
4751(a)2 and second-degree conspiracy under 11 Del. C. § 512(1)3, but 
found Bordley not guilty on a possession of drug paraphernalia charge.  
After her conviction but before sentencing, Bordley filed a motion to 
sentence outside the mandatory statutory provisions of 16 Del. C. § 
4763(a)(3).4  The trial judge denied that motion and sentenced Bordley to 
                                                 
1 263 A.2d 286, 289 (Del. 1970).   
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4751(a) (2003).   
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 512(1) (2003).   
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4763(a)(3) (2003).  This section states: 
 
In any prosecution for violation of § 4751 or 4761(a)(1) where a defendant 
has previously been convicted of any offense under this chapter, or under 
any statute of the United States or of any state relating to the delivery or 
possession with intent to deliver of a controlled substance or counterfeit 
substance classified in Schedules I and II as a narcotic drug, the minimum 
 
4
thirty years incarceration at Level 5 on the delivery conviction.  Bordley’s 
sentence included a fifteen year mandatory minimum.  Bordley received this 
enhanced sentence pursuant to 16 Del. C. § 4763(a)(3) because this was her 
second conviction for delivery of a narcotic schedule II substance.  The 
judge sentenced Bordley to two years consecutively on the second-degree 
conspiracy charge, suspended for Level 2 probation. 
6. 
Bordley raises two arguments for this Court’s consideration.  
First, Bordley argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he 
refused to follow Bland and denied her requested accomplice testimony jury 
instruction.  Second, Bordley argues that the judge abused his discretion 
when he denied her motion to be sentenced outside of the mandatory 
statutory framework.  Bordley claims that she should not be sentenced under 
16 Del. C. § 4763(a)(3), the enhanced penalty statute, because there was no 
physical delivery of the crack cocaine to Davis.     
7. 
With respect to Bordley’s first argument, we affirm the trial 
judge’s decision denying Bordley’s request for a specific jury instruction 
                                                                                                                                                 
term of imprisonment shall be 30 years and the maximum term for such 
conviction shall be 99 years and 15 years of such minimum term shall be a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and shall not be subject to 
suspension and no person shall be eligible for probation or parole during 
such portion of such minimum term.  
 
 
5
based on Bland.  In Bland, this Court did indeed approve an accomplice 
liability jury instruction, stating that:   
“A portion of the evidence presented by the State is the 
testimony of admitted participants in the crime with which 
these defendants are charged.  For obvious reasons, the 
testimony of an alleged accomplice should be examined by you 
with suspicion and great caution … .”5 
 
However, four years after Bland, a committee appointed by Chief Justice 
Wolcott and chaired by Justice Walsh drafted a set of pattern jury 
instructions for use with the newly enacted Delaware Criminal Code.6  The 
revised Delaware Pattern Jury Instructions dealing with accomplice 
testimony deleted both the “suspicion” and “great caution” language that this 
Court had previously approved in Bland. 7   
                                                 
5 Bland, 263 A.2d at 289. 
6 Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543, 545 (Del. 2000).     
7 See Revised Delaware Criminal Code, Pattern Jury Instructions, Instruction 4h.  This is 
the revised pattern jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony.  This revised 
instruction states: 
 
The testimony of the alleged accomplice, someone who said that [he/she] 
participated with another person in the commission of a crime, has been 
presented in this case. 
 
 
 
 may be considered an alleged accomplice in this case.  
 
The fact that an alleged accomplice has entered a plea of guilty to the 
offense charged does not mean that any other person is guilty of the 
offense charged.   
 
As stated elsewhere in these instructions, you are the sole judges of the 
credibility of each witness and of the weight to be given to the testimony 
of each.  You may consider all the factors which might affect and witness’ 
 
6
8. 
Furthermore, in Cabrera, this Court held that the pattern jury 
instructions “are a most valuable resource and should be consulted in the 
first instance when the trial court is conducting a prayer conference and 
selecting the wording of its instructions.”8  We recognize that the pattern 
instructions are not mandatory and that this Court has upheld instructions 
that have varied from the pattern jury instructions.9  As a general rule, 
however, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but she does 
have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the law.10  In Cabrera,  
                                                                                                                                                 
credibility, including whether the testimony of the accomplice has been 
affected by self-interest, by an agreement [he/she] may have with the 
State, by [his/her] own interest in the outcome of the case, by prejudice 
against the Defendant, and whether or not the testimony is corroborated by 
any other evidence in the case. 
 
Compare with Delaware Criminal Code, Pattern Jury Instructions, Instruction 4C.  This 
is the original pattern jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony.  This instruction 
stated:   
 
A portion of the evidence presented by the State is the testimony of an 
admitted participant in the crimes with which the defendant is charged. 
For obvious reasons, the testimony of an alleged accomplice should be 
examined by you with suspicion and great caution. This rule becomes 
particularly important if there is nothing in the evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, to corroborate the alleged accomplice's accusation that the 
defendant participated in the crime. Without such corroboration, you 
should not find the defendant guilty unless, after careful examination of 
the alleged accomplice's testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it is true and that you may safely rely upon it. Of course, if you 
are so satisfied, you would be justified in relying upon it, despite the lack 
of corroboration, and in finding the defendant guilty.  
 
8 Cabrera, 747 A.2d at 545. 
9 Floray v. State, 720 A.2d 1132, 1138 (Del. 1998). 
10 Id. 
 
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this Court affirmed a trial judge’s instruction that did not match the language 
approved in Bland, but instead incorporated the revised pattern jury 
instruction regarding accomplice testimony and instructed the jury that the 
accomplice’s testimony should be examined "with caution."11  Although the 
trial judge in the present case did not instruct the jury to examine Cry’s 
testimony “with caution”, the trial judge should be granted wide latitude in 
framing his jury instruction.12  Moreover, “a trial court's instructions will not 
be the basis for reversible error if they [correctly state the law and] 'are 
reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and 
standards of verbal communication.'"13   
9. 
In the present case, the trial judge read the pattern jury 
instruction and not the defendant’s proposed jury instruction.  The 
instruction given did, in fact, warn that the testimony of Cry, the accomplice, 
may be affected by self-interest, by an agreement she may have with the 
State, by her own interest in the outcome, and by prejudice against the 
defendant.  The record demonstrates that the pattern jury instruction used by 
the trial judge was a correct statement of the law and adequately guided the  
                                                 
11 Cabrera, 747 A.2d at 544. 
12 Id. at 543. 
13 Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Del. 1991) (citing Haas v. United Technologies 
Corp., 450 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Del. 1982)) (quoting Baker v. Reid, 57 A.2d 103, 109 (Del. 
1947); Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094 (Del. 1991)).   
 
8
jury as trier of fact and determiner of credibility.  Accordingly, the trial 
judge followed well-settled standards governing jury instructions.  Under 
these circumstances, there is no basis to conclude that he abused his 
discretion by refusing to give the requested instruction.  
10. 
The State contends that Bordley’s requested jury instruction 
would violate Delaware’s Constitution, Article IV, Section 9 because 
“judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state 
the questions of fact in issue and declare the law.”14  We need not reach the 
issue of whether Bordley’s proposed instruction would violate the Delaware 
Constitution because the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by reading 
the pattern jury instruction.   
11. 
With respect to Bordley’s second argument, we affirm because 
the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to 
sentence Bordley outside of the mandatory statutory f
ramework.  Title 16, 
Section 4763(a)(3) of the Delaware Code provides an enhanced penalty for a 
second drug delivery conviction (i.e. a 30 year minimum term of 
imprisonment with a 15 year mandatory minimum term). 15  Bordley argues 
that she is only guilty of attempted cocaine delivery because Cry never  
                                                 
14 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 19.   
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4763(a)(3) (2003). 
 
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physically transferred the crack cocaine to Davis.  Bordley also claims that 
the sentencing judge should have permitted her to avoid the mandatory 
minimum sentence because the accomplice, Cry, avoided the statutory 
mandatory minimum by plea agreement.  However, the statutes at issue here, 
16 Del. C. §§ 475116 and 476317, are unambiguous and we agree with the 
trial judge’s analysis as set forth in the record: 
                                                 
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4751 (2003).  This section states: 
 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, any person who manufactures, 
delivers or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled 
substance or a counterfeit controlled substance classified in Schedule I or 
II which is a narcotic drug is guilty of a class C felony and shall be fined 
not less than $ 5,000 nor more than $ 50,000.  
 
(b) Except as authorized by this chapter, any person who manufactures, 
delivers or possesses with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled 
substance or a counterfeit controlled substance classified in Schedule III, 
IV or V which is a narcotic drug is guilty of a class E felony and shall be 
fined not less than $ 3,000 nor more than $ 15,000.  
 
(c) Except as authorized by this chapter, in cases where death occurs as a 
result of the use or consumption of a controlled substance or counterfeit 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II, III, IV or V which is a 
narcotic drug, any person who is convicted of manufacturing or delivering 
such drug shall be guilty of a class B felony and shall be fined not less 
than $ 10,000 nor more than $ 100,000.  
 
(d) Where an individual is convicted of a violation of subsection (a), 
subsection (b) or subsection (c) of this section and the Attorney General 
may move to sentence the defendant as a nonaddict, the court shall 
conduct a hearing at which the Attorney General shall have the burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is a 
nonaddict. If the court, after hearing, is satisfied that the defendant is, and 
was at the time of the offense, not addicted to controlled substances, then 
the following enhanced penalties shall apply:  
 
 
10
All right.  I have considered Ms. Bordley’s motion.  A practice 
has developed in this county, of allowing defendants charged 
with delivery of a controlled substance to enter into plea 
agreements involving a plea of attempted delivery.  Although 
the precise statute involved is not always expressly set forth in 
such plea agreements, it is implied that the plea is entered 
pursuant to the attempt to commit a crime provision of Title 11.  
This practice has developed to ameliorate the often harsh effect 
of minimum mandatory sentences for second offenders by 
offering 
an alternative which allows for a sentence 
recommendation which may be more appropriate in the 
particular case.   
 
In this case, however, the defendant was tried for delivery under 
16 Delaware Code, Section 4751.  Under the definitional 
provisions set forth in 16 Delaware Code, Section 4751, a 
delivery expressly includes an attempted transfer.  Therefore, 
although this case did in fact involve an attempted transfer or 
attempted delivery, by statutory definition it is a delivery and 
the defendant’s conviction under 16 Delaware Code, Section 
4751 is legally correct.  Therefore, the defendant must be 
sentenced for a violation of 16 Delaware Code, Section 4751, 
and unfortunately in Ms. Bordley’s case that includes a 
minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years.18   
 
We agree. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1) For the first violation of this section a mandatory minimum sentence 
of 6 years to be served at Level V.  
 
(2) For the second or subsequent violation of this section a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 12 years to be served at Level V.  
    
These minimum sentences may not be suspended by the court.  
 
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4763 (2003). 
18 State v. Bordley, No. 0105014558 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).   
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of 
the Superior Court in AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice