Title: State v. Gould

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Gould, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-71.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-71 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. GOULD, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Gould, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-71.] 
A warrantless search of abandoned property does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, because any expectation of privacy is forfeited upon 
abandonment—To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
property protected by the Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit a 
subjective expectation of privacy that, viewed objectively, is reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
(No. 2010-1315—Submitted September 7, 2011—Decided January 17, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-08-1383, 2010-Ohio-3437. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. A warrantless search of abandoned property does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because any expectation of privacy is forfeited upon 
abandonment.  (United States v. Chandler (C.A.8, 1999), 197 F.3d 1198, 
followed.) 
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2. To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in property protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit a subjective expectation of 
privacy that, viewed objectively, is reasonable under the circumstances.  
(Smith v. Maryland (1979), 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 
followed.) 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} A Lucas County jury convicted Dennis Gould of two counts of 
rape, one count of gross sexual imposition, six counts of pandering sexually 
oriented material involving a minor, and five counts of illegal use of a minor in 
nudity-oriented material, all based on images located on the hard drive of his 
computer. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and held 
that the trial court should have excluded all evidence that resulted from the 
warrantless search of Gould’s hard drive. 
{¶ 2} We accepted the state’s appeal on the following proposition of law:  
“The exclusionary rule applies only when a violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
is the result of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard of Fourth 
Amendment rights or involves circumstances of recurring or systemic negligence. 
Evidence may not be excluded unless the conduct is ‘sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence 
is worth the price paid by the justice system.’ Herring v. United States (2009), 
[555] U.S. [135], 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496, explained.” 
{¶ 3} In order to resolve this case, however, it is not necessary to apply 
Herring because the evidence demonstrates that Gould had abandoned the hard 
drive, permitting the police to conduct a constitutional warrantless search of it. 
{¶ 4} Accordingly, because Gould did not have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hard drive, the search did not violate the 
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Fourth Amendment, and we therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} In December 2005, after Priority Trucking laid him off from his 
job as a truck driver, Gould moved in with his mother, Sharon Easterwood.  At 
that time, he gave her a computer hard drive and told her to keep it and not “let 
anybody get their hands on it.”  She then put it in an envelope and placed it in her 
nightstand.  In May 2006, Gould moved into his own apartment, taking his 
belongings, but not the hard drive. 
{¶ 6} About a month later, Gould’s twin brother, Douglas, told his 
mother that she should get the hard drive out of her house because it probably 
contained child pornography.  As a result, she returned it to Gould. 
{¶ 7} Thereafter, in August 2006, after Gould’s older brother Gregory 
moved in with him, Gould stole Gregory’s truck and left Toledo without taking 
any of his belongings from the apartment, and he never advised anyone of his 
whereabouts. 
{¶ 8} Sometime later, Gregory sold Gould’s belongings at a garage sale, 
but before the sale, Easterwood retrieved the hard drive because of her concerns 
about its contents. 
{¶ 9} On September 6, 2006, Easterwood delivered the hard drive to 
Detective Regina Lester in the Special Victims Unit of the Toledo Police 
Department.  According to Lester, Easterwood told her that it had been in her 
possession since December 2005.  Easterwood further advised Lester that she 
believed that Gould had abandoned it and that she did not want it in her home 
because of her suspicions about its contents.  Lester did not attempt to access the 
data on the hard drive but booked it into the property room and began efforts to 
locate Gould. 
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{¶ 10} When Easterwood received a billing statement for Gould’s cell 
phone at her home, she gave the cell-phone number to Lester, who tried 
unsuccessfully to contact him on several occasions and left a message asking him 
to return her call.  Gould never responded to Lester. 
{¶ 11} Almost three months later, on December 2, 2006, Easterwood 
consented to a police search of the hard drive.  Detective Jim Dec of the Toledo 
Police Computer Crimes Office conducted a forensic analysis and discovered 
child pornography, including images of Gould engaging in sexual conduct with a 
seven-year-old child. Police identified the victim as the daughter of Gould’s 
former girlfriend. 
{¶ 12} Federal marshals ultimately arrested Gould in Lansing, Michigan, 
and returned him to Toledo.  Upon questioning by Lester on June 3, 2007, Gould 
explained that he had left the hard drive in his apartment with his other belongings 
when he moved to Michigan and asserted that his mother had obtained it from his 
apartment without his knowledge. 
{¶ 13} Based on the images discovered on the hard drive, a grand jury 
subsequently indicted him on two counts of rape, one count of gross sexual 
imposition, six counts of pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, 
and five counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or 
performance. 
{¶ 14} Gould moved to suppress the evidence obtained following the 
search of the hard drive, asserting that police had illegally searched it in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that “Lester 
reasonably could have believed that [Gould] had abandoned any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the hard-drive,” such that the search did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
{¶ 15} The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury returned verdicts finding 
Gould guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to two concurrent life 
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sentences for the rape convictions, concurrent with a term of four years on the 
gross sexual imposition conviction, but consecutive to an aggregate term of 
incarceration of 13 years and 7 months on the convictions for pandering and 
illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material. 
{¶ 16} On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction 
and held that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from 
the hard drive as the product of an illegal search, stating that “Lester's subjective 
belief that the hard drive had been abandoned was unsupported by the objective 
facts and Easterwood's testimony.” State v. Gould, Lucas App. No. L-08-1383, 
2010-Ohio-3437, at ¶ 31.  It therefore concluded that “the state failed to 
demonstrate by credible, competent evidence that the hard drive was abandoned.”  
Id. 
{¶ 17} The state appealed that decision to this court, relying on Herring v. 
United States (2009), 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496, and urging 
that the exclusionary rule should apply only when a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is the result of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard of 
Fourth Amendment rights or when it involves circumstances of recurring or 
systemic negligence.  The state further maintains that Lester acted reasonably in 
determining that Gould had abandoned the hard drive and having it searched.  It 
also contends that because the facts demonstrate that Gould had abandoned the 
hard drive, the Fourth Amendment did not preclude the search, and the deterrent 
effect of excluding the hard drive does not outweigh the social cost of releasing a 
child rapist. 
{¶ 18} Gould urges that Herring references only negligent errors 
committed by third parties, not mistakes made by the police conducting a search.  
Thus, suppressing the hard drive in this case will deter police from making similar 
mistakes in future cases.  Moreover, because application of the exclusionary rule 
does not turn on the facts of a particular case, Gould argues that the societal costs 
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of suppressing evidence should not be determined by the gravity of the crime.  
Finally, he asserts that a review of the evidence demonstrates that Lester could not 
have reasonably believed that he had abandoned the hard drive, and therefore the 
trial court should have suppressed the evidence against him. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, we are asked whether the court of appeals correctly 
determined that the evidence against Gould should have been suppressed.  To 
decide this case, however, it is not necessary to reach the issue addressed in 
Herring, because the case is resolved by reviewing the basic question we must 
first consider under these facts: Did Gould have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the hard drive at the time the police searched it?   
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
{¶ 20} The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches does not apply to property 
that has been voluntarily abandoned, because society does not recognize an 
expectation of privacy in abandoned property as being objectively reasonable. 
{¶ 21} In Smith v. Maryland (1979), 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 
L.Ed.2d 220, the court adopted Justice Harlan’s concurring-opinion analysis in 
Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 
explaining that to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in property 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit a subjective 
expectation of privacy that, viewed objectively, is reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
{¶ 22} The facts in United States v. Hershenow (C.A.1, 1982), 680 F.2d 
847, which arose out of a mail-fraud investigation into fraudulent billing of 
insurance companies by physicians, closely parallel this case.  In Hershenow, 
shortly after federal authorities executed a search warrant at his office, Steven 
Hershenow, a physician, delivered a sealed box to Nelson Crawford, a 
maintenance worker at a nursing home where Hershenow practiced, with 
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instructions to “[p]ut this in the barn and keep it.”  Id. at 854.  More than three 
months later, a nun working at the nursing home discovered the box and told the 
administrator of the nursing home about it.  Id. Ultimately, a postal inspector 
looked through the box and discovered patient records and appointment books 
that had been missing during the earlier search of Hershenow’s office. Id. at 855. 
{¶ 23} Hershenow moved to suppress the evidence obtained from this 
warrantless search, claiming violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  The 
district court denied the motion, finding that Hershenow had abandoned the box 
and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the records “once they were 
stashed in the barn.” See id.  A jury subsequently found him guilty of ten counts 
of mail fraud.  Id. at 850. 
{¶ 24} On appeal, the First Circuit, applying Smith, affirmed the judgment 
and concluded that Hershenow had no objectively justifiable expectation of 
privacy in the box and determined that the search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id., 680 F.2d at 855-856. 
{¶ 25} While the court acknowledged that Hershenow had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the box as determined from his intent in taking the box 
to the nursing home to hide it, it also noted that “a legitimate expectation of 
privacy means more than a subjective expectation of keeping incriminating 
evidence hidden,” and it considered whether Hershenow had an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the box.  Id. 
{¶ 26} The court stated: 
{¶ 27} “The following factors weigh against an objective expectation of 
privacy: Hershenow did not know the location of the box except that it was 
somewhere in the barn (if Crowford [sic] had followed his instruction); 
Hershenow did not have regular access to the barn; at least four months had 
passed since Hershenow had turned the box over to Crawford, and there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that Hershenow had inquired about the box 
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during that time or had done anything to assert control over it; and, most 
important, Hershenow had no right of control over the locus of the box. 
{¶ 28} “The coutervailing [sic] factors are that the box was sealed and had 
Hershenow’s name on it.”  Id. 
{¶ 29} Weighing these factors, the First Circuit held that Hershenow had 
“no objective, justifiable expectation of privacy” in the box, and the postal 
inspector therefore did not conduct an unreasonable search of it.  Id. at 856. 
{¶ 30} Also instructive in this area of jurisprudence are the following 
three cases.  In State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 296, 18 O.O.3d 472, 
414 N.E.2d 1044, we held that the accused, who had dropped his luggage while 
fleeing from police, could not “object to a search and seizure of property that he 
has voluntarily abandoned.”  We clarified that “ ‘[t]he issue is not abandonment in 
the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search 
had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the 
property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.’ ” Id. at 297, quoting United 
States v. Colbert (C.A.5, 1973), 474 F.2d 174, 176. 
{¶ 31} Next, in United States v. Chandler (C.A.8, 1999), 197 F.3d 1198, 
after a St. Louis police supervisor informed Officer Reginald Chandler that he 
would be suspended without pay pending an investigation into drug trafficking, 
Chandler left his duty bag in the supervisor’s office, and it was placed in a locked 
closet for eight months.  Id. at 1199.  Although Chandler had inquired about a pair 
of boots he purportedly had left in his locker during this period, he never inquired 
about his duty bag. Id. When police rediscovered it, they searched it without a 
warrant and found crack cocaine and heroin.  Id.  After a federal grand jury 
indicted Chandler on drug charges based on the results of that search, the district 
court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, finding that he had abandoned 
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the duty bag, and a jury convicted him of unlawful distribution of crack cocaine 
and possession of both crack cocaine and heroin.  See id. at 1199-1200. 
{¶ 32} On appeal, the Eighth Circuit explained that “[a] warrantless 
search of abandoned property is constitutional because ‘any expectation of 
privacy in the item searched is forfeited upon its abandonment.’ ” Chandler at 
1200, quoting  United States v. Tugwell (C.A.8, 1997), 125 F.3d 600, 602.  The 
court upheld the district court's finding of abandonment, concluding that, from an 
objective viewpoint, Chandler had relinquished his expectation of privacy in the 
bag by leaving it in his supervisor’s office and that his failure to reclaim or even 
inquire about the bag in the following months constituted further evidence of its 
abandonment.  Id. at 1200-1201. 
{¶ 33} Lastly, in United States v. Davis (C.A.2, 2010), 624 F.3d 508, the 
evidence demonstrated that William Davis had left a safe with his estranged wife 
for an extended period of time and that the safe contained ammunition and a large 
quantity of pornographic images of children.  His wife signed an affidavit stating 
that she had “kicked [Davis] out” of her apartment after learning that he had 
sexually abused her daughter and that he had returned to her apartment to retrieve 
his belongings but failed to remove the safe.  Id. at 510-511.  The police later 
obtained the safe from her home and searched it with her permission.  She 
testified at the suppression hearing that Davis had never told her that he wanted 
the safe and that she had never prevented him from getting his property from her 
apartment. Id. at 511.  Noting that “ ‘[i]t is settled that a warrantless seizure of 
property that has been abandoned does not violate the Fourth Amendment,’ ” the 
court held that the district court had properly denied the motion to suppress the 
contents of the abandoned safe.  Id. at 510-511, quoting United States v. Springer 
(C.A.2, 1991), 946 F.2d 1012, 1017. 
{¶ 34} As in Hershenow, Freeman, Chandler, and Davis, here the 
evidence similarly weighs against a finding that Gould had an objectively 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the hard drive.  He left the hard drive in his 
apartment with his other belongings when he stole his brother’s truck and left 
Toledo sometime in August 2006.  From the time he left Toledo until his arrest by 
federal marshals sometime before June 3, 2007, Gould never inquired about the 
hard drive or attempted to assert control over it or its location, he concealed his 
whereabouts, and he never knew the hard drive had been removed from his 
apartment when his brother sold his other belongings. 
{¶ 35} And even if we consider the period of time from when Gould left 
Toledo until Detective Dec searched the hard drive in December 2006, the facts 
reveal that Gould had not made any inquiry about the hard drive or asserted 
control over it for almost four months.  Hence, the police could have reasonably 
concluded that Gould had abandoned it. 
{¶ 36} Thus, based on his conduct, Gould had no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the hard drive because when he relocated to Michigan 
he abandoned it by leaving it in his Toledo apartment without the ability to exert 
control over it.  And, as the courts concluded in Chandler and Davis, and as we 
held in Freeman, a warrantless search of abandoned property does not offend the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} A person who abandons property has no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it.  A warrantless search of abandoned property does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because any expectation of privacy is forfeited 
upon abandonment.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals ordering 
the exclusion of the evidence obtained from the hard drive is reversed, and 
Gould’s convictions and sentence are reinstated. 
Judgment reversed, 
and convictions and sentence reinstated. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett,  
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal on behalf of Franklin County 
Prosecuting Attorney Ron O’Brien. 
______________________