Title: Stastny v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMAS ALLEN STASTNY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 138Case Number: S-10-0206Decided: 09/29/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
THOMAS 
ALLEN STASTNY,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Gregory 
J. Blenkinsop, Senior Assistant Public Defender; Elisabeth M. W. Trefonas, 
Assistant Public Defender.  Argument 
by Ms. Trefonas.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a minor and one count of attempted 
sexual abuse of a minor.  In this 
appeal from those convictions, the appellant challenges the district court’s 
admission of evidence of a prior conviction, and he accuses the prosecutor of 
committing misconduct during closing argument.  Finally, he relies upon the cumulative 
error doctrine.  Finding no error, 
we affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      1.   Does the doctrine of invited error 
bar the appellant from raising in this appeal issues concerning the admission of 
evidence of his prior conviction?
 
            
2.   Did plain error 
occur as a result of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument?
 
            
3.   Does the doctrine of 
cumulative error require reversal of the appellant’s 
convictions?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The sordid 
details of the encounter between the appellant and his victim are not 
particularly relevant to our analysis of the appellate issues.  Briefly stated, the State produced 
evidence that the appellant manually stroked the penis of a twelve-year-old boy 
and attempted to insert a finger into the boy’s anus.  Further, the State proved that DNA 
consistent with that of the appellant was found on a swab taken from the boy’s 
penis.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Does 
the doctrine of invited error bar the appellant from raising in this appeal 
issues concerning the admission of evidence of his prior 
conviction?
 
[¶4]      Where an 
objection has been made, we review a district court’s decision as to the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 24, 252 P.3d 435, 441 
(Wyo. 2011).  Where “no objection is 
lodged in the trial court to the evidence challenged on appeal, we apply our 
plain error standard of review.”  Roden v. State, 2010 WY 11, ¶ 9, 225 P.3d 497, 500 
(Wyo. 2010).  These standards of 
review are inapplicable, however, where the appellant has not only failed to 
object at trial, but has affirmatively acted to introduce or allow introduction 
of the evidence.  “[T]he doctrine of 
invited error prohibits a party from raising error on appeal that was induced by 
the party’s own actions.”  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 34, 157 P.3d 923, 
930-31 (Wyo. 2007); see also Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1212 (Wyo. 2007) and 
Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 
552 (Wyo. 2005).  The invited error 
doctrine applies in this case.
 
[¶5]      The appellant 
filed a pretrial motion seeking disclosure by the State of any evidence it 
intended to introduce under W.R.E. 404(b) or under W.R.E. 609.  In a nutshell, W.R.E. 404(b) allows 
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence, under limited circumstances, if such 
evidence is probative of such things as motive or intent.  W.R.E. 609, on the other hand, allows 
admission of evidence of prior criminal convictions, under limited 
circumstances, for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness.  The State’s response to the appellant’s 
motion indicated the State’s intent to introduce evidence that the appellant had 
a prior conviction in Iowa for “lascivious acts with a child.”  While analyzing the evidence primarily 
under W.R.E. 404(b), the State reserved the right to argue for its admission 
under W.R.E. 609.
 
[¶6]      The district 
court heard the motion during a pretrial conference several months before 
trial.  In the midst of a brief 
generalized discussion concerning what the district court characterized as “the 
404(b) issue,” the following colloquy occurred:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . .  Probably goes more to 
609.
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  [Defense Counsel], what would you like 
me to know?
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, certainly if 
[the appellant] intends to take the stand within the last ten years of him being 
released – I believe it was 2001 from custody – I would think that information 
should come in.
 
            
However, without [the appellant] taking the stand, I think this is 
exactly the type of material that we would hope to keep out.  I think it’s highly prejudicial.  I think without [the appellant’s] 
testimony, based on the evidence the State may introduce, I think there’s a good 
possibility [the appellant] could be convicted, based almost wholly on this 
charge itself.
 
            
. . . .
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  I’ll take this one under advisement. . . 
.
 
[¶7]      The chronology of 
events and non-events that followed leads us to the conclusion that the 
appellant is barred from raising this issue on appeal.  To begin with, the district court never 
ruled upon the matter, and it does not appear from the record that the appellant 
ever sought such a ruling.  Further, 
the State did not mention the prior conviction during its opening statement or 
during the examination of any of its witnesses, and rested its case with no 
mention of the prior conviction.  
The appellant chose to testify, however, and during 
direct examination by his own counsel, 
the following exchange occurred:
 
Q.    Now, I want to ask you this, 
[appellant].  Are you a convicted 
felon?
 
A.    Yes, I 
am.
 
Q.    And what were you convicted 
for?
 
A.    Lascivious acts with a 
minor.
 
Q.    And when was 
that?
 
A.    ’98.
 
[¶8]      The State 
cross-examined the appellant, with the prosecutor’s first two questions being as 
follows:
 
Q.    Now, in response to [defense 
counsel’s] question, you have been convicted of a felony, haven’t 
you?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    And that felony I believe you 
said was lascivious acts with a minor.
 
A.    Yes.
 
[¶9]      The Iowa 
conviction is not again mentioned in the record until, after a conference 
concerning jury instructions, the playing of a tape recording and a limiting 
instruction not related to this issue, the following discussion was had in 
chambers:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, in the defendant’s direct 
counsel elicited the fact that [the appellant] had been convicted of a prior 
felony.  He stated that felony 
conviction was in 1998, and while that’s correct, I think it is still a 
qualifying offense under Rule 609 because the information that we got from – I 
believe from Iowa indicates that his discharge and end of sentence was March 6, 
2001, so it’s well within the ten years.  
And I’d like to for the record tender the copies that we have that were 
shared with defense.
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  Very good.
 
            
[Defense Counsel], anything you want me to know about 
that?
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Excuse me.  It’s just for the purposes of the court 
file, not evidence.
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  That’s correct.  I’m not offering that for the 
record.  It’s just the nature of a 
general proffer to clear up any confusion about whether or not it was proper to 
receive that 609 testimony.
 
THE 
COURT:  The effect in timing of 609, 
yes.  609 pertains to a number of 
different touchstones.  I’ll include 
that in the court file.
 
            
All right.  So take a look at 
the limiting instruction.  We’ll 
have everybody use the facilities.
 
            
[Defense Counsel], anything else?
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Will we be discussing the 
limiting instruction when we return?
 
[¶10]   It is significant in regard to this 
appeal that defense counsel did not use this opportunity to place on the record 
any objection to admission of evidence of the prior conviction, and he did not 
ask for an instruction limiting its use to its intended purposes under W.R.E. 
609.1  Furthermore, the State did not mention 
the prior conviction in its initial closing argument, nor in its rebuttal 
closing, even after defense counsel raised the issue of credibility.  Apparently, defense counsel concluded 
that the district court was going to admit the evidence of the prior conviction, 
so counsel decided to take the sting out of that bite by asking the appellant 
about it before the State had a chance to do so.  That is not an uncommon tactic.  See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 973 (Wyo. 2000) and 
Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1271-72 (Wyo. 
1991). 
 Whether or not it was error for that 
evidence to be admitted, its admission was not just invited by defense counsel, 
it was accomplished by defense counsel.2
 
Did 
plain error occur as a result of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument?
 
[¶11]   There was no trial objection to the 
State’s closing argument, so we review this contention under our plain error 
standard.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 875, 884 
(Wyo. 2003).  Succinctly stated, to 
show plain error the appellant must prove that the record clearly reveals a 
transgression of an unequivocal rule of law, resulting in the denial of a 
substantial right, to the appellant’s material prejudice.  Id.  We evaluate the prosecutor’s allegedly 
offending remarks in the context of the entire argument, and we review “the 
entire record to determine whether the [appellant’s] case was so prejudiced by 
the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair trial.”  Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 14, 177 P.3d 1166, 
1170 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 35, 57 P.3d 332, 344 (Wyo. 2002)).  “We are 
reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument 'lest the trial court 
becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does not 
object.’”  Id. at 1171 (quoting Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d 269, 275 (Wyo. 
2005)).  In the instant case, the 
appellant alleges that the prosecutor intentionally misstated the evidence, 
which is, of course, improper.  See, e.g., Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 27, 49 P.3d 975, 987 (Wyo. 
2002).
 
[¶12]   The alleged crime in this case took 
place in the early morning hours on August 29, 2009.  When allegations of the appellant’s 
alleged misconduct with the victim were made known, the appellant was forcefully 
ejected from the house and beaten by several men who were present.  Police officers responded to reports of 
the beating, and the appellant spoke briefly with them before he was taken to 
the hospital.  When asked why he was 
assaulted, the appellant replied that “they were accusing me of touching these 
boys, which I didn’t do.”
 
[¶13]   The officers continued to 
investigate the matter and at some point during that same day, they obtained a 
search warrant for the purpose of obtaining a “sexual assault kit” body search 
of the appellant.  They picked up 
the appellant at about 10:00 p.m. and took him to the local hospital for that 
purpose, where the requisite evidence was collected by a nurse.  At trial, the appellant testified as 
follows in that regard:
 
Q.    Okay.  Where did you give a statement to police 
at?
 
A.    Well, I kind of give them a 
statement when they came over the first time.  I was kind of out of it.  They come over and was saying, you know 
– because my roommate called the cops and said, Why aren’t these guys arrested 
for beating the crap out of him?  
There’s a lot of stuff going on at this house you guys need to look 
at.  They said, We’re looking into 
it, you know.
 
        And 
then the last statement I gave to them was probably when they come and arrested 
me like at midnight or something like that.  They told me I needed to come in and do 
a rape kit or whatever, sexual kit.
 
Q.    Do you do 
that?
 
A.    Yes.
 
Q.    And did you do it 
voluntarily?
 
A.    Oh, 
yes.
 
Q.    What happened after 
that?
 
A.    After that – they told me I 
wasn’t going to be arrested, but they handcuffed me anyway.  Told me it was for my safety but after – 
after all of the tests were done, then that’s when they said I had to arrest 
you.  They said I was arrested for 
first and second-degree sexual assault.
 
[¶14]   The appellant further testified at 
trial that, during the night of the incident, he had been drinking heavily and 
had passed out in the victim’s room.  
He testified that he twice briefly became conscious, once noticing “a 
brown head in my lap,” and once noticing “somebody was either sticking their 
dick or finger in my mouth.”  During 
closing argument, the prosecutor commented as follows regarding the appellant’s 
version of what had happened, with the highlighted portion being that to which 
objection is now made:
 
Now, 
the defendant has said he didn’t do it, and his version of the facts would state 
to you that he was the one who was the victim.  He was the one who was assaulted by a 
12-year-old boy.  That’s the 
defendant’s version; that somewhere around four to five o’clock in the morning 
he passed out and he was sexually assaulted by [the victim] sticking his penis 
in his mouth . . . .  And that he 
had a flash of consciousness that he just knew that someone was doing that, he 
didn’t know who, but he knew someone was doing that.  He also knew at some point somebody had 
their head in his crotch.
 
And 
that was what you heard the defendant say on the stand.
 
The 
thing that’s interesting about this is that this is so situational.  You heard the testimony from [the 
victim] about defendant licking his hand and putting it on his penis.  And you know that DNA was – a DNA test 
was taken later that day, and you’ve heard testimony that [the victim] didn’t 
shower, he didn’t change his clothes or pants, and so that results in the 
test.
 
And 
so we are faced at this point with one really absolute rock-solid fact, and that 
is the report of a crime lab.  The 
report of the crime lab is that they find DNA that is not from [the victim] on 
this 12-year-old boy’s penis.  It’s 
from another source.
 
It 
is, as they say, foreign to the provider.  
It is not his, and the question then becomes, well, whose is it?  Now, remember that they’ve taken [the 
victim’s] DNA, and that sample is done and it’s boxed and it’s separate and it’s 
held separately and it’s sealed.  
Later that same night, or actually earlier the next morning on the 30th, 
they go ahead and get [the appellant], and they go take another kit and they 
take a test of [the appellant].  
They do a sexual assault kit, and they do a blood reference.  They said they do a blood spot, and 
that becomes [the appellant’s] reference.  [The appellant’s] reference is then 
sent.  These are kept separate.  You’ve heard [the laboratory technician] 
talk about how they do that and how careful they are and why they do that and 
how carefully handled they are, kept completely separate, and the controls are 
used to make sure that there’s no possibility of 
contamination.
 
And 
then they run that test.  And after 
that test is run, then they see if there’s a comparison.  And what do you know?  They find in their comparison that the 
DNA sample that they have obtained from [the victim’s] penis is consistent with 
the defendant’s DNA.
 
Folks, 
it didn’t come there from the DNA fairy.  
It came there one of two ways.  
It either came there as [the victim] told you, after he licked his hand 
and put it on his penis, or it came there as the defendant tells you, because he 
was sexually assaulted and someone stuck their penis -- actually [the victim] 
stuck his penis in the defendant’s mouth.
 
That 
essential, incontrovertible fact, is the fact that you take with you into the 
jury room.
 
The 
defendant has testified, and we would suggest a good deal of his testimony is 
essentially self-serving.  The 
issue about how do you explain the findings on the laboratory report that come 
out on January 25th are really the reason you hear what you’ve heard today from 
the defendant, because there’s got to be some reason – 
he knows there’s some – 
there’s got to be some explanation because nobody believes in the DNA 
fairy.
 
Once 
that crime lab report comes out, he needs a way to explain it.  And 
you heard his explanation; 
that he was so drunk that he really didn’t remember this blackout hour, the 
missing hour.
 
[¶15]   The appellant was formally 
interviewed by the police on September 1, 2009, just before going to a bond 
hearing.  During that interview, he 
told the police essentially the same version of events to which he testified at 
trial.  The crux of the appellant’s 
present argument is that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in the above 
passage, or at least asked the jury to make an improper inference based on that 
evidence, by alleging that the appellant fabricated his version of the events 
after he learned of the DNA results, when, in fact, he had told the same story 
to the police officers on September 1.
 
[¶16]   This is precisely the type of case 
in which we are reluctant to find plain error in a prosecutor’s closing 
argument.  The questioned statement 
is not such a clear violation of a rule of law that we can say the second 
element of plain error analysis is met.  
The evidence was not just that the appellant had learned of the results 
of the “sexual assault kit”; the evidence also was that the appellant was aware 
from the start that the “sexual assault kit” was obtained for testing.  In other words, his need to explain away 
any results from those tests arose when the samples were collected, not just 
when the test results were reported.  
Beyond that, we cannot say that the appellant was unfairly prejudiced by 
the highlighted language.  The jury 
knew from the entirety of the testimony that the appellant’s trial testimony was 
consistent with his statement to the police on September 1.  The jury knew the DNA results, and the 
jury heard from, and could judge the credibility of, both the appellant and the 
victim as to how the appellant’s DNA was where it was.  In the context of the entire trial, we 
do not conclude that these isolated remarks were so prejudicial as to deny the 
appellant a fair trial.
 
Does 
the doctrine of cumulative error require reversalof the appellant’s 
convictions?
 
[¶17]   There being no error, there is no 
cumulative error.  See, e.g., Rolle v. State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 46, 236 P.3d 259, 277 (Wyo. 
2010).
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶18]   The 
admission of evidence of the appellant’s prior felony conviction, if error at 
all, was invited error, and prosecutorial misconduct did not occur during 
closing argument, so, therefore, we affirm.
FOOTNOTES
 
1As 
noted previously, counsel’s mention of a limiting instruction was in regard to 
another matter.
2This 
scenario raises an interesting question.  
The district court and the parties appear to have determined that 
admissibility of this prior conviction was governed by W.R.E. 609, rather than 
W.R.E. 404(b).  See Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 368 (Wyo. 1986) (once 
defendant becomes witness, admissibility of prior conviction evidence governed 
by W.R.E. 609).  However, the 
district court never ruled whether the evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 609, 
and the evidence was not offered at trial by the State for the limited purpose 
of W.R.E. 609—impeaching the credibility of the witness—or for any purpose.  Instead, the evidence was obtained from 
the appellant by his own counsel’s questioning during direct examination, and 
defense counsel did not ask for a limiting instruction, whereby the district 
court would have instructed the jury to  
consider the evidence for its limited purpose.  See W.R.E. 105.  In other words, the prior conviction 
evidence went to the jury in an unlimited capacity, and could have been used by 
the jury as direct evidence of guilt.  
The interesting question is whether we should even be treating this as 
W.R.E. 609 evidence at this point.