Title: Ex parte Jimmy Harris.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:07/29/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1141345
____________________
Ex parte Jimmy Harris
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Geraldine Grant Bryson
v.
Town of Mosses and Jimmy Harris)
____________________
1141385
____________________
Ex parte Town of Mosses
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Geraldine Grant Bryson
v.
Town of Mosses and Jimmy Harris)
(Lowndes Circuit Court, CV-12-12)
BOLIN, Justice.
The Town of Mosses ("the Town") and its employee, Jimmy
Harris, the Town's chief of police, separately petition this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit
Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain
claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson.  We
have consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing
one opinion. 
Facts
At the time of the events giving rise to this action,
Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." 
Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all
activities."  "The Spot" had pool tables and arcade games,
sold food, and hosted social and recreational events.  Bryson 
obtained from the Town a business license to operate "The
Spot"; the license prohibited the sale of alcohol on its
premises. Bryson subsequently requested that the Town grant
her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her 
2
1141345; 1141385
request. It is undisputed that Bryson was never granted a
liquor license for "The Spot," by either the Town or the State
of Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board ("the 
ABC 
Board"). 
Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host
an event on its premises on the evening of May 2, 2010. 
Bryson was paid a rental fee of $75.  The deejay hosting the
event distributed flyers in the community advertising that a
"beer bash" was going to be held at "The Spot" on May 2, 2010.
Bryson testified that she did not participate in distributing
the flyers in the community and that she did not learn of the
flyers until the evening of the event.  Approximately 200
people turned out for the event at "The Spot," even though the
entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by
the deejay.  Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the
night of May 2, 2010, testified that she did not see anyone
consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged
that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol to "The
Spot" that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for
showing support for the center."
Walter Hill, the Town's mayor, was contacted by a citizen 
and was told that flyers were being circulated in the
3
1141345; 1141385
community advertising a "beer bash" at "The Spot" at which 
individuals could pay an admission fee and consume alcohol
inside "The Spot."  Hill stated that he notified Harris, the
Town's police chief, of the call informing him of the "beer
bash" being advertised at "The Spot." Hill told Harris that
the matter needed to be investigated and that he would contact
the Drug Task Force for the 2d Judicial Circuit ("the task
force") as to how to proceed.  In the meantime, Harris had
obtained one of the flyers advertising the "beer bash" at the
"The Spot," which stated that the price of admission to the
event was $7.00. Harris then drove by "The Spot" and witnessed
several people standing outside.  Pursuant to 
the 
instructions
received from the task force, Harris, along with officers from
other 
law-enforcement 
agencies, 
entered 
"The 
Spot," 
where 
they 
observed people consuming alcohol.  
Harris testified that he did not actually witness the
sale of alcohol on the premises of "The Spot," but he stated
that it was his understanding that the business license the
Town issued for "The Spot" prohibited alcohol from even being
present on the premises.  According to the police report of
the events on May 2, 2010, Bryson was arrested for "selling
4
1141345; 1141385
alcohol without [a] license."   Harris testified that Kelvin
1
Mitchell, police chief for the City of Hayneville, which
participated in the seizure and arrest at "The Spot," made the
determination to arrest Bryson.  Bryson testified that Harris
arrested her.  Over 200 bottles of beer were seized from the
premises.  The charges against Bryson were ultimately
dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who
could testify to paying an admission [to "The Spot"] and
drinking alcohol on the premises.
On May 2, 2012, Bryson sued the Town and Harris, in his
individual capacity, in the Lowndes Circuit Court, asserting
claims of 
malicious 
prosecution, 
false arrest, 
false
imprisonment, 
harassment, 
 
intentional 
infliction 
of 
emotional
distress, 
libel, 
and 
slander. 
Bryson 
specifically 
alleged 
that
Harris was acting within the line and scope of his employment
as the Town's chief of police when she was arrested and that
her claims arose from the willful and intentional acts of the
defendants, which she says were designed to embarrass and harm
Section 28-3A-25(a)(14), Ala. Code 1975, makes it
1
unlawful "[f]or any person ... who ... has not been properly
licensed under the appropriate provisions of this chapter to
sell, offer for sale, or have in possession for sale, any
alcoholic beverages." 
5
1141345; 1141385
her. On August 24, 2012, the defendants answered Bryson's
complaint, generally denying the allegations and asserting
certain affirmative defenses, including the defense of
immunity.
On May 18, 2015, the defendants moved the trial court for
a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Harris
had probable cause to arrest Bryson and that Harris was immune
from suit pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, and the
doctrine of State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a plurality opinion, and
adopted by this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala.
2000). The Town argued that it is absolutely immune from suit
for all intentional torts of its agents pursuant to § 11-47-
90, Ala. Code 1975, and that it also enjoys the State-agent
immunity afforded Harris, as its employee.
On August 3, 2015, Bryson filed a response in opposition
to 
the 
defendants' 
summary-judgment 
motion, 
presenting 
certain
evidence that, she says, establishes that Harris's actions
relative to her arrest were motivated by malice toward her. 
Bryson also challenged the defendants' reliance upon the
affidavit of Valencia Aaron, an enforcement agent with the ABC
6
1141345; 1141385
Board, that the defendants presented in support of their 
summary-judgment 
motion. 
Bryson 
moved 
to 
strike 
the 
affidavit,
arguing that the defendants failed to produce the affidavit in
a timely manner and that Aaron had failed and/or refused to
make herself available to Bryson for a deposition.
On August 4, 2015, the defendants filed a response in
opposition to Bryson's motion to strike Aaron's affidavit,
contending that they had produced Aaron's statement to Bryson
on May 8, 2014, in response to certain interrogatories
propounded to them on April 24, 2014. The defendants also
argued that they had no affiliation with Aaron and thus had no
ability to compel her testimony.
On August 13, 2015, the trial court entered an order
striking Aaron's affidavit and denying the defendants' motion
for a summary judgment.  The defendants separately petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus. We grant Harris's petition
in part and deny it in part and issue the writ (case no.
1141345); we grant the Town's petition and issue the writ
(case no. 1141385). 
Standard of Review
7
1141345; 1141385
"'While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1996)....
"'Summary 
judgment 
is 
appropriate 
only
when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La
Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996). A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.
2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll–Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable
favorable inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel
Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 1992);
and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment
will, de novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court. Fuqua,
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that
factual material available of record to the
trial court for its consideration in
deciding the motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha
Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala. 1991),
Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So.
2d 595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.
2d 35 (Ala. 1992)."'
8
1141345; 1141385
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912–13 (Ala. 2000)). A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the
petitioner can demonstrate: "'(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).
Discussion
As an initial matter, we note that Bryson filed in this
Court -- in response to each petition for a writ of mandamus
-- a document entitled "preliminary opposition" to the
petition. Bryson states in each of those documents that the
Town and Harris have relied so extensively on Aaron's stricken
affidavit in the briefs filed in support of their petitions
for a writ of mandamus as to have irreparably tainted those
petitions.  Bryson moves this Court to strike the briefs filed
by the Town and Harris in support of their petitions for a
writ of mandamus and to deny their petitions.  
9
1141345; 1141385
Despite the fact that the Aaron affidavit was stricken by
the trial court, the defendants now rely upon it in their
petitions for a writ of mandamus.  Whether to strike an
affidavit is a decision left to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Ex parte Secretary of Veteran Affairs, 92 So. 3d
771 (Ala. 2012).  On review by mandamus, this Court must look
only at the facts and evidence that were before the trial
court.  Ex parte East Alabama Med. Ctr., 109 So. 3d 1114 (Ala.
2012); Ex parte Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d
395 (Ala. 2006). 
We cannot say the trial court exceeded its  discretion in
granting Bryson's motion to strike the Aaron affidavit. 
Therefore, because that affidavit was not considered by the
trial court, we will not give it any consideration in deciding
the merits of the defendants' petitions. Ex parte Michelin
North America, Inc., 161 So. 3d 164 (Ala. 2014).  However,
because the Aaron affidavit was one of a number of evidentiary
filings submitted in support of the defendants' summary-
judgment motion and because those other evidentiary materials
have been submitted to this Court as exhibits to the
defendants' 
petitions, we deny Bryson's motion to strike 
their
10
1141345; 1141385
briefs filed in support of those petitions in their entirety
because there is sufficient evidence before this Court to make
a determination as to the merits of the petitions without
considering the Aaron affidavit.  
1. Harris's Petition (No. 1141345)
The False-Arrest/False-Imprisonment Claims
Harris argues that he is immune from suit based on the
immunity afforded peace officers by § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code
1975, and by the doctrine of State-agent immunity set forth in
Ex parte Cranman, supra. 
Section 6–5–338(a) provides:
"Every peace officer, except constables, who is
employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution
or statutes of this state, whether appointed or
employed as such peace officer by the state or a
county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or
institution, 
corporate 
or 
otherwise, 
created
pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state
and authorized by the Constitution or laws to
appoint or employ police officers or other peace
officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by
the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,
include the enforcement of, or the investigation and
reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of
this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this
state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take
into custody persons who violate, or who are
lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other
lawful process, with violations of, the criminal
laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to
be officers of this state, and as such shall have
11
1141345; 1141385
immunity from tort liability arising out of his or
her conduct in performance of any discretionary
function within the line and scope of his or her law
enforcement duties."
The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this
Court in Ex parte Cranman, supra, governs the determination
whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under §
6–5–338(a). Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904
(Ala. 2005). This Court, in Cranman, set out the following
test for State-agent immunity:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) 
formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
12
1141345; 1141385
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or 
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
792 So. 2d at 405. Because the scope of immunity afforded
law-enforcement officers set forth 
in 
§ 6–5–338(a) 
was broader
than category (4) of the Cranman restatement, this Court, in
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006),
expanded and modified category (4) of the Cranman restatement
to read as follows:
13
1141345; 1141385
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'....
"'(4) exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons, or serving as
peace 
officers 
under 
circumstances
entitling 
such 
officers 
to 
immunity
pursuant to § 6–5–338(a), Ala. Code 1975.'"
(Added language emphasized.) 
"'This 
Court 
has 
established 
a 
"burden-shifting"
process when a party raises the defense of
State-agent immunity.' Ex parte Estate of Reynolds,
946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). A State agent
asserting State-agent immunity 'bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to
immunity.' 946 So. 2d at 452. Should the State agent
make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of
exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in
Cranman is applicable." 
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Ala. 2008).
It is undisputed that Harris, as the Town's police chief,
qualified as a law-enforcement officer for the purposes of §
6-5-338(a) and Ex parte Cranman, as modified by Hollis.  In
order to enjoy the immunity afforded law-enforcement officers
14
1141345; 1141385
under § 6-5-338(a) and Ex parte Cranman, Harris must have
been, at the time of the complained-of action, "exercising 
judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State
... including ... arresting or attempting to arrest persons,"
or serving as a peace officer under circumstances entitling
such officer to immunity "from tort liability arising out of
his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary
function within the line and scope of his or her law
enforcement duties."  Generally, arresting a person is
considered an exercise of a discretionary function entitling
the arresting officer to State-agent immunity. Swan v. City of
Hueytown, 920 So. 2d 1075 (Ala. 2005).
After reviewing the materials in support of the
defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, we conclude that
Harris has satisfied his initial burden of demonstrating that
at the time of the incident made the basis of Bryson's claims
Harris was engaged in a law-enforcement function for which
State-agent 
immunity would be available under § 6-5-338(a) 
and
Ex parte Cranman, as modified by Hollis. The evidence
presented in support of the defendants' summary-judgment
motion demonstrates the following: (1) that Harris was aware
15
1141345; 1141385
that Bryson did not have a license "to sell, [to] offer for
sale, or [to] have in possession for sale," § 28-3A-25(a)(14),
Ala. Code 1975, any alcohol at "The Spot"; (2) that Harris was
notified of the existence of flyers advertising that a "beer
bash" was going to be held at "The Spot" on May 2, 2010; (3)
that Harris obtained a flyer advertising the "beer bash" at
the "The Spot"; (4) that Harris drove by "The Spot" on May 2,
2010, and witnessed several people standing outside; (5) that 
Harris and other law-enforcement officers entered "The Spot"
and saw people consuming alcohol inside; (6) that Bryson was
arrested; and (7) that over 200 bottles of beer were seized
from the premises. 
However, relying upon this Court's decision in Telfare v.
City of Huntsville, 841 So. 2d 1222 (Ala. 2002), Bryson argues
that Harris was not engaged in a discretionary function and,
therefore, was not entitled to State-agent immunity because,
she says, he lacked the lawful authority to arrest her.
Specifically, 
Bryson 
argues 
that, 
because 
the 
criminal 
conduct
for which she was arrested was classified as a misdemeanor and
because Harris did not witness her actually selling alcohol on
the premises, Harris, in arresting her, could not be
16
1141345; 1141385
considered 
as being engaged in a discretionary function, i.e.,
Harris was not making a lawful arrest.  Thus, Bryson contends,
Harris is not entitled immunity. 
In Telfare, the plaintiff and his girlfriend became
involved in a physical altercation with other patrons at a
nightclub.  After the initial altercation, the plaintiff and
his girlfriend attempted to leave the nightclub.  However,  as
the two left the nightclub several patrons followed them and
attacked the girlfriend.  The plaintiff attempted to break up
the 
altercation; he ultimately removed his girlfriend from the
altercation, 
and they retreated to the plaintiff's vehicle 
and
prepared to leave the scene. In the meantime, a police officer
arrived at the nightclub in response to a call regarding the
altercation.  The patrons who had been fighting with the
plaintiff's girlfriend indicated to the police officer that
the plaintiff and his girlfriend had instigated the
altercation.  The police officer approached the plaintiff's
vehicle with his gun drawn and ordered the plaintiff to get
out of his vehicle and to lie on the ground.  The plaintiff
got out of the vehicle but refused to lie on the ground. The
police officer holstered his gun and withdrew an expandable
17
1141345; 1141385
baton that he used to strike the plaintiff in the legs until
he was subdued and handcuffed. The plaintiff, who had
sustained numerous contusions to his legs and lower body,  was
charged with disorderly conduct, harassment, and resisting
arrest. Telfare, supra.
The plaintiff sued the police officer and the city,
alleging, 
among 
other 
things, 
false 
arrest, 
false
imprisonment, and assault and battery.  The city moved to
dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to
discretionary immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338.  The trial court
granted the city's motion to dismiss. Telfare, supra.
On appeal, the city contended that § 6–5–338(a) granted
the police officer immunity from tort liability arising out of
the performance of his discretionary functions so long as
those functions were within the line and scope of his official
duties. The city further asserted that  § 6–5–338(b) extended
to the city the same immunity afforded the police officer
pursuant to § 6-5-338(a).  The plaintiff argued that the
police officer was not engaged in a discretionary function
because, he said, the police officer arrested him for a
misdemeanor that was not committed in the officer's presence. 
18
1141345; 1141385
This Court set forth the rule and statutory provisions that
govern a warrantless arrest.   Rule 4.1(a)(1), Ala. R. Crim.
P., states:
"(1) A law enforcement officer may arrest a
person without a warrant if:
"(i) The law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that a felony has
been committed, or is being committed, and
that the person to be arrested committed
it, or
"(ii) Any offense has been committed
in the law enforcement officer's presence
or view, or
"(iii) 
The 
arrest 
is 
otherwise
authorized by statute, such as Ala. Code
1975, §§ 32–5–171, 32–5A–191, 15–10–3."
Further, § 15–10–3(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"An officer may arrest a person without a
warrant, on any day and at any time in any of the
following instances:
"(1) If a public offense has been
committed or a breach of the peace
threatened in the presence of the officer.
"(2) When a felony has been committed,
though not in the presence of the officer,
by the person arrested.
"(3) When a felony has been committed
and the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that the person arrested committed
the felony.
19
1141345; 1141385
"(4) When the officer has reasonable
cause to believe that the person arrested
has committed a felony, although it may
afterwards appear that a felony had not in
fact been committed.
"(5) When a charge has been made, upon
reasonable cause, that the person arrested
has committed a felony.
"(6) When the officer has actual
knowledge that a warrant for the person's
arrest for the commission of a felony or
misdemeanor has been issued ....
"(7) When the officer has reasonable
cause 
to 
believe 
that 
a 
felony 
or
misdemeanor has been committed by the
person 
arrested 
in 
violation 
of 
a
protection order ....
"(8) When an offense involves domestic
violence ... and the arrest is based on
probable cause, regardless of whether the
offense is a felony or misdemeanor."
In determining that the police officer was not engaged in
a discretionary function and therefore was not entitled to
discretionary-function 
immunity 
pursuant 
to 
§ 
6-5-338(a), 
this
Court stated:
"The City correctly asserts that Officer
McCarver was effectuating an arrest. However, the
record before this Court indicates that [the
plaintiff] was apparently arrested for misdemeanor
offenses not committed in the presence of Officer
McCarver. Generally, Alabama's Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the statutes quoted above do not allow
law-enforcement officers the discretion to arrest
20
1141345; 1141385
alleged wrongdoers for misdemeanors not committed in
the presence of the arresting officer.
"....
"Here, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to [the plaintiff] as the nonmovant, we
must conclude that Officer McCarver arrested [the
plaintiff] for various misdemeanors, none of which
was committed in Officer McCarver's presence.
Because there is no evidence in the record tending
to show that Officer McCarver was pursuing a
discretionary function, i.e., was effectuating a
lawful arrest, the City has failed to demonstrate
that it is entitled to immunity. Considering the
evidence in a light most favorable to [the
plaintiff], as we must, we believe the trial court
erred in dismissing [the plaintiff's] state-law
claims."
Telfare, 841 So. 2d at 1229.
The facts in Telfare are distinguishable from the facts
in the present case.  The police officer in Telfare arrived on
the scene after the altercation between the plaintiff, his
girlfriend, and the other patrons had ended and the plaintiff
and his girlfriend had returned to their vehicle and were
preparing to leave.  Based on statements from the patrons
involved in the altercation, the police officer ordered the
plaintiff to get out of his car and the plaintiff was then
arrested following a struggle with the police officer.  The
events that prompted the police officer to arrest the
21
1141345; 1141385
plaintiff did not occur in the police officer's "presence or
view."  Rule 4.1(a)(1)(ii), Ala. R. Crim. P.
Here, although the evidence indicates that Harris did not
witness Bryson selling alcohol, the evidence does indicate
that Harris entered "The Spot" and saw people consuming
alcohol with the knowledge that Bryson did not have a liquor
license "to sell, [to] offer for sale, or [to] have in
possession for sale," § 28-3A-25(a)(14), Ala. Code 1975, any
alcohol on the premises of "The Spot."  Further, over 200
bottles of beer were seized from "The Spot" while Harris was
present.  Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the
conduct that prompted Bryson's arrest occurred in Harris's
"presence or view."  Thus, Harris was engaged in a law-
enforcement 
function, i.e., making a lawful arrest, that would
entitle 
him 
to 
State-agent 
immunity. 
Because 
Harris
established that he was engaged in a law-enforcement function
that would entitle him to State-agent immunity, the burden
then shifted to Bryson to show that one of the two categories
of 
exceptions 
to State-agent immunity recognized 
in Cranman 
is
applicable. Ex parte Kennedy, supra. 
22
1141345; 1141385
The exception Bryson argues here is that "the State agent
act[ed] willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
[or] beyond his or her authority."  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at
405.  Bryson  alleged in her complaint that Harris's conduct
in arresting her was "willful" and "malicious" and that it was
done "intentionally" to embarrass and harm her.  Bryson argued
in her response in opposition to the defendants' summary-
judgment motion that Harris was not entitled to State-agent
immunity because, she said, he acted "willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, [and] in bad faith" in arresting her. Ex parte
Kennedy, supra.  Bryson supports her argument by presenting
evidence indicating that Harris and Bryson had a conflicting
financial interest and that he held some personal animosity
toward her.  Bryson presented evidence indicating that Harris
was involved in a personal relationship with Bryson's sister,
Mary Ann Hester Briscoe.  Bryson and Briscoe had initially
planned on being partners in "The Spot" and, according to
Bryson, Harris had initially supported "The Spot."  However,
Bryson and Briscoe had a "personal family disagreement," and
Briscoe decided to open a competing business known as "Barlow
and Ann's."  Briscoe testified that Harris and Mayor Hill were
23
1141345; 1141385
partners with her in "Barlow and Ann's."  Briscoe further
testified that she intended for "Barlow and Ann's" to be a
restaurant but that Harris and Mayor Hill envisioned the
business as a club that served alcohol. Bryson stated that
Harris began harassing her and patrons of "The Spot" by
parking his patrol car in front of the building to intimidate
her and her customers.  According to Briscoe, Harris and Mayor
Hill were "desperate" to shut down "The Spot" -- even to the
extent of discussing the idea of planting drugs on Bryson or
at "The Spot" -- because, Briscoe testified, "The Spot" was
"taking money out of their pockets."  Additionally, Bryson
presented testimony indicating that Harris and Mayor Hill had
conspired 
to 
expedite 
Briscoe's 
liquor-licensing 
process 
while
attempting to impede Bryson's  liquor-licensing process. 
There was also testimony indicating that when Harris received
the flier advertising the "beer bash" he exclaimed: "Now I’ve
got her ... I’m going to close her ass down tonight."  
Harris argues that, on the occasion made the basis of
this action, he had probable cause to arrest Bryson and that
there is no evidence indicating that he acted fraudulently or
with any personal ill will, willfulness, or maliciousness, or
24
1141345; 1141385
in bad faith toward Bryson on the occasion of Bryson's arrest. 
 
A false arrest requires proof "'that the defendant caused
[her] to be arrested without probable cause.'" Walker v. City
of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 493 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Higgins
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 512 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1987)). "[F]or
a detention to be valid, the officer must reasonably, and in
good faith, suspect the individual detained of being involved
in some form of criminality." Walker, 62 So. 3d at 493
(quoting Higgins, 512 So. 2d at 768).  "Section 6–5–170, Ala.
Code 1975, defines false imprisonment as 'the unlawful
detention of the person of another for any length of time
whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty.'"  Walker, 62
So. 3d at 492. A false arrest will support a claim of false
imprisonment. Upshaw v. McArdle, 650 So. 2d 875 (Ala. 1994). 
As to false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims, "[p]robable
cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonable 
trustworthy
information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
25
1141345; 1141385
committed." Walker, 62 So. 3d at 492 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168 (Ala.
2003), this Court applied the standard of "arguable probable
cause" in determining whether a police officer was immune from
plaintiff's false-arrest claim pursuant to the immunity
provided police officers in § 6-5-338(a).  Arguable probable
cause exists "when an officer makes an arrest lacking probable
cause if officers of reasonable competence in the same
circumstances and with the same knowledge would disagree as to
whether probable cause existed."  Borders, 875 So. 2d at 1179. 
See also Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th
Cir. 2004)(noting that arguable probable cause exists where
"'reasonable 
officers 
in 
the 
same 
circumstances 
and 
possessing
the same knowledge as the [arresting officer] could have
believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff'").
Whether a police officer possesses probable cause or arguable
probable cause to arrest an individual depends on the elements
of the alleged offense and the operative set of facts. Brown
v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010). 
Further, a showing of probable cause does not require 
26
1141345; 1141385
evidence or information sufficient to support a conviction.
Dixon v. State, 588 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1991).
Bryson was arrested for selling alcohol without a
license. 
 Section 28-3A-25(a)(14) makes it unlawful "[f]or 
any
person ... who ... has not been properly licensed under the
appropriate provisions of this chapter to sell, offer for
sale, or have in possession for sale, any alcoholic
beverages."  Here, the evidence indicates that at the time
Bryson was arrested, Harris knew that she did not possess a
license "to sell, [to] offer for sale, or [to] have in
possession for sale, any alcoholic beverages."  Harris had
information via a flyer that a "beer bash" was to be held at
"The Spot" on the night in question and that, upon payment of
an admission fee of $7.00, patrons could enter the premises
and be provided alcohol for consumption. Finally, upon
Harris's arrival at "The Spot" at the time designated on the
flyer, he saw patrons of "The Spot" consuming alcohol. Based
on the facts known to Harris at the time, he had at least
arguable 
probable cause to arrest Bryson for illegally selling
alcohol without a license.  Because Harris had arguable
probable cause to arrest Bryson, we cannot say that he acted
27
1141345; 1141385
"willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith" so
as to remove him from the umbrella of State-agent immunity
afforded him under Ex parte Cranman.  See Ex parte Tuscaloosa
Cty., 796 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 2000); Borders, supra; Wood v.
Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 884 (11th Cir. 2003)("The existence of
probable cause, and in particular the facts showing that
probable 
cause, 
contradict 
any 
suggestion 
of 
malicious 
intents
or bad faith.").  Although we recognize that Bryson has
presented evidence indicating that Harris held some personal
animosity toward her and that he had a competing financial
interest, the fact remains that Harris had probable cause to
arrest Bryson for selling alcohol without a license on the
occasion made the basis of this action. "When considering
whether an arrest is valid, a police officer's subjective
intent is immaterial; the only requisite is that at the time
the arrest is made, the police officer have probable cause." 
Carruth v. Barker, 454 So. 2d 539, 540 (Ala. 1984).  Thus, we
conclude that Harris is entitled to State-agent immunity on
Bryson's false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims.
The Malicious-Prosecution Claim
28
1141345; 1141385
To the extent that Bryson seeks to assert a malicious-
prosecution claim against Harris, we note that she must prove
"'(1) that there was a judicial proceeding initiated by the
present defendant; (2) that it was initiated without probable
cause; (3) that it was initiated with malice on the part of
the present defendant; (4) that that judicial proceeding was
terminated in favor of the present plaintiff; and (5) that the
present 
plaintiff suffered damage from the prosecution of 
that
earlier action.'"  Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty., 796 So. 2d at
1106 (quoting Kmart Corp. v. Perdue, 708 So. 2d 106, 108 (Ala.
1997)).  A malicious-prosecution claim is disfavored in the
law because "[p]ublic policy requires that all persons shall
resort freely to the courts for redress of wrongs and to
enforce their rights, and that this may be done without the
peril of a suit for damages in the event of an unfavorable
judgment by jury or judge."  Moon v. Pillion, 2 So. 3d 842,
845 (Ala. 2008)(internal quotation marks omitted).  Probable
cause in the context of a malicious-prosecution claim is
defined as "'"[a] reasonable ground for suspicion, supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty
29
1141345; 1141385
of the offense charged."'" Moon, 2 So. 3d at 846 (quoting
Eidson v. Olin Corp., 527 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. 1988),
quoting in turn Parisian Co. v. Williams, 203 Ala. 378, 383,
83 So. 122, 127 (1919)).  This Court has stated:
"'The test that this Court must apply
when reviewing the lack-of-probable-cause
element in a malicious prosecution case in
which summary judgment has been granted to
a defendant is as follows: Can one or more
undisputed facts be found in the record
below 
establishing 
that 
the 
defendant 
acted
in good faith on the appearance of things
as they existed when suit was filed, based
upon 
direct 
evidence, 
or 
upon
circumstantial 
evidence 
and 
inferences 
that
can reasonably be drawn therefrom?'"
Moon, 2 So. 3d at 846 (quoting Eidson, 527 So. 2d at 1285-86).
Additionally, we have stated:
"It is well established that for purposes of a
malicious-prosecution claim, the element of malice
may be inferred from the lack of probable cause,
see, e.g., Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d
824, 833 (Ala. 1999); McLeod v. McLeod, 75 Ala. 483,
486 (1883), but this Court has recognized that
malice in law, or legal malice, for purposes of a
malicious-prosecution claim, is not sufficient to
defeat 
a 
state 
agent's 
defense 
of
discretionary-function immunity. This Court has
required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
conduct was 'so egregious as to amount to willful or
malicious conduct or conduct engaged in in bad
faith,' by, for example, showing that the defendant
had 'a personal ill will against the [plaintiff] and
30
1141345; 1141385
that he maliciously or in bad faith arrested him
solely for purposes of harassment.' Couch v. City of
Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 153–54 (Ala. 1998)
(affirming the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, a municipal police officer,
who, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6–5–338, was
entitled to discretionary-function immunity in the
same manner as a state agent)...."
Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty., 796 So. 2d at 1107.
Here, it is undisputed that Bryson did not have a license
to sell alcohol at "The Spot" and that Harris was aware of
this fact. It is further undisputed that Harris had acquired
information indicating that a "beer bash" was to be held at
"The Spot" on the night in question and that, for the payment
of a $7.00 admission fee, patrons could enter the premises and
be provided alcohol for consumption.  Finally, it is
undisputed that upon Harris's entry into "The Spot" he saw its
patrons consuming alcohol.  Based on the foregoing, we
conclude that Harris had probable cause to initiate a judicial
proceeding against Bryson and that he did so without malice.  
2
Malicious-prosecution actions are not disallowed against
2
arresting police officers simply because they are not the
individuals who ultimately decide to institute a criminal
proceeding.  See Exford v. City of Montgomery, 887 F. Supp. 2d
1210 (M.D. Ala. 2012).  Probable cause for a malicious-
prosecution claim is not determined at the time of the arrest
but when the defendant (usually the arresting officer)
31
1141345; 1141385
Because Harris had probable cause to initiate a judicial
proceeding against Bryson and because he did so without
malice, he is immune from suit on Bryson's malicious-
prosecution claim under the doctrine of State-agent immunity
set forth in Ex parte Cranman.  See Ex parte Tuscaloosa Cty.,
supra; Borders, supra; Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240
(11th Cir. 2010). As mentioned above, Bryson presented some
evidence indicating that Harris harbored some personal
animosity toward her and that he had a competing financial
interest, but that evidence does not alter the fact that he
had probable cause to initiate a judicial proceeding against
her, given his knowledge of the facts and circumstances giving
rise to that proceeding. Carruth, supra.
The Other Claims
In addition to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and
malicious-prosecution claims, Bryson asserted claims alleging 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment,
initiates the prosecution by filing a report with the
prosecutor, submitting an affidavit, or giving grand-jury
testimony.  Beyond Police Misconduct and False Arrest:
Expanding the Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation, 8 Suffolk
J. Trial & App. Advoc. 39.  Here, it was Harris who completed
the Alabama Uniform Incident/Offense Report and provided the
supporting deposition.  
32
1141345; 1141385
libel, and slander.  Harris did not raise immunity as a
defense to those claims.  Rather, he argued in his summary-
judgment motion that the 
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-
distress, libel, and slander claims were not supported by the
evidence.  He also argued that Alabama does not recognize a
civil cause of action for harassment.  Because the motion for
a summary judgment as to those claims was not grounded on a
claim of immunity, to the extent that Harris seeks mandamus
review of those claims, we conclude that they are not
reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Ex parte 
Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1996).  Accordingly, to the
extent that Harris seeks mandamus review of those claims, his
petition is due to be denied.
II. The Town's Petition (No. 1141385)
The Town argues that, under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975,
it cannot be held vicariously liable for the intentional acts
of its employees. This Court has stated:
"Section 11-47-190, Ala. 1975, provides that a
municipality is immune from tort liability 'unless
such injury or wrong was done or suffered through
the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some
agent, officer or employee of the municipality
engaged in work therefor and while acting in the
line of his or her duty.' This statute limits a
33
1141345; 1141385
municipality's liability for the acts of its agents
to those acts that are negligent, careless, or
unskillful. 
Section 
11–47–190 
provides 
a
municipality immunity from liability for the acts of
its agents that are carried out in bad faith or with
malice. Borders [v. City of Huntsville], 875 So. 2d
[1168] at 1183 [(Ala. 2003)] (quoting Ex parte City
of Gadsden, 718 So. 2d 716, 721 (Ala. 1998))"
Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 910 (Ala. 2005). 
See also Cremeens v. City of Montgomery, 779 So. 2d 1190, 1201
(Ala. 2000)("A municipality cannot be held liable for the
intentional torts of its employees. See Ala. Code 1975, § 11-
47-190."); Town of Loxley v. Coleman, 720 So. 2d 907, 909
(Ala. 1998) ("This Court has construed § 11–47–190 to exclude
liability for wanton misconduct.").  
Here, Bryson asserted in her complaint claims of
malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment,
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
libel, and slander. Bryson specifically alleged that Harris
was acting within the line and scope of his employment as the
Town's police chief and that the claims arose from Harris's 
willful and intentional acts, which, she says, were designed
to embarrass and harm her.  Because Bryson has alleged
intentional tortious conduct on Harris's part, the Town is
34
1141345; 1141385
immune from suit under § 11-47-190 as to each claim asserted
against it.   
We would further note that, to the extent that we have
concluded above that Harris was entitled to State-agent
immunity, the Town would also be immune from suit. Hollis v.
City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006); Ex parte Dixon,
55 So. 3d 1171 (Ala. 2010); City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925
So. 2d 944,955 (Ala. 2005); Thurmond v. City of Huntsville,
904 So. 2d 314, 326 (Ala. 2004), and § 6-5-338(b), Ala. Code
1975.
Conclusion
The trial court is directed to vacate its order denying
Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest,
false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to
enter a summary-judgment for Harris as to those claims.  To
the extent Harris seeks mandamus review of the claims alleging
an intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment,
libel, and slander, the petition is denied. The trial court is
further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's
summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for
the Town as to each claim asserted against it.
35
1141345; 1141385
1141345 –- MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; PETITION GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
1141385 –- MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; PETITION GRANTED; 
WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Murdock, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
     
36