Title: Daniel v. Leben

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

188 Kan. 344 (1961)
362 P.2d 634
THOMAS C. DANIEL, Appellee,
v.
HENRY LEBEN, Appellant.
No. 42,102

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 10, 1961.
Harold A. Zelinkoff, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
James R. Barr, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Payne H. Ratner; Louise Mattox; Payne H. Ratner, Jr., Cliff W. Ratner; Edmund R. Learned; Frank W. Hylton; R.R. Barnes, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This was an action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a written lease of real estate, a business property, in Wichita. The appeal is from an order overruling a demurrer to the second amended petition as amended by supplemental allegations, which pleading will be hereafter referred to as the petition.
Omitting formal averments, the prayer, allegations of damages claimed to have been sustained, and divers allegations of no consequence to the issues, pertinent portions of the pleading in question read:
*346 Salient portions of the lease which, as previously indicated, was attached to and made a part of the petition read:
Facets of the single appellate issue involved, i.e., whether the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer, will be clarified at the outset by establishing the theory on which plaintiff bases his claim the petition states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Quoting from his own brief that theory is stated thus:
Resort to the petition, which we again emphasize includes the lease contract, makes it clear there is a clear cut variance between the terms of the lease relied on and the allegations of the pleading. In such a situation the established rule of this jurisdiction, although sometimes differently stated, is that when an exhibit is the foundation of a petition the recitals in the exhibit control and govern the other allegations of the pleading of which it has been made a part.
For divers statements of the above mentioned rule see Zane v. International Hod Carriers B. & C.L. Union, 155 Kan. 87, 122 P.2d 715, where it is held:
*347 See Degenhardt, Administrator, v. Degenhardt, 183 Kan. 260, 326 P.2d 288, which holds:
See, also, Missionary Baptist State Convention of Kansas v. State, 180 Kan. 501, 305 P.2d 846, quoted with approval in Zehring v. Driskel, 184 Kan. 644, 646, 339 P.2d 57, where it is said:
For just a few of our other decisions, where such rule is stated, discussed and applied, see State, ex rel., v. Sinclair Pipeline Co., 180 Kan. 425, 304 P.2d 930; Galleher v. City of Wichita, 179 Kan. 513, 519, 296 P.2d 1062; State, ex rel., v. Hedrick, 178 Kan. 135, 139, 283 P.2d 437; Croasdale v. Butell, 177 Kan. 487, 491, 280 P.2d 593; Wood v. Stewart, 158 Kan. 729, 732, 733, 150 P.2d 331.
See, also, 41 Am. Jur., Pleading, § 57, pp. 328, 329.
With the foregoing rule in mind it becomes necessary to examine the basic instrument on which plaintiff founds his cause of action. That, as we have pointed out, in final analysis, is the original lease attached to the petition. In this connection it is to be noted that while a court has power to interpret and construe a written instrument it has no authority to reform the instrument by rejecting words of clear and definite meaning and substituting others therefor (See Geier v. Eagle-Cherokee Coal Mining Co., 181 Kan. 567, 572, 573, 313 P.2d 731, citing Sipes v. Pessemier, 144 Kan. 300, 58 P.2d 1085). Stated in different fashion it is not the function of the court to make contracts for the parties but to enforce them as made (Zelinkoff v. Johnson, 185 Kan. 489, 345 P.2d 665).
Turning to the lease it cannot be denied it states in clear and unambiguous terms that, unless written notice was given to the plaintiff (lessee) within ten days after the premises become untenantable, the lease ceased and became void. Moreover looking at other allegations appearing on the face of the petition, and giving them the benefit of inferences to which they are entitled in ruling on the demurrer, *348 it becomes clear (1) that the defendant did not give the notice electing to restore the premises within the ten day period; (2) that the oral agreement relied on was entered into some time after the expiration of such period of time but not later than the early part of October 1959; and (3) that based on the terms of such oral agreement plaintiff is claiming to have held and retained a lease on the real property in question, under the terms of the original written lease for a period of time which, in any event, would have exceeded one year in duration.
In the face of the related conditions and circumstances, and when the rules to which we have heretofore referred are properly applied in accord with this court's previous decisions, we are convinced that following the expiration of the ten day period the written lease, by its own terms, became null and void. With this point decided it becomes obvious that, under the allegations of his petition, and notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, plaintiff is actually in the position of attempting to state a cause of action founded upon a subsequent executed oral agreement, wherein he seeks to revive and reinstate the terms of the void lease contract, and thus establish a leasehold estate or interest in the real estate in question for a period of time exceeding more than one year.
Conceding, as plaintiff points out, that under our decisions (See, e.g., Bailey v. Norton, 178 Kan. 104, 283 P.2d 400) it is settled that the terms of an existing written contract may be varied, modified, waived, annulled, or wholly set aside, by any subsequently executed contract, whether such contract be in writing or parol, it does not follow that the terms and provisions of a written agreement, which has become void and of no force and effect for reasons herein stated, can be revived and reinstated in that manner. In the last mentioned situation, as we understand it, questions relating to the status of the prior agreement depend upon the terms and provisions of the new contract  in this case an alleged oral agreement  including, of course, all questions pertaining to the validity of the subsequent instrument.
Thus we come to the all decisive question involved in this case. Does the petition, which, on its face, shows facts such as have been heretofore related, state a cause of action?
Our statute of frauds (Chapter 33, G.S. 1949), so far as here pertinent, provides:
Even though the cases involving the subject now under consideration are limited, this court is not without controlling precedents dealing with the force and effect to be given the foregoing sections of the statute in situations which, although they are not identical, are somewhat similar to those here presented.
In Lane v. Ozias, 114 Kan. 46, 217 Pac. 331, we held:
And in the opinion said:
..............
In a later case, Hale v. Brown, 119 Kan. 303, 304, 239 Pac. 963, referring to what was then R.S. 33-105, and citing Lane v. Ozias, supra, we said that an oral promise to lease a farm for more than a year is void under the statute of frauds. That an oral contract to lease a farm for more than a year, comes within the same category as an oral contract to lease other real estate  here a business property  so far as application of the statute of frauds is concerned, cannot be questioned.
Moreover it is to be noted, that long ago in Pessemier v. Genn, 104 Kan. 287, 288, 178 Pac. 426, this court recognized that a demurrer, based on the ground a petition did not state a cause of *350 action, was sufficient to raise the enforceability of a contract under the statute of frauds when, in the opinion, it said:
Pessemier v. Genn, supra, also establishes that, where it appears from the face of the petition, a contract relied on as grounds for recovery is unenforceable by reason of inhibitions of the statute of frauds such pleading fails to state a cause of action.
After careful review of all questions raised by the parties and the decisions cited in support thereof, we are convinced the petition in this case shows on its face (1) that plaintiff was relying upon the terms of a subsequent oral agreement to establish a leasehold estate or interest in the real estate in question for a period of time exceeding more than one year or, if not, was bound to rely on that agreement as a matter of law to establish such interest and (2) that nothing appears on the face of such petition which takes the case out of the statute of frauds. Therefore, based on the decisions heretofore cited and what has been heretofore stated and held, we are constrained to hold the petition fails to state a cause of action and that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer to that pleading.
The judgment is reversed with directions to sustain the demurrer to the petition.
ROBB, J., not participating.