Title: State v. Sawatzky

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  December 30, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
SYLVIA MARIE SAWATZKY,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC Nos. 000332189, 000937299; SC S52332)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.
Argued and submitted September 9, 2005.
Gregory F. Silver, Metropolitan Public Defender Service,
Inc., Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
relator.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for the adverse party on review.  With her on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
DE MUNIZ, J.
Alternative writ of mandamus dismissed.
DE MUNIZ, J. 
This is an original mandamus proceeding.  Relator,
Sawatzky, pleaded guilty to a number of crimes.  At her original
sentencing, the trial judge found that there were "substantial
and compelling reasons justifying a deviation" from the
presumptive sentences for those crimes and, based on that
determination, imposed sentences that exceeded the presumptive
ranges.  Relator appealed to the Court of Appeals.  That court
concluded that the imposition of "enhanced" sentences violated
relator's Sixth Amendment jury trial right under the principles
articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348,
147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296,
124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), and remanded for
resentencing.  State v. Sawatzky, 195 Or App 159, 96 P3d 1288
(2004).  
On remand, the trial court expressed its intention to
empanel a jury to determine any facts necessary to reimpose
"enhanced" sentences.  Relator objected, arguing, inter alia,
that doing so would violate her statutory and state and federal
constitutional rights against former and double jeopardy. (1) 
When the trial court denied her jeopardy claim, relator
petitioned this court for an alternative writ of mandamus, and
this court issued the alternative writ to address that claim. 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that relator's rights
against former and double jeopardy do not prohibit the trial
court from empaneling a jury to determine aggravating factors on
which the trial court may rely in imposing sentences that exceed
the presumptive range for the felony crimes to which relator
pleaded guilty. (2)  We therefore dismiss the alternative writ.
The relevant facts are undisputed.  A 20-count
indictment charged relator with nine counts of aggravated theft
in the first degree, ORS 164.057; one count of theft in the first
degree, ORS 164.055; and ten counts of forgery in the first
degree, ORS 165.013.  The charges describe relator's acts of
embezzlement in the course of her employment as a bookkeeper.  A
separate indictment charged her with one count of failure to
appear in the first degree, ORS 162.205.  Relator pleaded guilty
to all charges and submitted separate plea petitions in the two
cases.  When the trial court imposed sentences based on the two
indictments, it entered "upward departure" sentences under the
Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines (sentencing guidelines),
i.e., sentences that exceeded the presumptive range with respect
to many of the counts in the first indictment and on the failure-to-appear charge alleged in the second indictment.  See ORS
137.671(1) (court may impose sentence departing from the
presumptive range if it determines that "there are substantial
and compelling reasons justifying a deviation from the
presumptive sentence"); OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b) (providing
nonexclusive list of aggravating factors for upward departure
sentences).  Specifically, the trial court stated that it imposed
enhanced sentences because the thefts that relator had committed
resulted in greater-than-typical harm, relator had abused her
employers' trust in stealing the money, and relator had failed to
appear while on a security release.  Relator's sentences totaled
100 months in prison. (3)
Relator appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial
court could not impose upward departure sentences because the
enhancement factors on which it relied were not based on facts
alleged in the indictment to which defendant had pleaded guilty. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the enhanced sentences, based
on judicial findings of fact instead of facts found by a jury,
violated relator's jury trial right under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution as construed in Apprendi and
Blakely.  Sawatzky, 195 Or App at 170-72.  The Court of Appeals
vacated the enhanced sentences and remanded the cases to the
trial court for resentencing.  Id. at 172.
On remand, the state moved to empanel a sentencing jury
to determine whether the applicable aggravating facts existed
that might provide the basis for imposing sentences that exceeded
the presumptive range.  Relator objected and argued that the
court could not convene a new jury.  According to relator, the
trial court could not impose any sentence that exceeded the
presumptive term of imprisonment for the charges alleged in the
indictment.  The trial court rejected relator's argument and
granted the state's motion to empanel a jury.  Relator then
sought an alternative writ of mandamus in this court.  After
considering the petition and the state's response, this court
issued the alternative writ. (4)
In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that
any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Apprendi, 530 US at 496-97.   Blakely
reinforced the principles articulated in Apprendi and established
that the statutory maximum sentence in a guidelines sentencing
scheme like Oregon's is the presumptive sentence that may be
imposed as a result of a jury verdict of guilt.  525 US at 310-14.  In addition, Blakely emphasized that the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant form the outer
boundary of support for a maximum sentence.  
Relator argues that, as construed in Apprendi and
Blakely, the Sixth Amendment requires that aggravating or
enhancing sentencing factors of the kind identified in Oregon's
sentencing guidelines be treated as elements of different and, in
fact, greater substantive crimes.  Specifically, relator contends
that, because the aggravating or enhancing factors that the state
now seeks to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt are
elements of crimes greater than those alleged in the indictments
to which she pleaded guilty, the state is placing her in jeopardy
a second time in violation of her state statutory and
constitutional rights against former jeopardy and her federal
right against double jeopardy.  See ORS 131.515 (statutory double
jeopardy protections); (5) Or Const, Art I, § 12 ("No person
shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence"); US Const,
Amend V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). (6)  The state's
response to relator's jeopardy claim is based, for the most part,
on the Oregon statutory definition of the term "offense."  The
state argues that "the term 'offense,' as used in the statutory
double-jeopardy provision,[ (7)] refers only to the conduct that
comprises the statutorily defined felony or misdemeanor." (8) 
According to the state that provision does not extend to
relator's definition of "offense," which includes "sentence-enhancement facts."  In other words, the state contends that,
because aggravating or enhancing factors are not part of the
statutory definition of an offense, the state is not prosecuting
relator a second time when, on remand, the court empanels a jury
to assess those aggravating or enhancing factors.
The state's argument is correct under the pertinent
statutes and this court's case law concerning the sentencing
guidelines scheme.  The state's argument, however, does not
directly address relator's claim that, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, this court must treat "aggravating or
enhancing factors" identified in Oregon's sentencing guidelines
scheme as offense elements that trigger jury trial protection
and, in circumstances such as this, former and double jeopardy
protection.  In view of the parties arguments, we must determine
whether the United States Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
analysis in Apprendi and Blakley compels the conclusion that
relator is entitled, at this stage of her criminal proceedings,
to invoke the shield of former or double jeopardy to prevent the
imposition of sentences that exceed the presumptive range for the
crimes to which she pleaded guilty.  We begin with the Court's
decision in  Apprendi.
Apprendi involved a defendant who fired several shots
into the home of an African-American family.  The indictment did
not allege facts to establish a motive, and it did not charge
circumstances otherwise justifying a "hate crime" sentencing
enhancement under New Jersey law.  The defendant pleaded guilty
to several counts, including second-degree possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carried a potential
sentence of five to ten years' imprisonment.  At sentencing, the
trial court enhanced that count as a hate crime, based on facts
that the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
after the defendant had pleaded guilty, and imposed a sentence of
12 years' imprisonment.  On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court held that, under the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state must submit to a jury and prove beyond a reasonable
doubt any fact that increases the penalty beyond the applicable
statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction. 
Apprendi, 530 US at 489. 
Apprendi recognized the "constitutionally novel and
elusive distinction between 'elements' and 'sentencing factors,'"
but emphasized that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but
of effect."  Id. at 494.  In other words, the inquiry should be
whether "the required finding expose[d] the defendant to a
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict."  Id. 
The Court in Apprendi also observed:
"The term ['sentencing factor'] appropriately describes
a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or
mitigating in character, that supports a specific
sentence within the range authorized by the jury's
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular
offense.  On the other hand, when the term 'sentence
enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the
maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty
verdict.  Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual
definition of an 'element' of the offense."
Id. at 494 n 19 (original emphasis omitted; emphasis added).  The
Court emphasized that, in effect, New Jersey's sentencing
enhancement scheme turned a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense under the state criminal code.  Id. at 494.  
Apprendi characterized the New Jersey enhancement scheme as "an
unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an
indispensable part of our criminal justice system" and reversed
the conviction.  Id. at 497.
Because the Sixth Amendment jury trial right extends to
any fact that can increase the length of a sentence, and because
the Court described such a fact as the functional equivalent of
an offense element, many of the reasons underlying the
traditional and constitutional distinction between a guilt
determination and a sentencing determination for jeopardy
purposes is no longer so clear.  In other words, under Apprendi,
a jury determination of a sentencing enhancement factor is now
part and parcel of a jury trial and we now must view that
determination similarly to a jury's decision to acquit or
convict.  In our view, because Apprendi and Blakely require that
the adjudication of sentencing enhancement factors be fully
adversarial within the context of a jury trial, the
constitutional principles of former and double jeopardy -- that
the state shall not prosecute a person a second time for the same
offense after acquittal or conviction -- should apply equally to
a jury determination of a sentencing enhancement factor.
That said, it nevertheless is clear that, in this case,
relator is not entitled to former or double jeopardy protection. 
This is not a second prosecution.  Rather, it is a sentencing
proceeding on remand -- a continuation of a single prosecution. 
See State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 604, 789 P2d 1352 (1990) ("A
penalty phase hearing is merely a continuation of the same trial
and not a separate or collateral proceeding threatening a new or
different sanction").  Because it is relator who challenged the
legality of her sentences in the Court of Appeals, she cannot now
claim that she had any justifiable expectation of finality -- a
fundamental jeopardy requirement -- with respect to her
sentences.
Neither was relator "acquitted" on any of the
sentencing enhancement factors that the state is obligated to
prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the
Sixth Amendment.  Instead, the original sentencing court
concluded that the aggravating factors had been proved and that
substantial and compelling reasons justified imposing sentences
that exceeded the presumptive range for the various crimes.  The
Court of Appeals vacated those sentences only because a jury had
not determined the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt
as required under the Sixth Amendment.  That court did not hold -- as would be required for former or double jeopardy to apply --
that the record would not permit the aggravating factors to be
found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, relator argues that, because sentencing
enhancement factors must be treated under Apprendi and Blakely as
the functional equivalent of "elements" of a criminal offense for
jeopardy purposes, the state's failure to allege those factors or
elements in the indictments precludes the state from now seeking
sentences based on those factors or elements.  
That aspect of relator's jeopardy argument hinges on an
assumption that Apprendi and Blakely require that each element of
the factual underpinnings of the sentence enhancement must be
pleaded in the charging instrument.  Apparently, relator assumes
that she must be charged again in new indictments that contain
the facts pertinent to the sentencing enhancements.  At the same
time, she observes that she already had pleaded guilty to the
indictments and the indictments cannot be rescinded without her
consent. 
We agree with relator that Apprendi describes a
"sentence enhancement" as "an increase beyond the maximum
authorized statutory sentence" and "the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the
jury's guilty verdict."  530 US at 494 n 19.  Although Apprendi
requires that the jury find the facts that would support an
enhanced sentence, we do not agree that Apprendi requires, as a
matter of state criminal procedure, that enhancement factors be
set out in the indictment.  Certainly the Court's holding in
Apprendi did not demand that procedure.  Instead, the Court
declined to answer that question in Apprendi, and this court
similarly has not so held. (9)  See State v. Oatney, 335 Or
276, 66 P3d 475 (2003), cert den, 540 US 1151 ("deliberateness"
finding required for death sentence need not be pleaded in
indictment).  Further, this court has recognized that neither
Apprendi nor Blakely held that the indictment clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a
criminal indictment in a state prosecution contain facts
necessary for the state to obtain a sentencing enhancement. 
State v. Cox, 337 Or 477, 499, 98 P3d 1103 (2004).  As we view
it, under Apprendi, "if defendant has a federal constitutional
right to have a fact pled in the indictment, that right derives
solely from the Fifth Amendment [and t]he decision in Blakely
does nothing to change that suggestion."  Id.  Finally, the
indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to only federal
prosecutions, because the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
that it apply to the states.  Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516,
4 S Ct 111, 28 L Ed 232 (1884).
Nothing in Apprendi or Blakely alters the definition of
an "offense" set out in ORS 161.505.  In our view, so long as a
defendant has timely notice that the state intends to prove
certain aggravating or enhancing factors necessary for the
imposition of a sentence that exceeds the presumptive range, and
the trial court affords a criminal defendant the opportunity to
exercise his or her jury trial right in that regard, the federal
constitution is satisfied.  Here, relator cannot now complain
that she does not know the precise nature of the aggravating or
enhancing factors the state now is obligated to prove to a jury.
We hold that relator has no statutory or constitutional
jeopardy right that prohibits the empaneling of a jury to
determine whether certain aggravating factors may support the
imposition of sentences that exceed the presumptive range for the
crimes to which relator pleaded guilty.
Alternative writ of mandamus dismissed.
1. Defendant's other arguments regarding the trial court's
authority to empanel a jury and the constitutionality of Senate
Bill 528 (2005) (which provides for the empaneling of sentencing
juries, among other things) are rejected for the reasons
expressed in State v. Upton, 339 Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (2005),
decided this date.
2. The parties alternatively use the terms "aggravating
facts," aggravating factors," and "enhancement facts."  We treat
the various references as meaning the same thing:  any fact that
increases the sentence beyond the presumptive range established
in the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines for a particular
crime.  Similarly, we treat the terms "upward departure sentence"
and "enhanced sentence" as referring to a sentence that exceeds
the presumptive range established in the sentencing guidelines
for that crime.
3. Relator contends -- and the state does not contest --that, without the upward departures, the trial court would have
sentenced her to 44-60 months in prison.
4. It is true, at least abstractly, that relator's
position also could be vindicated on a direct appeal after
conviction.  This court, however, has not regarded that fact as
defeating an application for a writ of mandamus in circumstances
like those presented in this case.  Instead, generally speaking,
this court has concluded that mandamus is an appropriate remedy
in a double or former jeopardy matter, because a defendant's
"ordinary right to appeal after conviction does not vindicate his
[or her] statutory right to be free from a second prosecution for
the same offense."  State ex rel Turner v. Frankel, 322 Or 363,
376, 908 P2d 293 (1995).  Consistently with that view, and in
light of the significant former and double jeopardy issue
presented, we issued the alternative writ of mandamus in this
case.
5. ORS 131.515 provides:
"Except as provided in ORS 131.525 and 131.535:
"(1) No person shall be prosecuted twice for the
same offense.
"(2) No person shall be separately prosecuted for
two or more offenses based upon the same criminal
episode, if the several offenses are reasonably known
to the appropriate prosecutor at the time of
commencement of the first prosecution and establish
proper venue in a single court.
"(3) If a person is prosecuted for an offense
consisting of different degrees, the conviction or
acquittal resulting therefrom is a bar to a later
prosecution for the same offense, for any inferior
degree of the offense, for an attempt to commit the
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
"(4) A finding of guilty of a lesser included
offense on any count is an acquittal of the greater
inclusive offense only as to that count."
6. The double jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment
apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Benton v.
Maryland, 395 US 784, 787, 89 S Ct 2056, 2058, 23 L Ed 2d 707
(1969).  We note that relator does not appear to contend that the
former jeopardy provisions of the state constitution operate
differently from the federal double jeopardy provisions regarding
the issue that she presents to this court in this case.
7. ORS 131.505(1) provides that, unless the context
requires otherwise, the meaning of the term "offense" is that
provided in ORS 161.505.
8. ORS 161.505 provides:
"An offense is conduct for which a sentence to a
term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any
law of this state or by any law or ordinance of a
political subdivision of this state.  An offense is
either a crime, as described in ORS 161.515, or a
violation, as described in ORS 153.008."
9. The Court observes in Apprendi:
"[The defendant] has not here asserted a
constitutional claim based on the omission of any
reference to sentence enhancement or racial bias in the
indictment.  He relies entirely on the fact that the
'due process of law' that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the States to provide to persons accused of
crime encompasses the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to have every element of the offense proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.  That Amendment has not,
however, been construed to include the Fifth Amendment
right to 'presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury'
that was implicated in our recent decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US 224, 118 S
Ct 1219, 140 L Ed 2d 350 (1998).  We thus do not
address the indictment question separately today."
530 US at 477 n 3 (some citations omitted).