Title: George Porter, Jr. v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC88562
____________
GEORGE PORTER, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[May 3, 2001]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
George Porter, Jr., a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit
court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of Porter’s 3.850 motion.
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FACTS
Porter was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the 1986
shooting deaths of Evelyn Williams and her boyfriend, Walter Burrows.  The facts,
as fully set forth in this Court’s opinion on Porter’s direct appeal, are:
Porter elected to represent himself, with the assistance of
standby counsel, when he went on trial in November 1987 on two
counts of first-degree murder and one count each of armed burglary
and aggravated assault.  The facts adduced at trial are as follows.
In 1985 in Melbourne, Florida, Porter became the live-in lover
of the first victim, Evelyn Williams (“Williams”).  Their relationship
was stormy almost from the beginning, aggravated by hostility
between Porter and Williams’ children, especially Williams’ daughter,
Amber.  Several violent incidents occurred during the course of
Porter’s relationship with Williams.  In July 1986, Porter damaged
Williams’ car while she was at work, and later he telephoned and
threatened to kill Williams and Amber.  Porter left town shortly
thereafter and was not seen again in town until early October 1986. 
Before Porter returned to Melbourne, Williams had entered a
relationship with the second victim, Walter Burrows.
When Porter returned to town, he contacted Williams’ mother,
Lora Mae Meyer.  He told her that he wanted to see Williams, and that
he had a gift for her.  Meyer told Porter that her daughter did not wish
to see him anymore, and that Williams wanted nothing from him. 
Nevertheless, Porter persisted.  During each of the two days
immediately preceding the murder, Porter was seen driving past
Williams’ house.
A few days before the murder, Porter had a conversation with a
friend, Nancy Sherwood, who testified that Porter told her, “you’ll
read it in the paper.”  She offered no explanation for Porter’s remark. 
Porter went to the home of another friend, Dennis Gardner, and asked
to borrow a gun.  Gardner declined, but the gun subsequently
vanished from Gardner’s home.
On October 8, 1986, Porter visited Williams, who then called
1Porter’s penalty phase counsel was his standby counsel in the guilty phase.
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the police because she was afraid of him.  That evening, Porter went
to two cocktail lounges.  He spent the night with a friend, Lawrence
Jury, who said that Porter was quite drunk by 11 p.m.
At 5:30 a.m. the next morning, Amber awoke to the sound of
gunshots.  She ran down the hallway and saw Porter standing over her
mother’s body. Amber testified that Porter came toward her, pointed a
gun at her head and said, “boom, boom, you’re going to die.” 
Burrows then came into the room, struggled with Porter, and forced
him outside.  Amber telephoned for emergency assistance.
Williams’ son, John, who lived next door, testified that he heard
gunshot blasts at about 5:30 a.m.  He ran outside and saw Burrows
lying facedown in the front lawn.  Both Williams and Burrows were
dead by the time police arrived at the scene.
On December 5, 1987, as the prosecution was nearly finished
presenting its case-in-chief, Porter told the judge that he wanted to
plead guilty to the murder charges and no contest to the other charges. 
When the judge sought the factual basis of the pleas from Porter,
Porter denied killing Williams, although said he may have killed
Burrows.  The judge refused to accept the pleas on that basis.  Porter
consulted with his standby counsel and then said he would plead guilty
to all four charges, but that he did not want to provide a factual basis
for the pleas.  The trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into the
voluntariness of the pleas, and the prosecutor presented the factual
basis in support of guilt.  Porter admitted his guilt and said he changed
his pleas “[b]ecause I want to get it over with.”  The trial court
accepted the guilty pleas to all four counts.
Porter v. State, 564 So 2d 1060, 1061-62 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110
(1991).
On January 21, 1988, the trial jury returned for the penalty phase, at which
Porter was represented by counsel. 1  The jury recommended death by a twelve-to-
2The four aggravators found by the trial judge were:  (1) the defendant had
been previously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felonies were committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary; (3) the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the murder was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner.
3Porter’s initial 3.850 motion was filed on June 22, 1992.  That motion
contained a public records request under chapter 119, Florida Statutes.  Porter was
given sixty days from the date of full disclosure of all public records to amend his
motion.  On June 28, 1993, Porter filed an amended motion to vacate the
convictions and sentences.  The trial court denied the motion because it failed to
contain a properly sworn oath.  After Porter’s motion for reconsideration was
denied, he sought review of the order with this Court.  On November 29, 1994, we
granted the State’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to Porter filing a properly
sworn motion within ninety days of that order.  This was the motion that was
ultimately denied by the trial court.
4Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
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zero vote for the murder of Williams and by a vote of ten to two for the murder of
Burrows, but the trial judge imposed death only on the murder of Williams.  The
trial judge found four aggravators2 and no mitigators.  On direct appeal, this Court
struck the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator but affirmed the
conviction and sentence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 1995, Porter filed the instant amended rule 3.8503 motion,
which contained fifteen issues.  The trial court conducted a Huff4 hearing on May
22, 1995.  Subsequent to that hearing, the trial court issued an order on July 12,
5In a recent case dealing with the failure of an attorney to file an appeal on
behalf of a defendant pursuant to the denial of a noncapital rule 3.850 motion, we
held that the defendant was entitled to petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus
on whether the attorney had indeed agreed to file an appeal.  See Steele v Kehoe,
747 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1999).  We further instructed that if the defendant
prevailed, he would have the right to file a belated rule 3.850 motion.  See id.  This
court has always recognized a defendant’s right to appeal from the denial of a
motion for postconviction relief.  Although Porter’s counsel was five days late in
filing his notice of appeal, we find that counsel’s tardiness of five days should not
constitute a waiver of Porter’s right to have his initial postconviction capital motion
reviewed.  The State does not challenge Porter’s wish to appeal.  However, we
caution counsel that such lateness in future cases may result in sanctions imposed
against counsel.
6Porter’s nine claims are:  (1) Porter received ineffective assistance of penalty
phase counsel; (2) Porter’s due process rights were violated when he was not
permitted to appear at the Huff hearing; (3) the trial court failed to grant an
evidentiary hearing on Porter’s claims that the record on appeal was incomplete; he
was incompetent to stand trial; the competency hearing and psychiatric evaluations
were inadequate; the Faretta inquiry was inadequate; and the State withheld
exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (4)
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1995, summarily denying all claims raised by Porter except for his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims regarding counsel’s failure to pursue mental health
evaluations for the purpose of developing mitigating evidence and counsel’s failure
to present other matters in mitigation.  On these claims the trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on January 4 and 5, 1996.  Subsequent to this hearing, the trial
court denied the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  This appeal follows.
ISSUES ON APPEAL5
Porter raises nine issues on appeal. 6  We conclude that issues 4, 5, 7, 8, and
the trial court impermissibly relied on nonstatutory aggravators; (5) the penalty
phase jury instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Porter; (6) the
aggravating circumstance instructions were overbroad and vague; (7) the death
sentence is impermissibly based on an unconstitutional automatic aggravating
circumstance; (8) the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence; and (9) the
prosecutor engaged in improper prosecutorial conduct during trial.
7See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), wherein the Court
held:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so
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9, as well as part of issue 6 (relating to the “committed during the commission of a
burglary” aggravator) are procedurally barred because they could have been raised
on direct appeal.  See Lecroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 240 (Fla. 1998) (issue 9);
Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1998) (issue 5); Oats v. Dugger, 638
So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 1994) (issue 6); Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So 2d 452, 453-54 (Fla.
1993) (issue 4); Garcia v. State 622 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 1993) (issues 7 and 8). 
The remaining arguments in issue 6, relating to the claim of vagueness in the
instructions on aggravating circumstances, are procedurally barred because Porter
did not make a specific objection at trial or propose an alternative instruction and
then pursue the vagueness issue on direct appeal.  See Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d
506, 517 (Fla. 1999).  We will discuss the remaining issues.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As his first claim, Porter asserts his penalty phase counsel was ineffective.7 
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components.  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient . . . .  Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
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This claim involves alleged failures in respect to investigation and presentation of
evidence concerning:  (1) statutory and nonstatutory mental mitigation; (2) Porter’s
abusive childhood environment; (3) Porter’s alcohol abuse; and (4) Porter’s
military combat service in Korea.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, taking two days of testimony.  At
the evidentiary hearing, Porter called his penalty phase counsel, Bardwell, as his
first witness.  The trial judge appointed Bardwell to represent Porter because the
public defender had a conflict.  Bardwell initially served as counsel in the guilt
phase but became stand-by counsel when Porter made the decision to represent
himself during the guilt phase.  Bardwell thereafter became counsel for the penalty
phase.
At the time of the Porter trial, Bardwell was an experienced criminal trial
attorney.  Bardwell had served as an assistant state attorney and then as a private
criminal defense attorney who accepted conflict cases from the public defender. 
Prior to his representation of Porter, Bardwell had received five appointments to
represent defendants in capital cases.  Porter’s penalty phase was the first penalty
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phase in which Bardwell had been involved as defense counsel.
Bardwell testified that, during the preparation for the penalty phase, Porter
was very “fatalistic.”  Bardwell stated that Porter instructed him not to discuss the
case with his wife or son.  He did not want them brought into the case.  Bardwell
also stated that Porter refused to talk to a medical doctor, whom Bardwell wanted
to evaluate Porter’s alcohol use.
Following two days of evidence, the trial court entered a detailed order.  In
this order the trial court found that Porter had significantly limited his trial counsel
in both the preparation for and presentation of the penalty phase defense.  In
footnote 4 of the order, the trial court stated:
This Court also finds that it is important to note here that had
the Defendant cooperated with Defense Counsel’s efforts to develop
the statutory mitigator alleged above, this Court would not now be in
the position of having to determine whether or not true statutory
mitigating evidence existed at the time of trial.  Indeed, the Defendant
gave Defense Counsel instructions not to speak to members of his
family (See Exhibit “A”, Transcript at pages 77-80, 90-92) and he
refused to speak to the doctor who Defense counsel sent to the jail
(See Exhibit “A”, Transcript at pages 55, 70-76).  This total lack of
cooperation with Defense Counsel, therefore, leaves this Court now in
a somewhat precarious position in regards to the true existence of this
statutory mitigating evidence and thus the Court finds this aspect of
the Defendant’s claim to be nothing more than speculation.
State v. Porter, No. 85-5546-CFA, order at 8 n.4 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. order filed May
10, 1996).  The lack of cooperation by Porter at the time of the trial is significant. 
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We have held that a defense attorney is not ineffective for following such
instructions by counsel’s client.  Sims v. State, 602 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 1992). 
See also Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (counsel cannot
be deemed deficient for failing to present additional evidence of mitigation of which
counsel was unaware due to defendant’s refusal to assist in obtaining the
information); Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1993) (trial counsel not
ineffective where defendant preempted trial counsel’s strategy).
Regarding Porter’s postconviction motion claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel based upon the failure to investigate and present statutory and
nonstatutory mental and other mitigation, both Porter and the State presented
psychologist testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Porter presented
the testimony of Dr. Henry Dee, an expert in forensic psychology and
neuropsychology.  Dr. Dee testified that Porter suffered from a mental condition
that substantially impaired his ability to comply with the law.  The State’s expert,
Dr. William Riebsame, an expert in forensic psychology, specifically disagreed with
Dr. Dee’s testimony and testified that this mitigation was not present.  The trial
court’s order held in respect to this conflicting expert testimony:
In regards to the Defendant’s allegation of the presence of
statutory mitigation evidence (e.g., mental health evaluations), the
Defendant called, at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Henry Dee as an
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expert witness in the area of forensic psychology and
neuropsychology.  See Exhibit “A”, Transcript at pages 205-289.  The
testimony of Dr. Dee was tendered to establish statutory mitigating
factors; i.e., that the Defendant suffered from a mental condition and
that this mental condition substantially impaired his ability to comply
with the law.  This Court, however, finds Dr. Dee’s testimony to be
speculative and not supported by the evidence to a reasonable
scientific certainty.  This Court thus rejects Dr. Dee’s testimony, and
rather accepts the testimony of Dr. William Riebsame (who
specifically disagreed with Dr. Dee), on this issue.  See Exhibit “A”,
Transcript at pages 310-394.  At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Riebsame
was tendered as an expert in the field of forensic psychology, and he
testified that the Defendant was not suffering from a mental condition
such that his ability to comply with the law was substantially impaired.
. . .
. . . Given, therefore, the factual findings of this Court and the
Trial Court judge, as well as the [testimony of Dr. Riebsame], this
Court determines that Defense Counsel was not ineffective for failing
to pursue mental health evaluations and that the Defendant has thus
failed to show sufficient evidence that any statutory mitigators could
have been presented.
State v. Porter, No. 85-5546-CFA, order at 4-7 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. order filed May
10, 1996) (footnote omitted).  The reason we have required postconviction
evidentiary hearings on capital postconviction motions claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel is to provide a defendant an opportunity to present factual
and expert evidence which was not presented at the trial of the case and to have the
trial court evaluate and weigh that additional evidence.  Following such an
evidentiary hearing, we have held that the performance and prejudice prongs are
mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review standard but that the
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trial court’s factual findings are to be given deference.  See Stephens v. State, 748
So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999).  So long as its decisions are supported by
competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.  Id.  We
recognize and honor the trial court’s superior vantage point in assessing the
credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.
At the conclusion of the postconviction evidentiary hearing in this case, the
trial court had before it two conflicting expert opinions over the existence of
mitigation.  Based upon our case law, it was then for the trial court to resolve the
conflict by the weight the trial court afforded one expert’s opinion as compared to
the other.  The trial court did this and resolved the conflict by determining that the
greatest weight was to be afforded the State’s expert.  We accept this finding by
the trial court because it was based upon competent, substantial evidence.  See id.
at 1034.
Having resolved the conflict of the expert opinion, the trial court concluded
that the defendant failed to demonstrate the existence of the alleged mitigation. 
Accordingly, the trial court held that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue mental
evaluations did not exceed the bounds for competent counsel set forth in Strickland
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v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In view of the trial court’s factual finding, we
agree that the trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective is legally
correct under Strickland.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d at 1034.  We therefore
affirm the trial court on this issue.
The trial court next stated its findings in respect to the other asserted
nonstatutory mitigators:
Given this finding of no statutory mitigators, the question thus
becomes whether the presentation of any of the nonstatutory
mitigators would have made a difference in the sentencing outcome of
this case.  This Court finds that even if the judge and jury had been
presented with the evidence of nonstatutory mitigators, this
presentation would not in fact have made any difference.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviews the evidence
presented by the Defendant, all of which may be categorized under the
penumbra of one of three mitigating categories.  The first of these
categories of mitigating evidence is that of the Defendant’s problems
with alcohol.  On this issue, the Court initially notes that the evidence
presented is far from conclusive and in fact, the testimony of the
Defendant’s brother and sister conflicted on this issue.  Additionally,
the Court again notes the finding of the trial court judge that:
[t]he defendant was sober the night before the murders
and he was sober immediately after the murders.  He was
able to drive and transact business.  There is nothing in
the record which would support a finding that this 
mitigating circumstance exists.
See Exhibit “B”, Judgment and Sentence dated 3/4/88.
Given this finding, as well as the conflicting testimony of
Defendant’s siblings, this Court finds that even if the judge and jury
had been presented with evidence of the Defendant’s prior problems
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with alcohol, the effect of any such evidence on the outcome of the
sentencing procedure would have been insignificant at best.
The second mitigating factor alleged by the Defendant is that of
an abusive childhood.  The Defendant, however, was approximately
fifty-four years old at the time of trial.  Due to this remoteness in time,
“‘evidence of a deprived and abusive childhood is entitled to little, if
any mitigating weight when compared to the aggravating factors”. 
Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1561 (quoting Frances v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 696,
703 (11th Cir. 1990)); See also, Bottoson, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S38. 
Any presentation of this factor would therefore have been insignificant.
The third area of mitigating evidence is that of the Defendant’s
military history.  Though this Court does recognize the Defendant’s
military service, it notes that if the Defendant had presented evidence
of his military experience, the judge and jury would have been
presented with evidence of the Defendant’ s recurring periods of being
Absent Without Leave (AWOL), as well.  In his testimony during the
evidentiary hearing, for example, Sherman Pratt testified that the
Defendant’s military records reflect that the Defendant:
did have two or three periods of absence without leave
. . . [and] that later on when he got back to the States he
went AWOL, for . . . almost a year.  For that he received
a special court-Martial and was sentenced to I think six
months, fifty dollars a month fine.
See Exhibit “A”, Transcript at pages 154, 155.  These periods of
desertion would have significantly impacted upon any mitigating effect
that the evidence would have had, and indeed they would have
reduced this impact to inconsequential proportions.
Not only would each of these three mitigators standing alone not
have made a difference to the sentencing outcome of this case, but
even if all three had been presented, their “mitigating effect [would] not
begin to tip the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors in favor
of [the] petitioner”.  Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1561.  The murders here
were cold, calculated, and highly premeditated; the Defendant had
made clear his intent to kill Evelyn Williams, and advised her family
through three separate phone calls of this intent.  Indeed, as the
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Florida Supreme Court found in its determination that “the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
moral or legal justification”,
Porter previously had threatened to kill Williams and
her daughter.  He watched Williams’ house for two days
just before the murders.  Apparently he stole a gun from
a friend just to kill Williams.  [Then] he told another friend
that she would be reading about him in the newspaper.  
While Porter’s motivation may have been grounded in 
passion, it is clear that he contemplated this murder well
in advance.
Porter, 564 So. 2d at 1064.
State v. Porter, No. 85-5546-CFA, order at 8-11 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. order filed May
10, 1996).
Giving appropriate deference to the trial court’s factual findings, we agree
with the trial court’s conclusion that Porter has not demonstrated sufficient
prejudice to sustain his burden under the prejudice component of Strickland.  We
conclude that the trial judge’s decision is in accord with our decisions in Asay v.
State, 769 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2000); Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998);
Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1997); and Haliburton v. Singletary, 691
So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1997).  Further, this case is very similar to our recent decision in
Cherry v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S719 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000).
In the present case, the trial court found that the defendant failed to
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cooperate with counsel at the penalty phase of the trial, and thereby defendant
himself limited the available evidence.  There is additional postconviction expert
testimony regarding mitigation which the trial court found to be entitled to little
weight in light of conflicting expert testimony.  The trial judge found the additional
nonstatutory mitigation to be lacking in weight because of the specific facts
presented.  Finally, following a full evidentiary hearing, the trial judge determined
that the additional mitigators were outweighed by the weighty aggravators of a prior
violent felony and a cold, calculated, and premeditated murder.  We agree.
In view of our conclusion that the trial court was correct in respect to the
failure by Porter to carry the burden on the prejudice component of Strickland, we
do not reach the first component in respect to competence of counsel.  See
Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 914 (Fla. 1989) (performance component need
not be considered when it is clear that prejudice component has not been met).
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order in respect to this claim.
Remaining Claims
We find no merit to the remainder of Porter’s claims.  In his second issue on
appeal, Porter alleges that the trial court denied him his due process rights by not
allowing him to be present at the Huff hearing to argue a claim that Porter had
raised in a separately filed pro se rule 3.850 motion.  As further support of the trial
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court’s error, Porter claims that defense counsel on several occasions informed the
court that Porter would be the one best prepared to argue some of the claims that
were in the motion because Porter claimed they had merit.  We find no merit to this
issue.  First, Porter was given the opportunity to raise these claims in his pro se
motion and in the one filed by his attorney, and he was represented by counsel at
the hearing.  Moreover, the judge specifically found that no evidence on the merits
of any of Porter’s claims would be heard at the hearing.  Finally, the trial court also
provided a detailed and accurate explanation of the reasons why he denied an
evidentiary hearing on the issues Porter claims he should have been present to
address.  Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Porter’s request
to appear at the Huff hearing.
Porter also claims error in the trial court’s summary denial of four of his
postconviction claims.  After a careful review of Porter’s allegations and the record
in this case, we find that the record clearly refutes Porter’s factual allegations on
each issue.  First, we find Porter’s claim that the record on direct appeal was
incomplete to be procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct
appeal.  See Muhammad v. State, 603 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1992).  To the extent that
this claim is based on newly discovered evidence, we find that the record clearly
refutes the claim.  In fact, a comparison of the record that Porter has now obtained
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from postconviction counsel to the record on appeal reveals that the record on
appeal was more complete and comprehensive.  Therefore, Porter suffered no
prejudice as a result, and no evidentiary hearing was required.
Porter next claims that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on his competence to stand trial, the adequacy of the competency hearing,
and the adequacy of the evaluations conducted by the court-appointed experts.  As
support for these claims, Porter points to his bizarre conduct before trial and his
two suicide attempts after pleading guilty.  Moreover, as to the inadequate
evaluation, Porter alleges that the appointed mental health experts failed to review
his background materials and merely based their recommendations on interviews
with Porter and observations during court proceedings.  We find no merit to any of
these claims.
First, the record reflects that as to his competency claims, the trial court went
to great lengths to ensure Porter was competent to stand trial.  Specifically, the
court conducted a competency hearing before the start of trial.  The record also
reflects that, at the hearing, the reports of the two experts appointed to evaluate
Porter were admitted into evidence, and the trial court also conducted its own
extensive evaluation and thorough inquiry of Porter’s rational understanding of the
proceeding against him.  Moreover, after Porter had pled guilty and had attempted
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to commit suicide, the court again ordered psychiatric examinations of Porter. 
After meeting with Porter in the hospital, Dr. J. Lloyd Wilder opined at the hearing
to withdraw the guilty plea that Porter was thinking clearly and exercising competent
judgment at the time he entered the plea.  On this issue, the record reflects that the
trial judge not only complied with his duty to conduct a competency hearing but he
undertook a conscious effort to ensure the integrity and reliability of these
proceedings.
As to the adequacy of the court-appointed experts, the record reflects that
Porter was evaluated by two reputable doctors on several occasions.  Each time,
the doctors opined that Porter was competent to stand trial.  Although Porter
alleges that he was evaluated by a different mental health expert who, after
examining him and reviewing his background, concluded that he was not competent
to enter a guilty plea, Porter does not provide the expert’s name or when any of
these evaluations occurred.  Moreover, we have held that merely because a
defendant presents a new expert who has evaluated a defendant after trial and who
renders a different opinion than prior experts that does not by itself render
inadequate a prior thorough evaluation.  See, e.g., Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696
(Fla. 1991).
As his next subclaim, Porter alleges that the trial court erred in summarily
8Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1963).
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denying his claim that the court conducted an inadequate Faretta8 inquiry to
determine whether Porter’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.  He further claims that the trial court applied the wrong standard for
determining a defendant’s competency to waive counsel.  We disagree with both of
his claims.  In United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408 (11th Cir. 1989), the court
outlined the following factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant
made a knowing and voluntary waiver:
(1) the background, experience and conduct of the defendant
including his age, educational background, and his physical and mental
health; (2) the extent to which the defendant had contact with lawyers
prior to trial; (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the
charges, the possible defenses, and the possible penalty; (4) the
defendant’s understanding of the rules of procedure, evidence and
courtroom decorum; (5) the defendant’s experience in criminal trials;
(6) whether standby counsel was appointed, and the extent to which
he aided the defendant; (7) whether the waiver of counsel was the
result of mistreatment or coercion; or (8) whether the defendant was
trying to manipulate the events of the trial.
Id. at 409-10 (quoting Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
The transcripts in the instant case reflect that the trial judge conducted several
extensive inquiries of defendant which covered all of the areas outlined in Fant.  He
inquired as to Porter’s knowledge and familiarity with the legal system and also
discussed Porter’s mental conditions and the dangers and disadvantages associated
9In fact, although not in effect at the time of the trial in this case, the judge’s
inquiry of Porter on this issue comports with the model colloquy that is now
available for trial judges when conducting a Faretta inquiry.  See Amendment to Fla.
Rule of Crim. Pro. 3.111(d)(2)-(3), 719 So. 2d 873, 876-80 (Fla. 1998).
10Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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with Porter representing himself.  Therefore, the record clearly refutes Porter’s
claim on this issue, and, therefore, no evidentiary hearing was required.9  Porter’s
claim as to the standard for determining competency is without merit.  See Godinez
v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993).
Porter’s final claim on this issue is that the trial court erred in summarily
denying his Brady10 claim.  As correctly found by the trial court, most of Porter’s
allegations on this issue constituted mere challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence; therefore, they are not Brady claims.  As to his remaining allegations, the
record reflects that both Porter and the State stipulated to the introduction into
evidence of the articles and objects claimed by Porter to have been withheld by the
State.  For these reasons, we find that Porter’s claims are clearly refuted by the
record, and no evidentiary hearing was needed.
CONCLUSION
Because Porter has failed to demonstrate any basis for relief, we affirm the
trial court’s denial of Porter’s rule 3.850 motion.
-21-
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The most troubling issue on appeal is appellant’s claim that defense counsel
provided virtually no representation for him at the penalty phase of the trial. 
Pointing to the complete lack of adversarial testing by counsel’s failure to challenge
the State's case or present mitigating evidence, Porter asserts that he was essentially
deprived of the benefit of counsel, and counsel’s default undermines confidence in
the outcome of the penalty phase proceeding.  Because the record clearly supports
Porter’s contention, and this Court has consistently ordered new penalty
proceedings in similar cases, I dissent from the majority opinion upholding the trial
court’s denial of relief on this issue.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 573-74
(Fla. 1996); Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1995).
Porter claims that because of counsel's failure to investigate and present
evidence of important and substantial statutory and nonstatutory mitigation, or to
challenge the State’s claims of aggravation, the jury and the trial court, and this
11Justice Barkett dissented in an opinion concurred in by Justice Kogan and
explained:
I agree that Porter’s conviction should be affirmed.  I believe,
however, that a proportionality review mandates reversal of the
penalty.  I am not persuaded that the aggravating factor of cold,
calculated, and premeditated has been established beyond every
reasonable doubt.  I do not suggest that there is an “unrequited love”
exception to the death penalty.  Nonetheless, this Court consistently
has accepted as substantial mitigation the inflamed passions and
intense emotions of such situations.  In almost every other case where
a death sentence arose from a lovers’ quarrel or domestic dispute, this
Court has found cause to reverse the death sentence, regardless of the
number of aggravating circumstances found, the brutality involved, the
level of premeditation, or the jury recommendation.
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1065 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
-22-
Court as well, approved a sentence of death predicated upon the erroneous
assumption that there were no mitigating circumstances.  He notes that even without
the substantial mitigation now established, two judges of this Court voted to reduce
his sentence to life.11  He also asserts that the substantial mitigation now shown to
exist becomes even more important in view of the original sentencing judge’s
finding that much of the State’s case for aggravation was “technical” in nature, and
this Court’s conclusion on appeal that the most serious aggravator, the heinous,
atrocious or cruel (HAC) aggravator, was improperly considered. 
LIMITED COURT ORDER
The majority opinion simply ignores the fact that the trial court expressly
12At one point in the majority opinion the majority appears to approve a trial
court finding of no ineffectiveness (majority opinion at 11); while at another point
the opinion acknowledges that the trial court only ruled on the prejudice prong
(majority opinion at 15).
-23-
declined to rule on whether counsel’s conduct was deficient: “The Court declines
to make a determination on the deficiency portion of this requirement, however,
because no prejudice was shown.”  The trial court ruled only that no prejudice to
Porter was demonstrated under the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Hence, contrary to the majority’s analysis, we have no ruling
by the trial court on counsel’s deficient performance to review.12  
LAW
In order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must establish two elements: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.    
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 (Fla.
1998); Rose, 675 So. 2d at 571; Hildwin 654 So. 2d at 109.  In Maxwell v.
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1986), this Court further explained the application
-24-
of the Strickland standard:
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered
meritorious, must include two general components.  First, the claimant
must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown
to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance
under prevailing professional standards.  Second, the clear, substantial
deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected
the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the
outcome is undermined. 
Id. at 932 (citing Strickland) (emphasis added); see also Downs v. State, 453 So.
2d 1102 (Fla. 1984).  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present a mixed
question of law and fact subject to plenary review based on the Strickland test.  See
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 1999) (citing Rose, 675 So. 2d at
571).  This requires an independent review of the trial court's legal conclusions,
while giving deference to the trial court's factual findings.  See id. 
TRIAL COURT’S ANALYSIS
In concluding that no prejudice had been demonstrated the trial court stated:
(H) The Court thus summarizes the holdings of this Order as
follows:  In order to deem Defense Counsel ineffective, this Court
must determine that Defense Counsel’s performance was deficient,
and that this deficiency prejudiced the Defendant.  The Court declines
to make a determination on the deficiency portion of this requirement,
however, because no prejudice was shown.  In making this
determination of no prejudice, the Court rejects the testimony of Dr.
Dee, accepts the testimony of Dr. Riebsame, and finds that no
statutory mitigators could have been presented.  In regards to
nonstatutory mitigators, the Defendant presented evidence of
-25-
problems with alcohol, childhood abuse, and participation in the
military.  Even if, however, the Defendant had presented such evidence
at the penalty phase proceedings, the effect thereof would have been
insignificant and indeed would have had no effect upon the sentencing
outcome in this case.  The circumstances of the crimes were brutal,
the murders were "cold-blooded" and "premeditated", and this Court
is quite convinced that none of the evidence it has reviewed would
have altered the outcome of the sentencing proceedings.  
In rejecting any showing of prejudice, the trial court summarily concluded that “no
statutory mitigators could have been presented."  The nonstatutory mitigation was
similarly rejected.  This evaluation clearly constitutes an error of law and ignores the
obligation of the judge and jury to consider mitigation, and especially the important
role of the jury in the determination of life or death. 
Although in the context of a Brady claim, the United States Supreme Court
considered a similar flawed analysis in the case of Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419
(1995): 
Justice Scalia [dissenting] suggests that we should “gauge” Burns’s
credibility by observing that the state judge presiding over Kyles’s
postconviction proceeding did not find Burns’s testimony in that
proceeding to be convincing, and by noting that Burns has since been
convicted for killing Beanie.  Of course, neither observation could
possibly have affected the jury’s appraisal of Burns’s credibility at the
time of Kyles’s trials.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 450 n.19 (emphasis supplied).  The circuit court analysis here
failed to focus on the jury’s role, much as the Supreme Court noted the trial court
-26-
failed to do in Kyles.  Like the trial court in Kyles, the circuit court here patently
failed to evaluate the evidence from the point of view of its possible effect on the
jury and whether the death recommendation rendered without this important
mitigating evidence being presented “result[ed] in a verdict worthy of confidence.” 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
In addition, of course, it would seem apparent that a defendant on trial for
his life would be prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to make a case for his life to be
spared, when there was a case to be made.  After reviewing the trial court’s method
of analysis against the prescribed statutory scheme for considering aggravation and
mitigation, and its conclusions against the record in this case, it is apparent that the
trial court here could provide no lawful basis to support the conclusion that the
defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s neglect or that a sentencing jury
would completely reject the substantial mitigation offered here. 
PREJUDICE
While the postconviction court may consider the credibility of the witnesses
presented, the court's analysis must focus on the legal competence of the proffered
evidence of mitigation and the potential effect the mitigation may have had on the
jury.  In turn, this analysis will result in a determination of whether the failure to
actually present such mitigation evidence at the penalty phase undermines
-27-
confidence in an outcome not informed by the presentation of such evidence as
required under the prejudice prong of Strickland.  
A simple illustration of this concept may be understood by positing a
situation where counsel presented no mitigation, but it turns out there was no
mitigation to present.  A defendant could hardly be deemed to have been
prejudiced by the failure to present what never existed.  But Porter has
demonstrated a scenario that is the exact opposite of this hypothetical.  He presents
a scenario where there was an abundance of mitigation but none was presented by
counsel.  Surely, nothing could be more prejudicial to a defendant whose only hope
for life rests on his counsel’s challenge of the State’s case for aggravation and the
affirmative presentation of mitigation in favor of the defendant to the jury.
STATUTORY SENTENCING SCHEME
An analysis of a claim of prejudice by the ineffectiveness of counsel at the
penalty phase must take into account the fact that the penalty phase of a capital trial
is based upon and controlled by a statutory scheme that instructs a jury and judge
to consider both evidence of aggravation and mitigation, and to come to a proper
conclusion based upon a reasoned comparative analysis of the aggravation and
mitigation as properly assessed and weighed.  See § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1999). 
Indeed, the instructions given to the jury mandate that the jurors utilize this
-28-
framework in deciding upon a recommendation.  The trial judge, too, is guided by
this framework in conducting a reasoned analysis of aggravation and mitigation in
order to determine the appropriate sentence of life or death.  Obviously, the
complete absence of evidence of either aggravation or mitigation would have a
marked effect on this analysis.  
For instance, in this case, the postconviction judge was required by the
legislative sentencing scheme discussed above to balance the extensive evidence of
statutory mental mitigation and important nonstatutory mitigation now shown to
have been available for presentation to the jury against the prior analysis of
aggravating factors relied upon by the sentencing court at the prior trial, but
excluding the heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) aggravator struck on direct appeal,
in order to determine whether prejudice existed.  The postconviction judge's order
simply does not reflect such an analysis. 
DUTY OF COUNSEL
Consistent with Florida’s statutory framework for aggravation and mitigation,
this Court has held that an attorney has a fundamental obligation to conduct a
reasonable investigation of a defendant's background for possible mitigating
evidence before counsel can make informed choices as to how to advocate for a
defendant at a penalty-phase proceeding.  See Rose, 675 So. 2d at 571 (citing
-29-
Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1994)).  In other words, defense
counsel must be prepared and knowledgeable about the law and the facts of his
client’s case concerning both aggravation and mitigation in order to make informed
strategic choices and to provide the adversarial testing required under our adversary
system of justice and the dictates of Strickland.  The United States Supreme Court
has declared: 
The paramount importance of vigorous representation follows from
the nature of our adversarial system of justice.  This system is
premised on the well-tested principle that truth--as well as fairness--is “
‘best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the
question.’ ”  Absent representation, however, it is unlikely that a
criminal defendant will be able adequately to test the government’s
case, for, as Justice Sutherland wrote in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 [69] (1932), “[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (citation omitted).  As the Supreme Court
has explained, under our procedural and adversarial system of justice, confidence
in the outcome is essentially based upon the quality of the process.  And the
process breaks down when counsel fails to fulfill his adversarial role.  
In short, it is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to have confidence in a
sentence that was imposed based upon a one-sided presentation, i.e., unchallenged
aggravation and no mitigation, when it is later demonstrated that substantial
mitigation exists and one of the most serious aggravators was improperly
-30-
considered and stricken on appeal.  To approve of counsel’s default, as we have
done here, is tantamount to holding that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit
of counsel at his penalty phase proceeding.
AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION
Even a cursory review of the evidence presented below establishes both
substantial neglect by counsel and substantial prejudice.  Counsel failed to
challenge the State’s case for aggravation in any way.  Despite this, the trial court,
on its own initiative, rejected the jury’s recommendation for death as to the death of
one victim, and held that two of the State’s proposed aggravators, while
established, were “technical” in nature and entitled to little weight.  See Porter v.
State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990).  In addition, despite trial counsel’s failure to
challenge the most important aggravator claimed by the State and found by the trial
court, this Court, on appeal, struck the heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC)
aggravator for lack of a sufficient factual predicate:
Moreover, this record is consistent with the hypothesis that Porter’s
was a crime of passion, not a crime that was meant to be deliberately
and extraordinarily painful.  The state has not met its burden of
proving this factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court
erred in finding to the contrary.
Porter, 564 So. 2d at 1063.  Hence, it is apparent that there were substantial
weaknesses in the State’s case for aggravation that defense counsel wholly failed to
13The State attempted to rebut this testimony with that of Dr. Riebsame, who
testified that he did not believe Porter was suffering from any brain damage or post-
traumatic disorder.  However, Dr. Riebsame's testimony was based solely on his
reading of available materials rather than any direct interview or testing of Porter.  In
fact, Dr. Riebsame never met or evaluated Porter.  Of course, a jury would be
entitled to hear and evaluate Dr. Riebsame’s testimony, just as it would have to
evaluate Dr. Dee’s evidence. 
-31-
address.  For example, defense counsel failed to challenge a jury instruction on the
cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator that was later found to be
unconstitutional. 
The failure to address mitigation is even more glaring.  At the postconviction
evidentiary hearing, Dr. Henry Dee, an expert in forensic psychology and
neuropsychology, testified that Porter suffers from brain damage and post-
traumatic stress disorder.  Dr. Dee's conclusions were based on the results of
extensive testing he personally conducted on Porter as well as substantial
background materials accumulated concerning Porter’s personal history.13  He
further testified that because of these conditions, Porter suffered from extreme
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime and his ability to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law at that time was substantially impaired. 
These are two important statutory mitigating factors expressly set out in Florida's
death penalty statutory scheme that the defendant was entitled to have presented to
14See § 921.141(6)(b)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999).
15When Porter returned to his jail cell on the night he entered his guilty pleas,
he attempted to commit suicide by twice hurling himself to the concrete floor from
a fourteen-foot catwalk.  Porter broke his leg but suffered no other serious injuries.
16In addition, although counsel failed to assert this as mitigation at the penalty
phase, there is no indication in the record that Porter had any prior record of violent
criminal activity.  
-32-
the jury.14  During the evidentiary hearing conducted in the trial court, evidence
established that at the penalty phase counsel for Porter did not investigate or
present any evidence of mental mitigation or request the assistance of a mental
health expert for mitigation purposes, even though Porter twice attempted suicide
and broke his leg in the attempt while these proceedings were pending, and it was
apparent that he had serious and substantial mental problems that should be
evaluated for mitigation.15  
In addition to the extensive evidence of statutory mental mitigation, Porter
presented evidence at the postconviction evidentiary hearing of his alcohol abuse,
his positive military history, and his troubled childhood riddled with abuse, all of
which has been recognized as valid nonstatutory mitigation.16  On the issue of his
alcohol abuse, Porter presented his sister, Eileen Wireman, and his brother James
Porter, who both testified that Porter had a serious and longstanding alcohol
problem.  Although his brother was able to provide more detailed testimony
-33-
because he was closer to Porter than his sister, they both testified that he drank
often and in great quantity after he returned from the Korean War.  Further, even
though the original sentencing judge found no mitigating circumstances, Justice
Barkett noted the important role alcohol played in this case:
Furthermore, the record discloses that Porter had been drinking
heavily, to the point of drunkenness, in the late night hours prior to the
murder.  Shortly after the murder he purchased more liquor and beer. 
This evidence, combined with evidence of Porter’s emotionally
charged, desperate, frustrated desire to meet with his former lover, is
sufficient to render the death penalty disproportional punishment in
this instance, although it certainly does not excuse the killing.
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d at 1065-66 (Barkett, J., dissenting).  
Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Pratt testified in great detail at the
postconviction evidentiary hearing that Porter provided heroic service during the
Korean War and, more importantly for purposes of mitigation, he testified that
Porter clearly suffered both physically and mentally, and that his company suffered
the heaviest casualties in battle.  Porter joined the Army at age sixteen.  Porter's
service in the war earned him several combat medals, including: three Bronze Stars;
the Combat Infantry Badge; and a Purple Heart (with first cluster).  Moreover, he
was favorably considered for the Good Conduct Medal, was entitled to award of
the Korean Presidential Unit Citation, and was subsequently honorably discharged. 
Finally, extensive evidence of Porter's troubled and abusive childhood was
17In addition, although we ordinarily give deference to the trial court's factual
findings, after reviewing both of the experts' testimonies, we would be hard-pressed
to approve the trial court's finding that the State's expert on mental mitigation was
more credible, when the record reflects no factual basis for this conclusion, the
State's expert neither personally met nor interviewed Porter before rendering his
opinion, and the trial court cites no other basis for this factual conclusion.  If
anything, an objective evaluation would ordinarily render the examining expert’s
opinion more credible.
-34-
presented which included Porter witnessing his drunk father's extensive abuse of
his mother, as well as receiving his own severe beatings from his father.   
Mental Mitigation
In essence, the trial court did its own subjective sentencing analysis when it
summarily concluded: "[T]his Court is quite convinced that none of the evidence it
has reviewed would have altered the outcome of the sentencing proceedings." 
However, Strickland requires an objective analysis of the omitted evidence and its
potential effect.  In fact, neither the trial court nor the State has demonstrated a legal
reason why a jury could not consider the testimony of the two experts and reach a
conclusion contrary to that of the trial judge.17 
While the credibility of the attesting witnesses will be a factor for both a jury
and judge in determining the appropriate weight to be given to the mitigating
evidence, the testimony of Dr. Dee, an unchallenged expert in forensic psychology
and neuropsychology, supporting the presence of two statutory mitigators, would
-35-
certainly have to at least be considered by a jury and judge, even when provided
with the contrary views of Dr. Riebsame.  Further, while the trial court concludes
that none of the above proffered evidence of mental mitigation could have been
presented to a sentencing jury, he provides absolutely no credible basis or rationale
for such a conclusion.  Consider, for example, our reaction on appeal if a trial court
prevented a defendant from presenting such important evidence to a penalty-phase
jury.
The prejudicial effect of the failure to present this important mitigation is even
more apparent.  On the issue of prejudice in this context, we have specifically
explained:
In evaluating the harmfulness of . . . counsel's performance, we have
consistently recognized that severe mental disturbance is a mitigating
factor of the most weighty order, Hildwin, 654 So. 2d at 110; Santos
v. State, 629 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1994), and the failure to present it
in the penalty phase may constitute prejudicial ineffectiveness. 
Hildwin, 654 So. 2d at 110.   
Rose, 675 So. 2d at 573; see also Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1512-13 (11th
Cir. 1995) (stating that “[p]sychiatric mitigating evidence ‘has the potential to totally
change the evidentiary picture.’ ”).  A review of our case law reflects that the mental
mitigation presented by the expert in this case is just as weighty as the mental
mitigation we have relied on in the past to require new sentencing proceedings of
-36-
defendants.  See, e.g., Rose, 675 So. 2d at 571 (finding counsel ineffective and
ordering a new sentencing proceeding where counsel failed to discover and present
expert testimony that defendant suffered from brain damage, his ability to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired, and that he was under the
influence of extreme or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime); Hildwin,
654 So. 2d at 110 (finding that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
discover and present expert testimony that defendant murdered while under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that defendant’s capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired).  
In addition, of course, prejudice in the failure to present two important
statutory mitigators must be considered in the context of a record that
demonstrates a trial court finding that two of the State’s aggravators were
“technical,” a Supreme Court finding that the most substantial aggravator (HAC)
was improperly found, and the strong opinions of two justices that a death sentence
was not warranted even without any mitigation.  Obviously, the failure to present
these important mitigators would seriously affect the balancing of the remaining
aggravation versus mitigation.
Nonstatutory Mitigation  
-37-
Further, this Court has consistently recognized the kind of evidence
presented by Porter as valid nonstatutory mitigation.  See Elledge v. State, 613 So.
2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1993); Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990);
Masterson v. State, 516 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1987).  In fact, all of the nonstatutory
mitigation described in this case has been recognized as supporting ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the past or to have served as the proper basis to
reduce a death sentence to life.  See, e.g., Masterson, 516 So. 2d at 258 (finding
that defendant's service in Vietnam, along with other mitigators, was sufficient for a
jury to recommend a life sentence); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990)
(reducing sentence to life where mitigating evidence showed among other things
that defendant had suffered from child abuse and alcohol abuse and had been
drinking heavily on the day of the murder).
First, with regard to Porter’s alcohol abuse, Justice Barkett emphasized in
her separate opinion on direct appeal: "[T]he record discloses that Porter had been
drinking heavily, to the point of drunkenness, in the late night hours prior to the
murder.  Shortly after the murder he purchased more liquor and beer."  Porter, 564
So. 2d at 1065 (Barkett, J. dissenting).  Neither the State nor the trial court has cited
any evidence to contradict these observations; hence, Porter's long-standing
problems with alcohol and his drinking on the night of the murder essentially stand
-38-
unrefuted.  Further, even if the court below was arguably correct in discounting
evidence of Porter’s intoxication on the night of the murders, the court has failed to
refute or provide any reasons for discounting the mitigating effect of Porter’s
established alcoholic past.  
The trial court discounted Porter’s alcohol abuse, finding that because the
original sentencing court had concluded that Porter was sober the night before the
murder and immediately thereafter, this mitigation would have been insignificant. 
On the issue of Porter’s troubled childhood, the trial court also found the evidence
presented insignificant since Porter was fifty-four years old at the time of the crime. 
Finally, the trial court dismissed Porter’s evidence of his military history on the
basis that Colonel Pratt's testimony noted that Porter had been AWOL on several
occasions, and this would “have reduced this impact [impact of mitigation on the
jury] to inconsequential proportions.”  
The trial court’s analysis on the issue of Porter’s abusive childhood also is
flawed.  In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the United States Supreme
Court stated: “Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is
typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.”  Id. at 115.  While "[t]he
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight
to be given relevant mitigating evidence . . . they may not give it no weight by
-39-
excluding such evidence from their consideration."  Id. at 114-15.  In addition, this
Court has repeatedly held that the effect of this mitigator is not nullified simply
because many years have passed between the time of the abuse and the effect of
that abuse.  See Nibert.  In Nibert, we specifically held: 
The fact that a defendant had suffered through more than a decade of
psychological and physical abuse during the defendant's formative
childhood and adolescent years is in no way diminished by the fact
that the abuse finally came to an end.  To accept that analysis would
mean that a defendant's history as a victim of child abuse would never
be accepted as a mitigating circumstance, despite well-settled law to
the contrary.   
574 So. 2d at 1062.  On this issue, the trial court did exactly what we have
cautioned trial courts against doing.  Instead of evaluating the evidence presented in
support of this mitigator, the trial court simply dismissed it because of the time
elapsed between when the abuse occurred and the time of the crime in this case.  
Finally, it is apparent that the trial court substituted its opinion for that of a
jury with its conclusion that the impact of Porter’s military history would have been
of “inconsequential proportions.”  As noted by the trial court, Porter was AWOL
and was disciplined accordingly.  Notwithstanding, his temporary status as AWOL
was apparently not serious enough to nullify his time and service in the military,
since he was decorated numerous times and honorably discharged.  In fact, the
same military witness who testified about his AWOL status also testified that Porter
-40-
was considered for several awards for his years and performance in the service. 
Moreover, there is unrefuted testimony that Porter’s company suffered extensive
casualties in the Korean War and that Porter himself suffered extreme physical and
mental pain.  Therefore, although his AWOL status may have reduced the effect of
this mitigator, the jury still could have considered it in mitigation and attributed it
some weight.  See, e.g., Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 1997) (finding
defendant’s honorable discharge as a mitigator even though his discharge was for
extreme demerits).  
CLASSIC CASE OF INEFFECTIVENESS
After evaluating the statutory and nonstatutory mitigation presented at the
evidentiary hearing, it is obvious that this case presents a classic scenario identical
to other cases in which we have overturned trial court decisions denying claims of
ineffectiveness when a death sentence has been imposed in the face of
uninvestigated and undisclosed evidence of mitigation.  See Rose, 675 So. 2d at
572) (finding defense counsel ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to present
evidence of severe mental disturbance and for failing to present evidence of
defendant’s alcoholism and mistreatment as a child); Hildwin, 654 So. 2d at 110
(finding ineffective assistance where counsel failed to present evidence of
defendant’s mental mitigation and several categories of nonstatutory mitigation
-41-
including defendant’s abuse and neglect as a child and his history of alcohol
abuse); Phillips v. State, 608 So. 2d 778, 783 (Fla. 1992) (finding ineffective
assistance of penalty-phase counsel where although counsel presented some
evidence in mitigation, he did not present a large amount of evidence concerning
defendant's childhood riddled with abuse and testimony of experts describing
defendant's mental and emotional deficiencies); Stevens v. State, 552 So. 2d 1082,
1087 (Fla. 1989) (holding that defense counsel's failure to investigate defendant's
background, failure to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, and
failure to argue on defendant's behalf rendered his conduct at the penalty phase
ineffective).  Consistency mandates that we apply those holdings here.
CONCLUSION
This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of presenting mitigating
evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial in light of the statutory sentencing
scheme that depends entirely on a jury and judge’s evaluation of aggravation and
mitigation in deciding on life or death.  As noted above, the Legislature has
carefully and specifically crafted a framework and set of guidelines in the form of
aggravators and mitigators to guide the judge and jury in considering whether life or
death is the appropriate sentence.  In fact, this specially created scheme is
18We have repeatedly stated:
Death is a unique punishment in its finality and in
its total rejection of the possibility of rehabilitation.  It is
proper, therefore, that the Legislature has chosen to
reserve its application to only the most aggravated and
unmitigated of most serious crimes. . . .  The Legislature
has  . . provided a system whereby the possible
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are defined, but
where the weighing process is left to the carefully
scrutinized judgment of jurors and judges. 
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis added).
-42-
warranted precisely because of the nature and gravity of the punishment choices.18 
Counsel’s actual presentation on behalf of Porter at the penalty phase bears
virtually no relationship to this framework, and, accordingly, we must conclude that
Porter was denied the right to have the jury and trial court judge review and weigh
the circumstances of his case under these legislatively established guidelines and
framework.  
The present record reflects that there exists too much mitigating evidence
that was not presented to now be ignored.  This failure to investigate and present
mitigation is especially harmful in light of the fact that this Court was confronted
with a trial court finding of no mitigation when we approved the death sentence on
Porter, and in light of the divided vote of the justices of this Court on
proportionality even without the substantial mitigation that we now know existed. 
-43-
In addition, the harm must be considered in light of the reversal of the HAC finding
in this case.  
In sum, it is apparent that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that a jury could not have considered the substantial mitigation that has
now been demonstrated to have existed, but that was never discovered or
presented by counsel, and in concluding that such evidence would have no effect
on the jury.  Surely, our Legislature’s capital sentencing scheme never
contemplated that a case would be found to be “the most aggravated and least
mitigated” because of the complete default of a defendant’s lawyer.
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,
Edward Richardson, Judge - Case No. 86-5546-CF-A
John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region, Michael P.
Reiter, Chief Assistant CCRC, Amy C. Settlemire, Assistant CCRC and Linda
McDermott, Staff Attorney, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle
Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
-44-
for Appellee