Title: McKinley v. Simmons

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

148 So. 2d 648 (1963)
Reuben F. McKINLEY
v.
Bowen SIMMONS.
1 Div. 96.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 10, 1963.
*649 Reuben F. McKinley, Bay Minette, for appellant.
Vincent F. Kilborn, Mobile, for appellee.
GOODWYN, Justice.
Appeal by plaintiff below from judgment of non-suit rendered after defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained.
The complaint consists of one count, as follows:
The only question presented is whether there was error in sustaining the demurrer.
The demurrer, containing 33 grounds, was sustained generally, without any particular ground or grounds being specified as the basis for such ruling. Accordingly, if any ground was good, the demurrer was properly sustained. National Park Bank v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 199 Ala. 192(1), 195, 74 So. 69; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wilson, 162 Ala. 588(11), 602, 50 So. 188; Opelika Montgomery Fair Co. v. Wright, 36 Ala.App. 1(1), 4, 52 So. 2d 404.
It might well be that the complaint is defective in more than one respect, as pointed out by the several grounds of demurrer here insisted upon by the defendant-appellee. However, we find it necessary to consider only those grounds going to the basic issue presented, that is, the question of defendant's immunity from civil liability.
In aid of a better understanding of the case, we note that the parties' briefs clearly show that plaintiff was a party to the divorce suit and was acting therein as his own counsel; that defendant's actions, of which complaint is made, were in connection *650 with defendant's decision that plaintiff could not adequately look after his own interests in said divorce suit, and that a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent him.
Construing the complaint most strongly against the plaintiff (on being tested by demurrer), it clearly appears that the defendant, in making the alleged statement concerning the plaintiff, and in rendering the alleged decree, was acting in a judicial capacity as a judge of a court of general jurisdiction in a cause over which he had jurisdiction. Accordingly, the defendant cannot be held liable in a civil suit for any damages which might flow from such acts, assuming, but without in any way deciding, that such acts were of a libelous or slanderous nature. See: Pickett v. Richardson, 223 Ala. 683, 684-685, 138 So. 274; Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 273, 57 So. 860, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 164, Ann.Cas.1914C, 1155; Coleman v. Roberts, 113 Ala. 323, 21 So. 449, 36 L.R.A. 84, 59 Am.St.Rep. 111; Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393, 399-402, 25 Am.Rep. 688; Duffin v. Summerville, 9 Ala.App. 573, 578-579, 63 So. 816, cert. den. 187 Ala. 403, 66 So. 779; 33 Am.Jur., Libel and Slander, § 177, pp. 170-171; 30A Am. Jur., Judges, § 73, p. 42; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 104d(3), pp. 177-178; Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, § 585, p. 225; Anno: 42 A.L.R.2d 825, 146 A.L.R. 913, 20 A.L.R. 407; 9 Columbia L. Rev., p. 463, "Absolute Immunity In Defamation: Judicial Proceedings."
The immunity of judges is based upon considerations of public policy and is designed to secure the complete freedom of the judiciary to discharge its functions without fear of consequences. The reason for the rule is thus stated in Duffin v. Summerville, supra, viz:
In Coleman v. Roberts, supra, Chief Justice Brickell had this to say concerning the rule of immunity, viz:
The demurrer to the complaint having been properly sustained, it follows that the judgment of non-suit appealed from is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.