Title: IN THE INTEREST OF MM, a Minor: MM V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF MM, a Minor: MM V. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2009 WY 28202 P.3d 409Case Number: S-08-0120Decided: 03/03/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF MM, a Minor: 
MM,Appellant(Respondent),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 
SERVICES,Appellee(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

David 
M. Clark of Worrall & Greear, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Elizabeth B. Lance, 
Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Lance.

 
 

Guardian 
Ad Litem:

            
Andrea 
L. Earhart of McCarty and Reed, Cody, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      MM (Father) 
appeals from the adjudication order incorporating the jury's verdict that MM 
(the child) was abused while in his custody.  He claims the juvenile court erred by 
refusing to dismiss the case because the State failed to timely disclose 
exculpatory evidence.  We conclude 
that the juvenile court properly addressed, pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of 
Procedure for Juvenile Courts, the State's failure to disclose the evidence by 
ordering production of the information to Father.  In light of the State's production of 
the evidence to Father prior to trial and the strength of the State's case, we 
further conclude Father failed to show a violation of his due process 
rights.   Consequently, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Father presents a 
single issue on appeal:

 
 
Whether 
the District Court erred by refusing to dismiss the case for the State's failure 
to timely disclose exculpatory evidence?

 
 
The 
State and guardian ad litem present similar issues.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On October 
12, 2007, the child's daycare provider reported to authorities that the two year 
old child's vaginal area "appeared to be swollen and bruised" and she had a 
"goopy" vaginal discharge.  A Cody 
Police Department detective went to the daycare and looked at the reported 
injury.  She took the child into 
protective custody and arranged for her to be transported to the emergency room 
at the local hospital.  

 
 
[¶4]      The emergency 
room physician performed a sexual assault examination.  The doctor noted systemic discoloration 
of the child's labia compatible with potential sexual assault and recommended 
that the child be seen by her pediatrician.  Photographs were taken of the child's 
genitals during the emergency room examination.    

 
 
[¶5]      On October 16, 
2007, the child was examined by her pediatrician.  He did not see any bruising or 
discoloration of the child's genitals.  
The pediatrician did, however, note that she had labial laxity which was 
a change from the last time he had examined her.  He considered the change to be a "red 
flag" for abuse.  He stated the 
child's condition was consistent with non-traumatic genital manipulation and 
penetration.   

 
 
[¶6]      The State filed a 
petition pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-403, et. seq. (LexisNexis 2007) alleging the 
child had been abused.  Father and 
VM (Mother) denied the allegations, and a trial was scheduled for February 7 and 
8, 2008.  A few days prior to the 
trial, Mother's counsel received a police report which referred to a telephone 
conversation between the State and the Kempe Children's Center in Colorado on 
December 12, 2007.  The State 
apparently contracted with the Kempe Children's Center for consultations in 
child abuse cases.  The police 
report indicated that, after reviewing the photographs of the child's genitals, 
a doctor with the Kempe Children's Center could not see an injury to the 
child.  The report also stated that 
the conversation had been recorded by the State.  

 
 
[¶7]      Mother and Father 
filed a motion to dismiss the neglect petition on the basis that the recording 
included exculpatory evidence and the State had failed to disclose it in a 
timely manner as required by the Wyoming Rules of Procedure for Juvenile 
Courts.  The juvenile court denied 
the motion to dismiss but ordered the State to produce the exculpatory portions 
of the recording to the respondents.  
The State produced the entire recording to the respondents on the day 
before the trial commenced.  Over 
the State's objection, the recording was admitted as evidence at trial and the 
entire conversation was played for the jury.1     

 
 
[¶8]      The jury returned 
its verdict finding the allegations that the child was abused while in the 
custody of Mother and Father to be true, and the juvenile court entered an 
adjudication order consistent with the jury's verdict.  Father appealed.      

            
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Father claims 
that the State's failure to produce the recording of the conversation with the 
Kempe Children's Center to the respondents in a timely manner violated the 
Wyoming Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Courts and the constitutional mandates 
set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).  
He argues the State's action compelled dismissal of the abuse 
petition.  

 
 
 [¶10]  W.R.P.J.C. 3 states in relevant 
part:         

 
 
            
(b) Discovery by the 
State.  The State shall without 
the necessity of a request by the Respondent, and within thirty (30) days of 
service of the applicable petition, furnish to the Respondent and guardian ad 
litem:

 
 
            
     (1) Any 
material or information within the knowledge, possession or control of the State 
which tends to negate the involvement of the Respondent as to the offense 
charged;

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
(c) Compliance by the 
State.  The State may comply 
with this rule by advising the Respondent in writing or on the record, that the 
Respondent may inspect the discoverable portions of the State's file and by 
allowing such inspection to occur at any time during normal business hours.  However, if the State has any 
exculpatory information specified in this Rule, the State shall promptly furnish 
such information to the Respondent, whether or not the Respondent has made the 
inspection provided for by that subsection.

 
 
            
(d) Matters Not Subject to 
Discovery.  This section does 
not require a party to disclose:

 
 
            
      (1) 
Any documents to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, 
conclusions, or other work product;

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
(f)  Procedure for Discovery, Time.  The State shall make the disclosure 
required under this Rule, and may request reciprocal discovery within thirty 
(30) days from the service of the petition.  The Respondent shall furnish the 
discovery required under this Rule within thirty (30) days after a request is 
made.  The court, for good cause 
shown, may extend the time for discovery.  
If discovery is not furnished as required, a motion to compel discovery 
may be filed which shall specify the items which have not been furnished.  A hearing shall be held no later than 
three (3) days after the motion is filed.  
If, at any time during the proceedings, it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply with this Rule or an order issued 
under this Rule, the court may:

            

            
      1. 
  Order such party to permit the 
discovery of the matters not previously disclosed;

 
 
            
      
2.   Strike the testimony 
to which the undisclosed matter relates;

 
 
            
      
3.   Grant a reasonable 
continuance;

 
 
            
      
4.   Prohibit the party 
from introducing in evidence the matter not disclosed;

 
 
            
      
5.   Grant a mistrial; 
or

 
 
            
      
6.   Enter such other 
order as may be appropriate under the circumstances.

 
 
            
(g) Continuing Duty to 
Disclose.  If, subsequent to 
compliance with a request made under this Rule or with any order compelling 
discovery, a party learns of additional information previously requested and 
required to be furnished, he shall promptly furnish the information to the other 
party or his counsel.  If the 
additional information is learned during a hearing, he shall, in addition to 
furnishing the information promptly to the other party or his counsel, notify 
the court that such matter is being furnished.

 
 
. 
. . .

            

            
(j) Timely Disclosure 
Required.  All matters and 
information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed in time to permit its 
beneficial use.

 
 
[¶11]   We interpret court rules applying 
the same principles used to interpret statutes.   See, Cotton v. McCulloh, 2005 WY 159, ¶ 14, 
125 P.3d 252, 257-58 (Wyo. 2005).  
See also, Andersen v. 
Hernandez, 2005 WY 142, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 950, 951 (Wyo. 2005).   Our rules of statutory 
construction are well-known:

 
 
We 
first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  A "statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability."  Allied-Signal, Inc.  [v. Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization], 813 P.2d [214,] 220 [(Wyo. 1991)].  A "statute is ambiguous only if it is 
found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations."   813 P.2d  at 219-20.  

 
 
            
If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect 
to the plain language of the statute.  
. . . We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, 
clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia.  

 
 

State 
Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994).  If 
we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of 
statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent.  State v. Bannon Energy Corporation, 999 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (Wyo. 2000) (some citations omitted); see also Wyodak Resources Development Corporation v. 
Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2002 WY 181, ¶ 9, 60 P.3d 129, ¶ 9 
(Wyo.2002).  

 
 

Cotton, 
¶ 14, 
125 P.3d 257-58 (some citations omitted).  
        

 
 
[¶12]   Rule 3(b)(1) clearly required the 
State to notify the respondents of all information which tended to negate their 
involvement in the charged offense.  
Rule 3(c) required the State to promptly furnish any exculpatory 
information to the respondents, and Rule 3(g) made the duty to disclose 
continuing.  

 
 
[¶13]   In the recording of the telephone 
conversation, a Kempe Children's Center doctor repeatedly stated that he could 
not see any injury to the child in the photos provided to him.  In fact, he went so far as to say that 
the pictures did not show any abnormality in the child's genitalia.  The doctor also stated that he did not 
know why a sexual assault examination had been performed at the emergency room, 
measurements of labial laxity are not diagnostic of child abuse, and he did not 
understand the pediatrician's diagnosis of non-traumatic genital manipulation 
and penetration.  Unquestionably, 
this evidence tended to negate Mother's and Father's involvement in any alleged 
abuse of the child and was, therefore, exculpatory.  

 
 
[¶14]   In the district court, the State 
claimed it was not required to produce the recording because it was privileged 
work product and not subject to discovery under W.R.P.J.C. 3(d)(1).  The court ruled that the State had 
waived the work product privilege when the conversation and recording were 
referenced in the police report and ordered the State to produce any exculpatory 
evidence contained in the recording to the respondents.  Although the State seems to vaguely 
argue on appeal that the evidence was work product, it does not provide 
sufficient argument or authority for us to review the district court's decision 
on that basis.  Thus, we will 
assume, for the purposes of this case, that the evidence was not work product 
and was subject to disclosure.

 
 
[¶15]   Rule 3(f) provides several options 
to the juvenile court once it learns that a party did not comply with its 
discovery obligations.  In other 
contexts, we have stated that the trial court has discretion in determining the 
appropriate remedy or sanction for violation of discovery requirements.  Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 946-47 
(Wyo. 2000) (criminal); Gooder v. Roth, 
788 P.2d 611, 612 (Wyo. 1990) (civil).  
The language of Rule 3(f) clearly indicates that the juvenile court is 
likewise intended to have broad discretion in crafting a remedy for a discovery 
violation.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the appropriate standard for reviewing the juvenile court's decision is the 
abuse of discretion standard.  

 
 
[¶16]   In determining whether the trial 
court abused its discretion, "the ultimate issue is whether or not the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did."  
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
[D]ecisions 
of the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.  It is also well established that a 
district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by 
the record.  However, where the law 
imposes a duty on the district court to make findings on the record, we will not 
speculate as to the reasons for the decision.  

 
 

English 
v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted).

 
 

Lawson, 
994 P.2d  at 947.  

 
 
[¶17]   In accordance with Rule 3(f)(1), 
the juvenile court ordered the State to provide the information to the 
respondents.  Other options 
available to the court under the circumstances presented here included granting 
a "reasonable continuance" or entering "such other order as may be appropriate 
under the circumstances."  
W.R.P.J.C. 3(f)(3) and (6).  
Presumably, Father's request for a dismissal would fall within the latter 
provision.  At the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss, Father's attorney indicated that he could not waive the right 
to a speedy adjudicatory hearing, thereby eliminating a continuance as a remedy 
for the discovery violation.   

 
 
[¶18]   Father argues that dismissal was 
appropriate because he did not have the evidence in time to make beneficial use 
of it as required by Rule 3(j).  The 
record indicates otherwise.  The 
recording was played for the jury and the information was available for the 
respondents to use in cross examining the State's witnesses.  The respondents also referred to the 
evidence in opening statement2 and closing argument.  Consequently, the jury had the evidence 
from the recording to weigh against the State's evidence in determining whether 
the State had proven that Father abused the child.  

 
 
[¶19]   At the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss, Father asserted that if the information had been disclosed earlier, the 
respondents could have called the participants in the conversation as witnesses 
in their defense.  On appeal, Father 
claims generally that "[h]ad the State timely disclosed the evidence, [he] would 
have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to investigate further, obtain 
witnesses to vouch for the reliability of the exculpatory evidence, and fully 
prepare for its effective use on cross examination."  However, Father does not indicate 
specifically how he could have used or developed the evidence to provide a 
better defense or what the live testimony would have accomplished that the 
recording did not.  Furthermore, 
although Father could have requested a continuance in order to complete those 
tasks, he declined that option.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused 
its discretion by imposing the sanction it didordering production of the 
evidence, or by refusing to impose Father's requested sanctiondismissal.  

 
 
[¶20]   Father also claims that his 
constitutional rights under Brady, 
373 U.S. 83, were violated when the prosecution withheld exculpatory 
evidence.  See also, Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, 47 P.3d 981 
(Wyo. 2002).  The parties do not 
direct us to any decision of this Court or the United States Supreme Court which 
expressly rules on whether the principles for criminal cases articulated in Brady apply in civil child abuse 
proceedings.  Nevertheless, in light 
of the fundamental right to associate with family, FML v. TW, 2007 WY 73, ¶ 6, 157 P.3d 455, 459 (Wyo. 2007), we 
assume without deciding that Brady 
applies for the purposes of this case.  
See generally, LP v. Natrona County Dep't of Pub. Assist. 
and Social Serv's, 679 P.2d 976, 992-94 (Wyo. 1984) (indicating that, under 
appropriate circumstances, Brady due 
process principles may apply in parental termination proceedings).    

 
 
[¶21]   In Brady, the United States Supreme Court 
held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution."  Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87.  To establish a violation under Brady, Father had the burden of proving: 
1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; 2) the evidence was favorable to the 
defense; and 3) the evidence was material because it is reasonably probable 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
Davis, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d  at 985; 
Wilkening, ¶ 7, 172 P.3d  at 
386-87.  The determination of 
whether the evidence the State withheld was material and whether the failure to 
disclose it to the defense affected the outcome of the trial involve mixed 
questions of fact and law.  Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d 457, 476 (Wyo. 2004).  A claim 
of failure to disclose evidence in violation of Brady is reviewed de novo.  Id.

 
 
[¶22]   The evidence contained in the 
recording was obviously favorable to the defense as the Kempe Children's Center 
doctor repeatedly stated that he could not see any injury to the child in the 
photos and, in fact, went so far as to say that the pictures showed normal 
female genitalia.  The defense is, 
however, required to show more than the evidence was exculpatory in order to 
establish a due process violation under Brady.  
  

 
 
[¶23]   Father is obligated to establish 
that the State suppressed the evidence in violation of the Brady principles.  The evidence of the Kempe Children's 
Center conversation was disclosed to the respondents the day before trial.  In Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 16, 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006), we stated:

 
 
The 
delayed disclosure of Brady materials 
is not always grounds for reversal.  
Whitney, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 58, 99 P.3d  at 476.  As long as disclosure 
is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of the evidence, due 
process is satisfied.  Id. Brady is not violated when the material 
is available to the defendant during trial.  Id. The essence of Brady is the discovery of information 
after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense 
during the trial.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).  
Thus, where exculpatory evidence is discovered during the trial and 
defense counsel has the opportunity to use it in cross-examination, closing 
argument, or other parts of the defense case, courts generally do not find a due 
process violation.  United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.1997);  Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 765 (Wyo. 
1993).

 
 
[¶24]   In Thomas, we concluded that the 
defendant's due process rights were not violated when the State revealed 
exculpatory evidence to the defense on the second and third day of trial.  Because the defense was able to use the 
evidence for cross examination and argument during trial and did not request a 
continuance, there was no violation of Brady. Id., ¶¶ 17-18, 131 P.3d  at 
353-54.  In this case, the State produced the 
recording to the respondents the day before trial and it was played for the 
jury.  The respondents referred to 
the recording in opening statement, had the opportunity to cross examine the 
State's witnesses with the information contained in it and emphasized it in 
closing arguments.  Moreover, Father 
did not request a continuance in order to further explore the exculpatory 
evidence.  Thus, he has not shown 
the evidence was improperly suppressed in accordance with Brady.  

 
 
[¶25]   Further, in order to establish a Brady violation, the evidence must be 
material in the sense that there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense in a timely manner, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
Consequently, we must consider the exculpatory evidence in the context of 
the other evidence presented at trial.  

 
 
[¶26]   The State called a number of 
witnesses to testify about their eye-witness observations of the child.  The daycare provider testified that on 
Wednesday, October 10, 2007, the child returned to daycare after being absent 
for several days.  The child was 
unusually tired, aggressive and unhappy.  
The daycare provider testified that the child resisted having her diaper 
changed and she noticed the child's genitalia were red, swollen, and elongated 
and she was experiencing vaginal discharge.  She asked other daycare workers to look 
at the child and documented her concerns.  
The next day, the child was still behaving differently than usual and the 
daycare provider noticed bruising of the labia.  On Friday, October 12, 2007, the child 
would not let the daycare provider clean her after a bowel movement, so she 
bathed the child.  The daycare 
provider then called the authorities.    

 
 
[¶27]   The detective testified that she 
observed the child's vaginal area on October 12, 2007.  She described the area as swollen with 
red marks on the labia.  She stated 
that it looked like the child had been injured.  Consequently, she took the child into 
protective custody.    

 
 
[¶28]   The DFS caseworker transported the 
child to the emergency room.  She 
stated that she was present during the emergency room doctor's examination of 
the child and saw "severe" redness and what looked like bruising on the outside 
of the child's labia.  She also 
described the vaginal area as swollen.    

 
 
[¶29]   The emergency room doctor testified 
that, based upon the history provided to him by the detective, he performed a 
sexual assault exam.  None of the 
tests revealed the presence of any foreign bodily fluids, such as semen.  He completed a schematic diagram of the 
child's genitalia, indicating he observed discoloration of the labia, although 
he stated that he could not call it bruising.  The emergency room doctor stated the 
discoloration was consistent with potential sexual assault.  He also testified that, although his 
examination was limited because of the child's size, he did not observe an 
obvious hymenal tear.  Because he 
was not a pediatric specialist, he recommended she be examined by her 
pediatrician.    

 
 
[¶30]   The child's pediatrician examined 
her on October 16, 2007.  During the 
visit, the child's behavior was different than normal; she was angry and 
physically aggressive.  The 
pediatrician did not see any redness, bruising or inflammation of her 
genitals.  However, he noticed the 
labia major, which protect the opening of the vagina, were apart resulting in a 
four millimeter space.  This labial 
laxity was a change from when he had examined her a few months before.  He concluded that his exam was 
"consistent with non traumatic genital manipulation and penetration."  The pediatrician was questioned about 
the Kempe Children's Center doctor's opinion that he could not see an injury and 
labial laxity was not diagnostic of sexual abuse.  He stated that his research indicated 
that labial laxity was an indicator of abuse and his diagnosis and concerns were 
due to the change in the child's genitalia from the last time he examined 
her.   

 
 
[¶31]   The child's foster mother also 
testified at the trial.  She had 
cared for the child for "a long time" prior to the events which led to the abuse 
petition in this case.  The foster 
mother, who was a registered nurse, testified that she had observed the child's 
genital area in the emergency room.  
She stated the area was "very red and discolored, puffy and stretched 
out."  Based upon her observations, 
she testified that she thought that the child had been hurt"that something 
terrible had happened to her."  The 
foster mother took physical custody of the child after she left the emergency 
room.  She stated that, during the 
following week, the child's behavior was different than normal.  She also stated that the child's vaginal 
opening was still "gaping" at the time of trial.       

 
 
[¶32]   The jury weighed the State's 
evidence against the exculpatory evidence contained in the recording from the 
Kempe Children's Center and Mother and Father's testimony that they had not 
injured the child.  The strength of 
the exculpatory evidence was reduced because the Kempe Children's Center doctor 
did not examine the child at the time of the alleged abuse.  His testimony, or that of any other 
medical expert, would have been limited to a review of the photographs and 
medical records.  Consequently his 
opinion was subject to the criticism that, unlike the emergency room doctor and 
the pediatrician, he did not actually see the alleged injury.  In fact, the Kempe Children's Center 
doctor indicated that the doctors who actually examined the child might have 
seen something different or might have reached a different conclusion than he 
did after reviewing the photographs and medical records.  On this record, we cannot conclude that 
there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense in a timelier manner, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  Consequently, Father's 
due process rights were not violated by the State's actions and the district 
court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss.  

 
 
[¶33]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Prior to trial, the respondents moved for admission of the recording with 
the parts that did not include exculpatory evidence redacted.  The State objected and filed a motion in 
limine, arguing the recording was not subject to disclosure because it was 
privileged work product.  The 
guardian ad litem maintained that, if the recording was admitted into evidence, 
it should be admitted in its entirety.  
The juvenile court admitted the entire recording as evidence at 
trial.  In addition to the 
exculpatory evidence, the recording includes discussion of the State's prior 
involvement with the family, the child's special needs, the inability of the 
parents to care for her, how best to protect the child, and other matters.  Father does not argue on appeal that the 
district court's decision to admit the entire recording, including the portions 
which were not exculpatory, was erroneous.  

 
 

2Father waived his right to make an opening statement.  Mother, however, referred to the Kempe 
Children's Center recording in her opening 
statement.