Title: State v. Alan L. Radke

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 7 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1879-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Alan L. Radke,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 146 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 448, 647 N.W.2d 873 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 26, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven D. Ebert   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by William E. Schmaal, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sandra 
L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2003 WI 7 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1879-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 518) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan L. Radke,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Radke, 2002 WI App 146, 256 Wis. 2d 448, 647 N.W.2d 873, 
affirming the judgment of conviction of the Circuit Court for 
Dane County, Steven D. Ebert, Judge. 
¶2 
Alan L. Radke, the defendant, was convicted of 
repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1) (1997-1998),1 and was also convicted 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
1998 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
2 
 
of 
being 
a 
persistent 
repeater 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.62(2m)(a)1m., 
(b)2., 
and 
(c), 
commonly 
known 
as 
Wisconsin's "two strikes" law.2  He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(2m)(a)1m., (b)2., and (c) compose 
the "two strikes" law and read as follows:  
(2m)(a) In this subsection: 
1m. "Serious child sex offense" means any of the 
following:  
a. A violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.05, 948.055, 
948.06, 948.07, 948.08 or 948.095 or 948.30 or, if the 
victim was a minor and the convicted person was not 
the victim's parent, a violation of s. 940.31.   
b. A crime at any time under federal law or the law of 
any other state . . . . 
 . . . . 
(b) The actor is a persistent repeater if one of the 
following applies: 
 . . . . 
2. The actor has been convicted of a serious child sex 
offense on at least one occasion at any time preceding 
the date of violation of the serious child sex offense 
for which he or she presently is being sentenced under 
ch. 973, which conviction remains of record and 
unreversed. 
 . . . . 
(c) If the actor is a persistent repeater, the term of 
imprisonment for the felony for which the persistent 
repeater presently is being sentenced under ch. 973 is 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or 
extended supervision. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The defendant challenges the constitutionality of the 
"two strikes" law.  The challenge focuses on a comparison of 
Wisconsin's "two strikes" law and Wisconsin's "three strikes" 
law3 in light of the statutory felony classification system.4  
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(2m)(a)2m., 
(b)1., 
and 
(c)  
compose the "three strikes" law and read as follows: 
(2m)(a) In this subsection: 
 . . . . 
2m. "Serious felony" means any of the following:  
a. Any felony under s. 961.41(1), (1m) or (1x) if the 
felony is punishable by a maximum prison term of 30 
years or more.   
b. Any felony under s. 940.01, 940.02, 940.03, 940.05, 
940.09(1), 
940.16, 
940.19(5), 
940.195(5), 
940.21, 
940.225(1) . . . . 
 . . . . 
(b) The actor is a persistent repeater if one of the 
following applies:  
1. The actor has been convicted of a serious felony on 
2 or more separate occasions at any time preceding the 
serious felony for which he or she presently is being 
sentenced under ch. 973, which convictions remain of 
record and unreversed and, of the 2 or more previous 
convictions, at least one conviction occurred before 
the date of violation of at least one of the other 
felonies for which the actor was previously convicted. 
 . . . . 
(c) If the actor is a persistent repeater, the term of 
imprisonment for the felony for which the persistent 
repeater presently is being sentenced under ch. 973 is 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or 
extended supervision. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.50(1) and (3) provide as follows: 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
4 
 
Under the statutory felony classification system, a Class A 
felony has a greater maximum penalty than a Class B felony.  The 
"two strikes" law, however, mandates that the second conviction 
for a Class B felony "serious child sex offense" be punished by 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, while the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Except as provided in ss. 946.43(2m)(a), 946.83 
and 946.85, felonies in chs. 939 to 951 are classified 
as follows:  
(a) Class A felony.  
(b) Class B felony.  
(bc) Class BC felony.  
(c) Class C felony. 
(d) Class D felony.  
(e) Class E felony. 
 . . . . 
(3) Penalties for felonies are as follows:  
(a) For a Class A felony, life imprisonment. 
(b) For a Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 
40 years. 
(bc) For a Class BC felony, a fine not to exceed 
$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 20 years, or 
both. 
(c) For a Class C felony, a fine not to exceed $10,000 
or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both. 
(d) For a Class D felony, a fine not to exceed $10,000 
or imprisonment not to exceed 5 years, or both. 
(e) For a Class E felony, a fine not to exceed $10,000 
or imprisonment not to exceed 2 years, or both. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
5 
 
"three strikes" law mandates that the third conviction for a 
Class A homicide felony be punished by life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  
¶4 
In short, the defendant argues that it is irrational 
and therefore unconstitutional for the legislature to authorize 
a more serious punishment for a single conviction of first-
degree intentional homicide (a Class A felony) than for a single 
conviction of first-degree sexual assault of a child (a Class B 
felony) 
under 
the 
felony 
classification 
system 
while 
simultaneously punishing a second first-degree child sexual 
assault conviction more severely than a second first-degree 
intentional homicide conviction. 
¶5 
The precise question raised, therefore, is whether the 
"two strikes" law violates the Due Process Clause of either the 
United States or Wisconsin Constitution because it requires a 
greater penalty to be imposed on an offender convicted of a 
second Class B non-fatal child sexual assault than the statutes 
require to be imposed on an offender convicted of a second Class 
A felony homicide offense.5   
                                                 
5 See State v. Asfoor, 74 Wis. 2d 411, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977) 
(addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute based on its 
relationship to another statute). 
A court imposing a sentence for a first or second Class A 
homicide 
conviction 
retains 
discretion 
to 
impose 
life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Therefore it is 
possible that a person convicted of a second Class B sexual 
assault and a person convicted of a first or second Class A 
homicide will receive the same sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  Nevertheless we state the 
issue in terms of the most disparate possible sentences for 
purposes of analyzing the defendant's constitutional challenge. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
6 
 
¶6 
The circuit court, on a pretrial motion, ruled that 
the "two strikes" law was a reasonable exercise of the 
legislature's power to determine appropriate criminal penalties 
and thus was constitutional.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
conviction.  It presumed that the legislature had an interest in 
protecting 
children 
from 
repeat 
sex 
offenders 
whom 
the 
legislature viewed as more likely to re-offend than other 
serious felons and concluded that the "two strikes" law is 
rationally related to that interest under either a due process 
or equal protection analysis. 
¶7 
We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
defendant's constitutional challenge to the "two strikes" law 
fails.  The legislature's interest in protecting the public from 
child sexual assault offenders, a particular subset of offenders 
with a perceived high rate of recidivism who victimize an 
especially vulnerable segment of the population, makes it 
rational for the legislature to impose a greater penalty on an 
offender convicted of a second Class B non-fatal child sexual 
assault than on an offender convicted of a second Class A 
homicide offense.6 
                                                 
6 The defendant argues that his claim presents a substantive 
due process challenge.  Because the court of appeals addressed 
an equal protection challenge, the defendant argues, in the 
alternative, 
that 
the 
"two 
strikes" 
law 
violates 
equal 
protection of the laws.  The defendant asserts, however, that 
the two constitutional doctrines are closely related (but not 
completely coterminous) and that a violation of one may be 
recharacterized as a violation of the other in the present case.   
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
7 
 
¶8 
The relevant facts of this case are few.  In 1986, the 
defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a 
child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(d) (1983-1984), which   
proscribes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 12 
years of age or younger.7  The defendant was sentenced to five 
years' probation with nine months in jail as a condition of his 
probation.  Violation of § 940.225(1)(d) was a Class B felony.8  
¶9 
On March 16, 1999, the State charged the defendant 
with committing repeated acts of sexual assault of the same 
child,9 in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1), a Class B 
                                                                                                                                                             
The defendant and the State acknowledge that the test for 
either constitutional challenge in the present case is whether 
the legislature had a rational basis for enactment of the "two 
strikes" law.  Accordingly, we address the defendant's claim 
under substantive due process.  See Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 
2000 WI 60, ¶50, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59 (noting the 
similarity between the tests for a violation of equal protection 
and of substantive due process). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.225(1) 
(1983-1984) 
reads, 
in 
relevant part:  "First-degree sexual assault.  Whoever does any 
of the following is guilty of a Class B felony: . . . (d) Has 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 12 years of 
age or younger." 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.225(1) (1983-1984) is the precursor 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1), which also classifies the offense as 
a class B felony. 
9 The second conviction was not for acts committed against 
the child who was the victim of his original sexual assault.  
Rather, 
the 
reference 
to 
"same 
child" 
comes 
from 
Wis. Stat. § 948.025 and refers to an independent series of acts 
committed against a single child, giving rise to his second 
conviction.  
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
8 
 
felony.10  As a result of his prior conviction for first-degree 
sexual assault of a child, the State also charged the defendant 
as a "persistent repeater" under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m).  The 
defendant entered a not guilty plea and then filed a motion to 
dismiss the repeater charge, arguing that it violated his right 
to due process.  The circuit court denied his motion. 
¶10 The jury convicted the defendant as charged.  The 
circuit court denied the defendant's motion for post-conviction 
relief, and as required by the "two strikes" law, the circuit 
court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.11  The defendant's conviction was upheld by the court of 
appeals, and we granted review. 
¶11 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that this court determines independently of the circuit 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025(1) reads as follows: "Whoever 
commits 3 or more violations under s. 948.02(1) or (2) within a 
specified period of time involving the same child is guilty of a 
Class B felony." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) makes it a crime of first-
degree sexual assault to have sexual contact or intercourse with 
a person under the age of 13.  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) makes 
it a crime of second-degree sexual assault to have sexual 
contact or intercourse with a person under the age of 16. 
11 The defendant filed a post-conviction motion arguing that 
he was entitled to a new trial because Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1) 
does not require juror unanimity on which of the five or six 
alleged 
incidents 
constituted 
the 
three 
violations 
of 
§ 948.02(1) or (2) and is therefore unconstitutional.  He also 
challenged the circuit court's restitution order.  The circuit 
court denied his motion for a new trial but did modify the 
restitution order.  These issues are not raised before this 
court.   
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
9 
 
court and court of appeals, yet with the benefit of the analyses 
of these 
courts. 
 All 
statutes 
enjoy a 
presumption of 
constitutionality and the heavy burden of overcoming this 
presumption lies with the person attacking the statute.12  This 
court will sustain a statute against a constitutional challenge 
if there is "any reasonable basis" for the statute.13  That 
reasonable 
basis 
need 
not 
be 
expressly 
stated 
by 
the 
legislature; if the court can conceive of facts on which the 
legislation could reasonably be based, it must uphold the 
legislation as constitutional.14 
¶12 In this case, the defendant attacks the statute as 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the state and 
federal 
constitutions.15 
 
In 
addition 
to 
the 
procedural 
                                                 
12 State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 762, 482 N.W.2d 883 
(1992).  
13 State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 
(1989). 
14 McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 129. 
15 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides, in relevant part: "[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
10 
 
protections provided by the Due Process Clause, there is also "a 
substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful 
government actions."16  Substantive due process forbids a 
government 
from 
exercising 
"power 
without 
any 
reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental 
objective."17 
¶13 The defendant argues that the "two strikes" law is 
"illogical, irrational, and arbitrary as a method of executing 
the legislature's overall determination of penal policy"18 and 
therefore violates his constitutional right to due process of 
law.  According to the defendant, a child sexual assault is a 
less serious crime than a homicide offense.  The defendant 
points out that the Wisconsin legislature has indicated that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
"All people are born equally free and independent, and have 
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness."  Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution further states:  "No person may be held to answer 
for a criminal offense without due process of law."  Both 
Wisconsin Constitution clauses have been cited as a source of 
substantive due process protection.  Compare Dowhower v. West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 
N.W.2d 557 (substantive due process is protected by Article I, 
Section 1), and Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, ¶45 (substantive due 
process is protected by Article I, Section 8). 
16 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995)(quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990))). 
17 Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, ¶45 (quoting County of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). 
18 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 
17 (emphasis in original). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
11 
 
Class A felony offenses are more serious crimes than Class B 
felony offenses by imposing a higher maximum penalty for Class A 
felony offenses than for Class B felony offenses.  Moreover, 
felony classification system aside, the defendant asserts that 
non-homicide child sexual assaults are inherently less serious 
than homicide offenses.  Consequently, the defendant argues, a 
second child sexual assault cannot rationally be punishable by a 
more severe penalty than a second homicide offense.  Yet 
convicted 
persons 
are 
considered 
persistent 
repeaters and 
sentenced to mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole after two convictions for Class B child 
sexual assault but are not so sentenced after two convictions 
for Class A homicide. 
¶14 The State responds that the "two strikes" law is a 
rational legislative attempt to protect children from sexual 
violence by incapacitating repeat offenders who are not likely 
to be rehabilitated.  Moreover, according to the State, the fact 
that a second conviction for a Class B felony might result in a 
more severe sentence than a second conviction for a Class A 
felony is consistent with the overall felony classification 
system in Wisconsin, which sets only maximum penalties for each 
felony class and permits other factors, such as the character of 
the offender and the need to protect the public from that 
particular offender, to establish the actual sentence to be 
imposed. 
¶15 We 
begin 
our 
constitutional 
analysis 
with 
an 
examination of the relevant statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.50 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
12 
 
establishes Wisconsin's felony classification system.  Under 
§ 939.50, felonies are grouped into one of six different classes 
with letter designations A, B, BC, C, D, and E.  The legislature 
has assigned a maximum penalty to each of these classes.  Class 
A felonies have been assigned the most severe maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment.19  Class E felonies have been assigned the 
least severe maximum penalty of a fine not to exceed $10,000 or 
imprisonment not to exceed 2 years, or both.20 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62 
is 
Wisconsin's 
repeat 
offender statute, containing the "two strikes" and "three 
strikes" laws.  For more than a century, Wisconsin laws have 
authorized courts to enhance the sentences of repeat offenders.  
By 1993 Act 289, the legislature enacted the "three strikes" 
law, creating a new subcategory of repeat offenders known as 
"persistent repeaters".21  Persistent repeaters under the "three 
strikes" law are defendants who have been convicted of two 
offenses, each of which the legislature has designated as a 
"serious felony," and are presently being sentenced for a third 
such offense.   
                                                 
19 The sentence for a Class A felony is a mandatory life 
sentence. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a). 
 
However, 
the 
sentencing judge has the discretion to set a date for parole 
eligibility.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.014. 
20 Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(f) (1997-1998). 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50 
(1999-2000), 
the 
maximum 
penalties for all felony classes have been increased, except for 
Class A felonies.  Class E felonies are now punishable by up to 
5 years imprisonment.   
21 See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b)1., (c). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
13 
 
¶17 Several, but not all, Class A, B, BC, and C felonies 
have been given the "serious felony" designation under the 
"three strikes" law.  These designated felonies range from Class 
A felonies such as first-degree intentional homicide to Class C 
felonies such as assault by a prisoner.22  Persistent repeaters 
under the "three strikes" law face a mandatory sentence of life 
in prison without the possibility of parole upon conviction of 
the third "serious felony." 
¶18 The legislature added to this new persistent repeater 
subcategory of repeat offenders by 1997 Act 326, the "two 
strikes" law.  Included in this second group of persistent 
repeaters are defendants who have been convicted of one offense 
that the legislature has designated as a "serious child sex 
offense" and who are being sentenced for a second such offense.23  
Several Class B, BC, C, and D felonies, primarily those 
addressing sex-related offenses targeting children, are given 
the "serious child sex offense" designation.  These designated 
felonies under the "two strikes" law range from Class B felonies 
such as repeated sexual assault of the same child to Class D 
felonies such as causing a child to view or listen to sexual 
activity.  Persistent repeaters under the "two strikes" law face 
a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility 
of parole.  Thus, included in the "two strikes" law are some 
                                                 
22 See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(a)2m. 
23 See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(a)1m., (b)2. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
14 
 
felonies with less severe maximum penalties than some felonies 
included in the "three strikes" law.  
¶19 Because a Class A felony is subject to a harsher 
maximum sentence than a Class B felony, it does appear at first 
blush that a second Class A homicide conviction should also be 
subject to a harsher sentence than a second Class B child sexual 
assault conviction.  Upon further analysis, however, we are not 
persuaded that the lack of symmetry between the "two strikes" 
law and the "three strikes" law, in light of the felony 
classification system, is irrational and violates substantive 
due process.  In short, the considerations that determine 
criminal penalties for particular crimes under Wisconsin law are 
more 
complicated 
than 
a 
quick 
reference 
to 
the 
felony 
classification system admits.  
¶20 Wisconsin's felony classification system establishes 
maximum allowable penalties for each class of felonies that 
reflect, as a general rule, the "degree of actual or potential 
harm 
[to 
both 
persons 
and 
property] 
involved 
in 
their 
commission."24  The graduated maximum punishments reflect a 
legislative penchant for imposing more severe punishments on 
people guilty of crimes resulting in death or serious physical 
harm and for imposing more severe punishments for crimes against 
persons than against property.25  Thus, by subjecting Class A 
                                                 
24 See Legislative Council Note, 1977, Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 939.50 (West 1996). 
25 See id. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
15 
 
offenders to the most severe maximum penalty, the legislature 
has determined that greater harm is caused by the commission of 
a Class A felony than by commission of a different class felony. 
¶21 Importantly, however, the maximum penalties set under 
the felony classification system do not take other traditional 
sentencing factors into consideration.  The mere fact that a 
felony receives a Class B label, for instance, does not 
necessarily reflect a legislative assessment of the character of 
the offender or the harm to the public that that offender 
represents.  Rather, the legislature has adopted indeterminate 
sentencing that leaves consideration of factors such as general 
and 
specific 
deterrence, 
rehabilitation, 
retribution, 
and 
incapacitation to the sentencing court in each individual case.26 
¶22 The maximum penalty for a Class C felony at the time 
of the defendant's second conviction, for example, was a fine 
not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed ten years, 
or both.27  The maximum penalty for a Class D felony was a fine 
not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years, 
or both.28  Yet under Wisconsin's indeterminate sentencing, a 
person who committed a Class C felony might have been sentenced 
to three years while a person who committed a Class D felony 
might have gotten the maximum five years, depending on the 
                                                 
26 See In re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 
200-01, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984).  
27 Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c). 
28 Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(d). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
16 
 
circumstances of the crime itself and the offender as weighed by 
the sentencing court. 
¶23 Furthermore, the maximum penalty of a given felony 
class can be increased.  The legislature has mandated enhanced 
penalties 
for 
the 
commission 
of 
crimes 
under 
particular 
circumstances.  For example, the legislature has provided that a 
sentence 
is 
increased 
in 
certain 
cases 
based 
upon 
the 
vulnerability of the victim.29  In other situations, the 
legislature has determined that a sentencing court may enhance 
the maximum sentence for a given crime when the offender engages 
in certain conduct in the course of his criminal act.30  In still 
other situations, the legislature has established that a penalty 
is enhanced beyond the maximum established under the felony 
classification system when a crime is committed in a specific 
location.31 
¶24 The 
legislature 
has 
thus 
established 
an overall 
sentencing scheme in which the commission of a less serious 
class felony, under certain circumstances set forth in the 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.647 (increasing the penalty 
for violent felony committed against an elder person). 
30 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.64 (increasing the maximum 
term of imprisonment by 10 years for the commission of a felony 
while 
wearing 
a 
bulletproof 
vest); 
Wis. Stat. § 939.641 
(increasing the penalty for commission of a crime while 
concealing identity). 
31 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.632 (increasing the maximum 
period of imprisonment for the commission of certain violent 
crimes committed in a school zone). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
17 
 
statutes, exposes an offender to a greater penalty than he would 
be exposed to had he committed a more serious class felony.32   
¶25 The "two strikes" law, as part of the general repeat 
offender statute, is a penalty enhancer that attaches to crimes 
committed under particular circumstances.33  The "two strikes" 
law represents the legislative determination that in certain 
circumstances——namely, when an offense is committed by a person 
with 
a 
particular 
criminal 
history 
that 
demonstrates 
a 
propensity to re-offend——the maximum penalty attached to a crime 
under the felony classification system no longer limits the 
sentencing court.34  Indeed, the "two strikes" law not only 
increases the maximum sentence allowable but also mandates that 
the most severe penalty under Wisconsin law be imposed.   
¶26 The issue in this case is whether there is a rational 
basis to justify mandating the penalty of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole under the circumstances of a 
second conviction of a child sexual assault when the penalty is 
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole under the 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 940.08 (homicide by negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is a Class D 
felony); § 939.64 (increasing the maximum term of imprisonment 
by ten years for commission of a felony while wearing a 
bulletproof vest). 
33 See State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶16, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 
649 N.W.2d 263("Wis. Stat. § 939.62 is one of many statutory 
provisions 
that 
enhance 
a 
convicted 
criminal 
defendant's 
potential exposure to confinement."). 
34 The prosecutor has discretion whether to charge the 
defendant as a repeater.  Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
18 
 
circumstances of a second conviction of a Class A homicide 
offense. 
¶27 The legislature did not expressly state a rationale 
for the "two strikes" law, and 1997 Wis. Act 326, creating the 
"two strikes" law, does not contain specific legislative 
findings to support the law.  The absence of a legislative 
pronouncement, however, is not fatal.35  A statute will survive a 
constitutional challenge if this court can conceive of a 
rational basis for the law.36  We conclude that a rational basis 
exists in the present case for the coexistence of the "two 
strikes" and "three strikes" laws in light of Wisconsin's felony 
classification system.37   
¶28 The most obvious basis for the "two strikes law" is 
that the legislature believes that there are greater incidents 
of recidivism among people who commit serious child sex offenses 
and that the interests of public safety therefore demand  
                                                 
35 Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). 
36 McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 129. 
37 The defendant's argument is presented as a facial 
challenge to the "two strikes" law, and the defendant disputes 
the court of appeals' references to the law "as applied" in his 
case.  Determining when an "as applied" challenge is appropriate 
and when a "facial" challenge is appropriate "has long troubled 
courts and scholars alike."  Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, 
¶15, ¶20 n.19, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266.  We hold that a 
rational basis exists for inclusion of non-fatal Class B child 
sexual assault felonies under the "two strikes" law and Class A 
homicide felonies under the "three strikes" law.  Whether the 
rationale supports other non-fatal offenses listed under the 
"two strikes" law is not before us. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
19 
 
incarceration without the possibility of parole for those 
offenders who demonstrate that they have not been sufficiently 
deterred by their first conviction.38  The legislature could 
reasonably determine that the need for incarceration without the 
possibility of parole is especially acute when children, a 
particularly vulnerable segment of the population, are the 
explicit targets of the offenses.39 
                                                 
38 Statements made by State Representative Mark Green, the 
act's sponsor, explicitly indicate that a reason for the law was 
the perceived high recidivism rate among child sex offenders.  
See Amy Rinard, Life Term for Child Sex Crimes Advances, 
Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Nov. 6, 1997, at 1. 
As the court of appeals correctly notes, despite the fact 
that experts dispute the threat of recidivism posed by child sex 
offenders, there is some evidence supporting the conclusion that 
child sex offenders, particularly those with prior convictions, 
pose a greater risk of recidivism than other offenders.  See 
State v. Radke, 2002 WI App 146, ¶10 n.8, 256 Wis. 2d 448, 647 
N.W.2d 873. 
The legislature's assumptions about recidivism may be 
erroneous, but they are arguably correct and that is sufficient 
on a rational basis review to protect the legislative choice 
from constitutional challenge.  State v. Block, 222 Wis. 2d 586, 
592, 587 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Martin, 191 
Wis. 2d 646, 658, 530 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993))).   
39 Indeed, the defendant concedes that a legitimate purpose 
of the "two strikes" law is to protect children from becoming 
the victims of sexual assaults and that if the legislature has 
come to believe that child sex offenders have a high recidivism 
rate, the legislature could have decided that an individual who 
has committed two sexual assaults against a child is likely to 
do so again and is unlikely to be rehabilitated.  Brief and 
Appendix 
of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 
16-17. 
 The 
defendant's challenge, again, is that there is no rational basis 
for including certain non-fatal offenses under the "two strikes" 
law while simultaneously including certain homicide offenses 
under the "three strikes" law.   
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
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¶29 The legislature has broad authority to define what 
conduct constitutes a crime and the appropriate penalties,40 
bound by the constitutional bar against cruel and unusual 
punishment and guarantees of due process of law and equal 
protection.41  "[T]he legislature has the responsibility for 
enacting 
laws 
reflecting 
society's 
appreciation 
of 
the 
seriousness of one crime as opposed to another.  The legislature 
also has the obligation to measure the kinds of sanctions that 
will, in society's judgment, best deter future criminality."42  
¶30 The "two strikes" law focuses on crimes of sexual 
conduct that victimize children committed by people who have 
already been convicted of a similar crime.  It represents a 
legislative determination that offenders convicted under these 
particular circumstances pose a unique threat to society and 
                                                 
40 In re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 
353 
N.W.2d 793 
(1984) 
("The 
legislature 
determines 
what 
constitutes a crime in Wisconsin and establishes maximum 
penalties for each class of crime."); Spannuth v. State, 70 
Wis. 2d 362, 
367, 
234 
N.W.2d 79 
(1975) 
("It 
is 
a 
well-
established proposition in our system of separate branches of 
government that the authority to punish is a matter for the 
legislature."). 
41 The "three strikes" law has withstood a constitutional 
challenge alleging that the law violates the cruel and unusual 
punishment provision.  See State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423, 
554 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1996).  The "three strikes" law has 
also 
survived 
an 
equal 
protection 
challenge 
alleging 
arbitrariness in the designation of certain crimes as "serious" 
and therefore subject to the "three strikes" law.  See State v. 
Block, 222 Wis. 2d 586, 587 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1998). 
42 State v. Martin, 191 Wis. 2d 646, 656, 530 N.W.2d 420 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
21 
 
must 
therefore 
face 
the 
maximum 
penalty 
allowable 
under 
Wisconsin 
law. 
 
The 
"three 
strikes" 
law, 
in 
contrast, 
encompasses a wider swath of criminal conduct.  It expresses a 
legislative determination that offenders who commit two of these 
crimes do not pose the same type of unique threat as persistent 
repeaters under the "two strikes" law.  The legislature has 
determined that there is something especially troublesome about 
the threat posed by a repeat child sex offender that does not 
arise when a person is convicted of a child sex offense after a 
prior conviction for a different serious felony that does not 
involve sexual conduct targeting a minor.     
¶31 The inclusion of certain felonies in each of the two 
persistent 
repeater 
laws 
need 
not 
have 
been 
done 
with 
"mathematical nicety."43  The felonies need only have a rational 
basis to be constitutional.  When a statute reasonably addresses 
the dangers created by one group of offenders, it is not 
constitutionally infirm just because it does not apply to all 
offenders to whom it might have been applied.44 
¶32 This 
court's 
decision 
in 
State 
v. 
Asfoor, 
75 
Wis. 2d 411, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977), upon which the defendant 
relies, does not compel a contrary result.  The Asfoor decision 
analyzed the constitutionality of a statute, considering the 
relationship of that statute to another.  The Asfoor decision 
                                                 
43 Heller, 509 U.S. at 321. 
44 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 329-30, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995). 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
22 
 
concluded that there was no conceivable rational basis for the 
legislature to punish a person more severely for negligent use 
of a weapon resulting in bodily injury than for the exact same 
negligent use of a weapon where it resulted in death of the 
victim.  "The same negligent conduct may be a felony or 
misdemeanor with the determining factor being whether death or 
injury resulted.  The irrationality of this classification 
results from the felony being imposed for causing injury and the 
misdemeanor for causing death."45  
¶33 The defendant argues that Asfoor stands for the 
proposition that it is always irrational to make a non-fatal 
crime of a certain type of culpable conduct punishable by a more 
serious penalty than a crime of the same type of culpable 
conduct that results in death.  Yet the Asfoor decision does not 
suggest such a broad holding.  Asfoor does not hold that it is 
always irrational for the non-fatal crime of negligent use of a 
weapon to be punishable by a greater penalty than negligent use 
of a weapon resulting in death.  Rational reasons may exist for 
punishing the negligent use of a weapon resulting in bodily 
injury more severely than the same conduct resulting in death 
under certain circumstances. 
¶34 The defendant in the Asfoor decision was not subject 
to a more severe penalty as a result of distinct circumstances 
surrounding the commission of his offense.  The issue addressed 
by this court in Asfoor was whether a rational basis existed for 
                                                 
45 Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d at 440-41. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
23 
 
the legislature to declare generically that "one who causes the 
death of another human being by a high degree of negligence in 
the operation or handling of a firearm commits a misdemeanor, 
while someone who causes bodily harm in the same manner commits 
a felony."46   
¶35 The "two strikes" law at issue in the present case 
imposes the more severe penalty on a person convicted of a non-
fatal child sexual assault who had previously been convicted of 
a child sexual assault.  In this way, the "two strikes" law is 
limited to a particular subset of offenders who repeatedly 
victimize a particular subset of people and holds them out for 
especially harsh penalties.  Thus, unlike in Asfoor, the 
legislature's 
more 
severe 
penalty 
for 
certain 
offenders 
convicted of non-fatal crimes under the "two strikes" law is 
neither irrational nor unconstitutional.  
¶36 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
legislature's interest in protecting the public from child 
sexual assault offenders, a particular subset of offenders with 
a perceived high rate of recidivism who victimize an especially 
vulnerable segment of the population, makes it rational for the 
legislature to impose a greater penalty on an offender convicted 
of a second Class B non-fatal child sexual assault than on an 
offender convicted of a second Class A felony homicide offense.  
We therefore hold that the defendant's constitutional challenge 
to the "two strikes" law fails. 
                                                 
46 Id. at 440. 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
24 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶37 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
01-1879-CR   
 
 
 
1