Title: State v. Martin

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
NO. COA13-713 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 18 February 2014 
 
 
TERRY WAYNE WOOD, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Forsyth County 
No. 09 CVS 3520 
JEREMY NUNNERY, NORTH CAROLINA 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and FIREMEN’S INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, D.C., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant Jeremy Nunnery from order entered 11 
February 2013 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court, 
Forsyth County.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2013. 
 
Maynard & Harris, Attorneys at Law, PLLC, by C. Douglas 
Maynard, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
 
Van Laningham Duncan PLLC, by L. Cooper Harrell; Smith 
Moore Leatherwood LLP, by James G. Exum, Jr.; and Bennett & 
Guthrie, PLLC, by Rodney A. Guthrie and Roberta King 
Latham, for Defendant-Appellant Jeremy Nunnery. 
 
 
Pinto Coates Kyre & Bowers, PLLC, by Deborah J. Bowers, for 
 
North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus 
 
curiae. 
 
 
Brown Moore & Associates, PLLC, by Jon R. Moore; and White 
&  
Stradley, PLLC, by J. David Stradley, for North Carolina 
 
Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae. 
 
 
McGEE, Judge. 
-2- 
 
 
Terry Wayne Wood (“Plaintiff”) was injured on 10 May 2006,  
in an automobile accident in Harnett County, as a result of the 
negligence of Jeremy Nunnery (“Defendant”).  At the time of the 
accident, Plaintiff was driving a truck owned by Plaintiff’s 
employer, in the course of his employment.  Plaintiff filed a 
complaint on 30 April 2009 against Defendants North Carolina 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), and 
Firemen's Insurance Company of Washington, D.C. (“Firemen's”). 
Farm Bureau was dismissed from the action and is not a 
party to this appeal.  Firemen's is the underinsured motorist 
carrier for Plaintiff's employer.  Defendant was insured at the 
time of the accident by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company (“State Farm”).   
At trial, the jury determined that Defendant’s negligence 
caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and awarded Plaintiff $300,000.00 
in compensatory damages on 11 August 2010.  The trial court 
entered judgment on 31 August 2010, directing that Plaintiff 
recover from Defendant damages in the amount of $300,000.00, 
along with interest at the statutory rate of eight percent (8%) 
from 30 April 2009.  State Farm paid its policy limit of 
$30,000.00 into the office of the Clerk of Court of Forsyth 
County on 2 September 2010.  Firemen's paid $202,627.58 into the 
-3- 
office of the Clerk of Court of Forsyth County on 13 September 
2010, in fulfilment of its obligations as the underinsured 
motorist carrier.  Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial that 
he had received workers' compensation benefits totaling more 
than $148,000.00.  The amount of the lien of Plaintiff’s 
employer’s 
workers’ 
compensation 
carrier 
was 
reduced, 
by 
agreement, to $50,000.00, leaving a net benefit in workers’ 
compensation benefits of $98,000.00. 
Defendant filed a motion for credit upon and satisfaction 
of the judgment on 1 December 2010.  The trial court entered an 
order on 29 December 2010, ruling that the payments of 
$30,000.00 
by 
State 
Farm, 
$202,627.58 
by 
Firemen's, 
and 
$98,000.00 
by 
Plaintiff’s 
employer’s 
workers’ 
compensation 
carrier, a total amount of $330,627.58, constituted payment in 
full of the judgment and that the judgment was satisfied.  
Plaintiff appealed, and this Court entered an opinion on 7 
August 2012 affirming in part and reversing and remanding in 
part.  Wood v. Nunnery, __ N.C. App. __, 730 S.E.2d 222 (2012) 
(Wood I).  In Wood I, and relevant to the current appeal, this 
Court stated: 
The trial court held that the $30,000.00 
from State Farm, $202,627.58 from Firemen's, 
and 
the 
net 
benefit 
of 
$98,000.00 
in 
workers' compensation benefits ($148,000.00 
less 
the 
reduced 
lien 
of 
$50,000.00) 
constituted a recovery to . . . [P]laintiff 
-4- 
of at least $330,627.58.  The trial court 
went 
on 
to 
hold 
that 
“the 
collective 
payments paid into the Office of the Clerk 
of Court of Forsyth County constitute full 
payment 
and 
satisfaction 
of 
the 
final 
Judgment entered herein.” 
  
Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224.  This Court went on to say: 
We initially note that the trial court 
conflated the concepts of the amounts owed 
by [D]efendant as the tortfeasor in this 
matter and the amount owed by Firemen's as 
an 
underinsured 
motorist 
carrier 
(UIM).  
Plaintiff instituted this action against 
[D]efendant, seeking monetary damages for 
personal injuries proximately caused by the 
negligence of [D]efendant.  The jury found 
that [P]laintiff's injuries were proximately 
caused by the negligence of [D]efendant and 
awarded 
damages 
to 
[P]laintiff 
of 
$300,000.00. 
 
The 
trial 
court 
entered 
judgment against only [D]efendant.  This 
judgment 
was 
based 
upon 
[D]efendant's 
negligence and was a tort recovery. 
 
The liability of Firemen's is based in 
contract, not in tort. 
 
Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224.  This Court held that Defendant 
was not “entitled to a credit against the judgment for payments 
made by Firemen's as a UIM carrier.”  Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 
225.  We  further held: “The only payment to which [D]efendant 
is entitled to a credit against the judgment is the $30,000.00 
paid by State Farm, [D]efendant's liability insurance carrier.”  
Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 226. 
However, in remanding to the trial court, this Court 
instructed:  
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The trial court erred in declaring that the 
judgment against [D]efendant had been paid 
and satisfied in full.  The portion of the 
trial court's order so declaring is vacated, 
and this matter is remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  At such a hearing, the 
trial court may consider whether [D]efendant 
is entitled to additional credits against 
the judgment, other than the $30,000.00 paid 
by State Farm. 
 
Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 226. 
 
Upon remand, the trial court, by order entered 11 February 
2013, ruled that Defendant was only entitled to a credit for the 
$30,000.00 paid by State Farm, his liability carrier, and that 
Defendant was not entitled to any credit for monies paid by 
either Firemen’s or by the workers’ compensation carrier.  
Defendant appeals the 11 February 2013 order. 
 
In Defendant’s first argument, he contends the trial court 
erred in “refusing to reduce the judgment against [him] to 
account for the UIM payment [made by Firemen’s] and net workers’ 
compensation benefits that were received by [Plaintiff] as 
compensation for his injuries.”  We disagree. 
 
In the prior appeal in this case, this Court held: “We hold 
that [D]efendant is not entitled to a credit for payments made 
by Firemen's into the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court for 
Forsyth County.”  Wood I, __ N.C. App. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 225.  
We have no authority to revisit that holding.  Weston v. 
-6- 
Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 415, 417, 438 S.E.2d 751, 
753 (1994) (citations omitted) (“According to the doctrine of 
the law of the case, once an appellate court has ruled on a 
question, that decision becomes the law of the case and governs 
the question both in subsequent proceedings in a trial court and 
on subsequent appeal.”). 
 
Less clear is the holding in Wood I concerning the workers’ 
compensation payments made to Plaintiff.  However, the Wood I 
opinion considered the credit given Defendant by the trial court 
for the net workers’ compensation payout in stating: “The trial 
court held that . . . the net benefit of $98,000.00 in workers’ 
compensation benefits ($148,000.00 less the reduced lien of 
$50,000.00) constituted a recovery to . . . [P]laintiff[.]”  
Wood I, __ N.C. App. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224.  The trial court 
then credited that amount (along with payments made by Firemen’s 
and State Farm) against Defendant’s recovery.  This Court held 
that the trial court had erred, stating: 
We initially note that the trial court 
conflated the concepts of the amounts owed 
by defendant as the tortfeasor in this 
matter and the amount owed by Firemen’s as 
an 
underinsured 
motorist 
carrier 
(UIM).  
Plaintiff instituted this action against 
[D]efendant, seeking monetary damages for 
personal injuries proximately caused by the 
negligence of [D]efendant.  The jury found 
that [P]laintiff’s injuries were proximately 
caused by the negligence of [D]efendant and 
awarded 
damages 
to 
[P]laintiff 
of 
-7- 
$300,000.00. 
 
The 
trial 
court 
entered 
judgment against only [D]efendant.  This 
judgment 
was 
based 
upon 
[D]efendant’s 
negligence and was a tort recovery. 
 
The liability of Firemen’s is based in 
contract, not in tort. 
 
Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224.  Though this Court did not include 
the workers’ compensation carrier in that discussion, its 
liability, like that of Firemen’s, was in contract, not tort.  
Plaintiff instituted this action in tort against Defendant, not 
the workers’ compensation carrier.  In Wood I, this Court 
continued: 
“The party against whom a judgment for the 
payment of money is rendered by any court of 
record may pay the whole, or any part 
thereof, in cash or by check, to the clerk 
of 
the 
court 
in 
which 
the 
same 
was 
rendered[.]” 
 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–239 
(2011). 
 
In this case, the judgment was entered only 
against [D]efendant.  It was not entered 
against Firemen’s.  By the plain language of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–239, [D]efendant is 
responsible 
for 
satisfying 
the 
judgment 
entered against him. 
 
The only payment to which [D]efendant is 
entitled to a credit against the judgment is 
the 
$30,000.00 
paid 
by 
State 
Farm, 
[D]efendant’s liability insurance carrier. 
 
Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 225-26.  Though the workers’ 
compensation payment is not specifically mentioned in this 
analysis, we find no distinguishing difference between the 
-8- 
relative positions of Firemen’s and the workers’ compensation 
carrier in this matter.  Within this context, we hold that our 
holding in Wood I: “The only payment to which [D]efendant is 
entitled to a credit against the judgment is the $30,000.00 paid 
by State Farm, [D]efendant’s liability insurance carrier[,]” 
id., applied to all potential credits that had been argued on 
appeal, including the workers’ compensation payment.  The trial 
court, having found that Defendant was not entitled to any 
additional credits not addressed in Wood I, did not err in 
denying Defendant credit for payments made to Plaintiff by 
Firemen’s or by the workers’ compensation carrier. 
 
Defendant’s policy arguments are not for us to decide, as 
we are bound by this Court’s holding in Wood I.  The same 
applies to Defendant’s collateral source argument. 
Affirmed. 
Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur. 
Report per Rule 30(e).