Title: State v. Kareski

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Kareski, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4008.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical 
or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4008 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KARESKI, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Kareski, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4008.] 
Criminal law—Evidence—Trial court error in taking judicial notice of essential 
fact—Appellate review—Effect of error on appellate court’s review of 
sufficiency of evidence for purposes of determining whether retrial is 
permissible under Double Jeopardy Clause—When erroneous judicial 
notice fills gap created by prosecution’s failure to prove essential element, 
judicially noticed fact may not be considered to determine whether 
sufficient evidence exists to permit retrial. 
(No. 2012-1242—Submitted April 24, 2013—Decided September 19, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 25705,  
2012-Ohio-2173. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case we address the implications of a trial court’s error in 
taking judicial notice of a fact when that error results in the reversal of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
conviction.  Specifically, we determine whether the fact that the court erroneously 
judicially noticed can be considered as evidence by the appellate court in deciding 
whether sufficient evidence exists such that retrial is permissible under the 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  We hold 
that the fact that was judicially noticed in error in this case should not have been 
considered evidence as part of the appellate court’s sufficiency analysis. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} A confidential informant and two Ohio Department of Public 
Safety (“ODPS”) agents walk into a bar.  The bar, the Rubber City Grille, is in 
Akron, and defendant appellant Matthew Kareski was bartending there on the 
evening of August 19, 2010.  Mychael Kimbel, the confidential informant, was a 
19-year-old employee of the ODPS. 
{¶ 3} Kimbel approached the bar and asked Kareski for a Bud Light.  
Kareski told Kimbel the price, grabbed a bottle of Bud Light, opened it, and 
placed it before Kimbel.  Kareski testified that he then noticed that Kimbel’s 
hands did not have the stamp showing that he had provided proof of his age at the 
door.  He told Kimbel that he could not give him the beer until he showed proper 
age identification.  At that moment, Kimbel pretended that a call was coming in 
on his cell phone.  He passed the money to Kareski, said he would return with 
identification, and walked away from the bar without the beer. 
{¶ 4} Kareski was charged with violating R.C. 4301.69(A), which 
prohibits the sale of beer to an underage person.  R.C. 4301.01(B)(2) contains the 
statutory definition of beer, defining it as “all beverages brewed or fermented 
wholly or in part from malt products and containing one-half of one per cent or 
more, but not more than twelve per cent, of alcohol by volume.” 
{¶ 5} ODPS Agent Keenan Reese had watched the transaction and 
retrieved the opened Bud Light as evidence.  He sent a sample of the contents of 
the bottle to a state lab to be analyzed, and a report was generated. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
{¶ 6} At Kareski’s trial, however, the state had difficulty proving that 
what Kareski had sold to Kimbel was, in fact, beer as defined by statute.  The 
particular bottle’s label itself did not disclose an alcohol content; a portion of the 
label was covered or obscured by the state’s evidence label, but it is unclear 
whether the bottle stated an alcohol content at all. 
{¶ 7} Kareski objected to the admission of the lab report regarding the 
contents of the bottle on the basis that no foundational witness testified as to its 
contents and that the report was hearsay and not properly authenticated.  The 
court took the matter under advisement, and after some research, concluded, “I 
don’t think the report comes in.  I think that I can take judicial notice that beer is 
an intoxicating liquor.”  After further discussion, the state asked, “Is the court 
taking judicial notice that Bud Lite [sic] is beer?”  The judge responded, “I’ll do 
that, but it seems to me the argument is going to be was there any testimony about 
what percentage of alcohol it contained.” When the jury returned, the judge stated 
to the jury, “I will take judicial notice that Bud Light is in fact beer.”  The state 
then rested its case. 
{¶ 8} The jury found Kareski guilty of a violation of R.C. 4301.69.  
Kareski appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred in taking judicial notice 
that Bud Light is beer pursuant to R.C. 4301.01(B)(2), that is, that it is a malt 
product containing “one-half of one per cent or more, but not more than twelve 
per cent, of alcohol by volume.”  The Ninth District Court of Appeals agreed and 
reversed the conviction. State v. Kareksi, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25705, 2012-
Ohio-2173.  The court held that the trial court should not have taken judicial 
notice of an element of the crime Kareski was charged with; further, it held that 
the court erred in taking judicial notice of a fact—the alcohol content by volume 
of Bud Light—that was not something that was “generally known.”  Evid.R. 
201(B).  The state did not appeal that decision. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 9} The issue before us is whether, given the trial court’s error, the 
appellate court properly ordered a new trial.  In particular, we must determine 
whether the fact that the trial court judicially noticed in error should have been 
considered as evidence in the appellate court’s determination of whether there 
was sufficient evidence against Kareski to allow a retrial.  Citing this court’s 
holding in State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, 
the court of appeals held that although the taking of judicial notice of an element 
of an offense was trial error, a reviewing court may consider the fact of which 
judicial notice was taken when determining the sufficiency of the evidence 
against the defendant.  2012-Ohio-2173, ¶ 12-13.  Using this approach, the court 
found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that therefore 
double jeopardy did not bar retrial. 
{¶ 10} Kareski filed an application for reconsideration in the court of 
appeals, requesting that the appellate court apply this court’s decision in State v. 
Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 683 N.E.2d 1112 (1997), a case involving a trial 
court’s error in taking judicial notice.  Kareski argued that because the trial court 
took judicial notice of an element of the offense in error, the absence of any 
evidence on that element meant that retrial was barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.  The 
appellate court denied Kareski’s motion for reconsideration. 
{¶ 11} Kareski has appealed to this court, arguing that his case should not 
have been remanded to the trial court for retrial.  He alleges that the appellate 
court erred in its determination of whether the state had offered sufficient 
evidence to convict him at trial.  Specifically, he argues that the appellate court 
should not have included within its sufficiency consideration the information 
regarding the alcohol content of Bud Light that the trial court had judicially 
noticed in error. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 12} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. State v. Kareski, 133 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2012-Ohio-4902, 976 
N.E.2d 913. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 13} The issue before us is how an appellate court should treat a trial 
court’s judicial-notice error when analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
determine whether the case should be remanded for retrial after reversal.  Our 
analysis hinges on whether this case is a Brewer case or Lovejoy case. 
{¶ 14} The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution 
protect criminal defendants against multiple prosecutions for the same offense.  
However, a retrial of a defendant after the reversal of a conviction does not 
necessarily constitute a double jeopardy violation.  In general, if the reversal is 
based on an error that occurred at trial, a retrial is appropriate.  Lockhart v. 
Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988).  If, on the other 
hand, the appellate court’s reversal is based upon an insufficiency of the evidence, 
a retrial violates double jeopardy. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).  The United States Supreme Court has explained the 
distinction for double jeopardy purposes between reversals based on insufficiency 
of the evidence and those based upon trial errors: 
 
While the former is in effect a finding “that the government has 
failed to prove its case” against the defendant, the latter “implies 
nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” 
but is simply “a determination that [he] has been convicted through 
a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect.” 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Lockhart at 40, quoting Burks at 15. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 15} In Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, 
this court considered the intersection of defective process and insufficient 
evidence, that is, whether an appellate court should include in its sufficiency 
determination evidence that had been admitted in error at trial.  Brewer cited the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart in holding that the wrongly 
admitted evidence could still be relied upon by a reviewing court to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence: 
 
As the United States Supreme Court held in Lockhart, we 
hold that when evidence admitted at trial is sufficient to support a 
conviction, but on appeal, some of that evidence is determined to 
have been improperly admitted, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of 
the United States and Ohio Constitutions will not bar retrial. 
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265. 
 
Brewer at  ¶ 25. 
{¶ 16} An important philosophical underpinning of Brewer is that the 
state relies upon a trial court’s evidentiary rulings in the presentation of its case:  
 
 
“If the evidence offered by the State is received after 
challenge and is legally sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
accused, the State is not obligated to go further and adduce 
additional evidence that would be, for example, cumulative.  Were 
it otherwise, the State, to be secure, would have to assume every 
ruling by the trial court on the evidence to be erroneous and 
marshall and offer every bit of relevant and competent evidence.  
The practical consequences of this would adversely affect the 
administration of justice, if for no other reason, by the time which 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
would be required for preparation and trial of every case.” State v. 
Wood (Mo.1980), 596 S.W.2d 394, 398–399; State v. Gray (1986), 
200 Conn. 523, 538, 512 A.2d 217.  Thus, retrial grants the state 
“one full and fair opportunity” to present its evidence to the jury 
free from error. See [Arizona v.] Washington, 434 U.S. [497,] 505, 
98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 [1978]. 
 
Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 17} Lockhart and Brewer both involved a trial court’s erroneous 
admission of evidence offered by the state.  The reversals in those cases therefore 
were due to a fault in procedure rather than a lack of proof.  In State v. Lovejoy, 
79 Ohio St.3d 440, 683 N.E.2d 1112, this court considered a case involving a trial 
court’s error in taking judicial notice where the state had failed to offer admissible 
evidence on an element of the crime.  Lovejoy was charged with having a weapon 
under disability, a charge that includes as a necessary element proof of a prior 
conviction.  The trial court in Lovejoy sua sponte reopened the evidence after 
closing arguments to “take judicial notice of prior proceedings in an earlier case 
to supply a crucial fact that the state had failed to prove,” i.e., the fact of a prior 
conviction.  Id. at 449.  The appellate court held that the trial court had erred in 
taking judicial notice, but ruled that the sufficiency of the evidence was moot in 
light of its disposition of other issues in the appeal, and the state did not appeal 
that holding.  This court held that because judicial notice had been taken in error, 
the court of appeals should have addressed the issue of the sufficiency of the 
evidence, “review[ing] the remaining evidence to determine whether it was 
sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. at 450.  Thus, this court held that the 
judicial notice of the prior conviction should not be considered by the appellate 
court in its sufficiency evaluation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 18} This court noted that despite the appellate court’s ruling that the 
sufficiency issue was moot, that court had actually resolved the issue by 
acknowledging that if the trial court had not taken judicial notice of the prior 
conviction, the documents offered by the state were insufficient to prove that 
Lovejoy was under a disability. Id.  That being the case, this court held that the 
appellate court’s remand for a retrial was improper: 
 
Because the appellate court ruled on the judicial notice issue as it 
did, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence was not moot.  In 
fact, the sufficiency of the remaining evidence became the key 
issue. 
* * * To simply remand the weapon under disability charge 
for a retrial would give the state a “second bite at the apple” and a 
chance to present evidence it failed to offer at the first trial. * * * 
In this case, the Double Jeopardy Clause applies.  In fact, this is 
what the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to prevent.  If the 
state fails to present sufficient evidence to prove every element of 
the crime, it should not get a second opportunity to do that which it 
failed to do the first time. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id., 79 Ohio St.3d at 450, 683 N.E.2d 1112. 
{¶ 19} This court’s decision in Lovejoy was consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, where the court held that “the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally 
insufficient” and that “the only ‘just’ remedy available for that court is the 
direction of a judgment of acquittal.”  Id. at 18.  As the court noted in Lockhart: 
 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
Burks was based on the view that an appellate court’s 
reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is in effect a 
determination that the government’s case against the defendant 
was so lacking that the trial court should have entered a judgment 
of acquittal, rather than submitting the case to the jury. 
 
Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 39, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265, citing Burks at 16-17. 
{¶ 20} This court did not overrule Lovejoy in Brewer.  Brewer 
acknowledged that the trial court in Lovejoy took judicial notice of a prior 
conviction because of a deficiency of proof offered by the state.  121 Ohio St.3d 
202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 22. The trial court’s action exposed the 
state’s failure to prove its case.  In Brewer, this court compared that case and 
Lockhart to Lovejoy:  
 
[T]his case and Lockhart involve a trial court’s erroneous 
admission of evidence presented by the state during its case-in-
chief and the state’s reliance upon the erroneous evidentiary 
rulings.  In contrast, the facts presented in State v. Lovejoy, 79 
Ohio St.3d 440, 683 N.E.2d 1112, differ dramatically from those 
presented here and in Lockhart. 
In Lovejoy, the state did not rely on an erroneous trial court 
evidentiary ruling, but rather failed to meet its burden of proof to 
present sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Recognizing the state’s failure, the trial court 
sua sponte reopened the case to take judicial notice of [a fact] to 
establish a missing element. * * * Thus, Lovejoy is factually 
distinguishable from Lockhart and this case because in Lovejoy, 
the state never relied on an erroneous evidentiary ruling in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
deciding what evidence to present at trial.  Instead, Lovejoy 
involved the prosecution’s failure to meet the sufficiency-of-
evidence standard. 
 
Brewer at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 21} Is this case more akin to Lovejoy or Brewer?  We find that it is 
controlled by Lovejoy. 
{¶ 22} As in Lovejoy, the trial court in this case judicially noticed a 
factual element of the crime after the prosecution demonstrated an inability to 
present evidence on that element.  The prosecution in this case attempted to 
submit a report on the testing of the contents of the bottle, but since the report 
lacked foundational testimony, the trial court did not allow it to be admitted as 
evidence.  The bottle itself was in the courtroom, but the witness who examined 
the bottle on the stand was unable to discern any information on the particular 
label regarding its alcohol content. The state then requested that the trial court 
take judicial notice that the bottle contained beer as statutorily defined, and the 
court complied.  The state then rested its case. 
{¶ 23} As in Lovejoy, the trial court filled a gap left by the state in proving 
its case by taking judicial notice of an essential element and thereby committing 
error.  As in Lovejoy, the prosecution cannot claim to have relied on an 
evidentiary ruling, because there was no ruling that the report or the bottle itself 
was admissible on which to rely.  As in Lovejoy, we cannot countenance allowing 
the state to come to trial unprepared to prove its case only to be rescued by a trial 
court taking judicial notice of an element the state has failed to prove, and 
committing error in doing so. 
{¶ 24} The court in Lockhart held that in conducting a sufficiency review, 
a reviewing court must consider all the evidence admitted at trial, even 
improperly admitted evidence:  “[W]here the evidence offered by the State and 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
admitted by the trial court—whether erroneously or not—would have been 
sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
preclude retrial.”  (Emphasis added.)  Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 34, 109 S.Ct. 285, 
102 L.Ed.2d 265. 
{¶ 25} But here, the sole evidence offered by the state on the issue of the 
alcohol content of the beer in question was never admitted.  Instead, the trial court 
saved the state’s case by taking judicial notice that the contents of the Bud Light 
bottle met the statutory definition of “beer.”  We thus find unavailing any claim 
by the state that it relied on the trial court’s taking of judicial notice; Brewer’s 
concern about forcing the state to offer cumulative evidence on every element 
rings hollow when the state offered nothing that the trial court deemed admissible. 
{¶ 26} Therefore, we conclude that the appellate court erred when it relied 
upon the trial court’s taking of judicial notice of the alcohol content of Bud Light 
in its review of the sufficiency of the evidence against Kareski and when it 
remanded the case for retrial.  Since there was no evidence admitted on that 
statutory element of the alcohol content of the substance sold by Kareski to the 
informant, there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution bar 
a retrial.  Accordingly, we vacate Kareski’s conviction. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment and concur 
separately. 
FRENCH, J., dissents. 
____________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 27} I concur in the judgment.  I would not, however, simply 
distinguish, but would overrule State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
593, 903 N.E.2d 284.  In cases like this, it is not useful to ask whether retrial may 
be allowed on grounds of trial error or whether retrial is prohibited by double 
jeopardy on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.  After all, the state argues 
that it relied on the court’s judicial notice under Evid.R. 201 that Bud Light is 
beer.  The state maintains that this ruling is “trial error” in the admission of 
evidence.  Under Brewer’s standard, all evidence, even that improperly admitted, 
is considered when determining sufficiency of the evidence; therefore, retrial is 
always possible. 
{¶ 28} The Brewer majority had accepted the federal rule stated in 
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial when all the evidence admitted by the 
trial court is sufficient to support a guilty verdict.  Yet, as Chief Justice Moyer 
pointed out in his dissent in Brewer,  
 
 
We held [in State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 683 
N.E.2d 1112 (1997)] that double-jeopardy principles barred retrial, 
because retrial under such circumstances [when the trial court sua 
sponte reopens the evidence to take judicial notice of a fact 
essential to the state’s case] “is what the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was intended to prevent.  If the state fails to present sufficient 
evidence to prove every element of the crime, it should not get a 
second opportunity to do that which it failed to do the first time.”  
Id.  The court of appeals, when reviewing the evidence for 
sufficiency, was constrained to use only the evidence that was 
properly admitted; because this evidence was insufficient, 
principles of double jeopardy barred a new trial.  Id. 
 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, at ¶ 29 (Moyer, C.J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 29} This court’s holding in Lovejoy and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Lockhart thus were in conflict regarding whether evidence that was 
improperly admitted may be considered when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim.  Chief Justice Moyer explained, 
 
 
In this instance, pursuant to Lovejoy, Ohio’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause would offer greater protection from multiple 
prosecutions 
than 
the 
federal 
clause 
by 
narrowing 
the 
circumstances under which a defendant may be retried when the 
state fails to prove its case during the first go-around.  Although 
we have historically found Ohio’s Double Jeopardy Clause to be 
coextensive with its federal counterpart, Ohio’s clause is not 
limited by the federal clause. 
 
Id. at ¶ 34 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).  I agree.  The state has one fair and full 
opportunity to be put to its proof against a criminal defendant and should ensure 
that it satisfies each element of the offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
support a conviction.  I would clarify the rule by holding that Brewer is no longer 
good law.  I concur in judgment reversing Kareski’s conviction. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, which I consider 
to be a departure from settled double jeopardy principles recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court and adopted by this court in the context of the Ohio 
Constitution.  By equating a reversal for evidentiary trial error with an acquittal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
for constitutionally insufficient evidence, the majority’s holding runs headlong 
into a thicket of state and federal constitutional problems and will undoubtedly 
cause uncertainty and confusion for appellate courts. 
{¶ 31} The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial 
following a reversal for insufficiency of the evidence, but not following a reversal 
for “trial error,” such as the “incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence.”  Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).  Unlike a 
reversal for evidentiary trial error, a reversal for constitutionally insufficient 
evidence is the equivalent of a trial court’s judgment of acquittal at the close of all 
of the evidence.  Id. at 16-17.  Reversal for insufficiency represents a legal finding 
that, after viewing the record evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 
S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 
{¶ 32} In Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 
265 (1988), the United States Supreme Court explained which evidence an 
appellate court must consider in a sufficiency analysis once it has determined that 
the conviction should be reversed due to trial error in the admission of evidence.  
Because a reversal for insufficiency of the evidence “should be treated no 
differently than a trial court’s granting a judgment of acquittal at the close of all 
the evidence,” the court held that an appellate court must consider “all of the 
evidence admitted by the trial court,” whether or not the evidence was 
erroneously admitted.  Id. at 41.  Where the evidentiary insufficiency exists only 
because of the appellate court’s initial conclusion that certain evidence was 
admitted in error, the reversal is one based on trial error, and a reversal will not 
bar retrial.  Id. at 40.  In State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, 903 
N.E.2d 284, syllabus, this court explicitly “followed” Lockhart in the context of 
the Ohio Constitution.  See also State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 80 (applying the “all evidence” rule established in 
Lockhart). 
{¶ 33} I am compelled, under the logic of Burks, Lockhart, and Brewer, to 
view the reversal in this case as one based on trial error.  The evidentiary 
insufficiency existed only because the court of appeals concluded that the trial 
court erred in taking judicial notice of an adjudicative fact, i.e., that Bud Light is 
beer.1  See Lockhart at 40 (finding “trial error” where “the trial court erred in 
admitting a particular piece of evidence, and without it there was insufficient 
evidence to support a judgment of conviction”).  With that judicially noticed fact, 
there was sufficient evidence to support Kareski’s conviction: the remaining 
evidence proved that Kareski, while bartending, served a bottle of “Bud Light 
beer” to a 19-year-old.  Accordingly, the court of appeals was correct to include 
the judicially noticed fact in its sufficiency analysis. 
{¶ 34} The majority acknowledges that the judicially noticed fact “saved 
the state’s case,” Majority opinion at ¶ 25, yet it concludes that the court of 
appeals should have subtracted that fact from its sufficiency analysis.  That is 
precisely what Lockhart says not to do.  A reviewing court must consider “all of 
the evidence admitted by the trial court,” regardless of whether that evidence was 
admitted erroneously.  Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 41, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265.  
Reviewing the “same quantum of evidence” is what “make[s] the analogy 
complete” between a reversal for insufficiency on the one hand, and the trial 
court’s granting of an acquittal at the close of the evidence on the other.  Id. at 42.  
Reviewing the sufficiency of only some of the evidence would destroy that 
analogy, and a finding of insufficiency would not equate to an acquittal for double 
jeopardy purposes. 
                                                 
1 The propriety of that conclusion is not before us in this appeal.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
{¶ 35} The majority relies on the “remaining evidence” standard, which 
this court created, without supporting authority, in State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 
440, 450, 683 N.E.2d 1112 (1997).  But we cannot apply such a standard for the 
simple reason that it conflicts with the “all evidence” standard established in 
Lockhart, which is a binding interpretation of the United States Constitution.  Our 
decision in Lovejoy did not rely on the Ohio Constitution to support a “remaining 
evidence” standard.  In fact, this court did not directly confront that question until 
Brewer, where we distinguished Lovejoy, but also expressly adopted the Lockhart 
rule in the context of the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at syllabus.  While the concurring 
opinion calls for an overruling of Brewer, which is no more than an adoption of 
Lockhart, I believe that Brewer is the only case keeping Ohio on track with the 
constitutional holdings in Burks and Lockhart.  We have historically treated the 
Ohio Double Jeopardy Clause as “coextensive” with its federal counterpart, State 
v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996), and I see no valid 
reason to depart from that practice in this case. 
{¶ 36} Lockhart’s “all evidence” rule is logical, straightforward, and, as a 
constitutional matter, mandatory.  I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment 
following Lockhart and hold that a reversal for an improper judicial notice of fact 
constitutes a reversal for trial error and that an appellate court must consider the 
judicially noticed fact in its sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
____________________ 
Cheri B. Cunningham, Akron Director of Law, Michael J. Defibaugh, 
Assistant Director of Law, and Gertrude Wilms, Akron Chief City Prosecutor, for 
appellee. 
Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., Jack Morrison Jr., Thomas R. Houlihan, 
and Scott E. Mullaney, for appellant. 
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Franklin 
County Prosecuting Attorney Ron O’Brien. 
________________________