Title: Stapleman v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stapleman v. State1984 WY 41680 P.2d 73Case Number: 83-142Decided: 04/20/1984DENNIS STAPLEMAN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
DENNIS STAPLEMAN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; Sylvia Lee Hackl, Cheyenne, Appellate Counsel; 
Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, and Mark K. 
Workman, Student Intern (argued), for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen.; Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen.; John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen.; and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and 
CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was charged 
in a two-count information with aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon and 
conversion by a bailee. He was acquitted of the aggravated assault charge but 
was found guilty of conversion by a bailee. He appeals from the conviction. We 
will reverse.

[¶2.]     The only issue 
presented on appeal is:

"Whether the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury on the offered defense instruction 
resulting in a denial of appellant's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution."

[¶3.]     Appellant had been 
involved in a business relationship with Black Hills Trucking from January of 
1981 until May of 1982. Appellant obtained a trailer from Black Hills Trucking 
to make a scheduled run in mid April 1982, but this run never materialized. 
Appellant remained in possession of the trailer from April until July 15, 1982. 
During this time, appellant was having difficulty collecting money owed to him 
by Black Hills Trucking. This problem was partially responsible for the 
termination of the business relationship. In April, appellant stated that he 
ought to hold the trailer until Black Hills Trucking paid him. During the months 
of May and June, appellant testified that he forgot he had the trailer. He owned 
approximately two and a half acres of land on which were parked several trucks 
and trailers, including the Black Hills 
trailer. Sometime in July, an employee of Black Hills Trucking noticed the 
trailer. On July 15, 1982, Black Hills Trucking sent an employee out to pick up 
the trailer. At that time, appellant rushed out with a gun and informed the 
employee that he would get the trailer when he received his money. The employee 
left. Shortly thereafter the Natrona County Sheriff's office was called to 
reclaim the trailer for Black Hills Trucking. Appellant was then charged with 
violation of § 6-7-303, W.S. 1977, which provided in part:

"If any bailee by finding 
or otherwise, of any * * * goods or chattels, shall convert the same to his or 
her own use, with intent to steal the 
same, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny * * *." (Emphasis 
supplied.)

[¶4.]     The case was tried to a 
jury. Appellant's theory of defense was that he lacked the necessary specific 
intent to steal the trailer. Appellant submitted the following 
instruction:

"A defense to larceny by 
bailee is the taking possession of property to secure payment of a 
claim."

This instruction 
was refused.

[¶5.]     Larceny by bailee is 
not a common-law offense but an offense created by statute, 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 
45. The Wyoming statute creating this offense, § 
6-7-303, W.S. 1977, supra, provides that once the elements of unlawful 
conversion by bailee have been established, the offender is "deemed guilty of 
larceny."

[¶6.]     Both larceny and 
larceny by bailee require the same "intent to steal" as an essential element of 
the crime, Neel v. State, Wyo., 452 P.2d 203 
(1969); § 6-7-303, W.S. 1977, supra, and the circumstances in which it has been 
held that the required intent was not present are generally the same for larceny 
as for larceny by bailee. 

[¶7.]     There are three 
elements which must be established to sustain a conviction of larceny by bailee: 
(1) goods received lawfully by a bailee; (2) thereafter conversion of the goods; 
(3) with an intent to steal the same, § 6-7-303, W.S. 1977, supra; Epperson v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1051, 1052 (1979); Morrow v. State, 146 Neb. 601, 20 N.W.2d 602 
(1945).

[¶8.]     Conversion of property 
by a bailee may be committed "* * * by refusing to redeliver to the bailor at 
the expiration or completion of the bailment." 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 
31.

[¶9.]     A conversion can occur 
without "intent to steal" as where possession of property is retained because of 
ignorance, mistake of fact, if reasonable, or bona fide but erroneous claim of 
right, although such error is one of law. 50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny § 
41.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that the instructions 
which were given did not affirmatively present his defense that he did not 
possess intent to steal.

"* * * It may be said 
that when the defendant proves facts or circumstances to excuse his acts which 
otherwise would be a crime, or when the specific issue is one of criminal 
intent, ordinarily an affirmative instruction should be given. * * *" Vinson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 248 S.W.2d 430, 
433 (1952).

When an 
instruction has been offered presenting the defendant's theory of defense, that 
instruction or a similar instruction must be presented to the jury if it is 
supported by competent evidence. Goodman 
v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400 (1977); Blakely v. State, Wyo., 474 P.2d 127 
(1970). It is the duty of the court to present to the jury the theory of the 
defense in his instructions when requested by the defendant. State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119 (1947); Jackson v. State, Wyo., 624 P.2d 751 
(1981). Therefore, we must look at the record to see if there was competent 
evidence requiring an affirmative presentation of defendant's theory, i.e., that 
he did not possess the specific intent to steal necessary to the 
conviction.

[¶11.]  In reviewing the evidence, we adhere to 
the following standard:

"`* * * For the purpose 
of determining whether an instruction in favor of accused should be given, the 
court must view the evidence in a light as favorable to him as is justifiable, 
and accused's testimony must be taken as entirely true.'" Goodman v. State, supra, at 409 quoting 
from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1313.

[¶12.]  There was testimony that appellant had 
told one of his drivers in mid April that he would retain possession of the 
trailer until Black Hills Trucking paid him. Appellant also testified that when 
the Black Hills Trucking employee came to get the trailer, he told him to get 
off his property and go tell Mr. Collins, the boss, that "when he brings me the 
money he owes me, he can have his trailer." This testimony was corroborated by 
the employee. Appellant had contacted an attorney who advised that he should 
place a lien on the trailer. Appellant's wife stated that the only reason 
appellant was holding the trailer was to secure payment of money owed. Appellant 
forgot that the trailer was on his lot during May and June. That is of no 
import. There was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that 
appellant believed he was retaining the trailer as security for payment of the 
debt owed him rather than intending to steal it.

[¶13.]  In McCann v. United States, 2 Wyo. 274 
(1877), defendant was a bailee of sugar to be delivered to Indian agencies. He 
sold some of it, but contended there was an arrangement authorizing him to do 
so. He was not permitted to answer a question inquiring about the arrangement 
and, in reversing, this court said,

"* * * had the answer 
shown only a belief on his part that the authority 
was and should be given, and that he kept within it, he would equally have been 
entitled to a verdict." (Emphasis supplied.) 2 Wyo. at 303.

 

This court said 
the following instruction should have been given to the 
jury:

"* * * `Ninth, That if 
the defendant took the property described in the indictment under an honest 
claim of right to do so, and under an honest belief that he had authority to 
take the same and dispose of it, then the act of taking would lack the felonious 
intent necessary to constitute the crime charged, and it is for the jury to say, 
in view of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, what the intention of 
the defendant was.' * * *" Id. at 310.

The court then 
said that the effect of incorrectly refusing the above instruction was to 
hold,

"* * * that his motives 
and purposes however honest and pure, or the circumstances under which he 
converted the property to his own use however conclusive to establish his 
innocence of the crime charged, are of no consequence whatever; that when the 
fact is once established that the defendant converted the property to his own 
use the law eo instanti pronounces him guilty, and that there is no balm in all 
Gilead that can save him from the penalty of the violated law. * * *" Id. at 
311.

And concluding, 
we said:

"* * * Can it be possible 
that this is the law? I cannot think so * * *." Id. at 
311.

And so it may 
not be larceny by bailee to retain possession of property, temporarily, under an 
honest belief in the right to do so, and without an "intent to steal." At least 
it is a question for the trier of fact to decide upon proper 
instructions.

[¶14.]  The State contends, however, that the 
proposed instruction did not accurately present the applicable law, even if 
there was evidence to support the theory. Generally, an instruction which is 
incomplete may be properly refused. Benson v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 595 
(1977); Wilson v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1246 (1982). However, if the 
instruction, although not entirely correct, is at least sufficient to apprise 
the court of the theory of defense, then it is incumbent upon the court to 
either give the instruction or to otherwise properly instruct upon the accused's 
theory of the case. Blakely v. State, 
supra, at 129; Thomas v. State, Wyo., 
562 P.2d 1287 (1977). Although the instruction proffered was incomplete and did 
not adequately present the law, it was sufficient to apprise the court of the 
appellant's theory, and an instruction upon that theory was 
required.

[¶15.]  The State contends that all of the 
instructions taken together fairly presented to the jury the law of the case and 
each element of the crimes charged. The instructions, however, did not present 
clearly, as a defense, the claim of rightful possession and its effect upon lack 
of intent to steal. That was the very crux of the case. Without question, 
appellant was prejudiced by the failure to so instruct. It is not enough to 
submit a mere abstract statement of the law. Poore v. State, 94 N.M. 172, 608 P.2d 148 (1980). Other instructions did not offer affirmatively that appellant's 
honest belief in his right to retain possession of the trailer would be a 
defense to the charge. Blakely v. 
State, supra.

[¶16.]  The failure to instruct upon the defense 
and the prejudice that resulted comes clearly into focus in the prosecutor's 
closing argument. The prosecutor, arguing the meaning of conversion by bailee, 
stated:

"* * * I came upon it 
lawfully, I was supposed to use it for Black Hills Trucking, but then I decided 
to use it for my purposes. He was going to use it for his own benefit. Pretty 
clearcut. What difference does it make if all he wanted to do was get paid. That 
isn't how you get paid. I am sure that there are some of us who felt that way, I 
am not going to pay you till the job is done. Right. We have all maybe wanted to 
do that, but it is against the law, and we don't do it. * * 
*"

And continuing, 
she said:

"If somebody told you, I 
am not going to give you your car back until you do what I say. Wouldn't you 
think your car had been stolen? Your choice is to do what he says or do without 
your car. Black Hills Trucking could pay or they could do without their trailer. 
That is theft. That is stealing. That is intent to steal."

These arguments 
misstate the law. Retaining possession of bailed property under a bona fide 
though mistaken belief in the right to do so is not "intent to steal." The 
combination of these statements without adequate instructions upon defendant's 
theory of his defense created a denial of due process. The standard under Goodman, supra, requires competent 
evidence supporting the theory of defense and an instruction adequate to inform 
the jury of that theory. If these two elements are present and prejudice results 
from the failure to instruct, as in this case, the error requires 
reversal.

[¶17.]  Reversed.

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18.]  I dissent. One cannot obtain a valid lien 
in the fashion here attempted by appellant. This type of lien is not provided by 
statute. Statutory liens are strictly construed. Minnehoma Financial Company v. Pauli, 
Wyo., 565 P.2d 835, 839 (1977); American Buildings Company v. Wheelers 
Stores, Wyo., 585 P.2d 845, 847 (1978). A nonstatutory lien cannot be 
created except by contract with the owner of the property. Cities Service Oil Company v. Pubco 
Petroleum Corporation, Wyo., 497 P.2d 1368, 1373 
(1972).

[¶19.]  The majority opinion does not contend 
otherwise. Rather, it contends that appellant's belief that he had a valid lien 
negatives his "intent to steal" and that the jury was not adequately instructed 
on lack of intent being a defense to the charge. The majority opinion 
acknowledges that the court did not err in refusing to give the instruction 
offered by appellant inasmuch as it was not a proper statement of the law. 
Rather, such opinion is premised on:

"* * * However, if the 
instruction, although not entirely correct, is at least sufficient to apprise 
the court of the theory of defense, then it is incumbent upon the court to 
either give the instruction or to otherwise properly instruct upon the accused's 
theory of the case. * * *"

[¶20.]  I believe (1) that the offered 
instruction was not sufficient to 
apprise the court of the theory relative to lack of intent, and (2) that, 
nonetheless, the court was otherwise aware of such theory, and did adequately 
instruct concerning it.

OFFERED 
INSTRUCTION

[¶21.]  The offered instruction is as 
follows:

"A defense to larceny by 
bailee is the taking possession of property to secure payment of a 
claim."

On its face, the 
instruction reflects the contention that one can take property of another at any 
time in any way to secure payment of a claim. As already noted, such is not the 
law. The offered instruction does not mention intent. The focus in it is on the 
activity of taking possession of property. It did not sufficiently apprise the 
court of a desire to put before the jury as a defense the appellant's belief that he had a valid 
lien. The court was not fairly informed that appellant did not believe the other 
instructions did not go far enough in this respect.

ADEQUATE 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶22.]  In any event, the instructions given by 
the court were adequate to advise the jury of appellant's theory, i.e., that he 
believed he had the right to refuse delivery of the trailer and thus did not 
have an intent to steal.

[¶23.]  In Instruction No. 3, the jury was 
informed that the State had "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential 
fact necessary to constitute the offenses charged." "Intent to steal" was set 
forth as an element of the crime in Instructions 7 and 8, with the direction in 
Instruction No. 8 that:

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant not 
guilty."

Instruction No. 
10A provided:

"Intent to steal means 
one must intend to deprive the owner of the possession of his property 
permanently or for an unreasonable length of time."

Specific intent 
was defined in Instruction No. 16 as follows:

"To constitute the crime 
charged of unlawful conversion by bailee and possession of a firearm with intent 
to unlawfully threaten, there must be a union of two essential elements, an act 
forbidden by law and a specific intent.

"Specific intent 
means more than the general intent to commit the act. To prove a crime which 
involves specific intent, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt:

"1. That the Defendant 
did the act charged; and

"2. That he did it with 
the specific intent described in the crime charged. The specific intent must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt as any other fact in the 
case."

[¶24.]  The jury was adequately instructed on the 
necessity for specific intent, and it is obvious that appellant's contention 
that he lacked specific intent was fairly placed before the 
jury.

[¶25.]  I would affirm.