Title: Beahringer v. Page

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93220-Agenda 10-January 2003.
JOHN BEAHRINGER, Appellee, v. JAMES H. PAGE et al., 
 								Appellants.
Opinion filed April 3, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, John Beahringer, is an inmate in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections. According to plaintiff's brief:
"When a recalcitrant bureaucracy failed to respond to his
grievance over the confiscation of his art materials, he filed a pro
se complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against
Department officials for a determination *** that the confiscation
violated his [constitutional] rights."
	The circuit court of Will County dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. With one justice dissenting, the
appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. No.
3-00-0720 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	We allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a)). We now hold that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient
facts showing that he exhausted the Department's grievance
procedure prior to filing his complaint. Accordingly, we reverse
the appellate court and affirm the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	In determining whether to allow a motion to dismiss, a court
must take as true all well-pled allegations of fact contained in the
complaint and exhibits attached thereto. Haddick v. Valor
Insurance, 198 Ill. 2d 409, 414 (2001); Kennedy v. Deere & Co.,
118 Ill. 2d 69, 71 (1987).
	Plaintiff's complaint alleged as follows. Plaintiff has been
incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC or
Department) since 1992. He is scheduled to be released in August
2005. Beginning in 1993, plaintiff actively practiced art while
confined at various correctional centers including Menard,
Pontiac, Big Muddy River, Stateville, and Centralia. He was
permitted to possess and use in his cell art materials that complied
with IDOC safety and security policies. Plaintiff bought art
supplies from several of the prison commissaries. Indeed, from
October 1998 to August 4, 1999, while confined at Centralia,
IDOC employed plaintiff as an art instructor. He was allowed to
purchase art supplies from an outside vendor. Over the years,
plaintiff has sent his works of art to relatives and friends.
According to plaintiff, he "communicates and bonds with his
family and friends" through his art.
	On August 18, 1999, IDOC transferred plaintiff from
Centralia to disciplinary segregation at Stateville. He was released
from discipline on February 3, 2000. IDOC officials informed
plaintiff that he would no longer be permitted to possess his art
materials. The officials instructed plaintiff to send his art materials
home or they would be destroyed. An IDOC official informed
plaintiff that Stateville no longer had an art program and that
IDOC intended to ban art programs from all of its facilities.
Plaintiff's art supplies have been withheld from him since that
date. Among plaintiff's confiscated items were paints and
paintbrushes; pencils, erasers, pens, and metal calligraphy nibs;
drawing paper, posterboard, and canvasses; and a staple remover.
	However, as of the filing of plaintiff's complaint, Stateville's
commissary sold a limited selection of art materials, many of
which were similar to those that IDOC officials confiscated from
plaintiff. Also, a number of inmates at Stateville possess art
materials and practice art in their cells.
	On February 9, 2000, plaintiff filed an emergency grievance.
On February 10, James Page, the warden at Stateville, denied
plaintiff's emergency grievance because it failed to state the
requisite facts for consideration as an emergency pursuant to
Department regulations. The warden directed plaintiff to file the
grievance with his counselor.
	On February 11, Stateville's personal property officer issued
to plaintiff a disposal-of-personal-property notice. The notice
required plaintiff to have a visitor pick up his art materials or to
send the materials out of the prison at his expense. If plaintiff
failed to do either within 60 days, the art materials would be
destroyed.
	On February 29, plaintiff filed a grievance through the
Department's established grievance procedure. His counselor
received the grievance on March 4 and referred it to a grievance
officer on March 11. As of the filing of plaintiff's complaint,
plaintiff has not received a response to his grievance.
	Also, on March 1, plaintiff wrote a personal letter to Donald
Gaetz, the assistant warden of operations at Stateville. On March
6, plaintiff wrote a letter to Donald Snyder, Jr., the director of
IDOC. In these letters, plaintiff described the circumstances
surrounding the confiscation and sought the return of his art
materials. Plaintiff received no response to his letters.
	On May 6, plaintiff filed in the circuit court of Will County
his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Page and
Snyder. He alleged as follows. Art "is a clearly established form
of speech and expression guaranteed under the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution." Defendants, by taking away his
art supplies, restricted his ability to communicate with his family
and friends through art. Plaintiff sought a declaration that
defendants violated his first amendment right to free expression by
confiscating his art supplies.
	Plaintiff also alleged as follows. He was being permanently
deprived of his art materials. Without preliminary injunctive relief,
plaintiff would lose the supplies, which he could not afford to
replace. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction preventing IDOC
from destroying his art materials.
	Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section
2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West
2000)). Defendants asserted that plaintiff's right to possess his art
materials did not override the Department's interests in regulating
prisoner conduct. Rather, plaintiff's possession of art materials
was within the safety and security authority of IDOC.
	Defendants also asserted that a preliminary injunction was
inappropriate because plaintiff failed to show that he would be
irreparably harmed. Defendants argued that plaintiff had the option
of sending his art materials home, where they could be retrieved
upon his release from prison. The circuit court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss.
	A divided panel of the appellate court vacated the circuit
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, granted his request for
a preliminary injunction, and remanded the cause for further
proceedings. No. 3-00-0720 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). The majority concluded that plaintiff's complaint
stated a cause of action for declaratory relief because plaintiff
alleged a controversy over whether he had a first amendment right
to possess and use his art supplies. The majority also concluded
that plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The majority
reasoned: "If the defendants were allowed to destroy his supplies
or he was required to send the supplies to a friend or family
member, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm in that should
he succeed on the merits of his petition he would be forced to
purchase new supplies."
	Justice Breslin dissented. Analyzing the merits of plaintiff's
complaint, Justice Breslin concluded that plaintiff could not
successfully plead a cause of action for either declaratory or
injunctive relief. Justice Breslin noted that plaintiff's property was
confiscated when he was transferred from a minimum security
facility to a maximum security facility and placed in segregation.
Following plaintiff's release from segregation, Justice Breslin
opined, it was the responsibility of IDOC to control plaintiff, and
courts should defer to IDOC regarding prison administration.
Defendants appealed to this court (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).

ANALYSIS
	This case is before us following the dismissal of plaintiff's
claims pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). A section 2-615 motion attacks
the legal sufficiency of a complaint. The motion does not raise
affirmative factual defenses, but rather alleges only defects on the
face of the complaint. The question presented by a section 2-615
motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the complaint,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are
sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted. A cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadings
unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which
will entitle the plaintiff to recover. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997); Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86-87 (1996).
	Moreover, Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction. A plaintiff
must allege facts sufficient to bring his or her claim within the
scope of the cause of action asserted. Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d  at 344;
People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc., 88 Ill. 2d 300,
308 (1981). We review a dismissal under section 2-615 de novo.
Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2000).

I. Declaratory Judgment
	Defendants contend that plaintiff's complaint failed to state
a cause of action for declaratory judgment because: (1) plaintiff
did not exhaust IDOC's grievance procedure prior to filing his
complaint, and (2) plaintiff did not allege a first amendment
violation. "A court will consider a constitutional question only
where essential to the disposition of a case, i.e., where the case
cannot be determined on other grounds." Bonaguro v. County
Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396 (1994) (and cases
cited therein); accord City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill. 2d 297, 304
(1957); Bohnert v. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 362 Ill. 403, 408 (1936)
("inasmuch as we have concluded that the complaint did not state
a cause of action it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the
constitutional questions"). Accordingly, we first consider whether
plaintiff was required to exhaust IDOC's grievance procedure
prior to filing his complaint and, if so, whether plaintiff pled
sufficient facts showing that he had done so. See, e.g., Bank of
Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Ill. 2d 493, 497 (1958).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy
	Plaintiff initially responds that defendants waived the issue of
whether he exhausted IDOC's grievance procedure. Plaintiff notes
that defendants did not raise the exhaustion issue in the circuit
court as part of their motion to dismiss. Rather, according to
plaintiff, defendants first raised this issue in the appellate court.
Plaintiff asserts that defendants' failure to raise this issue in the
circuit court constitutes a waiver of this issue.
	We disagree. Defendants were the appellees in the appellate
court. It is quite established that "the appellee may urge any point
in support of the judgment on appeal, even though not directly
ruled on by the trial court, so long as the factual basis for such
point was before the trial court." Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246,
248 (1969). Since plaintiff's complaint and attached exhibits
provide the requisite factual basis, we will address this issue. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Skinner v. Graham, 170 Ill. App. 3d 417, 440
(1988); Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill.
App. 3d 525, 527 (1982).

1. Federal Law
	Curiously, defendants base their exhaustion contention on
federal law. Plaintiff expressly seeks declaratory relief pursuant to
our declaratory judgment statute, codified in section 2-701 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2000)).
However, defendants assert that plaintiff "sought to vindicate an
alleged violation of his federally protected First Amendment
rights." Defendants reason: "The appropriate and common vehicle
for contesting alleged constitutional rights violations by state
officials is through a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Under section 1983, a person can obtain declaratory and
injunctive relief. *** Thus, Beahringer's action is, in essence, a
garden-variety section 1983 lawsuit."
	Continuing down this path, defendants invoke the Federal
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) (42 U.S.C. §1997e
(2000)), which states in pertinent part:
		"(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
				No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.
§1997e(a) (2000).
Defendants contend: "Beahringer cannot obviate the need to
comply with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement simply by not
mentioning section 1983 in his complaint. *** Beahringer was
required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA."
	The appellate court majority noted-and rejected-this
argument, observing that "plaintiff's complaint makes it clear that
he is requesting declaratory judgment, not relief under section
1983." We agree. Plaintiff's complaint refers neither to section
1983 nor to any other federal law. Defendants attempt to insert
federal law where it does not apply. Legislatures in many other
states have expressly adopted the PLRA. See, e.g., Wis. Stat.
§801.02(7)(b) (1994); Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5503(1) (2000);
Mo. Rev. Stat. §506.384.1 (2002). The Illinois General Assembly
has not and this court cannot do so by judicial fiat.

2. Declaratory Judgment
	However, based on established state law, we conclude that
plaintiff must nevertheless exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to bringing a declaratory judgment action. The Illinois
declaratory judgment statute provides in pertinent part:
			"(a) No action or proceeding is open to objection on the
ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is
sought thereby. The court may, in cases of actual
controversy, make binding declarations of rights, having
the force of final judgments, whether or not any
consequential relief is or could be claimed, including the
determination, at the instance of anyone interested in the
controversy, of the construction of any statute, municipal
ordinance, or other governmental regulation *** and a
declaration of the rights of the parties interested." 735
ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2000).
A declaratory judgment "may be obtained by means of a pleading
seeking that relief alone, or as incident to or part of a complaint,
counterclaim or other pleading seeking other relief as well." 735
ILCS 5/2-701(b) (West 2000). The essential requirements of a
declaratory judgment action are: (1) a plaintiff with a legal
tangible interest; (2) a defendant having an opposing interest; and
(3) an actual controversy between the parties concerning such
interests. Griffin v. County of Cook, 369 Ill. 380, 398 (1938)
(Stone, J., specially concurring, joined by Farthing, J.); accord
Alicea v. Snyder, 321 Ill. App. 3d 248, 253 (2001).
	The declaratory judgment procedure allows " ' "the court to
take hold of a controversy one step sooner than normally-that is,
after the dispute has arisen, but before steps are taken which give
rise to claims for damages or other relief. The parties to the dispute
can then learn the consequences of their action before acting." ' "
Kaske v. City of Rockford, 96 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (1983), quoting
Buege v. Lee, 56 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1978), quoting Ill. Ann.
Stat., ch. 110, par. 57.1, Historical & Practice Notes, at 132
(Smith-Hurd 1968). "The declaratory judgment procedure was
designed to settle and fix rights before there has been an
irrevocable change in the position of the parties that will
jeopardize their respective claims of right. [Citation.] The remedy
is used to afford security and relief against uncertainty so as to
avoid potential litigation." First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A.
v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165, 174 (1995); accord Illinois Gamefowl
Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 452 (1979).
	A declaratory judgment action is purely statutory and is to be
liberally construed. However, the provisions of the statute must be
strictly complied with. Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 299 (1950); see Lihosit v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 576, 579 (1993). In interpreting
the Illinois declaratory judgment statute, Illinois courts may look
to the decisions of other states in interpreting the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (12 U.L.A. 309 (1996)). AG Farms,
Inc. v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 684,
693 (1998); see 1 W. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory
Judgments §5 (2d ed. 1951).
	A declaratory judgment action is strictly remedial. The statute
does not create substantive rights or duties, but merely affords a
new, additional, and cumulative procedural method for the judicial
determination of the parties' rights. Berk v. County of Will, 34 Ill. 2d 588, 591 (1966); see Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2-701,
Historical & Practice Notes, at 6 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
	"Because the declaratory judgment procedure does not replace
but merely adds to existing remedies a form of judgment to declare
the rights of the parties, the existence of other remedies does not
preclude judgment for declaratory relief, even though such other
remedies may be equally effective." Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par.
2-701, Historical & Practice Notes, at 6-7 (Smith-Hurd 1983);
accord La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318,
322 (1974); Alderman Drugs, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 799, 804 (1979). For example, in Kaske, 96 Ill. 2d  at 305-06, this court concluded that a police officer need not
provoke an administrative disciplinary proceeding against himself
so as to provide a forum to challenge an order of his police chief;
rather, the officer could seek declaratory relief.
	However, where it is alleged that a facially valid statute,
ordinance, or administrative rule "is applied in a discriminatory or
arbitrary manner, the rule generally prevails that recourse must be
had in the first instance to the appropriate administrative board."
Bank of Lyons, 13 Ill. 2d  at 495; accord Castaneda v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308-09 (1989) (collecting
cases). Courts apply the exhaustion doctrine to declaratory
judgment actions. See, e.g., Bank of Lyons, 13 Ill. 2d  at 494; AEH
Construction, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1158,
1163-64 (2001); Union Bank v. Blackstone Sunbury-Nevada Grain
Co., 254 Ill. App. 3d 206, 207-08 (1993); Schwanke, Schwanke &
Associates v. Martin, 241 Ill. App. 3d 738, 749 (1992); Salk v.
Department of Registration & Education, 123 Ill. App. 2d 320,
324 (1970) (collecting cases).
	Referring to the "actual controversy" requirement of a
declaratory judgment action, this court has explained:
		" 'Actual' in this context does not mean that a wrong
must have been committed and injury inflicted. Rather, it
requires a showing that the underlying facts and issues of
the case are not moot or premature, so as to require the
court to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of
law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to
future events." (Emphasis added.) Underground
Contractors Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375
(1977).
The principles of ripeness and exhaustion of remedies are closely
related in that both involve generally the prematurity of an action.
AEH Construction, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1163; Schwanke, 241 Ill.
App. 3d at 748.
	The exhaustion doctrine applies where a claim is cognizable
in the first instance by an administrative agency. If the agency is
vested by the legislature with the authority to administer the
statute, declaratory relief is not available; judicial interference
must be withheld until the administrative process has run its
course. Schwanke, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 749; see also AEH
Construction, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1163. Among the policy
considerations underlying the exhaustion doctrine are that it allows
the agency to fully develop and consider the facts of the cause and
to utilize its expertise; it protects the agency processes from
impairment by avoidable interruptions; it gives the aggrieved party
the opportunity to succeed before the agency; and it allows the
agency to correct its own errors, thus conserving valuable judicial
resources. Schwanke, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 749; see also Union Bank,
254 Ill. App. 3d at 208-09.
	These policy considerations are manifest in prison
administration. Courts are ill-equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.
The problems of prisons in this country are complex and
intractable, and are not readily susceptible of resolution by judicial
decree. Operating a prison is an extremely difficult undertaking
that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are exclusively within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government. Moreover, since
prison administration is a task that has been committed to those
branches, separation of powers concerns advise a policy of judicial
restraint. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 76,
107 S. Ct. 2254, 2259 (1987); see In re Washington, 65 Ill. 2d 391,
399 (1976). Accordingly, courts afford wide-ranging deference to
the decisions of prison administrators. 72 C.J.S. Prisons §9(a)
(1987); 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal & Correctional Institutions §121, at
978 (2003).
	Based on the above principles: "The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies to grievances lodged by prisoners,
even when the grievances involve an alleged constitutional
violation." 72 C.J.S. Prisons §9(b), at 421 (1987). See, e.g., In re
Cliff, 264 A.D.2d 892, 696 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1999); Broeckel v. State
of Alaska Department of Corrections, 941 P.2d 893 (Alaska
1997); In re Alamin, 241 A.D.2d 586, 660 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1997);
Buehl v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 160 Pa.
Commw. 1, 635 A.2d 217 (1991).
	In the present case, the Unified Code of Corrections mandates
that IDOC: establish rules and regulations for the protection of the
person and property of Department employees and inmates (730
ILCS 5/3-7-1, 3-7-4 (West 2000)); and, under rules and
regulations, record and receipt all personal property not allowed to
committed persons (730 ILCS 5/3-4-3(a) (West 2000)). The Code
also empowers IDOC to investigate inmate grievances (730 ILCS
5/3-2-2(1)(h) (West 2000)).
	Implementing these legislative mandates, the Department
promulgated a coherent and systematic grievance procedure. 20 Ill.
Adm. Code §§504.800 through 504.870 (2000). The process
begins by first requiring an inmate to attempt to resolve problems
through his or her counselor. If the problem cannot be resolved
informally, the process proceeds to the filing of a formal written
grievance. 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.810 (2000). At the time of
plaintiff's grievance, a grievance officer was required to consider
the grievance, call witnesses if appropriate, and report his or her
written findings to the chief administrative officer "within 30 days
after the grievance is received *** whenever possible." In turn, the
chief administrative officer was required to issue a written
decision "within 15 days after receiving the [grievance officer's]
report, whenever possible." 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.830 (2000).
This administrative process continues with appeals to the Director
of Corrections and possibly to an administrative review board. 20
Ill. Adm. Code §504.850 (2000). Also, according to Stateville's
internal rules, if the inmate timely grieves the confiscation of his
or her property, which plaintiff did in this case, the property will
be retained at the facility and will not be destroyed until the
grievance procedure has been completed. Stateville Institutional
Directive 05.10.110K3 §II(V).
	We turn to plaintiff's complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief. Plaintiff expressly states therein that he filed his complaint
prior to receiving a response from his grievance officer. Plaintiff's
failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies is apparent
from the face of the complaint.
	However, plaintiff claims that he exhausted his administrative
remedies. Plaintiff contends that under the procedure in effect at
the time of his grievance, "he was required to wait a minimum of
45 days prior to filing suit." According to plaintiff, approximately
60 days had elapsed without a response to his grievance when he
filed his suit.
	We conclude that plaintiff did not exhaust this administrative
remedy. The relevant time requirements include the phrase
"whenever possible." 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.830 (2000). The
time frames for the consideration of grievances were directory and
not mandatory. See Village of Park Forest v. Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d 264, 267-68 (1976); Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n,
19 Ill. 2d 230, 233-34 (1960). Accordingly, they did not grant
plaintiff an automatic right of action. Plaintiff argues delay and not
unavailability. He has not pled the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. We express no opinion as to the amount of time that
must elapse before a petition under IDOC's grievance procedure
can be considered futile.
	We observe plaintiff's allegation in his complaint "that the
[standard] grievance process is futile" in his case because it was
the warden who initially approved the confiscation, and grievances
filed against warden-approved actions historically have failed.
Illinois recognizes a limited "futility" exception to the exhaustion
of administrative remedies doctrine. A party will not be required
to exhaust his or her administrative remedies when it would be
patently useless to do so. Northwestern University v. City of
Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80, 88 (1978). "However, the fact that there
are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is
generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to
avoid the exhaustion requirement." Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d  at 328
(and cases cited therein); see AEH Construction, 318 Ill. App. 3d
at 1163. Further, mere conclusions of fact or law unsupported by
specific factual allegations are insufficient to state a cause of
action. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 408 (1996);
Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 119 Ill. 2d 496,
509-10 (1988).
	Plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was properly
dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead that he exhausted his
administrative remedies. Our holding obviates discussion of
plaintiff's first amendment claim. See Gould, 12 Ill. 2d  at 304.

II. Preliminary Injunction
	Having concluded that the circuit court correctly dismissed
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action, we must next determine
whether the appellate court properly granted plaintiff a preliminary
injunction to prevent the destruction of plaintiff's art materials.
	The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo pending a decision on the merits of a cause. It is an
extraordinary remedy which should apply only in situations where
an extreme emergency exists and serious harm would result if the
injunction is not issued. A party seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that: (1) a clearly ascertained right in need of
protection exists; (2) irreparable harm will occur without the
injunction; (3) there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury;
and (4) there is a likelihood of success on the merits. Callis, Papa,
Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 365-66 (2001); Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 156 (1992).
	In this case, plaintiff has not demonstrated a need for a
preliminary injunction. As we previously observed, plaintiff's art
supplies will be retained at the facility and will not be destroyed
until the grievance procedure has been completed. See Stateville
Institutional Directive 05.10.110K3 §II(V). Since plaintiff has not
shown irreparable harm, injunctive relief is unavailable.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Will County
is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority
holds that plaintiff cannot maintain an action for declaratory
judgment because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Three years after plaintiff filed his initial grievance, defendants
have yet to respond to plaintiff's grievance, and defendants offer
no justification. The majority essentially rewards the Department
of Corrections for engaging in practices that effectively eliminate
the relief authorized by the administrative remedies, while
penalizing plaintiff for availing himself of the only other relief
available.
	I disagree with the majority's determination that the time
requirements for consideration of grievances are directory rather
than mandatory. A statute that specifies the time for performance
of an official duty is considered directory only when the rights of
the parties cannot be injuriously affected by the failure to act
within the time indicated. Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control
Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233 (1960). When the disregard of a time
requirement would injuriously affect private rights, the provision
is mandatory. Carrigan, 19 Ill. 2d  at 233. A proper analysis must
consider whether the time requirement prescribed is intended for
the protection of the person filing the grievance and to prevent a
sacrifice of his property. See People v. Jennings, 3 Ill. 2d 125, 127
(1954). In this case, the lengthy delay has injuriously affected
plaintiff's private rights, making the time requirement mandatory.
	I also believe that defendants have waived the exhaustion of
remedies defense. The majority cites the rule that " 'the appellee
may urge any point in support of the judgment on appeal, even
though not directly ruled on by the trial court, so long as the
factual basis for such point was before the trial court.' " Slip op.
at 5-6, quoting Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969).
Curiously, the majority departs from a recent case where this court
held that a defendant-appellee's failure to raise the exhaustion of
remedies issue in the trial court constituted a waiver of the issue
on appeal. See People v. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d 318, 337 (1991),
citing Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 508 (1988).
	In the instant case, defendants did not present the issue of
exhaustion of remedies in the circuit court, either in written
motions, memoranda, or oral argument. Defendants did not raise
exhaustion of remedies as an affirmative defense, and plaintiff was
never put on notice that such proof was required. Accordingly, I
believe that it is inappropriate to consider the exhaustion of
remedies issue for the first time on appeal as a basis for affirming
the decision of the circuit court. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d  at 509.
	Finally, I believe that the allegations in plaintiff's pro se
complaint were sufficient to state a claim for declaratory
judgment. To bring a declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff
must allege in sufficient detail an actual and legal controversy
between the parties and must demonstrate that the plaintiff is
interested in the controversy. 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2000);
Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 382-83 (1997);
First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165,
173 (1995). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must
take all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and
supporting documentation as true. Bryson v. News America
Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1996). "A cause of action
should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears
that no set of facts can be proved under the pleadings which will
entitle the plaintiff to recover." Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d  at 86-87.
	Here, plaintiff's complaint alleged facts that show a
controversy between himself and the defendants regarding his
ability to possess and use his art supplies. Plaintiff further
requested a declaration that he had a first amendment right to
possess and use those supplies. I believe that the appellate court
correctly determined that the allegations in plaintiff's pro se
complaint were sufficient to state a claim for declaratory
judgment. Accordingly, I would affirm the appellate court's order
vacating the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remand the case for further
proceedings. I therefore respectfully dissent.