Title: P. v. Stone

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 4/23/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S162675 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F051812 
NICHOLAS SCOTT STONE, 
) 
 
) 
Kings County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 05CM4433 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Can a person who shoots into a group of people, intending to kill one of the 
group, but not knowing or caring which one, be convicted of attempted murder?  
Yes.  The mental state required for attempted murder is the intent to kill a human 
being, not a particular human being. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We take our facts primarily from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. 
Around 8:30 p.m. on the evening of October 21, 2005, Officer Mark 
Pescatore was on duty with two other police officers at a parking lot carnival in 
Lemoore.  Officer Pescatore observed a group of 10 to 25 youths blocking the 
pathways and moving about the carnival area.  About half of those in the group 
were wearing red, a color associated with Norteno street gangs.  One of the 
officers believed the group was “looking for trouble.”  The group included 16-
year-old Joel F. as well as “Jamal,” a Norteno gang member.  Sixteen-year-old 
 1
Camilo M., a member of a Sureno street gang, and his friend Abel Rincon were 
also at the carnival. 
Several members of the Norteno gang called Camilo “scrapa,” a derogatory 
term for a Sureno, and challenged him and Rincon to fight.  Camilo and Rincon 
decided not to fight and left the carnival.  A group of Nortenos followed them, and 
Jamal kicked Rincon’s truck as Rincon and Camilo drove away.  Camilo and 
Rincon returned home and told several people, including defendant, what had 
happened at the carnival.  A short time later,  Camilo and Rincon and others, 
including defendant, returned to the carnival in Rincon’s truck.  Rincon drove.  
Defendant sat on the passenger side of the truck. 
Meanwhile, at the carnival, the police directed the Norteno group to leave, 
and about 10 of them went to a grassy area in the parking lot.  When Rincon and 
his companions returned to the carnival, Rincon drove his truck past the group of 
Nortenos twice.  On the third pass, he stopped the truck 10 to 15 feet from the 
group and held up three fingers, denoting a gang sign.  Defendant rolled down his 
passenger window, pulled out a gun, and fired it.  The truck then left the scene.  
Officer Pescatore, who was about 60 feet away, observed “an arm come out of the 
passenger window, and then saw a muzzle flash and heard a gunshot.”  He 
described the arm as “pointing straight out the window” at a group of individuals 
on the grassy island in the parking lot, about four to five feet away. 
Joel F. testified that the gun in defendant’s hand was “pointed up” slightly 
and extended toward the group when he fired.  Joel did not think defendant had 
pointed the gun at anyone in particular, but he said that when the gun was fired, he 
ducked because he was worried about being shot.  The group “scattered” and 
“[e]veryone kind of ducked.”  Joel testified that the gun had not been pointed 
“directly” at him, but it was “near” him.  Joel also expressed the belief that the gun 
was fired “[j]ust to scare us.  I don’t really think he was trying to shoot anybody.” 
 2
As relevant here, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of attempted 
premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664) and found true personal use of a 
firearm and criminal street gang enhancement allegations (Pen. Code, §§ 186.22, 
subd. (b), 12022.53, subd. (b)).  The information had alleged that Joel F. was the 
attempted murder victim.  The court sentenced defendant to state prison, and he 
appealed. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the attempted murder conviction and related 
enhancement findings.  It concluded that the trial court prejudicially misinstructed 
the jury on the intent requirement of attempted murder.  Additionally, it found 
insufficient evidence to support the attempted murder conviction and, citing 
People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 544, it prohibited retrial on that count.  It 
agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient “because it establishes, at 
most, that when he fired his single shot at the group of Nortenos, [defendant] 
intended to kill someone but not specifically Joel F. and not everyone in the 
group.”  It found “not a scintilla of evidence to distinguish Joel F. from any 
member of the group as a desired victim of [defendant’s] fire.” 
We granted the Kings County District Attorney’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Defendant was charged with and convicted of a single count of attempted 
murder for firing a single shot at a group of 10 people.  “Attempted murder 
requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act 
toward accomplishing the intended killing.”  (People v. Superior Court (Decker) 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7.)  The main issue before us on review concerns the nature 
of the intent-to-kill requirement.  Specifically, the question is whether the intent 
must be to kill a particular person, or whether a generalized intent to kill someone, 
but not necessarily a specific target, is sufficient. 
 3
Preliminary, we must explain how this question arises in this case.  The 
information specifically alleged that Joel F. was the attempted murder victim.  The 
trial court instructed the jury on a particular theory of attempted murder, discussed 
in People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313 (Bland).  Because Bland is central to the 
question here, we discuss it in detail. 
In Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th 313, the defendant and a cohort fired multiple 
shots at three persons in a car, killing the driver and injuring, but not killing, the 
two passengers.  The defendant was convicted of murdering the driver and of 
attempting to murder the two passengers.  The evidence supported a jury finding 
that the defendants intended to kill the driver, i.e., the one actually killed, but did 
not specifically target the two who survived.  (Id. at p. 319.)  We explained that a 
person who intends to kill is guilty of the murder of everyone actually killed, 
whether or not the person intended to kill each one.  “[A] person maliciously 
intending to kill is guilty of the murder of all persons actually killed.”  (Id. at pp. 
323-324.)  But we also held that situation is different concerning attempted 
murder.  “The crime of attempt sanctions what the person intended to do but did 
not accomplish, not unintended and unaccomplished potential consequences.”  (Id. 
at p. 327.)  We summarized the rule that applies when an intended target is killed 
and unintended targets are injured but not killed.  “Someone who in truth does not 
intend to kill a person is not guilty of that person’s attempted murder even if the 
crime would have been murder . . . if the person were killed.  To be guilty of 
attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not 
someone else.  The defendant’s mental state must be examined as to each alleged 
attempted murder victim.  Someone who intends to kill only one person and 
attempts unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the intended 
victim, but not of others.”  (Id. at p. 328.) 
 4
We also explained, however, that if a person targets one particular person, 
under some facts a jury could find the person also, concurrently, intended to 
kill — and thus was guilty of the attempted murder of — other, nontargeted, 
persons.  Citing a Maryland case (Ford v. State (Md. 1993) 625 A.2d 984), we 
explained that “the fact the person desires to kill a particular target does not 
preclude finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within 
what [the Ford court] termed the ‘kill zone.’ ”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 
329.)  For example, if a person placed a bomb on a commercial airplane intending 
to kill a primary target, but also ensuring the death of all the passengers, the 
person could be convicted of the attempted murder of all the passengers, and not 
only the primary target.  (Bland, supra, at pp. 329-330.)  Likewise, in Bland, 
“[e]ven if the jury found that defendant primarily wanted to kill [a driver] rather 
than [the] passengers, it could reasonably also have found a concurrent intent to 
kill those passengers when defendant and his cohort fired a flurry of bullets at the 
fleeing car and thereby created a kill zone.  Such a finding fully supports 
attempted murder convictions as to the passengers.”  (Id. at pp. 330-331.) 
We also explained in Bland that this “concurrent intent” or “kill zone” 
theory “is not a legal doctrine requiring special jury instructions . . . .  Rather, it is 
simply a reasonable inference the jury may draw in a given case:  a primary intent 
to kill a specific target does not rule out a concurrent intent to kill others.”  (Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6.)  Nevertheless, current pattern jury instructions 
discuss the kill zone theory.  (CALJIC No. 8.66.1 (2004 rev.); 1 CALCRIM No. 
                                              
1  
CALJIC No. 8.66.1 (2004 rev.) provides:  “A person who primarily intends 
to kill one person, may also concurrently intend to kill other persons within a 
particular zone of risk.  [This zone of risk is termed the ‘kill zone.’]  The intent is 
concurrent when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary 
victim, are such that it is reasonable to infer the perpetrator intended to kill the 
primary victim by killing everyone in that victim’s vicinity.  [¶]  Whether a 
 5
600 (2008).)2  The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 600 explain that Bland stated 
that a special instruction on the point is not required, and that the kill zone 
“language is provided for the court to use at its discretion.” 
In this case, the trial court gave a modified version of the CALCRIM kill 
zone instruction:  “A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at 
the same time intend to kill anyone in a particular zone of harm or  . . . ‘kill 
zone’ . . . .  [¶]  In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of [Joel 
F.], the People must prove either that the defendant intended to kill [Joel F.], or 
that he not only intended to kill another human being, but also that he intended to 
kill anyone within the ‘kill zone,’ and that [Joel F.] was in the zone of harm or 
‘kill zone’ at the time of the shot.  [¶]  If you have a reasonable doubt whether the 
defendant intended to kill [Joel F.] or intended to kill another by harming everyone 
in the ‘kill zone,’ or whether [Joel F.] was in the ‘kill zone’ then you must find the 
defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of [Joel F.].” 
The Court of Appeal found that the court erred in giving this instruction.3  
We agree.  The kill zone theory simply does not fit the charge or facts of this case.  
                                                                                                                                      
 
perpetrator actually intended to kill the victim, either as a primary target or as 
someone within a [‘kill zone’][zone of risk] is an issue to be decided by you.” 
2  
CALCRIM No. 600 (2008) provides in relevant part:  “A person may 
intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at the same time intend to kill anyone 
in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’  In order to convict the defendant of the 
attempted murder of ___ , the People must prove that the defendant 
not only intended to kill ___  but also 
either intended to kill ___ , or intended to kill anyone within the kill 
zone.  If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill ___ 
 or intended to kill ___  by 
harming everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not guilty of 
the attempted murder of ___ .” 
 6
That theory addresses the question of whether a defendant charged with the 
murder or attempted murder of an intended target can also be convicted of 
attempting to murder other, nontargeted, persons.  Here, defendant was charged 
with but a single count of attempted murder.  He was not charged with 10 
attempted murders, one for each member of the group at which he shot.  As the 
Court of Appeal explained, “There was no evidence here that [defendant] used a 
means to kill the named victim, Joel F., that inevitably would result in the death of 
other victims within a zone of danger.  [Defendant] was charged only with the 
attempted murder of Joel F. and not with the attempted murder of others in the 
group on which [defendant] fired his gun.” 
The error is not necessarily prejudicial by itself.  But the Court of Appeal 
found the error prejudicial in light of the prosecutor’s argument to the jury.  
Although the information alleged that Joel F. was the attempted murder victim, in 
his argument to the jury, the district attorney agreed he had not proven that 
defendant intended specifically to kill Joel F. rather than someone in the group of 
10 persons.  He argued, however, that an intent to kill someone, even if not 
specifically Joel F., was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of the 
attempted murder charge. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
3  
The Court of Appeal also noted two ambiguities in this portion of 
CALCRIM No. 600.  First, as did the Court of Appeal in People v. Campos (2007) 
156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1241, 1243, it noted that the instruction refers to the intent 
to kill “anyone” within the kill zone rather than “everyone.”  In context, a jury 
hearing about the intent to kill anyone within the kill zone would probably 
interpret it as meaning the intent to kill any person who happens to be in the kill 
zone, i.e., everyone in the kill zone.  But any possible ambiguity can easily be 
eliminated by changing the word “anyone” to “everyone.” 
 
Second, the Court of Appeal noted that “the final sentence refers to an 
intent to harm everyone in the kill zone, rather than to kill everyone in the zone.”  
Because the intent required for attempted murder is to kill rather than merely 
harm, it would be better for the instruction to use the word “kill” consistently 
rather than the word “harm.” 
 7
The Court of Appeal found that the instructions, combined with the 
prosecutor’s argument, might have caused the jury to believe it could convict 
defendant of attempted murder if it found an intent to kill someone, even if not 
specifically Joel F.  It concluded that this was an “erroneous theory of guilt” 
requiring reversal.  Moreover, it also found insufficient evidence to support the 
attempted murder conviction.  Both of the Court of Appeal’s conclusions — (1) 
that error in instructing on the kill zone theory, combined with the prosecutor’s 
argument, was prejudicial; and (2) that insufficient evidence supports the 
attempted murder conviction — may have been based, at least in part, on the 
understanding that attempted murder requires the intent to kill a particular person.  
This is the primary question presented in the district attorney’s petition for review.  
We now consider that question. 
In People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544, the defendant shot and killed an 
unintended target and wounded but did not kill the intended target.  We affirmed 
convictions of murder of the unintended target and attempted murder of the 
intended target, holding that the intent to kill the intended target transferred to the 
unintended target and could also support a conviction of attempting to kill the 
intended target.  Justice Mosk authored a concurring opinion criticizing use of the 
transferred intent doctrine.  He argued that the same result applies simply by 
holding, as he would have, that “there is no requirement of an unlawful intent to 
kill an intended victim.  The law speaks in terms of an unlawful intent to kill a 
person, not the person intended to be killed.”  (Id. at p. 556 (conc. opn. of Mosk, 
J.).)  In Bland, we endorsed Justice Mosk’s view that, for murder, “the intent to 
kill need not be directed at a specific person . . . .”  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 
323.)  “The social harm of murder is the ‘killing of a human being by another 
human being.’  The requisite intent, therefore, is the intent to kill a, not a specific, 
human being.”  (Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (4th ed. 2006) § 10.04[b], 
 8
p. 133; see also People v. Scott, supra, at pp. 554-556 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) 
[citing an earlier edition of this treatise].) 
In Bland, however, we explained that in some respects, the mental state 
required for attempted murder differs from that required for murder.  Attempted 
murder requires express malice, i.e., intent to kill.  Implied malice — a conscious 
disregard for life — suffices for murder but not attempted murder.  In addition, 
transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 327-328.)  The Court of Appeal here may have interpreted our discussion in 
Bland as requiring, for attempted murder, a specific primary target.  The Court of 
Appeal in People v. Anzalone (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 380, which reversed three 
of four convictions of attempted murder, seemed to interpret Bland this way.  (See 
id. at pp. 392-393.)  But the question never arose in Bland.  In Bland, there was a 
primary target.  We were considering the circumstances under which a person 
could be convicted of attempting to murder someone other than the primary target.  
We never considered, and accordingly expressed no view regarding, whether a 
person can be convicted of attempted murder when there is no primary target at 
all.  Cases are not authority for matters not considered.  (People v. Alvarez (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176.) 
Now that we consider the question, we conclude that a person who intends 
to kill can be guilty of attempted murder even if the person has no specific target 
in mind.  An indiscriminate would-be killer is just as culpable as one who targets a 
specific person.  One of Bland’s kill zone examples involved a bomber who places 
a bomb on a commercial airplane intending to kill a primary target but ensuring 
the death of all passengers.  We explained that the bomber could be convicted of 
the attempted murder of all the passengers.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 329-
330.)  But a terrorist who simply wants to kill as many people as possible, and 
 9
does not know or care who the victims will be, can be just as guilty of attempted 
murder. 
Bland cited with approval People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 
which affirmed convictions of 11 counts of attempted murder for spraying bullets 
at two occupied houses — one count for each person in the houses.  (See Bland, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 330.)  Vang found the evidence supported the conclusion 
that the “defendants harbored a specific intent to kill every living being within the 
residences they shot up.”  (People v. Vang, supra, at p. 564.)  We described Vang 
as essentially a kill zone case.  (Bland, supra, at p. 330.)  Although the defendants 
in Vang apparently had a primary target at each house, nothing in either Vang or 
Bland suggests that if they had shot at the houses simply to kill everyone who 
happened to be present, without any primary target, then no conviction whatever 
for attempted murder would be possible.  Although a primary target often exists 
and can be identified, one is not required. 
We explained in Bland that difficulties can arise when deciding whether a 
person can be convicted of the attempted murder of an untargeted person in 
addition to the murder or attempted murder of the target, and regarding how many 
attempted murder convictions are permissible.  (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 
328-329; see also People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733 [considering whether the 
defendant who fired one shot could be convicted of attempting to murder a baby in 
the line of fire in addition to the attempted murder of the mother, the primary 
target].)  After all, “[t]he world contains many people a murderous assailant does 
not intend to kill.”  (Bland, supra, at p. 329.)  But this case does not involve such 
difficulties.  Defendant was not charged with the attempted murder of all the 
world, or even everyone in the group at which he fired, but only of one attempted 
murder.  Whatever difficulties exist in deciding how many attempted murders a 
would be indiscriminate killer has committed do not exist here. 
 10
One difference regarding intent to kill does exist between murder and 
attempted murder.  A person who intends to kill can be guilty of the murder of 
each person actually killed, even if the person intended to kill only one.  (See 
Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 323-324.)  The same is not necessarily true 
regarding attempted murder.  Rather, “guilt of attempted murder must be judged 
separately as to each alleged victim.”  (Id. at p. 331.)  But this is true whether the 
alleged victim was particularly targeted or randomly chosen.  As the district 
attorney aptly summarizes in this case, “A defendant who intends to kill one 
person will be liable for multiple counts of murder where multiple victims die, but 
only one count of attempted murder where no one dies.”  But when no one dies 
that person will be guilty of attempted murder even if he or she intended to kill a 
random person rather than a specific one. 
In this case, the information specifically alleged that defendant intended to 
kill Joel F.  This allegation was problematic given that the prosecution ultimately 
could not prove that defendant targeted a specific person rather than simply 
someone within the group.  In hindsight, it would no doubt have been better had 
the case been charged differently.  In a case like this, the information does not 
necessarily have to name a specific victim.  Penal Code section 952 states it is 
sufficient if the charge “contains in substance, a statement that the accused has 
committed some public offense therein specified,” which “may be in  . . . any 
words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused.”  
(See also Pen. Code, §  951.)  A defendant’s right to be informed of the charges “is 
satisfied when the accused is advised of the charges against him so that he has a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare and present a defense and is not taken by 
surprise by the evidence offered at trial.”  (People v. Ramirez (2003) 109 
Cal.App.4th 992, 999.)  If the defendant is accused of attempted murder of 
someone, although not necessarily a specific person, it would be sufficient to 
 11
 12
allege enough facts to give notice of the incident referred to and that the defendant 
is charged with attempted murder.  For example, in this case, it would have been 
sufficient to allege that defendant committed attempted murder in that on or about 
October 21, 2005, he attempted to murder a member of a group of persons 
gathered together in a parking lot in Lemoore, California.  Although other ways to 
charge a case like this no doubt exist, a charge like this example would provide 
adequate notice of the offense of which defendant was accused. 
The Court of Appeal should reconsider the issues of this case in light of the 
views expressed in this opinion.  In doing so, the court should consider any issues 
regarding the variance between the information — alleging defendant intended to 
kill Joel F. — and the proof at trial — defendant intended to kill someone although 
not specifically Joel F.  (See Pen. Code, § 956.) 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Stone 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 160 Cal.App.4th 937 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S162675 
Date Filed: April 23, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Kings 
Judge: Peter M. Schultz 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Linnea Johnson and Patricia L. Watkins, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Rhodes and Clayton S. Tanaka, Deputy Attorneys General; 
Ronald L. Calhoun, District Attorney, Adam Nelson and Mitchell Keiter, Deputy District Attorneys, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Linnea Johnson 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
9916) 441-3792 
 
Mitchell Keiter 
Deputy District Attorney 
1400 West Lacey Boulevard 
Hanford, CA  93230 
(559) 582-0326