Title: Calumet County Department of Human Services v. Randall H.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 126 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1272 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. In re the  
Support of Robert H.: 
 
Calumet County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Randall H.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 21, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Calumet   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald A. Poppy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Brett C. 
Petranech and Kelly & Petranech LLP, Madison, and oral argument 
by Brett C. Petranech. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Melody Buchinger, corporation counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mary S. Gerbig, Mary L. 
Hubacher, Mark L. Olson and Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., Green Bay, 
on behalf of the Wisconsin Counsel of Administrators of Special 
Services, with oral argument by Mary S. Gerbig. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jeffrey Spitzer-
Resnick, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Coalition for 
Advocacy. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lucy T. Brown, Joanne 
Huston and Bruce Meredith, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John J. Prentice, 
Julianne Barker and Prentice & Phillips LLP, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
2002 WI 126 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1272  
(L.C. No. 
00 FA 139) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. In re the  
Support of Robert H.: 
 
Calumet County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Randall H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
Nov 21, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Calumet 
County, Donald A. Poppy, Judge.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J. 
 
This 
case 
involves 
the 
intersection of the federal 
Individuals with 
Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) and state statutes governing children in 
need of protection or services (CHIPS).  The issue is whether 
the parent of a disabled child placed in a residential treatment 
facility pursuant to a circuit court's CHIPS order is exempt 
from 
the 
court's 
child 
support 
order 
if 
the 
child's 
individualized education program (IEP), mandated by the IDEA, 
No. 
01-1272   
 
2 
 
subsequently specifies that the child's educational program be 
implemented at the residential treatment facility.  We conclude 
that the parent is not relieved of the obligation to contribute 
to the child's support under these circumstances.  
¶2 
Randall H. petitioned the Calumet County Circuit Court 
to have his son, Robert H., adjudicated a child in need of 
protection or services pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.13(4) (1999-
2000).1  Robert was diagnosed with schizo-affective disorder, 
oppositional defiant disorder, and personality disorder with 
schizo-typal features, and because of these mental health 
problems, his family could not care for him at home.  The 
circuit court entered a dispositional order finding Robert a 
child in need of protection or services and ordered him placed 
in a residential treatment facility, and also ordered Randall to 
contribute 
toward 
Robert's 
support 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 46.10 and 48.355. 
¶3 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 115.81, the responsible local 
education agency (LEA) convened an IEP team, which recommended 
that 
Robert's 
educational 
program 
be 
implemented 
at 
the 
residential treatment facility while he was residing there 
pursuant to the CHIPS order.  Randall then moved the circuit 
court for relief from the child support obligation, arguing that 
he was exempt from the support obligation by virtue of Robert's 
entitlement under the IDEA to a "free appropriate public 
                                                 
 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version.   
  
No. 
01-1272   
 
3 
 
education" (FAPE).  See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).  The circuit court 
denied the motion, Randall appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the case to this court on the issue of whether the 
IDEA preempts state statutes requiring parents to contribute to 
the support of their children placed outside the home by a CHIPS 
order.    
¶4 
We do not view this case as presenting a preemption 
question.  The federal and state statutory schemes at issue here 
do not conflict, at least not under the circumstances of this 
case.  Robert was placed in the residential treatment facility 
for mental health care pursuant to a CHIPS order of the circuit 
court.  The IEP specifying that his educational program be 
implemented at the facility while he resided there did not 
constitute a residential placement necessary for educational 
purposes under the IDEA.  Accordingly, the IDEA does not provide 
grounds for relief from the child support obligation in the 
CHIPS order.  We affirm the circuit court's order denying 
relief. 
I. FACTS 
¶5 
Robert H. was born on April 12, 1985.  He is the minor 
child of Randall H.  In the second grade, Robert was provided 
speech and language services in response to problems with 
dysfluency, and he was also placed on medication for Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). In the fifth grade, 
Robert 
was 
placed 
in 
special 
education 
programming 
for 
emotionally disturbed students.  Over time Robert has required 
both inpatient (two hospitalizations at St. Elizabeth's in 
No. 
01-1272   
 
4 
 
Appleton and one in Colorado) and outpatient mental health 
services to deal with concerns about potential harm to himself 
and others, depression, anger, aggressiveness, and auditory 
hallucinations.  At home, Robert became aggressive when stressed 
and exhibited isolation, anxiety, temper outbursts, insecurity, 
and hygiene problems. 
¶6 
Despite his persistent mental health problems, Robert 
possesses superior intellectual ability.  He began high school 
in the Stockbridge School District.  While there, a full-time 
aide assisted him with work organization and completion, and 
with behavior control.  This assistance was very beneficial to 
his education. 
¶7 
On December 23, 1999, however, Robert was hospitalized 
again, this time at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute 
(WMHI).  Some nine months later, on September 27, 2000, Randall 
petitioned the Calumet County Circuit Court to have Robert 
adjudged a child in need of protection or services.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.13.  In the petition, Randall stated that Robert 
had been diagnosed at WMHI with schizo-affective disorder 
(bipolar type), oppositional defiant disorder, and personality 
disorder with schizo-typal features.  The petition also stated 
that 
Robert's 
symptoms 
included 
auditory 
hallucinations, 
delusional 
and 
paranoid 
thoughts, 
homicidal 
and 
suicidal 
ideations, 
aggressive 
behaviors 
and 
threats, 
disorganized 
thinking, emotional dysregulation, negative self-concept, and 
difficulty forming and maintaining relationships.  A number of 
medications had been tried, but Robert's symptoms escalated 
No. 
01-1272   
 
5 
 
whenever he was removed from the structure of the hospital 
environment.  WMHI staff had recommended out-of-home placement 
in a residential treatment facility.  Randall's petition 
concluded: "[d]ue to Robert's severe pathology, the family is 
unable to provide the care and treatment to meet his numerous 
needs, thereby necessitating residential out-of-home placement."  
¶8 
On October 30, 2000, the circuit court, the Honorable 
Donald A. Poppy, Judge, adjudicated Robert a child in need of 
protection or services.  The court ordered out-of-home placement 
in a residential treatment facility and supervision by the 
Calumet County Department of Human Services (the Department) for 
one year.  The Department recommended, consistent with a 
referral from WMHI, that Robert be placed at the Lakeview 
Neurological Rehabilitation Center in Waterford, and the circuit 
court adopted that recommendation. 
¶9 
The dispositional order also required Randall to 
contribute toward the expense of the out-of-home placement in an 
amount 
to 
be 
determined 
by 
the 
Department. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 46.10(14)(b) and 48.355(2)(b)4.  Randall and the 
County entered into a stipulation whereby Randall agreed to pay 
$170 per week toward Robert's CHIPS placement at Lakeview, 
effective October 31, 2000.  The circuit court signed an order 
confirming the stipulation.  The County thereafter notified 
Randall's employer of its obligation to withhold a portion of 
his income to meet the child support obligation.  The total cost 
of Robert's care at Lakeview exceeded $9,000 per month. 
No. 
01-1272   
 
6 
 
¶10 Robert was transferred to Lakeview on October 31, 
2000.  Lakeview is located within the Waterford Union High 
School District, which became Robert's responsible LEA upon his 
arrival at Lakeview.  See Wis. Stat. § 115.81(1)(b). 
¶11 About two weeks later, on November 15, 2000, a 
Waterford School District IEP team met to address Robert's 
educational needs.  Randall, representatives of the Waterford 
District, and two Calumet County representatives participated. 
¶12 The IEP team determined that Robert exhibited strong 
reading and math concept skills, but weaknesses in math 
computation, written language, and spelling.  It found that, 
given adequate support, Robert could function well in the 
classroom.  The IEP team noted that special education at 
Waterford Union High had been considered and rejected because 
Calumet County already had placed Robert at Lakeview due to his 
mental 
health 
issues. 
 
The 
IEP 
specified 
that 
Robert's 
educational program would be implemented at Lakeview. 
¶13 Randall then moved for relief from the child support 
order, asserting that the IDEA required Robert's placement at 
Lakeview to be at no cost to the parents.  He requested 
suspension of future support payments and reimbursement of 
support payments already made.2  The circuit court denied the 
motion, concluding that Robert was placed at Lakeview because of 
his mental health needs, not his educational needs, and 
                                                 
2 The amounts paid have been held in trust pending 
resolution of this case. 
No. 
01-1272   
 
7 
 
therefore the IDEA did not relieve Randall of his obligation to 
contribute to Robert's support.  The court further held that the 
IEP developed by the Waterford District, which specified that 
Robert would receive special education services at Lakeview 
while residing there, was "incidental" to his CHIPS placement. 
¶14 Randall appealed the circuit court's order, the court 
of appeals certified the case to this court pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61, and we accepted the certification.  We now 
affirm. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 The court of appeals certified the case on the 
question of whether the IDEA, "which requires a free appropriate 
public 
education 
(FAPE) 
to 
students 
with 
disabilities, 
preempt[s] Wis. Stat. §§ 48.355 and 46.10 . . . which require 
parents to contribute to their children's support when placed 
outside the home by a juvenile court."  As we have noted, we do 
not view this case as presenting a preemption issue, and neither 
do the parties.  They assert, and we agree, that the federal and 
state statutes do not conflict, although Randall argues in the 
alternative that if there is a conflict, then the federal law 
preempts. 
¶16 We see this case as presenting a threshold question of 
whether Robert's placement at Lakeview was a residential 
educational placement under the IDEA, which carries with it the 
requirement that it be at no cost to the child's parents.  See 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(8), (22), and (25); 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 
(2000).  The preemption issue does not arise if Robert's 
No. 
01-1272   
 
8 
 
placement in the residential program was not for educational 
purposes under the IDEA. 
¶17 The federal courts have held that the question of 
whether a residential placement is educational and therefore 
covered by the IDEA is a mixed question of fact and law.3  Butler 
v. Evans, 225 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2000); Board of Educ. of 
County High Sch. No. 218 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 103 
F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 1996); Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. 
Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 980 (4th Cir. 1990); Kruelle v. New Castle 
County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 692-693 (3d Cir. 1981).  "[O]n 
appeal, we review the district court's judgment as a mixed 
question of fact and law, reviewing the ultimate determination 
de novo but reversing the court's factual findings only if 
clearly erroneous."  Butler, 225 F.3d at 892 (citing Heather S. 
v. State of Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
¶18 Here, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
factual 
findings 
were 
minimal, basically consisting of a brief recitation of the 
                                                 
3 The Seventh Circuit uses a fact-driven approach to 
identify an "educational placement" for purposes of parental 
reimbursement claims under the IDEA.  Because "the term 
'educational placement' is not statutorily defined," determining 
whether a placement is educational is "an inexact science."  
Board of Educ. of County High Sch. No. 218 v. Illinois State Bd. 
of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 1996).  "The meaning of 
'educational placement' falls somewhere between the physical 
school attended by a child and the abstract goals of a child's 
IEP."  Id.  "Hesitant to definitively establish the meaning of 
'educational placement' for our circuit, we adopt our sister 
circuits' fact-driven approach.  We accept as the outer 
parameters of 'educational placement' that it means something 
more than the actual school attended by the child and something 
less than the child's ultimate goals."  Id. at 549. 
No. 
01-1272   
 
9 
 
procedural history of the case.  The facts set forth above are 
from the procedural record and the IEP prepared for Robert by 
the Waterford School District, which was part of the record on 
the motion for relief from the child support order.  The parties 
do not disagree about the procedural history or the underlying 
evidentiary 
facts. 
 
This 
appeal 
turns 
on 
the 
ultimate 
determination of whether Robert was placed at Lakeview for 
educational 
purposes 
under 
the 
IDEA, 
which 
involves 
a 
determination of whether the facts meet the applicable legal 
standard.  We apply a de novo standard of review. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶19 The IDEA provides special education funding to the 
states for the education of disabled children, and also 
regulates the education of disabled children by conditioning 
receipt of this funding on compliance with federal statutory and 
code requirements.4  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487.  The IDEA 
"represents an ambitious federal effort to promote the education 
of handicapped children."  Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (discussing 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, later renamed 
the IDEA).  Its purpose is "to ensure that all children with 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin's implementation of the IDEA is found in Chapter 
115.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 115.758-115.90.  These sections spell 
out Wisconsin's procedural requirements for implementing the 
IDEA, including the rights and responsibilities of the various 
agencies and individuals impacted.  Wisconsin's version is 
identical to the IDEA in most respects and is to be "construed 
in a manner consistent with" the IDEA.  Wis. Stat. § 115.758.    
No. 
01-1272   
 
10 
 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services 
designed 
to 
meet 
their 
unique 
needs." 
 
20 
U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A). 
¶20 As is pertinent here, a FAPE, or "free appropriate 
public education" under the IDEA, is "special education and 
related services," provided at public expense, supervision, and 
direction, pursuant to an IEP, or "individualized education 
program."  20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).  The IDEA requires the LEA, or 
"local educational agency," to develop an IEP for any child with 
a disability.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(11) and (15). 
¶21 The IDEA defines "special education" as: 
[S]pecially designed 
instruction, 
at no 
cost to 
parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a 
disability, including — (A) instruction conducted in 
the 
classroom, 
in 
the 
home, 
in 
hospitals 
and 
institutions, 
and 
in 
other 
settings; 
and 
(B) 
instruction in physical education. 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(25).  "Related services" are: 
[T]ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, 
and 
other 
supportive 
services 
(including 
speech-
language 
pathology 
and 
audiology 
services, 
psychological 
services, 
physical 
and 
occupational 
therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, 
social work services, counseling services, including 
rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility 
services, and medical services, except that such 
medical 
services 
shall 
be 
for 
diagnostic 
and 
evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist 
a child with a disability to benefit from special 
education, and includes the early identification and 
assessment of disabling conditions in children. 
20 
U.S.C. 
§ 1401(22). 
 
The 
IDEA 
generally 
requires 
"mainstreaming"——educating 
disabled 
children 
in 
the 
least 
No. 
01-1272   
 
11 
 
restrictive 
environment 
and 
in 
school 
with 
non-disabled 
children——to "the maximum extent appropriate."  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(5)(A); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202-03.  
¶22 In certain limited circumstances, the IDEA requires 
that a public or private residential educational program be 
provided 
at 
no 
cost 
to 
the 
parents. 
 
See 
20 
U.S.C. 
§ 1412(10)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.302.  Specifically, 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.302 provides that "[i]f placement in a public or private 
residential program is necessary to provide special education 
and related services to a child with a disability, the program, 
including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no 
cost to the parents of the child."  34 C.F.R. § 300.302 
(emphasis added). 
¶23 Federal courts deciding parental reimbursement cases 
under the IDEA have generally held that the test for whether a 
child's placement in a residential program is educational and 
therefore reimbursable under the IDEA focuses on whether the 
child's residential placement is "necessary for educational 
purposes."  Butler, 225 F.3d at 893; Tennessee Dep't of Mental 
Health & Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (a residential placement is appropriate and free only 
if it "is necessary for educational purposes as opposed to 
medical, social, or emotional problems that are separable from 
the learning process"); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California 
Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(analysis focuses on whether a residential placement "may be 
considered necessary for educational purposes"); Burke County 
No. 
01-1272   
 
12 
 
Bd. of Educ., 895 F.2d at 980 (the IDEA covers residential 
placement only if such placement is "essential for the child to 
make any educational progress at all") (emphasis in original) 
(citing Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 
1983), and Matthews v. Davis, 742 F.2d 825, 829 (4th Cir. 
1984)); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(determination 
of 
whether 
the 
IDEA 
requires 
residential 
placement turns on whether full-time residential placement is 
necessary for educational purposes); Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693 
(only a residential placement that is "a necessary predicate for 
learning" is covered by the IDEA). 
¶24 If a residential placement is "a response to medical, 
social, or emotional problems that is necessary quite apart from 
the learning process," then it is not an educational placement 
for purposes of the IDEA.  Butler, 225 F.3d at 893 (quoting 
Clovis, 903 F.2d at 643).  The IDEA does not require 
reimbursement for a residential placement that "addresses the 
child's medical, social or emotional disabilities apart from 
[his] special education needs."  Id. at 894 (citing Clovis, 903 
F.2d at 646-47). 
¶25 Robert was placed at Lakeview pursuant to the circuit 
court's CHIPS order, a proceeding that Randall had initiated 
because 
Robert's 
mental 
illness 
necessitated 
out-of-home 
placement.  His placement there was clearly in response to his 
psychiatric and emotional problems and was necessary quite apart 
from his special education needs.  He had been hospitalized at 
WMHI for many months prior to the CHIPS petition, was diagnosed 
No. 
01-1272   
 
13 
 
with several serious psychiatric disorders, and had been 
recommended for a residential mental health placement by the 
staff at WMHI.  Robert's IEP, prepared after he arrived at 
Lakeview pursuant to the CHIPS order, did not conclude that a 
residential placement was an educational necessity; it merely 
accepted that Robert had been placed in residential treatment 
for mental health issues by the circuit court's CHIPS order, and 
for that reason specified that his IEP should be implemented 
there.5 
¶26 We find it significant that Robert's IEP does not 
specify residential placement as a "related service."  In the 
program summary on page I-14 of Robert's IEP, where necessary 
"related services" are listed, the box next to the statement 
"[n]one needed to benefit from special education" is checked, 
and the boxes next to the various itemized "related services" 
are left blank.  The box next to "other" related services is 
                                                 
 
5 Randall conflates the IEP and the CHIPS order to argue 
that Robert's placement at Lakeview was precipitated by his 
educational needs.  See, e.g., Butler v. Evans, 225 F.3d 887, 
893 (7th Cir. 2000).  Like the commitment and IEP proceedings at 
issue in Butler, the CHIPS dispositional order and the IEP 
recommendations in this case "were decided independently in 
separate proceedings . . . " and Robert was placed at Lakeview 
"outside of the IDEA procedures and IEP recommendations."  Id.  
While an IEP and a CHIPS proceeding cannot be conflated for 
purposes of IDEA analysis, we do not mean to suggest that the 
presence of a separate CHIPS proceeding automatically precludes 
a finding that a residential placement is educational for 
purposes of the IDEA.  
  
No. 
01-1272   
 
14 
 
also left blank.6  If the IEP team had concluded that a full-time 
residential program was necessary for Robert to make educational 
progress, the team would have listed it in this section of the 
IEP.  It did not.  In fact, residential programming is not 
identified as an educational necessity anywhere in the IEP.7  We 
conclude 
that 
Robert's 
placement 
at 
Lakeview 
was 
not 
necessitated by his educational needs for purposes of the IDEA.8  
¶27 Nothing in state law changes this conclusion.  The 
circuit court——not an LEA——has exclusive jurisdiction over 
children adjudged to be in need of protection or services.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.13.  State law provides that the circuit court 
                                                 
6 The IEP does conclude that Robert's behavioral problems 
interfere with his education and the education of other 
students, but it does so in the context of evaluating his basic 
need for special education services generally, not residential 
placement in particular.  The IEP lists several interventions 
and special educational support services recommended to address 
Robert's behavioral problems (e.g., one-to-one assistance with 
school work, coping skill strategies, cool down periods), but 
does not specify that residential placement is recommended or 
necessary to Robert's educational progress. 
 
7 Federal regulations require that the educational placement 
of a disabled child be "based on his or her IEP."  34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.552(b)(2) (2000).   
  
8 We also note that Stockbridge, Robert's original LEA, was 
not involved in placing Robert at either the Winnebago Mental 
Health Institute or Lakeview.  The IEP created by Stockbridge 
placed Robert in regular classes with a full-time aide who 
worked with him on a variety of tasks.  Both Randall and the 
County agree that these services were very beneficial to 
Robert's education.  His educational needs were being met 
without placement in a residential program.  This supports our 
conclusion that psychiatric needs triggered Robert's residential 
placement at Lakeview, not educational needs.    
No. 
01-1272   
 
15 
 
may include in a CHIPS dispositional order a requirement that 
the parent of a child placed in a residential treatment facility 
or child caring institution contribute to the support of the 
child.  Wis. Stat. §§ 48.10(14)(b) and 48.355(2)(b)(4). 
¶28 State law further provides that whenever a county or 
the state anticipates or recommends to a court that a child be 
placed in a child caring institution, the county or state "shall 
notify the responsible local educational agency," which in turn 
shall "appoint an individualized education program team to 
review and revise, if necessary, the child's individualized 
education program."  Wis. Stat. § 115.81(3)(a) and (b)1.  Under 
these circumstances, the county or state, rather than the LEA, 
is responsible for paying "all of the child caring institution 
related costs of educating the child while the child resides in 
the child caring institution."  Wis. Stat. § 115.81(4)(b)5. 
¶29 We read these state statutory provisions as allowing 
the circuit court to order child support when a CHIPS child is 
placed in residential treatment but precluding the court from 
assessing any of the facility's education-related costs against 
the parents of the child.  There is no evidence that Randall's 
court-ordered contribution of $170 per week toward Robert's 
$9,000 per month care at Lakeview pertains to the facility's 
education-related costs. 
¶30 Accordingly, 
because 
Robert's 
placement 
in 
the 
residential program at Lakeview was necessitated not by his 
educational needs, but, rather, his mental illness, and was 
brought about by the circuit court's CHIPS order rather than 
No. 
01-1272   
 
16 
 
Robert's IEP, it was not an educational placement for purposes 
of the IDEA.  Therefore, the IDEA does not provide a basis for 
relief from the child support obligation under the CHIPS order.  
Nor does Wis. Stat. § 115.81 provide a basis for lifting that 
obligation.  We affirm the circuit court's denial of Randall's 
motion for relief from the child support order. 
¶31 By the Court.—The order of the Calumet County Circuit 
Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No. 
01-1272   
 
 
 
1