Title: Sanders v. Lidle

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Sanders v. Lidle1984 WY 8674 P.2d 1291Case Number: 83-144Decided: 01/19/1984ENOCH SANDERS AND MARIAN M. SANDERS AND CAROL ANN SANDERS, AND THE UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS TO THE PREMISES HEREINAFTER DESCRIBED, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

RON LIDLE AND JUDITH SUZANNE DODDS LIDLE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
ENOCH SANDERS AND MARIAN 
M. SANDERS AND CAROL ANN SANDERS, AND THE UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS TO THE PREMISES 
HEREINAFTER DESCRIBED, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

RON LIDLE AND JUDITH 
SUZANNE DODDS LIDLE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Sky D. Phifer of 
Phifer & Phifer, Lander, for 
appellants.

Richard D. Gist 
and Richard Kraemer, Lander, for 
appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and 
CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In an action to quiet 
title, based on adverse possession, the trial court granted appellees' motion 
for a summary judgment, and appellants appealed.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellants designate 
the issues as whether the trial court correctly held that appellees established 
the necessary elements of adverse possession to the land in dispute, and whether 
the trial court committed reversible error in considering the depositions of 
appellants, taken in a separate court proceeding, when the depositions had not 
yet been filed.

[¶4.]     Appellants Enoch 
Sanders, Marian Sanders and Carol Ann Sanders, and appellees, Ron Lidle and 
Judith Dodds Lidle, are adjoining land owners in FremontCounty. Appellees acquired title to their 
property through Mrs. Lidle's father, A. Harry Dodds, who died in 1975. Dodds 
acquired a part interest in this property in 1944 and the entire interest in 
1946. Appellants acquired title to their property in 1966. In 1981 appellees had 
their property surveyed and discovered that the boundary fence between the two 
properties was not on the survey line, and that a small portion of the land 
described in appellants' deed was enclosed by appellees' fence. According to 
undisputed affidavits this boundary fence between the two properties had been in 
existence since at least 1944.

[¶5.]     In support of their 
motion for a summary judgment appellees set out in several affidavits the 
circumstances under which their predecessor in title possessed the disputed land 
from 1946 to 1964. These affidavits explain the details of actual, open, 
notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed lands for a 
period in excess of the ten year statutory period required for adverse 
possession.1 The affidavits further give the 
details of hostile possession and the adverse possessor's claim of right. These 
affidavits were not controverted.

"The elements of adverse 
possession consist of actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous 
possession of another's real property for the statutory period, which possession 
must be hostile, and under a claim of right or color of title. [Citation.]" Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 
Wyo., 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1982).

[¶6.]     In an affidavit filed 
in opposition to appellees' motion for a summary judgment, appellant Enoch 
Sanders, said:

"1. That I acquired the 
property, as more fully set out on Exhibit `A', in 1966, with Exhibit `A' being 
a copy of the Warranty Deed by which I acquired possession and 
ownership.

"2. That Mr. A. Harry 
Dodds, never used, irrigated, hayed, nor grazed any livestock upon the property 
that is the subject of this lawsuit, which property is more fully set out in the 
Exhibits attached to Plaintiffs' Affidavits, from 1964 until his death in 1975. 

"3. That from 1964 until 
1981, continuously every year, I either used the property that is the subject of 
this lawsuit for summer grazing of my cattle or put up hay for 
myself.

* * 
*"

[¶7.]     However, the affidavits 
of appellees show that any use made of the disputed land was with the permission 
of, and under the direction of Mr. Dodds, and later, appellee Judith Lidle. 
Nothing in appellants' affidavits denies this permissive 
use.

[¶8.]     We understand 
appellants' contention to be that the statute governing an adverse possession 
action, § 1-3-103, W.S. 1977, sets out two limitations. They contend first that 
the adverse possessor must possess the property of another adversely for ten 
years before a cause of action to quiet title matures. Second, they contend that 
the adverse possessor must bring an action within ten years after the cause of 
action matures or the statute bars the action. We disagree with the latter 
limitation suggested by appellants.

[¶9.]     Appellants further 
contend that a person occupying land adversely must maintain adverse possession 
continuously up to the time suit is filed to quiet title, even after the ten 
year statutory period has run and the adverse possessor's cause of action has 
matured. Appellants claim, therefore, that appellees' suit must fail for two 
reasons:

1) That appellees have 
not possessed the disputed land adversely since 1964 although it was adversely 
possessed between 1946 and 1964; and

2) That appellees' cause 
of action matured before 1964, but they waited more than ten years after their 
cause of action matured to bring a lawsuit, and are therefore barred by § 
1-3-103, supra.

[¶10.]  We disagree. We have examined cases cited 
to us by appellants in support of their theory; however, we believe that the 
appellants have misconceived the adverse possession law. In our view, therefore, 
these cases are not relevant and do not support the issues raised by 
appellants.

I

[¶11.]  When we review the granting of a motion 
for summary judgment the record is examined in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. All favorable inferences from the facts contained in 
affidavits, exhibits and depositions are drawn in favor of the party opposing 
the motion. Norman v. City of 
Gillette, Wyo., 658 P.2d 697 
(1983); and Dubus v. Dresser 
Industries, Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 (1982). The moving party 
has the burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Mealey v. City of Laramie, Wyo. 472 P.2d 787 (1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 931, 92 S. Ct. 282, 30 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1971). Upon a showing that the movant is entitled to summary judgment, "The 
opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissable at a trial 
showing that there are genuine issues of material fact." Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 4, 
Wyo., 636 P.2d 525, 528 (1981).

[¶12.]  Considering the affidavits of Enoch 
Sanders, and the affidavits filed by appellees, it is undisputed that (1) A. 
Harry Dodds, appellees' predecessor in title, possessed the disputed property 
from October 28, 1946, until at least 1964; (2) the disputed property was 
enclosed by Dodds;2 and (3) Dodds held this property 
adversely, that is, his possession was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, 
continuous, hostile and under a claim of right. Title to the disputed property, 
therefore, vested in Dodds on or about October 28, 1956. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 
136 A.L.R. 770 (1941). After title is vested it can only be divested by 
conveyance, descent or operation of law. Meyer v. Ellis, Wyo., 
411 P.2d 338 (1966).

[¶13.]  Appellee Judith Lidle acquired title to 
the disputed property by descent upon the death of her father, A. Harry Dodds, 
in 1975. After title of the disputed property vested in Mr. Dodds in 1956, he 
could treat this property the same as any other real property that he 
owned.

[¶14.]  According to Enoch Sanders' affidavit, 
Sanders used the disputed land from 1964 to 1981. However, as indicated, this 
use was with permission. Dodds could have been divested of his title by adverse 
possession, but appellants have never made this claim, and the affidavits do not 
support a contention they acquired title to the land in dispute by adversely 
possessing it.

[¶15.]  We hold that appellees are not barred by 
§ 1-3-103, supra, because they did not bring their quiet title action within ten 
years after title vested. We further hold that possession by appellees need not 
be adverse up to the time a quiet title action is filed. Their title vested in 
1956 and was not divested by conveyance or operation of 
law.

II

[¶16.]  In appellants' second assignment of error 
they assert that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider the 
depositions of appellants because they had not been physically filed in the 
record with the motion for summary judgment in violation of Rule 56(c), Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The depositions objected to were taken in connection 
with a case filed in June, 1981. That case was between the same parties and 
concerned the adverse possession of the same land involved here. It was 
dismissed, and in October, 1982, the action was refiled.

[¶17.]  In appellees' motion for summary judgment 
they stated that they were relying upon the depositions taken in the first case 
to support their motion. We need not decide whether the depositions were 
improperly considered by the trial court because they were unnecessary to 
support the motion for summary judgment. The only thing included in the 
deposition of Mr. Sanders that was not in appellees' affidavits was the 
admission by Sanders that he used the disputed property with permission. 
Appellees' affidavits did state that Sanders' use was permissive. For purposes 
of the summary judgment, failure to deny permissive use, once it was stated in 
appellees' affidavits, had the legal effect of admitting permissive use. If 
appellants contend that the use was not permissive they had a legal duty to say 
so. Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747 
(1981); Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.

[¶18.]  More importantly, as indicated in Part I 
of this opinion, title vested in A. Harry Dodds in 1956, and nothing happened 
after that time to divest title.3

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 "An action for the 
recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, hereditaments can only 
be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of such action accrues." § 
1-3-103, W.S. 1977.

2 See Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 
Wyo., 623 P.2d 1196 (1981); and Shores v. Lindsey, Wyo., 591 P.2d 895 
(1979).

3 Appellants filed a 
counterclaim to quiet title; however, they did not claim title by adverse 
possession, but relied solely upon their deed to the disputed land and the 
failure of appellants' claim of adverse possession.