Title: Commonwealth v. Moore

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11652 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY L. MOORE, JR. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     May 11, 2018. - October 31, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Armed Home Invasion.  Robbery.  
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Firearms.  Evidence, Third-party culprit, Hearsay, 
Relevancy and materiality, Identification, Unavailable 
witness, Testimony at prior proceeding, Testimony before 
grand jury, Impeachment of credibility, Exculpatory.  
Identification.  Witness, Unavailability, Impeachment.  
Practice, Criminal, Preservation of evidence, New trial, 
Assistance of counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 16, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before John S. Ferrara, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on December 24, 2015, and 
supplemented on January 25, 2017, was heard by him. 
 
 
 
Russell C. Sobelman for the defendant. 
 
Shane T. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On the evening of March 22, 2010, Margaret 
Przewozniak was shot, execution style, by a masked gunman during 
2 
 
 
an armed robbery and home invasion in Springfield.  A Hampden 
County grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant, 
Anthony L. Moore, Jr., with murder and various related offenses.  
At trial, the defendant pursued a misidentification defense and 
attempted to undermine the procedures employed by the 
Springfield police.  A Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and 
felony-murder with armed home invasion and armed robbery as the 
predicate felonies.1 
 
On appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, the defendant claims error in (1) the 
exclusion of evidence pertaining to the inadequacy of the police 
investigation; (2) the Commonwealth's failure to preserve and 
disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) the conduct of a showup 
identification procedure; (4) the admission of the prior 
testimony of an unavailable witness, and (5) error in the denial 
of his motion for a new trial.  The defendant also argues that 
we should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
order a new trial or reduce the murder verdict for a myriad of 
reasons.2  We find no reversible error, and we discern no basis 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of nine related offenses. 
 
 
2 The defendant submitted two appellate briefs; one in 
support of his direct appeal and one in support of his appeal 
3 
 
 
to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce 
the degree of guilt or order a new trial.  We therefore affirm 
the judgments and the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for our discussion of the 
specific issues raised on appeal. 
 
In March, 2010, Sarah LaPalm lived with her three year old 
child and the victim in a two-bedroom apartment in Springfield.  
LaPalm and her child occupied the two bedrooms on the second 
floor of the apartment, and the victim occupied a bedroom in the 
basement.  The victim sold cocaine and marijuana, and she kept 
large sums of money in various denominations in a small keyed 
strongbox in the basement. 
 
Sometime after 9 P.M. on March 22, 2010, LaPalm, the child, 
and the victim were in the kitchen of their apartment when a 
                     
from the trial judge's denial of his motion for a new trial.  
Together, the briefs assert numerous claims of error, some of 
which are barely comprehensible and lack compliance with our 
rule governing appropriate appellate argument.  Mass. R.A.P. 16 
(a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).  See Commonwealth v. 
Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 209 n.9 (2014) (arguments unsupported by 
"individual legal analysis or citation to the relevant legal 
authority" are insufficient under rule 16); Kellogg v. Board of 
Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2011) ("Briefs that 
limit themselves to 'bald assertions of error' that 'lack[] 
legal argument . . . [do not] rise[] to the level of appellate 
argument' required by rule 16").  However, we have reviewed all 
his claims of error under our obligation pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E; none requires relief. 
4 
 
 
masked African-American man carrying a gun entered the home.  
The intruder was dressed in black and wore a ski mask covering 
his face; he was approximately six feet tall and slim.3  The 
victim pulled down the intruder's mask, exposing part of his 
face, and said,  "What is this a joke?  We went to school 
together."  In response, the intruder pointed the gun at 
LaPalm's child and said, "This shit is serious.  Your [child]'s 
right there."  He then fired a bullet into the kitchen floor. 
 
LaPalm immediately picked up her child and ran out the back 
door to her neighbor's apartment, where she telephoned 911.  As 
LaPalm ran, she looked back into her kitchen and saw the victim 
struggling with the intruder, who was dragging the victim toward 
the basement.  LaPalm also saw a second man standing at the foot 
of the stairs outside her apartment.  He was approximately five 
feet, six inches tall, was dressed in black, and was wearing a 
ski mask. 
 
As LaPalm fled, a neighbor, Charles Brown, was arriving 
home.  He pulled into his driveway, saw LaPalm banging on his 
front door, and heard her "screaming," "There [are] two masked 
guys in my house."  Moments later, Brown saw two men wearing 
masks and dressed in all black leave LaPalm's apartment.  One of 
                     
 
3 According to the record, at the relevant time, the 
defendant was approximately six feet, two inches tall and 
weighed approximately 240 pounds.  The defendant was twenty-
three years old at the time of the crime. 
5 
 
 
the men was shorter than the other, approximately five feet, six 
inches tall; the other was over six feet tall and thin.  The two 
men ran past Brown's motor vehicle toward a light colored 
minivan.  One of the men was carrying a black box.  Although he 
was unable to see either perpetrator's face, Brown believed that 
he saw the hands of both men and concluded that they were 
African-American. 
 
LaPalm also watched the masked men run through the parking 
lot.  She noticed that the taller intruder was carrying the 
victim's strongbox.  LaPalm then returned to her apartment, 
where she found the victim in the basement, curled up in a fetal 
position and moaning.  The victim had suffered two gunshot 
wounds, one to the front of her left thigh and one to the back 
of her head.  Gunshot residue indicated that the muzzle of the 
gun had been pressed near or against the victim's head when she 
was shot.  The murder weapon was not recovered. 
 
Officers who responded to the scene that evening learned 
from college students who lived in a house next to the apartment 
complex that, at about 9:15 P.M., one of them saw two African-
American men walking out of his backyard.  One of the men was 
about six feet, three inches tall and weighed over 200 pounds.  
The other was approximately five feet, nine inches tall and 
skinny.  Both men appeared to be between eighteen and twenty-
four years old and were wearing black hooded sweatshirts and 
6 
 
 
black winter hats.  He asked the two men, "What's going on?"  
The taller man responded, "We're hiding out in your backyard."  
The witness went back inside and told his two roommates what he 
had observed, and they all went outside.  From the front porch 
they observed two African-American men walking towards LaPalm's 
apartment complex.  When one of the students asked the two men 
what they were doing, the taller man responded, "Do you have a 
problem?"  The three said, "No," and went back inside their 
house. 
 
In addition, an officer spoke with a woman and her young 
teenaged daughter, who lived in a house down the street from 
LaPalm's apartment complex.  The woman said that as she and her 
daughter left their house shortly after 9 P.M. to go grocery 
shopping, she noticed a gray minivan she did not recognize from 
the neighborhood parked directly in front of her driveway.  She 
also did not recognize either of the vehicle's two occupants, 
both of whom were wearing black hooded sweatshirts.  After she 
saw the two men leave the vehicle and run into her neighbor's 
backyard, the woman instructed her daughter to write down the 
vehicle's registration number on a piece of paper.  She also 
noticed white lettering on the top of the vehicle's windshield. 
 
As a result, an officer issued a radio broadcast that 
police officers should be on the lookout for a minivan with the 
registration number that the woman had provided.  Because police 
7 
 
 
were unable to find a matching vehicle in the registry of motor 
vehicles database, police tried a different combination of the 
letters and numbers that the woman had provided, and were able 
to match a registration number that was different by one digit 
to the license plate number of a vehicle matching witness 
descriptions.4 
 
Officers learned that the license plate number was 
associated with a gray Dodge minivan that was registered to the 
defendant's mother.  They went to the address in Springfield but 
did not locate the vehicle.  However, at approximately 11:30 
P.M., the same officers observed a gray Dodge minivan with the 
applicable registration number idling on a street in 
Springfield.  The officers could see two men in the vehicle but 
could not identify either of them. 
 
Within minutes, additional officers arrived and they all  
approached the vehicle with their guns drawn.  The passenger, 
who was the defendant's brother, was ordered out of the vehicle 
and placed in handcuffs.  When the defendant was ordered out of 
the vehicle, he refused to comply and was forcibly removed.  At 
some point during the forcible removal from the minivan and his 
                     
 
4 Before confirming that the second registration number was 
correct, an officer asked the daughter whether the "6" she 
recorded could have actually been a "G."  The daughter said that 
she was unsure, but the officer replaced the "6" with the letter 
"G" and got a match. 
8 
 
 
being escorted to the police cruiser in handcuffs, the defendant 
said, without any prompting, "That's my little brother.  He had 
nothing to do with what happened earlier."  Search of the 
defendant uncovered, among other things, $1,610 in various 
denominations, a bag of marijuana, and a small digital scale. 
 
Police remained at the location with the defendant and his 
brother and, beginning at around 12 A.M. on March 23, 2010, 
police conducted showup identification procedures of the two 
men.  Of the witnesses who participated in the showup 
identifications, three had observed the vehicle in which the two 
men had been traveling earlier that evening, three had observed 
the perpetrators' faces, and two had observed the perpetrators 
while they were wearing masks.  The witnesses were instructed 
that they were not to discuss the identification procedures or 
the results with other witnesses.  They were also instructed 
that it was just as important to clear an innocent person as it 
was to identify a guilty one, and that the individuals they were 
about to see may or may not be wearing the same clothing as they 
were wearing earlier that evening. 
 
Each witness was then separately driven to where the 
minivan was parked and illuminated by the headlights of a police 
cruiser.  After each witness arrived, the defendant was escorted 
out from the back of a police cruiser and stood in front of the 
transport vehicle so that the vehicle's headlights would 
9 
 
 
illuminate the defendant.  The defendant's hands were cuffed 
behind his back and an officer with a flashlight stood on either 
side of the defendant to illuminate his face.  The same process 
was repeated with the defendant's brother. 
 
All three of the witnesses who had seen the perpetrators' 
vehicle earlier that evening -- Brown and the woman and her 
daughter -- positively identified the minivan that the defendant 
had been driving as the same vehicle they had seen earlier that 
evening, with the woman pointing out the lettering on the 
windshield she had seen earlier.  Although the woman was unable 
to express confidence that the defendant was one of the two men 
she had seen getting out of the minivan, her daughter identified 
the defendant as being the same height and size as one of the 
two men she had observed earlier that evening. 
 
LaPalm and Brown had seen both men while they were wearing 
masks, while the three college students had observed both men at 
close range without masks.  Both LaPalm and Brown identified the 
defendant as being the same height and build as the taller 
perpetrator.  LaPalm also believed that the defendant was the 
same complexion as the intruder who was in her kitchen.  Two of 
the college students positively identified the defendant, and   
the third was confident that the defendant was the same size, 
build, and complexion as the taller man that he had seen outside 
his house, but could not confirm that the defendant was that 
10 
 
 
person.  With the exception of the mother, all the witnesses 
excluded the defendant's brother as either one of the two men 
they had observed that night near LaPalm's apartment complex. 
 
The defendant was then placed under arrest, and police sent 
the his T-shirt, jeans, and sneakers for testing.  Although 
officers observed no visible stains on the defendant's white T-
shirt during booking, a forensic scientist subsequently 
discovered light red-brown bloodstains on it.  Forensic testing 
revealed the presence of the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) on that T-shirt.  A test of the defendant's hands for 
gunshot primer residue came back negative. 
 
A search of the vehicle performed on March 24, 2010,  
revealed a red-brown stain on the inside of the door on the 
passenger's side of the vehicle.  That stain tested positive for 
the victim's DNA. 
 
In July, 2013, the defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with armed home invasion 
and armed robbery as the predicate felonies.  The defendant also 
was convicted of armed home invasion (two counts), assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon (three counts), unlawful possession 
11 
 
 
of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition without a 
firearm identification card.5 
 
While the defendant's direct appeal was pending in this 
court, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.  The motion 
judge, who had also been the trial judge, denied the motion, and 
the defendant appealed.  The appeals were consolidated. 
 
 Discussion.  Where, as here, an appeal from the denial of 
a defendant's motion for a new trial has been consolidated with 
a direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree, 
we review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 840 (2013). 
 
1.  Exclusion of third-party culprit and Bowden evidence.  
At trial, the defendant sought admission of an audio recording 
of the police radio broadcast published after the shooting that 
contained various witness descriptions of the suspects.6  Defense 
counsel argued that the audio recording was relevant to show 
that the police investigation was inadequate, thus pursuing a 
so-called Bowden defense, see Commonwealth v. Silva–Santiago, 
453 Mass. 782, 802 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 
Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  The judge concluded that the 
                     
 
5 The defendant was acquitted of assault and battery on a 
police officer. 
 
6 Different portions of the police radio broadcast described 
the perpetrators as:  five feet, five inches tall; five feet, 
six inches tall; five feet, seven inches tall; and six feet 
tall. 
12 
 
 
portions of the recording containing physical descriptions of 
the perpetrators was hearsay, and excluded them.  The judge 
instead allowed the defendant to play portions of the recording 
that involved the changed vehicle registration number, as well 
as portions containing information about the defendant having 
been previously stopped by police in the same vehicle.7 
 
The defendant contends that the physical description 
portions of the audio recording were admissible both as third-
party culprit evidence and as evidence of an inadequate 
investigation under Bowden, and that the judge's exclusion of 
these portions constituted reversible error.  We consider 
separately the admissibility of the audio recording under each 
theory advanced by the defendant because, "[a]lthough the same 
evidence often may be used to support a third-party culprit 
defense and a Bowden defense, these two defenses are 'logically 
(and legally) distinct.'"  Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 
409 n.6 (2014), quoting Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. at 800. 
 
a.  Third-party culprit evidence.  "A defendant may 
introduce evidence that tends to show that another person 
committed the crime or had the motive, intent, and opportunity 
to commit it."  Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. at 800, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 387 (1989).  See Mass. 
                     
 
7 In light of the judge's ruling, defense counsel declined 
to play the recording. 
13 
 
 
G. Evid. § 1105 (2018).  As a result, we afford "wide latitude 
to the admission of relevant evidence" insofar as it tends to 
show that "a person other than the defendant may have committed 
the crime charged."  Silva–Santiago, supra at 800-801.  "If the 
evidence is 'of substantial probative value, and will not tend 
to prejudice or confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor 
of admissibility.'"  Id. at 801, quoting Commonwealth v. Conkey, 
443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008).  However, 
"because the evidence is offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted -- that a third party is the true culprit -- we have 
permitted hearsay evidence that does not fall within a hearsay 
exception only if, in the judge's discretion, the evidence is 
otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the 
jury, and there are other substantial connecting links to the 
crime" (quotations and citation omitted).  Silva–Santiago, supra 
at 801.  "Because the issue is one of constitutional dimension, 
we are not bound by an abuse of discretion standard, but rather 
examine the issue independently."  Conkey, supra at 66-67. 
 
The defendant did not assert a third-party culprit defense 
at trial.  Even if he had, however, we would discern no error in 
the exclusion, as third-party culprit evidence, of those 
portions of the audio recording that contained witness 
descriptions of the perpetrators.  The recording was 
inadmissible "layered" hearsay, i.e., unidentified police 
14 
 
 
officers stating for the purpose of identifying the perpetrators 
what an unidentified person or persons said the perpetrators 
looked like.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 216 
(2014), citing Commonwealth v. Caillot, 449 Mass. 712, 721 
(2007) (layered hearsay with uncertain sources unreliable and 
inadmissible as third-party culprit evidence). 
 
b.  Evidence undermining police investigation.  The 
defendant's alternate theory is that the portions of the audio 
recording containing physical descriptions of the perpetrators 
were admissible as part of his inadequate police investigation 
defense under Bowden.  Because "the exclusion of evidence of a 
Bowden defense is not constitutional in nature," we review the 
judge's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard.  Silva–
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 804 n.26.  The defendant preserved his 
objections to the judge's rulings on this issue at trial.8  
                     
 
8 Although defense counsel did not specifically object to 
the judge's adverse ruling, the fact that he made an offer of 
proof as to those portions of the audio recording's 
admissibility put the judge on notice of the purpose of the 
proffered evidence.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 22, as appearing in 
378 Mass. 892 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 828 
(2006) ("We have consistently interpreted [rule 22] to preserve 
appellate rights only when an objection is made in a form or 
context that reveals the objection's basis"); Commonwealth v. 
Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 562 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 330 (1975), S.C., 371 Mass. 596 (1976) 
(counsel is "not required to make further efforts 'in the face 
of [a] judge's unequivocal adverse ruling'").  See also Mass. G. 
Evid. § 103(a)(2) (2018).  This is especially true in light of 
the extensive sidebar discussions about the audio recording 
throughout trial. 
15 
 
 
Accordingly, we review for prejudicial error if there is an 
abuse of discretion.  See Cassidy, 470 Mass. at 210, citing 
Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 307, 317-318 (2009). 
 
A defendant may rely on deficiencies or lapses in police 
investigations to raise the specter of reasonable doubt.  
Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486.  A defendant asserting a Bowden 
defense may "challenge the adequacy of a police investigation 
and may use information concerning third-party culprits to 
question whether the police took reasonable steps to investigate 
the crime."  Ridge, 455 Mass. at 316, citing Bowden, supra.  See 
Mass. G. Evid., supra at § 1107(a).  This defense suggests to 
the jury "that the evidence at trial may be inadequate or 
unreliable because the police failed to conduct the scientific 
tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police investigation 
would have conducted or investigated," with the result that the 
police may have missed "significant evidence of the defendant's 
guilt or innocence."  Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801.  
"Because any statements introduced as part of such a defense are 
offered not for their truth, but to prove that the police did 
not take 'reasonable steps to investigate,' those statements are 
not hearsay."  Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 414 
(2011), quoting Ridge, supra.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 295 n.15 (2017) ("If the out-of-court 
16 
 
 
statement is offered for any purpose other than its truth, then 
it is not hearsay"). 
 
A defendant does not, however, have an unfettered right to 
elicit evidence regarding the adequacy of the police 
investigation.  The admissibility of such evidence hinges first, 
and foremost, on its relevance.  See Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 60 
Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485 (2004); Mass. G. Evid., supra at §§ 401, 
402.  See also Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996) (evidence "must 
have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense 
raises"); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 382 Mass. 379, 383 (1981) 
("all relevant evidence is admissible unless barred by an 
exclusionary rule" [citation omitted]).  Relevant evidence means 
evidence having "any tendency" to make a consequential fact more 
or less probable than it would be without that evidence.  See 
Mass. G. Evid., supra at § 401.  As a result, evidence need not 
carry any particular weight to be relevant; it must only provide 
a link in the chain of proof bearing on an issue of consequence.  
Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144 (2004).  If evidence 
is relevant to the adequacy of the police investigation, the 
judge must then determine whether the probative value of the 
Bowden evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
17 
 
 
unfair prejudice.  See Mass. G. Evid., supra at § 403.  See also 
Harris-Lewis, supra.9 
 
Here, because the descriptions were not being offered for 
their truth, i.e., to show that the defendant did not match the 
descriptions of the perpetrators relayed by police, the judge 
erred in concluding that the portions of the audio recording 
that contained descriptions of the perpetrators constituted 
inadmissible layered hearsay.  See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 
Mass. 388, 390-392 (1999) (informants' statements relayed from 
one officer to another not inadmissible layered hearsay under 
Bowden).  See also Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 803 (evidence 
inadmissible under third-party culprit theory may be admissible 
as part of Bowden defense).  The descriptions were being offered 
                     
 
9 Our case law has not always been consistent regarding the 
standard for excluding evidence because the evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 
n.27 (2014).  In contrast to the "more exacting standard" of 
admissibility under Crayton, supra, where "other bad acts" 
evidence should be excluded where "its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice," evidence offered in 
furtherance of a defense under Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 
472, 485-486 (1980), should be excluded only where its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  See Mass. G. Evid., supra at §§ 403, 404(b).  The 
standard of admissibility for Bowden evidence articulated in 
Commonwealth v. Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 803 (2009), did 
not accurately reflect the appropriate balancing test.  See id. 
(considering "whether the probative weight of the Bowden 
evidence exceeded the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
Commonwealth from diverting the jury's attention to collateral 
matters").  We therefore clarify:  Bowden evidence is admissible 
so long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect.  See Mass. G. Evid., supra at § 403. 
18 
 
 
to show that, once police stopped the defendant, they focused 
their investigation on the defendant to the exclusion of all 
others, even though the defendant did not match the physical 
descriptions in the broadcast.  See Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 
Mass. 155, 166 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007).  Therefore, 
the portions of the audio recording that contained descriptions 
of the perpetrators were relevant to the defendant's Bowden 
defense, and nothing in the record suggests that the evidence's 
probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of 
unfair prejudice.  The portions of the recording containing 
descriptions of the perpetrators should have been admitted at 
trial. 
 
Although the judge erred in excluding those portions of the 
police broadcast, the error did not prejudice the defendant.  
The defendant was permitted to challenge the adequacy of the 
investigation as a whole, including that police failed to pursue 
other leads based on inconsistencies in the initial 
descriptions.  See Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 
562-563 (2015); See Ridge, 455 Mass. at 316.  Defense counsel 
had an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses about the various 
descriptions and to argue the point in closing argument.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 266, 278 (2014).  Moreover, the 
various initial descriptions of the perpetrators' heights are 
insignificant in view of the almost exact match of the actual 
19 
 
 
numbers of the registration plate of the vehicle the defendant 
had been driving, the defendant's positive identification by two 
witnesses, the defendant's statement to police, and the DNA 
evidence found in the vehicle and on the defendant's person.  
The identification by witnesses were corroborated through 
records from the Springfield school department indicating that 
the victim and the defendant had attended school together, just 
as the victim exclaimed when she had pulled down the taller 
intruder's mask.  The defendant was not prejudiced.10 
 
2.  Failure to preserve and disclose the booking video tape 
recording.  During pretrial discovery, the Commonwealth turned 
over video recordings that, the prosecutor claimed, showed the 
defendant's booking at the Springfield police station.  Shortly 
before trial, defense counsel learned that the prosecutor had 
failed to turn over the correct video recording and instead had 
                     
 
10 The defendant also argues that the judge impermissibly 
interfered with trial counsel's strategy and undermined his 
right to present a defense by excluding portions of the 
broadcast that included descriptions of the perpetrators, as 
well as portions containing information about the defendant 
having been stopped in the same vehicle on a prior occasion.  
Although we agree that "it is the defendant and his counsel, and 
not the judge, who must evaluate the risks of their trial 
strategy," Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 455 (2003), 
as previously discussed, the judge's evidentiary ruling did not 
preclude the defendant from presenting a Bowden defense to the 
jury.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 419 (2011) 
("the judge's exclusion of  [evidence did not] deprive the 
defendant of the ability to present a defense suggesting that [a 
third-party] was the killer"). 
20 
 
 
turned over a videotape recording of another unidentified 
African-American man wearing a white T-shirt leaning against the 
booking desk.  Defense counsel did not, however, notify the 
prosecutor that he had provided the incorrect booking videotape.  
Instead, defense counsel made a strategic decision to offer the 
incorrect booking videotape at trial to reinforce his Bowden 
defense.  Specifically, defense counsel intended to play the 
recording to show that police had turned over the wrong 
videotape, that the defendant did not have blood on his T-shirt 
when he first arrived at the police station, and that the 
victim's blood was transferred to the defendant's T-shirt 
through contact with the booking desk.  The judge subsequently 
denied defense counsel's request to play the incorrect booking 
videotape, but allowed him to question police witnesses about 
the absence of visible bloodstains on the defendant's T-shirt. 
 
The defendant now contends that he is entitled to a new 
trial because the Commonwealth failed to preserve and disclose 
the correct videotape recording.  We disagree.  A defendant who 
seeks relief from the loss or destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence has the initial burden to establish "a 
'reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than 
a fertile imagination,' that access to the [evidence] would have 
produced evidence favorable to his [or her] cause" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 1, 12 (1984).  See 
21 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 714 (1993), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 835 (1994).  If the defendant meets that 
initial burden, "a balancing test is employed to determine the 
appropriateness and extent of remedial action."  Commonwealth v. 
Willie, 400 Mass. 427, 432 (1987).  The judge "must weigh the 
culpability of the Commonwealth, the materiality of the 
evidence, and the potential prejudice to the defendant."  Id. 
 
We assume, without deciding, that cases addressing lost or 
destroyed evidence apply here because the Commonwealth failed to 
provide a videotape it claimed to have provided before trial, 
and that the defendant satisfied his initial burden of 
establishing a reasonable possibility that access to the 
videotape recording would have produced favorable evidence.  We 
conclude that the Commonwealth exhibited no bad faith and, even 
if the Commonwealth had been negligent in failing to preserve 
the recording, the defendant was afforded a sufficient 
opportunity to remedy any prejudice.  The defendant was allowed, 
through cross-examination of police witnesses, to elicit 
testimony about the absence of visible blood stains on the 
defendant's T-shirt.  This was sufficient to remedy any 
prejudice to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Harwood, 432 
Mass. 290, 302 (2000) ("Our courts have fashioned or upheld 
various judicial remedies for the loss of evidence").  See also 
Mass. G. Evid., supra at § 1102. 
22 
 
 
 
3.  The showup identification.  The defendant argues that 
the one-on-one showup identification procedures conducted within 
hours of the killing were so unnecessarily suggestive that they 
offend due process.  Although one-on-one showup identification 
procedures are "generally disfavored as inherently suggestive," 
Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 306 (2017), they only raise 
due process concerns if it is determined that the procedure was 
unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 217 (2014); Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 
Mass. 434, 441, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 279 (2006).  Police are 
permitted to conduct a showup identification if there is a "good 
reason" to secure the prompt identification of a suspect.  Dew, 
supra.  However, even where there is "good reason" for a showup 
identification, "it may still be suppressed if the 
identification procedure so needlessly adds to the 
suggestiveness inherent in such an identification that it is 
'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.'"  Figueroa, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 628 
(2008).  See Dew, supra at 307 ("the evidence must be excluded 
'[i]f there are special elements of unfairness'" [citation 
omitted]); Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 361 (1995). 
 
Here, there was good reason to conduct showup 
identifications, and the procedures were not so unnecessarily 
23 
 
 
suggestive as to create a substantial risk of a mistaken 
identification.  The crime involved an armed home invasion and 
homicide.  The police had not located the firearm and the 
perpetrators were still at large.  See Meas, 467 Mass. at 441 
("very good justification" for showup where firearm not 
recovered at scene).  The showup took place within three hours 
of the shooting, see Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 218  ("good reason" 
for showup two and one-half hours after shooting to determine 
whether shooter was still at large); Bowden, 379 Mass. at 479 
(showup identification conducted two hours after murder 
admissible), and there were no "special elements of unfairness, 
indicating a desire on the part of the police to 'stack the 
deck' against the defendant," Dew, 478 Mass. at 307, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Leaster, 395 Mass. 96, 103 (1985).  Public 
safety was paramount, and a prompt identification served to 
limit risk to the public and to avoid the escape of dangerous 
suspects.  See Austin, 421 Mass. at 364.  Accordingly, the 
showup identification procedures were not so unnecessarily 
suggestive as to offend due process.11 
                     
 
11 Relatedly, the defendant contends that the judge erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial because the jury were not 
given an instruction on cross-racial identifications.  Because 
this case was tried before our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 361–378 (2015), the judge was not required 
to give a cross-racial identification instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 23 (2015) ("Although it 
was not error before Gomes for the judge to decline to give a 
24 
 
 
 
4.  Use of unavailable witness's testimony from prior 
proceeding.  Because Brown died before trial, the Commonwealth 
introduced transcripts of his testimony from a pretrial hearing 
on the defendant's motion to suppress.  The judge had previously 
allowed the Commonwealth's motion in limine regarding this 
testimony, over the objection of the defendant, before jury 
selection on the first day of trial.  Because defense counsel 
did not renew his objection at trial, it was not preserved.12 
 
At the suppression hearing, Brown testified that based on 
his observations of the perpetrators' hands, he believed the two 
                     
cross-racial instruction, such an instruction must be given in 
trials that commence after Gomes where there is a cross-racial 
identification").  The defendant did not request such an 
instruction and the judge's instruction adequately addressed the 
issue of reliability in eyewitness identifications.  We 
therefore discern no error in the denial of the defendant's 
motion for a new trial on this ground.  See Commonwealth v. Bly, 
448 Mass. 473, 496 (2007). 
 
 
12 In Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016), we 
held that a defendant need not "object to the admission of 
evidence at trial where he or she has already sought to preclude 
the very same evidence at the motion in limine stage, and the 
motion was heard and denied."  The rule announced in Grady does 
not, however, apply retroactively.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 448 n.2 (2017).  We therefore review to 
determine whether any error created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 
275, 292 (2017).  We note, however, that even if the objection 
had been properly preserved, Charles Brown's testimony would 
have been admissible under the prior recorded testimony 
exception to the hearsay rule under Mass. G. Evid., supra at 
§ 804(b)(1). 
 
25 
 
 
men were African-American.13  During his testimony before the 
grand jury, Brown testified, contrary to his testimony at the 
suppression hearing, that on the night he gave his statement to 
police, he was "under a lot of . . . stress," and that he was no 
longer sure whether he had seen the shorter man's hands. 
 
The defendant makes two arguments related to the admission 
of transcripts of Brown's testimony.  First, the defendant 
contends that Brown's testimony was not admissible because it 
does not fall within the prior recorded testimony exception to 
the rule against hearsay and that its introduction violated the 
defendant's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  Second, the defendant argues 
that suppression counsel rendered deficient performance by not 
impeaching Brown with his prior grand jury testimony. 
 
a.  Admissibility of Brown's prior recorded testimony.  "We 
need not decide the admissibility of [Brown's] testimony as 
prior recorded testimony under our common law rule.  If the 
standards of the confrontation clause are met in the admission 
of [Brown's] testimony, the interests of justice test applied 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is also met."  Commonwealth v. 
Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 638 (1986).  As a result, "we review 
the admission of the prior recorded testimony only to determine 
                     
 
13 Before trial, suppression counsel withdrew, and the 
defendant was represented by different counsel for his trial. 
26 
 
 
whether it offends the defendant's confrontation rights." 
Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 293 (2017). 
 
The admission of prior testimony does not violate the 
defendant's confrontation rights "when the declarant is 
unavailable, as a matter of law, to testify and 'the defendant 
has had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.'"  Caruso, 476 Mass. at 293, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 60 (2009).  An adequate prior opportunity 
means effective cross-examination at a prior proceeding 
addressed to "substantially the same interests" where the 
defendant had a "similar motive" to cross-examine the witness.  
Caruso, supra.   It does not mean cross-examination that is 
"effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish."  Id., quoting Hurley, supra at 62.  See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57-59 (2004).  "That a subsequent 
[proceeding] involves additional evidence introduced against the 
defendant does not mean that the opportunity for cross-
examination at an earlier [proceeding] is inadequate to satisfy 
the confrontation clause."  Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 
833 (2004). 
 
Here, the issues at trial and the defendant's motive on 
cross-examination at the suppression hearing were sufficiently 
similar to satisfy the confrontation clause.  Brown's testimony 
at the suppression hearing dealt with the same underlying events 
27 
 
 
-- Brown's observations of the perpetrators and the vehicle on 
the night of the killing -- and his testimony was admitted at 
the defendant's trial for that very same purpose.  See Hurley, 
455 Mass. at 61–62; Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 500–
501 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).  The defendant 
also had the same motive to cross-examine Brown -- to undermine 
his identification.  Therefore, these issues had been subject to 
adequate cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the 
confrontation clause and our review pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33.  See Caruso, 476 Mass. at 295; Sena, 441 
Mass. at 833. 
 
b.  Use of grand jury testimony for impeachment.  The 
defendant contends that suppression counsel also rendered 
deficient performance by not impeaching Brown with his prior 
grand jury testimony.  Failure to impeach does not, standing 
alone, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 696 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 357 (2001), citing 
Commonwealth v. Bart B., 242 Mass. 911, 916 (1997).  
"Impeachment of a witness is, by its very nature, fraught with a 
host of strategic considerations, to which we will, even on 
§ 33E review, still show deference."  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
446 Mass. 709, 715 (2006), quoting Fisher, supra.  "[A]bsent 
counsel's failure to pursue some obviously powerful form of 
28 
 
 
impeachment . . . , it is speculative to conclude that a 
different approach to impeachment would likely have affected the 
jury's conclusion."  Hudson, supra, quoting Fisher, supra. 
 
Here, suppression counsel should have cross-examined Brown 
with inconsistencies between his testimony before the grand jury 
and at the suppression hearing.  We are confident, nonetheless, 
that suppression counsel's failure to do so had no bearing on 
the outcome of the case.  The inconsistencies were not material, 
because the record contains an abundance of evidence with 
identifications of both the defendant and the vehicle he was 
driving that night; these instances include identification of 
the vehicle the defendant had been driving by the mother and her 
daughter and, more importantly, the positive identification of 
the defendant by two of the college students at the showup. 
 
5.  Motion for new trial.  The defendant argues that his 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in a number of 
respects, and that the motion judge, who was also the trial 
judge, abused his discretion in denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial that raised these claims.  Specifically, the 
defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for (i) 
failing to consent to the nolle prosequi of the marijuana 
possession charge, and (ii) failing to call a blood spatter 
expert at trial.  The defendant also argues that the judge erred 
in denying his motion for a new trial because of newly 
29 
 
 
discovered evidence of video technology that was not available 
at the time of the defendant's trial. 
 
Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, "[r]ather than evaluating an ineffective assistance 
claim under the traditional standard of Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), . . . we apply the more 
favorable standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether 
there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice." 
Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 745-746 (2017), citing  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681–682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  See Alicea, 464 Mass. at 845.  "Under this 
standard, [w]e consider whether there was an error in the course 
of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) 
and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Long, 476 Mass. 526, 529 (2017).  
Tactical decisions by an attorney are error only if they were 
"manifestly unreasonable when made."  Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 
Mass. 1, 14 (2015). 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  i.  Strategic 
choices regarding nolle prosequi.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of possession of a class D substance (marijuana) with 
intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).  Before trial, 
the Commonwealth sought to enter a nolle prosequi on that 
30 
 
 
charge, but defense counsel refused.  Subsequently, trial 
counsel used the possession charge to explain the defendant's 
inculpatory statement to police, as well as his possession of 
marijuana, a scale, and $1,610 in various denominations.  The 
charge was nol prossed after the close of evidence, but before 
closing arguments. 
 
The defendant now contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to consent to the nolle prosequi, 
failing to challenge the indictment on the grounds that Sonja 
Farak was the confirmatory chemist,14 and putting evidence of the 
defendant's drug dealing activities before the jury. 
 
The defendant has not shown that his trial counsel's 
tactical decision was manifestly unreasonable.  To the contrary, 
this situation presents a textbook example of a reasonable 
strategic concession.  Within minutes of apprehension, the 
defendant made a statement to police that seemingly implicated 
himself in the shooting.  Based on the defendant's statement to 
police, it was a reasonable strategy at trial to justify those 
statements by suggesting that the defendant was referring to 
another criminal offense that, when compared to those before the 
jury, was seemingly innocuous.  Moreover, this strategy provided 
                     
 
14 For a description of Sonja Farak's misdeeds as a chemist 
at a State drug laboratory see, e.g., Committee for Public 
Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 706-710 (2018). 
31 
 
 
the jury with a possible explanation -- apart from the inference 
that these items had been secured in the strongbox that had been 
stolen from the victim's bedroom -- for the defendant's 
possession of marijuana, a digital scale, and $1,610 in various 
denominations.  The challenge trial counsel faced was not 
potential prejudice because the defendant may have sold 
marijuana, but overwhelming circumstantial evidence of guilt in 
the murder along with compelling DNA evidence and the 
defendant's inculpatory statement.  Although not entirely 
without risk, this strategy was not manifestly unreasonable.  
See Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 455 (2003); 
Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 277 (1991).  Accordingly, 
we discern no error. 
 
ii.  Failure to call expert witness.  The defendant 
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
offer at trial the testimony of a blood spatter expert.  The 
defendant asserts that a blood spatter expert could have 
explained that the blood stain on the defendant's T-shirt was a 
transfer stain.  He further contends that an expert should have 
been called to explain the significance of the absence of 
gunshot residue on the defendant's hands.  Although the 
defendant offered the curriculum vitae of a blood spatter 
expert, the defendant has not submitted an affidavit from that 
expert describing the testimony that he would have offered if 
32 
 
 
called to testify.  A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
"for failure to call an expert witness is generally doomed where 
'[t]he defendant's claim is not supported by any affidavits' to 
disclose the content of the omitted expert testimony" (citation 
omitted).  Alicea, 464 Mass. at 850-851.  Through cross-
examination of the Commonwealth's experts, trial counsel 
elicited evidence that the bloodstains on the defendant's T-
shirt could not be classified as spatter stains, thereby 
providing support for the defendant's theory that the 
bloodstains on the defendant's T-shirt were transfer stains.  
See Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 474 n.18 (2018) 
(ineffective assistance claim fails where defense counsel, 
through cross-examination of Commonwealth's experts, "elicited 
evidence to support the defense's theory of how the defendant's 
blood was transferred to the victim").  Accordingly, the 
defendant's argument fails. 
 
b.  Newly discovered evidence of videotape technology.  The 
defendant argues that his motion for a new trial should have 
been allowed on the ground of newly discovered evidence that 
allegedly casts doubt on whether he had blood on his T-shirt at 
the time of booking. 
 
A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence must first establish that the evidence was 
not discoverable at the time of trial despite the due diligence 
33 
 
 
of the defendant or defense counsel.  Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 
Mass. 623, 633 n.6 (2000).  Commonwealth v. Salvati, 420 Mass. 
499, 507 (1995).  The defendant must then show that the newly 
discovered evidence "casts real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction" (citation omitted).  Id. at 506.  In order to obtain 
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, there 
must be "a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a 
different conclusion had the evidence been admitted at trial." 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 408 Mass. 117, 126 (1990), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305–306 (1986). 
 
The defendant has failed to provide an expert affidavit 
showing that new video technology, not available at the time of 
the defendant's trial, could be used to show that the defendant 
did not have any blood on his T-shirt at the time of booking.  
The defendant has instead provided an affidavit from his sister 
concerning conversations she had had with various videography 
experts and what they had told her that this new technology 
would show.  The judge did not err in denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial on this ground.  See Alicea, 464 Mass. at 
850-851; Seino, 479 Mass. at 474. 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that we should exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the murder 
verdict for various reasons.  The defendant contends that he is 
34 
 
 
entitled to relief based on (1) insufficient "physical evidence" 
connecting the defendant to the crime; (2) misconduct by members 
of the Springfield police department; (3) the judge's failure to 
apply the correct standard in ruling on the defendant's motion 
for a new trial; (4) credibility issues involving the 
Commonwealth's key witness; and (5) the exclusion of portions of 
the police audio recording in contravention of the doctrine of 
verbal completeness. 
 
"When we undertake review under [G. L. c. 278,] § 33E, we 
do not function as a second jury. . . .  That is we do not 
determine what verdict we would have returned but whether the 
verdict 'was against the law or weight of the evidence, or 
because of newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason 
that justice may require'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Johnston, 467 Mass. at 705, quoting G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the defendant's arguments pursuant to our 
duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we conclude that the defendant 
is not entitled to relief.  Not only do many of the defendant's 
supplemental claims have no arguable basis in either law or 
fact, but also they are patently without merit.  See note 2, 
supra.  For example, the defendant argues that he is entitled to 
relief because LaPalm, the Commonwealth's key witness, "was a 
drug addict."  It is for the jury to make a determination of 
credibility, Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 469 n.17 
35 
 
 
(2007), and "[s]uch a determination does not inform whether 
there was sufficient evidence of the crime," id. 
 
Although the defendant contends that the case rests solely 
on unreliable witness identifications, the evidence of the 
defendant's guilt in this case was overwhelming.  That the 
murder weapon was never recovered and that the defendant's DNA 
was not found inside the victim's apartment does not render all 
other evidence of the defendant's guilt nugatory.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017) ("A conviction 
may rest exclusively on circumstantial evidence").  Based on our 
careful review of the entire trial record and our consideration 
of each issue raised by the defendant, we decline to reduce the 
degree of guilt, order a new trial, or grant other relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed.