Title: RANDALL D. SCHREIBVOGEL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RANDALL D. SCHREIBVOGEL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 45Case Number: S-09-0044Decided: 04/16/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RANDALL 
D. SCHREIBVOGEL,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Randall 
Schreibvogel was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual assault, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302,1 and one count of robbery, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401 (LexisNexis 2007).2  He challenges his convictions on several 
grounds.  He contends that he was 
denied his right to a fair trial because of erroneous evidentiary rulings, 
prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of defense counsel.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. 
Schreibvogel presents six issues:

 

1.    
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoena duces tecum at 
the request of the prosecutor?

 
 

2.    
Did 
the trial court commit plain error when it allowed into evidence victim impact 
testimony?

 
 

3.    
Did 
the cumulative effect of numerous instances of inadmissible hearsay deny 
Appellant his right to a fair trial?

 
 

4.    
Did 
the district court err when it allowed in 404(b) evidence after the Appellant 
had made the proper demand for notice, and the State had failed to provide any 
notice?

 
 

5.    
Did 
the prosecutor commit misconduct when he cross-examined the Appellant as to 
whether other witnesses were lying or mistaken; and did he commit misconduct 
when he requested that the jury consider the number of witnesses who testified 
on behalf of D.C. and her character, compared to the lack of witnesses that the 
defense presented on Appellant?

 
 

6.    
Did 
trial counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel, by his failure to 
object to inadmissible evidence, and failure to adequately advance his theory of 
the case?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues as follows:

 
 

1.    
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's motion to 
quash the subpoena for the victim's financial records?

 
 

2.    
Was 
the victim impact testimony and argument admitted during Appellant's trial 
relevant and was he prejudiced?

 
 

3.    
Was 
the challenged testimony inadmissible hearsay which denied Appellant his right 
to a fair trial?

 
 

4.    
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the admission of alleged 
uncharged misconduct testimony?

 
 

5.    
Did 
prosecutorial misconduct occur and was Appellant 
prejudiced?

 
 

6.    
Was 
trial counsel ineffective and was Appellant prejudiced?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
D.C., 
the victim in this case, lived in Rawlins and owned a hair salon in Saratoga. On 
October 31, 2007, she attended a Halloween party in Saratoga.  The restaurant hosting the Halloween 
party was located next door to her salon.  
D.C. planned to spend the night in Saratoga at her salon. 

 
 

[¶4]        
Mr. 
Schreibvogel was in the area on a fishing trip.  He also went to the party.  D.C. had met Mr. Schreibvogel briefly at 
a restaurant during lunch that day and noticed him sitting next to her at the 
bar.  They talked intermittently 
during the party.  On several 
occasions, Mr. Schreibvogel suggested that he and D.C. leave the party.  He offered to help her clean the 
salon.  She refused the offer each 
time. 

 
 

[¶5]        
At 
some point during the party, D.C. left her drink at the bar and went to the 
dance floor.  When she returned, she 
took a sip of the drink and soon felt "strange" and "groggy."  She informed the bartender that something 
was wrong and left the party.  When 
she arrived at her salon, D.C. testified that she remembered reaching down to 
retrieve a key she had placed in her shoe for safekeeping and then waking up on 
the ground outside of her salon.  
She testified that she could not remember if she fell or if she was 
struck.  Several witnesses testified 
that D.C. told them a few days after the incident that she had been hit.  An emergency room doctor testified that 
D.C. had facial injuries that were likely caused by a 
punch.

 
 

[¶6]        
When 
D.C. regained consciousness she discovered that she was bleeding.  She remembered hearing something, but was 
not sure what it was.  She then 
entered her salon and lost consciousness again.  She regained consciousness twice before 
morning.  When she awoke the first 
time, Mr. Schreibvogel was engaged in oral sex with her.  On the second occasion, Mr. Schreibvogel 
was engaged in sexual intercourse with her.  The next morning she awoke to discover 
that Mr. Schreibvogel had left, and that the money in her tip jar was 
missing.  She reported the incident 
to the hospital, her husband, and law enforcement officials two days after it 
occurred. 

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Schreibvogel's version of the events differed substantially.  He maintained that D.C. invited him back 
to her salon.  He testified that he 
witnessed her fall and hit her face on the ground.  When she got up, he claimed that he 
asked her if she was okay and they entered the salon.  Mr. Schreibvogel conceded that he and 
D.C. had sexual relations, but claimed it was consensual.  He maintained that he never saw money or 
a tip jar in the salon.  

 
 

[¶8]        
A 
jury found Mr. Schreibvogel guilty of two counts of first degree sexual assault 
and one count of robbery.  The 
district court imposed a prison sentence of fifteen to thirty years on each 
count of sexual assault and five to ten years on the robbery count.  The sentences were ordered to be served 
concurrently.  Mr. Schreibvogel 
filed a timely appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Motion 
to Quash 

 
 

[¶9]        
Prior 
to trial, Mr. Schreibvogel served a subpoena duces tecum on D.C.3  The subpoena required pretrial production 
of D.C.'s personal financial and bank records, including tax returns, for the 
past five years.  At D.C.'s request, 
the State moved to quash the subpoena.  After a hearing, the district court 
granted the motion pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 17(d) finding that compliance with the 
subpoena would be oppressive and burdensome to D.C.4  Mr. Schreibvogel claims that the State 
did not have standing to bring the motion, and the district court abused its 
discretion in granting the motion.

 
 

[¶10]     
Whether 
standing exists is a legal issue.  Northfork 
Citizens for Responsible Development v. Park County Bd. of County 
Commissioners, 
2008 
WY 88 
, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 262 (Wyo. 2008).  This Court reviews legal issues de 
novo.  Johnson 
v. State, 
2009 
WY 104, ¶ 12, 214 P.3d 983, 986 (Wyo. 
2009); 
Reiter 
v. State, 
2001 
WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001).  
For a party to have standing, he 
"must demonstrate the manner in which his own rights are adversely 
affected in light of the circumstances before the court."  Gooden v. State, 711 P.2d 405, 408 (Wyo. 1985), quoting 
Armijo v. State, 
678 P.2d 864, 868 (Wyo. 1984).  

 
 

[¶11]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel asserts that the State did not have standing to challenge the 
subpoena duces tecum.  The State 
maintains that it had standing to challenge the subpoena because it had a 
legitimate interest in protecting its witness, the victim, from harassment and 
"preventing unfounded and potentially time-wasting incursions during trial into 
an irrelevant and superfluous side issue."  
We agree with the State for reasons succinctly stated by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court:

 
 
We 
conclude that the state had standing to move to quash the defendant's 
subpoena.  "A party has standing to 
move to quash a subpoena addressed to another if the subpoena infringes upon the 
movant's legitimate interests."  United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 
712 (7th Cir. [1982]), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1035, 103 S. Ct. 446, 74 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1982).  It is inarguable that 
the state had a legitimate interest in challenging the subpoena duces tecum that 
had been issued to Smith [the defendant's supervisor].  The subpoena, which was served by the 
defendant on a key state witness during the pendency of the trial, sought 
numerous documents and materials. "The prosecution's standing rested upon its 
interest in preventing undue lengthening of the trial [and] undue harassment of 
its witness . . . ."  Id.

 
 
The 
defendant claims that the town of Westport has its own legal department and 
could have filed a motion to quash the subpoena on Smith's behalf.  This argument, however, misses the 
point: the interest that the state legitimately sought to protect in seeking to 
quash the subpoena belonged to the state, not the town.  Moreover, many state's witnesses are 
persons who cannot be expected to hire lawyers and incur the expense associated 
with challenging a subpoena issued by an accused.  Thus, the trial court properly concluded 
that the state had standing to challenge the subpoena that the defendant served 
on Smith.

 
 

State 
v. Decaro, 
745 A.2d 800, 816 (Conn. 2000).  See also Raineri, 670 F.2d  at 712; United States v. Segal, 276 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel also challenges the district court's ruling on the motion.  We review rulings on pretrial motions, 
such as a motion to quash, for an abuse of discretion.  Wolfe v. State, 998 P.2d 385, 387 (Wyo. 
2000).  This standard of review 
requires this Court to examine "the reasonableness of the trial court's choice," 
in ruling on the matter.  Gould 
v. State, 
2006 
WY 157, ¶ 8, 
151 P.3d 261, 264 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
district court "may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive."  
W.R.Cr.P. 17(d).  The 
subpoena served upon D.C. requested that she produce "all financial records 
including tax return[s] for the past five (5) years and bank records for the 
past five (5) years in her possession or control."  These items were to be produced 
pretrial.  After a hearing, the 
district court granted the State's motion to quash 
stating:

 
 

The 
Court finds [Mr. Schreibvogel's] subpoena duces tecum unreasonable and 
oppressive.  [Mr. Schreibvogel's] 
subpoena requests records for a lengthy period 
of time and any time period outside of that immediately surrounding the date of 
the alleged criminal act is irrelevant to the issues in question. Further, 
retrieving accurate financial records for such a time period overly burdens the 
alleged victim and the monetary cost would be incurred 
unnecessarily.

 
 
The 
record supports the findings of the district court and we are unable to find any 
abuse of discretion in quashing the subpoena. 

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
asserting that the district court abused its discretion in quashing the 
subpoena, Mr. Schreibvogel relies upon the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3103, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974).  His reliance is misplaced.  Nixon supports the decision reached by 
the district court. 

 
 

[¶15]     
In 
Nixon, the government pursued the 
prosecution of presidential campaign officials and former government officials 
for conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice.  In doing so, the special prosecutor 
issued a third-party subpoena duces tecum to the President seeking pretrial 
production of documents and recordings relating to conversations with advisors 
and aides.5  The President filed a motion to quash the 
subpoena.  The motion was denied and 
the President appealed.  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the trial court's denial of 
the motion to quash.  The Supreme 
Court stated: 

 
 
A 
subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be "unreasonable 
or oppressive," but not otherwise. The leading case in this Court interpreting 
this standard is Bowman Dairy Co. v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 214, 71 S. Ct. 675, 95 L. Ed. 879 (1951). This case 
recognized certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in 
criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide a means of discovery for 
criminal cases, id., at 220, 71 S.Ct. 
[679]; (2) its chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time 
and place before trial for the inspection of subpoenaed materials, ibid. As both parties agree, cases 
decided in the wake of Bowman have 
generally followed Judge Weinfeld's formulation in United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), as to the required showing. Under this test, in order to 
require production prior to trial, the moving party must show: (1) that the 
documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise 
procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that 
the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and 
inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection 
may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made 
in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition." 

 
 

Nixon, 
418 U.S.  at 698-700, 94 S. Ct.  at 3103 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).  The Court went on to state that, 
"[a]gainst this background" the party seeking enforcement of a subpoena, in 
order to carry his or her burden, had to clear the three hurdles of relevancy, 
admissibility, and specificity.  Id. at 700, 94 S. Ct.  at 3103.  

 
 

[¶16]     
In 
sum, the Court noted: 

 
 
In 
a case such as this, however, where a subpoena is directed to a President of the 
United States, appellate review, in deference to a coordinate branch of 
Government, should be particularly meticulous to ensure that the standards of 
Rule 17(c) have been correctly applied. United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. pp. 30, 
34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807).  From our examination of the materials 
submitted by the Special Prosecutor to the District Court in support of his 
motion for the subpoena, we are persuaded that the District Court's denial of 
the President's motion to quash the subpoena was consistent with Rule 17(c). 
 We also conclude that the Special 
Prosecutor has made a sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production 
before trial. The subpoenaed materials are not available from any other source, 
and their examination and processing should not await trial in the circumstances 
shown. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 214, 71 S. Ct. 675, 95 L. Ed. 879 (1951); United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). 

 
 

Id. 
at 702, 94 S. Ct.  at 3104-05 (emphasis omitted). 

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel made no attempt to comply with the requirements of the Nixon test.  He argued generally that the information 
was relevant because it went directly to the credibility of the witness 
regarding the amount of money she claimed was in her tip jar at the time of the 
incident.6  He made no effort to establish that his 
request was sufficiently specific.  
He did not explain why he had requested five years of documents or why it 
was necessary that D.C. provide him with all of her personal records.  He failed to establish that the 
documents were not available from another source.  It was undisputed that D.C. had 
previously provided the financial records of the hair salon business in response 
to another subpoena duces tecum.  
Mr. Schreibvogel did not contend that he could not properly prepare for 
trial without the requested personal financial documents.  Additionally, the request for "all 
financial records" for a five year period, ostensibly to challenge testimony 
regarding the contents of the tip jar on a specific date, could easily be viewed 
as a fishing expedition. 

 
 

[¶18]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel maintains that the district court should have modified the subpoena 
instead of granting the State's motion to quash.  W.R.Cr.P. 17(d) allows the court to 
modify a 
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive, but it does not 
require the court to do so.  During 
the hearing, defense counsel suggested that the court evaluate the records in 
camera and decide whether the records were relevant.  That procedure, however, would still 
have required D.C. to compile the records for the full five years.  Mr. Schreibvogel, as the party requesting the 
information, had the burden to show that the requested documents were specific, 
relevant, and not intended as a general fishing expedition.  Nixon, 418 U.S.  at 699-700, 94 S. Ct.  at 
3103.  He did not satisfy this 
burden.  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash.

 
 
Victim 
Impact Testimony

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel next contends the district court erred by allowing evidence 
regarding the impact of the incident on D.C.  He did not object to the introduction of 
this evidence at trial, and we review for plain error.  Plain error 
exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) 
there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice.  Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 18, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 

[¶20]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel takes exception to testimony from D.C. and her husband concerning 
D.C.'s behavior after the incident.  
In response to questions by the State, D.C. 
testified:

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Have you  did you ever stay overnight in that shop again?

 
 
[D.C.]: 
No.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q. 
 Okay. Did you change your 
hours?

 
 
A. 
 Yes.

 
 
Q. 
 Tell us about 
that.

 
 
A. 
 I didn't work after 
dark.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q. 
 When [your husband] leaves [town 
for work]  when he was leaving town prior to Halloween were you staying by 
yourself?

 
 
A. 
 Yes.

 
 
Q. 
After Halloween 2007, did you continue to stay by yourself when your husband is 
gone?

 
 
A. 
 No.

 
 
Q.  Do you have a concealed weapons 
permit?

 
 
A.  Arizona.

 
 
Q. 
 Did you start carrying a firearm 
with you?

 
 
A. 
 Yes.

 
 
Q. 
 Tell us about your sleeping habits. 
Did they change after October 31, 2007?

 
 
A. 
 Yes.

 
 
Q. 
 Can you tell us 
how?

 
 
A. 
 My sleep was violent to the point 
where my husband couldn't sleep with me some nights.

 
 
Q. 
 Describe, if you can, what you mean 
by "violent."

 
 
A. 
 He said I would punch and kick, and 
that's  

 
 
Q. 
How long did that  how long did it go on that your husband wasn't able to sleep 
with you?

 
 
A.  It still is sometimes. 

 
 

[¶21]     
D.C.'s 
husband testified as follows:

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
After Halloween of 2007, have you observed any changes in your wife's 
behavior?

 
 
[D.C.'s 
Husband]: Well, her personality hasn't changed. She is still the way she is. 
 She's friendly towards people. I'm 
sure some of the people already know about her personality.  She is real bubbly.  You know, but as for that, she doesn't  
she watches her back a little more.  She's a little more observant of where 
she is, where she's going. I told her not to stay at the shop anymore after 
dark.

 
 
Q. 
 What about 
sleeping?

 
 
A. 
 Excuse me?

 
 
Q. 
 What about her sleep 
habits?

 
 
A.  Her sleep habits changed.  I didn't like getting hit in bed all the 
time.  She was having pretty bad 
dreams, and I ended up going on the couch myself because I had to have a little 
bit better sleep than get woke up half the night.  And she told me that was just having bad 
sleep with a few nightmares here and there.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q.  What effect were the nightmares that she 
was having on you?

 
 
A. 
 Well, I was getting woke up.  I asked her what was the matter.  She said somebody is chasing me or got a 
hold of me or whatever.  And all 
that I can say is, well, you're okay.  You're at home.  And then she would go back to sleep, and 
I would go back to sleep.

 
 
Q. 
 Was she waking you up as a result 
of these nightmares?

 
 
A. 
 Yes, she was.

 
 
Q. 
 Was she hitting 
you?

 
 
A. 
 Yeah.

 
 
Q. 
 Was she kicking you? Was she saying 
anything?

 
 
A. 
 I'm not exactly sure a lot of the 
words, because some of it was mumbled, but I would hear "no" and "I got to get 
away" I heard a couple of times.  The exact verbiage, no, I couldn't tell 
you every one.  Those were pretty 
distinct that I remember.

 
 
Q. 
 Do you work out of town?  

 
 
A. 
 At that time or 
now?

 
 
Q. 
 Now.

 
 
A. 
 Yeah.  I'm about 30 miles from where we 
live.

 
 
Q. 
 Do you stay overnight when you're 
out of town?

 
 
A. 
 No, not for work.  Recently I have been out of town.  I was in North Dakota and Montana for 
almost a month, and I can travel sometimes.

 
 
Q. 
 Does your wife stay home alone when 
you're out of town anymore?

 
 
A. 
 No, not really. I ask friends to 
stay over  usually friends that I have known for like a  like a brother, so to 
speak. There's a couple of gentlemen that they either stay there at the house, 
or they come in and look in on her.

 
 
Because 
the testimony is clearly revealed in the record, the parties do not dispute that 
the first part of the plain error test is satisfied.  The parties differ on whether a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  

 
 

[¶22]     
Victim 
impact 
testimony is evidence that relates "to the victim's personal characteristics and 
to the physical, emotional, or social impact of a crime on its victim and the 
victim's family."  Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d 411, 416 (Wyo. 
2005); Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 151, 67 P.3d 536, 592 
(Wyo. 2003).  Victim 
impact testimony may or may not be admissible.  Thomas v. State, 2009 WY 92, ¶ 7, 211 P.3d 509, 511-12 (Wyo. 
2009).  "The key inquiry on 
the admissibility of victim impact 
testimony during the guilt phase of a criminal trial is relevancy."  White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 13, 80 P.3d 642, 649 (Wyo. 2003); 
Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Wyo. 
1989); McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo. 1993).  "Such testimony may be irrelevant if 
offered . . . as proof of the victim's loss; the physical, emotional, or 
psychological impact on the victim; or the effect upon the family.  Yet it may be relevant if offered for 
other purposes."  White, ¶ 13, 80 P.3d  at 649.  In criminal cases, evidence is relevant 
when it tends to prove or disprove an element of the charged crime.  Id.; Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo. 1980); see Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 42, 43 P.3d 80, 97 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 

[¶23]     
Before 
trial, Mr. Schreibvogel made it clear that his defense to the sexual assault 
charges was that the encounter was consensual.  Such a defense strategy naturally 
entailed an attack on D.C.'s credibility.  
Defense counsel immediately called D.C.'s credibility into question 
during opening statements when he posited his theory that D.C. had consensual 
sexual relations with Mr. Schreibvogel and then fabricated the assault to 
protect herself and her marriage.  

 
 

[¶24]     
The 
State concedes that the challenged testimony of D.C. and her husband is victim 
impact testimony.  It contends, 
however, that the testimony was relevant to counter the attack on D.C.'s 
credibility.  Specifically, the 
State maintains that evidence of changes to D.C.'s work habits, sleeping 
patterns, and other behaviors was relevant to prove she had undergone a 
traumatic experience.  We have 
previously recognized that it was not error, plain or otherwise, to utilize 
claimed victim impact testimony to bolster the credibility of a witness after an 
attack upon that witness' credibility.  Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 
534-35 (Wyo. 1993).  The same rule 
applies here.  D.C.'s credibility 
was at issue.  The challenged 
testimony bolsters her credibility and, under the circumstances of this case, we 
cannot find that there was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.  Mr. Schreibvogel has not 
established plain error.

 
 
Hearsay 
Testimony

 
 

[¶25]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel next asserts error arising from the testimony of three witnesses 
who testified regarding statements made to them by D.C. shortly after the 
incident.  He contends that the 
challenged testimony was "inadmissible hearsay" and that the cumulative effect 
of the testimony deprived him of a fair trial.  We disagree.

 
 

[¶26]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel did not object to the challenged testimony at trial.  Accordingly, we review for plain 
error.  Mr. Schreibvogel has failed 
to establish a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  He has not established that the 
challenged testimony was hearsay or that the testimony did not fall within one 
of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.  He also has not established that he was 
materially prejudiced by the testimony.  An error is prejudicial when a reasonable 
possibility exists that, absent the error, the appellant may have enjoyed a more 
favorable outcome.  Foster v. State, 2010 WY 8, ¶ 15, 224 P.3d 1, 7 (Wyo. 2010). 

 
 

[¶27]     
The 
asserted error arises from the testimony of the investigating officer, an x-ray 
technician, and an emergency room nurse.  
Each recounted D.C.'s statements to them about the incident.  All of the statements were made within 
two days of the incident.  For the 
most part, the statements were consistent with D.C.'s trial testimony.  There were some differences.  From Mr. Schreibvogel's perspective, the 
most significant difference related to whether D.C. was struck as she entered 
her salon.  At trial, D.C. testified 
that she could not recall if she had been hit.  The investigating officer and the x-ray 
technician both testified that D.C. told them that she had been 
hit.

 
 

[¶28]     
Because 
there was no objection at trial, it is difficult to identify the specific basis 
for admissibility of the challenged testimony.  For example, the testimony of the 
investigating officer is not hearsay, if not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. W.R.E. 801(c).  If the 
testimony was elicited in an effort to provide context for the officer's 
investigation, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, it is 
admissible for a limited purpose.  
Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 
114 (Wyo. 1985).  In such a 
situation, a limiting instruction would be appropriate if requested by the 
defendant.  Mr. Schreibvogel 
did not make such a request. 

 
 

[¶29]     
The 
testimony of the emergency room nurse regarding D.C.'s version of the incident 
may fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.  An exception to the hearsay rule allows 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  W.R.E. 803(4).  To the extent that D.C.'s prior 
statements were consistent with her trial testimony, they are potentially 
admissible under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) which provides:

 
 
(d) 
Statements which are not hearsay.A 
statement is not hearsay if:

 
 
(1) 
Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and 
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . 
. . (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive. 

 
 

[¶30]     
In 
short, because the challenged evidence was potentially admissible under several 
evidentiary rules, Mr. Schreibvogel has failed to establish a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
"Under the plain error standard of review, 
we reverse a trial court's decision only if it is so plainly erroneous that the 
judge should have noticed and corrected the mistake even though the parties 
failed to raise the issue. . . . [T]he Appellant must demonstrate the existence 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in 
a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way."  Causey, ¶ 19, 215 P.3d  at 293 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  

 
 

[¶31]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel has also failed to establish that he was materially prejudiced by 
the admission of the challenged evidence.  
Testimony 
from several other witnesses established the use of physical force.  The hospital manager of emergency 
services testified that D.C. said "she was struck from behind."  The emergency room doctor, when asked if 
he had an opinion about what caused D.C.'s injuries said, it "look[ed] like 
somebody who was probably right-handed punched her in the eye."  Mr. Schreibvogel's "pod-mate," who had 
shared a room with him in jail, testified that Mr. Schreibvogel had said "[I] 
should have hit the bitch in the mouth again."  There was no reasonable possibility that 
the outcome of the trial would have been any different had the challenged 
testimony not been admitted.

 
 
404(b) 
Evidence

 
 

[¶32]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel contends that the district court erred when it allowed testimony 
that he was "coked up" during the fishing trip and that he was behind on his 
child support payments.  He contends 
that the evidence is "404(b) evidence" and that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the evidence.7  The State disputes the characterization 
of the evidence as "404(b) evidence."  
It contends that it did not intend to introduce evidence that Mr. 
Schreibvogel was "coked up" during his fishing trip and that it had no 
obligation to provide notice.  The 
State asserts that the evidence relating to the child support arrearages was not 
404(b) evidence.  It also contends 
that, if 404(b) applies, the evidence was properly admissible to establish a 
motive for the robbery.

 
 

[¶33]     
We 
note at the outset that application of an abuse of discretion standard is 
difficult, if not impossible, in a situation where the issue is not brought to 
the attention of the district court for an evidentiary ruling.  Mr. Schreibvogel did not object to the 
admission of the evidence at trial and the district court had no opportunity to 
make a determination as to whether the evidence was 404(b) evidence and, if so, 
whether it was admissible for a proper purpose under that rule.  We recognize that we have previously 
held that a pretrial demand for notice of the State's intent to use 404(b) 
evidence satisfies the objection requirement.  Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 20, 72 P.3d 803, 810 (Wyo. 2003).  However, 
it is not always clear whether the State intended to introduce the evidence or 
whether the evidence is "404(b) evidence."  
We would strongly urge defense counsel to raise an objection at trial to 
any evidence that may run afoul of W.R.E. 404(b).

 
 

[¶34]     
The 
evidence that Mr. Schreibvogel was "coked up" during his fishing trip was 
introduced during the testimony of his former pod-mate.  Mr. Schreibvogel claims that the State 
should have given notice of its intent to use the evidence and that it was 
inadmissible under Rule 404(b).  The 
thrust of the testimony was that Mr. Schreibvogel had confessed to committing 
the sexual assault and robbery to the pod-mate while they were in jail 
together:

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
As close as you can, can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what he 
told you.

 
 
[Witness]: 
Yeah. He said that him and a friend were here on a fishing trip in Saratoga, and 
they were all coked up and Mr. 

 
 
Q.  Let's stop there.  What do you mean by "coked up?"  Does that have a meaning to 
you?

 
 
A.  Cocaine, drugs.  

 
 
Q.  Okay. What else did he tell 
you?

 
 
A.  That he went to a bar on Halloween night 
and that he was looking for a lady to take back to the motel, and she was the 
only one left.  I don't remember the 
gal's name.  But she had to go back 
and clean her hair salon place that she had owned, and he followed her there, 
and then he told mewell, he was showing me the rape kit papers that he 
had.  And he kind of laughed and 
said that he should have hit the bitch in the mouth again.

 
 
Q.  You remember him saying 
that?

 
 
A.  Yes, sir.  And that he made her suck his penis and 
that he had sex with her and it was the worst sexor the worst 
15-minute-piece-of-ass that he's had, and then he took an undisclosed amount of 
money from her, but it was enough to pay for his trip.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q.  Did he talk about the amount of money 
that he took from this woman?

 
 
A.  No, sir, he didn't.  He just said it was a 
lot.

 
 
Q.  He said what?

 
 
A.  It was a lot of money, and it paid for 
his trip and the motel room that they had rented. 

 
 

[¶35]     
It 
does not appear from the record that the State, prior to trial, intended to 
utilize the evidence of Mr. Schreibvogel's drug use.  The pod-mate was not asked to testify 
regarding Mr. Schreibvogel's drug use.  
He was merely asked to tell the jury what he had been told by Mr. 
Schreibvogel.  If the prosecution 
did not intend to introduce such evidence, it was not required to provide the 
defense with notice.  Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 19, 176 P.3d 647, 653 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 

[¶36]     
Even 
if the statements were admitted in error, Mr. Schreibvogel fails to establish 
that he was materially prejudiced by the challenged testimony.  See Britton v. State, 2009 WY 91, ¶ 15, 211 P.3d 514, 517 (Wyo. 2009).  The 
statements relating to drug use were cumulative of other evidence presented to 
the jury.  In opening statements, 
defense counsel told the jury about Mr. Schreibvogel's past cocaine use when he 
said: "Now, I'm not going to hide the bag from you.  [Mr. Schreibvogel] has a conviction for 
drug possession.  He's a convicted 
felon, but I tell you that because you need to know all of the pieces of the 
puzzle."  Mr. Schreibvogel testified 
during direct and cross-examination about his previous conviction for cocaine 
possession.  He also testified on 
redirect examination that he did not possess cocaine during the fishing trip and 
that he never told anyone that he did.  We are unable to find a reasonable 
possibility that the trial would have been any different had the pod-mate's very 
limited testimony regarding Mr. Schreibvogel's use of cocaine not occurred. 

 

[¶37]     
 The evidence of child support arrearages 
was not introduced during the State's case-in-chief.  The challenged testimony occurred during 
the State's cross-examination of Mr. Schreibvogel:  

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Do you have any children?

 
 
[Mr. 
Schreibvogel]: Yes, I do.

 
 
Q. 
And do you pay child support?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 
Q. 
And you are in arrearages on that, aren't you?

 
 
A. 
Yes, I am.

 
 
Q. 
And you're in arrearage in the amount of $12,000; is that 
correct?

 
 
A. 
It is in court right now.

 
 
Q. 
It is in the amount of about $12,000; isn't it?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 

[¶38]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel boldly asserts that the evidence relating to child support 
arrearages is 404(b) evidence.  We 
question that assertion.  "[A]n 
appellant cannot demonstrate error by simply branding any evidence 404(b) 
evidence."  Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 31, 148 P.3d 23, 34 (Wyo. 2006).  W.R.E. 
404(b) prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."  (Emphasis added.)  Evidence that Mr. Schreibvogel was 
behind in his child support payments is not the kind of evidence that would 
naturally lead the jury to believe that he would also commit a sexual assault 
and a robbery.  If the evidence was 
404(b) evidence, it is properly admissible to establish motive for the robbery. 
 Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 31, 73 P.3d 1041, 1085 (Wyo. 2003).  We find no abuse of discretion in 
admitting the evidence for that purpose.

 
 
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 

[¶39]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel also contends that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair 
trial.  Allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and "hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair 
trial."  Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 
2000), see also Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 15, 89 P.3d 324, 
329 (Wyo. 2004).  Mr. Schreibvogel 
did not object to the statements he now claims were error.  Thus, we review his claim for plain 
error.  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 
37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 

[¶40]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel contends that the prosecutor used an improper questioning technique 
during his cross-examination: 

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Did you hear the testimony of [the 
bartender] who heard you ask a number of times the victim in this case to go 
back to the [shop] to help her clean.  
Did you hear her testimony?

 
 
[Mr. 
Schreibvogel]:  Yeah, I heard the 
testimony.

 
 
Q. 
And that was her shop that she was going to, right, to clean up the shop? You 
heard that testimony?

 
 
A. 
Yes.

 
 
Q. 
And you asked that over and over again? Did you hear that 
testimony?

 
 
A. 
I heard that testimony, yes.

 
 
Q. 
And every time you asked that, the answer came back no. Did you hear 
that?

 
 
A. 
I heard her testimony. I never asked that.

 
 
Q. 
You never asked that?

 
 
A. 
No, I didn't.

 
 
Q. 
So when [the bartender] said that she was sitting really close to you and heard 
that on a number of occasions, that would be an incorrect statement by that 
bartender?

 
 
A. 
Yes. I neverI never asked over and over.

 
 
Q. 
You never did that?

 
 
A. 
No, I didn't.

 
 
Q. So the bartender would be mistaken then, 
correct?

 
 
A. I guess.  I guess.

 
 
Q. 
And you heard the victim's testimony, didn't you?

 
 
A. 
Yes, I did.

 
 
Q. 
Ten times you asked to go back, and each time you were refused until the end 
when you justshe just ignored you.  
Did you hear that testimony?

 
 
A. 
I heard the testimony.

 
 
Q. Was that testimony incorrect as 
well?

 
 
A. Yes, to my knowledge, 
yes.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q. 
And so when [your former pod-mate] indicated that you financed your fishing trip 
with that money, tell us about that.  
Is that also an incorrect 
statement?

 
 
A. I never once mentioned how I financed our 
fishing trip, never. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

                                                          

[¶41]     
"Although 
a 
defendant who testifies in a criminal case may be cross-examined regarding his 
credibility just like any other witness, there are limits placed upon 
the prosecutor."  Talley, ¶ 10, 153 P.3d  at 260.  A witness may not comment on the 
truthfulness or veracity of another witness.  Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Wyo. 
1999).  It is the jury's duty to 
resolve factual issues, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and determine 
the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 
1998).  It is error and misconduct 
for a prosecutor to ask a witness whether he thinks other witnesses are "lying" 
or "mistaken."  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 15, 193 P.3d 228, 235 (Wyo. 2008), citing Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 17, 
56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 

[¶42]     
The 
State concedes that the questions by the prosecutor violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.  It 
asserts, however, that Mr. Schreibvogel cannot establish that the misconduct 
resulted in unfair prejudice.  To 
determine whether unfair prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct has occurred 
this Court balances several factors: "1) the severity and pervasiveness of the 
misconduct; 2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the 
case; 3) the strength of the State's evidence; 4) the use of cautionary 
instructions or other curative measures; and 5) the extent to which the defense 
invited the misconduct." Talley, ¶ 
16, 153 P.3d  at 262.  When we apply 
these factors to the challenged testimony, we are unable to find unfair 
prejudice.

 
 

[¶43]     
Although 
Mr. Schreibvogel testified and his credibility was at issue, we cannot say that 
he "invited the misconduct."  
However, the misconduct here was not severe or pervasive.  The questioning, while improper, was 
brief and the prosecution did not draw attention to Mr. Schreibvogel's answers 
during closing argument.  The 
questions centered, not on the main issue of consent, but on the number of times 
Mr. Schreibvogel asked D.C. to go back to the salon and how he financed the 
fishing trip.  Mr. Schreibvogel 
did not request a cautionary instruction or other curative measure.  In closing argument, the prosecution 
reiterated that it was up to the jury to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses.  After reviewing the 
entire record, we cannot conclude that had the prosecutor not employed the 
"were-they-lying" technique, a reasonable possibility exists that the verdict 
would have been more favorable to Mr. Schreibvogel.

  

[¶44]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel also asserts that statements by the prosecutor during closing 
argument resulted in an unfair trial.  
In review, this Court considers the 
prosecutor's argument in its entirety, not just the sentences and phrases taken 
out of context.  Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 605 (Wyo. 1984).  Failure to 
interject a timely objection to an improper argument is treated as a waiver, 
unless the misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error and require 
reversal.  Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1301 (Wyo. 
1982).  "Plain error in closing argument must remain hard to find 
because otherwise the trial court becomes charged with an adversary 
responsibility to control argument even when objection is not taken by the 
opposing attorney."  Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 385 (Wyo. 1992).

  

[¶45]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of 
proof to the defense in the following statements:

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
The tough situation in judging the demeanor of the defendant is the situation in 
which he was asked about his constant repetition: I want to go back to the salon 
with you to help you clean it up.  
Now, the testimony presented by the Statewe have heard this occurred on 
at least ten occasions.  That is the 
victim's testimony.  And the 
bartender indicated it happened so many times that she could recount it, even 
though it was a busy night, and each time it was no. 

 
 
But 
when the defendant was confronted with this situation, how many times did you 
ask [the victim] to go back with you to help her clean, he didn't say he didn't 
remember.  He said it did not 
happen.  He said it did not happen 
because that would not clear with his story that he had indicated to you that 
the advances that night were not made by him, not by the gentleman that he is, 
but by the victim in this case.  

 
 
But 
there is no corroboration of that whatsoever.  There is not one independent witness that 
corroborates the testimony of the defendant.  Certainly that's a situation for your 
determination.  It's not only the 
credibility.  It is a matter of 
corroboration of the statement, and it just was not there.

 
 
The 
statement of the victim, taken in its entirety, indicates that [D.C.] had been 
raped brutally that day; she had been robbed.  And those statements are corroborated by 
other credible evidence.  The 
statements by the defendant are mixed with contradictions, outright lies, and 
certainly indicate a circumstance in which the defendant is doing everything 
tobecause he has an interest in this case.  He has an interest in this case to walk 
away and to walk away a free man, and you're instructed that you can't consider 
that in determining his testimony. 

 
 
            
And look at the corroboration by the bartenders, by people that knew the 
victim in this case, which indicates the type of person that the victim is in 
this case.  And these were people 
that came forward to talk about the person that the victim is.  It would be nice at a funeral if you 
would have that many people who would come up and say that you are that type of 
individual: That you're kind, professional and a person that will always help 
out.  

 
 

            
There is no legion of people that came up to talk about the defendant in 
this case, that corroborated what he said,  
corroborated the statements he made.  The statements stand alone 
uncorroborated. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶46]     
"A 
fundamental principle of our system of criminal justice is that the burden of 
proof rests upon the State and never shifts."  Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 919 (Wyo. 
1999).  However, we have also 
recognized that "[i]t is not improper for the government to draw attention to 
the failure or lack of evidence on a point, if it is not intended to call 
attention to the failure of the defendant to testify." Id.  Viewed in context, the prosecutor's 
statements referenced the lack of corroboration of Mr. Schreibvogel's version of 
the events.  We cannot conclude that 
this brief reference to the lack of corroborating evidence amounted to a shift 
in the burden of proof.  The 
prosecutor's statements did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law and 
we are unable to find plain error.  

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 

[¶47]     
In 
his last issue, Mr. Schreibvogel contends that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We review 
such claims de novo.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007).  This 
Court invokes a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable judgment.  Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 902 (Wyo. 
2000).  "[T]he paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance."  Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo. 
2000).  In order to prevail with his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Schreibvogel must first show that 
his counsel's performance was deficient.  
This requires a showing of errors so serious that Mr. Schreibvogel was 
essentially denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Eustice, 11 P.3d  at 901-02, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Second, he must show that the deficient 
performance of counsel prejudiced his defense.  Eustice, 11 P.3d  at 
901.

 
 

[¶48]     
In 
support of his claim, Mr. Schreibvogel contends that there were numerous 
instances when inadmissible evidence was presented to the jury without 
objection.  He does not specifically 
identify the objectionable evidence.  
Presumably, he refers to the claimed evidentiary errors discussed 
previously.  Trial counsel is given 
wide latitude to make tactical decisions.  
This includes not objecting upon the belief that such action might draw 
undue attention to damaging evidence.  
Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, 
¶ 22, 18 P.3d 1164, 1174 (Wyo. 2001); Dice, 825 P.2d  at 384; Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 
738 (Wyo. 1997).  Mr. Schreibvogel 
has failed to establish that any objection would have been sustained or that 
failure to object was not a reasonable tactical decision.

 
 

[¶49]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel also claims that his trial counsel did not adequately cross-examine 
D.C.  Specifically, he contends that 
D.C. should have been questioned regarding whether "she was assisted or asked if 
she was okay when she fell outside her shop."  He contends that cross-examination might 
have elicited a response that would have been supportive of his defense 
contention that the sexual relations were consensual.  His assertion is purely speculative and 
we will not consider it further.

 
 

[¶50]     
Mr. 
Schreibvogel cannot show that his defense was prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
performance.  He has not shown that 
he was materially prejudiced by any of the alleged evidentiary errors.  There is no reasonable possibility that, 
had trial counsel objected to the challenged evidence or questioned the victim 
about what she heard that night, the outcome of the trial would have been more 
favorable to Mr. Schreibvogel.

 
 

[¶51]     
Affirmed.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶52]     
I 
concur in the result reached by the majority because stare decisis requires us to place upon 
the appellant the impossible task of proving prejudice in cases such as 
this.   The majority states the 
well-established law in Wyoming:  "It is error and misconduct for a 
prosecutor to ask a witness whether he thinks other witnesses are lying' or 
mistaken.'"    See Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 15, 
193 P.3d 228, 235 (Wyo. 2008); Teniente 
v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 51, 169 P.3d 512, 528-29 (Wyo. 2007); Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶¶ 10-11, 
153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007); Jensen v. 
State, 2005 WY 85, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Wyo. 2005); and Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 17, 
56 P.3d 626, 635-36 (Wyo. 2002).  
Yet the prosecutor in this case asked the appellant not once, but three 
times, whether another witnessthe bartender, the victim, and the cellmatewas 
incorrect or mistaken.  Perhaps the 
State would pay attention to the law if it bore the burden of proof as to the 
lack of prejudice.

 
 

[¶53]     
Another 
point.  This was a sexual 
assault/robbery case.  I would think 
it would be fairly clear that the appellant allegedly being "coked up" was 
uncharged misconduct evidence, banned by W.R.E. 404(b) except under 
particularized circumstances.  The 
majority is correct that the appellant's failure to object to the "coked up" 
testimony at the time it was elicited makes it difficult to apply an abuse of 
discretion standard of review.  But 
the appellant did make a pretrial demand for notice of such evidence, meeting 
the requirement we have set, and there simply is no innocent explanation for the 
manner in which the State introduced the evidence.  The State cannot claim surprise as to 
the answer when it asks one of its own witnesses, "[a]s close as you can, can 
you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what he told you."  At best, that shows lack of 
preparation.  Maybe, had the 
prosecutor then left the subject alone and gone on with something else, it would 
be excusable.  But that question was 
followed up with these"Let's stop there.  
What do you mean by coked up?'  
Does that have meaning to you?"  
And the answer"Cocaine, drugs."  
The prosecutor intentionally introduced evidence of the appellant's drug 
use without subjecting that evidence to the judicial review that we have 
mandated.  See Bromley v. State, 2009 WY 133, 219 P.3d 110 (Wyo. 2009); Wease v. State, 
2007 WY 176, 170 P.3d 94 (Wyo. 2007); Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, 99 P.3d 432 (Wyo. 2004); Moore v. State, 2003 
WY 153, 80 P.3d 191 (Wyo. 2003); Gleason 
v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002); and Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, 42 P.3d 483 
(Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶54]     
My 
concern is that, while the harmless error rule certainly makes sense as a 
reasonable systemic tool, its actual application via a process that requires 
each appellant to prove that he or she has been prejudiced by prosecutorial 
misconduct, leaves the State nearly unfettered in its ability to do as it 
pleases, this Court's opinions to the contrary 
notwithstanding.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) & (iii) state:

 

(a) 
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in 
the first degree if: 

 
 
(i) 
The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, 
reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or 
forcible confinement; 

 
 


 
 
(iii) 
The victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know 
that the victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not consented. 

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a)(i) states:

 

(a) A 
person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a crime defined by 
W.S. 6-3-402 he: 

 
 

(i) Inflicts 
bodily injury upon another.

 
 

3Mr. Schreibvogel also 
served a subpoena duces tecum on D.C.'s business.  She produced the documents requested in 
that subpoena.  

 
 

4W.R.Cr.P. 17(d) 
governs subpoenas duces tecum:

 
 
A 
subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the 
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein.  The court on motion made promptly may 
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.  The court may direct 
that books, papers, documents or other objects designated in the subpoena be 
produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when 
they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the 
books, papers, documents, objects, and portions thereof, to be inspected by the 
parties and their attorneys.

 
 

5The subpoena duces 
tecum was issued pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c).  W.R.Cr.P. 17(d) was based on the federal 
rule and contains the same relevant language. 

 
 

6Mr. 
Schreibvogel claims on appeal that if prior tax records showed that D.C. did not 
receive a certain amount in tips throughout the years, such information could 
have been used to impeach her testimony about the value of the tips in the jar 
at the time of the incident.  He 
also asserts that the bank statements and business records would either prove or 
disprove D.C.'s assertion that she would routinely allow smaller tips to 
stockpile and periodically exchange them at the bank for larger bills.  These arguments were not presented to 
the district court during the hearing.  
In determining whether there was an abuse of discretion, we must focus on 
the information before the district court at the time it made its 
decision.

 
 

7At 
the time of Mr. Schreibvogel's trial, W.R.E. 404(b) 
provided:

Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

 
 
Effective 
January 1, 2009, W.R.E. 404(b) now provides:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence 
it intends to introduce at trial.