Title: P. v. Randle

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 5/26/05  (Publish this opinion after People v. Wright, also filed 5/26/05) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S117370 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A097168 
DARYL RANDLE, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 137823 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
The central question presented by this case is whether one who kills in the 
actual but unreasonable belief he must protect another person from imminent 
danger of death or great bodily injury is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and not 
murder, because he lacks the malice required for murder.  In other words, should 
California recognize the doctrine of imperfect defense of others?  We conclude the 
answer is, yes. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The homicide victim Brian Robinson lived with his parents and his cousin, 
Charles Lambert.  Late one evening, as Robinson drove up to their home, he saw 
defendant getting out of Lambert’s car, holding a large stereo speaker he had just 
stolen from it. 
 
Robinson confronted defendant, saying he was going to “beat your ass.”  
Defendant pulled a .25-caliber pistol from his pocket and fired it several times.  
Defendant and his cousin Byron W., who had helped him break into Lambert’s 
 
 
 
2
car, then fled on foot.  Byron retained a backpack full of Lambert’s stereo 
equipment. 
 
Defendant claimed he fired after Robinson “reached for his hip.”  However, 
he did not claim he thought Robinson was reaching for a gun or other deadly 
weapon.  Moreover, Byron testified Robinson approached them with a cup or 
bottle in his hand.  Defendant and Byron agreed it was some sort of object made of 
glass that Robinson threw at them after defendant fired the pistol. 
 
Defendant gave conflicting accounts as to his aim.  On the one hand, he 
claimed he “fired the gun in the air.”  On the other hand, he earlier testified, “I 
shot at him.” 
 
Defendant testified he heard Robinson say something about getting a gun 
himself, and that he heard two loud bangs behind them as they fled.  Byron 
testified he also heard gunshots as they ran.  There was no evidence to corroborate 
these claims. 
 
Robinson went into his house and roused Lambert.  The two men got into a 
truck and pursued defendant and Byron.  Defendant eluded them, but they caught 
Byron. 
 
According to Lambert’s testimony, he and Robinson took turns beating 
Byron with their fists.  After Byron fell to the ground, Robinson kicked him.  
Lambert pulled Robinson off Byron.  Having recovered the stolen stereo 
equipment, they returned to the truck.   However, Robinson jumped out of the 
truck and began beating Byron again.  As he did, Robinson yelled at Lambert to 
“get pops,” meaning Robinson’s father; Lambert drove off to do so.  While 
Lambert was present, the beating of Byron lasted “[p]robably five, ten minutes.” 
 
 
3
 
Byron testified his assailants1 hit and kicked him.  One of them stomped on 
his chest, stepped on his head, and kicked him in the mouth.  The beating 
continued for five minutes. One of the men spoke of putting Byron in the truck 
and taking him into the hills.  Byron was bleeding from the mouth; his nose was 
broken.  He was hollering his lungs out.  He thought he was going to die.  He was 
being beaten when defendant cried out, “Get off my cousin.”  Byron’s assailant 
continued beating him, and then defendant opened fire.  Defendant, Byron 
believed, saved his life. 
 
Defendant testified he ran away, but then backtracked in search of Byron.  
He heard someone yelling for help and someone else saying, “I’m going to kill 
this little nigger.”  Coming closer, defendant saw someone beating Byron.  
Defendant shouted, “Stop.  Get off my cousin.”  Byron’s assailant glanced at 
defendant, but then resumed beating Byron.  Defendant testified he fired his gun to 
make the man stop beating Byron. 
 
Two prior statements defendant had made, one to the police and the other to 
a deputy district attorney, were played for the jury.  According to defendant’s 
statement to the police, Robinson was beating Byron when defendant first shot at 
him.  Defendant was, he said, “mainly thinking about getting him off my little 
cousin.”  However, defendant admitted shooting at Robinson after Robinson 
started running away.  In his statement to the deputy district attorney, defendant 
said he warned Robinson to get off Byron, shot once in the air, and then when 
Robinson did not respond, shot at him.  Again, defendant admitted shooting at 
Robinson while he was running away.  Defendant added he ceased firing because 
he ran out of ammunition. 
                                              
1  
He did not identify Robinson or Lambert. 
 
 
4
 
Sharalyn Lawrence and Jennifer Wellington witnessed the beating from 
Lawrence’s upstairs window.  They could see that Byron was “being really hurt.”  
Still, for a couple of minutes they were undecided what they should do.  “I am 
like, this is Oakland,” Wellington testified; “what do you do[?]”  Finally, hearing 
Byron cry out, “Somebody help me,” Lawrence telephoned 911, reporting a man 
“getting his ass beat.”  She said an ambulance should be dispatched.  Defendant 
shot Robinson after Lawrence called 911 to report Byron was being badly beaten. 
 
As previously stated, although defendant and Byron testified Robinson was 
still beating Byron when defendant fired the shots, defendant, in his statements to 
the police and the deputy district attorney, said he fired one shot at Robinson while 
Robinson was running away.  The testimony of Wellington and Lawrence tends to 
support the view that defendant shot at Robinson after Robinson stopped beating 
Byron and while he was running away.  Wellington so testified, and Lawrence’s 
testimony, while not very clear on this point, suggested that at least some of the 
shots were fired as Robinson was running away. 
 
The cause of Robinson’s death was a bullet wound in the abdomen.  The 
bullet was a .25 caliber.  It entered Robinson’s lower right chest or upper abdomen 
and lodged in the left side of his abdomen.  Robinson was not wounded in the 
back. 
 
At trial, defendant asked for an instruction on imperfect defense of another.  
The trial court denied the request.  After deliberating five days, the jury convicted 
defendant of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189)2 and automobile 
burglary (§ 459).  The jury also sustained firearm use allegations on both the 
murder count (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and the automobile burglary count 
                                              
2  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 
5
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).  Defendant was sentenced to a term of 40 years to life 
imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed. 
 
Holding the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on imperfect defense of 
another, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment convicting defendant of 
second degree murder.  The Court of Appeal remanded the cause for a new trial on 
that count; in all other respects, it affirmed the judgment. 
 
We conclude the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury on the doctrine of imperfect defense of others. 
 
Moreover, we conclude it was error, under the circumstances of this case, 
for the trial court to instruct the jury that defendant could be found guilty of 
second degree felony murder if the killing was committed in the course of 
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner in violation of section 246.3.  
(People v. Robertson (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 171 (Robertson).)  Unlike the 
defendant in Robertson, defendant admitted shooting at Robinson.  Therefore, the 
collateral purpose exception to the merger doctrine is inapplicable.  (Ibid.) 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, reversing the 
trial court judgment insofar as it convicted defendant of second degree murder, 
and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with the views 
expressed herein. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Imperfect Defense of Others 
 
Again, the central question presented by this case is whether one who kills 
in the actual but unreasonable belief he must protect another person from 
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury is guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, and not murder, because he lacks the malice required for murder.  
 
Defendant contends such a person is guilty, under the doctrine of imperfect  
 
 
6
defense of others, of only voluntary manslaughter, and that the trial court 
prejudicially erred in refusing his request to instruct the jury on the doctrine.  
 
The Attorney General contends (1) California has not recognized the 
doctrine of imperfect defense of others; (2) even assuming California does 
recognize the doctrine, defendant was not entitled to invoke it because he created 
the circumstances leading to the killing; and (3) in any event, any error in refusing 
to give the requested instruction was harmless here. 
1. Whether California recognizes the doctrine 
We begin by reviewing the related concepts of self-defense and defense of 
others.  Self-defense is perfect or imperfect.  For perfect self-defense, one must 
actually and reasonably believe in the necessity of defending oneself from 
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.  (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 
Cal.3d 668, 674 (Flannel).)  A killing committed in perfect self-defense is neither 
murder nor manslaughter; it is justifiable homicide.  (§ 197; People v. Anderson 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 782 (Anderson).) 
 
One acting in imperfect self-defense also actually believes he must defend 
himself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury; however, his belief 
is unreasonable.  (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771 (Christian S.); 
Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674.)  Imperfect self-defense mitigates, rather than 
justifies, homicide; it does so by negating the element of malice.  (People v. Rios 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461 (Rios); Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 679.) 
 
“California statutes have long separated criminal homicide into two classes, 
the greater offense of murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter.  
The distinguishing feature is that murder includes, but manslaughter lacks, the 
element of malice.  (Compare § 187, subd. (a) [‘[m]urder is the unlawful killing of 
a human being . . . with malice aforethought’] with § 192 [‘[m]anslaughter is the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice’].) 
 
 
7
 
“Malice exists, if at all, only when an unlawful homicide was committed 
with the ‘intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature’ (§ 188), or 
with awareness of the danger and a conscious disregard for life (ibid.; People v. 
Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 450; see also People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 
290, 300 [‘wanton disregard for human life’]).[3]  In certain circumstances, 
however, a finding of malice may be precluded, and the offense limited to 
manslaughter, even when an unlawful homicide was committed with intent to kill. 
In such a case, the homicide, though not murder, can be no less than voluntary 
manslaughter.”  (Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 460.) 
 
“Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds 
that a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but 
unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, 
the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of 
no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.”  (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 771.)  “Imperfect self-defense obviates malice because that most culpable of 
mental states ‘cannot coexist’ with an actual belief that the lethal act was 
necessary to avoid one’s own death or serious injury at the victim’s hand. 
[Citations.]”  (Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 461.) 
                                              
3  
“Not all murder requires the People to prove the defendant killed 
intentionally or with conscious disregard for life.  Under the felony-murder rule, a 
homicide is murder when it occurs in the course of certain serious and inherently 
dangerous felonies (§ 189 [first degree felony murder]; see, e.g., People v. 
Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 (Patterson) [nonstatutory second degree 
felony murder].)  In such cases, the intent to commit a dangerous felony that 
actually results in death is substituted for malice, thus establishing the extent of 
culpability appropriate to murder.  (Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 626; see also 
People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 474-476.)  The felony-murder doctrine is 
not pertinent to the discussion here.” 
 
 
8
Defendant contends defense of others, like self-defense, has an imperfect 
form.  That is, defendant contends, if a killing is committed by someone who 
actually but unreasonably believes he is acting under the necessity of defending 
another person from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, then the 
killing is voluntary manslaughter, not murder, because the killer is not acting with 
malice. 
Defendant relies on our recent opinion in People v. Michaels (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 486 (Michaels).  In Michaels, the defendant confessed to killing his 
girlfriend’s mother JoAnn, but claimed he did so to protect his girlfriend Christina 
from JoAnn’s physical and sexual abuse, which, Christina told the defendant, was 
driving her to suicide.  (Id. at p. 501.)  On appeal from his first degree murder 
conviction, the defendant contended the trial court should have instructed the jury, 
on its own motion, on the doctrine of imperfect defense of others. 
The doctrine was, we noted, of “doubtful” applicability, given the facts of 
the case.  “Defendant’s problem is that both self-defense and defense of others 
requires a fear of imminent harm (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 
1082), so presumably imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of others would 
require an unreasonable belief that harm was imminent.  But when defendant 
committed the homicide, Christina was at Broad Horizons, a youth detention 
facility, and murder victim JoAnn was asleep in her apartment.  The record does 
not indicate when Christina would next be released to visit JoAnn, but even if it 
was the next day it is doubtful that the facts would show that defendant believed, 
reasonably or unreasonably, that any threatened danger to Christina was 
‘imminent.’ ”  (Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 530-531.) 
Nevertheless, we addressed the defendant’s contention that the trial court 
had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the doctrine.  “The doctrine of unreasonable or 
imperfect defense of others, in contrast to the doctrine of unreasonable or 
 
 
9
imperfect self-defense, is not well established in California law.  It has been 
recognized in only one decision, People v. Uriarte (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 
198, and there the court found the doctrine inapplicable because Uriarte did not 
present evidence that he believed (reasonably or unreasonably) that the asserted 
danger to his wife was imminent or that shooting the victims was necessary to 
rescue her.  Uriarte was decided two months after this case was tried.  Thus at the 
time of the trial here, there was no California authority recognizing a doctrine of 
imperfect defense of others.”  (Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 529.) 
Because the defense of imperfect defense of others was not, at the time of 
the Michaels trial, a well-established doctrine under California law, we held the 
trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the defense on its own motion.  
However, we acknowledged the doctrine “follows logically from the interplay 
between statutory and decisional law.  Section 197 provides that ‘[h]omicide is . . . 
justifiable when committed by any person . . .  [¶]  . . . [w]hen resisting any 
attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily 
injury upon any person.’ ”  (Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 530.)  Accordingly, 
we observed, “[i]nnovative counsel could view that statute in light of Flannel’s 
analysis of imperfect self-defense (see People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at 
pp. 674-680), and propose an instruction on imperfect defense of others.”  
(Michaels, at p. 530.) 
 
Again, as we said in Michaels, the doctrine of imperfect defense of others 
“follows logically from the interplay between statutory and decisional law.”  
(Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 530.)  The doctrine is based on statute in that (1) 
malice is required for murder (§ 187) and (2) perfect self-defense and perfect 
defense of others are complete defenses to charges of murder (§ 197).  One who 
kills in imperfect self-defense—in the actual but unreasonable belief he must 
defend himself from imminent death or great bodily injury—is guilty of 
 
 
10
manslaughter, not murder, because he lacks the malice required for murder.  
(Anderson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 782; Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 771.)  
For the same reason, one who kills in imperfect defense of others—in the actual 
but unreasonable belief he must defend another from imminent danger of death or 
great bodily injury—is guilty only of manslaughter. 
The Attorney General contends that, contrary to Michaels, California has 
rejected the doctrine of imperfect defense of others.  California has done so, the 
Attorney General argues, by treating the reasonableness requirement differently 
for self-defense than for defense of others.  In self-defense, the Attorney General 
notes, reasonableness is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person 
in the defendant’s position.  The jury must consider all the facts and circumstances 
it might expect to operate on the defendant’s mind.  (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 1055, 1065; People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1083.)  In 
defense of others, the Attorney General asserts, reasonableness is determined, not 
from the point of view of the defendant, but rather from the point of view of the 
person the defendant was seeking to defend.  That is, the California rule for 
defense of others, the Attorney General argues, is the alter ego rule, under which 
one who attempts to defend another person steps into the shoes of the other 
person, and so acts at his peril if that person was in the wrong. 
The Attorney General bases his argument on his construction of section 
197, on his interpretation of the case law, and on his reading of public policy.  He 
is, we conclude, mistaken in every respect. 
 
 
a. 
Section 197 
Section 197 provides in pertinent part:  “Homicide is also justifiable when 
committed by any person in any of the following cases:  1. When resisting any 
attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily 
injury upon any person; [¶]  . . .  [¶]  3. When committed in the lawful defense of 
 
 
11
such person, or of a wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of 
such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a 
felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design 
being accomplished; but such person, or the person in whose behalf the defense 
was made, if he was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in 
good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide 
was committed.” 
Section 197, the Attorney General argues, impliedly rejects the doctrine of 
imperfect defense of others.  His argument runs as follows:  The statutory basis of 
the doctrine of self-defense is subdivision 3, while the statutory basis of the 
doctrine of defense of others is subdivision 1.  Section 197, subdivision 3 
expressly incorporates a reasonable person standard:  “when there is reasonable 
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily 
injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished . . . .”  (Italics 
added.)  Since subdivision 1 does not expressly incorporate such a reasonableness 
standard, the Attorney General argues, the Legislature must have intended, with 
regard to defense of others, to adopt the alter ego rule. 
A problem with the Attorney General’s argument is that section 197 does 
not compartmentalize the doctrines of self-defense and defense of others as neatly 
as that.  Subdivision 1, which the Attorney General characterizes as the defense-
of-others provision, may also be read as including self-defense.  No reason appears 
why the phrase “any person,” which occurs both in the stem of section 197 and in 
subdivision 1, would not cover oneself as well as others.  Under section 197, 
subdivision 1, a homicide is justifiable when committed by “any person” “resisting 
any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great 
bodily injury upon any person.”  (Italics added.) 
 
 
12
On the other hand, subdivision 3, which the Attorney General characterizes 
as the self-defense provision, also expressly covers the defense of others, albeit 
others in specified relationships with the person who comes to their defense.  
Under this provision, a homicide is justifiable when committed by any person “in 
the lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or husband, parent, child, master, 
mistress, or servant of such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend 
a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent 
danger of such design being accomplished . . . .”  (§ 197, subd. 3, italics added.) 
Moreover, the Attorney General’s argument—that the Legislature must 
have intended to adopt the alter ego rule for defense of others because it did not 
expressly incorporate a reasonable person standard in subdivision 1—finds no 
support in the legislative history of section 197. 
Section 197, enacted in 1872, was based on the Crimes and Punishment Act 
of 1850.  Under the Crimes and Punishment Act, a reasonable person standard 
governed defense of others as well as self-defense.  Both of the defenses were 
covered by section 29.  “Justifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in 
necessary self-defence, or in defence of habitation, property, or person, against 
one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a 
felony . . . .”  (Stats. 1850, ch. 99, § 29, p. 232, italics added.)  The applicability of 
the reasonable person standard to section 29 was made clear in the next section.  
“A bare fear of any of these offences, to prevent which the homicide is alleged to 
have been committed, shall not be sufficient to justify the killing.  It must appear 
that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, 
and that the party killing really acted under the influence of those fears, and not in 
a spirit of revenge.”  (Stats. 1850, ch. 99, § 30, p. 232, italics added.)  There is no 
reason to believe the Legislature, by enacting section 197, intended to substitute 
the alter ego standard for the reasonable person standard with regard to defense of 
 
 
13
others.  To the contrary, the code commissioners noted:  “The commission have 
modified the language [of specified sections of the Crimes and Punishment Act of 
1850], making it accord, in many respects, with that of the New York Penal Code 
[Field’s Draft] §§ 260, 261, and 262.  The legal effect, however, has not been 
changed.”  (Code commrs. note foll. Deering’s Ann. Pen. Code, § 197 (1985 ed.) 
p. 163, italics added.) 
 
 
b. 
Case law 
The Attorney General also misreads our cases.  He asserts:  “Early 
California cases observe that one who kills in the defense of another steps into the 
shoes of the person defended for purposes of evaluating a claim that homicide was 
justified.  ‘A person interfering in a difficulty in behalf of another simply steps in 
the latter’s shoes; he may lawfully do in another’s defense what such other might 
lawfully do in his own defense but no more . . . .’  (People v. Will (1926) 79 
Cal.App. 101, 114 [(Will)], citing People v. Travis (1880) 56 Cal. 251, 256 
[(Travis)] . . . .” 
By calling to our attention the fact that Will cites Travis, the Attorney 
General implies that our decision in Travis supports the passage he quotes from 
the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Will.  However, it does not.  In Travis, Wirt 
Travis was convicted of manslaughter for killing A.G. Hill.  Wirt, along with his 
sister Georgia and their brother John, attended a social function also attended by 
Hill.  Georgia walked out, explaining to Wirt that she could not remain in the hall 
with Hill because he had impugned her virtue.  Wirt so informed his brother John.  
The two of them went back into the hall and took seats apart from one another but 
near Hill.  John hit Hill.  Hill drew a pistol on John.  Wirt then shot Hill in the 
back, killing him.  (Travis, supra, 56 Cal. at pp. 252-253.) 
Wirt claimed he acted in defense of John, believing Hill was about to shoot 
John.  His claimed fear had some basis.  A witness testified that Hill had 
 
 
14
previously told him “the first thing he was going to do with them boys [the Travis 
brothers], he would commence killing them, if he got in a row with them.”  
(Travis, supra, 56 Cal. at p. 252.)  While the witness did not tell the Travises of 
Hill’s threat against them, they may well have heard of it because the witness had 
told “fifty or sixty [other] people” (ibid.), and word like that presumably traveled 
fast in Forestville in 1878. 
Contrary to the Attorney General’s argument, Travis does not stand for the 
proposition that the reasonableness of a claim of defense of others is tested from 
the point of view of the person the defendant was seeking to defend.  Indeed, in 
Travis, we upheld a jury instruction to the effect that Wirt’s killing of Hill would 
have been justifiable if the jury had found that Wirt shot Hill in order to prevent 
Hill from shooting John, “if that was necessary to prevent [Hill] from executing 
his design; provided there was, or appeared to the defendant to be, imminent 
danger to the life or limb of his brother from the hostile and threatening attitude of 
Hill.”  (Travis, supra, 56 Cal. at p. 256, italics added.)  John was closely related to 
Wirt.  However, their relationship as brothers was not one of the relationships 
specified in subdivision 3 of section 197, in that John was not Wirt’s “wife or 
husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant.”4  Nevertheless, we upheld a 
                                              
4  
Perkins explains the origins and evolution of such catalogues of 
relationships in statutory provisions covering self-defense and defense of others.  
“The privilege of using force in defense of others, as a separate privilege, 
developed partly by accident.  It had its roots in the law of property.  The privilege 
of one to protect what was ‘his’ was extended to include the protection of his wife, 
his children and his servants.  In the course of time this privilege outgrew the 
property analogy and came to be regarded as a ‘mutual and reciprocal defence.’  
The household was regarded as a group, any member of which had a privilege to 
defend any other member.  ‘A man may defend his family, his servants or his 
master, whenever he may defend himself.’  Even this concept of the privilege was 
outgrown and it came to include the members of one’s immediate family or 
household and any other ‘whom he is under a legal or socially recognized duty to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
15
jury instruction that focused on Wirt’s point of view, and not upon the point of 
view of the brother he was seeking to defend. 
People v. Will, supra, 79 Cal.App. 101, is disapproved insofar as it is 
inconsistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
c. 
Public policy 
 
The Attorney General’s public policy argument is that the doctrine of 
imperfect self-defense is “an open invitation to assaults, not just upon undercover 
officers effectuating arrests, but upon innocent bystanders in many situations not 
the least of them being mob violence and gang warfare.”  However, the controlling 
public policy decision here was made by the Legislature when it decided the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice is manslaughter, not murder.  
(§ 192.) 
2. Whether defendant may invoke the doctrine 
The Attorney General, relying on Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th 768, 
contends defendant is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of imperfect defense of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
protect.’  Thus a conductor was privileged to defend his passenger, and a man 
privileged to defend a lady friend whom he was escorting at the moment.  The 
present position, which represents a merging of the privilege of crime prevention 
with the privilege of defending others, is that one may go to the defense of a 
stranger if that person is the innocent victim of an unlawful attack.”  (Perkins & 
Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) Self-Defense, § 5, pp. 1144-1145, fns. 
omitted.) 
 
While acknowledging some courts had adopted the alter ego rule, Perkins 
states the “sound” view was that one coming to the defense of others “is protected 
by the usual mistake-of-fact doctrine and may act upon the situation as it 
reasonably seems to be.”  (Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law, supra, § 5, p. 1147, 
fn. omitted.)  He adds:  “Most of the codes that deal separately with the defense of 
another seem to leave no trace of the view that one who goes to the aid of another 
‘acts at his peril’ with reference to the right of that person to receive such aid 
. . . .”  (Id. at p. 1148, fn. omitted.) 
 
 
16
others because he created the circumstances leading to the killing.  In Christian S., 
we observed, “It is well established that the ordinary self-defense doctrine—
applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his safety is endangered—
may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., 
the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created the 
circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.  
[Citations.]  It follows, a fortiori, that the imperfect self-defense doctrine cannot be 
invoked in such circumstances.  For example, the imperfect self-defense doctrine 
would not permit a fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing police officer to escape a 
murder conviction even if the felon killed his pursuer with an actual belief in the 
need for self-defense.”  (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1.) 
Defendant contends the Attorney General is barred from raising this 
argument because he did not raise it in the Court of Appeal.  The Attorney General 
responds the argument was “implicit” in his Court of Appeal brief.  We disagree.  
Fairly read, the Attorney General’s brief in the Court of Appeal is limited to the 
argument we discussed earlier, that contrary to Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th 486, 
California has rejected the doctrine of imperfect defense of others, and has, 
instead, adopted the alter ego rule. 
However, this issue, whether defendant is precluded from invoking the 
doctrine of defense of others because he created the circumstances leading to the 
killing, was squarely raised in the Attorney General’s petition for review, which 
we granted.  We may decide any issue raised or fairly included in the petition or 
answer.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).)  The Attorney General urges us to 
exercise our discretion to decide this issue. 
As a matter of policy, we generally will not consider on review any issue 
which could have been, but was not, timely raised in the Court of Appeal.  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 28(c)(1); Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 
 
 
17
Cal.4th 1246, 1265.)  However, “[i]n a number of cases, this court has decided 
issues raised for the first time before us, where those issues were pure questions of 
law, not turning upon disputed facts, and were pertinent to a proper disposition of 
the cause or involved matters of particular public importance.  (E.g., Temple 
Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464, 469, fn. 2; Cedars-
Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 7-8, fn. 2; Jolly v. Eli 
Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1118; Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 
37 Cal.3d 644, 654 & fn. 3.)”  (People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 888, 901, fn. 5, italics added.) 
The facts underlying the Attorney General’s argument were undisputed.    
Defendant admitted arming himself with a pistol when he and Byron set out to 
burglarize cars, and he admitted using the weapon when Robinson surprised him 
in the act of burglarizing Lambert’s car.  Therefore, we conclude the Attorney 
General is not barred, by his failure to raise it below, from arguing that defendant 
is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of imperfect defense of others because he 
created the circumstances leading to the killing. 
Turning to the merits, we agree with defendant. 
The Attorney General’s argument fails because although defendant’s criminal 
conduct certainly set in motion the series of events that led to the fatal shooting of 
Robinson, the retreat of defendant and Byron and the subsequent recovery of the 
stolen equipment from Byron extinguished the legal justification for Robinson’s 
attack on Byron.  (See Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1.) 
The record supports the conclusion that Robinson was taking the law into 
his own hands, meting out the punishment he thought Byron deserved, and not 
 
 
18
making a citizen’s arrest as the Attorney General claims.5  While Robinson may 
well have had a right to pursue Byron for the purpose of recovering Lambert’s 
stolen property, and to use reasonable force to retrieve it,6 the beating of Byron by 
Robinson and Lambert went well beyond any force they were entitled to use.  
Moreover, after they recovered the stolen stereo equipment and returned to their 
truck, Robinson jumped out of the truck and began beating Byron again.  At that 
point Robinson’s use of force was completely unjustified, and it was at that point, 
or shortly thereafter, that defendant shot Robinson. 
While we hold defendant’s conduct did not create circumstances legally 
justifying Robinson’s attack on Byron, we should not be understood as condoning 
it in any respect.  By making two fateful choices defendant triggered an escalating 
series of events that transformed the most mundane of property crimes into a fatal 
shooting.  When he set out to burglarize cars, defendant chose to arm himself.  
When he was surprised in the act of burglary, defendant chose to use the weapon.  
                                              
5  
Had Robinson and Lambert been attempting to effect a citizen’s arrest, the 
use of reasonable force may have been permitted.  (§§ 835, 837; People v. 
Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 579.)  However, none of the witnesses, not even 
Lambert, suggested the beating was incidental to a citizen’s arrest.  Indeed, 
Lambert testified that Robinson, in renewing the beating, yelled at him to “get 
pops,” not “get the police.”  According to Byron, one of his assailants spoke of 
taking him, not to a police station, but into the hills.  According to defendant, 
someone said, “I’m going to kill this little nigger.” 
6  
See, e.g., People v. Young (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 641.  “In this case 
defendant’s money was snatched from his hand so quickly that no particular force 
was required and no fear engendered upon the instant, but mere demand for return 
of the money brought forth the opened knife and the threat to cut defendant’s head 
off and he was in fear for his life; ‘I was always afraid of him.’  In these 
circumstances the California cases make it plain that the victim has a right to use 
reasonable force to recover his money and, if actually or apparently reasonably 
necessary, to kill the robber in so doing.”  (Id. at p. 648.) 
 
 
19
Whether, during that initial confrontation, he fired the pistol at Robinson, or fired 
in the air, as he variously testified, he raised the stakes enormously. 
3. Whether refusal to instruct on the doctrine was harmless 
 
The Attorney General contends that, even assuming arguendo the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct on the doctrine of imperfect defense of others, the error 
was harmless. 
 
Any error in failing to instruct on imperfect defense of others is state law 
error alone, and thus subject, under article VI, section 13 of the California 
Constitution, to the harmless error test articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.  “Did defendant suffer prejudice from the trial court’s failure to 
instruct the jury that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is 
involuntary manslaughter?  A majority of this court recently held that when, as in 
this case, a trial court violates state law by failing to properly instruct the jury on a 
lesser included offense, the following test applies:  ‘[I]n a noncapital case, error in 
failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses 
and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for 
prejudice exclusively under [Watson].  A conviction of the charged offense may 
be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, “after an examination of 
the entire cause, including the evidence” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears 
“reasonably probable” the defendant would have obtained a more favorable 
outcome had the error not occurred (Watson, [at p. 836].)’  (People v. Breverman, 
[(1998)] 19 Cal.4th 142, 178.)”  (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 93.) 
 
Is it reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have 
been reached had the trial court instructed the jury on imperfect defense of others?  
This is a close question, but on balance, we agree with defendant. 
 
 
20
 
The thrust of defendant’s testimony was that he acted in perfect defense of 
another.  He claimed he shot at Robinson in the reasonable belief he had to do so 
in order to protect Byron from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.  
However, the evidence was also susceptible of the interpretation that defendant’s 
belief in the necessity of protecting Byron, supposing he held such a belief, was 
unreasonable because Byron was not really in imminent danger of death or great 
bodily injury.  Indeed, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Bryon was not being 
beaten that badly; Byron did not, the prosecutor noted, seek any medical treatment 
for the injuries he claimed to have suffered.  Under this view of the evidence, 
defendant was entitled to an instruction on imperfect defense of others.  In 
concluding the failure to give the instruction was prejudicial, we note the jury, 
even without having been instructed on this theory, took five days to reach its 
decision. 
B. Section 246.3 and the Merger Doctrine 
 
The instructions permitted the jury to convict defendant of second degree 
murder on three theories:  express malice, implied malice, and felony murder.  The 
felony-murder theory was based on defendant’s having discharged a firearm in a 
grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3).  Defendant contends it was error to instruct on 
felony murder because the offense of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent 
manner here necessarily merged with the homicide. 
 
In People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, “we held that the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on second degree felony murder based on the crime of 
assault with a deadly weapon.  The defendant’s crime of assault with a deadly 
weapon merged with a resulting homicide and could not form the basis for an 
application of the second degree felony-murder rule.  The instructional error was 
prejudicial because . . . malice is not an element of second degree felony murder 
and therefore the felony murder instruction in the Ireland case permitted the jury 
 
 
21
to disregard the defendant’s diminished capacity defense.  (Id. at p. 539 & fn. 13.)  
We observed that ‘[t]o allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively 
preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases 
wherein homicide has been committed as the result of felonious assault—a 
category which includes the great majority of all homicides.’  (Id. at p. 539.)  The 
felony-murder instruction is not proper when the predicate felony is an ‘integral 
part of the homicide’ and when, under the prosecution’s evidence, it is ‘included 
in fact within the offense charged.’  (Id. at p. 539, italics omitted.)”  (Robertson, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 169.) 
 
In Robertson, as in this case, the question presented was “whether the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury that defendant could be found guilty of second 
degree felony murder if the killing was committed in the course of discharging a 
firearm in a grossly negligent manner in violation of section 246.3.”  (Robertson, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 164.)  The defendant in Robertson claimed he fired into the 
air, in order to frighten away several men who were burglarizing his car.  (Ibid.)  
However, the testimony of a neighbor, as well as ballistics evidence, indicated 
defendant shot at the victim.  (Id. at p. 162.)  This court held the merger doctrine 
did not apply because the defendant, by his account, had a “collateral purpose” in 
firing his weapon.  “In [People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177], we concluded 
that use of the second degree felony-murder rule was appropriate when the 
purpose of the predicate felony was independent of or collateral to an intent to 
cause injury that would result in death.  ([Id.] at p. 185.)  Although the collateral 
purpose rationale may have its drawbacks in some situations ([People v.] Hansen 
[(1994)] 9 Cal.4th [300,] 315), we believe it provides the most appropriate 
framework to determine whether, under the facts of the present case, the trial court 
properly instructed the jury.  The defendant’s asserted underlying purpose was to 
frighten away the young men who were burglarizing his automobile.  According to 
 
 
22
defendant’s own statements, the discharge of the firearm was undertaken with a 
purpose collateral to the resulting homicide, rendering the challenged instruction 
permissible.”  (Robertson, at p. 171.) 
 
Here, unlike Robertson, defendant admitted, in his pretrial statements to the 
police and to a deputy district attorney, he shot at Robinson.  Defendant told the 
police, “And I was like, ‘Get off my cousin!’  I shot one time in the air, and then 
they looked up, and I guess they started running.  That’s when I shot towards them 
one time.”  Upon being questioned by a deputy district attorney, defendant gave 
this account:  “. . . I said ‘Get off my cousin.’  That’s when I brandished the pistol 
and shot one time in the air.  And then he just stood there and looked at me like he 
didn’t care so I shot again.  [¶]  Q. Now when you shot, when you shot the next 
time where was the gun pointed?  [¶]  A. It was pointed towards him.  [¶]  Q. Ok.  
And then what did the guy do after you shot the second time when it was pointed 
at him?  [¶]  A. He ran.  [¶]  Q. And what did you do after he ran?  [¶]  A. I fired 
the gun one last time, he ducked, then he got back up and then when I tried to fire 
again it was just, the gun wouldn’t click.  It was out of bullets.” 
 
The fact that defendant admitted shooting at Robinson distinguishes 
Robertson and supports application of the merger rule here.  Defendant’s claim 
that he shot Robinson in order to rescue Byron simply provided a motive for the 
shooting; it was not a purpose independent of the shooting. 
 
 
23
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment convicting 
defendant of second degree murder.  The Court of Appeal remanded the cause for 
a new trial on that count; in all other respects, it affirmed the judgment.  We affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and we remand the cause for further 
proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
 
I concur in the opinion of the court, but write separately to clarify the 
limited role that In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 (Christian S.) plays in this 
case.  In particular, I disagree with Justice Brown that Christian S. compels the 
outcome here.  (See conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 1.) 
Here there was evidence showing that the aggression of Brian Robinson 
exceeded any justifiable response to the criminal conduct defendant and his cousin 
Byron W. initiated, and that Robinson acted to physically punish Byron when 
Byron was helpless and posed no threat to anyone.  Under these circumstances, 
Christian S. does not categorically bar defendant from invoking the doctrine of 
imperfect defense of others.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-19.)  But neither does 
Christian S. logically compel the doctrine’s availability in this case, as Justice 
Brown contends in her concurring opinion. 
In Christian S., an opinion I authored, we addressed the question whether 
the Legislature abrogated the doctrine of imperfect self-defense in 1981 by 
amending the Penal Code to eliminate the diminished capacity defense.1  We 
                                              
1  
In Christian S., the defendant, a minor, sought review of a judgment 
making him a ward of the juvenile court after sustaining a petition charging him 
with second degree murder.  The evidence showed that the victim was a so-called 
skinhead and a possible gang member, and that the defendant began carrying a 
handgun after the victim’s friends had physically and verbally harassed and 
threatened the defendant for about a year.  The victim had blamed the defendant 
for damaging his truck, and one day he chased the defendant while repeatedly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
2 
found the Legislature did not do so, and concluded the doctrine remained intact.  
As part of a general discussion of the doctrine’s limitations, we noted the “well-
established” rule that “the ordinary self-defense doctrine . . . may not be invoked 
by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a 
physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under 
which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.  [Citations.]”  (Christian 
S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1.)  After concluding that, “a fortiori, . . . the 
imperfect self-defense doctrine cannot be invoked in such circumstances,” we 
gave one clear example of its limited availability:  “[T]he imperfect self-defense 
doctrine would not permit a fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing police officer to 
escape a murder conviction even if the felon killed his pursuer with an actual 
belief in the need for self-defense.”  (Ibid.)  Although we also cautioned the 
imperfect self-defense doctrine was a narrow one, requiring a defendant’s actual 
fear of an imminent harm (id. at p. 783), we had no need and made no effort to 
otherwise define the parameters of the doctrine. 
Unlike the instant case, Christian S. did not involve any criminal conduct 
initiated by the defendant.  Neither did it concern any claim of perfect or imperfect 
defense of others.  Moreover, the decision did not purport to set forth all the 
circumstances under which a defendant may or may not assert the doctrine of 
imperfect self-defense.  In sum, Christian S. did not recognize, or refuse to 
recognize, the imperfect defense of others doctrine, and did not address possible 
restrictions to the imperfect self-defense doctrine other than to note the one 
                                                                                                                                      
 
threatening “ ‘to get him’ ” and challenging him to fire his weapon.  (Christian S., 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 772.)  The victim halted his advance each time the defendant 
pointed his gun at him.  Finally, after some additional taunting by the victim, the 
defendant shot and killed him.  (Ibid.)  Upon finding that the imperfect self-
defense doctrine had not been statutorily abrogated, we remanded the matter for 
further proceedings because the record was ambiguous whether the trial court 
found the defendant lacked an actual belief in the need for self-defense, or whether 
the court mistakenly believed the defense was not viable.  (Id. at pp. 783-784.) 
 
3 
obvious example above.  Accordingly, that decision does not compel the result 
here.  (See People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 17 [referencing the familiar rule 
that language in an opinion is to be understood in light of the facts and the issue 
then before the court].) 
That said, I concur in the court’s conclusion that nothing we said in 
Christian S. prohibits defendant here from invoking the imperfect defense of 
others doctrine.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-19.)  Although defendant’s initial 
criminal conduct in brandishing and shooting a firearm may well have provoked 
anger and fear in Robinson, there appears substantial evidence that Robinson 
exceeded any justifiable response when, after catching up to and physically 
attacking Byron the first time, Robinson returned to the obviously helpless Byron 
a second time to resume beating him. 
Although I believe our holding is consistent with the restrictions thus far 
recognized for the analogous doctrine of imperfect self-defense, I join Justice 
Brown in her call for the Legislature to provide clear definitions of malice, and to 
reexamine the issues of whether and to what extent a defendant may invoke the 
doctrines of imperfect self-defense and imperfect defense of others.  (See conc. 
opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 4; People v. Wright (May 26, 2005, S119067) __ 
Cal.4th __, __ (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [at p. 15].)  To the extent the doctrines are 
legislatively approved in some form, it would be particularly beneficial to have 
legislative guidance regarding:  (1) the type and nature of criminal conduct, 
whether violent or otherwise, that might preclude a defendant from invoking one 
or both doctrines; and (2) considerations for determining the duration that a 
defendant’s criminal conduct bars either doctrine’s availability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
1 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court.   
 
I write separately because the outcome of this case, although logically 
compelled by this court’s earlier decision in In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
768, 771 (Christian S.), seems to me unjust.  If I were writing on a clean slate, I 
would not permit defendant to take advantage of the fact that his victim Robinson 
exceeded the bounds of a lawful citizen’s arrest.    
 
In Christian S., we observed, “It is well established that the ordinary self-
defense doctrine—applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his safety 
is endangered—may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own 
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a 
felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is 
legally justified.  [Citations.]  It follows, a fortiori, that the imperfect self-defense 
doctrine cannot be invoked in such circumstances.  For example, the imperfect 
self-defense doctrine would not permit a fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing 
police officer to escape a murder conviction even if the felon killed his pursuer 
with an actual belief in the need for self-defense.”  (See Christian S., supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1.) 
 
There is no question but that defendant, by his felonious acts, set in motion 
the events resulting in his killing of Robinson.  “By making two fateful choices 
defendant triggered an escalating series of events that transformed the most 
mundane of property crimes into a fatal shooting.  When he set out to burglarize 
cars, defendant chose to arm himself.  When he was surprised in the act of 
burglary, defendant chose to use the weapon.  Whether, during that initial 
confrontation, he fired the pistol at Robinson, or fired in the air, as he variously 
testified, he raised the stakes enormously.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18-19.) 
 
2 
 
However, under Christian S., defendant may invoke the doctrine of 
imperfect defense of others because Robinson’s attack on Byron was not legally 
justified.  “The Attorney General’s argument fails because although defendant’s 
criminal conduct certainly set in motion the series of events that led to the fatal 
shooting of Robinson, the retreat of defendant and Byron and the subsequent 
recovery of the stolen equipment from Byron extinguished the legal justification 
for Robinson’s attack on Byron.  (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1.) 
 
“The record supports the conclusion that Robinson was taking the law into 
his own hands, meting out the punishment he thought Byron deserved, and not 
making a citizen’s arrest as the Attorney General claims.  While Robinson may 
well have had a right to pursue Byron for the purpose of recovering Lambert’s 
stolen property, and to use reasonable force to retrieve it, the beating of Byron by 
Robinson and Lambert went well beyond any force they were entitled to use.  
Moreover, after they recovered the stolen stereo equipment and returned to their 
truck, Robinson jumped out of the truck and began beating Byron again.  At that 
point Robinson’s use of force was completely unjustified, and it was at that point, 
or shortly thereafter, that defendant shot Robinson.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 17-18, fns. omitted.)  
 
The paradigm for permitting imperfect defense of others is a case like that 
of Kitty Genovese1—a case where someone is being attacked and a third party has 
to decide whether to intervene without knowing the full context.  In such a 
circumstance, there is good reason to be more lenient with a misperception or 
misjudgment.  In my view, however, we should never allow a felon whose 
felonious activity sets off a series of tragic (and ultimately fatal) events to claim 
partial exoneration—particularly if he murders in defense of a crime partner.  
 
The Legislature has made a policy decision that felons who break into 
                                              
1 
See Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police, N.Y. Times 
(Mar. 27, 1964) p. A1. 
 
3 
homes or businesses cannot sue for compensation.  (Civ. Code, § 847.)  Similarly, 
the Legislature enacted the Home Protection Bill of Rights in 1984 “ ‘to permit 
residential occupants to defend themselves from intruders without fear of legal 
repercussions, to give ‘the benefit of the doubt in such cases to the resident . . . .’  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 633.)  In other words 
those who do not play by the rules should not receive the benefit of the rules.  In 
the same vein, the law should preclude reliance on imperfect defense of others by 
miscreants whose misjudgments lead to the death of their victim. 
 
For the Attorney General, the specter raised by the doctrine of imperfect 
defense of others extends far beyond the circumstances presented by a case like 
this:  “A judicially created doctrine of unreasonable defense of others would be an 
open invitation to assaults, not just upon undercover officers effectuating arrests, 
but upon innocent bystanders in many situations not the least being mob violence 
and gang warfare.”  Indeed, members of violent street gangs, for whom 
manslaughter convictions would be little deterrent since they spend most of their 
lives in prison in any event, might well provoke violence in order to have a license 
to kill.2   
                                              
2 
That may have been the game the Travis brothers were playing in People v. 
Travis (1880) 56 Cal. 251.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-15.) 
 
4 
 
As the Attorney General observes, imperfect defense of others, like 
imperfect self-defense, is a judicially created doctrine.  (See People v. Rios (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 450, 465.)  I have elsewhere urged the Legislature to provide clear 
definitions of malice and imperfect self-defense.  (People v. Wright (May 26, 
2005, S119067) ___ Cal.4th ___, ___ (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [p. 15].)  For the 
reasons stated above, the derivative doctrine of imperfect defense of others should 
also be reexamined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Randle 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 109 Cal.App.4th 313 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S117370 
Date Filed: May 26, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Larry J. Goodman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
J. Bradley O’Connell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan M. 
Helman, Eric D. Share and Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. Bradley O’Connell 
First District Appellate Project 
730 Harrison Street, Suite 201 
San Francisco, CA  94107 
(415) 495-3119 
 
Amy Haddix 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5893