Title: Commonwealth v. Moffat

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-08733 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SHANE MOFFAT. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     May 8, 2020. - November 12, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Exculpatory, Opinion.  Practice, Criminal, 
Discovery, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, 
Assistance of counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 17, 2000. 
 
The case was tried before Tina S. Page, J.; motions for 
postconviction discovery and for a new trial were considered by 
her; and following review by this court, 478 Mass. 292 (2017), a 
second motion for postconviction discovery was considered by 
David Ricciardone, J., and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by Page, J. 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
LOWY, J.  In October 2001, a jury convicted the defendant, 
Shane Moffat, of murder in the first degree for the shooting 
death of Malcolm Howard.2  The defendant seeks reversal of his 
conviction, arguing that (1) the Commonwealth violated the 
defendant's due process rights by failing to investigate 
evidence that contradicted its trial theory and by presenting a 
trial theory that it knew or had reason to know was false; 
(2) two lay witnesses improperly testified as to the defendant's 
guilt without personal knowledge, violating the defendant's due 
process rights; (3) during closing argument, the prosecutor 
improperly urged the jury to draw an inference of guilt against 
the defendant due to his court room behavior; (4) the trial 
judge erred by providing incomplete jury instructions regarding 
circumstantial evidence; (5) trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance for various reasons, including by failing to 
investigate third-party culprit evidence; and (6) the motion 
judges erred in denying the defendant's motions for 
postconviction discovery.  The defendant also requests that we 
exercise our power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant him 
a new trial.  Finding neither reversible error nor reason to 
exercise our authority under § 33E, we affirm. 
                     
2 The judge sentenced the defendant to life in prison. 
3 
 
Background.  "We recite the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for 
later discussion."  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 484 Mass. 650, 651 
(2020). 
1.  The murder and aftermath.  During a meeting on May 10, 
1999, the defendant offered to procure cocaine for the victim 
and the victim's cousin, George Marshall.  Three days later, the 
victim's girlfriend gave the victim $1,300 to purchase drugs 
from the defendant.  Later that day, at around 11 A.M., Marshall 
drove the victim to meet the defendant in Marshall's fiancée's 
car, which was a Toyota.  The defendant told Marshall that the 
defendant and the victim had to meet the cocaine distributor 
elsewhere, and that Marshall could not come.  Marshall let the 
victim borrow the Toyota, and the victim agreed that he would 
return in time for Marshall to be able to pick up his daughter 
later that afternoon.  The victim drove away with the defendant 
at around 1:30 P.M. 
The victim first drove the defendant to the defendant's 
mother's house, where the defendant retrieved his mail.  The 
victim then drove the defendant to Fred Jackson Road in 
Southwick, and shortly thereafter, the victim was shot with a 
shotgun.  At 3:11 P.M., the defendant used the victim's cell 
phone to place a call.  The cell phone signal from that call 
4 
 
corresponded with a cell tower within three to five miles of 
Fred Jackson Road. 
After the victim did not return with the Toyota by the 
promised time, Marshall attempted to contact both the victim and 
the defendant.  The defendant told Marshall that the defendant 
had not seen or heard from the victim since earlier that day 
when the victim had dropped off the defendant.  Later that 
night, Marshall and the victim's girlfriend confronted the 
defendant about the victim's whereabouts, and the defendant 
again denied any knowledge. 
That same evening, the defendant and his friend, Jarod 
Thompson, took a taxicab to various locations, including one 
location where the defendant and Thompson disposed of a shotgun 
barrel in a storm drain.  During the ride, the defendant showed 
Thompson a shirt with blood on it.  The defendant also left a 
bag in the taxicab, which contained the boots the defendant was 
wearing during the murder. 
2.  The investigation.  On May 16, 1999, a man discovered 
the victim's body lying on the side of an embankment on Fred 
Jackson Road.3  An autopsy later revealed that the victim's cause 
of death was a close range shotgun wound to his neck.  On May 
18, 1999, the Toyota was discovered outside an abandoned 
                     
3 The victim was still wearing his jewelry, but there was no 
wallet or identification on him. 
5 
 
factory, and the driver's seat was soaked with blood.  Officers 
recovered the victim's baseball cap from the brush next to the 
Toyota and the defendant's mail, which bore his mother's 
address, from the front passenger seat. 
The police later recovered from the storm drain the shotgun 
barrel, which was consistent with the type of shotgun used to 
murder the victim.  The police also recovered from the taxicab a 
bag containing the defendant's boots and later determined that 
the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid was on the defendant's right 
boot. 
3.  Arrest and police interviews.  On May 21, 1999, a 
warrant issued for the defendant's arrest.  Shortly thereafter, 
the police went to Thompson's house looking for the defendant, 
but they did not find him there.4  The defendant fled to New 
York, and then to Florida, where police there arrested him 
several months later on an unrelated charge.5  Over the course of 
several interviews with the defendant, both in Florida and in 
                     
4 At trial, the defendant testified that he knew the police 
were there, but that he had hidden on the third floor until the 
police left. 
 
5 Upon arrest, the defendant identified himself under an 
alias, Frank Matta, with an address in Seattle, Washington. 
6 
 
Massachusetts, the defendant provided the Massachusetts police 
officers with three different versions of the murder.6 
First, the defendant claimed that when he could not reach 
the cocaine distributor, a man named "Ayah," the victim dropped 
off the defendant, and the defendant did not see the victim 
again.  Three days after the murder, a girl approached the 
defendant and handed him a bag containing three shotguns.  The 
defendant gave two away, and because the third smelled like it 
had just been fired, he dismantled it and disposed of it in the 
storm drain. 
The detectives then informed the defendant that the police 
had recovered the shotgun barrel and the defendant's boots from 
the taxicab, and that the police knew the defendant had used the 
victim's cell phone.  The defendant then asked the detectives, 
"Why would I murder somebody for just thirteen hundred 
dollars[?]" 
In his second version of events, the defendant claimed that 
he had brought the victim to meet Ayah and someone named 
Quentin.  Upon their arrival, Ayah and Quentin entered the 
backseat of the Toyota, while the defendant sat in the front 
passenger's seat, and the victim sat in the driver's seat.  As 
                     
6 The defendant told the police the first two versions in 
Florida.  The defendant told the police the third version in 
Massachusetts. 
7 
 
the four men talked, the defendant heard a loud bang and saw the 
victim slump over the steering wheel.  The defendant then helped 
remove the victim's body from the car and placed it in the trunk 
of Ayah and Quentin's car.  The defendant drove the blood-soaked 
Toyota to Hartford.  He accused Ayah and Quentin of framing him, 
claiming that Ayah and Quentin both wore surgical gloves, while 
he did not, and that he had let Ayah borrow his boots. 
Following the defendant's second version, the detectives 
gave the defendant a copy of Thompson's statement and 
photographs of the shotgun and the taxicab.  The detectives 
reviewed the evidence against the defendant, and the defendant 
acknowledged that the police had enough evidence to convict.  
The interview was then interrupted, and when it resumed a couple 
months later, the defendant offered a third version of events.7 
In this third version, the defendant, Marshall, and the 
victim met Ayah and Quentin at a convenience store.  The 
defendant and the victim then followed Ayah and Quentin in the 
Toyota to a gasoline station and then to Fred Jackson Road, 
stopping in between to retrieve the defendant's mail from his 
mother's house.  Once there, Ayah and Quentin got out of their 
car, and Quentin shot the victim while standing behind the 
                     
7 The detectives did not speak to the defendant again until 
January 2000, when they picked him at the airport in Miami to 
transport him back to Massachusetts. 
8 
 
driver's side window.  Ayah and Quentin then removed the 
victim's body from the Toyota and dropped him down the 
embankment.  After, Ayah drove the defendant away from the scene 
in Ayah's car, and Quentin drove the Toyota to Hartford. 
As to motive, the defendant offered that the victim was 
killed because Marshall and the victim had robbed someone in New 
York City during a drug deal.  The defendant admitted that he 
owned the murder weapon, that he had disposed of it, and that 
his fingerprints were on it.  The defendant then agreed to take 
police to the murder location.  Once at the murder site on Fred 
Jackson Road, the defendant admitted that he, not Ayah, had been 
wearing his boots during the murder, but he could not explain 
how the victim's blood had ended up on them. 
4.  The trial.  During his trial testimony, the defendant 
acknowledged that he was present during the murder, but he 
claimed that he did not shoot the victim and that he did not 
know that Ayah and Quentin had planned to do so.  The defendant 
largely reiterated his third version of events, but he denied 
that the murder weapon belonged to him.  On October 11, 2001, 
the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree 
on the theories of felony-murder and deliberate premeditation.  
The defendant was sentenced and filed a notice of appeal the 
following day.  Over the subsequent seventeen years, the 
9 
 
defendant filed multiple postconviction motions.8  We 
consolidated the defendant's direct appeal from his conviction 
of murder in the first degree with his appeals from the denials 
of some of those motions. 
Discussion.  1.  Commonwealth's improper trial theory.  One 
week prior to trial, the Commonwealth received a heavily 
redacted Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report from the 
United States Attorney's office, which contained a portion of an 
FBI interview of someone named Desmond Wolfe from December 9, 
1999.  The FBI report, which the defendant possessed prior to 
trial, stated: 
"With regards to a murder that occurred in Springfield, 
Screw told Wolfe that he (Screw) and [the defendant] on the 
day of the murder, 'licked a man down and now he died.'  
Screw . . . fled to Florida with [the defendant] and 
telephoned Wolfe from Florida a few times. . . .  Screw 
told Wolfe that the murder victim owed [the defendant] 
money and that he (Screw) witnessed [the defendant] commit 
the murder."9 
                     
8 We docketed the defendant's direct appeal in 2002 and, 
over the subsequent sixteen years, we allowed multiple of the 
defendant's motions to stay his direct appeal pending various 
other motions in the trial court. 
 
In 2013, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction 
testing for four cigarette butts pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, 
which the trial judge denied.  The defendant appealed.  We 
allowed the defendant's motion to stay his direct appeal, as 
well as his motion to proceed with that appeal, and ultimately, 
we affirmed the judge's denial on November 6, 2017.  See 
Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 292 (2017). 
 
9 "Screw" refers to the defendant's sister's partner, Everol 
Bartlett.  Wolfe was also known as Horace Richards.  In 
10 
 
 
The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant 
acted alone.  Conversely, the defendant's theory was that the 
defendant was present, but that Ayah and Quentin jointly 
murdered the victim without informing the defendant of their 
intent to do so.  The defendant did not mention Screw at trial, 
or in any of the three versions of events he told the police. 
On appeal, however, the defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth improperly failed to investigate the allegations 
contained in the FBI report that the defendant was not alone at 
the time of the murder, and the Commonwealth knew or should have 
known that its theory that the defendant acted alone was false 
or misleading.  The defendant contends that those errors 
violated his due process rights and entitle him to a new trial. 
a.  Failure to investigate.  The Commonwealth had no 
obligation to investigate the FBI report.  "While the 
prosecution remains obligated to disclose all exculpatory 
evidence in its possession, it is under no duty to gather 
evidence" or to conduct further investigation "that may be 
potentially helpful to the defense."  Commonwealth v. Wright, 
479 Mass. 124, 140 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Lapage, 435 
                     
addition, according to the defendant's brother's statement to 
police, the defendant told his brother about Screw's involvement 
in the murder in June 1999, which was several months before the 
defendant first spoke to the police and before the FBI 
interviewed Wolfe. 
11 
 
Mass. 480, 488 (2001).  As quoted above, the FBI report 
references that Screw told Wolfe that the defendant shot the 
victim, and that Screw witnessed the murder.  Nonetheless, 
assuming, without deciding, that the FBI report constitutes 
exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor satisfied his legal duty by 
providing the report to the defense prior to trial. 
b.  False or misleading theory.  "There is no doubt that 
the defendant would be entitled to relief if the prosecution 
'deliberately presented a false picture of the facts, either by 
knowingly using perjured testimony, failing to correct testimony 
when it became apparent that it was false, or actively 
suppressing evidence known to be exculpatory'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Earl, 362 Mass. 11, 15 n.4 (1972).  
Here, however, the Commonwealth did not present or fail to 
correct any false testimony. 
So long as the prosecutor abides by his or her duty to 
provide the defendant with any material, exculpatory information 
within the Commonwealth's possession or control, see 
Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 56 (2018), nothing requires 
the prosecutor to present that evidence to the jury.  Contrary 
to the defendant's assertion, omitting evidence that helps the 
defendant and that counters the prosecutor's theory of the case 
does not equate to presenting or failing to correct false 
testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 363 
12 
 
(2004) ("It was not the prosecutor's duty to try the defendant's 
case for him by attempting to impeach the testimony of the 
Commonwealth's own witnesses with cryptic and inconclusive 
documents in the defense counsel's possession").  The prosecutor 
satisfied his legal obligation. 
2.  Lay witness testimony.  During trial, the Commonwealth 
called Marshall and Marshall's fiancée, Nicole Wilson, to 
testify as to their encounters with the victim and defendant at 
around the time of the murder.  The defendant argues that 
several statements made by these witnesses lacked personal 
knowledge and improperly commented on the defendant's guilt; 
thus, the testimony prejudicially encroached on the jury's fact-
finding duty and violated the defendant's due process rights. 
a.  Personal knowledge.  During trial, both Marshall and 
Wilson testified that the defendant was the last person with the 
victim.  Marshall first testified that on the day the victim 
went missing, he had repeatedly called and paged the defendant 
because the defendant "was the last one with my cousin."  
Marshall also testified that he brought the defendant over to 
speak to the victim's girlfriend, telling her "this is the last 
guy that was with [the victim]."  Later, Wilson testified that 
she "knew [the defendant] was the last person with [the 
victim]."  Specifically, the defendant argues that through these 
13 
 
statements, the witnesses testified, without personal knowledge, 
that the defendant was the last person to see the victim alive. 
Lay witnesses may only testify regarding matters within 
their personal knowledge.  See Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 
600, 606, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 602 (2020).  Viewed in the context of Marshall's entire 
testimony, however, Marshall's first statement was part of his 
explanation as to why he repeatedly called the defendant after 
the victim did not return the Toyota –- because the defendant 
was the last person Marshall saw with the defendant.  Marshall's 
second contested statement and Wilson's contested statement were 
part of their respective explanations as to why Marshall asked 
the defendant to speak to the victim's girlfriend –- because 
they sought any additional information about the victim's 
whereabouts.  Moreover, at the time Marshall tried to contact 
the defendant, and at the time both Marshall and Wilson 
ultimately spoke with the defendant, neither Marshall nor Wilson 
knew the victim had been killed, as the police had not yet 
discovered his body.  It was therefore clear to the jury that 
Marshall and Wilson did not have personal knowledge of the 
events that gave rise to the victim's death.  There was no 
reversible error. 
b.  Culpability.  Marshall also testified that he had 
previously referred to the defendant as the "guy . . . who 
14 
 
killed my cousin."10  This evidence was inadmissible.  See 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 694 (2011) (error to 
permit witness to opine as to defendant's culpability).  See 
also Mass. G. Evid. § 704 (2020).  However, there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  It would 
have been obvious to the jury, as well as to all counsel and the 
judge, that the witness had no personal knowledge as to who shot 
the victim.  The testimony, however, occurred during defense 
counsel's cross-examination, and defense counsel neither moved 
to strike the answer nor moved to request a curative 
instruction.  Considering that the witness's nonresponsive 
answer demonstrated the witness's bias against the defendant, 
there were strategic reasons for allowing the answer to remain.  
We conclude that this inadmissible evidence did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.11 
                     
10 Marshall said this in response to defense counsel's 
question regarding the content of Marshall's adopted statement 
made to police.  Specifically, defense counsel asked Marshall to 
explain what Marshall meant when he told the police that the 
victim told him "the scoop" about why the victim and the 
defendant were going to meet the cocaine dealer alone. 
 
11 As stated, the judge would have recognized that neither 
Marshall nor Wilson had personal knowledge as to who shot the 
victim.  It is unrealistic in this context, however, to expect 
the judge to interrupt counsel during cross-examination merely 
because the case may one day be reviewed under a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard.  There is 
something to be said for letting lawyers try their cases. 
15 
 
Finally, Marshall's testimony was but one piece of evidence 
in an otherwise ornate puzzle.  Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the defendant admitted 
to being present at the time of the murder, to owning and 
disposing of the murder weapon, and to using the victim's cell 
phone after the murder.  The police found the defendant's mail 
in the Toyota, and the victim's blood was found on the 
defendant's boots, which the defendant admitted he was wearing 
during the murder.  As such, we are convinced that "stripping 
the improper testimony from the other evidence, the judgment was 
not substantially swayed by the error" (quotation omitted).  
Perez, 460 Mass. at 695, quoting Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 
Mass. 461, 468 (2000). 
3.  Closing argument.  The defendant next argues that the 
prosecutor made several improper statements during his closing 
argument, violating the defendant's due process rights.  Because 
the defendant did not object at trial, we review any error for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 417 (2020).  We consider 
statements made during closing argument "in the context of the 
whole argument, the evidence admitted at trial, and the judge's 
instructions to the jury."  Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 Mass. 
359, 368 (2009). 
16 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly invited 
an inference of guilt based on the defendant's court room 
behavior.  During his closing argument, the prosecutor referred 
to the defendant's testimony as "stone cold," and given without 
"emotion" and without "indication of remorse . . . [or] regret."  
Ultimately, the prosecutor drew a comparison between the 
defendant's demeanor while testifying and the manner in which 
the victim was killed:  "I purport to you, ladies and gentlemen, 
no emotion.  He was stone cold, just as stone cold as the 
shooting and the death of [the victim]."  These statements were 
improper.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900, 907 (1983) 
(no error for prosecutor to point out that, as jury observed, 
defendant, who did not testify, "squirm[ed] and smirk[ed] and 
laugh[ed]" during trial). 
Prosecutors may "properly attack" a testifying defendant's 
credibility, see Commonwealth v. Donovan, 422 Mass. 349, 357 
(1996), and such an attack may include comments on the 
defendant's demeanor on the witness stand, see Commonwealth v. 
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 521 (1987).  Prosecutors may not, however, 
extrapolate from that demeanor and argue that the jury should 
then draw an inference as to the defendant's conduct during the 
17 
 
alleged incident.12  Here, however, in at least one sentence of 
the closing, the prosecutor's improper link between the 
defendant's "stone cold" and emotionless testimony at trial and 
the "stone cold" nature of the killing went beyond benign 
comments on the defendant's credibility.  See id. at 523-524 
(improper and unfair for prosecutor to draw inference of guilt 
based on "prosecutor's perception of the defendant's [sorrowful] 
expression when the victim testified"); Commonwealth v. 
Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 9-10 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 
(1977) (error for prosecutor to reference "absence of remorse," 
as it was both immaterial and inappropriate).  There was no 
evidence as to the defendant's demeanor when he killed the 
victim. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the error did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 479 Mass. 764, 776 (2018).  The 
prosecutor's characterizations comprised only two sentences of 
his thirty-two page closing argument.  Moreover, the judge 
                     
12 Prosecutors may comment on a defendant's general 
appearance in closing, to the extent it is relevant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 532-533, 535 (1983) 
(permissible to comment on defendant's changed hairstyle between 
crime and trial, but improper for prosecutor to imply defendant 
did not wear short-sleeved shirts during trial to try to conceal 
his hairy arms where witness testified that suspect had hairy 
arms).  But see Commonwealth v. Young, 399 Mass. 527, 529 (1987) 
(improper to argue negative inference against defendant "from 
the fact that he sat quietly throughout the trial"). 
18 
 
provided three separate instructions to the jury that closing 
arguments were not evidence, including a thorough instruction 
just prior to closing arguments.  We must presume the jury 
understood those instructions.  See Andre, 484 Mass. at 418.  We 
conclude that the prosecutor's statements were "unlikely to have 
influenced the jury's ultimate decision," see Commonwealth v. 
Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 118 (2018), especially given the weight 
of the evidence against the defendant, as described supra.13 
4.  Jury instructions.  The defendant next argues that the 
judge's jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and 
inferences were incomplete,14 thereby decreasing the 
                     
13 The defendant also makes a passing argument that the 
prosecutor improperly referred to Ayah and Quentin as "mystery 
men," thereby mocking the defendant's testimony.  The defendant 
testified that while he did not know Ayah and Quentin's last 
names, he knew how to contact Ayah and he knew the address of 
the house where he had originally met both Ayah and Quentin.  
Despite this knowledge, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the defendant did not provide the 
police with more than their general physical descriptions.  The 
prosecutor's "mystery men" statements were accurate and within 
the bounds of a proper closing argument. 
 
14 As to the circumstantial evidence instruction, the 
defendant contends that the judge should have included language 
that states that where the Commonwealth's case is based solely 
on circumstantial evidence, the jury "may find the defendant 
guilty only if those circumstances are conclusive enough to 
leave you with a moral certainty –- a subjective state of near 
certitude –- that the defendant is guilty and that there is no 
other reasonable explanation of the facts as proven." 
 
As to the inference instruction, the defendant contends 
that the judge should have included language that states that 
19 
 
Commonwealth's burden of proof.15  While the language the 
defendant asserts should have been included comprises accurate 
statements of the law, we have never said, and we do not now 
say, that such language is required. 
When determining whether a jury instruction "lowers the 
criminal standard of proof, we consider the charge, taken as a 
whole, and assess the possible impact of [an] alleged error on 
the deliberations of a reasonable juror, i.e., whether a 
reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly" 
(quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Silva, 482 Mass. 275, 288 
(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 27 (1996).  
"This inquiry is not purely speculative but, rather, must be 
supported by some evidence in the record."  Silva, supra.  "A 
judge need not use any particular words in instructing the jury 
as long as the legal concepts are properly described."  
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 8 (2007). 
                     
"[i]n order to convict the defendant, you must find that all of 
the evidence and reasonable inferences that you have drawn, 
taken together, prove he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
 
15 In Commonwealth v. Bush, 427 Mass. 26, 32 n.4 (1998), we 
concluded that the trial judge adequately cured any possible 
error in the jury instructions by instructing the jury that 
"[t]he evidence must not only be consistent with the defendant's 
guilt, it must be inconsistent with his innocence" (citation 
omitted).  To the extent the defendant argues that in purely 
circumstantial evidence cases such an instruction is mandatory, 
he is incorrect.  The defendant cites to no cases, nor have we 
found any, in which we held as much. 
20 
 
"Taken as a whole, the judge's instructions on 
circumstantial evidence and inferences 'correctly stated the 
relevant principles and essentially cautioned the jury to be 
sure of the strength and logic of any inferences they drew.'"  
Silva, 482 Mass. at 290, quoting Commonwealth v. Schand, 420 
Mass. 783, 795 (1995).  As the defendant concedes, the judge 
properly defined both direct and circumstantial evidence.16  The 
judge then correctly defined the nature of an inference and 
properly instructed the jury that they "may draw [an] inference 
even if it is not necessary or inescapable, so long as it is 
reasonable and warranted by the evidence."17  See Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 407 Mass. 84, 89 (1990), S.C., 414 Mass. 123 
(1993).  See also Commonwealth v. Pires, 389 Mass. 657, 664 
(1983) ("nature of an inference . . . [is] a concept intimately 
related to circumstantial evidence").  Finally, the judge 
                     
16 The judge stated as follows: 
 
"Direct evidence is when a witness testifies to something 
they heard, saw, or somehow sensed.  The only question that 
you must resolve in your mind is whether or not you believe 
that witness. 
 
"You have circumstantial evidence, where no witness can 
testify directly about the fact that is to be proven but 
you are presented with evidence of other facts and then 
asked to draw reasonable inferences from them about the 
fact that is to be proved." 
 
17 Contrary to the defendant's contention otherwise, the 
judge did instruct the jury "not to decide this case based on 
suspicion or conjecture." 
21 
 
provided a detailed and proper description of the Commonwealth's 
burden to prove the elements of the charged offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, adhering to the then complete Webster 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 319-320 
(1850), modified by Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477 
(2015) (adding definition of "moral certainty" to Webster 
instruction).  There was no error. 
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant next 
asserts that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel 
because his trial counsel failed to investigate possible third-
party culprit evidence.  We review claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in cases of murder in the first degree for 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 745-746 (2017). 
The defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to "make 
reasonable inquiries" into the allegations contained in the FBI 
report, which indicated that the defendant was not at the crime 
scene alone, as well as to investigate the knowledge of the 
defendant's brother regarding the other potential individuals 
involved.  We conclude that the defendant's trial counsel did 
not provide ineffective assistance.18 
                     
18 The defendant also filed a motion for a new trial on 
similar grounds, which the trial judge denied.  As discussed 
infra, the defendant did not raise the denial of that motion in 
his appeal. 
22 
 
Contrary to the defendant's contention that his trial 
counsel "did nothing," the record indicates that the defendant's 
investigator followed up on the FBI report both before and 
during trial.  The defendant has failed to present evidence as 
to how further investigation into a largely inculpatory document 
"might have accomplished something material for the defense."19  
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977).  
Regarding the possibly helpful testimony of the defendant's 
brother, the defendant cites to a police report, which contains 
a summary of the police's interview with the defendant's 
brother.  In that police report, however, the author explicitly 
states that the knowledge of the defendant's brother regarding 
the murder is based solely on what the defendant previously told 
his brother.  Moreover, the defendant fails to assert how trial 
counsel's failure to elicit the testimony of the defendant's 
brother regarding his knowledge of other potentially involved 
individuals created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
Trial counsel presented a complete and thorough defense, 
contending that Ayah and Quentin, not the defendant, committed 
                     
19 By way of example only, the defendant has never submitted 
an affidavit from Wolfe's counsel as to the content of Wolfe's 
proffer to Federal law enforcement or how to decipher counsel's 
notes. 
23 
 
the murder.  The jury's rejection of the defense was due to 
"weaknesses in the facts rather than any inadequacy of counsel."  
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 383 Mass. 520, 528 (1981), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 33 (1980).20 
6.  Posttrial discovery.  a.  Procedural history.  The 
defendant filed two motions for posttrial discovery and a motion 
to reconsider the denial of his first posttrial discovery 
motion, among other motions.21  In support of those motions, the 
                     
20 The defendant also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to object to the improper lay opinion 
testimony, to the prosecutor's references to the defendant as 
"stone cold," and to the judge's instructions on circumstantial 
evidence.  Because we already concluded that these prior 
allegations of error either did not amount to error or did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, 
these claims similarly do not amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 431 Mass. 168, 185 
(2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Kosilek, 423 Mass. 449, 457-458 
(1996) ("[I]f an error not objected to by trial counsel does not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, 
. . . a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect 
to such error will not succeed"). 
 
21 The defendant also filed a motion for a new trial in 
2004, which the trial judge denied.  In 2018, the defendant 
included that denial in his motion to reconsider, the subsequent 
denial of which he appealed.  Here, the defendant does not 
address his 2004 motion for a new trial, nor that aspect of his 
2018 motion to reconsider.  Pursuant to our § 33E review, we 
conclude that the trial judge did not err in denying those 
motions. 
 
We understand that appellate counsel now asserts that the 
defendant's first version of events concerning the murder was 
arguably consistent with the FBI report.  That version of 
events, in which Screw was the perpetrator, is different from 
the defendant's own trial testimony.  While this theory may be 
24 
 
defendant primarily relied on three documents:  the FBI report, 
a 140-page affidavit in support of a Federal search warrant from 
an unrelated Federal narcotics case (Federal search warrant 
affidavit), and handwritten notes attributed to Wolfe's attorney 
(attorney's notes).  As stated supra, the FBI report contained 
Wolfe's statements to investigators that Screw told Wolfe that 
Screw had witnessed the defendant kill the victim.  The Federal 
search warrant affidavit pertained to a Federal narcotics 
investigation into Wolfe, and while it mentioned Ayah and Screw, 
it did not mention the murder.  The nearly illegible attorney's 
notes appeared to state that Screw said Screw killed someone 
named DJ and that the defendant was with him when that occurred. 
In 2004, the defendant moved for posttrial discovery of 
"any and all [documents] in the possession of the federal 
authorities" in which Wolfe is mentioned, arguing that the FBI 
report and the Federal search warrant affidavit demonstrated 
that the Federal authorities possessed exculpatory evidence.  
The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that the defendant 
failed to show that "further discovery or investigation would 
                     
pursued in a renewed motion for a new trial, trial counsel can 
hardly be faulted for not pursuing a theory different from his 
client's sworn testimony, and one emanating from an FBI report 
where a witness states that the defendant shot the victim. 
25 
 
produce anything helpful for his cause."  The defendant appealed 
from that denial.22 
In 2018, the defendant filed a second motion for posttrial 
discovery requesting from the Commonwealth information and 
documents pertaining to himself, the FBI report, and Screw, 
arguing that the Commonwealth either possessed or had access to 
certain evidence, including exculpatory evidence in the Federal 
government's possession.  In support of his contentions, the 
defendant again emphasized the FBI report and the attorney's 
notes.  In October 2018, a different motion judge denied the 
defendant's second motion for posttrial discovery, concluding 
that the information sought would not reasonably uncover 
evidence warranting a new trial.  The defendant appealed from 
both denials. 
b.  Analysis.  We review the denial of a motion for 
posttrial discovery for abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 598 (2015).  To succeed on a 
posttrial discovery motion, "a defendant must demonstrate that 
it is reasonably likely that such discovery will lead to 
evidence possibly warranting a new trial," and "the defendant 
                     
22 On June 25, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to 
reconsider the denial of his 2004 posttrial discovery motion, 
which the trial judge denied two days later, concluding that the 
defendant did not raise any new claims that warranted 
reconsideration. 
26 
 
must make a prima facie showing that the evidence sought would 
have materially benefited the defense and would have factored 
into the jury's deliberations."  Id.  "A defendant cannot use a 
motion for postconviction discovery to engage in a 'fishing 
expedition.'"  Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 85, 94 (2015), 
quoting E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 42:30 
(4th ed. 2014). 
Neither judge abused his or her discretion in denying the 
defendant's motions.  The defendant has not alleged any facts 
amounting to a prima facie showing that the requested evidence 
would exculpate him.  To the contrary, the documents upon which 
the defendant relies either inculpate him or do not reference 
the murder,23 and are overwhelmingly based on second- or even 
third-level hearsay.  Moreover, the defendant makes no showing 
that the Commonwealth has access to any exculpatory Federal 
documents.  See Ayala, 481 Mass. at 58 (defendant "has not 
produced any evidence that the redacted portions of the file 
contained any relevant, let alone exculpatory, information").  
In sum, the defendant fails to show that the evidence sought 
would have "materially benefited the defense and would have 
                     
23 In his affidavit, the defendant acknowledged that the 
Federal search warrant affidavit is devoid of any information 
pertaining to the murder. 
27 
 
factored into the jury's deliberations."  Camacho, 472 Mass. at 
598. 
7.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record of this case pursuant to our responsibilities 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We conclude that there is no basis 
for ordering a new trial and affirm the defendant's conviction 
and the orders denying his postconviction motions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.