Title: State v. King

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. King (2003-468); 179 Vt. 400; 897 A.2d 543

2006 VT 18

[Filed 24-Feb-2006]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 04-Apr-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 18

                                No. 2003-468


  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Mark King	                                 October Term, 2005


  Brian L. Burgess, J.

  Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
    Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
    General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Zimmerman, D.J.,
            and Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   In this appeal, defendant asserts that the
  trial court erred in sentencing him to twenty-seven to thirty years in
  prison after he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and first-degree
  aggravated domestic assault.  He contends that the court's decision is not
  supported by the evidence.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  Defendant was charged with second-degree murder in April 1998
  for causing the death of his girlfriend, Caroline Critchfield, by
  throttling her and striking her in the head.  The victim, who was eight
  inches shorter than defendant and fifty pounds lighter, suffered extensive
  physical injuries; she ultimately died from numerous blows to the head. 
  Defendant maintained that the victim had provoked him by pretending to kiss
  him and then biting down on his lip.  

       ¶  3.  In January 2003, the parties entered into a plea agreement. 
  The State amended the information from second-degree murder to two counts:
  voluntary manslaughter and first-degree aggravated assault.  Defendant
  agreed to plead guilty to these charges and the State agreed that at the
  sentencing hearing, it would be capped at arguing for an aggregate sentence
  of twenty-seven to thirty years to serve.  Defendant was free to argue for
  less.  The agreement provided:    

      The Defendant understands that the State will argue at sentencing
    that the Defendant's conduct constituted 2d Degree Murder in that
    he acted with wanton disregard for the likelihood that his conduct
    would naturally cause the death of Caroline Critchfield. 
    Defendant understands further that if the Court accepts the
    State's argument, Defendant may receive a minimum sentence
    warranted for 2d degree murder (up to 27 years).

      The State understands that the Defendant intends to argue at
    sentencing that his conduct constituted manslaughter.  The State
    understands further that if the Court accepts the Defendant's
    argument, Defendant may receive a sentence warranted for
    manslaughter.    

  In a separate pleading, defendant recognized that the State would seek a
  twenty-seven to thirty-year aggregate sentence at sentencing, which the
  State contended was consistent with a sentence for second-degree murder. 
  Defendant also acknowledged that if the State proved by a preponderance of
  the evidence that a sentence consistent with second-degree murder was
  warranted, the court could impose such a sentence. 
   
       ¶  4.  The State indicated that it entered into the plea agreement
  because it was concerned that a jury might compromise on a verdict and
  credit defendant's claims of provocation.  If defendant was found guilty of
  manslaughter rather than murder, the maximum sentence that he could receive
  would be fifteen years.  Under the plea agreement, and because defendant
  pled guilty to two offenses, the State was entitled to argue for
  twenty-seven to thirty years to serve, which in effect gave it the right to
  argue for a second-degree murder sentence.  The State, in turn, gave up its
  right to argue for a much lengthier sentence if defendant was convicted of
  second-degree murder.  Defendant indicated a similar understanding of the
  plea agreement, and he also recognized that, to his benefit, he could no
  longer be sentenced to life in prison for causing the victim's death. 

       ¶  5.  Defendant did not testify at the sentencing hearing, and both
  parties relied on statements that defendant made to emergency room
  personnel and police shortly after the killing.  The trial court found that
  defendant had given varying versions of what had occurred, and his story
  changed as he was confronted with additional physical evidence of the
  victim's injuries.  In his first statement, which he made to an emergency
  room physician, defendant indicated that the victim had fallen asleep on
  the couch after they had returned home from a bar.  Defendant said that
  when he went to check on her, she leaned forward and bit him; he hit her
  once in response.  When defendant checked on her again later, he could not
  wake her up.  He brought the victim to the emergency room, indicating that
  she had overdosed on drugs. 
   
       ¶  6.  In his second statement, given to police shortly after he
  brought the victim to the emergency room, defendant described the victim
  storming around the apartment.  He stated that when he went into the living
  room, the victim approached him as if to give him a hug, and then she moved
  forward and bit him on the lip and would not let go.  Defendant stated that
  he hit her once in the face, and the punch occurred in a doorway between
  the living room and the bedroom.  When police asked defendant about
  bruising on the side of the victim's head, defendant stated that he was
  certain that he struck the victim only once.  He insisted that he did not
  grab the victim's throat but instead pushed her one time.  When police
  asked defendant why the victim's apparent injuries exceeded the scenario
  that he described, defendant stated that he had nothing whatsoever to add.  

       ¶  7.  Defendant was then advised that he was under arrest for
  second-degree murder, and he declared that he "sincerely" and "honestly"
  hadn't done anything and he hadn't beaten the victim.  When he was informed
  that the victim had also been choked, defendant stated he hadn't choked
  her, and that "honestly," all he had done was push her away.  Defendant
  then said that he might have pushed the victim away by pushing on her
  shoulders but not her neck; he later stated that it was possible that he
  had pushed her on the neck.

       ¶  8.  Later that day, defendant gave a third statement to police,
  which he initiated.  He stated that the victim rose up and bit him on the
  lip and that he "pushed, I hit, no, I didn't choke her.  No I didn't."  He
  added that his arm was around her neck as he pushed her away, and the
  victim was clawing at him.  He stated that he punched the victim in the
  nose, and he then fell backwards into the bedroom.  The victim got up first
  and came toward him, clawing at him.  Defendant thought that he then
  grabbed her around the neck.  He spun her around and he came down on top of
  her.  He stated that her head hit the floor, probably on her side, and he
  indicated that he was defending himself.  Defendant told police that he
  assumed that everything was fine and the victim had then gone to the couch. 
  When he found her later that night, he thought that she had overdosed and
  choked on her own vomit.  
   
       ¶  9.  The trial court found defendant's version of events
  incredible and grossly inconsistent with the victim's injuries.  The court
  explained that, in addition to the strangulation trauma to Ms.
  Critchfield's neck and throat, she suffered some thirty traumas to her
  arms, back, forehead, back of her head, eyes, nose, mouth, and jaw.  These
  included: nine impact injuries on her arms; three impacts on her head and
  forehead from her head being pushed into a rug; three major impacts to the
  back of her head; two black eyes; a split eyelid, which was not caused by
  her face hitting the rug; a cut nose-bridge; two major impacts to her
  mouth; and at least two major impacts to her jaw.  The court found that
  these injuries did not result from a single blow to the nose, a push, a
  head-lock, and a fall on her head.  Even assuming secondary impacts from
  being pushed down once and falling down once, defendant's story fell far
  short of explaining the totality of the victim's injuries.  The court also
  found defendant's version of where the incident occurred inconsistent with
  the State's evidence that the victim's blood, torn clothing, and necklace
  were found in various rooms throughout the apartment. 
   
       ¶  10.  The court found that defendant had obviously and repeatedly
  lied in his statements to emergency room personnel and police, and it found
  defendant's assertion that he had been provoked by the victim no less
  self-serving and exculpatory than any of his other demonstrated falsehoods
  about what happened that night.  The court thus concluded that a
  preponderance of the evidence showed that defendant's claim of being bitten
  first was a lie and the logical inference was that defendant had not been
  provoked to beat the victim as the result of a first bite.  Consequently,
  for purposes of the plea agreement, defendant's intentional killing of Ms.
  Critchfield was not mitigated by actual provocation and it constituted
  second-degree murder.  The court considered the sentencing factors set
  forth in the second-degree murder statute and concluded that the murder was
  particularly severe, brutal, and cruel.  It further concluded that, under
  the sentencing structure of 13 V.S.A. § 2303, this major aggravating
  factor, with no substantial mitigation, would support an increase in the
  twenty-year minimum prescribed for second-degree murder.  It thus found
  that the State's request for a twenty-seven to thirty-year aggregate
  sentence was justified.  Accordingly, it sentenced defendant to fourteen to
  fifteen years for voluntary manslaughter, and thirteen to fifteen years for
  first-degree aggravated domestic assault, to be served consecutively. 
  Defendant appealed. 
   
       ¶  11.  On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
  finding that he committed second-degree murder rather than manslaughter. 
  We note, however, that defendant was not sentenced for second-degree murder
  under 13 V.S.A. § 2303(b).  Instead, he received a sentence that was
  consistent with the statutory penalties for the two crimes that he admitted
  committing-first-degree aggravated domestic assault and voluntary
  manslaughter.  The first-degree aggravated domestic assault charge was
  based on defendant's act of strangling the victim-the victim suffered
  external and deep internal injuries to her neck and damage to her hyoid
  bone when strangled by defendant.  The evidence also demonstrated that the
  victim had been severely beaten.  Defendant did not bring the victim to the
  hospital right away, and it may have taken at least one hour or possibly
  two before the victim died from the blows to her head.  Indeed, when
  defendant finally did take the victim to the hospital, he stopped to buy
  cigarettes on the way.  The evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing
  plainly supported the imposition of the maximum statutory penalty for
  voluntary manslaughter and first-degree aggravated domestic assault. 
  Because defendant received a sentence that was within the statutory limits
  and within the boundaries of the plea agreement as to both the charges and
  the range of potential sentences, it is difficult to see how defendant
  suffered any harm.  See State v. Cyr, 141 Vt. 355, 358,