Title: Chambers County Com'rs v. Walker

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

459 So. 2d 861 (1984)
CHAMBERS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
v.
Jon Tracy WALKER, et al.
83-508.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 28, 1984.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing October 26, 1984.
*863 Robert M. Girardeau of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, Birmingham, for appellant.
W.F. Horsley of Samford, Denson, Horsley, Pettey, Martin & Barrett, Opelika, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
Defendants-intervenors, the Chambers County Commissioners (Commissioners), appeal from the grant of plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment and the court's dismissal of the first lawsuit arising out of an automobile accident. We reverse and remand.
On February 2, 1979, automobiles driven by Jon Tracy Walker and Steve Lamar Green were involved in a collision around 10:00 p.m. on Chambers County Road 87, near Fairfax, Alabama. Jon Tracy Walker suffered severe injuries in the accident. Both drivers were minors at the time.
On February 4, 1980, Jon Tracy Walker, suing through his parents, Johnny M. and Barbara L. Walker, and joined by his parents suing individually, brought an action against defendants Steve Lamar Green and his father, William T. Green. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged negligent and wanton conduct on the part of Steve Lamar Green; however, they did not state a cause of action against William T. Green, although plaintiffs alleged he was the "owner of the vehicle operated by Steve Lamar Green" and demanded "judgment against the Defendants."
Several events and transactions concerning this first lawsuit occurred on March 28, 1980: plaintiffs' counsel was appointed guardian ad litem for Jon Tracy Walker; a settlement agreement was reached between the parties; and a release in full was executed. After a pro ami hearing, a judgment based on the settlement agreement was also entered on March 28 in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,331. The record indicates that this amount was paid into court on March 28, 1980, and disbursed on April 16, 1980, in two separate checks: one paid to Johnny Walker and Barbara Lynn Walker in the amount of $7,331, and one paid to Barbara Lynn Walker in the amount of $10,000.
In a second action filed December 18, 1981, against the Commissioners, plaintiffs alleged negligence and wantonness in the county's construction, operation, and maintenance of the intersection near where the automobile accident sub judice occurred. The Commissioners moved for summary judgment in this second action, citing as grounds satisfaction of the prior judgment and the release in full executed by plaintiffs.
Later, on March 28, 1983, pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 60(b)(6), A.R.Civ.P., plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from or revision of the judgment entered in the first action exactly three years earlier on March 28, 1980. Thereafter, on May 11, 1983, the trial court permitted the Commissioners to intervene in the plaintiffs' motion, and, on June 20, 1983, consolidated the first action and the second action for all pre-trial proceedings only.
Following a hearing on September 26, 1983, during which evidence and arguments were presented on both the Commissioners' motion for summary judgment in the second action and plaintiffs' motion for relief from or revision of the judgment in the first action, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion by the following order entered January 24, 1984:
From this, we may assume that the trial court also entered an order denying the Commissioners' summary judgment motion, although an order to that effect is not contained in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, it is from the grant of plaintiffs' motion that the Commissioners appeal.[1]
The first argument advanced by the Commissioners is that the trial court granted to the plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and, in so doing, abused its discretion, because the grounds set forth by plaintiffs fall not under Rule 60(b)(6) but under Rule 60(b)(1), which carries with it a four-month time limitation. Rule 60(b), in pertinent part, is set forth below:
In their motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), plaintiffs alleged the following grounds:
We agree with the Commissioners in their contention that the grounds set forth *865 above, under Rule 60(b), except paragraph number six, amount to a claim of mistake and/or inadvertence on the part of plaintiffs' counsel as to the effect the settlement, release, and judgment in the first action would have on any subsequent suit plaintiffs sought to maintain against the Commissioners. Therefore, if plaintiffs' right of action against the Commissioners was not "adequately protected," it was due to the mistake and/or inadvertence of plaintiffs' counsel. Indeed, plaintiffs' counsel[2] as much as admitted this in response to questions asked by counsel for the Commissioners at the September 26, 1983, hearing on the motions:
The case of Williams v. Woodman, 424 So. 2d 611 (Ala.1982), referred to in the above quote by counsel for the Commissioners, held:
Furthermore, in addressing the grounds set forth in number six of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) motion, which seems to allege that plaintiffs received insufficient damages, we note that Woodman, supra, also makes it clear that the prior judgment operated as a bar to any subsequent action plaintiffs sought to maintain against the Commissioners, even if, as plaintiffs allege, "full compensation" was not received in the first action:
The categories for relief under Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive, and grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) cannot be valid grounds under Rule 60(b)(6), in the absence of aggravating circumstances sufficient to permit the trial court to say that the case is properly within 60(b)(6)(e.g., where a motion for relief is filed more than four months after dismissal of the case where the dismissal was the result of the mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect of counsel, but the delay in filing the motion for relief was due to the active misrepresentation by counsel to his client as to the status or progress of the case.) See Giles v. Giles, 404 So. 2d 649 (Ala.1981); *866 Charles Townsend Ford, Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 900 (Ala.Civ.App.1979).
The record clearly shows that plaintiffs were able to prove grounds for relief only under Rule 60(b)(1), and failed to show any aggravating circumstances elevating the grounds of mistake or inadvertence of counsel to such grounds requiring relief under Rule 60(b)(6). "Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, and is available only in cases of extreme hardship or injustice." Douglass v. Capital City Church of the Nazarene, 443 So. 2d 917, 920 (1983), citing Howell v. D.H. Holmes, Ltd., 420 So. 2d 26 (Ala.1982). Nor can Rule 60(b)(6) be used "for the purpose of relieving a party from the free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made. A party remains under a duty to take legal steps to protect his own interest." See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2864 at 214-215 (1973).
Moreover, the trial court in the prior action complied with the mandate of Abernathy v. Colbert County Hospital, 388 So. 2d 1207 (Ala.1980), that courts should not, pro forma, ratify pro ami settlements. That case held that a hearing is required to determine whether a settlement is in the best interests of the child, and that "[s]uch a hearing requires [an] ... extensive examination of the facts." 388 So. 2d  at 1209. The judgment in the initial action reflects the proper handling of a pro ami hearing, settlement, and judgment:
While we recognize that the decision to grant or deny a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is within the discretion of the trial court, and the standard of this Court's review is whether the trial court abused its discretion, this discretion, however, is not unbridled. Douglass v. Capital City Church of the Nazarene, supra; Giles v. Giles, supra. *867 On these facts we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Nor are we persuaded by plaintiffs' contention that the March 26, 1980, pro ami judgment was interlocutory under Rule 54(b), and therefore that this judgment was subject to revision at any time. Plaintiffs reason that because the judgment did not mention William Green, who was a named defendant, the judgment only adjudicated the liability of Steve Green, William Green's son. We disagree.
While it is true that neither the judgment nor the agreement of the parties, upon which the judgment was based, named William Green, the release in full does name William Green:
It is apparent from the record that the omission of William Green's name from the agreement and the judgment was a mere oversight. Contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, it appears from the record that they had no intention of pursuing a claim against William Green after receiving the money from the pro ami settlement judgment:
Plaintiffs took no steps whatsoever to pursue a claim against William Green during the three-year period between the time judgment on the settlement agreement was entered (March 28, 1980), and the time *868 plaintiffs sought relief from that judgment (March 28, 1983). It was only after the plaintiff learned that the pro ami settlement and judgment stood in the way of an action against the Commissioners that plaintiff decided to look for a way to avoid the judgment, e.g., lack of finality under Rule 54(b). As applied to these facts, we find the language of the Court in Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir.1973), appropriate.
Beyond this, we note that plaintiffs, in their motion for relief, requested either Rule 60(b)(6) relief from final judgment or Rule 54(b) revision of nonfinal judgment, but, in their brief in support of their motion, plaintiffs argued more strongly in favor of a Rule 54(b) revision by pointing out that Rule 60(b)(6) relief may be "premature." Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear from the trial court's order that it granted plaintiff relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See the trial court's order quoted above. Consequently, plaintiff's argument with respect to the application of Rule 54(b) to the judgment in the prior action is not well taken on this appeal. Considering the entire record, we conclude, therefore, that the parties and the court intended that the settlement judgment adjudicate all of the claims plaintiffs had against both defendants, father and son.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court setting aside the March 28, 1980, judgment and dismissing the case, and remand the cause with instructions that the judgment be reinstated. It is so ordered.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, JONES, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
BEATTY, Justice.
OPINION MODIFIED TO ADD FOOTNOTE; APPLICATION OVERRULED.
JONES, SHORES, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  We note that the appeal by the Commissioners from the relief granted to the plaintiffs, as opposed to a petition for a writ of mandamus, is appropriate here, since the judgment granting plaintiffs' motion and dismissing the first action operated as a final disposition of that case. See Littlefield v. Cupps, 371 So. 2d 51 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2871, at 260 n. 95 (1973).
[2]  We note that appellate counsel for Walker was not the attorney representing Walker in the trial court for purposes of the pro ami settlement.