Title: Modernage Furniture Corp. v. Miami Rug Company

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

84 So. 2d 916 (1955)
MODERNAGE FURNITURE CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellant,
v.
MIAMI RUG COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.
November 16, 1955.
Rehearing Denied December 20, 1955.
*917 L.J. Cushman, Broad & Cassel and Lewis Horwitz, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Breslow & Gelb, Miami, for appellee.
HOBSON, Justice.
Appellant, Modernage Furniture Corporation, brought this proceeding below for a declaration of its rights under a contract which it had entered with Miami Rug Company, appellee. The contract, a copy of which was attached to the complaint, commenced with the following recital:
It went on to provide terms and conditions under which the parties would conduct the sale of carpets. Critical provisions of the contract for purposes of this case, are as follows:
The complaint alleged that the appellant contemplated establishing a store in West Palm Beach and had decided to operate a carpet department of its own in that store; that appellee contends it is entitled to a rental agreement and that appellant cannot operate its own carpet department in the new store; and that a dispute has thus arisen between the parties as to the interpretation of the contract between them, insofar as it involves the operation of such carpet department. A motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state an actionable claim was granted by the court below and this appeal is taken from final judgment entered consequent thereupon.
*918 In Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, Fla., 56 So. 2d 445, we approved the following statement made by the Supreme Court of Alabama:
Thus as we view the case the only question presented on this appeal is whether or not a bona fide doubt as to construction of the contract, of a character sufficient to activate the processes of the court under our declaratory judgment statute, was shown to exist.
The statutory sections with which we are here concerned read, where pertinent, as follows:
The provisions of the contract which we have outlined above are in conflict. The "privilege of first refusal" clearly implies, as appellant contends, not a prohibition against the operation by Modernage of its own carpet department but rather that if a third party were to apply for such privilege it would first be offered to the Miami Rug Company. The "exclusive right" granted the Miami Rug Company in the succeeding paragraph, however, appears to prohibit Modernage from operating its own branch. This latter provision might clearly be controlling were it not for the preamble which we have reproduced above, which refers to the two stores which were operated in Miami by Modernage when the contract was entered.
Appellant takes the position that the "exclusive right" of Miami Rug Company to sell rugs in Modernage stores was intended to apply only to the two Miami stores referred to in the contract, and that stores to be subsequently established by Modernage were not within the contemplation of the parties. We can see in the conflict of these provisions the "dispute" alleged in the complaint and can understand that appellant might well have been in doubt as to its rights under this contract. Such provable doubt is sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within the quoted statute. It follows that the judgment appealed from should be and it is hereby reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
DREW, C.J., and THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.