Title: State v. Wells

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32, 2001-Ohio-3.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WELLS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Wells (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 32.] 
Criminal law — Sufficient evidence of anal intercourse, for purposes of the crime 
of anal rape under R.C. 2907.02, is present, when. 
(Nos. 00-357 and 00-415 — Submitted November 15, 2000 — Decided 
January 31, 2001). 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery 
County, No. 17501. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  On April 14, 1998, M. found the defendant, Thomas 
Randall Wells, who was renting a room from M., crouched over her seven-year-
old son, C.  After Wells realized that M. was present, he immediately jumped up 
and left for work.  When M. talked with her son after Wells left, C. indicated that 
Wells had been molesting him for months. 
 
On April 23, 1998, Wells was indicted on one count of attempted rape 
pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and 2923.02(A) and two counts of rape 
pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).  The bill of particulars revealed that one of the 
two rape counts involved oral sex and the other involved anal sex.  At trial C. 
testified that, among other things, Wells attempted to insert his penis into C.’s 
anus but was unable to.  C. further testified that Wells did touch his buttocks with 
his penis.  At his first trial, the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on Count 
One (attempted rape), and the jury deadlocked and was unable to reach a verdict 
as to the remaining counts.  Following his second trial, Wells was convicted of 
both the oral and anal rape of C. 
 
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
for anal rape, finding that the state failed to prove penetration into C.’s anal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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cavity, and remanded for a finding of guilt for the crime of attempted anal rape.  
The court of appeals concluded that without evidence to show that the defendant’s 
penis penetrated the victim’s anus, the defendant could be found guilty only of the 
crime of attempted anal rape.  The court of appeals certified its judgment to be in 
conflict with a judgment of the First District Court of Appeals.  The issue certified 
by the court of appeals is as follows: “Bearing in mind that ‘penetration, however 
slight, is sufficient to complete anal intercourse’ – R.C. 2907.01(A) – is there 
sufficient evidence of anal intercourse where the evidence shows at most that the 
defendant’s penis was inserted between the victim’s buttocks, and the evidence 
fails to show that the defendant’s penis actually penetrated the victim’s anus 
itself?” 
 
The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists, and also upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
The issue we are asked to decide requires an interpretation of R.C. 
2907.01(A), which states that “[p]enetration, however slight, is sufficient to 
complete * * * anal intercourse.”  The specific question presented is whether there 
is sufficient evidence of anal intercourse where the evidence shows, at the most, 
that the defendant’s penis was inserted between the victim’s buttocks, and the 
evidence fails to show that the defendant’s penis penetrated the victim’s anus 
itself.  For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
The Ohio rape statute provides: 
 
“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another * * * when any of 
the following applies: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the 
offender knows the age of the other person.”  R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). 
 
The term “sexual conduct” is defined as “vaginal intercourse between a 
male and a female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons 
January Term, 2001 
 
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regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of 
any part of the body * * * into the vaginal or anal cavity of another.”  R.C. 
2907.01(A).  The question before us asks what the General Assembly intended 
through its use of the phrase “anal cavity.” 
 
In cases of statutory construction, the words used in a statute will be 
accorded their common, everyday meaning unless a contrary intent is expressed.  
R.C. 1.42; Lake Cty. Natl. Bank of Painesville v. Kosydar (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 
189, 191, 65 O.O.2d 404, 406, 305 N.E.2d 799, 801.  To determine the common, 
everyday meaning of a word, we have consistently used dictionary definitions.  
See Ritchey Produce Co., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
194, 272-273, 707 N.E.2d 871, 926-927.  When we look both to dictionary 
definitions and other provisions within R.C. Chapter 2907, it is evident that the 
General Assembly did not intend for contact with the buttocks alone to be 
sufficient to complete the act of anal rape. 
 
R.C. 2907.01(A) addresses insertion of any part of the body into the anal 
cavity of another.  The common, everyday meaning of “cavity” is “a natural 
hollow place within the body.”  (Emphasis added.)  Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3 Ed.1991) 224.  It would necessarily follow, therefore, that the term 
“anal cavity” makes reference to the lower portion of the alimentary canal and not 
the buttocks, which are not “within the body.”  Further, the term “intercourse” is 
defined as “the sexual joining of two individuals.”  Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3 Ed.1991) 703.  When the phrases “anal intercourse” and “anal 
cavity” in R.C. 2907.01(A) are read together (i.e., a sexual joining with the anal 
cavity), it is apparent that penetration into the anal cavity occurs when some part 
of the body or any other item is inserted into the anus. 
 
Apart from dictionary definitions, we are also able to discern the intent of 
the General Assembly from other provisions of R.C. Chapter 2907.  The gross 
sexual imposition statute states: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“No person shall have sexual contact with another * * * when any of the 
following applies: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen years 
of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.”  R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4). 
 
“Sexual contact” means “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, 
including without limitation the thigh, genitals, [or] buttock * * * for the purpose 
of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2907.01(B).  The General Assembly has already, therefore, made provision for an 
instance where an offender makes contact only with the buttocks. 
 
In general, statutes will be construed to avoid unreasonable or absurd 
consequences.  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 
382, 384, 18 OBR 437, 439, 481 N.E.2d 632, 634.  Moreover, we are constrained 
by R.C. 2901.04(A) to liberally construe the statute in favor of the accused.  To 
define the phrase “anal cavity” to include the buttocks would be to subject an 
offender committing only one criminal act to prosecution under two different 
criminal provisions, one a first-degree felony, see R.C. 2907.02(B), and the other 
a third-degree felony, see R.C. 2907.05(B).  It is doubtful that the General 
Assembly could have intended such an unreasonable consequence. 
 
Based on all of the foregoing, we hold that there is sufficient evidence of 
anal intercourse, for purposes of the crime of anal rape under R.C. 2907.02, where 
the trier of fact finds that the defendant penetrated, however slightly, the victim’s 
anus with any part of the defendant’s body, or with any instrument, apparatus, or 
other object.  If the evidence shows that the defendant made contact only with the 
victim’s buttocks, there is not sufficient evidence to prove the defendant guilty of 
the crime of anal rape.  As a corollary, where the evidence shows that the 
defendant attempts to penetrate the victim’s anus, and, for whatever reason, fails 
January Term, 2001 
 
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to do so and makes contact only with the buttocks, there is sufficient evidence to 
prove the defendant guilty of the crime of attempted anal rape.  The decision of 
the court of appeals, reversing the defendant’s conviction for anal rape and 
remanding the cause to the trial court for a finding of guilt on the crime of 
attempted anal rape, is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Todd T. Duwel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
L. Patrick Mulligan & Associates, L.P.A.., L. Patrick Mulligan and Jay A. 
Adams, for appellee. 
__________________