Title: WINSTON v. STEWART & ELDER, P.C.

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

WINSTON v. STEWART & ELDER, P.C.  WINSTON v. STEWART & ELDER, P.C. 2002 OK 68 55 P.3d 1063 Case Number: 94699 Decided: 09/17/2002 Mandate Issued: 10/14/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA BRUCE V. WINSTON and RODNEY C. RAMSEY, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. STEWART & ELDER, P.C., an Oklahoma corporation; STEWART & ELDER, a professional corporation; A.T. ELDER, JR.; MICHAEL C. STEWART; AND SE PROPERTIES, an Oklahoma partnership, Defendants/Appellees CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY HONORABLE CAROLYN R. RICKS, JUDGE ¶0 Winston and Ramsey [plaintiffs], former shareholders in Stewart & Elder, P.C., [law firm] brought suit to enforce certain provisions of employment contracts and shareholder agreements which were triggered by plaintiffs' resignations from law firm. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Stewart and Elder, individually, SE Properties, and Stewart & Elder, a professional corporation [a different entity from law firm]. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed all summary judgments granted by the trial court and remanded the case. Upon certiorari earlier granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. A. Daniel Woska of Woska & Hasbrook, P.L.L.C., of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the plaintiffs/appellants. B. J. Cooper and William C. McAlister of the Law Offices of B.J. Cooper, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the defendants/appellees. LAVENDER, J. ¶1 Today's appeal requires the Court to assess (1) the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Stewart and Elder, individually, SE Properties, and Stewart & Elder, a professional corporation, in a suit to enforce stock-purchase and employment agreements I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The history of today's case in the trial court is rather convoluted and stretches over an extended period of time. The cause began primarily as an action to enforce employment contracts and shareholder agreements. After the case's institution the trial court placed law firm in receivership. At the receivership's conclusion all sides except law firm sought summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment for Corporation, SE Properties and Stewart and Elder, as individuals, and denied the same to plaintiffs. ¶3 Plaintiffs were employees and shareholders of law firm. Winston resigned from law firm on July 22, 1994 and Ramsey terminated his employment relationship on November 12, 1994. ¶4 After plaintiffs' resignation defendants Stewart and Elder majority shareholders of law firm concluded that law firm was no longer a viable economic entity and themselves resigned from law firm on December 31, 1994. Stewart & Elder, P.C., was dissolved contemporaneous with their resignations. Stewart and Elder caused a new entity Stewart & Elder, a professional corporation to be incorporated on December 30, 1994 and went to work for it on January 1, 1995. Plaintiffs allege that Corporation operated from the same offices as law firm earlier had, continued to use the same letterhead stationery law firm had earlier used and used the same "book of business" developed by law firm. ¶5 On September 15, 1995 Winston and Ramsey brought suit against law firm alleging breach occasioned by law firm not making required payments under the Winston/Ramsey employment and shareholder agreements. Plaintiffs assert that upon termination their status changed from law-firm employee/shareholder to that of law-firm creditor. They allege that Stewart and Eld-[55 P.3d 1066]er (as majority shareholders) engaged in self dealing in the operation of law firm. They also complain that Stewart and Elder engaged in preferential treatment of other law-firm creditors which caused them harm. In their petition plaintiffs seek an accounting from Corporation and law firm and recoupment of certain payments made by law firm to Stewart, Elder and SE Properties (law firm's landlord) an entity owned by Stewart and Elder. ¶6 After plaintiffs' suit was filed, the district court appointed a receiver to marshal and sell law firm's assets. The receiver undertook and completed his responsibilities and was discharged by the trial court's November 22, 1996 order. The discharge order denominated Stewart, Elder, Winston and Ramsey as shareholders of law firm at the time of law firm's dissolution. ¶7 Law firm timely answered plaintiffs' petition on October 18, 1995. The remaining defendants did not timely file a response. Upon motion the trial court permitted their answers to be filed on September 10, 1998. In the interim Winston and Ramsey on July 13, 1998 moved to amend their petition to assert additional theories of liability in support of their claim against Stewart and Elder, individually. In their proposed amendment they allege that not only are Stewart and Elder law firm's alter ego but also that they breached the fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders to minority shareholders. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend on September 28, 1998. Plaintiffs and defendants [except law firm] then each sought summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment for Stewart and Elder, individually, SE Properties, and Corporation. In its April 18, 2000 order the trial court denied, "as moot," plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against law firm. ¶8 Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment and remanded the cause for trial. Defendants sought certiorari which was granted. II THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9 Today the Court is called upon to review both a trial court's grant and denial of summary judgment. Such review is conducted de novo. ¶10 Summary process allows for the isolation and identification of non-triable fact issues.III THE TRIAL COURT'S NOVEMBER 22, 1996 ORDER DISCHARGING LAW FIRM'S COURT-APPOINTED RECEIVER DOES NOT AFFECT LAW-FIRM'S CONTINUED EXISTENCE UNDER 18 O.S. 2001 § 1099'S TERMS FOR PURPOSES OF PENDING LITIGATION ¶11 Defendants take the position that because plaintiffs did not appeal within thirty (30) days from entry of the trial court's November 22, 1996 order discharging law firm's court-appointed receiver, that order is final and unappealable. They next reason that since all payments required under the "now-unassailable" discharge-order's terms have been made, law firm is dissolved as a matter of law under § 1099's provisions. Plaintiffs argue that the discharge-order is interlocutory and remains appealable until such time as judgment is entered on plaintiffs' claim against law firm and Stewart and Elder, individually. Plaintiffs further assert that full execution of the discharge order does not affect law firm's continued existence under § 1009's terms so long as no judgment is entered on plaintiffs' claim in its pending suit. ¶12 Ascertainment of the legal effect which should be accorded the discharge-order in issue requires us to construe the following provisions of § 1099: With respect to any action, suit, or proceeding begun by or against the corporation either prior to or within three (3) years after the date of its expiration or dissolution, the action shall not abate by reason of the expiration or dissolution of the corporation. The corporation, solely for the purpose of such action, suit or proceeding, shall be continued as a body corporate beyond the three-year period and until any judgments, orders or decrees therein shall be fully executed, without the necessity for any special direction to that effect by the district court. [Emphasis added.] In construing the above statutory provision the Court is mindful that if a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, its terms are to be given their reasonable and sensible meaning.13 When unambiguous statutory language is a case's focus, the statute's employed lexicon constitutes the highest proof of legislative intent and further construction is not mandated.14 Fundamental to all statutory construction is ascertainment of legislative intent and purpose as expressed in the act's language.15 This process requires that "relevant provisions must be considered together, where possible, to give force and effect to each other."16 If the statutory provision under review is part of the act, its meaning is ascertained by consideration of the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective.17 ¶14 The trial court's November 22, 1996 order discharging the court-appointed receiver was not a final order. It neither reached the merits of nor otherwise fully adjudicated the plaintiffs' theories of liability (as set forth in their petition) against law firm nor did it address plaintiffs' then-pending claims against SE Properties or corporation. It is interlocutory because it did not resolve all of the issues between all of the parties in today's case. ¶15 Today's construction of § 1099's language harmonizes with the legislative intent reflected in the law relative to receiverships i.e., ¶16 The statutory language employed in § 1099's provisions evinces an opposite intent. Based upon the statutory language used the Legislature obviously intended that a corporation's dissolution would not effect abatement of suits pending at the time of or filed within three years of its dissolution date. To read the last sentence of § 1099 to effectuate an opposite conclusion when a corporation's assets are disposed of through a receivership and the court-appointed receiver is discharged would render the earlier § 1099 language meaningless. ¶17 The trial court in ruling on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied the same as moot but offered no analysis in its order why this is so. Based upon the record the Court assumes the trial court reasoned [55 P.3d 1069] that law firm was dissolved by the ancillary receivership's conclusion i.e., when the proceeds from the sale of law firm's assets were distributed under the discharge-order's provisions. The trial judge must have reasoned plaintiff's suit could not be maintained against a dissolved corporation under § 1099's provisions once orders emanating from the receivership were fully executed. The receivership's conclusion did not render law firm dissolved under § 1099 terms; it remained viable for purposes of the then pending litigation against it. Hence, the trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because of mootness is reversed. Nonetheless, the trial court could have properly denied summary judgment to plaintiffs because there are unresolved questions of material facts relative to: (1) the majority shareholders' (Stewart and Elder) treatment of the minority shareholders (Winston/Ramsey), (2) Stewart and Elder's relationship with law firm and whether they were its alter ego, and (3) law firm's breach of applicable employment contracts and shareholder agreements. Denial of summary judgment for the latter reason does not dispose of plaintiffs' claim against law firm. Winston/Ramsey's claim against law firm remains pending and prevents the complete dissolution of the corporation under § 1099's terms. IV THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SE PROPERTIES AND STEWART & ELDER, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION [CORPORATION] WAS PROPER AND IS SUSTAINED. ¶18 The record reflects confusion concerning the plaintiffs' status vis a vis law firm after their termination dates. This confusion is apparent (a) from the face of the plaintiffs' petition and the receiver's discharge order and (b) in the way the plaintiffs and defendants conducted themselves during the interim between severance of the plaintiffs' employment relationship with law firm and law firm's dissolution date. ¶19 Winston/Ramsey in their petition assert claims for breach of contract occurring after their employment relationship with law firm ended. Plaintiffs also challenge certain acts of law firm relative to SE Properties and Corporation happening after they left law firm. The trial court's order discharging the receiver treats plaintiffs as though they were still law-firm shareholders at the time of its dissolution. Plaintiffs in their brief opposing summary judgment for defendants and also in their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment assert they became law-firm creditors upon their termination. The Court recognizes that subsumed within plaintiffs' assertion that they are law-firm creditors is an appeal from that provision of the trial court's order (discharging the receiver) which finds they were law-firm shareholders on the date of its dissolution. ¶20 The plaintiffs' respective termination dates are determinative of their legal status relative to law firm. Under paragraph 2.1 of the respective shareholder agreements plaintiffs were contractually required to surrender their law-firm shares upon termination at a price determined in accordance with shareholder agreement paragraph 3.2's terms. Assuming surrender occurred as contractually required, Winston was neither an employee of nor a shareholder in law firm after July 22, 1994 and the same is true of Ramsey after November 12, 1994. After their severance dates Winston and Ramsey's relationships with law firm are best characterized as that of general creditor to debtor. After their resignation from law firm and the surrender of their stock they could neither hold nor claim entitlement to those shareholder rights which are associated with corporate ownership. Their status as law-firm creditor does not entitle them to assert derivative actions on law firm's behalf, i.e., to seek recoupment of payments made by law firm to other creditors. ¶21 Plaintiffs' recoupment claim (for payments made by law firm after Winston/Ramsey's severance V THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING PLAINTIFFS' AMENDMENT TO THEIR PETITION TO ASSERT ADDITIONAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANTS STEWART AND ELDER ¶22 Plaintiffs moved to amend their petition to assert new theories of liability [alter ego and breach of fiduciary duty] in support of their claim against Stewart and Elder, individually, on July 13, 1998. [Their original petition was filed on September 15, 1995.] As of July 13, 1998 no responsive pleading, i.e., answer, to Winston/Ramsey's original petition had been filed by Stewart and Elder, who sought leave and were allowed to file their answers out of time on September 10, 1998. ¶23 The trial court's procedural rulings require the Court to construe the following provisions of "A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . . Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . ." ¶24 Under the federal Rule 15(A) it is axiomatic that a complaint [the federal equivalent of Oklahoma's petition] may be amended by right at any time before an answer is served. VI SUMMARY ¶25 Today the Court is called upon to assess the use of summary process to resolve a case which had been on the trial court's docket for almost five years. In our assessment we are extremely mindful that summary adjudication not be invoked except where it serves to eliminate a useless trial. A trial on the merits is always preferred to a trial by affidavit except where all questions of material facts have been resolved. ¶26 The defendants' [Stewart and Elder] conduct as majority shareholders of law firm presents questions of fact which remain unresolved by the conclusion of the ancillary receivership. Section 1099's language does not mandate the abatement of pending litigation such as that here upon the conclusion of an ancillary receivership unless the claim in issue [in the pending action] is specifically joined as an issue addressed by the receivership proceedings. Where, as here, the unresolved litigation is brought within three years of the corporation's dissolution date, the corporation's complete dissolution is not a fait accompli until that litigation is finished and any judgment entered in the same is fully executed. ¶27 Upon certiorari earlier granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; AND THE CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. ¶28 HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, KAUGER, SUMMERS and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur. ¶29 BOUDREAU, J., concurs in result. ¶30 WATT, V.C.J., disqualified. [ 55 P.3d 1072 ] FOOT