Title: The Florida Bar v. Geneva Carol Forrester

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
________________________ 
 
Nos. SC01-1819 & SC02-1752 
________________________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
GENEVA CAROL FORRESTER,  
Respondent. 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
GENEVA CAROL FORRESTER,  
Respondent. 
 
[September 8, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review the referee's reports in case numbers SC01-1819 and 
SC02-1752, regarding alleged ethical breaches by Geneva Carol Forrester.  We 
have  jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We have consolidated the two 
cases for review, and for the reasons explained below, we disbar respondent 
Forrester from the practice of law in the State of Florida. 
 
 
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Case Number SC01-1819 
On August 20, 2001, the Bar filed a complaint against respondent Forrester 
alleging that she had knowingly made false statements in two pleadings submitted 
to a court and had also made statements in those pleadings which were disparaging 
and humiliating to the person about whom the statements were made.  In a motion  
filed on February 4, 2000, Forrester stated in boldface type that the person in 
question was a "child molester and stalked his daughter" and that he was "recently 
convicted of aggravated stalking in Florida."  In a separate motion also filed on 
February 4, 2000, she made similar statements and also referred to the person as a 
"pedophile and convicted felon."  The Bar's complaint alleged that Forrester knew 
that her statements regarding the felony conviction were false and that she 
knowingly, or through callous indifference, made statements which were 
disparaging and humiliating when she called the person a stalker, a convicted 
felon, and a child molester.  The Bar alleged that Forrester's statements violated 
rules 4-3.3(a) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact 
or law to a tribunal); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, 
 
 
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disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court 
personnel, or other lawyers on any basis) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. 
After a final hearing, the referee issued his report and recommendation.  The 
referee found that on December 1, 1998, Forrester had been advised that the felony 
charge against the person in question had been reduced to a misdemeanor and 
adjudication was withheld.  Further, the referee found that it was clear that 
Forrester was aware of this at that time because on December 2, 1998, she made a 
specific inquiry of the clerk's office for verification of the conviction and sentence.  
The referee found that Forrester's statements that the person was a convicted felon, 
at the very least, exhibited callous indifference; accordingly, he recommended that 
Forrester be found guilty of violating only rule 4-8.4(d).  As for discipline, the 
referee recommended that Forrester receive a public reprimand. 
Case Number SC02-1752 
By order of this Court dated May 16, 2002, respondent Forrester was placed 
on a sixty-day suspension in Florida Bar v. Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2002).  
On August 8, 2002, The Florida Bar filed a petition for an order to show cause why 
Forrester should not be held in contempt and a petition for an interim suspension 
alleging that Forrester had violated the suspension order by practicing law while 
suspended.  Forrester filed a written response and a motion to dismiss the petition 
for interim suspension.  On November 20, 2002, the Court denied Forrester's 
 
 
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motion to dismiss, granted the Bar's petition for interim suspension, and ordered 
Forrester to show cause why she should not be held in contempt and disbarred for 
practicing law while under suspension.  The Court also appointed a referee to 
conduct an expedited hearing and submit a report and recommendation to the 
Court. 
After a final hearing, the referee filed his report making the following 
findings of fact.  After receiving the May 16, 2002, suspension order in Florida Bar 
v. Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2002), Forrester informed all of her clients of her 
suspension, as required, and attempted to refer her pending cases to other lawyers 
or to finally resolve the cases before the effective date of the suspension, June 16, 
2002.  However, as that date approached, Forrester realized that a few of her 
clients' cases had not been resolved or successfully referred to other attorneys.  
Accordingly, in June she interviewed and hired an associate.  The associate was a 
young, inexperienced recent law school graduate who had become licensed to 
practice in April 2002.  The associate's prior legal experience consisted of several 
law clerk positions with private and governmental law offices.  He had never 
functioned as a licensed attorney prior to his hiring by Forrester. 
During his employment, at Forrester's direction, the associate drafted 
pleadings and letters and met with present and prospective clients in person and by 
telephone.  As to pleadings and letters, after Forrester reviewed the drafts and 
 
 
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made corrections, a final pleading or letter would be prepared that the associate 
would sign.  After Forrester's review and final approval, the signed pleading or 
letter would be mailed by Forrester's legal assistant.  Essentially, nothing left the 
office without Forrester's approval. 
Although Forrester did not personally meet with any prospective or existing 
clients during the course of her suspension, she spoke with one existing client on 
the telephone several times.  In her deposition, the client stated that Forrester 
informed her of the suspension and that the telephone communications which 
occurred involved business, not legal, advice.  Forrester billed the client at her 
"business consultant" rate of $350.00 per hour, the same rate she bills as an 
attorney. 
The referee's report also found that once Forrester realized the Bar was 
investigating her activities during the suspension, Forrester asked her associate to 
sign a letter designed to constitute the notice of employment that is required by 
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-6.1(c) for suspended, disbarred, and resigned 
attorneys who work in a law office.  The proposed letter indicated that Forrester 
was employed by the associate as a paralegal.  The associate refused to sign the 
letter Forrester presented and instead signed a revised letter which deleted the 
references to Forrester's employment as a paralegal.  The same date he signed the 
 
 
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aforementioned letter, the associate resigned his position of employment with 
Forrester. 
Based on these findings, the referee found Forrester guilty of intentionally 
and willfully violating the May 16, 2002, suspension order.  Relying upon Florida 
Bar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1975), the referee reasoned that while a 
suspended attorney may work as a law clerk, investigator, or paralegal, 
employment in such a capacity contemplates supervision of the suspended attorney 
by a member of the Bar in good standing.  He determined that here, Forrester was 
not supervised.  To the contrary, she actively supervised the young attorney she 
hired to ostensibly maintain her law office during the suspension.  As a result of 
her violation of the suspension order, the referee recommended that Forrester be 
found guilty of contempt and be suspended for one year. 
I.  Referee's Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt. 
In case number SC01-1819, having considered the arguments of the parties, 
we approve the referee's findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt without 
further discussion. 
In case number SC02-1752, the Bar first challenges the standard of proof 
applied by the referee in the contempt proceedings.  In his report, the referee 
expressed some uncertainty as to the applicable standard of proof, and in an 
abundance of caution, chose to apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
 
 
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applicable to indirect criminal contempt proceedings.  The Bar contends that 
proceedings for contempt of an order of this Court suspending an attorney are 
simply a further action on the subject attorney's license to practice law and, as 
such, are subject only to the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to 
bar proceedings generally. 
As this Court recognized in Parisi v. Broward County, 769 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 
2000), contempt sanctions are broadly categorized as either civil or criminal, and 
the distinction between them "often turns on the 'character and purpose' of the 
sanctions involved."  Id. at 364 (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994)).  The purpose of criminal contempt 
proceedings is "'to vindicate the authority of the court or to punish an intentional 
violation of an order of the court.'  On the other hand, a contempt sanction is 
considered civil if it 'is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted) (quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985), 
and Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827).  Additionally, the hallmark of civil contempt is a 
purge provision allowing the contemnor to avoid the sanction imposed by 
complying with the court order.  Id. at 365. 
The purpose of contempt proceedings brought against an attorney for 
violation of an existing disciplinary order is to punish the offending attorney and to 
vindicate the authority of this Court to discipline Florida attorneys.  The purpose is 
 
 
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not remedial in nature or primarily for the purpose of coercing the disciplined 
attorney to comply, nor can the contemnor purge the contempt through compliance 
with the Court's order.  Thus, in some respects, it is akin to criminal contempt.  
However, unlike either criminal or civil contempt, the punishment sought and 
imposed is not monetary fines or imprisonment, but rather is additional 
disciplinary sanctions.  Given this fact, we agree with the Bar that the appropriate 
standard of proof is that which is applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings in 
general, clear and convincing evidence.1   
Next, Forrester challenges the referee's recommendation that she be found 
guilty of contempt, essentially arguing that she attempted to meticulously comply 
with the suspension order and did not know that what she was doing constituted 
the practice of law.  Accordingly, she contends that the referee erred in finding that 
she intentionally violated the suspension order.  In order to successfully attack the 
referee's finding, Forrester must demonstrate "that there is no evidence in the 
record to support [the referee's] findings or that the record evidence clearly 
                                          
 
 
1  This is a question of first impression in this Court.  In Florida Bar v. 
Weisser, 721 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 1998), cited by the Bar, the opinion reflects 
that the referee used a "clear and convincing" evidence standard in finding that 
Weisser had intentionally engaged in the unlicensed practice of law subsequent to 
his suspension and recommending that he be found in willful contempt of this 
Court's order granting his petition for resignation.   However, the issue of whether 
or not such was the appropriate standard was not an issue raised or determined in 
the case. 
 
 
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contradicts the conclusions."  Fla. Bar v. Spann, 682 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 
1996).  Forrester has not met this burden. 
The only evidence in the record supporting Forrester's claim that she did not 
violate the suspension order intentionally is her own testimony.  The referee heard 
and rejected this testimony.  Because the referee is in the best position to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the referee's assessment.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1999) (stating that "the referee is in a 
unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his judgment regarding 
credibility should not be overturned absent clear and convincing evidence that his 
judgment is incorrect"); Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991) 
(same); see also In re Weinstein, 518 So. 2d 1370, 1374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("A 
mere disclaimer by the [contemnor] that his conduct was not willful or intentional 
does not deprive the court of power to declare it to be contempt and punish it 
accordingly."). 
Additionally, absent an admission by the charged person, intent to violate a 
court order may be established by circumstantial evidence.  See Northstar Invs. & 
Dev., Inc. v. Pobaco, Inc., 691 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Paul v. Johnson, 
604 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).  Here, aside from Forrester's denial, the 
remaining evidence in the record supports the referee's finding that Forrester 
intentionally violated the suspension order by continuing to practice law while 
 
 
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suspended.  As her suspension approached, Forrester hired a newly licensed 
attorney, with no prior legal experience, as an associate.  During her suspension, 
she gave this associate direction on what pleadings ought to be filed and what 
correspondence ought to be sent to opposing counsel or clients.  She reviewed 
documents coming in from the court or opposing counsel and directed the associate 
as to what was to be done in response.  After the associate drafted a letter or 
pleading, Forrester reviewed it and made revisions to the draft, which were usually 
automatically incorporated into the final draft.  In addition, she directed the 
associate to make telephone calls to clients, telling him the purpose of the call and 
what information to convey.  Incoming phone messages were given to her for 
evaluation.  Forrester's paralegal also drafted correspondence at her direction, and 
Forrester, not the associate, reviewed and revised the paralegal's work. 
Additionally, Forrester had direct contact with one existing client several 
times by telephone during the course of the suspension.  Both Forrester and the 
client testified that they discussed property involved in the client's pending 
litigation.  The client was billed $350 per hour for business consulting.  However, 
the client testified that she had never before required Forrester's services as a 
business consultant prior to the suspension. 
As discussed by the referee, in Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 
1975), this Court held that a suspended attorney may be permitted to work at a law 
 
 
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firm as a law clerk or investigator during the period of suspension.  The decision 
was premised upon and clearly contemplated that the suspended attorney would be 
working under the direct supervision of a duly licensed attorney.  In permitting the 
employment arrangement presented by the respondent in that case, the Court 
carefully noted that the respondent was "employed under the direct supervision of 
his attorney-employers who are responsible for his work."  Id. at 301.  
Additionally, the Court approved the arrangement with the clear understanding that 
the respondent's functions had been limited "exclusively to work of a preparatory 
nature such as research, taking statements of witnesses consistent with initial 
investigation of a case, assembling information for review, and like work that 
would enable the attorney-employer to carry a given matter to a conclusion 
through his own examination, approval, or additional effort."  Id. 
As an attorney, Forrester was on notice of this case law and the parameters it 
sets for suspended attorneys wishing to work as law clerks in a law office during a 
period of suspension.  Here, it is clear that Forrester was not operating within these 
parameters.  She was not working under the direct supervision of her newly hired 
associate, and her work was not limited to work of a preparatory nature which 
would enable him to carry a given matter to conclusion through his own 
examination, approval, or additional effort.  To the contrary, she was directing 
what legal work was to be done in the first instance and was actively supervising 
 
 
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the associate's work.  She deliberately took this course of action.  Accordingly, we 
uphold the referee's finding that Forrester intentionally violated the suspension 
order. 
II.  Discipline. 
In case number SC01-1819, we agree with the Bar that in light of Forrester's 
disciplinary history, a sanction more weighty than a public reprimand is required.  
Forrester is no stranger to this Court in the arena of attorney discipline.  She has 
been before this Court on four prior occasions and has received sanctions ranging 
from an admonishment to a ninety-day suspension.  In 1994, Forrester was 
admonished for violating rule 4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests).  See Fla. 
Bar v. Forrester, No. 80,442 (Fla. Apr. 21, 1994) (unpublished order).  In 1995, 
Forrester was placed on twenty-four months' probation for violating rule 4-1.16(d) 
(Protection of Client's Interest).  See Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 659 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 
1995) (table).  Additionally in 1995, Forrester was suspended for ninety days for 
violating rule 4-1.5(a) (Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees and Costs) 
and was publicly reprimanded for violating rules 5-1.1(g) (Disbursement Against 
Uncollected Funds) and 5-1.2(c)(1)(A)-(B) (Minimum Trust Accounting 
Procedures).  See Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 656 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1995). 
Most recently in 2002, the Court suspended Forrester for sixty days for 
violating rules 4-3.4(a) and 4-8.4(c).  The misconduct involved in that case 
 
 
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occurred during a deposition where she concealed an exhibit that was relevant to 
the case and then, when asked about it, replied, "I'm not seeing it."  Fla. Bar v. 
Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477, 483 (Fla. 2002).  The Court stated that although her 
response was technically truthful (because she had hidden the document next to her 
brief case), it was intended to mislead because she, in fact, knew where the 
document was and failed to disclose it.  Id. 
Although Forrester was found to have made an intentional misrepresentation 
in this prior case, the conduct is somewhat similar to that involved in case number 
SC01-1819, where in pleadings submitted to a court, Forrester falsely referred to 
someone as a convicted felon.  Both instances display an attitude of "playing fast 
and loose" with the truth.  In the prior case, Forrester used a technically truthful 
statement to mislead opposing counsel.  In this case, she showed callous 
indifference to the truth and continued to make statements she should have known 
were false. 
Based on the misconduct in case number SC01-1819 and Forrester's prior 
history of discipline alone, we would likely conclude that an appropriate discipline 
would be a ninety-one-day suspension.  However, as previously explained, we 
have consolidated this case with case number SC02-1752, and we consider them 
together for purposes of discipline.  Based on a consideration of both matters, the 
 
 
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conclusion of the Court, as more fully explained below, is that an even more 
serious sanction is required. 
In case number SC02-1752, the referee recommended Forrester be 
suspended for one year.  In reviewing a referee's recommended discipline, this 
Court's scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of 
fact because, ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  
See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, 
Fla. Const.  However, generally speaking this Court will not second-guess the 
referee's recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing 
case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).   Upon review, we find that the 
recommendation of a one-year suspension lacks a reasonable basis in case law or 
the standards and conclude that Forrester should be disbarred. 
A survey of cases where an attorney has been held in contempt for practicing 
law while either suspended, disbarred, or permitted to resign reveals that 
disbarment is most often the chosen sanction.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Weisser, 721 
So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1998) (disbarring attorney for continuing to practice law after 
disciplinary resignation); Fla. Bar v. Neely, 675 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1996) 
(permanently disbarring already disbarred attorney for continuing to practice law 
after he was disbarred); Fla. Bar v. Brown, 635 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1994) (holding in 
 
 
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contempt and disbarring attorney for continuing to practice law after disciplinary 
resignation); Fla. Bar v. Greene, 589 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1991) (disbarring attorney 
for continuing to practice law while suspended); Fla. Bar v. Bauman, 558 So. 2d 
994 (Fla. 1990) (disbarring attorney for continuing to practice law while 
suspended); Fla. Bar v. Winter, 549 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989) (permanently disbarring 
attorney for continuing to practice law after disciplinary resignation). 
Additionally, the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide that 
absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, disbarment is appropriate when a 
lawyer "intentionally violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such 
violation causes injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession."  
Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 8.1.  We find nothing in the record here which 
would warrant a lesser sanction.  Indeed, the referee appropriately found three 
aggravating circumstances:  Forrester's four previous disciplinary offenses, her 
multiple offenses in the instant matter, and her substantial experience in the 
practice of law.  The referee found only one mitigating circumstance:  Forrester's 
substantial charitable and pro bono activities.  We now have before us an 
additional disciplinary matter, which, as discussed above, would alone warrant a 
ninety-one-day suspension.  Considering these two matters together along with 
Forrester's disciplinary history, we conclude that disbarment is the only appropriate 
sanction. 
 
 
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Geneva Carol Forrester is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the 
State of Florida, effective, nunc pro tunc, November 20, 2002, the date of the 
interim suspension order under which she currently stands suspended.  Judgment is 
entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-
2300, for recovery of costs from Geneva Carol Forrester in the amount of 
$7,238.31, for which sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I fully concur in the majority opinion, with the sole exception of the 
majority’s rejection of the referee’s recommendation that the respondent be 
suspended rather than disbarred.  While I would agree that the suspension should 
be much longer than the one year recommended by the referee, I do not agree that 
the ultimate sanction of disbarment is justified under the circumstances presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel, 
Tallahassee, Florida, Carlos Leon, Staff Counsel, Miami, Florida, and William 
Lance Thompson, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Geneva Carol Forrester, St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent