Title: James Antisdel v. City of Oak Creek Police and Fire Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3818 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
James Antisdel,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
City of Oak Creek Police and Fire  
Commission, City of Oak Creek Police  
Department and Acting Chief Thomas P.  
Bauer,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 433, 600 N.W.2d 1  
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 2, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 8, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Kathy L. Nusslock, Nancy L. Pirkey and Davis & 
Kuelthau, S.C.¸ Milwaukee, and Lawrence J. Haskin, Oak Creek, and 
oral argument by Lawrence J. Haskin. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
John F. Fuchs and Fuchs Snow DeStafanis, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
 
oral argument by John F. Fuchs. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by James R. Korom, Matthew A. 
Koch and von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf 
of The Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Scott Herrick and Herrick, 
Kasdorf, Dymzarov & Twietmeyer, Madison, on behalf The Board of 
Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Curtis Witynski, Madison, 
on behalf of The League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief of Jonathan Cermele, Laurie 
Eggert and Egert Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Milwaukee Police Association. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Gordon E. McQuillen, Shana 
R. Lewis and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Professional Police Association/Law Enforcement 
Employment Relations Division. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
 
No. 97-3818 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James Antisdel,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Oak Creek Police and Fire  
Commission, City of Oak Creek Police  
Department and Acting Chief Thomas P.  
Bauer,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   The City of 
Oak Creek Police and Fire Commission, the City of Oak Creek 
Police Department and Acting Police Chief Thomas P. Bauer, the 
defendants, seek review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals.1  The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Michael D. Guolee, Circuit 
                     
1 Antisdel v. City of Oak Creek Police & Fire Comm'n, 229 
Wis. 2d 433, 600 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999).  
FILED 
 
MAY 2, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
2 
Court Judge.2  The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, dismissing the action of James Antisdel, the 
plaintiff.  The court of appeals held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to a "just cause" procedure pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em) (1997-98)3 to contest his reduction in rank from 
sergeant to police officer.  We affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
¶2 
The only issue in this case is whether the defendants 
erred as a matter of law in denying the plaintiff a just cause 
procedure under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  We conclude that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the just cause procedure set forth in 
§ 62.13(5)(em) because he was a subordinate reduced in rank 
based on a disciplinary charge filed by the police chief.  The 
procedure set forth in section 62.13(5)(em) makes no exception 
for a subordinate who is promoted on a probationary basis.  The 
defendants thus proceeded on an incorrect theory of law. 
I 
¶3 
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. 
 James Antisdel, the plaintiff, joined the City of Oak Creek 
                     
2 In addition to the parties' briefs, several nonparty 
briefs were submitted to the court.  The Wisconsin Professional 
Police Association and the Milwaukee Police Association have 
submitted briefs in support of affirming the decision of the 
court of appeals.  The League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the 
Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison, 
and the Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association have submitted 
briefs seeking to reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 text unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
3 
Police Department as a police officer in 1985.  On March 1, 
1996, Michael Younglove, then Oak Creek Chief of Police, sent 
the plaintiff a memorandum stating: "I am pleased to advise that 
you are being promoted to the position of sergeant effective 
March 10, 1996."   The memorandum also stated: "Upon completion 
of a one year probationary period, you will receive a permanent 
appointment as sergeant."  The memorandum concluded by stating 
"[c]ongratulations on your promotion and best of luck." 
¶4 
The plaintiff began the City of Oak Creek's "Police 
Sergeant Training and Evaluation Program."  The purpose of this 
program was to offer new sergeants individualized training that 
would 
develop 
their 
sergeant 
skills 
until 
coaching 
from 
supervisors became unnecessary.4  Pursuant to this training 
program, the plaintiff was evaluated on a regular basis by a 
Sergeant Training Officer.  On December 9, 1996, Thomas P. 
Bauer, who had succeeded Younglove as Oak Creek's Chief of 
                     
4 The memorandum explaining the sergeant training program 
states that: 
The primary goal of the Police Sergeant Training and 
Evaluation 
Program is 
to 
specifically 
prepare 
a 
probationary sergeant 
to 
perform 
the 
duties and 
responsibilities of a police sergeant with confidence 
and ability.  It is highly improbable that any 
individual would automatically possess the ability to 
step from police officer to the duties of police 
sergeant and perform them in a totally acceptable 
manner.  The intent of the Police Sergeant Training 
and Evaluation Program is to guide a probationary 
sergeant through the subsequent steps of development 
until he/she is ready to function without constant 
coaching 
from 
the 
sergeants 
[sic] 
training 
and 
evaluation personnel. 
 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
4 
Police, sent the plaintiff a memorandum regarding "Notification 
of Your Failure to Pass Probation." 
¶5 
The memorandum detailed that the plaintiff had been 
the subject of a departmental investigation and that he had 
admitted to a police captain that from January 1993 until June 
1995 the plaintiff had allowed one of his colleagues to use his 
Oak Creek address so the colleague's child could enroll in the 
Oak Creek High School without paying the nonresident tuition.  
The 
memorandum 
stated: 
"Your 
conduct 
in 
this 
matter 
is 
inappropriate and unprofessional and has resulted in the 
dissolution of public respect and confidence in the Oak Creek 
Police Department."  The memorandum further noted that the 
plaintiff's 
conduct 
violated 
police 
department 
policy, 
"including, but not limited to, 3.58 Unprofessional Conduct."  
The memorandum concluded by stating: "I have reviewed you [sic] 
status and determined that you have not passed your probation as 
a sergeant in the Oak Creek Police Department and, as such, am 
putting you back to you [sic] position as Police Officer, 
effective Tuesday, December 10, 1996."  Other than the matter 
regarding the colleague's use of the plaintiff’s address, the 
memorandum did not detail any reason for the plaintiff's failure 
to pass probation. 
¶6 
On April 1, 1997, the plaintiff requested that the 
City of Oak Creek Police and Fire Commission (the Board)5 comply 
                     
5 The statutes refer to a police and fire commission as a 
board of police and fire commissioners.  Wis. Stat. § 62.13(1). 
 Accordingly we refer to the City of Oak Creek Police and Fire 
Commission as the Board. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
5 
with Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) regarding his reduction in rank. 
 The Board met on May 1, heard argument and denied the 
plaintiff's request.  The Board apparently concluded that the 
plaintiff's promotion was subject to a one-year probationary 
period and that probationary employees are not entitled to a 
just cause procedure under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
¶7 
The plaintiff then filed a Notice of Review in the 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, seeking to compel the Board 
to grant him a hearing.6  The circuit court granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, relying on 
the police chief's use of a probationary program for new 
sergeants and on Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4), which grants police 
chiefs great latitude in running their departments. 
                     
6 The plaintiff sought judicial review by filing a "Notice 
of Review" in the circuit court "pursuant to Sec. 62.13(5)(i), 
Wis. Stats."  This statute permits "[a]ny person . . . reduced" 
by a board of police and fire commissioners to "appeal from the 
order of the board to the circuit court."  The plaintiff was not 
reduced in rank by the Board; he was reduced in rank by the Oak 
Creek police chief. 
The plaintiff subsequently filed another action in the 
circuit court on May 23, 1997, seeking specifically a writ of 
mandamus directing the Board to provide written notice of 
charges and to grant him a just cause procedure pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
The parties, the circuit court, the court of appeals and 
this court treat the plaintiff's Notice of Review as seeking 
certiorari and mandamus relief.  These avenues of judicial 
review are available to a police officer aggrieved by a 
disciplinary action.  See State ex rel. Enk v. Mentkowski, 76 
Wis. 2d 565, 571, 252 N.W.2d 28 (1977). 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
6 
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court.  Each judge of the court of appeals wrote an 
opinion, resulting in a lead majority opinion, a concurrence and 
a dissent. 
¶9 
Judge Fine, writing the majority lead opinion, held 
that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) is plain and should be followed 
in all cases in which a police officer is reduced in rank based 
on charges filed by a police chief.7  Tracking the language of 
the statute, Judge Fine explained: 
                     
7 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em), provides: 
No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in rank, 
suspended and reduced in rank, or removed by the board 
under par. (e), based on charges filed by the board, 
members of the board, an aggrieved person or the chief 
under par. (b), unless the board determines whether 
there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, 
to sustain the charges.  In making its determination, 
the board shall apply the following standards, to the 
extent applicable: 
 
1. 
Whether 
the 
subordinate 
could 
reasonably 
be 
expected to have had knowledge of the probable 
consequences of the alleged conduct. 
 
2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate 
allegedly violated is reasonable. 
 
3. Whether the chief, before filing the charge against 
the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to discover 
whether the subordinate did in fact violate a rule or 
order. 
 
4. Whether the effort described under subd. 3. was 
fair and objective. 
 
5. Whether the chief discovered substantial evidence 
that the subordinate violated the rule or order as 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
7 
 
1. The plaintiff is a "subordinate." 
 
2. The defendants seek to reduce the plaintiff "in 
rank" based on "charges" made (albeit, apparently, not 
formally "filed") "by . . . the chief." 
 
3. The defendants may not reduce the plaintiff's rank 
unless 
the 
Board 
"determines . . . there 
is 
just 
cause" for the proposed reduction in rank. 
 
¶10 Judge Schudson concurred.  The concurrence recognized 
that it may be good policy to allow a police chief to promote a 
police officer to sergeant on a probationary basis and to reduce 
the rank during the probationary period from sergeant to police 
officer without complying with § 62.13(5)(em).  However, the 
concurrence recognized that the statutes do not state such a 
policy 
and 
that 
until 
§ 62.13(5)(em) 
is 
amended 
by 
the 
legislature, the statute must be followed. 
¶11 Judge Curley dissented, reasoning that the present 
case poses the need for a logical extension of the holding in 
Kaiser v. Board of Police & Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498, 503 
N.W.2d 646 (1981).  In Kaiser this court rejected the claim of a 
recently hired police officer that he could not be terminated 
                                                                  
described 
in 
the 
charges 
filed 
against 
the 
subordinate. 
 
6. Whether the chief is applying the rule or order 
fairly 
and 
without 
discrimination 
against 
the 
subordinate. 
 
7. Whether the proposed discipline reasonably relates 
to the seriousness of the alleged violation and to the 
subordinate's record of service with the chief's 
department. 
 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
8 
unless there was compliance with Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(e).  Our 
decision focused on Wis. Stat. § 165.85(4)(b) (1981) mandating 
that all new police hires be subject to a probationary period 
not to exceed one year.  Furthermore, the officer was hired 
pursuant to provisions in the collective bargaining agreement 
that stated that all new hires were probationary for one year.  
Based on the express statutory provisions and the collective 
bargaining agreement, the court held that the protections of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) did not apply to the police officer in 
that case.  Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 501-03. 
¶12 The dissent concluded that a period of probation is as 
essential for a police officer promoted to sergeant as for a new 
police officer and that the legislature has granted broad 
discretion to police chiefs to manage the operations of their 
police forces. 
II 
¶13 The plaintiff is seeking certiorari review and a writ 
of mandamus to compel the Board to grant him a just cause 
procedure.  The general scope of review pursuant to the writ of 
certiorari is limited to whether the Board: (1) acted within its 
jurisdiction; (2) proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3) was 
arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable; or (4) might have 
reasonably made the order or finding that it made based on the 
evidence.  State ex rel. Hennekens v. City of River Falls Police 
and Fire Comm'n, 124 Wis. 2d 413, 419, 369 N.W.2d 670 (1985).  
The issue presented is whether the Board proceeded on a correct 
theory of law. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
9 
III 
¶14 The briefs of the parties and nonparties focus to a 
large extent on this court's decision in Kaiser v. Board of 
Police & Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 498.  
¶15 Like the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals, 
the defendants argue that this case presents an opportunity to 
extend our holding in Kaiser.  They contend that the Kaiser 
court recognized the value of having a probationary period for 
new police officers and that the value of a probationary period 
extends to newly promoted sergeants.  They further argue that 
the legislature has recognized the importance of police training 
and thus implicitly endorses a probationary period.8  The 
defendants urge that, like the police officer in Kaiser, the 
plaintiff in the present case did not satisfy the probationary 
period and he is therefore not entitled to the procedures set 
forth in § 62.13(5)(em).  The defendants assert that the police 
chief has broad discretion to select and retain supervisory 
employees, as well as police officers.9 
                     
8 See Wis. Stat. §§ 165.85(1) and 165.85(4)(e). 
9 See Wis. Stat. § 62.13(4)(a) and (c).  The nonparty brief 
of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the City of 
Madison argues that probation should be understood as a part of 
the appointment procedures and not the disciplinary process.  As 
explained below, we reject this argument in this case because a 
disciplinary charge was filed against the plaintiff by the 
police chief.  In this situation, Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) 
applies by its express terms. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
10
¶16 Finally, the defendants contend that the probationary 
promotion in this case was done in accordance with the customary 
practices of the Oak Creek Police Department since 1985 and is 
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement with the 
police union.  The defendants recognize that the collective 
bargaining agreement does not expressly address probationary 
periods for those promoted to sergeant or other supervisory 
positions.  The defendants infer, however, from the failure of 
the union or any individual to challenge the probationary 
promotion 
since 
1985, 
that 
a 
probationary 
promotion 
is 
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement.10 
¶17 The plaintiff responds in part by emphasizing that 
this court's decision in Kaiser was grounded in Wis. Stat. 
§ 165.85(4)(b), providing that police employees must go through 
a probationary period before they can be hired on a permanent 
basis.  The plaintiff argues that in this case there is no 
specific statutory authority that mandates or authorizes a 
period 
of 
training 
or 
probation 
for 
sergeants 
or 
other 
                                                                  
The nonparty brief of the Wisconsin Chiefs of Police 
Association asserts that a ruling that promotions cannot be made 
on a probationary basis is bad public policy.  The brief asserts 
that such a ruling will encourage police departments to hire 
supervisory employees from outside the ranks of existing 
employees so that the police chiefs can hire new sergeants 
subject to a probationary period. 
10 Counsel for the defendants at oral argument acknowledged, 
however, 
that 
no 
established 
practice 
exists 
to 
deny 
probationary 
promotees 
the 
procedures 
set 
forth 
in 
§ 62.13(5)(em) when the probationary period was not successfully 
completed. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
11
supervisory employees.  In addition, the collective bargaining 
agreement at issue in Kaiser specifically provided for a 
probationary period for new hires.  The only provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement in the present case addressing 
probationary periods refers to employees in their first year of 
employment. 
¶18 Although the defendants offer good arguments for 
extending the Kaiser rule to apply to newly promoted police 
officers, we agree with the plaintiff that policy rationales 
cannot be employed to deprive employees of procedural rights 
guaranteed by the legislature.  The issue is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em) applies to this plaintiff. 
IV 
¶19 Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) requires that an employee 
seeking the procedural protections of that section be a 
"subordinate" who "is suspended, reduced in rank, . . . or 
removed . . . based 
on 
charges 
filed . . . by 
the 
chief . . . ."11 
                     
11 The 
nonparty 
brief 
of 
the 
League 
of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities notes that cities with populations under 4000 are 
not required to follow Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5), but rather 
§62.13(6m), which provides procedural protections only for any 
"law enforcement officer who is not probationary."  The League 
argues that those smaller communities will be able to reduce in 
rank 
probationary 
sergeants 
without 
hearings, 
creating 
differences among cities that the legislature could not have 
intended.  The legislature might have intentionally created 
different requirements for large and small municipalities.  We 
need not, and do not, address whether Wis. Stat. § 62.13(6m) 
applies to probationary promotees in addition to new hires. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
12
¶20 First, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
plaintiff 
is 
a 
"subordinate" 
as 
that 
word 
is 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em).12 
 
The 
defendants 
do 
not 
contest 
this 
interpretation of the statute. 
¶21 Second, we conclude that the plaintiff was "reduced in 
rank" as that phrase is used in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  The 
defendants argue that there was no reduction in rank because, 
pursuant to his probationary status, the plaintiff never 
achieved the rank of sergeant.  This argument is unpersuasive.  
The memorandum sent to the plaintiff by the police chief stated: 
" . . . you are being promoted to the position of sergeant 
effective March 10, 1996."  The memorandum concluded by stating 
"[c]ongratulations on your promotion."  In addition, according 
to counsel at oral argument, the plaintiff was referred to as 
"Sergeant Antisdel" after March 10, 1996,13 and it appears that 
he was paid at a sergeant's rate.  Although the police chief's 
memorandum stated that the plaintiff would have to complete a 
probationary 
period 
before 
the 
appointment 
would 
become 
"permanent," it is clear from the record that the plaintiff had 
been promoted to sergeant on a probationary basis. 
                     
12 See Kaiser v. Board of Police & Fire Comm'rs, 104 Wis. 2d 
498, 503, 311 N.W.2d 646 (1981) ("[a]s used in the statute, 
['subordinate'] 
is 
a 
generic 
term 
including 
all 
police 
officers"). 
13 The evaluation records filled out for the plaintiff 
referred to "Sergeant Antisdel," and were signed by the 
plaintiff as "Sergeant Antisdel." 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
13
¶22 Therefore the plaintiff was "reduced in rank" on 
December 10, 1996, when he was informed that from that day 
forward he would serve again as a police officer.14  He was no 
longer called sergeant and his compensation was decreased.15 
¶23 Third, we conclude that the plaintiff was reduced in 
rank "based on charges . . . by . . . the chief."  The statute 
does not specify what is meant by "charges." 
¶24 In this case the charges related to the plaintiff's 
conduct before he was made a sergeant.  The charge was that the 
plaintiff allowed a colleague to use the plaintiff's address to 
avoid paying nonresident tuition to the Oak Creek High School.  
The defendants' brief argues that the action taken against the 
plaintiff was not disciplinary and thus does not come within the 
protections of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5).  We disagree with the 
defendants. 
                     
14 The 
nonparty 
brief 
for 
the 
League 
of 
Wisconsin 
Municipalities argues that because the Oak Creek Police and Fire 
Commission 
never 
approved 
the 
plaintiff's 
promotion, 
the 
plaintiff never achieved the rank of sergeant.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(4)(a) 
states 
that 
"[t]he 
chiefs 
shall 
appoint 
subordinates subject to the approval of the board."  We refuse 
to adopt this interpretation of the statute.  Such a reading 
might encourage chiefs to avoid asking boards of police and fire 
commissions to approve probationary promotions so that the 
subordinates could be reduced in rank without following the 
procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
15 Although evidence of the plaintiff’s wages was not 
presented, part of the relief sought by the plaintiff was wages 
lost due to his reduction in rank from sergeant to police 
officer after December 1996.  It is reasonable to assume that 
the plaintiff was paid at the higher rate of sergeant until he 
was returned to police officer status in December 1996. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
14
¶25 The notice informing the plaintiff that he had not 
successfully completed the probationary period referred to an 
investigation into his conduct and stated: "Your conduct in this 
matter is inappropriate and unprofessional and has resulted in 
the dissolution of public respect and confidence in the Oak 
Creek Police Department."  The notice further stated that the 
plaintiff's 
conduct 
violated 
police 
department 
policy, 
"including, but not limited to, 3.58 Unprofessional Conduct."  
The charge had nothing to do with the plaintiff's actual 
performance as a sergeant.  We conclude that the charge in the 
present case was a disciplinary charge and thus fits within the 
boundaries of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). 
¶26 We need not, and do not, decide whether we would reach 
the same decision if the plaintiff were reduced in rank from 
probationary sergeant to police officer because he failed to 
meet the level of performance demanded by his superiors or for 
some other nondisciplinary reason.16 
                     
16 In Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503, the court stated that the 
officer "was not disciplined; he was terminated as not suited 
for service as a police officer." 
The court of appeals in Eastman v. City of Madison, 117 
Wis. 2d 106, 342 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1983), dismissed the 
claims of a firefighter and a police officer that they were 
entitled to a just cause procedure.  They were terminated 
because they violated a Madison municipal ordinance requiring 
that all city employees reside in the city.  Relying on the 
above-quoted language from Kaiser, the court of appeals denied 
the officers the protections under § 62.13(5), stating: 
The 
[municipal] ordinance 
is not 
a disciplinary 
provision, 
and 
sec. 
62.13(5) 
is 
therefore 
inapplicable.  Section 62.13(5) on its face only 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
15
¶27 Fourth, we conclude that the police chief filed the 
charges.  Section 62.13(5)(b) provides that charges are to be in 
writing and filed with the president of the Board.  Assuming 
that this subsection of the statute applies in this case, we 
note that the charges in this case were in writing and were sent 
to the plaintiff.  The record does not indicate, however, that 
the police chief filed the written charges with the president.  
The plaintiff apparently advised the president and the Board of 
the written charges.  We conclude that this notification was 
sufficient to satisfy the statute.  It would defeat the purpose 
of § 62.13(5)(em) to allow the police chief and the Board to 
reduce the rank of a subordinate and circumvent § 62.13(5)(em) 
by failing to file charges with the president. 
                                                                  
applies 
to 
proceedings 
of 
a 
disciplinary 
nature. . . .  
Appellants 
were 
not 
disciplined.  
Appellants were ineligible for employment because they 
did not reside in the city.  Section 62.13(5) is 
inapplicable 
to 
terminations 
which 
are 
not 
disciplinary. 
 
Eastman, 117 Wis. 2d at 115 (citing Kaiser v. Board of 
Police and Fire Comm’rs, 104 Wis. 2d at 502-03). 
In Hussey v. Outagamie County, 201 Wis. 2d 14, 548 N.W.2d 
848 (Ct. App. 1996), a deputy sheriff was discharged in his 
first year of employment during his probationary period because 
of poor performance.  The court of appeals applied the reasoning 
of Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d 498, and held that the deputy sheriff 
could be discharged without following the procedures of Wis. 
Stat. § 59.26(8)(b), a provision similar to § 62.13(5).  In 
contrast to Eastman, language in Hussey appears to reject the 
interpretation that § 62.13(5)(em) is limited to terminations 
based on disciplinary charges.  Hussey, 201 Wis. 2d at 20. 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
16
¶28 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
plaintiff's claim satisfies the elements set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.13(5)(em).  We therefore conclude that the defendants 
proceeded on an incorrect theory of law in denying the plaintiff 
the procedure set forth under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em).  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
97-3818 
 
 
1