Title: ALBERT A. McCARTY v. BEAR CREEK URANIUM COMPANY, STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ALBERT A. McCARTY v. BEAR CREEK URANIUM COMPANY, STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION1985 WY 8694 P.2d 93Case Number: 84-65Decided: 01/23/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALBERT A. McCARTY, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

BEAR CREEK URANIUM 
COMPANY, APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT), STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, 
for appellant.

D. Thomas Kidd, 
Casper, for appellee-employer, and A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, 
Deputy Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee-objector; oral argument by Kidd & 
Blonigen.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
denial of a permanent partial disability award under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act. We reverse and remand.

[¶2.]     Appellant suffered a 
compensable injury while working for Bear Creek Uranium Company and was awarded 
temporary total disability. Subsequently appellant applied for a seventy-five 
percent permanent partial disability based on loss of earnings as evidenced by 
income tax returns filed both before and after the injury. The depositions of 
two doctors were introduced by stipulation of the parties. Dr. Beehler, a 
neurosurgeon, testified by deposition to a disability of five to ten percent 
based on subjective symptoms. Dr. Ropp, an orthopedic surgeon, testified by 
deposition that appellant had a ten percent permanent impairment of the body as 
a whole. The district court denied appellant's claim of permanent partial 
disability.

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"1. Whether 
Employee-Claimant is entitled to seventy-five percent (75%) permanent partial 
disability or some part thereof as a result of a loss of income attributable 
solely to his injury under § 27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977.

"2. Whether 
Employee-Claimant is entitled to ten percent (10%) permanent partial disability 
based upon the impairment to which all medical personnel have testified pursuant 
to § 27-12-403(a), W.S. 1977."

[¶4.]     Section 27-12-403, W.S. 
1977, states in pertinent part:

"(a) Permanent partial 
disability means the loss or permanent impairment of a limb or sense, or any 
other injury known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent impairment of 
a bodily function.

* * * * * 
*

"(h) For any other injury 
known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent partial disability, the 
employee shall receive compensation in the amount proportional to the extent of 
permanent partial disability based as near as may be upon the foregoing 
schedule. One (1) factor to be considered is the ability of the employee to 
continue to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training prior to the injury."

In worker's 
compensation law, disability means an impairment of earning capacity. Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah Second Injury Fund, 
Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (1981). We have previously held that some medical statement of total 
disability or a percentage of partial disability is necessary. Conn v. Ed Wederski Const. Co., Wyo., 668 P.2d 649 (1983); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862 (1979). However, the court is not 
bound by medical testimony; non-medical witnesses and evidence are competent to 
prove disability. State, ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Comp. Div. v. Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984). Medical testimony alone does 
not necessarily determine the type of award which should be given. 
Employers Mutual of Wausau v. Eidson, Colo. 
App., 646 P.2d 959 (1982).

"The concept of 
disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is 
not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to 
that impairment. An award for compensation must be supported by a finding that 
the claimant suffered a compensable disability or, more precisely, a decrease in 
earning capacity to a work-connected injury or illness. Factors to be considered 
in making this finding include not only the extent of the injury, but also age, 
education, employment available in the area for persons with the capabilities in 
question, and intentions as to employment in the future." (Footnote omitted.) Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board, Alaska, 524 P.2d 264, 266 
(1974).

[¶5.]     Generally the loss of 
earning power of the worker is the theoretical basis for allowance of 
compensation. Daugherty v. National 
Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957). The evidence 
of wages earned by the employee is material to the question of the employee's 
earning capacity and entitled to whatever weight the fact finder gives to it. Peloso, Inc. v. Peloso, 103 R.I. 294, 
237 A.2d 320 (1968).

"A workman's post-injury 
earnings is evidence which, depending upon the circumstances of an individual 
case, may be of great, little, or no importance in determining loss of earning 
capacity." Ford v. State Accident Ins. 
Fund, 7 Or. App. 549, 492 P.2d 491, 493 (1972). See also, Matter of Compensation of Jacobs, 59 Or. 
App. 1, 650 P.2d 154 (1982).

However,

"[w]hile the wages or 
earnings of a workman may be evidence, varying in its probative value according 
to the circumstances, of his earning power or capacity, it is obvious that the 
extent, if any, to which the workman's earning capacity is affected by the 
injury complained of is not necessarily measured by the difference between his 
earnings before and after the injury, since the amount of his actual earnings 
may be affected by various extraneous matters. Ordinarily, any loss of earnings 
which is not attributable to the injury, as, for example, loss due to the 
workman's fault subsequent to the accident, or to his illness not connected with 
the accident, or to a general business depression, is not to be considered in 
determining the amount of compensation. Loss of earnings due to inability to 
obtain work is to be considered in determining the amount of compensation 
insofar, but only insofar, as such inability is attributable to the injury." 
(Footnotes omitted.) 82 Am.Jur.2d Workmen's Compensation § 347, p. 
145.

If jobs are 
unavailable because of economic conditions and the worker would not be hired 
regardless of his physical condition, then he has suffered no economic loss 
because of his industrial injury. Wiedmaier v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 
Ariz. 127, 589 P.2d 1 (1978).

[¶6.]     The claimant in the 
worker's compensation case has the burden of establishing every essential 
element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982). The claimant must 
show the extent of his injury, the disability, or loss of earning power. 
Jennings v. CM&W Drilling Co., 77 Wyo. 69, 307 P.2d 122 
(1957). He must show that he is entitled to the award sought. Matter of Hasser, Wyo., 
647 P.2d 66 (1982).

[¶7.]     In the present case, 
the judge stated in his order that:

"I am not aware of any 
section of the Worker's Compensation Statutes which would allow me to determine 
a percentage of disability because an injured worker has suffered a decrease in 
his income. Of course, any reduced income 
can be occasioned for many reasons, especially in these economic times. 

"However, this is all 
beside the point. The Worker's Compensation law provides for disability to be 
determined by a Doctor's determination of the percentage of disability. Perhaps 
you should have Mr. McCarty reexamined by his doctor or request the appointment 
of another physician. On the basis of your petition I will not set another 
hearing." (Emphasis added.)

Factors other 
than medical evidence may be considered in determining the amount of the award. 
State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. 
Div. v. Colvin, supra. Loss of income can be considered in appropriate 
cases. It seems that the judge was not persuaded that the seventy-five percent 
reduction in income as evidenced by income tax returns was sufficient evidence 
in itself to prove that the loss of appellant's income was directly caused by 
appellant's injury. Loss of income does not per se equal compensable disability. 
To the extent that the order reflects a viewpoint that disability can only be 
determined by a doctor's determination of the percentage of disability, it is 
incorrect. Non-medical relevant factors can and should be 
considered.

[¶8.]     It is obvious that in 
denying the application for seventy-five percent permanent partial disability, 
the trial court simply overlooked the five to ten percent impairment testified 
to by the two doctors. This evidence was undisputed. An application for an award 
of any percentage of compensation includes an application for any lesser amount 
that the court may deem appropriate. A claimant is not bound by the amount asked 
for. It is not an all-or-nothing proposition. The court can award any lesser 
amount established by the evidence. Although we have not specifically said this, 
it is the clear import of our previous holdings. See, State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div. 
v. Colvin, supra; Fox v. Hubbard 
Drilling Co., Wyo., 401 P.2d 706 (1965). Therefore, this case is remanded to 
district court for further consideration of the amount that should be awarded 
the worker for permanent partial disability based upon the record made and the 
evidence before the court all consistent with this 
opinion.

[¶9.]     Reversed and 
remanded.

ROONEY, Justice, 
dissenting.

I.

[¶10.]  I believe it not only to be extremely 
speculative and unreliable to gauge the extent of permanent partial disability 
only on evidence of reduced earnings, 
but it is also not statutorily authorized.

[¶11.]  In worker's compensation cases, judicial 
decisions from other states are of little or no help in Wyoming cases inasmuch as 
our worker's compensation law is not duplicated in other states. Our law 
designedly restricts consideration to the effect an injury has on the ability to 
work, not the ability to earn money.

"* * * One (1) factor to 
be considered is the ability of the employee to continue to perform work for which he 
was reasonably suited by experience or training prior to the injury." (Emphasis 
added.) Section 27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977.

The trial judge 
was definitely correct in stating in his order that:

"I am not aware 
of any section of the Worker's Compensation Statutes which would allow me to 
determine a percentage of disability because an injured worker has suffered a 
decrease in his income. * * *"

[¶12.]  In State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division v. Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984), we noted the propriety of 
evidence relating to the decreased ability of the claimant to perform work for 
which he was reasonably suited before the injury, but we carefully refrained 
from gauging the disability by comparable earnings. Now, in this case, we are 
opening the door into an uncontrollable evidentiary area of speculation 
deliberately avoided by the legislature.

II.

[¶13.]  I have no strong objection to a remand of 
the case for the purpose of taking correct medical evidence as to a percentage 
of permanent partial disability, but I do not think a proper showing has been 
made to us for such action.

[¶14.]  Appellant's pleadings in this case (the 
claim) made no mention of an issue based on medical evidence. The claim simply 
asserted a 25% permanent partial disability "as shown by earning losses." Now, 
on appeal, for the first time appellant asks for consideration of 2 1/2-year-old 
depositions of medical doctors assigning a 5% to 10% and a 10% permanent 
disability. The adverse parties had no notice of this contention and no 
opportunity to update or otherwise verify or contest the assertion. We do not 
normally give relief under such circumstances. Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration 
Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 (1983); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981); Harris v. 
Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 (1979); Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352 (1979); Kearney Lake, Land & 
Reservoir Company v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Company, Wyo., 475 P.2d 548 
(1970); Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 (1963).

[¶15.]  Appellant ought not be allowed to inject 
a new theory and issue for the first time on appeal. Again, a precedent with 
far-reaching results is being established by the majority 
opinion.

III.

[¶16.]  I am unwilling to overrule our previous 
positions in both of these respects, and I would affirm the trial 
court.