Title: Thompson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Thompson v. State, No. 126, September Term, 2008
                                                                                                                                                
EVIDENCE; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED
CRIMINAL CONDUCT ENGAGED IN BY A DEFENDANT WHEN THE
DEFENDANT WAS A JUVENILE:  The admissibility of other crimes evidence
allegedly committed by the defendant when the defendant was a juvenile, but never
presented in a juvenile court proceeding, is governed by Maryland Rule 5-404(b) rather
than by CJ Section 3-8A-23.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MARYLAND RULE 4-204; AMENDMENT TO
CHARGING DOCUMENT:  An amendment to a charging document that changes only
the date of the alleged offense and/or the location at which the offense allegedly occurred
does not change the “character of the offense.”  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 126
September Term, 2008
                                                                                 
KARL LYMONT THOMPSON
    
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                                 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                                 
Opinion by Murphy, J.
Bell, C.J., Greene and Eldridge, JJ., Dissent.
________________________________________
Filed:   February 17, 2010
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Karl Lymont Thompson,
Petitioner, of second-degree rape and related offenses.  The State’s evidence, which
included the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to establish that Petitioner committed the
rape in 1986 and committed a third-degree sex offense in 1983.  Petitioner does not argue
to the contrary.  He does argue, however, that he is entitled to a new trial.  After the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions in Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App.
74, 955 A.2d 802 (2008), he filed a petition for writ of certiorari in which he presented
this Court with two questions:  
I.
MAY 
EVIDENCE 
OF 
THE 
[PETITIONER’S]
UNCHARGED JUVENILE CONDUCT BE ADMITTED
IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION GIVEN THAT
JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AND THE EVIDENCE
THEREIN ARE INADMISSIBLE?
II.
DOES AMENDING THE INDICTMENT TO CHARGE
THAT 
A 
CRIME 
OCCURRED 
DURING A
DIFFERENT TIME-FRAME AND AT A DIFFERENT
LOCATION CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE
SEXUAL OFFENSE WHEN MULTIPLE OFFENSES
ARE ALLEGED?
We granted the petition.  406 Md. 744, 962 A.d 371 (2008).  For the reasons that
follow, we answer “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second.  We shall therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Background
The record shows that Petitioner was 40 years of age when the conduct at issue
was reported to a law enforcement officer.  The Court of Special Appeals provided the
following factual background: 
2
On May 10, 2005, [the victim] then thirty-one years of
age and a resident of San Diego, California, spoke by telephone
with Detective Edward Scott Jones of the Baltimore City Police
Department, informing him that, beginning in 1978, when she
was approximately five years old, until 1986, when she was
thirteen, she had been sexually abused by her uncle, [Petitioner],
on numerous occasions.   She stated that she had not previously
reported any of these incidents because she had been told by a
mental health counselor that “it was too late” to do so.
* * *
At trial, the court permitted [the victim] to testify about five
specific instances of sexual abuse. The first of the five
incidents occurred in the summer of 1978, at the Lynview
home, when [the victim] was “approximately five” years old
and appellant was fourteen years old. Because of appellant’s
juvenile status at that time, the State never charged appellant
with any crimes associated with this incident. The second
incident took place during a school vacation in 1983, when
[the victim] was ten years old and appellant was nineteen and
an adult. The third and fourth incidents happened during the
summers of 1984 and 1985 at her grandparents’ Hampstead
home, when [the victim] was about eleven years of age and
appellant was twenty. The charges stemming from these
incidents were dismissed during trial for lack of jurisdiction.
The fifth incident occurred in November 1986, when [the
victim] was thirteen and was staying at the Goodnow Road
apartment of appellant, who was then twenty-two.
 
* * *
With respect to the 1986 incident, [the victim] testified
that it occurred while she was visiting appellant at his apartment
on Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, during her Thanksgiving
school break. Appellant was then living at that address with his
girlfriend, Stephanie Perry. [The victim] recalled that one
evening, before appellant left for work, he provided her with a
shirt to sleep in and told her she could share a bed with Ms.
Perry. She then recounted how later that night, when appellant
3
returned home, he “got into bed” with her and Ms. Perry and
how she later awoke to find “his penis inside of [her],” while
Ms. Perry slept.
* * *
Over appellant’s objection, the circuit court permitted
[the victim] to testify that she had been sexually abused by
appellant as early as 1978, at her grandparents’ Lynview
home, when she was “[a]pproximately five” and appellant was
fourteen years old.  Although appellant was never charged,
either as a juvenile or an adult, with any offenses
stemming from this incident, the court ruled that such
testimony was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). It
reasoned that because “the . . . testimony would involve acts
by the same Defendant against the same victim . . . and the
acts [were] of the [same] general nature,” the evidence was
admissible as proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, common
scheme, plan and absence of mistake or accident.” [The
victim] then testified as follows:
I woke up to [appellant] touching me
between my legs with his hands and with his
penis. It hurt. I started to whimper a little bit and
I said to him that I need to go to the bathroom. I
didn’t need to go to the bathroom. I just wanted
to remove myself from the room. I went into the
[] bathroom and . . . s[a]t on the toilet. I
remember . . . my feet didn’t touch the floor.
And I left the bathroom, [] I went [] into my
aunt’s room . . . a different bedroom and I just
laid on her floor. And then he came into the
room after and asked why I didn’t come back. I
didn’t answer and he climbed into my aunt’s
bed.
Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App. 73, 78-81, 955 A.2d 802, 806-807 (2008).  (Footnotes
omitted).
4
Discussion
I.
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the Circuit
Court erred in admitting into evidence the victim’s testimony about the “uncharged 1978
incident, which occurred when [Petitioner] was 14 years old.”  The Circuit Court ruled
that evidence of the 1978 incident was admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b), which
provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
It is clear that the ruling at issue did not violate Md. Rule 5-404(b), which
codified the “sexual propensity” exception to the general rule excluding “other crimes”
evidence.  As this Court stated in Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d 1231 (1989),
the “sexual propensity” exception is applicable to evidence of “prior illicit sexual acts
[which] are similar to the offense for which the accused is being tried and involve the
same victim.”   Id. at 466, 554 A.2d at 1234.  Before Md. Rule 5-404(b) was adopted,
this Court stated:    
The primary policy consideration underlying the rule
against other crimes evidence “is that this type of evidence
will prejudice the jury against the accused because of the
jury’s tendency to infer that the accused is a ‘bad man’ who
should be punished regardless of his guilt of the charged
5
crime, or to infer that he committed the charged crime due to
a criminal disposition.” Yet, in the area of sex crimes,
particularly child molestation, “courts have been likely to
admit proof of prior acts to show a party’s conformity with
past conduct.” Professor McLain suggests that this relaxation
of the general prohibition is “probably because the character
evidence is believed to have greater probative value in those
circumstances.”  In sex crimes cases the special relevance of
the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal
propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on
the same victim.
Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the State
offers evidence of prior sexual criminal acts of the same type
by the accused against the same victim, the law of evidence
already has concluded that, in general, the probative value, as
substantive evidence that the defendant committed the crime
charged, outweighs the inherent prejudicial effect. The
discretion exercised by the trial judge in weighing unfair
prejudice against probative value is concerned with special
features in the particular case.
Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233, 1238 (1993) (Citations omitted).  The
record shows that the Circuit Court (1) was not clearly erroneous in finding that the
sexual offenses committed by Petitioner against the very same victim in 1978 had been 
proven by “clear and convincing” evidence, and had “special” probative value, and (2)
did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence on the ground that its probative
value outweighed the danger of unfair “bad actor” prejudice against Petitioner. 
Petitioner argues that Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
1  This Court has stated that "[t]he raison d'etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that
a child does not commit a crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not a
criminal.”  In re Darryl D., 308 Md. 475, 481, 520 A.2d 712, 715 (1987) (quoting
Matter of Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 104, 299 A.2d 856, 860 (1973)); see also Moore v.
Miley, 372 Md. 663, 673-74, 814 A.2d 557, 563 (2003) (“‘[T]he keystone of Maryland's
disposition of juvenile delinquents is that ‘the moral responsibility or blameworthiness of
the child [is] of no consequence,’ such that delinquency adjudication is seen as the
opportunity for the State to provide needed rehabilitative intervention.” (quoting Victor
B., 336 Md. [85] at 91-92, 646 A.2d [1012] at 1015)).  Accordingly, “[j]uvenile
proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules
developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the Court of Appeals.”  Victor B., 336
Md. at 96, 646 A.2d at 1017.
6
Article (CJ § 3-8A-23) prohibits the State from introducing evidence of “criminal acts,1
or wrongs” that were committed by an adult defendant when he or she was a juvenile. 
That statute, in pertinent part, provides: 
§ 3-8A-23.  Effect of proceedings under [the Juvenile
Causes Act] subtitle.
(b) Adjudication and disposition not admissible as evidence. 
An adjudication and disposition of a child pursuant to this
subtitle are not admissible as evidence against the child:
   (1) In any criminal proceeding prior to conviction; or
   (2) In any adjudicatory hearing on a petition alleging    
   delinquency; or
   (3) In any civil proceeding not conducted under this 
   subtitle.
(c) Evidence given in proceeding under this subtitle
inadmissible in criminal proceeding. Evidence given in a
proceeding under this subtitle is not admissible against the
child in any other proceeding in another court, except in a
criminal proceeding where the child is charged with perjury
and the evidence is relevant to that charge and is otherwise 
admissible.
2  See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), and
Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 792 A.2d 736 (2008) (stating that a trial judge does
not have discretion to admit evidence that must be excluded as a matter of law) (quoting
Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 82-83, 919 A.2d 1177, 1186 (2007)).
7
According to Petitioner, because Md. Rule 5-404(b) must be read in light of the
policy underlying the Juvenile Causes Act, evidence of unadjudicated juvenile acts
allegedly committed by an adult defendant is inadmissible as a matter of law in
subsequent criminal proceedings. Trial judges do not have discretion to admit evidence
that is inadmissible as a matter of law.  The issue of whether  CJ § 3-8A-23 “trumps”
Md. Rule 5-404(b) presents a question of law.2   
The State argues that the Circuit Court was correct in its conclusion that the
admissibility of the evidence at issue was controlled by Md. Rule 5-404(b) because the
statutory prohibition in CJ § 3-8A-23 does not apply to evidence that was never
presented in a juvenile proceeding.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed with that
argument.  So do we.  
To resolve a question of law that is controlled by a statute, this Court must
“identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.”  Serio v.
Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004) (quoting Drew v. First
Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003)).  While this Court
must be guided by the plain language of the applicable statute, we must “read statutory
language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the ‘purpose, aim, or
8
policy of the enacting body.’”  Serio, 384 Md. at 390, 863 A.2d at 962 (quoting Drew,
379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; citing Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349, 
800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346
(2001)).  
Having applied these principles to the issue before us, we agree with the Court of
Special Appeals that “the purpose and plain language of § 3-8A-23 does not provide a
basis for extending its application to the uncharged juvenile misconduct in this case.” 
Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App. 74, 87, 955 A.2d 802, 810 (2008).  “A court may
neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle
interpretations that limit or extend its application.”  Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835
A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003).  “Juvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive
scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and
the Court of Appeals.”  In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 96, 646 A.2d 1012, 1017 (1994).  If
the General Assembly intended to exclude evidence of other crimes allegedly committed
by an adult defendant when the defendant was a juvenile, but never presented in a
juvenile court proceeding, the General Assembly would certainly have placed that
restriction in CJ § 3-8A-23.  We therefore conclude that the admissibility of the evidence
at issue is controlled by Md. Rule 5-404(b).  
Our conclusion is consistent with the holding of State v. Shedrick, 574 N.E.2d
3 The Ohio legislature amended R.C. 2151.358(H), effective July 31, 1992.  That
statute now provides:
Evidence of a judgment rendered and the disposition of a child
under that judgment is not admissible to impeach the credibility
of the child in any action or proceeding. Otherwise, the
disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any
evidence given in court is admissible as evidence for or against
a child in any action or proceeding in any court in accordance
with the Rules of Evidence and also may be considered by any
court as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation.
9
1065 (Ohio 1991), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio was presented with two
conflicting interpretations of a statute that, prior to July 1, 1992,3 provided:
"The judgment rendered by the court under this chapter
shall not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed
by conviction of a crime in that the child is not a criminal by
reason of the adjudication, nor shall any child be charged or
convicted of a crime in any court except as provided by this
chapter. The disposition of a child under the judgment
rendered or any evidence given in court is not admissible as
evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in
any other court, except that the judgment rendered and the
disposition of the child may be considered by any court only
as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation.
The disposition or evidence shall not operate to disqualify a
child in any future civil service examination, appointment, or
application."
R.C. 2151.358(H) (Emphasis supplied).  
In the Common Pleas Court of Summit County, Ohio, a jury convicted Donald
Shedrick of the aggravated murder and rape of a thirteen year old girl, Lori E., whose
body was discovered on December 15, 1988.  The State’s case against Shedrick included
10
evidence that, in 1987, he raped a thirteen year old girl, Christine Y.  Shedrick noted an
appeal to the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Appellate District, and presented that Court
with two assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“The trial court erred in admitted evidence of prior acts
of the defendant when such evidence and such acts had been
the subject of a prior juvenile court adjudication.”
* * *
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“The trial court erred in allowing the admission of
prior acts of the defendant to prove identity, plan, scheme or
design.”
A divided three-judge panel of the intermediate appellate court held that neither
assignment was “well taken,” and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
That panel, however, (1) acknowledged that the majority’s disposition of the first
assignment of error was “in conflict with the judgment upon the same question by the
Court of Appeals of the Eighth Appellate District,” (2) concluded that this conflict should
be resolved by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and (3) therefore entered a JOURNAL
ENTRY that included the following provisions:  
The question of law upon which the conflict of opinion
exists is whether a person who testified in a juvenile court
proceeding is precluded by R.C. 2151.358(h) from testifying on
the same subject in any other case or proceeding in any other
court.
11
Therefore, the record of State v. Shedrick . . . is hereby
certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio for review and final
determination.
While holding that a remand was necessary to determine whether the evidence of
the 1987 rape should have been excluded on the ground that the witnesses who testified
about that crime (Christine Y., Christine’s mother, and a detective who investigated the
1987 case) had previously testified against Shedrick in juvenile court, the Supreme Court
of Ohio (1) explained what constitutes “evidence given in [juvenile] court,” and (2)
rejected Shedrick’s argument that the evidence of the 1987 rape should have been
excluded under Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.  
On the issue of what does -- and does not -- constitute “evidence given in
[juvenile] court,” the Supreme Court stated: 
When evidence is given in the form of testimony, it is the
essential subject matter of the testimony which constitutes the
evidence and not the precise words used. The transcript is not
the "evidence," but only a record of the evidence. Therefore,
where a witness has testified in a juvenile proceeding, R.C.
2151.358(H) prohibits that witness from giving essentially the
same testimony in any other criminal case or criminal
proceeding. Accordingly we hold that, under R.C. 2151.358(H),
testimony, documents, or exhibits, presented as evidence against
a juvenile in a juvenile proceeding, are inadmissible against the
juvenile in any other criminal case or criminal proceeding
except ones in which the same underlying alleged crime is being
adjudicated. 
* * *
Our interpretation of R.C. 2151.358(H) does not end the
inquiry necessary to decide this case. Appellant argues that the
4 Upon remand to the trial court, the State stipulated that (1) the testimony of
Christine, her mother, and the investigating officer was presented to the jury, and (2) that
testimony was inadmissible under R.C. 2151.358(H) because it was similar to the
testimony presented by those witnesses in the juvenile proceeding that preceded the jury
trial.  The trial court found, however, that the admission of that evidence was “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that decision was affirmed in State v. Shedrick, 610
12
"spirit" of R.C. 2151.358(H) precludes the use of any evidence
which formed the basis of prior juvenile disposition. . . .
Appellant argues that even if he pled guilty to the allegations of
a juvenile complaint, any evidence which could have been used
against him is inadmissible in a subsequent case. . . . 
We do not agree. This argument is also resolved by the
language of R.C. 2151.358(H). The language is unambiguous
in its prohibition against "any evidence given in [juvenile]
court." The statute does not exclude evidence that might
have been given in juvenile court.
* * *
Because of the discrepancy between the facts represented
by state's counsel at oral argument and the facts suggested by the
record, we must remand the case to the trial court for a
disposition in accordance with the law as we have set it forth. If
C.Y., her mother, or [the officer who investigated the 1987
case] testified at the juvenile proceeding, then R.C.
2151.358(H) bars the testimony of those witnesses in this
case to the extent that such testimony is essentially the same
as that previously given. O n the other hand, if any one of
these three witnesses did not testify at the juvenile
proceeding or if their testimony in the instant case was not
essentially the same, then such testimony would be
admissible in the instant case. Finally, if evidence was
admitted in this case in violation of R.C. 2151.358(H), the trial
court must determine whether the effect was prejudicial and
whether a new trial is warranted for Shedrick.
Id. at 1068-69.  (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted).4   
N.E.2d 1147 (Ohio App. 1992).  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied
Shedrick’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Shedrick v. Ohio, 508 U.S. 923, 113 S.Ct. 2374
(1993).  
13
As to Shedrick’s argument that evidence of the 1987 rape should have been
excluded under Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court stated:
In the case before us the identity of the perpetrator is at issue
because Shedrick denies that [he committed the crime]...We
conclude the similarities between the two crimes is sufficient. 
The evidence of the first rape tends to show the identity of the
perpetrator of the second.  Therefore, evidence of Shedrick’s
prior rape of C.Y. meets the requirements for admission set by
Evid. R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 [notwithstanding that the
defendant was a juvenile].
Id. at 1070. 
Our conclusion is also consistent with the holdings of State v. Collier, 892 S.W.2d
686 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994), and People v. Whittington, 74 Cal. App. 3d 806 (1977).  In
Collier, while affirming a murder conviction, the Court of Appeals of Missouri held that a
statute similar to § 3-8A-23 did not prohibit the State from introducing evidence of the
defendant’s uncharged juvenile misconduct.  The Collier Court stated:
Although the defendant was a minor when the above
incidents of burglary and robbery occurred, it appears that he
was never subjected to juvenile proceedings for any of them. 
Nor were the questions on cross-examination designed to
elicit statements made to juvenile authorities or matters
pertaining to any juvenile proceedings.
Id. at 691. 
In Whittington, the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District,
14
Division Two, affirmed a rape conviction based in part upon evidence of another rape
allegedly committed by the defendant while he was a juvenile, on the ground that the
evidence at issue “clearly raises a reasonable and strong inference that defendant . . . was
also the perpetrator of the instant crime.” 74 Cal. App. 3d at 816.  In support of that
conclusion, the Whittington Court stated:  
Here both offenses: 1) occurred at about the same time,
5 p.m. and 7 p.m., and in the same general vicinity, i.e.,
several blocks from one another and from defendant’s
residence at 15 Middle Street; 2) began near an apartment
house when defendant approached the victim on a public
street; 3) included defendant’s attempt to initiate a friendly
conversation with the victim; 4) occurred in a garbage
collection area near the street; 5) were initiated by the
defendant’s sudden seizure of victims with his hand clamped
over the mouth; 6) ostensibly were for the purpose of robbery,
as each victim was asked for money; 7) occurred while both
defendant and his victims were only partially disrobed; he
removed only his pants and each victim, only her pantyhose;
8) were consummated in a short period of time; 9) defendant
told the victims not to worry because he was not diseased and
that he had not had sexual relations for a long time; 10)
defendant engaged the victims in conversation after
consummation of the crime; 11) neither victim sustained any
physical injury other than the accomplishment of the sexual
act; 12) each victim was a young attractive Caucasian woman;
and 13) defendant offered the identical alibi defense – his
presence at Walton’s residence within walking distance of
each incident.
Id. at 815-16.  
For the reasons stated above, we hold that CJ § 3-8A-23 simply does not apply to
the testimony presented by the State in the case at bar, which was clearly admissible under
5 Our holding is not inconsistent with State v. Dixon, 656 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1983).  That case presented the issue of whether an adult defendant could be cross-
examined about whether he had -- when he was a juvenile -- committed acts that had
resulted in delinquency adjudications.  The prosecutor in that case conceded that a
delinquency adjudication was not a “conviction” for purposes of Tennessee’s
“impeachment by conviction” rule, but argued that the defendant could be questioned
about the conduct that resulted in the delinquency adjudications.  The trial court accepted
that argument, but the appellate court did not.  In the case at bar, Petitioner was not
questioned about conduct that had been the subject of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. 
6 The statutes cited in the indictment, which were in effect in 1986, were
transferred to the Criminal Law Article (CL) by Chapter 26, Acts of 2002.  Second degree
rape is proscribed by CL § 3-304.  Sexual offense in the third degree is proscribed by CL
§ 3-307.  Sexual offense in the fourth degree is proscribed by CL § 3-308.  Assault in the
second degree is proscribed by CL § 3-203.  
15
Md. Rule 5-404(b), and which had never been “given” in a juvenile proceeding.5
               
II. 
The indictment that the Circuit Court amended on its own initiative, in pertinent
part,6 asserted:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
State of Maryland -vs- Karl Thompson Defendant(s)
Date of Offense: 05/01/86 - 08/31/86
Location: 5429 Lynview Avenue
Complainant: [The victim’s name] 
INDICTMENT
The Jurors of the State of Maryland for the body of the City of
Baltimore, do on their own oath present that aforesaid
DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, heretofore on or about the
date(s) of offense set forth above, at the location(s) set forth above,
16
in the City of Baltimore, State of Maryland, feloniously did
COMMIT the CRIME of RAPE in the 2nd DEGREE, as defined in
Article 27, Sections 461 and 463 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland, upon the aforesaid Complainant; contrary to the form of
the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against
the peace, government and dignity of the State. 
SECOND COUNT
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further
present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on the
said date(s), at said place, at the City aforesaid, feloniously did
commit the crime of SEXUAL OFFENSE in the 3rd DEGREE, in
violation of Article 27, Sections 461 and 464B of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, upon the aforesaid complainant; contrary to the
form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and
against the peace, government and dignity of the State. 
THIRD COUNT
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further
present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on said
date(s), at the said place, at the City aforesaid, unlawfully did commit
the crime of SEXUAL OFFENSE in the 4th DEGREE, in violation of
Article 27, Section 461 and 464C of the Annotated Code of
Maryland, upon aforesaid Complainant; contrary to the form of the
Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the
peace, government and dignity of the State. 
FOURTH COUNT
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further
present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on the
said date(s), at the said place, at the City aforesaid, unlawfully did
ASSAULT [the victim] in the SECOND DEGREE in violation of
Article 27, Section 12A; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly
in such case made and provided and against the peace, government,
17
and dignity of the State. 
The verdict sheet pertaining to this indictment contains the following questions
and answers:
VERDICT SHEET
1. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at
Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the
Defendant, KARL THOMPSON, did commit the crime of
Rape in the Second Degree against [the victim]?
Not Guilty _______           Guilty       yes      
2. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at
Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the
Defendant, KARL THOMPSON[, d]id commit the crime of
Sexual Offense in the Third Degree against [the victim]? 
Not Guilty _______           Guilty        yes      
3. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at
Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the
Defendant, KARL THOMPSON[, d]id commit the crime of
Sexual Offense in the Fourth Degree against [the victim]?
Not Guilty _______           Guilty        yes      
4. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at
Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the
Defendant, KARL THOMPSON[, d]id commit the crime of
Assault in the Second Degree against [the victim]?
GUILTY
The record shows that the Circuit Court ruled as follows at the close of the State’s
18
case:
[O]n my own initiative, I make this amendment finding it
would not be a change in the character of the offenses. I
would note that the character of the offense described by [the
 victim] . . . was substantially the same as that described in her
written statement [to Detective Worts] of May 11th[, 2005,]
which the Court has had an opportunity to review, and that
her in-court testimony . . . differed from the indictments . . .
only with respect to Thanksgiving and the location.  I will
moreover note that the defense has been aware of the location
variance since before trial, because it was told to me prior to trial
that her testimony with respect to the 1986 events [would be]
that they occurred at [the] Goodnow Road [location] and not at
the Lynview Avenue location. While it is unclear why the State
has not made [a] motion [to amend the indictment] before . . . it
should come as no surprise to the defense that the indictments
were to be amended.  I will also note that the Court is not
[making] any . . .  substantiative changes with respect to [the]
indictments. . . .  [C]hanging the date of the offense in the
indictment constitutes a matter of form and not  substance . . .
and it may be amended in the Court’s discretion without
changing the character of the offense.
From our review of the record, the victim never stated that the 1986 offenses
occurred at the Lynview Avenue address.  Although the victim was unable to provide
Detective Wortz with the exact address, she stated that the 1986 offenses occurred at the
“studio apartment type of thing” where Petitioner was living at that time.  Prior to the date
of his indictments, Petitioner was arrested on a warrant issued by a District Court
Commissioner, who was presented with an Application for Statement of Charges that
included the following: 
APPLICATION FOR STATEMENT OF CHARGES
19
I, [Detective Jones], apply for a statement of charges and a
summons or warrant which may lead to the arrest of the named
Defendant because on or about 1 Jan.79 - 31 Dec. 86 at 5429
Lynview Ave. Baltimore Md. 21215 and 5105 Goodnow Rd.
Baltimore Md. 21206, the above named Defendant Did sexually
abuse and rape [the victim] F/B/31 DOB 07/29/1973 from the
time she was 6 to the time she was 13 years of age. 
The Statement of Charges filed pursuant to this Application mistakenly asserted
that all of the offenses occurred at the Lynview Avenue address, and this clerical mistake
was not corrected when the indictments were filed.  
According to Petitioner, he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that this ruling
violated  Md. Rule 4-202, which provides:
On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any
time before verdict may permit a charging document to be
amended except that if the amendment changes the character
of the offenses charged, the consent of the parties is required.
If amendment of a charging document reasonably so requires,
the court shall grant the defendant an extension of time or
continuance.
Petitioner argues that, even though the amendments at issue changed only the
period of time within which the crimes occurred and the location at which the crimes
occurred, those amendments changed “the character of the offenses charged.”  While
rejecting this argument, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
“Matters relating to the character of the offense are
those facts that must be proved to make the act complained of
a crime.” Tapscott v. State, 106 Md. App. 109, 134, 664 A.2d
42 (1995). Consequently, the only change to an indictment
that requires the consent of the parties is one that would alter
the elements of the crime charged. And, thus, “[a]n indictment
20
may be corrected without the defendant's consent if the
amendment does not alter any of the elements of the offense
and results in no prejudice.” Tapscott, 106 Md. App. at 134[,
664 A.2d at 54]. 
* * *
We have repeatedly held that the date that an
indictment alleges that the criminal conduct occurred “may be
amended in the court’s discretion without changing the
character of the offense.” Manuel [v. State], 85 Md. App. [1,]
18-19[, 581 A.2d 1287, 1295 (1991)].  See . . . Tucker v.
State, 5 Md. App. 32, 35, 245 A.2d 109[, 111] (1967)
(declaring that “[i]t is well-established that the State is not
confined in its proof to the date alleged in the charging
document”). Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in amending the date stated in the indictment. 
Nor does the amendment changing the location of the
conduct charged from one address to another within
Baltimore City change the character of the offense charged. In
Makins v. State, 6 Md. App. 466, 470, 252 A.2d 15, 17
(1969), we held that the trial court did not err in permitting
the State to amend an indictment to reflect the correct address
at which the alleged daytime housebreaking occurred. We
explained: “The incident as drawn clearly charged the
appellant with the crime of daytime housebreaking with intent
to steal the personal goods of another. Each of the elements of
that crime was alleged, without regard to the particular
apartment number specified, and none of the essential
elements of the offense were changed by the amendment.” Id.
(Internal citation omitted). The same reasoning applies here.
The indictment set forth the elements of the offense charged
without regard to the particular house address, and therefore,
“none of the essential elements of the offense were changed”
by the amendment of the address. 
Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App. at 98-100, 955 A.2d at 817.  We agree with that
analysis.  
21
In Makins, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon Corbin v. State, 237 Md. 486, 
206A.2d 809 (1965), in which this Court stated:
As to what constitutes substance and what is merely formal in
an indictment, it may be said that all facts which must be
proved to make the act complained of a crime are matters of
substance, and that all else -- including the order of
arrangement and precise words, unless they alone will convey
the proper meaning -- is formal.
 
Id. at 489-90, 206 A.2d at 811.  An amendment that constitutes merely a “matter of form”
does not change the character of the offense.  Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 384, 388, 749
A.2d 769, 771 (2000).  
In State v. Mulkey, 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989), while holding that “the exact
date of the offense is not an essential element, and is not constitutionally required to be
set forth [in an indictment,]” this Court cited with approval several decisions of the Court
of Special Appeals that “support the notion that the time of an offense stated in an
indictment need not be precise.”  Id. at 482, 560 A.2d at 27. 
In Busch v. State, 289 Md. 669, 426 A.2d 954 (1981), while holding that the State
should not have been permitted to substitute the words “resist arrest by a police officer”
for “resist and hinder a police officer,” this Court stated:
Because the charging document as amended contained
a specific reference to an arrest, it charged the offense of
resisting arrest.
The amendment here substituted the offense of
resisting arrest for the originally charged offense of resisting,
obstructing, or hindering an officer in the performance of his
7 Since October 1, 2002, CL §3-317(b) has provided that, “[i]n a case in which the
general form of [charging document] described in subsection (a) of this section is used,
the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars specifically setting forth the allegations
against the defendant.”  From July 1, 1977 to October 1, 2002, Article 27, § 461B(b)
provided that a defendant who is charged with rape or a sexual offense “is entitled to a
bill of particulars specifically setting forth the allegation against him.”  
22
duties.  The charge as amended required proof of an arrest
while the original charge did not.  Thus, the basic description
of the offense charged was changed.
Because the amendment changed the character of the
offense originally charged, it was not a matter of form.  The
petitioner did not consent to the amendment, and it is,
therefore, impermissible.
Id. at 679, 426 A.2d at 959.  In Johnson, supra, while holding that the State should not
have been permitted to substitute “cocaine” for “marijuana” in a criminal information
charging violations of the M aryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, this Court
stated:
[A]s in Thanos [v. State, 282 Md. 709, 387 A.2d 296 (1978)]
and in Brown [v. State, 285 Md. 105, 400 A.2d 1133 (1979)],
the description of the specific act alleged was significantly
changed by the amendment.  The information initially accused
the defendant of possessing marijuana, whereas the amended
information charged an entirely different act, possessing crack
cocaine.  It follows that, under Thanos and Brown, the
amendment did change “the character of the offense charged.” 
358 Md. at 390, 749 A.2d at 772.  In the case at bar, however, the amendments did not
substitute a different offense for any of the offenses charged in the indictment.  
Although Petitioner did not file a demand for a bill of particulars, 7 the record
23
shows that he received a copy of the Application for Statement of Charges when he was
arrested.  The record also shows that, prior to trial, Petitioner’s trial counsel was provided
with a copy of the victim’s statement to Detective Wortz.  Because the discovery
provided by the State made it clear that the 1986 incident occurred in November of that
year at the Goodnow Road address, Petitioner is not entitled to a new trial on the ground
that he was unfairly prejudiced by the amendments at issue.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED; PETITIONER TO
PAY THE COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 126
September Term, 2008
KARL LYMONT THOMPSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned) 
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Greene, J., which
Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J., Join.
Filed:   February 17, 2010
I respectfully dissent.  Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the
amendment of the charges did not change the character of the offenses charged, I disagree
with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence of Thompson’s uncharged juvenile conduct
was properly admitted into evidence during his criminal prosecution for other crimes.  I
would hold that evidence, of such acts, is not admissible to the extent that evidence of
adjudicated acts committed by a juvenile is not admissible in subsequent criminal
proceedings under the Juvenile Causes Act, Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-8A-01
et seq. of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.
I.
Karl Thompson, the petitioner, was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
with multiple sexual offenses allegedly committed against Kassandra Timm between the
years 1983 and 1986.  At Thompson’s trial, over defense counsel’s objection, the court
permitted the prosecutor to present evidence of uncharged sexual offenses that Thompson
allegedly committed against Ms. Timm in the summer of 1978, when Ms. Timm was age five
and Thompson was age 14.  The Circuit Court reasoned that evidence of the 1978 incident
was admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b) to prove motive, opportunity, intent, or common
scheme.
Ms. Timm testified that Thompson sexually abused her at her grandparents’ home in
1978.  She stated, in pertinent part:
I woke up to [Thompson] touching me between my legs with his
hands and with his penis.  It hurt.  I started to whimper a little bit
and I said to him that I need to go to the bathroom.  I didn’t need
to go to the bathroom.  I just wanted to remove myself from the
2
room.  I went into the bathroom and . . . sat on the toilet.  I
remember . . . my feet didn’t touch the floor.
And I left the bathroom, I went into my aunt’s room . . . a
different bedroom and I just laid on her floor.  And then he came
into the room after and asked why I didn’t come back.  I didn’t
answer and he climbed into my aunt’s bed . . . .
Ms. Timm also testified about four incidents that occurred after 1978.  Regarding an
incident that occurred in 1983, she testified:
My mother and I drove to Maryland . . . to visit.  The
whole family was there, I remember a very full house . . . we
slept in [Thompson’s] room . . . .  And there were a lot of other
people in the room . . . .
 
Everyone was going to sleep and [Thompson] kept saying
my mother’s name, Linda, are you asleep? . . .   And when she
stopped answer[ing] he came and he, he touched me with his
hands between my legs.  He molested me . . . .  I mean he was
touching me in my vagina with his hands.  He was inserting his
fingers between my legs.
Ms. Timm testified that, in 1986, during her Thanksgiving school break, she visited
Thompson at his apartment in Baltimore.  Ms. Timm stated that before Thompson left for
work one day, Thompson told her that she could sleep in his bed with his girlfriend,
Stephanie Perry.  Ms. Timm stated that she awoke that night to find “[Thompson’s] penis
inside of [her].”
On July 11, 2006, the jury rendered several guilty verdicts.  With respect to the
incident occurring in 
1983, the jury found Thompson guilty of third-degree and fourth-degree
sex offenses; the jury also found the petitioner guilty of second-degree rape, third-degree and
3
fourth-degree sexual offenses, as well as second-degree assault, for the incident in 1986.  The
court sentenced Thompson to 20 years incarceration.
Thompson appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed
the judgments entered below.  Thompson v. State, 181 Md. App. 74, 955 A.2d 802 (2008).
The intermediate appellate court held that the 1978 incident was admissible into evidence
pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-404(b).  In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals rejected
Thompson’s argument that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article applies
to unadjudicated acts.  The intermediate appellate court noted that interpreting § 3-8A-23 to
bar the admissibility of unadjudicated conduct in subsequent criminal proceedings conflicts
with the basic cannon of statutory construction that “a court may neither add nor delete
language” of a statute. Thompson, 181 Md. App. at 86-87, 955 A.2d at 810 (quoting Price
v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221 (2003)).
II.
In Maryland, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by a defendant is
generally not admissible in criminal proceedings.  Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Evidence,
Rule 5-404(b) thus provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
4
The General Assembly has deemed certain acts to be exempt from Rule 5-404(b)’s
purview altogether.  Under the Juvenile Causes Act, §§ 3-8A-01 et seq. of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article, prior adjudications or dispositions of juveniles, as well as any
evidence introduced therein, may not generally be admitted into evidence in subsequent
criminal proceedings.  The applicable provision reads, in pertinent part:
§ 3-8A-23.  Effect of proceedings under subtitle.
(b) Adjudication and disposition not admissible as evidence. –
An adjudication and disposition of a child pursuant to this
subtitle are not admissible as evidence against the child:
   (1) In any criminal proceeding prior to conviction; or
   (2) In any adjudicatory hearing on a petition alleging    
   delinquency; or
   (3) In any civil proceeding not conducted under this 
   subtitle.
(c) Evidence given in proceeding under this subtitle
inadmissible in criminal proceeding. – Evidence given in a
proceeding under this subtitle is not admissible against the child
in any other proceeding in another court, except in a criminal
proceeding where the child is charged with perjury and the
evidence is relevant to that charge and is otherwise admissible.
Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article is one part of a
comprehensive Juvenile Causes Act, an act that establishes “a separate system of courts,
procedure and method of treatment for juveniles.”  In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d
1012, 1016 (1994).  We have explained that "[t]he raison d'etre of the Juvenile Causes Act
is that a child does not commit a crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not
a criminal.”  In re Darryl D., 308 Md. 475, 481, 520 A.2d 712, 715 (1987) (quoting Matter
1 The Juvenile Causes Act defines a “delinquent act” as “an act which would be a crime if
committed by an adult”; a “delinquent child” as “a child who has committed a delinquent
act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation”; and a “child” as “an individual under
the age of 18 years.” § 3-8A-01(l),(m),(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
5
of Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 104, 299 A.2d 856, 860 (1973)); see also Moore v. Miley, 372 Md.
663, 673-74, 814 A.2d 557, 563 (2003) (“‘[T]he keystone of Maryland's disposition of
juvenile delinquents is that ‘the moral responsibility or blameworthiness of the child [is] of
no consequence,’ such that delinquency adjudication is seen as the opportunity for the State
to provide needed rehabilitative intervention.” (quoting Victor B., 336 Md. at 91-92, 646
A.2d at 1015)).  Accordingly, “[j]uvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive
scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the
Court of Appeals.”  Victor B., 336 Md. at 96, 646 A.2d at 1017.
Section 3-8A-02 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article lists the purposes of
the relevant subtitle of the Juvenile Causes Act.  Those purposes are:
(1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the
following objectives for children who have committed
delinquent acts:[1]
(i) Public safety and the protection of the community;
(ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the
community for offenses committed; and
(iii) Competency and character development to assist
children in becoming responsible and productive
members of society;
(2) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent
responsible for the child’s behavior and accountable to the
victim and the community;
6
(3) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent or in need
of supervision responsible, where possible, for remedying the
circumstances that required the court's intervention;
(4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental
and physical development of children coming within the
provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of
treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child's
best interests and the protection of the public interest;
(5) To conserve and strengthen the child's family ties and to
separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his
welfare or in the interest of public safety;
(6) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for
him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent
to that which should have been given by his parents;
(7) To provide to children in State care and custody:
(i) A safe, humane, and caring environment; and
(ii) Access to required services; and
(8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the
provisions of this subtitle.
§ 3-8A-02(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.  This section also states that this
subtitle, of which § 3-8A-23 is a part, “shall be liberally construed to effectuate these
purposes.”  § 3-8A-02(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article; see also In re Leslie
M., 305 Md. 477, 482, 505 A.2d 504, 507 (1986) (rejecting a “restrictive” reading of former
Maryland Rule 916 due to the “liberal statutory construction” required by the Juvenile Causes
Act).
7
In the case sub judice, Thompson contends that the Circuit Court erred in admitting
into evidence testimony concerning the uncharged 1978 incident, which occurred when
Thompson was 14 years old.   According to Thompson, Md. Rule 5-404(b) must be read in
light of the policy underlying the Juvenile Causes Act, and that, under such a construction,
evidence of unadjudicated juvenile acts is not admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings
as a matter of law.  The State argues to the contrary, maintaining that the Circuit Court acted
within its discretion in admitting into evidence the acts committed by Thompson when he
was a juvenile.  The majority concludes that § 3-8A-23 does not apply to testimony presented
by the State in the prosecution of Thompson for criminal offenses because the evidence was
admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b) and had never been “given” in a juvenile proceeding.
I disagree with that holding primarily because of the statutory mandate that § 3-8A-23 should
be construed liberally.
First, the determination of whether there exists an exception to Md. Rule 5-404(b) is
a matter of law not within the trial judge’s discretion.  Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d
at 898.  Similarly, the determination of whether an act is exempt from the purview of Rule
5-404(b) is a questions of law and not a matter of discretion.  See Figgins v. Cochrane, 403
Md. 392, 792 A.2d 736 (2008) (explaining that we review the determination of whether
evidence must be excluded as a matter of law) (quoting Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
398 Md. 67, 82-83, 919 A.2d 1177, 1186 (2007)).
8
Because the determination that the existence of an exemption to Md. Rule 5-404(b)
is a legal determination, we should consider whether the trial judge erred in admitting into
evidence testimony about the alleged sexual assault by Thompson in 1978.  As explained,
Thompson argues that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Proceedings Article provides the
applicable evidentiary exemption.  We should therefore interpret the language of that statute
to determine whether it does, in fact, apply to the testimony at issue in this case.  In
considering the Juvenile Causes Act, we construe this statutory language liberally to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.  § 3-8A-02(b) of the Courts and Proceedings Article.
With that requirement in mind, our goal is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent
underlying the statute(s) at issue.”  Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 863 A.2d 952,
962 (2004) (quoting Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d
1, 6 (2003)).  The statute’s plain language is the best source of legislative intent, and that
language guides our understanding of this intent, but we do not read the plain language of
a statute in a vacuum.  Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962 (citing Drew, 379 Md. at 327,
842 A.2d at 6; Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 336, 748 A.2d 478, 483-84 (2000)).  We should
instead “read the statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering
the ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.’”  Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962
(quoting Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; citing Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md.
335, 350, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346
(2001)).  As we have stated,
9
when we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not
limited to the words of the statute as they are printed . . . . We
may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or
“persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and function
paragraphs . . . and other material that fairly bears on the
fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes
the context within which we read the particular language before
us in a given case.
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 116, 753 A.2d 41, 49 (2000)
(quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33
(1987)).
With these rules guiding my analysis, I interpret the statute at hand differently than
the majority.  In my view, if Thompson’s juvenile conduct had been adjudicated in a juvenile
proceeding, § 3-8A-23 of the Juvenile Causes Act would have precluded admission of the
adjudication into evidence, as well as any evidence given in the juvenile proceeding from
admission in the criminal proceedings below.  Indeed, it is clear that the Legislature intended
for juvenile adjudications of delinquent acts to be wholly separate from the criminal justice
system.  § 3-8A-23(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“An adjudication of a
child pursuant to this subtitle is not a criminal conviction for any purpose and does not
impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by a criminal conviction.”); see also
Md. Code C.J. § 3-8A-01(l) (defining a delinquent act as an act that “would be a crime if
committed by an adult”); In re Alexander, 16 Md. App. 416, 420, 297 A.2d 301, 303 (1972)
(“We hold that it was the plain legislative intent that a finding of delinquency in a juvenile
court should not be equated in any way with a conviction for crime.”).  
10
The fact that § 3-8A-23 of the Juvenile Causes Act uses the terms “adjudicate” and
“disposition,” however, does not mean that unadjudicated conduct is excluded from the
prohibition’s purview.  Construing § 3-8A-23 to apply only to juvenile adjudications is
inconsistent with the “legislative purpose or goal” underlying the Juvenile Causes Act, see
Williams, 359 Md. at 116, 753 A.2d at 49, and it contradicts the basic cannon of statutory
interpretation that a court should “avoid a construction of [a] statute that is unreasonable,
illogical, or inconsistent with common sense,’” Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 573, 911
A.2d 427, 432 (2006) (quoting Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026
(2006)).  For a juvenile to be found involved and adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile
proceeding the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the conduct giving rise to the
juvenile act.  Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-8A-18(c) of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article.  Under Rule 5-404(b), however, the State is only required to prove the
conduct classified as a crime, wrong, or bad act by a lesser standard, clear and convincing
evidence.  Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 898.  Considering the lower standard of
proof under 5-404(b), it would be unreasonable to construe the Juvenile Causes Act as
merely precluding the admission of adjudicated juvenile conduct in a subsequent criminal
proceeding.  Under such a construction, the State could decline to have a juvenile’s conduct
adjudicated before the juvenile reached age 18, but then introduce that same conduct in a
criminal proceeding after the juvenile has turned age 18 or older.  The State would then only
need to prove the juvenile conduct by clear and convincing evidence, a lesser standard than
11
the Legislature has expressly required for establishing a juvenile delinquent act.  See § 3-8A-
18(c)(i) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (adopting the standard of reasonable
doubt to prove that a juvenile committed a delinquent act); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368,
90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075, 25 L. Ed.2d 368 (1970) (acknowledging that reasonable doubt is a
constitutional safeguard applicable to the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding).
This interpretation of § 3-8A-23 is untenable.  Such an interpretation would allow the
State to use Rule 5-404(b) as a way of keeping juveniles out of the juvenile justice system,
thereby allowing the State to defeat the Legislature’s intent in creating a separate system for
the adjudication of juveniles.  The explicit purposes underlying the Juvenile Causes Act
include rehabilitating and protecting juveniles, developing juveniles’ competency and
character, holding parents accountable, and strengthening family ties.  § 3-8A-02(a) of the
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.  We, therefore, should liberally construe the
provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act, including § 3-8A-23, to effectuate these purposes.  §
3-8A-02(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.  The juvenile justice system cannot
achieve any of these purposes if the State diverts juveniles from that system when they
commit delinquent acts.  Accordingly, we should construe § 3-8A-23 in a way that ensures
that the State will direct juveniles to the juvenile justice system when appropriate.  By
construing the statute to make inadmissible, in a criminal court, evidence of unadjudicated
delinquent acts to the same extent as adjudicated delinquent acts, we would ensure that the
State cannot bring these acts to the attention of a criminal court when the appropriate venue
12
was the juvenile justice system.  Any other interpretation would permit a subversion of the
juvenile justices system and thereby eviscerate the Juvenile Causes Act. 
Second, the majority’s and the State’s interpretation of § 3-8A-23 of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article contradicts another basic cannon of statutory interpretation: that
“[w]hen construing a provision that is part of a single statutory scheme, the legislative intent
must be gathered from the entire statute, rather than from only one part.”  Jones v. State, 311
Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988).  Each provision of the Juvenile Causes Act
therefore “must be harmonized both with its immediate context and with the larger context
of the entire Juvenile Causes Act.”    Jones, 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 475 (1988).  With
the Juvenile Causes Act, the Legislature set forth a statutory scheme that dictates that
juvenile acts should be considered by particular courts.  For example, the Legislature has
decided that the Juvenile Court lacks original jurisdiction in some circumstances.  § 3-8A-
03(d) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.  In addition, the Legislature has identified
certain circumstances where the Juvenile Court may waive jurisdiction in favor of a criminal
court.  § 3-8A-06 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.  The Legislature has also
created a procedure by which a criminal court may transfer some cases to the Juvenile Court,
after considering a variety of specified factors.  § 3-8A-03(d)(1),(4),(5) of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article; see also Md. Code (1974, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 4-202 of the
Criminal Procedures Article (providing factors the criminal court must consider in
transferring cases to the Juvenile Court).  These provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act set
13
forth the limited circumstances where juvenile conduct may come before a criminal court,
and we should construe § 3-8A-23 to prohibit the State from creating an additional method
for doing so.
Indeed, we have previously said that the lower courts must adhere to the waiver and
jurisdiction provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act in regard to delinquent acts committed by
individuals who have subsequently reached adulthood.  In In re Appeals No. 1022 & No.
1081, 278 Md. 174, 176, 359 A.2d 556, 558 (1976), the Juvenile Court had determined that
waiver was not warranted in regard to a case involving an adult who had committed a
delinquent act while still a juvenile.  The court then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the adult, pursuant to the statute that is now codified as § 3-8A-07(e) of the Courts and
Proceedings Act.  Id.  On appeal, we agreed with the Juvenile Court and rejected the State’s
argument that waiver was mandatory in such a case.  In re Appeals, 278 Md. 174, 178-79,
359 A.2d 556, 559-60.  We held instead that a waiver hearing must be conducted before a
criminal court may consider a delinquent act, even if the person who committed the act
subsequently reached adulthood.  In re Appeals, 278 Md. at 178-79, 359 A.2d at 559-60.  In
other words, absent a waiver hearing and determination that jurisdiction over an adult who
allegedly committed a delinquent act as a juvenile should be waived, a criminal court cannot
consider the alleged delinquent act.  Relying on In re Appeals, recently the Court of Special
Appeals reached the same conclusion in a similar case.  In re Saifu K., ___ Md. ___ (2009)
(No. 2196, September Term, 2007) (filed August 27, 2009) (rejecting the State’s argument
14
that the Juvenile Court was required to waive its jurisdiction when the defendant had
allegedly committed a delinquent act at age 14, but a petition was not served on him until he
had reached age 21).  In the case sub judice, I would similarly construe § 3-8A-23 to ensure
that criminal courts do not consider delinquent acts absent adherence to the waiver and
jurisdiction procedures of the Juvenile Causes Act.
Third, we should liberally construe § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Article “reasonably with reference to its purpose, aim, [and] policy.”   In re Keith G., 325
Md. 538, 542, 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992).  As the foregoing makes clear, the General
Assembly’s aim, in enacting the Juvenile Causes Act, was for juvenile acts, in most
instances, to be wholly separate from the criminal justice system.  Moreover, the well-
established purpose underlying the Juvenile Causes Act is to rehabilitate juvenile offenders.
See, e,g., In re Julianna B., 179 Md. App. 512, 574, 947 A.2d 126-27  (2008) (“[The
appellate courts] have repeatedly noted that the Legislature intended the juvenile justice
system to be ‘guided generally by principles of protection and rehabilitation of the individual
rather than a societal goal of retribution and punishment.’”) (quoting Smith v. State, 399 Md.
565, 580, 924 A.2d 1175 (2007)), vacated on other grounds, 407 Md. 657, 967 A.2d 776
(2009); Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md. App. 580, 598, 843 A.2d 915 (2004) (“The General
Assembly enacted the Juvenile Causes Act . . . to advance its purpose of rehabilitating the
juveniles who have transgressed . . . .”).  That § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article effectively prevents a prosecutor from using a juvenile’s adjudicated
15
delinquent acts against him in a later criminal proceeding is indeed evident of the General
Assembly’s broad policy of distinguishing between juvenile transgressions and those acts
that should be brought before the criminal justice system.
From the exclusion of charged juvenile conduct in subsequent criminal proceedings
pursuant to § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, it necessarily follows
that the Legislature intended to grant the same protections to uncharged juvenile conduct.
It is plainly inconsistent with the underlying policy and overall scheme of the Juvenile
Causes Act to admit as evidence, in a criminal case, the unadjudicated delinquent acts of a
juvenile when those same acts, if determined by the Juvenile Court to have been delinquent,
would not have been admitted as evidence in a criminal case.  Accordingly, there is no sound
justification for distinguishing between the unadjudicated delinquent acts of a juvenile
offender and the adjudicated delinquent acts of a juvenile offender for purposes of the
admissibility of evidence in a criminal case.  Both acts are not admissible into evidence in
a criminal case.  Therefore, I would hold that, under Maryland law, juvenile acts are not
legislatively deemed to be “crimes, wrongs, or acts” within the meaning of Rule 5-404(b),
because the General Assembly has determined that the acts are irrelevant in a criminal
prosecution.
In holding that evidence of unadjudicated juvenile conduct is inadmissible in
subsequent criminal proceedings to the extent that adjudicated conduct is precluded pursuant
to § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, such a holding would be
2Tennessee adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d) in State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 10
(Tenn. 1981).  That Rule provides:
Juvenile adjucations. Evidence of juvenile adjucations is
generally not admissible under this rule.  The court may,
however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of
the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.
16
consistent with the concerns expressed by the court in State v. Dixon, 656 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1983).  In Dixon, the Criminal Court of Appeals of Tennessee rejected the
prosecution’s argument that “bad acts” of a juvenile were distinguishable from juvenile
adjudications.  Dixon, 656 S.W.2d at 52.  Although the court found that the admission of
juvenile acts was harmless error, it noted that allowing the juvenile “bad acts” into evidence
would enable the State to circumvent Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d).2  Dixon, 656 S.W.2d
at 52.  Like § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(d) limits the admissibility of juvenile adjudications as evidence in subsequent
proceedings.  I agree that allowing evidence of uncharged juvenile conduct would open the
door for some prosecutors to elude the juvenile court system by choosing to not charge
juvenile acts in order to admit evidence of the acts in a later criminal court proceeding.  This
would enable some prosecutors to bypass the clear prohibition against the admission of
juvenile adjudications and dispositions in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as the
clear prohibition against the admission of evidence given in juvenile proceedings, contained
3 The term “proceeding” is undefined in the Juvenile Causes Act.  We recently explained:
Black's Law Dictionary defines a “proceeding” as: “1. The
regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts
and events between the time of commencement and the entry of
judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a
tribunal or agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger
action. . . .”  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY[]1241 [(8th ed.
2004)]; see also WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 902 (3d ed. 2005) (providing the legal
definition of “proceeding” as “[l]itigation” or “[t]he act of
instituting or conducting litigation”); EDWIN E. BRYANT,
THE LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 3 (1894) (“‘Proceeding’ is a word much used to
(continued...)
17
in § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article and would undermine the State’s
policy of protecting juveniles.
The State is correct in pointing out that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article does not expressly mention unadjudicated juvenile acts; however, both
the State and the majority place less significance on the purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act
and § 3-8A-23’s function within it.  The Juvenile Causes Act created Maryland’s juvenile
court system and process for dealing with juvenile offenders.  Lopez-Sanchez, 155 Md. App.
at 600, 843 A.2d at 927 (“The separate system of courts created by the Juvenile Causes Act
to address the problems of juvenile offenders are governed by their own procedures, as set
forth in CJ section 3-8A-01, et seq.”). Section 3-8A-23 is a subsection within the Juvenile
Causes Act entitled “Effect of proceedings under subtitle” that specifically addresses the
effect of juvenile adjudications and proceedings3 arising under the Juvenile Causes Act.  
3(...continued)
express the business done in courts.”).  
Kramer v. Liberty Property, 408 Md. 1, 21, 968 A.2d 120, 132 (2009).
As I construe the scope of the term “proceeding” within the meaning of the Juvenile
Causes Act, my focus is upon acts that were adjudicated in the context of juvenile
proceedings, as well as acts that could have been adjudicated if juvenile proceedings had
been initiated.
18
That § 3-8A-23 does not explicitly reference unadjudicated juvenile conduct does not change
the clear legislative policy of protecting or insulating juveniles from the criminal justice
system unless or until waived from the juvenile processes.  Moreover, this Court’s focus
should not be only on the language of the statute but on the underlying legislative intent to
separate juveniles and juvenile acts from the criminal justice system.
After holding that the 1978 incident was properly admitted into evidence and that §
3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article did not include unadjudicated juvenile
acts, the intermediate appellate court noted that it “decline[d] to construe . . . § 3-8A-23 so
that it prohibits the introduction of the very evidence that the Court of Appeals has declared
to be of “special relevance in a sex crime involving the same perpetrator, victim, and criminal
conduct.”  Thompson, 181 Md. App. at 87, 955 A.2d at 810.  The majority adopts this
position.  I do not find that concern compelling or consistent with the underlying policy of
the Juvenile Causes Act.  Maryland courts recognize a special “sexual propensity” exception
to Rule 5-404(b).  Adopted by this Court in Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d 1231
(1989), the “sexual propensity” exception allows prosecutors in sex crime cases to admit into
19
evidence “prior illicit sexual acts [which] are similar to the offense for which the accused is
being tried and involve the same victim.”   Vogel, 315 Md. at 466, 554 A.2d at 1234.  In
Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993), this Court elaborated on the sexual
propensity exception stating that:
The primary policy consideration underlying the rule
against other crimes evidence “is that this type of evidence will
prejudice the jury against the accused because of the jury’s
tendency to infer that the accused is a ‘bad man’ who should be
punished regardless of his guilt of the charged crime, or to infer
that he committed the charged crime due to a criminal
disposition.” Yet, in the area of sex crimes, particularly child
molestation, “courts have been likely to admit proof of prior acts
to show a party’s conformity with past conduct.” Professor
McLain suggests that this relaxation of the general prohibition
is “probably because the character evidence is believed to have
greater probative value in those circumstances.”  In sex crimes
cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may
be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar
sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim.
Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the State offers
evidence of prior sexual criminal acts of the same type by the
accused against the same victim, the law of evidence already has
concluded that, in general, the probative value, as substantive
evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged,
outweighs the inherent prejudicial effect. The discretion
exercised by the trial judge in weighing unfair prejudice against
probative value is concerned with special features in the
particular case.
Acuna, 332 Md. at 75, 629 A.2d at 1238 (citations omitted).  The “sexual propensity”
exception is based on the notion that evidence of prior sexual misconduct against the same
20
victim has a special probative value, it is asserted, sufficient enough that it generally
outweighs the inherent “bad actor” prejudice of other crimes evidence.
As discussed above, the State of Maryland’s policy of protecting or insulating
juveniles from the criminal justice system absent a waiver is evident from the Juvenile
Causes Act.  In light of that policy, juvenile acts are not legislatively deemed “crimes,
wrongs, or acts” within the meaning of Rule 5-404(b) and are therefore not relevant in
subsequent criminal proceedings.  Because I would hold that juvenile acts are not within the
purview of Rule 5-404(b), I would conclude that the “sexual propensity” exception to Rule
5-404(b) does not justify the admissibility of evidence of juvenile acts in subsequent criminal
proceedings.  In other words, a juvenile act does not constitute a criminal act within the
meaning of the sexual propensity exception.
III.
The Circuit Court’s admission into evidence testimony with regard to Thompson’s
juvenile act was not harmless error.  An error is deemed harmless when a reviewing court,
upon an independent review of the record, can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error in no way influenced the verdict. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678
(1976).  In the instant case, the State presented the 1978 incident to the court as the first of
five instances of sexual misconduct between Thompson and Ms. Timm.  The jury convicted
Thompson on charges arising from two of the five incidents.  Specifically, the jury heard
evidence that Thompson was a sexual predator when he was 14 years old.  In addition, the
21
jury heard that Thompson demonstrated that same deviant behavior toward the same victim
when Thompson became an adult.  It is highly unlikely that the jury separated Thompson’s
alleged juvenile acts from his criminal acts.  Thus, I do not believe that this Court can say
beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of evidence that Thompson sexually assaulted
Ms. Timm when Thompson was a juvenile in no way influenced the jury’s verdict.
Therefore, the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and
remand the case for purposes of a new trial.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge authorize me to state that they join in this
dissenting opinion.