Title: Britton v. Halliburton Services

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Britton v. Halliburton Services1995 WY 65895 P.2d 45Case Number: 94-173Decided: 05/04/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Workers' Compensation Claim of John A. BRITTON, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

HALLIBURTON SERVICES, Appellee 
(Employer-Objector).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Kennard F. Nelson of 
Kirkwood, Nelson & Huber, P.C., Laramie, for appellant. 

Thomas R. Smith of Murane 
& Bostwick, Casper, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      In this worker's 
compensation appeal, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the 
findings and conclusions of the hearing examiner.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
order of the district court denying additional benefits.

FACTS

[¶3]      On December 15, 
1990, appellant John Britton (Britton), while working for Halliburton Services 
(Halliburton), fell from a moving truck, injuring his back and his right knee. 
Britton received medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits until 
March 14, 1991. Just before obtaining his medical release to return to work, 
Britton fell down a flight of stairs, breaking a toe. A physician gave Britton a 
full release to return to work on March 14, 1991. Britton, however, did not 
return to work because he did not feel he was 100% physically 
able.

[¶4]      On March 22, 
1991, Britton consulted a second physician. The second physician diagnosed 
Britton's problems as a possible arthritic condition rather than a work-related 
injury. Britton, however, did not return to work at Halliburton. Although 
Britton continued to suffer pain and discomfort, it was not until approximately 
a year later that he saw a third physician.

[¶5]      The third 
physician ruled out inflammatory arthritis and ordered a Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging scan (MRI) of Britton's back. This approach was chosen because x-rays 
were inconclusive and anti-inflammatory medicine was ineffective. The first MRI, 
taken in May 1992, was of Britton's cervical spine. It proved to be inconclusive 
so an MRI of Britton's lumbar spine was performed in January 1993. The second 
MRI disclosed an abnormality with the last lumbar disc pressing up against the 
nerve root, i.e., a herniated disc. Britton received a referral to a fourth 
physician who prescribed physical therapy.

[¶6]      During the period 
in which the MRI scans took place and physical therapy started, Britton 
experienced two incidents that could have caused his back injury. First, Britton 
slipped and fell while mopping a floor, landing on his back. That accident 
resulted in emergency room treatment. Sometime later, Britton claimed his back 
"popped" during a physical therapy session. That event increased Britton's back 
pain.

[¶7]      In February 1993, 
Britton then received a referral to a fifth physician. After reviewing Britton's 
MRI results, that physician agreed Britton had a bulging or herniated disc. He 
testified that the initial work-related accident could be, and probably was, the 
mechanism which caused the injury to the disc. The physician acknowledged, 
however, that the fall down the stairs and/or the fall while mopping could have 
contributed to or caused the injury. The testimony of the fifth physician also 
suggests that, while an MRI scan could not date the initial injury, the presence 
of calcification around the rim of the disc could aid in dating a long-term 
injury.

[¶8]      After considering 
all the evidence, the hearing examiner concluded Britton had failed to show an 
entitlement to benefits based solely on the December 1990 injury. The hearing 
examiner found other possible sources of the injury, including the falls and the 
incident in physical therapy. In addition, the hearing examiner held that, while 
some calcification around the rim of the disc might date the injury, Britton 
failed to offer any such evidence.

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Britton 
challenges the hearing examiner's conclusion that his injury was not further 
compensable after he received a release to return to work in March 1991. He 
contends the evidence proves that his fall from a moving vehicle on December 15, 
1990, is the cause of his injury. In addition, he asserts that requiring a 
claimant to prove the absence of other possible sources of injury places an 
impossible burden of proof on him.

Standard of 
Review

[¶10]   This court has settled the standard 
for reviewing factual findings made in a worker's compensation hearing. If, 
after examining the entire record, we find substantial evidence to support the 
agency's finding, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the 
agency. Under such circumstances, we must uphold the agency's finding. Jaqua v. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 873 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶11]   Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence a reasonable mind might accept in support of a conclusion. It is more 
than a scintilla of evidence. Little America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 
58 (Wyo. 1993).

Findings

[¶12]   The hearing examiner made the 
following findings relevant to this issue:

3.         Dr. 
John D. Bailey released the employee/claimant to return to work without 
restrictions on March 14, 1991. However, the claimant himself did not feel that 
he was 100% able to return to work, and did not return to 
work.

4.         
Another physician who saw the employee/claimant on March 22, 1991, Dr. 
Anne MacGuire, believed that his problems stemmed not from a work-related injury 
but possibly from an arthritic problem.

*           
*           
*           
*        
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*

6.         There 
are three incidents in the record where the employee could have sustained injury 
to his back, other than by the injury of December 15, 
1990.

(a) 
Prior to seeing Dr. MacGuire, the employee fell down a flight of stairs. He 
testified to some increase in low back pain. His testimony is to some extent 
inconsistent with Exhibit 11 which relates no complaints other than a broken 
toe.

(b) 
The employee testified to his back "popping" during physical 
therapy.

(c) 
In August of 1992, the employee slipped and fell and went to the emergency room 
as a result of that fall.

7.         Dr. 
Akmakjian's testimony is equivocal. He notes some ability to date a bulging disk 
by calcification. But employee/claimant has offered no evidence to date the 
bulging disk.

[¶13]   It is beyond question Britton 
sustained an injury to his lower back when he fell from the truck in December 
1990 while employed by Halliburton. Britton contends that once he established 
the work connected injury, subsequent progression of that condition remains 
compensable if the worsening was not the result of an independent non-industrial 
cause.

[¶14]   The Wyoming statutes entitle an 
employee/claimant to additional benefits. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) (1991)1 provides in 
part:

If a determination is made in favor of or on behalf 
of an employee for any benefits under this act, application may be made to the 
division by any party within four (4) years from the date of the last payment 
for additional medical and disability benefits or for a modification of the 
amount of benefits on the ground of 
increase . . . of incapacity due 
solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake. . . . (emphasis 
added)

[¶15]   The plain language of WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-605(a) grants any party - employee, employer or the Worker's Compensation 
Division - a four-year window in which to petition to reopen a case for: (1) 
additional medical and disability benefits; or (2) modification of the amount of 
benefits because (a) of an increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the 
injury, or (b) a mistake or fraud has occurred. Here, Britton seeks an increase 
in the amount of his benefits based on a mistake in diagnosis. The mistake 
alleged is the neglect to use the definitive tool of MRI to timely discover the 
herniated disc.

[¶16]   A case illustrating the application 
of this law regarding mistake is Hunteman v. Ward Transport, Inc., 706 P.2d 1126 
(Wyo. 1985). In Hunteman, an employee injured his back in a work-related injury. 
The employee obtained a release to return to work full-time, but continued to 
experience problems. Subsequent tests by a neurosurgeon revealed a possible 
herniated disc and a laminectomy was performed. The neurosurgeon could not tell 
precisely when the injury occurred. His testimony was that it was more probable 
than not the herniated disc existed while the orthopedic surgeon was treating 
the employee. There was, however, testimony that the cause of the herniated disc 
could as easily have occurred while off the job as during employment. We upheld 
the district court's denial of the application for an increase in benefits. 
Although there was conflicting evidence, we concluded the district court did not 
err in relying on the testimony of the orthopedic surgeon. Conflicting evidence 
simply creates a question of fact that the fact finder must resolve. Where there 
is evidence to support the fact finder's conclusion, that conclusion should not 
be "adjusted" on appeal. That same reasoning applies in this 
instance.

[¶17]   With respect to additional 
benefits, the statute requires Britton to show he has sustained additional 
incapacity due solely to the injury. The reason for this is the concept of 
"finality." A court should accord finality to the initial award made because of 
the work-related injury. "The purpose of § 27-14-605(a) is to balance the 
concept of finality with the desire to see that a claimant receives no less and 
no more than that to which he is lawfully entitled." State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Jerding, 868 P.2d 244, 249 (Wyo. 1994) (collecting cases). 
In other words, once an agency makes an initial award, the agency also settles 
any compensation regarding the progression of the injury.

[¶18]   The employee/claimant, however, can 
challenge this presumption by showing that progression of the injury was due 
solely to the initial injury. Loghry v. Capshaw Well Service, 739 P.2d 1227 
(Wyo. 1987), illustrates this principle. In Loghry, the appellant claimed an 
increase in incapacity. The basis of increased incapacity was the recurrence of 
seizure activity, an increase in hearing deficiency and an increase in the pain 
and stiffness in the neck. At trial, however, the appellant failed to produce 
any evidence showing an increase in headache pain or hearing deficiency since 
the time of his original award. A physician testified the appellant suffered 
symptoms similar to those of rheumatoid arthritis. Despite a claim that the pain 
and stiffness in his neck were the result of the injury, and his arthritic 
condition had no connection to the work related injury, we held that the 
evidence sustained a finding that the increase in incapacity was not due solely to the 
injury.

[¶19]   While there is no dispute here that 
Britton sustained a work-related injury in December 1990, and that he received 
benefits through March 1991, it is also clear that he received a release to 
return to work without restrictions. Britton claims the herniated disc and the 
accompanying back pain are the result of the initial injury. Wyoming's rule with 
respect to asserting a change of condition, however, is in accord with the 
general rule; a party requesting the change, whether claimant or employer, has 
the burden of proof. Lehman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
752 P.2d 422, 425 (Wyo. 1988). Therefore, by invoking WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a), 
a claimant assumes the burden of demonstrating "increase . . . of incapacity due 
solely to the injury." WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) (1991) (emphasis 
added.)

[¶20]   The hearing examiner found there 
were other likely origins for the injury to Britton's back; there was a 
significant passage of time during which Britton could have injured himself; and 
Britton failed to offer any evidence to date the bulging disc. We hold these 
findings are supported by substantial evidence.

[¶21]   Britton argues that requiring proof 
to exclude all other possible sources of injury creates an impossible burden. In 
other words, the claimant must prove nothing else happened when there is no 
proof that something else did occur. The governing rule, however, is that the 
party who wishes to reopen a worker's compensation claim assumes the burden of 
showing the statutory basis for doing so. FMC v. Lane, 773 P.2d 163, 166 (Wyo. 
1989). In this instance, that burden was not met.

[¶22]   Because we conclude there is 
substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's determinations, the order 
of the district court must be affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTE

 

1 As amended by WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) 
(Supp. 1994).