Title: Young Americans for Liberty at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, et al. v. St. John IV, et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: November 18, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210309 
_________________________ 
 
Young Americans for Liberty at the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville and Joshua Greer  
 
v.  
 
Finis St. John IV, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the 
University of Alabama System; Charles L. Karr, in his official 
capacity as Interim President of the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville; Kristi Motter, in her official capacity as Vice 
President for Student Affairs at the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville; Ronnie Hebert, in his official capacity as Dean of 
Students at the University of Alabama in Huntsville; Will Hall, 
in his official capacity as Director of Charger Union and 
Conference Training Center at the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville; and Juanita Owens, in her official capacity as 
1210309 
2 
 
Associate Director of Conferences and Events at the University 
of Alabama in Huntsville 
 
 
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court 
(CV-21-900878) 
 
BRYAN, Justice. 
 
Joshua Greer, a student at the University of Alabama in Huntsville 
("the University"), and Young Americans for Liberty, a student 
organization at the University ("the plaintiffs"), appeal from a judgment 
dismissing their action challenging the legality of the University's policy 
regulating speech in outdoor areas of the University's campus ("the 
policy").  We reverse and remand.   
 
In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed what the parties refer to 
as the "Alabama Campus Free Speech Act" ("the Act"), § 16-68-1 et seq., 
Ala. Code 1975.  The Act provides, in part: 
"(a) On or before January 1, 2021, the board of trustees 
of each public institution of higher education shall adopt a 
policy on free expression that is consistent with [the Act]. The 
policy, at a minimum, shall adhere to all of the following 
provisions: 
 
"(1) That the primary function of the public 
institution of higher education is the discovery, 
improvement, transmission, and dissemination of 
knowledge by means of research, teaching, 
discussion, and debate, and that, to fulfill that 
function, the institution will strive to ensure the 
1210309 
3 
 
fullest degree possible of intellectual freedom and 
free expression. 
 
"(2) That it is not the proper role of the 
institution to shield individuals from speech 
protected by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 4 of the 
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, including 
without limitation, ideas and opinions they find 
unwelcome, disagreeable, or offensive. 
 
"(3) That students, administrators, faculty, 
and staff are free to take positions on public 
controversies 
and 
to 
engage 
in 
protected 
expressive activity in outdoor areas of the campus, 
and to spontaneously and contemporaneously 
assemble, speak, and distribute literature. 
 
"(4) That the outdoor areas of a campus of a 
public institution of higher education shall be 
deemed to be a forum for members of the campus 
community, and the institution shall not create 
free speech zones or other designated outdoor 
areas of the campus in order to limit or prohibit 
protected expressive activities. 
 
"…. 
 
"(7) That the public institution of higher 
education 
may 
maintain 
and 
enforce 
constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions 
for outdoor areas of campus only when they are 
narrowly 
tailored 
to 
serve 
a 
significant 
institutional interest and when the restrictions 
employ clear, published, content-neutral, and 
viewpoint-neutral criteria, and provide for ample 
alternative means of expression.  All restrictions 
shall allow for members of the university 
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4 
 
community 
to 
spontaneously 
and 
contemporaneously 
assemble 
and 
distribute 
literature." 
 
§ 16-68-3(a)(1)-(4), (7), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).  
 
 
In June 2020, in response to the passage of the Act, the Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama ("the Board") adopted the policy, 
which regulates the use of outdoor areas on the University's campus.  See 
the University's "Policies and Procedures," No. 03.01.06, "Use of Outdoor 
Areas of Campus."  The policy allows University students and student 
organizations, among others, to reserve and use outdoor spaces on 
campus to engage in speech.  Whether a reservation is required depends 
on the nature of the students' activities and expression.  The general rule 
is that students must make reservations for activities that make use of 
the outdoor areas of campus.  The Act defines "outdoor areas of campus" 
as "[t]he generally accessible outside areas of the campus of a public 
institution of higher education where members of the campus community 
are commonly allowed including, without limitation, grassy areas, 
walkways, and other similar common areas."  § 16-68-2(6), Ala. Code 
1975.  Under the policy, students seeking to reserve space must apply for 
a reservation at least three business days before the planned event.  
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However, there are two exceptions to the general rule requiring 
reservations for the use of outdoor space on campus.  No reservation is 
needed for "casual recreational or social activities," a term that the policy 
does not define.  The policy, ¶ B.   Similarly, no reservation is needed for 
"spontaneous activities of expression, which are generally prompted by 
news or affairs coming into public knowledge less than forty-eight (48) 
hours prior to the spontaneous expression."  The policy, ¶ F(1)(6).  The 
policy allows such spontaneous speech in certain designated areas 
without prior approval from the University.  The policy then lists 20 
designated areas on campus where spontaneous speech is allowed.    
 
In July 2021, the plaintiffs sued the members of the Board and 
various officials associated with the University; the members of the 
Board were later dismissed by joint stipulation.1  The plaintiffs alleged 
that the policy violates the Act insofar as the policy generally requires 
 
1The remaining defendants are Finis St. John IV, in his official 
capacity as Chancellor of the University of Alabama System; Charles L. 
Karr, in his official capacity as Interim President of the University; Kristi 
Motter, in her official capacity as Vice President for Student Affairs at 
the University; Ronnie Hebert, in his official capacity as Dean of 
Students at the University; Will Hall, in his official capacity as Director 
of Charger Union and Conference Training Center at the University; and 
Juanita Owens, in her official capacity as Associate Director of 
Conferences and Events at the University. 
1210309 
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reservations for speech, creates the exception for "spontaneous" speech, 
and creates designated areas on campus for that spontaneous speech.  
Alternatively, the plaintiffs alleged that the policy violates the right to 
free speech guaranteed by Article I, § 4, of the Alabama Constitution of 
1901 (Off. Recomp.), insofar as the policy requires reservations for speech 
and has the exception for spontaneous speech. The plaintiffs attached the 
policy to their complaint, which made the policy part of the complaint.  
See Rule 10(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  ("A copy of any written instrument which 
is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.").  The 
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. 
R. Civ. P., arguing that the policy does not violate the Act or § 4 of the 
Alabama Constitution.  The defendants also argued that the Act itself is 
unconstitutional because, they said, it violates Article XIV, § 264, of the 
Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.).  Section 264 gives the 
Board "management and control" over the University; the defendants 
argued that the Act impermissibly infringes on the Board's authority 
under that section.  The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss 
without providing an explanation.  The plaintiffs filed a postjudgment 
1210309 
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motion, which the circuit court denied with a lengthy order explaining its 
rationale for having dismissed the case.  The circuit court concluded that 
the policy does not violate the Act or § 4 of the Alabama Constitution.  
Given those conclusions, the circuit court declined to decide whether the 
Act violates § 264 of the Alabama Constitution.  The plaintiffs appealed 
to this Court.    
"The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. 
R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint 
are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears 
that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that 
would entitle [the pleader] to relief.  In making this 
determination, this Court does not consider whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [the 
plaintiff] may possibly prevail.  We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim 
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." 
 
Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted). 
In determining the meaning of a statute, "our inquiry begins with 
the language of the statute, and if the meaning of the statutory language 
is plain, our analysis ends there."  Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 
132 (Ala. 2005). 
"Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, 
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where 
plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that 
language to mean exactly what it says.  If the language of the 
1210309 
8 
 
statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial 
construction and the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature must be given effect." 
 
IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 
1992). 
We first address the plaintiffs' argument that the policy violates the  
Act by creating "free speech zones," which the Act prohibits.  The circuit 
court did not directly address this argument in its order explaining the 
rationale for dismissing the action.  As noted, the general rule under the 
policy is that students must make reservations for activities that make 
use of the campus's outdoor areas.  However, reservations are not 
required for "spontaneous activities of expression" that occur in outdoor 
areas.  But the policy allows such spontaneous speech only in certain 
designated areas on campus.  The policy lists 20 designated areas, spread 
out over campus, where spontaneous speech is allowed.   
 
We agree with the plaintiffs that the designated areas for 
spontaneous speech are prohibited "free speech zones" under the Act.  
The Act provides that the "outdoor areas" of the University's campus 
"shall be deemed to be a forum for members of the campus community, 
and the institution shall not create free speech zones or other designated 
1210309 
9 
 
outdoor areas of the campus in order to limit or prohibit protected 
expressive activities."  § 16-68-3(a)(4).  The Act broadly defines a "free 
speech zone" as "[a]n area on campus of a public institution of higher 
education that is designated for the purpose of engaging in a protected 
expressive activity."  § 16-68-2(3).  The designated areas for spontaneous 
speech fit squarely within this definition; those areas are "area[s] … that 
[are] designated for the purpose of engaging in protected expressive 
activity."  Id.  The Act establishes the outdoor areas of campus as an open 
forum for free speech and unambiguously prohibits the carving out of 
special free-speech areas on campus.  The designated areas for 
spontaneous speech identified in the policy are plainly free-speech zones 
under the Act, and the Act prohibits such zones.  Accordingly, the policy 
violates the Act insofar as it establishes designated areas for spontaneous 
speech, and the circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' action. 
The plaintiffs make other arguments asserting that the circuit 
court erred by determining that the policy does not violate the Act.  Those 
arguments present more complicated issues than the argument 
concerning free-speech zones.  Initially, we consider the overall 
framework established by the Act in addressing speech on campus.  The 
1210309 
10 
 
Act broadly provides that "students, administrators, faculty, and staff are 
free to take positions on public controversies and to engage in protected 
expressive activity in outdoor areas of the campus, and to spontaneously 
and contemporaneously assemble, speak, and distribute literature."  § 16-
68-3(3).  The Act does allow some restrictions on speech on campus, 
however.  The Act provides that "the public institution of higher 
education may maintain and enforce constitutional time, place, and 
manner restrictions for outdoor areas of campus."  § 16-68-3(7).  Those 
time, place, and manner restrictions must be "narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant institutional interest" and must "employ clear, published, 
content-neutral, and viewpoint-neutral criteria, and provide for ample 
alternative means of expression."  Id.  By using the term "constitutional 
time, place, and manner restrictions," the Act draws on federal First 
Amendment caselaw.  See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Loc. 
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (stating that the government 
may impose time, place, and manner restrictions on speech if the 
restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication").   Thus, federal caselaw is persuasive in 
1210309 
11 
 
evaluating the Act's provision regarding time, place, and manner 
restrictions, and we will draw on that caselaw here.  
The defendants contend, as they successfully did below, that the 
policy adopts valid time, place, and manner restrictions regarding speech 
in outdoor areas of campus.  In response, the plaintiffs take two 
approaches.  They present several arguments attempting to establish 
that the challenged parts of the policy are not valid time, place, and 
manner restrictions as a matter of law.  Alternatively, the plaintiffs 
argue that the circuit court's dismissal of their action was inappropriate 
given the fact-intensive analysis required to determine if time, place, and 
manner restrictions are valid; for the reasons explained below, we agree 
with that alternative argument.  We reiterate that "a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the 
plaintiff to relief."  Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299.  Thus, with respect to the 
challenged time, place, and manner restrictions in the policy, the 
dismissal was proper only if the defendants demonstrated that the 
plaintiffs can prove no set of facts supporting their claim that the policy 
1210309 
12 
 
conflicts with the Act.  That is a very favorable standard for the plaintiffs, 
and the defendants did not meet it in this case.  
 
The analysis of time, place, and manner restrictions is "highly fact-
bound."  United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater 
Cleveland, 383 F.3d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 2004).  "The nature of a place, 'the 
pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, 
place, and manner that are reasonable.'"  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the 
Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1042 (1969)). 
"[W]hether a restriction on the time, place, or manner of 
speech is reasonable presents a question of law.  However, the 
reasonableness of a restriction involves an underlying factual 
inquiry.  Under Ward[ v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
791 (1989)], the challenged restriction must be (1) content-
neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve an important 
governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternatives 
for communication of information.  These elements involve 
subsidiary fact questions …." 
 
McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  "A restriction 
cannot be 'narrowly tailored' in the abstract; it must be tailored to the 
particular government interest asserted."  Id. at 656. "[B]y demanding a 
close fit between ends and means, the tailoring requirement prevents the 
government 
from 
too 
readily 
'sacrific[ing] 
speech 
for 
1210309 
13 
 
efficiency.'"  McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (quoting Riley 
v. National Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).  "For a 
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation to be narrowly 
tailored, it must not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary 
to further the government's legitimate interests.'"  Id.  (quoting Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).  Once a plaintiff shows 
that the First Amendment applies to a challenged time, place, and 
manner restriction, the government then bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the restriction is constitutionally permissible.  Clark 
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 n.5 (1984); 1 
Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 8:49 (3d 
ed.) (updated Sept.  2022).  "The burden is on the government to show 
that its regulation is narrowly tailored."  Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 
F.3d 1111, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012).   
 
Here, the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiffs could not 
possibly prove facts supporting their claim that the policy violates the 
Act's provision regarding time, place, and manner restrictions.  
Specifically, we note that, as a general rule, the policy requires students 
who want to use outdoor space to speak on campus to reserve the outdoor 
1210309 
14 
 
space.  Importantly, this requirement appears to apply to even a single 
student wishing to speak on campus.  This point alone casts serious doubt 
on whether the requirement is narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
interest of the University. "Permit schemes and advance notice 
requirements that potentially apply to small groups are nearly always 
overly broad and lack narrow tailoring."  American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 
2005).  See also Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 
n.13 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that "several courts" have struck down 
"permitting requirements because their application to small groups 
rendered them insufficiently tailored" and citing supporting cases); and 
Marcavage v. City of Chicago, 659 F.3d 626, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(noting "that many … circuits have looked unfavorably on permit 
requirements for groups as small as [a] group of five" and citing 
supporting cases).   
Thus, it is doubtful that the reservation requirement is narrowly 
tailored, as the Act requires.  However, in light of the procedural posture 
here and the fact-intensive nature of determining whether the 
reservation requirement is narrowly tailored, we decline to decide 
1210309 
15 
 
whether the plaintiffs at this stage are entitled to prevail on the merits 
on this issue.  Given that this appeal is taken from a judgment of 
dismissal, the key point is that the plaintiffs could possibly prevail on the 
merits on this issue.  Crucially, there is no evidence in the record 
establishing that a reservation requirement for speech applying to even 
a single student is narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest of the 
University.  The defendants, as government officials restricting speech, 
have the burden of showing that the restrictions are narrowly tailored.  
Doe, 667 F. 3d at 1133.  In short, this is a factual issue that precludes the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, and the circuit court erred by 
dismissing the action. 
 
Thus, we are reversing the judgment dismissing the action on two 
grounds.  First, the policy plainly violates the Act insofar as the policy 
creates designated areas for spontaneous speech; those areas are 
prohibited free-speech zones under the Act.  Therefore, dismissal of the 
plaintiffs' action was improper for this reason alone.   Second, regarding 
other challenged parts of the Act, there is at least one unresolved factual 
issue concerning the evaluation of the policy's time, place, and manner 
restrictions.  Thus, because the defendants failed to demonstrate that the 
1210309 
16 
 
plaintiffs could prove no set of facts supporting their action, dismissal 
was inappropriate for this reason also.  On remand, the parties are free 
to submit evidence concerning whether the remaining challenged 
provisions in the policy are valid time, place, and manner restrictions 
under the Act.   
 
Because there are various moving parts in this case, we take this 
opportunity to briefly provide some further direction to the circuit court 
going forward.  In concluding that the policy violates the Act by creating 
free-speech zones, we have determined that the plaintiffs are due to at 
least partially prevail on their claim that the policy violates the Act.  That 
conclusion implicates the defendants' alternative argument that the Act 
violates § 264 of the Alabama Constitution, which  gives the Board 
"management and control" over the University.  The defendants contend 
that the Act impermissibly interferes with the power of the Board to 
manage and control the University.  Because the circuit court concluded 
that the policy did not violate the Act, the circuit court "decline[d] to 
reach [the § 264] issue pursuant to the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance," see Chism v. Jefferson Cnty., 954 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (Ala. 
2006) ("'"Generally courts are reluctant to reach constitutional 
1210309 
17 
 
questions, and should not do so, if the merits of the case can be settled on 
non-constitutional grounds."'" (citations omitted)).  However, on 
remand, the issue whether the Act violates § 264 is now ripe for the 
circuit court to consider in the first instance.  We decline to decide the 
constitutionality of the Act at this point in the proceedings.  In this 
appeal, we simply decide that dismissal of the plaintiffs' action was 
improper for the reasons discussed above.   We pretermit the remaining 
arguments made by the plaintiffs.  
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
Bolin, Wise, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.  
Shaw, J., concurs specially, with opinion. 
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion. 
Sellers, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion, 
which Stewart, J., joins. 
Mitchell, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
 
 
 
1210309 
18 
 
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially). 
I concur that the University of Alabama in Huntsville ("the 
University"), through its policy regulating speech in outdoor areas of the 
University's campus ("the policy"), has created "free speech zones or other 
designated outdoor areas of the campus in order to limit or prohibit 
protected expression activities" in violation of § 16-68-3(a)(4), Ala. Code 
1975.  I write specially to note the following. 
With the policy's exception limiting spontaneous speech to certain 
areas held to be in violation of § 16-68-3, the remaining portion of the 
policy providing time, place, and manner restrictions on speech would 
appear to apply to the University's entire campus.  However, 
spontaneous speech -- by its very nature often entirely unplanned -- is 
not always something for which a person could, in advance, reserve a 
time and place under the policy.  Further, the time, place, and manner 
policy must "allow for members of the university community to 
spontaneously 
and 
contemporaneously 
assemble 
and 
distribute 
literature."  § 16-68-3(a)(7).  The policy thus cannot be deemed to apply 
to spontaneous speech.  It can, however, apply to speech that is not 
spontaneous -- events, protests, assemblies, etc., that are planned in 
1210309 
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advance.  Factual issues preclude dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims 
regarding the viability of this portion of the policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1210309 
20 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in result). 
I concur in the main opinion except its analysis of the "free speech 
zones" aspect of the plaintiffs' claim. I believe that, at this motion-to-
dismiss stage, it is beyond our review to determine the merits of this 
aspect of the claim. And I agree with the other Justices who point out 
that the Alabama Campus Free Speech Act ("the Act"), § 16-68-1 et seq., 
Ala. Code 1975, prohibits "free speech zones" only if they are created "in 
order to limit" protected speech. In addition, I write to emphasize that 
the Alabama Constitution's protection of free speech is incorporated into 
the Act and that Alabama courts should independently interpret this 
State constitutional protection. Because the latter point is fundamental, 
I address it first. 
I. The Alabama Constitution's independent protection of free speech 
 
The Act allows certain "constitutional time, place, and manner 
restrictions." § 16-68-3(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The main 
opinion concludes that, by using this term, the Act "draws on federal First 
Amendment caselaw." ___ So. 3d at ___. I agree with that conclusion as 
far as it goes. As the Act itself emphasizes, however, freedom of speech is 
"protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
1210309 
21 
 
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901." § 16-68-
3(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the word "constitutional" in subsection 
(a)(7) necessarily incorporates the free-speech protections of both the 
federal and Alabama constitutions. 
Moreover, Alabama courts have an obligation to independently 
interpret the Alabama Constitution. To protect individual rights, our 
country's unique system of federalism contains an important feature: 
governments are constrained by two sources of constitutional limitation 
-- state and federal. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States 
and the Making of American Constitutional Law 8 (2018).  Indeed, for 
the first century and a half after America's founding, individual rights 
were protected primarily through state constitutions. Id. at 12-13. 
Treatises of that era, such as Thomas Cooley's General Principles of 
Constitutional Law, were concerned primarily with state constitutional 
law. Id. at 13. Indeed, until the 1920s, most federal constitutional 
protections, including the First Amendment's protection of freedom of 
speech, had not yet been applied against the states through selective 
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (declaring that freedom of speech 
1210309 
22 
 
had been determined to be incorporated, citing 1920s cases). Hence, after 
the State of Alabama was founded in 1819, the primary document that 
Alabamians looked to for vindication of their fundamental rights was not 
the federal constitution, but the constitution that they had adopted for 
their own self-governance. 
Further, our Alabama Constitution has a different text, history, 
and context from the federal constitution. It contains protections for life, 
liberty, and property that are not dependent on the meaning and scope 
of its federal counterpart. To name just a few, our State constitution 
protects religious freedom, Art. I, §§ 3-3.02, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. 
Recomp.), the right to bear arms, § 26, the right to compensation for 
takings of private property, § 23, the right to trial by jury, § 11, the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, § 5, and the right to 
due process in criminal cases, § 6. Our constitution also provides 
protections without any federal analog, such as for "the sanctity of 
unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life." 
§ 36.06(a).  
In addition, every Alabama state-court judge takes an oath to 
support not only the federal constitution but also the Alabama 
1210309 
23 
 
Constitution. See Art. XVI, § 279. Consequently, "there is committed to 
[Alabama courts] ... the trust of guarding and protecting the life, liberty 
and property of the citizen, as guarantied by the [State] constitution," 
Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 322 (1859). That is our obligation to the 
constitutional text and to the people protected by it.  
We cannot delegate that obligation to the United States Supreme 
Court. Regrettably, state courts, including Alabama's, have at times 
succumbed to blindly following federal constitutional interpretations in 
interpreting state constitutions. See generally Sutton, supra, at 174-78. 
There is a tendency among parties and courts to act as if there is only one 
source of constitutional law, and to treat the State constitution as at best 
an afterthought or footnote. Thus, whether the case is about a taking of 
property, a search or seizure, or assistance of counsel, parties often 
proceed as if the job of the court is solely to apply United States Supreme 
Court precedent. That should not be so. To the extent that federal 
decisions interpreting the federal constitution are illuminating, we 
should consider them. But they cannot bind our interpretation of the 
Alabama Constitution, nor ought parties to treat them as if they do. And 
this Court especially, as the final arbiter of cases arising under the State 
1210309 
24 
 
constitution, has a duty to interpret it independently. "[W]e need not rest 
our conclusions on the federal constitution ...." Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 
So. 2d 631, 633 (Ala. 1977). 
To faithfully carry out this duty in deciding cases, Alabama courts 
should prioritize analyzing the meaning of our State constitution. See 
Sutton, supra, at 178-82. In practice, courts should consider addressing 
State constitutional issues before determining whether federal 
constitutional issues must be addressed. Id. at 178-79. See generally 
Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of 
Rights, 9 Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980). If government conduct violates the 
Alabama Constitution, its legality under the federal constitution may be 
irrelevant. Cf., e.g., Peddy. See generally Mount Royal Towers, Inc. v. 
Alabama State Bd. of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1980). Similarly, 
citizens' conduct may be protected by the Alabama Constitution 
regardless of the federal constitution. See generally McKinney v. City of 
Birmingham, 292 Ala. 726, 727, 296 So. 2d 236, 237 (1974) (Jones, J., 
dissenting). At other times, we may determine that the Alabama 
Constitution does not protect a "right" protected by the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the federal constitution. Cf., e.g., Hamilton v. Scott, 97 
1210309 
25 
 
So. 3d 728, 742-47 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., concurring specially) 
(criticizing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Hicks v. State, 153 So. 3d 
53, 72-84 (Ala. 2014) (Parker, J., concurring specially) (same); Ex parte 
Phillips, 287 So. 3d 1179, 1244-53 (Ala. 2018) (Parker, J., concurring 
specially) (same); Magers v. Alabama Women's Ctr. Reprod. Alternatives, 
LLC, 325 So. 3d 788, 790-93 (Ala. 2020) (Mitchell, J., concurring 
specially) (same; urging Supreme Court to overrule Roe); Ex parte 
Church, [Ms. 1210187, Feb. 11, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) 
(Parker, C.J., concurring specially) (same). That decision too is 
significant, because the Supreme Court's interpretation can change. See, 
e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228 
(2022) (overruling Roe). To that end, we have a role in highlighting deeply 
erroneous Supreme Court decisions, recognizing that "[a]n illegitimate 
decision is due no allegiance," Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama Pol'y Inst., 
200 So. 3d 495, 611 (Ala. 2015) (Parker, J., concurring).  
In this case, the plaintiffs have recognized the independent 
significance of the Alabama Constitution's protection of free speech. In 
addition, amicus Alabama Center for Law and Liberty is to be 
commended for seeking to focus our attention on the Alabama 
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26 
 
Constitution. I urge future parties and amici to continue doing so. I also 
encourage legal scholars to explore the original meaning of this free-
speech provision as well as the many other protections of rights in the 
Alabama Constitution; at present, the literature is minimal. In the 
remainder of this section, I will outline potential avenues for that work. 
Even if Alabama's free-speech provision were the same as the 
federal First Amendment, "[t]here is no reason to think, as an 
interpretative matter, that constitutional guarantees of independent 
sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be 
construed in the same way." Sutton, supra, at 174. But the two free-
speech provisions are different. The federal First Amendment tersely 
declares: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press ...." U.S. Const. amend. I. Alabama's § 4 is more elaborate: 
"[N]o law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech 
or of the press; and any person may speak, write, and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that 
liberty." Art. I, § 4.  
"An amended or revised State constitution should be interpreted in 
the light of its predecessors." Steele v. County Comm'rs of Madison Cnty., 
1210309 
27 
 
83 Ala. 304, 305, 3 So. 761, 762 (1888). The first clause of § 4 was original 
to our 1901 constitution. The second clause, however, originated in our 
1819 constitution and was carried forward unchanged. See Art. I, § 8, 
Ala. Const. 1819; Art. I, § 8, Ala. Const. 1861; Art. I, § 5, Ala. Const. 1865; 
Art. I, § 6, Ala. Const. 1868; Art. I, § 5, Ala. Const. 1875. Thus, any court 
decisions applying the predecessors of the second clause could be 
illuminating. In addition, interpretation of § 4 should take into account 
contemporaneous dictionaries (published around the times when § 4 and 
its predecessors were adopted), the history and legal context of its 
adoption, contemporaneous lay-audience advocacy for (or against) its 
adoption, and any other evidence of its original public meaning. 
Particularly enlightening might be evidence of the contemporaneous 
general public understanding of free speech, especially as articulated in 
other states' free-speech provisions and court decisions interpreting 
them.  
One source of evidence of § 4's original meaning that should not be 
neglected is the common-law history of the freedom of speech. In 
particular, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England are at the foundation of American jurisprudence. See Albert W. 
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28 
 
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1996); Ex 
parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring 
specially). Although Blackstone supported after-the-fact punishments for 
wrongful speech such as defamation, he advocated for a categorical 
prohibition of prior restraints. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*151-53. For Blackstone, freedom of speech "consist[ed] in laying no 
previous restraints upon publications." Id. at *151. He deemed this 
prohibition "essential to the nature of a free state." Id. That was because 
prior-approval laws "subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of 
one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all 
controverted points in learning, religion, and government." Id. at *152. 
Thus, each person "ha[d] an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he 
please[d] before the public." Id. at *151.  
Generations ago, a court in Alabama applied that Blackstonian 
approach to § 4:  
"[T]he Constitution ... declares that: 
 
"'Any person may speak, write and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that liberty.' Const. Ala. 1901, art. 1, Sec. 4. 
 
"Neither a court of equity, nor any other department of 
government, can set up a censorship in advance over such 
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29 
 
matters, and prevent a person from exercising this 
constitutional right. He has the right to publish, if he chooses 
to take the consequences. After he has spoken or written 
falsely, the criminal law can punish him, and the civil courts 
amerce him in damages. That such redress may not be 
adequate in all cases, and in some cannot be, is quite 
apparent; but the remedies named are all that the 
Constitution permits any court to employ .... The court cannot 
go outside of the Constitution, or hold that to be an inadequate 
remedy which the Constitution has declared to be the sole 
remedy. The wrongs and injury, which often occur from lack 
of preventive means to suppress slander, are parts of the price 
which the people, by their organic law, have declared it is 
better to pay, than to encounter the evils which might result 
if the courts were allowed to take the alleged slanderer or 
libeler by the throat, in advance." 
 
Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power 
Co., 171 F. 553, 556 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1909). This Court itself declared: 
"A free government has never tolerated the muzzling of the 
press or the stifling of free speech. At most, it has only held 
those who enjoy this freedom answerable for an abuse thereof. 
... 
 
 
".... 
 
"Judge [Joseph] Story, in his treatise on the 
Constitution, ... says: '... It is plain ... that the language of this 
[First A]mendment imports no more than that every man 
shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon 
any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so 
always that he does not injure any other person in his rights, 
person, property or reputation; and so always that he does not 
thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the 
government.' ... 2 Story on the Constitution (5th Ed.) pp. 634, 
635." 
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30 
 
 
Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20, 22, 173 So. 626, 628 (1937) 
(emphasis omitted).  
If parties' counsel, amici, and scholars will carefully examine the 
evidence of the original public meaning of § 4's protection of free speech, 
their work will assist Alabama courts in independently interpreting this 
important constitutional protection. In addition, that work will help 
illuminate the meaning of the Act, which subjects its allowance of time, 
place, and manner restrictions to this constitutional protection. It is time 
for the Alabama bar and bench to dust off the Alabama Constitution and 
rediscover its independent protections of individual rights. 
II. "Free speech zones" 
 
I next explain my point of difference with the main opinion. The 
outdoor-speech policy of the University of Alabama in Huntsville ("the 
University") designated certain areas of campus for "[s]pontaneous 
activities of expression" without a prior reservation. (For ease of the 
reader, I will refer to "activities of expression" and similar terms as 
"speech.") The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that that designation of areas 
violated the following language of the Act: "[T]he institution shall not 
create free speech zones or other designated outdoor areas of the campus 
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31 
 
in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive activities," § 16-68-
3(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that 
the designated areas did not limit speech. Rather, the defendants 
contended, the areas expanded the opportunity for speech because they 
allowed spontaneous speech without the prior reservations that were 
required for the rest of the outdoor part of campus. The circuit court 
granted the motion without directly addressing that argument. The main 
opinion concludes that the circuit court erred because, as a matter of law, 
the designated areas were prohibited "free speech zones." 
However, in procedural terms, the defendants' argument was that 
the "free speech zones" aspect of the plaintiffs' claim failed to state a 
claim, under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. Specifically, the motion 
attacked this aspect of the claim on the basis that it was foreclosed by a 
correct interpretation and characterization of the policy's designated-
areas provision. The policy was an exhibit to the complaint. Thus, in 
essence, the defendants' argument was that the complaint's allegations 
were conclusively contradicted by the complaint's exhibit. See Twine v. 
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 294 Ala. 43, 49, 311 So. 2d 299, 304 (1975) 
("An exhibit made the basis of a cause of action ... and contradicting the 
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32 
 
averments of the pleading of which it is a part will control such 
pleading."). 
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the defendant bears the 
burden of showing that the claim, as pleaded, fails as a matter of law. 5B 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1357 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he burden is on the moving party to prove that 
no legally cognizable claim for relief exists."). The plaintiff's responsive 
burden is then to show that the defendant has not met its burden. Cf. 
Black v. North Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F. 3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Hooper v. City of Montgomery, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 
2007); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989). The plaintiff does 
not have to show that the claim will be ultimately meritorious. Cf. Nance  
v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). If the trial court grants the 
motion, then this Court's review is similarly bounded by the posture of 
those burdens. We "'"do[] not consider whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but only whether [the plaintiff] may possibly 
prevail."'" EB Invs., L.L.C. v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 930 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 
2005) (citations omitted). In other words, we cannot decide whether the 
plaintiff's claim is ultimately meritorious in the abstract; we decide only 
1210309 
33 
 
whether the defendant met its burden of showing that the claim was not 
meritorious as pleaded. Thus, here we cannot properly decide whether 
the "free speech zones" aspect of the plaintiffs' claim is ultimately 
meritorious, i.e., whether the policy's designation of areas violated the 
Act's prohibition of certain "free speech zones." We can decide only 
whether the defendants met their burden of showing that the terms of 
the policy, on their face (as an exhibit to the complaint), conclusively 
contradicted that aspect of the claim. 
As part of this inquiry, I agree with the other Justices who point 
out that the Act does not categorically prohibit public institutions of 
higher education from creating "free speech zones." Rather, it prohibits 
them from "creat[ing] free speech zones or other designated outdoor areas 
of the campus in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive activities." 
§ 16-68-3(a)(4) (emphasis added).  
The phrase "in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive 
activities" qualifies the preclusion of "free speech zones." (Although the 
Act uses the language "limit or prohibit," within this discussion I will 
refer only to "limit[ing]" protected speech, because "prohibit[ion]" is 
merely the ultimate form of limitation.) The defendants posit that the 
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34 
 
designated areas do not limit protected speech but instead expand or 
facilitate it. In the defendants' way of thinking, if it were not for the 
designated areas, all outdoor speech would require a prior reservation 
under the policy. Compared to that prior-reservation regime, the 
designated areas facilitate a greater amount of speech because they allow 
spontaneous speech without a reservation. 
But that argument assumes that the designated areas' effect on 
speech is properly measured by comparison to that general prior-
reservation regime. That view of the "baseline" level of speech for 
comparison does not square with the language of the Act. The Act 
prohibits areas that are created to limit "protected expressive activities." 
§ 16-68-3(a)(4). Thus, the comparison baseline is the category of all 
speech that is constitutionally protected. In contrast, time-place-manner 
restrictions such as the policy's general prior-reservation regime do not 
define what speech is constitutionally protected; they define how 
constitutionally protected speech is (perhaps permissibly) restricted. 
Because the defendants' argument that the designated areas facilitate 
speech is premised on a wrong view of the baseline, they have not met 
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35 
 
their burden of showing that the policy's designated areas were not 
created to "limit" protected speech. 
Turning now to another aspect of the Act's "free speech zones" 
provision, I note that it prohibits creating designated areas "in order to" 
limit protected speech. § 16-68-3(a)(4). In context, "in order to" means "for 
the purpose of." Cf. Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage 
460 (3d ed. 2011) ("The phrase in order to is often wordy for the simple 
infinitive ['to'] ...."); Singletary v. McCormick, 36 N.C. App. 597, 244 
S.E.2d 731 (1978) (applying statute that authorized grave removal "in 
order to" enlarge an existing church; interpreting "in order to" as 
meaning "as the means to"). The purpose of an actor's conduct can be 
determined based on evidence of the actor's subjective intent. Thus, 
Justice Sellers correctly implies that evidence of University officials' 
intent to limit protected speech could establish that the designated areas 
were created "in order to" limit protected speech. However, an actor's 
purpose can also be evidenced by the natural and ordinary results of the 
actor's conduct. See A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 43 (1934) 
(holding that requirement that tax be raised for a public purpose "has 
regard to the use which is to be made of the revenue derived from the tax, 
1210309 
36 
 
and not to any ulterior motive or purpose which may have influenced the 
Legislature in passing the act"); McCreary Cnty. v. American Civ. 
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) ("[S]crutinizing purpose 
[makes] practical sense … where an understanding of official objective 
emerges 
from 
readily 
discoverable 
fact, 
without 
any 
judicial 
psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts. The eyes that look to 
purpose belong to an '"objective observer,"' one who takes account of the 
traditional external signs that show up in the '"text, legislative history, 
and implementation of the ..."' ... official act." (citations omitted)); State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So. 2d 458, 464 (Ala. 1993) ("'[W]here 
intent to injure is inferred as a matter of law from the nature of the act 
committed, the insured's subjective intent does not matter.'" (citation 
omitted)); 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 114 (2016) ("Specific intent may 
be proved by direct evidence. However, ... it may be inferred from ... the 
actions of the defendant. ... [T]he fact finder may look to the act itself ...." 
(footnotes omitted)). Hence, the plaintiffs could establish that the 
designated areas were created "in order to" limit protected speech by 
showing that their primary function is to limit protected speech, 
regardless of evidence of the officials' subjective intent.  
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37 
 
In the defendants' motion to dismiss and on appeal, they have not 
shown that, on the face of the policy, limiting protected speech is not the 
primary function of the designated areas. And they cannot show, on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion limited to the four corners of the complaint and its 
exhibits, that the officials' subjective intent was not to limit protected 
speech. Therefore, the defendants have not met their burden of showing 
that the designated areas were not created "in order to" limit protected 
speech. 
To promote clarity and coherence in application of the Act, I note 
an additional point about "free speech zones." Within § 16-68-3, 
subsection (a)(4)'s prohibition of "free speech zones" appears to be an 
exception, a carve-out, from subsection (a)(7)'s allowance of time-place-
manner restrictions. Under (a)(7), in general, time-place-manner 
restrictions are allowed if they are constitutional and meet (a)(7)'s 
criteria. But under (a)(4), one particular type of "place" restriction is 
never allowed: designation of a particular outdoor area for speech, for the 
purpose of limiting protected speech (either within or outside that area).2 
 
2The Act appears to provide an exception to this prohibition. When 
a person or group has reserved an area for a particular speech event, 
subsection (a)(6) requires the institution not to allow others to disrupt 
1210309 
38 
 
Finally, I agree with Justice Mitchell that we should not care about 
individual legislators' subjective motives when we interpret statutes. The 
law is what the law says, not what individual legislators wanted it to 
accomplish. As I have said before, "[extratextual legislative] 'intent' is not 
the law. The words of the constitution and statutes are the law." Ex parte 
Huntingdon Coll., 309 So. 3d 606, 624 (Ala. 2020) (Parker, C.J., 
dissenting). To that end, I suggest that we consider jettisoning confusing 
language about "intent of the law" and "objective intent." That kind of 
language tends to inadvertently perpetuate the myth that legislators' 
motives are what we are after. And there are much better ways to express 
the substance of statutory interpretation, including some employed by 
Justice Mitchell here. 
 
that event. As Justice Mitchell points out, that protection temporarily 
creates a geographic zone in which the reserving speaker's speech is 
facilitated beyond the baseline of simply being allowed to engage in 
protected speech, because others are prevented from disrupting it. 
However, would-be disrupters' speech is also constitutionally protected. 
See 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 
10:39 (3d ed.) (updated Sept. 2022). Thus, an institution's prevention of 
disrupters' speech under (a)(6) functions as a time-place restriction on 
the disrupters' speech. Although such a restriction is "create[d] ... in order 
to limit" protected speech and thus would ordinarily be prohibited by 
(a)(4), it is nevertheless expressly allowed by (a)(6). 
1210309 
39 
 
In my view, the present posture of this case does not allow us to 
rule on the ultimate merits of the "free speech zones" aspect of the 
plaintiffs' claim. We can properly hold only that, under a correct 
interpretation of the Act as prohibiting designated areas that are 
"create[d] ... in order to limit" protected speech, the defendants have not 
met their burden of showing that this aspect is not meritorious. In 
addition, the Act must be interpreted coherently, as a whole, and not 
according to the subjective motives of legislators, but according to its 
words.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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40 
 
SELLERS, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
 
I concur in all parts of the main opinion except to the extent that 
the opinion mandates a conclusion that, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the free-speech zones created by the policy regulating 
speech in outdoor areas of the campus of the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville ("the University") violate § 16-68-3(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. 
Because I believe the issue whether the free-speech zones are permissible 
is a fact-intensive one, I concur in the result to reverse the trial court's 
judgment with respect to that issue. Section 16-68-3(a)(4) provides: 
"That the outdoor areas of a campus of a public institution of 
higher education shall be deemed to be a forum for members 
of the campus community, and the institution shall not create 
free speech zones or other designated outdoor areas of the 
campus in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive 
activities." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The majority holds that the trial court erred in dismissing the 
action filed by Joshua Greer, a student at the University, and Young 
Americans for Liberty, a student organization at the University ("the 
plaintiffs"), in part because the policy regulating speech in outdoor areas 
of the University's campus ("the policy") violates § 16-68-3(a)(4) as a 
matter of law by designating specific free-speech zones that can be used 
1210309 
41 
 
for protected expression without a reservation. But free-speech zones are 
prohibited only if they are created "in order to limit or prohibit protected 
expressive activities." § 16-68-3(a)(4). 
"A dismissal [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,] for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is 
warranted only when the allegations of the complaint, viewed 
most strongly in favor of the pleader, demonstrate that the 
pleader can prove no set of facts that would entitle the pleader 
to relief." 
Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. Moulton, [Ms. SC-2022-0447, 
Sept. 23, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022). The allegations in the 
complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, do not 
conclusively establish that the free-speech zones were not created in 
order to limit or prohibit protected expressive activities. Thus, I agree 
that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' action. But, 
consistent with our applicable standard of review for the dismissal of a 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), I would remand the case for further 
discovery so the parties can develop a factual record regarding whether 
the free-speech zones established by the policy were created for limiting 
or prohibiting protected speech.   
 
Stewart, J., concurs. 
 
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42 
 
MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
 
I concur in the main opinion with respect to its treatment of the 
plaintiffs' constitutional claims, but I concur only in the result as to its 
analysis of the plaintiffs' claims under the Alabama Campus Free Speech 
Act ("the Act"), § 16-68-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  I write separately to 
explain why I disagree with the main opinion's statutory analysis. 
 
I also write to emphasize two additional points, which I encourage 
the trial court and the parties to consider on remand.  First, it's important 
to clarify the role that "intent" plays in this Court's constitutional and 
statutory interpretation.  As the briefing in this case illustrates, litigants 
often seem to assume that a law's meaning depends on what individual 
lawmakers subjectively intended the law to mean.  That assumption is 
incorrect.  Our federal and state constitutions authorize lawmakers to 
enact texts, not intentions.  In accordance with that principle, the proper 
aim of judicial interpretation is to discern a law's objective semantic 
meaning (sometimes referred to as its manifest intention or as the intent 
manifested in the law's language); the subjective views, goals, or desires 
of individual lawmakers are irrelevant.   
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43 
 
 
Second, I flag an open question related to the defendants' 
arguments about Art. XIV, § 264, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.).  If the 
trial court decides to order supplemental briefing or oral argument on 
remand, the parties may wish to address this question.  Doing so would 
likely aid the trial court's analysis, as well as this Court's eventual review 
if another appeal is filed.   
I. 
I begin with the main opinion’s statutory analysis.  The Act defines 
a "free speech zone" as "[a]n area on campus of a public institution of 
higher education that is designated for the purpose of engaging in a 
protected expressive activity."  § 16-68-2(3), Ala. Code 1975.  The Act 
prohibits the creation of "free speech zones or other designated outdoor 
areas of the campus in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive 
activities."  § 16-68-3(a)(4).  That is, the Act does not prohibit all "free 
speech zones," as the main opinion concludes, but rather only those zones 
created "in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive activities."  Id.  
On my read of the Act, public universities retain the ability to create free-
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44 
 
speech zones in order to facilitate expressive activities.3  For example, a 
university may reserve an outdoor venue to promote a particular 
expressive event, such as a debate or a lecture, and may prohibit others 
from substantially disrupting the event while it is taking place.  § 16-68-
3(a)(6).   
Here, the University of Alabama in Huntsville's policy ("the Policy") 
plainly uses speech zones to limit expression rather than facilitate it.  
Specifically, it uses speech zones to funnel all non-preapproved 
"spontaneous activities of expression"4 into a handful of scattered tracts.  
Outside of these scattered tracts, the Policy prohibits even a single 
student from "spontaneous[ly]" expressing himself at a normal volume, 
absent prior University approval.  That prohibition applies at all hours 
of the day and night, and it applies even when there is no possibility that 
the student's speech could disrupt class or any other University function.  
 
3Indeed, the Act itself creates a free-speech zone on each campus by 
designating the campus's outdoor areas "to be a forum" for expressive 
activity "for members of the campus community."  § 16-68-3(a)(4).  
 
4The Policy makes an exception for spontaneous activities of 
expression that consist of "casual recreational or social activities," but the 
Policy never defines "casual recreational or social activities," nor does it 
explain what distinguishes those types of activities from other 
spontaneous activities of expression.  
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45 
 
That the Policy uses speech zones to fence off such manifestly protected 
activity demonstrates that the Policy creates "free speech zones … in 
order to limit or prohibit protected expressive activities."  Accordingly, I 
concur with the main opinion's holding that the trial court erred in 
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under 
the Act, but -- unlike the main opinion -- I do not read the Act to prohibit 
all speech zones. 
II. 
As is probably clear by now, this case turns on the interpretation of 
both constitutional and statutory texts.  When interpreting either type of 
text, this Court is guided by certain basic principles.  We have held, for 
example, that in interpreting the Constitution 
"we look to the plain and commonly understood meaning of 
the terms used in [a constitutional] provision to discern its 
meaning.  … 'The object of all construction is to ascertain and 
effectuate the intention of the people in the adoption of the 
constitution.  The intention is collected from the words of the 
instrument, read and interpreted in the light of its history.'" 
Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 79 (Ala. 2009) 
(quoting State v. Sayre, 118 Ala. 1, 28, 24 So. 89, 92 (1897)).  The same 
principles govern our interpretation of statutes: 
1210309 
46 
 
"'"The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to 
determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature as 
manifested in the language of the statute. ... Words must be 
given their natural, ordinary, commonly understood meaning, 
and where plain language is used, the court is bound to 
interpret that language to mean exactly what it says."'" 
Swindle v. Remington, 291 So. 3d 439, 457 (Ala. 2019) (citations omitted).  
These and similar formulations permeate our jurisprudence.  But 
many litigants -- even experienced ones -- sometimes misapprehend the 
role "intent" plays in those formulations.  As the two quoted passages 
above illustrate, our opinions routinely describe the goal of legal 
interpretation as ascertainment of the law's intent, which sometimes 
leads litigants to assume that the true meaning of the law is what the 
enacting legislators (or, for constitutional provisions, the ratifiers) 
subjectively wanted the law to mean.  For example, the defendants here 
say that the act of discerning "legislative intent" requires judges to 
examine individual legislator's "statements about the statutes they 
enacted" in order to understand those legislator's subjective goals or 
desires.  Defendants' brief at 80; see also id. at 77-78 (making an 
argument regarding the personal views of the governor who signed a bill 
into law).  Some of the amici seem to share this belief.  For instance, 
several state legislators filed a brief explaining how they "intended" the 
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47 
 
Act to operate and what types of behavior they "intended [it] to prevent."  
State legislators' brief at 3, 4.5   
Those views are misguided.  Under our federal and state 
constitutions, lawmakers cannot make law by forming intentions; rather, 
they make law only by fixing their intentions to written text and then 
subjecting that text to bicameralism and presentment (or, in the case of 
constitutional provisions, to the amendment process).  See U.S. Const. 
Art. I § 7; Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. V, § 125.  In other words, 
the subjective intentions that animate a law are not the law; only the text 
of a law is the law.    
That is why -- as the above quotes from Barber and Swindle go on 
to explain -- the "intent" courts are supposed to consider is the intent 
manifested in "the words of the [Constitution]," Barber, 42 So. 3d at 79, 
or in "the language of the statute," Swindle, 291 So. 3d at 457.  Those 
quotes make clear that the process of ascertaining a law's "intent" is an 
objective exercise focused on understanding the statute's language, not a 
 
5Despite that framing, most of the legislators' substantive 
arguments involve analysis of the Act's objective meaning rather than 
the legislators' subjective intentions.  To that extent, the legislators' 
arguments are proper.   
1210309 
48 
 
subjective one focused on ascertaining lawmakers' subjective goals or 
desires.   
Our Court has spelled out that point many times over the centuries.  
As far back as 1890, this Court wrote: 
"The office of construction is to ascertain what the language 
of an act means, and not what the legislature may have 
intended. '… The court knows nothing of the intention of an 
act, except from the words in which it is expressed, applied to 
the facts existing at the time; the meaning of the law being 
the law itself.'"  
Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 161, 7 So. 824, 827 (1890) (citation 
omitted).  And we made the same point again just two years ago: 
"'"'The intention of the Legislature, to which effect must 
be given, is that expressed in the [act], and the courts will not 
inquire into the motives which influenced the Legislature or 
individual members in voting for its passage, nor indeed as to 
the intention of the draftsman or of the Legislature so far as 
it has not been expressed in the act.  So in ascertaining the 
meaning of a[n act] the court will not be governed or 
influenced by the views or opinions of any or all of the 
members of the Legislature, or its legislative committees or 
any other person.'"'" 
State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 323 So. 3d 572, 596-97 (Ala. 2020) (citations 
omitted). 
The key takeaway here is that when our opinions talk about the 
"intent" of a law, we are usually using "intent" in its objectified sense -- 
as shorthand for the manifest intent, i.e., the intent that a reasonable 
1210309 
49 
 
reader would ascribe to a reasonable lawmaker based simply on reading 
the law's text in context.  Our precedents do not hold that courts can or 
should subordinate the objective indication of a law's text to individual 
lawmakers' subjective desires.   
Our Court is not alone in this practice.  As Chief Judge Pryor of the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed, reliance on an 
objectified concept of intent "track[s] a long tradition of discerning intent 
'solely on the basis of the words of the law,'" read in their textual and 
historical context, " 'and not by investigating any other source of 
information about the lawgiver's purposes.' "  William H. Pryor, Jr., 
Against Living Common Goodism, 23 Federalist Soc'y Rev. 24, 36 (2022) 
(quoting H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 895 (1985)). 
What does all this mean for the case on remand?  It means that the 
parties and amici should think carefully about their continued reliance 
on the statements of individual lawmakers.  Lawmakers' statements can 
sometimes be used to shed light on the social and linguistic conventions 
that prevailed at the time of a law's enactment (because those 
conventions inform the law's objective meaning), but they cannot be used 
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50 
 
to prioritize a subjective "intention" over the law's language.  See Bynum 
v. City of Oneonta, 175 So. 3d 63, 69 (Ala. 2015) ("'"[I]n ascertaining the 
meaning of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the 
views or opinions of any or all of the members of the Legislature …."'" 
(citations omitted; emphasis added)); State v. $223,405.86, 203 So. 3d at 
848 (Shaw, J., concurring in the result) ("'"[T]o seek the intent of the 
provision's drafters or to attempt to aggregate the intentions of [the] 
voters into some abstract general purpose underlying the Amendment, 
contrary to the intent expressed by the provision's clear textual meaning, 
is not the proper way to perform constitutional interpretation." … The 
words of a law must speak for themselves.'" (citations omitted)); see also 
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(explaining that legislative history may be used to illuminate semantic 
meaning, including by shedding light on how words are typically used in 
a particular historical context, but that it cannot be used to prioritize 
legislators' subjective intentions over the enacted text).   
Even when the statements of lawmakers are introduced for a 
proper purpose, courts must exercise caution in relying on those 
statements. 
 
Statements 
by 
individual 
legislators 
are 
often 
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51 
 
unrepresentative6 and can be easily cherry-picked.7  Reliance on such 
statements can also encourage strategic behavior: a lawmaker who 
knows that courts will rely on his statements to extend (or limit) a law 
beyond its text can easily assert -- either in recorded statements or in 
testimony before the court -- that the law enacts his own preferred 
interpretation, even if he knows that his preferred interpretation is not 
shared by the public at large or by most of his colleagues.  A healthy dose 
of skepticism is therefore often appropriate when considering the 
statements of individual lawmakers.  That is just as true in this case on 
remand as it is in others.   
III. 
 
Another question we've asked the trial court to consider on remand 
is the whether the Act violates § 264 of the Alabama Constitution, which 
 
6See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of a Method in Statutory 
Interpretation, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81, 91 (2017) (explaining that the 
legislators most likely to comment on a law are usually those who are 
either strongly opposed to, or strongly in favor of, its enactment).   
  
7Cf. Barnett v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 767 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., 
concurring specially) ("Much like legislative history can be cherry-picked 
to find remarks favorable to a particular interpretation of a statute, 
records of constitutional conventions can be similarly abused.").   
 
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52 
 
gives the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama "management 
and control" over the University.  In their brief before this Court, the 
defendants disclaim any suggestion that § 264 "exempts [the University] 
from generally applicable State law."  Defendants' brief at 54.  The 
defendants instead argue that the "management and control" language 
in § 264 prohibits the Legislature from passing laws that are "specifically 
directed" to the University.  Id.  The defendants then assert that "[i]t is 
beyond debate that the Act is not a generally applicable law."  Id. at 55-
56.   
I do not understand why that proposition is "beyond debate."  This 
Court has held that a law is "generally applicable" if it "'makes no 
reference to, or indeed functions irrespective of, the existence of'" the 
entity or category in question.  Ingram v. American Chambers Life Ins. 
Co., 643 So. 2d 575, 577 (Ala. 1994) (citation omitted); see also 
defendants' brief at 54-55 (adopting this same definition).  Here, the 
entity in question is the University, and the category in question (i.e., the 
category of things that the defendants argue is constitutionally 
protected) comprises universities governed by constitutionally created 
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53 
 
boards of trustees.8  But the Act, so far as I can tell, does not single out 
either the University, as an entity, or universities governed by 
constitutionally created boards of trustees, as a category, for special 
treatment.  The Act instead applies to all "public institution[s] of higher 
education" in the State, §§ 16-68-3 and -6, of which there are many -- 
including those that do not have constitutionally created boards.   
The defendants have not explained why this language, which is 
general on its face, should be understood as "specifically targeting" either 
the University itself or all universities with constitutionally created 
boards.  No one would say that a law regulating the conduct of "all 
persons over the age of 18" specifically targets me, just because I happen 
to be one person among many over that age.  For similar reasons, I don't 
understand how a law regulating the conduct of all public universities 
specifically targets the University, just because it happens to be one 
public university among many in the State.9   Nor do I understand how a 
 
8There are two universities in the State that have constitutionally 
created boards of trustees -- the University of Alabama and Auburn 
University.   See Art. XIV, § 264, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.); Art. 
XIV, § 266, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.).  
 
9The defendants seem to concede that the Act would qualify as 
generally applicable if it "appl[ied] to all public land in Alabama," instead 
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54 
 
law regulating the conduct of all public universities specifically targets 
universities with constitutionally created boards, simply because 
universities with constitutionally created boards are two among many 
public universities in Alabama.  It's therefore not clear to me why -- under 
the defendants' own interpretation of § 264 -- the Act raises constitutional 
concerns.  For the benefit of its own analysis and this Court's possible 
appellate review, the trial court may wish to ask the parties to address 
this question on remand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
of applying to all public universities in Alabama, defendants' brief at 55, 
but they do not lay out why the general category of "all public lands" is 
permissible while the (also general) category of "all public universities" 
is not.