Title: Lightolier v. Hoon

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Lightolier, A Division of Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC v. David Hoon et al.
No. 117, September Term, 2004
Headnote:
Placement of thermal insulation in direct contact with an electric light fixture
designed only for use where thermal insulation would be at least three inches
away from the fixture was a misuse of the product.  Numerous specific
warnings concerning the risk of fire if thermal insulation was placed within
three inches of that type of fixture existed directly on the light fixture, the
instruction manual that accompanied the fixture, and were also stated in the
National Electric Code.  Thus, the failure to heed these warnings when
installing the thermal insulation was a proximate cause of a damaging house
fire and constituted a misuse of the product.
Clear warnings on a product can also serve as a bar to strict liability actions
under certain circumstances.
Circuit Court for Kent C ounty
Case # C-99-4492
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2004
Lightolier, A Division of 
Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC
v.
David Hoon et al.
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Bell, C.J., Wilner and Battaglia, JJ. dissent.
Filed:   June 21, 2005
This case arises from the occurrence of a fire that caused substantial damage to the
home of David and Texie Hoon (“the Hoons”).  At issue is whether the manufacturer of a
recessed light fixture that gave rise to the fire when it was later improperly surrounded by
thermal insulation can be strictly liable under a product liability theory when warnings
existing on both the light fixture itself and the instruction manual accompanying it clearly
warned of a risk of fire if the light fixture was placed in close proximity to thermal
insulation.
On November 15, 1999, the Hoons and their insurer, Federal Insurance Company,
respondents, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Kent County against numerous
defendants including Lightolier, a Division of Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC (“Lightolier”),
petitioner, with the specific claims against Lightolier being for negligence, breach of
warranty and product liability – defective design.  Lightolier, a designer and manufacturer
of lighting products, including the light fixture alleged to have been involved in starting the
fire that damaged the Hoons’ home, thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment with
the Circuit Court on March 15, 2002.  On April 15, 2002, the Circuit Court granted
Lightolier’s motion for summary judgment.  
The Hoons thereafter filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  On September
15, 2004, the intermediate appellate court issued its opinion, Hoon v. Lightolier, 158
Md.App. 648, 857 A.2d 1184 (2004), which reversed the Circuit Court’s granting of
Lightolier’s motion for summary judgment.  On November 1, 2004, Lightolier filed a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court.  On December 17, 2004, we granted the petition.
1 “IC” stands for “Insulated Ceiling” and is a commonly used acronym with respect
to recessed lighting. With recessed lighting any recessed fixture that is in direct contact with
thermal insulation must carry an IC rating.  This makes IC rated fixtures the choice for the
ceiling on the top floor of a home, which is typically blanketed with thermal insulation, and
any other area where insulation is used.  Non-IC rated fixtures are commonly used in areas
(continued...)
-2-
Lightolier v. Hoon, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 997 (2004).  Lightolier presents one question
for our review:
“Where a manufacturer supplements its undisputedly sufficient warnings
accompanying its product with an additional safety feature, does the
manufacturer forfeit its right to assume that those warnings will be read and
heeded, such that misuse of the product in direct contravention of those
warnings is no longer deemed the proximate cause of damages under the law,
even though the product is safe for use when the warnings are followed?”
We hold that, because adequate warnings were placed on the Lightolier light fixture
at issue that warned of the risk of fire if thermal insulation was thereafter placed within three
inches of the light fixture, and it is undisputed that the fire would not have occurred if these
warnings had been heeded, the proximate cause of the fire was the negligent placement of
thermal insulation within three inches of the already installed light fixture, thereby resulting
in a misuse of the fixture.  Therefore, the Circuit Court properly entered summary judgment
in favor of Lightolier upon its motion.  
I. Facts
A. The Hoons’ Home Renovation and Ensuing Fire
While in the process of making extensive renovations to their Chestertown, Maryland
home, David and Texie Hoon designated that non-IC rated recessed light fixtures1 be
1(...continued)
away from insulation as they are not intended for insulation contact.
The July 2004 “Luminaire Marking Guide,” which was written by the Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. (responsible for the “UL” symbol found on all approved electric lights)
and “describes a marking [on a lighting unit] and briefly explains the meaning and
terminology of the marking,” explains the markings to be found on both IC and non-IC rated
light fixtures:
“RECESSED LUMINAIRE MARKINGS
 . . .
55. TYPE NON-IC — Recessed luminaires that are not suitable for
installation in direct contact with thermal insulation or combustible materials
(Type Non-IC) are marked ‘DO NOT INSTALL INSULATION WITHIN 76
mm (3 in) OF ANY PART OF THE LUMINAIRE.’
56. TYPE IC — A luminaire marked ‘TYPE IC’ may be installed where
insulation is placed in direct contact with the sides and the top of the
luminaire.  Recessed luminaires not marked ‘TYPE IC’ are intended to be
installed where insulation is kept at least 3 inches from its sides and from its
top such that heat is not entrapped.” 
-3-
installed in certain areas of their home.  These non-IC rated fixtures were manufactured by
Lightolier, Model 1002P1, and purchased in “early 1998.”  The actual installation of these
non-IC rated fixtures was performed by Westwind Construction Company (“Westwind”),
a company partly owned by David Hoon that acted as both the general contractor responsible
for the renovations to the Hoons’ home and as the electrical contractor.  Printed on each of
the Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures in large red letters was the following warning:
“WARNING – RISK OF FIRE
DO NOT INSTALL INSULATION WITHIN 3 INCHES OF
FIXTURE SIDES OR WIRING COMPARTMENT NOR
ABOVE FIXTURE IN SUCH A MANNER TO ENTRAP
HEAT.”
This warning was notice that subsequent improperly installed insulation would
2 The National Electric Code is a “model code promulgated by the National Fire
Protection Association.”  Edison Elec. Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 849
F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The NEC’s purpose is to specify how electrical devices and
materials should be installed from a safety standpoint.
3 This exception refers to an IC rated fixture.
4 Lightolier diagrams of its Model 1002P1 non-IC rated fixture show that the SHTP
is attached to the outer part of the “Junction Box,” which sits atop the mounting bars and
mounting frame of the fixture.  A description of the SHTP states that it “[m]eets NEC and
(continued...)
-4-
constitute a misuse of the previously installed light fixture.  Thus, the Hoons were on notice
of a responsibility to ensure that installers properly installed the thermal insulation.  An
identical warning was also found in a prominent enclosed box on page one of the instruction
manual accompanying each of the Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures.  Such warnings are in
accordance with the language found in § 410-66 of the National Electric Code2 (“NEC”),
which states:
“410-66.  Clearance and Installation.
. . .
(b) Installation.  Thermal insulation shall not be installed within 3 in.
(76 mm) of the recessed fixture enclosure, wiring compartment, or ballast, and
shall not be so installed above the fixture so as to entrap heat and prevent the
free circulation of air.
Exception: Recessed fixtures identified as suitable for insulation to be in
direct contact with the fixture.[3]” [Footnote added.]
Attached to each of the Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures was what is known as a self-
heating thermal protector (“SHTP”), which was located about three inches from the base of
each fixture.4  The SHTP is designed to detect excessive heat entrapped around the fixture
4(...continued)
UL requirements.  Insulation must be kept 3" away from fixture sides and wiring
compartments and must not be placed above fixture in a manner which will entrap heat.”
See http://www.lightolier.com/MKACatpdfs/1002P1.PDF.
5 It appears from the record that the Lightolier non-IC rated fixture would cycle, and
therefore blink, indefinitely until the cause of the overheating (e.g., incorrect wattage of bulb
or, as here, insulation placed too close to fixture) was remedied, but the fixture would not
permanently turn off.  The rate at which the light cycled/blinked would be dependent on how
quickly it cooled so as to be safe to turn on again.
-5-
and to “open” a small circuit inside the SHTP, causing the electric current to the fixture to
be cut off when such a buildup of heat occurs; the lights then would “cycle” (turn off and
then back on after the SHTP cooled).  The SHTP is designed to begin cycling the light if the
temperature around the light fixture exceeds 90ºC (194ºF).  This cycling of the light also has
an important secondary effect – the blinking effect of the cycling alerts the installer or
consumer that there may be a problem with the light that requires inspection.5  A label
attached to each non-IC rated fixture stated:
“NOTICE – THERMALLY PROTECTED FIXTURE
BLINKING LIGHT MAY INDICATE INSULATION TOO
CLOSE TO FIXTURE, OR IMPROPER LAMP.”  
Notwithstanding the addition of SHTPs to non-IC rated fixtures, they remain non-IC
rated fixtures and are not considered IC rated.  Therefore, a non-IC rated fixture, even with
a fully operational SHTP, is not to be used in an insulated ceiling where insulation exists or
may come to exist within three inches of the fixture. 
At some time after the non-IC rated fixtures were installed in the Hoons’ home, Gede
Insulation, LLC (“Gede”) installed blown-in cellulose insulation into the ceiling area where
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certain Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures had been placed.  It is undisputed that Gede placed
the thermal insulation in direct contact with the non-IC rated fixtures without regard to the
warning labels on those fixtures concerning the risk of fire.
On November 2, 1998, a fire caused substantial damage to the Hoons’ home.  The
fire marshal who investigated the fire concluded that it originated above the ceiling in the
rear hallway of the first floor of the Hoons’ home near one of the Lightolier recessed light
fixtures, most likely due to a problem with the light fixture itself or with the thermal
insulation being placed too close to the fixture.  It is now undisputed that the fire started
because of  direct contact between the thermal insulation and the non-IC rated fixture.
The record indicates that at some time prior to the fire two other Lightolier non-IC
rated fixtures, which were both located in the Hoons’ kitchen, began to blink.  The Hoons
saw the blinking occurring, investigated the cause, and saw that these two light fixtures were
covered in insulation in violation of their warnings.  Thereafter, the insulation was removed
from the area surrounding those two non-IC rated fixtures.  The Hoons, however, never
examined the proximity of insulation to the non-IC rated fixtures in the rear hallway of the
first floor, which is where the fire originated, alleging that the danger was not apparent
because the non-IC rated fixture at the fire’s point of origin never blinked as to indicate
overheating. 
B. Circuit Court Proceedings
On November 15, 1999, the Hoons filed a multi-count complaint in the Circuit Court
6 The record indicates that, after suit was filed, the Hoons reached a settlement with
Gede.
-7-
for Kent County against numerous defendants, including both Lightolier and Gede.  As
noted, the claims against Lightolier were for negligence, breach of warranty and product
liability – defective design.  Basically, the Hoons based these claims against Lightolier on
allegations that the SHTP of the non-IC fixture where the fire originated did not work
properly and that this malfunction made Lightolier liable for the damages caused by the fire.
The claims against Gede were for negligence and breach of contract.  Specifically, the
Hoons claimed that “Gede breached its duty in that it did install the insulation too close to
the light fixture as a result of which heat was accumulated and concentrated and igniting the
wood frame and other combustible portions of the residence.”6
During pretrial discovery, the Hoons identified three experts who agreed that, if Gede
had not installed the insulation within close proximity or in actual contact with the non-IC
rated fixture, an act in direct contravention of Lightolier’s instructions and warnings, the fire
would not have occurred.  One of the Hoons’ expert witnesses, however, Dr. Thomas Eager,
additionally commented that the location of the SHTP in the non-IC rated fixture was
defectively designed and “unreasonably dangerous.”  Dr. Eager based this opinion on his
belief that, because “[t]he thermal sensor was not located at the hottest region of the light
fixture[,] [t]he presence of the insulation made this sensor ineffective in controlling over-
temperature conditions.”
-8-
On March 15, 2002, Lightolier filed a motion for summary judgment in the Circuit
Court, arguing:
“The well-established doctrine of misuse precludes [the Hoons] from
recovering from Lightolier.  According to [the Hoons], a non-IC rated,
Lightolier recessed light fixture substantially contributed to a fire that caused
significant damage to the Hoons’ real and personal property.  Even if the
Lightolier fixture was the heat source for this fire, the only material that could
have combusted was cellulose insulation installed within three inches of the
fixture.  It is undisputed that (1) someone misused the fixture by installing
insulation within three inches of the fixture and (2) by installing insulation too
closely to the fixture, Gede Insulation, LLC acted contrary to warnings on the
fixture, to warnings in the instruction booklet accompanying the fixture, and
to common knowledge in the insulation and construction industry.  According
to [the Hoons], had Gede adhered to the warnings on the product, their
damages would not have resulted.  As a result, [the Hoons] cannot prove that
the Lightolier fixture was defective, unreasonably dangerous, or the proximate
cause of their damages and Lightolier is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law . . . .” [Alterations added.] 
On April 15, 2002, the Circuit Court granted Lightolier’s motion for summary
judgment, stating:
“The Court finds that the warnings placed on the light fixture and in the
instructions were adequate.  The Court finds that the manufacturer of the light
is entitled to believe that one installing the light together with any insulation
that may be applied near it would heed the warnings.  The failure to heed the
warning in this case is the proximate cause of the fire.  Further, the Court
finds that the [Hoons] were on further notice that there may be problems with
the insulation and the cause of the fire by the fact that other fixtures operated
properly causing them to blink and indicating problems.  If there is a problem
with one fixture with blown-in insulation, the Court finds that one is on notice
that there may be problems with other fixtures and that they should be
checked.  The Court finds that the subsequent malfunction or improper design
of the [SHTP] switch on this particular lamp . . . that its failure to operate in
this particular case does not provide the [Hoons] with another avenue for the
jury to make a determination because the Court finds, for the [] reasons stated,
that the Defendant Lightolier is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
7 In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals refers to Gede as having installed the
non-IC rated light fixture at issue.  This is not the case, as it was Gede who installed the
thermal insulation after Westwind installed the light fixtures.
-9-
[Alterations added.]
C. Court of Special Appeals Proceedings
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the court stated that “[t]he major issue
presented in this appeal is whether the motions judge was legally correct in granting
summary judgment on the ground that the third party’s failure to heed the manufacturer’s
warning was the sole proximate cause of the fire.”7  Hoon, 158 Md. App. at 651, 857 A.2d
at 1185.
Recognizing that “‘there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident,’” id.
at 655, 857 A.2d at 1188, the intermediate appellate court held that “a jury could reasonably
find that there were two concurrent proximate causes of the fire . . . (1) Gede’s negligence
in failing to heed Lightolier’s warning and (2) Lightolier’s defective design (or negligent
manufacture) of the SHTPs.”  Id. at 672, 857 A.2d at 1197.  Because of what it considered
to be this possible additional proximate cause of the fire, the Court of Special Appeals held
that the Circuit Court erred in granting Lightolier’s summary judgment motion.
II. Standard of Review
As indicated, the matter now before us was resolved in the Circuit Court on summary
judgment.  Whether summary judgment was granted properly is a question of law.  The
standard of review is de novo and we are concerned with “whether the trial court was legally
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correct.”  Goodrich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067,
1076 (1996); see also Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 9, 862 A.2d 33, 38 (2004);
Walk v. Hartford Casualty, 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2004); Murphy v. Merzbacher,
346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997).
The trial court, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-501(e), shall grant a motion for
summary judgment “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  The
purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual
disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact which is sufficiently material to be
tried.  See Goodrich, 343 Md. at 205-06, 680 A.2d at 1077; Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291
Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304, 413 A.2d
170, 171 (1980).  Thus, once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds
for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce sufficient evidence to the trial
court that a genuine dispute to a material fact exists.  See, e.g., Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Washington County Nat’l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 712, 467 A.2d 758, 769 (1983).  This
requires “produc[ing] facts under oath, based on the personal knowledge of the affiant to
defeat the motion.  Bald, unsupported statements or conclusions of law are insufficient.”  Id.
(alteration added).  With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice. 
III.  Discussion
Lightolier’s primary contention on this appeal is that the doctrine of misuse applies
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under the facts as heretofore described and that such misuse of the non-IC rated fixture bars
any recovery the Hoons claim against Lightolier.  Whether Lightolier is correct as to this
issue requires this Court to examine the doctrine of misuse and its application, if at all, to
the circumstances surrounding the destructive fire of November 2, 1998.
This Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine of misuse and its possible barring effect
on strict liability in tort claims twenty years ago in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303
Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985).  That case concerned a product liability suit brought by a
woman against a fabric manufacturer and the seller of a nightgown which ignited and caused
injury to her.  At the time of her injury, the woman was wearing the nightgown inside out,
draping the exposed pockets across the burners of a stove.  In deciding whether the trial
court was correct in instructing the jury on product misuse as a possible defense to the strict
liability claim, we initially recognized our adherence to the view of § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
“402A.  Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
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entered into any contractual relation with the seller.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).  Thereafter, we stated in Ellsworth that:
“‘Under § 402A, various defenses are [] available to the seller in an
action based on strict liability in tort.  These defenses are set forth and
explained in the official comments following § 402A.  For example, the seller
is not liable where injury results from abnormal handling or use of the
product (Comment h), where mishandling or alteration after delivery of the
product renders it unsafe (Comment g), or if warnings or instructions supplied
with the product are disregarded by the consumer where, if used in
accordance with these warnings, the product would be safe (Comment j).’”
Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 591-92, 495 A.2d at 353 (emphasis added) (quoting Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 346, 363 A.2d 955, 959-60)).  We then made it clear
that, in product liability actions, misuse of a product, if proven, negates a design defect claim
and occurs when the product in question is used in a manner not reasonably foreseeable to
the manufacturer and/or seller.  Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96, 495 A.2d at 355.  As the
Court of Special Appeals correctly noted in Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72
Md.App. 199, 527 A.2d 1337, cert. denied, 311 Md. 286, 533 A.2d 1308 (1987), however,
this reasonable foreseeability test must be applied with caution “because, with the benefit
of hindsight, any accident could be foreseeable.  Without care, the imposition of strict
products liability could result in a manufacturer’s becoming an insurer for every injury that
may result from its product.”  Id. at 206, 527 A.2d at 1341.
In Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 138 Md.App. 136, 770 A.2d 1072 (2001),
aff’d, 368 Md. 186, 792 A.2d 1145 (2002), a three-year-old child was killed when he
discovered a handgun under his parents’ mattress, loaded an ammunition magazine into the
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gun and, while playing with the gun, accidentally fired it, suffering a fatal bullet wound to
his head.  The instruction manual for the handgun included warnings that “‘Firearms should
always be stored securely and unloaded, away from children and careless adults’ and
‘Firearms should be securely locked in racks or cabinets when not in use.’” Id. at 173, 770
A.2d at 1094.
The mother of the child thereafter sued the gun manufacturer for strict product
liability based on defective design of the handgun.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City
granted summary judgment in favor of the handgun manufacturer.  On appeal to the
intermediate appellate court, one issue to be addressed was whether the placement of the
handgun under the mattress was a misuse of the handgun.  In holding that this did in fact
constitute misuse of the handgun, the Court of Special Appeals, applying the holdings in
Ellsworth and Simpson, stated that “had [the warnings] been followed, the tragic accident
in this case would not have occurred. . . .  Instead, however, [the father] stored the handgun
under his mattress, evidently within reach of his son.  There can be no debate that this was
an affirmative action on [the father’s] part that clearly contravened the warnings contained
in the instruction manual. [The father’s] improper storage of the handgun was misuse, thus
defeating appellant’s defective design claim.”  Id. at 174, 770 A.2d at 1094 (alterations
added) (emphasis added).
Insofar as Lightolier contends that the use of one of its non-IC rated fixtures in an
area where thermal insulation came within three inches of the fixture, thereby entrapping
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substantial heat and causing the fire, was a misuse of the non-IC rated fixture, we agree. 
Even under a reasonable foreseeability standard, while it was not a misuse for the Hoons to
have the non-IC rated fixtures installed in their home for lighting purposes, it was a misuse
of the product for the Hoons to contract for the installation of blown-in cellulose insulation
without taking adequate steps to ensure that the insulation installers heeded the warnings
relating to the fixtures.  There is little doubt that, because the thermal insulation was
installed after the non-IC rated fixtures were installed, Gede was negligent in placing
thermal insulation dangerously close to the fixtures.  It was reasonably foreseeable that
someone might place thermal insulation too close to a non-IC rated fixture, thereby creating
an increased risk of fire.  It was for this reason that Lightolier addressed that foreseeability
by providing adequate notice of the danger, notice that the Hoons and/or their agents failed
to heed by adequately supervising the installation of the insulation.  Warnings on products,
by their very nature, are generally meant to counteract reasonably foreseeable situations that
may pose a danger to the consumer or others.  As was the case in Halliday, the warnings in
the case sub judice were adequate and yet went unheeded.  Thus, this is a case of misuse of
the non-IC rated fixture by the Hoons.
Additionally, Lightolier asserts that, even in a non-misuse context, the existence of
clear warnings on a product that poses a danger may also serve to bar strict liability actions
if certain circumstances exist.  We agree.
“Failure to read or follow instructions or warnings also involves
conduct that may be considered negligent. . . .  If a product otherwise
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unreasonably dangerous can be made safe for reasonably foreseeable uses by
adequate warnings or instructions, liability will be avoided, and the focus in
such cases is generally upon the adequacy of the notice.  If the warnings or
instructions are adequate the product is not defective, and the plaintiff cannot
recover under a theory of strict liability in tort.  The cause of the injury in
such cases is the failure to read or follow the adequate warnings or
instructions, and not a defective product.”
Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 598 n.12, 495 A.2d at 356 n.12 (emphasis added).  See also Hood v.
Ryobi America Corporation, 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that “Maryland
imposes no duty to predict that a consumer will violate clear, easily understandable safety
warnings . . .”).
Comment j to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also emphasizes the
importance of considering warnings in product liability cases.  The comment states:
“Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will
be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for
use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (emphasis added).
It follows that misuse of a product and failure to read or follow a product’s warnings
and instructions exist as two distinct, though at times intertwined (as in the present case),
defenses to strict product liability.  In Simpson v. Standard Container Co., supra, the Court
of Special Appeals had before it a case in which a gasoline container was improperly stored
by a homeowner, Mr. Ramesh Oza, in the basement of his home.  The gasoline container had
warnings on it to “Keep Out of Reach of Children” and “Do Not Store in Vehicle or Living
Space.”  Mr. Oza’s four-year-old son was killed and a visiting child was severely burned
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when the two children removed the cap from the gasoline can, spilling gasoline over the
basement floor where it subsequently ignited.  
One issue before the intermediate appellate court was whether, notwithstanding the
warnings printed on the gasoline container, a cause of action for strict product liability could
proceed against the manufacturer of the container.  The court first considered whether the
placement of the gasoline container in a basement was to be deemed a misuse of the
container.  After explaining and applying our decision in Ellsworth to the facts before it, the
Court of Special Appeals stated:
“In this case, the Ozas stored the gasoline can in the basement of their
home, ignoring the admonitions on the sides of the can not to store it in living
areas.  The Ozas stored the can in an area which allowed two unsupervised
four-year-olds access to the can.  The gasoline can was not being used for the
purpose and in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable.  As a matter of
law, there was a misuse of this product and misuse negates the element of
defect.”
Simpson, 72 Md.App. at 206, 527 A.2d at 1341 (emphasis added).
Although the court at that stage found that misuse in and of itself served to bar the
plaintiff’s strict product liability claim, the intermediate appellate court continued, as we do
here, stating:
“Misuse is not the only ground upon which our decision rests.
Comment j to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, states:
‘Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing
such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.’
The gasoline can had warnings written on two of the four sides proclaiming
‘Keep Out of Reach of Children’ and ‘Do Not Store in Vehicle or Living
-17-
Space.’  The [manufacturer] provided adequate warnings which went
unheeded.  The product was not in a defective condition nor was it
unreasonably dangerous.  The appellants failed to state a cause of action for
strict products liability under Maryland Law.” 
Id. at 206-07, 527 A.2d at 1341 (alteration added) (emphasis added).  We agree with the
Court of Special Appeals’ determination in Simpson, which stemmed from our decision in
Ellsworth, that the failure of one to heed warnings concerning a product is a defense to a
strict products liability claim that can at times be considered independent from that of
misuse.
Of course, warnings on products that are vague or otherwise difficult to understand
shall not generally have the effect of barring a product liability claim when those warnings
go unheeded.  For example, if the non-IC rated fixtures at issue here merely had a warning
label affixed to them stating “Warning – Risk of Fire” and nothing more, it might constitute
such a generalized warning that in essence it might not warn at all.  See, e.g., Klein v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 92 Md.App. 477, 490, 608 A.2d 1276, 1282-83, cert. denied, 328 Md.
447, 614 A.2d 973 (1992) (Court of Special Appeals stating that radial power saw warnings
and instructions were “far too general . . . in this case . . . because reasonable minds may
differ as to whether the existence of such warnings, if heeded, would make the saw safe for
its intended use”).  In the case sub judice, however, Lightolier made unquestionably clear
and adequate warnings on its non-IC rated fixtures concerning the risk of fire they posed if
placed within three inches of thermal insulation.  As noted, supra, these warnings were
conspicuously located both directly on the light fixtures and also in the instruction manuals
8 The record does not indicate a history of Lightolier Model 1002P1 fixtures and
related fires, if any.
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that accompanied each Lightolier non-IC rated fixture.  Moreover, the warnings were
substantially in accordance with those required by the UL Marking Guide and § 410-66(b)
of the NEC.  As we stated in Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975),
when considering the adequateness of warnings, “it is proper for the trier of fact to consider
both the prior history of the product[8] . . . and the extent of the manufacturer’s adherence
to industry-wide standards and practices.”  Id. at 552-53 n.10, 332 A.2d at 20 n.10 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added) (footnote added).  Thus, we agree with the Circuit Court and find
no reason to hold that Lightolier’s warnings, which were clearly stated on both the light
fixtures and the instruction manuals accompanying those fixtures, were inadequate to warn
of the specific danger inherent in placing thermal insulation within three inches of a non-IC
rated fixture.
Notwithstanding the warnings on the non-IC rated fixtures, the Hoons contend that
Lightolier’s use of a SHTP on its non-IC rated fixtures should have prevented the fire
because it was designed to cycle the light when the temperature around the fixture became
excessive and stated in their complaint that “Lightolier . . . placed the lighting fixtures into
the stream of commerce . . . in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in that the
design of the lighting fixtures was such [that] the thermal protection component which was
designed to safeguard the lighting fixture from overheating was improperly located”
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(alteration added).  This improper location argument is in effect an allegation of defective
design.  Thus, the Hoons claim that the failure of the SHTP to cycle when surrounded by
thermal insulation was a proximate cause of the fire of which Lightolier should be held
liable.
Section 410-65 of the NEC provides the following guidelines in regard to
temperature and light fixtures:
“410-65.  Temperature.
(a) Combustible Material.  Fixtures shall be so installed that adjacent
combustible material will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of 90ºC
(194ºF).
(b) Fire-Resistant Construction.  Where a fixture is recessed in fire-
resistant material in a building of fire-resistant construction, a temperature
higher than 90ºC (194ºF), but not higher than 150ºC (302ºF), shall be
considered acceptable if the fixture is plainly marked that it is listed for that
service.
(c) Recessed Incandescent Fixtures.  Incandescent fixtures shall have
thermal protection and shall so be identified as thermally protected.
Because many recessed incandescent fixtures are suitable for a wide
variety of lamp sizes and types and finish trims, the temperature close to the
lamp can vary widely.  Therefore, many manufacturers have chosen to locate
thermal protectors away from the source of heat, such as in the outlet box,
and to design the protector so that it will detect a change in temperature
resulting from the addition of thermal insulation around the fixture.  This
prevents nuisance tripping of the protector (as a result of changing lamp
wattage, for example) but still provides protection against overheating arising
from thermal insulation around a recessed fixture not designed for such use.”
[Emphasis added.]
Thus, under the NEC guidelines, manufacturers of recessed non-IC rated fixtures are
required to design those fixtures to include thermal protection devices such as the SHTP
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involved in this case, recognizing at the same time that SHTPs are to be located away from
the fixtures themselves.  The record is completely devoid of any evidence that the placement
of the SHTPs by Lightolier on its non-IC rated fixtures was in violation of § 410-65 of the
NEC.  Whereas one of the Hoons’ expert witnesses, Dr. Thomas W. Eager, stated that “the
design of the light fixture was a contributory cause [of the fire because] [t]he thermal sensor
on the Lightolier fixture is well separated from the hottest portion of the fixture, namely, the
lamp holder,” § 410-65 clearly states that “[b]ecause many recessed incandescent fixtures
are suitable for a wide variety of lamp sizes and types and finish trims, the temperature close
to the lamp can vary widely.  Therefore, many manufacturers have chosen to locate thermal
protectors away from the source of heat . . .” (emphasis added).  As this practice has been
accepted by the NEC, we find no reason now to hold that Lightolier’s placement of the
SHTP constitutes a defective design creating an unreasonable risk of fire.  In respect to
design issues, the Hoons concede that the SHTPs affixed to two other fixtures operated
properly. 
Although the Hoons correctly point out that there can be more than one proximate
cause of an injury, we do not find that such is the case here.  It is undisputed that the Hoons,
or an entity partially owned by them and acting on their behalf, permitted Gede to, and that
Gede did, place thermal insulation too close to the non-IC rated fixtures in violation of the
warnings on the fixtures themselves and § 410-66(b) of the NEC (“Thermal insulation shall
not be installed within 3 in. (76 mm) of the recessed fixture enclosure”).  There is no
9 The record indicates, and the Hoons admit as much in their answers to Lightolier’s
interrogatories, that Gede’s placement of blown-in cellulose insulation in direct contact with
the non-IC rated fixture in effect created a barrier between the actual socket housing (from
which the heat emanated) and the SHTP, thereby handicapping the SHTP’s ability to detect
a dangerous rise in temperature near the socket housing.  As understood from the NEC
guidelines, however, the placement of a thermal sensor away from the source of heat is a
common practice among light fixture manufacturers and in certain ways makes the thermal
protector more effective than if placed closer to the source of the heat.  When Gede
improperly placed insulation between the socket housing and the SHTP, however, the ability
of the SHTP to detect rising heat conditions was drastically reduced.
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question that this occurrence was a proximate cause of the fire.  That is, but for Gede placing
the thermal insulation in contact with the non-IC rated fixture the fire would not have
occurred regardless of the placement of the SHTP.  Even with the SHTP there still existed
a very probable risk of fire if insulation came into contact with a non-IC rated fixture and
the conspicuous warnings on the Lightolier fixtures made this risk evident.9  There is an
absence of any evidence that the fire would have occurred without the thermal insulation
being placed within three inches of the non-IC rated fixture.  Therefore, we hold that the
sole proximate cause of the fire was the improper placement of thermal insulation in direct
contact with an electrical light fixture which displayed clear warnings that thermal insulation
was not to be placed within three inches of the fixture because of a risk of fire.
IV. Conclusion
We find no sufficient reason for the reversal of the Circuit Court’s granting of
Lightolier’s summary judgment motion.  Although the Circuit Court stated that its decision
was based on its concept of misuse, another reason given by the Circuit Court was also that
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“Gede Insulation, LLC acted contrary to warnings on the fixture, to warnings in the
instruction booklet accompanying the fixture, and to common knowledge in the insulation
and construction industry.  According to [the Hoons], had Gede adhered to the warnings on
the product, their damages would not have resulted” (alteration added).  Thus, in essence,
notwithstanding the use of the term misuse, which in any event was accurate, the Circuit
Court also based its holding on the failure of the Hoons’ thermal insulation installer to heed
the warnings concerning the non-IC rated fixture.  As we too find that this failure to heed
the adequate warnings on the Lightolier fixtures was a proximate cause of the fire at the
Hoons’ home, the Hoons’ claim against Lightolier for strict liability was properly denied by
the Circuit Court’s granting of Lightolier’s motion for summary judgment.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS 
REVERSED AND 
CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
AFFIRM 
THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR KENT COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE
RESPONDENTS.
In the Circuit Court for Kent County
Case No. 14-C-99-004492-CN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
LIGHTOLIER, A DIVISION OF
GENLYTE THOMAS GROUP, LLC
v.
DAVID HOON, ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.,
which Bell, C.J., and Battaglia, J., join
______________________________________
Filed:   June 21, 2005
With respect, I dissent from the Court’s holding that summary judgment in favor
of Lightolier was appropriate in this case.  Had a jury found in favor of Lightolier, I
would have no difficulty whatever in sustaining that verdict.  In my view, however, there
were issues presented that were properly for the jury to resolve and that, on this record,
should not have been resolved through the entry of summary judgment.
Although Lightolier suggested in its brief and at oral argument that the recessed
lighting fixture in question was not appropriate for use in an insulated ceiling, that
suggestion finds no support in the record.   Indeed, the record actually shows, at least by
inference, the contrary.  In conformance with a provision of the National Electric Code,
there was a warning that thermal insulation should not be installed within three inches of
the fixture sides or wiring compartment or above the fixture in such manner as to entrap
heat.  To me, that rather clearly indicates that the fixture was usable in an insulated
ceiling, so long as the insulation was kept at least three inches away from the sides and
some distance from the top.  
It appears that the fixture was installed by a contractor
prior to the installation of any insulation, so there would have been no misuse of the
product at the time of its installation.  Because the fixture was in place when the
insulation contractor did its work, it may be that the insulation contractor was negligent in
failing to heed the warning printed on the fixture.  Whether that negligence on the part of
the insulation contractor would translate into a “misuse” of the fixture by Hoon is not so
clear, at least on this record.  
The major problem that I have with the Court’s conclusion is its downplaying of
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the apparent failure of the SHTP device, not just to warn the Hoons of a problem by
causing the light to blink but, more important, to interrupt the power supply if and when
the lamp overheated.  Had the SHTP device worked as it was intended to work, as it
should have worked, and as it was required to work by the National Electric Code, the fire
may not have occurred.  There was conflicting evidence regarding the adequacy of the
design of the SHTP, and it seems clear to me that, whether that device was deficient and,
if deficient, whether that deficiency was at least one proximate cause of the fire were
issues for the jury to determine.  I believe that the Court of Special Appeals got it right
and that its judgment should be affirmed.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Battaglia have authorized me to state that they join in
this dissenting opinion.