Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13–1756 
 
Filed January 30, 2015 
 
 
SIOUX PHARM, INC. and SIOUX BIOCHEMICAL, INC., 
 
 
Appellees, 
 
vs. 
 
SUMMIT NUTRITIONALS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Duane E. 
Hoffmeyer, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant appeals order denying motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  AFFIRMED.   
 
 
Daniel J. Fischer, Brian J. Koenig, and J. Daniel Weidner of Koley 
Jessen, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.   
 
 
Anthony L. Osborn and Jeana L. Goosmann of Goosmann Law 
Firm, PLC, Sioux City, for appellees.   
 
 
 
2 
 
WATERMAN, Justice. 
 
This appeal provides our first opportunity to address when 
statements on a website support personal jurisdiction and the impact of 
recent United States Supreme Court precedent on the showing required 
for general jurisdiction.  Specifically, we must decide whether a 
nonresident corporation’s inaccurate statement on its passive website—
that it had a manufacturing facility in Sioux Center, Iowa—subjected it 
to personal jurisdiction in Iowa in a lawsuit by an Iowa plaintiff alleging 
unfair competition.  The district court denied the nonresident 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that general jurisdiction was 
established simply because its website held this defendant out as having 
an Iowa manufacturing facility.  The Sioux Center facility actually is 
owned and operated by a separate Iowa defendant that supplies the 
product to the nonresident defendant.  We allowed the nonresident 
defendant’s interlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional ruling.   
 
For the reasons explained below, we hold the district court erred 
by exercising general jurisdiction over Summit based solely on the 
inaccurate statement on its passive website.  Recent precedent requires 
proof the nonresident defendant is “essentially at home in the forum 
State” to establish general jurisdiction.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 180 
L. Ed. 2d 796, 803 (2011).  That proof is lacking here.  Nevertheless, we 
hold the totality of the nonresident’s contacts with Iowa, including its 
website statement, Iowa supply contract, and its sale of the product to 
the plaintiff in Iowa were sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction 
here on claims related to those contacts.  We therefore affirm the order 
denying its motion to dismiss on this alternative ground.   
 
3 
 
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings.   
 
Plaintiff 
Sioux Pharm, 
Inc.1 
is 
an 
Iowa 
corporation 
that 
manufactures chondroitin sulfate, a supplement for joint health usually 
mixed with glucosamine to help lessen the effects of osteoarthritis.  Eagle 
Laboratories, Inc. (Eagle Labs) is an Iowa corporation and a competitor of 
Sioux Pharm.  Eagle Labs sells and ships chondroitin sulfate monthly to 
Summit 
Nutritionals 
International, 
Inc. 
(Summit), 
a 
New Jersey 
corporation with its principal place of business in Branchburg, 
New Jersey.  Summit packages and resells the chondroitin sulfate.   
 
At the time this lawsuit was filed, Summit’s website erroneously 
claimed that Summit had a manufacturing facility in Sioux Center, Iowa.  
The 
website 
read, 
“Manufacturing 
Facility, 
Summit 
Nutritionals 
International, Inc.,” and for contact information listed a Sioux Center, 
Iowa, physical address and an email address.  In fact, the Sioux Center 
facility at that physical address has always been owned and operated by 
Eagle Labs.  Summit admits it listed the facility on its website to inform 
its customers as to the Iowa source of Summit’s chondroitin sulfate, 
which is derived from bovine organs.   
 
Summit actually has no Iowa office, agent, or employees.  It has 
never been registered to do business in Iowa, and neither owns nor 
leases any real or personal property in Iowa.  Summit has no Iowa bank 
accounts and has never been a party in litigation in Iowa before this 
case.  Summit has never specifically directed advertising at Iowa markets 
or sold its product to anyone in Iowa except for a sample purchased by 
Sioux Pharm to test for purposes of this lawsuit.  Summit purchases its 
1Plaintiff Sioux Biochemical, Inc. is a sister corporation to Sioux Pharm, Inc.  We 
will refer to the entities together as Sioux Pharm.   
                                      
 
 
4 
 
chondroitin sulfate from Eagle Labs under an annual contract to supply 
Summit’s requirements through monthly shipments.  Summit’s president 
traveled to Iowa once to inspect Eagle Labs’ facility, but he flew in and 
out of an airport in South Dakota and only spent a few hours in Iowa.  
No other employee of Summit has ever visited Iowa on its behalf.   
 
Sioux Pharm filed suit against Eagle Labs and its principals, Dana 
Summers, Robert Den Hoed, and John Ymker on March 8, 2012.  The 
initial pleading alleged claims for the misappropriation of trade secrets, 
which are the subject of a separate, pending interlocutory appeal.  See 
Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs, Inc., No. 13–1756 (Iowa filed 
September 27, 2013).  Sioux Pharm’s second amended petition, the 
operative pleading here, was filed April 23, 2013.  That pleading added 
claims of unfair competition, intentional interference with contractual 
relationships, and civil conspiracy and named Summit and Federal 
Laboratories Corporation (Federal Labs), a New York corporation, as 
additional defendants.  Sioux Pharm specifically alleged Summit, Federal 
Labs, and Eagle Labs conspired to distribute adulterated and diluted 
chondroitin sulfate while misrepresenting its purity, in violation of 
§ 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012).  On June 
7, the district court, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.914, 
granted Summit’s motion to bifurcate the trade-secret claims from the 
unfair-competition claims.   
 
Both Summit and Federal Labs moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Both nonresident defendants filed affidavits 
attesting to their lack of contacts with Iowa.  Sioux Pharm filed 
resistances and argued as to Summit that its website statement along 
with its contract with Eagle Labs and site visit there were sufficient to 
subject it to general jurisdiction or, alternatively, specific jurisdiction.  
 
5 
 
The district court granted Federal Labs’ motion, determining that 
Sioux Pharm “failed to present a prima facie case” sufficient to justify 
personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy theory and that Federal Labs lacks 
contacts with Iowa sufficient for general jurisdiction.  However, the 
district court denied Summit’s motion, stating: 
 
Although Summit presents this Court with many facts 
to establish that it has no systematic or continuous ties to 
the State of Iowa, this Court does not find those facts to be 
persuasive.  Although Summit may not have an office or real 
property in Iowa, it holds itself out as having both.  
Summit’s website clearly states that it has a manufacturing 
facility in Sioux Center, Iowa. . . .  Regardless of Summit’s 
intent when posting that information, and regardless of what 
ties Summit has to the manufacturing facility, by asserting 
that it has continuous and systematic ties with Iowa, 
Summit has availed itself [of] Iowa Courts.   
The district court did not reach the specific jurisdiction theory.  The 
district court also granted motions for partial summary judgment, 
dismissing the civil conspiracy claims against all defendants, including 
Summit, by finding “[t]here has been no evidence presented to show a 
meeting of the minds” or an overt act required to establish liability for 
civil conspiracy.   
 
We granted Summit’s application for interlocutory appeal and 
retained the appeal to determine if that defendant is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Iowa.  
 
II.  Standard of Review.   
 
“We review a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction for correction of errors at law.”  Shams v. 
Hassan, 829 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa R. App. P. 
6.907.  We are not bound by the court’s conclusions of law or application 
of legal principles.  Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 853.  The district court’s 
 
6 
 
factual findings are binding on appeal if supported by substantial 
evidence.  Id.   
 
“ ‘ “[W]e accept as true the allegations of the petition and the 
contents of uncontroverted affidavits.” ’ ”  Id. (quoting Addison Ins. Co. v. 
Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & Knight, L.L.C., 734 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Iowa 
2007)).  “After the plaintiff makes a prima facie case showing that 
personal jurisdiction is appropriate, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
rebut that showing.”  Id.   
We may affirm the district court on an alternative ground that is 
supported by the record and urged by the prevailing party in district 
court and on appeal.  Hawkeye Foodserv. Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators 
Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 609 (Iowa 2012).   
 
III.  Analysis.   
 
We must decide whether the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Summit.  This case requires us to determine the jurisdictional effect of 
an erroneous statement on defendant’s passive website that it has a 
manufacturing facility in Iowa.  We conclude the district court erred in 
ruling that Summit was subject to general jurisdiction in Iowa based on 
that website statement alone.  We further conclude that the totality of 
Summit’s contacts with Iowa falls short of establishing general 
jurisdiction under Goodyear.  564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 
L. Ed. 2d at 803.  But, we affirm the jurisdictional ruling on the 
alternative ground, supported by the record and urged by Sioux Pharm 
in district court and on appeal, that Summit is subject to specific 
jurisdiction here.   
 
We begin by reviewing well-established principles of personal 
jurisdiction.  A state’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
 
7 
 
nonresident defendant is limited by both the state’s jurisdictional rules 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Ostrem 
v. Prideco Secure Loan Fund, LP, 841 N.W.2d 882, 891 (Iowa 2014).  
Iowa’s jurisdictional rule authorizes the widest exercise of personal 
jurisdiction allowed by the Due Process Clause.  Id. (citing Iowa R. Civ. P. 
1.306, which states that “every corporation, individual, personal 
representative, partnership or association that shall have the necessary 
minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state”).  Therefore, we will focus on the 
constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction.   
 
“The touchstone of the due-process analysis remains whether the 
defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts with [the forum state] such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “ ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ”  Id. (quoting Viasys., Inc. v. EBM–
Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F. 3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011)).  
“Fairness is the crux of the minimum-contacts analysis.”  Shams, 829 
N.W.2d at 854.  The defendant must have sufficient contacts to 
“ ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’ in the forum state.”  
Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 891–92 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 
(1980)).  Therefore, “it is essential in each case that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  The purposeful-availment 
requirement prevents defendants from being forced to defend themselves 
in a jurisdiction “as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ 
 
8 
 
contacts.”  Id.  It also prevents defendants from being haled into court by 
the unilateral actions of plaintiffs.  Id.   
 
There are two forms of personal jurisdiction, general jurisdiction 
and specific jurisdiction.  Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 855.  General 
jurisdiction “ ‘refers to the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of 
action involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the cause of 
action arose.’ ”  Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Sondergard v. Miles, 
Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993)).  General jurisdiction allows 
suits on claims unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum and 
exists if the defendant’s “ ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous 
and systematic” as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the 
forum State.’ ”  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 
754, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624, 633–34 (2014) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 
___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 803).  “For an individual, the 
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s 
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 
131 S. Ct. at 2853–54, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 806 (emphasis added).   
 
By contrast, specific jurisdiction “ ‘refers to jurisdiction over causes 
of action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the forum 
state.’ ”  Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Sondergard, 985 F.2d at 
1392).  Specific personal jurisdiction has two requirements:   
“Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, 
[due process] is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully 
directed’ his activities at residents of the forum and the 
litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or 
relate to’ those activities.”   
Capital Promotions, L.L.C. v. Don King Prods., Inc., 756 N.W.2d 828, 834 
(Iowa 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 
 
9 
 
472, 105 S. Ct. at 2182, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 540–41).  “A single contact with 
the forum state can be sufficient to satisfy due process concerns when 
the plaintiff’s claim arises out of the contact.”  Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 
855.  Physical presence in the forum is not essential, but the court must 
investigate the nature and quality of the contacts between the defendant 
and the forum.  See Addison Ins. Co., 734 N.W.2d at 478.   
 
With these principles in mind, we examine whether Summit’s 
contacts with Iowa give rise to either general or specific personal 
jurisdiction.  Sioux Pharm relies on three grounds to establish personal 
jurisdiction over Summit in Iowa: (1) the erroneous statement on 
Summit’s website that it has a manufacturing facility in Iowa, (2) 
Summit’s supply contract purchasing its chondroitin sulfate from Eagle 
Labs, and (3) the brief Iowa visit and inspection of Eagle Labs by 
Summit’s president.2  Sioux Pharm argues these grounds support both 
general and specific jurisdiction over Summit.  We begin with the website 
statement that the district court concluded subjected Summit to general 
jurisdiction here.  We then examine whether the totality of Summit’s 
2Summit also sold one sample of its product in Iowa to Sioux Pharm, which 
used the sample to test for the purposes of this lawsuit.  Summit has made no other 
sales in Iowa, nor has it specifically directed any advertising at Iowa markets.  Sioux 
Pharm’s appellate brief does not argue the lone Iowa sale supports its position, but at 
oral argument, its counsel urged us to consider that sale as “a factor” establishing 
personal jurisdiction over Summit.  Some federal district courts have noted plaintiffs 
cannot create personal jurisdiction over a defendant seller merely by purchasing the 
defendant’s product in the forum state.  See, e.g., Mor-Dall Enters., Inc. v. Dark Horse 
Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874, 880 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (“ ‘[A] plaintiff may not 
manufacture jurisdiction by engaging in a sale merely to confer jurisdiction in a 
particular forum.’ ”) (quoting Dawson v. Pepin, No. 1:99-CV-316, 2001 WL 822346, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2001)); Foreign Candy Co. v. Tropical Paradise, Inc., 950 
F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032–33 & n.5 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (holding a single sale to plaintiff’s 
representative through a third-party retailer is insufficient to subject defendant to 
personal jurisdiction in trademark action); Krepps v. Reiner, 588 F. Supp. 2d 471, 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[P]laintiffs are not permitted to ‘manufacture’ personal jurisdiction 
over defendants by orchestrating an in-state web-based purchase of their goods.”), aff’d, 
377 F. App’x 65 (2d Cir. 2010).   
                                      
 
 
10 
 
contacts with Iowa support general jurisdiction.  Finally, we examine 
whether specific jurisdiction over Summit has been established.   
 
A.  General Jurisdiction Based on Summit’s Website.  The 
district court ruled that Summit is subject to general jurisdiction in Iowa 
because its website held the corporation out as having an Iowa 
manufacturing facility, regardless of whether that representation was 
true.  The manufacturing facility is in fact owned and operated by a 
separate corporation, codefendant Eagle Labs.  We hold that website 
statement is insufficient to subject Summit to general jurisdiction in 
Iowa under the recent United States Supreme Court decisions requiring 
a showing that the defendant’s “ ‘affiliations with the State are so 
“continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the 
forum State.’ ”  Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 187 
L. Ed. 2d at 633 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 
180 L. Ed. 2d at 803).  It is undisputed that Summit is a New Jersey 
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.   
 
Sioux Pharm contends that personal jurisdiction over Summit is 
established by waiver or estoppel based on Summit’s website 
representation it has an Iowa manufacturing facility.  We acknowledge 
there are circumstances under which personal jurisdiction may be 
established by waiver, consent, or estoppel.  See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 704, 102 S. Ct. 
2099, 2105, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492, 502 (1982) (“[T]he requirement of personal 
jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a 
defendant may be estopped from raising the issue.”).  Personal 
jurisdiction can be waived in several ways.  A party could submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court by appearance.  Id. at 703, 102 S. Ct. at 2105, 
 
11 
 
72 L. Ed. 2d at 502.3  Moreover, parties may agree contractually to 
submit to jurisdiction and venue in a given court, which operates as a 
waiver.  See id. at 703–04, 102 S. Ct. at 2105, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 502; EFCO 
Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 
2000) (noting that contractual choice-of-forum clauses have “long been 
recognized under Iowa law”).  Further, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized “constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the 
state court in the voluntary use of certain state procedures.”  Ins. Corp. 
of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704, 102 S. Ct. at 2105, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 502 (upholding 
jurisdiction as discovery sanction).  But, Summit has not waived its 
objection to jurisdiction in such a manner or otherwise consented to 
jurisdiction here.  See Cent. Life Assurance Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
466 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Iowa 1991) (describing waiver as the voluntary 
relinquishment of a known right).  Summit’s representation that it has a 
manufacturing facility in Iowa, even if true, does not render Summit at 
home in this state for purposes of general jurisdiction.  See Goodyear, 
564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct at 2853–54, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 806 (equating at-
home status with domicile).   
 
Nor does the record support a finding of jurisdiction by estoppel 
based on the website statement.  Sioux Pharm bears the burden to prove 
equitable estoppel by a clear and convincing preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 702 (Iowa 2005).  
Sioux Pharm must prove the following elements:  
“(1) The defendant has made a false representation or has 
concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks knowledge of 
the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act 
3Iowa abolished the special appearance in 1987.  Antolik v. McMahon, 744 
N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa 2007).  Defendants may now preserve a defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction by pleading it in the answer to the petition.  Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1).   
                                      
 
 
12 
 
upon such representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact 
rely upon such representations to his prejudice.”   
Id. (quoting Meier v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 578–79 (1990)). 
Because Sioux Pharm did not rely on Summit’s website statement, it 
cannot prove equitable estoppel to establish personal jurisdiction.   
 
Sioux Pharm relies on Turpin v. Mori Seiki Co., a case involving the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction.  56 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Mass. 
1999).  There, the federal district court ruled that a Japanese 
manufacturer of an engine lathe was subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Massachusetts in a product-liability action.  Id. at 124, 127–28.  The 
plaintiff’s employer had acquired the lathe made and sold by the 
Japanese defendant.  Id. at 123–24.  The plaintiff was injured when he 
was dragged into the lathe.  Id. at 124.  The workplace accident occurred 
in Massachusetts.  Id.  The lathe had been sold to plaintiff’s employer 
through intermediaries, and the Japanese defendant moved to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction.  See id.  Plaintiff submitted evidence that 
the defendant’s brochures represented it “has an overseas office in 
Boston.”  Id. at 127.  In response, the defendant “contend[ed] that it does 
not actually have an overseas office in Boston and that whenever it made 
such a representation, it was merely designating an authorized dealer or 
the office of its wholly-owned subsidiary as an overseas office.”  Id.  The 
district court concluded:  
The defendant can explain the facts, but it can’t change 
them.  Whether MS Ltd. was designating its own facility or 
the facility of an intermediary or subsidiary, the fact remains 
that it was explicitly holding itself out to the public as ready, 
willing and able to do business in Boston.  It is difficult to 
imagine a more intentional or deliberate effort to “serve the 
market in the forum” of the Commonwealth.   
Id.   
 
13 
 
 
The Turpin court relied in part on defendant’s representations 
about the Boston office and on the fact the Massachusetts plaintiff was 
injured in the forum using defendant’s product there.  See id. at 127–28.  
Turpin is distinguishable for that reason.  Here, Summit’s website merely 
identified an Iowa facility as the source of its raw product it repackaged 
and sold elsewhere.  By contrast, in Turpin, the office in Boston was 
admittedly open for the purpose of selling that defendant’s products in 
the forum state.  See id. at 127.  And most importantly, the product-
liability claims arose in the forum when plaintiff was hurt using 
defendant’s product in that state.  As the court said:  
 
The Commonwealth has a significant interest in 
obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant who causes tortious 
injury within its borders and in providing its citizens with a 
convenient 
forum 
in 
which 
to 
assert 
their 
claims.  
Massachusetts also has a strong policy interest in protecting 
its citizens from injuries caused by defective products, 
regardless 
of 
where 
those 
products 
were 
originally 
manufactured.   
Id. at 127 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, Turpin 
is a specific jurisdiction decision.  We do not see Turpin as persuasive 
authority for general jurisdiction.   
 
There are policy reasons against basing general jurisdiction solely 
on Internet activity.   
 
The fact that many companies have established virtual 
beachheads on the Internet and the fact that the Internet is 
now accessible from almost any point on the globe have 
created complex, new considerations in counting minimum 
contacts for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction.   
Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267–68 (N.D. Ala. 
2000).  Given the economic importance of the Internet, courts should 
consider the ripple effects before subjecting nonresidents to general 
jurisdiction based solely on information posted on defendants’ websites.  
 
14 
 
See David C. Tunick, Passive Internet Websites and Personal Jurisdiction, 
28 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 739, 750–51 (2003) (“Would an Internet company 
stop doing business on the Internet . . . if the company knew that 
personal jurisdiction could attach in a distant forum even if no products 
were sold?”).  Summit denies it intended to consent to jurisdiction in 
Iowa and contends that it placed the statement on its website merely to 
inform customers as to the Iowa source of its chondroitin sulfate.  
Commentators have expressed the concern that vague or expansive views 
of personal jurisdiction may subject new business owners to litigation in 
distant states through innocent misstatements on websites.   
“[B]ecause the Internet is bringing unsophisticated and 
poorly capitalized people into new situations where they are 
more likely than ever to make innocent mistakes and be 
sued for them, due process guarantees should be more 
robust in this new environment than they have been in more 
traditional commercial settings.”  Individual Web designers 
and bloggers can, and will, make mistakes concerning the 
content of their Web sites and electronic communications.  
With a vague standard for personal jurisdiction, suits for 
defamation, 
copyright 
infringement, 
and 
trademark 
infringement, as well as suits for relief in connection with 
other content-related claims, will be filed against these 
"unsophisticated and undercapitalized" designers.   
Mark D. Standridge, Passive Voice: The Unclear Standards for 
Establishing Personal Jurisdiction in New Mexico via the World Wide Web, 
35 N.M. L. Rev. 679, 697 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  We share this 
concern.   
Courts have relied on two tests to evaluate personal jurisdiction 
based on website activity, the Calder effects test and the Zippo sliding-
scale approach.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 
2010) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 
1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 812 (1984), and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).  We conclude both tests 
 
15 
 
may be used to determine the jurisdictional import of websites.  Although 
Calder, a libel case, predated the growth of the public Internet, it 
established 
a 
useful 
framework 
to 
evaluate 
whether 
website 
communications give rise to specific jurisdiction in tort cases.  Under the 
Calder effects test, “foreseeable effects from an intentional tort can 
occasionally support jurisdiction” when the primary effect of the tort is 
felt within the forum.  Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 856.  “[W]e look at the 
location of the tortious activities and the ‘focal point’ of the alleged tort.”  
Id.   
The Zippo approach recognizes a sliding scale from passive to 
interactive websites and is widely followed.  See Thomas A. Dickerson 
et al., Personal Jurisdiction and the Marketing of Goods and Services on 
the Internet, 41 Hofstra L. Rev. 31, 41–42 & n.29 (Fall 2012) (surveying 
caselaw holding passive websites insufficient to support personal 
jurisdiction).  The Zippo sliding-scale approach works as follows:  
[T]he 
likelihood 
that 
personal 
jurisdiction 
can 
be 
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the 
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the Internet.  This sliding scale is consistent 
with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.  At one 
end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly 
does business over the Internet.  If the defendant enters into 
contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve 
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files 
over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.  At the 
opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply 
posted information on an Internet Web site which is 
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.  A passive Web 
site that does little more than make information available to 
those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise 
[of] personal jurisdiction.  The middle ground is occupied by 
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information 
with the host computer.  In these cases, the exercise of 
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of 
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of 
information that occurs on the Web site.   
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
 
16 
 
 
The Zippo sliding-scale approach is used to evaluate specific 
jurisdiction, but also can be considered along with other contacts in a 
general jurisdiction analysis, as the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit has noted:  
[I]n a general jurisdiction case, . . . we consider the “nature 
and quality of the contacts” as well as the “quantity of the 
contacts.”  This is precisely why the Zippo test alone is 
insufficient for the general jurisdiction setting.   
 
. . . As a result, we will first apply the Zippo [quality] 
test and then also look at the quantity of those contacts with 
[forum] residents.   
Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994)).  If 
sufficient contacts are found, the court must still subject the defendant’s 
activities to the traditional test of “fair play and substantial justice,” 
including the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, 
and plaintiff’s interest in relief.  Id. at 713.   
 
The erroneous statement on Summit’s website does not establish 
general jurisdiction.  The Calder effects test is used to analyze specific 
jurisdiction and is inapplicable to the analysis of general jurisdiction.  
Nor is the Zippo sliding-scale approach met here for general jurisdiction 
purposes.  Summit’s website merely gave the address of the facility where 
Summit acquires its chondroitin sulfate.  Summit’s website is not 
interactive and falls on the passive end of Zippo’s sliding-scale approach.  
Moreover, there is no evidence anyone in Iowa accessed Summit’s 
website before this litigation.  See Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797–98 (holding 
defendant’s interactive website did not support personal jurisdiction 
without evidence defendant transacted business with forum residents 
through the website or that its website was “uniquely or expressly aimed” 
at the forum state).  We conclude the district court erred in ruling 
 
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Summit’s website statement alone subjected Summit to general 
jurisdiction in Iowa.   
 
B.  General Jurisdiction Based on the Totality of Summit’s 
Contacts with Iowa.  Sioux Pharm argues in the alternative that general 
jurisdiction exists based on Summit’s long-standing contract to purchase 
chondroitin sulfate from Eagle Labs and the Iowa site visit by Summit’s 
president.  Sioux Pharm relies on Iowa Code section 617.3(2) (2011), 
which states:  
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of 
Iowa to be performed in whole or in part by either party in 
Iowa, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole 
or in part in Iowa against a resident of Iowa, such acts shall 
be deemed to be doing business in Iowa by such foreign 
corporation for the purpose of service of process . . . .   
Therefore, Sioux Pharm argues, Summit’s contract with Eagle Labs 
represents continuous and systematic business contacts with Iowa and 
subjects Summit to general personal jurisdiction.   
As noted above, general personal jurisdiction requires that the 
defendant’s contacts “are sufficiently substantial or continuous and 
systematic.”  Bankers Trust Co. v. Fidata Trust Co. NY, 452 N.W.2d 411, 
415 (Iowa 1990).  The corporation must be “essentially at home in the 
forum State.”  Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 
L. Ed. 2d at 803 (holding tire manufacturer was not subject to general 
jurisdiction in North Carolina on claims arising from bus accident in 
France); see also Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 751, 187 
L. Ed. 2d at 633 (holding German parent corporation was not subject to 
general jurisdiction in California on tort claims arising from Argentinian 
subsidiary’s conduct aiding government security forces who kidnapped 
dissidents in so-called “Dirty War”).  In Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the United States Supreme Court concluded a 
 
18 
 
nonresident purchaser was not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas 
on claims arising out of a helicopter accident in Peru.  466 U.S. 408, 
409–10, 416, 418, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1870, 1873–74, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 
408–09, 412–14 (1984) (holding that general jurisdiction did not exist 
when the Colombian defendant negotiated a contract in Texas, accepted 
checks from Texas, and sent employees to purchase helicopters and 
attend training sessions in Texas).  Similarly, in Bankers Trust, we 
determined that personal jurisdiction over Fidata was lacking even 
though it sent its employees to Iowa to train Bankers Trust employees on 
multiple occasions and did business with Bankers Trust annually.  452 
N.W.2d at 416.  In these cases, general personal jurisdiction was lacking 
over the nonresident despite multiple in-person visits to the forum and 
ongoing contracts with the resident plaintiff.   
We rejected a similar jurisdictional argument based on Iowa Code 
section 617.3 in Rath Packing Co. v. Intercont’l Meat Traders, Inc., holding 
no personal jurisdiction existed over a nonresident purchaser despite its 
contract with an Iowa seller.  181 N.W.2d 184, 186–87 (Iowa 1970).  In 
Rath Packing Co., we found it significant that the nonresident defendant 
was a purchaser rather than a seller.  Id. at 188.  We concluded an out-
of-state purchaser does not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of 
conducting business in Iowa the same way a seller does.  Id.  “The state 
also has an interest in protecting its citizens from damages sustained 
from a product brought into the state which is not present when a 
resident seller seeks to collect for a product shipped out of state.”  Id. at 
189.  “ ‘[A] contract alone cannot automatically establish sufficient 
contacts.’ ”  Ross v. First Sav. Bank of Arlington, 675 N.W.2d 812, 816 
(Iowa 2004) (quoting Hager v. Doubletree, 440 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa 
 
19 
 
1989)).  Rather, the defendant must “purposely avail[] itself of the 
benefits of dealing with Iowa residents.”  Id. at 819.   
We conclude the totality of Summit’s contacts with Iowa falls short 
of establishing that it is “essentially at home in the forum State.”  
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 803.  
Accordingly, the district court erred in ruling that Summit was subject to 
general jurisdiction in Iowa.   
C.  Specific Jurisdiction Based on Summit’s Alleged Unfair 
Competition.4  We now turn to Sioux Pharm’s alternative argument 
raised in district court and on appeal that Summit’s Iowa contacts are 
sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in this lawsuit, alleging unfair 
competition.  Specific jurisdiction may be based on “ ‘single or occasional 
acts . . . with respect to suits relating to that in-state activity.’ ”  Daimler 
AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 187 L. Ed. 2d at 633 (quoting Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159, 90 L. Ed. 
95, 103 (1945)).  Thus, we have upheld the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation based on a single, harassing 
phone call to an Iowan in a lawsuit alleging that phone call violated our 
consumer credit code.  Norton v. Local Loan, 251 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 
4In district court, Sioux Pharm argued that the court could exercise personal 
jurisdiction on a theory of civil conspiracy to impute Eagle Labs’ Iowa contacts to 
Summit.  See Remmes v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1093–
95 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (noting split in authorities and predicting our court “would 
recognize civil conspiracy as a basis to support the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction”).  But see Brown v. Kerkhoff, 504 F. Supp. 2d 464, 518 (S.D. Iowa 2007) 
(surveying authorities to reject civil liability as a basis for establishing personal 
jurisdiction).  We have never decided whether to adopt a civil conspiracy theory of 
personal jurisdiction and do not reach that question today because the district court 
dismissed the civil conspiracy claims against all defendants, including Summit, based 
on lack of evidence of an overt act or agreement to conspire.  Sioux Pharm did not 
cross-appeal the ruling dismissing the conspiracy claims and does not argue in this 
appeal that Eagle Labs’ Iowa contacts may be imputed to Summit under a civil 
conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction.   
                                      
 
 
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1977).  More recently, in Shams, we held specific jurisdiction could be 
asserted over a nonresident who by mail misappropriated money from an 
Iowa bank account set up to benefit children, two of whom lived here, 
even though the defendant lacked any other contacts with this state.  
829 N.W.2d at 859–60.   
Two criteria must be met to subject a nonresident defendant to 
specific jurisdiction: (1) the defendant must purposefully direct its 
activities at residents of the forum, and (2) the litigation results from 
alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities.  Id. at 856 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “If sufficient minimum contacts 
exist, the court must then determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.”  Id. at 
857 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
We conclude the unfair-competition claims Sioux Pharm alleges 
against Summit are related to Summit’s Iowa contacts, and those 
contacts in their totality are sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction 
here.  Sioux Pharm alleges Summit competes unfairly in the sale of 
chondroitin sulfate by distributing diluted product that is mislabeled as 
at least ninety percent pure, in violation of § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, 
as well as Iowa common law.  The source of Summit’s raw product is 
codefendant Eagle Labs in Sioux Center, shipped monthly from Iowa to 
Summit under their long-standing supply contract.  For its own 
competitive marketing purposes, Summit touted the Iowa source of its 
product on its website, listing the Sioux Center manufacturing facility as 
its own.  Summit’s website statement, by holding itself out as operating 
its own Iowa manufacturing facility, supports specific jurisdiction 
notwithstanding that Eagle Labs actually owns the Iowa location.  See 
Turpin, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (holding that a brochure claiming Boston 
 
21 
 
office supported finding of specific jurisdiction even though another 
entity operated that office).  Summit falsely touted Iowa roots to enhance 
its sales.  Subjecting Summit to Iowa jurisdiction comports with fair play 
and substantial justice.  As the district court concluded, “Any party that 
claims to operate within a forum state should expect to be haled into 
court there, whether or not the claims are true.”   
Summit sold one shipment of the product to Sioux Pharm in Iowa.  
Although that sale was arranged by Sioux Pharm, it shows Summit’s 
willingness to sell the allegedly mislabeled product anywhere, including 
in this forum.  Courts have noted that a single sale in the forum may be 
sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the seller in a Lanham Act 
case.  See Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 170 
(2d Cir. 2010) (surveying caselaw and noting defendant’s “single act of 
shipping a counterfeit Chloé bag might well be sufficient, by itself, to 
subject him to the jurisdiction of a New York court”); Furminator, Inc. v. 
Wahba, No. 4:10CV01941AGF, 2011 WL 3847390, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. 
Aug. 29, 2011) (finding specific jurisdiction over defendants based on 
their sale of counterfeit goods over eBay.com and Amazon.com to the 
forum state plaintiff who owned the trademark).  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Chloé held the defendant was subject 
to specific jurisdiction based on his sale to an employee of the plaintiff’s 
law firm as well as at least fifty additional sales to other New Yorkers.  
Chloé, 616 F.3d at 165–67.  Like the Second Circuit, we regard Summit’s 
sale to Sioux Pharm in Iowa as a factor supporting specific jurisdiction.  
We need not and do not decide whether a single sale to the plaintiff by 
itself could support specific jurisdiction in an unfair-competition action.   
 
Sioux Pharm alleges intentional tort claims against Summit.  
Under the Calder effects test, we may consider the effects on Sioux 
 
22 
 
Pharm in Iowa of Summit’s sales in other states.  See Shams, 829 
N.W.2d at 856.  The Calder effects test applies if  
(1) the defendant’s acts were intentional; (2) those actions 
were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) 
the brunt of the harm was suffered in the forum state, and 
the defendant knew the harm was likely to be suffered there.   
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  We apply the Calder effects test 
narrowly “as an additional factor to consider when evaluating a 
defendant’s relevant contacts with the forum state.”  Johnson, 614 F.3d 
at 796–97.  “[A]bsent additional contacts, mere effects in the forum state 
are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 797.  The 
foreseeability of causing injury in the forum alone is not enough to 
establish jurisdiction, but it is a relevant factor.  Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 
855–56.   
The record shows Sioux Pharm and Eagle Labs are the only 
domestic producers of chrondroitin sulfate.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
infer Summit was aware its allegedly unfair competition would harm 
Sioux Pharm in Iowa.  See CollegeSource, Inc. v AcademyOne, Inc., 653 
F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting as “implausible” defendant’s 
claim it was unaware plaintiff’s principle place of business was in the 
forum state because they “were direct competitors in a relatively small 
industry”).   
Summit’s allegedly unfair competition harmed the Iowa plaintiff, 
Sioux Pharm, in this state under the Calder effects test.  See id. at 1079 
(“We have repeatedly held that a corporation incurs economic loss, for 
jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of business.”); 
Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1388–89 
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding economic injury in trademark-infringement case 
was suffered in forum state where plaintiff had its principal place of 
 
23 
 
business and offending product was sold); Mor-Dall Enters., Inc. v. Dark 
Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874, 881–82 (W.D. Mich. 2014) 
(noting Lanham Act violations cause economic harm to the plaintiff in its 
home state).   
Iowa has an interest in providing a forum for an “ ‘effective means 
of redress for its residents.’ ”  Ostrem, 841 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting McGee 
v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 201, 2 L. Ed. 2d 
223, 226 (1957)); see also Shams, 829 N.W.2d at 860 (“Iowa’s interest in 
adjudicating a dispute concerning a tort that [oc]curred within its 
borders and [plaintiff’s] interest in obtaining convenient relief outweigh 
any inconvenience to [defendant].”).   
We hold the totality of Summit’s contacts with Iowa, considered in 
light of the Calder effects test, are sufficient to establish specific 
jurisdiction here.  We therefore affirm the order denying Summit’s motion 
to dismiss.   
IV.  Disposition. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Summit is not subject general 
jurisdiction in Iowa, but specific jurisdiction has been established over 
Summit in this unfair-competition action.  We therefore affirm on that 
alternative ground the district court’s ruling denying Summit’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  We remand the case to allow 
Sioux Pharm’s claims against Summit to proceed.   
AFFIRMED.   
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.