Title: Gloria C. Pinczkowski v. Milwaukee County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 161 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Gloria C. Pinczkowski and Leroy S.  
Pinczkowski,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
Milwaukee County,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
Gloria C. Pinczkowski,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Milwaukee County,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 171 
Reported at:  276 Wis 2d 520, 687 N.W.2d 791 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 1, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea H. Roschke, and Michael Best & 
Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz 
and Andrea H. Roschke. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Timothy 
R. 
Karaskiewicz, 
principal 
assistant 
corporation counsel, with whom on the brief was William J. 
Domina, corporation counsel. 
 
 
2
 
 
2005 WI 161
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127  
(L.C. No. 
2000CV10550 & 2001CV5012) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gloria C. Pinczkowski and Leroy S. Pinczkowski, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 1, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Gloria C. Pinczkowski, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Gloria 
Pinczkowski, seeks review of a published court of appeals 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
2 
 
decision affirming two circuit court judgments relating to the 
condemnation of her property for purposes of an airport 
expansion project.1  She asserts that the circuit court erred by 
excluding evidence of the sale price of two adjacent properties 
previously sold to Milwaukee County and evidence of a private 
party's letter of intent to purchase her property.  Pinczkowski 
also contends that she was entitled to a replacement housing 
payment. 
¶2 
Relying on well-established precedent, we determine 
that the circuit court properly excluded evidence of the sale 
price of the adjacent properties because the sales were to a 
condemning authority in the process of obtaining property for a 
public project.  Likewise, we determine there was no circuit 
court error in excluding evidence of the letter of intent 
because it was speculative evidence of fair market value, and we 
observe that Pinczkowski was otherwise able to put her theory of 
private party interest before the jury.  Finally, adhering to 
principles of deference to agency interpretations of statutory 
                                                 
1 See Pinczkowski v. Milwaukee County, 2004 WI App 171, 276 
Wis. 2d 520, 687 N.W.2d 791 (affirming judgments of the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Michael D. Guolee, Judge).  Case 
number 2003AP1732 involves a challenge to the compensation 
ultimately paid for the acquisition of Pinczkowski's property.  
That case resulted in a judgment against Pinczkowski because the 
jury found the just compensation due Pinczkowski was less than 
the County paid.  Case number 2003AP2127 involves Pinczkowski's 
claim for a replacement housing payment and was resolved against 
her on summary judgment.  Although many of the filings in this 
case refer to Pinczkowski's husband, Leroy Pinczkowski, after 
trial it was discovered that he was not on the deed, and he was 
dismissed from the judgment entered against her.  Id., ¶2 n.3. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
3 
 
and 
administrative 
code 
provisions, 
we 
uphold 
the 
state 
Department of Commerce determination that Pinczkowski was not 
entitled to a replacement housing payment.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I   
¶3 
In 1987, the County began planning to expand General 
Mitchell 
International 
Airport. 
 
The 
County's 
plan 
was 
eventually detailed in an "Airport Master Plan," dated April 
1992, and was approved by the Milwaukee County Board of 
Supervisors in 1993.  The Plan reflected an intent to acquire 
private property, including Pinczkowski's property and two 
adjacent properties, for uses related to expansion of the 
airport.  In 1996, the County Board passed a resolution 
directing County officials to commence negotiations with the 
property owners.  
¶4 
Also by the mid-1990s, Hertz Corporation and another 
rental car company were informed that they would need to 
relocate their service facilities.  Hertz contacted Pinczkowski 
and in July 1997 sent her a letter of intent to purchase her 
property for a specified amount.  Hertz did not, however, 
ultimately purchase the property. 
¶5 
The County purchased the adjacent properties in 1997 
and 1998.  Then, in August 1999, it initiated negotiations to 
purchase 
Pinczkowski's 
property. 
 
It 
sent 
her 
a 
letter 
indicating an offer of $93,027 and explaining her eligibility 
for a replacement housing payment of $24,178.47, provided that 
she sold her house to the County for the offered amount.  
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
4 
 
¶6 
After Pinczkowski rejected the County's $93,027 offer, 
the County acquired title to her property in November 2000 
through eminent domain with an award of damages for $350,000.  
Pinczkowski challenged the amount of the award by bringing an 
action in circuit court, and the case was set for trial. 
¶7 
Prior to trial, the County brought a motion in limine 
to exclude certain evidence, and the circuit court made two key 
rulings that correspond to the issues now before us.  First, the 
circuit court barred evidence of the price the County paid for 
its 1997 and 1998 purchases of the properties adjacent to 
Pinczkowski's property.  The circuit court determined that the 
evidence was not admissible because the County purchased these 
properties in pursuit of the airport expansion project, with the 
right to acquire the property by eminent domain.  Therefore, the 
circuit court reasoned that the sales were not arms-length 
transactions and thus not indicative of fair market value.  
Second, the circuit court barred evidence of the Hertz letter of 
intent, determining that it was conditional, non-binding, and 
speculative. 
¶8 
At trial, during Pinczkowski's testimony, her counsel 
sought to introduce evidence of the Hertz letter, including the 
letter itself but with the amount of the offer redacted.  
Counsel asserted that, despite the court's previous ruling, 
evidence of the fact of the Hertz letter was admissible to show 
that there was private interest in Pinczkowski's property for a 
specific purpose.  She also sought to rely on the letter to show 
that when the County bought the adjacent properties, it ruined 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
5 
 
Hertz's plan to assemble Pinczkowski's property with adjacent 
property.  The circuit court ruled the evidence inadmissible.  
¶9 
The 
jury 
determined 
the 
fair 
market 
value 
of 
Pinczkowski's property was $300,000, or $50,000 less than the 
County had paid pursuant to its award of damages.  It also found 
that $15,000 should be deducted from Pinczkowski's award because 
of environmental conditions on the property.  Thus, the verdict 
resulted in a net award of $285,000.   
¶10 Meanwhile, Pinczkowski had purchased a new residence 
for $155,000 and sought to claim a replacement housing payment.  
The County denied her claim.  Pinczkowski petitioned the state 
Department of Commerce for review.  The department agreed with 
the County's decision.  It explained that "the County paid 
Gloria C. Pinczkowski $350,000 for her property appraised at 
$93,027.  It is our opinion that the 'financial means' standard, 
COMM 202.01(20), has been met for determining if a comparable 
dwelling is affordable for an owner-occupant."2 
¶11 Pinczkowski then brought an action on the claim in 
circuit court that was consolidated with her award-of-damages 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 202.01(20)(a) (March 1997) 
provides: 
(a) Owner-occupant.  The acquisition price of the 
comparable replacement dwelling does not exceed the 
sum of the payment for the acquired dwelling and the 
comparable replacement housing payment available under 
this chapter. 
All references to Wis. Admin. Code ch. Comm 202 are to the March 
1997 register, the most recent version of this code chapter. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
6 
 
case.  After the jury trial in the award-of-damages case, the 
circuit court dismissed Pinczkowski's claim for the replacement 
housing payment on a County motion for summary judgment.  The 
circuit court agreed with the County and department that 
Pinczkowski was not entitled to the payment. 
¶12 Pinczkowski appealed both the judgment in the award-
of-damages case and the judgment dismissing her claim for the 
replacement housing payment.  She challenged the circuit court's 
determinations that the sale prices of the adjacent properties 
were inadmissible at trial, that evidence of the Hertz letter of 
intent was inadmissible, and that she was not entitled to a 
replacement housing payment. 
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  It 
determined that clear precedent prohibits the introduction of 
the sale price of otherwise comparable properties when they are 
sold to a condemning authority engaged in negotiations to obtain 
property for a public project.  The court of appeals agreed with 
the circuit court that the expired letter of intent submitted by 
Hertz was conditional and speculative.  In addition, it 
determined that the exclusion of evidence of the letter was not 
prejudicial to Pinczkowski.  The court of appeals also agreed 
with the department and circuit court that Pinczkowski was 
ineligible for a replacement housing payment. 
II 
¶14 Broadly stated, this case presents three issues for 
our review.  Two issues involve evidentiary rulings and the 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
7 
 
third issue focuses on the interpretation of statutory and 
administrative code provisions.  
¶15 We will uphold a circuit court's evidentiary rulings 
if it examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of 
law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  
Whether the circuit court applied the proper legal standards, 
however, presents a question of law subject to independent 
appellate review.  See City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶10, 
262 Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 584.  The interpretation of a 
statute or administrative code provision also presents a 
question of law, but may warrant deference when we review that 
question in the context of an agency decision.  See Board of 
Regents v. State Personnel Comm'n, 2002 WI 79, ¶42, 254 
Wis. 2d 148, 646 N.W.2d 759.  
III 
¶16 We turn first to the issue of whether the circuit 
court erred in excluding evidence of the price for the 1997 and 
1998 sales of the properties adjacent to Pinczkowski's property.    
In order to resolve this issue, we begin with an examination of 
a long-standing evidentiary rule pertaining to the exclusion of 
purchase prices paid by condemning authorities as evidence of 
fair market value.  Based on that rule, we determine that 
evidence of the sale price for the adjacent properties was not 
admissible to show the fair market value of Pinczkowski's 
property.  We also determine that regardless of whether the rule 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
8 
 
leaves room for an exception advanced by Pinczkowski, the facts 
here do not fit within that exception.  Because the circuit 
court's ruling barred Pinczkowski's appraisers from relying on 
the sales, we address whether such reliance is a permissible use 
of the evidence in light of the long-standing rule, and we 
conclude that it is not. 
A 
¶17 This court recognized in Blick v. Ozaukee County, 180 
Wis. 45, 46, 192 N.W. 380 (1923), that "the price paid in 
settlement of condemnation proceedings, or the price paid by the 
condemnor for similar land, even if proceedings had not been 
begun, where the purchaser has the power to take by eminent 
domain, 
is 
not 
admissible." 
 
This 
general 
rule 
of 
inadmissibility is firmly rooted in market principles and logic:   
What the party condemning has paid for other 
property is incompetent.  Such sales are not a fair 
criterion of value, for the reason that they are in 
the nature of a compromise.  They are affected by an 
element which does not enter into similar transactions 
made in the ordinary course of business. . . .  The 
fear of one party or the other to take the risk of 
legal proceedings ordinarily results in the one party 
paying 
more 
or 
the 
other 
taking 
less 
than 
is 
considered to be the fair market value of the 
property.  For these reasons such sales would not seem 
to be competent evidence of value in any case, whether 
in a proceeding by the same condemning party or 
otherwise. 
Blick, 180 Wis. at 46-47 (quoting 2 Lewis, Em. Dom. § 667 (3d 
ed.)).  
If a sale is made to a condemnor that is about to 
institute proceedings if it cannot acquire the land by 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
9 
 
purchase at a satisfactory price, the amount paid is 
not a fair test of market value . . . . 
Kirkpatrick v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 522, 526, 192 N.W.2d 856 (1972) 
(quoting what is now 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 12B.07[2], 
at pp. 12B-44 to 12B-45 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 
¶18 Thus, dealings between one who must buy and one who 
must sell are not probative of fair market value because such 
dealings do not, by definition, reflect fair market value.  See 
Kirkpatrick, 53 Wis. 2d at 526.  Fair market value is "the 
amount for which the property could be sold in the market on a 
sale by an owner willing, but not compelled, to sell, and to a 
purchaser willing and able, but not obliged, to buy."  Wis. JI——
Civil 8100; accord Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, 219 Wis. 2d 764, 787, 
580 N.W.2d 644 (1998) ("Fair market value is what a willing 
buyer would pay to a willing seller, neither being under 
compulsion."). 
¶19 "The problem with evidence of sales of other land to 
the condemning authority is that the price may very well not be 
the fair market value of land, no matter how comparable the land 
may be in its physical aspects."  Kirkpatrick, 53 Wis. 2d at 
526.  Consequently, as a general matter, "[s]ales to condemning 
agencies are deemed to be incompetent evidence of market value 
because of the threat of condemnation in lieu of voluntary 
purchase."  7A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 9A.04[2][a], at p. 
9A-39 (3d ed. 2004). 
¶20 In addition, the general rule of inadmissibility is 
one of sound public policy and judicial economy.  A different 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
10 
 
rule 
in 
condemnation 
proceedings 
would 
likely 
result 
in 
satellite litigation relating to the allegedly voluntary or 
involuntary nature of sales of other property.  For each such 
sale, testimony by former property owners, their agents, the 
agents of the condemning authority, and other evidence would all 
be fair game as the basis for fact-intensive disputes in 
preliminary evidentiary proceedings.3 
¶21 In Kirkpatrick, we reaffirmed the rule in Blick.  
Kirkpatrick, 53 Wis. 2d at 526.  Subsequently, in Herro v. DNR, 
67 Wis. 2d 407, 432, 227 N.W.2d 456 (1975), we again upheld this 
long-standing rule, noting that "[t]he rule in Wisconsin on this 
issue is settled," and represents "[t]he great weight of 
authority" across jurisdictions.  Herro, 67 Wis. 2d at 432 
(quoting Blick, 180 Wis. at 46, for the latter proposition); see 
also J. H. Cooper, Annotation, Admissibility on Issue of Value 
of Real Property of Evidence of Sale Price of Other Real 
Property, 85 A.L.R.2d 110, § 10 (1962 updated to June 2, 2005, 
by Later Case Service).   
¶22 Pinczkowski nonetheless asserts that the adjacent 
property sales here should be admissible as voluntary, arms-
length transactions.  This argument misses the mark.  As both 
                                                 
3 At oral argument, counsel for Pinczkowski acknowledged as 
much:  "If I could write the script of how this should be played 
out . . . [i]deally I would want this presented in a hearing 
associated with a motion in limine in which all of the 
information could be brought forward by either party on the 
degree of voluntariness or the opposite . . . ."  (Emphasis in 
original remarks.) 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
11 
 
the court of appeals and the circuit court recognized, her 
attempt to characterize these particular sales as voluntary is 
semantic and ultimately unconvincing.  While the sales may have 
been voluntary in the sense that the County had not yet 
commenced 
formal 
condemnation 
procedures 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05 (2003-04),4 the sales were decidedly not voluntary in the 
sense relevant to the rationale of market-skewing behind the 
Blick line of cases. 
¶23 The County's airport expansion plans dated back to 
1987.  At the time, there were numerous conferences and public 
workshops, and the County's plan was eventually detailed in its 
Airport Master Plan in April 1992.  The Plan reflected an intent 
to 
acquire 
Pinczkowski's 
property 
and 
the 
two 
adjacent 
properties for uses related to airport expansion, and the Plan 
was approved by the County Board in 1993.  In 1996, a consultant 
retained by the County continued to recommend acquisition of 
these properties for purposes of airport expansion.  The County 
Board promptly resolved to adopt that recommendation and 
directed County officials to commence negotiations with the 
property owners. 
¶24 Thus, the County's intent to acquire the adjacent 
properties for airport expansion purposes would have been well 
known by at least 1996.  Indeed, Pinczkowski's attorney, in 
closing arguments to the jury, recognized as much: 
                                                 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
12 
 
By the early 1990s . . . [t]he county, in clear 
recognition of what is needed to grow the airport, 
developed and then approved a plan which made it clear 
to everyone that the destiny of the Pinczkowski 
property and its neighbors was to become part of 
General Mitchell International Airport. 
The County's widely-known intentions would have skewed the 
market for the targeted properties, including the properties 
adjacent to Pinczkowski's, precisely the concern underlying the 
Blick rule. 
¶25 Given the circumstances here, we have little trouble 
determining, as did the circuit court and court of appeals, that 
the sales of the adjacent properties could not have been 
"voluntary" for purposes of the admissibility of their sale 
prices.  The County, a condemning authority, was in the process 
of obtaining land for purposes of airport expansion at the time 
it purchased the properties.  Accordingly, under the Blick rule 
and rationale, evidence of the sale price for those properties 
was 
not 
admissible 
to 
show 
the 
fair 
market 
value 
of 
Pinczkowski's property. 
¶26 Based on the facts already recited, we also reject 
Pinczkowski's argument that the Blick rule should not apply 
because the sales of the adjacent properties were not part of an 
ongoing project.  Pinczkowski asserts there was no ongoing 
project because the County had not issued a relocation order 
under § 32.05(1) for the adjacent properties. 
¶27 Section 32.05(1) reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) RELOCATION ORDER. (a) Except as provided 
under 
par. 
(b), 
a 
county 
board 
of 
supervisors 
. . . shall make an order providing for the laying 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
13 
 
out, relocation and improvement of [an] . . . airport 
. . . which shall be known as the relocation order.  
Thus, as a general matter, before the County can actually 
condemn property under § 32.05, it must issue a relocation 
order.  See Wisconsin Town House Builders, Inc. v. City of 
Madison, 37 Wis. 2d 44, 52, 154 N.W.2d 232 (1967). 
¶28 Nothing about § 32.05(1) or the rationale behind the 
Blick evidentiary rule, however, convinces us that compliance 
with § 32.05(1) is necessary to trigger the applicability of the 
Blick rule.  The Blick rule may render evidence of sales to a 
condemning authority inadmissible even though the authority has 
not yet initiated formal condemnation procedures.   
¶29 Here, the County's public expression of its intent to 
acquire the properties adjacent to Pinczkowski's property as 
part of its airport expansion plans, and its resolution 
directing officials to commence negotiations to acquire these 
properties, suffice to warrant inadmissibility under the Blick 
line of cases.  The properties were purchased by a condemning 
authority in the process of obtaining land for a public project 
and were therefore purchased under threat of condemnation within 
the meaning of Blick.  Accordingly, the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in determining that evidence of the 
sale price for the adjacent properties was inadmissible. 
B 
¶30 We turn next to Pinczkowski's argument that this court 
should enunciate an exception to the rule set forth in the Blick 
line of cases, or what she terms a "new rule for voluntary 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
14 
 
transactions."  In support of this argument, Pinczkowski relies 
on a number of authorities which, she asserts, embody this 
exception or "new rule." 
¶31 For example, Pinczkowski cites Cain v. City of Topeka, 
603 P.2d 1031 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).  In that case, the Kansas 
Court of Appeals stated that: 
the mere fact that the purchaser of land was invested 
with the power of eminent domain does not in and of 
itself indicate that the sale was anything other than 
a fair, arm's length transaction . . . .  If the 
evidence is such as to indicate that an arm's length 
transaction 
occurred, 
then 
the 
rule 
[prohibiting 
admission] does not apply. 
Cain, 603 P.2d at 1034 (citations omitted).5 
¶32 In addition, Pinczkowski refers us to this statement 
in a leading treatise:  "[T]he mere fact that a corporation, 
which purchased land by voluntary sale, was invested with the 
power of eminent domain does not in and of itself show that the 
sale was a compulsory settlement rather than a fair transaction 
in the market."  5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 21.02[6], at pp. 
21-75 to 21-76 (footnote omitted); see also 5 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, § 21.02[6], at p. 21-77 ("In general, the price [paid] 
by an entity having eminent domain power but not using that 
authority to acquire the property may be introduced to establish 
                                                 
5 Pinczkowski cites other authorities for similar rules.  
See Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. O'Brien, 418 F.2d 15, 19 (5th 
Cir. 1969); Slattery Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37, 41 (5th 
Cir. 1956); Amory v. Commonwealth, 72 N.E.2d 549, 559 (Mass. 
1947). 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
15 
 
fair market value so long as the transaction was not influenced 
by any fear of litigation."). 
¶33 We need not decide whether the Blick line of cases 
leaves room for the exception articulated by these authorities 
and characterized by Pinczkowski as a "new rule" that this court 
should adopt.  Even if it did, the facts here would not fall 
within such an exception. 
¶34 The central tenet of the cited authorities is that the 
fact that a purchaser possesses the power to condemn does not by 
itself prove that the price of the sale should be inadmissible 
as incompetent evidence of fair market value.  Here, however, we 
are confronted with much more than the fact that the County 
possessed the power of eminent domain at the time it purchased 
the adjacent properties. 
¶35 As already explained, we are confronted with a case in 
which the County, through County Board action and other means, 
had publicly declared its intent to acquire the properties and 
in which the County Board had by resolution specifically 
directed County officials to commence negotiations for the 
acquisition of those properties.  As such, they would not fit 
the exception or "new rule" as proposed by Pinczkowski. 
C 
¶36 The 
circuit 
court's 
ruling 
also 
prevented 
Pinczkowski's appraisers from relying on the sale price of the 
adjacent properties in forming their estimates of the value of 
Pinczkowski's property.  We therefore address whether such 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
16 
 
reliance may be permissible despite the rule of inadmissibility 
under Blick.  
¶37 In the condemnation context, "[t]he general rule 
regarding admission of comparable sales as direct evidence of 
value is more restrictive than the admissibility rule when the 
evidence is offered only to show a basis for the opinion of an 
expert witness."  Kamrowski v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 195, 202, 155 
N.W.2d 125 (1967).  At the same time, however, "[s]ome evidence 
as to alleged comparable sales when offered even for this more 
limited purpose [of basis of opinion on value] may confuse or 
mislead the jury" and should therefore be excluded.  Id. at 203; 
see also Calaway v. Brown County, 202 Wis. 2d 736, 741-42, 745, 
553 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶38 The general evidentiary rule pertaining to the basis 
for expert testimony is also relevant here.  Under that rule, 
although an expert may rely on facts or data that are not 
themselves admissible, those facts or data must be of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences.  Wis. Stat. § 907.036; Enea v. 
Linn, 2002 WI App 185, ¶16, 256 Wis. 2d 714, 650 N.W.2d 315. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.03 provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be 
those perceived by or made known to the expert at or 
before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
17 
 
¶39 We determine that, given the rationale behind the 
Blick line of cases, it makes no difference whether Pinczkowski 
sought to offer evidence of the sale price for the adjacent 
properties directly or whether she sought to have her appraisers 
rely on those prices as a basis for their estimates of value.  
The 
adjacent 
property 
sales 
were 
inherently 
unreliable 
indicators of market value and, in that sense, not comparable 
sales.  Allowing evidence of the properties' sale prices would 
have been practically certain to confuse or mislead the jury.  
See Kamrowski, 37 Wis. 2d at 203; Calaway, 202 Wis. 2d at 741-
42.  Likewise, because of their inherent unreliability as an 
indicator of market value, such sales cannot constitute facts or 
data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in 
forming opinions or inferences.  See § 907.03; Enea, 256 
Wis. 2d 714, ¶16. 
 
¶40 In sum, under the rule and rationale articulated in 
the Blick line of cases, evidence of the sale price for the 
adjacent properties was not admissible to show the fair market 
value of Pinczkowski's property, and Pinczkowski's appraisers 
could not rely on the sales of those properties.  The circuit 
court therefore properly exercised its discretion in excluding 
evidence of the sale price for the adjacent properties. 
IV  
¶41 We next 
address 
the 
circuit court's 
evidentiary 
rulings barring evidence of Hertz's letter of intent, which 
reflected Hertz's interest in Pinczkowski's property.  Prior to 
trial, Pinczkowski maintained that the amount of Hertz's offer 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
18 
 
should have been admitted.  Pinczkowski has now accepted the 
circuit court's ruling that the amount was inadmissible but 
continues to contend, as she did during trial, that evidence of 
the fact of the offer, without the amount of the offer, should 
have been admitted. 
¶42 Both the court of appeals and circuit court correctly 
recognized that "[t]he general rule in condemnation cases 
is . . . that offers to purchase property are not receivable as 
evidence of its market value."  Fox Wisconsin Theatres, Inc. v. 
City of Waukesha, 253 Wis. 452, 456, 34 N.W.2d 783 (1948); see 
also 7A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 9A.04[2][b], at p. 9A-41 
("Generally, unaccepted offers to purchase are not admissible to 
show fair market value.").  
¶43 In certain situations, offers may nonetheless be 
admissible as evidence of fair market value "when made with 
actual intent and pursuant to actual effort to purchase."  Fox, 
253 Wis. at 456 (quoting Sammond v. Tax Commission, 230 Wis. 23, 
40, 283 N.W. 452 (1939)).  "In order to qualify as probative 
evidence, there must be a preliminary foundation of '[t]he bona 
fides of the offer, the financial responsibility of the offeror, 
and [the offeror's] qualifications to know the value of the 
property.'"  Bihlmire v. Hahn, 31 Wis. 2d 537, 544-45, 143 
N.W.2d 433 (1966) (quoting Fox, 253 Wis. at 458). 
¶44 Hertz's letter of intent was speculative evidence of 
fair market value in light of its preliminary and conditional 
nature.  This is apparent from the face of the letter.  First, 
Pinczkowski failed to sign the letter before its expiration 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
19 
 
date.  Second, the letter indicated that even if signed by 
Pinczkowski, it was non-binding.  Third, the letter set forth 
contingencies, including inspection for environmental conditions 
and "all other necessary government approvals."  It also 
contained numerous strike-outs, leaving unclear whether Hertz 
and Pinczkowski had a meeting of the minds, even as to this non-
binding agreement.  The circuit court aptly characterized the 
letter as speculative and "one step removed from an offer."  
¶45 Pinczkowski nonetheless argues that 
the fact of 
Hertz's letter of intent, without reference to the amount of 
Hertz's offer, was admissible to show that there was a private 
market for her property for a particular use.  She also contends 
it was relevant to show that when the County bought the adjacent 
properties, it ruined Hertz's plan to assemble Pinczkowski's 
property with adjacent property.  In the same vein, she asserts 
that the letter would also have validated her appraisers' 
assemblage approach to valuation. 
¶46 We recognize that the existence of a letter of intent 
from a third party may be relevant generally to show private 
interest in property for a particular use, whether standing 
alone or assembled in combination with another property.  
However, we are not persuaded by Pinczkowski's arguments that 
the circuit court erred in barring evidence of the letter. 
¶47 Insofar as Pinczkowski was seeking to admit the 
evidence to establish a particular fair market value based on 
the existence of Hertz's letter of intent, the evidence was 
inadmissible under the rule articulated in Fox.  While the 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
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threshold between offers that are admissible and those that are 
not may not always be clear under the principles of Fox, in this 
case it is plain that Hertz's letter of intent falls on the 
inadmissible side of the threshold.  Moreover, the circuit court 
has broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings, and our 
inquiry 
into 
whether 
the 
court 
properly 
exercised 
that 
discretion is highly deferential.  Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 
113, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698, ¶¶28-29. 
¶48 To the extent that Pinczkowski was instead seeking to 
admit evidence of the Hertz letter to establish more generally 
her theory that there was a private interest in her property for 
a particular use, whether standing alone or assembled with other 
properties, she was able to put that theory fully to the jury 
without evidence of the letter.  Even assuming arguendo that 
there was error, the trial record amply demonstrates that 
Pinczkowski would not have been prejudiced because she was 
otherwise able to put her theory of private party interest 
before the jury. 
¶49 During opening statements, Pinczkowski's counsel told 
the jury, without objection by the County, that it would learn 
that Hertz had an interest in acquiring Pinczkowski's property.  
Under adverse examination, the airport director testified that 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
21 
 
Hertz and another rental car company were informed that they 
would need to relocate their service facilities.7  
¶50 At least one of Pinczkowski's appraisers testified 
that the zoning of her property would have permitted it to be 
used as a car rental facility.  Similarly, the County appraiser 
testified that a rental car service facility would have been a 
potential 
use 
for 
Pinczkowski's 
property. 
 
Under 
cross-
examination, 
the 
County's 
expert 
also 
acknowledged 
that 
Pinczkowski's property could have been combined with one of the 
adjacent properties to form a lot similar in size to the site 
that Hertz ultimately purchased. 
¶51 Both of Pinczkowski's appraisers testified that they 
used the property that Hertz purchased as a comparable sale.  
They 
also 
testified 
that 
their 
estimates 
were 
based 
on 
assemblage theories of value. 
¶52 During 
closing 
arguments, 
Pinczkowski's 
attorney 
reminded the jury that Hertz had been informed it would have to 
relocate.  Counsel emphasized, again without objection by the 
County, that Hertz would have been a potential buyer for 
Pinczkowski's property and that Hertz may have been interested 
in combining properties.  Finally, counsel underscored for the 
jury that "[e]ven [the County's appraiser] admitted that Hertz 
                                                 
7 The airport director also testified specifically as to 
Hertz's interest in Pinczkowski's property, but the County 
immediately objected, and the circuit court instructed the jury 
to disregard this testimony.  Similarly, when Pinczkowski 
testified that Hertz had contacted her, the court told the jury 
to disregard the testimony after the County objected. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
22 
 
could have gotten exactly what it needed by simply combining the 
Pinczkowski property with the neighbor to the north."  Thus, the 
jury became well acquainted with the theory that there was 
private interest in her property for a particular use, whether 
standing alone or assembled with other properties. 
¶53 In sum, there was no error in the circuit court's 
exclusion of evidence of the Hertz letter.  The letter was 
speculative evidence of fair market value.  Even assuming 
arguendo that there was error, Pinczkowski was not prejudiced 
because she was otherwise able to put her theory relating to 
private party interest in her property before the jury.8     
V 
¶54 Finally, we must address the determination by the 
County, the department, the circuit court, and the court of 
appeals that Pinczkowski was not entitled to a replacement 
housing payment.  Pinczkowski asserts that she was entitled to 
the replacement housing payment under Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4)(a). 
¶55 Section 32.19 provides: 
(4)  Replacement housing.  (a) Owner-occupants. 
In addition to amounts otherwise authorized by this 
subchapter, the condemnor shall make a payment, not to 
                                                 
8 Pinczkowski also argues that evidence of Hertz's letter of 
intent would have validated her experts' approach to choice of 
comparables.   According to Pinczkowski, the letter helps show 
why her appraisers relied on Hertz's eventual purchase of 
another property and would have lent more credence to her 
appraisers' estimates of value.  The court of appeals declined 
to address this argument because Pinczkowski did not raise it in 
the circuit court.  We agree with the court of appeals that this 
argument should be deemed waived.  See Wirth v. Ehly, 93 
Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980). 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
23 
 
exceed $25,000, to any displaced person who is 
displaced 
from 
a 
dwelling 
actually 
owned 
and 
occupied . . . by the displaced person for not less 
than 180 days prior to the initiation of negotiations 
for the acquisition of the property. . . .  Such 
payment includes only the following: 
1.  The amount, if any, which when added to the 
acquisition payment, equals the reasonable cost of a 
comparable 
replacement 
dwelling 
available 
on 
the 
private market, as determined by the condemnor.9 
¶56 The 
County's 
August 
1999 
letter 
to 
Pinczkowski 
informed 
her 
that 
it 
was 
the 
County's 
"initiation 
of 
negotiations" for the purchase of her property and that the 
County was offering $93,027 as just compensation for her 
property.  It also informed her that the cost of a comparable 
replacement dwelling was determined to be $77,926.47 and that 
the replacement housing payment was calculated to be $24,178.47. 
¶57 Ordinarily, under Wis. Admin. Code. § Comm 202.68, a 
replacement housing payment to a person displaced from a 
dwelling is "the selling price of a comparable dwelling on a lot 
typical for the area, less the price of the acquired dwelling 
and 
the 
site." 
 
However, 
because 
Pinczkowski's 
property 
consisted of a lot that was larger than average in size and that 
had a higher and better use, the County calculated a "carve-out" 
for her property pursuant to § Comm 202.68(7)(a)2. and (7)(c).10 
                                                 
9 The payment may include amounts for other items, which we 
have 
not 
enumerated 
here. 
 
See 
generally 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(4)(a).  As we understand the parties' arguments, such 
other items are not at issue in this case. 
10 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 202.68(7), provides: 
(7) Carve-out and modification of replacement 
payment computation.  (a) Complete acquisition. . . .  
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
24 
 
¶58 The County thus separated out from the total offered 
amount of $93,027 an amount attributable to the residence plus 
the portion of Pinczkowski's land that represented a lot typical 
for the area.  See § Comm 202.68(7)(a)2. and (7)(c).  It 
calculated this amount to be $53,748.  By then subtracting the 
$53,748 figure from the $77,926.47 cost of a comparable 
replacement dwelling, the County arrived at the $24,178.47 
replacement housing payment. 
¶59 Pinczkowski rejected the County's $93,027 offer and 
submitted an application for the replacement housing payment.  
Shortly after the date of Pinczkowski's application, the County 
made the $350,000 award of damages.  It then denied her 
application for the replacement housing payment.  
¶60 Pinczkowski petitioned the department for review of 
the County's denial of her claim.  After the department issued a 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. Larger than typical size lot.  The maximum 
replacement payment shall be the price of a comparable 
dwelling on a lot typical for the area, less the price 
of the acquired dwelling plus the price of that 
portion of the acquired land which represents a lot 
typical for the area, when the acquired dwelling is 
located on a lot size larger than typical for the 
area. 
. . . . 
(c) Dwelling on land with higher and better use.  
The maximum replacement payment shall be the selling 
price of a comparable dwelling on a lot typical in the 
area, less the price of the acquired dwelling, and the 
price of that portion which represents a lot typical 
for residential use in the area, when the market value 
is based on a higher and better use than residential. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
25 
 
decision agreeing with the County's denial of the claim, 
Pinczkowski brought an action on the claim in circuit court.  
The circuit court dismissed the claim on summary judgment, and 
the court of appeals affirmed. 
¶61 Recognizing that the circuit court decided her claim 
on summary judgment, Pinczkowski cites the standard of review 
for summary judgment in her brief, but she is otherwise silent 
on the matter of whose decision we should be reviewing and under 
what standard we should be reviewing it.  The County, although 
not advancing a particular standard of review, has repeatedly 
emphasized in its brief and at oral argument that the department 
affirmed its decision that Pinczkowski was not entitled to a 
replacement housing payment. 
¶62 For reasons explained further below, we determine 
that, under the circumstances of this case, we will review the 
decision of the department.  Such review implicates one of three 
levels of deference: great weight, due weight, or no weight.  
Board of Regents, 254 Wis. 2d 158, ¶42. 
¶63 Great weight deference applies when (1) the agency is 
charged by the legislature with the duty of administering a 
statute; (2) the interpretation of the agency is one of long-
standing; (3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) the agency's 
interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the 
application of the statute.  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 
284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996). 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
26 
 
¶64 Due weight deference review, in turn, is not so much 
based upon an agency's knowledge or skill as it is on the fact 
that the legislature has charged the agency with the enforcement 
of the statute in question.  Id. at 286. 
¶65 We give no deference to an agency decision if the 
issue before the agency is clearly one of first impression, if a 
legal question is presented and there is no evidence of any 
special agency expertise or experience, or if the agency's 
position on an issue has been so inconsistent that it provides 
no real guidance.  Coutts v. Wisconsin Ret. Bd., 209 Wis. 2d 
655, 664, 562 N.W.2d 917 (1997). 
¶66 The legislature, in Wis. Stat. § 32.26, has addressed 
the role and authority of the department in matters relating to 
eminent domain.  It has specifically charged the department with 
a number of responsibilities relating to § 32.19, the relocation 
payment statute that is the source of Pinczkowski's claim.  
These 
responsibilities 
include 
that 
the 
department 
shall 
promulgate rules to implement and administer § 32.19; may make 
investigations to determine whether a condemnor is complying 
with § 32.19 and may seek a court order requiring compliance; 
shall prepare pamphlets for condemnees, in cooperation with the 
attorney general; and shall provide technical assistance on 
relocation plan development.  See § 32.26. 
¶67 Under 
Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 202.18, 
promulgated 
pursuant to the department's legislatively granted authority, 
see Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 202.001, a claimant may file a 
"relocation appeal" with the department, which may proceed on 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
27 
 
such an appeal in a number of ways.11  Similarly, § 32.26(5) 
provides that a person claiming a replacement housing payment 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 202.18 reads as follows: 
Relocation appeal.  A displaced person, or one 
claiming to be displaced, may file a complaint for 
review by the department under this subsection. 
. . . . 
(2) Appeal to displacing agency.  An agency shall 
establish an internal appeal procedure to resolve a 
relocation complaint. . . .  
(3) Appeal to department.  A displaced person may 
file an appeal to the department. The department 
shall: 
(a) 
Receive 
and 
consider 
all 
relocation 
complaints filed under this chapter; 
(b) Provide a written notice to the displacing 
agency within five working days of receipt of a 
complaint, including a copy of the complaint; 
(c) Request that an agency or a displaced person 
provide materials or documentation pertinent to a 
complaint and shall specify a time to provide the 
materials; 
(d) Promptly notify the parties of a dispute when 
the 
department 
determines 
that 
a 
complaint 
is 
unreasonable, including the reasons; 
(e) Schedule an informal meeting with the parties 
when necessary to resolve a dispute. The meeting shall 
be scheduled as soon as practicable and be held in the 
county where displacement occurred or another mutually 
agreed location; 
(f) 
Provide 
a 
written 
determination 
when 
necessary to resolve a dispute; 
(g) Notify the parties within 90 days after an 
informal meeting when an acceptable solution cannot be 
negotiated. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
28 
 
may petition the department for review.12  The claimant may also 
seek initial review of the condemning authority's denial of a 
claim 
directly 
in 
circuit 
court 
under 
§ 32.26(5) 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 32.20.13 
¶68 Here, Pinczkowski chose to seek initial review with 
the 
department. 
 
Specifically, 
after 
the 
County 
denied 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.26(5) reads: 
Any displaced person may, prior to commencing 
court action against the condemnor under s. 32.20, 
petition the department of commerce for review of his 
or her complaint, setting forth in the petition the 
reasons 
for 
his 
or 
her 
dissatisfaction. 
 
The 
department may conduct an informal review of the 
situation and attempt to negotiate an acceptable 
solution.  If an acceptable solution cannot be 
negotiated within 90 days, the department shall notify 
all parties, and the petitioner may then proceed under 
s. 32.20.  The informal review procedure provided by 
this subsection is not a condition precedent to the 
filing of a claim and commencement of legal action 
pursuant to s. 32.20. . . . 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.20 reads: 
Claims for damages itemized in ss. 32.19 and 
32.195 shall be filed with the condemnor carrying on 
the project through which condemnee's or claimant's 
claims arise.  All such claims must be filed after the 
damages 
upon 
which 
they 
are 
based 
have 
fully 
materialized but not later than 2 years after the 
condemnor takes physical possession of the entire 
property acquired or such other event as determined by 
the department of commerce by rule.  If such claim is 
not allowed within 90 days after the filing thereof, 
the claimant has a right of action against the 
condemnor carrying on the project through which the 
claim arises.  Such action shall be commenced in a 
court of record in the county wherein the damages 
occurred. . . .    
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
29 
 
Pinczkowski's claim, Pinczkowski filed a "Petition and Appeal 
for Denial of Relocation Claim for Replacement Housing Payment" 
with the department "pursuant to § 32.26(5) and Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Comm 202.18."  The County submitted a letter brief in response 
to the petition, Pinczkowski submitted her own brief in response 
to the County's, and the County subsequently submitted a reply 
brief.  After the briefing, the department issued a written 
determination under § Comm 202.18(3). 
¶69 Given the legislature's charge to the department, the 
statutory and administrative scheme for seeking review, the 
technical nature of the carve-out provisions, and the particular 
circumstances of this case, we determine that we will review the 
department's 
determination, 
and 
that 
we 
will 
give 
that 
determination deference.  We need not decide whether to give 
great 
weight 
deference 
or 
due 
weight 
deference 
to 
the 
department's 
determination 
because 
we 
conclude 
that 
its 
determination 
was 
reasonable 
and 
that 
Pinczkowski's 
interpretation of the relevant statutory and administrative code 
provisions is no more reasonable.  Applying even due weight 
deference, a reviewing court will not overturn a reasonable 
agency interpretation unless the court determines that there is 
a more reasonable interpretation.  UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 287. 
¶70 In the department's written decision, it cited Wis. 
Admin. Code § Comm 202.01(20) and concluded that Pinczkowski was 
not entitled to a replacement housing payment because "[t]he sum 
of the acquisition price and the replacement housing payment for 
the acquired dwelling exceeds the acquisition price of the 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
30 
 
replacement dwelling."  Section Comm 202.01(20), in turn, 
reflects the applicable standard in § 32.19(4)(a)1., which 
provides that the replacement housing payment consists of "[t]he 
amount, if any, which when added to the acquisition payment, 
equals 
the 
reasonable 
cost 
of 
a 
comparable 
replacement 
dwelling . . . ." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)14 
 
Obviously, 
the 
acquisition price (or payment) for Pinczkowski's property, 
whether taken to be the $350,000 in her award of damages or the 
$285,000 as found by the jury, far outstrips both the undisputed 
$77,926.47 cost of a comparable replacement dwelling and the 
$155,000 cost of the replacement home she actually purchased. 
¶71 It is not readily apparent from the face of the carve-
out provisions in the administrative code whether or how the 
initially 
proffered 
$24,178.47 
replacement 
housing 
payment 
should have been recalculated in light of the $350,000 award of 
damages that Pinczkowski received or the $285,000 the jury 
awarded.  Additionally, we note that the record does not reflect 
what portion of the $285,000 the jury attributed to "the 
acquired dwelling" or to "that portion of the acquired land 
which represents a lot typical for the area."  Section 
Comm 202.68(7)(a)2.; see also § Comm 202.68(7)(c).  
¶72 What is apparent, however, is that any calculation 
based on the carve-out provisions must be guided by the 
statutory standard defining the type of replacement housing 
                                                 
14 Again, as previously noted, the payment may include 
amounts for other items not at issue here. 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
31 
 
payment Pinczkowski seeks.  It is "[t]he amount, if any, which 
when added to the acquisition payment, equals the reasonable 
cost 
of 
a 
comparable 
replacement 
dwelling . . . ."  
Section 32.19(4)(a)1. (emphasis added).  This is the standard 
the department applied, and when we examine that standard in 
light of the facts presented here, we cannot say that the 
department's application of the standard was unreasonable.   
¶73 Pinczkowski asserts that there is no basis for 
changing the initial carve-out value or for recalculating the 
original amount of the replacement housing payment associated 
with the County's $93,027 offer in its August 1999 letter.  We 
disagree. 
¶74 First, the letter makes the $24,178.47 replacement 
housing payment contingent upon the acceptance of the $93,027 
offer.  It states, in relevant part: 
A. 
Replacement Housing Payment 
 
This 
payment 
has 
been 
determined 
to 
be 
$24,178.47, based on a comparable housing study of 
houses presently for sale on the real estate market, 
provided you sell your house to Milwaukee County for 
the above stated appraisal amount, which included a 
carve-out amount of $53,748.00, and you purchase a 
replacement dwelling which costs at least $77,926.47. 
(Emphasis added.)   Pinczkowski's assertion that the County is 
forever bound by the initial offer of a replacement housing 
payment is undermined by the clear language of the letter. 
¶75 Second, 
both 
statutory 
and 
administrative 
code 
provisions contemplate that the initial offer of a replacement 
housing payment is not static in amount.  Rather, these 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
32 
 
provisions contemplate a more dynamic approach, allowing for re-
computation of the payment after the acquisition damages have 
been more fully assessed.15 
¶76 Under § 32.20, all claims for damages itemized in 
§ 32.19 are ordinarily to be filed "after the damages upon which 
they are based have fully materialized but no later than 2 years 
after 
the 
condemnor 
takes 
physical 
possession . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.)  Additionally, § Comm 202.68(6) provides as 
follows: 
(6) Advance payment in a condemnation case.  An 
agency shall 
promptly 
pay a replacement 
housing 
payment.  An advance payment shall be made when an 
agency determines the acquisition payment will be 
delayed 
because 
of 
condemnation 
proceedings. 
An 
agency's 
maximum 
offer 
shall 
be 
used 
as 
the 
acquisition price for calculating the payment. The 
payment shall be contingent on a person signing an 
affidavit of intent that: 
(a) The agency shall re-compute a replacement 
payment using the acquisition amount set by the 
court . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶77 Given all the circumstances here, and given that 
Pinczkowski has not adequately explained how the facts of record 
support her interpretation of the carve-out formulas to yield a 
fixed replacement housing payment that could not change after 
                                                 
15 Pinczkowski also asserts that the County was equitably 
estopped from denying her replacement housing claim.  We agree 
with the court of appeals, however, that Pinczkowski has not met 
the elements of equitable estoppel.  For the reasons stated 
above, she could not have reasonably relied on the County's 
August 1999 letter as guaranteeing a fixed housing payment.  
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
33 
 
the County's initial offer and calculation, we determine that 
Pinczkowski's 
application 
of 
the 
relevant 
statutory 
and 
administrative code provisions is no more reasonable than that 
of the department.  We therefore uphold the department's 
determination that Pinczkowski was not entitled to a replacement 
housing payment. 
VI 
¶78 In sum, we determine that the circuit court properly 
excluded evidence of the sale price of the adjacent properties 
because the sales were to a condemning authority in the process 
of obtaining property for a public project.  In addition, we 
determine there was no circuit court error in excluding evidence 
of the letter of intent because it was speculative evidence of 
fair market value, and we observe that Pinczkowski was otherwise 
able to put her theory of private party interest before the 
jury.  Finally, we uphold the department's determination that 
Pinczkowski was not entitled to a replacement housing payment.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No. 
2003AP1732 & 2003AP2127   
 
 
 
1