Title: State v. Broberg

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Paul Everett Broberg, No. 22, September Term,
1995
EVIDENCE--In deciding whether "in life" photographs are admissible
in evidence, courts must first determine whether the photographs
are relevant, and then assess whether the probative value of the
photographs is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair
prejudice.  The trial court's determination will not be disturbed
unless plainly arbitrary.
EVIDENCE--Photographs need not have "essential evidentiary value"
to be admissible.  Photographs may be relevant even if they merely
repeat information presented through testimony, because often
"photographs present more clearly than words what the witnesses
were attempting to describe[.]"  Reid v. State, 305 Md. 9, 21, 501
A.2d 436, 442 (1985).
EVIDENCE--The trial court has discretion to determine whether
extrinsic evidence may be presented to prove a stipulated fact.  In
exercising this discretion, courts should consider, inter alia: (1)
the intent of the parties, if any, regarding presentation of the
proffered evidence; (2) the incremental probative value of the
evidence as compared to the stipulation; and (3) the potential
unfair prejudicial impact of the proffered evidence. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 22    
September Term, 1995
___________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
PAUL EVERETT BROBERG
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Murphy, C.J., Eldridge, and 
Bell, JJ., dissent
___________________________________
        Filed:  June 11, 1996      
      
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether "in
life" photographs, depicting a homicide victim while the victim was
alive, may be displayed to the jury at trial.
I.
On April 25, 1993, Respondent Paul Everett Broberg was driving
along a two-lane road in Frederick County.  The posted speed limit
was fifty miles per hour.  As Broberg drove over the crest of a
hill, he struck and killed eleven-year-old Thomas Blank, Jr., who
was driving a tractor across the road.  At the time of the
accident, Broberg's speed was estimated at approximately sixty-four
miles per hour.  His blood alcohol level was measured at 0.17. 
Broberg was indicted in the Circuit Court for Frederick County
on thirteen charges, including manslaughter by automobile, homicide
by motor vehicle while intoxicated, driving while intoxicated,
reckless driving, exceeding the speed limit, speed greater than
reasonable and prudent, failure to reduce speed to avoid an
accident, and other related offenses. 
Broberg was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for
Frederick County in November, 1993.  During its opening statement,
the State displayed two "in life" photographs of the victim: a
sixth-grade school picture, and a photograph of the victim in his
little league uniform.  Defense counsel objected and moved for a
       Respondent notes this fact in his brief, but he does not
1
cross-appeal the denial of his motion.  Before this Court, he does
not argue that this was error, nor does he ask the Court for relief
on this basis.  Although the dissent contends that our decision not
to address this point indicates that our treatment of the issues is
not "even handed," we do not believe it would be appropriate to
address an evidentiary issue that was neither briefed nor argued
before this Court.  See dissenting op. at 4, n.4.
2
mistrial, arguing that the photographs were irrelevant, and that
they could not be shown to the jury until they were introduced in
evidence.   The trial judge denied the motion.
1
The State used the photographs a second time during its direct
examination of the victim's father, Thomas Blank, Sr.  When Mr.
Blank was shown the photographs and asked to identify the victim,
he wept.  Defense counsel again objected and moved for a mistrial,
arguing that the photographs were irrelevant in light of the
parties' prior stipulation to the victim's identity.  The
prosecutor, however, disputed the scope of the stipulation, stating
"that's not what he stipulated to, your honor, for the record."
See infra Section IV.B and note 13.  The trial judge denied the
motion, and the prosecutor displayed the two photographs to the
jury.
  
Broberg was convicted of homicide by motor vehicle while
intoxicated, driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, exceeding
the speed limit, speed greater than reasonable and prudent, and
failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident.  He was sentenced to
five years imprisonment with all but eighteen months suspended, a
       The Petition for Writ of Certiorari framed the question
2
presented as:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in
concluding that the trial court improperly
exercised its discretion in allowing the jury
to become acquainted with the homicide victim
through a display of "in life" photographs of
the victim?
Although the dissent interprets the certiorari question to require
us solely to decide whether "in life" photographs may be used to
"humanize" a homicide victim, we do not agree with this narrow
interpretation of the issue.   See dissenting op. at 2-3.  While
Petitioner argued that "in life" photographs should be admitted for
this purpose to vindicate the rights of the victim, Petitioner also
argued that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
admitting the photographs, because they were relevant and because
their probative value was not outweighed by the potential
prejudicial effect.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-5.
3
fine of $3350 with $1500 suspended, and three years supervised
probation.  
Broberg noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
The intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment in an
unreported opinion, concluding that the photographs should have
been excluded because they were of minimal probative value and were
highly prejudicial.  We granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari to resolve the issue of the admissibility of "in life"
photographs in criminal cases.2
II.
 The State contends that admission of the "in life"
photographs was within the trial court's discretion, and therefore
      Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides
3
in pertinent part that:
(a) A victim of crime shall be treated by
agents 
of 
the 
State 
with 
dignity,
respect, and sensitivity during all
phases of the criminal justice process.
(b) In a case originating by indictment
or information filed in a circuit court,
a victim of crime shall have the right to
be informed of the rights established in
this Article and, upon request and if
practicable, to be notified of, to
attend, and to be heard at a criminal
(continued...)
4
that the Court of Special Appeals should not have reversed the
trial court's decision.  The State also argues that the photographs
provided relevant background information to "humanize" the victim,
consistent with the purposes of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.
Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) § 761 of Article 27.  
Respondent 
argues
that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State
to use the "in life" photographs because he contends that the
parties agreed to stipulate to the victim's identity, thereby
eliminating the photographs' probative value.  The photographs thus
served only to inflame the jury, and their probative value was
outweighed by their prejudicial effect.  Furthermore, Respondent
argues that the error in admitting the photographs was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, Respondent argues that neither
Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights nor § 761 of
Article 27 creates a right for a homicide victim to be represented
in a criminal proceeding by use of an "in life" photograph.3
     (...continued)
3
justice proceeding, as these rights are
implemented 
and 
the 
terms 
"crime",
"criminal 
justice 
proceeding", 
and
"victim" are specified by law.
MD. DECL. RTS. art. 47.  This provision was ratified in 1994,
subsequent to Petitioner's trial.  See 1994 Md. Laws ch. 102.
Prior to its enactment, however, similar provisions were contained
in § 761(2) of Article 27, which provides that crime victims and
witnesses should "be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and
sensitivity."  Section 761(4) also requires that crime victims
should be notified of all court proceedings. 
      Respondent was tried before the new Maryland Rules of
4
Evidence entered into effect on July 1, 1994.  Our analysis,
however, would be unchanged under the new rules.  As under the
common law, the new rules require that photographic evidence be
relevant to be admissible.  Md. Rule 5-402.  The new rules also
require that the probative value of photographic evidence must not
be substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect.  Md.
Rule 5-403. See also J. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 
(continued...)
5
III.  
A. Admissibility of Photographic Evidence  
This Court has on many occasions considered the admissibility
of photographic evidence.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 303 Md.
487, 495 A.2d 1 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 (1986); Cook v.
State, 225 Md. 603, 171 A.2d 460 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 970
(1962); Smith v. State, 182 Md. 176, 32 A.2d 863 (1943).  We
conclude that "in life" photographs are subject to the same
evidentiary analysis as other types of photographs.  
As we have consistently stated, the general rule regarding
admission of photographs is that their prejudicial effect must not
substantially outweigh their probative value.   See, e.g., Bedford
4
(...continued)
§ 1102, at Supp. 50 (2d ed. 1993 & 1995 Cum. Supp.). 
Furthermore, Rule 5-402 and Rule 5-403 are derived from the
corresponding Federal Rules of Evidence.  In determining the
admissibility of photographic evidence under the Federal Rules,
federal courts have applied the same two-part test we have adopted.
See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1499 (10th Cir.
1993), cert. denied,   U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994); United
States v. Grandison, 780 F.2d 425, 429 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1985). 
6
v. State, 317 Md. 659, 676, 566 A.2d 111, 119 (1989); Harris v.
State, 312 Md. 225, 245, 539 A.2d 637, 647 (1988); Mills v. State,
310 Md. 33, 43, 527 A.2d 3, 7 (1987), vacated on other grounds, 586
U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988).  This
balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  The trial
court's decision will not be disturbed unless "plainly arbitrary,"
Johnson, 303 Md. at 502, 495 A.2d at 8, because the trial judge is
in the best position to make this assessment.  See, e.g., Bedford,
317 Md. at 676, 566 A.2d at 119; Mills, 310 Md. at 43-44, 527 A.2d
at 8; Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 729, 506 A.2d 580, 602
(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873 (1986); but see Buch v. Hulcher,
180 Md. 309, 313-14, 23 A.2d 829, 831 (1941).
Photographs must also be relevant to be admissible.  J. MURPHY,
JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1102, at 578 (2d ed. 1993 & 1995 Cum.
Supp.); see also 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 792, at 237 (Chadbourn rev.
1981 & 1990 Supp.).  We have found crime scene and autopsy
     In addition to these relevancy determinations, photographs
5
must also be authenticated to be admissible.  Bedford v. State, 317
Md. 659, 676, 566 A.2d 111, 119 (1989).  The photographer need not
testify provided that someone with personal knowledge verifies that
the photograph accurately portrays its subject. 5 L. MCLAIN, MARYLAND
EVIDENCE § 403.5, at 317-18 (1987 & 1994 Cum. Supp.); E. IMWINKELREID,
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 75 (3d ed. 1995). See also MURPHY, supra, §
1102, at 578.
      Although the new rules of evidence also authorize the trial
6
judge to exclude evidence if necessary to prevent "needless
presentation of cumulative evidence," Md. Rule 5-403, we do not
(continued...)
7
photographs of homicide victims relevant to a broad range of
issues, including the type of wounds, the attacker's intent, and
the modus operandi.  See, e.g., Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11, 21-22,
207 A.2d 456, 561-62 (1965).  "In life" photographs are often
relevant to establish the victim's identity.  See Annot., Homicide:
Identification of Victim, 86 A.L.R.2d 722, 739 (1962).  The
relevancy determination is also committed to the trial judge's
discretion.   5 L. MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 403.5, at Supp. 106 (1987
5
& 1994 Supp.). 
In assessing the relevance of photographic evidence, we note
that photographs may be relevant and possess probative value even
though they often illustrate something that has already been
presented in testimony.  Grandison, 305 Md. at 730, 506 A.2d at
602.  As we observed in Johnson v. State, "all photographic
evidence is in some sense cumulative," 303 Md. at 504, 495 A.2d at
9, and "[a]lthough . . . cumulative, it should seldom be excluded
for that reason."   MURPHY, supra, § 1102, at 578.  The rationale
6
(...continued)
interpret the rule to alter the trial court's discretion to admit
photographic evidence.  
       We withdrew our initial opinion in Reid and ordered a
7
limited remand on an evidentiary issue unrelated to the
photographic evidence.  The original Reid opinion was attached to
our revised opinion in an appendix.  The portions of the initial
opinion relating to the photographs were incorporated in our
revised opinion by reference.  305 Md. at 13, 501 A.2d at 438.
 
8
for allowing photographs to be used to illustrate verbal testimony
is that in some cases "photographs present more clearly than words
what the witnesses were attempting to describe[.]"  Reid v. State,
305 Md. 9, 21, 501 A.2d 436, 442 (1985).7
We have also noted that photographs do not lack probative
value merely because they illustrate a point that is uncontested.
Grandison, 305 Md. at 730, 506 A.2d at 602.   For example, in Evans
v. State, 333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d 117 (1994), cert. denied,   U.S. 
, 115 S. Ct. 109 (1994), we held that autopsy photographs were
admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding even though the
defendant had stipulated to the facts the photographs were offered
to prove.  Judge Karwacki, writing for the Court, observed that:
[A] 
judge 
should 
exercise 
his 
or 
her
discretion with caution when ruling on the
admissibility of photographic evidence in
capital sentencing proceedings.  The need for
caution, however, in no way circumscribes the
judge's evidentiary authority; the admission
of photographs into evidence remains soundly
committed to the discretion of the trial judge
in capital sentencing proceedings.
      The tort action for alienation of affections "arose when a
8
(continued...)
9
Applying this standard to the facts
before us, we cannot say that the trial judge
abused his discretion in allowing these
photographs into evidence.  The photographs
illustrated the number of shots fired at each
victim and the pattern of the victims' gunshot
wounds.  It is immaterial for this purpose
that Evans had stipulated to the cause of
death, location of wounds, etc., for "the very
purpose of photographic evidence is to clarify
and communicate facts to the tribunal more
accurately than by mere words."
Id. at 693, 637 A.2d at 133 (citations omitted).  Accord Grandison,
305 Md. at 730, 506 A.2d at 602 ("[T]he particular photographs [are
not] inflammatory to the jury solely on the basis that they do not
represent any issue in controversy.  Further, since the photographs
are mere graphic representations of undisputed facts already in
evidence, their introduction could not be held to have injured the
accused.").
Although the trial judge possesses broad discretion regarding
the admission of photographs, this discretion does not authorize
the judge to admit irrelevant photographs.  For example, in Buch v.
Hulcher, 180 Md. 309, 23 A.2d 829 (1941), an action for alienation
of affections, we suggested that a photograph of "plaintiff's wife
closely and affectionately surrounded by her daughter and twin
sons, very nice looking children and of tender years" was
irrelevant, given that the wife was present in court and testified
on behalf of her husband.   Id. at 313, 23 A.2d at 831.  Therefore,
8
(...continued)
person induced a married woman to leave her husband or otherwise
interfered with the marital relationship, even though no act of
adultery was committed."  Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 590, 414
A.2d 929, 932 (1980).  The plaintiff was required to prove that an
affirmative act by the defendant caused harm to the marital
relationship.  PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 919 (5th
ed. 1984 & 1988 Supp.).  
In Buch, the photograph of the plaintiff's wife did not merely
duplicate evidence presented in the wife's testimony, nor was it
offered to prove an uncontested or stipulated element of the case.
The photograph simply did not serve to prove any element of the
case.
10
in determining the admissibility of any photograph, the trial judge
must make a two-part assessment: first, the judge must decide
whether the photograph is relevant, and second, the judge must
balance its probative value against its prejudicial effect.  We
will treat the trial judge's findings on these matters with great
deference.  See, e.g., Void v. State, 325 Md. 386, 393, 601 A.2d
124, 127 (1992) (quoting Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453, 397
A.2d 600, 605 (1979)).  See also M. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion
of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 663
(1971). 
B. Admissibility of "In Life" Photographs
In Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580, we applied
the two-part test for the admissibility of photographic evidence to
"in life" photographs.  Id. at 729-30, 506 A.2d at 602.  The
defendant, Anthony Grandison, contracted to have David and Cheryl
11
Piechowicz murdered to prevent them from testifying against him in
a pending narcotics proceeding. Id. at 697, 506 A.2d at 585-86.
Rather than killing the two intended victims, however, the
assailant mistakenly killed Cheryl Piechowicz's sister, Susan
Kennedy.  Id., 506 A.2d at 586.  We determined that the "in life"
photograph of Susan Kennedy was relevant to the issue of her
resemblance to her sister.  Id. at 729, 506 A.2d at 602.  We upheld
the admission of the photograph, concluding that there was "no
arbitrariness" in the trial court's decision.  Id., 506 A.2d at
602.  The Fourth Circuit later considered the same issue in United
States v. Grandison, 780 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 934 (1990).  With regard to the relevance of the "in life"
photographs, the court stated:
Objections [to the "in life" photographs] were
lodged on grounds of non-relevance . . . .
[W]e perceive no strength in the argument,
because [the victims] were central figures in
the crimes that had been charged.  They had to
be identified.
Id. at 429. 
The majority of appellate courts in other jurisdictions that
have considered the admissibility of "in life" photographs have
also upheld their admission.  Annot., Homicide: Identification of
Victim, 86 A.L.R.2d 722, 739 (1962).  See also  Drane v. State, 265
Ga. 255, 455 S.E.2d 27 (1995); State v. Ash, 526 N.W.2d 473 (N.D.
1995); State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995); State
12
v. Mergenthaler, 263 Mont. 198, 868 P.2d 560 (1994); State v.
Walker, 252 Kan. 279, 845 P.2d 1 (1993); State v. Williams, 313 Or.
19, 828 P.2d 1006 (1992), cert. denied,  U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 171
(1992); State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14 (R.I. 1991); State v. Ryan,
226 Neb. 59, 409 N.W.2d 579 (1987);  Com. v. Nadworny, 396 Mass.
342, 486 N.E.2d 675 (1985); State v. Aswegan, 331 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa
1983); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1080 (1982); Burgess v. State, 339 So.2d 121 (Ala.
1976); People v. Sullivan, 97 Mich. App. 488, 296 N.W.2d 81 (1980),
cert. denied, 308 N.W.2d 109 (1981).   A number of these
jurisdictions have adopted a two-pronged test for admissibility of
"in life" photographs similar to our own standard.  See, e.g.,
People v. Stevens, 76 N.Y.2d 833, 559 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (1990);
People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal.3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 1356 (1987).  
A minority of jurisdictions have taken the position that "in
life" photographs are irrelevant and prejudicial, and therefore
have concluded that use of "in life" photographs is disfavored.
See, e.g., Com. v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 716 (Pa. 1994); Valdez v.
State, 900 P.2d 363, 381 & n.83 (Okl. Crim. App. 1995).  A few
courts have articulated a higher standard for admission of
photographic evidence; for example, Pennsylvania courts have
suggested that if photographs are inflammatory, they must possess
"essential evidentiary value" to be admissible.  Com. v. McCutchen,
417 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), vacated on other
13
grounds, 454 A.2d 547 (Pa. 1982) ("essential evidentiary value"
standard upheld, but photographs excluded by trial court found to
possess essential evidentiary value, although graphic).  The
rationale for this elevated standard with respect to photographs is
that because they often merely repeat or restate evidence that has
been presented in other forms, they do not justify any additional
prejudice to the defendant.  See Rivers, 644 A.2d at 617.  We have
previously rejected this reasoning and have declined to apply an
elevated standard of admissibility to photographic evidence.
Bedford, 317 Md. at 677, 566 A.2d at 120 ("Bedford alleges that
where a photograph has only minimal significance, and no essential
evidentiary value, the trial judge should be more inclined to
exclude it if it is inflammatory.  Nonetheless, we have not adopted
such a test and require only that the trial judge not abuse his
discretion.").   
We have found no jurisdiction, however, that has adopted a per
se rule barring the use of "in life" photographs.  When appellate
courts have disapproved the admission of "in life" photographs,
they have generally either found that the photographs were
irrelevant, or that their probative value in the particular case
was outweighed by their prejudicial effect.  See, e.g., Rivers, 644
A.2d at 716; Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 731 S.W.2d 756, 763
(1987); Stevens, 559 N.E.2d at 1279; Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d
322, 326 (Okl. Crim. App. 1983).  Furthermore, even those
14
jurisdictions that have consistently criticized the use of "in
life" photographs have upheld admission of the photographs where
they were clearly relevant.  See, e.g., Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d
866, 870 (Okl. Crim. App. 1990).  For example, although the
Oklahoma courts have often expressed disapproval of "in life"
photographs, see, e.g., Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d 153, 162 (Okl.
Crim. App. 1987), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the
admission of an "in life" photograph of a murder victim despite the
defendant's offer to stipulate to identity based on the victim's
dental X-rays.  Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d at 870.  The court
upheld the admission because the photograph was necessary to
support other testimony by people who had observed the victim with
the attacker before the incident.  Id.  In addition, even where
courts have disapproved the use of "in life" photographs, errors in
admission have seldom been found prejudicial.  See, e.g., Valdez,
900 P.2d at 381; Rivers, 644 A.2d at 716; People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d
616, 809 P.2d 351, 375 (1991), cert. denied,   U.S.   , 112 S. Ct.
945 (1992); Stevens, 559 N.E.2d at 1280. 
C. Effect of Stipulations
We must next consider the relevance of the "in life"
photographs in this case in light of Respondent's contention that
the parties stipulated to the identity of the victim.  By
definition, a stipulation is an agreement between counsel akin to
      In some circumstances, if one party asserts that there is a
9
stipulation and the other party fails to object, this silence may
be interpreted as acquiescence.  See Henderson v. Warden, 237 Md.
519, 522, 206 A.2d 793, 795 (1965); Bloom v. Graff, 191 Md. 733,
736, 63 A.2d 313, 315 (1949).
     
 As one commentator notes, "[s]ometimes a stipulation may
10
appear to eliminate an element without actually doing so," because
stipulations . . . often . . . are worded
poorly, especially when offered in the heat of
argument.  It will not always be clear to a
trial judge exactly what the defendant is
conceding and what is being disputed.
* * * * *
In the midst of arguments over admission [of
evidence] . . ., a trial judge must parse a
stipulation on the spot and decide whether it
is fair to both sides.  This is not always
easy to do, especially if the defendant's
theory of defense is ambiguous. 
S. Saltzburg, Stipulations by the Defense to Remove Other Acts
Evidence, 9 CRIM. JUST. 35, 39 (1995).
15
a contract.  See Burke v. Burke, 204 Md. 637, 645, 106 A.2d 59, 63
(1954).  Like contracts, stipulations are based on mutual assent
and interpreted to effectuate the intent of the parties.   Id., 106
9
A.2d at 63.  Parties are generally held bound by their
stipulations.  Bloom v. Graff, 191 Md. 733, 736, 63 A.2d 313, 315
(1949).  Although a stipulation by definition must be based on
mutual assent, parties frequently dispute both the scope of the
stipulation and the extent to which it precludes the parties from
offering other evidence of the stipulated fact.   As Wigmore
10
observed:
16
A fact that is judicially admitted
[stipulated] needs no evidence from the party
benefiting 
by 
the 
admission. 
 
But 
his
evidence, if he chooses to offer it, may even
be excluded; first, because it is now . . .
immaterial to the issues . . . ; next, because
it may be superfluous and merely cumber the
trial . . . ; and furthermore, because the
added dramatic force which may sometimes be
gained from the examination of a witness to
the fact (a force, indeed, which the admission
is often designed especially to obviate) is
not a thing which the party can be said to be
always entitled to.
Nevertheless, a colorless admission by
the opponent may sometimes have the effect of
depriving the party of the legitimate moral
force of his evidence; furthermore, a judicial
admission may be cleverly made with grudging
limitations 
or 
evasions 
or 
insinuations
(especially in criminal cases) so as to be
technically but not practically a waiver of
proof.   
9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2591, at 824-25 (Chadbourn rev. 1981 & 1990
Supp.) (citations omitted).  
 
In determining whether to admit evidence that is offered to
prove a stipulated fact, courts must often balance the competing
interests of the parties.  State v. Gilmore, 332 So.2d 789, 795-96
(La. 1976).  The party who offers to stipulate is entitled to
obtain the benefit of his bargain, i.e., preventing the use of
inflammatory evidence.  Id.  The party benefiting from the
stipulation, however, may also be entitled to the "legitimate moral
force of his evidence."  WIGMORE, supra, § 2591, at 824.  
We believe, as Wigmore suggests, that because of these
competing considerations, "there should be no absolute rule on the
17
subject . . .  [and] the trial court's discretion should determine
whether a particular admission is so plenary as to render the first
party's evidence wholly needless under the circumstances."  Id. at
825, cited in Gilmore, 332 So.2d at 795.  See also Burgess v.
State, 339 So.2d 121, 123-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); Annot.,
Criminal Trial--Proving Conceded Fact, 91 A.L.R. 1478 (1934).  We
therefore conclude that the trial judge should retain the
discretion to determine whether evidence may be admitted to prove
a stipulated fact.  In exercising this discretion to determine
whether extrinsic proof of a stipulated fact is admissible, trial
courts should consider, inter alia: 
(1) the intent of the parties, if any,
regarding 
presentation 
of 
the 
proffered
evidence;
(2) the incremental probative value of the
evidence as compared to the stipulation,
(i.e., where the evidence provides greater
detail than the stipulation); and 
(3) the potential unfair prejudicial impact of
the proffered evidence. 
We shall review the trial court's decision in this regard for abuse
of discretion.
IV.
A. Probative Value Versus Prejudicial Effect  
Applying 
the 
two-pronged 
test 
for 
the 
admission 
of
photographic evidence to the "in life" photographs in this case, we
18
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the photographs.  In every homicide case, the State must
establish the identity of the person killed.  Jones v. State, 188
Md. 263, 272, 52 A.2d 484, 488 (1947) ("In a homicide case the
proof . . . [must] establish . . . the fact that the person for
whose death the prosecution was instituted is dead . . . .").
Either "in life" photographs or photographs taken after death may
be used to establish the victim's identity.  Cf. Grandison, 305 Md.
at 729, 506 A.2d at 602 (upholding admission of "in life"
photographs of victims as well as autopsy photographs to illustrate
medical examiner's testimony).  The photographs of Thomas Blank,
Jr., taken while he was alive were probative of the deceased
victim's identity because his father's testimony connected the
person depicted in the "in life" photographs to the person killed
in the accident.  
Furthermore, although the photographs were prejudicial to
Respondent's case, they were not unfairly prejudicial.  The "in
life" photographs were not used as part of a "before and after"
comparison with autopsy photographs, a practice that some courts
have suggested may exacerbate the prejudicial effect.  See, e.g.,
People v. Stevens, 76 N.Y.2d 833, 559 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (1990).  In
addition, neither of the photographs was more prejudicial than
autopsy photographs that are routinely admitted in homicide cases.
Accord Sample v. Campbell, 305 P.2d 1033 (Okl. 1957) (In a wrongful
     
 Respondent's counsel referred to an earlier discussion of
11
the stipulation with the trial judge in chambers.  There is no
record of this discussion.
     
 When the photographs were first used by the State during
12
opening arguments, Respondent's counsel objected, but not on the
(continued...)
19
death action, potential prejudice resulting from admission of a
photograph of the victim, a young boy, in his sports team uniform,
did not require reversal).  Thus, the trial court decision that the
potential prejudicial effect of the photographs did not outweigh
their probative value was not an abuse of discretion.
B. Relevance of the Photographs in Light of a Stipulation
Respondent also argues that the photographs presented in this
case were not relevant because the defense stipulated to the
identity of the victim.  Applying the principles regarding
stipulations outlined in Section III.C, supra, we must next
consider whether Petitioner and Respondent entered into a
stipulation.   
We are faced with conflicting information regarding the nature
and extent of the stipulation.  Before the trial began, at the
conclusion of a bench conference, Respondent's counsel remarked to
the judge that the parties had stipulated to the identity of the
victim, and thus no photographs would be necessary.   Although the
11
State's Attorney did not object, the record does not establish
whether he was still a party to the bench discussion.   The record
12
(...continued)
basis of the stipulation to identity.  See supra note 1.
     The dispute regarding the stipulation first arose during the
13
State's Attorney's direct examination of the victim's father:  
Q: I show you what's been marked State's Exhibits,
as well as defense exhibits, Number 1 and 2 for
identification [the "in life" photographs].  Can
you tell the jury and the Judge if you recognize
those? What are those, sir?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we've already
stipulated 
to 
the 
identity 
to 
avoid 
what's
happening now, Your Honor.  I object. 
[THE COURT]: You can just ask him a leading
question, I think, that it is who it is.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: He did say it's his son, Your
Honor, in case you didn't hear.
[THE COURT]: Right.  You stipulate to that,
[Defense Counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We already did, Your Honor, and
I'll renew my motion that I made at the beginning
of the case at this time.
[THE COURT]: All right. I understand, yes.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: That's not what he stipulated
to, Your Honor, for the record.
[THE COURT]: All right, objection's overruled.
The dispute arose again during the State's direct
examination of the emergency room physician, Dr. Frasier, who
treated the victim following the accident and signed the
victim's death certificate.  The State's Attorney offered to
use the "in life" photographs of the victim to demonstrate
that the person Dr. Frasier pronounced dead was the victim,
(continued...)
20
also indicates, however, that later in the trial, Petitioner and
Respondent disagreed regarding the nature of the stipulation.   At
13
(...continued)
Thomas Blank:
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  I don't want [Defense Counsel]
thinking he's identified the wrong person.  I have
photographs of the deceased.  I'm more than happy
to show it.  If he wants to stipulate it's the same
person, that's fine.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I've already done that.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: No, you did it to the father,
not to the doctor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge--
[THE COURT]: What do you want to do?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I want to address the Court,
because that's the proper thing to do.  I
stipulated to the identity of the victim.  The
subject who is deceased is the one who was involved
in the accident.  I have stipulated to the
identity.  He wants to show photographs.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  No, I don't.  I want to make
sure you're [not] going to then say that the person
that Dr. Roberts and Dr. Frasier declared dead, I
didn't show that person that was stipulated to back
at the scene of the crime.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I've already stipulated that's
the same person.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Okay, fine.  That's fine.
That's fine.
[THE COURT]: Okay.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: I just want to make sure it's
clear . . . (inaudible)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It's only the identity that I'm
stipulating to.
[THE COURT]:  All right, the stipulation is noted.
(continued...)
21
(...continued)
22
the hearing on Respondent's motion for a new trial, Respondent's
counsel again referred to a stipulation.  Finally, at oral
argument, Respondent contended that both parties agreed to
stipulate to the victim's identity, while the State contended that
there was no mutual assent to a stipulation. 
This case illustrates the need to state the precise terms of
a stipulation on the record.  We are limited in our review to the
information that appears in the record.  In future cases, the
proponent of a stipulation would be well advised to ensure that the
terms of any stipulation are recorded, and that mutual assent is
demonstrated.  See McLaurin v. State, 31 Md. App. 375, 356 A.2d 563
(1976). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the parties did agree to stipulate to
the 
victim's 
identity, 
the 
record 
illustrates 
that 
they
consistently disagreed about which evidence was precluded by the
stipulation.  See supra note 13.  As we noted in Section III.C,
supra, the decision regarding whether a particular piece of
evidence may be offered to prove a stipulated fact is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge.  
Although the record does not reflect any direct statement by
the trial judge whether the stipulation to the identity of Thomas
      Respondent's counsel argued the issue of the admissibility
14
of the "in life" photographs again at the hearing on his motion for
a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, stating:
I've looked through the exhibits this morning
and viewed the pictures again.  He [Thomas
Blank, Jr.] appeared to be an attractive and
normal 11-year old child at the time, and as
far as the pictures are concerned. . . the
testimony, even absent the pictures, the
testimony was already in at that time,
unchallenged by the defense, that the blood
alcohol level was . . . a .17. . . . .
Although the trial judge did not explicitly state that he was
balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, this
statement reflects the judge's consideration of the potential
unfair prejudicial impact of the photographs on the jury.  
When photographs are offered as proof of a stipulated fact,
the trial judge applies the balancing of probative value against
prejudicial effect twice.  First, the trial judge must balance
probative value against prejudicial effect as part of the two-part
test for admissibility of photographic evidence. See supra Section
III.A.  Second, the probative/prejudice balance is one factor to
consider in determining whether to admit evidence of a stipulated
fact.  See supra Section III.C.  
Although the trial judge in this case did not state on the
record that he was applying the probative/prejudice balancing test
twice, the statement above reflects that he conducted the required
balancing.  Furthermore, we presume the trial judge applied the law
correctly.  I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 20, 344
A.2d 65, 76 (1975). 
23
Blank, Jr., rendered the "in life" photographs unnecessary, the
judge considered the issue on at least four occasions.  While the
better practice is for the trial judge to state the basis for  the
decision on the record, the trial court is not required to do so.14
Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 270, 619 A.2d 105, 109 (1993).  The
trial judge was privy to a discussion of the terms of the
24
stipulation in chambers that is not included in the record.  He was
therefore in a better position to determine whether the "in life"
photographs were relevant.
In addition, although the relevance of the photographs derived
from their use to prove the victim's identity, which was
stipulated, the stipulation did not deprive the photographs of all
relevance.  See Grandison v. State, 305 Md. at 630, 506 A.2d at
602.  Photographs are inherently cumulative, whether used to
illustrate testimony or, as in this case, in support of a
stipulation.  We reaffirm the position we stated in Bedford, that
photographs need not possess "essential evidentiary value" to be
admissible.  317 Md. at 677, 566 A.2d at 120.  Furthermore,
photographic evidence ordinarily does not provide the factfinder
with new information, but rather with an alternative form of
information.  See Johnson v. State, 303 Md. at 504, 495 A.2d at 9.
The trial judge had discretion to determine whether this
alternative form of information regarding the identity of the
victim was "wholly needless under the circumstances."  WIGMORE,
supra, § 2591, at 825.  We hold that the trial judge's decision to
admit the photographs was not an abuse of discretion.
C. The Victim's Right to Be Present at Trial
Under the Victims' Bill of Rights
Finally, although we conclude that the "in life" photographs
were admissible in this case, we decline to adopt a per se rule
      An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Stephanie
15
Roper Foundation, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the
National Victim Center, and the Maryland Coalition Against Crime.
1
that "in life" photographs are admissible in every case.
Petitioner and Amici  suggest that Article 47 of the Maryland
15
Declaration of Rights and § 761 of Article 27 require the automatic
admission of "in life" photographs in order to effectuate the
policy of representing the interests of victims in criminal
proceedings.  See supra note 3.  Both Article 47 and § 761 were
intended to ensure the utmost respect and consideration for the
victims of crimes.  See also Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 421-413,
659 A.2d 291, 294-95 (1995).  We do not, however, interpret these
broad provisions to preclude the trial judge from exercising
discretion regarding the admission of photographic evidence. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Eldridge, J., dissenting:
The majority's opinion holds that "[t]he photographs of
Thomas Blank, Jr., taken while he was alive were probative of the
deceased victim's identity," that "[t]he trial judge had discretion
to determine whether this alternative form of information regarding
       Maryland Rule 8-131(b) provides as follows:
1
"(b) In Court of Appeals  -  Additional
    Limitations. -
"(1) Prior Appellate Decision. -
Unless otherwise provide by the order
granting the writ of certiorari, in
reviewing a decision rendered by the Court
of Special Appeals or by a circuit court
acting in an appellate capacity, the Court
of Appeals ordinarily will consider only
an issue that has been raised in the
petition for certiorari or any cross-
petition and that has been preserved for
review by the Court of Appeals.  Whenever
an issue raised in a petition for
certiorari or a cross-petition involves,
either expressly or implicitly, the asser-
tion that the trial court committed error,
the Court of Appeals may consider whether
the error was harmless or non-prejudicial
even though the matter of harm or
prejudice was not raised in the petition
or in a cross-petition.
"(2) No Prior Appellate Decision. - 
Except as otherwise provided in Rule 8-
304(c), when the Court of Appeals issues a
(continued...)
2
the identity of the victim was `wholly needless under the circum-
stances,'" and that the trial judge's decision in this regard "was
not an abuse of discretion." (Slip opinion at 16, 22).
The above-quoted holding by the majority decides an issue
which was not raised in a certiorari petition, in a cross-petition,
or in any order of this Court.  Therefore, under Maryland Rule 8-
131(b) and numerous decisions by this Court, the issue is not
before us.   Moreover, the majority fails to resolve the sole issue
1
     (...continued)
1
writ of certiorari to review a case
pending in the Court of Special Appeals
before a decision has been rendered by
that Court, the Court of Appeals will
consider those issue that would have been
cognizable by the Court of Special
Appeals."
3
presented in the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Because the majority's decision flatly violates a long established
and consistently applied limitation upon this Court's exercise of
its certiorari jurisdiction, I dissent.
The Court of Special Appeals held in this case, inter
alia, that, although "[p]ictures of a homicide victim taken before
his or her death will sometimes be relevant to the issue of
identity," the pictures here were not admissible on this basis
because "the parties stipulated to the victim's identity prior to
trial." (Broberg v. State, Court of Special Appeals No. 458, Sept.
Term 1994, slip opinion at 6).
The State's petition in this Court for a writ of
certiorari did not in any way challenge this holding by the Court
of Special Appeals.  The State in its certiorari petition did not
argue or even intimate that the trial judge had discretion to admit
the photographs on the theory that they were relevant to identity.
In fact, the State's petition did not even mention the word
"identity" in either the "Question Presented" or the portion of the
     
The word "identity" appears only once in the State's
2
certiorari petition, in the "Statement Of Facts," where the State
simply sets forth some of the Court of Special Appeals' holdings
in the case.
          Quoting from Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397, 108
3
S.Ct. 1860, 1876, 100 L.Ed.2d 384, 408 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
4
petition entitled "Reasons For Granting The Writ."2
The issue concerning the admissibility of the photographs
which the State raised in its certiorari petition was whether they
were admissible, in the discretion of the trial judge, to "allow[]
the jury to become acquainted with the homicide victim through a
display of `in life' photographs of the victim."  (Petition For
Writ of Certiorari, Question Presented, at 1).  The State's
arguments for admissibility set forth in the certiorari petition
were that the "homicide victim may be `humanized' during the trial
stage through the use of `in life' photographs," that the "jury is
acquainted with the defendant by virtue of being in the courtroom,
but the victim is a `faceless stranger,'" that the "State should be
allowed to offer a `glimpse of the life [which the defendant] chose
to extinguish,'"  and that, "in the non-homicide context, the jury
3
is introduced to the victim because often times, the victim
testifies.  Such is not the case with a homicide victim." (Id. at
3-4).  The State specifically relied on the Maryland statutes and
the constitutional provision relating to victim impact evidence and
"the importance of fair treatment and representation of a victim
     
 In addition, the majority's approach is not very even
4
handed.  While the majority decides favorably for the State an
issue not presented in a certiorari petition or cross-petition,
the majority expressly refuses to reach an issue noted by the
defendant, namely that the photographs "were never offered into
evidence and never received into evidence." (Respondent's brief
at 3). The majority justifies its position on the ground that the
defendant did "not cross-appeal the denial of his motion" and did
not brief or argue the issue before this Court. (Slip opinion at
2 n.1). 
Of course, the defendant did not have to "cross-appeal" the
denial of his motion.  His notice of appeal from the trial
court's final judgment brought up for appeal all prior rulings by
the trial court in the case.  Rule 8-131(d); B & K Rentals v.
Universal Leaf, 319 Md. 127, 132-133, 571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990),
and cases there cited.  Although the defendant did not file a
cross-petition for certiorari and did not argue the matter in his
brief beyond noting the issue as quoted above, the State neither
raised nor "noted" the identity issue in its certiorari petition,
and did not argue in its opening brief that the photographs were
admissible on the ground that they were relevant to identity.
I am not suggesting that the Court should address the issue
(continued...)
5
during a criminal trial." (Id. at 4).  The State characterized the
issue which it was presenting as "a novel issue."
This Court, believing that the State had presented an
issue of public importance, granted the State's petition.  There
was no cross-petition in this case.  Furthermore, our order
granting the certiorari petition did not add an issue or change the
issue presented by the State.  Today, however, the majority does
not resolve the important question which prompted the Court to take
the case.  Instead, the majority reaches an issue not raised in the
certiorari petition; it overturns a holding by the Court of Special
Appeals which was not challenged in this Court.4
     (...continued)
4
noted by the defendant.  Instead, the Court should treat the
State and defendant alike and, with respect to both, should not
decide issues which are not properly raised in this Court.
6
The majority asserts that the question of whether the
photographs were admissible on the ground that they were relevant
to identity was raised in the State's certiorari petition because
the State "also argued" in the petition that the photographs "were
relevant and because their probative value was not outweighed by
the potential prejudicial effect."  (Slip opinion at 3, n.2).  The
State's reference to "relevant" in its certiorari petition had
nothing to do with "identity."  Rather, as previously explained,
the State argued that the photographs were relevant so as to allow
the jury to become better acquainted with the victim.  The weighing
of probative value against the likelihood of unfair prejudicial
effect is a consideration with regard to almost all evidence
issues. See 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 10a, at 674 (1983); McLain,
Maryland Evidence, § 403.1, at 297 (1987).  Once it is determined
that evidence is admissible under some principle of evidence law,
ordinarily a trial judge has the discretion to exclude it if the
judge determines that the probative value is outweighed by the
unfair prejudicial effect.  The State's argument in its certiorari
petition was that the relevancy and probative value of the evidence
to "humanize" and acquaint the jury with the homicide victim was
not outweighed by an unfair prejudicial effect.   
     
This last category would include an issue added by a
5
subsequent order of this Court, having the effect of amending the
order granting certiorari.  Whenever an issue has been added by
an order of the Court issued after briefing and argument, the
parties have been given the opportunity to submit supplemental
briefs and/or supplemental oral argument.  See, e.g., Schochet v.
State, 320 Md. 714, 717, 725, 580 A.2d 176, 177, 181 (1990).  
7
Under the majority's reasoning, whenever a petitioner
uses the words "relevancy" and "prejudicial effect," the petitioner
has thereby raised virtually any issue that might exist in the
entire field of the law of evidence.  The issue of whether the
photographs were admissible because they were relevant to the
element of identity in the homicide offense, and the issue of
whether the photographs were admissible because they allowed the
jury to become acquainted with the homicide victim in the same way
that the jury is acquainted with a victim in a non-homicide case,
are clearly separate and distinct issues.  The State's certiorari
petition raised only the latter issue; the majority decides only
the former issue.  
For more than twenty years, since the time when this
Court's jurisdiction became largely dependent upon the issuance of
a writ of certiorari, we have consistently held that, in a case
decided by an intermediate appellate court, we shall not consider
an issue unless it was raised in a certiorari petition, a cross-
petition, or the order by this Court granting certiorari.5
Recently, in Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Artra Group, Inc.,
338 Md. 560, 568-569, 659 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1995), with regard to an
       Furthermore, even where the parties have fully briefed an
6
issue in this Court, we have refused to consider the issue unless
it was presented in a certiorari petition, cross-petition, or
order of this Court.  See, e.g., Maryland State Police v.
Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 562-563, 625 A.2d 914, 925 (1993); Maus v.
State, 311 Md. 85, 106, 532 A.2d 1066, 1077 (1987); Wright v.
State, 307 Md. 552, 587, 515 A.2d 1157, 1175 (1986); Md-Nat'l
(continued...)
8
issue not raised in a certiorari petition or cross-petition, Judge
Chasanow for the Court flatly stated:  "That issue is therefore not
properly before us. . . ."  See also, e.g., McElroy v. State, 329
Md. 136, 146, 617 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1993) ("McElroy's first argument
was not made . . . in his petition for certiorari addressed to this
Court.  Consequently, the issue is not before us"); Batson v.
Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 700-701, 602 A.2d 1191, 1199-1200 (1992);
Ungar v. Handelsman, 325 Md. 135, 147, 599 A.2d 1159, 1164-1165
(1992); Stinnettt v. Cort Furniture, 315 Md. 448, 452 n.2, 554 A.2d
1226, 1227 n.2 (1989); Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 103 n.4, 553
A.2d 684, 687 n.4 (1989); Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 690-691 n.5,
541 A.2d 1314, 1317 n.5 (1988); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 106, 532
A.2d 1066, 1077 (1987); Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 82, 522 A.2d
917, 929 (1987); Clark v. State, 306 Md. 483, 491-492, 510 A.2d
243, 247 (1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1084, 107 S.Ct. 1286, 94
L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); Fred W. Allnut, Inc. v. Comm'r Lab. & Ind., 289
Md. 35, 39 n.2, 421 A.2d 1360, 1362 n.2 (1980); McMorris v. State,
277 Md. 62, 70-71 n.4, 355 A.2d 438, 443 n.4 (1976); Walston v. Sun
Cab Co., 267 Md. 559, 569, 298 A.2d 392, 397 (1973).6
     (...continued)
6
Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 36-37, 511 A.2d 1079,
1097-1098 (1986); Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 219 n.4, 406 A.2d
922, 928 n.4 (1979); Mazor v. State Dep't of Correction,, 279 Md.
355, 370-71 n.8, 369 A.2d 82, 92 n.8 (1977).
Although it makes no difference in the application of Rule 8-
131(b) in the present case, as previously noted, the State's
opening brief in this Court did not argue that the photographs
were admissible because they were relevant to identity.  Instead,
the State in its brief expanded upon the argument in its
certiorari petition and also made a harmless error argument.
9
The general principle set forth in the above-cited cases
has repeatedly been applied in circumstances like those here.
Where, as in this case, a particular holding by the Court of
Special Appeals was not challenged in a certiorari petition or
cross-petition, we have refused to review that holding.  As Judge
Orth stated for the Court in Gonzales v. State, 322 Md. 62, 69, 585
A.2d 222, 226 (1991),
"Gonzales was obviously persuaded by the rea-
soning of the Court of Special Appeals.  He
did not challenge this holding.  The [issue]
was not raised in his petition for a writ of
certiorari, nor was it presented in our order
granting the writ.  Consequently, the issue is
not before us. . . ."
See, e.g., Middle States v. Thomas, 340 Md. 699, 702, 668 A.2d 5,
10
6-7 (1995) ("these rulings by the Court of Special Appeals have not
been challenged in this Court and are not before us");  Murphy v.
Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 375, 601 A.2d 102, 118 (1992).
Moreover, in criminal cases decided by the Court of
Special Appeals, where an issue has been put forth as an
alternative basis for upholding the conviction, this Court has
consistently refused to consider that issue if it was not raised in
a certiorari petition, a cross-petition, or the order of this Court
granting the petition.  See, e.g., Clark v. State, supra, 306 Md.
at 491-492, 510 A.2d at 249 ("In the case before us, however, the
State has failed to file a cross-petition [raising the] issue" and
"we will not consider it"); McCray v. State, 305 Md. 126, 135-137,
501 A.2d 856, 860-861 (1985) (the doctrine that an appellate court
will affirm the trial court on any ground adequately shown by the
record is not applicable in a case decided by the Court of Special
Appeals unless the ground was presented in a certiorari petition,
a cross-petition, or the order of this Court granting the petition,
and "[i]n this case there was no conditional cross-petition filed
[by the State] raising the . . . issue"); Dean v. State, 291 Md.
198, 202, 434 A.2d 550, 554 (1981) (the Court refused to consider
the State's alternative argument, based on the petitioner's failure
to raise an issue at trial, because the State failed to file a
cross-petition); Temoney v. State, 290 Md. 251, 262 n.8, 429 A.2d
1018, 1023-1024 n.8 (1981); Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 547, 380
       There is one exception to this principle expressly con-
7
tained in an amendment to Rule 8-131(b), namely the issue of
harmless error.  Prior to the amendment of the rule setting forth
this exception, however, this Court refused to consider the issue
of harmless error unless it was raised in a certiorari petition,
cross-petition, or order of this Court. See Clark v. State, 306
Md. 483, 492, 510 A.2d 243, 247 (1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1084, 107 S.Ct. 1286, 94 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); Coleman v. State,
281 Md. 538, 547, 380 A.2d 49, 55 (1977).
11
A.2d 49, 55 (1977) ("The State did not, however, file a cross-
petition for certiorari raising the [alternative] issue, and we
therefore will not consider it"); Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134,
142-143, 355 A.2d 455, 459-460 (1976) ("if the State believed that
we should review the Court of Special Appeals' invocation of the
plain error doctrine if we granted Dempsey's petition, the State
should have filed a conditional cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari").  See also State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 402 n.12,
631 A.2d 453, 462 n.12 (1993) ("In a case before us which has been
decided by the Court of Special Appeals, the principle that a trial
court will be affirmed for any reason adequately shown by the
record is applicable only if the ground was presented in a petition
for a writ of certiorari, in a cross-petition, or in this Court's
order granting certiorari"); Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502-
503, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223-1224 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021,
100 S.Ct. 680, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980).7
Rule 8-131(b) does state that this Court "ordinarily"
will consider only an issue raised in a certiorari petition, a
cross-petition, or an order of this Court.  The word "ordinarily"
     
 The principle that this Court ordinarily will consider
8
only issues raised in a certiorari petition, a cross-petition, or
the order granting certiorari, was first set forth in Walston v.
Sun Cab Co., 267 Md. 559, 569, 298 A.2d 391, 397 (1973).  The
principle was expressly set forth in the Maryland Rules by order
of this Court on May 5, 1978, effective July 1, 1978.
     
 In this respect, our exercise of discretion under Rule 8-
9
131(b)(1) to reach an issue not presented is more limited than
our exercise of discretion under the general appellate
preservation principle embodied in Rule 8-131(a).  Cf. State v.
Bell, 334 Md. 178, 186-191, 638 A.2d 107, 112-114 (1994).
12
does indicate that there are exceptions.  Nevertheless, neither the
use of the word "ordinarily" in Rule 8-131(b) nor the principle
embodied in the rule,  has been treated as granting a general
8
discretion to reach an issue whenever the Court so desires in the
interests of "fairness."   If it did, the amendment to Rule 8-
9
131(b), adopting an express exception for the "harmless error"
issue, would have been unnecessary.  Instead, we have held that the
"exceptions" to the principle embodied in Rule 8-131(b) are limited
to "extraordinary circumstances."  Mazor v. State Dep't of
Correction, 279 Md. 355, 370-371 n.8, 369 A.2d 82, 92 n.8 (1977);
Dempsey v. State, supra, 277 Md. at 142, 355 A.2d at 459, Walston
v. Sun Cab Co., supra, 267 Md. at 569, 298 A.2d at 397.
Only a very limited number of circumstances have been
treated as "extraordinary" and thus within the exceptions to the
requirement that an issue be raised in a certiorari petition,
cross-petition, or order by the Court.  They include jurisdictional
       See, e.g., Medical Mutual v. Evander, 331 Md. 301, 306,
10
628 A.2d 170, 172 (1993); Sisk v. Friendship Packers, 326 Md.
152, 157, 604 A.2d 69, 71 (1992); Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md.
219, 231, 503 A.2d 239, 245 (1986); Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md.
290, 402 A.2d 71 (1971). 
       See, e.g., Globe American v. Chung, 322 Md. 713, 716,
11
589 A.2d 956, 957 (1991).  
       See, e.g., Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150 n.1, 406
12
A.2d 415, 418 n.1 (1979); State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 478, 482-487,
404 A.2d 264, 266-269 (1979).
       See, e.g., State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 584-585, 640
13
A.2d 1104, 1108 (1994); State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 79, 553
A.2d 672, 675 (1989).
       See, e.g., Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 87, 660 A.2d
14
447, 455 (1995), and cases there cited; Creamer v. Helferstay,
294 Md. 107, 113, 448 A.2d 332, 335 (1982).
       Md.-Nat'l Cap. P.& P. Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 10
15
n.3, 511 A.2d 1079, 1083-1084 n.3 (1986).
13
questions,  whether the trial court's order was appealable,  a non-
10
11
constitutional issue that will enable the Court to avoid a
constitutional question presented,  whether the case has become
12
moot,  the question whether the trial court has either failed to
13
render a particular type of judgment required in the action (e.g.,
a declaratory judgment) or has rendered a type of judgment that is
beyond the court's authority,  state government sovereign immunity
14
under Maryland law,  and where the failure of the Court to consider
15
an issue would result in the violation of an important public
policy, such as the requirement that administrative remedies be
       See, e.g., Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519,
16
525, 597 A.2d 972, 974-975 (1991), and cases there cited.  See
also State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 596-597, 640 A.2d 1104, 1114
(1994).
14
exhausted.16
The issue decided by the majority today, namely whether
the photographs were admissible because they were relevant to
identity, falls within no recognized exception to the principle
that this Court will only consider issues raised in a certiorari
petition, cross-petition, or order of the Court.  The majority's
decision is inconsistent with the basic policy of the statutory
provisions authorizing our certiorari jurisdiction.  As pointed out
by the Court in Walston v. Sun Cab Co., supra, 267 Md. at 569, 298
A.2d at 397,
"[i]t should also be kept in mind that the
statute contemplated that the desirability and
public 
interest 
involved 
in 
granting
certiorari are shown to us by petition and the
matters presented to us by petition should
logically be those considered by us unless we
limit those matters for consideration in our
order granting certiorari."
The majority's decision cannot be reconciled with our
prior cases or with the language of Rule 8-131(b).  For this
reason, I cannot concur with the opinion or the judgment of the
Court.  
Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Bell have authorized me to
15
state that they concur with the views expressed herein.