Title: Turner v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ.  
 
JAMES TURNER 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 082122  
          November 5, 2009 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal presents a question concerning the 
admissibility of polygraph test results in evidence at a 
probation revocation proceeding. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
In 2005 James A. Turner was convicted of possession of 
child pornography in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.  He 
was sentenced to five years incarceration with three years 
suspended, conditioned upon supervised probation and “Sex 
Offender Evaluation and Treatment.”  In 2006 Turner’s 
probation officer requested and received permission from the 
circuit court to “utilize polygraph testing in conjunction 
with sex offender treatment in this case.”1  
 
In 2007 Turner’s probation officer reported to the court 
that Turner had been discharged from the sex offender 
treatment program for “failure to adhere to the attendance 
                     
1 The probation officer’s letter to the court explained 
that the court had instructed his office to obtain court 
approval for such testing on a case-by-case basis and that 
Turner had been referred to a program that uses such testing 
policy” and “lack of progress.”  The officer’s report also 
stated that Turner’s polygraph results had been described by 
his case manager at the treatment program as “deception 
indicated . . . . attempted to control his breathing” during 
testing. 
 
Turner was brought before the court on a bench warrant. 
At a revocation hearing, he admitted missing four appointments 
at the sex offender treatment program although he had had kept 
ten other appointments.  The Commonwealth presented no 
evidence and relied only on the probation officer’s report.  
In argument, the Commonwealth stated:  “The one thing I would 
really like to draw the court’s attention to is the fact that 
he was deceptive, according to the probation violation –.”  
Defense counsel promptly objected on the ground that the 
report that Turner had been deceptive was based solely on a 
polygraph test result that was “being admitted into evidence 
at this hearing.”  The court overruled the objection.2 
 
The court revoked the suspension of the remaining three 
years of Turner’s sentence, stating “I am not willing to 
subject the community to the dangers of your further conduct.”  
The court entered an order reciting that although the 
                                                                
“for evaluation and monitoring purposes in conjunction with 
therapy.” 
2 We reject the Commonwealth’s contention on appeal that 
Turner’s objection was procedurally defaulted. 
 
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sentencing guidelines recommended “Probation/No incarceration” 
in the circumstances of the case, the court’s stated reason 
for departing from the guidelines was:  “I conclude [that the 
defendant] is a danger to children in the community [and] is 
not amenable to treatment.”  The Court of Appeals denied 
Turner’s petition for appeal, finding no abuse of discretion 
in the circuit court’s decision to revoke his suspended 
sentence.  We awarded Turner an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
A sentencing court is vested with wide discretion in 
probation revocation proceedings and “formal procedures and 
rules of evidence are not employed.”  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 789 (1973).  Hearsay evidence has been held 
admissible in federal probation and parole revocation 
proceedings where the evidence is “demonstrably reliable.”  
United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 
1982).  In Dickens v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 412, 422-23, 
663 S.E.2d 548, 553 (2008), our Court of Appeals reached a 
similar conclusion in the context of the reliability of 
official records. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, in White v. 
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 191, 194, 583 S.E.2d 771, 773 
(2003), specifically held that polygraph examination results 
were inadmissible in probation revocation proceedings, citing 
 
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a “long line of cases, spanning almost thirty years, [in which 
this Court has] made clear that polygraph examinations are so 
thoroughly unreliable as to be of no proper evidentiary use 
whether they favor the accused, implicate the accused, or are 
agreed to by both parties.  The point of these cases is that 
the lie-detector or polygraph has an aura of authority while 
being wholly unreliable.”  Id. at 194, 583 S.E.2d at 772 
(quoting Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 156, 341 
S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986)) (citations omitted).  In Robinson, we 
expressed “our continuing concern over the use of polygraph 
exams in any court proceeding in Virginia.”  Robinson, 231 Va. 
at 156, 341 S.E.2d at 167. 
 
We continue to adhere to the views expressed in that 
“long line of cases.”  See Billips v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 
805, 808-09, 652 S.E.2d 99, 101 (2007) (“lie-detector” tests 
are so unreliable that the considerations requiring their 
exclusion have ripened into rules of law) (citing Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 97, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (1990)). 
 
While conceding that polygraph test results are 
inadmissible in criminal trials, the Commonwealth argues that 
they should be admitted under the more “relaxed” standards of 
proof prevailing in probation proceedings.  We do not agree.  
Polygraph test results fall far short of the “demonstrably 
 
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reliable” hearsay evidence that may be admitted under those 
“relaxed” standards. 
A trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or 
exclude evidence will not [ordinarily] be overturned 
on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.  
However, a trial court has no discretion to admit 
clearly inadmissible evidence because admissibility 
of evidence depends not upon the discretion of the 
court but upon sound legal principles.  
 
Gray v. Rhoads, 268 Va. 81, 86, 597 S.E.2d 93, 96 (2004) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
 
 For those reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in admitting the results of polygraph tests in Turner’s 
revocation proceeding and expressly approve the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in White.  We do not, however, by this 
holding intend to impose any restrictions on the use of the 
polygraph as a tool in law enforcement or in the treatment, 
therapy, monitoring or evaluation of offenders, although those 
making use of such tests should be aware that the results will 
not be admissible in judicial proceedings.  Any voluntary 
statements or admissions made by a person being tested remain 
admissible subject to the ordinary rules of evidence.  Our 
holding is limited to the exclusion of the opinions of the 
polygraph operator or others purporting to offer expert 
opinion interpreting the test results.  
 
The Commonwealth argues that any error in the circuit 
court’s admission of polygraph test results was harmless in 
 
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the present case because Turner admitted missing four 
appointments at the treatment program to which he had been 
assigned as a condition of his probation.  Thus, the 
Commonwealth points out, the fact of Turner’s violation of the 
terms upon which his sentence was partially suspended is 
undisputed.  For that reason, the Commonwealth contends, the 
circuit court had an adequate basis for its revocation 
decision independent of the polygraph results.  White is 
therefore distinguishable, the Commonwealth argues, because 
there the trial court based its revocation decision on 
polygraph test results alone. 
 
We agree that here the circuit court had additional 
evidence to support its revocation decision.  We cannot, 
however, say that the error of receiving evidence of polygraph 
test results was harmless because we cannot ascertain from the 
record the extent, if any, to which the error may have 
contributed to the punishment imposed.  The court had before 
it a spectrum of available penalties ranging from 
“Probation/No incarceration,” as recommended by the sentencing 
guidelines, to revocation of the entire period of suspension, 
the penalty the court decided upon.  From the argument of 
counsel and the court’s remarks at the revocation hearing, it 
appears likely that the evidence erroneously admitted was at 
least a contributing factor in the court’s decision. 
 
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Because Turner does not dispute that he violated the 
terms of his probation in missing four appointments at his 
treatment program, he does not contend that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in revoking his suspended sentence.3 
Rather, he contends that he is entitled to a new hearing on 
the issue of the penalty to be imposed for that violation, 
without consideration of the evidence erroneously admitted at 
his original revocation hearing.  We agree.  We have recently 
held such a disposition to be the appropriate remedy in a 
similar case.  Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 105, ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2009) (remanded for new hearing after 
inadmissible evidence was received at revocation proceeding). 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment 
appealed from and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with 
direction to remand the same to the circuit court for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
3 On appeal, the Commonwealth and Turner agree that if 
this Court should hold the acceptance of polygraph test 
results to constitute reversible error, the appropriate remedy 
is a remand for resentencing only. 
 
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