Title: James Bruno v. Milwaukee County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 28 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1970 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
James Bruno, James Schindler, Edgar Wesling, 
Fred Antonich, William J. Beam, Lyle H. Bonnin, 
George A. Bowman, Martha Clark, Rosario 
Consiglio, Robert G. Francis, John Glowacki, 
Herbert A. Goetsch, Dorothy Haynes, Kenneth 
Henrics, George Kozik, Pearl Kulinski, Mary 
Landis, William Moser, Virginia E. O'Connell, 
William O. Polley, Rosemary Pulito, Chester 
Sobush, William Stead, Shirley Whittow, and 
Bernard Wood,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Milwaukee County, Milwaukee County Employees 
Retirement System, and Milwaukee County Pension 
Board,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  255 Wis. 2d 833, 646 N.W.2d 855 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 1, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 16, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David Hansher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Lynne A. Layber, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lynne A. 
Layber. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendants-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by John F. Jorgensen, principal assistant corporation 
counsel. 
 
 
2003 WI 28 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1970  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 4004) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James Bruno, James Schindler, Edgar  
Wesling, Fred Antonich, William J. Beam,  
Lyle H. Bonnin, George A. Bowman, Martha  
Clark, Rosario Consiglio, Robert G.  
Francis, John Glowacki, Herbert A.  
Goetsch, Dorothy Haynes, Kenneth Henrics,  
George Kozik, Pearl Kulinski, Mary  
Landis, William Moser, Virginia E.  
O'Connell, William O. Polley, Rosemary  
Pulito, Chester Sobush, William Stead,  
Shirley Whittow, and Bernard Wood,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County, Milwaukee County  
Employees Retirement System, and  
Milwaukee County Pension Board,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   The issue in this case is whether 
certain former Milwaukee County employees who qualified for 
"deferred vested pensions" at the time they terminated their 
county employment have "retired from the county" within the 
No. 
01-1970   
 
2 
 
meaning of the Milwaukee County Code for purposes of receiving a 
military service pension credit.  Applying the plain language of 
the applicable ordinance provisions, we conclude that the former 
employees were "retired from the county" and are therefore 
eligible for the military service pension credit.  
¶2 
In November of 1996, the Milwaukee County Board 
enacted an ordinance granting a military service pension credit 
to certain members of the Milwaukee County Employees' Retirement 
System ("retirement system") who had served in the military 
during specified timeframes.1  The ordinance took effect, 
prospectively only, on January 1, 1997, and applies to "all 
retirees who retired from the county before July 1, 1985."  
Milwaukee County General Ordinances § 201.24(2.10). 
¶3 
After applying for the credit and being denied, 25 
former Milwaukee County employees filed this action in Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court requesting a declaration of entitlement to 
the military service pension credit.2  Each former employee is a 
member of the retirement system, left county employment before 
July 1, 1985, with a "deferred vested pension," and later 
(although still prior to July 1, 1985) began receiving payment 
                                                 
1 The credit applies only to retirees who were employed by 
the county for a certain number of years, and who had also 
performed military service during the period January 1, 1938, 
through December 31, 1974.  See Milwaukee County General 
Ordinances § 201.24(2.10).         
2 In some cases, a member is represented by a spouse who is 
receiving survivor benefits.  
No. 
01-1970   
 
3 
 
on the deferred vested pension.  See M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(4.5) and 
201.24(2.5).      
¶4 
Judge David A. Hansher, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, concluded that the plaintiffs were not eligible for the 
military service credit, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
Bruno v. Milwaukee County, No. 01-1970, unpublished slip. op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).  Both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals concluded that in order to have "retired from 
the county" for purposes of the military service credit, a 
retirement 
system 
member 
must 
have 
been 
old 
enough 
to 
immediately begin drawing a pension at the time he or she left 
county employment.  According to this interpretation of the 
applicable ordinance provisions, retirement system members who 
left county service with deferred vested pensions had not 
"retired from the county." 
¶5 
We granted the retirees' petition for review, and now 
reverse.  Although none of these retirement system members began 
collecting a pension immediately upon leaving county employment, 
each one qualified for a deferred vested pension at the time of 
termination, and this meets the definition of "retirement" in 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Code. 
 
See 
M.C.G.O 
§ 201.24(2.19).  
Retirement system members who leave county employment with 
deferred vested pensions have "retired from the county" for 
purposes of the military service credit.  
¶6 
This case involves the interpretation and application 
of an ordinance to an undisputed set of facts.  "The rules for 
the construction of statutes and municipal ordinances are the 
No. 
01-1970   
 
4 
 
same."  County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 169 n.7, 
288 N.W.2d 129 (1980).  The interpretation and application of an 
ordinance to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law, 
which this court decides de novo.  County of Adams v. Romeo, 191 
Wis. 2d 379, 383, 528 N.W.2d 418 (1995).  
¶7 
We 
begin 
with 
the 
language 
of 
the 
applicable 
ordinances.  "If the plain meaning of the [ordinance] is clear, 
a court need not look to rules of statutory construction or 
other extrinsic aids.  Instead, a court should simply apply the 
clear meaning of the [ordinance] to the facts before it."  UFE 
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-282, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996)(internal citations omitted). 
¶8 
We have "long recognized that when a court construes 
an ordinance or statute, words must be given their common 
meaning."  Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 224, 562 
N.W.2d 412 (1997) (citing State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 
470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) (citations omitted in original)). It is 
also "well established that technical words or phrases with a 
peculiar meaning in the law must be construed according to such 
meaning."  Id.   
¶9 
The 
Milwaukee 
County 
Code 
establishes 
several 
categories of retirement and sets forth the various requirements 
a retirement system member must meet in order to qualify for a 
pension. 
See 
generally 
M.C.G.O. 
§ 201.24(4.1) 
("normal 
retirement"); § 201.24(4.2) ("early retirement"); § 201.24(4.3) 
("accidental disability retirement"); § 201.24(4.4) ("ordinary 
No. 
01-1970   
 
5 
 
disability retirement"); and § 201.24(4.5) ("deferred vested 
retirement").3   
¶10 Section 201.24(4.5) sets forth the requirements for 
"deferred vested retirement," also referred to in the code as a 
"deferred vested pension."  See M.C.G.O. § 201.24(4.1).4  Section 
201.24(2.19) defines "retirement": 
Retirement shall mean termination of employment 
after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a 
pension.  Retirement shall be considered as commencing 
on the day immediately following a member's last day 
of employment (or authorized leave of absence, if 
later), and terminating upon date of death of retiree 
or beneficiary under option. 
M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19). 
¶11 Section 201.24(2.10) states that the military service 
pension credit "shall apply to all retirees who retired from the 
county before July 1, 1985."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.10).  It is 
undisputed that each of the retirement system members here met 
all of the requirements for a deferred vested pension and 
terminated county service prior to July 1, 1985.  
                                                 
3 "Pension" is defined as "a series of periodic payments 
which are payable to a person who is entitled to receive 
benefits under the ordinance."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.6). 
4 "A member shall be eligible for a deferred vested pension 
if his employment is terminated for any cause, other than fault 
or delinquency on his part, provided that he elects not to 
withdraw any part of his membership account and that his pension 
at age sixty (60) is at least ten dollars ($10.00) per month."  
M.C.G.O. 
§ 
201.24(4.5). 
 
The 
ordinance 
sets 
forth 
some 
exceptions to its general applicability, but none of them are 
relevant to this case. 
No. 
01-1970   
 
6 
 
¶12 Whether these retirement system members are entitled 
to receive the military service pension credit provided for in 
section 201.24(2.10) of the Milwaukee County Code depends upon 
whether they "retired from the county" within the meaning of 
that section and the related definitional sections of the code.  
As noted above, "retirement" is a defined term in the code: it 
means "termination of employment after a member has fulfilled 
all requirements for a pension."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19).  A 
"deferred vested pension" is a "pension" under the code.  
M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(2.6) and (4.5).  Indeed, section 201.24(4.5), 
which sets forth the criteria for deferred vested pensions, is 
entitled 
"Deferred 
vested 
retirement." 
 
M.C.G.O. 
§ 201.24(4.5)(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
code's 
definition 
of 
"retirement" also states that retirement commences "on the day 
immediately following a member's last day of employment."  
M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19). 
¶13 These 
terms, 
phrases, 
and 
definitions 
are 
not 
ambiguous.  A retirement system member who leaves county service 
having qualified for a deferred vested pension has "retired from 
No. 
01-1970   
 
7 
 
the county" within the meaning of the code.5  Although an 
employee leaving county service with a deferred vested pension 
does not immediately begin to collect payments on that pension, 
he or she has "fulfilled all requirements for a pension" at the 
time 
of 
termination, 
which 
satisfies 
the 
definition 
of 
"retirement" in the code. 
¶14  Milwaukee County argues that in order to be "retired 
from the county" a retirement system member must leave county 
service and begin drawing pension payments immediately.  This 
interpretation adds words to the definition of "retirement."  
The code does not define "retirement" as "termination of 
employment after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a 
pension and is old enough to immediately begin receiving pension 
payments." 
 
It 
defines 
"retirement" 
as 
"termination 
of 
employment after a member has fulfilled all requirements for a 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals cited Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary as support for its conclusion that "retirement" 
requires an employee to leave employment and immediately begin 
collecting a pension.  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, No. 01-1970, 
unpublished slip op. at ¶3 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002) (citing 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 1939 (1998)).  However, 
the court of appeals failed to supply any definition from 
Webster's, or any other dictionary definition for that matter.  
In fact, the Webster's definition of the verb "retire" supports 
the retirees, not the county: "retire" means "to withdraw from 
office, public station, business, occupation, or active duty."  
Webster's 
at 
1939. 
 
Webster's 
defines 
"retirement" 
as 
"withdrawal from office, active service, or business."  Id.  
Though our decision here rests on an application of the 
definition in the code itself (because "retirement" is a defined 
term in the code), we can find nothing in the dictionary 
definition of "retire" or "retirement" that would support the 
county's or the court of appeals' interpretation. 
No. 
01-1970   
 
8 
 
pension."  The definition does not mention receipt of pension 
payments. 
¶15 The ordinance does not confine the term "retirement" 
to terminations of county service with immediate eligibility to 
begin drawing a pension.  It requires only that the terminating 
employee has fulfilled the requirements for a pension.  Each of 
the employees in this case terminated employment after having 
fulfilled all requirements for a pension——a "deferred vested 
pension."  M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(2.19) and 201.24(4.5).  Because 
"[r]etirement shall be considered as commencing on the day 
immediately following a member's last day of employment,"  
M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.19), these deferred vested retirement system 
members "retired from the county before July 1, 1985" for 
purposes of the military service credit.  Payment of the 
deferred vested pension did not begin until each member's 
"normal retirement date,"6 although this, too, occurred before 
July 1, 1985, for each of these retirement system members. 
                                                 
6 The ordinance provides that upon timely application, 
"[p]ayment of a deferred vested pension shall commence as of the 
member's normal retirement date" and shall continue until "the 
date of death of the retired member."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(4.5). 
"Normal retirement date shall be the first day of the month 
following the date on which the member reaches the minimum ages 
for normal retirement."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.17). 
"Normal retirement age shall be fifty-seven (57) for deputy 
sheriffs and sixty (60) for all other members." M.C.G.O. § 
201.24(2.18). 
Each of these retirement system members reached the "normal 
retirement age" and began receiving payment for their deferred 
vested pensions prior to July 1, 1985. 
No. 
01-1970   
 
9 
 
¶16 The Milwaukee County ordinance extending military 
service pension credit to all those who "retired from the county 
before July 1, 1985" is clear and unambiguous, as is the 
definition of "retirement" in the Milwaukee County Code.  
Together, they plainly state that all those who retired from the 
county before that date——that is, terminated county employment 
having "fulfilled all the requirements for a pension"——are 
entitled to the credit.  The county's interpretation of the 
applicable ordinance provisions ignores their plain language and 
adds words that are not there.  Because these retirement system 
members terminated county employment before July 1, 1985 and had 
fulfilled all the requirements for a deferred vested pension at 
the time of termination, they are entitled to the military 
service pension credit provided for in M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.10). 
¶17 In closing, a few words about the concurrence.  The 
concurrence concludes that the ordinance is ambiguous because we 
have interpreted its "plain meaning" differently than the lower 
courts 
did, 
and 
worries 
that 
competing 
"plain 
meaning" 
interpretations "undermine[] the integrity of the appellate 
process."  Concurrence, ¶32.  The concurrence refers to the 
"oft-quoted maxim" of statutory ambiguity that states that a 
statute is considered ambiguous "when it is capable of being 
understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-
informed persons."  Concurrence, ¶31.  The concurrence then 
suggests that "[i]f judges and courts are considered reasonably 
well-informed persons, then under this  . . . rule of 
construction when they differ about an ordinance's 'plain' 
No. 
01-1970   
 
10 
 
meaning, 
the 
ordinance 
should 
generally 
be 
considered 
ambiguous."  Concurrence, ¶32. 
¶18 This distorts the test for ambiguity by placing the 
focus 
on 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
person 
offering 
the 
interpretation 
rather 
than 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
interpretation being offered.  Of course judges qualify as 
"reasonably well-informed persons."  So do lawyers.  But a 
disagreement between judges and lawyers about the plain meaning 
of a statute or ordinance does not always or even generally mean 
that the statute or ordinance is ambiguous.  If it did, then no 
statute or ordinance disputed in the courts could ever be given 
its plain meaning, because all statutory or ordinance language 
would be considered ambiguous.  This is not the law. 
¶19 The ambiguity maxim or canon of construction invoked 
by the concurrence is more completely stated as follows: 
Test of Ambiguity 
This court has consistently used the same test 
for ambiguity: 
"A statute or portion thereof is ambiguous when 
it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in either of two or more senses."  
State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 262, 
267, 128 N.W.2d 425, citing State ex rel. West Allis 
v. Dieringer (1957), 275 Wis. 208, 218, 81 N.W. 2d 
533. 
Whenever a case such as this one is before the court, 
however, it is obvious that people disagree as to the 
meaning to be given to a statute.  This alone cannot 
be controlling.  The court should look to the language 
of the statute itself to determine if 'well-informed 
persons' should have become confused. 
No. 
01-1970   
 
11 
 
". . . In construing or 'interpreting' a statute the 
court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear 
words of the statute."  State v. Pratt (1967), 36 Wis. 
2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18. 
Nat'l Amusement Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 41 Wis. 2d 261, 267-68, 
163 N.W.2d 625 (1969) (emphasis in original).  See also Wagner 
Mobil, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 585, 592, 527 N.W.2d 
301 (1995); State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 534-35, 348 
N.W.2d 159 (1984); Standard Theatres v. State Dep't of Transp., 
118 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984); Town of Ringle v. 
Marathon County, 104 Wis. 2d 297, 308, 311 N.W.2d 595 (1981). 
 
¶20 Accordingly, the test for statutory ambiguity focuses 
first (as it must) on the language of the statute, not the 
competing interpretations of it offered by lawyers or judges.  
The statutory language is given its common and ordinary meaning, 
and technical or specially-defined terms are given the technical 
or special definitional meaning assigned to them.  Weber, 209 
Wis. 2d at 224.  If this process of analysis yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its 
meaning. 
¶21 
The 
presence 
of 
different 
"plain 
meaning" 
interpretations by lawyers or judges does not authorize the 
court to skip this process, assume ambiguity, and begin 
searching for extrinsic sources of legislative intent.  Rather, 
as the cases cited above hold, the court examines the statutory 
or ordinance language to determine whether "'well-informed 
persons' should have become confused," that is, whether the 
No. 
01-1970   
 
12 
 
statutory or ordinance language reasonably gives rise to 
different meanings.  Nat'l Amusement Co., 41 Wis. 2d at 267.  A 
statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two or more 
"equally sensible interpretations."  State ex rel. Angela M.W. 
v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 122, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997). 
¶22 Thus, the court examines the reasonableness of the 
interpretation, not the general reputation for reasonableness of 
the person offering the interpretation.  Only if there is more 
than 
one 
reasonable 
interpretation 
(not 
more 
than 
one 
interpretation 
offered 
by 
persons 
generally 
regarded 
as 
reasonable), is there ambiguity.  It is the interpretation's 
reasonableness that counts, not the interpreter's status as a 
reasonable person.  
 
¶23  Here, as we have noted, the circuit court apparently 
overlooked 
the 
ordinance's 
definition 
of 
"retirement" 
in 
determining whether these employees were "retired from the 
county" within the meaning of the military service pension 
credit.  The court of appeals cited but did not apply the 
definition of "retirement," instead referencing a dictionary 
definition (without quotation or explanation) that contradicted 
the conclusion that the court reached.  In addition, as we have 
noted, the interpretation adopted by both lower courts adds 
words to the ordinance, as the concurrence also recognizes, 
concurrence, 
¶34, 
and 
thus 
is 
not 
a 
"plain 
meaning" 
interpretation.  This, therefore, is not a case of conflicting, 
reasonable "plain meaning" interpretations; it is a case of 
lower court error. 
No. 
01-1970   
 
13 
 
 
¶24  The concurrence also concludes that the ordinance is 
ambiguous because the phrase "from the county" is redundant or 
"unexplained 
surplusage," 
inasmuch 
as 
this 
is 
a 
county 
retirement 
ordinance applicable only 
to county 
employees.  
Concurrence, ¶35.  While we attempt to construe statutes and 
ordinances to avoid surplusages, a statutory redundancy or 
"unexplained 
surplusage" 
does 
not 
necessarily 
require 
a 
declaration of ambiguity.  The phrase "from the county" may have 
been unnecessary here (because this is a county retirement 
ordinance), but that does not render either the definition of 
"retirement" 
or 
the 
military 
service 
pension 
provision 
ambiguous.  The phrase makes explicit what is already implicit 
in the ordinance, concurrence, ¶35; that is, it reinforces its 
meaning rather than creates ambiguity.  That this reinforcement 
may have been unnecessary does not require us to search for some 
alternate meaning other than the obvious. 
 
¶25  It is odd that the concurrence would suggest that we 
are reading the ordinance as if it said "retired from the county 
from the county."  Concurrence, ¶36.  Statutory interpretation 
involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a search for 
ambiguity.7  The concurrence adopts the latter construct and 
takes it to a new level, manufacturing ambiguity where it does 
not exist. 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin courts do not "torture ordinary words until they 
confess to ambiguity."  W. States Ins. Co. v. Wis. Wholesale 
Tire, Inc., 184 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1999).   
No. 
01-1970   
 
14 
 
¶26 A phrase that makes explicit that which is implicit 
(i.e., states the obvious) is not the same as a phrase that is 
repeated twice in a row.  If it were, the concurrence might be 
correct in its assertion that there would be a "need to delete a 
few words for clarity."  Concurrence, ¶38.  As it is, the phrase 
"from the county" is not in fact repeated twice in this 
ordinance, 
and 
our 
straightforward 
"plain 
meaning" 
interpretation does not import such a repetition into the 
ordinance, so there is no need to delete anything in order to 
arrive at clarity. 
 
  ¶27  For example, if my law clerk gets up from his desk 
at around lunchtime and says, "I am going out to eat," I readily 
understand this to mean he is going out to eat lunch.  If 
instead he says, "I am going out to eat lunch," his statement is 
not 
rendered 
ambiguous 
because 
he 
has 
explicitly 
(if 
unnecessarily) identified the meal he is about to eat.  The word 
"lunch" may be surplusage, but there is no ambiguity and 
certainly no need to look for some alternate meaning or 
explanation for his inclusion of the word "lunch" where it is 
otherwise unnecessary.  He is only making explicit what is 
implicit 
in 
the 
shorter 
statement. 
 
A 
"plain 
meaning" 
interpretation of "I am going out to eat lunch" does not "in 
essence" read "I am going out to eat lunch lunch," as suggested 
by the concurrence, merely because "lunch" was already implicit.  
Concurrence, ¶36. 
No. 
01-1970   
 
15 
 
 
¶28  In short, the applicable ordinance provisions are 
unambiguous.8  These former county employees left county service 
having qualified for deferred vested pensions and within the 
applicable time frame specified in the military service pension 
credit.  Deferred vested pensions are "pensions" within the 
meaning of the code.  This meets the definition of "retirement" 
in the code.  Accordingly, the former employees are "retired 
from the county" within the meaning of the military service 
pension credit, and are entitled to receive it. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
¶29 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The concurrence concludes by referring to the "obvious 
purpose of the ordinance," and asserts that "there is no 
apparent reason" for the exclusion of deferred vested pensioners 
from the military service credit.  Concurrence, ¶40.  The 
concurrence also concludes that "the language of the ordinance 
supports the petitioners' interpretation more strongly than the 
county's interpretation."  Concurrence, ¶39.  If the "obvious 
purpose" and the "language of the ordinance" support one 
interpretation, and there is "no apparent reason" for any 
alternate interpretation, then the ordinance is unambiguous. 
No.  01-1970.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶30 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately 
to 
express 
my 
disagreement 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's reliance on the plain meaning canon to interpret this 
Milwaukee County ordinance.  I find the ordinance to be 
ambiguous.  Nevertheless, I concur in the majority's result 
because I find it to be the more reasonable interpretation in 
light of the language and purpose of the ordinance. 
¶31 The majority begins and ends its analysis by relying 
on the plain meaning maxim of statutory/ordinance construction:  
"if the plain meaning of the [ordinance] is clear, a court need 
not look to rules of statutory construction or other extrinsic 
aids." Majority op., ¶¶7, 16.  What the majority fails to 
acknowledge in this cursory approach is another oft-quoted maxim 
of statutory/ordinance interpretation:  a statute is ambiguous 
when it is capable of being understood in two or more different 
senses by reasonably well-informed persons.  Stockbridge School 
Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 222, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996); Ervin 
v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 472, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991); 
State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 687, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
¶32 Here, the circuit court and all three judges of the 
court of appeals, examining the same language, also found the 
meaning of this ordinance to be "plain"——but came to the 
opposite interpretation of what the majority today deems to be 
"plain."  If judges and courts are considered reasonably well-
informed persons, then under this latter rule of construction 
No.  01-1970.awb 
 
2 
 
when they differ about an ordinance's "plain" meaning, the 
ordinance should generally be considered ambiguous.  The tug of 
war between courts over opposite plain meaning constructions 
undermines the integrity of the appellate process. 
¶33 Our task is to discern the intent of the legislature.  
Here, I find the language of the ordinance to be ambiguous, not 
only because of the opposite plain meaning interpretations but 
also 
because 
I 
conclude 
that 
both 
interpretations 
are 
reasonable.  
¶34 The phrase in the ordinance that is the subject of 
interpretation is: "shall apply to all retirees who retire from 
the county."  The circuit court and the judges of the court of 
appeals reasonably interpreted it to mean that it applies to 
members who leave county service and begin immediately drawing 
pension payments.  The majority correctly notes that such an 
interpretation adds words to the definition of "retirement." 
¶35 The majority’s interpretation, however, has its own 
problems.  The majority sets forth the phrase in question, 
"shall apply to all retirees who retire from the county," but 
then only focuses on the second part of the phrase.  Since this 
is a county retirement plan, the word "retirees" implicitly 
means that it applies to those who retire from the county.  
Thus, the additional words "from the county" is unexplained 
surplusage.  When an ordinance is redundant or contains 
surplusage, it is not "clear and unambiguous."   
¶36 The majority explains away its construction which 
incorporates surplusage as serving merely to reinforce its 
No.  01-1970.awb 
 
3 
 
meaning rather than creating any ambiguity.  Majority op., ¶24.  
One could argue that its construction which in essence reads 
"retired from the county from the county" is not reasonable.  I, 
however, do not advance that position. 
¶37 The majority's effort to explain away the surplusage 
is undermined by the fact that the "from the county" phrase was 
not included in parallel language within the very same section.  
The parallel language describes the military service credit 
eligibility of post-1985 retirees rather than the pre-1985 
retirees at issue before us.  The section reads: 
The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
retirees 
who 
retired 
between 
July 
1, 
1985 
and 
January 26, 1989 and to retirees who retired after 
January 26, 1989 and were not represented by a 
collective bargaining unit immediately prior to their 
retirement. 
. . . . 
Effective solely with respect to pension payments 
payable on and after January 1, 1997, the provisions 
of the preceding paragraph shall apply to all retirees 
who retired from the county before July 1, 1985. 
M.C.G.O. § 201.24(2.10).  It is unclear why the County Board 
would find it necessary to reinforce the meaning of this 
language by adding "from the county" in one instance and not the 
other.  A reasonable inference is that the County Board intended 
that its selective use of the phrase have some meaningful 
effect.  The majority's opinion fails to acknowledge or explain 
this inconsistent treatment. 
¶38 Nevertheless, 
I 
find 
each 
interpretation 
to 
be 
reasonable, 
but 
not 
without 
its 
own 
problems. 
 
One 
interpretation is burdened with the need to add a few words for 
No.  01-1970.awb 
 
4 
 
clarity and the other suffers from the need to delete a few 
words for clarity.  
¶39 Although I conclude that the ordinance is ambiguous, 
this does not mean that the language of the ordinance does not 
favor one interpretation over the other.  For the reasons set 
forth in the majority opinion, I agree that the language of the 
ordinance supports the petitioners' interpretation more strongly 
than the county's interpretation. 
¶40 In 
addition, 
given 
the 
obvious 
purpose 
of 
the 
ordinance to recognize the valuable military service provided by 
county employees, there is no apparent reason why the county 
board would single out and exclude deferred vested pensioners 
from this recognition.  These factors lead to the conclusion 
that the ordinance was intended to make the petitioners eligible 
for the military service credit.  Accordingly, I concur.    
¶41 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this concurrence.    
 
 
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