Title: LUJAN, SR. v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LUJAN, SR. v. STATE2004 WY 12299 P.3d 979Case Number: 03-197Decided: 10/28/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
   

 

JOSEPH 
MICHAEL LUJAN, SR.,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bert 
T. Ahlstrom, Jr., Ahlsrom Law Offices, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. 
Fetsco, Assistant Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and GUTHRIE, 
D.J.

 

 

[¶1]      Joseph Michael 
Lujan, Sr. (Lujan) was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (a) (i).  Lujan was then sentenced to not less 
than seven and not more than ten years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  We hold that sufficient evidence existed 
to convict Lujan and therefore affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Lujan presents 
the following issue:

 

Whether 
there was sufficient evidence presented in this case for the jury to find that 
[Lujan] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge of sexual assault in 
the first degree contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (a) 
(i).

 

The 
State re-phrases the issue as follows:

 

Was 
[Lujan's] conviction for first degree sexual assault supported by sufficient 
evidence?

 

 

[¶3]      April Montoya 
(Montoya) went to Job Services on December 31, 2001, seeking employment.  She noticed that Lujan was hiring 
waitresses at Christy's La Ponderosa, a restaurant/bar in Rawlins.  Monotya had worked for Lujan previously 
and after contacting him, was offered and accepted employment as a waitress 
beginning that New Year's Eve night.

 

[¶4]      Lujan provided 
two alcoholic drinks to Montoya during the course of her shift.  Lujan made sexual advances toward 
Montoya that evening, including taking her hand and placing it on his crotch and 
kissing her on the cheek.  
Eventually she was invited by Lujan into a vacant barroom to discuss what 
her work schedule would be after the New Year's dance.  Upon entering the barroom she discovered 
the lights were out.

 

[¶5]      Montoya twice 
asked Lujan to turn the lights on in the barroom but Lujan refused.  Montoya started to walk out of the 
barroom but Lujan grabbed her by the arm, pulled her to a bench, and pushed her 
down onto the bench.  Lujan then 
pulled Montoya's pantyhose off her legs and pulled her underwear down.  Lujan held Montoya's hands over her head 
with one hand and inserted his penis into her vagina.  Montoya repeatedly told Lujan to stop 
during the assault.

 

[¶6]      Montoya was 
eventually able to free herself by kneeing Lujan.  In the moments following the assault 
both parties dressed, and Lujan attempted to hand Montoya fifty dollars, telling 
her to "take care" of her kids.  
Montoya then went to the bathroom and removed a tampon she had been 
wearing, flushing it down the toilet.  
Lujan told Montoya to come in tomorrow and "act like none of this ever 
happened."

 

[¶7]      After work 
finished and upon arriving home, Montoya told her boyfriend that "inappropriate 
things" had happened at work.  
Montoya then called the police to report the incident.  Initially, Montoya told police that the 
incident was an "attempted rape."  
Montoya claimed she felt uncomfortable discussing the sexual assault with 
police.  In an interview later that 
day with Julie Hahn, a victim's advocate, Montoya was able to relate the 
explicit details of the assault.

 

[¶8]      Following her 
disclosure, Dr. Duane Abels administered a sexual assault exam at the 
hospital.  Dr. Abels testified that 
Montoya had two fresh bruises on the inner portion of her arms and a small 
bruise on her spine.  Dr. Abels 
testified that Montoya was "on her period" at the time of his 
examination.

 

[¶9]      Lujan was 
contacted by Police Detective Eric Ford regarding the alleged sexual assault but 
claimed that the encounter was consensual.  
Lujan 
was charged with one count of first degree sexual assault.  

 

[¶10]   A trial was held, and a jury 
returned a guilty verdict.  Lujan 
moved for a judgment of acquittal.  
After that briefed motion was denied, Lujan moved for a mistrial or in 
the alternative a new trial.  The 
district court held a hearing and eventually denied that alternative 
motion.  The present appeal 
followed.

 

 

[¶11]   This 
Court's standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well 
established.  We must determine 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found present, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the essential elements of the crime.  Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236, 243 
(Wyo. 1994).  In making that 
determination, we review the evidence, and any inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the state.  
Id.  It is not this 
Court's role to reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the 
witnesses.  Pisano v. State, 
828 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 1992), Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 578 
(Wyo 1994).

 

[¶12]   This Court has consistently 
recognized that it is the jury's duty to resolve the factual issues, judge the 
credibility of the witnesses, and determine the guilt or innocence of a criminal 
defendant.  Huff v. State, 
992 P.2d 1071 (Wyo 1999).

 

[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (a)(i) 
(LexisNexis2003) states:

§ 
6-2-302.  Sexual assault in the 
first degree. 

   (a) Any actor who inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree 
if:

(i) 
The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, 
reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or 
forcible confinement[.]

 

 

[¶14]   Lujan claims there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain his conviction.  
He attacks the credibility of the victim, Montoya.  Lujan states that because he was 69 
years old, allegedly infirm, four inches shorter, and 20 pounds lighter than the 
27-year-old victim, it would have been impossible to force the victim to have 
sexual intercourse.  He further 
contends that since the victim had received training from a self-defense 
standpoint as a correction officer at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, she would 
have known how to avoid any such advance.  
He states that based upon the victim's testimony of the parties' 
positions and the location of various articles of clothing, penile access to her 
vagina would have been impossible.  
Simply put, Lujan feels all this creates a sort of cumulative physical 
impossibility and, therefore, says that his admitted penile penetration had to 
have been consensual.

 

[¶15]   Montoya testified that Lujan pushed 
her onto the bench, held her hands, pulled her undergarments off, and inserted 
his penis into her vagina.  Montoya 
testified that she constantly told Lujan to stop.  Montoya testified that after the 
encounter, she went to the bathroom and removed a tampon she had been wearing 
and flushed it down the toilet. 

 

[¶16]   Dr. Ables examined Montoya after 
the assault and testified that Montoya had two fresh bruises on the inner 
portions of her arms, and a small bruise on her spine.  Dr. Ables also testified that Montoya 
was "on her period" at the time of the assault, which was consistent with 
Montoya's testimony and contrary to Lujan's.  The bruising was consistent with the 
described assault.  Further, a 
reasonable jury could infer that Montoya likely did not consent to having sex 
with Lujan because, had she consented, she would have removed her 
tampon.

 

 

[¶17]   Drawing 
all inferences in the light most favorable to the State, we find that beyond a 
reasonable doubt a rational trier of fact could have found present the essential 
elements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (a) (i), and, accordingly, we 
affirm.