Title: Chaisson v. Ragsdale

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Roy CHAISSON v. Annette RAGSDALE

95-945                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1996


1.   Parent & child -- Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's
     purpose is the support of the child and the enforcement of the
     same -- consideration of collateral issues runs counter to the
     act's goal. -- Uniform Interstate Family Support Act actions
     are not intended to open up for renewed scrutiny all issues
     arising out of a foreign divorce; the purpose of UIFSA is
     support of the child and enforcement of the same; other issues
     such as visitation and payment of debts under the divorce
     decree are collateral matters which necessarily burden the
     child support determination and run counter to the goal of
     streamlining these proceedings.

2.   Setoff & counterclaim -- setoff may be pled in any action for
     the recovery of money -- an action for the establishment of
     child support not construed as an action for the recovery of
     money. -- Although the general setoff statute provides that a
     setoff may be pled "in any action for the recovery of money",
     the supreme court does not construe an action for the
     establishment of child support as an action for the recovery
     of money.

4.   Parent & child -- chancellor's authority in considering the
     UIFSA petition limited to child support and enforcement --
     chancellor's order as it pertained to setoff and visitation
     reversed. -- The authority of the chancellor in considering
     the UIFSA petition was limited to establishment of child
     support and its enforcement; resolution of other matters like
     setoff and visitation exceeded that authority in the UIFSA
     context; the order of the chancellor as it pertained to setoff
     and visitation was reversed, and the matter was remanded. 


     Appeal from Ouachita Chancery Court; David Guthrie,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     Greg L. Mitchell, for appellant.
     No response.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.Associate Justice Robert L. Brown
February 12, 1996 *ADVREP7*






ROY CHAISSON,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

ANNETTE RAGSDALE,
                     APPELLEE,

95-945




APPEAL FROM THE OUACHITA COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT,
NO. E-93-540-3,
HON. DAVID GUTHRIE, JUDGE,




REVERSED AND REMANDED.






     Appellant Roy Chaisson appeals from part of an order which (1)
grants appellee Annette Ragsdale a setoff against the child support
award for a debt she paid following the divorce, and (2) grants
visitation rights.  Annette Ragsdale did not file an appellee's
brief.  We reverse that part of the chancellor's order which grants
the setoff and visitation rights.
     On May 2, 1982, Roy Chaisson and Annette Chaisson (now
Ragsdale) were married.  Two children, William Roy Chaisson and
David Scott Chaisson, were born of that marriage.  On October 6,
1988, the couple divorced in New Jersey.  The New Jersey divorce
decree awarded full custody of the two children to Annette
Chaisson, with visitation rights granted to Roy Chaisson.  Under
the decree, Roy Chaisson was to pay $100.00 a week in child support
to Annette Chaisson.  He was further ordered to pay certain debts
of the marriage, including payment of a loan owed to Atlantic
Financial Company.  That debt was later sold to Chase Manhattan
Bank.  Several months after the couple was divorced, Roy Chaisson
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  As a result of the bankruptcy, all
of his debts, including the Chase Manhattan debt, were discharged. 
Chase Manhattan later pursued Annette Ragsdale for payment of the
debt.  
     In July 1989, the two Chaisson boys went to visit their father
in Mississippi where he now resides.  Annette Ragsdale had become
disabled due to a dislocated disk in her back, and because of her
disability she and Ron Chaisson agreed that the boys would stay
with their father.  In March of 1990, Roy Chaisson filed a motion
in Mississippi to modify the New Jersey divorce decree and
requested that custody of the two children be placed in him and
that his payment of child support be terminated.  On April 6, 1990,
he was awarded full custody of the two children by the chancery
court in Mississippi, and his payment of child support was halted.
     On November 3, 1993, Roy Chaisson, as a resident of
Mississippi, filed a uniform support petition in Arkansas and
requested that Annette Ragsdale, who had moved to Camden, pay him
child support for their son William.  (The second son, Scott, had
been placed in an institution in Mississippi and was covered by
Social Security.)  Annette Ragsdale answered the petition and
affirmatively pled the defense of setoff.
     Two hearings were held on the matter.  At the first hearing,
Annette Ragsdale testified that after Roy Chaisson took bankruptcy,
Chase Manhattan pursued her for payment of the credit card debt. 
She introduced into evidence the total amount she paid on that debt
of $3,816.51.  At the second hearing, Annette Ragsdale requested
that visitation be set as well as setoff for the debt paid.  The
chancellor awarded child support to Roy Chaisson in the amount of
$37.50 a week.  He further found that Annette Ragsdale was entitled
to a setoff in the amount of $3,815.51 due to her payment of the
Chase Manhattan debt and, in light of that, he held her payments in
abeyance until October 20, 1995.  He further granted her visitation
rights.
     Roy Chaisson raises two points regarding the award of setoff
and visitation on appeal.  Those points can best be combined and
framed this way: did the chancellor exceed his authority under the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)?  Roy Chaisson
indicates in his brief that the issue of the chancellor's subject
matter jurisdiction over a debt contained in a New Jersey divorce
decree was not raised at the trial level.  However, the issue of
whether the chancellor had the authority to address setoff and
visitation issues in a UIFSA proceeding was clearly raised. 
Accordingly, we will consider that issue.
     Arkansas enacted UIFSA in 1993, and it is codified at Ark.
Code Ann.  9-17-101 et seq. (Repl. 1993).  It is manifest from the
title of the uniform act, as well as the description of proceedings
that may be brought under it, that the enforcement of interstate
child support awards is the Act's purpose and focal point.  See
Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-301 (Repl. 1993).  The duties and powers of
the responding tribunal relate to the goal of enforcing child
support orders.  See Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-305 (Repl. 1993). 
Indeed, the Act specifically prohibits conditioning support orders
upon compliance with visitation rights.  Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-
305(d) (Repl. 1993).  The commentary to  9-17-305 is even more
specific and states that visitation issues should not be litigated
in the context of UIFSA proceedings.  Comment to Ark. Code Ann. 
9-17-305 (Repl. 1995).
     This court has addressed the issue of whether collateral
matters are appropriate for consideration when the issue before the
chancellor is enforcement of child support under a uniform act. 
See State v. Robinson, 311 Ark. 133,