Title: Timothy Ray Creech v. State of Indiana

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Darren Bedwell 
Steve Carter 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
Zachary J. Stock 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 35S02-0709-CR-376 
 
TIMOTHY RAY CREECH, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court, No. 35C01-0605-FC-24 
The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, Judge  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 35A02-0612-CR-1140 
_________________________________ 
 
May 21, 2008 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
The question here is whether a criminal defendant can, as part of a plea agreement, waive 
his right to appeal a discretionary sentencing decision.  We hold that a defendant can do so, as  
long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 
 
 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
May 21 2008, 10:50 am
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In May 2006, Timothy Ray Creech was charged with one count of child molesting as a 
class C felony.  See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(b) (West 2007).  Creech and the State 
subsequently tendered a plea agreement that left Creech’s sentence to the discretion of the trial 
judge but capped the executed portion at six years.  The agreement also contained the following 
paragraph: 
I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea.  An 
open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge’s discretion.  I 
hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence so long as the Judge sentences me 
within the terms of my plea agreement. 
(App. at 38.)  The judge did not question Creech about this provision at the guilty plea hearing or 
at the sentencing hearing.  
 
The court sentenced Creech to a six-year executed term.  At the conclusion of the 
sentencing hearing, after Creech had pled and his sentence had been pronounced, the judge 
advised Creech that he had the right to appeal his sentence.  In its sentencing order, the trial court 
expressly accepted Creech’s plea but also stated that “[t]he Court advises the defendant of his 
right to appeal.”  (Id. at 46-47.)   
 
On appeal, Creech argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
appellate review and that his sentence is inappropriate.  The Court of Appeals held that Creech 
had waived his right to a direct appeal of his sentence, stating “[t]he fact that the trial court did 
not engage Creech in a colloquy at the guilty plea hearing regarding the effect of this waiver 
provision . . . does not invalidate it.”  Creech v. State, No. 35A02-0612-CR-1140, slip op. at 2 
(Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2007).  We granted transfer.   
 
 
I. 
Waiving Direct Appellate Review of a Sentencing Decision 
 
Though the weight of Creech’s brief is to urge that his agreement to waive appeal was not 
voluntary and intelligent, he also presents a question of first impression: whether such waivers 
 
 
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should be enforceable at all.  The opportunity for appeal is the prevailing rule.  If a defendant’s 
sentence is not fixed by a plea agreement, for example, a defendant “who pleads guilty is entitled 
to contest on direct appeal the merits of a trial court’s sentencing decision.” Collins v. State, 817 
N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004).  The same is true even when the defendant agrees to a sentencing 
cap or range.  Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 2006).   
 
The issue here is whether, through a plea agreement, a defendant can waive altogether 
this right to appellate review of his sentence.  Of course, defendants who bargain to plead guilty 
in return for favorable outcomes “give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights.”  
Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind. 2001).  For instance, when a defendant pleads 
guilty, he waives the right to appeal his conviction.  Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 231.  And, there are 
circumstances in which we already recognize a defendant’s decision to forego appeal.  When a 
defendant pleads guilty and agrees to a specific sentence, he waives his right to challenge the 
propriety of his sentence.  Hole v. State, 851 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ind. 2006).     
 
The Seventh Circuit has declared, aligning itself with virtually every other federal court 
of appeals, that defendants “may waive their right to appeal as part of a written plea agreement 
 . . . as long as the record clearly demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily.”  
United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1999).1  The Seventh Circuit “has 
consistently upheld valid appeal waivers and dismissed appeals taken in contravention.”  Id.   
 
As aptly described by the Seventh Circuit, a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights can be 
of substantial benefit to both the defendant and society: 
[D]efendants are free to waive their rights, to exchange them for other things that 
they value more highly.  They exchange jury trials for lower sentences—and 
there is no reason why defendants cannot do the same with rights to appeal.  An 
                                             
 
1 See United States v. De-La-Cruz Castro, 299 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104 (2nd 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3rd Cir. 2001); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992); Hunter v. United States, 160 F.3d 1109 (6th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Any right, even a constitutional right, may be 
surrendered in a plea agreement if that waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.”); United States v. Feichtinger, 
105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997) (“the right to appeal is a statutory right, and like other rights—even 
constitutional rights—which a defendant may waive, it can be waived in a plea agreement”); United States v. 
Williams, 160 F.3d 450 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Hernandez, 134 F.3d 1435 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005 (11th Cir. 1997).  
 
 
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appeal requires the prosecutor’s office to spend time researching the record, 
writing a brief, and attending oral argument.  All of this time could be devoted to 
other prosecutions; and a promise that frees up time may induce a prosecutor to 
offer concessions.  A defendant who values these concessions will waive his 
rights in order to obtain them.  The process makes both society and the defendant 
better off.  To make a given right ineligible for waiver would stifle this process 
and imprison the defendant in his privileges.  
United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 
 
While the matter is not free from doubt, we find this reasoning persuasive.  Accordingly, 
we hold that a defendant may waive the right to appellate review of his sentence as part of a 
written plea agreement.  This holding does not affect our very long-standing policy that a 
defendant who can establish in a post-conviction proceeding that his plea was coerced or 
unintelligent is entitled to have his conviction set aside.  So it has been since the days of coram 
nobis.  Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888) (plea induced by false promises rendered 
to a defendant acting without legal representation should be set aside); Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 
318 (1882) (prisoner whose plea was induced by fear of a lynch mob entitled to withdraw his 
plea and have a trial). 
 
Moreover, we do not mean to alter our case law invalidating provisions that waive post-
conviction rights.  Provisions in plea agreements that waive a defendant’s right to seek post-
conviction relief remain void and unenforceable.  See Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991).   
 
 
II. 
Did Creech Waive Direct Appellate Review? 
  
Creech argues that, despite the express language of the written plea agreement, he should 
not be deemed to have waived his right to appellate review of his sentence because (1) the judge 
advised him that he retained the right to appeal and (2) the trial judge made no express or implied 
finding that Creech intended to waive his appellate rights.  We disagree. 
 
 
 
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The Seventh Circuit has observed that “[m]ost waivers are effective when set out in 
writing and signed.”  United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995).  “The content 
and language of the plea agreement itself, as well as the colloquy where necessary, govern [the] 
determination as to the validity of the waiver.”  Williams, 184 F.3d at 668.  “[A] specific 
dialogue with the judge is not a necessary prerequisite to a valid waiver of appeal, if there is 
other evidence in the record demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver.”  United States v. 
Agee, 83 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 1996).   
 
In Williams, the defendant argued that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his 
right to appeal, despite the express language in the written plea agreement, because the court, 
through certain statements at the sentencing colloquy, led him to believe that he retained the right 
to appeal.  184 F.3d at 668-69.  At the plea hearing, the judge told the defendant that “[he] 
waived [his] right to appeal” in the plea agreement, but “under certain circumstances [he] might 
nevertheless be able to appeal[,] and there are certain rights [he] may have left.”  Id. at 669.  The 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the district court’s statements were unclear, but nonetheless 
upheld the waiver stating that “‘inventiveness with the aid of hindsight is the principal threat to 
the stability of plea agreements, and therefore the major hazard to defendants’ ability to obtain 
concessions for the rights they surrender.’”  Id. (quoting Wenger, 58 F.3d at 283.)  The Court 
further emphasized that the defendant should not be freed from his bargain merely because the 
Court could “‘imagine potential changes in the procedures . . . used’” or “envision a more precise 
colloquy.”  Id. (quoting Wenger, 58 F.3d at 283). 
 
Similarly, Creech argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
appeal, despite the express language in the written plea agreement, because the court made 
statements at the close of the sentencing hearing that led him to believe that he retained the right 
to appeal.  While we take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of avoiding confusing 
remarks in a plea colloquy, we think the statements at issue are not grounds for allowing Creech 
to circumvent the terms of his plea agreement.   
 
Creech does not claim that the language of the plea agreement was unclear or that he 
misunderstood the terms of the agreement at the time he signed it, but rather claims that his 
 
 
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otherwise knowing and voluntary plea lost its knowing and voluntary status because the judge 
told him at the end of the sentencing hearing that he could appeal.2   
   
This is not a case in which a defendant failed to pursue a legal right after being instructed 
erroneously by the trial court that he lacked the ability to do so.  See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 853 
N.E.2d 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (where trial court erroneously informed defendant he could not 
appeal his sentence, defendant presents plausible entitlement to a belated appeal under Post-
Conviction Rule 2); Baysinger v. State, 835 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (defendant 
was entitled to file a belated notice of appeal because “the trial court failed to inform [him] of his 
right to appeal his sentence and instead informed him that by pleading guilty he was giving up 
‘most’ of his grounds for appeal”).  In those cases, defendants allege that but for the judge’s 
statements they would have taken a different course of action.  In contrast, Creech does not argue 
that he would have withdrawn his guilty plea or taken any different actions in the absence of the 
judge’s statements.     
 
By the time the trial court erroneously advised Creech of the possibility of appeal, Creech 
had already pled guilty and received the benefit of his bargain.  Being told at the close of the 
hearing that he could appeal presumably had no effect on that transaction.  The federal 
authorities appear to take the same view.3 
 
                                             
 
2 Creech makes this argument in spite of the plea agreement’s express provision explaining that if the judge accepts 
Creech’s plea, “the judge must follow the plea agreement.”  (App. at 32.)   
3 The Sixth Circuit analyzed a similar situation, saying: 
Even if the district court did recite the language of the Rule 32 notification of the right to appeal 
intending to modify the plea agreement to resurrect [the defendant’s] right to appeal, the court 
lacked the power to make such a modification.  ‘Nothing in the rules even remotely allows the 
district court to accept a guilty plea but rewrite the plea agreement, even if the modified agreement 
is more favorable to the defendant.’  ‘[O]nce an appeal waiver is established to be knowing and 
intelligent, the waiver may not be held unenforceable because of a district court’s erroneous 
statements at a subsequent proceeding . . . .’ 
United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 764-765 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  See United States v. 
Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s contention that the lower court’s routine remarks 
regarding the right to appeal negated defendant’s plea agreement waiver of that right); United States v. Melancon, 
972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that the district court’s misstatement that a defendant retained 
the right to appeal negated the knowingness of the appeal waiver in his plea agreement and rejecting the argument 
that the Government waived its right to enforce the agreement by failing to object to the district court’s 
misstatements). 
 
 
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As to Creech’s second argument that the trial court should have made an express finding 
as to whether he intended to waive his appellate rights, neither the Indiana Rules of Criminal 
Procedure nor Indiana Code requires trial courts that accept plea agreements to make express 
findings regarding a defendant’s intention to waive his appellate rights.  Acceptance of the plea 
agreement containing the waiver provision is sufficient to indicate that, in the trial court’s view, 
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the trial court’s sentence.     
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker, JJ., concur.