Title: State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 2002-
Ohio-6322.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] STACY, APPELLANT, v. BATAVIA LOCAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 269, 2002-Ohio-6322.] 
Employer and employee — Public employment — School district outsources 
transportation services and lays off its bus drivers and mechanic — 
Mandamus to compel Batavia Local School District Board of Education 
et al. to reinstate relator to his position as a mechanic, honor his 
statutory employment contract, and award him back pay and lost 
benefits — Court of appeals’ denial of writ reversed and cause 
remanded for issuance of a writ and further proceedings, when. 
(No. 2002-0672 — Submitted October 15, 2002 — Decided December 4, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County, No. CA2000-10-077, 
2002-Ohio-1015. 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee Batavia Local School District Board of Education 
employed appellant, Dorsie Stacy, as a mechanic under a continuing contract for 
approximately 13½ years, from March 1985, until August 21, 1998.  At the end of 
the 1997-1998 school year, the board employed 13 bus drivers and Stacy as the 
sole bus mechanic. 
{¶2} 
On June 22, 1998, the board executed a contract with Laidlaw 
Transit, Inc., to provide transportation services for the school district for five 
years.  On July 20, 1998, the board abolished the bus driver and mechanic 
positions and laid off the employees in those positions, including Stacy, effective 
August 21, 1998.  The affected employees received written notification of the 
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layoff, which provided that “[r]einstatement to employment shall be made from 
the list of laid off employees in order of seniority.” 
{¶3} 
Under its contract with the board, Laidlaw agreed to offer 
employment to the laid-off employees, to provide a three percent increase in pay 
and comparable benefits to these employees, and to permit them to receive the 
same severance pay that they would have been entitled to from the board upon 
retirement.  On June 24, 1998, Laidlaw offered Stacy employment as a bus 
mechanic, but Stacy refused it. 
{¶4} 
Before February 24, 1998, Stacy had contacted the School 
Employees Retirement System (“SERS”) to determine his benefits if he retired 
from employment with the board when he turned 62 in early 1999.  By letter 
dated February 24, 1998, SERS sent him an estimate of his retirement benefits, 
which assumed a retirement date of April 1, 1999. 
{¶5} 
Subsequent to the board’s abolishment of his job and the 
notification concerning his layoff, on August 12, 1998, Stacy tendered his written 
resignation from employment with the board.  In his letter, Stacy stated, “Due to 
my resignation, for the purpose of retirement (effective August 21, 1998)  I 
hereby request to be paid for all unused vacation days, and personal days.”  The 
board accepted Stacy’s resignation on August 17, 1998, and Stacy’s final day of 
work was August 21, 1998.  Stacy did not assert that he had been forced out of his 
job.  Stacy received his final paycheck and severance pay from the board, and he 
began receiving SERS and Social Security benefits. 
{¶6} 
On August 20, 1998, Ohio Association of Public School 
Employees/AFSCME, Local 4, AFL-CIO, the representative of the bargaining 
unit that included school bus drivers and Stacy as the lone mechanic, requested 
that the board honor the statutory employment contracts and continue to employ 
them for school year 1998-1999 and thereafter.  At the time of the union’s written 
January Term, 2002 
3 
request, Stacy had already tendered his resignation to the board and the board had 
accepted it. 
{¶7} 
On August 24, 1998, the union and the individual school bus 
drivers commenced an action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board, its 
superintendent, its treasurer, and its president to reinstate them and award back 
pay and lost benefits.  Stacy was not a party to the action.  After the court of 
appeals denied the writ, this court, on June 21, 2000, reversed the judgment, 
granted the writ, and remanded the cause to the court of appeals for a 
determination of back pay and fringe benefits.  State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. 
School Emp./AFSCME, Local 4, AFL-CIO v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 191, 729 N.E.2d 743 (“OAPSE”).  In so holding, we 
concluded that the board was not authorized to lay off the bus drivers, the 
contracting-out of these jobs to Laidlaw was invalid, and the bus drivers were 
entitled to reinstatement.  Id. 
{¶8} 
Shortly after our judgment was entered, Stacy asked the board by 
letter dated July 17, 2000, to be reinstated as a school bus mechanic.  From 
September 1, 1998, until July 2000, he did not apply for any other job.  The board 
did, however, reinstate all of the laid-off bus drivers, who, unlike Stacy, had not 
retired from their jobs. 
{¶9} 
On October 10, 2000, Stacy filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Clermont County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the 
board, its president, its superintendent, and its treasurer, to reinstate him to his 
position as a mechanic, honor his statutory employment contract, and award him 
back pay and lost benefits.  Stacy claimed that the court’s judgment in OAPSE 
had a “preclusive effect against [appellees] on all similar and dispositive issues” 
in the case.  Stacy further claimed that he had been wrongfully excluded from 
employment with the board. 
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{¶10} The parties subsequently submitted evidence and briefs.  In his 
deposition, Stacy testified that if the board had not executed the contract with 
Laidlaw and notified him of his layoff, he would not have retired in 1998.  Stacy 
further testified that he was advised that if he did not sign the resignation letter on 
August 12, 1998, he would not receive his severance pay upon retirement. 
{¶11} On March 11, 2002, the court of appeals denied the writ.  The 
court of appeals held that Stacy’s voluntary retirement from employment with the 
board waived any right to reinstatement and back pay. 
{¶12} This case is now before the court for consideration of the parties’ 
requests for oral argument and the merits of Stacy’s appeal. 
Oral Argument 
{¶13} The parties request oral argument in this appeal.  We deny the 
requests.  S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2) does not require oral argument in this appeal, and the 
parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this case.  Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 615, 757 N.E.2d 1153.  Although one of the issues 
raised in this appeal might be considered, as appellant contends, a matter of first 
impression for this court, this appeal involves no substantial constitutional issue, 
conflict between courts of appeals, or sufficiently complex legal or factual matters 
that would benefit from oral argument.  See State ex rel. Woods v. Oak Hill 
Community Med. Ctr., Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 459, 460, 746 N.E.2d 1108. 
{¶14} Therefore, oral argument is not warranted. 
Mandamus:  Collateral Estoppel 
{¶15} Stacy asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying the writ of 
mandamus.  Stacy initially contends that our judgment in OAPSE collaterally 
estopped appellees from contesting his right to reinstatement, back pay, and lost 
benefits. 
{¶16} “The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral 
estoppel, holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a 
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5 
previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the 
same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be 
identical or different.”  Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 692 N.E.2d 140; Norwood v. 
McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67, paragraph three 
of the syllabus.  Consequently, collateral estoppel prevents parties from 
relitigating in a subsequent case facts and issues that were fully litigated in a 
previous case.  State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 64, 
765 N.E.2d 345. 
{¶17} Contrary to Stacy’s assertions, the issue of the right of public 
employees who resigned following notice of being laid off to be reinstated to their 
former employment with the board was never litigated in OAPSE.  Stacy was not 
a party to that case, and none of the individual relators therein had retired before 
their layoff became effective.  Stacy in effect concedes that this issue was not 
previously litigated by stating in his appellate brief, “Admittedly, Stacy’s 
retirement was not litigated in [OAPSE].”  In fact, in a post-OAPSE case, we 
ordered a board of education to reinstate those relator bus drivers and mechanics 
who had not retired after the board abolished their positions and subcontracted 
school busing services to Laidlaw.  State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 558, 565, 757 N.E.2d 339. 
{¶18} Therefore, our judgment in OAPSE did not collaterally estop 
appellees from claiming that Stacy’s retirement waived his entitlement to 
reinstatement and back pay.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Stackhouse v. Becker (Dec. 14, 
1994), Lake App. No. 94-L-024, 1994 WL 721693 (no duty to reinstate public 
employee who had voluntarily retired); Phillips v. W. Holmes Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 20, 1990), Holmes App. No. CA-407, 1990 WL 41584 (public 
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employee waived his right to reinstatement and back pay by voluntarily retiring 
under board of education’s early-retirement incentive plan). 
Mandamus:  R.C. 3319.081 
{¶19} It is axiomatic that “[a] wrongfully excluded public employee may 
obtain back pay and related benefits in a mandamus action following 
reinstatement or, in some cases, may obtain reinstatement and back pay and 
related benefits in the same mandamus action.”  Boggs, 93 Ohio St.3d at 563, 757 
N.E.2d 339. 
{¶20} Although collateral estoppel does not establish liability on the part 
of appellees, precedent does.  R.C. 3319.081 prohibited the board from abolishing 
the positions of school bus driver and mechanic, laying off public employees in 
those positions, and contracting out those jobs to a private entity.  OAPSE, 89 
Ohio St.3d at 195, 729 N.E.2d 743; Boggs, 93 Ohio St.3d at 561, 757 N.E.2d 339.  
Consistent with OAPSE and Boggs, the board’s actions were invalid because they 
violated R.C. 3319.081, and Stacy—assuming that he did not waive his rights—
was not properly terminated from his continuing-contract status as a mechanic 
employed by the board. 
Mandamus:  Waiver 
{¶21} The court of appeals held that Stacy waived his right to 
reinstatement because he voluntarily retired from his school bus mechanic 
position with the board. 
{¶22} Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right.  State ex 
rel. Wallace v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 431, 435, 732 
N.E.2d 960.  Waiver is generally applicable to all personal rights and privileges, 
whether contractual, statutory, or constitutional.  State ex rel. Athens Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton Joint Solid Waste Mgt. Dist. Bd. of 
Directors (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 611, 616, 665 N.E.2d 202.  The burden is on the 
public employer to prove that waiver applies, and it may be enforced if the 
January Term, 2002 
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employer had a duty to perform and changed its position as a result of the waiver.  
Chubb v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 275, 279, 690 
N.E.2d 1267. 
{¶23} In examining the circumstances surrounding Stacy’s retirement 
here, it is evident that Stacy retired in August 1998 only because the board 
illegally abolished his position and laid him off and contracted out the same work 
to Laidlaw.  “[A]n election to retire should not be considered voluntary when the 
employee’s only alternative is a layoff or other reduction in work.”  See Res. 
Mining Co. v. Anderson (Minn.App.1985),  377 N.W.2d 494, 497, and cases cited 
therein; Fiskewold v. H.M. Smyth Co., Inc. (Minn.App.1989), 440 N.W.2d 164. 
{¶24} The facts relied upon by the court of appeals to hold otherwise do 
not render Stacy’s retirement involuntary.  In concluding that Stacy had waived 
his right to reinstatement, the court of appeals noted that Stacy refused an offer of 
employment with Laidlaw, requested and received an estimate of benefits that he 
would be entitled to from SERS based upon a retirement date in early 1999, did 
not join in the OAPSE action, and did not argue that his retirement was 
involuntary until after the OAPSE decision. 
{¶25} Stacy’s refusal of an offer of employment with Laidlaw is 
irrelevant to the determination of whether his retirement was voluntary.  It does, 
however, bear on the post-liability issue of mitigation of damages.  In other 
words, reinstated public employees seeking to recover compensation due for a 
period of wrongful exclusion from employment may have that compensation 
reduced if the employer establishes with reasonable certainty the amount that the 
wrongfully excluded employee could have earned in appropriate employment 
during the period of exclusion.  State ex rel. Martin v. Bexley City School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 36, 528 N.E.2d 1250, syllabus.  The court of 
appeals in effect conceded that Stacy’s refusal of employment with Laidlaw was 
irrelevant to the board’s duty to reinstate Stacy.  The court observed that “[t]he 
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reasons behind requiring a person who has been laid off or otherwise denied an 
employment opportunity to take available ‘substantially similar’ employment can 
be found in the common law duty to minimize damages.”  (Emphasis added.)  It 
would be nonsensical to require a public employee like Stacy to accept an offer of 
employment for a job that was created illegally, see OAPSE and Boggs, in order 
to retain his right to continued public employment.  And as a Laidlaw employee, 
Stacy would not have had the same protections as a public employee of the board, 
e.g., union representation and termination of employment only for the reasons 
specified in R.C. 3319.081(C). 
{¶26} Moreover, the fact that Stacy requested and received an estimate of 
retirement benefits before he was notified of the abolition of his position and his 
layoff is not credible evidence that he voluntarily retired.  Stacy’s request was for 
an estimate of retirement benefits when he reached 62 in March 1999.  He 
ultimately retired in August 1998 because of the board’s illegal actions in 
abolishing his position, laying him off, and outsourcing his work to a private 
company.  And “conduct in applying for and receiving retirement benefits does 
not necessarily indicate [his] intent to give up [his] right to continued [public] 
employment.”  See Meyer v. Chagrin Falls Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 320, 324, 9 OBR 587, 460 N.E.2d 269. 
{¶27} Nor is Stacy’s failure to join in the OAPSE action dispositive of the 
voluntariness issue.  It is immaterial whether Stacy knew about the suit before he 
decided to retire, which was soon after being notified of the abolition of his 
position and his layoff from public employment.  “ ‘The mere initiation of 
litigation is not such evidence of eventual success as to have required [an 
employee] to stake his sustenance on its outcome.’ ”  Yuni v. Merit Systems 
Protection Bd. (C.A.Fed.1986), 784 F.2d 381, 387, quoting Covington v. Dept. of 
Health & Human Serv. (C.A.Fed.1984), 750 F.2d 937, 942. 
January Term, 2002 
9 
{¶28} In addition, Stacy did not need to lodge a protest when he retired.  
Any such protest would have been futile.  The board was unwilling to void its 
actions until the court’s decision in OAPSE. 
{¶29} The court of appeals and appellees also erred in relying on Phillips 
and Stackhouse to support that court’s holding that Stacy waived his right to 
reinstatement by retiring.  In Phillips, the employee retired even though he failed 
to pursue an opportunity to remain employed by the board.  In Stackhouse, the 
employee retired and then attempted to return after he was informed that disability 
retirement benefits awarded following his retirement would cease within two 
years after his retirement.  Unlike the employee in Phillips, Stacy had no option to 
remain employed by the board, and unlike the employee in Stackhouse, he retired 
only after being notified that his position was being abolished and he would be 
laid off.  Both cases are consequently distinguishable. 
{¶30} Therefore, an examination of all of the material facts establishes 
that appellees failed to prove that Stacy voluntarily relinquished his right to 
challenge the board’s actions in abolishing his position and laying him off.  
Stacy’s August 1998 retirement was involuntary because it was precipitated by 
the board’s illegal actions.  Once Stacy became aware that he had a right to 
reinstatement, soon after the OAPSE decision, he promptly requested 
reinstatement to his former position with the board.  Stacy’s retirement was 
involuntary, and he was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling his 
reinstatement.  The court of appeals erred in denying the writ.1 
Back Pay and Fringe Benefits 
                                                 
1. 
Our standard of review requires deference to the court of appeals’ factual determinations 
on the voluntariness issue if they were supported by competent, credible evidence.  State ex rel. 
Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 529, 536, 751 N.E.2d 1032, fn. 1.  For 
the reasons previously discussed, however, the court of appeals’ findings were not supported by 
competent, credible evidence, and it erred in relying on evidence that was irrelevant to the 
determination. 
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{¶31} Because the court of appeals erroneously denied the writ to compel 
Stacy’s reinstatement, it did not address Stacy’s claim for back pay and lost 
benefits.  Therefore, remand is appropriate to resolve that issue.  See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 
35, 641 N.E.2d 188 (“Since damages and other issues, e.g., interest, have not yet 
been resolved, the court of appeals must address these issues on remand”). 
Conclusion 
{¶32} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause for the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling 
Stacy’s reinstatement to his former position as a mechanic and for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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Buckley, King & Bluso and James E. Melle, for appellant. 
 
Ennis, Roberts & Fischer, C. Bronston McCord III and George E. Roberts 
III, for appellees. 
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