Title: Podratz v. Cross Keys Motel

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

220 N.W.2d 352 (1974) James R. PODRATZ, Relator, v. CROSS KEYS MOTEL, et al., Respondents. No. 44445. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 5, 1974. *353 Anderson, Hedin & Messinger and Douglas A. Hedin, Minneapolis, for relator. Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousineau & McGuire, and Robert J. McGuire, Minneapolis, for respondents. Heard before SHERAN, C.J., and OTIS, SCOTT, and KNUTSON, JJ., and considered and decided by the court. SCOTT, Justice. Certiorari to review a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding compensation to relator, James Podratz. Affirmed. On June 1, 1970, Podratz and his wife were hired as resident caretakers of the Cross Keys Motel. Under the employment contract, the couple were to act as front desk clerks for a total of 14 hours per week. They further were to provide airport transportation for the guests, to handle emergencies that might arise, and to remain on call at all times. In exchange for these services, they were provided with a furnished apartment, utilities, and other conveniences. They were to be paid $1.50 per hour for additional desk work. The contract further provided that relator was to be paid at the rate of $2.50 per hour for any yard and maintenance work performed at the motel. On May 31, 1970, the Podratz couple moved into residence at the Cross Keys Motel, where they remained and worked until June 29, 1971. Two weeks after moving in, on June 13, 1970, relator allegedly suffered a back injury when he fell *354 down seven concrete steps to a landing outside his apartment. In early October he was again injured while working for the employer on a house next to the motel. He received a laceration on his arm and aggravated the preexisting back condition. This second fall occurred 17 weeks after he had commenced employment for the motel. He discontinued any yard or maintenance work after this second fall, as reflected in his wage record. He was able, however, to continue the front desk work and the airport service for the guests. On May 1, 1972, the compensation judge awarded relator 38 weeks of temporary partial disability in the sum of $482.58, together with 35 weeks of permanent partial disability at the rate of $42.62 per week in the sum of $1,491.70,[1] for a 10-percent permanent partial disability of the back, and $90 in medical expenses. The compensation judge determined that the employee had an average 7-day weekly wage in both June and October, 1970, of $63.92, comprised of $38.54 in earnings and $25.38 attributed to the employee's share in the weekly value of the apartment. The average earnings figure was found by totaling the weekly earnings received from May 28, 1970, through September 24, 1970. This total of $655.25 was divided by 17, representing the number of weeks in the period. The determination of the base period and the method of computation were affirmed by the commission. 1. The first contention by relator is that this method of computation is a misinterpretation of Minn.St. 176.011, subd. 3, which reads in part as follows: Relator contends that the commission is actually amending this section of the statutes to read, "the last 26 weeks or substantial part thereof," by merely utilizing the 17-week period in which the employee worked for the motel. If this contention were accepted, it would work to the detriment of relator since he worked for substantially less remuneration at his prior employment with two colleges under work-study programs. However, the statutory language of "employment in which he was engaged at the time of the injury" removes from consideration any past employment. Therefore, in the absence of a 26-week period upon which to base the average earnings, the commission should deal with reasonable and available time periods that will meet the standard of determining the wages "under normal conditions" in order to satisfy the guidelines suggested by this court in Johnson v. D. B. Rosenblatt, Inc., 265 Minn. 427, 122 N.W.2d 31 (1963). The employee contends that inasmuch as his earning capacity was substantially impaired by his first fall on June 13, 1970, the 17-week period utilized by the compensation judge, which was comprised, for the most part, of the period following this injury, does not satisfy the Rosenblatt standard. There is little evidence before *355 the compensation judge and the commission which would substantiate this contention. The standard for review in cases such as the one before us is clearly defined: In line with that standard, there is sufficient evidence to support the computations made by the compensation judge and affirmed by the commission. It is clear after a careful review of the evidence before it, including testimony by the employee that his earning power had been substantially reduced after his first fall, the commission's findings of fact also have ample support. 2. Relator also contends that a different standard should have been used in determining the compensation awarded for 10-percent permanent partial disability of his back under Minn.St. 176.011, subd. 18, which provides as follows: The employee contends that inasmuch as his greatest cash income was generated from his work as a maintenance man, that should be considered his primary employment for purposes of the statute. Therefore, he states, compensation should be determined by the number of hours that maintenance men generally work, namely 40 hours per week. Lee v. Villard Consol. School Dist. No. 5, 192 Minn. 449, 257 N.W. 90 (1934). It is clear that the statute is intended to provide maximum compensation for a permanent disability or death. However, *356 it certainly cannot be said that this theory should be extended to include a principle that where multiple duties are involved, the one area of employment that is the most lucrative should be considered for purposes of compensation. Since the employee was hired as a resident manager and desk clerk aside from doing maintenance work, it is apparent that there is also sufficient evidence to support the finding of the compensation judge and the commission here. We therefore affirm the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Affirmed. [1] See, Minn.St.1971, § 176.101, subd. 3(40) (now Minn.St. 176.101, subd. 3 [42]).