Title: State ex rel. Turbine Engine Components Textron, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Turbine Engine Components Textron, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 93 Ohio 
St.3d 156, 2001-Ohio-1296] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. TURBINE ENGINE COMPONENTS TEXTRON, INC., 
APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO; MOORE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Turbine Engine Components Textron, Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 156.] 
Workers’ compensation  — Application for permanent total disability benefits 
granted by Industrial Commission — Complaint in mandamus filed by 
employer in court of appeals alleging that commission abused its 
discretion in excluding two doctor reports from consideration — Court 
of appeals’ grant of writ reversed and commission’s grant of permanent 
and total disability reinstated, when. 
(No. 00-1236 — Submitted June 20, 2001 — Decided September 5, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-979. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant-claimant, Naomi R. Moore, filed an application 
for permanent total disability (“PTD”) benefits in October 1997.  On November 4, 
1997, pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(2), the Industrial Commission of 
Ohio mailed an acknowledgment letter that stated: 
 
“This will serve as your notice that an application for permanent total 
disability compensation was filed on 10/22/1997. 
 
“* * * 
 
“Employers may submit additional medical evidence relating to this issue, 
including reports from employer requested examinations.  This information is to 
be submitted to the file by 1/03/98 which is 60 days from the date of this 
acknowledgment letter. * * * 
 
“* * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“A medical examination or examinations will be scheduled with Industrial 
Commission physicians within 90 days of filing of the application * * *. 
 
“* * * 
 
“The Hearing Administrator may decide to schedule a pre-hearing 
conference within approximately 120 days from the filing of the application.” 
 
The commission mailed this letter to appellee-employer, Turbine Engine 
Components Textron, Inc. (“Textron”), at Textron’s Lima plant, where claimant 
was injured.  A copy was also sent to Gates McDonald Company in Columbus, 
Textron’s actuarial service representative. 
 
An April 1, 1998 letter from the law firm representing Textron advised 
claimant that it had scheduled her for a psychological examination with Dr. 
Robert P. Brady on April 21, 1998.  Counsel sent a second letter five days later 
informing claimant of a May 20, 1998 physical examination with Dr. Paul Martin.  
Claimant attended both examinations, and both doctors concluded that she could 
do some sustained remunerative work.  The Brady report was filed with the 
commission on May 20, 1998 and the Martin report on June 5, 1998. 
 
On June 24, 1998, for reasons unknown, the commission mailed a second 
acknowledgment letter.  It was nearly identical to the first, except that it gave the 
employer until August 23, 1998 to submit medical evidence.  In addition to Gates 
McDonald, the letter was also sent to Textron’s Cleveland plant and Textron’s 
counsel. 
 
PTD was granted on February 4, 1999.  In his order, the Staff Hearing 
Officer specifically excluded the Brady and Martin reports from consideration 
since they had not been filed by January 3, 1998—the deadline set in the first 
acknowledgment letter.  Reconsideration was denied. 
 
Textron filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
excluding the two reports from consideration.  The court of appeals, through its 
January Term, 2001 
3 
magistrate, agreed, and a writ was granted.  The magistrate found that the second 
acknowledgment letter contained the binding evidentiary submission deadline.  
Because the Brady and Martin reports had been submitted before that date, the 
magistrate stated, they were not excludable. 
 
This cause is now before this court on appeal as of right. 
 
In finding the second letter controlling over the first, the court of appeals, 
through its magistrate, stressed that the first acknowledgment letter went to 
Textron’s Lima plant, not the Cleveland plant.  The magistrate also noted that 
Textron’s counsel had not been sent the first letter.  From this, the magistrate 
concluded: 
 
“Given Textron’s apparent change of address and that a law firm came to 
represent Textron during the processing of the PTD application, a reasonable 
explanation for the issuance of the second acknowledgment letter is that someone 
at the commission felt that circumstances made it advisable to do so.  Apparently, 
there was some doubt on the part of someone at the commission as to whether the 
initial acknowledgment letter was sufficient.  The commission must have some 
discretion to issue another acknowledgment letter to correct a perceived defect 
with the previous acknowledgment letter.” 
 
This reasoning is too vague.  The magistrate implies an insufficiency of 
notice, presumably under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(2): 
 
“At the time the application for permanent total disability compensation is 
filed with the industrial commission, the industrial commission shall serve a copy 
of the application together with copies of supporting documents to the employer’s 
representative (if the employer is represented), or to the employer (if the employer 
is not represented) along with a letter acknowledging the receipt of the permanent 
total disability application.” 
 
“Representative” is defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-15-10(A)(5) as “any 
person who appears before the adjudicator, prepares any document on behalf of 
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any party for use by the adjudicator, renders any advice or performs any other 
related service for a party with respect to a dispute before the industrial 
commission.”  Counsel obviously qualifies as a representative, and indeed did not 
receive the first letter. 
 
But Textron never alleges insufficiency of service.  It concedes that it 
received the first acknowledgment letter.  Moreover, Textron obviously notified 
its counsel well before the second acknowledgment letter, since it was counsel 
who in April 1998 scheduled claimant for two medical examinations. 
 
In presuming that the commission had a justification for the second letter, 
the magistrate overlooked a crucial fact: the Brady and Martin reports were filed 
with the commission prior to the second acknowledgement letter—five and three 
weeks, respectively.  Thus, any question as to whether the notice contained in the 
first letter was sufficient had been clearly and conclusively answered. 
 
Any suggestion that reliance on the first letter is unfair is unfounded.  It is 
critical to remember that Textron’s untimely evidentiary submission was not the 
result of any detrimental reliance on the second letter.  Textron submitted its 
evidence before the second letter. 
 
In addition to implying detrimental reliance, Textron devotes considerable 
time to pointing out that the commission itself was untimely in scheduling 
commission examinations pursuant to the first letter.  This argument is irrelevant.  
It matters not what the commission did.  What matters is that Textron was given a 
deadline by which to file its evidence and Textron did not comply.  That the 
commission may not have scheduled its examinations within ninety days as 
specified in the letter does not advance Textron’s cause. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby reversed and the 
commission’s original grant of permanent and total disability is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I dissent and would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals that remanded this cause to the commission to 
issue a new order based on evidence submitted in timely response to the second 
acknowledgment letter.  To find that the first letter controls the filing deadline, as 
the majority does (even while acknowledging the confusing state of the applicable 
statutes), the majority unfairly penalizes the employer for the commission’s 
confusion and mistake.  The employer had a right to rely on the second deadline.  
The commission is still free to review and evaluate the additional medical reports 
and still award PTD if it finds the reports not credible.  If they are credible, the 
claimant has not earned PTD.  Fairness to both parties still results. 
 
Therefore, I would affirm the appellate court’s judgment granting the writ 
of mandamus. 
__________________ 
 
Crosby, O’Brien & Associates Co., L.P.A., Elizabeth A. Crosby and Steven 
P. Dlott, for appellee. 
 
William R. Hamelberg, for appellant. 
__________________