Title: BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY v. MADSEN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY v. MADSEN2002 WY 13553 P.3d 1088Case Number: 01-238Decided: 09/19/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                                                   

BP 
AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY, a

foreign 
corporation; and MARATHON

OIL 
COMPANY, a foreign corporation,

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

LARRY 
MADSEN as Special Trustee of the

H.M. 
KLAENHAMMER REVOCABLE

TRUST 
DATED MAY 9, 1996, Successor to

H.M. 
KLAENHAMMER; and ROBERT W.

SCOTT, 
Individually and as Managing Member

of 
R.W. SCOTT INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Suing 
on Behalf of Themselves and All Other

Similarly 
Situated Royalty Owners,

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Frank D. Neville, Richard E. Day and Scott W. Skavdahl of Williams, 
Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming; Kirby J. Iler of Marathon Oil 
Company, Cody, Wyoming; Michael Homeyer of BP Amoco Corporation, Houston Texas; 
Harrell Feldt and Richard H. Page of Vinson & Elkins, LLP, Houston, Texas; 
and Sheryl L. Hopkins of Vinson & Elkins, LLP, Dallas, Texas.

 
            
             
           
             
          

Representing 
Appellees:

J. Nicholas Murdock, Cody L. Balzer, Mark L. Carman and 
Scott J. Olheiser of Balzer Carman Murdock, P.C., Casper, Wyoming; Robert P. 
Schuster and Gary L. Shockey of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming; Charles Carpenter, Denver, Colorado; and Samuel Issacharoff, New York, 
New York.

 
 
              
             
         
        

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* and VOIGT, JJ., and 
KALOKATHIS, D.J.

 
      

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      The Third 
Judicial District Court has presented two certified questions concerning the 
jurisdictional provision contained in the Wyoming Royalty Payment Act (the 
WRPA), which is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-303(b) (LexisNexis 2001).  We conclude that the 
WRPA does not confer exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under it in the 
district court for the county in which a particular well is located; rather, the 
intent of the WRPA is to allow such claims to be brought in the district court 
of any county in which a well is located.

 
       
            
               
                
     

FACTS

 

[¶2]      The appellees are 
the Plaintiffs and the appellants are the Defendants in a civil action in the 
district court in Lincoln County.1  The Plaintiffs, as holders of overriding 
royalty interests, seek additional royalties under the WRPA from the Defendants, 
who are the oil and gas producers.  
The lawsuit covers claims for wells located in Lincoln County and in 
other Wyoming counties.  An issue 
has been raised whether the district court for Lincoln County has jurisdiction 
over the claims arising from wells not located in that county.  In that regard, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-303(b) 
provides:

 
       
 

The 
district court for the county in which a well producing oil, gas or related 
hydrocarbons is located has jurisdiction over all proceedings brought pursuant 
to this article 
and 
the prevailing party in any proceedings brought pursuant to this article shall 
be entitled to recover all court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees.

(Emphasis added.)

 
 

CERTIFIED 
QUESTIONS

 

[¶3]      In a Notice of 
Agreement to Answer Certified Questions dated December 4, 2001, we informed the 
district court and the parties that we would answer the following certified 
questions:

 
    
            
            

1.         
Does 
Wyo.Stat. § 30-5-303(b) confer exclusive jurisdiction over claims under the 
Wyoming Royalty Payment Act in the district court for the county in which a well 
producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons is located?

 
         
              
          

2.         
If 
so, may the provisions of Wyo.R.Civ.P. 23 override the grant of exclusive 
jurisdiction such that a district court may, in the context of a class action, 
adjudicate WRPA claims relating to wells not located in the county in which the 
class action is pending?

 
            
              
             
     

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶4]      In a W.R.A.P. 11 
certification of questions of law, we rely entirely upon the factual 
determinations made in the trial court.  
Wexpro Co. v. Brimhall, 7 P.3d 42, 43 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Allhusen v. State By and 
Through Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 881 
(Wyo. 1995)).  The following rules apply when the question is one of statutory 
intent:

 
      
     

"[W]e 
look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the 
statute is ambiguous.  Olheiser 
v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo.1994), 
citing Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo.1993).  A statute 
is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able 
to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Parker Land & Cattle, at 
1043.  Conversely, a statute is 
ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations.  Id.  . . .  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  Id.

            
. . .

            
When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of 
statutory construction.  Tietema 
v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo.1996); Butts v. State Board of 
Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo.1996).  Instead, our inquiry revolves around the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  In 
doing so, we view the statute as a whole in order to ascertain its intent and 
general purpose and also the meaning of each part.  We give effect to every word, clause 
and sentence and construe all components of a statute in pari 
materia.'  Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1042."

 
  
  

Murphy 
v. State Canvassing Bd., 
12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Campbell County School Dist. 
v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Wyo. 2000)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶5]      The position of 
the Defendants is simple and straightforward.  They contend that the statute contains 
an unambiguous geographic limitation that allows claims to be brought under the 
WRPA only in the district court for the county in which the well 
is located.  They further argue that 
the legislature is empowered to set the jurisdictional limits of the state's 
courts.  See Wyo. Const. art. 
5, § 10; Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Blury-Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117, 1121 
(Wyo. 1998) (legislature sets jurisdictional limits 
of county courts); Glandt v. Taylor, 920 P.2d 647, 649 (Wyo. 
1996) (superseded by statute) (district court 
granting divorce to retain jurisdiction); Stalkup v. State Dept. of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ), 838 P.2d 705, 714 (Wyo. 1992) (actions brought against DEQ to be 
brought in Laramie County); and Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 
1340 (Wyo. 1988) (superseded by statute) (district court 
granting divorce to retain jurisdiction).  
Because oil and gas royalty interests are 
real property interests, the Defendants also find the geographic limitation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-303(b) to be consistent with the general rule that real 
property disputes are handled where the real property is located.

 
           
            
             
     

[¶6]      The position of 
the Plaintiffs is equally simple and straightforward.  While they do not specifically state 
that the statute is unambiguous, they do contend that the statute clearly allows 
for suits to be brought where a (meaning "any") well is located, 
not just where the well is located.  They stress the fact that the WRPA, as a 
remedial statute, is to be liberally construed to achieve its goal of preventing 
underpayment by producers.  
See Moncrief v. Harvey, 816 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo. 
1991); 
State v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 804 P.2d 671, 672 (Wyo. 
1991); 
and Wold v. Hunt Oil Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335 (D.Wyo. 
1999).  Finally, despite the legislature's use 
of the word "jurisdiction," the Plaintiffs contend that this is actually a venue 
issue.  See Stalkup, 
838 P.2d at 714 (statute requiring suits against DEQ to 
be in Laramie County is a venue statute); Matter of Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Wyo. 1989) (geographic filing limitation in worker's 
compensation statute referred to venue, not jurisdiction); and Myuskovich v. 
State ex rel. Osborn, 59 Wyo. 406, 141 P.2d 540, 543 (1943) (word "jurisdiction" in paternity statute 
referred to venue rather than to subject matter jurisdiction).

 
     
        

[¶7]      To the extent 
necessary to answer the certified questions before us, we find Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
30-5-303(b) to be unambiguous.  
Further, we agree with the Plaintiffs that the statute allows WRPA claims 
to be brought in the district court of any county where a well at 
issue is located.  From high school 
English class, we know that the word "a" is an indefinite article, while the 
word "the" is a definite article.  
Beyond that, the dictionary definitions are not very helpful in allowing 
us to understand the common meanings of the words.  According to Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 1 (10th ed. 
1999), 
"a" may be "used as a function word before a singular noun followed by a 
restrictive modifier ."  According to the same source, "a" may 
also mean "any."  Id.  On the other hand, "the" is "used as a 
function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite 
or has been previously specified by context or by circumstance ."  Id. at 1221.  Simply put, it is the difference between 
"bring me a book" and "bring me the book."  
In the first instance, any book will do; in 
the second instance, a particular book is expected.

 
             
   

[¶8]      This Court has 
previously looked at the meanings of "a" and "the."  In McClanahan v. Woodward Const. 
Co., 77 Wyo. 362, 316 P.2d 337, 341 (1957) (quoting Webster's New 
International Dictionary 2617 (2d ed. 1935)), 
we said that "[t]he [is a] demonstrative adjective used chiefly before a noun 
to individualize, specialize, or generalize its meaning, having a force thus 
distinguished from the indefinite distributive force of a, an and 
from the abstract force of an unqualified noun.'"  Other courts agree that, in construing 
statutes, the definite article "the" is a word of limitation as opposed to the 
indefinite or generalizing force of "a" or "an."  Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 
450 P.2d 653, 655 (1969); 
United States v. Hudson, 65 F. 68, 71 (W.D.Ark. 1894).  The ordinary meaning of "a" is 
"any."  Castillo-Plaza v. 
Green, 655 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla.App.), review dismissed by Giron v. 
Noy, 661 So. 2d 824 (Fla.), review granted by Pierre v. North Shore 
Medical Center, Inc., 663 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1995), quashed, 671 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1996).  In a statute, "a" usually means 
"any."  Application of Hotel St. 
George Corp., 207 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (N.Y.Supp. 1960) (quoting Lindley v. 
Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E.2d 832, 837 (1944)).  See also Chavira v. State, 167 
Tex.Crim. 197, 319 S.W.2d 115, 120 (1958) ("a" is synonymous with "any").

 
    

[¶9]      If we apply this 
reasoning to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-303(b), the pertinent portion reads "[t]he 
district court for the county in which any well producing oil, gas 
or related hydrocarbons is located has jurisdiction over all proceedings brought 
pursuant to this article . . .."  
Clearly, the legislature intended that cases under the WRPA may be 
brought in any of the counties where one of the wells at issue is located.  This reading of the statute is much more 
reasonable than the alternativethat multiple suits involving the same issues 
and between the same parties must be brought in all the counties where a well is 
located.  Had the legislature 
intended that effect, it would have provided that "the district court for the 
county in which the well producing oil, gas 
or related hydrocarbons is located has jurisdiction over all proceedings related 
to that well brought pursuant to this article . . .."

 
       
           
        

CONCLUSION

 

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-303(b) is 
unambiguous.  It provides that 
claims under the WRPA may be brought in the district court of any county where 
any of the wells at issue is located.  
Therefore, we answer the first certified question, "No."  That answer renders the second certified 
question moot.  Furthermore, because 
we have not accepted the Defendants' argument that the statute contemplates a 
geographical limitation on district court jurisdiction, we need not address the 
Plaintiffs' response that such limitation is unconstitutional.  And finally, neither is it necessary to 
determine whether, despite use of the word "jurisdiction," the legislative 
intent was to create a venue provision, as is argued by the Defendants.2

 

[¶11]   This case is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consonant herewith.

 
      
      

FOOTNOTES

  1BP America Production Company has 
been substituted for Amoco Production Company.

  2In Myuskovich, 141 P.2d  at 
543, 
Justice Blume reached just that conclusion in construing a statute with similar 
language, including the word "jurisdiction."