Title: Talbott v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Talbott v. State1995 WY 160902 P.2d 719Case Number: 94-211Decided: 09/20/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Timothy 
Lee TALBOTT, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender; Deborah A. Cornia, Appellate Counsel; Gerald 
M. Gallivan, Director, Sam D. Starritt, and Gregory J. Blenkinsop (argued), 
Student Interns, Defender Aid Program, for appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts (argued), for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Timothy Lee 
Talbott (appellant) was convicted of second degree murder in the shooting death 
of his wife, Betty Jo Talbott. On appeal, appellant argues that his conviction 
should be reversed because the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
statements he made to the police without Miranda1 warnings and without honoring his 
request for counsel or that the statements should have been suppressed because 
they were the product of an earlier, illegal custodial interrogation. Appellant 
also raises a claim relating to an instruction rejected by the trial court on 
the standard used by the jury to judge the voluntariness of a 
confession.

[¶2]  We affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
three issues:

I. 
Did the trial court improperly deny appellant's motion to suppress statements he 
made on September 26, 1993, at the Campbell County sheriff's office, during a 
custodial interrogation, because the interrogating officers did not administer 
Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation and did not honor appellant's 
request for counsel, pursuant to Edwards, all in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 
Six and Eleven of the Wyoming Constitution?

II. 
Were appellant's statements made during the September 26, 1993 stationhouse 
interrogation suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree?

III. 
Did the trial court err when it rejected defendant's proffered Jury Instruction 
No. 12 instructing the jury that they must find the defendant's statements were 
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt when Wyoming follows the Massachusetts rule 
and Massachusetts' juries are instructed to find statements to be voluntary 
beyond a reasonable doubt before relying on them?

The 
State responds with two issues:

I. 
Did the district court err by not suppressing the statements appellant made to 
law enforcement on September 26, 1993, and did the State's reference to those 
statements in its opening statement constitute reversible error?

II. 
Did the district court properly refuse appellant's proffered jury instruction 
requiring the jury to find appellant's confession voluntary beyond a reasonable 
doubt?

[¶4]      Betty Talbott 
died of a single gunshot wound to the head in the early morning hours of 
September 25, 1993, at the Talbott's mobile home. The core of appellant's brief 
on appeal deals with whether statements made by him to law enforcement personnel 
during an interview at the county sheriff's office should have been suppressed. 
At the interview, appellant admitted that he had shot his wife but claimed that 
it was an accident.2 A motion to suppress hearing was 
held, and the trial court determined that the confession was admissible. 
Appellant argues that the confession should have been suppressed for any one of 
three reasons: it was a custodial interrogation and he was not given his Miranda 
warnings; he was denied his right to counsel per Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981); and/or the confession was the fruit 
of the poisonous tree since the interrogation was tainted by an earlier illegal 
interrogation the day before at appellant's motel room. The State, of course, 
counters that the interview at the station was proper and the trial court did 
not err in refusing to suppress the confession.

[¶5]      The problem we 
confront is that the confession was never admitted into evidence at trial. It is 
irrelevant whether or not the confession should have been suppressed. In order 
for a claimed error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a reasonable 
probability that, but for the error, the verdict would have been more favorable 
to the defendant. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67 (Wyo. 1989); Zabel v. 
State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988). The jury never considered the confession; 
therefore, there could be no prejudice to appellant during the trial based on 
the legality of it. Without prejudice, there is no reasonable probability that 
appellant's verdict would have been more favorable to him.

[¶6]      Furthermore, 
since this confession was not used, appellant's related claim about the 
propriety of his proposed jury instruction regarding the correct standard for 
determining the voluntariness of a confession is moot and will not be 
considered. Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 154 
(Wyo. 1981); Weddle v. State, 621 P.2d 231, 234 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶7]      There is one 
issue, considered peripherally by appellant in his brief, which does merit 
discussion. During his opening statement, the prosecutor mentioned the 
confession:

May 
it please the Court, Counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. The charge in 
this case is second degree murder, and the State's evidence will show you that 
Betty Talbott was murdered by Tim Talbott, her husband - that man seated right 
there on the corner - by his own confession given to law enforcement 
officers.

He'll 
describe how about 1:30 in the morning of September 25, 1993, at the parties' 
home here in Gillette, after an alcohol fueled argument, he held a .25 caliber 
pistol to Betty Talbott's head and fired a bullet into her brain.

He'll 
tell you in his confession how after the argument he retrieved the pistol from a 
closet in their home, how he pressed it to Betty Talbott's forehead to shut her 
up, as he put it. As he held the pistol there with his finger on the trigger, he 
will claim that the pistol discharged by accident as he stumbled or staggered, 
and that it killed his wife.

You'll 
learn also from that same confession how for the next 12 hours after the 
shooting the defendant left Betty Talbott's lifeless body seated right where 
she'd been killed while he drank, made a trip to a liquor store, and tried to 
decide what to do.

His 
confession will show you that at last he decided to call his father and claim 
that Betty had committed suicide.

The 
question we contemplate is whether it was reversible error for the prosecutor to 
mention the confession in his opening statement, when that confession was never 
introduced into evidence during the trial. We conclude that it is 
not.

[¶8]      Appellant did not 
object to the remarks in opening statement, thus our review is confined to a 
search for plain error. Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 762 (Wyo. 1995). Appellant 
has the burden of proving that the record clearly shows what occurred at trial, 
a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law occurred, which adversely 
affected a substantial right. Id.

[¶9]      Opening statement 
should be a brief abstract of the issues and the evidence which the prosecutor 
intends to offer and believes in good faith will be available and admissible. 
Vasquez v. State, 623 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Standard 3-5.5, Vol. 
I, American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2nd ed. 1980)). An 
instruction to the jury that arguments, statements or remarks by counsel are not 
evidence may be sufficient to cure any error that may exist. Vasquez, 623 P.2d 
at 1207-08; Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 291 (Wyo. 1974). Absent bad faith in 
the argument by the prosecutor, prejudicial error will not be presumed. Goodman 
v. State, 601 P.2d 178, 188 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶10]   The prosecutor in this case had a 
good faith belief that the evidence was available and admissible. The trial 
court had already ruled, in pre-trial suppression hearing, that the confession 
was admissible. The prosecutor had a right to rely on that ruling. The record 
also indicates that the prosecutor intended to offer the confession but, for 
tactical reasons, decided otherwise after the first day of trial. In any event, 
by mentioning evidence in opening that does not emerge during trial, the 
prosecutor leaves himself open to attack by the defense on issues of credibility 
and fairness, further mitigating any prejudicial effect the statements may have 
had. Boyd, 528 P.2d  at 291.

[¶11]   Moreover, error, if any existed, 
was sufficiently cured by the trial court's instructions to the jury that 
remarks of counsel were not evidence and should be disregarded. Vasquez, 623 
P.2d at 1207-08; Boyd, 528 P.2d  at 291. The trial court so informed the jury 
orally, prior to opening, and then later in the written instructions. We find no 
prejudice to the defendant in the prosecutor's opening remarks.

CONCLUSION

[¶12]  There being no error in appellant's 
trial, his conviction is affirmed in its entirety.

Footnotes

1 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 
(1966).

2 
Both parties refer to the statements made as a "confession." For the sake of 
simplicity, hereinafter, so will we.