Title: BRENT LEE SIX V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRENT LEE SIX V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 42180 P.3d 912Case Number: S-07-0199Decided: 04/09/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
BRENT 
LEE SIX,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Brent 
Lee Six (Six), appeals from the district court's judgment and sentence which 
found him guilty of escape.  Six 
contends that the State erred in failing to afford him an initial appearance 
within 72 hours of his arrest, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 5(a), and that 
circumstance requires dismissal of the charges against him.  In addition, he contends that the 
district court erred in instructing the jury as to the intent element of the 
crime of escape, and that error requires reversal of his conviction.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Six states these 
issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the failure to afford Brent Six an initial appearance within 72 hours 
of arrest constitute a violation of W.R.Cr.P. 5(a) and warrant a dismissal of 
the case?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err in failing to include intent as an element of 
escape?

 
 
The 
State contends:

 
 
I.          
Was [Six] arrested for the crime of escape on October 25, 2006, and 
therefore denied his rights under W.R.Cr.P. 5, or was he simply transferred to 
the sheriff's custody pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-113, due to a violation 
of the conditions of his placement at a community correctional 
facility?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court fail to properly instruct the jury on intent as an 
element of escape?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On October 25, 
2006, Six was a transitional inmate in the custody of the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections and was housed at Community Alternatives of Casper 
(CAC).

 
 
[¶4]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-18-110 (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
§ 
7-18-110. Authority of department of corrections to contract for 
services.

            
(a)  Subject to legislative appropriation, the department may, 
by negotiation without competitive bids or by competitive bidding, contract with 
any community corrections board created under this act, to provide services 
for:

                        
(i)  Convicted felony offenders ordered by a sentencing court 
to participate in adult community correctional facilities or programs as a 
condition of probation;

                        
(ii)  Inmates 
transferred to a residential adult community correctional facility by the 
department pursuant to W.S. 7-18-109; or

                        
(iii)  Parolees required to participate in a residential or 
nonresidential adult community correctional program as a condition of parole 
pursuant to W.S. 7-18-115.

            
(b)  No inmate, parolee or offender shall be deemed to be a 
third party beneficiary of, or to be otherwise entitled to enforce any provision 
of, any contract entered into under subsection (a) of this section.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Six was 
transferred to CAC by the Department of Corrections under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-18-109 (LexisNexis 2007):

 
 
§ 
7-18-109. Transfer of inmate to facility by 
department.

            
(a)  Subject to subsection (b) of this section, and upon 
recommendation of the warden or superintendent of the institution, the 
department may transfer an adult inmate to a residential adult community 
correctional facility.

            
(b)  A transfer of an inmate to a residential adult community 
correctional facility under this section may be made only 
if:

                        
(i)  The department determines the inmate poses a low risk of 
escape or violence;

                        
(ii)  The inmate is eligible under W.S. 
7-18-102(a)(iii);

                        
(iii)  The inmate is within at least twenty-four (24) months of 
his parole eligibility date and his conduct during his confinement has been such 
that he is appropriate for placement;

                        
(iv)  The residential adult community correctional facility is 
operated under a contract with a corrections board and the corrections board has 
contracted with the department to provide services which include placement of 
pre-parole inmates;

                        
(v)  The inmate has been accepted by the corrections 
board;

                        
(vi)  Funding for the placement is available; 
and

                        
(vii)  The department determines the correctional needs of the 
inmate will be better served by the transfer.

            
(c)  Prior to the placement of an inmate in any nongovernmental 
adult community correctional facility, the department shall notify or cause to 
be notified the law enforcement agencies of affected units of local government 
concerning the identity of the inmate to be placed.

            
(d)  No inmate shall be transferred to a residential adult 
community corrections facility under this section unless he agrees in writing to 
abide by the regulations of the program provider and any additional conditions 
imposed by the department.  Approval of a transfer under this section 
is not a discharge of the inmate but shall be construed as an extension of the 
limits of confinement of the institution to which the inmate was 
committed.  The department may 
revoke the approval of the transfer of an inmate under this section at any time 
for violation by the inmate of any conditions of the placement.  Upon revocation the inmate shall be 
returned to the physical custody of the department.

            
(e)  The probation and parole officers for the judicial 
district shall have general supervisory authority over all inmates in adult 
community correctional facilities or programs under this section.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶5]      The underlying 
facts that constitute the escape charge are not in dispute and we set them out 
only briefly for purposes of background and context.  At 7:10 a.m., on October 25, 2006, Six 
left CAC to go to work.  When he 
arrived at work, he was fired because he had not shown up for work the preceding 
day and had not called to say he was not coming to work.  He then returned to CAC but did not sign 
himself back into the facility.  
Instead, he picked up another inmate and left.  At 3:00 p.m. that same day, Six returned 
to CAC and was transferred to the custody of the Natrona County Sheriff pending 
review of his case under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-113 (LexisNexis 2007), which 
provides:

 
 
§ 
7-18-113. Confinement of violators.

If the 
administrator of an adult community correctional facility or any other 
appropriate supervising authority has cause to believe that an offender, parolee 
or inmate placed in an adult community correctional facility has violated any 
rule or condition of that person's placement in that facility or any term of 
post-release supervision or cannot be safely housed in that facility, the 
administrator or other authority shall certify to the department the facts which 
are the basis for the belief and execute a transfer order to the sheriff of the 
county in which the facility is located, who shall confine the offender, parolee 
or inmate in the county jail pending a determination by the appropriate judicial 
or executive authorities as to whether or not the offender, parolee or inmate 
shall remain in community corrections.

 
 
[¶6]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-18-112 (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
§ 
7-18-112. Escape.

            
(a)  An offender, parolee or an inmate is deemed guilty of 
escape from official detention and shall be punished as provided by W.S. 
6-5-206(a)(i) if, without proper authorization, he:

                        
(i)  Fails to remain within the extended limits of his 
confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an adult community 
correctional facility to which he was assigned or transferred;  or

                        
(ii)  Being a participant in a program established under the 
provisions of this act he leaves his place of employment or fails or neglects to 
return to the adult community correctional facility within the time prescribed 
or when specifically ordered to do so.

 
 
[¶7]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-206(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
§ 
6-5-206. Escape from official detention; penalties.

            
(a)  A person commits a crime if he escapes from official 
detention.  Escape 
is:

                        
(i)  A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years, if the detention is the result of a conviction for a 
felony;

                        
(ii)  A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
three (3) years, a fine of not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000.00), or 
both, if the detention is the result of:

(A)  A 
conviction for a misdemeanor; or

(B)  An 
arrest or charge for a crime.

 
 
As used 
in the above statute, "official detention" means "arrest, detention in a 
facility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of crime or alleged 
or found to be delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or 
detention in any manner and in any place for law enforcement purposes.  Official detention' does not include 
supervision on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release on 
bail[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-201(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
An arrest warrant for the crime of escape was issued on November 8, 2006, 
and Six was given an initial appearance that same day.  Because it was the State's intent to try 
Six for the escape, he was maintained in the county jail, rather than being 
returned to the state penitentiary.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Failure 
to Provide Initial Appearance

 
 
[¶8]      We review the 
construction of rules of procedure in the same manner and under the same 
standards as we do statutes, i.e., they present questions of law that we review 
de novo.  Bixler v. Oro Management, LLC, 2006 WY 
140, ¶ 5, 145 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Wyo. 2006).  Although the district court made some 
very brief findings, they were in the nature of applying undisputed facts to the 
applicable law.  Thus, we are not 
called upon to review the district court's factual findings under the usual 
clearly erroneous standard.

 
 
[¶9]      Six contends that 
the failure of the State to provide him with an initial appearance requires 
reversal of his conviction for escape from the CAC.  W.R.Cr.P. 5(a) 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Initial appearance before a judicial 
officer. -- A person arrested and in custody shall be taken without 
unnecessary delay before a judicial officer of the court from which the warrant 
issued or if no warrant has issued before a judicial officer of the court where 
the charging document will be filed. A person arrested without a warrant shall 
be released from custody unless probable cause for the arrest is established to 
the satisfaction of a judicial officer without unnecessary delay, but in no more 
than 72 hours. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a 
judicial officer an information or citation shall be filed at or before the 
initial appearance and, unless a judicial officer has previously found probable 
cause for the arrest, probable cause shall be established by affidavit or sworn 
testimony. When a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a summons, 
appears initially before the judicial officer, the judicial officer shall 
proceed in accordance with the applicable subdivision of this 
rule.

 
 
[¶10]   Six was moved from the CAC to the 
county jail on October 25, 2006.  It 
appears that he was released on bond of $10,000.00 (cash or corporate surety) on 
November 8, 2006.  His preliminary 
hearing was held on November 16, 2006.  
On December 27, 2006, Six appeared before the district court for 
arraignment.  On January 25, 2007, 
Six filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him on the basis that he had 
not had a speedy initial hearing.  
In that pleading he did not cite any pertinent authority or make any 
cogent argument in support of his position.  On February 6, 2007, the State responded 
to that motion, asserting that W.R.Cr.P.5(a) did not apply to the circumstances 
of Six's case, and that Six was properly and legally incarcerated, as the 
sentence that he was then serving would not be completed until February 27, 
2007.  The district court held a 
hearing on February 22, 2007, and by order entered of record on March 13, 2007, 
the district court denied Six's motion, stating that the extreme remedy of 
dismissal was not warranted in his circumstances.

 
 
[¶11]   In this appeal, Six attempts to 
liken his circumstances to the authority that we have applied in cases involving 
violation of the right to a speedy trial.  
We conclude that such an argument by analogy simply will not stand up in 
the face of the statutes that governed Six's status as an "inmate" already 
incarcerated, or in light of the purposes of Rule 5(a) itself, i.e., that 
persons not be incarcerated for more than 72 hours without there being  judicial intervention made 
available.  See Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 466 
(Wyo. 1979); 1 Wright & Leipold, Federal Practice and Procedure Criminal 
4th § 72 (2008) (e.g., statements obtained after significant delay 
may be suppressed; however Miranda 
warnings are the "more robust doctrine for regulating confessions;" such delay 
may give rise to civil liability; initial burden is on defendant; and undue 
delay may be explained by circumstances).  
Although Six concedes that there is no authority that requires dismissal 
with prejudice in these circumstances, he argues that his analogy should at 
least require dismissal without prejudice.  
However, we decline to embrace that argument because we deem it to be a 
doctrine that applies to persons newly incarcerated and not those whose 
incarceration has merely undergone a geographic change and/or a change in the 
degree of incarceration.  There may 
be circumstances where such changes warrant an internal, administrative-type 
hearing or procedure, but not an initial appearance before a judicial officer 
under Rule 5(a).

 
 
Jury 
Instructions

 
 
[¶12]   Six contends that the district 
court erred in instructing the jury and that he raised an objection to the form 
of the instructions in the district court.  
Specifically at issue are Instructions 10, 12 and 13.  In a case quite similar to the one at 
bar, Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, 
¶ 9, 152 P.3d 401, 404-5 (Wyo. 2007), we iterated the standard of review to 
be applied in circumstances such as those presented here:

 
 
We have 
a well-established standard for the review of jury instructions, which standard 
incorporates the test to be applied when there was no trial 
objection:

 
 
Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors 
concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings 
with respect to the material facts, instructions should be written with the 
particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from 
case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally 
correct, a failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal 
offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and 
the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary 
elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been 
committed.

 
 

Mueller 
v. State, 2001 
WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 23, 
29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo.2001) and Metzger v. 
State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo.2000)).  
We analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual 
instructions or parts thereof.  
Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo.2001).  We give 
trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and "'will not find reversible 
error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the 
law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were 
presented at the trial.' "  
Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 
(Wyo.1997)).  Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002).  

 
 
            
Finally, we have indicated that when an appellant does not object at 
trial to the jury instructions, or request that a certain instruction be 
included, our review of this issue follows our plain error 
standard:

 
 
First, 
the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Last, 
appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice against him.  

Ogden v. 
State, 2001 
WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001) (quoting In Interest of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 
(Wyo.1988));  see also Brown, ¶ 10.

 
 

Leyva v. 
State, 2005 
WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo.2005).

 
 
[¶13]   In Seymore, we considered the question of 
informing the jury of the mens rea element of the crime of escape, 
holding:

 
 
The 
instructions were inadequate :  
"even a general intent crime requires a showing that the prohibited 
conduct was undertaken voluntarily."  
Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 
939 (Wyo.1999) (citing Crozier v. 
State, 723 P.2d 42, 52 (Wyo.1986)).  
The law of intent, as applied to the facts of this case, required the 
State to prove that the appellant voluntarily failed to return to FCS at the 
required time.  Unfortunately, the 
jury was not instructed that it had to find the failure to return to have been 
voluntary.  Without voluntary 
conduct, there is no mens rea.   
No crime has been committed, for instance, if an adult community 
corrections resident fails to return to the facility because of disabling 
injuries suffered in an automobile accident or a natural calamity.  As we stated in Reilly, quoting from Dorador, "[w]hen the statute sets out 
the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without 
reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the 
trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed 
act."  Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d  
at 1262 (quoting Dorador v. State, 
573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo.1978)) (emphasis added).  That was not done in this case, and we 
have repeatedly stated that it is fundamental error requiring reversal for a 
trial court to fail to instruct on an essential element of the charged 
crime.  Leyva, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d  at 
876; Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, 
¶ 10, 100 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo.2004); Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 
36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001); and Compton, 931 P.2d  
at 940.

 
 

Seymore, 
¶ 15, 152 P.3d  at 406-407.

 
 
[¶14]   Six proffered these objections to 
the instruction at trial:

 
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  


The 
Court [has] included Instruction Number 12 and Instruction Number 13 into the 
packet.  Specifically, I believe 
Number 12 obviously is not a pattern instruction, nor do I think that it 
necessarily states the law, the correct law, out of that particular case [Seymore].  And with respect to Number 13, I agree  
my only objection is that it is not a pattern instruction.  Thank you.

THE 
COURT:  And, actually, you've 
tendered an instruction which I've marked defendant's A; and it is similar to 
12, but it says fail to return within the required time.  And you tendered that, and I marked that 
"Refused."

 
 
[¶15]   The district court agreed that 
Instructions 12 and 13 were not pattern instructions, but deemed them to be 
accurate statements of the law under Seymore, given the facts and 
circumstances of Six's case.

 
 
[¶16]   Instruction No. 10 
read:

 
 

YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED that the 
elements of the crime of Escape from Official Detention, as charged in this 
case, are:

1.  [O]n 
or about the 25th day of October, 
2006;

2.  In 
Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.  The 
Defendant, Brent Six;

4.  Escaped 
by failing to remain within the extended limits of his confinement without 
proper authorization;

5.  [S]aid 
confinement being the result of a felony conviction.

If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

If, on 
the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.

 
 
[¶17]   Instruction No. 12 
read:

 
 
Intent, 
as applied to the facts of this case, requires that the State prove that the 
appellant [sic] voluntarily failed to remain within the extended limits of his 
confinement.

 
 
[¶18]   Instruction No. 13 
read:

 
 
YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED THAT an act is done voluntarily if it is done knowingly or 
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent 
reason.

 
 
[¶19]   In Instruction No. 1, the jury had 
been told that it must read the instructions as a whole and to read each in the 
light of the others.

 
 
[¶20]   The instruction offered by Six was 
this:

 
 
            
Intent, as applied to the facts of this case, requires that the State 
prove that the appellant [sic] voluntarily failed to return to the Community 
Alternatives of Casper facility at the required time.

 
 
[¶21]   Based upon the objections contained 
in the record, as we analyze these instructions, and the objections raised by 
Six, we conclude that the plain error standard applies to the issue that Six has 
raised concerning the instructions.  
Furthermore, it is our conclusion that the instructions, when read 
together and in the light of each other, were adequate to inform the jury that, 
in order to find Six guilty, they had to find that all of the elements listed in 
Instruction No. 10 existed beyond a reasonable doubt, and further that they had 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Six acted voluntarily.  It is, of course, of some considerable 
disappointment that the trial court and the parties did not proof read and 
ponder these instructions a bit more methodically.  Although Six is referred to as 
"appellant" in instruction No. 12, in context we conclude that the jury most 
certainly would have known that "appellant" was a reference to Six, because 
there really was no other possibility.  
However, it does point out the risks of using an indefinite noun, when a 
definite noun is readily available, i.e., "Six," versus "defendant" or 
"appellant."  In addition, the 
intent element should, of course, have been included in Instruction No. 10 with 
the other elements, and it is difficult for us to grasp why it was not.  Nonetheless, while that represents a 
deficiency, it does not rise to a level where we are willing to say that Six was 
prejudiced by that oversight.  While 
the error is readily identifiable in the record, and the applicable rule of law 
is clear and unequivocal, that rule was not violated in a clear and obvious 
way.  Because the rule was 
substantially met by the instructions, we conclude that Six was not prejudiced 
by the error, and we decline to reverse his conviction on that 
basis.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   The failure of the State to provide 
Six with an initial appearance as set out in W.R.Cr.P. 5(a) does not require 
dismissal of the charge against him.  
The instructions were adequate, and the infirmities identified in them do 
not necessitate reversal of his conviction.  Therefore, the judgment and sentence of 
the district court are affirmed.