Title: State ex rel. Sebring v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Sebring v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5258.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5258 
THE STATE EX REL. SEBRING, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Sebring v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5258.] 
Workers’ compensation — Temporary total disability — Claimant’s refusal of 
suitable alternative employment terminates eligibility for continued 
compensation. 
(No. 2008-1639 — Submitted August 11, 2009 — Decided October 7, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 07AP-679,  
2008-Ohio-3625. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} At issue is appellant William R. Sebring Jr.’s eligibility for 
temporary total disability compensation.  Sebring sprained his lower back on July 
12, 2005 while working for appellee, Alro Steel Corporation.  He returned to his 
former position of employment a month later. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
{¶ 2} Sebring was laid off on September 6, 2005.  He has not alleged 
that his layoff was due to injury. A month later, Sebring moved to Cheyenne, 
Wyoming after his wife accepted a job there. 
{¶ 3} Alro — apparently unaware that Sebring had moved — sent a 
letter to Sebring’s Toledo area address on January 9, 2006, informing him that 
based on his seniority, he was being recalled from layoff.  This certified letter was 
returned unclaimed. 
{¶ 4} For reasons that are not clear, Sebring called plant superintendent 
Jeff Guerra three days later.  Guerra informed Sebring of the letter and of his 
recall.  Sebring responded that he would not be coming back to work. 
{¶ 5} In March 2006, Sebring asked appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio to additionally allow his claim for two disc conditions.  That request was 
granted and temporary total disability compensation was awarded from November 
20, 2005, continuing upon submission of medical proof. 
{¶ 6} Sebring’s doctor released him to light-duty work in August 2006.  
This prompted two offers from Alro.  The first was facilitated by CareWorks 
USA, an organization with an office in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  As outlined in 
Alro’s letter of August 16, 2008: 
{¶ 7} “At this time, no position is available with in [sic] your physician 
outlined temporary restrictions at [Alro].  Per Company policy, it has been 
determined that you qualify to participate in the Modified Duty Off-Site [MDOS] 
Program.  Through CareWorks USA, Alro Steel Corporation has agreements with 
several non-profit organizations to provide temporary placement for you within 
your outlined restrictions. 
{¶ 8} “Your CareWorks USA Case Manager * * * has secured a position 
at a [Cheyenne] non-profit facility that is within your physician[’s] outlined 
restrictions.  This is a temporary placement and the purpose of this temporary 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
placement is to facilitate a timely and safe return to work with the goal of 
returning to work on-site at Alro Steel Corporation. 
{¶ 9} “You are scheduled to report to work at Goodwill Industries * * * 
beginning on Friday, August 18th, 2006.  * * * Your CareWorks USA Case 
Manager will be meeting you at the off-site location on this day. * * * 
{¶ 10} “* * * 
{¶ 11} “Please note that refusal of the MDOS placement may result in 
termination of all Workers’ Compensation benefits.” 
{¶ 12} When Sebring’s case manager contacted him to confirm this 
meeting, Sebring responded that he was going to Ohio for several weeks and 
would not be attending his appointment.  Just days later, Alro sent another letter 
to Sebring extending an offer for a light-duty job at its Toledo facility.  Sebring 
visited the Toledo plant on September 8, 2006 to pick up a check.  Alro offered 
him a job on the spot, which Sebring refused because he was going to return to 
Cheyenne. 
{¶ 13} Alro moved the commission to terminate temporary total disability 
compensation based on Sebring’s refusal to accept light-duty work.  The district 
hearing officer granted that motion, and in January 2007 a staff hearing officer 
affirmed: 
{¶ 14} “The Hearing Officer GRANTS the request to terminate Injured 
Worker’s Temporary Total Disability benefits as of 9/8/2006, due to the Injured 
Worker’s refusal of a written light-duty job offer. 
{¶ 15} “The Hearing Officer finds Injured Worker[’s] restrictions are 
outlined by Dr. Cook * * *.  The Hearing Officer finds the written job offer, dated 
9/8/2006, is within Injured Worker’s restrictions as provided by Dr. Cook.  The 
Hearing Officer further finds that on 9/8/2006, the Injured Worker was personally 
provided with a copy of the letter and verbally offered the light-duty work.  
Therefore, the Hearing Officer does not find the Injured Worker’s argument that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
the description of job activity is too vague to be persuasive.  The letter of 
8/21/2006 clearly indicates that the Injured Worker’s work activities would 
include clerical and Administrative work assistance in the second shift operations 
at the Toledo Airport Highway Facility that would include but not be limited to 
general filing and distribution of pick tickets.  The Hearing Officer finds that if 
there was some question or confusion as to whether the job duties were within 
Injured Worker’s restrictions, he could have clarified them at the time he 
personally saw the Employer who provided him with the written description of 
work activity. 
{¶ 16} “Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that pursuant to [State ex 
rel.] Louisiana-Pacific [Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 401, 650 
N.E.2d 469], the Injured Worker was provided with a good faith job offer that 
was within his work restrictions and he refused it.  Therefore, Temporary Total 
Disability benefits should terminate 9/8/2006, the date of the refusal of the job 
offer.” 
{¶ 17} After further administrative proceedings concluded, this order 
became final. 
{¶ 18} Sebring filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County.  Sebring argued, among other things, that Alro’s offer of a job at 
its Toledo facility did not comply with Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) because 
it was not within “reasonable proximity” of his Wyoming home.  The court of 
appeals, speaking through its magistrate, rejected that argument: 
{¶ 19} “It is obvious that the purpose of the ‘reasonable proximity’ rule is 
to prohibit an employer from compelling its injured worker to relocate his 
residence as a condition of further employment.  It is also obvious that the rule 
was not promulgated for the purpose of allowing an injured worker to move his 
residence to a location not in reasonable proximity to the job site of his former 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
position of employment such that the employer cannot offer employment within 
reasonable proximity of the injured worker’s new residence. 
{¶ 20} “Relator’s suggested interpretation of ‘residence’ turns a rule 
designed to protect injured workers into one that can be used by an injured worker 
to prevent the employer from exercising its right under [R.C. 4123.56(A)] to 
make an offer of suitable employment.  In short, relator’s suggested interpretation 
of the word ‘residence’ in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) is inconsistent with 
the above-noted provision of R.C. 4123.56(A) which provides to an employer the 
right to offer suitable alternative employment that will eliminate the payment of 
TTD compensation.”  Id. at ¶ 45-46. 
{¶ 21} The court concluded: 
{¶ 22} “Relator must accept responsibility for his decision to move his 
residence to a location that makes it difficult to accept an offer of suitable 
alternative employment at the location of his former position of employment. 
{¶ 23} “Even though the economic reality of his spouse’s employment 
may have prompted the relocation of his residence, relator cannot shift to the 
employer the responsibility of accommodating the difficulty of his reporting to 
work at Toledo, Ohio, when his residence is at Cheyenne, Wyoming.”  Id. at ¶ 54-
55. 
{¶ 24} The denial of a writ of mandamus has prompted Sebring’s appeal 
to this court as of right. 
{¶ 25} Sebring issues two challenges to the commission’s decision.  The 
first arises from State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio 
St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, which clarified that voluntary 
abandonment and refusal of suitable alternative employment are separate and 
distinct employer defenses to the payment of temporary total disability 
compensation.  Sebring believes that this case involves refusal of suitable 
alternative employment.  Pointing to the order’s citation of Louisiana-Pacific, he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
asserts that the commission confused the two defenses by engaging in a 
voluntary-abandonment analysis.  This proposition fails. 
{¶ 26} The January 2007 order does cite Louisiana-Pacific, 72 Ohio St.3d 
401, 650 N.E.2d 469 – the seminal decision on voluntary abandonment.  The 
order’s discussion, however, focuses solely on Alro’s September 2006 
employment offer.  It does not mention voluntary abandonment or the three-prong 
test that Louisiana-Pacific created.  The commission’s mistaken reference to 
Louisiana-Pacific is inconsequential, given the substance of the order.   
{¶ 27} Sebring also asserts that Alro’s employment offer did not satisfy 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(2)(d) reiterates that 
temporary total disability compensation can be stopped if the hearing officer 
concludes that “the employee has received a written job offer of suitable 
employment.” “Job offer,” in turn, is “a proposal, made in good faith, of suitable 
employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker’s residence.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6). 
{¶ 28} The 
commission 
terminated 
temporary 
total 
disability 
compensation based on Sebring’s refusal of light-duty work at Alro’s Toledo 
facility. Sebring, however, lived in Wyoming by that time, so the proffered 
employment, on that occasion, was not reasonably proximate to his home. This 
has prompted vigorous debate among the parties.  Appellees stress that Sebring 
voluntarily chose to relocate and must accept the repercussions of that decision, 
both positive and negative.  The court of appeals agreed, stating that the employer 
is not required to accommodate an employee who has moved so far away that 
reporting to work is problematic.  Sebring counters that appellees’ position will 
allow employers to terminate the temporary total disability compensation of 
relocated claimants by offering them positions that they know the individual is 
geographically unable to accept. 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
{¶ 29} We find it unnecessary to address these arguments at the present 
time.  Alro secured jobs for Sebring both in Toledo and in Cheyenne, and Sebring 
refused both.  Regardless of which place is deemed to be his residence for 
purposes of Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6), Sebring refused job offers that 
were proximate to each.  Thus, there is no need for analysis of this issue to 
proceed further. 
{¶ 30} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. 
Bowman, for appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Sandra E. Pinkerton, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Law Offices of Margelefsky & Mezinko, L.L.C., and Vincent S. Mezinko, 
for appellee Alro Steel Corporation. 
______________________