Title: Dept. of Corrections v. Henderson

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Secretary, Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and
Commissioner, Division of Correction v. Vincent Henderson
No. 39, Sept. Term, 1998
Diminution of credits.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case #98128904/CH769
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 39
September Term, 1998
______________________________________
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
AND COMMISSIONER, DIVISION
OF CORRECTION
v.
VINCENT HENDERSON
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
Bell, C.J.; Rodowsky and Chasanow, JJ, concur
and dissent.
______________________________________
Filed:  October 8, 1998
We granted certiorari to review an order of Judge Joseph H. H. Kaplan, of the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, directing that the State Division of Correction release Vincent
Henderson from custody.  We shall affirm that order, but for different reasons than those
used by Judge Kaplan.
This appeal requires that we revisit two earlier decisions — Md. House of Corrections
v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 167 (1997) and Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d
608 (1998).  Those cases and this one involve the method of calculating diminution credits
that prisoners are eligible to earn for good conduct while incarcerated, and it would be
helpful to begin by reviewing that subject.
 Inmates in the State correctional system are generally eligible to earn four kinds of
credits against their sentences — credits for good conduct, for performing work tasks
assigned to them, for satisfactory progress in vocational or other educational and training
courses, and for special work projects.  All of those credits are provided for in Maryland
Code, Article 27, § 700.  Credits for work tasks (five days a month), vocational or
educational courses (five days a month), and special projects (up to ten days a month) are
awarded monthly, as earned.  Credits for good conduct, however, are deducted in advance,
subject to being forfeited if the inmate misbehaves in various ways.
Until 1992, good conduct credits were deducted at the rate of five days a month.
Section 700 provided, in relevant part, that an inmate was allowed “a deduction in advance
from the inmate’s term of confinement” at the rate of five days for each calendar month,
“from the first day of commitment to the custody of the Commissioner [of Correction]
-2-
through the last day of the inmate’s maximum term of confinement.”  Md. Code, Art. 27,
§ 700 (1992 Repl. Vol.).  Section 700(a) defined “term of confinement” as 
“(1) The length of the sentence for a single sentence; or
  
 (2) The period from the first day of the sentence beginning first
through the last day of the sentence ending last for:
(i) Concurrent sentences;
          (ii) Partially concurrent sentences;
         (iii) Consecutive sentences; or
         (iv) A combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences.”
That statutory regime worked quite well so long as all inmates were eligible for the
same number of monthly credits, regardless of the crime for which they were sentenced or
the dates upon which their respective sentences were imposed.  An inmate serving a single
ten-year sentence received, in advance, a credit of 600 days (five days per month times 120
months) upon the first day of commitment.  An inmate sentenced to two consecutive five
year terms also received a credit of 600 days upon the first day of commitment, as his or her
sentences were aggregated in accordance with § 700(a) to constitute a single term of
confinement, commencing on the first day of the first sentence and ending on the last day of
the second sentence.
When, through the application of these and any other credits earned, the inmate served
his or her effective sentence, the inmate was released on what is known as mandatory
supervision.  That term is defined in Article 41, § 4-501(13) of the Code as “a conditional
release from imprisonment which is granted to any person sentenced after July 1, 1970 to the
jurisdiction of the Division of Correction who has served the term or terms, less the
 Section 704A of Article 27 allows for similar credits during any period that the inmate was
1
detained in a correctional facility prior to sentencing.  Those credits are applied against the sentence
ultimately imposed for the crime.
-3-
deductions provided for in Article 27, §§ 700 and 704A of the Code.”   Persons released on
1
mandatory supervision remain in legal custody until expiration of their full term and are
subject to all laws, regulations, and conditions applicable to parolees.  See Article 41, § 4-
612(b) and (c).  If they violate the conditions of their mandatory supervision, they may be
returned to prison to complete their sentence.  How much time they will be required to serve
on the preexisting sentence will depend on the extent to which the good conduct credits
earned during their previous incarceration (that led to their release) are forfeited, and what,
if any, credit is given to them for “street time” — the time they spent out of prison prior to
their current infraction.
This relatively simple scheme became complicated as the result of 1992 Md. Laws,
Ch. 588.  In that Act, the General Assembly (1) amended § 700(d)(2) to retain the good
conduct credit of five days a month for “an inmate whose term of confinement includes a
consecutive or concurrent sentence for either a crime of violence as defined in Article 27,
§ 643B of the Code or a crime of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing a
controlled dangerous substance, as provided under Article 27, § 286 of the Code,” and
(2) enacted a new § 700(d)(3), to provide that, for all other inmates, “this deduction shall be
calculated at the rate of 10 days for each calendar month. . . .”  Section 2 of the Act made
the new law applicable “only to a term of confinement imposed on or after October 1, 1992.”
-4-
Neither the definition of “term of confinement,” in § 700(a),  nor the direction in § 700 (d)(1)
that good conduct credits were to be deducted in advance was changed by  Ch. 588.
The 1992 law immediately created a distinction between inmates serving one or more
sentences for a crime of violence or a listed drug offense and inmates incarcerated for other
crimes. That, when coupled with the prospectivity language of Section 2 of the Act, created
a double problem:  it brought into question whether an inmate serving a sentence imposed
prior to October 1, 1992 as well as a sentence imposed after that date was entitled to the
additional five days a month credit on the later sentence and, even if such an inmate
ordinarily would get the additional credit, it raised the question of whether that would be the
case if the earlier sentence was for a violent or listed drug offense.
The problem first surfaced in Md. House of Correction v. Fields, supra, 348 Md. 245,
703 A.2d 167.  In 1988, Fields was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for daytime
housebreaking,  five years of which were suspended.  He received an additional two-year
sentence, to be served consecutively, for violating a probation imposed as the result of a
possession of heroin conviction.  Through the application of various diminution credits,
Fields was released on mandatory supervision in 1992.  In February, 1994, he was convicted
of theft and malicious destruction of property, for which he received an eighteen-month
sentence.  That conviction led to (1) a consecutive six-month sentence for violating one
probation, (2) execution of the suspended five-year term for daytime housebreaking, to be
served concurrently, and (3) revocation by the Maryland Parole Commission of his
mandatory supervision release.  As part of the revocation of the mandatory supervision, the
-5-
Parole Commission rescinded all of the good conduct credits earned prior to Fields’s release
but allowed certain credits for “street time.”  In accordance with the directions set forth in
§ 700, the Division of Correction aggregated the three terms of confinement — eighteen
months, six months, and five years — into a single seven-year term and awarded new good
conduct credits, in advance, against that term at the rate of five days a month.  It awarded the
five days because it determined that Fields’s “term of confinement” included  sentences
imposed prior to October 1, 1992 — the remainder of the sentences imposed in 1988 — and
that it therefore commenced on the first day of that sentence.  Contending that he was
entitled to ten days a month credit on the post-October 1, 1992 sentences, which would
produce a release date eighteen months earlier, Fields filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The Division’s position was based on a strict application of the concept and definition
of “term of confinement.”  If the inmate was serving a term of confinement that included a
sentence imposed prior to October 1, 1992, the inmate continued to receive only five days
a month.  That would preclude inmates, such as Fields, who received a post-October 1, 1992
sentence for a non-violent, non-drug crime from receiving the benefit of the additional five
days a month for that new sentence.  We did not believe that the Legislature intended that
result.  We noted that the intent of the statutory direction to aggregate overlapping or
consecutive sentences into a single term of confinement was “to ensure that inmates serving
more than one sentence at a time [would] not receive good conduct credits for more than one
sentence.”  Fields, supra, 348 Md. at 264-65, 703 A.2d at 177.  After examining some of the
legislative history of Ch. 588, we determined that, in this context, the term was ambiguous
-6-
and needed to be read in a “commonsensical” manner.  We observed, for example, that
“where an inmate is serving two consecutive sentences, one imposed before October 1, 1992
and one imposed after that date, it would be impossible to say that a single “term of
confinement” was imposed either before or after October 1, 1992 because, in fact, the “term
of confinement was imposed both before and after that date.”  Id. at 266, 703 A.2d at 178.
The ambiguity led us to invoke the rule of lenity, requiring that the ambiguity be
construed “against the state and in favor of the [inmate].”  Id. at 267, 703 A.2d at 178.
Application of that rule required the construction that inmates receiving sentences imposed
on or after October 1, 1992 for non-violent, non-drug offenses were eligible to receive a rate
of ten days of good-conduct credits per month with respect to the post-October 1, 1992
sentence.  Id.  To achieve that end, which was the legislative desire, we rejected “the notion
that all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all purposes to a
single term of confinement” and, instead, held “that sentences imposed before October 1,
1992 are separable from new sentences imposed after that date.”  Id. at 267-68, 703 A.2d at
178 (emphasis added).  We decided that “[f]or the purposes of good-conduct credits, new
sentences imposed after October 1, 1992 should be construed as separate instead of
aggregated as part of one single term of confinement,” thereby effectuating the legislative
intent that good conduct credits of five days a month be awarded for sentences imposed prior
to October 1, 1992 and that credits of ten days a month be awarded for non-violent, non-
controlled dangerous substance offenses imposed on or after that date.  Id. at 268, 703 A.2d
at 178.  As to Fields, that meant that he would get the five days with respect to the balance
-7-
of the seven years imposed before October 1, 1992, and ten days for the other sentences.
Beshears v. Wickes, supra, 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 raised the second aspect of the
problem noted above; the factual circumstances were different, but the principle was the
same.  Wickes had been convicted of rape, a violent crime, in 1979.  Through the application
of diminution credits, he was released on mandatory supervision in 1993.  In 1995, he was
convicted of a new non-violent, non-drug crime, for which he received a seven-year
sentence.  When he returned to prison, he was thus serving the balance of his twenty-year
sentence for rape and the new seven-year sentence.  Because one of those sentences was for
a violent crime, the Division of Correction, aggregating the sentences as it had done in
Fields, effectively awarded Wickes only five good conduct credits a month on his post-1992
sentence for the non-violent, non-drug crime.  Consistent with our approach in Fields, we
rejected that result and held that, for purposes of calculating good conduct credits under
§ 700, a sentence imposed for a non-violent, non-drug related offense on or after October 1,
1992 does not aggregate with a sentence for a violent or listed drug offense imposed prior
to that date.  The result in Wickes really was dictated by our holding in Fields — that the
definition of “term of confinement” in § 700(a) should not be read to frustrate the legislative
intent that inmates receive ten days a month good conduct credit against  sentences imposed
for non-violent, non-drug offenses on or after October 1, 1992.   Fields could not be denied
that benefit on the ground that one of his sentences was imposed prior to October 1, 1992,
and Wickes could not be denied that benefit on the ground that a pre-October 1, 1992
sentence was for a violent crime.
-8-
Unfortunately, we used some language in Wickes that went beyond what was
necessary to the decision, and it is that language, rather than the actual holdings in Fields or
Wickes, that has led to this case.  Going beyond the rule of lenity, which would have dictated
the same result in Wickes that was reached in Fields and also confined the ruling to those
situations in which strict application of the § 700 definition of “term of confinement” would
preclude inmates from receiving the benefit of the 1992 law, we enunciated a broader
conclusion that “‘term of confinement’ does not aggregate sentences imposed before and
after the defendant is released on mandatory supervision.” We stated:
“Where a defendant is released on mandatory supervision and
later commits and is sentenced for a new crime, we hold that the
new sentence and the old sentence reimposed upon revocation
of mandatory supervision release do not aggregate to form one
term of confinement for the purpose of § 700.  The rate at which
an inmate is awarded good-conduct credits should not depend
on the Maryland Parole Commission’s decision to revoke
mandatory supervision release for a prior conviction based on a
subsequent offense.”
Wickes, 349 Md. at 9, 706 A.2d at 612.
Applying that “holding,” the Division proceeded to recalculate sentences and release
dates for about 2,000 inmates serving multiple sentences, one or more of which was imposed
before a release on mandatory supervision or parole and one or more of which was imposed
for conduct occurring while the inmate was on mandatory supervision or parole.  Mr.
Henderson was such a person.  Henderson was first imprisoned in 1975, upon a conviction
for robbery with a deadly weapon.  He received a twenty-year sentence, which was due to
expire in August, 1995.  He was paroled in 1983, but that parole was revoked in 1988.  As
-9-
a result of the revocation and the application of various diminution credits, the expiration
date for the 1975 sentence was adjusted to July 8, 1998.  In 1991, Henderson was paroled
again, but, in July, 1994, he was convicted of a new crime — possession with intent to
distribute cocaine — for which he received a ten-year sentence.  The expiration date of that
sentence was July 4, 2004.  By reason of the new conviction, Henderson’s parole was
revoked; after the application of various diminution credits, the expiration date of the
unserved part of the 1975 sentence became January 17, 1999.
Because the 1975 sentence was for a violent crime and the 1994 sentence was for a
listed drug crime, Henderson clearly was not eligible for the ten days a month good conduct
credit.  His situation, therefore, is quite different from that of Fields and Wickes.  By
aggregating Henderson’s two sentences in accordance with Article 27, § 700(a), the Division
of Correction determined his single term of confinement as running from August, 1975 —
the beginning of the twenty-year sentence — to July 4, 2004, the end of the ten-year
sentence.  Calculation of good conduct credits at the rate of five days per month based on
that single term of confinement yielded 1,529 such credits which, when added to other
diminution credits earned by Henderson, produced a mandatory supervision release date of
July 7, 1997, and that is the date he was released.
After reading Wickes, filed some 20 months later, the Division determined that
Henderson’s two sentences should not have been aggregated into a single term of
confinement, but should be considered separately, thereby producing two different release
dates — January 17, 1999 for the 1975 sentence and July 4, 2004 for the 1994 sentence.
-10-
Applying the various credits to the 1975 sentence produced a mandatory supervision release
date of September 11, 1993, but the mandatory supervision release date for the 1994 sentence
would not be until February 25, 2002.  Upon that determination, the Division issued a
“retake warrant” for the arrest of Henderson as an “escaped prisoner.”  The face of the
warrant charged Henderson with having escaped from the Division of Correction and ordered
his immediate apprehension.  It stated that the warrant was issued “as a result of a court
decision requiring a recalculation of the offender’s term of confinement and will expire on
2002/07/03.”  In an accompanying letter, the Division made specific reference to Wickes and
advised Henderson, among other things, that that decision “obligates the Division of
Correction to begin recalculation of sentences in certain categories,” that the warrant was
issued to expedite his return, and that it was not the Division’s intent to charge him with the
crime of escape.  Henderson was apprehended pursuant to the warrant on May 5, 1998 and
returned to the Division’s physical custody.  He had been free for about ten months and, so
far as this record indicates, had complied in every respect with the conditions of his
mandatory supervision.  The State conceded that there was no basis, other than the Division’s
recalculation of his diminution credits in accordance with the quoted language in Wickes, for
his arrest and return to custody.  It appears that the Division issued retake warrants for 88
other former inmates as well, who, like Henderson, had been released on mandatory
supervision based on a pre-Wickes calculation of good conduct credits, and that
approximately 53 had, in fact, been apprehended.
Henderson filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that his renewed incarceration,
-11-
effected pursuant to a retroactive application of Wickes, constituted a violation of (1) his
Federal and Maryland Constitutional right to due process of law, and (2) Federal and
Maryland prohibitions against ex post facto punishment.  Judge Kaplan found merit in his
complaints and ordered the Division, forthwith, to release Henderson.  The judge concluded
that Henderson’s re-incarceration (1) constituted a violation of Henderson’s right to due
process of law, (2) amounted to an unconstitutional application of an ex post facto law, and
(3) was fundamentally unfair.  He also questioned whether the State had the authority to
arrest Henderson after he had been lawfully released and had committed no violation of the
conditions of his release.
Judge Kaplan reviewed briefly our decisions in Fields and Wickes, noting,
inferentially, that they rested on the rule of lenity and quoting, in part, our statement in
Fields that the rule of lenity forbids the extension of punishment “to cases not plainly within
the language” of the statute.  Fields, supra, 348 Md. At 267, 703 A.2d at 178 (quoting State
v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975)).  He observed that neither Fields
nor Wickes required the Division “to recalculate the good-time credits accumulated by
incarcerated inmates” or indicated that they were to be applied retroactively.  Although
vigorously contested by the State, Judge Kaplan determined that the State had conceded that
its revised method of calculating good time credits, in conformance with the language used
in Wickes, created a “new law.”  He also concluded that Henderson had a Constitutionally
protected liberty interest in continuing on parole (presumably meaning on mandatory
supervision release), which cannot be denied without notice and an opportunity for hearing.
-12-
Those rights, he found, were denied Henderson, who was arrested without notice or the
opportunity for hearing.  The damage, he said, had already been done and was beyond
redemption:  “[a]llowing for hearing now, after the fact, to determine whether the State’s
calculations are correct, simply does the parolees [sic] no good whatsoever now that the
damage is done.”
The due process concerns expressed by Judge Kaplan extended beyond the procedural
deficiencies of lack of notice and opportunity for pre-arrest hearing.  He also concluded that
it was “fundamentally unfair for the State based upon its unilateral interpretation of Wickes
to arbitrarily and capriciously recalculate Henderson’s diminution credits and thereby serve
to deprive him of his constitutionally protected liberty interests.”  In essence, Judge Kaplan
found a violation of substantive as well as procedural due process.  Having 
determined 
that
the revised method of calculating good conduct credits, in accordance with the language used
in Wickes, amounted to a “new law,” Judge Kaplan, after examining two Supreme Court
cases — Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct. 960,  67  L. Ed 2d 17 (1981) and Lynce
v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S. Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63  (1997) — concluded that
application of that new law to Henderson, who had already been released under the
preexisting law, would amount to the unconstitutional application of an ex post facto law.
In reaching that conclusion, he rejected the State’s argument that Henderson’s release was
simply the product of the Division’s erroneous construction of the law and that, having been
informed by this Court of the error, it was authorized, and obliged, to correct that error.
Upon those findings and conclusions, Judge Kaplan, on May 14, 1998, entered an
-13-
order declaring that Henderson’s incarceration was unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, and in
violation of his Federal and State Constitutional rights.  He found that Henderson was
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the defendants — the Secretary of Public
Safety and Correctional Services and the Commissioner of Correction — to release
Henderson immediately and reinstate his mandatory supervision release.
The defendants, whom we shall henceforth refer to as the State, promptly noted an
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, filed a petition for certiorari and a motion for
expedited review in this Court, and moved for a stay, first before Judge Kaplan and, when
that motion was denied, in this Court.  We granted the petition for certiorari and the motion
for expedited review but denied the motion for stay, largely because the State informed us
that it had already released Henderson (and, it appears, the other 53 inmates who had been
re-incarcerated).  
Addressing the bases used by Judge Kaplan in ordering Henderson’s release, the State
urges that it neither deprived Henderson of due process of law nor applied an ex post facto
law.  Its position is that, based on this Court’s holdings in Fields and Wickes, Henderson is
not entitled to be free, and the State was fully authorized to apprehend and re-incarcerate
him.  It urges that no new law was applied to Henderson — that the Division of Correction
released him because it had misinterpreted the law and, when that misinterpretation was
brought to its attention in Fields and Wickes, it simply applied the correct interpretation.
Unlike the normal parole violation situation, the State exercised no discretion here, and there
were no disputed facts to be resolved through a hearing.  Noting our statement in Wickes that
-14-
“[t]he sentencing of a defendant for a subsequent offense while he is out on mandatory
supervision release for a prior offense is a separate sentencing event,” 349 Md. at 11, 706
A.2d at 613, the State believes that “[u]nder this required interpretation of § 700, Mr.
Henderson is not entitled to be released until February 25, 2002 . . . [and that] [t]he Division
of Correction has no authority to exempt Mr. Henderson from completing the term of
imprisonment to which he has been sentenced merely because the Division previously
calculated his release date erroneously.”
DISCUSSION
As indicated, Judge Kaplan based his determination that Henderson could not be re-
incarcerated on due process and ex post facto Constitutional grounds.  We have generally
followed the principle, however, that “‘we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case
can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.’” Professional Nurses v.
Dimensions, 346 Md. 132, 138, 695 A.2d 158, 161 (1997) (quoting State v. Lancaster, 332
Md. 385, 403-04 n.13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n.13 (1993)).  We shall follow that principle in
this case as well; as there is a valid non-constitutional ground upon which to affirm Judge
Kaplan’s order, there is no need for us to opine upon the Constitutional issues.  
The sole basis of the Division’s recalculation of Henderson’s good conduct credits
was the language we used in Wickes, quoted above, enunciating the view that, whenever an
inmate is released on mandatory supervision or parole and commits a new crime, the
sentence imposed for that new crime may not be aggregated with the sentence imposed
 As Judge Chasanow so cogently pointed out in Fields, rigid adherence to a single term of
2
confinement approach in the context presented would produce the absurdity of a term of confinement
imposed both before and after October 1, 1992.  Fields, 348 Md. at 266, 703 A.2d at 178.
-15-
earlier, to form one term of confinement.  That, and that alone, is what led the Division to
redetermine the mandatory supervision release dates of some 2,000 inmates.  That
recalculation, we now learn, affects inmates in different ways.
As we indicated above, the expanded “holding” in Wickes, precluding the Division
from applying § 700 as it is written whenever an inmate receives a new sentence for conduct
occurring while on mandatory supervision, was not necessary in order to reach the result in
Wickes.  Apart from the significant administrative problems it has caused for the Division,
which we perhaps dismissed too quickly, that expanded language actually conflicts with the
statutory direction in § 700 and has led to a result directly contrary to what was intended in
Fields and Wickes.  The predominant reasoning in both cases was that, through the enactment
of Ch. 588 in 1992, the General Assembly directed that inmates be allowed ten days a month
good conduct credit against sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1992 for non-violent,
non-drug offenses, and that, to the extent that the device of a single term of confinement
would frustrate that direction, an ambiguity was created — an ambiguity that the rule of
lenity required be resolved in favor of the inmate.   That reasoning fully justified the holdings
2
in both cases.  All that we said in Fields, and all that we needed to say in Wickes, was that
all sentences that overlap or run consecutively do not need to aggregate “for all purposes to
a single term of confinement.”  (Emphasis added.)
 In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Judge Chasanow claims that we have overlooked
3
the effect of § 700(k), which provides that, when an inmate is sentenced to imprisonment for a crime
committed while on parole and the parole is revoked, the diminution of credits allowed prior to the
inmate’s release on parole may not be applied toward the inmate’s term of confinement upon return
to the Division of Correction.  We have not overlooked § 700(k).  That subsection was not enacted
until 1996; it took effect October 1 of that year.  The conviction, sentence, and parole revocation that
led to Henderson’s re-incarceration occurred in 1994. Subsection 700(k) therefore has no application
to this case.  It will, however, apply to persons on parole who commit new crimes and receive new
sentences on or after October 1, 1996 and, subject to any individual defenses that might be raised,
will have to be given effect by the Parole Commission and the Division of Correction as to those
persons.
-16-
Aggregation was rejected in those cases because it denied the inmates a legislatively
mandated benefit.  Rejection in this case would have the opposite effect.  Section 700(d)(1)
states specifically that the good conduct credit is to be deducted in advance “from the
inmate’s term of confinement,” and § 700(a)(2) defines precisely how a “term of
confinement” is to be calculated when the inmate is serving multiple sentences.  Application
of the statutory direction to aggregate the sentences produces no ambiguity in this instance;
it does not deprive Mr. Henderson or others similarly situated of any legislatively created
benefit.  In short, his release in July, 1997 was not in contravention of the law but in full
accord with it.  The Division calculated his good time credits exactly as it should have and
properly released him.  The error, understandable in light of the noted language used in
Wickes, was in recalculating his credits so as to deprive him of the liberty to which he was
statutorily entitled.  Quite apart from whether the Division unconstitutionally applied some
new principle of law retroactively, as Judge Kaplan held, Henderson’s re-incarceration was
unlawful because it was not authorized by statute, and he was entitled to be released for that
reason.3
-17-
These three cases — Fields, Wickes, and Henderson — illustrate the different ways
in which a statute such as Ch. 588 can affect inmates in our correctional system.  In Fields
and Wickes, we were dealing with one context and did not need, or really intend, to go
beyond it.  In articulating a secondary justification for our holding in Wickes, we
inadvertently led the Division to a conclusion that was both unintended and erroneous.
Fields and Wickes remain good law, based on the ambiguity created in the circumstances of
those cases and its resolution through application of the rule of lenity.  That rule does not
require a departure from the statutory direction in § 700 when, as here, there is no ambiguity.
ORDER AFFIRMED; APPELLANTS TO PAY THE COSTS.
-18-
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
I cannot join the majority opinion for several reasons. First, a majority of the Court
acknowledges they joined in but at the time did not realize the implications of two of this
Court’s opinions:  Md. House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 167 (1997),
and Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 (1998).  Those same members of the
Court endorsed the clarification of the method of calculating good-conduct credits for
inmates released on parole or mandatory release (hereinafter referred to collectively as
“parole”) because it was more beneficial than the prior method to inmates who recidivate by
committing non-violent crimes.  Now, however, they decline to follow the same method of
calculation because it is less beneficial than the disapproved method of calculating good-
conduct credits for inmates who recidivate and commit violent crimes and serious drug
distribution crimes (hereinafter I will collectively refer to these crimes as “violent crimes”).
It seems to me that the method of calculation described in Wickes that lets non-violent
offenders out sooner, but also keeps parole-violating violent offenders in longer, is a
desirable result.  Second, the majority requires two totally different constructions of “term
of confinement” as it pertains to sentences for crimes committed while on parole because two
Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 41, § 4-511 provides
1
in pertinent part:
“(c) Action authorized by member. — If the Commission
member finds, from the evidence, that the parolee has violated
a condition of his parole, the Commission member may take the
action that he considers appropriate, including:
(1) Revocation of the order of parole.”
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.,
2
1997 Supp.), Art. 27.
-1-
different constructions are necessary to assure that both non-violent, as well as violent
offenders who commit crimes while on parole, serve the least possible time for their new
crimes.  Third, had the Parole Commission not exercised its discretion to revoke Henderson’s
parole when he committed a new crime,  Henderson would have been serving only one
1
sentence and would have had a mandatory release date of February 25, 2002, but because
the Parole Commission also revoked Henderson’s parole, he is serving two sentences and,
therefore, according to the majority, his mandatory release date is over 4 ½ years earlier, July
7, 1997.  I doubt that the Parole Commission will be pleased to find out that, by revoking
Henderson’s parole after his new sentence, it was decreasing, not increasing, the time he
would serve and was mandating that he be released 4 ½ years earlier than if his parole was
not revoked.  Finally, the majority purports to be construing Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 27, § 700,  but its construction is directly contrary to another
2
section of that same statute not cited by the majority.
The Division of Correction read our two opinions in Fields and Wickes, supra, and
-2-
understood both the clearly set forth holding that sentences for crimes committed while out
on parole were to be treated as new terms of confinement and the implications that these two
cases had on the method of calculating good-conduct credits for inmates who commit and
are sentenced for crimes committed when they are on parole.  We stated quite clearly that
a sentence for a crime committed by an inmate while out on parole is a separate sentencing
event and a separate term of confinement.  We even gave explicit examples of how the
calculations were to be made.  Wickes, 349 Md. at 10-12, 706 A.2d at 612-13.  The Division
used that new method to recalculate the sentences of Fields, Wickes, Henderson and many
other inmates.  Non-violent parole violators benefited from the new method of calculation
while violent parole violators faired worse under the new method of calculation.  Those
inmates like Fields and Wickes, who committed and were sentenced for non-violent crimes
while out on parole, received good-conduct credits at the rate of ten days per month on their
new terms of confinement and new earlier release dates than under the former method, but
those inmates like Henderson, who committed violent crimes while out on parole, received
only five days per month on their new terms of confinement and could not carry over
diminution credits from their prior terms of confinement, resulting in later release dates. 
The majority now says that a sentence for a crime committed while out on parole is a new
term of confinement only for some but not all parole violators.  There are no bases in
statutory language, law, or logic for holding that the same statute requires a new sentence for
a post-parole crime to be a different term of confinement if the sentence is for a non-violent
crime, but part of the same term of confinement if the new sentence is for a violent crime.
-3-
The majority’s opinion is consistent with Fields and Wickes in its explanation of the
history of § 700 and the interpretation of that statute as applied in Fields and Wickes.  The
majority strains to manufacture a way to make the Fields and Wickes decisions inapplicable
to recidivists who commit violent crimes on parole in order to let those violent recidivists out
earlier than our express language in the Wickes decision would allow.  I do not believe this
inconsistent construction that benefits violent multiple offenders was the intent of the
legislature, and I know it is contrary to the express language of Wickes and was neither the
intent of the author of the Fields and Wickes opinions nor at least two additional members
of the Court.  
The majority holds that, when an inmate is released on parole and commits a new and
nonviolent crime, the Fields and Wickes decisions are applicable and the second sentence
commences a new term of confinement, but when the parolee commits a violent crime Fields
and Wickes are not applicable and the second sentence is not a new term of confinement.
What is the rationale for this dual construction of the same statute?  That, if we apply Fields
and Wickes to those who commit violent offenses while on release, they will serve more time
than they would have served under the prior disapproved construction.  Either a new
sentence for a crime committed while on parole is a new term of confinement or is not a new
term of confinement.  The Fields and Wickes construction of “term of confinement” should
apply to all inmates, not just those whose new crimes were nonviolent.  There is no basis for
the novel approach of giving the same statute and the same issue of whether post-parole
sentencings are part of the same or different terms of confinement two different
-4-
interpretations.  
When Henderson was released on parole in l991, he committed another crime, a drug
distribution offense, which is one of those crimes the statute classifies along with violent
crimes and that I have collectively called violent crimes.  That sentence was in 1994.  He
received ten years for that new offense, consecutive to the sentences he was serving prior to
his parole.  Under Fields and Wickes this is a new term of confinement.  The new ten-year
term of confinement was for a violent offense, so Henderson could only receive five days per
month good-conduct credits or 600 days, which meant that he would not be eligible for
parole until February 25, 2002.  That is the way we said good-conduct credits should be
calculated in Fields and Wickes since the new sentence was a new term of confinement.   The
actual reason why the old disapproved method of calculation gives Henderson a 4 ½ year
earlier release date of July 7, 1997, is because if there is only a single term of confinement
encompassing both sentences, then the effect is that some of the diminution credits
Henderson earned on his pre-parole sentence are credited to reduce his new post-parole
sentence.  According to the majority, instead of getting the five days per month or 600 days
of diminution credits (less than two years) on the drug distribution offense he committed
while on parole, Henderson  actually receives well over 2,000 days of diminution credits
(over 6 ½ years according to the majority) on that new sentence because he gets additional
use of the pre-parole diminution credits to reduce his post-parole sentence.  In effect, while
Henderson was in prison and on parole he was earning 4½ years diminution credits that
could be applied to a post-parole crime he had not yet committed.  
-5-
Inmates should not have a kind of savings account where they can bank sentencing
diminution credits to be used to reduce the time they will be sentenced to for future crimes
they will commit when they are released from prison on parole.  Henderson should not be
able to store up over 4 ½  years of diminution credits earned before and during his parole and
apply them to a sentence for a crime he committed after he was paroled.  I thought it was
only in the game of Monopoly that one could acquire in advance a “get out of jail free” card.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the majority dismisses the fact that, within the
same statute the Court is construing, the legislature made clear its disapproval of what the
majority is doing by letting Henderson’s pre-parole diminution credits reduce his post-parole
sentence.  The same statute that the majority is construing states that an inmate who is
released on parole or mandatory supervision and who commits and is sentenced for a crime
while released should not receive carried over credit for pre-parole diminution credits on the
new post-parole sentence.  Thus, the majority’s construction of § 700(k) is not only contrary
to the express language in Fields and Wickes, it is contrary to the express language of §
700(k).  Section 700(k) provides in pertinent part:
“Effect of parole violation on deductions. —  (1) Except as
provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, if an inmate is
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a crime committed
while on parole and the parole is revoked, diminution credits
that were allowed prior to the inmate's release on parole may not
be applied toward the inmate's term of confinement upon return
-6-
to the Division of Correction.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to any
diminution credits earned following the inmate's return to the
Division of Correction.”
That statute, which went into effect in 1996, makes clear that, if a parolee commits and is
sentenced for a new crime, the parolee cannot use diminution credits earned before parole
to reduce the sentence for the crime committed while on parole.  The wisdom of telling
parolees they cannot store up diminution credits from their pre-parole sentences (in
Henderson’s case over 4 ½ years) to be applied to reduce future sentences for new crimes
they may commit while out on parole seems obvious.   That section shows that the legislature
did not intend § 700(k) to be construed as the majority construes it.  The only reason why
Henderson gets out in just over three years on a ten-year sentence for a crime he committed
while out on parole is that the majority applies an additional 4 ½ years diminution credits
from the sentence Henderson was serving prior to his release on parole in addition to the 600
days of good-conduct credits Henderson is entitled to as credit on the sentence for his post-
parole violent crime.  In clear contradiction to the legislative intent indicated in § 700(k),
Henderson is allowed diminution credits earned prior to release on parole to reduce the
sentence for a crime he later committed while on parole.  Members of the Court may be free
to ignore or disavow clear language they adopted in prior decisions, but they are not free to
-7-
ignore or disavow clear legislative intent when construing a statute.  At least the majority
does recognize that after 1996, if a parolee like Henderson commits and is sentenced for a
new crime, that post-parole sentence will constitute a new term of confinement.  Thus,
according to the majority, the 1992 good-conduct credit statute is to be construed as follows:
If a parolee commits and is sentenced for a nonviolent crime after being released on parole,
the new sentence and old sentence are separate terms of confinement.  If a parolee commits
and is sentenced for a violent crime while on parole before 1996, according to the majority,
the legislature intended violent parole violators to carry over good-conduct credits from pre-
parole sentences, and the pre-parole and post-parole sentences are one term of confinement,
but after 1996, all parolees who commit crimes are treated the same and the pre-parole
sentence and post-parole sentence are different terms of confinement.  I sincerely doubt that
is what the legislature intended.  I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion, but concur
in the result, albeit, for a different reason.
Henderson was released by the Division of Correction on mandatory release.  At the
time of his release, both the Division of Correction and Henderson believed he was entitled
to mandatory release under the applicable statutes.  Ten months later, as a result of our Fields
and Wickes decisions, the Division of Correction came to the conclusion that Henderson was
not entitled to mandatory release and determined to terminate Henderson’s release.  Based
on an arrest warrant issued without any semblance of probable cause, Henderson was
deprived of his liberty and reincarcerated by the Division of Correction without any prior
notice and without being given any opportunity to contest the Division’s unilateral action.
-8-
This is improper.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972).
The Division had two options and neither of them was entirely satisfactory, but I
believe the one chosen was improper.  The Division could have, and I believe should have,
sought revocation of Henderson’s mandatory release under one or more of the administrative
hearing provisions:  Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art.  41, § 4-612(2)(c)
(person under mandatory supervision is subject to rules and conditions applicable to
parolees); § 4-612(e)(revocation of mandatory supervision); § 4-511B (modification of
parole); and § 4-511 (revocation of parole).  These procedures would provide Henderson
with an opportunity to be heard as to why his mandatory release should not be terminated
and perhaps to even argue for continuation of parole or home detention.  Instead, the
Division chose to treat its release of Henderson as a nullity and caused an escape warrant to
issue for Henderson’s arrest.  Although an escape warrant might have been proper if
Henderson knew or even had some reason to suspect that his release was improper, that was
not the situation in the instant case.  At the time of Henderson’s release, all parties believed
the release was required.  Henderson had done nothing that justified an escape charge.  There
is absolutely no probable cause for the escape warrant and no justification for using a
baseless charge as a subterfuge to reacquire custody of a parolee instead of using the
administrative procedure for a revocation of mandatory release which provides for a hearing
for the parolee.  Henderson is entitled to habeas corpus relief as a result of the improper
procedure that returned him to prison.
-9-
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Rodowsky have authorized me to state that they join in
the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.