Title: JEANNE JONES V CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 2, 2002  
ROBERT POHUTSKI, AMY POHUTSKI, KIERK 
SANDERLIN, JOELLE SANDERLIN, ALAN 
BULLION, ANTHONY CORBELL, PIETRO FUSCO, 
NORMA FUSCO, KAYE GARDNER, BEVERLY 
GARDNER, SHIRLEY KARAPETOFF, KAREN 
KEREZI, BRIAN LaFUENTE, MICHELLE 
LaFUENTE, RICHARD REFALKO, DOLORES 
RAFALKO, WILLIAM SHAMUS, KATHLEEN 
SHAMUS, and all others similarly 
situated, a certified class,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v  
No. 116949  
CITY OF ALLEN PARK, a Michigan Municipal 
Corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
JOHN DOE REPRESENTATIVES, EMPLOYEES, OR 
AGENTS OF THE CITY OF ALLEN PARK, 
Jointly and Severally,  
Defendants.  
JEANNE JONES, JAMES JONES, ROGER TROST, 
CAROL TROST, MIKE ROBERT, MIKE BARTHLOW,  
CINDY BARTHLOW, SUSAN BROWN, KENNETH 
BROWN, SHIRLEY BRYANT, DAVID BURHANS, 
MAGDALENA CHAVEZ, WILLIAM CHUNN, IVAN 
GADJEV, FLORENCE GADJEV, REX GLASSON, 
BARBARA GLASSON, KEVIN HALL, SONIA HALL, 
LON HAMILTON, DIANE HAMILTON, WILLIAM 
HATTON, ELIZABETH HATTON, BILL HOFSESS, 
JOAN HOFSESS, JAMES HUBBLE, VIRGINIA 
HUBBLE, SOUREN MERUCCI, ENERA MERUCCI, 
MARY PEGORARO, PHIL PEGORARO, LUIS 
PERESSINI, MICHAL ALLEN PETERS, MIGUEL 
PRIETO, JILL PRIETO, TODD SNIDER, BETTY 
ZAHER, and all other similarly situated,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 117935  
CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS, a Michigan 
Municipal Corporation, and JOHN DOE 
REPRESENTATIVES, EMPLOYEES, OR AGENTS OF 
THE CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS, Jointly 
and Severally,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
In these consolidated cases, this Court once again faces  
whether the plain language of § 7 of the governmental tort  
liability act, MCL 691.1407, permits a trespass-nuisance  
exception 
to 
governmental 
immunity. 
 
Because 
the 
Legislature’s  
definition of the word “state” is clear and unambiguous, we  
hold that it does not.  In so holding, we overrule Hadfield v  
Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139; 422 NW2d 205 (1988),  
and other cases to the contrary.  However, because we are  
2  
mindful of the effect our holding will have on the  
administration of justice, we conclude that limiting our  
holding to prospective application is appropriate.  
I  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE  
A  
POHUTSKI V ALLEN PARK  
The city of Allen Park experienced a “ten year storm” on  
February 17 and 18, 1998. As a result of the high volume of  
rainfall, raw sewage from the city’s sewer system backed up  
through plaintiffs’ floor drains and into their basements.  
Plaintiffs filed a class action against the city of Allen Park  
for trespass, nuisance, trespass-nuisance, negligence, and  
unconstitutional taking in April 1998. Plaintiffs thereafter  
sought summary disposition of their trespass-nuisance claim  
under MCR 2.116(C)(10).  Plaintiffs argued that defendant was  
liable as a matter of law under the doctrine of trespass­
nuisance and that Hadfield barred governmental immunity as a  
defense. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that a claim  
of 
trespass-nuisance 
required a showing of causation, and that  
it could not be held strictly liable solely on the basis of  
its ownership of the sewer system.  
In a brief opinion rendered from the bench, Wayne Circuit  
Judge Edward Thomas granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial  
summary disposition, holding that defendant was strictly  
3  
liable 
under 
the 
“trespass-nuisance” 
exception 
to 
governmental  
immunity.  
The 
Court 
of Appeals denied defendant’s application  
for interlocutory review.  Unpublished order, entered May 23,  
2000 (Docket No. 222238).  
B  
JONES V FARMINGTON HILLS  
On August 6, 1998, a “one hundred year storm” dropped  
approximately 4.6 inches of rain in less than six hours on the  
city of Farmington Hills, causing flooding throughout the  
community.  As a result, raw sewage from defendants’ sewer  
system traveled up through plaintiffs’ floor drains and into  
their basements. Thirty-seven plaintiffs filed suit against  
the city of Farmington Hills, alleging claims of trespass,  
nuisance, 
trespass-nuisance, negligence, and unconstitutional  
taking.  Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition of their  
trespass-nuisance claim, arguing that defendant was liable as  
a matter of law under Hadfield. Defendant opposed the motion  
and filed a counter motion for summary disposition, arguing  
that trespass-nuisance is not a strict liability tort and that  
plaintiffs had failed to establish causation or improper  
construction, 
engineering, 
or 
maintenance 
of 
its 
sewer 
system.  
Oakland Circuit Judge Jessica Cooper denied defendants’  
motion and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition  
of their trespass-nuisance claim.  Judge Cooper held that  
trespass-nuisance 
was 
a 
recognized 
exception 
to 
the  
4  
 
governmental immunity statute, MCL 691.1407, and that no  
genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the  
exception’s three elements: (1) a condition (nuisance or  
trespass), (2) cause (physical intrusion), and (3) causation  
or control (by government).  
After the trial court denied reconsideration, defendant  
applied for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals.  The  
Court of Appeals granted the application and stayed the  
pending trial date.  Plaintiffs then filed an emergency motion  
for rehearing. The Court of Appeals granted plaintiffs’  
motion, vacated its earlier order, and denied leave to appeal.  
Unpublished order, entered September 29, 2000 (Docket No.  
227657).  
II  
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant  
summary disposition de novo.  Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare  
System, 465 Mich 53, 59; 631 NW2d 686 (2001).  Questions of  
statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo.  In re MCI  
Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
III  
THE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT  
From the time of Michigan’s statehood, this Court’s  
jurisprudence has recognized that the state, as sovereign, is  
immune 
from 
suit 
unless 
it 
consents, 
and 
that 
any  
5  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
relinquishment of sovereign immunity must be strictly  
interpreted. 
Manion v State Hwy Comm’r, 303 Mich 1, 19; 5  
NW2d 527 (1942).  Sovereign immunity exists in Michigan  
because the state created the courts and so is not subject to  
them. Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567,  
598; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).  
It is important to distinguish between “sovereign  
immunity” and “governmental immunity”:  
“[S]overeign” 
immunity 
and 
“governmental” 
immunity are not synonymous. True, they have been 
over the years used interchangeably in decisions, 
but a delineation may be helpful.  Sovereign 
immunity is a specific term limited in its  
application to the State and to the departments, 
commissions, 
boards, 
institutions, 
and  
instrumentalities of the State. The reason is the  
State is the only sovereignty in our system of 
government, except as the States delegated part of 
their 
implicit 
sovereignty 
to 
the 
Federal  
government.  
* * *  
. 
. 
. 
Over 
the 
years, 
by 
judicial 
construction, this “sovereign” immunity has been 
transmogrified into “governmental” immunity and 
made applicable to the “inferior” divisions of 
government, i.e., townships, school districts, 
villages, cities, and counties, but with an  
important distinction. 
These subdivisions of  
government enjoyed the immunity only when engaged 
in 
“governmental” 
as 
distinguished 
from  
“proprietary” functions. [Myers v Genesee Auditor, 
375 Mich 1, 6, 8-9; 133 NW2d 190 (1965) (opinion of 
O’HARA, J.) (emphasis in original).]  
In Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 250; 111 NW2d 1  
(1961), Justice EDWARDS, joined by Justices T.M. 
KAVANAGH, SMITH,  
6  
 
and SOURIS, wrote: “From this date forward the judicial  
doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts no  
longer exists in Michigan.  In this case, we overrule  
preceding court-made law to the contrary.”  Justice BLACK, in  
his concurring opinion, stated that governmental immunity  
would be abolished only for municipalities, not the state and  
its subdivisions. Id. at 278.  
As we noted in Ross, supra at 605, the Legislature  
enacted the governmental tort liability act in 1964 in  
reaction to Williams’ abolition of common-law governmental  
immunity for municipalities, and in anticipation of a similar  
abrogation of immunity for counties, townships, and villages.  
The act “was intended to provide uniform liability and  
immunity to both state and local governmental agencies” when  
involved in a governmental function.  Id. at 614. 
While  
there is agreement regarding the statute’s intent, there has  
been much disagreement regarding its meaning.  
When faced with questions of statutory interpretation,  
our obligation is to discern and give effect to the  
Legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute.  
DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300  
(2000); Massey v Mandell, 462 Mich 375, 379-380; 614 NW2d  
70(2000).  We give the words of a statute their plain and  
ordinary 
meaning, 
looking outside the statute to ascertain the  
7  
  
 
 
 
Legislature’s intent only if the statutory language is  
ambiguous. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 27, 528  
NW2d 681 (1995).  Where the language is unambiguous, “we  
presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly  
expressed-
-
-no further judicial construction is required or  
permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written.”  
DiBenedetto, supra at 402. 
Similarly, courts may not  
speculate 
about 
an 
unstated purpose where the unambiguous text  
plainly reflects the intent of the Legislature. See Lansing  
v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 649-650; 97 NW2d 804 (1959).  
When parsing a statute, we presume every word is used for  
a purpose.  As far as possible, we give effect to every clause  
and sentence.  “The Court may not assume that the Legislature  
inadvertently made use of one word or phrase instead of  
another.”  Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307  
(2000).  Similarly, we should take care to avoid a  
construction that renders any part of the statute surplusage  
or nugatory. In re MCI, supra at 414.  
With these principles of statutory construction in mind,  
we turn to the language of MCL 691.1407(1), which provides:  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
if the governmental agency is engaged in the  
exercise or discharge of a governmental function. 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act 
does not modify or restrict the immunity of the 
state from tort liability as it existed before  
8  
 
 
July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed. [Emphasis 
added.]  
“Governmental agency” and “state” are not synonymous, nor are  
they interchangeable.  Rather, each is precisely defined in  
the statute:  
(b) “Political subdivision” means a municipal 
corporation, county, county road commission, school 
district, 
community 
college 
district, 
port 
district, metropolitan district, or transportation 
authority or a combination of 2 or more of these 
when acting jointly; a district or authority 
authorized by law or formed by 1 or more political 
subdivisions; or an agency, department, court, 
board, or council of a political subdivision.  
(c) “State” means the state of Michigan and 
its agencies, departments, commissions, courts, 
boards, councils, and statutorily created task 
forces and includes every public university and 
college of the state, whether established as a  
constitutional corporation or otherwise.  
(d) “Governmental agency” means the state or a 
political subdivision. [MCL 691.1401.]  
Under a plain reading of the statute, then, the first sentence  
of § 7 applies to both municipal corporations and the state,  
while the second sentence applies only to the state.  Despite  
the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous use of the word  
“state” in the second sentence, this Court has struggled with  
its meaning.  
A  
HADFIELD V OAKLAND CO DRAIN COMM’R  
In Hadfield, we considered whether the trespass-nuisance  
exception 
to 
governmental 
immunity, 
as 
a 
common-law 
tort-based  
9  
 
exception, survived the governmental tort liability act. We  
concluded that recognition of the historic trespass-nuisance  
exception was required by the language of § 7.  In so holding,  
we strayed from the plain language of the statute, despite our  
claim 
that 
we 
“moved 
carefully to impose judicial construction  
only upon those terms in the statute that required  
interpretation.” Id. at 173.  
Hadfield correctly interpreted the first sentence of § 7  
because it focused on the plain language chosen by the  
Legislature:  
Taken alone, the first sentence of § 7 does 
support a narrow interpretation of the act, to 
preclude recognition of any nuisance exception. 
The Legislature’s use of the word “tort” to  
describe the liability from which governmental 
agencies are to be held immune exemplifies the 
breadth of the intended immunity.  There is no  
doubt that nuisance is a tort and that liability 
for nuisance would be within the scope of statutory 
governmental immunity as expressed in the first 
sentence of § 7. [Id. at 147.]  
Hadfield went astray, however, in interpreting the second  
sentence of § 7.  Ignoring the second sentence’s express  
application only to the “state,” the Hadfield Court held that  
“the second sentence of § 7 retains preexisting governmental  
immunity law except where provided otherwise in the act” and  
concluded that it required “a continuation of the nuisance  
exception as formulated prior to the enactment of the  
governmental immunity act in 1964, as amended by 1970 PA 155.”  
10  
 
 
 
Id. at 147, 149 (emphasis added).  
B  
LI V FELDT  
This 
Court 
reaffirmed 
Hadfield’s 
erroneous 
interpretation  
of the second sentence of § 7 in Li v Feldt (After Remand),  
434 Mich 584, 592-594; 456 NW2d 55 (1990). Justice GRIFFIN, in  
his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, pointed  
out 
what 
Hadfield’s 
plurality and Li’s majority missed: “[t]he  
significance of the Legislature’s use of [the terms]  
‘governmental agencies’ in the first sentence of § 7 and  
‘state’ in the second . . . .” Li, supra at 598-599. Justice  
GRIFFIN reasoned:  
A literal reading of the second sentence of § 
7 seems, at most, to require an historical analysis 
of 
the 
state’s 
common-law 
immunity. 
The  
significance 
of 
the 
Legislature’s 
use 
of  
“governmental agencies” in the first sentence and 
the “state” in the second sentence is underscored  
by the definitions expressly given those terms in 
the act. “Governmental agency” is defined as “the 
state, 
political 
subdivisions, 
and 
municipal 
corporations.” The “state,” on the other hand, is 
defined as “the state of Michigan and its agencies, 
departments, [and] commissions . . . .” The terms  
are not interchangeable.  The statutory provision 
prohibiting modification or restriction of immunity 
is specifically applied to the “state,” a term 
which does not embrace municipalities and other 
forms of lower government. Definitions supplied by 
the Legislature in the statute are binding on the 
judiciary.  Thus, assuming arguendo that the second 
sentence of § 7 requires an historical analysis, it 
should be applied to the “state” and not other 
“governmental agencies.” [Id. at 598-600.]  
He continued:  
11  
 
 
 
The 
underlying 
premise 
of 
the  
Hadfield plurality opinion appears to be that the 
Legislature’s intent to make uniform the immunity 
of all levels of government requires that the 
historical analysis purportedly required by § 7 
applies to all levels of government, despite the 
express limitation of the purported historical 
analysis to “the state.”  
Although the act’s title declares its purpose 
is “to make uniform the liability of municipal 
corporations, political subdivisions, and the  
state, 
its 
agencies 
and 
departments,” 
the  
uniformity of immunity intended by the Legislature 
does not necessarily include both governmental and 
nongovernmental 
functions. 
The 
act’s 
title  
qualifies the uniformity purpose by providing that 
the 
Legislature 
sought 
to 
make 
uniform 
the  
liability of all government “when engaged in the  
exercise or discharge of a governmental function .  
. . .” 
Simply because the Legislature claimed 
immunity on behalf of all levels of government 
“when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 
governmental function” does not necessarily compel 
the conclusion that the state has no immunity when 
not engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 
governmental function.  Indeed, the governmental 
tort liability act was “‘[d]rafted under the  
apparent assumption that the state and its agencies 
enjoyed a total sovereign immunity from tort  
liability . . . .’”  Thus, the legislative intent 
underlying the second sentence of § 7 could merely 
have been to “affirm” the state’s preexisting 
absolute sovereign immunity, rather than to codify 
common-law exceptions to governmental immunity. 
Strict uniformity of immunity among all levels of 
government is not clearly mandated by § 7. [Id. at  
600-601 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).]  
Justice GRIFFIN worried that the historical approach  
adopted by the Hadfield plurality and reaffirmed by Li would  
“leave[] ajar the door to additional immunity exceptions that  
cannot be fairly culled from the language of § 7.”  Id. at  
12  
602.
 He noted that nothing in the plain language of § 7  
indicated a legislative intent to create a nuisance exception  
to governmental immunity, and concluded:  
In my opinion, the fundamental purposes of the 
act were to restore immunity to municipalities, 
grant immunity to all levels of government when 
engaged in the exercise or discharge of a  
governmental 
function, 
and 
prevent 
judicial 
abrogation of governmental and sovereign immunity. 
The second sentence of § 7 was merely intended to 
prevent further erosion of the state’s common-law  
immunity, rather than preserve any common-law  
exceptions to governmental immunity. 
Under this  
analysis, unless the activity of a municipality 
falls within one of the five narrowly drawn  
statutory exceptions, the only question remaining 
in these cases is whether the activity is a 
“governmental 
function,” 
as 
defined 
by 
the  
Legislature. [Id. at 605 (emphasis in original).]  
We agree with Justice GRIFFIN’s analysis and adopt it  
today. We hold that while the first sentence of § 7 applies to  
both municipalities and the state, the clear and unambiguous  
language of the second sentence of § 7 applies only to the  
state, as defined in the statute.1  
C  
THE TRESPASS-NUISANCE EXCEPTION  
Because these cases involve cities, the second sentence  
1Because the state is not involved as a party in these 
cases, we need not explicate fully the meaning of the second 
sentence of § 7.  We agree with Justice GRIFFIN that, at most, 
the language of the second sentence requires an historical 
analysis of the state’s sovereign immunity, but we have no 
occasion to undertake such an analysis here.  Therefore, 
contrary 
to 
the 
dissent’s assertion, we make no determinations 
regarding common-law exceptions to the state’s governmental 
immunity.  
13  
of § 7 does not apply; any trespass-nuisance exception must  
therefore come from the first section of § 7.  The first  
sentence provides:  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
if the governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function. 
[MCL 691.1407(1).]  
The parties agree that the operation of a sewage system is a  
governmental function.  Thus, under the terms of the statute,  
municipal corporations are immune from tort liability except  
as otherwise provided in the act.  
The act sets forth five statutory exceptions to  
governmental immunity: the highway exception, MCL 691.1402;  
the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691. 1405; the public  
building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary function  
exception, MCL 691.1413; and the governmental hospital  
exception, MCL 691.1407(4). In determining if the statutory  
exceptions 
permit 
a 
trespass-nuisance 
exception, 
we 
are 
guided  
by the principle expressed in Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm,  
463 Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000): “There is one basic  
principle that must guide our decision today: the immunity  
conferred upon governmental agencies is broad, and the  
statutory exceptions thereto are to be narrowly construed.”  
(Emphasis in original.)  
With this principle in mind, we hold that the plain  
14  
 
language of the governmental tort liability act does not  
contain 
a 
trespass-nuisance 
exception 
to 
governmental  
immunity. Trespass-nuisance simply is not one of the five  
exceptions to immunity set forth in the governmental tort  
liability act.  As stated above, we are bound by the clear and  
unambiguous statutory text; we lack constitutional authority  
to impose on the people of this state our individual policy  
preferences regarding the availability of lawsuits arising  
from the operation of a sewage system.  We must “seek to  
faithfully construe and apply those stated public policy  
choices made by the Legislature” in drafting the governmental  
tort liability act. Nawrocki, supra at 151. We are mindful  
that, because immunity necessarily implies that a “wrong” has  
occurred, some harm caused by a governmental agency may lack  
a remedy.  Id. at 157. Although governmental agencies have  
many duties regarding the services they provide to the public,  
a breach of those duties is compensable under the statute only  
if it falls within one of the statutorily created exceptions.  
IV  
TITLE-OBJECT CLAUSE  
Plaintiffs argue that if the second sentence of § 7  
applies only to the state and not to all governmental  
agencies, 
it 
violates the Title-Object Clause, Const 1963, art  
4, § 24. We reject this argument.  
We note at the outset that “all possible presumptions  
15  
should be afforded to find constitutionality.”  Advisory  
Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441,  
464; 208 NW2d 469 (1973).  Const 1963, art 4, § 24 provides in  
pertinent part:  
No law shall embrace more than one object, 
which shall be expressed in its title.  
This constitutional provision requires that 1) a law must not  
embrace more than one object, and (2) the object of the law  
must be expressed in its title.  Livonia v Dep’t of Social  
Services, 423 Mich 466, 496; 378 NW2d 402 (1985).  This  
constitutional limitation ensures that legislators and the  
public receive proper notice of legislative content and  
prevents deceit and subterfuge.  Advisory Opinion, supra at  
465. The goal of the clause is notice, not restriction of  
legislation.  
The “object” of a law is defined as its general purpose  
or aim. Local No 1644 v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 367 Mich 79, 91;  
116 NW2d 314 (1962).  The “one object” provision must be  
construed reasonably, not in so narrow or technical a manner  
that the legislative intent is frustrated.  Kuhn v Dep’t of  
Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 387-388; 183 NW2d 796 (1971).  We  
should not invalidate legislation simply because it contains  
more than one means of attaining its primary object;  
“[h]owever, if the act contains ‘subjects diverse in their  
16  
 
nature, and having no necessary connection,’” it violates the  
Title-Object Clause.  Livonia, supra at 499. 
The act may  
include all matters germane to its object, as well as all  
provisions that directly relate to, carry out, and implement  
the principal object.  Advisory Opinion, supra at 465. The  
statute “may authorize the doing of all things which are in  
furtherance of the general purpose of the Act without  
violating the ‘one object’ limitation of art 4, § 24.”  Kuhn,  
supra at 388.  Finally, the constitutional requirement is not  
that the title refer to every detail of the act; rather, “[i]t  
is sufficient that ‘the act centers to one main general object  
or 
purpose 
which 
the 
title comprehensively declares, though in  
general terms, and if provisions in the body of the act not  
directly mentioned in the title are germane, auxiliary, or  
incidental to that general purpose . . . .”  Livonia, supra at  
501 (citations omitted).  
The title of the governmental tort liability act  
provides:  
An act to make uniform the liability of 
municipal 
corporations, political subdivisions, and 
the state, its agencies and departments, officers, 
employees, and volunteers thereof, and members of 
certain boards, councils, and task forces when  
engaged in the exercise or discharge of a  
governmental function, for injuries to property and 
persons; to define and limit this liability; to 
define and limit the liability of the state when 
engaged in a proprietary function; to authorize the 
purchase of liability insurance to protect against  
17  
loss arising out of this liability; to provide for 
defending certain claims made against public  
officers and paying damages sought or awarded 
against them; to provide for the legal defense of 
public officers and employees; to provide for 
reimbursement of public officers and employees for 
certain legal expenses; and to repeal certain acts 
and parts of acts. [Emphasis added.]  
Plaintiffs contend that the act would exceed the scope of  
its title were the second sentence of § 7 construed to allow  
differentiation between the immunity of the state and the  
immunity of inferior governmental agencies.  We reject this  
argument.
 The title of the act only provides that the  
immunity of all governmental agencies will be made uniform for  
circumstances involving “the exercise or discharge of a  
governmental function.”  This is accomplished by the first  
sentence of § 7, which confers uniform statutory immunity on  
all 
governmental 
entities engaged in the exercise or discharge  
of a governmental function. In enacting the second sentence  
of § 7, the Legislature ensured that, “by restoring to  
municipal 
corporations 
immunity 
for 
governmental 
functions 
and  
making uniform the immunity of all governmental entities for  
governmental 
functions, it was not thereby waiving the state’s  
common-law absolute sovereign immunity for non-governmental  
functions . . . .”  Ross, supra at 669 (LEVIN, J., dissenting  
in part).  
In essence, the Legislature defined the scope of the  
first sentence of § 7 through the second sentence.  Such a  
18  
limitation cannot be considered a subject diverse in nature  
that has no necessary connection to the primary object of the  
act.
 The limitation in the second sentence is clearly  
germane, auxiliary, and incidental to the general purpose of  
the act. Therefore, the act as interpreted does not violate  
art 4, § 24.  
V  
STARE DECISIS  
We do not lightly overrule precedent. Stare decisis is  
generally “‘the preferred course because it promotes the  
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal  
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and  
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the  
judicial process.’” Robinson, supra at 463, quoting Hohn v  
United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242  
(1998).
 Before we overrule a prior decision, we must be  
convinced “not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but  
also that less injury will result from overruling than from  
following it.” McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178;  
98 NW 1006 (1904).  
At the same time, we must also remember that stare  
decisis is a principle of policy, not an inexorable command.  
Robinson, supra at 464. Stare decisis should not be applied  
mechanically to prevent this Court from overruling erroneous  
19  
 
 
  
 
decisions regarding the meaning of a statute.  Id. at 463. In  
Robinson, supra at 464, we set forth four factors that we  
consider before overruling a prior decision: 1) whether the  
earlier case was wrongly decided, 2) whether the decision  
defies “practical workability,” 3) whether reliance interests  
would work an undue hardship, and 4) whether changes in the  
law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision.  In  
considering the reliance interest, we consider “whether the  
previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so  
fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to change it  
would 
produce 
not 
just 
readjustments, 
but 
practical 
real-world  
dislocations.” 
Id. at 466. 
Further, we must consider  
reliance 
in 
the 
context 
of 
erroneous 
statutory 
interpretation:  
[I]t is well to recall in discussing reliance, 
when dealing with an area of the law that is 
statutory, . . . that it is to the words of the 
statute itself that a citizen first looks for  
guidance in directing his actions.  This is the  
essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what  
the rules of society are.  Thus, if the words of 
the statute are clear, the actor should be able to 
expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried 
out by all in society, including the courts.  In  
fact, should a court confound those legitimate 
citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing 
a statute, it is that court itself that has  
disrupted the reliance interest. 
When that  
happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to 
the distorted reading because of the doctrine of 
stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s 
misconstruction.  The reason for this is that the  
court in distorting the statute was engaged in a 
form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to 
the 
bedrock 
principle 
of 
American  
constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power  
20  
 
 
is reposed in the people as reflected in the work 
of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional 
violation, the courts have no legitimacy in  
overruling 
or 
nullifying 
the 
people’s  
representatives.  Moreover, not only does such a 
compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to 
rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant, 
it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts 
repeat the error. [Id. at 467-468.]  
Thus, while too rapid a change in the law threatens judicial  
legitimacy, correcting past rulings that usurp legislative  
power restores legitimacy. 
Id. at 472-473 (CORRIGAN, J.,  
concurring).  
Accordingly, we must shoulder our constitutional duty to  
act within our grant of authority and honor the intent of the  
Legislature 
as 
reflected in the plain and unambiguous language  
of the statute. In so doing, we rectify Hadfield’s  
misconstruction of the statutory text.  
We are mindful, however, of the effect our decision may  
have in overruling Hadfield’s interpretation of § 7. As this  
Court noted in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 665;  
275 NW2d 511 (1979), quoting Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231,  
265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961):  
“This Court has overruled prior precedent many 
times in the past.  In each such instance the Court  
must 
take 
into 
account 
the 
total 
situation  
confronting it and seek a just and realistic 
solution of the problems occasioned by the change.”  
After 
taking 
into 
account the entire situation confronting the  
21  
 
 
Court, we hold that our decision shall have only prospective  
application.  
Although the general rule is that judicial decisions are  
given full retroactive effect, Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of  
Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), a more  
flexible approach is warranted where injustice might result  
from full retroactivity.  Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56,  
68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997).  For example, a holding that  
overrules settled precedent may properly be limited to  
prospective application. 
Id. 
Moreover, the federal  
constitution does not preclude state courts from determining  
whether 
their 
own 
law-changing 
decisions 
are 
applied  
prospectively or retroactively.  Great Northern R Co v  
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co, 287 US 358, 364-365; 53 S Ct 145;  
77 L Ed 360 (1932).  
This Court adopted from Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618;  
85 S Ct 1731, 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), three factors to be  
weighed in determining when a decision should not have  
retroactive application. Those factors are:  (1) the purpose  
to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on  
the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the  
administration of justice.  People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669,  
674; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). In the civil context, a plurality  
of this Court noted that Chevron Oil v Huson, 404 US 97, 106­
22  
 
107; 92 S Ct 349; 30 L Ed 2d 296 (1971), recognized an  
additional threshold question whether the decision clearly  
established a new principle of law.  Riley v Northland  
Geriatric Center (After Remand), 431 Mich 632, 645-646; 433  
NW2d 787 (1988) (GRIFFIN, J.).  
We turn first to the threshold question noted in Riley.  
Although this opinion gives effect to the intent of the  
Legislature that may be reasonably be inferred from the text  
of the governing statutory provisions, practically speaking  
our holding is akin to the announcement of a new rule of law,  
given the erroneous interpretations set forth in Hadfield and  
Li.  See Riley, supra; Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412  
Mich 270, 298; 315 NW2d 388 (1981).  
Application of the three-part test leads to the  
conclusion that prospective application is appropriate here.  
First, we consider the purpose of the new rule set forth in  
this opinion:  to correct an error in the interpretation of §  
7 of the governmental tort liability act.  Prospective  
application would further this purpose. See Riley, supra at  
646.  Second, there has been extensive reliance on Hadfield’s  
interpretation of § 7 of the governmental tort liability act.  
In addition to reliance by the courts, insurance decisions  
have 
undoubtedly 
been 
predicated 
upon 
this 
Court’s  
longstanding 
interpretation 
of 
§ 
7 
under 
Hadfield:  
23  
municipalities have been encouraged to purchase insurance,  
while homeowners have been discouraged from doing the same.  
Prospective application acknowledges that reliance.  Third,  
prospective application minimizes the effect of this decision  
on the administration of justice. Consideration of recently  
enacted 2001 PA 2222 strengthens our determination to limit  
our holding to prospective application.  2001 PA 222 amends  
the governmental tort liability act to provide a remedy for  
damages or physical injuries caused by a sewage disposal  
system event.3
 Section 17(2) of the act provides, in  
pertinent part:  
Sections 
16 
to 
19 
abrogate 
common 
law  
exceptions, if any, to immunity for the overflow or 
backup of a sewage disposal system and provide the  
22001 PA 222 took effect January 2, 2002.  
3Section 16(k) defines a sewage disposal system event:  
“Sewage disposal system event” or “event” 
means the overflow or backup of a sewage disposal 
system onto real property.  An overflow or backup 
is not a sewage disposal system event if any of the 
following was a substantial proximate cause of the 
overflow or backup:  
(i) An obstruction in a service lead that was 
not caused by a governmental agency.  
(ii) A connection to the sewage disposal 
system on the affected property, including, but not 
limited to, a sump system, building drain, surface 
drain, gutter, or downspout.  
(iii) An act of war, whether the war is 
declared or undeclared, or an act of terrorism.  
24 
 
sole remedy for obtaining any form of relief for 
damages or physical injuries caused by a sewage 
disposal system event regardless of the legal 
theory.  
2001 PA 222 does not contain any language indicating it  
is meant to apply retroactively, but provides only that it is  
to take immediate effect.  Section 19(1) provides that a  
claimant is not entitled to compensation under the statute  
unless the claimant notifies the governmental agency of a  
claim of damage or physical injury, in writing, within forty­
five days after the date the damage or physical injury was or  
should have been discovered.  Only two exceptions to the  
forty-five-day limit are available: if the claimant notified  
the contacting agency during the forty-five-day period or if  
the failure to comply resulted from the contacting agency’s  
failure to comply with notice requirements.  Given the absence  
of 
any 
language 
indicating 
retroactive 
effect, 
the 
forty-five­
day notice limit, and the presumption that statutes operate  
prospectively,4 we conclude that 2001 PA 222 does not apply  
retroactively.  
Thus, 
if 
we 
applied 
our 
holding 
in 
this 
case  
retroactively, 
the 
plaintiffs 
in 
cases 
currently 
pending 
would  
not be afforded relief under Hadfield or 2001 PA 222. Rather,  
4See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463  
Mich 578, 583; 624 NW2d 180 (2001); Franks v White Pine Copper  
Div, 422 Mich 636, 671; 375 NW2d 715 (1985); Hughes v Judges’  
Retirement Bd, 407 Mich 75, 85; 282 NW2d 160 (1979).  
25  
 
 
they would become a distinct class of litigants denied relief  
because of an unfortunate circumstance of timing.  
Accordingly, this decision will be applied only to cases  
brought on or after April 2, 2002.  In all cases currently  
pending, the interpretation set forth in Hadfield will apply.  
VI  
TAKING CLAUSE  
The parties have addressed whether trespass nuisance is  
not a tort within the meaning of the governmental immunity  
statute, but rather an unconstitutional taking of property  
that violates Const 1963, art 10, § 2.  The trial courts in  
these cases have yet to address the taking claims.  Therefore,  
we decline to discuss those claims at this time.  
VII  
CONCLUSION  
We hold that the first sentence of § 7, by its plain  
language, applies to both the state and its municipalities,  
but that the second sentence of § 7 applies only to the state,  
as defined in the statute. We overrule precedent holding to  
the contrary. 
Further, we hold that the statute as  
interpreted in this opinion does not violate Const 1963, art  
4, § 24. After consideration of the effect of this decision  
on the administration of justice, we hold that this decision  
is limited to prospective application.  
Finally, we observe that it appears from the record that  
26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the circuit courts may not have addressed all the elements  
required under Hadfield for a claim of trespass-nuisance,  
including causation, when deciding the motions for summary  
disposition.  Therefore, we remand these cases to the circuit  
courts 
to 
reconsider 
plaintiffs’ 
motions 
for 
summary  
disposition under Hadfield, including the issue of causation.  
See Hadfield, supra at 169; 
Peterman v Dep’t of Natural  
Resources, 446 Mich 177, 205, n 42; 521 NW2d 499 (1994).  
WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
27  
________________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT POHUTSKI, AMY POHUTSKI, 
KIERK SANDERLIN, JOELLE SANDERLIN, 
ALAN BULLION, ANTHONY CORBELL, 
PIETRO FUSCO, NORMA FUSCO, 
KAYE GARDNER, BEVERLY GARDNER, 
SHIRLEY KARAPETOFF, KAREN KEREZI, 
BRIAN LaFUENTE, MICHELLE LaFUENTE, 
RICHARD REFALKO, DOLORES RAFALKO, 
WILLIAM SHAMUS, KATHLEEN SHAMUS, 
and all others similarly situated, 
a certified class,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 116949  
THE CITY OF ALLEN PARK, a Michigan 
municipal corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
JOHN DOE REPRESENTATIVE, EMPLOYEES, 
OR AGENTS OF THE CITY OF ALLEN PARK, 
jointly and severally.  
JEANNE JONES, JAMES JONES, ROGER TROST, 
CAROL TROST, MIKE ROBERT, MIKE BARTHLOW, 
CINDY BARTHLOW, SUSAN BROWN, 
KENNETH BROWN, SHIRLEY BRYANT, 
DAVID BURHANS, MAGDALENA CHAVEZ, 
WILLIAM CHUNN, IVAN GADJEV, 
FLORENCE GADJEV, REX GLASSON, 
BARBARA GLASSON, KEVIN HALL, 
SONIA HALL, LON HAMILTON,  
________________________________________ 
DIANE HAMILTON, WILLIAM HATTON, 
ELIZABETH HATTON, BILL HOFSESS, 
JOAN HOFSESS, JAMES HUBBLE, 
VIRGINIA HUBBLE, SOUREN MERUCCI, 
ENERA MERUCCI, MARY PEGORARO, 
PHIL PEGORARO, LUIS PERESSINI, 
MICHAL ALLEN PETERS, MIGUEL PRIETO, 
JILL PRIETO, TODD SNIDER, BETTY ZAHER, 
and all other similarly situated,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 117935  
CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS, 
a Michigan municipal 
corporation, and JOHN DOE 
REPRESENTATIVES, EMPLOYEES, 
OR AGENTS OF THE CITY OF  
FARMINGTON HILLS, jointly and severally,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
The majority's decision today overrules many years of  
Michigan jurisprudence interpreting the government tort  
liability act (GTLA). Its rationale for upsetting the well­
reasoned precedent of this Court is that it brings the  
statute's construction closer to the Legislature's intent.  I  
find this patently inaccurate.  
Repeatedly, beginning with the decision in Ross v  
Consumers Power (On Rehearing),1 this Court has construed the  
GTLA each time by scrutinizing the language and the purpose the  
Legislature articulated for it.  Using a consistent approach,  
I conclude that the trespass-nuisance exception still exists  
1420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).  
2  
  
 
 
and that it applies to municipal units of government.  I would  
hold, as well, that the trespass-nuisance cause of action is  
constitutionally 
derived 
and 
unaffected 
by 
legislative 
action.  
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY ACT  
Whenever a court interprets a statute, it attempts to  
ascertain and fulfill the Legislature's intent in passing it.  
Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 407; 424 NW2d  
248 (1998).  It seeks to identify the object of the statute  
and the harm it was designed to remedy.  It endeavors to make  
a construction that is at once reasonable and analyzed so as  
best to accomplish the purposes of the statute.  Marquis v  
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 444 Mich 638; 513 NW2d 799  
(1994).  It construes the statute's provisions not in  
isolation, but in context.  Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460  
Mich 230; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).  
Having applied these principles, I conclude, as did the  
Court in Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm'rs,2 that if the  
Legislature had meant to abolish the trespass-nuisance  
exception, it would have stated so unequivocally.  
The Legislature enacted the GTLA in 1965 as a response to  
Williams v Detroit,3 a decision in which this Court abrogated  
governmental immunity for municipalities.  The Court was  
evenly divided concerning whether common-law governmental  
2430 Mich 139, 148; 422 NW2d 205 (1988).  
3364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961).  
3  
 
 
immunity existed. However, a majority agreed that municipal  
units of government are not immune from liability.  Id. at  
270. As a consequence of Williams, governmental entities in  
general 
retained 
their 
common-law 
immunity, 
while  
municipalities did not.  
The title of the GTLA reads as follows:  
An act to make uniform the liability of 
municipal 
corporations, political subdivisions, and 
the state, its agencies and departments, officers, 
employees, and volunteers thereof, and members of 
certain boards, councils, and task forces when 
engaged in the exercise or discharge of a  
governmental function, for injuries to property and 
persons . . . .  [MCL 691.1401 et seq., cited in  
Ross, supra at 593.]  
The language is unequivocal.  It expresses an intent to  
reestablish and codify a consistent and uniform form of  
governmental immunity, restoring the shield to municipal  
governments while in the exercise of a governmental function.  
After detailing some statutory exceptions to immunity, § 7 of  
the statute states:  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, all 
governmental agencies shall be immune from tort 
liability in all cases wherein the governmental 
agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 
governmental 
function. 
Except 
as 
otherwise  
provided in this act, this act shall not be 
construed as modifying or restricting the immunity 
of the state from tort liability as it existed 
before July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed. 
[MCL 691.1407(1).]  
In the cases before us today, the defendants argue that  
the word "state" in the second sentence of § 7 bars common-law  
exceptions to immunity for "all governmental agencies." The  
4  
  
  
 
majority goes further, holding that there were no common-law  
exceptions to even the state's governmental immunity.4  
I disagree with the former and dissent from the latter.  
With respect to the former, Ross shows that the word "state"  
must be read consistently with the creation of a uniform  
system of immunity between municipal, local, and state  
governments. With respect to the latter, Hadfield confirmed  
that common-law exceptions existed that did survive the  
enactment of the GTLA.  
A. ROSS V CONSUMERS POWER CO  
The Ross decision dealt with the use of the word "state"  
in the GTLA. 
It held that its placement there presented a  
clear conflict with the purpose and title of the act.  We  
faced the same dilemma over § 135 of the act. That section  
also used the word "state" to describe immunity:  
The immunity of the state shall not apply to 
actions to recover for bodily injury or property 
damage arising out of the performance of a  
proprietary function . . . [Former MCL 691.1413, as 
enacted by 1964 PA 170.]  
4The majority states that it makes no ruling with regard 
to the state's immunity. However, when it tries to resolve a 
conflict between its interpretation of § 7 and the Title- 
Object Clause, Const 1963, art 4, § 24, it interprets § 7 as 
reserving exceptions only to the state's sovereign immunity. 
Under that interpretation, no sentence in the GTLA reserves  
common-law 
exceptions 
to 
the 
governmental 
function 
immunity 
of 
the state.  Therefore, while the state is not a party to this 
action, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
still 
carries 
serious  
implications for the state's sovereign immunity.  
5MCL 691.1413.  
5  
 
  
The Court took the exception for "the state" and applied  
it to all governmental entities.  It rejected the plain  
meaning of § 13 because, so read, it would have limited the  
proprietary function exception to the state and its agencies,  
departments, and commissions.  The Court declined to find that  
restriction in the act because it was clearly not what the  
Legislature intended. It observed:  
The governmental immunity act was intended to 
provide uniform liability and immunity to both 
state and local governmental agencies.  A strict  
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" reading of 
§ 13 would destroy this uniformity. [Ross, supra  
at 614.]  
The Court concluded that restricting § 13 to state government  
would run contrary to the goal and intent of the act, namely,  
a uniform system of liability and immunity.  Moreover, it  
would abolish a longstanding exception to common-law immunity  
without the presence of any clear indications of legislative  
intent to do so.  The Legislature codified this Court's  
reading of § 13 of the act two years later by substituting the  
words "governmental agency" for the word "state."  
B. HADFIELD V OAKLAND CO DRAIN COMM'R  
Two years after the Legislature effectively ratified  
Ross's interpretation of § 13, the Court decided Hadfield,  
supra.  It found that the Legislature had used "state" in § 7,  
as it had in § 13, to mean "governmental agency."  The  
defendant in Hadfield argued that there were no common-law  
exceptions to governmental immunity under the statute.  
6  
Once again, the Court saw a conflict between the language  
of the statute, legislative intent, and an historic immunity  
exception. It concluded:  
While the defendant's arguments, advocating 
recognition of only statutory exceptions [to 
governmental immunity], are temptingly simple and 
straightforward, they negate or ignore the second 
half of the legislative mandate of § 7.  That  
section requires a continuation of the nuisance 
exception as formulated prior to the enactment of 
the governmental immunity act in 1964 . . . .  [Id.  
at 149.]  
The Court rejected the defendant's argument using this  
reasoning:
 The second sentence of § 7 requires that the  
state's governmental immunity remain as it existed before  
July 1, 1965.  The trespass-nuisance exception is strongly  
rooted in Michigan's history. Nothing in the expressions of  
the Legislature indicated an intention to change it.  
Today's holding discards the conclusion in Hadfield by  
reinterpreting the second sentence of § 7 as an expansion of  
sovereign 
immunity. 
 
I strenuously disagree with this newfound  
purpose for the statute.  Both the first sentence and the  
second sentence of § 7 use the words "tort liability."  
Therefore, the type of liability and immunity the Legislature  
intended in the first sentence, it also intended in the  
second. According to the second sentence, the immunity from  
liability was not to be modified or expanded from what existed  
under the common law.  
That reasoning, coupled with the intention to create a  
uniform system that we found in Ross, leads to one conclusion  
7  
  
only:  the Legislature meant to keep the state's sovereign  
immunity where it was before July 1965, preventing its  
expansion or erosion, and to extend it uniformly to all other  
governmental entities.  The common-law exception of trespass­
nuisance thus would have survived.  
C. LEGISLATIVE CONFIRMATION OF THE EXCEPTION  
This year the Legislature enacted 2001 PA 222,6 which  
added §§ 16 through 19 to the GTLA. MCL 691.1416 to 691.1419.  
The new act creates a mechanism for local governmental units  
to make compensation when a defect in a sewer system causes  
the type of damage complained of here. Section 17 states:  
Sections 
16 
to 
19 
abrogate 
common 
law  
exceptions, if any, to immunity for the overflow or 
backup of a sewage disposal system and provide the 
sole remedy for obtaining any form of relief for 
damages or physical injuries caused by a sewage 
disposal system event regardless of the legal 
theory. [MCL 691.1417(2).]  
This language acknowledges that there are or, at least, may be  
common-law exceptions to governmental immunity.  Given the  
intent and the timing of the act, it is apparent that the  
Legislature sought to prevent this Court from barring  
homeowner suits for damages.  
2001 PA 222 is not alone in acknowledging the likely  
existence of common-law exceptions to governmental immunity.  
The Legislature also suggests their existence in § 7a of the  
GTLA, which it passed in anticipation of Year 2000 computer  
6The act was signed by the Governor after oral arguments 
were made in this case.  
8  
  
failures.  
Except as . . . provided in . . . Section 13, 
a political subdivision other than a municipal 
corporation engaged in the exercise or discharge of 
a governmental function is immune from liability in 
an action to recover damages resulting directly or 
indirectly from a computer failure, including, but 
not limited to . . . an action based on section 2, 
3, 5, 6, or 7. [MCL 691.1407a(1).]  
This language indicates that an action to recover damages  
could be founded on § 7, a section that the majority believes  
is merely an assertion of state immunity. Section 7a of the  
GTLA and 2001 PA 222, in conjunction with the legislative  
intent 
described 
in 
Ross and Hadfield, are convincing evidence  
that 
the 
Legislature 
did not abrogate common-law exceptions to  
immunity with § 7.  
D. SCOPE OF TITLE  
The majority's treatment of the Title-Object Clause7 in  
the state constitution omits the significance of the title of  
the GTLA as a key indicator of the Legislature's intent.  
Since Justice COOLEY's time, the clause has been applied  
to insure that adequate notice of new legislation be given to  
the general public and to those affected by it. Maki v East  
Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 156-158; 188 NW2d 593 (1971). 
To  
accomplish that end and to avoid deception and subterfuge, the  
clause requires that the scope of all legislation must fall  
within the scope of its title. Id., Kurtz v People, 33 Mich  
279, 281 (1876).  In addition, the clause requires that no law  
7Const 1963, art 4, § 24.  
9  
 
embrace more than one object, which must be expressed in the  
title.  
The title of the GTLA indicates a desire for a "uniform"  
system of liability.  However, the majority's construction of  
§ 7 of the act accomplishes the opposite.  The majority  
examines the differences between sovereign and governmental  
function immunity.  It then concludes that, under its reading  
of the act, the system will be uniform as regards governmental  
function immunity. It finds that reaffirmation of sovereign  
immunity was incidental to the purpose of the act.  
I disagree.  If the first sentence of § 7 codifies a  
consistent governmental function immunity and the second  
reaffirms the state's sovereign immunity, the second sentence  
falls outside the requirements of the Title-Object Clause.  It  
is beyond the scope of the act's title to "affirm" and codify  
the state's common-law sovereign immunity, because the title  
refers only to an immunity enjoyed "when engaged in the  
discharge of governmental function."  MCL 691.1401 et seq. It  
is also beyond the act's scope to allow different governmental  
immunity at different levels of government, as the majority  
finds it does.  
The Ross and Hadfield decisions construed the act in a  
way that does not violate the Title-Object Clause. The Ross  
Court held that § 7 uses the expression "sovereign immunity"  
to include governmental functions.  The expression was the  
tool by which the Legislature made all immunity uniform when  
10  
  
 
  
a unit of government was performing a governmental function.  
Under this interpretation, the affirmation of sovereign  
immunity is germane to the creation of a uniform system of  
liability and immunity.  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR  
THE TRESPASS-NUISANCE EXCEPTION  
Overlooked 
in 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
of 
the  
Legislature's 
intent 
is 
whether 
the 
trespass-nuisance  
exception enjoys a constitutional basis that defeats a  
statutory 
grant 
of 
governmental immunity.  The majority treats  
the question as part of the plaintiffs' taking claim that has  
yet to be adjudicated below.  
I believe that it is preferable to address the question  
here, than wait for the matter to return to us.  I believe  
that the common-law cause of action of trespass-nuisance is  
based on the Taking Clause of the Michigan Constitution8 and,  
as a consequence, statutory governmental immunity is not a  
defense. Li v Feldt (After Remand), 434 Mich 584, 594, n 10;  
456 NW2d 55 (1990).  
This Court in Buckeye Union Fire Ins Co v Michigan9  
acknowledged that the trespass-nuisance exception has a  
constitutional basis.  Governmental immunity is not a defense  
to a constitutional tort claim, hence not to a claim based on  
8Const 1963, art 10, § 2.  
9383 Mich 630; 178 NW2d 476 (1970).  
11  
 
  
 
trespass-nuisance. 
Thom v State Hwy Comm'r, 376 Mich 608,  
628; 138 NW2d 322 (1965).  The claim survives despite the fact  
that a statutory exception is not present because the law  
views the trespass or nuisance as an appropriation of property  
rights. Taylor, Googasian & Falk, Torts, § 7:252, p 7-86.  
Not even the state can intrude on a citizen's lawful  
possession of his property.  Ashley v Port Huron, 35 Mich 296,  
300 (1877); Herro v Chippewa Co Rd Comm'rs, 368 Mich 263, 272;  
118 NW2d 271 (1962).  And the protection of one's property  
rights is not accomplished solely through actions for eminent  
domain. One may sue under the Taking Clause.  
Also, actions under the clause are not limited to claims  
alleging an absolute conversion of property.  Pearsall v  
Supervisors, 74 Mich 558; 42 NW 77 (1889).  The action of a  
governmental 
agency 
may constitute a taking when it interferes  
with, damages, or destroys the property of an individual.  
Buckeye, supra at 642.  
Since 1860, this Court has relied on the Taking Clause to  
support actions for trespass-nuisance.  This Court has held  
many 
times 
that 
an 
invasion by government-controlled waters or  
sewage creates a cause of action against which governmental  
immunity is not a bar.10  
10See Pennoyer v Saginaw, 8 Mich 534 (1860); Sheldon v  
Kalamazoo, 24 Mich 383 (1872); Ashley, supra at 296; Defer v  
Detroit, 67 Mich 346, 349; 34 NW 680 (1887); Rice v Flint, 67 
Mich 401, 403; 34 NW 719 (1887); Vanderlip v Grand Rapids, 73 
(continued...)  
12  
 
  
On the basis of that long-established precedent, I would  
hold 
that 
a 
trespass-nuisance 
cause 
of 
action 
is  
constitutionally based and cannot be abrogated by the  
Legislature. The actions of the defendants here in flooding  
the plaintiffs' basements constitute a "taking," and damages,  
if proven, should be available.  The basis for recovery is  
that the government deprived plaintiffs of the useful  
possession of property that they own.  Gerzeski v Dep't of  
State Hwys, 403 Mich 149, 170; 268 NW2d 525 (1978).  
III. APPLICATION OF THE TRESPASS-NUISANCE EXCEPTION  
Trespass-nuisance refers to a "trespass or interference  
with the use or enjoyment of land caused by a physical  
intrusion that is set in motion by the government or its  
agents and result[s] in personal or property damage."  
Continental Paper & Supply Co v Detroit, 451 Mich 162, 164;  
545 NW2d 657 (1996).  Its elements are (1) the existence of a  
condition, such as a nuisance or a trespass, (2) a cause, such  
as a physical intrusion, and (3) causation or control, as by  
government. Id.  
10(...continued) 
Mich 522, 535; 41 NW 677 (1889); Seaman v Marshall, 116 Mich 
327, 329-330; 74 NW 484 (1898); Ferris v Detroit Bd of Ed, 122 
Mich 315, 318; 81 NW 98 (1899); McAskill v Hancock Twp, 129 
Mich 74, 78-79; 88 NW 78 (1901); Onen v Herkimer, 172 Mich 
593, 598; 138 NW 198 (1912); Attorney General v Grand Rapids, 
175 Mich 503, 534; 141 NW 890 (1913); Donaldson v City of  
Marshall, 247 Mich 357, 359; 225 NW 529 (1929); Robinson v  
Wyoming Twp, 312 Mich 14, 23; 19 NW2d 469 (1945); Defnet v  
Detroit, 327 Mich 254, 258; 41 NW2d 539 (1950).  
13  
 
 
  
In both cases before us, plaintiffs' basements have been  
flooded 
by 
discarded 
water11 
that 
entered 
through 
drains 
hooked  
up to the municipal sewer system.  The nature of this  
intrusion is similar to that found in CS&P, Inc v Midland, 229  
Mich App 141, 145; 580 NW2d 468 (1998).  There, water and  
sewage flowed into the plaintiff's commercial suite from its  
floor drains and toilets. The Court of Appeals found that a  
trespass-nuisance cause of action existed.  A cause should be  
found to exist in the cases before us, given the similarity of  
facts.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The majority finds that the trespass-nuisance exception  
to governmental immunity ended in 1965 with passage of the  
GTLA.  I disagree with its conclusion because of subsequent  
judicial precedent upholding the exception and the lack of  
clear legislative intent to alter it. 
Moreover, any  
legislative attempt to remove the trespass-nuisance exception  
must be found invalid because a cause of action under the  
exception is constitutionally based in the Taking Clause.  
In making its ruling, the majority discards longstanding  
and well-reasoned precedent of this Court in order to make its  
own interpretation of a Michigan statute.12
 It does so,  
11Defendant disputes whether all the homes in question 
were flooded by debris-carrying sewage.  
12See Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 
702 (2000) (KELLY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
(continued...)  
14  
 
 
stating an obligation to "shoulder [its] constitutional duty  
to act within [its] grant of authority and honor the intent of  
the Legislature . . ." and to "rectify . . . [past]  
misconstruction of the statutory text." Slip op at 22-23.  
But what must be apparent to all, when the rhetoric is  
stripped of its gloss, is that this Court is again ignoring  
its own past rulings. 
And, if each successive Court,  
believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong,  
rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to  
year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable.  
The majority's decision to limit its interpretation of  
the statute to prospective use is little more than a  
furnishing of salve to stem a hemorrhage. For all the above  
reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
12(...continued) 
part).  
15