Title: In re J.K.F.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-137 
No. 82A21 
Filed 5 November 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 28 
October 2020 by Judge David V. Byrd  in District Court, Yadkin County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
James N. Freeman Jr. for petitioner-appellee Yadkin County Human Services 
Agency. 
 
Paul W. Freeman Jr. for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her 
parental rights in the minor children, “Jack,”1 “Hannah,” and “Nicole.” We affirm the 
trial court’s order and hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights for her failure to pay a reasonable portion of the 
                                            
1 We use pseudonyms to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading.  
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
cost of care for the children. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
On 13 September 2019, the Yadkin County Human Services Agency (YCHSA) 
moved to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in the minor children, Jack, 
Hannah, and Nicole. Although he is discussed in this opinion, the children’s father 
died in an automobile accident in May 2019 and is not a party to this appeal. On 28 
August 2020, the trial court held a hearing on YCHSA’s motion to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights. The trial court entered its order terminating 
respondent-mother’s parental rights on 28 October 2020. Respondent filed timely 
notice of appeal from the termination order on 25 November 2020.  
¶ 3 
 
In June 2018, YCHSA first investigated respondent-mother and the father 
based on a report that they had engaged in domestic violence at home while the 
children were present. In the course of its investigation, YCHSA observed that the 
father and respondent-mother were struggling financially and lacked electricity in 
their home. YCHSA recommended services for the family including mental health 
treatment and parenting education, but the parents declined to participate at that 
time. 
¶ 4 
 
YCHSA encountered the family again in August 2018 when they received a 
report that Hannah had been inappropriately touched by her grandfather. While 
these allegations ultimately were unsubstantiated, in the course of investigating 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
them, YCHSA observed that the home still lacked electricity, and the father and 
respondent-mother were having difficulty meeting their children’s basic needs. 
Shortly thereafter, the family relocated to Forsyth County. There, the father and 
respondent-mother attempted to enroll Jack in elementary school but could not 
provide the school with a permanent address, which caused Jack to miss several 
weeks of school. 
¶ 5 
 
The father contacted YCHSA on 22 October 2018, stating that he could not 
properly care for the children, that respondent-mother refused to bathe the children, 
and that she would not take care of them. The father brought a YCHSA employee to 
the camper trailer located on his brother’s property where the family was living.  
There, the YCHSA employee observed the following: the trailer had multiple broken 
windows covered with wood; the three children shared a single twin mattress; the 
toilet appeared to be clogged with feces and toilet paper; the trailer was heated by a 
small space heater which was insufficient to maintain heat in the structure; nails 
were protruding from the trailer door, creating a hazard to the children; and the only 
food in the trailer was a box of macaroni and cheese and an open bottle of soda. The 
three children were dressed in t-shirts and shorts though the temperature was in the 
fifties. 
¶ 6 
 
The father advised YCHSA that he wanted treatment for his mental health 
and anger issues. Respondent-mother also acknowledged having untreated mental 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
health issues. The father consented to YCHSA placing the children in foster care in 
order to meet their needs. 
¶ 7 
 
On 23 October 2018, YCHSA filed juvenile petitions alleging that Jack, 
Hannah, and Nicole were neglected juveniles, as they did not receive proper care, 
supervision, or discipline from their parents, and they lived in an injurious home 
environment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). The trial court placed the children in 
nonsecure custody pending its ruling on the petitions.  
¶ 8 
 
Respondent-mother signed an Out of Home Family Services Agreement (case 
plan) with YCHSA on 11 December 2018, which required her to complete a 
psychological assessment and a substance abuse assessment and comply with any 
recommendations; submit to random drug screens as requested; complete a parenting 
education program; obtain and maintain housing suitable for the children for at least 
six months; and obtain and maintain consistent employment for at least six months.  
¶ 9 
 
After a hearing on 3 January 2019, the trial court entered an order on 6 
February 2019 adjudicating the children to be neglected juveniles. On 29 April 2019, 
respondent-mother signed a voluntary support agreement. Pursuant to the 
agreement, she was ordered to pay $35.66 per child in monthly child support. 
¶ 10 
 
Based on respondent-mother’s additional positive drug screens and lack of 
progress on her case plan, the trial court concluded in an order entered on 6 August 
2019 that additional “[r]eunification efforts would clearly be unsuccessful or 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
inconsistent with the [children’s] health and safety.” The court established a primary 
permanent plan of adoption with a secondary plan of reunification and ordered the 
director of YCHSA to initiate a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. 
¶ 11 
 
On 13 September 2019, YCHSA moved to terminate respondent-mother’s 
parental rights in Jack, Hannah, and Nicole. As grounds for termination, the motion 
alleged that respondent-mother neglected the children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1); that she had willfully left the children in an out-of-home placement for 
more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the 
conditions leading to removal under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and that she had 
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the children’s cost of care in YCHSA 
custody for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the motion under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). Respondent-mother responded denying the motion’s 
material allegations. 
¶ 12 
 
On 28 August 2020, the trial court held a hearing on YCHSA’s motion to 
terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. At the time of the hearing, 
respondent-mother was homeless, unemployed, and receiving no treatment for her 
mental health or substance abuse issues. She had not completed the required 
parenting education program and had last visited the children in October 2019.   
¶ 13 
 
The trial court entered its order terminating respondent-mother’s parental 
rights on 28 October 2020. The court concluded YCHSA had proved the existence of 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
each of the asserted statutory grounds for termination by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence. After considering the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a), the court further concluded that terminating respondent-mother’s parental 
rights was in each of the children’s best interests. Respondent-mother filed timely 
notice of appeal from the termination order. 
II. 
Issues on Appeal 
¶ 14 
 
On appeal, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that 
grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s rights to her children pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3). The trial court found that three grounds existed to 
terminate respondent-mother’s rights: neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 
failure to make reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and willful 
failure to pay cost of care under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). As the law allows us to 
decide on one ground, we affirm the lower court’s decision on the third ground. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) (2019) (“The court may terminate the parental rights upon a 
finding of one or more of the following [grounds for termination.]”). 
A. Standard of Review 
¶ 15 
 
“Proceedings to terminate parental rights consist of an adjudicatory stage and 
a dispositional stage.” In re K.H., 375 N.C. 610, 612 (2020). At the adjudicatory stage, 
“the petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 
that grounds exist for termination pursuant to” the statute. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
388, 391 (2019). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on 
appeal.” In re K.H., 375 N.C. at 612. Respondent-mother does not allege any error at 
the dispositional stage.  Therefore, this opinion focuses on the findings of the trial 
court at the adjudicatory stage. 
B. Analysis 
¶ 16 
 
Granting the motion to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights, the 
trial court found that grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3), which reads 
as follows: 
The juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county 
department of social services, a licensed child-placing 
agency, a child-caring institution, or a foster home, and the 
parent has for a continuous period of six months 
immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion 
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 
care for the juvenile although physically and financially 
able to do so. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).  
¶ 17 
 
Since the motion for termination of parental rights was filed on 13 September 
2019, the trial court needed to make specific findings about the relevant six-month 
statutory period which was from 13 March 2019 to 13 September 2019. See In re K.H., 
375 N.C. at 616 (analyzing the trial court’s findings for evidence of willful 
nonpayment during the exact six-month period).  
¶ 18 
 
For the purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3), “[a] parent is required to pay that 
portion of the cost of foster care for the child that is fair, just and equitable based 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.” In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 357 (2020) 
(quoting In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 604 (1981)).  The existence of a valid child support 
order or voluntary support agreement is evidence of the parent’s ability to pay the 
amount prescribed therein.  In re A.P.W., 2021-NCSC-93, ¶ 44 (quoting In re J.M., 
373 N.C. at 359). 
¶ 19 
 
Respondent-mother argues that petitioner did not meet its burden to prove 
that she had the ability to pay child support during that period, and therefore, the 
nonpayment was not shown to be willful. She claims that her dates of incarceration 
and dates of working for her aunt were not entered into the record and there was no 
finding of employment during that time.   
¶ 20 
 
Respondent-mother’s argument is undermined by the undisputed facts that (1) 
she entered into a voluntary support agreement on 29 April 2019—during the six-
month period at issue—which is evidence of her ability to pay a monthly sum, as 
defined in that agreement, of “$107.00 in ongoing support, with $30.00 towards the 
arrears, split amongst all three children[,]” and (2) she paid no child support during 
the relevant statutory period. See In re A.P.W., 2021-NCSC-93, ¶ 44. As this Court 
explained in In re A.P.W., where a parent is subject to a valid child support order or 
voluntary support agreement establishing her ability to pay a particular amount, it 
is not fatal to petitioner’s case if the trial court fails to make “findings that address 
[her] income, employment, or capacity for the same during the six-month period 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
relevant to [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(a)(3).” Id. ¶¶ 42, 44 (alterations in original). 
Moreover, respondent-mother adduced no evidence that she was incarcerated 
between 13 March 2019 and 13 September 2019. The record shows that, in addition 
to attending the 14 March 2019 dispositional hearing, she attended the 27 June 2019 
permanency-planning hearing and submitted to drug screens requested by YCHSA 
on 4 April 2019 and 2 May 2019.  
¶ 21 
 
In fact, the evidence further shows that respondent-mother worked during at 
least part of the six-month period. The trial court substantiated that conclusion with 
the following findings of fact and conclusion of law:  
18. 
. . . [Respondent-mother] indicated she was 
working in early to mid-March 2019 with a relative. She 
indicated that work was available to her with an Aunt as 
well. She further indicated via her testimony that she 
lacked the motivation to get out and work because she 
didn’t have her kids and that if she did she would have 
[gone] to work. She never made a single voluntary payment 
towards the support of her children. The only form of 
payment received was a $642.00 intercept [on 21 July 2020, 
outside of the six-month range] that was split amongst the 
children. Her current arrears in support are $534.90 as to 
[Jack], $535.05 as to [Hannah] and $715.05 as to [Nicole]. 
. . . . 
20. 
The Court finds that [respondent-mother] has 
for a continuous period of more than 6 months immediately 
preceding the filing of this Motion for Termination of 
Parental Rights, failed to pay a reasonable portion of each 
child’s cost of care despite having been physically and 
financially capable of doing so. 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
. . . .  
3. 
[YCHSA] has shown by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that the following grounds exist to 
terminate the [respondent-mother’s] parental rights to the 
minor children: 
 
. . . .  
c. 
N.C.G.S. [§] 7B-1111(a)(3) in that the minor 
children are placed in the custody of [YCHSA] 
and [respondent-mother] has for a continuous 
period of 6 months immediately preceding the 
filing of the Motion to Terminate Parental 
Rights willfully failed to pay a reasonable 
portion of the cost of care for the minor 
children although she is physically and 
financially able to do so.  
To the extent respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, 
they are binding.  
¶ 22 
 
Respondent-mother claims that “no evidence” supports the trial court’s 
statement in finding of fact 18 that she “indicated she was working in early to mid-
March 2019 with a relative.” However, the Guardian ad Litem’s report dated 20 June 
2019 and received into evidence at the 27 June 2019 ninety-day review hearing,2 
                                            
2 The trial court took “judicial notice of all orders, court reports, attachments to court 
reports, and other documents contained in the underlying juvenile files . . . and in so doing 
consider[ed] the burden of proof under which such documents were accepted into evidence at 
the time.” See generally In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 410 (2019) (“A trial court may take judicial 
notice of findings of fact made in prior orders, even when those findings are based on a lower 
evidentiary standard because where a judge sits without a jury, the trial court is presumed 
to have disregarded any incompetent evidence and relied upon the competent evidence.”). 
 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
which was during the statutory period, includes a statement that respondent-mother 
indicated “she is working part-time in a thrift store owned by her aunt” but is not 
paying child support.  Respondent-mother testified about working for her aunt during 
the termination hearing, where she stated: 
I had worked with my aunt off and on [in] the past -- 
actually, I’ve worked with her numerous times since I've 
been out of jail with her lawn care service and her thrift 
shop, but it’s nothing major. I was only getting paid, like, 
maybe $200.00 to $300.00 a week, if that. 
Thus, the corresponding portions of finding of fact 18 are supported by the evidence, 
and we accept that respondent-mother worked during the relevant period. 
¶ 23 
 
Finally, respondent-mother observes that “no finding relevant to [N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(3)] includes the language that [she] willfully failed to pay support or a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care.” Although the term “willfully” does not appear 
in the findings pertinent to this adjudication, the trial court’s conclusion of law 3(c) 
expressly states that respondent-mother “has for a continuous period of 6 months 
immediately preceding the filing of the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights willfully 
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the minor children although 
she is physically and financially able to do so.”  
¶ 24 
 
The location of the trial court’s finding of willfulness has no bearing on its 
efficacy. In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 818 (2020). In light of the evidence that respondent-
mother signed a voluntary support agreement which she never moved to modify or 
IN RE J.K.F., H.N.F., N.L.F. 
2021-NCSC-137 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
set aside, that she had some gainful employment during the relevant period, and that 
she subsequently did not make reasonable payments toward the children’s cost of 
care during the relevant six-month period, we conclude “the trial court did not err in 
finding respondent-mother’s nonpayment to be willful and in concluding that grounds 
existed to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).” In re 
A.P.W., 2021-NCSC-93, ¶ 45. 
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 25 
 
Because we uphold the trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3), we need not review the two remaining grounds found by the court under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2). Respondent-mother offers no argument regarding the 
trial court’s assessment of the children’s best interests at the dispositional stage of 
the proceeding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The order terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights in Jack, Hannah, and Nicole is therefore affirmed.  
AFFIRMED.