Title: Whisenant v. Whisenant

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

219 Kan. 387 (1976)
548 P.2d 470
BILLY RAY WHISENANT, Appellant,
v.
JOYCE MARIE WHISENANT a/k/a JOYCE MARIE SWAFFORD, formerly known as JOYCE MARIE TAMASHIRO, Appellee, and TAMMY FUMIKO TAMASHIRO, a minor female, through her natural mother and next friend, JOYCE MARIE WHISENANT, (Defendant).
No. 47,898

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1976.
Laurence M. Jarvis, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellant.
Richard L. Reid, of Steineger and Reid, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRAGER, J.:
This is a civil action in which the plaintiff-appellant, Billy Ray Whisenant, claiming to be the natural father of a child, seeks a judicial determination of his paternity and his parental rights and obligations. Counsel for the plaintiff has characterized the action as a "reverse civil bastardy suit" which he alleges is the first proceeding of its kind. The basic issue to be determined on this appeal is whether the defendant-appellee, Joyce Marie Swafford, the mother of the child, has by her actions submitted to the long arm jurisdiction of the courts of Kansas in this proceeding in accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-308. The district court held that it had no jurisdiction of the action and denied relief to the plaintiff. From the judgment denying relief for lack of in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
This action was initiated by the filing of a petition which alleged four separate claims and which was in the following form:
*388 "COUNT ONE
"I
"II
"III
"IV
"V
"VI
"VII
"VIII
*389 "IX
"COUNT TWO
"I
"II
"III
"IV
"V
"VII
"COUNT THREE
"I
"II
"III
"IV
COUNT FOUR
"I
"II
Personal service was made on the defendant Joyce Marie Swafford at her home in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where the defendant lives with her present husband and her minor child, Tammy. The trial court found that no proper service of process had been made on the minor defendant, Tammy Tamashiro. Following service of the summons upon the defendant, counsel for defendant filed a motion challenging the in personam jurisdiction of the court. This motion was stricken by the court because of the defendant's failure to make discovery. The trial court thereafter conducted an evidentiary hearing at which plaintiff withdrew count three of his petition which alleged the existence of a common law marriage between plaintiff and defendant. He thereby withdrew his claim that the plaintiff and defendant had lived together in the marital relationship in the state of Kansas. It is undisputed that at the time the action was filed and throughout the course of the litigation the defendant-appellee, Joyce Marie Swafford, has been a citizen of the state of Oklahoma. Personal service of summons cannot be had upon her within the state of Kansas.
In order for the district court to have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant it was necessary for plaintiff to establish that the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of Kansas in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas long arm statute, K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-308. It provides in pertinent part as follows:
..............
..............
..............
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On this appeal the plaintiff contends that under the factual circumstances set forth in his petition the Kansas courts have jurisdiction of the action under subsections (b) (1), (2), and (5) of 60-308 relating to the transaction of business within the state ([b] [1]), the commission of a tortious act within this state ([b] [2]), and entering into an express or implied contract ([b] [5]).
The plaintiff first maintains that the defendant's alleged promise to marry the plaintiff followed by sexual intercourse, conception of a child, and the purchase of wedding rings constituted the transaction of business within the meaning of subsection (b) (1). An extensive analysis of this subsection as well as the general principles governing long arm jurisdiction may be found in Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 438 P.2d 135. There this court noted that the enactment of 60-308 (b) revealed a legislative intention to exert judicial jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Woodring we emphasized that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum state, he must have the minimum contacts enumerated in the statute. We have concluded that the acts of the defendant within the state of Kansas as enumerated above can not reasonably be said to constitute the "transaction of business' within the state, so as to subject the defendant to long arm jurisdiction under 60-308 (b) (1). Any claim or right of action which the plaintiff might have arose out of a personal relationship between the parties not constituting *393 the "transaction of business" within the meaning of the statute.
The plaintiff next argues that in personam jurisdiction over defendant has been established because defendant committed tortious acts within the state when she intentionally and wrongfully interfered with and deprived plaintiff of his parental rights. In State, ex rel., v. Schutts, 217 Kan. 175, 535 P.2d 982, we construed the phrase "the commission of a tortious act" in a paternity action brought by the mother against a nonresident alleged to be the putative father. We held that sexual intercourse or siring a child does not constitute the commission of a tortious act. In Schutts we pointed out that the courts of various jurisdictions are sharply divided on the issue. After considering the authorities on the subject, we concluded that the most liberal rules of construction of the phrase "tortious act" would not tolerate the inclusion of an act of sexual intercourse between consenting parties. In arriving at this conclusion we noted that the only provision in 60-308 with respect to out-of-state service of summons in a child support case was one where the child was born as a result of a marital relationship. In our judgment long arm jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the present case can not be justified on the theory of the "commission of a tortious act" within this state by defendant under the provision of 60-308 (b) (2).
Finally the plaintiff takes the position that by entering into plans for marriage with him in Kansas, the defendant entered into either an express or an implied contract within this state so as to subject her to the in personam jurisdiction of Kansas courts under 60-308 (b) (5). Counsel for the plaintiff in his brief correctly points out that the Kansas long arm statute is a single act statute, in that it permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on the making or performance of a single contract within the state. (Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richards of Rockford, Inc., 215 Kan. 849, 528 P.2d 1248.) The difficulty with plaintiff's position is that this is really not an action to recover damages or other relief for breach of contract. Any claim or cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in his petition does not arise from the execution of a contract between the parties but is founded upon the rights of a parent arising from a claimed father-child relationship. In our judgment the defendant has not submitted herself to the in personam jurisdiction of the Kansas courts in this action under the provisions of 60-308 (b) (5).
*394 It is clear to us that the controlling subsection of the Kansas long arm statute in this case is 60-308 (b) (8). It requires as the minimum contact necessary for in personam jurisdiction in actions involving family relationships that the parties live in a marital relationship within the state of Kansas. Where that occurs and one of the parties to the marriage subsequently departs from the state he may be personally served out of the state under 60-308 so as to give the Kansas courts in personam jurisdiction. Subsection 8 of 60-308 (b) is unique to Kansas. It was made a part of the Kansas long arm statute to solve the problem that arose from the fact that a court could decree a divorce without personal jurisdiction of one of the parties, but could not render an enforceable judgment for alimony, property settlement, or child support without personal or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the party to be bound or his assets. K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 60-308 (b) (8) restricts long arm jurisdiction in cases involving alimony, support, child custody, visitation, and other rights arising solely from the husband-wife or parent-child relationships, to factual situations where the parties actually lived in the marital relationship within the state of Kansas. It does not authorize long arm jurisdiction in such cases where the statutory minimum contact  living in the marital relationship in this state  is not present.
For the reasons set forth above we have concluded that the district court was correct in its finding and judgment that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendant-appellee in the action. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.