Title: Dandridge v. Marshall

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JONATHAN R. DANDRIDGE 
 
v.  Record No. 031457     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 23, 2004 
ALBERT R. MARSHALL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
Gary A. Hicks, Judge 
 
Jonathan R. Dandridge filed a personal injury action 
against Albert R. Marshall seeking damages of $300,000.  In 
this appeal, Dandridge asserts that due to the trial court's 
error in three of its evidentiary rulings, the jury awarded 
him only $15,000.  For the reasons we state below, we will 
remand the case for a new trial on damages because the trial 
court erred in excluding certain testimony and allowing other 
testimony. 
Facts
On December 5, 1999, Dandridge and Marshall were involved 
in an automobile accident.  An ambulance service transported 
Dandridge, complaining of nausea, blurred vision, and a severe 
headache, to the Medical College of Virginia Hospital for 
treatment. 
Dandridge filed a motion for judgment alleging that 
Marshall's negligence caused the accident.  Prior to trial, 
Marshall admitted liability but contested the extent of 
Dandridge's injuries stemming from the accident.  The case was 
submitted to the jury on the issue of damages only. 
 
At trial, Dandridge testified that he had suffered a 
concussion in a prior automobile accident two months before 
his accident with Marshall.  According to Dandridge, the 
concussion from his prior accident forced him to withdraw from 
classes he was taking at Virginia Commonwealth University and 
left him with "moderate" headaches, neck pain, and an 
inability to study due to medication.  By the time of the 
second accident, Dandridge testified he "still had some 
residuals of neck pain and from [sic] minor headaches, but 
nothing that was debilitating," and that his health generally 
was improving. 
 
Dr. Ross Bullock, a neurosurgeon and Dandridge's treating 
physician after his first accident, testified that in the 
first accident Dandridge had suffered whiplash and "mild to 
moderate traumatic brain injury" and that Dandridge would 
still have been feeling the effects of those injuries at the 
time of his second injury.  
After his second concussion, Dandridge's symptoms 
included significantly more severe headaches, blurred vision, 
nausea, and difficulty concentrating.  Dr. David X. Cifu 
treated Dandridge after his second accident and diagnosed him 
with "post-concussive syndrome" due to his two accidents.  
 
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According to Dr. Cifu, 85-90% of those who suffer a single 
concussion make a full recovery within eighteen months, and 
patients rarely show any improvement beyond that time.  While 
Dandridge was improving steadily before his accident with 
Marshall, in Dr. Cifu's opinion, the second concussion 
intensified his symptoms.  Because Dandridge continued to 
suffer the effects of these concussions as of his last visit 
with Dr. Cifu on January 24, 2002, Dr. Cifu suggested that 
Dandridge seek treatment from a psychiatrist or a pain-
management specialist.  Another physician, Dr. Martin Stein, 
treated Dandridge with pain medication, but Dr. Stein's 
treatment of Dandridge ended when Dr. Stein's medical license 
was suspended on October 21, 2002. 
Dr. Joel J. Silverman performed a psychiatric evaluation 
of Dandridge pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4:10, and portions 
of his deposition were read at trial.  Dr. Silverman testified 
that Dandridge suffered from chronic depression, and that his 
headaches were not caused by the second accident but by 
stress, depression, or a biological predisposition to 
headache.  Dr. Silverman concluded that the intensification of 
Dandridge's headaches was not the result of the second 
accident. 
In this appeal, Dandridge assigns error to three of the 
trial court's evidentiary rulings.  Dandridge asserts first 
 
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that the trial court erred in sustaining Marshall's objection 
to Dandridge's testimony regarding his treatment by Dr. Martin 
Stein.  Dandridge also assigns error to the trial court's 
rulings that permitted certain testimony by Dr. Silverman, 
specifically, that Dandridge had admitted he hoped to meet 
financial obligations with proceeds of the lawsuit and that 
Dandridge had purchased an "assault weapon" rather than 
securing further medical treatment.  We consider these issues 
in order. 
I. 
 
Dr. Stein treated Dandridge in 2002 following termination 
of Dr. Cifu's treatment.  Dandridge's treatment consisted 
primarily of prescriptions for pain medications.  Dr. Stein's 
medical license was subsequently revoked.  On the day of 
trial, Marshall filed a motion in limine to preclude Dandridge 
from introducing any testimony regarding the treatment 
Dandridge received from Dr. Stein.  Marshall's objection to 
this testimony was that Dr. Stein was not going to testify at 
trial and that, under McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 558, 569, 379 
S.E.2d 908, 914 (1989), only Dr. Stein could testify whether 
the treatment Dandridge received was reasonable and related to 
the accident. 
Marshall correctly recites the principle that only a 
physician can testify as to the reasonableness of treatment 
 
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and its causal connection to an event.  However, the testimony 
that Dandridge wished to present regarding Dr. Stein's 
treatment did not address those issues.  As he argued at trial 
and reasserts here, Dandridge wanted to testify that when Dr. 
Cifu told Dandridge he could not provide any further helpful 
treatment and Dandridge should seek treatment with a 
psychiatrist or pain management specialist, Dandridge followed 
those instructions and secured treatment with Dr. Stein, a 
psychiatrist specializing in pain management.  Such testimony 
bears not on the medical necessity of Dr. Stein's treatment 
but on Dandridge's heeding of Dr. Cifu's instructions. 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in sustaining Marshall's objection to Dandridge's 
testimony that Dandridge followed the advice of Dr. Cifu and 
secured pain management treatment by Dr. Stein.  This 
testimony was relevant in a number of particulars.  It showed 
that Dandridge followed the recommendation of Dr. Cifu, his 
treating physician, that Dandridge spent money on further 
treatment – in contradiction to Dr. Silverman's testimony – 
and it also supported Dandridge's claim of a permanent injury, 
because Dandridge continued to seek medical treatment even 
though his treatment with Dr. Cifu ended over a year before 
the litigation. 
 
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Our conclusion requires that we reverse the judgment of 
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial on 
damages.  Because the other issues Dandridge raises in this 
appeal may arise on retrial, we will address them here. 
II. 
Dandridge complains that the trial court erroneously 
overruled his objection to the following exchange during 
Marshall's questioning of Dr. Silverman: 
Q.  Now, Doctor, did you discuss at any point 
the motivation for this lawsuit or the basis for 
this lawsuit. 
 
. . . 
 
A.  Mr. Dandridge volunteered that he had 
heavy financial obligations, and that he hoped that 
he could better meet some of those obligations as a 
result of the litigation. 
 
Dr. Silverman's statement, according to Dandridge, improperly 
injects his financial standing into consideration of his 
damages.  Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Deahl, 126 Va. 141, 
150, 100 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1919).  Marshall counters that this 
statement is admissible as an admission that is probative on 
the issues of injuries and the extent of damages, citing 
Breeden v. Roberts, 258 Va. 411, 518 S.E.2d 834 (1999). 
In Breeden, a personal injury action, the plaintiff 
denied making a statement to a third party "about how much 
money [he was] going to get out of th[e] lawsuit."  Id. at 
 
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415, 518 S.E.2d at 837.  Unlike Dandridge, the plaintiff in 
Breeden neither objected to the question nor sought to have 
the answer stricken.  Id.  Nevertheless, in considering 
whether the defendant could introduce further evidence to 
contradict the plaintiff's testimony, we observed that the 
plaintiff's statement regarding the money he would receive 
from the lawsuit "related to and tended to cast light upon the 
issue of his injuries and the extent of his damages."  Id. at 
416, 518 S.E.2d at 837.  While this statement is dicta, we 
agree with Marshall that, like the statement in Breeden, 
Dandridge's statement here was relevant because it was not, as 
Dandridge argues, limited to his financial status but "cast 
light" on a matter contested at trial:  Dandridge's 
credibility regarding the extent of his injuries.  Id.  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting this 
statement into evidence. 
III. 
Finally, Dandridge asserts that the trial court erred in 
allowing Dr. Silverman to testify that Dandridge used his 
money to purchase an "assault weapon" and ammunition rather 
than seeking further medical treatment.  This testimony 
occurred by deposition and in the context of Dr. Silverman's 
explanation that impulsive behavior and irrational decisions 
 
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are relevant factors in the evaluation of a person who is 
depressed. 
 
In determining whether evidence should be admitted, 
the trial court must apply a balancing test in assessing 
the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial 
effect.  Brugh v. Jones, 265 Va. 136, 140, 574 S.E.2d 
282, 284-85 (2003).  This determination rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed 
on appeal only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.  
Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 262 Va. 484, 492, 551 S.E.2d 349, 
353 (2001). 
 
Dr. Silverman testified that irrational decisions 
including impulsive purchasing are relevant to the mental 
examination of a depressed person.  However, an expert need 
not identify every act that person performed to offer an 
opinion on the mental condition of the person under 
examination.  In this case, the prejudicial effect of 
identifying an assault weapon as one of Dandridge's impulse 
purchases substantially outweighs the probative value of 
identifying the object of an impulsive purchase. The mention 
of an assault weapon and ammunition distracts the jury from 
the matter at issue and prejudices Dandridge.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the trial court committed error because it 
 
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abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Silverman to testify 
that Dandridge purchased an assault weapon. 
 
Finally, we reject Marshall's suggestion that any error the 
trial court committed in the three evidentiary rulings at 
issue was harmless error.  Well established principles require 
that error be presumed prejudicial unless the record clearly 
shows that the error could not have affected the result.  
Spence v. Miller, 197 Va. 477, 482, 90 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1955).  
"There is no presumption that error is harmless."  Breeding v. 
Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 659, 159 S.E.2d 836, 842 (1968).  
Marshall bases his argument primarily on his theory that the 
jury returned a verdict of only $15,000 because it did not 
find Dandridge credible.  Nothing in the record of this case 
clearly shows that Dandridge's credibility alone was the basis 
of the jury's verdict or that the errors of the trial court 
did not affect Dandridge's credibility. 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial consistent 
with this opinion on the question of damages. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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