Title: Bartee v. Vitocruz

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, and 
Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ROBERT BARTEE, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF TONIA BEGLEY, 
DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 131283 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
MARISSA G. VITOCRUZ  
 
 
      June 5, 2014 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
Chadwick S. Dotson, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a sole surviving co-
administrator of an intestate’s estate may maintain a wrongful 
death action. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
On January 12, 2010, Tonia Michelle Begley presented to the 
Emergency Department of Wellmont Lonesome Pine Hospital 
complaining of chest pain, anxiety and elevated blood pressure.   
Marissa G. Vitocruz, M.D., evaluated, treated and discharged Ms. 
Begley from the Emergency Department.  Ms. Begley died on 
January 13, 2010. 
 
On January 29, 2010, Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley 
qualified in the Circuit Court of Wise County, Virginia, as co-
administrators of Ms. Begley’s estate.  On August 31, 2011, 
Wiley Begley died.  On December 22, 2011, Robert Bartee, as the 
“duly qualified . . . administrator” of Ms. Begley’s estate 
filed a wrongful death lawsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-50 
alleging that Vitocruz was negligent in her medical care and 
2 
treatment of Ms. Begley and that Vitocruz’ negligence was the 
proximate cause of Ms. Begley’s death. 
 
Vitocruz filed motions to dismiss and abate the wrongful 
death action asserting that Bartee lacked standing to file the 
action without the co-administrator joining in the case.  The 
trial court, citing this Court’s interpretation of the provision 
now found in Code § 8.01-50(C)1 that there must be “a unity of 
action whether there is one personal representative or more than 
one,” Addison v. Jurgelsky, 281 Va. 205, 208, 704 S.E.2d 402, 
404 (2011), held that Bartee lacked standing to sue alone.  The 
trial court also concluded that Code § 8.01-5(A) permitted the 
joinder of Wiley Begley as an additional party plaintiff at any 
time the ends of justice may require. 
 
Bartee filed a motion to reconsider with the trial court 
arguing that when there is a joint administration of an estate 
and one of the personal representatives dies, or is removed, the  
entire authority vests in the surviving administrator.  Vitocruz 
opposed the motion arguing that the doctrine of survivorship 
applies to executors only and not administrators. 
 
The trial court denied Bartee’s motion to reconsider, but 
granted him leave to amend his complaint.  On March 18, 2013, 
Bartee filed an amended complaint that did not add Wiley Begley 
                                                 
 
1Effective July 1, 2012, Code § 8.01-50 was amended, as 
relevant here, to redesignate subsection B to subsection C.  
2012 Acts ch. 725. 
3 
or another person as a party plaintiff, but explained that the 
Wise County Circuit Court Clerk “refused [Bartee’s] requested 
qualification or requalification, asserting that there was no 
need for another qualification or requalification in order for 
the original qualification to be effective and that the 
surviving administrator, Robert Bartee, had the authority to act 
alone.” 
 
Vitocruz filed motions to dismiss and abate Bartee’s 
amended complaint again arguing that Bartee lacked standing to 
file an action without the other co-administrator joining in the 
case and that Bartee failed to correct his lack of standing. 
 
The trial court granted Vitocruz’ motion to dismiss the 
amended complaint, finding that “Bartee lacked standing acting 
alone to sue the defendant because the qualification of both 
Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators was in full 
force and effect when Robert Bartee filed this action.”  The 
trial court denied Bartee’s motion for leave to file an 
additional amended complaint, dismissed the case and struck it 
from the court’s docket. 
 
Bartee filed a petition for appeal, arguing that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the wrongful death action because 
under the doctrine of survivorship he, as the sole remaining co-
administrator, had the authority to maintain the wrongful death 
action. 
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DISCUSSION 
In Addison, we held that one of two co-administrators of an 
estate had standing to file a wrongful death action pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-50 and that such filing was not a nullity.  281 Va. 
at 209, 704 S.E.2d at 404-05.  However, because Code § 8.01-50 
requires unity of action “whether there is one personal 
representative or more than one,” the other co-administrator was 
a necessary party plaintiff to the action.  Id. at 208, 704 
S.E.2d at 404.  Applying Code § 8.01-5, we concluded that the 
second co-administrator could be joined as a party plaintiff and 
that the original filing tolled the running of the statute of 
limitations.  Id. at 211, 704 S.E.2d at 406. 
In this case, Bartee, as a duly qualified co-administrator, 
filed the wrongful death action within the limitations period 
and, therefore, under Addison, he had standing to file the suit, 
the filing was not a nullity, and the filing tolled the statute 
of limitations. 
Bartee argues here, as he did in the trial court, that he 
was not required to take any further action because when Wiley 
Begley died, Bartee, as remaining co-administrator, had complete 
power and authority to maintain the wrongful death action.  This 
issue is a question of law that we review de novo.  Antisdel v. 
Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 47, 688 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2010).  Bartee also 
suggests that this is an issue of first impression and we agree. 
5 
Bartee relies on the doctrine of survivorship as the basis 
for his position, citing Virginia cases that hold where joint 
executors are appointed in a will that does not require joint 
exercise of the power, and one executor dies, the power of the 
office devolves on the surviving executor to exercise the power 
of that office.  Hofheimer v. Seaboard Citizens’ Nat’l Bank, 154 
Va. 896, 156 S.E. 581 (1931); Shepherd v. Darling, 120 Va. 586, 
91 S.E. 737 (1917); Davis v. Christian, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 11 
(1859).  Bartee cites to the Uniform Probate Code, § 3-718, 
cases from other jurisdictions and secondary sources for the 
principle that the doctrine of survivorship applicable to 
executors also applies to administrators.  See Smith v. Smith, 
173 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1943); Beall v. Hilliary, 1 Md. 186 (1851); 
Ballard v. Zachry, 187 S.E. 139 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936); 31 Am. 
Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators § 949 (2012); Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary 47 (Student ed. 1928); and Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 
1144 (8th ed. 1914).  However, he cites no Virginia authority 
for that proposition and we find none.  Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, our review of the relevant Virginia statutes 
and case law addressing the powers of administrators and 
substitution of parties is consistent with the application of 
the doctrine of survivorship upon which Bartee relies in this 
case. 
6 
 
Compliance with the trial court’s requirement that Bartee 
add Wiley Begley, the other named co-administrator, or some 
other co-administrator as a party plaintiff is not possible 
under Virginia statutory and case law.  First, Wiley Begley 
could not be added as a necessary party plaintiff because he was 
deceased.  Generally, if a person becomes incapable of 
prosecuting or defending a case due to death, the action may 
proceed on behalf of the decedent’s estate by and through the 
substitution of decedent with his personal representative.  Code 
§ 8.01-56; Rule 3:17; see also Estate of James v. Peyton, 277 
Va. 443, 451, 674 S.E.2d 864, 867 (2009)(holding that personal 
representative of estate may be substituted for deceased party 
defendant); Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 711, 75 S.E.2d 
77, 78 (1953)(reviving action in name of personal representative 
when party to litigation died).  However, when an executor or an 
administrator of an intestate’s estate dies, the estate of the 
deceased executor or administrator, by and through the estate’s 
personal representative, does not succeed to the interest of the 
executor as executor or administrator as administrator.  Rather, 
a new administrator or administrator with the will attached must 
be appointed to prosecute an action on behalf of the 
estate.  See, e.g., Coleman v. M’Murdo, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 51, 55, 
64, 79, 131-32 (1827)(holding administrator de bonis non, 
appointed upon death of intestate’s administrator, could not 
7 
maintain an action against the initial administrator for wasting 
assets); see also Code § 64.2-513 relating to executors.  
Therefore, in this case, neither Wiley Begley nor his estate, by 
and through its personal representative, could be joined as a 
necessary party for the prosecution of this wrongful death 
action. 
Second, Virginia jurisprudence provides that once the 
administrator or administrators of an intestate’s estate have 
been properly qualified and appointed, another administrator may 
not be appointed unless there is a vacancy in the 
office.   Bolling v. D’Amato, 259 Va. 299, 303-04, 526 S.E.2d 
257, 259 (2000)(citing Andrews v. Avory, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 229, 
236 (1858)).  A vacancy in the office exists only when there is 
no existing qualified administrator.  Id. 
If the office of administrator is not vacant, it follows 
that the powers of the office have not terminated and therefore 
the remaining co-administrator must have the authority to 
exercise the powers attached to the office.  We reached this 
conclusion long ago in Davis with regard to executors.  56 Va. 
(14 Gratt.) at 38.  In Davis, we concluded that, because the 
office survives as long as a co-executor survives, “by parity of 
reason” the powers of the office survive and can be executed by 
the sole surviving executor unless the will specifically 
required joint exercise of the powers.  Id.  We see no reason 
8 
why this same rationale should not be applied to the office of 
administrator of an intestate estate.  To do otherwise would 
either prevent administration of the estate or require a duly 
qualified administrator to submit his resignation to the court 
and, upon notice to the parties in interest, the court could 
accept the resignation and then allow another person to qualify 
as an administrator.  Code § 64.2-610(B).2  Neither course of 
action is acceptable.  Requiring the resignation and 
reappointment of a duly qualified administrator elevates form 
over substance, is an unnecessary use of judicial resources, 
would delay administration of the intestate’s estate - in this 
case, the prosecution of the wrongful death action - and 
provides no benefit to any party involved.  Alternatively, 
applying the survivorship doctrine to administrators allows the 
efficient use of judicial resources, continuation of the 
estate’s administration, and is not prejudicial to any party. 
 
Vitocruz argues, however, that the survivorship doctrine 
cannot be applied to administrators because in enacting Code § 
64.2-517 the General Assembly limited the doctrine of 
survivorship to executors and administrators with the will 
annexed.3  We disagree.  We cannot say that the intent of the 
                                                 
2Code § 64.2-1424 also allows a personal representative to 
resign, conditioned on the accounts being settled as provided by 
law.  This provision is not relevant here. 
 
3Code § 64.2-517 provides: 
 
9 
General Assembly in enacting Code § 64.2-517 was to limit the 
survivorship principle to co-executors.  A long-standing policy 
distinction exists between executors and administrators. 
Executors are specific individuals chosen by the testator to 
administer the testator’s estate.  If co-executors are 
appointed, there is a presumption that the testator intended 
that the administration be accomplished jointly by the named 
individuals.  Therefore, Code § 64.2-517 provides important 
notice to the testator that the survivorship principle will be 
applied unless the testator provides otherwise in the will.  No 
such presumption of joint administration exists in the case of 
an intestate’s estate and therefore notice to the testator 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
A. When discretionary powers are conferred upon the 
executors under any will and some, but not all, of the 
executors die, resign, or become incapable of acting, 
the executors or executor remaining shall continue to 
exercise the discretionary powers conferred by the 
will, unless the will expressly provides that the 
discretionary powers cannot be exercised by fewer than 
all of the original executors named in the will. 
 
B. When discretionary powers are conferred upon the 
executors under any will and all of the executors or 
the sole executor if only one is named in the will 
dies, resigns, or becomes incapable of acting, the 
administrator with the will annexed appointed by the 
court shall exercise the discretionary powers 
conferred by the will upon the original executors or 
executor, unless the will expressly provides that the 
discretionary powers can only be exercised by the 
executors or executor named in the will. 
10 
afforded by Code § 64.2-517 is not relevant in the case of 
intestacy. 
 
In summary, for the reasons stated above, we hold that 
Bartee, as a duly appointed co-administrator of the estate of 
Tonia Begley at the time he filed the wrongful death action 
against Vitocruz, had standing to file the action.  Because the 
other co-administrator had died, there was no other necessary 
party who could be joined as a party plaintiff.  The office of 
administrator of Tonia Begley’s estate was not vacant and no 
other appointment could be made until a vacancy existed.  
Applying the doctrine of survivorship, the power of appointment 
given Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators to prosecute 
a wrongful death action pursuant to Code § 8.01-50 could be 
exercised by Bartee as the sole remaining administrator. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
 
Reversed and remanded.