Title: In re Marriage of Lasky

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion 
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at 
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the 
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, 
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official 
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
               Docket No. 81572--Agenda 14--January 1997. 
        In re MARRIAGE OF CYNTHIA LASKY, n/k/a Cynthia Brandeis, 
                  Appellee, and JAMES LASKY, Appellant. 
                      Opinion filed March 20, 1997. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
     This litigation arises out of the separate petitions of 
appellee Cynthia Brandies (formerly Cynthia Lasky) and appellant 
James Lasky, the divorced mother and father of Michael. Each sought 
to modify the existing joint custody award entered pursuant to 
their divorce. 
     The order dissolving the marriage of James and Cynthia Lasky 
was filed on January 31, 1990. Incorporated into the dissolution 
order was the parties' joint parenting agreement, under which the 
parties agreed to joint custody of their minor child, Michael, born 
March 3, 1987. Pursuant to the agreement, Cynthia served as 
Michael's primary physical custodian and James had regularly 
scheduled visitation. On April 16, 1992, Cynthia filed her petition 
for modification of joint custody, and on July 2, 1992, James filed 
his own petition for modification of custody. Each sought sole 
custody. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that a substantial 
change in circumstances had arisen that made it necessary to modify 
joint custody. The trial court accepted the stipulation and 
determined that the only issue before the court was the best 
interests of the child. After a hearing, the court awarded James 
sole custody of Michael on that basis. 
     Cynthia appealed. She asserted, first, that the trial court 
had employed the wrong standard of proof in making its custody 
determination and, second, that the trial court's decision to award 
James sole custody of Michael was against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. The appellate court reversed based on Cynthia's first 
contention. No. 2--95--0185 (unpublished order under Supreme Court 
Rule 23). It ruled that the stipulation and the petitions to modify 
custody were insufficient, standing alone, to establish changed 
circumstances so as to warrant a modification of the custody 
decree. Rather, the appellate court ruled that the trial court 
still had the duty to determine by other clear and convincing 
evidence whether the requisite change in circumstances had been 
established that justified a termination of the joint custody 
agreement. The appellate court vacated the custody order on that 
basis and did not address Cynthia's argument that to award James 
sole custody of Michael was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse. 
     The relevant sections of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution 
of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 1994)) (the Act) are 
as follows. 
     Section 602.1: 
               "(b) Upon the application of either or both parents, 
          or upon its own motion, the court shall consider an award 
          of joint custody. *** In such cases, the court shall 
          initially request the parents to produce a Joint 
          Parenting Agreement. *** In the event the parents fail to 
          produce a Joint Parenting Agreement, the court may enter 
          an appropriate Joint Parenting Order ***. 
               (c) The court may enter an order of joint custody if 
          it determines that joint custody would be in the best 
          interests of the child[.]" 750 ILCS 5/602.1 (West 1994). 
     Section 610(b): 
               "The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment 
          unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence, upon 
          the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior 
          judgment or that were unknown to the court at the time of 
          entry of the prior judgment, that a change has occurred 
          in the circumstances of the child or his custodian, or in 
          that case of a joint custody arrangement that a change 
          has occurred in the circumstances of the child or either 
          or both parties having custody, and that the modification 
          is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In 
          the case of joint custody, if the parties agree to a 
          termination of a joint custody arrangement, the court 
          shall so terminate the joint custody and make any 
          modification which is in the child's best interest. The 
          court shall state in its decision specific findings of 
          fact in support of its modification or termination of 
          joint custody if either parent opposes the modification 
          or termination." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/610(b) 
          (West 1994). 
The districts of the appellate court have disagreed on whether, in 
the absence of other evidence, parties can agree to terminate joint 
custody or whether, despite their agreement, they must prove by 
other clear and convincing evidence that circumstances have changed 
so as to warrant a modification of joint custody. See, e.g., In re 
Marriage of Burke, 185 Ill. App. 3d 253 (2d Dist. 1989) (requiring 
that the parents must show by clear and convincing evidence that a 
change in circumstances has occurred); In re Marriage of Wycoff, 
266 Ill. App. 3d 408 (4th Dist. 1994) (ruling that parties need not 
show a change in circumstances when they file cross petitions to 
modify joint custody). 
     Cynthia urged this court to follow the reasoning of the 
appellate court below. It found, citing Burke, that the second 
sentence of section 610(b), which provides for the termination of 
joint custody where the parties so agree, had been impliedly 
repealed by legislative amendments found in Public Act 84--795. 
Pub. Act 84--795, 1, eff. January 1, 1986. In Public Act 84--795 
the legislature repealed former section 603.1 of the Act, which 
provided for joint custody only where both parties agreed. The 
legislature also enacted section 602.1, which grants the trial 
court the discretion to impose joint custody over the objections of 
the parties. 
     James countered that an agreement to terminate a joint 
custody, by its very nature, constitutes a substantial change in 
circumstances. He further asserted that the second sentence of 
section 610(b) had not been impliedly repealed and that the 
parents' agreement to terminate joint custody then shifted the 
focus of the inquiry to the best interests of the child. 750 ILCS 
5/610(b) (West 1994). 
     As a general rule, a repeal by implication is not favored. 
Lily Lake Road Defenders v. County of McHenry,  156 Ill. 2d 1 , 9 
(1993). Courts assume that the legislature will not draft a new law 
that contradicts an existing one without expressly repealing it, 
and that the legislature intends a consistent body of law when it 
amends or enacts new legislation. Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection 
District,  163 Ill. 2d 275 , 279-80 (1994); Lily Lake, 156 Ill. 2d  at 
9. Therefore, courts construe statutory provisions in a manner that 
avoids inconsistency and gives full effect to each provision 
wherever reasonably possible. Lily Lake, 156 Ill. 2d  at 9. The 
favored interpretation is the one that allows both statutes to 
stand. Jahn, 163 Ill. 2d  at 280. To help determine whether a 
statute has been repealed by implication, the courts look for 
indications that the legislature intended the latter to supersede 
the former. See Goodknight v. Piraino, 255 Ill. App. 3d 738, 741 
(1993). Implied repeal results only when the terms and operation of 
a later statute are so repugnant to the terms and operation of an 
earlier one that both cannot stand. Lily Lake, 156 Ill. 2d  at 9; 
Jahn, 163 Ill. 2d  at 280. In such circumstances, the subsequently 
enacted statute will repeal the former by implication, since it is 
presumed that the legislature would not enact contradictory laws. 
Lily Lake, 156 Ill. 2d  at 9. 
     We do not agree that the second sentence of section 610(b) has 
been repealed by implication through enactment of section 602.1. We 
note that the legislature added to section 610(b) at the same time 
it enacted section 602.1. See Pub. Act 84--795, 1, eff. January 1, 
1986. The sentence added provides that "[t]he court shall state in 
its decision specific findings of fact in support of its 
modification or termination of joint custody if either parent 
opposes the modification or termination." 750 ILCS 5/610(b) (West 
1994). This directive, immediately following the sentence allowing 
the termination of joint custody if both parties agree, indicates 
that the legislature anticipated a comprehensive scheme whereby a 
joint custody arrangement may be terminated either by the wishes of 
the parties or by an order of the court. The fact that the 
legislature added to section 610(b) without altering the second 
sentence, despite an obvious opportunity to do so, is further 
indication that the legislature intended for the second sentence to 
stand. 
     Furthermore, we do not find a clause allowing parties to 
terminate joint custody repugnant with another that authorizes the 
court to impose joint custody. Section 602.1 gives the court the 
authority to impose joint custody if it determines that such an 
arrangement would be in the best interests of the child. Section 
602.1(c) directs the court to consider several factors in deciding 
to award joint custody, including "the ability of the parents to 
cooperate effectively and consistently in matters that directly 
affect the joint parenting of the child." 750 ILCS 5/602.1(c)(1) 
(West 1994). Such circumstances may exist to support a court's 
initial award of joint custody, but they no longer exist when both 
parties petition to terminate joint custody. Given their agreement, 
it would be pointless and redundant to require the parties to prove 
by other clear and convincing evidence the same element that their 
agreement makes manifest. 
     When, as here, both parties seek to terminate joint custody 
and stipulate that a change in circumstances has occurred, it is a 
given that a change in circumstances has occurred. At that juncture 
the court should move directly to consider what custody 
modification is in the child's best interests. 
     Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court 
and remand this cause to the appellate court to consider the 
remaining issue, that is, whether the decision to award James sole 
custody of Michael was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed; 
                                            cause remanded with directions.