Title: Reed v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RALPH REED,
§
§
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§ No. 44, 2001
§
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ for Sussex County
§ Cr.A. Nos. IS99-12-0398
Plaintiff Below,
§ through 0399
Appellee.
§
Submitted: July 10, 2001
Decided:
July 12, 2001
Before WALSH, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 12th day of July 2001, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
appears to the Court that:
(1)
This is an appeal from a conviction in the Superior Court following a
jury trial.  The appellant, Ralph Reed, Jr. (“Reed”), was convicted of murder first
degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the fatal
shooting of Gregory Howard on November 23, 1999.
(2)
In this appeal, Reed asserts two claims of error: (i) that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence that on prior occasions he had discharged
a handgun and had been involved in drug dealing and (ii) that the court gave an
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incorrect instruction concerning the use of certain statements for impeachment
purposes.
(3)
With respect to Reed’s claim involving evidence of uncharged
misconduct, this claim was the subject of a post-trial ruling by the trial judge.  See
State v. Reed, Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. 99-12-0398, 99-12-0399, 2000 WL
33179685, Graves, J. (Dec. 19, 2000).  In that ruling the court concluded that the
admissibility of such misconduct evidence was appropriate under Getz v. State, Del.
Supr., 538 A.2d 726 (1988), as part of the State’s case-in-chief because the evidence
was directly relevant to identifying Reed as the assailant and it supported the State’s
claim that the killing was related to Reed’s activities as a drug dealer.  We conclude
that the court correctly applied pertinent Delaware law in rejecting Reed’s claim of
inadmissibility.
(4)
With respect to Reed’s claim that the court incorrectly charged the jury
concerning the admissibility of prior out-of-court statements of witnesses used by
the State for impeachment purposes, we note that no objection was made at trial
either to the immediate limiting instruction or to the final instruction.  Accordingly,
we review this claim under the plain error standard.  See Wainwright v. State, Del.
Supr., 504 A.2d 1096 (1986).  This claim of error was also the subject of the trial
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court’s post-trial decision denying a new trial.  As the trial court noted, the disputed
evidence was not offered by the State under 11 Del. C. § 3507 but, in any event,
the declarants were available for cross-examination on the alleged inconsistent
statements.  We agree with the trial court that the defense was not placed at any
strategic disadvantage by this practice and that the court’s instruction was properly
limited to the treatment of these statements as impeaching evidence.  Clearly the
court’s handling of this matter at trial was not plain error.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby is,
AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh   
          
Justice