Title: WOLFE v SCHULZ REFRIGERATION

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14385 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 ROBERT WOLFE and FRANCIS WOLFE, his wife, d/b/a THE MINT BAR, Plaintiffs and Appellants, SCHULZ REFRIGERATION, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Morrison Law Firm, Missoula, Montana Joan Jonkel argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Montana Sam Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana -- . ,. . . 3 &A ' = , Filed: Submitted: September 19, 1979 Decided:. . . - ... , , . ., - , . - --- Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. c his appeal is taken by the p l a i n t i f f s from t h e D i s - t r i c t Court's d e n i a l of p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a new t r i a l following a jury v e r d i c t f o r defendant. The p l a i n t i f f s are t h e owners and operators of t h e Mint Bar i n Polson, Montana. P l a i n t i f f s purchased t h e bar i n February 1969 and managed it a s a partnership u n t i l it was destroyed by f i r e on December 5 , 1974. The f i r e originated i n a small storage room where cleaning m a t e r i a l s w e r e kept and i n which a time clock device w a s located. The t i m e clock served t o r e g u l a t e t h e flow of e l e c t r i c i t y t o t h e beer cooler t o p e r i o d i c a l l y d e f r o s t it. Defendant owns and operates a r e f r i g e r a t i o n sales and service business i n Polson. Defendant's employee replaced t h e t i m e clock mechanism i n p l a i n t i f f s ' bar on August 11, 1973. This replacement required no e l e c t r i c a l wiring and consisted s o l e l y of attaching four w i r e s already i n place t o terminals provided i n t h e t i m e clock mechanism. A t t h e t i m e of t h e o r i g i n a l i n s t a l l a t i o n , the w i r e s from the c i r c u i t breaker box t o t h e t i m e clock were not placed i n conduit pipe. Defendant contends t h a t a t t h e t i m e of replacement he pointed o u t the dangers of t h e unencased wiring t o plain- t i f f s , b u t p l a i n t i f f s deny t h a t t h i s occurred. The absence of conduit eventually allowed the i n s u l a t i o n on t h e w i r e s t o be worn away as a r e s u l t of e i t h e r v i b r a t i o n caused by a compressor u n i t o r by cleaning m a t e r i a l s , such a s mops and brooms, rubbing a g a i n s t t h e w i r e s . With no p r o t e c t i v e covering on t h e w i r e s , t h e c u r r e n t arced which, i n t u r n , caused t h e fire. P l a i n t i f f s entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t f o r f i r e insurance with Transamerica Insurance i n February 1974. A s a condi- t i o n f o r maintaining p l a i n t i f f s a s i t s insureds, Trans- america conducted a f i r e inspection of t h e premises on March 1, 1974. The inspection r e p o r t described t h e e l e c t r i c a l system a s "romex with c i r c u i t breakers and it appears t o be i n good condition." P l a i n t i f f s brought an a c t i o n f o r negligence a g a i n s t defendant t o recover damages caused by the f i r e . Defendant sought t o prove t h a t p l a i n t i f f s w e r e c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negli- gent by f a i l i n g t o remedy t h e dangerous condition of t h e wiring. the c l o s e of t r i a l , the D i s t r i c t Court read s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury. Among t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given w e r e I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 17 and 23 t o which p l a i n t i f f s objected. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 s t a t e d : "Failure on t h e p a r t of e i t h e r P l a i n t i f f t o l o c a t e o r recognize a dangerous condition on t h e premises of t h e Mint B a r i s i n law a form of contributory negligence on t h e p a r t of t h e P l a i n t i f f s i f such f a i l u r e i s a proximate cause of t h e damages com- plained of." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 s t a t e d : "If you f i n d from t h e evidence t h a t Transamerica Insurance Company, i n undertaking t o i n s p e c t t h e premises and t o l o c a t e and eliminate any f i r e hazards present, acted on behalf of its insureds, Robert Wolfe and Frances Wolfe, such a c t s of Transamerica are imputed t o i t s insureds, Robert Wolfe and Frances Wolfe." The jury returned a v e r d i c t f o r defendant. P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t w a s ren- dered, contending t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s appealed. I n particu- lar, p l a i n t i f f s challenge jury i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e i s s u e s of contributory negligence and agency a s being erroneous s t a t e - ments of t h e law. Two i s s u e s are presented t o t h i s Court on appeal: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n giving a jury i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d t h a t f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s t o l o c a t e o r - recognize a dangerous condi- t i o n on t h e i r premises w a s contributory negligence i f such f a i l u r e w a s a proximate cause of t h e damages? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n giving a jury i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d t h a t t h e a c t s of a p a r t y w e r e imputed t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s i f t h e p a r t y acted on behalf of t h e p l a i n t i f f s where t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i - dence introduced a t t h e t r i a l regarding t h e elements of agency? This Court has had s e v e r a l occasions t o consider t h e s u b j e c t of a l l e g e d e r r o r i n jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e have previously held t h a t a p a r t y has t h e duty of r a i s i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l o r t h e opportunity i s l o s t . Roberts Realty Corp. v. City of G r e a t F a l l s (1972), 160 Mont. 1 4 4 , 154, 500 P.2d 956, 962. Objec- t i o n s t o i n s t r u c t i o n s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t cannot be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. Seder v. K i e w i t Sons' Co. (1971), 156 Mont. 322, 330, 479 P.2d 448, 452. W e have a l s o required a p a r t y t o state h i s ground f o r an objec- t i o n with s p e c i f i c i t y . P i c k e t t v. Kyger (1968), 151 Mont. 87, 96, 439 P.2d 57, 62; Kearns v. McIntyre Const. Co. Mont. Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Objections made s h a l l specify and state t h e par- t i c u l a r grounds on which t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s ob- jected t o and it s h a l l n o t be s u f f i c i e n t i n s t a t i n g t h e ground of such o b j e c t i o n t o s t a t e g e n e r a l l y t h e i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t state t h e l a w o r i s a g a i n s t t h e law, b u t such ground of objec- t i o n s h a l l specify p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h e in- s t r u c t i o n is i n s u f f i c i e n t o r does n o t s t a t e t h e law, o r what p a r t i c u l a r clause t h e r e i n i s ob- jected to." F i n a l l y , w e have determined t h a t , where e r r o r i s alleged i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u c t i o n , a reviewing c o u r t s h a l l consider t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y . I n Brothers v. Town of Virginia C i t y (1976), 171 Mont. 352, 359, 558 P.2d 464, 468, w e stated: "When determining whether jury i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e properly given o r refused t h e reviewing c o u r t considers t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y . Furthermore, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e read i n con- nection with o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s given and they a r e considered i n l i g h t of t h e evidence adduced. ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) Where t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y state t h e law appli- cable t o t h e case, a p a r t y cannot c l a i m reversi- b l e e r r o r as t o t h e giving o r denying of c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s . (Citation omitted. ) " I n t h i s case p l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e giving of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . P l a i n t i f f s maintain t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was an overbroad statement of t h e l a w i n t h a t it imposed a duty on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s t o l o c a t e o r recognize a l l dangerous conditions on t h e i r premises. P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n f a i l e d t o mention t h a t t h e law required no more than t h a t of an ordi- n a r i l y prudent person under t h e same circumstances. Plain- t i f f s argue t h a t t h e e r r o r prejudiced t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s and was n o t cured by the context of other i n s t r u c - t i o n s given. Defendant contends t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 was a proper and accurate statement of t h e l a w . I f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s erroneous, defendant argues t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s cured by t h e context of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s and d i d n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t o r prejudice t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of p l a i n t i f f s . I n analyzing these arguments, our a t t e n t i o n i s f i r s t drawn t o t h e grounds upon which p l a i n t i f f s objected t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a t t r i a l . There, p l a i n t i f f s s t a t e d : " P l a i n t i f f s o b j e c t . . . on t h e b a s i s t h a t it implies t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e a b l e t o l o c a t e and recognize t h e dangerous condition. The evidence uncontroveried before t h e Court i n t h e case i s t h a t n e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f w a s informed of t h e dan- gerous condition, o r t h a t they recognized the dangerous condition, and it i s n o t s u b j e c t t o c l a i m of contributory negligence and n o t a proper i n s t r u c t i o n . , . a l s o o b j e c t on t h e b a s i s t h a t it places a burden upon p l a i n t i f f s Wolfes which is a burden which, under the f a c t s of t h i s case, t h e l a w does n o t r e q u i r e them t o assume." I n essence, p l a i n t i f f s ' objection was t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 placed a higher duty on p l a i n t i f f s than t h a t fixed by law. This Court has previously questioned t h e sufficiency of t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of t h i s objection i n a s i m i l a r case. I n LeCompte v, Wardell (1959), 134 Mont. 490, 498, 333 P.2d 1028, 1033, w e stated: "Defendants contend t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n giv- ing i n s t r u c t i o n s No. 26 and 28 over t h e i r ob- jection. These i n s t r u c t i o n s i n e f f e c t made de- fendants l i a b l e f o r a want of care toward plain- t i f f i f they knew o r i n the e x e r c i s e of reasonable care should have known t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s present on defendants' property. The only objection t o these i n s t r u c t i o n s was t h a t they placed a higher duty upon defendants than t h a t fixed by law. Whether t h i s objection w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c . . . i s doubtful." Assuming f o r t h e purposes of argument t h a t t h e objec- t i o n w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c , we think t h a t the i n s t r u c - t i o n w a s i n f a c t erroneous. Where t h e law of contributory negligence r e q u i r e s t h a t a party a c t as an o r d i n a r i l y pru- d e n t person under t h e circumstances, Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Mon t . 294, 296, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t temper t h e duty owed with t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e law expects no more of a person than i s reasonable. While erroneous, however, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s cured by t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s given by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The omission of t h e reasonable man t e s t i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 i s cured by I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 10 and 12. See Peek v. Forbes (Colo. App. 1970), 470 P.2d 85, 88. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12 d e f i n e s contributory negligence i n t e r m s of negligence and I n s t r u c t i o n No. 10 d e f i n e s negligence a s t h e want of c a r e o r s k i l l of a reasonable and prudent person under t h e same circumstances. The reasonable man test i s t h e r e f o r e provided. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 12 s t a t e d : "Contributory negligence i s negligence on t h e p a r t of a claimant which contributed as a proxi- m a t e cause t o h i s damages. A person who i s con- t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t cannot recover f o r any damages sustained by him." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 10 s t a t e d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : ". . . negligence means want of such ordinary c a r e o r s k i l l . Such want of ordinary c a r e o r s k i l l e x i s t s when t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o do t h a t which a reasonable and prudent person would o r d i n a r i l y have done under t h e circumstances of t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r doing what such person under t h e e x i s t i n g circumstances would n o t have done. " W e hold, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s giving of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . P l a i n t i f f s ' second i s s u e concerns whether t h e giving of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . P l a i n t i f f s argue on appeal t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s erroneous because it f a i l e d t o r e q u i r e t h e jury t o f i r s t e s t a b l i s h an agency r e l a t i o n s h i p before applying t h e i n s t r u c t i o n and because it f a i l e d t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s an agency r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n essence, p l a i n t i f f s ' argument is t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s incomplete. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 e s s e n t i a l l y asked t h e jury, by em- ploying t h e p r i n c i p l e s of agency, t o impute t h e a c t s of Trans- america t o p l a i n t i f f s Wolfe. I n t h i s way, contributory negli- gence could be imputed t o t h e Wolfes because Transamerica had ordered an i n s p e c t i o n of t h e Mint Bar premises which revealed t h a t t h e wiring was i n good condition. Agency, of course, i s t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n which r e s u l t s i n t h e mani- f e s t a t i o n of consent by one person t h a t t h e o t h e r s h a l l a c t on h i s behalf and adhere t o h i s c o n t r o l and consent by t h e o t h e r s o t o a c t . Butler Mfg. Co. v. J. & L. Implement Co. (1975), 167 Mont. 519, 523, 540 P.2d 962, 965. I n reviewing t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , our f i r s t concern is whether t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o warrant t h e t r i a l c o u r t giving t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . I n t e g r a l t o any agency r e l a - t i o n s h i p a r e t h e elements of consent and c o n t r o l . With r e - s p e c t t o t h e element of c o n t r o l , defendant introduced a t t h e t r i a l a r e p o r t of t h e inspection which i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e fieldman, who conducted t h e inspection, had contacted t h e Wolfes before making t h e inspection. However, during t h e t r i a l , t h e fieldman could n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y remember contacting t h e Wolfes b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was h i s usual business prac- t i c e t o do so. Concerning t h e element of consent, t h e branch manager f o r p l a i n t i f f Transamerica t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n order- i n g inspections, Transamerica attempts t o p r o t e c t t h r e e peo- ple: t h e company, t h e agent, and t h e insured. I n t h i s sense, he t e s t i f i e d t h a t Transamerica acted on behalf of t h e plain- t i f f s Wolfe. However, during r e d i r e c t examination, t h e branch manager a l s o admitted t h a t t h e fieldman w a s never employed o r h i r e d by t h e Wolfes. W e believe t h a t t h e evidence i s c l e a r l y i n s u f f i c i e n t a s a matter of law t o warrant t h e giving of ~ n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 and t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was erroneous on t h i s ground. ~ e r e l y contacting an owner and obtaining permission t o i n s p e c t h i s premises is not s u f f i c i e n t c o n t r o l t o e s t a b l i s h an agency r e l a t i o n s h i p . Nor can one a c t on behalf of another where, as i n t h i s case, a fieldman is n o t h i r e d by t h e Wolfes t o conduct an inspection and t h e inspection i s ordered p r i - marily f o r t h e b e n e f i t of an insurance company. However, w e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which, when taken together, n e c e s s i t a t e t h e affirmance of t h e judg- ment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. F i r s t , w e note t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' grounds f o r o b j e c t i o n t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 appear t o be d i f f e r e n t on appeal than they w e r e a t t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f s argue on appeal t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s incomplete; it f a i l s t o r e q u i r e t h e jury t o f i r s t e s t a b l i s h an agency r e l a t i o n s h i p before applying t h e i n s t r u c t i o n and it f a i l s t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s an agency r e l a t i o n s h i p . P l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l , however, w a s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s unsupported by t h e evidence. A t t h e t r i a l p l a i n t i f f s s t a t e d : " P l a i n t i f f s o b j e c t . . . on behalf of Trans- america p a r t i c u l a r l y . Again, i t ' s an assurnp- t i o n t h a t t h e evidence does n o t support, be- cause it implies t h a t Transamerica has a duty t o somebody when they make an i n s p e c t i o n which c r e a t e s a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n on t h e p a r t of Transamerica, which t h e law does n o t recognize, and, a s such, it i s n o t a c o r r e c t statement of t h e law and very p r e j u d i c i a l t o P l a i n t i f f Transamerica i n t h i s case." The o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n " i s n o t a c o r r e c t statement of t h e law" i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c and sus- t a i n a b l e objection. Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P. Where t h e ground of t h e o b j e c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t , o b j e c t i o n s cannot be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal. Seder v. K i e w i t Sons' Co., supra; P i c k e t t v. Kyger, supra; Kearns v. McIntyre Const. Co., supra. Secondly, we note that plaintiffs Wolfe failed to spe- cifically object to Instruction No. 23 at the trial level. Rather, the record discloses that counsel for plaintiff Trans- america made the only formal objection. Although the record is not entirely clear whether the trial court permitted plaintiffs to make their objections jointly or independently, we believe that a party has some responsibility to assert his objection at the trial level if he wishes to raise it on appeal. Third, we also believe that, where a party considers an instruction incomplete, as is the case here, it has some responsibility to request and provide the trial court with an instruction that properly covers the situation. Pataniq v . Silverstone (1966), 3 Ariz-App. 424, 415 P.2d 139. Here, plaintiffs wish to assert error on the basis of an instruc- tion being incomplete, yet no attempt or request was made to provide an instruction which covered the issue in question. Finally, we believe that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that, if the case were tried again, the same verdict would be rendered. If the judgment is one which could be properly rendered consistent with the evidence and law of the case, error in instructions is not reversible. "One test that has been frequently held deter- minative of the prejudicial character of error in instructions is the correctness of the re- sult. If that is correct, the error is not reversible." Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Bldg. Corporation (1945), 326 I11.App. 598, 63 N.E.2d 411, 416. We hold, therefore, that there is no reversible error in the record and affirm the judgment of the District Court. We concur: P Chief J u s t i c e M r . Chief Justice Haswell, dissenting: I would hold that the giving of instructions 17 and 23 constitutes reversible error entitling plaintiffs to a new trial. The majority correctly hold that the giving of each of these instructions is error. I part with the majority in holding these errors harmless, however. In my view the errors affect the substantial rights of the plaintiffs and cannot qualify as harm- less errors. Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P. Instruction 17 flatly and unequivocally told the jury that failure of either plaintiff to locate or recognize the danger- ous condition is contributory negligence. In my opinion the omis- sion of the reasonable man standard is not cured by Instruction 10 defining negligence in terms of this test. The two instructions are contradictory in my judgment. Who can say with reasonable certainty which instruction the jury followed in arriving at its verdict? But the fundamental error was the giving of instruction 23. As stated by the majority, this instruction asked the jury, by em- ploying agency principles, to impute the acts of Transamerica to plaintiffs. In this way contributory negligence could be imputed to plaintiffs because Transamerica had ordered an inspection of the Mint Bar premises which revealed the wiring was in good con- dition. The majority hold the error harmless because of supposed defects in plaintiffs' objection to the instruction at the trial and because the same result would be reached if the case were tried again. Plaintiffs did object to the instruction at the trial on valid grounds that should have been sustained, specifically that the evidence did not support giving the instruction. The majority hold the evidence is clearly insufficient as a matter of law to warrant the giving of this instruction. I find no basis for re- quiring the plaintiffs to provide the trial court with an instruction that properly covers the situation as held by the majority. This was defendant's instruction and the responsibility was on the defendant to offer an instruction correctly stating the law. More importantly, how could plaintiffs or anyone else offer a correct instruction on imputed negligence arising from an agency relationship where the evidence was insufficient to establish an agency? Finally to justify the giving of an erroneous instruction on the ground that if the case was tried again, the same result would be reached requires a clairvoyance possessed by few appel- late judges. In my view, predicting the result on retrial is pure speculation. Here the error cannot be harmless. A verdict for the defendant could have been reached by imputing the negligence of Transamerica to the plaintiffs. The substantial rights of the plaintiffs were thus compromised by the erroneous jury instruc- tion defeating the harmless error test in Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P. Chief Justice Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written dissent later.