Title: Michael D. Milas v. The Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1197 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Michael D. Milas, Ozaukee County Sheriff, 
Ozaukee County and Ozaukee County Law 
Enforcement Committee, 
 
Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
v. 
The Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc., 
 
Respondent, 
Michael J. Ciszewski, 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
__________________________________ 
The Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc., for 
and on behalf of the Ozaukee County Law 
Enforcement Employees, 
     Petitioners, 
Michael Ciszewski, 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Michael D. Milas, Ozaukee County Sheriff, 
Ozaukee County and Ozaukee County Law 
Enforcement Committee, 
 
Respondents-Respondents.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 2, l997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Lawrence F. Waddick 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by 
Scott L. Schroeder and Murphy, Murphy & Schroeder, S.C., Racine 
and Gordon E. McQuillen and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison 
and oral argument by Gordon E. McQuillen  and Scott L. Schroeder. 
 
 
For the petitioners respondent there was a brief 
by Roger E. Walsh, William Sosnay and Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by William Sosnay. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed (in the Court of Appeals) 
by Richard Thal, Gordon E. McQuillen and Cullen, Weston, Pines & 
Bach, Madison for the Wisconsin Professional Police Association. 
 
No. 96-1197 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1197 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Michael D. Milas, Ozaukee County Sheriff,  
Ozaukee County and Ozaukee County Law  
Enforcement Committee,  
 
          Petitioners-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
The Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc.,  
 
 
          Respondent, 
 
Michael J. Ciszewski,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
__________________________________________ 
 
The Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc.,  
for and on behalf of the Ozaukee County  
Law Enforcement Employees,  
 
          Petitioners, 
 
Michael J. Ciszewski,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael D. Milas, Ozaukee County Sheriff,  
Ozaukee County and Ozaukee County Law  
Enforcement Committee,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents.  
 
FILED 
 
DEC 2, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
No. 96-1197 
 
2 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Ozaukee 
County, Lawrence F. Waddick, Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is an 
appeal by the Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc., and Michael 
J. Ciszewski from an order of the circuit court for Ozaukee 
County, Lawrence F. Waddick, judge, granting summary judgment to 
Ozaukee County Sheriff Michael D. Milas, Ozaukee County, and the 
Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Committee (collectively referred 
to as the County).  The circuit court's order vacated the 
decision of an arbitrator relating to a disciplinary dispute 
involving Michael J. Ciszewski, a deputy sheriff of Ozaukee 
County.1  The circuit court concluded that arbitration under the 
collective bargaining agreement subsequent to a disciplinary 
decision of the Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Committee was 
void because the deputy sheriff's sole and exclusive remedy 
following an adverse decision of the Law Enforcement Committee 
was review by the circuit court pursuant to the statutory appeal 
process set forth in Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92).2  The 
circuit court also concluded that the County had not "waive[d] 
                     
1 The deputy sheriff filed a petition with the circuit court 
to confirm the arbitration award.  The County sought to have the 
award set aside. 
2 This section was renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 59.26 (1995-
96).  See 1995 Wis. Act. 201, § 273.  Because the wording of 
Wis. Stat. § 59.26 differs slightly from Wis. Stat. § 59.21, the 
opinion will refer to Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92), which 
was in existence at all relevant times.  
No. 96-1197 
 
3 
the statutory process so as to be estopped by their actions."  
The deputy sheriff appealed to the court of appeals which 
certified the appeal to this court.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 
(1995-96).  
¶2 
The court of appeals certified two issues.  The first 
issue relates to the validity of the collective bargaining 
agreement 
allowing 
arbitration 
of 
a 
disciplinary 
matter 
involving a deputy sheriff.  The question is whether the deputy 
sheriff's sole and exclusive remedy following an adverse 
decision of the Law Enforcement Committee is review by the 
circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92).  
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 provides in pertinent part:  "The 
accused may appeal from the order [of the grievance committee] 
to the circuit court . . . ."3  The second issue relates to 
whether the County was estopped in this case from challenging 
                     
3 The court of appeals set forth the first question as 
follows:  "(1) Whether a county ordinance that establishes a 
'civil service system' to govern the disciplining of sheriff's 
deputies, as contemplated in Brown County Sheriff's Dep't v. 
Brown County Sheriff's Dep't Non-Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 
194 Wis. 2d 265, 275-76, 533 N.W.2d 766, 770 (1995), takes 
precedence over an element of a collective bargaining agreement 
that 
provides 
the 
alternative (and 
otherwise 
permissible) 
opportunity for arbitration of such matters?" 
Claiming that Ozaukee County has not enacted any ordinance 
establishing a "civil service system," the County states the 
issue as follows:  "Whether Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6, which 
provides a procedure for appealing a decision of the grievance 
committee to the circuit court, is the exclusive appeal 
procedure, and any different appeal procedure contained in a 
collective bargaining agreement is thus void and unenforceable." 
  
No. 96-1197 
 
4 
the validity of the arbitration award as contravening Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92).4  We hold that the County is estopped 
in this case from challenging the validity of the arbitration 
award as contravening Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92).  
Because we decide this case on estoppel grounds, we need not, 
and do not, reach the first question posed by the court of 
appeals. 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
arbitration 
provision 
in 
the 
collective bargaining agreement at issue in the present case no 
longer appears in the current collective bargaining agreement.  
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the order of the circuit 
court and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions 
to reinstate the arbitration award.5 
I. 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
 In January 1993 Ozaukee County Sheriff Michael D. Milas filed 
disciplinary 
charges 
against 
deputy 
sheriff 
Michael 
J. 
Ciszewski, alleging that between the summer of 1991 and fall of 
1992 the deputy sheriff had committed five acts of misconduct.  
                     
4 The court of appeals set forth the second issue as 
follows:  "Whether a county is estopped from trying to enforce 
an ordinance requiring that a disciplinary dispute proceed only 
through the 'civil service system' even though the county 
originally assented to arbitration?" 
The County disagrees with this statement of the issue on 
the ground that Ozaukee County has not enacted any ordinance 
establishing a "civil service system." 
5 No challenge to the arbitrator's decision other than on 
the ground of Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92) was presented 
in the court of appeals or in this court.  
No. 96-1197 
 
5 
The Sheriff suspended the deputy sheriff without pay and 
recommended to the Law Enforcement Committee that the deputy 
sheriff be dismissed.6  
¶4 
In 
February 
1993 
the 
Law 
Enforcement 
Committee 
reviewed the charges and determined that the dismissal of the 
deputy sheriff was warranted.  The deputy sheriff objected to 
the 
Law 
Enforcement 
Committee's 
decision 
and 
requested 
arbitration.  Although the collective bargaining agreement under 
which the deputy sheriff sought arbitration had expired on 
December 31, 1992, Ozaukee County and the deputy sheriff 
proceeded with arbitration in adherence to the collective 
bargaining agreement.  
¶5 
In June 1993 Ozaukee County and the deputy sheriff 
appeared before the arbitrator for hearings on the disciplinary 
matter.  In March 1994 the arbitrator concluded that Ozaukee 
County failed to prove three of the five charges against the 
deputy sheriff.  Although the arbitrator concluded that the two 
proven charges were "extremely serious," he found that the 
charges did not warrant dismissal of the deputy sheriff due to 
the deputy sheriff's "extremely difficult" personal problems.  
The 
arbitrator 
modified 
the 
Law 
Enforcement 
Committee's 
                     
6 Although the deputy sheriff initially elected to appear 
before the Law Enforcement Committee for hearings on the 
disciplinary matter, he later decided not to participate in the 
hearings.  Instead the deputy sheriff pursued the disciplinary 
matter in arbitration as provided for in the collective 
bargaining agreement between the County and the County Law 
Enforcement Employees Local 540, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
 
No. 96-1197 
 
6 
decision, treating the time following the deputy sheriff's 
dismissal as unpaid suspension and ordering the deputy sheriff 
to be returned to work after passing medical and psychological 
examinations to determine his fitness for duty.  
¶6 
As required by the arbitration award, the deputy 
sheriff submitted proof of fitness for duty.  The Sheriff, 
however, refused to return the deputy sheriff to work. 
¶7 
In 
June 
1994 
the 
County 
moved 
to 
vacate 
the 
arbitration award on summary judgment, claiming that under Wis. 
Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92) judicial review by the circuit 
court was the sole and exclusive means to challenge the Law 
Enforcement Committee's decision.  The deputy sheriff moved to 
confirm the arbitration award.  
¶8 
In January 1996 the circuit court granted the County's 
motion for summary judgment and vacated the arbitration award.7  
The deputy sheriff appealed the circuit court's order to the 
court of appeals, which certified the case to this court. 
II. 
¶9 
On appeal from a circuit court order granting summary 
judgment, this court applies the same methodology used by the 
                     
7 The circuit court based its order on City of Janesville v. 
WERC, 193 Wis. 2d 492, 535 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995).  In City 
of Janesville the court of appeals concluded that the collective 
bargaining agreement with the city police department that called 
for 
arbitration 
of 
certain 
disciplinary 
decisions 
was 
irreconcilable with Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) (1995-96).  Section 
62.13(5)(i) provides that "any person . . . may appeal from the 
order of the board [of police and fire commissioners] to the 
circuit court."  
No. 96-1197 
 
7 
circuit court, which is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) 
(1995-96).  See Jeske v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 183 Wis. 2d 667, 
672, 515 N.W.2d 705 (1994).  Whether summary judgment should be 
granted is a question of law.  
¶10 When the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are 
not disputed, it is a question of law whether equitable estoppel 
has been established.  This court determines questions of law 
independent of the circuit court, benefiting from its analysis. 
 See Harms v. Harms, 174 Wis. 2d 780, 784, 498 N.W.2d 229 
(1993). 
III. 
¶11 The circuit court concluded that the County had not 
"waive[d] the statutory appeal process so as to be estopped by 
their actions."  In stating its holding the circuit court used 
both the words "waiver" and "estoppel."8  The parties in this 
case seem to argue both waiver and estoppel but concentrate 
their legal analyses on waiver.  
¶12 While the words "waiver " and "estoppel" are often 
used 
interchangeably, they 
represent 
distinct 
but related 
doctrines.  See Von Uhl v. Trempealeau County Mut. Ins. Co., 33 
Wis. 2d 32, 37, 146 N.W.2d 516 (1966); Saverslak v. Davis-
Cleaver Produce Co., 606 F.2d 208, 213 (7th Cir. 1979).9  
                     
8 "Waiver and estoppel are established doctrines in the 
field of arbitration."  Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Police Dept., 70 
Wis. 2d 1006, 1020-21, 236 N.W.2d 231 (1975). 
9 The difficulty in distinguishing waiver and estoppel has 
been pointed out in several cases.  
No. 96-1197 
 
8 
¶13 This court has defined waiver as the "voluntary and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right" and has stated that 
"intent to relinquish [the right] is an essential element of 
waiver."  Von Uhl, 33 Wis. 2d at 37.10  The waiver doctrine 
focuses on the intent of the party against whom waiver is 
asserted.  It is not necessary, however, to prove that the party 
had an actual intent to waive.  See Attoe v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 539, 545, 153 N.W.2d 575 (1967).  
"[T]he intent to waive may be inferred as a matter of law from 
the conduct of the parties."  Nelson v. Caddo-Texas Oil Lands 
Co., 176 Wis. 327, 329, 186 N.W. 155 (1922). 
                                                                  
In Hanz Trucking, Inc., v. Harris Bros. Co., 29 Wis. 2d 
254, 266, 138 N.W.2d 238 (1965), the court stated:  "While the 
doctrines of waiver and estoppel lend themselves to separate 
definitions, because some of the same facts may affect both 
doctrines, 
the 
distinction 
between 
the 
two 
is 
sometimes 
difficult to demonstrate."  
See also Davies v. J.D. Wilson Co., 1 Wis. 2d 443, 469, 85 
N.W.2d 459 (1957), in which the court quoted 31 C.J.S., 
Estoppel, § 61(b) as follows: 
Waiver and estoppel or estoppel in pais are closely 
related; the line of demarcation between them is said 
to be very slight, since both partake of somewhat the 
same elements and ask essentially the same relief; and 
the 
terms 
are 
frequently 
and 
loosely 
used 
as 
convertible, especially where waivers implied, and 
estoppels arising, from conduct are involved, the 
dividing line being very shadowy in such cases and it 
being often a difficult question to determine just 
where the doctrine of implied waiver ends and that of 
estoppel begins. 
 
10 See also Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 249, 64 N.W.2d 
859 (1954); Mansfield v. Smith, 88 Wis. 2d 575, 592, 277 N.W.2d 
740 (1979). 
No. 96-1197 
 
9 
¶14 The parties in this case dispute whether the County 
made a voluntary and intentional waiver of a known right.  The 
County asserts that it never made a voluntary and intentional 
waiver of its right to object to the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrator.11  The County claims it did not know until three days 
after the arbitration award was announced that it could object 
to 
the 
arbitrator's 
jurisdiction 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.21(8)(b)6.12  
                     
11 The County never expressly stated its objection to the 
arbitrator's 
jurisdiction 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.21(8)(b)6.  
The parties agree that the County expressly waived its 
right to object to arbitration on the ground that the collective 
bargaining agreement had expired on December 31, 1992.  The 
parties disagree, however, whether statements by the County 
constitute a waiver by the County of objections to the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction based on Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6.  
 
12 The County argues that at the time the parties agreed to 
proceed with arbitration, the County was relying on decisions of 
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) upholding 
arbitration clauses similar to the one in the present case.  
See, e.g., City of Janesville, WERC Dec. No. 27645 (5/7/93); 
City of DePere, WERC Dec. No. 21574 at 18-20; Dodge County, WERC 
Dec. No. 21574 (4/84).  
 
The County concedes that about two weeks before the 
arbitrator delivered his decision in the present case, the Rock 
County circuit court, on February 18, 1994, held that an 
arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement 
between the city and the police union allowing appeal of a 
grievance committee decision to an arbitrator is illegal.  City 
of Janesville v. WERC, Case No. 93-CV-412 (2/18/94).  The County 
asserts, however, that it did not know of the City of Janesville 
circuit court decision until it received a copy of the decision 
on March 7, 1994, three days after the arbitrator issued the 
award in the case at bar.  
 
No. 96-1197 
 
10
¶15 We need not decide whether the County voluntarily and 
intentionally waived its objection to a known right.  For 
purposes of evaluating the County's argument we accept the 
County's position that it did not know it might object to 
arbitration on the basis of Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 when it 
proceeded with arbitration.  The County's knowledge of the right 
it asserts here to object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction is 
not, however, determinative of the rights of the parties.  As a 
matter of law, the facts of the case establish equitable 
estoppel.  
¶16 The estoppel doctrine, also called equitable estoppel 
or estoppel in pais, focuses on the conduct of the parties.13  
The elements of equitable estoppel are:  (1) action or non-
action, (2) on the part of one against whom estoppel is 
asserted, (3) which induces reasonable reliance thereon by the 
other, either in action or non-action, and (4) which is to his 
or her detriment.  See Department of Revenue v. Moebius Printing 
Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 634, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979).14  
                                                                  
The County claims that it cannot be deemed to have waived 
its right to object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction because it 
did not know that it could object to the arbitration on the 
basis of Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8).   
 
13 These terms are distinguished from legal estoppel, such 
as estoppel by deed or estoppel by matter of record.  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 551 (6th ed. 1990). 
14 The party asserting equitable estoppel as a defense must 
prove the elements of estoppel by clear, satisfactory and 
convincing evidence.  See Gabriel v. Gabriel, 57 Wis. 2d 424, 
428, 204 N.W.2d 494 (1973). 
No. 96-1197 
 
11
¶17 All the elements of equitable estoppel are present in 
this case.  The County's actions that form the basis of estoppel 
occurred both before and after the County's dispute with the 
deputy sheriff.  Prior to the deputy sheriff's discharge, the 
County had entered into a collective bargaining agreement that 
provided arbitration for disciplinary disputes.  After being 
suspended, the deputy sheriff pursued his dismissal grievance 
through arbitration.  Despite the fact that the collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
had 
expired, 
the 
County 
agreed 
to 
arbitration and appeared before the arbitrator.  
¶18 The County's full participation in the arbitration 
process implied a good faith effort to resolve the dispute 
through arbitration.  At no time during the arbitration 
proceeding, which lasted from June 1993 to March 1994, did the 
County object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction.  The first time 
the County objected to the arbitrator's jurisdiction was at the 
circuit court, 17 months after the filing of the disciplinary 
charges, 
one 
year 
after 
commencement 
of 
the 
arbitration 
proceeding 
and 
three 
months 
after 
announcement 
of 
the 
arbitration award.  In other words, the County made no objection 
to the arbitrator's jurisdiction until after the arbitrator 
ruled against the County.  
¶19 Relying 
on 
the 
County's 
failure 
to 
object 
to 
arbitration and on the County's full participation in the 
arbitration proceeding, the deputy sheriff pursued his grievance 
through arbitration.  Nothing in the record demonstrates that 
the deputy sheriff's reliance on the County's conduct was 
No. 96-1197 
 
12
unreasonable.  Based on the record, we conclude that the deputy 
sheriff had no reason to doubt the arbitration would result in a 
binding decision and award.  
¶20 The final element of equitable estoppel is whether the 
party against whom estoppel is asserted caused another party to 
change position to his or her detriment.  In the context of a 
claim of equitable estoppel, "detriment" has been equated with 
"prejudice," and commonly understood to mean "injury or damage." 
 City of Madison v. Lange, 140 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 408 N.W.2d 763 (Ct. 
App. 1987).  
¶21 The County's actions caused the deputy sheriff to 
invest time and resources in the arbitration proceeding.15  Had 
he 
known 
the 
County 
would 
object 
to 
the 
arbitrator's 
jurisdiction, the deputy sheriff might have sought review of the 
Law Enforcement Committee's decision in circuit court.  Now, 
more than four years after the dispute arose, the County is 
asking 
that 
the 
deputy 
sheriff 
recommence 
his 
dismissal 
grievance, this time in the circuit court.  
                     
15 See Pilgrim Inv. Corp. v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 677, 685-86, 
457 N.W.2d 544 (1990) (Ct. App. 1990) (partial participation in 
the arbitration process can serve to estop a party from 
challenging the arbitration agreement); Twomey v. Durkee, 291 
N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 1980) (participation in arbitration 
proceeding by county and sheriff estopped their later asserting 
that they had no contractual obligation to arbitrate); Simon-
Equity Jefferson Valley Partnership v. AJC Contractors, Inc., 
507 
N.Y.S.2d 
725, 
726 
(N.Y. 
App. 
Div. 
1986) 
(lessor's 
participation in arbitration barred lessor from obtaining stay 
of arbitration). 
No. 96-1197 
 
13
¶22 Because the elements of the defense of equitable 
estoppel have been met in the present case, we must next 
consider whether the defense of estoppel should be applied 
against the County.  The doctrine of equitable estoppel "is not 
applied as freely against governmental agencies as it is in the 
case of private persons."  Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Department 
of Taxation, 260 Wis. 551, 559, 51 N.W.2d 796 (1952).  Courts 
have recognized "the force of the proposition that estoppel 
should be applied against the Government with utmost caution and 
restraint, for it is not a happy occasion when the Government's 
hands, performing duties in behalf of the public, are tied by 
the acts and conduct of particular officials in their relations 
with particular individuals."  Schuster v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962).16  
¶23 Nevertheless, we have recognized that estoppel may be 
available 
as 
a 
defense 
against 
the 
government 
if 
the 
government's conduct would work a serious injustice and if the 
public interest would not be unduly harmed by the application of 
estoppel.  See Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d at 638.  In each 
                     
16 For instance, we have not allowed the estoppel doctrine 
to be invoked against the government when the application of 
estoppel interferes with the police power for the protection of 
public health, safety or general welfare.  See Department of 
Revenue v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610, 639, 279 N.W.2d 
213 (1979) (citing State v. Chippewa Cable Co., 21 Wis. 2d 598, 
608-09, 124 N.W.2d 616 (1963); Park Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 78, 87,88, 100 N.W.2d 571 (1960); Town of 
Richmond v. Murdock, 70 Wis. 2d 642, 653-54, 235 N.W.2d 497 
(1975); McKenna v. State Highway Comm'n, 28 Wis. 2d 179, 186, 
135 N.W.2d 827 (1965); Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 
22 Wis. 2d 240, 252-53, 125 N.W.2d 625 (1964)). 
No. 96-1197 
 
14
case the court must balance the public interests at stake if 
estoppel is applied against the injustice that might be caused 
if it is not.  See Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d at 639; 
State v. City of Green Bay, 96 Wis. 2d 195, 210, 291 N.W.2d 508 
(1980).17 
¶24 In this case principles of justice demand that the 
County be prevented from forcing the deputy sheriff to begin the 
grievance proceeding again.  It is unjust to allow the County to 
agree to arbitrate a disciplinary dispute and then, when the 
decision is adverse, to allow the County to question the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction over the dispute.  Permitting the 
County to question the arbitrator's jurisdiction after it has 
fully participated in the arbitration proceeding would give the 
County "two bites at the apple, arbitration and litigation, to 
obtain a favorable outcome."  United Indus. Workers, Serv., 
Transp., Prof'l Gov't of North Am. v. Government of the Virgin 
Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 169 (3rd Cir. 1993).  
¶25 Applying the doctrine of estoppel in this case 
prevents a serious injustice to the deputy sheriff and produces 
no undue harm to the public interest.  Although the County 
argues that the legislature has provided for judicial review by 
the circuit court rather than arbitration, it makes no showing 
that any public interests would be impaired if the estoppel 
doctrine were applied in this case.  The County does not assert 
                     
17 These 
cases 
use 
the 
words 
"serious 
injustice," 
"injustice," 
"unconscionable," 
"inequitable" 
and 
"unfair" 
interchangeably. 
No. 96-1197 
 
15
that the arbitration proceeding was in any way unfair to the 
County or contrary to the public interest.  We conclude that our 
decision in favor of the deputy sheriff in this case would not 
unduly 
harm 
the 
public 
interest 
even 
if 
the 
County's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 were to be adopted 
by this court.  
¶26 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
the 
undisputed facts in the case and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom that the County is estopped from challenging the 
validity of the arbitration award as contravening Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92).  The circuit court order vacating the 
arbitration award is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the 
circuit court with directions to reinstate the arbitration 
award.   
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
1