Title: SANDRA GAIL FULTZ V COMM-CO EQUITIES

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
SANDRA GAIL FULTZ and OTTO FULTZ, 
FILED JULY 14, 2004 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 121613 
UNION-COMMERCE ASSOCIATES,
COMM-CO EQUITIES, NAMER JONNA,
ARKAN JONNA, LAITH JONNA, MOHSIN
KOUZA, and GLADYS KOUZA, 
Defendants, 
and 
CREATIVE MAINTENANCE, LTD., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.   
This case arises from an injury that plaintiff 
Sandra Fultz sustained when she slipped and fell on an 
icy parking lot owned by defendant Comm-Co Equities 
(Comm-Co). 
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision 
holding a snow removal contractor, defendant Creative 
Maintenance Limited (CML), responsible for plaintiff’s 
injury on the basis of its alleged failure to plow or 
salt the parking lot. 
The injured plaintiff has no 
 
 
 
 
 
cause of action against CML because it breached no 
duty owed to plaintiff. 
The injured plaintiff’s 
husband filed a loss of consortium claim. 
Because 
this claim is derivative of her cause of action, this 
claim necessarily fails as well. 
Plaintiff's remedy 
lies solely against the premises owner. The threshold 
question for negligence claims brought against a 
contractor on the basis of a maintenance contract 
between a premises owner and that contractor is 
whether the contractor breached a duty separate and 
distinct from those assumed under the contract. 
Because the contractor in this case, CML, owed no duty 
to plaintiff, her claim fails. 
The Court of Appeals 
thus 
erred 
in 
affirming 
the 
jury 
verdict 
for 
plaintiff. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff fell and injured her ankle while 
walking across defendant Comm-Co’s snow-
and ice­
covered parking lot. 
Defendant CML had previously 
entered an oral contract with defendant Comm-Co to 
provide snow and salt services for the lot. 
At the 
time plaintiff fell, CML had not plowed the lot in 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
approximately fourteen hours and had not salted the 
parking lot. 
Plaintiff sued Comm-Co and CML for negligence. 
The trial court entered a default judgment against 
defendant Comm-Co, which is not a party to this 
appeal. The jury found no breach of the oral contract 
between defendants CML and Comm-Co, but awarded 
plaintiff compensatory damages after finding that 
defendant CML had been negligent by failing to perform 
under the contract and that CML's negligence was the 
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict. 
It held that Osman v Summer Green Lawn Care, Inc, 209 
Mich App 703; 532 NW2d 186 (1995), compelled the 
conclusion that defendant CML owed a common-law duty 
to provide the contracted snow removal service in a 
reasonable manner. 
The Court of Appeals further 
concluded that CML breached this duty by failing to 
perform its contractual obligation. 
We granted defendant CML's application for leave 
to appeal limited to two issues: 
(1) whether 
plaintiff can establish a duty owed her arising from a 
contract to which she was not a party and (2) whether 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a landowner's defenses are available to a contractor 
acting for the landowner. 468 Mich 882 (2003). 
We need not reach the second question regarding 
defenses because we hold, as a matter of law, that 
defendant owed no contractual or common-law duty to 
plaintiff to plow or salt the parking lot. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether defendant CML owed a duty to plaintiff is 
a question of law. 
We review de novo questions of 
law. 
Byker v Mannes, 465 Mich 637, 643; 641 NW2d 210 
(2002). 
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
It is well-established that a prima facie case of 
negligence 
requires 
a 
plaintiff 
to 
prove 
four 
elements: 
duty, breach of that duty, causation, and 
damages. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 
NW2d 17 (2000); Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 
440 Mich 85, 96 n 10; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). The 
threshold question in a negligence action is whether 
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. 
"It is 
axiomatic that there can be no tort liability unless 
defendants 
owed 
a 
duty 
to 
plaintiff." 
Beaty 
v 
Hertzberg & Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 262, 571 NW2d 
716 (1997). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Plaintiff does not claim that any statute or 
ordinance imposes a duty on CML to maintain the 
parking lot where she was injured, nor does she claim 
that she was a third-party beneficiary of the contract 
between defendant CML and the premises owner. 
She 
contends instead that defendant CML, by contracting to 
plow and salt the parking lot, owed a common-law duty 
to plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in performing 
its contractual duties. 
Plaintiff further alleges 
that defendant’s failure to plow or salt the parking 
lot breached that duty under the common-law tort 
principles expressed in Restatement Torts, 2d, § 324A: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third
person for physical harm resulting from his
failure 
to 
exercise 
reasonable 
care 
to 
protect [sic, perform][1] his undertaking, if 
* * * 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a 
duty owed by the other to the third person. 
. . . 
Michigan courts have accepted the Restatement of 
Torts, 2d, § 324A, as an accurate statement of 
Michigan law and used the principles stated above in 
1This is evidently a typographical error. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
analyzing plaintiffs’ claims in the past. See, e.g., 
Smith v Allendale, 410 Mich 685; 303 NW2d 702 (1981);, 
Callesen v Grand Trunk W R Co, 175 Mich App 252; 437 
NW2d 372 (1989), Cleveland Cunningham v Continental 
Cas Co, 139 Mich App 238; 361 NW2d 780 (1984), 
Staffney v Michigan Millers Mut Ins Co, 140 Mich App 
85; 362 NW2d 897 (1985), Schanz v New Hampshire Ins 
Co, 165 Mich App 395; 418 NW2d 478 (1988). 
While these opinions have endorsed § 324A, 
they 
must not be invoked uncritically or without regard to 
limiting principles within our case law. As we stated 
in Smith, supra at 713: 
Unlike a statute which expresses a 
legislative directive for the treatment of
future 
cases, 
the 
Restatement 
seeks 
primarily 
to 
distill 
the 
teachings 
of 
decided cases and is descriptive. . . . Even
where a particular Restatement section has
received 
specific 
judicial 
endorsement,
cases where that section is invoked must be 
decided by reference to the policies and
precedents underlying the rule restated. 
Thus, we must reconcile the principles expressed in § 
324A with our case law that limits their breadth. 
If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, 
having no prior obligation to do so, a duty may arise 
to perform the act in a nonnegligent manner. Home Ins 
Co v Detroit Fire Extinguisher Co, Inc, 212 Mich App 
522, 529; 538 NW2d 424 (1996); Osman, supra; Keeton, 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 56, pp 380-381 (5th ed, 
1984). 
We described this common-law duty in Clark v 
Dalman, 379 Mich 251; 150 NW2d 755 (1967): 
Actionable negligence presupposes the 
existence of a legal relationship between
parties by which the injured party is owed a
duty by the other, and such duty must be
imposed by law. . . . 
* * * 
Such duty of care may be a specific
duty 
owing 
to 
the 
plaintiff 
by 
the 
defendant, or it may be a general one owed
by the defendant to the public, of which the
plaintiff is a part. 
Moreover, while this
duty of care, as an essential element of
actionable negligence, arises by operation
of law, it may and frequently does arise out
of a contractual relationship, the theory
being that accompanying every contract is a
common-law duty to perform with ordinary
care the thing agreed to be done, and that a
negligent performance constitutes a tort as
well as a breach of contract. [Id. at 260­
261.] 
In defining the contours of this common-law duty, 
our 
courts 
have 
drawn 
a 
distinction 
between 
misfeasance (action) and nonfeasance (inaction) for 
tort 
claims 
based 
on 
a 
defendant's 
contractual 
obligations. We have held that a tort action will not 
lie when based solely on the nonperformance of a 
contractual duty. See Hart v Ludwig, 347 Mich 559; 79 
NW2d 895 (1956); Chase v Clinton Co, 241 Mich 478; 217 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NW 565 (1928); Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107; 152 NW 
989 (1915). 
This Court described the nonfeasance/misfeasance 
dichotomy in Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 
429 Mich 495, 498-499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988): 
In determining standards of conduct in
the area of negligence, 
the 
courts 
have 
made a distinction between misfeasance, or
active misconduct causing personal injury,
and nonfeasance, which is passive inaction
or the failure to actively protect others
from harm. The common law has been slow in 
recognizing 
liability 
for 
nonfeasance 
because the courts are reluctant to force 
persons to help one another and because such
conduct does not create a new risk of harm 
to a potential plaintiff. Thus, as a general
rule, there is no duty that obligates one
person to aid or protect another. 
In Hart, supra at 564-565, this Court opined that 
the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction 
is 
often 
largely semantic and somewhat artificial: 
The 
division 
thus 
made, 
between 
misfeasance, which may support an action 
either in tort or on the contract, and the
nonfeasance of a contractual obligation,
giving rise only to an action on the 
contract, is admittedly difficult to make in
borderland 
cases. 
There 
are, 
it 
is 
recognized, cases in which an incident of
nonfeasance occurs in the course of an 
undertaking assumed. 
Thus a surgeon fails
to sterilize his instruments, an engineer
fails to shut off steam, a builder fails to
fill in a ditch in a public way. 
These are 
all, it is true, failures to act, each 
disastrous 
detail, 
in 
itself, 
a 
"mere" 
nonfeasance. 
But the significant similarity
relates not to the slippery distinction 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
between action and nonaction but to the 
fundamental concept of "duty”; in each a
situation of peril has been created, with
respect to which a tort action would lie
without having recourse to the contract 
itself. [Citations omitted.] 
We believe the “slippery distinction” between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance of a duty undertaken 
obscures the proper initial inquiry: 
Whether a 
particular defendant owes any duty at all to a 
particular plaintiff. 
This Court and the Court of Appeals have defined 
a 
tort 
action 
stemming 
from 
misfeasance 
of 
a 
contractual obligation as the “violation of a legal 
duty separate and distinct from the contractual 
obligation.” Rinaldo's Constr Corp v Michigan Bell Tel 
Co, 454 Mich 65, 84; 559 NW2d 647 (1997); see, also, 
e.g., Ferrett v Gen Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235, 245; 
475 NW2d 243 (1991); Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 
Mich App 41, 48; 649 NW2d 783 (2002). 
We believe that the “separate and distinct” 
definition of misfeasance offers better guidance in 
determining whether a negligence action based on a 
contract and brought by a third party to that contract 
may lie because it focuses on the threshold question 
of duty in a negligence claim. 
As there can be no 
breach 
of 
a 
nonexistent 
duty, 
the 
former 
9  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
misfeasance/nonfeasance inquiry in a negligence case 
is defective because it improperly focuses on whether 
a duty was breached instead of whether a duty exists 
at all. 
Accordingly, the lower courts should analyze tort 
actions based on a contract and brought by a plaintiff 
who is not a party to that contract by using a 
“separate 
and 
distinct” 
mode 
of 
analysis. 
Specifically, the threshold question is whether the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff that is 
separate and distinct from the defendant’s contractual 
obligations. If no independent duty exists, no tort 
action based on a contract will lie.2 
Applying that analysis here, the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the jury verdict and in holding 
that 
"evidence 
suggested 
that 
[CML] 
engaged 
in 
misfeasance distinct from any breach of contract." 
2 This understanding is entirely consistent with
the hypothetical example set out in Justice KELLY’s 
concurring 
opinion. 
The 
hypothetical 
plaintiff
described in the concurrence would have no need to 
pursue a cause of action on a third-party beneficiary
theory because that plaintiff would have a direct
cause of action against the premises owner who owed a
duty to maintain a safe premises. 
The premises owner
could then seek indemnification from the contractor 
for 
breach 
of 
a 
contractual 
duty. 
Thus, 
the 
concurrence’s 
concern 
regarding 
this 
hypothetical
plaintiff is unwarranted. 
10  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 19, 2002 
(Docket No. 224019), p 6. 
In truth, plaintiff claims 
CML breached its contract with defendant Comm-Co by 
failing to perform its contractual duty of plowing or 
salting the parking lot.3  She alleges no duty owed to 
her independent of the contract. Plaintiff thus fails 
to satisfy the threshold requirement of establishing a 
duty that CML owed to her under the "separate and 
distinct" approach set forth in this opinion.4 
As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals relied on 
Osman to hold that CML owed a duty to plaintiff to 
fulfill its contractual obligation with defendant 
Comm-Co. 
The Court of Appeals reliance on this case 
was misplaced. 
3 The jury, however, found no breach of contract. 
4 
Plaintiff’s 
claim 
fails 
using 
a 
misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis, as well because she
alleges that CML committed nonfeasance by failing to
perform its snow removal obligation at all. 
Because 
no special relationship exists between the parties in
this case, and therefore 
defendant owed no duty to
make safe the parking lot where plaintiff was injured,
defendant 
CML’s 
nonfeasance 
of 
its 
contractual 
obligation cannot satisfy the threshold requirement of
establishing a duty owed to plaintiff under either
the former misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy or the
“separate and distinct” approach set forth in this
opinion. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like the plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Osman 
was injured when she fell on a patch of ice. 
Also, 
like the defendant here, the defendant in Osman had 
contracted to provide snow removal services to the 
premises owner. 
In that case, however, the defendant 
had breached a duty separate and distinct from its 
contractual duty when it created a new hazard by 
placing snow 
on a portion of the premises when it knew,
or should have known or anticipated, that
the snow would melt and freeze into ice on 
the abutting sidewalk, steps, and walkway,
thus 
posing 
a 
dangerous 
and 
hazardous 
condition to individuals who traverse those 
areas. [Osman, supra at 704.] 
Here, the Court of Appeals stated that given the 
snowy conditions on the day that plaintiff was injured 
[CML] had a duty to use reasonable care in 
removing dangerous ice and snow, which was 
distinct from its obligations under its contract
with Comm-Co. 
Moreover, the evidence suggested
that Creative Maintenance breached that duty when
it did not take reasonable steps to remove or
prevent 
the 
icy 
conditions 
that 
caused 
plaintiff's fall. [Slip op, p 7, (citations 
omitted; emphasis supplied.)] 
In this case, the Court of Appeals analysis is 
flawed because defendant CML’s failure to carry out 
its snow-removal duties owed to defendant created no 
new hazard to plaintiff. 
Thus, plaintiff alleges no 
duty owed to her by defendant CML separate and 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
distinct from its contract with defendant Comm-Co. 
CML could not logically breach a duty that it did not 
owe. 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
defendant CML was responsible for plaintiff’s injuries 
solely on the basis of the contract between defendants 
CML and Comm-Co. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, if defendant fails or refuses to 
perform a promise, the action is in contract. 
If 
defendant negligently performs a contractual duty or 
breaches a duty arising by implication from the 
relation of the parties created by the contract, the 
action may be either in contract or in tort. 
In such 
cases, however, no tort liability arises for failing 
to fulfill a promise in the absence of a duty to act 
that is separate and distinct from the promise made. 
We conclude in this case that, as a matter of 
law, CML owed plaintiff no duty. Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
SANDRA GAIL FULTZ and OTTO FULTZ, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
No. 121613 
UNION-COMMERCE ASSOCIATES,
COMM-CO EQUITIES, NAMER JONNA,
ARKAN JONNA, LAITH JONNA, MOHSIN
KOUZA, and GLADYS KOUZA, 
Defendants, 
and 
CREATIVE MAINTENANCE, LTD., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
I agree with the majority that the appellant, Creative 
Maintenance, Ltd., did not owe a duty to plaintiff Sandra 
Fultz. However, I cannot agree with some of the majority's 
rationale used in reaching this result. 
The issue is whether a duty exists. 
The majority 
opinion attempts to resolve it by recognizing the continued 
validity of Restatement Torts, 2d, § 324A.1
 The opinion 
1 Section 324A provides: 
(continued…) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
first appears to analyze this case under Restatement Torts, 
2d, § 324A(b). 
Ultimately, however, it rejects this 
provision. Instead, it limits the existence of tort 
liability that runs to persons not parties to a contract to 
situations 
where 
a 
duty 
arises 
“separate[ly] 
and 
distinct[ly]” from the duty owed under the contract. I read 
this as a conclusion that a nonparty to the contract can 
recover in tort only for damages arising out of situations 
covered by § 324A(a). 
The majority appears to ignore the 
situations outlined in § 324A(b) and (c). 
Therefore, I 
disagree with the limitations that the majority imposes on 
the existence of a duty. 
(…continued)
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to 
exercise reasonable care to protect [sic] his
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed
by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance 
of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
THE MAJORITY’S INTERPRETATION IS OVERLY EXPANSIVE 
The majority notes2 that this Court and the Court of 
Appeals have developed tests for deciding whether an action 
lies in breach of contract rather than in tort. 
The 
majority also observes3 that this Court and the Court of 
Appeals 
have 
defined 
a 
tort 
action 
stemming 
from 
misfeasance in terms of whether the "plaintiff alleges 
violation of a legal duty separate and distinct from the 
contractual obligation." Rinaldo's Constr Corp v Michigan 
Bell Tel Co, 454 Mich 65, 84; 559 NW2d 647 (1997). 
However, after reviewing the cases cited by the majority, I 
conclude that it is taking a more expansive view of that 
definition than has been taken previously. 
The existence of a "duty separate and distinct from 
the 
contractual 
obligation,"4 
has 
been 
identified 
historically as a dividing line between tort and contract 
obligations. Thus far, however, this rule has been applied 
only to disputes involving the parties to a contract. 
In 
those cases, the one harmed by a breach of the contract 
could not recover both in contract and in tort. 
2 Ante, pp 7-8. 
3 Ante, pp 9-10. 
4 Id. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
All the cases that the majority cites5 involve a duty 
allegedly separate from a contract. In Hart,6 the Court 
determined whether the plaintiff could maintain an action 
in tort against the defendant for failing to adequately 
care for the plaintiff's orchard. 
The parties had an oral 
contract. 
Sherman7 
involved a plaintiff who filed a 
complaint against a boat manufacturer arising from a 
contract to sell a boat. 
See also Rinaldo’s, 454 Mich 79­
80, Ferrett v Gen Motors Corp, 438 Mich 235; 475 NW2d 243 
(1991), Chase v Clinton Co, 241 Mich 478, 479-480; 217 NW 
565 (1928), and Churchill v Howe, 186 Mich 107; 152 NW 989 
(1915). 
In each of these cases, the plaintiff and the 
defendant were parties to a contract. It was necessary for 
each court to determine whether a breach of the contract 
could give rise to a separate tort duty. 
It was necessary 
to identify what theory of recovery applied as well as what 
damages were recoverable. 
However, this case is different. 
The contract 
involved is not between Creative Maintenance and Fultz. As 
5 Ante, pp 8-10.  
6 Hart v Ludwig, 347 Mich 559, 560; 79 NW2d 895 (1956).  
7 Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41; 649 
NW2d 783 (2002). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a consequence, I am not convinced that the law the majority 
invokes should be extended to this situation. 
The use of a "separate and distinct" test to determine 
whether a duty in tort arises independently of the contract 
may have appeal. 
However, it fails where the contract 
itself outlines a specific duty to protect third persons. 
A HELPFUL HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE 
By way of example, assume that a building owner hires 
a contractor to patch the building's crumbling façade to 
avoid injury to those passing near it. 
The contract 
explicitly states that the purpose of the contract is to 
protect the public from harm and that the contractor 
undertakes 
this 
duty. 
Nevertheless, 
the 
contractor 
misjudges the extent of the building’s deterioration and 
uses 
inadequate 
repair 
methods 
that, 
although 
not 
increasing the risk of falling materials, do not make the 
facade safe. Assume, moreover, that a member of the public 
sues the contractor, claiming harm from a failure to 
protect after being injured when a portion of the facade 
falls on him. 
To satisfy the majority's test, the 
contractor must owe a duty to the plaintiff that is 
separate and distinct from his contractual obligations. In 
this hypothetical case, application of the majority’s test 
would result in a finding of no cause of action for the 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
member of the general public. 
This is incongruous because 
it is the general public that the contract was designed to 
protect. 
It could be argued that a member of the public might 
still sue as a third-party beneficiary of the contract. 
However, this Court has recently stated that Michigan law 
does not empower incidental beneficiaries to enforce a 
contract. Koenig v South Haven, 460 Mich 667, 679-680; 597 
NW2d 99 (1999) (opinion by Taylor, J.); Schmalfeldt v North 
Pointe Ins Co, 469 Mich 422, 427-428; 670 NW2d 651 (2003); 
MCL 600.1405. 
Rather, a person can be a third-party 
beneficiary of a contract only when the promisor undertakes 
an obligation "directly" to or for that person. Koenig, 
supra; Schmalfeldt, supra. 
In Koenig, the author of the lead opinion wrote: 
"[T]his Court has adopted the persuasive rule that a third­
party beneficiary 'may be one of a class of persons, if the 
class is sufficiently described or designated.'" 
Koenig, 
supra at 680 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
But the 
benefit of such a contract cannot run to a member of the 
general public. Id.; Schmalfeldt, supra at 428. 
Therefore, in the hypothetical case, a third-party 
member of the public could not recover from the actual 
tortfeasor either under the contract or in tort. 
I do not 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
agree 
with 
this 
proposition. 
It 
is 
particularly 
distressing because the majority's new analysis of these 
claims could leave innocent persons without recourse to 
redress their injuries. Such persons may be precluded from 
recovering 
either 
from 
the 
tortfeasor 
or 
from 
the 
tortfeasor’s employer. 
In cases in which the jury assigns one hundred percent 
of the fault to the contractor, plaintiffs will have no 
recovery. 
MCL 600.2957(1) requires the jury to assess the 
percentage of fault by "consider[ing] the fault of each 
person, regardless of whether the person is, or could have 
been, named as a party to the action."  Thus, while the 
contractor does not owe any duty to the plaintiff, the 
premises owner's liability will be determined according to 
the jury's allocation of fault. 
So, an innocent plaintiff, whose injury results 
entirely from the negligence of a contractor, will recover 
nothing from the premises owner. 
She will also have no 
cause 
of 
action 
against 
the 
contractor 
because 
the 
contractor owes no duty to the plaintiff. 
Rather than 
adopt the majority’s new test, I would recognize that in 
certain circumstances a duty under tort can arise solely 
from a contractual obligation. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The facts of this case, as noted by the majority, are 
distinct from those in Osman v Summer Lawn Care, Inc, 209 
Mich App 703; 532 NW2d 186 (1995). Ante, p 12. In Osman, 
the defendant created a hazard by placing snow on a 
sidewalk, walkway, and steps where it should have known 
snow would melt and freeze into ice. 
However, the 
defendant's actions there gave rise to a tort claim under 
the theory embodied in Restatement Torts, 2d § 324A(a), not 
under the theory in § 324A(b). 
The latter subsection contemplates a situation in 
which the defendant assumes the duty owed by the other 
contracting party. The majority ignores this subsection in 
its decision to require a duty "separate and distinct" from 
the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff maintains that the Court of Appeals was 
correct when it found that a duty separate from the 
contract was at issue in the instant case. However, 
plaintiff assumes that every agreement to undertake a task 
for another equates to an agreement to undertake the duty 
owed by the other to a third person. This is not accurate. 
Such a comprehensive assumption of duty has been 
described in at least one jurisdiction as a case "where the 
contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
duty to maintain the premises safely . . . ." Espinal v 
Melville Snow Contractors, Inc 98 NY2d 136, 140; 773 NE2d 
485 (2002). 
At the least, to undertake a duty pursuant to § 
324A(b), the contracting party must clearly have agreed to 
fulfill the other party's obligation, together with the 
inherent responsibilities and potential liabilities. 
Such 
an agreement would meet the reasonable expectations of the 
contracting parties. It would also allow the plaintiffs an 
avenue of recovery where the duty to act is not necessarily 
separate and distinct from the duties spelled out in the 
contract itself. 
Here, there is no evidence that the contract between 
Creative Maintenance and the shopping center contemplated 
that Creative would assume the duties that the center owed 
to the center's business invitees. Thus, Fultz failed to 
establish that Creative Maintenance owed her a duty under § 
324A(b). 
Accordingly, I concur with the result reached by the 
majority. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
9