Title: State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. ASTI, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH 
SERVICES ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs.,  
107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-6432.] 
Public employees — R.C. 124.11(D) – Classified employee who accepts 
unclassified position has unqualified right to return to classified position. 
(No. 2005-0043 ─ Submitted July 26, 2005 ─ Decided December 21, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 03AP-998, 2004-Ohio-6832. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus to 
compel a state agency to reinstate a former employee to the classified service 
under the statutory fallback provision. 
{¶ 2} In August 1990, appellee Ohio Department of Youth Services 
(“DYS”) hired appellant, Tony Asti, as an account clerk.  In July 1998, DYS 
promoted Asti to a position classified as Fiscal Officer 4.  Between August 1990 
and July 1999, Asti held various DYS positions, which were all in the classified 
service. 
{¶ 3} On July 13, 1999, appellee Geno Natalucci-Persichetti, then the 
Director of DYS, appointed Asti Fiscal Management Bureau Chief of the DYS 
Division of Finance and Planning.  This bureau-chief position was unclassified.  
In a letter to Asti, Natalucci-Persichetti specified that the appointment was being 
made pursuant to R.C. Chapter 124 and that Asti would retain the right to resume 
his previous classified position or be placed in a comparable one: 
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{¶ 4} “This appointment is being made and accepted in accordance with 
Chapter 124 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Even with this change you will remain in 
your current classification of Fiscal Officer 4 under the E-1 rate schedule and will, 
in accordance with Chapter 124 of the Ohio Revised Code, retain the right to 
resume the position you previously held, or a comparable position, in the 
classified service at Central Office as outlined in this section.” 
{¶ 5} When Asti accepted the 1999 appointment to the unclassified 
position, he relied on Natalucci-Persichetti’s express promise that he had 
“fallback rights,” i.e., he retained the right to resume the classified position he had 
previously held. 
{¶ 6} In April 2001, DYS promoted Asti to the unclassified position of 
Acting Deputy Director of the Division of Finance and Planning.  In December 
2001, DYS promoted Asti to the unclassified position of Deputy Director of the 
Division of Finance and Planning. 
{¶ 7} On December 16, 2002, Asti attended a meeting that included 
Natalucci-Persichetti and a DYS attorney.  At that meeting, Asti was informed 
that he could either be demoted to another unclassified position or be removed 
from employment with DYS.  During this meeting, Asti asked whether he had any 
fallback rights, and he was told that he did not.  Asti signed a form consenting to a 
demotion to the position of Correctional Institutional Deputy Superintendent 3 at 
Scioto Juvenile Correctional Facility in Delaware County, Ohio.  Asti added the 
following handwritten statement to the form: 
{¶ 8} “I am signing this statement with the understanding that I will be 
able to research the right to fall back to my previous position in the classified 
service regardless of the number of classified positions I held.” 
{¶ 9} On January 2, 2003, Asti appealed his demotion to the State 
Personnel Board of Review.  On July 24, 2003, an administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) for the board issued a report and recommendation.  The ALJ 
January Term, 2005 
3 
recommended that the board dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  The ALJ further recommended that the board “in dictum find that * 
* * [Asti] has a clear legal right to [his] most recently held position of Fiscal 
Officer 4 in the classified service or similar position with [DYS] and that [DYS] 
has a clear legal duty to respond to [Asti’s] legitimate request to fallback to that 
same position.”  On August 27, 2003, the board adopted the ALJ’s 
recommendation and dismissed Asti’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 10} On September 9, 2003, Asti’s employment with DYS ended.  
Despite repeated demands, neither DYS nor its director provided Asti with his 
previous position in the classified service under the statutory fallback provision. 
{¶ 11} In October 2003, Asti filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County against appellees, DYS and its director.  Asti requested a writ of 
mandamus to compel appellees to (1) reinstate him to his fallback, classified 
position, (2) reinstate him to his unclassified Deputy Director position, (3) pay 
him back pay and lost benefits, (3) award costs and attorney fees, and (4) pay 
interest.  Appellees answered the complaint, and the parties moved for summary 
judgment. 
{¶ 12} On December 16, 2004, the court of appeals denied the writ of 
mandamus. 
{¶ 13} This cause is now before the court upon Asti’s appeal as of right. 
Oral Argument 
{¶ 14} Asti requests oral argument under S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A).  This rule 
provides that oral argument in cases like this is discretionary.  “Among the factors 
we consider in determining whether to grant oral argument in appeals in which 
oral argument is not required is whether the case involves a matter of great public 
importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a 
conflict between courts of appeals.”  Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 
311, 695 N.E.2d 751. 
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{¶ 15} In his request, Asti cites none of those factors, but instead claims 
that “the main issue in this case is one of first impression and oral argument will 
be helpful to the court in deciding this case.”  The issues raised, however, are 
straightforward – statutory interpretation and collateral estoppel.  And the parties’ 
briefs are sufficient to resolve these issues.  State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 
101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 16} Therefore, we deny Asti’s request for oral argument. 
Mandamus:  Standard of Review 
{¶ 17} Asti asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying his claim for 
a writ of mandamus.  In order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, 
Asti had to establish a clear legal right to his fallback, classified position,1 a 
corresponding clear legal duty for DYS and its director to reinstate him to that 
position, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
{¶ 18} Asti lacks an adequate legal remedy because he has no right to 
appeal appellees’ alleged denial of his statutory fallback rights, which appellees 
have a legal duty to honor.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ms. Parsons Constr., Inc. v. 
Moyer (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 404, 406-407, 650 N.E.2d 472 (mandamus is 
appropriate remedy when relator is being damaged by a failure of public officers 
to perform official acts that they are under a duty to perform); State ex rel. Glass, 
Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Internatl. Union, Local 333, AFL-
CIO, CLC v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 609 
N.E.2d 1266 (mandamus is an appropriate remedy in absence of statutory right of 
appeal). 
                                                 
1. Asti also claimed below that he was entitled to his unclassified position as Deputy Director of 
the Division and Finance and Planning, which he held before his December 2002 demotion.  His 
argument on appeal, however, is limited to seeking reinstatement to his previous classified 
position. 
January Term, 2005 
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{¶ 19} Accordingly, the dispositive issue is whether Asti has established a 
clear legal right to reinstatement to his previous classified position and a 
concomitant legal duty on the part of DYS and its director to reinstate him. 
Mandamus:  R.C. 124.11(D) 
{¶ 20} Asti claims that he is entitled to the writ because R.C. 124.11(D) 
confers a right to reinstatement to his previous classified position by providing: 
{¶ 21} “An appointing authority whose employees are paid directly by 
warrant of the auditor of state may appoint a person who holds a certified position 
in the classified service within the appointing authority’s agency to a position in 
the unclassified service within that agency.  A person appointed pursuant to this 
division to a position in the unclassified service shall retain the right to resume 
the position and status held by the person in the classified service immediately 
prior to the person’s appointment to the position in the unclassified service, 
regardless of the number of positions the person held in the unclassified service.  
Reinstatement to a position in the unclassified service shall be to a position 
substantially equal to that position in the classified service held previously, as 
certified by the director of administrative services.  If the position the person 
previously held in the classified service has been placed in the unclassified service 
or is otherwise unavailable, the person shall be appointed to a position in the 
classified service within the appointing authority’s agency that the director of 
administrative services certifies is comparable in compensation to the position the 
person previously held in the classified service.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} In interpreting R.C. 124.11(D), our paramount concern is 
legislative intent.  See State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  To determine this intent, we 
read words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common 
usage.  R.C. 1.42; State ex rel. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 105 
Ohio St.3d 177, 2005-Ohio-1150, 824 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 31. 
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{¶ 23} Reading the applicable words of R.C. 124.11(D) in context, we 
conclude that Asti has an unqualified right to resume his previous position in the 
classified service.  Asti was appointed to an unclassified position from a classified 
position pursuant to R.C. 124.11(D).  “ ‘[T]he word “shall” shall be construed as 
mandatory unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that [it] 
receive a construction other than [its] ordinary usage.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Ohio 
Civ. Rights Comm. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 522, 2003-
Ohio-4358, 794 N.E.2d 56, ¶ 4, quoting Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist. 
(1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 56 O.O.2d 58, 271 N.E.2d 834, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  The “shall” in R.C. 124.11(D) clearly requires a mandatory 
construction. 
{¶ 24} In addition, “retain” means “to hold or continue to hold in 
possession or use,” and “resume” means to “begin again.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1986) 1938 and 1937. 
{¶ 25} Thus, a person appointed to the unclassified service under R.C. 
124.11(D) holds the legal right to begin his previous classified position again.  
This right is not conditioned upon any additional triggering event, and its exercise 
is not restricted to any particular time or event.  Consequently, R.C. 124.11(D) 
vests an unqualified right in a person so appointed at any time after appointment 
to the unclassified position under this section. 
{¶ 26} The court of appeals determined that because R.C. 124.11(D) is 
silent as to the circumstances or events that would trigger fallback rights, Asti – 
and similarly situated classified employees appointed to unclassified positions – 
had no clear legal right to exercise these rights.  But the statute is not silent – the 
event that triggers the vesting of the right of reinstatement to the previous 
classified position is the initial appointment to an unclassified position.  And the 
lack of any other conditions on the exercise of that right manifests the General 
Assembly’s intent that it may be exercised upon demand by the employee.  
January Term, 2005 
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Further, an employee like Asti who subsequently accepts additional unclassified 
positions does not thereby waive entitlement to resume the fallback, classified 
position.  R.C. 124.11(D) specifies that the right continues “regardless of the 
number of positions the person held in the unclassified service.” 
{¶ 27} This interpretation is supported by Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-5-03(C), 
which specifies that “[u]nclassifed appointments made pursuant to division (D) of 
section 124.11 of the Revised Code may be rescinded by the appointing authority 
or upon the request of the employee.”  The court of appeals mistakenly interpreted 
this provision to mean that “rescission of the appointment to the unclassified 
service is entirely permissive, not mandatory, including when it is the employee 
who desires rescission.”  It is certainly true that “usage of the term ‘may’ is 
generally construed to render optional, permissive, or discretionary the provision 
in which it is embodied.”  State ex rel. Niles v. Bernard (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 31, 
34, 7 O.O.3d 119, 372 N.E.2d 339; Natl. City Bank v. Beyer (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 152, 159, 729 N.E.2d 711.  But its use in the administrative rule vests the 
discretionary authority to rescind the unclassified appointment in both the 
appointing authority and the employee, i.e., the rescission may be executed at the 
option of either the appointing authority or the employee upon request.  Cf.  
Crock Constr. Co. v. Stanley Miller Constr. Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 588, 593, 
613 N.E.2d 1027, fn. 2 (“It is apparent that the discretionary connotations of the 
word ‘may’ go to what must be done if a mechanic’s lien is desired, not to the 
question whether the specific steps enumerated are mandatory”) (emphasis sic). 
{¶ 28} Adoption of the court of appeals’ and appellees’ interpretation of 
R.C. 124.11(D) and Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-5-03(C) would render nugatory the 
R.C. 124.11(D) right to reinstatement to the classified service.  Under their 
interpretations, employees who accept unclassified positions would either have no 
enforceable legal right to resume their previous classified position or their right 
could be enforced only when an employee faced termination from employment.  
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And if Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-5-03(C) does not authorize employees to rescind 
their appointment to the unclassified service – as the court of appeals held – it 
would also not authorize appointing authorities to do so.  We must construe the 
applicable statute and rule to avoid such unreasonable or absurd results.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-
1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, ¶ 42; State ex rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 576, 580, 757 N.E.2d 357; R.C. 1.47(C). 
{¶ 29} Moreover, the court of appeals’ and appellees’ interpretation 
would in effect delete the statutory language that the person appointed to the 
unclassified service “shall retain the right to resume the position and status held 
by the person in the classified service immediately prior to the person’s 
appointment to the position in the unclassified service” or add language that “this 
right can be exercised only at the discretion of the appointing authority” or “this 
right can be exercised only when an employee is being terminated.”  Insofar as 
Asti also argues that the right can be exercised only upon demotion or other 
adverse employment action, he too would add language to R.C. 124.11(D) that is 
not contained therein.  We cannot, however, add or delete words to R.C. 
124.11(D).  State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 
N.E.2d 76, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 30} As Judge John G. Roberts Jr. observed in a unanimous opinion for 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “the 
Supreme Court has consistently instructed that statutes written in broad, sweeping 
language should be given broad, sweeping application.”  Consumer Electronics 
Assn. v. Fed. Communications Comm. (C.A.D.C.2003), 347 F.3d 291, 298.  Had 
the General Assembly intended to limit the R.C. 124.11(D) fallback right, it 
would have so provided, as it has in other provisions.  See, e.g., R.C. 5120.38 
(“Upon being relieved of the person’s duties as managing officer, the person shall 
be reinstated to the position in the classified service that the person held 
January Term, 2005 
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immediately prior to the appointment to the position of managing officer or to 
another position that the director, with approval of the state department of 
administrative services, certifies as being substantially equal to that prior 
position” (emphasis added)); see, also, R.C. 5120.381 and 5120.382.  Because 
R.C. 124.11(D) contains no comparable qualifying language concerning the 
exercise of fallback rights, it should be accorded the broad, sweeping scope 
contemplated by its plain language. 
{¶ 31} Furthermore, as Asti notes, R.C. 124.11(D) is a remedial provision 
that protects state employees when they move from classified positions, from 
which they may be terminated only for just cause, to unclassified, terminable-at-
will positions.  It provides appointing agencies like DYS with a broader pool of 
experienced applicants for upper level, unclassified positions by offering civil-
service protection to those classified employees appointed to unclassified 
positions.  See R.C. 1.11 (“Remedial laws * * * shall be liberally construed in 
order to promote their object”).  These statutory purposes are furthered by 
according R.C. 124.11(D) its plain meaning. 
{¶ 32} Finally, Asti did not waive his entitlement to this fallback position 
by arguing below that his statutory entitlement to fall back to his previous 
classified position was not premised on actions subsequent to his December 16, 
2002 demotion.  His questions concerning his fallback rights at the December 16, 
2002 meeting with appellees were tantamount to a request to resume his fallback 
position in the classified service. 
{¶ 33} Therefore, based on the manifest language of R.C. 124.11(D) and 
Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-5-03(C), Asti established a clear legal right to 
reinstatement to his Fiscal Officer 4 classified position or a substantially equal 
position and a clear legal duty on the part of DYS and its director to so reinstate 
him.  “ ‘[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts – at 
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it 
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according to its terms.’ ”  Lamie v. United States Trustee (2004), 540 U.S. 526, 
534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024, quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. 
v. Union Planters Bank, N.A. (2000), 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 
1.  Because the court of appeals failed to apply the plain language of the pertinent 
provision, its denial of the writ is reversed. 
Mandamus: 
Collateral Estoppel 
{¶ 34} Asti argues in the alternative that his entitlement to reinstatement is 
established by certain language in the administrative law judge’s report 
recommending that the State Personnel Board of Review dismiss his appeal from 
his demotion.  We need not address this argument because it is rendered moot by 
our disposition of Asti’s first claim.  See, e.g., PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration (C.A.D.C.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 799 
(Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“This is a sufficient ground 
for deciding this case, and the cardinal principle of judicial restraint — if it is not 
necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more — counsels us to go 
no further”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred by not granting 
Asti a writ of mandamus to compel his reinstatement to his Fiscal Officer 4 
classified position or a substantially equal position.  Because the court of appeals’ 
error prevented it from addressing Asti’s remaining claims, e.g., back pay and 
attorney fees, a remand is warranted.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
January Term, 2005 
11 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Buckley King, James E. Melle, and Donell R. Grubbs, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Jack W. Decker, and Nicole S. Moss, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees. 
_____________________