Title: Foster v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

654 So. 2d 112 (1995)
Charles Kenneth FOSTER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 82335.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 23, 1995.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1995.
Richard H. Burr, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York City, and Steven L. Seliger, Quincy, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Mark C. Menser and Curtis M. French, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
*113 PER CURIAM.
Charles Kenneth Foster appeals his sentence of death following the trial court's issuance of a new sentencing order in accordance with this Court's directive in Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 465 (Fla. 1992). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.
Charles Foster was convicted of Julian Lanier's murder and sentenced to death in 1975. Foster's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal in Foster v. State, 369 So. 2d 928 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 178, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979). The trial court denied Foster's first postconviction motion, and this Court affirmed. Foster v. State, 400 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1981). This Court also affirmed the trial court's denial of Foster's second postconviction motion. Foster v. State, 518 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240, 108 S. Ct. 2914, 101 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1988).[1] However, this Court granted Foster's habeas petition and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding based on a Hitchcock error.[2]Id.
The resentencing jury recommended death by an eight-to-four vote and the trial court followed that recommendation. On remand for resentencing, Foster filed a third postconviction motion which the trial court summarily denied. This Court affirmed the denial of Foster's third postconviction motion. Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 398, 126 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1993). However, on direct appeal of resentencing, this Court vacated Foster's death sentence and remanded the case for the trial court to enter a new sentencing order consistent with Rogers[3] and Campbell.[4]Id. at 465.
A new order was entered which reimposed the sentence of death. The trial court found fourteen nonstatutory mitigators to which it afforded little weight,[5] and three aggravators which it described as follows:
Foster raises three claims in this appeal: 1) the death penalty is not proportionately warranted in this case; 2) the trial court erred in concluding that a conflict existed regarding expert opinion relating to the mental health mitigators; and 3) the trial court's cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravator instruction was constitutionally impaired and the giving of that instruction cannot be deemed harmless error.
Having compared this case to other decisions of this Court, we conclude that death is proportionate here and therefore reject Foster's first claim. As to Foster's second claim, we simply note that this Court has repeatedly recognized that it is within the purview of the trial court to determine whether a particular mitigating circumstance was proven and the weight to be given it. See, e.g., Daugherty v. State, 419 So. 2d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228, 103 S. Ct. 1236, 75 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1983). We find that the trial court's conclusions regarding the mental health mitigators are supported by the record and therefore reject Foster's second claim. While we also reject *115 Foster's third claim, it does warrant discussion.
At resentencing, the trial court gave the following CCP aggravator instruction:
The trial court denied defense counsel's request for a more expansive instruction on the CCP aggravator.
The first half of the instruction given in this case mirrors the standard CCP instruction which this Court held to be invalid in Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994).[6] The second paragraph of the instruction given in this case was a step in the right direction, but did not cure the constitutional infirmity which this Court identified in Jackson. Stated otherwise, the CCP instruction given in this case does not adequately explain the difference between the premeditation required to convict for first-degree murder and the heightened premeditation required to find the CCP aggravator.
Having concluded that the CCP instruction given in this case was constitutionally impaired, we must determine whether the giving of that instruction was harmless error. Jackson explains that in order for the giving of an erroneous CCP instruction to be harmless, the State must establish "beyond a reasonable doubt that the invalid CCP instruction did not affect the jury's consideration or that its recommendation would have been the same if the requested expanded instruction had been given." Jackson, 648 So. 2d  at 90.
This Court previously concluded that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Lanier's murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. Foster, 614 So. 2d  at 461. We have again reviewed the record, including "new evidence" presented at resentencing, and we remain convinced that Lanier's murder could only have been cold, calculated, and premeditated. We find it particularly telling that after having concealed Lanier's body with bushes, Foster then proceeded to cut Lanier's spine with a knife when he realized that Lanier was still breathing. The fact that Foster had ample time to reflect on his actions and their attendant consequences, after concealing Lanier's body and before cutting Lanier's spine, is compelling evidence of the heightened level of premeditation required to establish the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator. See, e.g., Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S. Ct. 1578, 103 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1989); Jackson v. State, 522 So. 2d 802 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S. Ct. 183, 102 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1988). In view of the fact that the trial court found no statutory mitigators and three strong aggravators, we also find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the invalid CCP instruction did not affect the jury's consideration and that its recommendation would have been the same if the requested expanded instruction had been given. Hence, we conclude that the giving of the erroneous CCP instruction in this case was harmless error.
Accordingly, finding no error warranting reversal, we affirm Foster's sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
[1]  In addition, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Foster's two federal habeas petitions. Foster v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 402 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S. Ct. 2915, 101 L. Ed. 2d 946 (1988); Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 2375, 80 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984).
[2]  Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987) (concluding that an advisory jury must be instructed to consider, and a sentencing judge must consider, nonstatutory as well as statutory mitigating circumstances).
[3]  Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 534 (Fla. 1987) (discussing the manner in which a trial court should consider mitigating circumstances in a case in which the State seeks the death penalty), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S. Ct. 733, 98 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1988).
[4]  Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990) (recognizing that "the sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature").
[5]  1) Foster murdered Lanier while he was under the influence of emotional or mental disturbance  not extreme emotional or mental disturbance; 2) Foster's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law was impaired  not substantially impaired; 3) Foster has an abusive family background; 4) Foster's poverty; 5) Foster's physical illnesses; 6) Foster's love for, and love by, his family; 7) Foster's alcohol and/or drug addiction; 8) Foster's troubled personal life; 9) Foster's physical injuries; 10) Foster's lack of childhood development; 11) Foster's struggle with the death of loved ones; 12) Foster's learning disabilities; 13) Foster's potential for positive sustained human relationships; and 14) Foster's remorse for the crime.
[6]  Because Foster's sentence is not yet final, Jackson is controlling.