Title: Nichols v. Woodward Iron Company

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

103 So. 2d 319 (1958)
Nannie NICHOLS
v.
WOODWARD IRON COMPANY.
6 Div. 941.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 22, 1958.
*320 Lipscomb, Brobston, Jones & Brobston and Richard L. Jones, Bessemer, for appellant.
B. J. Dryer, Woodward, for appellee.
GOODWYN, Justice.
The appellant, Mrs. Nannie Nichols, brought action against appellee, Woodward Iron Company, in the circuit court of Jefferson County to recover damages allegedly resulting from disturbance of her husband's grave by defendant's mining operations. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and judgment was rendered accordingly. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial being overruled, she brought this appeal.
The case went to the jury on plaintiff's Count A and defendant's plea in short by consent.
Count A, in substance, alleges that the defendant engaged in underground mining operations beneath the surface of the Oak Grove M. E. Church Cemetery; that plaintiff was in possession of a burial plot in said cemetery in which plot her husband was buried; that defendant, by its underground mining operations, removed and excavated from "beneath and adjacent to said plot quantities of coal and other minerals, which * * * supported the surface of said land in its natural state or condition"; that "as a proximate consequence of the mining operations of the defendant, and said removal by defendant of said coal and other minerals as aforesaid, great surface cracks appeared in and on said grave, and said grave was caused to crack and sink, and otherwise become disturbed, and plaintiff was caused to suffer great humiliation, chagrin and embarrassment, and has been greatly shocked and grieved, and has been caused to suffer such mental anguish and has been caused to be greatly disturbed in mind, and plaintiff's feelings have been outraged, and plaintiff is apprehensive that the entire grave will cave into the mine, or mines, of the defendant."
Appellee insists that there is no liability because its mining operations were not carried on directly beneath the surface of plaintiff's burial plot; that "the rule of absolute liability for damage to the surface of land resulting from mining applies only to mining directly beneath the surface in the same land and in event of a claim for damage to the surface from mining in adjoining land negligence of the miner must be alleged and proved." In support of this contention appellee cites the following cases: Woodward Iron Company v. Mumpower, 248 Ala. 502, 28 So. 2d 625; Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764, 109 A.L.R. 385; Corona Coal Co. v. Thomas, 212 Ala. 56, 101 So. 673; Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350, 5 Am.St.Rep. 368.
Appellant insists that even though a pillar of coal was left directly under her burial plot "if the size of the pillar is still too *321 small and insufficient to support the surface, thereby causing the surface to crack and subside," the defendant is liable. It appears to be undisputed that a pillar of coal 20 feet wide and 60 feet long was left under plaintiff's 8 feet by 8 feet burial plot (the portion occupied by her husband's grave being 8 feet by 4 feet).
Bearing on this issue are the following written charges, given at defendant's request:
Appellee contends that these charges correctly state the rule of liability of a mine owner for damages to adjoining surface land. Appellant insists that the trial court erred in giving them. Clearly, these charges are to the effect that a mine owner has a right to remove minerals right up to his property line and is not liable for any damage to adjoining land caused thereby unless resulting from negligence in the mining operations. In other words, they lay down the principle that a mine owner is not required to provide lateral support for adjoining land in its natural state.
It does not appear that the precise question presented by these charges has been dealt with authoritatively by this court. However, it has been held consistently in this jurisdiction, and generally, that an adjoining landowner is entitled to lateral support for his land in its natural state. H. H. Parker & Bro. v. Hodgson, 172 Ala. 632, 634-635, 55 So. 818; Myer v. Hobbs, 57 Ala. 175, 176-177, 29 Am.Rep. 719; Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 45(1), 48-49, 84 Am.Dec. 770; 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners §§ 8 and 10, pp. 11, 12; 1 Am. Jur., Adjoining Landowners, § 25, p. 521; Restatement of the Law, Torts, Vol. IV, § 817, pp. 187-199; Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3d Ed., Vol. 3, § 752, p. 186; Lindley on Mines, Vol. 3, §§ 831 (p. 2030), 832 (pp. 2030-2032), 833 (pp. 2032-2034); Young v. Mall Investment Company, 172 Minn. 428, 215 N.W. 840, 55 A.L.R. 461; Hunt v. Peake (1860), Johns.Rep. 705, 709, 710, 70 Eng.Reprint 603. We see no good reason why this rule should not apply when there are underground mining operations just as it does when there are open excavations.
In Myer v. Hobbs, supra, the rule as to lateral support is thus stated:
From H. H. Parker & Bro. v. Hodgson, supra, is the following [172 Ala. 632, 55 So. 819]:
In Lindley on Mines, Vol. 3, §§ 831 (p. 2030), 832 (pp. 2030-2031) and 833 (pp. 2032-2033), supra, the rule is stated as follows:
"This rule is well established in America and in England."
Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3d Ed., Vol. 3, pp. 186, 187, supra, in discussing lateral support of land in its natural state, has this to say:
"§ 752. Lateral supportLand in its natural state.
From 1 Am.Jur., Adjoining Landowners, § 25, p. 521, supra, is the following:
The rule is thus stated in 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners §§ 8 and 10, pp. 11, 12, supra:
"§ 8. In General
"§ 10. Negligence
In Young v. Mall Investment Company, 172 Minn. 428, 215 N.W. 840, 55 A.L.R. 461, supra, the common law rule is stated as follows:
In Hunt v. Peake (1860), Johns.Rep. 705, 709-710, 70 Eng.Reprint 603, supra, the common law rule is thus stated:
We are at the conclusion that the charges do not properly state the applicable law in this state and that the giving of them calls for a reversal.
We have carefully examined the four cases relied on by appellee and do not think they militate against this conclusion.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.