Title: People v. Ramirez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MARCOS ANTONIO RAMIREZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S262010 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F076126 
 
Tuolumne County Superior Court 
CRF50964 
 
 
December 5, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero 
concurred. 
 
Justices Liu filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
S262010 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be 
present at trial.  Yet, once trial has commenced in the 
defendant’s presence in a noncapital felony case, the trial court 
may continue the trial in the defendant’s absence under Penal 
Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(2) (hereafter section 
1043(b)(2)), provided that the absence is voluntary.1  We granted 
review in this matter to decide whether the Court of Appeal 
erred when it upheld the trial court’s finding that defendant 
Marcos Antonio Ramirez was voluntarily absent under section 
1043(b)(2).     
Defendant failed to appear in court on the second day of 
trial.  Earlier that morning, emergency medical personnel and 
police officers had been dispatched to defendant’s home after a 
possible drug overdose was reported.  According to a police 
officer who responded to the home, defendant had initially 
declined medical care, but ultimately decided to be taken by his 
mother to a hospital rather than to court.  The trial court ruled 
that defendant was voluntarily absent under the circumstances, 
and it continued trial without him in accordance with section 
1043(b)(2).   
On appeal, defendant claimed the trial court violated his 
constitutional rights by finding him to be voluntarily absent 
 
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
circumstances of his absence.  A divided Court of Appeal ruled 
that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that 
defendant voluntarily absented himself from trial.  It further 
ruled that the court’s decision to proceed with trial, rather than 
grant defense counsel’s motion for a one-day continuance, 
constituted harmless error.  (People v. Ramirez (Mar. 5, 2020, 
F076126) [nonpub. opn.].) 
A trial court must assess the totality of facts when 
determining whether a defendant is voluntarily absent under 
section 1043(b)(2).  A defendant’s absence from trial due to drug 
use is not per se voluntary for purposes of section 1043(b)(2).  
Rather, it is among the relevant circumstances that a trial court 
must consider when it decides whether a defendant has 
voluntarily absented himself or herself from trial.  To the extent 
the trial court’s ruling or the Court of Appeal’s decision suggests 
that a defendant who ingests illicit drugs and subsequently 
seeks medical attention is voluntarily absent as a matter of law, 
we disagree with this proposition.   
Nevertheless, we hold that substantial evidence supports 
the trial court’s finding of voluntary absence under the 
circumstances.  In Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 
995–996, we explained that when an appellate court reviews a 
finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing 
evidence, an intermediate standard of proof, the reviewing court 
evaluates “whether the record as a whole contains substantial 
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found 
it highly probable that the fact was true.”  Assuming without 
deciding that we employ this heightened review to the trial 
court’s determination that defendant’s voluntary absence was 
clearly established, we conclude that the record as a whole 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact 
finder could have found it highly probable that defendant was 
voluntarily absent.  Because the Court of Appeal upheld the trial 
court’s determination that defendant had voluntarily absented 
himself from trial under section 1043(b)(2), we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant was charged with first degree residential 
burglary.  (§ 459.)  He pleaded not guilty to the charge and a jury 
trial was set for April 12, 2017, but he failed to appear on that 
date.  Defense counsel informed the court that defendant’s 
mother had called his office and notified him that defendant was 
ill.  The trial court vacated the jury trial and ordered defendant 
to appear for trial setting the next day.  It also issued a bench 
warrant but stayed execution of the warrant until the following 
day.  On April 13, after the trial court received a doctor’s note 
regarding defendant’s prior illness, it rescheduled trial for 
July 5, 2017. 
 
Defendant was present with counsel at the start of trial on 
July 5, at which time the jury was selected and sworn in.  
Following preliminary instructions to the jury, the trial court 
released the jurors for the day and ordered them to return the 
next day at 8:30 a.m.  Defendant was released on his previously 
sworn promise to appear.   
On the morning of July 6, defendant failed to appear in 
court.  At 9:30 a.m., outside the presence of the jury, the court 
called the matter with the prosecutor, defense counsel, and 
Sonora Police Officer John Bowly present to recap an earlier in 
camera discussion regarding defendant’s absence.  The court 
summarized:   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
“THE COURT:  It appears this morning [defendant] 
injected or ingested heroin and methamphetamine — at least 
the report to the Court indicated he overdosed and medical 
personnel were sent to his home. . . .  [T]he first alert to this 
condition was given to [defense counsel] by [defendant’s] 
mother, and [defense counsel] then notified [the prosecutor] by 
e-mail of a problem.  When . . . counsel arrived today to court, 
I had been in chambers.  We discussed the situation.  
My understanding was that — again, that emergency personnel 
were at the scene and examined [defendant,] who refused 
medical treatment.   
“It’s my understanding that Officer Norris, who was 
present at the scene, had observed the defendant at the time 
medical treatment was refused.  The Court had Officer Bowly 
contact Officer Norris to explain the situation, and . . . I asked 
Officer Norris to go to the defendant’s home and advise him that 
we were expecting him to show up for trial.  And the first 
response from the defendant was that he would be here — he 
will be here for trial.  And I advised him that if he failed to 
appear in 15 minutes, which is a reasonable time to arrive in 
court given the distance of his home from the courthouse, that 
I would proceed to try him in his absence.  [Defense counsel] . . . 
then asked if he was going to go to the hospital, and the 
defendant then claimed he wanted to go to the hospital.  And at 
that point I don’t know if he’s gone to the hospital or not.” 
Defense counsel then received a call from defendant’s 
mother, and reported that she stated she was with defendant at 
the emergency room waiting to see a physician.  The following 
colloquy occurred:   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
“THE COURT:  All right.  It’s also my understanding . . . 
that this is the second time that [defendant] has been sick on 
the day of trial.  The first time, which I believe was back in April 
when this case was set for trial, on the day of trial he requested 
his mother report to the Court that he was sick with the flu.  
Court continued his trial and issued a bench warrant and 
ordered him to appear the next day.  The next day his mother 
appeared, not the defendant, and she had a note from a doctor 
that said he was seen at the Sonora Regional Medical Center.[2]  
[¶]  Any other facts, [c]ounsel, that should be on the record 
regarding this incident?   
“[Prosecutor]:  Yes, your Honor. . . .  The Court mentioned 
in the beginning that the information was he had ingested drugs 
this morning.  I think that the information was the mom 
believed he had gone out with another individual.  She thinks 
he came back home around 2:00 a.m.  It was my understanding 
that he ingested it sometime in the night.   
“I received a text message from Officer Bowly . . . at 
7:00 a.m. in the morning indicating that at 7:00 a.m. [the] 
Sonora Police Department had responded to [defendant’s] home 
 
2  
The minute order indicates that defendant failed to 
appear in court on April 12, 2017, but was present in court on 
April 13.  However, in its recitation of facts concerning 
defendant’s second absence from trial on July 6, the trial court 
stated twice that defendant’s mother, and not defendant, was 
present in court on April 13.  Neither the prosecutor nor defense 
counsel voiced that the court was mistaken or otherwise 
indicated that defendant had personally appeared on April 13.  
In any event, it is undisputed that defendant did not appear on 
April 12, the date when his trial was initially set, and the trial 
court did not assign significant weight to defendant’s asserted 
presence (or failure to appear) in court the following day.  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
for the mother reporting that there was a potential overdose on 
heroin.  When the officers arrived medical was there, and at 
7:24 a.m. I got a message that the defendant declined medical 
attention and refused to go in an ambulance to the hospital.  
That was 7:24 a.m.  Our court hearing today was at 8:30 a.m.  
He did not show up at 8:30.   
“When we met with the judge and the phone call was 
placed and Officer Norris responded back to the house, it was at 
. . . approximately 9:25.  The defendant originally indicated over 
the phone — which we can all hear Officer Norris, that he was 
going to come at about 9:30 this morning.  When the Court 
indicated that Officer Norris should give him a ride, he was then 
asked if he was going to the hospital.  At that point, he switched, 
instead of coming to court, that he would rather go to the 
hospital. 
“Apparently, he is waiting to see the doctor.  It doesn’t 
appear that he’s not conscious.  We also have information that 
he appeared to Officer Norris to be coherent when answering the 
questions to medical.  He was able to walk unassisted.  He was 
conscious and apparently still appears to be that way.   
“As the Court mentioned, this is the second time, I believe, 
the defendant is voluntarily trying to avoid the process of the 
Court.  
“Those [are] additional facts I wanted to put on the record, 
he declined medical and then chooses to go to the hospital 
some — now almost getting to way over an hour after when he 
was suppose[d] to be here and two hours after medical first 
contacted him. 
“THE COURT:  [Defense counsel], would you like to put 
any other facts on the record? 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
“[Defense counsel]:  Yes, your Honor.  When we spoke to 
Officer Norris, Officer Norris clearly indicated that defendant 
was . . . under the influence of drugs.  [¶]  In speaking to the 
mother, she said that [defendant] was nodding out and being 
conscious and nonresponsive, and she said she was going to try 
to take him to the hospital.  Then on the last call [defendant’s 
mother] said she was taking him out to the car to take him to 
the hospital.  This latest phone call says that she was successful 
in getting him to the car.   
“[Defendant] is 19 years old.  He does have some learning 
disabilities.  So a lot of things he says on the phone, your Honor, 
cannot be taken at face value.  [¶]  And also if [defendant is] 
under the influence of drugs, I think he is likely to say anything 
to the policeman that was at his home.  Therefore, I will suggest 
we continue the case until tomorrow 8:30 or declare a mistrial. 
“[Prosecutor]:  And, your Honor, I have plans to be out of 
town tomorrow afternoon that have been in place for some time 
now. 
“THE COURT:  All right. . . .  [Section 1043(b)(2)] . . . 
provides that the absence of a defendant in a criminal felony 
case shouldn’t prevent the . . . continuing with the trial that’s 
already been commenced, the record will reflect [defendant] was 
present during jury selection process and when the jury was 
sworn.  And so, again, his absence should not necessarily 
prevent the continuance of the trial all the way through verdict 
if the defendant is voluntarily absent from trial. 
“So the issue before the Court is whether or not 
[defendant] is voluntarily absent from the trial.  And clearly the 
obvious cases — some case law supports this where the 
defendant escapes or absents himself from the trial or when 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
there is disruptive behavior, and the defendant is warned he will 
be removed from the courtroom because of disruptive behavior. 
“But I think it’s clear that in any case, criminal or civil, 
the law doesn’t allow him to take advantage of his own 
wrongdoing to delay the process of the court.  [Defendant] 
voluntarily ingested controlled substances to the extent that it 
required emergency response by police and emergency medical 
care, emergency medical personnel.  Apparently, he was not as 
seriously — in such a serious condition that he cannot refuse 
treatment and which he in fact did.  And it was only when he 
was asked if he was going to the hospital after I advised him to 
be in court in 15 minutes, that Officer Norris will give him a 
ride, that he decides to go to the hospital. 
“This is the second time on the day of trial or the first time 
on the day of trial before it commenced that he — his mother, 
again, reported that he had a medical condition, specifically the 
flu, I believe, and he could not be present; he was vomiting and 
could not be present.  It wasn’t until the next day she came in 
with a doctor’s note that he was in fact seen at the hospital.  We 
have no idea of the nature of his condition or what he was seen 
for or what the diagnosis was, just that he went to the hospital 
the next day. 
“In this case the trial commenced.  We get a call in the 
morning of the trial or the Court was advised the morning of the 
trial that he has engaged in some conduct voluntarily which 
made it — prevented him from attending the trial.  Given these 
circumstances, I think [defendant] voluntarily engaged in 
conduct that resulted in him being absent from his own trial, 
and I am going to proceed with this trial in his absence, and 
[defense counsel’s] request for a mistrial is denied, request for a 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
continuance is denied, but I think there’s an adequate record 
here to preserve any issues that might arise on appeal. 
“Anything else, Counsel? 
“[Prosecutor]:  No, your Honor, thank you. 
“[Defense counsel]:  Just one, he may have voluntarily 
used some drugs.  I think the court is making a big assumption 
that he continued to voluntarily use drugs to the extent that he 
needed medical treatment.  That portion we really don’t know. 
“[Prosecutor]:  Well, except that he did not go.  The initial 
call for medical came at 7:00 a.m.  They responded.  He refused 
medical.  He was conscious and coherent, according to Officer 
Norris.  [¶]  It’s now at 9:25 when he is told he needed to be in 
court or the judge was going to continue with the trial, did he 
then decide he wanted to go to the hospital some two and a half 
hours after the first call for medical. 
“THE COURT:  All right.  There’s no evidence that 
somebody forcibly injected or caused [defendant] to consume 
controlled substances — to use controlled substances to put him 
in the condition he was in this morning when his mother made 
the phone call to [defense counsel’s] office . . . .  His voluntary 
use — intentional use of controlled substances is a voluntary act 
which caused this circumstance.  And I consider that an 
intentional act which caused him to be absent from the court.  
I think he waived his right to be present at his trial based on 
these circumstances, and we will proceed with the trial.”   
The court then directed defense counsel to contact 
defendant’s mother to inform her the court planned to proceed 
with the trial without defendant.  Defense counsel confirmed 
that he had notified defendant’s mother as instructed, and 
proceedings resumed in front of the jury at 9:55 a.m.  The court 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
informed the jurors that trial would be proceeding in 
defendant’s absence and instructed them not to consider the 
reason for his absence or the fact that he was absent for part of 
the trial in their deliberations. 
The prosecution rested its case at approximately 
11:00 a.m., following testimony from its two witnesses.  Defense 
counsel stated that he had no witness “at this time.”  The trial 
court then called the attorneys for a sidebar conversation and 
told defense counsel that it was willing to take a recess if the 
defense wanted to bring defendant’s mother to court.  Defense 
counsel replied, “My thinking was to move things along.”  He 
suggested, “We can break, go over jury instructions, come back 
at 1:15 or 1:30, and then if they’re not here, then I will rest and 
then we will do closing.”  He also advised the court that he had 
asked defendant’s mother to bring defendant to the courtroom if 
they were done at the hospital.  The court released the jury until 
1:15 p.m.     
The trial court discussed the proposed jury instructions 
with counsel during the break in proceedings.  The court 
indicated that it would refrain from giving certain jury 
instructions until defense counsel confirmed whether defendant 
or his mother would testify in the afternoon.  The prosecutor 
then inquired whether defense counsel had heard from 
defendant.  Defense counsel responded that he had “been 
texting” with defendant’s mother and kept her updated about 
the proceedings.  According to defense counsel, defendant’s 
mother indicated that she was not sure whether defendant could 
return to court at 1:30 p.m. to testify, but that they would 
“definitely try.”  The court asked defense counsel to inform the 
prosecutor once he received confirmation regarding whether 
defendant would testify.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
Just before 2:00 p.m., defense counsel renewed his motion 
for a mistrial on the ground that defendant had gone to the 
emergency room that morning and was still not present.  The 
court denied the renewed motion without further comment.  The 
court then asked defense counsel whether defendant was still in 
the hospital.  Defense counsel confirmed that defendant was not 
in the hospital, adding, “I think he went back home with mom.”  
The court inquired whether that information was reflected in a 
text message from defendant’s mother, and defense counsel 
responded that it was.  The court subsequently noted on the 
record that defendant was no longer in the hospital and that it 
had given defendant an opportunity to appear at trial and put 
on any testimony or defense that he may have had.  Defense 
counsel noted that defendant’s mother had told him defendant 
was “in no state to come to court and take the witness stand,” 
adding, “whatever that means.”  The defense then rested 
without presenting any witnesses.  Following court instructions 
and closing arguments, the jury began deliberating.  The jury 
was released for the evening and ordered to reappear the 
following day.   
 
On July 7, the jury resumed deliberations and the court 
reconvened to address jury questions.  Defendant was present 
in court after the morning session began.  The jury found 
defendant not guilty of first degree residential burglary but 
found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted first 
degree burglary.   
Following the jury’s verdict, the prosecutor requested that 
defendant be remanded into custody prior to sentencing based 
on his prior serious felony conviction and multiple court 
absences.  Defense counsel objected, stating:  “Aside from last 
April when he had the stomach flu, [defendant] has made all 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
court appearances except for yesterday, which might have been 
a moment of panic.”     
The trial court ordered defendant to be remanded to the 
custody of the sheriff until sentencing.  It explained:  
“[Defendant’s] prior failure to appear from illness, the Court 
accommodated.  [The] Court established a record in this case as 
to why it continued in defendant’s absence.  He voluntarily 
ingested controlled substances too, which is voluntary conduct 
that caused him to absen[t] himself from this trial, whether he’s 
able to be here or not, he could have appeared yesterday because 
he was home according to the text message you received . . . and 
could have been in court.  In any event, I think his conduct 
suggests he may not appear.”   
At the sentencing hearing approximately three weeks 
later, the court sentenced defendant to five months in jail, 
suspended imposition of the sentence, and placed defendant on 
probation for five years.  As a condition of probation, defendant 
was required to complete a residential drug treatment program.   
Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial 
court violated his constitutional rights by finding him 
voluntarily absent and proceeding with trial in his absence.  
A divided Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an 
unpublished decision.  The majority held that the record at the 
time of the trial court’s ruling clearly supported its implied 
findings that defendant was aware of the processes taking place 
and knew he had a right and obligation to be present, as well as 
the court’s express finding that defendant voluntarily absented 
himself from trial.  The majority found defendant’s claim that 
the trial court should have granted his request for a one-day 
continuance to be “a much closer question,” but declined to 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
address the question on the merits by assuming error but 
finding it harmless.  (People v. Ramirez, supra, F076126.) 
The dissenting justice perceived the trial court as having 
misapplied the applicable law in finding that defendant was 
voluntarily absent from trial, and further concluded that, 
without an evidentiary hearing, the record was insufficient for 
the trial court to find that defendant intended to waive his 
fundamental constitutional right to be present at trial.  The 
dissenting justice also regarded the trial court’s rejection of the 
defense request for an overnight continuance as prejudicial 
error.   
We granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeal 
erred in affirming the trial court’s finding that defendant was 
voluntarily absent on the second day of trial. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial is 
protected under both the federal and state Constitutions.  (U.S. 
Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; People v. 
Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 72 (Espinoza).)  Yet that right is 
not absolute; it may be expressly or impliedly waived.  
(Espinoza, at p. 72.)  As the United States Supreme Court 
explained more than a century ago, “[W]here the offense is not 
capital and the accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has 
been, that if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he 
voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what has been 
done or prevent the completion of trial, but, on the contrary, 
operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the 
court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like 
effect as if he were present.”  (Diaz v. United States (1912) 
223 U.S. 442, 455.)  California has codified this rule as section 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
1043(b)(2).  (Espinoza, at p. 72, citing People v. Gutierrez (2003) 
29 Cal.4th 1196, 1204 (Gutierrez).) 
“ ‘In determining whether a defendant is absent 
voluntarily, a court must look at the “totality of the facts.” ’ ”  
(Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 72.)  We have often cited the 
high court’s decision in Taylor v. United States (1973) 414 
U.S. 17 (Taylor) as instructive when evaluating whether, under 
section 1043(b)(2), a defendant is voluntarily absent after trial 
has commenced.  (Espinoza, at p. 73; People v. Concepcion (2008) 
45 Cal.4th 77, 84 (Concepcion); Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 1204.)  In Taylor, the court confirmed that “ ‘[i]f a defendant 
at liberty remains away during his trial the court may proceed 
provided it is clearly established that his absence is voluntary.  
He must be aware of the processes taking place, of his right and 
of his obligation to be present, and he must have no sound 
reason for staying away.’ ”  (Taylor, at pp. 19–20, fn. 3, quoting 
Cureton v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1968) 396 F.2d 671, 676.)  We have 
affirmed that a trial court must adhere to Taylor’s three-part 
test when evaluating whether a defendant is voluntarily absent 
under section 1043(b)(2).  (Espinoza, at p. 74.)   
We have previously recognized that “[t]he role of an 
appellate court in reviewing a finding of voluntary absence is a 
limited one.  Review is restricted to determining whether the 
finding is supported by substantial evidence.”  (Espinoza, supra, 
1 Cal.5th at p. 74, citing Concepcion, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 84.)  
But we have not yet had occasion to explore how the substantial 
evidence standard of review applies in the context of a trial 
court’s factual finding that must be “ ‘clearly established.’ ”  
(Taylor, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 19, fn. 3.)   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
Our trial courts typically apply one of three standards of 
proof depending on the particular determination of fact:  the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, the “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard, or the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard.  (See Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at p. 998.)  The preponderance of the evidence standard, the 
lowest standard of proof, “ ‘ “simply requires the trier of fact ‘to 
believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  The clear and convincing evidence 
standard, the intermediate standard, “ ‘requires a finding of 
high probability’ ” that a fact is true.  (Ibid.)  The beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, the most rigorous standard of proof, 
applies to findings of guilt in criminal matters and requires the 
trier of fact to hold “an abiding conviction that the charge is 
true” although it “need not eliminate all possible doubt.”  
(CALCRIM No. 220; see Conservatorship of O.B., at p. 998, 
quoting § 1096.)  
The parties did not brief the question of what standard of 
proof applies when a trial court determines it is “clearly 
established” a defendant has voluntarily absented himself from 
trial.3  We note that Taylor’s “clearly established” requirement 
could arguably convey a heightened standard of proof designed 
to protect a defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to be 
present, which might suggest the intermediate clear and 
convincing standard.  (See Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 1209 [explaining that a defendant’s right to presence is 
 
3  
When asked at oral argument what the “clearly 
established” standard requires, the parties provided slightly 
different interpretations but agreed that the standard was no 
more stringent than the “clear and convincing evidence” 
standard. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
fundamental in our system of justice and guaranteed by our 
Constitution]; Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 999 [clear and convincing standard “applies to various 
determinations ‘ “where particularly important individual 
interests or rights are at stake” ’ ”].)  Nevertheless, we need not 
decide this issue.  Assuming for our limited purposes that the 
trial court’s finding of a clearly established voluntary absence 
was akin to a finding by clear and convincing evidence, that 
finding is supported even reviewing it under this more 
demanding standard applicable to such findings.4 
In Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th 989, we 
clarified how an appellate court is to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence associated with a finding made by the trier of fact 
pursuant to the clear and convincing standard.  Explaining that 
“appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of 
a finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for 
the level of confidence this standard demands” (id. at p. 995), we 
 
4  
The dissenting opinion would prefer to address what 
standard of proof must be met to “clearly establish” that a 
defendant’s absence is voluntary, despite neither party having 
briefed the issue, because “[n]either party here questions that 
‘clearly established’ means something more than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
pp. 3–4.)  We are not prepared to agree with this assumption in 
light of the parties’ statements at oral argument described ante, 
footnote 3, and the holdings of numerous courts to the contrary.  
(See, e.g., State v. Moore (Iowa 1979) 276 N.W.2d 437, 440 
[voluntary absence must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence]; State v. Lister (N.H. 1979) 406 A.2d 967, 969 [same]; 
People v. Anderson (N.Y.App.Div. 2003) 762 N.Y.S.2d 551, 551 
[same]; Dorsey v. State (Md.Ct.App. 1998) 709 A.2d 1244, 1253 
[same]; Commonwealth v. Carusone (Pa.Super. 1986) 506 A.2d 
475, 478 [same].)      
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
concluded that “when reviewing a finding that a fact has been 
proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the 
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains 
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could 
have found it highly probable that the fact was true” (id. at 
pp. 995–996).   
Thus, assuming the clear and convincing evidence 
standard of proof applies to the trial court’s voluntary absence 
determination, the question on review is whether the record as 
a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable 
fact finder could have found it highly probable that defendant’s 
absence was voluntary.  Put differently, we review the entire 
record to determine whether there is substantial evidence from 
which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly 
probable that defendant was “ ‘ “aware of the processes taking 
place,’ ” that he knew of ‘ “his right and of his obligation to be 
present,” ’ and that he had ‘ “no sound reason for remaining 
away.” ’ ”  (Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 74, quoting Taylor, 
supra, 414 U.S. at p. 19, fn. 3.)  We apply this standard of review 
to the present case, keeping in mind that an appellate court 
“must view the record in the light most favorable to the [trier of 
fact’s finding] and give due deference to how the trier of fact may 
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in 
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the 
evidence.”  (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 996.)   
We conclude that the record as a whole contains 
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could 
have found it highly probable that defendant was voluntarily 
absent.  Having been present in court on the first day of trial 
and been ordered by the court to return the following day, it is 
obvious that defendant was aware of the processes taking place 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
and knew of his right and obligation to be present the next day.  
(See Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 74.)  Defendant does not 
dispute this.  The only question, then, is whether defendant had 
no sound reason for remaining away.   
Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 
finding of voluntary absence and giving due deference to how 
the court may have evaluated the credibility of those present at 
defendant’s home, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn 
reasonable inferences from the evidence, the record supports the 
trial court’s implicit determination that defendant had no sound 
basis for failing to appear on the second day of trial.  After 
learning that defendant was not present in court and had 
ingested illicit drugs to the extent that it prompted an 
emergency response, the trial court sent an officer to defendant’s 
home to confirm his condition and to arrange for defendant to 
come to court.  In making its voluntary absence ruling, the court 
emphasized that defendant was sufficiently lucid to assess 
whether he needed medical treatment, which he initially 
refused.5  The court pointed out that it was only after it advised 
 
5  
As the prosecutor emphasized at the time of the voluntary 
absence 
ruling, 
emergency 
medical 
services 
personnel 
dispatched to defendant’s home accepted defendant’s refusal of 
medical treatment.  We take judicial notice on our own motion 
of Tuolumne County Emergency Medical Services Agency’s 
policy regarding patient refusal of emergency medical services, 
which provides that a patient may refuse emergency care only if 
emergency medical services personnel determines that the 
patient is “competent,” meaning “a patient who is alert and 
oriented with the capacity to understand the circumstances 
surrounding their illness or impairment and the risks associated 
with refusing treatment or transport.”  (Tuolumne County 
Emergency Medical Services Agency, Patient Refusal of 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
defendant to be in court in 15 minutes that defendant decided to 
go to the hospital.  The court also noted that this was the second 
time that defendant had failed to appear on the day of trial, and 
although defendant’s mother had reported on the trial date 
scheduled in April that defendant was ill with the flu, the court 
had “no idea of the nature of his condition or what he was seen 
for or what the diagnosis was.”  Defense counsel did not 
contradict these observations even after the court invited him to 
add to the record.    
Indeed, to the extent we may consider information provided 
to the trial court after it found defendant to be voluntarily 
absent, we note that no subsequent evidence undermined the 
court’s determination.  (Cf. Concepcion, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 85, citing People v. Connolly (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 379, 384–
385 [noting that “defendant did not move for reconsideration of 
the determination of voluntary absence, and he did not seek to 
bring to the trial court’s attention any new evidence that 
purportedly 
undermined 
that 
determination”].)  At 
approximately 11:00 a.m., after the prosecution put on its 
witnesses, the court and counsel agreed to a recess of more than 
two hours in order to give defendant a chance to appear and 
 
Treatment or Transport Against Medical Advice AMA 
 [as of November 30, 2022].  All internet 
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number, 
and case name at .)  Although 
the policy is not of substantial consequence to the determination 
of this action (see Evid. Code, § 459), it provides useful context 
regarding the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s refusal 
to accept medical treatment in making its voluntary absence 
finding.   
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
testify, and defense counsel informed defendant’s mother of this 
plan.  Yet defendant and his mother returned home instead of 
coming to court that afternoon.  It appears that defendant 
himself never contacted his counsel or the court at all during the 
entire day to update them regarding his condition — the court 
received only uncorroborated information from defendant’s 
mother via defense counsel.  And when defendant was present 
at court the following day, he offered no additional information 
regarding the hospital visit, such as the seriousness of his 
condition, when he was discharged, and why he could not attend 
court the previous afternoon.  Nor did defendant move for 
reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling.  (Concepcion, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at pp. 84–85 [“We reject defendant’s contention that 
the trial court had a sua sponte duty to reconsider its ruling once 
he was recaptured.  It was up to defendant to move for 
reconsideration, which he failed to do.  Even now he has failed 
to identify any new information that would have tended to 
undermine the trial court’s determination of voluntary 
absence.”].)  Finally, in opposing the prosecution’s request to 
remand 
defendant 
for 
sentencing, 
defense 
counsel 
acknowledged that defendant’s absence on the second day of 
trial “might have been a moment of panic.” 
Defendant asserts the trial court erroneously found that he 
was voluntarily absent merely because the absence was “self-
induced” based on his drug use.  As a general proposition, we 
agree with defendant that a defendant who ingests illicit drugs 
and subsequently requires medical assistance after trial has 
commenced has not, invariably, voluntarily absented himself or 
herself.  We reaffirm that “[i]n determining whether a defendant 
is absent voluntarily, a court must look at the ‘totality of the 
facts.’ ”  (Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1205; see Espinoza, 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 72.)  And it is true that the trial court here 
did at times place heavy reliance on defendant’s drug use.  But 
the record as a whole demonstrates that the trial court did 
consider all of the information available and made a factual 
finding that, notwithstanding the effects of his drug use, 
defendant could have come to court and voluntarily chose not to 
do so.  Substantial evidence supports that finding. 
From the court’s references to defendant’s only partly 
explained absence from court at the first trial date in April, his 
initial refusal to receive medical attention after medical 
personnel were dispatched to his home on the morning of July 6, 
and his decision to go to the hospital only after the court advised 
him to be in court in 15 minutes, we understand the court to 
have 
been 
unconvinced 
that 
defendant, 
especially 
by 
9:30 a.m. — more than two hours after medical personnel had 
been dispatched to defendant’s home — was truly debilitated 
and unable to come to court.  That disbelief seems to have played 
an important part in the court’s determination that defendant 
was voluntarily absent.  The circumstance that defendant’s 
condition, whatever it was, stemmed from voluntary drug use 
certainly also played a significant role.  But the record does not 
support defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s finding 
as resting on an asserted rule that an absence stemming from 
drug use is per se voluntary.  Indeed if this were so, the court’s 
inquiries to and colloquies with counsel, its unsuccessful 
advisement to defendant that he be in court in 15 minutes, and 
its later spontaneous willingness to recess for nearly three hours 
after the prosecution rested its case would likely not have 
occurred.  Rather, the record as a whole reflects that the trial 
court tried to ascertain whether defendant was absent 
voluntarily.  Put differently, the trial court does appear to have 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
considered all the circumstances shown by the evidence before 
it, even though it placed substantial emphasis on the apparently 
intentional nature of defendant’s drug use. 
In sum, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
trial court’s finding, we conclude that substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s ruling that defendant was voluntarily 
absent.  Our review of the record as a whole reveals substantial 
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found 
it highly probable that defendant was aware of the processes 
taking place, of his right and obligation to be present, and that 
he had no sound reason for staying away.6  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Court of Appeal did not err when it affirmed 
the trial court’s finding that defendant was voluntarily absent.7 
 
 
 
6  
To the extent the dissent suggests that additional 
information might have cast a different light on defendant’s 
absence, the responsibility to present such evidence lay with 
defense counsel.  
7  
Defendant’s petition for review did not adequately raise 
the additional question of whether the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion for a 
continuance.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(1); Scottsdale 
Ins. Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 654, fn. 2.)  
Even if the secondary issue were adequately raised, we are not 
compelled to address it and decline to do so here.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.516(b)(3) [“court need not decide every issue the 
parties raise”]; Coast Community College Dist. v. Commission on 
State Mandates (2022) 13 Cal.5th 800, 814, fn. 4.)  
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
S262010 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Defendant Marcos Antonio Ramirez was 19 years old and 
had been using heroin for almost a year when he overdosed on 
the night before the presentation of evidence was scheduled to 
begin in his burglary trial.  Police and medical personnel were 
dispatched to his home in the morning.  After initially declining 
medical treatment and telling an officer he would make it to 
court, Ramirez instead decided to go to the hospital and received 
care at the emergency room. 
The trial court concluded that Ramirez was voluntarily 
absent from trial that day.  Observing that “Ramirez voluntarily 
engaged in conduct that resulted in him being absent from his 
own trial,” the court decided it would “proceed with this trial in 
his absence,” and it denied defense counsel’s request for a 
one-day continuance so that Ramirez could be present.  The 
presentation of evidence began and ended that day without 
Ramirez, and the jury convicted him of attempted burglary the 
next day. 
A criminal defendant has a right to be present at his own 
trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  These rights are waived by a defendant’s 
absence only if “ ‘it is clearly established that his absence is 
voluntary.’ ”  (Taylor v. United States (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19, 
fn. 3 (Taylor).)  Even if a court finds a defendant voluntarily 
absent, it must grant a continuance of trial to allow the 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
2 
defendant to return unless “ ‘the public interest clearly 
outweighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant.’ ”  (U.S. v. 
Latham (1st Cir. 1989) 874 F.2d 852, 857.)  To weigh those 
interests, the court should assess “ ‘the likelihood that the trial 
could soon take place with the defendant present,’ ” “ ‘the 
difficulty of rescheduling,’ ” and “ ‘the burden on the 
Government.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting U.S. v. Tortora (2d Cir. 1972) 464 
F.2d 1202, 1210 (Tortora).) 
I agree with today’s opinion that the trial court should not 
have found that Ramirez’s voluntary drug use necessarily 
rendered him voluntarily absent from trial.  But I cannot agree 
that the sparse record before us contains sufficient evidence by 
which the trial court could have found it clearly established that 
Ramirez voluntarily absented himself from trial under the 
correct standard.  Nor can I agree that Ramirez has forfeited his 
challenge to the denial of his motion for a one-day continuance.  
Ramirez raised that argument in the trial court, in the Court of 
Appeal, and in his petition and briefing before us, and the 
Attorney General has never disputed that Ramirez properly 
preserved the issue for our review.  Because the trial court erred 
by finding Ramirez’s absence voluntary and by denying the 
continuance request, and because holding trial in Ramirez’s 
absence was prejudicial, I would reverse the judgment. 
I. 
I agree with today’s opinion that a defendant’s voluntary 
ingestion of drugs and subsequent absence from trial as a result 
of that drug use are alone insufficient to establish that the 
defendant voluntarily waived the right to be present at trial.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20‒21; see also People v. Bell (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 70, 114 [a defendant’s waiver of the right to be present 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
3 
must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”].)  I do not agree, 
however, that the record before us contains substantial evidence 
by which the trial court reasonably could have found such a 
waiver. 
“There can be no waiver of a constitutional right absent 
‘an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’ ”  
(People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 497.)  Courts must 
“ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of 
fundamental constitutional rights.”  (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 
304 U.S. 458, 464.)  In certain circumstances, defendants may 
impliedly waive their rights to be present at trial by voluntarily 
absenting themselves.  (People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
77, 82–83.)  We look to a defendant’s “purpose in failing to 
appear” to determine whether an absence constitutes a 
voluntary waiver.  (People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 74 
(Espinoza).)  For a court to find that a defendant has waived the 
right to be present, “ ‘it [must be] clearly established that his 
absence is voluntary.’ ”  (Taylor, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 19, fn. 3.) 
Today’s opinion does not address what standard of proof 
must be met for the voluntariness of a defendant’s absence to be 
“clearly established.”  (Taylor, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 19, fn. 3.)  
Instead, it declines to opine on the question given the parties’ 
statements at oral argument and “the holdings of numerous 
courts” that voluntary absence must be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16, fn. 4.) 
I see no reason to avoid the question.  Future courts 
deciding whether to proceed in a defendant’s absence would 
benefit from our guidance, and there seems to be little dispute 
about the standard.  Neither party here questions that “clearly 
established” means something more than proof by a 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
4 
preponderance of the evidence, and no one claims it requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Ramirez’s counsel suggested 
during oral argument that voluntariness must be “clearly and 
affirmatively demonstrated.”  The Attorney General agreed that 
the standard is “something more akin to clear and convincing 
[evidence],” and not merely that “the standard was no more 
stringent than the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 15, fn. 3).  As for the out-of-state cases 
applying a preponderance of the evidence standard (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 16, fn. 4), none of them appear in the briefing before 
us, and none discuss the requirement stated in Taylor that the 
voluntariness of a defendant’s absence be “clearly established.”  
(Taylor, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 19, fn. 3.) 
Proof by clear and convincing evidence “ ‘requires a finding 
of high probability.’ ”  (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 
989, 998.)  The evidence before the factfinder must be “ ‘ “ ‘so 
clear as to leave no substantial doubt’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘ “ ‘sufficiently 
strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable 
mind.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 998, fn. 2.)  We recently concluded that “an 
appellate court evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in 
support of a finding must make an appropriate adjustment to its 
analysis when the clear and convincing standard of proof 
applied before the trial court.”  (Id. at p. 1005.)  On appeal, we 
“must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, 
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded 
by this standard of proof.”  (Ibid.)  “Substantial evidence is 
evidence that is ‘of ponderable legal significance,’ ‘reasonable in 
nature, credible, and of solid value,’ and ‘ “substantial” proof of 
the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 1006.) 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
5 
The record in this case does not contain substantial 
evidence by which the court could have found it highly probable 
that Ramirez overdosed and went to the hospital for the purpose 
of avoiding his trial.  As Justice Smith explained in his dissent 
from the Court of Appeal’s decision, “[t]here was no evidence 
before the trial court as to why, for what purpose, and under 
what circumstances, Ramirez ingested the drugs.  Ramirez 
could very well have taken the drugs to calm himself or to fortify 
himself, so as to enable him to attend the proceedings, rather 
than in a bid to avoid the trial . . . .”  Justice Smith was correct 
to observe that because the trial court “did not consider the 
question whether, in ingesting the drugs, Ramirez had intended 
to waive his constitutional rights to be present at trial and to 
testify in his own defense,” and because it did not “hold[] a 
hearing to further develop the record,” it “simply did not have 
sufficient information to determine whether Ramirez took the 
drugs to thwart the judicial proceedings that were underway, 
thereby waiving his right to be present, or whether he took the 
drugs for other reasons.”  (People v. Ramirez (Mar. 5, 2020, 
F076126) (dis. opn. of Smith, J.) [nonpub. opn.].)   
The trial court was aware that Ramirez’s mother had 
called police and medical services that morning to report her 
son’s overdose.  The court emphasized in its ruling that Ramirez 
refused treatment offered by the medical responders.  However, 
as Justice Smith noted, it is unclear  “whether Ramirez refused 
all forms of assistance from paramedics or merely refused 
transport to the hospital by ambulance.”  The court also had no 
information about “what, and how much, assistance the 
paramedics actually rendered.”  To the extent today’s opinion 
relies on the Tuolumne County Emergency Medical Services 
Agency’s policy on a patient’s refusal of treatment or transport 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
6 
(maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18‒19, fn. 5), I note that neither party 
cites that policy and the record contains no indication that any 
such policy was followed here. 
The trial court instructed an officer at the scene to inform 
Ramirez that the trial would proceed without him if he was not 
at court in fifteen minutes.  Ramirez’s initial response was that 
he would come.  His counsel then asked him over the phone if he 
was going to go to the hospital, and he said he wanted to go.  
Shortly after that conversation, his mother called defense 
counsel to let him know that Ramirez “was nodding out and 
being [un]conscious and nonresponsive,” and that “she was 
going to try to take him to the hospital.”  Ramirez was 19 years 
old, had learning disabilities, and was in the midst of a heroin 
overdose.  The court had no information that indicated whether 
Ramirez understood the officer’s warning that he needed to 
come to court or whether he was well enough to follow through 
on his initial agreement to do so. 
Finally, the court noted that Ramirez had missed a day of 
trial once before.  Several months earlier, when the case was 
initially set for trial, Ramirez’s mother reported to the court that 
he could not make the first day of trial because he was sick with 
the flu.  The court continued the trial, and Ramirez’s mother 
came the next day with a note from a doctor that said he had 
been seen at a local medical center.  There was no evidence to 
discredit the mother’s report; the record provides no information 
from which the trial court reasonably could have concluded that 
Ramirez was absent in April because he sought to evade the 
proceedings rather than because he simply had the flu. 
The totality of the evidence considered by the trial court is 
not sufficient to support a finding that it was clearly established 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
7 
Ramirez voluntarily waived his right to be present when he 
went to the hospital to be treated for an overdose.  As today’s 
opinion acknowledges, if Ramirez went to the hospital instead 
of court because he “was truly debilitated” (maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 21), then he was not voluntarily absent, and his trial could 
not lawfully proceed without him.  To find him voluntarily 
absent under the proper legal standard, the court would have to 
have been persuaded that Ramirez was malingering.  It would 
have to have concluded that Ramirez did not need hospital 
treatment and knew as much, but that he chose to go with his 
mother anyway for the purpose of evading that day’s 
proceedings.  The thin record before us does not contain 
“ ‘ “substantial” proof’ ” that it was “ ‘highly probable’ ” Ramirez 
sought medical care in an effort to avoid his trial.  
(Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1006, 998, 
italics omitted.)  Finding Ramirez voluntarily absent was error. 
II. 
Even if the court were right to affirm the finding of 
voluntary waiver, that would not “end our inquiry regarding the 
propriety of the trial court’s decision to proceed with the trial” 
in his absence.  (Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 75.)  “[T]he 
decision whether to continue with a trial in absentia . . . rests 
within the discretion of the trial court” and is subject to review 
for abuse of discretion.  (Ibid.)  Before deciding to try a defendant 
in absentia, “[t]he court must consider the likelihood that the 
trial could take place with the defendant present, the difficulty 
of rescheduling, the inconvenience to jurors, and the burden on 
the government and others.”  (U.S. v. Benabe (7th Cir. 2011) 654 
F.3d 753, 769.)  A trial court “may exercise its discretion to 
proceed ‘only when the public interest clearly outweighs that of 
the voluntarily absent defendant.’ ”  (U.S. v. Bradford (11th 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
8 
Cir. 2001) 237 F.3d 1306, 1313, quoting Tortora, supra, 464 F.2d 
at p. 1210.)  Given the importance of the constitutional rights at 
stake, a trial court that decides to try the defendant in absentia 
must make a record adequate to enable review. 
The trial court here undertook no such analysis and made 
no such record.  After finding Ramirez voluntarily absent, the 
court declared without further discussion that it was “going to 
proceed with this trial in his absence,” and it denied his motion 
for a one-day continuance. 
I agree with Justice Smith that “[a] continuance was 
clearly warranted here.”  Nothing in the record supports the 
conclusion that the public interest in proceeding that day 
outweighed Ramirez’s interest in being present for his trial.  The 
Attorney General notes that the jurors and witnesses were 
present, but there is nothing to suggest that any witness or 
evidence would have become unavailable if the trial had been 
continued by one day or that a one-day continuance would have 
posed a specific hardship to the court, the witnesses, or the jury.  
The Attorney General also says the court could not be sure 
Ramirez would show up the next day if it granted a continuance.  
But no court faced with an absent defendant can be certain the 
defendant will return if it grants a continuance.  The court here 
had no particular reason to believe Ramirez would not be 
present the next day, and in fact he did return then.  
The only circumstance specific to this case that the 
Attorney General has cited for why the public interest favored 
proceeding with trial on the day of Ramirez’s absence was that 
the prosecutor had plans to be out of town the following 
afternoon.  But the trial court did not inquire into the 
prosecutor’s reason for being out of town and had no evidence 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
9 
from which it could reasonably conclude that the prosecutor’s 
interest in being out of town outweighed Ramirez’s interest in 
being present for his trial, having the opportunity to testify in 
his defense, and confronting the witnesses against him. 
Today’s opinion declines to reach this issue on the ground 
that Ramirez forfeited his argument that the denial of his 
continuance motion was error.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, fn. 7.)  
Ramirez sought a continuance in the trial court and later moved 
for a mistrial after the court proceeded in his absence.  He 
argued in the Court of Appeal that the denial of his continuance 
request was error, and he pressed the claim as well in his 
petition and briefing before us.  The Attorney General has never 
argued that Ramirez forfeited his continuance claim; instead, 
the Attorney General contests the claim on the merits in his 
briefing and agreed at oral argument that the claim is not 
forfeited. 
In concluding the issue has been forfeited, the court says 
Ramirez did not adequately raise the continuance issue in his 
petition for review.  While it is true that Ramirez might have 
referred to the continuance issue more clearly in his formulation 
of the issues presented for review, it is referenced in the two 
issues presented by his petition (Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 8.516(b)(1)), and he argues it repeatedly in the petition 
elsewhere.  Issue No. 1 of Ramirez’s petition for review asks 
whether the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the trial court’s 
decision to find him voluntarily absent “without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of [his] 
absence.”  One of the reasons his counsel asked for a continuance 
was to allow time for that evidentiary hearing.  Issue No. 2 asks 
whether the violation of Ramirez’s “constitutional right to be 
present for trial” was prejudicial error, and the issue of prejudice 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
10 
is informed by whether the trial court properly denied a 
continuance. 
In any event, Ramirez’s substantive arguments fairly 
indicated he was challenging the trial court’s denial of a short 
continuance, not just the trial court’s determination that he was 
voluntarily absent.  Specifically, Ramirez argued in his petition 
that the trial court erred by “refus[ing] to continue trial to the 
following day” when he did not appear in court.  He claimed he 
was “deprived of his constitutional right to be present at trial” 
when the trial court “determine[ed] that petitioner was 
voluntarily absent, without continuing the matter for one day.”  
Citing our decision in People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 
he argued that “a trial court should not ‘summarily plung[e] 
ahead’ with trial in a defendant’s absence.”  (Id. at p. 1209.) 
Forfeiture doctrine serves to prevent unfair surprise to the 
other party and to promote the orderly presentation of issues to 
the court.  (See People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 
1468 [“The rule that contentions not raised in the trial court will 
not be considered on appeal is founded on considerations of 
fairness to the court and opposing party, and on the practical 
need for an orderly and efficient administration of the law.”].) 
Neither concern is present here. 
In sum, the continuance issue has been fully briefed, and 
I see no sound basis for declining to address it.  I would address 
the issues properly raised and briefed by the parties, and I 
would hold that the trial court abused its discretion by 
proceeding in Ramirez’s absence rather than granting his 
motion for a one-day continuance so that he could return to 
court. 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
11 
III. 
An erroneous denial of a federal constitutional right that 
does not require automatic reversal is harmless only if we can 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the 
verdict.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  An 
error of state law is harmless if it is not “reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have 
been reached in the absence of the error.”  (People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  On the record before us, I would 
conclude that the trial court’s decision to try Ramirez in 
absentia was prejudicial under either standard. 
The most substantial pieces of evidence linking Ramirez 
to the attempted burglary were a blurry video from a 
surveillance camera at the victim’s home in which the burglar’s 
face is not visible and the fact that when Ramirez was arrested 
five weeks after the crime, he was wearing an Oakland Raiders 
hat that appeared similar to one worn by the burglar on the 
surveillance tape.  Ramirez’s defense consisted largely of the 
argument that he was not the person on the surveillance video.  
Defense counsel told the jury he would “invite you to look at that 
video of the person that’s removing this window screen.  I would 
submit to you that it’s not my client, doesn’t look like him at all.”  
Because the court erroneously proceeded with trial in Ramirez’s 
absence, defense counsel had to argue to the jury that Ramirez 
was not the burglar on the surveillance video at a time when 
Ramirez was not present for the jury to compare his features to 
those of the person on the tape. 
“ ‘[I]t is only the most extraordinary of trials in which a 
denial of the defendant’s right to testify can be said to be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. Allen (2008) 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
12 
44 Cal.4th 843, 872.)  This trial was not extraordinary in that 
way.  In total, the prosecutor called two witnesses, and the 
entire presentation of evidence took just over an hour and 
occupied roughly 30 pages of the reporter’s transcript.  Aside 
from the blurry surveillance video and the fact that Ramirez was 
wearing a hat five weeks after the burglary with the same 
coloring as the one worn by the burglar and the logo of a local 
football team, the only evidence presented against him was a 
short video of his conversation with police officers when they 
arrested him.  But, as Justice Smith explained, “Ramirez never 
directly admitted he had burgled [the victim’s] house on the 
night in question.  Initially, Ramirez denied any knowledge of 
the incident. . . .  After a significant amount of pressing from 
[Officer] Bowly, Ramirez said he was probably just looking.  
Later, Ramirez said he did not remember the incident. . . .  
During the questioning, Bowly never showed Ramirez a picture 
of [the victim’s] house or the surveillance tape; nor did he take 
Ramirez by the house.  Bowly also acknowledged he was not 
positive Ramirez knew which incident Bowly was talking 
about.”  (Italics omitted.)  If Ramirez had been able to testify, he 
could have explained his equivocal statements to the arresting 
officer. 
Because Ramirez was absent, the jury had no opportunity 
to evaluate the credibility of any argument he might have made 
that he was not the person on the surveillance video.  Instead, 
the defense called no witnesses, and after about six hours of 
deliberations, the jury found Ramirez guilty of attempted 
burglary.  That the jury’s deliberations took four times as long 
as the prosecutor’s presentation of evidence further suggests 
this was not an easy case.  And Ramirez’s testimony would likely 
have been significant in light of the limited evidence against 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
Liu, J., dissenting 
13 
him.  In sum, there was a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome if the trial court had not decided to try Ramirez in 
absentia, and the judgment must be reversed. 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ 
S262010 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
I agree with the majority opinion, as far as it goes.  A 
defendant who fails to appear at trial after voluntarily ingesting 
illicit drugs is not necessarily voluntarily absent.  But as the 
majority says, in this particular case there was substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of voluntary absence 
under the circumstances. 
The majority, however, declines to consider the natural 
follow-on question:  Whether the trial court should have granted 
a short continuance rather than conducting the one-day trial 
entirely in the defendant’s absence.  I would reach that issue 
and I would reverse for the reasons given in parts II and III of 
Justice Liu’s dissent. 
      KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Ramirez 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 3/5/20 – 5th Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S262010 
Date Filed:  December 5, 2022  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Tuolumne 
Judge:  James A. Boscoe 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Jacquelyn Larson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and 
Jennifer Mouzis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters 
and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri, Louis M. 
Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary, F. Matt Chen and Rachelle A. Newcomb, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jacquelyn Larson 
Central California Appellate Program 
2150 River Plaza Drive, Suite 300 
Sacramento, CA 95833 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Amanda D. Cary 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA 93721 
(559) 705-2305