Title: Celotex v. St. Joseph Hosp.

State: georgia

Issuer: Georgia Supreme Court

Document:

259 Ga. 108 (1989) 376 S.E.2d 880 CELOTEX CORPORATION et al. v. ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL. 46200. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided March 2, 1989. Reconsideration Denied March 29, 1989. Freeman & Hawkins, Julia Bennett Jagger, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas B. Kenworthy, Frank L. Corrado, Jr., Greene, Buckley, DeRieux & Jones, John D. Jones, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Ralph W. Brenner, Stephen A. Madva, for appellants. Speights & Runyan, Daniel A. Speights, Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, Edward J. Westbrook, Weeks, Chandler, Sams, Weatherly & Shinall, Charles L. Weatherly, for appellee. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Charles M. Richards, Assistant *112 Attorney General, amicus curiae. PER CURIAM. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to this court: "Whether [OCGA] § 9-3-30.1 applies to cases pending at the time of the statute's enactment so as to prevent these claims from otherwise being barred by an applicable period of limitation?" St. Joseph Hosp. v. Celotex Corp., 854 F2d 426 (1988). OCGA § 9-3-30.1, effective April 14, 1988, provides: We find that OCGA § 9-3-30.1 constitutes a special law within the meaning of Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a) of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983, which provides: "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law. ..." OCGA § 9-3-30.1, like the statute at issue in Lasseter v. Ga. Public Service Comm., 253 Ga. 227 (319 SE2d 824) (1984), Id. at p. 229. As we stated in Lasseter, Id. at pp. 229-30. This act singles out for special treatment property claims against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos and differentiates them from all other claims that might be based upon other hazardous or toxic substances. Because we do not find this separate classification to be reasonable, the statute does not meet constitutional standards. In light of this disposition, we answer the certified question in the negative. Certified question answered. All the Justices concur, except Hunt and Bell, JJ., who dissent. Gregory, J., not participating. *111 HUNT, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. As the majority acknowledges, the legislature may enact special laws if the classification of those affected is reasonable. Accordingly, we have consistently upheld special laws where there is reasonable justification for the law. See, e.g., Lasseter v. Ga. Public Service Comm., supra, 253 Ga. 227 (coal conversion statute applicable to particular class of power plants created reasonable classification); McAllister v. American Nat. Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246 (240 SE2d 247) (1977) (statute requiring showing of negligence in sale of blood was reasonable); C & S Nat. Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884 (218 SE2d 593) (1975) (statute classifying married women whose separate estates consist of real property and/or intangible personal property differently from married women whose separate estates consist of tangible personal property); Black v. Blanchard, 227 Ga. 167 (179 SE2d 228) (1971) (statute providing exemptions for certain individuals running for office of school superintendent established reasonable classification). It is undeniable that asbestos in buildings presents significant health and economic problems. The legislature of Georgia, like that of several other states, including Massachusetts, New York and Minnesota, chose to respond to some of these problems by enacting a statute which would lift a statute of limitation bar to asbestos-related property damage suits. I do not believe we can legitimately label this statute unreasonable, particularly in light of our duty to construe a statute as constitutional where possible. While the court may not agree with the wisdom of the statute, we are not authorized to second guess the legislature. I would hold the statute is not prohibited as a special law, and is not otherwise invalid, and would answer the certified question in the affirmative. I am authorized to state that Justice Bell joins in this dissent.