Title: SHENICE GAIL YOUNG V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHENICE GAIL YOUNG V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 136121 P.3d 145Case Number: 04-187Decided: 09/18/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
SHENICE 
GAIL YOUNG,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Shenice Gail 
Young appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the district court after 
a jury convicted her of one count of aggravated assault and battery and one 
count of simple battery.  Ms. 
Young's convictions resulted from an altercation involving her former boyfriend 
and his current girlfriend, ending with Ms. Young biting off a piece of the 
girlfriend's right ear.  On appeal, 
Ms. Young claims the district court erred by refusing to grant her motion for a 
continuance in order to consult an audiologist after the girlfriend testified 
she had suffered hearing loss as a result of the bite.  We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Young's request for a continuance of the 
trial and, therefore, affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's motion for a 
continuance.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Ms. Young was 
romantically involved with James Stevenson for approximately nine years, and 
they had a daughter (the child) together.  
Ms. Young and Mr. Stevenson ended their relationship, but they continued 
to cooperate with regard to visitation and custody of the child.  However, when Mr. Stevenson starting 
dating Shanie Devoe, Ms. Young objected to any contact between Ms. Devoe and the 
child.

 
 
[¶4]      On August 21, 
2003, Mr. Stevenson picked the child up from daycare and took her to his 
home.  Mr. Stevenson planned to 
deliver the child to Ms. Young at 8:00 p.m., after which he and Ms. Devoe 
intended to meet at his house to watch movies.  Ms. Young was not home when Mr. 
Stevenson attempted to leave the child; consequently, he and the child returned 
to his home and he contacted Ms. Devoe and asked her to come to his house.  At approximately 10:00 p.m., Mr. 
Stevenson put the child to bed.  

 
 
[¶5]      Ms. Young called 
a short time later to tell Mr. Stevenson she was on her way to pick up the 
child, but he told her the child was in bed and she should just let her spend 
the night.  Ms. Young insisted on 
picking the child up that evening, so Mr. Stevenson retrieved the child from her 
bed and met Ms. Young at the door.  
Ms. Young took the child, and Ms. Young and Mr. Stevenson quarreled.  The encounter turned physical, causing 
Ms. Young to drop the child.  During 
the ensuing struggle between Ms. Young and Mr. Stevenson, she kicked him, 
attempted to bite his hand, and violently squeezed his right testicle.  A man who was staying with Mr. Stevenson 
(the house guest) broke up the altercation and took Ms. Young to her car.  The house guest left Ms. Young in the 
car and went back into the house to get the child.  

 
 
[¶6]      During the 
quarrel between Mr. Stevenson and Ms. Young, Ms. Devoe went into the 
garage.  Ms. Young was tired of 
waiting in the car for the house guest to return with the child and re-entered 
the residence through the garage, where she encountered Ms. Devoe.  Ms. Young attacked Ms. Devoe and 
ultimately bit her right ear, detaching a large piece from the exterior portion 
of the ear.  Mr. Stevenson 
intervened and broke up the fight.  
He took Ms. Devoe to the emergency room in Casper, and she was later transferred to NorthernColoradoMedicalCenter in Greeley, Colorado, where a medical team attempted to 
reattach the missing portion of her ear.  Unfortunately, some of the reattached 
portion of the ear became necrotic and it had to be surgically removed.  

 
 
[¶7]      The State charged 
Ms. Young with one count of aggravated assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005),  for her assault upon Ms. Devoe; one 
count of simple assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(b) and (d) (LexisNexis 2005), for her assault upon Mr. Stevenson; and 
one count of illegally entering Mr. Stevenson's home, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-302 (LexisNexis 2005).  
The State dismissed the illegal entry count, and the parties proceeded to 
trial on the battery charges.  Ms. 
Devoe testified at the trial that she had suffered some loss of hearing as a 
result of the injury to her ear.  
Claiming surprise at this testimony, defense counsel requested a 
continuance of the trial in order to consult with an audiologist.  The district court denied Ms. Young's 
motion for a continuance.  

 
 
[¶8]      At the conclusion 
of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.  The district court denied Ms. Young's 
motion for a new trial and sentenced her to serve prison terms of 12 to 30 
months on the aggravated assault and battery count and two months on the simple 
assault and battery count, but ordered the sentences to run concurrently.  

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      A party may 
request a continuance of the trial proceedings if it is surprised by evidence 
presented at the trial or the opposing party does not comply with its discovery 
obligations.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
16(d)(2); Capshaw v. State, 714 P.2d 349, 352 (Wyo. 1986); Siegert v. State, 634 P.2d 323, 325-26 
(Wyo. 
1981).  "This Court has consistently 
held that the granting of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of 
the trial court.  The standard of 
review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying the continuance."  
BSC v. Natrona County Department 
of Family Services (In the Interest of CC), 2004 WY 167, ¶ 23, 102 P.3d 890, 
897 (Wyo. 2004) quoting Roose v. 
State, 753 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1988), which quoted Gentry v. State, 724 P.2d 450, 451 (Wyo. 
1986).  An abuse of discretion 
occurs when a district court

 
 
"[a]cts 
in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  An 
abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court 
under the circumstances."

 
 

Berry v. 
State, 2004 WY 
81, ¶ 43, 93 P.3d 222, 235 (Wyo. 2004), quoting Sampsell v. State, 2001 WY 12, ¶ 6, 17 P.3d 724, 726 (Wyo. 2001) (citations and emphasis omitted).  The determination of whether the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance depends 
upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case.  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d 323, 333-34 (Wyo. 2003); Clearwater v. State, 2 P.3d 548, 553 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
            

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The State charged Ms. Young with 
aggravated assault and battery, in violation of § 6-2-502, for biting off a 
piece of Ms. Devoe's ear.  That 
statute states, in relevant part:   

 
 
(a) 
  A person is guilty of aggravated assault 
and battery if he:

 
 
(i) 
Causes serious bodily injury to another intentionally,    knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life[.]

            

Section 
6-2-502(a)(i).  "Serious bodily 
injury" is defined at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2005) as 
"bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 
miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ[.]"  

 
 
[¶11]   At the trial on March 22, 2004, Ms. 
Devoe testified:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  All right.  And are you able to  do you notice any 
hearing differences between the ear that was bitten off and the ear that is 
intact?

 
 
[Ms. 
Devoe]: Yes.

 
 

Q.                
What do 
you notice?

 
 

A.                 
I notice 
if there's like a lot of sound on one side  or if somebody is talking to me, I 
just will give this ear a little bit forward if I don't understand them just 
because the whole function of this ear is actually muffle the ear  I didn't 
know that until this happened  but it's to actually kind of, like funnel it 
back into the ear and so  

 
 
[Objection] 

 
 
Q.        Do you 
notice any difficulty in hearing out of that ear as compared to the ear that's 
intact?

 
 

A.                 
Yes, I 
do.

 
 

Q.                
Okay.  And you were describing how when there's 
a lot of noise that you can  you use your good ear to 
hear?

 
 

A.                 
Yes, I 
will  yeah.  I can hear better out 
of this one.  And, say, when I'm on 
the phone, I usually talk on this one.  
But I, you know, I've tried to talk through this one on the phone; but 
it's just  I can't  I can never understand the full conversation, so I always 
have to switch back to the other ear.

 
 

Q.                
So you 
find it more difficult to hear different sounds or exactly what's being said 
with the --

 
 

A.                 
Yeah.

 
 

Q.                
With the 
ear that's missing as compared to the ear that's whole?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 

Q.                
And has 
that been something you've experienced the entire time?

 
 

A.                 
Yes.

 
 
[¶12]   Later in the trial, Sanjay Gupta, 
M.D., an otolaryngologist,1 testified about Ms. Devoe's 
injury.  Dr. Gupta was the 
Colorado 
physician who reattached Ms. Devoe's ear and then later surgically removed the 
necrotic portion.  One of his areas 
of expertise is audiology, which he described as "the effects of hearing and 
changes of hearing in children and adults."  He testified he had conducted a hearing 
test on Ms. Devoe and found, when sound was introduced into her ear canal, her 
hearing was normal.  Dr. Gupta 
explained, however, that hearing involves a complex sequence of events.  The outer portion of the ear actually 
acts as a funnel to collect sound, and when it is missing, the function is 
compromised.  He confirmed, because 
Ms. Devoe was missing a portion of her outer ear, she could have difficulty 
hearing in a crowded situation or in circumstances where there is background 
noise.  

 
 
[¶13]   The day after Ms. Devoe's 
testimony, the defense filed a motion to continue the trial.  The motion stated that, in light of Ms. 
Devoe's testimony, it was clear the State intended to establish Ms. Devoe had 
suffered serious bodily injury by showing impairment of the function of a bodily 
organ.  She claimed "none of the 
police reports nor any of the medical records supplied to the defense during 
discovery, make any mention of hearing loss and the defense was completely 
unaware prior to Ms. Devoe's testimony such a claim might be raised."  The defense asserted, therefore, it 
needed a continuance in order "to consult with an audiologist to determine if 
the injury to Ms. Devoe could possibly cause such a loss and if appropriate, 
present testimony on this issue."  

 
 
[¶14]   The district court heard arguments 
on the motion for a continuance prior to the start of trial proceedings on March 
23, 2004.  The State responded to 
Ms. Young's request for a continuance by noting it is a matter of basic 
understanding that loss of outer ear tissue may affect hearing.  The district court denied Ms. Young's 
request for a continuance, and the trial continued.   After the jury returned its 
verdict, Ms. Young filed a motion for a new trial, alleging, among other things, 
the district court erred by refusing her request for a continuance.  The district court denied that motion, 
as well.  

 
 
[¶15]   On appeal, Ms. Young claims she was 
surprised by the State's attempt to prove the serious bodily injury element of 
the crime by showing Ms. Devoe's hearing was impaired.  Because neither the police reports nor 
the medical records stated Ms. Devoe's ability to hear was compromised, she 
contends she could not have foreseen a need to defend against a showing of 
impairment of a bodily organ.  Prior 
to Ms. Devoe's trial testimony, Ms. Young believed the State was going to 
attempt to prove serious bodily injury simply by showing severe disfigurement of 
the ear.   Her defense, 
therefore, was the ear was not severely disfigured.  

 
 
[¶16]   The record indicates the defense 
could have foreseen the State would attempt to prove serious bodily injury by 
showing Ms. Devoe's hearing was impaired.  
Although the information was amended twice during the pendency of the 
action, the charging documents consistently stated Ms. Young was alleged to have 
caused serious bodily injury to Ms. Devoe.  
The documents did not indicate the prosecution was limiting its theory of 
the case to a showing of severe disfigurement.  Thus, this is not a case where the 
evidence presented at trial was different from the crime charged.  Compare, Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, 66 P.3d 703 (Wyo. 2003) (holding a prejudicial variance requiring reversal of the 
defendant's conviction occurred when the evidence presented at trial established 
facts different from those alleged in the charging document).  If Ms. Young was confused about the 
State's theory of the case, she could have filed a motion for a bill of 
particulars, asking for further explanation of the basis for the charge.  See e.g., Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶¶ 32-33, 46 P.3d 303, 304 (Wyo. 2002).  She did not, however, request a bill of 
particulars.  

 
 
[¶17]   The State did not commit any 
discovery violations.  The defense 
had been provided all of the relevant medical records, and, consequently, should 
have been aware she was treated by an otolaryngologist, who specialized in 
problems with the ear. As recognized by the district court, it is a matter of 
common knowledge that the outer portion of the ear has a function in 
hearing.  Furthermore, at a combined 
motion hearing and pretrial conference, which was held two weeks before the 
start of the trial, the State made the following comments with regard to the 
serious bodily injury element of the crime:  

 
 
Obviously, 
Your Honor, the State has an element to prove that what we have here is either 
severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily function or 
organ. 

 
 
 * * *

 
 
Obviously, 
there's going to be some ongoing medical care.  And the definition of severe 
disfigurement in and of itself infers something that might be continuous or 
permanent as well as the definition of protracted loss or impairment of a bodily 
member or organ, protracted meaning ongoing or continuous or 
permanent.

 

Thus, 
Ms. Young's claim she was unfairly surprised by or could not have foreseen the 
testimony about Ms. Devoe's hearing loss is not supported by the 
record.

 
 
[¶18]   Furthermore, Ms. Young does not 
explain how she was prejudiced by the district court's refusal to grant a 
continuance.  The defense was 
allowed ample opportunity to cross examine Ms. Devoe and Dr. Gupta.  Although her defense was not ultimately 
successful, Ms. Young effectively established, through cross-examination, that 
Ms. Devoe could hear normally when sound was directed into her ear canal, Dr. 
Gupta did not perform a field test to determine the effect upon Ms. Devoe's 
hearing from the loss of external ear tissue, and Dr. Gupta's records did not 
document Ms. Devoe's hearing complaints or his belief that she had suffered 
hearing loss.  The jury was, 
therefore, left to determine whether the State had met its burden of proof on 
the "serious bodily injury" element by weighing the evidence and determining the 
credibility of the witnesses.   

 
 
[¶19]   Additionally, at the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial, Ms. Young did not present any new evidence or an offer 
of proof to counter Ms. Devoe's or Dr. Gupta's testimony indicating she suffered 
hearing loss as a result of the bite.  
See generally, Cardenas v. State, 
811 P.2d 989, 994 (Wyo. 1991) (noting the "[a]ppellant failed to specify 
material evidence which he could have provided if the district court had granted 
his motion for a continuance").  We 
conclude, therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Ms. Young's request for a continuance.

            

[¶20]   Affirmed.   

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1According to 
Dr. Gupta, an otolaryngologist is a specialist for treatment of ear, nose and 
throat problems in both adults and children.