Title: Ferguson v. Brick

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

649 S.W.2d 397 (1983) 279 Ark. 168 Joyce T. FERGUSON et al., Appellants, v. Jake BRICK et al., Appellees. No. 82-288. Supreme Court of Arkansas. May 2, 1983. Claudell Woods, Staff Atty. for East Arkansas Legal Services, West Memphis, for appellants. McHenry, Skipper & Barns by Merl O. Barns, Little Rock, for appellees. PER CURIAM. We deny movant permission to file an amicus curiae brief. Last week we denied a similar motion. These rulings represent a slight shift in the practice of this Court and, for the benefit of the bar, we issue this per curiam opinion. The term "amicus curiae" is old Latin which literally means "a friend of the court." 3A C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 2 (1973). Historically, courts welcomed the aid of an amicus since "it is for the honor of a court of justice to avoid error." The Protector v. Geering, Hardees 85-86 (1656) 145 E.R. 394 (Ex.); see Note, Amici Curiae, 34 Harv.L.Rev. 773 n. 5 (1921). While the name has remained static, the undertaking of the amicus has changed from that of an impartial friend of the court to that of an acknowledged adversary. The transition has been discussed in three excellent law review articles. Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L.J. 694 (1963); Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 20 (1954); Harper and Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1172 (1953). Krislov, in discussing the transition, states: 2 Yale L.J. at 704. The consequences of the shift have been dramatic. A form of judicial lobbying is now regularly practiced by the United States Department of Justice as well as various other groups, particularly minority groups. As stated by Krislov: Id. at 710-11. Perhaps an even more dramatic consequence of the change is the change in the attitude of the court that appoints an amicus to actively seek implementation of a decree. This consequence is described by Krislov as follows: *399 So in both the Little Rock, Arkansas, and the University of Mississippi integration crises the federal district court, on its own initiative, designated the United States Attorney General and The United States Attorney as amici and specifically instructed its designated amici to carry out activities on behalf of the court. On September 9, 1957, in order to enforce its prior determinations the district court in Arkansas invited the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney to On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the case was styled Faubus v. United States (amicus curiae) [254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.1958)]. Among other claims, the attorneys for Governor Faubus argued that the United States had no standing to file such a petition for injunctive relief and that the court had erred in giving the United States such powers. The court of appeals, however, found that this was in accordance with past procedure and that it was "proper for the court to do all that reasonably and lawfully could be done to protect and effectuate its orders and judgments." The district court had acted properly in asking the law officers of the United States to act on its behalf for it "could not with propriety employ private counsel to do the necessary investigative and legal work. It has, we think, always in the past been customary for a federal district court to call upon the law officers of the United States for aid and advice in comparable situations." There was no need to go into the legal theory too thoroughly, the court of appeals pointed out, inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the Aaron case were still real parties in interest and had joined the government in requesting this injunction. Nonetheless, the court of appeals emphatically upheld the authority both of the court and its amici: Id. at 718-19. In Arkansas, this Court for many years has authorized attorneys to come into cases as amicus curiae. Although we have consistently limited their briefs to the facts proven at trial and the points raised by the parties on appeal, Mears v. Little Rock School District, 268 Ark. 30, 593 S.W.2d 42 (1980), we have traditionally welcomed these briefs for there is always the possibility that an amicus brief will have legal significance. For example, in a recent case we received 20 highly partisan amici briefs from the financial community. McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 271 Ark. 503, 611 S.W.2d 767 (1981). At the most, two of the briefs had legal significance, while the rest were simply endorsements of the briefs filed by the parties and added nothing to the arguments except the supposed political prestige of the group making the endorsement. To knowingly allow such briefs is to invite a charge of political pressure and, in addition, waste our time. In the federal court system there appears to be a new trend to question the filing of amici briefs, especially at the district court level. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.1979); Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir.1970); Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.Ill.1982). We share in questioning the filing of amici briefs in one circumstance and, henceforth, we will deny permission to file a brief when *400 the purpose is nothing more than to make a political endorsement of the basic brief. The obvious difficulty with this approach is that we normally wade through the entire brief before we can know whether it serves a valid purpose. However, Rule 19(a) requires the movant seeking permission to file as an amicus to show why such a brief is "thought to be necessary." On the motion now before us the movant states: In this particular motion for permission to file an amicus curiae brief it is obvious that the movant anticipates discussing nothing of legal significance. The proposed amicus brief would be solely for the purpose of judicial lobbying. Therefore we deny permission to file the brief.