Title: Cundy Asphalt Paving Const., Inc. v. Angelo Materials Co

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Cundy Asphalt Paving Const., Inc. v. Angelo Materials Co1996 WY 62915 P.2d 1181Case Number: 95-225Decided: 04/30/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

CUNDY 
ASPHALT PAVING CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Wyoming corporation;

and UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, an insurance 
company authorized to do business in the State of Wyoming,  

Appellants (Defendants), 

 

v. 

 

ANGELO MATERIALS COMPANY, a Wyoming 
corporation, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County 

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

James L. Edwards of Stevens, Edwards & Hallock, 
P.C., Gillette. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

John B. Patrick of Patrick & Korell, 
Torrington.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants Cundy 
Asphalt Paving Construction, Inc. and United Fire & Casualty Company appeal 
from the judgment entered in favor of Appellee Angelo Materials Company, from 
the order which taxed costs against the appellants, and from the order which 
denied Cundy's motion for a new trial.

 

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The appellants 
present the following issues for our review:

 

I. Was the verdict supported by sufficient 
evidence?

 

II. Did the trial court err in denying 
Defendant/Appellant Cundy Asphalt's motion for a new 
trial?

III. Did the district court improperly award costs to 
Angelo?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The State of 
Wyoming let bids in early 1993 for the reconstruction of approximately eight 
miles of Interstate 90 between Buffalo and Gillette. Cundy successfully bid the 
project and was awarded the general contract. As the general contractor, Cundy 
contracted with Angelo for gravel and crushed rock. Angelo was to obtain the 
rock from a pit owned by the State of Wyoming.

 

[¶5]      Under the 
contract, Angelo was required to furnish a specified quantity of rock in various 
sizes according to a project schedule which Cundy established after the contract 
had been signed. Although the contract required several types of mixtures which 
consisted of different amounts and types of ingredients, the controversy between 
Cundy and Angelo involved the Hot Plant Mix Type I materials. Cundy needed 
forty-five percent crushed rock, thirty-five percent crushed fines, and twenty 
percent natural filler as the ingredients for the Hot Plant Mix Type I. The rock 
and crushed fines were actually processed or crushed. The filler was a naturally 
occurring ingredient found in the designated pit and did not require any 
crushing.

 

[¶6]      According to the 
project schedule, Angelo was to begin its operations in the early part of April 
1993, but inclement weather at Angelo's prior job site prevented Angelo from 
actually beginning its operations on the highway reconstruction project until 
approximately six weeks after the specified date. Weather problems continued 
throughout the month of June, delaying both Angelo and Cundy. Angelo's problems 
were compounded by the fact that the percentage of unusable materials in the pit 
was higher than the project plans represented. Consequently, Angelo's daily 
production rate was lower than expected. To compensate for the low production 
rate, Angelo increased its operation from fifty hours per week to eighty-four 
hours per week, and Cundy contracted with another operator for approximately 
20,000 tons of Hot Plant Mix Type I materials.

 

[¶7]      As the work 
progressed under the contract, Angelo submitted bills to Cundy for the materials 
which had been produced, expecting to receive progress payments. Cundy usually 
received payment from the State of Wyoming within ten days after making its 
request, and it was obligated under the contract to pay Angelo immediately upon 
receiving that payment so long as Angelo was not in default under the contract. 
Cundy made two progress payments but refused to make the third payment because 
it thought that Angelo had overstated the payment amount. Cundy sent a letter to 
Angelo on August 9, 1993, informing Angelo that it had five days in which to 
produce adequate quantities of crushed material. Angelo maintained that it had 
produced a greater quantity of crushed material than it was requesting payment 
for. On August 11, 1993, Cundy informed Angelo that Cundy was not going to make 
any more progress payments until the project was completed. Angelo, 
consequently, decided to cease operating until it received payment for its 
progress. Cundy claimed that, since Angelo had ceased its operations, it 
breached the contract and, therefore, was not entitled to receive any more 
payments under the contract. On August 17, 1993, Cundy informed Angelo that 
Cundy was in the process of hiring a new subcontractor, and it ordered Angelo to 
leave the job site.

 

[¶8]      Angelo filed a 
complaint against Cundy, alleging that Cundy had breached the contract by 
refusing to make the progress payments. Cundy counterclaimed, asserting that 
Angelo had breached the contract by discontinuing its operations. After a trial 
on the merits, the jury found that Cundy had breached the contract, and it 
awarded damages to Angelo. Cundy moved for a new trial, and Angelo asked for 
costs. The trial court denied Cundy's motion for a new trial and granted 
Angelo's motion for costs. The appellants appealed to this 
Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 

[¶9]      Cundy claims that 
the evidence introduced at the trial was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict and that, as a result, the trial court erroneously denied its motion for 
a new trial. In analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, we use the 
following standard:

 

The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence is well established. On review, this court assumes that the evidence in 
favor of the successful party is true. We leave out of consideration entirely 
the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the 
evidence of the successful party, and we afford to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it.

 

Kadrmas v. Valley West Homeowner's 
Association, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 
1993) (citation omitted), quoted in 
Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 891 P.2d 773, 784 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶10]   After reviewing the record in the 
light most favorable to Angelo, we conclude that the jury based its verdict upon 
sufficient evidence. According to the contract, Angelo agreed to furnish 
specified quantities of rock in various sizes and to complete its work within 
the time specified by the schedule. Cundy agreed to pay Angelo immediately upon 
receiving payment from the State of Wyoming for such units of work as the 
project engineer determined had been produced.

 

[¶11]   Cundy improperly decided not to 
make progress payments to Angelo. The contract provided that the progress 
payments would be made, and it charged the project engineer with determining how 
much should be paid. Cundy breached the contract when it decided not to make the 
progress payment and when it decided not to make any more progress payments 
until the project was completed.

 

[¶12]   Cundy argues that Angelo breached, 
repudiated, and abandoned the contract when it stopped crushing to await payment 
from Cundy. The record, however, does not support Cundy's claim that Angelo did 
not proceed diligently. The project was never delayed because of Angelo's 
actions or inaction. In fact, after Angelo was ordered to leave the pit, Cundy 
was able to produce pavement for two to three more weeks with the material which 
Angelo left behind. Cundy was the one that breached the contract. Angelo merely 
ceased production, waiting for the progress payment which it was entitled to 
receive under the contract.

 

[¶13]   Cundy argues that the trial court 
should have granted its motion for a new trial under W.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) because 
sufficient evidence did not support the jury's verdict. Since it is our opinion 
that sufficient evidence did support the jury's verdict, we must also conclude 
that the trial court properly denied Cundy's motion for a new 
trial.

 

B. AWARD OF 
COSTS

 

[¶14]   The appellants claim that the trial 
court improperly awarded costs for depositions which were taken during discovery 
but were not used at the trial. With regard to the issue of whether the costs of 
discovery depositions are recoverable, we have adopted the following 
rule:

 

"With respect to costs of discovery depositions, we 
espouse the rule that if the discovery deposition is reasonably necessary for 
the preparation of the case, then there is no abuse of discretion on the part of 
the district judge in awarding such costs. With respect to the exercise of 
discretion as to such costs, however, the burden must be upon the party seeking 
the award of costs to justify to the district court that those costs were 
reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. If the 
depositions are introduced at the trial, or are used for purposes of impeachment 
or refreshing the recollection of a witness at the trial that would ordinarily 
satisfy the burden of demonstrating that they were reasonably necessary. Other 
uses of the deposition in connection with the trial proceedings such as motions 
for summary judgment might serve to persuade the district court that the 
depositions were reasonably necessary, but it would not be required to so 
conclude."

 

Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1373 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 11-12 
(Wyo. 1985) (citations omitted)).

 

[¶15]   In the case at bar, only one 
deposition was used at the trial. No evidence was introduced to establish that 
the remaining depositions were reasonably necessary for the preparation of the 
case for trial. We conclude, therefore, that the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding costs for the remaining depositions. See Dieringer, 708 P.2d  at 12.

 

C.W.R.A.P. 
10.05 SANCTIONS

 

[¶16]   Angelo asserts that the appellants 
did not have reasonable cause for this appeal and, therefore, requests an award 
of fees pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05. We cannot certify that no reasonable cause 
existed; therefore, we deny Angelo's request.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶17]   We hold that sufficient evidence 
was introduced at the trial to support the jury's verdict and the trial court's 
denial of Cundy's motion for a new trial but that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it awarded costs for the depositions which were not used in 
preparing the case for trial. The judgment entered in favor of Angelo and the 
order which denied Cundy's motion for a new trial are affirmed. The order which 
taxed costs against the appellants is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
trial court for entry of an order with regard to costs which is consistent with 
this opinion.