Title: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3110-W and 99-2810-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries America, Inc.,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the 
Honorable Dominic S. Amato, presiding, Patricia 
Wischer, Marjorie DeGrave, Ramona Dulde-Starr, 
Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company, 
The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, 
Neil F. Lampson, Inc., HCH Miller Park Joint 
Venture, Hunzinger Construction Company, Clark 
Construction Builders, Inc., Huber, Hunt & 
Nichols, Inc., The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
Inc. and Hearst Argyle Television, Inc.,  
 
Respondents.  
                                                 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries America, Inc.,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, The 
Honorable Dominic S. Amato, presiding, Patricia 
Wischer, Marjorie DeGrave, Ramona Dulde-Star, 
Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company, 
The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, 
Neil F. Lampson, Inc., HCH Miller Park Joint 
Venture, Hunzinger Construction Builders, Inc., 
Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., The Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, Inc. and Hearst Argyle 
Television, Inc., 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
ON PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 23, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
 
Oral Argument: 
December 14, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dominic S. Amato 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner there was oral argument by 
Ralph A. Weber and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & 
Rieselbach, SC., Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the respondent, The Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, Inc., there was oral argument by John A. Busch and 
Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to 
further 
editing 
and 
modification. 
 
The 
final 
version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
Nos. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State ex rel. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries America, Inc., 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, The 
Honorable Dominic S. Amato, presiding, 
Travelers Property Casualty Insurance 
Company, The Travelers Indemnity Company 
of Illinois, Neil F. Lampson, Inc., HCH 
Miller Park Joint Venture, Hunzinger 
Construction Company, Clark Construction 
Builders, Inc., Huber, Hunt & Nichols, 
Inc., The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 
Inc., Patricia Wischer, individually, and 
as Special Administrator of the Estate of 
Jeffrey A. Wischer, deceased, Marjorie 
DeGrave, individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of William R. 
DeGrave, deceased and Ramona Dulde-Starr, 
individually and as Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Jerome W. Starr, 
deceased, 
 
 
Respondents. 
_________________________________________ 
 
State ex rel. Mitsubishi Heavy  
Industries America, Inc., 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 23, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
2 
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County,  
The Honorable Dominic S. Amato,  
presiding, Patricia Wischer, Marjorie 
DeGrave, Ramona Dulde-Starr, Travelers 
Property Casualty Insurance Company, 
The Travelers Indemnity Company of  
Illinois, Neil F. Lampson, Inc.,  
HCH Miller Park Joint Venture,  
Hunzinger Construction Builders, Inc., 
Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., The  
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Inc. and 
Hearst Argyle Television, Inc., 
 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
Petition for Supervisory Writ.  Granted. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM 
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries America, 
Inc. (Mitsubishi) petitions this court to issue a supervisory 
writ directed to the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, the 
Honorable Dominic Amato presiding.  Mitsubishi challenges the 
circuit court's order dated October 29, 1999, which permitted 
the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Inc. (MJS) to intervene in the 
underlying negligence action.  The order directed, among other 
things, that the parties “in possession of any deposition, 
transcript, deposition videotape or related exhibits . . . 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
3 
provide copies of such materials upon request of Journal 
Sentinel Inc.”1   
¶2 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the 
circuit court erred in permitting MJS to intervene in this 
action and directing that MJS have access to unfiled, pretrial 
discovery materials the parties and their attorneys may have in 
their possession.  We conclude that the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, Inc. should not have been permitted to intervene as a 
matter of right to obtain access to unfiled, pretrial discovery 
materials.  Accordingly, we grant this petition for supervisory 
writ.   
¶3 
On July 14, 1999, three ironworkers were killed when a 
construction crane collapsed while lifting a section of the 
retractable roof for the new stadium being constructed at Miller 
Park in Milwaukee.  Subsequently, on August 12, 1999, the widows 
of the three deceased iron workers (plaintiffs) brought suit 
against 
Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries 
America, 
Inc., 
the 
subcontractor for the construction of the retractable roof, and 
other entities alleging claims of negligence as well as claims 
for punitive damages. 
                     
1 In addition to this petition for supervisory writ, 
Mitsubishi also simultaneously filed a petition for review of a 
court of appeals’ November 23, 1999 decision denying its request 
for supervisory relief.  Because this court now grants the 
petition 
for 
supervisory 
relief, 
Mitsubishi’s 
alternative 
petition for review is unnecessary and is therefore dismissed.  
State ex rel. Newspapers v. Circuit Court, 124 Wis. 2d 499, 504 
n. 2, 370 N.W.2d 209 (1985). 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
4 
¶4 
The plaintiffs then served deposition subpoenas on 
five employees of Mitsubishi and scheduled oral, videotaped  
depositions of those employees beginning in the second week of 
October, 1999.   
¶5 
On October 1, 1999, Mitsubishi filed a motion in the 
circuit court seeking a protective order pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.01(3),2 and a stay of the depositions of its five employees 
until investigations by the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s 
Office and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
had concluded and the possibility of criminal prosecution had 
passed. The circuit court, after a hearing, imposed what it 
referred to as a “gag order” directing that the depositions of 
the five Mitsubishi employees be sealed, that the parties and 
their attorneys be subject to the gag order and not reveal to 
the public or press the contents of those depositions, and that 
the gag order remain in effect for 30 days after the employees’ 
depositions were completed after which Mitsubishi would have to 
demonstrate that the depositions of the five employees should 
remain sealed. 
¶6 
At 
a 
subsequent 
scheduling 
conference 
held 
on 
October 15, 1999, the court explained that the gag order 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.01(3) provides in pertinent part: 
(3) Protective Orders.  (a) Upon motion by a party or 
by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for 
good cause shown, the court may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
or expense. . . .   
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
5 
remained in place with respect to the depositions of the five 
Mitsubishi employees, but that the order did not apply to any 
other depositions.  The court reiterated that the gag order 
would not remain in place indefinitely, but that within 30 days 
after the depositions of the five Mitsubishi employees had been 
completed, the gag order would be lifted unless Mitsubishi gave 
sufficient reasons why the order should remain in effect. 
¶7 
On October 18, 1999, the scheduled deposition of an 
employee of Neil F. Lampson, Inc., the lessor of the crane and 
one of the named defendants in the underlying action, was held. 
 A representative from MJS appeared at that deposition and 
requested that he be allowed to attend and be given copies of 
the transcript.  Because there was confusion and disagreement 
between the parties about the extent of the court's gag order, 
this request was denied and MJS’s representative was told to 
seek court permission to gain access to the depositions.   
¶8 
The next day, October 19, 1999, MJS filed a motion in 
the circuit court to intervene as a matter of right in the 
underlying action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1).  MJS 
claimed that it had a right to intervene for the purpose of 
protecting the public’s interest in disclosure of the discovery 
proceedings.  MJS also sought clarification of the existing gag 
order, review of the documents sealed by the circuit court, 
release of the videotapes and transcripts of depositions, and 
the right to attend or view other depositions.  
¶9 
Mitsubishi 
opposed 
these 
requests 
asserting 
that 
Wisconsin law does not give the public a right to examine before 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
6 
trial depositions or discovery materials and therefore, MJS had 
no right to intervene in the underlying circuit court action.  
Mitsubishi also asserted that media representatives have no 
right to attend depositions.  Noting that the existing gag order 
only 
applied 
to 
the 
depositions 
of 
its 
five 
employees, 
Mitsubishi maintained that there was “good cause” for such 
order.  Mitsubishi asked the court to deny MJS’s motions; 
however, 
Mitsubishi 
did 
not 
ask 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
affirmative relief in the form of a new protective order 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.01(3) to apply to discovery and 
depositions of individuals other than its five employees.   
¶10 At the October 21, 1999 hearing on the motions, MJS’s 
attorneys clarified that the newspaper was not contesting the 
existing gag order insofar as it related to the depositions of 
the five Mitsubishi employees; according to MJS, it wanted the 
gag order clarified so that lawyers for the parties would not be 
prevented from voluntarily discussing with MJS’s representatives 
their theories and the facts of the case.  Furthermore, MJS 
asserted it wanted access to the transcripts and videotapes of 
individuals other than the five Mitsubishi employees, and MJS 
wanted the right to attend the depositions if invited by any of 
the parties.   
¶11 Mitsubishi 
reiterated 
its 
opposition 
and 
again 
asserted that members of the media have no right to attend 
discovery depositions in civil actions, nor does the media have 
a right of pretrial access to discovery materials, including 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
7 
deposition transcripts, until those transcripts are filed with 
the court. 
¶12 The circuit court explained that the only gag order in 
effect in this matter related to the depositions of the five 
Mitsubishi employees.  Then the court ruled that the press had a 
right of access to information obtained in the course of 
discovery proceedings and that the only way such access could be 
denied would be if a timely motion for protective order were 
brought.3   
                     
3 In the oral ruling from the bench, the court stated: 
based upon the request of the press, I’m going to 
allow them access to all papers except the current gag 
order on the five Mitsubishi depositions, with the 
sunset date, knowing if they don’t come in and ask for 
relief, there'll also be access to those depositions. 
 
The 
lawyers who 
hold these 
depositions are 
custodians of public records of the court in this 
civil action.  You’re going to have to make available 
those depositions and documents upon reasonable time, 
upon reasonable notice, upon reasonable request.  And 
the party requesting will have to bear all the 
expense.   
 
There is no gag order preventing anybody from 
talking to anyone else. . . .  
 
So outside of the video depositions of the 
Mitsubishi employes . . . that is the only gag order 
in effect. 
 
. . .  
 
That it’s the judgment of this court, under First 
Amendment protections, because this is a public forum, 
and these documents are public records, that those 
documents 
held 
by 
the 
lawyers 
in 
the 
form 
of  
                                           (continued) 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
8 
¶13 The circuit court's oral ruling was subsequently 
reduced to written form and entered on October 29, 1999.  That 
October 29th order, which is the subject of this petition for 
supervisory writ, provides: 
 
1. 
Journal Sentinel Inc. has the right to 
intervene for the limited purpose of establishing its 
interest relative to the requested relief, but the 
Journal Sentinel Inc. is not to be a formal party to 
this action.   
 
2. 
Parties in this action in possession of any 
deposition, 
transcript, 
deposition 
videotape 
or 
related exhibits, except for those of the five 
employees of Mitsubishi . . . are to provide copies of 
such materials upon request of Journal Sentinel Inc.  
The cost of providing the materials shall be borne by 
Journal Sentinel Inc. 
 
3. 
No gag order exists on any party or counsel 
regarding this case except on such information that is 
directly 
related 
to 
the 
testimony 
of 
the 
five 
employees of Mitsubishi. . . .  
 
4. 
This order does not require any attorney to 
provide copies of their work product. 
 
5. 
Upon the invitation of the host of a 
deposition, a representative of Journal Sentinel, Inc. 
may attend or contemporaneously view, but may not 
participate in, any deposition. . . . If a party 
opposes the viewing, the party in opposition may bring 
a motion before this court to show good cause for 
protection. 
¶14 Mitsubishi thereafter filed a petition for supervisory 
writ in the court of appeals asking that the circuit court be 
prohibited 
from 
enforcing 
the 
October 
29th 
order. 
 
On 
                                                                  
depositions can be accessed by anyone, at their  
expense, 
upon 
reasonable 
notice 
and 
paying 
for 
reasonable costs. 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
9 
November 23, 1999, the court of appeals denied Mitsubishi’s 
petition for supervisory relief.  The court of appeals distilled 
Mitsubishi’s arguments to two primary contentions:  (1) MJS does 
not meet the criteria for intervention under Wis. Stat. § 
803.09; and (2) deposition transcripts, videotapes and exhibits 
that are not yet on file in the circuit court are not court 
records and as such are not subject to court ordered release. 
¶15 With respect to Mitsubishi’s challenge to allowing MJS 
to intervene, the appellate court agreed with Mitsubishi’s 
argument that the two primary cases relied on by MJS to support 
its intervention request, State ex rel. Bilder v. Delavan Tp., 
112 Wis. 2d 539, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983), and C.L. v. Edson, 
140 Wis. 2d 
168, 
409 
N.W.2d 
417 
(Ct. App. 
1987), 
were 
distinguishable because those cases involved a newspaper’s 
request for access to court documents after settlement of the 
underlying litigation.  In contrast, MJS’s intervention request 
in this case sought access to pretrial discovery materials 
generated by the litigation but not yet on file in the circuit 
court.  Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that 
Mitsubishi had not met the stringent standards for supervisory 
relief because there was no showing by Mitsubishi that the 
circuit court's decision permitting MJS limited intervention for 
the purpose of obtaining access to pretrial discovery documents 
plainly violated a clear legal duty.  Dressler v. Racine County 
Circuit Court, 163 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 472 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 
1991).   
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
10
¶16 With respect to Mitsubishi’s second argument--that 
discovery depositions not yet on file in the circuit court are 
not court records to which the court may grant access--the court 
of appeals again noted that there was no controlling statute or 
case law stating that such materials are not court records and 
cannot be released to an intervening party.  Describing 
Mitsubishi’s arguments as raising an “interesting legal theory,” 
the court of appeals nonetheless concluded that Mitsubishi had 
not demonstrated that the circuit court had violated clear 
controlling 
authority. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
court 
held 
that  
supervisory relief was unavailable.4 
¶17 Mitsubishi then filed with this court a petition for 
supervisory writ and an alternative petition for review of the 
court of appeals’ November 23, 1999 decision.  Mitsubishi’s 
request to stay the effect of the October 29th circuit court 
order and the November 23rd court of appeals’ decision was 
granted until further order of this court, and MJS was ordered 
to respond to Mitsubishi’s petition for supervisory relief.  
This court has now heard oral argument on the petition and 
response. 
 
For 
the 
reasons 
explained 
below, 
we 
grant 
Mitsubishi’s petition for supervisory relief concluding, after a 
de novo review, Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 549, that MJS should not 
be permitted to intervene in the underlying action for even the 
limited 
purpose 
of 
seeking 
access 
to 
pretrial 
discovery 
                     
4 The court of appeals also denied Mitsubishi’s alternative 
request that it be granted permissive appeal of the court of 
appeals’ October 29th order. 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
11
material.  We emphasize that this is a right of access case, not 
a right to disseminate case, and we hold that neither the public 
nor the press have either a common law or First Amendment right 
of access to unfiled pretrial discovery materials which remain 
in the custody and control of the parties to the litigation. 
 
ACCESS TO DISCOVERED INFORMATION 
The Common Law 
¶18 Neither the press nor the public have a common law 
right to examine discovery materials as they are being generated 
in the course of pretrial discovery in a civil action. The 
access rights of news media and the general public are identical 
in scope.  Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); City of Oak Creek v. King, 148 
Wis. 2d 532, 549, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989).  While the press and 
the public jointly possess a common law right to inspect and 
copy judicial records and public documents, Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1311, 
55 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1978); Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d at 546; C.L. v. 
Edson, 140 Wis. 2d at 177; Wis. Stats. §§ 19.32(1) and 59.20(1); 
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 677, 137 N.W.2d 
470 (1965), this court has never held that private documents 
collected during discovery are “judicial records;” in fact, 
there is substantial case authority to the contrary.  United 
States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986); In Re 
Alexander Grant and Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 
1987); Anderson v. Crayovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
12
1986).  Although the case law refers to a common law presumption 
that the public and media may inspect judicial records, 
generally that presumption extends only to documents which have 
been filed with the court such as pleadings, Bilder, 112 Wis. 2d 
and settlement agreements, Edson, 140 Wis. 2d.  The common law 
right of access does not extend to information collected through 
discovery which is not a matter of public record.  Seattle Times 
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).   
¶19 Documents on file with a court or custodian may be 
considered 
public 
records. 
Newspapers, 
Inc. 
v. 
Breier, 
89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) (daily arrest records are 
public documents within the public records statute); Bilder, 112 
Wis. 2d and Edson, 140 Wis. 2d.  Some cases have held, however, 
that even documents that have been filed with the court are not 
necessarily included within the scope of the common law 
presumption of access unless such documents have been relied on 
in determining the litigant’s substantive rights.  In Re 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. 
Circuit 1985) (Scalia, J., writing for court and Wright, J., 
dissenting, agree that the common law presumption of access does 
not go beyond evidentiary materials used in determining the 
litigant’s substantive rights).  Some cases have even held that 
the 
public’s 
right 
of 
access 
extends 
only 
to 
materials 
considered by the court when ruling on dispositive pretrial 
motions, Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 
732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2nd 
Cir. 1982).  That is not the situation here.  The discovery 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
13
materials sought--and which the circuit court granted MJS almost 
unrestricted access to--have not yet been filed nor used in any 
pretrial motions or rulings implicating the parties’ substantive 
rights; in fact, the circuit court's order operates for the most 
part in futuro since the discovery process in the recently filed 
underlying action has only just begun. 
¶20 In this state, unless otherwise ordered, the original 
copies of all depositions and other discovery materials are not 
filed in the circuit court but instead are retained by the party 
who 
initiated 
the 
discovery 
or 
that 
party’s 
attorney.  
Wis. Stat. § 804.01(6).5  The circuit court never ordered that 
any depositions, either those already taken or those to be taken 
in the future, will be filed in court; consequently, the 
depositions obtained during pretrial discovery in the underlying 
action presumably will be retained by the party initiating the 
discovery procedures.  The person before whom the depositions 
are taken must “securely seal” them and promptly serve the 
depositions upon the party or attorney requesting them, giving 
notice of the service to all parties and the court.  Section 
804.05(7).  Upon payment of reasonable charges, a copy of the 
deposition shall be furnished to “any party or to the deponent.” 
                     
5 The statutory provisions dealing with videotapes of 
depositions are similar but not identical.  For example, Wis. 
Stat. § 885.46 requires that the official before whom the 
videotape deposition is taken must maintain a secure and proper 
storage of the original videotape.  Like transcripts, videotape 
depositions are not required to be filed in court.  1988 
Judicial Council Note to Wis. Stat. § 885.43. 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
14
 Wis. Stat. § 804.05(7)(c).  Based on this statutory scheme, we 
conclude the depositions generated in the pretrial discovery 
proceedings in the underlying action are not judicial records to 
which a common law presumption of access applies because they 
have not yet been filed in court, nor have they yet been used as 
evidentiary 
material 
in 
determining 
any 
of 
litigants’ 
substantive rights.  As long as these materials remain in the 
possession of the parties and have not yet been filed or even 
used in court, they remain the private, personal property of the 
litigants to which neither the media nor the public have a 
common law right of access. 
First Amendment Right of Access 
¶21 Most of the cases addressing the issue of the public’s 
or 
media’s 
right 
of 
access--either 
common 
law 
or 
First 
Amendment--to pretrial discovery material arise in the context 
of a challenge to a protective order that has been issued, the 
effect of which is to seal the discovery materials from public 
examination.  The instant case presents the converse of that 
situation: here the circuit court did not issue a protective 
order but rather issued what amounts to a blanket order 
compelling the parties and their attorneys to provide MJS with 
access 
to 
not 
only 
existing 
discovery 
materials 
in 
the 
possession of any of the parties, but apparently also to any 
such discovery materials to be generated in the future.  In 
analyzing the appropriateness of such an order, the distinction 
must be maintained between the media’s First Amendment right to 
disseminate information acquired during a trial, and the media’s 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
15
right to access information generated in a pretrial discovery 
context.  The instant case involves private litigants conducting 
pretrial discovery in preparation for a trial on a tort claim.  
Although MJS contends that the discovery materials in this case 
are public documents because they have been generated in a 
lawsuit brought in the state court system involving a large 
public works project funded by public tax monies, this is, in 
the final analysis, a civil dispute between private litigants.  
As in Seattle Times, here there is no governmental entity or 
public official who is currently an active party to this 
litigation.  There are no allegations that public funds are in 
jeopardy in this lawsuit.  The underlying case is a tort action 
brought by private plaintiffs against a corporate entity; public 
issues and concerns are not in dispute.  The fact that this case 
arose from an accident at a public works project and has 
generated a great deal of publicity is not enough to transform 
this into the type of public controversy in which all documents 
are imbued with “public record” status. 
¶22 In Seattle Times, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that 
“pretrial 
depositions 
and 
interrogatories 
are 
not 
public 
components of a civil trial.”  Id. 467 U.S. at 33 (footnote 
omitted).  The court recognized that “[s]uch proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law. . . .”  Id.  Chief Justice 
Burger writing separately in another case asserted that “it has 
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial 
deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly 
private to the litigants.”  Gannett Company v. DePasquale, 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
16
443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979).  The same is true with respect to the 
discovery materials at issue here.  These are “wholly private to 
the litigants.” 
¶23 The issue in Seattle Times focused on the freedom of 
the press to publish pretrial discovery information rather than, 
as here, on the press’s right of access to such information; 
nevertheless, that case is instructive.  In Seattle Times, the 
newspaper was actually a defendant in a defamation action 
brought by Rhinehart, a leader of a religious group; the 
question was whether the newspaper could publish information it 
had gathered through the pretrial discovery process in the 
course of that civil litigation.  The state trial court granted 
Rhinehart a protective order prohibiting the newspaper from 
disseminating information obtained in the discovery process; 
that order, however, did not apply to information gained through 
means outside of the discovery process.  The protective order 
issued in Seattle Times was based on Washington’s Civil Rule 
26(c), which is almost identical to Wis. Stat. § 804.01(6).   
¶24 In Seattle Times, the United States Supreme Court 
viewed the crucial issue as being whether a protective order 
precluding the newspaper from disseminating information gathered 
during the pretrial discovery process was an infringement on 
that party’s First Amendment rights.  The Court concluded it was 
not.  Important to the Court’s analysis was the fact that the 
Washington 
discovery 
rules 
(like 
ours, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.01(2)(a)) provide for liberal discovery, not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial; the rules only require 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
17
that 
the 
information 
sought 
to 
be 
discovered 
is 
“not 
privileged,” is “relevant” and appears “reasonably calculated” 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  The Court 
pointed out that much of the information brought forth during 
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially 
related, to the underlying cause of action and that the 
discovery rules often allow extensive intrusion into the private 
affairs of both litigants and third parties.  Seattle Times, 
467 U.S. at 30-33.  Commenting on the private nature of the 
pretrial discovery process, the Court in Seattle Times stated 
that “pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public 
components of a civil trial.”  Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).  
Further, the Court noted that discovery rarely takes place in 
public and depositions are scheduled at times and places most 
convenient to those involved and that interrogatories are 
answered in private.  Id. at 33, n.19.   
¶25 In light of these factors, the United States Supreme 
Court in Seattle Times stated that restraints placed on 
discovered, but not yet admitted, information do not amount to a 
restriction on a traditionally public source of information.  
Id.  Accordingly, because of the unique character of the 
discovery process, trial courts have substantial latitude to 
fashion protective orders.  Id. at 36.  Therefore, the court 
held “that where . . . a protective order is entered on a 
showing of good cause . . . is limited to the context of 
pretrial 
civil 
discovery, 
and 
does 
not 
restrict 
the 
dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
18
it does not offend the First Amendment.”  Id. at 37 (footnote 
omitted).  The protective order in that case which prohibited 
the newspaper from disseminating discovered information before 
trial was not the kind of classic prior restraint that required 
an exacting First Amendment scrutiny.  Id. at 33.   
¶26 As noted, the instant case is not a restriction on the 
media to disseminate discovery information: Mitsubishi never 
asked for, and the circuit court never entered, a protective 
order (except for the gag order relating to the five Mitsubishi 
employees which is not challenged in this court).  Instead, this 
case involves the issue of whether MJS has a right of access to 
the discovery documents currently in possession of the private 
litigants in this case.  We have already concluded that there is 
no common law right of access to such discovery documents 
especially because they have not been filed in the circuit court 
nor have they been used to determine any substantive rights of 
the parties.  We also hold, for the reason suggested by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Seattle Times, that neither the 
media nor the public have a First Amendment right to have access 
to such pretrial discovery materials.   
¶27 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (1985) 
addressed the issue of whether there was a First Amendment right 
to court records of civil proceedings.  The court identified and 
analyzed the two-prong test utilized for determining whether the 
public has a First Amendment right of access to judicial 
proceedings:  (1) whether the proceeding has historically been 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
19
open, and (2) whether the right of access plays an essential 
role in the proper functioning of the judicial process and the 
government as a whole.  Id. at 1331.  Both those questions have 
to be answered affirmatively before a constitutional requirement 
of access could be imposed.  Id.  Judge Scalia, writing for the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, exhaustively 
examined 
historical 
tradition 
but 
found 
no 
clear, 
long-
established 
historical 
practice 
that 
would 
support 
the 
pronouncement of a constitutional rule precluding courts from 
treating the records of private civil actions as private matters 
until trial or judgment.  Then, applying a functional analysis 
to the issue of whether media access to pretrial discovery 
materials plays an essential role in the proper functioning of 
the judicial process, the court concluded that the press had no 
constitutional right of access to pretrial discovery materials 
until such materials had been admitted into evidence.  Judge 
Scalia read Seattle Times and Chief Justice Burger’s observation 
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 396, that pretrial 
depositions and interrogatories are “wholly private to the 
litigants,” as recognizing that the admission of evidence is the 
“touchstone” of a First Amendment right to public access.  
773 F.2d at 1338.  In other words, Judge Scalia believes there 
is no right of public access to discovery materials until such 
materials are actually admitted at trial.  The court went even 
further and held that until final judgment is entered, the 
district court could, without violating the First Amendment, 
categorically refuse to grant the press access to pretrial 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
20
discovery materials.  Specifically, the appeals court said that 
the press had no First Amendment entitlement to a document-by-
document determination of the need for a protective order prior 
to the entry of the final judgment.  Id.  Moreover, the court 
reasoned that a document-by-document justification for ordering 
trial exhibits to be sealed would be “simply unworkable” and 
“utterly infeasible.”  Id. 
¶28 In the instant case, the circuit court's suggestion 
that the parties have the burden to file motions for protective 
relief on a case-by-case or deposition-by-deposition basis would 
be subject to this same criticism: it is “simply unworkable” 
because of the burden it would impose on the circuit court, 
especially in a case where it is likely that the discovery 
process will be prolonged and extensive.   
¶29 The circuit court permitted MJS to intervene in this 
action for the limited purpose of obtaining access to the 
pretrial discovery material, not yet filed in the circuit court 
and much of which has not yet even been generated.  According to 
the court, the lawyers holding these depositions and discovery 
materials are “custodians of public records.”  From that 
premise, the circuit court found that MJS had a protectable 
legal interest permitting its intervention as a matter of right 
under Wis. Stat. § 809.03 to obtain access to these materials.  
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude this goes too far. 
 We hold that unfiled, pretrial discovery materials generated in 
a civil action between private parties are not public records 
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
21
and that neither the public nor MJS has either a common law or 
First Amendment right of access to such materials.6   
¶30 Because MJS has no common law or First Amendment right 
of access to the pretrial discovery materials it sought in this 
case, the circuit court erred in permitting MJS to intervene and 
erred in ordering the parties and their attorneys to provide 
copies of such materials upon request to MJS.  We deem the broad 
scope of the circuit court’s October 29, 1999 order to be a 
violation of the circuit court’s plain duty and of plain 
principles of law; accordingly, the petitioner has made a 
sufficient showing to justify supervisory relief.  See State ex  
rel. Beaudry v. Panosian, 35 Wis. 2d 418, 426, 151 N.W.2d 48 
(1967) and State ex rel. Newspapers v. Circuit Court, 124 Wis. 
2d at 513.  Therefore, we grant Mitsubishi’s petition for a 
supervisory writ to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing 
its October 29, 1999 order; we vacate the stay previously 
entered by this court on December 7, 1999, and we dismiss the 
petition for review in Case No. 99-2810-W.  We direct that 
further proceedings in this matter shall be conducted in 
accordance with this opinion. 
                     
6 We express no opinion concerning whether the parties may 
release to the media any depositions and discovery material the 
parties or their attorneys may have in their possession. Wis. 
Stat. § 804.01(6).  We only hold that the circuit court may not 
compel the parties or their attorneys to provide the media with 
access 
to 
such 
unfiled 
pretrial 
discovery 
materials.  
Accordingly, we vacate the stay previously entered in this 
matter which had the effect of precluding the parties or their 
attorneys from voluntarily providing the media with access to 
discovery materials.   
No. 99-2810-W, 99-3110-W 
 
22
 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
1 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  
The majority opinion’s holding is very narrow: “We hold that 
unfiled, pretrial discovery materials generated in a civil 
action between private parties are not public records and that 
neither the public nor MJS [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel] has 
either a common law or First Amendment right of access to such 
materials.”  Majority op. at ¶ 29 (emphasis added).  The 
majority repeatedly states its holding that the circuit court 
erred as a matter of law in providing the media with access to 
unfiled pretrial discovery material because access to unfiled 
pretrial discovery material is not protected by common law or 
the First Amendment.  Majority op. ¶¶ 2, 17, 20, 26, 29 and n.5 
(emphasis added). 
¶32 I can accept this narrow holding even though it 
elevates form over substance.  In this case the circuit court 
did not order the depositions in question to be filed in circuit 
court as is the court's prerogative under Wis. Stat. § 804.01(6) 
(1997-98).7  The circuit court did, however, exercise control 
over the depositions and in effect, ordered them filed and then 
released to the parties with instructions. 
¶33 As a result of the majority opinion, if the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel still wants access to the depositions, it 
should begin again in the circuit court.  The newspaper should, 
as it did in this matter, move to intervene in the action for 
                     
7 The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel does not assert in this 
court a right to sit in on depositions.  Rather, the newspaper 
seeks affirmation of the circuit court's order that deposition 
transcripts be provided to the newspaper. 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
2 
the limited purpose of seeking access to pretrial depositions.  
It should request the circuit court to order the depositions 
filed in circuit court and to authorize the newspaper to have 
access to the depositions.8  The circuit court may, in its 
discretion, then order release of all, part or none of the 
depositions filed in court.  Judicial restriction on access to 
pretrial discovery material is valid, when good cause is shown, 
such as potential harm to commercial, economic, privacy or 
reputational interests of parties or nonlitigants and the 
possible prejudice to the parties’ fair trial rights.  Wis. 
Stat. § 804.01(3) directs the circuit court to balance these 
concerns and to issue protective orders when appropriate.9  The 
circuit court’s exercise of discretion balances two competing 
principles fundamental to pretrial discovery: (1) The public at 
large pays for the courts; discovery is governed by the courts; 
the public has an interest in all stages of a judicial 
proceeding; and the subject of some cases involves a public 
                     
8 A motion to intervene for a limited purpose is the 
appropriate procedure.  See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Market-Makers 
Antitrust Litigation, 164 F.R.D. 346, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
9 The circuit court exercised its discretion in this case.  
Mitsubishi failed to seek a protective order, even when the 
circuit court invited such a request. 
Wis. Stat. § 804.01(3) provides: 
Protective orders.  (a) Upon motion by a party or by 
the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good 
cause shown, the court may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
or expense, including but not limited to one or more 
of the following . . . . 
 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
3 
interest; and (2) Pretrial discovery, unlike the trial itself, 
is usually conducted in private; the scope of discoverable 
information 
is 
broad, 
including 
material 
that 
cannot 
be 
introduced into evidence at trial; and pretrial discovery is 
designed for the party receiving it, not for strangers to the 
case. 
 
I 
¶34 The circuit court has express authority to order the 
depositions in question in the present case to be filed with the 
court.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 804.01(6) provides that the original 
copies of pretrial discovery material shall be retained by the 
party initiating the discovery “unless the court in any action 
orders otherwise” (emphasis added).10 
¶35 This reading of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 804.01(6) conforms 
to the historical development of the rule.  Until 1986 
deposition transcripts were filed with the circuit court 
immediately after they were taken.  Wis. Stat. § 804.05(7)(a) 
(1983-84).11  The deposition became part of the court record and 
                     
10 Wis. Stat. § 804.01(6) (1997-98) states: 
(6) Custody of discovery documents.  (a) Unless the 
court in any action orders otherwise, the original 
copies of all depositions, interrogatories, requests 
for 
admission 
and 
responses 
thereto, 
and 
other 
discovery documentation shall be retained by the party 
who initiated the discovery or that party's attorney. 
(b) The original copy of a deposition shall be 
retained by the attorney sealed as received from the 
person recording the testimony until the appeal period 
has expired, or until made a part of the record. 
 
11 Wis. Stat. § 804.05(7)(a) (1983-84) stated in part: 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
4 
apparently was available to the public pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.14 
(1983-84), 
subject 
to 
statutory 
and 
common 
law 
limitations on public access.12 
¶36 In 1986, pursuant to Supreme Court Order, Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
804.01(6) 
was 
created 
to 
provide 
that 
pretrial 
discovery material is retained by the parties rather than filed 
in circuit court unless the circuit court orders otherwise.  The 
drafting file for the newly created Wis. Stat. § 801.04(6) 
demonstrates that the only reason for the change was to ease the 
filing burden on the circuit courts and their clerks.13  The 1986 
amendment 
does 
not 
alter 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
deposition 
transcripts, which are documents that are under the custody and 
control of the circuit court. 
¶37 This reading of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 804.01(6) is 
consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5(d), which is 
the model for Wisconsin’s analogous § 804.01(6).14  Rule 5(d) 
                                                                  
The person [who recorded the deposition] shall then 
securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed 
with the title of the action and marked “Deposition of 
(here insert the name of the deponent)” and shall 
promptly file it with the court in which the action is 
pending . . . . 
 
12 For a discussion of limitations, see C.L. v. Edson, 140 
Wis. 2d 168, 180-82, 409 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1987). 
13 See Drafting File for Wis. Stat. § 801.04(6). 
14 Wis. Stat. § 804.01(3)(a) (regarding protective orders) 
is comparable to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c); 
Wis. Stat. § 804.01(6) is comparable to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 5(d). 
Rule 5(d) provides: 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
5 
states that discovery papers required to be served shall be 
filed with the district court unless the district court orders 
otherwise for discovery material.  Local rules in many federal 
district courts provide, as does Wis. Stat. § 804.01(6), that 
discovery material need not be filed with the district court 
except by order of the district court.  The federal Advisory 
Committee notes that accompany Rule 5(d) and a proposed 
amendment to change Rule 5(d) to read like § 804.01(6) state the 
Committee’s rationale clearly: Rule 5(d), the proposed amendment 
and the local rules embody the Committee’s concern that 
discovery material may be of interest to nonparties and that the 
general public should be afforded access to discovery material 
whenever possible.15 
¶38 Thus the fact that the depositions are now retained by 
parties pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 804.01(6) does not 
                                                                  
Filing; Certificate of Service.  All papers after the 
complaint required to be served upon a party, together 
with a certificate of service, shall be filed with the 
court within a reasonable time after service, but the 
court may on motion of a party or on its own 
initiative 
order 
that 
depositions 
upon 
oral 
examination 
and 
interrogatories, 
requests 
for 
documents, requests for admission, and answers and 
responses thereto not be filed unless on order of the 
court or for use in the proceeding. 
 
15 See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 
788-90 (1st Cir. 1988); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability 
Litigation, 821 F.2d 139, 145-47 (2d Cir. 1987); In re NASDAQ 
Market-Makers 
Antitrust 
Litigation, 
164 
F.R.D. 
346, 
354 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 581-83 (D. Nev. 
1990). 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
6 
change the circuit court's control over the depositions and the 
circuit court's power to order them filed in court. 
 
II 
¶39 The majority opinion does not address under what 
circumstances a nonparty may have access to depositions filed in 
circuit court.  The majority opinion merely holds that common law 
and the First Amendment do not require public access to unfiled 
pretrial discovery material. 
¶40 I need not discuss the common law or First Amendment 
rights to public access of pretrial discovery material that is 
filed in court.  The Wisconsin rules set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 
804 relating to discovery govern public access to filed pretrial 
discovery material.  The rules recognize that private litigants 
have protectable interests in information disclosed through 
discovery and afford means for protecting those interests.  
Public access is not permitted when good cause is shown to close 
access.  Wis. Stat. § 804.01(3)(a), like Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure Rule 26(c),16 provides in pertinent part that “[u]pon 
                     
16 Rule 26(c) provides: 
Protective Orders.  Upon motion by a party or by the 
person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a 
certification that the movant has in good faith 
conferred or attempted to confer with other affected 
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without 
court action, and for good cause shown, the court in 
which the action is pending or alternatively, on 
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
7 
motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is 
sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, 
embarrassment, 
oppression, 
or 
undue 
burden 
or 
expense . . . .”  Thus a party may seek a protective order to 
limit access to pretrial discovery material if the party shows 
good cause.  “[T]he obverse also is true, i.e. if good cause is 
not shown, the discovery materials in question should not 
receive judicial protection and therefore would be open to the 
public for inspection.”17  In other words, unless the public has 
access to discovery material under the law, a party would not 
need a court order seeking to protect the material.18 
III 
¶41 I conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 804.01(3) and 
804.01(6) permit a person, including the media, to intervene in 
an action for the limited purpose of asking the court to order 
pretrial discovery material to be filed in the court and to 
order access to the filed pretrial discovery material.  I 
further conclude that the circuit court must exercise its 
discretion in determining whether to allow access to all, part 
                                                                  
undue burden or expense, including one or more of the 
following . . . . 
 
17 In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 821 
F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
18 See also Wis. Stat. § 885.44(13)(a) regarding videotaped 
depositions, 
which 
expressly 
provides 
that 
a 
copy 
of 
a 
videotaped deposition or a written transcript or audio recording 
shall be provided to any party or other person authorized by the 
court. 
No. 99-3110.ssa 
 
8 
or none of the pretrial discovery material that is filed.  
Judicial restriction on access to filed pretrial discovery 
material is valid, under the rules, when good cause is shown, 
including potential harm to commercial, economic, privacy or 
reputational interests of parties or nonlitigants and the 
possible prejudice to the parties’ fair trial rights.  Federal 
courts that have examined the analogous federal rules have 
reached conclusions similar to the ones I reach.19 
¶42 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
 
                     
19 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 
F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir. 1988); In re “Agent Orange” Product 
Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1987); In re 
NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 164 F.R.D. 346, 351-
54 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 581-83 (D. 
Nev. 1990).