Title: Flynn v. Ryan

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90263-Agenda 17-September 2001.
PATRICK L. FLYNN et al., Appellees, v. GEORGE H. RYAN
et al., Appellants.
	At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of Public Act
90-737 (the Act) (Pub. Act 90-737, eff. January 1, 1999)), an
enactment that, inter alia, created the State Gift Ban Act (5 ILCS
425/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Plaintiffs Patrick Flynn, a former
village trustee of the Village of New Lenox, and State Senator
Dennis Jacobs, filed a declaratory judgment suit in the circuit court
of Will County against defendants Governor George H. Ryan and
Attorney General James E. Ryan, challenging the constitutionality
of the Act. The circuit court held that the Act was invalid in its
entirety. Defendants directly appeal to this court pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND
	The Act created the State Gift Ban Act and amended various
other statutes relating to matters of governmental ethics. The Act
generally prohibits state officials and employees in the three
branches of government, as well as their spouses and certain
immediate family members, from soliciting or accepting gifts from
"prohibited source[s]," including persons who are seeking official
action by, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated
by public officials or employees. 5 ILCS 425/5, 10 (West 2000).
The Act sets forth 23 exceptions to this prohibition. 5 ILCS 425/15
(West 2000). The exceptions relevant to this case are as follows:
			"(21) Golf or tennis; food or refreshments of nominal
value and catered food or refreshments; meals or
beverages consumed on the premises from which they
were purchased.
			***
			(23) An item of nominal value such as a greeting card,
baseball cap, or T-shirt." 5 ILCS 425/15 (21), (23) (West
2000).
	The Act also mandates that ethics officers be designated for
the various branches of government. 5 ILCS 425/35 (West 2000).
The officers have a duty to "provide guidance to members,
officers, employees, and judges in the interpretation and
implementation of [the] Act." 5 ILCS 425/35(2) (West 2000).
	Violators of the Act are penalized in two ways. The first is
criminal prosecution and a fine of $5,000. 5 ILCS 425/70 (West
2000). The second mechanism applies to public officials and
employees. Under the Public Act 90-737, each branch of
government is required to create an ethics commission. These
commissions may hear complaints against persons falling under
their jurisdiction and may also impose a fine. 5 ILCS 425/45(a)(1)
through (a)(7), 60(e) (West 2000). A commission may also
recommend further sanctions to the violator's "ultimate
jurisdictional authority," including "[d]ismissal, removal from
office, impeachment, or expulsion." 5 ILCS 425/65(a)(4) (West
2000). The ultimate jurisdictional authority may then "take
disciplinary action against the person as recommended by a
commission or as it deems appropriate, to the extent it is
constitutionally permissible for the ultimate jurisdictional
authority to take that action." 5 ILCS 425/65(c) (West 2000).
	Section 83 of the Act requires units of local government to
prohibit the solicitation and acceptance of gifts by public officials.
Section 83 provides in relevant part:
			"Within 6 months after the effective date of this Act,
units of local government, home rule units, and school
districts shall prohibit the solicitation and acceptance of
gifts, and shall enforce those prohibitions, in a manner
substantially in accordance with the requirements of this
Act and shall adopt provisions no less restrictive than the
provisions of this Act. Non-salaried appointed or elected
officials may be exempted." 5 ILCS 425/83 (West 2000).
	Public Act 90-737 also amended the Election Code (10 ILCS
5/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)) in two significant respects. First, the
Act amended section 9-8.15 of the Election Code. That section
now provides:
			"Contributions shall not be knowingly offered or
accepted on a face-to-face basis by public officials or
employees or by candidates on State property except as
provided in this Section." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS
5/9-8.15 (West 2000).
	Public Act 90-737 also amended section 9-23 of the Election
Code, authorizing the State Board of Elections to impose a civil
penalty of up to $5,000 against persons who fail or refuse to
comply with various Board orders issued under article 9 of the
Code. The following language was also added to section 9-23:
			"The name of a person who has not paid a civil penalty
imposed against him or her under this Section shall not
appear upon any ballot for any office in any election while
the penalty is unpaid." 10 ILCS 5/9-23 (West 2000).
	In March 1999, plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint, seeking
a declaration that Public Act 90-737 was unconstitutional and an
injunction against enforcement of the Act. We note that plaintiffs
had not been charged with any violation of the Act at the time they
filed their lawsuit.
	Count I of the complaint alleged that the Act violated the
separation of powers provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. II, §2) in two ways: (1) by creating standards of
ethical conduct for members of the executive and judicial branches
of government; and (2) by creating mandatory mechanisms for the
executive and judicial branches to enforce those standards. See 5
ILCS 425/35 (West 2000); 5 ILCS 425/45(a)(1) through (a)(7)
(West 2000).
	Count II alleged that the Act violates article IV, section 14, of
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §14) by
providing for a method to remove executive and judicial branch
officials. See 5 ILCS 425/65(a)(4) (West 2000).
	Count III alleged that the Act's amendment to section 9-23 of
the Election Code unconstitutionally imposed an additional
requirement for holding statewide office. That section provides as
follows:
			"The name of a person who has not paid a civil penalty
imposed against him or her under this Section shall not
appear upon any ballot for any office in any election while
the penalty is unpaid." 10 ILCS 5/9-23 (West 2000).
	Count IV of the complaint alleged that the Act was passed in
violation of the single subject provision of the Illinois Constitution
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)).
	Finally, count V alleged that several provisions of the Act
were unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process
clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). In
particular, count V challenged the lucidity of the definitions of
"[g]olf or tennis" (5 ILCS 425/15(21) (West 2000)), items of
"nominal value" (5 ILCS 425/15(23) (West 2000)), and "State
property" (10 ILCS 5/9-8.15 (West 2000)). Count V also alleged
that section 83 of the Act, requiring units of local government to
implement their own gift prohibitions, does not adequately apprize
local officials of what is required by the law.
	Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, in part, arguing
that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the aspects of the Act
related to the executive and judicial branches of government. The
trial court dismissed count IV of the complaint. The parties then
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In their motion,
plaintiffs claimed, in part, that they had standing to raise their
arguments as potential "prohibited sources," i.e., gift-givers, under
the Act.
	Following a hearing on the cross-motions, the trial court
issued a written order. The court found, among other things, that:
(1) plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Act as "prohibited
sources" under the Act; (2) the Act is unconstitutionally vague; (3)
the Act violates the separation of powers provision of the Illinois
Constitution; (4) the Act contravenes article IV, section 14, of the
Illinois Constitution by providing an additional means to
accomplish the removal of executive and judicial branch officials;
(5) the Act unconstitutionally imposes an additional requirement
for persons holding public office; and (6) the offending provisions
of the Act are too mutually connected to be severed from the
remainder of the Act.
	Defendants now appeal, primarily arguing that (1) the trial
court erred by invalidating portions of the Act on its face on
vagueness grounds where plaintiffs did not allege a first
amendment interest at stake in the Act; and (2) plaintiffs lacked
standing to raise arguments regarding alleged encroachments upon
the powers of the executive and judicial branches of government
because neither plaintiff is an official of the executive or judicial
branch of government.
II. ANALYSIS
	All statutes are presumed to be constitutional. People v.
Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). The party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute has the burden of rebutting this
presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation.
People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 526 (2001). We review de novo
a circuit court's holding that a statute is unconstitutional. People
v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2000). 
	Before addressing the merits of the circuit court's conclusion
regarding the constitutionality of the Act, however, there is a
threshold matter to consider. That is, did plaintiffs have standing
to raise all or any of their constitutional claims. Standing is a
preliminary question in all declaratory judgment actions. Illinois
Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 450 (1979). 
	In Illinois, standing is shown by demonstrating "some injury
in fact to a legally cognizable interest." Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1993). There are two components to the standing
requirement in the context of declaratory judgment actions. There
must be an "actual controversy" between adverse parties, and the
party seeking the declaratory judgment must be "interested" in the
controversy. Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d at 170-71; Gamefowl
Breeders, 75 Ill. 2d  at 450-51, quoting Underground Contractors
Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375-76 (1977). 
	In defining these components, this court has stated that the
"actual controversy" requirement 
		" 'does not mean that a wrong must have been committed
and injury inflicted. Rather, it requires a showing that the
underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or
premature, so as to require the court to pass judgment on
mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory
opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.
[Citations.] The case must, therefore, present a concrete
dispute admitting of an immediate and definitive
determination of the parties' rights, the resolution of
which will aid in the termination of the controversy or
some part thereof. [Citations.]
			The second, and somewhat related requirement, is that
the party seeking the declaration must be 'interested in the
controversy.' [Citation.] The word, 'interested' does not
mean merely having a curiosity about or a concern for the
outcome of the controversy. Rather, the party seeking
relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which
is capable of being affected. [Citations.] The dispute
must, therefore, touch the legal relations of parties who
stand in a position adverse to one another.' " Gamefowl
Breeders, 75 Ill. 2d  at 450-51, quoting Underground
Contractors Ass'n, 66 Ill. 2d  at 375-76.
Accord Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d  at 170-71.
	Thus, to have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action
challenging the validity of a statute, one must have sustained, or
be in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of
enforcement of the statute. Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d  at 171;
Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill. 2d  at 451.
	Applying these standards to the case at bar, it is clear that
plaintiffs lack standing to advance any of the claims they raised in
the circuit court. 
	Plaintiffs' first argument is that certain sections of the Gift
Ban Act are unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs contend that they
have standing to raise this argument because they are subject to the
terms and provisions of the Act, including the Act's enforcement
provisions (5 ILCS 425/65, 70 (West 2000)). In addition, they
claim they are "prohibited sources" under the Act. See 5 ILCS
425/5 (West 2000). Plaintiffs, however, do not suggest that they
have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining
disciplinary action or any direct injury under the Act, nor do they
even claim that they have given or would like to give a prohibited
gift under the Act. In short, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining a direct injury as
a result of enforcement of the challenged statute. Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d  at 171; Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill. 2d  at 451; see also
People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 320-21 (1992) (person has no
standing to challenge section of criminal statute under which he
had not been charged). Thus their challenge requests this court to
issue an advisory opinion. This we cannot do.(1) See, e.g., Chicago
Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000) ("[a] fundamental rule of
constitutional law is that a court will not determine the
constitutionality of a provision of a statute which does not affect
the parties to the cause under consideration"). 
	Another of plaintiffs' arguments alleges that the Act violates
separation of powers. This argument targets the Act's creation of
standards of ethical conduct for members of the executive and
judicial branches of government and the creation of mechanisms
to enforce those standards. Neither plaintiff has claimed to be a
member of the executive or judicial branch of government,
however. As a result, again, neither plaintiff is an "interested
party" (Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d  at 171; Gamefowl Breeders, 75 Ill.
2d at 451) with a personal claim, status, or right capable of being
affected by a determination that the Act violates separation of
powers. For the same reason, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue
their claim that the Act violates article IV, section 14, of the
Illinois Constitution by providing an additional means to
accomplish the removal of judicial and executive branch officials.
	Finally, we turn to plaintiffs' argument that the Act
unconstitutionally imposed an additional requirement for holding
statewide office by providing that the name of a person who has
not paid a previously imposed civil penalty under the Election
Code "shall not appear upon any ballot for any office." 10 ILCS
5/9-23 (West 2000). As detailed above, standing in this context
not only requires an "interested party," but also an "actual
controversy." While a wrong need not have been committed and
an injury inflicted, there must be a concrete dispute where a
definitive and immediate determination of the rights of the parties
is possible. Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d  at 170-71. Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that there is a concrete dispute in this case. Neither
of the plaintiffs has alleged that he has been subject to or
threatened with being removed from a ballot as provided by
section 9-23. In fact, neither plaintiff has alleged that a civil
penalty has ever been imposed against him under the Election
Code such that he would be in danger of being removed from a
ballot. Accordingly, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this claim as
well.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred by
declaring Public Act 90-737 unconstitutional. The complaint
should have been dismissed in its entirety because plaintiffs lacked
standing to urge any of the constitutional claims they raised.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment invalidating
Public Act 90-737.
 
 
1.      There is some question whether we should consider plantiffs'
standing to raise their vagueness challenge to the Gift Ban Act.
Before the circuit court defendants unsuccessfully challenged
plaintiffs' standing to bring any of the challenges they raised.
Before this court, defendants renew most of their standing
challenges. But in their reply brief, defendants state that they "do
not question the plaintiffs' right to contest some aspects of the law
(e.g., the gift ban prohibition and related exceptions)." (Emphasis
in original.) Because lack of standing is an affirmative defense (In
re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492, 496 (2001); Greer v. Illinois Housing
Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 494 (1988)), it could be
argued that defendants have waived the standing issue. 
	Nevertheless, we choose to consider plaintiffs' standing to
bring their vagueness challenge. As this court has many times
stated, waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation on
the powers of this court. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (1995);
In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 274 (1994). Moreover, it is a well-established rule that this court will not address the constitutionality
of a statute if the case may be decided on other grounds. See, e.g.,
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 492 (1998); In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 479 (1997). And in declaratory judgment actions, standing
is a preliminary question which should be considered at the outset.
Gamefowl Breeders Ass'n, 75 Ill. 2d  at 450. Accordingly, we find
it is proper to consider plaintiffs' standing to bring their vagueness
challenge before evaluating the merits of the argument.