Title: Diaz v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CESAR DIAZ,
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No. 584, 2012
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for New Castle County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Cr. I.D. No. 1111008581
Plaintiff Below, 
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  October 9, 2013
Decided:  December 11, 2013
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 11th  day of December, 2013, on consideration of the briefs of the parties,
it appears to the Court that:
1) Cesar Diaz appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of one count
of drug dealing.  His only claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to disclose the identity of the police confidential informant
(CI).  We find no merit to this claim and affirm.
2) On November 11, 2011, a CI told Wilmington Police Detective Hector
Cuadrado that an Hispanic male would be driving a Buick Rendezvous between
Philadelphia and Wilmington, carrying a “load of cocaine” in a hidden compartment.1
The CI also told Cuadrado when it would happen and the route the car would take.
3) Detective Raymond Mullin, and other members of the Wilmington Police
Department, set up surveillance along I-95 at the date and time given by the CI. 
When they spotted the car, they followed it.  The car was traveling at a high speed
and changed lanes several times without signaling.  The police stopped the car and
took the driver, Diaz, into custody.
4) After receiving Miranda warnings, Diaz denied knowing anything about
drugs being in the car.  He signed a consent-to-search form, and the police found
cocaine hidden in a secret compartment under the back seat.  Mullin then asked Diaz
about the drugs.  Eventually, Diaz told him that the drugs belonged to “his cousin or
his wife’s cousin.”2  
5) Diaz was charged with drug dealing, aggravated possession of cocaine,
improper lane change and traveling at an unsafe speed.  Before trial, he requested that
1 Appellant’s Appendix, A- 18.
2 Id. at A-21.
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the trial court conduct a “Flowers” hearing3 to determine whether the State would
have to disclose the identity of the CI.  After the hearing, the trial court denied Diaz’s
motion to disclose the CI’s identity, but did require the State to concede that the CI
never identified Diaz as the likely driver.  Diaz was found guilty of drug dealing.  The
State nolle prossed the remaining charges.
6) Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 509, the State has a privilege to withhold
the identity of a CI unless it appears that the CI would provide testimony that would
“materially aid the defense.”4  The Flowers court noted four common situations where
a CI becomes involved in a criminal investigation:  “(1) The informer is used merely
to establish probable cause for a search.  (2) The informer witnesses the criminal act. 
(3) The informer participates but is not a party to the illegal transaction.  (4) The
informer is an actual party to the illegal transaction.”5  In this case, the CI’s
information only established probable cause, which is a situation where no disclosure
is required.6
3 See:  State v. Flowers, 316 A.2D 564 (Del. Super. 1973).
4 D.R.E. 509(a),(c)(2).
5 Flowers, 316 A.2d at 567.
6 Ibid.
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7) Nonetheless, Diaz complains that the trial court abused its discretion in
conducting the  Flowers hearing.  The only person who testified was Detective Guy
DeBonaventura, an officer who did not know, or have any direct information about,
the CI.  Diaz contends that, if the CI were available to the defense, the CI might
testify that Diaz was not a trusted associate of the drug “kingpin,” and that testimony
would support his claim that he did not know that there were drugs hidden in the car
he was driving.
8) This argument fails for two reasons.  First, it is entirely speculative.7 
Second, such testimony would not materially aid the defense.  Diaz admitted to two
officers that he did know there were drugs in the car.  The CI would not be in a
position to testify that Diaz did not know about the drugs.  The most the CI could
have said is that the “kingpin” would not have told Diaz about the drugs.  A statement
like that would do little to establish Diaz’s actual knowledge.
9) In sum, because the CI’s only involvement with the police was to provide
probable cause, the limited Flowers hearing, which in other circumstances might not
have been acceptable, was adequate.  For the same reason, there was no abuse of
discretion in denying Diaz’s request to obtain the CI’s identity.
7 See:  Hooks v. State, 1992 WL 219078 at *3 (Del. Supr. 1992).
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice
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