Title: State v. Schaefer

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,915 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
TONY B. SCHAEFER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), for good cause shown and within 
the discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged.   
 
2. 
Three factors are commonly utilized as a starting point for the determination of 
whether a defendant has shown good cause to withdraw a plea, to-wit:  (1) whether the 
defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, 
coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly 
and understandingly made. But a court should not ignore other factors impacting a plea 
withdrawal that might exist in a particular case. 
 
3. 
A person seeking to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest does not necessarily 
have to establish that his or her counsel provided unconstitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
Where the facts of a particular case show no more than a remote possibility that 
the person entering a plea of guilty or no contest to a sexually violent offense will be 
involuntarily committed pursuant to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act upon 
completion of the person's prison term, the failure of defense counsel to advise the person 
of that remote possibility does not, standing alone, establish counsel's representation as 
being ineffective for plea withdrawal purposes.   
 
5. 
Viewing all of the provisions of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act as a 
whole reveals that the Act contemplates that the State must prove that a person actually 
committed the acts constituting a sexually violent offense before that person is subject to 
involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator. 
 
6. 
A person's plea of guilty or no contest to a sexually violent offense enhances that 
person's exposure to a subsequent proceeding under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator 
Act and such a plea prejudices the person's ability to defend against a Kansas Sexually 
Violent Predator Act petition. Nevertheless, if a person's knowledge of the potential for 
proceedings under the Act would not have changed that person's decision to plead guilty 
or no contest to a sexually violent offense, then the failure of the criminal defense counsel 
to provide the person with knowledge of the Act does not establish good cause for the 
withdrawal of the plea. 
 
7. 
As a general rule, an appellate court will give deference to a district court's ability 
to personally observe the proceedings below and will not overturn a trial court's weighing 
of the evidence or assessment of the witnesses' credibility based upon a cold record.  
3 
 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 15, 2014. 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; MARK S. BRAUN, judge. Opinion filed December 23, 2016. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.   
 
Caroline M. Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Johnathan M. 
Grube, of the same office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Jodi E. Litfin, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Pursuant to an agreement that his attorney negotiated with the 
prosecutor, Tony B. Schaefer pled nolo contendere (no contest) to amended on-grid 
charges of rape and attempted rape. But prior to sentencing, Schaefer moved to withdraw 
his plea, arguing that the requisite good cause for withdrawal existed because his trial 
counsel had failed to advise him that his plea exposed him to possible involuntary civil 
commitment under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA); his trial counsel 
and her law partner coerced him to accept the negotiated plea bargain; and his 
prescription drugs caused a faulty mental state that rendered ineffectual the colloquy with 
the judge at the plea hearing. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion to 
withdraw plea and proceeded to sentencing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
This court granted Schaefer's petition for review. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the 
district court, albeit we do not embrace all of the lower courts' reasoning.   
 
4 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
In August 2010, the State filed a criminal complaint against Tony Schaefer, 
charging him with one count of rape of a child under 14 by an adult, in violation of 
K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(2). The State alleged that Schaefer had digitally penetrated the vagina 
of a friend's 13-year-old daughter and that, in an interview with the Topeka Police 
Department, he had admitted doing so. Schaefer moved to suppress inculpatory post-
arrest statements he made, but, after a hearing, the district court denied the motion.   
 
After the State amended the complaint to reduce the severity level of the rape 
count from an off-grid felony to a level 1 on-grid felony and to add an attempted rape 
count, Schaefer agreed to plead no contest to both counts. In his written agreement with 
the State, Schaefer acknowledged that his plea could subject him to sex offender 
registration, as well as imprisonment and postrelease supervision. The agreement did not 
mention the possibility of involuntary civil commitment under the KSVPA, following 
Schaefer's prison term. It did include Schaefer's assurance that he was not under the 
influence of any substances and that he was in a fit state of mind to enter the plea.  
 
At the plea hearing, the district court conducted an extensive colloquy with 
Schaefer. It reviewed the changes in the amended complaint, the sentencing grid 
applicable to the charged offenses, the mandatory term of postrelease supervision, the 
potential sentences for the two counts, and the likelihood that the two sentences would 
run consecutive to one another. After the court observed that Schaefer had a minimal 
criminal history, defense counsel related that Schaefer had confirmed that he only had 
one prior misdemeanor and no out-of-state issues.   
 
The court further advised, and Schaefer acknowledged, that he would be subject to 
sex offender registration for life. After advising Schaefer of the trial rights he would 
5 
 
 
 
surrender by pleading no contest, the court verified that he was currently in a fit mental 
state notwithstanding a prior head injury. Schaefer assured the court that he had read the 
plea agreement and reviewed it with his counsel; that he was not being coerced into 
entering the plea; that the written plea agreement was the entire agreement he had with 
the State; and that no other promise had induced him to plead no contest to the charges. 
After waiving a formal reading of the complaint, Schaefer signed the written plea 
agreement in open court and formally entered a no contest plea to both counts of the 
amended complaint. The district court found a sufficient factual basis to support the plea 
and adjudged Schaefer guilty on both counts. 
 
Subsequently, but before sentencing, Schaefer's then-serving appointed attorney 
moved to withdraw as counsel, indicating that Schaefer had told her that he wished to 
withdraw his plea. The reason proffered for Schaefer's plea change was his assertion that, 
due to a change in medication, he was unable to remember counsel explaining the 
sentencing elements of his no contest plea. The district court granted the attorney's 
withdrawal motion.  
 
Thereafter, replacement counsel moved to allow Schaefer to withdraw his no 
contest plea. Schaefer asserted that his plea hearing attorney pressured him to enter into 
the plea agreement and rushed him through the plea process just prior to trial with no 
time for him to review the entire agreement. He also argued that the portion of the plea 
agreement waiving any direct appeal and/or collateral attack was insufficient because it 
failed to advise him that ineffective assistance of counsel would be a ground to seek 
habeas corpus relief. Finally, he contended that his plea hearing attorney had failed to 
advise him that, due to a prior out-of-state sexual allegation involving a minor, he was 
subject to civil commitment under the KSVPA.   
 
6 
 
 
 
The State responded that Schaefer's claim that his plea had been rushed was belied 
by the fact that it was entered 1 and 1/2 years after he was charged and after he had 
received advice from five different appointed attorneys. The State also pointed to 
Schaefer's representations to the plea hearing judge that no one had pressured him into 
the agreement. Additionally, the State contended that any alleged defects in the appeal 
waiver provision of the written plea agreement would not invalidate the plea that 
Schaefer proffered in open court. Finally, the State argued that treatment under the 
KSVPA would only be a collateral consequence of the plea, so that being advised of that 
potential was not a prerequisite to entering the plea.   
 
Further, the State asserted that merely being charged with a sexually violent 
offense was sufficient to subject a person to KSVPA proceedings. Therefore, the State 
argued, because the plea did not increase Schaefer's exposure to an involuntary 
commitment under the KSVPA, counsel's failure to advise Schaefer of the possibility of 
such commitment before the plea was not prejudicial.   
 
Both Schaefer and his plea hearing attorney testified at the plea withdrawal 
hearing. Schaefer said that he was rushed to make a decision because of his impending 
trial; that he was coerced by his attorney and her husband/law partner to abandon his 
desire to go to trial; that, when he entered the plea agreement, he was confused, dizzy, 
and experiencing difficulty connecting thoughts because of his medication for a prior 
traumatic brain injury (TBI); and that he was unaware that he could face indefinite civil 
commitment under the KSVPA based on his pleading no contest to rape of a minor.  
 
The plea hearing attorney described her interaction with Schaefer, including her 
advice that Schaefer should consider a plea agreement that would eliminate off-grid 
sentencing. The attorney related that Schaefer had rejected the first agreement she 
reached with the prosecutor because the length of the recommended sentence was too 
7 
 
 
 
long. After the attorney renegotiated the plea offer to shorten the recommended sentence 
by 1 year, Schaefer willingly accepted it. The attorney denied that either she or her 
husband had threatened Schaefer and noted that Schaefer appeared at all times to be in a 
right frame of mind to consider his options. With respect to the possibility of a KSVPA 
commitment, the attorney related that her file indicated that she had researched its 
applicability but that she did not believe she had discussed the KSVPA with Schaefer. 
She opined that she would not have felt the need to discuss the KSVPA with Schaefer 
because of his seeming lack of the requisite mental disorder to invoke that procedure. On 
the other hand, she denied making any affirmative representation to Schaefer that he 
would not be subject to the KSVPA. 
 
The district court took the matter under advisement. Schaefer relied in part on 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367-69, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that a defense attorney's failure to advise his 
or her client that a conviction would lead to deportation was constitutionally deficient 
performance.   
 
In a written order, the district court denied Schaefer's motion to withdraw plea, 
concluding that Schaefer was represented by competent counsel; that no credible 
evidence supported Schaefer's claim that his attorney and her husband/law partner 
pressured him to accept the plea agreement; that, despite any concerns about Schaefer's 
head injury, he had sufficient time to review and reflect on the plea agreement before 
entering into it; that Schaefer's plea was fairly and understandingly made; that his 
attorney's testimony regarding the attorney/client relationship was more credible than 
Schaefer's; that any errors in the appeal waiver provision of the written plea agreement 
did not invalidate the plea that Schaefer entered in open court; and that his attorney did 
not fail to advise Schaefer that his brain injury could be grounds for a diminished 
capacity defense.  
8 
 
 
 
 
With respect to the KSVPA issue, the district court found that the attorney had 
neither advised Schaefer of the possibility of involuntary commitment nor affirmatively 
asserted that the KSVPA did not apply to him; the KSVPA was simply not discussed 
between attorney and client. The district court distinguished Padilla as involving an 
automatic deportation for a noncitizen's drug offense convictions, whereas a KSVPA 
commitment was only a possibility that would require further findings. The district court 
pointed to the fact that the plea agreement recommended a sentence that was 
considerably shorter than the 25-to-life sentence Schaefer would have received if found 
guilty at trial under the original complaint and concluded that the result would not have 
been different if the attorney had advised her client of the KSVPA. Finally, the district 
court opined that Schaefer was not prejudiced by pleading to the charges without being 
notified about the KSVPA because his being charged with a sex offense had already 
exposed him to a KSVPA commitment under the provisions of that act. 
 
Thereafter, the district court sentenced Schaefer to 155 months' imprisonment on 
the rape count, a consecutive 59 months on the attempted rape count, and lifetime 
postrelease supervision. The district court advised Schaefer that he had to register as a 
sex offender for 10 years after he was released. 
 
Schaefer appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, albeit with one judge filing a 
concurring opinion. State v. Schaefer, No. 109,915, 2014 WL 4080152 (Kan. App. 2014) 
(unpublished opinion). We granted Schaefer's petition for review.   
 
DENIAL OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
 
Schaefer first contends that the district court erred in finding an absence of good 
cause to support his presentencing motion to withdraw his no contest plea. He argues that 
9 
 
 
 
his testimony established good cause for a number of reasons and that the district court 
failed to apply the correct legal standard in assessing the evidence.   
 
Standard of Review 
 
Generally, a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Freeman, 292 Kan. 24, 27, 253 P.3d 1 (2011) (quoting 
State v. Schow, 287 Kan. 529, 541, 197 P.3d 825 [2008]). Judicial action constitutes an 
abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on 
an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 
P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). The defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating the abuse of discretion, but the district court's decision must have been 
based on a correct understanding of the law to receive the full deference of that review 
standard. Freeman, 292 Kan. at 27-28.  
 
In Kansas, the withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea is governed by statute, i.e., 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(d). Procedures under the KSVPA are likewise governed by 
statutory provisions, i.e., K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. Accordingly, to the extent our decision 
turns on statutory interpretation, we are presented a question of law, subject to unlimited 
review. State v. Eddy, 299 Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014).   
 
Analysis 
 
We start our analysis of Schaefer's claim that he was denied his statutory right to 
withdraw his no contest plea by looking at the statutory language creating that right: 
 
 
"(d)(1) A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the 
discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged.  
10 
 
 
 
 
 
"(2) To correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the 
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea." K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 22-3210(d)(1), (2). 
 
As previously noted, Schaefer's motion to withdraw plea was filed, heard, and 
denied before his sentence was adjudged. Accordingly, his burden under the statute was 
to show good cause as to why he should be granted leave to withdraw his plea. He did not 
have to establish that a manifest injustice needed to be corrected. 
 
Historically, Kansas courts reviewing the denial of plea withdrawal requests have 
relied heavily on an assessment of three factors, recently referred to as the Edgar factors 
after State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006), to-wit:  (1) whether the 
defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, 
coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly 
and understandingly made. State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511-12, 231 P.3d 563 (2010) 
(discussing history of the three factors). But Aguilar clarified that, while the Edgar 
factors are "viable benchmarks for judicial discretion," a court should not ignore other 
factors that might exist in a particular case. Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 512-13; see also State v. 
Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 856, 249 P.3d 425 (2011) ("The district court also may consider 
other factors when determining whether good cause is shown."). 
 
Schaefer pays tribute to the Edgar factors by arguing that he was not competently 
represented because his attorney exerted undue pressure on him to accept the plea 
agreement, refusing to take "no" for his answer, and because the attorney failed to inform 
him that civil commitment under the KSVPA was a potential consequence of the plea. As 
a result, Schaefer claims to have been coerced and misled which would establish the 
second factor. Under the third factor, Schaefer contends that his plea could not have been 
11 
 
 
 
fairly and understandably made because he was not in the right frame of mind due to the 
effects of his TBI medications and the exhaustion his attorneys had induced.   
 
But in addition, Schaefer contends that the district court erred by ignoring any 
factors other than the three Edgar factors, which Aguilar specifically disapproved. 
Consequently, Schaefer claims that the district court abused its discretion by applying an 
incorrect legal standard. We take the liberty of quickly disposing of this contention first. 
 
 
Correct Legal Standard 
 
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the district court issued a thorough 
memorandum decision detailing its reasons for denying Schaefer's motion to withdraw 
plea. The court considered the points raised by Schaefer's testimony at the motion to 
withdraw hearing, albeit those assertions were considered against the backdrop of his 
attorney's testimony, as well as Schaefer's unequivocal statements at the plea hearing. 
The fact that the court made credibility determinations adverse to Schaefer does not mean 
that the court ignored factors germane to the issue of plea withdrawal. Moreover, the 
court considered the context in which the plea was made, including the significant 
reduction in recommended prison time resulting from the plea agreement. In short, the 
record on appeal belies Schaefer's claim that the district court applied an incorrect legal 
standard by ignoring relevant factors.  
 
Attorney Competence 
 
With respect to the competence of counsel, Schaefer complained that his attorney 
committed both an error of omission and an error of commission. The alleged omission 
was his attorney's failure to advise him that civil commitment under the KSVPA was a 
potential consequence of his plea. The alleged error of commission was coercing 
12 
 
 
 
Schaefer to accept a plea agreement when he had repeatedly said he wanted to go to trial. 
Schaefer points out that he does not have to prove that his attorney was unconstitutionally 
ineffective, but rather "[m]erely lackluster advocacy . . . may be plenty to support the first 
Edgar factor and thus statutory good cause for presentence withdrawal of a plea." 
Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 513.     
 
The Court of Appeals majority rejected Schaefer's claim of omission, relying, in 
part, on Bussell v. State, 25 Kan. App. 2d 424, 963 P.2d 1250 (1998), rev. denied 266 
Kan. 1107 (1998). Schaefer, 2014 WL 4080152, at *5. Bussell rejected a similar 
challenge to the denial of a postsentencing motion to withdraw plea, noting that a civil 
commitment under KSVPA is the product of a separate discretionary proceeding and 
determining that "[t]he uncertainty inherent in predicting whether the KSVPA will ever 
be invoked against defendant is such that the failure of his counsel to advise him of 
potential consequences cannot be said to be constitutionally deficient." 25 Kan. App. 2d 
at 428.   
 
But the postsentence plea withdrawal in Bussell was statutorily limited to 
correcting a manifest injustice. Here, we are presented with a presentence plea 
withdrawal motion with a good cause standard that Aguilar clarified does not require a 
demonstration that the movant was denied his or her constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In other words, it is possible that, under some circumstances, the 
failure of counsel to advise his or her client of the possibility of commitment under the 
KSVPA before the client pleads to a sexually violent offense would constitute good cause 
for the client to withdraw his or her plea before sentencing, notwithstanding that 
counsel's performance could not be deemed constitutionally deficient.  
 
Nevertheless, the panel makes a valid point. An involuntary commitment under 
the KSVPA is not an automatic consequence of a plea to a crime designated as a sexually 
13 
 
 
 
violent offense. First, to be a sexually violent predator subject to commitment, a person 
must not only commit a sexually violent offense, but he or she must "suffer[] from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in 
repeat acts of sexual violence." K.S.A. 59-29a02(a). Obviously, not all persons convicted 
of a qualifying crime will receive the requisite diagnosis.    
 
Then, a multidisciplinary team established by the secretary of corrections and a 
prosecutor's review committee appointed by the attorney general are charged with the 
task of assessing whether a person about to be released from custody meets the definition 
of a sexually violent predator under K.S.A. 59-29a02(a). K.S.A. 59-29a03. We do not 
know what percentage of ready-to-be-released sexual offenders the multidisciplinary 
team or the prosecutor's review committee assess as being eligible for KSVPA 
proceedings. But the applicable statute indicates that, after the prosecutor's review 
committee determines that a person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator, 
the attorney general "may file a petition" under the KSVPA, i.e., has discretion not to 
seek involuntary commitment. (Emphasis added.) KS.A. 59-29a04(a).  
 
Schaefer's attorney surmised that she had researched the KSVPA, based upon 
documents in the client file, but determined that Schaefer did not suffer from the requisite 
mental abnormality or personality disorder that would subject him to such a proceeding. 
Although Schaefer did not have to establish a violation of his right to effective assistance 
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, he at least had 
the burden to show that the potential consequence of which his attorney did not advise 
him was more than a remote possibility. He failed to do so.  
 
Instead, Schaefer relied upon an argument that Padilla, decided after Bussell, 
stands for the proposition that criminal defense attorneys are not exempt from the duty to 
inform their clients of the collateral consequences of a plea simply because the 
14 
 
 
 
consequences are civil in nature. The panel majority rejected Schaefer's characterization 
of Padilla's holding and noted the factual distinctions in that case. There, Padilla's 
attorney affirmatively told him that pleading guilty to drug trafficking would not affect 
his immigration status. To the contrary, deportation was a normal consequence of a drug 
conviction by noncitizens. Ultimately, the panel majority opined that Padilla should not 
be read to apply outside the unique area of deportation. Schaefer, 2014 WL 4080152, at 
*6. 
 
The concurring opinion was loathe to strictly limit Padilla's impact to cases in 
which deportation was the collateral consequence because of its reading of a later case, 
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013). 
Schaefer, 2014 WL 4080152, at *11 (Leben, J., concurring). Instead, the concurrence 
looked at the series of facts that led to the result in Padilla, e.g., "deportation was a 
unique and severe penalty, it related directly to the criminal process, and immigration 
statutes made deportation '"nearly an automatic result"' of the conviction. 133 S. Ct. at 
1110." 2014 WL 4080152, at *12. In comparison to the level of certainty of the 
consequence found in Padilla, the concurrence viewed the record in Schaefer's case as 
allowing the reviewing court "to do no more than speculate on possible future events that 
might—or might not—lead to involuntary-commitment proceedings." 2014 WL 
4080152, at *13. While the concurrence was unwilling to rule out the possibility that a 
case may later present itself where the consequences are certain enough that the defense 
attorney is found to have a duty to tell the defendant about the KSVPA, it found that the 
current consensus is that speculative consequences, such as those presented here, do not 
trigger a duty to inform the client about them. 2014 WL 4080152, at *13. 
 
We adopt the result reached by the Court of Appeals but agree with the 
concurrence that the holding should be narrowly tailored to the facts presented on this 
record. Here, those facts show no more than a remote possibility of a KSVPA proceeding 
15 
 
 
 
upon Schaefer's completion of his prison term. On the other hand, there is no need, at this 
point, to adopt a bright-line rule that a defense attorney never has a duty to advise his or 
her client of the KSVPA consequences of a plea to a sexually violent offense. On other 
facts, the probability of an involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator for an 
indeterminate period of time may be high enough to create a duty for defense counsel to 
advise the client of that consequence, prior to the plea hearing. 
 
Was Defendant Misled or Coerced?  
 
Schaefer uses the same complaint—that his attorney failed to advise him of the 
KSVPA commitment possibility—to argue that he was misled into pleading no contest 
within the purview of the second Edgar factor. The panel majority found that this 
argument failed for essentially the same reasons as the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim had failed. 2014 WL 4080152, at *7.   
 
But the opinion went further, opining that simply being charged with a sexually 
violent offense subjects the person to involuntary commitment under the KSVPA. The 
panel majority looked at the isolated provision of the KSVPA that calls for notification to 
the multidisciplinary team and the attorney general when a person is found not guilty of a 
sexually violent offense due to mental disease or defect, K.S.A. 59-29a03(a)(4), and 
declared that Schaefer "could be subject to the KSVPA even if his case proceeded to trial 
and he was acquitted." 2014 WL 4080152, at *7. The apparent suggestion is that entering 
a plea to, and being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of, a sexually violent offense 
does not affect a person's ability to defend against involuntary commitment as a sexually 
violent predator. We disagree with that reading of the KSVPA. 
 
Viewing the KSVPA as a whole, rather than isolating the words, "or charged," in 
K.S.A. 59-29a02(a), gives one a clear indication that the KSVPA contemplates that the 
16 
 
 
 
State must prove that a person actually committed the acts constituting a sexually violent 
offense before that person is subject to involuntary commitment as a sexually violent 
predator. For instance, the rest of the definition of sexually violent predator in K.S.A. 59-
29a02(a) requires a finding that "the person [is] likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual 
violence." (Emphasis added.) Of course, one can only repeat acts after having previously 
committed the acts. 
 
The other provision cited by the panel majority, K.S.A. 59-29a03, speaks to the 
"agency with jurisdiction" giving notification to the attorney general and the 
multidisciplinary team that a person may meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator. 
The fact that an agency has jurisdiction over the person suggests a court-ordered 
custodial arrangement, either because the person has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense or has been determined mentally incompetent to stand trial or to be convicted at 
trial. Pointedly, if a person charged with a sexually violent offense has been found 
incompetent to stand trial, he or she can still be subjected to KSVPA proceedings, but 
only after "the court shall first hear evidence and determine whether the person did 
commit the act or acts charged." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 59-29a07(g). The manner in 
which that determination must be made compellingly refutes the notion that the 
legislature intended a person merely charged with a sexually violent offense or a person 
who has been acquitted of a sexually violent offense (excepting acquittals due to mental 
disease or defect under K.S.A. 22-3428) to be subject to involuntary commitment. The 
required procedure is as follows: 
 
"The hearing on this issue [of whether the person did commit the act or acts charged] 
must comply with all the procedures specified in this section. In addition, the rules of 
evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all constitutional rights available to 
defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not to be tried while incompetent, shall 
apply. After hearing evidence on this issue, the court shall make specific findings on 
whether the person did commit the act or acts charged, the extent to which the person's 
17 
 
 
 
incompetence or developmental disability affected the outcome of the hearing, including 
its effect on the person's ability to consult with and assist counsel and to testify on such 
person's own behalf, the extent to which the evidence could be reconstructed without the 
assistance of the person and the strength of the prosecution's case. If after the conclusion 
of the hearing on this issue, the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person 
did commit the act or acts charged, the court shall enter a final order, appealable by the 
person, on that issue, and may proceed to consider whether the person should be 
committed pursuant to this section." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 59-29a07(g).  
 
Given that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person actually 
committed the act or acts charged, the person's plea in the criminal case takes the State 
one step closer to establishing the person as a sexually violent predator subject to 
involuntary commitment. In other words, the person's plea in the criminal case enhances 
that person's exposure to a subsequent proceeding under the KSVPA and such a plea 
prejudices the person's ability to defend against a KSVPA petition, contrary to the 
holdings of the district court and panel majority.  
 
Nevertheless, the question here is whether the attorney's failure to advise Schaefer 
of the KSVPA provided good cause for Schaefer to withdraw his no contest plea to the 
sexually violent offenses. The district court's credibility finding dooms Schaefer's 
argument. The district court noted that the plea agreement resulted in a considerable 
reduction in the prison time Schaefer faced and opined that Schaefer's statement that he 
would not have pled, had he known about the KSVPA, was unbelievable. Accordingly, 
the district court found that if Schaefer had been notified of the potential exposure 
pursuant to the KSVPA, there would have been no difference in the outcome. We defer to 
the district court's weighing of evidence and assessment of credibility. See State v. 
Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014) (appellate court will not reweigh 
evidence or credibility of witnesses), overruled on other grounds by State v. Dunn, 304 
Kan. 773, 807-11, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). If knowledge of the KSVPA would not have 
18 
 
 
 
changed Schaefer's decision to plead, his attorney's failure to provide that knowledge is 
not good cause for the withdrawal of the plea. 
 
The other argument Schaefer makes under the second Edgar factor is that his 
attorneys coerced him into accepting the plea agreement when all he wanted to do was go 
to trial. He supports that argument with his own testimony at the hearing on his motion to 
withdraw plea. On the other side of the ledger are Schaefer's responses to the district 
court's lengthy inquiry at the plea hearing; his attorney's testimony at the plea withdrawal 
hearing, including the fact that an initial plea agreement was renegotiated to effect 
Schaefer's demand for a shorter prison term recommendation; and the fact that the case 
had been pending for a year and a half with four prior attorneys representing Schaefer. 
The district court's "thorough review of the record as a whole" led it to find that "there is 
no credible evidence that the Defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly 
taken advantage of in changing his plea." Without reweighing the evidence or assessing 
witness credibility, we accept the district court's finding that Schaefer's plea change was 
not coerced by his attorney. 
 
Were the Pleas Fairly and Understandingly Made?  
 
With respect to the third Edgar factor, Schaefer asserts that he was not in the right 
frame of mind when he entered his pleas because the side effects of the medications he 
was taking for his TBI "'affected his thinking process'" and because he was "'worn out'" 
from meeting with his attorneys regarding the plea agreement. He acknowledges that the 
district court found that it had given Schaefer every opportunity to tell the court that he 
was not in the right frame of mind at the plea hearing. But he argues that a person that is 
not in the right frame of mind cannot be expected to advise the court of that 
circumstance. 
 
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This issue highlights the purpose behind the general rule that appellate courts will 
not overturn a trial court's weighing of the evidence or assessment of witness credibility 
from a cold record. The district court noted that it was aware of Schaefer's TBI and had 
observed him during the proceedings in this case. Because of that knowledge, the district 
court began the plea hearing colloquy by inquiring as to Schaefer's state of mind. 
Thereafter, the district court carefully posed a dozen and a half questions, as recited in the 
Court of Appeals opinion, followed by a reading and signing of the written plea 
agreement in open court. The district court had the opportunity to view Schaefer's affect 
and body language and assess whether he was truthfully and unequivocally answering 
those questions. The inquiries touched on such matters as whether Schaefer was suffering 
from any mental health, educational, or substance abuse issues that would interfere with 
his ability to understand what was going on, his ability to talk with his attorney, or his 
ability to make his own decision and whether he was in the right frame of mind to make a 
major life decision. Then, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea, the district court 
could again observe Schaefer making his frame-of-mind statements and assess his 
sincerity, as compared to his earlier responses at the plea hearing.  
 
After those observations, the district court declared that the evidence before the 
court was that "the Defendant understood the charges he faced; he understood the 
punishment he faced; he was in the right frame of mind to enter his pleas; and his pleas 
were voluntarily and knowingly made in open court." The record supports that 
declaration, and the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by finding Schaefer's pleas were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
In short, the third Edgar factor does not support Schaefer's claim of good cause to 
withdraw his plea. 
 
20 
 
 
 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
Schaefer's petition for review also seeks review of the district court's holding that 
the failure of Schaefer's counsel to inform him about the possibility of a KSVPA 
involuntary commitment did not deprive Schaefer of his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. When presented with a claim that a defendant's constitutional right to counsel 
has been violated, we engage a two-part test: 
 
"The first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant 
to show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
considering all the circumstances. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be 
highly deferential, and a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time. We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance. [Citation omitted.] 
 
"[Under the second prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel], the 
defendant also must establish prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome. A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the 
evidence before the judge or jury. [Citation omitted.]" Bledsoe v. State, 283 Kan. 81, 90-
91, 150 P.3d 868 (2007). 
 
As previously noted, the test for competent counsel when determining good cause 
to withdraw a plea is something less than the test to determine constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel. Therefore, having determined that Schaefer failed to establish that 
his plea counsel's representation was incompetent under the Edgar factors, we can 
21 
 
 
 
summarily declare that he has also failed to establish an unconstitutional ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
 
But we would note here that the district court specifically found that Schaefer's 
lack of knowledge about the possible consequences of the KSVPA had no effect on the 
result, i.e., he would have pled no contest to the amended charges even if he had known 
about the KSVPA. Given that his attorney's advice about the KSVPA would not have 
changed the result, Schaefer's claim about his attorney's error of omission cannot meet 
the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test. 
 
Affirmed.