Title: State v. Daniel J. Wideman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 16999.rtf 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification. The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0852-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN        :         
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Daniel J. Wideman, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 20, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Wideman, 
No. 95-0852-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 
1995), affirming a judgment and order of the circuit court for 
Winnebago County, William E. Crane and Thomas S. Williams, 
Judges.
1 The defendant, Daniel J. Wideman, was convicted after a 
jury trial of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (1991-1992).
2 The circuit 
court sentenced the defendant as a third-time OWI offender 
                     
1 Judge Crane presided at the trial, sentencing and hearing 
on the motion for postconviction relief. Judge Williams signed 
the order denying the motion for postconviction relief. 
2 All further references are to the 1991-1992 Statutes 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
2
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c), the OWI penalty enhancer.
3 
The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the 
sentence.
4 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order 
of the circuit court. We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
Two issues of law are presented in this case involving a not 
guilty plea. We decide these issues independently, benefiting 
from the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals: 
(1) Must the State establish prior suspensions, convictions or 
revocations under §  346.65(2) in accordance with §  973.12(1)? 
                     
3 346.65 Penalty for violating sections 346.62 to 
346.64 
 
 . . . . 
 
(2) Any person violating s. 346.63(1): 
 
(a) Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more than 
$300, except as provided in pars. (b) to (e). 
 
(b) Shall be fined not less than $300 nor more than 
$1,000 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more 
than 6 months if the total number of suspensions, 
revocations and convictions counted under s. 343.307(1) 
equals 2 in a 5-year period, except that suspensions, 
revocations or convictions arising out of the same 
incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. 
 
(c) Shall be fined not less than $600 nor more than 
$2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 days nor 
more than one year in the county jail if the total 
number of suspensions, revocations and convictions 
counted under s. 343.307(1) equals 3 in a 5-year 
period, 
except 
that 
suspensions, 
revocations 
or 
convictions arising out of the same incident or 
occurrence shall be counted as one. 
 
4 The defendant was also convicted of operating a motor 
vehicle after his license was revoked, third offense, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(2). The circuit court granted the 
defendant’s postconviction motion to dismiss this conviction. 
That disposition is not at issue in this case. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
3
(2) Is the record prior to the imposition of the sentence in the 
case at bar, involving a not guilty plea, sufficient to establish 
the 
prior 
suspensions, 
convictions 
or 
revocations 
under 
§ 346.65(2)(c)?
5 Hereafter we use the phrases “prior offense” or 
“prior offenses” to refer to suspensions, convictions or 
revocations described in Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) which subject a 
person to the enhanced penalties set forth in § 346.65(2).  
The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the State 
bears the burden of establishing prior offenses as the basis for 
the imposition of enhanced penalties under § 346.65(2). We hold 
that the requirements for establishing prior offenses set forth 
in § 973.12(1) are not applicable to the penalty enhancement 
provisions of § 346.65(2).
6 As we explain below, other provisions 
are relevant to establishing prior offenses under § 346.65(2). 
If the accused or defense counsel challenges the existence 
or applicability of a prior offense, or asserts a lack of 
information or remains silent about a prior offense, the State 
must establish the prior offenses for the imposition of the 
                     
5 Because we conclude that the record prior to the 
imposition of sentence in this case is sufficient to establish 
the prior suspensions, convictions or revocations, we decline to 
address another issue raised, namely whether the State could 
present proof of these prior suspensions, convictions or 
revocations at a postsentencing hearing or on remand from an 
appellate court. 
6 Unpublished decisions of the court of appeals have reached 
different conclusions about the applicability of § 973.12(1) to 
§ 346.65(2). Some decisions conclude that § 973.12(1) is not 
applicable to § 346.65(2). See, e.g., State v. Dean, No. 93-2026-
CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1994). Other 
decisions conclude that § 973.12(1) is applicable to § 346.65(2). 
See, e.g., State v. Miller, No. 96-0921-CR., unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1996); State v. Kasian, No. 96-0046-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 1996). 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
4
enhanced penalties of § 346.65(2) by presenting “certified copies 
of conviction or other competent proof . . . before sentencing.” 
State v. McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 539, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982). 
We conclude that the record in this case as of the 
imposition of sentence is sufficient to establish the prior 
offenses so that the circuit court could impose the penalty 
enhancer. Accordingly we affirm the court of appeals’ decision 
affirming the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and the 
circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for 
postconviction relief. 
I. 
For purposes of this review the facts are not in dispute. 
The defendant was arrested in April 1994 and charged with 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The complaint 
alleged that the charged offense was the defendant’s third 
offense.  
A 
criminal 
complaint 
was 
supported 
by 
a 
police 
investigator’s affidavit which attested, in pertinent part: 
Complainant further states that he has inspected a 
teletype of the defendant’s driving record received 
from 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin, 
Department 
of 
Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles, that your 
complainant believes the teletype record to be reliable 
and accurate based upon past professional use of the 
information, that said teletype record shows that the 
defendant has been revoked for violation of section 
343.305 
or 
convicted 
for 
violation 
of 
section 
346.63(1), 
Wis. 
Stats., 
or 
local 
ordinances 
in 
conformity with section 346.63(1) two (2) times in the 
past five years. 
 
The defendant was identified in the complaint by his full name 
and date of birth. The complaint alleged violation of Wis. Stat. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
5
§ 346.63(1)(a) and specified the penalty provisions for “a 3rd 
conviction of this offense” pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2). 
At the defendant’s initial appearance, the circuit court 
furnished the complaint to the defendant, informed the defendant 
that “[t]his would make this a third conviction within five years 
if [he was] convicted,” and pointed out the mandatory minimum and 
maximum penalties prescribed by the enhanced penalty statute. In 
response 
to 
the 
circuit 
court’s 
inquiry, 
the 
defendant, 
unrepresented by counsel, stated that he understood. The 
defendant obtained counsel after his initial appearance. 
When the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the circuit 
court entered judgment and immediately proceeded to sentencing. 
At sentencing, the circuit court stated three times that 
this was the defendant’s third conviction and set out the proper 
penalty range for a third offense under § 346.65(2). Defense 
counsel asked the circuit court to deviate from the sentencing 
guidelines and asked the circuit court to impose “the minimum 
period of incarceration as well as the minimum fines.”  
When the circuit court inquired of defense counsel whether 
the “state of the record” indicated that this was a third 
conviction on the offense of operating while intoxicated, defense 
counsel responded affirmatively. The defendant declined to speak 
in response to the circuit court’s invitation to exercise his 
right of allocution before sentence was pronounced.  
The circuit court sentenced the defendant to a fine and 60 
days’ incarceration, consistent with the third offense provisions 
of the OWI penalty enhancement statute, § 346.65(2)(c).  
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
6
With new counsel, the defendant brought a postconviction 
motion seeking to vacate the enhanced penalty and to impose a 
sentence consistent with a first OWI offense,
7 arguing that the 
defendant had not admitted and the State had failed to prove the 
prior offenses. The defendant urged that because of an inadequate 
record he should be sentenced as a first offender. At the hearing 
on the defendant’s motion the State, over the defendant’s 
objection, presented a certified copy of the defendant’s driving 
record.  
The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion for 
postconviction relief. The circuit court held that even without 
the certified copy of the defendant’s driving record, the record 
was sufficient for the court to find that the defendant had two 
prior offenses within the previous five years. Specifically, the 
circuit court referred to the allegations in the complaint and 
the defendant’s failure to object any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence.  
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order of the 
circuit court.  
II. 
Section 346.65(2) provides for escalating penalties for 
multiple offenses. Anyone violating § 346.63(1) as a first 
offense forfeits not less than $150 nor more than $300. For 
anyone 
violating 
§ 346.63(1) 
as 
a 
second 
offense 
under 
§ 343.307(1) in a period of five years, the statute prescribes a 
                     
7 A 
first 
OWI 
offense 
is 
a 
civil 
forfeiture; 
no 
incarceration or fine is imposed. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
7
fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1000 and imprisonment 
for not less than five days nor more than six months. For anyone 
violating § 346.63(1) as a third § 343.307(1) offense in a period 
of five years, the statute prescribes a fine of not less than 
$600 nor more than $2000 and imprisonment for not less than 30 
days nor more than one year in the county jail. The statute 
provides graduated penalties for anyone violating § 346.63(1) for 
the fourth, fifth and subsequent offenses within a five-year 
period.
8 The graduated penalty structure of § 346.65(2) has been 
described as “nothing more than a penalty enhancer similar to a 
repeater statute which does not in any way alter the nature of 
the substantive offense.” McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 535.  
The enhanced penalty provisions of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) do 
not address the manner by which the State is to establish prior 
offenses at sentencing. The defendant urges the court to apply 
the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), the general repeat 
offender statute,
9 to § 346.65(2).  
                     
8 The penalty structure of § 346.65(2) has been amended by 
1993 Wis. Act 317. 
9 Section 973.12(1) provides as follows:  
 
Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a 
repeater as defined in s. 939.62 if convicted, any 
prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, 
indictment or information or amendments so alleging at 
any 
time 
before 
or 
at 
arraignment, 
and 
before 
acceptance of any plea. . . . If such prior convictions 
are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state, 
he shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 . . . . 
An official report of the F.B.I. or any other 
governmental agency of the United States or of this or 
any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any 
conviction or sentence therein reported.  
 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
8
Section 973.12(1) provides that when a person charged with a 
crime will be a repeater under § 939.62
10 if convicted, a prior 
conviction may be alleged in the complaint, the indictment or 
information or amendments at any time before or at arraignment, 
and before acceptance of any plea; the accused shall be subject 
to sentence as a repeater if the prior convictions are admitted 
by the accused or proved by the State. According to § 973.12(1), 
an official report shall be prima facie evidence of any 
conviction or sentence therein reported.  
The defendant makes the following arguments for applying 
§ 973.12(1), the general repeater statute, to § 346.65(2), the 
OWI penalty enhancer: (1) the legislature has not evidenced any 
intention of mandating lesser proof requirements for OWI 
repeaters than are mandated under the general repeater provisions 
of § 973.12(1); (2) public policy does not support any lesser 
proof requirements for OWI repeaters compared to repeaters under 
§ 972.12(1); and (3) application of § 973.12(1) requirements 
would impose no more than a minimal burden on the State.  
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments that 
§ 973.12(1) is applicable to § 346.65(2). First and foremost, the 
legislature has specifically precluded application of § 973.12(1) 
to § 346.65(2). Section 939.62(3)(a), which defines a repeater 
for purposes of § 973.12(1), expressly excludes from the 
                     
10 Sections 939.62(2) and (3) provide in pertinent part: “The 
actor is a repeater if he was convicted of a felony . . . [or] of 
a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions . . . .'[F]elony' and 
'misdemeanor' . . . do not include motor vehicle offenses under 
chs. 341 to 349.” 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
9
definition of repeater and thus from § 973.12(1) "motor vehicle 
offenses under chs. 341 to 349."
11 
 We would be hard pressed to find a clearer expression of 
legislative intent. Furthermore, nothing in the legislative 
history of §§ 346.65(2), 939.62, and 973.12(1) suggests that the 
legislature 
contemplated 
that 
the 
proof 
requirements 
of 
§ 973.12(1) should be applied to § 346.65(2). 
Enhanced penalty provisions for multiple OWI offenses were 
first introduced in 1929.
12 Minimum penalties were mandated in 
1953.
13 Section 346.65(2) and its predecessor OWI penalty enhancer 
provisions have never specified the manner of proving a prior 
offense. The legislative drafting files are silent on this issue. 
The exclusion of motor vehicle offenses from the general 
repeat offender statute was introduced in 1950 as part of a 
revision of the criminal procedure code.
14 This legislation sought 
“radical" and "self-evident” reforms to the “archaic” general 
                     
11 Motor vehicle offenses set forth in the criminal code are 
not excluded from § 973.12(1). See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 940.09 
(homicide by negligent use of a motor vehicle); Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.10 (homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle); Wis. 
Stat. § 940.25 (injury by negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.23 
(operating 
without 
owner’s 
consent). 
12 § 3, ch. 454, Laws of 1929; Wis. Stat. § 85.91(3)(1929-
1930). 
13 § 2, ch. 340, Laws of 1953; Wis. Stat. § 85.13(3) (1953-
1954). 
14 § 171, ch. 631, Laws of 1949; Wis. Stat. § 359.12(1)(b) 
(1949-1950).  
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
10
repeater scheme.
15 The drafter lists the motor vehicle exclusion 
as one of five changes, but offers no reason for the exclusion.
16 
Beyond the words of the statutes our knowledge of legislative 
intent is limited to the following: (1) from 1929 to 1950 
multiple motor vehicle offenses were governed by the proof 
requirements of the predecessor to § 973.12(1), the general 
repeat offender statute; and (2) although the rationale is not 
evident, since 1950 the legislature has consistently directed 
that repeat offenders under chs. 341-349 be excluded from the 
procedural requirements of § 973.12(1).  
The most obvious conclusion that might be drawn from the 
statutes and legislative history is that the legislature, because 
of the large number of repeat motor vehicle offenses and the 
danger posed to the public by such offenses, wanted to facilitate 
OWI prosecutions by minimizing the State’s burden of establishing 
prior offenses at sentencing hearings. As it stated in § 967.055, 
the legislature encourages vigorous prosecution of offenses 
involving the operation of motor vehicles by persons under the 
influence of intoxicants.  
It 
is 
possible, 
as 
the 
defendant 
argues, 
that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
apply 
the 
proof 
requirements 
of 
§ 973.12(1) to OWI repeat offenses, while exempting OWI offenses 
                     
15 Advisory Committee on Rules of Pleading, Practice and 
Procedure, Comments on 1949 S.B. 474 § 171, Legislative Reference 
Bureau drafting file to § 171, ch. 631, Laws of 1949. 
16 William A. Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 236, 241 (1950). The 
drafting file is no more enlightening. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
11
from the harsh penalties applicable under the general repeat 
offender statute. This legislative intention is not, however, 
discernible from the words of the statutes, the legislative 
history or other statutory provisions. Accordingly we take the 
statute at face value and conclude, as the legislature expressly 
stated, that § 973.12(1) does not apply to § 346.65(2).  
The question then remains: Does the purpose of § 346.65(2) 
in the context of the entire statutory scheme impel the court to 
conclude that the legislature intended (1) to incorporate in 
§ 346.65(2) the body of law developed under § 973.12(1) regarding 
the State’s establishing a prior offense or (2) to incorporate in 
§ 346.65(2) the body of law other than § 973.12(1) regarding the 
State’s establishing a prior offense? This court has not 
previously addressed this question.  
The court has recognized that §§ 973.12(1) and 346.65(2) are 
different. In State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 45, 313 N.W.2d 67 
(1981), 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
“the 
language 
of 
sec. 
346.65(2)(a) [now sec. 346.65(2)(c)], differs in nature from that 
of the general repeater statutes . . . . It is evident that the 
clear and unambiguous language of [sec. 346.65(2)(c)] clearly 
manifests the legislature’s specific intent that the sanctions of 
[that statute] be applied in a manner substantially different 
from repeater penalties in general.” In Banks the court 
distinguished provisions within §§ 939.62(2) and 346.65(2) which 
control whether the prior offense must predate the commission of 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
12
the charged offense. Id. at 47-50.
17 This distinction would not, 
however, affect the manner by which the State establishes the 
existence of a prior offense and would not control the 
application 
of 
the 
proof 
requirements 
of 
§ 973.12(1) 
to 
§ 346.65(2).  
Another distinction between § 939.62(2) and § 346.65(2) is 
that the former directs that only prior felonies and misdemeanors 
be counted toward an increased penalty. In contrast, some prior 
offenses which lead to enhanced penalties under § 346.65(2) are 
civil forfeitures, or license revocations or suspensions.  
Minimizing 
the differences between 
the 
statutes, the 
defendant relies on State v. Coolidge, 173 Wis. 2d 783, 496 
N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993), in which the court of appeals applied 
the proof requirements of § 973.12(1) to a repeater offense 
charged under ch. 161, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The 
reasoning in Coolidge is not persuasive in the case at bar. 
Chapter 161 offenses are not excluded from § 973.12(1) as are 
offenses under chs. 341-349. Furthermore, ch. 161 offenses are 
more similar to the offenses included within § 973.12(1) than are 
the excluded chs. 341-349 motor vehicle offenses.  
Because 
the 
legislature 
has 
expressly 
provided 
that 
§ 973.12(1) does not apply to chs. 341-49 motor vehicle offenses, 
we examine other statutory provisions governing the State’s 
burden of establishing a prior offense to determine whether they 
apply to § 346.65(2).  
                     
17 The court has noted that the issue in Banks “was a limited 
one, namely the timing of the offenses.” State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 
2d 49, 66, 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992). 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
13
We begin with the general statutory requirements of a 
complaint. Section 970.02(1)(a) sets forth the duty of a circuit 
judge at an initial appearance to furnish an accused with a copy 
of the complaint which “shall contain the possible penalties for 
the offenses charged therein.” An amendment may be made to the 
complaint 
pursuant 
to 
§ 971.29.
18 
The 
provisions 
governing 
complaints are applicable to all criminal proceedings, Wis. Stat. 
§ 967.01, and we can find no reason why they should not apply to 
criminal prosecutions under § 346.65(2).
19  
Next we consult the law, other than § 973.12(1), which bears 
on the State’s establishing a prior offense under § 346.65(2). 
The court has held that for an accused to be given an enhanced 
penalty as a repeat OWI offender, the State need not prove the 
existence of a prior offense as an element of the offense of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. McAllister, 107 Wis. 
2d at 538. Thus, proof of a prior offense need not be submitted 
to the jury.  
Nonetheless, McAllister made clear that for the circuit 
court to impose an enhanced penalty under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) 
the State must establish the prior offense. McAllister, 107 Wis. 
2d at 539. A prior offense is an element of Wis. Stat. 
                     
18 For discussions of the complaint in relation to § 973.12, 
see State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991); 
State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995). 
19 See, e.g., State v. Mudgett, 99 Wis. 2d 525, 528-29, 299 
N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1980)(vacating OWI repeater conviction for 
failure to follow procedural requirements of § 970.02). 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
14
§ 346.65(2)(c), the OWI penalty enhancement statute, rather than 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1), the substantive crime charged.
20  
In McAllister, the court stated that prior OWI offenses “may 
be proven by certified copies of conviction or other competent 
proof offered by the state before sentencing.” McAllister, 107 
Wis. 2d at 539. Further, said the court, “[t]here is no 
presumption of innocence accruing to the defendant regarding the 
previous conviction,” but the accused must have an opportunity to 
challenge the existence of the prior offense. Id. 
If an accused admits to a prior offense that admission is, 
of course, competent proof of a prior offense and the State is 
relieved of its burden to further establish the prior conviction. 
State v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326, 338-39, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951). 
The defendant asserts that under State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 
651, 659, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984), any admission must be made 
personally by the accused. Farr requires a personal admission, 
but only on the basis of § 973.12(1). Because we have concluded 
that § 973.12(1) does not apply to § 346.65(2), Farr does not 
control the case at bar. The defendant offers no other statute, 
case law or legal principle that would suggest that defense 
counsel may not admit prior offenses on the accused’s behalf. Nor 
does he assert that the right to contest a prior offense for 
purposes of sentencing under § 346.65(2) is a fundamental right 
such that defense counsel may not speak for the accused. Upon 
examining our cases relating to those fundamental rights which an 
                     
20 Compare State v. Ludeking, 195 Wis. 2d 132, 139-40, 536 
N.W.2d 
392 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995) 
(interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1)(b) and 340.01(46m)(1993-94)).  
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
15
accused may only exercise or waive in his or her own behalf and 
those rights which defense counsel may exercise for the accused, 
we conclude that defense counsel may, on behalf of the defendant, 
admit a prior offense for purposes of § 346.65(2).
21  
In allowing the circuit court to address the accused’s 
counsel rather than addressing the accused personally, we rely on 
counsel to fulfill his or her obligation to investigate the 
accused’s case, including alleged prior offenses. Such an 
investigation 
is 
the 
minimal 
obligation 
of 
competent 
representation.
22 Allowing the accused’s counsel to respond about 
a prior offense adequately protects an accused’s due process 
right to a sentence based on legitimate considerations. State v. 
J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d 655, 666, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940 (1992). 
Although the defendant in this case acknowledges that not 
all criminal defendants need be treated alike, he asserts that 
the existence of different procedures for establishing prior 
offenses under §§ 346.65(2) and 973.12(1) implicates due process 
                     
21 This court has recognized that in the exercise of certain 
fundamental rights the accused must be addressed personally and 
must personally state his or her position on the record. 
Decisions to plead guilty and whether to request a trial by jury 
are reserved to the accused. State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 
129-130, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980)(citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969)); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 
(1942). See also State v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 368-72, 344 
N.W.2d 181 (1984) (waiver of right to interpreter must be made 
personally by accused). As to other rights, in the absence of the 
express disapproval of the accused, counsel’s actions and 
statements may bind the accused. Thus, for example, counsel may 
waive the accused’s right to testify. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 
130. 
22 State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 638, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985). 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
16
and equal protection considerations. The defendant asserts that 
there is no rational basis
23 upon which the legislature could 
distinguish offenders sentenced under §§ 346.65(2) and 973.12(1).  
We conclude that the difference between the two statutes 
rests upon a rational basis. The nature of OWI offenses and the 
penalties under § 346.65(2) justify the legislature’s imposing on 
the State different proof requirements than those prescribed by 
§ 973.12(1). Large numbers of OWI offenses are prosecuted. 
Moreover, in contrast with § 973.12(1), the enhanced penalties 
under § 346.65(2) are penalties for misdemeanors, with relatively 
short periods of incarceration and moderate fines. The efficient 
administration of the justice system militates in favor of the 
legislature’s 
choice 
not 
to 
require 
the 
same 
method 
of 
establishing 
repeat 
offenses 
under 
§ 346.65(2) 
as 
under 
§ 973.12(1). 
For these reasons we hold that there is no due process or 
equal protection violation when the legislature imposes different 
proof requirements for repeat OWI offenders under § 346.65(2) and 
repeat offenders charged under the general repeater statute, 
§ 973.12(1). 
Because we conclude that there was an admission of the prior 
offenses in this case, as we explain below, we need not comment 
further on the other methods by which the State may establish 
prior offenses. See State v. Spaeth, No. 95-1827-CR (S. Ct. Dec. 
20, 1996) (addressing competent proof under Wis. Stat. § 343.44). 
                     
23 Hilber v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 49, 54, 277 N.W.2d 839 (1979); 
State v. Chapman, 175 Wis. 2d 231, 245, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
17
Nevertheless, further comment is warranted on a related 
issue.  Numerous cases, some of which are cited in the margin at 
n.6, have arisen challenging the State’s proof of a prior offense 
under § 346.65(2). In reading the court of appeals’ decisions on 
this subject we are persuaded that both the State and defense 
counsel are often careless in making a record about prior 
offenses.
24 We urge, as did the court of appeals in the case at 
bar, that both the State and defense counsel adopt and follow 
better practices in the sentencing stage of these penalty 
enhancement cases. 
The State and defense counsel should, prior to sentencing, 
investigate the accused’s prior driving record. The State should 
be prepared at sentencing to establish the prior offenses by 
appropriate official records or other competent proof. Defense 
counsel should be prepared at sentencing to put the State to its 
proof when the state’s allegations of prior offenses are 
incorrect or defense counsel cannot verify the existence of the 
prior offenses. The State and defense counsel should, whenever 
appropriate, stipulate to the prior offenses. If the State and 
defense counsel follow these suggestions there should be no need 
for either party to request a continuance of a sentencing 
proceeding to obtain proof of prior offenses.  
In addition to suggesting the above practices for the State 
and defense counsel, we recommend that before imposing sentence 
                     
24 As court of appeals Judge Anderson commented below: “We 
recognize that prosecutors face many difficult tasks; however, 
properly pleading and proving repeater allegations are not among 
them.” State v. Wideman, No. 95-0852-CR, unpublished slip op. at 
6, n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995). 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
18
the circuit court make findings based on the record about the 
exact dates and nature of prior offenses. 
V. 
We now turn to whether the record of the sentencing 
proceeding in the case at bar, involving a not guilty plea, is 
sufficient to establish the prior offenses under § 346.65(2)(c).  
The complaint, although not evidence,
25 when coupled with the 
circuit court’s direct inquiry at sentencing and defense 
counsel’s concessions, was sufficient to inform the defendant of 
the prior offenses and to establish the prior offenses for 
purposes of sentencing.
26 
At sentencing the circuit court engaged the defendant and 
his counsel in the following colloquy: 
[THE COURT]: The jury having returned verdicts of 
guilty as to each of the two counts in the complaint, 
it is a finding of guilty and it would be a third 
conviction on the offense of operating under the 
influence. Apparently it is a third conviction within 
five years of operating after revocation. I believe 
that is what the status of the complaint is. Is that 
the state of the record? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor. 
 
[THE COURT]: Then is there anything that should be 
said before sentence is pronounced or why sentence 
should not be pronounced at this time? 
                     
25 State v. Oppermann, 156 Wis. 2d 241, 246 n.2, 456 N.W.2d 
625 (Ct. App. 1990) (the complaint is not evidence); Wis. 
JICriminal 145 (the complaint is not evidence). 
Most 
rules 
of 
evidence 
do 
not 
apply 
in 
sentencing 
proceedings. Wis. Stat. § 911.01(4)(c). 
26 According to the record the circuit court furnished the 
defendant the complaint at his initial appearance.  The circuit 
court then summarized its relevant contents in the defendant’s 
presence. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
19
 
[DEFENDANT WIDEMAN]: No, your Honor. 
 
Subsequent to this colloquy the defense counsel, in response 
to the court’s noting that “it is a third conviction,” stated 
that he “also believe[d] that [the defendant’s] previous offense 
dated back to 1990 and 1989 so he [had] gone a substantial 
period, almost five years, with no offenses.“ 
According to the defendant, the record demonstrates that the 
prosecutor did not have the defendant’s driving record before him 
and that defense counsel’s comments indicate uncertainty about 
the prior offenses. Appellate defense counsel reads the record as 
indicating that defense counsel did not know exactly what the 
prior offenses were and whether they occurred within the 
prescribed period. Appellate defense counsel urges that the 
record is therefore insufficient and that the remedy is 
imposition of an unenhanced sentence, that is a sentence for a 
first time offender.  
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel presented a model 
sentencing procedure for a § 346.65(2) penalty enhancer. Although 
marginal, the record in this case is sufficient to establish an 
admission of the prior offenses. The complaint described the 
prior offenses and advised the defendant and defense counsel that 
a penalty enhancement was being sought. After the jury returned 
its verdict, the circuit court advised the defendant and defense 
counsel that the offense of which the defendant was found guilty 
was his third OWI offense and described the statutory penalties 
for a third-time offender. Defense counsel’s responses to the 
circuit court’s inquiries and acknowledgment that sentence as a 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
20
repeat offender was appropriate constitute an admission under 
these circumstances and allay any concerns that defense counsel 
was in doubt that this was the defendant’s third offense. An 
admission is competent proof of a prior offense. State v. Meyer, 
258 Wis. at 338-39. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court properly 
denied the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief. We 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
21
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0852-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Daniel J. Wideman, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis. 2d  649, 539 N.W.2d 338 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 20, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
September 25, 1996 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
 
WILLIAM E. CRANE 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Ruth S. Downs, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Jerome 
S. Schmidt, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle