Title: MJP v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MJP v. State1985 WY 152706 P.2d 1108Case Number: C-84-7Decided: 10/02/1985MJP, Appellant (Defendant),



v.



The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
MJP, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, for 
appellant.

 
 
A. G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., ROONEY, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ., and GUTHRIE, Justice, Retired.*

 
 

* ROSE, J., having recused himself, 
GUTHRIE, J., Retired, was assigned pursuant to order of the court entered 
January 2, 1979.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this case, we are 
asked to decide whether a sentencing court may require a prosecutor to present 
at the sentencing hearing evidence of other crimes with which the defendant has 
not been charged *1109 pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. In treating 
with this issue we must deal with a claim that such a proceeding violates the 
concept of fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause. There also 
is an issue relating to the abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
sentencing. We conclude that the district court did not exceed its powers with 
respect to the evidence it required at the sentencing hearing, and that there 
was no violation of the concept of fundamental fairness as claimed. We also can 
discern no abuse of discretion in the sentencing. We affirm the judgment and 
sentence.

 
 

[¶2.]     In the Brief of 
Appellant the issues are articulated as follows:

 
 
"1. Whether the 
district court exceeded its powers in ordering a prosecutor in a sentencing 
hearing to present evidence of other crimes with which the defendant had not 
been charged pursuant to a plea agreement. 

 
 
"2. Whether the 
proceedings employed during the sentencing hearing violated the concept of 
fundamental fairness, which is embodied in the due process clause. 

 
 
"3. Whether the 
sentencing judge abused his discretion in sentencing 
Appellant."

 
 
The State of 
Wyoming in its Brief of Appellee states the issues somewhat 
differently:

 
 
"I. DID THE 
TRIAL COURT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY IN REQUESTING THAT ADDITIONAL RELEVANT 
INFORMATION BE PRESENTED DURING THE SENTENCING HEARING? 

 
 
"II. DID THE 
SENTENCING PROCEEDING COMPORT WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS? 

 
 
"III. DID THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO A TERM OF SEVEN TO 
TEN YEARS IN THE WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY?"

 
 
MJP was charged 
with taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a minor in violation of 
§ 14-3-105, W.S.1977 (December 1978 Replacement). That statute provides as 
follows:

 
 
"Any person 
knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or 
knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child 
to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon 
conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more 
than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more 
than ten (10) years, or both."

 
 
After being 
bound over to the district court for further proceedings by the County Court of 
Campbell County, MJP entered a plea of guilty to the charge pending against him. 
A plea agreement was made pursuant to which the State agreed not to file incest 
charges against the appellant in exchange for his plea of guilty to the indecent 
liberties charge. The incest charges, according to the discussion of the 
arrangement at arraignment, would have related to a different victim and a 
different incident.

 
 

[¶3.]     When the case first 
came on for sentencing, the State indicated it had no evidence to present. The 
defense also offered no evidence other than the defendant's personal statement 
and allocution. When the State argued for incarceration, however, the court 
asked the State if MJP had been threatened with prosecution for three other acts 
against his own children. When the prosecutor responded affirmatively, the court 
asked if there was proof of those crimes. Upon an affirmative response from the 
prosecutor, the court decided it needed to hear further evidence and ordered a 
further sentencing proceeding. At that proceeding, a social worker and a child 
and family therapist were called as witnesses. These two witnesses testified 
about their interviews with MJP's daughters and both were cross-examined by 
MJP's counsel. This evidence indicated that the other crimes to which the State 
had alluded in fact had been committed against the daughters of 
MJP.

 
 

[¶4.]     MJP argues that the 
requirement of the submission of additional evidence was an infringement upon 
the prosecutor's discretion*1110 in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine. See e.g., Petition of Padget, Wyo., 678 P.2d 870 (1984); 
United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.1984); People v. 
Thorpe, Colo., 641 P.2d 935 (1982). The State contends that the issue is not 
available to MJP because it was not presented to the trial court. Hopkinson 
v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983).

 
 

[¶5.]     It is clear to this 
court that since sentencing is a judicial function, Wright v. State, 
Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1983), the trial court is entitled to have presented 
to it whatever information is available that will assist it in that difficult 
task. Rule 33(c)(1), W.R.Cr.P., provides that a presentence report is to be made 
unless the trial court directs otherwise. Rule 33(c)(2), W.R.Cr.P., mandates 
that "circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing 
sentence" be included in the report. Case authority indicates that a sentencing 
court must consider "the character of the criminal," as well as "the crime and 
its circumstances." Wright v. State, supra, 670 P.2d  at 1092; Aldrich 
v. State, Wyo., 
706 P.2d 271 (1985). It is clearly necessary for the court to 
properly inform itself with respect to those factors deemed significant for 
purposes of sentencing. As this court explained in Wright v. State, 
supra, 670 P.2d  at 1093, "The character of the criminal could reasonably 
increase or decrease his sentence. His * * * criminal and delinquency record, 
attitude, etc., well bear upon the accomplishment of the purpose of the 
sentence."

[¶6.]     In Minchew v. 
State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 30, 31 (1984), this court approved the actions of the 
trial court in ordering the arresting officer to appear before the court at 
probation revocation proceedings, which are merely extensions of the sentencing 
procedure. The court just wanted "to make sure that it understands" and wanted 
"to have some additional testimony to find out if there is an excuse * * * or to 
find something which would go to the defendant's benefit." Id. at 33. In 
Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 749, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 (1975), this 
court commended the efforts of the trial court at the sentencing hearing, in 
part, because "The defendant's background was investigated from A to 
Z."

 
 

[¶7.]     In the case at bar, at 
the original sentencing hearing, the trial court recognized his responsibility 
not only to impose an appropriate sentence based upon the character of the 
defendant, but also to make an accurate determination of the defendant's 
character:

 
 
"But it seems to 
me important that these factors are taken into consideration. If you're going to 
stand there and argue for a long penitentiary sentence, then I want to hear some 
evidence that supports. And we've had this undercurrent throughout this case, 
and it seems to me that we need to clear the air on it one way or the other. 
Either it is a factor or it's not a factor. If it is a factor and * * * you can 
show it by competent evidence, then it's something that the Court definitely 
would want to take into consideration in imposing sentence. 

 
 
"On the other 
hand, if the proofs are not there and its merely innuendo, then he ought not to 
be sentenced on the basis of innuendo."

 
 
Because we have 
determined that sentencing is a judicial function for which the trial court has 
broad authority to assure itself of the accuracy of the information presented 
and alluded to, there was no violation of the separation of powers doctrine with 
respect to this sentencing proceeding.

 
 

[¶8.]     Furthermore, the 
proceeding did not infringe upon MJP's right to due process. The trial court 
ordered the prosecutor to provide defense counsel with advance notice of the 
witnesses and a summary of their testimony. The defendant had ample opportunity 
to contest the evidence presented. The sentencing hearing is not a trial. 
Williams v. People of State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949), reh. denied 338 U.S. 841, 70 S. Ct. 34, 94 L. Ed. 514 (1949); 
Minchew v. State, supra, 685 P.2d  at 31. In assessing a lawful sentence, 
the court is required to *1111 consider relevant factors. It needs to inform 
itself about the circumstances surrounding the offense and also the facts 
relating to the accused. The court did this in connection with this sentencing 
proceeding, and in the process none of the constitutional rights of MJP were 
violated.

 
 

[¶9.]     With respect to the 
claim of abuse of discretion in sentencing, we note that there is nothing in 
this record to persuade this court that the trial court could not reasonably 
conclude as it did. The sentence is within the lawful limits and there is no 
error of law under the circumstances. Aldrich v. State, supra, and the 
cases cited therein.

 
 

[¶10.]  
The judgment and sentence is affirmed.

 
 

GUTHRIE, Justice, Retired, concurring in the 
result and dissenting in part.

 
 

[¶11.]  
I concur in the result of this opinion but dissent from that part or 
portion thereof which treats and discusses appellant's first asserted issue. 
Appellant cannot properly raise his first contention not having made the proper 
objections or presented this question to the trial court. He does not in his 
brief contend or attempt to demonstrate that this involves plain error. 
Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, 50, cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983), and authorities cited therein. Absent plain 
error, it is well recognized that the supreme court is not the proper forum in 
which to raise a constitutional question for the first time. Apodaca v. 
State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 603, 605 (1977).

 
 

[¶12.]  
Since it is neither proper nor necessary for this court to decide this 
question, this is dicta. Felske v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 257 
(1985).