Title: Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 403, 2005-Ohio-5410.] 
 
 
SARMIENTO ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. GRANGE MUTUAL 
CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 
 106 Ohio St.3d 403, 2005-Ohio-5410.] 
A two-year contractual limitation period for filing uninsured- and underinsured-
motorist claims is reasonable and enforceable, regardless of whether the 
foreign state in which the accident occurred provides a longer statute of 
limitations for the underlying tort claim — R.C. 2305.16 does not toll the 
limitation period in an insurance contract for persons who are minors at 
the time the cause of action accrues. 
(No. 2004-0193 — Submitted March 2, 2005 — Decided October 26, 2005.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for  
Cuyahoga County, No. 82807, 2003-Ohio-6485. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
A two-year contractual limitation period for filing uninsured- and 
underinsured-motorist claims is reasonable and enforceable, regardless of 
whether the foreign state in which the accident occurred provides a longer 
statute of limitations for the underlying tort claim. 
2. 
R.C. 2305.16 does not toll the limitation period in an insurance contract 
for persons who are minors at the time the cause of action accrues. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} One issue before us is whether a two-year contractual limitation 
period for filing uninsured- and underinsured-motorist (“UM/UIM”) claims is 
reasonable and enforceable when the underlying tort claim is governed by the 
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2 
laws of another state, whose statute of limitations for the claim is longer than two 
years.  Appellants and cross-appellees, David Camacho, David Camacho III (a 
minor), Francisco Sarmiento, Rita Sarmiento, Braulio Sarmiento (a minor), Jesus 
Sarmiento, and Delores Sarmiento (collectively, “Sarmientos”), urge us to 
interpret former R.C. 3937.18 as requiring insurers to afford the same amount of 
time to bring a claim for UM/UIM coverage as the claimant is afforded under the 
applicable tort law to bring a suit against the tortfeasor. 
{¶ 2} The second issue, which is raised in the cross-appeal of appellee 
and cross-appellant, Grange Mutual Casualty Company (“Grange”), is whether an 
insured who is a minor is bound by the terms and conditions of an insurance 
policy, including a two-year contractual limitation period for commencing a 
UM/UIM claim, or whether R.C. 2305.16 applies to toll the limitations provision 
during the period of minority. 
{¶ 3} Appellant and cross-appellee David Camacho was driving a pickup 
truck owned by Maria Sarmiento when it was struck by a motor vehicle driven by 
an allegedly uninsured motorist in New Mexico on November 5, 1998.  The six 
other appellants and cross-appellees were passengers in the truck. 
{¶ 4} Grange had issued a policy of insurance on the truck to Maria 
Sarmiento that included UM/UIM coverage in effect on the date of the accident.  
On November 5, 2001, the Sarmientos filed a complaint in the Common Pleas 
Court of Cuyahoga County, seeking UM coverage under the Grange policy issued 
to Maria Sarmiento.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Grange.  The court concluded that Grange was not obligated to provide UM 
coverage, because the plaintiffs had not filed suit within two years from the date 
of the accident as required by the insurance policy. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Sarmientos argued that Grange’s two-year 
limitation period was unreasonable and unenforceable because it was shorter than 
New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, which was 
January Term, 2005 
3 
applicable in the underlying tort claim.  They also argued that even if the two-year 
limitation period was enforceable, it was tolled as to the claims of the two minors. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals concluded that the rights and duties under the 
Grange policy should be determined by the laws of Ohio, not New Mexico.  
Applying Ohio law, the appellate court agreed that Grange’s two-year limitation 
period was reasonable and enforceable, and the court affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court on that issue.  However, the appellate court concluded that Ohio’s 
tolling statute, R.C. 2305.16, applied to the UM claims of the two minors.  
Therefore, as to the minors, David Camacho III and Braulio Sarmiento, the court 
of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for 
further proceedings. 
{¶ 7} This cause is before this court upon our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
{¶ 8} An insurance policy is a contract, and the relationship and rights of 
the insurer and insured are contractual in nature; therefore, a claim for UM/UIM 
coverage sounds in contract, not in tort. Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 474, 480, 747 N.E.2d 206; Miller v. Progressive Cas. Ins. 
Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 619, 624, 635 N.E.2d 317.  Although the underlying 
tort claims of the Sarmientos were subject to the laws of New Mexico, where the 
accident occurred, the appellate court properly concluded that Ohio contract law 
applied to their UM claims.  The insurance contract was entered into in Ohio, it 
was issued to Maria Sarmiento, a resident of Ohio, and it covered vehicles 
principally garaged in Ohio. 
{¶ 9} We begin our analysis by examining the language used in the 
insurance contract, giving the words used their plain and ordinary meaning.  
Gomolka v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 167-168, 24 
O.O.3d 274, 436 N.E.2d 1347.  The Grange policy issued to Maria Sarmiento 
included an endorsement for UM/UIM coverage that provided: 
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{¶ 10} “Any arbitration or suit against us will be barred unless 
commenced within 2 years (TWO YEARS) from the date of the accident or 1 
year (ONE YEAR) after the date that you were aware, or should have been 
aware, of a claim for which coverage would apply whichever is later.”  (Emphasis 
sic.) 
{¶ 11} In Ohio, the statutory limitation period for a written contract is 15 
years.  R.C. 2305.06.  However, the parties to a contract may validly limit the 
time for bringing an action on a contract to a period that is shorter than the general 
statute of limitations for a written contract, as long as the shorter period is a 
reasonable one.  Miller v. Progressive, 69 Ohio St.3d 619, 624, 635 N.E.2d 317; 
Colvin v. Globe Am. Cas. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 293, 295, 23 O.O.3d 281, 
432 N.E.2d 167, overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Progressive.  A contract 
provision that reduces the time provided in the statute of limitations must be in 
words that are clear and unambiguous to the policyholder.  Id. at 296, 23 O.O.3d 
281, 432 N.E.2d 167. 
{¶ 12} There is no dispute that Sarmiento’s policy clearly and 
unambiguously limits to two years the time in which an insured may sue Grange 
for UM/UIM benefits.  Under a pure contract analysis, we need go no further.  
The Sarmientos’ complaint would fail as a matter of law because it was filed more 
than two years after the accident occurred. 
{¶ 13} Nevertheless, the Sarmientos contend that the policy’s two-year 
limitation should not bar their lawsuit for UM coverage that was filed within three 
years of the accident, because their claims against the tortfeasor are subject to a 
three-year statute of limitations under New Mexico law.  They argue that pursuant 
to Miller v. Progressive, a contract provision that provides less time in which to 
pursue UM/UIM benefits than to pursue the underlying tort claim is 
unenforceable because it violates the public policy behind former R.C. 3937.18. 
January Term, 2005 
5 
{¶ 14} We do not read Miller v. Progressive, 69 Ohio St.3d 619, 635 
N.E.2d 317, as broadly as the Sarmientos suggest we should.  Instead, we find that 
Lane v. Grange Mut. Cos. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 63, 543 N.E.2d 488, read in 
conjunction with Miller v. Progressive, is dispositive of this matter. 
{¶ 15} In Lane v. Grange Mut. Cos., we construed language in a Grange 
policy that prohibited the filing of UM/UIM claims “unless * * * commenced 
within the time period allowed by the applicable statute of limitations for bodily 
injury or death actions in the state where the accident occurred.”  Id. at 63, 543 
N.E.2d 488.  Lane concluded that the provision was unclear and ambiguous 
because it failed to tell policyholders the amount of time available for 
commencing an action and when the limitation period began to run.  Id. at 64, 543 
N.E.2d 488.  The court also reasoned that the provision created ambiguity with 
regard to claims for damages other than for bodily injury, such as loss-of-
consortium claims and claims for which the insured was subject to a legal 
disability.  Id. at 65, 543 N.E.2d 488. The court refused to enforce the provision.  
Id. 
{¶ 16} In Miller v. Progressive, 69 Ohio St.3d 619, 635 N.E.2d 317, this 
court decided that a contractual one-year limitation period for filing UM/UIM 
claims, when Ohio’s statute of limitations for bodily injury in R.C. 2305.10 was 
two years, was unreasonable and void as against the public policy behind former 
R.C. 3937.18.  Id. at 623-624, 635 N.E.2d 317.  The court noted, however, that a 
two-year limitation period would be a “reasonable and appropriate period of time” 
in which to require an insured to commence an action under the UM/UIM 
provisions of an insurance policy.  Id. at 624-625, 635 N.E.2d 317. 
{¶ 17} Grange argues that Miller serves as authority for the proposition 
that a two-year contractual limitation period for filing UM/UIM claims is 
reasonable and enforceable.  According to Grange, the interpretation of Miller 
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advocated by the Sarmientos would require insurers to amend their policies to 
include the language that was rejected as ambiguous in Lane. 
{¶ 18} The Sarmientos disagree, claiming that the Lane court rejected 
only the specific contract language that it found to be ambiguous, but did not 
prohibit an insurer from drafting provisions to address the public-policy 
consideration raised in this case.  The Sarmientos contend that Miller’s conclusion 
that a two-year limitation period would be reasonable was based strictly upon the 
fact that that case involved Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations for bodily 
injury. 
{¶ 19} Lane rejected as ambiguous the language that attempted to define 
the contractual limitation period in terms of the statute of limitations for the 
underlying tort claim, which the Sarmientos suggest is the only reasonable and 
appropriate limitation period. Furthermore, Miller does not limit its holding to 
Ohio accidents, as the Sarmientos suggest.  Instead, Miller acknowledges that 
contractual time-limitation provisions are permissible and concludes that two 
years “would be a reasonable and appropriate period of time for an insured who 
has suffered bodily injuries to commence an action or proceeding for payment of 
benefits under the uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of an insurance 
policy.”  Miller, 69 Ohio St.3d at 624-625, 635 N.E.2d 317. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, pursuant to Miller v. Progressive, the two-year 
limitation period in the Grange policy is reasonable and enforceable.  A 
contractual limitation period of two years does not violate the underlying purpose 
of UM/UIM coverage, because the limitation period does not eliminate or reduce 
the UM/UIM coverage required by former R.C. 3937.18.  See State Farm Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 583 N.E.2d 309, syllabus.  The 
insured is not foreclosed from commencing an action for UM/UIM coverage so 
long as the insured satisfies the policy’s conditions precedent to coverage, 
January Term, 2005 
7 
including commencing an action against the insured within the contractual 
limitation period. 
{¶ 21} Despite the three-year statute of limitations for torts in New 
Mexico, nothing prevented the Sarmientos from commencing an action against 
Grange for UM benefits within the two-year contractual limitation period and 
then assigning their rights against the tortfeasor to Grange.  Therefore, we hold 
that a two-year contractual limitation period for filing UM/UIM claims is 
reasonable and enforceable, regardless of whether the foreign state in which the 
accident occurred provides a longer statute of limitations for the underlying tort 
claim.  We affirm the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals that held that 
Grange’s limitation period is reasonable and enforceable. 
Grange’s Cross-Appeal 
{¶ 22} The issue before us in Grange’s cross-appeal is whether R.C. 
2305.16 tolls the two-year contractual limitation period for a minor.  The 
appellate court held that R.C. 2305.16 applied to toll the UM/UIM claims of the 
minors, Braulio Sarmiento and David Camacho III.  Grange, however, argues that 
a minor is bound by all the terms of a contract that he or she is trying to enforce 
and that R.C. 2305.16 does not apply. 
{¶ 23} R.C. 2305.16, Ohio’s tolling statute, provides: 
{¶ 24} “Unless otherwise provided in sections 1302.98, 1304.35, and 
2305.04 to 2305.14 of the Revised Code, if a person entitled to bring any action 
mentioned in those sections, unless for penalty or forfeiture, is, at the time the 
cause of action accrues, within the age of minority * * *, the person may bring it 
within the respective times limited by those sections, after the disability is 
removed.” 
{¶ 25} When construing a statute, we must “ ‘ascertain and give effect to 
the legislative intent, and it is well settled that none of the language employed 
therein should be disregarded, and that all of the terms used should be given their 
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usual and ordinary meaning and signification except where the lawmaking body 
has indicated that the language is not so used.’ ”  Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 
104 Ohio St.3d 390, 393, 2004-Ohio-6549, 819 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 12, quoting 
Carter v. Youngstown Div. of Water (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 32 O.O. 184, 65 
N.E.2d 63, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “ ‘[T]he statute may not be restricted, 
constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged; significance and effect 
should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an 
act.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 36 
O.O. 554, 78 N.E.2d 370, paragraph five of the syllabus. 
{¶ 26} The plain language of R.C. 2305.16 states that it applies to toll 
only certain statutes of limitation created by law — that is, those in “sections 
1302.98, 1304.35, and 2305.04 to 2305.14 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2305.06, 
one of the enumerated sections in the tolling statute, provides that “an action upon 
a specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought 
within fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued.” 
{¶ 27} Grange argues that, according to the plain language of the tolling 
statute, it applies only if the cause of action is based upon a written contract to 
which the 15-year statute of limitations created by R.C. 2305.06 applies. The 
Sarmientos do not make such a distinction.  They contend that the tolling statute 
applies to all written contracts, regardless of whether the 15-year statute of 
limitations or a shorter contractual limitation period applies. 
{¶ 28} A provision in a contract may validly limit, as between the parties, 
the time for bringing any action to a period less than that provided by the statute 
of limitations.  Colvin, 69 Ohio St.2d 293, 295, 23 O.O.3d 281, 432 N.E.2d 167.  
When the parties agree to a shorter period in which to commence an action, the 
general statute of limitations for written contracts in R.C. 2305.06 does not apply.  
The scope of R.C. 2305.16 is limited to persons entitled to bring any action 
mentioned in R.C. 1302.98, 1304.35, and 2305.04 to 2305.14.  The general statute 
January Term, 2005 
9 
of limitations in R.C. 2305.06 is irrelevant when the parties have agreed to a 
different contractual limitation period. 
{¶ 29} The Sarmientos contend that the tolling statute must apply in order 
to protect the interests of minors who, because of their disability, are incapable of 
protecting their own interests.  However, the General Assembly did not broadly 
draft R.C. 2305.16 so that it tolls all statutes of limitations applicable to claims of 
minors.  For instance, the statute of limitations for minors with wrongful-death 
claims is not tolled by R.C. 2305.16.  Brookbank v. Gray (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
279, 291, 658 N.E.2d 724.  The two-year statute of limitation for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim on behalf of a minor is not tolled.  State ex rel. Goodenough 
v. Indus. Comm. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 218, 7 O.O. 492, 6 N.E.2d 755.  We cannot 
extend the statute beyond that which is written, for “ ‘[i]t is the duty of this court 
to give effect to the words used [in a statute], not to delete words used or to insert 
words not used.’ ”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 12 O.O.3d 1, 387 N.E.2d 1222, 
quoting Columbus-Suburban Coach Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1969), 20 
Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 49 O.O.2d 445, 254 N.E.2d 8.  To do so would enlarge the 
scope of the statute beyond that which the General Assembly enacted. 
{¶ 30} The Sarmientos’ cause of action was based on the Grange policy, 
which expressly required that an action against the insurer be commenced within 
two years from the date of the accident (or, if later, one year after the date the 
insured was aware, or should have been aware, of a claim).  Other jurisdictions 
have held that the limitation period in an insurance policy controls, not the general 
statute of limitations, even in the case of minors.  See, e.g., Mead v. Phoenix Ins. 
Co. (1904), 68 Kan. 432, 75 P. 475.  The reason given for this holding is that one 
who seeks the benefits of a contract, including a beneficiary who is a minor, must 
also assume its burdens.  Reiter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (D.N.J.1940), 33 F.Supp. 
159.  We agree with that reasoning.  Thus, the minors in this case who seek to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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reap the benefits of the Grange policy must comply with the requirements of the 
insurance policy.  This includes commencing an action for UM coverage within 
the contract’s two-year limitation period.  Consequently, the minors in this case 
are not “person[s] entitled to bring any action mentioned in [R.C. 2305.06],” and, 
thus, R.C. 2305.16, the tolling statute, does not apply. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, we hold that R.C. 2305.16 does not toll the limitation 
period in an insurance contract for persons who are minors at the time the cause 
of action accrues.  If a minor seeks coverage as a third-party beneficiary of an 
insurance policy, the minor must comply with the policy’s limitation period in 
which to commence an action.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals as to the claims of minors David Camacho III and Braulio Sarmiento. 
{¶ 32} Consistent with this opinion, we affirm in part and reverse in part 
the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 33} While I concur in the first portion of the majority’s opinion, I write 
separately to dissent from the majority’s holding that R.C. 2305.16 does not toll 
the limitation period in an insurance contract for persons who are minors at the 
time the cause of action accrues.  The plain import of the statute tolls the running 
of limitation periods while claimants are minors. 
{¶ 34} Ohio’s tolling statute, R.C. 2305.16, states:   
{¶ 35} “Unless otherwise provided in sections 1302.98, 1304.35, and 
2305.04 to 2305.14 of the Revised Code, if a person entitled to bring any action 
January Term, 2005 
11 
mentioned in those sections, unless for penalty or forfeiture, is, at the time the 
cause of action accrues, within the age of minority * * *, the person may bring it 
within the respective times limited by those sections, after the disability is 
removed.”  (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 36} According to the plain language of the tolling statute, the statute of 
limitations begins to run in certain specified actions only when the claimant’s 
disability is removed.  For the minors in this case, the disability will be removed 
when they reach the age of majority. Because the legislature included the 
limitation period for contract actions in the tolling statute by specifically 
enumerating the contract provision, R.C. 2305.06, I cannot agree with the 
majority’s conclusion that the limitation period for the claims of the minors in this 
case is not tolled. 
{¶ 37} The majority also states that “the General Assembly did not 
broadly draft R.C. 2305.16 so that it tolls all statutes of limitations applicable to 
claims of minors.”  (Emphasis added.)  It cites wrongful-death claims and 
workers’ compensation claims as examples of actions whose statutes of 
limitations are not tolled by the minority of a claimant.  While I do not dispute 
that R.C. 2305.16 is inapplicable to those claims, I believe that there is a 
fundamental difference between those claims and the claims at issue here.  The 
limitation periods for wrongful-death claims and workers’ compensation claims 
are not among the enumerated limitation periods included in R.C. 2305.16.  The 
tolling statute tolls the limitations periods of only those actions that are 
specifically listed, and a contract claim under R.C. 2305.06 is so listed. 
{¶ 38} The majority holds that because parties to a contract can agree to 
validly limit the time for bringing any action to less than the statutory period 
pursuant to Colvin v. Globe Am. Cas. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 293, 23 O.O.3d 
281, 432 N.E.2d 167, this removes the action from R.C. 2305.16’s tolling 
provision.  In Miller v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 619, 635 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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N.E.2d 317, we overruled Colvin to the extent that it permitted a contractual time-
limitation provision that was unreasonable and inappropriate.  For minors, the 
time period in which to bring an action can be reasonable and appropriate only if 
it begins after the minor reaches the age of majority.  Therefore, while the minor 
must comply with the policy’s limitation period in which to commence an action, 
he or she can be required to do so only after reaching the age of majority.  To hold 
otherwise circumvents legislation enacted to protect the legal rights of minors. 
{¶ 39} Because I believe that the plain language of R.C. 2305.16 clearly 
and unambiguously tolls the limitation period in an insurance contract for persons 
who are minors at the time the cause of action accrues, I respectfully dissent. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion as to the issue 
of tolling. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} In Miller v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 619, 
635 N.E.2d 317, this court did not set forth a judicially created two-year 
limitations period for UM/UIM claims against insurers.  The court did not pull 
“two years” from thin air and proclaim it good.  This court determined in that case 
that a two-year period for bringing a claim against an insurer was appropriate 
because in that case, two years was the statutory period an insured had to bring a 
claim against a tortfeasor on the underlying claim.  The court determined that a 
UM policy should provide the same level of protection for an insured as if the 
tortfeasor had been insured: 
{¶ 41} “As a result of the policy provision [requiring a lawsuit to be filed 
within one year of the accident], appellants were not placed in the same position, 
with regard to the recovery of damages, that they would have enjoyed had the 
tortfeasor been insured.  As a practical matter, the effect of the policy provision 
January Term, 2005 
13 
was to deprive appellants of the coverage required by R.C. 3937.18.” Miller, 69 
Ohio St.3d at 623, 635 N.E.2d 317. 
{¶ 42} Miller’s purpose was not to create a limitation period that would 
apply in every case.  It stood for the proposition that an insured should enjoy the 
same limitation period whether the tortfeasor was insured or not.  Miller 
acknowledged that parties to an insurance contract could negotiate a limitation 
period less than the 15-year statute of limitations for contract actions set forth in 
R.C. 2305.06.  But the agreed-upon reduced time period is void if it “purports to 
dilute or eliminate the rights of the insured to coverage required by statute.” 
Miller, 69 Ohio St.3d at 624, 635 N.E.2d 317.  The contract provision in this case 
clearly diluted the rights of appellants under New Mexico law.  Thus, the two-
year limitation period in the contract should be declared void in this case. 
{¶ 43} The circumstances of this case make the majority opinion 
especially hard to swallow.  Appellants notified Grange of the accident soon after 
it occurred, well within the two-year limitation period of the contract.  Appellants 
also sued the tortfeasor in New Mexico, preserving Grange’s subrogation rights.  
What kept Grange from paying under the policy?  The fact that after two years, 
they could no longer be forced to. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P. A., Brenda M. Johnson, 
and Jonathan D. Mester, for appellants and cross-appellees. 
 
Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Timothy J. Fitzgerald, Robert H. 
Eddy, and Colleen A. Mountcastle, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
_______________________