Title: Burnell v. Burnell

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME  
24 
Docket: 
Pen-11-222 
Argued: 
January 11, 2012 
Decided: 
February 28, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
FRANKLIN L. BURNELL JR. 
 
v. 
 
LYNETTE D. BURNELL 
 
 
LEVY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Franklin L. Burnell Jr. appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Bangor, Gunther, J.) granting Lynette Burnell’s motion to modify the parties’ 
1989 divorce judgment.  Franklin argues that the divorce judgment was 
unambiguous in awarding him his full military pension and that the court erred in 
determining otherwise and awarding a portion of his benefits to Lynette.  We agree 
and vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Franklin and Lynette Burnell were divorced in an uncontested 
proceeding in 1989 after nineteen years of marriage.  The divorce judgment 
(Kravchuk, J.), which incorporated an agreement that Franklin’s attorney drafted 
following mediation, allocated parental rights and responsibilities, provided for 
alimony and child support payments, and divided the parties’ property, including 
 
 
 
2 
awarding the marital real estate to Lynette and awarding to Franklin his savings 
account and employer-sponsored pension.  The provision relevant to this appeal 
relates to Franklin’s military retirement benefits and states: “The Court hereby 
awards to the husband his National Guard Pension Plan except that the wife shall 
be entitled to any rights that she has to said plan pursuant to Federal Law.” 
[¶3]  Franklin retired from the Air National Guard in 2002 after 
twenty-seven years of service, including four in active duty in the Air Force, and 
he began collecting his retirement benefits in 2006.  When Lynette learned in 2009 
that Franklin was collecting his military pension, she applied to the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the federal agency responsible for 
processing military retirement pay, for what she believed to be her share of 
benefits.  DFAS denied her application, but sent a form that she and Franklin could 
complete to “clarify” the court order by agreeing to a specific amount or 
percentage of benefits to be paid to Lynette. 
[¶4]  After contacting Franklin but failing to receive a response from him 
regarding the DFAS form, Lynette filed a motion to modify the divorce judgment 
in January 2010, requesting that the court specify the amount of Franklin’s pension 
to which she was entitled, determine that the amount was retroactive to 2002, and 
order Franklin to pay that amount plus attorney fees.  Lynette’s subsequent motion 
to enforce the divorce judgment was denied and is not at issue on appeal. 
 
 
 
3 
[¶5]  After a March 2011 hearing, the court (Gunther, J.) granted Lynette’s 
motion to modify, concluding that the provision of the divorce judgment regarding 
Franklin’s military pension was ambiguous.  The court found that the judgment 
intended to award Lynette her “full share” of the marital interest in Franklin’s 
military benefits.  Accordingly, after calculating that approximately eleven of 
Franklin’s twenty-seven years of service occurred during the marriage, the court 
concluded that Lynette was entitled to 11/54 of Franklin’s prospective benefits 
(one half of 11/27), and amended the judgment to read: “The Court hereby awards 
Franklin Burnell his Military Pension Plan except that Lynette Burnell shall be 
entitled to 11/54 of the monthly net pay payable to him, effective April 1, 2011.”  
This appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶6]  Franklin contends that the divorce judgment unambiguously awarded 
him his full military pension and that the court erred by concluding otherwise and 
granting Lynette’s motion to modify the judgment.  He argues that the language 
reserving Lynette’s federal rights to the pension was provisional, requiring an 
inquiry into Lynette’s rights pursuant to federal law, but nothing more.  We 
therefore begin by reviewing the language of the divorce judgment in the context 
of the applicable federal law.  “We review de novo whether a provision in a 
 
 
 
4 
divorce judgment is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations and 
therefore ambiguous.”  Ramsdell v. Worden, 2011 ME 55, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1224. 
[¶7]  The contested provision of the divorce judgment states: “The Court 
hereby awards to the husband his National Guard Pension Plan except that the wife 
shall be entitled to any rights that she has to said plan pursuant to Federal Law.”  In 
finding this provision to be ambiguous, the court stated: 
Under the military retirement statute . . . the wife of a service member 
acquires no personal “rights” in the military pension.  The only 
interest a spouse accrues is the undivided marital interest. . . .  
“Rights” as used in the judgment must mean something other than 
direct entitlement.  The only rights the judgment could be referencing 
are the undivided property rights. 
 
The court is correct that a former spouse has no right pursuant to federal law to a 
share of a service member’s pension.  However, the distinction drawn by the court 
between “rights” and “marital interest” is misplaced.  Whether construed as an 
“interest” in marital property or as a “right,” federal law grants neither to the 
spouse of a service member.  See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2616 (2011) (“[P]roperty interests are created and defined by state law.” (quoting 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443, 451 
(2007)) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
[¶8]  The federal law governing distribution of a service member’s pension 
in state court divorce proceedings is the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ 
 
 
 
5 
Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408 (LexisNexis 2011).1  See Gillis v. 
Gillis, 2011 ME 45, ¶ 10, 15 A.3d 720.  The USFSPA authorizes, but does not 
require, a state court to “treat disposable retired pay payable to a member . . . either 
as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.”  10 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1408(c)(1).  The statute provides: 
After effective service . . . of a court order . . . , with respect to a 
division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an 
amount of the disposable retired pay from a member to the spouse or 
a former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall make 
payments . . . , with respect to a division of property, in the amount of 
disposable retired pay specifically provided for in the court order. 
 
Id. § 1408(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
[¶9]  The statute also expressly defines “court order” to mean “a final decree 
of divorce . . . which . . . in the case of a division of property, specifically provides 
for the payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of 
disposable retired pay, from the disposable retired pay of a member to the spouse 
or former spouse of that member.”  Id. § 1408(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added).  Finally, 
the statute notes that it “does not create any right, title, or interest which can be 
                                               
 
1  Although the USFSPA has been amended several times since it was enacted in 1982 (with 
retroactive applicability to retirement benefits received after June 25, 1981), there have been no relevant 
amendments to the provisions pertinent to this appeal since the divorce judgment was entered in 1989.  
See Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982); 
10 U.S.C.S. § 1408(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).  
 
 
 
6 
sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a 
spouse or former spouse.”  Id. § 1408(c)(2).   
 
[¶10]  The federal statute is thus clear in its scope: it permits state courts to 
divide military pensions according to state law and provides a mechanism through 
which such awards to spouses may be enforced.  See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 
581, 584-85 & n.2 (1989).  However, the statute applies only when the court order 
expressly makes such an award as a specific amount or percentage of benefits and 
does not itself grant a former spouse any independent right to the benefits.2  See 
Koszegi v. Erickson, 2004 ME 113, ¶ 20, 855 A.2d 1168 (stating that the USFSPA 
“governs direct payments from military retirement pay made in compliance with 
court orders in divorce cases”); see also Stotler v. Wood, 687 A.2d 636, 637 n.2 
(Me. 1996) (“[T]he [USFSPA] does not bear on the issue whether a military 
pension is property under state law.”). 
 
[¶11]  The only right or interest a spouse accrues in a service member’s 
pension is therefore solely a result of state law.  See Stern, 564 U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2616.  The “undivided marital interest” referenced by the court is not an interest 
created by federal law, but rather a property interest that accrues during marriage 
pursuant to Maine’s property distribution statute, 19-A M.R.S. § 953 (2011).  
                                               
 
2  A DFAS summary of the statute also emphasizes its scope: “The USFSPA does not automatically 
entitle a former spouse to a portion of the member’s retired pay.  A former spouse must have been 
awarded a portion of a member’s military retired pay as property in their final court order.”  Defense 
Finance 
and 
Accounting 
Service, 
Former 
Spouses’ 
Protection 
Act: 
Legal 
Overview, 
http://www.dfas.mil/garnishment/usfspa/legal.html (April 1, 2011). 
 
 
 
7 
Section 953 allows for the portion of a military pension earned during marriage to 
be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution.  See Black v. 
Black, 2004 ME 21, ¶ 10 n.4, 842 A.2d 1280; see also Stotler, 687 A.2d at 638 
(discussing 19 M.R.S. § 722-A (1981), the property distribution statute in effect in 
1989).  Maine law does not require that a divorce court divide marital property 
equally, only that the overall property division be just.  Doucette v. Washburn, 
2001 ME 38, ¶ 24, 766 A.2d 578 (construing section 953); Robinson v. Robinson, 
554 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me. 1989) (construing section 722-A). 
[¶12]  Here, the divorce judgment expressly “awards to [Franklin] his 
National Guard Pension Plan.”  It makes no affirmative award to Lynette in the 
form of a specific amount or percentage of Franklin’s benefits.  Although the 
divorce judgment might have divided Franklin’s military benefits and awarded a 
share to Lynette pursuant to state property division law, it did not.  By reserving 
for Lynette only those “rights” she had pursuant to federal law, the clear import of 
the divorce judgment is that its affirmative award of the military pension to 
Franklin constituted the application of state equitable distribution law. 
[¶13]  The context of the judgment further supports this interpretation.  See 
Ramsdell, 2011 ME 55, ¶ 18, 17 A.3d 1224.  The property distributed in the 
judgment included marital real estate, Franklin’s two pensions and his savings 
account, and the parties’ personal property.  Lynette was awarded the marital real 
 
 
 
8 
estate, Franklin was awarded his pensions and savings account, and the personal 
property was divided between them.  In the nearly twenty-three years since their 
divorce judgment was entered, neither Franklin nor Lynette have challenged the 
property division as inequitable.3  The affirmative language used to divide the 
property further emphasizes its plain meaning: When introducing its allocation of 
Franklin’s pensions, the judgment uses the phrase, “The Court hereby awards to 
the husband.”  It is undisputed that Franklin alone was thereby awarded his 
employer-sponsored pension plan, and the same outcome is presumed from the use 
of identical language in the military pension provision.  By contrast, when Lynette 
is awarded property, the judgment states: “The Court hereby sets aside said marital 
real estate to the wife.”  There is no ambiguity in this language.4   
[¶14]  Lynette argues that the second clause of the contested provision—
“except that [Lynette] shall be entitled to any rights that she has to said plan 
pursuant to Federal Law”—would be meaningless if it is not construed as awarding 
Lynette some portion of Franklin’s military pension.  We disagree.  This 
                                               
 
3  Franklin and Lynette agreed to modify the alimony provisions of the divorce judgment in 1994.  
Their stipulation was incorporated into a judgment (Hjelm, J.) stating that “[a]ll other matters set forth in 
said divorce judgment dated September 5, 1989 shall remain in full force and effect.” 
 
4  Although the judgment is unambiguous on its face, we also take note that the court’s notations on 
the 1989 Divorce Hearing Form—of which judicial notice was taken without objection in the 
post-judgment proceeding—state on three separate lines under the heading “Property”: (1) “Real Estate—
to her,” (2) “Retirement to him,” and (3) “Personal property all divided,” further underscoring the lack of 
ambiguity in the court’s award of the entire military pension to Franklin pursuant to state property 
distribution law. 
 
 
 
 
9 
reservation of Lynette’s rights is appropriately deferential language recognizing 
that the rights of former spouses of service members may change based on 
congressional action and preserving Lynette’s opportunity to claim a share of 
Franklin’s pension should she gain a right to do so in the future.  See McCarty v. 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981) (noting that “Congress may well decide . . . 
that more protection should be afforded a former spouse of a retired service 
member”).5  Since federal law does not now and did not in 1989 require the court 
to make such an award to Lynette, nor did it independently entitle her to any 
portion of Franklin’s pension, the additional clause does not alter the meaning of 
the first part, which awards Franklin his entire military pension pursuant to the 
court’s state law authority to equitably divide marital property.  The divorce 
judgment is not reasonably susceptible to an alternative interpretation, and the 
court’s determination that the divorce judgment is ambiguous therefore was in 
error.  See Ramsdell, 2011 ME 55, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1224. 
 
[¶15]  When a judgment is unambiguous, it “must be enforced in accordance 
with the plain meaning of the language in the judgment.”  Id.  Courts “may not, 
under the guise of a clarification order, make a material change that modifies the 
                                               
 
5  The McCarty decision held that state courts may not divide military retirement pay pursuant to state 
community property laws.  McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 232-36 (1981).  As the decision itself 
contemplated, its holding was superseded by Congress’s subsequent enactment of the USFSPA, which 
increased the protections for former spouses of service members by expressly permitting state courts to 
treat military retirement pay as property subject to division upon divorce.  See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 
U.S. 581, 584, 587 (1989); 10 U.S.C.S. § 1408(c)(1); see also Depot v. Depot, 2006 ME 25, ¶ 8, 893 A.2d 
995 (acknowledging that “Congress has legislatively countermanded the holding[] in . . . McCarty by 
making . . . military retirement benefits subject to community property law”). 
 
 
 
10 
provisions of the original judgment.”  Corcoran v. Marie, 2011 ME 14, ¶ 12, 
12 A.3d 71 (quotation marks omitted); see also Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d 
750, 752 (Me. 1983).  The most that Lynette is granted by the unambiguous 
language of the divorce judgment is an inquiry into her rights in the future should 
Congress amend the USFSPA in an applicable manner or enact other legislation 
altering her federal rights with respect to Franklin’s pension.  Accordingly, her 
motion to modify the judgment should have been denied. 
[¶16]  Because we conclude that the provision awarding Franklin his 
military pension is unambiguous and that Lynette’s motion to modify was 
improperly granted, we need not address Franklin’s remaining arguments. 
The entry is: 
Order vacated with respect to the grant of the 
motion 
to 
modify 
the 
divorce 
judgment.  
Remanded to the District Court for entry of a 
judgment denying the motion to modify. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Jed J. French, Esq., and Maryellen Sullivan, Esq., Freeport, for appellant 
Franklin L. Burnell, Jr. 
 
Suzanne N. Russell, Esq., Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, LLP, Bangor, 
for appellee Lynette D. Burnell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
At oral argument: 
 
Jed J. French, Esq., for appellant Franklin L. Burnell, Jr. 
 
Suzanne N. Russell, Esq., for appellee Lynette D. Burnell 
 
 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket number DV-1998-477 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY