Title: City of Minot v. Whitfield

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

71 N.W.2d 766 (1955) CITY OF MINOT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Hope WHITFIELD, Respondent. No. 7488. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 29, 1955. Paul Campbell, Minot, for appellant. Ella Van Berkom, Minot, for respondent. GRIMSON, Judge. On August 29, 1953, one Leonard Dahl, a policeman in the City of Minot, signed a complaint before the Police Magistrate, charging Hope Whitfield with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of the Minot City ordinances. A warrant was issued and the defendant taken into custody. A hearing on the complaint was had. Mrs. Whitfield was represented by her attorney. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to serve 50 days in jail and to pay a fine of $95 and costs taxed at $5. In default of the payment of the fine and costs defendant was ordered to be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of forty days at hard labor. Defendant promptly appealed to the district court of Ward County and put up an undertaking on appeal. In due time the case was tried in district court before a jury. The defendant was found not guilty. Thereupon the City of Minot made a motion in district court for a new trial. The motion was denied. The City of Minot takes this appeal from the order of the district court denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The error assigned by the plaintiff, City of Minot, is the refusal of the court to admit in evidence the results of the use of the Hargar "Drunk-o-Meter" test on the *767 defendant for the purpose of establishing percentage of alcohol in her breath. The defendant contends that the City of Minot has no right to a new trial after the acquittal of the defendant. That raises the question whether an action under the city ordinances under which defendant was prosecuted was a civil or criminal proceeding. An examination of the cases discloses that the decisions in each case are largely based on the nature of the ordinance and whether the object is the collection of a penalty or the punishment of a crime. This court discussed the matter somewhat in the case of the Village of Litchville v. Hanson, 19 N.D. 672, 124 N.W. 1119, 1120. A Litchville ordinance provided for the licensing of dogs and a penalty by way of a fine for violation thereof. The court said: The court quotes In Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 as follows: It is clear that this court did not go any further than to hold that an action under local ordinance, such as the one involved in that case, was not strictly a criminal proceeding. This question whether actions for violation of municipal ordinances are of civil or criminal nature has been before the courts of many of the states. The conclusions of the courts show a great divergence of opinion. It seems that the nature of the ordinance and the seriousness of the penalty prescribed have largely controlled the conclusions of the courts. It is generally held that at common law a violation of an ordinance was treated as a civil action. 14 Am.Jur. Criminal Law, Sec. 9, p. 759. It is also held that when an ordinance provides simply for a fine and provides a penalty to aid in the collection thereof civil procedure must be followed. People ex rel. Kane v. Sloane, 98 App.Div. 450, 90 N.Y.S. 762. In re Cox, 129 Mich. 635, 638, 89 N.W. 440. The conviction for violation of an ordinance of the City of Detroit, which restricts the use of public places, was held not to "rise to the dignity of criminal proceedings." The cases disclose, however, that as the seriousness of the matter involved in the ordinance and the penalty for violation increased, the courts have been more inclined to consider a violation of an ordinance as quasi criminal. In Stevens v. City of Kansas City, 146 Mo. 460, 48 S.W. 658, 659, the court said: In the case of O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S.W. 449, 451, 127 Am.St.Rep. 1014, the court in discussing the procedure for violation of ordinances said: *768 In cases where the violation of an ordinance is also a violation of a state-wide statute, it is generally held that a prosecution for a violation of such ordinance is governed by the rules of criminal procedure. In Ex parte Clark, 24 Cal. App. 389, 141 P. 831, 833, the trial was under an ordinance declaring the sale of intoxicating liquor to be unlawful and providing a specific penalty of $40 for the breach thereof and imprisonment if not paid. The court said: In Spokane v. Smith, 37 Wash. 583, 79 P. 1125, 1126, the court said: In City of St. Louis v. Young, 235 Mo. 44, 138 S.W. 5, 8, the court in discussing proceedings under a city ordinance said: The nature of an action or proceeding for violation of a municipal ordinance has been thoroughly annotated in 33 L.R.A. p. 33, 48 L.R.A.,N.S., 156, and Ann.Cas.1917A, 220. In the first-mentioned annotation it is said: In case of State v. Vail, 57 Iowa 103, 10 N.W. 297, the court said regarding the prosecution under ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors: The ordinance which the defendant was charged with violating reads as follows: The punishment provided for in ordinance 8-204 is a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding ninety days or by both such fine and imprisonment. It will be noticed that there may be imprisonment without a fine. That shows the ordinance to be clearly of a criminal nature. The defendant was arrested on a complaint signed by a policeman. She was taken into custody. She was given a hearing and convicted in police magistrate's court. She was sentenced to serve 50 days in jail. Clearly that indicates that the object sought was punishment. She appealed according to the statutes for appeal by the defendant from a conviction in police magistrate's court, Sec. 40-1819, NDRC 1943. She was being tried for a violation of an ordinance which prohibited driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. That is an offense also prohibited by state law, Section 39-0801, 1949 Supp. NDRC 1943. That is an ordinance not only to prevent local offenses but to protect peace and welfare of the community and the state and to punish a public wrong. It follows that this case is in the nature of a criminal action and subject to trial under the rules of criminal procedure. The defendant was acquitted by the jury on the trial in district court. Plaintiff immediately made a motion for a new trial which was denied. The plaintiff then appeals to this court from order denying the motion for a new trial. Causes for granting a new trial in a criminal case are prescribed by Section 29-2402, 1953 Suppl. NDRC 1943. According to that section only the defendant can apply for a new trial when a verdict has been rendered against him. There is no provision for granting the plaintiff, the City of Minot, the right to move for a new trial after the acquittal of the defendant. Amend 5, U.S. Constitution and Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution provide that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." In the case of State v. Kelsey, 49 N.D. 148, 190 N.W. 817, this court says: The district court correctly denied the motion for a new trial. The order of the District Court is affirmed. BURKE, C. J., and JOHNSON, SATHRE and MORRIS, JJ., concur.