Title: REED B. HOHNHOLT v. BASIN ELECTRIC POWER CO-OP

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

REED B. HOHNHOLT v. BASIN ELECTRIC POWER CO-OP1989 WY 225784 P.2d 233Case Number: 89-154Decided: 12/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
REED B. HOHNHOLT, 
PETITIONER (EMPLOYEE-APPELLANT), 

v. 

BASIN ELECTRIC POWER 
CO-OP, RESPONDENT (EMPLOYER-APPELLEE).

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for petitioner 
(employee-appellant).

Stephen N. 
Sherard, Wheatland, for respondent 
(employer-appellee).

Before CARDINE, C.J., and 
THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The sole question we 
must decide here is whether the hearing examiner's finding that a worker's 
compensation claimant's need for psychiatric treatment did not arise from an 
injury sustained in the course of employment is supported by substantial 
evidence. 

[¶2.]     Petitioner Reed 
Hohnholt frames the issue as:

"Were medical expenses 
for psychiatric care properly denied where the evidence showed that such care 
was precipitated by an injury in the course of 
employment?"

[¶3.]     RespondentBasin Electric Power Co-op frames the 
issue as:

"Based on the evidence 
produced by employer and employee, was the denial of the employee's claims for 
psychiatric care expenses arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
unsupported by substantial evidence?"

[¶4.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶5.]     Reed Hohnholt suffered 
a shoulder injury at Basin Electric's Grayrocks Power Plant on March 12, 1987. 
Initially the injury was treated as a strained shoulder. Thereafter, Hohnholt 
underwent surgery for the problem twice, first in January of 1988 and again 
during May 1988. During the course of treatment, Hohnholt's orthopedic surgeon 
became concerned about Hohnholt's mental state and referred him to a 
psychiatrist.

[¶6.]     On August 8, 1988, 
Basin Electric terminated Hohnholt's employment after denying his request for a 
leave of absence. On September 6, 1988, suffering from depression, Hohnholt 
entered CrestViewHospital 
in Casper for 
psychiatric treatment. He stayed there until October 21, 
1988.

[¶7.]     Hohnholt had a history 
of mental difficulties before 1988. He underwent treatment at the DePaul 
Hospital Chemical Dependency Center in Cheyenne and Crest View in 1985. He was raised 
in an abusive environment, served in Vietnam, and had problems with drug 
and alcohol use. The hearing examiner determined that these factors contributed 
to his need for psychiatric treatment in 1988.

DISCUSSION

[¶8.]     The standard of review 
we apply here reflects a change in the worker's compensation laws by the 1986 
state legislature. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Special Session, ch. 3. As 
part of this revision, the legislature created the position of hearing examiner 
to hear contested worker's compensation cases. W.S. 27-14-602 (1977 & 1989 
Cum. Supp.). The effect was to change contested worker's compensation cases from 
judicial to administrative proceedings. See W.S. 27-12-601 through -618 
(repealed 1986).

[¶9.]     We have said that when 
this court reviews an agency decision:

"We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency. It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence." (citation omitted) Trout v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986).

The standard of 
review articulated in Lehman v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 752 P.2d 422, 425 (Wyo. 1988), does not 
apply to administrative worker's compensation cases.

[¶10.]  W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) defines an injury 
for the purposes of worker's compensation claims as 
follows:

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. `Injury' does not 
include:

* * * * * * 

"(F) Any injury or 
condition preexisting at the time of employment with the employer against whom a 
claim is made."

[¶11.]  This definition includes non-traumatic 
mental injuries when they result from a situation or condition in employment 
that is of greater magnitude than the day-to-day stresses and tensions all 
employees usually experience. Graves v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 190 (Wyo. 1986). Such injuries 
occurring as the result of a physical injury arising out of employment can be 
compensable. See Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's 
Compensation, 23 Vand.L.Rev. 1243, 1249-51 (1970).

[¶12.]  However, the burden is on the claimant, 
Hohnholt, to establish every essential element of his claim by a preponderance 
of the evidence. W.S. 27-14-603 lists these elements. It states in pertinent 
part:

"(a) The burden of proof 
in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of 
time is on the employee to prove by competent medical authority that his claim 
arose out of and in the course of his employment and to prove by a preponderance 
of evidence that:

"(i) There is a direct 
causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which the work is 
performed and the injury;

"(ii) The injury can be 
seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the 
employment;

"(iii) The injury can 
fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate cause;

"(iv) The injury does not 
come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally exposed outside of 
the employment; and

"(v) The injury is 
incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation 
of employer and employee."

[¶13.]  The evidence presented at the hearing 
consisted of the testimony of Hohnholt, Dr. Leggett, the attending psychiatrist 
during Hohnholt's first stay at Crest View, the deposition of Dr. Cooperman, the 
attending psychiatrist during Hohnholt's second stay at Crest View, and 
miscellaneous exhibits. Dr. Leggett testified that in his opinion the 
hospitalization for which Hohnholt sought benefits resulted from Hohnholt's 
problems that existed before the accident at the power plant. Although Dr. 
Cooperman placed emphasis on Hohnholt's injury and surgery as the reason for his 
hospitalization, he acknowledged Hohnholt's past problems as a contributing 
factor. Hohnholt also testified as to the existence of these 
problems.

[¶14.]  Thus, the record contains substantial 
evidence to support the finding that Hohnholt's need for psychiatric treatment 
did not arise out of the injury sustained in the course of employment. Hohnholt 
failed to carry his burden of proof. We will not disturb the hearing examiner's 
decision.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.