Title: Pugh v. Griggs

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Joy PUGH, Individually and as Administratrix
of the Estate of John Pugh v. Ronald L.
GRIGGS and Stephen R. Crane

96-402                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 17, 1997


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- when granted. -- Summary judgment is
     to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that
     there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated
     and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
     law; once the moving party has established a prima facie
     entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet
     proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material
     issue of fact. 

2.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- standard of review. -- On review, the
     appellate court determines if summary judgment was appropriate
     based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving
     party in support of the motion leave a material question of
     fact unanswered; the appellate court views the evidence in a
     light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was
     filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving
     party.

3.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- may be appropriate in legal malpractice
     suit. -- The granting of summary judgment may be appropriate in
     a legal malpractice suit.

4.   Attorney & client -- legal malpractice -- controlling principles. -- An
     attorney is negligent if he or she fails to exercise
     reasonable diligence and skill on behalf of the client; to
     prevail on a claim of legal malpractice, a plaintiff must
     prove that the attorney's conduct fell below the generally
     accepted standard of practice and that such conduct
     proximately caused the plaintiff damages; to show damages and
     proximate cause, the plaintiff must show that but for the
     alleged negligence of the attorney, the result in the
     underlying action would have been different. 

5.   Attorney & client -- legal malpractice -- when attorney is not liable. --
     An attorney is not liable to a client when, acting in good
     faith, he or she makes mere errors of judgment; moreover, an
     attorney is not, as a matter of law, liable for a mistaken
     opinion on a point of law that has not been settled by a court
     of highest jurisdiction and on which reasonable attorneys may
     differ.

6.   Attorney & client -- legal malpractice -- trial court did not err in
     deferring to appellees' decision to seek voluntary dismissal of appellant's
     case -- matter within counsel's discretion. -- The supreme court held
     that it was not error for the trial court to defer to
     appellees' decision to seek a voluntary dismissal or nonsuit
     of appellant's case because such matters were within counsel's
     discretion; ARCP Rule 41(a) clearly allows a plaintiff to
     nonsuit a claim, and the supreme court has recognized that the
     rule creates an absolute right to a nonsuit; appellant does
     not claim that the nonsuit was taken without her consent or
     that she did not understand the concept of taking a nonsuit. 
     

7.   Attorney & client -- legal malpractice -- appellant's continued retainment
     of appellees as counsel constituted waiver of negligence claim. -- The
     supreme court concluded that by continuing her retainment of
     appellees as counsel well into the filing of her second
     complaint, appellant effectively waived any claim that she may
     have had against appellees for any alleged negligence
     committed in the prosecution of the first suit.

8.   Judgment -- trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees
     was proper. -- Noting that while it might not have approved of
     appellees' lack of due diligence in the handling of
     appellant's cases, the supreme court held that because the
     area of the law concerning the timely refiling of a complaint
     after taking a nonsuit was not settled and had not been
     addressed by the court until the first appeal in this matter,
     the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper, and
     appellees were entitled to judgment on the issue as a matter
     of law. 

9.   Appeal & error -- denial of motion for summary judgment -- not reviewable
     on appeal. -- The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
     reviewable on appeal.


     Appeal from Union Circuit Court, Second Division; David F.
Guthrie, Judge; affirmed.
     Steven R. Smith, for appellant.
     R. Gary Nutter, for appellees.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     This is an appeal from the order of the Union County Circuit
Court granting summary judgment on the issue of attorney
malpractice to Appellees Ronald L. Griggs and Stephen R. Crane and
denying summary judgment on the issue of liability to Appellant Joy
Pugh.  As this appeal involves a question concerning the law of
torts, jurisdiction is proper in this court.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(16) (as amended by per curiam July 15, 1996).  On appeal,
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting Appellees'
motion for summary judgment as there were issues of material fact
yet to be decided and that the trial court also erred in denying
her motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons outlined below,
we affirm the trial court's judgment.
                I.  Facts and Procedural History
    We have discerned the following facts from the pleadings and
affidavits filed with the trial court.  Appellant entered into a
contract with Appellee Griggs on June 21, 1985, in which Griggs
agreed to represent Appellant in her claim for damages, wrongful
death, and medical malpractice for the death of her husband John
Pugh.  Thereafter, Appellee Griggs associated with Appellee Crane
in the prosecution of Appellant's claim.  Appellees continually
represented Appellant through January 27, 1992.
     On May 21, 1987, Appellees sent notice of intent to sue to the
medical defendants, including Warner Brown Hospital and two
doctors, James Weedman and Durwood Flournoy.  On July 29, 1987,
Appellees filed Appellant's suit against the medical defendants
alleging negligence in the treatment of Appellant's husband,
resulting in his death.  The negligent acts complained of occurred
on or about May 26, 1985.  On September 29, 1989, Appellant, on the
advice of Appellees, took a voluntary nonsuit.
     On September 24, 1990, Appellees served the medical defendants
with notice of intent to sue, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.
 16-114-204 (1987) (repealed 1995).  On November 29, 1990,
Appellees refiled Appellant's complaint.  The medical defendants
moved for summary judgment on December 19, 1990, alleging that
Appellant's action was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations for filing a claim after nonsuit as provided in Ark.
Code Ann.  16-56-126 (1987).  The motion was denied.
     On February 25, 1993, approximately one year after Appellees
had withdrawn from Appellant's case, the medical defendants filed
a motion for reconsideration of summary judgment.  This time the
trial court granted the motion, applying this court's holding in
Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138,