Title: State v. Link

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: May 7, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondent
on Review,
v. 
JUSTIN ALAN LINK, 
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
01FE0371AB; CA A123223; SC S055516)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
November 4, 2008.
Susan F. Drake,
Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner
on review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Legal Services Division.
Timothy
A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of
the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, Alta J. Brady, Judge. 214 Or App 100, 162 P3d 1038 (2007).
WALTERS, J.
Defendant was a teenager when he and
four friends stole a car belonging to one friend's mother, killed her to
conceal the robbery, and drove to Canada.  Although defendant took part in the
preparations to commit the murder and encouraged and directed the others to
shoot the victim, he was not physically present when, after three of his
friends either refused or were unable to shoot her, the fourth fired the fatal
shot.  Defendant was charged with five counts of aggravated murder.  Counts 1
through 3 charged defendant with aggravated felony murder -- specifically, that
defendant had committed first-degree robbery by three different means and that,
in the course of committing each of those felonies, he had committed the murder
of the victim "personally and intentionally."  See ORS
163.095(2)(d) (1999) (defining felony murder under those circumstances as
aggravated murder).(1) 
Counts 4 and 5 charged that defendant had killed the victim to conceal the
commission of other crimes (Count 4) and the identity of the perpetrators of those
crimes (Count 5).  See ORS 163.095(2)(e) (defining murder under those
circumstances as aggravated murder).  After a bench trial, the trial court
convicted defendant of aggravated murder on all five counts.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
defendant challenged his convictions on Counts 1 through 3, contending that the
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish that he had committed
the murder "personally" and that the trial court therefore had erred
in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on those three counts.  Defendant
did not challenge his aggravated murder convictions on Counts 4 or 5.  The
Court of Appeals concluded that defendant would stand convicted of aggravated
murder and receive the same sentence regardless of whether his convictions on Counts
1 through 3 were reversed.  The court therefore declined to reach the issue of
the sufficiency of the evidence on those counts.  State v. Link, 214 Or
App 100, 162 P3d 1038 (2007).    
We allowed defendant's petition for
review and now hold that (1) the Court of Appeals should have reached the
merits of defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts 1
through 3; and (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal on Counts 1 through 3.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Because the parties do not contest
the accuracy of the statement of facts by the Court of Appeals, we take the
facts from its opinion.
"In March 2001, defendant and his friend * * * Thomas,
the son of the victim in this case, were living in a motel in Deschutes
County.  Thomas had recently moved out of his mother's house because he was not
getting along with her, due in part to her antipathy toward defendant.  At some
time during the morning of March 26, 2001, defendant, then 17 years old, along
with Thomas and three other friends -- Summers, age 15; Koch, age 15; and
Karle, age 16 -- entered the victim's house while she was at work.  The five
friends had decided to drive Koch's mother's Cadillac (which Koch had taken
from her and not returned) to Canada, and they had stopped at the victim's
house to shower, get food, and steal valuables.
"Shortly after they arrived, defendant and
two of his friends decided to make a trip to the store to buy cigarettes.  As
they were about to leave, defendant handed another one of his friends, Karle, a
.308 rifle -- stolen earlier from a shop owned by Thomas's father and later
used to kill the victim -- and told her to shoot anybody who might arrive
during the errand.  When Karle asked who that might be, defendant named the
victim.  However, the errand never took place; nobody could find the keys to
the Cadillac in which the friends had arrived.  At defendant's suggestion, they
ransacked the house looking for the keys, but to no avail.  At that point, they
decided to wait for the victim to return, knock her out, and go to Canada in
her other car.
"Defendant, however, told the others that
merely knocking the victim unconscious and tying her up would not be
sufficient; rather, they had to kill her so that she could not have them
apprehended.  As the discussion continued, the five friends suggested various
ways to accomplish the murder:  beating the victim to death with empty wine
bottles, injecting her with bleach, setting the house on fire with her inside,
and electrocuting her by immersing her in the bathtub and then also immersing
plugged-in appliances.  Defendant told them, however, that, if all else failed,
they should shoot her.
"As the late morning and afternoon passed,
defendant instructed his friends how they should go about setting up the house
for the planned murder.  Wine bottles were emptied; a hypodermic needle was
filled with bleach; the bathtub was filled and electrical cords brought into
the bathroom and connected to a hair dryer and radio.  Shortly before the
victim's expected return, two of the codefendants stationed themselves as
lookouts so they could alert the others to the victim's approach; two stationed
themselves where they could hit her when she entered; and defendant, telling
the others that he could not be seen in the house, stationed himself outside,
where he stayed in contact with the others by cellphone.  At one point, he
telephoned Koch and delivered what Koch later described as a 'pep talk,'
encouraging him to carry out their plans.
"When the victim arrived, Thomas and Koch
hit her between four and six times with the empty wine bottles and, when she
fell to the ground, kicked her.  Despite the attack, however, she was able to
stand and get to the back porch.  From his vantage point outside, defendant saw
her, and asked Thomas and Koch, who by now were also on the porch, 'Why isn't
she dead yet?  Get her back in the house.  Shoot her.  Get the gun.'  As Koch
went to retrieve the rifle, defendant told Thomas that the victim looked 'really
bad' and that they should put her out of her misery.  After Thomas, Summers,
and Karle either refused or were unable to shoot the victim, Koch did so
himself.  Defendant remained outside.
"After the murder, the five young people
took a cordless phone, alcohol, guns, jewelry, and money from the residence,
transferred their belongings from the Cadillac to the victim's Honda, and drove
away."
214 Or App at 102-04.
Defendant and his cohorts were
captured as they attempted to enter Canada.  They were each indicted on 22
criminal counts, including the five counts of aggravated murder previously
described and five counts of conspiracy to commit aggravated murder.(2)
Defendant was tried separately from
the others and waived his right to a jury trial.  At the close of the state's evidence,
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.  As to Counts 1
through 3, the three counts charging aggravated felony murder, defendant
contended that there was no evidence from which a rational factfinder could
conclude that he had "personally * * * committed" the murder, as is
required by ORS 163.095(2)(d) (felony murder is aggravated murder if defendant "personally
and intentionally committed the homicide").(3) 
Defendant asserted that, under that subsection of the statute, only the person
who fired the fatal shot could be convicted.
The state disagreed.  It contended
that, under State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 789 P2d 1326 (1990), the requirement
that a defendant act "personally" could be met by other active involvement
in the murder.  The evidence, the state argued, was sufficient to permit a
factfinder to conclude that defendant's actions constituted active involvement
in the victim's murder. 
The trial court agreed with the
state, denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, and convicted defendant on
all 22 counts.(4) 
Conviction of aggravated murder requires one of three sentences:  death, life
imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, or life
imprisonment.  ORS 163.105(1)(a).  Defendant was not eligible for the death
penalty by virtue of ORS 137.707(2) (prohibiting death penalty for defendant
who was under 18 years of age when crime was committed).  The trial court
sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or
parole.  
During the sentencing phase of the
trial, defendant argued that the five aggravated murder counts (plus other
counts) should be merged into a single conviction for aggravated murder.  Defendant
relied on this court's decision in State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 10 P3d
901 (2000).  The state did not argue to the contrary.  In fact, the state
specifically "agree[d] that all five counts of Aggravated Murder [should]
merge for sentencing purposes."
Because the exact nature of the "merger"
that the law requires is relevant to our disposition here, we pause to consider
Barrett and its application of the "anti-merger statute" in
some detail.  That statute, currently codified as ORS 161.067(1), but discussed
in Barrett as also codified in former ORS 161.062(1) (1997), provides:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of
an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are separate statutory violations."(5)
In Barrett, the defendant had been convicted of three
counts of aggravated murder (among other crimes) for killing a single victim.  This
court concluded that a defendant's murder of one victim, even though attended
by multiple aggravating circumstances, does not violate two or more statutory
provisions as required to constitute two or more separately punishable offenses
under former ORS 161.062 (1997); therefore, the trial court had erred in
imposing separate sentences for each aggravated murder conviction.  331 Or at
29-31.
The court in Barrett nevertheless
concluded that the judgment needed to reflect the full extent of the defendant's
crime:
"Each of the three theories of aggravated
murder at issue here is one on which the jury had to agree unanimously.  If the
trial court were to enter a conviction on only one count, and dismiss the other
two, it always would be possible that an appeal would result in a reversal, for
insufficient evidence, of the count that was selected to serve as the basis for
conviction.  With the other two counts dismissed, defendant would be able to
argue that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of
aggravated murder.  Such an outcome would be inappropriate, if there were
evidence to sustain defendant's guilt under either of the other two counts, but
there is no obvious mechanism for 'reviving' counts that have been dismissed."
Id. at 36-37 (citation omitted).  To address that possibility,
the court concluded that the "appropriate procedure" is "to
enter one judgment of conviction reflecting the defendant's guilt on the charge
of aggravated murder, which judgment separately would enumerate each of the
existing aggravating factors."  Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
Here, the trial court did not follow
precisely the procedure described in Barrett.  In the trial court's
judgment of conviction and sentence, the court sentenced defendant to life
without the possibility of parole on the first aggravated murder count,
Count 1.  The court then separately listed convictions on each of the four
remaining aggravated felony murder convictions, Counts 2 through 5,
noting for each one that those counts "merge into COUNT [1] for sentencing
purposes."(6)
On appeal, defendant presented two
issues pertinent to the disposition of this case.  First, defendant argued that
the trial court had erred when it denied defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal on the three aggravated felony murder counts, Counts 1 through 3. 
Defendant renewed his assertion that there was no evidence from which a
rational trier of fact could have found that he "personally * * *
committed" the murder, as required by ORS 163.095(2)(d).  Second,
defendant maintained that the trial court had erred by not merging the
aggravated murder convictions.  Under Barrett, defendant argued, the
trial court should have entered a single judgment of conviction for aggravated
murder, then listed the aggravating factors found in the five aggravated murder
counts. 
The state disagreed with defendant concerning
the trial court's ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1
through 3, but it concurred with defendant regarding the merger issue.  The
trial court, the state agreed, should have merged the five aggravated murder
counts by entering a single judgment of conviction for aggravated murder that
listed each aggravating factor.
After the Court of Appeals took the
case under advisement, that court asked the parties to address whether merger
of Counts 1 through 5 would mean that any error in denying the motion for
judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1 through 3 was harmless -- specifically, whether
merger would mean that any error did not affect a substantial right of the
parties, as is required to serve as a basis for reversal under ORS 138.230 and
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution.  The parties
agreed that any error was not harmless.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court should have merged the aggravated murder counts,
Counts 1 through 5, into a single conviction that listed the different
aggravating factors for all five counts.  Link, 214 Or App at 110 (relying
on this court's decision in Barrett).  The Court of Appeals held,
however, that, the agreement of the parties notwithstanding, merger rendered
harmless any error by the trial court in denying defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal:
"[D]efendant explicitly does not assign error to
his convictions on Counts 4 and 5, aggravated murder based on the attempt to
conceal the crimes or the identity of the perpetrator.  Thus, even if defendant
is correct that the court erred in not acquitting him on Counts 1 through 3, he
would still stand convicted on Counts 4 and 5.  Because all of the counts merge
into a single conviction, resulting in a single sentence, acquittal on Counts 1
through 3 would not affect a substantial right of defendant.  We therefore
could not reverse his conviction for aggravated murder.  ORS 138.230 (directing
court to disregard defects that do not affect party's substantial rights); see
also Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3 (Supreme Court must affirm
notwithstanding harmless error); State v. Culver, 198 Or App 267, 271,
108 P3d 104 (2005) (applying constitutional harmless error rule to Court of
Appeals decisions)."
Link, 214 Or App at 111 (emphasis in original).  
In their arguments to the Court of
Appeals, the parties had suggested that acquittal on Counts 1 through 3 would
affect a substantial right of defendant because, "should [defendant]
ultimately succeed in a post-conviction proceeding in obtaining a reversal on
Counts 4 and 5, then his convictions on Counts 1, 2, [or] 3 * * * would prevent
his complete vindication as to the aggravated murder convictions."  Id. 
The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, because it concluded that
defendant would not be able to obtain post-conviction relief as to the
aggravated murder charges on Counts 4 and 5.  The court stated:
"Defendant * * * did not appeal his convictions on the
grounds that he was wrongly found guilty on Counts 4 or 5.  He is therefore
barred from seeking post-conviction relief on those grounds.  [ORS 138.550]; Palmer
v. State of Oregon, 318 Or 352, 867 P2d 1368 (1994).  Further, because the
trial court found as fact that defendant committed the murders in order to
prevent the victim from revealing the perpetrators of the robbery and other
crimes, and that finding is supported by evidence in the record, the
possibility of actually achieving meaningful post-conviction relief,
even if it were possible to pursue it, would be so remote as to be essentially
nonexistent."
Link, 214 Or App at 112 (emphasis in original).
This court allowed defendant's
petition for review, limited to two of the questions presented by defendant:  (1)
whether a challenge to a conviction becomes moot if the conviction merges with
other counts that have not been specifically challenged; and (2) what level of
participation in a felony murder constitutes having "personally and
intentionally committed the homicide" for purposes of aggravated felony
murder under ORS 163.095(2)(d).(7) 
We must begin, then, by considering whether we can reach the issue regarding
the interpretation of "personally and intentionally" in ORS
163.095(2)(d).  
In that regard, the first issue that defendant
presents challenges a holding that the Court of Appeals never made.  Defendant
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the matter was moot,
and defendant's briefing attempts to refute that proposition.  The Court of
Appeals, however, did not hold that the matter was moot.  Rather, the Court of
Appeals concluded that any error was harmless.  Link, 214 Or App at
111.  We begin our analysis with that ruling.  We then consider whether, in all
events, the matter is moot.
HARMLESS ERROR AND
MOOTNESS
As the Court of Appeals correctly
noted, the harmless error doctrine is prescribed by two authorities, one statutory
and one constitutional.(8)
 The statutory authority for harmless error is ORS 138.230, which provides, in
part:
"After hearing the appeal, the court shall
give judgment, without regard to * * * technical errors, defects or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
The Court of Appeals concluded that
any error by the trial court in denying defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal did not affect defendant's substantial rights (as that term is used
in ORS 138.230) because defendant presently has (or should have) one merged conviction
for aggravated murder and his success on appeal would not change that result or
the sentence imposed.  In other words, even if the convictions on Counts 1
through 3 were set aside, defendant would still have one merged conviction for
aggravated murder based on Counts 4 and 5, and he would still serve the same
sentence.
As noted, the Court of Appeals based
its conclusion in part on the view that defendant would not be able to obtain
relief from his convictions on Counts 4 and 5.  Link, 214 Or App at
112.  The Court of Appeals correctly observed that defendant had not assigned
error with respect to his convictions on Counts 4 and 5 and thus was barred
from challenging those convictions in post-conviction proceedings on grounds that
he reasonably could have asserted, but did not assert, on direct appeal.  Id.
at 112 (citing ORS 138.550 and Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or
352, 867 P2d 1368 (1994)).  Conversely, however, defendant was entitled to raise
issues on post-conviction that he reasonably could not have raised on direct
appeal.  See ORS 138.550(2) (post-conviction relief available only if
ground for relief "was not asserted and could not reasonably have been
asserted in the direct appellate review proceeding").  Palmer identifies
a number of circumstances in which that might occur.  See 318 Or at
357-58 (recognizing that post-conviction court could consider arguments not
made at trial where "counsel was incompetent or guilty of bad faith";
where "the right subsequently sought to be asserted was not generally
recognized to be in existence at the time of trial; where counsel was excusably
unaware of facts which would have disclosed a basis for the assertion of the
right; and where duress or coercion prevented assertion of the right"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged
that there was, therefore, a procedural possibility that defendant could obtain
post-conviction relief from his convictions on Counts 4 and 5.  However, based on
the court's assessment that the likelihood of success was remote, the court deemed
that relief to be a practical impossibility.  Link, 214 Or App at 112.  
The court erred in relying on that conclusion as a basis for its determination
that the alleged trial court error did not affect defendant's substantial
rights.  The court had no way to know the grounds that defendant might assert
as the basis for a claim of post-conviction relief, and therefore it had no means
of assessing the merits of defendant's potential claims.  See, e.g., Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 39 P3d 851 (2002) (petitioner was entitled
to post-conviction relief due to inadequate assistance of counsel who unreasonably
had withdrawn petitioner's alibi defense).   
The Court of Appeals also erred
analytically by working backward from its conclusion -- that defendant would
stand convicted of aggravated murder and serve the same sentence, regardless of
the strength of his position on appeal -- instead of beginning with the
significance of the relief that defendant seeks on appeal -- acquittal of three
of the charges against him.  In Counts 1 through 3, the state charged defendant
with committing the murder of the victim "personally and
intentionally."  The trial court's verdict as to each of those three charges
was "guilty," and the trial court consequently convicted defendant of
all three charges.  On appeal, defendant seeks a ruling that the trial court
erred in entering those verdicts and convictions.
When the state charges a defendant with
illegal acts, the public is entitled to measure the truth of those charges not
by the defendant's protests of innocence, but by the final judgment of the
court.  If the state does not produce facts necessary to sustain a verdict of
guilty, then the defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal and to have
the public record of his case reflect that judgment.  Here, defendant was
denied that opportunity because the Court of Appeals merged his convictions and
then used the merger as a reason not to assess the sufficiency of the evidence
to support their initial entry.
The statute setting out the
requirements for judgments in criminal cases, ORS 137.071, recognizes a
defendant's interest in having the criminal record correctly reflect the
court's resolution of each charge that the state makes.  That statute specifically
requires that the judgment "must specify clearly the court's determination
for each charge in the information, indictment or complaint."  Former ORS
137.071(7) (1999).(9) 
If defendant in this case is correct that the trial court should have granted his
motion for acquittal, then the judgment that the trial court entered did not reflect
the correct determination for each charge in the indictment.  The result in Barrett
is consistent with ORS 137.071.  In Barrett, the court required that the
judgment of conviction specifically record each aggravating factor of which the
defendant was found guilty, although the court concluded that only one
conviction for aggravated murder could be entered.  331 Or at 36-37.
The state acknowledges that, in the
past, a valid conviction on one count of aggravated murder has not deterred this
court from reaching the issue of the validity of convictions on other counts of
aggravated murder, or the accuracy of the judgment, even where the issue that the
court reached had no impact on the sentence imposed.  See, e.g., State
v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 622, 188 P3d 242 (2008), pet for cert filed,
(08-9543) (March 26, 2009) (affirming conviction on two counts of aggravated
murder and sentence of death, but reversing one count of aggravated murder); State
v. Tiner, 340 Or 551, 566-67, 135 P3d 305 (2006), cert den, 549
US 1169 (2007) (reaching unpreserved claims of error in form of judgment
despite argument that death sentence would render issue moot); State v. Hale,
335 Or 612, 632, 75 P3d 448 (2003), cert den, 541 US 942 (2004)
(affirming convictions on seven counts of aggravated murder and associated sentences
of death, but reversing convictions on six counts of aggravated murder and associated
sentences of death); State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 252, 269, 839 P2d 692
(1992), adh'd to on recons, 318 Or 28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993) (affirming
convictions on 15 counts of aggravated murder, but reversing conviction on one
count of aggravated murder and vacating sentence of death for error in penalty
phase).  The state argues, however, that those prior decisions are not
persuasive because none of them specifically addressed the reviewability issues
that this case raises.  In that regard, the state suggests that we focus our
attention instead on State v. Pratt, 316 Or 561, 853 P2d 827, cert
den, 510 US 969 (1993).  
In Pratt, the defendant had
been convicted on two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death.  316
Or at 564.  During trial, the defendant had moved for a judgment of acquittal
on one of the two aggravated murder counts, but the trial court had denied the
motion.  Id. at 575.  On automatic and direct review, this court
declined to decide whether the trial court had erred.  The court explained its
reasoning this way:
"We need not decide that issue, * * * because,
even if defendant were correct, the insufficiency of the evidence as to count
two did not affect his conviction on count one or the resulting sentence of
death.  See State v. Langley, supra, 314 Or at 269 (trial
court's error in denying defendant's motion for acquittal held to be reversible
error; however, remaining aggravated murder convictions affirmed).  Indeed,
defendant does not suggest any manner in which the submission of count two to
the jury might have affected adversely his conviction or sentence on [count
one], and no such adverse effect is apparent to this court.  Even if this court
were to reverse defendant's conviction on count two, he still would stand
convicted of one count of aggravated murder, and the sentence of death would
remain.  Accordingly, we decline to address the sufficiency issue further."
316 Or at 575.
The court's decision in Pratt not
to exercise its discretion to consider the merits of the defendant's claim on
appeal does not control the legal question with which we are presented here. 
In this case, the issue arises in a different context than that which existed in
Pratt.  Here, defendant has done what the defendant in Pratt did
not do -- he has identified the way in which his rights were affected by the
trial court's denial of his motion for acquittal.  In that regard, we have the
benefit of the court's decision in Barrett.  In Barrett, this
court held that a conviction for aggravated murder must specify each
aggravating factor supporting the conviction.  331 Or at 36-37; see also
Tiner, 340 Or at 566-67 (valid sentence of death did not render moot
defendant's argument that judgment entered against him must accurately reflect merged
convictions).  To give effect to those cases and to the requirement of ORS
137.071(7) that a judgment be an accurate record of the court's determination
on each charge, we must be able to review defendant's challenges to the guilty
verdicts on Counts 1 through 3 of the indictment.
Although a ruling in defendant's
favor on direct appeal would not, in itself, result in a reversal of his
convictions on all five counts of aggravated murder, such a ruling would reverse
the guilty verdicts entered on three of the five aggravated murder counts.  If
we were to adopt the position of the Court of Appeals, the guilty verdicts
entered against defendant on Counts 1 through 3 would stand, not because the
state proved those charges, but because the state proved that defendant was guilty
of other, separate charges -- those set forth in Counts 4 and 5.  Merger of
charges based on insufficient evidence would bar defendant from obtaining acquittal
on those charges.  That inverts the proper analytical sequence.  The question
whether a person is guilty as charged has an independent significance that
cannot be foreclosed by later merger.  Merger presumes the validity of the
convictions being merged; acquittals do not merge with convictions.
We conclude that the ruling that defendant
seeks would affect his substantial right, if the evidence were insufficient, to
acquittal of the charges of aggravated felony murder.  Therefore, the error, if
any, was not harmless error under ORS 138.230.
We also conclude that the
constitutional standard for harmless error under Article VII (Amended), section
3, of the Oregon Constitution has not been met here.  That constitutional
provision provides, in part:
"If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after
consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment of the court
appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment
shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial * * *."
Under that section, this court must consider whether "the
judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in
the case."  In State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003),
this court explained the appropriate test under that provision: 
"* * * Oregon's constitutional test for affirmance
despite error consists of a single inquiry:  Is there little likelihood that
the particular error affected the verdict?  The correct focus of the inquiry
regarding affirmance despite error is on the possible influence of the error on
the verdict rendered, not whether this court, sitting as a factfinder, would
regard the evidence of guilt as substantial and compelling."
The error that defendant alleges in
this case is not harmless under the test articulated in Davis.  If
defendant is correct, then the trial court should not have entered a verdict of
guilty on Counts 1 through 3.  By definition, the court's error affected the
verdict.  
Our determination that the error that
defendant claims affects his substantial rights also resolves the state's
contention that this case is moot.  If defendant is successful on his claim
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on
Counts 1 through 3, then that ruling will have a "practical effect"
on his rights in the same way that it affected his substantial rights for
harmless error purposes:  Defendant's judgment of conviction will be modified
to reflect acquittals on the charge set forth in Counts 1 through 3.  See Brumnett
v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 406, 848 P2d 1194 (1993) (stating that case is moot if
decision will no longer have a practical effect on or concerning rights of
parties).  The matter, therefore, is not moot.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state
did not adduce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that he had "personally and intentionally committed the homicide." 
ORS 163.095(2)(d).  Defendant does not assert any issue as to the "intentionally"
requirement; rather, the dispute surrounds whether defendant's conduct would
permit a factfinder to conclude that he "personally * * * committed"
the murder.  Defendant contends that one does not "personally" commit
aggravated felony murder under ORS 163.095(2)(d) simply by aiding in the commission
of a murder.  To have "personally * * * committed" the murder,
defendant argues, he "must have physically participated in the actual
conduct that caused the victim's death."  (Emphasis added.)
For its part, the state contends that
"personally" reaches a much broader spectrum of conduct:
"Any conduct, either physical or verbal, that
personally connects the defendant with the murder of the victim in a way that
constitutes having an 'actual role in causing the death' is sufficient to prove
aggravated felony murder."
The state contends that that definition is met here.  Although
the evidence would not support a finding that defendant shot the victim, the
state asserts that the evidence would support a finding that defendant had a
role in the shooting because he helped the others prepare for it and because he
encouraged and even ordered them to kill the victim.
To determine the meaning of "personally"
as it is used to define aggravated felony murder in ORS 163.095(2)(d), we must
interpret that statute.  In doing so, we first must understand how aggravated
felony murder fits into the general framework of the murder statutes.  
When a person causes or participates
in the death of another, he or she may be convicted of various crimes ranging
from criminal homicide to aggravated murder.
ORS 163.005 provides that a person
commits criminal homicide  
"if, without justification or excuse, the person
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the
death of another human being."
(Emphasis added.)
ORS 163.115(1)(b) provides that
criminal homicide constitutes felony murder
"[w]hen it is committed by a person, acting * * * with
one or more persons, who commits or attempts to commit [certain felony] crimes
and in the course of and in furtherance of the crime the person is committing
or attempting to commit, or during the immediate flight therefrom, the person,
or another participant * * *, causes the death of a person other than
one of the participants[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, a defendant may be convicted of
felony murder when, in the course of committing a felony, another participant in
the felony causes a death.  In that circumstance, the defendant may be
convicted of felony murder even though the defendant did not participate in the
murder, cause the death, or intend that the death occur.  For example, a person
who participates in a robbery may be guilty of felony murder if one of his or
her companions kills the victim in the course of the robbery, even if the
robber had no idea that the companion would strike the victim and did not
intend that the companion kill the victim.  See State v. Williams, 131
Or App 85, 87, 883 P2d 918 (1994), adh'd to on recons, 133 Or App 191,
891 P2d 3, rev den, 321 Or 512 (1995) (defendant convicted of felony
murder when defendant and two companions robbed victim; one companion struck victim
repeatedly with pipe and killed him).(10)
Criminal homicide constitutes intentional
murder when the person who causes the death does so intentionally. 
ORS 163.115(1)(a).(11) 
That statute includes within its reach persons who commit a felony and, in the
course of doing so, intentionally cause the death of a victim.  Thus, if a
participant in a felony also participates in and causes a murder, and does so
intentionally, then the participant commits intentional murder, as well as
felony murder.  In the previous example, if
the participant in the robbery also participated in and caused the murder by
providing the pipe to his or her companion and intended that the companion kill
the victim, the participant could be convicted of both intentional murder and
felony murder.  See State v. Gee, 224 Or App 635, 637, 198 P3d 950
(2008) (defendant convicted of attempted intentional murder where, in drive-by
shooting, defendant identified intended victim to companion and encouraged
companion to shoot).
The aggravated felony murder statute imposes
even more stringent criteria than does the intentional murder statute.  See
State v. Ventris, 337 Or 283, 292, 96 P3d 815 (2004) ("The murder
statutes distinguish between 'ordinary' murder and murder that is accompanied
by specified aggravating circumstances.").  The statute defining
aggravated murder, ORS 163.095, provides, in part:
"As used in ORS 163.105 and this section, 'aggravated
murder' means murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which is committed under, or
accompanied by, any of the following circumstances:
"* * * * *
"(2) * * *
"(d) Notwithstanding ORS 163.115 (1)(b),
the defendant personally and intentionally committed the homicide under the
circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115 (1)(b) [defining felony murder]."
Aggravated felony murder thus requires not only that the defendant
be a participant in a felony (as required for felony murder) and that the
defendant, with the intent to kill, participate in and cause the murder (as required
for intentional murder), but also that the murder be accompanied by the
aggravating circumstance that the defendant both committed the homicide and
did so personally. 
Both intentional murder and
aggravated felony murder require that a defendant intend the death of the
victim and participate in the homicide.  The distinction between the crimes is
the nature of the defendant's participation in the homicide.  And that distinction
carries with it a difference of real significance.  Only a defendant convicted
of aggravated felony murder is subject to the death penalty.  See ORS
163.105(1)(a) (sentencing options for aggravated murder include death); compare
ORS 163.115(5)(b) (sentence for ordinary murder is life in prison with
mandatory minimum of 25 years).
The meaning of the term
"personally," one of the terms that distinguishes the crimes of
aggravated felony murder and intentional murder, was the subject of this
court's decision in State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 789 P2d 1326 (1990). 
In that case, the state had accused the defendant and his companion of
killing the victim by repeatedly stabbing him in the chest.  The defendant had denied
that he had inflicted the fatal wound and, in that regard, raised two issues on
appeal:  (1) whether, if the state did not prove that the defendant had inflicted
the fatal wound, there was sufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated
murder; and (2) whether the trial court had erred in its instructions to the
jury.  As to the first issue, the defendant suggested that, "as a matter
of law, stabbing a victim without delivering the death blow[,] or pinioning the
victim so that the death blow can be struck, does not constitute personally
committing a homicide."  Id. at 543.  This court rejected that
argument:
"To state this contention is to refute it. 
Joining in the stabbing of a dying victim or restraining the victim so that he
cannot avoid the fatal knife thrusts constitutes 'personally' committing the
homicide.  Thus, in the instant case, even if defendant choked and restrained
the victim but did not also stab him, nonetheless defendant 'personally'
committed this homicide and he is directly responsible for it."
Id.  
As to the second issue, the defendant
argued that the trial court had erred in giving the following instruction:  
"Personally in the context of aggravated murder means
that[,] to be guilty of that crime[,] the Defendant must have had an actual
role in causing the death and not merely a role in the felony during which the
death occurred."
Id. at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The defendant
did not object or except to that instruction on the basis that it failed to
inform the jury that, to convict a defendant of aggravated felony murder, the
state must prove that the defendant inflicted the fatal wound himself.  The
defendant's only exception was that "personally" was a word of common
meaning and that no jury instruction to define it was necessary.  Id. at
541 n 10.  In addressing that argument on review, this court explained that the
term "personally" is not statutorily defined and that "[n]othing
in either the legislative history of the aggravated murder statute or in its
judicial interpretation suggests that 'personally' has any statutory meaning
that departs from the common understanding of the word."  Id. at
540.  The court therefore agreed with the defendant that the term
"personally" was understandable to the jurors without elaboration by
the trial court.  Id. at 539-41.  The court then went on to state that,
although the instruction was unnecessary, that did not mean that the trial
court had erred in giving it.  Id. at 541.  The court concluded that the
instruction was correct in the context of the limited nature of the defendant's
exception.  See id. at 541-42 (explaining why instruction was correct); id.
at 541 n 10 (noting narrow exception by defendant).  
Nefstad thus stands for two
propositions:  (1) to convict a defendant of aggravated felony murder, the
state must prove that the defendant participated in the murder itself, not only
in the underlying felony; and (2) evidence that a defendant physically acts to
restrain the victim so that the victim "cannot avoid" the fatal blow
is sufficient to establish that defendant "commit[s]" the homicide "personally." 
We have no quarrel with either conclusion, but neither answers the question that
we face in this case:  given that defendant did not perform the act of homicide
himself, nor physically act to restrain the victim so that she could not avoid
being shot, was his participation in the murder sufficient to establish that he
committed the murder personally?
The state's first argument is that
defendant's participation suffices because a defendant commits a murder
personally any time the defendant has an "actual role in causing the death." 
For the reasons explained below, we reject that argument.  
First, although the state bases its argument
on the jury instruction in Nefstad, the court in that case did not
decide whether any conduct other than physical conduct that restrains the
victim to permit the fatal blow is sufficient to establish the "personally
* * * committed" element of aggravated felony murder.  The instruction
discussed in Nefstad used the words "actual role" to distinguish
between an "actual role in causing the death and not merely a role in the
felony during which the death occurred."  Id. at 541.  But beyond
that threshold, "actual role" is not helpful in describing how
significant a defendant's role in the murder must be to reach the level of
personal action necessary to constitute committing aggravated felony murder.
Second, we know from the structure of
the murder statutes set out earlier that, to be convicted of aggravated felony murder,
rather than intentional murder, a person must do more than intend the murder
and have some role in causing the death of the victim.  The terms
"personally" and "committed" are not used to describe the
participation of the defendant in the crimes of homicide, felony murder, or
intentional murder.  Those terms must have a meaning beyond simply having an "actual
role in causing the death," or else the aggravated felony murder statute
would not require greater participation in the murder than those other, lesser
offenses.
Third, the wording of the aggravated
murder statute and the meaning of its terms compel rejection of the state's proposal. 
The common and ordinary meaning of "personally" is:
"so as to be personal : in a personal manner; often
: as oneself : on or for one's own part < ~ I don't want to go>[.]"
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1687
(unabridged ed 2002) (emphasis in original).  The relevant definitions of "personal"
are:
"2 a : done in person without the intervention of
another : direct from one person to another [.]"
Id. at 1686.  In ORS 163.095(2), the term
"personally" modifies the word "committed."  The relevant
definition of the term "commit" is:
"DO, PERFORM  < ~suicide>  [.]" 
Webster's at 457 (emphases in original).             Thus,
applying the common and ordinary meaning of both terms used in ORS
163.095(2)(d), an individual "personally * * * commit[s]" murder when
he or she does or performs the act in question, the act of homicide, "in a
personal manner."  The act of homicide is committed (done or performed)
"in a personal manner" if a defendant performs it "in person
without the intervention of another," "direct from [the defendant] to
[the victim]," or, simply, himself or herself.
Fourth, the legislative history of
the aggravated murder statute also indicates that the legislature intended to
require that the defendant perform the act of homicide himself or herself.  In
discussing the legislative history of the aggravated felony murder statute, the
court in Nefstad quoted the following testimony from Edward Sullivan,
the chairman of the Governor's Task Force on Corrections:
"'The insertion of the word "personal[ly]" *
* * was made to get at the person who deliberately committed murder in the
course of a felony but not any of the other individuals who may have
participated in the course of the felony.  (Whether it be robbery or theft or
whatever.)  What is meant * * * is that the person must have pulled
the trigger or used the knife or what have you, himself * * *.'"
309 Or at 540 n 8 (quoting Minutes, Senate Judiciary
Committee (HB 2011), May 31, 1977, at 3) (emphasis and first alteration added;
other alterations in original).
We conclude from the structure of the
murder statutes, and from the wording and legislative history of the aggravated
murder statute that, to prove aggravated felony murder, the state must prove
that a defendant performed the physical act of homicide himself or herself.(12) 
That does not mean that the defendant must have acted alone or that the act of
homicide need be a solitary physical act, or limited to the final fatal act. 
As in Nefstad, people acting together each may "personally *
* * commit[]" the physical act of homicide.  And, as in Nefstad, it
may take a confluence of physical acts to effectuate the act of homicide.  
To decide whether the evidence was
sufficient to support a guilty verdict against defendant in this case, we
"examin[e] the evidence in the light most favorable to
the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable
inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431
(1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995) (citation omitted).  Here, the act
of homicide was one act -- the act of shooting -- committed by one person --
Koch.  Even if, as the state argues, the defendant was the leader of the group,
he remained outside the house and was not physically present when Koch committed
that act.  Defendant did not perform the shooting himself.  
That conclusion does not resolve this
dispute, however.  As an alternative argument, the state contends that the
evidence that it adduced at trial would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find
that defendant "personally * * * committed" the act of homicide,
because the shooter had been "within his control" and he had used the
shooter "as [an] instrument[] to accomplish his purpose." 
We need not decide here whether a defendant
personally commits an act if the defendant exercises such complete control over
another that the other functions as the defendant's instrumentality.  Even if
that were true as a proposition of law -- a decision that we need not and do
not make -- the facts quoted earlier in this opinion, which the state agrees
accurately summarize the record, would not support such a finding.  Although those
facts establish that defendant encouraged and even directed Koch to shoot the
victim, we do not think that they give rise to a reasonable inference that Koch
was so completely within defendant's control that defendant was able to use Koch
as an instrument to accomplish defendant's purpose.(13) 
The facts do not demonstrate, for instance, that defendant used force or
threats of force to compel Koch to act as defendant's instrumentality or that Koch
was acting under other duress or mental impairment.(14) 
We conclude, therefore, that a reasonable trier of fact could not have found that
defendant committed the act of homicide personally, either individually or by
controlling Koch as his instrumentality. 
CONCLUSION
In summary, we hold that the trial
court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to
Counts 1 through 3 and in finding him guilty of those charges.  That error was
not harmless, and the issues that defendant raised were not moot.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in
part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
1. Unless
otherwise noted, all references to the Oregon Revised Statutes are to the 1999
version in effect when the crimes were committed.  ORS 163.095 has since been
amended.  Or Laws 2005, ch 264, § 17.
2. The
five counts of aggravated murder alleged:
Count 1:  that defendants committed
the crime of Robbery in the First Degree as defined in ORS 164.415(1)(a) while
armed with a deadly weapon (a firearm), and in the course of and in furtherance
of that crime, defendants personally and intentionally caused the death of the
victim.
Count 2:  that defendants committed
the crime of Robbery in the First Degree as defined in ORS 164.415(1)(b) by use
of a dangerous weapon (a bottle), and in the course of and in furtherance of
that crime, defendants personally and intentionally caused the death of the
victim.
Count 3:  that defendants committed
the crime of Robbery in the First Degree as defined in ORS 164.415(1)(c) and
caused serious physical injury to the victim, and in the course of and in
furtherance of that crime, defendants personally and intentionally caused the
death of the victim.
Count 4:  that defendants
intentionally caused the death of the victim to conceal the crimes of theft,
criminal mischief, assault, robbery, and unauthorized use of a vehicle.
Count 5:  that defendants
intentionally caused the death of the victim to conceal the identity of a perpetrator
of the crimes of theft, criminal mischief, assault, robbery, and unauthorized
use of a vehicle.
3. ORS
163.095 provides, in part:
"As used in ORS 163.105 and this section,
'aggravated murder' means murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which is committed
under, or accompanied by, any of the following circumstances:
"* * * * *
"(2) * * *
"(d) Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(1)(b), the
defendant personally and intentionally committed the homicide under the
circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115(1)(b) [the felony murder statute]."
4. In
announcing its decision finding defendant guilty of aggravated murder, the
trial court concluded that defendant was not "the ringleader, controlling
and dictating [to] the other four.  I think more likely it was a situation of
pack mentality at its worst."
5. The
first sentence of former ORS 161.062(1) (1997) was identical to ORS
167.067(1); the statutes were adopted in 1985 and 1986, respectively.  Former
ORS 161.062(1) (1997) was repealed by Oregon Laws 1999, chapter 136, section
1.  ORS 167.067(1) remains unchanged.  See State v. Crotsley, 308
Or 272, 276 n 3, 779 P2d 600 (1989) (discussing history of adoption of both statutes).
6. The
trial court merged other counts similarly, but the details of those mergers are
not relevant to the issues on review.
7. Because
this court limited the questions on review, we express no opinion on the other
issues addressed by the Court of Appeals.  We also note that, on review,
defendant makes no argument regarding the five counts of conspiracy to commit
aggravated murder.  Accordingly, we do not discuss those five counts.
8. The
term "harmless error" can be somewhat problematic.  In State v.
Davis, 336 Or 19, 77 P3d 1111 (2003), this court explained that the term
"harmless error" was simply "a shorthand reference to a legal
standard" and that it was not "an entirely accurate descriptor of the
legal analysis that the constitution requires."  Id. at 27.
9. A
2003 amendment renumbered that requirement; it is now found at ORS
137.071(2)(f).  Or Laws 2003, ch 576, § 162.
10. Oregon
law provides an affirmative defense to felony murder if a participant in the
felony (among other things) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other
participant was armed with a deadly weapon and that any other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death.  See ORS
163.115(3) (listing elements of defense).
11. ORS
163.115(1)(a) provides, in part: 
"Except as provided in ORS 163.118 and
163.125, criminal homicide constitutes murder:  
"(a) When it is committed intentionally * *
*."
12. The
instruction that the court gave in Nefstad did not inform the jury of
that requirement, and trial courts should not use it in the future.
13. As
discussed in footnote 4, ___ Or at ___ n 4 (slip op at 5-6 n 4), in rendering
its verdict the trial court also specifically found that defendant did not
control the other four.   
14. We
mention those facts not to indicate that they necessarily would demonstrate a
requisite degree of control, but only to indicate that the record is devoid of
such facts.