Title: State ex rel. Crangle v. Summit County Common Pleas Court

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Crangle v. Summit Cty. Common Pleas Court, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4871.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4871 
THE STATE EX REL. CRANGLE, APPELLANT, v. SUMMIT COUNTY COMMON 
PLEAS COURT, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Crangle v. Summit Cty. Common Pleas Court, Slip 
Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4871.] 
Mandamus—Inmate had adequate remedy at law to challenge his sentence on 
direct appeal—Court of appeals’ dismissal of petition affirmed. 
(No. 2020-0329—Submitted July 7, 2020—Decided October 15, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 29569, 
2020-Ohio-368. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
 
Appellant, Thomas Charles Crangle, appeals the judgment of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus.  Crangle 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, Summit County Common Pleas 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Court, to vacate what he alleges to be a void prison sentence and to impose a different 
one.  We affirm. 
Background 
In February 2007, Crangle pleaded guilty to one count of rape and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after ten years.  The trial court 
also adjudicated Crangle to be a sexual predator.  In November 2007, the trial court 
entered a nunc pro tunc judgment of conviction changing some of the wording in 
the previous judgment of conviction but imposing the same sentence and sexual-
predator designation.  The Ninth District affirmed Crangle’s conviction on direct 
appeal.  State v. Crangle, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24033, 2008-Ohio-5703. 
In November 2010, the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc order correcting 
the November 2007 judgment of conviction to specify that Crangle’s sentence 
included five years of mandatory postrelease control.  In the same order, the trial 
court denied Crangle’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The denial of Crangle’s 
motion to withdraw his plea was affirmed on appeal.  State v. Crangle, 9th Dist. 
Summit No. 25735, 2011-Ohio-5776.  In neither his direct appeal nor the motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea did Crangle challenge the legality of his sentence. 
Crangle commenced this mandamus action in the Ninth District in October 
2019.  He sought a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to “vacate his void 
sentence * * * and impose a sentence that is authorized by statute.”  The trial court 
filed a motion to dismiss the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which Crangle 
opposed.  The trial court argued that mandamus was unavailable because Crangle 
had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal.  The Ninth District granted the 
trial court’s motion and dismissed the action.  Crangle has appealed to this court as 
of right. 
Analysis 
A court may dismiss a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) “if, after all 
factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences 
January Term, 2020 
 
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are made in the relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of 
facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus.”  State ex rel. Russell v. 
Thornton, 111 Ohio St.3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, 856 N.E.2d 966, ¶ 9.  We review 
de novo a lower court’s dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  State ex rel. Green v. 
Wetzel, 158 Ohio St.3d 104, 2019-Ohio-4228, 140 N.E.3d 586, ¶ 7. 
To obtain a writ of mandamus, Crangle must show (1) a clear legal right to 
the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the trial court to provide it, 
and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Id. at ¶ 8.  In 
this case, Crangle attempts to satisfy the first two requirements by arguing that his 
sentence is void because life imprisonment was not a statutorily authorized 
punishment at the time he was sentenced. 
As the Ninth District held, this court’s recent decision in Green is 
dispositive of Crangle’s claim to extraordinary relief in mandamus.  In that case, 
Green—like Crangle—was sentenced to a definite term of life imprisonment for 
rape.  He sought a writ of mandamus, arguing that his sentence was void because 
the court had improperly sentenced him to a definite term of life imprisonment and 
had failed to properly notify him of his postrelease-control sanction.  In affirming 
the dismissal of Green’s mandamus action, we held that the issue of the allegedly 
void sentence of life imprisonment was not reviewable in mandamus.  Green at  
¶ 10.  Because sentencing errors are reviewable on direct appeal, Green had 
adequate remedies at law that precluded extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Id.; see 
also State ex rel. Ridenour v. O’Connell, 147 Ohio St.3d 351, 2016-Ohio-7368, 65 
N.E.3d 742, ¶ 3. 
This case is no different.  Crangle could have asserted his challenge to his 
definite life sentence in his direct appeal.  The availability of that remedy bars 
Crangle’s mandamus claim, and the Ninth District was correct to dismiss it. 
Crangle attempts to distinguish Green by arguing that Green’s sentence was 
merely voidable whereas Crangle’s is void.  But Green raised the same argument 
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that Crangle is raising here—that his sentence was “void,” in part because he had 
received a definite life sentence that was not authorized by statute.  See Green at 
¶ 3-4. 
But even if Crangle’s distinction were accurate, he is wrong to characterize 
his sentence as “void,” such that it may be collaterally attacked in mandamus.  As 
this court has recently clarified, “[a] sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the 
accused.”  State v. Harper, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-2913, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 42; 
see also State v. Henderson, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-4784, ___ N.E.3d ___, 
¶ 1 (“sentences based on an error, including sentences in which a trial court fails to 
impose a statutorily mandated term, are voidable if the court imposing the sentence 
has jurisdiction over the case and the defendant”).  Crangle does not argue that the 
trial court lacked personal or subject-matter jurisdiction in his criminal case; he 
argues instead that the trial court imposed a sentence that was not authorized by 
statute.  This assertion of error challenges the exercise of jurisdiction and, if true, 
would render Crangle’s sentence voidable, not void.  See Henderson at ¶ 1.  His 
case therefore falls within the general rule that mandamus is not an appropriate 
remedy to challenge sentencing errors.  See Ridenour, 147 Ohio St.3d 351, 2016-
Ohio-7368, 65 N.E.3d 742, at ¶ 3. 
For these reasons, the Ninth District was correct to dismiss Crangle’s 
mandamus petition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Thomas Charles Crangle, pro se. 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Colleen 
Sims, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
January Term, 2020