Title: Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Scott

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2214 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Madison Teachers, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James R. Scott, Chairman and Records Custodian, 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 6, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 5, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Anderson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) filed by Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant 
attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  There 
was an oral argument by Steven C. Kilpatrick. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) filed by Susan M. Crawford and Pines Bach LLP, 
Madison.  There was an oral argument by Susan M. Crawford. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Freedom 
of 
Information 
Council, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Newspaper 
Association, and the Wisconsin Broadcasters Association by 
 
 
2 
Dustin B. Brown, James A. Friedman, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., 
Madison.
 
 
2018 WI 11
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2214 
(L.C. No.  2015CV3062) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Madison Teachers, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James R. Scott, Chairman and Records Custodian, 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant 
FILED 
 
FEB 6, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County.  
Reversed.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This case comes 
before us on a bypass petition filed by the records custodian 
and chairman of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission 
("WERC"), James R. Scott.  Scott appeals a decision of the 
circuit court1 that granted summary judgment to Madison Teachers, 
Inc. ("MTI") on its claim that the public records law was 
violated.2  The circuit court also awarded MTI statutory damages, 
attorneys fees and costs.  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Peter C. Anderson of Dane County presided. 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) (2015-16).  All further 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
2 
 
¶2 
MTI had made repeated requests, at various times 
during the 2015 certification elections, for names of Madison 
Metropolitan School District (the "School District") employees 
who had voted as of those dates.  WERC denied MTI's requests 
based on Scott's determination that while this election was 
ongoing, the public interest that elections remain free from 
voter intimidation and coercion outweighed the public interest 
in favor of openness of public records.     
¶3 
One issue is presented in this appeal:  whether the 
public 
interest 
that 
elections 
remain 
free 
from 
voter 
intimidation and coercion in this certification election is 
sufficient to outweigh the public interest in favor of openness 
of public records.  Because we conclude that Scott lawfully 
performed the balancing test in concluding that the public 
interest in elections free from voter intimidation and coercion 
outweighs the public interest in favor of openness of public 
records, we reverse the circuit court.  Accordingly, no 
attorneys fees are due MTI under the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
From November 4 through November 24, 2015, WERC 
conducted the annual certification election for collective 
bargaining representatives of the School District's employees 
                                                                                                                                                             
references to Wisconsin statutes are to the 2015-16 version 
unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
3 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.b.3  WERC contracted with 
the American Arbitration Association (the "Association") to 
provide 
technological 
services 
necessary 
to 
conduct 
the 
election.4  With the Association's support, voting occurred via 
telephone and internet for 20 days, and the Association 
electronically maintained data for votes that were cast.  
According to the contract between WERC and the Association, the 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.b. states: 
Annually, the commission shall conduct an election to 
certify 
the 
representative 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining unit that contains a general municipal 
employee.  The election shall occur no later than 
December 1 for a collective bargaining unit containing 
school district employees and no later than May 1 for 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
unit 
containing 
general 
municipal employees who are not school district 
employees. 
 
The 
commission 
shall 
certify 
any 
representative that receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the general municipal employees in 
the collective bargaining unit.  If no representative 
receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of 
the general municipal employees in the collective 
bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective 
bargaining agreement, the commission shall decertify 
the current representative and the general municipal 
employees shall be nonrepresented.  Notwithstanding 
sub. (2), if a representative is decertified under 
this subd. 
3.b., the affected general municipal 
employees may not be included in a substantially 
similar collective bargaining unit for 12 months from 
the date of decertification.  The commission shall 
assess and collect a certification fee for each 
election conducted under this subd. 3.b.  Fees 
collected under this subd. 3.b. shall be credited to 
the appropriation account under s. 20.425(1)(i). 
4 In total, there were 301 union certification elections in 
November 2015, involving nearly 60,000 municipal employees. 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
4 
 
Association was required to email election results to WERC no 
later than one business day after the election concluded.   
¶5 
Notably, under Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.b., in order 
to be certified as the elected representative of the bargaining 
unit, a labor organization must receive the votes of at least 51 
percent of the total number of employees in the bargaining unit.  
Therefore, a non-vote in the election is for all intents and 
purposes a "no" vote.  Pursuant to § 111.70(1)(e), certification 
elections are conducted by secret ballot.   
¶6 
One week prior to the start of the certification 
election, MTI wrote to Scott stating that it intended to submit 
requests pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1) for records of the 
names of the School District's employees who had voted at 
specific points during the election.  MTI wrote that it 
"wish[ed] to assure you that MTI will not engage in voter 
coercion or any other illegal election practices during the 
upcoming election.  MTI is fully committed to exercising its 
First Amendment and statutory rights within the law."   
¶7 
On November 10, 2015, MTI submitted the first of its 
requests, seeking names of employees, by bargaining unit, who 
had voted as of that date.  MTI requested that the records be 
delivered "as soon as possible, but not later than 5:00 p.m., 
November 16."  On November 16, 2015, Scott advised MTI in 
writing that its request was denied for three reasons:  first, 
because WERC utilized the Association, a third-party vendor to 
collect votes, the Commission did not possess the requested 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
5 
 
documents; second, because the annual certification election is 
conducted by secret ballot, disclosure of the names of employees 
who had voted would violate the secrecy of the ballot; and 
third, because the common law balancing test weighed in favor of 
"maintaining the secrecy of the ballot and of avoiding the 
potential for voter coercion while balloting is ongoing . . . ."  
Scott was aware of a complaint submitted to WERC by the Racine 
Unified School District, alleging that voters had been coerced 
and harassed into voting during the 2014 annual certification 
elections.5   
¶8 
MTI submitted a second request on November 17, 2015, 
for names of employees, by bargaining unit, who had voted as of 
that date.  MTI requested that Scott respond "as soon as 
possible, but not later than 5:00 p.m., November 20."  This 
request was also denied in writing on November 30, 2015.   
¶9 
The election ended at noon on November 24, 2015.  At 
3:26 p.m. on that day, MTI submitted a third request to WERC, 
requesting names of all employees who had voted in the 
certification 
election. 
 
WERC 
provided 
those 
names, 
by 
bargaining unit, at 12:37 p.m. the following day, November 25.  
                                                 
5 An affidavit subsequently filed in this action revealed 
that Scott was aware that the Racine Unified School District had 
filed a complaint alleging union representatives had approached 
three teachers, asked if they had voted in the certification 
election, 
and 
urged 
them 
to 
vote 
immediately 
in 
the 
representative's presence using the representative's laptop.  
The complaint was dismissed without investigation because the 
conduct, even if substantiated, would not have affected the 
outcome of the election. 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
6 
 
Scott concluded that the public interest in maintaining openness 
of public records was satisfied by disclosing the requested 
lists immediately after the elections were over. 
¶10 On November 30, 2015, MTI filed a complaint pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a),6 seeking an order for mandamus, 
punitive damages, attorneys fees and costs, based on Scott's 
refusal to release voting records in response to MTI's November 
10 and November 17 requests.  On December 1, 2015, MTI filed an 
ex parte motion, citing Wis. Stat. § 801.02(5), for an order 
shortening the time for filing an answer or other responsive 
pleadings from 45 days to 20 days.  The circuit court granted 
the ex parte motion on December 3.7  On December 4, 2015, MTI 
served the complaint, its ex parte motion and the resulting 
order on Scott. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) states: 
Enforcement and penalties.  (1)  Mandamus.  If an 
authority withholds a record or a part of a record or 
delays granting access to a record or part of a record 
after a written request for disclosure is made, the 
requester 
may 
pursue 
either, 
or 
both, 
of 
the 
alternatives under pars. (a) and (b). 
(a)  The requester may bring an action for 
mandamus asking a court to order release of the 
record.  The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to have access to the requested record under 
restrictions or protective orders as the court deems 
appropriate. 
7 The Honorable Juan B. Colas of Dane County presided.  
Scott filed a judicial substitution request on December 8, 2015, 
and on December 11, 2015, the Honorable Peter C. Anderson was 
appointed. 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
7 
 
¶11 On December 11, 2015, Scott filed a motion and 
supporting brief to reconsider and vacate the court's December 3 
order.  A hearing was conducted on December 15, at which the 
court granted Scott 45 days to answer.  Scott timely answered.   
¶12 On December 22, 2015, WERC's legal counsel, Peter 
Davis, emailed the Association, stating:  "Whenever convenient 
can you tell me if it [is] still possible to identify who had 
voted as of noon Nov 10 and noon Nov 17 in the various Madison 
Schools/Madison Teachers units.  If it is possible, can you send 
me that info[] unit by unit[?]"  The Association provided those 
records to WERC, which WERC provided to MTI during discovery. 
¶13 MTI 
and 
Scott 
filed 
cross-motions 
for 
summary 
judgment.  Scott argued, among other things, that the public 
interest in non-disclosure of the names of those who had voted 
when the election was ongoing outweighed the public interest in 
disclosure at that time and therefore, MTI did not have a legal 
right to the records it sought.  Meanwhile, MTI argued that 
Scott failed to overcome the strong presumption in favor of 
openness of public records.  Upon completion of briefing, the 
court granted MTI's motion and denied Scott's.   
¶14 At the hearing on summary judgment, MTI also sought 
punitive damages, costs, and attorneys fees.  A second hearing 
was held on these issues, and the court modified its previous 
order 
denying 
punitive 
damages 
and 
granting 
MTI 
$100.00 
statutory damages, $41,462.50 attorney fees and $301.35 costs.   
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
8 
 
¶15 Scott appealed and, following initial briefing, Scott 
petitioned for bypass, which we granted.  We now reverse the 
circuit court. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶16 We review a record custodian's decision to deny a 
public records request independently.  It is the duty of the 
records custodian to specify the reasons for not disclosing a 
public record, and we decide whether those reasons outweigh the 
public interest in disclosure as a matter of law.  See 
Democratic Party of Wis. v. DOJ, 2016 WI 100, ¶9, 372 Wis. 2d 
460, 888 N.W.2d 584.  When a records custodian employs a 
balancing test, it is the custodian's burden to show that the 
public 
interest 
favoring 
denial 
of 
the 
requested 
record 
outweighs the public interest favoring disclosure.  Id. (citing 
John K. MacIver Inst. for Pub. Policy, Inc. v. Erpenbach, 2014 
WI App 49, ¶14, 354 Wis. 2d 61, 848 N.W.2d 862). 
B.  Public Records Law 
¶17 Wisconsin's public records law is set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31, et seq.  Wisconsin's public records law requires 
that, absent a statutory, common law or overriding public 
interest in denying access, the public has the right "to inspect 
certain documents within the possession of a state entity."  
Voces De La Frontera v. Clarke, 2017 WI 16, ¶17, 373 Wis. 2d 
348, 891 N.W.2d 803.  The public records law "serves one of the 
basic 
tenets 
of 
our 
democratic 
system 
by 
providing 
an 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
9 
 
opportunity for public oversight of the workings of government."  
Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996) 
(citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 433-34, 279 
N.W.2d 179 (1979)).  When evaluating a public records request, 
we keep in mind that Wisconsin has a "presumption of open access 
to public records."  Osborn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., 2002 WI 83, ¶13, 254 Wis. 2d 266, 647 N.W.2d 158 (citing 
Hathaway v. Green Bay Sch. Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 
N.W.2d 682 (1984)); see also Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (providing that 
"it is . . . the public policy of this state that all persons 
are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the 
affairs of government and the official acts of those officers 
and employees who represent them."); cf. Leann Holcomb & James 
Isaac, Comment, Wisconsin's Public Records Law:  Preserving the 
Presumption of Complete Public Access in the Age of Electronic 
Records, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 515.   
¶18 The public's right to access public records is very 
strong, but it is not unrestricted.  Voces De La Frontera, 373 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶18.  "The strong presumption of public access may 
give way to statutory or specified common law exceptions, or if 
there is an overriding public interest in keeping the public 
record confidential."  Kroeplin v. DNR, 2006 WI App 227, ¶13, 
297 Wis. 2d 254, 725 N.W.2d 286 (citation omitted); see also 
Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397 ("[T]he general presumption of our 
law is that public records shall be open to the public unless 
there is a clear statutory exception, unless there exists a 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
10 
 
limitation under the common law, or unless there is an 
overriding 
public 
interest 
in 
keeping 
the 
public 
record 
confidential.").8  In other words, "[b]ecause the denial of 
public access is generally contrary to the public interest," 
access may be denied only in limited circumstances.  Kroeplin, 
297 Wis. 2d 254, ¶12 (citing Kailin v. Rainwater, 226 Wis. 2d 
134, 142, 593 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
¶19 In determining whether there is an overriding public 
interest in keeping a requested record confidential when there 
is no statutory exception to provision of the record, the record 
custodian balances competing public interests that bear on the 
release of the requested record.  Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. 
DOA, 2009 WI 79, ¶¶55-56, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700.  That 
is, the custodian balances the public interest in nondisclosure 
against the public interest in disclosure.  Id., ¶55.  The 
balance 
is 
accomplished 
through 
a 
case-by-case 
analysis.  
Because the interests asserted in denying disclosure are 
discrete to each case, "blanket exceptions from release" 
generally are not forthcoming.  Id., ¶56.  Stated otherwise, 
"the custodian must determine whether the surrounding factual 
circumstances create an 'exceptional case' not governed by the 
                                                 
8 The legislature has codified some of the public records 
that are subject to public inspection and some that are 
statutorily exempt.  To that end, Wis. Stat. § 19.36 lists 
thirteen statutory exemptions, none of which are applicable 
here. 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
11 
 
strong presumption of openness."  Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 
2005 WI 120, ¶63, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551. 
¶20 The public interest balancing test considers "whether 
disclosure would cause public harm to the degree that the 
presumption of openness [of public records] is overcome."  
Democratic Party of Wis., 372 Wis. 2d 460, ¶11; see also Osborn, 
254 Wis. 2d 266, ¶15.   
C.  Secret Ballot Elections 
1.  General principles 
¶21 As a general matter, voting may occur by voice 
acclamation, the raising of hands in a meeting or by secret 
ballot, depending on the statutory directive or lack thereof.  
In regard to the matter before us, Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(e) 
requires that certification elections be conducted by secret 
ballot. 
¶22 All 50 states have employed the secret ballot method 
of voting to limit voter intimidation during elections.  Burson 
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).  As explained in Burson, 
the history of election regulation in the United States shows 
that voter intimidation and coercion are long-standing evils 
that election regulations sought to prevent.  Id.   
¶23 The right to vote in certification elections is a 
statutory right; yet, Burson is instructive in the matter before 
us because of its exposition of the policies that underlie the 
use of secret ballots.  In Burson, a political party worker 
sought 
to 
enjoin 
enforcement 
of 
Tennessee 
statutes 
that 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
12 
 
prohibited solicitation of votes and display of campaign 
materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling places on 
election day.  Id. at 193-94.  The party worker claimed that the 
statutory regulation violated her right to communicate with 
voters, in contravention of her First Amendment rights.  Id. at 
194-95.  Tennessee contended that its statutes were narrowly 
drawn to serve compelling state interests of preventing voter 
harassment and intimidation.  Id.  Further, Tennessee contended 
that the campaign-free zone "protects the right to vote in an 
election conducted with integrity and reliability."  Id. at 199.   
¶24 In 
concluding 
that 
the 
Tennessee 
statute 
was 
constitutional, even though it was not a content-neutral 
regulation of speech, the Supreme Court reviewed the history of 
the secret ballot method of voting in the United States and how 
it has had an immediate and positive effect in limiting 
intimidation and coercion of voters.  Id. at 202-06.  The Court 
concluded by explaining that the contest over Tennessee's 
election regulation involved "the exercise of free speech rights 
[in] conflict[] with another fundamental right, the right to 
cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation 
and fraud."  Id. at 211.  On balance, the Court said that 
removing the opportunity for intimidation of voters must 
prevail.  Id. 
2.  Certification elections 
¶25 2011 
Wisconsin 
Act 
10 
made 
various 
changes 
to 
collective bargaining for most public employees.  Act 10 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
13 
 
requires annual certification elections, which are administered 
by WERC.  Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(c) and (e).  Prior to Act 10, 
collective bargaining units for municipal employees also were 
established through WERC's recognition of employee votes.  See 
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶19, 358 Wis. 2d 
1, 851 N.W.2d 337.  Before Act 10, members of a collective 
bargaining unit were allowed to select a labor organization as 
their representative when a majority of the votes cast were for 
a particular labor organization, even when those votes were not 
equivalent to a majority of the employees in the bargaining 
unit.  Id., ¶62.  The elected union remained the representative 
unless 30 percent of members of the collective bargaining unit 
asked for a decertification election at which the union was 
defeated.  Id.   
¶26 Act 10 changed much of that.  It required a labor 
organization that was representing a municipal bargaining unit 
to succeed in annual certification elections in order to 
continue.  Id., ¶63.  WERC was to certify any representative 
that received at least 51 percent of the votes of all of the 
employees in the collective bargaining unit.  Id.  Accordingly, 
a non-vote constituted a "no" vote.  If no labor organization 
received 51 percent of the votes of all members of the 
bargaining 
unit, 
WERC 
was 
to 
decertify 
the 
current 
representative when the then-existing collective bargaining 
agreement ended and the members of the collective bargaining 
unit became unrepresented.  Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.b.   
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
14 
 
¶27 Act 10 specifically prohibited employees from coercing 
or intimidating other employees in regard to joining, or 
refraining from joining, a labor organization.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(3)(a)1.  Having certification elections that are free 
of intimidation and coercion was not a new goal for labor 
organization elections in Wisconsin.  See WERC v. City of 
Evansville, 69 Wis. 2d 140, 164, 230 N.W.2d 688 (1975). 
¶28 In City of Evansville, the process then required to 
hold a certification election had been followed and an election 
date was established.  Id. at 146.  Prior to the election, the 
City's agents coerced employees by offering benefits to those 
who did not support a union and threatened the loss of benefits 
to those who voted to support the union.  Id. at 147.  We held 
the City's actions were prohibited practices within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a)1.  Id. at 156.    
¶29 Under current law, one of the primary goals of 
certification elections is to give employees an unintimidated 
voice in deciding who, if anyone, will be their representative.  
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.70(3)(a)1. 
 
Consistent 
with 
that 
goal, 
certification elections are conducted by secret ballot to lessen 
intimidation of voters.  § 111.70(1)(e); see also Burson, 504 
U.S. at 211.  
¶30 Mechanisms to lessen voter intimidation when an 
election is carried out electronically over 20 days cannot be 
the same as they were in Burson when paper ballots were used at 
designated polling places.  For example, the 100 foot restricted 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
15 
 
zone around the polling place that the Supreme Court approved in 
Burson as a narrowly tailored restriction to meet the compelling 
state interest of reducing voter intimidation would have no 
effect in the election at issue here because members of the 
bargaining unit could vote from the workplace, from home or from 
another location over a 20-day period.  However, preventing 
voter intimidation and coercion are as important in a statutory 
certification election as they were in an election of the type 
reported in Burson.   
D.  Application 
¶31 As evidenced above, we are tasked with independently 
weighing two important public interests.  On the one hand, there 
is a general presumption that public records shall be open to 
the public unless there is a clear statutory exception, a 
limitation under the common law, or unless there is an 
overriding 
public 
interest 
in 
keeping 
the 
public 
record 
confidential.  Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397.  On the other hand, 
there is a clearly expressed right to vote in certification 
elections that are free from voter intimidation and coercion.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a)1.; see also Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.  
¶32 MTI contends that because voting was ongoing, those 
who had not yet voted could not be treated as a firm "no" vote 
and, therefore, the lists of those who had voted would not 
violate the secrecy of the ballot by revealing the votes of 
anyone.  MTI's argument misses the point of why disclosure of 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
16 
 
the names of those who had voted affects the important public 
interest that underlies the use of secret ballots.   
¶33 Let us explain.  Throughout the election, MTI remained 
free to provide truthful information to all members of the 
bargaining unit that bore on the advisability of electing MTI as 
the exclusive representative.  However, giving MTI lists of 
employees who had voted at various dates before the election 
process was concluded, through simple deletion of voter names 
from the list of all members of a bargaining unit, also would 
give MTI names of all who had not voted by those dates.  Those 
non-voting employees could then become individual targets of 
MTI's most forceful efforts because if they did not vote by the 
conclusion of the election, MTI may have been unable to secure 
"yes" votes from 51 percent of the members in the bargaining 
unit and thereby fail in its certification efforts.   
¶34 When elections are conducted over a period of time and 
voting occurs in many locations, there is no physical boundary 
by which voter intimidation can be regulated as there was in 
Burson. 
 
Therefore, 
preventing 
voter 
intimidation 
during 
elections conducted by phone and email, as occurred here, is 
challenging.  Given MTI's repeated requests for the names of 
those who voted before the election concluded, it is entirely 
possible that those employees who had not yet voted would become 
subject to individualized pressure by MTI of a type that MTI 
could not exert when speaking to all members of the bargaining 
unit collectively.   
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
17 
 
¶35 As the history underlying the use of secret ballots 
teaches, a major purpose of secret ballots is to protect "the 
fundamental right" to cast votes in elections that are "free 
from the taint of intimidation."  Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.  
While Burson did not involve a statutory right to vote in 
certification elections as is presented here, the public 
interest 
in 
certification 
elections 
that 
are 
free 
from 
intimidation and coercion is evidenced by the requirement that 
those elections be conducted by secret ballot and free from 
prohibited 
practices. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 111.70(1)(e) 
and 
111.70(3)(a)1.   
¶36 Intimidation in the WERC certification election was a 
concern.  Scott had received detailed and specific complaints of 
past coercion in other certification elections.9  Complaints 
included:  a union representative directing an employee to a 
computer and coercing her to vote for recertification; another 
employee being repeatedly asked whether she had voted; and a 
third employee witnessing employees being similarly pressured to 
vote.   
¶37 Each individual voter has a fundamental right to cast 
his or her vote without intimidation or coercion.  WERC is 
charged with conducting fair and accurate annual certification 
elections, free from the taint of voter intimidation.  The 
public has a significant interest in fair elections, where votes 
                                                 
9 The Racine Unified School District had filed a complaint 
of which Scott was aware.  See supra, ¶7. 
No. 
2016AP2214 
 
 
18 
 
are 
freely 
cast 
without 
voter 
intimidation 
or 
coercion.  
Accordingly, the public interest in elections that are free from 
intimidation and coercion outweighs the public interest in favor 
of open public records under the circumstances presented in the 
case before us.  Scott's denial of MTI's requests for voter 
names during the course of the certification election evidences 
the lawful balance of public interests presented here.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 One issue is presented in this appeal:  whether the 
public 
interest 
that 
elections 
remain 
free 
from 
voter 
intimidation in this certification election is sufficient to 
outweigh the public interest in favor of openness of public 
records.  Because we conclude that Scott lawfully performed the 
balancing test in concluding that the public interest in 
elections free from voter intimidation and coercion outweighs 
the public interest in favor of openness of public records, we 
reverse the circuit court.  Accordingly, no attorneys fees are 
due MTI under the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a).  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed. 
 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
1 
 
¶39 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
pays lip service to the important policy behind the public 
records law.  It proclaims that "[t]he public records law 
'serves one of the basic tenets of our democratic system by 
providing an opportunity for public oversight of the workings of 
government'".  Majority op., ¶17.  Heralding the policy that 
"all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information 
regarding 
the 
affairs 
of 
government," 
it 
reaffirms 
that 
Wisconsin has a "presumption of open access to public records."  
Id. 
¶40 Such exaltation seems to be all hat and no cattle.  
Despite 
Wisconsin's 
longstanding 
public 
policy 
favoring 
transparency, for the third time in three years this court 
continues to undermine our public records law.1  Yet again, this 
court overturns a lower court decision favoring transparency of 
records to which the public is rightfully entitled.  Once more 
we must ask, "[w]hat has the majority achieved with its opinion 
grounded in speculative, abstract, and unsubstantiated fears?"  
Democratic Party of Wis. v. DOJ, 2016 WI 100, ¶123, 372 
Wis. 2d 460, 888 N.W.2d 584 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
¶41 This time the majority undermines the presumption of 
open access to public records by imputing an unsupported and 
                                                 
1 See Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 2017 WI 16, 373 
Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803 (4-2 decision, Ann Walsh Bradley, 
J., dissenting, joined by Abrahamson, J.); Democratic Party of 
Wis. v. DOJ, 2016 WI 100, 372 Wis. 2d 460, 888 N.W.2d 584 (5-2 
decision, Abrahamson, J., dissenting, joined by Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J.). 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
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nefarious purpose to the records requests based on nonexistent 
facts.  Without supportive evidence in the record, it speculates 
that by providing the requested records to Madison Teachers, 
Inc. 
(MTI), 
employees 
who 
had 
not 
yet 
voted 
in 
the 
recertification election "could then become individual targets 
of MTI's most forceful efforts."  Majority op., ¶33. 
¶42 Neither the majority nor the records custodian points 
to any evidence of voter intimidation or coercion by MTI in this 
recertification election.  Rather, this concocted concern is 
based solely on one uninvestigated and unsubstantiated complaint 
from Racine County, involving a different union, in a different 
election, in a different year, that did not involve a public 
records request. 
¶43 Not only does the majority base its conclusion on 
facts that do not exist, it also fails to inform the reader of 
existing facts in the record and existing public records 
precedent that support a contrary conclusion.  See John K. 
MacIver Inst. for Pub. Policy, Inc. v. Erpenbach, 2014 WI App 
49, ¶¶23, 26, 354 Wis. 2d 61, 848 N.W.2d 862 (explaining that a 
possibility of threats, harassment or reprisals cannot be 
accorded significant weight in the balancing test when the 
custodian fails to establish it is reasonably probable such harm 
would occur).2  Nevertheless, the majority relies on conjecture 
                                                 
2 See also Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, 
¶¶57, 63, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (concluding that 
safety concerns about retaliation or harassment of DOC employees 
by incarcerated persons are not unique concerns and therefore do 
not preclude the disclosure of names of corrections employees). 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
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about generalized concerns of voter coercion in denying this 
records request. 
¶44 Unlike the majority, I conclude that the records 
custodian Scott failed to overcome the presumption of open 
access to public records.  The unfounded speculation that the 
records might be used for improper purposes does not outweigh 
the strong public interest in opening the records to inspection. 
¶45 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶46 The majority engages in selective vision.  It sees 
facts that do not exist, while at the same time failing to 
recognize existing facts of record. 
A 
¶47 Left with non-existent facts, the majority instead 
speculates.  It imputes an unsupported and nefarious purpose to 
the records requests.  Ultimately it concludes that "[g]iven 
MTI's repeated requests3 for the names of those who voted before 
the election concluded, it is entirely possible that those 
employees who had not yet voted would become subject to 
individualized pressure by MTI of a type that MTI could not 
exert when speaking to all members of the bargaining unit 
collectively."  Majority op., ¶34 (emphasis added). 
                                                 
3 When 
left 
without 
supportive 
facts, 
the 
majority 
apparently resorts to exaggeration.  It states that MTI made 
"repeated requests" during the 2015 certification elections for 
the names of those who had cast ballots.  Majority op., ¶¶2, 34.  
In fact, MTI made just two public records requests during the 
2015 recertification election. 
No. 
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¶48 Absent from the record is evidence that providing the 
requested records presented a reasonable probability of voter 
intimidation or coercion: 
 There is no evidence in the record that the Wisconsin 
Employment 
Relations 
Commission 
(WERC) 
opened 
an 
investigation about MTI engaging in such acts here. 
 The record is devoid of any evidence of a verbal or written 
complaint of voter intimidation or coercion in this 
recertification election. 
 The majority cannot point to any allegation in the record 
that MTI has ever acted improperly in this or any other 
recertification election. 
¶49 Left with this void, the majority instead relies on an 
unsubstantiated allegation from Racine County that voters there 
"had been coerced and harassed into voting."  Majority op., ¶7.  
The Racine allegations, however, involved not only a different 
location, but also a different union, in a different election, 
in a different year, that did not involve a public records 
request.  WERC did not investigate the Racine allegations, and 
accordingly those allegations were never substantiated. 
¶50 In short, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where 
there is less evidence of potential harm in the record than 
here.  One would expect the highest court of this state to rely 
on more than such unrelated and unsubstantiated allegations for 
its assertion that the risk of voter intimidation or coercion 
here was great enough to overcome the strong presumption of open 
access to public records.  It does not. 
No. 
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5 
 
B 
¶51 A public record that is available to one, is available 
to all.  Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. Dane Cty., 229 Wis. 2d 86, 102, 
599 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1999).  It has long been recognized that 
"[n]either the identity of the requester nor the reasons 
underlying 
the 
request 
are 
factors 
that 
enter 
into 
the 
balanc[ing test]."  State ex rel. Ledford v. Turcotte, 195 
Wis. 2d 244, 252, 536 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1995); Levin v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2003 WI App 181, ¶¶14-18, 266 
Wis. 2d 481, 668 N.W.2d 779. 
¶52 These guiding principles are rooted in the language of 
the statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(i) explains that a 
records custodian may not refuse to release a public record 
"because the person making the request is unwilling to be 
identified or to state the purpose of the request."  Likewise, § 
19.35(1)(a) provides that "any requester has a right to inspect 
any record."  See also Linda de la Mora, The Wisconsin Public 
Records Law, 67 Marq. Law Rev. 65, 69 (1983) (explaining that in 
Wisconsin, as in most jurisdictions, the motive of the requester 
is irrelevant to the question of whether to grant access to 
public records). 
¶53 The identity of the requester and the purpose of the 
request should not matter here.  Nevertheless, if the majority 
is going to erroneously superimpose its own speculative motive 
upon the requester, it should at least mention existing facts of 
record that support a contrary conclusion.  It fails to do so. 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
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¶54 In providing context, counsel for MTI explained at 
oral argument that "the only opportunity that the public has for 
oversight of the WERC's election administration is through 
public records.  There is a strong public interest in ensuring 
that the recertification elections that are conducted by the 
WERC are transparent and open to ensure the integrity of those 
elections." 
¶55 The annual elections for public employees to select 
representatives for purposes of collective bargaining were 
previously conducted in person.  They are now conducted 
electronically and employees vote either by phone or computer.  
MTI asserts that what was formerly an open and observable 
government process is now closed.  It contends that the only 
opportunity that the public has for oversight of WERC's election 
administration is through public records.  MTI explains that the 
need for oversight is revealed by the facts of record. 
¶56 However, the majority omits these facts.  WERC 
acknowledged 
various 
voter 
complaints 
during 
MTI's 
2015 
recertification election, including that an eligible voter's 
name was not in the system and a failure to receive confirmation 
that a vote had been counted.  Absent from the majority opinion 
is the fact that Scott specifically acknowledged receiving 
various complaints about: 
 A voter who was blocked from voting because she was told 
she had already voted; 
 A voter who had submitted a ballot but did not receive 
confirmation that the vote was submitted; 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
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 A voter's name that was missing from the eligible voter 
list, and; 
 A voter who needed a new access code to submit a ballot. 
¶57 When speculating about the intent behind these records 
requests, the majority also ignores the record evidence that MTI 
advised WERC that it "w[ould] not engage in voter coercion or 
any other illegal election practices during the upcoming 
election."  MTI explained at oral arguments that it made these 
records requests to ensure WERC properly executed its election-
administration duties. 
¶58 The majority fails to take into account these facts of 
record that address the integrity of the election process.  In 
other words, when conducting the balancing test, the majority 
erroneously relies solely on what it assumes is the intent 
behind the records requests.  It ignores the evidentiary record 
which illustrates the importance of the policy behind the public 
records law:  it "serves one of the basic tenets of our 
democratic system by providing an opportunity for public 
oversight of the workings of government."  See majority op., ¶17 
(citing Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 544 N.W.2d 428 
(1996). 
II 
¶59 The usual admonition is that if you do not have the 
facts, then argue the law.  Conversely, if you do not have the 
law, then argue the facts.  The majority has neither. 
¶60 Here the majority fails to recognize and address 
recent precedent that impels a conclusion contrary to that of 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
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the majority.  In Erpenbach, the MacIver Institute sought copies 
of correspondence sent to Senator Erpenbach's office related to 
2011 Act 10.  354 Wis. 2d 61, ¶3.  Erpenbach agreed to provide 
some of the requested documents, but redacted the personal 
contact or identifiable information of the email senders.  Id.  
He justified the redactions in part on the context of the 
"nuclear environment" surrounding 2011 Act 10 debates, asserting 
that the redactions would protect the e-mail senders against 
unwanted threats, harassment or reprisals.  Id., ¶¶5, 22, 23. 
¶61 The 
court 
disagreed, 
explaining 
that 
although 
Erpenbach identified threats and harassment levied against 
public officials and police officers, he did not identify actual 
threats, harassment or reprisals against concerned citizens.  
Id., ¶23.  Accordingly, it determined that Erpenbach failed to 
demonstrate "a reasonable probability" that the email senders 
"would be subjected to negative repercussions for sharing their 
views regarding the legislation."  Id. 
¶62 Further, 
the 
court 
observed 
that 
"Erpenbach's 
generalized concern of possible threats, harassment or reprisals 
could apply equally to any controversial public policy."  Id., 
¶24.  Indeed, the problem with relying on generalized concerns 
of harm when conducting the balancing test is that such concerns 
"would be in the eyes of the beholder," thus drawing courts into 
the political fray.  Id., ¶39 (Brown, C.J., concurring). 
¶63 Neither Scott nor the majority contends that voter 
intimidation or coercion was probable during MTI's election.  
Rather, Scott referred to a "potential" for voter coercion, and 
No. 
2016AP2214.awb 
 
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the majority suggests only that it is "entirely possible" that 
MTI would exert pressure on potential voters.  Majority op., 
¶34. 
¶64 The mere possibility of voter intimidation or coercion 
they both raise falls short of establishing a reasonable 
probability that such harm would actually occur.  Accordingly, 
this concocted concern should not be afforded significant weight 
in the balancing test.  See Erpenbach, 354 Wis. 2d 61, ¶26. 
¶65 Ignoring 
Erpenbach, 
the 
majority 
instead 
unpersuasively relies on non-public records cases, Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) and WERC v. City of Evansville, 69 
Wis. 2d 140, 230 N.W.2d 688 (1975).  In Burson, the Supreme 
Court upheld a restricted zone around polling places to preserve 
the right to cast a ballot free from the taint of intimidation 
or fraud.  504 U.S. at 211.  The concern examined in Burson was 
the right to vote and the secrecy of the ballot.  Id. at 198-
202.  Conversely, at issue here is a request for the list of the 
names of those who have cast a ballot in an election—— 
information that has historically been publicly available.  
Neither the right to vote nor the secrecy of the ballot is 
implicated in these public records requests. 
¶66 In Evansville, the analysis relied heavily on evidence 
of actual threats or coercion, thus undermining the majority's 
reliance on generalized conjecture.  69 Wis. 2d at 153-157.  The 
Evansville court examined extensive documentation of threats and 
coercive communications to employees, including threats of loss 
of benefits if employees engaged in union activities.  Id.  In 
No. 
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contrast, the record here lacks evidence of any actual coercion 
or threats by MTI. 
¶67 Finally, when conducting the balancing test the 
majority takes into account that this recertification election 
was conducted electronically, rather than by paper ballot.  
Majority op., ¶¶30, 34.  According to the majority, "[w]hen 
elections are conducted over a period of time and voting occurs 
in many locations, there is no physical boundary by which voter-
intimidation can be regulated . . . ."  Majority op., ¶34. 
¶68 As MTI explained in its brief to the court, "[i]f WERC 
had conducted an election that required employees to cast 
ballots in person rather than electronically, MTI would have had 
no need to request the record, but could simply have had 
representatives present to observe the election firsthand, as 
allowed under the WERC's administrative rules."4  MTI's counsel 
further explained at oral arguments that as a result of WERC's 
change in the administration of the certification election, 
"what was formerly an open and observable government process is 
now closed." 
¶69 Unlike 
the 
majority, 
I 
would 
not 
permit 
a 
technological upgrade in the administration of an election to 
shield the release of records to which the public is rightfully 
                                                 
4 Public union certification elections may be conducted "on-
site or by mail or by other means determined by the commission 
to be fair and reliable."  Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 70.07(1).  
"Any interested party may be represented by observers at on-site 
election locations and at locations at which vote counts are 
conducted."  Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 70.07(3). 
No. 
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entitled.  State ex rel. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Jones, 2000 
WI App 146, ¶19, 237 Wis. 2d 840, 615 N.W.2d 190 ("A potent open 
records law must remain open to technological advances so that 
its statutory terms remain true to the law's intent."). 
¶70 For the reasons stated above, I find unpersuasive the 
majority's determination that Scott "lawfully performed the 
balancing test in concluding that the public interest in 
elections free from voter intimidation and coercion outweighs 
the public interest in favor of openness of public records."  
Majority op., ¶3. 
III 
¶71 Applying the public records balancing test, I conclude 
that Scott has failed to overcome the strong presumption 
favoring the release of the requested records.  See Linzmeyer v. 
Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶¶10-12, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.  
"The duty of the [records] custodian is to specify reasons for 
nondisclosure and the court's role is to decide whether the 
reasons asserted are sufficient."  Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 
89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979). 
¶72 Before this court, Scott provides two5 justifications 
for denying these public records requests:  to protect the 
                                                 
5 The first reason Scott provided to MTI in the denial 
letters was that because WERC utilized a third-party vendor to 
administer the election, WERC did not possess the requested 
records.  Majority op., ¶7.  However, the circuit court stated 
that "there was no attempt ever made to figure out if [Scott] 
could produce the documents," a conclusion that counsel for 
Scott conceded was accurate at oral arguments before this court. 
Counsel for Scott further explained that he abandoned this 
argument on appeal.  Accordingly, I do not consider it when 
conducting the balancing test. 
No. 
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secrecy of the ballot and to avoid the potential for voter 
coercion during the election.  Majority op., ¶7. 
¶73 Scott's first argument——that disclosure would violate 
the 
secrecy 
of 
the 
ballot——rings 
hollow. 
 
Although 
the 
substantive votes on a ballot are confidential, the identity of 
those who voted is not.6  Disclosing the names of those who have 
cast a ballot prior to the conclusion of an election does not 
violate the secrecy of the ballot.  At oral argument, counsel 
for Scott aptly explained the distinction between the act of 
voting and the secrecy of the ballot: 
The act of voting is never secret. The ballot is 
certainly secret.  After an election is finished, no 
ballot will ever be disclosed.  The act of not voting 
is a non-vote, but the Chairman decided that because 
of transparency after the election . . . The act of 
not voting is not given the same protection as the 
ballot. 
¶74 Additionally, Scott undermined his purported concern 
about protecting the secrecy of the ballot by releasing the 
names of those who voted after the conclusion of the election.  
I agree with the circuit court that refusing to disclose the 
names 
of 
voters 
during 
the 
election 
but 
releasing 
that 
information after the election is "entirely contradictory" and 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 6.36(1)(a)(1),(7)&(1)(b)1 (clarifying 
that the official voter registration list in Wisconsin——
including the names and dates of any election in which the 
elector votes——is a public record "accessible by any person"); 
Wis. Stat. § 6.79(2)-(3) (voters must state their names and 
present proof of identity at polling places before they may 
vote); Wis. Stat. § 7.41(1) (members of the public may observe 
elections at polling places); see also Wis. Admin. Code § EL 
3.50(2)-(3); Wis. Admin. Code § ERC 70.07(3). 
No. 
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"paradoxical."  Accordingly, I afford Scott's purported concern 
about maintaining the secrecy of the ballot little weight in the 
balancing test. 
¶75 Scott's second argument that denying these public 
records requests was necessary to prevent "the potential for 
voter 
coercion 
while 
balloting 
is 
ongoing" 
is 
similarly 
unconvincing.  As discussed above, Scott failed to provide any 
evidence that MTI ever attempted to coerce or intimidate voters 
in this, or any other, recertification election.  Moreover, 
Scott 
did 
not 
provide 
any 
substantiated 
evidence 
that 
intimidation or coercion occurred in any other recertification 
election in Wisconsin.  Thus, I conclude that Scott failed to 
establish that it was reasonably probable that such harm would 
occur in MTI's 2015 recertification election. 
¶76 Ensuring the integrity of elections is an important 
public interest.  For that reason, the legislature empowered 
WERC with tools to investigate and penalize unfair labor 
practices, including voter coercion.  See Wis. Stat. § 111.07.  
The legislature did not, however, carve out an exception to the 
public records law permitting WERC to withhold records that 
historically have been accessible to the public. 
¶77 In sum, I conclude that Scott failed to overcome the 
presumption that all public records shall be open to the public.  
Unlike the majority, I determine that the unfounded speculation 
that the records might be used for improper purposes does not 
outweigh the strong public interest in opening the records to 
No. 
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inspection.  Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court's 
determination that Scott violated the public records law. 
¶78 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No. 
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