Title: State v. Davis

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

290 So. 2d 30 (1974)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Cullen DAVIS, Respondent.
No. 43874.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 13, 1974.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and David Luther Woodward and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
James A. Gardner, Public Defender, and Thomas A. Capelle and Charles H. Livingston, Asst. Public Defenders, for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 276 So. 2d 846. Our jurisdiction is based on conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and, inter alia, Tracey v. State[1] and Redditt v. State.[2]
Respondent was convicted of robbery in the Court of Record, Hillsborough County. The Second District reversed and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the admission of evidence of another crime violated *31 the rule of Williams v. State.[3] The State has urged that the District Court erred because the Williams rule issue was not raised in appellant's brief, although it was assigned as error in the Assignments of Error.
The appellant's brief, an "Anders" brief, filed on the authority of Anders v. California,[4] concluded:
In its first opinion on the matter, the Second District noted that:
Upon petition for rehearing, which had been sought by the State on the grounds that the issue was not raised in appellant's brief, although it did appear in the assignment of error, the Second District noted:
On the merits, the Second District's opinion on rehearing recognized, as was asserted in appellant's brief, that the other evidence presented at the trial was more than sufficient to convict, and that the Williams rule testimony added nothing to the State's case. However, it was found that the evidence was wrongfully admitted, and due to the fact that two witnesses appeared, taking 25 pages of testimony, the evidence became a "feature" of the trial. On this basis, the District Court reversed on the authority of Green v. State,[7] which excluded evidence of a prior crime, although the prior crime was material, because the prior crime became "a feature instead of an incident" of the trial.
The State has urged conflict with numerous cases. One of these is Tracey v. State,[8] where it was held that:
Another representative case cited by the State is Redditt v. State,[10] which, in discussing the assignments of error, noted that Florida law provides that:
Thus, before this Court, two issues arise in this proceeding. The first of these is the threshold question of whether the Second District properly considered the Williams rule issue, which, although raised as an assignment of error, was not argued in appellant's "Anders" brief. If the answer to this question is in the negative, a reversal of the District Court is called for without further discussion. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, we must then pass to the merits of the Williams rule issue.
As regards the threshold question of the very consideration of the Williams rule issue by the District Court, one must turn to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the *33 United States in Anders v. California,[12] wherein that Court discussed not only the purposes behind the filing of an "Anders" brief, but also the procedures to be followed by the appellate court upon the receipt of such a brief:
It would appear then that, while the action of the District Court in the instant case may well have been in conflict with prior decisions of this Court regarding the general law pertaining to the waiving of assignments of error, the action of the District Court was nevertheless certainly in accord with that mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders, wherein, as noted, the Court said that after an Anders brief was filed, "The Court  not counsel  then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous". What is evident from the Court's opinion in Anders is that the function of an Anders brief is not to make the traditional and judicial determination of whether or not a case is meritorious a new part of the public defender's job; rather, it is apparent that under the mandate of Anders, even after such a brief is filed by the public defender, it is still the appellate court's duty to review the record, sua sponte, to determine whether or not, in its opinion there has been error committed. It would appear that, at least in this limited area of the law, i.e., when an "Anders". brief is filed on behalf of an indigent defendant by his State-appointed counsel, the general Florida law regarding the waiving of assignments of error must bend to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders.[14] It would thus appear, as regards the threshold question of consideration of the Williams rule issue, the Second District was correct in so considering that issue, inasmuch as it was merely following its duty as enunciated by Anders.
On the merits, petitioner argues that the Williams rule is a rule of relevancy, and the obviously proper objection to the proffer of testimony under that is to relevancy.
*34 Petitioner argues that, in the trial court, the defense made a rambling general objection thereto, whereas the proper objections should have been that the testimony was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and that the only purpose of the proffer was to place the defendant's character in question and to further show his propensity to commit crimes.
Petitioner cites Franklin v. State,[15] which interpreted the Williams rule as follows:
The petitioner concludes that the record in the instant case clearly reflects the failure on the part of the defense to show the necessity of exclusion, and, therefore, the District Court seized upon an issue not fundamental, nor adequately prejudicial to warrant reversal.
In response, respondent argues that, at trial, counsel for State offered Williams rule testimony by specifically naming it as such immediately prior to defense counsel's objection in the following exchange:
Given this context, respondent urges that the objection by defense counsel to testimony from the two witnesses can be clearly seen as an objection to Williams rule testimony; moreover, respondent's motion for new trial recited the trial court's error in a more precise term:
Respondent concludes, therefore, that it seems quite apparent that specific objection to the Williams rule testimony was made at the trial level, as to preserve the objection for appeal.
Finally, respondent notes that at no point in the proceeding has the attorney general challenged the conclusion that the Williams rule testimony was not relevant to the charge for which appellant was convicted.[17]
Our careful examination of the record, together with the petition and briefs and arguments of counsel, leads us to the conclusion that the District Court was correct in reversing and remanding for a new trial on the basis that the "Williams" testimony of two witnesses became a "feature" of the trial.[18]
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., dissent.
[1]  130 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1961).
[2]  84 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1956).
[3]  110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
[4]  386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
[5]  276 So. 2d  at 847-848. (Emphasis supplied.)
[6]  Id. at 848-849. (Emphasis supplied.)
[7]  228 So. 2d 397 (Fla.App.2d 1969).
[8]  See note 1, supra.
[9]  130 So. 2d  at 610.
[10]  See note 2, supra.
[11]  84 So. 2d  at 320.
[12]  See note 4, supra.
[13]  386 U.S.  at 744-745, 87 S. Ct.  at 1401 (Emphasis supplied.)
[14]  Tracey and Redditt are, of course, but two representatives of the many Florida decisions enunciating the general "not argued equals abandoned" rule of appellate practice. Under today's decision, we naturally recede from all such decisions  in the limited area concerning briefs filed on behalf of indigents by their State-appointed counsel  where such decisions conflict with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders.
[15]  229 So. 2d 892 (Fla.App.3d), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1970).
[16]  229 So. 2d  at 893-894.
[17]  The State, in fact, has admitted that the testimony did not properly come within the purview of the Williams rule.
[18]  See 276 So. 2d  at 847-849 for the Second District's thorough discussion of the subject.