Title: State v. Stutler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Stutler, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2792.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2792 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. STUTLER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Stutler, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2792.] 
R.C. 2945.401—Burden of proof—Changes to commitment conditions following 
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity—Under the plain language of 
R.C. 2945.401, unless the state proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that the recommended change would result in a threat to public safety or 
any person, the trial court does not have discretion to deny the requested 
change—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2021-0428—Submitted March 9, 2022—Decided August 16, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, 
No. 2020 CA 00022, 2021-Ohio-481. 
__________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, 
we are asked to determine the extent of a trial court’s discretion under R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
2945.401 to deny a recommended change in the commitment conditions of a 
mentally ill person subject to court-ordered commitment to a mental-health facility.  
We hold that under the plain language of R.C. 2945.401, unless the state proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that the recommended change would result in a 
threat to public safety or any person, the trial court does not have discretion to deny 
the requested change.  Since the record before us demonstrates that the trial court 
might have denied the requested change in the conditions of appellant Jeremy 
Stutler’s commitment based on factors other than those specified in the statutory 
provisions concerning the state’s burden of proof, we reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment and remand the case to that court for it to consider the evidence under the 
appropriate standard. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In 2012, at a bench trial before the Stark County Court of Common 
Pleas, Stutler was found not guilty by reason of insanity of murder, tampering with 
evidence, and abuse of a corpse.  As required by R.C. 2945.40 and 2945.401(A), 
the trial court ordered Stutler committed to a mental-health facility for up to the 
maximum term that could be imposed as a prison sentence if Stutler had been 
convicted of the most serious offense charged. 
{¶ 3} Stutler was initially committed to the Timothy B. Moritz Forensic 
Unit of Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare (“Twin Valley”), a maximum-security 
facility that provides inpatient care for acutely mentally ill adults.  After spending 
over a year receiving treatment at Twin Valley, and on the recommendation of a 
psychologist with Twin Valley, the trial court determined that Stutler’s mental 
health was sufficiently stable for him to be transferred out of a maximum-security 
setting.  Accordingly, Stutler was transferred to Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare 
to continue his commitment.  Following a status-review hearing in June 2014, the 
trial court granted Stutler Level III movement to participate in additional activities 
at the facility.  In October 2014, the trial court granted Stutler additional latitude 
January Term, 2022 
 
3
for purposes of medical treatment (“Level IV medical privileges”) that permitted 
him supervised leave from Northcoast for medical treatment not available at the 
facility. 
{¶ 4} In February 2015, the chief clinical officer at Northcoast filed a 
request with the trial court asking that Stutler be allowed to leave Northcoast to go 
on trips outside the facility while under the supervision of Northcoast staff or his 
case manager (“Level IV community movement”).  The trial court denied the 
request, and the Fifth District affirmed that decision.  State v. Stutler, 2015-Ohio-
5518, 55 N.E.3d 600, ¶ 17-18 (5th Dist.).  In 2017, the chief clinical officer filed a 
second request for Stutler to be granted Level IV community movement.  The trial 
court denied the second request, and the Fifth District affirmed that decision.  State 
v. Stutler, 2018-Ohio-1619, 101 N.E.3d 738, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.).  In 2019, the chief 
clinical officer filed a third request for Stutler to be granted Level IV community 
movement, which included the requirement that Stutler be monitored by electronic 
GPS during any outings.  The trial court denied the third request, this time after 
holding a hearing. 
{¶ 5} At the hearing, a psychologist and a psychiatrist testified regarding 
Stutler’s progress while committed and on his medications and Stutler testified on 
his own behalf.  Both the psychologist and the psychiatrist testified that in the years 
since his commitment, Stutler had shown no violent behavior toward anyone, even 
when others showed violent behavior toward him.  The testimony demonstrated 
that Stutler was nonviolent when properly medicated.  The state did not call any 
witnesses to testify at the hearing, but it did cross-examine the psychologist.  
Further, the court questioned both the psychologist and the psychiatrist. 
{¶ 6} The trial court’s decision denying the request for Level IV community 
movement began with a summary of the charges for which Stutler had been found 
not guilty by reason of insanity, Stutler’s initial treatment at Twin Valley, and his 
transfer to Northcoast.  The court then gave a detailed history of the prior requests 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
for Stutler to be granted Level IV community movement and the reasons why those 
requests were denied.  Turning to the chief clinical officer’s most recent request for 
Level IV community movement, the court opined that the testimony presented at 
the hearing by the psychologist, the psychiatrist, and Stutler “[was] centered on the 
fact that [Stutler] had not shown any violence at Northcoast, not contributed to any 
problems, and in their opinion, appeared fit to follow the treatment plan that had 
been proposed, which features community trips supported by [Northcoast] staff and 
police.”  The court explained that it nevertheless remained concerned about the 
potential threat to public safety.  The court indicated that some of its concern 
stemmed from Northcoast’s previous failure to properly supervise Stutler during an 
offsite dental appointment conducted under his Level IV medical privileges.  
Additionally, the court was skeptical about whether the psychologist and the 
psychiatrist had had a sufficiently close working relationship with Stutler or a 
sufficient understanding of the history of his case and past treatment such that they 
could accurately ascertain his level of risk to the public.  In that regard, the trial 
court stated: 
 
This Court works within a very small margin of error; if the 
trial court allows these trips and [Stutler] were to cause serious 
injury to another, the Court, not the psychiatrist, would bear the 
legal, moral and ethical responsibility.  The crimes in this particular 
case were violent, lethal and gruesome.  These were not crimes that 
were committed because of a lapse of judgment, but claimed to be 
committed due to “delusional visions by demons.” 
 
Lastly, the court noted that the victim’s family opposed the request for Level IV 
community movement, and it stated that “[w]hile the Court does not find the 
victims’ recommendation the ultimate legal authority, the Court certainly values 
January Term, 2022 
 
5
their input.”  The court concluded that although it respected the opinions of the 
psychologist and the psychiatrist who testified at the hearing, it disagreed with their 
ultimate determinations that Stutler was fit for Level IV community movement. 
{¶ 7} Stutler appealed the trial court’s decision to the Fifth District, raising 
two assignments of error: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying him 
Level IV community movement and its decision was not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence and (2) the trial court had no discretion to deny the requested 
level change in the absence of clear and convincing evidence presented by the state 
showing that the level change should not be granted due to a public-safety risk.  
2021-Ohio-481, ¶ 7-8.  In affirming the trial court’s denial of the request for Level 
IV community movement, the Fifth District determined—consistently with its 
previous decisions affirming the trial court’s denials of the 2015 and 2017 requests 
for Level IV community movement—that a trial court has discretion under R.C. 
2945.401 to deny a request for increased privileges even if the state opposes the 
request and fails to provide clear and convincing evidence of a threat to public 
safety.  Id. at ¶ 12-13, 21-23.  The court of appeals observed that Stutler suffers 
from “bipolar disorder with psychotic features” and that the testifying psychiatrist 
admitted that Stutler had the capacity to commit future violence if he were to stop 
taking his medication.  Id. at ¶ 15-16.  The court of appeals also noted the trial 
court’s statement that it “ ‘works within a very small margin of error’ ” and would 
bear the responsibility if any harm came to others due to its granting the request for 
Level IV community movement.  Id. at ¶ 20.  In light of those facts and because the 
testimony established that Northcoast’s staff had previously failed to properly 
supervise Stutler when he attended an offsite dental appointment, the court of 
appeals determined that the trial court’s concern for public safety was reasonable.  
Id. at ¶ 20-22.  Finding no abuse of discretion, the appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the request for Level IV community movement.  Id. at ¶ 22-23. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
{¶ 8} Stutler appealed to this court, and we accepted the following 
proposition of law for review: “The trial court has no discretion to deny a level 
change requested in the absence of clear and convincing evidence indicating that 
the level change should not be granted.”  See 163 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2021-Ohio-
2069, 169 N.E.3d 680. 
Analysis 
{¶ 9} The issue before this court concerns a pure question of law: When a 
request for a change in a person’s commitment conditions has been filed in the trial 
court, does the state have to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
proposed change represents a threat to public safety or any person before the trial 
court may deny the requested change, or does the court retain discretion to deny the 
request in the absence of such evidence?  The answer to this question lies in the 
reconciliation of two statutory provisions, R.C. 2945.401(G)(2) and (I).  We hold 
that a trial court lacks discretion to deny a request for a level change when the state 
has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the change represents a 
threat to public safety or any person. 
{¶ 10} The procedure at issue here is governed by R.C. 2945.401.  The 
statute provides a comprehensive scheme that gives Ohio’s trial courts continuing 
jurisdiction over the commitment conditions of persons committed to mental-health 
institutions by court order.  R.C. 2945.401(A) and (J)(1) provide that if a defendant 
in a criminal case is found not guilty by reason of insanity and then committed to a 
mental-health institution, the defendant shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of 
the trial court until final termination of the commitment, which occurs through 
either early termination of the commitment by the trial court or the expiration of 
the maximum prison term that could have been imposed if the person had been 
convicted of the most serious offense charged.  The statute requires that the 
institution at which the person has been committed provide a written report to the 
trial court on the person’s treatment progress after the first six months of treatment 
January Term, 2022 
 
7
and on a biannual basis thereafter.  R.C. 2945.401(C).  Within 30 days of receiving 
the report, the trial court must hold a hearing on the continued commitment of the 
person or any requested changes in the conditions of the person’s commitment.  Id.  
At any time after evaluating the risk to public safety and the welfare of the 
committed person, the managing officer of the institution or the director of the 
facility or program to which the person is committed may recommend to the trial 
court that the person’s commitment be terminated or that the conditions of the 
person’s commitment be changed.  R.C. 2945.401(D). 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2945.401(E) outlines various factors that a trial court must 
consider when ruling on a recommendation that a committed person be granted 
“nonsecured status or termination of commitment.”  In addition to any other 
relevant factors, R.C. 2945.401(E) states that the trial court must consider: 
 
(1) Whether, in the trial court’s view, the defendant [found 
incompetent to stand trial] or person [found not guilty by reason of 
insanity] currently represents a substantial risk of physical harm to 
the defendant or person or others; 
(2) Psychiatric and medical testimony as to the current 
mental and physical condition of the defendant or person; 
(3) Whether the defendant or person has insight into the 
defendant’s or person’s condition so that the defendant or person 
will continue treatment as prescribed or seek professional assistance 
as needed; 
(4) The grounds upon which the state relies for the proposed 
commitment; 
(5) Any past history that is relevant to establish the 
defendant’s or person’s degree of conformity to the laws, rules, 
regulations, and values of society; [and] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
(6) If there is evidence that the defendant’s or person’s 
mental illness is in a state of remission, the medically suggested 
cause and degree of the remission and the probability that the 
defendant or person will continue treatment to maintain the 
remissive state of the defendant’s or person’s illness should the 
defendant’s or person’s commitment conditions be altered. 
 
The prosecutor is charged with representing the state or the public interest at a 
hearing on an institution’s recommendation for a change in a person’s commitment 
conditions.  R.C. 2945.401(H).  Further, R.C. 2945.401(G)(2) makes clear that the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a 
proposed change in the conditions of a person’s commitment to a less restrictive 
status represents a threat to public safety or any person.  Finally, R.C. 2945.401(I) 
states that at the conclusion of the hearing on an institution’s recommended change 
in a person’s commitment conditions, “the trial court may approve, disapprove, or 
modify the recommendation and shall enter an order accordingly.” 
{¶ 12} In affirming the trial court’s denial of the request for Stutler to be 
granted Level IV community movement, the Fifth District found dispositive the 
language in R.C. 2945.401(I) stating that a trial court “may” approve, disapprove, 
or modify a recommendation—determining that this language provided the trial 
court with discretion to deny the request for a change in Stutler’s commitment level 
even in the absence of the state’s providing clear and convincing evidence that 
granting the recommendation would result in a threat to public safety.  See 2021-
Ohio-481 at ¶ 11-12, 21-23.  But R.C. 2945.401(I) may not be read in a vacuum.  
R.C. 2945.401(I) is part of a comprehensive statutory scheme that also requires the 
prosecutor to represent the state or the public interest, R.C. 2945.401(H), and to 
carry the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
January Term, 2022 
 
9
recommended change would result in a threat to public safety or any person, R.C. 
2945.401(G)(2).  These provisions must be read in harmony. 
{¶ 13} In its brief and oral argument before this court, the state has 
suggested that the procedure outlined in R.C. 2945.401 is designed to function like 
a motion for summary judgment, whereby the institution petitioning the trial court 
for a change in the conditions of commitment has the initial burden of producing 
some competent, credible evidence that the recommended change is warranted and 
would not pose a threat to public safety.  The state asserts that only when this initial 
burden is met does it then have the burden of rebutting the evidence by presenting 
its own evidence showing that the recommended change, if granted, would result 
in a threat to public safety.  This suggested analysis may make sense when R.C. 
2945.401(E) applies.  However, the recommended change in commitment level at 
issue here does not trigger the application of R.C. 2945.401(E). 
{¶ 14} Under the plain language of R.C. 2945.401(E)—which lists the 
statutory factors that a trial court must consider when ruling on a request for 
nonsecured status or termination of commitment—the trial court must consider (1) 
whether the committed person represents a substantial risk of physical harm to the 
person or others, (2) any psychiatric and medical testimony regarding the status of 
the person’s mental and physical health, (3) the person’s appreciation and 
understanding of their mental-health condition, (4) the prosecution’s grounds for 
the proposed commitment, (5) the committed person’s history relevant to the 
person’s conformity with the laws, regulations, and values of society, and (6) any 
evidence regarding remission of the person’s mental illness and the likelihood that 
the person will continue treatment to maintain the remissive state if the person’s 
commitment conditions are altered.  But those factors apply only when there has 
been a request under R.C. 2945.401(D)(1) for “nonsecured status or termination of 
commitment.”  (Emphasis added.)  In this case, the institution’s request under R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
2945.401(D)(1) was for off-grounds supervised movement, not nonsecured status 
or termination of commitment.  Therefore, R.C. 2945.401(E) does not apply. 
{¶ 15} That a trial court has more discretion to disapprove or modify an 
institution’s recommendation for a committed person’s nonsecured movement or 
termination of the person’s commitment explains why the legislature chose to use 
the word “may” in R.C. 2945.401(I).  R.C. 2945.401(I)’s statement that the trial 
court “may approve, disapprove, or modify” a recommendation made under R.C. 
2945.401(D)(1) shows that the court has more discretion to disapprove or modify a 
recommendation for nonsecured status or termination of commitment based on its 
findings under R.C. 2945.401(E) than it does for other recommendations for 
changes that involve the person’s remaining supervised.  In this context, the use of 
the word “may” is nothing more than a reflection of the trial court’s options, which 
are based on the type of recommended change in commitment status or conditions 
before the court.  See United States v. Rogers, 461 U.S. 677, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 
76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) (“The word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies 
some degree of discretion.  This common-sense principle of statutory construction 
is by no means invariable, however, * * * and can be defeated by indications of 
legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and 
purpose of the statute” [footnote omitted]). When the recommended change in a 
person’s commitment status or conditions does not include a request for nonsecured 
status or termination of the person’s commitment, however, the prosecution’s 
burden of proof under R.C. 2945.401(G)(2) remains in full force and effect.  Thus, 
unless the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that the institution’s 
recommended change in the person’s commitment conditions would result in a 
threat to public safety or any person, the trial court does not have discretion to deny 
the recommended change. 
{¶ 16} In this case, the Fifth District concluded that the trial court had 
discretion to deny the requested change in Stutler’s commitment level even if the 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
state failed to meet its burden of proof.  That legal conclusion is incorrect, and thus 
we must reverse the appellate court’s judgment.  We are cognizant, however, of the 
fact that the state can meet its burden of proof by introducing its own evidence and 
through cross-examining and impeaching Stutler’s evidence.  In this case, the 
prosecution did engage in cross-examination of one of Stutler’s witnesses at the 
December 12, 2019 hearing on the institution’s request for Stutler to be granted 
Level IV community movement.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for it to consider 
whether the state met its burden of proof under R.C. 2945.401(G) and therefore 
whether the trial court’s decision denying the recommended change in Stutler’s 
commitment conditions should be affirmed or reversed. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Vicki L. DeSantis, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Michael A. Partlow, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Peter Galyardt, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender. 
_________________