Title: Munnerlyn v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

576 S.W.2d 714 (1979) David MUNNERLYN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR78-138. Supreme Court of Arkansas, Division 2. January 29, 1979. Rehearing Denied March 5, 1979. *715 Jeff Duty, Rogers, for appellant. Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen. by Catherine Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. FOGLEMAN, Justice. Appellant was found guilty of the sale of methamphetamines, a controlled substance, on October 27, 1977, sentenced to ten years imprisonment and fined $10,000. Appellant appeals from his conviction, alleging four points for reversal. Points I and II of appellant's brief both deal with alleged irregularities in the chain of custody of evidence introduced at the appellant's trial in two different samples, and we discuss them together. Methamphetamines were introduced into evidence from two sales allegedly made by the appellant, occurring on October 14, 1977 and October 27,1977. The testimony which furnished the foundation for the introduction of these exhibits was substantially as follows: The appellant argues that the introduction of both samples was erroneous because the prosecution failed to properly complete the chain of custody of the evidence. More specifically, the appellant contends that to properly develop the chain of custody, the testimony should have included Stevens' identification of the samples introduced into evidence as those purchased from the appellant and the testimony of the department of health evidence technician concerning receipt of the samples in the mail. To allow introduction of physical evidence, it is not necessary that every moment from the time the evidence comes into the possession of a law enforcement agency until it is introduced at trial be accounted for by every person who could have conceivably come in contact with the evidence during that period. Nor is it necessary that every possibility of tampering be eliminated; it is only necessary that the trial judge, in his discretion, be satisfied that the evidence presented is genuine and, in reasonable probability, has not been tampered with. See Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74; Wickliffe & Scott v. State, 258 Ark. 544, 527 S.W.2d 640; Rogers v. State, 258 Ark. 314, 524 S.W.2d 227, cert. den. 423 U.S. 995,96 S. Ct. 423, 46 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1975). Rystrom testified that he mailed the pills given to him by Stevens to the health department via certified mail. The certified mail numbers on the envelopes introduced into evidence corresponded with those recorded by Rystrom. The envelopes were sealed when received at the department of health and remained in a locked room until the contents were analyzed. Each envelope was resealed by the chemist who conducted the tests and remained in a vault until the time of their introduction into evidence at the trial of the appellant. The appellant has not alleged that the samples were tampered with and the circumstances of this case do not suggest any significant possibility of tampering. In such a case we will not reverse the ruling of the trial judge in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Point III of appellant's brief claims that it was error for the jury to be given an instruction on circumstantial evidence because the prosecution relied on direct evidence and not circumstantial evidence. Appellant apparently fails to recognize that circumstantial evidence was presented at trial. There was no direct evidence presented concerning what occurred between the time the envelopes were placed in the mail by Rystrom and when they were received by the department of health. Rather, it was from circumstantial evidence that the jury could find that the substances in the envelopes arrived in the same condition in which they were mailed, and that they were in the same condition at the time of the trial. The prosecution chose to rely on circumstantial evidence to establish that the envelopes were not tampered with while in the custody of the United States Postal Service in preference to facing the onerous burden of presenting the testimony of every employee who came in contact with the envelopes during their course of travel through the mail. Circumstantial evidence was the only practical method available to the prosecution to establish the chain of custody. In addition, the instruction given by the trial judge did not limit the jury to the consideration of circumstantial evidence in arriving at a verdict but merely stated, in part, that "[A] fact in dispute may be proved by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence." [Emphasis ours.] It was for the jury to *717 consider all of the evidence, circumstantial as well as direct, in arriving at a verdict and that was the purpose of the instruction given. The appellant contends in Point IV that the trial judge erred in overruling an objection to the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney. The portion of the closing argument that the appellant's attorney objected to is as follows: Appellant says that no one testified that anyone connected with him had threatened Jim Stevens. The prosecuting attorney's argument was, at least in part, responsive to the following argument by appellant's attorney: The witness did testify on redirect examination as follows: Gary Mitchell testified for the state and the testimony he gave at trial was in contradiction of a statement made earlier by Mitchell in which he said that he had purchased controlled substances from the appellant on more than one occasion. It is apparent from the quoted testimony and argument that the exertion of influence on the witnesses was placed in issue during the course of the trial. Items of evidence adduced at trial are suitable subjects for argument by the attorneys. Gibson v. State, 252 Ark. 988, 482 S.W.2d 98. This court will not reverse the action of a trial court in matters pertaining to its controlling, supervising, and determining the propriety of, the arguments of counsel in the absence of manifest gross abuse. Rowland v. State, 263 Ark. 77, 562 S.W.2d 590 and Perry v. State, 255 Ark. 378, 500 S.W.2d 387. The jury was in better position than anyone else to know whether Mitchell acted as the prosecuting attorney stated. Allowing the argument of the prosecuting attorney in this case in light of the testimony presented and the jurors' opportunity to observe the witnesses was not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion and therefore does not constitute error. Furthermore, the trial judge, as part of Instruction No. 1, *718 informed the jury that the arguments of the attorneys were not evidence and that "any argument, statements or remarks of attorneys having no basis in the evidence should be disregarded." We have previously been strongly influenced by the giving of this instruction (AMI, Civil, 101) in determining whether the trial judge has abused his discretion in respect to arguments by counsel. We find no merit in any of the appellant's points and affirm the judgment. We agree. HARRIS, C. J., and BYRD and HICKMAN, JJ.