Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 113 Ohio St.3d 48, 2007-Ohio-979.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. COX. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 113 Ohio St.3d 48, 2007-Ohio-979.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2006-1906 — Submitted November 29, 2006 — Decided March 21, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-101. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Marion Neal Cox of East Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0041495, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.  In 
March 1999, respondent was appointed acting judge in the East Cleveland 
Municipal Court.  He served in that capacity until January 2006. 
{¶ 2} On December 5, 2005, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 
respondent with three counts of professional misconduct for violations of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility.  
Respondent answered the complaint with admissions and denials, but later 
stipulated to most of the charges against him and the underlying facts. 
{¶ 3} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the cause, and although he had notice of the proceeding, 
respondent chose not to attend.  The panel made findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and a recommendation, all of which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Count I alleges that respondent acted improperly in issuing a 
contempt order.  Count II recounts respondent’s conviction of a misdemeanor 
drug charge.  Count III alleges that respondent grossly exceeded the bounds of 
professionalism during an argument with opposing counsel. 
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Count I 
{¶ 5} According to the stipulations, James C. Portis accompanied his 
nephew on June 24, 2004, to proceedings in respondent’s courtroom.  After the 
proceedings concluded, Portis and the nephew left the courtroom, apparently with 
instructions to pay assessed fines and costs.  Portis learned from a court cashier 
that an additional $200 fee was due.  During their exchange, Portis allegedly said 
to the cashier that “judges can be crooks, too.”  Portis then left the courthouse to 
wait outside for his nephew. 
{¶ 6} Within 15 minutes or so, the court cashier had reported to 
respondent that Portis had made a remark implicating respondent’s integrity as a 
member of the judiciary.  Respondent instructed police officers to arrest Portis.  
The officers took Portis into custody and kept him in police lockup for 
approximately three hours. 
{¶ 7} Around 3:00 p.m., officers brought Portis back to respondent’s 
courtroom, where respondent accused him of indirect contempt of court.  The 
transcript documents the following exchanges between respondent and the court 
cashier and then respondent and Portis: 
{¶ 8} “This was indirect contempt.  I did not hear it.  So, that way, we’re 
going to have to have a hearing on it.  I’ll set a bond today.  You’ll have to come 
back for a hearing.  But since you’ll be making the charge, I need to hear what 
you heard so I can determine if that’s contempt or not.” 
{¶ 9} The cashier then described the interchange with Portis:  “This 
gentleman came to the window, said, “ ‘Give me the amount so that I can, uh, pay 
you all.’  I then said to him, ‘You’re not paying me, you’re paying the city.’ ”   
{¶ 10} According to the cashier, Portis then stated, “The judge is a crook.”  
At this point, the cashier’s supervisor intervened. 
{¶ 11} Portis entered a not guilty plea and stated, “I don’t understand 
what’s going on here.” 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 12} Respondent stated:  
{¶ 13} “Well * * * let me explain it to you.  If I had heard it myself, I 
could have made a determination that it’s contempt, if you say something 
disrespectful in front of the Court.   ‘The judge’ being ‘the Court.’ ” 
{¶ 14} “* * * Since you didn’t say it to my face, these witnesses here, 
they’re the charging witnesses.  They are Officers of the Court.  They heard you 
say it.  So what I have to do is, I am going to enter a plea of not guilty; you’re 
saying you didn’t do it.  Set it down for trial.  Have you post a bond, come back 
for the trial, you can have your lawyer, you can have witnesses and the like.” 
{¶ 15} Respondent continued: 
{¶ 16} “You can be represented by counsel.  If you can’t afford counsel, 
we’ll have a public defender to represent you. They will * * * have a hearing, just 
as if it was a trial. You’ll get a chance to prove whether you’re guilty or not 
guilty.” 
{¶ 17} Portis responded:   
{¶ 18} “Your honor, what I’m trying to figure out is that — how is that — 
how, by me making a statement — making a statement, not meaning any harm, 
how am I doing you any harm if — I — I don’t understand what’s going on here.” 
{¶ 19} Respondent answered:  
{¶ 20} “It’s disrespectful to the judicial process and to the Court at large.  
If you’re going to stand in the hallway, and there are other citizens there, and 
you’re going to stand up and say, ‘The Judge is a crook,’ in front of other people, 
you have no — If you have evidence to support that and prove that, you bring it to 
court with you when we have the trial.  That is what is disrespectful.  If you have 
your thoughts, your comments, you want to say them to yourself, you keep them 
to yourself.  But if you are coming to this Court, we have certain rules and 
procedures that we follow.  You breached those by opening your mouth in the 
way (unintelligible) and saying the terms and statements that you did.  That’s 
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what we’re going to try to prove against you.  You can — you can be sentenced 
up to a 180 days in jail and $1,000 fine.” 
{¶ 21} When Portis again indicated that he didn’t understand why he was 
arrested, respondent stated:  
{¶ 22} “For what you said when you were at the window. What you said 
in — in this young — young lady’s presence.  When you said the Judge was a 
crook. That’s why you’re standing there.” 
{¶ 23} Portis indicated that he then understood why he was in custody and 
before respondent. 
{¶ 24} Respondent then stated:  
{¶ 25} “That’s right.  That’s — That’s defamation.  You shouldn’t go 
around calling people something that they’re not, unless you can prove it. You 
can’t defame my character in front of other people and say I’m a crook, unless 
you can prove it.  That’s defamation. You don’t have any right to say those things 
about me, or anybody. 
{¶ 26} “Now, if you’re too dense to understand that, maybe your lawyer 
will be able to explain it to you.  Do you understand?” 
{¶ 27} At the end of the proceeding, Portis pleaded no contest, was fined 
$500, and was assessed $69 in costs. 
{¶ 28} Portis later filed a grievance with relator.  In responding to 
relator’s inquiries about the events leading to the Portis contempt citation, 
however, respondent twice represented that he had actually heard Portis utter the 
offending “the judge is a crook” statement.  Compounding these false statements, 
respondent further explained that it was because of this direct contempt that Portis 
was immediately placed in custody.  Also contrary to actual events, respondent on 
one occasion reported to relator that Portis had pleaded no contest to contempt but 
had not been fined and had been released on time served. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 29} In addition, respondent concedes without explanation that he 
wrongly advised Portis that Portis had the burden of proving his innocence to the 
contempt charge.  Respondent also had no explanation for why he admonished 
Portis with the threat “That’s what we are going to try and prove against you,” 
implicating his own partiality in the process.  Finally, respondent acknowledged 
that he had insulted Portis by suggesting that he was “too dense to understand” the 
contempt charge against him. 
{¶ 30} The parties stipulated and the board found that by citing Portis for 
contempt and misrepresenting the incident to relator, respondent had violated 
Canon 2 (a judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times 
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary); Canon 3(B)(4) (a judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an 
official capacity); and Canon 4 (a judge shall avoid impropriety or the appearance 
of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
Count II 
{¶ 31} Around December 7, 1999, respondent was indicted for a felony 
offense of possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11.  The indictment 
charged that on April 18, 1999, respondent had in his possession five grams or 
less of cocaine, a Schedule II drug.  On January 25, 2000, respondent pleaded 
guilty to attempted possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2925.11, 
a first-degree misdemeanor.  Respondent was sentenced to three months’ 
incarceration, all suspended, placed on six months’ probation, and ordered to 
submit to regular drug testing.1 
                                                 
1. During these proceedings, which were contemporaneous with his assignment as an acting judge, 
respondent was declared indigent and was represented by a public defender. 
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{¶ 32} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s illegal 
conduct and conviction violated Canon 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary), Canon 2, and Canon 4. 
Count III 
{¶ 33} On February 25, 2005, while acting as plaintiff’s counsel in a case 
before Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge John D. Sutula, respondent 
attended a final pretrial hearing.  At some point before, after, or during that 
proceeding, respondent accused a defense counsel on multiple occasions of being 
a “pathological liar.”  Immediately after the hearing, respondent accosted another 
defense counsel in the courtroom and in the hallway outside.  Loudly and 
repeatedly, respondent taunted the second defense counsel with invectives, 
including profanities and racial slurs. 
{¶ 34} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s use of 
profanity to berate opposing counsel during and in the vicinity of court 
proceedings violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 35} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
board weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors of respondent’s case.  See 
Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 36} Adopting 
the panel’s 
report, the board found that in 
misrepresenting events leading up to and after the Portis contempt citation, 
respondent had submitted false statements during the disciplinary process, an 
aggravating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(f).  The board found as a 
mitigating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) that respondent had no prior 
disciplinary record. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 37} Relator argued that respondent’s failure to appear at the hearing 
constituted another aggravating factor and proposed that respondent receive a 
two-year suspension, with a conditional stay of six months.  The board 
recommended a one-year suspension, and in doing so, accepted the panel’s 
recommendation and explanation for that sanction: 
{¶ 38} “The panel was primarily concerned with Count Two of the 
complaint in which Respondent entered a plea of guilty to ‘attempted possession 
of drugs,’ a first degree misdemeanor.  That offense was the result of an 
amendment to an indictment for possession of drugs, ‘to wit: Cocaine, a Schedule 
II drug in the amount of five grams or less.’  Since Respondent did not appear at 
the hearing, or cause any evidence to be submitted on his behalf including any 
character witnesses, the panel could not formulate any conclusion whether the 
drug possession was indicative of a major drug problem or an isolated incident. 
{¶ 39} “The panel recommends that Respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of one year.” 
Review 
{¶ 40} We agree that respondent violated Canons 1, 2, 3(B)(4), and 4, and 
DR 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6), as found by the board.  The recommended 
sanction, however, is too lenient for respondent’s egregious misconduct. 
{¶ 41} Contempt power is properly used “to secure the dignity of the 
courts and the uninterrupted and unimpeded administration of justice.”  Windham 
Bank v. Tomaszczyk (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 56 O.O.2d 31, 271 N.E.2d 815, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  But here, it is obvious that respondent used this 
power merely to intimidate and demean Portis.  This grave abuse of the contempt 
power “not only throws doubts on respondent’s impartiality, but also weakens the 
public's perception of the integrity of the judiciary.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Karto (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 114, 760 N.E.2d 412. 
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{¶ 42} “It is of utmost importance that the public have confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen (1997), 
79 Ohio St.3d 494, 495, 684 N.E.2d 31.  Indeed, the judicial disciplinary system 
exists to guarantee “the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain and 
enhance public confidence in the integrity of this institution.”  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33.  
Because respondent’s abuse of the contempt powers seriously undermined these 
goals, an equally serious sanction must follow for the public’s protection and as a 
deterrent to such subversive conduct in the future. 
{¶ 43} Moreover, although neither the panel nor the board emphatically 
denounced respondent’s false accounts of the events underlying the Portis 
contempt citation, we find these untruths intolerable.  Respondent did not offer 
any reason for these inaccurate explanations, a fact that suggests to us that they 
were made intentionally to mislead relator, and not by some mistake.  Such 
falsehoods certainly exacerbate the misconduct committed in this case.  Accord 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 137, 2006-Ohio-5342, 855 
N.E.2d 462, ¶ 49. 
{¶ 44} That a lawyer who once served as a member of the judiciary in this 
state would submit dishonest or misleading information during a disciplinary 
investigation to cover up his misuse of judicial authority is an affront to our entire 
legal and disciplinary system.  When such conduct is considered in addition to 
respondent’s drug use, berating of counsel, and use of profanities and racial slurs, 
a one-year suspension is simply insufficient for misconduct of this magnitude.  
Respondent is therefore indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 45} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2007 
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PFEIFER, J., dissents and would suspend respondent from the practice of 
law in the state of Ohio for two years, with one year stayed. 
 
CUPP, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
______________________