Title: Balentine v. Sparkman

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Berniece BALENTINE v. Lisa SPARKMAN, et al.

96-196                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 3, 1997


1.   Evidence -- sufficiency of -- factors on review. -- When
     reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court
     reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising
     therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on whose
     behalf judgment was entered; the verdict will be affirmed if
     there is substantial evidence to support it; substantial
     evidence is evidence that passes beyond mere suspicion or
     conjecture and is of sufficient force and character that it
     will with reasonable and material certainty compel a
     conclusion one way or the other.  

2.   Negligence -- negligent entrustment -- necessary elements. --
     To establish negligent entrustment under Arkansas law, the
     plaintiff must show that (1) the entrustee was incompetent,
     inexperienced, or reckless; (2) the entrustor knew or had
     reason to know of the entrustee's conditions or proclivities;
     (3) there was an entrustment of the chattel; (4) the
     entrustment created an appreciable risk of the harm to the
     plaintiff and a relational duty on the part of the defendant;
     and (5) the harm to the plaintiff was proximately or legally
     caused by the negligence of the defendant.

3.   Witnesses -- credibility of -- jury chooses who to believe. --
     It is the sole province of the jury to determine the
     credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their
     testimony. 

4.   Negligence -- jury found driver negligently operated car --
     evidence sufficient to support jury's conclusion. -- Where, in
     addition to showing that the driver had consumed alcohol, the
     witnesses also declared that he staggered and slurred his
     speech, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that his
     consumption of alcohol had impaired his physical abilities
     and, more importantly, his ability to operate the vehicle in
     a reasonable manner; there was sufficient evidence to support
     the jury's conclusion that the driver negligently operated the
     station wagon.

5.   Jury -- jury draws upon common knowledge and experience in
     reaching verdict. -- A jury is allowed to draw upon its common
     knowledge and experience in reaching a verdict from the facts
     proven at trial; moreover, it is appropriate for the jury to
     draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented at trial.

6.   Negligence -- jury's inference reasonable -- evidence
     sufficient to support finding of negligent entrustment. -- The
     jury could have reasonably inferred that if the driver was
     intoxicated at the time of the accident, he would have also
     exhibited similar physical signs of intoxication moments
     before the accident when appellant entrusted him with the
     operation of her car; thus there was sufficient evidence to
     support the jury's conclusion that appellant negligently
     entrusted the station wagon to the driver; the trial court did
     not err in instructing the jury on negligent entrustment.

7.   Trial -- mistrial drastic remedy -- when granted. -- A
     mistrial is a drastic remedy that should only be used when
     there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be
     served by continuing the trial or when fundamental fairness of
     the trial itself has been manifestly affected; the trial court
     has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for a
     mistrial, and, absent an abuse, the decision will not be
     disturbed; a mistrial will only be granted where any possible
     prejudice could not have been removed by an admonition to the
     jury. 

8.   Trial -- references to beer sufficient grounds for mistrial --
     cased reversed and remanded for new trial. -- Where the trial
     judge held that testimony regarding both a six-pack of beer
     that was brought to appellant's home and three unopened
     containers of beer seen in appellant's car at the time of the
     accident was more prejudicial than probative of the issue of
     whether the driver was intoxicated at the time of the accident
     and granted a motion in limine excluding all evidence on
     either point, yet the other driver's attorney made both
     express and implied references to beer on the floorboard of
     appellant's vehicle, the supreme court found sufficient
     grounds for a mistrial; the case was reversed as to all
     parties and remanded for a new trial. 

9.   Evidence -- admission of evidence discretionary -- no abuse of
     discretion found. -- Where the trial court granted a motion in
     limine prohibiting the parties from mentioning the presence of
     unopened beer containers in either vehicle because, under Ark.
     R. Evid. 403, the prejudicial nature outweighed the probative
     value, the trial court's order excluding the evidence was
     affirmed; a trial judge's ruling in this regard will be
     affirmed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.

10.  Evidence -- matter not collateral -- trial judge's ruling
     excluding the prior inconsistent statement was an abuse of
     discretion. -- The trial court committed prejudicial error
     when it precluded testimony that would have impeached the
     officer who worked the accident; the trial judge excluded the
     testimony on grounds that it was impermissible extrinsic
     evidence offered to prove a collateral matter; a matter is not
     collateral if the cross-examining party would be entitled to
     prove the issue as part of the case in chief, or if the
     evidence is relevant to show bias, knowledge, or interest;
     whether or not the driver was intoxicated at the time of the
     accident was the central issue of the case; it was not a
     collateral matter; the trial judge's ruling excluding the
     alleged prior inconsistent statement was reversed as an abuse
     of discretion.

11.  Evidence -- emergency-room statements cumulative -- right
     decision made for wrong reason. -- Where the trial court
     excluded evidence of statements the driver made while waiting
     in the hospital emergency room on the grounds that he would
     not be able to deny or respond to the statement under A.R.E.
     613, which was inapplicable; however, the driver had already
     told the jury that he admitted fault at the scene of the
     accident, his statements in the emergency room were merely
     cumulative and thus properly excluded under Ark. R. Evid. 403;
     because the trial judge made the right decision for the wrong
     reason, the supreme court affirmed as to this evidentiary
     ruling.


     Appeal from Cleburne Circuit Court; John Dan Kemp, Judge;
reversed and remanded; on cross-appeal, reversed in part.
     Matthews, Sanders, & Sayes, by: Mel Sayes, for appellant.
     Comer Boyett, Jr., and J. Russell Green, for appellee Lisa
Sparkman.  
     Odell Pollard, P.A., by:  Odell Pollard, for appellee Jerry
Howell, Jr.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     This cause of action arose out of a traffic accident that
occurred on May 19, 1990, in Heber Springs, Arkansas, during which
a station wagon owned by Berniece Balentine and driven by Billy
Sparkman collided with a Jeep driven by Jerry Howell.  
     On the evening of May 19, 1990, Lisa and Billy Sparkman were
visiting Berniece Balentine, who is Lisa Sparkman's grandmother. 
While at the Balentine residence, Billy Sparkman thought he
observed lightning strike a relative's home.  Lisa, Billy, and Ms.
Balentine decided to drive to the home to determine if the
lightning had caused any damage.  Because it was dark and raining,
Ms. Balentine asked Billy Sparkman to drive her station wagon, and
he complied. 
     Billy drove the station wagon a few blocks before stopping at
the intersection of Highway 25 and Scott streets.  Billy asked the
passengers if they detected any oncoming traffic.  Ms. Balentine
and Lisa told Billy that the intersection was clear.  Billy drove
the station wagon halfway into the intersection when it was struck
in the rear passenger door by a Jeep driven by Jerry Howell.  Lisa
Sparkman was knocked unconscious and suffered permanent brain
damage.  
     At trial, Ms. Balentine and Billy Sparkman testified that
Howell was driving the Jeep without his headlights on, and that he
did not turn on his lights until seconds before impact.  However,
Howell and an eyewitness told the jury that Howell did indeed have
his headlights on as he approached the intersection.  Immediately
after the collision, Howell overheard Billy Sparkman crying and
exclaiming that the accident was his fault.  
     Ms. Balentine and Billy Sparkman testified that Billy had not
been drinking alcohol the night of the accident.  Likewise, a
police officer and two other witnesses testified that they did not
detect the presence of alcohol on any of the parties to the
accident.  However, Howell, an eyewitness, and Howell's two sisters
claimed that they detected alcohol on Billy Sparkman's breath, that
he staggered, and that his speech was slurred. 
     The jury found that at the time of the accident Billy Sparkman
was acting as Berniece Balentine's agent, that Balentine had
negligently entrusted Sparkman with the operation of the station
wagon, and that Lisa Sparkman, Billy Sparkman, and Berniece
Balentine were engaged in a joint enterprise. Furthermore, the jury
apportioned fault as follows:  Lisa Sparkman (injured party) 0%,
Jerry Howell (driver of the Jeep) 0%, Billy Sparkman (driver of the
station wagon) 45%, and Berniece Balentine (owner of the station
wagon) 55%.  Hence, Billy Sparkman and Berniece Balentine were held
legally responsible for the $250,000 in damages suffered by Lisa
Sparkman.
     Immediately after the jury rendered its verdict, Balentine
made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
motion for a new trial.  Both were denied, and Balentine appeals.
Although the jury completely exonerated Jerry Howell of any
liability for the accident, he cross-appealed alleging three trial
errors. 
       1. Negligent Entrustment/AMI 609 Jury Instructions.
     For her first argument on appeal, Berniece Balentine alleges
that the trial judge erred in a) denying her motion for a directed
verdict on the issue of negligent entrustment, b) instructing the
jury on negligent entrustment, and c) rejecting her motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  These arguments are
essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and
thus should be considered together.  See, Medlock v. Burden, 321
Ark. 269,