Title: State v. Brown

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2438.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2438 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BROWN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2438.] 
Criminal law—Unreasonable search and seizure—Officer’s statutory authority—
Traffic stop for minor misdemeanor outside officer’s statutory jurisdiction 
or authority violates Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 2014-0104—Submitted February 3, 2015—Decided June 23, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wood County, 
No. WD-12-070, 2013-Ohio-5351. 
_______________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals that reversed Terence Brown’s conviction for possession of 
oxycodone and held that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence 
obtained following a traffic stop for a marked lane violation made by a township 
police officer who acted without statutory jurisdiction.  The appellate court 
concluded that the traffic stop was unreasonable pursuant to Article I, Section 14 
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of the Ohio Constitution because the township officer lacked statutory authority to 
make a stop for a marked lane violation on an interstate highway, and it 
suppressed the evidence obtained from the search of Brown’s vehicle. 
{¶ 2} It is undisputed that the township police officer in this case exercised 
law-enforcement powers not granted to township police officers by the General 
Assembly; thus, because the officer acted without authority to stop Brown for a 
minor misdemeanor traffic offense on an interstate highway, the traffic stop, the 
arrest, and the search were unreasonable and violated Article I, Section 14 of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
  
{¶ 3} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} On the evening of March 16, 2011, a Lake Township patrol officer 
and canine handler, Kelly Clark, pulled from the median on Interstate 280 into the 
passing lane and observed the passenger-side tires of a Chevy Impala 
momentarily cross the solid white fog line for a distance of approximately 100 
feet.  Clark pulled her police vehicle alongside the Impala and observed that the 
driver, Terence Brown, was staring directly ahead and did not look over at her.  
Clark decided to stop Brown for leaving the lane of travel approximately two and 
one half miles from where the violation occurred.  It is undisputed that Clark 
lacked authority to stop a motorist for a marked lane violation on an interstate 
highway. 
{¶ 5} Brown had a suspended driver’s license and an active felony warrant 
in Michigan.  The record here, however, does not disclose whether Officer Clark 
was aware of those facts when she walked her drug dog around the Impala, 
leading to the discovery of 120 oxycodone tablets and a baggie of marijuana. 
{¶ 6} The state thereafter indicted Brown for aggravated possession of 
drugs.  Brown filed a motion to suppress, but the court denied it, finding that 
Clark had probable cause to stop Brown for a marked lane violation.  Brown 
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subsequently pleaded no contest to aggravated possession of drugs, and the trial 
court sentenced him to a mandatory term of three years in prison. 
{¶ 7} Brown appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, asserting that 
because Clark lacked statutory authority to stop him for a marked lane violation 
on an interstate highway, the stop and the subsequent arrest and search violated 
his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Ohio Constitution.  The appellate court determined that the stop did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, because Clark had probable cause to believe Brown had 
committed a misdemeanor in her presence.  However, the court held that the stop 
was unreasonable and violated the Ohio Constitution because the marked lane 
violation occurred outside Clark’s territorial jurisdiction and there were no 
extenuating circumstances that called for the township police officer to initiate the 
extraterritorial stop.  Concluding that the trial court should have suppressed the 
drug evidence, the appellate court reversed Brown’s conviction. 
{¶ 8} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on the following 
proposition of law:  “A violation of R.C. 4513.39 does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution or the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; therefore, the exclusionary 
rule cannot be invoked to suppress the fruits of any such statutory violation.”  138 
Ohio St.3d 1467, 2014-Ohio-1674, 6 N.E.3d 1204. 
The State’s Contentions 
{¶ 9} The state argues that the prohibitions against unreasonable searches 
and seizures set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution are nearly identical and should 
be read in harmony.  It further relies on our decision in State v. Jones, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-316, 902 N.E.2d 464, for the proposition that a search or 
seizure outside an officer’s territorial jurisdiction does not violate the Fourth 
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Amendment, provided that the officer has probable cause, and it urges us to hold 
that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution affords no greater protection 
than that afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Finally, the state contends that the violation of a statute does not, by itself, rise to 
a constitutional violation requiring suppression of evidence, and therefore the fact 
that a statute provides no remedy for its violation indicates a policy decision by 
the legislative branch of government that should not be disturbed by the judicial 
branch. 
Brown’s Contentions 
{¶ 10} Brown contends that the township officer lacked statutory authority 
to stop any motorist on an interstate highway for a marked lane violation.  
Claiming that the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force, he notes 
that in determining whether an extraterritorial stop violates the Ohio Constitution, 
we have considered the totality of the circumstances and balanced the 
government’s interests against the privacy right of the accused to decide whether 
the stop was reasonable.  In this case, he urges that the violation of the statute rose 
to a constitutional infringement, and therefore the proper remedy is for the court 
to exclude the drug evidence. 
{¶ 11} Accordingly, the issue presented on this appeal is whether a traffic 
stop made without statutory jurisdiction or authority violates the protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by Article I, Section 14 of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
  
Extraterritorial Arrests 
Common Law 
{¶ 12} At common law, police officers had no authority to make 
warrantless arrests outside the jurisdiction of the political entity that appointed 
them to office; unless they were in hot pursuit of a suspected felon fleeing that 
jurisdiction, officers making an extraterritorial arrest acted outside their official 
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5
capacity and were therefore treated as private citizens.  See, e.g., Fairborn v. 
Munkus, 28 Ohio St.2d 207, 209, 277 N.E.2d 227 (1971); State v. Zdovc, 106 
Ohio App. 481, 485-486, 151 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1958); State v. Eriksen, 172 
Wash.2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011), ¶ 8-9; Commonwealth  v. Limone, 460 Mass. 
834, 837, 957 N.E.2d 225 (2011); Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 351, 958 A.2d 356 
(2008), fn. 6; People v. Lahr, 147 Ill.2d 379, 382, 589 N.E.2d 539 (1992); State v. 
Stahl, 838 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Wyo.1992); Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 102, 794 
S.W.2d 141 (1990); People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 154 (Colo.1983); 3 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Section 5.1(b) 
at 18-19 (5th Ed.2012); 4 Bergman & Duncan, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, 
Section 23:23, at 23-79 to 23-80 (14th Ed.2010). 
Statutory Law 
{¶ 13} The General Assembly codified this common law rule in Ohio as 
early as 1837, when it enacted an act “[d]efining the powers and duties of Justices 
of the Peace and Constables, in Criminal Cases,” 35 Ohio Laws 87, 91, which 
authorized constables to apprehend felons and disturbers of the peace without a 
warrant “within their respective counties.”  And in 1869, when the General 
Assembly enacted R.S. 7129, 66 Ohio Laws 287, 291, as part of the act 
establishing the Ohio Code of Criminal Procedure, it retained the common law 
rule limiting an officer’s authority to make a warrantless arrest to the geographical 
boundaries of the political subdivision employing the officer.  Cincinnati v. 
Alexander, 54 Ohio St.2d 248, 252, 375 N.E.2d 1241 (1978) (“the General 
Assembly intended no devolution of arrest power outside the respective political 
subdivisions relating to the enumerated officers in the enactment of Section 21 
[R.S. 7129]”). 
{¶ 14} The General Assembly subsequently recodified R.S. 7129, and the 
current version, R.C. 2935.03(A)(1), now provides:  
 
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A sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, 
municipal police officer, township constable, [or] police officer of 
a township or joint police district * * * shall arrest and detain, until 
a warrant can be obtained, a person found violating, within the 
limits of the political subdivision * * * in which the peace officer 
is appointed, employed, or elected, a law of this state, an ordinance 
of a municipal corporation, or a resolution of a township. 
 
{¶ 15} However, the General Assembly has not extended the authority to 
enforce traffic laws on state highways to all police officers.  In that regard, R.C. 
4513.39(A) provides: 
 
The state highway patrol and sheriffs or their deputies shall 
exercise, to the exclusion of all other peace officers except within 
municipal corporations and except as specified in division (B) of 
this section and division (E) of section 2935.03 of the Revised 
Code, the power to make arrests for violations on all state 
highways, of sections 4503.11, 4503.21, 4511.14 to 4511.16, 
4511.20 to 4511.23, 4511.26 to 4511.40, 4511.42 to 4511.48, 
4511.58, 4511.59, 4511.62 to 4511.71, 4513.03 to 4513.13, 
4513.15 to 4513.22, 4513.24 to 4513.34, 4549.01, 4549.08 to 
4549.12, and 4549.62 of the Revised Code. 
 
The enumerated Revised Code sections in this statute include the marked lane 
violation at issue in this case as well as speed limits and the use of turn signals, 
headlights, and brake lights. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 4513.39(B), on the other hand, grants authority to certain 
township police officers to enforce traffic laws on state highways, stating: 
January Term, 2015 
 
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A member of the police force of a township police district created 
under section 505.48 of the Revised Code or of a joint police 
district created under section 505.482 of the Revised Code, and a 
township constable appointed pursuant to section 509.01 of the 
Revised Code, who has received a certificate from the Ohio peace 
officer training commission under section 109.75 of the Revised 
Code, shall exercise the power to make arrests for violations of 
those sections listed in division (A) of this section, other than 
sections 4513.33 and 4513.34 of the Revised Code, as follows: 
(1) If the population of the township that created the 
township or joint police district served by the member’s police 
force or the township that is served by the township constable is 
fifty thousand or less, the member or constable shall exercise that 
power on those portions of all state highways, except those 
highways included as part of the interstate system, as defined in 
section 5516.01 of the Revised Code, that are located within the 
township or joint police district, in the case of a member of a 
township or joint police district police force, or within the 
unincorporated territory of the township, in the case of a township 
constable; 
(2) If the population of the township that created the 
township or joint police district served by the member’s police 
force or the township that is served by the township constable is 
greater than fifty thousand, the member or constable shall exercise 
that power on those portions of all state highways and highways 
included as part of the interstate highway system, as defined in 
section 5516.01 of the Revised Code, that are located within the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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township or joint police district, in the case of a member of a 
township or joint police district police force, or within the 
unincorporated territory of the township, in the case of a township 
constable. 
 
{¶ 17} This statute thus precludes township police officers who are not 
commissioned peace officers from enforcing these traffic laws on any state 
highway, and commissioned peace officers serving a township with a population 
of fifty thousand or less may not enforce these traffic laws on state highways 
included in the interstate highway system.  And, as we explained in State v. 
Holbert, 38 Ohio St.2d 113, 116, 311 N.E.2d 22 (1974), because the statute 
precludes township officers from enforcing the listed traffic laws, those officers 
cannot stop a motorist or make an arrest alleging such a violation. 
{¶ 18} We have previously held that an arrest made in violation of a 
statute limiting the police officer’s authority to make the arrest infringes on “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures” as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 
of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 19} In State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 
175, officers arrested Dali Jacques Brown, a suspected drug dealer, for 
jaywalking, a minor misdemeanor, and a search incident to the arrest revealed that 
Brown had crack cocaine.  Id. at ¶ 1-3. The state indicted him for possession of a 
controlled substance.  The trial court, however, suppressed the drug evidence 
because the officers lacked statutory authority to make an arrest for a minor 
misdemeanor pursuant to R.C. 2935.26, and therefore the search incident to the 
arrest was unreasonable for purposes of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
{¶ 20} The court of appeals affirmed the suppression of the evidence, and 
we accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to consider “whether an arrest for a 
minor misdemeanor violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution” in light of the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 
121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001).  Id. at ¶ 5-7.  Atwater had held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal 
offense, such as a minor misdemeanor seat belt violation punishable only by a 
fine. 
{¶ 21} We recognized that the warrantless arrest for a minor misdemeanor 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Brown at ¶ 20-21, but we determined that 
“Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against warrantless 
arrests for minor misdemeanors,”  id. at ¶ 22.  In reaching that conclusion, we 
reaffirmed the application of the balancing test set forth in State v. Jones, 88 Ohio 
St.3d 430, 727 N.E.2d 886 (2000), to ascertain whether a search or seizure is 
reasonable by weighing the competing interests involved and considering the 
extent of the officer’s intrusion on an individual’s liberty and privacy against the 
need to promote legitimate governmental interests.  Brown at ¶ 17-19, 22; Jones 
at 437. 
{¶ 22} We concluded that “Brown was arrested for a minor misdemeanor 
offense when none of the R.C. 2935.26 exceptions were applicable, and thus, the 
arrest violated Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.”  Brown, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, at ¶ 25. Accordingly, we upheld the 
suppression of the evidence discovered.  Id. 
{¶ 23} Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution affords greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment against searches and seizures conducted 
by members of law enforcement who lack authority to make an arrest.  Therefore, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor offense made by a township police officer 
without statutory authority to do so violates Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶ 24} The state’s reliance on State v. Jones, 121 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-
Ohio-316, 902 N.E.2d 464, is misplaced.  Jones holds that a traffic stop made 
outside the officer’s statutory jurisdiction but founded on probable cause is not 
per se unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  However, as we 
explained in Brown, decisions interpreting the United States Constitution do not 
control the analysis here, because “ ‘[t]he Ohio Constitution is a document of 
independent force,’ ” Brown at ¶ 21, quoting Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 
35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus, and “it is our charge to 
determine and not to disturb the clear protections provided by the drafters of our 
Constitution,” Arnold at 43. 
{¶ 25} In this case, the state admits that Officer Clark violated R.C. 
4513.39 by stopping Brown for a marked lane violation on Interstate 280.  Thus, 
Clark acted outside her authority and exercised law-enforcement powers not 
expressly granted to a township officer by the General Assembly.  The 
government’s interests in permitting an officer without statutory jurisdiction or 
authority to make a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor offense in these 
circumstances is minimal and is outweighed by the intrusion upon the individual’s 
liberty and privacy that necessarily arises out of the stop.  Accordingly, the traffic 
stop and the ensuing search and arrest in this case were unreasonable and violated 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, and the evidence seized as a result 
should have been suppressed. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 26} A traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor made outside a police 
officer’s statutory jurisdiction or authority violates the guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures established by Article I, Section 14 of the 
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Ohio Constitution.  Here, the appellate court correctly determined that the 
township police officer lacked authority to enforce a marked lane violation on an 
interstate highway and that the traffic stop and ensuing search of the vehicle were 
unreasonable, and it properly ordered suppression of the evidence obtained from 
that search. 
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
 
French, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} For the second time in recent months, a majority of this court has 
elected to create a new state constitutional right in the absence of “ ‘compelling 
reasons why Ohio constitutional law should differ from the federal law.’ ”  See 
State v. Bode, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2015-Ohio-1519, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 33 
(French, J., dissenting), quoting State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 363, 662 
N.E.2d 311 (1996).  And, more troublingly, it has done so without carefully 
examining the language of the Ohio Constitution to justify its departure from 
federal law. 
{¶ 29} In light of the nearly identical text of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
coupled with the Ohio framers’ reliance on the preexisting Fourth Amendment in 
drafting Ohio’s constitutional search-and-seizure provision, I discern no 
compelling basis for affording Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution 
broader reach than the Fourth Amendment. 
{¶ 30} The exclusionary rule applies only to evidence obtained in 
violation of a constitutional right.  Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12
235, 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980).  Therefore, this case asks whether a traffic stop 
based upon probable cause but contrary to a state statute that limits a township 
police officer’s authority to stop a motorist for certain traffic violations on an 
interstate highway rises to the level of a constitutional violation.  This court has 
previously held that a traffic stop outside an officer’s statutory jurisdiction but 
founded upon probable cause is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
State v. Jones, 121 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-316, 902 N.E.2d 464 (“Jones II”).  
Yet the majority here concludes that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution 
provides greater protection and requires exclusion of the evidence.  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 26.  I conclude, however, that the traffic stop at issue here—a stop 
that undisputedly did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was based 
upon probable cause—similarly did not violate Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution so as to require exclusion of the evidence. 
{¶ 31} This court has repeatedly recognized that the language in Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution is nearly identical to the language of the 
Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430, 434, 727 N.E.2d 
886 (2000) (“Jones”).  The Fourth Amendment provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution differs from the Fourth Amendment 
in only minimal, non-substantive ways.  In addition to minor changes in 
punctuation, it substitutes the word “possessions” for “effects,” removes the 
January Term, 2015 
 
13
capitalization from “Warrants” and “Oath,” changes the plural “Warrants” to the 
singular “warrant,” and substitutes “and” for “or” in the final clause. 
{¶ 32} When Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution was adopted in 
1851, the Fourth Amendment had been in effect for about 60 years.  At that time, 
however, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states.  See State v. 
Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936), paragraph one of the syllabus 
(“The Fourth * * * Amendment[] to the Constitution of the United States, 
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures * * *, [is] directed exclusively 
against the activities of the federal government and [has] no application to the 
various states and their agencies”).  It was not until 1949 that the United States 
Supreme Court held that the principle at the core of the Fourth Amendment—
security against arbitrary police intrusion—is enforceable against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 
L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
645-655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). 
{¶ 33} We presume that a body that enacts a constitutional amendment is 
aware of relevant and existing constitutional provisions.  State v. Carswell, 114 
Ohio St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 6.  Accordingly, we presume 
that the drafters of Article I, Section 14 of the 1851 Ohio Constitution were 
cognizant of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, especially given 
the decision to incorporate nearly identical language into the Ohio Constitution.  
But not only did the framers of Article I, Section 14 track the language of the 
Fourth Amendment, they also departed from the search-and-seizure provision of 
the 1802 Ohio Constitution, which prohibited any search or seizure without a 
warrant.  Ohio Constitution of 1802, Article VIII, Section 5.  The framers of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution intentionally brought the text of 
Ohio’s provision regarding searches and seizures by state actors in line with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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text of the Fourth Amendment, which governed searches and seizures by the 
federal government.  There is simply no indication that the framers intended 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution to provide greater protections 
against state action than the Fourth Amendment provides against federal action.  
Nor does the majority in this case suggest otherwise. 
{¶ 34} To be sure, the Ohio Constitution may provide greater protection of 
individual rights and civil liberties than the United States Constitution.  State v. 
Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 21, citing Arnold 
v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163, paragraph one of the syllabus; 
see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 
30 (1988) (“Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as 
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal 
Constitution”).  But “we have sworn not to create new, Ohio-specific 
constitutional doctrines absent ‘compelling reasons why Ohio constitutional law 
should differ from the federal law.’ ”  Bode, ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2015-Ohio-
1519, ___ N.E.3d ____, at ¶ 33 (French, J., dissenting), quoting Wogenstahl, 75 
Ohio St.3d at 363, 662 N.E.2d 311.  This case does not present those compelling 
reasons. 
{¶ 35} Rather than looking to the text of the Ohio Constitution, the 
majority today relies almost exclusively on this court’s opinion in Brown to hold 
that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than 
the Fourth Amendment against searches and seizures conducted by a law-
enforcement officer who lacks statutory authority to arrest.  Majority opinion at  
¶ 19.  In Brown, a custodial search following an arrest for a minor-misdemeanor 
jaywalking offense uncovered crack cocaine.  This court held that Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution “provides greater protection than the Fourth 
Amendment * * * against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors” and 
required suppression of the crack cocaine.  Brown at syllabus.  But reading Brown 
January Term, 2015 
 
15
in the broader context of this court’s search-and-seizure jurisprudence and in light 
of a more recent opinion involving facts substantially similar to this case reveals 
that Brown is an outlier and offers no compelling reason for reading Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution differently than we read the Fourth 
Amendment. 
{¶ 36} Three years earlier, this court addressed the issue presented in 
Brown and held that the protections provided by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution “are coextensive” with those provided by the Fourth Amendment.  
Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d at 434, 727 N.E.2d 886, citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997).  There, we engaged in a single analysis 
applicable to both the Ohio and the United States Constitutions, in which we 
balanced the extent of the intrusion on the individual’s liberty and privacy against 
the need for the intrusion to promote legitimate governmental goals.  Jones at 
437, citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-653, 115 S.Ct. 
2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), and Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 
119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).  Looking exclusively to federal caselaw, 
we concluded that the serious intrusion upon a person’s liberty and privacy 
outweighed the minimal governmental interest in a full custodial arrest for a 
minor misdemeanor.  Id. at 437-440.  Accordingly, we held that absent a statutory 
exception allowing arrest, a full custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor violates 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.  Jones 
at 440. 
{¶ 37} We revisited that issue in Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-
3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, to address the effect of the United States Supreme Court’s 
intervening decision in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 
149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), which held, “If an officer has probable cause to believe 
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his 
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”  
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Atwater involved an alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a result of an arrest 
for a minor misdemeanor, which Texas statutory law made punishable only by a 
fine.  The Supreme Court rejected the application of a balancing test like the one 
we applied in Jones: “we confirm today what our prior cases have intimated: the 
standard of probable cause ‘applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to “balance” 
the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  
Id. at 354, quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 
L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 
1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (“In a long line of cases, we have said that when an 
officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in 
his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt.  The 
arrest is constitutionally reasonable”). 
{¶ 38} In light of Atwater, we acknowledged that Jones “is no longer 
authoritative regarding warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors” under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Brown at ¶ 21.  Nevertheless, despite our previous treatment 
of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourth Amendment as 
coextensive, the Brown majority changed course and found that “the balancing 
test set forth in Jones provides ample reason” for holding that Article I, Section 
14 of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at ¶ 22.  But the balancing test rejected for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment in Atwater does not justify distinguishing Article I, Section 14 
of the Ohio Constitution.  The balancing of interests would be the same under 
either of those nearly identical provisions, and the Brown majority offered no 
justification for applying that test under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution when the United States Supreme Court has rejected its application 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
{¶ 39} Subsequent to Brown, we addressed an extraterritorial traffic stop 
in Jones II, 121 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-316, 902 N.E.2d 464, and held, “A 
January Term, 2015 
 
17
law-enforcement officer who personally observes a traffic violation while outside 
the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction has probable cause to make a traffic 
stop; the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment * * *.”  Id. at 
syllabus.  We held that Moore, 553 U.S. at 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559, 
“removed any room for finding that a violation of * * * R.C. 2935.03 [which 
governs a police officer’s territorial jurisdiction], in and of itself, could give rise 
to a Fourth Amendment violation and result in the suppression of evidence.”  
Jones II at ¶ 15.  Moore clarified that the existence of probable cause ensures the 
constitutional reasonableness of a search or seizure and renders superfluous any 
weighing of the parties’ interests.  Moore at 171; see also State v. Wilson, 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-205, 2013-Ohio-4799, ¶ 11 (“the balancing test is not the 
proper analysis; instead, it must be determined whether probable cause existed”); 
State v. Dillehay, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-12-07, 2013-Ohio-327, ¶ 35 (stating that 
Jones II “explicitly rejects the application of a balancing test when remedying a 
violation of R.C. 2935.03”). 
{¶ 40} Although Jones II specifically addressed only the Fourth 
Amendment, and not Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, the state’s 
reliance on that case here is not “misplaced,” as the majority states.  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 24.  In Jones II, we held that observation of a traffic violation gave 
the officer probable cause to initiate a stop, which was constitutionally sound 
even though it was contrary to a state statute.  Id. at ¶ 19, citing Dayton v. 
Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996).  We held that the 
officer’s presence “outside his jurisdiction and * * * his reasons for being there 
[are] irrelevant” to the constitutional analysis because “the violation of R.C. 
2935.03 does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation for the reasons 
expressed in Moore.”  Jones II at ¶ 20.  Nothing in Jones II suggests a reason for 
reaching a different result under the Ohio Constitution.  Moreover, as we noted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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there, the remedy for a violation of R.C. 2935.03 “falls within the realm of the 
legislative branch.”  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 41} The majority offers no compelling reason, other than blind reliance 
on Brown, for applying a balancing test to determine whether a stop based upon 
probable cause is reasonable under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution 
when the existence of probable cause conclusively demonstrates the 
reasonableness of the stop under the Fourth Amendment.  Absent compelling 
reasons to differ, this court should harmonize our interpretation of Article I, 
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment and continue to 
treat those provisions as coextensive with respect to extraterritorial stops based 
upon probable cause.  See Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 239, 685 N.E.2d 762; see 
also State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 55 
(refusing to extend Brown in the absence of “persuasive reasons for holding that 
the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment”). 
{¶ 42} Officer Clark had probable cause to stop Brown’s vehicle after 
observing a traffic violation, and there is accordingly no need to balance the 
governmental interests against Brown’s interests; the stop did not violate Brown’s 
constitutional rights under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 14 
of the Ohio Constitution, despite its violation of R.C. 4513.39.  An extraterritorial 
stop for a traffic violation is reasonable and constitutionally sound, so long as it is 
based upon probable cause.  Jones II, 121 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-316, 902 
N.E.2d 464, at ¶ 19, fn. 4.  Because I conclude that the stop in this case did not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation under either the Fourth Amendment 
or Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, I also conclude that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply.  I would therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals and reinstate Brown’s conviction. 
{¶ 43} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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____________________ 
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas A. 
Matuszak and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Lawrence A. Gold, for appellee. 
The Law Office of Robert L. Berry, L.L.C., and Robert L. Berry, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Buckeye State Sheriffs Association. 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Lucas County 
Prosecutor Julia R. Bates. 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Office of the Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
Carrie Wood, Assistant State Public Defender, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender. 
____________________