Title: Guardianship of Hailey M.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 80 
Docket: 
Cum-15-461 
Argued: 
February 11, 2016 
Decided: 
May 26, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and 
HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF HAILEY M. 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
[¶1]  The mother of sixteen-year-old Hailey M.1 appeals from a judgment 
entered by the Cumberland County Probate Court (Mazziotti, J.) granting Hailey’s 
paternal grandparents’ petition for guardianship.  The mother challenges the 
court’s findings and argues that the award of full guardianship—rather than a 
limited guardianship—to the paternal grandparents, with no arrangement for 
transition back into the mother’s home, unreasonably infringed on her fundamental 
right to parent her daughter in violation of her substantive due process rights.  We 
affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In September 2014, Hailey’s mother petitioned the Cumberland County 
Probate Court for Hailey’s paternal grandparents to be appointed as guardians so 
that Hailey could attend school in Freeport, where the grandparents live.  The 
                                         
1  On motion of one of the parties, the Court has allowed the use of this confidential naming protocol. 
Cf. 18-A M.R.S. §§ 5-101 to 5-213 (2015). 
 
2 
mother withdrew the petition in November 2014 because the petition had been 
sought “for an educational purpose that [was] no longer needed.”  The court 
dismissed the petition. 
 
[¶3]  On December 12, 2014, the grandparents petitioned to have themselves 
appointed as the guardians of the child on the grounds that the child needed a safe 
and supportive environment, and had threatened to run away from her mother’s 
house if she could not stay at her grandparents’ house.  The child began to live 
with her grandparents in January 2015.  The child’s father consented to the 
guardianship, but her mother did not. 
 
[¶4]  A trial was held on July 9, 2015, at which the court heard testimony 
from the child, who was then fifteen years old; her parents; her grandmother; and a 
clinician who had provided home and community treatment services to the child 
and her mother.  The parties also stipulated that the grandfather agreed with the 
grandmother that the two of them should become guardians for the child. 
 
[¶5]  The court entered a judgment finding, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the mother had created a living situation that was at least 
temporarily intolerable for the child and that a guardianship with the paternal 
grandparents was in the child’s best interest.  It found that the mother had shown 
an inability to meet the child’s needs that threatened the child’s well-being and 
could result in trauma to the child if she remained with the mother.  The court also 
 
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found that the grandparents were qualified and able to care for the child, and that 
the appointment was necessary and in the best interest of the child, who agreed 
with the creation of a guardianship.  The court ordered that contact between the 
mother and the child not be obstructed or restricted if the child desires contact, and 
that the grandparents “encourage and facilitate a healthy relationship between 
mother and daughter.” 
 
[¶6]  The mother moved for additional findings of fact and for a conclusion 
that the grandparents had failed to prove the mother’s unfitness by clear and 
convincing evidence.  In that motion, the mother also asked the court to indicate 
whether it had considered ordering a limited guardianship or a reunification plan 
with the mother. 
 
[¶7]  The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
August 27, 2015.  The court ultimately found that a full guardianship in the 
grandparents was warranted.  In its order, the court did not make extensive findings 
of fact but instead primarily summarized the witnesses’ testimony.2  Apart from 
noting an inconsistency in the mother’s testimony about how many times the child 
had run away, the court did not indicate which testimony it found credible.  We 
                                         
2  Because a record of the testimony must be kept in proceedings pertaining to the guardianship of a 
minor, see M.R. Prob. P. 76H; M.R. Civ. P. 76H; Recording of Trial Court Proceedings, Me. Admin. 
Order JB-12-1 § II (as amended by A. 11-14) (effective Nov. 24, 2014), it is not necessary for the court to 
recite or summarize the testimony in its judgment.  The best, and most efficient, practice is for the court to 
expressly state the facts that it found to be true. 
 
4 
therefore focus on the following findings that the court did make in support of its 
conclusion that the mother had created an at least temporarily intolerable living 
situation. 
 
[¶8]  The court explicitly found that the mother had created an abusive 
environment in which the child was hurting herself and running away, and that the 
mother was unable to meet the child’s mental health needs.  The court further 
found that the mother’s conduct toward the child had caused, or at least 
exacerbated, the child’s unsafe behaviors, resulting in a home environment that 
was unfit and not suited to meeting the child’s needs. 
 
[¶9]  Supporting these findings, the record includes evidence of the 
following facts.  When the child lived with her mother, the mother took out her 
aggressions on the child and would swear, scream, and yell at her.  The child 
inflicted harm on herself, as evidenced by slash marks on her arms and calls the 
father received from the school nurse.  The child threatened to hurt herself if she 
had to stay with the mother, and she underperformed at school in hope that she 
would be allowed to leave the mother’s home.  The child has given up on her 
relationship with her mother after repeated attempts to repair it with the help of 
counselors.  The child’s interactions with her mother exacerbated the child’s 
symptoms of anxiety, depression, and isolation.  If she were forced to live with the 
mother, the child would run away again. 
 
5 
 
[¶10]  The child, her clinician, her father, and her grandmother all agreed 
that the child is doing much better since leaving the mother’s home.  She is not 
hurting herself, is happy, is no longer depressed and hiding in her room, no longer 
takes anti-depressant medication, and is putting effort into school and 
extracurricular activities. 
 
[¶11]  In entering its judgment after the mother’s motion for findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the court did not alter its appointment of the grandparents 
as full guardians.  Nor did it articulate its reasons for deciding not to limit the 
guardianship or establish arrangements for a transition to the mother’s home. 
 
[¶12]  The mother timely appealed from the judgment.  18-A M.R.S. § 1-308 
(2015); M.R. App. P. 2. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶13]  The mother argues that the court (A) misunderstood her testimony as 
being self-contradictory and (B) violated her due process rights by awarding a full 
guardianship to the paternal grandparents based on findings that were insufficient 
to demonstrate parental unfitness. 
A. 
The Mother’s Testimony 
 
[¶14]  We first address the mother’s argument that the court misunderstood 
her testimony as being inconsistent, which demonstrably affected the court’s 
assessment of her overall credibility.  She contends that her testimony was meant 
 
6 
to convey that the child had run away three times—twice from the mother’s home 
and once from the father’s home.3 
 
[¶15]  A probate court’s findings in support of a guardianship, reached by 
clear and convincing evidence, are reviewed for clear error.  Guardianship of 
Jewel M. (Jewel II), 2010 ME 80, ¶ 47, 2 A.3d 301.  A finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it, see 
Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 19, 98 A.3d 1023; if “the fact-finder 
clearly misapprehends the meaning of the evidence,” Guardianship of Jewel M. 
(Jewel I), 2010 ME 17, ¶ 14, 989 A.2d 726; or if the finding is so contrary to the 
                                         
3  The following testimony from the mother was admitted: 
Q. 
We have also heard about a couple of times that Hailey has run away.  What 
times do you remember Hailey running away? 
A. 
Hailey has run away three times that I can remember for sure, and there may 
have been another couple of times that were less extravagant where situations weren’t as 
extreme . . . . 
Q. 
So what about . . . specifically the time when the Freeport police were called, 
what do you remember about that time? 
A. 
Hailey was in the . . . guardian of my grandmother who was watching her for me, 
and it was the evening her dad was supposed to come pick her up at my grandmother’s 
house in Freeport and Hailey refused to go with him; and so she ran across the train track 
to the movie theater where I was called, from my grandmother and the Freeport police, to 
come down because they were looking for her. 
Q. 
And have there been other times when Hailey has run away from [the father’s], 
to your knowledge? 
A. 
Yes. 
 
She later testified as follows on cross-examination: 
 
Q. 
And [you are aware] that she has run away from your home on several 
occasions? 
A. 
Not several. 
Q. 
How many? 
A. 
Twice. 
 
 
7 
credible evidence “that it does not represent the truth and right of the case,” id.  In 
guardianship cases, determinations of the weight, credibility, and significance of 
evidence are primarily for the trial court as the finder of fact.  Guardianship of 
Autumn S., 2007 ME 8, ¶ 5, 913 A.2d 614. 
 
[¶16]  The findings available to us are brief, and the mother has not argued 
that the actual findings—as opposed to the summarized testimony—are insufficient 
to support the judgment.  Rather, the mother contends that the court 
misapprehended the evidence in determining that she had contradicted herself in 
her testimony.  See Jewel I, 2010 ME 17, ¶ 14, 989 A.2d 726.  Reviewing that 
testimony, we can discern only that the testimony was unclear regarding the 
number of times that the child had attempted to run away from the mother’s home.  
The trial court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and reach findings, 
see In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 31, 55 A.3d 463, and we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that the court “clearly misapprehend[ed] the meaning of the 
evidence” in finding the mother’s testimony to be inconsistent, Jewel I, 2010 ME 
17, ¶ 14, 989 A.2d 726.   
B. 
Substantive Due Process 
 
[¶17]  The mother argues that the court’s judgment violated her substantive 
due process rights because the evidence of unfitness was insufficient for the court 
to interfere with her parental rights by appointing the grandparents as full 
 
8 
guardians.  She also argues that, even if the government does have a compelling 
interest, for an infringement on her parental rights to be narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest, it had to be confined to the creation of a limited guardianship or a 
guardianship with an arrangement for the child to transition back into the mother’s 
home.  See Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶¶ 65-66, 61 A.3d 718 (“A substantive 
due process analysis turns on whether the challenged state action implicates a 
fundamental right . . . .  If state action infringes on a fundamental right or 
fundamental liberty interest, the infringement must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.”).  We review the court’s unfitness determination and 
then address the alternatives of a limited guardianship or transitional arrangement. 
1. 
Unfitness and the Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
[¶18]  The mother argues that the guardianship statute was applied 
unconstitutionally because there was no showing of harm that would create a 
compelling government interest justifying the intrusion into her fundamental 
parental rights.  
 
[¶19]  “A parent, so long as [she] adequately cares for . . . her children (i.e., 
is fit), has a firmly-established fundamental liberty interest, protected by the Due 
Process Clause, to direct and control her child’s upbringing.”  Guardianship of 
Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 22, 976 A.2d 955 (quotation marks omitted).  If 
parental unfitness has been demonstrated, however, a court may infringe on 
 
9 
parental rights because the State has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare 
of the child.  See Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶¶ 12-14 & n.5, 90 A.3d 1169; 
Jewell II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 46, 2 A.3d 301; Jewel I, 2010 ME 17, ¶ 12, 989 A.2d 
726; cf. Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 22, 890 A.2d 691.  Thus, the State 
may infringe on the fundamental liberty interest of a parent in the care and custody 
of a child if the parent is unfit, the infringement on parental rights is in the child’s 
best interest, and the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve the State’s 
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the child.  See Sparks v. Sparks, 
2013 ME 41, ¶¶ 23-27, 65 A.3d 1223; Jewell II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 7, 2 A.3d 301. 
 
[¶20]  The question of whether the guardianship statute, as applied, violates 
the mother’s due process rights depends initially on factual and discretionary 
determinations.  Specifically, the statute is constitutionally applied if (1) the court 
did not commit clear error in finding that “the parent is currently unable to meet 
the child’s needs and that inability will have an effect on the child’s well-being that 
may be dramatic, and even traumatic, if the child lives with the parent,” and (2) the 
court committed no error or abuse of discretion in finding and determining that 
“the proposed guardian will provide a living situation that is in the best interest of 
the child.”  Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 7, 2 A.3d 301 (quotation marks omitted).  This 
standard recognizes that, due to constitutional protections of a parent’s 
fundamental rights to the care and custody of her child, the existence of “a 
 
10 
temporarily intolerable living situation must relate to a parent’s inability to care for 
the child,” such that “proof of parental unfitness is a required element to support 
the establishment of a guardianship over the parent’s objection.”  Id. ¶ 46 
(quotation marks omitted); see Guardianship of Johnson, 2014 ME 104, ¶ 19, 98 
A.3d 1023. 
 
[¶21]  As previously stated, a probate court’s findings are reviewed for clear 
error.  Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 47, 2 A.3d 301.  The ultimate determination of the 
child’s best interest based on the factual findings is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, consistent with the review of such determinations in child protection 
cases, see In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 16, 889 A.2d 297, and parental rights 
and responsibilities matters, see Pearson v. Wendell, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 29, 125 A.3d 
1149. 
 
[¶22]  Here, the court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence 
in the record; the judgment does not suggest that the court misapprehended the 
meaning of the evidence; and the judgment is not so contrary to the credible 
evidence “that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.”  Jewell I, 2010 
ME 17, ¶ 14, 989 A.2d 726; see Jewell II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 46, 2 A.3d 301.  The 
determination of unfitness based on the mother’s own conduct and her inability to 
meet the child’s needs is not error given the court’s findings that the child had 
physically harmed herself and had run away from the mother’s home, and that the 
 
11 
interactions between the child and her mother had exacerbated the child’s unsafe 
behaviors.  Based on these findings and the finding that the child’s grandparents 
are qualified and capable of providing for her care, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that appointing the grandparents as guardians was in the 
child’s best interest. 
 
[¶23]  Accordingly, the substantive due process requirements have been met 
as long as a limited guardianship or transitional arrangement was not necessary to 
satisfy the additional constitutional requirement that any infringement on parental 
rights be narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in protecting the child’s 
welfare.  See Sparks, 2013 ME 41, ¶¶ 23-27, 65 A.3d 1223; Doe I, 2013 ME 24, 
¶ 66, 61 A.3d 718; Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 7, 2 A.3d 301. 
2. 
Limited Guardianship and Transitional Arrangement 
 
[¶24]  The mother argues that, even if the evidence was sufficient to find an 
at least temporarily intolerable living situation, the court should have appointed the 
grandparents as limited—not full—guardians because a change in school could be 
achieved without infringing on the mother’s fundamental right to parent her child.  
She further contends that a transitional arrangement should have been ordered to 
enable her to attempt reconciliation with the child and demonstrate that she has 
remedied any unfitness identified by the court.  We review each determination and 
then consider whether either a limitation on the guardianship or a transitional 
 
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arrangement was necessary for the infringement on the mother’s parental rights to 
be narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in protecting the child’s welfare. 
a. 
Limited Guardianship 
 
[¶25]  “In any case in which a guardian can be appointed by the court, the 
judge may appoint a limited guardian with fewer than all of the legal powers and 
duties of a guardian.”  18-A M.R.S. § 5-105 (2015).  The concept of limited 
guardianship serves to effectuate the policy that a court “should only grant to the 
guardian those powers actually needed.”  Unif. Probate Code § 5-206 cmt. (Unif. 
Law Comm’n amended 2010); see Guardianship of Collier, 653 A.2d 898, 901-02 
(Me. 1995) (applying this general principle with respect to an incapacitated adult).  
We review a trial court’s determination whether a full or a limited guardianship 
was in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.  Guardianship of I.H., 2003 
ME 130, ¶ 19, 834 A.2d 922. 
 
[¶26]  Due to the severity of the child’s symptoms when residing with her 
mother and the child’s age at the time of trial, the court did not abuse its discretion 
in determining that a full guardianship establishing a known and stable home for 
the child with her grandparents was in the child’s best interest.  If the mother were 
correct that the judgment’s sole purpose was to enable the child to attend school in 
a different municipality, her argument might be persuasive.  Here, however, the 
court determined that the mother’s interactions with the child were creating a 
 
13 
significant risk of harm to the child.  Reviewing the judgment as a whole, we 
conclude that the court committed no abuse of discretion in establishing a full, 
rather than a limited, guardianship in the grandparents. 
b. 
Transitional Arrangement 
 
[¶27]  Title 18-A M.R.S. § 5-213 (2015) authorizes a probate court to 
provide for transitional arrangements for a minor “if the court determines that such 
arrangements will assist the minor with a transition of custody and are in the best 
interest of the child.”  (Emphasis added.)  Section 5-213 “vests discretion in the 
Probate Court to decide whether to implement transitional arrangements for a 
minor under a guardianship.”  Guardianship of Stevens, 2014 ME 25, ¶ 16, 86 
A.3d 1197.  “Such discretion is not without limits, however.  The critical test in 
determining the propriety of the exercise of judicial discretion is whether, under 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, it is in furtherance of justice.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶28]  Here, the court did not order the child to transition back into her 
mother’s home—a decision that was supported by evidence of the child’s age and 
the severity of her symptoms when living with the mother.  The “transition” to the 
grandparents’ home had already occurred in this case.  Therefore, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in deciding not to establish a transitional arrangement. 
 
14 
 
 
c. 
Narrowly Tailored Judgment 
 
[¶29]  Based on the evidence presented, the court created a full guardianship 
in the child’s grandparents to establish a stable living situation for a then 
fifteen-year-old child whose interactions with her mother exacerbated the risk that 
the child would injure herself or run away.  Given the circumstances of this case, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition for full guardianship, 
and the infringement on the mother’s parental rights was narrowly tailored to serve 
the State’s compelling interest4 in protecting the child from psychological and 
physical harm.  See Sparks, 2013 ME 41, ¶¶ 23-27, 65 A.3d 1223; Doe I, 2013 ME 
24, ¶ 66, 61 A.3d 718; Jewel II, 2010 ME 80, ¶ 7, 2 A.3d 301.  We affirm the 
court’s judgment. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
4  Because the facts here overwhelmingly support the entry of the guardianship order, we need not 
discuss further the descriptions of that compelling state interest.  See Gordius v. Kelley, 2016 ME 77,  
¶ 18, --- A.3d --- (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
 
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On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Melissa L. Martin, Esq., Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Portland, for appellant 
mother 
 
Kristina M. Kurlanski, Esq., Ranger & Copeland, P.A., Brunswick, for 
appellees paternal grandparents 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Probate Court docket number 2014-1193 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY