Title: STATE v BUCKMAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 80-284 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 T H E STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS. JOSEPH R U B E N BUCKMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Marcia Birkenbuel, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : A p r i l 8 , 1981 Decided: JUL 2 m 4 P L L L a / g-. P / i L Clerk 4 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. Buckman a p p e a l s C a s c a d e C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n v i c t i o n s f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . During t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s of October 29, 1979, d e f e n d a n t Buckman was observed i n t h e p a r k i n g a r e a of t h e H e r i t a g e Inn i n G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. A Walker S e c u r i t y p a t r o l m a n s t o p p e d and q u e s t i o n e d d e f e n d a n t , whereupon d e f e n d a n t drew a handgun o u t of h i s pocket and f i r e d a s h o t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e patrolman. During t h i s i n c i d e n t a m i l k t r u c k , d r i v e n by Lyle Mahon, approached t h e s e c u r i t y p a t r o l m a n ' s c a r . A s Mahon g o t o u t of t h e t r u c k , he encountered Buckman. Defendant f o r c e d Mahon i n t o t h e s e c u r i t y c a r h o l d i n g t h e p i s t o l t o Mahon ' s head. Soon t h e r e a f t e r a n o t h e r Walker S e c u r i t y o f f i c e r appeared on t h e s c e n e , a s d i d s e v e r a l G r e a t F a l l s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . Defendant Buckman o r d e r e d Mahon t o t e l l t h e o f f i c e r s n o t t o approach t h e s e c u r i t y c a r o r he would k i l l him. For twenty minutes, d e f e n d a n t h e l d Mahon ca.ptive i n t h e s e c u r i t y c a r . He t h e n s u r r e n d e r e d and was taken i n t o custody. D e f e n d a n t Buckman r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r t h i s C o u r t ' s review: 1. Was d e f e n d a n t c o n v i c t e d o f , and sentenced f o r , two s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e s a r i s i n g o u t of a s i n g l e a c t i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 46-11-502, M C A ? 2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements of s e c t i o n 46-14-202, M C A ? 3 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t who is a c q u i t t e d by reason of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ? S e c t i o n 46-11-502(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t a person may n o t be c o n v i c t e d of two o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e p a r t of t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n i f one o f f e n s e is included i n t h e o t h e r . An " i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e " is d e f i n e d a s one which " i s e s t a b l i s h e d by proof of t h e same or l e s s t h a n a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e charged." S e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 1 - 5 0 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) , MCA. Buckman a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e same f a c t used t o e s t a b l i s h t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge is a l s o used t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r e s t r a i n t by u s e , o r t h r e a t t o u s e , p h y s i c a l f o r c e e l e m e n t of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . An a d d i t i o n a l f a c t is n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e t h e a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping charge--that is, t h e purpose t o hold t h e v i c t i m a s a s h i e l d or h o s t a g e . T h e r e f o r e , he concludes, t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge is e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e same or l e s s t h a n a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e t h e a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping c h a r g e , and it must be c o n s i d e r e d an included o f f e n s e a s charged i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . The q u e s t i o n of when an o f f e n s e is included i n another under t h e terms of a s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t m u l t i p l e c o n v i c t i o n s o r punishments f o r t h e same a c t h a s been considered and e v a l u a t e d under two b a s i c t e s t s c i t e d by d e f e n d a n t , b u t t h e S t a t e p r o p e r l y t a k e s i s s u e w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s r e l i a n c e on c a s e law from Arizona, Oregon, C a l i f o r n i a and I l l i n o i s . While t h e s e d e c i s i o n s may be an a c c u r a t e r e c i t a l of t h e law i n t h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n s , under c u r r e n t Montana s t a t u t e s and c a s e law, t h e t r i a l judge d i d n o t e r r i n imposing s e n t e n c e s a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t on b o t h c h a r g e s of which he was c o n v i c t e d . I n S t a t e v . Close ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 623 P.2d 940, 38 St.Rep. 177, 189, we found t h a t s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, is merely a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e s t a n d a r d e n u n c i a t e d i n Blockburger v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306. See a l s o S t a t e v . Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 605 P.2d 1000, 1009-1010, 36 St.Rep. 1134. I n Blockburger, t h e Court r u l e d : "The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e is t h a t where t h e same a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e t e s t t o be a p p l i e d t o determine whether t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y one, is whether each p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s proof of a f a c t which t h e o t h e r does n o t . " 284 U.S. a t 304. (Emphasis added. ) The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Blockburger a n a l y s i s t o t h e s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n h e r e make it c l e a r t h a t d e f e n d a n t could p r o p e r l y be c o n v i c t e d and s e n t e n c e d f o r b o t h o f f e n s e s charged. A s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) , MCA, a c o n v i c t i o n f o r aggravated a s s a u l t r e q u i r e s proof t h a t a person (1) purposely o r knowingly ( 2 ) caused r e a s o n a b l e apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n another ( 3 ) by use of a weapon. A s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e , aggravated k i d n a p p i n g r e q u i r e s p r o o f t h a t t h e p e r s o n c h a r g e d (1) knowingly o r purposely and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y ( 2 ) r e s t r a i n e d another person (3.) by u s i n g or t h r e a t e n i n g t o use p h y s i c a l f o r c e ( 4 ) w i t h t h e purpose of holding t h e v i c t i m a s a s h i e l d or hostage. S e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 3 0 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) , MCA. Under t h e s e s t a t u t e s t h e c h a r g e of aggravated a s s a u l t may be proved w i t h o u t a showing of r e s t r a i n t o r t h e i n t e n t t o hold another a s a h o s t a g e o r s h i e l d . S i m i l a r l y , t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g d o e s n o t e n t a i l t h e v i c t i m ' s apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y o r use of a weapon by t h e accused. Thus, each charge r e q u i r e s proof of f a c t s which t h e o t h e r does n o t ; t h e r e f o r e , n e i t h e r o f f e n s e merges w i t h or is included i n t h e o t h e r under Blockburger and s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA. Buckman a l s o m a i n t a i n s t h a t s e c t i o n 46-11-502(4), MCA, p r o h i b i t s c o n v i c t i o n of both o f f e n s e s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . I t p r o v i d e s t h a t when more t h a n one o f f e n s e is e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n , a person may n o t be c o n v i c t e d of more t h a n one o f f e n s e i f " t h e o f f e n s e s d i f f e r only i n t h a t one is d e f i n e d t o p r o h i b i t a d e s i g n a t e d kind of conduct g e n e r a l l y and t h e o t h e r t o p r o h i b i t a s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e of such conduct. " Buckman a r g u e s t h a t aggravated a s s a u l t p r o h i b i t s t h e use of f o r c e g e n e r a l l y and aggravated kidnapping is d e f i n e d t o p r o h i b i t t h e use of such f o r c e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o r e s t r a i n a person f o r purposes of a h o s t a g e or s h i e l d . H i s c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t s i n c e t h e a s s a u l t charge p r o h i b i t s a g e n e r a l behavior and t h e kidnapping charge p r o h i b i t s t h e same behavior s p e c i f i c a l l y , o n l y one charge can be s u s t a i n e d . W e d i s a g r e e . The conduct p r o h i b i t e d by t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s e c t i o n p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s c a s e is c a u s i n g a r e a s o n a b l e apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n another by use of a weapon. S e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) , MCA. The c o n d u c t p r o h i b i t e d by t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e i s r e s t r a i n i n g another by using or t h r e a t e n i n g t o use f o r c e of any k i n d . S e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 3 0 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) , MCA. A g g r a v a t e d kidnapping is, t h e r e f o r e , n o t merely a more s p e c i f i c form of aggravated a s s a u l t , b u t an e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e crime, w i t h its own s p e c i f i c elements d i f f e r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y from t h o s e i n t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e . Buckman n e x t argues t h a t t h e language of s e c t i o n 46- 14-202, MCA, mandates e i t h e r t h e appointment of a s p e c i f i c p s y c h i a t r i s t or t h e r e q u e s t t o have one d e s i g n a t e d by Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l whenever t h e r e is reason t o doubt a d e f e n d a n t ' s f i t n e s s t o proceed o r reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t of a d e f e n d a n t w i l l o t h e r w i s e become an i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . S e c t i o n 46-14-202, MCA, p r o v i d e s : "When t h e r e is r e a s o n t o d o u b t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f i t n e s s t o proceed o r reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t of t h e defendant w i l l o t h e r w i s e become an i s s u e i n t h e cause, t h e c o u r t s h a l l a p p o i n t a t l e a s t one q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t o r s h a l l r e q u e s t t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f Warm S p r i n g s s t a t e h o s p i t a l t o d e s i g n a t e a t l e a s t one q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t , which d e s i g n a t i o n may be o r include h i m s e l f , t o examine and r e p o r t upon t h e mental c o n d i t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t . " I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o r e l y on t h e d e f e n s e of mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t t o prove t h a t he d i d n o t have a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which is an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e o f f e n s e s charged. He a l s o p r e s e n t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y of C h a r l e s J o n e s , C l i n i c a l P s y c h o l o g i s t with t h e North C e n t r a l Montana Community Mental Health C e n t e r . J o n e s s t a t e d t h a t h i s meetings w i t h Buckman r e v e a l e d v a r i o u s symptoms which gave him reason t o b e l i e v e Buckman was s u f f e r i n g from a mental i l l n e s s . Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s testimony and t h e n o t i c e gave t h e c o u r t reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t would be an i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . I n Buckman's view t h e c o u r t had only two o p t i o n s under t h e mandatory language of s e c t i o n 46-14-202, MCA, n e i t h e r o f which were c h o s e n . T h e r e f o r e , defendant concludes, t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n its d e n i a l of h i s m o t i o n f o r e x a m i n a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o t h e requirements of section 46-14-202, MCA. As a preliminary matter we note that section 46-14- 202(2), MCA, goes on to provide that the court may order a defendant to be committed to a hospital or "other suitable facility" for psychological examination. This Court is not persuaded that the District Court failed to fulfill any judicial function or directive in sending Buckman to the state prison for examination. Buckman presents no evidence that the prison facility is unsuitable for such a purpose. We find the argument that the court's order was deficient because it failed to name a particular psychiatrist an exaltation of form over substance. There is no question that defendant was examined by a qualified psychiatrist, who, along with a psychologist, filed a detailed report of defendant's mental condition. This issue closely resembles that posed in State v. Kyle (1980), Mont. , P.2d , 37 St.Rep. 1447, in which the defendant attacked the legitimacy of a report from Warm Springs on the ground that the order of the court appointed the superintendent to examine him, but some of the tests were actually conducted by others on the staff. This Court rejected the defendant's technical attack on the report. 37 St.Rep. at 1449-1450. We find Kyle persuasive here. The spirit of the statute is to have a qualified professional examine a defendant for the purposes of evaluation. Where that spirit is substantially fulfilled, as here, we can find no substantial interference with a defendant's rights and, thus, no reversible error. Section 46-20-701, MCA. See also State v. Olsen (1980), Mont. , 614 P.2d 1061, F u r t h e r , w e t a k e n o t e of t h e f a c t t h a t , a t t h e time t h e motion r e g a r d i n g mental examination was d e n i e d , t h e D i s t r i c t Court had r e c e i v e d t h e r e p o r t of a q u a l i f i e d p s y c h i a t r i s t and p s y c h o l o g i s t i n d i c a t i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t s u f f e r i n g from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t a t t h e time t h e crimes were committed. A t t h a t p o i n t t h e judge had no " r e a s o n t o doubt" d e f e n d a n t ' s competence o r s a n i t y . To r a i s e such a doubt, d e f e n d a n t p r e s e n t e d t h e testimony of a p s y c h o l o g i s t who s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h some of t h e language i n t h e r e p o r t b u t who a l s o admitted t h a t he had n o t p e r s o n a l l y examined d e f e n d a n t . Based on t h e o r d e r t h a t f o l l o w e d , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e j u d g e , who had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o review t h e r e p o r t and p e r s o n a l l y l i s t e n t o t h e w i t n e s s , d i d n o t a c c e p t t h i s testimony a s c a l l i n g t h e o r i g i n a l r e p o r t i n t o q u e s t i o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s f i n a l i s s u e a t t a c k s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l of a proposed j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which read: "When a d e f e n d a n t is a c q u i t t e d on t h e ground t h a t due t o a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t he could n o t have a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind t h a t is an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e o f f e n s e charged, t h e c o u r t s h a l l o r d e r him committed t o t h e custody of t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t of Warm S p r i n g s s t a t e h o s p i t a l t o be placed i n an a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t i t u t i o n f o r c u s t o d y , c a r e , and t r e a t m e n t . " (See s e c t i o n 46-14-301, MCA) . The S t a t e o b j e c t e d t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , r e l y i n g on S t a t e v. French ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 196, 531 P.2d 3 7 3 . The o b j e c t i o n was s u s t a i n e d , and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n r e f u s e d . T h i s Court, i n French, determined t h a t it was n o t e r r o r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o r e f u s e t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t a person a c q u i t t e d by reason of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t s h a l l be committed t o t h e S t a t e H o s p i t a l a t Warm S p r i n g s . The C o u r t ' s r a t i o n a l e was s t a t e d a s follows: "The j u r y ' s f u n c t i o n is t o determine t h e f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o g u i l t o r innocence. I t should n o t concern i t s e l f w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e c o u r t f o l l o w i n g t h e v e r d i c t . " 166 Mont. a t 205. Buckman begins h i s argument by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t French was decided i n 1975 b e f o r e t h e changes i n t h e mental competency c h a p t e r of t h e Montana Criminal Procedure Code, e n a c t e d i n 1979. Under t h e o l d law, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y could be made i n e i t h e r of two ways. S e c t i o n 46-14-211, MCA, p r o v i d e d f o r a summary-type d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n which t h e c o u r t could e n t e r a judgment of a c q u i t t a l on t h e g r o u n d o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t e x c l u d i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h o u t holding a t r i a l . The second method was t o have t h e i s s u e o f mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t decided a t t r i a l along w i t h t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e s of t h e c a s e . The 1979 l a w r e p e a l e d t h e summary d e t e r m i n a t i o n provided i n s e c t i o n 46-14-211, MCA. The i s s u e must now be decided a t t r i a l i n e v e r y c a s e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e j u r y ' s r o l e i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s i s s u e is g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d . For t h a t r e a s o n , Buckman a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r u l e of L y l e s v. United S t a t e s ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 5 7 ) , 254 F.2d 725, which was r e j e c t e d i n French, should be reviewed. I n L y l e s , t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e j u r y h a s a r i g h t t o know, a s p a r t and p a r c e l of t h e i r f a c t - f i n d i n g r o l e , t h e meaning of an a c q u i t t a l v e r d i c t based on an i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e . See a l s o 1 1 A.L.R.3d 737. Buckman f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t a s t o t h e consequences of t h e n o t g u i l t y by reason of mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t v e r d i c t was p a r t i c u l a r y p r e j u d i c i a l i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . I n t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ' s c l o s i n g argument, he t o l d t h e j u r y : "I s u g g e s t t h a t you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h t h e a c q u i t t a l based upon what you know t h i s man d i d , i f you a c q u i t him and t u r n him l o o s e , you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e w i t h t h a t . " (Emphasis d e f e n d a n t ' s . ) Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t compounds t h e j u r y ' s misunderstanding of t h e n o t g u i l t y by reason of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t v e r d i c t and t h a t t h i s misunderstanding can o n l y be prevented by i n s t r u c t i o n a s t o t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n f o r commitment f o l l o w i n g such a v e r d i c t . W e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e L y l e s r u l e is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Montana law o r made c o n s i s t e n t by v i r t u e of t h e 1979 amendments t o t h e mental competency law. Nor do w e f i n d t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s comments i n t h i s c a s e make it s p e c i a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o a Lyles a n a l y s i s . W e have c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e j u r y i n t h i s S t a t e is t o determine t h e f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o g u i l t o r innocence. S t a t e v . French, s u p r a . Accord, S t a t e v. C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 414, 426, 543 P.2d 389, 396. W e r e a f f i r m t h a t t h e j u r y ' s purpose and d u t y go no f u r t h e r and should n o t be involved w i t h t h e consequences of t h e v e r d i c t t h e y a r e charged t o r e n d e r . Although, a c c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t , t h e r e is no longer a p r o v i s i o n allowing t h e judge t o determine t h e e x i s t e n c e of a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t w i t h o u t a t r i a l , t h e s t a t u t o r y changes have i n c r e a s e d t h e j u r y ' s r o l e on t h i s i s s u e . T h i s c o n t e n t i o n o v e r l o o k s t h e f a c t t h a t both French and Caryl involved j u r y t r i a l s , n o t summary d i s p o s i t i o n s by t h e p r e s i d i n g judge. T h e r e f o r e , t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e c i t e d a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e s t a t u t e s h a s no e f f e c t whatsoever on t h e e a r l i e r h o l d i n g s of t h i s Court on t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n . Our review of t h e record r e v e a l s t h a t d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e summation, d e f e n d a n t ' s lawyer s t r e s s e d t o t h e j u r y t h e t h e o r y t h a t d e f e n d a n t was s u f f e r i n g from a mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t and t h a t he should t h e r e f o r e be g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t r e a t m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n being c o n v i c t e d . She a l s o p o i n t e d o u t s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h e y would have t o l i v e w i t h a c o n v i c t i o n . T h u s , t a k e n i n c o n t e x t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s remark was nothing more t h a n a l e g i t i m a t e response t o t h e e a r l i e r e x h o r t a t i o n s of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . I n l i g h t of t h a t f a c t , any e r r o r caused by t h e S t a t e ' s comment is made harmless when t h e record is c o n s i d e r e d i n its e n t i r e t y . Affirmed. We concur: \ I %&d'* k - & C ef J u s t i c e J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t reached by t h e majority. How- ever, I take exception t o t h a t language i n t h e majority opinion which g i v e s sanction t o t h e prosecuting a t t o r n e y ' s c l o s i n g argument. A s pointed o u t i n t h e majority opinion, t h e prosecutor t o l d t h e jury: "I suggest t h a t you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e with a c q u i t t a l based upon what you know t h i s man d i d , i f you a c q u i t him and t u r n him loose, you must a l s o be a b l e t o l i v e with t h a t . " This statement was made i n response t o a defense argu- ment t h a t t h e defendant should be given an opportunity f o r treatment. The majority f i n d s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s statement t o be a l e g i t i m a t e response t o t h e defense argument. I f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s statement was made i n response t o a defense argument regarding the consequences of a c q u i t t a l based upon mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , then t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s argument was improper. Although t h e defense went o u t s i d e t h e record, t h e defense a c c u r a t e l y informed t h e jury about t h e consequence of a mental d i s e a s e a c q u i t t a l . I f t h e prosecutor was responding t o such an argument, t h e prosecutor f a l s e l y informed t h e jury t h a t such an a c q u i t t a l would r e s u l t i n t h e defendant being turned loose. Though both comments went out- s i d e t h e record, t h e defense statement was t r u e while t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s was f a l s e . I r e a l i z e t h a t t h e statement made by t h e prosecuting a t t o r n e y can be j u s t i f i e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t an o u t r i g h t a c q u i t t a l of t h e defendant would have t h e e f f e c t of f r e e i n g t h e defendant. Nevertheless, t h e statement i s misleading, and when made i n response t o the defense argument regarding mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , would tend t o c r e a t e a f a l s e impres- s i o n i n t h e minds of t h e jurors. A prosecuting a t t o r n e y has a f a r d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l r o l e than an a t t o r n e y prosecuting a c i v i l a c t i o n . The prose- c u t i n g a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t s the people and should always s t r i v e t o p r e s e n t t h e case o b j e c t i v e l y . The p r o s e c u t o r ' s c l o s i n g argument i n t h i s case i s improper when viewed i n context of t h e o b l i g a t i o n owed. Defense counsel d i d not move f o r a m i s t r i a l and only argues err i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on t h e consequences of an a c q u i t t a l based upon mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . Under these circumstances, I concur with t h e affirm- i n g v e r d i c t . However, I do hereby intend t o express strong sentiment a g a i n s t improper jury argument and, i f t h e proper record i s made, w i l l tend t o view p r e j u d i c i a l arguments a s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . I concur with M r . J u s t i c e Morrison.