Title: People v. Shapiro

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Shapiro, No. 81920 (10/17/97) 
 
 
        NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of 
        the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, 
        correction or withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk 
        of the Court. Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
        available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered 
        the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following opinion will be 
        published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
        advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
 
               Docket No. 81920--Agenda 28--May 1997. 
     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CRAIG L. 
                     SHAPIRO et al., Appellees. 
                  Opinion filed October 17, 1997. 
 
          JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
          At issue is the constitutionality of the United States Postal Service s 
     detention and investigation of a suspicious package, and of the search warrants 
     and arrests which ensued. The Framers of the United States Constitution believed 
     a uniform, safe and secure mail delivery system so important to our democracy 
     that the United States Constitution requires Congress to establish a post office. 
     U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 7. Indeed, at the inception of our Republic mail 
     delivery was deemed so essential that some of those who unlawfully interfered 
     with it were sentenced to death.[fn1] But what of where the interfering party is 
     the government itself, either in the person of the United States Postal Service or 
     any of our myriad police agencies? Obviously, the United States mail cannot be 
     completely immune from any and all investigation. Yet, the constitutional 
     ramifications of exercising police power over the mail are significant, especially 
     as regards the free speech guarantees of the first amendment and the search and 
     seizure guarantees of the fourth amendment. We allowed the State s petition for 
     leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) to consider whether the government s actions 
     in the instant case comported with the fourth amendment s search and seizure 
     guarantees. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that the government s 
     actions violated the fourth amendment and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of 
     the lower courts suppressing the evidence and quashing defendants  arrests. 
 
                              FACTS 
          Defendants, Rachel H. Smith and Craig L. Shapiro, were charged with 
     possession with intent to deliver 200 grams or more of the controlled substance 
     psilocybin. 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(11) (West 1994). The following facts pertinent 
     to this appeal were subsequently elucidated[fn2]. 
          On or before January 19, 1995, a 14 by 14 by 9 inch package wrapped in 
     heavy brown paper, with heavily taped seams, was deposited with the United 
     States Postal Service s (Postal Service) Express Mail in Eugene, Oregon. The 
     return address was in Eugene, Oregon, and the addressee was defendant Rachel 
     Smith of Champaign, Illinois. The scheduled delivery date was Friday, January 20, 
     1995. On Thursday, January 19, 1995, the package was en route to Champaign 
     when Postal Service officials identified it as suspicious at O Hare International 
     Airport (O Hare) in Chicago because it met three of the Postal Service s drug 
     package profile criteria, viz., wrapped in heavy brown paper; heavily taped; and 
     addressed from one individual to another. Pursuant to the Postal Service s internal 
     policies, the package was removed from the mail stream at O Hare and shipped 
     to United States Postal Inspector Stephen Atterbury in St. Louis, Missouri, for 
     investigation. 
          Atterbury received the package on Friday, January 20, 1995, whereupon 
     he telephoned Postal Service officials in Oregon and learned that the return 
     address on the package was fictitious. He then contacted the St. Louis County 
     police department canine unit and arranged for one of its narcotics dogs to check 
     the package. After the dog twice "alerted on" the package, Atterbury completed 
     a search warrant affidavit and presented it to a federal magistrate in Missouri, who 
     issued a search warrant at 2:38 p.m. on January 20, 1995. Atterbury thereafter 
     searched the package and discovered that it contained the controlled substance 
     psilocybin. He then contacted Champaign police officials and arranged to 
     participate in a controlled delivery of the package the following Monday. 
          On Monday, January 23, 1995, Atterbury assisted the Champaign police 
     in obtaining an anticipatory search warrant for the addressee s premises. After the 
     search warrant was issued, Atterbury and the police attempted the first controlled 
     delivery of the package. Because no one answered the door, delivery was 
     postponed until the following day. On Tuesday, January 24, 1995, Atterbury 
     successfully accomplished a controlled delivery. Defendant Shapiro signed for the 
     package on behalf of defendant Smith and the police then executed the 
     anticipatory search warrant. When the police subsequently interviewed defendant 
     Shapiro, Shapiro noted that she had been expecting the package and, when it was 
     not delivered on time, had called the post office to inquire about the delay. The 
     post office told her that the package was lost. 
          After their arrests, both defendants moved to suppress the evidence and to 
     quash their arrests on a variety of search and seizure theories. The circuit court of 
     Champaign County suppressed the evidence and quashed defendants  arrests, 
     finding, inter alia, that the government lacked probable cause to detain and to 
     investigate the package at O Hare, which rendered all the subsequent searches and 
     warrants invalid. The appellate court observed that the circuit court incorrectly 
     applied the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable articulable suspicion 
     standard in determining the validity of the initial decision to detain and investigate 
     the package, and further held that the latter standard had been met. The appellate 
     court nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on a different ground, 
     ruling that the nature and extent of the detention and investigation which led to 
     the advent of probable cause was unreasonable. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 354-55. 
 
                            ANALYSIS 
          Whether the government has seized property in violation of the fourth 
     amendment generally presents a mixed question of law and fact: first a court 
     weighs the evidence and determines the facts surrounding the complained-of 
     conduct, after which it decides whether, as a matter of law, these facts constitute 
     an unconstitutional seizure. In the instant case, however, there are no factual 
     disputes and our review is de novo. People v. Foskey,  136 Ill. 2d 66 , 76 (1990). 
     We additionally observe that our disposition of this case follows from our 
     conclusions regarding the constitutionality of (1) the initial decision to detain and 
     investigate the defendants  package at O Hare International Airport; and (2) the 
     reasonableness of that detention and investigation. Accordingly, we consider only 
     these issues and do not reach the arguments raised by the parties concerning the 
     anticipatory search warrant issued in Champaign, Illinois. 
 
      I. Decision to Detain and to Investigate the Package 
          The United States Constitutions protects the "right of the people to be 
     secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
     and seizures." (Emphasis added.) U.S. Const., amend. IV.[fn3]  When the people 
     deposit their effects/possessions for delivery with the United States mail, the 
     constitutional proscriptions concerning searches and seizures do not cease to apply 
     simply because the item has been delivered into the hands of the government. See 
     United States v. Place,  462 U.S. 696 , 705, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 119-20, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1983) ("seizure may be made after the owner has relinquished control 
     of the property to a third party"). Indeed, effects deposited with the United States 
     mail enjoy the same search and seizure protections as if they were located within 
     a private residence. In re Jackson,  96 U.S. 727 , 733, 24 L. Ed. 877, 879 (1878). 
          Yet the fourth amendment does not preclude all investigations of the mail. 
     A seizure, after all, involves the meaningful interference with a person s 
     possessory interests in an item of personal property. United States v. Jacobsen, 
 466 U.S. 109 , 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984). Citing United States v. 
     Van Leeuwen,  397 U.S. 249 , 252, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282, 285, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 1032 
     (1970), the State contends that the mere detention of mail to examine the exterior 
     of a package never constitutes a seizure because the fourth amendment does not 
     prohibit examinations of the exterior of packages, regardless of whether delivery 
     delays result. As defendants correctly counter, however, such a broad reading of 
     Van Leeuwen is unwarranted given its further statement that "[t]heoretically *** 
     detention of mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure of `papers' 
     or `effects' within the meaning of the fourth amendment." United States v. Van 
     Leeuwen, 397 U.S.  at 252, 25 L. Ed. 2d  at 285, 90 S. Ct.  at 1032. Indeed, to 
     suggest otherwise raises an Orwellian specter quite at odds with the fourth 
     amendment. The investigation of the exterior of a package by the government may 
     often be consistent with the fourth amendment; however, depending upon the 
     nature and duration of the detention and investigation, it may at other times violate 
     the fourth amendment s seizure proscription. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.  at 252, 25 L. Ed. 2d  at 285, 90 S. Ct.  at 1032; see also United States v. 
     Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering, and citing other cases which 
     have considered, whether the government s detention of mail amounted to an 
     unconstitutional seizure as anticipated in Van Leeuwen). 
          The rationale for allowing the detention and investigation of mail absent 
     probable cause is found in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880 (1968), and its progeny, which interpret the fourth amendment as 
     permitting minimally intrusive investigatory stops of individuals and/or their 
     property where there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Ill. Rev. 
     Stat. 1971, ch. 38, pars. 107--14, 108--1.01 (statutory adoption of Terry standard 
     in Illinois). Reasonable suspicion arises where specific and articulable facts, and 
     rational inferences therefrom, reasonably justify an intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880. Based upon experience and 
     drug-trafficking intelligence, the United States Postal Inspection Service has 
     developed a drug package profile for packages deposited in the Express Mail and 
     Priority Mail. Profile characteristics include: (1) heavy brown paper wrapping; (2) 
     heavily taped seams; (3) handwritten address label; (4) sent from one individual 
     to another; (5) mailed from a zip code different from the address; and (6) a 
     fictitious address. While it is uncertain whether any one of these criteria, standing 
     alone, would support a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion, in various 
     combinations these criteria might indeed support such a finding. 
          In the instant case, Postal Service officials initially decided to investigate 
     defendants  package at O Hare because it was wrapped in brown paper with heavy 
     taping and was hand-addressed from one individual to another. In considering the 
     constitutionality of this action, the trial court erroneously ruled that probable cause 
     was necessary to permit the detention and investigation of defendants  package, 
     whereupon it concluded that the initial detention and investigation amounted to an 
     unconstitutional seizure. The appellate court, however, applied the legally 
     appropriate reasonable articulable suspicion standard and concluded that there was 
     reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate the package. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 
     351-52. 
          Despite defendants  protestations otherwise, we hold that the appellate court 
     was correct in its conclusion that these factors were sufficient to give rise to a 
     reasonable articulable suspicion that the package contained narcotics. According 
     to the Postal Service, only 5% of Express Mail packages are addressed from one 
     individual to another. This fact, in concert with the brown paper and heavy taping 
     typically used to prevent narcotics odors from escaping such packages, warranted 
     a minimally intrusive detention and investigation of defendants  package under the 
     reasonable articulable suspicion standard. United States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 703, 
     77 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 103 S. Ct.  at 2642. 
 
      II. Reasonableness of the Detention and Investigation 
          We next consider the reasonableness of the government s detention and 
     investigation of the defendants  package, for where reasonable articulable suspicion 
     permits the detention and investigation of a person s personal property, the fourth 
     amendment further demands that that detention and investigation be reasonable. 
     United States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 709-10, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 122-23, 103 S. Ct.  at 
     2645-46. Whether the detention and investigation of a person s property, 
     commenced upon reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, is itself 
     reasonable depends largely upon investigatory diligence and the length of 
     detention. United States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 709-10, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 122-23, 103 
     S. Ct. at 2645-46; see also United States v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671-72 (1st Cir. 
     1993) (applying the United States v. Place criteria to determine reasonableness of 
     detention and investigation of United States mail). Only when the nature and 
     extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of an individual s fourth 
     amendment possessory interests can opposing law enforcement interests support 
     a seizure based upon less than probable cause. United States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 703, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 103 S. Ct.  at 2642. 
           Here the government did not expeditiously conduct its investigation of the 
     defendants  package at O Hare, where it initially targeted the package for 
     investigation because it was wrapped in brown paper, heavily sealed with tape and 
     hand-addressed from one individual to another. Indeed, no investigation occurred 
     at O Hare. Instead, pursuant to an internal policy of the Postal Service, the 
     package was sealed in a new container and rerouted for investigation by the postal 
     inspector in St. Louis, far afield from either O Hare or the package s intended 
     destination in Champaign, Illinois. In St. Louis, Postal Inspector Atterbury 
     telephoned postal officials in Oregon and determined that the return address was 
     fictitious. He then arranged to have a dog trained to detect drugs come into close 
     proximity to the package, which the dog alerted on twice. At this juncture there 
     was probable cause to suspect the package contained narcotics and, after receiving 
     a warrant from a federal magistrate in Missouri, Atterbury searched the package 
     and discovered that it contained psilocybin. That probable cause eventually arose 
     is dispositive of nothing, however, as it does not address the reasonableness of the 
     detention and investigation which gave rise to the probable cause. 
          In considering whether the investigation and length of detention of mail is 
     so minimally intrusive that it is reasonable in the absence of probable cause, 
     courts consider whether law enforcement officials could have acted more swiftly. 
     See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir. 1993). We take 
     judicial notice that O Hare is located in Chicago, which has no shortage of 
     telephones, drug detection dogs or federal magistrates. Thus there appears no 
     constitutionally reasonable justification for shipping the defendants  package, 
     which they expected would arrive by Express Mail on January 20, 1995, to St. 
     Louis so that Atterbury could telephone Oregon to establish whether the return 
     address was fictitious and afterwards arrange for a drug detection dog to sniff the 
     package. Had these investigatory steps been taken in Chicago, the duration of the 
     investigation would have been significantly shorter, and the five-day delivery 
     delay caused in part by rerouting the package to St. Louis substantially reduced. 
     This is the investigatory diligence that is mandated by the fourth amendment, 
     which seeks to insure that the government s interference with a person s possessory 
     interest in property is minimally intrusive where it is premised not upon probable 
     cause, but merely upon a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity. 
     United States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 703, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 103 S. Ct.  at 2642. 
     That the Postal Service s internal policies required shipment of the package out of 
     state for investigation is of no constitutional consequence, as it is the Postal 
     Service that must accommodate the fourth amendment and not vice-versa. 
     Accordingly, we conclude that the government s intrusion upon the instant 
     defendants  possessory interest in their package was not minimal and thus did not 
     comply with the fourth amendment. 
          We are cognizant that United States v. Place considered a third factor in 
     determining the reasonableness of a detention and investigation of personal 
     property short of probable cause: information given to the owner or possessor of 
     the item detained for investigation. United States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 709-10, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 122-23, 103 S. Ct.  at 2645-46. An Illinois State Police investigative 
     report contained in the instant record shows that defendant Shapiro called the post 
     office to inquire why the package was late and was told that it was lost. The 
     record does not indicate whether Shapiro s telephone inquiry and the post office s 
     response occurred prior to or after the advent of probable cause. We need not 
     consider the uncertainty of the conversation s timing and its constitutional 
     significance, however, because of our determination that the nature and duration 
     of the detention and investigation alone rendered it unreasonable. See United 
     States v. Place, 462 U.S.  at 710, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 123, 103 S. Ct.  at 2646 (finding 
     that the nature and length of detention was sufficient to render seizure 
     unreasonable, though considering also what the suspect had been told regarding 
     the detention). It is nevertheless worth observing that defendant Shapiro s 
     awareness of and expectation that the package would arrive on its delivery date 
     further illustrates the defendants  possessory interest in the package. 
          In affirming the judgments of the lower courts suppressing the evidence 
     and quashing defendants  arrests, we are mindful of the scourge that drugs 
     represent to American society and the importance of the so-called "war on drugs" 
     in eradicating this social calamity. However, our Republic has enjoyed a peaceful 
     and prosperous history for well over two centuries, not because we have increased 
     police powers to achieve ordered liberty, but because we have recognized that 
     ordered liberty requires that police powers be sublimated to the Bill of Rights. It 
     is the latter, and not the former, that guarantees those freedoms the rest of the 
     world associates with our Republic. 
 
                           CONCLUSION 
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court affirming the 
     circuit court s order suppressing the evidence and quashing defendants  arrests is 
     affirmed. 
 
     Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
 
                                                                      JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: 
          Unlike the majority, I believe that the brief detention effected by 
     authorities of the package in this case did not contravene the defendants' 
     constitutional rights, and therefore I dissent. 
          The majority makes much of the decision by postal authorities to reroute 
     the package from Chicago to St. Louis for purposes of investigation. The majority 
     insists that the detour contributed significantly to the delay in the delivery of the 
     package. I do not agree. The package was initially pulled from the stream of mail 
     on Thursday, January 19, 1995. The postal inspector assigned to the case, Stephen 
     Atterbury, received the package the next day, January 20, in St. Louis. Atterbury 
     then learned from his counterparts in Oregon that the return address on the 
     package was fictitious, and Atterbury also obtained the services of a specially 
     trained dog, who detected narcotics in the package. That same day, Atterbury 
     presented a request for a search warrant to a federal magistrate in St. Louis, and 
     a warrant was issued at 2:38 that afternoon. Atterbury then opened the package 
     and found inside 3« pounds of a material containing psilocybin, a controlled 
     substance. 
          The relevant period here begins with the initial seizure of the package on 
     January 19 and ends with the issuance of the search warrant the next day. It is not 
     clear from the record how much delay, if any, was caused by the decision to 
     transfer the package to St. Louis on its southward journey from Chicago to 
     Champaign. The extra time could not have exceeded part of a day, however, and 
     Atterbury acted expeditiously in conducting his investigation and obtaining the 
     warrant. It should be noted that most of the five-day delay in the delivery of the 
     package, mentioned by the majority, occurred after the warrant was obtained and 
     the package was opened. Indeed, the record shows that, prior to the delivery of the 
     package on Tuesday, January 24, Atterbury made several attempts to deliver the 
     package on Monday, January 23, after the weekend, but no one at the residence 
     answered the door that day. 
          Because I believe that the initial period of detention was reasonable, I 
     respectfully dissent from today's decision. 
 
          JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring: 
          I agree with the analysis and the result reached in part II of the majority 
     opinion. 
          Because the detention and investigation of the defendants' package was not 
     reasonable under the fourth amendment, the defendants' motions to suppress must 
     be granted and their arrests quashed. This holding is dispositive of this appeal. 
          There is no need to resolve the issues in part I of the majority opinion. 
 
 
     [fn1] W. Rich, The History of the United States Post Office to the Year 1829, 95 
     (1924). 
 
     [fn2] For a more detailed rendition of the facts, the reader is referred to the 
     appellate opinion in 283 Ill. App. 3d 343. 
 
     [fn3] The Illinois Constitution similarly provides that "people shall have the right 
     to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against 
     unreasonable searches [and] seizures." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
     sec. 6. The parties, however, have not premised any of their arguments on the 
     Illinois Constitution and we thus do not consider its application, except to observe 
     that there is no reason to suggest that the search and seizure guarantees of article 
     I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution are any less comprehensive than we 
     interpret those of the fourth amendment to be.