Title: In re Grillot - Disbarment video

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 119,909 
 
In the Matter of TIMOTHY J. GRILLOT, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed January 25, 2019. Disbarment. 
 
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Penny R. Moylan, Deputy 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Timothy J. 
Grillot, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Timothy J. Grillot, of Independence, 
an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1982. 
 
 
On April 10, 2018, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent timely filed an answer to the complaint on April 24, 
2018. Stipulations signed by respondent and the office of the Disciplinary Administrator 
were filed June 4, 2018. A hearing was held on the complaint before a panel of the 
Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on June 5, 2018, where the respondent was 
personally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined that 
respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 289) (competence); 1.3 (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 292) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 293) (communication); 1.5 (2018 
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Kan. S. Ct. R. 294) (fees); 1.15 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 328) (safekeeping property); 1.16(d) 
(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 333) (termination of representation); 3.3(a)(1) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
344) (candor toward tribunal); 8.4(b) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 381) (commission of a 
criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"DA12756 
 
 
"8. 
In 2005, a jury convicted N.H. of capital murder and several drug 
offenses. His convictions were affirmed by the Kansas Supreme Court on April 15, 2010. 
 
 
"9. 
On April 13, 2011, N.H. filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in 
Montgomery County District Court, case number 11-CV-000071. The motion was legally 
insufficient. On April 13, 2011, N.H. also filed a pro se motion for a continuance to 
supplement his petition with specific grounds for relief and a pro se motion for 
appointment of counsel. 
 
 
"10. 
On August 19, 2011, the district court granted N.H.'s motion for a 
continuance to supplement his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and appointed Rustin Rankin to 
represent him. 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
"11. 
Mr. Rankin did not file any supplemental pleadings within the time 
period provided by the district court. However, on November 15, 2011, N.H. filed a pro 
se motion seeking additional time to file a memorandum in support of his K.S.A. 60-1507 
motion. The district court did not rule on the motion. On December 20, 2011, N.H. filed 
an untimely pro se memorandum in support of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 
 
 
"12. 
On February 15, 2013, the State filed a motion to dismiss the K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion. The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss in April, 2013. The 
district court provided N.H. with an opportunity to present evidence. Mr. Rankin, who 
appeared with N.H. at the hearing, declined that offer and advised the court that he and 
his client would rely on the pro se motion and memorandum filed by N.H. On August 16, 
2013, the district court denied N.H.'s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. (Mr. Rankin was later 
disbarred for conduct unrelated to his representation of N.H. See In re Rankin, 302 Kan. 
181, 351 P.3d 1274 [2015]). 
 
 
"13. 
Mr. Rankin filed a timely notice of appeal and the district court 
appointed the appellate defender's office to represent N.H. Later, on April 1, 2014, the 
district court appointed the respondent to represent N.H. in the appeal. 
 
 
"14. 
On October 14, 2014, the respondent filed the initial brief with the 
Kansas Court of Appeals. The brief failed to contain appropriate citations to the record as 
required by Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 34). Consequently, after receiving notice 
from the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, the respondent filed a corrected brief on October 
24, 2014. 
 
 
"15. 
The sole argument raised by the respondent in the appellant's brief was 
that Mr. Rankin provided N.H. with ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the 
respondent mistakenly alleged that Mr. Rankin, not N.H., filed the supplemental 
memorandum in support of the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after the deadline had passed. The 
respondent presented no arguments in support of extending the deadline to prevent 
manifest injustice. Finally, the respondent did not specify the relief he sought for N.H. 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
"16. 
On October 30, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of the action. The Court of Appeals noted that N.H.'s appeal hinged 'on the 
effectiveness of Rankin in handling the 60-1507 motion in the district court. But we 
haven't an appellate record from which to determine why Rankin did what he did or more 
aptly, perhaps, why he seemingly didn't do much of anything.' N.H. v. State, No. 111,794, 
2015 WL 6629778 at 2 (Kan. 2015) (unpublished opinion). The Court of Appeals further 
noted that N.H. did not request a remand to the district court for a Van Cleave hearing to 
determine whether Mr. Rankin's representation was ineffective before the district court. 
N.H., 2015 WL 6629778 at 2. See State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, Syl. ¶ 2, 716 P.2d 
580 (1986) ('When appellate counsel in a criminal case desires to raise the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and that issue has never been ruled upon by the trial 
court, defendant may seek a remand of the case to the trial court for an initial 
determination of the issue. In doing so, the procedure for remand to consider newly 
discovered evidence explained in State v. Shepherd, 232 Kan. 614, 657 P.2d 1112 (1983), 
and set forth in this opinion, should be followed.'). 
 
 
"17. 
The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by noting that N.H. could 
bring another K.S.A. 60-1507 motion 'premised on the twin arguments that inadequate 
legal representation in this proceeding deprived him of a fair hearing on the underlying 
constitutional challenges to his convictions and that he has challenges warranting judicial 
consideration.' N.H., 2015 WL 6629778 at 2. 
 
 
"18. 
On November 20, 2015, the respondent purportedly sent a copy of the 
appellate decision to N.H. However, N.H. never received it. 
 
 
"19. 
On April 9, 2016, and May 14, 2016, N.H. sent the respondent letters 
inquiring about the status of the appeal. The respondent did not respond to N.H.'s 
inquiries. 
 
 
"20. 
In November, 2016, N.H. contacted the Clerk of the Appellate Courts 
and learned that the Court of Appeals had affirmed the district court's dismissal of his 
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
"21. 
On January 12, 2017, N.H. filed a complaint with the disciplinary 
administrator's office. The respondent cooperated in the disciplinary investigation. 
 
"DA12931 
 
 
"23. 
On November 3, 2015, the respondent filed a petition for issuance of 
letters of administration in Labette County District Court case number 15-PR-65PA, 
entitled In the Matter of the Estate of A.V., Deceased and K.D., Deceased and 
Dissolution of the A.V. and K.D. Trusts. The petition alleged: 
 
a. 
A.V. died testate on July 21, 2013, a resident of Labette County, Kansas, 
and a citizen of the United States; 
 
b. 
A.V. was survived by her husband, K.D., who died on August 28, 2013, 
in India; and 
 
c. 
the decedents' beneficiaries and heirs consisted of A.V.'s two nephews 
(R.K. and V.K.) and K.D.'s daughter (A.T.), all of whom resided in India. 
In the petition, the respondent requested that he be appointed as an emergency 
administrator for the purpose of preserving the estate's assets, at that time 
estimated at $157,000. 
 
 
"24. 
Also on November 3, 2015, the respondent filed consents executed by 
R.K. and V.K. for the respondent to serve as the emergency administrator without bond, a 
petition for the issuance of emergency letters of administration, and the respondent's oath 
as emergency administrator. The court entered an order appointing the respondent as 
emergency administrator. 
 
 
"25. 
A hearing on the petition and dissolution of the trusts was originally 
scheduled for January 11, 2016. However, the matter was continued. The court scheduled 
a status hearing for August 25, 2016. The respondent and an attorney retained by A.T. 
appeared. The parties advised the court that a dispute had arisen between the heirs and 
beneficiaries. 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
"26. 
The matter was continued on several occasions until January 2017. 
Throughout the time period, the parties informed the court that they were attempting to 
resolve the dispute, but were struggling with language and communication barriers with 
the clients. During the January 2017 status hearing, the court set the matter for trial on 
May 10, 2017, but encouraged the parties to agree on stipulated facts to avoid the need 
for the parties, who all resided in India, to appear in Kansas. 
 
 
"27. 
On April 26, 2017, A.T.'s attorney filed a motion for the respondent to 
file an inventory and accounting and to inform the parties of the tax status of the estates. 
 
 
"28. 
On May 10, 2017, the district court learned that the parties had made no 
progress on resolving their dispute. 
 
 
"29. 
The district court appointed Lucas Nodine to be the estate administrator 
and ordered that the respondent's appointment as emergency administrator terminate. The 
district court provided the respondent with 30 days to prepare an inventory of the estates' 
assets, to prepare an accounting of any receipts or disbursements during his time as 
emergency administrator, and to prepare a report regarding the tax status of the estates. 
The district court's journal entry, documenting the oral orders, was filed on June 15, 
2017. 
 
 
"30. 
On July 6, 2017, the respondent filed an initial accounting with the 
district court, but subsequently filed an amended accounting on July 18, 2017. The 
amended accounting detailed estate assets of approximately $358,000. The respondent 
included only two disbursements:  one for publication expenses and one for reprinting 
bank statements. 
 
 
"31. 
On August 18, 2017, Mr. Nodine notified the district court that the 
respondent disbursed a total of $45,000, from the estate account to himself for attorney 
fees. The eight disbursements were made from November 25, 2015, through August 19, 
2016. The disbursements were not presented to the district court, nor were they approved 
7 
 
 
 
by the district court. Further, the disbursements were not reported in the July 2017, estate 
accountings filed by the respondent. 
 
 
"32. 
Mr. Nodine further informed the district court that on June 28, 2017, the 
respondent deposited a $45,000 check drawn on his trust account into the estate account. 
The deposit was also not reported in the estate accountings filed by the respondent. 
 
 
"33. 
On August 21, 2017, the Honorable Jeffry L. Jack, Labette County 
District Court Judge, filed a complaint against the respondent. The respondent cooperated 
in the disciplinary investigation. In his response to the complaint, the respondent admitted 
that he improperly paid out $45,000, from the estate funds to himself. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"34. 
Based upon the written stipulation and the above findings of fact, the 
hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 
(competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.15 (safekeeping 
property), 1.16 (terminating representation), and 8.4 (professional misconduct), as 
detailed below. Additionally, based upon the above findings of fact, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1), as alleged in the formal complaint. 
 
"KRPC 1.1 
 
 
"35. 
Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 
1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' The respondent did not provide 
competent representation to N.H. when he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for 
the first time on appeal without first having requested a Van Cleave hearing. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1. 
 
8 
 
 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
 
"36. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and 
promptly represent N.H. when he failed to request a Van Cleave hearing and when he 
failed to timely notify N.H. of the Court of Appeals' decision. The respondent's failure to 
timely notify N.H. of the Court of Appeals' decision left little time to take action. 
Because the respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing his client, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
1.3. 
 
"KRPC 1.4 
 
 
"37. 
KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.' In this case, the respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) when he failed to respond 
to N.H.'s letters. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.4(a). 
 
"KRPC 1.5 
 
 
"38. 
KRPC 1.5 provides that '[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.' It is per se 
unreasonable for the respondent to take $45,000 in attorney's fees from an estate without 
prior court approval. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5. 
 
"KRPC 1.15 
 
 
"39. 
Lawyers must keep the property of their clients safe. See KRPC 1.15. In 
this case, the respondent failed to properly safeguard his client's property when he took 
$45,000 from the estate without the permission of the court. Therefore, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15. 
 
9 
 
 
 
"KRPC 1.16 
 
 
"40. 
KRPC 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect clients after 
the representation has been terminated. Specifically, KRPC 1.16(d) provides: 
 
 
'Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to 
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as 
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of 
other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is 
entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been 
earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent 
permitted by other law.' 
 
In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) when he abandoned his representation 
of N.H. He took no action to protect N.H.'s interests after the Court of Appeals' decision 
and he did not notify N.H. that he was no longer providing any representation. The 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d). 
 
"KRPC 3.3(a)(1) 
 
 
"41. 
'A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the lawyer.' KRPC 3.3(a)(1). In this case, the respondent filed accountings in 
the estate case but failed to include entries that detailed the eight checks he wrote himself 
which totaled $45,000 and the repayment of the $45,000 from his attorney trust account. 
By filing pleadings with the court which contained false information, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent knowingly made false statements of fact to the court in 
violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1). 
 
"Rule 8.4(b) 
 
 
"42. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
10 
 
 
 
other respects.' KRPC 8.4(b). While the respondent was not charged and convicted of any 
criminal offenses, the respondent's conduct rises to the level of criminal deprivation of 
property, in violation of K.S.A. 21-5803. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(b). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
 
"43. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' Rule 8.4(c). The respondent 
engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he took $45,000 without the 
permission of the court and when he filed false accountings with the court. As such, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
 
"44. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he filed incomplete, 
inaccurate, and false accountings in the estate case. As such, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"45. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"46. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 
competent and diligent representation and reasonable communication. The respondent 
11 
 
 
 
also violated his duty to his client to properly safeguard his client's property. Finally, the 
respondent violated his duty to the public to maintain his personal integrity. 
 
 
"47. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"48. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
serious potential injury. 
 
 
"49. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
a. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent previously participated in 
the attorney diversion program. On February 28, 2002, the respondent entered a 
diversion agreement for having violated KRPC 1.3 (diligence) and 1.4 
(communication). 
 
b. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent improperly took $45,000 
from the estate and filed accountings which did not detail the transfers to him or 
the deposit from him. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty. 
 
c. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. On eight separate occasions, the respondent 
took funds from the estate. As such, the respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct. 
 
d. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 
(communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.15 (safekeeping property), 1.16 (terminating 
representation), 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), and 8.4 (professional misconduct). 
As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple 
offenses. 
12 
 
 
 
 
e. 
Vulnerability of Victim. A.V. and K.D.'s heirs and beneficiaries were 
vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct. 
 
f. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1982. At 
the time of the misconduct, the respondent had been practicing law for more than 
30 years. 
 
g. 
Illegal Conduct, Including that Involving the Use of Controlled 
Substances. The respondent engaged in illegal conduct when he paid himself 
$45,000 from the estate. 
 
 
"50. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
a. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent suffers 
from depression. Additionally during the relevant time period, the respondent's 
son had a serious accident, the respondent's father was gravely ill, and the 
respondent's father passed away. It is clear that the respondent's personal 
problems contributed to his misconduct. 
 
b. 
Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify 
Consequences of Misconduct. The respondent made restitution by depositing 
$45,000 into the estate account. The respondent repaid the funds before the theft 
was discovered and before the disciplinary complaint was filed. 
 
c. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment 
of the Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary 
13 
 
 
 
process. Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the 
violations and the respondent stipulated that he violated various rules. 
 
d. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and 
General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive 
member of the bar of Southeast Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect 
of his peers and generally possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced 
by the testimony of Sara Beezley and the many letters received and reviewed by 
the hearing panel. The attorneys who testified and wrote letters on behalf of the 
respondent universally indicated that the respondent's conduct in this case was 
out-of-character. 
 
e. 
Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed 
genuine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct. 
 
f. 
Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The misconduct which gave rise to the 
respondent's participation in the attorney diversion program is remote in time to 
the misconduct in this case, having occurred in 2002. 
 
 
"51. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or 
should know that he is dealing improperly with client property 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or 
 
14 
 
 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client.  
 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
. . . . 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in any other intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that 
false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or 
that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes 
no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially 
adverse effect on the legal proceeding.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"52. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
disbarred. Counsel for the respondent recommended that the respondent's license be 
suspended for a period of one year. 
 
 
"53. 
The respondent engaged in serious misconduct. The respondent took 
$45,000 from an estate without permission. While it is important that he repaid the 
money, the fact remains he engaged in serious dishonest conduct. 
 
 
"54. 
The respondent's serious misconduct is mitigated by considerable 
evidence in his favor. Prior to engaging in the misconduct in this case, the respondent 
enjoyed a long and productive law career in Southeast Kansas. The hearing panel was 
particularly moved by Exhibit N, an email message sent from a young man the 
15 
 
 
 
respondent previously coached in baseball. Clearly, the respondent has made significant 
contributions to his community. 
 
 
"55. 
Based on the serious nature of the respondent's misconduct and after 
considering the Supreme Court's opinions in In re Wright, 276 Kan. 357 (2003); In re 
Schnittker, 298 Kan. 89 (2013); In re Harrington, 305 Kan. 643 (2016); and In re 
Lundgren, 306 Kan. 482 (2017), a majority of the hearing panel recommends that the 
Supreme Court indefinitely suspend the respondent's license to practice law. 
 
 
"56. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
 
 
"While I concur in the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority's recommendation in this case. The misconduct in 
this case was the result of a perfect storm—the respondent suffers from depression, his 
son was in a serious car accident, his father was gravely ill, and his father passed away all 
in a relatively short period of time. Because of the significant evidence in mitigation, and 
because of the impressive endorsements by respected members of Mr. Grillot's 
community and profession, I recommend that the respondent's license be suspended for a 
period of two years. I also recommend that prior to considering reinstating the 
respondent's license to practice law, the Court require the respondent to file a petition for 
reinstatement and appear before a hearing panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of 
Attorneys pursuant to Rule 219." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
16 
 
 
 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 251). Clear 
and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth 
of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint to which he filed 
an answer. Respondent was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel 
and the hearing before this court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final 
hearing report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed 
admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 255). Furthermore, the 
facts before the hearing panel establish by clear and convincing evidence the charged 
misconduct in violation of KRPC 1.1 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 289) (competence); 1.3 (2018 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 292) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 293) (communication); 1.5 
(2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 294) (fees); 1.15 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 328) (safekeeping property); 
1.16(d) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 333) (termination of representation); 3.3(a)(1) (2018 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 344) (candor toward tribunal); 8.4(b) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 381) (commission of a 
criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). The evidence also supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt 
the panel's findings and conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. The hearing panel majority recommended that respondent be suspended 
indefinitely from the practice of law. A minority recommended a two-year suspension 
followed by a Rule 219 (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 264) reinstatement hearing. At the hearing 
17 
 
 
 
before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office of the Disciplinary 
Administrator recommended that the respondent be disbarred. The respondent requested 
indefinite suspension. 
 
This court agrees with the recommendation of the Disciplinary Administrator and 
holds that disbarment is the appropriate discipline. 
 
 
The respondent violated multiple rules of professional conduct and their 
subsections, some of them numerous times. We agree with the panel that he engaged in 
"serious dishonest conduct." Among other things, he admitted that while he was the 
emergency administrator of the A.V. estate he improperly paid out $45,000 from its funds 
to himself. And he made these eight different estate disbursements over nine months 
without:  (1) presentation to the district court; (2) approval by the court; or (3) reporting 
to that court when, pursuant to court order, he filed the July 2017 estate accountings. 
While he did make repayment, he did so only after the court ordered him to file the 
accountings; and he did not report that repayment to the court. See American Bar 
Association Standard 5.11 ("Disbarment is generally appropriate when . . . [b] a lawyer 
engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty . . . that seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice."). 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that TIMOTHY J. GRILLOT be and he is hereby 
disciplined by disbarment in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2018 Kan. 
S. Ct. R. 234). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
18 
 
 
 
 
ROSEN, J., not participating. 
 
DAVID B. DEBENHAM, District Judge, assigned.1 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Debenham was appointed to hear case No. 
119,909 vice Justice Rosen under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 
6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.