Title: Ex Parte Edwards

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

452 So. 2d 503 (1983)
Ex parte: Ervin EDWARDS.
(In re: Ervin Edwards v. State of Alabama.)
82-119.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 10, 1983.
Rehearing Denied July 8, 1983.
*504 Merceria L. Ludgood and Michael A. Figures, Walter Davis and Samuel F. Irby, Jr., Mobile, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Edward E. Carnes and Thomas R. Allison, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
On August 14, 1979, Henry Booth, a Mobile police officer, was killed while attempting to arrest the petitioner, Ervin Edwards. Edwards was indicted by the Mobile County Grand Jury for the capital murder of a police officer and found guilty under Code 1975, § 13-11-2(a)(5). The jury recommended the death penalty and the trial court sentenced Edwards to death.
On the day of the killing, Officer Booth was attempting to locate Edwards, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant of arrest for misdemeanor assault with a gun. Booth did not have the arrest warrant in his possession. At approximately 7:45 p.m., Officer Booth stopped a car in which Edwards was riding.
Edwards got out of the car after it was stopped. Officer Booth told Edwards to come to him and that he had a warrant for Edwards's arrest. Edwards asked to see the warrant, but Booth did not produce it; Edwards refused to come to Booth. As Booth approached Edwards, Edwards opened his jacket to show Booth he was unarmed.
Booth attempted to force Edwards into his patrol car. Edwards refused to get into the car and a scuffle broke out between them. There was evidence to show that Booth hit Edwards with a flashlight during the struggle. The two then began to fight over control of Officer Booth's service revolver, which Booth was attempting to remove from its holster. Booth and Edwards fell on the ground and continued to fight over the gun. During the scuffle, the gun discharged and Booth was killed.
Edwards was found guilty of capital murder under Code 1975, § 13-11-2(a)(5). That section provides for the death penalty for the following offense:
Under this Code section the state must prove more than a killing of a police officer while on duty. It must also prove that the killing was murder.
The killing took place in 1979, before the effective date of the new Criminal Code. Thus, in defining the elements of the crime necessary to prove a prima facie case of murder, we must consider Code 1975, § 13-1-70 (formerly Code 1940, Tit. 14, § 314), which provides:
The indictment indicates that the prosecution intended to use second degree murder as the basis for the capital murder charge.
We note at the outset that the attempted arrest of petitioner by Officer Booth was an illegal arrest. A warrantless arrest may be made under any of the following circumstances:
Code 1975, § 15-10-3. None of these provisions covers the circumstances in the case before us. Booth was attempting to arrest Edwards for a misdemeanor that was not committed in his presence. There was considerable evidence that Edwards asked Booth to show him the warrant. The Alabama statutes require that the defendant be shown the warrant when he asks to see it:
Code 1975, § 15-10-2. Thus, Officer Booth's attempted arrest of Edwards was illegal under these circumstances.
Alabama law is clear that, to a limited degree, a party is justified in attempting to resist an unlawful arrest.
Adams v. State, 175 Ala. 8, 12, 57 So. 591, 592 (1912). Clearly, the actions of Edwards went beyond the lawful bounds of resistance to an illegal arrest.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the legality or illegality of the attempted arrest is not determinative of this case. We also agree that "[i]t is not an element of the capital crime that the officer be effectuating a legal arrest." Edwards v. State, 452 So. 2d 487 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). Nonetheless, we are convinced that the circumstances surrounding this killing, including the attempted illegal arrest, are crucial to the outcome of this case.
Edwards argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the state's evidence for failure to prove a prima facie case of capital murder. Under the circumstances presented here, we agree.
An essential element of the prima facie case for second degree murder is malice aforethought. This rather elusive concept is central to this case.
Our courts have defined malice aforethought on a number of different occasions. In Harris v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Harris v. State, 56 Ala.App. 301, 306, 321 So. 2d 267, 272 (Ala.Cr.App.1975).
*506 The state apparently relied upon the presumption which arises from the use of a deadly weapon to prove malice aforethought. Reviewing the entire record, we can find no other evidence of this element of the offense.
We are convinced, however, that the facts presented at trial effectively rebut the presumption of malice that arises from the use of a deadly weapon. First, this was not the defendant's gun, and, in fact, the gun only came into the incident when the officer attempted to draw the gun on the defendant. This is significantly different from a situation where a party brings a weapon to the scene of a crime, where malice is more readily inferable. Secondly, the parties were struggling over control of the weapon, rather than the defendant being in exclusive control of it. Finally, the defendant was attempting to resist an unlawful arrest. We are convinced that these facts, taken together, rebut the presumption of malice described in Harris, supra.
Our examination of the record reveals that no other evidence was presented on this element of the prima facie case. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence of second degree murder to sustain the conviction. Further, we are of the opinion that the state offered sufficient evidence on the lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter, which requires only a voluntary killing rather than a killing with malice aforethought. The statutory element of voluntariness is satisfied where defendant does "an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, whereby death ensues." Rainey v. State, 245 Ala. 458, 461, 17 So. 2d 687, 689 (1944). Nonetheless, because the state failed to produce sufficient evidence of malice, we are required to reverse and remand.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All the Justices concur.