Title: Idaho v. Oldenburg

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 49358 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
NICKOLAUS AARON OLDENBURG, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
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Caldwell, May 2023 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: November 17, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.  
 
The order of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant, Nickolaus 
Aaron Oldenburg. Justin M. Curtis argued.  
 
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent, State of Idaho. Kenneth 
K. Jorgensen argued.  
 
_____________________ 
 
STEGNER, Justice. 
Following the State’s dismissal of criminal charges against him, Nickolaus Oldenburg filed 
a motion in district court to seal the criminal court file pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-3004(10). 
The State did not contest the motion. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it did not have 
the authority to seal Oldenburg’s case file under section 67-3004(10) and, therefore, could not 
grant his request. As a result of its analysis, the district court denied Oldenburg’s motion. 
Oldenburg appeals from the district court’s denial of his request. For the reasons discussed below, 
we affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Nickolaus Oldenburg was originally charged with thirteen felonies. As part of a plea 
agreement resolving three separate cases against him, the district court dismissed all thirteen 
charges included in the underlying criminal information. The State never refiled the dismissed 
charges.  
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After the charges were dismissed, Oldenburg succeeded in obtaining the expungement of 
the Idaho State Police records that related to his charges. Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) gives 
authority to the Idaho Bureau of Criminal Identification to expunge “the fingerprint and criminal 
history record” in certain circumstances. The statute states:  
Any person who was arrested or served a criminal summons and who 
subsequently was not charged by indictment or information within one (1) year 
of the arrest or summons and any person who was acquitted of all offenses 
arising from an arrest or criminal summons, or who has had all charges 
dismissed, may have the fingerprint and criminal history record taken in 
connection with the incident expunged pursuant to the person’s written request 
directed to the department and may have the official court file thereof sealed. 
This provision shall not apply to any dismissal granted pursuant to 
section 19-2604(1), Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 67-3004(10) (italics added). Following the expungement of his records by the Idaho State 
Police, Oldenburg moved the district court in this case to seal the “criminal court file” relating to 
the charges pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-3004(10). The State did not oppose Oldenburg’s 
motion.  
Even though there was no opposition to his motion, the district court denied Oldenburg’s 
motion to seal the records in this criminal case. The district court reasoned that it lacked the 
authority to seal the records because the Idaho Supreme Court has not adopted specific “rules 
affecting court records” in the manner authorized by Idaho Code section 67-3004(10). In other 
words, the district court determined that section 67-3004(10) was, in its words, not 
“self-executing[.]” Instead, the district court concluded that the statute requires the creation of “a 
specific mechanism by which to exercise the right[.]” Without such a mechanism in place, the 
district court determined that it lacked the authority to seal Oldenburg’s criminal court file pursuant 
to section 67-3004(10). Oldenburg timely appealed the district court’s denial of his request.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court exercises free review over legal questions presented by the construction and 
application of a statute.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 492, 337 P.3d 647, 651 (2014) (internal 
citation omitted). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
The central question in this appeal is whether Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) is a 
mechanism by which a lower court may seal court records. Below, Oldenburg moved the district 
court, pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-3004(10), to seal the criminal court file involving charges 
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brought against him which were later dismissed in their entirety. The district court concluded it 
lacked the requisite authority to grant Oldenburg relief absent some additional authority that had 
yet to be approved by this Court. The district court distilled its analysis of section 67-3004(10) to 
three clarifying questions: “(1) [W]hat, if any, administrative rules or mechanisms apply to the 
request [to seal the criminal court file], (2) to what body is the request addressed[,] and (3) in the 
absence of such provisions, has this [c]ourt been given the authority to act?”  
The district court then concluded, sua sponte, that the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho 
Court Administrative Rules vest the control of “access to court records” exclusively with the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The district court explained that this Court “adopted . . . [I.C.A.R.] 32(i)[1] to 
address sealing of records[,]” but it has not adopted any alternative rules that suggest that Idaho 
Code section 67-3004(10) “provides a separate and independent basis” to seal a court’s file. 
Therefore, because Oldenburg moved to seal his court file only under section 67-3004(10) and not 
also under I.C.A.R. 32(i), the district court concluded it did not have the authority to seal the court 
file. The district court similarly concluded that the Idaho State Police (“ISP”) did not have the 
authority to order Oldenburg’s court file sealed since the ISP does not exercise control over Idaho 
court records.  
             This Court’s jurisprudence and the Idaho Constitution, Article V, section 2, make it clear 
that this Court “has the inherent power to make rules governing the procedure in all of Idaho’s 
courts.” State v. Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 486, 447 P.3d 930, 934 (2019) (quoting Talbot v. Ames 
Constr., 127 Idaho 648, 651, 904 P.2d 560, 563 (1995)). In State v. Griffith, we held: “ While the 
legislature has authorized this Court to formulate rules of procedure, this Court has the inherent 
authority, made especially clear by the amended provisions of Article V, [s]ection 2, of the Idaho 
Constitution to make rules governing procedure in the lower courts of Idaho.” State v. Griffith, 97 
Idaho 52, 58, 539 P.2d 604, 610 (1975). This power is codified in Idaho Code section 1-212: “The 
inherent power of the Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho 
is hereby recognized and confirmed.” With the authority to create its own rules, this Court 
expressly adopted I.C.A.R. 32 to “govern[] the records maintained by the judicial department.” 
State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869, 871, 216 P.3d 627, 629 (2009). I.C.A.R. 32(i) reads in part: 
 
1 For the sake of brevity, this opinion does not spell out “Idaho Court Administrative Rule” every time a provision is 
cited. Instead, “I.C.A.R. [number]” refers to the applicable Idaho Court Administrative Rule. No other set of rules are 
at issue in this case.   
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“Physical and electronic records, may be disclosed, or temporarily or permanently sealed or 
redacted by order of the court on a case-by-case basis.”  
Until 2018, I.C.A.R. 32 was the only mechanism available to defendants seeking to seal 
court records. Then, in 2018, the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) to 
add the following underlined language:  
Any person who was arrested or served a criminal summons and who subsequently 
was not charged by indictment or information within one (1) year of the arrest or 
summons and any person who was acquitted of all offenses arising from an arrest 
or criminal summons, or who has had all charges dismissed, may have the 
fingerprint and criminal history record taken in connection with the incident 
expunged pursuant to the person’s written request directed to the department and 
may have the official court file thereof sealed. This provision shall not apply to any 
dismissal granted pursuant to section 19-2604(1), Idaho Code.  
S.B. 1314, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2018 Idaho Sess. Laws 674-675.  
Prior to these amendments, relief under Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) related only to 
expungement2 of police records. However, the most recent version of the statute is an attempt to 
expand the relief available to seal official Idaho court records as well. The amendment also widens 
those persons covered by the statute to include individuals who have had all charges against them 
dismissed. These amendments indicate that the legislature intended to provide individuals covered 
by the statute the benefit of having their court records sealed, rather than limiting that relief solely 
to the expungement of police records.  
Oldenburg contends that the amendments to section 67-3004(10) made by the Idaho 
Legislature in 2018, as well as the plain language of Idaho Code section 67-3003(2),3 act on their 
own to expand the basis for sealing Idaho court records. Specifically, Oldenburg argues that by 
enacting the 2018 amendment, the legislature intended to provide a broader category of defendants 
the ability to seal their underlying criminal case than what was provided under I.C.A.R. 32. The 
State counters that Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) cannot operate independently because, if it 
did, then the statute would be an impermissible overreach into the authority vested to the Idaho 
Supreme Court by Article V, section 13, of the Idaho Constitution.  
 
2 For the sake of clarity, we find it important to, once again, distinguish expungement from the act of sealing a record. 
Expungement refers to the complete removal, erasure, or destruction of a record. See State v. Abramowski, 164 Idaho 
857, 860, 436 P.3d 678, 682 (2019). In contrast, sealing a record does not result in the destruction of those records but 
instead prevents them from being publicly accessible. See id.; I.C.A.R. 32(g) and (i). 
3 Idaho Code section 67-3003(2) reads as follows: “In accordance with chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, the department 
[Idaho State Police] may adopt rules . . . . Rules relating to information maintained and reported by the court shall be 
made after consultation with and approval by the Idaho supreme court.” (Italics added.) 
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Article V, section 13, of the Idaho Constitution provides: “[t]he legislature shall have no 
power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate department of the government; . . .” We have held that this provision “forbids the 
legislature from exercising powers rightly pertaining to the judicial department. This is a direct 
recognition and reiteration of the separation of powers provided by Art. 2, § 1 [of the Idaho 
Constitution].” R. E. W. Const. Co. v. District Court of Third Jud. Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 437, 400 
P.2d 390, 397 (1965). In this same vein, we have held “[t]his [C]ourt always must be watchful, as 
it has been in the past, that no one of the three departments of the government encroach upon the 
powers properly belonging to another.” State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 380, 387 P.3d 1189, 1194 
(2015) (citations omitted, brackets in original). Given the plain language of Idaho’s constitution 
and this Court’s interpretation of it, we agree with the State’s argument that Idaho Code section 
67-3004(10) impermissibly violates Idaho’s separation of powers doctrine.   
Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the legislature could 
not independently vest the district court with the authority to seal Oldenburg’s court file. The 
control of court records resides within the prerogative of this Court, and this Court has adopted 
I.C.A.R. 32 to govern a defendant’s request to seal court records. In the event of a conflict between 
this Court’s procedural rules and a “statutory provision that is procedural in nature[,]” this Court’s 
rules govern. Weigle, 165 Idaho at 486, 447 P.3d at 934 (internal citations omitted). When the 
statute is procedural, it is viewed as an attempt “to control this Court’s processes” and is classified 
as an impermissible overreach into the authority of this Court to develop its own procedures. Id. 
at 487, 447 P.3d at 935. 
 
Holding that the 2018 amendments obviate the need for I.C.A.R. 32(i) would effectively 
give the Idaho Legislature the authority to seal Idaho court records, in contravention of the Idaho 
Constitution. “Article II [section 1] prohibits the [l]egislature from usurping powers properly 
belonging to the judicial department[.]” Weigle, 165 Idaho at 486–87, 447 P.3d at 934–35 (internal 
citation omitted). Additionally, as explained by the district court, the ISP “cannot order court 
records sealed[,]” and Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) does not grant it the authority to do so. The 
power to set rules governing that process resides with this Court.  
Thus, the district court correctly found that Idaho Code section 67-3004(10) impinges on 
this Court’s prerogative to make its own rules which govern its own procedure. Accordingly, the 
decision of the district court is affirmed. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s order concluding that it did not have the authority to seal the 
court records pertaining to the charges brought against Oldenburg pursuant to Idaho Code section 
67-3004(10). Nothing in this opinion should be read to preclude Oldenburg from making a similar 
request under I.C.A.R. 32(i). 
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.