Title: Byrd, et al. v Franklin County

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA14-224 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 16 September 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Mecklenburg County 
Nos. 12 CRS 16114, 202039 
STILLOAN DEVORAY ROBINSON 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 August 2013 by 
Judge Robert T. Sumner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 August 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Hugh Harris, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Jon H. Hunt, for Defendant. 
 
 
STEPHENS, Judge. 
 
 
Procedural and Factual Background 
On 6 February 2012, Defendant Stilloan Devoray Robinson was 
indicted for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, breaking and 
entering a motor vehicle, and larceny of a motor vehicle.1  On 2 
April 2012, Defendant was indicted for having attained the 
                     
1 In two superseding indictments in May 2013, Defendant was 
indicted for the same three offenses. 
-2- 
 
 
status of an habitual felon.  The evidence at Defendant’s August 
2013 trial tended to show the following: 
On 13 January 2012, Defendant was arrested just after 
parking and exiting a car belonging to William Markham which 
Markham had reported stolen.  At the time, Markham and Defendant 
were roommates at the McCloud Federal Halfway House2 in 
Charlotte.  Markham testified that, on 10 January 2012, he 
returned to the house after work, parking his car in a back 
parking lot.  Markham checked in with staff and went to his 
room.  Defendant and Markham’s other roommates were present.  
After changing out of his work clothes, Markham hid his car keys 
in his shoe and left the room to make a phone call.  When 
Markham returned, he discovered that Defendant and the car keys 
were both gone.  Markham checked the parking lot and saw that 
his car was missing.  Markham testified that he had not given 
Defendant permission to take his car.  A staff member at the 
halfway house testified that she saw Defendant drive away in 
Markham’s car and called the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 
Department.   
                     
2 The facility is also referred to as the “McCloud Center” at 
certain points in the trial transcript. 
-3- 
 
 
Defendant’s theory of the case was that Markham had given 
him permission to use the car on a limited basis.  Specifically, 
Defendant testified that Markham had agreed to loan Defendant 
the car for one day in exchange for crack cocaine.3  After being 
unable to obtain actual crack cocaine, Defendant gave Markham 
some counterfeit crack cocaine on 10 January 2012.  In exchange, 
Markham gave Defendant his car keys with the understanding that 
Defendant would return the car by leaving it at a local 
McDonald’s the following day.  However, on direct examination, 
Defendant acknowledged that he kept Markham’s car for three 
days: 
Q. 
About how long would you have used the 
car? 
 
A. 
He wanted it the next day. 
 
Q. 
So the understanding was that you were 
going to use it one day. 
 
A. 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q. 
You were only supposed to only have it 
one day. 
 
A. 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q. 
And you wound up keeping it longer? 
 
A. 
Longer than that.  
 
                     
3 Markham testified that he had never used any form of cocaine. 
-4- 
 
 
At the charge conference following completion of the evidence, 
Defendant requested that the jury be instructed on the crime of 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a lesser-included offense 
of possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  The trial court denied 
the request. 
The jury found Defendant guilty of possession of a stolen 
motor vehicle, but not guilty of the other two substantive 
criminal charges.  Defendant admitted to having attained 
habitual felon status.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to 
an active term of 84-113 months in prison.  Defendant’s trial 
counsel gave notice of appeal in open court following the jury’s 
verdict, but failed to give notice of appeal following entry of 
the trial court’s final judgment.  Instead, trial counsel asked 
the court whether the appeal would be assigned to the Office of 
the Appellate Defender.  The trial court responded by appointing 
the Office of the Appellate Defender to represent Defendant in 
his appeal, and stated, “I’ll note your appeal for the record.”   
By failing to give timely notice of appeal, Defendant has 
lost his right of appeal.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b), 15A-
1444(a) (2013).  
Recognizing 
this deficiency, Defendant’s 
appellate counsel has filed, along with the record on appeal and 
Defendant’s brief, a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to 
-5- 
 
 
Appellate Rule 21.  “Rule 21 provides that a writ of certiorari 
may be issued to permit review of trial court orders . . . 
when[, inter alia] the right to an appeal has been lost by 
failure to take timely action . . . .”  Bailey v. North Carolina 
Dep’t of Revenue, 353 N.C. 142, 157, 540 S.E.2d 313, 322 (2000) 
(citing N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)) (italics added).  The State did 
not oppose Defendant’s petition, and we allowed Defendant’s 
petition for writ of certiorari by order entered 23 July 2014.   
Discussion 
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel 
(“IAC”) 
in 
that 
“his 
trial 
attorney, 
on 
direct 
examination, asked him questions to which the answers conceded 
his guilt to the only crime for which he was convicted[,]” to 
wit, possession of a stolen motor vehicle.   
“An IAC claim must establish both that the professional 
assistance [the] defendant received was unreasonable and that 
the trial would have had a different outcome in the absence of 
such assistance.”  State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 167, 557 S.E.2d 
500, 525 (2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 
153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002). 
IAC claims brought on direct review will be 
decided on the merits when the cold record 
reveals that no further investigation is 
required, i.e., claims that may be developed 
-6- 
 
 
and argued without such ancillary procedures 
as the appointment of investigators or an 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
This 
rule 
is 
consistent with the general principle that, 
on 
direct 
appeal, 
the 
reviewing 
court 
ordinarily limits its review to material 
included in the record on appeal and the 
verbatim transcript of proceedings, if one 
is designated. 
 
Id. at 166, 557 S.E.2d at 524-25 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Defendant contends that the record 
before us is sufficient for this matter to be resolved without 
further investigation, and we agree.  Accordingly, we address 
the merits of his argument. 
 
The only elements of the offense of possession of a stolen 
motor vehicle under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-106 are that (1) the 
defendant possessed a motor vehicle which (2) he knew or had 
reason to believe was stolen.  State v. Baker, 65 N.C. App. 430, 
437, 310 S.E.2d 101, 108 (1983), cert. denied, 312 N.C. 85, 321 
S.E.2d 900 (1984).  Property is stolen when it has been carried 
away without the owner’s consent and with the intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of the property.  See, e.g., State 
v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 233, 287 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1982), 
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Mumford, 364 N.C. 
394, 699 S.E.2d 911 (2010).   
-7- 
 
 
As noted supra in the recap of the evidence presented at 
trial, Defendant never disputed that he possessed Markham’s car.  
Rather, Defendant contended that he possessed the car with 
Markham’s permission and that he intended to return it to 
Markham per their alleged agreement.  On direct examination, 
defense counsel’s questions only induced Defendant to admit that 
he had kept the car longer than the alleged agreement with 
Markham had permitted.  Defense counsel’s questions did not 
require Defendant to admit to believing the car was stolen, and 
indeed, Defendant never gave any testimony indicating that he 
knew or had reason to know that the car was stolen.  To the 
contrary, Defendant’s testimony was that he knew the car was not 
stolen at the time he possessed it, in that Markham had given 
Defendant permission to use it.  Although Defendant did admit to 
keeping Markham’s car longer than permitted by the alleged 
agreement, he never suggested that he had the intent to 
permanently deprive Markham of the car.  In sum, defense counsel 
did not elicit testimony from Defendant which conceded his guilt 
of any crime for which he was charged,4 and thus, Defendant 
                     
4 Defendant’s testimony would have supported his conviction of a 
charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (the current 
version of statute is titled “[u]nauthorized use of a motor-
propelled conveyance”).  “A person is guilty of [unauthorized 
 
-8- 
 
 
cannot show that he received ineffective assistance in this 
regard.  Accordingly, Defendant’s IAC argument is overruled. 
Defendant’s Motion to File Supplemental Brief 
On 30 June 2014, Defendant filed with this Court a “motion 
to file supplemental brief.”  In the motion, appellate counsel 
for Defendant states the following:  That he intended to argue 
on direct appeal that the trial court committed reversible error 
in denying the defense request to instruct the jury on 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a lesser-included offense 
of possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  While researching the 
issue, however, appellate counsel reviewed this Court’s opinion 
in State v. Oliver, __ N.C. App. __, 718 S.E.2d 731 (2011).  In 
Oliver, the defendant had alleged error in the trial court’s 
refusal to instruct on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, 
                     
use of a motor vehicle] if, without the express or implied 
consent of the owner or person in lawful possession, he takes or 
operates an aircraft, motorboat, motor vehicle, or other motor-
propelled conveyance of another.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72.2(a) 
(2013).  “One of the essential elements of unauthorized use of a 
motor vehicle is the taking or operating of a motor vehicle 
without having formed an intent to permanently deprive the owner 
thereof.”  State v. McCullough, 76 N.C. App. 516, 518, 333 
S.E.2d 537, 538 (1985) (contrasting this offense with that of 
common law robbery).  This offense occurs, inter alia, where one 
initially has permission for the use of a vehicle, but keeps the 
vehicle after its owner has withdrawn his permission or 
requested that the vehicle be returned.  See, e.g., State v. 
Milligan, 192 N.C. App. 677, 666 S.E.2d 183 (2008). 
-9- 
 
 
contending that “all the essential elements of unauthorized use 
of a stolen vehicle are essential elements of possession of a 
stolen vehicle.”  Id. at __, 718 S.E.2d at 734.  This Court 
rejected the defendant’s contention on the following basis: 
During the pendency of [the] defendant’s 
appeal, our Supreme Court addressed this 
very issue of whether unauthorized use of a 
motor vehicle is a lesser[-]included offense 
of possession of a stolen vehicle.  See 
State v. Nickerson, 365 N.C. 279, 715 S.E.2d 
845 (2011).  Due to our Supreme Court’s 
recent decision, we see no need to further 
discuss this issue.  Id.  Consequently, the 
trial court did not err in not instructing 
the jury on the crime of unauthorized use of 
a stolen vehicle as it is not a lesser[-
]included offense of possession of a stolen 
vehicle. 
 
Id.  However, as appellate counsel now notes, in Nickerson “the 
principal question [wa]s whether the crime of unauthorized use 
of a motor vehicle is a lesser[-]included offense of possession 
of stolen goods.”  Nickerson, 365 N.C. at 281, 715 S.E.2d at 846 
(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
[b]oth offenses concern personal property.  
However, 
the 
specific 
definitional 
requirement that the property be a “motor-
propelled 
conveyance” 
is 
an 
essential 
element 
unique 
to 
the 
offense 
of 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  For 
the offense of possession of stolen goods, 
the 
State 
need 
not 
prove 
that 
[the] 
defendant had a “motor-propelled conveyance” 
but rather that the property in [the] 
defendant’s 
possession 
is 
any 
type 
of 
-10- 
 
 
personal property.  As such, unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle has an essential 
element not found in the definition of 
possession of stolen goods.  Because we 
conclude that this element of the lesser 
crime is not an essential element of the 
greater crime, we need not address the other 
elements. 
 
Id. at 282, 715 S.E.2d at 847 (citation omitted).  Thus, in 
Oliver, this Court mistakenly relied on Nickerson for a 
proposition not addressed, nor a holding reached, in that case.  
 
To compound that error, appellate counsel concedes that he 
relied solely on our opinion in Oliver in determining that the 
law on whether unauthorized use of a stolen vehicle is a lesser-
included offense of possession of a stolen vehicle was settled 
contrary to Defendant’s prospective argument on this issue.  
Appellate counsel did not read Nickerson at that time, and thus 
did not discover the discrepancy in the opinions.  Instead, 
appellate counsel filed Defendant’s brief and petition for writ 
of certiorari with this Court without including the jury 
instruction issue. 
 
In June 2014, appellate counsel read Nickerson and realized 
the discrepancy between that opinion’s actual holding and the 
holding as described in and relied upon by this Court in Oliver.  
In Defendant’s “motion to file supplemental brief[,]” he asks 
this Court to exercise our discretion under Rule 2 of our Rules 
-11- 
 
 
of 
Appellate 
Procedure 
to 
prevent 
manifest 
injustice 
to 
Defendant.  See N.C.R. App. P. 2.  In its response filed 8 July 
2014, the State did not object to Defendant’s motion.  By order 
entered 24 July 2014, we allowed Defendant’s motion and 
instructed the State to file its own supplemental brief on the 
jury instruction issue no later than 8 August 2014.  The 
following day, the State filed a motion for an extension of time 
until and including 20 August 2014 to file its supplemental 
brief which we allowed by order entered 1 August 2014. 
 
As for the merits of this argument, as Defendant concedes 
in his supplemental brief, we are bound by this Court’s decision 
in Oliver.  See In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 
384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, 
a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, 
unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”) (citations 
omitted).  However, we hope that by noting the clear discrepancy 
between Oliver and Nickerson, the Supreme Court may take this 
opportunity to clarify our case law and provide guidance on the 
issue of whether unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is in fact 
a lesser-included offense of possession of a stolen motor 
vehicle.  See State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 487, 598 S.E.2d 125, 
-12- 
 
 
134 (2004) (“While we recognize that a panel of the Court of 
Appeals may disagree with, or even find error in, an opinion by 
a prior panel and may duly note its disagreement or point out 
that error in its opinion, the panel is bound by that prior 
decision until it is overturned by a higher court.”).  In light 
of Oliver, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in 
denying Defendant’s request for an instruction on unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle. 
NO ERROR. 
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.