Title: Streitmatter v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Streitmatter v. State1999 WY 78981 P.2d 921Case Number: 97-171Decided: 06/04/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ELMER 
STREITMATTER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge

Sylvia L. Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Assistant Public Defender; and Karl 
Linde, Assistant Public Defender, Representing 
Appellant:

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. BakerMusick, Assistant 
Attorney General, Representing the Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, * 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In his appeal 
from a conviction of aggravated assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(ii) (Michie 1997), Elmer Streitmatter (Streitmatter) raises the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. In a related 
claim of error, he asserts that the trial court failed to properly instruct the 
jury on the elements of the crime. In addition, he presents claims of error in 
the admission and exclusion of evidence, arguing that a police officer should 
not have been permitted to recount statements made to him by the victim and the 
victim's daughter and, further, that he should have been permitted to present 
evidence as to his mental and physical condition at the time of the offense. Our 
examination of the record and review of the pertinent rules of law persuade us 
that the statute is constitutional; the trial court properly instructed the 
jury; and there was no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary rulings. The 
Judgment and Sentence of the Court is affirmed.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, the issues raised by Streitmatter are:

ISSUE 
I

Whether Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it does 
not require a mental element and fails to discriminate between threats with a 
deadly weapon that constitute criminal behavior and those that do not, in 
violation [of] Wyo. Const. Art. 1 § 6. U.S. Const. Amend. 
XIV.

ISSUE 
II

Whether the 
district court committed reversible error when it allowed Officer Smith to 
testify to numerous statements allegedly made by [the victim] and [the victim's 
daughter] that did not qualify for any hearsay exception or 
exemption.

ISSUE 
III

Did the district 
court commit reversible error by failing to properly instruct the jury on the 
law relating to the elements of the crime?

ISSUE 
IV

Whether the 
district court deprived appellant of his right to present a defense by 
prohibiting three defense witnesses from testifying concerning appellant's 
mental and physical condition at the time of the offense.

The State of 
Wyoming presents the issues in this way in its Brief of 
Appellee:

I. Whether Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague?

II. Whether the 
trial court properly instructed the jury?

III. Whether the 
trial court properly allowed Officer Smith to testify concerning statements made 
to him? IV. Whether the trial court properly prohibited testimony concerning 
appellant's medical and physical condition?

[¶3]      On April 14, 
1996, Streitmatter was living in Cheyenne with his ex-wife, the victim, and 
their four children. Sometime during the morning of that day, Streitmatter and 
the victim argued about Streitmatter's drinking alcohol in the morning. The 
victim and the children left the house shortly before noon with the victim's 
mother, and they all went to the home of the victim's step-sister. About an hour 
later, the victim's mother left the step-sister's home with the children, and 
eventually she took the children back to the Streitmatter residence. The victim 
returned home later that evening.

[¶4]      Streitmatter 
pulled the victim into the house by her hair, and he began beating her and 
accusing her of spending the evening in the company of other men. There came a 
time during the struggle when Streitmatter held the victim against a wall with 
one hand while holding two knives in his other hand. Fortuitously, the 
Streitmatters' landlord was in the area on an unrelated errand, and, having 
noticed the screen door was open, he decided to investigate. The victim asked 
Streitmatter to permit the landlord to take her and the children to her mother's 
house for the night. Streitmatter then accused the victim of wanting to have sex 
with the landlord, and he threw her against the wall, causing her to lose 
consciousness. After that, Streitmatter threatened the landlord with the knives, 
but the landlord was able to calm Streitmatter down enough so that he would sit 
and talk.

[¶5]      The victim 
regained consciousness, and, without Streitmatter noticing, went to a neighbor's 
home to call for help. The victim then returned home and stayed with the 
children while the landlord held Streitmatter in conversation until the police 
arrived. After talking with the parties, the police took Streitmatter into 
custody on a charge of simple assault.

[¶6]      Later, 
Streitmatter was charged with aggravated assault and battery, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii), with the charge specifying the knives as the 
deadly weapon. Streitmatter entered a plea of not guilty to this charge, and his 
trial commenced on November 18, 1996. The following day, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. On March 14, 1997, the trial court sentenced Streitmatter to 
a term of not less than four and not more than six years in the state 
penitentiary. Streitmatter appeals from the Judgment and Sentence of the 
Court.

[¶7]      In what can best 
be described as a convoluted argument, Streitmatter first attacks the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) because it does not 
require a mental element and because it fails to discriminate between conduct 
that would constitute criminal behavior and conduct that would not. Streitmatter 
acknowledges the clear holding of this court in Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183 
(Wyo. 1992), that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) defines a general intent 
crime, which simply proscribes a particular act, and requires only the intent to 
be inferred from doing the act that constitutes the offense charged. Even so, 
Streitmatter relies upon State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1974) and Nimmo v. 
State, 603 P.2d 386 (Wyo. 1979) to structure an argument that the statute is 
unconstitutional because no mental element is articulated.

[¶8]      The major fallacy 
in Streitmatter's reliance on Stern lies in the assumption that assault and 
battery is not a common law crime. In Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 P. 299, 301 
(1908), in dictum, this Court recognized that assault and battery was a common 
law crime, while noting that the statutory definitions differed from the common 
law crime. We are in accord with the Supreme Court of Maine, which held that the 
statutory definition of assault and battery is simply declaratory of the common 
law. State v. Rand, 156 Me. 81, 161 A.2d 852, 853 (1960). It is clear that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-501 and 6-2-502 (Michie 1997), simple assault and battery and 
aggravated assault and battery, are the statutory equivalents of a crime at 
common law. In Nimmo, the court pointed out that Stern "warns that the 
guidelines set forth in the opinion are inapplicable in determining the validity 
of statutes involving common-law crimes * * *." Nimmo, 603 P.2d  at 389. While 
Streitmatter seeks to sever subparagraph (iii) from the rest of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a), claiming that the conduct proscribed was not a crime at common 
law, we are satisfied that the entire statute must be evaluated to determine if 
it had a genesis in common law, and we hold that it did.

[¶9]      We have no 
hesitancy in holding in this case that the crime defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) is a general intent crime. The statute proscribed this 
conduct:

(a) A person is 
guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

* * 
*

(iii) Threatens 
to use a drawn deadly weapon on anotheru unless reasonably necessary in defense 
of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another 
* * *.

We rely upon 
Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905, 909 (Wyo. 1987), where we 
said:

Indetermining 
whether a factual basis exists for a guilty plea to a general intent crime, the 
court must only find that the act was done voluntarily. "`[T] he inference 
thereupon arises that The defendant intended that which resulted.'" Slaughter v. 
State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 481, 483-484 (1981), quoting Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839, 843 (1978).

"[W]here the 
offense is malum prohibitum, intent and knowledge are not elements of the crime, 
unless expressly made so, and all that is required for the commission of the 
crime is the intentional doing of the prohibited act itself, regardless of 
whether the doer intended to commit the crime resulting from the intentional 
act." (Footnotes omitted.) 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law, § 30, p. 
105.

Further, we said 
in Cox, 829 P.2d at 1185-86:

Rather than 
describing a specific intent crime, § 6-2-502(a)(iii) conforms to our definition 
of a general intent crime; i. e., a statute which simply describes a particular 
act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future 
consequence. The language, "[t]hreatens to use," merely describes what a 
defendant must do with a drawn deadly weapon to be guilty of aggravated assault. 
See Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1987) ("threatens to use" 
requires an actual threat of physical injury during the act of employing a 
deadly weapon). As a general intent crime, aggravated assault requires only that 
intent which may be inferred from doing the act which constitutes the offense 
charged; i. e., slashing back and forth with the hunting knife. Carfield [v. 
State], 649 P.2d [865,] 869 [(Wyo. 1982)]; Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 279 
(Wyo. 1977).

The prong of 
Streitmatter's first argument that this statute is unconstitutionally vague 
because it does not require a mental element is fallacious. We hold that the 
statute is constitutional contrary to Streitmatter's 
argument.

[¶10]   Streitmatter also asserts facial 
unconstitutionality because the statute lacks the requisite specificity to 
permit a reasonable person to understand what conduct is proscribed. He present 
suggestions of innocent activities that he contends would be reached by this 
statute, and that a reasonable person could not separate the activities that are 
prohibited from those that are not. Streitmatter suggests that theatrical 
productions involving weapons, Halloween entertainment and self-defense classes 
in which the participants "threaten" each other with weapons, while innocent in 
their nature, could be charged as crimes under this statute. Streitmatter's 
argument misapprehends the meaning of the word "threaten." In Johnston v. State, 
747 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1987), we held that the phrase "[t]hreatens to use" in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) means "an actual threat of physical injury," 
definition easily distinguishable from the feigned threats argued y Streitmatter 
because in none of those instances is there an actual threat of physical injury. 
Specificity, therefore, can be inferred from the word "threaten" in the statute, 
as we have defined that word. There is no real possibility of harm in the 
conduct that Streitmatter relies upon, and, therefore, such conduct encompasses 
no actual threat. This Court stated the proposition clearly in Nimmo, 603 P.2d  
at 390, when we said that "[w]e believe it is ridiculous to impute to the 
legislature an intention to include innocent acts as criminal felonies." This 
statute does not extend constitutionally protected 
conduct.

[¶11]   Since the statute does not extend 
to constitutionally protected conduct, we review for facial unconstitutionality 
only if the statute specifies no standard of conduct at all. Griego v. State, 
761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988). The United States Supreme Court has identified a 
statute that encompasses no standard of conduct as "so indefinite that police, 
court, and jury were free to react to nothing more than their own preferences * 
* *." Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1250, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 
(1974). That description of a statute that has no standard of conduct is not 
applicable in construing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii). We decline to apply 
facial review to this case, and we hold that the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague on its face.

[¶12]   The claim of error in instructing 
the jury is intertwined with the claim of unconstitutionality regarding the 
element of intent. Streitmatter's argument is that reversible error was 
committed when the trial court refused two jury instructions requested by the 
defense. The jury instructions that were refused read:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
___

The State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crime of 
Aggravated Assault as described in instruction No. ___. In order for the State 
to prove the element of "threatens to use," it must prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Streitmatter actually threatened [the victim] with physical 
injury during the act of employing a deadly weapon.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
____

The crime of 
Aggravated Assault is a general dintent crime. This means that, in order for the 
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Streitmatter committed 
Aggravated Assult it mus also proves, beyond a reasobable doubt, that Mr. 
Streitmatter committed the charged act with an evil meaning 
mind.

We afford 
significant deference to the trial court in instructing the 
jury:

[T]he trial 
judge is afforded latitude to tailor the dinstructions to the facts of the case, 
and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed 
as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover 
the issues.

Scadden v. 
State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo. 1987), followed in Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶13]   Streitmatter argues that it was 
essential to give the first requested jury instruction because of a technical 
legal meaning attached to the phrase "[t]hreatens to use." The requested jury 
instruction follows our language in Johnston, and Streitmatter's contention is 
that this suggests a meaning so different from the ordinary meaning that the 
jury could misunderstand the import of the phrase. If Streitmatter's analysis 
were accurate, it would be incumbent upon the trial court to instruct the jury 
on the technical legal meaning of the term. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 
(Wyo. 1997). We hold, however, that the definition of the phrase "[t]hreatens to 
use" found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) does not afford a different 
meaning to that phrase than its ordinary meaning. Cox, 829 P.2d  at 1185. The 
jury instruction given by the trial court on the elements of the offense 
correctly tracked the statute. The essence of the argument by Streitmatter is 
that the phrase "actually threatened" encompasses different conduct than the 
word "threaten." There is no meaningful distinction between "threaten" and 
"actually threatened." The proposed jury instruction would have afforded no 
useful clarification to the jury, but instead it appears that it would likely 
cause the very confusion that Streitmatter claims it would 
remedy.

[¶14]   The second jury instruction 
requested by Streitmatter is premised upon a perceived necessity for us to 
redefine a general intent crime. Streitmatter is not satisfied with the 
connotation that has attached to a "general intent" crime in our prior cases. 
For some twenty years, our rule has been that to convict on a general intent 
crime, the jury need only find that the defendant intended to do the prohibited 
act. Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978). For even longer, it has 
been our rule that the jury may infer intent from the conduct of the defendant. 
Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68, 71 (Wyo. 1972). The jury instructions given by the 
trial court adequately addressed both of these 
propositions.

[¶15]   We assume that defense counsel is 
aware that the word "evil" is an emotionally charged word in the setting of our 
modern society in America. In asking that the jury be required to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt the commission of the act charged with an "evil meaning mind," 
Streitmatter simply invites the redefinition of the concept of general intent. 
We choose not to pursue that invitation. We do not reverse upon claims of 
instructional error so long as the trial court adequately instructed the jury on 
all the elements of the crime, and the trial court did that in this 
case.

[¶16]   The second claim of error that 
Streitmatter asserts is that the trial court should not have allowed Officer 
Smith to testify about statements made by the victim and the victim's daughter 
because their testimony was hearsay. We also afford deference to the rulings of 
a trial court on the admission or exclusion of evidence, and we reverse only if 
we find an abuse of discretion. Horton v. State, 764 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Wyo. 
1988). If a legitimate basis exists for the decision of the trial court, and it 
did not act in any unreasonable fashion, we sustain its ruling. Id. at 677 
(citing Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219 
(1985)).

[¶17]   The question then is whether the 
ruling of the trial court in admitting the testimony of the officer had a 
reasonable and legitimate basis. Hearsay is defined in W.R.E. 801(c): "`Hearsay' 
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." The utilization of hearsay is controlled by W.R.E. 802, which 
provides: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute." Testimony 
that would be excludable under W.R.E. 802 may be admitted pursuant to exceptions 
from that rule set forth in W.R.E. 803. In W.R.E. 803(2), an exception is found 
for "excited utterance," which is defined as: "A statement relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition[.]" The excited utterance exception 
is justified by the "special reliability that is furnished when excitement 
suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and fabrication." 2 McCormick on 
Evidence § 272 at 216 (4th ed. 1992).

[¶18]   Streitmatter's contention is that 
the recitation by the officer of the statements made by the victim and the 
victim's daughter does not fit within the scope of the excited utterance 
exception. Streitmatter points out correctly that we have identified several 
factors for trial courts to consider in determining whether the excited 
utterance exception applies, but the ultimate issue is whether the declarant's 
condition at the time the statement was uttered was such as to make the 
statement spontaneous, excited, or impulsive rather than the product of 
reflection and deliberation. Streitmatter then points to the forty-five minute 
interval between the threats by Streitmatter and the statements to the officer, 
and he argues that this was too long a time for the declarants to remain under 
the stress of excitement. A lapse of time of similar duration was discussed by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. 
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). 
That court refused to hold that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
permitting testimony recounting statements made forty-five to seventy-five 
minutes after the startling event. Examining the facts in the record, we are 
satisfied that they were sufficient to justify the determination by the trial 
court that the victim and her daughter were still under the stress of excitement 
when they spoke to the officer. The officer repeatedly testified that both the 
victim and the victim's daughter were still hysterical and very upset when he 
spoke with them. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted 
the testimony of the officer pursuant to W.R.E. 803(2).

[¶19]   As a final assertion of error, 
Streitmatter argues that the trial court should have permitted three defense 
witnesses to testify as to Streitmatter's mental and physical condition at the 
time of the offense. The proffered testimony was refused, and the record 
demonstrates that these witnesses would have testified that Streitmatter 
suffered from severe back pain, stress, post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
depression; was addicted to drugs and alcohol; and experienced seizures shortly 
after his arrest. The same rule with respect to an abuse of discretion applies 
to the exclusion of proffered evidence that pertains to the admission of 
proffered evidence. Horton, 764 P.2d  at 676-77. Streitmatter again rests his 
claim upon the difference between "threaten" and "actually threatened." The 
claim fails in this context as well. He argues that he was denied the 
opportunity to present a defense because the testimony that was rejected 
addresses the element of intent. He contends that the conditions identified in 
the proffered testimony preclude the formation of the necessary general intent, 
and that in turn precludes the existence of an "actual 
threat."

[¶20]   The crime of aggravated assault is 
a general intent crime, and its commission requires only that intent which the 
jury may infer from the commission of the proscribed act. Cox, 829 P.2d  at 1186. 
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime. Id. Mental 
illness indeed is a valid defense, but Streitmatter did not present a plea of 
not guilty by reason of mental illness or efficiency.1 The proposed testimony that 
Streitmatter sought to have admitted would not affect the element of general 
intent, and in the absence of a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness 
or deficiency, it was not relevant, and the trial court committed no abuse of 
discretion in excluding the testimony.

[¶21]   We have found no reversible error 
in the record such as that claimed on behalf of Streitmatter. The Judgment and 
Sentence of the Court is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
Streitmatter filed a motion to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency, but an evaluation at the Wyoming State Hospital 
established that he was not mentally ill as described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-304 (Michie 1997).