Title: Ward v. Ward

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-312


H. Grace Ward                                Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Lamoille Superior Court

Lewis R. Ward                                June Term, 1990


Alan W. Cook, J.

Williams and Green, Morrisville, for plaintiff-appellant

Edward B. French, Jr., of David B. Stackpole Law Offices, Stowe, for
  defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff wife appeals from a trial court judgment
granting a divorce, alleging that the court failed to grant her an adequate
portion of the marital estate, chose the wrong date for valuation of the
parties' home, failed to distribute certain rental income to which she was
entitled, and dismissed improperly her additional claims for assault and
battery.  We reverse on the issue of the property valuation date and
otherwise affirm.
     The parties were married in 1976, after signing an antenuptial
agreement in which they waived all claims to solely held property or
separate maintenance.  They separated in June 1986, and plaintiff filed for
divorce a month thereafter.  After the case was filed, the court granted
plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to include claims for assault and
battery.  Defendant thereafter counterclaimed for divorce and for damages
for assault and battery and emotional distress.
     At the time the action was filed the sole asset owned jointly by the
parties was their share of a residence in Hyde Park, which they held
together with two of the defendant's children.  Defendant had paid about
$11,000 of his own money for their interest in the property and, according
to the trial court, had spent about two thousand hours of his time
renovating it.  Plaintiff had contributed no funds and about one hundred
hours of her own time helping defendant with the construction.
     The marriage was a tumultuous and sometimes violent one.  The trial
court's findings detail defendant's assaultive conduct toward plaintiff,
together with a full account of plaintiff's own behavior and her responses
to the rocky relationship with defendant.  The court divided the blame for
the termination of the marriage:
         This Court is persuaded that each party contributed to
         the break up of the marriage, a marriage more in name
         than in practice.  Defendant was uncontrollably jealous
         of Plaintiff's attention and affection, be it to other
         male friends or to her children.  Defendant drank
         alcoholic beverages to excess, often at social
         gatherings.  This behavior heightened his jealousy,
         often resulting in verbal and physical assaults by
         Defendant on Plaintiff. .  .  .
            . . . .
            . . . Plaintiff contributed no money to the Hyde Park
         property and, in comparison to Defendant virtually no
         labor.  Plaintiff was more interested in spending her
         time at the Darling Road residence with her children
         than in establishing a permanent home with Defendant.
         This Court is persuaded that Plaintiff was unable or
         unwilling to totally cut the emotional tie she felt for
         her ex-husband.  She often showed more affection and
         concern for him than she did for Defendant.  Plaintiff
         made little or no attempt to hide her feelings in this
         regard from Defendant.  While in no way does Plaintiff's
         behavior excuse or justify Defendant's assaults,
         Plaintiff's disregard for Defendant significantly
         contributed to the end of the marriage.

Citing defendant's "abusive behavior" and plaintiff's "behavior and lack of
contribution," the court awarded each party a one-fourth interest in the
Hyde Park property.  The court expressly chose a valuation date near the
date of the separation in June of 1986, yielding a total net equity for the
four owners of $57,000, rather than a date closer to the date of the order.
In doing so, it rejected use of an October 1988 appraisal proffered by
plaintiff and showing a value of $87,000.  Since defendant was to retain his
interest in the property, the court ordered him to pay plaintiff the value
of her share, which it calculated at $14,250.  The court did not grant
plaintiff's request for a larger share of the value of the Hyde Park
residence, nor did it award her a share of the rental income derived from
the property during the pendency of the case.  The court's findings,
conclusions and order do not address the tort claim of the plaintiff or the
counterclaims of the defendant.
     Plaintiff argues first that the trial court erred in failing to make
findings and conclusions disposing of her amended complaint for assault and
battery.  Defendant responds that the trial court "basically found for the
Plaintiff on the issue of assault, and provided her compensation for her
damages by adjusting her interest in the homestead."
     We start by considering whether the count of plaintiff's complaint
which stated a cause of action for assault and battery was properly joined
with the divorce action and, thus, was properly before the trial court. (FN1)
The procedure in divorces is governed by V.R.C.P. 80.  Subdivision (a) of
that Rule states that the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure apply to divorce
actions unless otherwise provided in Rule 80.  The general rule on joinder
of claims is found in V.R.C.P. 18(a), which provides:  "[a] party asserting
a claim to relief as an original claim . . . may join, either as independent
or as alternate claims, as many claims either legal or equitable or both as
the party has against an opposing party."  If Rule 18(a) applies in this
context, it was proper to join the tort claim with the divorce claim in one
action.  For a number of reasons, we do not believe that Rule 18 applies in
this instance. (FN2)
     First, although Rule 80 does not specifically preclude the joinder of
other claims in a divorce action, such a result can be inferred from the
structure of the rule.  The rule provides for a specific type of complaint
and service.  See V.R.C.P. 80(b).  It specifically requires the plaintiff to
prove a case even though the defendant fails to answer, thereby ensuring
that defendant's rights are protected even in the absence of an answer.  See
V.R.C.P. 80(d).  It limits the scope of counterclaims and provides for
discovery, absent a showing of good cause, only on the issues of
maintenance, maintenance supplement, support and counsel fees.  See V.R.C.P.
80(f), (g).  It requires a cooling-off period before the hearing can be
scheduled where children are involved.  See V.R.C.P. 80(h).
     Two parts of the rule present difficulties in cases like this one.  The
counterclaim provision appears to preclude the counterclaims filed in this
case, an unfair result if plaintiff is not similarly prohibited from joining
her tort claim.  See V.R.C.P. 80(f) (counterclaims limited to "cause for
divorce or annulment of marriage"); Reporter's Notes, V.R.C.P. 80 ("other
claims that would be compulsory under Rule 13(a) . . . may thus be asserted
in a subsequent action").  The discovery provision does not authorize
discovery as of right on the tort claim although discovery would be
routinely allowed on such a claim if filed independently.  See V.R.C.P.
80(g).  If discovery is allowed on the tort claim as of right, court
control over discovery on non-monetary issues in the divorce would be lost.
     Further, our precedents are more consistent with the view that joining
other claims with a divorce action is improper.  The most important
precedent is Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 438,