Title: Adair, Adm'x v. Valley Flying Service

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed with directions November 14, 1952.
*480 Howard K. Beebe, of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Maguire, Shields, Morrison & Bailey, of Portland.
C.S. Emmons argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Willis, Kyle & Emmons, of Albany.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TOOZE, J.
This is an action for damages for the alleged wrongful death of Darius C. Adair, plaintiff's intestate, caused by an airplane accident. The case was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $10,000; defendant appeals.
Defendant Valley Flying Service is an Oregon corporation, engaged in an airport and airplane rental business at Sweet Home airport, near the city of Sweet Home, in Linn county, Oregon.
On September 18, 1948, one Frederick Richard Redding rented from defendant a plane for the purpose of flying for pleasure in the locality of the airport. Redding had rented a plane from defendant upon prior occasions and was an experienced pilot. When he rented the plane, Redding was accompanied by his friend, plaintiff's intestate, who became a passenger therein. Redding piloted the plane up a canyon at a height of approximately 30 feet above the trees growing therein and eventually collided with some of the trees, completely wrecking the plane and causing the deaths of both himself and plaintiff's intestate.
*481 This action is brought by plaintiff Veta Adair, as administratrix of the estate of Darius C. Adair, deceased, for the benefit of herself, as widow, and for the benefit of two surviving minor children and dependents, of decedent, pursuant to the provisions of § 8-903, OCLA.
On September 13, 1950, plaintiff filed in the circuit court for Linn county her amended complaint which, omitting formal parts, alleges as follows:
Defendant's answer consisted simply of a general denial. The defense of contributory negligence was not affirmatively pleaded.
1. A right of action for the wrongful death of a person is statutory. In this state it is governed by the provisions of § 8-903, OCLA, which partially provides as follows:
Under the express provisions of this statute, the test of the right of a personal representative of a deceased person to maintain an action for wrongful death is whether the deceased person, had he lived, could have maintained an action against the alleged wrong-doer for an injury caused by the same act or omission.
2, 3. It is a well-established general rule in this state that contributory negligence is an affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded, or it is waived. However, there is a well-recognized exception to that rule. *484 If plaintiff's own evidence clearly discloses contributory negligence on his part, as a matter of law, or if the fact of such negligence is disclosed or put in issue by the allegations of the complaint, no recovery can be had by plaintiff, even though contributory negligence has not been specially pleaded as a defense. Flatman v. Lulay Brothers, 175 Or 495, 500, 154 P2d 535; 38 Am Jur, Negligence, 966, § 278; 65 CJS, Negligence, 926, § 198 (c).
In 65 CJS, Negligence, 926, § 198(c), the rule is thus stated:
4. Contributory negligence is the neglect of the duty imposed upon all men to observe ordinary care for *485 their own safety. It is the doing of something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do, or the failure to do something that a person of ordinary prudence would do, under the circumstances. 38 Am Jur, Negligence, 858, § 181.
The law imposes on a person sui juris the obligation to use ordinary care for his own protection, the degree of which is commensurate with the danger to be avoided. Burroughs v. Southern Pacific Co., 153 Or 431, 56 P2d 1145; Carroll v. Grande Ronde Elec. Co., 47 Or 424, 84 P 389, 6 LRA NS 290.
In the briefs filed on this appeal and in the oral arguments before this court, the parties discussed at length the alleged negligence on the part of defendant. Defendant insists that the evidence offered as to intoxication on the part of Redding is insufficient to establish that fact; and further, that such evidence did not suffice to put defendant on notice that either Redding or plaintiff's intestate had been drinking intoxicating liquor. Neither party argued the sufficiency of the pleadings.
5. It is our opinion that the amended complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and was subject to demurrer on that ground. No demurrer was filed. However, it is firmly established by the decisions of this court that the failure of a complaint to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is not waived by answer, and the question as to the sufficiency of a complaint may be raised at any time. It may be raised for the first time in this court, and it may be noted by the court of its own motion. It is unnecessary to cite the numerous decisions of this court in which these rules have been stated and restated.
6. Upon the face of the complaint (paragraph III *486 thereof, supra), it conclusively appears that the decedent, Darius C. Adair, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
It is manifest that Redding was guilty of negligence in operating an airplane while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. By voluntarily becoming a passenger in the airplane operated by Redding when he, Redding, was visibly intoxicated as alleged, Darius C. Adair must be presumed to have acquiesced in such negligent operation. As a matter of law, he failed to exercise that degree of care for his own protection that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in like or similar circumstances and, therefore, was guilty of contributory negligence.
In Petersen v. Abrams and Leatham, 188 Or 518, 523, 216 P2d 664, in speaking of the degree of care required of a guest in an automobile, this court said:
See also Willoughby v. Driscoll, 168 Or 187, 203, 120 P2d 768, 121 P2d 917.
Considering the nature of an airplane and what its operation in the air entails, the above rule applies *487 with particular force to one who enters an airplane as the guest of a pilot who is visibly intoxicated.
It appears from the allegations of the complaint that, had he lived, Darius C. Adair would have had no cause of action against defendant, growing out of the airplane accident, even conceding defendant's negligence as alleged. It follows, therefore, that no cause of action exists in favor of plaintiff.
The judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the action.