Title: Irvin v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

282 N.E.2d 825 (1972)
Phillip IRVIN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 671S150.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 30, 1972.
Rehearing Denied July 11, 1972.
David F. McNamar, Steers, Klee, Sullivan & LeMay, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Clase, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
DeBRULER, Justice.
The appellant was indicted for a violation of the 1935 Narcotics Act (as amended) which indictment charges in relevant portion that the appellant:
The appellant was tried in the Criminal Court of Marion County before the Honorable Saul I. Rabb, Judge, sitting without a jury, and found guilty. He was sentenced to not less than one nor more than five years. On this appeal, the appellant alleges that the evidence introduced against him should have been excluded because he was illegally arrested, and that even if the evidence was admissible, it was insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction on this charge. Specifically he argues that there was no competent evidence on the issue of intent to use the eye-dropper and needle found on him for the injection of narcotic drugs.
The State relied in this case on the testimony of the arresting officer only. The crucial portion of his testimony as it relates to the evidence in this case is as follows:
Thereafter, State's Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence. This Exhibit consisted of a manilla envelope containing an eye-dropper, black socks, matches and a cooker cap. After this evidence was admitted, the officer testified as follows:
The appellant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the evidence was seized following an illegal arrest. Since this search was conducted outside the judicial process, that is, not under the auspices of a legally obtained search warrant, its justification must be drawn from one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirements of our State and Federal Constitutions. Sayne v. State (1972), Ind., 279 N.E.2d 196. The exception relied upon by the State in this case, and denied by the appellant, is that this search was incident to a legal arrest. As we pointed out in Paxton v. State (1970), Ind., 263 N.E.2d 636, relying on Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, following a legal arrest:
The appellant argues that this exception to the warrant requirement cannot be invoked in this case because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the appellant until after he had searched him and found the paraphernalia. He cites in support of his contention the cases of Enlow v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 156, 125 N.E.2d 250, and Crowe v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 562, 243 N.E.2d 759, both of which excluded evidence gathered after an illegal arrest. However, we do not find those cases appropriate since both involved situations in which the officer's arrest was based on a mere hunch or suspicion unsupported by articulable facts indicating that the felony is being or has been committed by the person arrested. In the case at bar, the officer testified that he had made other arrests involving the use of narcotics, that the appellant was on his knees and incoherent in the hall of the apartment, that his eyes were contracted, and that he found a cooker cap and several matches near the appellant. Although it is obvious, as the appellant points out, that there could conceivably be an innocent explanation for what the officer saw, these facts, in our opinion, do supply the requisite probable cause necessary to support this arrest. The arrest being legal, the resulting search of the person of the appellant was justified and the evidence seized in that search was properly admitted at the trial.
The appellant next urges that the decision of the trial court was not supported by sufficient evidence in that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a specific intent to violate the 1935 Narcotic Act. The appellant was convicted under I.C. 1971, XX-XX-X-X, being Burns' § 10-3520(c), which makes it unlawful:
As we said in Taylor v. State (1971), Ind., 267 N.E.2d 383:
The appellant argues that no intent to use the material found was proven in this case and that, therefore, his case of possession of the instruments would not be punishable under this statute. In Taylor, supra, we reversed the conviction where the narcotics paraphernalia was found on the appellant after he had been arrested for shoplifting. There was no evidence in Taylor connecting the defendant with the use of drugs. In a similar situation, in Stevens v. State (1971), Ind., 275 N.E.2d 12, we affirmed a conviction under this statute, where the appellant was found with similar paraphernalia after being arrested for shoplifting. However, Stevens unlike Taylor, had needle marks in his arm indicating narcotic injections and he admitted his prior involvement with narcotics. We held these facts sufficient to distinguish the Stevens case from Taylor, supra. Similarly, in the case at bar, the officer testified that in his opinion the appellant had just injected himself with narcotics. This opinion was born out by the appellant's physical condition as well as the presence of the cooker, matches, eye-dropper, needle, and the presence of a fresh puncture mark on the appellant's arm. Looking to the officer's testimony and the reasonable inferences therefrom which support the finding of the trial court, we find that the facts stated supply sufficient evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.