Title: CURTIS TRUMBULL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CURTIS TRUMBULL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 103214 P.3d 978Case Number: S-08-0242Decided: 08/20/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
CURTIS 
TRUMBULL,Appellant(Defendant),v.  THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Meri V. 
Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Ramsey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Curtis 
Trumbull (Trumbull), was convicted of two counts of third degree sexual assault 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).  The victim of this crime was his own 
child.  She was ten years old at the 
time the acts constituting the crimes occurred in June and early July of 
2006.  Trumbull was sentenced to two 
concurrent sentences of 4-6 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  In this appeal, he asserts that the 
evidence introduced at his trial before the district court sitting without a 
jury was insufficient to sustain the presiding judge's finding of guilt.  He also contends that the district court 
erred because it did not indicate in the written sentence (or otherwise) that it 
had considered probation as a potential sentence.  We will affirm Trumbull's convictions, 
but we reverse the sentences imposed and remand this matter to the district 
court for resentencing.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Trumbull raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Was there sufficient evidence to convict 
[Trumbull]?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err in sentencing when it did not consider 
probation?

 
 
The 
State rephrases those issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the State present sufficient evidence for the trial court to 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Trumbull] was guilty of two counts of 
third degree sexual assault, a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-304(a)(ii)?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court properly consider probation thereby rendering 
harmless any error in pronouncing [Trumbull's] sentence?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      A couple of 
prefatory matters deserve brief mention.  
The record on appeal does not contain a document identified as a 
Judgment.  See W.R.Cr.P. 
32(b)(2).  As a general rule, in a 
criminal case the trial court need not articulate detailed findings unless one 
of the parties requests it before the trial begins.  W.R.Cr.P. 23(c).  No such request was made in this 
case.  The record does contain an 
"Order on July 2, 2008 Sentencing."

 
 
[¶4]      Trumbull was 
charged with, and convicted of, two counts of sexual assault in the third 
degree, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005):1

 
 
            
(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, 
under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or second 
degree:

                        
.

 
 
(ii)  The 
actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age of fourteen (14) years to 
sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without 
causing serious bodily injury to the victim;

 
 
[¶5]      "Sexual contact" 
is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2009) 
thus:

 
 
            
(vi)  "Sexual contact" means touching, with the intention of 
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the 
actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing 
covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate 
parts;

 
 
[¶6]      "Intimate parts' 
means the external genitalia, perineum, anus or pubes of any person or the 
breast of a female person."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a) (ii) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶7]      The only witness 
called by the State at trial was the victim.  Her testimony was to the effect that 
during June and early July of 2006, she visited Trumbull at his home which he 
shared with his girlfriend Rachel Allen.  
The victim told about two events that occurred while she was staying with 
Trumbull.  During both of those 
events Trumbull "massaged" the victim.  
The victim testified that during the massages Trumbull touched her on her 
"legs, arms, boobs, privates, butt, and girl spot."  The victim was clothed during the 
massages.  In order to demonstrate 
more clearly for the trial court, the victim pointed out the parts of her body 
she described, on a demonstrative exhibit.  
It was evident from the testimony, in combination with the exhibit, that 
"girl spot" referred to the vaginal area.

 
 
[¶8]      The Presentence 
Investigation Report contained a recommendation to the district court that 
Trumbull be sentenced to a term of incarceration, but that the term of 
incarceration be suspended in favor of supervised probation, or a split-sentence 
with probation (jail time in local facility followed by probation).  It was further recommended that Trumbull 
be placed in Intensive Supervised Probation and that a number of other stringent 
conditions be imposed in connection with his probation.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶9]      Trumbull was 
tried before the district court sitting without a jury.  For its statement of the applicable 
standard of review, Trumbull referred only to cases that restate the jury's 
place in performing the role of making fact and credibility determinations.  The State, on the other hand, referred 
only to civil or quasi-criminal cases wherein we apply the well-known "clearly 
erroneous" standard.  To ensure 
there is no confusion in this regard, we quote this long-standing articulation 
of the pertinent standard of review:

 
 
In 
discussing the facts of this case, we apply the principle that the evidence 
should be examined in the light most favorable to the State when a question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence is raised.  
We accept as true evidence favorable to the State; we disregard evidence 
favorable to the defendant in conflict with the State's evidence; and we afford 
to the State's evidence every favorable inference which may reasonably and 
fairly be drawn from it.  Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386 
(1979); Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 (1979).  Heretofore we 
have had occasion to apply these concepts only to cases tried before 
juries.  We have no compunction, 
however, in joining other courts which have applied these concepts in trials to 
the court.  Simmons v. State, 255 Ark. 82, 498 S.W.2d 870 (1973); People v. Johnson, 
276 Cal. App. 2d 232, 80 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969).  The function of the finder of fact in 
cases tried to a court is identical to that in cases tried to juries, and the 
same rules are applicable with respect to the standards and principles applied 
in appellate review.

 
 

Fitzgerald 
v. State, 
599 P.2d 573, 574 (Wyo. 1979); see Lopez 
v. State, 788 P.2d 1150 1152 (Wyo. 1990); Tennant v. State, 776 P.2d 761, 763 
(Wyo. 1989); State v. Maldonado, 108 Hawai'i 436, 121 P.3d 901, 907 (Hawai'i 2005); compare Odhinn v. State, 2003 WY 169, ¶ 13, 
82 P.3d 715, 719 (review under "clearly erroneous" standard is correct as to the 
denial of his motion to dismiss based on lack of a speedy trial); and In re Avery, 2002 WY 87, ¶ 5, 47 P.3d 973, 975 ("clearly erroneous" standard may be correct standard where issue 
before district court is defendant's classification under the Sex Offender 
Registration Act).

 
 
[¶10]   The only witness called by the 
State was the victim and we summarized the gravamen of her testimony 
above.

 
 
[¶11]   The essence of Trumbull's claim is 
that, although the evidence established that he may have committed a touching as 
set out in the governing statute, there was no evidence that the touching was 
accomplished with the required mens 
rea, i.e., "touching, with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification 
or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the actor[.]"  § 6-2-301(a)(vi).  In Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596 
(Wyo. 1993) we opined, albeit in a considerably different 
context:

 
 
Of 
the five-factor analysis in Bishop, 
appellant's appeal focuses on only two, viz., purpose and materiality.  He contends that the prosecution's 
stated purposes of motive and identity were bogus in that motive is not an 
element of the crime charged and identity was not a disputed material 
issue.  Our reading of the 
second-degree sexual assault statute and the information in this case reveals 
that this case, like the typical prosecution case, is reducible to three 
elements:  (1) someone committed the 
criminal act (actus reus) alleged in 
the information, i.e., intrusion of the perpetrator's finger inside the victim's 
vagina;  (2) the perpetrator 
possessed the requisite guilty state of mind (mens rea);  i.e., for the purpose of sexual arousal, 
gratification, or abuse; and (3) the perpetrator was the defendant 
(identity).  See, EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 3.01 at 3 and § 4.01 at 2 (1992 
& Supp.1993).  In this 
particular prosecution, the accused pleaded not guilty, defending on the ground 
that the crime charged never happened.  
He asserted the victim had fabricated the allegations.  He did not offer to stipulate to any of 
the three essential elements of the crime charged, such as the occurrence of the 
criminal act and the perpetrator's possession of the requisite guilty state of 
mind, while still disputing the identity element.  By defending on the ground that the 
charged crime never happened, the accused necessarily put into material dispute 
each of the three elements of the charged crime.  To accord the accused due process, the 
prosecution had to prove each one of the three essential elements of the charged 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
[¶12]   This case presents a considerably 
different scenario.  Trumbull did 
not attempt to deny that he had massaged his daughter, although he did not 
himself testify about the incidents at issue.  His mother appeared as a witness and her 
testimony was to the effect that she was present in Trumbull's household on both 
occasions where the victim claimed to have been the object of sexual 
contact/abuse.  Trumbull's mother 
testified that she did not observe any inappropriate touching, although she 
confirmed that Trumbull did give his daughter "massages."  Trumbull's girlfriend did not make 
herself available as a witness at trial.  
However, Trumbull deemed her testimony very important, and the parties 
agreed that her preliminary hearing testimony could be played for the judge, in 
lieu of her live testimony.  That 
testimony tended to exonerate Trumbull and it also confirmed that Trumbull gave 
his daughter massages.  The "reason" 
for her reluctance to appear as a witness is only made evident by that 
testimony, i.e., she too had been criminally charged in connection with the 
incidents at issue herein.

 
 
[¶13]   With this evidence in mind, we 
confront the sufficiency of the evidence issue posed here.  Had Trumbull's case been tried before a 
jury, we would be faced with a more difficult question.  However, since this matter was tried to 
the district court sitting without a jury, we are not concerned with how the 
jury instructions should have been formulated, given the language contained in 
the governing statute.  It suffices 
to note here that where a statute criminalizing sexual contact contains an 
element of sexual gratification, it is not enough to establish that the 
defendant merely touched the sexual or intimate parts of an individual.  The law at issue requires the presence 
of intent of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.  However;

 
 
An 
oral expression of intent is not required to establish a defendant's 
intent.  Intent in a sexual assault 
may be established through defendant's conduct and circumstances of physical 
contact.  Intent of sexual 
gratification may be inferred from touching the complainant on more than one 
occasion, and committing the act after no adults were remaining in the 
house.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
2 
Paul DerOhannesian II, Sexual Assault 
Trials, § 16.19 (Instructions concerning the element of intent  Sexual 
gratification in touching or sexual contact), 326 (3rd ed. 2006); also see Ladnier v. State, 878 So. 2d 926, 929-30 
(Miss. 2004); and Farmer v. State, 15 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Ark. 2000).  Here, 
we conclude that the trial judge would have been justified in finding 
"gratification" based upon the two virtually identical touchings.  The above quoted treatise, as well as 
the illustrative cases cited, serve as guidance for fact finders about the sorts 
of evidence needed to support the "gratification" element, although they do 
discuss factual circumstances not directly applicable to this 
case.

 
 
[¶14]   We conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient so that the district court could find that Trumbull acted with the 
intention of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.

 
 
Failure 
of District Court to Articulate, in the Written Sentence, that it Considered 
Probation

 
 
[¶15]   At no point in the proceedings 
before the district court, or in its "Order on July 2, 2008 Sentencing," did the 
district court mention the word probation.  
We do take note that the principal issue before the trial court, at 
sentencing, was whether it would effectuate the Presentence Investigation 
Report's recommendation that Trumbull be placed on probation.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(D) contains this 
mandate:

 
 
            
(c)  Sentence. 

            
.

            
(2)  Contents. -- A 
written sentence shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk of court 
without delay.  The sentence 
may be included in the judgment or separately entered.  Except for forfeit offenses for which 
citations have issued, other misdemeanors where the penalty imposed does not 
exceed a fine of $200.00, and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), as a minimum the sentence 
shall:

                        
(A)  State each offense for which sentence is imposed, 
including the statute number and whether the offense is a felony or a 
misdemeanor;

                        
(B)  State the sentence imposed for each convicted offense 
including for felonies the minimum and maximum term and state whether multiple 
sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively;

                        
(C)  State whether the sentence is to run concurrently with or 
consecutive to any other sentence being served or to be served by the 
defendant;

                        
(D)  If probation is 
not granted, state whether probation was considered by the 
court;

                        
(E)  Include a finding of all time served by the defendant in 
presentence confinement for any sentenced offense;

                        
(F)  State the extent to which credit for presentence 
confinement is to be given for each sentenced offense;

                        
(G)  Include an assessment for the victims of crime 
compensation fund as required by W.S. 1-40-119; and

                        
(H)  Include a finding as to whether the defendant is able to 
make restitution and if restitution is ordered fix the reasonable amount owed to 
each victim resulting from the defendant's criminal acts.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
See 
Martinez v. State, 2002 WY 10, 
¶¶ 10-13, 39 P.3d 394, 396-97 (Wyo. 2002); and compare Bloomer v. State, 2009 WY 77, 
¶¶ 18-21, 209 P.3d 574, 592-93 (Wyo. 2009) and Guinn v. State, 2009 WY 15, ¶¶ 6-7, 
201 P.3d 423, 424 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶16]   Trumbull contends that the mandate 
of the rule cited above should require a new sentencing.  The State contends that the record 
establishes with adequate certainty that probation was front and center at the 
sentencing.  We agree that the focus 
of sentencing was the Presentence Report's recommendation that Trumbull be 
placed on probation.  However, we 
deem this factor one that makes the sentencing order's silence on probation all 
the more puzzling.  The cases cited 
immediately above emphasize that the district court's handling of the issue of 
probation at sentencing involves a fundamental right, and we consider it too 
important to be decided on the basis of treating the district court's absolute 
silence as a tacit "consideration" of probation.  In the face of the matter having been 
broached to the trial court, an implied, but not actually expressed rejection of 
probation simply does not suffice.  
The rule we adopt today requires that the district court meaningfully 
adhere to the requirement that probation be considered as an alternative 
sentence in accordance with the governing rule and our many precedents on that 
subject (excepting cases punishable by death, life without parole, or a life 
sentence).  Failure to express that 
plainly in the written sentence will result in reversal of the 
sentence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   Trumbull's convictions are 
affirmed.  The district court's 
sentence is reversed and this matter is remanded to the district court with 
directions that sentencing be considered anew in a manner consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The statutes that applied in this case were substantially amended in 
2007.