Title: Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 89551, 89560 cons.-Agenda 18-March 2001.
JOHN STEINBRECHER et al., Appellants, v. ROSEMARY 								STEINBRECHER, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 27, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	In November 1995, John Steinbrecher (John) filed suit under
the Illinois partition act (735 ILCS 5/17-101 et seq. (West 1994))
against his two siblings, Jerome and Rosemary (Rosemary)
Steinbrecher, to partition or sell three parcels of land located in
Kendall County. At the close of the partition trial, the circuit court
held that each sibling held an undivided one-third interest as
tenants in common, but that the property could not be divided
"without manifest prejudice." The circuit court ordered public sale
of the entire property. Thereafter, the circuit court approved the
offer of the highest bidder, Moser Enterprises, Inc. (Moser);
confirmed the sale to Moser in open court; and directed that the
deed be recorded in Moser's name. Rosemary never perfected a
motion to stay judgment and filed her notice of appeal 49 days
after the circuit court order. The appellate court determined that
Rosemary's procedural errors did not bar her appeal. The appellate
court vacated the sale of property to Moser and remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings. 312 Ill. App. 3d 289. We now
reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On January 21, 1991, Francis Steinbrecher died intestate,
survived by his three children, John, Jerome, and Rosemary. As
heirs and beneficiaries of the estate of Francis Steinbrecher, John,
Jerome, and Rosemary held title as tenants in common to three
separate land parcels situated in Kendall County, totaling 409
acres. In November 1995, John filed suit under the Illinois
partition act against Jerome and Rosemary in order to partition, or
sell in the event partitioning was infeasible, the property.
	In August 1996, pursuant to the partition act the trial court
appointed a real estate consultant as commissioner to "evaluate the
feasibility of partitioning" the property.(1) This commissioner
surveyed the property and prepared a written
"Appraisal/Commissioner Report" for the court.
	At the partition trial in August 1997, consistent with his
report, the commissioner testified that the property was incapable
of equitable partition-in-kind between the three heirs. He stated
that the property consisted of three noncontiguous parcels with
widely varied characteristics. For example, the property contained
farmland and wooded acreage on a flood plane. Moreover, the
location and man-made obstacles such as a railroad track, a county
road, and a running creek, further prevented an equal three-way
division of the property. Neither Jerome nor Rosemary presented
evidence to the trial court to refute the commissioner's testimony.
	After reviewing the evidence, the trial court ruled that John,
Jerome, and Rosemary each held an undivided one-third interest
as tenants in common, that the property could not be divided
without manifest prejudice, and that the property should be sold at
a public sale.
	In 1998, the exclusive listing agent approved by the court
listed the property for a price of $4.5 million. In August 1998,
after the trial court was notified by the agent of three offers to
purchase, the trial court approved the $3.5 million offer of the
highest bidder, Moser. In open court on September 24, 1998, the
trial court confirmed the sale, directed a quitclaim deed be
recorded in Moser's name, and entered a Rule 304(a) finding (155
Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) regarding the sale to Moser. Pursuant to the sale,
monies were disbursed, including the IRS liens, marketing and
advertising fees, the mortgage, closing costs, and attorney fees.
	On September 25, 1998, Rosemary filed a pro se "Motion for
Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal and Rehearing Re: Deposition"
which she noticed for hearing on October 2, 1998. On October 2,
the trial court continued the motion for hearing to October 30,
1998. The trial court then addressed Rosemary:
			"THE COURT: *** I told you a long time ago that I'm
not going to hear this thing every other day. Just because
you want to file a motion doesn't mean I'm going to hear
it. I told you to file things once a month. We've set a date
for a motion sometime later in this month.
* * *
			Now, yet, you continually file motions. You continually
get the-the Clerk's office has to bring this file down here.
The other attorney has to come in. He was here all
morning. And I've told you in the past I'm not going to
hear this just because you want to file a motion and notice
it up on whatever day you want to notice it up. Now, I will
hear the-everything you have, whatever it is, on the next
court date
* * *
			Now if you do this again, I'm going to start imposing
sanctions against you. We're not going to be disrupting
everybody's life simply because you want to file a motion,
especially when I've given you a date in the future.
			ROSEMARY: Your Honor, the date in the future had
nothing to do with this particular issue.
			THE COURT: What difference does that make? It's
[sic] court date where everybody is supposed to be here,
correct? Do you think I'm going to sit here and have
everybody come in here every day just because you want
to file a motion and you want to be heard on this day
because you happen to be available?
			ROSEMARY: I thought time might be of the essence,
in fairness to the parties.
			THE COURT: I doubt, in this case, time is of the
essence to anybody. As I said, do it again and I'm going
to start imposing sanctions against you. Okay?"
	On October 30, 35 days after the court's final judgment,
Rosemary appeared for hearing on her stay of judgment motion.
Additionally, Rosemary filed and presented for hearing a new
motion, entitled "Motion to Declare Void the Sale of Property to
Moser Enterprises, Inc." The trial court denied Rosemary's motion
to void the sale and denied Rosemary's motion to stay the
judgment. Rosemary never filed a motion with the appellate court
to stay the judgment.
	Despite the September 24, 1998, order granting right, title,
and interest to Moser, Rosemary refused to vacate the Kendall
County property. As a result, on October 30, 1998, Moser sought
leave to intervene for the limited purpose of "enforc[ing] its right
to possession." This was Moser's first appearance in the litigation.
The trial court granted Moser's petition for leave to intervene,
granted Moser's motion for possession, and ordered Rosemary to
vacate the property on or before November 13, 1998.
	On November 13, 49 days after Moser was granted exclusive
possession of the property, Rosemary filed a notice of appeal. John
moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appellate court
lacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was untimely and
because the appeal was moot pursuant to the protections afforded
third-party purchasers under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(j)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j)).
	 The appellate court held that procedural errors did not bar
Rosemary's appeal because the threat of sanctions voiced by the
trial judge to Rosemary, a pro se litigant,(2) "were confusing and
likely had the effect of keeping her from filing her motion" within
the proper time period. 312 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297. By the term "her
motion" the appellate court referred to Rosemary's October 30,
1998, "Motion to Declare Void the Sale," which it labeled a post-judgment motion. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297. According to the
appellate court, the October 30 post-judgment motion served to
toll the period for appeal such that the notice of appeal filed on
November 13, 1998, was timely. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297.
Additionally, the appellate court held that the issue was not moot
because Moser's post-sale, post-judgment intervention on October
30, 1998, barred the application of Rule 305(j) and any protection
it afforded nonparty purchasers. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297-98. The
appellate court then vacated the sale of the property and remanded
for further proceedings to determine, again, whether the property
could be partitioned without manifest prejudice. 312 Ill. App. 3d
at 305.
	Following entry of the appellate court judgment, Moser
moved to intervene in order to file a petition for rehearing. On
April 19, 2000, the appellate court granted Moser leave to
intervene but denied its petition for rehearing. On May 24, 2000,
Moser timely filed its petition for leave to appeal to this court. On
July 5, 2000, John timely filed his petition for leave to appeal to
this court. We granted the petitions and consolidated the appeals.



ANALYSIS
	As an initial matter, John and Moser contend that the
appellate court committed reversible error because it lacked
jurisdiction due to Rosemary's failure to file a timely notice of
appeal. Rosemary filed her notice of appeal on November 13,
1998, 49 days after the trial court entered its final judgment. They
contend that the notice of appeal was untimely under Rule 303(a),
and that her "Motion to Declare Void the Sale" filed on October
30, 1998, did not toll the time to file her notice of appeal because
it was also untimely under section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a); 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West
1998)). Moreover, they contend that even if the motion to void
was timely, it did not toll the time to appeal because the motion
was an insufficient post-judgment motion under section
2-1203(a). Anderson v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342 (1990) (a post-judgment motion must include a request for at
least one form of relief specified in section 2-1203 and allege
grounds that warrant the relief); accord Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232 (1991); but see Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d
891 (1998) (holding that section 2-1203 does not require
specificity despite judicial dictum stating to the contrary), vacated
& appeal dismissed, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000).
	It is a well-established proposition that jurisdiction only arises
in the appellate court when a party timely files a notice of appeal.
Berg, 193 Ill. 2d  at 189; Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538 (1984); 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. Under Rule 303(a),
entitled "Appeals from Final Judgments of the Circuit Court in
Civil Cases," a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after
entry of a final judgment or within 30 days after the entry of an
order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion. 155 Ill.
2d R. 303(a). Section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
addresses the timing of the post-judgment motions referred to in
Rule 303(a). According to section 2-1203(a), "[i]n all cases tried
without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the
judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the
30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or
a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment
or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 1998).
	Whether Rosemary's notice of appeal was timely filed is
dependent on whether her October 30, 1998, "Motion to Declare
Void the Sale to Moser Enterprises, Inc." was a sufficient post-judgment motion under section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and whether Rosemary timely filed that motion. Only
a sufficient post-judgment motion, timely filed, will toll the 30-day
period for filing a notice of appeal.
	In addressing these matters, the appellate court held that
Rosemary's October 30 motion was essentially a motion to
reconsider, which is a proper post-judgment motion under section
2-1203. As to the timeliness of the October 30 motion, the
appellate court held that under the circumstances of this case, the
motion was timely and it thus served to toll the 30-day appeal
period. The appellate court explained that, although pro
se litigants are presumed to know the procedural rules, "when, as
here, a trial court threatens sanctions for the filing of motions,
such a litigant must be given considerable leeway in meeting
procedural requirements." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297.
	We need not decide whether Rosemary's October 30 motion
was a proper motion under section 2-1203 or whether the trial
judge's egregious comments excuse Rosemary's failure to file her
motion within 30 days of the court's September 24, 1998, final
order. Rather, we agree with John and Moser that Rosemary's
appeal is moot, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305(j), and that
jurisdiction is therefore lacking. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).
	An appeal is moot when it involves no actual controversy or
the reviewing court cannot grant the complaining party effectual
relief. Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 133-34 (1945). Courts of
review will generally not consider moot or abstract questions
because our jurisdiction is restricted to cases which present an
actual controversy. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 130-31 (1994); People ex rel. Partee v. Murphy, 133 Ill. 2d 402 (1990); Barnard, 392 Ill.  at 133-34. If this court extends
Moser Rule 305(j) protection, the issue is moot and any judgment
or reversal by a reviewing court is without effect. 
	Pursuant to Rule 305(j), John and Moser argue that when the
trial court granted right, title, and interest to a nonparty on
September 24, 1998, and Rosemary failed to perfect a stay of that
judgment, any order invalidating that judgment and sale is without
effect. Whether Rule 305(j) renders this matter moot involves the
application of law to undisputed facts. Therefore, our review is de
novo. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204-05 (1999).
	Rule 305(j) protects third-party purchasers of property from
appellate reversals or modifications of judgments regarding the
property, absent a stay of judgment pending the appeal. Rule
305(j) provides:
			"If a stay is not perfected within the time for filing the
notice of appeal, or within any extension of time granted
under subparagraph (c) of this rule, the reversal or
modification of the judgment does not affect the right,
title, or interest of any person who is not a party to the
action in or to any real or personal property that is
acquired after the judgment becomes final and before the
judgment is stayed; nor shall the reversal or modification
affect any right of any person who is not a party to the
action under or by virtue of any certificate of sale issued
pursuant to a sale based on the judgment and before the
judgment is stayed." 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).
Thus, Rule 305(j) requires (1) the property passed pursuant to a
final judgment; (2) the right, title and interest of the property
passed to a person or entity who is not part of the proceeding; and
(3) the litigating party failed to perfect stay of judgment within the
time allowed for filing a notice of appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).(3)
	We now apply those requirements to the instant case. First, on
September 24, 1998, the right, title and interest to the Kendall
County property passed pursuant to a final judgment. A final
judgment disposes of the rights of the parties. In re Estate of
French, 166 Ill. 2d 95, 101 (1995). Particularly, the final judgment
"decides the controversies between the parties on the merits and
fixes their rights, so that, if the judgment is affirmed, nothing
remains for the trial court to do but to proceed with its execution."
In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (1982); see also Black's Law
Dictionary 847 (7th ed. 1999) (a final judgment is a "court's last
action that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues
in controversy, except for the award of costs *** and enforcement
of the judgment"). Where multiple parties are involved in the
litigation, a court may enter a final judgment pursuant to Rule
304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). A Rule 304(a) finding renders a
judgment final, enforceable, and appealable.
	In this case, all issues in controversy concerned the
disposition of the Kendall County property. The trial court
confirmed the sale of that property, directed a quitclaim deed be
recorded, and entered a Rule 304(a) finding regarding the sale on
September 24, 1998. Under Rule 304(a), this was a "final
judgment" and therefore satisfies the first element of Rule 305(j).
	Second, the property passed to a nonparty to the litigation,
Moser. A party is defined as "[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit
is brought." Black's Law Dictionary 1144 (7th ed. 1999). This
includes a person who has a stake or standing in the lawsuit and
one who is entitled to enforce rights from the final outcome of the
litigation. Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93 (1988).
	Under Rule 305(j) a person or entity is deemed a nonparty at
the time of the judgment and sale. Its language compels this
conclusion. Specifically, in regard to minors or persons with
disabilities, the text provides that "[t]his paragraph applies even if
the appellant is a minor or a person under legal disability or under
duress at the time the judgment becomes final." 155 Ill. 2d R.
305(j). Thus, the rule clearly evaluates and assigns status at the
time of the judgment and sale.
	John initiated his partition claim in November 1995. On
September 24, 1998, the trial court approved the offer, ordered the
quitclaim deed entered in Moser's name, and entered a 304(a)
finding. When Moser acquired title pursuant to the judgment and
sale, and at all times prior, neither was it "[o]ne by or against
whom a lawsuit is brought" nor did it have a stake or standing in
the partition lawsuit. Moser was a mere purchaser of the property.
At the time of the judgment and sale, therefore, Moser was a
nonparty for purposes of Rule 305(j).
	Consistent with the appellate court's opinion, Rosemary
contends that when Moser intervened in the circuit court on
October 30, 1998, to secure its right to possession it became a
"party" to the litigation and lost the protections afforded to
nonparty purchasers under Rule 305(j). We reject this argument
and hold that post-sale, post-judgment intervention does not bar
the application of Rule 305(j). As discussed, status attaches at the
time of the sale and judgment. Stripping the protection of Rule
305(j) because of subsequent efforts by a party to secure exclusive
possession of the property would render an absurd result. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992)
(whenever possible, this court shall avoid interpretations that
render absurd or unjust results). Such a holding would deny
recourse to parties who in good faith purchase property pursuant
to a judicial sale, but are unable to secure right to possession and
use of that property. This outcome would force parties to choose
court intervention, and lose the protection of Rule 305(j), or
engage in self-help to secure possession.
	Finally, as required under Rule 305(j), Rosemary failed to
perfect a stay of judgment in order to bar its application. A stay of
judgment is collateral to the judgment and does not affect or alter
the issues on appeal. See In re Estate of Goodlett, 225 Ill. App. 3d
581, 587 (1992). The Illinois Supreme Court rules provide clear
direction regarding stay of judgments and the recourse available in
the event a trial court denies a stay of judgment. Rule 305(d)
authorizes litigants to make a motion in the reviewing court for a
stay of judgment following denial of the same motion by the trial
court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(d). As noted by our appellate court, even
if the motion before the trial court was denied in error, the
recourse remains unchanged, and the party must renew the motion
in the appellate court. In re Estate of Bork, 145 Ill. App. 3d 920,
930 (1986); Horvath v. Loesch, 87 Ill. App. 3d 615, 620 (1980).
Rule 305 requires that a litigant must "show that application to the
trial court is not practical, or that the trial court has denied an
application or has failed to afford the relief that the applicant
requested." 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(d). Moreover, under Rule 305(j), a
stay must be "perfected within the time for filing notice of appeal."
155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).
	On October 2, 1998, Rosemary filed a "Motion for Stay of
Judgment Pending Appeal and Rehearing Re: Deposition." This
motion was denied by the trial court on October 30, 1998.
Contrary to the requirement in Rule 305(j), Rosemary never
renewed her motion to stay in the reviewing court.(4) Therefore,
under Rule 305(j), Moser's rights in the Kendall County property
are protected and the relief Rosemary sought-a judgment voiding
the sale to Moser-cannot be granted. Rather, her appeal is moot.
	Rosemary's pro se status does not alter this result. Pro se
litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court
rules and procedures, including procedural deadlines with respect
to filing motions. See Domenella v. Domenella, 159 Ill. App. 3d
862, 868 (1987) (construing Rule 303(a), holding that pro se
defendants must comply with the same rules of procedure as
would be required of litigants represented by an attorney).
Moreover, despite Rosemary's pro se status, the record does not
indicate that she was ignorant of court rules and procedures. In
fact, the record shows that Rosemary litigated this matter,
including the filing of motions, responses, and court appearances,
for several years prior to the trial court's final judgment. Rule
305(d) clearly explained her recourse following the dismissal of
her motion to stay in the trial court. This court cannot excuse her
failure to follow procedure in order to bar the application of Rule
305(j).
	Public policy of this state supports our conclusion. Illinois law
protects the integrity and finality of property sales, including
judicial sales. Dixon v. City National Bank, 81 Ill. 2d 429, 433
(1980); Checkley & Co. v. Citizens National Bank, 43 Ill. 2d 347,
350 (1969); Blancett v. Taylor, 6 Ill. 2d 434, 438 (1955); Shultz v.
Milburn, 366 Ill. 400, 405 (1937); Levy v. Broadway-Carmen
Building Corp., 366 Ill. 279, 282-83 (1937); Smith v. Herdlicka,
323 Ill. 585, 592-93 (1926); Crist v. McCoy, 287 Ill. 641, 647
(1919); Osmond v. Evans, 269 Ill. 278, 284 (1915); Conover v.
Musgrave, 68 Ill. 58, 62 (1873). Indeed, it extends this protection
to purchasers who without notice at the time of the purchase buy
in good faith. This finality and permanence is relied on by both
purchasers and others in connection with the purchase of the
property, including financial institutions, title insurers, realtors,
and tenants. Absent this policy, no person would purchase real
property involved in a judicial proceeding, if afterwards he
incurred the hazard of losing the property due to facts unknown to
him at the time of the sale. A party may avoid the harshness of this
rule by complying with the procedural mechanisms available, such
as a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment and sale.
	The dissent suggests that this court ignore the plain language
of Rule 305(j) and strong public policy favoring the finality and
permanence of judicial sales to address alleged procedural
irregularities occurring during the sale. This opinion declines to
address or outline those irregularities because they are secondary
to Rule 305(j).
	The dissent maintains that the trial court lacked authority to
order the sale because it failed to comply with the Act, and that
this rendered the judgment "void." According to the dissent,
failure to follow the Act is fatal to the circuit court's jurisdiction.
The Act, the dissent argues, gives the circuit court the "inherent
authority"to adjudicate the controversy and, therefore, failure to
follow procedure under the Act divests the court of jurisdiction
and renders the order "void." See slip op. at 26-28 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53 (1993); People v.
Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1 (1987); Peck v. Peck, 16 Ill. 2d 268 (1959);
Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140 (1921); Woodward v. Ruel,
355 Ill. 163 (1933); Maloney v. Dewey, 127 Ill. 395 (1889).
According to the dissent, if the judgment is "void" Rule 305(j)
would not apply.
	The dissent mistakenly relies upon a rule of law not applicable
to the present circumstances. The "inherent authority" requirement
existed before reform to the judicial system in 1964. Effective
January 1, 1964, the General Assembly amended article VI and
replaced limited jurisdiction: "Circuit Court[s] shall have
unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters." Ill. Const.
1870, art. VI, §9 (amended 1964); accord Ill. Const. 1970, art VI,
§ 9 ("Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction"). This amendment created a single
integrated trial court vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies. Zamarron v. Pucinski, 282 Ill. App. 3d 354, 360
(1996). Thus, the "inherent power" requirement applies to courts
of limited jurisdiction and administrative agencies. As we noted in
City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976):
			"We believe the jurisdictional rule applicable to the
Commission is analogous to that governing the courts of
limited jurisdiction and powers formerly existing in our
pre-1964 judicial system. In the context of cases involving
the validity of orders or judgments of those courts, this
court has said: 'A judgment, order or decree entered by a
court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the
subject matter or which lacks the inherent power to make
or enter the particular order involved, is void ***.' "
(Emphases added and omitted.)
	An administrative agency, like the pre-1964 circuit courts, is
powerless to act unless statutory authority exists. City of Chicago,
65 Ill. 2d  at 112. An administrative agency is a statutory creature
with no general or common law power. City of Chicago, 65 Ill. 2d 
at 112-12. Conversely, a circuit court is a court of general
jurisdiction, which need not look to the statute for its jurisdictional
authority.
	Importantly, the dissent overlooks our recent discussion
explaining the distinction between "void" and "voidable"
judgments. In Mitchell we stated that "[t]he question whether a
judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court
entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter. [Citation.] If jurisdiction is lacking,
any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered void ***. " In re
Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998), quoting People
v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155-56 (1993).
	Significantly, the dissent does not dispute that the trial court
in the present case had both subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction over the parties. For this reason, the judgment
is not "void." This is true even if we were to assume that the trial
court failed to strictly follow the provisions of the Act.
	In Mitchell, a wife argued that the settlement agreement was
"void" because the trial judge specified child support payments as
a percentage rather than a dollar amount, and so failed to comply
with procedures set forth in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d  at 171-73.
We agreed that the trial judge failed to follow the precise terms of
the Act. However, we reversed the order of the appellate court
finding the judgment "void":
			"In exercising this jurisdiction, however, the trial court
judge entered a judgment that was contrary to the statute.
*** The error in judgment, however, is not enough to
divest the court of jurisdiction to enter the order. The
judge had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter,
and, although the judgment was erroneous, the judge had
authority to enter the child support order." In re Marriage
of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d  at 175. 
Clearly, under this holding, even if the trial court failed to follow
the precise terms of the Act or entered a judgment in error, the
resulting judgment is not "void."
	Quoting a more recent decision, People v. Davis, the dissent
asserts that failure to comply with a statute is tantamount to a
jurisdictional defect and renders the judgment "void." Slip op. at
26 (Freeman, J., dissenting), quoting Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156 ("the
power [conferred by the statute] to render the particular judgment
or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as its
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction"). Initially, we
observe that Davis discusses jurisdiction "in the context of
criminal proceedings." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156. Criminal
proceedings that involve the power to render judgments or
sentences address a separate set of concerns not at issue in the
present matter. Nevertheless, Davis does not hold that failure to
comply with a statute robs a court of jurisdiction. Instead, we held
that, "[w]hether a judgment is void or voidable presents a question
of jurisdiction." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 155. Yet, jurisdiction is not
affected by an incorrect judgment: "jurisdiction or power to render
a particular judgment does not mean that the judgment rendered
must be the one that should have been rendered, for the power to
decide carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as to
decide right." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156. For this reason, this court
held that although the erroneous judgment was "voidable," the
error in sentencing under the statute did not divest jurisdiction.
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 157-58.
	Plainly, the judgment of the circuit court is not "void" and the
provisions of Rule 305(j) apply. On September 24, 1998, when the
trial court confirmed the sale of property to Moser and directed a
quitclaim deed be recorded in its name, Moser was a nonparty to
the action between John, Jerome, and Rosemary. Moreover, the
property passed pursuant to a final judgment in a circuit court with
jurisdiction. Rosemary failed to perfect a stay of that judgment.
Thus, according to Rule 305(j) there was no longer any justiciable
issue for which an appellate court could grant relief. As noted
earlier, the power of appellate review is confined to the
"consideration of actual controversies, cases in which the
judgment can be given effect." Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130,
133-34 (1945).
	For the foregoing reasons, we find it unnecessary to address
the remaining contentions on the merits. The judgment of the
appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	Today, the majority extends the protection of our Rule 305(j)
(155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j)) to a sale ordered by the circuit court in a
partition action brought by plaintiff, John Steinbrecher, against
defendants, Rosemary C. Steinbrecher and Jerome Steinbrecher.
The majority does so without addressing completely the concerns
raised by Rosemary regarding the authority of the circuit court to
order the sale. The majority does so without due concern that
defendants have been deprived of their property under
circumstances which, at best, evince a forced sale of the property,
and, at worst, suggest that the sale was fraudulent. Indeed, the
majority asserts that a fraudulent sale merits the protection of our
Rule 305(j). Further, in its haste to extend Rule 305(j) protection
to this sale, the majority overrules long settled precedent regarding
the elements of jurisdiction, and the equally settled precedent that
this court will not countenance fraud. Because I believe that this
court has a responsibility to examine matters of jurisdiction, and
an affirmative duty to refrain from condoning fraud, I respectfully
dissent.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
	The facts as stated in the majority opinion require elaboration.
In the complaint for partition filed on November 28, 1995,
plaintiff represented that he and defendants, the heirs and
beneficiaries of the estate of Francis J. Steinbrecher, held title to
the property as tenants in common. Plaintiff named as additional
defendants Hinsdale Nurseries, Inc., C.D.'s Trees Service, and
David Mukelson, tenants in possession of certain portions of the
property, and Farm Credit Services of Northern Illinois, the holder
of a mortgage on a portion of the property. Plaintiff did not name
the estate as a defendant even though the estate only released its
interest in the property on January 31, 1997.
	On April 26, 1996, plaintiff requested that the circuit court
appoint a commissioner to assess the feasibility of a partition. On
May 5, 1996, the court appointed Chicago Title & Trust Company,
as a single commissioner, to partition the property. Chicago Title
declined the appointment and, eventually, Michael R. Crowley
was appointed as a substitute commissioner. Prior to the
appointment of Crowley as substitute commissioner, the court did
not ascertain and declare the rights, titles and interest of all the
parties in the action, nor did it enter judgment of partition
according to the rights of the parties. Further, Crowley did not take
and subscribe an oath that he would fairly and impartially partition
the property according to the rights and interests of the parties as
declared by judgment of the court.
	On March 11, 1997, Crowley submitted an
"Appraisal/Commissioner's Report" to the court. In the report,
Crowley valued the property, consisting of three parcels of land
with a total of 409 acres, at $4,500,000. Crowley noted that, if the
three parcels were sold individually, the value of the property
would be $4,859,000. The values ascribed were as of August 30,
1996.
	For purposes of partition, Crowley divided the three parcels
into five segments. Crowley then stated:
			"One of the purposes of this analysis is to recommend
to the client an equitable distribution of the various
segments and parcels of the subject property among three
parties. The appraiser considered various permutations of
the five various segments, with individual values of
$1,595,000; $1,608,000; $1,008,000; $426,000; and
$222,000.
			None of the combinations of these five segments
resulted in three relatively equal units. The closest
combination to this target was: the South Segment of
Parcel #1 at $1,595,000, the North Segment of Parcel #1
at $1,608,000, leaving all of Parcel #2 at $1,434,000, and
all of Parcel #3 at $222,000, for a total of $1,656,000 as
the third unit.
			While the first and second combinations resulted in
relatively similar values, the third combination was
substantially greater. And therefore, the appraiser, acting
as the court appointed commissioner, was unable to
recommend an equitable distribution of these assets
among three parties unless other compensation was
provided to the first two combinations and/or some
concession was applied to the third."
	At a bench trial in August 1997, Crowley testified that the
three parcels were not contiguous. Parcel 1 was located
approximately one mile from parcels 2 and 3. If the three parcels
were sold as a unit, the property would be on the market for a
longer period of time. Additionally, a buyer would likely discount
the price paid for the property as a whole. Again, Crowley noted
that the appraised value of the property as a whole was $359,000
less than the appraised value of the three parcels.
	Crowley testified that in attempting to partition the land, he
divided parcels 1 and 2 into four segments. He believed that each
parcel should be so divided because the parcels were bisected by
a road. Adding parcel 3 to parcels 1 and 2, he obtained five
segments that he attempted to partition equally. In his opinion, an
equitable distribution or partition of the property in kind was not
feasible unless some concession was made for the financial
inequality between the three parcels as proposed for partition.
Crowley did not consider further subdividing the 409 acres to
arrive at a more equal partition of the property.
	In a letter to all parties dated October 1, 1997, the court stated
that the property could not be divided amongst the three heirs. The
court ordered a public sale of the property, with the terms and
notice of sale to be decided at a later date. Subsequently, in an
order dated October 28, 1997, the court found that the three heirs
were the owners of the property, each holding interests of an
undivided one-third, as tenants in common. Further, the court
found that the property could not be divided without manifest
prejudice to the owners. The court ordered that the entire property
be sold at public sale on terms agreed to between the parties or
further ordered by the court. The court denied Rosemary's motion
for a stay of judgment pending appeal, and set the appeal bond at
$3 million.
	Upon motion of plaintiff, the court approved a contract for the
real estate firm of Dolan and Murphy to sell the property.
According to the contract, Dolan and Murphy had the exclusive
right to sell the property for the period beginning January 9, 1998,
and ending April 7, 1998. The contract was not renewed in April
1998. However, the court allowed Dolan and Murphy to continue
marketing the property. On July 16, 1998, Dolan and Murphy
forwarded to the clerk of the circuit court a contract submitted by
Inland Real Estate Development Corporation for the purchase of
the property. The purchase price proposed by Inland was $3.5
million. On July 28, 1998, Dolan and Murphy forwarded to the
clerk of the circuit court a contract submitted by Robert Hamman
to purchase the property for $3,050,000.
	At a hearing on July 30, 1998, plaintiff requested that the
court approve one of the contracts submitted by Dolan and
Murphy. Jerome objected to approval of the contracts, and the
court continued the hearing to August 19, 1998. The night before
the continued hearing, Dolan and Murphy mailed to the clerk of
the circuit court a contract submitted by Moser Enterprises Inc.,
for the purchase of the property. The contract listed a purchase
price of $3,550,000, $50,000 more than the purchase price
proposed by Inland. At the hearing on August 19, 1998, plaintiff
tendered copies of the Moser contract to the judge, and defendants.
Over defendants' objections, the court approved the Moser
contract. Subsequently, the court denied Rosemary's motion for
rehearing.
	On September 4, 1998, Inland filed a petition for leave to
intervene and a motion to reconsider the order of August 19, 1998.
Initially, Inland noted that its contract to purchase the property was
a matter of record in the proceeding and was file stamped by the
clerk of the court on July 20, 1998. Moser's contract to purchase
the property was file stamped on August 19, 1998. Inland also
noted that Dolan and Murphy did not advise Inland that Moser had
submitted a contract to purchase the property. To the contrary,
Dolan and Murphy advised Inland that the Inland contract would
be approved by the court at the hearing on August 19, 1998.
Relying on this representation, Inland did not attend the hearing.
	Inland suggested that the court allow the parties to submit
additional sealed offers to purchase the property. Inland
represented to the court that it would make another offer, on terms
comparable to Moser's offer, with a higher purchase price. Inland
believed that fundamental fairness to the buyers and to the heirs
supported reopening the bids. At a hearing on September 24, 1998,
plaintiff's counsel admitted telling Inland that Inland's offer to
purchase the property was the highest offer received. He also told
Inland that if the court were to approve one of the offers it would
be the one Inland submitted. He testified, however, that Dolan and
Murphy received Moser's offer to purchase the property the night
before the hearing. The circuit court denied Inland's petition for
leave to intervene and confirmed the sale to Moser.
ANALYSIS
A. Court's Statutory Authority
	In the circuit court proceedings, as on appeal, Rosemary
maintained that the circuit court's judgment, and the sale pursuant
thereto, were void because the circuit court failed to comply with
the Partition Act in several aspects. Since the circuit court derived
its authority to sell the property from the Act, Rosemary argued
that the court's failure to follow the dictates of the Act was
jurisdictional.
	The majority does not detail the aspects in which the circuit
court failed to comply with the Act nor does it consider whether
the circuit court exceeded its authority by failing to comply with
any particular provision of the Act. I will outline the four
allegations I find most troubling.
	First, Rosemary alleged that the circuit court appointed a
commissioner to partition the property without first ascertaining
the rights, titles and interest of all the parties to the action. Section
17-105 of the Act provides:
			"Judgment. The court shall ascertain and declare the
rights, titles and interest of all the parties in such action,
the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, and shall enter
judgment according to the rights of the parties." 735 ILCS
5/17-105 (West 1996).
Section 17-108 of the Act provides:
			"Duty of Commissioners. The commissioners shall
enter upon the premises and, if the same are susceptible of
division without manifest prejudice to the rights of the
parties, they shall make partition thereof, allotting the
several shares to the respective parties, quality and
quantity relatively considered, according to their
respective rights and interests as adjudged by the court
***. If the premises are not susceptible of division
without manifest prejudice to the parties in interest, the
commissioners shall value each piece or parcel
separately." 735 ILCS 5/17-108 (West 1998).
Thus, the circuit court must declare the rights of the parties and
enter a judgment of partition according to those rights before it
appoints commissioners to partition the premises. Indeed, the
commissioners are not able to partition the premises without
direction from the court regarding the rights and interest of the
parties. Without such direction, the commissioners simply do not
know the identities of the owners and what portion of the land
each owner is entitled to.
	The circuit court appointed Crowley substitute commissioner
on August 30, 1996. Crowley submitted his report to the court on
March 11, 1997. Subsequently, in its order of October 28, 1997,
the court found that the three heirs were the owners of the
property, holding interest of an undivided one-third each, as
tenants in common. It thus appears that the court did not comply
with the requirements of the Act.
	Second, Rosemary alleged the circuit court failed to require
that Crowley take an oath, as commissioner, to fairly and
impartially partition the property. Section 17-107 of the Act
provides:
			"Oath of Commissioners. Each commissioner shall take
and subscribe an oath or affirmation fairly and impartially
to make partition of the premises, according to the rights
and interests of the parties, as declared by the judgment of
the court, if the same can be done consistently with the
interests of the parties; or, if the same cannot be so
divided without manifest prejudice to the parties in
interest, that they will fairly and impartially appraise the
value of each piece or parcel of the premises sought to be
divided, and make a true report to the court." 735 ILCS
5/17-107 (West 1996).
	In Tibbs v. Allen, 27 Ill. 119 (1862), this court noted that the
commissioners appointed by the circuit court in the partition
action did not take the oath prescribed by statute. "They were not
sworn to make partition, 'in accordance with the judgment of the
court as to the rights and interests of the parties,' but only sworn
to divide the land according to their own opinions of those rights
and interests, without regard to the judgment of the court." Tibbs,
27 Ill.  at 126-27. For this, and other reasons, this court reversed
the decree for the sale of property and remanded for further
proceedings. See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 42 Ill. 315, 319 (1866)
("After their appointment, and they have taken the oath required
by the statute, then, and not till then, are they clothed with legal
authority to act as commissioners").
	In the present case, the record confirms that Crowley did not
take an oath as commissioner.
	Third, Rosemary alleged that the circuit court was not
authorized to sell the property because Crowley did not report that
the property could not be divided in kind. Section 17-116 of the
Act provides:
		"Sale of premises not susceptible to division. When the
whole or any of the premises sought to be partitioned cannot
be divided without manifest prejudice to the owners thereof,
and the commissioners appointed to divide the same so report,
the court shall order the premises not susceptible of division
to be sold at public sale, upon such terms and notice of sale as
the court directs." 735 ILCS 5/17-116 (West 1996).
Thus, it is only upon a finding by the commissioners that the
property is not susceptible of division that the circuit court will
order a sale of the property.
	Crowley's report states:
		"While the first and second combinations resulted in
relatively similar values, the third combination was
substantially greater. And therefore, the appraiser, acting
as the court appointed commissioner, was unable to
recommend an equitable distribution of these assets
among three parties unless other compensation was
provided to the first two combinations and/or some
concession was applied to the third." (Emphasis added.)
Was Crowley thereby making an unequivocal statement that the
property could not be partitioned without manifest prejudice to the
parties in interest, or was Crowley suggesting that the property
could be partitioned subject to additional compensation to some of
the owners? If the actual finding was that the property could be
divided subject to owelty payments, the circuit court could not
direct that the property be sold. In so doing, the circuit court would
have exceeded its authority under the statute.
	In Peck v. Peck, 16 Ill. 2d 268 (1959), this court held that a
judgment of partition was invalid because it was not in conformity
with the Partition Act. The court observed:
		"The object of partition is to enable those who own
property in common to sever their interests, so that each
one may take possession of, enjoy, and improve his
separate estate at his own pleasure. [Citations.] The law
favors a division of land in kind, rather than a division of
the proceeds of a sale thereof, and a sale under partition is
proper only where a division of the premises cannot be
made without prejudice to the rights of the interested
parties. [Citations.] To implement this policy our statute
provides for the appointment of commissioners to
determine whether property is susceptible of division,
[citation] and in construing such statute this court has
said: '*** whether the proceeding for partition is by
petition under the statute or by bill in chancery, an
essential prerequisite to a decree authorizing a sale is the
appointment of commissioners to make partition, and a
report by them that the land is not susceptible of partition;
*** section 16 of the Partition Act is mandatory, and ***
where partition is sought by either mode, a decree for sale
is erroneous, unless based upon a report of
commissioners.' [Citations.] Considering these
established principles it is manifest that the court was in
error in directing a sale of appellant's interest in the
manner prescribed." Peck, 16 Ill. 2d  at 285-86.
This court remanded the cause to the trial court for the entry of a
decree in conformity with the partition statute. See also
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15 (1976) (The court
observed that a decree of sale is erroneous unless it is based on the
report of a commissioner or commissioners. Commissioners were
not appointed in the case, nor did the report of a commissioner
precede the lower court's order of sale. Therefore, the judgment of
the court "did not include nor can it be construed to include a valid
partition judgment").
	Returning to the present facts, the property at issue consisted
of 409 acres of land. The very size of the property suggests that
some division in kind would have been possible. As this court
observed in considering a report that 720 acres of land could not
be divided:
	"It would require much proof to induce the belief that so
much land could not be divided fairly and equally, according
to quantity and quality, among seven claimants." Tibbs, 27 Ill. 
at 128.
	Fourth, Rosemary alleged that the circuit court was not
authorized to sell the property in any manner other than at public
sale. Section 17-116 of the Act provides that "the court shall order
the premises not susceptible of division to be sold at public sale."
735 ILCS 5/17-116 (West 1996). The circuit court allowed the
property to be listed exclusively with Dolan and Murphy.
Contracts to purchase the property were submitted to Dolan and
Murphy, and the property was eventually sold to Moser. There was
no notice of the property's sale to the public. Nor was there a sale
at auction of the property. Thus, it appears that the circuit court did
not follow the dictates of the statute in conducting the sale of the
property.
	The mechanics of the sale of the property in this case
demonstrate the problems inherent in a sale which is not at public
vendue. Inland's contract to purchase the property was a matter of
record in the proceeding and was file stamped by the clerk of the
court on July 20, 1998. Moser's contract to purchase the property
was mailed to the clerk of the court the evening of August 18,
1998, and was presented to the circuit court at the hearing on
August 19, 1998. The purchase price listed in Moser's contract,
$3,550,000, was only $50,000 more than the purchase price listed
in Inland's contract. Inland was not informed of Moser's contract,
and, consequently, Inland did not increase the purchase price listed
in its contract. Moreover, the circuit court refused to reopen
bidding on the property.
	Three parties submitted contracts for the purchase of the
property. These parties were vying for the right to construct new
housing in an area undergoing substantial development. Surely, a
public sale with all parties aware of the proposed bids would have
maximized the returns to the owners of the property.
	The majority purports to answer Rosemary's argument in a
footnote. See slip op. at 8 n.3. Therein, the majority notes that the
circuit court had jurisdiction and authority over the parties and the
property. The majority also notes that "a circuit court does not lose
jurisdiction because it made a mistake in determining the facts, the
law, or both."
	The majority notes correctly that a court may not lose
jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining the facts or
the law. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 156 (1993). However,
Rosemary did not merely argue that the circuit court made a
mistake in determining the facts or the law. Rosemary argued that
the circuit court failed to follow the very statute empowering the
court to sell the property. As this court observed in Davis, "the
power to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important
an element of jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction." Further, "a judgment or decree may be void
where a court has exceeded its authority." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at
156.
	Thus, in People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995), this court held
void a trial court order which did not conform to a statutory
requirement. The trial court had jurisdiction of the parties and
subject matter. However, the trial court did not have the inherent
authority to enter an order imposing concurrent terms on the
defendant.
	And in Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140 (1921), this court
found that a sale made contrary to statute, and a deed executed in
pursuance of such sale, were void. In so doing, this court
observed:
			"The statement has very frequently been made that
where a court has jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter, its decree, however erroneous, can only be
attacked on appeal or error; but the rule is subject to an
exception equally well settled,-that a decree may be void
because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The bill
prayed for the enforcement of the lien by a sale beyond
and contrary to the powers given by the statute for
enforcing mechanics' liens, and it does not follow that
because the court had acquired jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter it could make such a decree as was
prayed for. Courts are limited in the extent and character
of their judgments, and if they transcend their lawful
powers their judgments and decrees are void and may be
collaterally impeached wherever rights claimed under
them are brought in question. The doctrine that where a
court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide
every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment
or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally
assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds
according to the established modes governing the class to
which the case belongs and does not transcend in the
extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or
statute which is applicable to it. [Citations.] Where a
court, after acquiring jurisdiction, has assumed to enter a
decree for a sale which goes beyond the limits of the
jurisdiction and transgresses the law the decree is void,
and the sale based thereon is likewise an absolute nullity."
Armstrong, 300 Ill.  at 142-43.
See also In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993) (jurisdiction is "the
power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question
involved [citation], as well as the power to grant the particular
relief requested [citations]. Every act of the court beyond that
power is void"); People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1 (1987); Woodward
v. Ruel, 355 Ill. 163, 173 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("One of
the essentials of a valid judgment is that the court have jurisdiction
to render that particular judgment. Where a court, after acquiring
jurisdiction of the subject matter, transcends the limits of the
jurisdiction conferred, its judgment so entered is void"); Maloney
v. Dewey, 127 Ill. 395, 402-03 (1889) (where a court, having
jurisdiction of the person, and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
subject matter, renders a judgment not authorized by law in that
class of cases, under any possible proofs, its judgment is not an
instance of mere misapplication of law to particular facts, or
erroneous interpretation of rules in particular cases, but an attempt
to exercise an authority which has no existence in the particular
case).
	To answer Rosemary's contention, the majority must actually
determine whether the circuit court exceeded its authority in
ordering the sale of the property, and whether the circuit court's
failure to follow the Act rendered its judgment void. The majority
is unwilling to do so.
	Instead, citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169
(1998), the majority suggests that I "overlook[ed] our recent
discussion explaining the distinction between 'void' and
'voidable' judgments." Slip op. at 14. The majority educates:
		"In Mitchell we stated that '[t]he question whether a
judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the
court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter. [Citation.] If
jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the
court is rendered void ***.' In re Marriage of Mitchell,
181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998), quoting People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155-56 (1993).
			Significantly, the dissent does not dispute that the trial
court in the present case had both subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties. For
this reason, the judgment is not 'void.' This is true even
if we were to assume that the trial court failed to strictly
follow the provisions of the Act." Slip op. at 14-15.
Thus, according to the majority, a judgment rendered by a court
lacking the inherent power to make or enter the particular order
involved is not "void" but merely "voidable."
	I note that Mitchell relied primarily upon Davis, a decision
which affirmed that "the power to render the particular judgment
or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at
156. I also note that Mitchell nowhere states that it is overruling
Davis or the precedent from which Davis is derived. See also
Wade, 116 Ill. 2d  at 5; Woodward, 355 Ill.  at 173 (Stone, J.,
dissenting); Maloney, 127 Ill.  at 402. I am confident that Mitchell
was not intended to overrule settled precedent on the elements of
jurisdiction.
	Assuming, however, that Mitchell created some confusion as
to the continued validity of the requirement that a court have
inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, such
confusion was dispelled in City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 510 (1998), a decision issued 10 months after Mitchell, and
one which the majority fails to acknowledge. In Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 
at 510, this court reiterated that "[a] void judgment is one entered
by a court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to make or
enter the particular order involved." See also People ex rel. Waller
v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 401 (2001) ("Because the concurrent
sentences imposed upon defendant by the circuit court were not
authorized by section 5-8-4(b), those sentences are void").
	I submit that Mitchell is not this court's latest pronouncement
on jurisdiction. I also submit that it is the majority, not this dissent,
which has failed to acknowledge recent precedent of this court.
	The majority offers two distinctions. First, the majority states:
		"Davis discusses jurisdiction 'in the context of criminal
proceedings.' Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156. Criminal
proceedings that involve the power to render judgments or
sentences address a separate set of concerns not at issue in
the present matter." Slip op. at 15.
The majority does not elaborate on the nature of these "concerns"
or explain why these "concerns" require a different application in
the context of a criminal proceeding. Also, the majority does not
cite any law in support of the distinction it seeks to draw.
	I note that Davis cites Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove,
369 Ill. 334, 339 (1938), a case involving special assessments and
bonds, in support of the proposition that "the power to render the
particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of
jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156. I also note that Davis cites
Armstrong, 300 Ill.  at 142-43, a mechanics' lien case, in support
of the proposition that "a judgment or decree may be void where
a court has exceeded its jurisdiction." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156.
Thus, Davis does not draw a distinction between criminal and civil
proceedings and does not provide support for the proposition
advanced by the majority.
	Further, Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, the centerpiece of the
majority's analysis on jurisdiction, does not support a distinction
between jurisdiction in criminal and civil proceedings. At issue in
Mitchell was the validity of a child support order which expressed
the support level as a percentage of income, instead of a dollar
amount. As noted above, Mitchell relied primarily upon Davis in
its discussion of jurisdiction. Thus, Mitchell, a civil case, relied
upon the holding of Davis, a criminal case, without drawing any
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings.
	McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d  at 401, Roman, 184 Ill. 2d  at 510, Arna,
168 Ill. 2d  at 113, and Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156, all stand for the
proposition, as stated in Roman, that: "A void judgment is one
entered by a court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to
make or enter the particular order involved." This holding cannot
be overlooked or disposed of on the ground that Davis was a
criminal proceeding.
	Next, the majority draws a distinction between cases adopted
before, and after, the reform to the judicial system in 1964. The
majority concedes that the "inherent authority" requirement was
a part of this state's jurisprudence before 1964, and applied to the
exercise of jurisdiction by our circuit courts. See slip op. at 14.
However, the majority maintains that, with the implementation of
the reform to the judicial system, the circuit courts derive
jurisdiction from the constitution and need not act in conformance
with statutory authority in order to exercise jurisdiction. The
majority explains:
			"The dissent mistakenly relies upon a rule of law not
applicable to the present circumstances. The 'inherent
authority' requirement existed before reform to the
judicial system in 1964. Effective January 1, 1964, the
General Assembly amended article VI and replaced
limited jurisdiction: 'Circuit Court[s] shall have unlimited
original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.' Ill. Const.
1870, art. VI, §9 (amended 1964); accord Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, §9 ('Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction'). This amendment
created a single integrated trial court vested with
jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies. [Citation.]
Thus, the 'inherent power' requirement applies to courts
of limited jurisdiction and administrative agencies." Slip
op. at 13.
The majority concludes that: "a circuit court is a court of general
jurisdiction, which need not look to the statute for its jurisdictional
authority." Slip op. at 14.
	This court has rejected the notion that a court of general
jurisdiction, which derives its jurisdiction from the constitution,
may proceed in derogation of statutory authority. In In re M.M.,
156 Ill. 2d  at 65, this court observed: "[I]t is by reason of our
constitution that our circuit courts acquire power to adjudge ***."
However, "it is by reason of the statute that the justiciable matter
exists," and the circuit court must proceed within the strictures of
the statute. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d  at 65-66.
	The distinction the majority draws is unavailing. To date, this
court has steadfastly recognized that the circuit court must have
the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved.
Roman, 184 Ill. 2d  at 510. This court has also recognized that "a
judgment or decree may be void where a court has exceeded its
authority." Davis, 156 Ill. 2d  at 156, citing Armstrong, 300 Ill.  at
142-43.
	The majority misapprehends my dissent. The majority states:
			"The dissent maintains that the trial court lacked
authority to order the sale because it failed to comply with
the Act, and that this rendered the judgment 'void.'
According to the dissent, failure to follow the Act is fatal
to the circuit court's jurisdiction. The Act, the dissent
argues, gives the circuit court the 'inherent authority' to
adjudicate the controversy and, therefore, failure to follow
procedure under the Act divests the court of jurisdiction
and renders the order 'void.' " Slip op. at 13.
I make no pronouncement in my dissent as to the validity of the
circuit court's order and the resultant sale. My objective is more
modest. I merely ask that the majority address Rosemary's
contention that the circuit court's judgment, and the sale pursuant
thereto, were void because the circuit court failed to comply with
the Act in several aspects. The majority, however, "declines to
address or outline those irregularities because they are secondary
to Rule 305(j)." Slip op. at 12-13.



B. Fraud in Sale
	In her appeal, Rosemary suggested that a fraud was
perpetrated in the sale of the property to Moser. She directed this
court's attention to Moser's access to information regarding the
other contracts to purchase the property; the circumstances
surrounding Moser's last minute contract to purchase the property;
the lack of notice to defendants regarding Moser's contract to
purchase the property; the representations made to Inland that the
circuit court would approve Inland's contract to purchase the
property, and that Inland's presence at the hearing was not
necessary; the circuit court's denial of Inland's petition for leave
to intervene; and the circuit court's refusal to reopen the bidding
when presented with an offer $50,000 higher than Moser's.
	The majority does not give voice to, or acknowledge
Rosemary's argument in any way. I am of the opinion, however,
that this court has an affirmative duty to address this argument,
for, if the argument is meritorious, it obviates all reasons for
extending Rule 305(j) protection to this sale.
	From my review of the record, this case appears troubled by
irregularities. Plaintiff's complaint for partition was not verified
as required by section 17-101 of the Act.(5) See 735 ILCS 5/17-101
(West 1996). Plaintiff averred in November, 1995, that he and
defendants held title to the property as tenants in common. In
actuality, the estate did not release its interest in the property until
January 31, 1997. The circuit court did not ascertain and declare
the rights and interest of the parties prior to appointing a
commissioner to partition the property. See 735 ILCS 5/17-105,
5/17-108 (West 1996). The circuit court did not require that the
commissioner take an oath "fairly and impartially to make
partition" of the property. See 735 ILCS 5/17-107 (West 1996).
The commissioner's report did not contain an unequivocal finding
that the property could not be divided. See 735 ILCS 5/17-109
(West 1996). The property was not sold at public vendue.
	These irregularities aside, the circuit court ordered the sale of
the property as one unit. The property consisted of three parcels of
land, with extensive acreage. In his report, Crowley valued the
property at $4,859,000 if the three parcels were sold individually,
compared to $4,500,000 if the property was sold as a unit. Parcel
1 was located a mile away from Parcels 2 and 3. Thus, the sale of
the property as a unit could not be justified by contiguity of the
parcels. In Meeker v. Evans, 25 Ill. 283 (1861), this court
observed:
			"It would seem, that when several distinct tracts of land
are ordered to be sold by the master, under a decree, it is
the duty of that officer to sell each tract separately, unless
it is evident that the land will be more valuable in one
than in several tracts. [Citation.] It is believed that this
rule is of general if not uniform application. *** When
several tracts of land are sold en masse, for a gross sum,
on the same biddings, the presumption is, that it must
have been sold for a smaller amount than they would have
brought had each tract been offered separately. When
offered en masse, persons of limited capital are
necessarily precluded from competing at the sale. And
when such a sale is made, and an objection is interposed
on that ground, to its confirmation, it will be set aside;
unless the evidence clearly shows that it has produced
more money than it would have done had it been offered
in separate parcels." Meeker, 25 Ill.  at 285.
See also Bowen v. Bowen, 265 Ill. 638, 640 (1914) ("It is the duty
of the master in making a sale to offer the land in parcels if the
same is susceptible of division. If the master fails in the
performance of his duty in this regard and the lands are thereby
sold for an inadequate price the sale will be set aside upon a proper
showing").
	The circuit court ordered the sale of the property as one unit
even though the evidence showed that it would take longer to sell
the property as a unit, and the property would fetch a higher price
if the parcels were sold individually. This irregularity in the sale
of the property, along with the others noted above, fuels concerns
that the interest of defendants in the property was not protected.
	In Meeker, 25 Ill.  at 283, this court also stated:
			"In conducting judicial sales good faith must be
observed, as well by the purchaser as by the officer,
intrusted by the court and the law, to enforce its
judgments and decrees, in that mode. The rights of all
parties to the proceeding must be regarded and properly
protected. When, by a violation of the requirements of the
law, by the officer conducting a sale, or by the purchaser
at the biddings, the rights of the owner are sacrificed or
injuriously affected, the court will interpose, and set aside
the sale, and require it to be again offered. Any fraud by
the purchaser, by which competition is prevented, or any
neglect of duty on the part of the officer producing that
result, is regarded as sufficient grounds to order a re-sale."
Meeker, 25 Ill.  at 284.
	And, in Tibbs, this court observed:
			"When it is considered, that titles to valuable lands can
be divested by this statutory proceeding, it is essential the
statute should be observed, the courts not tolerating any
essential departure from it." Tibbs, 27 Ill.  at 128.
I could not agree more with this court's assessment that the
authority to partition lands also entails a duty to protect the rights
and interest of all parties to the lands.
	The majority does acknowledge my concerns regarding the
possibility of fraud in this matter. In footnote 4 of the opinion, the
majority states:
			"The dissent also maintains that additional irregularities
suggest fraud in the sale. The dissent fails to explain how
this overcomes Rule 305(j) and Rosemary's failure to file
a motion to stay in the appellate court." Slip op. at 11 n.4.
	Since the majority requests an explanation, I provide one.
This court is a court of equity and justice; this court has an
affirmative duty not to condone fraud. Litigants seeking the
protection of this court must do equity. Likewise, under our Rule
305(j), a purchaser seeking the protection of this court must have
acted in good faith in the purchase of the property.
	This court affords protection to bona fide purchasers at
judicial sales because these purchasers rely upon the court
processes and are entitled to a measure of security in their
purchases. Where a sale is procured through fraud or collusion
between a plaintiff and a purchaser, the purchaser is not only
aware of the irregularities in the sale but is an active participant
thereto. By what right does that purchaser lay claim to protection
of the fraudulent sale? He has not relied upon the court processes,
but upon his own actions in effectuating the purchase of the
property. To afford him the protection of this court is to place a
premium upon his misconduct. And what of the rights of the
defendant who has been deprived of his property? It must be
remembered after all that "[w]hilst the law guards the rights of
bona fide purchasers at judicial sales with scrupulous care, it will
protect owners from being deprived of their property by
proceedings unauthorized by law." Morris v. Hogle, 37 Ill. 150,
155 (1865); see also Brod v. Brod, 390 Ill. 312, 325 (1945)
("While the right to partition is an absolute one, [citation] a court
of equity will not permit the proceeding to be used to circumvent
and avoid the established principles of law and public policy and
will, in the exercise of its general, equitable jurisdiction, control
the proceedings so as to protect the rights of all parties
concerned."); Bydalek v. Bydalek, 396 Ill. 65, 71 (1947); Barnes
v. Freed, 342 Ill. 73, 78 (1930) (where consideration paid for land
was inadequate, purchaser at a judgment sale could retain his
advantage only by showing that he acquired his title by
proceedings free from fraud or irregularity).
	This court has long espoused the principle that a party may
obtain relief, on the ground of fraud, against a void as well as a
voidable judgment. Elting v. First National Bank of Biggsville,
173 Ill. 368, 391 (1898), citing Nelson v. Rockwell, 14 Ill. 375
(1853). The majority eschews this principle without explaining
why this court should place its imprimatur upon, and afford
protection to, a sale which may be fraudulent.
	Explanations aside, the majority fails to notice that its
approach to the fraud issue is somewhat inconsistent with the
reasons it advances in support of the circuit court's judgment, and
the sale pursuant thereto. The majority states:
			"Public policy of this state supports our conclusion.
Illinois law protects the integrity and finality of property
sales, including judicial sales. [Citations.] Indeed, it
extends this protection to purchasers who without notice
at the time of the purchase buy in good faith. This finality
and permanence is relied on by both purchasers and others
in connection with the purchase of the property, including
financial institutions, title insurers, realtors, and tenants.
Absent this policy, no person would purchase real
property involved in a judicial proceeding, if afterwards
he incurred the hazard of losing the property due to facts
unknown to him at the time of the sale." Slip op. at 12-13.
(Emphases added.)
Thus, the majority recognizes that Illinois law affords protection
to good-faith purchasers, that is "purchasers who without notice at
the time of the purchase buy in good faith." Further, the majority
recognizes that this court extends protection to a good-faith
purchaser in order to protect the purchaser from the "hazard of
losing the property due to facts unknown to him at the time of the
sale." However, the majority refuses to address Rosemary's
contention that the sale of the property was fraudulent. Instead, the
majority extends the protection of our Rule 305(j) to Moser's
purchase of the property. The inconsistency could not be more
apparent.



CONCLUSION
	Rosemary argued that the judgment of partition, and the sale
pursuant thereto, were void because the circuit court did not
comply with the requirements of the Act. The majority answers
that Rule 305(j) precludes Rosemary from contesting the validity
of the partition sale. However, Rosemary's argument called into
question whether the circuit court exceeded its statutory authority
and whether there was a final judgment in the circuit court. If the
circuit court's judgment, and the resulting sale, are void, Rule
305(j) does not apply, for it is a requirement of the rule that the
property passed pursuant to a final judgment. A void judgment
may be attacked either directly or indirectly at any time. Davis,
156 Ill. 2d  at 155.
	In addition, Rosemary questioned whether the sale of the
property to Moser was fraudulent. While I do not imply that the
sale was fraudulent, the record presents sufficient facts to merit
consideration of this issue. In the event due consideration leads to
the conclusion that the sale of the property to Moser was
fraudulent, I, for one, could not endorse or protect the sale.
	I believe this court is duty-bound to protect the rights of all
parties to the partition action. The rights of one owner must not be
sacrificed or injuriously affected to benefit another. Likewise, the
rights of the owner must not be compromised to benefit one who
is not a good faith purchaser at a judicial sale. Where it appears
that the party seeking partition of the land has colluded with the
purchaser to effectuate a fraudulent purchase, that purchase must
be set aside.
	This court can only fulfill its responsibilities to the owners of
the land by examining questions of jurisdiction, and exhibiting
intolerance to all manners of fraud and collusion. The majority
believes otherwise. In extending Rule 305(j) protection to the
present sale, the majority overrules long settled precedent
regarding the elements of jurisdiction, and clarifies that fraud is
not a sufficient ground to withhold Rule 305(j) protection from a
purchaser. My disagreement could not be greater. Accordingly, I
dissent.
 



 



1.      1The Illinois partition act provides that the court must appoint three
commissioners to assess the feasibility of partitioning the property. 735
ILCS 5/17-106 (West 1998). However, the Act allows the court
discretion to appoint one commissioner, rather than three. 735 ILCS
5/17-106 (West 1998) ("The court may in its discretion appoint one
commissioner who shall have all the rights and powers").

2.      2Rosemary appeared pro se in this matter, with two exceptions: she
retained counsel to represent her during the partition trial and to
represent her during her appeal to the appellate court.

3.      3Section 12-149 of the Code of Civil Procedure is consistent with
Rule 305(j). Section 12-149 states:
			"The right, title and interest of any purchaser acquired at a
sale made under or pursuant to any judgment in a proceeding
in which the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties, and who was not a party to such proceeding ***
shall not be affected by any reversal, modification or order
setting aside such judgment made in any proceeding to review
such judgment, unless at the time of such sale, assignment or
pledge, an appeal was pending which operated as a stay of
enforcement of the judgment ***." 735 ILCS 5/12-149 (West
1998).
Section 12-149 contains only one discernable difference: it requires
jurisdiction in the circuit court, an implicit requirement under Rule
305(j). 
	Rosemary contended during oral argument that the Kendall County
court lacked jurisdiction because it rendered "erroneous orders and
judgments." Even if Rosemary's contention that the trial court rendered
erroneous judgments is correct, a circuit court does not lose jurisdiction
because it made a mistake in determining the facts, the law, or both. In
re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174-75 (1998). Further, under
the Illinois Constitution, circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9. In the instant matter, the proceeding was
before the Kendall County circuit court concerning Kendall County
property. Thus, the Kendall County court had jurisdiction and authority
over the parties and the subject matter.

4.      4Tangentially, we note that Rosemary's notice of appeal directed
against, in part, the October 30 order denying her motion to stay does
not satisfy Rule 305(d). A notice of appeal is not an application of stay
within the meaning of this court's rules. Rather, our rules clearly
distinguish between a notice of appeal and motion to stay. Compare 155
Ill. 2d R. 303(b) with 155 Ill. 2d R. 305. Further, the mere nature and
effect of the notice of appeal and motion to stay illustrate that they are
not synonymous. A notice of appeal is a procedural device filed with the
trial court, that when timely filed vests jurisdiction in the appellate court
in order to permit review of the judgment such that it may be affirmed,
reversed, or modified. Berg, 193 Ill. 2d  at 189. A motion to stay impacts
the enforcement and effect of the judgment, but does not challenge the
sufficiency of that judgment.
	The dissent also maintains that additional irregularities suggest
fraud in the sale. The dissent fails to explain how this overcomes Rule
305(j) and Rosemary's failure to file a motion to stay in the appellate
court.

5.      5Although the complaint purports to be verified, it was not
subscribed and sworn to before a public notary. See Hough v. Weber,
202 Ill. App. 3d 674, 692 (1990).