Title: Angell v. City of Raleigh

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

148 S.E.2d 233 (1966) 267 N.C. 387 Ray E. ANGELL, Robert B. Corns, David M. Crenshaw, and James L. Stough, on behalf of themselves and all other citizens and taxpayers of the City of Raleigh, v. The CITY OF RALEIGH, a municipal corporation, James W. Reid, Charles W. Gaddy, Earl H. Hostetler, William L. McLaurin, Travis H. Tomlinson, John W. Winters, and William H. Worth, members of the City Council of the City of Raleigh, North Carolina, T. Wade Bruton, Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, and Southeastern Cablevision Company. No. 536. Supreme Court of North Carolina. May 25, 1966. *234 Johnson, Gamble & Hollowell, Raleigh, for plaintiffs, appellants. Smith, Leach, Anderson & Dorsett and Donald L. Smith, Associate City Atty., Raleigh, for defendants, appellees. EMERY B. DENNY, Emergency Judge. In the case of Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 56 S.E.2d 404, Ervin, J., speaking for the Court, said: In the case of Bragg Development Co. v. Braxton, 239 N.C. 427, 79 S.E.2d 918, in 1950 the Federal Government by contract leased to plaintiff, a domestic corporation, a certain tract of land lying entirely within Cumberland County. The lease was for a period of 75 years. The lessee obligated itself to construct and maintain on said leased land a housing project of 500 units for Army personnel. In 1952 Cumberland County notified plaintiff that said property of plaintiff would be assessed for ad valorem taxes. The plaintiff, protesting, asserted that said property was not subject to taxation by the county and requested that the question be submitted to the court for decision under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The county agreed, and thereupon the proceeding was instituted. The question presented for decision was: "Does Cumberland County have the right to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on the aforesaid property or any part thereof?" The appeal was dismissed. In Fox v. Board of Commissioners of Durham, 244 N.C. 497, 94 S.E.2d 482, plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of a zoning statute, applicable to all of Durham County not within the corporate limits of a city or town. Bobbitt, J., speaking for the Court, said: In the case of City of Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 101 S.E.2d 413, the proceeding was instituted to have determined the validity of a redevelopment project. The Court said: Our Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not authorize the adjudication of mere abstract or theoretical questions. Neither was this act intended to require the Court to give advisory opinions when no genuine controversy presently exists between the parties. Actions for declaratory judgment will lie for an adjudication of rights, status, or other legal relation only when there is an actual existing controversy between the parties. Lide v. Mears, supra. In the instant case the City of Raleigh has issued no license pursuant to the provisions of the ordinance alleged to be unconstitutional. Moreover, nothing has been done in connection with said ordinance that has violated any rights of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs do not allege they have suffered any wrong or financial loss by reason of any action taken by the City of Raleigh in connection with the adoption of the ordinance in question. We hold that since no genuine justiciable controversy now exists between the parties hereto, the judgment below must be vacated and the cause remanded with direction that the action be dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to entitle them to any injunctive relief. Judgment vacated and cause remanded. MOORE, J., not sitting.