Title: People v. DeLeon

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 7/24/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S230906 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A140050 
ALLEN DIMEN DELEON, 
) 
 
) 
Solano County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. FCR302185 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 (Morrissey), parolees 
facing revocation are constitutionally entitled to certain due process protections.  
These include the right to a prompt preliminary hearing after arrest to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe a parole violation has occurred.  (Id. at 
pp. 485–487.)  The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (the Realignment 
Act) transferred jurisdiction over most parole revocation hearings from the Board 
of Parole Hearings (BPH) to the superior courts.  The question here is whether this 
enactment makes a preliminary hearing unnecessary.  The Court of Appeal held 
that it did.  We reject this conclusion, and hold that the Morrissey preliminary 
hearing requirement applies to parole revocation proceedings conducted in 
superior court.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Defendant Allen Dimen DeLeon was paroled in January 2012 after serving 
a prison sentence for committing a lewd act on a minor and failing to register as a 
 
2 
sex offender.  On August 23, 2013, he was arrested for possessing pornographic 
material in violation of a condition of his parole.   
On August 26, 2013, a supervising parole agent with the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation found probable cause to revoke DeLeon‘s parole 
and gave him written notice of the alleged parole violation.  A petition to revoke 
was filed in the superior court on September 4, 2013.  On September 6, a judicial 
officer conducted an ex parte review, found probable cause, and summarily 
revoked DeLeon‘s parole.  A hearing was set for September 11, 19 days after 
DeLeon‘s arrest.  
On the scheduled hearing date, DeLeon appeared with counsel and moved 
to dismiss the petition because he had not received a preliminary hearing within 15 
days of his arrest, as specified in Penal Code1 section 3044.  Over his objection, 
the court continued the motion and set a briefing schedule.  On September 25, 
2013, the court denied the motion to dismiss.  It found that the ex parte 
determination of probable cause, made 14 days after DeLeon‘s arrest, satisfied due 
process.   
On October 3, 2013, 41 days after DeLeon‘s arrest, the court held a 
revocation hearing, found him in violation, sentenced him to serve 180 days in 
custody, and reinstated parole. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Mootness 
 ― ‗[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and 
without any fault of the [opposing party], an event occurs which renders it 
impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to 
                                              
1  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
3 
grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal 
judgment, but will dismiss the appeal‘ ‖ as moot.  (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. 
(1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132, quoting Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers 
(1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.)   
DeLeon has completed his county jail term.  Counsel has informed us that 
parole supervision ended on June 27, 2014, one day after the Court of Appeal 
briefing was complete, and 16 months before that court issued its opinion.  
DeLeon‘s appeal is technically moot because a reviewing court‘s resolution of the 
issues could offer no relief regarding the time he spent in custody or the parole 
term that has already terminated.  (See People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 
409 (Morales) [order discharging defendant from parole rendered appeal moot].)   
DeLeon argues that his appeal is not moot because he faces 
disadvantageous collateral consequences from the fact that he was found in 
violation of parole.  (See Carafas v. LaVallee (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 237 
[discussing collateral consequences of a criminal conviction]; People v. DeLong 
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 487–492 [collecting cases].)  He points out that 
unsatisfactory performance on parole is a criterion affecting eligibility for 
probation and mandatory supervision (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.414(b)(2), 
4.415(c)(5)), and is an aggravating circumstance in selecting a term of 
imprisonment (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)).   
The Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 
523 U.S. 1 (Spencer).  There the court considered whether the defendant‘s appeal 
from a parole revocation was mooted by the fact that he had completed the entire 
term of imprisonment underlying the revocation.  (Id. at p. 3.)  Interpreting the 
case-or-controversy requirement of article III, section 2 of the federal Constitution 
(id. at p. 7), the court held that a violation of parole does not result in civil 
disabilities resembling those that stem from a criminal conviction (id. at p. 12, 
 
4 
citing Lane v. Williams (1982) 455 U.S. 624, 632).  The court further rejected the 
argument that the defendant faced ―collateral consequences‖ from the potential 
use of the parole violation in a future proceeding.  (Spencer, at p. 12.)  This 
possibility did not show an injury in fact.  First, it was contingent upon the 
defendant again violating the law, a circumstance that was wholly within his 
control.  Second, a prior parole violation did not mandate a particular 
consequence, but was simply one factor among many that could be considered in a 
discretionary decision by the parole authority.  (Id. at p. 13.)  
By contrast, two Court of Appeal opinions lend support to DeLeon‘s 
position.  People v. Gonzalez (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 370 held that the defendant‘s 
appeal from an order revoking postrelease community supervision was not made 
moot by his discharge from supervision because his unsatisfactory performance 
could have disadvantageous collateral consequences should he be convicted of a 
new offense.  (Id. at pp. 380–381 [citing Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.414(b)(2), 
4.421(b)(5)].)  Gonzalez did not discuss the high court‘s contrary holding in 
Spencer, supra, 523 U.S. 1.  People v. Osorio (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1408 did 
acknowledge Spencer, but observed that it could not say ―with reasonable 
certainty‖ that the defendant‘s appeal was moot given the possibility that the 
parole revocation might be used against him in a future criminal sentencing 
proceeding, employment determination, or child custody matter.  (Id. at p. 1412.)   
Spencer‘s analysis is persuasive, and we adopt it.  The trial court‘s finding 
that DeLeon violated his parole does not involve the same collateral consequences 
that attach to a criminal conviction.  Future consequences will not arise unless 
there is additional criminal conduct.  Even then, his parole violation is just one of 
many factors a court may consider in deciding whether to grant probation, or what 
sentence to impose.  Under these circumstances, DeLeon‘s parole violation does 
not constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence for purposes of assessing 
 
5 
mootness.2  We disapprove contrary language in People v. Gonzalez, supra, 7 
Cal.App.5th at pages 380–381, and People v. Osorio, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at 
page 1412.   
Even though DeLeon‘s appeal is moot, we exercise our discretion to decide 
what procedure should govern parole revocation proceedings under the 
Realignment Act.  The issue ―is likely to recur, might otherwise evade appellate 
review, and is of continuing public interest.‖  (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 
409; accord, Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636, 654 
(Williams); cf. People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 408, fn. 8; People v. 
Hronchak (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 884, 889.)  Accordingly, we resolve the legal 
question that prompted our grant of review.     
B.  Overview of the Realignment Act 
Historically, BPH was responsible for conducting parole revocation 
hearings.  (In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238, 249, 254 (Prather).)  Under the 
Realignment Act, jurisdiction over most petitions to revoke parole shifted to the 
superior courts.  (§ 3000.08, subds. (a), (f), added by Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 38 
[Assem. Bill No. 117]; amended by Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 35 [Sen. Bill No. 1023].)  
In 2012 the Legislature amended section 1203.2 to incorporate parole into the 
statutes governing revocation of probation, mandatory supervision, and postrelease 
community supervision.  (§ 1203.2, subds. (a), (b)(1), (f)(3)(E), as amended by 
Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30 [Sen. Bill No. 1023].)  Its stated intent was ―to provide for 
a uniform supervision revocation process for petitions to revoke probation, 
                                              
2  
We do not foreclose the possibility that, under other circumstances, a 
defendant could demonstrate sufficiently concrete consequences to avoid a finding 
of mootness, even if the term of imprisonment has already concluded.  Instead, we 
hold that the consequences DeLeon has identified here are simply too speculative 
to support the conclusion that a legally sufficient controversy exists. 
 
6 
mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, and parole.‖  (Stats. 
2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (a).)   
Together, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish a statutory framework for 
parole revocation.  A parolee may be arrested, with or without a warrant, based on 
probable cause to believe that a parole violation has occurred.  (§§ 1203.2, subd. 
(a), 3000.08, subd. (c).)  The supervising parole agency determines if there is good 
cause to believe the subject has violated parole, and may impose intermediate 
sanctions, including ―flash incarceration‖ for up to 10 days.  (§ 3000.08, subds. 
(d), (e).)  If intermediate sanctions are not appropriate, the parole agency must 
petition the superior court to revoke parole, and provide notice to the parolee.  (§§ 
1203.2, subd. (b), 3000.08, subd. (f).)  Jurisdiction lies ―in the county in which the 
parolee is released, resides, or in which an alleged violation of supervision has 
occurred.‖  (§ 3000.08, subd. (a); see also § 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).)  The court may 
modify or revoke parole if the interests of justice so require.  (§ 1203.2, subd. (b); 
§ 3000.08, subd. (f).)  In so doing, the court may order the parolee to serve up to 
180 days in jail.  (§ 3000.08, subds. (f)(1), (2), (g).) 
Section 1203.2 does not expressly provide for a preliminary hearing.  
DeLeon argues that another statutory provision, section 3044, and the due process 
clause of the federal Constitution, require one.  The Court of Appeal rejected these 
arguments.  It held that section 3044 is directed to BPH, not the superior courts.  It 
further held that, under the Realignment Act, ―superior courts are not required to 
conduct preliminary probable cause hearings as specified in [Morrissey, supra, 
408 U.S. 471] before revoking parole, and that a timely single hearing procedure 
can suffice.‖  The court noted that a judicial probable cause determination was 
made within 14 days of DeLeon‘s arrest, he appeared before the court on the 20th 
day of his detention, and he received other procedural protections.  In light of 
 
7 
these circumstances, ―the hearing conducted within 45 days of his arrest afforded 
him constitutionally adequate process.‖         
C.  Section 3044 
We first address DeLeon‘s claim of statutory error.  Section 3044 sets forth 
several procedural rights to be afforded parolees in revocation hearings conducted 
by BPH.  As relevant here, a parolee is entitled to a probable cause hearing within 
15 days after an arrest for a parole violation.  (§ 3044, subd. (a)(1).)  DeLeon 
contends that this statute applies to parole revocation proceedings conducted in 
superior court.  His interpretation of the statute is unpersuasive.         
Section 3044 was enacted by the voters in 2008 as part of Proposition 9, 
commonly known as ―The Victims‘ Bill of Rights Act of 2008:  Marsy‘s Law.‖  
(In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 278; Prop. 9, § 5.3, as approved by voters, 
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) eff. Nov. 5, 2008 (Marsy‘s Law).)  At that time, BPH 
was responsible for conducting parole revocation hearings.  (Prather, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 254.)  Section 3044 is directed to the ―Board of Parole Hearings or its 
successor in interest.‖  (§ 3044, subd. (a).)  It provides that BPH ―shall be the 
state‘s parole authority,‖ ―shall be responsible for protecting victims‘ rights in the 
parole process,‖ and shall adhere to the procedures it provides.  (Ibid.)  
Subdivision (b) emphasizes that ―[t]he board is entrusted with the safety of victims 
and the public and shall make its determination fairly, independently, and without 
bias and shall not be influenced by or weigh the state cost or burden associated 
with just decisions.  The board must accordingly enjoy sufficient autonomy to 
conduct unbiased hearings, and maintain an independent legal and administrative 
staff.  The board shall report to the Governor.‖  (§ 3044, subd. (b).)   
The fact that the statute is bookended by directives to BPH provides context 
for its procedural provisions.  ― ‗[W]e look to ―the entire substance of the statute 
 
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. . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . .  [Citation.]‖ 
[Citation.]  That is, we construe the words in question ― ‗in context, keeping in 
mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .‘ [Citation.]‖ [Citation.]  
We must harmonize ―the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering 
the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a 
whole.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 112.)  ―[O]ur interpretation 
of a ballot initiative is governed by the same rules that apply in construing a 
statute enacted by the Legislature.‖  (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796.)  
The statute as a whole makes clear that its procedures were drafted to apply to 
BPH when acting as the arbiter of parole revocation hearings.   
Even were we to view the statutory language as ambiguous, the ballot 
materials accompanying Marsy‘s Law provide further support for this conclusion.  
(See Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 406–407 [looking to the Legis. Analyst‘s 
analysis for evidence of the voters‘ likely understanding of a proposition‘s 
meaning].)  The analysis told voters that ―[t]he Board of Parole Hearings conducts 
two different types of proceedings relating to parole,‖ release and revocation.  
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) analysis of Prop. 9 by the 
Legis. Analyst, p. 59 (2008 Voter Information Guide).)  It explained that ―[t]his 
measure changes the board‘s parole revocation procedures for offenders after they 
have been paroled from prison‖ and mentioned a federal court order directed to the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  (Id. at p. 60.)  There is no reason to 
believe that the voters contemplated adopting a set of procedures for the superior 
courts, which then played no role in the revocation process. 
The voters did make section 3044 applicable to BPH or ―its successor in 
interest.‖  (§ 3044, subd. (a).)  However, the superior court, an arm of the judicial 
branch, is not a successor in interest to BPH, an agency of the executive.  (See §§ 
3044, subd. (b), 5075.)  To conclude otherwise would ignore the distinct roles of 
 
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these two branches of government and create anomalies in other portions of the 
statute.  Subdivision (a) refers to BPH ―or its successor in interest‖ as the ―state‘s 
parole authority.‖  (§ 3044, subd. (a).)  While the courts handle most revocation 
hearings postrealignment, they do not act as the ―state‘s parole authority‖ in other 
respects, including determining parole suitability and setting parole release dates.  
(See §§ 3040, 3041, 5075.1.)  Nor do the superior courts ―report to the Governor‖ 
as required under section 3044, subdivision (b).  A more reasonable reading of the 
―successor in interest‖ provision is that it applies in the event that another 
administrative agency assumes responsibility for overseeing the parole process as 
the ―state‘s parole authority.‖  (§ 3044, subd. (a).)       
We also find no evidence that the Legislature intended to incorporate 
section 3044‘s procedures into the Realignment Act.  The act inserted parole 
revocation provisions into section 1203.2, which falls under part 2, title 8, of the 
Penal Code (§ 1191 et seq.), governing ―Judgment and Execution‖ in the superior 
court.  It did not cross-reference the provisions of section 3044.  Rather, the 
Legislature stated its intent ―that these amendments simultaneously incorporate the 
procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation 
procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, and People v. Vickers 
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, and their progeny.‖  (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (b).)3 
The Legislature‘s reference to Morrissey, and its omission of any reference 
to section 3044, is significant in light of the protracted and ongoing litigation over 
parole revocation proceedings, including section 3044.  In 1994, California 
parolees filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court challenging various 
aspects of the state‘s unitary parole revocation process.  (See Valdivia v. Brown 
                                              
3  
Those procedures are discussed in further detail below. 
 
10 
(E.D.Cal. 2013) 956 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1126 [summarizing procedural history].)  
That system was found unconstitutional (Valdivia v. Davis (E.D.Cal. 2002) 206 
F.Supp.2d 1068, 1075–1078), and the parties ultimately filed a stipulated order for 
injunctive relief, which the court entered in 2004.  (See Valdivia v. Brown, supra, 
956 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1128–1129 [summarizing injunction].)  Marsy‘s Law took 
aim at this injunction by adopting minimum procedural protections to be afforded 
parolees under section 3044.  (2008 Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of 
Prop. 9 by the Legis. Analyst, p. 60 [discussing Valdivia litigation].)  Section 
3044, in turn, was challenged in federal court.  The district court issued an order in 
March 2009 invalidating four provisions of the statute because they conflicted 
with the 2004 injunction.  (Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2009) 603 
F.Supp.2d 1275, 1282–1283.)  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with 
directions that the district court review the statute against constitutional standards.  
(Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 984, 994–995.)  In January 
2012, the district court found six provisions of section 3044, including subdivision 
(a)(1), unconstitutional.  Concluding these provisions were not severable from the 
remainder of the statute, it struck section 3044 down in its entirety.  The district 
court accordingly granted the plaintiffs‘ motion to reinstate the injunction, albeit 
with one modification.  (Valdivia v. Brown (E.D.Cal. Jan. 24, 2012, No. CIV. S-
94-671 LKK/GGH) 2012 WL 219342 at pp. *4–*13.)  We presume that the 
Legislature was aware of this ongoing litigation when it amended section 1203.2 
on June 27, 2012.  (People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1424; see fn. 4, post.)  
The Legislature‘s reference to Morrissey as the constitutional baseline, rather than 
section 3044 (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (b)), is consistent with this 
presumption, and it suggests an intent to avoid any constitutional infirmity in the 
statute‘s provisions.  Notably, in 2013 the district court held that California‘s 
 
11 
passage of the Realignment Act had rendered the Valdivia legislation moot.  
(Valdivia v. Brown, supra, 956 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1135–1137.)   
In arguing that section 3044‘s provisions apply to proceedings in superior 
court, DeLeon reasons that section 3044 was enacted by a voter initiative and was 
not properly amended according to the initiative‘s terms.  Williams, supra, 230 
Cal.App.4th 636, concluded that, because the requisite voting margin was not 
achieved in amending section 1203.2 as part of the Realignment Act, the statutes 
must be harmonized by applying the procedural requirements of section 3044 to 
the provisions of section 1203.2.  (Williams, at pp. 658–659.)4  We reject this 
conclusion.   
Under article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of our Constitution, ―[t]he 
Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that 
becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute 
permits amendment or repeal without their approval.‖  (Italics added.)  Marsy‘s 
Law allows amendment by the Legislature ―by a statute passed in each house by 
roll-call vote entered in the journal, three-fourths of the membership of each house 
concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the 
                                              
4  
Senate Bill No. 1023 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1203.2 to 
incorporate parole into the statutes governing revocation of probation, mandatory 
supervision, and postrelease community supervision.  (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30.)  
It passed in the Assembly by a vote of 49 to 29 with two members abstaining and 
in the Senate by a vote of 22 to 15 with three members abstaining.  (4 Assem. J. 
(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) p. 5478; Sen. Daily J. (June 27, 2012) p. 4152.)  
Assembly Bill No. 117 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) added section 3000.08, which 
authorized the superior courts to exercise jurisdiction over most parole revocation 
proceedings.  (Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 38.)  It passed in the Assembly by a vote of 51 
to 28 with one member abstaining and in the Senate by a vote of 24 to 14 with two 
members abstaining.  (2 Assem. J. (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) pp. 2096–2097; Sen. 
Daily J. (June 28, 2011) p. 1614.)   
 
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voters.‖  (2008 Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 9, § 9 at p. 132.)  
Additionally, it permits the Legislature to ―amend the statutory provision of this 
act to expand the scope of their application, to recognize additional rights of 
victims of crime, or to further the rights of victims of crime by a statute passed by 
a majority vote of the membership of each house.‖  (Ibid.)    
―[F]or purposes of article II, section 10, subdivision (c), an amendment 
includes a legislative act that changes an existing initiative statute by taking away 
from it.‖  (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1026–1027.)  Assuming the 
Realignment Act effectively amended section 3044 by adopting parole revocation 
procedures for the superior courts, the amendment furthers the purposes of 
Marsy‘s Law, and was therefore permissible by majority vote.   
We ―start[] with the presumption that the Legislature acted within its 
authority‖ and uphold the validity of the legislative amendment ―if, by any 
reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes‖ of the 
initiative.  (Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1256.)  
Marsy‘s Law sought to curtail the procedural rights of parolees to spare crime 
victims and their families from burdensome and unnecessary proceedings.5  
Section 3044, like the rest of Marsy‘s Law, evinces this intent.  Subdivision (a) of 
that statute is phrased in terms of limiting a parolee‘s procedural rights:  ―to 
                                              
5  
One of the findings and declarations of Marsy‘s Law was that ―[e]ach year 
hundreds of convicted murderers sentenced to serve life in prison seek release on 
parole from our state prisons.  California‘s ‗release from prison parole procedures‘ 
torture the families of murdered victims and waste millions of dollars each year.  
In California convicted murderers are appointed attorneys paid by the tax dollars 
of its citizens, and these convicted murderers are often given parole hearings every 
year.  The families of murdered victims are never able to escape the seemingly 
unending torture and fear that the murderer of their loved one will be once again 
free to murder.‖  (2008 Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 9, § 2, at pp. 
128–129.)   
 
13 
protect a victim from harassment and abuse during the parole process, no person 
paroled from a California correctional facility following incarceration . . . shall, in 
the event his or her parole is revoked, be entitled to procedural rights other than 
the following . . . .‖  (§ 3044, subd. (a), italics added.)  Several of the enumerated 
procedural rights are less protective of parolees than those previously adopted by 
the federal district court in the 2004 stipulated order for injunctive relief.  (See 
2008 Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 9 by the Legis. Analyst, at 
p. 60; Valdivia v. Brown, supra, 956 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1128–1129.)  Of course, no 
statute, whether enacted by the Legislature or by voter initiative, can circumvent 
minimum constitutional protections.  The Legislature‘s decision to set parolees‘ 
rights at Morrissey‘s constitutional baseline in section 1203.2 proceedings furthers 
the purposes of Marsy‘s Law.  
Moreover, we may consider later statutory amendments in deciding the 
validity of an implied amendment.  (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 
390–393 (Ewoldt).)  Here, two statutory amendments are significant.  The first 
was part of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, enacted by 
the voters on November 4, 2014.  (Prop. 47, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 
(Nov. 4, 2014) eff. Nov. 5, 2014.)  That proposition added section 1170.18.  It 
allows someone serving a sentence for a crime that the proposition reduced to a 
misdemeanor to petition for recall of the sentence.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (a); Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 14, pp. 73–74.)  
As relevant here, section 1170.18, subdivision (d) provides:  ―A person who is 
resentenced pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be given credit for time served and 
shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence, 
unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the 
person from parole.  Such person is subject to Section 3000.08 parole supervision 
by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the jurisdiction of the 
 
14 
court in the county in which the parolee is released or resides, or in which an 
alleged violation of supervision has occurred, for the purpose of hearing petitions 
to revoke parole and impose a term of custody.‖  (Italics added.)  The voters, by 
initiative, thus approved section 3000.08‘s provision authorizing superior court 
jurisdiction over most parole revocation proceedings.6     
The second relevant action, Senate Bill No. 517 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.), 
amended and reenacted sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 in 2015.7  (Stats. 2015, ch. 
61, §§ 1, 2.)  That bill was passed with the required three-fourths‘ vote in each 
house.8  It added a substantive provision to each statute authorizing the court to 
order the release of a supervised person, ―who has been arrested under this 
section,‖ from custody ―under any terms and conditions the court deems 
appropriate.‖  (Stats. 2015, ch. 61, § 1 [amending § 1203.2]; see id., § 2 [amending 
§ 3000.08].)  As Ewoldt explained, under section 9 of article IV of the California 
Constitution, ― ‗[a] section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is 
re-enacted as amended.‘ ‖  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 391.)  The Legislature 
did so.  The amendments cannot be dismissed as merely technical.  They could 
have no practical effect without reaffirming the Legislature‘s earlier enactments 
                                              
6  
See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
245, 249–251 (Cal. Const., art. 11, § 10, generally allows voters to amend one 
initiative with another passed by majority vote); Proposition 103 Enforcement 
Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1486 (amendments that 
conflict with the subject matter of an initiative measure may be accomplished by 
popular vote). 
7  
As noted, these sections contain the provisions that authorize superior 
courts to conduct parole revocation hearings in most cases.  (§§ 1203.2, subds. (a), 
(b), 3000.08, subds. (a), (f).)   
8  
Senate Daily Journal (April 20, 2015) page 668 (passed by a vote of 34 to 
one with five members abstaining); Assembly Daily Journal (June 25, 2015) page 
2147 (passed by a vote of 76 to zero with four members abstaining). 
 
15 
authorizing the superior courts to exercise jurisdiction over parole revocation 
proceedings.  (See id. at p. 392.)  To the extent it is inconsistent with our ruling 
here, Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pages 657–659, is disapproved. 
D.  Procedural Due Process 
We now consider whether DeLeon was denied his right to due process 
under the federal Constitution.  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) 
Over four decades ago, Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 471, established the 
minimum due process protections for parolees facing revocation.  There, two 
parolees complained that their parole had been revoked based on a written report 
but without a hearing.  (Id. at p. 473.)  Holding that due process required a 
hearing, the court observed that ―[i]mplicit in the system‘s concern with parole 
violations is the notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he 
substantially abides by the conditions of his parole.‖  (Id. at p. 479; see also id. at 
p. 482.)  At the same time, however, the court emphasized that ―revocation of 
parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a 
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.‖  (Id. at p. 
480.)   
The court identified ―two important stages‖ of the process.  (Morrissey, 
supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485.)  First, ―some minimal inquiry [must] be conducted at or 
reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly 
as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.  
[Citation.]  Such an inquiry should be seen as in the nature of a ‗preliminary 
hearing‘ to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to 
believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a 
violation of parole conditions.‖  (Ibid.)  The determination must be made by 
someone uninvolved in the case.  (Id. at pp. 485–486.)  The procedure is informal.  
 
16 
(Id. at pp. 484–485.)  It requires notice to the parolee and a chance to appear and 
speak on his own behalf.  (Id. at pp. 486–487.)  ―[H]e may bring letters, 
documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing 
officer.‖  (Id. at p. 487.)  At the parolee‘s request, witnesses to the parole violation 
must generally be available for questioning.  (Ibid.)9  The officer then decides 
whether probable cause supports continued incarceration pending a final 
revocation hearing.  (Morrissey, at p. 487.)  The officer must prepare ―a summary 
. . . of what occurs at the hearing in terms of the responses of the parolee and the 
substance of the documents or evidence given‖ at the hearing, and shall ― ‗state the 
reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on . . . .‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  
However, ― ‗formal findings of fact and conclusions of law‘ ‖ are not required.  
(Ibid.) 
Second, the parolee must have an opportunity for a final hearing to 
determine if parole should be revoked.  The minimum due process requirements 
for this hearing are:  (1) written notice of the alleged parole violations; 
(2) disclosure of the evidence against the parolee; (3) an opportunity for the 
parolee ―to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence‖; (4) ―the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,‖ unless 
good cause exists to deny confrontation; (5) a ― ‗neutral and detached‘ hearing 
body‖; and (6) a written decision regarding the evidence and the reasons for 
revoking parole.  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489.)   
In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146 (La Croix) recognized Morrissey‘s 
application to California parolees, including the first-stage preliminary hearing:  
―It is thus clear that in all instances of alleged parole violations within this state a 
                                              
9  
The hearing officer may decline to allow ―confrontation and cross-
examination‖ of a confidential informant.  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 487.) 
 
17 
parolee who has not waived his right is entitled to a prerevocation hearing as 
mandated by Morrissey‖ (La Croix, at p. 152), if the parolee is in custody for the 
parole violation (id. at p. 152, fn. 2).  For over 40 years, incarcerated California 
parolees have been entitled to such a hearing.  The question is whether the changes 
made to the parole revocation process by the Realignment Act eliminated this 
requirement.  We conclude to the contrary.     
Although section 1203.2 does not expressly provide for a preliminary 
hearing, that right is firmly established in constitutional precedent.  (Morrissey, 
supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485–487; La Croix, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 152.)  In 
amending the statutes, the Legislature stated its intent ―that these amendments 
simultaneously incorporate the procedural due process protections held to apply to 
probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 
and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, and their progeny.‖10  (Stats. 2012, ch. 
43, § 2, subd. (b).)  
The Attorney General properly concedes that parolees who face revocation 
under section 1203.2 are entitled to a preliminary hearing, and that the less formal 
procedures employed here did not comply with Morrissey‘s due process 
requirements.  Morrissey requires that the parolee be given notice of the 
preliminary hearing and an opportunity to appear, be heard, present documents 
and witnesses, and question adverse witnesses, absent good cause to deny cross-
examination.  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 486–487.)  Here, two initial 
probable cause determinations were made:  one by the parole agency three days 
after DeLeon‘s arrest, and a second by the court 14 days after the arrest.  However, 
in neither instance was DeLeon allowed to appear, be heard, present evidence, or 
                                              
10People v. Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d 451 (Vickers), a probation revocation 
case, is discussed in further detail below. 
 
18 
question his parole agent who reported the violation.  These procedures did not 
satisfy Morrissey.  (Id. at p. 487.)  
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal looked to People v. 
Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), a probation revocation case.  It 
reasoned that, under the Realignment Act, both parole and probation revocations 
are judicial proceedings ―and as recognized in Coleman, cases such as Morrissey 
stating the due process requirements for revocation of parole by executive branch 
agencies do not clearly mandate the process that must be employed by the courts.‖  
Applying the three-factor test from Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319,11 
the appellate court observed that a parolee has only ―conditional liberty,‖ and that 
―[t]he prompt probable cause review of the charges and the parole violation report 
by a judicial officer as specified in section 1203.2, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2) 
guards against the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty pending a full 
hearing in parole revocation cases.‖  The court concluded that a probable cause 
hearing ―would further burden our overworked and under-resourced superior 
courts while adding little to the fair determination of revocation proceedings.‖  
Amicus curiae District Attorney of Los Angeles County supports this position.   
The Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that superior court revocation 
proceedings are not subject to Morrissey‘s procedural due process requirements 
falters.  Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at page 458, found Morrissey applicable to 
probation revocation proceedings, which have long been conducted in superior 
court under section 1203.2.  It found no principled distinction between revocation 
                                              
11  
That test considers (1) the private interest affected by the official action; 
(2) the risk of error under the procedures employed, as well as the likely value of 
additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) ―the Government‘s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens‖ that additional 
procedures may impose.  (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335.) 
 
19 
of parole and of probation ―insofar as the demands of due process are concerned.‖  
(Vickers, at p. 458.)  ―Certainly the nature of a probationer‘s interest in his liberty 
. . . is at least as great as that of a parolee and is entitled to at least the same due 
process safeguards before it is terminated.  Morrissey is thus equally applicable in 
the case of a revocation of probation insofar as it assures that revocation can be 
had only with due process protections.‖  (Ibid.)  Vickers found former section 
1203.2 deficient in part because it made ―no provision for a preliminary 
determination of probable cause to believe that a violation of probation has 
occurred in order to warrant the detention of a probationer until a more formal 
hearing is had.‖  (Vickers, at p. 458.)  ―The statutory provision . . . fails to meet 
several of the mandatory requirements of due process as set out in Morrissey and 
as now held by us to be applicable in probation revocation proceedings.‖  (Id. at p. 
459.) 
The high court confirmed Vickers‘s conclusion a year later in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778:  ―Petitioner does not contend that there is any 
difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of 
parole and the revocation of probation, nor do we perceive one.  Probation 
revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but 
does result in a loss of liberty.  Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a 
parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the 
conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra.‖  (Id. at p. 782, fns. omitted.)  
Far from authorizing fewer procedural protections, these authorities support the 
conclusion that Morrissey‘s preliminary hearing requirement applies to both 
parole and probation revocation proceedings under section 1203.2.  (See People v. 
Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1238 [given ―well-established case 
authority‖ the court ―construe[s] section 1203.2 to impliedly require a probable 
 
20 
cause hearing if there is any significant delay between the probationer‘s arrest and 
a final revocation hearing‖].) 
The Court of Appeal also looked to Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 
(Gerstein) to conclude that an ex parte, nonadversarial determination of probable 
cause by a magistrate suffices to detain the parolee until the final revocation 
hearing.  That case is inapposite.  Gerstein held that the Fourth Amendment‘s 
protection against unlawful seizures entitles persons arrested on suspicion of 
criminal activity to a judicial determination of probable cause, either before or 
promptly after arrest, as a prerequisite to continued detention.  (Gerstein, at pp. 
111–114, 125; see also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44, 56 
[―a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 
hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement 
of Gerstein‖].)  For purposes of that hearing, adversary safeguards such as the 
right to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for 
witnesses ―are not essential . . . .  The sole issue is whether there is probable cause 
for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings.  This issue can be 
determined reliably without an adversary hearing.  The standard is the same as that 
for arrest.  That standard—probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a 
crime—traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary 
proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these 
informal modes of proof.‖  (Gerstein, at p. 120, fn. omitted.) 
Gerstein addressed the Fourth Amendment‘s application to an early stage 
of new criminal proceedings following arrest.12  Morrissey, by contrast, 
                                              
12  
We note that a defendant who is accused of a felony and who does not 
waive time is entitled to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days of arraignment 
or plea as a matter of statute.  (§ 859b.)  
 
21 
envisioned a different set of procedures for parolees facing revocation, as a 
component of due process.  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 486–487.)  
Morrissey‘s citation to Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 267–271, along 
with its description of the procedures due, made clear that the parolee was not 
merely entitled to an ex parte determination of probable cause, but to an 
opportunity to be heard and to defend at an early stage.  (Morrissey, at p. 487; 
accord, Valdivia v. Davis, supra, 206 F.Supp.2d at p. 1075.)  Gerstein reaffirmed 
the justifications for Morrissey‘s holding, even as it declined to extend it to the 
limited probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment.  
(Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 121–122, fn. 22.)  Nothing in Gerstein casts 
doubt on Morrissey‘s preliminary hearing procedure as applied to parolees.   
We therefore reject the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that Morrissey is 
inapplicable because the parole revocation process is conducted by the superior 
court, rather than the parole board.  Accordingly, we have no need to resort to the 
three-factor test of Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 319.  Morrissey has 
already established that an incarcerated parolee is entitled to a prerevocation 
preliminary hearing.  DeLeon was deprived of that hearing. 
The Court of Appeal expressed concern over ―further burden[ing] our 
overworked and under-resourced superior courts‖ by requiring both a preliminary 
hearing and a final revocation hearing.  This legitimate institutional concern, 
however, cannot justify depriving a parolee of his right to due process of law.  
Additionally, there are several practical solutions to address this increased burden 
on judicial resources.  First, the preliminary hearing provides a valuable screening 
tool that will result in some early dismissals, thereby lessening the number of final 
revocation hearings the court will be required to perform.  Second, Morrissey does 
not require that a judge conduct the preliminary hearing.  (Morrissey, supra, 408 
U.S. at p. 486.)  Section 1203.2, subdivision (f) provides that the revocation 
 
22 
proceedings may take place before a ―judge, magistrate, or revocation hearing 
officer described in Section 71622.5 of the Government Code.‖  That section 
authorizes the superior court to ―appoint as many hearing officers as deemed 
necessary to conduct parole revocation hearings pursuant to Sections 3000.08 and 
3000.09 . . . .‖  (Gov. Code, § 71622.5, subd. (b).)  Third, section 3000.08 
contemplates review by the parole agency before the case is submitted to the 
superior court for revocation.  (§ 3000.08, subds. (d), (f).)  This review may satisfy 
Morrissey‘s preliminary hearing requirement if it includes a probable cause 
determination, conducted reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation 
or arrest, by someone not directly involved in the case, with notice to the parolee 
and an opportunity to appear and defend.  (Morrissey, at pp. 485–487.) 
Both parties ask us to address additional questions not directly implicated 
by the facts of this case in order to provide broader guidance.  The Attorney 
General urges us to approve a unitary hearing procedure for parole revocations 
conducted under section 1203.2 (see Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 894–895), 
even as he concedes that the final revocation hearing, conducted 41 days after 
DeLeon‘s arrest, could not be considered a timely unitary hearing.  (See Williams, 
supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 655 [―Coleman‘s approval of a single revocation 
hearing is conditional; it presumes the hearing will be held relatively soon after the 
person is arrested, and that the person will be afforded procedural benefits at all 
stages of the revocation process‖].)  We decline the Attorney General‘s invitation.  
The due process question is necessarily informed by the particular procedures 
employed by the court.  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481.)  It is therefore best 
to resolve the constitutionality of a unitary hearing in the context of a proceeding 
that purports to satisfy the minimum requirements for such a hearing. 
DeLeon urges us to hold that due process requires that the preliminary 
hearing take place within 15 days of arrest.  We decline this invitation as well.  
 
23 
When faced with systemic constitutional violations, some courts have found it 
necessary to impose a mandatory time limit for conducting a Morrissey 
preliminary hearing.  In Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 636, the court found it 
―manifest that the due process rights of parolees are being systematically violated 
in Orange County‖ (id. at p. 654), based on a 2013 survey indicating that parolees 
averaged more than 16 days in custody before their first court appearance (id. at p. 
646).  The Williams court adopted a rule requiring ―arraignment within 10 days of 
an arrest for a parole violation, a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the 
arrest, and a final hearing within 45 days of the arrest.‖  (Id. at p. 643.)  Similarly, 
a class action lawsuit filed against the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation in federal district court in 1994 established that parolees were 
denied a preliminary revocation hearing, and were detained an average of 35 days 
before receiving a final revocation hearing.  (Valdivia v. Davis, supra, 206 
F.Supp.2d at p. 1071 & fn. 7.)  The district court adopted a remedial plan 
requiring, among other things, that parolees receive a probable cause hearing 
within 10 business days after service of a notice of charges and rights.  (Valdivia v. 
Brown, supra, 956 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1127–1128.)  The lawsuit was later dismissed 
as moot due to the passage of the Realignment Act.  (Valdivia v. Brown, at pp. 
1135–1140.)  
There is no evidence in this record of the timelines for conducting 
preliminary hearings in Solano County, or of systemic violations of parolees‘ 
constitutional rights.  DeLeon points to a remark by defense counsel on the date 
set for the preliminary hearing that the prosecutor ―is well aware of this issue.  I 
made the same objection last week.  And it is an ongoing problem, and it is an 
easy fix.‖  After the trial court ordered briefing, however, defense counsel offered 
no argument or evidence that the Morrissey procedures had been systematically 
violated.  Nor did the trial court make a finding in this regard.  We agree with the 
 
24 
federal district court‘s observation in Valdivia that ―[w]hether the new system 
provides adequate due process must be demonstrated in practice, without 
untoward judicial interference until the need for intervention is clear.‖  (Valdivia v. 
Brown, supra, 956 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1136–1137.)  Accordingly, we decline to 
resolve whether an outer time limit is constitutionally compelled.  Instead, we 
reiterate Morrissey‘s command that the preliminary hearing should occur ―as 
promptly as convenient after arrest.‖  (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485.)   
E.  Prejudice 
―The denial of [a parolee‘s] right to a timely prerevocation hearing 
notwithstanding his timely effort to assert it does not necessarily mean that he is 
automatically entitled to relief therefrom.‖  (La Croix, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 154.)  
Someone ―whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation 
hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the 
failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the 
[final] revocation hearing.‖  (Ibid.)  The test of prejudice is whether the denial of 
the constitutionally mandated hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Ibid., citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  Additionally, the 
reviewing court may restore a parolee to parole status even absent a showing of 
prejudice as a ―severe sanction‖ based on ―a showing that the Authority is 
unresponsive to [the] mandates of Morrissey and its progeny and must be coerced 
to comply therewith.‖  (La Croix, at p. 155.)   
As explained, this record does not support DeLeon‘s assertion that 
Morrissey has been systematically violated.  Nor are we called upon to evaluate 
whether case-specific prejudice occurred because subsequent events have mooted 
DeLeon‘s claim for relief.   
 
25 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We conclude that incarcerated parolees facing revocation under section 
1203.2 are entitled to a timely preliminary hearing.  DeLeon was denied such a 
hearing, but he has completed his period of incarceration, and his parole 
supervision has terminated.  Because these events occurred during the pendency of 
his appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with 
directions to dismiss the appeal as moot.13   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
 
 
                                              
13  
See People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897–898, 903; People v. 
Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 310, 321–322; Fallbrook Sanitary Dist. v. 
San Diego Local Agency Formation Com. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 753, 757–758, 
765. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. DeLeon 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 241 Cal.App.4th 1059 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S230906 
Date Filed: July 24, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Solano 
Judge: Robert S. Bowers 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Sharon Petrosino, Public Defender (Orange), Daniel J. Cook, Chief Deputy Public Defender, and David 
Dworakowski, Assistant Public Defender, for Orange County Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Jeff Adachi, Public Defender (San Francisco), Matt Gonzalez, Chief Attorney, and Dorothy Bischoff, 
Deputy Public Defender, for San Francisco Public Defender‘s Office as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Allen R. Crown, Allan 
Yannow, Stephen G. Herndon, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Steven Katz, Head Deputy District Attorney, Phyllis C. 
Asayama and Ruth M. Low, Deputy District Attorneys, for Los Angeles County District Attorney as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Roberta Simon 
Post Office Box 10728 
Oakland, CA  94610 
(510) 763-7226 
 
Darren K. Indermill 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5244