Title: State v. Brennan

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Brennan (2000-050); 172 Vt. 277; 775 A.2d 919

[Filed 01-Jun-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-050

State of Vermont 	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit

Robert J. Brennan	                         September Term, 2000

David A. Howard, J.

William D. Wright, Bennington County State's Attorney, and Brian K. Marthage, 
  Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney, and Seth Carey, 
  Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Defendant Robert Brennan appeals from a conditional
  guilty plea to the  charge of 13 V.S.A. § 2503, larceny from the person. 
  The district court granted the State's motion to  amend the initial
  misdemeanor charge of 13 V.S.A. § 2502, petit larceny to a felony charge of 
  larceny from the person.  Defendant argues that larceny from the person
  requires that the property  stolen must literally be attached to or
  touching the owner when stolen in order to satisfy the statute.   We
  disagree that the items must be directly touching the victim but find that
  the evidence does not  support the heightened charge.  We reverse. 

       On September 9, 1999 at approximately 10:50 a.m., Priscilla Nicholson,
  accompanied by a  friend, picked up defendant at the on-ramp to Route 7 in
  Manchester, Vermont.  Defendant sat in the 

 

  backseat of the vehicle near some of Nicholson's personal belongings,
  including her purse.  When  Nicholson reached Bennington, Vermont, she
  dropped defendant off and continued to her  destination.  Soon after, she
  realized her purse had been opened and eighty dollars had been stolen.  
  She contacted the police, giving a physical description of defendant.  She
  provided other information  defendant had volunteered during the ride, such
  as his name, address, and place of work.  Later that  afternoon, defendant
  was taken into custody for questioning.  He admitted riding in Nicholson's
  car  and was cited for petit larceny, defined as the theft of goods or
  property worth less than $500.00. 13  V.S.A. § 2502.

       On October 6, 1999, the State's Attorney moved to amend the
  information to a violation of 13  V.S.A. § 2503, larceny from the person, a
  felony.  Larceny from the person  is defined as stealing or  attempting to
  steal "from the person and custody of another." 13 V.S.A. § 2503.  
  Defendant moved  to dismiss the amended information, but the court granted
  the amendment to the information on  October 29, 1999.  The court held that
  the statute was intended to give added protection against  "thefts that
  presented a high risk of actual confrontation" and to "cover thefts from
  the immediate  presence and control of an owner."  The court relied on
  another district court case, State v. Shatney,  890-6-98Wmcr, in which,
  under similar circumstances, that court held  larceny from the person did 
  not require "a taking from the very person or body of the victim."

       Defendant was sentenced to one to three years imprisonment, all
  suspended and eighty  dollars restitution.  He entered the conditional plea
  agreement, retaining his right to appeal the court's  decision and order. 
  His appeal presents a case of first impression in Vermont.

       At issue is the meaning of "from the person and custody of another." 
  13 V.S.A. § 2503.   Defendant argues on appeal that § 2503 requires that
  the property taken must be attached to or on the  owner's body at the time
  of theft.  Defendant reasons that since Nicholson's purse was in 

 

  the back seat of the vehicle and not directly touching her, the property
  was not literally taken "from  the person."  Thus, defendant argues, the
  physical contact requirement of the statute was not met.   Defendant
  supports his claim by contrasting § 2503 with similar sections of the
  Vermont criminal  statutes, such as 13 V.S.A.§ 608, assault and robbery. 
  Unlike § 2503, 13 V.S.A § 608 specifically  punishes assaultive theft that
  occurs either "from his person or in his presence."  Had the legislature 
  intended larceny from the person to apply to property in the immediate
  presence of the person,  defendant contends it would have expressly used
  the language found in § 608; because the language  "in his presence" is
  absent from § 2503, the crime should not be interpreted to include it. 
  Defendant  also argues that his interpretation of § 2503 is consistent with
  common law because the statute was  originally enacted to punish
  pickpockets, who necessarily have direct contact with the property  owner's
  person to accomplish the theft.  Finally, defendant claims that if § 2503
  is read broadly, i.e.,  to include the concept of "in his presence," then
  the trial court has created a new crime, namely  'larceny from the person
  or presence of another,' which violates defendant's due process rights.

       In response, the State contends that the phrase "from the person" has
  been used at common  law to describe the theft of objects from the
  immediate presence of the owner as well as literally  attached to the
  owner.  The State claims that because Nicholson kept her purse sufficiently
  close to  her body and under her immediate control, the statute is
  satisfied;  therefore, the charge of larceny  from the person is
  appropriate in spite of the fact that the purse was located in the rear
  seat of her car.  The State also argues that the history of the statute
  demonstrates a legislative intent to construe §  2503 broadly, to include
  "in his presence."  The State claims that evidence of this intent is based
  on  the addition of the phrase "and custody of another" to the statute in
  1880, and the additional language  emphasizes that the offense is comprised
  of two 

 

  elements: 1) the taking of property from an individual's person; and 2) the
  taking of property from an  individual's custody.  Thus, the State
  concludes that if the statute is interpreted narrowly, i.e., to  exclude
  the concept of "in his presence," then the phrase "and custody" will be
  rendered meaningless,  which is contrary to the intent of the legislature.

       In construing a statute, "our principal goal is to effectuate the
  intent of the Legislature."  Tarrant v. Department of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189,
  197,