Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HAROLD S. CHEEK, JR., DECEASED

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HAROLD S. CHEEK, JR., DECEASED2002 WY 13053 P.3d 113Case Number: 02-30Decided: 09/04/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
              

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

HAROLD 
S. CHEEK, JR., Deceased:

 

JOHN 
CHEEK,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

                                                                                                

MARTHA 
ZERBE and DAVID ZERBE,

Personal 
Representatives of the Estate of

Harold 
S. Cheek, Jr.,

 

Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jerry 
A. Yaap of Bishop, Bishop & Yaap, Casper, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

James 
Richard McCarty of McCarty Law Office, Lahaina, HI; Donald R. Winship of Winship 
& Winship, Casper, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

* 
Chief Justice at time of expedited conference

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
John 
Cheek appeals from a verdict issued after a bench trial denying several 
petitions protesting various aspects of the probate of an estate.  One petition specifically sought to 
prove a lost will.  Finding no 
grounds to support his alleged errors, we affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
presents two issues for our review:

 

A.        
Whether Appellant was entitled to a jury trial?

B.        
Whether the trial court erred in finding that appellant failed to meet 
the requirements of W.S. § 2-6-207 in establishing a lost 
will?

 

Appellees 
accept this characterization of the issues.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Harold 
Cheek, Jr., died in 1999.  John 
Cheek is Harold's brother and sole heir at law.  After Harold's death, Martha and David 
Zerbe introduced a will for probate dated 1996 naming them as primary heirs and 
executors.  John Cheek claims that 
Harold gave him a will dated 1998.  
Mr. Cheek alleges that he briefly looked over the will when Harold gave 
it to him and noted that it made him the sole heir and executor of the 
estate.  Mr. Cheek then put the will 
away someplace and cannot now find it.  

 

[¶4]           
The 
will dated 1996 was presented by the Zerbes and was admitted for probate.  Mr. Cheek filed a Petition to Revoke 
Probate, Petition to Restrain Personal Representatives, Motion to Stay Further 
Actions of Executor, Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Waste 
and Embezzlement, Petition to Prove Last Will and Testament as Lost, and a 
Request for Jury Trial.  The Request 
for Jury Trial was stricken upon motion of the Zerbes.  The Petition to Restrain Personal 
Representative and the Motion to Stay Further Actions of Executor were denied 
after hearing.  All other petition 
demands were denied after a bench trial.

 

 

DISCUSSION

[¶5]           
As 
his first issue on appeal, Mr. Cheek argues that the trial court erred in 
striking his request for a jury trial.  
Mr. Cheek argues that he was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of law; 
therefore, our review is de novo.  
Arch of Wyoming, Inc. v. Sisneros, 971 P.2d 981, 983 (Wyo. 1999) 
("We review issues of law de novo.")

 

[¶6]           
Mr. 
Cheek first invokes the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.1  The problem with this argument is that 
the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution was not incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment and is not applicable to state court 
proceedings.  "A trial by jury in 
suits at common law pending in the State courts is not  a privilege or immunity 
of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to abridge."  Walker v. 
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 
92 (1875).  See 
also In re Adoption of KJD, 2002 WY 26, ¶23, 41 P.3d 522, 528 (Wyo. 
2002); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 988 (Wyo. 1984).

 

[¶7]           
Mr. 
Cheek next attempts to invoke W.R.C.P. 38 in support of his argument that he is 
entitled to a jury trial.  W.R.C.P. 
38(a) states:

 

Issues 
of law must be tried by the court, unless referred as hereinafter provided; and 
issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only, or specific 
real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury unless a jury trial be 
waived, or a reference be ordered.  
All other issues of fact shall be tried by the court, subject to its 
power to order any issue to be tried by a jury, or 
referred.

 

Mr. 
Cheek presents a very simple argument.  
He argues that, essentially, his action is focused on gaining the 
personal and real property of his deceased brother; the action is therefore an 
action for "specific real or personal property" within the terms of W.R.C.P. 
38(a) and therefore "shall be tried to a jury."  

 

[¶8]           
Unfortunately 
for Mr. Cheek, his argument skips a critical step.  In order to achieve his goals, he either 
had to get the will that already had been admitted to probate set aside, as he 
requested in his Petition to Revoke Probate, or he had to prove a lost will that 
superseded the will admitted to probate, as he requested in this Petition to 
Prove Last Will and Testament as Lost.  
Those, along with a petition to remove the personal representative, were 
the issues before the district court and for which Mr. Cheek sought a trial by 
jury.  There were no "actions for 
the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property" and so 
W.R.C.P. 38 simply does not apply.  

 

[¶9]           
Mr. 
Cheek's final argument essentially is that he is entitled to a jury trial under 
common law.  A right to a jury 
trial, even under the federal constitution, is preserved only as it existed at 
common law.  50A C.J.S. 
Juries § 8 (1997).  At common 
law, a right to a jury trial is recognized in cases triable at law, while there 
is no right to a jury trial in cases in equity.  See generally Davidek v. Wyoming Inv. 
Co., 77 Wyo. 141, 154-55, 308 P.2d 941, 946 (1957).  This remains the general rule in 
Wyoming.  Hyatt Bros., Inc. ex 
rel. Hyatt v. Hyatt, 769 P.2d 329, 333 (Wyo. 1989) ("[U]nder W.R.C.P. 38, 
purely equitable actions remained triable by the trial court unless it 
ordered an issue tried to a jury."); True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, 
Inc., 577 P.2d 991, 1003 (Wyo. 1978) ("The adoption of [W.R.C.P. 38], 
however, does not alter the long-established precept that cases purely equitable 
in character are triable by the court."); Lellman v. Mills, 15 Wyo. 149, 
176, 87 P. 985, 994 (1906) ("The case at bar is one of equitable cognizance, in 
which a jury was not demandable as a matter or right.").

 

[¶10]      
Mr. 
Cheek argues that because he is seeking the recovery of real and personal 
property, his is an action at law and therefore he is entitled to a jury 
trial.  Again, the critical flaw in 
Mr. Cheek's argument is that he mischaracterizes his petitions.  His petitions were all petitions in a 
probate proceeding.  He did not have 
any direct action for the recovery of real or personal property.  Once set in the proper contextthat of a 
probate proceedingit is clear that Mr. Cheek is not entitled to a trial by 
jury.

 

[¶11]      
Probate 
proceedings are not proceedings at law or in equity but rather are unique 
proceedings.  "[U]nder our codes 
probate proceedings are entirely separate and distinct from actions either at 
law or in equity."  Gaunt v. 
Kansas University Endowment Ass'n of Lawrence, Kan., 379 P.2d 825, 826 (Wyo. 
1963).  The general rule regarding 
the right to jury trials in probate proceedings is as follows: 

 

The 
right to demand a trial by jury in decedent estate administration proceedings 
was not given by the common law, and is not within a general constitutional 
guaranty, but exists only when, and to the extent that, it is conferred by 
statute.  Thus, in probate 
proceedings, there is no constitutional right to jury 
trial.

 

50A 
C.J.S. Juries § 110 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  More specifically:

 

A 
general constitutional guaranty of the right to a trial by jury does not 
ordinarily extend to proceedings for the probate or the revocation of the 
probate of wills, since such proceedings are special in character, belonging at 
common law to ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  
Thus, there is no constitutional right to jury trial in a will contest 
proceeding in probate court or a court of general jurisdiction, and there is 
generally no right to jury trial in a proceeding for the probate of a will or a 
will contest proceeding.

Id. 
at §111 (footnotes omitted).  In 
short, probate proceedings were unknown under the common law.  Therefore, the common law does not 
provide for the right to a trial by jury in such proceedings.2

 

[¶12]      
We 
have been given no applicable argument why a jury trial was demandable as of 
right under the specific facts and circumstances of this case.  As such, the trial court had the 
authority to strike Mr. Cheek's request for a jury trial.

 

[¶13]      
Mr. 
Cheek's second issue concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
trial court's denial of his attempt to prove a lost will.  Our standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence underlying trial court findings involves examining 
only the evidence in the record that is favorable to the prevailing party, 
giving that evidence every favorable inference.   Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 
80, ¶24, 30 P.3d 547, 553 (Wyo. 2001).  
We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court's findings and 
judgment of the facts unless they are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence.  Ruby 
Drilling Co., Inc. v. Ratcliff, 994 P.2d 931, 933 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶14]      
A 
lost will must be proven according to the terms of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-207 
(LexisNexis 2001) as follows:

 

§ 
2-6-207. Proof; lost or destroyed will; court may restrain personal 
representatives pending disposition.

 

(a) 
Whenever any will is lost or destroyed, the district court shall take proof of 
the execution and validity thereof to establish the same.  All the testimony shall be reduced to 
writing and signed by the witnesses.

(b) 
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless it is proved to have 
been in existence at the time of death of the testator, or is shown to have been 
fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its 
provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two (2) credible 
witnesses.

(c) 
When a lost will is established, the provisions thereof shall be distinctly 
stated and certified by the judge, under his hand and the seal of the court, and 
the certificate shall be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and 
recorded, and letters testamentary or of administration with the will annexed, 
shall be issued thereon in the same manner as upon wills produced and duly 
proved.

(d) 
If before or during the pendency of an application to prove a lost or destroyed 
will, letters of administration are granted on the estate of the testator or 
letters testamentary of any previous will of the testator are granted, the court 
may restrain the personal representatives so appointed from any acts or 
proceedings which would be injurious to the legatees or devisees claiming under 
the lost or destroyed will.

 

Mr. 
Cheek presents several arguments as to how the evidence he presented complies 
with the statutory requirements.  
We, however, need not look beyond one particular evidentiary requirement 
 the requirement under subsection (a) that the execution and validity of the 
will be proven.

 

[¶15]      
In 
the case sub judice, we need not concern ourselves with the exact requirements 
of the statute because absolutely no evidence was presented that even 
potentially supports a conclusion that the purported 1998 will was properly 
executed.  While several witnesses 
testified to either having seen the will or having heard Harold Cheek, Jr., 
mention the will, no witness testified regarding the valid execution of the 
will.  Mr. Cheek specifically 
testified that he did not know where the will was executed. No witness had any 
knowledge concerning the execution of the purported 1998 
will.

 

[¶16]      
The 
only testimony remotely concerning the validity of the will came from Mr. Cheek 
and one other witness.  Both 
witnesses testified that they saw the will and checked the signature page and 
recognized the signature of Harold Cheek, Jr.  The one witness, an office assistant of 
Mr. Cheek, testified she saw "other names on the last page" and that there were 
notaries on the will.  Mr. Cheek 
testified that "there were witnesses" and "there was a notary."  This information is woefully short of 
proving the valid execution of the purported will under any standard.  Given the state of the evidence on the 
issue of execution, the trial court did not err in ruling that Mr. Cheek failed 
to prove the existence of a valid will that was lost.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶17]      
The 
trial court did not err in striking Mr. Cheek's request for a jury trial.  With regard to proving a lost will, no 
evidence was presented supporting the existence of a validly executed will dated 
1998.  The petition to prove a lost 
will was properly denied.

 

[¶18]      
Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The Seventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution reads as 
follows:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.  

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads, in 
pertinent part:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.

2In Wyoming, we have recognized that "[p]roceedings for disproving or 
contesting a will were unknown to the common law.  The right of contest is a creature of 
statute and a contestant has such rights and only such rights as the law gives 
him."  Gaunt, 379 P.2d  at 
826.  Mr. Cheek makes no argument 
that any provision within the Wyoming Probate Code guarantees him the right to a 
jury trial, so we will not review that general issue.