Title: LUCIA J HANSON V DALLAS JOSEPH SULLIVAN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 3, 2002  
LUCIA J. HANSON, Individually 
and as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of NELS THOMAS  
HANSON, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117176  
BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY  
OF MECOSTA, a Municipal 
Corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
DALLAS JOSEPH SULLIVAN,  
Defendant.  
LUCIA J. HANSON, Individually 
and as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of NELS THOMAS  
HANSON, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
 No. 117973  
BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY  
________________________________ 
 
OF MECOSTA, a Municipal 
Corporation,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
and  
DALLAS JOSEPH SULLIVAN,  
Defendant.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiff’s decedent died as a result of a motor  
vehicle accident on a road under the jurisdiction of defendant  
Mecosta County Board of Road Commissioners.  Plaintiff sued  
both the other driver and the road commission, contending that  
the accident was caused in part by the defective condition of  
the roadway, and that this claim was within the highway  
exception 
to 
the 
governmental 
immunity 
statute.  
MCL 691.1402(1).  Among other things, the plaintiff alleged  
that the slope of the road at the crest of a hill prevented  
drivers from seeing each other in time to avoid a collision.  
The circuit court granted summary disposition for the road  
commission, and, on rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
The plaintiff’s allegations regarding the slope of the  
road present a claim of defective design, which is not within  
the road commission’s duty to maintain and repair the highway  
under § 1402(1).  We therefore affirm the decisions of the  
lower courts.  
2  
 
I  
Plaintiff’s decedent, Nels Hanson, was seriously injured  
in a head-on automobile collision on August 3, 1994, and died  
the following day. Decedent and the other driver, defendant  
Dallas 
Joseph 
Sullivan, were driving in opposite directions on  
160th Avenue, an unpaved road in Mecosta County. It appears  
that the accident occurred as both vehicles were approaching  
the crest of a hill. Plaintiff maintained that Sullivan had  
crossed over the center line, though expert testimony  
developed during discovery suggested that both drivers may  
have done so.1  
The essence of plaintiff’s claim against the road  
commission was that the section of highway in question was  
unsafe because of the limited sight distance caused by the  
curvature of the hill. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that  
the road commission breached its duties by:  
a. 
Failing 
to 
keep 
the 
improved, 
travelled portion of 160th Avenue in a reasonable 
state of repair and reasonably safe and convenient 
for public travel;  
b. Failing to grade and profile 160th Avenue 
on the hill north of 22 Mile Road to conform to the  
applicable standards for sight distance;  
c. Maintaining the grade and profile of  
160th Avenue on the hill north of 22 Mile Road so  
that southbound motorists did not have a safe sight 
distance as they climbed the hill;  
1 
 Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Sullivan was 
resolved by acceptance of a mediation evaluation under 
MCR 2.403.  
3  
 
d. Failing to provide adequate warning to 
southbound motorists of the limited sight distance 
on the hill north of 22 Mile Road;  
e. Failing to reduce the speed limit on 
160th Avenue in recognition of the danger posed by 
the limited sight distance;  
f. Failing to maintain 160th Avenue at a  
proper and adequate width given the limited sight 
distance caused by the grade and profile of the 
hill to provide motorists reasonable margins of 
error in their driving patterns and allow oncoming 
vehicles to safely pass each other at the crest of 
the hill;  
g. Failing to provide proper or adequate 
shoulder area for emergency use by motorists  
climbing the hill; and  
h. Carelessly and negligently breaching its 
statutory duties.  
Among other defenses, the road commission contended that  
plaintiff’s claim was barred because it was not within the  
highway exception to the governmental immunity statute,  
MCL 691.1402(1), which provides:  
(1) 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
in  
section 
2a, 
each 
governmental 
agency 
having 
jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the 
highway in reasonable repair so that it is  
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. 
A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to 
his or her property by reason of failure of a 
governmental agency to keep a highway under its 
jurisdiction 
in 
reasonable 
repair 
and 
in 
a  
condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may 
recover the damages suffered by him or her from the 
governmental agency.  The liability, procedure, and 
remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of 
a county road commission shall be as provided in 
section 21 of chapter IV of 1909 PA 283, MCL 
224.21. The duty of the state and the county road 
commissions to repair and maintain highways, and 
the liability for that duty, extends only to the 
improved portion of the highway designed for  
4  
  
vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, 
trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation 
outside of the improved portion of the highway 
designed for vehicular travel.  
The circuit court granted summary disposition for the  
defendant, 
concluding that the highway exception did not apply  
and that the road commission was protected by governmental  
immunity.  The court also rejected the plaintiff’s nuisance  
theory.2  
The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The  
Court’s initial decision affirmed in part and reversed in  
part.3
 The Court concluded that summary disposition was  
properly granted on the nuisance theory.  However, it reversed  
on the highway exception. 
The Court relied on Pick v  
Szymczak, 451 Mich 607; 548 NW2d 603 (1996), for the  
proposition that the duty of highway maintenance includes a  
duty to erect adequate warning signs or traffic control  
devices at a “point of hazard” or a “point of special danger”.  
The Court of Appeals said that the evidence submitted created  
a genuine issue of material fact about whether the hill crest  
was a point of danger to such an extent that the defendant had  
a duty to provide adequate warning signs.  
2 That issue is not raised in the present appeals.  
3 
  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 9, 2000 
(Docket No. 217869).  
5  
 
On June 30, 2000, the defendant road commission filed an  
application for leave to appeal to this Court,4 and on the  
same day the plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing in the  
Court of Appeals.  While that motion was pending, on July 28,  
2000, we decided Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143;  
615 NW2d 702 (2000), which clarified the law regarding the  
highway exception and overruled Pick. In light of Nawrocki,  
the Court of Appeals granted rehearing and reversed itself on  
the highway exception issue, affirming the circuit court’s  
grant of summary disposition.5  
The plaintiff has filed an application for leave to  
appeal from that decision.6  
II  
This case involves a review of a decision on a motion for  
summary disposition, and presents an issue of statutory  
construction, both of which we review de novo. Hazle v Ford  
Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001); Brown v  
Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374; 617 NW2d 301  
(2000).  
4 Docket No. 117176.  
5 
  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 3, 2000 
(Docket No. 217869). Judge JANSEN dissented from the highway 
exception portion of the opinion, believing that several of 
the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint were sufficient to 
avoid governmental immunity even under the principles 
announced in Nawrocki.  
6 Docket No. 117973.  
6  
 
 
  
III  
In Nawrocki and its companion case, Evens v Shiawassee Co  
Rd Comm’rs, we relied on Ross v Consumers Power Co (On  
Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), for the basic  
principle 
that 
the 
immunity 
conferred 
on 
governmental 
agencies  
is a broad one, with only narrowly drawn exceptions.  420 Mich  
618.  In rejecting Brian Evens’ claim that the repair and  
maintenance obligation imposed by the highway exception  
includes a duty to install, maintain, repair, or improve  
traffic control devices, we examined the plain language of  
§ 1402(1).  While we agreed with Pick that the first sentence  
of the statutory clause creates a general duty to repair and  
maintain highways so they are reasonably safe and convenient  
for public travel, we noted that the duty with regard to state  
and county road commissioners is significantly limited,  
extending “only to the improved portion of the highway  
designed for vehicular travel.” We explained:  
Nowhere in this language, or anywhere else in 
the statutory clause, do phrases such as “known 
points of hazard,” “points of special danger,” 
“integral parts of the highway,” or “traffic sign 
maintenance” appear. We are not persuaded that the  
highway 
exception contemplates “conditions” arising  
from “point[s] of hazard,” “areas of special  
danger,” or “integral parts of the highway,”  
outside the actual roadbed, paved or unpaved,  
designed for vehicular travel.  None of these  
phrases or concepts appears anywhere within the 
provision of the highway exception. To continue to  
rely upon these phrases in determining the scope of 
the highway exception is contrary to the language 
selected by the Legislature in creating this  
7  
 
 
exception.  [463 Mich 176-177 (emphasis supplied).]  
In light of those principles, we concluded that Pick must  
be overruled and the liability of state and county road  
commissions limited. We said:  
The state and county road commissions’ duty, 
under the highway exception, is only implicated 
upon their failure to repair or maintain the actual  
physical structure of the roadbed surface, paved or  
unpaved, designed for vehicular travel, which in  
turn 
proximately 
causes 
injury 
or 
damage. 
Scheurman [v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619,  
631; 456 NW2d 66 (1990)].  A plaintiff making a 
claim of inadequate signage, like a plaintiff 
making a claim of inadequate street lighting or 
vegetation obstruction, fails to plead in avoidance 
of governmental immunity because signs are not 
within the paved or unpaved portion of the roadbed 
designed for vehicular travel. 
Traffic device  
claims, such as inadequacy of traffic signs, simply 
do not involve a dangerous or defective condition 
in the improved portion of the highway designed for 
vehicular travel.  
Evens argues that the SCRC failed to install 
additional traffic signs or signals that might 
conceivably have made the intersection safer.  
Because the highway exception imposes no such duty 
on the state or county road commissions, we reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to 
the SCRC. [463 Mich 183-184 (emphasis supplied).]  
IV  
The majority of the plaintiff’s allegations in this case  
involve the very sorts of warning and traffic control sign  
claims rejected in Nawrocki. Such claims are clearly outside  
the purview of the highway exception, and we affirm the grant  
of summary disposition to the road commission with respect to  
these claims.  
8  
 
V  
In addition to her claims involving inadequate warning,  
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached its duty by:  
b. Failing to grade and profile 160th Avenue 
on the hill north of 22 Mile Road to conform to the  
applicable standards for sight distance;  
c. Maintaining the grade and profile of  
160th Avenue on the hill north of 22 Mile Road so  
that southbound motorists did not have a safe sight 
distance as they climbed the hill . . . .  
The plaintiff argues that these allegations do involve  
the actual roadway designed for vehicular travel, thus  
avoiding the principles stated in Nawrocki. 
The Court of  
Appeals majority disagreed, holding that Nawrocki made clear  
that these types of claims do not implicate the statutory duty  
of the road commission to repair and maintain the roadbed:  
In the present case, there is no dispute that 
the 
actual 
roadbed 
surface 
itself 
was 
well  
maintained.
 
Although 
plaintiff 
focused 
her  
argument on the limited sight distance where the 
crash occurred, the limited sight distance is not a 
road surface condition.  Rather, it is a design 
feature that is a product of the terrain through 
which the road traverses.  We believe that under  
the 
statute 
in 
question, 
as 
interpreted 
in  
[Nawrocki], the road commission’s duty does not 
include a duty to correct design defects. Had the  
Legislature intended the correction of design 
defects to be included, it would have included such 
a requirement in the statutory language, and not 
assumed that such a requirement would be inferred 
under “maintenance and repair.” As we observed in  
our original opinion, this design feature created a 
point of hazard that prior to [Nawrocki] created an  
issue of fact.  In overruling Pick, supra, the 
Supreme Court instructed that the highway exception 
to governmental immunity does not contemplate 
conditions 
arising 
from 
points 
of 
hazard.  
9  
 
 
 
 
 
[Nawrocki], supra at 176-177.  At best, plaintiff 
can only establish a point of hazard resulting from 
the limited sight distance at the crest of the hill 
where this occurrence happened, rather than a 
defect in the actual roadbed surface. [Slip op, pp 
2-3.]  
The dissenting Court of Appeals judge stated:  
I 
cannot 
believe 
that 
the 
Legislature 
“intended” that a governmental entity responsible 
for designing and building a road would be immune 
from 
liability 
where 
the 
design 
itself 
is  
dangerous, but the road itself contained no  
“potholes” or other defects in the surface itself. 
[Slip op, p 2 (JANSEN, P.J.).]  
This latter statement is contrary to the plain language of the  
statute, 
which 
carves 
out 
a 
limited 
exemption 
from  
governmental immunity and imposes on the state and county road  
commissions a narrow duty to “repair and maintain . . . the  
improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel  
. . . .”  MCL 691.1402(1). Nowhere in the statutory language  
is there a duty to install, to construct or to correct what  
may be perceived as a dangerous or defective “design.”7  
7 We disagree with dicta in cases such as Killeen v Dep’t  
of Transportation, 432 Mich 1, 4-5; 438 NW2d 233 (1989), 
Arnold v State Hwy Dep’t, 406 Mich 235, 237-238; 277 NW2d 627  
(1979), and Peters v State Hwy Dep’t, 400 Mich 50, 57; 252 
NW2d 799 (1977), that the duty to maintain a road in a  
reasonably 
safe 
condition includes the duty to correct defects 
arising from the original design or construction of highways.  
Although the dissent criticizes us for “dismissing” such 
cases, the dissent itself recognizes that “the primary issue 
in Killeen involved jurisdiction over a highway . . . .” Post  
at 3, n 5.  The dissent further recognizes that the other 
cases, “did not specifically reach the design defect issue.” 
Id.  Yet, the dissent seems to believe that this Court should 
elevate conclusory statements of dicta, lacking in any  
10  
 
 
  
  
Moreover, it is not the province of this Court to make policy  
judgments or to protect against anomalous results.  See  
Nawrocki, supra at 171, n 27.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals majority and hold that  
the road commission’s duty under the highway exception does  
not include a duty to design, or to correct defects arising  
from the original design or construction of highways.  In the  
highway exception, the Legislature has said that the duty of  
the road commission is to “maintain the highway in reasonable  
repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public  
travel.” The statute further provides that the specific duty  
of the state and county road commissions is to “repair and  
maintain” highways. 
“Maintain” and “repair” are not  
technical legal terms. In common usage, “maintain” means “to  
statutory analysis, above the plain words of the statute. 
However, our judicial task is to give meaning to the intent of 
the Legislature, as expressed in the statutory text.  
Accordingly, we decline to elevate such statements above the 
plain words of the highway exception.  
Moreover, the dissent relies upon the doctrine of 
legislative acquiescence in stating that "[t]he Legislature’s 
failure to change the language [in response to the dicta 
contained in the above decisions] suggests its intent to make 
a design defect actionable.” Post at 6. However, even apart 
from the fact that these decisions involve dicta to which few  
legislative bodies would feel the need to respond, this Court 
has made it clear that the doctrine of legislative 
acquiescence "is a highly disfavored doctrine of statutory 
construction; sound principles of statutory construction 
require that Michigan courts determine the Legislature's 
intent from its words, not from its silence." Donajkowski v  
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999) 
(emphasis in the original).  
11  
keep in a state of repair, efficiency, or validity: preserve  
from failure or decline.” Webster’s Third New International  
Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1966), p 1362.  Similarly,  
“repair” means “to restore to a good or sound condition after  
decay or damage; mend.”  Random House Webster’s College  
Dictionary (2000), p 1119. We find persuasive the analysis of  
Wechsler v Wayne Co Rd Comm, 215 Mich App 579, 587-588; 546  
NW2d 690 (1996) that  
[t]he Legislature thus did not purport to demand of 
governmental 
agencies 
having 
jurisdiction 
of  
highways that they improve or enhance existing 
highways, as by widening existing lanes or banking 
existing 
curves; 
that 
they 
augment 
existing 
highways, as by adding left-turn lanes; or that 
existing highways be expanded, as by adding new 
travel lanes or extending a highway into new  
territory. The only statutory requirement and the 
only mandate that, if ignored, can form the basis 
for tort liability is to "maintain" the highway in 
reasonable repair.  
Thus, . . . highway authorities are under no 
statutory obligation to reconstruct a highway 
whenever some technological safety advancement has 
been developed.  Rather, the focus of the highway 
exception is on maintaining what has already been 
built in a state of reasonable repair so as to be 
reasonably safe and fit for public vehicular  
travel.  
The plain language of the highway exception to governmental  
immunity provides that the road commission has a duty to  
repair and maintain, not a duty to design or redesign.  
What the plaintiff sought in this case was to create a  
duty to design, or redesign, the roadway to make it safer by  
eliminating points of special danger or hazard.  However,  
12  
 
 
             
there is no such design duty included in the statute.  Nowhere  
in the statutory language are there phrases such as “known  
points of hazard” or “points of special danger.”  We  
emphasized in Nawrocki that the highway exception does not  
permit claims based on conditions arising from such points of  
hazard, and that the only permissible claims are those arising  
from a defect in the actual roadbed itself.8  Accordingly, the  
plaintiff’s claims that 160th Avenue was poorly designed and  
that it did not provide an adequate sight distance are  
insufficient to avoid governmental immunity.  
Reasonable minds can differ about whether it is sound  
public policy to so limit the duty imposed on authorities  
responsible for our roads and highways.  However, our function  
is not to redetermine the Legislature’s choice or to  
independently assess what would be most fair or just or best  
public policy.  Our task is to discern the intent of the  
8 In Nawrocki, we stated that the duty imposed upon state 
and county road commissions to “repair and maintain . . . the 
improved 
portion 
of 
the highway designed for vehicular travel” 
is implicated only when the alleged “defect,” or “dangerous or  
defective condition,” is located within the actual roadbed  
itself. See id. at 161-162.  We used the terms “defect” and  
“dangerous 
or 
defective condition” in Nawrocki to describe the  
status of the highway following a breach of the road 
commission’s specific duty to “repair and maintain” the  
highway. The terms “defect” and “dangerous or defective 
condition” do not expand the statutory duty, but instead 
describe the general conditions that trigger the statutory 
duty to “repair and maintain.”  In other words, if the road 
commission’s statutory duty is breached, it follows that the 
highway is in a state of disrepair, a synonym of which is  
“defect.”  
13  
 
 
 
 
 
Legislature from the language of the statute it enacts.  Ross,  
supra at 596.  The Legislature has clearly limited the duty of  
the road commission to the repair and maintenance of the  
roadways, and the plaintiff’s claim does not fall within that  
scope.  Thus, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals  
and the Mecosta Circuit Court.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
14  
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LUCIA J. HANSON, individually 
and as personal representative 
of the estate of NELS THOMAS  
HANSON, deceased,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 117176  
BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY  
OF MECOSTA, a municipal 
corporation,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
DALLAS JOSEPH SULLIVAN,  
Defendant.  
LUCIA J. HANSON, individually 
and as personal representative 
of the estate of NELS THOMAS  
HANSON, deceased,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
No. 117973  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY  
OF MECOSTA, a municipal 
corporation,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
and  
DALLAS JOSEPH SULLIVAN,  
Defendant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that the  
highway exception to governmental immunity1 does not extend to  
a duty to design safe roadways.  I would reverse the Court of  
Appeals decision that plaintiff's design defect claim is  
barred by governmental immunity.  
The majority approaches the issue of design defects as  
one of first impression, relying on Nawrocki v Macomb Co Road  
Comm,2 and selected dictionary definitions of "maintain" and  
"repair."
 It fails to discuss any case law dealing with  
governmental 
immunity 
and 
a 
highway's 
design 
defect,  
dismissing in a footnote three such examples as dicta.  
Without acknowledging that it is doing so, the majority is  
again overturning the longstanding precedent of this Court.  
As recently as 1989, this Court held a governmental  
1  MCL 691.1402(1).  
2  463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).  
2  
 
 
 
 
entity that defectively designed a highway liable for a loss  
suffered as a result of the defect.  Killeen v Dep't of  
Transportation, 432 Mich 1, 4-5; 438 NW2d 233 (1989).  
Moreover, in Arnold v State Hwy Dep't,3 this Court explicitly  
stated:  "[D]efects in the construction of highways [are]  
within the bounds of the [highway exception] statute." That  
conclusion echoed this Court's statement in Peters v State Hwy  
Dep't,4 where it asserted: "[L]iability for defective highways  
is an express exception to the general sovereign immunity  
scheme created by statute," including a "defect in the design  
or construction of the highway." Until now, those decisions  
have not been called into question.5  
More recently, this Court decided Nawrocki, supra.  
Admittedly, the majority opinion in Nawrocki stands for the  
3  406 Mich 235, 237; 277 NW2d 627 (1979).  
4  400 Mich 50, 57; 252 NW2d 799 (1977).  
5 The majority dismisses references to design defects "in 
cases such as" Killeen, supra, as dicta, meaning statements 
unnecessary to support the decision of the Court.  Black's Law  
Dictionary (6th ed).  Although the primary issue in Killeen  
involved jurisdiction over a highway, the conclusion that 
design defects are actionable was critical to the highway 
department's liability.  Id. at 13. Moreover, this Court did 
not specifically reach the design defect issue in other cases 
only because no one disputed that defects in design and 
construction fall within the highway exception. See Arnold,  
supra at 237-238; Peters, supra at 55-57. This implies that 
the fact has been well accepted.  Accordingly, even as dicta, 
this Court's repeated assertions that the highway exception 
includes design defects are persuasive.  
3  
 
  
proposition 
that 
the 
highway exception is limited to hazardous  
conditions of the actual road surface designed for vehicular  
travel. Nawrocki, supra at 176-177. However, with respect to  
governmental liability for highway design defects, I do not  
read that decision as overruling any of the cases cited  
herein.  
A hazard on the traveled surface of a road can certainly  
be caused by a design defect, as this case demonstrates.  
Plaintiff has alleged that the county failed to create a safe  
surface for travel because the road was designed with too  
steep a grade.  I would hold that plaintiff's design defect  
claim survives Nawrocki to the extent that she contends that  
the design defect rendered the road surface unsafe for  
travel.6  
A logical reading of the highway exception supports that  
conclusion.
 The statute provides for a cause of action  
against a governmental agency for failure "to keep a highway  
under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition  
reasonably safe and fit for travel . . . ."  It instructs  
agencies 
"having 
jurisdiction over a highway [to] maintain the  
highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and  
6  Certainly, some roadways must traverse terrain making 
it impossible to avoid arguably unsafe conditions. However, 
whether a road was designed to be reasonably safe considering 
the terrain it must traverse is a question of fact for a jury.  
4  
 
 
convenient for public travel." 
MCL 691.1402(1) (emphasis  
added).  
The majority construes that language to mean that the  
government has no duty other than to keep a highway in its  
original condition. However, implicit in a duty to maintain  
a reasonably safe highway is a duty to design a reasonably  
safe highway in the first place.  It mocks common sense to  
construe "maintain" to permit an agency that designed a  
dangerous roadway to escape liability as long as it keeps the  
road in that same condition.  The Legislature must have  
intended "maintain" to include "design and build."  
In 1886, this Court examined a predecessor statute7 to  
the current highway exception statute and reached the same  
conclusion as I do in this case. 
The language of both  
statutes requires the governmental agency having authority  
over a particular highway to "keep" the highway in reasonable  
or good repair and "in a condition reasonably safe and fit for  
travel."  See Carver v Detroit & Saline Plank-Road Co, 61 Mich  
584, 589; 28 NW 721 (1886).  Speaking for the Court then,  
Justice Champlin stated:  
I have no doubt that the defects in highways 
covered by the act of 1879 extend to defects in 
construction, as well as defects through omission 
to repair, and to neglect to keep the public 
highways in a condition reasonably safe and fit for  
7  1879 PA 244.  
5  
 
travel by day or by night; and unless it is so 
kept, it constitutes a defect in the highway, for 
which, if injury results, an action will lie.  [Id.  
at 590.]  
I reaffirm that longstanding assessment.  Also, I note  
that the Legislature could have used different language when  
it codified governmental immunity and specifically carved out  
the highway exception.  Presumably it acted with knowledge of  
this Court's interpretation of the language it chose. 
The  
Legislature's failure to change the language suggests its  
intent to make a design defect actionable.  See Gordon  
Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 505; 475 NW2d  
704 (1991); Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 353; 439 NW2d 899  
(1989).  
On the basis of the highway exception's wording and this  
Court's longstanding precedent, I conclude that a highway  
design defect is actionable as an exception to governmental  
immunity.  I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision to  
the contrary.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
6