Title: Wallace v. Wallace

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

214 Kan. 344 (1974)
520 P.2d 1221
JANET S. WALLACE, Appellee,
v.
DONALD L. WALLACE, Appellant.
No. 47,149

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 6, 1974.
J. Stephen Nyswonger, of Braun & Nyswonger, of Garden City, argued the cause, and Lelyn L. Braun, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
R.R. Mitchell, of Mitchell, Smith & Patton, of Dodge City, argued the cause, and Don C. Smith, of the same firm, was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OWSLEY, J.:
This action involves post-trial motions and orders in a divorce action relative to the effect of the wife's remarriage on an alimony award. The husband appeals from a nunc pro tunc order made by the trial court changing an alimony judgment to a property division judgment.
The plaintiff, Janet S. Wallace, and the defendant, Donald L. Wallace, were married in 1964 and subsequently had one child. They lived together as husband and wife until 1969 when the wife filed an action for divorce. A divorce was granted the wife in January, 1970, and she recovered an award of alimony in the sum of *345 $7,500 payable over a ten-year period. Other appropriate provisions were made as to custody, child support, and division of property. In December, 1970, the wife remarried. In July, 1971, the husband filed a motion to terminate alimony. Thereupon, the wife filed a motion for a nunc pro tunc order to set aside the award of alimony and change the same to a division of property. In December, 1971, the court changed by nunc pro tunc order the $7,500 judgment for alimony to reflect a division of property in the same amount. The only evidence before the court was in the form of a stipulation, the pertinent provisions of which read:
On appeal, the husband argues the trial court did not have jurisdiction to change the previous judgment, citing Herzmark v. Herzmark, 199 Kan. 48, 427 P.2d 465; Flannery v. Flannery, 203 Kan. 239, 452 P.2d 846; Beck v. Beck, 208 Kan. 148, 490 P.2d 628; and Drummond v. Drummond, 209 Kan. 86, 495 P.2d 994.
The wife contends since the parties agreed the $7,500 was actually *346 a division of property the trial court had the right by nunc pro tunc order to correctly reflect what the parties agreed to in the first instance.
The answer to the question presented in this appeal centers around a proper construction of K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 60-1610 (b) and (c). With relation to this issue, we first considered the statute in Herzmark. There, a judgment was entered divorcing the parties and, in addition to other provisions, an alimony award was made in favor of the wife. Subsequently, the wife remarried and the husband filed a motion to set aside the unpaid portion of the alimony judgment. We held that remarriage of a recipient of alimony does not of itself operate to release the obligation to pay alimony, but proof of remarriage on motion to modify makes out a prima facie case requiring termination of future alimony payments. In reaching this conclusion we stated care should be exercised in an original decree of divorce that payments to equalize the division of property are not included with payments for future support denominated as alimony.
In Flannery, the wife moved to modify an order for division of property. We stated an alimony judgment may be modified subject to the limitations set out in the statute, but no comparable authority is granted with respect to a division of property. We construed the omission as a deliberate legislative design to withhold from a trial court the power to modify its original decree as to property rights or division of property.
In Beck, the husband appealed from an order on a post-divorce motion to discontinue alimony. The trial court reduced the alimony from $7,500 to $5,000 upon proof of the wife's remarriage. In its decision the trial court took the position that the award of $7,500 was in the nature of a property settlement. We noted that the record disclosed at the time the divorce was granted both court and counsel regarded the sum as alimony. In setting aside the alimony judgment we repeated the admonition in Herzmark as to the necessity of recognizing the distinction between alimony and a division of property.
In Drummond, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which provided for a division of property and alimony. The agreement was submitted to the trial court and it was approved and made the judgment of the court. Subsequently, the wife remarried and moved to have the alimony award changed to a division of *347 property. We held that the wife's motion to modify, although aimed at the award of alimony, had the effect of changing the division of property which was prohibited by our decision in Flannery. Counsel for the husband admitted the alimony award was not for future support, but was a means of equalizing the division of property. We held that the written settlement agreement was binding on the parties and the judgment for alimony should be terminated. We recognized that many factors may be considered in negotiating a divorce settlement, one of which is the matter of taxes. We also pointed out that a party to a divorce case has a right to negotiate for a higher award for alimony in lieu of a lesser amount by way of a division of property. We also stated that a party having reached such an agreement cannot attack the judgment based thereon after submitting the agreement to the court requesting its approval. We again reiterated the caveat in Herzmark and Beck, stating:
Although we have considered variances in the facts in the instant case from those in Drummond, we have failed to discover any basis for denying application of the law set forth in Drummond. The plaintiff wife points out the agreement in this case was oral while the agreement in Drummond was written. We give this no significance when in each instance the parties agreed the amount to be paid to the wife should be designated as alimony. In Drummond, the alimony judgment was entered as a result of asking the court to approve the written agreement, while in the instant case it was done by oral request before the court. An oral request by the parties that a judgment be entered in a certain manner remains subject to the exercise of judicial discretion. When discretion is exercised by the court in the manner requested by the parties, they should not be permitted to attack the judgment and urge a result contrary to their request.
The defendant husband also claims the nunc pro tunc order was erroneously issued. This question was not presented in any of the cases previously cited herein. If the trial court had the right and power to issue the nunc pro tunc order the foregoing result is incorrect.
*348 Both parties rely on Mathey v. Mathey, 175 Kan. 446, 264 P.2d 1058. In this case the court granted a divorce to the plaintiff and in the journal entry awarded certain real and personal property to each of the parties without designating whether the award to plaintiff constituted a division of property or alimony. Subsequently, by nunc pro tunc order, the court corrected the journal entry to show the excess awarded the wife was actually permanent alimony. In sustaining the order on appeal we stated the following rules relating to nunc pro tunc orders:
"In the Tincknell case it was held:
..............
In Cazzell v. Cazzell, 133 Kan. 766, 3 P.2d 479, it was said:
Application of these rules was affirmed in the following cases (Ramsey v. Hand, 185 Kan. 350, 343 P.2d 225; Aeby v. State, 199 Kan. 123, 427 P.2d 453; Hoard v. Shelton, 201 Kan. 145, 439 P.2d 123; and Norcross v. Pickrell Drilling Co., 202 Kan. 524, 449 P.2d 569.)
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to provide a means of entering the actual judgment of the trial court which for one *349 reason or another was not properly recorded. The right to make the order is based on the failure to accurately record the court's decision. In the instant case, both of the parties requested in open court that the payment of $7,500 to the wife be awarded as alimony. In compliance with this request the trial court signed a journal entry to this effect. Undoubtedly, the court knew the amount of the award was to equalize the property awarded the husband. Notwithstanding this knowledge, there can be no valid argument that it was not the court's intention to make the award alimony as requested by the parties. This is in accord with the test of clerical error versus judicial error set forth in 46 An. Jur.2d, Judgments, §§ 201 and 202. It is stated:
The trial court in entering the nunc pro tunc order was not correcting a clerical error. Any attempt by a court, under the guise of correcting clerical error to revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion, is not permitted.
The stipulation filed by the parties by its terms constituted all the evidence before the trial court on defendant's motion to modify and on plaintiff's motion for an order nunc pro tunc. In accord with the foregoing the motion for an order nunc pro tunc should have been denied and the motion to modify should have been sustained. We are reversing the case with directions to sustain the motion to modify.
Reversed with directions.