Title: Faunce Levon Pearce v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC02-476
____________
FAUNCE LEVON PEARCE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 1, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and
attempted second-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the
judgments and sentences.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Faunce Pearce was charged as a codefendant in the murder of Robert
1.  Pearce and his codefendant Lawrence Joseph Smith were tried separately
for these crimes.  Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-
degree murder and sentenced to death.  Smith’s convictions and life sentence for
attempted first-degree murder were affirmed on direct appeal.  See Smith v. State,
866 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2004).  However, based on erroneous statements in the
sentencing order, this Court remanded the case for resentencing before the trial
judge for the first-degree murder conviction.  Id. at 67-68. 
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Crawford and in the attempted murder of Stephen Tuttle.1  The following facts
were revealed at Pearce’s trial.
On the evening of September 13, 1999, Pearce visited Bryon Loucks at
Loucks’ home, which was also Loucks’ place of business, a mobile home
dealership known as We Shelter America.  Pearce worked for the business by
setting up mobile homes.  Pearce was looking for Loucks’ teenage stepson, Ken
Shook, in order to obtain LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) geltabs.  Shook called
two friends, Stephen Tuttle and Robert Crawford, who in turn called another
friend, Amanda Havner.  Havner contacted her source for drugs, Tanya Barcomb,
who said she could obtain the geltabs.  Tuttle, Crawford, and Havner then went to
Loucks’ business, where Pearce gave them $1200 to obtain a book of 1000
geltabs.  Pearce indicated that they should not return without either the money or
the drugs.  Shook, Tuttle, Crawford, and Havner went to Barcomb’s house, where
Barcomb indicated that she, her boyfriend, and Havner would obtain the drugs
from a supplier while the three boys remained behind.  After arriving at an
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apartment complex, Barcomb told Havner to stay in the car.  Barcomb and her
boyfriend entered a friend's apartment.  The boyfriend hid the money in his own
shoe and punched himself in the face.  When Barcomb and her boyfriend returned
to the car, they told Havner that their drug supplier stole the money.  Because of
Barcomb’s deception, Shook, Tuttle, Crawford, and Havner eventually were
forced to return to Loucks’ business without the money or the drugs.
While the teenagers were gone, Pearce and Loucks received a telephone call
from Barcomb explaining that Pearce’s money had been stolen.  Pearce became
very angry and was standing outside with a gun visibly tucked in his pants when
the four teenagers returned shortly thereafter.  As Shook, Tuttle, Crawford, and
Havner exited the car, Pearce waved the gun and ordered them inside Loucks'
business office.  This business location was surrounded by a twelve-foot fence,
topped with barbed wire.  The fence also had a locked gate.  Pearce confined
Loucks and the four teenagers at this location for an unknown period of time. 
During this confinement, the witnesses described Pearce's mood as swinging
between calm and threatening.  Pearce refused to allow anyone to leave and, at
various times, waved his gun at the confined individuals.  Havner made some
phone calls in a futile attempt to recover Pearce’s money.  At one point, Pearce
grabbed Havner by the throat and slammed her head against a wall.  He also
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pointed the gun at Havner and threatened to shoot her in the head.  Pearce
eventually allowed Havner to leave when her brother arrived at the business
location.  At another point, Pearce took Tuttle outside and forced him at gunpoint
to perform oral sex upon him.
At some point, Pearce called his friend Theodore Butterfield, and requested
that Butterfield come armed to Loucks’ business.  Pearce also requested that
Butterfield bring Lawrence Joey Smith with him.  Heath Brittingham, who was at
the house with Butterfield, accompanied Butterfield and Smith.  When Butterfield,
Smith, and Brittingham arrived at Loucks’ business, they were visibly armed. 
Smith stated, “We're here to do business.”  According to Tuttle, Pearce spoke with
these three men outside.  Brittingham also testified that Pearce and Smith spoke to
each other, but he was not able to hear their conversation.  Pearce told the three
men that Tuttle and Crawford were going to show them where to find the people
who had stolen Pearce's money. While still holding his gun, Pearce told Tuttle and
Crawford to get in his car.  Loucks refused to allow Pearce to take his stepson,
Shook.  Loucks also offered to drive Tuttle and Crawford to their homes and to get
Pearce his money in the morning.  Pearce refused, but told Loucks he was not
going to hurt the boys—only take them down the road, punch them in the mouth,
and make them walk home.  Pearce instructed Loucks to wait by the phone to hear
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from the boys.
Pearce, Smith, Butterfield, Brittingham, Tuttle, and Crawford left in
Pearce's car, a two-door Trans Am with a t-top.  Pearce drove the car and Smith sat
in the front passenger seat.  Tuttle sat on Crawford's lap in the middle of the
backseat, with Butterfield and Brittingham seated on both sides of the boys.  After
driving south on Highway 41 in Pasco County, Pearce turned right on State Road
54 and drove to a dark, desolate area.  According to Butterfield’s testimony,
sometime during this drive Smith told Pearce that his 9 mm pistol was jammed and
the two men exchanged guns, with Smith receiving Pearce's functional .40 caliber
pistol.  Brittingham also testified that Pearce and Smith exchanged guns during the
drive.
Pearce stopped the car along the side of the road and told Tuttle to get out of
the car.  Smith first exited from the passenger's side and stood between the door
and the car while Tuttle exited the backseat on the passenger's side.  Pearce told
Smith either to “break [Tuttle’s] jaw” or “pop him in the jaw for stealing my shit,”
to which Smith replied, “Fuck that.”  Smith then turned around and shot Tuttle
once in the back of the head.  When Smith got back in the car, Pearce asked, “Is he
dead?,” and Smith replied, “Yeah, he's dead.  I shot him in the head with a fucking
.40.”  Pearce then drove approximately two hundred yards down the road, stopped
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the car, and Smith exited the vehicle again.  Pearce ordered Crawford out. 
Crawford complied while pleading, “No.  Please no.”  Smith shot Crawford twice: 
in the head and in the arm.
After leaving the scene, Smith threatened to kill Butterfield and Brittingham 
if they “snitched” on him.  Pearce drove to a restaurant where he and Smith ate
breakfast.  Pearce and Smith left Butterfield and Brittingham at a grocery store,
telling them not to leave, and returned for them within an hour.  Pearce then drove
to the Howard Frankland Bridge over Tampa Bay, where Smith wrapped the .40
caliber pistol in newspaper and threw it in the water.  Shortly thereafter, the four
men split up.  Smith attempted to leave town by bus but was unable to do so
because of an approaching hurricane.
Tuttle survived the gunshot to his head.  At trial, he testified that he
remembered getting out of the car and then everything went black.  His next
memory was waking up on the side of the road.  He felt the hole in his head, but
did not remember being shot or who shot him.  He eventually flagged down a
passing motorist for assistance.  Crawford, however, died at the scene.  The
medical examiner testified that Crawford’s injuries suggested that he was shot first
in the arm, with that bullet traveling through his body and lodging in his throat;
that the gunshot wound to Crawford’s head, which was fatal, entered the right side
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of Crawford’s head about four inches above his ear and exited the left side; and
that Crawford would have lost consciousness fifteen to twenty seconds after the
shot to his head and died within two to five minutes.
The entire course of these events occurred during the evening of September
13, and into the morning of September 14, 1999.  That morning, Butterfield and
Brittingham were located and interviewed by police.  Smith was arrested on the
same day, and Pearce was located and arrested a few weeks later.  The murder
weapon, Pearce's .40 caliber pistol, was recovered from the location in Tampa Bay
where Butterfield stated that Smith had thrown it.  The bullets removed from
Tuttle and Crawford were matched to the same pistol.
Butterfield and Brittingham agreed to cooperate with the State in exchange
for not being charged with any crimes related to these offenses.  Both testified at
trial.  During the cross-examination of Brittingham, Pearce’s counsel attempted to
offer a videotape of a prior statement that Brittingham made to an investigating
officer.  This prior statement was offered as impeachment evidence, but the court
denied its introduction.  A transcript of the videotape was proffered by the
defense.  In this videotaped statement, Brittingham stated that Pearce had no
knowledge of Smith’s intention to shoot the victims and that Pearce had asked
Smith what he was doing when he shot the victims.
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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Pearce did not testify or present any evidence during the guilt phase.  Pearce
was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm for Crawford’s death and
attempted second-degree murder with a firearm for the shooting of Tuttle.  During
the penalty phase, the State relied upon the evidence presented in its case in chief. 
Pearce chose not to testify or present penalty phase argument.  The jury
recommended death by a vote of ten to two.
During the Spencer2 hearing, Pearce declined to present evidence or
argument and forbade his attorneys to do so.  In imposing sentence, the trial court
considered a handwritten letter from Pearce, letters from family members of
Crawford, a comprehensive presentence investigation, and several hundred pages
of court, criminal, school, and other records pertaining to Pearce.  The trial court
found three aggravating factors:  a previous conviction of a violent felony, based
on the attempted murder of Tuttle (given great weight); that the murder was
committed while engaged in kidnapping (given great weight); and that the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal
justification (given great weight).  See § 921.141(5)(b), (d), (i), Fla. Stat. (2001). 
The trial court found no statutory mitigating factors.  While Pearce requested no
nonstatutory factors, the trial court considered a number of factors based on claims
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in Pearce’s correspondence to the court.  The trial court concluded that two of
Pearce’s claims (that he was afraid of Smith and only participated in the murder
because of this fear, and that the State witnesses lied) were actually claims of
lingering doubt and would not be considered as mitigating factors.  The trial court
also discounted Pearce’s claim that Crawford was killed because of his
involvement in an illicit drug deal and Pearce’s complaints about the conduct of
his trial.  The trial court noted that a teenager’s foolish involvement with the illicit
drug culture did not warrant his death and that any complaints about the trial
proceedings could be raised during appellate review.  The trial court did find
Pearce’s good conduct in jail to be a mitigating factor, but only entitled to little
weight.  The trial court concluded that the aggravating factors far outweighed the
mitigating factors and imposed a death sentence.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
In his direct appeal to this Court, Pearce raises five issues, three challenging 
the guilt phase proceedings of his trial and two directed at the penalty phase
proceedings.  Pearce claims that the trial court erred:  (1) by refusing to allow
defense counsel to impeach State witness Brittingham with a previous videotaped
statement; (2) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on first-degree
murder on the element of premeditation; (3) in denying his motion for judgment of
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acquittal on felony murder; (4) in finding the aggravating circumstance that the
murder occurred during the course of a kidnapping; and (5) in finding the cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravating circumstance.
Impeachment Evidence of Witness
During cross-examination of State witness Heath Brittingham, defense
counsel asked Brittingham if he had previously told the investigating detective
that Pearce expressed surprise after Smith shot Tuttle.  When Brittingham
responded that he did not remember saying that, defense counsel requested that a
videotape of a previous statement by Brittingham be shown to the jury.  The judge
responded that the defense would have to present the tape in its own case, not
during the State’s case.  After the State rested its case, Pearce moved for judgment
of acquittal, which was denied by the judge.  When the judge asked if the
defendant intended to present testimony or evidence, defense counsel stated his
intent to present the videotape of Brittingham’s statement as impeachment
evidence.  Defense counsel then proffered the testimony of the technician who had
videotaped the interview.  The technician stated that although she operated the
video camera, she did not pay attention to the various interviews conducted by the
detective, had not viewed the videotape in question, and could not authenticate its
contents.  Defense counsel also proffered the testimony of the investigating
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detective who conducted the interview.  After viewing the videotape, the detective
testified that it fairly and accurately depicted his interview with Brittingham. 
Defense counsel specified that he wanted admitted into evidence a part of the
videotaped interview in which Brittingham stated that Pearce had expressed
surprise after Smith shot Tuttle by stating, “What the hell? What are you doing?”
and that Smith directed Pearce either to “go, go” or “drive, drive” after Smith shot
Tuttle.  Defense counsel argued that this was impeachment evidence that should
be admitted.  The State objected, arguing that the defense could not impeach
Brittingham’s response of “I don’t recall” or “I don’t remember.”
The trial court did not permit Pearce to introduce Brittingham’s previous
videotaped statement into evidence, even for impeachment purposes, but allowed 
defense counsel to proffer the videotape for the record after the State rested its
case.  The trial court ruled that the tape did not meet the requirements of the
Florida Evidence Code for impeachment purposes.
In order to resolve this claim, we must examine the law relating to the
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements.  Prior inconsistent statements are not
hearsay and can be admitted as substantive evidence “if the declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement
and the statement is . . . [i]nconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was
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given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding or in a deposition.”  § 90.801(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). 
However, in State v. Delgado-Santos, 497 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1986), this Court held
that a statement given under oath during a police investigation is not a statement
given at an “other proceeding” and consequently is not admissible as substantive
evidence under section 90.801(2)(a).  See also Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991, 997-
98 (Fla. 1993) (concluding that pretrial statement by witness during interview with
prosecutor could not be admitted as substantive evidence under section 
90.801(2)(a) because the interview was not an “other proceeding”within the
meaning of the rule).  Thus, the videotaped statement that Brittingham gave to the
investigating detective did not meet the last requirement of section 90.801(2)(a)
and could not be admitted as substantive evidence here.
However, introduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a
witness’s present testimony is also one of the main ways to attack the credibility of
a witness.  See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt,
Florida Evidence § 608.4 (2002 ed.).  “The Florida Evidence Code does not
require the witness's prior inconsistent statement to be reduced to writing in order
to impeach the witness under section 90.608(1)(a).”  Kimble v. State, 537 So. 2d
1094, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).  The theory of admissibility is not that the prior
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statement is true and the in-court testimony is false, but that because the witness
has not told the truth in one of the statements, the jury should disbelieve both
statements.  See Florida Evidence § 614.1.  To be inconsistent, a prior statement
must either directly contradict or be materially different from the expected
testimony at trial.  The inconsistency must involve a material, significant fact
rather than mere details.  See State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 313 (Fla. 1990). 
“Nit-picking” is not permitted under the guise of prior inconsistent statements. 
See Morton v. State, 689 So. 2d 259, 264 (Fla. 1997) (“[C]aution should be
exercised in permitting impeachment of a witness who has given favorable
testimony but simply fails to recall every detail unless the witness appears to be
fabricating.”), receded from on other grounds Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29
(Fla. 2000) (receding from Morton to extent it holds that a prior inconsistent
statement cannot be used as substantive evidence in a penalty phase proceeding);
see also Florida Evidence § 608.4.  If a witness has made a prior inconsistent
statement concerning a collateral matter, cross-examining counsel may question
the witness about the statement, but must “take the answer” and cannot present
extrinsic evidence to prove the prior inconsistent statement.  Florida Evidence §
608.4.
Before a witness can be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the
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proper foundation must be laid.  Prior to questioning a witness about the contents
of a previous inconsistent statement, counsel must call to the witness’s attention
the time, place, and person to whom the statement was allegedly made.  Rowe v.
State, 174 So. 820, 821 (Fla. 1937); see also Florida Evidence § 614.1.  As
provided in section 90.614(2),
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is
inadmissible unless the witness is first afforded an opportunity to
explain or deny the prior statement and the opposing party is afforded
an opportunity to interrogate the witness on it . . . .  If the witness
denies making or does not distinctly admit making the prior
inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such statement is
admissible.
Thus, if the witness admits making the prior statement, examining counsel may not
offer any evidence to prove the statement was made.  See Jennings v. State, 512
So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 1987) (explaining that sworn pretrial motions, containing
statement of a state witness which was inconsistent with his trial testimony, were
not admissible for impeachment, where witness admitted making the prior
inconsistent statement).  Further, even if the witness admits making a prior
statement, the witness should be given an opportunity to explain it, show that he or
she was mistaken when it was made, or explain that the prior statement is not
inconsistent.
Under section 90.614(2), extrinsic evidence is admissible when a witness
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does not “distinctly admit” making the prior statement.  See Pugh v. State, 637 So.
2d 313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (finding error in not admitting prior inconsistent
portions of witness’s deposition into evidence when witness stated that “he did not
remember the questions he was asked nor the answers he gave during his
deposition”).  If the witness does not distinctly admit making a prior statement,
then when it is counsel’s turn to offer evidence, he or she may introduce extrinsic
evidence that the statement was made.  See Florida Evidence, § 614.1.  This
evidence can include a properly authenticated written statement and the testimony
of individuals who were present when the statement was made.  See id. § 608.4.
The record in this case shows that defense counsel laid the proper
foundation under section 90.614(2):  counsel called to Brittingham’s attention the
time, place, and person to whom he made the prior inconsistent statements, quoted
from the prior statements, and gave Brittingham an opportunity to explain his prior
statements.  See Brumbley v. State, 453 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1984) (finding it
proper for State to impeach witness by quoting the precise language of his prior
statements as “such references were a correct method of laying a predicate for the
introduction of the prior statements”).  Further, the prior statements and
Brittingham’s in-court testimony were relevant to the issue of Pearce’s level of
involvement in the shootings.  When Brittingham did “not distinctly admit making
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the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such statement [was]
admissible.”  § 90.614(2), Fla. Stat. (2001).  Thus, the trial court erred by not
permitting defense counsel to admit extrinsic evidence of Brittingham’s prior
statement.
However, we conclude that the error in excluding this evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.
2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).  The evidence was only admissible for purposes of
impeaching Brittingham’s credibility, not as substantive evidence of Pearce’s level
of involvement in the killings or his prior knowledge of Smith’s intentions when
he shot the victims.  While the videotape itself was not admitted into evidence,
defense counsel did call Brittingham’s credibility into question before the jury
when he quoted directly from Brittingham’s previous statements.  Further, even if
Brittingham’s credibility had been called into question by the admission of his
prior inconsistent statements, Brittingham’s account of the evening (i.e., that
Pearce played the primary role in the kidnappings) was corroborated in every
significant detail by the testimony of Butterfield, Tuttle, Loucks, Shook, and
Havner.  Cf. Garcia v. State, 816 So. 2d 554, 563 (Fla. 2002) (finding that
exclusion of relevant impeachment evidence of key state witness was harmful
where no physical evidence linked the defendant to the murder scene or murders
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and witness’s credibility was critical to strength of State’s case).  Butterfield’s
testimony recounted the same conversation between Pearce and Smith after Tuttle
was shot as Brittingham did during his in-court testimony, i.e., Pearce sought
assurance from Smith that Tuttle was dead but there was no other conversation. 
More importantly, Brittingham’s prior statement to the detective, Brittingham’s in-
court testimony, and Butterfield’s in-court testimony were consistent as to the
events and conversation that preceded Crawford’s shooting, which is the basis for
Pearce’s first-degree murder conviction and death sentence.  There was no
evidence of any discussion between Pearce and Smith when Pearce stopped the car
the second time and ordered Crawford out of the car.  Pearce never distanced
himself from Smith’s previous actions of shooting Tuttle and leaving him for dead. 
Notably, Pearce never told Smith not to kill or shoot Crawford when he stopped
the car the second time, even though he thought that Smith had already killed
Tuttle.  There was also direct testimony and physical evidence that tied Pearce to
the kidnappings, the shootings, and the murder of Crawford.  Thus, the cases
relied upon by Pearce are distinguishable as Pearce’s conviction did not rest solely
or even primarily on the testimony of Brittingham.  Cf. Pugh v. State, 637 So. 2d
313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (finding that error in not admitting portion of
pretrial deposition as prior inconsistent statement to impeach key prosecution
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witness was not harmless as this was only witness to claim defendant was directly
involved in robbery and holding gun); Kimble v. State, 537 So. 2d 1094, 1096
(Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (same as to prior inconsistent statement of witness-victim).
Thus, we conclude that any error in excluding extrinsic evidence of
Brittingham’s prior inconsistent statements was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt under the facts of this case.  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1135.
Denial of Judgment of Acquittal on Premeditation
After the State rested its case, Pearce moved for a judgment of acquittal on
the first-degree murder charge, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant submission of the case to a jury on the theory of premeditation.  The trial
court denied the motion.  Pearce now claims that the trial court erred in not
granting his motion for judgment of acquittal.
Under Florida law, the unlawful killing of a human being is murder in the
first-degree (1) “[w]hen perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death
of the person killed or any human being”; or (2) “[w]hen committed by a person
engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any . . .
kidnapping.”  § 782.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  A trial court should not grant a
motion for judgment of acquittal unless there is no view of the evidence which the
jury might take favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the law. 
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Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1991).  In moving for judgment of
acquittal, Pearce admitted the facts in evidence as well as every conclusion
favorable to the State that the jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the
evidence.  Id.  Where there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable
people as to the proof or facts from which an ultimate fact is to be established, or
where there is room for such differences on the inferences to be drawn from
conceded facts, the trial court should submit the case to the jury.  Id.  Once
competent, substantial evidence has been submitted on each element of the crime,
it is for the jury to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 
Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1060 (Fla. 1997); see also Hufham v. State, 400
So. 2d 133, 135-36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Premeditation is a fully formed conscious purpose to kill that may be
formed in a moment and need only exist for such time as will allow the accused to
be conscious of the nature of the act about to be committed and the probable result
of that act.  Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 1998); Asay v. State, 580 So.
2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1991).  Whether a premeditated design to kill was formed prior
to a killing is a question of fact for the jury that may be established by
circumstantial evidence.  Asay, 580 So. 2d at 612.  Circumstantial evidence of
premeditation can include the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence
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of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in
which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds
inflicted.  Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1994); Holton v. State, 573
So. 2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990).  However, where the element of premeditation is
sought to be established by circumstantial evidence, the evidence relied upon by
the State must be inconsistent with every other reasonable inference.  Cochran v.
State, 547 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1989).  Notably, the circumstantial evidence rule
does not require the jury to believe the defendant's version of the facts when the
State has produced conflicting evidence.  Spencer, 645 So. 2d at 381.  Where there
is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, the verdict will not
be reversed on appeal.  Id.
A review of the record in this case reveals that there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury could have inferred premeditation by Pearce.  Pearce told the
victims and their companions that his “money was their life,” and that he expected
them to come back with either his money or the drugs.  Pearce subsequently told
the victims and their companions that they would have to “pay the consequences”
for losing his money.  Pearce called armed assistance to the business location
where he was holding the victims at gunpoint.  Pearce rejected attempts and
requests to let the victims leave.  Pearce was the individual who ordered the
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victims into his car and drove the car to the remote location where the shootings
took place.  Pearce also switched guns with the triggerman, Smith, ostensibly to
ensure that Smith had a functioning weapon.  Pearce told Smith either to “pop”
Tuttle in the jaw or “break” his jaw for stealing Pearce’s money.  After Smith shot
Tuttle, Pearce requested assurance that Tuttle was dead.  Smith assured Pearce that
Tuttle was dead as he had “shot him in the head with a fucking .40 caliber” gun. 
When Pearce stopped the car and ordered Crawford out of the car, he thought that
Tuttle was dead.  Thus, even assuming arguendo that Pearce did not intend for
Smith to shoot Tuttle, there is little doubt that Pearce intended for Smith to shoot
Crawford, whose death is the basis of Pearce’s first-degree murder conviction. 
There was no evidence that Pearce urged Smith not to shoot Crawford after Tuttle
was shot or that Pearce in any way withdrew from this criminal plan.  Pearce drove
the car approximately 200 yards away from the scene where Tuttle was shot in the
head and left for dead, stopped the car, and ordered Crawford to get out of the car. 
Crawford pled for his life before being shot in the head by Smith.  There is no
evidence that the victims provoked these shootings in any way during the drive.
In light of this circumstantial evidence of premeditation, we find no error in
the trial court’s denial of Pearce’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to
premeditation.
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Denial of Judgment of Acquittal on Felony Murder
Pearce also moved for a judgment of acquittal on the theory of felony
murder, arguing that the State failed to establish that he was an aider or abetter of
an underlying kidnapping and presented no proof of his intent to participate in a
kidnapping that would support a theory of first-degree felony murder.  The trial
court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury.  Pearce now argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motion.
As discussed above, there are two ways in which first-degree murder can be
proven under Florida law:  through a premeditated design to kill or when the
killing occurs during the course of an enumerated felony, including kidnapping. 
See § 782.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  In order to prove kidnapping in Pearce’s case,
the State had to prove three elements:  (1) Pearce forcibly or by threat confined
and abducted Crawford and Tuttle against their will; (2) Pearce had no lawful
authority to do so; and (3) Pearce acted with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon
or terrorize the victims or another person.  See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).
Both Havner and Tuttle testified that Pearce ordered them into the business
office, waved a gun around, and pointed the gun at them.  Tuttle testified that
Pearce threatened to shoot him in the head if he did not perform oral sex on him. 
Tuttle also testified that he repeatedly asked Pearce if he could leave and Pearce
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told him no.  Havner and the others present testified that Pearce slammed her head
against the air conditioner and threatened to shoot her in the head.  Testimony also
showed that Pearce refused to let the boys go when asked by Havner and Loucks
at separate times.  Even though Pearce may have left the victims alone in the office
several times, there was little opportunity for them to escape from the business
premises, which were surrounded by a high fence topped with barbed wire and
behind a locked gate.  According to Havner’s brother, Havner was hysterical even
after Pearce permitted her to leave and that she spent the rest of the night placing
phone calls trying to verify the safety of Tuttle and Crawford.  Havner testified
that she was afraid of Pearce, that Pearce was irate, and that she and her
companions were not free to leave the business location where Pearce confined
them.
Pearce called his associate Butterfield, told him that he needed some help
because he had been ripped off, and asked Butterfield to come armed.  Butterfield
arrived with Brittingham and Smith, who were also visibly armed.  According to
Butterfield, Pearce was “calling the shots” and was “in charge.”  Tuttle and
Crawford were ordered into the car by Pearce, who had a gun in his hand. 
Brittingham testified that he interpreted Pearce’s actions as threatening to the
boys.  Tuttle testified that he did not feel that he or Crawford was free to leave. 
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Pearce stated his intent was to “rough up” the boys and teach them a lesson for
losing his money.  Pearce drove the car to a deserted area, ordered Tuttle out of the
car, and instructed Smith to “break his jaw” or “pop him in the jaw.”  Pearce then
drove a short distance more and ordered Crawford out of the car.  Because the
victim’s liberty was never restored prior to his death, there was a continuing
kidnapping here.  See Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 754 (Fla. 2001) (citing
with approval State v. Stouffer, 721 A.2d 207, 215 (Md. 1998)).
Pearce also argues that, in order to obtain his conviction for the acts of
Smith under the felony murder rule, the State must establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that Smith killed Crawford in furtherance of the kidnapping or a common
criminal design, and not as an independent act of his own.  However, because the
State presented competent, substantial evidence that Pearce orchestrated the
kidnapping and violence against the victims, it was a jury question whether the
murder was an independent act of Smith.
The “independent act” doctrine that Pearce asserts “arises when one cofelon,
who previously participated in a common plan, does not participate in acts
committed by his cofelon, ‘which fall outside of, and are foreign to, the common
design of the original collaboration.’”  Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla.
2000) (quoting Dell v. State, 661 So. 2d 1305, 1306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)).  Under
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these limited circumstances, a defendant whose cofelon exceeds the scope of the
original plan is exonerated from any punishment imposed as a result of the
independent act.  Id.  “Where, however, the defendant was a willing participant in
the underlying felony and the murder resulted from forces which they set in
motion, no independent act instruction is appropriate.”  Id. (emphasis added); see
also Lovette v. State, 636 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1994).
Here, Pearce set the kidnapping in motion, brought Smith into contact with
the victims, gave Smith a functioning weapon that was used as the murder
weapon, and drove the victims to a remote location where the shootings occurred. 
“Only a finding that the criminal episode had ceased might give significance to”
Pearce’s argument.  Ray, 755 So. 2d at 609.  The facts do not support such a
conclusion here.  Thus, there was sufficient evidence to deny Pearce’s motion for
judgment of acquittal on felony murder.
Although Pearce raises no other issues relating to his convictions, we have
reviewed the evidence and find sufficient evidence to support his convictions.  See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (“In death penalty cases, the court shall review the
evidence to determine if the interest of justice requires a new trial, whether or not
insufficiency of the evidence is an issue presented for review.”).  Accordingly, we
affirm Pearce’s convictions for first-degree murder with a firearm and attempted
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first-degree murder with a firearm.
During the Course of a Kidnapping Aggravating Circumstance
The trial court found that Crawford’s murder was committed while Pearce
was engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of kidnapping.
Pearce argues that the trial court erred in finding this aggravating circumstance as
it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 921.141(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that it is an
aggravating circumstance if “[t]he capital felony was committed while the
defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice, in the commission of . . . any . . .
kidnapping.”  On appeal, this Court does not reweigh the evidence to determine
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt--that is the trial court's job.  Rather, this Court reviews the record to
determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating
circumstance and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence supports its
finding.  Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).  To establish the “during
the commission of a kidnapping” aggravating circumstance, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of kidnapping.  Anderson v. State,
841 So. 2d 390, 404 (Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 408 (2003).
As discussed above, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of this
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aggravating circumstance.  Tuttle, Havner, and other witnesses testified that
Pearce held the victims against their will with a threat of violence and that he also
ordered them to get in his car against their will.  Pearce had no lawful authority to
do so.  Even assuming that Pearce did not originally intend to kill the victims, he
clearly intended to inflict bodily harm upon them as evidenced by his statement to
Loucks that he meant to “rough up” the victims and teach them a lesson.  See §
787.01(1)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (1999).
Pearce also argues that his death sentence is not appropriate under the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).  In Enmund, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not permit
imposition of the death penalty on a defendant “who aids and abets a felony in the
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be
employed.”  458 U.S. at 797.  In Tison, the Supreme Court expanded the Enmund
culpability requirement for imposing a death sentence under a felony murder
theory to include “major participation in the felony committed, combined with
reckless indifference to human life.”  481 U.S. at 158; see also Franqui v. State,
804 So. 2d 1185, 1206 n.12 (Fla. 2001).
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While the trial court did not engage in a specific Enmund/Tison analysis in
its sentencing order, the court did analyze the role of Pearce and his culpability in
this crime.  Diaz v. State, 513 So. 2d 1045, 1048 n.2 (Fla. 1987) (requiring trial
courts to include in their sentencing orders findings supporting the Enmund/Tison
culpability requirement).  As explained in detail in the sentencing order and as
supported by the evidence in this case, Pearce’s role in the murder satisfies the
Enmund/Tison requirements.  Pearce was a major participant in the underlying
felony of kidnapping and “orchestrated the events leading to [the victim’s] death.” 
Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997, 1020 (Fla. 2001).  Additionally, where there is
substantial, competent evidence to uphold a conviction under a premeditation
theory, Enmund/Tison is not applicable.  See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d
1009, 1018 (Fla. 1999).  As explained above, the record in this case reveals
sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred
premeditation by Pearce.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly applied the aggravating
circumstance of commission during the course of a kidnapping in this case.
CCP Aggravating Circumstance
The trial court concluded that Crawford’s murder was “committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
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justification.” § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Pearce contends that the State
failed to show the necessary elements of CCP.  He further argues that, even if the 
underlying felony of kidnapping was fully planned ahead, it would not constitute
CCP if the kidnapping plan did not also include the commission of murder.
As discussed above, this Court reviews the record to determine whether the
trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if
so, whether competent, substantial evidence supports its finding.  Alston v. State,
723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).  To establish the CCP aggravator, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) “the killing was the product of cool and
calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic or a fit of rage
(cold)”; (2) “the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit
murder before the fatal incident (calculated)”; and (3) “the defendant exhibited
heightened premeditation (premeditated)”.  Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89
(Fla. 1994).
This Court has held that execution-style killing is by its very nature a “cold”
crime.  See Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 372 (Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 189
(2003); Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 388 (Fla. 1994).  As to the “calculated”
element of CCP, this Court has held that where a defendant arms himself in
advance, kills execution-style, and has time to coldly and calmly decide to kill, the
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element of calculated is supported.  See Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d 629, 650 (Fla.
2001); Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 436 (Fla. 1998) (holding "[e]ven if Knight
did not make the final decision to execute the two victims until sometime during
his lengthy journey to his final destination, that journey provided an abundance of
time for Knight to coldly and calmly decide to kill").  This Court has “previously
found the heightened premeditation required to sustain this aggravator where a
defendant has the opportunity to leave the crime scene and not commit the murder
but, instead, commits the murder.”  Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d at 162; see also
Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 372 (noting that defendant had five- to seven-minute
opportunity to withdraw from the scene or seek help for victim, but instead
calculated to shoot her again, execution-style).
The sentencing order in this case discusses in great detail the facts that
support this aggravating circumstance:  Pearce confined the victims, called for
assistance from his friends, and requested they come to the location armed, thereby
revealing a plan that required the use of firearms.  The circumstances also showed
that the “business” for which Pearce summoned the armed assistance “was
intended to harm Crawford and Tuttle in some fashion.”  Pearce and Smith
engaged in a private conversation when Smith arrived at the location.  While the
content of this conversation is not known, the conversation shows they had an
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opportunity to discuss a plan.  Pearce drove the car and stopped on his own
initiative along the deserted rural road where the shootings occurred.  Pearce
exchanged firearms with Smith when informed that Smith’s gun was jammed. 
Even though Pearce did not actually pull the trigger, he voiced neither objection
nor surprise when Smith shot Tuttle in the head.  Instead, Pearce requested
assurance that Tuttle was dead.  Pearce drove the vehicle a short distance down the
road and again stopped on his own initiative.  He asked no questions after Smith
shot Crawford twice.  Pearce and Smith then drove to a restaurant where they ate
breakfast and then threw the murder weapon into Tampa Bay.  There was no
evidence that Pearce acted in an emotional frenzy, panic or rage.  There was no
evidence of victim resistance or struggle that could have provoked the shootings. 
Further, Pearce had the means and opportunity to either “rough up” or shoot the
victims at the business location.  Instead, he called his associates, took the victims
for a ride at night to a remote, unlighted location, and sat by while Smith shot
them in the head execution style.  There is competent, substantial evidence in the
record to support these findings.  Thus, we conclude that the CCP aggravating
circumstance was properly found in this case.
-32-
Proportionality
Although Pearce does not raise an issue relating to the proportionality of his
death sentence, this Court performs proportionality review to prevent the
imposition of “unusual” punishments contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution.  See Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000).  In deciding
whether the death sentence is proportional in a particular case, this Court is
required to consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the case and
compare it to other capital cases.  Id.; Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1998). 
Our proportionality review “is not a comparison between the number of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064
(Fla. 1990).
Comparing this case to other capital cases with similar aggravating and
mitigating circumstances demonstrates that Pearce's sentence of death is
proportional.  The trial court found three aggravating circumstances (CCP, prior
violent felony, and committed during a kidnapping) and little mitigating
circumstances.  As this Court stated in Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla.
1999), the CCP aggravator is one of the “most serious aggravators set out in the
statutory sentencing scheme.”  In other similar “execution-style” killings, this
Court has affirmed sentences of death.  See Ford v. State, 802 So. 2d 1121, 1133
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(Fla. 2001) (finding death sentence proportional with four aggravating
circumstances of heinous, atrocious, or cruel, CCP, commission during the course
of a felony, and contemporaneous murder of another victim and some mitigation),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1103 (2002); Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 921 (Fla.
2000) (finding death sentence proportional with two aggravating circumstances of
avoiding arrest and CCP and little mitigation); Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144
(Fla. 1998) (upholding death sentence with three aggravating factors of
commission during the course of a robbery, avoiding arrest, and CCP and several
mitigating factors); Jones v. State, 690 So. 2d 568, 571 (Fla. 1996) (finding death
sentence proportional with three aggravating circumstances of CCP,
contemporaneous attempted murder of second victim, and pecuniary gain and two
mitigating circumstances).  Pearce's death sentence is also proportionate to other
cases where the persons who were the “masterminds” or dominating force behind
the murder have been sentenced to death, even though they did not actually
commit the murder.  See, e.g., Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 407 (Fla. 1996);
Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 792-94 (Fla. 1992).  Thus, we find the death
sentence proportionately warranted in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons discussed above, we affirm Pearce’s convictions and
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his sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and
BELL, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, 
Maynard F. Swanson, Jr., Judge - Case No. 99-3110CFAES
Steven Herman, Zephyrhills, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee