Title: State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 20, 2002-Ohio-7038.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 20, 2002-
Ohio-7038.] 
Workers’ compensation — Determination of whether claimant’s activities for 
his own lawn care company constitute work thus precluding him from 
receiving temporary total disability compensation from his primary 
employer — Claimant’s activities consisted of signing four workers’ 
checks and fueling and driving riding lawnmower onto a truck — 
Benefits not terminated when activities are truly minimal and only 
indirectly related to generating income. 
(No. 2002-0087 — Submitted November 13, 2002 — Decided December 20, 
2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-813. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In 1998, appellee-claimant, Christopher D. Posey, held two jobs 
concurrently:  one was with appellant, Ford Motor Company, and the other was 
his own lawn care business—Nature’s Creations Landscaping.  From 1994 
through 1996, claimant was the sole employee of his business.  In 1997, he hired 
another employee. 
{¶2} 
In 1998, claimant injured his neck while working for Ford.  
Claimant’s injury forced him to stop his physical participation in his lawn care 
business, so he hired three more employees.  The injury also temporarily forced 
claimant from his job at Ford, and he received temporary total disability 
compensation (“TTC”) from June 24, 1998, through September 8, 1998. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
Ford later sought to recoup that TTC, alleging that claimant’s 
participation in his business constituted work and therefore prohibited TTC.  
Evidence presented regarding claimant’s participation in his business, however, 
established only that claimant signed his four workers’ paychecks and fueled and 
drove riding lawnmowers onto a truck.  Surveillance of claimant by Ford 
supported claimant’s contention that he did no landscaping work in connection 
with this business while receiving TTC. 
{¶4} 
Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio refused Ford’s request to 
declare TTC to have been overpaid: 
{¶5} 
“The claimant admits to owning a landscaping business during the 
period in question but denied working at the business while collecting temporary 
total compensation.  The claimant contends that he hired help to do the work after 
he became disabled and that he withdrew from nearly all business activities. 
{¶6} 
“The claimant states that he engaged in the following business 
activities: approximately once a week he put gas in lawn mowers, signed checks 
and issued cash for the employees[’] wages; on one occassion [sic] he pushed his 
self propelled mower into the garage and he continued to store the landscaping 
equipment at his residence just as he had done before he became disabled. 
{¶7} 
“Prior to becoming temporarily and totally disabled, the claimant 
performed nearly all of the general labor for his business.  He cut grass and 
maintained lawns for approximately thirty-five to forty customers.  Occasionally 
he cut trees and installed retaining walls. 
{¶8} 
“With the exception of signing payroll checks, all of the clerical 
duties were performed by his girlfriend. 
{¶9} 
“* * * 
{¶10} “According to the [hearing] transcript[,] the employer had the 
claimant surveilled for approximately thirty-six hours by Choice Point Services.  
At the District Hearing Officer’s hearing, Ms. Miller, the claims Director of 
January Term, 2002 
3 
Choice Point Services, admitted that neither she nor anyone from her company 
observed the claimant performing any landscaping work for his business.  (See 
page 90 of the transcript.) 
{¶11} “* * * 
{¶12} “Both [State ex rel.] Nye [v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 
75, 22 OBR 91, 488 N.E.2d 867] and [State ex rel.] Durant [v. Superior’s Brand 
Meats, Inc. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 284, 631 N.E.2d 627] are factually different 
from this case because they each demonstrate a claimant actively engaged in his 
own business.  Here the claimant was observed over several months for a total of 
thirty-six hours.  During the observation the claimant was not seen at any job site 
despite the fact that he maintained accounts for thirty-five to forty customers. 
{¶13} “Surely the claimant would have been seen working if he had 
carried on his business pursuits, after his injury as he had done before, because the 
nature of his business required that the work be done outside. 
{¶14} “Instead the evidence supports the claimant’s contention that he 
withdrew from nearly all business activities except those necessary to preserve the 
business until he was physically able to return to it.  The Staff Hearing Officer 
does not believe the Nye and Durant [decisions] prevent the meager activities 
engaged in by the claimant nor do they require a self-employed individual to 
relinquish even that control which is absolutely necessary to preserve the 
existence of his pre-existing enterprise. 
{¶15} “Based upon the foregoing facts, the Staff Hearing Officer finds 
that the claimant was not working [and] therefore fraud is not an issue in this case.  
The Staff Hearing Officer also finds that the claimant did not engage in activities 
inconsistent with the receipt of temporary total compensation during the period in 
question.  While the concept of activities inconsistent with the receipt of disability 
benefits has no precise definite [sic] case of temporary total disability in general, 
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it encompasses situations where one engages in physical activities which exceeds 
[sic] the medical restrictions. 
{¶16} “The employer has not produced evidence which shows any of the 
claimant’s activities exceeding his physical capabilities[, and] therefore, the 
employer’s argument fails and the claimant remains entitled to the temporary total 
disability benefits paid from June 24, 1998 to September 9, 1998 inclusive.” 
{¶17} The court of appeals declined Ford’s request to order the 
commission to vacate its order.  Ford now appeals here as a matter of right. 
{¶18} TTC is prohibited to one who has returned to work.  R.C. 
4123.56(A); State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 
O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586.  At issue is whether claimant’s activities for 
Nature’s Creations constitute work. For the reasons that follow, we find that they 
do not. 
{¶19} Work is not defined for workers’ compensation purposes.  We 
have held, however, that any remunerative activity outside the former position of 
employment precludes TTC.  State ex rel. Nye v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 22 Ohio 
St.3d 75, 78, 22 OBR 91, 488 N.E.2d 867.  We have also held that activities 
medically inconsistent with the alleged inability to return to the former position of 
employment bar TTC, regardless of whether the claimant is paid.  State ex rel. 
Parma Community Gen. Hosp. v. Jankowski, 95 Ohio St.3d 340, 2002-Ohio-2336, 
767 N.E.2d 1143, ¶ 15.  Activities that are not medically inconsistent, however, 
bar TTC only when a claimant is remunerated for them.  Id. at ¶ 14-15, 767 
N.E.2d 1143.  Work, moreover, does not have to be full-time or even regular part-
time to foreclose TTC; even sporadic employment can bar benefits.  State ex rel. 
Blabac v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 113, 717 N.E.2d 336. 
{¶20} Ford asserts that Blabac is controlling and bars TTC here.  In 
Blabac, the claimant, John Blabac, was getting TTC when it was discovered that 
he was earning wages as a scuba diving instructor.  While his partner did the 
January Term, 2002 
5 
physical instruction, Blabac sat at poolside with a clipboard, grading the students.  
Id. at 113, 717 N.E.2d 336.  Whether he lectured, prepared or graded written 
exams, or otherwise instructed students was not known. 
{¶21} The commission terminated TTC and declared an overpayment.  
Blabac argued that only “substantially gainful” work could bar TTC, and that his 
work was neither substantial nor gainful.  We disagreed with Blabac, holding that 
low paying and sporadic employment was still work.  Because Blabac was paid 
for his efforts, we determined that they constituted work, and barred TTC.  We 
suggested that wage-loss compensation would have been more appropriate for 
Blabac’s circumstances. 
{¶22} Ford argues that under Blabac, any work precludes TTC and 
asserts that Blabac forbids TTC here.  Ford, however, overlooks the distinction 
between this case and Blabac.  Blabac never disputed that his actions constituted 
work.  He argued instead that he had not worked enough to prevent TTC.  
Claimant herein, on the other hand, argues that his activities were not work, 
rendering Blabac off point. 
{¶23} Claimant’s assertion has merit.  Unlike the claimants in Blabac, 
Nye, State ex rel. Johnson v. Rawac Plating Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 599, 575 
N.E.2d 837, and State ex rel. Durant v. Superior’s Brand Meats, Inc. (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 284, 631 N.E.2d 627, this claimant’s activities did not, in and of 
themselves, generate income; claimant’s activities produced money only 
secondarily, e.g., claimant signed the paychecks that kept his employees doing the 
tasks that generated income. 
{¶24} Obviously, application of this rationale must be applied on a case-
by-case basis and only when a claimant’s activities are minimal.  A claimant 
should not be able to erect a façade of third-party labor to hide the fact that he or 
she is working.  In this case, however, claimant’s activities were truly minimal 
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and only indirectly related to generating income.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Timothy J. Krantz, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Bevan & Associates and Raymond M. Powell, for appellee Christopher D. 
Posey. 
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