Title: State v. William Troy Ford

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 138 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP806-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
William Troy Ford, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 298 Wis. 2d 551, 727 N.W.2d 375 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 11, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Ralph J. Sczygelski, and Sczygelski Law Firm, LLC, 
Manitowoc, and oral argument by Ralph J. Sczygelski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Rebecca Rapp St. John, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 WI 138
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP0806-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF70) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
William Troy Ford, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 11, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, William Troy 
Ford, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
affirming a judgment convicting him of battery, bail jumping, 
and conspiracy to bribe a witness, all as a repeater.1 Ford 
maintains the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it denied his motion for a mistrial.  He contends that he 
                                                 
1 See State v. Ford, No. 2006AP806-CR, unpublished slip 
opinion (Wis. Ct. App. December 12, 2006)(affirming a judgment 
of the circuit court for Ashland County, Robert E. Eaton, 
Judge). 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
2 
 
is entitled to an automatic reversal of his convictions because 
the bailiff's contact with the victim of the crime made the 
bailiff a potential witness and tainted the jury deliberations.  
He further asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing 
witnesses to testify regarding the contents of a surveillance 
videotape.  
¶2 
We determine that the bailiff's contact with the crime 
victim is not structural error and does not require automatic 
reversal. Further, the circuit court's determination that the 
alleged error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a 
mistrial was within its discretion.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's decision to deny Ford's motion for mistrial was not an 
erroneous exercise of its discretion.   
¶3 
In 
addition, 
we 
determine 
that 
because 
the 
surveillance tape was unplayable, and the State made reasonable 
efforts to restore it to playability, the circuit court did not 
err in concluding that the tape was destroyed within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 910.04(1).  We therefore determine that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
admitting 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
tape.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
In August 2004, at about one o'clock in the morning, 
Ford and a female companion entered an Ashland convenience 
store. The female came to the counter to pay for some items. As 
the store clerk was tending to the companion, Ford came up 
behind the clerk and struck him in the head with a glass bottle. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
3 
 
Ford next struck the clerk several times in the face with his 
hands.  
¶5 
At trial the clerk testified that Ford then picked up 
a stapler, shook it at him, and demanded that he give Ford his 
car.  When the clerk refused, Ford joined his companion at the 
counter and suggested that the clerk pay for her merchandise. 
Again, the clerk refused. The companion paid for her items. Ford 
then apologized for his conduct and asked the clerk if he was 
going to call the police. When the clerk responded that he did 
not intend to call them, Ford and his companion left.  
¶6 
About two hours later a regular customer, Larry 
Wolfgram, came to the convenience store during his shift as a 
cab 
driver. 
When 
Wolfgram 
heard 
about 
the 
incident 
he 
recommended that the clerk call the police and the store 
manager, and the clerk did so.  
¶7 
Wolfgram left the store for a drive, but he returned a 
while later. When he returned, police officers were present at 
the store. One officer was looking for the phone number for the 
store. Wolfgram retrieved the number from a phonebook, wrote it 
down, and handed it to the officer. Wolfgram left without 
speaking to the officer. 
A. The Bailiff 
¶8 
During direct examination of the clerk on the first 
day of trial, the prosecuting attorney asked the clerk why he 
did not call the police immediately after the incident. The 
clerk stated that he simply kept working because he needed the 
money and that the blows he received affected his perceptions. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
4 
 
He explained that he decided to call the police after it was 
recommended that he do so.  Both the State and the defense were 
under the impression that the clerk called the police after 
speaking with his manager.  When the prosecuting attorney asked 
if it was his manager who made the recommendation, the clerk 
responded by pointing to the bailiff.  Wolfgram was serving as a 
bailiff at the trial.  The court interceded, attempting to 
clarify the situation:   
The Court: Just for the record, are you pointing to 
the bailiff, Mr. Wolfgram?  
A: Yes, I am. 
¶9 
At the conclusion of the clerk's direct examination, 
the court took a recess. It had another person act as bailiff 
and instructed Wolfgram "not to have any contact with the jurors 
in the case."  
¶10 After the break, the court examined Wolfgram's role in 
the case. It established that Wolfgram had not discussed the 
matter with the jurors. Wolfgram stated that he did not realize 
until the morning of the trial that the case for which he was 
serving as bailiff concerned the incident at the convenience 
store. He stated that he had not said anything because his 
contact with the case had been so limited and seemingly 
irrelevant. 
¶11 Ford moved for a mistrial, arguing that Wolfgram could 
be an important defense witness if the clerk did not mention 
anything about an attempted armed robbery.  Additionally, he 
argued that the jury could have been improperly influenced 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
5 
 
because the jurors "would likely want to know" what the bailiff 
"might have to say about the case."   
¶12 The circuit court denied the motion. It stated that 
there was no indication that Wolfgram had any improper contact 
with the jury or had said anything to the jury regarding the 
incident. Further, the court determined that there was not even 
an appearance of impropriety because Wolfgram was not a witness 
for the State and only a potential witness for the defense.  
¶13 The court explained that it did not "consider him a 
critical witness or even a material witness, [rather] we have 
somebody who is potentially the hundredth person that [the 
clerk] talked to that day after the alleged events." Thus, based 
on Wisconsin case law,2 the court concluded that it had no basis 
for declaring a mistrial because it did not "have a basis for 
concluding that the parties can't receive a fair trial in this 
case."  
¶14 Nonetheless, the court replaced Wolfgram with a 
different bailiff. As a precaution in case Ford wished to call 
Wolfgram as a witness, the court excluded Wolfgram from the 
trial and instructed him not to discuss the case with witnesses. 
In addition, it questioned the jury as to whether any members 
knew Wolfgram and whether they could be fair and impartial. One 
juror stated that Wolfgram was a cousin of one of her relatives 
                                                 
2 The circuit court based its decision on La Valley v. 
State, 188 Wis. 68, 205 N.W. 412 (1925); Surma v. State, 260 
Wis. 510, 51 N.W.2d 47 (1952); State v. Cotter, 262 Wis. 168, 54 
N.W.2d 43 (1952); and Cullen v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 652, 133 
N.W.2d 284 (1965). 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
6 
 
by marriage, but that she could decide the case fairly and 
impartially. No other jurors responded when asked if they knew 
Wolfgram, and no jurors indicated that their contact with 
Wolfgram as bailiff would keep them from acting fairly and 
impartially in the case.  
¶15 Cross-examination of the clerk continued with a new 
bailiff. Although Ford subpoenaed Wolfgram to appear as a 
witness, he released Wolfgram from the subpoena the following 
day.  He did not call Wolfgram as a witness at any point in the 
trial.  
B. The Videotape 
¶16 Ford's actions at the convenience store were recorded 
by the store's surveillance cameras. The store's surveillance 
system uses a "multiplexor" device, which takes time-lapsed 
still images from multiple cameras and records them sequentially 
on a standard videotape. When the tape is played on specialized 
equipment, multiple images appear on the screen simultaneously. 
However, when it is played on a standard tape player, multiple 
images from different cameras appear in rapid succession and the 
tape is incomprehensible. 
¶17 The tape on which the actions were recorded became 
damaged and unplayable. Ford filed a motion to dismiss the case, 
arguing that the tape was exculpatory evidence and should have 
been preserved by the State. 
¶18 At the hearing on Ford's motion to dismiss, the 
officer in charge of the investigation scene testified that he 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
7 
 
met with the convenience store manager to review the tape. He 
described the contents of the tape as follows:  
[The store clerk] was behind the counter. A male and 
female came into the store and the next thing you see 
is the male and female are at the check-out and the 
male 
approaches [the clerk] behind the counter, 
apparently strikes him with an object and the next 
thing you see is this male again taking a punch at 
[the clerk] or [the clerk] puts up his arms in defense 
to try to block the blow then the two males were——
actually [the clerk] and the male were face-to-face 
and then the male walks back behind——from out behind 
the till area to check out where the female was still 
standing and it looked like a money transaction was 
made for an item and the male and female exited the 
store. 
¶19 The officer indicated that Ford was the male who 
entered the store on the videotape. He did not recall seeing 
images of Ford picking up a stapler or any object other than the 
one used for the initial strike to the clerk. The officer 
testified that he watched the tape with the store manager 
approximately two times. He testified that the store manager 
offered to send the tape to the store's district headquarters so 
that it could clarify the images on the tape and produce still 
photographs of the incident.  
¶20 The store manager testified that after reviewing the 
tape with the police, she played the tape a couple of times each 
for the store's owner and for the clerk. However, she did not 
send the tape to district headquarters.  
¶21 A few weeks later, a detective retrieved the tape from 
the store's manager so that the state crime lab could reproduce 
the tape in a format that could be played on a standard tape 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
8 
 
player and provide copies to both the State and the defense. A 
member of the Ashland police department placed the tape into a 
large, unpadded envelope and mailed it to the crime lab via U.S. 
Postal Service. 
¶22 When a state crime lab analyst attempted to view the 
tape, he noticed that the cassette shell was cracked. He 
remounted the tape into a new shell. When he began viewing the 
tape, it appeared normal. However, as the tape approached the 
point where Ford's actions were recorded, the image deteriorated 
in a way that is consistent with that portion of the tape having 
been played repeatedly. As the tape progressed, the analyst's 
tape player shut down.  
¶23 The analyst's examination of the tape revealed that 
there was a film deposit on the surface of the tape. His 
examination also revealed that the tape was physically damaged; 
he described the tape as being "crinkled." He tried to remove 
the film by applying distilled water to the tape, which is the 
standard procedure for such problems. However, the water did not 
remove the film. 
¶24 At the motion hearing the analyst testified that a 
stronger solvent might remove the deposit from the tape, but it 
would not repair the crinkling and could damage the tape 
further. He therefore did not attempt to repair the tape by 
applying the stronger solvent. At the hearing the parties also 
discussed that the State offered the tape to one of Ford's 
attorneys, who later returned the tape.  The State remained 
willing to make the tape available to any expert designated by 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
9 
 
Ford to review or repair the tape. Ford never designated an 
expert.  
¶25 The circuit court denied Ford's motion to dismiss. It 
determined that there was nothing obviously exculpatory on the 
tape. The court reasoned that although the testimony indicated 
that the tape did not show Ford wielding a stapler, that could 
be due to the limitations of the surveillance system or 
witnesses forgetting the stapler. The court further determined 
that there was no bad faith in damaging the tape.  
¶26 Before trial, Ford filed a motion in limine to 
prohibit the State from introducing evidence of the contents of 
the tape. The circuit court denied the motion, stating that the 
tape was destroyed and that there had been "no showing of bad 
faith on the part of the police in terms of how the tape came to 
be destroyed." Thus, it determined that testimony regarding the 
contents of the tape was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 910.04. 
At trial, the store manager and the police officer who had 
viewed the tape testified regarding its contents.  Their 
testimony was consistent with the testimony they had given at 
the motion hearing. 
¶27 A jury convicted Ford of battery, bail jumping, and 
conspiracy to bribe a witness,3 but acquitted him of attempted 
armed 
robbery. 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed, 
and 
Ford 
petitioned for review.  
                                                 
3 The facts surrounding the bail jumping and conspiracy to 
bribe a witness charges are not relevant to our review. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
10 
 
II 
¶28 This case requires that we determine whether the 
circuit court erred in denying Ford's motion for a mistrial. A 
motion for mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the 
circuit court. An erroneous exercise of discretion may arise 
from an error in law or from the failure of the circuit court to 
base its decisions on the facts in the record. State v. Raye, 
2005 WI 68, ¶16, 281 Wis. 2d 339, 697 N.W.2d 407.  
¶29 Ford's claim that he is entitled to automatic reversal 
is an argument that there is structural error and that the 
circuit court made an error of law.  We review questions of law 
independent of the determinations rendered by the circuit court 
or court of appeals.  Generally, in determining whether to grant 
a mistrial in cases where there is no structural error, the 
circuit court must decide, in light of the entire facts and 
circumstances, whether the defendant can receive a fair trial.  
It 
examines 
whether 
the 
claimed 
error 
is 
sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. State v. Nienhardt, 196 
Wis. 2d 161, 166, 537 N.W.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1995).  The denial of 
a motion for mistrial will be reversed only on a clear showing 
of erroneous use of discretion.  State v. Ross, 2003 WI App 27, 
¶47, 260 Wis. 2d 291, 659 N.W.2d 122. 
¶30 We also review the circuit court's decision to admit 
testimony regarding the contents of a videotape. A circuit 
court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under 
an erroneous exercise of discretion standard. State v. Shomberg, 
2006 WI 9, ¶10, 288 Wis. 2d 1, 709 N.W.2d 370. The test is not 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
11 
 
whether the reviewing court would admit the evidence, but 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
"exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with 
the facts of record, [and] whether appropriate discretion was in 
fact exercised." Id., ¶11. This court will not find that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion if there is a 
rational basis for its decision. Id. 
III 
¶31 We turn first to the issue regarding the bailiff. Ford 
contends that the bailiff's contact with the store clerk in the 
hours after the incident entitles him to automatic reversal.  
¶32 He cites to a number of cases automatically reversing 
convictions on the ground that bailiffs serving as prosecution 
witnesses taint the jury process. Among these is Turner v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), in which jurors were sequestered 
during a three-day trial and continuously in the company of 
deputy sheriffs who were serving as bailiffs. The deputies ate 
with the jurors, conversed freely with them, and ran errands for 
them. Id. at 468.   
¶33 Two of the deputies were also witnesses for the 
prosecution. One testified regarding his investigation of the 
crime scene and incriminating actions taken by the defendant. 
The 
other 
testified 
about 
apprehending 
the 
defendant, 
incriminating statements made by the defendant, and how the 
deputy prevailed upon the defendant to provide a written 
confession. Id. at 467.  
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
12 
 
¶34 The Supreme Court determined that the defendant's 
right to a jury trial was violated. That right guarantees "a 
fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors" and 
the failure to provide such does not meet the minimum standards 
of due process. Id. at 471-72. The Court noted the particularly 
close contact between the jurors and the deputies, describing it 
as "a continuous and intimate association throughout a three-day 
trial——an 
association 
which 
gave 
these 
witnesses 
an 
opportunity . . . to 
renew 
old 
friendships 
and 
make 
new 
acquaintances among the members of the jury." Id. at 473.   
¶35 It further noted that the deputies' testimony was 
central to the prosecution's case and was outcome-determinative: 
"the credibility which the jury attached to the testimony of 
these two key witnesses must invariably have determined" the 
outcome. Id. at 473. The Court concluded that there was "extreme 
prejudice inherent" in the deputies' relation with the jury and 
that automatic reversal was required. Id. at 473-474.  
¶36 A few years after Turner, the Court again addressed 
the issue of contact between a jury and a witness who served as 
a bailiff. In Gonzalez v. Beto a county sheriff served as the 
prosecution's key witness, attesting to the authenticity of the 
defendant's confession, which had been dictated to the sheriff 
and signed with an "X" by the defendant. 405 U.S. 1052 (1972). 
The sheriff also served as jury bailiff, which involved 
"substantial and continuing contact with and authority over [the 
jurors] during the entire course of the trial." Id. at 1053. The 
sheriff 
conversed 
with 
the 
jurors, 
escorted 
them 
to 
a 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
13 
 
restaurant, ate with them, and brought them soft drinks during 
deliberations. Id. Immediately after defense counsel challenged 
the sheriff's credibility, the court asked the sheriff to step 
down from the witness stand and "retire the jury for a few 
minutes." Id., n.1.  
¶37 The Court determined that Turner had not established a 
per se rule requiring reversal when a prosecution witness comes 
into contact with the jury. Id. at 1055. Rather, it stated that 
Turner was a "recognition of the great prejudice inherent in the 
dual role of jury bailiff and key prosecution witness." Id. The 
Court concluded that the close association between the sheriff 
and the jurors together with the sheriff's key testimony merited 
reversal under Turner.  Id. at 1056.  
¶38 Wisconsin 
cases 
are 
in 
accord 
with 
Turner 
and 
Gonzalez. La Valley v. State involved a juror who during the 
course of the trial received a ride to a dance with the sheriff, 
danced once with the sheriff's wife, and received a return ride 
from other friends. 188 Wis. 68, 71, 205 N.W. 412 (1925). This 
court 
determined 
that 
such 
involvement 
could 
improperly 
influence even a conscientious juror, for the investigation of 
the crime had been conducted by the sheriff's office. Id. at 80. 
It therefore reversed the conviction, stating that preserving 
impartial trials requires that "deliberations and pronouncements 
must be kept pure, and untainted not only from all improper 
influences but from the appearance thereof." Id. 
¶39 In Surma v. State, 260 Wis. 510, 51 N.W.2d 47 (1952), 
the bailiff in charge of the jury during deliberations was an 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
14 
 
arresting officer, had helped obtain a confession from the 
defendants, and testified for the prosecution. In his bailiff 
capacity he took the jurors to a meal and ate with the male 
jurors while his wife ate with the female jurors. Id. at 511. 
Citing La Valley, this court reversed the conviction and granted 
a new trial, stating that "as one of the arresting officers and 
witnesses for the state, [the bailiff] is almost as closely 
identified 
with the prosecution . . . as was the district 
attorney." Id. at 513.  
¶40 State v. Cotter, 262 Wis. 168, 54 N.W.2d 43 (1952), 
also involved a deputy sheriff serving as jury bailiff. The 
bailiff had taken part in the investigation of the case and 
served as a witness for the state.  Id. at 170. As the jury 
retired for deliberations, the bailiff told the jury that "they 
would not hurt my feelings if they hurried." Id. Following Surma 
and La Valley, this court reversed the conviction, rejecting the 
view that reversal required a showing of prejudice. Id. at 172-
73. 
¶41 Ford argues that his situation is similar to the above 
cases. He asserts that the bailiff had established a bond with 
the jury before the circuit court removed him from the case, and 
that the relationship taints the entire jury deliberation 
process. Thus, Ford argues that Turner, Gonzalez, La Valley, 
Surma, and Cotter require automatic reversal, without any 
showing of prejudice. 
¶42 In essence, Ford is arguing that his case involves 
structural error, that is, a "defect affecting the framework 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
15 
 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in 
the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
310 (1991); State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶62, 298 
Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623. Structural errors "infect the entire 
trial process and necessarily render a trial fundamentally 
unfair." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)(internal 
citations and quotations omitted). They "seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 
and are so fundamental that they are considered per se 
prejudicial." 
Shirley 
E., 
298 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶62 
(internal 
quotations omitted).  
¶43 Structural errors are subject to automatic reversal. 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 8; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. The United States Supreme Court has 
found structural error in only a "very limited class of cases." 
Id.4  
                                                 
4 In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997), the 
Supreme Court listed as structural errors complete denial of 
counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); biased 
trial judge (Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)); racial 
discrimination in grand jury selection (Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 
U.S. 254 (1986)); denial of self-representation at trial 
(McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)); denial of public 
trial (Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)); and defect in 
reasonable-doubt instruction (Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275 (1993)).   
At least one federal court has described the Supreme 
Court's decision in Turner as structural error. Helmig v. Kemna, 
461 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2006).   But see Agnew v. Leibach, 
250 F.3d 1123, 1125 (7th Cir. 2001), which specifically declined 
to reach the question of whether Turner involved structural 
error.   
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
16 
 
¶44 Ford has not set forth any case that supports the 
conclusion that a structural error requiring automatic reversal 
exists here.  Neither Turner, Gonzalez, nor the Wisconsin cases 
Ford cites resemble the present case. To begin, this is not a 
case involving a bailiff-witness. Turner, Gonzalez, Surma, and 
Cotter each involved a bailiff who also served as a prosecution 
witness. Here, however, Wolfgram did not serve as a witness in 
any capacity, and there is no indication that he was ever even 
considered as a prosecution witness. 
¶45 Further, Wolfgram's involvement in the case is nothing 
like the involvement of the bailiffs in the cases Ford cites. In 
Turner and Gonzalez the bailiffs provided key testimony for the 
prosecution regarding incriminating statements or defendant 
confessions. Surma involved a bailiff who was closely involved 
in the case by serving as an arresting officer and helping 
obtain a confession from the defendant. In Cotter the bailiff 
took part in the investigation. Although the sheriff in 
La Valley 
did 
not 
serve 
as 
a 
prosecution 
witness, 
the 
investigation of the crime in that case was conducted out of the 
sheriff's office.  
¶46 The situation here is altogether different. Wolfgram 
did not investigate the crime, was not a part of the office 
investigating the crime, did not help obtain an incriminating 
statement, and did not take part in the defendant's arrest. He 
simply saw the store clerk sometime after the crime and advised 
him to call the police and his manager. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
17 
 
¶47 Finally, the contact between Wolfgram and the jury is 
less significant than the contact involved in the other cases. 
In Turner the bailiffs ate and conversed freely with jurors over 
a three-day trial, and the Court described the association as 
"intimate" and allowing renewal of old friendships and making 
new acquaintances. Gonzalez involved "substantial and continuing 
contact" between the bailiff and jury. In La Valley the sheriff 
had contact with a juror in a social context outside of the 
trial while the trial was ongoing. The Surma bailiff and his 
wife ate with the jurors. Cotter involved contact that was 
significant both because it was inappropriate and because it 
occurred as the jury retired for deliberations.  
¶48 In contrast, Wolfgram's contact with the jury was more 
limited. He did not spend the entire trial with the jurors. 
Rather, he was with the jury only during voir dire, opening 
statements, and direct examination of the State's first witness. 
Wolfgram did not take meals with the jurors, and there is no 
indication 
that 
he 
renewed 
old 
friendships 
or 
made 
new 
acquaintances. On examination, Wolfgram testified that he had 
not discussed with the jury his contact with the store clerk. 
There is no indication that Wolfgram made inappropriate comments 
to the jury or had contact with a juror outside of the trial 
while the trial was ongoing.  
¶49 Thus, we conclude that this case does not involve 
structural error requiring automatic reversal.  It does not 
contain a defect that "infect[s] the entire trial process and 
necessarily render[s the] trial fundamentally unfair." Neder, 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
18 
 
527 U.S. at 8 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Wolfgram was not a witness, and his testimony therefore could 
not be given undue weight so as to prejudice the trial.  
Further, he did not have inappropriate contact with the jurors, 
which could "seriously affect the . . . public reputation of 
judicial proceedings."  Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶62. 
¶50 Having determined that automatic reversal is not 
required, we address next whether the circuit court otherwise 
erred in denying Ford's motion for mistrial.  As noted above, 
the decision whether to grant a mistrial lies within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.  It must determine, in light of 
the whole proceeding, whether the basis for the mistrial request 
is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.   
¶51 Ford's motion for a mistrial was based on two 
assertions:  (1) that Wolfgram could be an important defense 
witness if he testified that the clerk mentioned nothing about 
an attempted armed robbery, and (2) that given the role of a 
bailiff, the jury could have been improperly influenced because 
they would want to know what the bailiff had to say about the 
case.   
¶52 After applying La Valley, Surma, Cotter, and Cullen to 
the facts of this case, the court denied the motion for 
mistrial.  It stated: 
There is no indication in this record that the bailiff 
has had any improper contact with the jury.  There is 
no indication that he said anything to the jury that 
would reflect his observations of [the victim]. . . . 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
19 
 
So, I guess the question is:  Is there an appearance 
of impropriety?  I don't see one.  He's not a witness 
for the State.  Potentially he'll be a witness for the 
defense but he's not a witness for the State and there 
is nothing that he said to the jury that's going to 
influence them in any way.   
So, I deny the motion for mistrial.  I don't have a 
basis for concluding that the parties can't receive a 
fair trial in this case.   
. . . . 
From what I've heard I don't consider him a critical 
witness or even a material witness, we have somebody 
who is potentially the hundredth person that [the 
victim] talked to that day after the alleged events.  
I haven't heard . . . how immediate the contact was 
between these two, other than it was a couple of hours 
after the alleged events. 
¶53 In essence, the circuit court determined that the 
alleged error is not "sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a 
mistrial."  Nienhardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 166. While our research 
failed to uncover any Wisconsin cases involving contact between 
a non-witness bailiff and a victim, there are cases involving 
potential prejudice that provide guidance. 
¶54 Cullen v. State involved a trial bailiff who was 
married to an investigating officer who served as a prosecution 
witness. 26 Wis. 2d 652, 660, 133 N.W.2d 284 (1965). The record 
did not indicate that the jury was aware of the connection.  The 
bailiff was in contact with the jury for about three hours. The 
jury's lack of awareness of the connection and the "relatively 
short period during which the jury may have been subjected to 
[the bailiff's] influence" led this court to determine that 
there was no prejudice. Id. at 661-62. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
20 
 
¶55 Another case involving potential prejudice is State v. 
King, 120 Wis. 2d 285, 354 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1984). On the 
second day of trial in an armed robbery case, a juror reported 
to the bailiff that he knew the complaining witness. Id. at 295. 
When questioned by the court and defense counsel in chambers, 
the juror indicated that during voir dire he had not recognized 
the name of the witness as someone he knew. However, when the 
witness testified, the juror recognized him as a coworker and 
brother-in-law of another coworker. Id.  
¶56 The juror stated that his only relationship with the 
witness was as a coworker with whom he exchanged greetings at 
work. Id. He told the court that his relationship with the 
witness would not affect his judgment. Id. The circuit court 
denied the defendants' motions for mistrial. The court of 
appeals determined that the circuit court had not erroneously 
exercised its discretion on the ground that the juror admitted 
the contact and stated that it would not affect his judgment. 
Id. at 296. 
¶57 In the present case, Wolfgram was unaware of his 
involvement in the case until the morning of trial.  The jury 
was unaware of his involvement until the direct examination of 
the store clerk, and Wolfgram was removed after the direct 
examination. Wolfgram therefore had very little contact with the 
jury after his involvement became known. Thus, as in Cullen, the 
jury could have been exposed to Wolfgram's potential influence 
for only a very limited period of time. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
21 
 
¶58 Further, this case involves a jury learning that the 
bailiff talked to a prosecution witness and urged him to call 
the police shortly after the crime took place. The potential for 
prejudice in such a case is no greater than when it is a juror 
who knows the complaining witness, as was the case in King. 
¶59 Finally, the circuit court took a number of measures 
to assure that Ford was not prejudiced. It replaced the bailiff 
to avoid the possibility that the jurors would inquire about his 
observations. Because Ford requested that Wolfgram be subpoenaed 
as a witness, the court excluded the bailiff from the courtroom 
and instructed him not to discuss the case with witnesses.  
¶60 More important, the circuit court inquired as to 
whether the jurors could decide the case fairly and impartially. 
One juror indicated that Wolfgram was a cousin of someone she 
was related to by marriage, but that she could set aside any 
prior contact and decide the case fairly and impartially.  
¶61 The court asked whether "the contact the jurors have 
had with Mr. Wolfgram as the bailiff [would] be something that 
would influence their decision as jurors." No jurors answered 
"yes." The court further asked if any juror would "not be able 
to set aside whatever contact they've had with Mr. Wolfgram as 
bailiff and act fairly and impartially in the case." Again, no 
juror responded affirmatively. The court was satisfied that 
Wolfgram's time as bailiff and contact with the clerk was not 
prejudicial and therefore denied Ford's motion for a mistrial. 
¶62 Thus, the circuit court decided "in light of the 
entire facts and circumstances" that the claimed error was not 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
22 
 
"sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial." Nienhardt, 196 
Wis. 2d at 166. Because of the limited potential for Wolfgram to 
influence the jury and the circuit court's efforts to assure 
that the jurors could decide the case fairly and impartially, we 
determine that the circuit court's decision was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  
IV 
¶63 We consider next the circuit court's decision to allow 
witness testimony regarding the contents of the surveillance 
tape. Wisconsin Stat. § 910.025 provides that in order to prove 
the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,6 the original 
is required. There are several exceptions to this rule, however, 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 910.02 
(Requirement 
of 
original) 
provides in full: 
To prove the content of a writing, recording or 
photograph, 
the 
original 
writing, 
recording 
or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided 
in chs. 901 to 911, s. 137.21, or by other statute. 
6 The definition of "photographs" includes such diverse 
depictions as still photographs, X-ray films and 
motion 
pictures. 
 
The 
rule 
differs 
from 
the 
corresponding federal rule. 
The Wisconsin rule, unlike FRE 1001(2), does not 
expressly include "video tapes."  The legislative 
history of the federal rule suggests that videotape 
was added in order to "expressly" include what was 
implicit in the rule.  Despite this difference, 
§ 910.01(2) 
should 
be 
interpreted 
as 
including 
videotapes because the rule reveals no intent to 
otherwise exclude them or to limit the rule's reach to 
those types of depictions specifically listed in the 
statute.  
7 Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Evidence, § 1001.3 (2d Ed. 2001) 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
23 
 
and Wis. Stat. § 910.04(1) sets forth one of the exceptions.  It 
provides in relevant part:   
The original is not required, and other evidence of 
the contents of a writing, recording or photograph is 
admissible if: 
(1) Originals Lost or Destroyed.  All originals are 
lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost 
or destroyed them in bad faith . . . . 
¶64 The essential question here is whether the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it determined that the 
videotape was destroyed for purposes of § 910.04(1).  The 
decision of whether the definition of "destroyed" can include a 
tape that is unplayable presents a question of law. However, the 
question of whether a tape is unplayable is a question of fact.     
Reviewing courts will not disturb an evidentiary ruling where 
the circuit court has exercised its discretion in accordance 
with acceptable legal standards and the facts of record.  
Shomberg, 288 Wis. 2d 1, ¶11.   
¶65 Ford contends that the videotape was not destroyed and 
that the State should have used "extraordinary methods to clean 
the tape." Thus, he maintains that the circuit court erred in 
allowing testimony regarding the contents of the tape. His 
argument is unpersuasive.  
¶66 There is no question that the tape was damaged and 
unplayable when it arrived at the state crime lab. The tape had 
a cracked casing, it was covered in a film, and it was 
physically damaged by crinkling. The State attempted to restore 
the tape to playability. The crime lab analyst began by 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
24 
 
replacing the cracked casing. When the analyst discovered the 
film on the tape, he followed standard procedure and attempted 
to remove the film by applying distilled water. 
¶67 Although the distilled water failed to remove the 
film, the analyst did not attempt to use stronger solvents that 
might have removed it. Such solvents might also have done 
further damage to the tape. Further, the physical damage to the 
tape from crinkling could not be cured by adding the solvents.  
¶68 We are satisfied that where a tape is damaged and 
unplayable, the proponent of the evidence makes reasonable 
efforts to restore the tape to playability, and those reasonable 
efforts fail, the tape is destroyed within the meaning of 
§ 910.04(1). We find persuasive the reasoning of a treatise on 
the federal counterpart of § 910.04(1): 
"Destroyed" usually signifies that the item no longer 
exists.  However, an item may be destroyed for 
purposes of this rule even if it is not completely 
obliterated.  Writings become unreadable, recordings 
become inaudible, and photographs fade.  In addition, 
the contents of such items can be intentionally and 
irreversibly altered.  The best-evidence doctrine is 
all about proving the contents of such items.  Thus, 
so long as the contents can no longer be discerned, it 
makes sense to conclude that the item is destroyed for 
purposes of Rule 1004(1) even if the medium on which 
those contents were recorded still exists.  Similarly, 
partial destruction may be sufficient under Rule 
1004(1) to permit the admission of secondary evidence 
concerning the portion destroyed. 
Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, 31 Fed. Prac. & Proc. 
Evid. § 8014 (2007). 
¶69 Thus, because the surveillance tape was destroyed, and 
Ford has made no argument that the State destroyed the tape in 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
25 
 
bad faith,7 the testimony regarding the contents of the tape is 
admissible under § 910.04. We therefore determine that the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
admitting testimony regarding the contents of the tape.   
V 
¶70 In sum, we determine that the bailiff's contact with 
the crime victim is not structural error and does not require 
automatic reversal. Further, the circuit court's determination 
that the alleged error was not prejudicial was within its 
discretion. Therefore, the circuit court's decision to deny 
Ford's motion for mistrial was not an erroneous exercise of its 
discretion.  
¶71 In 
addition, 
we 
determine 
that 
because 
the 
surveillance tape was unplayable, and the State made reasonable 
efforts to restore it to playability, the circuit court did not 
err in concluding that the tape was destroyed within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 910.04(1).  We therefore determine that the 
                                                 
7 In his brief to this court, Ford states that should we 
determine that the tape is destroyed "the issue may then become 
one of the State's negligence or bad faith." Elsewhere in the 
brief he asserts that the circuit court's "finding that the tape 
was 'destroyed' is the sole question on this issue." At oral 
argument, counsel stated that he was merely "suspicious that 
something negligent occurred" and that he did not "think that 
the police did anything wrong" in leaving the tape with the 
store manager. These statements cannot be construed as an 
argument that the tape was destroyed in bad faith, especially 
where nothing else in the record indicates bad faith. In any 
case, Ford has not sufficiently developed such an argument for 
us to consider it here. Kristi L.M. v. Dennis E.M., 2007 WI 85, 
¶20 n. 7, __ Wis. 2d __, 734 N.W.2d 375. 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
26 
 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
admitting 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
tape.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2006AP0806-CR   
 
 
 
1