Title: People v. Clark

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Clark, 2016 IL 118845 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. FRED 
CLARK, Appellee. 
 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
118845 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
March 24, 2014 
 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. 
James B. Linn, Judge, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
Affirmed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita M. 
Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette 
Collins, and Mari R. Hatzenbuehler, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of 
counsel), for the People. 
 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy 
Defender, and Gilbert C. Lenz, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the 
Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee. 
 
 
Justices 
 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, 
and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and integrity 
of this document 
Date: 2016.05.11 
08:34:50 -05'00'
 
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OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The defendant, Fred Clark, was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated 
vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2010)) and 
armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)). Following a 
bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County acknowledged that defendant committed the 
charged offenses while armed with a gun; however, the court determined that the gun “was 
used as a bludgeon and will be treated as such.” Commensurate with the court’s apparent belief 
that the manner of the firearm’s use was relevant to the charged offenses, the court pronounced 
oral findings that defendant was “guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery 
without a firearm” (emphasis added), uncharged offenses identified in different subsections of 
the pertinent statutes. See 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2010) (aggravated vehicular hijacking, 
while armed with a dangerous weapon “other than” a firearm); 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 
2010) (armed robbery, while armed with a dangerous weapon “other than” a firearm). On 
appeal, the appellate court concluded those uncharged offenses were not lesser-included 
offenses of the charged firearm offenses, and thus those convictions were improper. The court 
found the issue forfeited but held it cognizable as second-prong plain error. Pursuant to those 
findings, the appellate court reduced the convictions to vehicular hijacking and robbery, 
respectively, and remanded for resentencing on those convictions. 2014 IL App (1st) 123494. 
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013)) and 
now affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Defendant was initially charged by indictment in the circuit court of Cook County with 
aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 
2010)), armed robbery while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)), two 
counts of burglary (entry of a building and entry of a motor vehicle with the intent to commit a 
theft) (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2010)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(1) (West 
2010)), aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1 (West 2010)), and six counts of 
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (all counts specifying a firearm) (720 ILCS 
5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A), (a)(1)(3)(C), (a)(1)(3)(I) (West 2010)). As relevant to an argument 
posited by the State, and discussed hereafter, we note that the aggravated battery charge stated 
in pertinent part that defendant caused bodily harm to Tyronn Wise “while using a dangerous 
weapon other than by the discharge of a firearm, to wit: struck Tyronn Wise about the body 
with a firearm.” (Emphasis added.) The aggravated unlawful restraint charge similarly stated 
that defendant committed the offense “while using a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm.” 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶ 4 
 
Prior to defendant’s jury waiver and ensuing bench trial, the trial court admonished 
defendant that he was charged with aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm 
and armed robbery while armed with a firearm: Class X felonies with potential sentences upon 
conviction of 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment. The trial court did not reference any other charges 
or penalties. 
¶ 5 
 
At defendant’s bench trial, Tyronn Wise testified that on May 15, 2011, around 6:30 a.m., 
he was accosted by defendant and another man while he was parking his vehicle, a Dodge 
 
- 3 - 
 
Charger, in his garage. He stated that defendant put a gun to his temple and ordered him to 
“give that shit up.” The other individual was not armed. The offenders took a cell phone and 
cash from Wise’s person. The other man then went through Wise’s vehicle while defendant 
continued holding Wise at gunpoint. While the other man rifled through Wise’s vehicle, 
defendant ordered Wise to the back of the garage and ordered him to kneel, “execution style,” 
facing the wall, with his hands behind his head. Wise testified that defendant continued to hold 
the gun: “upside my head,” “in the back of my head.” Eventually, the other man drove off in 
Wise’s vehicle. Before defendant departed in a separate vehicle, he told Wise he should kill 
him, and he then struck Wise twice in the head with the gun. Wise later identified defendant in 
a lineup and in open court. He also identified People’s exhibit No. 6 as a photograph of the 
firearm defendant held “upside my head.” He affirmed that gun was “at his person” during the 
entire 15-minute encounter. 
¶ 6 
 
Officer Rangel1 of the Chicago police department testified he and his partner were on 
patrol on May 15, 2011, around 11 p.m., when they stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. 
The occupants immediately fled on foot. Rangel pursued one person, who was ultimately 
apprehended. Rangel identified that individual as the defendant. A handgun was recovered 
from the vehicle. Rangel identified People’s exhibit Nos. 3 and 4 as photographs depicting the 
Dodge Charger he stopped on May 15, 2011. 
¶ 7 
 
Officer Juan Aguirre, an evidence technician, testified that he recovered a gun from behind 
the front seat of the Dodge Charger. The gun, pictured in, among other exhibits, People’s 
exhibit No. 6, was a loaded 9-millimeter Ruger handgun. 
¶ 8 
 
After Aguirre’s testimony, the State rested. The defendant’s motion for directed verdict 
was denied. 
¶ 9 
 
The defense first called Detective Sharon Walker. Walker testified that defendant and 
Kamari Belmont were arrested in connection with this case. Both appeared in a lineup on May 
16, 2011. Wise viewed that lineup and identified defendant as the man who held a gun to his 
head. Wise did not identify Belmont. 
¶ 10 
 
Defendant then testified in his own behalf. Defendant stated that, on May 15, 2011, 
Belmont and Belmont’s cousin picked him up in a red Dodge Charger, which Belmont said 
belonged to his aunt. Defendant said he did not see a gun in the car. Defendant stated that he 
eventually drove, as Belmont’s cousin appeared to be intoxicated. 
¶ 11 
 
According to defendant, he drove to a gas station near 55th Street and Wells Street. He 
exited the car and saw someone in black with something in his hand. Defendant stated he 
thought that person might have had a gun, so he ran behind a nearby house. Defendant said, 
when he walked back to the front of the house, he encountered the police, who arrested him. 
¶ 12 
 
Defendant testified he had never seen Wise before trial. He denied holding a gun to Wise’s 
head or taking anything from him. Defendant acknowledged that he was, at the time of trial, in 
custody for a juvenile parole violation. He was on parole for a controlled substance offense. 
¶ 13 
 
In argument before the court, the issues addressed by both sides were whether defendant 
was proven to be the individual who held “the gun” to Wise’s head and whether “the gun” 
subsequently found in the Dodge Charger when defendant was arrested was adequately tied to 
defendant. Wise’s testimony that defendant held a gun to his head and thereafter 
                                                 
 
1The record does not disclose the officer’s first name. 
 
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pistol-whipped him stood uncontradicted. Defense counsel never argued that the weapon 
employed was anything other than a firearm. He asked that the trial court find defendant not 
guilty of all charges. 
¶ 14 
 
The trial court found that Wise was credible and defendant was not. The court recounted 
Wise’s testimony, that defendant was “the person that robbed him as he was trying to pull into 
his garage. He came into his garage with another person, put a gun to his head, ordered him to 
do various things, smacked him with a pistol that was in his hand, then fled. *** Later the same 
day Mr. Clark was seen driving the victim’s car, and a gun was recovered in the car.” 
¶ 15 
 
The court concluded: 
 
“I do believe he was properly identified as the person involved in this case. The 
weapon was used in this case in the manner of a bludgeon. He was pistol-whipped with 
it. 
 
I find under all circumstances that it was used as a bludgeon and will be treated as 
such. So he is found guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery 
without a firearm, also the other charges, the burglary charges as well.” 
¶ 16 
 
Neither the State nor defense counsel objected to the court’s findings when announced, and 
defendant’s motion for a new trial subsequently raised only generic, boilerplate contentions 
that were insufficient to bring the error subsequently claimed on appeal to the attention of the 
circuit court. 
¶ 17 
 
At the hearing on defendant’s motion and sentencing, the court stated that it had found 
defendant “guilty of armed robbery on [sic] a firearm, and aggravated vehicular hijacking, and 
burglary.” Defense counsel chose to stand on his posttrial motion, which was “respectfully 
denied.” In the course of defense counsel’s sentencing argument, counsel took issue with the 
court’s finding that defendant had “pistol-whipped” the victim. In response, the court 
recharacterized: “Smacked him in the head with a gun.” 
¶ 18 
 
In announcing defendant’s sentences, the court first noted that defendant had been in 
trouble “a number of times,” had had multiple “encounters with the police,” and “was on 
parole at the time of this offense.” The court then shed some light on the thought process that 
led to its finding on these uncharged offenses, which carried a lower penalty range than those 
with which defendant was charged: 
 
“This offense did involve some amount of premeditation, and it was violent, and an 
actual gun was recovered later. I[,] already in light of his age, the fact the gun wasn’t 
fired, other circumstances that I heard at the trial, gave some deference and benefit of 
the doubt and justice as to the ultimate finding.” 
It appears the presentence report thereafter prompted the judge to rethink the “benefit” and 
“justice” conferred upon defendant. The court continued: 
 
“That being said, now that I see the Pre-sentence Investigation, I hear more about it, 
I agree this is a serious matter. He’s got a violent side to him, particularly again the fact 
he’s on parole at the time of this offense is disturbing. 
 
As to the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, it’s 17 
years in the penitentiary; as to the burglary, 7 years in the penitentiary. All sentences 
will run concurrently.” 
 
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The court’s written order of commitment and sentence recites those sentences, but reflects 
convictions for the firearm offenses as charged. 
¶ 19 
 
On appeal, the appellate court first considered whether the trial court had acquitted 
defendant of the charged offenses of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm and armed 
robbery with a firearm. In the course of addressing that issue, the court examined state and 
federal authority. The appellate court cited People v. Rey, 136 Ill. App. 3d 645 (1985), for the 
proposition that the Illinois Constitution bars an appeal from a judgment of acquittal 
“ ‘regardless of whether the court’s ruling [was] based upon a mistake of fact or mistake of 
law.’ ” 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 20 (quoting Rey, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 651). Quoting this 
court, the appellate court noted that a judgment constitutes an acquittal where it “ ‘actually 
represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense 
charged.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 300 (1999)). The appellate court 
also cited the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. ___, 
___, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1075-76 (2013), wherein the Supreme Court stated, “ ‘an acquittal due to 
insufficient evidence precludes retrial, whether the court’s evaluation of the evidence was 
correct or not, [citation], and regardless of whether the court’s decision flowed from an 
incorrect antecedent ruling of law.’ ” 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 20 (quoting Evans, 568 U.S. 
at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1075-76). 
¶ 20 
 
In this case, the appellate court concluded that the trial court’s guilty findings on the 
uncharged offenses of aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery without a firearm 
constituted acquittals of the charged firearm offenses. Id. ¶ 21. The court acknowledged a 
conflict between the trial court’s oral pronouncement—finding defendant guilty of aggravated 
vehicular hijacking and armed robbery without a firearm—and the court’s written order of 
commitment and sentence, which reflected convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking 
with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm. The court observed that the 17-year sentences 
imposed by the trial court were consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement. Quoting 
People v. Roberson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 758, 774 (2010), the court held that when the oral 
pronouncement of the court and the written pronouncement conflict, the oral pronouncement 
controls. 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 21. In this respect, the appellate court concluded: 
“As the trial court’s oral pronouncements reflect a resolution of the factual elements of 
aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm in 
defendant’s favor, as well as an express rationale for it, it is clear that the trial court 
acquitted defendant of those offenses. We may not review the trial court’s judgment of 
acquittal, even if the judgment resulted from a mistake of fact or law.” Id. 
¶ 21 
 
The appellate court then turned to the question of whether the offenses of aggravated 
vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm and armed robbery with a 
dangerous weapon other than a firearm were lesser-included offenses of the charged firearm 
offenses. Applying the charging instrument approach, the appellate court determined they 
were not. 
¶ 22 
 
En route to that conclusion, the court first, pursuant to our direction in People v. Kolton, 
219 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (2006), considered whether the description of the charged offenses in the 
charging instrument—here the charged firearm offenses—contained the broad foundation or 
main outline of the uncharged offenses. 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶¶ 25-26. In the course of 
that inquiry, the court noted that the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute and the armed 
 
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robbery statute provide for differing charging variants that entail differing penalties upon 
conviction. In each, there is a subsection specifying commission of the offense while “armed 
with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm” (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1), 18-4(a)(3) (West 
2010)) and another referencing commission of the offense while “armed with a firearm” (720 
ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), 18-4(a)(4) (West 2010)). 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 27. Although all 
variants of the offenses are classified as Class X felonies, the legislature has determined that an 
additional 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment when the offense is committed 
while “armed with a firearm.” 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b), 18-4(b) (West 2010). The appellate court 
observed that the charges here consistently alleged that defendant committed the offenses 
while “armed with a firearm.” “The State did not charge defendant with aggravated vehicular 
hijacking or armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm pursuant to section 
18-2(a)(1) or 18-4(a)(3).” 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 28. 
¶ 23 
 
The court considered whether an allegation that defendant was armed with a dangerous 
weapon other than a firearm could be inferred from charges that defendant was armed with a 
firearm. Id. ¶ 29. Consistent with decisions in People v. Barnett, 2011 IL App (3d) 090721, and 
People v. McBride, 2012 IL App (1st) 100375, the appellate court determined it could not. The 
plain language of the statutory provisions in question rendered them “ ‘mutually exclusive of 
each other.’ ” 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 30 (quoting Barnett, 2011 IL App (3d) 090721, 
¶ 38). In other words, a weapon cannot at once be a “firearm” and something “other than a 
firearm.” The appellate court found this court’s decision in People v. Washington, 2012 IL 
107993, inapposite, as it involved an earlier version of the armed robbery statute, which did not 
distinguish between firearms and dangerous weapons other than firearms; it simply required 
the State to prove that the defendant was armed with “a dangerous weapon.” 2014 IL App (1st) 
123494, ¶ 33. 
¶ 24 
 
Having concluded that aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon other than 
a firearm and armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm were not 
lesser-included offenses of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm and armed robbery 
with a firearm (id. ¶ 32), and that the trial court therefore erred in convicting defendant of those 
uncharged offenses (id. ¶ 34), the appellate court went on to consider whether that error 
constituted second-prong plain error, i.e., “ ‘a clear or obvious error *** so serious that it 
affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, 
regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 36 
(quoting People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010)). 
¶ 25 
 
The appellate court rejected the State’s contention that this court has limited second-prong 
plain error to the categories of error synonymous with structural errors identified by the United 
States Supreme Court, noting that although our decisions in People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 
(2009), and Thompson equated second-prong plain error to structural error, we did not restrict 
plain error to the types of structural error recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 2014 
IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 40. The appellate court observed that this court has in fact applied 
second-prong plain error in other contexts, holding, in In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 
378-79 (2009), that the failure to apply the one-act, one-crime rule constituted second-prong 
plain error, and in People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 131 (2009), that the failure to exercise 
discretion in denying a request for a continuance constituted second-prong plain error, given 
the egregious facts of that case. 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 40. 
 
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¶ 26 
 
The appellate court held that second-prong plain error applies to these facts, essentially 
marrying the principle that convicting a defendant of an uncharged offense that is not a 
lesser-included offense of a charged offense violates a defendant’s “ ‘fundamental due process 
right to notice of the charges brought against him’ ” (id. ¶ 41 (quoting Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 
359-60)) with the appellate court’s understanding of our holding in Samantha V.: “[P]ermitting 
unauthorized convictions to stand challenges the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. ¶ 42. In 
so holding, the appellate court acknowledged the State’s argument that it is “ ‘disingenuous’ ” 
for defendant to assert that his convictions erode the integrity of the judicial process because 
the trial court, despite finding that defendant was armed with a firearm, “ ‘went out of its way 
*** to conclude that it would “treat” the firearm as a bludgeon’ ” in an “ ‘attempt to shield 
defendant from the mandatory additional fifteen-term [sic] of imprisonment.’ ” Id. (quoting the 
State’s argument).2 The appellate court “recognize[d] that the trial court intended to afford 
defendant ‘some deference and benefit of the doubt and justice’ by acquitting him of the 
charged offenses,” but the appellate court nonetheless determined that the convictions for the 
uncharged offenses violated defendant’s fundamental right to due process and were 
remediable via plain error. Id. (quoting the trial court). The appellate court concluded that the 
offenses of vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 2010)) and robbery (720 ILCS 
5/18-1(a) (West 2010)) would be lesser-included offenses of the charged offenses, and the 
evidence at trial supported convictions for those lesser offenses; therefore, the appellate court 
exercised its authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) to reduce the degree of 
defendant’s conviction to those lesser, uncharged, offenses. 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 43 
(quoting People v. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 25, and citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(3)). The 
court vacated the convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon 
other than a firearm and armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, and it 
remanded for resentencing on vehicular hijacking and armed robbery convictions. Id. ¶ 45. 
¶ 27 
 
In a footnote, the appellate court agreed with the Barnett court’s observation that the State 
could have avoided this result had it separately charged defendant with aggravated vehicular 
hijacking pursuant to section 18-4(a)(3) and armed robbery pursuant to section 
18-2(a)(1)—alleging that he committed the offenses with a dangerous weapon other than a 
firearm. Id. ¶ 42 n.2. The clear suggestion is that the State should have charged defendant with 
an offense for which it had no proof—there was no evidence that defendant used something 
other than a firearm—in order to provide the trial court in this case the option of finding 
defendant guilty of a charged offense he did not in fact commit, but one that carries a lesser 
penalty. 
 
¶ 28 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 29 
 
Before this court, the State argues that: (1) “the appellate court misapplied the charging 
instrument approach when it held that aggravated vehicular hijacking (with a dangerous 
weapon other than a firearm) and armed robbery (with a dangerous weapon other than a 
firearm) cannot be lesser-included offenses of aggravated vehicular hijacking (with a firearm) 
                                                 
 
2We note that the same judge, in People v. Funches, 2015 IL App (1st) 131591-U, where defendant 
was charged with armed robbery while armed with a firearm along with other firearm offenses, found 
that defendant guilty of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, yet also found 
him guilty of offenses requiring the possession of a firearm. 
 
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and armed robbery (with a firearm)” and (2) “the appellate court erred in holding that any error 
by the trial court in finding defendant guilty of the lesser offenses constituted second-prong 
plain error under Supreme Court Rule 615(a).” The defendant addresses those contentions and 
argues, alternatively, that even if the circuit court’s error does not constitute second-prong 
plain error, relief is required because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
entry of two improper convictions. We begin with the first issue. 
¶ 30 
 
A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a fundamental due process right to notice of the 
charges against him; thus, a defendant may not be convicted of an offense he has not been 
charged with committing. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 27; Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 359. 
However, a defendant may be convicted of an uncharged offense if it is a lesser-included 
offense of a crime expressly charged in the charging instrument and the evidence adduced at 
trial rationally supports a conviction on the lesser-included offense and an acquittal on the 
greater offense. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 27; Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 360; People v. 
Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2002); People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 105, 108 (1994). 
¶ 31 
 
We apply the “charging instrument approach” when determining whether an uncharged 
offense is a lesser-included offense of a charged offense. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 32; 
Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 362-63. Under the charging instrument approach, the lesser offense need 
not be a necessary part of the greater offense, but the facts alleged in the charging instrument 
must contain a broad foundation or main outline of the lesser offense. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 
113998, ¶ 30; Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 361; Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107. The charging instrument 
need not explicitly state all of the elements of the lesser offense as long as any missing 
elements can be reasonably inferred from the allegations included. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 
113998, ¶ 30; People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161, 166-67 (2010). Under the charging instrument 
approach, whether a particular offense is “lesser included” is a decision which must be made 
on a “case-by-case basis” using the factual description of the charged offense in the indictment. 
Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 367. 
¶ 32 
 
Thus, we first consider whether armed robbery charged via the provisions of section 
18-2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery charged 
pursuant to section 18-2(a)(2) and whether aggravated vehicular hijacking charged pursuant to 
the provisions of section 18-4(a)(3) is a lesser-included offense of aggravated vehicular 
hijacking charged under section 18-4(a)(4). Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of 
a charged offense is an issue of law that we review de novo. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 18; 
Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 361. Following is an overview of the statutory schemes in question. 
¶ 33 
 
Section 18-2(a) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2010)) provides in pertinent part: 
 
“(a) A person commits armed robbery when he or she violates Section 18-1; and 
 
(1) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a 
dangerous weapon other than a firearm; or  
 
(2) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a 
firearm; or  
 
(3) he or she, during the commission of the offense, personally discharges a 
firearm; or  
 
(4) he or she, during the commission of the offense, personally discharges a 
firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent 
disfigurement, or death to another person.” 
 
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Pursuant to subsection (b) of the statute, a violation of any of the foregoing provisions would 
be a Class X felony, with violations of subsections (a)(2) through (a)(4) carrying sentencing 
add-ons of 15, 20, and 25 years to life, respectively. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2010). 
¶ 34 
 
Section 18-4(a) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a) (West 2010)) provides in pertinent part: 
 
“(a) A person commits aggravated vehicular hijacking when he or she violates 
Section 18-3; and 
 
(1) the person from whose immediate presence the motor vehicle is taken is a 
physically handicapped person or a person 60 years of age or over; or 
 
(2) a person under 16 years of age is a passenger in the motor vehicle at the time 
of the offense; or 
 
(3) he or she carries on or about his or her person, or is otherwise armed with a 
dangerous weapon, other than a firearm; or 
 
(4) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a 
firearm; or 
 
(5) he or she, during the commission of the offense, personally discharges a 
firearm; or 
 
(6) he or she, during the commission of the offense, personally discharges a 
firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent 
disfigurement, or death to another person.” 
Violations of this statute are classified as Class X felonies, with a violation of subsection (a)(3) 
requiring at least a seven-year sentence and violations of (a)(4) to (a)(6) requiring sentencing 
add-ons of 15, 20, and 25 years to life, respectively. 720 ILCS 5/18-4(b) (West 2010). 
¶ 35 
 
The legislature has defined an “included offense” to mean “an offense which” 
 
“(a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable 
mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged, or 
 
(b) Consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense included 
therein.” 720 ILCS 5/2-9 (West 2010). 
¶ 36 
 
We note that while some of the offenses identified in sections 18-2(a) and 18-4(a) appear to 
inclusively build upon others, not all exhibit that relationship. Certainly, subsections (a)(3) and 
(a)(4) of section 18-2 have that relationship to subsection (a)(2) of that section, as is the case as 
well with subsections (a)(5) and (a)(6) of section 18-4 with subsection (a)(4) of that section. In 
each instance, the base offense requires commission of the crime while “armed with a 
firearm.” 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), 18-4(a)(4) (West 2010). Subsequent subsections build upon 
that lesser, base offense by adding, first, the element that the perpetrator “personally 
discharges a firearm” (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3), 18-4(a)(5) (West 2010)), and then another 
element, that the discharge of the firearm “proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent 
disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person” (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4), 
18-4(a)(6) (West 2010)). 
¶ 37 
 
However, other offenses identified in the two statutory schemes have no apparent 
relationship to offenses committed with a firearm. For example, the fact, or allegation, that 
“the person from whose immediate presence [a] motor vehicle is taken is a physically 
handicapped person or a person 60 years of age or over” (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(1) (West 2010)) 
 
- 10 - 
 
bears no necessary relationship to the fact that a firearm was used in the commission of the 
offense (see 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2010)), nor does one allegation apprise the accused, 
explicitly or inferentially, that he will be facing charges involving the other. The same can be 
said with respect to the charge that a vehicular hijacking was committed when “a person under 
16 years of age [was] a passenger in the motor vehicle at the time of the offense.” 720 ILCS 
5/18-4(a)(2) (West 2010). 
¶ 38 
 
More to the point for present purposes, we would have to stretch plain meaning and 
common understanding beyond a semblance of reason to conclude that a charge that a 
defendant committed an offense while “armed with a firearm” puts that defendant on notice, 
explicitly or inferentially, that he may be prosecuted for, and convicted of, an uncharged 
offense committed “with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm.” (Emphasis added.) 
Compare 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), 18-4(a)(4) (West 2010), with 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1), 
18-4(a)(3) (West 2010). In this case, unlike the other subsections discussed, the language of 
sections 18-2(a)(1) and 18-4(a)(3) explicitly excludes the use of a firearm. We agree with the 
appellate panel below, and those in Barnett and McBride: the plain language of these statutes 
indicates that violations are “ ‘mutually exclusive of each other.’ ” 2014 IL App (1st) 123494, 
¶¶ 30-32 (quoting Barnett, 2011 IL App (3d) 090721, ¶ 38); McBride, 2012 IL App (1st) 
100375, ¶ 24. The charging instrument in this case, describing, without exception, the 
possession of a firearm during the commission of the offenses, cannot be construed so 
“broadly” as to include the possession of a weapon that is something “other than a firearm.” 
We conclude that the offenses of aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery without a 
firearm are not, given the circumstances of this case, lesser-included offenses of aggravated 
vehicular hijacking and armed robbery with a firearm. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
convicting defendant of the former. 
¶ 39 
 
We note in passing, even if we had found otherwise with respect to lesser-included status, 
it would still have been error to convict the defendant of offenses set forth in sections 
18-2(a)(1) and 18-4(a)(3). In order to convict a defendant of an uncharged offense, the 
evidence adduced at trial must rationally support a conviction on the lesser-included offense 
and an acquittal on the greater offense. Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶ 27; Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d 
at 360; Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 6; Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 105, 108. Neither is the case here—which 
brings us to the matter of acquittal. 
¶ 40 
 
The evidence overwhelmingly supported convictions on the charged firearm offenses. 
Initially, the court denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the 
State’s case, thus indicating that the State’s evidence was sufficient to support convictions for 
those offenses. See People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 63 (1990) (standard is whether a 
reasonable mind could fairly conclude the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, 
considering the evidence most strongly in the State’s favor). At the conclusion of all the 
evidence, the State’s evidence that a firearm was used in the commission of the offenses stood 
uncontroverted. Defendant simply denied ever seeing the victim before the trial, and he 
proffered an explanation for his presence in the victim’s vehicle, in which the gun was found. 
The trial court resolved any question of credibility in favor of the State and against the 
defendant. The trial judge in his own remarks repeatedly referred to the presence of “a gun” 
and “pistol[-]whipping.” Whether the trial court’s finding of guilt on the uncharged 
offenses—implicitly acquitting defendant, sub silentio, of the charged offenses requiring 
possession of a firearm—was arrived at under the misapprehension that the manner of the 
 
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gun’s use mattered, or the judge was simply giving the defendant a break notwithstanding the 
evidence—as the appellate court seemed on the verge of suggesting (2014 IL App (1st) 
123494, ¶ 42)—the result is the same. We have reviewed the authorities cited by the appellate 
court (see id. ¶ 20) and agree that the trial court’s judgment, whether premised upon a mistake 
of law, a mistake of fact, or outright beneficence, amounts to an unassailable acquittal of the 
charged firearm offenses. The State has now abandoned any argument otherwise. 
¶ 41 
 
Although defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
guilty findings that were entered by the trial court, we need not further consider whether 
counsel’s representation was deficient or whether defendant was prejudiced thereby, because, 
ultimately, we conclude that the trial court’s error is cognizable and remediable as plain error. 
¶ 42 
 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides as follows: 
 
“(a) Insubstantial and Substantial Errors on Appeal. Any error, defect, irregularity, 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or 
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the trial court.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a). 
The plain error doctrine is applicable when: “ ‘(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the 
evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against 
the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred 
and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged 
the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” Thompson, 
238 Ill. 2d at 613 (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007)). As the language 
of the rule indicates, remedial application of the plain error doctrine is discretionary. People v. 
Walker, 109 Ill. 2d 484, 497 (1985); People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 176-77 (1984). 
Second-prong plain error is at issue here. 
¶ 43 
 
As we have observed, the plain language of sections 18-2(a)(1) and 18-4(a)(3) of the Code 
explicitly excludes the possession or use of a firearm. Thus, violations of sections 18-2(a)(2) 
and 18-4(a)(4)—offenses committed with firearms—and sections 18-2(a)(1) and 
18-4(a)(3)—offenses committed with weapons other than firearms—are mutually exclusive of 
each other. That would seem self-evident from the language employed in the statutory scheme, 
as amended.3 So, there is, in our view, clear error. 
¶ 44 
 
The next question is whether that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Here, we find ourselves in 
peculiar territory. Looking at it one way, defendant got more than he deserved: the evidence 
overwhelmingly indicated he was armed with a firearm when he committed the offenses; both 
the charged offenses, and the uncharged offenses for which the trial court entered guilty 
findings, were Class X felonies in any event; and the only difference was defendant was 
                                                 
 
3As we noted in People v. Washington, 2012 IL 107993, ¶ 6, Public Act 91-404, effective January 
1, 2000, altered the prior statutory scheme by creating distinct offenses based on whether the offenses 
were committed with a dangerous weapon “other than a firearm” or committed “with a firearm.” For 
offenses committed with a “firearm,” sentencing enhancements were created, commonly referred to as 
the 15-20-25-to-life sentencing provisions, which the court was required to impose based on whether a 
firearm was in the offender’s possession, discharged, or used to cause bodily harm. 
 
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subjected to a lower range of penalties because of the trial court’s actions.4 In that sense, 
defendant benefitted from the error. However, defendant was not charged with armed robbery 
and aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, and the 
evidence did not support findings of guilt on those offenses. To allow those convictions and 
sentences to stand would seem to suggest that we condone a kind of mix-and-match, ad hoc 
justice, where the specific convictions of record do not matter. In that respect, in considering 
whether the discretionary exercise of remedial plain error is appropriate in this case, we have to 
account for and preserve “the integrity of the judicial process.” 
¶ 45 
 
We, like the appellate court, “recognize that the trial court intended to afford defendant 
‘some deference and benefit of the doubt and justice’ by acquitting him of the charged 
offenses” (2014 IL App (1st) 123494, ¶ 42 (quoting the trial court)); however, the result of the 
trial court’s action is that defendant stands convicted of offenses he was not charged with and 
he did not commit. There is no question that he committed armed robbery and vehicular 
hijacking, but he did not possess “a dangerous weapon other than a firearm” when he 
committed those offenses. In applying second-prong plain error here, the appellate court, 
respectively, cited and tacitly referenced our decision in Samantha V. for two propositions: (1) 
this court has held that second-prong plain error applies to errors other than the types of 
structural error that have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court (id. ¶ 40) and 
(2) we have recognized that permitting unauthorized convictions to stand challenges the 
integrity of the judicial process (id. ¶ 42). The decision in Samantha V., of course, did not 
announce any new rule of law. As this court noted therein, it was already “well established that 
a one-act, one-crime violation affects the integrity of the judicial process, thus satisfying the 
second prong of the plain-error test.” Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 378-79 (citing People v. 
Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 389 (2004), and People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 167-68 (2009)). 
¶ 46 
 
As the appellate court observed in this case, although our decisions in Glasper and 
Thompson equated second-prong plain error with structural error, we did not restrict plain error 
to the types of structural error that have been recognized by the Supreme Court. 2014 IL App 
(1st) 123494, ¶ 40. We certainly did not overrule Samantha V., Artis, and Harvey. The concern 
that drove those decisions was articulated in Artis, where no sentence was even imposed on the 
improper conviction: 
“ ‘[T]he effects of the improper conviction are not confined to this trial and sentence. 
Defendant may be subject to future prejudice as a result of the improper conviction[ ]. 
In the unfortunate event of a future encounter with the criminal justice system, the 
improper conviction could likely affect decisions with respect to the setting of bond 
and sentencing, as well as parole opportunities. This is so regardless of whether an 
                                                 
 
4The rationale for the trial court’s findings on the uncharged offenses appears to be unrelated to the 
pertinent statutory criteria. We recognize that mistakes of law are inevitable. Beyond that, we would 
note that the General Assembly is free to enact any legislation that the constitution does not expressly 
prohibit. Maddux v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill. 2d 508, 522 (2009). This court has upheld the constitutionality 
of firearm enhancements enacted by the legislature. See People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (2005). “The 
question as to whether or not a better law might have been enacted is for the legislature and not for the 
courts, and criticisms against the wisdom, policy or practicability of a law are subjects for legislative 
consideration and not for the courts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Howard, 228 Ill. 2d 
428, 438 (2008). 
 
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improper sentence has also been imposed.’ ” Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at 166-67 (quoting 
People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 160 (1993)). 
¶ 47 
 
Here, though defendant has been acquitted of the charged firearm offenses, which the 
evidence indicates he committed, he stands convicted of and sentenced for uncharged offenses 
he did not commit. The quandary we face is whether we should penalize him for the acquittal 
by allowing the improper convictions and sentences to stand or rectify the improper 
convictions and sentences via remedial application of plain error. We agree with the appellate 
court—the latter. Two principles underpin that determination, both of which appear to have 
figured into the appellate court’s decision as well: (1) convicting a defendant of an uncharged 
offense that is not a lesser-included offense of a charged offense violates a defendant’s 
“ ‘fundamental due process right to notice of the charges brought against him’ ” (2014 IL App 
(1st) 123494, ¶ 41 (quoting Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 359-60)), and (2) an unauthorized conviction 
challenges the integrity of the judicial process and should not stand (id. ¶ 42). A defendant 
should have fair notice of the charges he will be called upon to defend, and any conviction 
ultimately entered should be based upon the evidence, not judicial fiat. 
¶ 48 
 
As we observed in Kennebrew, it is within a court of review’s authority to utilize Rule 
615(b)(3) to reduce the degree of a defendant’s conviction, even when a lesser offense is not 
charged, so long as the offense is a lesser-included offense of the crime expressly charged. 
Kennebrew, 2013 IL 113998, ¶¶ 25, 47; Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(3). The elements of the lesser 
offenses of vehicular hijacking and robbery are set forth in the greater offenses charged in 
counts I and II of the indictment, and the evidence at trial supported convictions for those 
offenses. See 720 ILCS 5/18-3, 18-1(a) (West 2010). Therefore, under the circumstances, the 
appellate court properly reduced the degree of defendant’s convictions to vehicular hijacking 
and robbery and remanded for resentencing. 
¶ 49 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
 
¶ 50 
 
Affirmed.