Title: State v. Greene

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Greene (2001-181); 172 Vt. 610; 782 A.2d 1163

[Filed 28-Aug-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-181

                               JUNE TERM, 2001

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
Frank Reginald Greene	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NOS. 981-6-98 & 
                                       }                    273-2-99Wmcr

                                                Trial Judge: David T. Suntag

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals from a mittimus issued by the district court
  committing him to the custody  of the Department of Corrections for a
  period of twelve to forty-eight months.  The order indicates  that he is to
  serve his sentence on pre-approved furlough in an intensive substance abuse
  program,  but until an appropriate space is available for him in such a
  program, he should serve his sentence  within a correctional facility. 
  Defendant argues that this constitutes an impermissible increase in the 
  severity of the sentence ordered by the court in its original order,
  entered on a plea agreement  defendant reached with the State. 
  Alternately, defendant argues that the provision is a more severe  sentence
  than that contemplated in his plea agreement, and he should be given leave
  to withdraw his  plea.  We disagree and, therefore, affirm.

       Defendant was charged with two separate counts of prescription fraud
  in violation of  18 V.S.A. § 4223(a)(1) and (d) respectively.  Defendant
  entered into a plea agreement with the State  in which he pled guilty to
  the charges, and the State recommended a sentence of six to twenty-four 
  months on each charge, served consecutively.  The agreement indicates that
  the sentence is to be  served via pre-approved furlough (PAF) in an
  intensive substance abuse program (ISAP).  The  agreement also gives
  defendant leave to withdraw his plea should his medical condition prevent
  him  from participating in the ISAP.  The court accepted the plea and
  entered an order dated September  21, 1999 incorporating the terms of the
  agreement, providing that defendant's sentence was to be  served "on
  pre-approved furlough under the Intensive Substance Abuse Program," to
  commence  January 3, 2000.  Attached to the mittimus was a list of general
  conditions titled "Agreement for Pre-Approved Furlough" signed by the
  defendant.  The above-quoted language providing that defendant  was to
  serve his sentence on PAF followed, however, a statement found at the top
  of the order that  the defendant was "sentenced to serve a supervised
  community sentence, as recommended by the  Department of Corrections." 

       Following the entry of the court's order committing defendant to the
  Department of  Corrections, defendant sought two stays delaying the
  commencement of his sentence, both of which 

 

  were granted.  Following the expiration of the stays in June 2000,
  defendant failed to report to the  Department of Corrections.  During a
  phone contact by an officer, defendant indicated that he did not  know he
  was supposed to report to the department.  Because defendant had still not
  reported to the  department as of September 2000, the officer sent
  defendant a registered letter directing him to report  to the department no
  later than October 11, 2000.  When defendant failed to report, the
  Department  of Corrections requested that either a hearing or status
  conference be scheduled to determine  defendant's status. 

       Following a status conference in February 2001, the court issued an
  entry order providing that  defendant's sentence was to commence on March
  13, 2001 unless defendant either could demonstrate  medical impossibility
  (presumably regarding his participation in ISAP) or withdrew his plea.  
  Defendant then sought another continuance to gather further medical
  evidence regarding his heart  condition.  The court granted the
  continuance, but indicated that no further continuances would be  granted. 
  The court held a status conference on April 3, 2001, after which the court 
  issued a  mittimus committing defendant to the custody of the Department of
  Corrections and providing that  defendant was to serve his sentence on PAF
  ISAP.  The order also stated that "the court understands,  as do all
  parties, that the defendant shall need to commence service of sentence
  within a correctional  facility until such time as an appropriate residence
  is available for PAF ISAP purposes."  Defendant  appeals from this order.

       Defendant's primary argument on appeal is that the last mittimus
  issued by the court is at odds  with its first.  Defendant relies on the
  fact that the first mittimus indicated that he was sentenced to  supervised
  community service (SCS) to argue that the court was acting ultra vires by
  changing his  sentence to PAF in its most recent mittimus.  This argument
  is disingenuous.

       Defendant's plea agreement with the state clearly provided for a
  sentence to be served PAF  ISAP.  The list of conditions signed by
  defendant and attached to the court's sentencing order is titled 
  "Agreement for Pre-Approved Furlough."  The non-boilerplate portion of the
  court's order provides  that defendant's two consecutive sentences of six
  to twenty-four months are to be served "on pre-approved furlough under the
  Intensive Substance Abuse Program."  There is no assessment of  defendant
  in the record evaluating whether he should be considered for SCS, as
  required by statute.   28 V.S.A. § 352(a), (b).  The fact that the
  substance of the court's order followed boilerplate  language that was
  inconsistent, as well as at odds with defendant's plea agreement, can be 
  attributable only to a clerical error.  As one federal court noted in the
  context of an appeal from a trial  court's correction of a sentencing
  order, "a clerical error must not be one of judgment or even of 
  misidentification, but merely of recitation, or the sort that a clerk or
  amanuensis might commit,  mechanical in nature."  United States v.
  Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal  quotation marks and
  citation omitted).  Such errors are susceptible to correction at any time.  
  V.R.Cr.P. 36.  Remand for the purpose of correction would serve no purpose,
  however, as defendant  is not appealing from the court's original order. 
  Rather, he simply argues that the sentencing order  from which he does
  appeal impermissibly changes his original sentence.  But it is clear from
  the  record that the court intended that defendant serve his sentence PAF
  pursuant to his plea agreement, 

 

  not as SCS. (FN1) Consequently, the court's most recent mittimus does not
  represent a departure  from its original sentence.

       At oral argument, defendant contended additionally that, regardless of
  whether his sentence is  described as pre-approved furlough or supervised
  community service, his plea agreement and the  original mittimus issued
  pursuant to the agreement never contemplated that he would be incarcerated 
  in a correctional facility.  This argument ignores one of the defining
  characteristics of furlough.  As  we stated in Conway v. Cumming,
  "[s]upervision of [a defendant] by the Commissioner both under  law and in
  practice [is] not diminished by . . . furlough status."  161 Vt. 113, 116,