Title: Holly Lynn Weiss v. City of Milwaukee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
94-0171 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Holly Lynn Weiss, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
City of Milwaukee and Yvette Marchan, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  197 Wis. 2d 953, 543 N.W.2d 866 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 4, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Skwierawski 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
GESKE, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief by Robert J. Baratki and Law Offices of Robert J. 
Baratki, Racine and oral argument by Robert J. Baratki. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was 
argued by Susan E. Lappen, assistant city attorney, with whom on 
the brief was Grant F. Langley, city attorney. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-0171 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Holly Lynn Weiss, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, and Yvette Marchan, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 4, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Holly Lynn Weiss seeks review 
of an unpublished court of appeals decision which affirmed a 
summary 
judgment 
dismissal 
of 
her 
complaint 
against 
the 
defendants, the City of Milwaukee and its employee, Yvette 
Marchan (together, "the City").
1  Weiss argues that the court of 
appeals erred in determining that the Worker's Compensation Act 
(WCA) provides the exclusive remedy for her claim of emotional 
distress resulting from the City's disclosure of her home 
address and telephone number to her abusive former spouse. 
Because we conclude that Weiss has alleged injuries covered by 
                     
1 See Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, No. 94-0171, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1995), affirming the grant of 
summary judgment by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 
Michael J. Skwierawski, Judge. 
No. 94-0171 
 
2 
the Worker's Compensation Act, and that the exclusive remedy 
provision of the WCA precludes her common law action against the 
defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On July 31, 
1990, Weiss obtained a temporary restraining order against her 
abusive husband, Osama Abughanim.  Shortly thereafter, she 
commenced a divorce action.  Abughanim, forced to vacate the 
marital residence, began a campaign of harassing telephone calls 
and personal visits during which he would threaten the lives of 
Weiss and their two children.  In October 1990, Weiss vacated 
the residence and moved in with her parents in order to escape 
her husband's harassment.  Abughanim persisted in making 
threatening telephone calls, both to Weiss's parents' residence 
and to her place of employment.  The calls to Weiss's employer 
were of such frequency that they resulted in her termination in 
December 1990. 
¶3 
In February 1991, Weiss obtained employment with the 
City of Milwaukee as an engineering technician.  As an employee, 
she was required to establish residence in Milwaukee within one 
month of hiring.  She therefore moved from her parents' 
residence in Waukesha County to an apartment located in 
Milwaukee.  At that time, Abughanim did not know Weiss's 
Milwaukee address or telephone number.   
¶4 
Weiss was instructed by her supervisor to provide her 
address and telephone number to the City's payroll department.  
She contacted the payroll department, explained that she had an 
abusive former husband, and expressed her desire that her 
No. 94-0171 
 
3 
residential information remain confidential.  A City payroll 
clerk assured Weiss that the City had a policy prohibiting the 
disclosure of such employee information to private individuals. 
 Relying on the clerk's assurance, Weiss provided her address 
and telephone number to the payroll department. 
¶5 
On July 10, 1991, Abughanim contacted the City's 
Department of Employee Relations and spoke with Sheila Bowles, 
an employee of the department.  Abughanim falsely represented to 
Bowles that he was calling on behalf of a bank and needed to 
confirm 
Weiss's 
address 
and 
telephone 
number 
for 
credit 
purposes.  Bowles relayed the bogus inquiry to her supervisor, 
Yvette Marchan, who, without attempting to verify Abughanim's 
claimed credentials, authorized Bowles to disclose Weiss's 
residential information.   
¶6 
By this ruse, Abughanim obtained Weiss's home address 
and 
telephone 
number. 
 
Thereafter, 
Abughanim 
regularly 
telephoned Weiss at work to inform her that he now knew her home 
address and telephone number, and that he would kill her and 
their two  children.  Her awareness that Abughanim knew her 
address, and her then existing financial inability to change her 
residence, caused Weiss severe emotional distress arising from 
fear for her safety and that of their two children.   
¶7 
Weiss commenced a common law action in the circuit 
court against the City to recover damages for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress arising from the City's 
unwitting disclosure to Abughanim.  The City filed a motion for 
No. 94-0171 
 
4 
summary judgment, asserting that the WCA
2 covered Weiss's 
injuries, and the statute's exclusive remedy provision therefore 
barred Weiss's suit.  The City also maintained that it had no 
duty to keep confidential Weiss's home address and telephone 
number, because such information was available to the public 
pursuant to Wisconsin's open records law.
3 
¶8 
The circuit court granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment, dismissing Weiss's complaint.  The court 
reasoned 
that 
the 
City 
had 
no 
duty 
to 
maintain 
the 
confidentiality of Weiss's home address and telephone number, 
since the open records law would have required disclosure had 
Abughanim filed a request for the information.  In addition, the 
court determined that the damages sought by Weiss were so 
difficult to ascertain that they were precluded on public policy 
grounds.  The circuit court expressly declined to base its order 
on provisions of the WCA.  Weiss appealed.   
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed, on different grounds, 
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.  Concluding that 
Weiss stated a claim under the WCA, the court of appeals 
determined that her common law negligence action against the 
City was barred by the statute's exclusive remedy provision, 
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  The court did not squarely address the 
open records law issue, but did "detect grave faults in the 
trial court's application" of the statute.  Weiss v. City of 
                     
2 Wis. Stat. §§ 102.01-.89 (1991-92).  Unless otherwise 
indicated, all future statutory references are to the 1991-92 
volume. 
3 Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-.39. 
No. 94-0171 
 
5 
Milwaukee, No. 94-0171, unpublished slip op. at 9 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Oct. 24, 1995).  Weiss petitioned this court for review.  
¶10 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment using 
the same methodology as the circuit court.  State ex rel. 
Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 547 
N.W.2d 587 (1996).  If there are no material facts in dispute, 
as here, we must determine whether the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  The question in this case is 
whether Weiss's common law negligence claim must be dismissed, 
as a matter of law, because it is precluded by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the WCA.  Our task is to interpret the 
provisions of Chapter 102 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
4  A question 
of law is therefore presented, which we review de novo, without 
deference to the decisions of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Jenson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 253, 
262, 468 N.W.2d 1 (1991). 
¶11 We have repeatedly stated that the provisions of 
Chapter 102 must be liberally construed to effectuate the WCA's 
goal of compensating injured workers.  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 
Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); Nigbor v. DILHR, 120 
Wis. 2d 375, 382, 355 N.W.2d 532 (1984); Cruz v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 
2d 442, 450, 260 N.W.2d 692 (1978).  However, courts must also 
exercise care to avoid upsetting the balance of interests 
achieved by the WCA.  County of La Crosse v. WERC, 182 Wis. 2d 
15, 30, 513 N.W.2d  579 (1994).   
                     
4 For purposes of summary judgment, the parties have 
conceded that there are no genuine issues of material fact.  
No. 94-0171 
 
6 
¶12 Generally, an employer's obligation to pay worker's 
compensation accrues under Chapter 102 when all of the following 
conditions are present: 1) the employee sustains an injury; 2) 
at the time of the injury, both the employer and the employee 
are subject to the provisions of the WCA; 3) at the time of the 
injury, the employee is performing service growing out of and 
incidental to his or her employment; 4) the injury is not 
intentionally self-inflicted; and 5) the accident or disease 
causing injury arises out of the employment.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.03(1)(a)-(e).  For purposes of our review of summary 
judgment in this case, our inquiry is limited to determining 
whether, at the time of her injury, Weiss was performing service 
growing out of and incidental to her employment, and whether the 
accident causing injury arose out of her employment.
5 
¶13 It 
is 
well 
settled 
that 
when 
the 
§ 102.03(1) 
conditions of liability for worker's compensation are satisfied, 
the 
                     
5 Weiss argues upon review that the open records law did not 
require or authorize the City to release her residential 
information, and that the damages she seeks for emotional 
distress are not so difficult to ascertain as to be precluded on 
public policy grounds.  Because our resolution of the WCA issue 
is dispositive in this case, we do not consider Weiss's 
additional arguments. 
No. 94-0171 
 
7 
exclusive remedy provision, § 102.03(2),
6 precludes an injured 
employee from maintaining a negligence action against his or her 
employer and fellow employees.  See, e.g., County of La Crosse, 
182 Wis. 2d at 32 (exclusive remedy provision "was designed to 
supplant actions in tort by injured employes against their 
employers"); Jenson, 161 Wis. 2d at 263 (plaintiff's "common law 
action is barred by the exclusivity provisions if she in all 
other respects is entitled to recovery under the Act").
7  Thus, 
Weiss's common law action against the City is barred if her 
alleged injuries are covered by Chapter 102. 
¶14 The City asserts that Weiss meets each of the five 
criteria set out in §§ 102.03(1)(a)-(e), and that the remedy for 
her injuries is therefore solely that which is provided under 
                     
6 Section 102.03(2) provides: 
(2) Where such conditions exist the right to the 
recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other 
employe 
of 
the 
same 
employer 
and 
the 
worker's 
compensation insurance carrier. . . . 
 
7 See also Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 
2d 615, 621, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979); Crawford v. Dickman, 72 Wis. 
2d 151, 152, 240 N.W.2d 165 (1976); Rosencrans v. Wisconsin 
Telephone Co., 54 Wis. 2d 124, 127, 194 N.W.2d 643 (1972); Grede 
Foundries, Inc. v. Price Erecting Co., 38 Wis. 2d 502, 505, 157 
N.W.2d 559 (1968);  A.O. Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag 
Co., 16 Wis. 2d 145, 149, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962); Guse v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 408, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952); Borgnis v. 
Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 337, 133 N.W. 209 (1911). 
No. 94-0171 
 
8 
the WCA.
8  In attempting to establish that her injury is not 
covered by Chapter 102, Weiss contends that at the time she was 
injured, she was not performing service growing out of and 
incidental to her employment.  She also argues that the court of 
appeals erred when it determined that "the incident causing the 
injury arose out of Weiss's employment."  Weiss, slip op. at 6-
7. 
¶15 We deal first with Weiss's claim that her injury is 
not encompassed within the WCA because at the time of the 
injury, she was not "performing service growing out of and 
incidental 
to . . . her 
employment," 
as 
required 
by 
§ 102.03(1)(c).  In essence, Weiss's argument is that an 
employee cannot satisfy § 102.03(1)(c) when receiving a personal 
telephone call at work.  We disagree. 
¶16 The statutory clause "performing service growing out 
of 
and 
incidental 
to 
his 
or 
her 
employment" 
is 
used 
interchangeably with the phrase "course of employment."  John D. 
Neal and Joseph Danas, Jr., Worker's Compensation Handbook, 
§ 3.8 (1996); Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, 1 The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 6.10 (1996) (hereinafter The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation).  Both phrases refer to the "time, 
                     
8 The legal positions of the employer and employee in this 
instance are the reverse of those found in many worker's 
compensation cases.  Often it is the employer who resists 
coverage under the WCA, and the employee who desires such 
coverage.  As Weiss candidly admits, she has filed a common law 
action because she feels that a recovery under the WCA would be 
inadequate compared to a jury award on her tort claim.  
Conversely, the City invokes the WCA in this instance in order 
to limit Weiss's potential recovery for its allegedly wrongful 
disclosure of her residential information.      
No. 94-0171 
 
9 
place, and circumstances" under which the injury occurred.  
Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 549, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980).
9 
 
An injury is said to arise in the course of the 
employment when it takes place within the period of 
the 
employment, 
at 
a 
place 
where 
the 
employee 
reasonably may be, and while he [or she] is fulfilling 
his [or her] duties or engaged in doing something 
incidental thereto. 
1 The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 14.00. 
¶17 There is no dispute that Weiss's alleged injury 
occurred within the time and place of her employment.  The 
question is whether receiving a personal phone call at work 
constitutes a "circumstance" of employment.  We conclude that it 
does.  Under the liberal construction given to Chapter 102, an 
employee acts within the course of employment when he or she is 
otherwise within the time and space limits of employment, and 
briefly turns away from his or her work to tend to matters 
"necessary or convenient to his [or her] own personal health or 
comfort."  American Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 1 Wis. 2d 
261, 265, 83 N.W.2d 714 (1957) (citations omitted).  The 
personal comfort doctrine does not apply, and an employee is not 
within the course of employment, if the "extent of the departure 
is so great that an intent to abandon the job temporarily may be 
                     
9 The Goranson court stated that "course of employment" 
refers to the "time, place, and circumstances of the accident." 
 Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 549, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980) 
(emphasis added).  This statement is correct only to the extent 
that the accident and the injury occur contemporaneously.  In 
the present case, the accident occurred when the City disclosed 
Weiss's residential information to Abughanim, and the injury 
occurred later when Abughanim called to inform her that he had 
acquired the information.  Because § 102.03(1)(c) involves the 
timing of the injury, the phrase "course of employment" is 
properly 
understood 
to 
refer 
to 
the 
time, 
place, 
and 
circumstances of the injury.    
No. 94-0171 
 
10
inferred, or . . . the method chosen is so unusual and 
unreasonable that the conduct cannot be considered an incident 
of the employment."  Id.  Applying the doctrine to the facts of 
this case, we conclude that regardless of the contents of a 
brief personal telephone call, the act of taking such a call at 
work constitutes a momentary departure from work duties to 
attend to a matter of personal comfort.  Thus, when Weiss 
answered the personal telephone call from Abughanim, she was 
engaged in an activity incidental to employment, and was 
therefore within the course of employment.      
¶18 Weiss next contends that the accident causing her 
injury did not arise out of her employment.  § 102.03(1)(e).  
Citing Goranson and cases from other jurisdictions, Weiss 
asserts that where, as here, an employee is injured at work by a 
non-employee 
for 
purely 
personal 
reasons, 
the 
injury 
is 
noncompensable under the WCA.  
¶19 We agree with Weiss that Goranson stands for the 
proposition that injuries sustained in an assault occurring in 
the course of employment are generally noncompensable under the 
WCA when the assailant is motivated purely by personal animus, 
and the employment in no way contributes to the incident.  We 
also agree that Weiss's employment did not create the initial 
threat posed to her by Abughanim.  We nevertheless conclude that 
the accident did arise out of Weiss's employment with the City, 
because the conditions of Weiss's employment facilitated her 
eventual injury.  
¶20 The "arising out of" language of § 102.03(1)(e) refers 
to the causal origin of an employee's injury.  Goranson, 94 Wis. 
No. 94-0171 
 
11
2d at 549.  However, "arising out of his or her employment" is 
not synonymous with the phrase "caused by the employment."  Id. 
at 555.  In interpreting § 102.03(1)(e), we have adopted the 
"positional risk" doctrine: 
 
[A]ccidents arise out of employment if the conditions 
or obligations of the employment create a zone of 
special danger out of which the accident causing the 
injury arose.  Stated another way, an accident arises 
out of employment when by reason of employment the 
employee is present at a place where he is injured 
through the agency of a third person, an outside 
force, or the conditions of special danger. 
Id. at 555.  However, when the origin of the assault is purely 
private and personal, and the employment in no way contributes 
to the incident, the positional risk doctrine does not apply.  
Id. at 556-57; 1 The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 11.21(c). 
¶21 For example, in Goranson, a charter bus driver was 
injured after he drove a group of people to Green Bay.  Upon 
arriving in Green Bay, the driver checked into a hotel along 
with his passengers.  Later in the evening, he leaped from his 
third floor hotel room onto the roof of another section of the 
hotel two floors below, sustaining a broken hip and other 
injuries.  There was evidence that the driver had been drinking 
throughout the evening with a woman, and that he had quarreled 
in his hotel room with the woman just prior to jumping from the 
hotel window. 
¶22 This court upheld a denial of worker's compensation 
benefits.  While there was no dispute that the driver was in the 
course of employment at the time of injury, the court determined 
that the accident did not arise out of the driver's employment, 
No. 94-0171 
 
12
because 
the 
injuring 
force 
was 
purely 
personal 
to 
him.  
Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 557.   
¶23 The facts of this case are distinguishable from those 
in Goranson.  In Goranson, the bus driver's employment did not 
contribute to or facilitate the accident causing the injury he 
suffered jumping from the hotel window.  In this case, however, 
Weiss was required to provide her residential address and 
telephone number to the City as a condition of employment.  If 
Weiss had never been required to provide the information to the 
City, the accident would not have occurred.  The City's 
unwitting 
disclosure 
of 
that 
information 
to 
a 
private 
individual, Weiss's abusive former husband, was an accident that 
led to her injury.  Because a condition of her employment 
facilitated the accident which caused her injury, we conclude 
that the accident arose out of her employment.  See 1 The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 11.21(c) (privately motivated assaults 
generally do not arise out of employment, except where the 
employment facilitates the assault). 
¶24 Weiss cites several cases from foreign jurisdictions 
for the proposition that when purely private animosity manifests 
itself in a workplace attack, the employment connection to the 
injury is so minimal that worker's compensation should be 
denied.  Monahan v. United States Check Book Co., 540 N.W.2d 380 
(Neb. App. 1995); Ross v. Mark's, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. 
App. 1995).  In both Monahan and Ross, a non-employee attacked 
and killed an ex-spouse at the ex-spouse's place of employment. 
 Worker's compensation was denied in both cases, on the ground 
that assaults do not arise out of employment when they involve 
No. 94-0171 
 
13
private quarrels imported into the workplace.  In neither case 
did the court find evidence that the employment contributed to 
or facilitated the attacks. 
¶25 We 
find 
unpersuasive 
the 
examples 
of 
worker's 
compensation denials cited by Weiss.  Consistent with Goranson, 
we are of the view that in certain situations, "an injury from 
an admittedly private source should be compensable because it 
[is] 
facilitated 
or 
contributed 
to 
by 
the 
employment 
environment." 1 The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 11.23. For 
example, in Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., 200 S.E.2d 64 
(S.C. 1973), the claimant had previously quarreled with Crosby, 
a non-employee.  On the date of the assault, Crosby threatened 
the claimant while the latter was engaged in repairing his 
employer's roof.  Before returning to the roof, the claimant 
reported the threats to his employer, who responded that the 
claimant would be protected and should proceed with his work.  
Crosby later returned and shot the claimant, inflicting grievous 
injuries.  The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the 
claimant's injuries arose out of his employment, because: 
 
the employee was required to perform his duties under 
circumstances where he was endangered by a peril from 
a source outside of and unrelated to his actual work, 
which peril was known to the employer and against 
which the employer afforded no protection or relief.  
Id. at 67. 
¶26 Similarly, in Raybol v. Louisiana State University, 
520 So. 2d 724 (La. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in 
Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 653 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1995), 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana awarded worker's compensation to 
a dormitory worker who was assaulted at work by her estranged 
No. 94-0171 
 
14
former boyfriend.  The court concluded that the worker's 
injuries arose out of her employment, based in part on its 
determination that "the employer's custodial workers contributed 
to the danger of the assault by informing the assailant of the 
plaintiff's work location in the building and by assisting him 
in gaining access to her by unlocking a door to the dormitory." 
 Id. at 727. 
¶27 In California Compensation & Fire Co. v. Worker's 
Compensation Appeals Bd., 436 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1968), a worker at a 
table pad manufacturer was shot and killed by her ex-husband.  
The worker's employment required her to visit the homes of 
customers in order to measure the dimensions of tables.    Upon 
learning that the worker intended to remarry, her ex-husband 
rented an apartment, ordered a table pad, and requested that 
someone be sent to measure the table.  When his ex-wife arrived 
at the apartment, he murdered her and then committed suicide.  
The supreme court of California affirmed an award of death 
benefits in part on the grounds that the husband's elaborate 
plot 
was 
facilitated 
by 
the 
conditions 
of 
the 
worker's 
employment.  Id. at 69.   
¶28 Finally, in Epperson v. Industrial Commission, 549 
P.2d 247 (Ariz. App. 1976), the claimant informed a security 
guard at her place of employment that she was having personal 
difficulties with her husband and did not wish to speak to him. 
 Her husband later appeared at the building, observed the 
claimant, and proceeded unimpeded past the security guard's desk 
to confront the plaintiff.  During the course of his ensuing 
conversation with the claimant, the husband shot her.  The 
No. 94-0171 
 
15
Arizona court of appeals concluded that the assault did not 
arise out of the course of her employment.  However, it 
intimated that a different result would have been reached had 
the claimant informed the security guard of her fears and the 
dangers posed by her husband in a manner sufficient to justify 
reliance on the guard's protection.  Id. at 250. 
¶29 None of the cited cases is on all fours with the one 
presently before us.  However, each stands for the proposition 
that when an attack occurs during the course of employment and 
arises 
from 
personal 
animus 
imported 
from 
a 
private 
relationship, 
the 
incident 
arises 
out 
of 
the 
claimant's 
employment if employment conditions have contributed to or 
facilitated the attack.  Weiss was required to provide her 
residential 
information 
to 
the 
City 
as 
a 
condition 
of 
employment.  That condition of employment facilitated the City's 
subsequent accidental release of the information to a private 
individual, Weiss's abusive former spouse.  The disclosure of 
the residential information in turn enabled Abughanim to 
threaten Weiss.  We therefore conclude that the accident causing 
Weiss's injury arose out of her employment with the City. 
¶30 In summary, Weiss has alleged an emotional injury 
which occurred in the course of employment and was caused by an 
accident arising out of that employment.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Weiss's complaint states a claim covered under 
§ 102.03(1) of the WCA.  Because the exclusive remedy provision 
of the WCA, § 102.03(2), bars Weiss's common law tort action 
against the City, the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment dismissing the complaint, and the court of appeals 
No. 94-0171 
 
16
correctly 
upheld 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision.           
       
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J. did not participate.