Title: Louisville & Nashville RR Co. v. Harris Transfer Co.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

300 So. 2d 378 (1974)
LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corp.
v.
HARRIS TRANSFER COMPANY, a corp.
SC 312.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 12, 1974.
Lawrence B. Clark, Birmingham, for appellant.
William C. Wood, Jr., Birmingham, for appellee.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
The facts and issues raised on this appeal are well stated in the dissenting opinion to which we refer the reader for an understanding thereof.
At the outset it should be noted that those who concur in the majority opinion agree with the dissenting opinion to the extent that we hold that all the assignments of error are related and that arguing them together does not preclude consideration of one assignment, even though others may be without merit.
As to the merits, on this appeal, we affirm the trial court which held the railroad *379 (L&N) is not entitled to indemnity from the industry (Harris Transfer) for the alleged injuries to the railroad's employee (under FELA) suffered as a result of being pinned between an oversized boxcar and the industry's building where the clearance between the building and centerline of the spur track was less than eight feet, the required clearance in the side-track agreement.
By the terms of paragraph 12 of the side-track agreement, the industry agreed it would not construct, place or permit structures within eight feet of the centerline of the track. At the place where the employee alleges to have been injured, the clearance is less than eight feet.
By the terms of paragraph 14 of the side-track agreement, the railroad assumed all liability for injuries to its employees unless the injury resulted directly or indirectly from the industry's breach of the provision in paragraph 12 concerning clearances.
Thus, the determinative issue is whether or not the industry breached its agreement not to construct, place, or permit any structure within eight feet of the centerline of the spur track.
The trial court found, inter alia, that the railroad itself built the side track with less than the required clearance between the centerline of the track and the warehouse which was constructed before the track was laid.
This Court has long been committed to the rule that when a chancellor hears evidence ore tenus (as the chancellor did here) his findings of fact have the weight of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust and there is no credible evidence to support his findings. Morris v. Morris, 290 Ala. 41, 273 So. 2d 203 (1973). We cannot say the chancellor's findings were plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. To the contrary, these findings, in our judgment, are supported by credible evidence.
We consider that the following evidence supports the chancellor's findings:
(1) The letter of February 8, 1929, from the industry's attorney to the industry which contains a legal opinion concerning the "proposed contract" . . . which speaks of "force you to execute the agreement". . . "compel the Railroad. . . to build and operate the spur track" . . . "terms of the contract must be agreed upon between you". . . "it can agree to construct it". . . all of which looks to the future execution of the contract. We think that the letter permits the inference that the contract had not been signed by February 8;
(2) The letter of February 13, 1929, from the railroad's assistant superintendent to the industry implies, according to our view, not that "the work of surveying, setting out stakes," etc. had already been done and that the contract had been executed, but rather that the railroad assistant superintendent had not yet commenced to do anything towards constructing the track, the physical fact at issue. The letter specifically states "advise when you desire this work started.";
(3) The ledger sheets clearly admit of the interpretation that the track was constructed subsequent to the building;
(4) The Internal Revenue Service Audit clearly implies that the track was constructed subsequent to the building since the federal government allowed only six months depreciation for the spur track but allowed seven and one-half months for the warehouse building;
(5) The direct testimony by witness Edwards who worked for the industry at that time and who testified in part, as follows:
When one considers this direct testimony (which is uncontroverted), along with the other indirect testimony, it seems to us, one has to conclude there was credible evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact.
It is thus that we must conclude to affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD, MADDOX and JONES, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, McCALL and FAULKNER, JJ., dissent.
COLEMAN, Justice (dissenting):
A party to a suit for declaratory relief appeals from an adverse decree declaring that appellant is not entitled to indemnity from appellee under a contract, and declaring further that appellant owes a duty to indemnify appellee.
Appellant is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation, and will be referred to as L & N.
Appellee is Harris Transfer Company, a corporation, and will be referred to as Harris.
On May 19, 1972, Harris filed its bill of complaint against L & N, and also Eddie Walton who has been served with citation of appeal but has filed no brief. Walton is indifferent to the issue of indemnity which is between Harris and L & N.
Harris avers that on, to wit, January 30, 1929, Harris executed with L & N a certain contract which is sometimes called a *381 side track agreement; that the agreement provided for the construction, operation, and use of a spur or side track on the premises of Harris' place of business in Birmingham. A copy of the agreement is made an exhibit to the bill.
Harris further avers that on October 1, 1971, Walton, an employee of L & N, filed suit against L & N for damages for personal injury resulting from an occurrence on September 17, 1971, in which Walton was struck by a boxcar on the premises of Harris; and that L & N has demanded that Harris defend, indemnify, and hold harmless L & N in said lawsuit by Walton, said demand being based on the provisions of the side track agreement.
Harris avers that L & N claims that the injuries of Walton were caused by a violation of Paragraph (12) of said agreement and that, under said agreement, Harris has a duty to indemnify L & N; but Harris denies that the allegations of Walton's complaint create any liability against Harris or set out facts showing a breach of Harris' duties under said Paragraph (12).
Harris avers that, under Paragraph (14) of the agreement, it appears that L & N is the only party liable to Walton.
Harris prays that the court declare that Harris owes no duty to indemnify L & N.
Subsequently, Harris amended its complaint by adding averments that on September 13, 1972, Walton filed suit against Harris for damages for Walton's injuries sustained as aforesaid. Harris amended its prayer by asking that the court also declare that L & N owes a duty to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the complainant, Harris, in said suits by Walton.
L & N answered the bill and denied that Paragraph (14) of the agreement is controlling and says that Harris has the duty to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless L & N against the claim made by Walton.
The side track agreement designates L & N as first party and Harris as second party. Paragraphs (12) and (14) recite as follows:
After a hearing ore tenus, the court rendered a decree holding that Harris owes no duty to indemnify L & N for the claim of Walton against L & N, and that L & N owes a duty to indemnify Harris from any loss arising from the claim of Walton.
The court noted "that L & N's obligation in this regard is contingent in that its obligation is only to pay any judgment which may be entered in said lawsuit against Harris. L & N has no duty to defend the lawsuit against Harris, but Harris has no obligation to offer a defense in its own behalf."
By his deposition, Walton testified that he was employed by L & N as a switchman; that the accident occurred at 6:00 a. m.; that it was dark and raining; he carried a lantern; that he operated the switch to let the train in the "cross-over and line it back when he gets through"; that the train was going in to leave one car and pick up two; that all three cars were connected at the time of injury; they had two 40-foot boxes and a 50-foot box; the 50-foot box was in the middle; the 50-foot car is wider than the 40-foot car, he guesses "about a foot, a foot and a half, something like that"; that is "a foot on each side of the car"; there was about a foot and a half of water standing there; he had trouble walking in the water; he had made the coupling; the train was moving very slowly, 3 or 4 miles an hour, to stretch the coupling; Walton was walking along with it shining his light on the rail; he was walking watching the wheels, and the wide boxcar "hit me and turned me around" and "rolled me up in between the building and the wall," "The building and the car."
L & N's argument is divided into two parts. The first part is in support of Assignment 12 wherein L & N asserts that the court erred in declaring that L & N owes a duty to indemnify Harris and that Harris owes no duty to indemnify L & N. By reference, L & N directs the same argument against seven other assignments.
The second part of L & N's argument is in support of Assignment 15 wherein L & N asserts that the court erred in finding that L & N had unilaterally increased the risk of injury by constructing the track where it did. By reference, L & N directs the same argument against seven other assignments.
Harris asserts in brief that appellant's brief contains argument specifically addressed to two assignments of error, 12 and 15; that appellant has tacked on a concluding paragraph to each division of the argument attempting to assign the argument presented to each individual assignment made by appellant; that this constitutes a grouping of assignments for the purpose of argument; and that ". . . Alabama law is clear that where several assignments of error are grouped and argued together in brief and one is found to be without merit the Court will not consider the others." Harris cites Supreme Court Rule 9 and certain authorities.
Harris asserts that Assignments 1 and 2 are not sufficiently precise to be considered on appeal and that the other assignments to which the first part of appellant's argument is directed are due to be disregarded because they are grouped together with Assignments 1 and 2 for the purpose of argument; citing, inter alia, Burroughs v. Booth, 286 Ala. 110, 237 So. 2d 496, and Purvis v. Ennis, 258 Ala. 174, 61 So. 2d 451.
Assignments 1 and 2 are to effect that the court erred in rendering the final decree *384 and in rendering the final decree in favor of Harris and against L & N.
The single issue in this case is which party, Harris or L & N, is bound to assume liability for Walton's injury and indemnify the other party. Under the rule in Robinson v. Murphy, 69 Ala. 543; Murphy v. Pickle, 264 Ala. 362, 87 So. 2d 844; and Wiggins v. Stapleton Baptist Church, 282 Ala. 255, 210 So. 2d 814, it may be argued that Assignments 1 and 2 are sufficiently precise.
In any event, all the assignments are related, and the rule against grouping assignments for argument, on which appellee Harris relies, applies only when the assignments argued in bulk are not all related. This writer has had occasion heretofore to acknowledge this rule as follows:
Appellee argues that appellant's argument should not be considered because it is directed to the support of assignments which are not due to be considered because they do not refer to any ruling of the trial court, citing Stone v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County, 290 Ala. 229, 275 So. 2d 659; All American Life & Casualty Co. v. Dillard, 287 Ala. 673, 255 So. 2d 17; and McCullar v. Conner, 287 Ala. 455, 252 So. 2d 422.
In this argument, appellee asserts that Assignment 10 is faulty in that it does not refer to any ruling of the trial court. Assignment 10 recites that the court erred in making the following statement in the decree:
In the statement from the decree which is quoted in Assignment 10, the court construes the side track agreement and holds that Paragraph 14 requires L & N to indemnify Harris. The assignment not only refers to the decree but also quotes from it and sets out the ruling complained of in the language used by the court. There is no merit in appellee's argument that the assignment does not refer to a ruling of the court.
The assignments to which the argument is directed are all related in that they are governed by the same legal principles and argument, and arguing them together does not preclude consideration of one assignment even though others may be imperfect or without merit.
Appellee says in brief:
The evidence to support the finding that L & N negligently constructed the track will be considered in detail.
The evidence tends to show that in the early months of 1929, Harris desired to build a warehouse and to have a side track built on Harris' premises to serve the movement of articles from warehouse to train and vice versa. The precise dimensions of the warehouse are not shown. A scale drawing which is in evidence shows that the wall of the warehouse which faces the track is more than four hundred feet long. Roughly described, the warehouse is south of the track. The wall and the track are both arched or curved. The center of the arc, or of the circle of which the arc appears to be a part, lies south of the wall. In the warehouse wall there are seven doors which provide access from warehouse to track.
Harris and L & N entered into the written contract dated January 30, 1929. A drawing of the side track appears on the agreement. As noted above, the court found that the agreement was signed "about February 12, 1929" and that construction of the warehouse had begun "by the date of execution."
There is no averment in the pleading with respect to the time when the contract was signed or that it was not signed on the day of its date. Over objection of L & N, evidence was admitted tending to show that the contract was not signed on the date it bears.
There is no direct evidence showing the day or date on which construction of warehouse or side track actually began. As hereafter noted, over L & N's objection, Harris introduced evidence which was intended to furnish an inference as to when the work was done on the warehouse and the track.
The evidence supports an inference that construction of the side track and ware-house were begun in early 1929 and finished in the latter part of that year.
The court found that Harris ". . . has not constructed, placed, or permitted any structure within the limits specified in paragraph twelve. Rather, L & N itself has caused the Harris warehouse to be located within the agreed limitation.. . ." L & N contends that said finding is not supported by the evidence. Harris contends to the contrary. The evidence to support the finding of the court is next considered.
Harris' Exhibit 1 is a letter from an attorney to Harris dated February 8, 1929. The letter commences:
Harris says the letter shows that Harris had not executed the contract on February 8, 1929.
The letter also shows that Harris had written a letter on February 1st inquiring about the provisions of the contract. The reasonable inference follows that the contract had been prepared and was in the possession of Harris on or before February 1st.
Harris' Exhibit 2 is a letter dated February 13, 1929, from L & N's Assistant Superintendent in Birmingham to Harris. The text of the letter recites:
Harris says the letter shows that ". . . L & N had not, as of that date, begun any work on the spur track. . ."
*386 In the light of evidence hereinafter noted, the letter can hardly be said to show that L & N had not begun "any work." The Assistant Superintendent says he has been instructed to lay the track as soon as Harris is ready. The letter implies that the work of surveying, setting out stakes, and preparing the side track agreement had been done; that the contract had been executed by both parties, and had been approved by the Assistant Superintendent's superiors who instructed him to lay the track "as soon as" Harris was ready.
Harris' Exhibit 3 is a letter from Harris to L & N dated December 10, 1934, which recites:
Harris says the letter shows that the agreement was not executed until sometime in February, 1929. It shows nothing as to whether L & N was negligent. It does show that Harris had lost its copy of the contract and requested another copy.
Harris' Exhibits 4 and 5 are two ledger sheets. The words "HARRIS TRANSFER & WAREHOUSE COMPANY" are printed at the top of the page on both sides of both ledger sheets.
The following words are written near the top of the page on Exhibit 4, to wit: "New Building A/C Special." On Exhibit 5, the following words are written: "Special Ledger A/C Building Fund." The figures "1929" are stamped or typed at the top of the "DATE" column on both exhibits. It is thus indicated that the date of all entries is in the year 1929.
Harris says on page 5 of brief that Exhibits 4 and 5 are "ledger sheets of Harris which show that no payments were made by Harris for the sidetrack until after payments had been made for the construction of the Harris warehouse."
On pages 22 and 23 of brief, Harris says: ". . . The debit entry on Exhibit 4 indicates that Harris did not deposit funds with the L & N to cover the costs of material until February 12 (T. 37).. . ."
The first debit entry on Exhibit 4 is dated "Feb 12"; is to "L & N Ry Co" in amount 1350.00," which appears to indicate dollars; and is the only debit entry charged to "L & N Ry Co" which appears on either Exhibit 4 or 5. "Feb 12" is the earliest date shown on any entry, debit or credit, on either Exhibit 4 or 5. All other entries on both exhibits are dated "Mch," or some month subsequent to March.
In brief, page 23, Harris says:
If, as Harris says, the fourth debit entry on Exhibit 5 shows that the cross-ties were not purchased until the date of the fourth entry, which is March 20, 1929, then it must follow that the items shown in subsequent debit entries were not purchased until the respective dates of the subsequent debit entries.
Each entry is on one line. The month is written on the first entry. The month is not repeated or shown on subsequent entries until a new, subsequent month is entered. The month of the first five entries *387 is "Mch," which appears to indicate March. The month of the sixth entry is "Apr."
The first four debit entries on Exhibit 5 recite as follows:
As stated above, the first debit entry on Exhibit 4 is to "L & N Ry Co," dated "Feb 12," for "1350.00." If the date of the debit entry shows the date an item was purchased, the track was purchased February 12, prior to any debit entry to C. M. Allen & Son.
Exhibit 5 contains at least eight subsequent debit entries to "Chas M Allen & Son" and four subsequent entries to "C M Allen & Son"; and one or more of said subsequent debit entries is in each of the months of April, May, June, July, August, and September. There appears in September a debit entry as follows:
If the dates of the entries on Exhibits 4 and 5 support any inference as to when work was done on the warehouse and track, the inference must be that work on the track began before work on the warehouse began, and the track was completed before the warehouse was completed. The two exhibits do not tend to show that L & N did not lay the track at the place designated by Harris.
Harris offered in evidence a copy of an audit made by the Internal Revenue Service in 1932, which appears to cover the year 1929. Harris contends that the audit allows depreciation for five-eighths of a year on the warehouse and four-eighths of a year on the side track. The allowance of depreciation as Harris contends, however, sheds no light on the issue of negligence in construction of the track.
Harris called the witness Edwards who started to work for Harris "July the 9th, 1926," and worked for Harris forty-one years. Edwards testified that Harris started moving into the warehouse in June, 1929.
The witness Smiles testified that he has been employed by Harris since 1923, that the warehouse and track were "put in sometime in 1929"; that other railroad tracks immediately to the north of the spur track were on the same level as the spur track; they had been raised but "everything was level, the spur track and the main lines of the Southern and L & N were all level with the road"; those tracks are now raised to a higher elevation at this time; there is an overpass at 14th Street one block away from the Harris building where 14th Street traffic can go under the railroad tracks; there is a bank to the north of the spur track and Walton contended that he could not work to the north of the track.
The witness Holland testified that he is employed by L & N as assistant engineer of the Birmingham Division, that he made certain measurements about the warehouse *388 and track, and he had prepared a drawing showing measurements to scale which is respondent's Exhibit 1.
He testified that, at the point which had been identified to him as the place where Walton was injured, the building was 7 feet 3 5/8 inches from the center of the track, and the distance from the center of the track to retaining wall on opposite side of track was 7 feet 6 inches.
The drawing on the 1929 contract does not show the location of any building. He testified:
The testimony of Holland showing the procedure followed in making the survey, preparing the side track agreement, and constructing the side track is not contradicted. The testimony shows that if the building were in existence, the practice would be to show it on the drawing on the contract. A finding that the building was in existence at the time the survey was made and the stakes set at the place indicated by the industry must rest on speculation or conjecture. Such a finding must disregard the undisputed testimony and does not rest on the evidence. The finding that L & N negligently constructed the track so that the center line of the track was within eight feet of the building is not supported by the evidence.
The trial court found that Paragraph (14) of the contract deals with the situation and establishes L & N's obligation to indemnify Harris. In this finding the court erred. The injury to Walton was caused directly or indirectly by a structure within the limits of the clearances specified in Paragraph (12) of the contract. The right to indemnity rests on the provisions of Paragraph (12). To hold that Paragraph (14) applies to the right to indemnity requires that the last sentence of Paragraph (14) be ignored and held for naught. The parties explicitly agreed to the provisions: "Provided, that nothing in this section contained is intended to or shall relieve second party of the obligations of release and indemnity contained in Sections 11 and 12."
Under the provisions of Paragraph (12), the negligence of the parties is not material. On an appeal by an industry from a judgment requiring that the industry indemnify the railroad under a side track agreement, The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed. The following are excerpts from the opinion:
". . .
In Miller and Company of Birmingham v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 328 F.2d 73, the court considered a side track agreement which is identical in all material respects with the agreement in the instant case. The court affirmed a judgment requiring the industry to indemnify the railroad. Among other things the court said:
I would reverse the judgment appealed from and remand the cause with directions that a judgment be entered declaring that Harris is obligated to indemnify L & N for its liability to Walton.
McCALL and FAULKNER, JJ., concur.