Title: HENRY R. SANCHEZ, a/k/a RICKY SANCHEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HENRY R. SANCHEZ, a/k/a RICKY SANCHEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 77Case Number: No. S-09-0113, S-10-0044Decided: 05/05/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
HENRY 
R. SANCHEZ, a/k/a RICKY SANCHEZ,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County
The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender Program; Timothy C. 
Kingston of the Law Office of Tim Kingston, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Kingston.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      A jury found 
Appellant Henry R. Sanchez guilty of attempted second degree murder, aggravated 
assault and battery, felony possession of a controlled substance, and 
interference with an emergency call.  
Sanchez later sought a new trial, which the district court denied.  Sanchez appealed both the judgment and 
sentence and the denial of his new trial motion, and we consolidated those 
appeals.  Finding no reversible 
error in any of the issues presented on appeal, we affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Sanchez offers 
these issues in his opening brief:
 
I.          
Did the district court err when it denied Appellant's motion for judgment 
of acquittal, for lack of sufficient evidence, on the possession of a controlled 
substance charge?
 
II.         
Did the [district] court err when it allowed in prejudicial hearsay 
testimony under W.R.E. 803(2)?
 
III.        Did 
the [district] court violate Appellant's constitutional right to be presumed 
innocent and invade the province of the jury by referring to the complaining 
witness as "the victim"?
 
IV.       Was 
Appellant denied his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial 
jury when one of the jury members had knowledge that Appellant had previously 
been incarcerated at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and failed to divulge this 
fact when asked on voir dire if he 
knew Appellant?
 
In 
a supplemental brief, Sanchez submits this additional 
issue:
 
[V.]      Did the Appellant 
receive ineffective assistance of counsel from his attorneys in their 
representation of him in the court below?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In February 2008, 
Sanchez and the victim, AI, started exploring a dating relationship.  On February 10, Sanchez showed up 
unannounced at the victim's apartment with some cocaine.  The victim did not want Sanchez or the 
cocaine in her apartment, and she told him to leave.  When Sanchez refused to do so, the 
victim retrieved a knife, pointed it at him, and again told him to leave, which 
he did.  
 
[¶4]      Two days later, 
during the early evening hours of February 12, Sanchez and the victim were at 
her uncle's apartment.  Both were 
heavily intoxicated.  Eventually, 
the two went to the victim's apartment, which was located in the same building, 
where they continued to drink.  
Around 1:00 a.m. on the 13th, a cab service delivered more vodka and 
cigarettes to the apartment.  
Sanchez left with the cab driver, but returned to the victim's apartment 
a few minutes later.  Shortly 
thereafter, the atmosphere in the apartment abruptly and drastically 
changed.  According to the victim, 
Sanchez "snapped" while they were talking about art.  Over the next four to five hours, 
Sanchez repeatedly choked the victim, pushed her, kicked her, beat her with his 
fists, pounded her skull with a glass beer mug, and threatened to kill her.  During the mªl©e, Sanchez placed a knife 
against the victim's throat, stating: "See how easy this would be," and tied a 
cell phone cord around her neck in such a fashion that it could be tightened 
with ease at anytime.  The victim 
fought back and tried without success to escape the situation.  At one point she attempted to call 911, 
only to have Sanchez grab the phone and throw it out of her reach.  
 
[¶5]      The physical 
attack finally ended around 6:00 a.m. when a friend of the victim showed up at 
her apartment.  Sanchez then left 
the residence.  About 45 minutes 
later, Sanchez called 911 and reported that he had been stabbed by the 
victim.  Sergeant Chris Gulbrandson 
and Officers Jeff Sheaman and John Thompson of the Rawlins Police Department 
were dispatched to Sanchez's residence.  
After speaking with Sanchez and observing two small stab wounds, one in 
Sanchez's upper left arm and the other in his left chest, Sergeant Gulbrandson 
and Officer Sheaman went to the victim's apartment to interview her about the 
stabbing, while Officer Thompson accompanied Sanchez to the hospital.1  
 
[¶6]      The officers 
arrived at the victim's apartment around 7:00 a.m.  When the victim opened the door, the 
officers immediately noticed that she was covered in blood.  She had blood in her eyes and ears, as 
well as on her face, arms and legs.  
Her hair and clothing were saturated and blood was oozing from open 
wounds throughout her head and body.  
The officers also observed a cell phone cord tied around the victim's 
neck.  The officers called for 
assistance and requested that an ambulance be dispatched to the residence.  
 
[¶7]      When the officers 
went inside, they found an apartment in disarray; furniture was out of place 
and/or tipped over and there were cushions, bedding and other items on the 
floor.  The officers noticed blood 
on the walls and floor throughout the apartment, and found blood-soaked bedding 
in the victim's bedroom, a bloody towel in the bathroom sink, and multiple 
bloody "head prints" on the bedroom wall and bathroom door.  They also discovered a butcher knife, 
with blood on both the blade and handle, on the bedroom floor and a bloody glass 
beer mug lying on the bed.  

 
[¶8]      The victim was 
transported to the hospital, where she remained for approximately nine 
hours.  A medical examination 
revealed numerous bruises on the victim's face, scalp, chest, arms and hands, a 
perforated left ear drum, blood in the external canals of both ears, and several 
lacerations on her hands, left knee and left heel.  The examination also revealed a dozen 
severe lacerations in the victim's scalp and forehead, all of which had to be 
sutured.2  
 
[¶9]      During the 
ensuing investigation, police executed a search warrant at Sanchez's 
residence.  In a search of the game 
room where Sanchez had initially spoken with the officers that morning, police 
discovered the victim's social security card and a baggie containing 7.14 grams 
of a white powdery substance hidden behind a speaker.  Testing of that substance revealed a 
mixture of baking soda and cocaine.  

 
[¶10]   On February 15, 2008, the State 
charged Sanchez with one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of 
aggravated assault and battery, one count of felony possession of a controlled 
substance, and one misdemeanor count of interference with an emergency 
call.  The case went to trial on 
December 15, 2008.  At the close of 
the State's case, Sanchez moved for judgment of acquittal alleging the State had 
failed to provide sufficient evidence proving all of the elements necessary for 
conviction on the charged offenses.  
The district court denied the motion.    
 
[¶11]   Thereafter, Sanchez presented 
evidence in defense of the charges, including his own testimony.  Sanchez admitted striking the victim 
numerous times during a 15- to 20-minute fight, but claimed he did so in 
self-defense.  Sanchez testified 
that, during this time, the victim continually bit him and stabbed him three 
times, and he punched her in the head and body in order to get the knife away 
from her and to stop the biting.  
Sanchez, however, denied responsibility for the full extent of the 
victim's injuries and specifically denied striking her with the beer mug.  He also denied taking the victim's phone 
during the incident, tying the cord around her neck, and having any knowledge of 
the cocaine found behind the stereo speaker.  
 
[¶12]   At the conclusion of a four-day 
trial, the jury acquitted Sanchez on the attempted first degree murder charge, 
but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree 
murder, as well as guilty on the other charged offenses.   The district court sentenced 
Sanchez on March 20, 2009, to a combined prison term of thirty to forty years. 
Sanchez appealed the judgment and sentence, and that appeal was docketed in this 
Court as case number S-09-0113.
 
[¶13]   While his direct appeal was pending 
in this Court, Sanchez moved the district court for a new trial on the grounds 
of juror misconduct, alleging that two jurors failed to disclose during voir 
dire that they knew Sanchez as a result of their employment at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  The district court 
held an evidentiary hearing and denied Sanchez's new trial motion.  Sanchez appealed that denial, and that 
appeal was docketed in this Court as case number S-10-0044.  This Court consolidated the 
appeals.
 
[¶14]   More than one month after filing 
his opening appellate brief, Sanchez, through new counsel, filed a motion in 
this Court requesting a limited remand to the district court for an evidentiary 
hearing concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel.  In addition, or in the alternative, 
Sanchez requested that he be permitted to file a supplemental brief on the issue 
of whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.3  We denied Sanchez's motion for a remand, 
but granted his request to file a supplemental brief addressing trial counsel's 
alleged ineffectiveness.
 
[¶15]   Additional facts will be set forth 
as necessary in our discussion of Sanchez's appellate issues. 

 
DISCUSSION
 
Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal
 
[¶16]   Sanchez first takes issue with the 
district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
possession charge.  Sanchez 
maintains the evidence was insufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that 
he was in actual or constructive possession of the cocaine.  Our response to Sanchez's argument will 
be brief.
 
[¶17]   As previously noted, Sanchez moved 
for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case.  After the district court denied that 
motion, Sanchez introduced evidence in defense of the possession charge. The law 
is well established that a defendant's introduction of evidence following the 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case 
constitutes a waiver of that motion, thereby precluding appellate review of that 
denial.  Granzer v. State, 2010 WY 130, ¶ 7, 239 P.3d 640, 643-44 (Wyo. 2010); Butcher v. 
State, 2005 WY 146, ¶¶ 12, 14, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo. 2005); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 
(Wyo. 2000); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995); see also 6 
Wayne R. LaFave et al. Criminal 
Procedure § 24.6(b) at 443-44 (3d ed. 2007).  Consistent with existing law, we hold 
that Sanchez waived the right to challenge the district court's ruling in this 
appeal.  Consequently, we will not 
consider his claim.  We also do not 
consider whether the evidence as a whole at the close of all the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain Sanchez's possession conviction because Sanchez did not 
raise that discrete issue in his opening brief.
 
Hearsay 
Testimony
 
[¶18]   At trial, Sergeant Gulbrandson 
testified that after speaking to Sanchez on the morning of February 13, he went 
to the victim's apartment to interview her about the reported stabbing.  He then testified as to the victim's 
behavior and appearance when she opened the door to her apartment: 

 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: [The victim] slowly opened the door, kind of peeked -- she wasn't 
sure -- you could tell she wasn't sure who was at the door, so she kind of 
peeked around the door.  When she 
seen myself and Officer Sheaman, she opened the door 
fully.
 
Her 
condition at that time was very scary.  
She was completely covered in blood.  She had dried blood around her 
lips.  She had blood in her ears and 
her eyes.  Her hair was actually 
matted with blood.  She had blood on 
her shirt, on her arms.  It was 
fairly gruesome.  

 
Sergeant 
Gulbrandson then testified about his assessment of the seriousness of her 
injuries:
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: Her condition was very hard to diagnose, because there was so much 
blood, and it was coagulated and matted and it was hard to tell how many 
injuries she had, where exactly they were, and whether or not they were 
life-threatening.  She -- I 
originally noticed there was a cord around her neck.  I checked that, made sure it wasn't 
constricting her airway.  I checked 
for profuse bleeding from any wound.  
She typically had an oozing effect about her whole body. . . 
.
 
                        
* * * * 
 
Blood 
continually came out of her head.  
Her hair actually dripped with blood.  
 
 
The 
sergeant next described the victim's demeanor:
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: I was rather dumbfounded by her demeanor.  She was -- she was very agitated.  She didn't actually complain of a lot of 
pain, but you could tell -- I think she was kind of numb.  She was very talkative.  I could -- obviously she was either 
intoxicated or was suffering from a head wound to make her appear to be 
intoxicated.  She was just very 
angry.  
 
[¶19]   When the State asked if the victim 
had made any statements regarding what had happened to her, defense counsel 
posed a hearsay objection.  After 
some discussion, the district court overruled defense counsel's objection and 
allowed the testimony under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay 
rule.  Thereafter, the following 
exchange occurred:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:     . . . What statements, 
if any, did she make as to how she had gotten into that 
condition?
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: She stated that Henry tried to kill her throughout the 
night.
 
Q.        Did 
she make any other statements regarding that night during the time that she was 
talking to you?
 
A.        She 
stated she was -- that Henry choked her, that he beat her with a mug that night, 
that he beat her -- it was just an all-night-long ordeal.
 
            
            
* * * * 
 
Q.        . . . 
Did she state to you whether or not she had fought Mr. Sanchez off during the 
night?
 
A.        She 
was very proud of herself to the fact that she had fought all night and believed 
that was the reason that she was still alive.  
 
[¶20]   Sanchez contends the district court 
erred in allowing the testimony of Sergeant Gulbrandson under the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  
In reviewing the propriety of the district court's evidentiary ruling, we 
are guided by the following principles:
 
Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. The burden is 
on the [appellant] to establish such abuse.
 
Brown 
v. State, 
2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 2005) (quotation marks and internal 
citations omitted); see also Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 699, 703 (Wyo. 2005); Holloman v. State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 
883 (Wyo. 2005).
[¶21]   Hearsay is defined as "a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  W.R.E. 801(c).  Hearsay is not admissible unless it 
falls within a well-delineated exception.  
W.R.E. 802.  An exception is 
found for an "excited utterance," which is defined as "[a] statement relating to 
a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition."  W.R.E. 803(2).  In addressing the excited utterance 
exception, we have said:
 
"The 
exception is founded upon the proposition that a statement made during the 
stress of excitement resulting from a startling event is probably trustworthy, 
since there is not leisure to reflect, contrive or fabricate.  The rule assumes the presence of a 
startling event which temporarily stills the senses and alleviates any motive to 
fabricate.  A leading treatise 
explains that the excited utterance exception is justified by the special 
reliability that is furnished when excitement suspends the declarant's powers of 
reflection and fabrication.'"
 
Boykin 
v. State, 
2005 WY 15, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 481, 483 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 961 (Wyo. 
2000)) (citations omitted in original).
 
[¶22]   This Court has identified five 
factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of evidence under the 
excited utterance exception:  (1) 
the nature of the startling event; (2) the declarant's physical manifestation of 
excitement; (3) the declarant's age; (4) the lapse of time between the event and 
the hearsay statement; and (5) whether the statement was made in response to an 
inquiry.  Boykin, ¶ 8, 105 P.3d  at 483.  The ultimate inquiry is whether the 
"declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, 
excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and 
deliberation."  Id. (quoting James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo. 
1994)).
 
[¶23]   In this case, the first factor 
weighs heavily in favor of admissibility.  
The victim was the recipient of a savage beating that took place over a 
period of hours.  Little question 
exists that the beating was a shocking and startling event.  The second factor, the victim's 
manifestation of excitement, also favors admission.  At the time the statements were made, 
the victim was very angry and agitated, and she was pacing back and forth in the 
apartment.  The third factor, the 
victim's age, is neutral with respect to these facts, but the fourth factor 
favors admission.  The precise time 
elapsing between when the beatings actually stopped and the statements is 
unclear from the record, but the record shows the victim was still under the 
stress of the incident when she spoke to Officer Gulbrandson approximately one 
hour after Sanchez left the apartment.  
See Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 926 (Wyo. 1999) (under stress of excitement 45 minutes after startling 
event); see also United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980) (under the stress of 
excitement 45 to 75 minutes after startling event).  The fifth factor also favors 
admissibility because there is no indication the statements were made in 
response to an inquiry by the officers as to what Sanchez had done.  Finally, based on the descriptions of 
the victim provided at trial, we are confident that her statements were not the 
product of reflection or deliberation.  
We find the challenged statements were properly admitted as excited 
utterances under W.R.E. 803(2) and, consequently, no abuse of discretion 
occurred in this instance. 
 
District 
Court Referring to AI as "the victim"
 
[¶24]   Sanchez contends that reversible 
error occurred when the district court referred to AI as the victim in the 
case.  Sanchez claims the district 
court's actions violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and 
effectively nullified his claim of self-defense.
 
[¶25]   At issue is the following statement 
made during the State's voir dire, which we have highlighted and placed in 
context:4
 
THE 
COURT:  First of all, this case 
happened February 13, 2008.  It 
happened . . . in Rawlins, Wyoming.  
That's in Carbon County.  
It's in the . . . Apartments.  
Now, I don't know if there has been much media coverage, but you already 
know who the defendant is in this case.  
It is Mr. Henry R. Sanchez.  
The victim is [AI].  Does anybody know about this case?  Has anybody heard about this case prior 
to coming in here today?  [Emphasis 
added.]  
 
Sanchez 
acknowledges that he did not object to the alleged error at trial and, 
consequently, he bears the burden of demonstrating plain error.  Under the plain error doctrine, Sanchez 
must prove, by reference to the record, the existence of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law which was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way 
and resulting material prejudice to a substantial right.  Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 797-98 (Wyo. 2006); Duke v. 
State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 91, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 2004).  To establish material prejudice, Sanchez 
must show a reasonable possibility exists that he would have received a more 
favorable verdict in the absence of the error.  Miller, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d  at 798.  We find that Sanchez has not satisfied 
his burden.
 
[¶26]   Primarily, we are not convinced 
that any error occurred in this instance.  
Sanchez's entire argument is premised on a contention that the district 
court improperly "instructed" the jury panel, and thus members of the seated 
jury, that AI was, in fact, the victim in the case.5  However, viewing the challenged 
statement in proper context, it is clear the district court was simply 
describing the alleged roles of the major identified players in the case in an 
effort to ascertain if any of the potential jurors had knowledge of the case, or 
had any ties to it or the parties which might prevent them from being impartial 
or fair.  The district court did not 
tell the panel that, as a matter of law, it had to consider AI to be a victim, 
much less Sanchez's victim.
 
[¶27]   Moreover, we are not persuaded the 
district court's statement materially prejudiced Sanchez.  The district court's description of AI 
as the victim was a single, isolated incident that occurred at the beginning of 
a four-day trial.  The jury was 
instructed that it was the sole judge of the facts of the case and that it was 
to disregard any comment the court made regarding the facts in assessing 
Sanchez's guilt or innocence on the charged offenses.  Additionally, it was uncontested at 
trial that AI was the victim of a vicious beating.6  The only real dispute concerned whether 
Sanchez was her assailant and, if so, whether he was the first aggressor or 
acted in self-defense.  Lastly, as 
already noted, the evidence of Sanchez's guilt was substantial.  After careful consideration of the 
record, we do not believe a reasonable possibility exists that the jury's 
verdict would have been more favorable to Sanchez in the absence of that 
isolated statement.  Accordingly, we 
cannot find the existence of plain error.
 
Denial 
of Motion for New Trial
 
[¶28]   During voir dire, the prosecutor 
inquired of the jury panel if anyone "knew" Sanchez.  Several potential jurors acknowledged 
personally knowing Sanchez.  One of 
the potential jurors, Juror R., indicated during an in-chamber discussion that 
he had direct knowledge and experience with Sanchez through his employment in 
the intensive treatment unit, a drug and alcohol program, at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  Upon defense 
counsel's request, the district court removed Juror R. for cause.  Two additional jurors from the venire, 
Juror K. and Juror P., also worked at the state penitentiary.  Neither indicated during voir dire that 
they knew Sanchez.  Both served as 
jurors on Sanchez's trial. 
 
[¶29]   After trial, an investigator for 
the Wyoming Public Defender's Office interviewed the jurors who sat on Sanchez's 
trial.  During those interviews, 
several jurors allegedly commented regarding Juror P.'s and Juror K.'s 
employment at the state penitentiary.  
Juror P. allegedly informed the investigator that he knew from his 
employment that Sanchez had previously been incarcerated at the state 
penitentiary.  Based on this newly 
discovered information, Sanchez filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 33(c), asserting, in pertinent part, that Jurors P. and K. committed 
misconduct by failing to disclose their knowledge of him during voir dire.  More particularly, relying on McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984), Sanchez 
contended that his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury had been 
violated by the jurors' failure to answer honestly a material question during 
voir dire for, had they disclosed they knew him, such would have provided a 
valid basis for a challenge for cause, as had been the case with Juror R.  Sanchez also alleged the jurors were 
biased against him.  

 
[¶30]   The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which Juror K. and Juror P., as well as 
four other jurors, testified.  Juror 
K. testified that he did not know Sanchez prior to the trial.  He went on to explain that his duties at 
the prison did not provide him the opportunity to meet and interact with the 
inmates.  Juror P. testified as 
follows regarding his knowledge of Sanchez:
 
[APPELLATE 
COUNSEL]:  Did you know Mr. Sanchez 
prior to the start of the trial?
 
A.        Not 
personally.
 
Q.        Could 
you explain that to me.
 
A.        I 
didn't -- I knew of a previous incarceration at the penitentiary 
before.
 
Q.        And 
how did you know . . . of a previous incarceration before?
 
A.        I 
worked there.  It was -- under 
custody -- I had seen him prior at the penitentiary.
 
* 
* * *
 
Q.        Did 
you know what he was incarcerated for?
 
A.        
No.  
 
[¶31]   The district court ultimately 
issued a decision letter and order denying Sanchez's new trial motion.  In relevant part, the district court 
determined that Sanchez had not demonstrated that either juror intentionally 
failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire, nor had he shown 
that the two jurors were biased.  In 
this appeal, Sanchez challenges the district court's ruling.7
 
[¶32]   The law is well settled that a 
defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must establish: 
1) the new evidence did not come to the defendant's knowledge until after the 
trial; 2) that it was not owing to the lack of due diligence that the new 
evidence did not come to light sooner; 3) the evidence is so material that it 
would probably produce a different verdict if a new trial is granted; and 4) the 
evidence is not cumulative.  Smith v. State, 2008 WY 98, ¶ 15, 190 P.3d 522, 526 (Wyo. 2008); Opie v. 
State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967).  
All four of these factors must be met for a defendant to be entitled to a 
new trial, and, if any one factor is not satisfied, there is no error in the 
denial of the new trial motion.  
Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531, 535 (Wyo.1983).  A denial of a motion for new trial is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
Chauncey v. State, 2006 WY 18, 
¶ 13, 127 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2006).
 
[¶33]   No question exists that the 
evidence of juror misconduct/bias in this case was newly discovered evidence and 
that its late discovery was not due to the lack of due diligence.  Rather, the issue here revolves around 
the substantive question of whether Sanchez could show that Juror P. was 
dishonest during voir dire and biased against him, an inquiry relevant to the 
issue of materiality encompassed in the third element of the new trial 
standard.  Smith, ¶ 16, 190 P.3d  at 
527.
 
[¶34]   This Court has summarized the law 
applicable to the determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a new 
trial based on allegations that a juror was untruthful during voir dire or was 
biased:
 
Requests 
for a new trial on the basis that a juror was not honest during voir dire 
or was biased may be brought in different ways.  First, a claim may be brought under the 
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
McDonough.  In order to 
obtain a new trial under McDonough, 464 U.S.  at 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, a 
party must demonstrate
 
that 
a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and 
then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for 
a challenge for cause.  The motives 
for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a 
juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a 
trial.
 
In 
order to satisfy the first part of the McDonough test, the party must 
show that the juror intentionally gave an incorrect answer to a voir dire 
question.  Gonzales v. 
Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDonough 
test to a criminal case).  The 
question of whether a juror was honest during voir dire is a factual 
determination reviewed for clear error.  
Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 
164 F.3d 511, 515 (10th Cir. 1998).
 
* 
* * *
 
In 
addition to the McDonough test, a party can obtain a new trial by showing 
that the juror had an actual or implied bias.  Skaggs, 164 F.3d  at 516.  "A finding of actual bias is based upon 
express proof, e.g., . . . admission by the prospective juror of a state of mind 
prejudicial to a party's interest.'"  
Id. at 517, quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 
984 (2d. Cir. 1968).  "Actual bias 
is a factual finding reviewed for clear error."  Id. at 516.  See also, Gonzales, 99 F.3d  at 
986.  A determination on a claim of implied bias, on the 
other hand, is a question of law reviewed de novo.  Skaggs, 164 F.3d  at 517.  "Implied bias can be proved by showing 
that the juror had a personal connection to the parties or circumstances of the 
trial'" or when there are "similarities between the personal experiences of the 
juror and the issues being litigated."  
Id., quoting Gonzales, 99 F.3d  at 
987.
 
Smith, 
¶¶ 26-27, 29, 190 P.3d  at 530-32.
 
[¶35]   With these legal principles in 
mind, we now turn to the question of whether the district court correctly denied 
the motion for new trial.  The 
district court concluded that Sanchez did not satisfy the first part of the McDonough test:
 
Based 
upon Juror [P.'s] testimony, the Court finds that Juror [P.] did not fail to 
answer the question regarding whether he knew Mr. Sanchez honestly.  His testimony reveals that he knew whom 
Mr. Sanchez was and knew of Mr. Sanchez, but he did not feel that he "knew" Mr. 
Sanchez.
 
This 
case is analogous to United States v. 
McConnell [sic], 464 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).  There, jurors were asked if they had 
ever been involved "in any court" in a criminal matter in which they had been a 
defendant, witness, or victim.  Id. at 1156.  The eventual jury foreman did not 
respond, although he had once been charged with several felonies.  Id.  The charges against the jury foreman had 
been dismissed at an early stage in the proceedings.  Id.  At the hearing on the defendant's new 
trial request, the jury foreman stated that he did not respond to the voir dire inquiry because he had not 
been "involved in any court" since the charges against him had been dismissed 
before trial.  Id.  The court found that, though the juror's 
answer (or non-answer) was mistaken, it was not dishonest.  Id. at 1157.  "The McDonough test is directed at 
intentionally incorrect responses[.]'"  
Id. at 1157-58 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th 
Cir. 1996)).
 
The 
facts in this case are even more innocuous.  Juror [P.] did not think that he "knew" 
Mr. Sanchez and responded accordingly.  
Though it was later discovered that Juror [P.] knew who Mr. Sanchez was, 
this fact does not indicate his response (or non-response) was dishonest or 
intentionally incorrect.  The 
testimony of Juror [C.] also supports Juror [P.'s] testimony that he knew who 
Mr. Sanchez was, but did not "know" him.  
(See November 10, 2009[,] 
Transcript, p. [50] ("I'm not sure that he said that he knew him, but he said 
that he knew who he was."[)).]  

 
* 
* * *
 
Mr. 
Sanchez has not demonstrated that . . . Juror [P.] failed to answer honestly a 
material question in voir dire.  He, therefore, cannot satisfy the McDonough test . . . 
.
 
[¶36]   After careful review, we cannot say 
that the district court's conclusion was clearly erroneous.  While we might agree with Sanchez that 
Juror P. should have answered the voir dire question in the affirmative, we 
cannot conclude that his failure to do so was anything other than an honest 
mistake based on a misunderstanding of the scope of that question.  Since there is no evidence that Juror P. 
deliberately failed to answer honestly a material question in voir dire, we 
agree with the district court that the McDonough test cannot be satisfied.  As such, it is not necessary to address 
the second part of the test.
 
[¶37]   The district court also found that 
Sanchez failed to prove the existence of actual or implied bias on the part of 
Juror P.  In his appellate brief, 
Sanchez does not challenge the district court's finding with respect to actual 
bias, and he fails to offer any cogent argument, in accordance with Skaggs, proving that Juror P. was 
impliedly biased.  We therefore 
summarily affirm the district court's determination on this 
issue.
 
[¶38]   In sum, we hold the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez's motion for a new trial. 

 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel
 
[¶39]   Sanchez contends trial counsel 
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  Specifically, Sanchez faults counsel for 
not conducting an adequate voir dire and for failing to object to leading 
questions, references to AI, the complaining party, as the victim, the 
prosecutor's declaration in opening statement that Sanchez would testify, the 
prosecutor's reference to the white powdery substance as cocaine, testimony that 
Sanchez was possibly selling cocaine, improper opinion testimony by the State's 
witnesses, and the prosecutor's statement that Sanchez was seeking "jury 
nullification" with respect to the cocaine possession 
charge.
 
[¶40]   Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel entail mixed questions of law and fact and, consequently, our review is 
de novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 2008).  For 
Sanchez to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, he must first establish that 
trial counsel's performance was deficient.  
This requires a showing that counsel failed to render such assistance as 
would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 18, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Hirsch 
v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 593 (Wyo. 2006)).  Sanchez then must demonstrate that 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  Under the prejudice prong, Sanchez must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of his trial would have been different.  Dettloff, ¶¶ 18-19, 152 P.3d  at 
382.  The failure to make the 
required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats 
an ineffectiveness claim.  Id.
 
[¶41]   We find that Sanchez has not 
satisfied his burden on either prong of the ineffectiveness standard.  First, Sanchez's ineffectiveness 
argument is devoid of any analysis establishing that counsel's performance was 
legally deficient in any of the identified areas.  For example, Sanchez's contention that 
counsel should have posed an objection when various witnesses gave allegedly 
improper testimony consists essentially of excerpts of the witnesses' trial 
testimony without any analysis or citations to pertinent legal authorities.  His other claims concerning counsel's 
failure to object are similarly deficient.  
As to counsel's alleged inadequate voir dire, Sanchez simply points to 
the fact the voir dire consisted of "some twenty questions" spanning six pages 
of the trial transcript, and offers only a conclusory characterization of it as 
extremely brief and shallow and "below the line of competence."  Sanchez does not identify with any 
specificity the questions counsel were remiss in not pursuing, nor does he 
otherwise provide any insight into what counsel should have, or even could have, 
done differently.  Sanchez's 
argument seems to rest on the fact the district court twice expressed 
frustration with counsel on other matters during his trial.  However, this fact alone does not 
establish that counsel's performance was outside the range of professionally 
competent assistance with respect to the specific matters at issue in this 
appeal.
 
[¶42]   More importantly, Sanchez has made 
absolutely no showing of actual prejudice arising from counsel's alleged 
deficient performance.  That is, he 
does not explain, within the context of the facts of this case, how counsel's 
alleged errors adversely affected the outcome of his trial.  Rather, Sanchez offers nothing more than 
a bald assertion that prejudice occurred.  
His argument in this regard seems to be simply: "Because I said it is so, 
then it must be so."  Suffice it to 
say, Sanchez's argument is utterly insufficient to satisfy his burden of proving 
counsel rendered prejudicially deficient assistance.  We therefore reject Sanchez's claim that 
he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.
 
[¶43]   Before leaving this topic, we are 
compelled to address an additional matter.  
As already noted, Sanchez presented a motion to this Court requesting 
that we grant a partial remand in order for the district court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether his trial counsel provided legally 
effective assistance.  This Court 
denied his motion.  Sanchez 
challenges that denial in his appellate brief and asks this Court to reconsider 
and grant his remand request.  We 
decline Sanchez's request for the reasons discussed below.  
 
[¶44]   There are generally two types of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, those that are apparent in the trial 
record and those that are outside the record.  An evidentiary hearing is necessary only 
on the latter type of claim, if an appellant can make a showing that his 
ineffectiveness claim has merit.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶¶ 27-29, 
100 P.3d 394, 407 (Wyo. 2004); Calene v. 
State, 846 P.2d 679, 687 (Wyo. 1993); 
W.R.A.P. 21(a).  ("Such remand 
shall be available only if the motion is accompanied by affidavits containing 
nonspeculative allegations of facts, not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel's 
representation was deficient and prejudiced the 
appellant.")
 
[¶45]   In his motion for remand, Sanchez 
claims his trial counsel were ineffective in five general ways.  First, Sanchez complains that trial 
counsel failed to present evidence that the victim engaged in a sham marriage 
with a Russian national and encouraged others to engage in such marriages.  Sanchez does not identify any legal 
basis for the admissibility of this "sham marriage" evidence, nor does he 
explain how its admission would alter the outcome of his trial. 

 
[¶46]   Second, Sanchez contends trial 
counsel were ineffective in failing to call four witnesses who would have 
testified the victim told conflicting stories about the altercation and one 
witness who would have testified about the victim's general reputation for 
dishonesty.  Sanchez does not 
identify, via affidavit or otherwise, the proposed testimony of the five 
individuals.  Nor does he identify 
the prejudice resulting from counsel's failure.
 
[¶47]   Third, Sanchez contends that his 
mother should have been called as a witness to testify regarding her knowledge 
of the baggie containing cocaine.  
He claims his mother would have testified that a police officer took the 
baggie from her freezer and "planted" it behind the stereo speaker.  An affidavit from his mother supports 
this claim.  The affidavit indicates 
that his mother advised trial counsel of this information and of her desire to 
testify about the same at trial.  
Sanchez does not explain how trial counsel's apparent tactical decision 
not to have his mother testify constituted prejudicially deficient 
assistance.
 
[¶48]   Fourth, Sanchez complains that 
trial counsel did not permit him to participate in jury selection, and claims 
that, if provided a list of the venire, he would have identified panel members 
who knew him from his time at the penitentiary.  Sanchez does not identify these panel 
members.  If this claim involves the 
same jurors who were the subject of his new trial motion, the matter has been 
addressed in this opinion.
 
[¶49]   Lastly, Sanchez generally contends 
that trial counsel did not adequately communicate with him prior to trial.  Even assuming they did not, Sanchez does 
not identify how counsel's lack of communication actually prejudiced 
him.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶50]   We find no reversible error with 
respect to any of the issues raised in this appeal.  Affirmed.
 
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Sanchez was treated for the two stab wounds, as well as some minor 
scratches on his face and chest.  
While there, Sanchez was belligerent and uncooperative with medical and 
law enforcement personnel and ultimately had to be chemically sedated.  
 
2The doctor who treated the victim testified that in his 29 years of 
practice he had rarely seen an individual, including victims of wrecks, with 
injuries as extensive as the victim's.  

 
3After new counsel entered his appearance, this Court allowed the Wyoming 
Public Defender's Office to withdraw as Sanchez's 
counsel.
 
4After reviewing the transcript of voir dire, we question whether the 
district court actually uttered the statement at issue.  When viewed in context, this entire 
excerpt appears to be an aspect of the prosecutor's voir dire that was 
inadvertently attributed to the district court by the court reporter.  However, because the parties have 
proceeded on the assumption the transcript is correct, we will also do 
so.
 
5A jury instruction is defined as "[a] direction or guideline that a judge 
gives a jury concerning the law of the case."  Black's Law Dictionary 935 (9th ed. 
2009).
 
6"Victim" is defined as a "person harmed by a crime, tort, or other 
wrong."  Black's Law Dictionary 1703 
(9th ed. 2009).
 
7On appeal, Sanchez has abandoned his attack on Juror K., and limits his 
argument to challenging the district court's ruling concerning Juror 
P.
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

HENRY 
R. SANCHEZ, a/k/a RICKY SANCHEZ,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender Program; Timothy C. 
Kingston of the Law Office of Tim Kingston, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Kingston.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found 
Appellant Henry R. Sanchez guilty of attempted second degree murder, aggravated 
assault and battery, felony possession of a controlled substance, and 
interference with an emergency call.  
Sanchez later sought a new trial, which the district court denied.  Sanchez appealed both the judgment and 
sentence and the denial of his new trial motion, and we consolidated those 
appeals.  Finding no reversible 
error in any of the issues presented on appeal, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sanchez offers 
these issues in his opening brief:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court err when it denied Appellant's motion for judgment 
of acquittal, for lack of sufficient evidence, on the possession of a controlled 
substance charge?

 
 
II.         
Did the [district] court err when it allowed in prejudicial hearsay 
testimony under W.R.E. 803(2)?

 
 
III.        Did 
the [district] court violate Appellant's constitutional right to be presumed 
innocent and invade the province of the jury by referring to the complaining 
witness as "the victim"?

 
 
IV.       Was 
Appellant denied his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial 
jury when one of the jury members had knowledge that Appellant had previously 
been incarcerated at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and failed to divulge this 
fact when asked on voir dire if he 
knew Appellant?

 
 
In 
a supplemental brief, Sanchez submits this additional 
issue:

 
 
[V.]      Did the Appellant 
receive ineffective assistance of counsel from his attorneys in their 
representation of him in the court below?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In February 2008, 
Sanchez and the victim, AI, started exploring a dating relationship.  On February 10, Sanchez showed up 
unannounced at the victim's apartment with some cocaine.  The victim did not want Sanchez or the 
cocaine in her apartment, and she told him to leave.  When Sanchez refused to do so, the 
victim retrieved a knife, pointed it at him, and again told him to leave, which 
he did.  

 
 
[¶4]      Two days later, 
during the early evening hours of February 12, Sanchez and the victim were at 
her uncle's apartment.  Both were 
heavily intoxicated.  Eventually, 
the two went to the victim's apartment, which was located in the same building, 
where they continued to drink.  
Around 1:00 a.m. on the 13th, a cab service delivered more vodka and 
cigarettes to the apartment.  
Sanchez left with the cab driver, but returned to the victim's apartment 
a few minutes later.  Shortly 
thereafter, the atmosphere in the apartment abruptly and drastically 
changed.  According to the victim, 
Sanchez "snapped" while they were talking about art.  Over the next four to five hours, 
Sanchez repeatedly choked the victim, pushed her, kicked her, beat her with his 
fists, pounded her skull with a glass beer mug, and threatened to kill her.  During the mªl©e, Sanchez placed a knife 
against the victim's throat, stating: "See how easy this would be," and tied a 
cell phone cord around her neck in such a fashion that it could be tightened 
with ease at anytime.  The victim 
fought back and tried without success to escape the situation.  At one point she attempted to call 911, 
only to have Sanchez grab the phone and throw it out of her reach.  

 
 
[¶5]      The physical 
attack finally ended around 6:00 a.m. when a friend of the victim showed up at 
her apartment.  Sanchez then left 
the residence.  About 45 minutes 
later, Sanchez called 911 and reported that he had been stabbed by the 
victim.  Sergeant Chris Gulbrandson 
and Officers Jeff Sheaman and John Thompson of the Rawlins Police Department 
were dispatched to Sanchez's residence.  
After speaking with Sanchez and observing two small stab wounds, one in 
Sanchez's upper left arm and the other in his left chest, Sergeant Gulbrandson 
and Officer Sheaman went to the victim's apartment to interview her about the 
stabbing, while Officer Thompson accompanied Sanchez to the hospital.1  

 
 
[¶6]      The officers 
arrived at the victim's apartment around 7:00 a.m.  When the victim opened the door, the 
officers immediately noticed that she was covered in blood.  She had blood in her eyes and ears, as 
well as on her face, arms and legs.  
Her hair and clothing were saturated and blood was oozing from open 
wounds throughout her head and body.  
The officers also observed a cell phone cord tied around the victim's 
neck.  The officers called for 
assistance and requested that an ambulance be dispatched to the residence.  

 
 
[¶7]      When the officers 
went inside, they found an apartment in disarray; furniture was out of place 
and/or tipped over and there were cushions, bedding and other items on the 
floor.  The officers noticed blood 
on the walls and floor throughout the apartment, and found blood-soaked bedding 
in the victim's bedroom, a bloody towel in the bathroom sink, and multiple 
bloody "head prints" on the bedroom wall and bathroom door.  They also discovered a butcher knife, 
with blood on both the blade and handle, on the bedroom floor and a bloody glass 
beer mug lying on the bed.  

 
 
[¶8]      The victim was 
transported to the hospital, where she remained for approximately nine 
hours.  A medical examination 
revealed numerous bruises on the victim's face, scalp, chest, arms and hands, a 
perforated left ear drum, blood in the external canals of both ears, and several 
lacerations on her hands, left knee and left heel.  The examination also revealed a dozen 
severe lacerations in the victim's scalp and forehead, all of which had to be 
sutured.2  

 
 
[¶9]      During the 
ensuing investigation, police executed a search warrant at Sanchez's 
residence.  In a search of the game 
room where Sanchez had initially spoken with the officers that morning, police 
discovered the victim's social security card and a baggie containing 7.14 grams 
of a white powdery substance hidden behind a speaker.  Testing of that substance revealed a 
mixture of baking soda and cocaine.  

 
 
[¶10]   On February 15, 2008, the State 
charged Sanchez with one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of 
aggravated assault and battery, one count of felony possession of a controlled 
substance, and one misdemeanor count of interference with an emergency 
call.  The case went to trial on 
December 15, 2008.  At the close of 
the State's case, Sanchez moved for judgment of acquittal alleging the State had 
failed to provide sufficient evidence proving all of the elements necessary for 
conviction on the charged offenses.  
The district court denied the motion.    

 
 
[¶11]   Thereafter, Sanchez presented 
evidence in defense of the charges, including his own testimony.  Sanchez admitted striking the victim 
numerous times during a 15- to 20-minute fight, but claimed he did so in 
self-defense.  Sanchez testified 
that, during this time, the victim continually bit him and stabbed him three 
times, and he punched her in the head and body in order to get the knife away 
from her and to stop the biting.  
Sanchez, however, denied responsibility for the full extent of the 
victim's injuries and specifically denied striking her with the beer mug.  He also denied taking the victim's phone 
during the incident, tying the cord around her neck, and having any knowledge of 
the cocaine found behind the stereo speaker.  

 
 
[¶12]   At the conclusion of a four-day 
trial, the jury acquitted Sanchez on the attempted first degree murder charge, 
but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree 
murder, as well as guilty on the other charged offenses.   The district court sentenced 
Sanchez on March 20, 2009, to a combined prison term of thirty to forty years. 
Sanchez appealed the judgment and sentence, and that appeal was docketed in this 
Court as case number S-09-0113.

 
 
[¶13]   While his direct appeal was pending 
in this Court, Sanchez moved the district court for a new trial on the grounds 
of juror misconduct, alleging that two jurors failed to disclose during voir 
dire that they knew Sanchez as a result of their employment at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  The district court 
held an evidentiary hearing and denied Sanchez's new trial motion.  Sanchez appealed that denial, and that 
appeal was docketed in this Court as case number S-10-0044.  This Court consolidated the 
appeals.

 
 
[¶14]   More than one month after filing 
his opening appellate brief, Sanchez, through new counsel, filed a motion in 
this Court requesting a limited remand to the district court for an evidentiary 
hearing concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel.  In addition, or in the alternative, 
Sanchez requested that he be permitted to file a supplemental brief on the issue 
of whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.3  We denied Sanchez's motion for a remand, 
but granted his request to file a supplemental brief addressing trial counsel's 
alleged ineffectiveness.

 
 
[¶15]   Additional facts will be set forth 
as necessary in our discussion of Sanchez's appellate issues. 

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal

 
 
[¶16]   Sanchez first takes issue with the 
district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
possession charge.  Sanchez 
maintains the evidence was insufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that 
he was in actual or constructive possession of the cocaine.  Our response to Sanchez's argument will 
be brief.

 
 
[¶17]   As previously noted, Sanchez moved 
for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case.  After the district court denied that 
motion, Sanchez introduced evidence in defense of the possession charge. The law 
is well established that a defendant's introduction of evidence following the 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case 
constitutes a waiver of that motion, thereby precluding appellate review of that 
denial.  Granzer v. State, 2010 WY 130, ¶ 7, 239 P.3d 640, 643-44 (Wyo. 2010); Butcher v. 
State, 2005 WY 146, ¶¶ 12, 14, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo. 2005); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 
(Wyo. 2000); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995); see also 6 
Wayne R. LaFave et al. Criminal 
Procedure § 24.6(b) at 443-44 (3d ed. 2007).  Consistent with existing law, we hold 
that Sanchez waived the right to challenge the district court's ruling in this 
appeal.  Consequently, we will not 
consider his claim.  We also do not 
consider whether the evidence as a whole at the close of all the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain Sanchez's possession conviction because Sanchez did not 
raise that discrete issue in his opening brief.

 
 

Hearsay 
Testimony

 
 
[¶18]   At trial, Sergeant Gulbrandson 
testified that after speaking to Sanchez on the morning of February 13, he went 
to the victim's apartment to interview her about the reported stabbing.  He then testified as to the victim's 
behavior and appearance when she opened the door to her apartment: 

 
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: [The victim] slowly opened the door, kind of peeked -- she wasn't 
sure -- you could tell she wasn't sure who was at the door, so she kind of 
peeked around the door.  When she 
seen myself and Officer Sheaman, she opened the door 
fully.

 
 
Her 
condition at that time was very scary.  
She was completely covered in blood.  She had dried blood around her 
lips.  She had blood in her ears and 
her eyes.  Her hair was actually 
matted with blood.  She had blood on 
her shirt, on her arms.  It was 
fairly gruesome.  

 
 
Sergeant 
Gulbrandson then testified about his assessment of the seriousness of her 
injuries:

 
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: Her condition was very hard to diagnose, because there was so much 
blood, and it was coagulated and matted and it was hard to tell how many 
injuries she had, where exactly they were, and whether or not they were 
life-threatening.  She -- I 
originally noticed there was a cord around her neck.  I checked that, made sure it wasn't 
constricting her airway.  I checked 
for profuse bleeding from any wound.  
She typically had an oozing effect about her whole body. . . 
.

 
 
                        
* * * * 

 
 
Blood 
continually came out of her head.  
Her hair actually dripped with blood.  

 
 
 
 
The 
sergeant next described the victim's demeanor:

 
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: I was rather dumbfounded by her demeanor.  She was -- she was very agitated.  She didn't actually complain of a lot of 
pain, but you could tell -- I think she was kind of numb.  She was very talkative.  I could -- obviously she was either 
intoxicated or was suffering from a head wound to make her appear to be 
intoxicated.  She was just very 
angry.  

 
 
[¶19]   When the State asked if the victim 
had made any statements regarding what had happened to her, defense counsel 
posed a hearsay objection.  After 
some discussion, the district court overruled defense counsel's objection and 
allowed the testimony under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay 
rule.  Thereafter, the following 
exchange occurred:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:     . . . What statements, 
if any, did she make as to how she had gotten into that 
condition?

 
 
[SERGEANT 
GULBRANDSON]: She stated that Henry tried to kill her throughout the 
night.

 
 
Q.        Did 
she make any other statements regarding that night during the time that she was 
talking to you?

 
 
A.        She 
stated she was -- that Henry choked her, that he beat her with a mug that night, 
that he beat her -- it was just an all-night-long ordeal.

 
 
            
            
* * * * 

 
 
Q.        . . . 
Did she state to you whether or not she had fought Mr. Sanchez off during the 
night?

 
 
A.        She 
was very proud of herself to the fact that she had fought all night and believed 
that was the reason that she was still alive.  

 
 
[¶20]   Sanchez contends the district court 
erred in allowing the testimony of Sergeant Gulbrandson under the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  
In reviewing the propriety of the district court's evidentiary ruling, we 
are guided by the following principles:

 
 

Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. The burden is 
on the [appellant] to establish such abuse.

 
 

Brown 
v. State, 
2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 2005) (quotation marks and internal 
citations omitted); see also Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 699, 703 (Wyo. 2005); Holloman v. State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 
883 (Wyo. 2005).

[¶21]   Hearsay is defined as "a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  W.R.E. 801(c).  Hearsay is not admissible unless it 
falls within a well-delineated exception.  
W.R.E. 802.  An exception is 
found for an "excited utterance," which is defined as "[a] statement relating to 
a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition."  W.R.E. 803(2).  In addressing the excited utterance 
exception, we have said:

 
 
"The 
exception is founded upon the proposition that a statement made during the 
stress of excitement resulting from a startling event is probably trustworthy, 
since there is not leisure to reflect, contrive or fabricate.  The rule assumes the presence of a 
startling event which temporarily stills the senses and alleviates any motive to 
fabricate.  A leading treatise 
explains that the excited utterance exception is justified by the special 
reliability that is furnished when excitement suspends the declarant's powers of 
reflection and fabrication.'"

 
 

Boykin 
v. State, 
2005 WY 15, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 481, 483 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 961 (Wyo. 
2000)) (citations omitted in original).

 
 
[¶22]   This Court has identified five 
factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of evidence under the 
excited utterance exception:  (1) 
the nature of the startling event; (2) the declarant's physical manifestation of 
excitement; (3) the declarant's age; (4) the lapse of time between the event and 
the hearsay statement; and (5) whether the statement was made in response to an 
inquiry.  Boykin, ¶ 8, 105 P.3d  at 483.  The ultimate inquiry is whether the 
"declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, 
excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and 
deliberation."  Id. (quoting James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo. 
1994)).

 
 
[¶23]   In this case, the first factor 
weighs heavily in favor of admissibility.  
The victim was the recipient of a savage beating that took place over a 
period of hours.  Little question 
exists that the beating was a shocking and startling event.  The second factor, the victim's 
manifestation of excitement, also favors admission.  At the time the statements were made, 
the victim was very angry and agitated, and she was pacing back and forth in the 
apartment.  The third factor, the 
victim's age, is neutral with respect to these facts, but the fourth factor 
favors admission.  The precise time 
elapsing between when the beatings actually stopped and the statements is 
unclear from the record, but the record shows the victim was still under the 
stress of the incident when she spoke to Officer Gulbrandson approximately one 
hour after Sanchez left the apartment.  
See Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 926 (Wyo. 1999) (under stress of excitement 45 minutes after startling 
event); see also United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980) (under the stress of 
excitement 45 to 75 minutes after startling event).  The fifth factor also favors 
admissibility because there is no indication the statements were made in 
response to an inquiry by the officers as to what Sanchez had done.  Finally, based on the descriptions of 
the victim provided at trial, we are confident that her statements were not the 
product of reflection or deliberation.  
We find the challenged statements were properly admitted as excited 
utterances under W.R.E. 803(2) and, consequently, no abuse of discretion 
occurred in this instance. 

 
 
District 
Court Referring to AI as "the victim"

 
 
[¶24]   Sanchez contends that reversible 
error occurred when the district court referred to AI as the victim in the 
case.  Sanchez claims the district 
court's actions violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and 
effectively nullified his claim of self-defense.

 
 
[¶25]   At issue is the following statement 
made during the State's voir dire, which we have highlighted and placed in 
context:4

 
 
THE 
COURT:  First of all, this case 
happened February 13, 2008.  It 
happened . . . in Rawlins, Wyoming.  
That's in Carbon County.  
It's in the . . . Apartments.  
Now, I don't know if there has been much media coverage, but you already 
know who the defendant is in this case.  
It is Mr. Henry R. Sanchez.  
The victim is [AI].  Does anybody know about this case?  Has anybody heard about this case prior 
to coming in here today?  [Emphasis 
added.]  

 
 
Sanchez 
acknowledges that he did not object to the alleged error at trial and, 
consequently, he bears the burden of demonstrating plain error.  Under the plain error doctrine, Sanchez 
must prove, by reference to the record, the existence of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law which was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way 
and resulting material prejudice to a substantial right.  Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 797-98 (Wyo. 2006); Duke v. 
State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 91, 99 P.3d 928, 954 (Wyo. 2004).  To establish material prejudice, Sanchez 
must show a reasonable possibility exists that he would have received a more 
favorable verdict in the absence of the error.  Miller, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d  at 798.  We find that Sanchez has not satisfied 
his burden.

 
 
[¶26]   Primarily, we are not convinced 
that any error occurred in this instance.  
Sanchez's entire argument is premised on a contention that the district 
court improperly "instructed" the jury panel, and thus members of the seated 
jury, that AI was, in fact, the victim in the case.5  However, viewing the challenged 
statement in proper context, it is clear the district court was simply 
describing the alleged roles of the major identified players in the case in an 
effort to ascertain if any of the potential jurors had knowledge of the case, or 
had any ties to it or the parties which might prevent them from being impartial 
or fair.  The district court did not 
tell the panel that, as a matter of law, it had to consider AI to be a victim, 
much less Sanchez's victim.

 
 
[¶27]   Moreover, we are not persuaded the 
district court's statement materially prejudiced Sanchez.  The district court's description of AI 
as the victim was a single, isolated incident that occurred at the beginning of 
a four-day trial.  The jury was 
instructed that it was the sole judge of the facts of the case and that it was 
to disregard any comment the court made regarding the facts in assessing 
Sanchez's guilt or innocence on the charged offenses.  Additionally, it was uncontested at 
trial that AI was the victim of a vicious beating.6  The only real dispute concerned whether 
Sanchez was her assailant and, if so, whether he was the first aggressor or 
acted in self-defense.  Lastly, as 
already noted, the evidence of Sanchez's guilt was substantial.  After careful consideration of the 
record, we do not believe a reasonable possibility exists that the jury's 
verdict would have been more favorable to Sanchez in the absence of that 
isolated statement.  Accordingly, we 
cannot find the existence of plain error.

 
 
Denial 
of Motion for New Trial

 
 
[¶28]   During voir dire, the prosecutor 
inquired of the jury panel if anyone "knew" Sanchez.  Several potential jurors acknowledged 
personally knowing Sanchez.  One of 
the potential jurors, Juror R., indicated during an in-chamber discussion that 
he had direct knowledge and experience with Sanchez through his employment in 
the intensive treatment unit, a drug and alcohol program, at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  Upon defense 
counsel's request, the district court removed Juror R. for cause.  Two additional jurors from the venire, 
Juror K. and Juror P., also worked at the state penitentiary.  Neither indicated during voir dire that 
they knew Sanchez.  Both served as 
jurors on Sanchez's trial. 

 
 
[¶29]   After trial, an investigator for 
the Wyoming Public Defender's Office interviewed the jurors who sat on Sanchez's 
trial.  During those interviews, 
several jurors allegedly commented regarding Juror P.'s and Juror K.'s 
employment at the state penitentiary.  
Juror P. allegedly informed the investigator that he knew from his 
employment that Sanchez had previously been incarcerated at the state 
penitentiary.  Based on this newly 
discovered information, Sanchez filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 33(c), asserting, in pertinent part, that Jurors P. and K. committed 
misconduct by failing to disclose their knowledge of him during voir dire.  More particularly, relying on McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984), Sanchez 
contended that his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury had been 
violated by the jurors' failure to answer honestly a material question during 
voir dire for, had they disclosed they knew him, such would have provided a 
valid basis for a challenge for cause, as had been the case with Juror R.  Sanchez also alleged the jurors were 
biased against him.  

 
 
[¶30]   The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which Juror K. and Juror P., as well as 
four other jurors, testified.  Juror 
K. testified that he did not know Sanchez prior to the trial.  He went on to explain that his duties at 
the prison did not provide him the opportunity to meet and interact with the 
inmates.  Juror P. testified as 
follows regarding his knowledge of Sanchez:

 
 
[APPELLATE 
COUNSEL]:  Did you know Mr. Sanchez 
prior to the start of the trial?

 
 
A.        Not 
personally.

 
 
Q.        Could 
you explain that to me.

 
 
A.        I 
didn't -- I knew of a previous incarceration at the penitentiary 
before.

 
 
Q.        And 
how did you know . . . of a previous incarceration before?

 
 
A.        I 
worked there.  It was -- under 
custody -- I had seen him prior at the penitentiary.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Q.        Did 
you know what he was incarcerated for?

 
 
A.        
No.  

 
 
[¶31]   The district court ultimately 
issued a decision letter and order denying Sanchez's new trial motion.  In relevant part, the district court 
determined that Sanchez had not demonstrated that either juror intentionally 
failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire, nor had he shown 
that the two jurors were biased.  In 
this appeal, Sanchez challenges the district court's ruling.7

 
 
[¶32]   The law is well settled that a 
defendant seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must establish: 
1) the new evidence did not come to the defendant's knowledge until after the 
trial; 2) that it was not owing to the lack of due diligence that the new 
evidence did not come to light sooner; 3) the evidence is so material that it 
would probably produce a different verdict if a new trial is granted; and 4) the 
evidence is not cumulative.  Smith v. State, 2008 WY 98, ¶ 15, 190 P.3d 522, 526 (Wyo. 2008); Opie v. 
State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967).  
All four of these factors must be met for a defendant to be entitled to a 
new trial, and, if any one factor is not satisfied, there is no error in the 
denial of the new trial motion.  
Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531, 535 (Wyo.1983).  A denial of a motion for new trial is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
Chauncey v. State, 2006 WY 18, 
¶ 13, 127 P.3d 18, 21 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶33]   No question exists that the 
evidence of juror misconduct/bias in this case was newly discovered evidence and 
that its late discovery was not due to the lack of due diligence.  Rather, the issue here revolves around 
the substantive question of whether Sanchez could show that Juror P. was 
dishonest during voir dire and biased against him, an inquiry relevant to the 
issue of materiality encompassed in the third element of the new trial 
standard.  Smith, ¶ 16, 190 P.3d  at 
527.

 
 
[¶34]   This Court has summarized the law 
applicable to the determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a new 
trial based on allegations that a juror was untruthful during voir dire or was 
biased:

 
 
Requests 
for a new trial on the basis that a juror was not honest during voir dire 
or was biased may be brought in different ways.  First, a claim may be brought under the 
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
McDonough.  In order to 
obtain a new trial under McDonough, 464 U.S.  at 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, a 
party must demonstrate

 
 
that 
a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and 
then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for 
a challenge for cause.  The motives 
for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a 
juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a 
trial.

 
 
In 
order to satisfy the first part of the McDonough test, the party must 
show that the juror intentionally gave an incorrect answer to a voir dire 
question.  Gonzales v. 
Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDonough 
test to a criminal case).  The 
question of whether a juror was honest during voir dire is a factual 
determination reviewed for clear error.  
Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 
164 F.3d 511, 515 (10th Cir. 1998).

 
 
* 
* * *

 

In 
addition to the McDonough test, a party can obtain a new trial by showing 
that the juror had an actual or implied bias.  Skaggs, 164 F.3d  at 516.  "A finding of actual bias is based upon 
express proof, e.g., . . . admission by the prospective juror of a state of mind 
prejudicial to a party's interest.'"  
Id. at 517, quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 
984 (2d. Cir. 1968).  "Actual bias 
is a factual finding reviewed for clear error."  Id. at 516.  See also, Gonzales, 99 F.3d  at 
986.  A determination on a claim of implied bias, on the 
other hand, is a question of law reviewed de novo.  Skaggs, 164 F.3d  at 517.  "Implied bias can be proved by showing 
that the juror had a personal connection to the parties or circumstances of the 
trial'" or when there are "similarities between the personal experiences of the 
juror and the issues being litigated."  
Id., quoting Gonzales, 99 F.3d  at 
987.

 
 

Smith, 
¶¶ 26-27, 29, 190 P.3d  at 530-32.

 
 
[¶35]   With these legal principles in 
mind, we now turn to the question of whether the district court correctly denied 
the motion for new trial.  The 
district court concluded that Sanchez did not satisfy the first part of the McDonough test:

 
 
Based 
upon Juror [P.'s] testimony, the Court finds that Juror [P.] did not fail to 
answer the question regarding whether he knew Mr. Sanchez honestly.  His testimony reveals that he knew whom 
Mr. Sanchez was and knew of Mr. Sanchez, but he did not feel that he "knew" Mr. 
Sanchez.

 
 
This 
case is analogous to United States v. 
McConnell [sic], 464 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).  There, jurors were asked if they had 
ever been involved "in any court" in a criminal matter in which they had been a 
defendant, witness, or victim.  Id. at 1156.  The eventual jury foreman did not 
respond, although he had once been charged with several felonies.  Id.  The charges against the jury foreman had 
been dismissed at an early stage in the proceedings.  Id.  At the hearing on the defendant's new 
trial request, the jury foreman stated that he did not respond to the voir dire inquiry because he had not 
been "involved in any court" since the charges against him had been dismissed 
before trial.  Id.  The court found that, though the juror's 
answer (or non-answer) was mistaken, it was not dishonest.  Id. at 1157.  "The McDonough test is directed at 
intentionally incorrect responses[.]'"  
Id. at 1157-58 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th 
Cir. 1996)).

 
 
The 
facts in this case are even more innocuous.  Juror [P.] did not think that he "knew" 
Mr. Sanchez and responded accordingly.  
Though it was later discovered that Juror [P.] knew who Mr. Sanchez was, 
this fact does not indicate his response (or non-response) was dishonest or 
intentionally incorrect.  The 
testimony of Juror [C.] also supports Juror [P.'s] testimony that he knew who 
Mr. Sanchez was, but did not "know" him.  
(See November 10, 2009[,] 
Transcript, p. [50] ("I'm not sure that he said that he knew him, but he said 
that he knew who he was."[)).]  

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Mr. 
Sanchez has not demonstrated that . . . Juror [P.] failed to answer honestly a 
material question in voir dire.  He, therefore, cannot satisfy the McDonough test . . . 
.

 
 
[¶36]   After careful review, we cannot say 
that the district court's conclusion was clearly erroneous.  While we might agree with Sanchez that 
Juror P. should have answered the voir dire question in the affirmative, we 
cannot conclude that his failure to do so was anything other than an honest 
mistake based on a misunderstanding of the scope of that question.  Since there is no evidence that Juror P. 
deliberately failed to answer honestly a material question in voir dire, we 
agree with the district court that the McDonough test cannot be satisfied.  As such, it is not necessary to address 
the second part of the test.

 
 
[¶37]   The district court also found that 
Sanchez failed to prove the existence of actual or implied bias on the part of 
Juror P.  In his appellate brief, 
Sanchez does not challenge the district court's finding with respect to actual 
bias, and he fails to offer any cogent argument, in accordance with Skaggs, proving that Juror P. was 
impliedly biased.  We therefore 
summarily affirm the district court's determination on this 
issue.

 
 
[¶38]   In sum, we hold the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez's motion for a new trial. 

 
 

Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶39]   Sanchez contends trial counsel 
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  Specifically, Sanchez faults counsel for 
not conducting an adequate voir dire and for failing to object to leading 
questions, references to AI, the complaining party, as the victim, the 
prosecutor's declaration in opening statement that Sanchez would testify, the 
prosecutor's reference to the white powdery substance as cocaine, testimony that 
Sanchez was possibly selling cocaine, improper opinion testimony by the State's 
witnesses, and the prosecutor's statement that Sanchez was seeking "jury 
nullification" with respect to the cocaine possession 
charge.

 
 
[¶40]   Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel entail mixed questions of law and fact and, consequently, our review is 
de novo.  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 2008).  For 
Sanchez to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, he must first establish that 
trial counsel's performance was deficient.  
This requires a showing that counsel failed to render such assistance as 
would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 18, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Hirsch 
v. State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 593 (Wyo. 2006)).  Sanchez then must demonstrate that 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  Under the prejudice prong, Sanchez must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of his trial would have been different.  Dettloff, ¶¶ 18-19, 152 P.3d  at 
382.  The failure to make the 
required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats 
an ineffectiveness claim.  Id.

 
 
[¶41]   We find that Sanchez has not 
satisfied his burden on either prong of the ineffectiveness standard.  First, Sanchez's ineffectiveness 
argument is devoid of any analysis establishing that counsel's performance was 
legally deficient in any of the identified areas.  For example, Sanchez's contention that 
counsel should have posed an objection when various witnesses gave allegedly 
improper testimony consists essentially of excerpts of the witnesses' trial 
testimony without any analysis or citations to pertinent legal authorities.  His other claims concerning counsel's 
failure to object are similarly deficient.  
As to counsel's alleged inadequate voir dire, Sanchez simply points to 
the fact the voir dire consisted of "some twenty questions" spanning six pages 
of the trial transcript, and offers only a conclusory characterization of it as 
extremely brief and shallow and "below the line of competence."  Sanchez does not identify with any 
specificity the questions counsel were remiss in not pursuing, nor does he 
otherwise provide any insight into what counsel should have, or even could have, 
done differently.  Sanchez's 
argument seems to rest on the fact the district court twice expressed 
frustration with counsel on other matters during his trial.  However, this fact alone does not 
establish that counsel's performance was outside the range of professionally 
competent assistance with respect to the specific matters at issue in this 
appeal.

 
 
[¶42]   More importantly, Sanchez has made 
absolutely no showing of actual prejudice arising from counsel's alleged 
deficient performance.  That is, he 
does not explain, within the context of the facts of this case, how counsel's 
alleged errors adversely affected the outcome of his trial.  Rather, Sanchez offers nothing more than 
a bald assertion that prejudice occurred.  
His argument in this regard seems to be simply: "Because I said it is so, 
then it must be so."  Suffice it to 
say, Sanchez's argument is utterly insufficient to satisfy his burden of proving 
counsel rendered prejudicially deficient assistance.  We therefore reject Sanchez's claim that 
he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.

 
 
[¶43]   Before leaving this topic, we are 
compelled to address an additional matter.  
As already noted, Sanchez presented a motion to this Court requesting 
that we grant a partial remand in order for the district court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether his trial counsel provided legally 
effective assistance.  This Court 
denied his motion.  Sanchez 
challenges that denial in his appellate brief and asks this Court to reconsider 
and grant his remand request.  We 
decline Sanchez's request for the reasons discussed below.  

 
 
[¶44]   There are generally two types of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, those that are apparent in the trial 
record and those that are outside the record.  An evidentiary hearing is necessary only 
on the latter type of claim, if an appellant can make a showing that his 
ineffectiveness claim has merit.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶¶ 27-29, 
100 P.3d 394, 407 (Wyo. 2004); Calene v. 
State, 846 P.2d 679, 687 (Wyo. 1993); 
W.R.A.P. 21(a).  ("Such remand 
shall be available only if the motion is accompanied by affidavits containing 
nonspeculative allegations of facts, not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel's 
representation was deficient and prejudiced the 
appellant.")

 
 
[¶45]   In his motion for remand, Sanchez 
claims his trial counsel were ineffective in five general ways.  First, Sanchez complains that trial 
counsel failed to present evidence that the victim engaged in a sham marriage 
with a Russian national and encouraged others to engage in such marriages.  Sanchez does not identify any legal 
basis for the admissibility of this "sham marriage" evidence, nor does he 
explain how its admission would alter the outcome of his trial. 

 
 
[¶46]   Second, Sanchez contends trial 
counsel were ineffective in failing to call four witnesses who would have 
testified the victim told conflicting stories about the altercation and one 
witness who would have testified about the victim's general reputation for 
dishonesty.  Sanchez does not 
identify, via affidavit or otherwise, the proposed testimony of the five 
individuals.  Nor does he identify 
the prejudice resulting from counsel's failure.

 
 
[¶47]   Third, Sanchez contends that his 
mother should have been called as a witness to testify regarding her knowledge 
of the baggie containing cocaine.  
He claims his mother would have testified that a police officer took the 
baggie from her freezer and "planted" it behind the stereo speaker.  An affidavit from his mother supports 
this claim.  The affidavit indicates 
that his mother advised trial counsel of this information and of her desire to 
testify about the same at trial.  
Sanchez does not explain how trial counsel's apparent tactical decision 
not to have his mother testify constituted prejudicially deficient 
assistance.

 
 
[¶48]   Fourth, Sanchez complains that 
trial counsel did not permit him to participate in jury selection, and claims 
that, if provided a list of the venire, he would have identified panel members 
who knew him from his time at the penitentiary.  Sanchez does not identify these panel 
members.  If this claim involves the 
same jurors who were the subject of his new trial motion, the matter has been 
addressed in this opinion.

 

[¶49]   Lastly, Sanchez generally contends 
that trial counsel did not adequately communicate with him prior to trial.  Even assuming they did not, Sanchez does 
not identify how counsel's lack of communication actually prejudiced 
him.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶50]   We find no reversible error with 
respect to any of the issues raised in this appeal.  Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Sanchez was treated for the two stab wounds, as well as some minor 
scratches on his face and chest.  
While there, Sanchez was belligerent and uncooperative with medical and 
law enforcement personnel and ultimately had to be chemically sedated.  

 
 

2The doctor who treated the victim testified that in his 29 years of 
practice he had rarely seen an individual, including victims of wrecks, with 
injuries as extensive as the victim's.  

 
 

3After new counsel entered his appearance, this Court allowed the Wyoming 
Public Defender's Office to withdraw as Sanchez's 
counsel.

 
 

4After reviewing the transcript of voir dire, we question whether the 
district court actually uttered the statement at issue.  When viewed in context, this entire 
excerpt appears to be an aspect of the prosecutor's voir dire that was 
inadvertently attributed to the district court by the court reporter.  However, because the parties have 
proceeded on the assumption the transcript is correct, we will also do 
so.

 
 

5A jury instruction is defined as "[a] direction or guideline that a judge 
gives a jury concerning the law of the case."  Black's Law Dictionary 935 (9th ed. 
2009).

 
 

6"Victim" is defined as a "person harmed by a crime, tort, or other 
wrong."  Black's Law Dictionary 1703 
(9th ed. 2009).

 
 

7On appeal, Sanchez has abandoned his attack on Juror K., and limits his 
argument to challenging the district court's ruling concerning Juror 
P.