Title: Freeman v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JEROME FREEMAN,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 112, 2003
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Kent County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IK95-07-0124 
§                   IK95-07-0121
§
Submitted: March 12, 2003
  Decided:   April 8, 2003
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 8th day of April 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a),
it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Jerome Freeman, filed an appeal from the
Superior Court’s February 14, 2003 order denying his motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of
1SUPR. CT. R. 25(a).
2Freeman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 237, 1997, Berger, J. (Aug. 20, 1997).
-2-
the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Freeman’s
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and AFFIRM.
(2)
In November 1995, Freeman pleaded guilty to one count of
Misdemeanor Theft and was sentenced to 1 year incarceration at Level V.  In
January 1996, Freeman pleaded guilty to Forgery in the Second Degree and was
sentenced to 2 years incarceration at Level V, to be followed by 1 year at
decreasing levels of probation.  Freeman did not file direct appeals from either
of his convictions or sentences.  In 1996 Freeman filed a postconviction motion
arguing that his counsel was ineffective and that the charges against him
violated double jeopardy. The Superior Court denied the motion and this Court
affirmed.2  Subsequent postconviction motions filed by Freeman contained the
same arguments raised in his 1996 motion.
(3)
In this appeal, Freeman once again argues that his counsel was
ineffective and that the charges against him violated double jeopardy.  In a
“Supplement to Appellant’s Opening Brief,” Freeman also argues that the
Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his request for a transcript of
his November 1995 guilty plea at State expense.
3SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (1).
4SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4).
5Id.
6U.S. v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317, 330 (1976); Bratcher v. State, Del. Supr., No.
331, 1998, Veasey, C.J. (Nov. 10, 1998).
-3-
(4)
The Superior Court correctly denied Freeman’s repetitive
postconviction motion.  Not only is Freeman’s motion time-barred,3 his claims
are barred as formerly adjudicated.4  Moreover, there is no evidence that
reconsideration of the claims is warranted in the interest of justice.5  There was
also no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in denying
Freeman’s motion for a transcript of his guilty plea.  Absent a showing that
there is some legal or factual basis for relief and that there is a particularized
need for a transcript, the Superior Court is within its discretion to deny a
request for a transcript at State expense.6 
(5)
It is manifest on the face of Freeman’s opening brief that this
appeal is without merit because the issues on appeal are controlled by settled
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly
there was no abuse of discretion.
-4-
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice