Title: Hall v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC10-1335 
_____________ 
 
FREDDIE LEE HALL, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[September 8, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case comes before this Court on remand from the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  In our previous 
decision in Hall v. State (Hall IX), 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012), we affirmed the 
Fifth Circuit court’s denial of Hall’s postconviction motion, holding that our 
interpretation of section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, in Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 
702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007), was proper.  We concluded that because Hall failed to 
establish that his IQ was below 70, the circuit court properly denied his claim.  The 
United States Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that our decision 
interpreted section 921.137 so narrowly that it precluded sentencing courts from 
 
 
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considering substantial evidence that is accepted by the medical community to be 
probative of intellectual disability.   
 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida, on July 25, 2014, 
we granted Hall’s motion for supplemental briefing.  After careful consideration of 
the parties’ briefs, the voluminous record, and the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision, we withdraw our prior opinion and conclude that Hall has demonstrated 
that he meets the clinical, statutory, and constitutional requirements to establish 
that his intellectual disability serves as a bar to execution.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the circuit court’s order denying postconviction relief, vacate Hall’s sentence of 
death, and remand for imposition of a life sentence. 
FACTS 
Freddie Lee Hall was tried and convicted in Putnam Country for the 1978 
murder of Karol Hurst.1  Hall v. State (Hall I), 403 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 1981).  
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial was moved from Sumter County to Putnam County on Hall’s 
motion for change of venue.  Hall and his codefendant, Mack Ruffin, were also 
indicted for the murder of Deputy Sheriff Lonnie Coburn.  Hall, 403 So. 2d at 1323 
n.1.  Hall was tried separately for the murder of Hurst.  Id.  The facts of the Hurst 
murder are described differently by the courts.  These facts are clear: Hurst was 
seven months pregnant, forced into her car by Hall, driven to a secluded wooded 
area, and then beaten, sexually assaulted, and shot.  In Hall I, it is stated that the 
State presented the evidence as though the codefendants acted in unison, although 
Hall stated in his confession that Ruffin alone committed the sexual battery and 
murder.  Hall I, 403 So. 2d at 1323.  In Hall VII, this Court summarized the facts 
stating “both men raped the victim, after which she was beaten and shot and her 
body dragged further into the woods.  Later that day. . . they killed a deputy 
sheriff.”  Hall v. State (Hall VII), 614 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1993).  The gun used 
 
 
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This Court upheld Hall’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  Id. at 1325.  
On September 9, 1982, the governor signed Hall’s first death warrant, effective for 
the week of October 1-8, 1982.  Hall v. State (Hall II), 420 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 
1982).  Hall filed a motion to vacate, a habeas petition, and an application for stay 
of execution, all of which were denied.  Id.  Hall then sought habeas relief in the 
federal court, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing.  Hall v. 
Wainwright (Hall III), 733 F.2d 766, 769 (11th Cir. 1984).  Hall appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed in part and remanded for a 
hearing.  Id. at 777 (finding that Hall was entitled to a hearing on the issues of his 
absence from the courtroom and whether he deliberately bypassed his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim).   
 
On remand, the district court again denied relief, finding that Hall’s absences 
from trial occurred in non-critical stages and were therefore harmless, and that he 
deliberately bypassed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Hall v. 
Wainwright (Hall IV), 805 F.2d 945, 946 (11th Cir. 1986).   The Eleventh Circuit 
                                          
 
to kill Hurst was found under the deputy’s body.  Id.  However, in his special 
concurrence in Hall VIII, Justice Anstead stated, “it is important to note that Hall 
did not actually kill the victim.  Rather, his codefendant, Ruffin, was the actual 
killer.  It should also not go unnoticed that the actual killer, Ruffin, received a life 
sentence while Hall was sentenced to death.”  Hall v. State (Hall VIII), 742 So. 2d 
225, 233 (Fla. 1999) (Anstead, J., specially concurring (citing Hall VII, 614 So. 2d 
at 478-79)).  Accordingly, it is not readily apparent whether Hall committed the 
murder, but this Court has found him to be an active participant in the crimes. 
 
 
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affirmed the denial.  Id. at 948.  Hall then petitioned for habeas relief with this 
Court based on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 
481 U.S. 393 (1987).  This Court held that any error in the sentencing was 
harmless.  Hall v. Dugger (Hall V), 531 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1988). 
 
The governor then signed a second death warrant on September 20, 1988.  
Hall v. State (Hall VI), 541 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 1989).  Hall filed his second 
3.850 motion, alleging error under Hitchcock.  The trial court found that this 
Court’s ruling on the issue in Hall V was a procedural bar to Hall’s raising the 
claim again.  Id.  This Court disagreed, stating that the “case involves significant 
additional non-record facts” that had not been considered on habeas review.  Id.  
Ultimately, this Court determined that a Hitchcock error occurred, and that such 
error could not be considered harmless.  Id. at 1128.  This Court then vacated 
Hall’s death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.  Id.
 
During the resentencing,2 the trial court found Hall intellectually disabled as 
a mitigating factor and gave it “unquantifiable” weight.  State v. Hall, No. 78-52-
CF (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir. Feb. 21, 1991) (Findings of Fact for Sentencing Order).  The 
court again condemned Hall, and this Court affirmed.  Hall VII, 614 So. 2d at 479.  
                                          
 
 
2.  The resentencing was held in Marion County upon Hall’s motion for 
change of venue and after the original trial judge disqualified himself, stating “the 
only proper disposition herein is for the execution of the Death Sentence originally 
imposed upon the defendant.” 
 
 
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Hall sought postconviction relief, which was denied.  Hall VIII, 742 So. 2d at 225.  
This Court affirmed the denial.  Id. at 230.  In finding that the trial court properly 
denied Hall’s claim that the court erred in finding him competent to proceed at the 
resentencing, this Court stated “While there is no doubt that [Hall] has serious 
mental difficulties, is probably somewhat retarded, and certainly has learning 
difficulties and a speech impediment, the Court finds that [Hall] was competent at 
the resentencing hearings.”  Id. at 229.  In a special concurrence, Justice Anstead 
wrote that while the majority was technically correct regarding the procedural bars 
to Hall’s claim, his intellectual disability should provide a bar to his execution.  
Quoting Chief Justice Barkett’s dissent in Hall VII, he noted that the evidence 
showed Hall’s mental retardation: 
 
The testimony reflects that Hall has an IQ of 60; he suffers 
from organic brain damage, chronic psychosis, a speech impediment, 
and a learning disability; he is functionally illiterate; and he has a 
short-term memory equivalent to that of a first grader.  The defense’s 
four expert witnesses who testified regarding Hall’s mental condition 
stated that his handicaps would have affected him at the time of the 
crime.  As the trial judge noted in the resentencing order, Freddie Lee 
Hall was “raised under the most horrible family circumstances 
imaginable.” 
 
Indeed, the trial judge found that Hall had established 
substantial mitigation.  The judge wrote that the evidence conclusively 
demonstrated that Hall “may have been suffering from mental and 
emotional disturbances and may have been, to some extent, unable to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law.”  Additionally, the judge found that Hall 
suffers from organic brain damage, has been mentally retarded all of 
his life, suffers from mental illness, suffered tremendous emotional 
deprivation and disturbances throughout his life, suffered tremendous 
 
 
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physical abuse and torture as a child, and has learning disabilities and 
a distinct speech impediment that adversely affected his development. 
 
Hall’s mental deficiency as an adult is not surprising.  The 
sixteenth of seventeen children, Hall was tortured by his mother and 
abused by neighbors.  Various relatives testified that Hall’s mother 
tied him in a “croaker” sack, swung it over a fire, and beat him; buried 
him in the sand up to his neck to “strengthen his legs”; tied his hands 
to a rope that was attached to a ceiling beam and beat him while he 
was naked; locked him in a smokehouse for long intervals; and held a 
gun on Hall and his siblings while she poked them with sticks.  Hall’s 
mother withheld food from her children because she believed a famine 
was imminent, and she allowed neighbors to punish Hall by forcing 
him to stay underneath a bed for an entire day. 
 
Hall’s school records reflect his mental deficiencies.  His 
teachers in the fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades described him 
as mentally retarded.  His fifth grade teacher stated that he was 
mentally maladjusted, and still another teacher wrote that “his mental 
maturity is far below his chronological age.” 
Hall VIII, 742 So. 2d at 231 (Anstead, J. specially concurring (quoting Hall VII, 
614 So. 2d at 479-80 (Barkett, C.J. dissenting))). 
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the 
execution of a person with an intellectual disability.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002).  Hall filed a motion to declare section 921.137, Florida Statutes, 
unconstitutional.  While the motion was pending, this Court adopted rule 3.203 as 
a mechanism to file Atkins claims.  Hall timely filed such a claim on November 
30, 2004.  No action was taken on the motion until, on March 27, 2008, Hall filed 
an unsuccessful motion to prohibit relitigation of the intellectual disability issue.  
The court then held an evidentiary hearing on Hall’s successive motion to vacate 
his sentence. 
 
 
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At the evidentiary hearing held on December 7-8, 2009, Hall presented 
testimony from Dr. Valerie McClain, who testified that she did not obtain Hall’s 
IQ; Lugene Ellis, Hall’s half-brother, who testified about his recollection of Hall as 
a child; James Hall, Hall’s brother, who testified regarding Hall’s problems with 
reading, writing, and caring for himself; Dr. Harry Krop, who testified that Hall’s 
IQ using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised was 73; and Dr. Gregory 
Prichard, who testified that Hall scored a 71 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale Third Edition.  Hall sought to introduce a report compiled by then-deceased 
Dr. Bill Mosman through Dr. Prichard, but the court denied it and only allowed 
Hall to proffer the report for the record.  After reviewing the evidence presented, 
the court determined that Hall could not meet the first prong to establish his 
intellectual disability—an IQ below 70.  The court denied relief in an order issued 
May 26, 2010, and entered an amended order on June 16, 2010. 
Dr. Gregory Prichard reported that Hall started the first grade in public 
school in 1950, at age six, and then failed.  A second grade report in 1952 by the 
school guidance counselor reported seven-year-old Hall’s mental maturity as far 
below his chronological age.  In 1953, eight-year-old Hall was described as very 
inattentive and extra slow in comprehension.  In 1954, nine-year-old Hall was 
described as slow in all his work.  Then in 1955, when he was in the fourth grade 
and age ten, Hall was characterized as “Mentally Retarded” by school counselors.  
 
 
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During his fifth-grade year, Hall was again described as slow in all phases of his 
work and described as mentally maladjusted.  In 1957 (at age eleven to twelve), 
Hall was described as “Mentally Retarded.”  In 1958 (at age twelve to thirteen), 
Hall was again described as “Mentally Retarded,” and in 1961 (at age fourteen to 
fifteen) Hall was once more described as “Mentally Retarded.”  Hall’s elementary 
school grades were Cs, Ds, and Fs, in a vast majority of classes in grades one 
through six.  In middle school, grades seven and eight, Hall had one D and eleven 
Fs, and in high school his grades were Ds and Fs in all classes before he dropped 
out in eleventh grade.  Hall was socially promoted, a fact corroborated by a Florida 
Department of Corrections (DOC) Classification and Admission Summary Report 
dated December 24, 1968.  In short, all of the information in Hall’s school and 
military records shows a history of low intellectual functioning and provides strong 
evidence of his mental retardation claim. 
The record reflects that attempts to locate Florida Public School records for 
psychological testing administered during the 1950s were not successful.  
However, based on Hall’s academic record, it is reasonable to believe that some 
testing must have occurred because Hall was referred for placement in Special 
Education classes and referred to as intellectually disabled in the school record.   
 
 
 
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The results of the testing performed on Hall are summarized in the following 
chart: 
Mental Health Evidence 
Dates/Hall’s Age  
Administrator/Test/Records 
Results 
12/24/68      Age 23 
DOC Beta IQ 
IQ Score 76 
Reading level 2.6 
2/11/69       Age 23 
California Achievement 
Level 3.8 
2/13/69       Age 23 
DOC Report 
4-F Military 
8/22/69       Age 24 
DOC Vocational Report 
Psychological DOC Screening 
Report 
Adaptive deficits 
Reading level 2.6 
9/13/78       Age 33 
DOC Confidential Evaluation 
DSM-Diagnosis 
“borderline 
retardation in 
intellectual ability” 
1/10/79       Age 33 
DOC 
Kent IQ Test 
Score 79 
Borderline 
intelligence 
Social difficulties 
Illiteracy 
Reading level 2.8 
9/8/86         Age 41 
Dr. Barbara Bard 
Woodcock Johnson 
Psycho-Educational Battery 
Severe adaptive 
deficits 
9/10/86       Age 41 
Dr. Dorothy Lewis, M.D. 
NYU Medical Center 
Neuropsychological Evaluation 
(Halstead-Reitan) 
Chronic brain 
damage 
Severe learning 
disabled 
9/10/86       Age 41 
Marilyn Feldman, M.A. 
WAIS-R 
FSIQ-80 
Organic brain 
damage 
Limited intelligence 
9/15/86       Age 41 
Dr. Lelie Prichep, Ph.D. 
NY Medical Center 
Neurometric Exam 
Moderately abnormal 
8/22/88       Age 43 
Dr. Jethro Toomer, Ph.D. 
Psychologist, Florida 
International University 
IQ: 60 
Organic brain 
damage 
 
 
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Dates/Hall’s Age  
Administrator/Test/Records 
Results 
Revised Beta/Bender Gestalt 
Adaptive Behavior Evaluated 
DX: Mental 
retardation 
10/18/90      Age 45 
Dr. Johnathan Pincus, M.D. 
Georgetown University 
Hospital 
Neurological Exam/Evaluation 
DX: Mildly retarded 
3/16/90        Age 45 
 
1/8/91         Age 46 
Dr. Harry Krop, Ph.D. 
Psychologist 
WAIS-R 
FSIQ-73 
Cognitive deficits 
Mental age 13 years 
DX: Functional 
retardation 
10/6/90       Age 45 
Dr. Kathleen M. Heide, Ph.D 
Criminologist 
Cognitive deficits 
Adaptive deficits:  
Restricted 
personality 
development 
5/12/95       Age 48 
Dr. Mark Zimmerman, 
Psychologist 
WAIS 
Wide Range Assessment 
Woodcock Johnson 
Westwood Adult Scale Revised 
Retention Test 
Short Category Test 
Adaptive Functioning 
Evaluation 
FSIQ-74 
Deficiencies noted 
Deficiencies noted 
Deficiencies noted 
Mildly deficient 
Brain damage 
Deficits 
DX: Mentally 
retarded and brain 
damaged.  Possible 
psychosis. 
 
11/19/01      Age 51 
Dr. Bill E. Mosman, 
Psychologist 
WAIS-III 
Leiter Adult Intelligence Scale 
Slosson Intelligence 
WRAT-III 
Vineland 
FSIQ-69 
FSIQ-52 
Mental age -10 
1st grade child 
Adaptive deficits 
DX: Mental 
retardation 
8/14/02       Age 57 
 
 
Dr. Gregory Prichard, 
Psychologist 
WAIS-III 
FSIQ-71 
1st-2nd grade level 
Adaptive deficits 
 
 
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Dates/Hall’s Age  
Administrator/Test/Records 
Results 
8/15/02 
WRAT-III 
Vineland 
DX: Mentally 
retarded 
11/25/08      Age 63 
Dr. Joseph Sesta 
WAIS-IV 
IQ Testing Administration Only 
FSIQ-72 
 
As this Court stated in Hall VI, 541 So. 2d at 1127, “Hall’s childhood was 
marked by an existence which can only be described as pitiful.  Teachers and 
siblings alike immediately recognized him to be significantly mentally retarded.” 
United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Hall v. Florida 
 
The United States Supreme Court held: 
On its face, the Florida statute could be consistent with the views of 
the medical community noted and discussed in Atkins.  Florida’s 
statute defines intellectual disability for purposes of an Atkins 
proceeding as “significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.”  Fla. 
Stat. §921.137(1) (2013).  The statute further defines “significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning” as “performance that is 
two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a 
standardized intelligence test.”  Ibid.  The mean IQ test score is 100. 
The concept of standard deviation describes how scores are dispersed 
in a population.  Standard deviation is distinct from standard error of 
measurement, a concept which describes the reliability of a test and is 
discussed further below.  The standard deviation on an IQ test is 
approximately 15 points, and so two standard deviations is 
approximately 30 points.  Thus a test taker who performs “two or 
more standard deviations from the mean” will score approximately 30 
points below the mean on an IQ test, i.e., a score of approximately 70 
points. 
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. at 2000-2001. 
 
 
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The Court explained that our statute may be interpreted consistently with 
Atkins because it does not preclude taking the standard of error into account.  Id. at 
2001.  The Court opined that the problem with our decision in Hall IX is that it 
interpreted the statute too narrowly and held that a person with a score of above 70, 
including a score within the margin for error, is barred from presenting evidence 
that would show intellectual disability.  Id.  Because of this mandatory cutoff, the 
Court opined that sentencing courts cannot consider substantial evidence such as 
medical history, school and test reports, and testimony regarding past behavior, 
even though this evidence is accepted by the medical community to be probative of 
intellectual disability.  Id. at 1994. 
The Court further explained that our decision in Hall IX disregards 
established medical practice in two interrelated ways.  Id. at 1995.  First, it takes an 
IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity 
when experts in the field would also consider other evidence.  Id.  Second, it relies 
on the IQ score while refusing to recognize that the score may be imprecise.  Id.  
Instead of using a fixed number IQ score as determinative of intellectual disability, 
Florida’s courts must also use other indicative evidence such as past performance, 
environment, and upbringing.  Id. at 1996.  In sum, when determining the 
eligibility for the death penalty of a defendant who has an IQ test score 
approaching 70, Florida courts may not bar the consideration of other evidence of 
 
 
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deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning.  Florida courts may continue to 
abide by section 921.137(1), but may not have a bright-line cutoff IQ test score 
because “[i]t is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and 
interrelated assessment.”  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. at 2001. 
Application to Freddie Lee Hall 
 
The Supreme Court stated: 
Florida’s rule is in direct opposition to the views of those who design, 
administer, and interpret the IQ test.  By failing to take into account 
the standard error of measurement, Florida’s law not only contradicts 
the test’s own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing 
court’s inquiry into adaptive functioning.  Freddie Lee Hall may or 
may not be intellectually disabled, but the law requires that he have 
the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability, 
including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime. 
Id.  We therefore turn to the record to determine whether Hall has presented 
sufficient evidence to establish that he meets the statutory definition of intellectual 
disability.  Because we find that Hall has demonstrated that he is intellectually 
disabled, we vacate his sentence of death and remand with instructions to enter a 
life sentence. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing below, despite granting the State’s motion in 
limine to prevent Hall from introducing any evidence relating to adaptive 
functioning, the court permitted Hall to proffer evidence related to all three 
statutory prongs.  The circuit court found that Hall failed to establish that he had 
concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning.  Specifically, the court relied on our 
 
 
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opinion in Phillips v. State, 984 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2008), stating that the expert 
witnesses failed to properly interview correctional officers.  The lower court’s 
reading of Phillips is too narrow, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hall v. Florida. 
 
In Phillips, this Court held that Phillips’ experts’ reliance on retrospective 
diagnosis, which focused solely on Phillips’ adaptive functioning prior to age 18, 
was insufficient to satisfy the second prong of the intellectual disability prong.  
Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 511 (citing Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 325-27 (Fla. 
2007)).  We opined that a defendant must demonstrate significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning to exist with concurrent deficits in adaptive 
behavior.  Id.  In Phillips, we were able to determine from the record that: 
Phillips does not suffer from deficiencies in adaptive functioning. 
Phillips supported himself.  He worked as a short-order cook, a 
garbage collector, and a dishwasher.  The mental health experts 
generally agreed that Phillips possessed job skills that people with 
mental retardation lacked.  Specifically, the defense’s expert admitted 
that Phillips’s position as a short-order cook was an “unusually high 
level” job for someone who has mental retardation. 
Id.  The record further demonstrated that Phillips lived with his mother where he 
paid most of the bills and did a majority of the household chores.  Phillips also 
cared for his nieces and nephews overnight, cooked, and went grocery shopping.  
Id.  In short, there was record evidence that Phillips lived a normal life prior to his 
crimes, and our decision was not based solely on the retrospective analysis 
 
 
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performed.  The retrospective analysis in Phillips was focused solely on Phillips’ 
adaptive skills prior to the age of 18 and failed to consider any of his adult skills.  
It was that limitation coupled with the record evidence that led to our decision. 
 
Indeed, in Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2007), we considered whether 
a determination of the second prong was limited to an assessment of adaptive 
functioning prior to age 18 “instead of an assessment of [a defendant’s] adaptive 
functioning as an adult.” Id. at 325.  We rejected that the statute and rule should be 
read so narrowly.  However, the lower court incorrectly read this Court’s decision 
to preclude a retrospective analysis of Hall prior to his incarceration but while he 
was an adult. 
 
Section 921.137(1) of the Florida Statutes defines “adaptive behavior” as 
“the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of 
personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural 
group, and community.” § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2016).  Evaluating the adaptive 
behavior of an individual who has spent much of his adult life incarcerated can be 
difficult.  In another case before this Court, Williams v. State, No. SC13-1472, Dr. 
Thomas Oakland explained that the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System II 
(ABAS) scale is not normed on prison populations because: 
prison represents clearly the antithesis of the environment in which 
adaptive behavior can be displayed.  The assumption in the 
assessment of adaptive behavior is that a person has considerable 
degrees of freedom and opportunity to decide what he or she will do 
 
 
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with his or her time and how they will progress.  And within a prison 
setting the people of course are highly restricted as to the behaviors 
that they can display, and therefore we are not going to get an accurate 
assessment of adaptive behavior by . . . acquiring information on 
prison related behaviors. 
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Record on Appeal Vol. 48 at 4681, State v. 
Williams, No. 93-003005CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 2012).  This difficulty 
has also been acknowledged by the American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities.  See Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 258 (Fla. 2011) 
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“much of the clinical 
definition of adaptive behavior is much less relevant in prisons”).  Accordingly, we 
reject the trial court’s narrow reading of Phillips and the State’s argument that 
mental health experts may only evaluate a prisoner’s adaptive functioning during 
his or her incarceration. 
 
Hall committed the murder at issue in 1978 at the age of thirty-two, and has 
been incarcerated ever since.  As such, it would be illogical to preclude a 
retrospective analysis of Hall’s deficits in adaptive functioning at the time of the 
murder.  The prohibition against executing the intellectually disabled is based, in 
part, on their culpability at the time the crimes were committed.  The reason that 
defendants claiming intellectual disability must demonstrate its onset prior to 
adulthood is to differentiate them from those who have suffered brain damage in 
adulthood that rendered them incompetent but not intellectually disabled. 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
At the evidentiary hearing in 2009, the unrefuted opinion presented by Dr. 
Gregory Prichard was that Hall meets the clinical definition of an intellectually 
disabled person.  Dr. Prichard made this determination in 2002 based on his 
personal evaluation of Hall and the records and reports of the multiple other mental 
health experts who evaluated Hall.  Relating to adaptive functioning, Dr. Prichard 
administered the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Test and the Wide Range 
Achievement Test in addition to reviewing Hall’s school records, DOC records, 
prior mental health evaluation records, and speaking to Hall’s family members.  
Thus, to find that Dr. Prichard failed to adequately determine Hall’s adaptive 
functioning because he failed to speak to corrections officers ignores the depth and 
breadth of Dr. Prichard’s evaluation and—worse—ignores that Dr. Prichard had 
access to DOC records that also considered Hall to lack the skills necessary to 
adequately cope with the more complex factors in his environment.  Accordingly, 
we find that Hall has presented evidence that satisfies the second prong. 
 
We also find that Hall has established the third prong.  As noted by the 
United States Supreme Court, age of onset was “not at issue” in this case.  Hall v. 
Florida, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.  The State’s argument that a proper IQ test prior to the 
age of 18 is the only valid evidence to establish this prong is unjustifiable and 
would effectively preclude a finding of intellectual disability in most people born 
prior to a certain era.  This Court has never held that in order to find an intellectual 
 
 
- 18 - 
disability, the defendant must have been given a specific IQ test prior to the age of 
18.  Such an inflexible view would not be supported by Hall v. Florida, which 
recognized that, based on a consensus within the medical community, this prong 
simply requires the “onset of these deficits during the developmental period.”  Id. 
at 1994.  Further, this argument was raised and rejected in Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 
457, 469 (Fla. 2015) (holding that section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, requires 
only that intellectual disability be demonstrated to have manifested prior to age 
eighteen, not that it be diagnosed). 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that when 
determining whether an individual meets the criteria to be considered intellectually 
disabled, the definition that matters most is the one used by mental health 
professionals in making this determination in all contexts, including those “far 
beyond the confines of the death penalty.”  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. at 1993.  As 
such, courts cannot disregard the informed assessments of experts.  Id. at 2000.  
Here, the record evidence amassed over nearly thirty-seven years, and the 
unrefuted testimony at the 2009 evidentiary hearing is that Hall meets the medical 
definition of intellectually disabled.   
 
The State argues that it has not had a chance to have a full adversarial 
proceeding to challenge Hall’s claim that he is intellectually disabled.  Notably, 
 
 
- 19 - 
this argument was not raised in the State’s initial supplemental brief, where it 
merely asked this Court to affirm the lower court’s order based on Hall’s failure to 
establish deficits in adaptive functioning, but only in its supplemental reply brief.  
Additionally, at the evidentiary hearing, the State did not attempt to rebut the 
testimony of the experts, but instead stated that “a clinician’s approach to mental 
retardation . . . is not relevant to this proceeding.”  Furthermore, the State’s 
assertion is not supported by the record.  As previously noted in Justice Pariente’s 
concurring opinion after Hall’s most recent postconviction motion, the State came 
into this proceeding forewarned for twenty years of Hall’s claim of intellectual 
disability and was afforded the opportunity of a full adversarial proceeding under 
Atkins.  Hall IX, 109 So. 3d at 712-14 (Pariente, J., concurring) (noting that “in 
2010, there was a true adversarial testing of whether Hall was [intellectually 
disabled] under Florida’s statutory definition.”).  The fact that the State has chosen 
not to avail itself of prior opportunities is not a sufficient reason to expend further 
resources to continue to litigate this issue. 
The United States Supreme Court was clear that this state is not free “to 
define intellectual disability as [it] wishe[s],” and the unrefuted evidence in this 
case has consistently demonstrated that Hall meets the clinical and statutory 
definition of intellectual disability.  The record evidence in this case 
overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that “Hall has been [intellectually 
 
 
- 20 - 
disabled] his entire life.”  Accordingly, we vacate his sentence of death and remand 
with instructions to enter a life sentence. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
In this case, the Supreme Court held “that an individual with an IQ test score 
‘between 70 and 75 or lower’ . . . may show intellectual disability by presenting 
additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning.”  Hall v. Florida, 
134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 
(2002)).  The Court recognized that “Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be 
intellectually disabled,” and instructed “that he have the opportunity to present 
evidence of his intellectual disability, including deficits in adaptive functioning 
over his lifetime.”  Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.  As instructed by the Supreme Court, I 
would reverse the circuit court’s order denying Hall’s motion for postconviction 
relief and remand for a new evidentiary hearing in which Hall and the State would 
have an opportunity to litigate this intellectual disability claim under the standard 
that has now been articulated by the Supreme Court.  I therefore dissent from the 
 
 
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majority’s decision to foreclose further evidentiary proceedings and to impose a 
sentence of life. 
The majority asserts that Hall has presented sufficient evidence to establish 
that he meets the statutory definition of intellectual disability.  Majority op. at 13.  
The majority relies on the fact that the circuit court permitted Hall to proffer 
evidence related to all three statutory prongs of intellectual disability at the 
evidentiary hearing, majority op. at 13, and the circuit court’s order denying 
postconviction relief and the transcript from the evidentiary hearing reflect that 
Hall proffered the testimony of Lugene Ellis, James Hall, and much of the 
testimony of Dr. Prichard—including Dr. Prichard’s report in which he assessed 
Hall for intellectual disability.  But “[p]roffered evidence is merely a 
representation of what evidence the defendant proposes to present and is not actual 
evidence.”  Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 462 (Fla. 2003); LaMarca v. State, 785 
So. 2d 1209, 1216 (Fla. 2001) (same); see also Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 
399, 410 (Fla. 2000) (“In order to preserve a claim based on the court’s refusal to 
admit evidence, the party seeking to admit the evidence must proffer the contents 
of the excluded evidence to the trial court.”).  The proffered evidence was not 
subjected to adversarial testing, and its credibility was not evaluated by the trier of 
fact.  The majority thus errs by relying on proffered evidence to support its 
conclusion that Hall has presented sufficient evidence to establish that he is 
 
 
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intellectually disabled.  It is a cardinal error for an appellate court to step outside 
its proper role and make findings of fact based on a proffer. 
The majority asserts that the State is not entitled to a new evidentiary 
hearing because it was afforded the opportunity of a full adversarial proceeding 
where it failed to rebut or refute the proffered testimony of Hall’s experts.  
Majority op. at 18-19.  But the State, of course, had no obligation to rebut or refute 
the proffered evidence.  And it is doubly inappropriate to now fault the State for 
failing to rebut evidence when that evidence only requires rebuttal because the law 
has subsequently changed.  At the time of the 2009 evidentiary hearing Hall failed 
to provide evidence of an IQ score of 70 or below.  Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 
707-10 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the denial of Hall’s postconviction motion in 
relevant part because Hall failed to present evidence of an IQ score of 70 or 
below), rev’d and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  And under clearly 
established Florida law at that time, the State did not need to rebut or refute the 
testimony of Hall’s experts because Hall’s claim was precluded by his failure to 
provide evidence of an IQ score of 70 or below.  See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So. 
2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (holding that a person whose test score is above 70, 
including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an 
intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show 
his faculties are limited), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 993 (2007), abrogated by Hall v. 
 
 
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Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).  This Court should not penalize the State for 
failing in 2009 to anticipate the ruling the Supreme Court would hand down in 
2014. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sumter County,  
Richard Tombrink, Jr., Judge – Case No. 601978CF000052CFAXF 
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Eric Calvin 
Pinkard, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida; and Mark Evan Olive of the Law Office of Mark Olive, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Carol Marie 
Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee