Title: State v. Laurino

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

106 Ariz. 586 (1971) 480 P.2d 342 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel LAURINO, Appellant. No. 2096. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 8, 1971. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. DeConcini & McDonald, by J. William Brammer, Jr., Tucson, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of guilt after a plea of guilty to the crime of giving away marijuana, § 36-1002.07 A.R.S. Defendant was sentenced to not less than five nor more than seven years in the Arizona State Penitentiary. We are called upon to determine whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. The facts necessary for a determination of the matter on appeal are as follows. A four count information was filed on 5 June 1969 charging defendant as follows: Count 1, § 36-1002.07 A.R.S., Unlawful Giving Away of Marijuana; Count 2, § 36-1002 A.R.S., Unlawful Possession of a Narcotic Drug; Count 3, § 32-1964, subsec. A(7) A.R.S., as amended, § 32-1965 A.R.S. and § 32-1975, subsec. B A.R.S., Possession of LSD; and Count 4, § 36-1002.05 A.R.S., Unlawfully Possessing *587 Marijuana, all under cause number A17313. Trial by jury was set for 16 September 1969, and on that date defendant changed his plea on Count 1 from not guilty to guilty. The Court questioned the defendant as follows: On acceptance of the plea by the court, the Deputy County Attorney moved to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the original information against the defendants which motion was granted. The matter was set over for sentencing and after a hearing in mitigation the court stated: The defendant indicated later his desire to appeal and counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal. The attorney, in the brief filed herein, stated pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), that after examination of the entire record he believed the appeal to be frivolous. However, as required by Anders, supra, counsel listed as possible appealable grounds the following: MUST APPELLANT SPECIFICALLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY AND TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSERS? The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a criminal trial is governed by federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965). And the case of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), states, "we cannot presume a waiver of these * * * rights from a silent record." 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712. This case, in effect, extended the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the state courts. Federal Rule 11 reads as follows: It is true that when a plea of guilty is entered in a criminal trial there is a waiver of certain basic federal constitutional rights. Among these is the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 522 (1968), and the right to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965), but neither Rule 11 nor the Boykin case requires in express terms that each of the rights mentioned herein, confrontation and jury trial, must be specifically and expressly waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea. WAS THE PLEA OF GUILTY PROPERLY MADE? We have read the portion of the transcript relating to the plea of guilty to the charge and we are convinced that the defendant, who was a Junior in college, entered his plea voluntarily and intelligently. The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering in to his decision. *589 Our Court of Appeals has stated: We believe that the Boykin mandate has been complied with and that the plea of the defendant was intelligently and knowingly made. We have reviewed the entire record as required by § 13-1715 A.R.S., State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 921 (1964), and as required by Anders v. California, supra, in cases wherein the attorney is unable to find error. We have found no fundamental error. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HAYS, V.C.J., and UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.