Title: STATE BY AND THROUGH WYO. DEPT. OF REVENUE v. BUGGY BATH UNLIMITED, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE BY AND THROUGH WYO. DEPT. OF REVENUE v. BUGGY BATH UNLIMITED, INC.2001 WY 2718 P.3d 1182Case Number: 00-148, 00-149Decided: 03/08/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                 March 
8, 2001  

STATE OF 
WYOMING BY AND THROUGH

THE 
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Appellant

(Petitioner),

v.

BUGGY 
BATH UNLIMITED, INC.; and RICHARD D. HALL,

Appellees

(Respondents).

BUGGY 
BATH UNLIMITED, INC.; and RICHARD

D. HALL 
d/b/a BUGGY BATH CAR WASH,

Appellants

(Petitioners),

v.

STATE OF 
WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF

REVENUE,

Appellee

(Respondent).

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certifications from the District Court of Sheridan 
County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

Representing 
State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Harold E. Meier, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Michael Dinnerstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General 

 Representing 
Buggy Bath Unlimited & Hall:

            
Nancy D. Freudenthal of Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

             
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Buggy Bath 
Unlimited, Inc.1 (Buggy Bath) submitted sales tax 
refund claims for the periods of January 1996 through October 1998 to the 
Department of Revenue (Department).  
The Department denied the claims pursuant to application of its 
rules.  Buggy Bath appealed to the 
State Board of Equalization (Board of Equalization) which interpreted § 
39-6-410(c),2 prior to a 1997 amendment, to 
require erroneously collected sales tax be refunded to purchasers and, 
subsequent to the amendment, to require erroneously collected sales tax be 
refunded to vendors.  The Department 
and Buggy Bath petitioned the district court for review of the decision, and the 
cases were certified to this court.  
We affirm in part and reverse in part, holding that § 39-6-410(c), both 
pre- and post-1997 amendment, requires all erroneously collected sales tax be 
refunded to the vendor.

[¶2]      The Department, 
as the appellant in Case No. 00-148, structures the issues in its opening brief 
and reply brief in this manner:

Do 
refunds of overpaid sales taxes belong to the customers who paid them or the 
vendors who merely collected them? (Opening Brief)

Are The 
Vendors Here Estopped From Denying That They Collected Sales Tax From Their 
Customers And Calculated Their Sales Tax Based Upon Their Net Receipts by Their 
Own Admissions? (Reply Brief)

Buggy 
Bath, as the appellee in Case No. 00-148, states one issue as 
follows:

Was the 
State Board of Equalization correct to order a sales tax refund of erroneous 
payments made by Buggy Bath based on gross receipts from coin operated car wash 
machines?

Buggy 
Bath, as the appellant in Case No. 00-149, frames one 
issue:

Did the 
State Board of Equalization err in denying a portion of Appellant's sales tax 
refund claim by (1) applying a prior refund law existing at the time the 
overpayments were made instead of the law in effect on the date of the claim; 
and (2) construing that prior law so that only purchasers and not vendors may 
receive a refund of tax erroneously paid by the vendor?

[¶3]      In February 1997, 
the Department adopted a regulation imposing sales tax on the sales price 
charged for washing motor vehicles (car-wash rule).3 Department of Revenue Rules ch. 2 
(Sales and Use Tax), § 13(d) (Specific Taxability Issues) (2/24/97) (superseded 
4/13/00).  Subsequently, through a 
declaratory judgment action filed by another car wash business, the Seventh 
Judicial District Court declared the rule null and void.  The Department did not appeal this final 
decision and ceased collecting sales tax pursuant to the car wash 
rule.

[¶4]      Buggy Bath is a 
car wash business with four separate facilities in various parts of 
Wyoming.  On January 26, 1999, Buggy 
Bath filed a claim for refund of $3,781.28, which it had paid under protest to 
the Department pursuant to the car wash rule, for the months of September and 
October 1998.  On January 28, 1999, 
Buggy Bath filed a second claim for refund of $114,974.08 it had paid for the 
periods of January 1996 through August 1998.  The total amount of monies claimed for 
refund was $118,755.36.  The claims 
were denied pursuant to Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i) of the Department of Revenue 
Rules4 because Buggy Bath did not provide 
evidence that the taxes it requested to be refunded had in fact been returned by 
Buggy Bath to its purchasers.  Buggy 
Bath appealed the denial to the Board of Equalization.  Upon notice to the parties, the matter 
was considered on briefs and documentary evidence without a contested case 
hearing.  The Board of Equalization 
issued a final decision concluding that (1) prior to the amendment effective 
July 1, 1997, § 39-6-410(c)5 required erroneously collected 
sales tax to be refunded to the purchasers of Buggy Bath's services and (2) 
taxes collected subsequent to the July 1, 1997, amendment required refund to the 
vendor, Buggy Bath.  It also 
concluded that Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i) did not apply and the proper rule was 
Chapter 2, Section 8,6 which authorized refund of 
erroneous taxes to the vendor.  Both 
parties filed petitions for review to the district court which certified the 
case to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

[¶5]      When we review 
cases that have been certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b), we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to the court of 
the first instance.  Union 
Telephone Company, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission, 907 P.2d 340, 
341-42 (Wyo. 1995).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) governs judicial review of administrative 
decisions.  W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); 
Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶6]      The issues 
presented in this case require us to interpret Chapter 2, Sections 6(g)(i) and 8 
of the Department of Revenue Rules to the extent they pertain to the refund of 
erroneously collected sales tax.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 
1998).  An agency's conclusions of 
law are affirmed when they are in accordance with the law.  Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996).  However, we correct the agency's error 
when it has failed to invoke and properly apply the correct rule of law.  State v. Bannon Energy 
Corporation, 999 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 2000).  The rules of statutory interpretation 
also apply to the interpretation of administrative rules and regulations.  Antelope Valley Improvement v. State 
Board of Equalization for State of Wyoming, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 1999), 
opinion clarified at 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 2000).

[¶7]      Our review of 
statutory interpretation begins with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed by the legislature according to the manner in 
which those words are arranged.  If 
more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we resort to general principles 
of statutory construction.  When the 
legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, however, we are bound to the 
results so expressed.  Osenbaugh 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 10 P.3d 544, 548 
(Wyo. 2000). 

[¶8]      Upon evaluation 
of the petitions for review, we concisely restate the issues for consideration 
as follows:

            
Did the Board of Equalization properly construe § 39-6-410(c) to 
conclude that, prior to the 1997 amendment, refund to purchasers was required 
and, subsequent to amendment, refund to vendors was 
required?

Did the 
Board of Equalization err in determining Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Department 
of Revenue Rules, as opposed to Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i), was 
applicable?

[¶9]      The Department 
denied Buggy Bath's claims on the sole basis of Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i) 
without reference to § 39-6-410(c).7 The Board of Equalization concluded 
the proper rule was Chapter 2, Section 8.  
The Department takes issue with this determination.

[¶10]   Administrative agencies have only 
those powers expressly conferred by statute.  US WEST Communications, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Commission, 907 P.2d 343, 346 (Wyo. 1995).  This legal principle applies with equal 
force to an agency's authority to promulgate rules.  State Department of Revenue and 
Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 166 (Wyo. 1994).  Rules promulgated in excess of an 
agency's statutory authority are null and void.  State Board of Equaliza­tion v. 
Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 737 P.2d 350, 356 (Wyo. 1987).  On this legal basis, we must first 
consider the proper construction of § 39-6-410(c) to ultimately determine 
whether the Board of Equalization's application of the Department's rules was 
correct. 

A.        
Construction of § 39-6-410(c): Pre- and Post-1997 
Amendment

[¶11]   The 1997 amendments made to § 
39-6-410(c) are illustrated below, with strikeout text indicating language which 
was removed and underlined text denoting language which was 
added:

(c) Any license fee, 
tax, assessment, penalty or interest which has been 
erroneously paid, collected or computed shall either be credited against 
any subsequent tax liability of the vendor or may be refunded.  No credit or refund shall be allowed 
after eighteen (18) months three (3) years from the date of 
overpayment.  The receipt of a claim 
for a refund by the department shall toll the statute of limitations.  All refund requests received by the 
department shall be approved or denied within ninety (90) days of receipt.  Any refund or credit erroneously made or 
allowed may be recovered in an action brought by the attorney general in any 
court of competent jurisdiction.

1997 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 111, § 1.

[¶12]   The difference between the pre-1997 
and post-1997 amended statutory language is minimal.  The only substantive change was the 
increase of the refund claim period from eighteen months to three years from the 
date of overpayment.  The remaining 
changes appear to have been made for the sake of clarification of the statutory 
language; e.g., the removal of the terms "license fee" and "assessment," the 
addition of "either," and the removal of "may be."

[¶13]   The Board of Equalization, 
interpreting this court's decision in M & B Drilling and 
Construction Company, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 706 P.2d 243 
(Wyo. 1985), held that, prior to the amendment, purchasers and not vendors were 
entitled to refunds and, subsequent to the amendment, vendors and not purchasers 
were entitled to the refund.  We 
conclude this distinction, made on the basis of these minor amendments to the 
statute, is in error. 

[¶14]   The Board's interpretation of our 
holding in M & B Drilling is unfounded.  In M & B 
Drilling, this court construed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-417(a) (Michie 
1977) (amended 1991), which provided: "(a) Any vendor who under the pretense of 
collecting the [sales] taxes imposed by this article collects and retains an 
excessive amount or who intentionally fails to remit to the board the full 
amount of taxes when due is guilty of a misdemeanor." 706 P.2d  at 246.  The statute at issue made it a crime for 
vendors through "pretense" to purposefully collect erroneous sales taxes.  Id.  M & B argued the sales tax 
it had collected in violation of this statute should be applied to its 
underpayment of its own sales tax liability as a contractor.  This court stated: "The vendor should, 
we think, not be permitted--unless the statute in clear and positive language so 
says . . . to use the money of a vendee who for one reason or another 
has overpaid the sales tax on a purchased article to offset the failure of such 
vendor to collect the proper amount from another taxpayer." 706 P.2d  at 
245-46.  In so concluding, the court 
relied on its prior holding in Walgreen Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 62 Wyo. 288, 166 P.2d 960, 964 (1946).  In Walgreen, similar to 
M & B Drilling, the vendor was attempting to apply sales 
tax erroneously collected from purchasers to sales tax imposed on and owed by 
the vendor itself.  Both 
M & B Drilling and Walgreen stand for the 
proposition that, when a vendor, through violation of the applicable statutes, 
erroneously collects sales tax from purchasers, the vendor cannot thereafter 
attempt to apply the erroneously collected monies to its own sales tax 
liability.

[¶15]   These prior cases do not reflect 
the facts or the applicable statute of the instant case and thus are not 
analogous.  First, Buggy Bath did 
not, as the law was applied at the time of the collection, inappropriately 
misapply the tax law to collect the sales tax.  Buggy Bath, at the direction of the 
Department, remitted the car wash sales tax until the Seventh Judicial District 
Court declared the car wash rule null and void and the Department advised 
vendors to cease remitting the sums.  
Second, Buggy Bath did not ask that these erroneously collected monies be 
applied to its own distinct tax liability, rather it asked for a 
refund.

[¶16]   We must next consider what the 
refund statute, § 39-6-410(c), mandates and whether there is a distinction 
between its meaning prior to and after the 1997 amendment.  The language of both versions of the 
subsection mentions only the vendor with no reference to the purchaser, 
taxpayer, or any other individual identifiable as a party to the sales 
transaction.  This omission is not 
without significance because other provisions of the sales tax act do mention 
these other parties.8 The operative sentence reads: "Any 
license fee, tax, assessment, penalty or interest which has 
been erroneously paid, collected or computed shall either be credited 
against any subsequent tax liability of the vendor or may be refunded." 
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 111, § 1.  
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-402(a)(ix) (Michie 1997) (repealed 
1998), the term vendor "means any person engaged in the business of selling at 
retail or wholesale tangible personal property, admissions or services which are 
subject to taxation under this article."9 The specific language of 
§ 39-6-410(c) only provides for the vendor to receive a refund or 
credit.  No other party is 
named.  It would be pure conjecture 
and speculation to read into the language additional provisions that either (1) 
permit the Department to withhold refunds to vendors pending proof of 
reimbursement to the purchasers or (2) permit the Department to make direct 
refunds to purchasers.

When the 
words used are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible 
substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the 
legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis 
other than the language invoked by the legislature. . . . If the 
language selected by the legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language 
establishes the rule of law. . . . This inhibition upon statutory 
construction offers assurance that the legislative efforts and determinations of 
elected representatives will be made effective without judicial adjustment or 
gloss. 

Allied-Signal, 
Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991) (citations omitted); see also Basin Electric 
Power Cooperative v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 (Wyo. 1999); Longfellow v. 
State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶17]   In this court's opinion, the 
amended language does nothing more than to clarify the statute's intended 
meaning that any refund or credit must be made to the vendor.  It removes "may be," a permissive term, 
and leaves "shall," a mandatory term, in place.  This correction clarifies any 
uncertainty created by the combination of permissive and mandatory words.  It utilizes the more precise language of 
"tax, penalty or interest" to describe the type of monies subject to credit or 
refund.  Finally, it makes clear 
that there is an option to credit or refund, but one or the other shall 
occur.  These are not substantive 
changes, and, contrary to the Board of Equalization's decision, they do not 
change the statute's meaning with regard to the recipient of the refund.  We conclude, both pre- and 
post-amendment, the plain language of the statute requires the Department to 
credit or refund erroneously paid taxes (tax assessment, tax) to the 
vendor.  The vendor is the only 
party mentioned and therefore is the only party entitled to a credit or 
refund.

[¶18]   Our holding is consistent with 
decisions of other jurisdictions which have concluded the explicit statutory 
term used constitutes an unambiguous expression of legislative intent.  These decisions construed terms such as 
taxpayer, collector, "taxpayer" defined as dealer and vendor, or "taxpayer" 
defined as the person liable for sales taxes imposed.  See SunTrust Bank, Nashville 
v. Johnson, No. M199700202COAR3CV, 2000 WL 1817199 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 
2000); Serna v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 21 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1999); Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 
1999); Greater Park City Company v. Tax Commission, Operations Division, 
954 P.2d 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Reimann v. Huddleston, 883 S.W.2d 135 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).  Had the 
legislature chosen to include the purchaser or taxpayer of goods or services in 
this provision, it could have done so.  
It did not, and we decline to import such a meaning by strained 
inference. 

B.        Board 
of Equalization Conclusion: Chapter 2, Section 8 of the Department of Revenue 
Rules Was the Applicable Rule 

[¶19]   As noted previously, the Department 
denied Buggy Bath's claims on the sole basis of Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i).  Rules adopted pursuant to statutory 
authority and properly promulgated have the force and effect of law.  Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment 
Security Commission, 858 P.2d 1122, 1123-24 (Wyo. 1993).  An administrative agency must follow its 
own rules and regulations.  
Antelope Valley Improvement, 992 P.2d  at 566.  However, rules promulgated in excess of 
an agency's statutory authority are null and void.  U S WEST Communications, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Commission, 992 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wyo. 1999); 
Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 737 P.2d  at 356.

[¶20]   Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i) 
provides: 

 (g)  Deductions. 

            
(i)  Refunds.  
Vendors are entitled to claim a deduction from gross sales receipts on 
the tax return for refunds after the tax is refunded to the 
purchaser.

The 
section is entitled "Reporting/Filing Sales/Use Tax Returns." The rule precludes 
a vendor from taking a deduction from its gross sales receipts until it has 
refunded the tax to the purchaser.  
There is no contention that Buggy Bath attempted to or actually took a 
deduction from its gross sales receipts.  
We agree with the Board of Equalization's conclusion.  This is not the proper rule to be 
applied to a request for refund, as opposed to deduction, of erroneously paid 
sales tax.

[¶21]   The Board of Equalization 
determined the proper rule is Chapter 2, Section 8 which provides in relevant 
part:

(a) General.  The Department will issue refunds or 
credits to the vendor from whom the original tax payment was received.  Under special circumstances the 
Department may refund overpayments of tax to the consumer. 

This 
rule, as it provides for refunds or credits to the vendor from whom the original 
tax payment was received, is explicitly authorized by § 39-6-410(c).  However, as we have concluded, the 
statute provides only for refund to the vendor.  The provision for refund to the consumer 
is in excess of an agency's statutory authority and is therefore null and 
void.  U S WEST Communications, 
Inc., 992 P.2d  at 1094; Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 737 P.2d  at 
356.

[¶22]   In sum, we hold the refunds must be 
made to Buggy Bath pursuant to § 39-6-410(c) and Chapter 2, Section 8 to the 
extent that rule provides for vendor refunds.  The Department has raised a concern 
regarding its potential for double indemnity if Buggy Bath's purchasers apply 
for refunds subsequent to refund of the sales tax to Buggy Bath.  This concern is unfounded.  In the event individual purchasers seek 
refunds from the Department, it can rely on the fact it has made a lawful refund 
to the vendor. 

C.        
Application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-109(b)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) and Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) (LEXIS 1999) 

[¶23]   Finally, through our inherent 
authority to ensure the efficient functioning and the prompt and just 
disposition of litigation, we elect to address an unbriefed issue.  Terry v. Sweeney, 10 P.3d 554, 
559 (Wyo. 2000).  This court 
has recently considered the application of § 39-11-109(b)(ii)10 and § 16-3-114(a)11 in relation to appeals from the 
Board of Equalization.  It is 
our observation that many litigants have concluded these two statutes, when read 
together, require an appeal from the Board of Equalization to be filed in the 
district court for each county where property is or may be located as well as 
the First Judicial District as the location of the administrative action.12 In the instant case, such 
an interpretation by the Department led it to file four separate petitions for 
review in three distinct judicial districts.  This court, through an order of 
consolidation and dismissal, ultimately resolved the confusion created by these 
multiple district court certifications.  
However, such duplicative filings and filing fees result in misuse of 
scarce resources.  Other 
litigants have taken the approach of filing only in the First Judicial District 
as the location of the administrative action regardless of the location of the 
property at issue.  It is 
apparent that confusion exists and clarification at this time will prevent 
continued waste.  "We have held a 
specific statute controls over a general statute on the same subject.  A specific provision in a statute 
controls over an inconsistent general provision pertaining to the same 
subject." Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Investment Co. v. County 
of Laramie, 5 P.3d 774, 782 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).  Applying this rule of statutory 
construction, we conclude that the specific provision of § 39-11-109(b)(ii), 
which addresses tax appeals from the Board of Equalization, controls over the 
general administrative appeals provision of § 16-3-114(a).  This being the case, proper filing of 
appeals from the Board of Equalization should be made to the district court of 
the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is located.  There is no need for duplicative filings 
when property is located in multiple jurisdictions.  One jurisdiction will provide adequate 
access for judicial review.

[¶24]   Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

FOOTNOTES

1For the sake of clarity, the joint 
appellants/appellees, Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc. and Richard D. Hall, will be 
referred to collectively as "Buggy Bath."

2Recodified in 1998 as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-15-109(c) (Michie Supp. 1998). We will consistently refer to this statute by 
the pre-1998 recodification citation of § 
39-6-410(c).

3Buggy Bath asserts this rule 
reflected the Department of Revenue's prior unwritten position that income from 
self-service, coin-operated car wash machines was subject to sales tax.  The record contains evidence that Buggy 
Bath remitted these sales tax monies to the Department of Revenue since 
1973.  The Department of Revenue 
does not dispute these contentions, and this payment history appears consistent 
with Buggy Bath's refund claims for monies submitted prior to the date the rule 
was adopted.

Department of Revenue Rules ch. 2 
(Sales and Use Tax), § 13(d) (Specific Taxability Issues) (2/24/97) (superseded 
4/13/00):

(d)  Car Washes.  The sales price charged for washing or 
polishing motor vehicles or other objects defined as tangible personal property 
is subject to the sales tax.  The 
purchase of materials and supplies which become an ingredient of the service are 
wholesale purchases or sales as defined by W. S. 
39-6-402(a)(x).

            
(i)  Income derived from coin operated machines is subject to 
the sales tax.  The purchase of 
materials and supplies which become an ingredient of the taxable service are 
wholesale purchases or sales as defined by W. S. 
39-6-402(a)(x).

 4  Department of Revenue Rules ch. 2 (Sales and Use Tax), § 
6(g)(i) (Reporting/Filing Sales/Use Tax Returns) (2/24/97) (superseded 
4/13/00):

(g)  Deductions.

(i)  Refunds. Vendors are 
entitled to claim a deduction from gross sales receipts on the tax return for 
refunds after the tax is refunded to the purchaser.

  5See 
supra note 2.

  6Department of 
Revenue Rules ch. 2 (Sales and Use Tax), § 8 (Refunds and Credits) (2/24/97) 
(superseded 4/13/00):

(a)  General.  The Department will issue refunds or 
credits to the vendor from whom the original tax payment was received. Under 
special circumstances the Department may refund overpayments of tax to the 
consumer. 

(b)  Credit.  The Department will credit vendor 
accounts for any overpayment of tax, penalty or interest. Credits will 
automatically be applied against the next appropriate tax liability on the 
vendor account. 

(c)  Refunds. Refund claims 
must be initiated by the vendor or consumer making the overpayment.  The refund request must be made in 
writing to the Department and explain the basis of the refund request. 
Supporting documentation evidencing the overpayment must be submitted with the 
refund request.  Postmarks will 
serve as the date of refund request and will begin tolling of the statute of 
limitations.  The Department will 
refund or deny all refund claims within ninety (90) days of the date adequate 
supporting documentation is received.

(d)  Statute of Limitation. 
Requests for refund or credit of sales tax shall be made within eighteen (18) 
months of the date of overpayment. Requests for refund of the use tax shall be 
made within eighteen (18) months of overpayment.

(e)  Repossession.  No refund of sales/use tax will be made 
as a result of repossession of tangible personal 
property.

7The Department notice of denial of the 
refund request stated in relevant part as follows:

Based on the information and 
documentation you have provided, your 5-24-99 request for tax refund for your 
client, Buggy Bath Car Wash, must be 
denied.

Chapter 2, Section 6(g)(i) states: 
"Refunds.  Vendors are entitled to 
claim a deduction from gross sales receipts on the tax return for refunds after 
the tax is refunded to the purchaser."

No evidence has been provided that these 
taxes were in fact refunded to the purchaser. 

8See Selective Sales Tax Act of 1937, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-6-401 to -418 (Michie 1994): "purchaser"  39-6-404(a), 
39-6-406(b), 39-6-407(d), 39-6-410(a); "donee"  39-6-406(d); "persons who are 
parties to the transaction"  39-6-410(a); "person who feels aggrieved by the 
payment of the taxes, penalty and interest"  39-6-410(e).

  

See also Selective Sales Tax Act of 1937, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-6-401 to -418 (Michie 1997): "purchaser"  39-6-404(a), 
39-6-406(b); "taxpayer"  39-6-406(h)(iii); "[e]very person purchasing goods or 
services taxed by this article"  39-6-407(d); "persons who are parties to the 
transaction"  39-6-410(a); "person who feels aggrieved by the payment of the 
taxes, penalty and interest"  39-6-410(e).    

9Recodified in 1998 as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-15-101(a)(xv) (Michie Supp. 1998) and amended in 2000 by adding the last 
sentence:

            
(xv) "Vendor" means any person engaged in the business of selling at 
retail or wholesale tangible personal property, admissions or services which are 
subject to taxation under this article.  
"Vendor" includes a vehicle dealer as defined by W.S. 
31-16-101(a)(xviii)[.]

2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 79, § 
1.

10Section 39-11-109(b)(ii): "Any person 
including the state of Wyoming aggrieved by any order issued by the board, or 
any county board of equalization whose decision has been reversed or modified by 
the state board of equalization, may appeal the decision of the board to the 
district court of the county in which the property or some part thereof is 
situated."

            
 

11Section 
16-3-114(a):

(a)  Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any 
person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person 
affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review 
in the district court for the county in which the administrative action or 
inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by the administrative 
action or inaction is located, or if no real property is involved, in the 
district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected 
by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its principal place of 
business.  The procedure to be 
followed in the proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with 
rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme 
court.

            

12Filing in the First Judicial District, 
as the location of the administrative action, is apparently based on the fact 
that the Board of Equalization's offices are located in 
Cheyenne.