Title: Liberty v. Bennett

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 81 
Docket: 
Cum-11-433 
Argued: 
May 10, 2012 
Decided: 
June 21, 2012 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ. 
 
 
SCOTT A. LIBERTY 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY BENNETT et al. 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
 
[¶1]  Scott A. Liberty appeals from an interlocutory order entered in the 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Marden, J.) denying his motion to reconsider 
his motion to disqualify attorney Martha Gaythwaite from representing Jeffrey 
Bennett.  Liberty contends that Gaythwaite should be disqualified because she 
previously represented Liberty’s former attorney, David Van Dyke, in a legal 
malpractice action brought by Liberty.  Because Liberty has failed to demonstrate 
that any exception to the final judgment rule should apply to justify reaching the 
merits of this interlocutory appeal, we dismiss the appeal.  
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶2]  This consolidated case is one of a succession of cases arising from the 
divorce of Liberty and Darlene Copp.  A review of three cases, including this one, 
is necessary to understand the unique circumstances of this appeal. 
 
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A. 
Copp v. Liberty 
[¶3]  In the highly contentious divorce proceeding, Van Dyke, then of the 
law firm Berman & Simmons, represented Liberty from 2000 to 2002, and Bennett 
of The Bennett Law Firm represented Copp.  
[¶4]  After the parties agreed to a settlement, a divorce judgment was entered 
in 2001.  After the judgment was entered, Liberty filed a post-judgment motion to 
set aside or modify the judgment, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).  In support of the 
motion, Liberty alleged that Van Dyke had agreed to the purported settlement 
without his consent.  Because Liberty, by filing the post-judgment motion, put at 
issue attorney-client communications leading to the divorce settlement, the divorce 
court (Cole, J.) found that confidential information and work product documents 
that were held by Van Dyke in his representation of Liberty were no longer 
protected by attorney-client privilege.  During the hearing on the Rule 60(b) 
motion, Van Dyke testified regarding his representation of Liberty in the divorce 
action.  The court denied Liberty’s post-judgment motion, and on Liberty’s appeal, 
we affirmed.  See Copp v. Liberty, Mem-05-144 (Oct. 17, 2005).  
B. 
Liberty v. Van Dyke et al.   
[¶5]  In 2006, Liberty filed a complaint against Van Dyke and the law firm 
of Berman & Simmons alleging legal malpractice in the divorce action.  Van Dyke 
 
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retained Gaythwaite to represent him in the matter.  Her representation spanned 
two years.   
[¶6]  To facilitate her defense of Van Dyke, Gaythwaite obtained discovery 
relating to Van Dyke’s representation of Liberty during the divorce proceeding, 
including Liberty’s depositions, Van Dyke’s depositions, Van Dyke’s testimony 
from the Rule 60(b) motion hearing, Van Dyke’s affidavits, Liberty’s secretly 
recorded conversations with Van Dyke, and the Berman & Simmons case file 
containing Van Dyke’s work product.  The discovery included information that 
had been protected by attorney-client privilege before Liberty initiated the legal 
malpractice claim against Van Dyke and filed the Rule 60(b) motion in the divorce 
action. 
[¶7]  Ultimately, the malpractice court (Crowley, J.) granted Van Dyke’s 
motion for summary judgment, and we affirmed.  See Liberty v. Van Dyke, 
Mem-09-91 (May 26, 2009). 
C. 
Liberty v. Bennett et al. 
[¶8]  Liberty commenced the action now before us in 2003.1  Liberty filed a 
thirteen-count complaint2 against Bennett and the Bennett Law Firm.3  After an 
                                         
1   In 2011, this case was consolidated with Liberty’s counterclaim in Darlene Copp v. 
Scott A. Liberty et al., CV-05-00066. 
 
2  Following the court’s (Delahanty, J.) order dismissing several counts on Bennett’s motion to 
dismiss, the remaining counts of the complaint are: abuse of process (Count I), assault (Count VI), 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII), interference with contractual relations (Count IX), 
 
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extensive procedural history with Bennett represented by other counsel, 
Gaythwaite entered her appearance to represent Bennett on May 31, 2011. 
[¶9]  On June 14, 2011, Liberty filed a motion to disqualify Gaythwaite due 
to her prior representation of Van Dyke in the legal malpractice action.  Liberty 
asserted that Gaythwaite holds confidential information, acquired during her 
representation of Van Dyke, that is materially related to the subject matter of the 
pending case between Liberty and Bennett.  In response, Bennett asserted that 
Gaythwaite had never represented Liberty and, further, that Liberty had waived 
any claim to attorney-client privilege with Van Dyke when he brought the post-
judgment motion and the legal malpractice action. 
[¶10]  The court (Marden, J.) held a hearing on the motion to disqualify.  
The court initially granted the motion to disqualify, finding that Liberty had 
waived the attorney-client privilege in the malpractice case, but stating, “the 
[c]ourt is concerned that somewhere out there lurks a piece of information that was 
not disclosed, that was not known, that arises during the course of the trial which 
has the effect . . . of throwing the entire trial into a turmoil and create the 
possibility of a trial within a trial.” 
                                                                                                                                   
negligence based on vicarious liability (Count XII), and violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (Count 
XIII). 
 
3  Currently, attorneys Elizabeth Germani and Tracy Hill of Germani, Martemucci, Riggle & Hill 
represent The Bennett Law Firm.   
 
5 
[¶11]  Bennett filed a motion for reconsideration.  Citing Morin v. Maine 
Education Association, 2010 ME 36, 993 A.2d 1097, Bennett asserted that Liberty 
must suffer “actual prejudice” as a result of Gaythwaite’s continued representation 
of Bennett, which he had failed to show. 
[¶12]  The court granted Bennett’s motion for reconsideration, and denied 
Liberty’s motion to disqualify Gaythwaite.  The court, applying the standard of 
proof delineated in Morin, found that Liberty “[had] not established the ‘specific, 
identifiable harm’ he will suffer in litigation by opposing counsel’s continued 
representation.”   
[¶13]  Liberty then moved for reconsideration, contending that the court 
erred in applying the actual prejudice standard. Liberty asserted that the court 
should have applied the standard of proof set forth in Estate of Markheim v. 
Markheim, 2008 ME 138, ¶¶ 24, 31, 957 A.2d 56, which requires attorney 
disqualification when it can be reasonably inferred that confidential information 
was obtained through the attorney’s prior representation in substantially related 
cases.  Liberty also requested that the court conduct an in camera review of the 
confidential information in an effort to show the requisite prejudice.  The court 
denied Liberty’s request for an in camera review as untimely, and denied his 
motion for reconsideration. 
[¶14]  Liberty timely appealed the interlocutory order.      
 
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II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  
Interlocutory Appeal 
[¶15]  Because “the final judgment rule prevents a party from appealing a 
trial court’s decision on a motion before a final judgment has been rendered,” we 
must first determine whether an exception to the final judgment rule permits us to 
reach the merits of this interlocutory appeal.  Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 
ME 71, ¶ 12, 974 A.2d 918; see Aubry v. Town of Mount Desert, 2010 ME 111, 
¶ 4, 10 A.3d 662 (“A final judgment . . . is a decision that fully decides and 
disposes of the entire matter pending before the court . . . , leaving no questions for 
the future consideration and judgment of the court . . . .”).  We will dismiss an 
appeal sua sponte if we determine that the appeal is not “properly before us on 
appeal from a final judgment.”  Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 5, 30 A.3d 816; see 
Aubry, 2010 ME 111, ¶ 4, 10 A.3d 662.   
[¶16]  We will reach the merits of an interlocutory appeal from a trial court 
order disqualifying an attorney from representing a litigant because an improper 
disqualification “involves a disadvantage and expense that cannot be remedied 
after the conclusion of the case.”  Hurley v. Hurley, 2007 ME 65, ¶ 6, 923 A.2d 
908; see also Morin, 2010 ME 36, ¶ 6 n.1, 993 A.2d 1097.  Generally, however, 
we will not undertake appellate review of an interlocutory order denying a motion 
to disqualify an attorney unless the court’s order qualifies for an exception to the 
 
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final judgment rule. See Tungate v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc., 1997 ME 113, 
¶¶ 4-5, 695 A.2d 564; Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 304(f) at 206 (3d ed. 
2008); see also, e.g., Fiber Materials, Inc., 2009 ME 71, ¶¶ 12 13, 974 A.2d 918; 
Estate of Markheim, 2008 ME 138, ¶ 12, 957 A.2d 56.  
[¶17]  There are two exceptions to the final judgment rule that may apply to 
support review on the merits of an appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion to 
disqualify an attorney: the death knell exception and the judicial economy 
exception. 
[¶18]  Under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, an 
interlocutory appeal is permitted only when “substantial rights of a party will be 
irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.” Bruesewitz v. Grant, 
2007 ME 13, ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255; Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 1261.  
The death knell exception applies only to orders that, without interlocutory appeal, 
will “result in a substantial loss or sacrifice of the rights, property, or claim at 
issue.”  Bruesewitz, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255.  
[¶19]  The “judicial economy” exception to the final judgment rule may be 
difficult to quantify, but generally an interlocutory appeal is permitted only when 
two prerequisites are met: (1) “review of a non-final order can establish a final, or 
practically final, disposition of the entire litigation,” and (2) “the interests of justice 
require that immediate review be undertaken.”  Town of Otis v. Derr, 2001 ME 
 
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151, ¶ 3, 782 A.2d 788; Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2000 ME 178, ¶ 16, 760 A.2d 
250; Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Lowatchie, 569 A.2d 197, 199 (Me. 1990). 
[¶20]  To qualify this interlocutory appeal under the death knell exception, 
Liberty would have to contend that his substantial rights to keep confidential 
information obtained by Van Dyke in attorney-client communications will be 
irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.  Before the trial court, 
and before us on appeal, Liberty makes generalized allegations that Gaythwaite, 
who has never represented Liberty, obtained significant confidential information as 
a result of her prior representation of Van Dyke.  However, beyond the general 
allegations, Liberty only proffered Gaythwaite’s status, as former counsel for 
Van Dyke, as sufficient cause for her disqualification.   
[¶21]  If Gaythwaite is in possession of confidential material, and privilege 
or confidentiality was not waived as a result of the legal malpractice action or the 
Rule 60(b) motion,4 Liberty, as the moving party and the appellant, had the burden 
to demonstrate to the trial court and to us that Gaythwaite possessed important 
confidential information, obtained as a result of her representation of Van Dyke, 
and to which the attorney-client privilege continues to apply.  See Morin, 2010 ME 
                                         
4  When a client initiates a legal malpractice claim against his or her attorney, any relevant privileged 
communication with that attorney is considered waived.  See M.R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(b)(5); Conkling v. 
Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that the privilege is waived when a party “place[s] 
information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit”) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 502.5 at 220 (6th ed. 2007) (“Once [the 
attorney-client privilege] is waived, it cannot be later revived.”). 
 
9 
36, ¶ 10, 993 A.2d 1097.  In the absence of Liberty pointing to “the specific, 
identifiable harm [he] will suffer in the litigation by opposing counsel’s continued 
representation,” id., we conclude that he has failed to identify any “substantial 
rights . . . [that] will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment,” 
Bruesewitz, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1255.  The death knell exception does not 
apply to support reaching the merits of this appeal.   
[¶22]  If we are to reach the merits of the appeal, it must be pursuant to the 
judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule.  Particularly unique 
circumstances may justify reaching the merits of an interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule.  See, e.g., Efstathiou 
v. The Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 23, 956 A.2d 110 (concluding that “the 
exceedingly long history of this litigation” and the “unusual circumstance” of the 
case warranted the application of the judicial economy exception to the final 
judgment rule); Adoption of Michaela C., 2004 ME 153, ¶ 14, 863 A.2d 270 
(concluding that the judicial economy exception is appropriate when there were 
three proceedings pending in separate courts involving the same party and the 
pendency of the proceedings had created a stalemate); Williams v. Williams, 1998 
ME 32, ¶ 7, 706 A.2d 1038 (accepting the appeal in the interest of judicial 
economy when the litigation had been subject to “inordinate delay” and “it [was] 
possible to finally resolve virtually every issue”). 
 
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[¶23]  Although there has been a large number of lawsuits involving Liberty, 
Bennett, and other related parties, and although an argument could be made that 
the litigious history of this case and related proceedings warrants application of the 
judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule to reach the merits of the 
appeal and move the case toward finality, there is no evidence that accepting this 
appeal will establish a final or practically final disposition of the litigation. 
Accordingly, we decline to apply the judicial economy exception to the final 
judgment rule to reach the merits of this appeal. 
The entry is: 
Appeal dismissed as interlocutory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
John H. Branson, Esq., Branson Law Office, P.A., Portland, for appellant 
Scott A. Liberty 
 
Martha C. Gaythwaite, Esq., and F. David Walker, IV, Esq., Friedman 
Gaythwaite Wolf & Leavitt, Portland, for appellee Jeffrey Bennett 
 
At oral argument: 
 
William J. Kelleher, Esq., Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, Waterville, for 
appellant Scott A. Liberty 
 
Martha C. Gaythwaite, Esq., for appellee Jeffrey Bennett 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2003-421 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY