Title: Eugenia Brennan Heslin v. County of Greene

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 1  
Eugenia Brennan Heslin, &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
County of Greene, et al.
            Respondents,
et al.,
            Defendants.
Pamela A. Nichols, for appellant.
Cynthia Dolan, for respondent County of Greene.
Maureen S. Bonanni, for respondents County of Greene
Department of Social Services and County of Greene Child
Protective Services.
City of New York et al., amici curiae.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In this case, we conclude that the special infancy toll
applicable in wrongful death actions involving sole infant
distributees under Hernandez v New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp. (78 NY2d 687 [1991]) is not available for personal injury
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No. 1
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claims.  We therefore affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Plaintiff Eugenia Brennan Heslin is the administrator
of the estate of the decedent, Egypt Phillips.  Egypt, born in
May 2001, lived with her two young sisters and their mother Tanya
Rose.  Egypt's biological father, a convicted felon, had
abandoned her.  In early 2004, Rose's boyfriend, James Smith,
moved in with the family.  In May and again in August 2004, Egypt
was taken to health care facilities for treatment of various
injuries, including a broken clavicle and head trauma.  According
to plaintiff, these instances of suspected abuse were reported to
defendants County of Greene, County of Greene Mental Health,
County of Greene Department of Social Services and/or County of
Greene Child Protective Services (collectively, the County
defendants).  Following the August incident, Smith was apparently
ordered to leave the family home.  However, on November 21, 2004,
Egypt died tragically as a result of injuries intentionally
inflicted upon her by Smith.
About two weeks later, Smith and Rose were each charged
in connection with Egypt's death.  Rose pleaded guilty to
criminally negligent homicide and was subsequently sentenced to a
prison term of 1a to 4 years.  Following a jury trial, Smith was
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a term of 25
years to life imprisonment.
In December 2004, shortly after Egypt's death,
plaintiff was appointed as the attorney for the children, Egypt's
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No. 1
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sisters, in connection with an abuse and neglect proceeding
pending in Family Court against Smith and Rose.  In addition to
serving as attorney for the children (formerly referred to as a
law guardian) in Family Court, Surrogate's Court appointed her as
the administrator of Egypt's estate in October 2006.
Until plaintiff's application, no one had petitioned
Surrogate's Court to handle the administration of Egypt's estate
under SCPA 1001 and 707.  Rose and the biological father were
each disqualified because of their felony status (see SCPA 707
[1] [d]).  Although the task would have ordinarily fallen to
Egypt's siblings under the priority of decedent's relatives
established in SCPA 1001 (1), they too were ineligible based on
their infancy (see SCPA 707 [1] [a]).  Because no other relative
sought to be appointed guardian for the siblings under article 17
of the SCPA, they had no adult representative who could function
as the administrator or consent to anyone else assuming that role
(see SCPA 1001 [2], [6]).  Out of concern for the fate of Egypt's
siblings, plaintiff pursued appointment as administrator pursuant
to the fallback provision of SCPA 1001 (8) (b), allowing any
qualified "petitioner" to become an administrator in the court's
discretion.
In the course of fulfilling her duties as attorney for
the children and administrator of Egypt's estate, plaintiff
determined that Egypt's siblings had potential claims against the
County defendants and private individuals based on their alleged
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No. 1
1  Plaintiff also sued Early Childhood Learning Center of
Greene County (Egypt's preschool) and Catalina Alegre, M.D.
(Egypt's pediatrician).  Those causes of action are not at issue
on this appeal.
2  Rose cannot qualify as a distributee because of her
culpable conduct contributing to Egypt's death (see Matter of
Covert, 97 NY2d 68, 74 [2001]).  Egypt's biological father is
similarly disqualified because he abandoned her (see EPTL 4-1.4
[a] [1]).
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negligence contributing to Egypt's death at the hands of Smith. 
On November 16, 2006, plaintiff served a notice of claim on the
County defendants in her capacity as administrator of Egypt's
estate.  Five days later, plaintiff commenced this action against
the County defendants alleging causes of action for wrongful
death and personal injury.1  Any damages recovered would
ultimately benefit the siblings as Egypt's sole distributees by
intestacy.2  Plaintiff simultaneously moved pursuant to General
Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to file a late notice of claim
for the personal injury cause of action.
Supreme Court granted the motion and extended the time
to serve the notice of claim to November 16, 2006, the date it
was actually filed.  Initially, the court determined that the
wrongful death claim was timely because the notice of claim was
filed within 90 days from plaintiff's appointment as
administrator and the action was commenced within two years of
Egypt's death, as required by statute (see General Municipal Law
§ 50-e [1] [a]; § 50-i [1]).  Turning to the personal injury
cause of action, the court found that the notice of claim was
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No. 1
3  The wrongful death cause of action remains pending and is
not at issue before us.
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untimely because it was not filed within 90 days after the claim
arose.  Recognizing that it lacked the discretion to extend the
time beyond the expiration of the applicable one-year and 90-day
limitations period, the court relied on our decision in Hernandez
v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (78 NY2d 687 [1991]) to
conclude that the toll afforded by CPLR 208 applied, based on the
infancy of Egypt's siblings, and, as a result, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff's appointment as
administrator in October 2006.  In Hernandez, this Court held
that the CPLR 208 infancy toll applies when an infant is the sole
distributee in a wrongful death action.  Relying on the factors
in General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), the court granted plaintiff
leave to file the late notice of claim.
The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the
personal injury claim, but agreed that the wrongful death claim
was timely (53 AD3d 996 [3d Dept 2008]).3  The court held that
Supreme Court lacked discretion to enlarge the time to serve the
late notice of claim because the personal injury claim was time-
barred, reasoning:
"Supreme Court's reliance on the infancy toll
of CPLR 208, on behalf of decedent's infant
distributees, to extend the statute of
limitations on the personal injury claim was
not proper inasmuch as such a claim is
brought on behalf of decedent and is personal
to her, not her surviving infant
distributees" (id. at 998).
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No. 1
4  Before 1935, although a decedent's claims based in
contract and injury to property survived and could be maintained
by the estate's representative, any personal injury cause of
action abated upon death (see Herzog v Stern, 264 NY 379, 383
[1934], cert denied 293 US 597 [1934]; see also former Decedent
Estate Law §§ 116, 117, 118, 119, 120).  Recognizing the inequity
in treating personal injury claims differently, the Legislature
amended the relevant statutes in 1935 to provide that such claims
also survive a decedent's death (see L 1935, ch 795; see also
former Decedent Estate Law §§ 118, 119, presently codified at
EPTL 11-3.2).  Consequently, all tort and contract actions that
belonged to a decedent may now be maintained by the estate's
personal representative (see EPTL 11-3.1, 11-3.2).
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We granted plaintiff leave to appeal (12 NY3d 702 [2009]).
EPTL 11-3.2 (b), referred to as the "survival statute,"
provides that "[n]o cause of action for injury to person or
property is lost because of the death of the person in whose
favor the cause of action existed.  For any injury an action may
be brought or continued by the personal representative of the
decedent."4  As a condition precedent to initiating a personal
injury action against a municipality, a notice of claim must be
served within 90 days after the claim arises (see General
Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]).  The action must also be commenced
within the statutorily prescribed one-year and 90-day limitations
period (see General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]).  Although a court
is authorized to extend the filing of a notice of claim beyond
the 90-day period, the time for filing may not be extended beyond
the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations
(see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).
In this case, Egypt first sustained injuries at some
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No. 1
5  CPLR 208 provides, in relevant part: "If a person
entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of
infancy . . . at the time the cause of action accrues, and the
time otherwise limited for commencing the action . . . is less
than three years, the time shall be extended by the period of
disability."
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point in early 2004 and died on November 21, 2004.  Since a
notice of claim was not filed within 90 days of her death, leave
to file a late notice was necessary.  The personal injury claim
accrued no later than the date of her death and, absent the
application of a toll, the one-year and 90-day limitations period
expired in February 2006.  Because the request for leave to file
a late notice was not made within that time frame, as mandated by
General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), an extension of time to file
such notice is not statutorily authorized unless the limitations
period was tolled.
Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations for
the personal injury cause of action was tolled under CPLR 208 due
to the infancy of Egypt's sole distributees -- her sisters.5  In
particular, plaintiff submits that Supreme Court appropriately
applied the rationale of Hernandez, which held that CPLR 208
tolls the statute of limitations where the sole distributee in a
wrongful death action is an infant, to this personal injury
claim.  While the dissent adopts this position, we cannot agree
based on the fundamental distinction between the natures of the
two claims.
In Hernandez, the decedent died intestate in April 1987
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No. 1
6  At the time, a wrongful death claim against the New York
City Health and Hospitals Corporation was governed by a one-year
and 90-day statute of limitations.  A two-year limitations period
now applies to such wrongful death claims (see McKinney's Uncons
Laws of NY § 7401 [2] [L 1990, ch 804, § 122]).
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in a facility operated by defendant New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation, leaving her infant son as her sole
distributee.  Letters of guardianship were issued to the infant's
grandmother in December 1987 and an administrator of the estate
was appointed with the guardian's consent later that month.  In
February 1988, the administrator was granted leave to file a late
notice of claim.  But she did not commence a wrongful death
action until December 1988, more than one year and 90 days after
decedent's death.6  The defendant moved to dismiss the wrongful
death action as time-barred.  On appeal, a majority of this Court
concluded that the action was timely by virtue of the CPLR 208
infancy toll, holding that where the only distributee is an
infant, the distributee's infancy serves to toll the limitations
period "until the earliest moment there is a personal
representative or potential personal representative who can bring
the action," which the Court stated would occur upon the
"appointment of a guardian or majority of the distributee,
whichever occurs first" (78 NY2d at 693).
In reaching this result in Hernandez, we were careful
to limit our analysis to wrongful death actions authorized by
EPTL 5-4.1, emphasizing that such claims belong to a decedent's
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No. 1
7  "Personal representative" is defined as "a person who has
received letters to administer the estate of a decedent" (EPTL 1-
2.13).  When a decedent dies intestate, the administrator is the
estate's personal representative.
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distributees rather than the estate standing in place of the
decedent.  For example, we observed that "any damages recovered
are exclusively for the benefit of decedent's distributees" and
that "the cause of action is not part of and bears no legal
relationship to decedent's estate" (id. [internal quotation marks
and citations omitted]).  Moreover, any damages must be "measured
by the effect of the wrongful act on the distributees -- the
pecuniary loss suffered by the individual distributees as a
result of decedent's death" (id.).  In contrast, we noted that a
personal injury action brought under EPTL 11-3.2 (b) seeks
damages for an injury to the decedent and belongs to the estate. 
Finally, we stressed that in a wrongful death case involving a
sole infant distributee, it is the "infant child who has suffered
any loss recognized by law" (id.).
Hence, even though CPLR 208 applies when the "person
entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of
infancy" -- and the person entitled to bring a wrongful death
claim under EPTL 5-4.1 is the estate's "personal representative"7
-- in Hernandez we employed the CPLR 208 toll based on the
infancy of the distributee himself.  In that unique context,
where no personal representative was otherwise available, it was
reasonable to look to the distributee's infancy status because
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No. 1
8  We, too, have declined to read Hernandez broadly. 
Notably, we did not see fit to apply the Hernandez toll on behalf
of infant beneficiaries of a wrongful death claim where the
decedent's will named an executrix who could have timely
commenced an action on the infants' behalf (see Baez v New York
City Health & Hosps. Corp., 80 NY2d 571, 576-577 [1992]).
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the wrongful death claim belonged to him and would compensate him
for damages that he directly sustained as a result of his
mother's death.  As we put it, the distributee was "the only
person . . . whose interests are at stake in bringing this
[wrongful death] action" (id.).  In effect, we treated the
distributee as the plaintiff under the tolling statute because,
for all intents and purposes, the claim was his own.
Following Hernandez, Appellate Division case law has
consistently declined to extend the toll rule fashioned in
Hernandez outside the wrongful death context (see Matter of
Hidalgo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 210 AD2d 481, 482-
483 [2d Dept 1994]; Kemp v City of New York, 208 AD2d 684, 686
[2d Dept 1994]; see also Baker v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 53
AD3d 21, 23 [1st Dept 2008]).8  These courts recognized that,
unlike a wrongful death claim that directly compensates a
decedent's distributees for their own damages, a personal injury
claim is designed to compensate the decedent for injuries
suffered and is personal to the deceased -- in other words, it is
a claim assumed by the estate.
In the present case, the Appellate Division acted in
accord with these precedents (see Heslin v County of Greene, 53
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No. 1
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AD3d 996, 998 [3d Dept 2008]), and we believe it correctly drew a
distinction between the two causes of action in holding that
Hernandez should be limited to the wrongful death arena.  As we
explained in Hernandez itself, a wrongful death action belongs to
the decedent's distributees and is designed to compensate the
distributees themselves for their pecuniary losses as a result of
the wrongful act (see EPTL 5-4.3).  The proceeds are paid
directly to the distributees in the proportions directed by the
court, determined by their respective monetary injuries (see EPTL
5-4.4).  In comparison, a personal injury action on behalf of the
deceased under EPTL 11-3.2 (b) seeks recovery for the conscious
pain and suffering of the deceased and any damages awarded accrue
to the estate (see Ratka v St. Francis Hosp., 44 NY2d 604, 609
[1978]).  Such a claim is personal to the deceased and belongs to
the estate, not the distributees.  The types of damages that are
recoverable are different and the calculations of damages for the
two claims are based on separate factors.
Moreover, because it is the estate that recovers in a
personal injury action, any proceeds will first be applied to
outstanding liens, debts or expenses (see EPTL 4-1.1, 13-1.3;
SCPA 1811).  Only after the obligations of the estate are
fulfilled would any remaining funds be paid to beneficiaries or
distributees.  This is in stark contrast to the damages
recoverable in a wrongful death action, where any proceeds are
generally not subject to the claims of the estate's creditors
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No. 1
9  The dissent criticizes our reliance on Ratka in
emphasizing that wrongful death claims are materially different
from personal injury actions.  But the dissent fails to
acknowledge that in Hernandez itself the Court focused on the
unique qualities of a wrongful death claim and explicitly
distinguished it from a personal injury action available pursuant
to EPTL 11-3.2 (b).
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(see 9 Warren's Heaton, Surrogate's Court Practice § 122.02 [4]
[c], at 122-42 [7th ed]).  In short, the two causes of action are
"predicated on essentially different theories of loss which
accrue to different parties" (Ratka, 44 NY2d at 609).9
Unlike the infant distributee in Hernandez, who was the
only party that "suffered any loss recognized by law" as the
beneficiary of a wrongful death claim (Hernandez, 78 NY2d at
693), the infant distributees here do not seek to recover their
own damages through a personal injury claim.  Rather, they hope
to inherit through intestacy any damages that their sister would
have been entitled to had she survived.  The rationale underlying
Hernandez -- that a court may take into account the infancy of
the distributee because the wrongful death claim belongs to and
is for the "sole benefit" of the distributee (id. at 694 n 5) --
simply does not apply here, despite the sympathetic plight of
Egypt's siblings.  Put differently, the necessary connection
between infant distributees and a personal injury action brought
on behalf of the deceased under EPTL 11-3.2 (b) is missing since
such a claim redresses a wrong suffered by the deceased, not the
distributees.
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No. 1
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Plaintiff nevertheless urges that the tolling rule
adopted by Hernandez should apply with equal force to personal
injury actions because EPTL 11-3.2 (b), like EPTL 5-4.1,
authorizes a "personal representative" to bring the action and,
in this case, Egypt's siblings would be the ultimate
beneficiaries of any damages recovered under either claim. 
Plaintiff points out that no personal representative existed to
bring the personal injury action until her appointment as
administrator in October 2006, after the statute of limitations
had expired.  Despite that unfortunate occurrence, we cannot
disregard the fundamental legal distinction between the two
causes of action, and the argument of the plaintiff and dissent
would result in a rule that is unsupported by the key
jurisprudential underpinning of Hernandez -- the unique status of
a distributee as the direct beneficiary and source of a wrongful
death claim.
In fact, it is notable that EPTL 11-3.1, a catch-all
provision, similarly enables a "personal representative" to
commence all other types of action that survive the decedent's
death.  Taken to its logical conclusion, plaintiff's position
would result in the application of the CPLR 208 toll to any cause
of action belonging to a decedent -- adult and infant alike --
who leaves only infant distributees.  A decedent's personal
claims could potentially be pursued more than a decade later on
the basis that an infant distributee would be entitled to any
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No. 1
10  For example, suppose the adult decedent in Hernandez
possessed a breach of contract claim against XYZ Corporation. 
Under the rule proposed by plaintiff, an action to recover
contract damages could hypothetically be brought approximately 11
years after the decedent's death based on the distributee's
infancy even though the claim belonged to the decedent, not the
distributee.  But the distributee's infancy should be irrelevant
under CPLR 208, which provides a toll based on the plaintiff's
infancy, not the infancy of a distributee who inherits through
intestacy any damages accruing to the estate.
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damages recovered by the estate through intestate succession.10 
The adoption of such a rule, impinging on the settled policies
underlying statutes of repose, must be made by the Legislature.
We therefore conclude that Supreme Court improperly
relied on the CPLR 208 toll to permit a late notice of claim for
the personal injury action based on the infancy of the decedent's
siblings.  Because the applicable statute of limitations expired
before the filing of a late notice of claim, the Appellate
Division correctly denied the motion and dismissed the personal
injury claim.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs.
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Eugenia Brennan Heslin, as Administrator of the Estate of Egypt
A. Phillips, Deceased v County of Greene, et al.
No. 1
CIPARICK, J.(dissenting) :
Because I believe that plaintiff, administrator of the
estate of the infant decedent whose sole distributees are her
infant sisters, is entitled to the infancy toll pursuant to CPLR
§ 208 in this personal injury action as we applied it in
Hernandez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (78 NY2d 687
[1991]), I respectfully dissent.   
Here, as in Hernandez, the decedent died intestate,
survived only by infant distributees.  However, the majority
opines that the rule we announced in Hernandez cannot apply to a
personal injury cause of action for conscious pain and suffering
because of the "fundamental distinction between the natures" of
personal injury claims and wrongful death claims (majority op.,
at 7).  The majority observes that the two claims are predicated
on different theories of loss and are compensable by different
measures of damages (see id. at 11).  Specifically, the majority
states that a personal injury cause of action for conscious pain
and suffering is "personal to the deceased and belongs to the
estate, not the distributees" (id.).  The majority concludes that
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No. 1
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the adoption of a rule expanding Hernandez to claims other than
wrongful death must be accomplished by the Legislature (see id.
at 14).  I disagree because I believe the statutory scheme and
the rationale of Hernandez compel a different result.
  The survival statute, EPTL 11-3.2 (b), provides, in
relevant part: "No cause of action for injury to person or
property is lost because of the death of the person in whose
favor the cause of action existed.  For any injury an action may
be brought or continued by the personal representative of the
decedent."  Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the survival
statute, a personal injury claim survives the decedent's death.  
CPLR 208 provides in pertinent part:
"If a person entitled to commence an action
is under a disability because of infancy    
. . . at the time the cause of action
accrues, and the time otherwise limited for
commencing the action is three years or more
and expires no later than three years after
the disability ceases, or the person under
the disability dies, the time within which
the action must be commenced shall be
extended to three years after the disability
ceases or the person under the disability
dies, whichever event first occurs; if the
time otherwise limited is less than three
years, the time shall be extended by the
period of disability" (emphasis added).
Notably, CPLR 208 does not limit the toll to causes of action
that are "personal" to the infant (majority op., at 11).  Rather,
the person under the disability of infancy must only be "entitled
to commence [the] action" (CPLR 208).
In Hernandez, we considered the difficult circumstance
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No. 1
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presented by "the confluence of the pertinent EPTL, SCPA and CPLR
provisions" in a wrongful death case where the sole distributee
of an estate was an infant (78 NY2d at 693).  We eschewed the
"unnecessarily harsh result" reached by a "mechanical application
of CPLR 208" and instead applied the infancy toll "until the
earliest moment there is a personal representative or potential
personal representative who can bring the action, whether by
appointment of a guardian or majority of the distributee,
whichever occurs first" (id.).  We determined in Hernandez that
what "ultimately" tipped the balance in favor of extending the
CPLR 208 toll to permit the wrongful death claim to proceed was
"the infancy of the sole distributee" (id. at 694).  That same
consideration should tip the scale here, where no person was
entitled to commence the action other than the infant
distributees until the appointment of Heslin as administrator. 
The existing statutory scheme supports the conclusion
that the personal injury claim be permitted to move forward. 
EPTL 11-3.2 (b), the survival statute, contemplates the transfer
of a cause of action to another -- i.e., the decedent's personal
representative (see also Matter of Meng, 227 NY 264, 277 [1919]
[cause of action "belongs to or is vested in the person or
persons who has or have the lawful right to prosecute it"]).  The
practical consequence of the survival statute is to sever a
personal injury claim from the decedent and transfer it to the
personal representative.  Ratka v St. Francis Hosp. (44 NY2d 604,
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No. 1
1  The finality analysis we employed in Ratka is no longer
good law (see Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d 10, 16-17, 17 n 3 [1995]
["where a negligence cause of action has been dismissed but there
remain other claims for relief based on the same transaction or
transactions, the doctrine of implied severance is not
available"]). 
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609 [1978]), a case relied on by the majority, is not to the
contrary.  Ratka drew a distinction between personal injury and
wrongful death causes of action for the purpose of determining
finality when considering our jurisdiction and concluded that the
two causes of action were "materially separate and distinct" and
"predicated on essentially different theories of loss which
accrue to different parties" (id. at 609).1  Ratka never drew the
distinction for purposes of applying an infancy toll, which we
draw here.  Of course, there is no question that the two causes
of action are different and are "predicated on . . . different
theories" (id.).  The question here is whether, for the purposes
of applying the CPLR 208 infancy toll as we did in Hernandez,
there is any legal or logical basis to treat the causes of action
differently.  I submit there is not.  
Egypt's infant sisters, who would have priority to
serve as personal representatives of the decedent here (see EPTL
1-2.13; SCPA 1001) -- and who would thus be "entitled to commence
the action" (CPLR 208) -- are unable to serve in that capacity by
virtue of their infancy.  In Hernandez, we remedied that unique
legal situation by applying the CPLR 208 infancy toll until the
appointment of a guardian or the majority of the distributee.  We
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No. 1
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did that because the only person "whose interests [we]re at stake
in bringing th[e] action" was the sole infant survivor of the
decedent (78 NY2d at 693).  Here, contrary to the majority's
assertions, the only real parties in interest to both the
personal injury claim and the wrongful death claim are Egypt's
infant sisters -- the only persons who can inherit from her
estate and who will benefit from the outcome of both the personal
injury and wrongful death claims.  
The practical consequences of allowing a personal
injury claim to go forward, other than the possibility of a
larger damages award to the infant distributees, are minimal. 
The infant distributees are no differently situated with respect
to the personal injury claim than they are with respect to the
wrongful death claim.  For both causes of action, they will be
the sole beneficiaries of any damages.  The majority would deny
the infant plaintiffs the benefit of the CPLR 208 toll, as we
applied it in Hernandez, merely because any damages must first
pass through the estate.  It is interesting to note that the
plaintiff in Hernandez was also the personal representative of
the estate.    
The majority draws a line where the statutory structure
does not support one, apparently out of concern that applying
Hernandez to personal injury claims will lead to "the application
of the CPLR 208 toll to any cause of action belonging to a
decedent -- adult and infant alike -- who leaves only infant
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No. 1
- 6 -
distributees" (majority op., at 13).  However, certain causes of
action already continue after death by reason of legislative act
(see EPTL 11-3.2 [b]), and there exists a legislative
determination that those under the disability of infancy are
entitled to a toll of the statute of limitations to protect their
interests.  No purpose is thus served by denying this very narrow
class of claimants -- infants who are the sole distributees of a
decedent -- the benefits of these legislative determinations.  I
respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the Appellate
Division and reinstate the order of Supreme Court granting
plaintiff's motion, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5),
for leave to file a late notice of claim.   
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Judges
Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents and votes
to reverse in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge
Jones concur.
Decided February 11, 2010