Title: Keyes v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

312 So. 2d 7 (1975) Robert H. KEYES v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 48382. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 5, 1975. Martha Bergmark, Andalman, Bergmark & Ratcliff, Hattiesburg, for appellant. *8 A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Pete J. Cajoleas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before GILLESPIE, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ. ROBERTSON, Justice: Robert H. Keyes was indicted, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County, Missippi Bureau of Narcotics. He was sen-Gross, an undercover agent of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics. H was sentenced to twelve years in the State Penitentiary. The offense occurred on April 6, 1973, but he was not indicted until March 19, 1974. The trial was begun on April 3 and concluded on April 4, 1974. The testimony is conflicting: State Narcotics Agents Henry Thompson and David Gross testified that on April 6, 1973, about 4:45 p.m., at a pool hall on Brown Street in Laurel, Mississippi, they were placed in contact with Keyes by a confidential informant; that after Thompson purchased a lid of marijuana from Keyes for $15, Agent Gross told Keyes he would like to purchase a lid. Keyes, Thompson and Gross went outside to Keyes' car, where Keyes removed several lids of marijuana from underneath the seat. Keyes laid out the lids of marijuana, and told Gross to pick one. Gross picked a lid of marijuana and paid him $15 for it. Appellant's defense was that he was at Kinslow's house in Waynesboro on the afternoon of April 6, 1973, playing cards with three of his friends, McGilberry, Kinslow and Evans. Keyes' wife testified that he dropped her and their young daughter off at her mother's home in Laurel about 3:00 p.m., and that he picked them up about 9:00 that night. McGilberry testified that after dropping off Keyes' wife and daughter that Keyes and he proceeded to Waynesboro in Keyes' car, where they played cards until 9:00 that night. Kinslow also testified about playing cards with Keyes in Waynesboro. All of the defense witnesses were somewhat equivocal about the date of the card-playing in Waynesboro. In view of the fact that we must reverse this case because the trial court committed fatal error in allowing the district attorney to cross-examine defendant about a conviction in a justice of the peace court for possession of marijuana, based on a plea of nolo contendere, which case had been appealed to the county court for a trial de novo, we will not discuss the other assignments of error unless they bear on this particular ground on which we reversed. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-1-13 (1972) provides: In Piassick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.1958), the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, said: After stating that Mickler was a civil case, whereas Piassick was a criminal case, the Court continued: In the early case of Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922), the only question involved was whether the trial court could find the defendant guilty where a plea of nolo contendere was made. In answering this question, this Court said: In the case at bar the conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere had been appealed to the county court for a trial de novo. The conviction in justice of the peace court was in that posture when the district attorney cross-examined the defendant about it. In Harris v. State, 209 Miss. 141, 46 So. 2d 91 (1950), some evidence of two previous convictions had been admitted before the jury, before the jury was retired and the trial court ruled that such evidence was inadmissible. This Court, in reversing, said: In Murphree v. Hudnall, 278 So. 2d 427 (Miss. 1973), (a civil case), we said: In the case at bar, the conviction in the justice of the peace court was not a final judgment since there was to be a trial de novo in county court. We could base *10 our decision to reverse on that ground alone, but we prefer to set at rest also the question of whether a final judgment based upon a plea of nolo contendere constitutes a conviction under Section 13-1-13. The Supreme Court of Alabama aptly expressed our views in State v. Thrower, 272 Ala. 344, 131 So. 2d 420 (1961), when it said: Georgia has also held that evidence of a previous conviction, based on a plea of nolo contendere, is inadmissible. See Clinkscales v. State, 104 Ga. App. 723, 123 S.E.2d 165 (1961). We hold that evidence of a previous conviction, based on a plea of nolo contendere, is not admissible in another case. Also, the plea of nolo contendere is only available in light or petty misdemeanor cases, not in felony cases. See Bruno v. Cook, 224 So. 2d 567 (Miss. 1969). The district attorney was in error when he stated in his closing argument to the jury: While we appreciate the fact that ours is an adversary system, prosecuting attorneys would do well to exercise some caution and discretion in making extreme statements in their arguments to the jury, if for no other reason than to save themselves, the defendant, the court, and the jury, the additional time, expense and effort involved in a retrial. After all, the defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial before a jury not exposed to abusive arguments appealing to their passions and prejudices. The assignment of error on pre-indictment delay was answered adversely to the defendant in our opinion in Campbell v. State (No. 48,290), handed down March 10, 1975. We find the other assignments of error to be without merit. The judgment is reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. RODGERS, P.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, SMITH, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur.