Title: Gary v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Morris K. Gary v. State of Maryland - No. 64, 1995 Term
CRIMINAL LAW - Sentencing -- Life sentence permissible punishment
for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 64
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
MORRIS K. GARY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell 
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  February 8, 1996     
           
We are called on in this case to determine whether the trial
judge erred in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment for the
crime of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.  We find no
error in the sentence, and therefore affirm the decision of the
trial judge.
I.
Petitioner Morris K. Gary (Gary) was convicted by a jury in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of conspiracy to commit first
degree murder.  Evidence at trial showed that Gary was one of
several participants in a drive-by shooting on Old York Road in
Baltimore.  Testimony revealed that the shooting grew out of an
ongoing feud between two groups of young men, one living in the
McCabe Avenue area of Baltimore and the other in the Old York Road
neighborhood.  In August of 1992, a young man living in the McCabe
Avenue area was killed, and several of his friends believed that
their rivals on Old York Road were responsible for the killing.  On
August 23, 1992, several members of the McCabe Avenue group decided
that "somebody had to pay" for the murder of their friend.  To
avenge the murder, members of the McCabe group planned to "drive by
and shoot up [the Old York Road] neighborhood," in an attempt to
kill some of "the Old York Road guys" who had been shooting at
them.  First, a scout was sent out to ensure that the some of "the
Old York guys" would be on the street.  Then, the men took several
firearms and got into a van.  As the van travelled up Old York
-2-
Road, several of the men opened fire on people in the street,
killing two and wounding several others. 
   
Gary was charged with two counts of murder, conspiracy to
commit first degree murder and related charges.  The jury
deadlocked on the murder charges, but convicted Gary of conspiracy
to commit first degree murder.  Judge Elsbeth L. Bothe sentenced
Gary to life in prison on the conviction for conspiracy to commit
first degree murder.  Gary appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals, which affirmed both his conviction and sentence in an
unreported per curium opinion.  We granted certiorari to consider
Gary's contention that his sentence of life imprisonment for
conspiracy to commit first degree murder was illegal.  
II.    
 The discretion of a judge imposing sentence in Maryland is
extremely broad.  Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632,
642 (1981).  Only three grounds for appellate review of sentences
are recognized in this state: (1) whether the sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional
requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by
ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3)
whether the sentence is within statutory limits.  Teasley v. State,
298 Md. 364, 370, 470 A.2d 337, 340 (1984).  Gary does not contend
that his sentence is unconstitutional, or that Judge Bothe was
-3-
     Unless otherwise provided, all references to Article 27 are
1
to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.).
     Where, as in the instant case, the object of a conspiracy is
2
to kill, the appropriate charge may be conspiracy to commit first
degree murder. See Bell v. State, 48 Md. App. 669, 680, 429 A.2d
300, 306, (1981)("If one conspires to murder ... the conspiracy
itself is the premeditating factor raising the underlying crime
from a second to a first degree offense.").
motivated by impermissible considerations.  His sole contention is
that his sentence exceeds a statutory limitation imposed by the
legislature, and therefore is illegal.
The relevant statutory provision is Maryland Code (1957, 1992
Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 38,  which provides:
1
"The punishment of every person convicted of
the crime of conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for the offense he
or she conspired to commit."
There can be no dispute that the statute, by its plain language,
limits the maximum penalty for conspiracy to the maximum penalty
for the substantive crime that was the object of the conspiracy. 
Hence, any sentence up to and including the maximum penalty for the
substantive crime is permissible.  See DeLeon v. State, 102 Md.
App. 58, 63, 648 A.2d 1053, 1055 (1994)(noting that a sentencing
provision setting an upper limit indicates implicit legislative
approval to impose any sentence up to that limit); accord Walker v.
State, 53 Md. App. 171, 187, 452 A.2d 1234, 1243 (1982). 
In the instant case, Gary was charged with and convicted of
conspiracy to commit first degree murder.   The penalty for first
2
-4-
     We are not called upon in this case to decide whether a
3
defendant convicted of conspiracy to commit murder could receive
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Article 27,
§ 412(b) authorizes this harsher sentence for defendants convicted
of first degree murder, but only when the State notifies the
defendant in writing 30 days prior to trial of its intent to seek
life without parole. 
     We note that this Court has, on more than one occasion, been
4
faced with cases in which defendants convicted of conspiracy to
commit murder were sentenced to life imprisonment.  See Henry v.
State, 324 Md. 204, 239-40, 596 A.2d 1024, 1042 (1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 972, 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992);
Jordan v. State, 323 Md. 151, 159-62, 591 A.2d 875, 879-80 (1991).
By not taking action to correct these sentences, this Court tacitly
approved of life sentences imposed for conspiracy to commit murder.
See Jordan, 323 Md. at 161, 591 A.2d at 880 (noting that this Court
can correct an illegal sentence at any time).  
degree murder in Maryland is set out in Art. 27, § 412(b), which
provides in pertinent part: 
"[A] person found guilty of murder in the
first degree shall be sentenced to death,
imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole."
Thus, a sentence of life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit
first degree murder is the lowest of the statutory penalties for
first degree murder.   Therefore, Gary's sentence does not violate
3
the maximum penalty for conspiracy to murder set out in Art. 27, §
38, and is not illegal.4
Gary, however, argues against this inescapable conclusion.  He
posits that despite the plain language of the statute, the
legislature intended that there be a ten-year limit on any sentence
for conspiracy, regardless of the maximum sentence permitted for
the substantive crime that was the object of the conspiracy.  For
-5-
     Conspiracy is a common law misdemeanor in Maryland.  Archer
5
v. State, 145 Md. 128, 136, 125 A. 744, 747 (1924).  Hence, prior
to the enactment of Chapter 651 of the Acts of 1927, conspiracy
could be punished by imprisonment for any period that was not cruel
and unusual.  Jones v. State, 8 Md. App. 370, 375 n.4, 259 A.2d
807, 811 n.4 (1969).   
support, Gary points to a previous version of Art. 27, § 38,
enacted in 1927, which provided in pertinent part:
"Every person convicted of the crime of
conspiracy shall be liable to be punished by
... imprisonment ... for not more than ten
years...."
Chapter 651 of the Acts of 1927.   In 1961, the legislature
5
repealed the 1927 version of the statute and adopted Art. 27, § 38
in its present form, without the 10-year limitation.  See Ch. 691
of the Acts of 1961. 
Gary argues that the sole purpose of the 1961 amendment was to
prevent defendants convicted of conspiracy from receiving sentences
harsher than those they could receive if they had been convicted of
the substantive crime that was the object of the conspiracy.  As an
example, Gary cites Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310, 93 A.2d 753,
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 955, 73 S.Ct. 937, 97 L.Ed. 1377 (1953), in
which this Court upheld a sentence of seven years for conspiracy to
violate lottery laws even though the maximum penalty for the
substantive crime was one year. 201 Md. at 320-21, 93 A.2d at 757-
58.  Gary contends that the only purpose of the 1961 amendment,
which limits the penalty for conspiracy to the maximum penalty for
the substantive crime, was to eliminate the inequities illustrated
-6-
by Scarlett.  The legislature did not intend, Gary asserts, to
authorize sentences of greater than 10 years for conspiracy
convictions.
We find no merit in this contention.  Gary may be correct that
the legislature's purpose in amending § 38 was to prevent harsher
sentences for conspiracy than were authorized for the substantive
crime.  See State v. Michael, 2 Md. App. 750, 753, 237 A.2d 782,
784 (1968)(noting the purpose of 1961 amendment of § 38 apparently
was to avoid harsher sentence for conspiracy than for the
substantive crime).  But even conceding that point, there is no
basis from which to conclude, as Gary urges us to do, that this was
the legislature's only purpose in amending the statute.  It is just
as logical to conclude that the legislature also intended to ensure
that those who conspire to commit criminal acts be punished just as
severely as those who commit them.  
Gary places great emphasis on Michael, supra, in which the
Court of Special Appeals expressed doubt that the legislature
intended Art. 27, § 38 to authorize the death penalty for
conspiracy to commit capital crimes.  The court noted that
"[w]ithout a more definite expression" of the legislature's intent,
it did not believe the death penalty could be imposed for
conspiracy, even though the death penalty was available for first
degree murder.  Michael, 2 Md. App. at 753, 237 A.2d at 783.  Gary
argues that this same reasoning should be applied to a sentence of
-7-
life imprisonment.  
Gary is correct that the death penalty generally is an
unavailable penalty for conspiracy to commit murder.  As we noted
in Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 510, 495 A.2d 1, 12 (1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 1065 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986),
pursuant to the Maryland death penalty statute, only principals in
the first degree to first degree murder are eligible for the death
penalty in Maryland.  See Art. 27, §§ 412(b), 413(a), and
413(e)(1).  A principal in the first degree is "`one who actually
commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by inanimate agency, or
by an innocent human agent.'" Johnson, 303 Md. at 510, 495 A.2d at
12 (citation omitted).  In addition, under the statute, one who
employs another person to kill is also considered a principal in
the first degree for purposes of the death penalty.  See Art. 27,
§§ 413(e)(1) and 413(d)(7).  Since a conviction for conspiracy to
murder does not by itself establish that the defendant committed
the crime by his own hand, by inanimate agency, by an innocent
agent, or employed another person to kill, the death penalty is
generally unavailable for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
It does not follow, however, that because the legislature did
not authorize the death penalty for conspiracy, that the
legislature also did not intend to authorize life imprisonment.
The death penalty "`differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind.'"  Woods v. State, 315 Md.
-8-
591, 605, 556 A.2d 236, 243 (1989)(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 306, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2760, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 388
(1972)(Stewart, J., concurring)).  Given the unique nature of the
death penalty, it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that,
although the legislature did not authorize the death penalty for
conspiracy, it did intend to authorize life imprisonment.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the legislature.  Oaks v. Connors, 339
Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).  The first step in
determining the legislature's intent is to look at the language of
the statute itself.  Id.  If the language is clear and unambiguous,
there is usually no need to look further.  Harris v. State, 331 Md.
137, 145-46, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993).  Here, we find the language
"[t]he punishment of every person convicted of the crime of
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for the
offense he or she conspired to commit" to be clear and unambiguous.
Hence, we hold that Art. 27, § 38 authorizes a sentence of life
imprisonment for the crime of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder.  We find nothing illegal in Gary's sentence.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.