Title: Lawlor v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
MARK ERIC LAWLOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 120481 
  
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 10, 2013 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we review convictions for capital murder 
and the imposition of two sentences of death.  We consider 
whether the circuit court erred when it (a) limited questioning 
during voir dire, (b) excluded evidence during the penalty 
phase of trial, and (c) instructed the jury.  We review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to prove the elements of the 
offenses charged and the aggravating factors required for 
imposition of a sentence of death.  We also consider challenges 
to the imposition of the death penalty on constitutional and 
statutory grounds.  Finally, as required by Code § 17.1-313(C), 
we consider whether the sentences of death were imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary 
factor and whether the sentences of death are excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Mark Eric Lawlor was indicted on and convicted of one 
count of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, 
 
2 
rape or attempted rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(5), and 
one count of capital murder in the commission of abduction with 
the intent to defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(1). 
The victim, Genevieve Orange, was found on the floor of 
the living area of her studio apartment.  She was naked from 
the waist down, her bra and t-shirt had been pushed up over her 
breasts, and semen was smeared on her abdomen and right thigh.  
Her soiled and bloodied shorts and underpants had been flung to 
the floor nearby.  She had been struck 47 times with one or 
more blunt objects. 
A bent metal pot was found near Orange’s body.  Its wooden 
handle had broken off and was found in the kitchen sink, near a 
bloody metal frying pan that had been battered out of its 
original shape.  Some of Orange’s wounds were consistent with 
having been struck with the frying pan.1  Subsequent medical 
examination established that she had aspirated blood and 
sustained defensive wounds, together indicating that she had 
been alive and conscious during some part of the beating. 
Lawlor resided in Orange’s apartment building.  He also 
worked there as a leasing consultant and had access to keys to 
each apartment.  On the eve of trial, Lawlor admitted 
“participation” in the murder. 
                     
 
1 Other wounds may have been consistent with having been 
struck by a hammer but no hammer was recovered. 
 
3 
A blood sample from Orange's body and a buccal swab from 
Lawlor resulted in the compilation of a polymerase chain 
reaction (“PCR”) DNA profile for each person, consisting of 
type characteristics or alleles from 16 genetic regions on 
their respective DNA strands.  Police and medical personnel 
also collected forensic evidence from Orange’s body.  This 
forensic material, the wooden pot handle, and the frying pan 
were subjected to DNA analysis resulting in the compilation of 
a PCR DNA profile for each sample.  A comparison of the PCR DNA 
profiles revealed that every allele at each of the 16 genetic 
regions from the forensic material and the frying pan was 
consistent with either Orange or Lawlor, with one exception: 
DNA from a non-sperm sample recovered from Orange's abdomen 
included a fractional amount of a single allele that was not 
consistent with either person’s DNA profile.  However, each of 
the alleles at the 15 other genetic regions in the sample was 
attributable to either Orange or Lawlor, as was each of the 
alleles at all 16 genetic regions from the other forensic 
material and the frying pan.  The statistical probability that 
an unrelated person other than Lawlor contributed the DNA 
foreign to Orange was 1 in more than 6.5 billion. 
After Lawlor's conviction during the guilt phase of trial, 
the jury proceeded to the penalty phase.  The Commonwealth 
presented its evidence of aggravating factors as required by 
 
4 
Code § 19.2-264.4(C).  Lawlor presented rebuttal evidence and 
evidence of mitigating factors pursuant to Code § 19.2-
264.4(B).  Over his objection, the court excluded some of his 
evidence.  At the conclusion of the evidence, the court 
instructed the jury after rejecting some of Lawlor's proffered 
instructions.  The jury found both the vileness and future 
dangerousness aggravating factors and returned a sentence of 
death on each count.  After denying Lawlor’s post-trial 
motions, the court imposed the jury's sentences. 
Lawlor timely filed 217 assignments of error pursuant to 
Rule 5:22(c) and Code § 19.2-320.  We consider his appeal and 
review the sentences of death pursuant to Code § 17.1-313. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Of the 217 assignments of error Lawlor originally filed, 
96 are neither listed nor argued in his opening brief and 
therefore are abandoned under Rule 5:27(c) and (d).2  Prieto v. 
Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 159, 721 S.E.2d 484, 490-91, cert. 
denied, __ U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2012 U.S. Lexis 6641 (2012) 
(“Prieto II”); Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 252, 699 
                     
 
2 The abandoned assignments of error are 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 
33, 36, 37, 43, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 92, 94, 99, 100, 
101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 118, 121, 
122, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161, 163, 166, 
169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 181, 182, 183, 
184, 191, 192, 197, 201, 203, 205, 211, 212, 216, and 217. 
 
5 
S.E.2d 237, 249, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2999 
(2010).  Lawlor aggregates the remaining 121 assignments of 
error into 18 claims, which we will review chronologically 
based upon when the core of the alleged error in each claim 
occurred during the course of the proceedings. 
A. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
CLAIM 4: EXCLUSION OF QUESTIONS DURING VOIR DIRE 
This claim consists of 38 assignments of error asserting 
that the circuit court improperly limited Lawlor’s questioning 
of 19 members of the jury venire during voir dire, and 
therefore erred by seating the 12 jurors and 2 alternates.3  Of 
these, assignments of error 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 each merely state 
that the court erred generally in limiting Lawlor’s questioning 
of specified members of the venire, providing no basis for the 
asserted error.  Similarly, assignment of error 31 asserts that 
the court erred by limiting voir dire by excluding unspecified 
“life qualification” questions and assignment of error 67 
asserts the court erred by seating the 14 jurors and alternates 
“without first ensuring their legal qualification to sit on a 
                     
 
3 One of these, assignment of error 79, asserts that the 
court erred by denying Lawlor the follow-up question “And what 
would it depend on, ma’am?” when the member of the venire 
answered that her decision to impose the death penalty would 
“depend on the evidence.”  We find no argument for this 
assignment of error in Lawlor’s brief and it therefore is 
abandoned.  Rule 5:27(d). 
 
6 
capital jury.”  These 21 general assertions are amplified by 16 
assignments of error setting forth the questions he was not 
permitted to ask or information he sought to elicit and the 
members of the venire to whom the questions were or would have 
been propounded.  The 21 general assignments of error are not 
independently argued on brief so to the extent they are not 
encompassed by our review of the 16 specific assignments of 
error, we will not consider them.4  Rule 5:27(d). 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“The purpose of standards of review is to focus reviewing 
courts upon their proper role when passing on the conduct of 
other decisionmakers.”  Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term 
Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2008).  Therefore 
it is incumbent upon the parties and the appellate court to 
correctly identify and apply them. 
Lawlor has incorrectly identified the standard of review 
applicable to this issue.  Citing Nelson v. Commonwealth, 281 
Va. 212, 215, 707 S.E.2d 815, 816 (2011), he contends that 
whether a defendant’s right to voir dire the jury was infringed 
is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo.  However, 
the sole issue in Nelson was sufficiency of the evidence to 
                     
 
4 The brief also contains no independent argument on 
assignment of error 76 so to the extent it is not encompassed 
by assignments of error 74 and 75, it too is abandoned.  Rule 
5:27(d). 
 
7 
establish a conviction for driving while intoxicated, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-266.  Id.  Although Nelson was tried 
by jury, id. at 214, 707 S.E.2d at 815, voir dire was not an 
issue in the appeal. 
In prior cases, we have stated that a ruling on a motion 
to exclude a juror for cause is reviewed as a mixed question of 
law and fact.  LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 584, 304 
S.E.2d 644, 654-55 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); 
Briley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 180, 185, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154 
(1981).  But see Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329, 
619 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2005) (applying abuse of discretion 
standard); Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 536, 552 S.E.2d 
344, 358 (2001) (“Powell I”) (same); Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 307, 329-30, 541 S.E.2d 872, 887, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
1043 (2001) (trial court’s decision “will not be reversed on 
appeal absent a ‘showing of manifest error or abuse of 
discretion.’” (quoting Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 
252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988)); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 
Va. 121, 134, 410 S.E.2d 254, 262 (1991), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 946 (1992) (trial court’s decision “will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the refusal amounts to manifest error.”).  
However, the conduct of voir dire, not exclusion for cause, is 
the issue raised here. 
 
8 
It is well-established that the manner of conducting voir 
dire, including the exclusion of questions to the venire, is 
committed to the trial court’s discretion and we review its 
rulings only for abuse of that discretion.  Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 131, 162, 688 S.E.2d 220, 237, cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 143 (2010); Juniper v. 
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 390, 626 S.E.2d 383, 402, cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006); Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 
403, 519 S.E.2d 808, 815 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1107 
(2000) (“Orbe I”). 
In contrast to the de novo standard of review, “the abuse 
of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show 
enough deference to a primary decisionmaker’s judgment that the 
court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a 
different result in the first instance.”  Evans, 514 F.3d at 
322.  Accordingly, “when a decision is discretionary . . . . 
the court has a range of choice, and . . . its decision will 
not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is 
not influenced by any mistake of law.’ ”  Landrum v. Chippenham 
& Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 
134, 137 (2011) (quoting Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 
968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)); see also Evans, 514 F.3d at 322 
(“[T]he [abuse of discretion] standard draws a line – or 
rather, demarcates a region – between the unsupportable and the 
 
9 
merely mistaken, between the legal error, disorder of reason, 
severe lapse of judgment, and procedural failure that a 
reviewing court may always correct, and the simple disagreement 
that, on this standard, it may not.”). 
We recently focused this standard of review by identifying 
the “three principal ways” by which a court abuses its 
discretion: “when a relevant factor that should have been given 
significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or 
improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and 
when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, 
but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error 
of judgment.”  Landrum, 282 Va. at 352, 717 S.E.2d at 137 
(quoting Kern, 738 F.2d at 970)).  Naturally, the law often 
circumscribes the range of choice available to a court in the 
exercise of its discretion.  In such cases, “[t]he abuse-of-
discretion standard includes review to determine that the 
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions,” id. 
at 357, 717 S.E.2d at 139 (Millette, J., concurring) (quoting 
Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 261, 661 S.E.2d 415, 445 
(2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1189 (2009)), because a court 
also abuses its discretion if it inaccurately ascertains its 
outermost limits.  Such an error may occur when the court 
believes it lacks authority it possesses, see id. at 358, 661 
S.E.2d at 140 (discussing court’s mistaken belief it lacked 
 
10 
authority to supervise courtroom security), when it believes 
the law requires something it does not, LaCava v. Commonwealth, 
283 Va. 465, 472, 722 S.E.2d 838, 841 (2012) (court abused its 
discretion in denying a motion to extend the deadline for 
filing a transcript based on a flawed interpretation of Rule 
5A:8(a)), or when it fails to fulfill a condition precedent 
that the law requires, Turner v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 198, 
208, 726 S.E.2d 325, 331 (2012) (court abused its discretion in 
ruling a witness unavailable for lack of memory when it failed 
to inquire into the authenticity of his claim as required by 
precedent).  But whether a court possesses or lacks authority, 
and whether it has correctly identified and fulfilled the legal 
prerequisites to a discretionary act, are themselves 
significant factors in its consideration.  Therefore, while our 
abuse of discretion standard of review necessarily must include 
a review of any legal conclusions made concomitant with a lower 
court’s exercise of discretion, that does not mean abuse of 
discretion review is partially de novo.  See Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).5 
                     
 
5 Lawlor similarly implies a de novo review under the abuse 
of discretion standard elsewhere in his brief when quoting our 
statement in Porter and subsequent cases that a court “by 
definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 
law.”  276 Va. at 260, 661 S.E.2d at 445.  For the foregoing 
reasons, this statement was not intended to be a back door 
through which an appellant may convert abuse of discretion 
review into de novo review. 
 
11 
In the case of voir dire, a trial court’s discretion in 
excluding questions asked of the venire is limited by statute 
and the United States Constitution.  Code § 8.01-358 
establishes a “right to ask [a member of the venire] directly 
any relevant question to ascertain whether he is related to 
either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has 
expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or 
prejudice therein.”  To exclude all such questions would be 
contrary to the statute, thereby constituting an abuse of 
discretion.  See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 143, 590 
S.E.2d 537, 559, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 892 (2004) (“Powell 
II”); LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653. 
In a capital case, this inquiry of a prospective juror 
encompasses questions of whether his “views [on the death 
penalty] would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance 
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
and his oath.’”  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992) 
(quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)); see 
also Mackall, 236 Va. at 251, 372 S.E.2d at 766 (“[E]ither 
party may require prospective jurors to state clearly that 
whatever view they have of the death penalty will not prevent 
or substantially impair their performance as jurors in 
conformity with their oath and the court's instructions.”).  
But within those perimeters, “[a] party has no right . . . to 
 
12 
propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire 
questioning ad infinitum.  The court must afford a party a full 
and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective jurors 
‘stand indifferent in the cause,’ but the trial judge retains 
the discretion to determine when the parties have had 
sufficient opportunity to do so.”  LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 
304 S.E.2d at 365; accord Thomas, 279 Va. at 162-63, 688 S.E.2d 
at 237; Juniper, 271 Va. at 396, 626 S.E.2d at 405.  We 
therefore review the challenged jurors’ entire voir dire, not 
merely individual statements taken in isolation.  Powell I, 261 
Va. at 536, 552 S.E.2d at 358; Burns, 261 Va. at 329, 541 
S.E.2d at 887. 
2. VIEWS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
In assignments of error 77, 78, and 88, Lawlor asserts 
that the court erred by preventing him from asking specific 
members of the venire “[D]o you have strong feelings in favor 
of the death penalty?” or “[W]hat are your views about the 
death penalty?”  Lawlor asserts that the Supreme Court of the 
United States identified such questions as constitutionally 
protected in Morgan.  That assertion is not accurate.  Rather, 
in Morgan the Supreme Court merely reiterated its earlier 
holding in Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, and Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 
38, 45 (1980), that a potential juror may be questioned to 
determine whether his views “would prevent or substantially 
 
13 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath.”  504 U.S. at 728 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus there is no statutory or 
constitutional right to ask Lawlor’s questions.  Cf. Code 
§ 8.01-358. 
Accordingly, we have held that a party is not entitled to 
ask potential jurors their views on the death penalty.  Burns, 
261 Va. at 329, 541 S.E.2d at 887 (citing Mackall, 236 Va. at 
251, 372 S.E.2d at 766).  The relevant inquiry is whether the 
juror would adhere to them in disregard of the jury 
instructions and in violation of his or her oath.  Witt, 469 
U.S. at 420 (“[A] juror may not be challenged for cause based 
on his views about capital punishment unless those views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” 
(quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45) (emphasis in Witt)).  The court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion by excluding Lawlor’s 
questions. 
3. MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
In assignments of error 74, 75, 76, 80, 83, 84, 85, and 
86, Lawlor argues that the court erred by preventing him from 
asking specific members of the venire whether they would 
consider specific types of evidence as mitigating evidence, 
including evidence that the defendant was under the influence 
 
14 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; evidence of 
childhood neglect; evidence of the defendant’s full life 
history; evidence of a lack of prior violent criminal record; 
and evidence of drug or alcohol use.  Citing Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007), he argues that by denying him 
the opportunity to ask about specific types of mitigating 
evidence, the court prevented him from determining whether the 
jurors could give meaningful consideration to all mitigating 
evidence. 
However, Abdul-Kabir requires that juries consider all 
mitigating evidence as a whole; it does not require courts to 
permit defendants to ask jurors how they would weigh every 
species of mitigating evidence.  See id. at 246.  Furthermore, 
we have ruled that questions about the effect of specific 
mitigating evidence on the jurors’ deliberations “are improper 
in voir dire because they are not relevant to a determination 
of whether a juror has a particular bias or prejudice, but 
instead attempt to elicit the juror's views on specific types 
of evidence.”  Powell I, 261 Va. at 536, 552 S.E.2d at 358.  
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by 
prohibiting this line of questioning. 
In assignment of error 81, Lawlor argues that the court 
erred by preventing him from asking whether specific members of 
the venire would consider a life sentence in the absence of any 
 
15 
mitigating evidence.  While we have indicated that a defendant 
need not present any evidence pertaining to sentencing, see 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 194, 590 S.E.2d 520, 529, 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 891 (2004), each of the specified 
members of the venire was instructed during voir dire that a 
sentence of death is never mandatory and that the jury could 
return a sentence of life imprisonment without parole even if 
the Commonwealth proved both aggravating factors and Lawlor 
presented no mitigating evidence.  The court thereafter asked 
each member whether he or she understood that the defense was 
not required to present mitigating evidence.  Counsel also 
asked whether the members of the venire understood and received 
affirmative responses.  However, the court rejected some forms 
of Lawlor’s question and limited his inquiry as repetitive. 
Reviewing the entire voir dire of the specified members of 
the venire, Powell I, 261 Va. at 536, 552 S.E.2d at 385; Burns, 
261 Va. at 329, 541 S.E.2d at 887, we are satisfied that “[t]he 
circuit court explained the relevant legal principles, asked 
appropriate questions to ensure that the jurors understood 
those principles and could apply them to the case, and afforded 
[Lawlor] a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether 
jurors could stand indifferent in the cause.”  Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 196-97, 563 S.E.2d 695, 711-12 
(2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003) (internal quotation 
 
16 
marks omitted).  While the court restricted his voir dire, 
Lawlor elicited the information he sought and was not entitled 
to ask the members of the venire this question repetitively or 
in his preferred form.  Thomas, 279 Va. at 162-63, 688 S.E.2d 
at 237; Juniper, 271 Va. at 396, 626 S.E.2d at 405; see also 
Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 97, 580 S.E.2d 834, 843 
(2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1194 (2004) (“When . . . a trial 
court affords ample opportunity to counsel to ask relevant 
questions . . . sufficient to preserve a defendant's right to 
trial by a fair and impartial jury, we will generally not 
reverse [its] decision to limit or disallow certain questions 
from defense counsel.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion. 
In assignment of error 87, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by preventing him from asking specific members of the 
venire if they were substantially impaired from considering a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole if the defense 
presented no mitigating evidence.  He argues that the court 
properly allowed him to ask whether they were “prevented” from 
considering life imprisonment without parole but improperly 
prevented him from asking whether they were “substantially 
impaired” from considering such a sentence.  He argues that 
“prevent” and “substantially impair” are not interchangeable. 
 
17 
As noted above, the terms “prevent” and “substantially 
impair” come from Adams, 448 U.S. at 45, and have been 
reiterated in Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728, 
and Mackall, 236 Va. at 251, 372 S.E.2d at 766--all cases 
applying them to a juror’s views on capital punishment and 
their effect on his or her ability to follow jury instructions 
and fulfill his or her oath.  We need not decide whether the 
terms “prevent” and “substantially impair” are interchangeable 
in that context because they were not used for that purpose in 
the portion of the record relevant to this assignment of error.  
Rather, Lawlor asked a member of the venire, “[D]o you think 
you would be substantially impaired from considering life 
without parole as punishment for the guilty capital murderer 
where aggravating circumstances were found and you heard no 
evidence of mitigation?”6  The question therefore did not seek 
to elicit the effect of the jurors’ views on capital punishment 
but rather whether they would consider life imprisonment 
without parole if Lawlor presented no mitigating evidence, 
which, as noted above, they had already answered.7  That was the 
view of the circuit court as well:  in excluding the question 
                     
 
6 Lawlor also proposed a similar but longer version of the 
question in written form. 
 
7 This assignment of error names two additional members of 
the venire who were not specified in assignment of error 81.  
However, they too had been fully instructed that the defendant 
need not present any mitigating evidence and were questioned 
whether they understood by the court and counsel. 
 
18 
upon the Commonwealth’s objection, it ruled, “They have 
answered that question about eight times.  Each of the 
prospective jurors have said [‘]I would consider both, whether 
there was mitigating evidence or where there wasn't mitigating 
evidence[’] and you continue to ask the question.” 
As noted above, a defendant has a right to propound 
questions relevant under Code § 8.01-358 and the Adams line of 
cases.  However, he is not entitled to his preferred form of 
question and does not have the right to repeat them 
cumulatively when he already has elicited the relevant 
information.  Thomas, 279 Va. at 162-63, 688 S.E.2d at 237; 
Juniper, 271 Va. at 396, 626 S.E.2d at 405; Green, 266 Va. at 
97, 580 S.E.2d at 843.  The information Lawlor sought was 
whether the jurors would consider life imprisonment without 
parole in the absence of any mitigating evidence.  Any 
distinction between the terms “prevent” and “substantially 
impair” in the Adams line of cases does not apply to this 
particular inquiry.  Therefore, he had obtained the relevant 
information and the court did not abuse its discretion by 
restricting the form or frequency of his questions. 
4. PRISON CONDITIONS 
In assignment of error 72, Lawlor argues that the court 
erred by preventing him from asking potential jurors whether 
they could consider a sentence of life imprisonment without 
 
19 
parole in the absence of any evidence of prison security.  He 
contends that jurors may have been more willing to sentence him 
to life imprisonment without parole if they were confident he 
would be unable to present a danger there or escape. 
We have previously ruled that evidence of general prison 
conditions is not relevant in a capital case, either as 
mitigating evidence, Juniper, 271 Va. at 425, 626 S.E.2d at 423 
(citing Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 
642, 653, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999)), or to rebut the 
future dangerousness aggravating factor.  Id. at 426-27, 626 
S.E.2d at 424 (citing Bell, 264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E. 2d at 
714); see also Morva v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 329, 350, 683 
S.E.2d 553, 565 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 
97 (2010) (“The generalized competence of the Commonwealth to 
completely secure a defendant in the future is not a relevant 
inquiry.”).  Code § 8.01-358 does not entitle or permit the 
court or a party to examine potential jurors to ascertain what 
effect the exclusion of irrelevant evidence may have on their 
deliberations.  Accordingly, the court did not abuse its 
discretion by excluding Lawlor’s question. 
5. MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
In assignments of error 59 and 61, Lawlor argues that the 
court failed to remedy its erroneous restrictions on voir dire 
by denying his motion to re-question 7 members of the venire 
 
20 
and by denying his alternative motion for a mistrial.  Because 
we have found that the court did not erroneously restrict voir 
dire, the court did not err in denying the motion.8 
CLAIM 5: THE CIRCUIT COURT’S CONDUCT DURING VOIR DIRE 
This claim consists of 10 assignments of error asserting 
that the circuit court erred by engaging in prejudicial conduct 
during voir dire. 
Lawlor asserts in assignments of error 34, 77, and 82 that 
the court engaged in prejudicial conduct during voir dire by 
issuing contradictory rulings.  Based on our review of the 
places in the record to which Lawlor refers, see Rule 5:27(c) 
(requiring an appellant to refer “to the pages of the appendix 
where the alleged error has been preserved”), the only rulings 
adverse to Lawlor were those we have refused to reverse under 
the abuse of discretion standard, including rulings on 
questions to elicit the jurors’ views or feelings on capital 
punishment, their ability to consider a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole in the absence of mitigating 
evidence, and their willingness to consider specific types of 
mitigating evidence.  Because those rulings were not error, 
                     
 
8 These assignments of error include four members of the 
venire not specified in assignments of error 81 and 87.  
However, each of these members had also been instructed by the 
court that the defendant need not present any mitigating 
evidence and were questioned whether they understood by the 
court and counsel.  Therefore the reasoning set forth above 
also applies to them.  
 
21 
they did not prejudice Lawlor in voir dire.  To the extent that 
the adverse rulings may have been contradicted by favorable 
rulings at other places in the record, the favorable rulings 
could not prejudice Lawlor because they enabled him to propound 
questions that the court could properly, in its discretion, 
have excluded. 
Lawlor also argues in assignments of error 35, 39, 60, 89, 
90, and 91 that he was prejudiced by the court’s reprimands in 
the presence of jurors, either in open court or in a loud voice 
during bench conferences, and in sustaining the Commonwealth’s 
objections to his voir dire questions in the presence of the 
jury.  Based on our review of the places in the record to which 
Lawlor refers, see Rule 5:27(c), either he did not object that 
the comments were prejudicial when they were made in open court 
or there is no indication that the jury heard the comments made 
during bench conferences.9  We cannot consider any comments 
where the record contains no indication that the jury heard 
                     
 
9 Lawlor did request that the court and counsel keep their 
voices down in the bench conferences, but there is no 
indication that the comments he asserts were prejudicial were 
overheard by the jury.  On one occasion, he suggested the 
possibility they were audible but the court ruled they were 
not.  On another occasion, co-counsel noted that the bench 
conference could be heard at counsel table and objected to the 
seating of the members of that panel of the venire.  However, 
the court ruled that counsel had already consented to their 
qualification and that the objection therefore was untimely.  
Lawlor has not assigned error to either ruling.  Consequently, 
we will not review them.  Rule 5:22(c). 
 
22 
them because there is no basis to find prejudice.  Prince 
Seating Corp. v. Rabideau, 275 Va. 468, 470, 659 S.E.2d 305, 
307 (2008) (per curiam) (“We cannot review the ruling of a 
lower court for error when the appellant does not . . . provide 
us with a record that adequately demonstrates that the court 
erred.”).  We will not consider any comments where Lawlor 
failed to object because the issue was not preserved.  Rule 
5:25; Porter, 276 Va. at 256, 661 S.E.2d at 442 (noting the 
issue of prejudice was not preserved because “the record shows 
that he failed to timely object to any of the circuit court's 
comments”). 
In assignment of error 62, Lawlor argues that the court 
erred by denying his written motion to reopen voir dire to 
permit him to ask additional questions.  In that motion, he 
also sought in the alternative a mistrial on the ground that 
the court’s comments and reprimands could be heard by the jury 
and were prejudicial.  In denying the motion, the court stated 
that it could only rule on timely objections. 
We review denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of 
discretion.  Lewis v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 209, 213-14, 608 
S.E.2d 907, 909 (2005) (citing Burns, 261 Va. at 341, 541 
S.E.2d at 894).  The comments and reprimands Lawlor asserted to 
be prejudicial in the motion were made during voir dire of the 
first nine jurors, which occurred on February 2 and 3, 2011.  
 
23 
However, he did not file his motion until February 7.  The 
court denied it then as untimely.  That ruling was not an abuse 
of discretion.  See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 40, 393 
S.E.2d 599, 607 (1990) (declining to reverse denial of motion 
for mistrial where the defendant failed to seek corrective 
action promptly when the allegedly prejudicial comments were 
made). 
CLAIM 6: MISLEADING THE JURY 
This claim consists of 2 assignments of error, assignments 
of error 63 and 64, in which Lawlor asserts that by overruling 
his objections to the Commonwealth’s voir dire questions and 
sustaining the Commonwealth’s objections to his, the circuit 
court misled the jurors into believing they could disregard 
mitigating evidence. 
Lawlor first argues that the court erred by allowing the 
Commonwealth to state “[W]hen it comes to mitigating evidence 
the [c]ourt will instruct you that you shall consider . . . the 
mitigating evidence?  But, again, [as with evidence of 
aggravating factors,] you don’t have to accept it?”  However, 
Lawlor did not object to the statement.  We therefore will not 
consider this argument.  Rule 5:25. 
Similarly, he argues that the court erred by sustaining 
the Commonwealth’s objection to his question, “Do you all 
understand that you can't reject any kind of mitigation 
 
24 
evidence?”  The court sustained the objection as the question 
was worded.  Lawlor then expressly accepted the court’s ruling 
and agreed to move on.  We therefore will not consider this 
argument.  Rule 5:25. 
Lawlor also refers to a written motion in limine he filed 
to prevent future statements by the Commonwealth that the jury 
could reject mitigating evidence.  However, the court granted 
the motion.  Lawlor is not aggrieved by a ruling in his favor. 
B. THE GUILT PHASE OF TRIAL 
CLAIM 8:  CHALLENGES TO COUNT I (CAPITAL MURDER IN 
THE COMMISSION OF RAPE OR ATTEMPTED RAPE) 
This claim consists of 2 assignments of error relating to 
the first count of the indictment, challenging rulings on a 
motion to strike and a motion in limine. 
1. MOTION TO STRIKE 
In assignment of error 93, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his motion to strike the element of rape from 
Count I of the indictment, capital murder in the commission of 
or subsequent to rape or attempted rape, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(5).  Citing Moore v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 184, 186, 
491 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1997), he contends that there was no 
evidence of penile penetration, an essential element of rape. 
Under Code § 18.2-31(5) willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing is capital murder if committed in the 
 
25 
commission of or subsequent to either rape or attempted rape.10  
Proof of either predicate is sufficient to establish the crime 
of capital murder under the statute.  Accordingly, the 
conviction must be affirmed if the evidence is sufficient to 
prove the statutory crime charged in the indictment, which in 
this case includes both rape and attempted rape. 
While Lawlor’s assignment of error asserts that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove rape, neither it nor any 
other challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 
attempted rape.  Consequently, the unchallenged attempted rape 
predicate is a separate and independent basis upon which to 
affirm his conviction of the statutory crime as charged in the 
indictment.  We therefore do not review the sufficiency of the 
evidence to prove the separate rape predicate.  Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 113, 116-17, 609 S.E.2d 58, 60 
(2005); see also Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Batt, 284 Va. 409, 421-22, 732 S.E.2d 690, 698 (2012). 
2. MOTION IN LIMINE 
In assignment of error 114, Lawlor asserts that allowing 
the jury to consider the rape predicate during the penalty 
phase may have been prejudicial because jurors may have viewed 
                     
 
10 Such a killing also is capital murder if committed in 
the commission of or subsequent to forcible sodomy, attempted 
forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration.  Code § 18.2-
31(5).  These predicates were not included in the indictment 
and are not relevant in this appeal.  
 
26 
rape as more reprehensible than attempted rape, thereby 
influencing them to impose a sentence of death rather than life 
imprisonment without parole. 
Lawlor challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the 
rape portion of the charge in his motion to strike.  That 
motion was timely made.  However, he did not make this argument 
regarding prejudice then.  Rather, he argued prejudice for the 
first time in a motion in limine filed after the jury had been 
instructed in the guilt phase of trial and after it returned 
its verdict.  This prejudice argument was not timely at that 
stage of the trial.   
It is axiomatic that when a jury considers what sentence 
to impose upon a defendant convicted of a crime, the charge 
upon which he stands convicted is essential to its 
deliberation.  Both Code § 19.2-295(A) and Code § 19.2-264.3(C) 
direct that the same jury that returned a conviction shall 
thereafter determine the sentence to be imposed.  The statutes 
therefore presume that the jury is cognizant of the conviction 
during its deliberation of the sentence.  Further, Code 
§§ 18.2-10, 18.2-11, 18.2-12, and 18.2-13 set forth the 
permissible ranges of sentences that juries may impose based 
upon the offense for which the defendant stands convicted, 
either directly or as a result of the classification of the 
 
27 
offense.  Thus it is by knowing the offense that the jury knows 
the legal range for the sentence. 
Consequently, the charge upon which a defendant stands 
convicted cannot, as a matter of law, be irrelevant to or 
prejudicial in the jury’s consideration of the sentence to be 
imposed.11  Accordingly, because Lawlor’s argument that allowing 
the jurors to consider the rape predicate would prejudice their 
penalty phase deliberations was first made after they had 
convicted him, it was not timely.  It therefore will not be 
considered.  Rule 5:25. 
CLAIM 7: CHALLENGES TO COUNT II (CAPITAL MURDER IN 
THE COMMISSION OF ABDUCTION WITH INTENT TO DEFILE) 
This claim consists of 7 assignments of error relating to 
the second count of the indictment, challenging rulings on a 
motion to strike, a motion in limine, and jury instructions. 
1. MOTION TO STRIKE 
In assignments of error 95 and 96, Lawlor asserts that the 
court erred by denying his motions to strike the evidence on 
Count II of the indictment, capital murder in the commission of 
abduction with the intent to defile, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(1).  Citing Powell I, he contends that there is no 
                     
 
11 This does not affect those situations wherein the 
defendant has been convicted on multiple charges based on the 
same facts, when double jeopardy considerations may compel the 
Commonwealth to elect which charge to submit to the jury for 
the imposition of a sentence.  E.g., Andrews, 280 Va. at 287-88 
& n.19, 699 S.E.2d at 269-70 & n.19. 
 
28 
evidence of an abduction “separate and apart from, and not 
merely incidental to” capital murder in the commission of rape 
or attempted rape. 
A motion to strike challenges whether the evidence is 
sufficient to submit the case to the jury.  Culpeper Nat’l Bank 
v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 384, 191 S.E. 764, 766 (1937).  What 
the elements of the offense are is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to 
prove each of those elements is a factual finding, which will 
not be set aside on appeal unless it is plainly wrong.  George 
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 278, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992).  In reviewing that factual 
finding, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth and give it the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.  Commonwealth v. McNeal, 
282 Va. 16, 20, 710 S.E.2d 733, 735 (2011) (citing Noakes v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 338, 345, 699 S.E.2d 284, 288 (2010)); 
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479, 619 S.E.2d 16, 31 
(2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006).   
After so viewing the evidence, the question is 
whether any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In sum, if there is evidence 
to support the conviction, the reviewing court 
is not permitted to substitute its judgment, 
even if its view of the evidence might differ 
from the conclusions reached by the finder of 
fact at the trial. 
 
29 
 
McNeal, 282 Va. at 20, 710 S.E.2d at 735 (citations, internal 
quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 
In Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 323 S.E.2d 572 
(1984), we considered the elements of the statutory offense of 
abduction set forth in Code § 18.2-47.  We determined that 
statutory abduction, unlike common law abduction, required no 
proof of asportation.  Rather, the statutory offense is 
complete upon “the physical detention of a person, with the 
intent to deprive him of his personal liberty, by force, 
intimidation, or deception.”  Id. at 526, 323 S.E.2d at 577.  
We recognized that some form of detention is inherent in rape, 
robbery, and assault but postponed consideration of any 
potential constitutional problems created by the overlap for a 
future case where they were squarely presented.  Id. 
That case came a year later, in Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 
Va. 310, 337 S.E.2d 711 (1985).  We determined that “the 
General Assembly did not intend to make the kind of restraint 
which is an intrinsic element of crimes such as rape, robbery, 
and assault a criminal act, punishable as a separate offense.”  
Id. at 314, 337 S.E.2d at 713.  The test enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932), to ensure that a prosecution does not violate the 
 
30 
double jeopardy clause therefore did not apply.  Brown, 230 Va. 
at 313-14, 337 S.E.2d at 713-14.  Accordingly, 
one accused of abduction by detention and 
another crime involving restraint of the victim, 
both growing out of a continuing course of 
conduct, is subject upon conviction to separate 
penalties for separate offenses only when the 
detention committed in the act of abduction is 
separate and apart from, and not merely 
incidental to, the restraint employed in the 
commission of the other crime. 
 
Id. at 314, 337 S.E.2d at 713-14. 
Lawlor argues that applying the facts of his case to the 
factors adopted by the Court of Appeals in Hoyt v. 
Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 489, 494, 605 S.E.2d 755, 757 (2004), 
leads to the conclusion that there was no abduction separate 
and apart from the murder and rape or attempted rape.12  We 
disagree that Hoyt is applicable in this case. 
The only issue when abduction is charged alongside an 
offense for which detention is an intrinsic element is whether 
                     
 
12 According to the Court of Appeals in Hoyt, the “ ‘four 
factors . . . central to’ determining whether or not an 
abduction or kidnapping is incidental to another crime” are  
(1) the duration of the detention or 
asportation; (2) whether the detention or 
asportation occurred during the commission of a 
separate offense; (3) whether the detention or 
asportation which occurred is inherent in the 
separate offense; and (4) whether the 
asportation or detention created a significant 
danger to the victim independent of that posed 
by the separate offense. 
 
44 Va. App. at 494, 605 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting Gov’t of the 
V.I. v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 227 (3d. Cir. 1979)). 
 
31 
any detention exceeded the minimum necessary to complete the 
required elements of the other offense.13  See Powell I, 261 Va. 
at 541, 552 S.E.2d at 360 (stating the question is whether 
“there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the 
jury that [the defendant] used greater restraint than was 
necessary” to commit the other offense.  (emphasis added)).  We 
already have stated that murder is not a crime for which 
detention is inherent as an intrinsic element.  Id. at 541 
n.11, 552 S.E.2d at 360 n.11.  We therefore need only consider 
whether the evidence in this case proves detention separate and 
apart from rape or attempted rape. 
Lawlor was neither indicted nor convicted upon a charge of 
rape.  However, the charge of capital murder in the commission 
of or subsequent to rape or attempted rape incorporates the 
statutory definition of rape.  As relevant to this case, the 
elements of that offense are “sexual intercourse with a 
complaining witness” “against the complaining witness's will, 
                     
 
13 In Brown and subsequent cases, we have acknowledged some 
degree of detention to be inherent in rape, robbery, and 
assault but we have not indicated that any asportation of the 
victim is similarly inherent.  Cf. Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 501, 511, 450 S.E.2d 146, 153 (1994), cert. denied, 514 
U.S. 1097 (1995) (“[T]ransporting [the victim] from the robbery 
scene was . . . separate and apart from, and not merely 
incidental to, the robbery and was greater than the restraint 
intrinsic in a robbery.”); Coram v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 
623, 626, 352 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1987) (“[A]sportation to 
decrease the possibility of detection is not an act inherent in 
or necessary to the restraint required in the commission of 
attempted rape.”). 
 
32 
by force, threat or intimidation.”  Code § 18.2-61(A).  Because 
intercourse constituting rape necessarily occurs against the 
victim’s will, we presume that the victim was present only 
because the offender “deprive[d her] of [her] personal liberty” 
to escape.  Scott, 228 Va. at 526, 323 S.E.2d at 576.  Thus the 
restraint necessary to prevent such escape is an intrinsic 
element of the offense.  But additional restraint, either as to 
duration or degree, is not inherent in rape and therefore is 
not an intrinsic element.  See Brown, 230 Va. at 314, 337 
S.E.2d at 714 (considering both the “time and distance” between 
the abduction and other offense and the “quality and quantity” 
of the force and intimidation used to effectuate the abduction 
and other offense). 
For example, in Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 311, 
377 S.E.2d 595, 600, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989), the 
victims’ “wrists and ankles were bound securely with ligatures, 
her mouth was gagged tightly, and she was detained for a 
lengthy period.”  We determined that this was sufficient to 
establish a detention beyond that necessary to complete the 
separate offenses of robbery and rape.  Similarly, in Fields v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 393, 400, 632 S.E.2d 8, 11 (2006), 
the defendant “twice choked [the victim] to the point of 
unconsciousness.”  The choking increased the risk of death and 
injury beyond the rape itself and deprived the victim of the 
 
33 
opportunity to resist or call for help in ways not 
intrinsically encompassed by rape alone.  Id. 
This case is similar to Fields.  Rendering one’s victim 
unconscious is not an essential, intrinsic element to complete 
the offense of rape.  The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, established that 
Orange was beaten 47 times with a blunt object, and she was 
conscious and alive for part of the beating.  This manner of 
effectuating a capital murder in the commission of rape or 
attempted rape is not inherent in the elements of those crimes.  
The evidence therefore is sufficient to establish capital 
murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile 
“separate and apart from, and not merely incidental to,” 
capital murder in the commission of or subsequent to rape or 
attempted rape.14  See Powell I, 261 Va. at 540-41, 552 S.E.2d 
at 360; Brown, 230 Va. at 314, 337 S.E.2d at 713-14. 
2. MOTION IN LIMINE 
Lawlor also asserts in assignments of error 113, 115, and 
116 that the court erred by denying his motion in limine to 
exclude the conviction for capital murder in the commission of 
an abduction because it was based on the same operative facts 
as capital murder in the commission of rape or attempted rape.  
                     
 
14 Having addressed Lawlor’s argument on these assignments 
of error in the context of our own precedents, we express no 
opinion on the Hoyt factors. 
 
34 
He argues that allowing the jury to consider both charges 
violates the double jeopardy clause.  We review de novo claims 
that multiple punishments have been imposed for the same 
offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause.  Fullwood 
v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 531, 539, 689 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2010) 
(citing United States v. Imngren, 98 F.3d 811, 813 (4th Cir. 
1996)). 
We previously examined this issue in Brown and Powell I: 
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment provides that no person shall “be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb. . . .” It is now well 
recognized that this clause affords an accused 
three distinct constitutional guarantees. “It 
protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal. It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction. And it protects 
against multiple punishments for the same 
offense.” 
 
Brown, 230 Va. at 312-13, 337 S.E.2d at 712-13 (quoting North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)); accord Andrews, 
280 Va. at 279, 699 S.E.2d at 264.  “The present case involves 
the third protection because [Lawlor’s] convictions, and the 
death sentences that resulted, occurred in a single trial.”  
Id. (citing Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 
S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (1981). 
However double jeopardy does not prevent a defendant from 
suffering separate punishments for separate offenses growing 
 
35 
out of the same continuing course of conduct.  So long as 
abduction “is separate and apart from, and not merely 
incidental to, the restraint employed in the commission of the 
other crime” the defendant may be punished for both.  Powell I, 
261 Va. at 540-41, 552 S.E.2d at 360; Brown, 230 Va. at 314, 
337 S.E.2d at 713-14.  As noted above, the evidence in this 
case supports convictions for capital murder in the commission 
of abduction with intent to defile and capital murder in the 
commission of or subsequent to rape or attempted rape.  The 
duration and manner of Orange’s detention is separate and apart 
from the detention inherent in capital murder in the commission 
of rape or attempted rape.  Therefore the conviction and 
sentence on the charge of capital murder in the commission of 
abduction with intent to defile do not violate the double 
jeopardy clause. 
3. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
In assignments of error 97 and 98, Lawlor asserts that the 
court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the detention 
inherent in capital murder in the commission of or subsequent 
to rape or attempted rape cannot serve as the basis for 
conviction upon a charge of capital murder in the commission of 
abduction with intent to defile.  The court refused his 
proffered instruction that the jury must find “beyond a 
reasonable doubt[] that any abduction . . . was separate and 
 
36 
apart from, and not merely incidental to, the act of rape or 
attempted rape.  The restraint inherent in Count 1 cannot serve 
as the sole basis for a conviction for Count 2.”  He argues 
that in refusing the instruction, the court failed to instruct 
the jury on a necessary element of the charge.  
We review jury instructions “to see that the law has been 
clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which 
the evidence fairly raises.”  Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 
377, 381, 673 S.E.2d 185, 187 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  This is a mixed question of law and fact.  It is 
error to give an instruction that incorrectly states the law; 
“whether a jury instruction accurately states the relevant law 
is a question of law that we review de novo.”  Orthopedic & 
Sports Physical Therapy Assocs., Inc. v. Summit Group Props., 
LLC, 283 Va. 777, 782, 724 S.E.2d 718, 721 (2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Velasquez v. Commonwealth, 
276 Va. 326, 330, 661 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (2008) (finding error 
when court’s instruction was an incorrect statement of law).  
However, “jury instructions ‘are proper only if supported by 
the evidence,’ ” Orbe I, 258 Va. at 398, 519 S.E.2d at 813 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445, 507 S.E.2d 
75, 76 (1998)), and more than a scintilla of evidence is 
required.  Andrews, 280 Va. at 276, 699 S.E.2d at 263; Juniper, 
271 Va. at 418, 616 S.E.2d at 419.  “When reviewing a trial 
 
37 
court's refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of 
the instruction.”  Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33, 557 
S.E.2d 220, 221 (2002); accord Cooper, 277 Va. at 381, 673 
S.E.2d at 187. 
A trial court has a duty when instructing the jury to 
define each element of the relevant offense.15  Dowdy v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 114, 116, 255 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1979).  
However, as noted above, what the elements are is a question of 
law.  See Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. at 349, 706 S.E.2d 
at 862; Houston v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. at 262, 12 S.E. at 386.  
Therefore, whether the detention established by the evidence is 
“the kind of restraint which is an intrinsic element of crimes 
such as rape, robbery, and assault,” Brown, 230 Va. at 314, 337 
S.E.2d at 713 (emphasis added), is a question of law to be 
determined by the court.  Fields, 48 Va. App. at 399, 632 
S.E.2d at 10.  Accordingly, the court did not err in denying 
the instruction. 
CLAIM 12: VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
This claim consists of a single assignment of error, 
assignment of error 111, in which Lawlor asserts that the 
                     
 
15 Instructions 6 and 7 set forth the elements of rape and 
attempted rape.  Instruction 12 set forth the elements of 
abduction with intent to defile.  These instructions were 
granted. 
 
38 
circuit court erred by excluding Charles Wakefield’s testimony 
during the guilt phase of trial.  He proffered that Wakefield 
would have testified that Lawlor drank, bought liquor, and 
often smelled of alcohol during the three weeks preceding the 
murder.  The court ruled that evidence of general alcohol abuse 
may be relevant as mitigation during the penalty phase but was 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in the guilt phase.  
Lawlor argues that the court’s ruling was error because he 
sought to establish that he was voluntarily intoxicated at the 
time of the offense and therefore incapable of forming the 
requisite intent to commit capital murder. 
A ruling that evidence is inadmissible is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  Thomas, 279 Va. at 168, 688 S.E.2d at 
240; Commonwealth v. Wynn, 277 Va. 92, 97, 671 S.E.2d 137, 139 
(2009).  “[E]vidence of collateral facts and facts incapable of 
supporting an inference on the issue presented are irrelevant 
and cannot be accepted in evidence.  Such irrelevant evidence 
tends to draw the jurors' attention toward immaterial matters” 
and therefore is properly excluded.  Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 
Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). 
We have said that “[a] person who voluntarily has become 
so intoxicated as to be unable to deliberate and premeditate 
cannot commit any class of murder that is defined as a wilful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing.”  Giarratano v. 
 
39 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1073, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1980) 
(citing Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 814, 241 S.E.2d 
756, 758 (1978)); accord Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 
281, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984).  However, proof of mere 
intoxication is insufficient; the defendant must establish 
intoxication so great it rendered him incapable of 
premeditation.  Giarratano, 220 Va. at 1073, 266 S.E.2d at 99.  
Consequently, even testimony that the defendant was drinking on 
the day of the offense is insufficient to establish that he was 
too intoxicated to form the requisite intent.  Waye v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 698, 251 S.E.2d 202, 211, cert. 
denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979).  Accordingly, testimony about 
Lawlor’s drinking during the three-week period prior to the 
murder would not be probative of that issue and it therefore 
was irrelevant.  The court did not abuse its discretion by 
excluding it during the guilt phase. 
CLAIM 13: PRINCIPAL IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
This claim consists of 3 assignments of error asserting 
that the circuit court erred by preventing Lawlor from 
presenting a defense that he was merely a principal in the 
second degree. 
1. REQUESTS FOR FUNDING 
In assignment of error 27, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his requests for funding for a private 
 
40 
investigator to travel to Uruguay to interview and collect a 
DNA sample from a third party.  Lawlor similarly asserts in 
assignment of error 29 that the court erred by denying his 
request for funds for private mitochondrial DNA testing of hair 
recovered from Orange’s body.  Lawlor argues that these funding 
requests were necessary to enable him to present a defense on 
the ground that (a) someone else actually committed the murder, 
(b) Lawlor was merely a principal in the second degree, and 
therefore (c) Lawlor was culpable only of first-degree murder 
rather than capital murder. 
Citing Crawford, 281 Va. at 97, 704 S.E.2d at 115 (2011), 
Lawlor again mistakenly asserts that we review these issues de 
novo.  However, we did not review any denial of a request for 
funding in that case.  To the contrary, denial of funding is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  In particular, 
[i]n Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 476 
S.E.2d 920 (1996), this Court noted that an 
indigent defendant is not constitutionally 
entitled, at the state's expense, to all the 
experts that a non-indigent defendant might 
afford.  Id. at 211, 476 S.E.2d at 925.  All 
that is required is that an indigent defendant 
have “‘an adequate opportunity to present his 
claims fairly within the adversary system.’”  
Id. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 
(1974)). 
 
 
In Husske we held that 
 
an indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert witness, at the 
Commonwealth's expense, must demonstrate 
 
41 
that the subject which necessitates the 
assistance of the expert is "likely to be a 
significant factor in his defense," and 
that he will be prejudiced by the lack of 
expert assistance. 
 
Id. at 211-12, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citation 
omitted).  In that context, we specified that a 
defendant seeking the assistance of an expert 
witness “must show a particularized need” for 
that assistance. Id. 
 
 
It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate 
this “particularized need” by establishing that 
an expert's services would materially assist him 
in preparing his defense and that the lack of 
such assistance would result in a fundamentally 
unfair trial.  Id.; accord Green v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 92, 580 S.E.2d 834, 
840 (2003).  We made clear in Husske and 
subsequent cases that “mere hope or suspicion 
that favorable evidence is available is not 
enough to require that such help be provided.”  
252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Whether a defendant 
has made the required showing of particularized 
need is a determination that lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  Id. [at 
212], 476 S.E.2d at 926; Lenz v. Commonwealth, 
261 Va. 451, 462, 544 S.E.2d 299, 305, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001); Bailey v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 737, 529 S.E.2d 570, 
578[, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995] (2000). 
 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 268 Va. 161, 165, 597 S.E.2d 197, 199 
(2004) (internal alteration omitted); accord Thomas, 279 Va. at 
169-70, 688 S.E.2d at 241.  The expert services to which a 
defendant may be entitled following the required showing of 
particularized need may include those of a private 
investigator.  Husske, 252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 926; 
Bailey, 259 Va. at 737, 529 S.E.2d at 578. 
 
42 
During a December 9, 2010 motions hearing, Lawlor sought 
funding to send an investigator to Uruguay.  He argued that he 
wanted the investigator to interview and collect a DNA sample 
from Rafael Delgado, who lived in Orange’s apartment building 
at the time of the murder but who thereafter left the country.  
Lawlor admitted that he had known of Delgado’s existence since 
the indictment in March 2009.16  Nevertheless, in December 2010 
he still did not know where in Uruguay Delgado might be found 
and had not asked him whether he would provide a DNA sample. 
The court noted that Lawlor had known of Delgado’s 
existence for nearly two years but had not undertaken any 
significant steps to locate him.  It also ruled that it would 
not approve funding the investigation until Lawlor had located 
Delgado and ascertained that he was willing to provide a DNA 
sample. 
Lawlor renewed his request at a January 13, 2011 motions 
hearing after locating Delgado and ascertaining that he was 
willing to speak with the investigator and return to testify at 
trial if appropriate.  During that hearing, Lawlor admitted to 
participating in Orange’s murder.  The court then again noted 
that Lawlor had known of Delgado’s existence for 22 months but 
had only obtained the information necessary to justify a 
                     
 
16 He had also cited Delgado’s presence in Uruguay during a 
January 21, 2010 hearing as partial basis for a continuance 
when the trial was scheduled for March 1 of that year. 
 
43 
request for investigatory funds on the eve of trial.  Because 
Lawlor admitted participation in the murder, he should have 
known promptly whether there were any potential co-defendants 
and who those potential co-defendants were.  The court then 
ruled that Lawlor had a right to call Delgado at trial and that 
it would provide funds to make Delgado available as a defense 
witness.  However, it denied the request for funds to send the 
investigator to Uruguay. 
As noted above, an indigent defendant has the right to an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.  Sanchez, 
268 Va. at 165, 597 S.E.2d at 199.  However, he bears the 
burden of establishing a particularized need for an expert’s 
services – i.e., that the services must “materially assist him 
in preparing his defense and that the lack of such assistance 
would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.”  Id.; Thomas, 
279 Va. at 169-70, 688 S.E.2d at 241.  The court ruled that 
Lawlor was entitled to call Delgado as a witness and that it 
would provide the funds necessary to make him available.  That 
ruling adequately preserved Lawlor’s right to a fair trial.  He 
did not show any need for further funding for the 
investigator’s trip to Uruguay.  Accordingly, the court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying his request. 
On the issue of DNA testing, Lawlor made several 
successive funding requests.  In January 2010, he requested 
 
44 
testing of blood recovered from various public places in the 
apartment building outside Orange’s apartment.  The court 
granted that request.  The next month, he requested testing of 
8 foreign hairs found on Orange’s pubic region and the court 
again granted his request.  In April 2010, he requested that a 
swab be sent to an outside, private laboratory for testing 
because it did not contain a sample sufficient for testing by 
the Department of Forensic Sciences (“DFS”).  The court also 
granted that request. 
In September 2010, Lawlor requested that hairs and hair 
fragments in three forensic collections recovered from 
fingernail scrapings and from Orange’s left hand during the 
autopsy be submitted for testing.  Because some hairs and hair 
fragments did not include the hair root, they were unsuitable 
for nuclear DNA testing and had to be subjected to more 
protracted mitochondrial DNA testing.  The court indicated it 
would revisit the issue after the human hairs were isolated.17  
After further forensic study of the three hair collections, the 
court ordered the testing of all the complete human hairs.  It 
also ordered DFS to select a random sample from the remaining 
91 human hair fragments and to subject the random sample to 
mitochondrial DNA testing. 
                     
 
17 Orange owned a cat and some of the hair was identified 
as non-human. 
 
45 
In November 2010, Lawlor asked for further testing of the 
hair fragments.  He noted that DFS had classified the 91 
fragments from 2 of the forensic collections into 7 distinct 
groups based on microscopic evaluation of their physical 
characteristics.  He requested that one hair fragment from each 
group be subjected to mitochondrial DNA testing.  The first 
forensic collection contained 3 groups of hair fragments:  one 
containing 36 fragments, one containing 15, and one containing 
a single fragment.  The second forensic collection contained 4 
groups of fragments:  one containing 23, one containing 17, and 
two groups each containing a single fragment.  The condition of 
the majority of the hair fragments indicated that they were not 
fresh and had likely been in the apartment for some time.  
Nevertheless, the court again granted his request. 
Testing on these 7 final hair fragments resulted in a 
mitochondrial DNA profile for each fragment.  A comparison 
indicated that the profile for one hair fragment was 
inconsistent with the profiles of the others.  It is not clear 
from the record whether the single inconsistent fragment came 
from a group containing other fragments sharing the same 
microscopic physical characteristics or from one of the unique, 
single-fragment groups.  In other words, it is not clear 
whether the single inconsistent hair fragment shared physical 
characteristics with any untested hair fragments. 
 
46 
On January 3, 2011, based on this single inconsistent 
mitochondrial DNA profile, the fractional amount of the single 
inconsistent allele detected in the PCR DNA testing on the non-
sperm portion of DNA recovered from Orange’s abdominal swab, 
and the fact that the blood recovered from the public areas of 
the apartment building could not be attributed either to him or 
Orange, Lawlor moved for a continuance and requested 
mitochondrial DNA testing of all the forensic evidence.  The 
court denied the motion and the request: 
The Defense [has] asked the Court to test 
virtually everything that’s there, and I have 
yet to see any basis that would produce evidence 
of a second participant. . . .  Absent some 
showing that we’re not just continuing to test 
everything that’s there, every hair, every item 
in the room, it’s simply a wish and a hope and 
speculation, and the motion is denied. 
 
As noted above, a defendant must show a particularized 
need that expert services will materially assist him in 
preparing his defense and that denial of such services will 
result in a fundamentally unfair trial.  Sanchez, 268 Va. at 
165, 597 S.E.2d at 199; Thomas, 279 Va. at 169-70, 688 S.E.2d 
at 241.  However, “[a] particularized need is more than a ‘mere 
hope’ that favorable evidence can be obtained through the 
services of an expert.”  Id. at 170, 688 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting 
Husske, 252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E. 2d at 925); accord Sanchez, 
268 Va. at 165, 597 S.E.2d at 199; Morva, 278 Va. at 344, 683 
 
47 
S.E.2d at 562.  The court repeatedly granted Lawlor’s 
successive requests for additional DNA testing, despite the 
fact that Lawlor admitted participating in the murder and the 
overwhelming consistency of the forensic evidence recovered 
from inside Orange’s apartment.  It was not an abuse of 
discretion for the court to rule that a single hair fragment, 
which was present in the apartment for an undeterminable period 
of time, was insufficient to justify testing approximately 80 
other hair fragments, many of which had different physical 
characteristics.  Similarly, the court did not abuse its 
discretion by ruling that the single hair fragment, even 
coupled with blood recovered from the public areas of the 
apartment building and the single, fractional inconsistent 
allele discovered during PCR DNA testing, did not justify 
subjecting all the forensic evidence to mitochondrial DNA 
testing.  Rather, as the court observed, the notion that 
further DNA testing would establish the presence of a second 
perpetrator was merely “a wish and a hope and speculation.”  We 
therefore will not reverse its denial of the requests. 
2. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
In assignment of error 103, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by failing to instruct the jurors that they could not 
impose a sentence of death if they found he was merely a 
principal in the second degree.  He argues that the evidence 
 
48 
was sufficient to support such an instruction based on (a) the 
DNA evidence attributable to neither Lawlor nor Orange, as 
described above, and (b) the possibility that some of Orange’s 
wounds were inflicted by a hammer, though no hammer was found 
either in her apartment or in his. 
As noted above in Claim 7, a jury instruction may be given 
only if it is supported by more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence.  Andrews, 280 Va. at 276, 699 S.E.2d at 263; Juniper, 
271 Va. at 418, 616 S.E.2d at 419.  When reviewing the evidence 
to determine whether it supports a proffered instruction, “we 
view [it] in the light most favorable to the proponent of the 
instruction.”  Vaughn, 263 Va. at 33, 557 S.E.2d at 221.  This 
means we grant Lawlor all reasonable inferences fairly 
deducible from it.  Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 279, 
720 S.E.2d 74, 77 (2012). 
The absence of a possible weapon from the scene of a 
murder and the defendant’s residence is not evidence that a 
third party participated in the crime.  It may support a 
reasonable inference that someone removed the weapon but not 
the exclusion of the defendant from the universe of people who 
may have done so.  One also cannot reasonably infer that a 
defendant did not use a murder weapon based only on its absence 
from his residence after the crime occurred.  Similarly, even 
assuming that one could reasonably infer from the two minor 
 
49 
inconsistencies in the DNA evidence that a third party was 
present during the crime, a hypothesis that Lawlor was merely a 
principal in the second degree extends the inference beyond 
reasonableness into speculation.  Because there was not more 
than a scintilla of evidence supporting such a hypothesis, the 
court did not err in refusing the instruction. 
C. THE PENALTY PHASE OF TRIAL 
CLAIM 11: BIFURCATION OF THE PENALTY PHASE 
This claim consists of a single assignment of error, 
assignment of error 13, in which Lawlor asserts that the 
circuit court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate the 
penalty phase into two proceedings:  one in which the jury must 
unanimously find one or more of the aggravating factors set 
forth in Code § 19.2-264.2 beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby 
making him eligible for a sentence of death, followed by one in 
which the jurors considered his mitigating evidence to 
determine whether to impose a sentence of death or life 
imprisonment without parole.  He argues that such a bifurcation 
is required both by Code § 19.2-264.4(A) and the United States 
Constitution.  These are questions of law we review de novo.  
Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 444, 449, 732 S.E.2d 22, 24 
(2012). 
Code § 19.2-264.4(A) requires that “[u]pon a finding that 
the defendant is guilty of an offense which may be punishable 
 
50 
by death, a proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to 
a determination as to whether the defendant shall be sentenced 
to death or life imprisonment.”  Lawlor argues that a defendant 
is not “guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death” 
until after at least one aggravating factor has been proved.  
Therefore, he contends, the separate proceeding referred to in 
Code § 19.2-264.4(A) must occur after that time. 
We construe a statute under familiar principles. 
The primary objective of statutory construction 
is to ascertain and give effect to legislative 
intent.  When a given controversy involves a 
number of related statutes, they should be read 
and construed together in order to give full 
meaning, force, and effect to each.  Therefore 
we accord each statute, insofar as possible, a 
meaning that does not conflict with any other 
statute.  When two statutes seemingly conflict, 
they should be harmonized, if at all possible, 
to give effect to both. 
 
Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630-31, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118 
(2010) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations 
omitted).  “[A]n undefined term must be given its ordinary 
meaning, given the context in which it is used.  Furthermore, 
the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be 
preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction, 
and a statute should never be construed in a way that leads to 
absurd results.”  Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 
S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks, 
and alteration omitted).  Where the same term is used in 
 
51 
different places within a statutory scheme, we apply the same 
meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different 
one.  Eberhardt v. Fairfax County Emps. Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 
283 Va. 190, 195, 721 S.E.2d 524, 526 (2012). 
The language at issue in Code § 19.2-264.4(A) is “an 
offense which may be punishable by death.”  This phrase is an 
integrated relative clause narrowing the universe of offenses 
to which the subsection applies.  Under Lawlor’s 
interpretation, an offense is not “an offense which may be 
punishable by death” until after the jury has found at least 
one of the aggravating factors set forth in Code § 19.2-264.2.  
This argument is without merit. 
First, Code § 19.2-264.2 also uses the phrase “an offense 
for which the death penalty may be imposed” to describe the 
offenses to which that statute applies.  It provides: 
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted 
of an offense for which the death penalty may be 
imposed, a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after 
consideration of the past criminal record of 
convictions of the defendant, find that there is 
a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute 
a continuing serious threat to society or that 
his conduct in committing the offense for which 
he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated 
battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that 
the penalty of death be imposed. 
 
 
52 
Code § 19.2-264.2 (emphasis added).  Thus, if the phrase “an 
offense for which the death penalty may be imposed” truly is 
defined by this section as Lawlor argues, a jury may not 
consider the aggravating factors set forth in that section 
until after it has found at least one of them and has 
recommended a sentence of death.  This is an absurd, circular 
result.  We therefore will not adopt Lawlor’s interpretation.  
Meeks, 274 Va. at 802, 651 S.E.2d at 639. 
Second, while Code § 19.2-264.2 does not define “an 
offense for which the death penalty may be imposed,” Code 
§§ 18.2-10 and 18.2-31 do.  Code § 18.2-10 states in relevant 
part that “[t]he authorized punishments for conviction of a 
felony are: (a) For Class 1 felonies, death . . . or 
imprisonment for life . . . .”  Code § 18.2-31 enumerates the 
offenses “constitut[ing] capital murder, punishable as a Class 
1 felony.”  Accordingly, “an offense for which the death 
penalty may be imposed” for the purposes of Code §§ 19.2-264.2 
and 19.2-264.4(A) is capital murder and it is “a finding that 
the defendant is guilty of” capital murder that triggers the 
separate sentencing proceeding.  Code § 19.2-264.4(A). 
Code § 19.2-264.3 supports this interpretation.  Code 
§ 19.2-264.3(A) directs the trial court first to submit the 
question of guilt or innocence to the jury.  Thereafter, and 
only “[i]f the jury finds the defendant guilty of an offense 
 
53 
which may be punishable by death,” does it commence a penalty 
proceeding under Code § 19.2-264.4.  Code § 19.2-264.3(C).  “If 
the jury finds the defendant guilty of an offense for which the 
death penalty may not be imposed,” there is no Code § 19.2-
264.4 penalty proceeding at all.  Code § 19.2-264.3(B).  
Accordingly, the General Assembly could not have intended the 
phrase “an offense which may be punishable by death” to mean 
only those offenses for which one or more aggravating factors 
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt because the 
proceeding in which those factors are presented to the jury 
only commences after the defendant has been convicted of such 
an offense. 
Citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Lawlor also 
argues that bifurcation of the penalty phase is required by the 
United States Constitution.  However, that was not the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Ring.  Rather, the Court reiterated its 
holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that 
“[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized 
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact – no 
matter how the State labels it – must be found by a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  Ring, 536 U.S. at 602 (citing Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 482-83.)  The Court then extended its Apprendi 
rationale to hold that “Arizona's enumerated aggravating 
factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of’ ” such 
 
54 
factual findings and could not be found by a sentencing judge 
without a jury.  Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 
n.19). 
Lawlor also cites Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), 
for the proposition that bifurcating the penalty phase is 
required to ensure jurors can meaningfully consider all 
mitigating evidence.  However, while the Supreme Court held in 
that case that a defendant must be allowed to present “any 
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death,” it did not require the 
fact-finder to consider that evidence in a separate proceeding.  
Id. at 604. 
Virginia law complies with these constitutional 
requirements.  See Code § 19.2-264.4(B) (“Evidence which may be 
admissible . . . may include the circumstances surrounding the 
offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any 
other facts in mitigation of the offense.”); Code § 19.2-
264.4(C) (“The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the 
Commonwealth shall prove [one or more aggravating factors] 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”); Prieto v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 366, 413, 682 S.E.2d 910, 935 (2009), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3419 (2010) (“Prieto I”) (“[W]e hold that 
in the penalty phase of capital murder trials the death penalty 
 
55 
may not be imposed unless the jury unanimously finds either one 
or both of the aggravating factors . . . beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”); Andrews, 280 Va. at 301, 699 S.E.2d at 277 (“A 
defendant in a capital case has the constitutional right to 
present virtually unlimited relevant evidence in mitigation.”). 
Accordingly, there is no basis for Lawlor’s claim that the 
Constitution requires bifurcation of the penalty phase.  For 
these reasons, the court did not err in denying Lawlor’s 
motion.18 
CLAIM 1: MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
This claim consists of 19 assignments of error asserting 
that the circuit court erred by excluding specific types of 
mitigating evidence either as hearsay, irrelevant, or both. 
1. GENERAL ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
In assignment of error 117, Lawlor asserts that a court 
may not exclude mitigating evidence on the basis of hearsay.  
Citing Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), and subsequent 
cases, he argues that the exclusion of mitigating evidence as 
hearsay violates a defendant’s constitutional right to due 
process.  This is a question of constitutional interpretation 
                     
 
18 This appeal does not present, and we do not consider, 
whether the statute prohibits a circuit court from exercising 
its discretion to bifurcate the penalty phase.  The question 
here is limited to whether the statute and applicable 
precedents require it to do so. 
 
56 
that we review de novo.  Gallagher, 284 Va. at 449, 732 S.E.2d 
at 24. 
In Green, the defendant and another person, Moore, were 
indicted together but tried separately for a rape and murder.  
At Moore’s trial, a prosecution witness testified that Moore 
told him that he had killed the victim after ordering Green to 
leave the scene.  However, when Green attempted to introduce 
the testimony in his trial, the prosecution objected on the 
ground that it was hearsay.  The objection was sustained and 
the evidence was excluded.  442 U.S. at 95-96. 
The Supreme Court ruled that excluding the witness’s 
testimony in Green’s trial was error.  The Court considered 
both its relevance and reliability and determined that the 
prosecution’s use of the testimony to secure Moore’s conviction 
and sentence of death was “[p]erhaps [the] most important” 
factor justifying its admission in Green’s trial.  Id. at 97.  
It held that “[i]n these unique circumstances, ‘the hearsay 
rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice.’”  Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
302 (1973)) (emphasis added).19 
                     
 
19 The Court also considered that Moore’s comment to the 
witness was made spontaneously to a close friend, was against 
his penal interest, and was independently corroborated by other 
evidence.  442 U.S. at 97.  These are the same factors the 
Court considered in Chambers.  410 U.S. at 301-02.  Although 
the Court ruled that exclusion of the testimony at issue in 
 
57 
Thus, Green turned on the fact that the prosecution had 
introduced and relied upon witness testimony in a separate 
prosecution for the same crime:  it could not subsequently 
impugn the reliability of that testimony in the related 
proceeding.  By its own terms, Green does not stand for the 
proposition that evidence may not be excluded on hearsay 
grounds simply because it is offered as mitigation in the 
penalty phase of a capital murder trial. 
Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3259 (2010), 
similarly fails to support Lawlor’s broad argument.  In that 
case the Supreme Court did not rule that mitigating evidence 
may not be excluded as hearsay.  Rather, citing Green and 
Chambers, the Court again emphasized that reliability is the 
touchstone for determining whether such evidence should be 
admitted.  Id. at 3263 & n.6 (“[T]he fact that some of such 
evidence may have been ‘hearsay’ does not necessarily undermine 
its value—or its admissibility—for penalty phase purposes.”  
Rather, “reliable hearsay evidence that is relevant to a 
capital defendant's mitigation defense should not be excluded 
                                                                 
Chambers was improper because the evidence “bore persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness,” it nevertheless observed that 
“the accused . . . must comply with established rules of 
procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and 
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”  Id. 
at 302. 
 
58 
by rote application of a state hearsay rule.” (emphasis 
added)). 
However, when hearsay evidence does not bear the indicia 
of reliability present in Green and Chambers, it may properly 
be excluded even when offered in mitigation.  Buchanan v. 
Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The excluded 
statements also lack the inherent reliability of the statement 
excluded in Green. The statement in Green was against the 
declarant's penal interest, made spontaneously to a close 
friend, and the state itself had relied on the excluded 
testimony to convict the declarant of capital murder. . . .  
The evidence in this case discloses that the application of 
Virginia's hearsay rule did not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.”). 
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err simply because 
it declined to overrule each of the Commonwealth’s hearsay 
objections to some of Lawlor’s mitigating evidence.  We must 
consider each ruling individually.20 
2. SPECIFIC RULINGS 
                     
 
20 In assignment of error 124, Lawlor generally assigns 
error to the court’s exclusion of “relevant mitigating evidence 
in the form of reliable hearsay.”  The brief contains no 
independent argument on this assignment of error.  
Consequently, to the extent it is not encompassed by the 
assignments of error challenging specific rulings and addressed 
below, it is abandoned.  Rule 5:27(d). 
 
59 
As noted above in Claim 12, we review rulings that 
evidence is inadmissible for abuse of discretion.  Thomas, 279 
Va. at 168, 688 S.E.2d at 240. 
In assignment of error 132, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by excluding Charles Wakefield’s testimony that Lawlor 
showed remorse.  Specifically, he proffered that Wakefield 
would testify that Lawlor said, “I just don’t want to hit 
anyone” several days after the murder occurred.  The 
Commonwealth objected that the statement was hearsay.  Lawlor 
responded that it was admissible as a statement of his then-
existing mental and emotional condition – i.e., that at the 
time he made the statement to Wakefield, several days after the 
murder, he did not “want to hit anyone.”  The court ruled that 
the statement was irrelevant. 
To be admissible as evidence of a then-existing state of 
mind, the state of mind must be relevant to a material issue.  
See Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 
(2001) (Statements showing state of mind are admissible 
“provided the statements are relevant and probative of some 
material issue in the case.”).  As proffered by Lawlor, 
Wakefield would have testified that Lawlor no longer wanted to 
hit anyone.  But such testimony would not establish remorse.  
While the alleged statement may indicate that Lawlor had purged 
himself of a desire to do violence at that time, it does not 
 
60 
encompass any sentiment of regret for his prior violent acts.  
Moreover, remorse includes “sympathy” or “concern for the 
victims of the crimes for which he was convicted.”  Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 364-65, 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 
(1998).  The proffered testimony includes neither of these 
attributes.  It therefore was not probative of the issue of 
Lawlor’s remorse and the court did not abuse its discretion by 
excluding it. 
In assignments of error 134, 135, 136, 137, and 148, 
Lawlor asserts that the court erroneously excluded testimony 
from his former probation officers, Mark Crosby and Kathy 
Coburn.  He argues that they would have testified that Lawlor 
had suffered childhood sexual abuse.  He concedes that the 
excluded statements were hearsay but contends they are 
nevertheless admissible.  He argues they are reliable because 
they were made years before to probation officers in the 
context of supervisory relationships.  We disagree. 
Lawlor cites no authority for his argument that statements 
made to probation officers are sufficiently reliable to 
overcome the hearsay rule.  The issue is not whether the 
probation officers are reliable, but whether the statements 
Lawlor made to them can be relied upon as truthful under the 
circumstances, rather than being self-serving or manipulative.  
The statements at issue are not clothed with any of the indicia 
 
61 
of reliability the Supreme Court set forth in Green or 
Chambers.  They were not made against Lawlor’s penal interest, 
they were not made spontaneously to a close friend, and they 
were not independently corroborated by other evidence.  
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by 
excluding them. 
In assignments of error 146 and 147, Lawlor asserts that 
the court erred by excluding testimony and written evidence 
from Woody Couts, who provided a court-ordered alcohol and drug 
dependency assessment while Lawlor was incarcerated 2 years 
prior to Orange’s murder.  Couts also would have testified that 
Lawlor told him of childhood sexual abuse.  Lawlor argues that 
the testimony was admissible because the statements were made 
for the purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment.  
Further, he argues that the statements were reliable even if 
not covered by that exception to the hearsay rule.  We again 
disagree. 
We have acknowledged that “a physician [may] testify to a 
patient's statements concerning his ‘past pain, suffering and 
subjective symptoms’ to show ‘the basis of the physician's 
opinion as to the nature of the injuries or illness.’ ”  
Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516, 518, 248 S.E.2d 784, 785-
86 (1978); accord Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 333, 339, 
492 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1997).  However, Couts was not a 
 
62 
physician; he was not even licensed as a substance abuse 
counselor. 
Moreover, a statement made for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis or treatment in contravention of the hearsay rule is 
admissible because “a patient making a statement to a treating 
physician recognizes that providing accurate information to the 
physician is essential to receiving appropriate treatment.” 
Jenkins, 254 Va. at 339, 492 S.E.2d at 134-35.  The exception 
therefore includes an assessment of reliability.  However, as 
the circuit court noted, 
 
The fallacy [in your analogy] is that you 
believe that a defendant who is incarcerated who 
talks to a drug counselor is going to be a 
hundred percent honest as one would who is 
seeking treatment from a physician. 
 
 
If I’m seeking treatment from a physician, 
I want that treatment to cure me of my ill or 
illness, whatever it is. 
 
 
A defendant sitting in jail wants to 
minimize his time, wants to get probation 
instead of penitentiary time, depending on what 
the offense is.  And your theory is that [the] 
defendant will, of course, automatically be one 
hundred percent honest to the drug treatment 
counselor. 
 
 
And we know that’s not true, even through 
your own witnesses, who have said that the most 
drug-challenged people are not honest, even with 
their own – even with their own treatment people 
. . . .” 
 
Accordingly, the rationale underlying the medical 
diagnosis or treatment exception does not apply to substance 
 
63 
abuse assessments in the context of incarceration.  The circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this 
testimony.21 
In assignment of error 131, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by preventing his investigator, Samuel Dworkin, from 
testifying about Lawlor’s father’s failure to appear at trial.  
Lawlor alleges that his father threatened to commit suicide if 
he was subpoenaed to testify at trial.  He argues that this 
information was relevant because the Commonwealth had objected, 
in the presence of the jury, to evidence that his father had 
sexually abused other children on the ground that “[t]he man’s 
not here to defend himself.”  He also argues that it may have 
disposed the jury to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.  
We again disagree. 
The court provided Lawlor the opportunity to call Dworkin 
to establish that his father was unwilling to appear 
voluntarily.  However, the court ruled that the reason Lawlor’s 
father did not appear at all was that Lawlor chose not to 
subpoena him and Lawlor’s rationale for that decision was not 
relevant.  We agree with the circuit court that a party’s 
                     
 
21 In assignment of error 119, Lawlor also generally 
assigns error to the court’s exclusion of evidence of his 
history of sexual abuse.  The brief contains no independent 
argument on this assignment of error.  Consequently, to the 
extent it is not encompassed by the foregoing assignments of 
error, it is abandoned.  Rule 5:27(d). 
 
64 
litigation strategy is not evidence of a fact at issue in the 
proceeding.  Testimony justifying a party’s chosen course at 
trial therefore is not relevant.  The reasoning behind Lawlor’s 
decision not to subpoena his father was irrelevant and the 
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Dworkin’s 
testimony.   
In assignments of error 14 and 120, Lawlor asserts that 
the court erred by denying his motion to allow evidence of the 
effect his execution would have on his family and friends.  
Similarly, in assignments of error 128, 141, and 145, he 
asserts that the court erred by excluding testimony from his 
sister, Elizabeth Cox, mother, Joann Cox, and friend, Richard 
Poorman, respectively, about the value of their relationships 
with him.  He argues that this was relevant mitigating evidence 
under our decision in Andrews and the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Lockett and Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004).  We 
disagree. 
In Andrews, we said “[a] defendant in a capital case has 
the constitutional right to present virtually unlimited 
relevant evidence in mitigation.”  280 Va. at 301, 699 S.E.2d 
at 277 (emphasis added). 
[T]he meaning of relevance is no different in 
the context of mitigating evidence introduced in 
a capital sentencing proceeding than in any 
other context, and thus the general evidentiary 
standard—any tendency to make the existence of 
 
65 
any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the 
evidence—applies. . . .  Relevant mitigating 
evidence is evidence which tends logically to 
prove or disprove some fact or circumstance 
which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to 
have mitigating value. 
 
Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
In Lockett, the Supreme Court defined the circumstances 
which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating 
value as those relevant to “the ‘character and record of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular 
offense.’ ”  438 U.S. at 601 (quoting Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).  Lockett does not “limit[] 
the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, 
evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior 
record, or the circumstances of his offense.”  Id. at 605 n.12.  
Therefore, to be relevant to mitigation in the penalty phase of 
a capital case, evidence must be relevant to these three 
factors. 
As we noted in Cherrix, “Code § 19.2-264.4(B) vests the 
trial court with the discretion to determine, subject to the 
rules of evidence governing admissibility, the evidence which 
may be adduced in mitigation of the offense.”  257 Va. at 309, 
513 S.E.2d at 653 (citing Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 
 
66 
253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103, 
(1980)).  In Coppola, we expressly declined to reverse as an 
abuse of discretion a circuit court’s exclusion of evidence 
addressing the effect of the defendant’s arrest and trial on 
his family as irrelevant to the issue of mitigation.  220 Va. 
at 253, 257 S.E.2d at 804.  Although Coppola addressed only 
arrest and trial, not the imposition of a sentence of death, 
and Code § 19.2-264.4(B) has been amended since that decision, 
we are not persuaded that the effect on a defendant’s family 
and friends of such a sentence is relevant mitigating evidence 
“bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the 
circumstances of his offense.”  Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 n.12.  
The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
this evidence. 
3. RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY 
In assignments of error 125 and 177, Lawlor asserts that 
the court erred by ruling that he would have to testify to 
present his mitigating evidence to the jury.  He identifies 4 
specific statements made by the court referring to Lawlor’s 
failure to take the stand himself. 
Each of the identified statements was made as the court 
ruled on an objection by the Commonwealth.22  Contrary to 
                     
 
22 The comments were made outside the presence of the jury 
and therefore could not have influenced its deliberation. 
 
67 
Lawlor’s assertion, the court did not base its rulings on his 
exercise of his right against self-incrimination.  Rather, it 
based these rulings on its determination that the evidence 
Lawlor was attempting to present was inadmissible hearsay.  The 
court noted that while the witnesses would not be allowed to 
present hearsay evidence by testifying to statements Lawlor 
made to them, the evidence would be admissible if Lawlor 
testified himself:  then, by definition, it would not be 
hearsay. 
A court does not err by observing outside the presence of 
the jury that inadmissible hearsay evidence would be admissible 
if the declarant testified directly – even if the declarant is 
the defendant.23 
CLAIM 3: TESTIMONY OF DR. MARK CUNNINGHAM 
This claim consists of 6 assignments of error asserting 
that the circuit court erred by excluding portions of the 
testimony of Dr. Mark Cunningham.24  Lawlor offered Dr. 
                     
 
23 Lawlor also argues the Commonwealth improperly referred 
to his failure to testify during an objection in the presence 
of the jury.  However, Lawlor failed to preserve this issue 
because he did not timely object to the comment or seek a 
curative instruction or mistrial.  Rule 5:25; Porter, 276 Va. 
at 256, 661 S.E.2d at 442; Cheng, 240 Va. at 40, 393 S.E.2d at 
607. 
 
24 In assignment of error 185, Lawlor generally assigns 
error to the court for restricting Cunningham’s testimony.  The 
brief contains no independent argument on this assignment of 
error so to the extent it is not encompassed by the other 
assignments of error, it is abandoned.  Rule 5:27(d).  
 
68 
Cunningham as an expert witness to rebut the Commonwealth’s 
evidence on the future dangerousness aggravating factor and to 
provide mitigating evidence.25  As noted above in Claims 1 and 
12, we review a ruling that evidence is inadmissible for abuse 
of discretion.  Thomas, 279 Va. at 168, 688 S.E.2d at 240. 
As an initial matter, we note that a defendant’s evidence 
rebutting the risk of future dangerousness serves a purpose 
different from mitigating evidence.  While the same evidence 
may be adduced to serve both purposes, the purposes must not be 
conflated. 
Pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C), a 
sentence of death may not be imposed unless the Commonwealth 
has proved one or both of the aggravating factors set out in 
the statutes beyond a reasonable doubt.  Where the Commonwealth 
alleges that the future dangerousness factor applies and 
adduces evidence to prove it, the defendant has a due process 
right to rebut that evidence.  Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 
U.S. 154, 164 (1994) (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 
                                                                 
Similarly, we find no argument in the brief related to 
assignment of error 190 and it too is abandoned.  Id. 
 
25 The aggravating factor commonly referred to as the risk 
of future dangerousness factor provides that “a sentence of 
death shall not be imposed unless the . . . jury shall . . . 
after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions 
of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the 
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society . . . .”  
Code § 19.2-264.2; accord Code § 19.2-264.4(C). 
 
69 
U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986)).  However, where the Commonwealth does 
not pursue the future dangerousness aggravating factor, there 
is nothing for the defendant to rebut. 
The statutes also define the evidence relevant to prove 
the future dangerousness aggravating factor, or the probability 
that the defendant “would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.”  Code 
§§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C).  The relevant evidence is “the 
past criminal record of convictions of the defendant,” Code 
§ 19.2-264.2, and “evidence of the prior history of the 
defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of 
the offense of which he is accused.” Code § 19.2-264.4(C); see 
also Morva, 278 Va. at 349, 683 S.E.2d at 565 (“The relevant 
evidence surrounding a determination of future dangerousness 
consists of the defendant’s history and the circumstances of 
the defendant’s offense.”). 
By contrast, a defendant is always entitled to present 
relevant mitigating evidence in a capital case.  Andrews, 280 
Va. at 301, 699 S.E.2d at 277 (citing Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285, 
and Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608).  This right is grounded in the 
Eighth Amendment.  Simmons, 512 U.S. at 164 (citing Skipper, 
476 U.S. at 4). 
Mitigating evidence includes “any aspect of a defendant's 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense 
 
70 
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.”  Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.  “[A] defendant’s 
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to 
life in prison is itself an aspect of his character” and 
therefore is relevant mitigating evidence.  Skipper, 476 U.S. 
at 7. 
In Bell, we described evidence of a defendant’s 
disposition to adjust to prison life as “future adaptability” 
evidence.  264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714.  We also stated 
that it must be specific to the individual defendant or 
relevant “as a foundation for an expert opinion.”  Id.; accord 
Juniper, 271 at 427, 626 S.E.2d at 424.  With these principles 
in mind, we turn to Lawlor’s arguments. 
1. REBUTTING THE RISK OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
In assignments of error 180 and 188, Lawlor asserts that 
the court erred by excluding Dr. Cunningham’s testimony about 
his risk of future dangerousness in prison.  He argues that the 
court repeatedly excluded such testimony by sustaining the 
Commonwealth’s objections and by denying him the opportunity to 
recall Dr. Cunningham following a proffer of additional 
testimony. 
We thoroughly reviewed the evidence that is admissible to 
rebut the future dangerous aggravating factor in Morva based on 
Simmons, Skipper, and Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C).  We 
 
71 
reiterated our earlier holding that “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
not whether a defendant could commit criminal acts of violence 
in the future but whether he would.”  Id. at 349, 683 S.E.2d at 
564 (quoting Burns, 261 Va. at 339-40, 541 S.E.2d at 893) 
(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).  In other 
words, the issue is not whether the defendant is physically 
capable of committing violence, but whether he has the mental 
inclination to do so.  Compare Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 517 (1993) (defining “could” in part 
as the conditional of “can”) and id. at 323 (defining “can” in 
part as “to be able to do, make, or accomplish” (emphasis 
added)) with id. at 2638 (defining “would” in part as the 
conditional of “will”) and id. at 2616 (defining “will” in part 
as “to be inclined to” (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, evidence of restrictions on a prisoner’s 
physical capacity to commit violence due to generalized prison 
conditions is not relevant: 
Increased security measures and conditions of 
prison life that reduce the likelihood of future 
dangerousness of all inmates is general 
information that is irrelevant to the inquiry 
required by Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-
264.4(C).  See [Juniper, 271 Va. at 426-27, 626 
S.E.2d at 423-24]; Porter, 276 Va. at 252, 661 
S.E.2d at 440.  The generalized competence of 
the Commonwealth to completely secure a 
defendant in the future is not a relevant 
inquiry.  Our precedent is clear that a court 
should exclude evidence concerning the 
defendant's diminished opportunities to commit 
 
72 
criminal acts of violence in the future due to 
the security conditions in the prison.  Burns, 
261 Va. at 339-40, 541 S.E.2d at 893-94. 
 
Morva, 278 Va. at 350, 683 S.E.2d at 565.  In short, the 
question of future dangerousness is about the defendant’s 
volition, not his opportunity, to commit acts of violence.  
Evidence of custodial restrictions on opportunity therefore is 
not admissible. 
Lawlor argues that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony was not 
about generalized prison conditions.  He argues it was 
sufficiently particularized based on attributes such as his 
age, prior behavior while incarcerated, education, and 
employment history, which are admissible under Morva.  He 
asserts that the court excluded the testimony simply because 
Dr. Cunningham’s opinion was restricted to Lawlor’s risk of 
dangerousness to “prison society” or “while in prison.”  He 
contends this was error because if sentenced to life 
imprisonment, prison society would be the only society to which 
he could pose a risk. 
We previously considered and rejected this argument in 
Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 537 S.E.2d 866 (2000), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001).  In that case we said, 
Code § 19.2-264.2 requires that the jury make a 
factual determination whether the defendant 
“would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society.”  The statute does not limit this 
 
73 
consideration to “prison society” when a 
defendant is ineligible for parole, and we 
decline Lovitt's effective request that we 
rewrite the statute to restrict its scope. 
 
Id. at 517, 537 S.E.2d at 879.  Thus, evidence concerning a 
defendant’s probability of committing future violent acts, 
limited to the penal environment, is not relevant to 
consideration of the future dangerousness aggravating factor 
set forth in Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C). 
 
Accordingly, the excluded testimony ran afoul of Lovitt to 
the extent it was offered to rebut evidence of the future 
dangerousness aggravating factor.  It expressed Dr. 
Cunningham’s opinion of Lawlor’s risk of future violence in 
prison society only, rather than society as a whole.  To be 
admissible as evidence rebutting the future dangerousness 
aggravating factor under the statutes, expert opinion testimony 
must not narrowly assess the defendant’s continuing threat to 
prison society alone.  The court therefore did not abuse its 
discretion by excluding Dr. Cunningham’s testimony as rebuttal 
evidence on the future dangerousness aggravating factor. 
2. MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
In assignments of error 179 and 189, Lawlor asserts that 
even if Dr. Cunningham’s testimony was properly excluded as 
rebuttal evidence, it should have been admitted as mitigating 
evidence. 
 
74 
General conditions of prison life also are inadmissible as 
mitigating evidence.  Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70, 
515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000), 
and Cherrix, 257 Va. at 309-10, 513 S.E.2d at 653.  Our 
determination that such evidence may properly be excluded was 
based on the description of relevant mitigating evidence the 
Supreme Court set forth in Lockett.  As noted above in Claim 1, 
that case did “not limit ‘the traditional authority of a court 
to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the 
defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of 
his offense.’ ”  Cherrix, 257 Va. at 309, 513 S.E.2d at 653 
(quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 n.12).  Evidence of general 
prison conditions therefore may properly be excluded even as 
mitigating evidence. 
Significantly, though, Lockett made clear that 
“ ‘consideration of the character and record of the individual 
offender’ ” is required by the United States Constitution.  438 
U.S. at 604 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).  “[T]he 
sentencer [must] not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”  
Id. (emphasis in original).  As noted above, future 
adaptability evidence is relevant character evidence.  Bell, 
 
75 
264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714.  Nevertheless, future 
adaptability evidence must be specific to the individual 
defendant or relevant “as a foundation for an expert opinion.”  
Id.; accord Juniper, 271 Va. at 427, 626 S.E.2d at 424. 
In this context, a defendant’s probability of committing 
violence, even when confined within a penal environment, is 
relevant as mitigating evidence of his character and is 
constitutionally mandated under Lockett, provided the evidence 
establishing that probability arises specifically from his 
character and is sufficiently personalized to him.  As with 
evidence rebutting the future dangerousness aggravating factor, 
the relevant inquiry is narrowly focused on whether the 
particular defendant is inclined to commit violence in prison, 
not whether prison security or conditions of confinement render 
him incapable of committing such violence.  Unlike inclination 
or volition, capacity – i.e., what a prisoner could do – is not 
relevant to character. 
Further, testimony relevant to a defendant’s propensity to 
commit violence while incarcerated necessarily must be 
personalized to the defendant based on his specific, individual 
past behavior or record.  Otherwise it cannot constitute 
evidence of the defendant’s personal character and would be 
irrelevant even for purposes of mitigation.  See Morva, 278 Va. 
 
76 
at 350, 683 S.E.2d at 565; Juniper, 271 Va. at 426-27, 626 
S.E.2d at 423-24. 
We stress that characteristics alone are not character.  
Merely extracting a set of objective attributes about the 
defendant and inserting them into a statistical model created 
by compiling comparable attributes from others, to attempt to 
predict the probability of the defendant’s future behavior 
based on others’ past behavior does not fulfill the requirement 
that evidence be “peculiar to the defendant’s character, 
history, and background” under Morva.  278 Va. at 350, 683 
S.E.2d at 565.  To the contrary, it is mere “statistical 
speculation.”  Porter, 276 Va. at 255, 661 S.E.2d at 442. 
To satisfy Morva’s standard, the evidence must consist of 
more than the recitation of shared attributes as the basis for 
predicting similar behavior.  Evidence of a defendant’s 
objective attributes may be relevant as foundation for expert 
opinion establishing his character, history, and background 
under this standard.  See Juniper, 271 Va. at 427, 626 S.E.2d 
at 424; Bell, 264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E.2d at 714.  However, the 
mere fact that an attribute is shared by others from whom a 
statistical model has been compiled, and that the statistical 
model predicts certain behavior, is neither relevant to the 
defendant’s character nor a foundation for expert opinion.  See 
Porter, 276 Va. at 255, 661 S.E.2d at 442.  Merely stating that 
 
77 
the percentage of violent crimes committed by a specified 
demographic group sharing one of the defendant’s attributes is 
lower, based on statistical models, than others who do not 
share it does not suffice. 
Lawlor submitted a written proffer of questions he would 
propound to Dr. Cunningham, and Dr. Cunningham’s expected 
answers to them.  The proffer contains the following proposed 
exchanges: 
1. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's behavior pattern 
while [previously] in 
custody/incarceration, impacts his 
future prison adaptability?  
 
A: Because of Mark Lawlor's prior 
adaption in prison and jail, and 
particularly because of his lack of 
violent activity in these settings, 
Mr. Lawlor represents a low 
likelihood of committing acts of 
violence while in prison.  
2. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's age impacts his 
future prison adaptability? Does 
that opinion take into account the 
fact that Mr. Lawlor committed his 
current crime at age 43?  
 
A: Because of Mark Lawlor's age of 45 
years old, Mr. Lawlor represents a 
low likelihood of committing acts of 
violence while in prison. The fact 
that Mr. Lawlor committed his 
current offense at age 43 has been 
taken into account in forming this 
opinion, but it does not change my 
opinion about his future prison 
adaptability.  
3. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's education impacts 
his future prison adaptability? Is 
 
78 
this risk factor predictive of 
violence in the free community as 
well?  
 
A: The fact that Mr. Lawlor has earned 
his G.E.D. is predictive of a low 
likelihood of committing acts of 
violence while in prison. This risk 
factor is far more predictive of 
violent conduct in the prison 
context than it is in the free 
community context.  
4. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's employment history 
impacts his future prison 
adaptability?  
 
A: Mark Lawlor's employment history in 
the community is predictive that Mr. 
Lawlor represents a low likelihood 
of committing acts of violence while 
in prison.  
5. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's continued contact 
with his family and friends in the 
community impacts his future prison 
adaptability?  
 
A: Mark Lawlor's continued contact with 
these individuals while in prison, 
is predictive that Mr. Lawlor 
represents a low likelihood of 
committing acts of violence while in 
prison.  
6. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's past correctional 
appraisal impacts his future prison 
adaptability?  
 
A: Mark Lawlor's past correctional 
appraisal is predictive that Mr. 
Lawlor represents a low likelihood 
of committing acts of violence while 
in prison.  
7. Q: What is your expert opinion as to 
how Mark Lawlor's lack of gang 
affiliation impacts his future 
prison adaptability?  
 
A: Mark Lawlor's lack of gang 
affiliation is predictive that Mr. 
Lawlor represents a low likelihood 
 
79 
of committing acts of violence while 
in prison.  
8. Q: Have you reached an opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of psychological 
certainty, based on all of the 
factors relevant to your studies of 
prison risk assessment, as to what 
Mark Lawlor's risk level is for 
committing acts of violence while 
incarcerated? And if so, what is 
your opinion?  
 
A: Yes. It is my opinion based on my 
analysis of all of the relevant risk 
factors which are specific to Mr. 
Lawlor's prior history and 
background, that Mr. Lawlor 
represents a very low risk for 
committing acts of violence while 
incarcerated.  
9. Q: Are all of your opinions concerning 
the above questions and answers 
about Mr. Lawlor, grounded in 
scientific research and peer-
reviewed scientific literature?  
 
A: Yes. 
 
Of these proffered answers, only the first meets the 
standard for admissibility as future adaptability mitigating 
evidence.  The others merely (a) supply an item of demographic 
data coupled with an unexplained, conclusory opinion that the 
datum indicates Lawlor will present a low risk of violence 
while incarcerated or (b) lay the foundation that the opinion 
is based on statistical models.  While each datum is extracted 
from Lawlor’s personal history, it sheds no light on his 
character, why he committed his past crimes and the crime for 
which he stood convicted, or how would it influence or affect 
his behavior while incarcerated.  It therefore is not 
 
80 
personalized for the purposes of establishing future 
adaptability.  In short, the proffered testimony is not 
probative of Lawlor’s “disposition to make a well-behaved and 
peaceful adjustment to life in prison.”  Skipper, 476 U.S. at 
7.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding these questions and answers. 
While the first proffered answer would be admissible 
because it establishes the fact that Lawlor did not engage in 
violent behavior during past periods of incarceration, that 
fact was already known to the jury through other evidence.  For 
example, Dr. Cunningham testified without objection that 
Lawlor’s records of incarceration covered a period of 120 
months of intermittent custody and the only violent behavior 
recorded for the entire duration of that time was when he was 
the victim of two fistfights in January 2009, for which he 
incurred no disciplinary action.  Dr. Cunningham also testified 
that the Virginia Department of Corrections had classified 
Lawlor as presenting a low likelihood of committing violence.  
Because the excluded testimony was either cumulative or 
inadmissible, the court did not abuse its discretion. 
CLAIM 14: THE VILENESS AGGRAVATING FACTOR 
 
81 
This claim consists of 5 assignments of error asserting 
that the circuit court erred by allowing the jury to consider 
the vileness aggravating factor.26 
1. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Lawlor asserts in assignments of error 149 and 156 that 
the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he originally 
was charged with first-degree murder rather than capital 
murder.27  He argues that this evidence was relevant to rebut 
the vileness aggravating factor.  However, as explained below, 
Lawlor did not present this argument to the court for its 
consideration. 
While Lawlor asserted in a hearing on March 8, 2011 that 
the evidence subject to these assignments of error should be 
admitted, he argued only that the records were relevant to show 
his conduct in custody and because they “show[] the dates he 
was brought in[to detention] and why he was brought in and 
                     
 
26 The aggravating factor commonly referred to as the 
vileness factor provides that “a sentence of death shall not be 
imposed unless the . . . jury shall . . . find . . . that [the 
defendant’s] conduct in committing the offense for which he 
stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim . . . .”  Code § 19.2-264.2; 
accord Code § 19.2-264.4(C). 
 
27 In assignment of error 123, Lawlor also generally 
assigns error to the court’s “limiting and excluding evidence 
. . . to rebut the Commonwealth’s allegation of vileness.”  
Because he presents no argument about any rulings other than 
those challenged in assignments of error 149 and 156, this 
assignment of error is abandoned to the extent it is not 
encompassed by them.  Rule 5:27(d). 
 
82 
measures taken.”  The court allowed all evidence showing 
Lawlor’s conduct but excluded the portion that referred to the 
original charge of first-degree murder having been superseded 
by a charge of capital murder.  Lawlor said, “Your Honor, 
that’s fine. . . .  I don’t intend to make the argument in any 
more of a sophisticated way than I have.  If the court 
disagrees with me, I understand.  I don’t want to go back and 
forth but that’s why we offered it.” 
On March 10, 2011, Lawlor filed a more nuanced, written 
motion in which he raised the argument he makes on appeal:  
that the original charge was relevant as rebuttal evidence to 
the vileness aggravating factor.  However, our review of the 
record reveals that Lawlor never argued the written motion, 
sought or obtained a ruling, or otherwise provided the court 
with an opportunity to rule on it.  We therefore will not 
consider it.  Rule 5:25; Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 
422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010) (“[T]he provisions of Rule 
5:25 protect the trial court from appeals based upon 
undisclosed grounds. . . .  In analyzing whether a litigant has 
satisfied the requirements of Rule 5:25, this Court has 
consistently focused on whether the trial court had the 
opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue.  If the 
opportunity to address an issue is not presented to the trial 
court, there is no ruling by the trial court on the issue, and 
 
83 
thus no basis for review or action by this Court on appeal.” 
(citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations 
omitted)). 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
In assignments of error 2 and 4, Lawlor asserts that the 
court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to seek a sentence of 
death based on the vileness aggravating factor because it is 
unconstitutionally vague.  We have previously considered and 
rejected these arguments.  Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290, 
314-15, 645 S.E.2d 448, 463 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1151 
(2008) (citing Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 208, 576 
S.E.2d 471, 480, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1019 (2003) and Beck v. 
Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997)).  The circuit court did not err 
in adhering to our controlling precedents.  We also find no 
reason to modify the views we previously expressed in them. 
Lawlor also argues that the composite sub-factors to the 
vileness aggravating factor must be individually proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt and agreed upon unanimously by the jury.  We 
recently rejected this argument in Prieto II, 283 Va. at 180-
81, 721 S.E.2d at 503, which had not been decided at the time 
of the proceedings in this case.  The court’s ruling was 
consistent with our holding in Prieto II and we decline 
Lawlor’s invitation to revisit it. 
 
84 
CLAIM 9: JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
In this claim, Lawlor challenges the instructions given to 
the jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase in 4 
assignments of error.28  As noted above in Claims 7 and 13, we 
review whether a jury instruction accurately states the 
relevant law de novo.  Summit Group Props., 283 Va. at 782, 724 
S.E.2d at 721.   
Even if accurate, a jury instruction may be given only if 
it is supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence, 
Andrews, 280 Va. at 276, 699 S.E.2d at 263, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.  
Vaughn, 263 Va. at 33, 557 S.E.2d at 221.  The proponent is 
entitled to all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the 
evidence.  Branham, 283 Va. at 279, 720 S.E.2d at 77.  
Nevertheless, a court may exercise its discretion and properly 
exclude an instruction that both correctly states the law and 
is supported by the evidence when other “granted instructions 
fully and fairly cover” the relevant principle of law.  Daniels 
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 460, 466, 657 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2008) 
                     
 
28 In assignment of error 160, Lawlor also generally 
assigns error to the court’s denial of his proffered 
instructions.  Because he presents no argument about any 
instructions other than those specifically identified in 
assignments of error 162, 164, 165, and 168, this assignment of 
error is abandoned to the extent it is not encompassed by them.  
Rule 5:27(d). 
 
85 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Juniper, 271 Va. at 431, 
626 S.E.2d at 426. 
In assignment of error 168, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his motion to exclude the torture sub-factor 
from Instructions S-2a and S-3a, relating to the vileness 
aggravating factor, because there was no evidence that Orange 
had been tortured.  He cites Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 
127, 149, 295 S.E.2d 643, 654 (1982), a case in which the 
circuit court eliminated the torture element although the 
victim had been struck with a hammer 11 times. 
 “Torture” as set forth in the vileness aggravating factor 
is not defined by statute.  However, Virginia’s vileness 
aggravating factor is identical to the State of Georgia’s 
aggravating factor reviewed by the Supreme Court in Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).  Compare Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 
19.2-264.4(C) with Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422 (quoting Ga. Code 
Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).  The Supreme Court of Georgia 
has defined the torture element of its statute: 
[T]orture occurs when a living person is 
subjected to the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of severe physical or mental pain, 
agony or anguish.  Besides serious physical 
abuse, torture includes serious sexual abuse or 
the serious psychological abuse of a victim 
resulting in severe mental anguish to the victim 
in anticipation of serious physical harm. 
 
 
86 
West v. State, 313 S.E.2d 67, 71 (Ga. 1984) (appendix).29 
Courts of last resort in other states have similarly 
formulated definitions of torture that include physical and 
psychological aspects.  E.g., State v. White, 668 N.W.2d 850, 
857 (Iowa 2003) (“‘[T]orture’ is either physical and/or mental 
anguish.”); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1361 (Conn. 1994) 
(holding torture may be psychological as well as physical).  
But cf. Newman v. State, 106 S.W.3d 438, 461 (Ark. 2003) 
(reciting a statutory distinction between torture and mental 
anguish under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-604(b)(B)(ii)).  The 
psychological aspect of torture may be established, for 
example, “where the victim is in intense fear and is aware of, 
but helpless to prevent, impending death . . . for an 
appreciable lapse of time.”  Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d 384, 390 
(Ala. 2004). 
                     
 
29 “Aggravated battery” is also undefined by Virginia 
statute, though it was and remains a statutory offense in 
Georgia.  Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 431 n.13 (citing Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 26-1305 (1978)); see also West, 313 S.E.2d at 69; Ga. Code 
Ann. § 16-5-24(a).  The elements of that statutory offense 
define aggravated battery for the purpose of establishing the 
aggravating factor under Georgia law.  West, 313 S.E.2d at 71 
(appendix).  Similarly, though “depravity of mind” is undefined 
by statute in both Virginia and Georgia, the Georgia Supreme 
Court has defined it as “a reflection of an utterly corrupt, 
perverted or immoral state of mind.”  Id.  The meanings of 
these two terms for the purposes of the Virginia vileness 
aggravating factor are not at issue in Lawlor’s appeal and we 
express no opinion on them. 
 
87 
In this case, unlike Quintana, the medical evidence of 
aspirated blood and defensive wounds established that Orange 
was alive and conscious during some of the 47 blows she 
sustained.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the proponent of the instructions, there is more 
than a mere scintilla of evidence that Orange was tortured 
within the meaning of Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C).  
Accordingly, the court did not err in giving the proposed 
instructions. 
In assignment of error 164, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his proposed Instruction S-A.  He argues that 
the Commonwealth’s Instructions S-2a and S-3a erroneously 
instructed the jurors that they could not impose a sentence of 
life imprisonment unless they found that a sentence of death 
was not justified.  In particular, he challenges the portion of 
the two instructions that included the language: 
However, even if you find that the Commonwealth 
has proved [one or] both of the aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury 
has so found unanimously, if you nevertheless 
believe from all the evidence, including 
evidence in mitigation, that the death penalty 
is not justified, then you shall fix the 
punishment of the defendant at [life 
imprisonment]. 
 
However, this argument is not within the scope of the 
assignment of error. 
 
88 
Assignment of error 164 states, “The trial court erred in 
denying Mr. Lawlor’s proffered penalty phase instruction S-A 
regarding whether the jury may impose a sentence of life even 
if it is unanimous regarding the factors necessary to impose a 
sentence of death.”  Neither this nor any other assignment of 
error challenges the Commonwealth’s proposed instructions on 
the basis that they misled the jurors into believing they could 
not impose a sentence of life imprisonment.  We consider only 
arguments within the scope of the assignment of error.  Rule 
5:27(d); Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 484, 643 S.E.2d 
708, 725 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191 (2008).  We 
therefore do not consider whether Instructions S-2a and S-3a 
misled the jurors into believing they could not impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
In assignment of error 162, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his proposed Instruction S-L.  He again argues 
that the instruction would have remedied alleged defects in 
Instructions S-2a and S-3a which, according to Lawlor, misled 
the jurors about their ability to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  However, this argument is again outside the 
scope of the assignment of error. 
Assignment of error 162 states, “The trial court erred in 
denying Mr. Lawlor’s proffered penalty phase instruction S-L 
and in failing to instruct the jury that a sentence of life 
 
89 
without the possibility of parole is the default sentence for 
capital murder.”  As noted above, no assignment of error 
challenges Instructions S-2a and S-3a on the ground that they 
misled the jurors about their ability to impose a sentence of 
life imprisonment.  Because Lawlor’s argument is again outside 
the scope of the assignment of error, we will not consider it.  
Rule 5:27(d); Teleguz, 273 Va. at 484, 643 S.E.2d at 725. 
In assignment of error 165, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his proposed Instruction S-C.  However, there 
is only one Instruction S-C in the record and it is marked 
“granted.”  To the extent Lawlor offered another Instruction S-
C that was denied, it appears in neither the joint appendix nor 
the manuscript record.30  “We cannot review the ruling of a 
lower court for error when the appellant does not . . . provide 
us with a record that adequately demonstrates that the court 
erred.”  Prince Seating Corp., 275 Va. at 470, 659 S.E.2d at 
307.  Consequently, we cannot consider this assignment of 
error. 
CLAIM 2: IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
This claim consists of 11 assignments of error asserting 
that through rulings on jury instructions and answers to 
questions from the jury during its penalty phase deliberations, 
                     
 
30 The record does include a description of language from 
an alternative Instruction S-C but the entire, verbatim 
instruction is not clear. 
 
90 
the circuit court erred by misleading the jurors into believing 
that Lawlor could be released from prison if they imposed a 
sentence of life imprisonment.31 
1. JURY INSTRUCTIONS  
As noted above in Claims 7, 9, and 13, we review jury 
instructions “to see that the law has been clearly stated and 
that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence 
fairly raises.”  Cooper, 277 Va. at 381, 673 S.E.2d at 187 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  A court may in its 
discretion properly exclude an instruction when other 
instructions fully and fairly cover the relevant principle of 
law.  Daniels, 275 Va. at 466, 657 S.E.2d at 87. 
                     
 
31 In assignment of error 186, Lawlor asserts the court’s 
error also extended to rulings and comments during Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony.  However, he cites to no place in the 
record where the court made such rulings and comments or where 
he preserved objection to them.  Accordingly, we do not 
consider this assignment of error.  Rule 5:27(c).  The court’s 
rulings during Dr. Cunningham’s testimony are also included in 
assignment of error 187, but we likewise do not consider that 
portion of it.  Id. 
 
Similarly, in assignments of error 193 and 194, he asserts 
that the court also erred by misleading the jurors that they 
could not consider his risk of future dangerousness in prison 
in rulings relating to jury selection and Dr. Cunningham’s 
testimony.  Again, he cites to no place in the record where the 
court made such rulings and comments or where he preserved 
objection to them.  Accordingly, we do not consider those 
portions of these assignments of error.  Id.  In addition, his 
argument on jury instructions is limited to his assertion that 
they misled the jury into believing he would not spend his 
sentence in prison if sentenced to life imprisonment.  The 
portions of these assignments of error relating to jury 
instructions therefore are abandoned.  Rule 5:27(d). 
 
91 
In assignment of error 167, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by granting the Commonwealth’s proposed Instruction S-8a 
relating to the future dangerousness aggravating factor.  He 
argues that the instruction failed to inform the jury that he 
would spend the rest of his life in prison if not sentenced to 
death.  In considering Lawlor’s objection to the instruction, 
the court observed that other granted instructions informed the 
jury that a sentence of life imprisonment meant life without 
parole and declined to add the information to Instruction S-8a. 
Instruction S-4, which the court granted, stated, “The 
words ‘imprisoned for life’ mean imprisonment for life without 
possibility of parole.”  This instruction adequately informed 
the jury of the law and the court did not err in declining to 
modify Instruction S-8a as Lawlor suggested. 
In assignment of error 187, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his proposed Instruction S-J.  That 
instruction stated, “The words ‘imprisonment for life’ mean[] 
imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.  In other 
words, if sentenced to life imprisonment, Mark Lawlor will 
never be released on parole.”  The jury was adequately informed 
of the meaning of life imprisonment by Instruction S-4, which 
the court granted.  The court therefore did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing Lawlor’s proffered instruction. 
 
 
92 
2. ANSWERS TO JURY QUESTIONS 
In assignments of error 187, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 
200, and 202, Lawlor asserts that the court erred by answering 
the jury’s questions during its penalty phase deliberations.  
We review the court’s answers to questions propounded by the 
jury for abuse of discretion.  Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 
App. 619, 625, 347 S.E.2d 167, 171 (1986). 
The jury asked three questions.  The initial question was, 
“Re: ‘Continuing threat to society[,]’ Society means prison 
society, or society in general?”  The court answered, “Society 
is not limited to ‘prison society’ but includes all society; 
prison and society in general.  Your focus must be on the 
particular history and background of the defendant, Mark 
Lawlor, and the circumstances of his offense.”  Lawlor 
expressly consented to the court’s answer.  Thus, to the extent 
these assignments of error encompass that answer, they are not 
preserved.  Rule 5:25. 
Thereafter, the jury asked two follow-up questions 
simultaneously.  The first follow-up question was “Are we to 
consider ‘society in general’ is free society or Mark Lawlor as 
a prisoner in society inside & outside the wire?”  In response, 
the court directed the jury to its answer to its first question 
and reiterated, “Society means all of society.  All of society 
 
93 
includes prison society as well as non-prison, i.e., all 
society.” 
Lawlor objected to the court’s answer, arguing that a 
sentence of life imprisonment means life without the 
possibility of parole and the only relevant society therefore 
was prison society.  The court overruled his objection because 
the jury already had been instructed that life imprisonment 
means life without parole and because the relevant inquiry is 
society in general, not prison society. 
The second follow-up question was “If imprisoned for life, 
what physical constraints would Mark Lawlor be under outside of 
his cell while exposed to other persons?  Inside prison?  
Outside prison?”  The court responded, “The circumstances of 
Mr. Lawlor once he is delivered to the Department of 
Corrections is not a matter [with] which you should concern 
yourself.” 
Lawlor again objected, arguing that prison conditions 
could be relevant mitigating evidence.  He also argued that the 
question asked only about imprisonment for life rather than 
imprisonment for life without parole.  The court ruled that the 
conditions of confinement were not relevant to the jury’s 
deliberations and again ruled that other instructions informed 
them that life imprisonment meant life without parole.  
 
94 
Instruction S-4 adequately informed the jury that life 
imprisonment meant life without parole.  Further, in Lovitt, we 
expressly determined that “society” for the purposes of the 
future dangerousness aggravating factor was society as a whole, 
not merely prison society.  260 Va. at 517, 537 S.E.2d at 879.  
We reaffirm that holding in Claim 3 of this case.  Finally, we 
ruled that the general conditions of confinement and prison 
security are not relevant either to future dangerousness or as 
mitigating evidence in Morva, 278 Va. at 350, 683 S.E.2d at 
565, Juniper, 271 Va. at 425-27, 626 S.E.2d at 423-24, Bell, 
264 Va. at 201, 563 S.E. 2d at 714, Walker, 258 Va. at 70, 515 
S.E.2d at 574, Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653, and 
in Claims 3 and 4 of this case.  Accordingly, the court did not 
abuse its discretion by overruling Lawlor’s objections.   
D. GENERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
CLAIM 10: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CODE § 19.2-264.5 
This claim consists of 7 assignments of error challenging 
Code § 19.2-264.5 generally and as the circuit court applied it 
in Lawlor’s case. 
1. FACIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
In assignment of error 7, Lawlor asserts that the court 
erred by denying his motion to declare Code § 19.2-264.5 
unconstitutional.  The statute states that “upon good cause 
shown, the court may set aside the sentence of death and impose 
 
95 
a sentence of imprisonment for life.”  Code § 19.2-264.5 
(emphasis added).  He argues that permitting the court such 
discretion is unconstitutional. 
We have previously considered and rejected Lawlor’s 
argument.  Prieto I, 278 Va. at 416, 682 S.E.2d at 937 (citing 
Juniper, 271 Va. at 389, 626 S.E.2d at 401, Teleguz, 273 Va. at 
474, 643 S.E.2d at 719, and Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 
76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994)).  
The circuit court did not err in adhering to our controlling 
precedents.  We also find no reason to modify the views we 
previously expressed in them. 
2. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS-APPLIED 
Lawlor also asserts in assignments of error 207, 208, 209, 
and 210 that the court erred in the exercise of its discretion 
under the statute because it considered improper factors in 
denying his motion to set aside the jury’s recommendation.  
Specifically, Lawlor argues that the court erred by considering 
the defense strategy and representations in pre-trial motions, 
finding that Lawlor had not expressed remorse, and noting that 
Lawlor did not testify on his own behalf in the penalty phase.32 
                     
 
32 In assignment of error 206, Lawlor also generally 
assigns error to the court’s failure to find good cause to set 
aside the jury’s recommendation and impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  The brief contains no independent argument on 
this assignment of error.  Consequently, to the extent it is 
not encompassed by his other assignments of error, it is 
 
96 
Code § 19.2-264.5 requires the preparation of a post-
sentence report prior to the imposition of a sentence of death.  
“After consideration of the report, and upon good cause shown, 
the court may set aside the sentence of death and impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for life.”  Code § 19.2-264.5.  We 
review a trial court’s decision on a motion to set aside a 
sentence of death for abuse of discretion.  See Yarbrough v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 388, 398, 551 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2001) 
(noting the trial court’s authority under Code § 19.2-264.5 to 
set aside a jury’s sentence of death is discretionary), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1060 (2002). 
As noted above in Claim 4, there are “three principal 
ways” by which a court abuses its discretion: “when a relevant 
factor that should have been given significant weight is not 
considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered 
and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and 
no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing 
those factors, commits a clear error of judgment.”  Landrum, 
282 Va. at 352, 717 S.E.2d at 137 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
                                                                 
abandoned.  Rule 5:27(d).  Similarly, in assignment of error 
213, Lawlor generally assigns error to the court’s denial of 
his motion to suspend or vacate the final judgment but provides 
no argument relating to that motion.  Therefore, to the extent 
this assignment of error is not encompassed by the others, it 
too is abandoned.  Id. 
 
97 
The court clearly set forth its basis for denying Lawlor’s 
motion: 
 
So, I have reviewed all of the evidence, 
all of the materials, the voluminous materials, 
the letters in support of you, the research 
articles submitted, and all of the other offered 
materials proffered in the presentations by your 
counsel in the sentencing phase. 
 
 
This was done despite the large quantity of 
material that was delivered only a few days ago. 
 
 
I have reviewed all of the Phase II 
litigation testimony of more than 50--I think 
the total is 51 witnesses presented by the 
defense at trial.  I’ve considered the pre-
sentence report as well as the statements you’ve 
made, the arguments of your attorneys, arguments 
of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
There simply has not been a document 
submitted on behalf of either the Commonwealth 
or the Defendant that has not been reviewed by 
the Court. 
 
 
The jury in this case was selected after a 
multi-week voir dire, and was selected and 
approved by both the Commonwealth and the 
Defendant as to composition of membership. 
 
 
Over a period of 31 trial days this jury 
heard the evidence in the guilt [or] innocence 
phase of this trial, including . . . your 
admission through counsel that you were the 
perpetrator of this horrific, vile, and 
unnecessarily cruel and vicious criminal act on 
Ginny Orange on September 24th, 2008. 
 
 
Thereafter, the jury found by a unanimous 
vote that you were guilty of the capital murder, 
as in alleged in both count one and count two. 
 
 
I have before me both Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 
2 from the trial.  Exhibit 1 is a picture of Ms. 
Orange in life and Exhibit 2 is a picture of Ms. 
 
98 
Orange in death.  Only discretion prevents me 
from showing those to you because there are 
citizens in the courtroom. 
 
 
In Phase II of this trial, the jury was 
presented with and heard over 50 mitigation 
witnesses presented by the Defense in Phase II. 
 
 
The jury thereafter deliberated for several 
days and they reviewed the evidence and the 
argument of both the Commonwealth and the 
Defendant.  The jury reached their unanimous 
verdict with the determination that under the 
facts of this case, the appropriate sentence 
under the law was the imposition of the death 
penalty for each of the two counts in the 
indictment. 
 
 
I note that upon the reentry of the jury in 
to the court to deliver their verdict in Phase 
II, it was clear and obvious that the jury was, 
I guess the word is distraught, or better word, 
emotionally drained, and in fact several of the 
jurors were in tears. 
 
 
It is clear evidence of the heavy emotional 
burden placed upon 12 citizens in a capital 
prosecution, and the seriousness and 
deliberation with which they addressed their 
civic duty as jurors. 
 
 
There simply are no mitigating facts in 
this case that would convince the Court that the 
jury failed to properly consider any evidence in 
this litigation submitted by the defense. 
 
 
There was abundant evidence and the jury’s 
conclusion that the two crimes as charged 
contained both the presence of a continuing 
threat and a violence factor, which has not been 
discussed today at all in this hearing, and thus 
warranted punishment by the imposition of death. 
 
 
Counsel argues that the Defendant has 
accepted responsibility and the Defendant has 
said that today.  Although I note for the record 
that over 22 months the defense position was 
 
99 
that someone else had committed this act . . . .  
Even[] as late as December 9th of 2010, the 
defense was asking for funds to send an 
investigator to Uruguay to interview one Rafael 
Delgado, who they at least intimated was 
involved in this crime. 
 
 
It was only on January 13th in the opening 
statements that counsel for the Defendant 
accepted some responsibility. 
 
 
Mr. Lawlor, I find today, and it is a 
difficult finding, I will admit to you, no 
reason to intercede and sentence you contrary to 
the recommendations of the jury in either count 
one or count two. 
 
 
Today the Court affirms and imposes those 
sentences. 
 
The record also indicates that the court prefaced its 
remarks by observing that Lawlor did not express remorse prior 
to sentencing.  Lawlor points to a number of statements in 
which he expressed remorse, but these statements were contained 
in or attached as exhibits to a pleading filed on June 17, 
2011, less than a week prior to the court’s June 23 hearing.  
This 6-day interlude is a distinction without a difference for 
the purposes of reviewing the court’s statement that “up until 
today, there has not been a scintilla of remorse,” particularly 
when the court expressly noted that it had reviewed these 
statements when referring to “the large quantity of material 
that was delivered only a few days ago.” 
However, the record also indicates that the court 
considered Lawlor’s pre-trial motions for funding to send an 
 
100 
investigator to Uruguay to interview and collect DNA from 
Delgado, whom Lawlor at the time asserted may have committed 
the murder as principal in the first degree.  In addition, the 
court commented that Lawlor “continued to deny [responsibility] 
for over 22 months of pretrial investigations, in motions, 
[and] pleadings by the defense team.”  It also stated that he 
accepted responsibility “only on January 13th in the opening 
statements.” 
While it is proper for a court to consider a defendant’s 
“present tense refusal to accept responsibility, or show 
remorse,” Jennings v. State, 664 A.2d 903, 910 (Md. 1995) 
(emphasis added), it may not be linked to his “prior claim of 
innocence or not guilty plea or exercise of his right to remain 
silent.”  Saenz v. State, 620 A.2d 401, 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1993).  See also Smith, 27 Va. App. at 362-63, 499 S.E.2d at 
13-14 (citing Jennings and Saenz).  Lawlor’s defense strategy 
in the 22 months preceding trial, including his assertion that 
Delgado may have committed the murder and the concomitant 
denial of responsibility it implied, was not an appropriate 
factor to consider in weighing Lawlor’s sense of remorse at the 
time of sentencing.  Simply put, a defendant must not be 
penalized at sentencing for having mounted a legal defense to 
 
101 
the charge against him.33  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what 
the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of 
the most basic sort.”). 
Nevertheless, the consideration under Code § 19.2-264.5 is 
whether there is good cause to set aside the jury’s sentences 
of death; the court correctly noted that the question before it 
was whether to intercede and overrule the jury’s determination.  
It is clear from the record that in evaluating that question 
the court considered and gave the greatest weight to the 
statutory sentencing report; the evidence adduced at trial, 
including Lawlor’s mitigating evidence in the penalty phase; 
the duration of voir dire and the resulting impartiality of the 
jury; the seriousness with which jurors undertook and completed 
their deliberations; the jury’s finding of both aggravating 
factors; and the egregiousness of the offense.  These are all 
proper factors for the court’s consideration.  While Lawlor’s 
defense strategy was not a proper factor, the court did not 
give it significant weight in relation to the many other 
factors stated from the bench when it determined that Lawlor 
had not shown good cause to set aside the jury’s sentences.  
                     
 
33 As noted, whether the defendant expresses remorse at 
sentencing is a proper factor for consideration and the trial 
court may weigh the credibility of any such expression, 
provided it does not consider the defendant’s prior legal 
positions when doing so. 
 
102 
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Lawlor’s motion.  Landrum, 282 Va. at 352-53, 717 S.E.2d at 
137. 
CLAIM 15: NARROWING THE CLASS OF CAPITAL OFFENSES 
This claim consists of a single assignment of error, 
assignment of error 20, in which Lawlor asserts that the 
circuit court erred by denying his motion to declare Code 
§ 18.2-31 unconstitutional for failing to narrow the class of 
murders for which a sentence of death may be imposed.  He 
contends that the number of offenses defined as capital murder 
in the statute has increased to the point that it no longer 
satisfies the requirements of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).  We review this issue de novo.  
Gallagher, 284 Va. at 449, 732 S.E.2d at 24 (2012). 
Lawlor’s argument is without merit.  In Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court determined that 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional.  
States responded by narrowing the class of defendants on whom a 
sentence of death could be imposed.  For example, in Texas such 
a sentence could be imposed after conviction for one of only 
five categories of murder.  Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 
(1976), overruled on other grounds by Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 
258.  The Court determined that limiting the type of murder for 
 
103 
which a sentence of death could be imposed was sufficient for 
Furman purposes.  Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276. 
By contrast, in Georgia every murder was punishable by 
either death or life imprisonment.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196.  
Nevertheless, that state narrowed the imposition of a sentence 
of death to those cases in which a jury found at least one of 
ten statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The Court determined that requirement eliminated the 
opportunity the Furman jury had to impose a sentence of death 
arbitrarily, “without guidance or direction.”  Id. at 196-97.  
In Godfrey, the Court reiterated its holding in Gregg that 
“if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a 
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a 
manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of 
the death penalty.”  446 U.S. at 428.  “It must channel the 
sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that 
provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make 
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
While the Court reversed the death sentence imposed in 
Godfrey, it did so because it determined that the sole 
aggravating factor upon which the sentence had been imposed had 
been applied unconstitutionally.  Id. at 432-33.  Notably, it 
did not reverse on the ground that Georgia law extended the 
 
104 
potential imposition of a sentence of death to too many 
offenses.  To the contrary, in Zant, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the principle that appropriate aggravating factors 
may be sufficient to narrow the class of defendants upon whom a 
sentence of death may be imposed.  462 U.S. at 878-79. 
In short, states may avoid the arbitrary imposition of the 
death penalty either by restricting the types of murder 
constituting capital offenses or by setting forth aggravating 
factors which must be proved prior to the imposition of a 
sentence of death.  By specifying certain offenses as capital 
murder in Code § 18.2-31 and setting forth aggravating factors 
in Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C), Virginia has done 
both.  Accordingly, the statutory aggravating factors set forth 
in Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C) satisfy the 
constitutional obligation to narrow the cases in which a 
sentence of death may be imposed regardless of the number of 
offenses defined as capital murder in Code § 18.2-31.  The 
court therefore did not err in denying Lawlor’s motion. 
CLAIM 16: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
This claim consists of a single assignment of error, 
assignment of error 204, in which Lawlor asserts that the 
circuit court erred by denying his motion to bar the imposition 
of a sentence of death because both of the Commonwealth’s 
methods of execution constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  
 
105 
He also argues that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to 
ascertain the changes made to its lethal injection protocol 
since our last review. 
Code § 53.1-234 allows a prisoner who has been sentenced 
to death to elect whether the sentence will be executed by 
electrocution or lethal injection; if the prisoner fails to 
make a timely election, the statute directs that the sentence 
be executed by lethal injection.  We have consistently ruled 
that execution by electrocution is constitutionally 
permissible.  Porter, 276 Va. at 238, 661 S.E.2d at 432 
(quoting Bell, 264 Va. at 203, 563 S.E.2d at 715-16)); Orbe v. 
Johnson, 267 Va. 568, 570, 601 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2004) (“Orbe 
II”).  When a prisoner sentenced to death may choose to have 
his sentenced executed through a constitutionally permissible 
method, we will not consider a constitutional challenge to an 
alternative choice.  Porter, 276 Va. at 237, 661 S.E.2d at 432 
(“When a condemned prisoner has a choice of method of 
execution, the inmate may not choose a method and then complain 
of its unconstitutionality, particularly when the 
constitutionality of the alternative method has been 
established.”) (quoting Orbe II, 267 Va. at 570, 601 S.E.2d at 
546).  Accordingly, we will not reverse the court’s ruling. 
CLAIM 17: LACK OF MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW 
 
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This claim consists of a single assignment of error, 
assignment of error 8, in which Lawlor asserts that the circuit 
court erred by denying his motion to declare the Commonwealth’s 
capital punishment statutory scheme unconstitutional because it 
fails to provide defendants with an opportunity for meaningful 
appellate review.  We have previously considered and rejected 
Lawlor’s arguments.  Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 
398, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55-56 (2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1077 
(2003); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 742, 529 S.E.2d 
570, 581, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000).  The circuit court 
did not err in adhering to our controlling precedents.  We also 
find no reason to modify the views we previously expressed in 
them. 
III. REVIEW UNDER CODE § 17.1-313(C) 
Code § 17.1-313(C) requires us to review every sentence of 
death and “consider and determine: [(1) w]hether the sentence 
of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice 
or any other arbitrary factor; and [(2) w]hether the sentence 
of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.”  Lawlor presents his argument relating to this 
review in his eighteenth and final claim.  While we consider 
Lawlor’s arguments concomitantly with our statutory review, 
they do not restrict its scope.  Code § 17.1-313(F). 
 
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A. PASSION, PREJUDICE, OR OTHER ARBITRARY FACTORS 
In assignment of error 214, Lawlor asserts that the 
sentences of death were imposed under the influence of 
prejudice and an arbitrary factor, i.e., mistake.  In 
particular, he cites the trial court’s references to his 
decision not to testify and his counsel’s advocacy.  He also 
argues that the jury’s sentences were made without the evidence 
of his remorse and his asserted lack of risk of future 
dangerousness excluded by the court’s rulings. 
We have addressed each of these arguments above and have 
found no reversible error.  In addition, we have reviewed the 
errors Lawlor assigns to the judgment of the trial court to 
ascertain whether they suggest prejudice when considered 
cumulatively.  See Porter, 276 Va. at 266, 661 S.E.2d at 448 
(citing Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 704, 251 S.E.2d 202, 
214 (1979)).  We conclude that they do not. 
Expanding our review beyond the scope of Lawlor’s 
argument, we have thoroughly reviewed the record as mandated by 
Code § 17.1-313(C)(1). Nothing therein suggests that the jury 
failed to consider fully all evidence adduced in both the guilt 
and penalty phases of trial, including Lawlor’s relevant 
mitigating evidence.  Likewise, nothing suggests any improper 
influence in imposing the sentences of death.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that there is no indication that the sentences were 
 
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imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor. 
B. EXCESSIVE OR DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE 
In assignment of error 215, Lawlor asserts that, although 
his crime was terrible, it does not compare to those this Court 
routinely sees in capital cases.  However, that is not the 
standard set forth in the statute.  Rather, we “determine 
whether other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally 
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, 
considering both the crime and the defendant.”  Morva, 278 Va. 
at 354, 683 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting Lovitt, 260 Va. at 518, 537 
S.E.2d at 880) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “This 
review is not designed to ensure complete symmetry among all 
death penalty cases.  Rather, the goal of the review is to 
determine if a sentence of death is aberrant.”  Prieto II, 283 
Va. at 188-89, 721 S.E.2d at 507-08 (quoting Porter, 276 Va. at 
267, 661 S.E.2d at 448 (internal citation, alteration, and 
quotation marks omitted). 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) and (E), we examined 
similar cases in which a sentence of death was imposed 
following a conviction for capital murder in the commission of 
abduction with intent to defile or a conviction for capital 
murder in the commission of or subsequent to rape or attempted 
rape.  Our review was especially attentive to those cases in 
 
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which both aggravating factors were found, including Vinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 522 S.E.2d 170 (1999), cert. denied, 
530 U.S. 1218 (2000), Prieto II, and the cases cited therein. 
Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 477 S.E.2d 270 
(1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997), and Payne v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293 (1999), are 
particularly analogous in that they each involve victims of 
rape or attempted rape who suffered multiple blows from blunt 
objects.  Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 506 S.E.2d 763 
(1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999), is similarly 
noteworthy in that both capital murder in the commission of 
abduction with intent to defile and capital murder in the 
commission of rape were charged in that case as they were in 
Lawlor’s. 
We also reviewed capital murder cases in which a sentence 
of life imprisonment was imposed.  Based on the totality of 
this review, we find that the sentences of death imposed in 
this case were not excessive or disproportionate to sentences 
imposed in capital murder cases for comparable crimes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We find no error in the judgment of the circuit court.  
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions for capital murder and 
the sentences of death returned by the jury and the judgment 
entered by the court. 
 
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Affirmed.