Title: Onaka v. Onaka. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 09/20/2006 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

AW LIBRARY

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

-=-000-=-

  
 

vs.

ALLYSON L. ONAKA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24463

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(FC-D NO. 96-0431)

AUGUST 30, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Allyson Lesli Onaka (hereinafter “Allyson”] appeals
from twenty-four orders of the second circuit family court’
concerning the division of property and debts. On appeal, this
court is faced with the following two issues: (1) Clarence
Shizuo Onaka’s [hereinafter “Clarence”] argument that this court
lacks jurisdiction inasmuch as Allyson’s multiple notices of
appeal were either invalid or untimely; and (2) Allyson’s
contention that the family court violated her due process right
to be present at trial by denying her motions to continue, which
were based upon her alleged inability to travel due to her
pregnancy. Although Allyson presents other points of error on
appeal, they fail to comply with the mandatory requirements of

the Hawas'i Rules of Appellate Procedure [hereinafter “HRAP”)

‘The Honcrsble Eric G. Ronsnensk presides.
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Rule 26(b) (4). Accordingly they have not been properly preserved
for appeal and we do not address them.

Based upon the following analysis, we conclude that
Allyson's August 3, 2001 notice of appeal vested this court with
jurisdiction and that the family court did not violate Allyson’s
fe right to be present. Accordingly, we affirm the

 

due proc
orders appealed from.
T. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Allyson and Clarence resided on Mavi and were married
on August 1, 1986. Clarence’s primary income was derived from
Tasty Crust Restaurant [hereinafter “Testy Crust], an
establishment that he purchased in August 1982. Clarence also
owned a business known as Quality Lighting and Supply Co.
(hereinafter “Quality Lighting”). Allyson managed Quality
Lighting from approximately 1989 to 1986, Allyson also helped
Clarence manage several real estate properties located in Hawai'i
and Nevada, which were acquired during the pendency of the
narriage.

In March 1996, Allyson and Clarence separated.
Allyson thereafter moved to Las Vegas, Nevada.
B. Procedural Background

On August 27, 1996, Clarence filed 2 complaint for
divorce in the second circuit family court. The court entered a
divorce decree on Decenber 30, 1999, bifurcating the proceedings

and reserving the property division issues for trial.
 

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1. Allyson's motions to continue

Amidst chaotic pretrial proceedings, Allyson filed a
motion te continue trial, which was scheduled to commence on
January 20, 2000. Her initial motion, filed on November 19,
1999, requested a continuance to permit her attorneys more time
to obtain and review additional documents and potentially depose
persons identified on Clarence’s witness list. On November 29,
1999, Allyson filed a supplemental affidavit offering an
additional, more compelling reason to continue trial. Therein,
she claimed that she was pregnant‘ and that the high-risk nature
of her pregnancy made it impossible for her to travel to Hawai't
to attend trial. Allyson thus requested that the court continue
trial until after her date of delivery, approximated to occur on
May 22, 2000. The court thereafter ordered Allyson to submit to
‘an independent medical examination to verify her medical
condition.

on January §, 2000, the court conducted an evidentiary
hearing, at which Allyson’s treating physician, Dr. Richard Litt,
testified by telephone in support of Allyson’s motion, stating
that “[sJhe is @ high risk patient because of her age, the fact
that she’s had two ectopic pregnancies, one (inaudible)
resection, and she’s had some recent vaginal bleeding (inaudible)
unknown etiology[,]” and that she should “[s]tay off her feet as
much as possible, no travel, no exercise, no intercourse, no
stress, no strain, to lead as quiet time as she can until the

+ alayson's pregnancy was the result of her intimate relationship

with Willian Bernere
 

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baby is delivered.” To the contrary, the doctor who conducted
the independent medical examination, Dr. Benjamin Berry,
testified that traveling to Hawai'i for trial during the second
trimester of pregnancy would not increase the risk of harm to
either Allyson or her unborn child. The court considered the
testimony of beth doctors, but concluded that Dr. Berry was more
credible and denied Allyson’s motion on the basis of her
pregnancy. Nevertheless, the court continued trial until
February 17, 2000, based upon Allyson’s attorney’s representation
that approximately eight-thousand pages of documents had yet to
be reviewed.”

on February 15, 2000, Allyson filed another motion for
8 continuance alleging a medical relapse and degenerating health.
She asserted that because the family court ordered her to be
Present at a pretrial conference on February 15, 2000, she
attempted to comply by traveling from Las Vegas, Nevada to Los
Angeles, California on February 13, 2000. She further alleged
that she suffered an episode of elevated blood pressure while in
transit and subsequently visited Dr. Robert Karns, a physician
located in Beverly Hills. Dr. Karns determined that she was “too

 

brittle” to travel, and that “(sJuch an elevated blood pressure
was consistent with preeclampsia, and could pose great danger to
both mother and child.” Also, Dr. Litt was dismayed when he

discovered Allyson’s attempt to travel to Hawai'i, and stated, by

 

On February 23, 2000, the court menorisiized ite oral relinge in
an “Order Granting In Fart’And Denying In Part Defendant’ s Motion Te Continue
Trial And Extend And Clarify Discovery Cutoff Filed On November 19, 1955.”

4
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letter, that Allyson suffered from anxiety attacks, preeclampsia,
and gestational diabetes.

on February 17, 2000, the first day of trial, the
family court denied Allyson's February 15, 2000 motion te

 

continue, ‘The court first noted that the parties had stipulati
to the fact that Allyson was, at that time, unable to fly from
Las Vegas, Nevada to Maui, Hawai'i. However, balancing the
rights of the parties, and based upon a consideration of the
record, the court determined that trial should commence. In
order to mitigate the prejudice to Allyson, the court ordered
that she be permitted to participate de bene esse, by videotaped
deposition. Allyson nevertheless declined to take advantage of
the court's accommodation because of the alleged “dangers that
such a procedure would create for [her] and her baby.”
2. Teial

‘Trial commenced on February 17, 2000 and concluded on
February 24, 2000, without Allyson’s presence.‘

on June &, 2000, the family court filed its findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The court also filed its property
division order, inter alia, (1) awarding title and possession of
all of the marital real estate properties to Clarence, subject to
a1] indebtedness secured by the properties and owed on account of
the use and ownership thereof, (2) quashing all of the lis
pendens filed by Allyson in connection with other civil actions

filed by her, (3) ordering Clarence to assume and pay all current

Litigation °

 

ison’ s attorneys were present at each stage of the
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debts owed to his parents, Tsuneo and Nancy Onaks, and his
sister, Karen Burry-Onaks, (4) ordering Allyson to pay Clarenc
the amount of $227,178.96 for the wasting of assets belonging to
Tasty Crust and Quality Lighting, and (5) awarding Clarence

attorneys’ fees and costs based upon multiple sanctions imposed

 

on Allyson.*
3. Family court post-decree proceedings

on June 20, 2000, Clarence filed a motion requesting
that the family court adopt three additional findings of fact --
clarifying whether the family court adjudicated Allyson's claim
that Clarence wasted marital assets -- for the benefit of the
circuit court judge presiding over a separate civil proceeding
filed by Allyson.*

On June 23, 2000, Clarence filed a motion for fees and
costs in the amount of $262,181.15, pursuant to Hawai'i Family
Court Rules [hereinafter “HFCR”) Rule 68.7

On October 1, 2000, Clarence filed a motion to anend
the family court’s findings of fact to reflect that Allyson moved
her residence from Las Vegas, Nevada to Cedar City, Utah on
February 28, 2000.

On November 13, 2000, the family court filed three

 

+ on duly 7, 2000, Allyson filed a notice of appeal trom, inter
alia, the family court's June ,” 2000 Property division order, thereby
Eennencing eppea romber 23597." However, en Ganvary si, 2001, thie court
Gtenissed appeal nunber 25877 for ack of Suriaciction inassuch ea Allyaen's
Suly’5,°2000 netice of appecl, violates the autenatic stay triggered bye
bankruptey petition filed By her on June 20,2000

   

 

* Allyson fled = menorandum in opposition on July 10, 2000.

Allyson Led » nenorendim

 

opposition on July 10, 2000.
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WES’

 

post-decree orders granting each of the foregoing motions
4. Bankruptcy proceedinas

Allyson filed @ petition for bankruptcy in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah on June 20,
2000.

Clarence thereafter filed a motion in the bankruptcy
court requesting relief from the automatic stay triggered by
Allyson's bankruptey petition. On September 20, 2000, following
a hearing held on September 5, 2000, the bankruptcy court granted
Clarence’s motion and lifted the stay for the limited purpose of
enforcing the June &, 2000 property division order.

on September 26, 2000, Clarence filed 2 complaint for
an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, arguing that (1)
the obligations imposed by the June 8, 2000 property division
order were not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § $23(a) (15),
and (2) Allyson failed to fully and accurately disclose her
assets and liabilities, and therefore should be denied discharge
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (4).

on July 11, 2001, the bankruptcy court filed an “order
Discharging Debtor.” Thereafter, on July 27, 2001, the
benkruptey court filed an order entitled, “Final Decree And Case
closed.”

on August 3, 2001, Allyson filed a notice of appeal,

 

+ pilysen filed her

 

\cond notice of appeal on Decenber 11, 2000,
\9 from these post-decree orders, thereby commencing appeal number
Tlouevers on Merch 27, 2001, this court dersesed oppeat number 23944

‘FJorisciction insofar ae Allyson’s Decenser 11, 2000 notice of
tiled in vielation of the automatic stay

 

      
 
 

  

  

 
 

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thereby initiating the present appellate proceedings.”

On August 21, 2001, the bankruptcy court commenced a
separate, two-day trial to adjudicate whether Allysen’s debt to
Clarence was dischargeable. On September 18, 2001, the court
filed a judgment discharging Allyson’s debts to Clarence as
established in the June 8, 2000 property division order.

IX, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Constitutional Questions

We review questions of constitutional law de nove,
under the right/wrong standard. See State v, Friedman, 93
Hawai'i €3, 67, 996 P.2d 268, 273 (2000) ("We anewer questions of
constitutional law by exercising our oun independent
constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case. Thus, we
review questions of constitutional law under the right/wrong
standard.”) (Quotation marks omitted.) (Citations omitted.).

B. Motions te Continue

We review @ trial court’s decision to grant or deny 2
motion te continue for an abuse of discretion. see State v,
Escobido-Ortiz, 109 Hawai'i 359, 364, 126 P.3d 402, 407 (App.
2005) ("The trial court's decision to grant or deny @ continuance
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”); State vs Lee, 9 Haw.
App. 600, 603, 856 F.2d 1279, 1281 (1983) (“A motion for
continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial

court, and the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal

 

+ She subsequently filed an anended notice of appeal on October 3
2001 to correct clerical errors in the august 3, 2001 notice.

 

5
 

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absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.”), reconsideration
denied, © Haw. App. 660, 661 P.2¢ 767, cert, denied, 75 Haw. 51,
861 P.2d 736 (1993); State v. Gacer, 45 Haw. 478, 488, 370 P.2d
739, 745 (1962) ("The granting of a continuance is within the
discretion of the trial judge and is not reviewable except for
abuse of that discretion.”).

It ds well established that “(an abuse of discretion
occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of
reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to
the substantial detriment of a party-litigant.” Keahole Def.
Coalition, Inc, v. Bd. of Land and Natural Res., 110 Hawai'i 419,
436, 134 P.3d 585, 602 (2006) (citations omitted).

IIT. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction

Clarence contests the jurisdiction of this court to
hear the present appeal. Thus, we initially retain jurisdiction
to decide the jurisdictional issue. See State v. Bohannon, 102
Hawas's 228, 234, 74 P.3d 980, 986 (2003) ("A court always has
jurdediction to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a
particular case.”) (Quotation marks omitted.) (Citing State v.
Brandimart, 68 Haw. 495, 496, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1986).

Clarence argues that Allyson is barred from pursuing

 

her app

 

insofar as: (1) this court dismissed her July 7, 2000
and Decenber 11, 2000 notices of appeal as invalid; (2) the
automatic bankruptcy stay continued until the termination of

Clarence’s adversary proceeding on September 18, 2001, thus
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xendering Allyson's August 3, 2001 notice of appeal void absent
retroactive annulment: and (3) Allyson’s October 30, 2001
Yamended notice of appeal” was filed more than thirty days after
the September 18, 2001 termination of Clarence’s adversary
proceeding and was thus untimely.

Allyson, on the other hand, argues that her first two
appeals were dismissed without prejudice based on a lack of
jurisdiction created by the automatic stay in effect during the
pendency of her bankruptcy case, and that her August 3, 2001
notice of appeal was timely under both bankruptcy law and the
applicable appellate rules. We agree.

11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000) provides, in relevant part, that

a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . .

comencenent of contineation «11 sof a Judicial, sdministretive

or other action or proceeding against the debtor’ that was or could

Rave been commenced before the conmencenent of the case under this
eielet]

 

 

Pursuant to the foregoing language, we dismissed two of Allyson’s
prior attempts to pursue an appeal, insofar as her July 7, 2000
and December 11, 2000 notices of appeal violated the automatic
stay.

However, despite the invalidity of her first two
notices of appeal, Allyson’s third notice of appeal, filed on

August 3, 2001, adequately vested this court with jurisdiction

 

 

gee OA C.d.5. Bankruptey $ 67 (2988) ("IT]he automatic stay
incluces a stey of the conmencenent of continuation of 3 jusicial acticn or
proceesing against the derecr that wae or could have been commences

or te recover a prepetition clain. This provision applies te

pict, regardices of whether t

‘iieellane cr-anapceliee,*]~ (Footnotes omitted.) (Enphesis eageas
10

      

 

       
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inasmuch as the automatic stay had been previously terminated on
duly 11, 2002.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c) provides, in pertinent part, that

(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section
continues until the earliest of

 

 

(A) the time the case is clos

 

(B) the time the case is dismissed; or

 

concerning an tadieitusl crattave SnOen CMpteE Sate ae ae 29

ofthis titie, ihe tine a discharge je arated or deniedt |
(Emphases added.) As previously mentioned, the bankruptcy court
filed an order discharging Allyson’s debts on July 11, 2001.
That discharge terminated the automatic stay pursuant to the
express terme of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2) (C).

Clarence attenpts to circumnavigate the foregoing
conclusion by asserting that the July 11, 2001 discharge was not
effective as to him insofar as his September 26, 2000 adversary
proceeding objecting to Allyson’s discharge was still pending.
He concludes that the automatic stay continued until September
18, 2001 when the bankruptcy court entered its judgment in favor
of Allyson, thereby rejecting Clarence’s objection to Allyson’s
discharge. However, Clarence’s position is untenable insofar as
an adversary proceeding is @ proceeding distinguishable from the
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) expressly binds the life

10 Coliser on Bankruptcy 4 7003.02 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds.,
ath ed. rev. 700€) describes the cistinction as fellows

The scversary proceeding, which is ccmmenced by filing

complaint pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7003, must be differentiated

fron the Cede case itself. the conmencenent cf the Code case is
(cont inved!

 

a
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of an automatic stay to the case -- not to a related adversary

 

proceeding -- and thus where a discharge is granted in the case,
the mere continued existence of a related adversary proceeding is
of no consequence. See Moody v, Comn’r of Internal Revenue, 9
T.C. 655, 664 (1990) (concluding that the bankruptcy court's
confirmation of a chapter 11 plan constituted a discharge and
that “the existence of a pending adversary proceeding [did] not
serve to continue the stay."); cf. Allison v, Conn’ of Internal

Revenue, 97 T.C. 544, 548 (1991) (“Accordingly, we hold that when

2 bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed or a discharge has been
granted or denied pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(¢) (2), the

automatic stay is terminated, and the reopening of 2 case does
not, absent an order from the bankruptcy court, reimpose the
stay.”) (Emphasis added.).
Having concluded that the automatic stay terminated on
Joly 11, 2001, the remainder of the analysis is perfunctory.
RAP Rule 54 (2001) provides, in relevant part, that
(w)henever a feders bankruptcy court Lifts or terminates 2 stey
of proceedings that has been entered with respect to # civil cere
in Snich an appeal ic permitted by law and no notice of appeal has
been files, the provisions of Rule 4 shail apply ae if the date of

Lifting or termination of the stay was the date of entry of the
Jedgnent appealed fron(-)

 

HRAP Rule 4 (2001) mandates, in relevant part, that “the notice

 

(.s-continved)
commenced by filing @ petition, as provided in Sankruptey Rule
1002(a) and sections 301-303 of the Code. The word “ease” mean
the entire matter that is Before the court, Within the context of
the case there may be proceedings Co resclve cisputes; one type of
such proceedings is defined as an “adversary proceeding”
proceecings that weula fit within that definition are specified in
Benkroptcy Aule 7003.

  

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of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the
judgment or appealable order." Accordingly, Allyson was required
to file her notice of appeal within thirty days after the lifting
or termination of the automatic stay, or July 11, 2002.

We prudentially note that Clarence contests the
applicability of HRAP Rule $4 insofar as two notices of appeal
have, in fact, been filed. However, Clarence overlooks the fact
that both notices of appeal were inadequate to vest this court
with jurisdiction insofar as they were filed during the pendency
of the automatic stay. Generally, most courts consider actions
taken in violation of an automatic stay void. See In re Halas,
249 B.R. 182, 191 (Bankr. N.D. T11. 2000) ("Some courts have held
that actions taken in violation of the stay are voidable.

Most courts, however, have found such actions to be void.”);
Bronson v. United States, 46 F.3d 1573, 1877 (Fed. Cir, 1995) ("A
majority of the circuits have held that actions taken in
violation of the automatic stay are void.”) (Footnotes
omitted.); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 362.11{1] (Alan N. Resnick
et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006) ("Most courts have held that
actions taken in violation of the stay are void and without
effect.”). Actions thet are void have no legal effect. See
Black's Law Dictionary 1573 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term
“void” as “having no legal force or binding effect”). Applying
that definition, the situation wherein two notices of appeal have
been filed without legal effect is the functional equivalent of
the situation wherein no notice of appeal has been filed. Thus,

Allyson's appeal violates neither the letter nor the spirit of

13
 

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HRAP Rule 54.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we believe that

Allyson complied with the requirements of HRAP Rules 54 and 4 by
filing her notice of appeal on August 3, 2001. Her notice of
appeal thus serves as an appropriate conduit through which we are
vested with jurisdiction. Having resolved the jurisdictional
matter, we next consider the merits of the arguments that have
been properly presented.

Motions to Continue

 

Allyson’s first point of error asserts that the family
court violated her due process right to be present when it denied
her Novenber 19, 1999 and February 15, 2000 motions to continue
trial. More specifically, Allyson argues that she was physically
unable to travel to Maui to attend trial due to her high-risk
pregnancy and other related impairments, and that the family
court's refusal to grant her motions effectively denied her
fundamental right to be present at every stage of her civil
proceeding. We disagree.

Tt is well settled that an accused has 2 fundamental
Hight to be present at each critical stage of the criminal
proceeding. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 (1983)
(stating that the right to personal appearance at every critical
stage of the trial constitutes @ “fundamental right{] of each
criminal defendant”); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455
(1912) (stating that @ criminal defendant's right to be present
at every stage of trial is “scarcely less important to the
accused than the right of trial itself"). Although it is

us
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generally acknowledged that civil litigants have 2 similar right
to be present, it is equally clear that the right is not
absolute." Nevertheless, the arbitrary denial of a civil

 

a gee “ » 705.24 361, 373
we, 2001) (Pin concert with courts throughout the Country, we have made clear
thet & party to a civil litigation hes s fight to'be present for and te,
participate in the trial of his/her case")? ne Yaligs 31 S:w.30. $66, $73
(enn. Gt. "App. 2000) (ile ‘generally recognize that the party litigant ie
entitied ic Be present in ail stages of the actual trial of the cases")? Gary
‘i. Onesks ings, 940 P.2a'203, 204 (Okie. 1999)
ideals behind due process endo fair trial pernit party to be present in the
Courtroom absent extrene conditions|.]"); Meson v. Moore” £26°R.b.20'993, "984s
641 Nov.5.20 195, 197 IN.Y-A.D. 1996) ("it da aziGmetie Chet, absent an
xpress waiver of unusual circumstances, 8 party toa civil action ie ontitied
telbe present during #1! stages of eriai(.]"); fussbaus v,-stelabeza, 162
Wisc26 524, S25, G16 N.¥.8:20 166, 168. (ey. Sup. A904) There Teno question
that the be process clause of the Constatucion provices every Litigent the
right to be present during every stage of the trie) of an cetion(«))7 Beams
wvst, Jossch's Hose, i Heelth Center, S36 NeWsi0 G66, C09 N.b. ise) SERS
recess anc the right to s fair trial ordinarily preciuge courts trem
Sxcloding thove parties who are able to unceratend the proceedings end to
Sssist counsel in the presentation sf their actions"); a «85
$0.20 886, 888 Ila. Ct, App. 1966). ("ike find the right cf a Gary tebe
Present at each stage of @ lousuit virtoally ssctossnce and ceresinly
Paramount to en opposing party's mere fear sf dove-taiied or hend-nede
Eestinony.°) “lepphasis in ordginel-|7 delfferien ve Farley, (13 head 523,
(Conn. Super. 1980) ("The right of a party te be present sering the course
trial ts basic to the triel process.")i Exons v. Bisehott, 217 N.We2d 850 B58
tse. 1979)" the general rule is that 2 party to a civil action has a right

 

 

    

 

  

 

      

  

 

   

 

 

go be present ot trial.) 326 NiE.20 92,
93 (Il. Ct. app. 1975) (Sceneraily, a rule thet seeures fundamental feirness
applies to all cases, civil es well ae criminal. $0 it ie with the role
thet gives & defendant the right to be present at the trial of his case")?

Burke v. Scott, 410 $.W.20 626, 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (“in addition to the

Fight to be physically and mentally able to aid in the preparation of his
trlel, © litigant also has the valuable right to be present st his triel for
Feasohs that are cbvious.”); Raper v, Berrie, $7 §.£.26 782, 764 (N.C. 2957)
(The public, and especially the parties are entitled to see\and heat whet
goesJon in the courts.”1; Eillinmon v, United Albion vein Slate co., 250 U.s.
6, 61 (1818) (We entertain no Goubt that the orderly conduct of «trie! by
jury, essential to the preper protection of the right te be neard, entities
the Parties who attend for the purpose to be present in person cr’ by counsel
at 21] proceedings from the tine the jury is inpaneled until it is discherged
after rendering the verdict”)

 

 

 

 

» see 126.8.4.34 733, 735 (Me. Ct. App. 2003)
(wmether » trial court has abused its discretion in proceeding to trlel and
jusgnent in the absence of party or his attorney must be deternined upon the
particular tacte eng circunstences in the case under considerations”)
(céntinued. ..)

 

as
 

HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

JLICATION IN WEST

 

Litigant’s right to be present implicates the due process clause
of the fifth amendnent to the United States Constitution. see
Helminski v. Averst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1965) (“We
believe that the extent of a civil litigant’s right to be present
at trial is appropriately analyzed under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment."), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 961 (1985).
rly establishes that

 

The foregoing precedent cl
Allyson had a qualified right to be present at her civil trial.
Here, however, that right was unobstructed inasmuch as the fanily
court did not preclude Allyson from attending. Rather, the court
merely denied her motion to continue, and she had no fundamental
Hight to have trial conmence at the time of her choosing.

Absent violation of a fundamental right, the relevant
inquiry is whether the family court abused its discretion insofar
as it is axiomatic that the decision to grant or deny a motion to
continue is within the discretionary realm of the trial court and
Will be upheld absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.

See C8. v, People, 83 P.3d 627, 638 (Cole. 2004) (“Because the

(continued)
(Quotation marke omitted.) (Citing Sau Fin. Comp. vs Blaix, 260 5.W.2¢ 675,
OS" the, Cen App. 1988) <1 Tits es h-0. 28 669, 690, 134 KeYs8.3d
527, $28 (W.y.ArD. 2001) ("It is now well settled that 2 litigant does not
have an absolute right to be present at al stages of « civil proceeding(«]")1
Ssbeun, 162 Misc.2d at S25, E18 N-¥.S.26 at 169 ("The defendant's right te
be present at 2 civil criai ie not sbsoivte.")? Waster of Donne K., 132 4.0.20
3004, 1004, $26 N.Y.8.26 269, 290 (N.Y.A.D. 1967) (While every litigant has @
fundanentei right, guaranteed by the coe process clase of both the Federe)
and State Constitutions, to be present at every stage of the trial... this
Fight is net apsclote in civil sctsone(.]"): i
phnscn, 642 R.2d 1114, 2126 (Pa, Soper. 1962) (While we recognise that the
Fight of 2 litigant to'be present st the tine bis case is heard is a cher!

  

        

 

 

  

 

ed

 

 

Fight... we alec are aware thot the right ie not sbeolute."); Casson v,
Hotton, 174 Azo Se1, Se2" (mG, 1961) (holding that 2 civil Iitigant “hea te

 

abeoluve right to be’ present”)

16
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#

denial of C.S.'s motion to continue did not affect her

fundamental rights, we review the district court’s order only for

abuse of discretion.”); see also discussion at Part I1.B. supra.
1, November 19, 1989 motion to continue

e, the record indicates that Allyson’s first motion

 

to continue was filed on November 19, 1999. In support of her
motion, Allyson presented the family court with the testimony of
her treating physician, Dr. Litt, indicating that Allyson
suffered from the following maladies: (1) a history of epilepsy:
(2) @ high-risk pregnancy “because of her age, the fact that
she's had two ectopic pregnancies, one (inaudible) resection, and
she’s had sone recent vaginal bleeding (inaudible) unknown
etiology”; and (3) an “increased risk for hypertension,

gestational diabetes and abnormal labors.” Dr. Litt also

 

testified that Allyson previously underwent @ surgical operation
during which the top portion of her uterus was renoved, thus
increasing the risk of rupture as her pregnancy progressed and
she increased in size. Dr. Litt ultimately reconmended that
Allyson “[s]tay off her feet as much as possible, no travel, no
exercise, no intercourse, no stress, no strain, [and] lead as
quiet a time as she can until the baby is delivered.”

By contr

 

ty Dr. Benjamin Berry, testified that Allyson
Was copable of traveling to Hawai'i during her second trimester.
Dr. Berry conducted an independent medical examination, and
reported his findings to the family court as fellows:

A. Based upon cbjective findings from her ultra sound

fexanination and review of her medical records, 1 cane te the
Sonciusion that the would be able te fly te Reweil Curing her

 

uv
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAl REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

 

second trimester without increasing risk of harm to herself or her

tisborn ehila.
O. ifd like to refer you to == I'm sorry.

 

Do you feel that physical examination would have
changed that evaluation?

O. Why de that?

Bl Edged on the cbjective evidence of the ultra sound

examination performed on Decenber 16th, there was envisble
intrauterine. pregnancy with a normal placental locstion.

There had been normal growsh from the initial ltrs
sound examination performed by Dr. Lite on November sth 1995,

‘There ues no mention of any evidence of @ separation
of the placenta which would have caused her to have any bleeding,
‘bh abnormal location of the plecents, ‘nor wae there any mention of
Gny abnormalities at far as the cervicel length. That is, if you
had shortening of the cervix, then there might be 2 possible risk
of early labor, but there wae no mention of eny cervical

 

 

Shortening:

(.. Are you snare that Allyson claims that she is et high
risk because ahels had tho ectopie pregnancies?

Re yess

G.___ Is the fact of her ectopic, her two ectopic
pregnancies, change her ability to travel in the second trimester?

Re Not in this casi

0: Woutd! you explain to the Court, please?

R. Yes. Ber first ectopic pregnancy was in the left tube

and it was treated by uhat we call a linear salpingcstosy. That
SS, they cpenes the tube and rencved the products ef conception
aocceusfully. The tube was not removes

‘ith ber second ectopic pregnancy it was in the sane
tube, but the tube was so badly damaged thet it required renovel
of the tube, what ve call  salpingectony.

and one of the procedures that is frequently perforned
‘at the sane tine is called o cornual resection of the uverss.
Which mean{s] the renoval of a snail portion of the tube as it
goes into the uterus itsel!, This is performed to help to prevent,
what we call cornval pregnancy, an actuel pregnancy, in thet
Section of the uterus with a possitie later pregnancy. 50 it’s
done as a prophylactic procedure.

‘The fact that she had an intrauterine pregnancy, which
was normal, both en Novenber the 18th end again on Decesber’ 16

 

 

 

   

 

  

  

eens that her previous history of ectopic pregnancy if of no
Consequence with this current pregnancy.

(G. De you understand Allysen to be 40 years old?

Rl Yess

@: Does that change her risk facter for travel?

lM.

0: You understand that Allyson alleges thet she has
epilepsy?

hr Yee.

@! Have you reviewed her medical records uith respect te
her alleges epilepsy?

Re” Yes.

@! —osie you tela the Court what your findings are, wos

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** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAN REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

there objective evidence of epilepsy?
4K.” “There is no docunented, objects
epileptic disorder er convulsive disoraer.

‘She gives a2 history of having had gran mal seizures,
but none of this is docunented By any physiciens

She dia have =- there is e'-~ there are reports in her
records, one of @ normal EEG, and this was back in 1966 or ‘65;
Slightly sbnormal E2¢'in 1989 unich the report or non-specific
Changes that could be sssociated with © seizure disorder. Bot
they are net S- there's no conclusive evidence that this Je
associated with @ seizure disorder

‘she gives a# history of having been on Dilantin during
the 1960s bot she discontinued this on ner own, and By ner report
has hac no seizures since that tine.

‘There were reports of what we call mild chronse
activity which, in 1989, ot the tine that she had her last known
Bes, and St that particoler tine she was experiencing sleep
deprivation and also severe stress. And by “myoclonic activity”,
we're talking about muscle Jerks which iz, sometimes sone of us
have experienced in going to sleep or with sleep deprivation that
you can get that type of Jerking activity, And this is what she
Feported:

evidence of # true

 

 

 

 

 

 

And she wae prescribed Depekote by a nevrologist at
that time, but she did net toke the medication and did ast follow
up with nie visite

So to my knowledge and to any report in the records,
which I reviewed, there are no reports of any seizure activity

‘She has an unrestricted driver's license, and she’ hi
obviously, traveled Back and forth between Eawsil and the meinlend
without being cn any type of medications. And, um, her age and
her pregnancy do not offer any sdditional rick of seizure

 

 

 

 

 

scesnity

‘G._Thank you, Would you (inaudible) Allyson te be an
accurate historian with respect of her medical nistory?

he Roe

G! thet are the factors that prompt you to reach thet
conclusion?

Ti She has failed to report, at least in the histories

fang physicals which I’ve reviewed, on various cocasions she’s
failed to report » pregnancy termination in 1962, she has foiled
to report herpes Sinpley virus infection, the initial date of
which T do not. know.

There ig no mention from the neurologist, who did her
EEG, that she had seizure activity, apparently, when she wae on

 

 

Quealuce and Placiayl which are substances, wich can be abused,
When she woe Sn ner 202.
Or hae ts Placteyl?
BR.  Flacidy2 is e sleep medication treated for insomnia.
And what are Quesludes?
AL Qussludes are iilegs! druge at this time. They were

stimulated drugs
Now, Allyson hed a laparoscopy performes by or.

Incuye?

a. Correct.

© Houle’ that have been under genera? onesthesia?

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

BO Yes

8, __Did'the disclose her epilepsy, alleged epilepsy ==
excuse me -- to Dr. Inouye at that tine?

‘Ru There ig no record in Or. Inouye’s records of any
seizure discraer.

(G.Now, Allyson's affidavite allege diarrhea end vomiting

as further preciuaing her from traveling
there documentation of thie complaint in any of

 

 

Uinavatbies?

GO. Now, Af Allyson’ ellegations of
vouiting were true, woule you expect her toe
och condition?

RS  Yes

©  Thave no further questions for this witness, Your
Honor

Jere darshes and
fteatnent for

 

 

Faced with the conflicting

 

timony of Dr. Litt and
Dr. Berry, the family court expressly subscribed to Dr. Berry's
conclusion that traveling to Hawai'i for trial would not increase
the risk of harm to either Allyson or her unborn child. Given
the family court's consideration of the testimony of both
doctors, we cannot say that the family court's crediting of Dr.
Berry's testimony was an abuse of discretion inasmuch as it is
axiomatic that reconciling conflicting testimony is beyond the
scope of appellate review. See State v, Martinez, 101 Hawai'i
332, 340, 68 P.3d 606, 614 (2003) (“But ‘[i]t is well-settled
that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon

the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence: this

is the province of the trier of fact.'") (Alteration in
original.) (Citations omitted.); State v. Mitchell, 94 Hawai'i

388, 393, 15 P.3d 314, 319 (App. 2000) ("The appellate court will
neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor interfere with the
decision of the trier of fact based on the witnesses’ credibility

or the weight of the evidence.”) (Citation omitted.).

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February 15, 2000 motion to continue
Allyson filed a second motion to continue on
November 15, 2000, which the family court orally denied at a

February 17, 2000 hearing, as follows:

Without making # detailed set of findings at this
point, 1 wosld, I guess, Just sunmarize it by saying that, in
[ooking et the status of this case, first of ali, it's not in
Gispute. The parties have stipulated that Hs. Onake is not today
Sble to fly fron Las Vegas to Maul, Hawaii because of her present
necice: condition and the fact that she is now considered to be at
B'point of Raving a high-risk pregnancy and in her seventh month,

‘Vee also coneiseres, of course, the fact that the
defencont has been able to travel earlier from Las Vegas to Mavi,
Howes, at least up to or on or Before the 20th of January of this
Jeet which was the previous date thet wae set for trial and she
AisTnot do se. “That wes the finding of (the pretrial judge) at
the Cine e's nearing held sa cr abaut the 20th. 2 can't renenber
the exact cate, but I’m really bound by it, but, T think, by that
Eines at Jeast up to that point, she was able to travel and could
have participated in 9 trie) here on Maui.

P'think talso have to consider the fact that the
Gefendant has been, I guess, afforded an opportunity to provide
festincnial evidence by way’ of deposition, either « regular
Sepssieion cf evens video tape deposition, but never the less, &
Sepesition, prior to the trial date back in December and since
hens up until, 1 guess, teaay, really, but she has not done so.

Ang 1 think T have also coneicered and locked at the
record in this case, and in looking at ner responses to some of
the discovery mach earlier on in the year 199%, remarketly,
think, #8 [Clarence's counsel] has pointed cut in her menorendun,
Bae"itr2'sn the record in this case, really, since some of the
things go back a way, she just can't renenber a whole lot about
Sone ef what 1 coneider to bey material
[Stues of fact here st triel.| So I don’t know, even if she were
presents te what extent she would in fact be able to participate
Rossel!’ by giving testimony. I recognize there are other reasons
why 8 party needs to be present. But that ise factor that is,
tito; P'thlaks wertay ef/ recognition. And sy conclusion thet the
Triel should proceed se in recognition of the fact that both
parties, the pleintitf and the gefendont, do have due process
Fights to participste in their civil trial, which this-is. And,
[oeking st'the rights of both the plaintiff ond the defendant

ind. pricr te today, this is © case that J have hed to,

thy, Balance those rights. And what I have concluded 4
Chet in balancing those rights, the prejudice to Mrs. Onaka by not
being present here cn basi during the trial, being able to aseist
her lenyere in perticipeting in that trial, ‘being eble to, ins
Sense, confront any of the witnesses that would be called’ én th:
EGeil ‘case, which dea slightly ifferent right then & cefendant
Soa criminal case would have, Put, never the less, we recognize
that parties do have the Fight to be present and confront the

 

 

   

   

 

 

  

 

 

 

    

 

 

 

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** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

evidence in # civil proceeding, All of these rights at this tine
are outweighed by the rights of the plaintif® to proceed to have
this matter resolved at this tine. And in calencing those rights
B, also, at this tine, find there is a way to mitigate the
prejugice to the defendant, and in doing so 1 woole order that she
be allowed to participate, if she chooses to do so, in
consultation with her attorneys, by giving s deposition as
Scheduled and noticed by her attorneys, not by spposing attorneys,
niet by opposing counsel, provided that ‘opposing counse: receive
Rotice ang are sllowed to be present

Te would be Helpful to ne ifs depesition it so
scheduled that it be 2 vides deposition since the parties have
indicated to ne the credibility is an issue. nd T think
credibility is, to sone extent, at least a little better on
viseo tape than it is by written transcript. And the right £0
Schedule # deposition for Mrs, Onaka would be a right that 1 would
extend to her at any tine during this trial -- we're scheduled to
complete this trisi next week -- but 1 would even allow a
Fessonable period of tine st the conclusion of the evidentiary
portion of the trisi to schedule s deposition because I don't
Expect her counsel to, between now and whenever we finish next
Week, get up to Vegas, fut T would give time after the concivsion
Of trial next week to do that’ And, in talking about a reasonable
Eine, I would Say a period of at least up to 10 days, 1 think,
would be"reasonable.. If you can convince me thet more tine <¢
hhecessary, then 1 would consider it- But I intend to bring the
evidentiaty portion of this case toa conclusion as socn a©
Possible so that we can get a ruling out alse as soon es possible.

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

As noted by the family court, the parties stipulated
that Allyson was no longer able to fly to Maui to attend trial
due to her medical condition. A high-risk pregnancy would
ordinarily constitute @ legitimate basis for a continuance if it
precluded a party from attending or participating in trial. To
that end, in Gaspar v. Kassm, 493 F.2d 964, 969 (34 Cir. 1974),
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated as follows:

It 4s customary to grant @ continuance on the ground of illness of

a party. We conclude that Facen's testimony was necessary for the

defense of his case, that the granting cf @ continuance would not

have unduly prejudiced the other parties, eng that the continuance
notion was not motivated by procrastination, bad planning or bea
faith oh the part cf Kessn or his counsel, It Sethe lew that

Where none of the foregcing appear, the denial of a continvance
for ilinces Le abuse of discrets

 

 

    

 

22
 

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Other courts are generally in accord."* Nevertheless, we cannot
conclude that the family court abused its discretion inasmuch as
the record indicates that Allyson falsely exaggerated the
incapacitating effects of her pregnancy. Allyson must be
precluded from perpetuating @ fraud upon the court.

lihsle arguing Allyson’s February 15, 2000 motion to
continue, Allyson’s attorney represented to the family court as
follows:

So, the medica) question is that she is pre

travel, she cannct be subjected to any acre

anything for the nest © gneil ner Gelivery, she can't, besicelly,

So anything except renain sn bed on her left side, getting up only,
ke go to the bathroom, and for meals, that's it.

 

 

Despite the foregoing representation and the fact that she indeed

* See Lathan v, Crafters, ince, 492 F.2d 913, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1974)
[concluding thet the trial court abused its discretion where, among other
things, the motion for continuance uae based upen “the intervening éllnese of
a party” and the party's vestinony was important to the case); Davie vy
nes, 378° F.26 101, 102 (10th Cir. 1967) ("We spouse
Observe thet iiiness of a litigant severe enough to prevent hin from appearing
in court 1s always a lecitinate ground for asking for s continuance. Even
hen the judge has doubts about the existence cf the clained iliness, the
movant should be afforded an opportunity to substantiate his claim by proper
proof. well F118 F.24 396, 396-99 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(although the granting of & continuance or of notions for vacation of
juconent and for new trial sre sddresses to the discretion of the trial court,
thet discretion mist be exercised in the interest of justice. Where, 08 he
appellant war ill snd was the most materiel witness in support of her om

‘ee conclude that the sotione should heve been granted.”). (Footnotes
enitted.)) Harrah v, orgarshau, 69 F.26 863, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ("If there
were anjthing in this recora challenging the good faith of the motion for
Continuance, ‘the profersienal ability or character or truthfulness cf the
Physicians who nade affidavit to the inability ef Dunning to appear, oF even
Ee’there were « showing that continuance would have resulted in serious loss
to the other parties, we should not now hesitate to sustain the action of the
ewer court: Bot here we are confronted with @ cate in which, se appears, the
pleinti#! was hie only witness and uae so seriously il] that his appearance in
Eoare noord prosebly have zesuited in nie ceath:’ Insiecing opon e trial
ae clestences must necessariiy have resultea in prejuaice ¢0 Sonning’

   

 

 

 

 

  

 

   

 

 

   

 

Highte:s], gebradented, 68 F.2a 668 (1937) 262 F. 251, 252
(cele. 19997 Bare ve Easton, 212 Now, 12, 102-79" (Neb- 1920) 7 Borman v.
Geib, 221 F.'100¢, 100e-07 (Okla. 1973); Howse v. Cardizal, 122 Nee. tT, 32

(Ing, Ce. App. 1918)) Mathews v, Wilieushby, 17 SE, 620, €20 (ca, ies0i.
23
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

Gid not attend trial, Allyson testified before the United States
District Court for the District of Utah that she moved from Las
Vegas, Nevada to Cedar City, Utah on February 28, 2000." Her
relocation fell within the precise period of time during which
she claimed that she was essentially bed-ridden.

Allyson was also extended the courtesy of a post-trial
deposition on March 6, 2000 to provide her with an opportunity to
provide testimony, de bene esse. However, Allyson’s attorney
cancelled the March 6, 2000 post-trial deposition as follows:

Portuant to ay conversations today with Ms. Onaks and her
ing pnyeician, Richard Lite, t.0., Me. Onaka iil got be able

ve her viseotsped testimony’ taken’ on Harch €, 2000 in Lss
Nevada beceuse of the cengers such = procedure would create

       

Vega:
fer NS. Gnaka and her Baby.

 

(Emphasis in original.) She thus continued te rely upon her
alleged incepacity while conveniently failing to disclose the
fact of her travel -- another activity that she claimed would
pose an unacceptable risk of harm to her and her unborn child.
Allyson’s falsity exposed, we perceive no abuse of
Giscretion insofar as we cannot conclude that the family court
“clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or

principles of lew or practice to the substantial detriment of a

 

% Allyson does not dispute thet che traveled from Nevada to Utah.
Indeed, she does not even mention that fact in esther ber opening cr reply
briefs. “The erly conceivebiy related argument cen be found in ner reply
brief, which asserts that "[tJhe many references to matters that allegedly
occurred in Aliyson's Eankruptcy case should be struck as that case 1s not
part ef the record.” That is cinply e misstatement of the law, inasmuch as it
[e'Settied that we ay take Judicial notice of the record in a related case.
See State v. Kido, 109 Hawai'i «58, 661 n.7, 128 F-38240, 344 1-7 (2006)
Although the fact of Kide'e re-cenviction does not appear in the record en
appesi in the instant case, this court may take Judicial notice of the records
ane fizee in cr. Ne. 01-1"0265.")<

   

 

      

 

24
 

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“OR PUBLICATION IN WES1

party litigant.” Keahole Def, Coalition, Inc., 110 Hawai'i at
436, 134 P.36 at 602.
¢. Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28 (b) (4) (434)
We next take a moment to comment on the failure of the
opening brief to comply with HRAP Rule 28(b) (4) (144).
Preliminarily, we note that

sitihe rule in this suriedietion . . . prohibits an
appellant. from complaining for the first tine on appeal of error
COuhich he hes acguiecced or to which he failed to object.”
Skuhars ve groigs, si Haw. 253, 255, 456 P.zd 226, 230 (1965)
citations oniteed); gs alsa #RS € 641-2 (2004) (“The appellate
Gourt - "need not consider @ point that was not presented in
Eke triai court in an sppropriete asnner."); Craft 9, Peebles, 76
Hawai'i 267, 20¢, 693 Poze 196, 145 (1985); Hawaid Rules of
Procedure (HKAP) Rule 28(b) (4) (143) (2004) (noting that
Ghappeiient’s opening Brief shall state “where in the record the
aiieges error Met objected to or the manner in which the alleged
Error wos brought te the attention of the court or agency.")

 

 

 

 

‘There are sound reasons for the rule. It is unfeir to the
trial court to reverse on @ ground that no one even
Soggested might be error. Iv is unfair to the opposing
party, whe might nave net the argument not made below.
Flneliyr ie dees not comport with the concept of erderly and
cificiane method of soministration of justice

 

Kawmate Farms, inc. v United keri Prods,, 66 Hawai" 214, 248,
H4e Peid i088, 1085 11997} teitation omatted) «

Querubin v. Thronas, 107 Hawai'i 48, 61 n.5, 109 P.3d 689, 702
n.5 (2005) (ellipses in original) (citation omitted).

Commensurate with the duty to object is the duty to
identify where in the record that objection occurred. To thet
end, HRAP Rule 28(b) (4) (144) (2002) requires that “[e]ach point
shall state . . . where in the record the alleged error was
objected to or the manner in which the alleged error was brought
to the attention of the court or agency.” Here, Allyson has

failed to indicate where in the record she objected to the
 

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actions of the family court from which she now takes exception.
The record before this court contains over seven thousand pages,
contained within twenty-eight volumes. We have repeatedly warned
that an appellate court will not sift through a voluminous
record, Kienker v, Bauer, 110 Hawai'i 97, 104 n.12, 129 P.3d
122, 1132 n.12 (2006) ("The appellate courte are not obligated
to search the record to crystallize the parties’ arguments.”);
Lanaico., Inc. v. Land Use Comm'n, 105 Hawai'i 296, 309 n.31, 97
P.3d 372, 385 n.32 (2004) (“This court is not obligated to sift
through the voluminous record to verify an appellant's
inadequately documented contentions.”); Mivamoto v. Lum, 104
Hawai'i 1, 11 n.14, 84 P.3d 509, $19 n.14 (2004) ("None of the
parties direct us to the April 1, 1999 report's location in the

cord on appeal, and we will not sift through ten volumes of

 

records to find the report.”), Additionally, we have stated that
“{clounsel has no right to cast upon the court the burden of
Searching through a voluminous record to find the ground of an
ebjection. . . . It is counsel’s duty to cite accurately the
portions of the record supporting counsel's position.” Int'l
Bhd, of Elec. Workers, Local 1357 v. Howai‘ian Tel. Cox, 68 Haw.
316, 323 n.7, 723 P.26 943, 950 n.7 (1986).

Accordingly, we decline to canvas the record to verity
whether Allyson appropriately preserved her points of error on
appeal by making @ timely objection to the challenged actions,

This defect is particularly unacceptable considering the fact that

eviously struck Allyscn's opening brief for feiling te comply with HRAP
(a) ang 321b) (2002). We specificslly ordered Her to filed an anended

opening brief “that fully complies mith the roles of appellate procedure.”

  

      

 

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and her appellate argunents are deemed waived. See HRAP Rule
28 (b) (4) (“Points not presented in accordance with this section
will be disregarded.”)
Iv. concnusion
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that
Allyson’s points of error are either without merit or have been

waived. Therefore, we affirm the orders appealed from.

on the briefs:

Terry L. Day for
defendant -appellant

Bllyson Lesli Onaka 4
Ufiiem
Joy Yanagida
for plaintiff-appelles -
Clarence Shizuo Onaka here Pretharnaser
Rieu OS nNudeLLLy Cure

a

Cane, Detéye th +

 

20