Title: Downs v. Dugger

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

514 So. 2d 1069 (1987)
Ernest Charles DOWNS, Petitioner,
v.
Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent.
No. 71100.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 9, 1987.
Rehearing Denied November 23, 1987.
*1070 Maurice N. Nessen and Stephen N. Young of Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel, New York City, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Doran and Elizabeth Masters, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Ernest Charles Downs, under sentence of death and the governor's death warrant, petitions this Court for extraordinary relief, writ of habeas corpus and stay of execution. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (7) & (9), Fla. Const. We grant the writ, stay the governor's warrant, vacate Downs' sentence of death, and remand for a new sentencing proceeding that complies with Hitchcock v. Dugger, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987), before a jury.
In April 1977, John Barfield[1] offered Downs $5,000 to kill a Jacksonville bank executive, Forrest Jerry Harris, Jr.[2] Downs in turn enlisted the assistance of Larry Johnson, the state's star witness at the trial below. According to Johnson's immunized testimony, Downs gunned the victim down at a clandestine location while Johnson passively looked on. Hidden in a palmetto thicket, the body was not discovered for some months, and then only because Johnson arranged for a grant of total immunity in return for information and his testimony.
This Court rejected numerous claims of error filed by Downs and his counsel on direct appeal. Downs v. State, 386 So. 2d 788 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976, 101 S. Ct. 387, 66 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1980). We later rejected a collateral attack under Rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Downs v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1984), and an initial petition for habeas relief. Downs v. Wainwright, 476 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1985).
We now find that a substantial change in the law has occurred that requires us to reconsider issues first raised on direct appeal and then in Downs' prior collateral challenges. Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hitchcock, which examined Florida's death penalty statute in light of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982). Lockett held that the sentencer in a capital trial may
438 U.S.  at 604-05, 98 S. Ct.  at 2964-65, (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Eddings held that
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.  at 113-15, 102 S. Ct.  at 876-77 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
Hitchcock rejected a prior line of cases issued by this Court, which had held that the mere opportunity to present nonstatutory mitigating evidence was sufficient to meet Lockett requirements. Under this "mere presentation" standard, we routinely declined to consider whether the judge or jury actually weighed the evidence in question. A consideration of the history behind Hitchcock illuminates this Court's prior standard of review and the Supreme Court's reaction to it.
In Hitchcock's collateral challenge under Rule 3.850, this Court expressly had rejected his claim that a mere presentation standard was insufficient to meet Lockett:
Hitchcock v. State, 432 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla. 1983) (McDonald & Overton, JJ., concurring with opinion). This statement elaborated upon this Court's earlier pronouncement on direct appeal that Hitchcock
Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960, 103 S. Ct. 274, 74 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1982). With this comment, we thus rejected Hitchcock's claim of a Lockett violation based on our conclusion that a judge and jury "consider" mitigating evidence by receiving it.
On review, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded by our reasoning. It held that the record in Hitchcock reflected a Lockett violation:
107 S. Ct.  at 1824 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further noted that the trial judge, in imposing sentence, expressly weighed only those mitigating factors enumerated in the death penalty statute. Id.
We thus can think of no clearer rejection of the "mere presentation" standard reflected in the prior opinions of this Court, and conclude that this standard no longer can be considered controlling law. Under Hitchcock, the mere opportunity to present nonstatutory mitigating evidence does not meet constitutional requirements if the judge believes, or the jury is led to believe, that some of that evidence may not be weighed during the formulation of an advisory opinion or during sentencing. As we recently have stated,
Riley v. Wainwright, No. 69,563 (Fla.Sept. 3, 1987), slip op. at 7 (footnote omitted). Accord Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1987) (consolidated cases).
Turning now to the facts of this case, we find that the factual situation presented by Hitchcock also exists here in substantially identical form. The trial court, just as in Hitchcock, instructed the jury that they must determine
We find this language substantially similar to the improper instruction given the jury in Hitchcock. Moreover, we note that the prosecuting attorney in this case exacerbated the Lockett error:
The judge further reinforced the impression already laid in jurors minds by providing them with a copy of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors for use during their deliberations:
These instructions to the jury unconstitutionally restricted the review of nonstatutory mitigating evidence, in violation of Hitchcock and Lockett.
The state argues that even if we find error, it was harmless. However, the jury in this case clearly was troubled by potential mitigating evidence, as reflected in a question posed to the judge regarding a firearms charge of which Downs stood accused:
This Court previously has recognized as mitigating the fact that an accomplice in the crime in question, who was of equal or greater culpability, received a lesser sentence than the accused. E.g., Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1980); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975). The question posed by the jury plainly shows that they considered that Downs' accomplice, Johnson, may have been of equal or greater guilt. This, along with other mitigating evidence that was presented, precludes any finding of harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.
Thus, in light of the requirements established by the United States Supreme Court in Hitchcock, we grant the writ, stay the governor's warrant, and vacate Downs' sentence of death, remanding for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury that complies with Hitchcock.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, J., concurs in result only.
[1]  A codefendant in this cause, Barfield was tried separately and sentenced to death despite a jury recommendation of life in prison. This Court subsequently held that the jury override was improper, and reduced the penalty to life. Barfield v. State, 402 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1981).
[2]  This contract killing was part of a conspiracy that included at least four other men. Two, Larry Johnson and Huey Austin Palmer, received complete immunity from prosecution or had all charges dropped. Another, Gerry Ralph Sapp, accepted a five-year plea bargain. The last, Ron Garelick, died when his private plane crashed only two days after the victim's body was discovered.