Title: In re Estate of Wellman

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the 
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are 
subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior 
to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, 
because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to 
the Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered 
the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following 
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of 
Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final 
action by the Court. 
 
          Nos. 80182, 80184, 80246 cons.--Agenda 21--May 1996. 
      In re ESTATE OF JOHN F. WELLMAN (Samuel H. Young, Appellant; 
                      Patrick T. Murphy, Appellee). 
                     Opinion filed October 18, 1996. 
 
     JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court: 
     These consolidated appeals arise out of a series of events 
during the last years in the life of John Wellman. He executed a 
durable power of attorney, in which he appointed his attorney, 
Samuel Young, as his agent. Wellman also established joint 
tenancies with Young in several accounts. The circuit court of Cook 
County: adjudicated Wellman mentally disabled and appointed Patrick 
Murphy, the public guardian of Cook County, as Wellman's plenary 
guardian; restored Wellman to competency and discharged Murphy; and 
granted Murphy leave to appeal as Wellman's plenary guardian. 
Wellman died. Lastly, the trial court granted the fee petition of 
Wellman's guardian ad litem. 
     In an unpublished order (Nos. 1--90--3008, 1--90--3011, 1--91- 
-2055, 1--92--1983 cons. (unpublished order under Supreme Court 
Rule 23)), the appellate court: held that Murphy had standing to 
appeal, severed the joint tenancies, upheld the fee award to 
Wellman's guardian ad litem, and held that Wellman's death rendered 
moot the parties' remaining issues on appeal. We allowed leave to 
appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We now reverse the appellate 
court's severance of the Wellman-Young joint tenancies, and affirm 
the appellate court's upholding of the guardian ad litem's fee 
award and dismissal of the remaining issues. 
 
                                BACKGROUND 
     The record contains the following facts that are pertinent to 
our disposition of the issues raised on appeal. John Wellman was 
born in 1900. A certified public accountant, he was a self-employed 
businessman and stock trader during his lifetime. By early 1990, he 
had accumulated assets totalling approximately $850,000, of which 
$650,000 were invested in United States Treasury bills, savings and 
checking accounts, and stock. 
     Samuel Young was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1948. In 
1986, Wellman first employed Young concerning the probate of an 
estate. Wellman was the executor of the estate; he had been a joint 
tenant with the testator in certain accounts. Wellman continued 
using Young's services concerning, inter alia, tax preparation, 
real estate matters, and the management of Wellman's property. 
     In a letter to Young dated March 21, 1988, Wellman stated in 
writing what he had previously told Young on "many occasions." 
Wellman, having no family, asked for Young's assistance in handling 
his financial affairs. Wellman also wanted Young to look after his 
affairs if he should become incapacitated. On December 27, 1988, 
Wellman executed a durable power of attorney in which he appointed 
Young as his agent. See generally 755 ILCS 45/1--1 et seq. (West 
1992). Wellman granted Young broad authority to act for him whether 
competent or incompetent. 
     On December 1, 1989, Wellman and Young exchanged two letters. 
The first letter, from Wellman to Young, confirmed: Wellman's 
previous request for Young to assist him in managing his property, 
Young's agreement to provide such assistance, and, in consideration 
thereof, Wellman's promise to place his property in joint tenancy 
with Young with right of survivorship. Also, during Wellman's life, 
all of the assets and income would be used for Wellman. 
     The second letter, from Young to Wellman, acknowledged: 
Wellman's decision to make Young his "partner" in managing his 
property, Wellman's decision to place his property in joint tenancy 
with Young to avoid probate, Young's agreement to look after 
Wellman and to see that Wellman had medical and health care, 
Young's agreement not to spend or use Wellman's property for any 
purpose other than for Wellman's benefit, and Wellman's power to 
revoke the joint tenancies at any time and to make gifts to others 
at his death. 
     On December 7, 1989, Wellman and Young visited the Northern 
Trust Bank in Chicago. They spoke to Paul Larson, who had been 
Wellman's personal banker since 1984. Wellman and Young instructed 
Larson to place Wellman's savings and checking accounts in joint 
tenancy. Larson refused. Eventually, Wellman and Young closed the 
account, totalling $188,000, but returned when the bank agreed to 
the Wellman-Young joint accounts. 
     After visiting the Northern Trust Bank, Wellman and Young went 
to the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago. They spoke to Andrew 
Vlahos, who had served Wellman since 1985. They discussed Wellman's 
United States Treasury Direct Account and joint tenancy with Young. 
On January 30, 1990, the account was placed in the name of Wellman 
and Young in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. 
     In December 1989, Vlahos contacted Assistant Illinois Attorney 
General Ann Parisi. Vlahos told Parisi that Young possibly was 
exploiting Wellman. On December 21, 1989, Parisi visited Wellman to 
investigate whether any laws had been violated and whether Wellman 
had been financially exploited in any way. 
     On January 7, 1990, the Illinois Attorney General's office 
referred the matter to the Cook County public guardian's office to 
investigate whether Wellman needed a guardian. On March 30, 1990, 
Murphy petitioned the trial court to be appointed plenary guardian 
of Wellman's person and estate. On April 3, 1990, the trial court 
appointed Sandra Thiel as Wellman's guardian ad litem. On May 8, 
1990, at the close of a hearing, the trial court adjudicated 
Wellman mentally disabled and appointed Murphy plenary guardian of 
Wellman's person and estate. On May 24, 1990, the trial court, 
granting Murphy's petition, entered an order freezing the Wellman- 
Young joint accounts at the Northern Trust Bank. 
     On June 13, 1990, Young petitioned the trial court to vacate 
the appointment of the plenary guardian for Wellman. In a separate 
filing, Young petitioned the court to vacate the order freezing the 
bank accounts. On June 14, 1990, Wellman's attorney, Robert 
Downing, petitioned the trial court to restore Wellman to 
competency and discharge Murphy and Thiel, and to vacate the order 
freezing the bank accounts. Also, on June 24, 1990, Downing moved 
to vacate the May 8, 1990, guardianship order specifically because 
it violated Wellman's due process rights and the durable power of 
attorney. 
     On July 13, 1990, Murphy moved to dismiss Young's petition to 
vacate the appointment of a plenary guardian for Wellman. In a 
separate filing, Murphy moved to dismiss Downing's petition to 
restore Wellman. Murphy also filed answers to Young's and Downing's 
petitions. On July 24, 1990, Murphy petitioned the trial court to: 
(1) revoke the durable power of attorney in which Wellman appointed 
Young as his agent, and (2) sever all of the joint tenancy 
accounts. 
     On September 12, 1990, Murphy moved for summary judgment on 
Young's and Downing's petitions to vacate the guardianship order. 
On September 19, Young cross-moved for summary judgment on his 
petition. 
     In orders entered on October 16 and 17, 1990, the trial court 
granted Murphy's motion for summary judgment and denied Young's and 
Downing's petitions on most issues. On October 19, 1990, Downing 
(Docket No. 1--90--3008) and Young (Docket No. 1--90--3011) each 
appealed from the trial court's denial of their respective 
petitions. 
     From January 7 through March 28, 1991, the trial court held 
hearings on Murphy's July 24, 1990, petition to revoke the durable 
power of attorney and sever the joint tenancies. On May 8 through 
10, 1991, the court held hearings on Downing's June 14, 1990, 
petition to restore Wellman. 
     On June 3, 1991, the trial court entered a "final judgment 
order" dismissing Murphy's petition and granting Downing's peti- 
tion. The court terminated the adjudication of mental disability, 
restoring Wellman to competency. The court also vacated its order 
freezing the Northern Trust Bank accounts. 
     On June 12, 1991, Murphy filed in the trial court a "Motion 
for Leave to Appeal" to the appellate court. In the motion, Murphy 
acknowledged that by terminating the adjudication of mental 
disability, the trial court restored Wellman to competency and 
discharged Murphy as his guardian. Murphy further stated: 
               "3. That having been discharged as guardian of the 
          estate and person of John F. Wellman, the Public Guardian 
          has no standing to act on behalf of the estate in any 
          respect including appeal of the June 3, 1991, final 
          judgment order. 
               4. That it would be a circumvention of the Illinois 
          Supreme Court Rules and clearly against their spirit and 
          intent to deny the estate any opportunity to appeal from 
          this final judgment order. 
               5. That there is no other party available to take an 
          appeal of such order other than the Public Guardian of 
          Cook County. 
               6. That the Public Guardian will not seek any fees 
          from the estate of John F. Wellman for any work on the 
          appeal. 
               WHEREFORE, the Public Guardian of Cook County 
          respectfully requests leave of this court to prosecute an 
          appeal, on behalf of the estate of John F. Wellman, of 
          this court's final judgment order entered on June 3, 
          1991." 
The trial court entered an order stating in pertinent part that 
Murphy, as Wellman's plenary guardian of Wellman's estate, was 
granted leave to appeal from the final judgment order "on behalf of 
the estate." 
     On June 28, 1991, Murphy filed his notice of appeal in the 
appellate court (Docket No. 1--91--2055). Murphy asked the appel- 
late court to reverse the trial court's final judgment order and 
empower the guardian to revoke the agency agreement between Wellman 
and Young, reverse the trial court's restoration of Wellman, hold 
that the Young-Wellman joint tenancies are null and void, and order 
all accounts to revert back to the sole ownership of Wellman. 
     On July 3, 1991, Murphy filed in the trial court a first and 
final account of Wellman's estate. Murphy distributed to Young 
$955.23, which was the balance of the cash receipts and disburse- 
ments that Murphy handled during the guardianship. The trial court 
approved the final account, formally discharged Murphy as plenary 
guardian of the person and estate of Wellman, and closed the 
estate. 
     On August 17, 1991, Wellman died. Around August 28, Young 
formally reported Wellman's death to the trial and appellate 
courts, Downing, and Murphy. On October 2, 1991, Wellman's will was 
admitted to probate and Young was appointed executor. 
     On January 30, 1992, Thiel, Wellman's guardian ad litem, 
petitioned the trial court for a fee award of $4,843 to "be paid 
from the funds" of Wellman. Young moved to dismiss. On April 15, 
1992, the trial court denied Young's motion to dismiss and awarded 
Thiel fees in the amount requested. Young appealed from the fee 
award (Docket No. 1--92--1983). 
     The appellate court consolidated the four separate appeals. On 
February 17, 1993, the court heard oral argument and, on March 15, 
1995, issued an unpublished order (134 Ill. 2d R. 23). The court 
held that Wellman's death rendered moot most of the issues raised 
on appeal. However, the appellate court held that Murphy's dis- 
charge as Wellman's plenary guardian, or Wellman's subsequent 
death, did not deprive Murphy of standing to appeal from the denial 
of his petition to sever the joint tenancies. The appellate court 
then reversed the trial court and severed the joint tenancies. The 
court also upheld the fee award to Thiel. Young, Downing, and 
Murphy all appeal. 
 
                                DISCUSSION 
     Before this court, Downing and Young continue their piecemeal 
appellate litigation style. In cause No. 80182, Downing appeals 
from the appellate court's severance of the joint tenancies. In 
cause No. 80184, Young appeals from the trial court's initial 
adjudication of Wellman as mentally disabled, and the appellate 
court's severance of the joint tenancies. Murphy, responding in 
these causes, cross-appeals from the trial court's restoration of 
Wellman. In cause No. 80246, Young appeals from the appellate 
court's judgment upholding the trial court's fee award to Thiel. We 
consolidated these causes for review. 
 
                Murphy's Standing to Appeal Joint Tenancies 
     Young and Downing contend that the appellate court erred in 
severing the Wellman-Young joint tenancies. Each initially argues 
that Murphy lacked standing to appeal from the denial of his 
petition to sever the joint tenancies. 
     The doctrine of standing requires that a party, either in an 
individual or representative capacity, have a real interest in the 
action brought and in its outcome. The purpose of the doctrine is 
to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies 
and not abstract questions or moot issues. In re Marriage of 
Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1989); see 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
Parties 30, 31 (1987). Standing "is not simply a procedural 
technicality" (59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 30, at 416 (1987)), but 
rather is an aspect or a component of justiciability. In re Estate 
of Burgeson,  125 Ill. 2d 477 , 485 (1988); Weihl v. Dixon, 56 Ill. 
App. 3d 251, 253 (1977). 
     The essence of the inquiry regarding standing is whether the 
litigant, either in an individual or representative capacity, is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of a dispute or a 
particular issue. Helmig v. John F. Kennedy Community Consolidated 
School District No. 129, 241 Ill. App. 3d 653, 658 (1993). This 
court has repeatedly held that standing requires some injury in 
fact to a legally recognized interest. Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d  at 
280 (and cases cited therein). 
     We agree with Young and Downing that Murphy lacked standing to 
appeal from the denial of his petition to sever the Wellman-Young 
joint tenancies. We note that our conclusion is based on 
established guardianship principles, and that Murphy, as a public 
guardian, "has all the powers and duties of any other guardian 
appointed under the Probate Act of 1975." Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d  at 
486. The occurrence of two events deprived Murphy of standing. 
First, the trial court restored Wellman to competency and dis- 
charged Murphy. Second, Wellman died. 755 ILCS 5/24--12 (West 
1992). 
 
                           Wellman's Restoration 
     Murphy himself acknowledged to the trial court in his motion 
for leave to appeal that the court restored Wellman and discharged 
Murphy. He also admitted that, as a result, he had "no standing to 
act on behalf of the estate in any respect including appeal of the 
June 3, 1991, final judgment order." 
     However, the trial court granted Murphy leave to appeal "on 
behalf of the estate." The appellate court held that Murphy had 
standing to appeal, reasoning: 
               "We first find that the Public Guardian had standing 
          to appeal the denial of his petition to sever the joint 
          tenancies. The Public Guardian had an interest in seeking 
          that relief because the Public Guardian had been 
          appointed plenary guardian of Wellman and because he 
          believed that his ward was incapable of handling his own 
          affairs. The discharge of the Public Guardian did not 
          deprive the Public Guardian of the ability to appeal an 
          adverse ruling." 
     This reasoning was erroneous. Murphy correctly acknowledged 
that Wellman's restoration deprived him of standing to appeal. The 
Probate Act of 1975 does not provide for the automatic termination 
of a guardianship for a disabled ward as in the case of a 
guardianship for a minor ward who reaches the age of majority (see 
755 ILCS 5/11--14.1 (West 1992)). Rather, the Act requires the 
trial court to hold a hearing on the petition of the ward, someone 
on the ward's behalf, or on the court's own motion, to revoke or 
modify the guardianship. 755 ILCS 5/11a--20, 11a--21 (West 1992). 
At the close of the hearing, the court may: "(1) dismiss the 
petition; (2) terminate the adjudication of disability; (3) revoke 
the letters of guardianship of the estate or person, or both; (4) 
modify the duties of the guardian; and (5) make any other order 
which the court deems appropriate and in the interests of the 
ward." 755 ILCS 5/11a--21(c) (West 1992). 
     In Hoff v. Meirink,  12 Ill. 2d 108 , 111 (1957), this court 
stated: 
               "While it is clear that a restoration to competency 
          does not ipso facto terminate the office of the 
          conservator, it by no means follows that the probate 
          court can continue to exercise its supervisory power over 
          the property of the ward after the ward has been restored 
          to competency and until the conservator's office 
          terminates. Indeed, serious constitutional questions 
          would be presented by a statute that provided for the 
          exercise of supervisory power after the ward's disability 
          had been removed. We find no such provision in the 
          Probate Act." 
The appellate court has correctly read Hoff as "authority for the 
general proposition that a restored ward becomes reinvested with 
the rights he lost when adjudicated an incompetent." In re Estate 
of Hayden, 105 Ill. App. 3d 60, 65 (1982). Upon the restoration of 
a mentally disabled ward, the ward has the right to be put in 
possession of his or her property, and to ask the court to order 
the guardian to deliver to the ward all of the ward's money and 
property that the guardian has, or the money and property to which 
the ward is entitled. In re Estate of Berger, 166 Ill. App. 3d 
1045, 1055 (1987). 
     Following the restoration of a ward, the now-competent former 
ward is capable of representing, and has the right to represent, 
his or her own interests. Thus, the guardian no longer has standing 
to represent in court the interests of the former ward. Hayden, 105 
Ill. App. 3d at 63-66. 
     Further, we agree with long-established authority that upon a 
ward's restoration, the guardian lacks standing to appeal 
therefrom. In re Guardianship of Love, 19 Ohio St. 2d 111, 249 N.E.2d 794 (1969) (and cases cited therein); see, contra, Cobb v. 
South Carolina National Bank, 210 S.C. 533, 43 S.E.2d 465 (1947). 
Courts reason that the guardian lacks a legally sufficient interest 
in the ward's restoration to allow the guardian to contest it on 
appeal. The guardian " `is simply a trustee and can have no 
interest in this regard adverse to the recovery of sanity by the 
ward.' " Love, 19 Ohio St. 2d at 114-15, 249 N.E.2d  at 796, quoting 
Ensign v. Flaxon, 224 Mass. 145, 150, 112 N.E. 948, 950 (1916). 
     This reasoning is quite settled in Illinois. The appointment 
of a guardian creates the relation of trustee and beneficiary 
between the guardian and the ward. The estate becomes a trust fund 
for the ward's support. Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542, 545 (1944). 
The guardian only acts as the hand of the court and is at all times 
subject to the court's direction in the manner in which the 
guardian provides for the care and support of the disabled person. 
In re Estate of Nelson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1993). 
     Also, guardianship proceedings are not, strictly speaking, 
adversarial. The trial court protects the disabled person as its 
ward, vigilantly guarding the ward's property and viewing the ward 
as a favored person in the eyes of the law. The court functions in 
a central role, which permits it to oversee and control all aspects 
of the management and protection of the disabled person's estate. 
The court controls the ward's person and estate, and directs the 
guardian's care, management, and investment of the estate. Berger, 
166 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The sole issue facing the trial court in 
a restoration proceeding is the mental condition and the best 
interests of the ward. See Love, 19 Ohio St. 2d at 114, 249 N.E.2d  
at 795. Thus, based on the foregoing principles, and contrary to 
the appellate court's reasoning, the trial court's restoration of 
Wellman cannot be considered to be such an "adverse ruling" to 
Murphy as to allow him to appeal therefrom. 
     We note that Murphy characterizes the final judgment order as 
only partially restoring Wellman. Thus, according to Murphy, his 
relationship to Wellman should not have ended, providing him with 
standing to appeal. Murphy points to the final judgment order, in 
which the trial court found "that John F. Wellman [was] a partially 
disabled person who lacks some but not all of the capacity as 
specified in [755 ILCS 5/11a--3 (West 1992)] and, therefore, is 
entitled to the appointment of a limited guardian of the person and 
estate." The court also found that Wellman lacked the "capacity to 
perform the tasks necessary for the routine care and safety of his 
person or for the tasks incidental to the paying of bills, writing 
checks, making purchases and managing his estate at that level of 
performance." 
     However, the trial court terminated the adjudication of mental 
disability. In addition to the above-quoted finding, the court also 
found that: the extent of Wellman's confusion or dementia varied 
due to his anemia and blood transfusions, and that drug therapy had 
helped with those conditions; Wellman had the mental ability to 
communicate with his physician, to understand his mental and 
physical conditions, and to make responsible decisions concerning 
his health care; and that Wellman had the mental ability to make 
and communicate responsible decisions concerning the control, 
investment, and management of his financial affairs and the 
disposition of his estate. The trial court also found that Wellman 
understood the nature and consequences of placing his accounts in 
joint tenancy with Young, had the requisite mental capacity to 
enter into the transactions, and was capable of controlling or 
revoking the agency relationship with Young. 
     These findings show that the trial court found Wellman to be 
a partially disabled person, but not yet in need of a guardian over 
his estate. With help from others, i.e., Young, his agent, Wellman 
was able to direct and manage his affairs and estate. See In re 
Estate of Galvin, 112 Ill. App. 3d 677, 681 (1983), quoting In re 
Estate of Mackey, 85 Ill. App. 3d 235, 238 (1980). Of course, the 
question of Wellman's mental disability was a uniquely factual 
question for the trial court, whose findings will not be disturbed 
on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. See Galvin, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 681-82. 
     When the trial court restored Wellman on June 3, 1991, the 
reason for the State's interference with his affairs ceased. See In 
re Estate of Hire, 309 Ill. App. 566, 568 (1941), rev'd on other 
grounds, 379 Ill. 201 (1942). The only function for Murphy to 
perform was to account for Wellman's estate and deliver it to 
Wellman. The existence or absence of Wellman's next of kin neither 
diminished nor enlarged Murphy's role as guardian. 
     On July 3, 1991, a few days after Murphy filed his notice of 
appeal, he filed his account of Wellman's estate. The trial court 
approved the account, formally discharged Murphy as plenary 
guardian of Wellman's person and estate, and closed the estate. 
Contrary to the trial court's grant of leave to appeal, Murphy 
could not appeal "on behalf of the estate." After July 3, 1991, 
Murphy's relationship to Wellman's money and property ceased to 
exist. In terms of our definition of standing, after Wellman was 
restored and Murphy was discharged, Murphy could no longer claim an 
injury in fact to a legally recognized interest. See Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d  at 487. 
 
                              Wellman's Death 
     If Wellman's restoration and Murphy's discharge, standing 
alone, did not deprive Murphy of standing to appeal, then they 
certainly did when considered with Wellman's death. However, the 
appellate court reasoned that "[a]s Wellman's property held in 
joint tenancy remains, we hold that the issue whether the denial of 
the petition to sever the joint tenancies was error is not moot." 
     This reasoning was erroneous. Not only did Wellman's death 
render moot the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying 
Murphy's petition to sever the joint tenancies, but Wellman's death 
also deprived Murphy of standing to assign the error. 
     The general rule is that a guardianship necessarily terminates 
by the death of the ward. 57 C.J.S. Mental Health 146, at 45, 
158, at 55 (1992); 39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian & Ward 54 (1968). 
Contrary to the appellate court's reasoning, although Wellman's 
property remained after his death, at issue is Murphy's 
relationship to that property. Murphy was the guardian of Wellman's 
estate. That relationship ended at the latest on July 3, 1991, when 
Murphy was formally discharged, or on August 17, 1991, when Wellman 
died. 
     Section 24--12 of the Probate Act of 1975 accords with the 
general rule that a guardianship terminates with the death of the 
ward, but subject to section 24--19. 755 ILCS 5/24--12 (West 1992). 
Section 24--19(a) provides: "Without order of appointment and until 
the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration OR UNTIL 
SOONER DISCHARGED BY THE COURT, a representative of the estate of 
a deceased ward has the powers and duties of an administrator to 
collect." (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/24--19(a) (West 1992). In 
the present case, Murphy was discharged prior to Wellman's death. 
Accordingly, the general rule applies. 
     The appellate court's order lacks any reference to this 
court's decision in Burgeson, where the court applied this 
reasoning against Murphy. This court held that "Murphy's duties as 
Burgeson's guardian terminated upon her death." Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d  at 487. We further held that Murphy had a legally recognizable 
interest that existed following Burgeson's death--an unpaid 
creditor of the estate. However, that interest terminated once 
Murphy's office received its fees in the final account of the 
estate. Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d at 487-88; 755 ILCS 5/18--10 (West 
1992). 
     Murphy unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish the present case 
from Burgeson. Murphy first argues that in Burgeson the decedent's 
estate was closed, while Wellman's estate is in probate and a will 
contest is pending. Thus, "the decedent's estate in this case has 
not been closed." However, Murphy's relationship to Wellman's 
person and estate was closed on July 3, 1991, when Murphy was 
formally discharged. Murphy also characterizes himself as an unpaid 
creditor. However, he filed his final account of the estate, which 
the trial court approved. Also, in his motion for leave to appeal, 
Murphy stated to the trial court that he would not seek any fees 
from Wellman's estate for work on the appeal. Burgeson controls the 
outcome of this issue. 
     Murphy raises serious allegations impugning the professional 
conduct of Young. If Murphy suspects Young of unethical conduct, 
then he, like anyone else, can complain to the Attorney Registra- 
tion and Disciplinary Commission. See Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d  at 488. 
However, we hold that Wellman's restoration and death deprived 
Murphy of standing to appeal from the denial of his petition to 
sever the Wellman-Young joint tenancies. Consequently, the 
appellate court erred in severing the joint tenancies. 
 
                          Guardian Ad Litem Fees 
     "A guardian ad litem *** is entitled to such reasonable 
compensation as may be fixed by the court to be taxed as costs in 
the proceedings and paid in due course of administration." 755 ILCS 
5/27--4 (West 1992). However, Young contends that the appellate 
court erred in upholding the trial court's fee award to Thiel. We 
note two surprising arguments of Young. He first argues that the 
trial court lacked authority to award Thiel fees from the funds of 
Wellman because she petitioned the court for fees "six months after 
the Estate was closed and all assets of $955.23 distributed." Young 
also argues that "[t]he size of this estate, $955.23, shows that an 
award of $4,843.75 is excessive." 
     These arguments completely lack merit. Of course, Wellman's 
"estate," in the context of his adjudication of mental disability, 
was not limited to the balance of the cash receipts and 
disbursements that Murphy handled during the guardianship. Rather, 
Wellman's "estate" during the time of his adjudication of 
disability consisted generally of all of his real and personal 
property (see Black's Law Dictionary 547 (6th ed. 1990), citing 
Uniform Probate Code 1--201(11); accord In re Estate of Anderson, 
195 Ill. App. 3d 644, 650 (1990)), which totalled in the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. Thiel was properly awarded fees from the 
assets that she was appointed to protect. See People v. Pasfield, 
284 Ill. 450, 458 (1918); Nelson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 288. 
     The questions of who must pay guardian ad litem fees and in 
what amount rest within the discretion of the trial court. See In 
re Estate of Dyniewicz, 271 Ill. App. 3d 616, 622-23 (1995); 
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Czubak, 52 Ill. App. 3d 986, 989 
(1977); Merneigh v. Merneigh, 2 Ill. App. 2d 352, 356 (1954). In 
the present case, the trial court found that Thiel's hourly rate 
and the number of hours that she billed were reasonable and 
necessary. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion 
in granting Thiel's fee petition. 
 
                             Remaining Issues 
     We also agree with the appellate court that Wellman's death 
rendered moot the numerous remaining issues raised by the parties. 
"A case can become moot when, pending the decision on appeal, 
events occur which render it impossible for the reviewing court to 
grant effectual relief to either party." Bluthardt v. Breslin,  74 Ill. 2d 246 , 250 (1979). The existence of a real controversy is an 
essential prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. Where the issues 
involved in the trial court no longer exist, an appellate court 
will not review the cause merely to decide moot or abstract 
questions, to determine costs, or to establish a precedent. When, 
pending an appeal from a judgment of a lower court, an event occurs 
that renders it impossible for a court of review to grant any 
effectual relief, the court will dismiss the appeal. La Salle 
National Bank v. City of Chicago,  3 Ill. 2d 375 , 378-80 (1954); 
Tuttle v. Gunderson, 341 Ill. 36, 45-46 (1930). 
     In the present case, the appeals of Downing, Young, and Murphy 
were pending in the appellate court when Wellman died on August 17, 
1991. Downing contended, inter alia, that the adjudication of 
Wellman as mentally disabled violated Wellman's due process rights. 
Young also contended, inter alia, that the adjudication of mental 
disability was void for several reasons. Murphy contended, inter 
alia, that Wellman's restoration was against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. 
     Wellman was the person who was allegedly improperly adjudi- 
cated mentally disabled, and was the person who was allegedly 
improperly restored. These issues obviously became moot with 
Wellman's death. 
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court 
in cause Nos. 80182 and 80184 is reversed insofar as it severed the 
Wellman-Young joint tenancies, and affirmed insofar as it dismissed 
the remaining issues; the judgment of the appellate court in cause 
No. 80246 is affirmed. 
 
Nos. 80182, 80184--Appellate court affirmed in part 
                                                    and reversed in part; 
                                                  circuit court affirmed. 
                                                     No. 80246--Affirmed. 
 
     CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
 
     JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:  
     Having initially been adjudicated to be an incompetent, Mr. 
Wellman was made a ward of the court and a guardian was appointed. 
Later, the wardship was terminated and the guardian was discharged. 
The guardian appealed. Soon thereafter, Mr. Wellman died. 
     The majority opinion holds, in part, that the termination of 
the wardship and the discharge of the guardian deprived the 
guardian of his standing to appeal. I disagree as a matter of 
public policy. Trial courts can be wrong. In this case, for 
instance, if the trial court was in error and misperceived Mr. 
Wellman's true condition, the only way to protect his estate and to 
remedy the situation would be to afford the discharged guardian a 
right to appeal. We know, in fact, that, at an earlier time, Mr. 
Wellman was found to be elderly, ill, confused, and unable to 
properly care for himself. Surely, a restoration decision should at 
least be subject to the possibility of review. Otherwise, an 
erroneous order of restoration might facilitate the wasting and 
dissipation of the former ward's estate. If, as the majority rules, 
the former guardian has no right to take an appeal, then, quite 
simply, there is no appeal since no one else is in a position to 
bring it. 
     I, of course, agree with the majority's position that the 
death of the ward terminated the guardian's standing to appeal. 
However, on the salient and important point of whether a guardian 
should be allowed to appeal a restoration order, I respectfully 
dissent. As a matter of public policy, a guardian should retain the 
right to appeal the restoration of a person previously declared to 
be incompetent. 
 
     JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this partial concurrence and partial 
dissent.