Title: State v. Charles A. Dunlap

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 19 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2189-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Charles A. Dunlap, a/k/a Char Lee Dancing  
Eagle,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App. 251 
Reported at:  239 Wis. 2d 423, 620 N.W.2d 398 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 27, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 16, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Race   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Jack E. Schairer, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2002 WI 19 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-2189-CR   
(L.C. No. 
90 CR 123) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles A. Dunlap, a/k/a Char Lee Dancing  
Eagle,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 27, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   In this case we review a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Dunlap, 2000 WI App 
251, 239 Wis. 2d 423, 620 N.W.2d 398, which reversed an order of 
the Walworth County Circuit Court, John R. Race, Judge.  The 
question before us is whether a defendant who is charged with 
sexual assault should be allowed to present evidence of sexual 
behavior exhibited by the child complainant prior to the alleged 
assault, even though the evidence would normally be barred by 
the rape shield law, because the State has introduced expert 
testimony to explain the complainant's reporting behavior. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The defendant, Charles Dunlap, was convicted of first-
degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (1989-90).  During the trial, the circuit court did 
not allow Dunlap to introduce evidence of the complainant's 
prior sexual behavior, holding that it was barred by the rape 
shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) (1997-98).1  Dunlap challenged 
this ruling on appeal.  The court of appeals reversed Dunlap's 
conviction, and held that the State had opened the door to 
Dunlap's proffered evidence when it offered expert testimony to 
explain inconsistencies in 
the complainant's 
testimony as 
behaviors commonly displayed by sexual assault victims.  Dunlap, 
2000 WI App 251, ¶19.  The court of appeals also found that the 
defendant's proffered evidence was not barred under either the 
hearsay rule or the rape shield law.  Id. at ¶¶24, 30.  On 
review, we hold that the circuit court was correct in preventing 
the defendant from introducing this evidence.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals' decision and reinstate Dunlap's 
conviction. 
I 
¶3 
Charles Dunlap babysat six-year-old Jamie F. on the 
evening of November 7, 1989.  Two days later, Jamie informed her 
mother that Dunlap had "touched her private parts" when he 
babysat her.  Jamie's father reported the incident to the 
police, who then secured a warrant for Dunlap's arrest.  About 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
3 
 
the same time, Dunlap apparently left Wisconsin.  Dunlap was 
apprehended approximately eight years later in California. 
¶4 
Jamie was 15 years old when Dunlap's trial began.  At 
trial, Jamie testified that when she was six, on the evening in 
question, she had been left in Dunlap's care at the house of two 
of her mother's friends, Susan Smith and Gary Cox.  Dunlap had 
been staying temporarily with Smith and Cox at their house.  
Jamie testified that while she was lying down to go to sleep in 
the bedroom, Dunlap had entered the room and had lain down 
beside her.  Jamie testified that Dunlap had put his hands 
inside her underwear and had fondled her buttocks and vagina. 
¶5 
On 
cross-examination, 
defense 
counsel 
established 
several inconsistencies in Jamie's testimony.  When Jamie was 
interviewed in 1989, she had told investigators that Cox's son 
Shawn had been in the house at the time of the assault.  At 
trial, Jamie stated that she had been in the house alone with 
Dunlap.  In 1989, Jamie had not said that Dunlap penetrated her 
vagina with his finger, while at the preliminary hearing and at 
trial she testified that he had.  Finally, defense counsel noted 
that in 1989, Jamie had not said that Dunlap threatened her.  At 
trial, Jamie testified that Dunlap had threatened to kill her 
parents if she were to tell anyone what happened. 
¶6 
In an effort to rehabilitate Jamie, the State called 
Theresa Hanson, a child protective services investigator for 
Walworth County, who provided expert testimony about the typical 
reporting behaviors of child sexual assault victims.  Hanson 
testified that children at age six often do not grasp the 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
4 
 
concepts of "in" and "out" in reference to something being put 
into their genitalia.  Hanson also testified that six-year-olds 
are often confused about the details that surround a sexual 
assault, that they focus on the core activity, and that they 
sometimes have problems grasping the concepts of "before" and 
"after."  Hanson noted that Jamie had reported the incident to 
her mother at a location away from where the incident took 
place, and stated that factors such as fear, guilt and 
embarrassment could have explained Jamie's inconsistencies and 
her delay in reporting certain aspects of the alleged assault.  
Hanson also noted certain behaviors Jamie had displayed during 
their 1989 interview——fidgeting, kicking the table, putting her 
hands in her mouth, and reticence to talk about the assault.  
Hanson indicated that Jamie's behavior was consistent with that 
of other sexual assault victims in all of these regards. 
¶7 
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Hanson 
if 
a 
six-year-old 
with 
"detailed 
and 
unexplained 
sexual 
knowledge" was an indicator of sexual assault.  The prosecutor 
objected on relevance grounds and noted that the State had not 
offered any evidence of unexplained sexual precocity on the part 
of Jamie.  Dunlap argued that because the State had introduced 
testimony about the complainant's behaviors that were consistent 
with sexual assault victims, it would have been inappropriate to 
leave 
the 
jury 
with 
the 
impression 
that 
the 
behaviors 
necessarily resulted from a sexual assault by the defendant. 
¶8 
The defendant made the following offer of proof.  
Hanson's 1989 report included a statement from Susan Smith 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
5 
 
stating that Smith was concerned about Jamie.  Smith, who was 
deceased by the time of Dunlap's trial, allegedly told Hanson 
that Jamie had been involved in a great deal of "seductive 
behavior" including touching men in the genital area, "humping 
the family dog," and frequent masturbation.  Smith noted that 
these behaviors had occurred before the alleged assault by 
Dunlap. 
¶9 
The State argued that the evidence proffered by the 
defense 
was 
barred 
by 
the 
rape 
shield 
law, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2), and that any attempt to admit the evidence should 
have been made in a motion in limine.  Additionally, the State 
argued that the evidence should be barred as inadmissible 
hearsay. 
¶10 The circuit court sustained the State's objection.  
The court held that the expert testimony presented by Hanson had 
not been offered by the State to show whether or not Jamie had 
been assaulted, but rather it was offered to show why Jamie 
might have been slow in reporting certain aspects of the alleged 
assault.  The court thus held that the State had not "opened the 
door" to the defendant's testimony.  Furthermore, the court held 
that the statements by Susan Smith were hearsay and did not fit 
into any of the exceptions for hearsay by an unavailable 
witness.  The court did allow Dunlap to cross-examine Hanson 
about typical behaviors of sexual assault victims that Jamie had 
not exhibited and about the fact that Jamie's reporting 
behaviors, although consistent with those of other sexual 
assault victims, could not necessarily be linked to any one 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
6 
 
assailant, or to Dunlap in particular.  The jury found Dunlap 
guilty of first-degree sexual assault of a child and he was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison.  Dunlap renewed his argument 
regarding Hanson's testimony on a post-conviction motion, but 
the motion was denied by the circuit court. 
¶11 On appeal, Dunlap challenged the circuit court's 
ruling that he could not admit the evidence of Jamie's prior 
sexual behaviors over the rape shield law.  Dunlap argued that 
this error deprived him of his constitutional right to present a 
defense.  The court of appeals agreed with Dunlap.  Dunlap, 2000 
WI App 251, ¶36.  The court of appeals held that the State had 
opened the door to the defendant's proffered evidence when it 
introduced expert testimony that compared Jamie's behavior to 
that of other sexual assault victims.  Id. at ¶19.  The court 
concluded that Dunlap had been denied the right to fully cross-
examine Hanson and thereby was entitled to a new trial. 
¶12 The court of appeals went on to hold that Smith's 
statements were also not barred by the hearsay rule or by the 
rape shield law.  Finding that the hearsay rule could be 
overcome, the court noted that "due process and 'fair play'" 
required the admission of the evidence and that there was "some 
assurance that Smith's statement [was] trustworthy."  Id. at 
¶24.  In determining that the rape shield law did not bar 
admission of the evidence, the court of appeals applied the test 
set down by this court in State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 
456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), and found that the evidence met the 
requirements of that test.  The court of appeals reversed 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
7 
 
Dunlap's conviction and ordered a new trial.  Dunlap, 2000 WI 
App 251, ¶36. 
¶13 On 
review, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
incorrectly applied the Pulizzano test and that the State did 
not open the door to Dunlap's proffered evidence.  We therefore 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate 
Dunlap's conviction. 
II 
¶14 We use the curative admissibility doctrine, commonly 
referred to as "opening the door," as the framework for our 
analysis.  See 1 McCormick on Evidence § 57, at 253 n.3 (5th ed. 
1999); 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 15 (Tillers rev. 1983).  The 
curative admissibility doctrine is applied when one party 
accidentally or purposefully takes advantage of a piece of 
evidence that that would normally be inadmissible.  State v. 
Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 665, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998).  Under 
such circumstances, the court may allow the opposing party to 
introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence if it is required by 
the concept of fundamental fairness to prevent unfair prejudice.  
Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 702, 706, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971); 
Pruss v. Strube, 37 Wis. 2d 539, 543-44, 155 N.W.2d 650 (1968). 
¶15 We therefore approach this issue in three steps.  We 
must first determine if the evidence in Dunlap's offer of proof 
was, in fact, inadmissible——in this case, whether the rape 
shield law prohibits the introduction of the evidence.  If the 
rape shield law does forbid introduction of the evidence, we 
must next determine if any statutory or judicial exception to 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
8 
 
the rape shield law applies.  In particular, we look at the 
exception articulated by this court in Pulizzano.  If we find 
that the proffered evidence was still inadmissible, we then must 
determine whether the State opened the door, requiring the 
circuit court to admit the otherwise inadmissible evidence to 
prevent unfair prejudice.  When reviewing Dunlap's offer of 
proof, we note that the offer of proof need not be stated with 
complete precision, but it must state an evidentiary hypothesis 
supported by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the 
conclusion that the court is asked to make.  State v. Robinson, 
146 Wis. 2d 315, 327-28, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). 
A 
¶16 We first address the applicability of the rape shield 
law, 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2), 
to the 
evidence 
proffered by 
Dunlap.  Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(2) provides, in relevant part: 
 
(a) In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means 
any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities 
of the complaining witness, including but not limited 
to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and 
life-style. 
 
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under 
s. 940.225, 
948.02, 
948.025, 
948.05, 
948.06 
or 
948.095, 
any 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
complaining 
witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions of the 
witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as to 
prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11): 
 
1. Evidence of the complaining witness's 
past conduct with the defendant. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
9 
 
 
2. Evidence of specific instances of sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
 
3. Evidence of prior untruthful allegations 
of 
sexual 
assault 
made 
by 
the 
complaining 
witness. 
 
(c) Notwithstanding s. 901.06, the limitation on 
the admission of evidence of or reference to the prior 
sexual conduct of the complaining witness in par. (b) 
applies regardless of the purpose of the admission or 
reference unless the admission is expressly permitted 
under par. (b)1., 2. or 3. 
In this case, the overt sexual behaviors exhibited by Jamie are 
clearly examples of "sexual conduct" as envisioned by the 
statute.  Unless the behaviors are somehow exempted from the 
rape shield law, the evidence offered by Dunlap is inadmissible 
under § 972.11(2). 
B 
¶17 Having found that the rape shield law applies, we must 
next determine whether the evidence offered by the defendant is 
admissible under a statutory or judicial exception to the rape 
shield law.  The statute itself lists three types of evidence 
that are excepted from the rape shield law: (1) evidence of the 
complainant's past conduct with the defendant; (2) evidence of 
specific instances of sexual conduct used to show the source or 
origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining 
the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered; 
and (3) evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual 
assault made by the complainant.  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b).  
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
10 
 
The evidence that Dunlap seeks to admit——the sexually precocious 
behavior of the complainant prior to the alleged assault——
clearly does not fall into any of these statutory categories. 
¶18 However, Dunlap argues that the evidence is admissible 
under the judicial exception to the rape shield law articulated 
by this court in State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 651.  In 
that case, we held that under certain circumstances, evidence of 
a sexual assault complainant's sexual history may be admitted 
over 
the 
rape 
shield 
law 
to 
protect 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right to present a defense.  Id. at 651-52. 
¶19 Wisconsin's rape shield law was enacted to counteract 
outdated beliefs that a complainant's sexual past could shed 
light on the truthfulness of the sexual assault allegations.  
Michael R.B. v. State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 727, 499 N.W.2d 641 
(1993).  However, we have recognized that the rule takes on a 
slightly different role when the complainant is a child.  Id. at 
727-28.  Because the normal presumption is that a child does not 
have a sexual history, it is possible that a jury might 
incorrectly attribute any evidence of a child complainant's 
sexual behavior to an assault by the defendant.  Thus, the 
possibility of using past sexual experience to provide an 
alternate source of a child's sexual knowledge or a child's 
injury might be relevant to a defendant's case.  Id. at 728.  
Still, this type of evidence can be extremely prejudicial.  Any 
evidence of a complainant's prior sexual behavior can improperly 
focus attention on the complainant's character and past actions, 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
11 
 
rather than on the circumstances of the alleged assault.  Id. at 
727.  Thus, a balance has to be struck. 
¶20 In order to balance the interests of the defendant and 
the complainant, this court developed a narrow test to determine 
when a defendant's right to present a defense should supersede 
the 
state's 
interest 
in 
protecting 
the 
complainant 
from 
prejudice and irrelevant inquiries.  In State v. Pulizzano, we 
held that evidence of a child complainant's past sexual behavior 
may be admissible over the rape shield law if it meets a five-
part test and if the defendant's right to present the evidence 
outweighs the state's interests in excluding it.  Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d at 651-52.  In applying that test to Dunlap's case, we 
hold that the evidence offered by Dunlap does not meet the 
criteria of Pulizzano and is therefore inadmissible. 
¶21 To meet the Pulizzano test, the defendant must show 
that the proffered evidence meets five criteria: (1) the prior 
acts must have clearly occurred; (2) the prior acts must closely 
resemble those of the present case; (3) the prior acts must be 
clearly relevant to a material issue; (4) the evidence must be 
necessary to the defendant's case; and (5) the probative value 
of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.  Id. at 
651-52.  If the five prongs are met, the court must then balance 
the 
parties' 
interests 
to 
determine 
if 
the 
evidence 
is 
admissible.  Id. 
¶22 Although the State challenges Dunlap on all five of 
the Pulizzano criteria, we limit our focus to the second 
criterion——whether the acts sought to be admitted by the 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
12 
 
defendant closely resemble those of the present case.  Here, 
Dunlap was accused of touching Jamie's buttocks and vagina, and 
the 
evidence 
Dunlap 
seeks 
to 
admit 
includes 
Jamie's 
masturbating, touching men in the genital area, and "humping the 
family dog."  Dunlap argues that all of the events "involve 
touching" and are therefore sufficiently alike to pass the 
Pulizzano test.  Similarly, in overturning Dunlap's conviction, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
compared 
Hanson's 
testimony 
about 
"abnormal" behavior for a six-year-old, to Dunlap's offer of 
proof that involved "abnormal behavior" for a six-year-old, and 
concluded that enough similarity existed for the evidence to 
pass the second prong of Pulizzano.  State v. Dunlap, 2000 WI 
App 251, ¶29. 
¶23 We disagree with both of these characterizations of 
the acts in question and we refuse to interpret the second prong 
of Pulizzano so broadly.  We hold that the acts about which 
Dunlap wishes to introduce evidence do not sufficiently resemble 
those of the present case to pass the Pulizzano test. 
¶24 The Pulizzano case itself is instructive on how 
similar the prior acts must be to meet the test.  In Pulizzano, 
the defendant was accused of having sexual contact with several 
children.  The assaults included fondling, fellatio, anal 
penetration with an object, and digital vaginal penetration.  
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 640-41.  Ms. Pulizzano sought to admit 
evidence of a prior sexual assault on one of the victims, seven-
year-old M.D., to show an alternative source of the boy's sexual 
precocity.  The prior assault had included "fondling and 'sodomy 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
13 
 
of the penis,' . . . fellatio, and 'possibly' anal penetration."  
Id. at 652.  The previous sexual assault on M.D. had also been 
committed by several adults, including an older female——a 
situation which mirrored the circumstances of the alleged 
assault in Pulizzano almost exactly.  Id. at 639.  This court 
held that the facts of the two cases were sufficiently similar 
to meet the second prong of the test.  Id. 
¶25 Conversely, in Michael R.B., this court found that 
prior acts of sexual touching were not sufficiently similar to 
acts of sexual intercourse to be admitted under Pulizzano.  
Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 736.  In Michael R.B., the 
defendant sought to admit evidence that the eight-year-old 
complainant and her brother had been seen on a swing "'touching 
each other's private parts.'"  Id. at 726.  The defendant wanted 
to use this evidence as an alternate explanation for evidence 
that the complainant's hymenal opening was larger than it should 
have 
been. 
 
Id. 
at 
726-27. 
 
This 
court 
found 
it 
an 
"insupportable leap of reasoning" to conclude that the offered 
evidence was sufficiently similar to the act of penis-to-vagina 
intercourse alleged in Michael R.B. to meet the Pulizzano test.  
Id. at 736. 
¶26 In State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 580 N.W.2d 181 
(1998), we qualified our holding in Michael R.B. and noted that 
the order and scope of the incidents is relevant to the 
analysis.  In Dodson, the defendant wanted to admit evidence of 
a prior incident of sexual intercourse to show an alternative 
source of the victim's sexual knowledge in a case where the 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
14 
 
defendant was accused of sexual contact.  Id. at 68.  This court 
held that even though in Michael R.B. we held that a previous 
act 
of 
sexual 
contact 
was 
not 
sufficiently 
like 
sexual 
intercourse to pass the second prong of the Pulizzano test, a 
previous act of sexual intercourse necessarily involves sexual 
contact and could meet the second prong of Pulizzano in a case 
where only sexual contact was alleged.  Id. at 78-79. 
¶27 In the present case, the acts that Dunlap seeks to 
admit are not even close to the type of act he is accused of 
committing.  Dunlap is alleged to have committed an act of 
finger-to-vagina 
sexual 
contact 
with 
possible 
digital 
penetration. 
 
The 
prior 
behaviors 
that 
Dunlap 
seeks 
to 
introduce——that the complainant had touched men in the genital 
area, writhed on men's laps, masturbated, and "humped the family 
dog"——bear very little similarity to the acts at issue in the 
present case. 
¶28 Dunlap asks us to infer that these behaviors exhibited 
by Jamie could have been brought on by a previous act of sexual 
abuse, but Dunlap is unable to connect Jamie's behaviors with 
any specific incident.  Furthermore, Dunlap cannot rule out the 
possibility that Jamie might have learned these behaviors from 
exposure to pornography or from having viewed sexual activity, 
rather than from having been previously sexually assaulted.  
Dunlap's inability to show a connection to any specific prior 
incident leads us to conclude that he has not met the second 
prong of the Pulizzano test. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
15 
 
¶29 Because Dunlap's offer of proof does not meet the 
second prong, we do not need to go further in applying 
Pulizzano.  Dunlap's offer of proof fails the Pulizzano test, 
and his evidence is therefore not admissible over the rape 
shield law.2 
C 
¶30 Finally, Dunlap claims that even though the evidence 
of Jamie's prior behavior is inadmissible under § 972.11(2) and 
does not meet any exception to the rape shield law, he is still 
entitled to introduce the evidence because the State "opened the 
door" to its admission.  Dunlap argues that he must be allowed 
to present the evidence out of fundamental fairness.  We 
disagree. 
¶31 The admission of evidence is a decision that is left 
to the discretion of the circuit court.  Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 
655.  We will not find an erroneous exercise of that discretion 
when the circuit court has properly applied the facts of record 
to the accepted legal standards.  Id.  Here we are asked to 
review whether the trial court properly held that the State had 
not opened the door to Dunlap's proffered testimony. 
¶32 To determine whether the State opened the door, we 
apply the curative admissibility doctrine.  Under the version of 
this doctrine that has been adopted in Wisconsin, when one party 
accidentally or purposefully takes advantage of a piece of 
                                                 
2 Because we hold that Dunlap's proffered evidence is 
inadmissible under the rape shield law and Pulizzano, we do not 
reach the hearsay question. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
16 
 
evidence that is otherwise inadmissible, the court may, in its 
discretion, allow the opposing party to introduce otherwise 
inadmissible evidence if it is required by the concept of 
fundamental fairness to cure some unfair prejudice.  Bertrang, 
50 Wis. 2d at 706; see also 1 Wigmore, § 15 at 740-41 & n.6.  
For example, a litigant may introduce otherwise inadmissible 
evidence about hypnotically-refreshed testimony used to support 
an expert's opinion when the opposing party has opened the door 
by challenging the reliability of the facts on which the expert 
based the opinion.  State v. Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d 387, 400, 453 
N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990).  Similarly, the doctrine has been 
used to allow evidence that a defendant was armed, even when the 
prosecution had made a pre-trial promise not to introduce such 
evidence, in order to cure the prejudice that arose when the 
defendant 
introduced 
extraneous 
evidence 
that 
the 
police 
officers had drawn their guns during the defendant's arrest.  
United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1975).  
We now assess whether any evidence offered by the State opened 
the door. 
¶33 We first address the holding of the court of appeals.  
In its decision, the court of appeals held that because the 
State's expert offered evidence regarding Jamie's behavior that 
was consistent with that of other sexual assault victims, it 
opened the door for Dunlap to explore other behavior exhibited 
by Jamie before the alleged assault that was common for sexual 
assault victims.  Dunlap, 2000 WI App 251, ¶19.  We refuse to 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
17 
 
make such a broad statement.3  We have held that in limited 
circumstances, expert testimony about the consistency of a 
sexual assault complainant's behavior with victims of the same 
type of crime may be offered for the purpose of helping the 
trier of fact understand the evidence to determine a fact in 
issue, as long as the expert does not give an opinion about the 
veracity of the complainant's allegations.  State v. Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d 240, 256, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988).  If we were to adopt 
the court of appeals' position, we would essentially force the 
State 
to 
choose 
between 
attempting 
to 
rehabilitate 
the 
complainant and allowing the admission of a complainant's sexual 
history in every sexual assault case where the State seeks to 
explain the complainant's reporting behavior.  This result would 
run counter to the legislature's purpose in enacting the rape 
shield law, and we refuse to promote such a consequence. 
¶34 We think that Dunlap's alternative argument raises the 
more appropriate question here.  Instead of arguing that all 
comparison evidence opens the door, Dunlap argues that some of 
the State's expert testimony about Jamie's behaviors fell 
outside of the scope of evidence allowed by our decision in 
                                                 
3 We note that the curative admissibility doctrine also 
limits what evidence can come through the door, once the door 
has been opened.  In general, the inadmissible evidence should 
be allowed "'only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair 
prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original 
evidence.'"  United States v. Martinez, 988 F.2d 685, 702 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).  Since we find that the door was not 
opened in this case, however, we are not required to address the 
scope of admissibility. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
18 
 
Jensen.  Dunlap argues that the testimony not covered by Jensen 
would have been otherwise inadmissible, and caused unfair 
prejudice in favor of the State.  Dunlap concludes that this 
opened the door to his proffered evidence. 
¶35 Dunlap points to two specific parts of Hanson's 
comparison testimony, which he asserts fall outside of the reach 
of Jensen.  First, Dunlap challenges Hanson's testimony about 
Jamie's 
behaviors 
during 
their 
1989 
interview——fidgeting, 
kicking the table, and reticence to talk about the incident.  
Second, Dunlap challenges Hanson's testimony about Jamie's 
disclosure of the assault to her mother as being consistent with 
the behavior of sexual assault victims, who normally report an 
assault to a trusted person away from the site of the assault.  
Dunlap argues that these two pieces of evidence were offered 
only as substantive comparisons between Jamie's behavior and 
that of sexual assault victims and were not offered to assist 
the jury in its understanding of a fact in issue.  Dunlap 
contends that the admission of this evidence caused unfair 
prejudice and required the trial court to admit the evidence of 
Jamie's past sexual behavior out of fundamental fairness. 
¶36 We begin our analysis by determining whether or not 
the challenged evidence was admissible under Jensen.  In Jensen, 
we held that expert testimony about the consistency of a sexual 
assault complainant's behavior with victims of the same type of 
crime may be offered for the limited purpose of helping the 
trier of fact understand the evidence to determine a fact in 
issue.  
Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256; 
see 
also 
State v. 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
19 
 
Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 697-98, 575 N.W.2d 268 (1998).  
However, we held that an expert witness may not convey to the 
jury, either explicitly or implicitly, the expert's own beliefs 
about the veracity of the complainant's allegations with respect 
to the assault.  Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256-57. 
¶37 For example, in State v. Robinson, this court allowed 
expert testimony from a rape crisis center worker, who offered 
information to explain the reporting behavior of a sexual 
assault complainant.  The complainant was not crying after the 
assault and was able to write out her own statement to police 
shortly thereafter.  Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d at 335.  The expert 
witness testified that it was not uncommon, in her experience, 
for sexual assault victims to be emotionally flat after an 
assault.  Id. at 333.  This testimony was offered by the State 
after the defense had tried to capitalize on the misconception 
that all sexual assault victims are emotional following an 
assault.  Id. at 335.  This court held the testimony admissible 
because the witness's expert testimony assisted the jury in its 
fact-finding role and because the witness was not asked to draw 
any conclusions or offer any opinions about the complainant 
based on what the witness had observed in other sexual assault 
victims.  Id. at 333. 
¶38 Similarly, in Jensen itself, this court allowed a 
school guidance counselor to testify about whether the 11-year-
old complainant's marked change of behavior at school——including 
asking precocious questions in a sex education class, wearing 
what was deemed by school officials to be inappropriate 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
20 
 
clothing, and pinching a boy's buttocks——was consistent with the 
behavior 
of 
other 
sexual 
assault 
victims. 
 
Jensen, 
147 
Wis. 2d at 244, 254.  We noted that the counselor's testimony 
was offered to explain the context in which the complainant made 
her allegations and to rebut the defense's theory that the 
complainant had fabricated the charge against the defendant.  
Id. at 250.  In Jensen, just as in Robinson, we noted that the 
defense had tried to use these behaviors to suggest that the 
complainant was lying.  Id. at 251-52. 
¶39 Applying 
the 
Jensen 
principles 
to 
the 
evidence 
challenged by Dunlap, we hold that Hanson's statements were 
admissible.  We recognize that the line between substantive 
comparisons and comparisons offered for explanation is sometimes 
fine, but we hold that the testimony here fell within the 
boundaries of Jensen.  During her direct examination, Hanson 
limited her testimony to a description of Jamie's reporting 
behavior.  This included the concept that sexual assault victims 
may progressively disclose details of an assault; the concept 
that 
six-year-olds 
are 
often 
confused 
about 
the 
details 
surrounding an assault, including the general time frame of the 
assault and who was present; the concept that a six-year-old 
does not understand "in" and "out" when referring to their 
genitalia; the concept that a young sexual assault victim would 
most likely report the assault to a trusted person away from the 
scene of the assault; and the concept that fear, embarrassment, 
or guilt might prevent the child from reporting immediately.  
Hanson's testimony explained the context in which Jamie reported 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
21 
 
the assault and helped rebut the defense suggestion that Jamie 
was fabricating her allegations against Dunlap.  This was the 
type of testimony we recognized as admissible in Jensen.  Id. at 
250-51. 
¶40 Hanson's testimony did not indicate, either implicitly 
or explicitly, her opinion regarding the veracity of Jamie's 
allegations.  Likewise, the comparisons were not offered as 
substantive proof that Jamie had been sexually assaulted by 
Dunlap. 
 
Rather, 
they 
were 
offered 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
inconsistencies in Jamie's testimony that had been pointed out 
by the defendant on cross-examination and to explain the 
circumstances of Jamie's reporting behavior.  Under Jensen, the 
testimony was therefore admissible. 
¶41 Because Hanson's testimony fell within the bounds of 
Jensen, it was admissible and thus did not open the door to 
Dunlap's proffered evidence.  The State's evidence was admitted 
for the purpose of rehabilitating Jamie and did not cause any 
unfair advantage to the State.  The evidence that Dunlap offered 
therefore was not required to cure any prejudice and the circuit 
court did not err when it refused to admit the evidence. 
III 
¶42 In sum, we hold that the evidence offered by Dunlap 
was 
properly 
excluded 
by 
the 
circuit 
court.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(2) 
bars 
the 
introduction 
of 
the 
evidence offered by Dunlap, and the evidence is not admissible 
under any statutory exception or under the narrow judicial 
exception articulated by this court in Pulizzano.  Additionally, 
No. 
99-2189-CR   
 
22 
 
the circuit court properly held that the State did not open the 
door to Dunlap's proffered testimony.  For these reasons, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate 
Dunlap's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  99-2189-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
¶43 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (concurring).  In Part II C of 
the majority opinion, the court concludes that because the child 
protective services investigator's expert testimony was Jensen4 
evidence, it did not "open the door" under the curative 
admissibility doctrine to the admission of evidence that was 
otherwise barred by the rape shield statute.  I write separately 
because, in my view, the inapplicability of the curative 
admissibility doctrine does not depend upon a conclusion that 
the investigator's expert testimony was Jensen evidence. 
¶44 In 
the 
first 
place, 
no 
one 
argued 
that 
the 
investigator's expert testimony was inadmissible or improper in 
any way.  As a result, there was nothing to "cure" under the 
curative admissibility doctrine. 
¶45 Second, the investigator's testimony was relatively 
routine opinion evidence, typical of many child sexual assault 
cases, concerning the consistency of the six-year-old victim's 
behavior in reporting the sexual assault with the reporting 
behavior of child sexual assault victims generally.  The 
evidence the defendant sought to introduce, on the other hand, 
concerned 
certain 
alleged 
incidents 
of 
unusual, 
sexually 
inappropriate 
behavior 
by 
the 
victim 
that 
pre-dated 
the 
defendant's assault.  
¶46 The defendant has not articulated any link whatsoever 
between the evidence he sought to introduce and that which was 
testified to by the protective services investigator.  He has 
not demonstrated how the evidence, otherwise barred by the rape 
                                                 
4 State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988). 
No.  99-2189-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
shield statute, would explain, cure, or correct the admission of 
the expert's testimony about common victim reporting behaviors, 
and there is no apparent connection between the two.  
¶47 The suggestion seems to be (although this is mostly 
guesswork) that the allegations about the victim's earlier 
sexually inappropriate behavior shows that she had perhaps been 
sexually assaulted by someone else prior to the assault by the 
defendant.  But this is pure speculation, and something more 
than conjecture or speculation is required before evidence 
barred for important policy reasons by the rape shield law will 
be admitted under the curative admissibility doctrine.  
¶48 In any event, the investigator's expert testimony 
about the consistency of the victim's reporting behavior with 
that of other child sexual assault victims was not admitted as 
substantive circumstantial evidence that the assault by the 
defendant occurred, but, rather, as rehabilitative evidence to 
rebut the defense attack on inconsistencies in the victim's 
manner of reporting the assault.  For reasons stated in greater 
detail in my concurrence in State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, __ 
Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, also released today, I would conclude 
that this type of expert testimony is not, strictly speaking, 
Jensen evidence.  
¶49 While the investigator's expert testimony was in part 
stated in the form of a Jensen-style consistency comparison, it 
was not similar in type to the expert testimony at issue in 
Jensen, which concerned a child sexual assault victim's post-
No.  99-2189-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
assault sexually precocious "acting out" changes in behavior.5  
Expert testimony, like that of the investigator here, that 
explains a victim's reporting behavior in the context of the 
common reporting behaviors of sexual assault victims generally 
is admissible under State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 431 
N.W.2d 165 (1988), a case which heavily influenced this court's 
decision in Jensen.6  
¶50 Accordingly, it is not necessary to characterize the 
expert testimony at issue in this case as Jensen evidence in 
order to conclude that it did not "open the door" to the 
evidence the defendant sought to introduce.  For the reasons 
stated in my concurrence in State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, I would 
not do so, and therefore respectfully concur. 
                                                 
5 Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 248-49. 
 
6 Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 251-52. 
No.  99-2189-CR.dss 
 
1