Title: Lansing v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lansing v. State1983 WY 96669 P.2d 923Case Number: 83-15Case Number: 83-15Decided: 09/22/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
VICTOR A. LANSING, SR., 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

Cary R. Alburn, 
III, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Patrick R. Day, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
by a jury of possessing a firearm with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or 
physical well-being of a police officer. He was thereafter placed on conditional 
probation.

[¶2.]     Appellant lists the 
issues on appeal:

"1. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by refusing to admit appellant's Exhibits C, D and 
E?

"2. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to have the jury view 
appellant's premises?

"3. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a new trial? 

"4. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by requiring appellant to abstain from alcohol and obey 
minor traffic laws as conditions of probation?"

[¶3.]     On July 3, 1982, after 
drinking copious quantities of spirits, appellant struck his helpmate in the 
face. The police became aware that there was trouble at the Lansing home as a result 
of a telephone call from appellant's wife. The police responded to the call and, 
at appellant's request, temporarily removed him from the 
home.

[¶4.]     The next day appellant 
made a round-trip to Encampment. During this trip he continued to joust with 
"Johnny Barleycorn," as was his wont to do. After returning home, appellant 
precipitously heaved the dinner prepared by his wife out the front door and hied 
to his bedroom. He thereupon procured a shotgun and proceeded to load it with 
ammunition. His son saw him loading the gun and conveyed this intelligence to 
his mother. Appellant's wife became alarmed and went with her son to the Rawlins 
police department.

[¶5.]     In response to Mrs. 
Lansing's report, officers Rockwood and Henderson went to appellant's house. 
Henderson 
cautiously went upon the porch while Rockwood covered him from off the porch. 
Henderson 
knocked on the screen door several times. He heard appellant's voice inside the 
house. Although it was difficult to see through the screen door, the officer 
eventually saw appellant with a gun in his hand standing in the living room 
several feet from the front door. For several minutes Henderson talked to 
appellant and repeatedly asked him to put the gun down. During this time 
appellant brought his gun up about three times and each time officer Henderson was able to 
prevail upon him to put the gun down. Appellant eventually set the gun on the 
floor and turned away from the door, at which time Henderson entered the 
house, and layed hands on appellant.

[¶6.]     In two counts, 
appellant was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to 
unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being of another, a violation of § 
6-11-101, W.S. 1977, (Cum.Supp. 1981).1 Appellant was acquitted on count 
one which had charged possession of a weapon with intent to threaten his wife 
and was convicted of possession of a weapon with intent to threaten officer 
Henderson.

I

[¶7.]     Appellant's first 
assignment of error is the trial court's refusal to admit three photographs of 
his front screen door. Admission of photographs into evidence is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the 
appellate court will not reverse the trial court's ruling on the admission of 
photographic evidence. Shaffer v. 
State, Wyo., 640 P.2d 88 (1982). A photograph must 
correctly portray the subject matter. The trial court must exercise care by 
refusing to admit a photograph if it can reasonably be said to be misleading or 
confusing to the jury or prejudicial to the objecting party. Reeder v. State, Wyo., 515 P.2d 969 
(1973).

[¶8.]     Appellant contends that 
three photographs of the screen door, taken from various distances, demonstrate 
that officer Henderson could not have seen through the door and observe 
appellant with a shot gun. The photograph taken closest to the screen door was 
taken two feet away; however, the State's evidence was that Officer Henderson 
stood six to eight inches from the door when he saw appellant with the gun. 
Since appellant conceded that visibility through the screen door improved as a 
person moved from two feet away to six to eight inches, the photographs offered 
by appellant did not accurately depict what officer Henderson would have been 
able to see. We have examined the photographs of what appellant says is his 
screen door; we cannot even tell that the exhibits are photographs of a door. 
Since this would have been confusing and misleading, the trial court properly 
refused to admit into evidence the photographs that appellant said were of his 
screen door. There is no merit to appellant's first assignment of error. 

II

[¶9.]     Appellant assigns as 
error the denial of his request that the jury be permitted to view his home. 
Section 7-11-204, W.S. 1977, provides for a viewing of the crime scene by the 
jury in certain circumstances:

"Whenever, in the opinion 
of the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of the place in which any 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of the sheriff, to the place which shall be shown to them by some 
disinterested person appointed by the court. * * *"

[¶10.]  We have not heretofore had an occasion to 
consider when "it is proper" to allow the jury to view the crime scene, but the 
purpose of a jury view is to help it understand and comprehend the evidence 
which has already been presented and not to take new evidence. State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979). This was not a proper case for a jury view since there was 
conflicting testimony. Appellant admitted that if officer Henderson were 
standing where he said he was (six to eight inches from the screen door), the 
officer quite possibly could have seen him. Appellant contended that he was not 
in the living room near the screen door, but rather that he was between the 
kitchen and living room some distance from the door. Appellant was not really 
disputing the officer's ability to see through the screen, but rather appellant 
argued that he was not where the officer said he was, but was further away from 
the screen door.

[¶11.]  A view of the premises would not have 
assisted the jury in resolving this conflicting testimony. The decision whether 
or not to allow the jury to view the scene is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. People v. Favors, 192 
Colo. 136, 556 P.2d 72 (1976). The court properly denied the request to view the crime 
scene.

III

[¶12.]  After appellant was convicted he moved 
for a new trial alleging he had discovered new evidence. He claims that it was 
only after his trial that he learned there were other people in the vicinity of 
the Lansing home 
at the time of the incident for which he was arrested. Appellant maintains that 
these witnesses' sworn statements attached to the motion for a new trial, 
"corroborated appellant's version of the incident, in opposition of the version 
of the officer's."

[¶13.]  According to Bimbo Garcia, on July 4, 
1982, there were ten or eleven people attending a barbeque in the front yard 
across the street from the Lansing home. They became curious and walked 
closer. Others who signed the statements said that they could see the front of 
the Lansing 
house and saw the officers bring appellant out of the house to the police car. 
None of these newly discovered witnesses could see into the house nor did they 
hear what was said.

[¶14.]  Appellant would have us believe that he 
did not see these potential witnesses when he was brought out of the house. 
Appellant knew as early as the preliminary hearing that it would be helpful to 
his case if he had someone to testify who would verify some of the things he 
said and dispute what the police said. The entire case depended on who the jury 
believed. So far as the record reveals, appellant made no effort to see if 
anyone in the vicinity of his house had seen or knew anything about the 
case.

[¶15.]  One of the "newly discovered witnesses" 
was appellant's son-in-law who went to the Lansing house after learning that there was 
trouble therein. The substance of the son-in-law's sworn statement was that it 
was officer Rockwood who was the first one on the porch, rather than "the 
dark-haired guy" (Henderson), and that Rockwood was the first one 
to go inside the house. Also, Rockwood was doing the talking with someone 
through the screen door.

[¶16.]  In Grable v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 531 
(1983), we discussed the law relating to new trials based on newly discovered 
evidence. We said:

"* * * [I]t is clearly 
within the sound discretion of a district court to either grant or deny a motion 
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and the ruling by the 
district court will not be a basis for reversal of the conviction unless there 
is affirmatively shown an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
[Citations.]" Grable v. State, supra, 
at 532.

[¶17.]  Appellant has the burden of demonstrating 
an abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of his new trial motion. Seigert v. State, Wyo., 634 P.2d 323 
(1981); and Opie v. State, Wyo., 422 P.2d 84 (1967).

[¶18.]  A party seeking a new trial on the 
grounds of newly discovered evidence must demonstrate:

"1. The evidence must 
have come to the defendant's knowledge since the trial.

"2. It must not have been 
owing to want of due diligence on the part of the defendant that it did not come 
to his knowledge sooner.

"3. The newly discovered 
evidence must be so material that it would probably produce a different verdict 
if the new trial were granted.

"4. The newly discovered 
evidence is not cumulative, viz., speaking of facts in relation to which there 
was evidence at the trial. [Citations.]" Grable v. State, supra, at 
533.

[¶19.]  All four of these tests must be met for 
appellant to be entitled to a new trial, and if any one is not satisfied there 
is no error in the denial of the new trial motion. Grable v. State, supra. 
Furthermore,

"[w]here a motion for a 
new trial is made on the ground of newly discovered evidence the burden is on 
the moving party to prove that it was discovered since the trial and that he was 
free from fault or lack of due diligence in failing to discover, before or 
during the trial, the newly discovered evidence upon which he relies. 
[Citations.]" Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238, 243 (1977).

[¶20.]  Appellant failed to establish the second 
element (and perhaps the third and fourth) of the four-part test set out in Grable v. State, supra. Under that 
requirement appellant must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence could 
not have been found earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Grable v. State, supra; and Opie v. State, supra. Failure to 
convince the court that due diligence was exercised constitutes sufficient 
grounds for denying a motion for a new trial. Grable v. State, supra. Appellant failed 
to convince the trial court that he had exercised due diligence in discovering 
evidence that was pertinent to his defense, nor has he convinced this 
court.

[¶21.]  In any event, this case is not a problem 
of newly discovered evidence, but rather newly discovered witnesses. The sworn 
statements merely corroborate some of appellant's testimony, while contradicting 
the testimony of two police officers. We see no new evidence being offered, but 
only a different version of some of the evidence already produced by the police. 
Evidence which only impeaches a witness, contradicts or corroborates evidence 
produced at trial is not sufficient to grant a new trial. Salaz v. State, 
supra.

[¶22.]  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying a new trial.

IV

[¶23.]  Appellant's final assignment of error 
addresses the conditions of probation requiring him to obey the law, including 
minor traffic laws, and refrain from drinking. The judgment and sentence 
granting probation provides in part:

"3. The Defendant shall 
refrain from drinking of alcohol in any form or manner whatsoever in public or 
in private during the period of his probation.

"4. The Defendant shall 
not offend the laws of the community in which he lives, the State of Wyoming, or 
the United States of America. Any and all offenses, minor traffic offenses 
included, shall not be violated, and any violation thereof shall be considered a 
violation of the terms of this probation."

[¶24.]  Sentencing judges have wide discretion in 
determining appropriate conditions of probation. The conditions imposed can be 
challenged only upon a showing that the trial judge exceeded his authority or 
abused his discretion. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice provides in part:

"(e) Conditions imposed 
by the court should be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, 
including the goal of rehabilitation, and should not be unduly restrictive of 
the probationer's liberty or autonomy. Where fundamental rights are involved, 
special care should be taken to avoid overbroad restrictions or restraints which 
are so vague or ambiguous as to fail to give real guidance. * * *" III ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 18-2.3, Sentences Not Involving 
Confinement, p. 18.72 (1980).

[¶25.]  The commentary on Standard 18-2.3(e), 
supra, says:

"Paragraph (e) requires 
that probation conditions be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. * 
* * California courts have probably been the most aggressive in interpreting 
what `reasonableness' means in this context, and they have established the 
following rule for testing conditions of probation. A condition will be held 
invalid if it (1) has no relation to the crime of which the offender was 
convicted, (2) relates to conduct that is not itself criminal, and (3) requires 
or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to possible future 
criminality. As a practical matter, use of the phrase `purposes of sentencing' 
in paragraph (e) subsumes substantially the same considerations. * * 
*

"The instant standards do 
not, however, endorse the gloss that a few courts have placed on the word 
`reasonableness,' namely, that the condition be one with which the probationer 
can voluntarily comply, given the probationer's level of volition. These cases 
have typically invalidated conditions that the offender refrain from the use of 
alcohol where the offender's acute alcoholism made voluntary compliance with 
such a condition impossible. The view taken here is that to the extent 
alcoholism or drug use seems linked with future criminality, the interests of 
society deserve priority. Thus, the `reasonableness' requirement should be 
satisfied by a relationship between the probationer's inability to control an 
alcohol or drug problem and anticipated future 
criminality."

[¶26.]  In Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743 
(1975), a condition of probation was "that you do not drink any intoxicants 
whatsoever." In that case we did not find any of the conditions of probation 
objectionable; however, we remanded for other reasons.

[¶27.]  In Martin v. State, Alaska, 517 P.2d 1389 
(1974), the sentencing judge ordered as a condition of probation that the 
defendant not use alcoholic beverages. In appealing revocation of probation 
Martin argued that a probation condition which required him to refrain from 
using alcohol violated a provision of the Alaska Constitution which required 
that penal sanctions should be based on the principal of reformation and the 
need to protect the public. The court stated:

"We find this contention 
devoid of merit. Appellant's drinking problems were discussed at some length 
prior to his original sentencing and again at the revocation hearing. The 
condition was originally imposed because appellant himself blamed his criminal 
behavior upon excessive drinking. * * * Under these circumstances it was certainly 
reasonable for the sentencing court to conclude that appellant's rehabilitation 
was dependent upon his abstention from alcohol and so make abstention a 
condition of probation. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Martin v. State, supra, at 
1402.

[¶28.]  Appellant admitted to being a disciple of 
Bacchus and an alcoholic, a condition for which he had been hospitalized. By his 
own admission, he "was constantly being arrested for being drunk in public and 
public disturbance." He was also arrested at least three times for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol. The probation officer concluded that, in the 
past, fines and substance abuse counseling never "significantly acted as a 
deterrent to [appellant's] behavior." 

[¶29.]  It was not an abuse of discretion to 
require appellant to abstain from the use of alcohol or to obey traffic laws or 
the law in general. Imposing these conditions to probation seems most 
appropriate considering that appellant's assaults on his wife and his traffic 
violations were, by his own admission, related to alcohol.

[¶30.]  We hold that the conditions of probation 
requiring abstinence from alcohol and the obeyance of traffic laws are 
reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, especially the goal of 
rehabilitation. We further hold that such conditions relate to the crime for 
which appellant was convicted and forbid conduct that might lead to future 
criminal behavior. Appellant has demonstrated that he requires specific and 
detailed rules to live by.

[¶31.]  There is no merit to appellant's 
appeal.

[¶32.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 This section now 
renumbered § 6-8-103, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 replacement).