Title: State v. Ramano. Dissenting Opinion by J. Levinson [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Amendment, filed 03/08/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Amendment, filed 03/30/2007 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘s+4fOR PUBLICATION ON WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

00" I

 

L234 woe

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee —_ 5

suai

 

PAME ANN MARY LEILANI ROMANO, Defendant-Appellant

No. 26110

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1P103-00755 OF 8/26/03; HPD CR. NO 03024777)

FEBRUARY 27, 2007

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.+
AND LEVINSON, J., DISSENTING

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

We hold that Defendant-Appellant Pane Ann Mary Leilani
Romano (Defendant) has not established, as she argues on appeal,
that (1) “[Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) }
failed to support a prima face [sic] case of prostitution because
the [prosecution] failed to prove . . . that Defendant was not a
law enforcement officer,” (2) the [prosecution] failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a prima face [sic] case of
prostitution,” (3) “there was insufficient evidence adduced to
support a finding of guilt,” and (4) “Laurence v. Texas[, 539
U.S. 558 (2003),)] renders Hawai'i Revised Statutes [(HRS)] § 712-

aa
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1200 et. seq. unconstitutional as applied in this case.”
(Capitalization omitted.) ‘Therefore, Defendant’s August 26, 2003
judgment of conviction and sentence by the district court of the
first circuit (the court)! for the offense of prostitution, HRS §

712-1200(1) (Supp. 2006),* is affirmed.

 

A

Trial began on August 13, 2003, and the evidence
following was adduced. On January 18, 2003, Officer Jeffrey
‘Tallion was on duty with the Narcotics/Vice Division of the
Honolulu Police Department Morals Detail. He testified he was on
assignment investigating prostitution in the Waikiki area.
Tallion related that the investigations involved “checking into
hotel rooms and then . . . either go[ing] on to the street or

- set[ting] up appointments either in the telephone book or
‘Pennysaver,’ ‘Midweek,’ or internet cases.”
In preparation for his undercover operation, Tallion

obtained a hotel room at the Aston Waikiki Beach Hotel and

 

+ the Honorable Faye Koyanagi presided

“cion HBSS 72222000) stares that Ia) parson commita the offense of
prostitution Lf the person en or agrees or attere to engage in, sensed
Sencuct ith angther’ person Zor's fee. ike 112-2800(2) Sefines Seenaal conduct,”
Snker ala, es “senvel contact.» AAS § 701-700 (2993) defined sexual contact as

        

intimate parte of a person
yroal or other sntumate parte
rectly of through the

 

Inlay touching of the sexsi or othe
not matried to the actor, cf of the
(Of the actor sy the person, whether
Glgihlog of other material" sntended fo cover the

     

 

ual contact An HRE § 707-700 was amended in 2004, 88 Haw. S43
lding the phrase “other than acts of ‘sersal peneeration =
‘The anenanent dows not aftect oor

Eovaet 61, $3 at 30%,
F tany touching” in the first sentenc

 

    

 

  

 
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dressed in civilian clothes. He browsed through the “Pennysa’

 

newspaper and called the phone number on a massage advertisement.
When Defendant answered the phone call, Tallion asked if she did

“out calls.” At this time, there was no discussion of any

 

Alliest conduct or sexual acts.

 

‘Tallion set up an appointment with Defendant and they
met on the street in front of the Aston Waikiki Beach Hotel, but
then moved to Tallion’s hotel room. In court, Tallion positively
identified Defendant as the individual he met outside on
January 18, 2003.

Upon arriving in the room, Tallion confirmed that the
price of an out call was $100 and then asked Defendant whether
“she did anything else.” Defendant responded, “Like what?
Dance?” Tallion responded, “No,” so Defendant asked, “Well, what
do you have in mind?”

Tallion then answered, “Well, I was referring to a
blowjob.”? Defendant replied, “No, hands only.” Tallion
clarified, “So no blowjob, so handjob.” Defendant responded,
“Yeah, I can do that.” Tallion asked the cost and Defendant
responded, “Add 20." Tallion reconfirmed with, “Oh, $20 for a
handjob?" and Defendant replied, “Yes.” Tallion testified that a
handjob is street vernacular commonly used in prostitution for

“assisted masturbation.”

 

2 oe gal GSNEea Humcasnd, 66, tm. 935496657, 666 0.28 508, 5911989),
this court said the term “bioweb" ss “recognized by » large segnene of the adult
popuistion in Hawaii se (an expression] seseribing sersal conduct in slang” snd the
Ferm could be found in Under
Both Sblow Jeb" and *tellatier™

    

 
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Following Defendant’s reply, Tallion “gave a pre
determined signal” and the arrest team entered the hotel room.
Tallion apprised Honolulu police officer William Lurbe of the
facts and Lurbe placed Defendant under arrest.

Tallion testified that he had been with the Morals
Detail for three years; he was involved in 400 prostitution cases
in 2002 as either the undercover or arresting officer: maybe five
of the prostitution cases were initiated from “Pennysaver” ads;
and after the talk about “handjob,” Defendant added $20.00 to her
quoted $100.00 charge for the out-call service. On cross
examination, Tallion recounted that he found Defendant’ s
advertisement in “Pennysaver! s” Nassage/Acupuncture Section and
not the Adult Section. He also related that “hands only” could
have meant what a masseuse actually does.

In his testimony, Lurbe testified that he arrested
Defendant for prostitution on January 18, 2003, after being
“informed by [Tallin] that he [had] obtained a prostitution
violation from [Defendant], which was assisted masturbation for
$20.” On cross-examination, Lurbe indicated that Tallion
notified him of the violation via cellular phone.

Following Lurbe’s testinony, the prosecution rested.
Defendant moved for a continuance “to subpoena, investigate and
talk to witnesses who were in the room adjoining this, this
room.” Over the prosecution's objection, the court continued the

case to August 26, 2003.

 
 

on August 21, 2003, Defendant filed a “Motion to

Dismiss.” In the memorandum attached to the motion, Defendant
asserted that Lawrence “invalidate(d] Hawaii's prostitution
statutes (and) thus{,] the [prosecution's] case [against
Defendant] must necessarily fail.”

At the start of the proceedings held on August 26,
2003, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that
the prosecution had failed to prove (1) that there was an offer
and agreement to engage in sexual conduct for @ fees and (2) that
Defendant was “not a police officer, @ sheriff, works for the
sheriff's department or law enforcenent acting in the course or
scope of her duties.” After hearing fron the prosecution, the
court denied Defendant's motion.

Defendant's “Motion to Dismiss” was then heard. The
court denied the motion, stating that it “[did) not agree with
the applicability of (Lawrence) to the instant situation.”

Defendant took the witness stand in her own defense and
testified that she was a self-employed license massage therapist,
she had been a licensed massage therapist for “19 years, going on

20” and her license was current and up-to-date on January 16,

 

2003, She testified that she placed her ad under the “Body, Mind
and Spirit,” “Massage,” or “Health and Fitness” sections and not
under the “Personal” or “Adult” sections.

Defendant also recounted that on January 18, 2003,

‘Tallion inmediately asked for a blow job when she entered the

 
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hotel room. She explained that she was “caught off guard”
because she was “not the typical person that men want this fron,”
as she was “overweight” and “old.”

She reported that after Tallion asked for the “blow
job," she put her hands up and stated, “Hey, I only do hands
only.” she also declared that she was shaking her head “no” at
the same time. Defendant then indicated that Tallion repeated
his question again and also asked how much it would cost.
Defendant again said, “No, hands only.” Defendant also
maintained that Tallion was “loud,” “demanding,” and
“boisterous.”

After Defendant repeated “hands only” again, Tallion
asked about handjobs. Defendant claims that she had no intent to
conmit any kind of sexual contact with Tallion. She explained
that she only gave Tallion a figure of $20 because she felt
threatened and because of Tallion’s loud demands. She then
testified about 2 1983 incident where “[she] got beat up real bad
by this person who [she] had gone to for a job for telephone
soliciting.”

On cross~exanination, Defendant admitted that she

n Tallion and herself)

 

“couldn't remember [the conversation betwi
word for word." She also stated that Tallion did not block her
way to the door leading to the hallway, Tallion did not tell her

she could not leave the room, and she did not attempt to use the

 

telephone or walk out of the room. Furthermore, Defendant

indicated that she said “yes” when Tallion asked for @ handjob,

 
FOR PUBLICATION ON MEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#
she knew that handjob could mean assisted masturbation, she told

 

Tallion that the handjob would cost $20.00 extra, and she said
yes” when Tallion reiterated $20.00 for a handjob. On redirect
examination, Defendant claimed that she felt trapped because it

was not her room, the room “didn’t have much room in it,” and

 

“she was within arm's reach of [Tallion]

Following Defendant's testimony, the defense rested.
‘The court found Defendant guilty of the charged offense.
Defendant was sentenced to six months’ probation and fined
$500.00. Judgment was entered on August 26, 2003. Imposition of
sentence was continued for thirty days for perfection of appeal.

The court instructed the prosecution to prepare written
findings of facts and conclusions of law. The “Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Finding Defendant Guilty After
Jury-Waived Trial” were filed on September 26, 2003. Notice of
appeal was filed on September 19, 2003.

um.
As noted previously, Defendant raised four issues on

appeal.* In regard to issue (1), an exception to the offense of

 

+ the prosecution answered (1) the prosecution did not have to prove
chat Defendant wae a law enforcement officer acting in the course and scope of
her duties, (2) there was sufficient evidence adduced at txial to support
Defendant's prostitution conviction, (3) Defendant failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she acted under “duress” when she agreed to
Ehgoge in sexual conduct with Tellicn fers fee, and (4) Hawaii's prostieation
Statute se not rendered unconstitutional by

Defendant reitersted in her reply brief that the application of
RS § 712-1200 to this case was unconstituticnal.. We must note that it
appesrs ¢ substantial part of the reply brief corresponds verbatim to the
Boblished opinicn of the New York City Family Court sn Bey 400 N.Y.8.24
E55, 462-68, 467-69 (Fam. Ct. 1977), zev'd, 418 N.Y.S.26 597, 605 (App. Div.
1878).

 

  

 
 

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prostitution applies under HRS § 712-1200(5) for “any menber of a
police department, sheriff or other law enforcement officer
acting in the course of and scope of duties.” State v, Nobriaa,
10 Haw. App. 353, 357-58, 873 P.2d 110, 112-13 (1994), overruled
nother arounds by State v. Macleaa, 80 Hawai'i 172, 178-79, 907
P.2d 758, 764-65 (1995), is instructive. According to that case,
“[t]he general and well-settled conmon law rule is that where an
exception is embodied in the language of the enacting clause of a
criminal statute, and therefore appears to be an integral part of
the verbal description of the offense, the burden is on the
prosecution to negative that exception, prima facie, as part of
its main case.” Ig, at 357, 873 P.2d at 112-13 (footnote and
citation omitted). The Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA)
further noted that “when the exception appears somewhere other
than in the enacting clause, and is thus a distinct substantive
exception or proviso, the burden is on the defendant to bring
forward evidence of exceptive facts that constitute a defense”
and, in such an instance, “[t}he prosecutor is not required to
negative, by proof in advance, exceptions not found in the
enacting clause.” id, at 358, 873 P.2d at 113 (citations

omitted) .*

 

Further, the ICk noted that the general rule does not apply “when
the facts hypothesized in the exceptive provision ere peculiarly within ene
knowledge of the defendant, or the evidence concerning them is within the
Gefendant’s private control.” Nabriga, 10 Kaw. App. at 356, 673 Pr2d at 113
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted) «

 

 

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In Nobriga, the defendant was cited under Revised
Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) § 7-2.3 (1990),* “animal nuisance,”
for keeping numerous roosters at his home, resulting in
complaints from neighbors. Id, at 385, 873 P.2d at 112, At
trial, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the
premise that the State had failed to prove defendant's conduct
did not fall within the exceptions to the animal nuisance law set
forth in ROH § 7-2.4(a).7 Id, at 356, 873 P.2d at 112. The
district court denied the motion. The ICA affirmed the denial,
stating that the general prohibition against animal nuisance as
set forth in ROH $§ 7-2.2 and 7-2.3 govern the elements of the
case and “does not incorporate ROH § 7-2.4" as “the exceptions
are located in a separate and distinct section of the ordinance.”
Ad. at 389, 873 P.2d at 113.

‘The ICA also indicated “the burden of proving

exceptions to a criminal statute appear to be codified in the

‘RoW § 7-2.3 provides, in pertinent part, that “[iJt is unlawful to
be the owner of an animal, farm aninal or poultry engaged in aninal nissance
a2 defined in Section 7-2.2." ROM § 7-2.2 (1990) defines “Aninal nuisance,”
partly, as follows

 

“animal nuisance,” for the purposes of this section,

shall ineluse but not be limited to any snimal, farm animal

or poultry which:

(2) "Makes noise continuously and/or incessantly for

S perios of 10 minutes or intermittently for
Snechalf hour of sore to the disturbance of any
person at any tine of day or night and
Fegardiess of whether the animal, farm animal or
poultry is physically situated in or upon
Private property]

 

 

 

+ ROH § 7-2.44a) (1990) provides that “InJothing in this article
applies to animals, farm aninals or poultry raised, bred or kept asa
Consercial enterprise or for food purposes where connercial kennels or the
Keeping of livestock is a permitted use.”

 

 

 
 

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Hawai'i Penal Code” pursuant to HRS §§ 701-114(1) (a) (1985) and
702-205 (1985). Id, at 358, 873 P.2d at 113, The ICA declared
that HRS § 701-114(1) (a) requires that “the State’s burden is to
prove, beyond @ reasonable doubt, each element of the offense,”
Adi at 358, 873 P.2d at 113; “the elements of an offense” include
vaRs § 702-115(1)

 

that which “[njegative(s) a defense,” idu;
(2985) defines a ‘defense’ as ‘a fact or set of facts which
negatives penal liability,’" ids but “*{nJo defense may be
considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the specified
fact or facts has been presented,’ ids (quoting HRS § 701-

115 (2) (1988)),

In regard to the penal code requirenents, the ICA
reiterated that the prosecution “has the initial burden of
negativing statutory exceptions to an offense only if the
exceptions are incorporated into the definition of the offense.”
Id. at 359, 873 P.2d at 113. However, as the ICA explained,
“Li]f @ statutory exception to an offense constitutes a separate
and distinct defense, . . . the State's burden to disprove the
defense beyond 2 reasonable doubt arises only after evidence of
the defense is first raised by the defendant.” Id.

im.

Applying the foregoing formulation, the enacting clause
for the offense of prostitution is HRS § 712-1200(1), because
this clause “contains the general or preliminary description of
the acts prohibited; i.e., proscribes the offensive deed.” state
wales, 90 Hawai'i 130, 138 -n.7, 976 P.26 444, 452 n.7 (1999)

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(citations omitted) (defining the term “enacting clause”). HRS
$ 712-1200(5) does not prescribe the offense, but states an
exception to the offense for law enforcement officers acting “in
the course and scope of duties.” Similar to Nobriga, then, the
exception here, HRS § 712-1200(5), is not located in the same
section, HRS § 712-1200(1), as the definition of the offense."

As the exception in HRS § 712-1200(5) would negative
the prostitution offense, it constitutes a defense. See Nobriaa,
10 Haw. App. at 359, 873 P.2d at 113. In order to claim the
benefit of this defense, then, evidence that Defendant fell
within the exception must have been adduced. See id, However,
Defendant did not adduce any such evidence at trial. Under
Nobriga, the prosecution is not required to disprove the defense
until there is evidence that the defendant falls within HRS
§ 712-1200(5). Id, Thus, the prosecution was not required to
negate the defense. See HRS § 701-115(2) (1993) ("No defense may
be considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the
specified fact or facts has been presented|.]”). There was,
then, no defect in the proof of a prima facie case.

wv.

As to issue (2), the prosecution must prove every

element of a crime charged and the burden never shifts to the

defendant. Territory v. Adiarte, 37 Haw. 463, 470-72 (1947).

1 in reviewing the

 

We recently stated that “*[t]he test on app

   

+ woreover, S¢ may Be noted that Sf Defendant was a law enfo:
officer, this fact would be peculiarly within Defendant” knowledge oF the
Sten titnin Defendant's privete control

ae
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legal sufficiency of the evidence is whether, when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
substantial evidence exists to support the conclusion of the
trier of fact.’" State v. Agard, No. 27219, 2007 WL 198725, at
*3 (Haw. Jan. 23, 2007) (quoting State vs Bui, 104 Hawas'l 462,
467, 92 P.34 472, 476 (2004)) (other citation omitted).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “‘credible evidence which is
of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to reach a conclusion.’* Id. (ellipses
points, brackets, and citations omitted)).

As indicated previously, HRS § 712-1200(1) provides in
relevant part that prostitution is committed “if the person...
agrees . . . to engage in. . . sexual conduct with another
person for a fee.” Under HS § 712-1200(2), “sexual conduct”
includes “sexual contact,” as that term is “defined in section
707-700." In pertinent part, “*sexual contact’ meant any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parte of a person not
married to the actor{.]" HRS § 707-700.

‘The evidence demonstrated that Defendant agreed to give
Tallion 2 “handjob” for a fee of $20.00. Tallion confirmed with
Defendant that the charge for the “out-call” was $100.00. when
Tallion said, “So no blowjob, so handjob,” Defendant responded,
wYah, T can do that.” Tallion then asked whether “that cost
extra,” and according to Tallion, Defendant answered, “Add 20.”

Tallion testified he confirmed, “Oh, $20 for handjob,” and

a2
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Defendant replied, “Yes.” This testimony indicates that the $20
added fee was’ for the handjob.
Defendant argues that agreement for a handjob does not

necessarily involve sexual conduct. She contends that Tallion

 

never defined “assisted masturbation” and that although Tallion
equated @ “handjob” with sexual contact, he did admit that
another Licensed masseuse had given him a hand massage and, thus,
the meaning of “handjob” is not always sexual in nature. The
phrase “assisted masturbation” would appear susceptible to conmon
understanding. “Masturbation” is defined, inter alia, as “the
stimulation, other than by coitus, of another's genitals
resulting in orgasm.” Random House Dictionary of the English
Languace 883 (Unabr. ed. 1973). Genitals describe “the
reproductive organs, especially the external sex organs.” The
American Heritace Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.
2000), available at http: //www.bartleby.com/61/.

Tallion testified that “*{hJandjob’ is street
vernacular conmonly used in prostitution for assisted
masturbation.” Defendant also testified that she knew that the
term “handjob” could mean assisted masturbation." As noted, the

meaning of “sexual contact” in HRS § 712-1200(1) included “any

 

+ aulson also testified he had never been marcied to Defendant and
the had never “lived together at man and wife with (Defendant].” See supra’
note 2 defining sexual contact.

  

 

on cross-exanination, the prosecution asked Defendant, “Did you
know that ‘handjob’ could nean sgsicted masturbation?” and she replied in the
aftizmetive

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touching of the sexual . . . parts of a person{.]” HRS § 707-

700, Plainly, the reference to “hand” in the term “handjob
connotes physical contact with genitals. Hence, considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution, substantial evidence was
adduced that would enable a person of reasonable caution to
conclude, ste Acard, 2007 WL 156725, at +3, that Defendant agreed
to engage in sexual contact with Tallion for a fee.
v

As to issue (3), HRS § 702-231 (1993) provides in

relevant part:

Duress. (1) It iz a defense toe penal chara thet the
‘Sr caused the result
aiieges Bs
Sessat couse, “onlanful force gainst his person or the
oh of another

Bi‘ siverion wauid'hase been unable to restate

(si in’ prosecutions tor any offense descrsbed in this
Gade, the Sefense asserted under this section shall

‘Soutiiute ap atfiimative defense, “The defendant shall have
fhe burden of soins torwarg with the evidence te prove The
facts constituting such defence, oniese such facts are
supplied by the testinony of the prosecuting witness or
circumstance in such testinony,

and_of proving such facts by
a-rependerance of the svigense pursuant fo section Tite,
added.)

 

    

 

“the preponderance standard directs the factfinder to
decide whether ‘the existence of the contested fact is more
Probable than its nonexistence." Kekona v. Abastillas, No.
24051, 2006 WL 3020312, at *6 (Haw. Sept. 26, 2006) (quoting E.
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 339, at 957 (3d ed. 1984)) (other
citation omitted). Accordingly, “[t]o prevail, (the defendant]
need only offer evidence sufficient to tip the scale slightly in

his or her favor, and [the prosecution] can succeed by merely

nee
 

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keeping the scale evenly balanced.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

Defendant contends her claims “meet the elements of the
affirmative defense of duress by a preponderance of evidence.”
She argues that because the duress claim was “unchallenged by the
(prosecution) ox the (cJourt[,] preponderance of the evidence is
indeed established.” However, the court considered Defendant's
affirmative defense of duress and concluded that Defendant did
not meet her burden.

specifically, in its oral finding, the court stated,
“[ale far as the duress defense, the burden--it becomes an
affirmative defense and the burden then shifts to the [Dlefendant
to prove that the duress did in fact occur by preponderance of
the evidence, which the [cJourt does not feel the [DJefendant has
met that burden.” In its written findings, the court found
“Defendant failed to present an adequate defense to the charge.”
“‘A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard.’ State v. Keliiheleua, 105 Hawai'i 174,
178, 95 P.3d 605, 609 (2004) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted) (quoting Dan vs State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 428, 879
P.2d $28, 533 (1994)).

“YA finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the
record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or
(2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the
appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” foo v, State, 106

nase
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Hawas's 102, 112, 102 P.34 346, 356 (2004) (quoting State vs
Okumura, 78 Howai'i 383, 392, 894 P.2d 0, 89 (1995)). The
record indicates that there was substantial evidence to support
the finding and that it is not clear that 2 mistake has been
made. See id. at 46, 137 P.3d at 360.

Defendant related that Tallion was “loud” and
“demanding” and she only agreed to Tallion’s request for a
“handjob” because she felt threatened. However, upon cross-
examination, Defendant conceded that (1) Tallion had not blocked
her egress from the hotel room; (2) Tallion was not holding a
weapon when he asked about the “blowjob”? (3) Tallion never told
her that she could not leave the room; and (4) she never
attempted to use the phone or walk out of the room.

Matters of credibility and the weight of the evidence
and the inferences to be drawn are for the fact finder. see
Acard, 2007 WL 158725, at *3 (stating that “*appellate courts
Will give due deference to the right of the trier of fact to
determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence adduced’ (quoting In re Doe, 107
Hawai'i 12, 19, 108 P.3d 966, 973 (2005) (other citation
omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant did not
testify to any “use of, oF a threat of use, with unlawful force
against (her) person[.]” HRS § 702-231(1). Defendant
acknowledged Tallion did not block her exit and she did not
attempt to leave. Under these circumstances and giving due

deference to the court as fact finder, it cannot be said the

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court's finding that Defendant failed to establish duress by a
preponderance of the evidence was clearly erroneous, See Fisher,
111 Hawas's at 46, 137 P.36 at 360.

vr.

As to Defendant's last issue, the dissent agrees with
Defendant and argues that (1) “at the time of this court's
holding in (State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.24 1351 (1983)],
there was no federal precedent addressing whether the
criminalization of an utterly private sexual activity (and its
associated monetary component) abridged an individual's right to
privacy[ but] Laurence created just such a precedent, confirming
that individual decisions by married and unmarried persons
‘concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship . . «
are a form of “Liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Anendnent{,]’” dissenting opinion at 8, and
(2) “article 1, section 6 does not abide the criminalization of
wholly private, consensual sexual activity between adults without
the state’s having demonstrated a compelling interest by way of
Minjury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects,’
539 U.S. at S6B[,]” dissenting opinion at 10. We must
respectfully disagree with these propositions and discuss then
herein

vin.
The dissent’s first position is not tenable because it

runs into the specific qualification in Lawrence that excludes

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prostitution as part of protected “liberty” under the federal due

process clause.

not involve minors. It does not
injured oF coerced oF who ar
aiay be

 

‘The present case dot
Persons who might be
din relationships where consent might not.

 

Avo
refused. It does not involve public conduct or
Erogtinueian. Tt does fot invelve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.

   

 

Tifestvie. the petitioners ore entitied to respect for
Their private lives. The State cannot demean chest
existence of control their destiny by making their private
Sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause giver then the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government:

 

 

 

 

539 U.S. at 578 (emphases added).
Additionally, despite this clear exclusion, the dissent
argues that a logical extension of Laurence precludes the states
from exercising their police power to curb prostitution.
(Where two consenting adults susp money for sex in

transaction undertaken entirely in seclusion, the analysis

of the Laurence majority,
auoid the action, leads inexorably to the conclusion that
She state nay not exercise its colice power to criminalize a
Eiiuate decision between two consenting adults to engage in
semual activity, whether for remuneration os not.
Dissenting opinion at 9-10 (emphasis added). But, the dissent’s
position is not supportable on this premise. The Court has in
the past drawn legal boundaries around its decisions, despite the
fact that arguably logic would “lead{] inexorably” beyond such

strictures, ‘Thus, in State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 748 P.2d 372
(1988), this court recognized that although the Court had held a
state “would not be able to prohibit an individual from
possessing and viewing . . . pornographic materials in the

at 489, 748 P.2d at 376

 

privacy of his or her own home(,]” id.

(citing Stanley v. Georaia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), “(t)he -

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court hald) effectively ruled that the protected right to possess

 

obscene material in the privacy of one’s home does not give ri
to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to
others{,]” Kam, 69 Haw. at 490, 748 P.2d at 376 (internal
quotation marke and citation omitted), leading to the paradoxical
conflict of a “citizenry(’s] . . . right to read and possess
material which it may not legally obtain[,]” id. at 491, 748 P.2d
at 377. Hence, although the Court's language may seemingly point
to broader application, that does not portend an extension of a
given proposition especially when, as here, the Court expressly
limits the scope of the liberty interest protected.”
Furthermore, the dissent misreads Lawrence. As

mentioned above, prostitution, i.e., “swap[ping] money for sex,"

 

dissenting opinion at 9, is expressly rejected as a protected
Liberty interest under Lawrence. Laurence did not involve an
exchange of money for sexual relations but focused on the
specific sexual conduct, i.e., sodomy, as being outside the scope
of legitimate government concern. It is important to remember
that “[t]he question before the Court [was] the validity of a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex
to engage in certain intimate sexval conduct [,]” 539 U.S. at 562,
described as “(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of

fone person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the

nts atatenent, see dissenting opinion at 9
Svate solicited
ming, arquenda, public

contrary to the at
10, the Court gid not draw the Gistinction between
prostitutions ond public solicited prostitutions,
Eelicitstion ig sbeent in this case’

 

 

 

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penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an
object (,]” ids (quoting Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(1) (2003)).
Lawrence thus contains a lengthy dissertation on homosexual
conduct and sodomy dating back to 1533. Id. at 568-77. As the
Court stated, the case involved “two adults who . . . engaged in
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.” Id. at 578
(emphasis added) .

Assuming, arauendo, that “Lawrence presupposed private
sexual activity between two adults fully capable of giving valid
consent [,]" dissenting opinion at 22, that does not mean Lawrence
sanctioned prostitution in the “(nJarrow[er]," dissenting opinion
at 21, form advocated by the dissent. Lawrence simply placed no
qualification on excluding prostitution from its holding.

vinr.

In Lawrence, the Court reconsidered its earlier holding
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where “Hardwick, in
his own bedroom, [was observed] engaging in [sodomy] with another
adult male.” Lawrence, $39 U.S. at 566. In doing so the
majority adopted the dissent of Justice Stevens in Bowers, where
a sodomy statute similar to that in Texas was upheld by the
Rowers majority. In his dissent, Justice Stevens rested on two

% the Georgis statute criminalizing sodomy at issue in Bowers,
Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1964), provides in pertinent part

 

 

(2) A person comits the offense of sodony when he performs
or submite to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the nouth or anus of another»

(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be
punished by inprisonnent for not less than one ner more then
20 years{.]

  

 

 

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contentions.
First, the fact that the governing majority in 9 state has

treditionally vieued @ cayticular gractica as immoral is not
# sufficient reason for upholding = 1aw prohibiting the
Practice; neither history nor tradition could save « lav
Prohibseing miscegenation from constitutional attack
Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning

fhe Intinacies of thelr phvsies) relaticnshio, even when not

Protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, ten

 

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and
citations omitted) (emphases added). ‘The majority in Lavrence
decided that “Justice Stevens’ analysis . . . should have been
controlling in Bowers and should control here.” $39 U.S. at 578.
‘Thus, Lawrence invalidated a criminal statute
prohibiting the “particular practice” of sodomy because it
involved the “intimacies of . . . physical relationship” and such
“intimate choices” should be left to unmarried as well as married
persons. Id, at 577-78 (emphasis added). Lawrence, then, was
concerned with specific conduct seemingly aimed at persons
engaged in homosexual relationships. Consequently, Lawrence
precludes government interference or regulation of intimate
sexual practices or conduct with respect to homosexual as well as
heterosexual adults. Such intimate practices or conduct are not
at issue in the instant case or prohibited by HRS $ 712-1200, the
prostitution statute. Laurence, then, is not federal precedent

for the proposition that “private sexual activity” “associated

   

470 v8 ae TREE bad,

 

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[with a] monetary component," “abridged” the “right to privacy”

 

‘as the dissent argues. Dissenting opinion at
Ix.

As to the dissent’s second position, in our view

Lawrence ae construed above does not vitiate the holding in

Mueller. In Mueller, the defendant wi
in, or agree[ing] to engage in, sexual conduct with anoth

charged with “engag[ing]

 

 

person, in return for a fee, in violation of [HRS §) 712-1200(,1"
66 Haw. at 618, 671 P.2d at 1354, as Defendant was so charged in
the instant case. Somewhat similarly the question posed there
was “whether the proscriptions of (HRS) § 712-1200 may be applied
to an act of sex for a fee that took place in a private
apartment.” Id. at 619-20, 671 P.2d at 1354. In affirming the
conviction, this court said that “we are not convinced a decision
to engage in sex for hire is a fundamental right in our schene of
ordered liberty, . . . [therefore] ve affirm [the defendant’ s]
conviction.” Id. at 618, 671 P.2d at 1353-54.

Unlike in the instant case, in Mueller “the activity in
question took place in [defendant's] apartment, the participants
were willing adults, and there were ‘no sians o ‘*
66 Haw. at 618-19, 671 P.2d at 1354 (emphasis added). Despite

the dissent’s assertion “that the charged transaction,” dissent

 

at 22, was “wholly private,” ida, it is arguable in this case
that “public solicitation” was implicated, inasmuch as contact
with Defendant was made by way of a newspaper ad soliciting

members of the public and the assignation took place in a hotel

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as opposed to “the privacy of her own hone.” Mueller, 66 Haw. at
618, 671 P.2d at 1354,
x.

As to the right of privacy in article I, section 6 of
the Hawai"l Constitution, the Mueller majority noted that (1) “a
party challenging the statute has the burden of showing
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt (,]" ida at 627, 671
P.2d at 1958 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),
(2) “only personal rights that can be dened fundanental or
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are included in this
guarantee of personal privacyl,]” id, at 628, 671 P.2d at 1359
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and (3) {t]he
defendant has directed us to nothing suggesting @ decision to
engage in sex for hire at hone should be considered basic to
ordered Liberty[,]" ida

Mueller is precedent. “Precedent is an adjudged case
or decision of # court, considered as furnishing an example of
authority for en identical or similar case afterwards arising or
a similar question of law{] . . . and operates as @ principle of
self-restraint . . , with respect to the overruling of prior
decisions.” State v, Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 205, 29 P.3d 919,
924 (2001) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations
omitted) (ellipses points in original). In this regard, “(t)he
policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
points is referred to as the doctrine of stare deciais(.J" Id.
(brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted) .

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While not having ike “force . . . in the context of
constitutional interpretation,” 4d. at 206, 29 P.3d at 925,
“(t]he benefit of stare decisis is that it furnishes a clear
guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan
their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise;
eliminates the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in
every case; and maintains public faith in the judiciary 2s a

at 205-06, 29

 

source of impersonal and reasoned judgments[,]” id.
P.3d at 924-25 (brackets, internal quotation marks, citations,
and ellipses points omitted) .

Consequently, “a court should not depart from the
doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.”
Id, at 206, 29 P.3d at 925 (internal quotation marks, citations
and emphasis omitted). “[WJhen the court reexamines a prior
holding, [then,] its judgment is customarily informed by a series
of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and
overruling @ prior case.” Id, (internal quotation marks,
citation, and brackets omitted).

There is no denying that “*[wjhile the outer limits of
this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court [or this
court), it is clear that among the decisions that an individual

may make without unjustified government interference are personal

 

jecisions relating to marriage . . . , procreation. .
contraception . . . , family relationships . . . , and child

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rearing and education(,]'" Mueller, 66 Haw. at 627, 671 P.2d at

1359 (quoting Carev v, Population Servs, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
684-85 (1977) (other citations omitted) (some internal quotation

marks omitted), and now qualified intimate sexual conduct between

 

or among consenting adult.
The right to privacy has been expanded by the Court in
discrete situations. See, e.a., Kyllo v. United States, $33 U.S.
27, 34, 40 (2001) (concluding that the government’s use of a
thermal imaging device from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within a private home, which would have been
previously unknowable without physical intrusion, constitutes “a
search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant, in order to
“assure(] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”);
Rog _v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that “the right
of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation”); Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568
(holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
making mere private possession of obscene material a crime”
because although “the States retain broad power to regulate
obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession
by the individual in the privacy of his [or her] own home");
Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding

that a law which forbade the use of contraceptives

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unconstitutionelly interfered with the “notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship").

This court has also extended privacy rights under our
own constitution. See, e.g. State v, Cuntapay, 104 Hawai'i 109,
120, 85 F.3d 634, 635 (2004) (holding that “under Article 1,
section 7 of the Hawas't Constitution, a guest of a honedveller
is entitled to a right of privacy while in his or her host's
home” (footnote omitted) ); State v. Detrov, 102 Hawai'{ 13, 20-
22, 72 P.3d 485, 492-94 (2003) (holding that Kvllo, $33 U.S. 27,
was dispositive of the defendant's federal constitutional claim
and, additionally, that the use of a thermal imager to measure
heat emanating from the interior of the defendant's apartment
violated article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution because
“[4]t nas long been recognized in Hawai'i that generally, a
person ‘has an actual, subjective, expectation of privacy in his
or her hone’ (quoting State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai'i 433, 442, 096
P.2d 897, 898 (1995); State v. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124, 146, 856
P.2d 1265, 1277 (1993) (holding that “the defendants had an
objectively ‘reasonable privacy expectation that [they] would not
be videotaped by government agents’ in the employee break room”
(quoting United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (Sth Cir.
1991))+ Kam, 69 Haw. at 496, 748 P.2d at 380 (declaring » statute
that prohibited the promotion of pornographic adult magazines
unconstitutional under article I, section 6 of the Hawai'i

Constitution “as applied to the sale of pornographic materials to

26
‘++FOR PUBLICATION ON WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS **
a person intending to use those items in the privacy of his or
her hone”).

‘Thus conduct once denominated criminal has later been
afforded constitutional protection under the privacy umbrella.
See, e.g., Kvllo, $33 U.S. at 34, 40; Roe, 410 U.S. at 1547
‘Cuntapay,

 

Stanley, 394 U.S. at $68; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-8
104 Hawai'i at 110, 85 P.3d at 635; Detrov, 102 Hawai'i at 20-22,
72 B.3d at 492-94; Bonnell, 75 Haw. at 146, 856 P.2d at 12777
Kam, 69 Haw. at 496, 748 P.2d at 380. And while such expansion
may not be without controversy, prostitution seems almost
singularly unique in historical and social condemnation.
XL.
Mueller acknowledged the resiliency of prostitution

laws as noted by the drafters of the penal code.'? This court

 

outer referred to
(tlhe commentary on HRE § 72-1200. . . in pertinent par

 

Our study of public attitude in this area revealed the
Widespread belief anong these interviewed that
prostitution should be suppressed entirely or that it
Ehould be so restricted as not to offend those menbers
of society who do not wish to consort with prostitutes
of to be atfronted by then. Making prostitution 8
Grimins! offense sz one method of controlling the
Scope of prostitution and thereby protecting those
Segments of society which are offended by its open
Sristence. this “abolitionist” approach ie not
without ite vociferous detractors. There are those
that contend chat the only honest ond workable
approach to the problen 12 to legalize prostitution
Ghd confine it to certain localities within a ives
Community. While such a proposal say exhibit
foresight end practicality, the fact renains that 2
Srae-seqment of society is not presenely wiiuing to
Recoonising this fa

 

‘andthe need for public order, the Code makes
Eroatitution and ite associate enterprises criminal
pitenses,.

(continves.

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declared that “[t]he drafters of the Hawai‘ Penal Code justitied
the enactment of HRS § 712-1200 on ‘the need for public order.’
[Thus this court) would not dispute that it was reasonable for
the legislature to act on that basis.” 66 Haw. at 628-29, 671
P.2d at 1359-60 (footnote omitted). It was recognized that “[a]
large segment of society undoubtedly regards prostitution as
Smmoral and degrading, and the self-destructive or debilitating
nature of the practice, at least for the prostitute, is often
given as 2 reason for outlawing it. [Accordingly, wle could not

deem these views irrational." Id, at 629, 671 P.2d at 1360.

 

 

4, oneinues)

66 Haw. Gt 629 n.8, 671 P.2d at 1360 n.8 (emphasis added).

 

“  Relatedly, there is a general consensus in the international
community that prostitution has negative consequences, The Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in fersen and the Exploitation of the Prestitseion
of Others states that “prostitution and the accompanying evil of the traffic
in person for the purpose of prostitution are incompatible with the dignity,
and Worth of the hunah person and endanger the welfere of the individvel, the
family and the community." Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N-T.8- 271. [herednatter th
Convention)

The partice to the Convention agrs
prostitution of ancther person, even with the consent
take or to encourage, through their poblic and prival
social, economic and other related

 

to punish any person who *(e)xploite the
that person” and “to
‘education, health,

 

 

    

 

‘The United States has agreed to “take 11 appropriate messures,
including legislation, to suppress sll forms of traffic in women and
exploitation of prostitution of wonen.” Convention on the Elimination of ALL
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1269 U.NeTeS._13, 19,
I-L.M. 39 (1960) {hereinafter the Convention on Discrimination], The
Convention on Discrimination was adopted in 1979 by the ON General Assenbly
ang as of Nov. 2006, 165 ccuntries (over 90% of the menbers of the OM) are
Parties to the Convention. several of the countries thet have ratified che
treaty are Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Cubs, China, Germany, Issel,
Italy, Mexico, Netherlends, and the United States. gag United Netions,
Division on the Advancenent of Women,
hetp://me.un.org/wonermatch/daw/cedsu/states.htn (last visited Feb. 21,

2009) «

 

 

 

 

 

‘This court has cited international authority in resclving appeals.
Seg Almeida vs Correa, 51 Haw. 594, 602 0.9, 603, 465 Pr2d Sel, 510 e.9e 21)
(S70) tholaing “thst the exnibieion of 2 child to the finder of fect in 2
Paternity case is not to be permitted,” but that “expert testimony concerning
(continued.

 

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XII.

It may be that non-injurious sexual conduct by
consenting adults in a private place for a fee preceded by
(veiled) public advertising may one day be drawn into the
protective shelter of Haweii’s privacy provision, as has other
conduct once thought of as illegal. But “(t]he sum of

experience,” id., as elucidated in the penal code presently,

 

seems to the contrary. See supra note 13; cf. Janra Enters...
ne. v. Ci ) 107 Hawai'i 314, 322, 113 P.3d
190, 198 (2005) (holding that “viewing adult material in an
enclosed pancran booth on commercial premises is not protected by
the fundamental right of privacy enshrined in article I, section
6 of the Hawai'i Constitution”). Hence, “prudential and
pragmatic considerations” do not compel a departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis, Garcia, 96 Hawai'i at 206, 29 P.3d at
928, so as to justify overruling Mueller, much less based on the
Court's present express holding in Lawrence.

Of course the legislature may alter the law to allow

non-injurious sexual contact by consenting adults in a private

(.--continued)
the resenblance of an child to the person alleged to be the father is
Admissible to prove or disprove the paternity ef the child” and relying on a
United Nations Edvestional, Scientifse snd Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
‘document for the proposition that "individuals belonging to different major
‘groups of mankind are distinguishable by virtue of their physical characters,
But individual wenbers, or small groups, belonging to different races within
the sane major group ave Usually fot so distinguishable’ (quoting Statement
fon the lature of Race snd Race Difference by Physicel Anthropologists and
Geneticists, Sept. 1982 (UNESCO) quoted in A. Montagu, Wan" s Host Dangerous
Muth the Pudacy of Race 368 (ath ea. 2964))).

 

 

 

 

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place for a fee, conduct that is presently proscribed by HRS

 

$ 712-1200(1). For,

(als a general rule, the role of the court in supervising
the activity of the’ leatelsture is confined to seeing that
tthe actions of the legislature do not violate any

We will not interfere with the
Conduct of legislative affairs in absence of
Constitutions! mandate to do go, oF unless the procedure or
Fesult constitutes a deprivation of constitutionally
Guaranteed rights

Schwab v. Arivoshi, 58 Haw. 25, 37, 564 P.2d 135, 143 (197)

(citations omitted). We only decide that the considerations

 

  

 

 

before us do not compel the legal conclusion that, on
constitutional grounds, HRS § 712-1200 must be ruled invalid.
XIII.

Based on the foregoing, the court’s August 26, 2003

Gor—

WiLlfam A Harrison Rancta Orca aes

(Harrison & Matsuoka)

City « county of Honolulu, Gort, Desig br:

for plaintiff-appellee.

judgment is affirmed.

on the brief:

 

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