Title: Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Walters

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Walters1985 WY 165707 P.2d 733Case Number: 84-41, 84-42Decided: 10/15/1985WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, A CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO UNION MANUFACTURING AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

HENRY B. WALTERS AND REVA B. WALTERS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; GUARANTY FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION; RON KUHN, D/B/A RON'S PLUMBING AND HEATING; ASPEN ELECTRIC, INCORPORATED, A WYOMING CORPORATION; AND WILLIAM C. BURT, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, A CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO UNION MANUFACTURING AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

GORDON A. VALASEK AND BEVERLY MARRIE VALASEK, HUSBAND AND WIFE; THE RICHARD GILL COMPANY; MGIC MORTGAGE MARKETING CORPORATION; M & I MARSHALL AND ILSLEY BANK; RON KUHN, D/B/A RON'S PLUMBING AND HEATING; ASPEN ELECTRIC, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; MACKENZIE CABINET COMPANY OF WYOMING, INC.; AND POZZI WINDOW COMPANY, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO UNION MANUFACTURING AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

HENRY B. WALTERS AND REVA 
B. WALTERS, HUSBAND AND WIFE; GUARANTY FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION; 
RON KUHN, D/B/A RON'S PLUMBING AND HEATING; ASPEN ELECTRIC, INCORPORATED, A 
WYOMING CORPORATION; AND WILLIAM C. BURT, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO UNION MANUFACTURING AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

GORDON A. VALASEK AND 
BEVERLY MARRIE VALASEK, HUSBAND AND WIFE; THE RICHARD GILL COMPANY; MGIC 
MORTGAGE MARKETING CORPORATION; M & I MARSHALL AND ILSLEY BANK; RON KUHN, 
D/B/A RON'S PLUMBING AND HEATING; ASPEN ELECTRIC, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION; 
MACKENZIE CABINET COMPANY OF WYOMING, INC.; AND POZZI WINDOW COMPANY, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Kenneth R. 
Marken, Casper, 
for appellant.

Dennis M. Hand 
and James A. Hardee of Hand, Hand & Hand, P.C., Casper, for appellees Walters, Guar. Federal 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Valaseks, The Richard Gill Co., MGIC Mortg. Marketing 
Corp., M & I Marshall and Ilsley Bank.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal raises 
questions concerning Wyoming's construction lien statutes, §§ 
29-1-201 through 29-2-109, W.S. 1977 (June 1981 Replacement). The appeal 
concerns two lawsuits initiated by Union Manufacturing and Supply Company, Inc. 
(Union), a dissolved subsidiary of appellant 
Weyerhaeuser Company, to enforce construction liens on certain real property and 
associated improvements. The district court concluded that our statutes required 
Union, as a supplier of building materials 
under a contract with the property owner, to perfect its liens within the 90-day 
period allotted to materialmen rather than within the 120-day period prescribed 
for contractors. Since Union had filed its lien 
statements after the expiration of the filing time for materialmen, the court 
entered summary judgments against appellant.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The material facts in 
this case are undisputed. Before its dissolution in December, 1982, Union was 
wholly owned by appellant Weyerhaeuser, and authorized to transact business in 
Wyoming. In 
each of the two cases involved in this appeal, Union entered into a contract 
with Baird Homes, Inc. (Baird), the record owner of real property in Natrona County, Wyoming, to furnish lumber and other materials 
for Baird's construction of a new home on such property. Union acted as a supplier only, installing no materials 
into the new homes. On October 12, 1982, Union 
supplied the last materials to one homesite which, that same day, Baird conveyed 
by warranty deed to appellees Gordon and Beverly Valasek. Union furnished the last materials on October 27, 1982, to 
the second homesite, and Baird conveyed the property two days later by warranty 
deed to appellees Henry and Reva Walters.

[¶4.]     Baird failed to pay for 
any of the materials furnished by Union. On 
December 22, 1982, Union notified Baird, by 
certified mail, of its intent to file a lien on the Valasek property. Union sent Baird a similar notice with respect to the 
Walters property on December 30, 1982. No notice of intent to file a lien was 
given to either the Walters or the Valaseks, the record owners of the properties 
at the times of notification.

[¶5.]     Union filed its lien statement concerning the Walters 
property with the county clerk on January 27, 1983, 92 days after furnishing the 
last materials to the property. The lien statement describing the Valasek 
property was filed February 8, 1983, 119 days after Union supplied the last materials.

[¶6.]     Union initiated separate actions to enforce the liens in 
July, 1983, naming as defendants the Valaseks in one case and the Walters in the 
other case, their respective mortgagees, and other lien claimants of record. The 
district court subsequently granted, in each case, Union's motion to substitute 
as the real plaintiff in interest, appellant Weyerhaeuser Company, the successor 
corporation to Union.

[¶7.]     Appellees, the property 
owners and mortgagees, moved the district court for summary judgments based on 
Union's failure to timely file its lien 
statements and failure to notify the owners of its intent to file liens. 
Following a hearing, the court found as a matter of law that Union had acted as a materialman in performing its 
contracts with Baird. The court, therefore, entered summary judgments against 
appellant on the ground that Union had not 
filed its lien statements with the county clerk within the 90-day period 
prescribed for materialmen by statute. Section 29-2-106, infra. Weyerhaeuser's 
appeals from these judgments have been consolidated to expedite 
review.

[¶8.]     Appellant Weyerhaeuser 
Company raises a single issue for our consideration:

"Whether, under the 
present construction lien statutes of Wyoming, W.S. § 29-1-201 (1981) et seq., 
the Appellant is a `contractor', entitled to one hundred twenty (120) days in 
which to file its lien statement, where the Appellant furnished building 
materials only to certain real property pursuant to a contract with the then 
owner of such property, who incorporated such materials into permanent changes 
therein?"

Appellees, the 
Walters, Valaseks, and mortgagees, restate the issue raised by appellant and 
present three alternative grounds for affirming the summary 
judgment:

"A. DID APPELLANT FILE 
ITS LIEN STATEMENTS WITHIN THE TIME LIMITED BY STATUTE?

"1. Was Appellant a 
`contractor' entitled to one hundred twenty (120) days or a `materialman' 
entitled to ninety (90) days within which to file its lien 
statements.

"B. CAN SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT BE AFFIRMED ON ANY OTHER LEGAL GROUND APPEARING IN THE 
RECORD?

"1. Did Appellant give 
adequate pre-lien notice?

"2. Was Appellant's 
pre-lien notice also defective because it did not state from whom the claim was 
due?

"3. Are Appellant's liens 
invalid because they were filed in the name of a nonexistent company and suit to 
foreclose was brought in the name of a nonexistent 
company?"

I

[¶9.]     It is necessary for the 
disposition of this case to determine whether appellant was a contractor or a 
materialman. Several sections of our lien law have application. Any person who 
contributes to the permanent improvement of real property in this state is 
entitled to a lien upon that improvement and upon the land.1 To enforce his lien, a claimant 
must perfect it by timely filing an appropriate statement with the county 
clerk.2 Section 29-2-106(a) prescribes a 
longer filing period for a "contractor" than for "every other person" seeking to 
perfect a lien:

"(a) Every contractor 
shall file his lien statement within one hundred twenty (120) days and every 
other person shall file within ninety (90) days:

"(i) After the last day 
when work was performed or materials furnished under contract; 
or

"(ii) From the date the 
work was substantially completed or substantial completion of the contract to 
furnish materials, whichever is earlier; or

"(iii) With respect to an 
employee or subcontractor, after the last day he performed work at the direction 
of his employer or contractor."

Section 
29-1-201(a) defines "contractor" and related terms:

"(a) Except as otherwise 
provided, as used in this title:

"(i) `Contractor' 
means:

"(A) A person employed by 
and contracting with an owner to improve an owner's property * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) `Improve or 
improvement' means:

* * * * * 
*

"(B) Any work performed 
or material furnished for the permanent change of any real property; * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"(v) `Owner' as used in 
this act means: 

"(A) With respect to 
construction liens: any person with a legal or equitable interest in the 
property to be changed, altered or improved, for whose use or benefit any 
improvement shall be made or any materials furnished * * 
*."

One who improves 
real property but does not satisfy the definition of a contractor is a 
subcontractor or materialman under § 29-1-201(a)(vi):

"(vi) `Subcontractor' or 
`materialman' means a person other than a contractor performing work or 
furnishing materials to an owner or a contractor under contract * * 
*."

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that a lien claimant 
who furnishes materials to the owner of the property being improved, pursuant to 
a contract, is a contractor and entitled to 120 days from the last date of 
delivery of materials in which to file a lien.

[¶11.]  Appellant fashions its own definition of 
contractor as a "person employed by and contracting with an owner to improve an 
owner's property, by performing work or furnishing materials." Appellant, in 
effect, paraphrases the statutory definition of improvement, § 
29-1-201(a)(iii)(B), underlined above, and adds it to the statutory definition 
of contractors. § 29-1-201(a)(i). Appellant's definition is misleading and 
improper. The fact that "improvement" is defined in the disjunctive, to include 
"work performed or material furnished" for the improvement of real property, 
does not relate to or affect the definitions of "contractor," "subcontractor," 
or "materialman."

[¶12.]  The statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous. A "contractor" is a person "employed by and contracting with" an 
owner. § 29-1-201(a)(i)(A). A "materialman" is a person "other than a contractor 
* * * furnishing materials to an owner or contractor under contract." Appellant 
does not fit the statutory definition of a contractor here in that it was not 
"employed by" the owner, even if we assume it contracted with the 
owner.

[¶13.]  In American Buildings Company v. Wheelers 
Stores, Wyo., 585 P.2d 845, 847 (1978), we 
said:

"* * * [W]hen a contract 
concerns the construction of improvements to real property, `contractor' has a 
specialized meaning related to the building trades; and it is in this sense that 
`contractor' is connected to the law of mechanics' liens, as is a 
`subcontractor' and one who supplied materials. The latter has come to be known 
as a `materialman'. Statutory terms must be construed in connection with the 
subject matter with which they are used. Morrison-Knudson Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 1943, 58 Wyo. 500, 135 P.2d 927.

* * * * * 
*

"The authority is 
overwhelming that one who merely furnishes materials to the owner or a 
contractor is a materialman, and not a contractor or subcontractor, within the 
meaning of the mechanics' lien laws. Anno., short-titled `Mechanic's Lien - Who 
Is Materialman,' 141 A.L.R. 321. See also, A.L.R. Bluebooks of Later Decisions. 
As concluded by the same annotation, one who not only furnishes materials, but 
installs them, is a contractor or a subcontractor, and not a materialman, within 
the meaning of mechanics' lien laws. * * *"

[¶14.]  Appellant distinguishes the case before 
us from the American Buildings Company case because the lien statute applicable 
in the case here included definitions while the lien statute applicable in that 
case did not. We do not believe the amendment overruled the American Buildings 
case. A supplier of materials cannot be converted into a contractor, as 
appellant has tried to do, by expanding the statutory definition of 
contractor.

[¶15.]  We hold that appellant was a materialman 
and did not file its lien statement within the time provided by 
statute.

II

[¶16.]  The judgment of the trial court can be 
affirmed for the additional reason that appellant did not give proper notice of 
a lien to the owners of the property. We have held that a district court 
judgment may be affirmed on any legal ground appearing in the record. Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981); and Skinner v. 
Skinner, Wyo., 601 P.2d 543 (1979). Other issues were 
presented by appellees to the district court which could have been the basis of 
a summary judgment:

1) Did appellant give 
adequate pre-lien notice?

2) Was appellant's 
pre-lien notice defective because it did not state from whom the claim was 
due?

3) Are appellant's liens 
invalid because they were filed in the name of a nonexistent company and suit to 
foreclose was brought in the name of a nonexistent 
company?

[¶17.]  Section 29-1-201(a)(v)(A) defines owner 
to include "any person with a legal or equitable interest in the property." 
Appellees Walters and Valaseks filed their deeds to the property on October 12 
and 29, 1982. The notices of intent to file a lien were not sent to Baird until 
December 22 and December 30, 1982. Appellees Walters and Valaseks had legal 
title to the property about two months before notice was sent, and appellants 
are presumed to have knowledge of such from the recordings. Appellees Walters 
and Valaseks should have been included among those to whom the notice was sent. 
We so held in Davis v. Big Horn Lumber 
Co., 14 Wyo. 517, 85 P. 980 (1906). Appellant 
distinguishes Davis and the case before us on the 
basis that the statute at the time of Davis required the lien to specify "the name of 
the owner or owners," whereas the present statute requires the lien statement to 
contain the "name and address of the person against whose property the lien is 
filed." This is a distinction without a difference. Obviously, the "name * * * 
of the person against whose property the lien was filed" in this case was the 
Walters in one instance and the Valaseks in the other. Any effort to turn this 
language into a direction to give the notice only to the owner of the property 
at the time of contract is contrary to the purpose of giving 
notice.

[¶18.]  The statutory direction is 
clear:

"Before filing a lien 
pursuant to this chapter every person shall give ten (10) days notice to the 
owner or his agent in writing of any claim against a building or an improvement 
or for materials furnished stating the amount of any claim and from whom it is 
due." (Emphasis added.) Section 29-2-107.

The notice must 
go to the "owner or his agent." Common sense would make this so. In this case, 
for example, why should Baird care if a lien is placed on the property of 
appellees Walters or Valaseks. Appellees Walters and Valaseks do care. If they 
had timely notice of the lien, they might have been in a position to withhold 
some payments to Baird or otherwise assure payment by Baird. The fact that the 
owner may be other than the one owing the claim is recognized in § 
29-1-301(b)(iii) and (v), wherein the lien statement is required to contain both 
the "name and address of the person against whose property the lien is filed" 
and the "name of the person against whom the lien claim is 
made."

[¶19.]  The purpose of our recording statutes is 
to give constructive notice. They are designed to prevent fraud. Cheyenne National Bank v. Citizens Savings 
Bank, Wyo., 391 P.2d 933 (1964); Torgeson v. Connelly, Wyo., 
348 P.2d 63 (1960); Boswell v. First National Bank, 16 Wyo. 161, 92 P. 624 
(1907).

[¶20.]  Inasmuch as appellant failed to comply 
with the requirement of the lien statute in not giving proper notice to the 
owners of the property, i.e., appellees Walters and Valaseks, the lien is 
ineffective. We can affirm the trial court in its summary judgment because 1) 
appellant was a materialman rather than a contractor and did not file notice of 
intent to file a lien within the time required by statute, and 2) proper notice 
of intent to file a lien was not given.

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 29-2-101, W.S. 
1977 (June 1981 Replacement), provides:

"(a) Every person 
performing any work on or furnishing any materials or plans for any building or 
any improvement upon land shall have for his work done or plans or materials 
furnished a lien upon the building or improvements, and upon the land of the 
owner on which they are situated to the extent of one (1) acre. If the 
improvements cover more than one (1) acre the lien shall extend to all the 
additional land covered thereby.

"(b) To have a lien the 
work or materials shall be furnished under a contract.

"(c) Notwithstanding 
subsection (a) of this section if the land subject to a lien is located in any 
city, town or subdivision the lien shall extend to the entire lot upon which the 
building or improvement is located."

2 Section 29-1-301(a), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1981 Replacement), requires:

"(a) In order to have a 
perfected lien pursuant to this title, a lien claimant shall file with the 
county clerk a lien statement sworn to before a notary public. The county clerk 
shall file the statement and index by date, name of claimant and property owner, 
and legal description." 

ROSE, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom CARDINE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶22.]  Under the plain and unambiguous language 
of our construction-lien statutes, §§ 29-1-201 through 29-2-109, W.S. 1977, 
Union Manufacturing and Supply Company, Inc. (Union) qualified as a contractor 
and timely perfected its construction liens within the prescribed 120-day 
period. In addition, Union acted in accordance with every authority of which I 
am aware by sending pre-lien notices of its claims only to the property owner 
actually obligated on the construction contract. Therefore, I would have 
reversed the summary judgments entered in this case by the district 
court.

CONTRACTOR OR 
MATERIALMAN

[¶23.]  As discussed in the majority opinion, 
Union timely filed its lien statements with the county clerk only if it 
qualified as a contractor, entitled to the extended filing period afforded by § 
29-2-106(a).1 Our construction lien statutes 
precisely define "contractor" and related terms. Section 29-1-201(a), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"(a) Except as otherwise 
provided, as used in this title:

"(i) `Contractor' 
means:

"(A) A person employed by 
and contracting with an owner to improve an owner's property * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) `Improve or 
improvement' means:

* * * * * 
*

"(B) Any work performed 
or material furnished for the permanent change of any real property; * * 
*"

To know whether 
a person is a contractor, it obviously is necessary to consult the statutory 
definition of "improve," since that term appears in the definition of 
"contractor." I am at a loss to understand how the majority can hold that the 
statutory definition of "improve or improvement" does not relate to or affect 
the statutory definition of "contractor." The meaning of "contractor" depends upon the meaning of 
"improve."

[¶24.]  According to the plain, unambiguous 
language of § 29-1-201(a)(i)(A) and (a)(iii)(B), a contractor is one who enters 
into an agreement with an owner to perform work or furnish material for the 
permanent change of the owner's real property. Where the legislature expresses 
its intent this clearly in the language of the statute, we must give effect to 
that intent. We collected our holdings with respect to this rule in Board of County Commissioners of the County 
of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, 1184, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 
(1981):

"The primary objective in 
ascertaining the meaning of a law is legislative intent; and, if such intent is 
expressed clearly and without ambiguity in the language of the statute, such 
intent must be given effect. Intent must be found in the language of the statute 
itself. Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo. 1979, 598 P.2d 432, 434. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and 
conveys clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules 
of statutory construction; and the court has no right to look for and impose 
another meaning. Wyoming State Treasurer 
v. City of Casper, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687, 698. The plain, ordinary and 
usual meaning of words used in a statute controls in the absence of clear 
statutory provisions to the contrary. State v. Stern, Wyo. 1974, 526 P.2d 344, 
346. Courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not 
falling within its express provisions. Lo 
Sasso v. Braun, Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 630, 632. Courts will not usurp the power of the 
legislature by deciding what should have been said. Barber v. State Highway Commission, 
1959, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723." (Emphasis added.)

Through 
precisely defined terms, the legislature has indicated its intent to include 
among contractors those persons who contract with the owner to furnish material 
for the permanent change of the owner's real property. The significant feature 
which distinguishes the contractor from the materialman (who also furnishes 
materials under contract, § 29-1-201(a)(vi)2) is the fact that the contractor 
deals directly with the property owner. Section 
29-1-201(a)(i)(A).

[¶25.]  Ignoring our well-established rules 
concerning the ascertainment of legislative intent, the majority turn to the 
judicial definitions of "contractor" and "materialman" developed in American Buildings Company v. Wheelers 
Stores, Wyo., 585 P.2d 845 (1978). We decided that case, however, under our 
previous construction-lien statutes, which included no definitions of the terms 
"contractor," "subcontractor" or "materialman." We attempted, therefore, to 
construe the statutory meaning of those terms according to their usage in the 
building trade. Since our present lien laws precisely define these crucial 
terms, we no longer need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Board of County Commissioners of the County 
of Campbell v. Ridenour, supra.

[¶26.]  By amending the construction-lien 
statutes in 1981, the legislature rejected our definitions of "contractor" and 
"materialman" used in American Buildings 
Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra, and restored the law of construction 
liens announced by this court in Jordan 
v. Natrona Lumber Co., 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P.2d 378, 113 A.L.R. 1377 (1938). 
Jordan presented a factual situation remarkably similar to the instant case. 
There, the lumber company, pursuant to a contract with the property owner's 
lessee, had furnished only building materials for the improvement of the 
property. Receiving no payment, the lumber company filed a claim of lien 114 
days after delivering the last materials to the project. The owner argued that 
the lumber company did not qualify as an original contractor and, therefore, was 
required to file its lien statement within 90 days under § 66-508, W.R.S. 
1931,3 the predecessor of § 29-2-106(a), 
supra n. 1. The court rejected that argument saying:

"It is said that the 
lumber company must be regarded as included within the words of the quoted 
statute, `and every other person'; that one who supplies only material for a 
building cannot be regarded as an original contractor * * *. These contentions, 
also, we are obliged to say are without merit.

"In Ambrose Mfg. Co. v. Gapen, 22 Mo. App. 
397, the court said:

"`It is contended by 
appellants that the term original contractor, as used in the statute, has 
reference solely to those who may do service, by way of work, labor, or 
superintendence, upon the building.

"`The point is not well 
taken. It has been specially ruled by our supreme court, that a material man may be an original 
contractor, and that he is, in fact, such contractor, if he furnish the material 
on a contract with the owner. Hearne v. Ry. Co., 53 Mo. 
324.'

* * * * * 
*

"The decision in the Hearne Case was rendered in 1873 and 
some time before our mechanics' lien law was adopted by the territorial 
Legislature. The principle would seem applicable that a statute borrowed from 
the legislation of another state will be presumed to have been adopted with the 
construction placed upon it by the courts of that state. [Citations.]" (Emphasis 
added.) 75 P.2d  at 384-385.

The definitions 
section of our current construction-lien law reflects the legislature's approval 
of the result in Jordan.

[¶27.]  I would have held that one who furnishes 
materials for the permanent change of real property, under a contract with the 
owner of such property, is a contractor entitled to 120 days within which to 
perfect his lien under §§ 29-1-201(a) and 29-2-106(a). Accordingly, Union 
qualified as a contractor in furnishing construction materials under its 
agreement with the owner and timely filed its lien statements with the county 
clerk.

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE 
A LIEN

[¶28.]  The majority deny appellant the right to 
enforce its construction liens on the additional ground that the notices of 
intent to file such liens were sent to the contracting property owner and not to 
the persons who owned the property at the time of notification. This holding 
places Wyoming squarely in opposition to every case on point of which I am 
aware. Furthermore, Davis v. Big Horn 
Lumber Co., 14 Wyo. 517, 85 P. 980 (1906), the case cited by the majority as 
controlling, deals with recorded lien statements and has absolutely nothing to 
do with the notice of intent to file a lien at issue in the instant 
case.

[¶29.]  Section 29-2-107, W.S. 1977, requires a 
lien claimant to notify the property owner of a claim prior to the actual filing 
of a lien statement:

"Notice of intention to 
file lien.

"Before filing a lien 
pursuant to this chapter every person shall give ten (10) days notice to the 
owner or his agent in writing of any claim against a building or an improvement 
or for materials furnished stating the amount of any claim and from whom it is 
due."

This pre-lien 
notice serves to warn the owner obligated on the construction contract against 
paying the original contractor while outstanding claims exist in favor of 
laborers and materialmen, Kirby Building 
Systems, Inc. v. Independence Partnership No. One, Wyo., 634 P.2d 342, 346 
(1981); Jordan v. Natrona Lumber Co., 
supra, 75 P.2d  at 386. In addition, the ten-day notice affords the owner an 
opportunity to discharge the debt and prevent the perfection of a lien against 
the property, R.L. Sweet Lumber Company 
v. E.L. Lane, Inc., Mo., 513 S.W.2d 365, 76 A.L.R.3d 596, 603 
(1974).

[¶30.]  To accomplish these purposes, the notice 
of intent to file a lien must inform the owner of the property who entered into 
the construction contract, since only such owner has a contractual obligation to 
pay the claimant. Courts uniformly have held to this effect, as the A.L.R. 
Annotation, "Who is the `owner' within mechanic's lien statute requiring notice 
of claim," 76 A.L.R.3d 605, 622-623, observes:

"Thus, in regard to a 
prelien notice, such as * * * a notice of intention to claim a lien, it is held 
that notice is properly given and is required to be given to the owner at the 
time the contract was made, or the work commenced or the materials furnished; 
and notice to a subsequent owner particularly one who becomes such after the 
completion of the work or the furnishing of the materials for which the lien is 
claimed, is not required * *."

The annotation 
cites no cases which hold for the contrary position adopted by the 
majority.

[¶31.]  The "general rule" has been distilled by 
Missouri appellate courts interpreting a pre-lien notice statute identical to 
ours in all aspects pertinent here:

"* * * The general rule 
is that the notice must be given to the one who owned the property at the time 
the contract for the improvement was made. [Citations.] And it has been held 
that, if the property is conveyed while the improvement is in progress, a notice 
to the grantee is not necessary. [Citations.]" P.M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v. Klein, 100 
Mo. App. 289, 73 S.W. 313 (1903).

The court in Edward McLundie & Co. v. Mount, 145 
Mo. App. 660, 123 S.W. 966, 967 (1909), approved this rule even though the 
contracting owner no longer had an interest in the property which would require 
his joinder in the subsequent foreclosure action.

[¶32.]  This general rule comports with the 
definition of "owner" set out in our construction-lien statutes. Section 
29-1-201(a)(v)(A) provides:

"(v) `Owner' as used in 
this act means:

"(A) With respect to 
construction liens: any person with a legal or equitable interest in the property to be changed, altered or improved, 
for whose use or benefit any improvement shall be made or any 
materials furnished; * * *" (Emphasis added.)

This statute 
contemplates that the owner is one who holds an interest in the property at the 
time that action is taken to improve the property.

[¶33.]  The majority ask,

"* * * [W]hy should Baird 
[the contracting property owner] care if a lien is placed on the property of 
appellees Walters or Valaseks?"

Baird should 
care, obviously, because the perfection of the construction liens will place 
Baird in breach of the statutory covenants in its warranty deeds.4 See Bakken v. Price, Wyo., 613 P.2d 1222, 
1229-1230 (1980). The pre-lien notices gave Baird a final opportunity to pay the 
contractor and avoid the filing of the liens.

[¶34.]  It is true that the perfection and enforcement of the liens affect the 
interests of the current property owners. However, their dilemma would not have 
been eased by the receipt of pre-lien 
notices. They had closed their transactions with Baird two full months 
before the pre-lien notices were sent. It is doubtful that they were in a 
position at that time to withhold payments to Baird, as the majority suggest. 
The current owners' remedies lie against Baird, as grantor by warranty deeds, after the lien statements have been 
recorded. While pre-lien notice to the current, as well as the contracting, 
owner would be courteous and desirable, a claimant should not be denied 
enforcement of his lien when, in compliance with universal authority, he has 
notified the entity against whom the claim for nonpayment is 
made.

[¶35.]  I would have reversed the summary 
judgments entered by the district court and remanded this case for 
trial.

1 Section 29-2-106(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Every contractor 
shall file his lien statement within one hundred twenty (120) days and every 
other person shall file within ninety (90) days:

"(i) After the last day 
when work was performed or materials furnished under contract; 
or

"(ii) From the date the 
work was substantially completed or substantial completion of the contract to 
furnish materials, whichever is earlier; or

"(iii) With respect to an 
employee or subcontractor, after the last day he performed work at the direction 
of his employer or contractor."

2 Section 29-1-201(a)(vi) 
provides:

"(vi) `Subcontractor' or 
`materialman' means a person other than a contractor performing work or 
furnishing materials to an owner or a contractor under contract * * 
*."

3 Section 66-508, W.R.S. 
1931, provided in part:

"It shall be the duty of 
every original contractor, within four months, and every subcontractor, and 
every journeyman and day laborer and every other person seeking to obtain the 
benefits of the provisions of this article, within ninety days after the 
indebtedness shall have accrued, to file in the office of the register of deeds 
of the proper county, a just and true account of the demand due him, her, or 
them, after all just credits shall have been given, which is to be a lien upon 
such building or improvements * * *."

4 By virtue of its 
warranty deeds, Baird covenanted that the conveyed properties were free from 
encumbrances and that the grantees would enjoy quiet and peaceful possession of 
the premises. Section 34-2-103, W.S. 1977, provides:

"Every deed in substance 
in the [standard warranty deed] form [§ 34-2-102], when otherwise duly executed, 
shall be deemed and held a conveyance in fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs 
and assigns, with covenants on the part of the grantor, (a) that at the time of 
the making and delivery of such deed he was lawfully seized of an indefeasible 
estate in fee simple in and to the premises therein described, and had good 
right and power to convey the same; (b) that the same were then free from all 
incumbrances; and (c) that he warrants to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, 
the quiet and peaceful possession of such premises, and will defend the title 
thereto against all persons who may lawfully claim the same. And such covenants 
shall be obligatory upon the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, as 
fully, and with like effect as if written at length in such 
deed."