Title: People v. Johnson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89910-Agenda 3-March 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								LENARD JOHNSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 19, 2002.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Petitioner, Lenard Johnson, pleaded guilty in 1990 to the
murder of 11-year-old Donald Buske, the aggravated criminal
sexual assaults of two female minors who were visitors at
Donald's home, and home invasion. He waived a jury trial for
sentencing. The circuit court of Montgomery County found three
aggravating factors, concluded that there were no mitigating
factors, and sentenced petitioner to death. Petitioner filed a late
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court heard
upon the order of this court and denied. On direct appeal, this
court affirmed the murder and sexual assault convictions and
corresponding sentences, but vacated the conviction and sentence
for home invasion. See People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356 (1993).
Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied. Johnson v. Illinois, 512 U.S. 1227,
129 L. Ed. 2d 848, 114 S. Ct. 2725 (1994).
	Petitioner subsequently filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
1994)). The circuit court dismissed several of his claims and
denied others. Because petitioner was sentenced to death for the
underlying convictions, his appeal lies directly to this court. 134
Ill. 2d R. 651(a). He raises five issues in this appeal: (1) whether
he must be granted a new trial because, at the time he pleaded
guilty, facts existed that would have raised a bona fide doubt as to
his competence; (2) whether he received effective assistance of
trial counsel because he had only one attorney and no mitigation
specialist, (3) whether his court-appointed attorney was operating
under a conflict of interest, (4) whether his death sentence is
disproportionate to sentences imposed on similarly situated
defendants, and (5) whether the death penalty statute is
unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
	This court has previously described the facts underlying
petitioner's conviction and sentencing in our opinion on his direct
appeal. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356. Thus, we will refer to those facts
only as necessary in the discussion of the issues raised in
petitioner's post-conviction petition. Because of the unusual
procedural history of this case, however, a rather detailed summary
of the post-conviction proceedings is necessary.

POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
	In 1995, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief
containing 15 separate claims plus a "catch-all" claim, purporting
to incorporate by reference all claims made in his pretrial and post-trial motions and his direct appeal. The State filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to section 122-5 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-5
(West 1994)), arguing that all of the issues raised by petitioner
either were or could have been raised on direct appeal and were,
therefore, barred by waiver or res judicata. In addition, the State
argued that petitioner had not presented any new evidence that
would justify an evidentiary hearing.
	After a hearing on January 26, 1996, the circuit court granted
the State's motion, in part, dismissing all but five of petitioner's
original 16 claims and directing the State to file an answer to the
remaining claims, enumerated I, II, III, X, and XV. The State
apparently filed its answer on March 1, 1996. The table of contents
provided with the record indicates that the State's answer is to be
found at page 812 of the common law record. Pages 812 and 813
are missing, so we are unable to determine how the State answered
the five claims that survived the motion to dismiss.
	On May 23, 1997, petitioner filed a supplement to his petition,
adding two additional claims, numbered XVII and XVIII. At all
times relevant to this matter, the Act has specifically prohibited the
filing of further pleadings after the circuit court has ruled on a
motion to dismiss. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1994, 1996, 1998)
(after denial of motion to dismiss and filing of an answer by the
State,"[n]o other or further pleadings shall be filed except as the
court may order on its own motion or on that of either party"). The
record does not contain a motion by petitioner seeking leave to
supplement his petition with two additional claims after the circuit
court ruled on the State's first motion to dismiss. However, the
State did not challenge petitioner's filing of additional pleadings.
Instead, the State filed a second motion to dismiss, which was
denied after a hearing on March 17, 1998. The State then filed an
answer, denying the allegations contained in both of the new
claims. Thereafter, the State apparently sought leave to file a
motion for summary judgment. The record contains an April 9,
1998, docket entry with the notation "Confer[ence] call w/o
record. SA to file Motion for Summ. Jmt. by 5/4/98 at 4 p.m."
	On May 4, 1998, the State filed a "Motion for Summary
Judgment" in which it argued that the two claims raised in the
supplemental petition could be resolved by the circuit court based
entirely on its examination of the record and that, therefore, an
evidentiary hearing would not be necessary. The motion, however,
neither cited section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998)), nor requested that judgment be
entered for the State as a matter of law.
	On June 19, 2000, the circuit court heard arguments on the
State's motion for summary judgment and denied it, thereby
indicating its determination that two newly added claims could not
be resolved purely as a matter of law. Immediately thereafter, the
circuit court heard arguments on the merits of all seven of the
pending claims, the five that survived the State's original motion
to dismiss and the two claims raised in the supplemental petition.
Petitioner describes this as a "stipulated hearing," because no
testimony was presented.
	The circuit court based its ruling on the record as it stood on
June 19, 2000, including the transcripts of the original
proceedings, the deposition of trial counsel, David Grigsby, which
had been taken on November 4, 1998, the 1995 report of
mitigation specialist Jeffrey Eno, and the reports of four mental
health professionals who examined petitioner at various times.
Psychiatrist M. Scott Hamilton examined him in 1990, prior to his
pleading guilty. Psychiatrist Philipp E. Bornstein apparently
examined petitioner prior to the entry of his plea, but did not
provide a written report until several days thereafter. Clinical
psychologist Mark Ramsden evaluated him after his conviction
and sentencing, but prior to a hearing on his late motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. In addition, clinical psychologist Michael
M. Gelbort evaluated petitioner on April 8, 1999. Both the Grigsby
affidavit and the Gelbort evaluation were made part of the record
after the circuit court denied the State's motions to dismiss. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied the seven
remaining counts of the petition.
ANALYSIS
	The Act provides a remedy to a criminal defendant whose
federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in
his original trial or sentencing hearing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A petition for post-conviction relief is not an
appeal of the underlying judgment; rather, it is a collateral
proceeding. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502. As such, a post-conviction
proceeding allows inquiry only into constitutional issues that were
not, and could not have been, adjudicated on direct appeal. Towns,
182 Ill. 2d  at 502. Thus, issues that were raised and decided on
direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res
judicata; issues that could have been raised, but were not, are
considered waived. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03.
	Post-conviction proceedings in capital cases are governed by
section 122.2-1(b) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122.2-1(b) (West
1994)), which requires the circuit court to determine initially
"whether the petitioner, if indigent, wants to be represented by
counsel. After the petitioner makes that choice, the matter is then
docketed for further proceedings." People v. Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d 37, 40 (2001). The State must then either answer the petition or
move to dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1994); Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d  at 40. If the State moves to dismiss the petition, the circuit
court must examine and rule on the legal sufficiency of each of
defendant's claims, taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v.
Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1999). If the allegations of the post-conviction petition, supported by the trial record and any
accompanying affidavits, do not make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation, the petition may be dismissed. People v.
Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 448 (2001). If the petition does make a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the matter
proceeds to a hearing on the merits of petitioner's claims. People
v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998).
	Our detailed recitation of the various stages of this matter
before the circuit court is necessary to our determination of the
standard of review. Both parties suggest de novo review, citing
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-89 (1998), in which this
court determined that plenary review is appropriate when the
circuit court has granted the State's motion to dismiss based on its
determination that the allegations in a post-conviction petition are
insufficient to demonstrate a constitutional deprivation that entitles
the petitioner to relief under the Act. The lengthy explanation of
the standard of review in Coleman has since been reduced to a
simple formula: de novo review for the dismissal of post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing and review for
manifest error when petitioner's constitutional claims were denied
following an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., People v.
Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, slip op. at 8 (May 23, 2002); People v.
Topps, 309 Ill. App. 3d 813, 819 (1999).
	In the present case, the parties agree that there was no
"evidentiary hearing." Petitioner describes the hearing that took
place after the State's motion for summary judgment was denied
as a "stipulated hearing." The Act, however, does not mention a
"stipulated hearing." Indeed, the words "evidentiary hearing" do
not appear in the Act. Rather, the Act provides that if the petition
is not dismissed pursuant to section 122-2.1, "the court shall order
the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance
with Sections 122-4 through 122-6." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b)
(West 1994). Section 122-6 governs such "further consideration."
Under this provision, the circuit court "may receive proof by
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence." 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 1994).
	Black's Law Dictionary defines "hearing" as a "judicial
session usu[ally] open to the public, held for the purpose of
deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses
testifying." Black's Law Dictionary 725 (7th ed. 1999). The more
specific term "evidentiary hearing" is a "hearing at which evidence
is presented, as opposed to a hearing at which only legal argument
is presented." Black's Law Dictionary 725 (7th ed. 1999). It is the
section 122-6 hearing that has come to be called an "evidentiary
hearing."
	The circuit court declined to dispose of seven of petitioner's
claims as a matter of law by initially denying the State's motion to
dismiss 5 of the 16 original claims and then subsequently rejecting
the State's motion to dismiss and its motion for summary
judgment as to the two additional claims. At the June 19, 2000,
hearing, the circuit court, having previously found that each of
these seven claims did make a substantial showing of a violation
of a constitutional right, allowed the parties to address each claim
on the merits. Thus, this proceeding was a section 122-6 hearing
even though no live testimony was presented.
	The question that we must resolve is whether de novo review
is appropriate where no new evidence was presented at the section
122-6 hearing that would require the circuit court to assess the
credibility of witnesses. We recently addressed a similar question
in People v. Caballero, No. 88784, slip op. at 17-18 (October 18,
2002), where the circuit court, at the section 122-6 hearing, heard
argument based on the record, but did not hear testimony. We
concluded:
		"The de novo standard of review is applicable when the
issue presented is purely a question of law. People v.
Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 217 (2000) (stating that de
novo review is appropriate when there are no factual or
credibility disputes and the appeal, therefore, 'involves a
pure question of law'); see also People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2000) (stating that de novo review is applicable to
questions of statutory interpretation or other questions of
law). In Hall, the defendant urged de novo review because
the rulings at issue 'involved no fact-finding based on the
demeanor or credibility of the witnesses because the
evidence was written.' Hall, 195 Ill. 2d  at 21. We rejected
this argument because the issue presented, whether certain
evidence should have been admitted at trial, was not a
pure question of law. Some deference was due to the trial
court's rulings because 'the trial court exercised discretion
***, i.e., the court based these rulings on the specific
circumstances of this case and not on a broadly applicable
rule.' Hall, 195 Ill. 2d  at 21."
	Although the circuit court in Caballero heard no new
evidence and credibility of witnesses was not a concern, the circuit
court did have to weigh the facts and make inferences therefrom
in order to rule on "the specific circumstances" of the case.
Nevertheless, we applied a de novo standard of review because,
given the fact that more than a decade had passed between the trial
and the post-conviction proceeding, the circuit court had no
special expertise or familiarity with the case that would have made
it more capable than this court of weighing the facts presented by
the written record and drawing necessary inferences.
	In Coleman, we observed that the "proper standard of review
cannot be articulated without first examining the substantive and
procedural backdrop against which the appealed order or ruling
arose." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 378. Thus, in determining the
standard of review, we consider not only the procedural posture
(whether the circuit court was ruling on a motion to dismiss or
after a section 122-6 hearing), but the nature of the question
(whether it is a pure question of law or a question of fact), and the
degree to which the court must assess credibility, weigh facts, and
draw inferences.
	In the present case, we will review de novo those claims
dismissed by the circuit court in response to the State's first
motion to dismiss. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89. These are his
conflict of interest argument (claim XI in petitioner's original
petition and point III in his current brief) and his various
arguments about the constitutionality of the death penalty statute
(claims IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and XIII in his original petition
and point V in his current brief).
	Petitioner's point IV, regarding similarly situated defendants,
is an amalgam of his original claims X and XIV, one of which was
dismissed and one of which was denied after the section 122-6
hearing. Because this issue is one that can be resolved as a matter
of law, without the need to consider the specific circumstances of
this case, we review it de novo. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d  at 21.
	As to the claims denied following the section 122-6 hearing,
we will give some deference to the circuit court in
acknowledgment of its familiarity with petitioner's case and
particularly with the professional performance of trial counsel.
We, therefore, review petitioner's arguments regarding his fitness
to plead guilty (point I) and the performance of trial counsel (point
II) for manifest error. Manifest error is that which is "clearly
evident, plain, and indisputable." People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368,
384-85 (1997).

I. Fitness to Plead Guilty
	Although not set out as separate arguments within petitioner's
brief, his fitness claim offers two distinct rationales. First,
petitioner makes statements suggesting that the trial court actually
had a bona fide doubt as to his fitness and, thus, should have
conducted a hearing to determine his capacity to enter a knowing
and voluntary plea. Second, even if the trial court's comments do
not reflect an actual doubt as to his fitness, he argues that he has
produced new evidence that would have raised a bona fide doubt
if it had been available to the trial court. He further argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing
and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue
on direct appeal. He asserts that, had either trial or appellate
counsel performed effectively, there is a reasonable probability the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
	The due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV) prohibits the conviction and sentencing of a
person who is incompetent to stand trial. See Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 172, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 113, 95 S. Ct. 896, 904
(1975); People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 328-29 (2000). Our
state statutes have long contained provisions designed to safeguard
this right (see 725 ILCS 5/104-10 et seq. (West 2000)). This
statutory scheme has been held to adequately protect a defendant's
due process right to be prosecuted only when fit to stand trial.
Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 328-29. By statute, a defendant is
"presumed to be fit to stand trial or to plead, and be sentenced."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-10. However, when a bona
fide doubt of the defendant's fitness exists, the court must order a
fitness hearing so that the question of fitness may be resolved
before the matter proceeds any further. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,
par. 104-11(a). Once a bona fide doubt is demonstrated, the State
has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant is fit. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
104-11(c). A defendant is fit to stand trial, plead, or be sentenced
if he is able to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989, ch. 38, par. 104-10.

A. Actual Doubt
	The argument that the trial court had actual doubts as to
petitioner's fitness to plead guilty was available to him at trial and
on direct appeal. It is, therefore, subject to waiver. However, the
doctrine of waiver will be relaxed where the alleged waiver results
from the incompetence of appellate counsel. People v. Mahaffey,
194 Ill. 2d 154, 171 (2000). To avoid application of the doctrine
of waiver, petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue, first, that the trial court failed to carry out its
duty to sua sponte hold a fitness hearing and, second, that trial
counsel failed to recognize the trial court's actual doubts as to his
fitness and to request a fitness hearing based on those actual
doubts.
	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
petitioner must show both that: (1) counsel's representation was
so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the
deficient performance so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a
fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). With regard to the
performance of trial counsel, this means the petitioner must show
that counsel's errors were so serious, and his performance so
deficient, that he did not function as the "counsel" guaranteed by
the sixth amendment. In addition, petitioner must prove there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. People v. Whitehead,
169 Ill. 2d 355, 380-81 (1996). As applied to a claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the defendant must show that the
failure to raise the issue was objectively unreasonable and that, but
for this failure, a reasonable probability exists that his sentence or
conviction would have been reversed. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at
381. If either prong of the Strickland test is not met, petitioner's
claim must fail. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 380-81.
	As evidence of an actual bona fide doubt of his fitness,
petitioner points to several instances in the record where the trial
court expressed concern regarding his ability to understand the
proceedings. At the arraignment hearing on June 4, 1990, the trial
court, after granting the defense motion for a psychiatric
evaluation, questioned petitioner: "Do you believe you understand
what it is that you are charged with in each of these six Bills of
Indictment, Mr. Johnson?" "Do you believe you understand what
the possible penalties can be in the event that you plead guilty or
are found guilty of any or all of these Indictments?" "Do you
believe you understand what your rights are?" After petitioner
answered each of these questions in the affirmative, the trial court
turned to defense counsel: "Do you believe he understands, Mr.
Grigsby?" Defense counsel replied, "Yes, I do, Your Honor." This
same sort of exchange-the trial court's questioning of the
defendant, the defendant's affirmative answer, and verification by
defense counsel-occurred repeatedly at this hearing.
	Petitioner first attempted to plead guilty at a hearing on
August 20, 1990. Defense counsel informed the trial court that the
first psychiatric examination showed petitioner to be fit for trial.
After several motions were disposed of, defense counsel informed
the court that petitioner wished to plead guilty. The trial court
questioned him about his discussions with counsel. He stated that
he had received adequate advice. The trial court admonished him
that he could be sentenced to death if he pleaded guilty. Petitioner
stated that he understood. The trial court concluded the hearing
with the remark, "Mr. Johnson, I would like you to take some time
to further consider whether or not that is what you want to do in
this case. I want you to consider it very seriously, sir."
	A hearing was held on September 7, 1990, for the purpose of
entry of petitioner's guilty plea. After defense counsel withdrew
several pending motions at petitioner's request, including the
request for a second psychiatric examination, the trial court
commented on counsel's duty "not to proceed in motions where
your client, in the exercise of competent judgment, has indicated
that you ought not." The trial court further stated:
		"[I]f there is some question concerning the defendant's
competency, that is a matter which counsel has an
obligation to bring to the attention of the Court by way of
motion seeking full expiration [sic] of that matter,
irrespective of defendant's wishes. I have seen nothing in
Mr. Johnson's conduct before this Court that leads me to
think that there is any question concerning his
competence. There is nothing in the reports of the
psychiatrist that was appointed at your request on his
behalf which leads me to think that there is any question
concerning his competence and ability to proceed here in
this case. But if you, as an officer of this court, have any
questions, then I believe it is incumbent upon you to
request an additional examination."
The trial court asked counsel directly whether he had any doubts
regarding his client's competence and counsel responded that he
had "always found [petitioner] competent and able to talk about
the case and his wishes." Petitioner's guilty plea was not accepted
at that time, however, because he disputed the factual basis
presented by the State. During the delay between this hearing and
the actual entry of his guilty plea, petitioner was evaluated by a
second psychiatrist who also found him fit for trial.
	Petitioner points to such comments as evidence that the trial
court had actual doubts about his fitness. We do not understand
petitioner to be accusing the trial court of being untruthful when
it stated that it had observed no evidence of unfitness. Rather,
petitioner seems to be arguing that the trial court's comments
reflect sufficient uncertainty about his fitness to trigger the court's
duty to order a fitness determination. See People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 367 (2000); 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1996). The
State interprets the same comments as the trial court's merely
taking care to protect a defendant's rights.
	The record supports the State's position. Given the
circumstances, including petitioner's apparent suicide attempt at
the time of his arrest, the trial court was attuned to the possibility
that his mental state was less than stable. The trial court granted
the motion for a psychiatric evaluation, which revealed petitioner
to be fit for trial. In addition to questioning defense counsel
repeatedly about his client's mental state, the trial court expressly
reminded counsel of his duty to raise the fitness issue if indeed he
had any doubts as to his client's condition. Even after petitioner's
insistence that he did not desire a second psychiatric evaluation,
the trial court ordered it done. It, too, revealed that petitioner was
fit. Finally, nothing in petitioner's demeanor or conduct during the
proceedings would have raised an actual bona fide doubt in the
trial court's mind. The trial court repeatedly questioned petitioner
and received answers that demonstrated his understanding of the
nature and purpose of the proceedings. His ability to assist in his
own defense was demonstrated by his withdrawing his initial
guilty plea when he disputed the State's proffered factual basis.
Later, when he was satisfied with the State's recitation of the facts
of his crime, he did enter a guilty plea.
	We, therefore, reject petitioner's claim that the trial court held
an actual bona fide doubt of his fitness for trial but neglected to
conduct a fitness hearing. Thus, we find no manifest error in the
circuit court's denial of petitioner's claim that appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.

B. New Evidence
	The second part of petitioner's fitness claim is that new
evidence, in the form of Ramsden's report and defense counsel
Grigsby's deposition, reveals the existence of certain facts, which
existed at the time he pleaded guilty, and which, had they been
known to the trial court, would have raised a bona fide doubt as to
his fitness. He argues that the existence of these facts is sufficient
to put the burden on the State to prove him fit. See Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989, ch. 38, par. 104-11(c).
	Although, at trial, the existence of a bona fide doubt as to
fitness imposes the burden of proof on the State, the burden in the
present case is on petitioner. He is entitled to post-conviction relief
"only if he shows that the trial court would have found a bona fide
doubt of his fitness and ordered a fitness hearing if it had been
apprised of the evidence now offered." People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 319 (2000).
	The State urges us not to consider the reports of Ramsden and
Gelbort and other evidence developed after the trial court accepted
petitioner's guilty plea, citing People v. Franklin, 48 Ill. 2d 254
(1971), and People v. Wilson, 29 Ill. 2d 82 (1963). These cases do
not support the State's contention. In Franklin, we rejected the
defendant's argument that the mere fact the trial court ordered an
examination by a behavior clinic demonstrated a bona fide doubt
as to his fitness. Franklin, 48 Ill. 2d  at 256-57. In Wilson, the
defendant claimed that his guilty plea was coerced, in part,
because the trial court denied his motion for a "sanity hearing."
We affirmed because, although defense counsel did request a
fitness hearing, he did not present any factual basis to justify his
request. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the requested
examination and hearing. Wilson, 29 Ill. 2d  at 93-94. Neither of
these cases speak to the present situation.
	In People v. Harris, No. 89796, slip op. at 4 (June 20, 2002),
the defendant argued that a bona fide doubt of his fitness existed
at the time of his trial because he suffered from depression, a
personality disorder, and organic brain damage. The State argued
that he had waived any argument that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to seek a fitness hearing by failing to raise it on direct
appeal. Because the defendant's argument was based on evidence
outside the record, however, we determined that the claim should
be considered on the merits. Harris, slip op. at 4-5. To establish
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show
that the facts that would have raised a bona fide doubt of his
fitness for trial existed at the time of his trial, but those facts need
not actually have been known to the court or counsel. Harris, slip
op. at 5-6; People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 319 (2000). We,
therefore, reject the State's suggestion that the new evidence
offered by petitioner should not be considered on post-conviction
review.
	The new evidence includes the deposition of trial counsel,
Grigsby, and the report of the clinical psychologist, Gelbort. In
addition, the record contains information that is not new to this
post-conviction proceeding, but that was not available to the trial
court when it accepted petitioner's guilty plea. This includes his
mother's testimony at the sentencing hearing regarding his history
of mental illness and the report of the clinical psychologist,
Ramsden, who testified at the hearing on petitioner's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. All of the evidence developed after he
pleaded guilty, when considered in combination with the
information known to the trial court at the time, is, according to
petitioner, sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to
stand trial or to enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea.
	Grigsby stated that he had been a public defender for
approximately four years prior to being appointed to represent
petitioner. He previously had defended one other capital
defendant, who also pleaded guilty and waived a jury for
sentencing. Grigsby recalled that petitioner chose to be sentenced
by the judge because he did not want the facts of his crimes
revealed to a jury. In addition, petitioner wanted to be sentenced
to death and thought that the judge would be more likely to impose
the death penalty. Petitioner requested that, at the sentencing stage,
Grigsby not put on any evidence of mitigating factors. Grigsby
thought that petitioner wanted to plead guilty and have a bench
sentencing so that he could "get it over with" as quickly as
possible.
	Gelbort, in 1999, found petitioner to display "a pattern of
internal psychological functioning typically associated with post-traumatic stress disorder," but found "no overt psychopathology."
Gelbort concluded that petitioner was mildly impaired
intellectually and that his most prominent limitation is his visual
defect. Gelbort also found that petitioner demonstrated "organic
brain dysfunction" that affects his cognitive ability and that
"[h]istorical information supports the finding that these deficits
have been present since before the time of the event for which he
is incarcerated."
	Ramsden tested and interviewed petitioner after he was
sentenced to death, but before the hearing on his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. His diagnosis was major depression and
dysthymia. Ramsden concluded that petitioner "appreciated the
wrongfulness of his actions, understood the consequences of his
behavior and was most probably not psychotic." However:
		"[His] suicidal behavior at the time of his arrest and his
reported unwillingness to participate in a meaningful
defense prior to his conviction support the contention that
this was a period of time where he was experiencing an
acute exacerbation of his depressive disorder. The
extreme psychological distress experienced during these
periods significantly influenced and impaired his ability
to determine what actions, statements and behaviors were
in his best interests. In this light, it is difficult to
characterize his behavior at that time as either completely
knowing or completely voluntary. He was driven at that
time by his depressive beliefs that exploitation, ruin and
punishment were the inevitable conclusions of his life and
that nothing he could do would change that outcome."
	Petitioner argues that this new information, when considered
in conjunction with the facts known at the time of his guilty plea
and those that were revealed at his sentencing hearing, create a
bona fide doubt of his fitness.
	At the time it accepted his guilty plea, the trial court was
aware that when the police arrived at the crime scene while his
attack on the girls was still in progress, petitioner attempted to kill
himself by slitting his own wrist and throat. Later, when he was
interviewed in the hospital by a police officer, he claimed that his
body had been present when the murder and sexual assaults took
place, but not his mind. He begged another officer to shoot him.
Petitioner also relies on his mother's testimony at the mitigation
stage of his sentencing hearing regarding his history of psychiatric
treatment, beginning in adolescence, and her opinion that he had
always been "mentally unbalanced."
	The State replies that the two contemporaneous psychiatric
evaluations more accurately reveal petitioner's mental state at the
time he pleaded guilty. Dr. Hamilton examined petitioner in July
1990. He diagnosed pedophilia, chronic depression, and antisocial
personality traits. He concluded, however, that petitioner did "not
meet the criteria for major depression," nor did psychological
testing reveal any "evidence of psychosis or organic mental
syndrome." With regard to petitioner's fitness to stand trial,
Hamilton found that he knew what he was charged with, knew
who his lawyer was, and was aware of potential penalties. He
understood his lawyer's role and the roles of the judge and
prosecutor. Hamilton concluded that petitioner was "capable of
appropriate behavior in the courtroom" and competent to testify if
he chose. Hamilton stated that petitioner was "not motivated to
assist his lawyer in his own defense. This seems largely out of a
feeling of guilt. Although this lack of motivation would certainly
make him difficult to defend, I do not see this impairment as a
product of mental illness."
	Dr. Bornstein diagnosed petitioner with antisocial personality,
pedophilia, chronic alcoholism, possible mild chemical
dependency, and mild dysthymia. He found "no evidence for any
psychiatric disorder which is characterized by psychosis, organic
brain disease, or mental retardation." Bornstein concluded that
petitioner had no psychiatric disorder that rendered him unfit for
trial.
	The State also points to the many instances in the record of
the original proceedings where the trial court asked defense
counsel about petitioner's mental state and defense counsel
repeatedly stated that petitioner understood the proceedings and
was communicating with counsel. In addition, the transcripts
reveal numerous exchanges between the trial court and petitioner
in which he demonstrated his awareness of the proceedings and his
ability to participate.
	With regard to the Ramsden report and opinion, the State
notes that Ramsden expressed no opinion on petitioner's fitness.
Rather, Ramsden was asked to address petitioner's claim that his
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, not his fitness for trial.
Indeed, Ramsden's findings support a finding of fitness. Ramsden
stated that petitioner was alert and oriented to time, place, and
situation; he demonstrated adequate attention and concentration;
he was of at least normal intelligence; his memory was intact; and
his speech was coherent and relevant. Except for his visual
impairment, Ramsden found that petitioner displayed no
significant signs of organic impairment or disability. All of these
findings suggest that petitioner was able to understand the nature
and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense if he
chose to do so.
	Similarly, the State points out that Gelbort found petitioner's
intellectual impairments to be "subtle and mild." Gelbort
expressed no opinion about petitioner's fitness at the time he
pleaded guilty, and no statement that his mild mental deficits
would have affected his ability to understand the proceedings or
assist counsel.
	Petitioner has cited no comparable cases in which a defendant
has been granted post-conviction relief based on similar facts. Our
own research has revealed several informative cases. In Harris, we
noted that even "[t]aking as true defendant's allegations that he
suffers from mental impairments as they are stated in his post-conviction psychological assessments [citation], these allegations
do not necessarily establish that defendant was unfit." Harris, slip
op. at 6. Instead, we focused on the defendant's ability to function
in the context of a trial, not on his sanity or competence in other
areas. We concluded that the record clearly indicated defendant's
understanding of the nature and purpose of the proceedings:
		"On several occasions, the court provided defendant with
a detailed explanation of the proceedings and informed
defendant of his rights during those proceedings.
Following these admonishments, defendant stated that he
understood. Furthermore, the record shows that defendant
participated in his own defense; communicated and
conferred with his trial counsel; expressed to the court his
understanding of the proceedings, including his decision
to litigate rather than agree to a plea, waive his right to
testify, and waive his right to a jury at the sentencing
hearing; and articulated a clear statement in allocution
during mitigation." Harris, slip op. at 6-7.
	In the present case, petitioner participated in similar
exchanges with the trial court during which he demonstrated his
understanding of the proceedings. His own statements and those
of counsel reveal that he communicated and conferred with
counsel. His decision to enter a guilty plea was contingent on the
State's offering a version of the facts that he was willing to accept.
We conclude, as we did in Harris, that the record clearly indicates
petitioner's understanding of the proceedings and his ability to
participate when he chose to do so. See also People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 474-75 (2000) (rejecting defendant's post-conviction
claim based upon records of psychiatric illness predating his crime
where, at the time of trial, the evaluating psychiatrist found
defendant fit for trial and also capable of choosing not to cooperate
with his attorney).
	In Easley, we considered the results of psychological
examinations conducted after the defendant's conviction as they
related to his fitness at the time of trial. These examinations,
conducted six years after the trial, indicated that the defendant had
"long-standing mental problems at the time of trial that affected
his ability to understand written and oral instructions." Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322. In addition, at times of extreme stress, the defendant
suffered from "thought and personality disorder, paranoia, and
episodic breaks with reality." Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322. Taking as
true the allegations that the defendant suffered from mental illness,
we nevertheless rejected his claim that his mental illness raised a
bona fide doubt as to his ability to understand the proceedings
against him and cooperate with counsel in his defense. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322-23.
	In the present case, petitioner has presented evidence obtained
subsequent to his conviction that was cumulative to the various
psychiatric diagnoses made before he pleaded guilty. The new
evidence, however, when considered along with the record of his
conduct before the trial court, does not raise a bona fide doubt of
his fitness in 1990. As we noted in Easley, "a defendant may be fit
for trial although his or her mind may be otherwise unsound."
Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322. See also People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 483-84 (1996) (a history of attempted suicide does not
demonstrate that the defendant's ability to understand the
proceedings or assist in his own defense was diminished).
	We conclude that no bona fide doubt as to petitioner's fitness
would have existed at the time he pleaded guilty, even if the trial
court had been aware of the facts now available, including the
testimony at his sentencing hearing, the deposition of defense
counsel, and the Ramsden and Gelbort reports. We note that both
Grigsby and Ramsden testified at the hearing on petitioner's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the conclusion of that
hearing, the trial court commented that, "having had the
opportunity to observe the defendant over a number of months in
the courtroom setting," petitioner "well understood what these
proceedings were about." Petitioner "clearly and unequivocally"
instructed counsel to take certain positions, and to withdraw
certain motions; counsel advised against these actions, but carried
out petitioner's instructions. The court concluded that petitioner
"made those instructions knowingly and intelligently, and he made
his plea knowingly and intelligently." Based on the entire record,
we hold that the circuit court did not err when it denied
petitioner's claim that his new evidence creates a bona fide doubt
of his fitness at the time he pleaded guilty.
	Petitioner briefly raises a separate but related claim that, even
if he was minimally competent to stand trial, he was not competent
to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. He asserts that the
level of competence required to enter a guilty plea is higher than
that required to stand trial and that both trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective for failing to raise this issue. This argument was
not contained in his amended post-conviction petition and, thus,
the claim is waived.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
	Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
contains two separate assertions of ineffectiveness. First, petitioner
points to the fact that he was represented before the trial court by
only one attorney. Second, petitioner claims that there is a
reasonable probability he would not have received the death
sentence if counsel had obtained and presented a report by a
mitigation specialist. The circuit court rejected both claims, stating
that it was familiar with defense counsel's work and that he was
an experienced public defender, with felony experience including
at least one prior death penalty case.
	These claims were not raised on direct appeal. Instead,
petitioner argued on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective
because he introduced the reports of Drs. Hamilton and Bornstein
at the mitigation stage and these reports, in addition to
documenting the facts that counsel was offering in mitigation,
contained some information that might have been seen as
damaging. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 368-69. We rejected that
argument, finding that counsel's decision to offer the reports was
reasonable. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 369-70.
	Thus, petitioner's new claims regarding the effectiveness of
trial counsel are waived for failure to raise them on direct appeal.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03. He has not argued that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them. Nevertheless, the
State has not asserted waiver and we choose to address these
claims on their merits under the familiar Strickland standard of
deficient representation plus prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	Petitioner has provided photocopies of the "American Bar
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases" (no date given) and the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association's "Standards for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases" (dated November 18, 1988). Because these standards
recommend that a capital defendant be represented by more than
one attorney, he claims to have been denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
	Petitioner has cited no authority from any jurisdiction in
which a court has held that representation of a capital defendant by
a single attorney is per se ineffective assistance of counsel. In the
absence of such authority, this claim can succeed only if both
prongs of the Strickland test are met. The fact that a single
attorney might represent a capital defendant is not objectively
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. In addition,
petitioner has not described what an additional attorney might
have done on his behalf that his own attorney did not do. In short,
he has not even attempted to argue prejudice. Therefore, because
the claim fails both prongs of Strickland, the circuit court did not
err in denying it.
	Petitioner next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to arrange for a mitigation specialist from the Capital
Resource Center to evaluate him and prepare a mitigation report.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the
sentencing stage, a defendant must show that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that, absent counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability
that the trier of fact would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating factors weighed against imposing the
death penalty. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d  at 347. Counsel has a duty to
make a reasonable investigation of potential sources of mitigating
evidence and to present such evidence at the capital sentencing
hearing. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 510. Strategic choices made by
counsel after having made a thorough investigation are virtually
unchallengeable. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514; see also Strickland,
466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. Strategic
decisions made after a less than complete investigation, however,
will survive challenge only if the limited investigation was the
result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.
	At the mitigation stage of this case, counsel offered the
reports of the two psychiatrists who assessed petitioner's fitness
for trial, the testimony of petitioner's mother, and that of Robert
Samuelson, a rehabilitation counselor at the Chicago Lighthouse
for the Blind, who evaluated and counseled petitioner in the early
1970s. The trial court found no factors in mitigation. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 361. Petitioner states that the trial court remarked that the
only fact in mitigation is that he is "a human being." Reviewing
the transcript, we find that, in fact, after commenting that the
parents of the murdered child had "stretched out the hand of
friendship" to petitioner and had entrusted him with the care of
their children, the trial court commented that "there is nothing
more than the very fact of your humanity to commend you for this
Court's mercy. And the mere fact of your humanity is not
sufficient unto itself."
	Petitioner now seeks consideration of additional evidence that
he contends trial counsel should have obtained and offered in
mitigation.
	The record before the circuit court as it considered this post-conviction petition included the report of Jeffrey Eno, a licensed
clinical social worker and mitigation specialist for the Capital
Resource Center, who conducted his mitigation assessment in
1995. Eno documented petitioner's disadvantaged childhood,
including his diagnosis at the age of four with congenital cataracts,
which rendered him legally blind. He was bullied by children at
school and in the neighborhood. At the age of 14, he was
hospitalized at Cook County Hospital because of depression and
suicidal ideation. (The page of Eno's report that immediately
follows this statement is missing, so only the bare fact of the
hospitalization is documented.) Petitioner suffered several
traumatic losses, including the death by drug overdose of one
sister to whom he was very close and the murder of another sister.
He has a history of drug and alcohol abuse beginning at the age of
12, which may have caused organic brain damage. He also
suffered multiple head traumas that may have caused neurological
damage.
	Eno's report is thorough and well organized. However, the
information itself is quite similar to that contained in the reports
of Hamilton and Bornstein, which were available to the trial court
when it imposed sentence. Thus, petitioner was not prejudiced by
the absence of a report by a mitigation specialist, and counsel was
not ineffective for failing to obtain such a report. No manifest
error occurred.

III. Conflict of Interest of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel
	Petitioner asserts that a public defender who is appointed by
the vote of a majority of circuit judges operates under an inherent
conflict of interest. Specifically, petitioner asserts that counsel's
"decisions not to request a jury trial or jury sentencing, not to seek
assistance of second counsel and not to seek the assistance of a
social worker for sentencing could all [have been] motivated by an
interest to save the County money and thus not invoke the
'displeasure' of the circuit judges." He did not raise this issue on
direct appeal, and now claims that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to do so.
	Like claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are evaluated
under the two-part test set forth in Strickland, which requires a
showing that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable
and that it prejudiced the defendant. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 328-29.
"Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable
issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain
from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without
merit, unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong."
Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 329. Accordingly, unless there is merit to
petitioner's underlying claim, he can have suffered no prejudice
from counsel's failure to raise it on direct appeal.
	Petitioner has not cited a single case from Illinois or
elsewhere in which a public defender or other court-appointed
attorney was deemed to be operating under an inherent conflict of
interest merely because his paycheck comes from county coffers.
He has attempted to fault counsel's decisionmaking, but fails to
acknowledge that the decisions to plead guilty and to waive a jury
for sentencing were his own. We have already determined that he
was not prejudiced by the lack of a mitigation specialist's report.
	In the end, petitioner's conflict of interest claim is totally
lacking in merit. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for
choosing not to make a meritless argument. The circuit court
properly dismissed this claim.

IV. Sentencing of Similarly Situated Defendants
	Petitioner asserts that both trial and appellate counsel were
ineffective for failing to argue that his death sentence cannot stand
when similarly situated defendants have not received the same
sentence. Petitioner would define "similarly situated" as having
been convicted of a crime that is factually similar to his own. This
claim was properly dismissed by the circuit court because it fails
as a matter of law.
	Our constitutional duty is to determine whether the death
penalty has been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly
severe, considering the circumstances of the offense and the
character and rehabilitative potential of the individual defendant.
People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 576 (2000). Comparative
proportionality review in capital cases is not required by either the
United States Constitution or the Illinois death penalty statute.
Thus, we do not compare the sentence received by one individual
to sentences received by other individuals convicted of similar
crimes. Only when one defendant is sentenced to death while his
codefendant or accomplice, convicted of the same crime, receives
a lesser sentence will we engage in a comparative review of
disparate sentences. See, e.g., People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453,
479 (1996). Petitioner acted alone and, thus, proportionality
review is neither required nor appropriate. We, therefore, affirm
the circuit court's dismissal of this claim.

V. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute
	Petitioner's final argument is that the death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because once a defendant has been found eligible
for the death penalty based on the presence of one or more
aggravating factors, the statute, in effect, places upon the
defendant the burden of persuading the jury that the mitigating
factors outweigh aggravating factors.
	This argument was made by petitioner and rejected by this
court on direct appeal and is, therefore, res judicata. See Johnson,
154 Ill. 2d  at 373. The circuit court properly dismissed this claim.

CONCLUSION
	We affirm the judgment of the circuit court and direct the
clerk of this court to enter an order setting Thursday, March 13,
2003, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the
circuit court of Montgomery County shall be carried out. Petitioner
shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS
5/119-5 (West 2000). The clerk of this court shall send a certified
copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to
the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of
the institution where petitioner is now confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084, 86926, slip op. at
35-38 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe
that defendant's convictions and sentence should be set aside
because the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance
with the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I
stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this
court's adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and
did not sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For
this reason, the new rules should be applied retroactively. See
People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.