Title: Ex Parte Giles

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

554 So. 2d 1089 (1987)
Ex Parte Arthur Lee GILES.
(Re Arthur Lee Giles v. State).
86-416.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 25, 1987.
*1090 Dennis N. Balske of Balske and Van Almen, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and William D. Little and Thomas R. Allison, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Giles was initially convicted and sentenced to death in 1979; however, his conviction and sentence were overturned, and he was granted a new trial pursuant to our holding in Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala.1980). Giles v. State, 405 So. 2d 50 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). His second trial resulted in a conviction and sentence of death also. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, 554 So. 2d 1073, and his petition for writ of certiorari was granted. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it affirmed the conviction, but reverse it insofar as it affirmed the sentence, and remand the cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions to remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing before a jury.
Defense counsel conceded in his opening statement at trial that the evidence would establish that Giles was guilty of murder. Consequently, on appeal, the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his guilt. The defendant takes issue with pretrial rulings on change of venue, recusal, and exclusion of jurors; with prosecutorial comments to the venire; with court instructions to the jury; and with the trial court's decision during the sentencing hearing to send the jury back for further deliberations after the jury foreman informed the court that the jurors were hopelessly deadlocked.
After a careful review of all the questions raised by the defendant, we find that the only issue with merit concerns the court's response to the jury foreman's announcement that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked.
After lengthy instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances at the sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded its oral charge to the jury by stating:
"If you unanimously find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more of the three aggravating circumstances that I instructed you on, and if you unanimously find that aggravating circumstance or *1091 circumstances outweighs the mitigating circumstances in this case, then you should return the form of verdict as follows: We, the Jury, fix the punishment of the Defendant, Arthur Lee Giles, at death.
The jury was then dismissed from the courtroom so that the trial court could entertain objections. Defense counsel's objection to the court's charge on the necessity of unanimity was stated and resolved as follows:
"THE COURT: All right. Then you may retire to the jury room to consider the case. You will have out with you the evidence which was introduced by the parties and the forms. We have prepared the forms of verdict here. You will have out the forms of verdict and the evidence presented to you in this case, *1092 and when you have reached a verdict, you signify that fact and we will be at the pleasure of the Jury. If you want to work tonight or want to come back tomorrow, all you have to do is let us know."
The jury retired at 6:50 p.m. and returned at 9:10 p.m., at which time the following transpired:
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in requiring the deadlocked jury to return the next morning for further deliberations. He argues that the trial court instead should have entered a sentence of life without parole. He also argues that the trial court's actions impermissibly suggested to the jury that the trial court favored a death sentence in the case. We agree with the latter contention.
The defendant was convicted and sentenced for the November 10, 1978, murders of Willene and Carl Nelson pursuant to Alabama's old death penalty statute, Code 1975, § 13-11-1 through § 13-11-8.[1] In Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala.1980), the court interpreted the statute as requiring a unanimous verdict at a sentencing hearing before the jury can recommend the death sentence. The court further held that "[i]f the jury cannot agree on a sentence of death, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole." Id. at 663.
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on the effect of a non-unanimous verdict. Although the court's charge was a correct statement of law, taken directly from Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 663 (Ala.1980), it was not a proper subject of instruction for the jury. This court's explanation in Beck of the procedural and legal effect of a jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict was directed to the trial court alone. As the Court of Criminal Appeals observed in Whisenhant v. State, 482 So. 2d 1225, 1236 (Ala.Cr.App.1982):
The jury in this case deliberated approximately two-and-one-half hours after being instructed on the effect of a non-unanimous verdict. The jurors then returned to the courtroom and told the judge that they were "hopelessly deadlocked". Conceivably, the jurors were confused by the trial court's ordering them to deliberate further. After all, this same judge had recently charged that if they were unable to agree unanimously, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be imposed as a *1093 matter of law. We can only speculate on what actually entered these jurors' minds; however, under the circumstances of this case, at least one juror may have changed his vote from life without parole to death because of a feeling that the judge favored the death penalty in this case.
Under Alabama law, "a trial judge may urge a jury to resume deliberations and cultivate a spirit of harmony so as to reach a verdict, as long as the court does not suggest which way the verdict should be returned and no duress or coercion is used." Showers v. State, 407 So. 2d 169, 171 (Ala.1981). In a capital case, however, under the old Alabama death penalty statute, which contemplated a unanimous jury verdict, but in its absence, provided for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, the mere fact that the court instructs the jury to deliberate further, after what the jury characterizes as a "deadlock" has occurred, impermissibly suggests which way the verdict should be returned.[2]
In a similar case from Delaware, Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439, 453 (Del.1985), the court held:
Similarly, in Florida, under a statute requiring a majority verdict in order to recommend death and, in the case of a deadlocked jury, requiring the automatic imposition of a life-without-parole sentence, the court held that it was error for the trial court to send the jury back for further deliberations after they asked for instructions on how to resolve a 6-6 tie:
Rose v. State, 425 So. 2d 521 (Fla.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S. Ct. 1883, 76 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1983).
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the murder conviction, but reverse insofar as it affirmed the death sentence, and we remand the cause to that court with instructions to remand it to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
[1]  The statute was repealed by Acts 1981, No. 81-178, § 20, effective July 1, 1981; however, conduct occurring before 12:01 a.m. on July 1, 1981, continues to be governed by pre-existing law.
[2]  For a case reaffirming the significance of the jury's role in the sentencing process, see Williams v. State [MS. 86-518, Sept. 18, 1987] 556 So. 2d 744 (Ala.1987).
[3]  A jury charge recognized in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896), instructing the jury on their duty to resolve their differences, come to a conclusion, and return a verdict.