Title: SHANNON v HULETT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 83-101 IN THE SUPREME COIJRT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 19 8 3 CHARLES SHANNON, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, DONALD E . HULETT, EAST VALLEY TRUCKING and STEVE LUKSHA, Defendants and Appellants Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t I n and For t h e County o f J e f f e r s o n Honorable Frank D&, Judge p r e s i d i n g . BL+==? t rJ Counsel o f Record: For Appellant : C o r e t t e , Smith, Polhman C , A l l e n , B u t t e , Montana Robert M. Carlson and R , D. C o r e t t e , Argued For Respondent : John L . P e t e r s o n , B u t t e , Montana John L . P e t e r s o n , Argued Submitted: June 6 , 1 9 8 3 Decided: August 1 6 , 1983 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Prank 1. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e 3 p i n i o n of t h e Court. Donald H u l e t t , d/b/a E a s t V a l l e y Trucking, and S t e v e n Luksha a p p e a l t h e J e f f e r s o n County D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r g r a n t i n g C h a r l e s Shannon a new t r i a l . W e r e v e r s e . On September 2 2 , 1979, Shannon was d r i v i n g h i s 1966 C h e v r o l e t nortnbound on 1-15 a t a b o u t 35 m.p.h. Luksha was d r i v i n g a 1972 Kenworth t r u c k w i t h a p u p - t r a i l e r , owned by h i s employer H u l e t t , southbound on 1-15 approximately 40 t o 45 n.p.h. Both d r i v e r s were on a two-lane p o r t i o n of 1-15 j u s t s o u t h of Boulder, which i n many p l a c e s was i n poor c o n d i t i o n . The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t because of t h e rough shoul- d e r , Luksha was v e r y c l o s e t o t h e c e n t e r l i n e . J u s t a f t e r he e n t e r e d t h e two-lane highway, f i v e oncoming c a r s passed by him, and he checked t h e i r p r o g r e s s i n h i s r e a r v i e w m i r r o r . When he looked forward he saw Shannon c u t t i n g through an approaching c u r v e one o r two f e e t i n h i s l a n e o f t r a v e l . Luksha t e s t i f i e d t h a t lt appeared a head-on c o l l i s i o n was ~ m m i n e n t , s o he swerved h i s t r u c k t o t h e r i g h t . T h i s sudden a c t i o n and t h e rough road caused t h e t r u c k t o l e a n b a d l y and Luksha a l m o s t l o s t c o n t r o l . I t a l s o caused t h e p u p - t r a i l e r t o swing o u t i n t o Shannon's l a n e of t r a v e l . The l e f t s i d e of t h e t r a i l e r c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e f r o n t and t o p of Shannon's v e h i c l e . Shannon s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s i n j u r y . Shannon brought an a c t i o n i n J e f f e r s o n County D i s t r i c t Court a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t s s e e k i n g damages a r i s i n g from t h e a c c i d e n t . By s p e c i a l v e r d i c t t h e j u r y found a p p e l l a n t s n o t " g u i l t y of n e g l i g e n c e which was t h e proximate c a u s e of t h e claimed damage." T h e r e a f t e r , Shannon moved t h e c o u r t t o s e t a s i d e t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and t o g r a n t a new t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d a new t r i a l w i t h o u t s u p p o r t i n g memorandum. An a p p e a l was brought t o t h i s Court which f i l e d its o p i n i o n on J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1983. T h i s Court d i s m i s s e d t h e a p p e a l w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e and remanded t h e c a s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n and e n t r y of an o r d e r s t a t i n g t h e grounds f o r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l i n compliance with Rule 5 9 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P. Shannon v. H u l e t t ( 1 9 8 3 ) , Mont. , 656 P.2d 825, 40 St.Rep. 35. The r e m i t t i t u r was f i l e d i n D i s t r i c t Court on February 1, 1983. On t h a t same day, D i s t r i c t J u d g e s F r a n k B l a i r ( r e t i r e d ) and F r a n k D a v i s complied with t h i s C o u r t ' s o r d e r by f i l i n g memoranda i n s u p p o r t of t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g Shannon's motion f o r a new t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r J e f f e r s o n County. Luksha and B u l e t t a p p e a l t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l . They r a i s e two i s s u e s f o r our c o n s i d e r a t i o n : 1. Was t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r and memorandum i n s u p p o r t of o r d e r p r o c e d u r a l l y proper and i n d i c a t i v e of a c t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n g i v e n t o its d e c i s i o n ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its d i s c r e t i o n by g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l ? W e r e v e r s e on t h e ground t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . The f i r s t i s s u e is t h u s moot, and w e do n o t a d d r e s s it. E s s e n t i a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t a new t r i a l may n o t be g r a n t e d i f t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . Here, t h e r e a r e s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t t h a t Luksha was f r e e from n e g l i - gence, and t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t . Shannon a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e is no c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e which can s u p p o r t t h e j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t Luksha was f r e e from n e g l i g e n c e . H e was n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of l a w when t h e t r a i l e r c r o s s e d i n t o Shannon's l a n e of t r a v e l . S h a n n o n ' s i n l u r i e s were p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d by s u c h n e g l i g e n c e . The s t a n d a r d f o r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l is w e l l e s t a b - l i s h e d i n Montana. I f t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e v e r d i c t , a new t r i a l may n o t be g r a n t e d . Srenberg v. Nee1 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 613 P.2d 1007, 37 St.Rep. 1170; Lyndes v. S c o f i e l d ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 177, 589 P.2d 1000; Kincheloe v. Rygg ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 187, 4 4 8 P.2d 1 4 0 ; Hinton v. P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 118 Mont. 574, 169 P.2d 333. N e i t h e r may a D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t a new t r i a l s i m p l y because it b e l i e v e d one l i n e of t e s t i m o n y d i f f e r e n t frorn t h a t which t h e j u r y b e l i e v e d . Yerkich v. O p s t r a ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 272, 577 P.2d 857; I n r e E s t a t e of Hardy ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 133 Mont. 536, 326 P.2d 692. When a D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e s a motion f o r a new t r i a l , w e a r e less i n c l i n e d t o d i s t u r b t h a t o r d e r because t h e lower c o u r t h a s i n d i c a t e d f a i t h i n t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . However, when a D i s t r i c t C o u r t is p r e s e n t e d w i t h e v i d e n c e i n f a v o r of t n e v e r d i c t b u t p r o c e e d s t o g r a n t a new t r i a l , it is our d u t y t o test t h e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e v e r d i c t . Campeau v. L e w i s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 144 Mont. 543, 549, 398 P.2d 960, 963. W e find t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . The e v i d e n c e is u n d i s p u t e d t h a t Shannon, w h i l e d r i v i n g northbound on 1-15, c u t through a c u r v e i n t h e opposing l a n e . Luksha, approaching Shannon, responded by swerving t o t h e r i g h t t o avoid a head-on c o l l i s i o n . There was no evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t Luksha was d r i v i n g u n s a f e l y p r i o r t o observing Shannon o r t h a t he was n e g l i g e n t i n any o t h e r way. By s p e c i a l v e r d i c t t h e j u r y found t h a t n e i t h e r Luksha nor h i s employer were g u i l t y of any n e g l i g e n c e which p r o x i - mately caused t h e claimed damage. C o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 3 and 4 s t a t e : "Every p e r s o n is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n j u r y t o t h e p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y of a n o t h e r , caused by want o i o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l . "When used i n t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , n e g l i - gence means want of such o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l . Such want of o r d i n a r y c a r e o r s k i l l e x i s t s when t h e r e is a f a i l u r e t o do t h a t which a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t person would o r d i n a r i l y have done under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r doing what such p e r s o n under t h e e x i s t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s would n o t have done." In- s t r u c t i o n No. 3 . "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a v i o l a t i o n of law is of no consequence u n l e s s it was a proximate c a u s e of ( o r c o n t r i b u t e d a s a proximate c a u s e t o ) an i n j u r y found by you t o have been s u f f e r e d by t h e P l a i n - t i f f . " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 4. Under t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e and w i t h i n t h e p a r a m e t e r s of t h e above i n s t r u c t i o n s t h e j u r y could have, f i r s t of a l l , found Luksha committed no n e g l i g e n c e . There was no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g he was n e g l i g e n t p r i o r t o t a k i n g e v a s i v e a c t i o n . F u r t h e r , Luksha a c t e d a s any r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t p e r s o n would when f a c i n g an imminent head-on c o l l i s i o n - - h e moved o u t o f t h e way. Secondly, t h e f a c t t h a t Shannon w a s d r i v i n g i n t o t h e oncoming l a n e when approaching Luksha f u r t h e r s u p p o r t s a f i n d i n g t h a t s u c h a c t i o n was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f Shannon I s i n j u r i e s . W e v a c a t e t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l . W e r e i n - s t a t e t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and t h e judgment e n t e r e d t h e r e o n . ~LJk.8 t $ & A , C h i e f J u s t i c e W e concur: Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison specially concurs as follows: I concur in the result but not in all that is said in the majority opinion. The majority dismisses negligence on the part of the defandant without discussing defendant's statutory violation. Is the majority taking the position that defendant was involuntarily across the centerline in the wrong lane of traffic? If so there is support in the law excusing the statutory violation. However, if the defendant made a calculated judgment to leave his lane of traffic for some reason, a holding that a statutory violation is excused represents new law in Montana. The issue is concluded without discussion. The majority simply states that the defendant's conduct was to be considered by the jury under the "reasonable and prudent person" standard. The defendant's statutory violation is ignored. I would reverse the granting of a new trial and reinstate the defense verdict for the reason that the jury could have found that any negligence on the part of the defendant was not a proximate cause of the accident. The record in this case supports the defense verdict on the basis that plaintiff's conduct, rather than the conduct of defendant, formed the sole proximate cause of the accident and consequent injuries to the plaintiff. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, dissenting: I would affirm the order granting a new trial. The statutory violation of defendant driver is clear--the tail end of his tractor-trailer rig was on the wrong side of the road at the time of collision. I would further hold as a matter of law that at least one proximate cause of the accident was the pup-trailer being on the wrong side of the highway at the time of impact. Regardless of plaintiff's initial negligence, he had a right to expect that when he recovered from his own driving error that his own lane of traffic would be clear. It is not necessary that the driver of the tractor-trailer rig be actively negligent. Here, he may not have been. He swerved his rig to avoid the plaintiff's vehicle which was initially in the wrong lane of traffic. However, the effect of swerving the rig was to swing the pup-trailer into plaintiff's lane of travel. I have no doubt that a contributing proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the defendant driver to have his rig in the proper lane of travel. There being negligence (a statutory violation) and there being negligence which was at least a contributing proximate cause of the accident, the jury could not properly absolve the defendant of all responsibility. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting a new trial. The distance between the front bumper of the tractor to the rear bumper of the pup-trailer was 73 feet, 6 inches. The pup trailer was hooked to the main trailer with a 15 foot tongue that produced a "swivel at the back of the truck." This combination rig made it an extremely long and dangerous highway vehicle, and the danger was multiplied many times over by the fact that the tractor was pulling 10,000 gallons of gasoline. Plaintiff, an 87 year old man, regardless of his own initial negligence in swerving onto the lane of the tractor-trailer, had a right to assume that once he recovered from his own driving error he would not be confronted with the pup-trailer blocking in part his lane of travel. The extreme length of the tractor-trailer rig made it impossible for the defendant driver to have his rig under control. Although federal and state laws seem to be ever more permissive as to allowable tractor-trailer lengths, the traffic safety laws must also be interpreted to protect the driving public who meet these monsters on the highway. We have failed in that duty here.