Title: Hageman v. Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HAGEMAN v. GOSHEN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 12011 WY 91Case Number: S-10-0009Decided: 06/06/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 
HUGH and LEE HAGEMAN, 
as parents and next friends of C and LH; DEWEY and DINELLE HAGEMAN, as parents 
and next friends of T, M and WH; ROBERT and JOHANNA ABERNATHY, as parents and 
next friends of TA; CHAD and SANDY ARNETT, as parents and next friends of K, T 
and TA; GREG and JOLENE BEBO, as parents and next friends of N, J and MB; MARK 
and ROSE BEBO, as grandparents and next friends of N, J and MB; TODD and ANNE 
BERRY, as parents and next friends of L and CB; RICHARD and LUCINDA BREEDLOVE, 
as parents and next friends of RWB; JERRY and KIM BREMER, as parents and next 
friends of CB; ERIC and SHELLY DUNCAN, as parents and next friends of J and ID; 
DAN ELLIS, as the parent and next friend of ZE; CORY and DAWN GILCHRIEST, as 
parents and next friends of C and SG; EDDIE and TAMI GREENWALD, as parents and 
next friends of K and MG; SHAWN and MARLISA HALL, as parents and next friends of 
H and JH; J.L. and SHERRI HERBST, as parents and next friends of BH; BYRON and 
DONNA JUMA, as parents and next friends of B, S, C and TJ; SHANE and CHERIE 
LIMMER, as parents and next friends of C and ML; JEFF and KARI McCLUN, as 
parents and next friends of K, K and KM; MARLA McNEES, as parent and next friend 
of PM; BRETT A. MEYER, as parent and next friend of G, K, and TM; PAUL and 
CHRISTINE MILLER, as parents and next friend of P, S and PM; JEFF MUELLER, as 
parent and next friend of C and TM; LOIS A. PAULES, as grandmother of J and DG; 
ALVIN and RENNAE RUIZ, as parents and next friends of LR; TIM and MICHELE 
TOEDTER; ROCKY and PAULA VAUGHN, as parents and next friends of C and MV; TERRY 
and MARY VIKTORIN; SHANE VIKTORIN; DAVID and SUSAN WALKER; as parents and best 
friends of T and EW; RUSSELL and JoANNE WALTER, as parents and next friends of 
KW; MICHAEL and GRETCHEN WOLLERT, as parents and next friends of C, T G, and 
GW,

 
 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE GOSHEN COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1; RAY SCHULTE, in his official capacity as Superintendent 
of Goshen County School District No. 1; LINDA KESSLER, LINDA JOHNSON, CLARK 
HOUSE, BRENT KAUFMAN, JIM EDDINGTON, ED JOLOVICH, CHARLIE HARSHBERGER, and ROB 
BRANHAM, in their official capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of the 
Goshen County School District No. 1,

 
 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 

 Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County
 

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellants:

Kara Brighton and 
Harriet M. Hageman, Hageman & Brighton, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Hageman.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Tracy J. Copenhaver, 
Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, 
Wyoming.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
In 
an effort to address a perceived drug and alcohol problem among its students, 
Goshen County School District No. 1 adopted a policy requiring all students 
who participate in extracurricular activities to consent to random testing for 
alcohol and drugs.  Appellants 
initiated litigation, claiming that the Policy is unconstitutional.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the School District.  
Appellants challenge that decision in this appeal.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
These issues were 
raised by the Appellants and adopted by the Appellees:

 
 

1.    
Whether 
the district court erred in refusing to declare that the District's "Mandatory 
Drug Testing for Students Involved in Extracurricular Activities" violates [the 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures of] Article 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.

 
 

2.    
Whether 
the district court erred in refusing to declare that the District's Drug Testing 
Policy violates Article 1, §§ 2 and 3 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

 
 

3.    
Whether 
the district court erred in refusing to declare that the District's Drug Testing 
Policy violates Article 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

 
 

4.    
Whether 
the district court erred in refusing to enjoin the District from implementing 
the Drug Testing Policy.

 
 

5.    
Whether 
the district court erred in granting the District's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
For 
the past several years, Goshen County School District No. 1 has participated in 
surveys of its students, known as the "Wyoming Youth Risk Surveys."  According to the affidavit of the School 
District's Superintendent, the surveys revealed "a serious prevalence of alcohol 
and drug use among Goshen County School District No. 1 students.  Goshen County has ranged at or near the 
top for alcohol and drug use for several of those surveys."  The School District participated in 
another statewide survey in 2008, the "Wyoming Prevention Needs Assessment State 
Profile Report."  This survey 
indicated that:

 
 
[I]n 2008 26% of our 
sixth graders had used alcohol at some point, 10% had used cigarettes; and 6% 
inhalants, with 4% of the sixth graders having used inhalants within the past 30 
days; 3% of our sixth graders reported binge drinking; 33% of Goshen County 
eighth graders were perceived to be at risk [of] harm [from] drug use; 41% of 
tenth grade students were perceived to be at risk [of] harm [from] drug use; 47% 
had friends who use drugs; . . . 44% were deemed to have favorable attitudes 
toward drug use; 52% of twelfth grade students were at risk [of] harm [from] 
drug use; 40% expressed an intent to use; 43% had friends who used drugs; 
. . . 50% were classified as at risk for early initiation of drug 
use.

 
 
Concern 
over the pervasiveness of drug and alcohol use among its students prompted the 
School District to hold a public forum on February 2, 2009, to discuss the 
possibility of requiring students to take random drug and alcohol tests.  Following that forum, on April 14, 2009, 
the School District's Board of Trustees adopted a new policy requiring all 
students in grades 7 through 12 who participate in extracurricular activities to 
consent to random testing for drugs and alcohol.  According to the School District's 
Superintendent: 

 
 
The policy recognizes 
that many of the students participating in extracurricular activities are viewed 
as role models to other students and that it is important that they avoid drug 
and alcohol use in their position as role models.  It is also the position of the Board 
that to achieve the goal of reducing risks of alcohol and drug abuse and to 
maximize the skills and talents participating in extracurricular activities, it 
is important that participants refrain from drug and alcohol use.  It is the belief of our school district 
that this policy will assist in that endeavor.

 
 
Testing 
is done chiefly through urinalysis, although testing may also be done with 
saliva or breath samples.

 
 

[¶4]        
Appellants, 
referred to collectively as the Coalition, are a group of students and their 
parents or guardians1 who filed a declaratory judgment 
action in district court seeking to have the School District's Policy declared 
unconstitutional.  After briefing 
and argument, the district court concluded that the drug testing program did not 
violate either the Wyoming Constitution or the United States Constitution.  It granted summary judgment in favor of 
the School District, and the Coalition appealed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶5]        
We review a district 
court's decision granting summary judgment using this standard of 
review:

 
 
Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  "A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted."  Id.  Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 

Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 
LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 
128-29 (Wyo. 2008).  In the case 
before us now, the Coalition and the School District agree that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact.  
They disagree, however, about whether the district court correctly 
applied the provisions of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions to the 
undisputed facts.  "Issues arising 
under the constitution are questions of law which we review de novo."  Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 48, 
193 P.3d 203, 214 (Wyo. 2008); Wilkening 
v. State, 2007 WY 187, ¶ 6, 172 P.3d 385, 386 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Search 
and Seizure

 
 

[¶6]        
The Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  See Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 
¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).  
The parties agree, as do we, that the drug tests mandated by the Policy 
are searches for purposes of constitutional analysis.  See ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 311 
(Wyo. 1992) ("[T]he testing of urine is a search."); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo. 
1999) ("Obtaining a blood or saliva sample is a search and seizure implicating 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights.").  
Generally, the Coalition contends that the searches at issue here are 
unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional.  

 
 

[¶7]        
The Coalition 
concedes that the Policy does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  It contends, 
however, that Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides greater 
protections, under the facts of this case, than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment.  In support of this contention, the 
Coalition relies heavily on Vasquez v. 
State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999) and O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005).  In Vasquez, 
we considered the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), which 
established a rule "that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial 
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident 
of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile."  
Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 480.  Applying Belton, we concluded that 
the search of Mr. Vasquez's vehicle satisfied the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  That did not end our analysis, however, 
because we also recognized that Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
provided a separate and independent source of state constitutional rights.  
Id. at 486.  We rejected the bright-line rule of Belton, and 
instead held that the Wyoming Constitution "requires a search be reasonable 
under all of the circumstances."  Id. at 489.  "Is this result 
a narrower application than Belton?" we asked.  "We think so."  
Id.2

 
 

[¶8]        
In O'Boyle, we 
observed that, "[i]n the specific context presented in Vasquez, i.e. a 
vehicle search incident to an arrest, we said Wyoming's search and seizure 
provision provided greater protection than the federal provision" because the 
Wyoming Constitution "requires that searches and seizures be reasonable under 
all the circumstances."  Id., ¶¶ 30-31, 117 P.3d  at 410.  
We then extended the same "reasonable under all the circumstances" analysis to a 
traffic stop and detention, and concluded that Mr. O'Boyle's lengthy detention 
and "extensive questioning" were unreasonable under the circumstances, and 
therefore contrary to Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
Id., ¶ 32, 117 P.3d  at 410-11.

 
 

[¶9]        
Both Vasquez and O'Boyle dealt with searches by police in 
the criminal law context.  We have 
never before considered what limitations the Wyoming Constitution may place, in 
the context of an administrative search, on a school's testing of students for 
alcohol and drugs.  This "is a 
matter of first impression in Wyoming, so we therefore look to other 
jurisdictions for guidance."  Hofstad v. Christie, 2010 WY 134, ¶ 10, 240 P.3d 816, 819 
(Wyo. 2010); Taylor v. Schukei Family 
Trust, 996 P.2d 13, 18 (Wyo. 2000); Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 882 
(Wyo. 1998).  

 
 

[¶10]     
In Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995), the United States Supreme 
Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a school district policy 
requiring drug testing for high school athletes.  The Court declared that "the ultimate 
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 
reasonableness.'"  Id. at 652, 115 S. Ct.  at 2390.  To determine the reasonableness of these 
random, suspicionless searches, the Court applied a balancing test, weighing 
three factors:  the nature of the 
privacy interest at issue, id. at 
654, 115 S. Ct.  at 2391; the character of the intrusion, id. at 658, 115 S. Ct.  at 2393; and the 
nature of the governmental concern and the efficacy of the policy in addressing 
that concern.  Id. at 660, 115 S. Ct.  at 2394.  The Court concluded that public school 
students have a lower expectation of privacy than citizens in general, and that 
the expectation of privacy is even lower for student athletes.  It found the search relatively 
unobtrusive.  It determined that the 
school had a legitimate interest in deterring drug use, and noted that the 
school had presented evidence of a serious drug problem in the school, 
particularly among the student athletes.  
The drug testing program was considered an efficacious way to address the 
problem because it was aimed directly at the student athletes who were a major 
part of the problem.

 
 

[¶11]     
Seven years later, 
the Court decided Board of Education of 
Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002), again applying the basic standard 
of "reasonableness."  This drug 
testing policy was not targeted at a specific group of problematical students 
with documented drug problems.  
Rather, like the Policy before us now, it subjected all students involved 
in extracurricular activities to random, suspicionless testing for drugs.  The Court stated that all participants 
in extracurricular activities had a diminished expectation of privacy, and that 
the intrusion on that privacy was not significant.  The Court concluded that the school's 
interest in deterring drug use prevailed over the insignificant intrusion on 
privacy, and thus rejected the constitutional challenge to the drug testing 
policy.

 
 

[¶12]     
In addition to Vernonia and Earls, we have reviewed decisions from 
several state courts.  The majority 
of such cases have applied some version of the reasonableness test, and 
concluded that random, suspicionless drug testing of students involved in 
extracurricular activities did not violate the provisions of their respective 
state constitutions.  In Joye v. Hunterdon Central Regional High 
School Board of Education, 176 N.J. 568, 618-19, 826 A.2d 624, 655 (2003), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court gave detailed consideration to both federal and New 
Jersey precedent, and concluded that "there is room in our State's constitution 
for school officials to attempt to rid Hunterdon Central of illegal drugs and 
alcohol in the manner sought here."  
In Linke v. Northwestern School 
Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972, 985 (Ind. 2002), the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that 
its state constitution "does not forbid schools from taking reasonable measures 
to deter drug abuse on their campuses but they must do so with due regard for 
the rights of students."  It held 
that a drug testing policy similar to the one before us now did not violate the 
rights of the students.  See also Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. 
Shell, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2845 (2003); Weber v. Oakridge School Dist. 76, 184 
Ore. App. 415, 56 P.3d 504 (2002) (drug testing for student athletes); State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142 (Iowa 
2003) (random, suspicionless searches of student lockers).

 
 

[¶13]     
The Coalition cites 
York v. Wahkiakum School Dist. 
No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 316, 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (2008), in which the 
Washington Supreme Court concluded that random, suspicionless testing of student 
athletes violated their rights under Article I, § 7 of the Washington 
Constitution.  Article I, § 7 
of the Washington Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in 
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."  Id. at 299 n.1, 178 P.3d  at 997 
n.1.  The Washington Supreme Court 
acknowledged that this language differs markedly from the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which states: 

 
 
The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.

 
 
The 
court noted that, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
"the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 
reasonableness,'" id. at 305-06, 178 P.3d  at 1001, citing Vernonia, 515 U.S.  at 652, 115 S. Ct.  at 2390.  In 
contrast, analysis under the Washington Constitution "hinges on whether a search 
has authority of law'  in other words, a warrant."  York, 163 Wn.2d  at 306, 178 P.3d  at 
1001.  The Washington Supreme Court 
declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's analysis as reflected in Earls, and instead decided that, under 
"our article I, section 7 jurisprudence," the Court could not "countenance 
random searches of public school student athletes."  Id. at 316, 178 P.3d  at 
1006.

 
 

[¶14]     
Article 1, § 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution is much more similar to the language of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Our state constitution reads as 
follows:

 
 
The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing 
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 
Given 
the significant difference between the text of Article I, § 7 of the Washington 
Constitution and the language of Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, York provides little guidance in 
resolving the issue before us.

 
 

[¶15]     
The Coalition also 
claims that "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a drug testing policy as 
violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution," citing Theodore v. Delaware Valley School 
Dist., 575 Pa. 321, 836 A.2d 76 (2003).  This claim is inaccurate.  The Pennsylvania Court did not say that 
a policy of random, suspicionless drug testing of students violated the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.  Rather, 
it ruled that "such a search policy will pass constitutional scrutiny only if 
the [School] District makes some actual showing of the specific need for the 
policy and an explanation of its basis for believing that the policy would 
address that need."  Id. at 348, 836 A.2d  at 92.  The trial court had dismissed the case 
on "preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer," based solely on the 
pleadings and before either party had presented any evidence.  Id. at 329, 836 A.2d  at 80.  Accordingly, the school district had 
"offered no reason to believe that a drug problem actually exists in its 
schools, much less that the means chosen to address any latent drug problem 
would actually tend to address that problem."  Id. at 347, 836 A.2d  at 91.  The case was returned to the trial court 
to allow the parties the opportunity to present their evidence, and the 
Pennsylvania Court observed:

 
 
It may be that, upon 
the trial of the matter, the [School] District can produce evidence of an 
existing drug problem as well as the success and/or failure of other means 
adopted to eradicate the problem, along the lines of that which ultimately 
convinced a majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court [in Joye, 176 N.J. 568, 826 A.2d 624].

 
 

Id. 
at 352, 836 A.2d  at 94.

 
 

[¶16]     
Although the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was critical of certain aspects of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Earls, it 
agreed that the basic test of the constitutionality of a search under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution is the "reasonableness" of that search.  Theodore, 575 Pa. at 342, 836 A.2d  at 
88.  This statement reflects a broad 
theme running through all such cases.  
The United States Supreme Court declared in Vernonia that, "[a]s the text of the 
Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is reasonableness.'"  
515 U.S.  at 652, 115 S. Ct.  at 2390.  
In Earls, it characterized 
reasonableness as "the touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental 
search."  536 U.S.  at 828, 122 S. Ct. 
at 2564.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Joye stated that "the 
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, 
under all the circumstances, of the search."  176 N.J. at 592, 826 A.2d  at 639, 
quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 
(1985).  And in Linke, the Indiana Supreme Court 
explained that "the measure of whether a government search violated 
Section 11 [of the Indiana Constitution] is whether the process is 
reasonable.'"  763 N.E.2d  at 
977.  

 
 

[¶17]     
This unifying theme 
is consistent with our decisions in Vasquez and O'Boyle, where we stated that 
Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution requires that searches be 
"reasonable under all of the circumstances."  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 489; O'Boyle, ¶ 32, 117 P.3d  at 
410.  Based on this precedent, and 
having considered guidance from other jurisdictions, we will apply this same 
"reasonable under all of the circumstances" standard to determine whether 
searches undertaken pursuant to the School District's Policy violate Article 1, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.

 
 

[¶18]     
Another common 
feature of the cases upholding the constitutionality of such searches is the 
list of factors considered to determine reasonableness.  In Vernonia, these factors were stated 
as:  (1) "the nature of the 
privacy interest upon which the search here at issue intrudes," 515 U.S.  at 654, 
115 S. Ct.  at 2391; (2) "the character of the intrusion that is complained 
of," Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct.  at 2393; 
and (3) "the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue 
here, and the efficacy of this means for meeting it."  Id. at 660, 115 S. Ct.  at 2394.  The same three factors, in only slightly 
different words, were also considered in Earls, 536 U.S.  at 830-34, 122 S.Ct. at 
2565-67; in Joye, 176 N.J. at 584-85, 
826 A.2d at 633-34; in Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 979; and in Theodore, 575 
Pa. at 341-42, 836 A.2d  at 88.

 
 

[¶19]     
This list of factors 
is also consistent with Wyoming precedent.  
We have explained that the reasonableness of a 
search

 
 
is not capable of 
precise definition or any mechanical application.  Each case requires a weighing of the 
need for the particular search in the public interest against the invasion of 
the personal rights that the search calls for.  Courts must probe the scope of the 
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is carried on, the justification 
for its initiation, and the place in which it is 
conducted.

 
 

Jessee 
v. State, 
640 P.2d 56, 61 (Wyo. 1982), overruled on 
other grounds by Jones v. State, 
902 P.2d 686, 692 (Wyo. 1995).  
Again, based on our precedent and guidance from other jurisdictions, we 
will determine the reasonableness of searches under the School District's Policy 
by weighing three factors:  
(1) the nature of the personal privacy rights that the Coalition 
claims are infringed by the Policy; (2) the scope and manner of the alleged 
intrusion on the students' rights; and (3) the nature of the public interest and 
the efficacy of the means chosen to further that interest.

 
 

[¶20]     
The Coalition asserts 
that a "child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection 
of the Constitution," citing as authority ALJ, 836 P.2d  at 315 (Urbigkit, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  We agree, and indeed, have previously 
acknowledged that students do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the 
schoolhouse gate.  Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1175 (Wyo. 1976), quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 
(1969).  In ALJ, however, we also recognized that 
what is "reasonable under all of the circumstances" is different in different 
circumstances.

 
 

[¶21]     
In ALJ, a minor was adjudicated delinquent 
and placed on probation.  ALJ, 836 P.2d  at 309.  In his appeal, the minor claimed that 
the probation condition requiring him to submit to random urine testing for 
alcohol violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
§ 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
He pointed out that, in Pena v. 
State, 792 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1990), we held that "a parole officer, before he 
makes a search, must still have a reasonable suspicion' that the parolee 
committed a parole violation."  ALJ, 836 P.2d  at 311.  Claiming the same constitutional rights, 
the minor in ALJ contended that he 
could not be forced to submit to random urinalysis absent reasonable suspicion 
that he had used alcohol.

 
 

[¶22]     
We agreed that 
urinalysis is a search for constitutional purposes, and that constitutional 
rights apply to juveniles.  We said, 
however, that constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures may apply differently to minors than to adults.  Id.  We recognized that, pursuant to 
Wyoming's Juvenile Justice Act, Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229, a judge imposing 
probation on a minor

 
 
must do what is best 
suited for the public safety, the preservation of families, and the physical, 
mental, and moral welfare of the child. . . .  To fulfill this mandate and to address 
the rehabilitative needs of juveniles, the court must have flexibility when it 
is formulating the probation conditions.

 
 

ALJ, 
836 P.2d  at 311.  Based on this need 
for flexibility, we determined that it was "within the court's discretion to 
allow a probation officer to search a juvenile without reasonably suspecting 
that a probation violation exists."  
Id.  Thus, we held that a minor probationer 
could be subject to random, suspicionless testing for alcohol, even though an 
adult probationer could not be searched without reasonable 
suspicion.

 
 

[¶23]     
The analysis in ALJ applies to the case before us 
now.  We recognize that public 
school students in Wyoming are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures 
by Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, but we also acknowledge that 
what is reasonable under all of the circumstances must be determined in light of 
factors such as the age of the students and the school environment.  Wyoming school districts have a 
"compelling interest" in providing for the safety and welfare of their 
students.  RM v. Washakie County School Dist. 
No. 1, 2004 WY 162, ¶ 16, 102 P.3d 868, 873 (Wyo. 2004).  Indeed, we have expressed "little doubt 
that the safety and welfare of students in the state are of utmost 
importance."  Id.  In order to maintain safety and welfare, 
schools are afforded the flexibility to impose rules on students that might be 
inappropriate for adults.  As the 
United States Supreme Court observed, a school's role "is custodial and 
tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be 
exercised over free adults."  Vernonia, 515 U.S.  at 655, 115 S. Ct.  at 
2392.  Because of the degree of 
supervision and control a school commonly exercises over its students, "students 
generally have diminished privacy expectations born of the government's duty to 
maintain safety, order, and discipline in the schools."  Joye, 176 N.J. at 597, 826 A.2d  at 
642.

 
 

[¶24]     
The School District 
further points out that students participating in extracurricular activities are 
subject to rules and requirements not applicable to students in general.  As set forth in the School District's 
Student Activity Code of Conduct:  
"Students who volunteer to participate in the Goshen County School 
District No. 1 extracurricular activities programs do so with the 
understanding that they must observe some regulations that are more restrictive 
than those relating to the general student community."  These regulations vary according to the 
particular activity, but include requirements for medical releases and physical 
exams, academic standards, attendance rules, and compliance with specific rules 
pertaining to tobacco, alcohol, controlled substances, and offensive 
conduct.  Because students who 
participate in extracurricular activities are already regulated more strictly, 
their reasonable expectations of privacy are even more limited than those of the 
general student population.  See Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 981; Earls, 536 U.S.  at 832, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2566.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the legitimate expectations of privacy are reduced for those students subject to 
drug testing under the School District's Policy.

 
 

[¶25]     
The School District's 
Policy specifies that students participating in extracurricular activities must 
consent to testing, chiefly through urinalysis, for drugs and alcohol.  The Coalition correctly contends that 
urination is a bodily function traditionally shielded by privacy.  See Earls, 536 U.S.  at 832, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2566.  However, the degree to which 
the School District's Policy intrudes on the students' privacy depends largely 
upon the details of how the urine samples are collected.  Id.

 
 

[¶26]     
 Under the School District's Policy, 
students to be tested are randomly selected by an independent testing 
company.  Selected students are sent 
individually into a restroom to produce a sample.  Each student enters the restroom alone, 
and remains unobserved while producing a sample.  Direct observation of the students is 
not necessary, as tampering with the samples is prevented by measures such as 
rendering water faucets inoperable and placing dye in the water in the 
toilets.  When a student exits the 
restroom, the sample is handed to a testing company employee, who splits the 
sample in two and marks them while the student observes.  The student then returns to 
class.

 
 

[¶27]     
The School District's 
Policy is less intrusive than the one upheld by the United States Supreme Court 
in Vernonia, where male students were 
required to

 
 
produce samples at a 
urinal along a wall.  They remain 
fully clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all.  Female students produce samples in an 
enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listening only for sounds 
of tampering.  These conditions are 
nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, 
women, and especially school children use daily.  Under such conditions, the privacy 
interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in 
our view negligible.

 
 

Vernonia, 
515 U.S.  at 658, 115 S. Ct.  at 2393.  
In contrast, under the School District's Policy, each student is alone in 
the restroom while producing a sample.  
No one watches or listens, and monitors remain not just outside of the 
stall, but out of the restroom entirely.

 
 

[¶28]     
We also note, 
briefly, that the School District's policy is less intrusive than the one 
accepted by the United States Supreme Court in Earls, where a monitor waited outside 
the bathroom stall and listened "for the normal sounds of urination in order to 
guard against tampered specimens."  
536 U.S.  at 832, 122 S. Ct.  at 2566.  
In protecting students' privacy, the School District's Policy is more 
like the one considered by the Indiana Supreme Court in Linke, where students went into "a 
private room and [were] allowed to close the door."  763 N.E.2d  at 982.  It is quite similar to the policy 
considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Joye, where students produced specimen 
samples "in closed-door restrooms without being observed directly by adult 
monitors."  176 N.J. at 599, 826 A.2d  at 643. 

 
 

[¶29]     
In the case before us 
now, the record includes evidence about the practices actually employed under 
the School District's Policy.  Two 
students who were tested provided affidavits detailing their experiences.3  The affiants said they felt embarrassed 
because monitoring personnel and the other students being tested could see them 
enter and exit the restroom.  We do 
not find this to be an undue intrusion on the students' legitimate expectations 
of privacy, because students are commonly observed by others when entering or 
exiting school restrooms.  The 
affiants also expressed discomfort at having to handle the sample bottles, and 
concern that they could not wash their hands because the faucets were turned off 
to prevent tampering with the samples.  
We note, however, that the students were allowed to wash their hands in 
another restroom before returning to class. 

 
 

[¶30]     
We recognize that 
some individuals may be "seriously embarrassed by the need to provide a urine 
sample," while other individuals may find it "no more intrusive than a routine 
medical examination."  Earls, 536 U.S.  at 841, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).  The 
School Board has implemented a number of measures clearly intended to reduce the 
intrusiveness of sampling under its Policy, and meant to preserve the students' 
privacy rights as much as possible under the circumstances.  As we weigh this factor, we cannot 
conclude that the School District's Policy results in an undue intrusion into 
the students' privacy.

 
 

[¶31]     
There are additional 
measures taken under the School District's Policy to help preserve privacy.  Testing is done for only a specified 
list of substances:  alcohol, 
marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates, methadone, opiates, 
benzodiazepines (metabolites of Valium), and propoxyphene (metabolites of 
Darvon).  Other information about, 
for example, any prescription medications a student might be taking, or other 
information about a student's health, is beyond the scope of testing under the 
School District's Policy.  The 
results of testing under the School District's Policy serve only limited 
purposes.  A student who tests 
positive may be suspended from extracurricular activities and required to 
participate in counseling and treatment programs.  However, positive test results have no 
academic consequences, and do not lead to school discipline.  Records of the testing are kept 
separately from the students' academic records, are held in confidence, and are 
destroyed when the student graduates.  
Records of the testing are turned over to law enforcement officials only 
by court order.

 
 

[¶32]     
Similar factors in Earls led the United States Supreme 
Court to conclude that, "given the minimally intrusive nature of the sample 
collection and the limited uses to which the test results are put, we conclude 
that the invasion of students' privacy is not significant."  Id. at 834, 122 S. Ct.  at 2567.  Similar factors also led the New Jersey 
Supreme Court to conclude that "the school's test policy limits the intrusion on 
the students' privacy interests and protects their personal dignity to the 
extent possible under the circumstances."  
Joye, 176 N.J. at 600, 826 A.2d  at 644.  We reach the same 
conclusion.

 
 

[¶33]     
As noted earlier, we 
have recognized that a school district has a "compelling interest" in providing 
for the safety and welfare of its students.  RM, ¶ 16, 102 P.3d  at 873.  The School District's Policy requiring 
drug and alcohol testing for students who participate in extracurricular 
activities is intended to further its interest in maintaining the health and 
safety of its students.  The facts 
of record indicate that the School District's Policy was prompted by survey 
results indicating that drug and alcohol use is relatively prevalent and 
widespread among students in Goshen County schools.  Courts appear unanimous in identifying 
drug and alcohol use by students as a serious threat to their health, safety, 
and welfare.  "School years are the 
time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most 
severe," and "of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not 
just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty."  Vernonia, 515 U.S.  at 661-62, 115 S. Ct. 
at 2395.  Based on the School 
District's compelling interest in providing for the health and safety of its 
students, and because drug and alcohol use presents a threat to students' health 
and safety, we agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana that "[d]eterring drug 
abuse by children in school is an important and legitimate concern for our 
schools."  Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 
983.

 
 

[¶34]     
As we turn to examine 
the efficacy of the means chosen by the School District to address that concern, 
it is important to note what it is that the School District must show.  The Coalition appears to contend that 
the School District must prove that its Policy will achieve a specific level of 
success.  We do not agree.  Under such a stringent test, the School 
District would be limited to implementing only programs that have already been 
tried and proven.  We do not think 
the Wyoming Constitution should preclude the School District from trying more 
innovative methods of deterring drug use.  
As the Supreme Court of Indiana observed, when the school district 
identified a drug problem among its students, it had "an interest in experimenting with methods to deter 
drug use."  Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 984 (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶35]     
The proper test can 
be gleaned from the cases we have already discussed.  The New Jersey Supreme Court explained 
that:

 
 
Reasonableness in 
this context does not require that the Board possess irrefutable proof verifying 
the efficacy of random drug and alcohol testing in reducing substance abuse 
among students.  Rather, it is 
enough that the Board believed that its program would have some measurable 
effect in attaining the Board's objectives.

 
 

Joye, 
176 N.J. at 603, 826 A.2d  at 646.  
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the school would be 
required to make "some actual showing of the specific need for the policy and an 
explanation of its basis for believing that the policy would address that 
need."  Theodore, 575 Pa. at 348, 836 A.2d  at 
92.  In short, in the case before 
us, the School District was not required to prove that the policy will achieve a 
specific level of success.  Rather, 
it is sufficient if the School District establishes that there is a rational 
connection between the Policy chosen and the problem 
identified.

 
 

[¶36]     
In this case, the 
School District has provided a factual basis to support its concerns regarding 
drug and alcohol usage by students in the district.  As discussed previously, surveys 
identified relatively prevalent and widespread drug and alcohol use among 
students in Goshen County schools.  
This problem may not seem as serious as the one in Vernonia, where the United States 
Supreme Court quoted this description from the district 
court:

 
 
The administration 
was at its wits end and . . . a large segment of the student body, particularly 
those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion.  Disciplinary actions had reached 
"epidemic proportions."  The 
coincidence of an almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and 
disciplinary reports along with the staff's direct observations of students 
using drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to the 
inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug 
abuse as well as the student[s'] misperceptions about the drug 
culture.

 
 

Vernonia, 
515 U.S.  at 649, 115 S. Ct.  at 2389.  
On the other hand, the survey evidence presented by the School District 
provides more concrete evidence of a problem than the largely anecdotal evidence 
in Earls, which the United States 
Supreme Court summarized as follows:

 
 
Teachers testified 
that they had seen students who appeared to be under the influence of drugs and 
that they had heard students speaking openly about using drugs. . . .  A drug dog found marijuana cigarettes 
near the school parking lot.  Police 
officers once found drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a Future 
Farmers of America member.  And the 
school board president reported that people in the community were calling the 
board to discuss the "drug situation."

 
 

Earls, 
536 U.S.  at 834-35, 122 S. Ct.  at 2567.  

 
 

[¶37]     
In the case before us 
now, the School District relies on information gathered by surveys to document 
drug and alcohol problems.  This 
evidence is comparable to that in Joye, where survey results showed, for 
example, that "over thirty-three percent of Hunterdon Central's students between 
grades ten and twelve had used marijuana within the preceding twelve-month 
period," and that "thirteen percent of seniors had tried cocaine."  176 N.J. at 575-76, 826 A.2d  at 
628.  "As for alcohol, the study 
indicate[d] that over forty percent of students between grades ten and twelve 
had been drunk' within the twelve-month period prior to the survey, and over 
eighty-five percent of all students had tried alcohol."  Id. at 576, 826 A.2d  at 628.  The evidence in the case before us is 
also comparable to that in Linke, 
although survey results in that case were rendered more compelling by the 
"recent death" of a student from an overdose of drugs.  Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 
975.

 
 

[¶38]     
Thus, the evidence 
presented by the School District indicates a drug problem somewhere in the 
spectrum among Vernonia, Linke, Joye, and Earls.  It is up to the School District to 
determine whether the problem is serious enough to require action.  School districts in Wyoming have "wide 
discretion in the management of the district's affairs," and this Court "will 
not interfere with an honest exercise of discretion by public boards or 
officers."  Hyatt v. Big Horn School Dist. 
No. 4, 636 P.2d 525, 529 (Wyo. 1981).  In this case, the School District 
decided that there is a drug problem among its students, and it has presented 
evidence to support that belief.  
Like the United States Supreme Court, we "cannot articulate a threshold 
level of drug use that would suffice to justify a drug testing program for 
schoolchildren," and "we refuse to fashion what would in effect be a 
constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a drug problem.'"  Earls, 536 U.S.  at 836, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2568.  As in Earls, the "School District has provided 
sufficient evidence to shore up the need for its drug testing program."  Id. at 835, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2568.

 
 

[¶39]     
The real difficulty 
in this case surrounds the efficacy of the School District's chosen means of 
addressing the problem it has identified.  
The School District has chosen to require drug and alcohol testing for 
all students involved in extracurricular activities.  Like the dissenters in Earls, we are troubled that the School 
District's Policy targets students who may be perceived as "least likely to be 
at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging effects."  Earls, 536 U.S.  at 843, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  To 
explain the nature of this concern, it is helpful to consider important 
differences between Vernonia and Earls.

 
 

[¶40]     
In Vernonia, the school district did not 
require testing for all students, or for all students involved in 
extracurricular activities.  Rather, 
its drug testing policy applied only to students involved in interscholastic 
athletics.  The United States 
Supreme Court upheld this policy, concluding that the school district had 
adequately identified a drug problem among its students, particularly among its 
student athletes, and that the policy implemented by the school district was 
rationally related to the problem because it was aimed directly at the student 
athletes who were a major part of the problem.  In addition, the Court noted that the 
program was directed "narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of 
immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his 
sport is particularly high."  Id. at 662, 115 S. Ct.  at 2395.  

 
 

[¶41]     
In Earls, the Court upheld a drug testing 
policy that, like the one before us now, applied not just to student athletes, 
but to students involved in extracurricular activities of any kind, "such as the 
Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, 
choir, pom pon, cheerleading, and athletics."  536 U.S.  at 826, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2562-63.  As noted above, there was 
anecdotal evidence of drug use at the schools.  There was, however, no evidence 
indicating that students participating in extracurricular activities were a 
particular source of the drug problem, or that drug usage was any more prevalent 
among them than among the general student population.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
this lack of evidence fatal to the policy, ruling that a school district 
"seeking to impose a random suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition to 
participation in a school activity must demonstrate that there is some 
identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to 
the testing, such that testing that group of students will actually redress its 
drug problem."  Earls v. Board of Education, 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001).  The Supreme Court specifically rejected 
this test, however, instead ruling that, "Given the nationwide epidemic of drug 
use, and the evidence of increased drug use in [the] schools, it was entirely 
reasonable for the School District to enact this particular drug testing 
policy."  Earls, 536 U.S.  at 836, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2568.

 
 

[¶42]     
In Earls, those who challenged the drug 
policy, relying on Vernonia, asserted 
that "the testing of nonathletes does not implicate any safety concerns, and 
that safety is a crucial factor.'"  
Id.  The United States Supreme Court also 
rejected this argument, stating that "the safety interest furthered by drug 
testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children, athletes and nonathletes 
alike."  Id. at 836, 122 S. Ct.  at 2568.  

 
 
While in Vernonia there might have been a closer 
fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court's finding that the drug 
problem was "fueled by the role model' effect of athletes' drug use," such a 
finding was not essential to the holding. . . .  Vernonia did not require the school to 
test the group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather considered the 
constitutionality of the program in the context of the public school's custodial 
responsibilities.  Evaluating the 
Policy in this context, we conclude that the drug testing of . . . students who 
participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the School 
District's interest in protecting the safety and health of its 
students.

 
 

Id. 
at 837-38, 122 S. Ct.  at 2569.

 
 

[¶43]     
These aspects of the 
Court's decision were particularly criticized by the dissenters, who asserted 
that interscholastic athletics "require close safety and health regulation; a 
school's choir, band, and academic team do not."  Id. at 846, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2573.

 
 
Not only did the 
Vernonia and Tecumseh districts confront drug problems of distinctly different 
magnitudes, they also chose different solutions: Vernonia limited its policy to 
athletes; Tecumseh indiscriminately subjected to testing all participants in 
competitive extracurricular activities.  
Urging that "the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly 
substantial for all children, athletes and nonathletes alike," . . . the Court 
cuts out an element essential to the Vernonia judgment. . . .  

 
 
At the margins, of 
course, no policy of random drug testing is perfectly tailored to the harms it 
seeks to address.  The School 
District cites the dangers faced by members of the band, who must "perform 
extremely precise routines with heavy equipment and instruments in close 
proximity to other students," and by Future Farmers of America, who "are 
required to individually control and restrain animals as large as 1500 pounds." 
. . .  Notwithstanding 
nightmarish images of . . . livestock run amok, and colliding tubas 
disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of students the 
School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in activities that are not 
safety sensitive to an unusual degree. There is a difference between imperfect 
tailoring and no tailoring at all.

 
 
The Vernonia 
district, in sum, had two good reasons for testing athletes: Sports team members 
faced special health risks and they "were the leaders of the drug culture." . . 
.  No similar reason, and no other 
tenable justification, explains Tecumseh's decision to target for testing all 
participants in every competitive extracurricular 
activity.

 
 

Id. 
at 851-53, 122 S. Ct.  at 2576-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted).

 
 

[¶44]     
The Coalition, in the 
case before us now, makes similar arguments against the School District's 
Policy: there is no evidence that participants in all extracurricular activities 
are leaders of the drug culture, and there are no special health risks faced by 
those who participate in, for example, choir, drama club, or student 
council.  For these reasons, the 
Coalition argues that there is, in effect, a disconnect between the problem 
identified by the School District  widespread drug and alcohol use among 
students  and the means chosen to address that problem  testing all students 
who participate in extracurricular activities.  Based on this disconnect, the Coalition 
urges us to find the Policy unconstitutional.

 
 

[¶45]     
By a narrow margin, 
however, we believe that the School District has demonstrated a sufficient 
connection between the means chosen and the problem identified.  The School District has explained that 
it chose to test students who participate in extracurricular activities in order 
to "undermine the effects of peer pressure by providing legitimate reasons for 
students to refuse use of illegal drugs and/or alcohol."  The School District's Policy, like the 
policy considered in Earls, 

 
 
seeks to discourage 
demand for drugs by changing the school's environment in order to combat the 
single most important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs, namely, peer 
pressure. . . .  It offers the 
adolescent a nonthreatening reason to decline his friend's drug-use invitations, 
namely, that he intends to play baseball, participate in debate, join the band, 
or engage in any one of half a dozen useful, interesting, and important 
activities.

 
 

Id. 
at 840-41, 122 S. Ct.  at 2570 (Breyer, J., concurring).  There may be no guarantee that the 
Policy will achieve this purpose, but the School District has shown a rational 
basis for believing that it might.

 
 

[¶46]     
In addition, the 
Coalition alleged in its complaint that a majority of students in Goshen County 
schools participate in extracurricular activities, and the School District 
admitted this allegation.  Under the 
School District's Policy, then, a majority of the students in the district will 
be subject to drug and alcohol testing.  
The School District has presented survey evidence that a substantial 
percentage of students are at risk from drug or alcohol use.  Given these facts, we cannot say it is 
irrational for the School District to anticipate that there is some substantial 
number of students who both participate in extracurricular activities and are at 
risk from drug or alcohol use.  
Because the Policy is clearly aimed at deterring drug and alcohol use 
among these students, we cannot conclude that the School District's Policy lacks 
efficacy.

 
 

[¶47]     
The Coalition 
fervently stresses the importance of extracurricular activities, asserting that 
they are "critically important" in developing "the type of responsible students 
who will some day be leaders in our communities and in our State."  The Coalition offered evidence that 
involvement in extracurricular activities is particularly significant to 
students who wish to pursue higher education.  We readily acknowledge the importance of 
extracurricular activities in Wyoming's public schools.  But we also recognize, as did the United 
States Supreme Court, that participation in extracurricular activities is a 
voluntary choice.  Vernonia, 515 U.S.  at 657, 115 S. Ct.  at 
2393.  See also Joye, 176 N.J. at 611, 826 A.2d  at 651 
("[W]e cannot conclude that the importance of extracurricular activities 
outweighs the Board's articulated need to engage in reasonable efforts to 
enhance the educational environment for all students by reducing substance abuse 
within its high school."); Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 981 ("The fact that refusal to agree to drug testing results in 
forfeiture of the opportunity to obtain certain benefits is not so weighty as to 
constitute forced consent.").  

 
 

[¶48]     
Because participation 
in extracurricular activities is optional, the School District's Policy in this 
case, like the one in Earls, 
"preserves an option" for a student who chooses not to be tested for drugs and 
alcohol.  "He can refuse testing 
while paying a price (nonparticipation) that is serious, but less severe than 
expulsion from the school."  Earls, 536 U.S.  at 841, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).  A 
student who genuinely believes that his privacy rights are unduly infringed by 
the School District's Policy may choose not to submit to drug and alcohol 
testing.  He will have to forego 
optional extracurricular activities, but he is not deprived of the fundamental 
right to an education.  

 
 

[¶49]     
Finally, we note 
evidence that the School District did not adopt this Policy hastily or without 
careful consideration.  Before the 
Policy was adopted, the Superintendent of Schools sent a letter to parents and 
guardians of school students.  In 
this letter, the Superintendent summarized the survey results from the past 
several years as indicating "a serious prevalence of alcohol and drug use among 
our students."  He explained 
previous efforts to address that problem, including educational and awareness 
programs, but said that "other school districts can and are doing more.  Random drug testing of students involved 
in extra-curricular activities is an example of what other districts have 
successfully implemented to encourage youngsters to avoid the use of drugs and 
alcohol."  He then invited 
recipients to a public forum in order to "hear from representatives from other 
school districts about the process of implementing a random drug and alcohol 
policy," and to receive "public comment on this issue."

 
 

[¶50]     
After engaging in 
this process to assess the Policy, the School District's board of trustees 
adopted the Policy by a vote of eight to one.  As the Superintendent explained in his 
affidavit, 

 
 
The policy recognizes 
that many of the students participating in extracurricular activities are viewed 
as role models to other students and that it is important that they avoid drug 
and alcohol use in their position as role models.  It is also the position of the Board 
that to achieve the goal of reducing risks of alcohol and drug abuse and to 
maximize the skills and talents participating in extracurricular activities, it 
is important that participants refrain from drug and alcohol use.  It 
is the belief of our school district that this policy will assist in that 
endeavor.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  As we noted earlier, when 
we consider the efficacy of the School District's Policy, "it is enough that the 
Board believed that its program would have some measurable effect in attaining 
the Board's objectives," Joye, 176 
N.J. at 603, 826 A.2d  at 646, and the School District must provide "an 
explanation of its basis for believing that the policy would address that 
need."  Theodore, 575 Pa. at 348, 836 A.2d  at 
92.  In this case, the School 
District has supplied a sufficient explanation of why it believes its Policy is 
"reasonably related to achieving the school's purpose in providing for the 
health and safety of students, and undermining the effects of peer pressure by 
providing a legitimate reason for students to refuse to use illegal drugs."  Linke, 763 N.E.2d  at 986.  

 
 

[¶51]     
In sum, we 
acknowledge that Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution protects public 
school students from unreasonable searches and seizures.  In considering whether the testing 
mandated by the School District's Policy is reasonable under all of the 
circumstances, we recognized that students, particularly those who participate 
in extracurricular activities, are already subject to more stringent rules and 
regulations than adults, and so have limited expectations of privacy in the 
school setting.  We found that the 
School District's Policy adequately preserves the students' personal privacy 
rights, and appropriately limits the degree of invasion into those rights.  We concluded that the School District 
has a compelling interest in providing for the safety and welfare of its 
students, and that it therefore has a legitimate interest in deterring drug and 
alcohol use among students.  On the 
closest question of all, we determined that the School District showed that its 
Policy requiring random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing for all students 
who participate in extracurricular activities is rationally related to 
furthering its interest in deterring drug and alcohol use among 
students.

 
 

[¶52]     
We conclude that the 
Coalition has not demonstrated that the School District's Policy subjects 
students to searches that are unreasonable under all of the circumstances.  Accordingly, we hold that the School 
District's Policy does not violate Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution. 

 
 

Equal 
Protection

 
 

[¶53]     
The United States 
Constitution provides that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Equal protection "is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). 
 "The Wyoming Constitution does not 
contain such an express equal protection' clause; rather, it contains a variety 
of equality provisions, viz., Article 
1, §§ 2, 3, and 34; and Article 3, § 27."  Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 
77, ¶ 39, 71 P.3d 717, 730 (Wyo. 2003).  Despite differences between the texts of 
the two constitutions, the Coalition concedes that "this Court uses the 
conventional federal equal protection analysis in the interpretation of the 
equality provisions of the Wyoming Constitution."  Newport International University, Inc. v. 
State Dept. of Educ., 2008 WY 72, ¶ 15, 186 P.3d 382, 387 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 

[¶54]     
In determining 
whether there is a violation of equal protection doctrine, 

 
 
we 
require the party claiming such violation to first demonstrate that the 
classification at issue "treats similarly situated persons unequally."  Matter of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 313 (Wyo. 
1992).  If we determine that the 
classification does "treat similarly situated persons unequally," we apply two 
different levels of scrutiny depending upon the nature of the classification to 
determine whether equal protection is violated. 

 
 
That 
is, where a statute . . . affects a fundamental interest or creates an 
inherently suspect classification, the court must strictly scrutinize that 
statute . . . to determine if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state 
interest. However, if the statute . . . only affects ordinary interests in the 
economic and social welfare area, the court need only determine that it is 
rationally related to a legitimate state objective.

 
 

Ellett 
v. State, 
883 P.2d 940, 944 (Wyo. 1994), quoting White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1315 
(Wyo. 1989).  While the cases cited 
above dealt with statutory provisions, we apply the same analysis to the School 
District's Policy.

 
 

[¶55]     
The Coalition claims 
that the School District's Policy divides similarly situated students into two 
classifications:  those who 
participate in extracurricular activities, and those who do not.  It claims that the Policy treats the two 
classes unequally:  those who 
participate in extracurricular activities are subject to random, suspicionless 
testing for drugs and alcohol, while those who do not participate in 
extracurricular activities are not subject to such testing.  In contrast, the School District argues 
that the Policy does not create two separate but similarly situated classes that 
are treated differently.  According 
to the School District, every student who attends school in Goshen County has an 
equal opportunity to receive an education.  
Every student has the same rights, including the right to choose whether 
or not to participate in extracurricular activities.  Further, the School District contends, 
"[t]o the extent a student chooses to participate in activities, each and every 
student is similarly treated in that all students are equally required to comply 
with the rules and regulations" adopted by the School District, including the 
Policy requiring drug and alcohol testing.

 
 

[¶56]     
Even if we assume, 
without deciding, that the Coalition has accurately identified a classification 
through which similarly situated persons are treated unequally, the argument 
presented by the Coalition is unpersuasive.  The Coalition contends that the School 
District's Policy must be subject to strict scrutiny.  However, it does not claim that students 
are a suspect class, nor does it assert that students have a fundamental 
interest in participating in extracurricular activities.  Rather, the Coalition urges us to apply 
strict scrutiny because "the fundamental right' at issue in this case is the 
right to be free from an unreasonable search undertaken in violation of Article 
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution."  
This contention fails because, as already established, the School 
District's Policy does not subject students to unreasonable searches.  We therefore reject the Coalition's 
position that we should subject the School District's Policy to strict scrutiny 
under our equal protection analysis.

 
 

[¶57]     
If we ask instead 
whether the School District's Policy is rationally related to a legitimate state 
objective, we find that question already resolved by our previous analysis.  In determining that the drug and alcohol 
testing required under the Policy was reasonable under all of the circumstances, 
we concluded that the School District has a compelling interest in providing for 
the safety and welfare of its students, and a legitimate interest in deterring 
drug and alcohol use among students.  
We also concluded that the School District's Policy is reasonably related 
to furthering those interests.  With 
these conclusions, we also effectively determined that the School District's 
Policy is rationally related to a legitimate state 
objective.

 
 

[¶58]     
The equal protection 
argument, as presented by the Coalition, can succeed only if the Coalition also 
succeeds on its search and seizure claim.  
Our conclusion that the School District's Policy does not subject 
students to unreasonable searches and seizures is, therefore, determinative of 
the Coalition's equal protection claim as 
well. 

 
 
Due 
Process

 
 

[¶59]     
Article 1, § 6 
of the Wyoming Constitution provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law."  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution contains similar language, which applies to the states pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  We have 
explained that a "party claiming an infringement of his right to due process has 
the burden of demonstrating both that he has a protected interest and that such 
interest has been affected in an impermissible way.  The question is whether there has been a 
denial of fundamental fairness."  DH v. Wyoming Department of Family 
Services, 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003) (internal 
citations omitted).

 
 

[¶60]     
The Coalition points 
out that, under the School District's Policy, a student found to be in violation 
of the Policy may appeal that decision to the Superintendent or his 
designee.  Under the terms of the 
Policy, the Superintendent's decision on a student's appeal is "conclusive in 
all respects."  The Coalition 
contends that this provision violates the due process protections of the state 
and federal constitutions "by foreclosing any type of review, judicial or 
otherwise, of the Superintendent's final decision regarding whether a student is 
in violation of the Drug Testing Policy."

 
 

[¶61]     
The School District 
maintains the due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions 
apply only if the Coalition shows that it has been deprived of a protected life, 
liberty, or property interest.  
Characterizing a student's participation in extracurricular activities a 
privilege rather than a protected right, the School District contends that the 
Coalition has not shown that any student's due process rights are infringed by 
the Policy.  The district court 
adopted the School District's position, ruling that participation in 
extracurricular activities

 
 
is not a protected 
interest.  See, e.g., In re University Interscholastic League, 
20 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Tex. 2000) (right to participate in extracurricular 
activities is not a fundamental right); Mancuso v. Massachusetts Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 900 N.E.2d 518, 527-28 (Mass. 2009) (for due process 
purposes, student's property interest  
in her right to public education did not imply that she also had a 
property interest in her participation in extracurricular activities); Adamek v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 426 A.2d 1206 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (collecting cases 
that found participation in extracurricular activities was not a fundamental 
property right).

 
 
Though the Wyoming 
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, the Court finds these and the 
myriad of concurring cases persuasive because Wyoming requires compulsory school 
attendance.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 21-4-101  107 (LexisNexis 2009).  
The Wyoming Legislature has also set forth a right for students age 5 to 
21 to attend public school.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 21-4-301 (LexisNexis 2009).  However, there are no legislative 
counterparts mandating students' participation in extracurricular activities or 
creating a statutory right to such participation.

 
 
This Court finds that 
the Goshen County students do not hold a property interest in their 
participation in extracurricular activities. . . .  Without such a protected interest, they 
have no right to the protection of due process as provided by the U.S. and 
Wyoming Constitutions.  See Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).

 
 

[¶62]     
We do not need to 
agree or disagree with the district court's conclusion, because we find a more 
fundamental flaw in the Coalition's due process claim.  As stated above, a party claiming an 
infringement of his due process rights must demonstrate both a protected 
interest and an impermissible infringement on that interest.  DH, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d  at 1008.  The Coalition has not demonstrated any 
infringement because it has not shown, or even alleged, that any of its members 
has sought and been denied judicial review of any decision made by the 
Superintendent pursuant to the Policy.  
The Coalition's speculation that judicial review might be denied in the 
future is insufficient to support a due process claim now.  "Constitutional questions are too 
important to be answered by this court at random and should not be answered 
unless fully presented."  Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 
1989), quoting Witzenburger v. State, ex 
rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, 1134 (Wyo. 
1978) and Tharp v. Unemployment 
Compensation Comm'n, 57 Wyo. 486, 502, 121 P.2d 172, 178 (1942).  Until this Court is presented with a 
case in which judicial review has been denied, it is premature to consider the 
Coalition's claim that the Policy violates due process.  The district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment against the Coalition on this 
claim.

 
 
Remaining 
Issues

 
 

[¶63]     
Because the Coalition 
has failed to prove that the School District's Policy is unconstitutional, there 
is no basis for their claim that they are entitled to a permanent injunction 
against implementation of the Policy, or for their claim that the district court 
erred in granting the School District's motion for summary judgment.  In conclusion, we find ourselves in 
agreement with the observation of Justice Breyer of the United States Supreme 
Court:  "I cannot know whether the 
school's drug testing program will work.  
But, in my view, the Constitution does not prohibit the effort."  Earls, 536 U.S.  at 842, 122 S. Ct.  at 
2571.  We therefore affirm the grant 
of summary judgment in the School District's favor.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1As 
the district court observed, the Coalition includes several named plaintiffs who 
may lack standing to bring these claims, including, for example, at least one 
person who had already graduated from high school and was no longer subject to 
the drug testing policy.  But as 
also pointed out by the district court, it has been established by affidavits 
that at least two of the students named as plaintiffs have been tested pursuant 
to the drug testing policy.  Based 
on the standing of at least those two members of the Coalition and their 
parents, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the Coalition has 
standing in this matter.  See Northfork Citizens for Responsible 
Development v. Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d 260, 262 (Wyo. 2008); International 
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local No. 279 v. Civil Service Comm'n of Fire Department 
of City of Cheyenne, 702 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Wyo. 1985) (Thomas, C.J., 
specially concurring).

 
 

2The 
United States Supreme Court recently revisited Belton and abandoned its 
bright-line rule.  It now holds that a law enforcement officer may search 
the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to an arrest only if it is 
reasonable to believe that the arrested person can access the vehicle at the 
time of the search, or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested 
might be found in the vehicle.  Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). 

3The district court 
placed these affidavits under seal to protect the minor affiants.  Sharing the district court's concern 
about protecting the identities of these students, we will discuss these 
affidavits only in broad terms.