Title: State v. Ruggiero.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

taw uBR

 

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

-— e00 ---

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee, 2; 12

war dena

qaws

 

Wo, 26940

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(Case Nos. B-94-96:9/30/04, MPD Rep. No. 04-22073)

JUNE 5, 2007
LEVINSON, J., WITH WHOM DUFFY, J. JOINS; NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING
‘AND DISSENTING, WITH WHOM MOON, C.J., JOINS:

AND ACOBR, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING SEPARATELY

OPINION BY LEVINSON, J.
ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

‘The defendant-appellant Adam Ruggiero appeals from the
September 30, 2004 judgment and sentence of the district court of
the second circuit, the Honorable Douglas H. Ige presiding,
convicting him of operating a vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant [hereinafter, “DUI”], in violation of Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 2916-61 (Supp. 2003), see infra note 10.

on appeal, Ruggiero asserts that the district court
erred in sentencing him as a repeat offender, pursuant to HRS
§ 2918-61 (b) and (c), see infra note 10, inasmuch as nine days
after his DUI arrest but prior to his conviction and sentencing,
this court, in summary disposition order (SD0) No. 25671 (March

19, 2004) [hereinafter, “SDO No. 25671"), reversed his previous
FOR PUBLICATION 8 WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++

 

Janvary 29, 2003 DUI conviction, thereby, Ruggiero alleges,
removing the basis for the enhanced penalty.

For the reasons discussed infra in section IIT, we hold
that the language set forth in HRS § 291E-61(c), see infra
note 10, manifests a clear legislative intent to create a status
offense in HRS § 291-61 and, therefore, that it was not
violation of Ruggiero’ s due process rights, guaranteed by
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution! and article 1, section 5 of the Hawai'i
a second-time offender on the

 

Constitution? to sentence him
basis of a prior conviction that was valid at the tine of his
arrest for the present offense.

However, in keeping with the due process protections
articulated in State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 142-43, 63
P.3d 1109, 1112-13 (2003), State v. Terael, 78 Hawai'i 66, 73,
90 P.2d 303, 310 (1995), and State v, Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i 517,
525, 880 P.2d 192, 200 (1994), gee infra section IIT.c.5, in
order for his conviction and sentencing as a second-time offender
to be valid, Ruggiero’s prior conviction, as an essential element
of the offense charged, had to be alleged in the complaint and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Insofar as the
complaint in the present matter failed to allege Ruggiero's prior

conviction, it was insufficient to charge Ruggiero with a

1 he fourteenth anencment, section 1, provides in relevant part
that “{nJo State shall... deprive any person of Liberty, of property,
without due process of law.”

Article 1; §§ provides in pertinent part that “[nJo person shall
be deprives of isberty or property without due process of law.”

2
 

444 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b) (2) as a second-time
offender. We therefore vacate his conviction of and sentence for
driving under the influence for the second time within a five-
year period, in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b) (2) and
remand to the district court for the entry of 2 judgment of
conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant with
no prior offenses, in violation of HRS § 291B-61(a) and (b) (1),
see infra note 10, and sentencing in accordance therewith. State
ve Elisott, 77 Hawai'i 309, 313, 884 P.2d 372, 376 (1994). We
affirm the district court's judgment with respect to Ruggiero’ s
convictions of the infractions alleged in Counts II, III, and IV
of the complaint, none of which Ruggiero appealed, see infra note
3

1. BACKGROUND

on March 10, 2004 -- while his appeal of a January 29,
2003 conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant, in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) (1) (Supp. 2002), was
pending before this court -- Ruggiero was again arrested for DUI.
Nine days later, on March 19, 2004, we reversed the January 29,
2003 conviction on the grounds that the prosecution failed to
prove an essential element of the offense.

Following from the March 10, 2004 arrest, on April 19,
2004, Ruggiero was charged by complaint with, inter alia, DUI
(Count I), in violation of HRS § 2916-61 (Supp. 2003), see infra
 

¢4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

note 10.? On September 8, 2004, the district court of the second
circuit, the Honorable Douglas H. Ige presiding, conducted a

trial and convicted Ruggiero, inter alia, of that charge.
The district court then proceeded to the sentencing
phase of the trial, whereupon the plaintiff-appellee State of
Hawai'i (hereinafter, “the prosecution") moved for an enhanced
sentence based on the prior January 29, 2003 conviction. After a

conference in chambers, the district court made the following

 

statement

{Ruggiero}’s co-counsel[] brought to the Court’s
attention that the conviction that the

Prosecution is relying on for [DUT] that

Decurred on October €, 2002 whereby the

Sefendant was convicted on January 25, 2003, had

een appealed and the Supreme Court by summary
Gisposition order reverses the conviction [on

Naren 15, 2008),

S0' the defense was arguing thet, accordingly, it
should not be considered asa pricr conviction. There
iss provision, however, in (HRS §] 291(E=)62(c),
‘hereby it states thet any judgment on @ verdict of &
Finding of guilty .  . that at the tine of the
Sffense has not been expunged by pardon, reverse(él,
[or] set aside shail be deemed & pricr conviction
Under this section.

 

 

 

» the portion of the complaint charging Ruggiere with DUI (Count T)
reads in its entirety:

That on or about the 10th day of March, 2004, in the
Division ef Wailuko, County of Mau, State of Hawsi[']i, ADAM M.
RUGGIERO did operate or asgune sctual physical contro! ‘of
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant meaning that he
Mas under the infivence of alechel in an amount sufficient to
Unpair his nocmal mental facsities or ability to care for himself
and guard against casualty, thereby conmitting the offense of
Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant in
violation of Section 2916-6] of the Hawai[']i Revised Statutes.

 

Inasmuch as Ruggiero does not appeal his conviction of and sentence for
Griving without no-fault insurance, in violation of HRS § 431; 10-106 (a)
(Count 11), driving 2 motor venicle with delingvent tax, in violstion of ARS
$ 245-11 (Count II1), and failure to signal, in violation of HRS § 291C-84(b)
(count Iv), we affirm the district court's judgnent and sentence regarding
those counts
‘94 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +#+

‘The question now is the legsl (elffect of that
statutory provision. ‘the reversal took place
on Worch 13, "and the date of this
violation was March 10, 2004, nine days earlier. so
at the tine of the commission of this offense, that
Conviction had not been reversed by the Supreme Court.

   

The’ district court then continued the sentencing hearing to allow
both parties to brief the issue of whether Ruggiero’s prior
conviction could serve as the basis for an enhanced sentence as a
repeat offender, pursuant to HRS § 291E-61(c), see infra note 10.
In his memorandum in opposition, Ruggiero argued only that the
language of the statute was ambiguous and that the ambiguity
should therefore be construed in his favor.‘

At the September 30, 2004 hearing, Ruggiero reiterated
the argument set forth in his memorandum. The district court
asked Ruggiero’s counsel whether any other arguments came to

mind:

‘The Court: [1s there anything outside the cleer reading of
‘the statute

n> constitutional grounds, anything elge that would
prevent the Court from... applying the cleer
Feading of the statute(?)
counsel: ‘Just, your Honor, in the interest of justice and
rness the firet conviction should not count as it
wes overturned before this current conviction...
Firet, he already completed classes and ther
requirenents for the first conviction that was
overturned, even though it was overturned. "He has
faced those penalties already for that offe
Second, your Hongr, the legislative history does
not indicate a reason for the Isnguage of the statute
at iseue. So, basically, your Honor, he is punished
for the first offense, aithough it’s overturned. Now
he faces a second conviction anda second conviction
penalties.

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

«the only argument thet conceivably sae not based on statutory
construction asserted that "(L)n the interests of justice, (Ruggiere]”s
Current conviction should be consigered his first Offense.”

5

     
s+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#

Your Honor, the legislature may have intended
that the Language of the statute provides notice to
Gefendante above their convictions so that they can
Conform their behavior, but here Mr. Ruggiero had a
Valid issue for appeal and believed he vould win on
‘appeal |;] therefore he wasn’t on notice that he would
bet facing a second conviction penalty.

 

 

 

‘The court fell, you're making the argunents that you made

Wiaitten -- I don't need you to read ie
+ Sor anything else?

 

Counsel: No, your honor:

(Some capitalization altered.) The district court then concluded

that

o]n the clear reading of [MRS $ 291E~€1(c}) when the
Gefensont comittes this offense st would have been
hie second. There wos & previous conviction that had
not yet been overturned by the appellate courts.

 

Fhe court believes that that reading of that
statute is clear.” It's not anbiguous. And at the
{me of the commission of this offense oh March 10,
200¢, ‘the conviction of the previous. [DUZ) [that]
feccurred on October 6, 2002(,) resulting in conviction
oh January 29th, 2003{,] had’ not been set aside.

[T]he Coute nae ot Been cited [end no) argurent
has bean sade to the Court. «whereby any
statutory or constitutional ‘provision or requirement
Would prevent the Court from... interpreting oF
Seplying the statute as it cleafly reads in the

So the Court will find that this offense is the
second offense for the defendant within a five year
period under [HRS §) 2916-61.

 

 

 

‘The court proceeded to sentence Ruggiero, as a second-tine

offender,

 

to fines, fourteen days in jail, and a one-year licens.

suspension.

2004.

Ruggiero filed a timely notice of appeal on October 29,

IT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

wITIhe interpretation of 2 statute... is 2
question of law reviewsble de nova.” Stale v. Arcea,
84 Hawas's 1, 10, $28 F.2d 843, 852 (1986),

 
‘4*% FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #*#

Grav v. Adwini.1 Diri.1 of the court, ¢ Hawai'i 138,
144, 931 P.2d 580, S66 (1997). Furthermore, our
statutory construction is guided by established rules:

nen construing a statute, our foremost
celigstion is to ascertain and give effect
fo the intention of the legislature, which
is to be obtained primarily from the
Jenguage contained in the statuve steelf.
Aad we must read statutory language in the
Context of the entire statute ang construe
fe'in's manner consistent with ite
purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinetiveness or
Uncertainty of on expression used in
statute, an ambiguity exists.

Th construing an enbiguous statute,
s[eyne meaning of the ambiguous words may
be sought by examining the context, with
which the ambiguous words, phrases, and
Sentences may be compared, in oraer to
ascertain their true meaning.” HRS
S 151511) (11883)].” Moreover, the courts
Ray resort to extrinsic aids. in
Seternining legislative intent. One

jenve is the use of legislative history
2 an interpretive tool

  

 

 

 

 

Gray, 84 Havai's at 148, 931 P.2d at $90 (footnote
onitted). “This court may also consider “(t]ne reason
and spirit of the lew, end the cause which induced the
Tegisiature to enact it... to discover ite true
meaning." HRS §1-15(2) “taws dn pari.

OF upon the sane subject matter, shalt be
Eonstrucd with reference te each other. What is clear
Sn one statute nay be callea upon in aid to explain
what ie doubtful in snether-"" HRS § 1-16 (1995)

State v. Koch, 107 Hawai'i 215, 220-21, 112 P.3d 69, 74-75 (2005)
(some internal citations omitted) (some brackets and ellipses
added and some in original) (quoting State v. Kava, 102 Hawai'i
1, 7-8, 72 P.3d 473, 479-480 (2003) (quoting State v. Rauch, 94
Hawai'i 325, 322-23, 13 P.3d 324, 331-32 (2000) (quoting State vs
Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 327, 964 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting state
va Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting

State vi Stocker, 90 Hawai'i 85, 90-91, 976 P.24 399, 404-05

 
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

(2998) (quoting Ho vs Leftwich, 68 Hawai'i 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d
793, 796-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhiet Dae Won Sa Temple ¥.
Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1927-28
(2998)))0)))). Nonetheless, absent an absurd or unjust result,
see State v, Haugen, 104 Hawai's 71, 77, 85 P.3d 178, 164 (2004),
this court is bound to give effect to the plain meaning of

unambiguous statutory language and may only resort to the use of

 

legislative history when interpreting an ambiguous statut

State v, Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i 465, 472, 24 P.3d 661, 668 (2001).

TIT. pEscussIoN
A, Ruggiero Failed To Preserve His Constitutional

Arguments For Appeal

In opposing the imposition of a repeat-of fender
sentence, Ruggiero relied virtually exclusively on statutory
arguments, principally that HRS § 2916-61(c), see infra note 10,
was ambiguous. As we have noted, his only departure from that
Line of argument, raised in his memorandum in opposition to the
enhanced sentence and again at the September 30, 2004 sentencing
hearing, was that “the interest of justice and fairness” weighed
against his vacated conviction being used as the basis for
sentencing him as @ second-time offender.

Ruggiero contends that the invocation of “justice and
fairness” is sufficient to preserve for appeal constitutional
grounds for vacating the district court’s September 30, 2004
Judgment and sentence. (Quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941), for the proposition that “denial of due process is

the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER **4
very concept of justice.”) In so arguing, Ruggiero essentially
contends that the invocation was sufficient to put the district
court on notice that he was arguing that his right to due process
was. violated by the enhanced sentence. The record reflects,
however, that the district court gave him ample opportunity to
articulate @ due process ground with specificity. Inasmuch as
Ruggiero was represented by counsel and failed to invoke, either
in his brief or in oral argument, the protections of either the
United States or Hawai'i Constitutions, to accept Ruggiero’ s
contentions (1) that the district court erred in its ruling on
his purported constitutional arguments and (2) that he adequately
preserved those arguments for appeal would be to conclude that
virtually any invocation of basic fairness is sufficient to
preserve virtually any conceivable constitutionally-based

argument for appeal.
rve the

 

Wie hold that Ruggiero failed to pr
constitutional arguments for appeal and, therefore, we may only
reach the merits of his argunents by noticing plain error on the
Gistrict court’s part. See HRPP Rule 52(b); In re John Doe, Born
on January 25, 1985, 102 Hawai'i 75, 87, 73 P.3d 29, 41 (2003);
Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 101, 997 P.2d 13, 27 (2000); State ve
McGriff, 76 Hawai'i 148, 155, 871 P.2d 782, 789 (1994) (this
court may sua sponte notice plain errors that affect a
defendant's substantial rights).
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

B. The Parties’ Arounents Regarding The Enhanced Sentence

1, Rugaiero’s aroument

Ruggiero proposes that the district court erred in
premising his sentence on the commission of a second offense
within a five-year period, pursuant to HRS § 291£-61(b)(2), see
infra note 10, because the prior conviction was a nullity due to
constitutional defects. He asserts that sentencing him according
to the provisions set forth for second-tine offenders “denies
(him) his Due Process and Double Jeopardy rights” under the fifth
end fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution® and
Article 1, $§ 5 and 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution. (Citing
State v, Sinacoga, 81 Hawai'i 421, 918 F.2d 228 (App. 1996).

Ruggiero contends that HRS § 291-61 is a purely

recidivist statute and that the district court erred by failing

 

to follow the sentencing procedure prescribed by the Intermediate
Court of Appeals (ICA) in Sinagoga, 61 Hawai'i at 447, 918 P.2d
at 254, for the ordinary sentencing of repeat offenders, which he
contends requires that the sentencing court confirm that any

Prior convictions upon which an enhanced sentence will be based

 

She fifth amendnent to the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part that "(njo person shall'. . . be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in Jeopardy of lite cr 1inby |. nor be deprived of life,
Liberty, Gr property, without dve process of law. ss" the fourteenth
anendnent is! set forth in relevent part gupga in hote'2

* Article 1, § 10 provides that “{nlo person shall . . . be subject
for the sane offense to be twice put in Jeopardy.” Elfective November 2,
2004, Article 2, § 10 was amended by Senate Bill No. 2651 in respects,
Annaterial to the present aatter by voters in a general election’ ee 2004
Hew. Sess. L., at 1085. Article 1, section § Se set forth supra in note 2

 

 

 

10
 

‘e+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

are valid at the time of sentencing.” He maintains that under a
straightforward recidivist statute, due process requires that

enhanced sentences be based on convictions that are valid at the

time of sentencing. (Citing State v. Veikese, 102 Hawai'i 219,
14 P.3d 575 (2003); State v. Shimabukuro, 100 Hawaii 324, 60

P.3d 274 (2002)7 State v. Hahn, 618 N.W.2d $28, 535 (Wis. 2000).)
2. The prose 5 arcunents
‘The prosecution asserts that, by amending HRS
§ 291-61 (c) to require the sentencing court to treat the tine of
conmission of the subsequent offense as the touchstone for
determining the validity of prior convictions for sentencing
purposes, the legislature clearly intended to create 2 status
offense. Therefore, the prosecution argues, the underlying

predicate conviction need only be valid at the time of the

In dictum, the TCA in Sinagcaa concluded that, “where ordinary

3’ are oppiicable and there iss possibility that the court
hay use the defendant's prict conviction (s) ae a besis for the imposition or
enhancenent of # prison Sentence,” 61 Hawaii at 447, 918 P.2d at 254, Hawai'd
Courts sust thereinafter fellow @ fave-step procedure: (2) the court must
Supply both parties with any relevant presentence reports implicating prior
CHEital convictions, (2) the Gefendant must alert the court to any prior
Convictions thet were eilegedly uncounseles, "otherwise invalidly entered,”
anc/or “not ageinet the defendant"; (3) the court must inform the defendant
thet any prior convictions not challenged st this stage ore dened valid and
Gannot later be raised, absent good cause, to attack the court's sentence; (4)
Smith respect to each reported pricr conviction that the defendant challenges,
the (Howal'i Rules of Evidence] shail apply and the court shall expressly
Gecide before the sentencing whether the (prosecution has) satisfies its
Burden of proving to the reasonable satisfaction of the court that the
Opposite of the defendant's challenge is true”; and (5) “if the court is aware
OF the defendant's pric: . . . invalid criminal conviction(), it shall not
Gnpose oF enhance e prisch sentence prior to expressly stating on the record
thet it die not consider it ‘aeva basis for the inposition or enhancement
of a prizon sentence.” Id. at €47, 918 Pu2d at 254.

jerthelessy fecognizing that the ICR, in permitting defendants

to challenge any previews conviction “etherwise invalidiy entered,” wai
pening the door to collateral sttacks on prior convictions "whenever the
validity of a conviction is challenged,” thie court, in State V Veikosc, 102
Nawai't 219, 236 nit), 14 P.3d 575, 582 9.8 (2003), expressly directed thet the
Language “cthereise ‘invalid criminal conviction” be disregarded.

nu

 

   
  

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +##
commission of the subsequent offense, regardless of whether the
underlying conviction is later vacated.' (Citing state vi.
Lobendahn, 71 Haw. 111, 113, 784 P.2d 872, 873 (1989).) This
reading of HRS § 291£-61, the prosecution maintains, conports
with the legislative intent to deal harshly with “scofflaws” who
reoffend while appealing previous DUI convictions. (Quoting sen.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1185, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1523.)

c
x iS ¢ 251E~ Plaini in
Scuuisting And Sentencing Rusaiera As A Second-Tine
- Asta ¢_statute son: e
‘Of the subsequent violation.

Conviction of or imposition of sentence for a “status”

offense, in which one element of the offense is the status of the

defendant at the time of the alleged violation, does not require

that the conviction continue to be valid at the time of
sentencing. See Lobendahn, 71 Haw, at 123, 784 P.2d at 073,
uoted in Veikosa, 102 Hawai'i at 227 n.5, 74 P.3d at 583 n.5
("In Lobendahn we held that, inasmuch as the statute created a

+ Black's Lam Dictionary 400 (8th ed. 2004) defines » “statue crime”
as “(al crime of which a perscn ts guilty by being in s certain condition oF
Of @ specific character.” A status offense therefore generally includes: 9 @
material elenent, « particular condition or characteristic thet renders
gthervise potentially iegsi behavior illegal. See, 2.a., HRS § 134-7, (Supp.
2006), which provides in pertinent pert that “In]o person who ie a fugitive
fron justice Gr is a person prohibited from possessing firesrns oF ammunition
lunder” federal aw shell own, po control any firearm of ammunition
therefor." In State. Lebengann, Ti aw, Ill, 113, 166 Prod €72) 673 (1989),
2 conviction under HRS 5 184-7 (1985) remained’ valid despite the unserlying
Predicate felony conviction being overturned later on eppeel- See disccaston
infra in section I1T.c.1

 

 

 

wz
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER

‘status offense,’ the subsequent invalidation of the predicate
felony conviction did not affect the validity of the criminal
possession charge because the defendant was ‘a convicted felon at
the time he possessed the firearm and ammunition. Such
possession was unlawful and the subsequent reversal of the

conviction does not then render such possession lawful.’"). But

see United States v, Bagley, @37 F.2d 371, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that a prior felony conviction obtained in violation
of federal constitutional rights cannot serve as the basis for a
subsequent conviction under @ federal law prohibiting felons from

possessing firearms).

2. Under a purely recidivist statute, a conviction

Purely recidivist statutes address repeat offender
behavior by increasing the punishment for every subsequent
violation. See Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai'i at 330, 60 P.3d at 280

(Levinson, concurring) (noting that HRS § 291-4(b) (Supp.

 

1998)? “created an escalating sentencing scheme keyed to the

 

* ae the tine of the decision in Shimabukura, HRS § 291-8(b)
provided in pertinent par

 

1 person committing the offense of driving under the
Antlvence of intoxicating Liguor shall be sentenced es follows

 

(2) For the first offense, or any offense not preceded
within » five-year pefiog for @ conviction under this
Section, byt

(A) A’ fourteen-hour minimum aleshol abuse
rehabilitation program... 7 and

(B) Ningty-asy proapt suspension Of license... 7
ans

(©) Any one or more of the following
(2) "Seventy-two hours of community

service work)

 

(continued...

3
 

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#

defendant's degree of recidivism”); id, at 333, 60 P.3d at 283
(Nakayama, J., dissenting) (noting that HRS § 2918-61 (Supp.

2001)" resembled a recidivist statute in that “the

 

"(as continued)
(iL) Not less than forty-eight hours and
not more than five days of
Imprisonment? oF
(414) Rifine of not less than $150 but not
ore than $1, 000.
(2) For an offense which occurs within five years of
a prior conviction under this section, by:
(al "Promp: suspension of license for 8 period
of one year :
(B) Either one of the followine
(i) Not lese then one hundred hours of
Conaunity service work) oF
(44) Not lese than ferey-eiane
Consecotive hours but not more than
fourteen days of

 

imprisonment... ; and
Ic) A fine of not Less than’ $800 but not more

than $1, 500.
(2) For an offense which occurs within five years of

two prior convictions under this section, by:
(A) "A'Eine of not less than $500 bat not more
‘than 32,5007
(B) Revocation of license for a period of not
less than one year but not more than five
ne

 

 

© ‘than ten days but not more than
thirty days imprisonment. + =
w uRS § 2918-61 (Supp. 2001) provided in relevant part that:

(a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant if the perscn operates oF
autumes actual physical control of a vehicle:

(2) hile under the influence of alechol in an amount
sufficient to impair the person's normal mental
facalties or ability te care for the person and guard
ageinse casualty:

 

 

{bi “x’person connitting the offense of operating 2 vehicle
under the influence of en intoxicant shall be sentenced as follows
without possibility of probation or suspeneion of sentence:

(a) "For the first offense, or any offense not

preceded within a five-year pericd by a

Eonviction for en offense onder thie

Section.

ia) 8 fourteen-hoor minimon substance abuse
rehabilitation program. + 7

 

 

(continued

4

 
HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +##

 

 

(B] Ninety-day prompt suspension of license... ;

(©) Any one oF more of the following:

(a) "Seventy-two hours of community service
works

(44) Not less than forty-eight hours and not

 

pore than five days of inprisonment; cr
(14) A'fine of not Less than $150 but not wore

than’$1,000{-)
(2) For an offense that occurs within five years of &
prior conviction for sn offense under this section
peer bye
inj " Prompt suspension of License . . . for # period
of one year.

 

(5) Either Gre of the followin
(3) Not lese than two hundred forty hours of
Community service work; or
(43) Not less than five days but not more than
fourteen days of inprisonnent. = ns
(C)_ A fine of not ese than $500 but not more than
$1,500(-)

 

(3) For an'offense that occurs within five years of two
prior convictions for offenses under this section

ial "A fine of not less than $500 but not more than $2, 500;

 

(8) Revocation of iicense . . . to cperate # vehicle for
Period not less than one year but not more than five
years:

(C) Not less than ten days but not more than thirty days
Inprisonsent
(4) For an offense that occurs within ten years of three or more

prior convictions for offenses under this section... 7
a)" Mansatory revecetion of license... fer a per:

not less than one year but not more chan five y
Not less than ten doye imprisonment os

of

    

   

ie thie ase ¢ felon

 

(Emphasis added.) As discussed infra, effective January 1, 2004, the
legisleture anended HRS § 2S1E~E1 by excising the clase C felony offense for a
fourth offense within ten years provides for in HRS § 2916-61(b) (4) and
cresting a separate offense of habitual drunk driving codified at HRS
§,2206°62.5, as dntza note 13. "See 2003 Hw. Seas. Ls Act 71, $6 1, 3, and 7
ae 125-27)

Central to the analysis of the present matter, the 2003 amendnents also
enacted two key changes in ARS'§ 2918-61. HRS § 2918-63 (0) (4) was amended to

 

Any person eighteen years of age or older who is convicted under

this section and wno operated a vehicle with s passenger, in or on

the vehicle, who was younger than fifteen yeare of age, shell be
cont inved. .

 

1s.
‘1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER +

 

‘amended version includes, in its plain language, a ‘multiplier?
effect or enhanced sentencing” for the repeat offender) .

In contrast to a status offense, under = purely
recidivist statute, if a conviction was valid at the tine of the
commission of 3 subsequent offense but was later invalidated
prior to adjudication of the subsequent offense, the defendant's
conviction for that subsequent offense may not be based on the
vacated conviction. See Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai'i at 330-32, 60
P.3d at 280-82 (Levinson, J., concurring) (reasoning thet,
inasmuch as at the time of adjudication of the habitual DUI
offense at issue, one of the defendants prior DUI convictions
had been vacated, he could therefore not be convicted of habitual
drunk driving ~

 

as to which three prior convictions was a

requisite attendant circumstance -- because, in light of the
vacated conviction, at the time of adjudication he had been
lawfully convicted of DUI only twice).

(.. .continued)

 

itenced to an additional mandatory fine of $$00 and an
sdeitional nandatory ter of inpriscnment of fortyveight hours;
provides that the total tern of imprisonment for a person
Sonvicted under this paragraph and paragraph (1), (2), OF (3)
Shall not exceed thirty aaye

 

In addition, BRS § 2918-61(c) Mae onended to add the underscored language:

Notwithstanding any other lew to the contrary, any:

("Conviction under thie section
REL be" condidered = prior conviction for the purposes of
Imposing sentence under thie section, dict
singin 2 Del. Ean
adjudication in the case ota ainot, shat at the time of tne
nse has exeuneae yeversed. oF

"In fact, Justice Levinson's concurring opinion in
expressly distinguished the recidivist nature of the statute at Sesce TKS
(continued...)

 

16
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER **#

In Veikoso, this court characterized the Shimabukuro

analysis as follows:

[clentral co the judgment in Shimabukuro . . . wae the
fact that the defendant... had succeeded Sn having
one of hie prior convictions vacated by the rendering

sourt_orior to entering his... uiltvoles. ..
Rnajority of this court agreed |S. that the sacaied
Conviction could not be used to establish
culpability... +

102 Hawai'i at 222, 74 P.3d at $78. We further reasoned in
Veikoso that,

Iw]here a defendant succeeds in having 3 prior
conviction expunged, reversed, of set aside, its use
in connection with procesdinge relating to subsequent
offenses will be linited, similarly, s defendant who
Succeeds in having pricr convictions expunged
Eeversed, or set azide after they have been used to
Support guilt or enhance punienment in subsequent
Broceedings may have a basis for attacking shat
Subsequent conviction or enhanced punishnent.

 

 

     

 

 

Ad, at 226-27, 74 P.3d at 582-83 (emphasis in original). rf a
defendant who succeeds after sentencing in having a prior

conviction expunged or vacated “nay have a basis for attacking
that subsequent conviction or enhanced punishment,” id. it
follows, a fortiori, that a defendant who, at sentencing, has,

through direct appeal, succeeded in having a prior conviction

 

 

.scontinued)
§ 291-¢.4, see infsa note 14, from a status offense, such as the one set forth

in uns § 347, gee gunra note 6, and enelyzed in Labendahn. See snimabukuro,
100 Wawai'i at '350-8.3) 60 odd at 200 0-3.

eg Init conclusion ie supported by abn, 618 N.W.2¢ $28, upon which
this court relied in part in Veikose: in Hahn, the Wisconsin Soprene Court
Feasoned that “*[i}f the offencer succeeds [in challenging the valiaity of &
pricr conviction in an appropriate forus], the offender may seek to reopen 2
Sentence inposed az a persistent repeater under [the Risconsin recidivis
statute] if thet sentence was based on s vacated conviction." 102 Hawal's at
227, 74 P.3d at 583 (qucting Hams, €16 N.W.2d at 535)

 

 

 

 

v
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
vacated as constitutionally defective, has grounds for opposing
an enhanced sentence based upon that invalid conviction.

3. HRS $ 2918-61 (Supp, 2001), a recidivist statute,
required that any necessary prior convictions be

valid at the tim i ‘and sent
Fa rani

Se

HRS § 2915-61 (Supp. 2001), see supra note 10, “created
an escalating sentencing scheme keyed to the defendant’s degree
of recidivism,” Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai'i at 330, 60 P.3d at 280
(Levinson, J., concurring), and was devoid of language
indicating, for purposes of sentencing, that any prior conviction
upon which the sentence was premised need only be valid at the
time of the commission of the subsequent offense. Therefore,
consistent with Shimabukuro and Veikose, pursuant to HRS
§ 291£-61(b) (Supp. 2001), any prior convictions to which a
defendant’s punishnent was pegged would necessarily have had to
be viable at the time of adjudication and sentencing.

In 2003, however, the legislature manifested a clear
intent to transform HRS § 2918-61(b) (1) to (3) into three
separate status offenses by adding the following language to HRS
§ 2918-61(c): “Any judgment on a verdict or @ finding of
guilty . . . that at the time of the offense has not been
expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside shall be deened a
prior conviction under this section.” (Emphasis added.)

‘The conclusion that the legislature intended that HRS
§ 291£-61(b) (1) to (3) be treated as status offenses is
reinforced by the legislative history surrounding the creation,

through the same legislation, of the separate offense of habitual

18
‘1 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IOWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
intoxicated driving: As part of the 2003 amendments, the
legislature excised the class C felony for four convictions
within ten years set forth in HRS § 291£-61(b) (4), see suora note
10, and renumbered it as @ wholly separate offense, entitled
“wabitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant,” codified at HRS § 2916-61.5."" The Senate expressly

 

RS § 251B-61.5 (Supp. 2003) provided in pertinent pert thet:

(a)_A person connits the offense of habitually operating a

venicle under the influence of an intoxicant if:
(ay The person is a habitual operstor of a vehicle while

under the inf!

 

   

(2) The person oper:
veniele:
TA) While under the influence of alcohol

in an gnount sufficient to impair
the person's normal mental faculties
or ability to care for the person
and guard against casualty;

(b) For the’ purposes of this section:
“Convicted three or sore tines for offenses of operating «

vehicle under the influence” means that, st the tine of the

 

 

 

Berson bag three oF more tines withan ten years of the instant
offense:
(0) Ajudoment ona verdict . . . for a violation of
Chis section or [HRS $5] 25178, 291-4.8, oF
291-7. a8 those sections were in effect on
Decenber $1, 2001;
pardon, Feversed, or set side. All convictions that have been

 

expunged by perdon, Feversed, cr set aside prior te the instant
offense shell not be Geenes prior convictions for the purposes of
proving the person's statue asa habital cperator of s venicie
while under the influence of an"intoxicant

Biperson has the statue of @ "hebituel operator of a vehicle
waite under the influence of an intoxicant™ df the person has been
Convicted three or more tines within ten years of the instant
offense, for offenses of operating # vehicie under the infiuence
Gf an intext cant

(c) Nabitelly operating a vehicle whiie under the
Anfluence of en intoxicant is class © felony.

 

 

(Emphases added.) Effective September 1, 2004, the legislature added “; oF
THRE $6) 2918-61 or 707-702.5" to IIRE § 291E-61,5(b) (3) to bring st into
(cont inves...)

19
 

FOR PUBLICATION 18 WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER ++

indicated that it was creating @ status offense in HRS

§ 2918-61.

 

1 the Senate Committee on Transportation, Military

Affairs, and Government Ope

 

ions explained that it “anended the
provisions of the habitual drunk driver offense so that it is
clearly a status offense.” sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1185, in
2003 Senate Journal, at 1523. The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and Hawaiian Affairs further noted that it found

that being punished as a status offender rather then
Feceiving an enhanced sentence has distinct
implications. Status offenders receive a specific
Punishment ai long as the offender meets the criteria
at the tine the cfvfender reoftends. The offender
Cannot defeat the charge by having a previous
Conviction reversed on's evbeequent eppeal. By
Contrast, enhances sentences cen be avoided Lf any:
prior cohvictions that are the basis for en enhance
Sentence are overturned.

‘Your Committee believes it Le important that the
hebitually impaired driver nderetand that he or she
Will be charged with a felony for any further impaired
Griving arrests, even if one of [the driver's) prior
Convictions is reverses after their arrest

 

 

   

 

   

 

Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1268, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1564.
In order to effectuate its intent, the legislature included the
following language in HRS § 291£-61.5(b):

For the purposes of this section:

 

“Conistsd three or nore tines...” means
hat, atthe tine of the behavicr for which the wersan
s-charaad Under ins section, the serson bag three or

nore tines within ten years of the instant offense

mers Sia" shaoment <""*"thet, at the time of the

instant_offense, nad not been “expunged by pardon.

ieversed or set aside.

 

(continued)
uniformity with HRS § 2916-€1.5(b} (2) and (3) and further amended the section
In respects inmaterial to the present matter, See 200¢ lian, Sess. Le Act Ur
§§ 13 and 17 at 362-64. “Eftective July 5, 2008, the legislature onendes HRS
§ 2918-61.5 again, in respects immaterial to the present matter. fe 2005,
How. Sess. L. Act 194, $62 and 5 at 609-20.

 

 

 

20
 

‘t+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +**

(Enphases added.) This language strongly resembles the amended
language of HRS § 2918-61(c), see supra note 10 (“Any judgment on
a verdict or a finding of guilty . . . that at the time of the
offense has not been expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside
shall be deemed a prior conviction under this section”). Both
the plain language of and the legislative history surrounding the
2003 amendments, accordingly, reflect a clear legislative intent
that HRS § 2916-61(b) (1) to (3) be treated as separate status
offenses. We therefore hold that the 2003 amendnents to HRS

§ 2918-61 transformed HRS § 291E-61(b) (1) to (3) into status

offenses.

4. The amenduents to HRS § 2916-61 do not alter this

‘sourt’s conclusion in State v. Domingues that HRS
§ 2918-61 (b) (1) to (4) describe intrinsic elements
that_the prosecution is required to plead and
Drove bevond a reasonable doubt.

Effective January 1, 2002, the legislature repealed an
and enacted HRS

 

arlier DUI law, HRS $ 291-4.4 (Supp. 2000)
§ 2918-61 (Supp. 2001), gee supra note 10. See 2000 Haw. Sess.
L. Act 189, $§ 21, 23, 32, and 41 at 405-06, 425-27, 432-33.

 

“Rs § 292

 

4 provided in pertinent part!

(a) A person commits the offense of habitually driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquer .. . if, dering a te
year period|,] the person has been convicted three or more tines
For a! Griving under’ the influence offense: and

(1) The person operates or assumes actual physical control

of the operation of any vehicle walle under the
Influence of an intoxicating liquor ss

   

ici “Rébitvetly driving under the intluence of intoxicating
Liquor... ta class C felony,

white both the 2000 and the 2001 HRS Cumulative Supplements
contain the language of HRS § 2916-61, the revisor of statutes evident ly
felled to Incltde a notation that the’ statute dia not become effective dott
(continved. =)

2
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#

In State v. Domingues, 106 Hawai"i 480, 107 P.3d 409,
(2005), this court confronted the question whether HRS § 2916-61
(Supp. 2001) was a substantial reenactment of HRS § 291-4.4. In
Domingues, the defendant had been arrested in August 2001 for
violating HRS § 291-4.4, in effect at the time, but was
subsequently indicted in March 2002 under the same law, three
months after its repeal, 106 Hawai'i at 482-83, 107 P.3d at
411-12. This court analyzed the structure and purpose of the two
statutes and held that the legislature had substantially
reenacted HRS § 291-4.4 as HRS § 291E-61. Id. at 482, 107 P.3¢
at 411. In reaching that holding, this court concluded that the
language of HRS § 291E-61(b) (1) to (4), see supra note 10,
“describes attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and
‘enmeshed’ in the hierarchy of offenses that HRS § 2916-61 as a
whole describes.” Id, at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 (citing HRS
§ 702-205 (1993) (defining elements of an offense)). This court
thereby concluded that, as attendant circumstances and,
therefore, essential elements of the offense intrinsic to the
commission of the crime charged, “such aggravating circumstances
‘must be alleged in the [charging instrument] in order to give
the defendant notice that they will be relied on to prove the
defendant’ s guilt and support the sentence to be imposed, and

they must be determined by the trier of fact.’" Id, at 487-88,

 

(continued)
January 1, "2002." Sompare 2000 Haw. Sees. L. Act 169, $§ 23 and 41 at 425-27
fand 433; 2001 Haw. Sess. L. Act 157, $8 25 and 39 at’ 387-56, 404 with HAS 2000
Cumulative Supplerent vol. 5 at 210°12; HRS 2001 Comuiative Supplement vol.
oe 198-200

 

 

22
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#

107 P.3d at 416-17 (quoting Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i at 528, 880
P.2d at 203). That was required, we concluded, because

[vi]t ds an impermissible dilution of the jury's role
as factfinder to renove the responsibility for
Setermining the existence of faces Leading £0 the
imposition of particular punishment... We hold
that wien a fact susceptible to Jury devermination i
a predicate to the imposition of an enhanced sentence,
the Hawai's Constitution requires that such factual
determinations be nade by the trier of fact. The
legislature may not dilute the historical province of
the jury by relegeting facts necessary to the
Imposition of s certain penalty for criminal behavior
to the sentencing court. The jury is the body.
responsible for determination of intrinsic facts
necessary for the inpositicn of punishment for an
Cifense eximinslized by the legislstore. The analysis
in Schroeder protects the jury's role by mandating
thet the cetermination of facts intrinsic to the
offense be made by the trier of fact. ["1

 

 

Id. at 486, 107 P.3d at 417 (quoting State vs Tafova, 91 Hawai'i
261, 270, 273, 982 P.2d 890, 899, 902 (1999)) (emphases omitted).
The language of HRS § 2916-61(b) (1) to (3) remains
unchanged by the 2003 amendments and, while the legislature, as
noted supra in section III.C.3, excised the class C felony from
HRS § 2916-61 (b) (4), it inserted a new aggravating factor into
§ 2916-61 (b) (4), imposing additional punishments beyond those
provided for in HRS § 291E-61(b) (1) to (3), for any adult
convicted of operating a vehicle while under the influence and
with @ passenger under the age of fifteen years in or on the
vehicle, see supra note 10. The Domingues analysis, therefore,
retains its vitality, inasmuch as considerations of due process

continue to require that the aggravating factors set forth in HRS

23
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION I WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER +#*
§ 2918-61 (b)** —- all of which remain “attendant circumstances
that are intrinsic to and ‘enmeshed’ in the hierarchy of offenses
that HRS § 2918-61 as a whole describes,” Domingues, 106 Hawai'i
at 487, 107 P.3d at 416 -- be alleged in the charging instrument

and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

The district court plainly erred in convicting

03s fen
HRS = Pi

This court's holding in Tafova requires that the
essential elements of any offense be alleged in the complaint and
found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. 91 Hawai'i
at 270, 273, 982 P.2d at 899, 902; see also Schroeder, 76 Hawai'i
at 528, 880 P.2d at 203, Inasmuch as we conclude, supra, that a
prior conviction, as described in HRS § 2916-61(b) (2) (Supp.
2003), is an elemental attendant circumstance, intrinsic to the
offense of operating @ vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant, it was necessary that Ruggiero’s prior conviction be

alleged in the charging instrument and proven at trial as

 

The holding in Domingues was based in part on the concezn that due
process required that the defendant be put on notice thst, under HRS
§ 2916-61(b) (4), he or she was charged with a class C felony rather than the
petty misdemeanors set forth in HRS § 2916-61 (b)(1] to (3). See 106 Howat
ot 407 6 n.8) 107 F.3e at 416 4 n.€ (noting that “(3]t se fundsmental that,
a matter of basic aue process, ‘[a) defendant must be put on sufficient notice
of the ‘nature and cause of the accusation’ with which he is charged"” and
‘observing that the inclusion of a class ¢ felony alongside three petty
misdeneancrs generated the conundrun that a defendant would be insufficiently
Put on notice of the right to a Jury trial absent the requirenent. that the
Clements of IRS § 291E-E1(b) be included in an. indictment cr conpleit)

 

              

 

(quoting sate vs Lenaly, 72 Naw. 130, 13¢, 809 P.20 442, #44 (1991) (quoting
State wi Jendrasch, 56 Haw. 279, 261, 567 £.24 1242, 1245 (19771). In the
amended Version of HRS § 251E~€1(b) (4), see gunxa note 10, due process would

Sinilerly require the prosecution to allege in the charging instrument ond
prove at crial that a passenger under the age of fifteen wae in cr on the
defendant's venicle at the tine of the arrest. See Zafova, 9] Hawai'i at 270,
273, 962 F.2d at 699, 902; Schrosder, 76 Hawai's at 928, 860 P.2d at 203:

 

 

24
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*

preconditions to his present conviction of operating a vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant for the second time within
five years, in violation of HRS $ 291E-61(a) and (b) (2).

‘The complaint charging Ruggiero with a violation of HRS
§ 2918-61 was silent with respect to the attendant circumstance
of any prior conviction, see aupra note 3, and, therefore, was
insufficient as a matter of law in charging a violation of HRS
§ 2918-61 (a) and (b) (2), because

[i]t is well settled thet an “accusation must
sotficient1y allege ail of the essential elenents of
the offense charges,” 2 Fequirenent thet “obtains
whether en accusation ie in the nature of an oral
Charge, information, indictment, or complaint []”
Hiate £. Jendruach, 58 Haw. 279, 261, 567 F.20 1242,
Tee S77 (; aecord Jerse), 76 Hawaii (av)
65-70, 850 P.24 [at] 306-07 > 7
Hawai"s “{at) Sui, 864 F.2d (acy 374
differently, thé sufficiency of the charging
Anstronent is seasured, inter alia, by "whetner st
Contains the clenents of the offense intended to be
Charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of
What he’ (er she) must be prepared to meet(.]” State
Me Welle, 76 Hawai'i 373, 379-80, €e4 Poze 70, Fe
(1995) (citations and internal quotation marke
omitted) Ibrackets in criginal). “A charge defective
in this regara snounte toa failure to state an
offense, ends conviction based upon it cannot be
Sustained, for that would constitute a denial of due
process." Jendrusch, 6 Haw. at 261, S67 F-2¢ at 2246
(citations omitted)

 

fut

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cummings, 101 Hawai'i at 142, 63 P.3d at 1112 (some bracketed
material added and some in original) (quoting State v. Merino, 81
Hawai'i 198, 212, 918 P.2¢ 672, 686 (1996).

[gluse ae the (Sitate must prove beyond =
reasonable deubt all of the essential
clement of the offense charged, ‘the state
is also required to eufficiently allege
them and that requirenent is not satisfied
by the fact that the accused actually knew
then and was not sisled by the failure to
sufficiently allege all of then.

 

 

25
‘0+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **+

Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310 (brackets in original)

(quoting State v. Tuua, 3 Haw. App. 287, 293, 649 P.2d 1160,
11g4-85 (1982)).
In State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 657 P.2d 1019 (1983), we

adopted a “standard for post-conviction challenges to indictments
[that] means we will not reverse a conviction based upon a
defective indictment unless the defendant can show prejudice or
that the indictment cannot within reason be construed to charge a
crime.” Id. at 92, 657 P.2d at 1020. But Ruggiero does not
“challenge” the sufficiency of the complaint against him on
appeal; rather he challenges only his sentence as a second-time
offender. Therefore, any review of the sufficiency of the
complaint under the Motta standard has to be undertaken on the
basis of plain error.

owe may recognize plain error when the

error doamiteed effects substantial Fights

Of the Gefendant.” state v, cullen, 66

Hawat't 2, 6, 06 P.2a 955, S62 11397)

(citations and internal quotation signals

omitted) (; giae alug Hawai't Roles of

Penal Frocecure (HRP) Role $2(b)

(Plain error or defects affecting

substantial rights may be notices although

they were not Brought to the attention of
the court")

 

 

 

State v, Staley, 91 Hawai'i 275, 262, 982 P.2d 904,
51: (1999) (quoting [State x. IMauralenca, 90 Hewas's
(58,} 63, 976 P.24.[372,) 377 -((2998)], (quoting
([seate vi) Davia, 67 Bawas's [249,] 293, 953 7.28
(3077 3511 2898) 7)

 

Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i at 101, 997 P.2d at 27.

Ruggiero does not claim that the complaint “prejudiced”
him; rather, he filed his appeal solely to reduce his sentence to
that of 2 first-time offender. while the complaint -- by

omitting any mention of a prior DUI conviction -- substantially

26
(96 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +*#

 

prejudiced him with regard to defending against a DUI charge as a
second-time offender, cf, State v. Kekuewa, 112 Hawai'i 269, 145
P.3d 812 (App. 2006),"" Ruggiero concedes that he is subject to
sentencing under HRS § 2918-61(b) (1) as a first-time offender.
Moreover, on its face, the complaint can’ reasonably be
construed to charge the crime of DUI as a first offense, in
violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b)(1). It plainly states the
elements set forth in HRS § 291E-61(a) (“operates or assumes
actual physical control of a vehicle”) and -61(a) (1) ("{w)hile
under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair
the person's normal mental faculties or ability to care for the
Person and guard against casualty”). See supra note 3. While
the complaint is silent as to the lack of prior DUI convictions,
given the unique nature of the element -- the presence of an
empty set, that is, the absence of any prior convictions" --
silence with respect to prior violations can only betoken that

their absence, i.e,, the import of HRS $ 291B-61(b) (1), is

 

In Kekusua, the defendant, convicted of DUI under the same statute
at issue in the present matter, HRS §'291E-61 (Supp. 2003), had several prior
Dur convictions. 112 Hawai's at 277, 165 P.3d at 620. On ‘appeal, he
Contended that che oral accusation uae inaufficient because, while st stated
the present charge was his second offense, it omitted to specify whether the
proseestion was relying on # prict offense within the preceding five yeas
Feguired by the plain language of MKS § 2526-6) (b) (2), ase supra note 10. "1d.
at 270-71, 145 P.3a at B1s-i4. The Intermediate Court Gf Appeals concluded
thet, in light of his multiple prior convictions, the defencant’ s due proce
Fight to notice of the elenente of the charge aginst him was violated by t!
prosecution’ s failure specifically to allege « pricr conviction thet had
Sceurred within the previous five years. By contvast, Rugelero evinces
ho prejudice from a complaint that on its face makes it clear that prior
convictions will not be relied upon in seeking & conviction or sentencing
ters.

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

% Indeed, we ere hard pressed to imagine another instance where, in
the charging inserunent, silence af tos material element leaver no Goube ar
tothe nature of the offense charged, rendering the elenent set forth in HRS

§ 2918-61 (b) (1) poesbly aus genre’
27
+1 FOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ HAMAI'S REFORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER +44
implicit in the charge."* Ruggiero himself impliedly acknowledges
that the complaint was sufficient to charge DUI as a first-time
offense when he concedes that he is subject to sentencing as a
first time offender under HRS § 2916-61 (b) (1). And while, in
Light of Ruggiero’s January 29, 2003 DUI conviction, it was
within the discretion of the prosecution to pursue @ sufficiently
articulated charge of DUI as a second-tine status offender, it
would also have fallen within the prosecution's discretion to
charge the lesser included offense of DUI as a first-tine
offender. See State vy, Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 44, 904 P.2d 912,
929 (1995) ("Within constitutional limits, it is always the
prosecution's prerogative to undercharge any offense for whatever

reason it deems appropriate . . . .” (Emphasis in original.));

State v. Mendonca, 68 Haw. 280, 283, 711 P.2d 731, 734 (1985)

(holding that the prosecution has “the discretion to decide which
statutory subsection to charge the accused with”); Territory v.

 

% We emphasize, contrary to Justice Nakayama’s suggestion,
concurring and dissenting opinion at 3, that, because the attendant
Circunstence of no pricr convictions within the five precesing years, as set
forth in HRS § 291E-61(b) (2), i8 elemental, st ghould be alleged in the charge
and proved at trial. We also disagree with Justice Nakayana’s assertion, ace
ick at 2) that the prosecution's burden of proof on the issue at trial resuite
Gn“an abfurdity; as a practical matter, any atvempe by the defendent to
establish, as s “defense,” that he or the did, in fact, have prior convictions
would be self-defeating insofar as a violation of HRS § 251E-€l(a) with ne
priors is's lesser included offense of the same viclatson with pricrs and
therefore, any such assertion would be 9 de facta adnission of guilt of the
leseer inciuces off Seq State v. gurgett, 10 saw. 85, 86, 62 Pr2e Les,
166 (1988) ("[A) lesser, .-. offense ts necessarily included in s charge of
the greater if the proof necessary to establien the greater offense will of
necessity establish the lesser offense.") (internal quotation marks omitted);

. 62 Haw. 637, €39, 610 F.2d. 306, 308 (1980) "(esting
caste 16 Fie 1155, 1257" (9th Ciz. 1968)) ("Simply
Pot, an offense is included af it ie impossible to commit the greater offense
without also committing the lesser."); HRS § 701-208(4) (e) (1983) fe. lesser
included offense “differs from the (greater) offente , . « only in the respect
that a less serious injury... tothe sane... public’ dnterest » |
suffices to establish ies commizelon.”)

28

 

 

 

       

 

 

 
OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS 24D PACIFIC REPORTER *#*

 

Quve, 37 Haw. 176, 181 (1945) (noting that the prosecution had
the discretion to select which charge upon which it wished to
proceed)

Inasmuch as Ruggiero suffered no substantial prejudice
from the complaint in defending against a DUI charge as a first~
time offender, and the circuit court made the appropriate
findings and conclusions to convict Ruggiero of DUI as a first~
time offender, we remand the case to the district court for the
entry of judament of conviction of that offense. See Elliott, 77
Hawai'i at 313, 884 P.2d at 376.

TV. CONCLUSION

Insofar as (1) the complaint was insufficient to
‘support a conviction of, and sentence for, operating 2 vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant as a second offense within
five years and (2) the district court therefore plainly erred in
entering its judgment of conviction and sentence on that count,
We vacate the district court’s September 30, 2004 judgment and
sentence as it pertains to the violation of HRS § 2916-61.
However, insofar as the complaint was sufficient to support a
conviction and sentence as a first-time violator of HRS
$ 291£-61(a) and (b) (1), we remand this matter to the district
court for the entry of a judgment of conviction for operating a

vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant with no prior

29
‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#
offenses, in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a) and (b) (1), and for
resentencing in accordance therewith. We affirm the district

court's judgment in all other respects.’

On the briefs:

Arleen Y. Watanabe,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for the plaintiff-appellee Yon. Delis Gy +

State of Hawai't

Deborah L. Kim and
Marcus L. Landsberg 1V,
Deputy Public Defenders,
for the defendant-appellant
Adam Ruggiero

Inssmuch as our disposition of the matter does not rely on
Ruggiero’ s January 29, 2003 conviction vacated by this court, we need not
reach Suggiere's double jecparay argunents pertaining te that conviction

 

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