Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ohnstad

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ohnstad1990 WY 139802 P.2d 865Case Number: 90-94Decided: 12/10/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellant 
(Objector-Defendant),

v.

Johan A. OHNSTAD, 

Appellee 
(Employee-Claimant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Converse County, William A. Taylor, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Larry M. Donovan, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellant.

Eric A. Easton, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]            
Appellant State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division 
appeals from a decision by the district court, affirming the grant of temporary 
total disability benefits to Appellee Johan Ohnstad. The court stated that 
Ohnstad's act of supplementing his temporary total disability award by working 
as a counselor was permissible under Pacific Power and Light v. Parsons, 692 P.2d 226 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division submits the following issues:

     I. Did the 
administrative hearing officer err by awarding temporary total disability 
benefits to an individual who was working while receiving those 
benefits?

     II. Should the case of 
Pacific Power & Light v. Parsons, 692 P.2d 226 (1984), be 
reversed?

[¶4]            
Ohnstad injured his back on November 1, 1988, while he was working for 
Rainbow Carpet Dyeing & Cleaning Co. As a result of the injury, Ohnstad was 
unable to perform heavy labor. He had been employed to perform heavy labor since 
his graduation from high school in 1972. In January 1989, Ohnstad began working 
as a counselor for the Central Wyoming Counseling New Directions Program. The 
position with the New Directions Program required that Ohnstad: (1) be 
twenty-five years of age or older; (2) be a high school graduate; and (3) 
preferably have some experience with alcohol or drug abuse. Ohnstad earned four 
dollars per hour while he was working as a counselor. He was not required to 
perform heavy labor, and he could sit, stand, or lie down as was necessary. 
Ohnstad worked for the New Directions Program until May 12, 1989.

[¶5]            
Ohnstad applied for temporary total disability benefits for January, 
February, and March of 1989 and was awarded benefits in the amount of $660.82 
per month. He also applied to receive such benefits for April, May, June, and 
July of 1989. The Workers' Compensation Division and Rainbow Carpet Dyeing & 
Cleaning Co. objected to Ohnstad's second request, and the matter was referred 
to a hearing examiner pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-602 (1977).1

[¶6]      The hearing 
examiner conducted a hearing and concluded that: Ohnstad had no substantial 
"restitution" of his preinjury earning capacity; Ohnstad did not have previous 
training or experience for his duties with the New Directions Program; the job 
with the New Directions Program did not interfere with his recovery; and Ohnstad 
sought employment with the New Directions Program to obtain experience for 
future employment and to supplement his disability award. The hearing examiner 
also concluded that under Parsons the sole fact that an employee receives 
earnings is an insufficient basis for denying temporary total disability 
benefits. The hearing examiner ordered the Workers' Compensation Division to pay 
temporary total disability benefits to Ohnstad for the period of April 1, 1989, 
through the date of the order, August 14, 1989. The Workers' Compensation 
Division filed a petition for review with the district court, and the district 
court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision on the basis of 
Parsons.

[¶7]      Our review of a 
decision by the office of independent hearing examiners is governed by the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. Section 27-14-602(b). Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (1977) of that act provides:

     To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

     (i) Compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

     (ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

     (A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

    (B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

     (C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

     (D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

     (E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶8]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division contends that Ohnstad is not entitled to temporary total 
disability benefits, because Ohnstad's claim did not meet the requirements of 
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-404 (1977). At the time of Ohnstad's injury, § 27-14-404(a)2 stated:

     If after a compensable 
injury is sustained and as a result of the injury the employee is subject to 
temporary total disability as defined under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xviii), the 
injured employee is entitled to receive a monthly temporary total disability 
award for the period of temporary total disability as provided by W.S. 
27-14-403(c).

Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xviii) (1977) defines a temporary total disability as

that period of time an 
employee is temporarily and totally incapacitated from performing employment at 
any gainful employment or occupation for which he is reasonably suited by 
experience or training. The period of temporary total disability terminates at 
the time the employee completely recovers or qualifies for benefits under W.S. 
27-14-405 or 27-14-406[.]

Section 
27-14-404(c) provides:

Payment under subsection (a) of 
this section shall cease if:

     (i) Recovery is 
complete to the extent that the earning power of the employee at a 
gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training 
is substantially restored; or

     (ii) The employee has 
an ascertainable loss and qualifies for benefits under W.S. 27-14-405 or 
27-14-406.

(Emphasis 
added.) The purpose of awarding temporary total disability benefits is to 
provide income for an injured employee while he or she recovers. Parsons, 692 P.2d 226. The provisions dealing with temporary total disability benefits, when 
read together, indicate that the legislature intended for workers who are 
temporarily injured to be compensated until their earning power is substantially 
restored. Paravecchio v. Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, 742 P.2d 1276 
(Wyo. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 915, 108 S. Ct. 1088, 99 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988) 
(holding that we should read statutes relating to the same subject matter 
together to effectuate the legislature's intent). 

[¶9]      The Workers' 
Compensation Division argues that the hearing examiner erred by concluding that 
Ohnstad was not reasonably suited by experience or training for his job as a 
counselor for the New Directions Program and that Ohnstad's earning power was 
not substantially restored. We must examine the record and determine whether it 
is sufficient to "permit a court to follow the [hearing examiner's] reasoning 
from the evidentiary facts on record to [the] eventual legal conclusions." 
Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 786 P.2d 874, 
878 (Wyo. 1990). We accomplish that task by ascertaining if there is "`such 
relevant evidence as reasonable minds would accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.'" Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Western Gas 
Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Southwest Wyoming 
Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989)).

[¶10]            
Regardless of whether Ohnstad was reasonably suited by experience or 
training for the counseling position because he was (1) twenty-five years of age 
or older, (2) a high school graduate, and (3) experienced with alcohol or drug 
abuse, the record indicates that Ohnstad's earning power decreased dramatically 
after he injured his back and that his earning power was not substantially 
restored. Ohnstad earned approximately $1,200 per month before he was injured 
and four dollars per hour while he was working for the New Directions Program. 
At four dollars per hour, the most Ohnstad earned during one month of employment 
with the New Directions Program was less than $600.3 Hence, we hold the evidence is 
adequate to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that Ohnstad's claim met 
the statutory requirements for receipt of temporary total disability 
benefits.

[¶11]   The Workers' Compensation Division 
also contends that under Parsons Ohnstad is not entitled to receive temporary 
total disability benefits, because he worked for the New Directions Program 
during the period he claimed to be disabled, or, in the alternative, that 
Parsons should be overruled. In Parsons, an employee was granted temporary total 
disability benefits despite the fact he worked in his sod and landscaping 
business during the period he was disabled. The employee worked in his business 
for six weeks during the five-and-one-half-month period he was unable to work 
for Pacific Power and Light, and he received temporary total disability benefits 
for the five-and-one-half-month period, minus six weeks. This Court affirmed the 
grant of benefits and stated that "doing some work and earning some money during 
a period of temporary total disability does not automatically disqualify a 
worker from receiving disability benefits." Parsons, 692 P.2d  at 230. The Court 
explained:

The worker's compensation 
law should not, and does not encourage indolence by requiring that a worker be 
completely idle in order to remain eligible for temporary total disability 
compensation.

Id. at 229. The 
employee did not appeal the trial court's decision not to grant benefits to him 
for the period he worked in his sod and landscaping business, and this Court 
made no determination as to whether the trial court should have disallowed 
compensation for that period.

[¶12]   We refuse to overrule Parsons and 
proceed from where that decision left off. We hold that Ohnstad is entitled to 
receive temporary total disability benefits for the period he worked as a 
counselor for the New Directions Program. The record indicates that Ohnstad met 
the requirements for temporary total disability benefits prescribed in § 
27-14-404. Ohnstad's employment with the New Directions Program does not justify 
carving out an exception to the criteria created by the legislature.

[¶13]            
Affirmed.

CARDINE, 
J., 
filed a concurring opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶14]   While the majority opinion 
satisfactorily resolves this case, it leaves this area of law in a state of 
uncertainty. I would prefer some guideline for future cases for determining when 
"earning power" is substantially restored.

[¶15]            
Ohnstad never worked full time at his counseling job. He earned 
substantially less than he would have at his pre-injury job. The majority states 
that fact is dispositive. Why is it dispositive? Is it because he worked less 
than full time; because he worked just a few months; because he earned less than 
his pay at the time of injury? If so, at what point in his working while drawing 
temporary total disability can we say his "earning power" has been 
restored?

[¶16]   I agree with a policy that 
encourages injured employees to return to work. Still, a need exists for ground 
rules to determine when the worker's entitlement to temporary total disability 
payments ceases. This issue has been answered for too long on an ad hoc basis. 
Perhaps the court is reluctant to set guidelines or perhaps it is unable to 
determine what they ought to be. If that is the problem, then clearly this type 
of decision more appropriately should be left to the legislature.

FOOTNOTES

1 The parties stipulated 
that, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 4.03, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order submitted by the hearing examiner constituted the statement of 
evidence.

2 Amended effective July 
1, 1989.

3 While we recognize that 
actual earnings is not the only method for comparing an individual's pre- and 
post-injury earning power, see Spera v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 713 P.2d 1155, 54 A.L.R. 4th 231 (Wyo. 1986), and 
Parsons, 692 P.2d 226, the comparison is dispositive in this case.