Title: MARK CHRISTOPHER STOKES, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARK CHRISTOPHER STOKES, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 134144 P.3d 421Case Number: 05-195Decided: 10/19/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
MARK 
CHRISTOPHER STOKES, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofConverseCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially concurring 
opinion

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of expedited 
conference

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found 
Appellant Mark Stokes guilty of taking "immoral" liberties with a 
sixteen-year-old girl in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 
2005).  In this appeal, Stokes 
challenges the constitutionality of that statute.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Stokes offers the 
following issue for our review:

 
 
Whether 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 is unconstitutionally vague.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The essential 
facts of this case are not in dispute.  
AJ, the victim in this case, was a sixteen-year-old junior in high school 
when she met Stokes in the fall of 2004.  
At the time, AJ was dating Stokes' younger brother.  Eventually, Stokes, who was then 
twenty-one years of age, and AJ began dating.  Sometime around the end of October or 
early November 2004, AJ's mother (hereinafter "Mother") learned of their 
relationship, and she confronted them.  
Mother told both AJ and Stokes that Stokes was too old for AJ and she did 
not want them to date under any circumstances.  Stokes agreed to discontinue dating AJ 
until she turned eighteen years of age.  

 
 
[¶4]      Despite Mother's 
demands to terminate the relationship, Stokes and AJ continued to see each 
other.  In early December 2004, 
Stokes and AJ decided to take their relationship to the next level.  On two occasions, Stokes and AJ had 
sexual intercourse at Stokes' apartment.  
When Mother found out she reported the matter to police.  Upon questioning by police, Stokes 
described his relationship with AJ as boyfriend and girlfriend and admitted to 
having sexual intercourse with AJ on two occasions.  Stokes also acknowledged that he knew he 
was doing something wrong when he had sex with sixteen-year-old AJ, and that he 
broke the rule by getting involved with someone under the age of eighteen.  

 
 
[¶5]      Stokes was 
arrested and charged with one count of taking immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties with a child.  At the 
conclusion of a one-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding 
Stokes guilty of taking immoral liberties with AJ and not guilty on the 
alternative acts of immodest and indecent liberties.1  The district court sentenced Stokes to 
three to five years imprisonment but suspended execution of that sentence in 
favor of probation.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We review 
constitutional questions de 
novo.  Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2006); Giles v. 
State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004).  Because Stokes did not raise the issue 
of the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 in the district court, 
our review of Stokes' claim is confined to a search for plain error.  Plain error exists when: (1) the record 
is clear as to the incident alleged as error; (2) the error transgressed a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the error adversely affected a substantial 
right of the accused which materially prejudiced him.  Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 7, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005); Pierson v. 
State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      This Court is 
once again asked to review the constitutionality of Wyoming's indecent 
liberties statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2005), which states in 
pertinent part:

 
 
(a)  Except under circumstance[s] 
constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third degree as defined by 
W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child 
to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent 
act is guilty of a felony. . . .

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(c)        As 
used in this section, "child" means a person under the age of eighteen (18) 
years.

 
 
Like 
others before him, Stokes contends the statute is unconstitutionally vague, both 
"facially" and "as applied" to his conduct.  Stokes complicates our review of his 
claim by merging his facial challenge with his "as applied" challenge.  Regardless, we reject his constitutional 
challenges.

 
 
[¶8]      A statute is 
facially vague if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct or if it specifies no standard of conduct at all.  Moe, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d  at 1210; Giles, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d  at 1031.  On numerous occasions this Court has 
considered and soundly rejected facial vagueness challenges to § 14-3-105.  See Moe, ¶¶ 10-11, 110 P.3d at 
1210-11; Giles, ¶¶ 15-19, 96 P.3d at 
1031-33; Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 
73, ¶ 28, 29 P.3d 76, 85 (Wyo. 2001); Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1123-24; Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1114-16 
(Wyo. 1996); Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 1995); Ochoa v. 
State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975-76 
(Wyo. 1988); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Wyo. 1979).  
Stokes' argument offers nothing new that compels us to reconsider our 
prior holdings on this issue.

 
 
[¶9]      We now turn to 
Stokes' contention that § 14-3-105 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
him.  When a statute is challenged 
on an "as applied" basis, we must determine whether the statute provides 
sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his conduct was 
illegal and whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary 
enforcement.  Rabuck, ¶ 16, 129 P.3d  at 865 (citing Lovato, 901 P.2d  at 412; Griego, 761 P.2d at 976).  In determining whether a statute 
provides sufficient notice, we consider the statutory language, any prior court 
decisions that have construed the statute, and whether the statute has been 
previously applied to substantially identical conduct.  Rabuck, ¶ 16, 129 P.2d  at 865; Giles, ¶ 23, 96 P.3d  at 1035; Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976.  "If the statute has been previously 
applied to conduct substantially identical to that of the appellant, he cannot 
complain notice was lacking."  Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001) (footnote omitted).

 

[¶10]   Stokes complains that the statute 
is vague in that it does not describe with particularity what acts are 
forbidden.  As a consequence, it was 
only after the jury rendered its verdict that he understood his acts to be 
criminal conduct.  This is the same 
argument that was presented to this Court in Giles.  The majority of this Court found such 
argument to be unpersuasive:

 
 
Giles 
argues that § 14-3-105 fails to describe with particularity what acts are 
considered criminal because it relies on undefined terms.  Thus, Giles asserts that he was afforded 
inadequate prior notice that the acts in which he engaged constituted a 
violation of the indecent liberties statute. . . . Giles contends that it was 
only after the jury passed judgment in his case, based on the undefined terms of 
"immoral," "immodest," and "indecent," that he could have understood that his 
acts constituted criminal conduct.  
Upon consideration, we reject Giles' argument.

 
 

Giles, ¶ 20, 
96 P.3d  at 1033-34.  

 
 
[¶11]   Stokes' contention that the statute 
fails to provide sufficient notice that his consensual sexual relationship with 
sixteen-year-old AJ was prohibited conduct under the terms of the statute is not 
well taken.  This Court has held 
that the meaning of the terms "immoral," "immodest," and "indecent" is 
sufficiently clear.  See Rabuck, ¶ 17, 129 P.3d  at 865; Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1123; Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1034-35.  Further, consensual sex with a 
sixteen-year-old has previously been determined to violate the statute.  See Moe, ¶¶ 12-13, 110 P.3d  at 1211; Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1123-24; Moore, 912 P.2d at 1114-16; McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 292-94 
(Wyo. 1985).  Although Stokes 
briefly mentions the lack of an extreme age difference as a mitigating factor, 
Stokes admitted that he understood that his conduct was wrong and that he should 
have waited until AJ was eighteen years of age.  Under these specific circumstances, and 
in the absence of any evidence that the statute was enforced in a discriminatory 
manner, we have no hesitation in holding that § 14-3-105 is not vague as applied 
to Stokes' conduct in this case.

 
 
[¶12]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The district 
court gave the special verdict form to the jury at the request of defense 
counsel and in accordance with Giles v. 
State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 46, 96 P.3d 1027, 1043 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶13]   I concur in the result of the 
majority opinion out of deference to the doctrine of stare decisis.  See Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, 
¶34, 129 P.3d 861, 869 (Wyo. 2006) (VOIGT, Justice, specially 
concurring).