Title: Semmes v. GARY NAT'L. BANK

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

254 Ind. 682 (1970)
262 N.E.2d 529
SEMMES
v.
GARY NATIONAL BANK, EXECUTOR, ET AL.
No. 970S224.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 28, 1970.
Transfer granted September 28, 1970.
John P. McQuillan, Spangler, Jennings, Spangler and Dougherty, of Gary, for appellant.
Albert H. Gavit, Albert H. Gavit, Jr., William Theodoros, Call, Call, Borns and Theodoros, of Gary, for appellees.
*683 JACKSON, J.
This case comes to us on petition to transfer from the Appellate Court under Acts 1901, ch. 247, § 10, p. 565; 1933, ch. 151, § 1, p. 800, being Burns Ann. Stat. § 4-215 (1968 Repl.). See Semmes v. Gary National Bank (1968), 144 Ind. App. 25, 242 N.E.2d 517, for the opinion of the Appellate Court.
It appears from the record that on or about the 21st day of May, 1966, one, Gertrude Semmes, died a resident of the City of Gary, Lake County, Indiana, leaving a will. Said will was admitted to probate and record in Lake Superior Court on May 24, 1966. Thereafter, Gary National Bank was appointed and qualified as the Executor of the Estate of Gertrude Semmes, deceased.
On July 11, 1966, the Gary National Bank, as Executor, filed its Complaint to Construe Will, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
On September 12, 1966, the appellant filed his answer to said complaint and a Counter Petition to Construe Will, the latter reading in pertinent part as follows:
(Exhibit A, attached to said counter-petition and made a part thereof, is the same as Appellee's Exhibit #1 heretofore set out and is, therefore, omitted).
Also, on September 12, 1966, appellant moved for a change of venue from the county, and on October 17, 1966, the parties hereto, by their respective counsel, pursuant to stipulation and agreement, caused the venue of this case to be changed to the Porter Superior Court.
On December 9, 1966, certain named defendant-appellees filed their answer to the Executor's original Complaint to Construe Will and their answer to appellant's counter-petition, the latter reading in pertinent part as follows:
The Gary National Bank filed its answer to appellant's counter-petition as follows:
*690 This cause was duly set for trial in the Porter Superior Court on January 19, 1967, and the only evidence presented in said cause was by stipulation, as follows:
Thereafter, on February 15, 1967, the court entered its finding and judgment, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant filed his motion for new trial on February 24, 1967, and the same was overruled by the court on March 6, 1967. His sole Assignment of Error on appeal is that:
The judgment of the Porter Superior Court herein was reversed by the Second Division of the Appellate Court on December 17, 1968, by its written opinion reported in 242 N.E.2d 517. The Petition to Transfer this cause from the Appellate Court to this Court was filed by appellee, Gary National Bank, on January 24, 1969; a Petition to Transfer was filed by all other appellees, except Gary National Bank, on January 27, 1969.
The precise question in issue here relates to the legal effect to be given the wording of Item #4 of decedent's will, which reads as follows:
No controversy exists as to the ademption of Item #3 of the will, and all parties agree that the legacy to Madeleine Walton, appearing in Item #4, lapsed on her death in November, 1947, by reason of her having predeceased the testatrix, whose death occurred in May, 1966.
Appellant argues that this Court should give effect to the "substitutionary disposition" (Appellant's brief, p. 24) of the testatrix since she provided for disposition of the legacy after a refusal, and, in fact, some other contingency occurred which prevented the primary legatee, Mrs. Madeleine Walton, from taking. In order for this Court to so construe the will of Gertrude Semmes, and thus dispose of her property in a manner beneficial to the appellant, we would not only have to re-write Mrs. Semmes' will (an action we are prohibited from taking, see McConnell v. Robbins (1923), 193 Ind. 359, 140 N.E. 59; Aldred v. Sylvester (1916), 184 Ind. 542, 111 N.E. 914; Gibson v. Seymour (1885), 102 Ind. 485), but would also be compelled to contravene previous decisions of this Court to the effect that if a condition precedent to a bequest does not take place, the conditional or provisional bequest is inoperative. Dykeman v. Jenkines (1913), 179 Ind. 549, 101 N.E. 1013; Gibson v. Seymour, supra.
The appellant, by the express terms of Item #4 of the will, was to take only that part of the residuary estate of Gertrude Semmes that Madeleine Walton elected not to take. Having predeceased the testatrix, Mrs. Walton could not have made, and did not make, the necessary election, and appellant, therefore, takes nothing under the will.
Appellant further argues that the testatrix intended to, and did, in fact, give Mrs. Walton more than a mere power of *694 appointment, and that "An intent that Granville Martin Semmes be a substitutionary legatee for Madeleine Walton is much more likely than an intent (that) Granville Martin Semmes have a mere expectancy as the possible appointee under a power of appointment vested in Madeleine Walton." (Appellant's brief p. 30).
We are somewhat confused with respect to this argument advanced by the appellant, as it would not seem to matter what Mrs. Walton was given, for, in any event, she did not receive it and could not, therefore, have disposed of it in a manner which would be beneficial to appellant. His statement that it is more likely that Mrs. Semmes intended him to be a substitutionary legatee cannot be characterized as anything more than wishful thinking on his part. It is true, and this Court has so held on numerous occasions, that a testator may, in order to avoid a lapsed bequest, designate to whom the gift shall go in case the primary devisee or legatee predeceases said testator. Borgner v. Brown (1892), 133 Ind. 391, 33 N.E. 92; Tyner v. Reese (1880), 70 Ind. 432. Had Item #4 stated "* * * in the event Mrs. Walton predeceases me (the testatrix, Mrs. Semmes), the entire residue of my estate shall pass to Granville Martin Semmes," or words to that effect, there would have been no question but that appellant could have qualified as a substituted residuary legatee. But the will did not so provide, and we cannot say that it did.
Appellant argues that "Gertrude Semmes knew for 19 years the impossibility of an election, or refusal, taking place (and) (h)er failure to revoke her will, or alter it, tends to an inference that the gift over to Granville Martin Semmes was to take effect despite the technical terms `elect not.'" (Appellant's brief, p. 33). Said argument must fail for two reasons: (1) there was no gift over, (2) the trial court drew the more reasonable inference that, Mrs. Walton not being alive so as to renounce in favor of the appellant, Mrs. Semmes knew that *695 he could take nothing and, being satisfied that her heirs would take, made no change in her will.
In order for there to be a gift over, the intent of the testator to so provide must be expressed in the terms of the will with sufficient clarity. In Borgner v. Brown, supra, this Court stated:
Clearly, Mrs. Semmes did not provide for a gift over to the appellant upon the death of Mrs. Walton prior to her own demise; had she so provided, the specific language heretofore set out in this opinion, as an example, or words which would have required a like result, would have been used.
Appellant finally argues that any reasonable construction should be adopted to avoid intestacy. He cites Dykeman v. Jenkines, supra, for the proposition that:
The error into which appellant has fallen in his determination that: (1) the will is susceptible of two different constructions, (2) there was a gift over to him, provided for in Item #4 of the will, and (3) the necessary election of Mrs. Walton was not an absolute condition precedent but merely an awkward way of providing for a substitution. The specific language of Item #4 deprives each of these arguments of any semblance of validity, as previously discussed in this opinion.
By virtue of the death of Mrs. Walton prior to the death of the testatrix the bequest to Mrs. Walton lapsed completely; there being neither a gift over to appellant Semmes of the residuary estate, nor a renunciation of part or all of her bequest by Mrs. Walton in favor of appellant Semmes as required by Item #4 of decedent's will, the entire estate passed by way of intestate succession to the heirs at law of Mrs. Gertrude Semmes.
We accept transfer of this case, and we affirm the judgment of the Porter Superior Court in all respects.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn, DeBruler and Givan, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 262 N.E.2d 529.