Title: Steve Ottman v. Town of Primrose

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 18 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP3182 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Steve Ottman and Sue Ottman, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Town of Primrose, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 22, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 4, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
and oral argument by John D. Varda and DeWitt Ross and Stevens, 
SC, Madison. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Glenn Reynolds and Reynolds and Associates, Madison. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 18
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2008AP3182 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1158) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steve Ottman and Sue Ottman, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Primrose, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 22, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  The petitioners, Steve and Sue 
Ottman, seek review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals that affirmed a circuit court order dismissing their 
petition for certiorari review of a decision of the Town of 
Primrose Board of Supervisors.  The Board denied the Ottmans' 
application for a permit to build a residential driveway.1  
                                                 
1 See 
Ottman 
v. 
Town 
of 
Primrose, 
No. 
2008AP3182, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Feb. 18, 2010), affirming 
an order of the circuit court for Dane County, Maryann Sumi, J. 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The Ottmans contend that our standards for certiorari 
review should be changed in two respects.  First, they argue 
that we should overrule cases imposing limitations on the scope 
of statutory certiorari.  Second, they argue that we should 
reexamine the presumption of correctness and deference afforded 
to a municipality's decision.  The Ottmans assert that the Board 
interpreted the farm income requirement contained in the Town of 
Primrose Driveway Ordinance in a way that is contrary to the 
plain language of the Ordinance. 
¶3 
Because 
the 
Ottmans 
have 
failed 
to 
provide 
a 
persuasive 
rationale 
for 
upsetting 
our 
longstanding 
jurisprudence, we decline to alter the established scope of 
statutory certiorari.  We further decline to graft the framework 
for reviewing administrative agency determinations onto our 
framework for reviewing municipal decisions.  In situations 
where the language of a municipality's ordinance appears to be 
unique and does not parrot a state statute but rather was 
drafted by the municipality in an effort to address a local 
concern, we will defer to the municipality's interpretation if 
it is reasonable.  
¶4 
Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude 
that the Board's interpretation of the farm income requirement 
is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and we will accord 
it deference.  The Ottmans have not met their burden of showing 
that the Board's interpretation is unreasonable.  Applying its 
interpretation, the Board made a finding of fact that the farm 
income requirement was not met, and the Ottmans have failed to 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
3 
 
demonstrate that no reasonable view of the evidence supports 
that finding.  Therefore, we conclude that the Ottmans have not 
overcome the presumption of correctness.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
The Town of Primrose operates under a Land Use Plan 
that was prepared for the Town by staff to the Dane County 
Regional Planning Commission.2  In recognition that "unplanned 
development, particularly on a large scale, can occur in such a 
way that . . . problems with agricultural uses may occur," the 
Land Use Plan establishes "guidelines upon which development 
decisions can be based."      
¶6 
It provides that the Town's policy is "[t]o actively 
use and improve land use control measures which will discourage 
and prevent non-farm development in agricultural preservation 
areas."  Section II.A of the Land Use Plan establishes the 
following objectives: 
1. To preserve productive farmlands for continued 
agricultural use.   
2. To discourage land uses which conflict with 
agriculture.   
3.  To maintain agriculture as the major economic 
activity and way of life within the Town.   
                                                 
2 The parties agree that the Town's Land Use Plan was 
significantly revised in 2010.  Throughout this opinion, 
references to the Land Use Plan are to the version of the plan 
that was in effect on September 3, 2004, the day the Ottmans 
filed the permit application that is the subject of this review.   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
4 
 
4. To protect farm operations from incompatible land 
uses and activities which may adversely affect the 
capital investment in agricultural land, improvements 
and equipment.    
¶7 
In 2001, Steve and Sue Ottman became interested in 
purchasing a 47.7-acre parcel located in the Town of Primrose 
that had been zoned A-1 Exclusive Agricultural under Dane County 
zoning ordinances.  Prior to purchasing the property, they asked 
the Town of Primrose Board of Supervisors to approve their 
request to build a field road.  The Ottmans expressed their 
intention to develop the parcel into a Christmas tree farm, and 
they explained that they would need to have access to their 
trees and to the agricultural accessory building they planned to 
build on the property.     
¶8 
After extensive discussion at the August 21, 2001 
Board meeting, the Board passed a resolution granting the 
Ottmans 
an 
access 
off 
Primrose 
Center 
Road 
to 
enhance 
agricultural use of the property.3  Throughout the meeting, the 
supervisors expressed concern that approval of a field road 
might later be misinterpreted as approval for a residential 
driveway.  One supervisor explained:  
                                                 
3 The minutes from the meeting reflect: "Steve Ottman, 
possible purchaser of Meyers/Sarko property on Primrose Center 
Road to obtain permission for a field road to allow him to plant 
Christmas trees.  After a lengthy discussion, permission was 
granted to Ottman for access to the property off of the township 
road.  It was stated that in no way would a driveway permit be 
issued on this property because of safety issues.  Motion by 
Rassner, seconded by Judd to adopt a resolution to allow access 
off 
town 
road 
on 
the 
Meyers/Sarko 
property 
to 
pursue 
agricultural activities.  Motion carried."   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
5 
 
I'm trying to steer away from anything that gets to be 
interpreted later as a driveway.  You understand where 
I'm coming from?  But at the same time, we don't want 
to limit your ability to put Christmas trees in there 
and derive profit from doing that.     
The same supervisor explained: "[Y]ou could come back here in 
several years and, maybe I'll be here, maybe I won't, and [you 
could] say, I want a driveway permit now, and [you] could get 
turned down."  
¶9 
The Ottmans purchased the property.  They erected an 
agricultural accessory building at the top of the hill and put 
in a 500-foot gravel field road linking that building to 
Primrose Center Road, which bordered the parcel.  Over the 
course of the next several years, the Ottmans planted trees on 
18 acres, and they also rented 29 acres to Al Hanna, a neighbor 
who grew field corn.       
¶10 On September 3, 2004, the Ottmans filed a document 
entitled 
"Preliminary Application for Driveway Permit and 
Approval of Site Plan for Primary Farm Residence."4  The 
application 
asserted 
that 
"[u]pon 
establishment, 
estimated 
annual income of Applicants' farm will exceed $30,000 annually" 
and 
that 
the 
proposed 
residence 
would 
be 
"for 
farm 
owner/operator who will derive substantial income from the farm 
operation."  
                                                 
4 Under Primrose Ordinances, one must receive a driveway 
permit and then construct the driveway before one can receive 
approval of a building site plan.  Town of Primrose Driveway 
Ordinance 1.05(9) Building Permits ("No Building Permit for new 
residential construction will be issued until the driveway is 
constructed 
according 
to 
the 
specifications 
of 
this 
Ordinance.").  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
6 
 
¶11 The 
Ottmans' 
application 
contended 
that 
their 
Christmas tree farm could not be viable without a residence.5  It 
asserted that the Ottmans wanted to place the residence at the 
top of the hill because the soil was rockier and less 
productive.  It identified a proposed site for the residence 
approximately 200 feet north of the existing agricultural 
accessory building.    
¶12 The application was presented to the Town of Primrose 
Planning Commission on March 7, 2005.  The Commission voted to 
recommend that the Board of Supervisors deny the application.    
¶13 The following week, the application was presented at a 
meeting of the Board.  During the meeting, supervisors expressed 
concern about the viability of the farm as a Christmas tree 
operation.  They also expressed concern about whether the 
Ottmans' application met some of the requirements in the Town of 
Primrose 
Driveway 
Ordinance, 
including 
the 
farm 
income 
requirement contained in the Driveway Ordinance's "Agricultural 
Productivity" Clause.     
¶14 The 
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Clause 
provides 
as 
follows:   
No driveway shall be approved in the Town of Primrose 
if the Town Board finds that the driveway will 
                                                 
5 The Ottmans' application contended: "Applicants not being 
able to reside on the Subject Farm has created hardship in the 
maintenance of the Christmas tree crop they have been planting, 
because these Christmas trees require timely weed control and 
the need for irrigation.  The type of tree planted on the 
Subject Farm . . . requires the tree farmer to reside on site in 
order to provide maintenance and security."    
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
7 
 
adversely impact productive agricultural land, unless 
the Town Board finds that the driveway is necessary to 
enhance the agricultural productivity of an adjacent 
parcel or the person requesting the permit can show 
that the parcel to be served by the driveway is 
capable of producing at least $6000.00 of gross income 
per year.  Under any circumstance, the Town Board 
shall approve a driveway with the least impact on 
agricultural land.   
Town of Primrose Driveway Ordinance 1.10.6  One supervisor 
explained that the Board's historical interpretation of the farm 
income requirement was to require proof of actual income, not 
speculative income.7 
¶15 Ultimately, the Board voted unanimously to deny the 
application.  All three supervisors indicated that, among other 
reasons, they denied the application based on the Ottmans' 
failure to meet the Agricultural Productivity Clause's farm 
                                                 
6 The Town of Primrose Building Site Permit contains a 
nearly identical clause.  Because receipt of a driveway permit 
was necessary before the Board would consider an application for 
a building site permit, we focus our examination exclusively on 
the Agricultural Productivity Clause contained in the Driveway 
Ordinance.  
7 The supervisor elaborated: "[The Ottmans have] to have 
income.  Keith is a good example.  You had to prove your income 
didn't you Keith?  In order to get your house?  You've been 
farming for years.  That's the way he got it.  You didn't say——
come and say well I can make it down the road or something.  He 
had to show what income he had the last year from that crop.  
And that's what we're asking.  That's what we've been asking all 
the time."   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
8 
 
income requirement.8  Shortly thereafter, the Ottmans filed a 
certiorari action in Dane County Circuit Court.    
¶16 At a pretrial scheduling conference that took place 
while the action was pending in the circuit court, the parties 
agreed to send the matter back to the Town of Primrose for 
review under Wis. Stat. Ch. 68.9  The purpose of Chapter 68 is 
"to afford a constitutionally sufficient, fair and orderly 
administrative procedure and review" of municipal determinations 
that involve constitutionally protected rights.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 68.001.  Based on the parties' stipulation, the circuit court 
remanded the matter to the Town Board for Chapter 68 review.10       
¶17 On remand, the parties appear to have had difficulty 
deciding upon the procedures that should be used in conducting a 
review under Chapter 68.  Ultimately, the parties reached a 
                                                 
8 The minutes reflect: "Discussion with Steve/Sue Ottman 
regarding a building site on their property Primrose Center 
Road.  Questions on farm income were raised. . . . Rassner not 
sure that enough income can be derived from this farm and also 
that no builds are allowed on ag land unless it is a retirement 
home.  The Ottmans[] felt that they could prove they can make 
enough money to show this as farm income.  A ballot vote was 
taken with 3 for denial and 0 for approval."   
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
10 There is no transcript of the March 22, 2006 pretrial 
scheduling conference.  However, the clerk's minutes reflect: 
"Atty Reynolds——tentative agreement to remand for Chpt. 68 
review. . . . Atty Varda——straight remand."  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
9 
 
joint recommendation on procedures.  They agreed upon a site 
visit and a special hearing in front of the Town Board.11     
¶18 The special hearing was held on July 26, 2006.  During 
the hearing, both sides presented exhibits, called witnesses, 
and 
presented 
direct 
examination 
and 
cross 
examination 
testimony.    
¶19 Although the Board voted unanimously to deny the 
application and issued a proposed written decision at the 
January 16, 2007 meeting, it took several months, meetings, and 
                                                 
11 The parties' attorneys agreed that the Ottmans would 
provide their expert witnesses' written reports and both parties 
would identify their witnesses and summarize their expected 
testimony in advance; that witnesses would not be sworn; that 
the hearing would be recorded on the Town's tape recorder; that 
the Ottmans could hire a court reporter at their own expense; 
that the Ottmans would have an opportunity to present a reply 
after all evidence had been submitted; and that the Town would 
be permitted to inspect the property again after the hearing.   
When the parties presented their joint recommendation, one 
supervisor asked the Ottmans' attorney whether the agreed-upon 
procedures would satisfy the requirements of Chapter 68.  
Attorney Varda responded: "At least for this case.  You know you 
may want to consider whether this type of procedure is what you 
want permanently."   
Later, however, Attorney Varda stated: "[W]hile we agreed 
to the procedure and we hope this goes well and quickly, we have 
not waived any of our potential objections to the process.  
Particularly in regard to Section 68.11(2), in regard to an 
impartial decision maker.  Our view is, we'll——you'll proceed 
under the rules and see where we end up."  
Although the Ottmans challenged the partiality of the 
proceedings in the circuit court, they subsequently abandoned 
that challenge.  In their reply brief, they explained that they 
"elected not to seek review of such claims in order to focus on 
the deference issue and the need for more conscientious judicial 
scrutiny of such decisions."  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
10 
 
redrafts before the decision was finalized.  The Ottmans' 
attorney made a number of objections to the draft decision and 
asked the Board to reconsider or clarify several of its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.  The Board's written decision 
was ultimately signed on September 18, 2007.     
¶20 In its written decision, the Board made a finding of 
fact that "[a]ll 47 acres of the Ottman farm are productive 
agricultural lands[.]"  It provided two independent reasons for 
denying the application.  The first reason was based on the 
Agricultural Productivity Clause's farm income requirement, and 
the second reason was based on the proposed site for the house. 
¶21 The 
Board 
concluded 
that 
because 
the 
Ottmans 
"[c]urrently . . . receive no agricultural income from the sale 
of trees from the property," they "therefore do not currently 
meet the farm income standards" of the Town of Primrose Driveway 
Ordinance.12  Due to the lack of farm income, the Board 
determined that "a residence constructed at this time would by 
definition be a 'non-farm' residence."  It concluded that "[a] 
driveway built to service a non-farm residence in the location 
requested would violate Primrose's Land Use Plan which states 
that 'no roads or driveways shall be permitted to cross 
agricultural land to reach proposed non-farm development.'"  
                                                 
12 For the same reason, the decision also concluded that the 
application failed to meet the requirements of the Town of 
Primrose 
Building 
Permit 
Ordinance 
and 
County 
income 
requirements.     
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
11 
 
¶22 The Board also determined that "[e]ven if the Ottmans 
currently met the Town and County farm income requirements, they 
would not obtain approval of the farm house site they have 
requested[.]"13  It stated that "[t]he proposed site and driveway 
do not meet the 'least impact' requirements of the Ordinances or 
have the least impact among all the options available on the 
farm due to the fact that building a residence at the top of the 
                                                 
13 In its decision, the Board found as a fact that "[t]he 
Town Board approved the construction of an agricultural building 
and a field road for access from Primrose Center Road . . . with 
the recommendation that the agricultural accessory building be 
constructed close to the road to minimize adverse impact on the 
productive agricultural land of the farm."  It found that the 
Ottmans' construction of the agricultural accessory building on 
top of the hill was "against the recommendation of the Town 
Board."   
At the hearing, a former supervisor testified that during a 
site visit, supervisors advised the Ottmans to build the 
agricultural accessory building as close to the road as 
possible.  Nevertheless, the Ottmans have vigorously contested 
the Town's finding of fact.  We do not rely on it in this 
opinion.  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
12 
 
hill will require a longer driveway that will needlessly consume 
a greater amount of agricultural land."14   
¶23 The action returned to the circuit court, and the 
Ottmans amended their complaint.  Although they acknowledged 
that jurisdiction was founded on Wis. Stat. § 68.13, they 
asserted for the first time that the Primrose Ordinances 
"constitute a pervasive regulation of land use" and therefore 
"the scope of certiorari review is modified under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10."  Although Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10 permits a 
circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the Ottmans did 
not request that the circuit court hold a hearing or take any 
additional evidence.    
                                                 
14 The Board also noted that "[a]t the time the agricultural 
accessory building and the field road were approved, the Ottmans 
were informed by the Town Board that the field road could not be 
used as a residential driveway."  It identified some potential 
problems with converting the existing field road into a 
residential driveway: "The width, rise, and ditch distance of 
the Ottmans' current field road do not meet the driveway 
criteria and would need significant changes to be brought into 
compliance."  The Board stated: "The Ottmans propose to upgrade 
the existing field road for the driveway and have committed to 
meet the requirements of the Driveway Ordinance, but the 
extensive 
excavations 
needed 
may 
cause 
other 
compliance 
problems."  It concluded that extensive excavation might be 
required, and that the driveway "may exceed the 25% maximum 
slope requirement of the Driveway Ordinance."   
The Ottmans objected to the inclusion of this information 
in the decision.  They asserted that the process before the 
Board should have been bifurcated, that once their preliminary 
application was approved they would be permitted to submit an 
engineer's report, and that the report would show that a 
driveway could be built that would not exceed the 25 percent 
maximum slope requirement or cause other compliance problems.     
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
13 
 
¶24 In their amended complaint, the Ottmans argued that 
the Town proceeded on an incorrect theory of law.  Their primary 
assertion was that the Board misapplied the farm income 
requirement contained in the Driveway Ordinance.  They contended 
that the Agricultural Productivity Clause requires only that the 
land be "capable of producing" income, but that the Town 
erroneously required the Ottmans to demonstrate that their farm 
was "currently producing" income.     
¶25 Based on their interpretation of the farm income 
requirement, the Ottmans argued that they had demonstrated that 
their land was "capable of producing" more than $6,000 annually:  
The 20 plus acres currently (2002 through 2006) in 
corn production yields 80 to 120 bushels per acre.   
Were all 43 of the farm's productive acres (i.e., 
except 4 acres for the Ag Accessory Building, proposed 
primary farm residence, and driveway) planted in corn, 
assuming an average yield of 100 bushels of corn per 
acre, the Ottmans' farm parcel is capable of producing 
$6,450 of gross income per year at $1.50 per bushel 
and $9,245 of gross income per year at $2.15 per 
bushel.    
Additionally, the complaint asserted that once Christmas tree 
harvesting begins in 2010, the farm "will sustain an annual 
gross income flow of at least $21,000 based solely on wholesale 
pricing."  
¶26 The complaint also asserted that the Town's denial was 
willfully arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, and unreasonable, 
that the Town proceeded outside its jurisdiction, and that the 
proceedings were "permeated by bias and fail the standards of 
neutrality, due process and equal protection."  Finally, the 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
14 
 
Ottmans argued that their proposed site for the residence would 
have the least impact on agricultural land.      
¶27 In its decision, the circuit court began by noting 
that on certiorari review, there is a presumption of correctness 
afforded to the Board's decision.15  It determined that the 
permit denial was not actually a zoning decision, and it 
therefore conducted review under Chapter 68 rather than under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.  It further concluded that the Board 
did not erroneously interpret its Ordinances and that it had 
acted according to the law in applying the least impact standard 
and the farm income requirement.  The court determined that the 
farm income requirement should be liberally construed in favor 
of the municipality, and that the Board's interpretation, which 
required current income rather than speculative income, was 
reasonable.    
¶28 The Ottmans filed a motion for reconsideration.  Among 
other arguments, the motion rehashed their prior arguments about 
the interpretation of the Agricultural Productivity Clause.  In 
addition, the Ottmans argued that the process in front of the 
Board should have been bifurcated, and that at the preliminary 
application stage, the Ottmans had not been required to furnish 
an engineer's plan or any technical details about driveway 
                                                 
15 We recognize that Wisconsin cases often refer to "the 
presumption of correctness and validity."  Like the circuit 
court, 
we 
occasionally 
use 
the 
phrase 
"presumption 
of 
correctness" throughout this opinion for the sake of simplicity.    
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
15 
 
specifications.  Ultimately, the circuit court denied the 
Ottmans' motion for reconsideration.       
¶29 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals 
affirmed.  Addressing the argument that review should be under 
the zoning statute, Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7), the court determined 
that "the Ottmans have not explained how our review would differ 
if we proceeded under § 62.23(7)(e)10."  Ottman v. Town of 
Primrose, No. 2008AP3182, unpublished slip op., ¶5 n.2 (Wis. Ct. 
App., Feb. 18, 2010).  Therefore, the court concluded, "we need 
not address this argument further."  Id.    
¶30 Because it concluded that the Board did not err in 
rejecting the proposed site for the residence, the court of 
appeals did not interpret the farm income requirement.  Id., 
¶11.  In an unpublished order, the court subsequently denied the 
Ottmans' motion for reconsideration.  Ottman v. Town of 
Primrose, No. 2008AP3182, unpublished order, (Wis. Ct. App., 
Mar. 25, 2010). 
II 
¶31 In their petition for review, the Ottmans set forth 
three questions: 
• Is the Town engaged in land use regulation such 
that this case calls for statutory certiorari 
review under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10, and 
limitations on the scope of statutory certiorari 
should be overruled?  
• Does the current judicial rule on deference to 
land use decisions of local governments overly 
insulate from judicial review the balancing of 
community 
interests 
and 
individual 
property 
rights?  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
16 
 
• Does 
the 
Town's decision fail to withstand 
conscientious 
judicial 
scrutiny 
under 
the 
customary standard of certiorari review? 
The Ottmans' first two questions ask this court to modify the 
existing standards for certiorari review.  The first relates to 
the scope of review, and the second relates to the amount of 
deference that should be given to a municipality's conclusions 
of law.  By contrast, the third question asks us to apply the 
existing standards of certiorari review to the Board's decision. 
¶32 We begin by examining the requested changes to the 
law.  First, we address whether we should overrule limitations 
on the scope of certiorari review.  Next, we clarify the 
circumstances in which deference is owed to a municipality's 
decision.  Finally, we apply the principles we have set forth to 
the Board's decision.       
A 
¶33 The Ottmans' argument regarding the appropriate scope 
of 
review 
hinges 
upon 
its 
assertion 
that 
the 
Driveway 
Ordinance's 
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Clause 
is 
a 
zoning 
ordinance and therefore, decisions relating to that clause 
should be reviewed under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.  It is 
important to note, however, that the Ottmans are not challenging 
the validity of the Agricultural Productivity Clause.16  Rather, 
                                                 
16 The Wisconsin Realtors Association, which filed an amicus 
brief, expands upon the Ottmans' argument that the Agricultural 
Productivity Clause is a zoning ordinance.  Without any citation 
to 
the 
record, 
the 
Realtors 
assert 
that 
"the 
Town 
of 
Primrose . . . failed to follow the procedures and standards 
[set forth in Wis. Stat. § 62.23(d) that are] required for 
adopting a zoning ordinance."  The Realtors contend that the 
Town's Ordinances are invalid and unenforceable. 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
17 
 
they simply assert that our Chapter 68 review should be 
augmented by the standards for certiorari review set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23.   
¶34 Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test 
the validity of a decision rendered by a municipality, an 
administrative agency, or an inferior tribunal.  See Acevedo v. 
City 
of 
Kenosha, 
2011 
WI 
App 
10, 
793 
N.W.2d 500, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ¶8 (Ct. App. 2010).  There are two general 
categories of certiorari: common law certiorari and statutory 
certiorari. 
 
Michael 
S. 
Heffernan, 
Appellate 
Practice 
& 
Procedure in Wisconsin § 28.27 (4th ed. 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Realtors' assertion finds no support in the record.  
During oral argument, the Ottmans' attorney clarified that the 
Ottmans "do not agree with the amicus" and are not challenging 
the validity of any ordinance:   
The Court: I do not read in your briefs that you are 
challenging that this is a zoning ordinance that was 
not adopted in accordance with the procedures of a 
zoning ordinance, and the amicus brief does. 
Attorney Varda: Exactly.  We do not.  The amicus 
briefs say that the Ordinances, the Driveway and 
Building Permit Ordinances, are zoning.  And we say 
yes we agree with that as to the agricultural 
productivity provisions of those Ordinances. . . . And 
the amicus briefs go on to suggest that the Town's 
Ordinances are void for lack of approval by the 
county. 
The Court: Are you willing to say that? 
Attorney Varda: It is an interesting argument.  We do 
not agree with it.  
The Court: No.  You are just on scope of review.   
Attorney Varda: That is correct, your honor.  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
18 
 
¶35 Common law certiorari is available whenever there is 
no express statutory method of review.  Coleman v. Percy, 96 
Wis. 2d 578, 588, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980).  When conducting common 
law certiorari review, a court reviews the record compiled by 
the municipality and does not take any additional evidence on 
the merits of the decision.  State ex rel. Brookside Poultry 
Farms, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. Adjustment, 131 Wis. 2d 101, 
119, 388 N.W.2d 593 (1986).  The court's review is limited to: 
(1) whether the municipality kept within its jurisdiction; (2) 
whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3) whether its 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, 
or 
unreasonable 
and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question.  Id. at 119-20; Snyder v. Waukesha 
Cnty. Zoning Bd. Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 475, 247 N.W.2d 98 
(1976).   
¶36 Certiorari review may also be designated by statute.  
In that case, unless the statute providing for certiorari 
further limits or enlarges the scope of review, the reviewing 
court makes the same four inquiries that are made under common 
law certiorari review.  State ex rel. Ruthenberg v. Annuity & 
Pension Bd., 89 Wis. 2d 463, 474, 278 N.W.2d 835 (1979).   
¶37 Here, the parties stipulated to the Board conducting 
proceedings under the procedure specified in Wis. Stat. Ch. 68.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 68.13(1) provides that "[a]ny party to a 
proceeding resulting in a final determination may seek review 
thereof by certiorari within 30 days of receipt of the final 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
19 
 
determination."  There is nothing in the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 68.13(1) limiting or enlarging the scope of certiorari 
review.17  Accordingly, the scope of review under Chapter 68 is 
identical to the scope of common law certiorari review.  See 
Ruthenberg, 89 Wis. 2d at 474.  
¶38 The Ottmans argue that the scope of review should be 
augmented by the standards for certiorari review set forth in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23(7). 
 
Unlike 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 68.13(1), 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10 expressly empowers the circuit court 
to take evidence on the merits of the Board's decision: 
[An aggrieved person may] commence an action seeking 
the remedy available by certiorari. . . . If necessary 
for the proper disposition of the matter, the court 
may take evidence, or appoint a referee to take 
evidence and report findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as it directs, which shall constitute a part of 
the proceedings upon which the determination of the 
court shall be made.  The court may reverse or affirm, 
wholly or partly, or may modify, the decision brought 
up for review. 
¶39 Here, neither party asked the circuit court to take 
additional evidence on any issue, and the circuit court based 
its review on the record before the Board.  Nevertheless, like 
the court of appeals, we examine in this case whether the scope 
of review under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10 differs in any other 
way from the scope of review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13 and common 
law certiorari.   
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 68.13(2) provides that under some 
circumstances, the proceedings will be transcribed.    
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
20 
 
¶40 We have previously interpreted a statute with language 
that is nearly identical to the current version of Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10.  See Brookside Poultry, 131 Wis. 2d at 120-22.  
Like § 62.23(7)(e)10, Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) (1983-84)18 expanded 
the courts' role on certiorari review by permitting a circuit 
court to take additional evidence "[i]f necessary for the proper 
disposition 
of 
the 
matter." 
 
Like 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10, 
Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) (1983-84) permitted the court to "reverse 
or affirm, wholly or partly," and to "modify[] the decision 
brought up for review."  
¶41 In Brookside Poultry, it was argued that statutory 
certiorari provides a circuit court with broader latitude to 
independently 
determine 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
administrative 
decision.  131 Wis. 2d at 121.  We rejected that assertion, 
concluding that when the circuit court takes no additional 
evidence, "the circuit court reviews the administrative record 
                                                 
18 Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) (1983-84) provided: 
Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved 
by any decision of the board of adjustment, or any 
taxpayer, or any officer, department, board or bureau 
of the municipality, may, within 30 days after the 
filing of the decision in the office of the board, 
commence an action seeking the remedy available by 
certiorari. . . . If 
necessary 
for 
the 
proper 
disposition 
of 
the 
matter, 
the 
court 
may 
take 
evidence, or appoint a referee to take evidence and 
report findings of fact and conclusions of law as it 
directs, 
which 
shall 
constitute 
part 
of 
the 
proceedings upon which the determination of the court 
shall be made.  The court may reverse or affirm, 
wholly or partly, or may modify, the decision brought 
up for review.   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
21 
 
under traditional standards of common-law certiorari."  Id. at 
122; see also Klinger v. Oneida Cnty., 149 Wis. 2d 838, 845, 440 
N.W.2d 348 (1989) ("When, as in this case, the circuit court 
takes evidence that is substantially the same as that taken by 
the Board, deference to the Board demands that the evidentiary 
hearing should be treated as a nullity for purposes of 
determining the standard of review to be applied to the Board's 
decision."). 
¶42 The rule set forth in Brookside Poultry is well 
established.  On many occasions, circuit courts and appellate 
courts in this state have applied the Brookside Poultry rule 
when conducting certiorari review under the zoning statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10.  See, e.g., Lamar Cent. Outdoor, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Zoning Appeals City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 117, ¶16, 284 
Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 87; Hearst-Argyle Stations, Inc. v. Bd. 
Zoning Appeals City of Milwaukee, 2003 WI App 48, ¶11, 260 
Wis. 2d 494, 659 N.W.2d 424; Winkelman v. Town of Delafield, 
2000 WI App 254, 239 Wis. 2d 542, 620 N.W.2d 438; Arndorfer v. 
Sauk Cnty. Bd. Adjustment, 162 Wis. 2d 246, 469 Wis. 2d 831 
(1991); State v. Outagamie Cnty. Bd. Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 
¶26, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376; State ex rel. Ziervogel v. 
Washington 
Cnty. 
Bd. 
Adjustment, 
2004 
WI 
23, 
¶13, 
269 
Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.     
¶43 In this case, the circuit court did not take evidence 
on any issue.  Accordingly, under existing law, even if we 
conducted review under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10 the court 
would 
simply 
apply 
the 
traditional 
scope 
of 
common 
law 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
22 
 
certiorari review.  Like the court of appeals, we conclude that 
the Ottmans have not demonstrated how our review would differ if 
we proceeded under the standards set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10, as those standards have historically been 
interpreted by Wisconsin courts.  Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 
No. 2008AP3182, unpublished slip op., ¶5 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App., 
Feb. 18, 2010). 
¶44 The Ottmans appear to acknowledge that in this case 
under existing law, review under Wis. Stat. Ch. 62 would provide 
nothing more than what is provided by Wis. Stat. Ch. 68.  
Therefore, they urge us to overrule or modify the cases limiting 
the scope of certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 62.23.   
¶45 No persuasive rationale is provided for upsetting our 
longstanding jurisprudence.  The argument advanced in favor of 
altering the existing scope of review is set forth in the 
Ottmans' brief as follows:  
The legal construction the Town has imposed on its LUP 
and Driveway Ordinance in [the] Ottmans' case has led 
to the Town's engagement in the direct regulation of 
the use of land. . . .  
It is said to be well settled law that common law 
certiorari applies when the circuit court does not 
take new evidence. . . . The judicial rationale relies 
upon 
a 
blanket 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
and 
validity. . . . None of the precedent cases . . . 
turns on a straightforward adjudication and legal 
construction as the Ottmans' case does.    
¶46 The Ottmans' argument about a "blanket presumption of 
correctness" to a municipality's determination of a question of 
law does not directly implicate the scope of common law 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
23 
 
certiorari review.  Our established scope of review permits 
courts to determine whether the Board proceeded on a correct 
theory of law.  Brookside Poultry, 131 Wis. 2d at 119-20.  
Instead, 
the 
Ottmans' 
argument 
appears 
to 
more 
directly 
implicate the presumption of correctness and amount of deference 
a court should give to a Board's determination of a question of 
law.  We address questions related to deference and the 
presumption of correctness below in Part II.B.19   
¶47 Because no persuasive rationale is provided for 
upsetting our longstanding jurisprudence, we decline to alter 
the established scope of certiorari review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10.  Therefore, like the court of appeals, we 
determine that we need not address whether the Agricultural 
Productivity Clause is in fact a zoning ordinance.  Ottman, 
unpublished slip op., ¶5 n.2.  In this case, under both Wis. 
                                                 
19 Additionally, citing State ex rel. Nagawicka Island Corp. 
v. City of Delafield (Nagawicka II), 117 Wis. 2d 23, 343 
N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983), the Ottmans appear to urge us to 
broaden the scope of review by independently balancing the Town 
of Primrose community interests against restrictions on property 
owners' rights.  The Nagawicka II decision does not support the 
Ottmans' argument.   
In Nagawicka II, "the zoning ordinance itself" was being 
challenged as resulting in an unconstitutional taking of 
property without just compensation.  Id. at 26.  Here, the 
Ottmans are not challenging the validity of the Driveway 
Ordinance, nor are they asserting that the Board's application 
of 
the 
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Clause 
results 
in 
an 
unconstitutional 
taking. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Nagawicka II does not support the Ottmans' suggestion that we 
should independently balance local interests and property 
owners' rights.   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
24 
 
Stat. § 68.13(1) and Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10, our review is 
the same.  It is limited to: (1) whether the Board kept within 
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct theory 
of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and 
(4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make 
the order or determination in question. 
B 
¶48 Having determined the scope of our certiorari review, 
we turn to examining the deference due to the Board's decision.  
Wisconsin courts have repeatedly stated that on certiorari 
review, there is a presumption of correctness and validity to a 
municipality's 
decision. 
 
Lamar 
Outdoor 
Advertising, 
284 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶16; Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶13; Herman v. Cnty. 
of Walworth, 2005 WI App 185, ¶9, 286 Wis. 2d 449, 703 
N.W.2d 720.   
¶49 During oral argument, the Ottmans' attorney contended 
that the language in our cases setting forth a presumption of 
correctness and validity is "meaningless boilerplate," and that 
affording a "blanket" presumption of correctness to all aspects 
of a municipality's decision improperly insulates the decision 
from meaningful judicial review.  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
25 
 
¶50 The concept of a "presumption" is very familiar in the 
law, and it is closely related to the concept of a "burden."20  
On certiorari review, the petitioner bears the burden to 
overcome the presumption of correctness.   
¶51 The 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
and 
validity 
is 
appropriate because it recognizes that locally elected officials 
are especially attuned to local concerns.  It does not follow, 
however, that affording the municipality a presumption of 
correctness 
eviscerates 
meaningful 
review. 
 
A 
court's 
acknowledgement of a presumption does not mean that the 
presumption will never be overcome.   
¶52 The Ottmans correctly observe that certiorari courts 
apply 
different standards when reviewing a municipality's 
discretionary determination, a municipality's determination of a 
question of fact, and a municipality's determination of a 
question of law.  For example, the court on certiorari review 
may be asked to review a determination that is entrusted to the 
discretion of the municipality, such as whether to grant a 
variance.  If the municipality applied the correct legal 
                                                 
20 In a criminal case, for example, there is a presumption 
of innocence and the State has the burden of proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 
(1970).  In evidentiary disputes, a presumption is a rule of law 
by which a finding of a basic fact gives rise to an existence of 
a presumed fact, and the party against whom the presumption is 
directed bears the burden of proving that the nonexistence of 
the 
presumed 
fact 
is 
more 
probable 
than 
its 
existence.  
Wis. Stat. § 903.01; 
see 
also 
Keen 
v. 
Dane 
Cnty. 
Bd. 
Supervisors, 
2004 
WI 
App 
26, 
¶6, 
269 
Wis. 2d 488, 
676 
N.W.2d 154.   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
26 
 
standards and reached a decision that is not arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable, we will not upset a municipality's 
discretionary determination.  See State ex rel. Warren v. 
Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 710, 726, 566 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶53 The court may also be asked to review a municipality's 
findings of fact and to determine whether the evidence was such 
that the municipality might reasonably have reached the decision 
it reached.  A certiorari court may not substitute its view of 
the evidence for that of the municipality.  On certiorari, a 
court will sustain a municipality's findings of fact if any 
reasonable view of the evidence supports them. Kapischke v. 
Cnty. of Walworth, 226 Wis. 2d 320, 328, 595 N.W.2d 42 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
¶54 Additionally, a court may be asked to review whether 
the municipality "kept within its jurisdiction."  Or, in 
reviewing whether the municipality "proceeded according to law," 
the court may be asked to determine whether the applicant was 
afforded due process under the state and federal constitutions.  
These are questions of law, and courts review questions of law 
independently 
from 
the 
determinations 
rendered 
by 
the 
municipality or the circuit court.   
¶55 An interesting question arises when a court is asked 
on certiorari to review a municipality's interpretation and 
application of its own ordinance.  Like the interpretation and 
application 
of 
a 
state 
statute, 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of an ordinance is a question of law.  Marris v. 
City of Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 32, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993).  
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
27 
 
Nevertheless, in Marris, this court provided guidance as to when 
the court should give some deference to a municipality's 
interpretation of its own ordinance.   
¶56 The issue in that case was whether the City of 
Cedarburg erred when it determined that Marris's property had 
lost its status as a legal nonconforming use.  On certiorari 
review, resolution of the issue depended upon the interpretation 
and application of the phrase "total lifetime structural repairs 
or alterations," which was found in the Cedarburg ordinance 
regulating nonconforming uses.  Id. at 31.   
¶57 The Marris court acknowledged that courts sometimes 
give deference to a municipality's interpretation of its own 
ordinance.  Id. at 33.  Nevertheless, the court was cognizant 
that "the ordinance in question is substantially similar to a 
state statute and to ordinances across the state."  Id.  The 
phrase "total structural repairs or alterations" was found in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h) (1993-94), the state statute regulating 
nonconforming uses: "The total structural repairs or alterations 
in such a nonconforming building shall not in its lifetime 
exceed 50% of the assessed value of the building unless 
permanently changed to a nonconforming use."    
¶58 Given 
that 
the 
Cedarburg 
ordinance 
essentially 
parroted the standard set forth in the state statute, we were 
concerned "that any discussion of the phrase 'structural 
repairs' in the Cedarburg ordinance may have significance beyond 
interpreting the Cedarburg ordinance."  Marris, 176 Wis. 2d at 
33.  Under the circumstances, we did not give deference to the 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
28 
 
City's interpretation because "one board's interpretation of the 
language in a single case should not be viewed as controlling or 
persuasive."  Id.  In other words, we declined to permit the 
City of Cedarburg to establish the interpretation of a statewide 
standard.    
¶59 We take the following lessons from Marris.  A court 
should not defer to a municipality's interpretation of a 
statewide 
standard. 
 
Doing 
so 
would 
give 
one 
locality 
disproportionate 
authority 
to 
influence 
state 
standards 
established by the legislature.   
¶60 In other circumstances, however, the language of the 
municipality's ordinance appears to be unique and does not 
parrot a state statute but rather the language was drafted by 
the municipality in an effort to address a local concern.  In 
such a case, the municipality may be uniquely poised to 
determine 
what 
that 
ordinance 
means. 
 
Then, 
applying 
a 
presumption of correctness, we will defer to the municipality's 
interpretation if it is reasonable.   
¶61 As 
in 
other 
situations 
involving 
deference 
to 
interpretations 
of 
statutes 
and 
rules, 
deference 
to 
the 
municipality's interpretation of its own ordinance "does not 
mean that the court accepts the [municipality's] interpretation 
without a critical eye."  Racine Harley Davidson, Inc. v. State 
Division Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 186, ¶15, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 
717 N.W.2d 184.  A court will not defer to an interpretation 
that is unreasonable.  Id.   
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
29 
 
¶62 A municipality's interpretation of its own ordinance 
is unreasonable, for example, if it is contrary to law, if it is 
clearly contrary to the intent, history, or purpose of the 
ordinance, or if it is without a rational basis.  Id., ¶17.  An 
interpretation that directly contravenes the words of the 
ordinance is also unreasonable.  Id.     
¶63 The Ottmans urge us to provide additional guidance.  
They 
point 
to 
our 
jurisprudence 
on 
deference 
to 
state 
administrative 
agencies, 
which 
establish 
three 
levels 
of 
deference, great weight deference, due weight deference, and no 
deference, that "take into account the comparative institutional 
qualifications 
and 
capabilities 
of 
the 
court 
and 
the 
administrative agency."  Id., ¶13.  They urge us to apply these 
three levels of deference when reviewing a municipality's 
interpretation of its own ordinance.     
¶64 Although we have borrowed from cases setting forth the 
framework for reviewing administrative agency determinations in 
our discussion above, we decline to graft that framework 
wholesale onto our framework for reviewing municipal decisions.  
The considerations that guide our decisions when reviewing 
administrative agency determinations would be unnecessarily 
complex and cumbersome when applied to municipality decisions.   
¶65 For example, a central consideration in administrative 
agency cases is whether the agency has been charged by the 
legislature with the administration of a state statute.  Id., 
¶¶16, 18.  That consideration is inapplicable when reviewing a 
unique municipal ordinance that was drafted by the municipality 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
30 
 
rather than the legislature. The framework for reviewing 
administrative agency decisions, which grew out of the division 
of authority between the judicial and executive branches of 
state government and the interpretation of state law, does not 
fit comfortably with the division of authority between the state 
judiciary and local government in interpreting local law.    
III 
¶66 We turn next to applying the principles set forth 
above to the Board's decision.  The Ottmans challenge the 
Board's interpretation of the Agricultural Productivity Clause 
and the Board's application of that clause to deny their 
application for a driveway permit.  They contend that the Board 
did not proceed according to law because its interpretation of 
the farm income requirement violates the Ordinance's plain 
language.  They further assert that the evidence was such that 
the Board could not reasonably have made its determination that 
the proposed building site would not have the least impact upon 
agricultural land.  They contend the Board's rejection of the 
proposed building site was based on findings of fact that are 
not supported by substantial evidence.     
¶67 We begin by examining the farm income requirement to 
determine whether the Board proceeded according to law.  In 
relevant part, the Agricultural Productivity Clause provides 
that "[n]o driveway shall be approved in the Town of Primrose if 
the Town Board finds that the driveway will adversely impact 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
31 
 
productive 
agricultural 
land,21 
unless . . . the 
person 
requesting the permit can show that the parcel to be served by 
the driveway is capable of producing at least $6000.00 of gross 
income per year."  Town of Primrose Driveway Ordinance 1.10.  
Unlike the ordinance at issue in Marris, the Agricultural 
Productivity Clause appears to be unique and does not parrot the 
language of a state statute.  Applying the presumption of 
correctness and validity here, we will defer to the Board's 
interpretation if it is reasonable.   
¶68 The Board and the Ottmans disagree about what it means 
to "show that the parcel . . . is capable of producing at least 
$6000.00 of gross income per year."  The Board concluded that 
because the Ottmans "currently . . . receive no agricultural 
income from the sale of trees from the property [they] therefore 
do not currently meet the farm income standards" of the Town of 
Primrose Driveway Ordinance.  Implicitly, the Board determined 
that in showing that the parcel is "capable of producing" a 
certain amount of agricultural income, an applicant must provide 
                                                 
21 The 
Ottmans 
also 
assert 
that 
the 
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Clause 
is 
not 
even 
implicated 
here 
because 
approving the driveway would have "zero impact" on productive 
agricultural land.  However, they ignore the Board's finding of 
fact that the entire 47-acre parcel, including the proposed site 
for the residence, is productive agricultural land.  The Board's 
finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence, including 
soil tests introduced by both parties.  Accordingly, the Board's 
implicit conclusion that extending the existing field road and 
placing a permanent residence on the land would have an adverse 
impact on productive agricultural land is reasonable. 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
32 
 
evidence of actual income rather than speculation about income 
that could be produced.   
¶69 By contrast, the Ottmans argue that the Ordinance 
requires them to present evidence of what they could produce, 
not necessarily what they are producing or have produced.  They 
argue that the plain meaning of the phrase "capable of 
producing" does not require them to prove that they have 
actually received any income from the property.    
¶70 The Ottmans correctly assert that an interpretation by 
the Board which contravened the plain meaning of the Ordinance 
would be unreasonable and not entitled to deference.  However, a 
close examination of the Ottmans' "plain meaning" interpretation 
raises significant questions.   
¶71 The phrase that the Ottmans rely upon, "capable of 
producing," 
does 
not 
exist 
in 
isolation. 
 
Rather, 
the 
Agricultural Productivity Clause requires the Ottmans to "show" 
that the parcel is "capable of producing" $6,000 in income.  The 
verb "show" suggests that applicants must provide something 
beyond conjecture about what the property could produce.  It 
suggests that applicants may be required to provide evidentiary 
support to back their claims of what a parcel is "capable of 
producing" by demonstrating what the parcel can actually 
produce.  The Ottmans' "plain meaning" interpretation of the 
farm income requirement based on the three-word phrase "capable 
of producing" is not so plain when the language of the Ordinance 
is read as a whole.         
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
33 
 
¶72 Given that there is tension between the Ottmans' 
interpretation of the phrase "capable of producing" and the 
language of the Ordinance when read as a whole, we conclude that 
the Board's interpretation does not contravene the plain meaning 
of the Ordinance.  Rather, we determine that the phrase "show 
that the parcel . . . is capable of producing" is ambiguous.  
Accordingly, we must examine whether the Board's interpretation 
is reasonable.           
¶73 The Board interprets the farm income requirement to 
require 
an 
applicant 
to 
prove 
actual 
income. 
 
This 
interpretation furthers the Town of Primrose's stated goals 
related to the preservation of agricultural land.  The Town of 
Primrose Land Use Plan sets forth the following objectives: 
"preserve productive farmlands for continued agricultural use"; 
"discourage land uses which conflict with agriculture"; and 
"maintain agriculture as the major economic activity and way of 
life within the Town."  Requiring actual agricultural income 
promotes the preservation of agricultural land by encouraging 
residential development that will benefit actual agricultural 
use of the land and by discouraging development that is 
unrelated to agricultural use.   
¶74 By contrast, an interpretation that required only 
speculation about the amount of income that the property was 
"capable of producing" would appear to render the farm income 
requirement nearly meaningless.  One can imagine that most 
property 
owners 
could 
produce 
a 
hypothetical 
farm 
plan 
purporting to demonstrate that their farm was "capable of 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
34 
 
producing" at least $6,000 in income.  A requirement that would 
be so easily satisfied regardless of whether the property owner 
actually intended to preserve productive farmlands for continued 
agricultural use would undermine the Town of Primrose's stated 
goals related to the preservation of agricultural land.     
¶75 Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude 
that the Board's interpretation of the farm income requirement 
is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and we will accord 
it deference.  The Board's interpretation does not contravene 
the plain language of the Ordinance, and further, there is no 
allegation that it is contrary to any other law or that it lacks 
a rational basis.  The Board's interpretation is consistent with 
the purpose of the Ordinance.  The Ottmans have not met their 
burden 
of 
showing 
that 
the 
Board's 
interpretation 
is 
unreasonable.     
¶76 Having deferred to the Board's interpretation of the 
farm income requirement, we examine the Board's application of 
that interpretation to the evidence presented at the hearing.  
To meet the farm income requirement, the Ottmans were required 
to provide evidence of actual income derived from the parcel 
rather than speculation about how much income they could 
produce.   
¶77 The Ottmans acknowledge that they did not introduce 
any evidence that the parcel had actually produced $6,000 in 
income from the sale of Christmas trees.  However, in their 
reply brief to this court, they argue that they did show that 
the parcel is capable of producing $6,000 in income from the 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
35 
 
sale of field corn.  In support, they point to two exhibits that 
were introduced at the hearing: (1) a written statement made by 
Al Hanna, the neighbor who rented a portion of the Ottmans' 
property and grew field corn; and (2) a chart calculating the 
gross income that would be received from various yields of corn 
per acre sold at various prices.22     
¶78 These exhibits do not show that Hanna received $6,000 
in annual income from the field corn that he grew on the 
Ottmans' property.  Hanna's signed letter stated: "Depending on 
growing conditions, I have had yields approximately between 80 
and 120 bushels per acre."  It did not state the number of 
bushels actually harvested or the price at which Hanna sold the 
corn.  The Ottmans did not present any tax documents or any 
other statements setting forth the income that was actually 
generated from the sale of corn that was grown on the Ottmans' 
parcel.  
¶79 Although Hanna did not indicate how much income he had 
received from the sale of corn grown on the property, the 
Ottmans speculated about what Hanna could have made.  The chart 
they introduced, which appears to have been generated by their 
attorney, 
asserted 
that 
Planning 
Commissioner 
Dale 
Judd 
"indicated he had sold corn for $1.50, $2.10 and $2.15/bushel."   
                                                 
22 The Ottmans did not introduce any evidence showing the 
rental income they received from Hanna.  At oral argument, their 
attorney conceded that the annual rent actually paid was far 
less than $6,000. 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
36 
 
¶80 According to the Ottmans' chart, Hanna would have 
exceeded the $6,000 farm income requirement if he had a yield of 
at least 100 bushels of corn per acre and was able to sell that 
corn at $2.15 a bushel.  The chart also indicates that if he had 
a yield of 80 bushels of corn per acre and sold that corn for 
$1.50 a bushel, he would have produced only $3,480 in income.23  
The Board could reasonably have disregarded this speculation 
about what Hanna might or might not have received as income when 
it found that the farm income requirement had not been met.          
¶81 On certiorari, a court will sustain a municipality's 
findings of fact if any reasonable view of the evidence supports 
them. 
 
Kapischke, 
226 
Wis. 2d at 
328. 
 
Applying 
their 
interpretation of the farm income requirement, the Board made a 
finding of fact that the farm income requirement was not met.  
The Ottmans have failed to demonstrate that no reasonable view 
of the evidence supports that finding.  Therefore, we conclude 
that 
the 
Ottmans 
have 
not 
overcome 
the 
presumption 
of 
correctness.24 
                                                 
23 The Ottmans' amended complaint appears to acknowledge 
that the property had not produced $6,000 in income from the 
sale of field corn.  The amended complaint explained that 
"[w]ere all 43 of the farm's productive acres . . . planted in 
corn, assuming an average yield of 100 bushels of corn per acre, 
the Ottmans' farm parcel is capable of producing $6,450 of gross 
income per year at $1.50 per bushel and $9,245 of gross income 
per year at $2.15 per bushel.  (Emphasis added.)  
24 Having determined that the Ottmans failed to satisfy the 
farm income requirement, we need not address the Ottmans' 
contentions regarding the building site and various findings of 
fact. 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
37 
 
¶82 In sum, because the Ottmans have failed to provide a 
persuasive 
rationale 
for 
upsetting 
our 
longstanding 
jurisprudence, we decline to alter the established scope of 
statutory certiorari.  We further decline to graft the framework 
for reviewing administrative agency determinations onto our 
framework for reviewing municipal decisions.  In situations 
where the language of a municipality's ordinance appears to be 
unique and does not parrot a state statute but rather was 
drafted by the municipality in an effort to address a local 
concern, we will defer to the municipality's interpretation if 
it is reasonable.  
¶83 Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude 
that the Board's interpretation of the farm income requirement 
is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and we will accord 
it deference.  The Ottmans have not met their burden of showing 
that the Board's interpretation is unreasonable.  Applying its 
interpretation, the Board made a finding of fact that the farm 
income requirement was not met, and the Ottmans have failed to 
demonstrate that no reasonable view of the evidence supports 
that finding.  Therefore, we conclude that the Ottmans have not 
overcome the presumption of correctness.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No. 
2008AP3182   
 
 
 
1