Title: Collins v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GALEN COLLINS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  Nos. 87 & 130, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court BelowSuperior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9802013395 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 7, 2002 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 10, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This tenth day of July 2002, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Galen Collins, filed these consolidated 
appeals from two orders of the Superior Court dated January 27, 2002 and 
March 1, 2002, respectively.  The January 27 order denied Collins’ first 
motion for postconviction relief.  The March 1 order denied Collins’ motion 
to recuse the judge who ruled on the postconviction motion.  After careful 
consideration of the issues raised on appeal, we have concluded that the 
Superior Court’s judgment regarding Collins’ postconviction motion must 
 
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be reversed.  This matter will be remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this Order. 
 
(2) 
The procedural circumstances leading to Collins’ criminal 
convictions are unusual.  Collins, at the age of 16, was indicted in March 
1998, along with Abraham Farnum and Dion Oliver, on charges of 
trafficking cocaine (more than 100 grams), possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony, and resisting arrest. Although Collins was a 
minor at the time, his case was filed as an adult criminal case in the Superior 
Court because of the firearm charge.1   
 
(3) 
Apparently the State engaged in extensive negotiations with the 
three codefendants and their respective counsel.  As a result, the State 
achieved a “wired” plea agreement, meaning all three codefendants had to 
accept the respective deals offered by the State or else none of them would 
be offered a deal, and all three would be required to stand trial.  On July 19, 
1999, Collins pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of 
trafficking cocaine (50 to 100 grams).  The Superior Court immediately 
sentenced him to fifteen years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
                                                 
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1447A(e), regarding possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony, provides that, “Every person charged under this section over 
the age of 15 years shall be tried as an adult, notwithstanding any contrary provisions or 
statutes governing the Family Court or any other state law.” 
 
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after serving ten years for five years of probation.  The guilty plea agreement 
contains no reference to Collins’ codefendants, nor was there any indication 
in the plea agreement or during the guilty plea colloquy that Collins’ plea 
agreement was “wired.”  In fact, the deputy attorney general appearing at the 
guilty plea hearing informed the Superior Court, “There are no other 
agreements, Your Honor.” 
 
(4) 
On July 23, 1999, the State filed a motion to vacate Collins’ 
plea agreement.  The State asserted that, after Collins’ sentencing, Oliver 
had rejected the terms of the State’s plea offer, thereby breaching the 
“wired” plea agreement and making Collins’ plea agreement voidable by the 
State.  Following an office conference with counsel on September 27, 1999, 
at which Collins was not personally present, the Superior Court granted the 
State’s motion and reinstated all of the original charges against him. 
 
(5) 
In February 2000, Collins was tried and convicted of trafficking 
cocaine (50 to 100 grams), possession with intent to deliver, resisting arrest, 
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  The 
Superior Court judge presiding at Collins’ trial was not the same judge who 
had accepted, and then vacated, Collins’ guilty plea.  At Collins’ scheduled 
sentencing hearing, the trial judge, sua sponte, raised concerns about “the 
legality of setting aside Mr. Collins’ guilty plea.”  The trial judge postponed 
 
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sentencing to allow the parties to file supplemental submissions on several 
issues, including the legality of vacating Collins’ plea and sentence.  On 
May 2, 2000, the Superior Court, among other things, denied Collins’ 
motion to reinstate his guilty plea and sentence, stating that, although the 
law appears “uncertain,” the prior ruling vacating the guilty plea and 
sentence “is not clearly incorrect and . . . is the law of the case.”  
Furthermore, the judge noted that the “issue has now been preserved twice 
for appeal.”  The Superior Court then sentenced Collins on all four 
convictions to a total of twenty-three years at Level V incarceration, to be 
suspended after serving eighteen years minimum mandatory for five years of 
probation. 
 
(6) 
Collins, through his trial counsel, filed a direct appeal to this 
Court from his convictions and sentence.  Collins raised several issues on 
appeal but did not raise any issue challenging either the Superior Court’s 
decision granting the State’s motion to vacate Collins’ plea and sentence or 
the decision denying Collins’ motion to reinstate his guilty plea and 
sentence.  In September 2001, this Court affirmed Collins’ convictions and 
sentence on appeal.2 
                                                 
2 Collins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 274, 2002, Berger, J. (Sept. 6, 2001). 
 
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(7) 
In November 2001, Collins, acting pro se, filed a motion for 
postconviction relief in the Superior Court.  Among other things, Collins 
asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Collins’ motion was 
considered by the judge who had vacated his guilty plea and sentence.3  The 
judge determined that Collins’ motion was subject to summary disposition4 
and, therefore, did not request a response to Collins’ motion from either the 
State or Collins’ trial counsel.  Without reaching the merits of any issues 
raised therein, the Superior Court held that Collins’ motion was procedurally 
barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4).5  The judge ruled that 
Collins’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was simply an attempt to 
“rehash” the issue of the Superior Court’s refusal to reinstate Collins’ guilty 
plea and sentence, and the interests of justice did not require reconsideration 
of this claim. 
                                                 
3 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(1) provides that a postconviction petition 
should be “presented promptly to the judge who accepted a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or presided at trial in the proceedings leading to the judgment under attack.”  
In Collins’ case, the judge who had presided at trial had retired from the bench by the 
time Collins filed his Rule 61 petition. 
4 Rule 61(d)(4) provides, “If it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction 
relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to 
relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be 
notified.” 
5 Rule 61(i)(4) provides, “Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, 
whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a 
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, 
unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.” 
 
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(8) 
We disagree.  Although Collins’ pro se motion may not have 
been artfully drafted, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
sufficiently stated, had not been and could not have been previously raised, 
and therefore was not procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(4).  Accordingly, 
we find that the Superior Court abused its discretion in summarily denying 
Collins’ first petition for postconviction relief without considering the merits 
of the claims raised therein. 
(9) 
We express no view on the merits of Collins’ postconviction 
claims, nor do we find it necessary to reach the merits of Collins’ claim that 
the judge deciding the postconviction motion should have recused himself.  
We have no doubt that the judge involved could fairly and impartially rule 
on the merits of the Collins’ postconviction petition.  We also find that good 
cause exists for the appointment of counsel to represent Collins’ in this 
postconviction proceeding.  Counsel should be permitted to review the 
record and, if necessary, file an amended petition for postconviction relief 
raising any issues counsel deems appropriate, including the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim Collins already raised. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is REVERSED.  This matter is REMANDED for further 
proceedings consistent with this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice