Title: MITCHELL S. SHELHAMER V. SHARON G. SHELHAMER, n/k/a SHARON G. ALTERMATT

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MITCHELL S. SHELHAMER V. SHARON G. SHELHAMER, n/k/a SHARON G. ALTERMATT2006 WY 83138 P.3d 665Case Number: 05-155Decided: 07/17/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
MITCHELL 
S. SHELHAMER,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
SHARON G. SHELHAMER, n/k/a SHARON G. ALTERMATT,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Georgia L. Antley and Luke Esch, Student Intern, Williams, 
Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing Appellee:

Sharon G. Altermatt, Pro se.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Mitchell 
S. Shelhamer (Father), seeks review of the district court's order that awarded 
him primary custody of the parties' seventeen-year-old son.  The parties had 
stipulated to that change in custody.  The district court's order also provided that 
Appellee, Sharon G. Altermatt, fka Sharon G. Shelhamer (Mother), pay child 
support in the amount of $50.00 a month to Father, a deviation from the 
presumptive support level.  In addition, the district court's order 
provided that Mother's child support responsibility would cease on August 31, 
2005.  Father 
contends that the district court abused its discretion:  (1) In ordering the 
cessation of child support when the child reached the age of majority; (2) in 
ordering only minimal child support; and (3) in employing improper reasons for a 
deviation from the presumptive support level.  Although we conclude that the district 
court's order was erroneous in several respects, we conclude that all errors 
were de minimus 
and harmless under the circumstances of this case.  Thus, we will 
affirm the district court's order.

 
 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Father raises these 
issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court abused its discretion in terminating child 
support in contravention of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-313 (a)(iv) and/or Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-204(a)(iii).

 
 
II.          
Whether the district court erred by omitting the presumptive child 
support amount in its order.

 
 
III.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion by using improper 
reasons as deviation factors from presumptive child support.

 
 
[¶3]      Mother filed her 
brief one day late.  
See W.R.A.P. 7.06(b) and 7.10.  In addition, her brief did not comply with 
the requirements set out in the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See W.R.A.P. 7.01 
and 7.02.  For 
these reasons we will not hear or consider Mother's contentions.  See W.R.A.P. 7.11 
and 1.03.

 
 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      The record does not 
reflect when the parties were married, but by Decree entered on October 8, 1993, 
the parties were divorced.  The Decree incorporated the parties' 
stipulation as to the terms of the divorce.  The Decree of Divorce awarded the parties 
joint custody of the parties' four children, with Mother having "present 
physical care, custody and control of the minor children."  Father was to pay 
Mother $200.00 per month, per child in child support (a total of $800.00).  The parties also 
agreed to "split equally any and all medicals incurred by the parties' four 
minor children."  
Father was to claim the older two children for income tax purposes until 
they were 18, and Mother was to claim the two younger children for income tax 
purposes until they were 18.  Of special significance to this case, Mother 
was awarded primary custody of the parties' youngest son, James, who was born on 
October 11, 1987.  
Father also agreed to be responsible for any debt incurred by the parties 
prior to the filing of the divorce action.

 
 
[¶5]      In an Order for 
Modification of Support by Default entered on October 28, 1996, the district 
court awarded Mother a judgment in the amount of $10,811.38 for child support 
arrearages.  
Father sought reconsideration of that order, and the district court did 
conduct proceedings in the nature of a reconsideration of its October 28, 1996, 
order.  The 
parties then entered into another stipulation.  On April 15, 1997, the district court entered 
another order based on that stipulation.  That order provided:  For reasonable 
visitation for Father; that Father would pay $112.50 per month per child in 
child support (a total of $450.00 per month); that Father was "deemed current on 
all child support due by him to [Mother] on or before December 1, 1996[;]" that 
Mother would provide health insurance and be responsible for all healthcare 
costs for the children; and that Mother would be entitled to claim all minor 
children for income tax purposes.

 
 
[¶6]      The parties entered 
into another stipulation which was filed in the district court on October 13, 
1998.  By order 
entered on October 13, 1998, the district court effectuated that stipulation to 
the effect that Father would pay Mother $150.00 per month for the three children 
who were still minors (a total of $450.00 per month), and that that child 
support "does comport with the provisions of the Wyoming Child Support 
Guidelines[.]"

 
 
[¶7]      The parties entered 
into yet another stipulation which was filed in the district court on July 14, 
2003.  By order 
entered on August 21, 2003, the district court approved that stipulation:

 
 
1.  [Father] filed his petition for modification 
of child custody and child support on or about July 2, 2002.

2.  Entry of default against [Mother] took place 
on July 26, 2002.  
Thereafter, [Mother] moved to set aside the default and that hearing was 
scheduled for October 9, 2002).

3.  The parties have reached resolution 
concerning the issues in [Father's] petition for modification.

4.  That stipulation should be approved by the 
court relative to the change in custody of the minor child Jenna Mae Shelhamer 
who achieved majority on October 9, 2002 [dob October 9, 1984].

5.  [Father] is employed by the Bank of Greybull 
in Greybull, Wyoming, and has additional income from 
horseshoeing both of which lead to a net income of $2,019.30 per month.  [Mother] is 
employed as a grant writer on contract with Big Horn County, 
Wyoming.  Her net monthly 
income is $2,336.00.

6.  Child support computed in accordance with the 
presumptive child support guidelines of 20-2-304 is $50.00 per month effective 
the month of July, 2002 continuing through May, 2003 owed from [Father] to 
[Mother].  
Commencing with the month of June, 2003 in accordance with the agreement 
of the parties, presumptive child support in accordance with Wyoming Statute 
20-2-304 is $352.38 per month due from [Father] to [Mother] payable through the 
Clerk of District Court.

7.  The parties' agreement makes for no deviation 
from the presumptive child support guidelines.

8.  The parties have reserved the issue of 
arrearages, if any.

 
 
[¶8]      The order provided 
that the agreement made no deviation from presumptive support, yet Mother was 
required to pay Father only $50.00 a month in child support for the support of 
the child who was in Father's custody, whereas Father was required to pay Mother 
$352.38 a month in child support because she retained custody of James.  Thus, while the 
stipulation and associated order purports that the child support awarded is in 
conformity with the guidelines, clearly that was not the case given the parties' 
respective incomes.

 
 
[¶9]      On December 10, 2004, 
Father filed a Petition to Modify Decree Regarding Custody.  He filed that 
petition pro se and its format was that of a fill-in-the-blank form, although 
the source of that form is not evident from the record.  Mother filed a 
response on January 3, 2005.  She used a similar type of form (Response to 
Petition) and also appeared pro se.  The record is not clear if the parties were 
represented by counsel in any of the earlier proceedings, although in some of 
them it appears at least one of the parties may have been represented by 
counsel.  The 
essence of Father's petition in this case was that the youngest child, James, 
was now living with Father and that Father should, therefore, be awarded 
custody, and that Mother should pay him child support in accordance with the 
child support guidelines.  In her response to Father's petition, Mother 
stated the following:

 
 
James did not return from his summer visit with his 
father.  It was 
my wish that he would return, however, since he is 17 years old, I did not think 
it prudent to force him.  I would ask the Court to consider allowing me 
to pay less than the guidelines as I made an agreement with [Father] to cut his 
payment in half and have his several thousand dollars arrearage forgiven when he 
wanted to pay less in exchange for giving up his custody of the four children, 
an agreement the Court approved.  I would also ask that I be required to pay 
$50/month only until James is 18, as he is almost emancipated, and it is only 
through good grace that I am allowing him to live there.  I think it is 
important to note that my husband provided health insurance on all of the 
children for 8 years, which at the time he dropped them was costing $358.00 a 
month.  The 
insurance premium was more than we were receiving in child support.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court conducted a hearing 
into this matter at which the parties appeared pro se.  The proceedings 
were informal, with Father essentially giving a narrative of what he wanted to 
say and asking questions of Mother.  Mother did about the same thing, giving a 
narrative of what she wanted to say and asking some questions of Father.  The district court 
asked questions of both parties as well.  No exhibits were introduced into evidence, or 
at least none appear of record.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the 
district court asked Mother to prepare the judgment/order, and she indicated 
that she would do so.  
However, we cannot tell for certain who actually did prepare the 
appealable order in this case, and the order did not indicate that either party 
approved or disapproved of it as provided for in W.R.C.P. 58.

 
 
[¶11]   The order issued by the district court 
awarded primary custody of James to Father.  It also provided that Mother was to pay 
Father $50.00 per month for child support from January 1, 2005, through August 
31, 2005, "at which time [Mother's] child support obligation shall cease, (i.e., 
last child support due on August 1, 2005)."  The district court indicated it would deviate 
from the presumptive child support guidelines "pursuant to W.S. § 
20-2-307(b)(i), (v) and (xiii) including the age of the child, who will be 18 in 
October of 2005 and the fact that a previous arrearage was accrued by [Father] 
which was forgiven by [Mother]."1

 
 
[¶12]   The order appealed in this case did not 
set out the detail of the district court's findings that supported its decision 
to deviate from the child support guidelines.  The presumptive child support schedule must 
be followed unless the district court finds that there are factors that warrant 
a deviation.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 
2005)

provides:

 
 
§ 20-2-307.  Presumptive child support to be 
followed; deviations by court.

 
 
            
(a)  The presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 
shall be rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be 
awarded in any proceeding to establish or modify temporary or permanent child 
support amounts.  
Every order or decree providing for the support of a child shall set 
forth the presumptive child support amount and shall state whether the order or 
decree departs from that amount.

            
(b)  A court may deviate from the presumptive child support 
established by W.S. 20-2-304 upon a specific finding that the application of the 
presumptive child support would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular 
case.  In any 
case where the court has deviated from the presumptive child support, the 
reasons therefor shall be specifically set forth fully in the order or 
decree.  In 
determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child support established by 
W.S. 20-2-304, the court shall consider the following factors:

                        
(i)  The age of the child;

                        
(ii)  The cost of necessary child day care;

            
(iii)  Any special health care and educational needs of the 
child;

(iv)  The responsibility of either parent for the 
support of other children, whether court ordered or otherwise;

(v)  The value of services contributed by either parent;

(vi)  Any expenses reasonably related to the 
mother's pregnancy and confinement for that child, if the parents were never 
married or if the parents were divorced prior to the birth of the child;

(vii)  The cost of transportation of the child to 
and from visitation;

(viii)  The ability of either or both parents to 
furnish health, dental and vision insurance through employment benefits;

                        
(ix)  The amount of time the child spends with       
each parent;

(x)  Any other necessary expenses for the benefit 
of the child;

(xi)  Whether either parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed.  In such case the child support shall be 
computed based upon the potential earning capacity (imputed income) of the 
unemployed or underemployed parent.  In making that determination the court shall 
consider:

(A)  Prior employment experience and history;

            
(B)  Educational level and whether additional education would 
make the parent more self-sufficient or significantly increase the parent's 
income;

(C)  The presence of children of the marriage in 
the parent's home and its impact on the earnings of that parent;

(D)  Availability of employment for which the 
parent is qualified;

(E)  Prevailing wage rates in the local area;

                                    
(F)  Special skills or training;  and

            
(G)  Whether the parent is realistically able to earn imputed 
income.

(xii)  Whether or not either parent has violated 
any provision of the divorce decree, including visitation provisions, if deemed 
relevant by the court;  and

(xiii)  Other factors deemed relevant by the court.

            
(c)  If the parties fail to agree that the presumptive child 
support amount under W.S. 20-2-304 is appropriate, the court may order the party 
seeking to deviate from the presumptive child support amount to pay reasonable 
attorney fees and court costs to the other party unless, after hearing the 
evidence and considering the factors contained in subsection (b) of this 
section, the court deviates from the presumptive support amount.

            
(d)  Agreements regarding child support may be submitted to the 
court.  All 
such agreements shall be accompanied by a financial affidavit as required by 
W.S. 20-2-308.  
The court shall use the presumed child support amounts to review the 
adequacy of child support agreements negotiated by the parties.  If the agreed 
amount departs from the presumed child support, the parties shall furnish 
statements of explanation which shall be included with the forms and shall be 
filed with the court.  
The court shall review the agreement and inform the parties whether or 
not additional or corrected information is needed, or that the agreement is 
approved or disapproved.  No agreement which is less than the presumed 
child support amount shall be approved if means tested sources of income such as 
aid under the personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) 
program, health care benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, food 
stamps, supplemental security income (SSI) or other similar benefits are being 
paid on behalf of any of the children.  [Emphasis added denoting those subsections 
cited by the district court in its order.]

 
 
[¶13]   The district court's oral comments at 
the conclusion of the informal hearing held in this matter on April 11, 2005, 
are more detailed:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Okay.  Then the Court is prepared to go 
ahead and enter an order in this case.  And the order will provide for a change of 
custody as agreed by the parties, and so that the child, James, is now in the 
legal and physical custody of his father subject to visitation with his 
mother.

            
The Court will further advise the parties that any modification, as far 
as the date that it can relate back to, cannot go back farther that the date the 
petition for modification was filed, which was December 10th, 2004.  So the previous orders remained in full force 
and effect until the date of December 2004.

            
Considering that fact  apparently Mr. Shelhamer stopped paying support 
approximately in July of 2004, also considering the amount of past due support 
that was actually forgiven by Ms. Altermatt and the indebtedness that she was 
required to pay as a result of the bankruptcy having been filed by Mr. 
Shelhamer, the Court finds that the presumed child support, if it were followed 
according to the guidelines, from December 10th, 2004, up to the end 
of April, would be $391.35, and after that it would be $300.12.  However, the Court 
concurs that this is a case in which a deviation is appropriate in view of the 
facts that have been testified to and that I already have mentioned.

            
The Court will refer to the section that provides for deviations by the 
Court, which is Section 20-2-307, that the presumptively  presumptive child 
support is rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be 
awarded in any proceeding to establish or modify temporary  or permanent child 
support payments.

            
Also, it provides, the Court may deviate from the presumptive child 
support upon a specific finding that the application of the presumptive child 
support would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case.

            
And in this case, the Court finds that the application of the presumptive 
child support would be both unjust and inappropriate.  And that is taking 
into consideration the age of the child, the expense that may be involved in 
raising this child at the age of 19 [sic] [James was still 17 years of age on 
the date of the hearing], and the other facts and circumstances that have been 
testified to, that a substantial amount of child support that should have been 
paid by Mr. Shelhamer was forgiven and that Ms. Altermatt was required to pay a 
number of debts as a result of the fact that he declared bankruptcy [Father 
admitted that he declared bankruptcy and Mother's testimony that she paid those 
bills is not contradicted in the record.

            
The Court agrees that this is a case in which there should be a deviation 
from the guidelines, and the Court accordingly is going to order a deviation 
downward to the amount of $50 per month retroactive to December 10, 2004.  Any child support 
that she owes from December 10, 2004, at $50 per month would be set off against 
any support that Mr. Shelhamer continues to owe as a result of the previous 
order in the case up to that date.

            
The Court will further find that considering the age of the child, the 
fact that he is, as apparently testified to and undisputed, a 19-year-old 
freshman [in high school], that the Court cannot order that support go on 
indefinitely with an expectation that he's going to remain a high school student 
on an indefinite basis.  It is going to be necessary to take a close 
look at the possibility of having him complete a GED or go into the Job Corps, 
one of those alternative-type plans.

            
Accordingly, the Court is going to  to go on the basis that with proper 
tutoring he most likely would be able to complete a GED, even at the IQ that he 
has, by the end of summer of 2005.  So the child support obligation is not going 
to continue beyond August 31, 2005.

 
 
[¶14]   The circumstances of James' high school 
education and work experience are found in these excerpts from Mother's 
testimony at the hearing:

 
 
MRS. ALTERMATT:  Number two, James is 17 years 
old and pays his own bills.  He is employed by the Forshee Ranch in 
Hyattville.  
When he lived with me, he worked for Carl Jones.  He makes his own 
vehicle payment, and he pays his own vehicle insurance.  At least he did 
when he lived with me.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
Well, his dad had him start as a freshman [in high school].  He's always been 
behind in school, Your Honor.  And when we moved to Powell, he had a really 
rough year, and so he  I took him out, and he was doing correspondence courses, 
working for Carl Jones and then doing correspondence course.  He would go to work 
with me.  But 
they didn't recognize that, I guess, when he started school in Basin, and he's a 
17-year-old freshman.

THE COURT:  Have you and Mr. Shelhamer discussed whether 
he's going to remain in school to get a high school diploma or attempt to get a 
GED?

            
MS. ALTERMATT:  
My plan for him  to answer the question, yes, we have discussed it.  My plan for him was 
to get a GED, and he was training with a mechanic in Lovell, to be like a 
mechanic's  a mechanic eventually.  And he was more on a vocational track.  I explained that 
here.

            
School's always been hard for James.  When he first started, they did testing on 
him, and his IQ was tested at 79.  And we were able to get him through school 
until high school, and then it just became too difficult.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
MRS. ALTERMATT:  Well, just regarding James, his 
dad did not agree with my educational plan, but I felt it was working out well 
for him.  He 
would have  we also talked about Job Corps, where he could either get a high 
school diploma or a GED, either one, and they would train him.  With an IQ of 79, I 
think vocational track is appropriate for him.  And I was going to get him through.  He would have 
either had a high school diploma or a GED by the time he was 18 if he would have 
stayed in my household.  But as it is now, I don't know.  I don't know.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
MRS. ALTERMATT:  Well, he was being tutored for 
GED, and I had him tested as well, and he was middle eighth grade.  But that's  if he 
would have stayed in the resource room where they started him in school, he 
would have been lucky to even obtain seventh-grade level.  But he was being  
adult education is in with my office in Lovell, and he was being tutored for his 
GED, and they would have just made  they would have kept working with him until 
he got it.

 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶15]                           
Our role in reviewing petitions to modify child support is well 
established:

 
 
      There are few rules 
more firmly established in our jurisprudence than the proposition that 
disposition of marital property, calculation of income for child support 
purposes, and the granting of alimony are committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court.  
Johnson v. 
Johnson, 11 P.3d 948, 950 
(Wyo.2000).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria;  it means exercising sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily 
or capriciously.  
Id.; Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo.1998).  We 
must ask ourselves whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did 
and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Johnson, 11 P.3d  at 
950.  In 
accomplishing our review, we consider only the evidence in favor of the 
successful party, ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant to 
the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
record.  
Id.

 
 

Belless v. Belless, 2001 WY 41, ¶ 6, 21 P.3d 749, ¶ 6 
(Wyo.2001).

 
 
The party seeking modification must establish there has 
been a material and substantial change in circumstances which outweighs the 
interest of society in applying the doctrine of res judicata.  Pauling v. Pauling, 
837 P.2d 1073 
(Wyo.1992);  Crawford v. 
Crawford, 828 P.2d 1192 
(Wyo.1992);  Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172 
(Wyo.1990);  Mentock v. Mentock, 
638 P.2d 156 
(Wyo.1981).  
The trial court is vested with discretion to modify the provisions of the 
divorce decree and, absent a grave abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb 
its decision.  
Parry v. 
Parry, 766 P.2d 1168 
(Wyo.1989);  Manners v. Manners, 
706 P.2d 671 
(Wyo.1985).  
The standard we apply in review of cases asserting abuse of discretion as 
an issue is whether the trial court reasonably could have concluded as it 
did.  Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20 (Wyo.1993), 
and Parry (both 
citing Martinez v. 
State, 611 P.2d 831 
(Wyo.1980)).

 
 

Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d 324, ¶ 9 
(Wyo.2002) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 
(Wyo.1993)).

 
 
This policy manifests a balance between the doctrine of 
finality of judgments which is supported by the doctrine of res judicata and the 
statutes providing for modification of the provisions of a decree relating to 
child custody, support, and alimony.  The trial court is charged with resolving 
that tension, and it must do so in the exercise of discretion.  The discretion 
afforded the trial judge is encompassed in Wyo. Stat.  § 20-6-302(b).  The discretion is 
guided by a list of thirteen factors, but the final one, "[o]ther factors deemed 
relevant by the court * * *," is a classic acknowledgment of judicial 
discretion.

 
 
      The child support 
guidelines identify a base from which the judge must invoke the exercise of 
discretion.  In 
the absence of an agreement with respect to child support, the guidelines will 
have a more significant controlling impact.  When an agreement as to child support is 
involved, however, more weight may be given to the agreement.  Child support 
agreements entered into by the parties are favored by the courts.  Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953 
(Wyo.1962).

 
 

Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo.1995).

 
 

Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d 836, 838-39 (Wyo. 
2003); and see Steele v. Steele, 2005 WY 33, ¶¶ 10-16, 108 P.3d 844, 848-51 (Wyo. 
2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Support Beyond Age 18

 
 
[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-313 (LexisNexis 
2005) provides:

 
 
§ 20-2-313. Cessation of child support.

            
(a)  An on-going child support obligation terminates when 
the:

                        
(i)  Parents marry or remarry each other;

                        
(ii)  Child dies;

                        
(iii)  Child is legally emancipated;  or

                        
(iv)  Child attains the age of majority.

            
(b)  After the remarriage of the parents to each other, the 
court may eliminate all child support arrearage existing between the parents 
except those assigned to the state of Wyoming.

 
 
[¶17]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added) provides:

 
 
(a)  Any person legally responsible for the 
support of a child who abandons, deserts, neglects or unjustifiably fails to 
support the child is liable for support of the child.  It is no defense 
that the child was not or is not in destitute circumstances.  For purposes of 
this section, a 
parent's legal obligation for the support of his or her children, whether 
natural or adopted, continues past the age of majority in cases where the 
children are:

(i)  Mentally or physically disabled and thereby 
incapable of self support;  or

                        
(ii)  Repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 1, § 2.

            
(iii)  Between the age of majority and twenty (20) years and 
attending high school or an equivalent program as full-time 
participants.

 
 
[¶18]   With respect to this issue, the 
original, stipulated Decree of Divorce provided:  "Such support shall continue until each child 
 becomes self-supporting, marries or becomes 18 years of age, whichever event 
shall first occur."

 
 
[¶19]   There is no indication in the record 
that the parties were aware of their son's learning disability at the time that 
the decree was agreed to and entered.  Although, as we have noted above, agreements 
with respect to child support are favored, we have also held that "[a] child's 
right to adequate support cannot be bargained away by a contract between the 
parents regardless of the validity of the agreement between the parents 
themselves."  
Kimble v. 
Ellis, 2004 WY 161, ¶ 8, 101 P.3d 950, 953 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶20]   For more than a decade, these parties 
were able to resolve their differences by stipulation, but were unable to do so 
in this case.  
It appears from the record extant that the stipulations were largely 
driven by Father's needs and Mother's acquiescence.  In this instance it 
appears that Father was unable to find common ground with his former wife.  Our conclusion is 
driven in large part by the precise circumstances presented in this case, and we 
hold that the parties' original agreement that child support should terminate 
when James reached the age of 18 (i.e., on October 17, 2005) should govern 
here.  The 
district court chose to terminate child support as of August 31, 2005.  The termination 
date set by the district court is erroneous.  However, because the error is de minimus, we will 
affirm the district court's order as entered.  See Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, ¶ 26, 94 P.3d 450, 462 (Wyo. 
2004); W.R.A.P. 9.04.2

 
 

Failure to State Amount of Presumptive Support in 
Decree

 
 
[¶21]   In cases too numerous to mention here, 
we have stressed the importance of the district court making detailed findings 
in matters such as the one before us today.  Of course, it was irresponsible of the 
district court to assign the task of preparing the order in this case to a party 
who was appearing before the court pro se.  Furthermore, it was irresponsible for the 
district court to sign a judgment that did not contain the information that is 
required by the governing statute.  In its oral findings, the district court did 
state what the presumptive support would have been had the district court chosen 
to adhere to the presumptive support tables.  However, that information was not 
memorialized in the order from which this appeal was taken.  There is an 
inherent tension between statutes such as those at issue here (cases where the 
"best interests of the child" are at stake and/or where a statute specifically 
calls for findings to be in an order or decree) and the provisions of W.R.C.P. 
523 and 58.4  However, it is 
incumbent upon the district court in any case, but especially in a case where 
the parties are appearing before it in child custody and/or child support 
matters, to ensure that the order contains all required findings.  Here, the record 
contains a statement of the presumptive support level which we quoted 
above.  
Therefore, we conclude that this error too is de minimus and, 
hence, harmless.

 
 
Deviation from Presumptive Support Level

 
 
[¶22]   The district court made a decision to 
deviate from presumptive support in this instance.  It based that 
decision on the age of the child (§ 20-2-307(b)(i)); the value of services 
contributed by either parent (§ 20-2-307(b)(v)); and, other factors deemed 
relevant by the court (§ 20-2-307(b)(xiii)).  The factor specifically pointed to by the 
court in the order was Mother's forgiveness of child support arrearages owed to 
Mother by Father, but as we noted above in our quotation of the district court's 
oral findings, there were several other such factors that the district court 
took into account.  
In its oral findings, the district court made a specific finding that 
application of the presumptive support guidelines would be unjust and 
inappropriate in this particular case.  Our decision in Steele was 
available to the district court at the time the order, which is the subject of 
this appeal, was entered (it was published just one month before the date of 
that order), although there is no indication in the record on appeal that it was 
called to the attention of the district court by the parties.  In the light of all 
of these circumstances, we conclude that, although the proceedings in this case 
are no model for either litigants or for district courts, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in taking into account the facts and circumstances that 
it did, or in making its decision to deviate from the presumptive support 
level.  All 
errors were de 
minimus and harmless.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   The proceedings in this case were 
inexcusably unconventional.  While we have repeatedly held that the 
settlement of cases is favored by the courts in virtually all circumstances, 
when the issues relate to the custody of children and their support and welfare, 
a trial court must often forgo informality in favor of careful attention to the 
governing statutes and the standards that the legislature expects both parties 
and the courts to adhere to in such cases.  To do otherwise needlessly complicates and 
delays the final resolution of these important cases.  Clearly, there were 
errors and lapses of judgment that crept into these proceedings, and in some 
respects it was a decade's worth of cumulative errors that finally came to bear 
on the final months of this family's experience with divorce, child custody, and 
child support.  
We are confident that neither courts nor litigants will look to the 
unique (or so we hope) circumstances of this case as a precedent for much of 
anything other than that such muddling only leads to ever greater 
complications.  
However, in the final analysis we conclude that the errors that crept 
into this case were both de minimus and harmless, and we hold that the district 
court's order should be affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Of course, a parent who is to receive child support 
payments under a court order may not legally bargain away those funds because 
they belong not to the parent, but to the child.  Whitt v. State ex 
rel. Wright, 2001 WY 
128, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d 617, 622 (Wyo. 2001).  Although that issue is not raised in this 
case, we do not want our affirmance to appear to condone such conduct.

 
 

2W.R.A.P. 9.04 
provides:

 
 
Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded by the reviewing court.

 
 

3W.R.C.P. 52 provides:

 
 
(a)  General and special 
findings by court. -- Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, or 
with an advisory jury, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its 
findings, except generally for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the 
parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view of 
excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the 
trial, in which case the court shall state in writing its special findings of 
fact separately from its conclusions of law;  provided, that without such request the court 
may make such special findings of fact and conclusions of law as it deems proper 
and if the same are preserved in the record either by stenographic report or by 
the court's written memorandum, the same may be considered on appeal.  Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review.  The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court.  Findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion 
except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule.

            
(b)  Amendment or additional findings. -- On a party's 
motion filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment; the court may amend 
special findings--or make additional findings--and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. 
When special findings of fact are made in actions tried without a jury, the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings may be later questioned 
whether or not in the court the party raising the question objected to the 
findings, moved to amend them, or moved for partial findings.

            
(c)  Judgment on partial findings. -- If during a trial 
without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds 
against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law 
against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the 
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that 
issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all 
the evidence.  
The party against whom entry of such a judgment is considered shall be 
entitled to no special inference as a consequence of such consideration, and the 
court may weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts.  Such a judgment 
shall be supported by findings as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule.

 
 

4W.R.C.P. 58 provides:

 
 
(a)  Presentation. -- 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 55(b) and unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, written judgments or orders shall be presented to the court within 20 
days after its decision is made known.  Before submitting the judgment or order, the 
party drafting it shall seek to secure the written approval as to form of the 
other parties.  
If, within 10 days, approval as to form is not obtained, the party 
drafting the form of judgment or order may forward the original to the court and 
serve a copy on the other parties with a notice advising objections must be made 
within 10 days.  
If no written objection is timely filed, the court may sign the judgment 
or order.  If 
objection is filed, the court will resolve the matter with or without a 
hearing.  A 
party objecting shall submit an alternative form of judgment or order with the 
objection.

            
(b)  Form and entry. -- Subject to the provisions of Rule 
54(b), in all cases, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the form of the 
judgment or order and direct that it be entered by the clerk.  Every judgment 
shall be set forth on a separate document, shall be identified as such, and may 
include findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The names of all parties shall be set out in 
the caption of all final orders, judgments and decrees.  All judgments and 
orders must be entered on the journal of the court and specify clearly the 
relief granted or order made in the action.

            
(c)  Time of entry. -- A judgment or final order shall be 
deemed to be entered whenever a form of such judgment or final order, signed by 
the trial judge, is filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which the 
case is pending.  
Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed, nor the time for appeal 
extended, in order to tax costs or award fees, except that, when a timely motion 
for attorney's fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the court, before the appellate 
court acquires jurisdiction, may order that the motion have the same effect on 
the time for appeal for all parties as a timely motion under Rule 
59.