Title: EKLUND v. PRI ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EKLUND v. PRI ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.2001 WY 5525 P.3d 511Case Number: 00-51, 00-52Decided: 06/14/2001
 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

RANDY 
EKLUND,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

PRI 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.,

a 
Wyoming corporation,

Appellee(Defendant).

 

FARMERS 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

Appellant(Defendant 
in Intervention),

 

v.

 

PRI 
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.,

a 
Wyoming corporation,

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant Randy Eklund: 

            
Les Bowron of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. Bowron.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Brett 
Marshall Godfrey of Godfrey & Associates, PC, Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Godfrey.

 Representing 
Appellant Farmers Insurance Exchange: 

James D. 
Bramer and Blair J. Trautwein of Wick Campbell Bramer Ukasick & Trautwein, 
LLC, Fort Collins, CO.  Argument by 
Mr. Trautwein.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  
            
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      Randy Eklund 
(Eklund) was injured when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was rear-ended 
by a vehicle driven by a co-worker, Terry Tebben (Tebben).  The district court concluded that the 
co-worker was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident and granted the employer's, PRI Environmental, Inc.'s (PRI), motion for 
summary judgment on Eklund's claim of vicarious liability on the theory of 
respondeat superior.  Eklund 
also contends that a prior settlement entered into between PRI and the driver of 
Eklund's vehicle constituted collateral estoppel on the issue of whether the 
co-worker was acting within the scope of his employment.  Eklund appeals the grant of PRI's motion 
for summary judgment and the district court's refusal to apply the doctrine of 
issue preclusion to the question of Tebben's employment status.  We affirm.

 

[¶2]      Eklund presents 
the following statement of the issues:

1.                  
The 
District Court committed reversible error by granting Defendant, PRI 
Environmental, summary judgment in the face of clearly defined genuine issues of 
material fact on the issue of Defendant Tebben's employment status at the time 
of the accident.

 

2.                  
The 
District Court committed reversible error by granting Defendant, PRI 
Environmental, summary judgment when Plaintiff's own Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment demonstrated that PRI was barred and should have been estopped, as a 
matter of law, from relitigating the issue of Defendant Tebben's employment 
status at the time of the accident.

 

Intervenor/Appellant 
Farmers Insurance Exchange addresses only one of the 
issues:

Did the 
trial court err in granting summary judgment to defendant PRI Environmental, 
Inc. on the issue of respondeat superior?

 

Appellee 
PRI also presents the matter on appeal in the form of a single 
issue:

Did the District Court err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of PRI where all of Plaintiff's damages were 
alleged to have arisen out of an automobile accident involving Plaintiff and an 
employee of PRI, Terry Tebben, who had, at the time of the accident, "clocked 
out" at the end of the work day on Friday afternoon and would not return to 
employment-related activities until the following Monday 
morning?

 

[¶3]      Tebben was 
employed by PRI as a health and safety officer.  As part of his duties, Tebben was 
required to purchase parts in Casper and deliver them to PRI's work site.  Although Tebben used his personal truck 
to transport these parts, PRI compensated him by purchasing gasoline, new tires, 
an engine block, and overloads for the shock absorbers for the 
vehicle.

 

[¶4]      On Friday, 
October 21, 1994, just before quitting time at 5:30 p.m., Tebben picked up a 
list of parts needed for the following Monday.  Tebben was specifically instructed to 
purchase the parts on Monday morning before reporting back to the work 
site.  With the list in hand, Tebben 
left work for his home in Casper.

 

[¶5]      In order to reach 
a public highway, PRI employees had to travel on a long, narrow and curvy dirt 
road.  On the day in question, 
visibility on the road was hindered by glare from the setting sun and dust 
kicked up by moving vehicles.  
Traveling ahead of Tebben on the road were PRI employees Eklund and 
Warren Ash (Ash).  Eklund and Ash 
normally waited until Tebben had left the work site before leaving themselves 
because they were concerned about Tebben's driving habits.  At some point, Ash stopped on the road 
apparently to determine whether Tebben would take a shortcut or continue along 
the road.  Tebben collided with the 
Ash vehicle causing physical injury to all three.

 

[¶6]      Two separate 
litigations arose from the accident.  
In the first, Ash sued Tebben for his injuries.  After an unsuccessful attempt by Tebben 
to implead PRI as a third-party defendant, Ash filed an amended complaint adding 
a claim against PRI based on a theory of respondeat superior.  Ash and PRI apparently reached a 
settlement, and the district court granted a joint motion to dismiss the 
complaint against PRI.

 

[¶7]      Subsequently, 
Eklund filed this action against Tebben and PRI. Eklund claimed Tebben was 
negligent in driving his vehicle and that PRI was liable for his damages caused 
by Tebben's actions under the theory of respondeat superior.  Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), 
which provided insurance to Eklund through the underinsured motorist coverage of 
Ash's automobile insurance policy, intervened in the 
action.

 

[¶8]      PRI and Eklund 
filed competing motions for summary judgment.  PRI argued that Tebben was on his way 
home at the time of the accident, so there was no genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Tebben was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of 
the accident.  Eklund's motion for 
partial summary judgment was based on the settlement PRI reached with Ash in the 
first litigation.  Eklund contended 
that by settling in favor of Ash, the question of whether Tebben was acting in 
the scope of his employment was necessarily decided in the positive and, as a 
consequence, PRI was precluded from relitigating the 
issue.

 

[¶9]      On November 23, 
1999, the district court denied Eklund's motion for partial summary judgment and 
granted PRI's motion for summary judgment.  
The denial of Eklund's motion was predicated on the district court's 
conclusion that the issue of Tebben's employment status at the time the accident 
occurred was not necessarily decided in the prior adjudication.  The district court granted PRI's motion 
on the basis that at the time of the accident, Tebben was simply leaving the job 
site after work and did not have to return with the parts until Monday 
morning.  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the facts 
was that Tebben was not acting in the course of his employment when the accident 
happened.  Eklund now 
appeals.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶10]   Our standard for reviewing a 
summary judgment is well established:

 

Summary judgment is appropriate when 
no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for Platte 
County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995); see also 
W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense which has been asserted by the parties. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995).  We 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.  Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of 
Los Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo. 1995).  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were 
employed and used by the lower court.  
Adkins, 892 P.2d  at 130.  
We do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on 
issues of law.  Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 406.

 

            
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for a summary judgment.  If the movant carries this burden, the 
party opposing the summary judgment must come forward with specific facts to 
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.  Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 1992).  General allegations and conclusory 
statements are not sufficient.  
Board of County Comm'rs of County of Laramie v. Laramie County Sch. 
Dist. Number One, 884 P.2d 946, 956 (Wyo. 1994).

 

Bachmeier v. Hoffman, 1 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Eklund and Farmers argue that the 
district court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact in dispute on whether Tebben was acting in the scope of his employment at 
the time of the accident.  They 
argue that there is evidence suggesting that Tebben was engaging in a "dual 
purpose."  They note that Tebben had 
been given a parts list at the end of the work period on Friday and was told to 
return to the job site on Monday with those parts.  In addition, they point out that Tebben 
was compensated for performing this service through the improvements to his 
vehicle and the gasoline for which PRI paid.  Thus, their position is that Tebben's 
traveling to Casper was based, at least in part, on a purpose in furtherance of 
his employer's business.

 

[¶12]   Pursuant to the theory of vicarious 
liability or respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligent 
acts of an employee who is acting within the scope of his employment.  Hamilton v. Natrona County Education 
Association, 901 P.2d 381, 385 (Wyo. 1995); see also, Miller v. 
Reiman-Wuerth Company, 598 P.2d 20, 22-23 (Wyo. 1979); and Combined 
Insurance Company of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Wyo. 
1978).  An employee is acting within 
the scope of his employment if, at the time of the alleged negligent act or 
omission, the activity in which he was engaged was: (1) activated in part by a 
purpose to serve the employer; (2) done with the intention to perform it as a 
part of or incident to a service on account of which the employee is employed; 
and (3) performed to further the business interests of the employer in some 
part.  Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 735 (Wyo. 1980).  An 
employee "will be held to be within the scope of his employment when the 
employee is engaged in an activity which has a multiple purpose, and it is 
sufficient that one of the purposes is employment-related."  Combined Insurance Company of 
America, 584 P.2d  at 1041.  
Whether or not an employee is within the scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident is ordinarily a factual question for the jury.  Miller, 598 P.2d  at 23; 
Combined Insurance Company of America, 584 P.2d  at 1041.  It becomes a question of law only when 
but one reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts.  Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 385; 
Miller, 598 P.2d  at 23.

 

[¶13]   The record in this case supports 
but one reasonable inference:  
Tebben was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of 
the accident.  In his deposition1, Tebben gave the following 
testimony:

 

Q:        When 
you say "we get off," what do you mean?

A:        We 
work ten hours a day, and at 5:30 the day was over unless there was work to be 
finished up, overtime over the 5:30.

Q:        When 
you say "the day was over," does that mean you're no longer on the 
clock?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        And 
when you're no longer on the clock, your time is yours?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        Where 
were you headed at the time you left the worksite?

A:        
Home.

Q:        What 
was the name of that worksite?

A:        Gas 
Hills project.

Q:        Now, 
as of 5:31 p.m., could you have gone anywhere in the world you 
wanted?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        And 
that would include, assuming finances permit, any destination on the 
planet?

A:        
Assuming finances permit.

Q:        And 
there was no one directing your actions or telling you what to 
do?

A:        
No.

Q:        And 
did something specific happen at 5:30 p.m.?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        What 
was that thing that happened?

A:        I was 
called back in to pick up a list of parts that I was requested to bring back out 
Monday morning with me.

Q:        Were 
you told where to purchase the parts?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        Were 
you told specifically when to purchase the parts?

A:        
Monday morning.

Q:        And 
if you had not been given that assignment, would it have been your schedule to 
return to work Monday morning at the Gas Hills site?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        So by 
instructing you to purchase parts Monday morning, they were telling you to do a 
thing that would have been on the clock for you, in any event, regardless of the 
assignment.  
Correct?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        They 
did not expect you  and when we talk about "they," telling you to do this or 
that, we're talking about your employer?

A:        
Yes.

Q:        And 
your employer at that time was whom [sic]?

A:        
PRI.

Q:        So 
PRI told you once you were back on the clock on Monday morning, then after that 
you would purchase parts to bring back to the worksite. 
Correct?

A:        
Yes.

 

Tebben's uncontradicted testimony is 
that he was returning home at the time of the accident and that he was 
specifically instructed to purchase the parts on Monday morning.  There is no evidence that, in leaving 
the job site, Tebben's actions were in any way motivated by a purpose intended 
to serve his employer.  Any links 
between Tebben leaving the work site on Friday with his employment duty to 
purchase and deliver parts to the job site on Monday morning are tenuous, at 
best.  The mere fact that PRI 
previously paid for improvements to Tebben's personal vehicle and that he was 
given a list of parts on Friday to purchase on Monday is not sufficient to 
create a link between Tebben's employment and his actions on the day of the 
accident.  See Beard, 616 P.2d  at 736 ("The mere fact that an employee is remunerated or paid by employers 
for time traveling to and from work does not place that employee within the 
"scope of employment" rule in a negligence case.").  There is nothing to distinguish Tebben's 
trip home on Friday afternoon with any other trip he could have made over the 
course of the weekend prior to Monday morning.  Thus, if one were to accept Eklund's and 
Farmers' position and take it to its logical extreme, we would have to conclude 
that at all times during the course of that weekend Tebben would be acting 
within the scope of his employment.  
Such a conclusion would distort the concept beyond all reasonable 
meaning.  If the accident had 
occurred on Monday morning between Tebben's residence and the parts store, then 
there would be a reasonable inference that Tebben was acting on the behest of 
his employer.  However, that simply 
is not the factual scenario before us.  
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts of this case is 
that Tebben was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident.

 

[¶14]   Eklund also contends that PRI is 
barred by consideration of the doctrines of preclusion from contesting whether 
Tebben was acting within the scope of his employment.  PRI reached a settlement with Ash, the 
driver of the vehicle in which Eklund was a passenger, in a prior 
litigation.  The court in that 
matter granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss with prejudice Ash's claims 
against PRI.  Eklund asserts that 
the settlement in the Ash litigation constitutes a valid, final determination on 
the merits in which PRI had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all 
issues.  Since Tebben's status as an 
employee acting within the scope of his employment was a necessary prerequisite 
to any liability on the part of PRI, Eklund concludes that PRI is precluded from 
re-arguing the contrary.

 

[¶15]   Res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are related but distinct concepts.  Res judicata bars the relitigation of 
previously litigated claims or causes of 
action.  Slavens v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 1993).  Four factors are examined to determine 
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies:  (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in 
subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; 
and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the 
subject matter and the issues between them.  Id.  Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of 
previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four 
similar factors:  (1) whether the 
issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented 
in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment 
on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.  Id.

 

[¶16]   The proper doctrine for our 
consideration is collateral estoppel.  
As noted, res judicata applies to claims or causes of action.  The prior adjudication involved a claim 
by Ash against PRI, while this action concerns a claim by Eklund against 
PRI.  While the two proceedings 
arose out of the same incident and involve the same defendant, they are clearly 
separate claims arising out of injuries personal to each plaintiff.  The question Eklund has raised relates 
to the issue of whether Tebben was acting within the scope of his 
employment at the time of his alleged negligent act.  Eklund posits that consent decrees, 
settlements, and voluntary dismissals constitute a "judgment on the 
merits."  Eklund argues that an 
admission by PRI that Tebben was acting within the scope of his employment is a 
necessary predicate of the settlement with Ash and, accordingly, PRI is 
precluded from contesting the issue in this litigation.  

 

[¶17]   We have considered consent 
judgments and dismissals with prejudice to be the equivalent of a judgment on 
the merits for purposes of res judicata.  
In CLS v. CLJ, 693 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1985), the appellant failed to 
appear at trial, and his suit to establish paternity was dismissed with 
prejudice pursuant to W.R.C.P. 41(b).  
A second suit raising the same claim was subsequently filed.  We held that the appellant was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same claim because an involuntary 
dismissal under Rule 41(b) operated as an adjudication of the merits.  693 P.2d  at 777.

 

[¶18]   In Day v. Davidson, 951 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1997), Day had filed an action based on vicarious liability against 
Pamida, Inc. based on the negligent acts of one of its employees.  Day accepted an offer of judgment from 
Pamida and then subsequently filed an action against the employee based on the 
negligent act underlying the vicarious liability claim.  We held that Day could not bring a 
subsequent action against the employee based on the fact that, as a vicarious 
liability situation, the employee was entitled to be credited with the amount of 
the judgment entered against his employer leaving Day with nothing to recover 
from the employee.  951 P.2d  at 
383.  While not directly implicating 
the doctrine of res judicata, Day, like CLS, concerned the same 
claim brought by the same plaintiff.

 

[¶19]   The application of res judicata to 
those situations where a plaintiff attempts to bring the same claim in a 
subsequent action against the same or different defendants has a logical 
basis:  It encourages resolution of 
the plaintiff's claims in a single action, and it forces parties to abide by 
their agreements.  The other cases 
cited by Eklund in his brief also concern the application of res judicata to 
consent judgments and settlements.  
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 451 P.2d 730 (Alaska 1969); Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235 
(10th Cir. 1992); and In re Vern O. Laing, 31 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1994).  We are not, however, dealing with res 
judicata in this case, but rather, with collateral 
estoppel.

 

[¶20]   We have never addressed the effect 
of collateral estoppel on settlements or consent judgments.  Other authorities have set forth the 
rule as follows:

 

Issue preclusion does not attach 
unless it is clearly shown that the parties intended that the issue be 
foreclosed in other litigation.

. . . .

. . . In most circumstances, it is 
recognized that consent agreements ordinarily are intended to preclude any 
further litigation on the claim presented but are not intended to preclude 
further litigation on any of the issues presented.  Thus consent judgments ordinarily 
support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion.

 

18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 
4443, at 382-85 (1981) (emphasis added).  
See also, Linder v. Missoula County, 824 P.2d 1004, 1006-07 (Mont. 
1992); and Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 385 
(N.D. 1992).  The logic behind not 
applying collateral estoppel to settlements and consent judgments absent an 
expressed intention of the parties to be bound in further proceedings is quite 
obvious:  Application of the 
doctrine absent an intent to be bound in subsequent proceedings would act as a 
deterrent to voluntary settlements.  
If, by settling one lawsuit, a party forsakes the right to challenge all 
issues at stake in any future litigation, then the incentive to settle short of 
trial is reduced.

 

[¶21]   Turning to the case before us, we 
conclude that there is no evidence that PRI intended to be foreclosed from 
contesting any issue before the court in the Ash litigation in any subsequent 
proceedings.  The record before us 
simply consists of a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice and the order 
signed by the district court granting the motion.  There is nothing in the motion or order 
suggesting that PRI was foregoing its right to contest the issue of whether 
Tebben was acting in the course of his employment in any other proceedings.  Absent such evidence, we conclude that 
the district court was correct in not applying the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel in this case.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶22]   Under the facts of this case, 
the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that Tebben was not acting within 
the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.  Therefore, the district court did not 
err in granting PRI's motion for summary judgment.  Nor did the court err in denying 
Eklund's claim that PRI was precluded from contesting the issue of Tebben's 
employment status because the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not applicable 
without evidence that PRI intended to be bound on the issue through its 
settlement in a prior adjudication.

 

[¶23]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1In addition to his deposition, the 
only other piece of evidence before the district court was an affidavit filed by 
Tebben.  The affidavit does not 
contain any new information nor does it materially differ from the 
deposition.