Title: Calloway v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Tracy Trinette CALLOWAY v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-398                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 9, 1997


1.   Jury -- instructions -- use of model instruction over non-
     model -- considerations on review. -- In reviewing the trial
     court's decision to use a model jury instruction over a non-
     model instruction, the supreme court has held that the trial
     court should not use a non-model instruction unless there is
     a finding that the model instruction does not accurately
     reflect the law. 

2.   Jury -- instructions -- argument that AMCI 2d 401 should be
     altered to reflect that mere presence not enough to establish
     accomplice lability specifically rejected. -- The supreme
     court has specifically rejected the argument that AMCI 2d 401
     should be altered to reflect that mere presence is not enough
     to establish accomplice liability; in order to prove that a
     person is an accomplice under AMCI 2d 401, one must prove that
     the defendant was engaged in activity which aided in the
     commission of the crime and, thus, was not merely present; if
     the State proves that a person was present when a crime was
     committed but does not further prove beyond a reasonable doubt
     that person in some way participated in the crime, the State
     has not met its burden; it would be redundant for the trial
     court to instruct the jury on what does not give rise to
     accomplice liability in addition to what does.
3.   Jury -- instructions -- attempt by appellant to distinguish
     case meritless -- argument overlooked recent decision. --
     Appellant's attempt to distinguish Webb v. State, 326 Ark.
     878, 395 S.W.2d 250 (1996), by contending that the supreme
     court found that the facts in Webb did not support a "mere
     presence" instruction was meritless where appellant failed to
     acknowledge the more recent decision in Williams v. State, 326
     Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997), where the court specifically
     stated that Webb rejected the requirement of a "mere presence"
     jury instruction; both Williams and Webb held that AMCI 2d 401
     accurately and completely reflects the law of accomplice
     liability. 

4.   Mistrial -- extreme remedy -- when mistrial should be
     declared. -- A mistrial is such an extreme remedy that it
     should not be used unless there has been error so prejudicial
     that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial or when
     the fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been
     manifestly affected; a mistrial should only be declared when
     an admonition to the jury would be ineffective; the trial
     court is given broad discretion to control counsel in closing
     arguments and the supreme court will not disturb the trial
     court's decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion;
     remarks that require a reversal are rare and require an appeal
     to the jurors' passions.
5.   Trial -- use of improper closing remarks by one party -- other
     party may respond in kind. -- The supreme court has recognized
     that when one party uses improper closing remarks the other
     party may respond with what would ordinarily be improper
     remarks.

6.   Trial -- defense counsel invited prosecutor's closing remarks
     -- trial court immediately admonished jury -- no abuse of
     discretion found. -- Where the trial court made a specific
     finding that defense counsel had "invited" the prosecutor's
     rebuttal by questioning the integrity of the prosecutor in
     closing argument, and the prosecutor's rebuttal sought to
     correct any inference that she told the witness to lie, the
     prosecutor was properly allowed to counter any suggestion of
     suborning perjury; furthermore, the trial court immediately
     sustained defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's
     injecting personalities into her argument and immediately
     admonished the jury to that effect, thereby curing any
     potential prejudice; having observed the argument first hand,
     the trial court was in the best position to determine if there
     was prejudice; no abuse of discretion was found.

7.   Trial -- closing arguments -- trial court has broad discretion
     to control. -- The trial court is given broad discretion to
     control counsel in closing arguments, and the supreme court
     will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a manifest
     abuse of discretion.

8.   Trial -- denial of defense counsel's request for surrebuttal
     argument not abuse of discretion -- prosecutor's arguments
     were logical and permissible. -- Defense counsel's motion for
     a surrebuttal argument was properly denied where defense
     counsel could have objected to any misstatements made by the
     prosecutor in her rebuttal argument, and the prosecutor's
     arguments were logical inferences based on the testimony of
     the witnesses; it is logical to conclude that if a defendant
     testifies in a manner that completely contradicts a witness's
     testimony, there is an implication that the defendant is
     saying the witness is lying; this easily falls within the
     confines of permissible argument; there was no abuse of
     discretion in refusing to grant surrebuttal argument.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; John W. Langston, Judge;
affirmed.
     Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Kelly Terry, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This appeal arises out of the murders of three children in
Little Rock and the attempted murder of their mother.  The
appellant, Tracy Trinette Calloway,  was convicted of three counts
of murder in the first degree and one count of criminal attempt to
commit murder in the first degree.  She was sentenced to a total
term in prison of 132 years.  Her appeal raises three issues: (1)
the propriety of a non-model jury instruction on accomplice
liability, (2) the prosecutor's placing her own character at issue
in closing argument, and (3) the trial court's discretion in
refusing to grant defense counsel surrebuttal argument following
the prosecutor's rebuttal argument.  We affirm the judgments of
conviction.
     On June 4, 1995, Riley Dobi Noel, Terry Carroll, Curtis
Cochran, and Tracy Calloway were riding in Little Rock in Cochran's
car and, according to Calloway, "getting high" on drugs.  They went
to the home of Mary Hussian, where Calloway got out of the car and
followed Noel and Carroll to the house.  Just before they entered
the house, Noel handed her a handgun, and she testified that she
returned it immediately.  Noel burst into the house, and Calloway
followed, stopping just inside the doorway.  Noel told three
children in the residence to get down on the floor, and Calloway
testified that she told them to do what Noel said.  She watched
Noel shoot each of the children in the head and kill them.  The
victims were Malak Hussian, age 10; Mustafa Hussian, age 12; and
Marcel Young, age 17.  According to Curtis Cochran, the murders
were in retaliation for Yashica Young's involvement in the death of
Noel's brother.  Yashica Young was another child of Mary Hussian. 
Following the murders, Calloway testified that she ran from the
house with Carroll.
     On June 6, 1995, the Little Rock Police Department focused its
investigation on a search of Calloway's neighborhood in an effort
to locate a suspect named "Tracy," and Calloway surrendered herself
to police officers that same day.  Calloway gave a full statement
indicating that she was with the young men at the time of the
murders but stating that she was not aware of an intention to
commit the killings.
     At trial, the prosecutor's theory of the case against Calloway
was one of accomplice liability.  Calloway's defense was that she
did not know what Noel and Carroll intended to do at the Hussian
house and that she did not assist them in any way in the commission
of the murders.  The prosecutor presented testimony from Curtis
Cochran, who was driving the vehicle that day.  Cochran testified
that everyone in the car knew where they were going and what Noel
intended to do because Noel announced it in the car.  According to
Cochran, Noel gave Calloway a .45 caliber handgun while they were
in the car, and she still had it when they went to the Hussian
house.
     Jack Thomas, a neighbor of the victim, also testified for the
State and stated that he saw Calloway run from the Hussian house
and that it appeared as though she was carrying a gun.  Kyle Jones
testified that he arrived at the Hussian residence with his
fiancée, Marcel Young, and saw three people standing in the
carport: Noel, Cochran, and Calloway.  The threesome asked Marcel
and Kyle if Yashica Young was home, and Kyle said that he would
check.  Kyle and Marcel entered the house, and Kyle went to the
back of the home to tell Marcel's mother, Mary Hussian, that they
were home.  He heard someone burst in through the front of the
house and heard Marcel scream.  Kyle and Mary Hussian ran toward
the front of the house and were intercepted by Carroll, who was
carrying a shotgun.  They retreated to the bedroom.  Kyle went into
the bathroom and closed the door.  Mary Hussian hid behind the bed
and dialed 911.  Kyle testified that he heard three shots come from
the front room and that he heard the shotgun blast in the bedroom
just before he escaped through the window.  Kyle eventually came
back to the house and told police officers what he had seen.
     Mary Hussian told the same story to the jury as Kyle did.  She
testified that when she hid behind the bed to call 911, Carroll
yelled for her to come out from behind the bed.  She pleaded with
him not to kill her or her children.  She eventually rushed
Carroll, and they fought for control of the shotgun.  The shotgun
discharged in the struggle, and the shot went through the roof. 
Mary Hussian gained control of the gun and chased Carroll back
through the house, where she saw her three murdered children lying
on the floor.  Carroll left through the front door.  Mary Hussian
saw three people in the house, but could only identify Carroll and
Noel and not Calloway.
     The State also contended at trial that Calloway's original
statement to the Little Rock police officers and her trial
testimony were in conflict.  She first told police officers that
she was in the car and that Cochran and she picked up Carroll and
Noel, but at trial she testified that the threesome picked her up
to give her a ride home.  She also testified at trial that she did
not see any guns in the car until the group was about to go into
the Hussian house.  However, it was established at trial that two
weapons were used at the murder scene -- a .45 caliber pistol and
a shotgun.  Calloway admitted that Carroll was in the back seat of
the two-door car with her but maintained that she did not see the
shotgun.
     The jury convicted Calloway of the four charges and
subsequently sentenced her as stated above.
     Calloway's first assignment of error is that the trial court
used a model jury instruction, AMCI 2d 401, instead of the amended
AMCI 2d 401 proffered by her.  AMCI 2d 401, which was given to the
jury, reads as follows:
          In this case, the State does not contend that Tracy
     Calloway acted alone in the commission of the offenses of
     Capital Murder and Criminal Attempt to Commit Capital
     Murder.  A person is criminally responsible for the
     conduct of another person when she is an accomplice in
     the commission of an offense.
          An accomplice is one who directly participates in
     the commission of an offense or when causing a particular
     result is an element of an offense, acting with respect
     to that result with the kind of culpability sufficient
     for the commission of that offense, she:
          Solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other
     person to engage in that conduct causing the result; or
     aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person
     in planning of the conduct causing the result.
     Calloway sought to add the following language relating to
"mere presence:"
          Mere presence, acquiescence, silence or knowledge
     that a crime is being committed, in the absence of a
     legal duty to act, is not sufficient to make one an
     accomplice.
The language was refused, and defense counsel proffered the amended
instruction for the record.
     In reviewing the trial court's decision to use a model jury
instruction over a non-model instruction, this court has held that
the trial court should not use a non-model instruction unless there
is a finding that the model instruction does not accurately reflect
the law.  See Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997);
Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408,