Title: Commonwealth v. Amran

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11686 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ASIM AMRAN. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 6, 2015. - April 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Photograph, Inflammatory evidence.  Jury 
and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Mistrial, 
Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel, Jury and 
jurors, Deliberation of jury, Voir dire. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 20, 2009. 
 
 
The case was tried before Janet Kenton-Walker, J. 
 
 
 
Leslie W. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Stephen J. Carley, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant was convicted of killing his wife 
with deliberate premeditation.  On appeal he alleges error in 
(1) the admission of photographs prejudicially depicting the 
victim's body in an advanced state of decomposition, and lacking 
any relevance to any issue at trial; (2) the failure to grant a 
mistrial after the medical examiner testified that the victim's 
2 
 
death was a homicide, when the defense was that it was a 
suicide; (3) the admission of the defendant's statement to 
police with no redactions of (i) inadmissible accusations by 
police, (ii) assertions that police had inculpatory evidence 
that was not presented to the jury, and (iii) hearsay; and (4) 
the failure to conduct a voir dire of jurors after at least one 
juror had been exposed to prejudicial extraneous material.  We 
affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our powers under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  We reserve additional details for discussion of 
particular issues.  The defendant and the victim were married in 
Pakistan in 2003 or 2004.  The marriage was arranged by the 
defendant's family.  Shortly after the marriage, the defendant, 
an American citizen, returned to the United States with the 
victim.  She spoke no English and did not drive.  She was 
entirely dependent on the defendant's family for companionship 
and transportation.  The couple had a son with whom the victim 
was very close. 
 
The couple came under stress after the defendant lost a 
lucrative job.  They began arguing and discussed separating.  In 
2008, their financial circumstances forced them to move to an 
apartment owned by the defendant's parents in Fitchburg.  That 
year the defendant obtained employment as a staff nurse at a 
3 
 
nursing home in Tewksbury.  One of his responsibilities included 
administering medications, including morphine, to residents of 
the nursing home.  The system used by the nursing home to 
account for medicating residents did not track the actual 
administration of the medications.  That is, it did not account 
for a staff member who kept the medication rather than give it 
to the resident. 
 
During the fall of 2008 the defendant met a woman, Sara, at 
a Worcester nightclub.  After about one month they started a 
relationship.  He occasionally stayed at her apartment, and he 
began supporting her.  The defendant's wife learned of his 
affair, and their marriage further deteriorated.  She confided 
in her sister-in-law, with whom she was close, often crying, and 
expressing feelings of depression and a desire to take her own 
life.  She contacted a homeopathic doctor in Virginia. 
 
On December 31, 2008, Sara told the defendant that he had 
to choose between her and the victim by the end of that day.  He 
went home, where he and the victim argued.  After, he left and 
took their three year old son with him.  They went to Sara's 
apartment.  He told Sara, who had a young son of her own, 
"That's your son.  You have two kids now."  The defendant stayed 
at Sara's apartment that night.  When she awoke he was gone.  
She reached him by telephone.  He told her the victim was drunk 
and he was taking care of her.  At about noon Sara again 
4 
 
telephoned him.  He said he was on his way, but it would take 
some time because of a bad storm.  He arrived at Sara's 
apartment at about 4:30 P.M.  The defendant said the victim had 
gone to his aunt's house in Virginia. 
 
On January 2 or 3, 2009, one of the defendant's brothers 
learned that the victim was missing.  Some of her relatives had 
been concerned and tried unsuccessfully to contact her.  The 
defendant's brother went to the defendant's and victim's 
apartment and saw "a lot of stuff moved around."  On January 4 a 
Fitchburg police detective went to the defendant's apartment to 
investigate a missing persons report concerning the defendant's 
wife and son.  He noticed the apartment was neat, with the 
exception of the den, which was in total disarray.  The 
detective asked the defendant to come to the police station for 
an interview.  Later that day the defendant went to the 
Fitchburg police station with his son.  He told the detective he 
and his wife were constantly arguing, and she had left him.  He 
said she had gone to Virginia. 
 
The defendant gave several inconsistent accounts of his 
wife's absence to various people.  He told one brother she had 
moved to Florida and he would join her in the near future.  He 
told another brother that she disappeared and he had no idea 
where she was.  He told an investigator with the Department of 
Children and Families that his wife had left him for another man 
5 
 
around January 1 and her family suspected she was in Virginia.  
The victim's family tried for months to locate her.  The State 
police became involved, and that investigation also lasted 
months. 
 
Sara repeatedly questioned the defendant about the victim.  
He eventually told her that he caused the victim to become 
unconscious, then cut her, and put her in a suitcase.  He showed 
Sara the traffic rotary in Oxford where he had disposed of the 
body.  On August 17, 2009, Sara spoke with police and showed 
them where the defendant had disposed of the victim's body.  
Police recovered the body from the bottom of an embankment. 
 
An autopsy revealed that the victim's remains were in an 
advanced state of decomposition.  There was no evidence of 
trauma to the body, but laboratory results indicated the 
presence of morphine.  The precise cause of death could not be 
determined due to the extent of decomposition, but there was 
still sufficient morphine to cause death. 
 
On August 20, 2009, police executed a search warrant at the 
defendant's apartment in Fitchburg.  Various medications and 
pills were seized, including three tablets containing morphine.  
The defendant was arrested.  On September 17, 2009, the 
defendant telephoned Sara from the jail where he was being held.  
He instructed her to contact one of his brothers, who had a 
letter for her.  Police searched the brother's home and 
6 
 
retrieved a letter purporting to be Sara's confession, 
describing how she had poisoned the victim with morphine.  The 
letter was in the defendant's handwriting.  He had instructed 
his brother to have Sara copy it in her handwriting. 
 
The defendant testified at trial.  He described the 
deterioration of his marriage and his relationship with Sara.  
He testified that on the morning of December 31, 2008, his wife 
was asleep and there were empty pill bottles in their apartment.  
When he checked on her later, she had died.  He tried 
unsuccessfully to revive her.  He did not call for help because 
he believed he would be suspected of causing his wife's death, 
citing the facts that he was a cheating husband, a former 
Marine, and a nurse.  He brought his son to Sara's apartment.  
He testified that he told Sara what happened and they discussed 
the need to get rid of the victim's body.  He returned to his 
apartment, wrapped the victim's body in plastic, and placed it 
in a suitcase.  He drove to Oxford and threw the body over the 
side of a road.  The defendant said he had lied to police 
because he thought they would not believe the truth.  The 
defendant said that he wrote the letter for Sara to copy before 
he received the autopsy report, and only guessed as to what 
drugs were in the victim's body. 
 
2.  Photographs of the victim's body.  The defendant argues 
that the admission in evidence of two postmortem photographs of 
7 
 
the victim's body in an advanced state of decomposition was 
prejudicial, with no offsetting probative value related to any 
issue in the case.  One of the photographs depicts the body as 
it was found in a suitcase, in a fetal position wrapped in 
plastic.  The other photograph depicts the body on the autopsy 
table.  The defendant objected, so we review under the 
prejudicial error standard.  See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 
Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  "The question whether the inflammatory 
quality of a photograph outweighs its probative value and 
precludes its admission is determined in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 Mass. 1, 12 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. DeSouza, 428 Mass. 667, 670 (1999). 
 
The resolution of this issue is controlled by Commonwealth 
v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 366-367 (1985), cert. denied, 477 
U.S. 904 (1986).  In that case, we affirmed the admission of 
similar photographs, reasoning that "the state in which the body 
was found, bound into a position [and wrapped in a plastic bag] 
which would best effectuate transportation and concealment, as 
well as its advanced state of decomposition, was evidence of 
malice and consciousness of guilt and thus probative of guilt.  
Moreover, the pictures were relevant to assist the jury in 
understanding the pathologist's testimony, particularly as to 
the fact that the decomposition prevented establishing precise 
cause and time of death."  Id. 
8 
 
 
The judge took measures to mitigate any potential prejudice 
from the two photographs by alerting the venire during jury 
selection that graphic photographs might be admitted in 
evidence, and she asked potential jurors if that might cause 
anyone particular difficulty.  She excused potential jurors who 
responded affirmatively.  The judge prohibited the Commonwealth 
from displaying the photographs on a high-resolution video 
screen, and invited jurors who did not wish to view the 
photographs to pass them along.  She cautioned the jury four 
times that the photographs were only to be considered for 
"clinical" and "medical issues," "the nature of the injuries, or 
the nature of the incident itself," and not "to evoke sympathy 
or emotion" for the deceased.  She also limited the Commonwealth 
to two postmortem photographs.  The judge proceeded with the 
degree of care and special attention that we have recommended 
for the admission of such photographs.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 432 (2001); Commonwealth v. 
Vizcarrondo, 431 Mass. 360, 362-363 & n.2 (2000); Nadworny, 396 
Mass. at 367.  There was no abuse of discretion. 
 
3.  Motion for mistrial.  Defense counsel filed a motion in 
limine that sought to prevent the medical examiner from 
testifying, as he had before the grand jury, that the cause of 
death was "homicide, poisoned by another, [and] homicidal 
violence."  The prosecutor had argued that the medical examiner 
9 
 
at least should be permitted to testify that in his opinion the 
victim was "poisoned by another."  The judge expressed doubt 
that "poisoned by another" would be admissible, but she allowed 
for the possibility that an opinion as to "morphine poisoning" 
might be admissible.  She deferred action on the motion until 
she heard the medical examiner's testimony as it developed.  At 
trial, when asked for his opinion as to cause of death, the 
medical examiner said "homicidal violence."  Defense counsel 
immediately objected and moved for a mistrial.  There was no 
suggestion that the prosecutor knowingly elicited that opinion.  
The judge denied the motion for a mistrial but said she would 
strike the answer and give a curative instruction to the effect 
that the doctor's answer was beyond his area of expertise and 
must be disregarded.  Trial counsel did not object, and 
indicated that the judge's proposed curative instruction was 
acceptable. 
 
The judge instructed the jury immediately after the sidebar 
conference that the doctor's answer with respect to "homicide" 
was struck and that they must disregard it.  She explained that 
the doctor was qualified to give an opinion as to the cause of 
death in medical terms, but he could not testify that the 
victim's death was a homicide.  She further explained that the 
method by which death occurred was a question reserved for the 
jury.  The defendant did not object to the curative instruction 
10 
 
or request any further instruction.  The defendant now argues 
that the curative instruction was inadequate to cure the 
prejudice interjected by the medical examiner, and that the 
judge abused her discretion in denying the motion for a 
mistrial. 
 
"A trial judge retains broad discretion in deciding whether 
to declare a mistrial, and this court should defer to that 
judge's determination of whether [there was] prejudicial error, 
how much any such error infected the trial, and whether it was 
possible to correct that error through instruction to the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 157 (1999).  This court 
has said that the term "homicide" implies no liability in law.  
See Commonwealth v. Lannon, 364 Mass. 480, 483 (1974).  However, 
its use by the medical examiner here, particularly where the 
defense was suicide, probably created the impression that death 
was brought about by criminal means.  This was an impermissible 
expression of opinion that intruded on the function of the jury.  
See id. at 483-484.  A trial judge is in the best position to 
determine whether a mistrial, an extreme measure available to a 
trial judge to address error, is necessary, or whether a less 
drastic measure, such as a curative instruction, is adequate.  
See Commonwealth v. Costa, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 826-827 
(2007); Commonwealth v. Riberio, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 10-11 
(2000). 
11 
 
 
Where the judge promptly struck the improper testimony and 
gave a highly specific curative instruction, the judge acted 
appropriately and within her discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Chubbuck, 384 Mass. 746, 753 (1981); Costa, supra.  The curative 
instruction was acceptable to very experienced defense counsel, 
which is some indication of its effectiveness.  Moreover, the 
medical examiner had been unable to articulate a precise cause 
of death due to the advanced state of decomposition.  The jury 
are presumed to follow the judge's instruction, Commonwealth v. 
Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 470 (2004), and we see no reason to think 
otherwise. 
 
Finally, the judge instructed the jury in her final 
instructions, five times, that the Commonwealth had to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the victim's 
death, that it was not an accident, that he intended to kill the 
victim, and that the defendant acted with deliberate 
premeditation.  She also reminded the jury that they were not to 
consider any matter that she had struck and told them to 
disregard.  We are satisfied that any potential prejudice that 
flowed from the medical examiner's testimony was neutralized by 
the judge's careful attention and her curative instruction. 
 
4.  Defendant's statement.  The defendant had given a 
statement to two State police officers that was video recorded 
and shown to the jury.  A transcript of the statement was 
12 
 
provided to each juror.  Portions of the interview contain 
numerous accusations that he was lying to the officers, 
statements by the officers implying they had inculpatory 
evidence beyond that presented to the jury, and hearsay 
statements that violated his right of confrontation.  The 
defendant now argues that those portions should have been 
redacted. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 288-289 (2012), 
we held that admission of interrogating officers' frequent 
accusations that the defendant was lying during a recorded 
statement played to the jury ran afoul of the fundamental 
principle that a witness cannot be asked to assess the 
credibility of his testimony or that of other witnesses.  Id., 
citing Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 394 Mass. 702, 706 (1985).  
Similarly, "[o]pinions of the interrogating detectives that the 
defendant is guilty and lying . . . and police reiteration of 
accusations by third parties that the defendant has denied, are 
not admissible."  Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 48-49 
(2013).  It is improper for a Commonwealth witness to imply that 
he or she possesses inculpatory information beyond what the jury 
has heard.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Meuse, 423 Mass. 831, 832 (1996) 
(improper for prosecutor to imply he has special knowledge 
concerning information not presented at trial).  Finally, 
admission of testimonial statements of persons who did not 
13 
 
testify and who were not subject to cross-examination generally 
is proscribed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57-59 
(2004).  The defendant did not object to the admission of the 
portions of his statement he now asserts should not have been 
presented to the jury.  We review to determine if any error 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).  We 
conclude that it did not. 
 
Had an objection been made, there is no question that the 
portions complained of should have been redacted.  There is also 
no question that trial counsel did not object because the 
unredacted portions of the defendant's interview figured 
prominently in the theory of the defense.  The defendant 
maintained his innocence, he contended that his wife had 
committed suicide, he realized no one would believe that he did 
not kill her, and the portions of his interview that he now 
argues should not have been admitted were relied on by trial 
counsel to support his theory of police bias and his Bowden 
attack on the integrity of the police investigation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 & n.7 (1980).  
Trial counsel informed the jury of the defense in his opening 
statement.  At the time the Commonwealth sought to offer the 
video recording of the defendant's interview, trial counsel had 
14 
 
agreed to redact several portions (references to ownership of a 
gun, a polygraph examination, and his brother's criminal 
history), but not those portions in question.  The portions of 
the video recording in question were admitted in evidence and 
played to the jury by express agreement.  The defendant 
maintained his innocence throughout the three and one-half hour 
interview with two State police officers under blistering 
accusations that he was lying. 
 
Trial counsel cross-examined one of the two interrogators, 
reminding him of his assertion in the video recording about 
keeping "an open mind."  The trooper acknowledged that he was 
unaware if anyone had interviewed the defendant's relative with 
whom the victim was closest, or whether the victim had seen a 
doctor for depression.  Trial counsel specifically advised the 
judge that the purpose of his inquiry was to call into question 
the integrity of the police investigation, pursuant to Bowden.  
The judge, in her final instructions to the jury, at the request 
of trial counsel, gave a Bowden instruction.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 22-23 (2011) (we have stated 
on many occasions that judge is not required to instruct on 
claimed inadequacy of police investigation under Bowden). 
 
In his closing argument, trial counsel forcefully drove 
home the many points he had made, integrating the now challenged 
portions of the video recording with evidence that had been 
15 
 
admitted that supported the defense theory that the victim's 
death was a suicide, and that police had rushed to judgment, 
just as the defendant had feared.  By allowing the jury to see 
the contested portions of the interview, trial counsel was able 
to present the defendant as someone who consistently admitted 
that he made a mistake in judgment by not contacting the police 
when he discovered his wife had died, but who steadfastly 
maintained his innocence.  The defense was well conceived, well 
considered, and well anchored in the evidence. 
 
The decision of trial counsel to agree to the admission of 
otherwise inadmissible evidence that supported the defense was a 
conscious strategic decision that was not unreasonable at the 
time it was made.  We have recognized the validity of such a 
strategy on many occasions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 692-693 (2014); Commonwealth v. 
Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 327 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 
(2009); Commonwealth v. Cutts, 444 Mass. 821, 831 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Squailia, 429 Mass. 101, 110-111 (1999); 
Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728 (1978).  We conclude 
there was no error, i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel, 
much less a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
 
5.  Extraneous influence.  As previously mentioned, some 
portions of the defendant's statement concerning his ownership 
16 
 
of a gun, the results of a polygraph examination he had taken, 
and his brother's criminal history were redacted from the video 
recording admitted in evidence and played to the jury.  The 
jurors were provided a transcript of the video recording.  When 
the jurors began their deliberations, those transcripts as well 
as the exhibits went with them.  During the morning of the 
second day of deliberations the foreperson sent a note to the 
judge informing her that four numbered pages of one juror's 
transcript contained text, but the same numbered pages in the 
other jurors' transcripts were blank.  The note indicated that 
the four pages in question had not been discussed.  The pages in 
question contain references to the defendant's ownership of a 
gun, and a reference to the defendant's polygraph examination -- 
with a comment that he "didn't do well."  The four pages in 
question constituted material that the parties had agreed would 
be redacted from the transcripts, and had been redacted from the 
video recording. 
 
The judge proposed speaking first with the foreperson to 
determine the identity of the juror who had the unredacted 
transcript, and whether any other jurors were affected.  The 
parties agreed to this procedure.  After questioning both the 
foreperson and juror no. 10, whose transcript was unredacted, 
the judge determined that only juror no. 10 had an unredacted 
transcript, that juror no. 10 only read the first line of the 
17 
 
pages in question, that no other juror had been exposed to the 
pages in question, and that the material in question was neither 
shared nor discussed among the jurors.  The only line read by 
juror no. 10, states:  "Sergeant Nanof:  Do you own a gun?"  The 
judge found that "there was no extraneous influence on the jury 
as a whole," and to the extent that juror no. 10 had only read 
the first line, there was "no extraneous influence on the juror" 
either.  The defendant, in consultation with trial counsel, was 
satisfied with the judge's resolution and that it was 
appropriate.  The defendant also agreed with trial counsel's 
recommendation not to move for a mistrial and not to move to 
replace juror no. 10 with an alternate juror. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred by failing to 
conduct a voir dire either individually or collectively after it 
became clear that at least one juror had been exposed to 
extraneous material.  He relies primarily on Commonwealth v. 
Tennison, 440 Mass. 553, 557-558 (2003), where we reaffirmed the 
procedure prescribed in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 
800 (1978), for judges to follow when a claim of extraneous 
influence on a jury is brought to their attention.  That 
procedure requires "[t]he judge [to] first 'determine whether 
the material . . . raises a serious question of possible 
prejudice.'  [Jackson, supra.]  If the judge so determines, he 
or she should conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors.  
18 
 
Id.  This initial voir dire may be conducted collectively, but 
if, in fact, a juror indicates exposure to the extraneous 
material in question, an individual voir dire is required to 
determine the extent of that exposure and its prejudicial 
effect.  Id."  Tennison, supra, quoting Jackson, supra.  In 
Tennison, we also observed that "[t]he trial judge has 
discretion in addressing these issues, and we must give 
deference to [her] conclusions."  440 Mass. at 558, citing 
Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 369-370 (2000).  "The 
facts of the specific case are important," and we review the 
judge's procedure for an abuse of discretion.  Francis, supra at 
370, quoting Commonwealth v. Kamara, 422 Mass. 614, 616 (1996). 
 
The judge was entitled to rely on the answers of the 
foreperson and juror no. 10 to the questions she asked.  See 
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 389 Mass. 667, 676 n.7 (1983).  It was 
apparent from the voir dire of those jurors that the only person 
exposed to the four unredacted transcript pages was juror no. 
10, and that juror no. 10 had only read the first line, which 
was merely a question by one of the interrogators.  The judge 
acted within her discretion when she determined that juror no. 
10 had not been a source of extraneous influence on the other 
jurors, and that the material to which juror no. 10 had actually 
been exposed supported a finding that there was no serious 
question of possible prejudice that required a voir dire of 
19 
 
other jurors.  See Francis, supra.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 761, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2312 
(2014). 
 
6.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the entire 
record and the briefs, and discern no reason to reduce the 
verdict or order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.