Title: Cagle v. Lawson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

445 So. 2d 564 (1984)
Dewayne CAGLE
v.
William S. LAWSON.
82-1036.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 27, 1984.
J. William Thomason, Bessemer, for appellant.
Jerry W. Jackson, Haleyville, for appellee.
EMBRY, Justice.
Plaintiff, Dewayne Cagle, appeals from the trial court's order of dismissal based upon a lack of in personam jurisdiction over defendant. We reverse.
Defendant, Williams S. Lawson, is a Mississippi resident and is licensed to practice law in that state. He agreed with Lanny Vines, an Alabama attorney, to aid in the prosecution, in Mississippi, of a personal injury suit on behalf of Dewayne Cagle, an Alabama resident. Allegedly at Lawson's urging, Cagle fired Vines and contracted with Lawson for representation in said suit. This occurred while Lawson was in Alabama for the purpose of conferring with Cagle regarding his lawsuit.
Cagle now sues Lawson for fraud, misrepresentation, professional negligence, and breach of warranties in connection with that contract and in connection with Lawson's prosecution of Cagle's claim.
The issue before this court is whether this state can secure in personam jurisdiction over Lawson. Lawson contends that this factual situation does not meet the "minimum contacts" mandate of Rule 4.2(a)(2)(I), ARCP. That rule provides:
Recently, in View-All, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, 435 So. 2d 1198 (Ala. 1983), this court, quoting Professor Moore, summarized the correct constitutional requirements in this area:
435 So. 2d  at 1201.
Where, as here, there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, we consider the quality and nature of the activity in this state in order to determine whether maintenance of the suit will offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Williams v. Barrington Ford, 402 So. 2d 903 (Ala.1981). Also relevant are the foreseeability by the defendant of being sued in Alabama as a result of his activity in this state and the level of inconvenience to the defendant in defending the suit.
The nature of the transaction here presented indicates Lawson had sufficient "minimum contacts" with Alabama to make it reasonable to require him to defend this action in an Alabama forum. The parties agree Lawson made four visits to Alabama to confer with Cagle concerning the personal injury suit filed on his behalf in Mississippi. Cagle's complaint alleges a contract was entered into as a result of one of those visits. He contends Lawson made *566 a number of fraudulent representations during that visit regarding Vines's inability to pursue a personal injury action successfully before a Mississippi court. Lawson, by deposition, states he provided legal representation for Cagle after Vines had returned Cagle's file to Cagle. He alleges, however, that he assumed Vines was still involved with the case.
Cagle presented evidence, also by deposition, that Lawson contacted him by phone and by mail in Alabama on a number of occasions for the purpose of communicating regarding the lawsuit filed in Mississippi.
There is evidence that Lawson solicited a client in Alabama and that he provided a service which involved frequent trips to Alabama and communications with his client in Alabama. Under this particular factual situation, we think Lawson could surely anticipate falling within this state's jurisdiction. The foreseeability is critical to our analysis. Hoffman v. Chandler, 431 So. 2d 499 (Ala.1983).
Furthermore, it is relevant that defending this suit in Alabama will not provide a substantial inconvenience to Lawson. Semo Aviation, Inc. v. Southeastern Airways Corp., 360 So. 2d 936 (Ala.1978). The suit was filed in Winston County, Alabama. Double Springs is the seat of Winston County. Lawson resides in Tupelo, Mississippi. We judicially note that Tupelo and Double Springs are approximately 75 miles apart. We find that distance not so great as to substantially inconvenience Lawson as defendant.
Because of the quality and nature of Lawson's activities in Alabama, the resultant foreseeability by Lawson of being required to defend an action in this state, and the lack of inconvenience of travel between Lawson's home and Double Springs, Alabama, we are convinced it is reasonable to require Lawson to defend this action in Alabama. We therefore hold that Lawson did have the requisite minimum contacts with Alabama necessary to permit the assertion of this state's jurisdiction over him. The case is due to be, and it is, hereby, reversed and remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.