Title: Save Our Rural Oregon v. Energy Facility Siting

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  September 29, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Application for
a Site Certificate for the COB Energy Facility
SAVE OUR RURAL OREGON,
CARL and SUSIE GIBSON,
WILLIAM and MELYN M. "LYN" BROCK,
LEWIS W. SOWLES, MARYANN REED,
MARY KENT, CHERI MADSEN,
MARIO and DIANA GIORDANO,
DOUGLAS MADSEN, MARSHA ROBINSON,
ROGER HAMILTON, BERKELEY CONE,
DOUGLAS and GAIL WHITSETT,
LYNDA KING-CLEGG, ANN S. FAIRCLO,
DON RAJNUS, CINDY DEAS,
DARREL and TRAUDY BAGLEY, and WATER FOR LIFE,
Petitioners,
v.
ENERGY FACILITY SITING COUNCIL,
Respondent,
and 
COB ENERGY FACILITY LLC,
Intervener.
(SC S52315)
En Banc
On judicial review from an order of the Oregon Energy Facility
Siting Council dated February 4, 2005.*
Argued and submitted May 11, 2005.
Edward J. Sullivan, Garvey Schubert Barer, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners.  With him on the
briefs was Carrie A. Richter.
Denise J. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent Energy
Facility Siting Council.  With her on the briefs were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
James N. Westwood, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for Intervener COB Energy Facility
LLC.  With him on the briefs were Timothy L. McMahan, Michelle M.
Rudd, and Peter D. Mostow.
BALMER, J.
The order of the Energy Facility Siting Council is affirmed.
*Karen H. Green, Chair, Oregon Energy Facility Siting
Council.
BALMER, J.
Petitioners seek judicial review of a final order of
the Energy Facility Siting Council (council) granting a site
certificate that would allow COB Energy Facility LLC (COB) to
build an energy facility in Klamath County.  Petitioners are 22
Klamath County residents who live near the site of the proposed
facility and two organizations representing those residents. 
Respondents are the council and COB.  This case comes to us on
direct review of the council's final order.  ORS 469.403(3)
(providing for direct review by this court in such cases).
We review final orders of the council for errors of
law, abuse of agency discretion, and lack of substantial evidence
in the record to support the challenged findings of fact.  ORS
469.403(6); ORS 183.482(7), (8); see also Friends of Parrett
Mountain v. Northwest Natural, 336 Or 93, 96, 79 P3d 869 (2003)
(so stating).  In this case, petitioners' assignments of error
raise only the first and the last kinds of issues.  For the
reasons we explain below, we conclude that, with one exception,
the council did not commit legal error and that its challenged
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the
record.  As to the one respect in which the council erred -- its
interpretation of ORS 469.504, which sets out the procedure for
determining a proposed facility's compliance with land use
planning goals -- we nevertheless conclude that the council
correctly determined that the proposed facility complied with
those goals.  Accordingly, we affirm the council's order. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As noted, petitioners seek judicial review of the
council's decision to issue a site certificate allowing COB to
build an energy facility.  The legislature has entrusted the
council with the authority to decide whether to issue a site
certificate.  ORS 469.470(1).  The council's decision to issue a
site certificate "binds state, county, and city governments in
accordance with the council's determination and requires state
agencies and local governments to issue any permits specified in
the site certificate without further proceedings."  Friends of
Parrett Mountain, 336 Or at 96; see also ORS 469.300(26)
(defining "site certificate").  An applicant for a site
certificate begins the application process by submitting to the
council a Notice of Intent (NOI) that provides information about
the proposed site and the characteristics of the proposed
facility.  ORS 469.330(1).  After receiving the NOI, the council
notifies the public, providing information regarding the site and
the facility.  ORS 469.330(2).  The State Department of Energy
(department) then prepares a project order that, based on
applicable statutes, rules, and standards, establishes the legal
requirements for an application for a site certificate (ASC). 
ORS 469.330(3).
After completing the project order's requirements, the
applicant must submit its ASC to the council.  ORS 469.350(1). 
The NOI and the ASC then are sent for comment and recommendation
to various state agencies and affected cities and counties.  ORS
469.350(2).  The department reviews the ASC to determine whether
it is complete.  ORS 469.350(4).  When the department determines
that the ASC is complete, it notifies the applicant and the
public.  Id.  Based on its review of the ASC and the comments and
recommendations that it receives, the department prepares and
issues a draft proposed order.  ORS 469.370(1).  The council then
holds one or more public hearings regarding the ASC and the draft
proposed order in the area affected by the ASC and elsewhere, as
the council considers necessary.  ORS 469.370(2).  The department
reviews the testimony from the public hearing or hearings,
consults with other agencies, reviews the draft proposed order in
light of the information that it has received, issues a proposed
order, and notifies the public of the proposed order and that the
council will hold a contested case hearing to consider adoption
of the proposed order.  ORS 469.370(4).  On receipt of the
proposed order from the department, the council conducts the
contested case hearing, following the procedures outlined in ORS
183.413 to 183.470.  ORS 469.370(5).  Following that hearing, the
council issues a final order approving or rejecting the ASC.  ORS
469.370(7).
A. COB's Application for a Site Certificate
In accordance with the procedures described above, on
December 3, 2001, COB submitted an NOI to file an ASC to build a
power generation facility in Klamath County.  The council
provided notice of the NOI, and the department prepared a project
order establishing the requirements for the ASC.  On September 5,
2002, COB filed its ASC with the department.  On April 30, 2003,
the department issued a public notice that the ASC was complete. 
The notice described the ASC as proposing a "natural gas-fired,
combustion turbine, combined-cycle energy facility in Klamath
County near Bonanza, Oregon," capable of generating 1150
megawatts of electricity.  According to the notice, the water-cooled facility would require between 5,390 and 7,590 gallons of
water per minute, which COB proposed to draw from deep wells in
the Lost River Basin by means of a new water pipeline and
reservoir.  The proposed facility would use natural gas from one
or both existing gas pipelines, which would be connected to the
facility by a new 4.1-mile distribution line.  The facility would
deliver electric power to the regional power grid at the nearby
Captain Jack Substation via a 7.2-mile transmission line
occupying a 154-foot-wide corridor.  The facility would require
approximately 194 acres of land, which would be situated within a
749-acre parcel owned by COB.  Of those 194 acres, 42.5 were to
be used for the main facility and the remainder for ancillary
applications including wastewater management areas, the natural-gas pipeline, the electrical transmission line, and a water-supply system.  Klamath County had zoned most of the 194 acres
for Exclusive Farm Use (EFU); it had zoned some of that acreage
for forestry.
In addition to describing the proposed facility, the
notice informed the public of the process for evaluating the ASC,
beginning with an open comment period that ended on June 23,
2003.  In particular, it stated that the council intended to
review the ASC to determine whether it "complies with Klamath
County's land use and zoning ordinances as well as with state
land use laws," noted that the project "would require an
exception from Goal 3 of the * * * statewide planning goals," and
stated that the council's "rules for evaluating a Goal 3
exception can be found at ORS 469.504(2)." (1)
B. Notice and Comment
During the notice and comment period, the department
held public meeting at which residents could ask questions and
make comments regarding the ASC. (2)  The department received
oral and written comments from residents of the area surrounding
the proposed site, including most of the petitioners.
On June 11, 2003, in response to comments criticizing
the proposed facility as using too much water, COB informed the
department that it intended to amend the ASC to reflect a
proposal for an air-cooled, rather than a water-cooled, facility. 
On July 28, 2003, the department issued a public notice
indicating that it had received that amendment and that it would
allow a three-week period for comments on it.  The notice
described the amendment as reducing the proposed facility's water
requirements from approximately 7,500 gallons per minute to 210
gallons per minute and reducing the size of the proposed overall
facility from 194 acres to between approximately 104 and 140
acres, depending on the method of wastewater treatment.  The
amendment also increased the size of the main facility from 42.5
acres to 50.6 acres.
C. Orders and Contested Case Proceeding
On December 30, 2003, the department issued a draft
proposed order recommending approval of the ASC.  The council
held public hearings on the draft proposed order, and the
department issued a proposed order on March 16, 2004.  That order
proposed to approve the project.  One month later, the department
issued a supplement to the order imposing several conditions on
its proposed approval of the ASC. (3)  
Petitioners objected to the proposed order.  They
requested (and were granted) party status in the contested case
proceeding that the council scheduled to consider the proposed
order.  Petitioners argued, among other things, that the proposed
order misinterpreted ORS 469.504's standards for determining
compliance with statewide planning goals and taking exceptions to
them, that it lacked substantial evidence to support taking
exceptions to Goal 3 and Goal 4, that the department should have
promulgated rules to define certain statutory terms before
issuing the proposed order, and that the proposed order lacked
substantial evidence for its conclusions that COB had complied
with geologic and water standards.  At the conclusion of the
contested case proceeding, the department's hearings officer
issued a recommended order generally approving the ASC. (4)  
The council chair received the recommended order, and,
in response to legal issues that the petitioners raised,
requested that the hearings officer reconsider part of the
recommended order in light of the proper standard for assessing
the weight of the evidence.  The hearings officer reconsidered
and issued a supplemental recommended order.  After oral argument
by the parties, the council decided to approve the ASC.  The
final order issued a site certificate for the proposed facility,
with certain conditions.  The present petition seeks judicial
review of the council's decision in this court.  ORS 469.403(3).
II.  PROPOSED FACILITY'S COMPLIANCE WITH STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS
We turn now to the legal issues presented.  Petitioners
assign error to the council's construction of ORS 469.504.  That
statute, pertinent parts of which we set out below, provides the
method for determining whether an ASC complies with statewide
land use planning goals.  We first provide an overview of ORS
469.504.  We then describe the council's interpretation and
application of that statute in this case and petitioners'
challenges to the council's analysis and conclusions.  Next, we
review the words and structure of the statute in detail as part
of our interpretation of the statute.  As we noted at the outset,
although we conclude that the council misconstrued the specific
manner in which ORS 469.504 applies in this case, we conclude,
nevertheless, that the council's findings and determinations
support its conclusion that the proposed facility complies with
statewide planning goals under ORS 469.504, as properly
interpreted.
A. Overview of ORS 469.504 
Oregon's statewide land use planning goals, adopted by
the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), set out
broad objectives for land use planning in Oregon.  Local
governments implement those objectives in local comprehensive
plans.  ORS 197.225 to 197.250.  ORS 469.503(4) provides that the
council may not issue a site certificate approving an ASC unless
the proposed facility complies with the statewide planning goals. 
ORS 469.504, in turn, provides the guidelines for determining
whether the ASC complies with those goals.  
ORS 469.504(4) allows the applicant to decide whether
it will demonstrate compliance with statewide planning goals
under ORS 469.504(1)(a) (in which case, compliance is determined
by the affected local government) or under ORS 469.504(1)(b) (in
which case, compliance is determined by the council).  In this
proceeding, COB elected to have the council determine compliance
with land use planning goals.  In that circumstance, ORS
469.504(5) provides that the council shall designate a "special
advisory group" consisting of the governing body of the local
government in which the proposed facility is located and that it
shall charge that group with recommending "applicable substantive
criteria" for the council to use in making its determination.  If
the special advisory group fails to respond in a timely manner,
then the council
"may either determine and apply the applicable
substantive criteria under subsection (1)(b) of this
section or determine compliance with the statewide
planning goals under subsection (1)(b)(B) or (C) of
this section."
ORS 469.504(1)(b) provides that a proposed facility
shall be found in compliance with the statewide planning goals
if:
"(b) The Energy Facility Siting Council determines
that:
"(A) The facility complies with applicable
substantive criteria from the affected local
government's acknowledged comprehensive plan and land
use regulations that are required by the statewide
planning goals and in effect on the date the
application is submitted, and with any Land
Conservation and Development Commission administrative
rules and goals and any land use statutes directly
applicable to the facility under ORS 197.646(3);
"(B) For an energy facility or a related or
supporting facility that must be evaluated against the
applicable substantive criteria pursuant to subsection
(5) of this section, that the proposed facility does
not comply with one or more of the applicable
substantive criteria but does otherwise comply with the
applicable statewide planning goals, or that an
exception to any applicable statewide planning goal is
justified under subsection (2) of this section; or
"(C) For a facility that the council elects to
evaluate against the statewide planning goals pursuant
to subsection (5) of this section, that the proposed
facility complies with the applicable statewide
planning goals or that an exception to any applicable
statewide planning goal is justified under subsection
(2) of this section."
B. Council's Interpretation and Petitioners' Objections
In this proceeding, the council appointed the Klamath
County Board of Commissioners (county board) as the "special
advisory group" and requested that the county board recommend
criteria to evaluate the proposed facility.  The county board
never made any recommendations. (5)  In its final order, the
council stated that its regular procedure to evaluate whether a
proposed facility meets statewide goals is to look first to the
"applicable substantive criteria" from the local land use
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, along with any directly
applicable statutes and rules, as described in ORS
469.504(1)(b)(A).  If any local standard is not met, then the
council's practice is to follow ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) and consider
whether the ASC complies with statewide planning goals and, to
the extent that it does not, whether an exception to those goals
is justified.  The council followed that procedure here,
determining that the proposed facility met most of the local
criteria but that there were several aspects of the proposed
facility that did not meet local criteria.  It determined that
those nonconforming aspects also did not meet statewide goals,
but that they qualified for exceptions to those goals under the
goal exception criteria of ORS 469.504(2).
The parties disagree as to whether the council must
select and use only one of the three "tracks" identified in the
three paragraphs of ORS 469.504(1)(b) when evaluating a proposed
facility or whether it may choose to use a combination of those
"tracks."  Petitioners argue that the council misapplied the
statutory criteria in subsection (1)(b) because it approved
certain aspects of the facility under subsection (1)(b)(A) and
other aspects under subsection (1)(b)(B).  They contend that the
plain text of that statute establishes those two subsections as
separate methods for determining whether the land use
requirements are met and that the council may choose one or the
other, but it cannot choose both. (6)  COB and the council
respond that because the three paragraphs of subsection (1)(b)
are related by the conjunction "or," the council may, as it did
here, determine that a proposed facility complies with land use
planning requirements by evaluating different aspects of the
facility under a combination of paragraphs (A) and (B).  They
point out that their interpretation advances the policy goal of
requiring the council to consider both local land use standards
and statewide goals. 
C. Interpretation of ORS 469.504
Cautioning the reader at the outset that this statutory
interpretation exercise involves mind-numbing detail, we begin
our analysis with the text of ORS 469.504(5).  That provision
requires the council to consider local "applicable substantive
criteria" in reviewing an ASC for compliance with land use
planning goals and, in petitioners' view, directs the council to
choose only one of the three tracks for compliance set out in ORS
469.504(1)(b).  The dispute between the parties centers on the
relationship between subsection (1)(b) and section (5) of ORS
469.504.  
ORS 469.504(5), quoted previously, provides that "[i]f
the special advisory group does not recommend applicable
substantive criteria * * * the council may either determine and
apply the applicable substantive criteria under subsection (1)(b)
of this section or determine compliance with the statewide
planning goals under subsection (1)(b)(B) or (C) of this
section." (7) (Emphasis added.)  That provision plainly gives
the council a choice; the parties, however, disagree about the
nature of that choice.
As noted, petitioners argue that ORS 469.504(5)
requires the council to choose one and only one "track" within
ORS 469.504(1)(b).  They advance several distinct theories in
support of their interpretation.  First, petitioners argue that
the reference in ORS 469.504(5) to "subsection (1)(b)" must be a
scrivener's error, that the legislature intended in that section
to refer to "the applicable substantive criteria under subsection
(1)(b)(A)," and that, therefore, the council only may apply one
of the paragraphs of subsection (1)(b) -- either (A), (B), or (C)
-- throughout its consideration of an ASC.  
We reject petitioners' first argument because it is
inconsistent with the text of the statute as enacted by the
legislature.  If the special advisory group does not recommend
applicable substantive criteria, then ORS 469.504(5) allows the
council to choose whether to "determine and apply" those criteria
under subsection (1)(b) or to determine compliance with statewide
planning goals under subsection (1)(b)(B) or (C).  Contrary to
petitioners' assertion, there is nothing absurd about that
result.  Subsections (1)(b)(A) and (1)(b)(B) both refer to
"applicable substantive criteria," so it is not anomalous for
section (5) to allow the council to "determine and apply" those
criteria "under subsection (1)(b)" and to interpret that
reference to include at least paragraphs (A) and (B) within that
subsection.  If the legislature had intended, in section (5), to
refer to subsection (1)(b)(A) rather than subsection (1)(b), it
presumably would have said so, and there is no compelling reason
in the structure or application of the statute to assume that the
legislature unintentionally erred in that way.
Petitioners next point out that parts of ORS 469.504(5)
not applicable in this case expressly authorize the council to
consider both the local applicable substantive criteria and
statewide planning goals. (8)  That fact, they assert,
demonstrates that if the legislature had intended to authorize
the council to consider both the applicable substantive criteria
and statewide planning goals with respect to facilities that are
evaluated under subsection (1)(b), it expressly would have
provided so.   Petitioners note that section (5) expressly
authorizes consideration of both the criteria and the goals only
when the special advisory group has recommended applicable
substantive criteria, a predicate that is not met in this case.
     Petitioners are correct that one sentence in ORS
469.504(5) expressly authorizes the council to consider the
criteria or the goals or a combination of both in certain
circumstances when the special advisory group has recommended
applicable substantive criteria.  That observation, however, does
not answer whether the council was authorized to consider both
the criteria and the goals when the special advisory group has
not recommended any criteria.  Petitioners' argument still
succeeds or fails depending on whether the council had authority
to consider both the criteria and the goals under subsection
(1)(b) –- an argument they raise separately and to which we now
turn.
Petitioners argue that, even if the reference in ORS
469.504(5) to "subsection (1)(b)" refers to all three paragraphs
of that subsection (rather than only to paragraph (A), an
argument we rejected above), the council nevertheless may not
utilize more than one of those three paragraphs in analyzing a
particular ASC because the three paragraphs are related by the
conjunction "or."  Petitioners are correct, in part.  
The structure of ORS 469.504(1)(b), setting out
paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) and connecting them with the word
"or," suggests that they are alternative means by which the
council may determine compliance with planning goals. 
Petitioners' arguments reinforce that reading of subsection
(1)(b).  They argue that those paragraphs are mutually exclusive
and that nothing in the text of section (5) or the introductory
words of section (1) or subsection (1)(b) suggests that the
council may determine that a facility complies with applicable
land use rules by "picking and choosing" from among the different
criteria and methods described in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C).
Additionally, petitioners argue that each paragraph expresses a
complete thought as to an alternative route by which the council
may determine compliance with land use requirements.  Paragraph
(A) allows the council to find a facility in compliance with
statewide planning goals by determining that the facility
complies with applicable substantive criteria from the local
government's comprehensive plan and land use regulations.  Under
that paragraph, the council is not required to consider whether
the facility complies with the statewide land use planning goals
themselves or exceptions to those goals. (9)  Paragraph (B)
provides that, if the proposed facility does not comply with the
applicable substantive criteria, the council may determine that
it either complies with statewide planning goals or warrants an
exception to those goals.  Paragraph (C) makes no mention of the
applicable substantive criteria and authorizes the council to
"elect" to evaluate a facility by determining whether it complies
with the statewide planning goals or, if not, whether exceptions
to those goals are justified.
For those reasons, we agree with petitioners that,
under ORS 469.504(1)(b) and (5), the council may choose to
determine compliance with statewide planning goals by evaluating
a facility under paragraph (A) or (B) or (C), but that it may not
combine elements or methods from more than one paragraph, except
to the extent that the chosen paragraph itself permits.  The
council thus erred in interpreting subsection (1)(b) to permit it
to determine compliance with the applicable substantive criteria
under subsection (1)(b)(A), and then, as to aspects of the
facility that did not comply with those criteria, to evaluate
them under subsection (1)(b)(B).  
That, however, does not end our inquiry.  As we noted
above in examining the council's option to review a facility
under paragraph (B), that provision, unlike paragraphs (A) and
(C), refers both to "applicable substantive criteria" and to
"statewide planning goals."  Specifically, paragraph (B) provides
that the council may find that a proposed facility meets the
requirements of ORS 469.504 it if determines "that the proposed
facility does not comply with one or more of the applicable
substantive criteria but does otherwise comply with the
applicable statewide planning goals" or that an exception to
those goals is justified.  Because paragraph (B) permits the
council to review for compliance with statewide planning goals
only if it first determines that the proposed facility does not
comply with the applicable substantive criteria -- the local
standards -- that paragraph necessarily contemplates the same
review that the council undertook here.  In its 393-page order,
the council evaluated the ASC under the applicable substantive
criteria and, when it determined that the proposed facility did
not comply with one or more of those criteria, it determined
whether the proposed facility nonetheless complied with the
statewide planning goals or an exception to those goals.  Thus,
the council's review was substantially the same as the review
that ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) contemplated. (10)  
Our legal analysis differs from the council's because,
as discussed above, we have concluded that the council may not
evaluate a proposed facility under both paragraph (A) and
paragraph (B).  However, because paragraph (B) necessarily
requires an evaluation of the same applicable substantive
criteria as paragraph (A) (11) and, to the extent those
criteria are not met, directs the council to consider statewide
planning goals, we conclude that the council's review of the
proposed facility met ORS 469.504's requirements.
That conclusion is consistent with the legislature's
intention, apparent from the text and structure of ORS 469.504 as
outlined above, to permit the council to review proposed energy
facilities for compliance with both local land use regulations
and statewide planning goals.  The statewide planning goals are
umbrella regulations establishing state policy in land use
planning.  ORS 197.225 - 197.250.  State agencies, special
districts, and local governments all are subject to the goals;
local government plans and implementing regulations must comply
with the goals.  Id.; Perkins v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 300 Or 1,
10, 706 P2d 949 (1985) (describing certification of local
comprehensive plans); see also Land Use § 1.7 (OSB CLE 1994 &
Supp 2000).  In short, the statewide land use planning goals
establish broad policy objectives, while the "applicable
substantive criteria" provide specific ways of implementing those
objectives through local regulation.  Because the local criteria
often are more specific than the goals, an ASC may fail to meet
the local criteria but still meet the goals.  ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) allows a comprehensive inquiry that requires the
council to determine compliance with the most specific criteria
that it can:  local "applicable substantive criteria" where
possible; findings of compliance with the statewide planning
goals in the alternative; and exceptions to the goals if
necessary.  That scheme is consistent with the overall land use
planning structure in Oregon.
III.  EXCEPTIONS TO LAND USE PLANNING GOALS
Petitioners also argue that the council erred in its
application of the criteria for taking exceptions to statewide
land use planning goals under ORS 469.504(2).  As noted, if the
council finds that the ASC does not meet statewide planning
goals, it still may approve the ASC by "tak[ing] an exception" to
the applicable goal under the criteria described in ORS
469.504(2).  That statute provides:
"(2) The council may find goal compliance for a
facility that does not otherwise comply with one or
more statewide planning goals by taking an exception to
the applicable goal.  Notwithstanding the requirements
of ORS 197.732,[ (12)] the statewide planning goal
pertaining to the exception process or any rules of the
Land Conservation and Development Commission pertaining
to an exception process goal, the council may take an
exception to a goal if the council finds [that]:
"* * * * *  
"(c) The following standards are met:
"(A) Reasons justify why the state policy embodied
in the applicable goal should not apply;
"(B) The significant environmental, economic,
social and energy consequences anticipated as a result
of the proposed facility have been identified and
adverse impacts will be mitigated in accordance with
rules of the council applicable to the siting of the
proposed facility; and
"(C) The proposed facility is compatible with
other adjacent uses or will be made compatible through
measures designed to reduce adverse impacts."
Petitioners argue that the council erred in taking
exceptions to Statewide Planning Goals 3 and 4.
A. Exceptions to Goal 3
Goal 3 provides that "[a]gricultural lands shall be
preserved and maintained for farm use, consistent with existing
and future needs for agricultural products, forest and open space
and with the state's agricultural land use policy expressed in
ORS 215.243 and 215.700."  Klamath County Land Development Code §
54.030M implements that goal, providing that a commercial energy
facility may use a maximum of 12 acres of high-value farmland or
20 acres of non-high-value farmland before a goal exception is
required. (13)  The proposed facility would use 50.6 acres of
land zoned for exclusive farm use.  Because the facility did not
meet either the local regulation or the applicable statewide
planning goal, the council could approve the ASC only by taking
an exception to Goal 3.  The final order evaluated the evidence
in the record and made findings.  Based on those findings, which
we summarize below, the council concluded that the proposed
facility met the three requirements for an exception that are set
out in ORS 469.504(2)(c).  
Petitioners object that the council committed legal
error by failing to include an "alternatives analysis" to review
other possible sites that would not require a goal exception.  In
addition, petitioners object that the council's findings
regarding the requirements of ORS 469.504(2)(c) are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
1. Alternatives Analysis
Petitioners first argue that the council's analysis in
taking an exception to Goal 3 was flawed because the council did
not require the applicant to provide reasons why the proposed
site was better suited than any other site.  Petitioners assert
that the council's order "ignores the myriad of possibilities of
alternative locations consistent with the statewide planning
goals."  Respondents counter that petitioners seek an
"alternatives analysis" for the proposed facility that the
statutes do not require when the council, rather than a local
government, takes an exception to a land use planning goal.
We agree with respondents.  ORS 469.504(2)(c), quoted
above, sets out the requirements that must be met for the council
to take an exception to a land use planning goal.  That statute
has distinct similarities to ORS 197.732(1)(c), which was enacted
14 years earlier and which sets out the requirements for a local
government to take an exception.  However, the two statutes also
have important differences, which we think are dispositive here. 
ORS 197.732, the statute relating to exceptions taken by local
governments, provides in part:
"(1) A local government may adopt an exception to
a goal if:
"* * * * * 
"(c) The following standards are met:
"(A) Reasons justify why the state policy embodied
in the applicable goals should not apply;
"(B) Areas which do not require a new exception
cannot reasonably accommodate the use;
"(C) The long term environmental, economic, social
and energy consequences resulting from the use at the
proposed site with measures designed to reduce adverse
impacts are not significantly more adverse than would
typically result from the same proposal being located
in areas requiring a goal exception other than the
proposed site; and
"(D) The proposed uses are compatible with other
adjacent uses or will be so rendered through measures
designed to reduce adverse impacts."
(Emphasis added.)  The emphasized text highlights one significant
difference between ORS 197.732(1)(c) and ORS 469.504(2)(c):  The
former requires what the parties describe as an "alternatives
analysis," i.e., a finding that the "environmental, economic,
social and energy consequences" of using the proposed site are
"not significantly more adverse" than those that would result
from using an alternative site in an area requiring a goal
exception.  
In construing the text of a statute, we consider "other
provisions of the same statute and other related statutes."  PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143
(1993).  In this case, a comparison of the two statutes makes
clear that the legislature used ORS 197.732(1)(c) as the basis
for the later-enacted ORS 469.504(2)(c) but omitted the
requirement of an alternatives analysis.  We therefore conclude
that the legislature did not intend to require the council to
perform an alternatives analysis in making a determination under
ORS 469.504(2)(c) that an exception could be taken to a land use
planning goal.  Contrary to petitioners' argument, ORS
460.504(2)(c) does not require the council to compare an
applicant's proposed site with other potential sites, and the
council did not err in failing to do so.
2. Findings Regarding Exceptions to Goal 3
Petitioners also claim that substantial evidence does
not support the council's findings under ORS 469.504(2)(c)(A). 
The council found that the proposed facility required 50.6 acres. 
It further found that COB would construct the proposed facility
at the confluence of three unique and essential resources (a
stable groundwater well, an existing natural gas pipeline, and an
existing electric transmission line and substation); that the
proposed facility would support the existing electrical
transmission system, which is "in critical need of more
capacity"; that it would benefit the local economy through
employment opportunities and contributions to the local tax base;
and that it would conserve farmland over the long run by
concentrating electrical generation facilities into one larger
compact facility rather than several smaller facilities that
would occupy more total acreage.  Based on those findings, the
council determined that "reasons justified" the siting of the
50.6-acre facility on land zoned EFU.
Petitioners challenge the council's findings, asserting
that the fact that there are alternative sites on industrial, not
EFU, land, shows that the proposed site is not unique. 
Petitioners also argue that the site is not unique because the
change from water to air cooling meant that the facility no
longer required large amounts of water.
We review any challenged factual findings of the
council for substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(7);
Friends of Parrett Mountain, 336 Or at 96.  Substantial evidence
in the record exists "when the record, viewed as a whole, would
permit a reasonable person to make that finding."  ORS
183.482(8)(c).  
We have reviewed the evidence in the record regarding
Goal 3 exceptions, and we conclude that substantial evidence in
the record supports the challenged factual findings.  Although
the change from water to air cooling appreciably diminished the
proposed facility's need for water, the record shows that the
amount of water used was not the only concern that led COB to
request a water permit to use the deep underground wells at the
proposed site.  The evidence showed that that water supply is
unique because it taps into an aquifer at a deeper level than
other local water uses, providing the facility with an unusually
stable water supply without affecting the supply to other local
water users.  The evidence also showed that the proximity of the
site to an existing natural gas pipeline and to the major north-south electricity transmission line on the West Coast (as well as
a substation on that line) made the site particularly suited for
a gas-powered electricity generation facility.  Other evidence
showed that the facility needed a site of 50.6 acres.  Each of
the council's findings regarding the Goal 3 exceptions is
supported by substantial evidence in the record. (14) 
3. Findings Regarding Significant Consequences of the Proposed Facility
Petitioners next challenge the council's factual
findings that, pursuant to ORS 469.504(2)(c)(B), substantial
evidence in the record demonstrates that the plans for the
proposed facility and COB's construction and operation of the
facility will "mitigate" the adverse impacts of "significant
environmental, economic, social and energy consequences" that may
result from the facility.  In the contested case proceeding,
petitioners described numerous adverse impacts that they asserted
would follow from "significant environmental, economic, social
and energy consequences" of approving the ASC.  COB presented
testimony of expert and lay witnesses either that those
consequences were insignificant or that COB's undertakings (as
set out in the ASC) would mitigate them.  
In its final order, the council noted that it found
that "for each specific type of alleged adverse impact identified
by [petitioners], the applicant has identified * * * evidence
that shows that the impact is not significant or has shown how
the impact will be avoided or mitigated."  The council reviewed
the evidence, noting, for example, that the ASC proposed to
mitigate the potential environmental impacts of the proposed
facility by redesigning it to use less water and to change the
handling of wastewater to reduce environmental impact, by
creating plans for the disposal of waste, and by complying with
air emissions standards.  The council found that COB proposed to
mitigate the facility's effects on deer winter range by restoring
and improving deer habitat, that the facility would have a
positive economic impact because it would create jobs and provide
significant income for the county, and that, although the
proposed facility would displace a small amount of farming, it
would increase the aggregate income of the surrounding farms
through easement purchases.  Finally, the council found that the
proposed facility would have positive energy impacts because it
would use existing resources while helping to meet the region's
increasing energy needs.  Based on those findings, the council
determined that the ASC mitigated or avoided any "significant
environmental, economic, social and energy consequences" that the
proposed facility posed.
Petitioners argue that the council's findings are
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, contending
that the council simply accepted "the applicant's
characterization of the issue and its reference to its own
evidence" rather than making independent findings.  That
description of the council's action is inaccurate.  Although the
council did refer to COB's brief in its final order, it did so to
identify the brief's references to the record.  The council, as
described above, made findings of fact that COB had identified
the significant consequences anticipated as a result of the
proposed facility and that the adverse impacts of those results
would be mitigated by measures described in the ASC and in the
final order.  We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that
substantial evidence in that record supported each of the
council's findings of fact required under ORS 469.504(2)(c)(B).
4. Findings Regarding Compatibility with Other Uses
Finally, petitioners argue that the council's findings
regarding ORS 469.504(2)(c)(C) are unsupported by substantial
evidence.  That subsection requires the council to evaluate the
ASC to determine whether "[t]he proposed facility is compatible
with other adjacent uses or will be made compatible through
measures designed to reduce adverse impacts."  Based on evidence
in the record and the council's findings of fact in accordance
with that evidence, the council determined that the proposed
facility was or could be made compatible with other adjacent
uses, that the location is remote, that the site is in an
already-existing utility corridor, and that the topography of the
area segregates the site from other nearby uses.  The council
also included in the final order a requirement that COB take
certain mitigation measures to ensure that the facility would
cause minimal disturbance to its neighbors.  Having examined the
record, we are satisfied that substantial evidence in the record
supports the council's findings of fact in this respect and that
the council therefore did not err in concluding, based on those
findings, that the facility is compatible with other adjacent
uses.
B. Exceptions to Goal 4
Petitioners contend that the council erred in allowing
an exception to Goal 4, pursuant to which the state endeavors to
conserve forest lands.  The proposed facility would involve the
construction, on land zoned for forest use, of a 100-foot-wide
transmission-line corridor, a zone of vegetative maintenance 54
feet on each side of the corridor, and roads to allow access to
the transmission lines and vegetative maintenance zone.  
No exception was required for the first two uses: 
Klamath County LDC § 55.040P allows a 100-foot-wide transmission
line corridor as a permissive use, and ORS 772.210 allows a
vegetative maintenance zone of up to 100 feet on either side of
such a corridor.  The access roads required an exception,
however, because they did not fall within either of those
permissive uses.  The council determined that the roads did not
meet Goal 4, reviewed the goal exceptions criteria of ORS
469.504(2)(c), and took an exception to Goal 4 for the access
roads. (15)  It based that exception on the following findings: 
that "reasons justif[ied]" the exception because the use is
locationally dependent, the corridor width is dictated by
engineering and safety concerns, and the facility would further
efficient development and economic growth; that COB would
mitigate the environmental consequences posed to seasonal creeks,
cultural resources, bald eagle nesting locations, and deer winter
range; and that the roads would be compatible with adjacent land
uses because they would not alter the forest-regulated land use
pattern or the landscape significantly.  We have reviewed the
record and conclude that substantial evidence supports those
findings.  
As to petitioners' argument that the council's reasons
for taking an exception to Goal 4 are legally insufficient
because the council failed to consider alternative locations for
the proposed facility, we hold that ORS 496.504(2)(c) does not
require an alternatives analysis in these circumstances, for the
reasons we discussed above.IV. REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING
Petitioners argue that the council erred by approving
the final order without conducting rulemaking proceedings to
clarify the meaning of specific terms used in ORS 469.504,
including "notwithstanding," "significant," and "mitigated." 
Petitioners contend that, because the council failed to adopt
rules clarifying those terms, the parties to the contested case
proceeding had no notice of how the council intended to apply ORS
469.504.  The council, in its final order, declined the request
for rulemaking, stating that "additional rulemaking is neither
required nor warranted in this instance" and that "the existing
rules are adequate to allow full and fair adjudication of the
issues in this case." 
As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioners
cannot directly challenge the council's denial of their request
for rulemaking in this proceeding.  This case is before us on
direct review from the council's final order approving the ASC. 
That review is limited to "review of the council's approval or
rejection of an application for a site certificate or amended
site certificate."  ORS 469.404(3).  Nevertheless, to the extent
that petitioners argue that the absence of rules renders the
final order invalid, we properly may consider that argument.  In
doing so, however, we limit our review to determining whether the
council properly approved the ASC when it had not promulgated
rules clarifying ORS 469.504.
Petitioners base their argument in part on several
statutes that require the council to adopt standards and rules. 
ORS 469.470(2) provides that the council "shall * * * adopt
standards and rules to perform the functions vested by law in the
council including the adoption of standards and rules for the
siting of energy facilities pursuant to ORS 469.501[.]"  ORS
469.501(1) in turn provides that the council "shall adopt
standards for the siting, construction, operation and retirement
of facilities" and that the "standards may address but need not
be limited to" those regarding "[c]ompliance with the statewide
planning goals adopted by the Land Conservation and Development
Commission as specified by ORS 469.503." (Emphasis added.) 
"Notwithstanding," "significant," and "mitigated," as
used in ORS 469.504, are terms used to define "compliance with
the statewide planning goals as specified by ORS 469.503."  The
use of the words "may address" in ORS 469.501(1) demonstrates
that the legislature intended the council to have discretion to
determine whether to create standards -- rule-based or otherwise
-- to define those terms.  At most, ORS 469.501(1) requires the
council to adopt some standards addressing the "siting,
construction, operation and retirement of facilities."  The
council already has adopted rules in those categories.  See OAR
Ch 345 Div 22 (setting out standards).  In our view, the text of
ORS 469.501 does not require the council to undertake additional
rulemaking.  ORS 469.470(2), requiring the council to adopt
standards and rules, adds nothing to petitioners' argument; that
statute is simply a general requirement that the council adopt
rules and standards regarding its operations and regulatory
authority, and the council has done so.
Neither does this court's decision in Marbet v.
Portland Gen. Elect., 277 Or 447, 561 P2d 154 (1977), on which
petitioners rely, require the council to adopt rules.  In Marbet,
this court addressed whether the council had failed to
"[e]stablish standards and promulgate rules that applicants for
site certificates must meet," as required by an older version of
the energy facility siting statute. (16)  Id. at 458.  Marbet
distinguished between statutes that required the adoption of
"standards promulgated as rules" and those that provided for the
adoption of standards or rules.  Id. at 459.  This court
determined that, in the former case, the council must adopt
formal rules; in the latter, the statute required the council
either to adopt formal rules or to articulate standards in the
course of contested case proceedings.  Id. at 459-60.  The court
held that
"[i]t is not indispensable that every standard [under
those statutes] have been adopted in the form of a rule
before the initiation of a contested case, as long as
it is in fact adopted as a standard, upon notice and
procedures that allow for the presentation of views and
data on the issues involved, and sufficiently in
advance of the final decision so that the applicant and
other parties can address the import of the standard
for the particular project. * * * We do not prescribe
one specific procedure.  Where the act does not itself
prescribe that standards must be rules * * *, the
choice of procedure is left to the council to make,
* * * as long as the purposes we have stated are met."
Id. at 463-64.  Marbet thus holds that where a statute requires
an agency to choose either to promulgate rules or to articulate
standards, it need not always promulgate a rule.  In either case,
however, the agency must provide notice of the standard and allow
the parties to comment on it.  
The council correctly stated in its final order that
the holding in Marbet does not assist petitioner here because, as
described above, neither ORS 469.501(1) nor ORS 469.470(2)
require the council to adopt rules to clarify the terms used to
define "compliance with the statewide planning goals" in ORS
469.504.
In the present case, the council gave petitioners
notice of the standards that the council intended to apply and
ample opportunity to comment on them.  The council described the
methods that it would use to evaluate goal compliance or goal
exceptions in the proposed draft order, the draft order, and the
hearing officer's recommended order -- all well in advance of the
final order.  At each stage of the proceedings, the council
provided notice and a hearing, and it accepted comments.  In
addition, the council conducted a contested case proceeding in
which petitioners and COB, with knowledge of the council's
proposed standards as articulated in the previous preliminary
orders, introduced evidence and presented lengthy oral and
written legal arguments.  All the versions of what was to become
the final order did more than simply state the standards that the
council intended to apply.  They also showed how those standards
would be applied with sufficient specificity to provide the
participants with informed notice and to enable them to make
meaningful comments, and the successive draft orders evolved in
response to those comments.  In sum, we conclude that the council
did not err in issuing the final order without conducting
rulemaking proceedings and that the council's procedures in this
case gave petitioners adequate notice of how the council was
proposing to apply the relevant statutes.
V. FINDINGS REGARDING CONDITIONAL USE CRITERIA
UNDER KLAMATH COUNTY LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE
Petitioners argue that substantial evidence does not
support the council's findings that form the basis for its
determination that the ASC met the conditional use criteria of
Klamath County LDC § 44.030C and LDC § 54.040C.  LDC § 44.030C
provides that conditional uses may be approved if "[t]he
location, size, design, and operating characteristics of the
proposed use will not have a significant adverse impact on the
livability, value or appropriate development of abutting
properties and the surrounding area."  LDC § 54.040C provides
that conditional uses are approvable if "[t]he location, size,
design, and operating characteristics of the proposed use will
not force a significant change in, or significantly increase the
cost of, accepted farm or forestry practices on nearby
agricultural or forest lands."
The council heard testimony from COB's agricultural and
soils expert that, although construction of the facility would
cause some adverse impacts to the soil, COB's proposed mitigation
plan would avoid, minimize, and mitigate impacts to soil and
existing agricultural practices.  COB's appraiser and land use
consultant testified that the proposed facility would not devalue
surrounding properties, that the majority of those properties
were agricultural and contained no residences, that "few homes
are situated within the project vicinity," and that only two
homesites would have a view of the facility.  The consultant also
testified that COB's purchase of surrounding lands provided a
"massive acreage buffer" between the proposed facility and
adjacent sites.  The Water Resources Department reviewed the
proposed facility's use of water and recommended that the council
find that that use would not injure or interfere with existing
agricultural uses of water.  Petitioners, on the other hand,
presented the testimony of a land use consultant who, based on
testimony from several of the petitioners, concluded that the
proposed facility would reduce property values and compromise the
rural lifestyles of neighboring property owners.
Based on that evidence, the council determined that
"[t]he location, size, design and operating characteristics of
the proposed use will not force a significant change in, or
significantly increase the cost of, accepted farm or forestry
practices on nearby agricultural or forest lands."  The council
further determined that the same testimony supported a finding
that those characteristics "will not have a significant adverse
impact on the livability, value or appropriate development of
abutting properties and the surrounding area."  Evidence in the
record, which we have summarized above, supported the council's
findings of fact.  The council did not err in concluding, based
on findings of fact that it made, that the ASC met the
conditional use criteria of Klamath County LDC § 44.030C and LDC
§ 54.040C. 
VI. SITING OF UTILITY FACILITIES ON EXCLUSIVE-FARM-USE LAND
As described earlier, the ASC contained proposals for
an energy generation facility, wastewater management
areas, (17) a natural gas pipeline, an electrical transmission
line, and a water supply system.  Petitioners contend that the
council erred in approving the construction of these ancillary
facilities in an area zoned for exclusive farm use (EFU) because
the council misconstrued the requirements of ORS 215.283 and ORS
215.296.
ORS 215.283 provides, in part:
"(1)  The following uses may be established in any
area zoned for exclusive farm use:
"* * * * * 
"(d)  Utility facilities necessary for public
service, including wetland waste treatment systems but
not including commercial facilities for the purpose of
generating electrical power for public use by sale or
transmission towers over 200 feet in height.  A utility
facility necessary for public service may be
established as provided in ORS 215.275.
"* * * * * 
"(y)  Subject to [certain other provisions,] the
land application of reclaimed water, agricultural or
industrial process water or biosolids for agricultural,
horticultural or silvicultural production, or for
irrigation in connection with a use allowed in an
exclusive farm use zone under this chapter.
"* * * * * 
"(2)  The following nonfarm uses may be
established, subject to the approval of the governing
body or its designee in any area zoned for exclusive
farm use subject to ORS 215.296:
"* * * * * 
"(g)  Commercial utility facilities for the
purpose of generating power for public use by sale."
(Emphasis added.)  
As shown above, ORS 215.283(1)(d) provides that
"utility facilities necessary for public service" are permitted
in an EFU-zoned area and refers to ORS 215.275 to determine
whether a utility facility is necessary for public
service. (18)  ORS 215.283(2)(g) provides that a "commercial
utility facilit[y] for the purpose of generating power for public
use by sale" may be sited in an EFU-zoned area, subject to ORS
215.296.  That statute, in turn, provides that a use under ORS
215.283(2) is approvable when it will not "[f]orce a significant
change in accepted farm or forest practices" on EFU or forest
lands or "[s]ignificantly increase the cost" of those practices. 
In enacting ORS 215.283, "the legislature intended that the uses
delineated in ORS 215.283(1) be uses 'as of right,' which may not
be subjected to additional local criteria," while "a county may
enact and apply legislative criteria of its own that supplement
those [uses] found in * * * ORS 215.283(2)."  Brentmar v. Jackson
County, 321 Or 481, 496, 900 P2d 1030 (1995).
The council reviewed the generation portion of the
energy facility as a conditional use under ORS 215.283(2)(g), the
wastewater management areas under ORS 215.283(1)(y), and the
other ancillary uses as uses as of right under ORS 215.283(1)(d). 
Petitioners contend that the council erred in analyzing the
ancillary uses as uses as of right.  Instead, petitioners argue
that the ancillary uses are both "commercial utility facilities
for the purpose of generating power for public use by sale" (ORS
215.283(2)(g)) and "utility facilities necessary for public
service" (ORS 215.283(1)(d)) and that, consequently, the council
should have reviewed those uses for compliance with both ORS
215.296 and ORS 215.275. (19)
Petitioners' interpretation is inconsistent with the
text of those statutes.  As noted above, ORS 215.283(1)(d)
expressly excludes from the application of that provision
"commercial [utility] facilities for the purpose of generating
electrical power for public use by sale," while ORS 215.283(2)(g)
expressly applies to "[c]ommerical utility facilities for the
purpose of generating power for public use by sale."  Therefore,
the generating portion of the facility, at least, may not be
subject to both provisions.  In addition, this court's decision
in Brentmar reviewed ORS 215.283 and determined that the
legislature intended to allow uses covered by ORS 215.283(1) as
of right and to subject uses covered by ORS 215.283(2) to
conditional use criteria.  That decision supports the conclusion
that subsections (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.
As noted, the council determined that the ancillary
facilities were "utility facilities necessary for public
service," while the energy generation portion of the project was
a "commercial utility facilit[y] for the purpose of generating
power for public use by sale."  The council based that
determination on its interpretation of the legislative history of
ORS 215.283.  That interpretation was summarized in the advice
that an assistant attorney general provided to the council and
which the council quoted and expressly relied on in its final
order:
 "It really gets to the history of the development of
the statutes governing non-farm uses on farm land. 
When those statutes were first adopted, there were five
categories of non-farm use that were allowed on farm
land.  One of those five categories was utility
facilities necessary for public service.  So at the
very outset in the farm use laws of Oregon we had this
provision allowing utility facilities on farm land[.] 
Then, about 10 years later, the legislature amended –-
made the first of many subsequent amendments to those
statutes, and * * * one of the things they did was
divide up the utility facility category [and] create[]
two subcategories.  One was for power plants, they made
that a conditional use[.] * * * We believe what that
history shows is general [legislative] intent * * * to
use [ORS] 215.283(1)(d) as what I would call a general
category for utility facilities, and then they've
created a number of specific subcategories for
particular types of utility facilities. * * * [P]ower
plants go in the [subsection] (2)(g) box, but because
the [ancillary facilities] originally would have been
in the [subsection] (1)(d) box, they stay there.  So
that's the basic advice we've given to the [c]ouncil
over the years."
We agree with the council that the statutes distinguish
between a commercial facility "for purposes of generating power,"
which is a conditional use under ORS 215.283(2)(g), and related
non-generation "[u]tility services necessary for public service,"
which are uses of right under ORS 215.283(1)(d).  We further
conclude that the council's findings of fact, on which it based
its determination that the facility met the conditional use
criteria of ORS 215.283(2)(g), are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.  The council did not err in interpreting
and applying those statutes here. VII.  GEOLOGIC AND SEISMIC STANDARDS
OAR 345-022-0020 requires the applicant for a site
certificate to "adequately characterize[]" the proposed site as
to seismic and geological hazards and to show that it can
"design, engineer, and construct" the facility to withstand those
hazards. (20)  To aid applicants in complying with that rule,
the council instructs them to submit "[i]nformation from
reasonably available sources regarding the geological and soil
stability of the site and vicinity[.]"  OAR 345-021-0010(1)(h). 
Both petitioners and COB presented expert testimony on those
issues.  COB's expert discussed the geotechnical exploration that
applicant had undertaken and described his modeling of "worst
case scenario" seismic activity at the proposed site.  He
testified that COB had completed all geological research
necessary to determine whether the proposed site was "generally
suitable for safe development of a power plant," but that
additional research would be necessary before constructing the
facility.  Petitioners' expert testified that COB should have
performed further geologic exploration and that COB's models
estimated the magnitude of a possible seismic event too
conservatively.  
The council found that COB had submitted all the
information that OAR 345-021-0010(1)(h) required and that the
preponderance of evidence in the record showed that COB had
complied with OAR 345-022-0020 by adequately characterizing the
site and showing that it could "design, engineer and construct
the facility to avoid dangers to human safety."  Although the
council found that the level of analysis was sufficient to comply
with OAR 345-022-0020, it also imposed conditions in the site
certificate that required COB to conduct further study. (21)
On review, petitioners argue that the council erred in
finding that COB had characterized the site adequately.  We
reject that argument because we find that substantial evidence in
the record supported the council's determination.  "In making [a]
determination [of substantial evidence], the probative weight to
be accorded the testimony of expert witnesses is for the trier of
fact to apportion."  Friends of Parrett Mountain, 336 Or at 105. 
When reviewing agency findings to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record, this court
defers to the factfinder's determination of the probative weight
to be accorded the testimony of expert witnesses.  Id. 
Petitioners' argument, in brief, is that the council credited
COB's expert rather than their own.  That decision was the
council's and provides no basis for this court to reverse the
council's conclusion that the applicant met the required
geological and seismic requirements.
VIII.  WATER RIGHTS
Finally, petitioners challenge the council's decision
to direct the Water Resources Commission to issue a water permit
to COB.  The council may grant an application for water rights if
it determines that the proposed use will "ensure the preservation
of the public welfare, safety and health."  ORS 537.621(2).  That
statute also creates a rebuttable presumption that a proposed
water permit will ensure the preservation of the public welfare,
safety and health when four conditions are met:  (1) the proposed
use is allowed under the "basin program" established under ORS
536.300 and 536.340 or given a preference under ORS 536.310, (2)
water is available, (3) the proposed use will not injure other
water rights, and (4) the use complies with rules of the Water
Resources Commission.  Id.  Petitioners challenge only the
council's finding that the proposed use will not injure other
water rights.  
COB proposed to use water from an existing well that
draws groundwater from a deeper level than any of the surrounding
wells.  Although COB asserted that there was no underground
connection between the deep well and the shallow wells,
hydrogeological testing suggested that there was some connection
between the two.  However, there also was expert testimony that
the limited connection was unlikely to have any measurable impact
on existing water rights.
The council determined that the water permit that COB
requested would not injure other water rights.  Its basis for
that determination was twofold.  First, the council found that
the evidence presented showed that any impact on surrounding
water users would be extremely small.  Second, the council
imposed conditions on the permit requiring COB to monitor the
impact of its deep well on the surrounding shallow wells and to
modify or cease its water use if monitoring revealed any
measurable impact.  The council considered petitioners'
objections and evidence that showed that the permit, even as
conditioned, could injure existing water rights.  However, it
determined that the evidence showing that existing water rights
would not be injured was more persuasive.  As we indicated in our
previous discussion, when there is conflicting evidence in the
record, the council has authority to determine which evidence to
credit.  Here, the council's determination that existing water
rights would not be injured was supported by substantial evidence
in the record. (22)
CONCLUSION
We have considered each of petitioners' assignments of
error.  We conclude that the council's analysis of the procedure
for evaluating the proposed facility's compliance with statewide
planning goals under ORS 469.504 was incorrect in part, but that
the council nevertheless correctly determined that the proposed
facility complied with that statute.  We further conclude that
the council did not commit other legal error and that its
challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
in the record.  
The order of the Energy Facility Siting Council is
affirmed.
1. 
As we describe below, the statewide land use planning
goals adopted by the Land Conservation and Development Commission
(LCDC) set out broad objectives for land use planning in Oregon. 
ORS 197.225 to 197.250.  Goal 3 generally aspires to preserve and
maintain agricultural lands for farm use.
2. 
The department accepted public comment during the period
preceding the draft proposed order, although it was not required
to do so.  See ORS 469.350 (describing required process).
3. 
Those conditions related to the construction process
for the proposed facility and the creation of a program to
monitor the proposed pipeline.
4. 
The council conducts contested case proceedings using a
hearings officer, but the final authority for approving or
disapproving a proposed facility rests with the council.
5. 
Although the county board made no recommendations, the
county's planning director, after the date set by the council and
without purporting to act on behalf of the county board, provided
the department with portions of the Klamath County Land
Development Code, zoning ordinances, and conditional-use
criteria.  He further stated in a letter to the council that COB
had addressed the applicable criteria to his satisfaction.
6. 
The council did not purport to apply ORS
469.504(1)(b)(C), and no party argues that the council should
have applied that subsection.
7. 
The phrase "applicable substantive criteria" also is
used in ORS 469.504(1)(b)(A) and (1)(b)(B).  Subsection (1)(b)(A)
clarifies that the legislature understood that phrase to denote
criteria "from the affected local government's acknowledged
comprehensive plan and land use regulations that are required by
the statewide planning goals and in effect on the date the
application is submitted[.]"  Because "use of the same term
throughout a statute indicates that the term has the same meaning
throughout the statute," PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), we determine that the
references to "applicable substantive criteria" in ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) and (5) also denote those local regulations. 
See also Columbia Steel Castings, Co. v. City of Portland, 314 Or
424, 430, 840 P2d 71 (1992) ("Generally, and in the absence of
some specific indication of a contrary intent, terms are read
consistently throughout a statute.").
8. 
For example, ORS 469.504(5) provides that if a special
advisory group recommends applicable substantive criteria for
certain energy facilities "that pass[] through more than one
jurisdiction or more than three zones in any one jurisdiction,"
then the council is to determine whether to apply the applicable
substantive criteria, the statewide planning goals, or "a
combination of the applicable substantive criteria and statewide
planning goals."  (Emphasis added.)
9. 
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(A) does require the council to find
that the facility complies with LCDC administrative rules and
goals and any land use statutes that are "directly applicable to
the facility under ORS 197.646(3)." 
10. 
The council may conduct its review under ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) only if the facility is one "that must be
evaluated against the applicable substantive criteria pursuant to
subsection (5)."  Petitioners do not argue that the proposed
facility does not meet this requirement.  In any event, ORS
469.504(5) authorized the council, if the special advisory group
failed to recommend any criteria, to "determine and apply the
applicable substantive criteria"; once that determination was
made, the facility was one that "must" be evaluated against the
applicable substantive criteria.  We conclude that ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) was an appropriate mechanism for reviewing the
proposed facility.
11. 
As discussed earlier, the term "applicable substantive
criteria" has the same meaning throughout ORS 469.504.  See ___
Or ___, n 7, (slip op at 14, n 7), supra.
12. 
ORS 197.732 describes exceptions to the statewide
planning goals that a local government may take.
13. 
Some of the proposed site rests on high-value farmland
and some on non-high-value farmland.  That distinction did not
influence the council's analysis because the 50.6-acre proposed
site exceeded the maximum acreage for both types of farmland.
14. 
As noted above, and contrary to petitioners' argument
here, ORS 469.504(2)(c)(A) does not require an alternatives
analysis.  Therefore, the council did not have to find that the
proposed site was the only workable site or even the best site;
it only had to find that reasons justified the use of that site.
15. 
Petitioners also argue that the council should have
taken an exception to Goal 4 because, under LDC § 55.040I and OAR
660-06-0025(4)(j), the transmission lines could not exceed a
total of 10 acres without an exception.  We disagree.  Those
provisions, which impose a limit on "power generation
facilit[ies]," do not apply here because the transmission lines,
vegetative maintenance zone, and access roads are not "power
generation facilit[ies]."  The power generation facility itself
is not located on forest lands.
16. 
Marbet addressed two statutes in particular:  former
ORS 469.470, which provided, in part, that the council shall
"[e]stablish standards and promulgate rules that applicants for
site certificates must meet including, but not limited to,
standards of financial ability and qualifications as to ability
to construct and operate the energy facility to which the site
certificate applies and prescribe the form[,]" and former ORS
469.510, which required the council to "set standards and
promulgate rules for safety, construction and operation of
thermal plants and nuclear installation[s.]"  Marbet, 277 Or at
458-59.
17. 
The council noted that COB was unsure whether it would
need the wastewater management areas, but it considered several
alternatives for disposing of wastewater and allowed their
construction if necessary.
18. 
ORS 215.275 provides:
"(1) A utility facility established under ORS
* * * 215.283(1)(d) is necessary for public service if
the facility must be sited in an exclusive farm use
zone in order to provide the service.
"(2) To demonstrate that a utility facility is
necessary, an applicant for approval under ORS
215.213(1)(d) or 215.283(1)(d) must show that
reasonable alternatives have been considered and that
the facility must be sited in an exclusive farm use
zone due to one or more of the following factors:
"(a) Technical and engineering feasibility;
"(b) The proposed facility is locationally
dependent. A utility facility is locationally dependent
if it must cross land in one or more areas zoned for
exclusive farm use in order to achieve a reasonably
direct route or to meet unique geographical needs that
cannot be satisfied on other lands;
"(c) Lack of available urban and nonresource
lands;
"(d) Availability of existing rights of way;
"(e) Public health and safety; and
"(f) Other requirements of state or federal agencies."
19. 
Petitioners' arguments are not entirely consistent. 
Elsewhere, they contend that the entire facility, including the
ancillary facilities, should be subject to conditional use
criteria under ORS 215.283(2)(g).  We address that contention in
our discussion below.
20. 
The council implemented that standard under its
statutory power to adopt "rules for the siting of energy
facilities pursuant to ORS 469.501."  ORS 469.470(2).
21. 
The council also imposed a condition in the site
certificate requiring COB to "design, engineer and construct the
facility to avoid dangers to human safety."  Petitioners
characterize that condition as a way of allowing COB to comply
with the requirements of OAR 345-022-0020 retroactively, after
the issuance of the site certificate.  We disagree.  OAR 345-022-0020 requires applicants to show that they "can design, engineer,
and construct the facility to avoid dangers to human safety"
(emphasis added); the council's condition requires the applicant
to follow through by designing, engineering, and constructing the
facility to meet that standard. 
22. 
We have discussed petitioners' primary arguments in
detail.  We also have considered petitioners' other challenges to
findings of fact made by the council and petitioners' other
arguments that the council committed legal error.  Those other
arguments are not well taken, and we do not discuss them further.