Title: IN RE HON CYNTHIA GRAY HATHAWAY

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 10, 2001  
IN RE HONORABLE CYNTHIA GRAY HATHAWAY, 
Judge of the Third Circuit Court, 
Detroit, Michigan.  
No. 112495  
______________________________________/  
PER CURIAM  
The 
Judicial 
Tenure 
Commission 
recommends 
that 
we 
suspend  
Wayne Circuit Judge Cynthia Gray Hathaway for thirty days,  
without pay, for misconduct in the performance of her judicial  
office.
 Because we conclude that the severity of the  
misconduct 
at 
issue 
warrants 
greater 
discipline 
than  
recommended, pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) and MCR  
9.225, we modify the recommendation of the commission and  
order that Judge Hathaway be suspended without pay for a  
period of six months.  
I  
Facts  
The recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission is  
based on its findings of fact.  In turn, those findings are  
adopted from findings made by the master.1  Specifically, the  
commission found that Judge Hathaway acted improperly in her  
handling of two cases, and in an overall lack of industry that  
was exemplified by a third case.2  
1 MCR 9.210, 9.215.  
2 The master further found that Judge Hathaway had 
committed judicial misconduct in her dispositive rulings in 
several cases that are not discussed in this opinion.  The  
commission rejected those findings, explaining:  
Based on the record before us, the decision­
 
 
 
A  
The first case is a drug prosecution, People v Spearman,  
in which Judge Hathaway conducted an arraignment at a Detroit  
police precinct.  With regard to this case, the commission  
adopted these findings of the master:  
Late in the afternoon of May 6, 1997, Attorney  
Otis 
Culpepper, 
criminal 
lawyer, 
called 
the  
Respondent at her home as she was arriving from 
work.  He advised that his client, Bruce John 
Spearman[,] had been arrested by the Detroit Police 
Department on a marijuana charge.  His client was  
on bond from federal district court on a drug 
charge.  Bond was $30,000 cash and required that he  
wear a tether. 
He further requested that  
Respondent come to the 7th District Precinct office 
and arraign the defendant so that he could be 
released 
and 
abide 
by 
the 
federal 
release  
restriction to be at his home by 7:30 in the 
evening.  Police Lt. Gary D. Hendrix and Attorney 
Otis Culpepper both testified that Respondent knew 
that there were additional drug charges, including 
cocaine 
and 
heroin, 
before 
the 
arraignment. 
Notwithstanding that, the arraignment took place on 
the 5th floor of the police precinct because there 
was an altercation in the lobby of the 1st floor. 
At the time of the arraignment, Respondent had no 
documentary evidence of the charges and arraigned 
the defendant on “a warrant for marijuana” only. 
At the time, however, Respondent had been informed 
by Lt. Gary D. Hendrix of the fact there was a 
warrant for cocaine and heroin.
 This was not  
mentioned in the arraignment.  Respondent fixed 
bond at $10,000, 10%. 
Bond was furnished by 
Attorney Culpepper and Defendant Spearman was  
released from custody and ordered to report the 
following day to fix a date for his preliminary 
examination.  
Defendant Spearman absconded on bond and was 
not arrested until January 21, 1998, in St. Louis, 
Mo., and returned to this jurisdiction.  
There was testimony that the ususal procedure 
on an arrest of this type was to detain the 
defendant and have him arraigned the following 
morning before a circuit judge or magistrate.  At  
that time, the police record and other information 
about the defendant and the crime would be  
available to have at the arraignment.  Respondent  
also knew that Christine A. Kowal, Assistant  
Prosecuting Attorney, was on her way to attend the 
arraignment and also knew that Sgt. Dwane Blackmon 
was on his way with a copy of the defendant’s 
police record.  Notwithstanding this, Respondent 
decided to go ahead with the arraignment because 
she had “waited long enough.”  She said that she  
was aware of the federal charge and bond and felt 
that a larger bond was not required under these 
circumstances.
 Both Lt. Hendrix and Assistant  
Prosecutor Kowal advised that they had never  
making by the judge in these specific cases is not 
a matter for a determination of judicial misconduct 
by the JTC.  It is not the responsibility of the 
JTC to function as an appellate court nor can  
erroneous decisions by a judge made in good faith 
and 
with 
diligence 
be 
grounds 
for 
judicial 
misconduct. MCR 9.203(B).  
2  
 
 
 
experienced an arraignment such as this before a 
circuit judge in the police precinct. 
Other  
attorneys and police officers testified that they 
never knew of such a proceeding and it was against 
all accepted procedures and court rules.  
On the basis of these findings, the commission reached  
the following conclusion:  
The arraignment conducted by the Respondent at 
the 7th Precinct headquarters in People v Spearman 
was inappropriate in that it was contrary to all 
practice and procedure under court rules and  
contrary to the practice and custom in Wayne 
County.  It was not conducted in court during 
normal business hours and was conducted without a  
prosecutor present. 
A questionable bond was  
established under the circumstances considering the 
crimes alleged.
 The entire procedure gave the 
appearance of impropriety, contrary to Canons 1, 2, 
and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and MCR  
9.205(A) and (C)(4).  
B  
The second case on which the commission’s recommendation  
for discipline is based is People v Crosse. With regard to  
Crosse, the commission adopted the following findings:  
Defendant Crosse, a middle-aged man who had 
retired to the Upper Peninsula, was charged with 
CSC-1 and CSC-2 by a teen-age girl who was a former 
neighbor.
 It was agreed between defendant’s  
counsel and Respondent that the cases against 
defendant in Macomb County would be tried first. 
He was acquitted of the Macomb County charges and 
Respondent attempted to induce Defendant Crosse to 
waive a jury so that the case could be expedited. 
Defendant Crosse, however, insisted upon a jury 
trial and Respondent threatened to put him in jail 
if he did not waive the jury.  
At approximately 11:00 a.m., April 28, 1997, 
when the case had not been called, defendant and 
his attorney left the courtroom, notifying the 
prosecutor that they were stepping out for a  
“cigarette” and would be available when the case 
was called.  Shortly thereafter the case was called 
and when the defendant and his attorney were not 
immediately in the courtroom and ready to proceed, 
Respondent ordered a habeas issued for the arrest 
of both the attorney and defendant.  
Within a few minutes, defendant appeared in 
the courtroom and Respondent had him arrested and 
detained in a restricted area of the courtroom.  
When defendant’s counsel returned, he was released. 
The trial did not start on that day, but on the 
following day, April 29, a jury was sworn and, 
again, the matter was adjourned until April 30, 
1997, at 9:00 a.m.  It was then adjourned to May 8, 
1997, and continued on May 12, 1997.  
Defendant’s attorney then filed a motion for a 
speedy trial to be heard on May 8, 1997.  
Respondent showed her anger at the hearing of this 
motion, 
and 
accused 
defendant’s 
counsel 
of  
“dishonesty” and cut him off from placing matters 
on the record.  Her anger was apparent to all in 
the courtroom, and the matter appeared to be 
delayed solely because of defendant’s resistance to  
3  
 
waive a jury.  
This was obviously prejudicial conduct on the 
Bench, which was apparent to all who were in the 
courtroom.  
With respect to Crosse, the commission reached this  
conclusion:  
Respondent’s conduct in the case of People v 
Crosse, wherein Respondent threatened to put 
defendant in jail if he did not waive his  
constitutional right to a jury trial, as well as 
questionable adjournments in view of defendant’s 
resistance to waive a jury, constituted a failure 
to properly perform Respondent’s judicial duties, 
as 
well 
as 
conduct 
prejudicial 
to 
the  
administration of justice, contrary to Canons 1, 2 
and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and MCR  
9.205(A) and (C)(4).  
C  
The third basis for the commission’s recommendation of  
discipline is a problem noted in connection with Crosse- -a  
remarkable pattern of adjourning cases and failing to attend  
in timely fashion to the business of the court. An example is  
the handling of a case called People v Ketchings. Here, the  
commission adopted the following findings of the master:  
Defendant 
Ketchings 
was 
one 
of 
four  
co-defendants accused in a shooting death of a 
9-year old girl. Separate trials were set for the 
four defendants. Respondent tried the first three, 
who were convicted and given extended prison 
sentences.  The Ketchings matter was finally set 
for trial for December 9, 1996. The attorneys were 
ready for trial, efforts were made to negotiate a 
plea which were unsuccessful, and Respondent 
adjourned the trial until January 30, 1997. Both  
the attorneys were ready to proceed on that date. 
The matter was adjourned because Respondent said 
“She did not feel like hearing it” on that date and 
later recused herself. The attorneys then went to 
Chief Judge Michael Sapala, who attempted to induce 
the 
Respondent 
to 
try 
the 
matter 
but 
was  
unsuccessful.  When the attorneys returned to the 
courtroom, Respondent recused herself on the basis 
that she could no longer be impartial because she 
had tried the other three defendants. 
Both  
attorneys tried to persuade her to proceed with the 
trial since she would not be the trier of the facts  
and would only have to make rulings upon the 
evidence. Respondent refused to try it.  
The case was thereafter assigned to Judge 
Harvey Tennen, who because of the substantial 
delay, was compelled to release Defendant Ketchings 
pending trial. There had been no evidence that she  
was going to recuse herself or had even thought 
about it when she reset the case on December 9, 
1996, to be tried on January 30, 1997, so another 
trial date was set.  
Some of the problems with scheduling and 
finding that the case was adjourned were vividly 
set forth by Lisa Lindsey, Special Assignment, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney in the Ketchings  
4  
 
 
case.  
“Well, the adjournments on the Ketchings case, 
you have to take into combination with the other 
codefendants.  All the witnesses were the same on  
each case, and as it relates to having witnesses 
who are cooperative, having witnesses who are 
available, it really impacted on the witnesses 
because the witnesses would come down. 
Even the  
police witnesses they would come down. They would 
be there and nothing-
--and it wouldn’t go. And the  
witnesses-
--I know specifically in the civilian 
witnesses, we had a lot of trouble with the  
civilian witnesses. We had to get bench warrants 
for the civilian witnesses in order to get them in.  
“At some points, I was literally begging the 
witnesses to show up for the next hearing. 
The  
witnesses would curse me out, and it just-
--and  
then, you know, they would just-
--they would  
cuss-
--curse me out. 
I mean, you know, they’d be 
very profane, very upset. 
They’d complain that 
they were taking off from work, not getting paid. 
The victim’s mom, she was always very, very upset.  
“And then you would have-
--when the witnesses  
would come down, every time the witnesses would be 
there, the defendant’s family and friends would be 
there, and there would always be a situation where 
in the hallways you would worry about whether a 
fight was going to break out between the victim’s 
family and the defendant’s friends and family. 
They’d be out there wolfing [sic]. 
When I say 
wolfing, it’s a slang term, you know, for talking 
back and forth at each other and things of that 
nature. So it was difficult.”  
These are clear violations of the statute and  
Canons of judicial conduct and prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.  
In addition to the facts pertinent to Ketchings, the  
master made additional findings regarding Judge Hathaway’s  
handling of her docket and her apparent pattern of absence.  
In this respect, the master relied on a report submitted in  
1996 by Susan B. Boynton of the State Court Administrative  
Office.
 The contents of this report, which Ms. Boynton  
confirmed in her testimony at the hearing, included this:  
Examination of the daily court sheets in the 
Systems Department at Recorder’s Court presents 
another possible theory for the increase in  
adjournments.  For many days during the summer, all  
proceedings 
were 
adjourned 
and 
the 
judge’s 
signature was stamped at the bottom of the daily 
court sheets, not signed as required by the  
Recorder’s Court Docket Control Directive 93-5 (see 
attachment 2).[3]  The same Directive requires the  
3  
Docket Control Directive: DCD No. 93-5  
Date: February 1, 1993 
Re: Maintenance of Records on Court Sheets  
1.  Each judge shall personally sign the court 
sheets recording each day’s activity.  
5  
court clerk to indicate on the court sheet if the  
judge takes an unanticipated leave for vacation or 
illness.  There were no indications on the court  
sheets in those months and no leave of any type 
reflected 
in 
the 
Recorder’s 
Court 
official  
attendance 
record 
[4] 
for Judge Hathaway during those  
months.  
If judicial leave cannot explain the high 
number of days when all or most of the proceedings 
were adjourned, then the possibility exists that 
Judge Hathaway was choosing not to do the scheduled 
work in her courtroom. For example, June, 1996 had 
20 working days. The court sheets are missing for 
two days, six days had all matters adjourned and 
four days had most proceedings adjourned.  Trial  
activity occurred on three days during the month, 
resulting in one guilty verdict and one mistrial.  
August, 1996 shows a similar pattern of work 
habits.  No official leave is recorded, yet nine of 
the 19 working days on the court sheets showed that 
all matters were adjourned and on another two days 
most matters were adjourned.  There was no trial  
activity in August other than a plea at a scheduled 
jury trial.  
In light of the facts pertaining to Ketchings and Judge  
Hathaway’s more generalized failure to perform the duties of  
office, the commission reached this conclusion:  
Respondent’s 
constant 
and 
repeated 
adjournments of proceedings without good cause, as 
exemplified in the case of People v Ketchings, as 
well as repeated unnecessary and unexcused absences 
from judicial responsibilities during normal court 
hours were inappropriate.  Likewise, Respondent’s 
overall lack of industry and proper management of 
her court docket as well as an unwillingness to 
take corrective action or accept constructive  
suggestions 
or 
assistance 
to 
improve 
case  
management, 
constituted 
a 
hindrance 
to 
the  
administration of justice and gave the appearance 
of impropriety, all contrary to Canons 1 and 3 of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct and MCR 9.205(A) and 
(C)(2) and (4).  
D  
The overall conclusion of the commission was that Judge  
Hathaway “has committed misconduct in office, in violation of  
MCR 9.205(C), and violated the provisions of Canons 1, 2 and  
3 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct.”  Without  
2. If the judge takes an unanticipated leave 
for vacation or illness, it should be indicated by 
the court clerk on the court sheet.  If the judge 
comes in and leaves because of illness or other  
business, that should also be indicated on the  
court sheet.  
3.  In the absence of a judge on pretrial day, 
a court clerk may not set subsequent proceeding 
dates and indicate on the court sheets that  
pretrial was held.  
4 The record of this case does not contain the “official  
attendance record.”  
6  
additional explanation, the commission then recommended that  
this Court accept its findings of judicial misconduct and  
impose a thirty-day suspension without pay.5  
II  
In lieu of acting upon that recommendation, we remanded  
this case to the commission “for the articulation of standards  
of 
judicial 
discipline, and the application of those standards  
to the instant case, in order that this Court can meaningfully  
carry out its powers of judicial review under Const 1963, art  
6, § 30(2).  See In re Brown, [461 Mich 1291 (2000)].” 461  
Mich 1296 (2000).  
On remand, the commission renewed its recommendation of  
a thirty-day suspension without pay. The commission did not  
provide 
further 
elaboration of its reasoning, noting that “the  
composition 
of 
the 
Commission 
has 
changed 
substantially” 
since  
its initial recommendation. The commission added:  
In the future the Commission will, to the 
extent possible, cite additional factors which may 
facilitate the Supreme Court’s review of sanctions 
imposed by the Commission.  
This Court then placed the case on its calendar,6 and  
directed the parties to brief the issue “whether the proposed  
suspension 
of 
thirty 
days without pay is sufficient discipline  
in this case.” 462 Mich 1233, 463 Mich 1201 (2000).  
III  
The Judicial Tenure Commission was established in 1968  
when the people of Michigan amended the constitution to add a  
§ 30 to article 6.  When the commission comes to this Court  
with a recommendation for discipline, it invokes the Court’s  
jurisdiction under Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2), which provides:  
On recommendation of the judicial tenure  
commission, the supreme court may censure, suspend 
with or without salary, retire or remove a judge 
for conviction of a felony, physical or mental 
disability which prevents the performance of  
judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent 
failure 
to 
perform 
his 
duties, 
habitual  
intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.  The supreme 
court shall make rules implementing this section 
and providing for confidentiality and privilege of  
5 Eight of the nine commission members heard this matter. 
All eight concurred in the recommendation.  
6 MCR 9.224(C), (F).  
7  
 
 
proceedings.  
Under 
this 
Court’s 
constitutional 
authority 
to 
make 
rules  
implementing Const 1963, art 6, § 30, we promulgated GCR 1963,  
932 in early 1969.7
 381 Mich lxxxiii (1969). 
When the  
General Court Rules of 1963 were replaced in 1985 by the  
Michigan Court Rules, the provisions of GCR 1963, 932 were  
placed in separate rules within subchapter 9.200. 419A Mich  
552-569 (1985).  
When this Court receives a disciplinary recommendation  
from the commission, it has authority to “censure, suspend  
with or without pay, retire or remove” a judge.8  Const 1963,  
art 6, § 30(2).  On receipt of such a recommendation, this  
Court undertakes a de novo review of the matter.  In re  
Ferrara, 458 Mich 350, 358; 582 NW2d 817 (1998).  This review  
occurs whether or not the respondent judge files a petition  
with this Court. MCR 9.224(A), (C).  
In 1969, when this Court exercised its constitutional  
rulemaking authority under Const 1963, art 6, § 30 by  
implementing GCR 1963, 932, we included this subrule:  
The Supreme Court shall review the record of 
the proceedings on the law and facts and shall file 
a written opinion and judgment directing censure, 
removal, 
retirement, 
suspension, 
or 
other  
disciplinary action as it finds just and proper, or 
reject or modify, in whole or in part, the  
recommendations of the commission. 
[GCR 1963, 
932.25.]  
That subrule was not amended until 1985, when it was  
replaced by MCR 9.225:  
The Supreme Court shall review the record of 
the proceedings and shall file a written opinion 
and judgment which may direct censure, removal, 
retirement, suspension, or other disciplinary 
action, or reject or modify the recommendations of  
7 
 We earlier had promulgated GCR 1963, 931 as a 
transitional rule. 381 Mich lxxxii (1968).  
8 
 Independent of Const 1963, art 6, § 30, which the 
people of Michigan added to the constitution in 1968, this 
Court has general superintending control of all Michigan 
courts.  Const 1963, art 6, § 4.  This provision is a broad 
grant of constitutional authority to take necessary action, 
short of the outright removal of a judge.  See In re Probert, 
411 Mich 210, 229-233; 308 NW2d 773 (1981).  See also In re  
Huff, 352 Mich 402; 91 NW2d 613 (1958) and the discussion of 
Huff by the framers of the 1963 constitution. 
1 Official  
Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1269-1287. In the  
present case, there is no need to explore the nature or 
dimensions of this Court’s authority under Const 1963, art 6, 
§ 4.  
8  
 
 
 
 
the commission.  
The court rule states our authority to modify a  
recommendation of the commission, and the meaning of the word  
”modify” encompasses authority to alter the recommended  
discipline.  
Random 
House 
Webster’s 
College 
Dictionary 
defines  
“modify” as follows:  
[T]o change somewhat the form or qualities of; 
alter partially; amend; to modify a contract. RANDOM  
HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 843 (2nd ed. 1997).9  
Our respect for the judgment of the men and women who  
have served on the commission is substantial, and to date we  
have not had occasion to increase the discipline recommended  
for a respondent judge-
--we likewise anticipate that few such  
occasions will arise in the future. 
Yet our authority to  
increase the recommended discipline is clear.10  
9 The dissent purports to rely upon two dictionary 
definitions 
that 
seemingly restrict the meaning of “modify” to 
its “limiting” sense. Both of the dictionaries the dissent  
references, however, include the definition of “modify” we 
rely upon here.  
10 There is no indication that the use of the term  
“modify” was intended to permit or preclude this Court from 
altering the recommended discipline so as to adequately 
address the nature of the ethical infraction at issue.  
Illustratively, the term “modify”, if construed to mean that 
this Court could only reduce a sanction recommended by the 
JTC, would, in our judgment, deny this Court the ability to 
fairly and effectively carry out its obligations under MCR 
9.225 to “review” the JTC’s record and to file a “written  
opinion and judgment” in accord with that review. 
As we  
recently observed in an order of remand to the JTC:  
The most fundamental premise of the rule of 
law is that equivalent misconduct should be treated 
equivalently . . . it is the burden of the JTC to 
persuade this Court that it is responding to 
equivalent cases in an equivalent manner and to 
unequivalent cases in a proportionate manner. In  
other words, to demonstrate that there is a  
consistently enforced system of judicial discipline 
in Michigan.  
* * *  
The importance of such standards is both in 
ensuring that the JTC is consistent in its  
consideration of factors relevant to the level of  
sanctions, and in enabling this Court, by its 
constitutional obligation, to meaningfully review 
the JTC’s recommendations. In re Brown, 461 Mich 
1291, 1292 (2000).  
Just as there is an obligation upon the JTC, derived from 
the fundamental “rule of law”, to sanction in an equivalent 
and proportionate manner, so too does this Court have such an 
obligation under MCR 9.225.  Satisfying this obligation would  
not be possible if this Court could only “modify” the 
recommended sanctions of the JTC in a downward manner. Unless  
“modify” is given its ordinary meaning, to change or to alter,  
9  
 
That we have authority to alter the recommended  
discipline is bolstered by the persuasive decision of the  
Washington Supreme Court in In re Disciplinary Proceeding  
against Anderson, 138 Wash 2d 830; 981 P2d 426 (1999).  
Working 
from 
a 
similar 
grant 
of 
constitutional 
authority,11 
the  
Washington Supreme Court considered a recommendation from the  
state’s Commission on Judicial Conduct12 that a judge be  
suspended without pay for four months and required to take a  
specified “course of corrective action.”  138 Wash 2d 840.  
For reasons stated at length by the Washington Supreme Court,  
it decided instead to remove the judge from office. 138 Wash  
2d 854.  With regard to its authority to take such action, the  
Washington Supreme Court explained:  
This court reviews judicial disciplinary 
proceedings de novo.  In re Discipline of Deming, 
108 Wash 2d 82, 87-89; 736 P2d 639; 744 P2d 340 
(1987). De novo review of judicial disciplinary 
proceedings requires an independent evaluation of 
the record as the court is not bound by the 
Commission's 
findings 
or 
conclusions. 
In 
re  
Discipline of Turco, 137 Wash 2d 227, 246; 970 P2d 
731 (1999). De novo review does not mean that the  
Supreme Court conducts a new evidentiary hearing. 
Rather, this court must independently determine if 
the judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
and, if so, the proper sanction to be imposed.  Id.  
The Commission bears the burden of proving factual 
findings by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 
Id.  In evaluating the evidence, we necessarily  
give 
considerable 
weight 
to 
credibility  
the 
simultaneous 
pursuit 
of 
equivalence 
and 
proportionality 
in 
this Court’s review of the recommendations of the JTC, would, 
in many cases, be unattainable.  Because we do not believe  
that these objectives are in tension with one another, or that 
there are occasions on which we should be constrained by one 
from 
achieving 
the 
other, “modify” is properly interpreted, in 
our judgment, to enable either upward or downward changes in 
the recommendations of the JTC.  
11  
Upon the recommendation of the commission, the 
supreme court may suspend, remove, or retire a 
judge or justice.  The office of a judge or justice 
retired or removed by the supreme court becomes 
vacant, and that person is ineligible for judicial 
office until eligibility is reinstated by the 
supreme court.  The salary of a removed judge or  
justice shall cease. The supreme court shall  
specify the effect upon salary when it suspends a 
judge or justice. The supreme court may not  
suspend, remove, or retire a judge or justice until 
the 
commission, 
after 
notice 
and 
hearing, 
recommends that action be taken, and the supreme 
court conducts a hearing, after notice, to review 
commission proceedings and findings against the 
judge or justice. [Wash Const, art 4, § 31(5).]  
12 As in Michigan, the Washington commission is itself a 
creature of the constitution. Wash Const, art 4, § 31(1).  
10  
  
determinations by the Commission, as the body that 
had the opportunity directly to observe the  
witnesses and their demeanor.  Id. Additionally, 
we give serious consideration to the Commission's 
recommended sanctions. 
In re Discipline of  
Ritchie, 123 Wash 2d 725; 870 P2d 967 (1994). 
Nevertheless, the Commission's recommendation is  
just that.  The constitution's use of the word  
“recommend” indicates an intent to place the  
ultimate decision to discipline in the Supreme 
Court. 
Deming, 108 Wash 2d at 88.  [138 Wash 2d 
843 (emphasis supplied).]  
IV  
We explained in Ferrara that “[o]ur primary concern in  
determining the appropriate sanction is to restore and  
maintain the dignity and impartiality of the judiciary and to  
protect the public.” 458 Mich 372. Thus, we chose a course  
of discipline that was “based on the nature, extent, and  
frequency of the misconduct.” 458 Mich 373.  
Earlier, we had said this in In re Hocking, 451 Mich 1,  
24; 546 NW2d 234 (1996):  
In assessing the appropriate sanction in  
judicial disciplinary proceedings, our primary 
charge is to fashion a penalty that maintains the 
honor and the integrity of the judiciary, deters 
similar conduct, and furthers the administration of 
justice.  See In re Seitz, 441 Mich 590, 624; 495 
NW2d 559 (1993).  
In this Court’s Brown decision, we listed the following  
standards, though not an exhaustive list, that the JTC shall  
consider in making its recommendation:  
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or 
practice is more serious than an isolated instance 
of misconduct;  
(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more 
serious than the same misconduct off the bench;  
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the 
actual administration of justice is more serious 
than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the 
appearance of propriety;  
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the 
actual administration of justice, or its appearance 
of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct 
that does;  
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is 
less serious than misconduct that is premeditated 
or deliberated;  
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of 
the justice system to discover the truth of what 
occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the 
most just result in such a case, is more serious 
than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;  
(7) misconduct that involves the unequal 
application of justice on the basis of such  
11  
 
 
considerations as race, color, ethnic background, 
gender, or religion is more serious than breaches 
of justice that do not disparage the integrity of 
the system on the basis of a class of citizenship. 
Brown, supra, at 1292-1293 (2000).  
In its Anderson decision, the Washington Supreme Court  
elaborated on similar criteria.13  
In the present case, we cannot agree with the commission  
that a thirty-day suspension without pay is sufficient  
discipline.  Applying the Brown standards to the instant case,  
we believe that the course of sustained judicial misconduct  
that 
this 
record 
reveals 
requires 
stronger 
disciplinary 
action  
than 
the 
thirty-day 
suspension without pay that Judge Hathaway  
consented to and which the JTC recommended to this Court.  In  
particular, we conclude that Judge Hathaway’s protracted  
refusal to attend to her judicial duties has worked an  
injustice, not only upon the defendants charged with crimes  
who had every legitimate expectation that their cases would be  
handled expeditiously by the court, but also the witnesses in  
those matters, the very people on whom our system of justice  
depends.  The repeated unexplained adjournments of matters  
pending before Judge Hathaway have worked an injury upon the  
public and potentially contributed to the increasing cynicism  
about our judicial system, its efficacy and fairness.  
The circumstances of the arraignment in Spearman were  
utterly irregular.  The confusion regarding the charges  
against Mr. Spearman and regarding the advisability of  
facilitating his release were the direct result of Judge  
13 In determining the appropriate sanction for judicial 
misconduct, the court considers:  
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated  
instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the 
nature, extent and frequency of occurrence of the 
acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct 
occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether 
the misconduct occurred in the judge's official 
capacity or in his private life; (e) whether the 
judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts 
occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an 
effort to change or modify his conduct; (g) the 
length of service on the bench; (h) whether there 
have been prior complaints about this judge; (i) 
the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of 
and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent 
to which the judge exploited his position to 
satisfy his personal desires. Deming, 108 Wash 2d 
at 119-120. [138 Wash 2d 854-855.]  
12  
 
 
Hathaway’s 
inexplicable decision to place the interests of Mr.  
Spearman and his counsel, Mr. Culpepper, ahead of all other  
interests, including protection of the public. We employ the  
term “inexplicable” advisedly, since no remotely convincing  
explanation has yet been tendered for the handling of the  
Spearman arraignment, nor can we imagine one.  
The improper effort to persuade Mr. Crosse to waive his  
right to a jury trial is another example of a serious one-time  
breach of Judge Hathaway’s responsibility to use her judicial  
power lawfully. However, it surely was connected to a more  
serious problem that was ongoing-
--her prolonged failure to  
attend in timely fashion to the business of her court.  
Ketchings was chosen by the commission as an example of  
a case in which Judge Hathaway’s refusal to do her work caused  
profound suffering for the family of the victim and outrageous  
inconvenience for the witnesses. 
However, it is only an  
example.
 The record of this case amply demonstrates the  
remarkable 
extent 
of 
Judge Hathaway’s failure to discharge her  
judicial duties. We are not talking here of a failure to move  
papers or to file administrative reports. 
Nor are we talking  
about a judge having “a bad day”-
--or several. Rather, this  
disciplinary proceeding concerns a judge who has simply  
declined over an extended period to do her work.  
Again citing Ketchings only as an example, the record  
reflects twenty-one adjournments, five initiated by the  
defense, none by the prosecution, and sixteen by the court.  
After all this, the parties gathered for trial on January 30,  
1997, only to be advised by Judge Hathaway that another  
adjournment would occur because “I just don’t feel like doing  
it.”  Judge Hathaway then inexplicably recused herself from  
the case, causing still more delay. The assistant prosecutor  
described the mother of the nine-year-old victim as  
“devastated” by the events of January 30. 
This record  
establishes, if not a pattern of deliberate misconduct,  
capricious conduct shockingly lacking in appropriate judicial  
deliberation.  
This is indefensible conduct. 
A judge’s whimsical  
13  
 
 
 
decision whether to work on a particular day, or during  
particular months, cannot take precedence over the affairs  
brought to the courthouse by the people for resolution.  
As with Spearman, we are further troubled by the absence  
of any plausible explanation for this conduct.  Judge Hathaway  
generally denies excessive absences, and relies on the fact  
that her docket is reported to be current at this time.  
Absent some understanding of why these problems occurred, or  
even a direct acknowledgment that such a situation existed, we  
see no reasonable basis for assuming that these problems are  
safely behind her.14  
For 
these 
reasons, 
we 
disagree 
with 
the 
JTC’s  
recommendation that respondent be suspended only thirty days  
without pay. In our judgement, the conduct of respondent is  
deserving of far more serious discipline that is in keeping  
with severity of the breach of standards of judicial conduct  
demonstrated in this record. The discipline sanction should  
(1) first and foremost impress upon the respondent the  
severity and significance of her misconduct and (2) serve as  
a strong motivation to deter her from future misconduct.  
Highly relevant to our determination is the fact that Judge  
Hathaway has never on this record acknowledged the nature of  
her misconduct, or the deleterious effect that it has had on  
the persons who appeared before her, or on the public’s  
perception of the judiciary.  
We conclude that our disciplinary goals will be best  
served if Judge Hathaway is suspended without pay for a period  
of six months.15  
14 Indeed, the only 
Brown criterion not implicated in this 
record is criterion seven. There is no evidence that any of 
Judge Hathaway’s actions or inactions were predicated upon 
consideration of race, sex or any other impermissible 
characteristic.  
15 Likewise, in In re Moore we ordered that Judge Moore 
be suspended for a period of six months without pay.  We  
recognize that the Brown standards, as applied to the conduct 
of 
Judges 
Hathaway 
and 
Moore, 
support 
proportionate 
sanctions. 
A six-month suspension without pay is justified in Moore  
because of Judge Moore’s pattern of misconduct extending over 
a period of twenty years.  Though Judge Hathaway’s misconduct 
occurred over a shorter period of time in comparison to that 
of Judge Moore, we believe a six-month suspension is justified 
because of the troubling nature of Judge Hathaway’s conduct. 
Accordingly, 
the 
misconduct engaged in by both Judges Hathaway  
14  
 
 
 
V  
The dissent contends that this Court does not have the  
constitutional 
authority 
to 
increase 
the 
discipline  
recommended by the JTC.  In fact, the dissent suggests that to  
do so violates our duty to the constitution. We believe, to  
the 
contrary, 
that 
the dissent’s position is inconsistent with  
the constitution.  The dissent’s view results in partial  
“immunization” of JTC decisions from accountability to any  
elected branch of government and is contrary to the central  
organizing principle of constitutional government–control by  
the citizens, either indirectly (election of legislators,  
executive or judicial officers all of whom are accountable for  
their actions and the actions of their agents) or directly  
(initiative or referendum) of all aspects of government.  
Under the dissent’s approach, the JTC, selected not by the  
people but by lower court judges, the State Bar of Michigan,  
and the Governor,16 could conceivably give mild wrist slaps to  
seriously 
misbehaving judges, and no one that reports directly  
to the people, no member of this Court, no legislator, and no  
Governor could do a thing about it.  Such a departure from  
fundamental constitutional theory, namely, a departure from  
electoral accountability, should be a power found only if very  
clearly stated in the constitution.
 We do not have that  
situation here.  Indeed, the dissent’s position can only be  
attained by torturing the definition of the word “modify,”  
suggesting that it only means a downward departure.  
This is an interesting position for the author of the  
dissent to advocate, given that only six months ago he voted  
to increase a JTC recommended sanction.  See In re Runco, 463  
Mich 517, 518; 620 NW2d 844 (2001), the very thing he today  
says is constitutionally forbidden.  In that matter, Judge  
and Moore are equally deserving of a six-month sanction.  
16 Pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 30, the JTC has nine 
members, one Court of Appeals judge elected by the Court of 
Appeals judges, one circuit judge elected by the circuit 
judges, one probate judge elected by the probate judges, one 
district court judge elected by the district judges, three 
members elected by the state bar of whom one shall be a judge 
and two shall not be judges, and two members are appointed by 
the Governor who shall not be judges, retired judges or 
members of the state bar.  
15  
 
 
  
Runco was brought before this Court by the JTC with the  
recommendation being a censure. 
We affirmed. 
Justice  
Cavanagh, however, in dissent effectively asserted that the  
sanction be “modified” upward from a censure to thirty days.  
Id. at 524. A penalty, not to belabor the obvious, that was  
considerably more severe than that recommended by the JTC.  
As to the dissent’s analysis, after deconstructing the  
definition of the word “modify” to claim it only allows a  
downward departure (see n 9), it then urges that the language  
“[o]n recommendation of the judicial tenure commission”  
suggests that “[t]his Court’s actions in judicial discipline  
cases that are not ‘on recommendation’ of the JTC are actions  
. . . not authorized by the constitution.”  Slip op pp 3-4.  
However, the dissent’s argument is effectively undermined by  
its further insistence that an increase from the JTC’s  
recommended discipline is not “on recommendation” of the JTC,  
but that a decrease from the JTC’s recommended discipline is  
“on recommendation” of the JTC.  We do not understand how the  
dissent 
can, 
consistent with the constitution, vote in support  
of a decrease in the discipline recommended by the JTC,17 yet  
maintain that it is unconstitutional for this Court to  
increase the JTC’s recommended discipline.18  
17 See In re Simmons, 444 Mich 781; 513 NW2d 425 (1994).  
In 
Simmons, 
this 
Court 
rejected 
the 
commission’s  
recommendation of a public censure and did not impose any 
punishment.  
18 The dissent's theory of what "on recommendation" means 
can only be described as a "ratchet construction"—one that 
proceeds in only one direction.  The dissent urges that the 
Mikesell matter, in which this Court rejected the JTC's  
recommendation 
of 
permanent removal in favor of a time-limited 
suspension, 
was 
nonetheless 
a 
decision 
made 
"on  
recommendation" "because the more severe discipline, or more 
bases of misconduct, recommended by the JTC necessarily 
include lower levels of discipline and the bases of misconduct 
recommended, but not accepted."  Slip op, p 5 n 1 (emphasis  
added).  
Apart from the fact that this explanation has a certain 
impenetrable Alice in Wonderland logic about it, and leaving 
aside that judicial discipline jurisprudence recognizes no 
"lesser included offenses," the dissent's argument is  
internally inconsistent.  If this Court rejects the JTC  
recommendation 
and 
interposes a lower level of discipline, the 
Court has not acted on the recommendation as the dissent  
contends.  On the contrary, if the dissent's argument were 
truly consistent, then when, as in Mikesell, this Court 
rejects some of the bases for discipline the JTC relied upon, 
the Court would then be obligated to remand the case to the 
JTC for a new recommendation concerning the remaining acts of  
16  
 
Indeed, consistent with Justice Cavanagh’s own voting  
record, we are convinced that the phrase “on recommendation”  
is an expression on how the judicial discipline process is  
initiated.  Once the JTC makes a recommendation of discipline,  
this Court may accept or reject that recommendation.  Inherent  
in our authority to reject a JTC recommendation is the option  
to decide the appropriate discipline to impose, whether it be  
an 
affirmance, 
a 
reduction, 
or 
an 
increase 
in 
the  
recommendation of the JTC.19  
It is also noteworthy that the dissent has no response to  
the anomalous situation, identified in note 10, in which this  
Court would find itself if “modify” were interpreted only to  
refer to a downward change in sanction.  We would be precluded  
in many instances from achieving both equivalence and  
proportionality in our sanctions, instead necessarily having  
to subordinate one or the other of these fundamental judicial  
values in favor of the other. In fact, the most that can be  
argued by one holding the position that no upward departure is  
constitutionally allowed—and it has been said by none other  
than 
Justice 
Cavanagh 
himself—is 
that 
increasing the  
recommended 
suspension 
has 
“never 
directly 
[been] 
addressed 
by  
this Court before” (except of course, in Justice Cavanagh’s  
dissent in Runco). See Hathaway, 463 Mich 1201 (2000).  This  
case presents a question of original impression, rather than  
as the dissent would characterize it, a departure from an  
unbroken line of cases for thirty-three years that have held  
contrary to today’s majority.  Only if “modify” is accorded  
the meaning adopted by the majority can this Court  
simultaneously achieve both of these indispensable ends.  
Finally, we could not disagree more with the dissent that  
Judge Hathaway was not aware of the possibility that “the  
harshest discipline” she might face may go beyond that  
misconduct.
 Neither the dissent nor this Court has  
interpreted the Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) in this fashion and 
nothing in that provision compels such a construction.  
19 The dissent’s position would also preclude this Court 
from being able to ensure fairness and proportionality across 
discipline cases. See footnote 10.  
17  
 
 
 
recommended by the JTC.  Slip op, p 15. Judge Hathaway fully  
contested the charges at every level available to her at the  
JTC.  In this Court’s July 26, 2000, order directing that this  
case be placed on the calender for oral argument and also  
directing the parties to address the sufficiency of the  
recommended 
discipline, 
Judge 
Hathaway 
was 
fully 
apprised 
that  
she might face an increased sanction from that recommended by  
the JTC.  See 463 Mich 1201 (2000). Even in the dissenting  
statement prepared by Justice Cavanagh, when this matter was  
set for oral argument, Judge Hathaway was provided with  
further notice of the possibility that this Court might not  
believe a thirty-day suspension is justifiable and that  
increased sanctions might be forthcoming.  Here is what  
Justice Cavanagh said:  
I can only assume that implicit in this 
Court’s order is the issue whether this Court  
has the authority to increase any discipline 
recommended by the Judicial Tenure Commission, 
an issue of great significance and one never 
directly addressed by this Court before. 463  
Mich 1201 (2000). Id.  
Indeed, Judge Hathaway’s brief addressed the issue whether  
this Court had the authority to increase the recommended  
suspension and the issue was explored further when we heard  
oral argument.  We believe that there was no question that  
Judge Hathaway was aware of the potential for an increased  
sanction from that recommended by the JTC.  
For these reasons, we do not agree with the dissent.  
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to  
issue the judgment order forthwith.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
18  
_____________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
IN RE HONORABLE CYNTHIA GRAY HATHAWAY, 
Judge of the Third Circuit Court, 
Detroit, Michigan.  
No. 112495  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result and the reasoning of parts I  
through IV of the majority opinion.  
________________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
IN RE HONORABLE CYNTHIA GRAY HATHAWAY, 
Judge of the Third Circuit Court, 
Detroit, Michigan.  
No. 112495  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
With its decision in this case, this Court departs from  
thirty-three years of precedent to assert that it has the  
constitutional authority to impose a level of discipline that  
exceeds the discipline recommended by the Judicial Tenure  
Commission.  It does so in a matter that the JTC has twice  
considered and in which twice a unanimous JTC and the  
respondent 
Judge 
Hathaway have agreed on the appropriate level  
of discipline.  I do not believe that this Court has the  
constitutional 
authority 
to 
increase 
the 
discipline  
recommended by the JTC and, accordingly, I must respectfully  
dissent.  
I  
As our deliberations in these cases have invariably  
demonstrated, 
our 
views 
of 
what 
is 
appropriate 
and  
“proportionate” discipline vary greatly. The final level of  
discipline imposed quite often is a negotiated level on which  
at least a majority of this Court can agree.  I have no reason  
to doubt that the decisional process for the JTC works  
similarly.  Any recommendation emanating from that body, more  
often an amalgam of its members opinions, is a subjective  
view.  Because the JTC has the experience of dealing with  
these matters routinely, I have usually felt great reluctance  
in replacing the JTC’s determination of an appropriate  
discipline with my own subjective view.  On some occasions, I  
have joined this Court’s rejection of recommended discipline  
as inadequate.  See, e.g., In re Griffin, 448 NW2d 352 (1989).  
However, in each instance of this Court finding the  
recommended discipline inadequate, it has returned the matter  
 
  
to the JTC for reconsideration and the possibility of a new  
recommendation.  With its decision in this case, though, a  
majority of this Court rejects the JTC’s twice-offered,  
unanimous recommendation, and sua sponte raises the level of  
discipline imposed.  In doing so, it also raises the stakes  
and alters the historically understood dynamic in judicial  
discipline proceedings.  
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S AUTHORITY TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE  
Before addressing the now-dynamited dynamic, though, I  
must address the majority’s error in concluding that this  
Court even has the authority to increase the level of  
discipline recommended by the JTC.  The JTC was created by the  
Michigan Constitution, and this Court’s authority over  
judicial discipline is granted by that document as well.  Our  
authority, however, is limited:  
On recommendation of the judicial tenure  
commission, the supreme court may censure, suspend 
with or without salary, retire or remove a judge 
for conviction of a felony, physical or mental  
disability which prevents the performance of  
judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent 
failure 
to 
perform 
his 
duties, 
habitual  
intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.  The supreme 
court shall make rules implementing this section 
and providing for confidentiality and privilege of 
proceedings. [Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2).]  
The majority concludes that this provision gives this Court  
the authority to increase the level of discipline recommended  
by the JTC.  It observes that this Court may “censure,  
suspend, with or without pay, retire or remove” a judge.  See  
slip op at 11, quoting Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2). However,  
I cannot agree with that conclusion because it does not  
account for the common understanding of the constitution.  
When interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court  
applies 
the 
rule 
of 
common understanding, first articulated by  
Justice COOLEY.  Any such analysis is conspicuously absent from  
the majority opinion, but under this rule, we interpret the  
constitution to have the meaning most obvious to the common  
understanding, which is the meaning reasonable minds, the  
great mass of the people, would give it.  See Traverse City  
Sch Dist v Attorney Gen, 384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).  
2  
 
 
  
The most obvious sense of the constitution is that this Court  
may impose the levels of discipline mentioned, but that it may  
only do so “[o]n recommendation of the judicial tenure  
commission . . . .”  This phrase introduces this Court’s power  
in judicial discipline cases, and conditions any exercise of  
this Court’s authority on that exercise first having been  
recommended by the JTC.  If the JTC has not recommended to  
this Court that the Court exercise its authority to impose a  
certain penalty, then any such exercise by definition cannot  
be “on recommendation” of the JTC.  This Court’s actions in  
judicial discipline cases that are not “on recommendation” of  
the JTC are actions in the first instance, and are not  
authorized by the constitution.  Rather, they are an assertion  
of plenary power over judicial discipline cases.  
This exercise of plenary power is contrary to this  
Court’s demonstrated understanding of its proper role in  
judicial discipline cases. For example, In re Mikesell, 396  
Mich 517; 243 NW2d 86 (1976), held that § 30(2) authorizes  
this Court to act in judicial discipline cases only on the  
JTC’s recommendations. In Mikesell, the JTC filed a complaint  
against the respondent judge, alleging twelve instances of  
misconduct. 
However, only five of the twelve allegations  
survived the initial proceedings and were recommended to this  
Court as bases for discipline. One of the issues this Court  
had to decide was whether it could consider all twelve  
allegations, or only those five that survived the JTC’s  
review. The Court concluded that the allegations upon which  
the JTC had not relied were “not part of the recommendation of  
the Commission and [would] not be considered by this Court.”  
Id. at 526. Thus, Mikesell held that in judicial discipline  
cases, this Court is limited to acting on recommendation of  
the JTC, and matters beyond the JTC’s recommendation are not  
to be considered by the Court.1  
1  Occasionally, this Court has deviated downward from 
both the JTC’s recommendations on the bases of discipline and 
the level of discipline.  In Mikesell, for example, the JTC 
alleged five bases of misconduct and recommended that the 
(continued...)  
3  
  
 
 
Despite the Court being restricted to acting “on  
recommendation” of the JTC, a majority of this Court imposes  
discipline 
on 
respondent 
that 
is 
beyond 
the 
JTC’s  
recommendation. The JTC recommended that respondent receive  
a thirty-day suspension, but the Court has gone well beyond  
that recommendation to impose a six-month suspension.  Like  
the bases of discipline that were not recommended and could  
not be considered in Mikesell, the six-month suspension the  
Court imposes on respondent was not recommended to this Court,  
so this Court lacks the constitutional authorization to  
consider such discipline, let alone the authorization to  
impose it on respondent.  If the Court is unhappy with the  
JTC’s recommendation, it should follow our longstanding  
practice and remand the case to the JTC, rather than assert  
its own power to act beyond the JTC’s recommendation.  
Because the constitution limits this Court to the  
discipline recommended by the JTC, I also cannot agree with  
the majority’s interpretation of MCR 9.225.  That rule, which  
provides 
that 
this 
Court 
may 
“modify” 
the 
JTC’s  
recommendations, must be read to conform to the Constitution.  
As we stated in Grievance Admin v Underwood, 462 Mich 188,  
193; 612 NW2d 116 (2000), the court rules are interpreted  
under the principles of statutory construction, which require  
us to read the court rules in a manner that does not conflict  
1 (...continued) 
respondent judge be removed from office. However, the Court 
accepted only three of the bases for discipline, and suspended 
the judge for one and a half years.  See Mikesell at 520, 539; 
see also In re Moore, 464 Mich 98; ___NW2d __ (2001) 
(rejecting bases of misconduct and lowering the recommended 
discipline).  
Although these cases represent variations from the JTC’s 
recommendations, the Court’s actions in them did not go beyond 
the JTC recommendations.  For example, the JTC recommended 
removal in Mikesell, but the Court ordered a suspension. The  
suspension was “on recommendation” of the JTC because  
permanent removal certainly entails one and a half years off 
the bench.  When the Court has ordered less severe discipline 
than the JTC has recommended, or has not accepted all the 
bases of misconduct, the Court nevertheless acts “on  
recommendation” 
of 
the JTC because the more severe discipline, 
or more bases of misconduct, recommended by the JTC  
necessarily include the lower levels of discipline and the 
bases of misconduct recommended, but not accepted. Thus, I 
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that such an action 
would not be “on recommendation” of the JTC.  
4  
 
 
 
 
with the Constitution.  See People v McLeod, 407 Mich 632,  
657; 288 NW2d 909 (1980).  Thus, the court rule’s provision  
that we may “modify” the JTC’s recommendations can only mean  
that this Court may modify them as long as it stays within the  
recommendations.  It cannot mean that this Court may “modify”  
a recommendation to do something that the JTC has not  
recommended in the first place. Doing so is not modifying a  
recommendation for action, but is taking a greater action  
despite the recommendation.  Such a meaning and the actions  
pursuant to it, conflict with the constitutional requirement  
that this Court can only act “on recommendation” of the JTC.2  
The 
majority 
seems 
to 
understand 
me 
to 
first  
“deconstruct” and “torture” the term “modify,” and then urge  
2  Notably, the majority cites a definition of “modify” 
that allows it to “alter” the recommendation, and asserts that 
its authority to increase discipline is “clear.” Slip op at 
12-13. Even aside from the constitutional problems with the 
majority position, the Court’s understanding of the term  
“modify” is not so “clear.”  Rather, “modify” is defined to 
mean to alter something by making it less extreme, severe, or 
strong.  For example, The American Heritage Dictionary (2d 
College ed), p 806-807, defines “modify” to mean:  
1.  To change in form or character; alter. 2.  
To make less extreme, severe, or strong.  3. . . .  
To qualify or limit the meaning of. . .  4. . . .  
To change (a vowel) by umlaut . . . To be or become 
modified. [Emphasis added.]  
Similarly, Webster’s New International Dictionary of the 
English Language (2d ed, unabridged), p 1577, indicates that 
“modify” means to change by lessening:  
1.  To limit; also, to mitigate, assuage, Obs. 
 2. 
To reduce in extent or degree; to moderate; 
qualify; 
lower; 
as, 
to 
modify 
heat, 
pain, 
punishment.  (He modifies his first severe decree.  
Dryden.)  3.  To differentiate into, or diversify 
by, different forms, as light, sound, passion; – 
now merged in sense 4. 4. To change somewhat the 
form or qualities of; to alter somewhat; as, to 
modify the terms of a contract.
 5. 
Gram. 
To  
limit or restrict the meaning of; to qualify.  6.  
Philol.
 To change by umlaut. 
7. 
Philos.  To  
determine the, or a particular, mode of.  8. Scots  
Law. To award a decree as something to be done or 
paid. 
–, 
Intrans.: 
To 
undergo 
or 
make 
a  
modification; change. [Emphasis added.]  
The majority is correct that these dictionaries include the 
definitions they choose. 
See slip op at 12, n 9.  
Nevertheless, I offer these definitions of “modify” to 
illustrate the different understandings of the term, in 
contrast with the majority’s convenient citation of only the 
definition 
that 
supports its conclusion.  With these different  
understandings of “modify,” I can hardly agree that the 
majority conclusion is “clear.” See slip op at 13.  
5  
 
that 
the 
constitutional 
language 
“on 
recommendation”  
conditions this Court’s power in judicial discipline cases.  
See slip op at 22.  This understanding is quite backward. As  
explained above, the “on recommendation” language from art 6,  
§ 30(2) limits this Court’s power. Because of that limit, we  
must interpret the term “modify” consistent with the  
constitution, which means interpreting it to mean that this  
Court cannot exceed the JTC recommendations in imposing  
discipline.
 If interpreting a term in the court rules  
consistent with the constitution is a “tortured” reading of  
the term, then this Court must be the Torquemada of text,  
because we interpret such terms as consistent with the  
constitution as frequently as necessary because it is our  
duty.  See McLeod, supra at 657; see also Singer, 2A Statutes  
& Statutory Construction (6th ed), § 45.11, pp 70-71.  If  
adhering to this canon of construction is torturing a word,  
then we all must be prepared to occasionally inflict forty  
lashes.  
Beyond this, I find perplexing the majority’s other  
pontifications on restricting the term “modify” to conform to  
the constitutional requirements.  See slip op at 13, n 10.  
The majority sees no indication that the term “modify” only  
allows the Court to operate within the JTC’s recommendations,  
but that indication is the constitution, which restricts this  
Court to the JTC recommendations.  Further, the majority  
suggests 
that, 
absent 
the 
expansive 
understanding 
of 
“modify,”  
which 
is 
only 
possible once the constitutional limitation that  
this Court may act only on the JTC’s recommendation is  
discarded, this Court would be unable to review JTC decisions,  
and would not operate under the “rule of law.”  For thirty­
three 
years, 
however, this Court has successfully reviewed JTC  
actions, and has issued written opinions and judgments in  
accord with its review without exercising the power to sua  
sponte increase the discipline imposed on respondent judges.  
During that time, rather than act in the first instance, if  
our review of JTC decisions had left us dissatisfied, we  
indicated that the proposed discipline was inappropriate and  
6  
  
 
 
remanded such decisions to the JTC for further consideration.  
See, e.g., In re Griffin; In re Lawrence, 419 Mich 1212  
(1984).  Our practice of conforming to the constitutional  
language and remanding to the JTC in no way hindered our  
ability to review JTC decisions.  In carrying out our review,  
we simply gave the JTC an opportunity to come to a  
satisfactory decision before this Court reviewed the matter  
again.  Because this Court’s longstanding practice fully  
effectuated its duty to review JTC decisions, the majority’s  
apparent 
conclusion 
that for the past thirty-three years, this  
Court and the JTC have been operating outside of the rule of  
law is at best hyperbole, and disrespects this Court itself.  
Overstated as well are the majority’s protestations that  
my position is contrary to the central organizing principle of  
constitutional 
government.  The majority asserts that under my  
view, the JTC is not accountable to any elected body, and that  
the JTC, therefore, could act inappropriately and no elected  
body could do a thing about it.  See slip op at 21-22.  These  
assertions are simply not true.  Under my view, the JTC  
remains accountable to this Court, which is in turn  
accountable to the people of Michigan.  JTC recommendations  
must be approved by this Court, and if we think the  
recommended discipline is not sufficient, we can direct the  
JTC to consider the matter further.  Thus, if the JTC acts  
inappropriately, we can do a thing about it, the same thing we  
have done for years. 
For those years, and under the  
constitutional condition that our actions must be “on  
recommendation” of the JTC, accountability has not been a  
problem, and continuing as we have been is in no way a threat  
to our constitutional order.3  
Thus, I cannot agree that this Court may impose greater  
discipline on respondent than the JTC recommended because the  
constitution only allows this Court to take those actions that  
3  I find it ironic indeed that the majority invokes the 
constitutionally safeguarded referendum power as a tool of 
electoral accountability, yet in MUCC v Secretary of State, 
464 Mich ___ ; ___ NW2d ___ (2001), it subverts the 
accountability provided by that power.  
7  
 
  
the JTC has recommended.  Rather than imposing a harsher  
sanction itself, if the Court believes that the JTC’s  
recommended discipline is insufficient, it should remand the  
case to the JTC to formulate a more severe sanction, as we  
have done in the past.  In the instant case, though, such a  
remand would be odd, because respondent had agreed to accept  
the JTC’s recommendation, and did not petition this Court to  
modify that recommendation.  Cases like the instant case  
illustrate that the majority’s misreading of the constitution  
will cause unfortunate consequences in judicial discipline  
proceedings.  
B. THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF SUA SPONTE INCREASING DISCIPLINE  
By departing from the constitutional restriction that  
this Court must act only on recommendation by the JTC, the  
decision in this case will set in motion unfortunate  
consequences in judicial discipline cases.  It is important in  
this case that respondent has not petitioned this Court to  
modify the JTC’s recommended discipline. 
Rather, she  
indicated her willingness to accept the thirty-day suspension  
the JTC recommended.  In fact, respondent only became  
“adverse” to the JTC in this Court when this Court declined to  
adopt the recommendation and ordered the parties to argue  
whether the thirty-day suspension was appropriate, inherently  
ordering them to address this Court’s authority to sua sponte  
increase discipline beyond the JTC’s recommendation. See 463  
Mich 1201 (2000). Thus, the dispute over how this Court may  
“modify” the JTC’s recommendations comes not at respondent’s  
urging, and not at the JTC’s either, which recommended the  
thirty-day suspension, but only upon the majority of this  
Court’s own interest in deciding a question that the parties  
had not actually presented.  
In any event, previously, when a judge consented to the  
JTC’s recommended discipline and did not petition this Court  
to modify the JTC’s recommendation, this Court has entered the  
recommended discipline. See, e.g., In re Waterman, 461 Mich  
1207 (1999); In re Milhouse, 461 Mich 1279 (2000). However,  
after this decision, respondent judges would be well advised  
8  
 
to consent to nothing and run the entire gauntlet of available  
proceedings 
because 
whatever 
the 
discipline 
recommended 
by 
the  
JTC, this Court is lurking at the end of the line to increase  
that discipline if it so chooses. 
A respondent judge’s  
consent, then, would be futile, as this Court may turn a  
recommended censure into a suspension, or a suspension into  
removal, regardless of the respondent judge’s willingness to  
acknowledge an ethical breach and submit to the discipline the  
expert body, the JTC, has recommended.  
Instead of relying on the JTC’s expertise, though, the  
majority has decided that this Court would do better to take  
these matters into its own hands. 
The benefits of a  
negotiated and relatively amicable resolution between the JTC  
and the respondent judge, avoiding the hearings and attendant  
publicity 
that 
contested 
allegations 
entail, 
and 
thus 
avoiding  
unnecessarily promoting the appearance of impropriety guarded  
against by Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct, are lost  
when judges must contest every case or be subject to a  
sanction that, before this Court issues the final word in a  
discipline case, is unforeseen.  Also lost are the benefits of  
a judge acknowledging before the JTC and the public that he  
has done wrong and voluntarily is taking steps to correct the  
problem. Instead, the new practice of increasing discipline  
beyond 
the 
JTC 
recommendations 
encourages 
respondent 
judges 
to  
fight alleged misconduct to the bitter end because the final  
sanction that might be imposed in the end would be unknown  
until this Court imposed it, when it would be too late for a  
respondent judge to have any input or review of that  
sanction.4  Even if the Court’s decision did not contravene  
the constitution, I would not be able to join a decision that  
encourages such practices.  
4  The majority discusses respondent’s notice that she 
faced an increase in discipline, see slip op at 25-26, but 
nevertheless both she, as well as future respondent judges, 
would not know, beyond the possibility of removal, what the 
upper limit of their discipline will be until it is upon them. 
In curious contrast, a convicted felon is at least informed of 
the upper limit of the possible sentence for his crime.  
9  
  
 
 
 
 
C. THE RUNCO DISSENT  
Oscar Wilde once wrote that “[c]onsistency is the last  
refuge of the unimaginative.”5  If Wilde was correct, then the  
majority 
is 
apparently 
attempting 
to 
flatter 
me 
by  
complimenting my imaginativeness when it asserts that my  
dissent from In re Runco, 463 Mich 517; 620 NW2d 844 (2001),  
is not consistent with my view in the instant dissent.  
However, I must decline this compliment because my Runco  
dissent is not inconsistent with my present position, as the  
majority claims.  
In Runco, this Court entered the discipline recommended  
by the JTC.  I did not agree with the recommendation, thinking  
it was insufficient and preferring the JTC minority position.  
See id. at 524. 
As a constitutional matter, before my  
preferred discipline could have been imposed, the appropriate  
action would have been for the Court to have remanded to the  
JTC for further consideration, as we have done in the past.  
See, e.g., Griffin, supra.  However, because six members of  
this Court did not agree with me, the Court adopted the  
recommendation and the case was resolved.  The final decision  
was made, and no remand was considered.  Thus, because this  
Court was unanimous in concluding that respondent Runco  
deserved some level of discipline, and because the case was  
going to be resolved, my dissent simply stated the discipline  
that I believed would have been appropriate for the JTC to  
recommend. For me to have stated that I would have remanded  
would have been futile; instead, I went on record with my  
substantive position. My Runco dissent, then, is consistent  
with the instant dissent, and I am not so imaginative as the  
majority seems to believe.  
Quite imaginative, however, is the majority’s idea that  
my voting habits are relevant to our disagreement over the  
meaning of art 6, § 30(2).  Though the majority and I may  
dispute the meaning of that constitutional provision, as  
5  The Relation of Dress to Art, quoted in Flesch, ed, 
The New Book of Unusual Quotations (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966), p 62.  
10  
 
explained, my Runco dissent has no effect on this case, so to  
suggest that my voting habits are hypocritical advances  
nothing.  
II  
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the  
majority opinion.  By misreading the constitution, the  
majority transforms our judicial discipline system into a  
system that encourages members of the state judiciary to  
contest allegations of misconduct and leaves judges in the  
precarious position of not knowing the upper limit of their  
potential discipline before that discipline becomes final and  
irrevocable, except that they may be removed from the bench.  
I do not believe that the great mass of the people who  
ratified the constitutional language creating our judicial  
discipline system intended the system to so operate.  Rather,  
the Michigan Constitution provides for a system that  
encourages judges to acknowledge and resolve their ethical  
mistakes.
 Also, our system allows those judges that do  
contest their alleged misconduct to arrive at this Court,  
before it makes a final decision, knowing that the harshest  
discipline they face is the discipline recommended by the JTC,  
and knowing that if the recommendation does not suit this  
Court, it will remand the case to allow the JTC and the  
respondent judge an opportunity to reach an alternate  
solution, or at least to allow the respondent judge to know  
what he faces before this Court makes a final decision.  I  
would 
remain 
true 
to 
this constitutional design, and therefore  
I would either accept the JTC’s recommended discipline or  
reject the recommendation and remand the case to the JTC for  
further consideration.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
11