Title: In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, LLC

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5478.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5478 
IN RE APPLICATION OF BLACK FORK WIND ENERGY, L.L.C., FOR A 
CERTIFICATE TO SITE A WIND-POWERED ELECTRIC GENERATION FACILITY IN 
RICHLAND AND CRAWFORD COUNTIES, OHIO; BIGLIN ET AL., APPELLANTS; 
POWER SITING BOARD ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5478.] 
Power Siting Board—Wind-powered electric generation facility—Board’s 
determination approving siting of facility affirmed—Appellants were not 
denied the opportunity to cross-examine staff members—No due process 
violation. 
(No. 2012-0900—Submitted August 21, 2013—Decided December 18, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Power Siting Board, No. 10-2865-EL-BGN. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellants, Gary J. Biglin, Brett A. Heffner, Alan Price, Catherine 
Price, and John Warrington, appeal from an order of the Power Siting Board 
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issuing a certificate to Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., to construct a proposed 
wind-powered electric generation facility, or wind farm, in portions of Richland 
and Crawford counties.  In their only remaining proposition of law, appellants 
argue that the board violated their “right to procedural due process by disallowing 
the appellants from conducting cross-examination on staff members” and 
“prohibiting the presentation of evidence” at the evidentiary hearing on Black 
Fork’s application to site the project.  After review, we hold that the board did not 
prevent appellants from cross-examining any witness or presenting evidence, and 
therefore appellants have not established that the board violated their due process 
rights.  Because appellants have not established that the board’s order is unlawful 
or unreasonable, the board’s order is affirmed. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
A.  The proposed project 
{¶ 2} The Power Siting Board has exclusive authority to issue 
certificates of environmental compatibility and public need for construction, 
operation, and maintenance of “major utility facilities,” such as the proposed wind 
farm at issue here.  In re Application of Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio St.3d 
449, 2012-Ohio-878, 966 N.E.2d 869, ¶ 2; R.C. 4906.01, 4906.03, and 4906.13.  
In March 2011, Black Fork filed an application to construct a wind farm 
consisting of up to 91 turbines in portions of Crawford and Richland counties.  In 
addition to the turbines, Black Fork’s project includes access roads, electrical 
collection lines, a construction-staging area, a concrete-batch plant, a substation, 
and an operation and maintenance facility.  The project area covers approximately 
24,000 acres of land, and the facilities will be located on approximately 14,800 
acres of leased private land with 150 participating landowners.  According to 
Black Fork’s application, voluntary agreements have been signed by the 
participating property owners within the project area.  Black Fork claims that the 
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facility will provide up to 200 megawatts of renewable energy “with effectively 
zero air emissions and waste generation.” 
B.  Proceedings before the board 
{¶ 3} Upon receipt of Black Fork’s application, the board’s staff 
conducted an investigation into the environmental and other impacts of the 
proposed wind farm, and on August 31, 2011, the staff filed a report 
recommending that 71 conditions become a part of any certificate issued for the 
proposed facility.  By that time, intervening-party status had been granted to the 
following entities and individuals: the boards of commissioners of Crawford and 
Richland counties; the Richland County engineer; the boards of trustees of 
Plymouth, Sharon, and Sandusky townships; the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation; 
appellants, who claimed to live near the leased land or within the boundaries of 
the project area; and ten other local residents. 
{¶ 4} Because appellants, as well as certain other parties, were acting pro 
se, the board’s administrative law judge (“ALJ”) believed that it was “important 
to provide some clarification of the procedures” prior to the evidentiary hearing.  
Accordingly, in an August 31, 2011 order, the ALJ explained that the purpose of 
the upcoming evidentiary hearing was “to allow the parties to the case the 
opportunity to present sworn testimony subject to cross-examination that will 
form the evidentiary record that the board will weigh and consider in arriving at 
its formal decision on the merits of the application.”  The ALJ explained that 
parties would 
 
not only be allowed to present testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing (on their own behalf or through the testimony of 
witnesses that they bring to the hearing, so long as such 
testimony is timely filed by September 15, 2011), but [would] 
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also have the right to cross-examine all other parties’ witnesses 
who appear and testify at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
{¶ 5} Black Fork thereafter prefiled direct testimony of ten witnesses 
that it planned to call at the evidentiary hearing, and the board’s staff prefiled the 
testimony of eight witnesses.  Of the board’s staff witnesses, seven of them 
authored sections of the staff’s report, and the eighth, Jon Pawley, managed the 
staff’s investigation and compiled the final report.  Appellants prefiled their own 
written testimony, but they did not prefile testimony of other witnesses. 
{¶ 6} At the request of the board’s staff, an ALJ issued an entry prior to 
the scheduled September 19, 2011 evidentiary hearing converting the first day of 
the hearing into a settlement conference.  The ALJ also directed the staff and 
intervenors to bring to that settlement conference “a list of the witnesses they 
[would] be calling to testify at the evidentiary hearing, along with the dates that 
they [would] be available to testify.”  Upon commencement of the settlement 
conference, one of the two ALJs present requested that the parties first discuss 
“the order of witnesses that might be scheduled.”  After that off-the-record 
discussion, an ALJ summarized the schedule of witnesses as follows:  Black 
Fork’s witnesses would testify on September 21-23; the witnesses for the county 
commissioners and the township trustees would testify on the afternoon of 
September 23; the staff witnesses would testify on September 26 and 27; and the 
remaining intervenors would testify on September 28 and September 30, if 
necessary. 
{¶ 7} Settlement negotiations proved fruitful, and the date for the start of 
the evidentiary hearing was continued.  Black Fork, the board’s staff, and the 
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation eventually entered into a joint stipulation 
recommending that the board approve the project subject to 71 conditions.  The 
same parties later filed an amendment to the stipulation that added nine conditions 
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and included the approval of the Crawford County Board of Commissioners.  
None of the appellants signed the stipulation. 
{¶ 8} The evidentiary hearing commenced on October 11, 2011.  Each 
appellant participated in the hearing by cross-examining witnesses, including 
those from Black Fork, the board’s staff, and the county commissioners, and each 
appellant testified.  Even though the staff had prefiled the testimony of eight 
witnesses, the only staff member who testified was Pawley, the project manager 
who had overseen the compilation of the staff report.  Four appellants cross-
examined Pawley; appellant Alan Price had no questions for him.  No appellant 
objected to the introduction of Pawley’s testimony, to the staff’s decision to 
present only Pawley, or to the fact that other board staff members were not 
present.  And while appellant Warrington requested that Pawley’s testimony—and 
the hearing—be suspended so that a noise standard could be completed and 
reviewed by experts, the transcript does not indicate that Warrington, or any other 
appellant, requested that the hearing be suspended or continued so that they could 
subpoena additional board staff witnesses or otherwise compel the attendance of 
more staff witnesses. 
C.  Appellants’ appeal 
{¶ 9} In January 2012, the board issued its order approving the 
stipulation and granting a certificate for construction of the proposed wind farm, 
subject to the 80 conditions set forth in the stipulation.  Each appellant filed an 
individual application for rehearing, all of which were denied.  Appellants 
thereafter joined together, obtained counsel, and timely appealed to this court.  
We granted Black Fork’s motion for leave to intervene, and Black Fork later 
moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that appellants failed to preserve most of 
their appellate arguments by not raising them below and failed to properly 
identify certain arguments in their notice of appeal.  We granted Black Fork’s 
motion in part, dismissing appellants’ first and second propositions of law in their 
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entirety and dismissing a portion of appellants’ third proposition of law relating to 
the alleged deprivation of an opportunity to cross-examine an independent 
engineer about decommissioning costs.  In re Application of Black Fork Wind 
Energy, L.L.C., 134 Ohio St.3d 1506, 2013-Ohio-1123, 984 N.E.2d 1100.  
Appellants’ remaining due process arguments from their third proposition of law 
are now before the court. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
A.  Standard of review 
{¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 4906.12, we apply the same standard of review to 
power-siting determinations that we apply to orders of the Public Utilities 
Commission.  Buckeye Wind, 131 Ohio St.3d 449, 2012-Ohio-878, 966 N.E.2d 
869, at ¶ 26.  “R.C. 4903.12 applies to board proceedings pursuant to R.C. 
4906.12 and provides that an order ‘shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by this 
court only when, upon consideration of the record, the court finds the order to be 
unlawful or unreasonable.’ ”  In re Application of Am. Transm. Sys., Inc., 125 
Ohio St.3d 333, 2010-Ohio-1841, 928 N.E.2d 427, ¶ 17, quoting Constellation 
NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, 2004-Ohio-6767, 820 
N.E.2d 885, ¶ 50.  We have, however, “ ‘complete and independent power of 
review as to all questions of law’ ” in appeals from the board.  Ohio Consumers’ 
Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-604, 904 N.E.2d 
853, ¶ 13, quoting Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 466, 469, 
678 N.E.2d 922 (1977). 
B.  The board’s order is neither unlawful nor unreasonable  
{¶ 11} 
Appellants claim that they were denied the opportunity to cross-
examine the seven board staff members responsible for drafting sections of the 
staff report and were thereby prohibited from presenting evidence at the hearing.  
Specifically, appellants assert that after the board’s staff entered into the 
stipulation, the staff “unilaterally pulled” the seven drafters of the report from 
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testifying and called Pawley as the only staff witness.  But Pawley, according to 
appellants, could not answer all of their questions on cross-examination.  In 
appellants’ words, “[b]y not having the [seven other] Staff members available at 
the evidentiary hearing it effectively denied the appellants their statutory right of 
participation under R.C. 4906.08 and their right to procedural due process.”  
Appellants request that we reverse the board’s order, remand for a new 
evidentiary hearing, and compel the attendance of the seven other staff members 
responsible for drafting the staff’s report. 
{¶ 12} For the following reasons, appellants’ arguments are not well 
taken. 
1.  Appellants have not established that more board staff members were 
required to appear and testify at the evidentiary hearing 
{¶ 13} In order for us to determine whether appellants were denied the 
opportunity to cross-examine the staff members, appellants must first demonstrate 
that the attendance of the seven additional staff members was compulsory.  
Appellants, however, point to nothing in the record, applicable statutes and 
administrative rules, or our precedents that obligated the seven staff members to 
appear and testify at the evidentiary hearing. 
{¶ 14} Appellants primarily rely on an ALJ’s alleged “representation” at 
the September 19, 2011 settlement conference that the staff members would be 
available to testify on September 26 and 27, when it was anticipated that the 
evidentiary hearing would continue through those dates.  But appellants 
misinterpret the ALJ’s comment.  The ALJ, in summarizing the dates on which 
each party would present its witnesses, merely indicated that September 26 and 27 
would be the dates for the staff witnesses to testify.  The ALJ did not order that all 
staff members previously identified as witnesses be present at the hearing and 
subject to appellants’ cross-examination, nor was it reasonable for appellants to 
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interpret the ALJ’s scheduling comment as a mandate that the board’s staff call 
each staff member it had previously identified to testify. 
{¶ 15} Appellants also suggest that because the staff prefiled the direct 
testimony of the seven staff members, the members’ attendance at the hearing 
should have been required.  But the fact that the staff prefiled their testimony did 
not later obligate the staff to call each as a witness.  The board’s administrative 
rules allow an ALJ to accept written, prefiled testimony, as occurred in this case.  
See Ohio Adm.Code 4906-7-01(B)(7).  Prefiled written testimony, however, is 
unsworn and is not considered evidence.  Only when a witness is sworn in at the 
hearing does he or she adopt the prefiled testimony under oath.  “It is at this point 
that the written testimony [becomes] evidence, not at the time of filing.”  Duff v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 56 Ohio St.2d 367, 374-75, 384 N.E.2d 264 (1978). 
{¶ 16} Here, the board’s staff prefiled the unsworn testimony of eight 
staff members but called only Pawley to testify at the hearing.  When the staff 
presented Pawley, he was sworn in and adopted the prefiled direct testimony as 
his own.  At that point, the testimony became evidence in the certification 
proceeding, and Pawley was subject to cross-examination.  None of the prefiled 
testimony from the seven other staff members was evidence, nor have appellants 
suggested that the board improperly considered their prefiled testimony as 
evidence. 
{¶ 17} In sum, because appellants cannot point to any board order, statute, 
rule, or precedent requiring the attendance of these seven staff members, 
appellants have not established that they were prevented from cross-examining 
the staff members. 
2.  Appellants failed to compel the attendance of the seven staff members 
or to object to their absence 
{¶ 18} If appellants desired to examine the seven staff members, they also 
had mechanisms available to compel their attendance.  Most importantly, as 
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parties to the certification proceeding appellants had the ability to subpoena the 
staff members under Ohio Adm.Code 4906-7-08.  It is undisputed, however, that 
appellants failed to exercise that authority.  A party is precluded from claiming a 
denial of the right of cross-examination when that party did not take advantage of 
the opportunity to subpoena the witness.  See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 
389, 404-405, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (claimant precluded from 
arguing that he was denied opportunity to cross-examine physician whose medical 
report was admitted into evidence when claimant failed to exercise his subpoena 
authority). 
{¶ 19} Moreover, appellants not only failed to subpoena the seven staff 
members, they failed to object when they learned that the staff would not 
introduce any more staff members to testify.  A party’s failure to challenge an 
alleged error constitutes a forfeiture of the objection because it deprives the board 
of an opportunity to cure any error when it reasonably could have.  Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 127 Ohio St.3d 524, 2010-Ohio-6239, 
941 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 18, citing Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm., 86 Ohio St.3d 144, 148, 
712 N.E.2d 724 (1999) (“By failing to raise an objection until the filing of an 
application for rehearing, Parma deprived the commission of an opportunity to 
redress any injury or prejudice that may have occurred”). 
{¶ 20} At oral argument, appellants’ counsel claimed that appellants 
Warrington, Heffner, and Biglin had raised objections at the beginning of 
Pawley’s testimony.  But contrary to counsel’s assertion, none of these appellants 
made an objection to the staff’s decision to call only Pawley.  Indeed, neither 
Warrington nor Biglin made any comment on the record at the beginning of 
Pawley’s testimony.  Appellant Heffner questioned an ALJ about which matters 
he could ask Pawley—that is, whether he could inquire about the staff report and 
not simply the stipulation.  In response, the ALJ repeatedly advised Heffner that 
he could ask Pawley any question that he wanted.  Even under the most liberal 
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reading of this discussion, we cannot interpret Heffner’s questions as preserving 
for appellate review an objection regarding the inability to cross-examine the 
remaining seven staff members.  In the end, appellants should have objected to 
the absence of those staff members or at least requested an opportunity to compel 
their attendance.  Appellants’ decision to wait until the rehearing stage to raise 
this objection is fatal to their claim. 
{¶ 21} Alternatively, if the testimony of these seven staff members was so 
critical to appellants’ case, appellants could have identified the staff members in 
their own witness lists.  An ALJ directed the intervening parties to bring to the 
settlement conference “a list of the witnesses they [would] be calling to testify at 
the evidentiary hearing.”  There is no indication from the record—or from 
appellants’ arguments on appeal—that any of them identified a board staff 
member as a potential witness.  And appellants certainly did not attempt to call 
any additional staff members as witnesses during their separate presentations of 
evidence at the hearing—which was after the staff’s presentation of evidence. 
{¶ 22} Finally, the fact that appellants were acting pro se at the 
certification proceeding does not excuse their failure to subpoena the staff 
members or object to their absence.  “ ‘It is well established that pro se litigants 
are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are 
held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.’ ”  State ex 
rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, 800 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 10, 
quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 
654, 763 N.E.2d 1238 (10th Dist.2001).  See also Zukowski v. Brunner, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 53, 2010-Ohio-1652, 925 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 8 (“mere fact that [relator] is 
proceeding pro se does not entitle him to ignore these [court rules]”); State ex rel. 
Leon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 123 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-
4688, 914 N.E.2d 402, ¶ 1 (“mere fact that [relator] is pro se does not entitle him 
to ignore the requirements of the local appellate rule”). 
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III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Our review of the record indicates that appellants were permitted 
to intervene as parties and were actively involved throughout the certification 
proceeding.  They participated in the prehearing and settlement conferences, 
cross-examined witnesses, testified themselves, and delivered closing arguments 
at the evidentiary hearing.  And the board’s 75-page order shows that it carefully 
considered appellants’ challenges to the proposed wind farm, including their 
concerns about property values, the impact on bird breeding, the minimum 
setback requirements, the noise impact, and the impact on county and township 
roads.  In short, appellants were granted the opportunity to be heard.  They 
disagree with the board’s order and now assert that they could have produced 
more evidence if they had been given the opportunity to question seven staff 
members who drafted portions of the staff report.  However, appellants have 
failed to establish that the board’s staff was under any requirement to introduce 
the testimony of those members, and appellants have similarly failed to explain 
why they did not compel the attendance of those staff members or object to their 
absence.  Accordingly, we find that appellants were not denied the opportunity to 
cross-examine any staff member or to present additional evidence.  Their due 
process arguments therefore fail. 
{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, appellants have not sustained their 
burden of showing that the board’s order in this case is unlawful or unreasonable.  
The board’s order is therefore affirmed. 
Order affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DORRIAN, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
JULIA LILLIAN DORRIAN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
PFEIFER, J. 
____________________ 
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Patrick T. Murphy Law Office, Patrick T. Murphy, and Zachary L. 
Tidaback, for appellants. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William L. Wright and Devin D. 
Parram, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., M. Howard Petricoff, Stephen 
M. Howard, and Michael J. Settineri, for intervening appellee Black Ford Wind 
Energy, L.L.C. 
Chad A. Endsley and Leah F. Curtis, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation. 
________________________