Title: State v. John P. Hunt

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 81 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0272-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
John P. Hunt,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2003  
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 9, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Rex R. 
Anderegg and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Rex R. Anderegg. 
 
 
2003 WI 81 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0272-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 4897) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John P. Hunt,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a court of 
appeals' decision, which reversed the circuit court's conviction 
of John P. Hunt (Hunt) on six criminal counts, including two 
counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child, one count of 
repeated sexual assault of the same child, one count of first-
degree sexual assault causing pregnancy of a child, one count of 
exposing a child to harmful materials, and one count of second-
degree sexual assault by use of force.1  
                                                 
1 The complaint alleged Tiffany J. was the victim of counts 
one through five, and Angelica J. the victim of count six. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This court is presented with the following issues: 
(1) Does a circuit court commit reversible error if it fails to 
provide a detailed Sullivan2 analysis for admitting other-acts 
evidence? (2) Is an appellate court required to perform an 
independent review of the record for permissible bases for 
admitting other-acts evidence if the circuit court fails to 
adequately provide a Sullivan analysis, or alternatively states 
an impermissible basis for the admission of such evidence? 
(3) Is an appellate court required to reverse a defendant's 
convictions on all counts if the circuit court states an 
improper basis for the admission of other-acts evidence? (4) Is 
the court afforded greater latitude when applying the Sullivan 
analysis in cases dealing with sex crimes, especially where a 
child victim is involved?  
¶3 
We hold that the appellate court erred in reversing 
the conviction of Hunt on all six counts.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  Although the 
circuit court could have provided a more detailed or exhaustive 
Sullivan analysis for admitting the other-acts evidence in this 
case, reversal was not appropriate here.    
¶4 
Additionally, 
pursuant 
to 
the 
well-established 
independent review doctrine in Wisconsin, we hold that the court 
of appeals is required independently to review the record if the 
circuit court fails to provide a detailed Sullivan analysis.  
Based upon our independent review of the record, we hold that 
                                                 
2 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
3 
 
there were reasonable bases justifying the circuit court's 
decision to admit the other-acts evidence pursuant to Sullivan. 
The other-acts evidence was properly admitted pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) (1999-2000)3 to prove motive, opportunity, 
intent, absence of mistake or accident, and context.4  The 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) provides:  
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that 
the 
person 
acted 
in 
conformity 
therewith. 
This 
subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered 
for 
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 
THE COURT: Just based on what I am hearing you 
are talking about a contextual framework because I am 
not exhaustive as to these reasons.  If there is other 
appropriateness, especially in view of the prior 
inconsistent statements being the substantive basis 
for the charge, context takes more——actually it may 
very well be moved to the fore in this case because of 
that issue under Shillcut.  But certainly there is a 
motive involved here as to what is involved with the 
ongoing nature of the alleged allegations.  Certainly 
there is an opportunity for doing these things.  They 
are in the same household under the circumstances 
involved.  His intent was to gain access by whatever 
means he felt was appropriate, and certainly to say 
well that is crazy but the ongoing nature of the 
allegations which certainly go to absence of mistake 
or accident. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 71:39-40); see also Pet'r App. at 129-30.  
We note that the trial court record refers to Shillcutt as 
Shillcut.  State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 341 N.W.2d 716 
(Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 119 Wis. 2d 788, 350 
N.W.2d 686 (1984). 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
4 
 
circuit court properly admitted the other-acts evidence to 
provide the necessary 
background 
for 
understanding 
Hunt's 
behavior and to provide an independent source as to the victims' 
credibility, as well as their state of mind, in light of their 
recantations of prior charges against Hunt.  
¶5 
In addition to holding that there were permissible 
purposes, we hold that the other-acts evidence was relevant and 
probative. 
 
Moreover, 
we 
hold 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
cautionary 
jury 
instructions 
on 
the 
other-acts 
evidence 
mitigated any potential danger of causing unfair prejudice, 
confusion, misleading the jury, or undue delay.  
¶6 
Here, where permissible purposes existed for the 
admission of other-acts evidence, and where strong DNA evidence 
had been introduced, we hold that the court of appeals was not 
correct in reversing the convictions on all counts.  The 
conviction on the charge of first-degree sexual assault causing 
pregnancy should have been upheld, even if there were not 
permissible purposes for the admission of other-acts evidence. 
¶7 
Finally, we hold that the circuit court properly 
applied the greater latitude rule in allowing other-acts 
evidence in this case where there were charges of sex crimes, 
especially since child victims were involved.   
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
5 
 
I. FACTS 
 
¶8 
The facts of this case are undisputed.  John Patrick 
Hunt (Hunt) lived with his wife, Ruth,5 and their six children.  
In 1988 Angelica J. and her three children, 15-year-old Tiffany 
and two other daughters, Lana and April, moved in with Hunt in a 
marital-type relationship.  Angelica and her children resided 
with Hunt, Ruth, and the other children, in what was a 
functionally bigamist household.  After Angelica arrived Hunt 
had another child with Ruth and three more with Angelica.  
¶9 
In 1998 Tiffany J. (Angelica's daughter from a 
previous relationship and 15 years old at the time) gave birth 
to a son, Isaiah.  The DNA testing subsequently established that 
Hunt was the father of Tiffany's child.  At the time of this 
dispute, the Hunt household had 13 people living in it:  Hunt; 
his two "wives," Ruth and Angelica; and ten minor children. 
¶10 On September 21, 1999, Ruth and Angelica took the 
children to the police station and reported that Hunt had 
threatened them and others in the household.  Ruth informed 
Milwaukee police officers that she was afraid to return home, 
and that her husband had threatened their lives.   
¶11 Based on the information provided in the police report 
the police officers accompanied them back to their home.  Ruth 
and the others waited in the car about a half-block away, while 
                                                 
5 The record reflects that Ruth Hunt is also referred to as 
"Ruthie" Hunt.   
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
6 
 
the officers went to the premises.  At the home the officers 
arrested Hunt and allowed the others back inside.   
¶12 After the arrest of Hunt police officers interviewed 
members of the family.  Officers learned that Hunt frequently 
smoked crack cocaine and would force the entire family into the 
upstairs portion of the home, which was without running water, 
for the duration of his drug use.  It was also revealed, through 
these interviews, that Hunt would force either Tiffany or 
Angelica J. to have sexual intercourse with him while he was 
smoking crack cocaine. 
¶13 Hunt was charged by the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney, E. Michael McCann, with six criminal counts, including 
two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child, one count 
of repeated sexual assault of the same child, one count of 
first-degree sexual assault resulting in the pregnancy of a 
child, one count of exposing a child to harmful materials, and 
one count of second-degree sexual assault by use of force. 
¶14 After the charges were filed the victims and witnesses 
recanted their statements to police officers and refused further 
cooperation with the prosecution. 
¶15 On February 28, 2000, as a result of the women's 
refusal to cooperate, the prosecutor filed a pre-trial motion in 
limine seeking, inter alia, the introduction of other-acts 
evidence that Hunt had physically and sexually abused Ruth, 
Tiffany, and Angelica.  Under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) (1997-98) 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove character of a person to show that he acted in conformity 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
7 
 
therewith, but may be permitted for purposes such as proof of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, 
plan, 
knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.6  In support of its 
                                                 
6 The State sought to introduce the following other-acts 
evidence concerning the defendant: 
1.  That the defendant's wife, Ruthie Hunt, had 
been the victim of both physical and sexual abuse at 
the hands of her husband.  This included the time 
period involved in the sexual abuse to the child 
Tiffany J. 
2.  That Jennifer M., another stepdaughter of the 
defendant, was sexually abused by the defendant when 
she was approximately the same age as Tiffany J.  That 
sexual abuse was reported to the police in 1995.  It 
consisted of defendant asking Jennifer to hug and kiss 
him, telling her she could feel his erect penis.  He 
would also kiss her on the neck and fondle her breasts 
on top of her clothing.  This occurred during the time 
period that Jennifer lived in the same residence as 
John 
P. 
Hunt, 
and 
was 
related 
to 
him 
as 
a 
stepdaughter.  
3.  That John P. Hunt molested his daughter 
Cleopatrick M., at a time when she was approximately 
the same age as the victim Tiffany J.  The defendant 
was also in the position of stepfather and was 
residing in the same residence with her.  He fondled 
her bare breasts and vagina, and also exposed his 
penis to her, asking if she would like to have sex 
with him.  This was also reported to the police. 
4.  That the defendant was physically abusive to 
the victim, Tiffany J., as well as to the victim, 
Angelica J.  All of the reports had either been 
submitted to the defense in this matter, or were being 
provided along with the motion. 
5.  That under Section 904.04(2), with regard to 
the 
prior 
acts 
of 
sexual 
conduct 
with 
his 
stepdaughters, that these acts were relevant and 
probative of the issues of the defendant's intent and 
motive.  With respect to the issues relating to the 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
8 
 
motion, the prosecution argued that the other-acts evidence was 
admissible 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) 
as 
relevant 
and 
probative of the context in which these sexual offenses 
occurred, and was part of the corpus of the crimes with which 
Hunt had been charged.  The prosecution asserted that the other-
acts evidence related directly to the victims' state of mind, 
and their past acts of recanting prior charges against Hunt.   
¶16 With respect to the other-acts evidence of Hunt's drug 
use, the prosecution argued that those allegations (e.g., that 
he constantly smoked crack) provided the necessary background 
for understanding Hunt's behavior and provided an independent 
source of information about the credibility of the victims' 
stories.  Moreover, the prosecution argued that the other-acts 
drug evidence was highly relevant in light of the victims' 
current recantations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
physical abuse of the parties mentioned above, it was 
the State's position that these acts were relevant to 
the "context" in which the sexual assaults occurred, 
and also part of the corpus of the crimes with which 
the defendant was charged.  They also related directly 
to the victims' state of mind.  State v. C.V.C., 153 
Wis. 2d 145, 450 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989).  
(Emphasis added.) (R. 16:3-4); see also Pet'r App. at 116-
17 (state's motion in limine); see also R. 33:1 (state's 
supplemental motions in limine asking the court to consider 
Hunt's prior drug use).  
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 Defense counsel, Thomas M. Bartell,7 filed a brief in 
opposition to the motion in limine, and the prosecutor later 
filed a supplemental motion to admit evidence that Hunt had 
previously used drugs.  The supplemental motion listed three 
reasons for the inclusion of the other-acts evidence: (1) as 
part of the corpus of the crimes; (2) context and necessary 
background 
information; 
and 
(3) for 
corroboration 
of 
the 
information previously given to police, since the witnesses were 
recanting their stories. 
¶18 The circuit court held a pre-trial motion hearing, 
where the prosecutor repeated the arguments for the other-acts 
evidence, and also pointed out that the evidence would help the 
jury understand the recantations by the witnesses, as well as 
the circumstances of the case.  In addition, the prosecutor 
argued that the evidence showed an absence of mistake on Hunt's 
part and that the evidence showed opportunity and motive.  Over 
defense objections Judge Dennis P. Moroney granted the State's 
motion in limine and allowed the State to introduce some of the 
other-acts evidence it requested.8 
                                                 
7 The record indicates that Hunt was dissatisfied with his 
counsel.  Thomas M. Bartell, his first attorney, eventually 
withdrew as counsel.  David K. Ziemer was then retained as 
counsel but later withdrew.  The record also indicates that 
Attorney Brendan Rowen had been assigned as counsel to Hunt's 
case but decided to leave the legal profession. 
8 As noted by Hunt in his brief at pages 37-39, at least 
fifteen other acts were introduced in this case: 
1. Hunt had been reported to police for using drugs. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
10 
 
¶19 In its analysis, 
the circuit court 
specifically 
referred to the Sullivan test for admitting the evidence of 
other-acts.  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998).  The circuit court judge said:  
                                                                                                                                                             
2. Ruth had sought a restraining order against Hunt on 
three separate occasions, alleging on one occasion 
that Hunt said his friends could kill her. 
3. Ruth had alleged Hunt had pushed her around and hit 
her with a big knife. 
4. Hunt threatened to mess Ruth up so much that nobody 
would recognize her. 
5. Hunt had "busted [Ruth's] head." 
6. Hunt "busted [Ruth's] mouth open causing her to 
need 22 stitches back in the early 1970s when they 
were teenagers." 
7. Hunt had slapped, kicked and put a knife to Ruth. 
8. Hunt struck Ruth in the face causing a cut to the 
inside of her cheek. 
9. Hunt threatened to kill Ruth with a gun and a gun 
was found in Hunt's bedroom. 
10. 
Hunt hit Ruth in the chest with a closed fist. 
11. 
Hunt had punched a pregnant Angelica three or four 
times to her ribs, bruising her ribs. 
12. 
Hunt had done physical, bad, painful and harmful 
things to Ruth, Angelica, and Tiffany in the past. 
13. 
Hunt stole money from Angelica's purse. 
14. 
On another occasion, Hunt was arrested by the 
police for physically abusing Angelica. 
15. 
Hunt had been seen choking Ruth. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
11 
 
The 
Court 
would 
find 
that 
the 
threshold 
requirements of a 904.04 other acts evidence have been 
satisfied in this case.  I think there is not much 
question about that just based upon what I have heard, 
and also what I have read in the case and also the 
certain amount of information that has been provided 
but then certainly——certainly denied at various times, 
and it goes to the credibility of the people, I grant 
you, but it——but it also goes to whether or not 
contextually in this case here to show whether or not 
he acted in conformity therewith under the——you know, 
under the rules of the other acts evidence.  
So therefore I think that there is relevancy 
under the three-prong test of Sullivan.  There is no——
certainly the appropriate reasons under the 904.04.  
There certainly is a relevancy connected with this 
which would give some corroborative effect to the 
initial statements, at least of the witnesses, and 
certainly then you have got to take a look and, yes, 
it is prejudicial to the extent that any evidence that 
could be received in the case against Mr. Hunt would 
be prejudicial.  I mean that goes without saying.  
Anything 
contrary 
or 
anything 
against 
him 
is 
prejudicial, but whether or not the relevancy under 
the 
appropriateness of 
the other 
acts 
evidence, 
particularly 
in 
a 
sexual 
assault 
case 
which 
historically is more of a one-on-one situation, the 
rule is that, and especially in view of the issues 
affecting Ruthie Hunt and may very well be involved 
though the same things enter into as far as Tiffany is 
concerned.  
(R. 71:38-39); see also Pet'r App. at 129-30. 
¶20 In addition to allowing the evidence, the circuit 
court judge reasoned that the application of the greater 
latitude rule was appropriate because the case involved a sexual 
assault of a child.9 
                                                 
9 
THE COURT: Well, and they [other acts evidence] 
are even more so [prejudicial] that the Court is 
supposed to allow more leniency and more latitude when 
it involves particularly sexual assaults of children, 
and that is what we have in this case at least at the 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
time.  And certainly with the prior inconsistent 
statements being the basis of the substantive proof in 
this case, the Court does feel that it is appropriate 
and I will allow 10-1 in, Number 2, 10-2. 
MR. 
ZIEMER: Actually, 
your 
Honor, 
I 
think 
although there is more latitude with sexual abuse of 
children, I think that what is generally meant there 
is that you can bring in other instances of child 
sexual. 
THE COURT: Not every act here of child sexual 
abuse was charged in this case, obviously. 
MR. ZIEMER: Well what exactly as far as is it 
motive or to show motive or to show mistake of? 
THE COURT: Just based on what I am hearing you 
are talking about a contextual framework because I am 
not exhaustive as to these reasons.  If there is other 
appropriateness, especially in view of the prior 
inconsistent statements being the substantive basis 
for the charge, context takes more——actually it may 
very well be moved to the fore in this case because of 
that issue under Shillcut.  But certainly there is a 
motive involved here as to what is involved with the 
ongoing nature of the alleged allegations.  Certainly 
there is an opportunity for doing these things.  They 
are in the same household under the circumstances 
involved.  His intent was to gain access by whatever 
means he felt was appropriate, and certainly to say 
well that is crazy but the ongoing nature of the 
allegations which certainly go to the absence of 
mistake or accident. 
So for those four reasons the Court feels that 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
that 
were 
specifically 
identified plus the contextual aspect will be allowed 
in this case.  And it is particularly true not only as 
to Ruthie Hunt, even though she was an uncharged 
victim in this case, alleged victim, but it is 
particularly true when it comes to Tiffany, because 
she was a minor, which gives the Court even further 
latitude under the circumstances and requirements of 
law, which allows for the Court to have greater 
latitude 
when 
allowing 
in 
other 
acts 
evidence, 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
13 
 
¶21 In light of the circuit court's ruling the prosecution 
introduced evidence that: (1) Hunt had been reported to the 
police for using drugs; (2) Ruth had sought restraining orders 
against him on three prior occasions; (3) Hunt had verbally 
threatened Ruth and others in the household; and (4) Hunt had 
physically abused Angelica and Ruth in the past.  The jury also 
heard evidence concerning DNA testing, which established Hunt's 
paternity of 15-year-old Tiffany's child.  The DNA test 
established the likelihood of Hunt's paternity of the child at 
99.989 percent. 
¶22 At the conclusion of the trial the circuit court judge 
instructed the jury, using the standard jury instruction, Wis 
JI——Criminal 275, that it could only use the evidence of Hunt's 
prior bad acts for specific permissible purposes, such as Hunt's 
opportunity, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
and preparation or plan.  No mention was made of context in the 
instruction given.  The circuit court also warned the jury that 
it could not make any conclusions of Hunt's character or 
propensity to commit the crime charged based on the other-acts 
evidence.10  No objection was made by the defense, and the  jury 
                                                                                                                                                             
especially when there is alleged actions of child 
molestation involved.   
I am doing that. 
(R. 71: 39-41); see also Pet'r App. at 130-32. 
10 Jury Instructions: 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
Evidence 
has 
been 
received 
regarding 
other 
incidents 
involving the 
defendant 
for 
which the 
defendant is not on trial. 
Specifically, evidence has been received that the 
Defendant made threats of death or physical harm to 
each of the Hunt/J. family as same resided at 2433 
North 22nd Street, City and County of Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, on September 21st, 1999. 
Further, there have been other acts of reported 
physical abuse on the part of the Defendant regarding 
Ruthie Hunt and/or Angelica J. reported to the police 
and/or 
District 
Attorney's 
Office 
which 
were 
subsequently not prosecuted due to the said alleged 
victims not following through with the prosecution. 
Further, there have been other acts of alleged 
sexual abuse of Jennifer M. and/or Cleopatrick M. on 
the part of the Defendant.  The same were reported to 
the police and/or District Attorney's Office which 
were subsequently not prosecuted due to the said 
alleged 
victims 
not 
following 
through 
with 
the 
prosecution, or the prosecution not being pursued by 
the State. 
If you find that this conduct did occur, you 
should consider it only on the issues of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation or plan, or absence 
of mistake or accident. 
You may not consider this evidence to conclude 
that the defendant has a certain character or a 
certain character trait and that the defendant acted 
in conformity with that trait or character with 
respect to the offenses charged in this case.  The 
evidence was received on the issues of: 
Motive; that is, whether the defendant has a 
reason to desire the result of the crime. 
Opportunity; that is, whether the defendant had 
the opportunity to commit the offense charged. 
Intent; that is, whether the defendant acted with 
the state of mind that is required for the offense. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
15 
 
found Hunt guilty on all six counts. Hunt received a sentence 
totaling 122 years in prison on four counts, and he was placed 
on probation on the two remaining counts. 
¶23 Hunt appealed arguing, inter alia, that the circuit 
court erred when it allowed the prosecution to introduce 
evidence that Hunt had engaged in prior bad acts, including 
illegal drug use and the physical and sexual abuse of Ruth.   
¶24 The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court 
erred in admitting the other-acts evidence and that the error 
was not harmless.  As a result the court of appeals reversed 
Hunt's judgment of conviction and remanded the entire matter to 
the circuit court for a new trial.   
¶25 In reaching its decision the court of appeals reasoned 
that the circuit court had committed two errors.  First, when 
addressing the "context" rationale for admitting the other-acts 
evidence in the pre-trial ruling, the circuit court stated that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Preparation or plan; that is, whether such other 
conduct of the defendant was part of a design or 
schedule that led to the commission of the offense 
charged. 
Absence of mistake or accident; that is, whether 
the defendant acted within the state of mind required 
for this offense.   
You may consider this evidence only for the 
purposes I have described, giving it the weight you 
determine it deserves.  It is not to be used to 
conclude that the defendant is a bad person and for 
that reason is guilty of the offense or offenses 
charged.  
(Emphasis added.)  Pet'r App. at 141-43. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
16 
 
the evidence "also goes to show whether or not he acted in 
conformity therewith."  The court of appeals found that clearly 
was an erroneous basis for admitting other-acts evidence, as the 
State had conceded.  The court of appeals, however, did not 
discuss the permissible bases on which the circuit court held 
the other-acts evidence admissible; instead, the appellate court 
concluded that the judge's "propensity rationale" required 
reversal of all of Hunt's convictions.  Contrary to the 
cautionary jury instructions given by the circuit court, the 
court of appeals nevertheless opined: 
Although the circuit court could have mitigated the 
unfairly prejudicial effect of the evidence by giving 
a cautionary instruction to the jury about the 
purposes for which the evidence was admitted and the 
proper use of that evidence in their deliberations it 
gave no such instruction . . . While it is doubtful 
that, given the nature of the other acts evidence 
allowed, a cautionary instruction could have reduced 
the prejudice to Hunt to such a degree that the 
evidentiary ruling could have been upheld, the circuit 
court's failure to give such an instruction further 
solidifies 
our conclusion 
that admission 
of the 
evidence was erroneous and unfairly prejudiced Hunt's 
defense. 
State v. Hunt, No. 01-0272-CR, unpublished order at 6 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jul. 17, 2002). 
¶26 Second, the court of appeals reasoned that the circuit 
court had erroneously applied the greater latitude rule for 
admitting other-acts evidence in a case involving the sexual 
assault of a child.  According to the court of appeals the 
greater latitude test did not apply because the other acts that 
were identified to the jury were not sufficiently similar to the 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
17 
 
sexual assault crimes with which Hunt was charged in this case. 
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals said: 
We are satisfied that the prejudicial effect of the 
admitted 
evidence 
substantially 
and 
unfairly 
outweighed its probative value, primarily because the 
other acts evidence involved behavior significantly 
different than that for which Hunt was being tried.   
Id. 
¶27 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 12, 2002. 
 
II. WISCONSIN STATUTE § 904.04(2) AND OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE LAW 
 
¶28 Before engaging in an analysis of the issues presented 
it is necessary to understand the historical background of 
Wisconsin's other-acts evidence law. 
¶29 Generally, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  However, Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) allows 
other-acts evidence to be admitted "when offered for other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident."  As we noted in State v. Hammer: 
 . . . not all of the exceptions under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2) must be met.  "The exceptions 
listed in the statute [§ (Rule) 904.04(2)] are not 
mutually exclusive.  The exceptions slide into each 
other; they are impossible to state with categorical 
precision and the same evidence may fall into more 
than one exception."  State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
18 
 
647, 662, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting).  What is required is "one" acceptable 
purpose.  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998); State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 
729, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982). 
State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶29, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 
629. 
¶30 In Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 
557 (1967), this court noted the danger in admitting prior acts 
evidence.  The court set forth reasons for limiting the use of 
such evidence:  (1) The overwhelming tendency to presume the 
defendant is guilty because he is a person likely to commit such 
acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not because of the defendant's 
actual guilt, but because he may have escaped punishment for 
previous acts; (3) the injustice in attacking a person who is 
not prepared to show that the evidence used for attack is 
fabricated; and (4) the confusion of issues that may result in 
the introduction of other crimes.   
¶31 This court reaffirmed the cautionary rationale behind 
admitting other-acts evidence expressed in Whitty in our 
decision in Sullivan.  In Sullivan the defendant was convicted 
of battery and disorderly conduct, apparently in part due to 
evidence introduced at trial of a prior act of domestic 
disturbance.  The defendant's ex-wife and neighbor testified 
about the prior act of domestic disturbance.   The defendant 
appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. On review this court 
held that the other-acts evidence was offered for a permissible 
purpose but was not probative of defendant's intent or absence 
of accident.  In reaching our decision, we set forth  a three-
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
19 
 
part analytical test for determining when other-acts evidence 
can be admitted.   
¶32 The Sullivan test provided circuit courts with an 
analytical framework for deciding the admissibility of other-
acts evidence.  The three-part test asks the court to consider: 
(1) Whether the evidence is offered for a permissible purpose; 
(2) whether the evidence is relevant; and (3) whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the jury or 
needless delay.11  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. 
 
III. ISSUES 
 
¶33 As noted previously, this court is presented with the 
following issues: (1) Does a circuit court commit reversible 
error if it fails to provide a detailed Sullivan analysis for 
admitting 
other-acts 
evidence? 
(2) Is 
an 
appellate 
court 
required to perform an independent review of the record for 
permissible bases 
for 
admitting other-acts 
evidence 
under 
                                                 
11 This 
three-part 
test 
has 
sometimes 
been 
worded 
differently, apparently combining the second and third step into 
one step.  See State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1993) (holding that trial courts must apply a two-prong test in 
determining whether evidence of other crimes is admissible.  The 
first prong requires the trial court to determine whether 
evidence fits within one of the exceptions set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04, and the second prong requires the trial 
court to determine whether the probative value of the evidence 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant).  
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
20 
 
Sullivan if the circuit court fails to adequately provide a 
Sullivan analysis or states an impermissible basis? (3) Is an 
appellate court required to reverse a defendant's  convictions 
on all counts if the circuit court states an improper basis for 
the admission of other-acts evidence? (4) Is the court afforded 
greater latitude when applying the Sullivan analysis in cases 
dealing with sex crimes especially where a child victim is 
involved? 
 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶34 The 
applicable standard for 
reviewing 
a circuit 
court's admission of other-acts evidence is whether the court 
exercised 
appropriate 
discretion. 
 
State 
v. 
Pharr, 
115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983).  An appellate court 
will sustain an evidentiary ruling if it finds that the circuit 
court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of 
law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-415, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) 
(citing McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971)).  A circuit court's failure to delineate the factors 
that influenced its decision constitutes an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  See McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 282.  When a circuit 
court fails to set forth its reasoning, it has been held that an 
appellate court independently should review the record to 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
21 
 
determine whether it provides an appropriate basis for the 
circuit court's decision.  See Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343. 
 
V. APPLICATION OF THE SULLIVAN TEST 
 
¶35 The State asks this court to reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.  The State argues that by failing to 
conduct an independent review of the record, as required by 
Sullivan, the court of appeals erroneously reversed the circuit 
court's 
admission 
of 
other-acts 
evidence 
and, 
therefore, 
erroneously reversed Hunt's convictions.  The State maintains 
that the court of appeals' decision reflects an unanticipated 
interpretation of the Sullivan test and such an interpretation 
implies that per se reversible error occurs when a circuit court 
does not adequately explain its reasons for admitting other-acts 
evidence. 
 
The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
aforementioned 
interpretation of Sullivan is problematic because it relieves 
the appellate court of any obligation independently to review 
the record to sustain the circuit court's decision.  In support 
of its position the State maintains that independent review has 
previously been recognized in many cases, and that, therefore, 
the appellate court ignored well-established case law. 
¶36 Next, the State contends that had the court of appeals 
engaged in an independent review of the record, it would have 
discovered that in addition to the alleged improper "propensity" 
rationale expressed by the circuit court, the circuit court 
based 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
other-acts 
evidence 
on 
five 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
22 
 
additional permissible bases.  The State argues that instead of 
analyzing the circuit court's proper reasons for admitting the 
other-acts evidence (i.e., motive, opportunity, intent, absence 
of mistake or accident, and context) the court of appeals simply 
relied on the one concededly erroneous "propensity rationale" 
expressed by the circuit court. 
¶37 Moreover, the State asserts that the court of appeals' 
improper and inadequate analysis is reflected in the court's 
erroneous statement that the circuit court never instructed the 
jury that the other-acts evidence could not be used as 
propensity evidence.  The State points out that a cautionary 
instruction was given to the jury, twice.  
¶38 Hunt disagrees and argues that the court of appeals 
was correct in its summary reversal of all counts.  Hunt 
maintains that Sullivan requires all parts of the three-prong 
test to be satisfied.  Because the court of appeals determined 
the probative value of the other-acts evidence was substantially 
outweighed by the potential prejudicial effect, the evidence 
should have been excluded.  Hunt asserts that the court of 
appeals was not suggesting that no cautionary instruction was 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
23 
 
given, but rather that a proper instruction was not given.12  
Hunt argues that a proper instruction should have included a 
definition of "context" by which the court allowed the other-
acts evidence to be admitted. 
¶39 Moreover, Hunt maintains that while the State gave an 
extensive list of permissible purposes for the other-acts 
evidence, it was really introduced for propensity purposes.  
Hunt argues that the great number of other-acts admitted at 
trial prejudiced the jury and led to confusion of the jury.  
¶40 Next, Hunt claims that the court of appeals had no 
obligation independently to review the record when the circuit 
court failed to provide a detailed Sullivan analysis and 
admitted other-acts evidence for an impermissible purpose.  
Moreover, Hunt argues that the court of appeals was not required 
independently to review the record given the sheer size of the 
record.  Hunt maintains that independent review of each prior 
act admitted into evidence would be impractical.  Hunt also 
argues that independent review would have led the court of 
appeals to the same conclusion because the alleged prior bad 
                                                 
12 As noted in the statement of facts, Hunt failed to object 
to the jury instructions at trial.  Failure to object to the 
jury instructions waives the issue. State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 
46, 243 Wis.2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762 (holding that failure to 
object at conference about jury instructions constitutes a 
waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or verdict); 
State v. J., 184 Wis. 2d 794, 823, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994)(citing 
State v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 43-44, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986). 
Even though this matter could be resolved on the issue of 
waiver, we feel that it is necessary to discuss the matter 
thoroughly. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
24 
 
acts were not admitted for a permissible purpose, were not 
relevant, and did not accurately explain the recantation of 
witnesses. 
¶41 Hunt argues that an appellate court is required to 
reverse 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
if 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously admits evidence for propensity purposes.  Hunt 
maintains that reversal is required when prior acts are 
improperly admitted into evidence without conducting a proper 
Sullivan analysis for each prior act, and without giving the 
jury a proper instruction based upon this analysis.  Moreover, 
Hunt argues that because the cautionary instruction was too 
broad and most likely ineffective, the jury likely used the 
other-acts evidence for the impermissible purpose of propensity. 
 
VI. ANALYSIS 
 
¶42 Upon review of evidentiary issues, "[t]he question on 
appeal is not whether this court, ruling initially on the 
admissibility of the evidence, would have permitted it to come 
in, but whether the trial court exercised its discretion in 
accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with 
the facts of the record."  Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 342 (citations 
omitted).  This court will not find an abuse (now an erroneous 
exercise) of discretion, if there is a reasonable basis for the 
circuit court's determination.  Id. (citing Boodry v. Byrne, 22 
Wis. 2d 585, 589, 126 N.W.2d 503 (1964)).  However, in order for 
a discretionary decision to be upheld, "there should be evidence 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
25 
 
in the record that discretion was in fact exercised and the 
basis of that exercise of discretion should be set forth."  Id. 
(citing State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 764, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968)).  
 
A. Automatic Reversal/Duty To Review The Records 
 
¶43 The State maintains that the court of appeals erred in 
interpreting Sullivan.  We agree.  Sullivan does not state, as 
the decision of the court of appeals suggests, that in 
situations where the circuit court fails to set forth a detailed 
analysis for admitting or excluding other-acts evidence, the 
reviewing court should summarily reverse all counts.  Here the 
circuit court did explain its reasons for the admission of 
other-acts evidence, but it could have provided a more detailed 
Sullivan analysis for the decisions made. 
¶44 Rather, Sullivan requires that the circuit court 
"articulate its reasoning for admitting or excluding the 
evidence, applying the facts of the case to the analytical 
framework." Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 774.  A circuit court's 
failure to delineate, with sufficient detail, the factors that 
influenced its decision in admitting other-acts evidence would 
seem to be contrary to the requirements we set forth in 
Sullivan.   That case declared that ordinarily the appropriate 
recourse for the court of appeals should be  to review the 
record independently, to determine the existence of a reasonable 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
26 
 
basis for the circuit court's discretionary decision.13  As noted 
in Sullivan: 
A circuit court's failure to delineate factors 
that influenced its decision constitutes an erroneous 
exercise of discretion. When a circuit court fails to 
set 
forth 
its 
reasoning, 
appellate 
courts 
independently review the record to determine whether 
it provides a basis for the circuit court's exercise 
of discretion.   
Id. at 781 (citations omitted).   
¶45 The independent review doctrine set forth in Sullivan 
is well-settled law in Wisconsin.  See Hammen v. State, 87 
Wis. 2d 791, 800, 275 N.W.2d 709 (1979) (holding this court will 
uphold a discretionary decision of the trial court, if the 
record contains facts which would support the trial court's 
decision had it fully exercised its discretion); State v. 
                                                 
13 See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182 N.W.2d 
512 (1971). In McCleary, we said that we would not set aside a 
sentence where the trial judge failed to give the reasons for a 
lengthy sentence, but rather, we recognized the obligation "to 
search the record to determine whether in the exercise of proper 
discretion the sentence imposed can be sustained."  See also 
State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343 (holding that, where the 
trial court fails to set forth its reasoning in exercising its 
discretion to admit evidence, the appellate court should 
independently review the record to determine whether it provides 
a basis for the trial court's exercise of discretion). 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
27 
 
Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 728, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982); and Pharr, 
115 Wis. 2d at 343.14  
¶46 Upon review of this case it is clear that the court of 
appeals ignored the independent review doctrine and its duty 
independently to review the record in this case.  The court of 
appeals failed even to mention such duty.  Instead, the court of 
appeals stated that its standard of review of evidentiary 
decisions was the "erroneous exercise of discretion" standard.  
Although the court of appeals cited portions of Sullivan, it 
failed to cite Sullivan's independent review rule.  State v. 
Hunt, No. 01-0272-CR, unpublished order at 6 (Wis. Ct. App. Jul. 
17, 2002) (citing State v. Chambers, 173 Wis. 2d 237, 255, 496 
N.W.2d 191 (1992), and Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 780-81).  
¶47 Hunt now attempts to argue that the court of appeals 
did not opine that no cautionary instruction was given, but 
rather, indicated that a proper instruction should have included 
a definition of context.   
¶48 The court of appeals stated: "Although the circuit 
court could have mitigated the unfairly prejudicial effect of 
the evidence by giving a cautionary instruction to the jury 
                                                 
14 Recently, this court has upheld and emphasized the 
independent review doctrine.  State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606, and State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, 
236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629.  In discussing the independent 
review doctrine, we want to emphasize its applicability in 
other-acts evidence cases.  We recognize that there are cases 
where independent review may be too onerous for the appellate 
court 
to 
undertake, 
or 
may 
be 
inappropriate 
under 
the 
circumstances presented.     
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
28 
 
about the purposes for which the evidence was admitted and the 
proper use of that evidence in their deliberations, it gave no 
such instruction."  Hunt, unpublished order at 6 (citations 
omitted).  The court of appeals' statement clearly conflicts 
with the record.  The circuit court properly instructed the jury 
regarding the proper purposes for which it should consider the 
evidence.  Moreover, the circuit court properly instructed the 
jury on two separate occasions that it could not consider the 
evidence for improper purposes, such as propensity, or to 
conclude that Hunt was a bad man. 
¶49 In addition to ignoring the cautionary instruction 
given by the circuit court, had the court of appeals conducted 
an independent review of the record it would have discovered at 
least five permissible bases pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) 
to admit the other-acts evidence. 
¶50 In failing to review the record independently the 
court of appeals essentially rewrote the independent review 
doctrine, set forth in Sullivan, to require summary dismissal if 
the circuit court does not give what the court of appeals 
considers to be a clear explanation.  We hold that such an 
interpretation of Sullivan is in error. 
 
B. Admissibility Of Other-Acts Evidence 
 
 
¶51  After our own independent review of the record we 
hold that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence.  We hold that 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
29 
 
the circuit court had a reasonable basis for finding threshold 
requirements of a 904.04 other-acts evidence had been satisfied 
in this case, and admitting the other-acts evidence. 
¶52 When reviewing a circuit court's determination for 
erroneous exercise of discretion an appellate court may consider 
acceptable purposes for the admission of evidence other than 
those contemplated by the circuit court, and may affirm the 
circuit court's decision for reasons not stated by the circuit 
court.  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 784-85.  "Regardless of the 
extent of the trial court's reasoning, we will uphold a 
discretionary decision if there are facts in the record which 
would support the trial court's decision had it fully exercised 
its discretion."  State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d 227, 238, 341 
N.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 119 
Wis. 2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984).  
¶53 As noted previously it is the party seeking to use 
other-acts evidence that bears the burden of establishing the 
relevance of other-acts evidence.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 774.  
However, it is the opponent of the admission of the evidence who 
must 
show 
that the probative value 
of the 
evidence is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  Id. at 773; State 
v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1114, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993).15 
 
C. First Prong——Evidence Offered For A Permissible Purpose 
                                                 
15 It is important to note that though it did not have the 
burden to do so, the State offered reasons why the other-acts 
evidence was not unduly prejudicial. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
30 
 
 
¶54 We conclude under the first prong of Sullivan, that 
the 
other-acts 
evidence 
was 
properly 
admitted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) as an exception. As noted previously, 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) is not exhaustive. 
¶55 The State's pre-trial motion in limine sought to 
introduce the other-acts evidence on the grounds that such 
evidence was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) for 
purposes of establishing the "context" in which these sexual 
offenses occurred, and part of the corpus of the crimes with 
which Hunt had been charged.  The prosecution also asserted, 
both in its motion in limine and pre-trial argument to the 
circuit court, that the other-acts evidence related directly to 
the victims' state of mind and their past acts of recanting 
prior charges against Hunt.  
¶56 With respect to the other-acts evidence of Hunt's drug 
use, the prosecution argued that those allegations (e.g., that 
he constantly smoked crack), provided the necessary background 
for understanding Hunt's behavior and provided an independent 
source of information about the credibility of the victims' 
stories.  Moreover, the prosecution argued that the other-acts 
evidence was highly relevant in light of the victims' current 
recantation. 
¶57 The 
circuit 
court 
agreed 
with 
the 
prosecution.  
Explicitly referring to the Sullivan test, the circuit court 
recognized permissible purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) to 
admit the other-acts evidence.  Those purposes included: 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
31 
 
(1) showing 
the 
context 
in 
which 
events 
(including 
the 
recantations) occurred in the case; (2) opportunity; (3) intent; 
(4) absence of mistake or accident; and (5) motive.  Although 
the circuit court recognized the permissible purposes in 
admitting 
the 
other-acts 
evidence, 
the 
circuit 
court 
nevertheless stated: 
 . . . I think there is not much question about that 
just based upon what I have heard, and also what I 
have read in the case and also the certain amount of 
information that has been provided but then certainly—
—certainly denied at various times, and it goes to the 
credibility of the people, I grant you, but it——but it 
also goes to whether or not contextually in this case 
here to show whether or not he acted in conformity 
therewith under the——you know, under the rules of the 
other acts evidence. 
(R. 71:38)  As stated earlier, we recognize that the circuit 
court's reference to conformity was in error.  However, we note 
that the statement was made during a pre-trial hearing, and was 
not made in the presence of the jury.  
 
¶58 First, 
the 
circuit 
court 
could 
reasonably 
have 
concluded, 
as 
it 
did, 
that 
the 
other-acts 
evidence 
was 
admissible for the purpose of establishing context.  Other-acts 
evidence is permissible to show the context of the crime and to 
provide a complete explanation of the case.  Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d at 348-49; Shillcutt, 116 Wis. 2d at 236.  The context 
of other-acts evidence in this case provided insight as to the 
unique circumstances in the Hunt household.  The other-acts 
evidence provided an understanding of the abuse that took place 
in the home, and the authority and control Hunt possessed over 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
32 
 
Ruth, Angelica, and the children living with them.  Moreover, 
the other-acts evidence of abuse toward Ruth, and drug use, 
provided a context in which the jury could understand the 
victims' and witnesses' fear of the defendant and their pattern 
of recantations.   
¶59 The other-acts evidence was permissible to show the 
victims' state of mind, to corroborate information provided to 
the police, and to establish the credibility of victims and 
witnesses in light of their recantations.  Such purposes have 
been held to be permissible purposes in Wisconsin.  See State v. 
C.V.C., 153 Wis. 2d 145, 450 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
that the other-acts evidence that husband had been charged with 
false imprisonment and sexual assault of his wife and had 
threatened his wife's life some two years earlier was properly 
admitted for limited purpose of showing the wife's state of mind 
on 
issue 
of 
whether 
she 
consented 
to 
acts 
of 
sexual 
intercourse); Kluck v. State, 223 Wis. 381, 389, 269 N.W. 683 
(1936) (holding that, where other criminal acts are so connected 
with the offense charged that their commission directly tends to 
prove some element of the latter, such as guilty knowledge, or 
some specific intent, evidence of such other acts is admissible 
to explain or to corroborate the evidence showing the act 
charged); State v. Schaller, 199 Wis. 2d 23, 43, 544 N.W.2d 247 
(Ct. App. 1995) (holding that evidence of the defendant's abuse 
of his child in a public park as testified to by third-party 
witnesses was admissible to illustrate extent to which his wife 
would go to extricate her husband, the defendant, from potential 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
33 
 
criminal prosecution and to assist jury in evaluating whether 
the wife was being truthful when she later recanted sexual 
assault charges against husband).  While only mentioned in the 
cautionary instructions given, preparation or plan was also a 
permissible purpose for admission of other-acts evidence. 
¶60 Next, 
the 
circuit 
court 
could 
reasonably 
have 
concluded that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the 
purpose 
of 
establishing 
opportunity 
and 
motive. 
When 
a 
defendant's motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element 
of the charged crime, we have held that other crimes evidence 
may be offered for the purpose of establishing opportunity and 
motive.  State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶57, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 
616 N.W.2d 606 (citations omitted).  As noted before, Hunt was 
charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a 
child (Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)), one count of repeated sexual 
assault of the same child (Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)), one count 
of first-degree sexual assault resulting in the pregnancy of a 
child (Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(a)), one count of exposing a 
child to harmful materials (Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a)), and one 
count 
of 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault 
by 
use 
of 
force 
(Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a)).  As such, five out of the six 
crimes Hunt was charged with related to sexual assault.  There 
is no doubt that sexual assault, involving either sexual contact 
or sexual intercourse, requires an intentional or volitional act 
by the perpetrator.  See State v. Olson, 2000 WI App 158, ¶6-12, 
238 
Wis. 2d 74, 
616 
N.W.2d 144. 
 
As 
an 
example, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a), sexual contact is defined as:  
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
34 
 
Intentional 
touching 
by 
the 
complainant 
or 
defendant, either directly or through clothing by the 
use of any body part or object, of the complaintant's 
or defendant's intimate parts if that intentional 
touching is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complaintant or 
sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant. 
The other-acts evidence was properly admitted to prove motive 
because purpose is an element of sexual assault, and motive and 
opportunity are relevant to purpose.  State v. Plymesser, 172 
Wis. 2d 583, 593-96, 493 N.W.2d 376 (1992).  Thus, Hunt's motive 
or opportunity for allegedly touching or having intercourse with 
Tiffany J. was part of the corpus of the crimes charged, and 
evidence relevant to the motive or opportunity was therefore 
admissible.  Id. 
¶61 Similarly, 
according 
to 
the 
meaning 
of 
"sexual 
contact" under Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a), the defendant had to 
intentionally touch the victims.  The admission of the other-
acts evidence was therefore relevant to show that the Hunt did 
not touch the victims by accident or mistake, but intended to do 
so. 
 
D. Second Prong——Evidentiary Relevance 
 
¶62 Under the second step of Sullivan we hold that the 
circuit court properly found the other-acts evidence to be 
relevant for the purposes of showing context, opportunity, 
intent, absence of mistake or accident, and motive.   
¶63 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 defines "relevant evidence" 
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
35 
 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
¶64 "The measure of probative value in assessing relevance 
is the similarity between the charged offense and the other 
act."  State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 58, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  
Similarity is demonstrated by showing the "nearness of time, 
place, and circumstance" between the other act and the alleged 
crime.  State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 305, 595 N.W.2d 661 
(1999).  It is within a circuit court's discretion to determine 
whether other-acts evidence is too remote.  See Hough v. State, 
70 Wis. 2d 807, 235 N.W.2d 534 (1975).  There is no precise 
point at which a prior act is considered too remote, and 
remoteness must be considered on a case-by-case basis.  State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987).  Even when 
evidence may be considered too remote, the evidence is not 
necessarily rendered irrelevant if the remoteness is balanced by 
the similarity of the two incidents.  See State v. Mink, 146 
Wis. 2d 1, 16, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988).  For example, this 
court has, in other cases, upheld the admission of other-acts 
evidence, where the remoteness was over ten years.  Plymesser, 
172 Wis. 2d 583 at 596 (upholding the admissibility of 13-year-
old evidence); State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 467 N.W.2d 531 
(1991) (upholding the admissibility of 16-year-old evidence).   
¶65 In the State's motion in limine, and in the State's 
oral argument to the circuit court, the State argued that the 
other-acts evidence involving the physical abuse of Ruth Hunt 
was relevant to show context, the defendant's state of mind, the 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
36 
 
victims' and witnesses' state of mind, absence of mistake or 
accident, as well as motive and opportunity.16 
                                                 
16 In the motion hearing before the circuit court, the State 
argued that the above evidence was relevant: 
 . . . for two reasons.  First of all, she was one of 
a large number of people who showed up at the police 
station that opened the door to this investigation.  
Her information was confirmed by the statements that 
were made by Angelica and Tiffany relating to what was 
going on within that household.  So they were all 
telling the same story, and they were all describing 
physical abuse to various parties including Miss Hunt 
by Mr. Hunt. 
. . . .  
So 
the 
physical 
evidence 
in 
this 
case 
corroborates the information that had been provided by 
Ruthie Hunt.  Why this is relevant——it takes on a 
particular importance in light of the fact that 
everybody is recanting their stories now. . . .  
. . . .  
 . . . I 
believe 
that 
this 
information 
is 
relevant, . . . .  It is part of the corpus of the 
crime.  It is the reasoning behind why these people 
reported to the police, and they did not report 
because Tiffany was being sexually abused.  They 
reported because they were all in dire fear of their 
lives because of the threats to physical harm and to 
killing 
them 
that 
had 
been 
going 
on 
by 
Mr. 
Hunt. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . It is necessary to explain what was going on in 
this household, why the finding of the baseball bat 
and why the exodus of these 12 people out of the house 
in the night hours of September 21 even occurred.  All 
of those things are relevant to this case, and I 
believe that the Court should allow its admissibility. 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
37 
 
¶66 The circuit court judge agreed and stated: "There 
certainly is a relevancy connected with this which would give 
some corroborative effect to the initial statements, at least of 
the witnesses. . . . "  (R. 71:38)  
¶67 We agree with the reasons offered by the State and the 
decision of the circuit court and hold that the other-acts 
evidence admitted by the circuit court satisfied the second-
prong of the Sullivan test.   
                                                                                                                                                             
THE COURT: What specific under 904.04(2), what 
specific, appropriate reasons do you believe the State 
would be using this for? 
MS. FALK: Well other than the context which is 
not——the Court knows that under 904.04(2) that is 
illustrative and not exhaustive, and I will again 
state to the Court the State v. Shillcut, that 
proposition that is where it was very clearly set, and 
is 116 Wis. 2d——I think it is 325.  It is a 1983 case 
from the Court of Appeals. 
In addition, I believe that this also goes to the 
defendant's state of mind, and it goes to both of the 
victims, both of the victims and the witnesses' state 
of mind as well.   It also goes to the absence of 
mistake or accident on the part of the defense, and 
this relates to what I have been explaining to the 
Court about it is just unlikely that this number of 
people could provide this level of detail relating to 
the same story and it all just be a conjecture. 
THE COURT: Well you are saying——I mean it would 
almost have motive and opportunity as well being 
within the same household and within the same context 
of 
the 
behavior 
ostensibly 
with 
others 
in 
the 
household besides the named defendant. 
MS. FALK: That is correct. 
(R. 71:29-34) 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
38 
 
 
E. Third Prong——Evidentiary Balancing Test 
 
¶68 Finally, under the third step of Sullivan, we hold 
that the circuit court properly determined that the probative 
value of the other-acts evidence was not outweighed by unfair 
prejudice.  
¶69 Even if the evidence is found to be probative, we must 
address whether the probative value of the other-acts evidence 
is substantially outweighed by any of the concerns listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03.17 
 
As 
such, 
in 
order 
to 
prevent 
admissibility, the probative value of the evidence must be 
substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice and not 
be merely prejudicial.  See Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 64.  Hunt bears 
the burden of showing that such probative value is outweighed. 
¶70 In 
the 
pre-trial 
motion 
arguments, 
the 
State 
repeatedly argued that the other-acts evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial, because the court could, and should give a 
cautionary instruction to the jury regarding the other-acts 
evidence.  
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 provides:  
Exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues, 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.  
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
39 
 
¶71 In reaching its decision to admit the other-acts 
evidence, the circuit court, while recognizing the danger of 
prejudice inherent in the other-acts evidence, seems to have 
concluded that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.  See 
Pet's App. at 129-30. 
¶72 In determining whether a piece of evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial, we have held that cautionary instructions help to 
limit 
any 
unfair 
prejudice 
that 
might 
otherwise 
result.  
Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596-97. 
¶73 Contrary to Hunt's argument and the court of appeals' 
decision, 
the 
circuit 
court 
offered 
proper 
cautionary 
instructions on the other-acts evidence. Accordingly, any unfair 
prejudicial effect caused by the admittance of the other-acts 
evidence was substantially mitigated by the circuit court's 
cautionary instructions to the jury.     
¶74 As noted 
before, 
the circuit 
court's 
cautionary 
instructions to the jury specifically told the jurors that they 
should not conclude from the evidence that the defendant has a 
certain character or a certain character trait and that the 
defendant acted in conformity with that trait or character.  
After listing proper purposes for which the jury could consider 
the 
other-acts 
evidence, 
the 
circuit 
court 
specifically 
instructed the jury that it should not conclude from the other-
acts evidence that the defendant was a "bad person."   
¶75 The cautionary instructions given by the circuit court 
in this case are the type of cautionary instructions that we 
affirmed in State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 262, 378 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
40 
 
N.W.2d 272 (1985), and Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 65.  In light of the 
mitigating 
effect 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
cautionary 
instructions, we hold that Hunt failed to meet his burden of 
showing that the probative value of the other-acts evidence was 
substantially outweighed by any alleged unfair prejudicial 
effect.  Further, we affirm the circuit court's decision to 
admit the other-acts evidence because it satisfies all three 
prongs of the three-part Sullivan test for admissibility of 
prior acts evidence.18  
 
F. Harmless Error 
 
¶76 Assuming arguendo, that the circuit court erroneously 
admitted 
other-acts 
evidence 
based 
upon 
an 
impermissible 
propensity/character basis, the fact remains that five other 
permissible bases existed for admitting the other-acts evidence.  
If there was error here, it was harmless. 
¶77 The test for harmless error is "if it is 'clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.'"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
                                                 
18 Despite the "kitchen sink" claim of the dissent, see 
dissent, ¶95, we are satisfied that it is not necessary, to meet 
the requirements of Sullivan, that we now evaluate in this 
opinion, each of the other-acts admitted, separately, in light 
of permissible purposes, relevancy, and probative value vis-à-
vis unfair prejudice.  We are satisfied, based on our review of 
the record before us, that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence at 
issue here.  We are satisfied that our review and analysis is 
sufficient under the circumstances presented.  
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
41 
 
93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2). 
¶78 The court of appeals based its summary reversal upon 
an erroneous interpretation of Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 
300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938). Gross states that if one argument 
out of many sufficiently supports a judgment, that one argument 
is sufficient to  uphold a ruling, not overturn it.  Id. 
¶79 As noted before, unlike the court of appeals' belief, 
Sullivan states that if the circuit court erroneously admitted 
other-acts evidence based upon an impermissible purpose, there 
must be an independent determination whether it constituted 
reversible or harmless error.  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 792. 
¶80 Upon this court's independent review, we believe that 
the circuit court judge set forth five permissible bases for 
admitting the other-acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  
Although the State concedes that the circuit court judge 
improperly made reference to propensity, that statement was 
never heard by, or revealed to, the jury.    
¶81 As a result, we hold that the court of appeals erred 
by reversing the convictions on the grounds that the lower court 
had made reference to an impermissible basis (the propensity 
basis) even though the circuit court relied upon five other 
permissible 
bases 
consistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) 
(context, motive, opportunity, intent, and absence of mistake or 
accident). Had the court of appeals conducted an independent 
review of 
the record, 
in 
all likelihood 
it 
would 
have 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
42 
 
determined, as we do, that the record contained proper reasons 
for admitting the other-acts evidence.19 
¶82 Moreover, it is noted that the court of appeals 
reversed the conviction on the charge of first-degree sexual 
assault causing pregnancy where the DNA evidence established the 
likelihood that the defendant was the father of the child at 
99.989 percent.  Even if the other-acts evidence was admitted 
improperly, it seems "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error."  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 469, ¶51 (Crooks, J. concurring). 
 
G. Application Of The Greater Latitude Test 
 
¶83 The State maintains that by peremptorily dismissing 
the application of the greater latitude rule in this case, the 
court of appeals has revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the rule.  According to the State, the greater latitude rule, as 
applied in child sexual assault cases, does not depend on the 
similarity between the other-acts evidence offered and the 
charged conduct.  Rather, the rule concerns the difficulty 
                                                 
19 The failure of the circuit court to include "context" in 
the cautionary instruction is also subject to review under the 
harmless error test.  Again, assuming error, it seems that it is 
"clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found the defendant guilty absent the error."  Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 469, ¶51 (Crooks, J. concurring).  We also note, as 
discussed previously, that this matter could be resolved on the 
basis 
of 
waiver, 
since 
there 
was 
no 
objection 
to 
the 
instructions.  See supra note 11.  
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
43 
 
sexually abused children experience in testifying, and the 
difficulty prosecutors have in obtaining admissible evidence in 
child sexual abuse cases.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶42.  
According to the State, the degree of similarity and remoteness 
factors between the charged acts and other-acts evidence offered 
might influence the determination of the probative value of the 
other-acts evidence.  However, neither a lack of similarity nor 
remoteness necessarily precludes the use of other-acts evidence 
under the appropriate application of the greater latitude rule.  
The State argues that a correct interpretation of the greater 
latitude rule requires discretion when assessing the relevance 
and probative value of the other-acts evidence.  
¶84 Hunt maintains that the circuit court misapplied the 
greater latitude rule by concluding that this rule may be 
applied when the current crime charged involves the sexual 
assault of a child, because, here, the defendant's acts were not 
substantially similar to the crimes charged.  According to Hunt, 
the greater latitude rule should only apply when the prior act 
involves the sexual assault of a child.  Moreover, Hunt argues 
that the State's interpretation of Davidson is incorrect; the 
greater latitude rule is to be used only to admit into evidence 
similar prior acts to the crime charged, not any prior bad act. 
¶85 As noted previously, an appellate court will sustain 
an evidentiary ruling if it finds that the circuit court 
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and used a demonstrative rational process, and reached a 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
44 
 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Loy, 107 
Wis. 2d  at 414-415 (citing McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263 (1971)).  
¶86 We have ruled that "Wisconsin courts permit a more 
liberal admission of other crimes evidence in sexual assault 
cases than in other cases."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶44; 
State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 
629.  Accordingly, in a sex crime case, the admissibility of 
other-acts evidence must be viewed in light of the greater 
latitude test.  As we noted in Hammer:  
The greater latitude rule was first stated in 1893 in 
Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 628-30, 55 N.W. 1035 
(1893). . . .  The rule helps other acts evidence come 
in under the exceptions stated in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2). State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 256, 
378 N.W.2d 272 (1985). 
Id. 
¶87 In 
Davidson, 
a 
case 
mandated 
with 
Hammer, 
the 
defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of his 
13-year-old niece.  At trial, under the greater latitude rule, 
the circuit court allowed evidence of a previous conviction for 
sexual assault to be introduced, with a cautionary instruction 
given to the jury. The defendant appealed, the court of appeals 
reversed, and the State sought review. On review to this court, 
we held that admitting evidence of defendant's prior conviction 
for sexual assault was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
We held that other-acts evidence is relevant to sexual assault 
cases (particularly those of children), because a normal juror 
would presume that the defendant was incapable of such a 
depraved act.  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶42.  We also noted 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
45 
 
the 
"difficulty 
sexually 
abused 
children 
experience 
in 
testifying, and the difficulty prosecutors have in obtaining 
admissible evidence."  Id.  In light of such difficulty, we held 
that the greater latitude rule "support[s] the more liberal 
standard of admissibility in child sexual assault cases." Id. 
(citing State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d  at 30-33 and n.17. 
However, the greater latitude rule does not relieve the court of 
the duty to ensure that the other-acts evidence is offered for a 
proper purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Davidson, 236 
Wis. 2d 537, ¶52 (citing Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 598). 
¶88 Applying the above rules to the facts of this case, we 
hold that that the circuit court was correct here in applying 
the greater latitude rule in the determination of whether other-
acts evidence was admissible.   Accordingly, we hold that the 
court of appeals was in error in its determination regarding the 
applicability 
of 
greater 
latitude 
in 
sex 
crimes 
cases, 
particularly when a child victim is involved. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
¶89 In summary, we hold that the court of appeals erred in 
reversing the circuit court's conviction of Hunt on all six 
counts.  Although the circuit court could have provided a more 
detailed Sullivan analysis for admitting other-acts evidence, 
reversal was not appropriate here. 
¶90 We 
hold 
that 
pursuant 
to 
the 
well-established 
independent review doctrine in Wisconsin, the court of appeals 
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
46 
 
is required independently to review the record if the circuit 
court fails to provide a detailed Sullivan analysis.  As a 
result, based upon our own independent review of the record, we 
hold that the circuit court had reasonable bases for admitting 
the 
other-acts 
evidence 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). 
Such 
evidence was properly admitted for the purposes of motive, 
opportunity, intent, absence of mistake or accident, and 
context.  The circuit court properly admitted the other-acts 
evidence to provide the necessary background for understanding 
Hunt's behavior and to provide an independent source to judge 
the victims' credibility, and their state of mind, in light of 
their past acts of recanting prior charges against Hunt. The 
other-acts evidence was relevant.  Also, its probative value was 
not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice due 
to the circuit court's cautionary jury instructions, which were 
important in offsetting any prejudicial effect.   
¶91 Next, we hold that here, where permissible purposes 
existed for the admission of other-acts evidence, and where 
strong DNA evidence had been introduced, the court of appeals 
was not correct in reversing the convictions on all counts.  The 
conviction on the charge of first-degree sexual assault causing 
pregnancy should have been upheld, even if there were not 
permissible purposes for the admission of other-acts evidence.  
¶92 Finally, we hold that the circuit court properly 
applied the greater latitude rule in allowing other-acts 
evidence in this case where there were charges of sex crimes, 
especially since child victims were involved.   
No. 
01-0272-CR   
 
47 
 
¶93 We therefore reverse. 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶94 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
takes the circuit court to task for failing to provide a 
detailed 
or 
exhaustive 
Sullivan 
three-prong 
analysis 
in 
determining the admissibility of other acts evidence.  It 
criticizes the court of appeals for avoiding the careful step-
by-step analysis set forth in Sullivan.  Then, after explaining 
the careful analysis required by Sullivan and reaffirming its 
vitality, the majority inexplicably neglects to engage in the 
mandated analysis. 
¶95 The majority, like the circuit court, fails to 
carefully analyze each item of other acts evidence to ensure 
that it does not merely color the defendant's character, but 
legitimately serves a permissible purpose.  Its "kitchen sink" 
listing of permissible purposes without adequate analysis of how 
each item of other acts evidence is relevant to the identified 
purpose falls short of the approach required by Sullivan.  I 
write to emphasize that the Sullivan mandate includes a careful 
statement of a clearly articulated purpose of each piece of 
other acts evidence and an analysis of whether that evidence is 
relevant to the purpose. 
¶96 In Sullivan, we observed that the introduction of 
other acts evidence creates a risk that jurors will punish the 
accused for being a bad person regardless of his or her guilt of 
the crime charged.  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 783, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998).  We cited Whitty which set forth the following 
reasons for excluding other acts evidence: 
"(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant 
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
likely to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn 
not because he is believed guilty of the present 
charge but because he has escaped punishment from 
other offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who 
is not prepared to demonstrate the attacking evidence 
is fabricated; and (4) the confusion of issues which 
might result from bringing in evidence of other 
crimes." 
Id. at 782-83 (citing Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 
N.W.2d 557 (1967). 
¶97 To protect against the improper admission of other 
acts evidence, the Sullivan court described a three-pronged 
analysis to be used in determining whether to admit other acts 
evidence.  This analysis requires a circuit court to consider 
(1) whether the other acts evidence is offered for a permissible 
purpose; (2) whether the other acts evidence is relevant; and 
(3) whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the 
jury, 
or by 
consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
772. 
¶98 The Sullivan court observed that the absence of 
careful statements regarding the rationale for admitting or 
excluding 
other acts evidence substantially 
increases the 
likelihood for trial court error and makes appellate review more 
difficult.  Id. at 774.  The analysis set forth in Sullivan 
requires a clearly articulated purpose of each piece of other 
acts evidence and an assessment of whether that evidence is 
relevant to the purpose. 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶99 The proponent of other acts evidence must clearly 
articulate the purposes for which it is intended and apply the 
facts to the analytical framework.  Id.  Similarly, the court's 
obligation is to clearly articulate its reasoning for admitting 
or excluding other acts evidence, applying the facts of the case 
to the three-prong analysis.  Id.  Thus, I agree with the 
majority opinion that the circuit court erred in failing to 
perform 
the 
required 
analysis 
and 
neglecting 
to 
clearly 
articulate its reasoning for admitting the other acts evidence.  
Majority op., ¶3. 
¶100 The majority, however, fares little better in its 
attempt to articulate its reasoning in a manner that satisfies 
Sullivan.  Its inadequate analysis is particularly apparent in 
its explanation of how the other acts evidence satisfies the 
first and second prongs of Sullivan. 
¶101 The majority cites to a litany of permissible purposes 
that it considers to be applicable in this case.  In ¶59, the 
majority opines that the other acts evidence was permissible to 
show the victims' state of mind, to corroborate information 
provided by the police, and to establish the credibility of 
victims and witnesses in light of their recantations.  The 
opinion, however, fails to reference which of the 15 enumerated 
other acts related to which purpose.20 
                                                 
20 Hunt's brief-in-chief before this court contained a list 
of 15 other acts introduced at trial.  According to Hunt, this 
list was not exhaustive and the admission of the other acts 
permeated the proceedings. 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶102 After listing these purposes as applicable to this 
case, some of them disappear from sight.  The opinion does not 
take any of these purposes through the second and third prongs 
of the Sullivan analysis and does not include them in the list 
of purposes for which the evidence was properly admitted.  See 
majority op., ¶90.  Likewise, in a tag along line at the end of 
¶59, the majority raises the purposes of preparation or plan.  
They also disappear from the opinion without further analysis. 
¶103 Next, in ¶60, the majority adds the dual purposes of 
establishing opportunity and motive.  Yet it never explains what 
other acts evidence is offered for those purposes.  In ¶61, the 
majority again makes a generic reference to other acts evidence 
and concludes that it is "relevant to show that Hunt did not 
touch the victims by accident or mistake."  Without a proffered 
analysis, it is difficult to understand the relevance given that 
Hunt never raised accident or mistake as part of his defense. 
¶104 Even more troubling is the majority's discussion of 
why the other acts evidence satisfies the second prong of the 
Sullivan analysis.  In this discussion, the majority concludes 
that the other acts evidence was relevant for the purposes of 
showing context, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake or 
accident, and motive.  Majority op., ¶62. 
¶105 To support this conclusion, the opinion cites excerpts 
from 
a 
motion 
hearing 
which 
contain 
arguments 
regarding 
admitting the evidence for the purposes of showing context.  
These excerpts also vaguely refer to the purposes of showing the 
defendant's state of mind, the victims' and the witnesses' state 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
of 
mind, 
absence 
of 
mistake 
or 
accident, 
motive, 
and 
opportunity.  The reference to these excerpts is the extent of 
the majority's articulation of the reasons why the other acts 
evidence was relevant. 
¶106 The excerpts are woefully inadequate in articulating 
the reasons for relevance.  Rather than attempt to set forth the 
reasons, the majority simply concludes that the other acts 
evidence was relevant for the purposes of showing context, 
motive, opportunity, intent, and absence of mistake or accident 
because of "the reasons offered by the State and the decision of 
the circuit court."  Majority op., ¶67.  Apparently the majority 
now decides to rely on the reasoning of the circuit court even 
though it determined that the circuit court "could have provided 
a more detailed or exhaustive Sullivan analysis for admitting 
the other-acts evidence in this case . . . ."  Majority op., ¶3. 
¶107 Nowhere 
in 
the 
paragraphs 
leading 
up 
to 
this 
conclusion does the majority state the reasons offered by the 
State and the circuit court for why the other acts evidence was 
relevant to motive, opportunity, intent, or absence of mistake 
or accident.  Nowhere in the analysis assessing relevance is 
there any discussion of similarity between the other acts and 
the charged offenses.  A comparison of the nearness of time, 
place, and circumstance is central to, but completely absent 
from the majority's analysis.  Yet, in ¶64, the majority 
acknowledges that such a discussion is mandated by the Sullivan 
second prong.21 
                                                 
21 In ¶64, the majority emphasizes the import of the 
mandated analysis: 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶108 It is not surprising that the majority does not 
attempt to explain the reasons because, with respect to many of 
the identified purposes, it is difficult to articulate any 
persuasive justification for why the other acts evidence is 
relevant.  It is also not surprising because, as predicted by 
the Sullivan court, the absence of a circuit court's careful 
statements regarding the rationale for admitting other acts 
evidence makes appellate review difficult.  Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d at 774. 
¶109 Nevertheless, the majority criticizes the court of 
appeals for failing to conduct an independent Sullivan analysis.  
Curiously, 
although 
paying 
lip 
service 
to 
the 
Sullivan 
framework, 
the 
majority 
itself 
fails 
to 
engage 
in 
the 
step-by-step analysis mandated by Sullivan.  Given the laundry 
list of other acts evidence admitted, the litany of permissible 
purposes accepted by the circuit court, and the lack of the 
development of the record regarding the nature of each item of 
other acts evidence, I think this case should be remanded to the 
circuit court for a proper Sullivan analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
"The measure of probative value in assessing relevance 
is the similarity between the charged offense and the 
other act."  State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 58, 590 
N.W.2d 918 (1999).  Similarity is demonstrated by 
showing 
the 
"nearness 
of 
time, 
place, 
and 
circumstance" between the other act and the alleged 
crime.  State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 305, 595 
N.W.2d 661 (1999). . . .  Even when evidence may be 
considered too remote, the evidence is not necessarily 
rendered irrelevant if the remoteness is balanced by 
the similarity of the two incidents. . . . 
No.  01-0272-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶110 In sum, Sullivan mandates a careful statement of a 
clearly articulated purpose of each piece of other acts evidence 
and an analysis of whether that evidence is relevant to the 
purpose.  Because neither the circuit court nor the majority 
conducted a proper Sullivan analysis of the other acts evidence 
admitted in this case, I respectfully dissent. 
¶111 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.