Title: BRIEFING.COM, a California corporation; and RICHARD C. GREEN V. GREGORY JONES, individually; CYNTHIA DIETZMANN, individually; and STREET ACCOUNT LLC, a Wyoming corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRIEFING.COM, a California corporation; and RICHARD C. GREEN V. GREGORY JONES, individually; CYNTHIA DIETZMANN, individually; and STREET ACCOUNT LLC, a Wyoming corporation2006 WY 16126 P.3d 928Case Number: 04-196Decided: 01/26/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
BRIEFING.COM, 
a California 
corporation;

and 
RICHARD C. GREEN,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
GREGORY 
JONES, individually; CYNTHIA

DIETZMANN, 
individually; and

STREETACCOUNT 
LLC, a Wyoming

corporation,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Certified 
Questions from the United 
States District 
Court

for the 
District of Wyoming

The 
Honorable William F. Downes, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 

            
Thomas 
A. Nicholas, III and Robert C. Jarosh of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming; and Paul E. Chronis and Melissa Eckhause of McDermott, Will & 
Emery, Chicago, Illinois.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 
 

            
William 
P. Schwartz, William B. Campbell, and Janet Lewis of Ranck & Schwartz, LLC, 
Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, C.J., files a dissenting opinion, 
in which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This matter is 
before the Court upon our agreement to answer questions certified to us by the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the Honorable William 
F. Downes presiding.1  Appellants, Briefing.com and Richard C. 
Green, filed suit in the federal district court against Gregory Jones, Cynthia 
Dietzmann, and StreetAccount LLC, based in part on a theory of misappropriation 
of trade secrets.

 
 
CERTIFIED 
QUESTIONS

 
 
[¶2]                  
            
1.         
Would the Wyoming Supreme Court adopt a common-law cause of action for 
misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential information when former 
employees of a company are alleged to have misappropriated their former 
employer's trade secrets and/or confidential information to start a competing 
business?

 
 
            
2.         
If the answer to question number 1 is yes, what are the elements of the 
cause of action?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      W.R.A.P. 11.03 
requires the certifying court to provide a "statement of all facts relevant to 
the questions certified," as well as the "nature of the controversy in which the 
questions arose[.]"  The certifying 
order from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming provides 
the following information in that regard:

 
 

Statement 
of Alleged Facts Relevant to Certified Questions

 
 
            
Plaintiff, Briefing.com, is a California corporation that provides analysis 
of stock and fixed income markets for use by professional and individual 
investors.  Plaintiff, Richard 
Green, is the President of Briefing.com and is a member of Briefing.com's board 
of directors.  The Briefing.com 
website was started in 1995.  Mr. 
Green owns approximately 51 percent of Briefing.com's outstanding shares and is 
Briefing.com's majority shareholder.

 
 
            
StreetAccount LLC is a Wyoming limited liability company whose 
members include defendants Gregory Jones and Cynthia Dietzmann.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 
StreetAccount LLC is [a] direct competitor of Briefing.com in the internet-based 
market analysis industry.  
Defendants Jones and Dietzmann are citizens of the State of Wyoming.  Mr. Jones and Ms. Dietzmann currently 
own approximately 10 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively, of the outstanding 
shares of Briefing.com.

 
 
            
Mr. Jones and Ms. Dietzmann are former employees of Briefing.com.  While employed with Briefing.com, they 
worked in the company's Jackson, Wyoming office.  Ms. Dietzmann was employed by 
Briefing.com for approximately seven years as a market analyst until her 
resignation in or about late February or early March 2003.  Mr. Jones was employed by Briefing.com 
from approximately November 1996 through late February or early March 2003.  Plaintiffs allege that in addition to 
being an employee of Briefing.com, Mr. Jones was also a member of Briefing.com's 
board of directors for approximately six years until his resignation from that 
position in April 2003.

 
 
            
Plaintiffs allege that, based on their former positions with 
Briefing.com, Defendants Jones and Dietzmann knew of Briefing.com's work and 
proprietary studies in developing Briefing.com's themes and designs.  More specifically, Plaintiffs allege 
that, as employees of Briefing.com, Defendants Jones and Dietzmann had inside 
access to certain of the company's confidential information and data regarding 
the internet-based market analysis trade.

 
 
            
Plaintiffs allege that while working for Briefing.com, Ms. Dietzmann 
developed a list of market contacts that Briefing.com used to obtain market 
information that could be displayed on its website.  Plaintiffs allege that such market 
contact information developed by Ms. Dietzmann was developed pursuant to her 
employment with Briefing.com, and is therefore the sole property of 
Briefing.com.  Plaintiffs allege, 
however, that Ms. Dietzmann did not return all of Briefing.com's market contact 
information to the company, either before or after her resignation.  As a result, Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants misappropriated certain of Briefing.com's trade secrets and/or 
confidential information in order to form and operate a competing 
business.

 
 

Nature 
of Controversy in Which the Questions Arose

 
 
            
In Count V of their Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Plaintiffs asserted 
a common-law cause of action against Defendants for misappropriation of trade 
secrets and/or confidential information.  
On or about March 30, 2004, Defendants moved to dismiss Count V of the 
SAC on the grounds that Wyoming law does not recognize a cause of 
action for misappropriation of trade secrets.  Alternatively, Defendants requested that 
the issue be certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court for a determination as to 
whether such a cause of actions exists under Wyoming law.  On June 4, 2004, [the federal district 
court] heard oral argument from all parties relating to Defendants' motion to 
dismiss Count V.  After hearing 
argument, [it was] determined that there was no controlling precedent under 
Wyoming law to rule on this issue, and therefore, [the federal district court] 
found that the questions referenced above should be certified to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court for resolution.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Trade Secret 
Law

 
 
[¶4]      A cause of action 
for misuse of trade secrets was first recognized by Roman law, and was well 
known to the common law.2  Trade secret laws have their genesis in 
society's need to encourage innovation and to foster standards of trust in the 
marketplace:

 
 
            
The basis of the law as to trade secrets, apart from breach of contract, 
is the abuse of confidence or an impropriety in the means of procurement of 
information.  Trade secrets are 
protected to encourage the development of new inventions, processes, and 
business techniques, to protect against breaches of faith and the use of 
improper methods to obtain information, and to maintain standards of loyalty and 
trust in the business community.  An 
employee owes a duty of fidelity to an employer while the worker is employed by 
that employer, even where the employment is at will and even though the worker 
has not signed an agreement not to use trade secrets acquired by the employee; 
therefore, an employee will be restrained from using the employer's trade 
secrets learned during employment.  
Moreover, one who knowingly and for his or her own interests helps 
employees to violate their duty of fidelity and trust to their employer with 
respect to trade secrets is also liable to the employer, and will be restrained 
from use of the confidential information.

 
 

54A 
Am.Jur.2d Monopolies, Restraints of 
Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 1114 (1996 and Supp. 2005).  At the same time, however, trade secret 
law has recognized a counterbalancing need for free 
competition:

 
 
            
It has been said that the law of trade secrets is the result of balancing 
two conflicting elements essential to society.  On the one hand, there is a strong 
policy favoring free competition, thus entitling an employee to use the skill 
and knowledge of his trade or profession which he has learned in the course of 
his employment, for the benefit of himself and the public, if he does not 
violate a contractual or fiduciary obligation in doing so.  On the other hand, in order to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, the law provides certain 
protections to an originator, one of these being the law protecting trade 
secrets.

 
 

P. 
Guthrie, Annotation, Employee's Duty, in 
Absence of Express Contract, Not to Disclose or Use in New Employment Special 
Skills or Techniques Acquired in Earlier Employment, 30 A.L.R.3d 631, § 2 at 
636 (1970 and Supp. 2005).

 
 

[¶5]      The body of law 
on this subject has accumulated over many years and it is well annotated in 
various authorities.  See generally Alois Valerian Gross, 
Annotation, What is "Trade Secret" so as 
to Render Actionable Under State Law its Use or Disclosure by Former Employee, 
59 A.L.R.4th 641 (1988 and Supp. 2005); 
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Proper 
Measure and Elements of Damages for Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 11 
A.L.R.4th 12 (1982 and Supp. 2005); K.H. 
Larsen, Annotation, Former Employee's 
Duty, in Absence of Express Contract, Not to Solicit Former Employer's Customers 
or Otherwise Use his Knowledge of Customer Lists Acquired in Earlier Employment, 
28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969 and Supp. 2005); Donald 
M. Zupanec, Annotation, Criminal 
Liability for Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 84 A.L.R.3d 967 (1978 and 
Supp. 2005); and 
Gregory M. Wasson, Misappropriation of 
Trade Secret Under the Restatement of Torts, 14 P.O.F.3d 619 (1991 and Supp. 
2005).

 
 

[¶6]      Today, there are 
three primary manifestations of trade secret law.  The first is the formulation of the 
common law tort set forth in the 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Division 
Nine, Part 1, Chapter 36, § 757 at 1-2 (1939):

 
 
§ 
757.  Liability for Disclosure or Use 
of Another's Trade Secret-General Principle.

 
 
            
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to 
do so, is liable to the other if

 
 
(a)     he discovered the 
secret by improper means, or

 
 
(b)     his disclosure or use 
constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the 
secret to him, or

 
 
(c)     he learned the secret 
from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the 
third person discovered it by improper means or that the third person's 
disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, 
or

 
 
(d)     he learned the secret 
with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure was made 
to him by mistake.

 
 

[¶7]      This version of 
the common law tort has been supplanted by sections now found in the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition (1995).  The authors of the Restatement explain 
that change as follows:

 
 
            
Part 1 of the Division covered Interference by Trade Practices and 
included Chapters 34 (The Privilege to Engage in Business), 35 (Confusion of 
Source) and 36 (Miscellaneous Trade Practices).  The rules relating to liability for harm 
caused by unfair trade practices developed doctrinally from established 
principles in the law of Torts, and for this reason the decision was made that 
it was appropriate to include these legal areas in the Restatement of Torts, 
despite the fact that the fields of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation were 
rapidly developing into independent bodies of law with diminishing reliance upon 
the traditional principles of Tort law.  
In the more than 40 years since that decision was initially made, the 
influence of Tort law has continued to decrease, so that it is now largely of 
historical interest and the law of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation is no 
more dependent upon Tort law than it is on many other general fields of the law 
and upon broad statutory developments, particularly at the federal level.  The Council formally reached the 
decision that these chapters no longer belong in the Restatement of Torts, and 
they are omitted from this Second Restatement.  If it should be later decided that the 
law on these subjects ought to be restated, it will be done by separate 
restatements on the subjects involved.

 
 

4 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Division Nine, Introductory Note at 1-2 
(1979).

 
 

[¶8]      The commentary 
accompanying the trade secret provisions now found in the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition make it clear that development of these provisions was not 
meant to be a "sea change" in the law, but was meant to accommodate the law to 
developments in the commercial world, especially those wrought by the increased 
mobility of employees during the industrial revolution.  See Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, supra, at 
425-426.  The prohibition against misuse of trade 
secrets remains a common law cause of action, formulated through case decision, 
just as before.  These new sections 
provide as follows:

 
 
§ 
39.   Definition of Trade 
Secret

 
 
            
A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a 
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to 
afford an actual or potential economic advantage over 
others.

 
 
§ 
40.   Appropriation of Trade 
Secrets

 
 
            
One is subject to liability for the appropriation of another's trade 
secret if:

 
 
(a)    the actor acquires by means 
that are improper under the rule stated in § 43 information that the actor knows 
or has reason to know is the other's trade secret; or

 
 
(b)    the actor uses or discloses 
the other's trade secret without the other's consent and, at the time of the use 
or disclosure,

 
 
(1)     the actor knows or has 
reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired 
under circumstances creating a duty of confidence owed by the actor to the other 
under the rule stated in § 41; or

 
 
(2)     the actor knows or has 
reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired by 
means that are improper under the rule stated in § 43; or

 
 
(3)     the actor knows or has 
reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired 
from or through a person who acquired it by means that are improper under the 
rule stated in § 43 or whose disclosure of the trade secret constituted a breach 
of a duty of confidence owed to the other under the rule stated in § 41; 
or

 
 
(4)     the actor knows or has 
reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired 
through an accident or mistake, unless the acquisition was the result of the 
other's failure to take reasonable precautions to maintain the secrecy of the 
information.

 
 
§ 
41.   Duty of 
Confidence

 
 
            
A person to whom a trade secret has been disclosed owes a duty of 
confidence to the owner of the trade secret for purposes of the rule stated in § 
40 if:

 
 
(a)    the person made an express 
promise of confidentiality prior to the disclosure of the trade secret; 
or

 
 
(b)    the trade secret was 
disclosed to the person under circumstances in which the relationship between 
the parties to the disclosure or the other facts surrounding the disclosure 
justify the conclusions that, at the time of the 
disclosure,

 
 
(1)     the person knew or had 
reason to know that the disclosure was intended to be in confidence, 
and

 
 
(2)     the other party to the 
disclosure was reasonable in inferring that the person consented to an 
obligation of confidentiality.

 
 
§ 
42.   Breach of Confidence by 
Employees

 
 
            
An employee or former employee who uses or discloses a trade secret owned 
by the employer or former employer in breach of a duty of confidence is subject 
to liability for appropriation of the trade secret under the rule stated in § 
40.

 
 
§ 
43.   Improper Acquisition of 
Trade Secrets

 
 
            
"Improper" means of acquiring another's trade secret under the rule 
stated in § 40 include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of 
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of 
confidence, and other means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under the 
circumstances of the case.  
Independent discovery and analysis of publicly available products or 
information are not improper means of acquisition.

 
 
§ 
44.   Injunctions:  Appropriation of Trade 
Secrets

 
 
(1)    If appropriate under the rule 
stated in Subsection (2), injunctive relief may be awarded to prevent a 
continuing or threatened appropriation of another's trade secret by one who is 
subject to liability under the rule stated in § 40.

 
 
(2)    The appropriateness and scope 
of injunctive relief depend upon a comparative appraisal of all the factors of 
the case, including the following primary factors:

 
 
(a)     the nature of the 
interest to be protected;

 
 
(b)     the nature and extent 
of the appropriation;

 
 
(c)     the relative adequacy 
to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other remedies;

 
 
(d)     the relative harm 
likely to result to the legitimate interests of the defendant if an injunction 
is granted and to the legitimate interests of the plaintiff if an injunction is 
denied;

 
 
(e)     the interests of third 
persons and of the public;

 
 
(f)      any unreasonable 
delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise asserting its 
rights;

 
 
(g)     any related misconduct 
on the part of the plaintiff; and

 
 
(h)     the practicality of 
framing and enforcing the injunction.

 
 
(3)   The duration of injunctive relief 
in trade secret actions should be limited to the time necessary to protect the 
plaintiff from any harm attributable to the appropriation and to deprive the 
defendant of any economic advantage attributable to the 
appropriation.

 
 
§ 
45.   Monetary Relief:  Appropriation of Trade 
Secrets

 
 
(1)     One who is liable to 
another for an appropriation of the other's trade secret under the rule stated 
in § 40 is liable for the pecuniary loss to the other caused by the 
appropriation or for the actor's own pecuniary gain resulting from the 
appropriation, whichever is greater, unless such relief is inappropriate under 
the rule stated in Subsection (2).

 
 
(2)     Whether an award of 
monetary relief is appropriate and the appropriate method of measuring such 
relief depend upon a comparative appraisal of all the factors of the case, 
including the following primary factors:

 
 
(a)     the degree of certainty 
with which the plaintiff has established the fact and extent of the pecuniary 
loss or the actor's pecuniary gain resulting from the 
appropriation;

 
 
(b)     the nature and extent 
of the appropriation;

 
 
(c)     the relative adequacy 
to the plaintiff of other remedies;

 
 
(d)     the intent and 
knowledge of the actor and the nature and extent of any good faith reliance by 
the actor;

 
 
(e)     any unreasonable delay 
by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise asserting its rights; 
and

 
 
(f)      any related 
misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.

 
 

Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition, supra, 
at 425-527.

 
 

[¶9]      In 1979, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws produced the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which is the third current compilation of trade secret 
law.  As amended in 1985, the UTSA 
is, as its name implies, intended to be legislatively adopted.  Because it is a complex statutory scheme 
with numerous sections, and because we do not consider it appropriate for 
judicial adoption, we will not set it out here at length.  See Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 
Amendments §1, 14 U.L.A., 537 
(2005).  It should be noted, however, that some 
version of the UTSA has been adopted by forty-four states and the District of 
Columbia.  
The states not listed in 14 Uniform Laws Annotated, supra, at 529-30 as having adopted the UTSA are 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming.  All of these states but Wyoming, however, provide 
in some manner for a cause of action for misuse of trade secrets.  Massachusetts has its own statutes creating 
tort liability for misappropriation of trade secrets.  Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93, §§ 42 and 42A (Law. 
Co-op. 1994).  North Carolina also has 
its own statutes.  10 N.C. Gen. 
Stat. §§ 66-152 through 66-157 (LexisNexis 2005).  New Jersey provides protection to trade 
secrets both under employment agreements and the traditional common law 
protection afforded to such secrets.  
Raven v. A. Klein & Co., Inc., 
478 A.2d 1208 (N.J. 1984).  New York gives recognition to the common law 
protections articulated in the Restatement of Torts § 757 and the common law.  See Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278 N.E.2d 636, 639-40 (N.Y. 1972) and Sterling Television Presentations, Inc. v. 
Shintron Co., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 183, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  Texas recognizes trade secret misappropriation 
as a common law tort cause of action.  
Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus 
Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Tex.App. 2004).

 
 

Wyoming 
Law

 
 

[¶10]   Wyoming is the only jurisdiction in the United 
States that has not given specific legislative 
or judicial recognition to a tort cause of action for misuse of trade 
secrets.  This Court has discussed 
the related issue of covenants not to compete or to use employers' trade 
secrets, but we have not directly addressed the Restatement of Torts 
§ 757, or 
either of the more modern formulations of trade secret law.  See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 
861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993) and Ridley v. Krout, 63 Wyo. 252, 180 P.2d 124, 127 (1947).  Nevertheless, trade secret protection is 
a well-established principle in this state.  For instance, W.R.C.P. 26(c)(1)(G) 
protects trade secrets during the pre-trial discovery process in civil 
cases.  And the legislature has 
recognized the sanctity of trade secrets in numerous statutes:  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-502(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005) (trade secrets as 
intellectual property in criminal statute); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(d)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2005) (trade secrets as 
exception to right to inspect public records); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-19-304(e)(iii) (LexisNexis 2005) 
(trade secrets not to be disclosed by insurance commissioner); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
26-34-129 (LexisNexis 2005) (trade 
secrets of health maintenance organizations not public documents); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-11-109(f) (LexisNexis 2005) 
(trade secrets confidential in occupation health and safety investigations); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-24-104(e) (LexisNexis 2005) (trade secrets not to be disclosed 
in application process for cooperative health care providers); and Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 37-15-401(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 
2005) (trade secrets contained in reports to public service commission).  Clearly, the concept of trade secret 
protection is firmly embedded in the existing law of Wyoming.

 
 

The 
Common Law

 
 
[¶11]   Perhaps this entire discussion 
should have been shortened to the dual observation that (1) misuse of trade 
secrets is a recognized common law cause of action; and (2) the Wyoming legislature 
adopted the common law over 100 years ago.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 (LexisNexis 2005) provides as 
follows:

 
 
The 
common law of England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is 
of a general nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts 
or statutes made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to 
the fourth year of James the First (excepting the second section of the sixth 
chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and 
ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature 
and not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority.

 
 
[¶12]   The question is not so much whether 
this Court should "adopt" a cause of action for misuse of trade secrets.  Rather, the question is whether this 
Court should declare that such a cause of action exists in the common law that 
has been statutorily adopted in this State.  We begin our resolution of that issue by 
considering what the "common law" is:

 
 
The 
common law, as frequently defined, includes those rules of law which do not rest 
for their authority upon any express or positive statute or other written 
declaration, but rather upon statements of principles found in the decisions of 
the courts.  Common law is the law 
of necessity, and is applied in the absence of controlling statutory 
law.

 
 
Although 
the common law is inseparably identified with the decisions of the courts, and 
can be determined only from such decisions, it has also been said that the 
common law is not limited to published judicial precedent, but includes the 
entire wealth of received tradition and usage, fundamental principles, modes of 
reasoning, and the substance of its rules as illustrated by the reasons on which 
they are based, rather than the mere words in which they are expressed.  Thus, in a broader sense, the common law 
is the system of rules and declarations of principles from which our judicial 
ideas and legal definitions are derived, and which are continually 
expanding.  It is not a codification 
of exact or inflexible rules for human conduct, for the redress of injuries, or 
for protection against wrongs, but is rather the embodiment of broad and 
comprehensive unwritten principles, inspired by natural reason and an innate 
sense of justice, and adopted by common consent for the regulation and 
government of human affairs.

 
 

15A 
Am.Jur.2d Common Law § 1 
(2000) (internal footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

[¶13]   This Court has been called upon 
many times to determine the applicability of the common law to various 
controversies, and our cases are too numerous to cite individually herein.  See case annotations following Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 and in 2 West's Wyoming Digest, Common Law, Key Nos. 11-14 (2003 and 
Cum. Supp. 2006).  We will, however, 
point out some key principles that have application to the instant case.  We have said, for instance, that the 
common law is "applicable" within the intent of the adopting statute if it is 
"applicable to the habits and condition of our society, and in harmony with the 
genius, spirit and objects of our institutions."  Crawford v. Barber, 385 P.2d 655, 657 
(Wyo. 1963) (quoting Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783, 
792 (1945)).  The principles of the common law adopted 
for this State are only those "adapted to our circumstances, state of society, and form of 
government."  Fuchs, 163 P.2d at 792 (emphasis in 
original).

 
 

[¶14]   As noted above, the common law is 
not a set code of law, static and unchanging.  Choman v. Epperley, 592 P.2d 714, 716 
(Wyo. 1979).  Rather,

 
 
[t]he 
common law is not exactly the common law of 1607.  Many, and probably most of the rules of 
the common law of 1607, aside from equitable rules and aside from fundamental 
maxims, have been modified by judicial decisions.

 
 

Krug v. 
Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152 (Wyo. 1971) (quoting In re Smith's Estate, 55 
Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940)).  In holding to this principle, this Court 
has repeatedly recognized the dynamic nature of the common 
law:

 
 
            
That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law 
which grew up in a remote generation may in the fullness of experience be found 
to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds 
that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established 
and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have become 
vested in reliance upon the old rule.  
It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source 
and method of its growth, and in its growth found its health and life.  It is not and it should not be 
stationary.  Change of this 
character should not be left to the Legislature.

 
 

Borns ex 
rel. Gannon v. Voss, 2003 WY 
74, ¶ 26, 70 P.3d 262, 271 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419, 428 (Wyo. 1976)).  See also Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County 
Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wyo. 1990); Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 
551 (Wyo. 1985); 
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of 
American Law, 17 (Simon and Schuster 1973); 15A 
Am.Jur.2d Common Law, supra, 
§13; 15A 
C.J.S. Common Law § 15 
(2002).

 
 
CONCLUSIONS

 
 

[¶15]   Misuse or misappropriation of a 
trade secret as a tort was part of the common law adopted by the Wyoming legislature as 
the "rule of decision" for this State.  
The numerous statutes listed above recognizing the confidentiality of 
trade secrets in particular contexts reveal the legislature's commitment to 
trade secret protection, yet they do not constitute such a "covering of the 
whole field" as to evidence legislative intent to abrogate the common law 
rule.  See Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 
1046 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on related grounds, by Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991), and Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo. 
1973).3  Furthermore, as Wyoming has advanced into the modern commercial world 
along with the rest of the United States, its people have the 
same need for trade secret protection as do the rest of the people of the 
country.  Consequently, we have no 
hesitation in declaring that the tort of misuse or misappropriation of trade 
secrets is part of the law of this jurisdiction.  Furthermore, because it represents the 
common law cause of action in its modern and most appropriate version, we adopt 
the cause of action as it appears in Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, 
supra, §§ 39 through 45.

 
 
ANSWERS 
TO CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

 
 
[¶16]   1.         
The common law cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets 
and/or confidential information when former employees of a company are alleged 
to have misappropriated their former employer's trade secrets and/or 
confidential information to start a competing business is part of the common law 
in the State of Wyoming.

 
 
            
2.         
The elements of the cause of action are those contained in Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition, supra, 
§§ 39 through 45.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, in which GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶17]   I respectfully dissent because I 
perceive that the protection of trade secrets and other confidential economic 
information developed by employers has become an increasingly complex issue that 
is fraught with technicalities and permeated with vital public policy 
issues.  I would have answered the 
certified questions in the negative and referred the responsibility for 
answering those questions to the legislature.  Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 provides:  "The powers of the government of this 
state are divided into three distinct departments:  The legislative, executive and judicial, 
and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers 
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution 
expressly directed or permitted."

 
 
[¶18]   The majority expressly recognizes 
the complexities of the issues at hand, that the Restatement of Torts § 757 has 
been deprived of the essence of its vitality, and that this Court does not have 
authority to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).  The vast majority of jurisdictions now 
use UTSA, or other legislative enactments, to govern this area of law.  Prior to this litigation, Wyoming was alone in not 
having given recognition to a civil remedy to protect trade secrets.  Wyoming will now be alone in adopting the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as the vehicle for filling in this 
gap.  It is my conviction that the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition so closely resembles a system of 
statutes, akin to UTSA, that the adoption of it as the governing law in 
Wyoming is a 
usurpation of the Legislature's authority and 
responsibility.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See 
W.R.A.P. 
11.01 through 11.07, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-13-104 through 1-13-107 
(LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 

2See 
Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995) and Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 
Amendments Prefatory Note at 530-532, 14 U.L.A. (2005).

 
 

3Abrogation of the common law is not 
to be presumed; such legislative intent must clearly appear in the unambiguous 
language of a statute.  Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 
2002 WY 73, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 323, 327 
(Wyo. 2002).