Title: In re Martinez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 12/4/17 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
In re HECTOR MARTINEZ 
) 
S226596 
 
 
) 
 
on Habeas Corpus. 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D066705 
 
 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
 
) 
Super.Ct. No. SCD224457 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Petitioner Hector Martinez was convicted of first degree murder after the 
jury was instructed on both a direct aiding and abetting theory and a natural and 
probable consequences theory.  After his conviction, we held in People v. Chiu 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) that a natural and probable consequences theory of 
liability cannot serve as a basis for a first degree murder conviction.  It is 
undisputed that the trial court in this case committed Chiu error.  The sole question 
is whether the error was prejudicial.  We hold that on a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, as on direct appeal, Chiu error requires reversal unless the reviewing court 
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid 
theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.  Because we are unable 
to reach such a conclusion based on the record here, we vacate Martinez’s first 
degree murder conviction. 
I. 
Martinez was convicted of the first degree murder of Guillermo Esparza 
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) (all undesignated statutory citations are to this code)), 
assault of Esparza with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)(1)), and assault 
of Jimmy Parker with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, 
2 
subd. (a)(1)).  In a general verdict, the jury found true allegations that each crime 
was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a 
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); that Martinez was vicariously armed 
with a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)); that the 
codefendants were principals in the commission of the murder; and that a principal 
used a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, 
subds. (d), (e)(1)).  The trial court sentenced Martinez to a determinate term of six 
years plus an indeterminate term of 50 years to life. 
The facts of the crime committed by Martinez and his codefendant Darren 
Martinez (no relation to petitioner) are summarized by the Court of Appeal as 
follows:  Late in the evening on August 20, 2009, Darren’s girlfriend was with 
Darren and Martinez when she saw Darren with a gun.  She objected to his having 
a gun at her house and asked him to take the gun away.  Darren, accompanied by 
Martinez, left the house but did not dispose of the gun.  A few hours later, 
Martinez, Darren, and Darren’s girlfriend were in her car at a drive-thru restaurant.  
She noticed a gun in Darren’s lap.  When she was driving home, Darren suddenly 
told her to stop the car.  Martinez and Darren got out of the car and ran up to 
Jimmy Parker and Guillermo Esparza, who were walking down the street.  
Martinez asked Parker, “Where are you from?”  Parker mentioned the name of a 
group that was not a gang but was engaged in tagging.  Martinez punched Parker, 
and they fought.  Parker heard Darren say, “This is Lomas,” and Darren shot 
Esparza, who died as a result.  Martinez hit Parker once more after the gunshot 
was fired.  Martinez and Darren then ran from the crime scene. 
At trial, Detective Nestor Hernandez testified that Martinez and Darren 
were documented Lomas gang members, that gang members commonly carried 
weapons when preparing to assault someone or enter rival gang territory, that the 
question “where are you from?” is a challenge to those perceived to be trespassing 
3 
on gang territory, and that gang members can be expected to stand up for one 
another. 
The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 regarding 
aiding and abetting, and with CALCRIM No. 403 regarding the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine.  CALCRIM No. 403 provides in part:  “To prove 
that a defendant is guilty of murder, the People must prove that:  [¶] 1. The 
defendant is guilty of assault and/or battery; [¶] 2. During the commission of 
assault and/or battery, a coparticipant in that assault and/or battery committed the 
crime of murder; [¶] AND [¶] 3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s position would have known that the commission of the 
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the assault 
and/or battery.” 
Martinez timely appealed, contending among other things that his first 
degree murder conviction should be reversed because the trial court’s instruction 
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine “failed to correctly inform the 
jury that [the defendants were] guilty of premeditated murder only if the jury 
found that premeditated murder, and not merely murder, was the natural and 
probable consequence of the target crimes.”  The Court of Appeal rejected that 
argument based on its reading of People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 878–880.  
We denied Martinez’s petition for review without prejudice to any relief he might 
obtain under Chiu, which was pending before this court at the time.  We 
subsequently held in Chiu that a natural and probable consequences theory cannot 
be a basis for convicting a defendant of first degree murder.  (Chiu, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 166.) 
Martinez filed this writ petition in the Court of Appeal, arguing that he is 
entitled to have his conviction reduced to second degree murder under Chiu.  
While recognizing that the jury instruction on natural and probable consequences 
4 
was error under Chiu, the Court of Appeal affirmed Martinez’s first degree murder 
conviction because it was supported by “sufficient evidence.”  We granted review 
to address the proper standard of prejudice for Chiu error on a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. 
II. 
In Chiu, we said that “the connection between the defendant’s culpability 
and the perpetrator’s premeditative state is too attenuated to impose aider and 
abettor liability for first degree murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, especially in light of the severe penalty involved and the 
. . . public policy concern of deterrence.  [¶] Accordingly, we hold that punishment 
for second degree murder is commensurate with a defendant’s culpability for 
aiding and abetting a target crime that would naturally, probably, and foreseeably 
result in a murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.  We 
further hold that where the direct perpetrator is guilty of first degree premeditated 
murder, the legitimate public policy considerations of deterrence and culpability 
would not be served by allowing a defendant to be convicted of that greater 
offense under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”  (Chiu, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 166.)   
We went on to say:  “When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of 
guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is 
required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a 
valid ground.  (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128–1129; People v. 
Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 69–71.)  Defendant’s first degree murder conviction 
must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and 
abetted the premeditated murder.”  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.) 
5 
The Attorney General contends that a different standard of prejudice should 
apply with respect to Chiu error when a defendant seeks to attack his conviction 
not by direct appeal, as in Chiu, but collaterally through a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  The Attorney General relies on a line of our earlier cases in which 
we said:  “Habeas corpus is available in cases where the court has acted in excess 
of its jurisdiction.  [Citations.]  For purposes of this writ as well as prohibition or 
certiorari, the term ‘jurisdiction’ is not limited to its fundamental meaning, and in 
such proceedings judicial acts may be restrained or annulled if determined to be in 
excess of the court’s powers as defined by constitutional provision, statute, or 
rules developed by courts.  [Citations.]  In accordance with these principles a 
defendant is entitled to habeas corpus if there is no material dispute as to the facts 
relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute under which he was 
convicted did not prohibit his conduct.”  (In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 667–
668 (Zerbe), italics added; see People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396 (Mutch) 
[applying same standard]; In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 125 (Earley) 
[same].) 
In determining the prejudicial effect of Chiu error in a habeas corpus 
proceeding, the Courts of Appeal have differed on the appropriate standard.  (See 
In re Johnson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1406 [adopting Chiu standard of 
prejudice and rejecting the standard set forth in the “older line of habeas corpus 
cases”]; In re Lopez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 350, 360–361 [Zerbe and Mutch set 
forth the proper standard for determining whether Chiu error is prejudicial in a 
habeas corpus proceeding].) 
The justification for requiring habeas corpus petitioners to meet a more 
demanding standard of prejudice was explained by Justice Traynor in In re Bell 
(1942) 19 Cal.2d 488.  Bell involved a county ordinance prohibiting labor 
picketing.  A portion of the ordinance prohibiting peaceful picketing was clearly 
6 
unconstitutional, whereas another portion prohibiting various acts of violence was 
clearly constitutional.  (Id. at pp. 496–498.)  The general verdict on its face was 
ambiguous as to which portions of the ordinance the petitioners were convicted of 
violating.  The court recognized that “[t]he ambiguity of the judgment in the 
present case would thus clearly warrant a reversal of the conviction on appeal or 
other direct attack.”  (Id. at p. 500, citing Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 
359, 363.)  But the petitioners in Bell had exhausted their appeals, and habeas 
corpus “is in the nature of a collateral attack, and a judgment that is collaterally 
attacked carries with it a presumption of regularity.  [Citation.]  . . .  The 
presumption, however, is not conclusive in a habeas corpus proceeding but places 
upon petitioners the burden of proving that their convictions were based not upon 
the constitutional but upon the unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance.  
[Citation.]  Unless they can sustain this burden they must be considered as having 
been convicted of violating the valid provision relating to acts of violence, and the 
judgment must be upheld.”  (Bell, at pp. 500–501.)  In order to carry this burden, a 
petitioner may rely on evidence outside the trial record.  (Id. at p. 504.)   
As we have emphasized, this presumption of regularity stems from the 
recognition that “ ‘habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy “and that the 
availability of the writ properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due 
consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt 
implementation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality of 
judgments.” ’ ”  (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 451.)  The interest in finality 
has led this court to develop various procedural bars to collateral attacks on the 
judgment.  The bar most relevant to this case is the so-called Waltreus rule:  A 
writ of habeas corpus will not issue for a claim that was raised and rejected on 
appeal.  (Reno, at p. 476; see In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 
(Waltreus).)  There are exceptions to this rule.  One such exception applies “when 
7 
there has been a change in the law affecting the petitioner.”  (In re Harris (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 813, 841 (Harris).)  To trigger this exception, the change in the law must 
have retroactive effect.  We have said that a change in the criminal law will be 
given retroactive effect when a rule is substantive rather than procedural (i.e., it 
alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes, or it 
modifies the elements of the offense) or when a judicial decision undertakes to 
vindicate the original meaning of the statute.  (In re Lopez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 
350, 357–359.)  Here, as the Attorney General concedes, Chiu is retroactive.  (See 
id. at p. 359.) 
The application of procedural bars and limitations on the retroactivity of 
changes in the criminal law serves to protect the finality of judgments on collateral 
review.  The Attorney General argues that even when a petitioner has surmounted 
these hurdles, as is the case here, the imposition of an additional hurdle –– a 
heightened standard of prejudice that a habeas corpus petitioner must meet –– is 
necessary to safeguard finality.  But the case law applying the heightened standard 
does not support this position.  In many of the cases cited by the Attorney General, 
there was no change in the law, and the court was simply asked to review a 
constitutional claim rejected on appeal.  (See Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 495; In re 
Klor (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 817–818, 822; Zerbe, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 667.)  As 
noted, the courts in these cases assigned habeas corpus petitioners “the burden of 
proving that their convictions were based not upon the constitutional but upon the 
unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance” (Bell, at p. 501) or the burden of 
showing that “there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction 
and . . . the statute under which he was convicted did not prohibit his conduct” 
(Zerbe, at p. 668).  These standards generally correspond to two other exceptions 
to the Waltreus rule.  First, “where the claimed constitutional error is both clear 
and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process . . . an opportunity for 
8 
a third chance at judicial review (trial, appeal, postappeal habeas corpus) [is] 
justified.”  (Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 834.)  Second, review of a previously 
litigated claim is justified where the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction and 
“ ‘there [was] no material dispute as to the facts.’ ”  (Id. at p. 840, citing Zerbe, at 
p. 668.) 
Other cases cited by the Attorney General did involve a change of law.  In 
Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d 389, petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction 
in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in 
People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139, that such a conviction could not 
be based on “movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the 
commission of the robbery . . . .”  (Mutch, at p. 394; see ibid. [Daniels overruled 
the contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 
168, 192].)  In Mutch, the court first determined that Daniels’s construction of 
section 209 should be given retroactive effect because Daniels had not redefined 
the crime of kidnapping but simply declared what the Legislature’s intent had been 
in enacting the 1951 amendment to section 209.  (Mutch, at p. 394.)  The court 
then recapitulated the Zerbe standard that a habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to 
relief only “ ‘if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction 
and if it appears that the statute under which he was convicted did not prohibit his 
conduct.’ ”  (Id. at p. 396.)  In Mutch, the petitioner was able to meet that burden.  
(Id. at p. 399.)  In Earley, a case in which the same issue was raised and the same 
standard of prejudice articulated, the petitioner was not able to meet the burden, 
and we denied relief.  (Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 125, 132–133.) 
Unlike the present case, the petitioners in Mutch and Earley claimed they 
were actually innocent of kidnapping under section 209 because the statute did not 
proscribe their conduct.  (Mutch, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 395 [“the issue is ‘whether 
the acts of [defendant], on the record in this case, constitute the kind of conduct 
9 
proscribed by section 209’ ”]; Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 125 [petitioner seeks 
relief “on the ground that his conduct did not violate section 209” as construed in 
Daniels].)  In evaluating this claim, the court applied the rule established in Zerbe 
that “a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus if there is no material dispute as to 
the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute under which he 
was convicted did not prohibit his conduct.”  (Zerbe, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 668.)  
The granting of relief in such circumstances would in effect be a holding that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict the petitioner of kidnapping when section 209 
was properly construed, and it would therefore bar retrial on the kidnapping 
charge.  (See People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591.) 
Martinez’s claim is different.  He contends the jury was improperly 
instructed on what constitutes aiding and abetting a first degree murder.  Such an 
erroneous instruction deprives a defendant of the right to a jury trial under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; that right implies a right to a 
jury properly instructed in the relevant law.  (See Neder v. United States (1999) 
527 U.S. 1, 12.)  A reversal of his conviction on that basis does not bar retrial.  
(See People v. Collins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 690, 698.)  A petitioner in these 
circumstances does not carry the burden of demonstrating that his conviction was 
based on insufficient evidence.  Rather, once he has shown that the jury was 
instructed on correct and incorrect theories of liability, the presumption is that the 
error affected the judgment:  “ ‘Jurors are not generally equipped to determine 
whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law — 
whether, for example, the action . . . fails to come within the statutory definition of 
the crime.  When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a 
legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence 
and expertise will save them from that error.’ ”  (People v Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
1116, 1125, quoting Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46, 59.)  Of course, 
10 
the presumption of error can be rebutted by a showing “beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory.”  (Chiu, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 167.) 
Thus, both the nature and the procedural posture of the claim presented in 
this case distinguishes it from the claims considered in the cases on which the 
Attorney General relies.  Because the claim was presented after a change in the 
law given retroactive effect, it is not barred by Waltreus or any other procedural 
rule designed to safeguard the finality of judgments against collateral attack.  And 
the claim does not allege actual innocence or insufficiency of the evidence; it 
alleges a deprivation of the right to have a jury properly decide a defendant’s 
culpability.  Under these circumstances, it is inappropriate to place on a habeas 
corpus petitioner the burden of proving that the jury relied on the legally incorrect 
theory in order to vindicate his constitutional right to a jury trial.  We hold that 
such a habeas corpus petitioner is in the same position as a defendant raising this 
type of error on direct appeal, and the same rule should apply:  The “first degree 
murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant 
directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder.”  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 167.)  We express no view on whether the same rule would apply to an 
individual asserting the same claim in a habeas corpus petition when there has 
been no intervening change in the law (cf. Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 500–501) 
or whether such a claim would fit into some other exception to the Waltreus rule. 
The Attorney General argues in the alternative that we should adopt the 
federal standard of prejudice articulated in Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57, 
derived from Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 637 (Brecht).  Under 
this standard, a collateral attack on a state court judgment in a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding on the ground that the jury had been instructed on legally valid 
11 
and invalid theories will succeed only if the error “ ‘had substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ”  (Hedgpeth, at p. 58.)  The 
high court has further clarified that neither party has a burden of proof or 
persuasion, but that reversal of the verdict is required where “a conscientious 
judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error.”  (O’Neal v. McAninch 
(1995) 513 U.S. 432, 437.)   
The federal standard is based in part on the concern for preserving the 
finality of judgments against collateral attack.  (See Brecht, supra, 507 U.S. at 
p. 637.)  But it is not clear that what amounts to a “grave doubt” standard of 
prejudice is fairer or more workable than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
articulated in Guiton and Chiu.  At least with respect to the type of claim that 
Martinez raises in this case, the state law framework discussed above sufficiently 
addresses such finality concerns and properly balances those concerns with the 
need to correct serious constitutional error on collateral review.  We decline to 
adopt the federal standard. 
III. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal correctly recited the Chiu prejudice 
standard.  But the court did not go on to inquire whether it could conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that 
Martinez directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder.  Rather, it concluded 
there was “sufficient evidence” that Martinez acted as a direct aider and abettor:  
“Martinez was aware the codefendant carried a gun in the vehicle because he was 
aware the codefendant had it earlier, and after the girlfriend had told the 
codefendant to remove it from her house, Martinez accompanied the codefendant 
who had promised to dispose of it.  Further, the gang expert’s testimony provided 
the jury with a basis to find that Martinez likely was emboldened to challenge 
Parker and Esparza—by asking them where they were from—precisely because 
12 
Martinez knew the codefendant was carrying a gun and Martinez relied on his 
codefendant’s support as he attacked the others.  Further, Martinez’s use of 
violence would enhance the respect he received within the gang and for the gang 
among rival gangs.  Lastly, Martinez encouraged and facilitated the first degree 
murder by attacking Parker, thus simultaneously preventing Parker from defending 
Esparza, and freeing up the codefendant to focus exclusively on Esparza, which 
the codefendant did by shooting and killing him.”  
The Court of Appeal’s analysis, while showing that the jury could 
reasonably have found Martinez guilty as a direct aider and abettor of the murder 
of Esparza, does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied 
on that theory.  We conclude that the record does not permit us to rule out a 
reasonable possibility that the jury relied on the invalid natural and probable 
consequences theory in convicting Martinez of first degree murder.   
An instruction on an invalid theory may be found harmless when “other 
aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no reasonable doubt that the jury made 
the findings necessary” under a legally valid theory.  (People v. Chun (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 1172, 1205.)  The Attorney General points to nothing in the verdict 
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury made the findings necessary to 
convict Martinez as a direct aider and abettor.  The Attorney General’s position, 
like the Court of Appeal’s, is based on its review of the evidence.  But the 
evidence in this case does not compel the conclusion that the jury must have relied 
on a direct aider and abettor theory. 
The evidence shows that Martinez was engaged in a fight with Parker and 
that the only assistance he rendered to his codefendant was incidental to his assault 
on Parker –– that is, his assault prevented Parker from coming to Esparza’s 
assistance.  Although the Court of Appeal and the Attorney General may be 
correct that there is sufficient evidence to convict Martinez of directly aiding and 
13 
abetting, the evidence also supports the theory that the murder was a natural and 
probable consequence of the assaults that Martinez and his codefendant 
committed. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the prosecutor argued the 
natural and probable consequences theory to the jury at length during closing 
argument and rebuttal.  Moreover, an inquiry by the jury during its deliberations 
suggested that it was considering the natural and probable consequences theory of 
liability.  The jury asked to clarify the meaning of the instruction regarding 
“Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes,” which states:  “To prove that a defendant 
is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove 
that:  [¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime;  [¶] 2. The defendant knew that 
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime;  [¶] 3. Before or during the 
commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in 
committing the crime;  [¶] AND  [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in 
fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.  [¶]  Someone aids 
and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he 
or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, 
or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”  (CALCRIM No. 401.)   
The jury sent the court a note that said:  “Clarification request on 
description of #401 Aiding and Abetting:  [¶] Point #2 says: ‘The defendant knew 
that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime,’ [¶] What is meant by ‘the 
crime’?  Did aider and abett[or] have to know or even expect the possibility that it 
will be murder (for count #1)?  Or does it mean any crime?”  The court replied, 
“This is what the jury has to decide.  Refer to instructions 400, 401 and 403, read 
together.”  The court added, “ ‘[A]ny crime’ means any crime the defendants are 
on trial for.’ ”  The jury’s query and the trial court’s response, with its reference to 
the natural and probable consequences instruction (CALCRIM No. 403), suggest 
14 
that some of the jurors’ ambivalence about convicting Martinez on a direct aiding 
and abetting theory may have been resolved by relying on the theory that the 
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the assaults committed by 
Martinez and his codefendant. 
In sum, we conclude that the Attorney General has not shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury relied on a legally valid theory in convicting 
Martinez of first degree murder.   
15 
 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Chiu error here was prejudicial, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal and remand with directions to enter an order granting Martinez 
habeas corpus relief and vacating his conviction for first degree murder.  If the 
prosecution elects not to retry Martinez, the trial court shall enter judgment 
reflecting a conviction of second degree murder and sentence him accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
JOHNSON, J.* 
 
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. 
 
 
At Hector Martinez’s trial for first degree murder, the jury was instructed 
on two alternative theories of guilt, both based on Martinez’s having aided and 
abetted a killing perpetrated by his codefendant.  This court’s later decision in 
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 made clear that one of those theories—the 
so-called natural and probable consequences theory—was invalid.  Invoking Chiu, 
Martinez now petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.  The Attorney General opposes 
the grant of relief.  He argues that it is Martinez’s burden to establish that he could 
not have been found guilty under the remaining, legally valid theory, and Martinez 
has not sustained that burden.  I agree with the majority that it is not Martinez’s 
burden to prove this negative; it is enough that the jury realistically could have 
relied on the invalid theory in rendering its verdict.  Martinez is entitled to a new 
trial before a properly instructed jury. 
I write separately to explain why, in my view, this court’s cases do not 
support the far more demanding rule the Attorney General proposes.  Martinez 
raises a claim of what is sometimes called alternative theory error:  He challenges 
his conviction on the basis that the jury in his case “was instructed on alternative 
theories of guilt and may have relied on an invalid one.”  (Hedgpeth v. Pulido 
(2008) 555 U.S. 57, 58 (Hedgpeth); see, e.g., Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 
U.S. 359 (Stromberg).)  As the majority points out, many of the cases on which 
the Attorney General relies involved a different sort of claim:  that is, a claim to 
2 
unconditional release on grounds that the defendant was actually innocent of the 
crime of which he was convicted.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8–9.)  The context is 
important.  For example, when the court in People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 
396 noted that “ ‘a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus . . . if it appears that the 
statute under which he was convicted did not prohibit his conduct,’ ” the context 
makes clear that the court was merely acknowledging that the defendant’s claim of 
innocence in that case, if sustained, would entitle him to the relief he sought.  The 
court was not, as the Attorney General would have it, requiring all habeas 
petitioners to prove their innocence in order to secure relief from a jury verdict 
rendered unreliable by flawed instructions. 
I would place In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488 (Bell) in a different category, 
however.  The petitioners in Bell had been convicted of violating an anti-picketing 
ordinance that they challenged as unconstitutional.  On appeal, the superior court 
(which was the highest court to which petitioners could appeal) rejected the 
constitutional challenge and affirmed petitioners’ convictions.  (Id. at p. 491.)  
Petitioners then renewed the constitutional challenge in habeas corpus petitions 
filed in the superior court, the Court of Appeal, and, ultimately, this court.  The 
threshold question before this court was whether the constitutionality of the 
ordinance could be tested by a habeas petition, despite the traditional view that 
habeas corpus lies only to test the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is 
challenged and not to correct errors committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction.  
(Id. at p. 492.)  Answering that question in the affirmative, this court proceeded to 
strike down provisions of the ordinance prohibiting peaceful picketing, while 
upholding one provision insofar as it prohibited picketing by acts of violence.  (Id. 
at pp. 496–498.) 
This partial invalidation created something of a dilemma, because the 
record in the petitioners’ case did not specify which provision—the valid one or 
3 
the invalid one—formed the basis of their conviction.  (Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d at 
p. 499.)  The court acknowledged that had the case arisen on direct review, this 
ambiguity would have warranted reversal of the conviction.  (Id. at p. 500, citing 
Stromberg, supra, 283 U.S. at p. 368.)  The court also acknowledged that if the 
statute had been held “entirely unconstitutional,” then petitioners would have been 
entitled to release from custody.  (Bell, at p. 498.)  But because the claim arose on 
habeas corpus, and because the statute of conviction was only partly invalid, the 
court reasoned that petitioners were entitled to relief only if it was “clear” that they 
were not convicted of violating the valid portion of the statute.  (Id. at p. 499, 
citing Ex parte Morrison (1891) 88 Cal. 112 (Morrison).)  Applying that rule, the 
court concluded that petitioners “failed to sustain the burden of proving that they 
were not tried and convicted” under the valid portion of the anti-picketing 
ordinance because the record revealed evidence of violent acts.  (Bell, at p. 504.)   
Unlike the other cases on which the Attorney General relies, Bell does 
suggest that a reasonably convincing claim of actual innocence under any valid 
theory of liability is a prerequisite to habeas relief when a jury has rendered a 
general verdict after being presented with both valid and invalid theories.  And I, 
unlike the majority, do not think the suggestion is readily cabined to claims not 
“presented after a change in the law given retroactive effect.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 10.)  After all, there had been a retroactive change in the law in Bell, too:  The 
anti-picketing ordinance, which had been upheld in petitioners’ case on direct 
review, was ruled unconstitutional in part on habeas.  I do not see why it matters 
that petitioners sought habeas relief in the very same case in which the 
constitutional ruling was rendered, rather than invoking a favorable constitutional 
ruling rendered in some other case involving some other set of picketers. 
The more pertinent point about Bell, as I see it, is that it was decided under 
the influence of authorities taking a different view of the scope of the writ of 
4 
habeas corpus than we now hold.  Today we understand habeas generally to 
“ ‘permit[] judicial inquiry into a variety of constitutional and jurisdictional 
issues,’ ” acting as a “ ‘safety valve’ . . . for cases in which a criminal trial has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 450.)  But 
as noted, the traditional view was that habeas corpus existed only to test the 
jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is challenged and not to correct errors 
committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction.  (Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 492; 
see also, e.g., In re Reno, supra, at p. 450.) 
Of course, by the time Bell was decided, courts had begun to recognize that 
this rule had become “more a fiction than anything else” (Wainwright v. Sykes 
(1977) 433 U.S. 72, 79), and Bell itself recognized the trend toward using habeas 
“to test the constitutionality not only of a statute but of the procedure in 
petitioner’s trial, even though the trial court has jurisdiction to try the petitioner” 
(Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 493).  But in adopting its restrictive approach to a 
claim of alternative theory error raised on habeas, Bell reached well back into the 
old regime, relying on a one-paragraph 1891 opinion holding that a habeas 
petitioner was not entitled to release where it was unclear that he had been 
convicted under the invalid portion of a partially invalid statute.  (Morrison, supra, 
88 Cal. 112, cited in Bell, supra, at p. 499.)  The underlying premise of that 
opinion was that habeas provided a vehicle for relief from convictions that were 
“void,” such as a conviction entered under an invalid statute, but not as a vehicle 
for the correction of errors committed by a court with jurisdiction over the person 
and the subject matter.  (See, e.g., Ex parte Mirande (1887) 73 Cal. 365, 371; 
Morrison, at p. 112.)  Bell itself represented an important chapter in the story of 
the expansion of habeas beyond this historical understanding.  But as Bell’s 
reliance on Morrison indicates, the analysis had not entirely caught up with these 
developments. 
5 
Bell also, as the majority notes, invoked the notion that a judgment that is 
collaterally attacked on habeas carries with it a presumption of regularity.  (Bell, 
supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 500–501; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  But the presumption 
of regularity alone does not explain Bell’s choice to analyze the claim in that case 
as limited to a claim that the convictions had been entered under an invalid portion 
of the ordinance, nor does it otherwise justify erecting such a high bar to relief in 
cases of alternative theory error.  The presumption of regularity, we have since 
explained, is designed to protect society’s legitimate interest in the finality of its 
criminal judgments:  “If a criminal defendant has unsuccessfully tested the state’s 
evidence at trial and appeal and wishes to mount a further, collateral attack, ‘ “all 
presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and 
sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning them.  
Society’s interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands[.]” ’ ”  (In re 
Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 451.)  Here, Martinez has discharged that burden by 
demonstrating that the jury at his trial received instructions that were later exposed 
as flawed in Chiu.  The presumption of regularity does not require Martinez to 
bear the further burden of proving that this admitted irregularity led the jury to 
return a verdict that no properly instructed jury conceivably could have rendered. 
Since Bell was decided, it has been sparingly invoked for the rule that the 
Attorney General urges here; in In re Klor (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 822, the court 
cited Bell under comparable circumstances but found its exacting standard to be 
satisfied.  At this point, many decades later, it seems appropriate to recognize that 
the standard is rooted in an outmoded understanding of the scope of the writ and 
should no longer be followed.  I would disapprove In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 
488, and In re Klor (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, to the extent they are inconsistent with 
this conclusion. 
6 
The Attorney General also argues in the alternative that even if Martinez need 
not show that he could not have been convicted under a valid theory, we should adopt 
the harmlessness standard that applies in federal habeas proceedings, which would 
require Martinez to show that the flawed jury instructions “ ‘had substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ”  (Hedgpeth, supra, 
555 U.S. at p. 58, quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 623.)  Under 
that standard, a jury verdict may be reversed if a court has “grave doubt” as to 
whether the verdict would have been the same absent the error.  (O’Neal v. McAninch 
(1995) 513 U.S. 432, 436–437.)  For the reasons the majority gives, I think this 
standard would be satisfied here:  The facts of the case, the prosecutor’s reliance on 
the natural and probable consequences doctrine at argument and rebuttal, and the 
jury’s inquiry during deliberations all at least give rise to grave doubt about the effect 
of the erroneous instruction on the jury’s verdict.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10–11.)  
But we are not bound to adopt this federal standard, and I agree with the majority that 
it is unnecessary to introduce yet another harmlessness standard into California law in 
order to safeguard finality interests already accounted for elsewhere in the state law 
habeas framework.  I accordingly concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Martinez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 5/15/15 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S226596 
Date Filed: December 4, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Robert F. O’Neill 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Marilee Marshall & Associates and Marilee Marshall for Petitioner Hector Martinez. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor 
General, Lise Jacobson and Kimberley A. Donohue, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent State of 
California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Marilee Marshall 
Marilee Marshall & Associates 
595 E. Colorado Boulevard, Suite 324 
Pasadena, CA  91110 
(626) 564-1136 
 
Kimberley A. Donohue 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-3196