Title: Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 5/4/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SUNGHO PARK, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S229728 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B260047 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE  
) 
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC546792 
 
____________________________________) 
 
To combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and 
petition rights (typically known as strategic lawsuits against public participation, 
or SLAPPs), the Legislature has authorized a special motion to strike claims that 
are based on a defendant‘s engagement in such protected activity.  (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)1  We consider a question that has generated uncertainty 
in the Courts of Appeal:  What nexus must a defendant show between a challenged 
claim and the defendant‘s protected activity for the claim to be struck? 
As we explain, a claim is not subject to a motion to strike simply because it 
contests an action or decision that was arrived at following speech or petitioning 
activity, or that was thereafter communicated by means of speech or petitioning 
activity.  Rather, a claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
 
2 
 
itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step 
leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.  Because the Court of 
Appeal ruled to the contrary, holding a claim alleging a discriminatory decision is 
subject to a motion to strike so long as protected speech or petitioning activity 
contributed to that decision, we reverse. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Sungho Park was a tenure-track assistant professor at California 
State University, Los Angeles.  He is of Korean national origin.  In 2013, Park 
applied for tenure but his application was denied.  He filed a discrimination charge 
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing and, after receiving a right-
to-sue letter, filed suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) for national origin discrimination and failure to 
receive a discrimination-free workplace. 
Defendant the Board of Trustees of the California State University 
(University) responded with a motion to strike.  Anti-SLAPP motions are 
evaluated through a two-step process.  Initially, the moving defendant bears the 
burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ―aris[e] from‖ 
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b); see 
id., subd. (e) [defining protected activity]; Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 21; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 53, 66–67.)  If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then 
demonstrate its claims have at least ―minimal merit.‖  (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 82, 89; see generally City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
409, 420; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)  The University argued 
Park‘s suit arose from its decision to deny him tenure and the numerous 
communications that led up to and followed that decision, these communications 
 
3 
 
were protected activities, and Park had not shown a sufficient probability of 
prevailing on the merits. 
The trial court denied the motion.  It agreed with Park that the complaint 
was based on the University‘s decision to deny tenure, rather than any 
communicative conduct in connection with that decision, and that the denial of 
tenure based on national origin was not protected activity, so the University had 
not carried its burden of showing Park‘s suit arose from protected activity within 
the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e).  Accordingly, the trial court did 
not reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry. 
A divided Court of Appeal reversed.  The majority reasoned that although 
the gravamen of Park‘s complaint was the University‘s decision to deny him 
tenure, that decision necessarily rested on communications the University made in 
the course of arriving at that decision.  Such communications were in connection 
with an official proceeding, the tenure decisionmaking process, and so were 
protected activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.  The dissent argued, in 
contrast, that all government action inevitably involves some form of 
communication, and courts must distinguish between instances when a claim 
challenges only the action itself and instances when a claim challenges the process 
that led to the action.  Because the claim here, in the dissent‘s estimation, involved 
only the decision to deny tenure and not any arguably protected communications 
that preceded it, the trial court‘s ruling should have been affirmed. 
The Court of Appeal‘s division is symptomatic of ongoing uncertainty over 
how to determine when ―[a] cause of action against a person aris[es] from‖ that 
person‘s protected activity.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)  We granted review. 
 
4 
 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
The Requisite Nexus Between the Claims an Anti-SLAPP Motion 
Challenges and Protected Activity 
Anti-SLAPP motions may only target claims ―arising from any act of [the 
defendant] in furtherance of the [defendant‘s] right of petition or free speech under 
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a 
public issue . . . .‖  (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)  In turn, the Legislature has defined such 
protected acts in furtherance of speech and petition rights to include a specified 
range of statements, writings, and conduct in connection with official proceedings 
and matters of public interest.  (Id., subd. (e).)2  We consider here the relationship 
a defendant must show between a plaintiff‘s claim and the sorts of speech on 
public matters the Legislature intended to protect. 
A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms 
the basis for the claim.  (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78; 
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 66; Briggs v. 
Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1114.)  Critically, 
―the defendant‘s act underlying the plaintiff‘s cause of action must itself have been 
an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.‖  (City of Cotati, at 
p. 78; accord, Equilon Enterprises, at p. 66.)  ―[T]he mere fact that an action was 
filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that 
                                              
2  
As relevant here, section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines an act in 
furtherance of speech or petition rights to ―include[]: (1) any written or oral 
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, 
or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral 
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or 
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 
proceeding authorized by law, . . . or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.‖ 
 
5 
 
activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.‖  (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 89; see City of Cotati, at p. 78 [suit may be in ―response to or in 
retaliation for‖ protected activity without necessarily arising from it].)  Instead, the 
focus is on determining what ―the defendant‘s activity [is] that gives rise to his or 
her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or 
petitioning.‖  (Navellier, at p. 92, italics omitted.)  ―The only means specified in 
section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can satisfy the [‗arising from‘] 
requirement is to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff 
claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in 
subdivision (e) . . . .‖  (Equilon Enterprises, at p. 66, italics added.)  In short, in 
ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the 
challenged claim and what actions by defendant supply those elements and 
consequently form the basis for liability. 
Thus, for example, in City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69, the 
plaintiff city filed a state suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its rent control 
ordinance was constitutional.  The suit followed in time the defendant owners‘ 
federal suit seeking declaratory relief invalidating the same ordinance.  In the state 
action, the defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion alleging the suit arose from 
their protected activity of filing the federal suit.  The motion, we explained, should 
have been denied because the federal suit formed no part of the basis for the state 
claim.  The city‘s potential entitlement to a declaratory judgment instead arose 
from the parties‘ underlying dispute over whether the ordinance was 
constitutional, a dispute that existed prior to and independent of any declaratory 
relief action by the owners.  (Id. at p. 80.) 
In contrast, in Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th 82, another case in 
which the defendant‘s protected activity was the prior filing of court claims, the 
prior claims were an essential part of the activity allegedly giving rise to liability.  
 
6 
 
The Navellier plaintiffs sued for breach of contract and fraud, alleging the 
defendant had signed a release of claims without any intent to be bound by it and 
then violated the release by filing counterclaims in a pending action in 
contravention of the release‘s terms.  Unlike in City of Cotati, the defendant was 
―being sued because of the affirmative counterclaims he filed in federal court.  In 
fact, but for the federal lawsuit and [defendant‘s] alleged action taken in 
connection with that litigation, plaintiffs‘ present claims would have no basis.  
This action therefore falls squarely within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute‘s 
‗arising from‘ prong.‖  (Navellier, at p. 90.) 
While in both cases it could be said that the claim challenged as a SLAPP 
was filed because of protected activity, in that perhaps the City of Cotati plaintiff 
would not have filed suit had the defendant not done so first, in only Navellier did 
the prior protected activity supply elements of the challenged claim.  The City of 
Cotati plaintiff could demonstrate the existence of a bona fide controversy 
between the parties supporting a claim for declaratory relief without the prior suit, 
although certainly the prior suit might supply evidence of the parties‘ 
disagreement.  In contrast, specific elements of the Navellier plaintiffs‘ claims 
depended upon the defendant‘s protected activity.  The defendant‘s filing of 
counterclaims constituted the alleged breach of contract.  (Navellier v. Sletten, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 87.)  Likewise, the defendant‘s misrepresentation of his 
intent not to file counterclaims, a statement we explained was protected activity 
made in connection with a pending judicial matter (see § 425.16, subd. (e)(1), (2)), 
supplied an essential element of the fraud claim (Navellier, at pp. 89–90).  
Together, these cases reflect what we have described elsewhere, in a non-SLAPP 
context, as ―a careful distinction between a cause of action based squarely on a 
privileged communication, such as an action for defamation, and one based upon 
 
7 
 
an underlying course of conduct evidenced by the communication.‖  (White v. 
Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888.) 
Many Courts of Appeal likewise are attuned to and have taken care to 
respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those 
that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for 
the claim.  In San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County 
Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, a fire protection district 
sued a county retirement board over the pension contribution levels the board 
decided to impose.  The board filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the suit arose 
out of the deliberations and vote that produced its decision.  The Court of Appeal 
disagreed.  It explained that ― ‗[t]he [anti-SLAPP] statute‘s definitional focus is 
. . . [whether] the defendant‘s activity giving rise to his or her asserted liability . . . 
constitutes protected speech or petitioning.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 354.)  It distinguished 
between the board‘s allegedly wrongful act (the contribution level decision) and 
the preceding deliberations and vote.  ―[T]he fact that a complaint alleges that a 
public entity‘s action was taken as a result of a majority vote of its constituent 
members does not mean that the litigation challenging that action arose from 
protected activity, where the measure itself is not an exercise of free speech or 
petition.  Acts of governance mandated by law, without more, are not exercises of 
free speech or petition.‖  (Ibid.; see City of Montebello v. Vasquez, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at pp. 425–426 [discussing with approval San Ramon‘s distinction, for 
anti-SLAPP purposes, between government decisions and the deliberations that 
lead to them].) 
Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010) 181 
Cal.App.4th 1207 illustrates the related distinction between speech that provides 
the basis for liability and speech that provides evidence of liability.  There, a 
company sued a city after its government contract was terminated and a new 
 
8 
 
contract awarded without competitive bidding to a rival.  The trial court granted 
the city‘s anti-SLAPP motion.  Reversing, the Court of Appeal explained, ―In 
deciding whether an action is a SLAPP, the trial court should distinguish between 
(1) speech or petitioning activity that is mere evidence related to liability and (2) 
liability that is based on speech or petitioning activity.  Prelitigation 
communications or prior litigation may provide evidentiary support for the 
complaint without being a basis of liability.  An anti-SLAPP motion should be 
granted if liability is based on speech or petitioning activity itself.‖  (Id. at 
pp. 1214–1215.)  While communications by the city preceding its decision might 
be helpful in establishing what events led to the change in contract, the 
contractor‘s claims were not based on them, but on the award of a new contract in 
alleged violation of laws regulating competitive bidding.  (Id. at pp. 1215, 1224.) 
In Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, plaintiffs 
sued for malpractice after the defendants‘ representation of them in a prior lawsuit 
led to their answer and cross-complaint being struck as a terminating sanction for 
discovery violations.  The attorney defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, 
arguing the malpractice suit arose out of a declaration they had submitted in the 
earlier suit admitting misconduct and seeking to set aside the terminating sanction 
under section 473.  While the declaration supplying ―evidence of [the attorneys‘] 
conduct‖ (Jespersen, at p. 631) might be protected, this was insufficient to carry 
the attorney-defendants‘ first-step burden: they were being sued not for filing the 
declaration, but for the underlying misconduct (id. at p. 632; see Gallimore v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1399 
[emphasizing that courts should not confuse a party‘s ―allegedly wrongful acts 
with the evidence that plaintiff will need to prove such misconduct‖ and denying 
an anti-SLAPP motion where the plaintiff sought no relief for the defendant‘s 
communicative acts].) 
 
9 
 
Courts presented with suits alleging discriminatory actions have taken 
similar care not to treat such claims as arising from protected activity simply 
because the discriminatory animus might have been evidenced by one or more 
communications by a defendant.  In Department of Fair Employment & Housing 
v. 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1273, the 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) sued a landlord for failing 
to provide accommodations to a disabled tenant.  The landlord had advised the 
rent control board it was removing units from the housing market, disputed the 
tenant‘s assertion of a disability that would have entitled her to one year to find 
alternate housing, and ultimately filed an unlawful detainer action against her and 
evicted her.  The landlord responded to the disability suit with an anti-SLAPP 
motion, arguing the suit arose out of communications with the rent control board 
and tenant and the unlawful detainer suit.  The Court of Appeal disagreed.  The act 
giving rise to liability was the ―fail[ure] to accommodate [the tenant‘s] disability‖ 
by allowing the tenant time to seek alternate housing; ―[t]he letters, e-mail and 
filing of unlawful detainer actions constituted DFEH‘s evidence of [the landlord‘s] 
alleged disability discrimination.‖  (Id. at pp. 1284–1285.) 
In Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611, 
the plaintiff sued his public agency employer for racial and age discrimination and 
retaliation, resulting in his constructive discharge, as well as defamation.  The 
agency argued in an anti-SLAPP motion that the suit arose from negative 
evaluations of the plaintiff made by agency officers and board members.  
Addressing the nondefamation claims, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument; 
―the pleadings establish[ed] that the gravamen of plaintiff‘s action against 
defendants was one of racial and retaliatory discrimination, not an attack on 
[defendants] for their evaluations of plaintiff‘s performance as an employee.‖  (Id. 
at p. 625.)  Liability, if any, would arise from the constructive discharge of 
 
10 
 
plaintiff for illegal reasons, not the defendants‘ evaluations of plaintiff at the 
agency‘s board meeting.  (Id. at pp. 624–625.) 
Most recently, in Nam v. Regents of University of California (2016) 1 
Cal.App.5th 1176, the plaintiff, a University of California Davis medical resident, 
sued for sexual harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination.  The 
defendant Regents‘ anti-SLAPP motion contended the suit arose from 
communicated complaints about the plaintiff‘s performance, written warnings it 
issued her, an investigation it conducted, and the written notice to plaintiff of her 
termination.  Not so; the basis for liability was instead the Regents‘ alleged 
retaliatory conduct, including ― ‗subjecting [plaintiff] to increased and disparate 
scrutiny, soliciting complaints about her from others, removing [her] from the 
workplace, refusing to permit her to return, refusing to give her credit towards the 
completion of her residency, failing to honor promises made regarding her 
treatment, and ultimately terminating her on February 2, 2012.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1192.)  
Nam illustrates that while discrimination may be carried out by means of speech, 
such as a written notice of termination, and an illicit animus may be evidenced by 
speech, neither circumstance transforms a discrimination suit to one arising from 
speech.  What gives rise to liability is not that the defendant spoke, but that the 
defendant denied the plaintiff a benefit, or subjected the plaintiff to a burden, on 
account of a discriminatory or retaliatory consideration. 
As many Courts of Appeal have correctly understood, to read the ―arising 
from‖ requirement differently, as applying to speech leading to an action or 
evidencing an illicit motive, would, for a range of publicly beneficial claims, have 
significant impacts the Legislature likely never intended.  Government decisions 
are frequently ―arrived at after discussion and a vote at a public meeting.‖  (San 
Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ 
Retirement Association, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.)  Failing to distinguish 
 
11 
 
between the challenged decisions and the speech that leads to them or thereafter 
expresses them ―would chill the resort to legitimate judicial oversight over 
potential abuses of legislative and administrative power.‖  (Ibid.; accord, Graffiti 
Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1224–1225.)  Similar problems would arise for attempts to enforce the state‘s 
antidiscrimination public policy.  ―Any employer who initiates an investigation of 
an employee, whether for lawful or unlawful motives, would be at liberty to claim 
that its conduct was protected and thereby shift the burden of proof to the 
employee who, without the benefit of discovery and with the threat of attorney 
fees looming, would be obligated to demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on 
the merits.‖  (Nam v. Regents of University of California, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1189.)  Conflating, in the anti-SLAPP analysis, discriminatory decisions and 
speech involved in reaching those decisions or evidencing discriminatory animus 
could render the anti-SLAPP statute ―fatal for most harassment, discrimination 
and retaliation actions against public employers.‖  (Id. at p. 1179.) 
II. 
Application to This Record 
We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.  (Soukup 
v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.)  We exercise 
independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the 
record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.  (Schwarzburd v. 
Kensington Police Protection & Community Services Dist. Bd. (2014) 225 
Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350; Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency, supra, 198 
Cal.App.4th at p. 624.)  In addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits 
concerning the facts upon which liability is based.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); 
Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)  We do not, however, weigh the 
evidence, but accept plaintiff‘s submissions as true and consider only whether any 
 
12 
 
contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a 
matter of law.  (Soukup, at p. 269, fn. 3.) 
Park‘s discrimination claim requires that he show ―(1) he was a member of 
a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing 
competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, 
such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other 
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.‖  (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)  Park has alleged that he is of Korean national origin, 
was qualified for tenure, and was denied tenure while other faculty of Caucasian 
origin with comparable or lesser records were granted tenure.  The complaint also 
alleges a school dean ―made comments to Park and behaved in a manner that 
reflected prejudice against him on the basis of his national origin‖ and that Park 
pursued an internal grievance, which was denied.  The elements of Park‘s claim, 
however, depend not on the grievance proceeding, any statements, or any specific 
evaluations of him in the tenure process, but only on the denial of tenure itself and 
whether the motive for that action was impermissible.  The tenure decision may 
have been communicated orally or in writing, but that communication does not 
convert Park‘s suit to one arising from such speech.  The dean‘s alleged comments 
may supply evidence of animus, but that does not convert the statements 
themselves into the basis for liability.  As the trial court correctly observed, Park‘s 
complaint is ―based on the act of denying plaintiff tenure based on national origin.  
Plaintiff could have omitted allegations regarding communicative acts or filing a 
grievance and still state the same claims.‖  (See Department of Fair Employment 
& Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1285 [―DFEH might well have filed the same lawsuit had [the landlord] simply 
 
13 
 
ignored [the tenant‘s] claim of disability and requests for extension of her tenancy 
without any communication from it at all‖].)3 
The University offers a threefold response.  First, it asserts that anti-SLAPP 
motions are decided on the pleadings and any evidence the parties submit, and so 
Park could not hide the existence of University communications by omitting them 
from his complaint.  This misses the point of the trial court‘s observation, which is 
that the elements of Park‘s claims do not depend on proof of any University 
communications.  No one disputes the University can submit evidence of 
communications leading to the decision to deny tenure, but doing so does not 
establish those communications, rather than the tenure denial decision itself, as the 
―facts upon which the liability . . . is based.‖ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)  
Communications disparaging Park, without any adverse employment action, 
would not support a claim for employment discrimination, but an adverse 
employment action, even without the prior communications, surely could. 
Second, the University urges that its tenure decision and the 
communications that led up to it are intertwined and inseparable.  It bases this 
argument on Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 192 and Kibler‘s progeny, which it contends establish that decisions and 
the deliberations that underlie them are indistinguishable for anti-SLAPP 
purposes. 
                                              
3  
Park‘s first claim is a traditional claim for discrimination based on national 
origin.  His second claim asserts in its entirety, ―By virtue of the foregoing, [the 
University] has failed to provide Park with a workplace environment free of 
discrimination.‖  Because neither party argues the claim for a discriminatory 
workplace environment should be analyzed any differently for anti-SLAPP 
purposes from the claim for discrimination in employment, we do not differentiate 
between them. 
 
14 
 
Kibler lends no support.  There, the plaintiff doctor sued a hospital and 
various individual defendants for defamation and related torts.  The trial court in 
Kibler found, and we accepted for purposes of review, that these tort claims arose 
from statements made in connection with a hospital peer review proceeding.  The 
only issue before us was whether, assuming this to be so, the peer review 
proceeding was an ― ‗official proceeding‘ ‖ within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist., supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 198; see § 425.16, subd. (e)(2) [defining protected activity to include ―any 
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
official proceeding authorized by law‖ (italics added)].)  That is, we took for 
granted lower court findings as to what activity the tort claims arose from under 
section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), and then considered whether that activity 
constituted protected activity under a particular portion of subdivision (e)‘s 
statutory definition.  We did not consider whether the hospital‘s peer review 
decision and statements leading up to that decision were inseparable for purposes 
of the arising from aspect of an anti-SLAPP motion, because we did not address 
the arising from issue.  (See Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 
Cal.App.4th 35, 58 [correctly recognizing Kibler addressed only whether hospital 
peer review proceedings can be ― ‗official proceedings,‘ ‖ and courts resolving 
anti-SLAPP motions must still separately determine whether a given claim arises 
from any protected activity].) 
Applying our decision in Kibler, the Court of Appeal in Nesson v. Northern 
Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 65 concluded an anti-
SLAPP motion against the claims of a doctor who alleged discriminatory and 
retaliatory termination of privileges was properly granted.  The Nesson court 
reasoned that under Kibler, a hospital‘s peer review proceedings are official 
 
15 
 
proceedings, and thus every aspect of those proceedings, including the decision to 
impose discipline, is protected activity for anti-SLAPP purposes.  (Nesson, at 
pp. 78–79, 82–84.)  Similarly, in DeCambre v. Rady Children’s Hospital-San 
Diego (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1, the Court of Appeal concluded Kibler dictated 
finding the allegedly discriminatory decision not to renew a doctor‘s contract to be 
protected activity.  The court correctly considered the elements of the plaintiff‘s 
claims in order to identify what conduct underlay each cause of action.  (E.g., 
DeCambre, at p. 22.)  However, it also concluded, in reliance on Kibler, that every 
part of the peer review process was protected activity.  To the extent plaintiff‘s 
claims included as an essential element her termination, and that termination was a 
product of peer review, her claims arose from protected activity.  (DeCambre, at 
pp. 14–16.) 
The University argues by analogy that all aspects of its tenure process, 
including its ultimate decision, are inextricably intertwined protected activity, and 
the Court of Appeal here agreed.  But both Nesson and DeCambre overread 
Kibler, which did not address whether every aspect of a hospital peer review 
proceeding involves protected activity, but only whether statements in connection 
with but outside the course of such a proceeding can qualify as ―statement[s] . . . 
in connection with an issue under consideration‖ in an ―official proceeding.‖  
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)  Kibler does not stand for the proposition that disciplinary 
decisions reached in a peer review process, as opposed to statements in connection 
with that process, are protected.  We disapprove Nesson v. Northern Inyo County 
Local Hospital Dist., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th 65, and DeCambre v. Rady 
Children’s Hospital-San Diego, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 1, to the extent they 
indicate otherwise. 
In support of the argument for inseparability, the University also cites 
Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387.  In Vergos, the plaintiff 
 
16 
 
complained of sexual harassment and filed an internal grievance, which was 
denied.  Plaintiff then sued both his public university employer and the individual 
employee who had served as a hearing officer and denied his grievance.  The civil 
rights claim against the individual hearing officer expressly rested on her 
― ‗hearing, processing, and deciding the grievances‘ ‖ (id. at p. 1391) as well as 
the allegation the employer and officer had deprived him of a hearing before a 
― ‗fair and impartial hearing officer‘ ‖ (id. at p. 1392).  The Court of Appeal 
concluded this claim arose from the officer‘s ―statements and communicative 
conduct in handling plaintiff‘s grievance.‖  (Id. at p. 1394.)  In turn, the hearing 
officer‘s conduct of an internal grievance proceeding was protected activity 
because it furthered employees‘ rights to petition for redress of harassment, 
discrimination, and similar complaints.  (Id. at pp. 1398–1399.) 
Vergos does not assist the University.  In Vergos, only the individual officer 
filed an anti-SLAPP motion, and the court was not called on to decide whether any 
of the claims against the employer defendant arose from protected activity.  
Vergos does not stand for the proposition that a suit alleging an entity has made a 
discriminatory decision necessarily also arises from any statements by individuals 
that may precede that decision, or from the subsequent communication of the 
decision that may follow.  As the Vergos court observed, denying protection to the 
hearing officer‘s participation in the process might chill employees‘ willingness to 
serve and hamper the ability to afford harassed employees review of their 
complaints.  (Vergos v. McNeal, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398–1399.)  
Likewise, to deny protection to individuals weighing in on a public entity‘s 
decision might chill participation from a range of voices desirous of offering input 
on a matter of public importance.  But no similar concerns attach to denying 
protection for the ultimate decision itself, and none of the core purposes the 
Legislature sought to promote when enacting the anti-SLAPP statute are furthered 
 
17 
 
by ignoring the distinction between a government entity‘s decisions and the 
individual speech or petitioning that may contribute to them.4 
The Court of Appeal found support from one other case, Tuszynska v. 
Cunningham (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 257, for the conclusion that a claim arising 
from a decision inevitably arises from the communications leading to that 
decision.  The Tuszynska court concluded that, for anti-SLAPP purposes, a 
discrimination suit alleging an attorney was denied case referrals because she was 
a woman was necessarily based on both the referral decisions ―and, concomitantly, 
communications defendants made in connection with making those decisions.‖  
(Tuszynska, at p. 269.)  To the extent Tuszynska v. Cunningham, supra, 199 
Cal.App.4th 257 presupposes courts deciding anti-SLAPP motions cannot separate 
an entity‘s decisions from the communications that give rise to them, or that they 
give rise to, we disapprove it. 
Third, the University contends that even if the tenure decision alone is 
treated as the basis for this case, that decision is protected activity.  The University 
places principal reliance on Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 
Cal.App.4th 1510.  There, the plaintiff sued over the defendant‘s allegedly 
discriminatory refusal to hire him as a weather news anchor.  The reporting of 
news, whether in print or on air, is constitutionally protected free speech (Briscoe 
                                              
4  
We have described the anti-SLAPP statute as ―intended broadly to protect, 
inter alia, direct petitioning of the government and petition-related statements and 
writings.‖  (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 1120; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1264 (1991–1992 
Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 6, 1992, pp. 3–4 [highlighting the need to address 
unmeritorious tort suits filed against private citizens and associations for 
exercising their rights to seek changes in government policy].)  These concerns are 
promoted, not impaired, by differentiating between individual speech that 
contributes to a public entity‘s decision and the public entity decision itself. 
 
18 
 
v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 534–536), and Hunter 
treats a news media organization‘s decision as to who shall report the news as an 
act in furtherance of that protected speech (Hunter, at p. 1521). 
The University argues that tenure decisions implicate the public interest as 
much as decisions concerning who should appear in a news broadcast and thus are 
equally entitled to protection.  But this argument fails to appreciate the underlying 
structure of the position accepted in Hunter and thus offers a mismatched 
analogy.  The defendant television station argued that (1) the station itself engaged 
in speech on matters of public interest through the broadcast of news and weather 
reports, and (2) the decision as to who should present that message was thus 
conduct in furtherance of the station‘s protected speech on matters of public 
interest, to wit, its news broadcasts.  (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) [defining as 
protected activity ―any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . . the 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest‖]; Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1518–1521.)  Whether the hiring decision itself was a matter of any particular 
public importance was immaterial.  (See Hunter, at p. 1527 [―the proper inquiry is 
not whether CBS‘s selection of a weather anchor was itself a matter of public 
interest; the question is whether such conduct was ‗in connection with‘ a matter of 
public interest.  As Hunter concedes, weather reporting is [speech in connection 
with] a matter of public interest.‖]; id. at p. 1527, fn. 3 [declining to consider the 
significance of the hiring decision itself].) 
To make a similar argument, the University would have had to explain how 
the choice of faculty involved conduct in furtherance of University speech on an 
identifiable matter of public interest.  But the University has not developed or 
preserved any such argument before us.  It has not explained what University 
expression on matters of public interest the retention or nonretention of this faculty 
 
19 
 
member might further, nor has it discussed the circumstances in which a court 
ought to attribute the speech of an individual faculty member to the institution 
with which he or she is affiliated.  Whether the grant or denial of tenure to this 
faculty member is, or is not, itself a matter of public interest has no bearing on the 
relevant questions—whether the tenure decision furthers particular University 
speech, and whether that speech is on a matter of public interest—and cannot 
alone establish the tenure decision is protected activity under section 425.16, 
subdivision (e)(4). 
We have no occasion to consider the scope of free speech protection for 
professors, the potential liberties at stake in a university‘s choice of faculty (cf. 
University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C. (1990) 493 U.S. 182, 195–198 & fn. 6; 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) 354 U.S. 234, 262–263 (conc. opn. of 
Frankfurter, J.)), or under what circumstances the protected speech of an 
individual professor might be attributable to a private or public university for 
either free speech or anti-SLAPP purposes.  Nor do we express any opinion 
concerning whether Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., supra, 221 Cal.App.4th 
1510, itself was correctly decided.  We hold simply that the assertion the 
University‘s hiring decision is a matter of public interest does not suffice to bring 
that decision within the scope of protected activity defined by section 425.16, 
subdivision (e)(4). 
Accordingly, the University has not carried its burden of showing ―the 
defendant‘s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one 
of the four categories described in subdivision (e).‖  (Equilon Enterprises v. 
Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 66; see City of Cotati v. Cashman, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 78.) 
 
20 
 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 239 Cal.App.4th 1258 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S229728 
Date Filed: May 4, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Richard E. Rico 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Towle, Denison, Smith & Maniscalco, Towle Denison & Maniscalco and Michael C. Denison for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Joseph T. Francke and Steven J. André for Californians Aware, First Amendment Project, Penelope Canan, 
Libertarian Law Council, Angie Morfin Vargas, City Watch, Inc., and Consumer Attorneys of California as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Siegel & Yee, Jane E. Brunner and Alan S. Yee for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Nicolas A. Jampol and Diana Palacios for First Amendment 
Coalition as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Briggs Law Corporation, Anthony N. Kim and Cory J. Briggs for San Diegans for Open Government and 
The Inland Oversight Committee as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Duchrow & Piano and David J. Duchrow for California Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael C. Denison 
Towle Denison & Maniscalco 
11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 330 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 446-5445 
 
Alan S. Yee 
Siegel & Yee 
499 14th Street, Suite 300 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 839-1200