Title: Green v. Virginia State Bar

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
WALTER FRANKLIN GREEN, IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 082530 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   JUNE 4, 2009 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
In this appeal of right, we review an order of the 
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (the Board) suspending 
the license to practice law of Walter Franklin Green, IV 
(Green) for eighteen months.  Finding no error, we will 
affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On May 18, 2006, a duly convened subcommittee of the 
Seventh District Committee of the Virginia State Bar (the 
Subcommittee) consisting of Steven H. Gordon, lay person, 
Samuel R. Walker, Esquire, and Peter C. Burnett, Esquire 
considered disciplinary charges against Green.  By letter 
dated May 19, 2006, Green was notified that the Subcommittee 
had certified four charges against him to the Board.1  Green 
was also provided copies of the reports of the investigator 
for the Virginia State Bar (the Bar), and was notified that he 
                                                 
1 VSB Docket Number 06-070-0739 (Kenneth B. Henley, Sr.), 
and VSB Docket Number 06-070-2259 (Kristen L. Beavers/Michael 
S. Eavey).  The Subcommittee also certified two additional 
cases, which were later dismissed and are not the subject of 
this appeal. 
would receive the Subcommittee Determination (Certification). 
On May 31, 2007, by letter from Assistant Bar Counsel, Alfred 
L. Carr (Bar Counsel), Green was provided with a copy of the 
Certification signed by Samuel R. Walker, Chair Designate of 
the Seventh District Committee.2 
Green filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and 
sought a stay of the disciplinary proceedings in the circuit 
court, which was denied, and this Court subsequently denied 
his motion for a stay.  Green v. Virginia State Bar, Record 
No. 080577 (June 6, 2008).  Green requested two continuances, 
which the Board granted.  The Board heard the cases on June 
27, 2008 and August 22, 2008.  James L. Banks, Jr., Esquire, 
served as Chairman of both Board panels. 
At the June hearing, the Bar and Green presented evidence 
on the matter of Kenneth B. Henley, Sr. (Docket Number 06-070-
0739) and the matter of Kristen L. Beavers/Michael S. Eavey 
(Docket Number 06-070-2259).  The hearing extended into the 
evening, at which time the Board continued it to a later date.  
On August 22, 2008, the hearing resumed.  Three Board members 
were substituted for the August hearing due to the 
unavailability of three members who sat in June.  Prior to the 
August hearing, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System provided 
                                                 
2 Green’s demand for a three-judge panel pursuant to Code 
§ 54.1-3935 was denied as untimely made.   
 
2
each of the substituting Board members with a transcript of 
the June 27, 2008 hearing, as well as a copy of the entire 
record. 
At the conclusion of the Bar’s case, Green moved to 
strike “each and every one of the allegations” against him.  
Green challenged the presence of the Board members who did not 
participate in the June hearing.  Green further argued that 
the Board lacked jurisdiction due to the delay between the May 
18, 2006 Subcommittee determination of misconduct and the May 
31, 2007 Certification.  Green contended that the Board’s 
failure to substantially comply with procedural requirements, 
as mandated by Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-12, resulted in its loss of 
jurisdiction.3  Green also argued that the Bar had not proven 
any of the alleged misconduct by clear and convincing 
evidence.  The Board overruled Green’s motion to strike as to 
the procedure implemented in substituting Board members, 
finding it in compliance with the provision now found in Part 
6, § IV, ¶ 13-18(Q), and determined that the Board retained 
jurisdiction, having shown substantial compliance.  The Board 
sustained Green’s motion to strike as to certain of the 
alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
                                                 
3 The provisions applicable during the proceedings against 
Green have been reorganized, effective May 1, 2009 in a 
revised Paragraph 13.  No substantive change was made to any 
 
3
Following the August hearing, the Board concluded that 
Green violated Rules 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.15(a)(2), and 
1.16(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Board 
suspended Green’s license to practice law in the Commonwealth 
for eighteen months.  Green appealed the Board’s order 
(Suspension Order) to this Court.  By Order entered December 
12, 2008, we stayed the Suspension Order pending the outcome 
of the appeal. 
At the June and August 2008 hearings (collectively, the 
hearing), the Board considered the following two cases 
certified from the May 18, 2006 Subcommittee meeting. 
A.  Matter of Kenneth B. Henley, Sr. 
(Docket Number 06-070-0739) 
 
 
Green represented Henley on charges of driving under the 
influence, driving after having been declared a habitual 
offender, and child neglect.  Henley paid directly to Green 
$7,500 in cash as an advanced legal fee.  Green described the 
fee arrangement as a “flat fee” because the majority of his 
clients did not want to pay an hourly fee over the initial 
deposit. 
At the hearing, Green testified that he did not consider 
a flat fee to be earned when he received it and that he 
believed that he made periodic withdrawals at the rate of $250 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
of the provisions applicable in this case.  For convenience, 
 
4
per hour from Henley’s account as legal services were 
provided.  The Bar, however, introduced as evidence at the 
hearing its Exhibit #20, Green’s client account ledger for 
Henley, which showed $7,500 received on December 24, 2003, 
$7,500 charged against the account on December 24, 2003, and 
thereafter a balance of $0.  The ledger also showed numerous 
dates subsequent to December 24, 2003 with indications of 
client conferences and court appearances without a concomitant 
listing of the time expended or charges made to the account.  
Green did not recall whether he notified Henley when Green 
withdrew the $7,500 from the trust account. 
The Bar investigator testified that Green said he put 
flat fees in his general or office account.  Green’s “office’s 
policy [was] that the money would be deposited in the trust 
account, initially.”  Green asserted that he performed a 
monthly reconciliation of the escrow account balance, but 
Green did not present any evidence that he made a monthly 
reconciliation of his trust account disbursement journals. 
The Board found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Green received $7,500 on December 24, 2003 and immediately 
withdrew the money as having been earned based on the flat fee 
charged when in fact the entire fee had not then been earned.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the current numbering is used in this opinion. 
 
5
The Board determined that Green violated Rule 1.15(a)(2) 
pertaining to the handling of client funds. 
B.  Matter of Kristen L. Beavers/Michael S. Eavey 
(Docket Number 06-070-2259) 
 
 
Green represented Beavers and Eavey in an action against 
Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for a claim under an 
insurance policy covering a vehicle they co-owned.  Beavers 
and Eavey claimed that their vehicle had been either 
vandalized or stolen. 
Eavey’s grandmother paid Green $2,500 for the 
representation against Allstate.  At the hearing before the 
Board, only Eavey testified, as Beavers was ill in June and 
unavailable in August.  Eavey testified that he met with Green 
only three times for “[m]aybe 10 minutes” over the course of 
his representation from 2000 to 2006.  According to Eavey, 
Green did not inform him that a warrant in debt was filed 
against Allstate on his and Beavers’ behalf, that in December 
2000 there was a court date in the general district court, 
that the lawsuit was removed to the circuit court, that 
Allstate had propounded discovery to which Eavey needed to 
respond, or that Allstate had filed a motion to compel.  Eavey 
also testified that Green did not inform him that Allstate’s 
counsel had scheduled depositions to be taken on four separate 
dates.   
 
6
 
In August 2002, the circuit court to which the case had 
been removed entered an order for counsel to appear on 
November 20, 2002 for entry of a pre-trial order and 
scheduling a trial date.  Green did not provide Eavey with the 
order, and did not appear on November 20, 2002.  The circuit 
court entered an order in December 2002 dismissing the case 
without prejudice for failure of the parties to appear. 
Despite the 2002 dismissal of the lawsuit, in November 
2003, Green attempted to negotiate a settlement with Allstate 
in the amount of $2,500.  Allstate responded that the case had 
been dismissed.  Eavey testified that Green did not inform him 
of the settlement proposal, and Eavey did not authorize 
settlement.  Eavey also testified that he met with Green in 
November 2003 and demanded a refund of the $2,500, because 
nothing had been done with his case and it had “been too 
long.”  Green told Eavey “to wait that the insurance company 
puts those funds on hold for five years and then they’ll 
settle.” 
 
In December 2005, Beavers and Eavey wrote to Green and 
demanded a return of their $2,500.  At that point in time, 
five years had elapsed since the case against Allstate had 
been filed, three years since the case had been dismissed, and 
two years since Green had attempted to “settle” the case.  
Green did not refund any of the $2,500 to them.  The Board 
 
7
found by clear and convincing evidence that Green violated 
Rule 1.4(a), (b), and (c), requiring attorney communication 
with the client, and Rule 1.16(d), concerning termination of 
an attorney’s representation of the client. 
 
Green’s disciplinary record was introduced into evidence 
for the Board’s consideration at the August 2008 hearing 
without objection.  The Board imposed an eighteen month 
suspension, effective August 22, 2008.  On October 23, 2008, 
Green moved to set aside the summary order in the Henley and 
Beavers/Eavey matters.  Green argued that the Board lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction due to the participation of Grant 
A. Richardson (Richardson), who had represented Green in prior 
disciplinary matters, on subcommittees that had certified 
prior charges against Green.  Green also argued that those 
certifications led to a six month suspension and a forty-five 
day suspension, imposed in 2007 and reflected on Green’s 
disciplinary record.  Green asserted that Richardson’s 
participation on the subcommittees was in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct concerning conflicts of 
interest.  At oral argument on appeal, Green acknowledged that 
Richardson last represented him in 1998. 
Green’s counsel did not discover Richardson’s 
participation on the 2004 and 2005 subcommittees until October 
10, 2008.  Green had “not complained about those whatsoever 
 
8
until [his counsel] brought it to his attention and [they] 
discussed it on October the 10th.”  The Board unanimously 
decided to overrule the motion to set aside the summary order.  
On November 17, 2008, Green was served with the Suspension 
Order entered on November 12, 2008 from which he presently 
appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Green assigns error to the Board’s order based on the 
following:  (1) not dismissing the cases when the Bar mailed 
the Certification more than one year after the Subcommittee 
voted to certify charges of misconduct, (2) using a 
disciplinary record that was void because it contained 
sanctions imposed by subcommittees on which Green’s former 
attorney participated, (3) improperly allowing substitution of 
Board members at the August 22, 2008 continuance of the 
hearing, (4) entering the Suspension Order with the 
endorsement of a designate of the Chairman of the Board, and 
(5) finding that Green had violated any of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under an established standard of review of the Board’s 
decision in a disciplinary proceeding, we conduct an 
independent examination of the entire record.  Pilli v. 
Virginia State Bar, 269 Va. 391, 396, 611 S.E.2d 389, 391 
 
9
(2005).  We consider the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Bar, the prevailing party in the Board 
proceeding.  Id.  We accord the Board’s factual findings 
substantial weight and we view those findings as prima facie 
correct.  Id.  Although we do not give the Board’s conclusions 
the weight of a jury verdict, we will sustain those 
conclusions unless they are not justified by a reasonable view 
of the evidence or are contrary to law.  Id. 
1.  The Certification was Served One Year and Two Weeks 
after the Meeting of the Subcommittee that 
Certified the Charges of Misconduct 
 
 
Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-15(E) provides in part that “[i]f a 
Subcommittee elects to certify a Complaint to the Board, the 
Subcommittee Chair shall promptly mail a copy of the 
Certification to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System, Bar 
Counsel, the Respondent and the Complainant.”  Green argues 
that the Subcommittee’s determination was made on May 18, 
2006, but the Certification was not promptly mailed in 
compliance with the provisions of Subsection (G)(4), because 
the Certification was mailed by Bar Counsel on May 31, 2007.  
Although Green notes that Bar Counsel rather than the required 
Subcommittee Chairman mailed the Certification, the thrust of 
his argument is that he was prejudiced by the delay.  In 
arguing prejudice, Green points to the dissent to the 
 
10
Suspension Order, which states, “we believe that a one year 
and two week delay in notifying [Green] of the charges that 
arose as early as 2000 . . . can be nothing but prejudicial.” 
 
Green argues that witnesses called by the Bar conceded 
they could not remember events that occurred over eight years 
before the hearing.  Green also argues that the delay between 
alleged misconduct and a hearing resulted in a much harsher 
disposition because his disciplinary record was enhanced by 
other sanctions imposed between the time of misconduct and the 
hearing. 
 
The Bar argues that although there was a delay between 
the Subcommittee determination and the mailing of the 
Certification, Green did not establish that he was prejudiced 
by the delay.  The Bar contends that Green clearly knew of the 
allegations of misconduct when he was notified by the Bar’s 
May 19, 2006 letter, which contained the Bar’s investigative 
reports of the four charges brought against him.  The Bar 
argues that Green was able to present his case, that Green 
testified on his own behalf, and did not claim that his memory 
was impaired by the passage of time.  Furthermore, Green 
presented 64 exhibits in his defense.  The Bar also argues 
that Green only pointed to one witness, Eavey, who, when his 
memory was refreshed, said “done forgot now.  This has been so 
long ago.”  But the Bar maintains that Eavey was able to 
 
11
testify in considerable detail about the events in question, 
and Green does not proffer how he was prejudiced by any lapse 
in Eavey’s memory. 
The Bar disagrees that Green was prejudiced by having an 
enhanced disciplinary record due to the delay.  The Bar argues 
that Green’s disciplinary record dates back to 1997 and 
includes multiple public reprimands and admonitions, in 
addition to the six month and forty-five day suspensions in 
2007.  It is the Bar’s contention that had the sequence of 
sanctions been reversed, Green might have received the same or 
harsher discipline.  The Bar asserts that it is speculation as 
to what the result would have been had this matter been 
considered before some of the other matters, and therefore 
Green cannot demonstrate prejudice. 
 
Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-12(A) provides in part:  “Except where 
[Paragraph 13] provides specific time deadlines, substantial 
compliance with the provisions hereof shall be sufficient, and 
no Charge of Misconduct shall be dismissed on the sole ground 
that any such provision has not been strictly complied with.”  
We have previously considered the prompt mailing provision 
presently located in Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-15(E) to be a 
procedural requirement and found that dismissal of charges 
because of an eleven month delay in notice of certification 
was inappropriate when the attorney was unable to demonstrate 
 
12
how such delay caused him prejudice.  Motley v. Virginia State 
Bar, 260 Va. 251, 258, 536 S.E.2d 101, 104 (2000).  Green has 
not established how the delay in this case has caused him 
prejudice.  Green did not claim he was prejudiced in either 
his own recollection of the events or in his presentation of 
exhibits.  Green did not demonstrate how Eavey’s purported 
memory difficulties prejudiced him, and in fact, the Bar was 
more prejudiced than Green by faulty memory of witnesses, 
resulting in dismissal of multiple charges.  Finally, it was 
through Green’s filing of pleadings with this Court and 
requests for continuances that the Board hearing was delayed 
from October 26, 2007 until June 27, 2008. 
 
We have previously admonished the Bar for the untimely 
performance of certain of its responsibilities for 
professional regulation in a prior proceeding against Green, 
and the Court again states its disapproval of the Bar’s delay 
in the certification of ethical complaints from a 
subcommittee.  See Green v. Virginia State Bar, 274 Va. 775, 
786, 652 S.E. 2d 118, 123 (2007).  However, absent a showing 
of prejudice by the attorney, “[a]ny betrayal of the trust 
which the attorney is sworn to keep demands appropriate 
discipline; a delay in prosecution, without more, cannot 
override this necessity.”  In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 
(D.C. 1986).  “If the conduct of a member of the bar 
 
13
disqualifies [the attorney] from the practice of law, it would 
not be in the public interest to dismiss the disciplinary 
proceedings for no reason other than the Bar’s failure to 
prosecute [him] with the proper dispatch.”  Id. at 797 
(quoting In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392, 394, 459 P.2d 548, 549 
(1969)).  The burden of demonstrating prejudice remains on 
Green, and he failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the 
delay in this case. 
The record clearly reflects that the public was 
prejudiced by the lapse of memory of several of the Bar 
witnesses, which contributed to the dismissal of some of the 
misconduct charges against Green.  Therefore, the Bar operates 
at its own peril in failing to comply with the same standard 
of professionalism that it expects from the lawyers it 
regulates. 
2. Board’s Consideration of Green’s Disciplinary Record 
In determining the appropriate sanction, the Board 
considered Green’s disciplinary record, which reflects a six 
month suspension and a forty-five day suspension resulting 
from subcommittee certifications that took place in 2004 and 
2005.  Green’s former attorney, Richardson, participated on 
the subcommittees that certified the charges of misconduct. 
 
Green argues that his disciplinary record was void due to 
the inclusion of those sanctions, because Richardson was 
 
14
ineligible to participate in subcommittee determinations 
involving Green.  According to Green, Richardson’s 
participation was a conflict of interest, in violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and his ineligibility to 
participate resulted in a lack of a quorum as required by what 
is now Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-7(B)-(C).  Green therefore argues 
that any certification by a subcommittee on which Richardson 
sat is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, 
Green contends that the Bar should not have been permitted to 
use his disciplinary record, which reflected sanctions arising 
out of void certifications, to induce the Subcommittee’s 
certification on May 18, 2006 and, later, to enhance his 
sanction.  Green maintains that the use of his disciplinary 
record by the Subcommittee should have resulted in dismissal 
by the Board, and that the resultant Suspension Order is void 
ab initio. 
 
The Bar argues that Green is alleging an irregularity of 
procedure, not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Bar 
cites Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 260, 634 S.E.2d 
341 (2006) for the proposition that an objection to the 
qualification of subcommittee members must be timely made or 
it is waived.  The Bar also relies on what is now Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13-12(B), which provides that substantial compliance 
with the procedures of this Paragraph is sufficient, except 
 
15
“where specific deadlines are provided, such deadlines shall 
be jurisdictional.”  Continuing, the Bar argues that the 
regulations on quorum and qualifications of subcommittee 
members do not contain specific time deadlines and thus are 
not jurisdictional. 
 
The Bar contends that any argument regarding Richardson’s 
participation in the prior subcommittees and the inclusion of 
charges certified by those subcommittees on Green’s 
disciplinary record is waivable, and has been waived by Green.  
The Bar asserts that Green did not object to Richardson’s 
participation on any subcommittee and did not object to the 
admission of his disciplinary record in the present case. 
We agree with the Bar that this issue does not involve 
subject matter jurisdiction and has been waived by Green. 
We have stated: 
The term jurisdiction embraces several concepts 
including subject matter jurisdiction, which is 
the authority granted through constitution or 
statute to adjudicate a class of cases or 
controversies; territorial jurisdiction, that is, 
authority over persons, things, or occurrences 
located in a defined geographic area; notice 
jurisdiction, or effective notice to a party or 
if the proceeding is in rem seizure of a res; and 
‘the other conditions of fact must exist which 
are demanded by the unwritten or statute law as 
the prerequisites of the authority of the court 
to proceed to judgment or decree.’  
 
Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 
(1990) (quoting Farant Investment Corp. v. Francis, 138 Va. 
 
16
417, 427-28, 122 S.E.2d 141, 144 (1924)) (emphasis added); 
accord Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 228, 661 S.E.2d 
415, 426 (2008). 
The Bar was created in 1938 by the General Assembly as an 
administrative agency of this Court.  Code § 54.1-3910 
establishes the Bar as an administrative agency “for the 
purpose of investigating and reporting violations of rules and 
regulations adopted by the Court under [Title 54.1, Subtitle 
IV, Chapter 39, Article 2].”  Issues regarding the composition 
of Board subcommittees do not divest the Bar of this 
jurisdiction.  Objections to such composition are therefore 
waived if not timely made. 
In Barrett, the attorney claimed that the three-judge 
panel erred in denying his motion to dismiss all charges 
against him because a member of the subcommittee that 
certified the charges was “not impartial” and “was biased.”  
272 Va. at 267, 634 S.E.2d at 344.  The attorney raised this 
issue for the first time before the three-judge panel, and not 
before the subcommittee, although he was aware of the alleged 
conflict at that time.  Id.  We held that the circuit court 
properly determined that the attorney had waived this issue.  
Id. 
As in Barrett, Green did not object to Richardson’s 
participation on the subcommittees, or to the use of his 
 
17
disciplinary record in this case, in a timely manner.  The 
subcommittee meetings to which Green objects took place on 
April 15, 2004, June 16, 2005, June 21, 2005, and February 24, 
2006.  As an exhibit to his brief, Green appended notices of 
these meetings, several of which are certifications.  Each 
notice clearly states that Richardson was a member of the 
subcommittee that considered the charges of misconduct against 
Green.  In addition, in this Court’s opinion rendered in 
Green’s previous appeal from disciplinary proceedings, issued 
on November 2, 2007, we set forth that Richardson was the 
subcommittee chair at the June 16, 2005, June 21, 2005, and 
February 24, 2006 subcommittee meetings.  Green, 274 Va. at 
780-81, 652 S.E.2d at 120. 
Despite Green’s knowledge of Richardson’s participation 
in the subcommittee determination that resulted in sanctions 
included in his disciplinary record, Green did not lodge an 
objection to Richardson’s participation until October 23, 
2008, when he moved to set aside the summary order in the 
Henley and Beavers/Eavey matters.  Prior to Green’s October 
10, 2008 meeting with counsel, he had “not complained about 
[the 2004 and 2005 subcommittees] whatsoever.”  Green argued 
on October 23, 2008, for the first time, and before a 
different panel of the Board than the panels that held the 
June and August 2008 hearings, that the Board lacked subject 
 
18
matter jurisdiction due to Richardson’s participation and the 
subcommittees’ consequently void certifications.  Moreover, 
Green did not object to the introduction of his disciplinary 
record at the August 2008 hearing when disposition of the 
charges was made.  We hold that the Board correctly decided to 
overrule Green’s motion to set aside the Suspension Order on 
this basis, as Green’s objection was not timely made. 
We note that effective January 1, 2007, this Court 
amended Part 6, § IV in what is now Paragraph 13-14(E) to 
avoid the need for a separate hearing on whether a 
subcommittee member has a conflict of interest.  Part 6, § IV, 
¶ 13-14(E) now clearly provides that “[a]ny member or former 
member of a District Committee or the Board shall be 
ineligible to serve in a Disciplinary Proceeding in which 
. . . [t]he District Committee or Board member previously 
represented the Respondent.” 
3. Substitution of Board Members at August 2008 Hearing 
 
Green argues that the Board erred by failing to document 
the inability of three Board members who sat at the June 2008 
hearing to be present at the August 2008 continuation of that 
hearing.  Green contends that the Board was therefore in 
violation of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-18(Q), which provides: 
Whenever a hearing has been adjourned for any 
reason and one or more of the members initially 
constituting the quorum for the hearing are 
 
19
unable to be present, the hearing of the matter 
may be completed by furnishing a transcript of 
the subsequent proceedings conducted in one or 
more member’s absence to such absent member, or 
substituting another Board member for any absent 
member and furnishing a transcript of the prior 
proceedings in the matter to such substituted 
member(s). 
 
Green asserts that substantial compliance with what is 
now Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-18(Q) was lacking because three of the 
five Board members on August 22, 2008 had to rely on a 
transcript of the June 2008 hearing to make their 
determination, and no valid reason was given for the absence 
of the original members. 
 
The Bar argues that it fulfilled the requirements of Part 
6, § IV, ¶ 13-18(Q) by providing the substituted Board members 
with a transcript of the June 2008 hearing.  According to the 
Bar, the Board was not required to note or document the reason 
for the inability of members to be present. 
 
We agree with the Bar.  At the August 2008 hearing, the 
chairman stated, “we do have new members on the panel” and 
“ask[ed] each member of the panel to identify himself or 
herself for the record.”  The new members had been provided a 
transcript of the June 2008 hearing, as well as a copy of the 
entire record.  Nothing more was required of the Board in 
order to substitute Board members for the absent members, in 
compliance with Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-18(Q). 
 
20
4.  Entry of the Suspension Order with the Endorsement 
 of a Designate of the Chairman of the Board 
 
Green argues that the Suspension Order, entered on 
November 12, 2008, was invalid because it was signed by James 
Banks, who was neither the Chairman of the Board nor a member 
on that date.4  Pursuant to the provision now found in Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13-18(P), “[u]pon disposition of a matter, the Board 
shall issue the Summary Order.  Thereafter, the Board shall 
prepare the Memorandum Order.  A Board member shall prepare 
the Summary Order and Memorandum Order for the signature of 
the Chair or the Chair’s designee.”  Banks served as the chair 
of both the June 2008 and August 2008 panels. 
The Bar argues that Green waived this argument by failing 
to inform the Board of his objection to Banks’ authority to 
enter the Suspension Order.  We agree with the Bar.  Since 
Green raises his objection for the first time on appeal to 
this Court, we will not consider this issue.  Rule 5:25. 
5. Green’s Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
Green argues that the Board erred in finding any 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13-18(K) provides that at a disciplinary hearing 
before the Board, the Bar must present clear and convincing 
evidence to prove a violation of the Rules. 
 
21
In the Henley matter, Green contends that the evidence 
established there was no dispute regarding escrowed funds or 
fees.  Green argued that funds paid to him by Henley were 
placed in escrow and withdrawn as earned, and that there was 
no evidence that Green violated Rule 1.15(a)(2).  Rule 1.15 
(a) and its subpart(2) state, in part: 
All funds received or held by a lawyer . . . on 
behalf of a client . . . shall be deposited in 
one or more identifiable escrow accounts . . . 
and no funds belonging to the lawyer . . . shall 
be deposited therein except as follows: 
 
. . . 
 
(2) funds belonging in part to a client and in 
part presently or potentially to the lawyer . . . 
must be deposited therein, and the portion 
belonging to the lawyer . . . must be withdrawn 
promptly after it is due. 
 
The Bar argues that the Board had sufficient evidence to 
find Green’s violation of the Rule by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Henley paid Green $7,500 in cash to represent him, 
which Green considered a “flat fee.”  Green testified that he 
did not know whether the $7,500 was deposited into his escrow 
account.  Moreover, the Bar’s investigator testified that 
Green admitted depositing flat fees into his general office 
account and did not differentiate between a flat fee and a 
retainer.  The Bar maintains that its Exhibit #20, the account 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4  Banks resigned effective June 30, 2008, though his term 
was not set to expire until 2009. 
 
22
ledger tracking Green’s activity on the Henley case, shows a 
payment and a charge of $7,500 on December 24, 2003.  The 
exhibit does not show periodic withdrawals of fees earned at a 
rate of $250 per hour, as alleged by Green.  Accordingly, the 
Bar contends the Board correctly ruled that funds were 
deposited into escrow and withdrawn “immediately” without 
being earned.  Applying the standard of review set forth 
above, we view the evidence in a manner consistent with the 
Bar’s position and hold that the Board did not err in finding 
Rule violations in the Henley matter by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
In the Beavers/Eavey matter, Green argues that only 
Beavers was his client, as she was the only party to the 
insurance contract with Allstate, and therefore, the Bar’s 
failure to obtain her testimony resulted in insufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Green violated Rules 1.4 
and 1.16, regarding duties owed by lawyers to their clients.  
Green maintains that the Board erroneously concluded that he 
represented both Beavers and Eavey against Allstate. 
Based on our independent examination of the entire 
record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Bar, the evidence shows that Green represented both 
Beavers and Eavey in the insurance litigation.  Green conceded 
at the June 2008 hearing that he filed the lawsuit for both 
 
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Beavers and Eavey, and the warrant in debt listed both Beavers 
and Eavey as plaintiffs.  Green also testified about meetings 
he held with both Beavers and Eavey.  Green stated that 
“[t]hey would come in all the time.”  We give the Board’s 
factual finding that Green represented both Beavers and Eavey 
substantial weight, and view it as prima facie correct.  Green 
has failed to sufficiently challenge this finding of fact.  We 
therefore hold that the Board did not err in finding Rule 
violations in the Beavers/Eavey matter by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Board’s 
order suspending Green’s license to practice law for eighteen 
months. 
Affirmed. 
 
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