Title: In re T.E.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-411


In re T.E., Juvenile                         Supreme Court


                                             On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

                                             May Term, 1990


Kilburn, J. (termination-of-rights proceeding); Costes, J. (motion to
   modify and vacate)

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Barbara L. Crippen,
   Special Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellee
   State of Vermont

Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant mother

Steve Dunham, Public Defender, St. Albans, for defendant-appellee T.E.



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   The mother of T.E. appeals from a denial by the Franklin
District Court, sitting as a juvenile court, of her motion to modify and
vacate an order terminating her residual parental rights with respect to her
daughter.  We affirm.
     As a seven-year-old, T.E. was taken into custody by the Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) on September 15, 1980, pursuant to
an emergency detention order.  The SRS complaint alleged that appellant was
a substance abuser who had left T.E. and her brother unsupervised on
numerous occasions.  She was in the process of being evicted, and the trial
court found that "[s]he had no prospects of obtaining a suitable residence
and refused to acknowledge her substance abuse problem and to seek treatment
therefor."  T.E. was placed in the home of her maternal aunt and uncle, and
the court subsequently found T.E. to be in need of care and supervision,
placing her in the custody of SRS for six months.
     At a juvenile court review hearing on May 21, 1981, the court ordered
T.E. to remain in SRS custody, without objection from appellant.  As the
trial court later found, it was made clear to appellant at the May 21, 1981
hearing that "if sufficient progress were not made by her, then SRS would
seek a termination of her parental rights."   Appellant did not thereafter
make that progress in the view of SRS, and T.E., who had stabilized in
foster care, had meanwhile expressed a desire to be adopted.  SRS filed a
petition to terminate residual parental rights, and a three-day hearing on
that petition was conducted in October and November of 1983, resulting in a
March 2, 1984 decision terminating appellant's rights.  The trial court
found that appellant's pattern of instability had not changed, though her
"nomadic lifestyle had at least temporarily stabilized to some extent."  The
court found that T.E. was ready for adoption, "believing her mother could no
longer take care of her," that there was "virtually no likelihood" that
appellant would be able to resume her parental duties, that reunification
efforts had "long since reached a level of complete and total stagnation,"
and that continued efforts in this direction would "impair the future
healthy development" of T.E.  The court concluded, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that it would be in T.E.'s best interest to terminate
appellant's residual parental rights.
     Appellant filed a timely motion to amend the findings, and a hearing on
the motion was held on April 5, 1984.  Inexplicably, that motion was not
decided until March 10, 1987, nearly three years later, an appalling delay.
Prior to the decision, appellant filed a motion to modify and vacate the
1984 order, as permitted by 33 V.S.A. { 659(a).  Because of its inordinate
delay in deciding the motion to amend, the court apologized to the parties
and offered appellant an opportunity to reopen the matter before a different
judge.  On March 31, 1987, appellant filed an amended motion, asking that
all prior orders be vacated.  After a two-day hearing before a second judge
in July and August of 1987, and prior to a decision, appellant moved for a
third hearing, alleging prejudice because T.E.'s attorney had represented
both T.E. and her brother during the 1984 hearing, when the two siblings had
conflicting desires regarding termination of the parental relationship.  The
court denied that motion.  In deciding the motion to modify and vacate, the
court found that appellant had not established a stable living arrangement
or employment since the 1984 decision, that her emotional problems remained,
and that "it is not clear whether she is drug free."  The court also found
that appellant had not made a substantial change in her material
circumstances, and it therefore denied her motion.  The present appeal
followed.
     Appellant contends first that the trial court erred by imposing on her
the burden of proving her case by clear and convincing evidence, when the
burden should simply have been a preponderance of the evidence.  It is
settled law that a state's initial burden of proof in seeking to terminate
residual parental rights is by clear and convincing evidence.  Santosky v.
Kramer,