Title: Clubine v. American Cyanamid Co.

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

534 N.W.2d 385 (1995) Patton CLUBINE, Kuhn Farms, Inc., Kuhn Farms Limited, Allen Robert Welte and Frank Welte II, Appellants, v. AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY and E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company, Appellees. No. 94-452. Supreme Court of Iowa. July 19, 1995. Allen K. Nepper, Denison, for appellant. Mark A. Woollums and Jean Dickson Feeney of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, Davenport, for appellee American Cyanamid Co. Joseph E. Halbur, Carroll, and Raymond Michael Ripple, Wilmington, DE, for appellee Du Pont De Nemours & Co. Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ. *386 HARRIS, Justice. Farmers sued providers of herbicides for damage to their crops. The principal issue is whether, as the trial court ruled, their claims were preempted by federal legislation. We affirm. Plaintiffs are farmers who sought to eradicate a weed called "shatter cane" from their corn. Defendants are chemical companies whose herbicides were the ones plaintiffs applied to their fields. Defendant American Cyanamid Company manufactures and markets "Prowl." Defendant E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company manufactures and markets "Bladex." Both Prowl and Bladex have been approved by the environmental protection agency of the federal government pursuant to the federal insecticide, fungicide, and rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. The trial court explained the approval process this way: American Cyanamid, on the herbicide label, recommends application of Prowl/Bladex mix for weed control. Du Pont makes no recommendation on the use of Bladex in combination with any other herbicides. After suffering damage to their corn, plaintiffs filed this suit against American Cyanamid and Du Pont alleging: (1) their herbicides were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (2) they breached an implied warranty of merchantability; (3) they breached an express warranty; and (4) they negligently failed to test, label and provide adequate instructions and warning regarding the use of their product. Plaintiffs' expert testified that American Cyanamid was made aware that the mix might damage crops under certain weather conditions. Except for the claim of negligence, to be discussed separately, the district court, after trial, dismissed all claims on the ground FIFRA preempted jurisdiction from all Iowa courts. Because the trial court also found plaintiffs failed to establish the negligence claim, the suit was dismissed. I. The preemption doctrine rests on the supremacy clause of the federal constitution: U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. If a matter is preempted a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide it. Walles v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Iowa 1977). Preemption may be found where congress' intent to preempt the field is either expressly stated or implicit in *387 congressional policy. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 514 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 1994). The trial court based its finding of expressed preemption from the following language of FIFRA: 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1993). The trial court thought the preemption issue was controlled by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1992), a case that involved the claim of inadequate warnings on cigarette advertisements and promotional materials. Plaintiffs in Cipollone were also met by preemptive language in legislation, language we find strikingly similar to that faced by the present plaintiffs: 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1993). In conformance with Cipollone the federal courts have uniformly held that state actions based on the adequacy of warnings or instructions on the labels of EPA-registered pesticides are preempted. Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, ___ (8th Cir.1995); Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir.1995); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir.1994); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 748 (4th Cir.1993); King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir.1993), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 490, 126 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir.1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.1993) (Papas II), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 300, 126 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1178-79 (10th Cir.1993) (Arkansas-Platte II ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 60, 126 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1993). FIFRA's definition of pesticides includes herbicides. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u). The term "labeling" is defined as "all labels and all other written, printed, or graphic matter (A) accompanying the pesticide or device at any time; or (B) to which reference is made on the label or in the literature accompanying the pesticide or device." 7 U.S.C. § 136(p)(2). In determining whether a state claim is preempted under FIFRA, "the issue may ... be resolved by looking to, as one factor, whether one could reasonably foresee that the manufacturer, in seeking to avoid liability for the error, would choose to alter the product or the label." Worm, 5 F.3d at 747-48. We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that it could not reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims. Under the statutory definition those claims are label-based, and, because they depend on requirements in addition toor different fromthose imposed under FIFRA, are preempted. Each of the claims (that the herbicides were defective and unreasonably dangerous, that they breached an implied warranty of merchantability, and that they breached an express warranty) is derived from the assertion of factual matters FIFRA expressly places within the exclusive dominion of the EPA. The trial court was correct in so holding. II. The only part of plaintiffs' claims not preempted are those charging defendants with negligence in testing their products. Worm, 5 F.3d at 747. On these claims the trial court allowed the parties to present evidence. The court held that: Id. The record amply supports this finding. Dismissal of all claims must be affirmed. Like the trial court, we are mindful of the economic loss suffered by the plaintiffs. Like the trial court, we are however obliged to yield to federal law that denies Iowa courts jurisdiction to proceed to the merits. AFFIRMED.