Title: State v. Mull

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1362-CR  
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jovan T. Mull, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 401 Wis. 2d 195, 973 N.W.2d 14 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 4, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 29, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph R. Wall & Jonathan D. Watts   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. 
There was an oral argument by Christine A. Remington, assistant 
attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Christopher P. August, assistant state public defender. There 
 
 
2 
was an oral argument by Christopher P. August, assistant state 
public defender.  
 
 
2023 WI 26 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1362-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF2419) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jovan T. Mull, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 4, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished, per curiam decision from the court of appeals.1  The 
court of appeals granted defendant Jovan T. Mull a new trial 
because it concluded Mull received ineffective assistance of 
                                                 
1 State v. Mull (Mull II), No. 2020AP1362-CR, unpublished 
slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2022) (per curiam).  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
2 
 
counsel at his trial, which resulted in his conviction for 
first-degree reckless homicide.2   
¶2 
We conclude that Mull's trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently.  Because we make this determination, we need not 
assess whether counsel's performance prejudiced the defense.  
Lastly, we decline Mull's request to grant him a new trial in 
the interest of justice because the controversy was fully tried, 
and 
it 
is 
not 
probable 
that 
justice 
has 
miscarried.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Incident  
¶3 
Ms. Ericka Walker was shot and killed in her bedroom 
during a crowded house party in the early morning hours of March 
7, 2015, when a fight bordering on a brawl erupted.  Eyewitness 
accounts are consistent so far as the general details of the 
evening, but differ significantly regarding the specifics.  
¶4 
Most accounts describe the initial outbreak of a 
small, personal fight, which subsided only to swell into a 
larger clash almost immediately.  The fight escalated quickly 
from grabbing, to pushing, to throwing dishes, to the use of one 
or multiple tasers.  A few people and Ms. Walker, who by most 
accounts was not involved in the fight, sheltered in a bedroom 
off of the main living area where the fight was taking place.  
Seeing a roommate engaged in the fight, Ms. Walker pulled him 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Jonathan D. Watts of Milwaukee County 
presided and entered the judgment of conviction.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
3 
 
and his friend into the bedroom with her.  However, the pair 
continued to fight, throwing objects at people standing outside 
the bedroom's main door from a second door to the bedroom.  The 
fight culminated when someone fired multiple shots into the 
bedroom 
through 
the 
closed 
door, 
striking 
and 
killing 
Ms. Walker.  Ms. Walker's autopsy confirmed she was struck by 
six bullets.   
B.  The Investigation 
¶5 
Police arrived on scene and began investigating the 
shooting immediately.  Witness accounts suggest that 40 to 100 
people attended the party, and police obtained statements from 
more than 25 individuals.  Eyewitness descriptions identified 
the person who shot through the door as a black male who fired 
the gun with his right hand, but descriptions were otherwise 
very inconsistent.   
¶6 
The array of witness statements described the shooter 
as 16-24 years old, 5'2"-5'11" tall, slim, medium or stocky 
build, with a medium or dark complexion.  Investigators were 
told the shooter had short dreads, a short "afro," a four-inch 
"afro," and "short, curly hair."  Numerous people described the 
shooter as wearing a red sweatshirt, although some reported the 
sweatshirt was "Adidas" brand, while others told investigators 
it was a Wisconsin Badgers sweatshirt.  Two people told police 
the shooter wore a blue sweatshirt.  Three individuals reported 
seeing the shooter in a black or dark sweatshirt, while another 
person reported the shooter was in a white t-shirt.  The shooter 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
4 
 
was described as wearing red Rock Revival pants while others 
reported the shooter wore black pants or blue jeans.   
¶7 
Accounts varied as to how many people were outside the 
bedroom.  One witness placed two individuals outside the 
bedroom, both with guns and one in an orange shirt.  Others told 
police three to eight men were looking for the two individuals 
Ms. Walker pulled into the bedroom.  Reports also varied as to 
whether the lights were on or off in the living room during the 
fight.  Nearly all accounts, however, suggested Vashawn Smyth3 
and his friend Menjuan Bankhead were involved in the initial 
stages of the fight.  
¶8 
Shortly after the party, rumors began circulating on 
Facebook accusing Smyth of firing his gun into the door.  A 
mysterious 
Facebook 
user 
contacted 
Ms. Walker's 
former 
girlfriend Cheyenne Pugh to convey that Smyth was the person who 
shot through the door.  Pugh reported this information to 
police.  Witness Keshawna Wright told officers she had seen 
Smyth shoot into the door at the party.  Police initially 
investigated and arrested Smyth for Ms. Walker's death.  Smyth 
remained adamant that he did not have a gun while at the party.  
Smyth first told officers he was already leaving the house when 
                                                 
3 The record reflects numerous alternate first and last name 
spellings for many subjects involved.  We use the spelling used 
at trial for those who testified or the most common spelling 
that appears in the record.  Further, many individuals have 
nicknames, but as the record connects an individual's name and 
nickname, and neither party disputes this, we proceed using what 
appeared to be each person's legal name.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
5 
 
the 
shooting 
began, 
but 
in 
later 
interviews 
he 
told 
investigators he was in the house when someone shot through the 
door.  One individual involved in the fight did not identify 
Smyth in a lineup in which he was the target.  Smyth is right-
handed.   
¶9 
Witness Jalyn Lynch reported that he saw two people 
holding guns at the party and identified one of them as 
Bankhead.  Lynch told officers that Bankhead did not shoot into 
the door, but rather he shouted to the other person with a gun 
to shoot through the door.  Witness Wright did not identify 
Bankhead in a lineup for which he was the target.  Officers 
arrested Bankhead as a felon in possession of a firearm.  
Bankhead 
told 
officers 
he 
wore 
a 
red 
Wisconsin 
Badgers 
sweatshirt on the night of the party.  The record does not 
reflect why investigators turned their attention from Bankhead. 
¶10 During one interview, Smyth told officers Tyler Harris4 
displayed a handgun to Smyth from across the room at the party 
minutes before someone shot through the door.  Smyth reported to 
investigators that Tyler Harris later told him he "emptied [his] 
clip" at the party.  Shortly after, Tyler Harris changed his 
Facebook status to indicate he needed to "stay low."  Witness 
Channel Howard identified Tyler Harris in a photo array as the 
"person [she] saw in possession of a gun at [the] party."  
Officers arrested Tyler Harris as a felon in possession of a 
                                                 
4 There are four individuals with the last name Harris in 
the record:  Tyler, Sanchez, Demon, and Dejuan.  For clarity, we 
refer to each individual by his full name.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
6 
 
firearm.  The record does not reflect why investigators turned 
their attention from Tyler Harris. 
¶11 A few days after the incident, Pugh began hearing new 
rumors that Jovan Mull was the person who shot Ms. Walker 
through the door.  Pugh received photos of Mull from unknown 
senders who said the person in the photo was the shooter.  Pugh 
brought that information to investigators' attention, too.   
¶12 The investigation then focused on Mull.  Witness Lynch 
stated he did not remember seeing Mull at the party, although 
others recalled seeing him there.  Three individuals——Sanchez 
Harris, 
Alphonso 
Carter, 
and 
Desmond 
Butler——separately 
identified Mull in a photo array as the person who shot through 
the door.  Four people——Demon Harris, Tyler Harris, Charles 
Cantrell, and Elicia Burrows——did not recognize or identify Mull 
as 
the 
shooter 
in 
separate 
photo 
arrays. 
 
Smyth 
told 
investigators Mull was "the person that had the gun in the 
kitchen," although he did not identify Mull as the shooter.  
Smyth also told investigators that he and Mull did not have an 
amicable history.   
¶13 Additional accounts implicated Mull.  Sanchez Harris 
told investigators that Mull said he had a gun on him while they 
rode to the party together.  Sanchez Harris further told 
officers Mull "did the shooting," but also that, Mull "had to 
be" the shooter.  Vachune Hubbard told investigators that he had 
spoken with Mull shortly after the party and Mull said that at 
the party, "[T]hey got to fighting, so I got to shooting," and 
"I shot through the door."  Mull is right-handed.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 The State ultimately charged Mull with first-degree 
reckless homicide for Ms. Walker's death. 
C.  Mull's Trial 
¶15 A four-day jury trial took place in April 2016.  The 
State presented multiple witnesses, including witnesses who 
attended the party, witnesses who did not attend the party, and 
investigators. 
 
The 
defense 
did 
not 
call 
any 
witnesses 
independently.5   
¶16 The State called Ms. Walker's former girlfriend, Pugh, 
who did not attend the party.  On direct examination, the State 
questioned Pugh regarding Facebook messages and a photo of Smyth 
that Pugh received and brought to police regarding the shooter's 
identity.  Counsel objected on foundation and hearsay grounds 
multiple times during Pugh's testimony.  In one instance, Pugh 
read a message on the stand to which defense counsel made a 
                                                 
5 The defense submitted a witness list that identified nine 
individuals.  Of those nine individuals, eight were cross-listed 
on the State's witness list.  The ninth, and the only name that 
was not cross-listed, was "Donika Payton," which may be an 
alternate spelling of "Donieka Payton."  Review of the record is 
inconclusive as to whether Donika and Donieka are actually the 
same person.   
Assuming 
they 
are 
the 
same 
person, 
all 
individuals 
identified on the defense's witness list were also identified on 
the State's witness list.  Of the eight individuals on the 
defense's witness list, the record supports that neither the 
State nor the defense subpoenaed five of those witnesses.  The 
State 
subpoenaed 
the 
remaining 
three 
individuals 
on 
the 
defense's list——Sanchez Harris, Elicia Burrows and Keshawna 
Wright.  Sanchez Harris appeared and testified at trial, but the 
record reflects Burrows and Wright could not be located after 
multiple attempts.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
8 
 
hearsay objection.  The State explained the message was offered 
"to explain further [officers'] investigation."  The court 
overruled all of the defense's objections.  Pugh then testified 
that others told her Mull was the shooter.  Pugh received a text 
with a photo of Smyth, and another person sent her a photo of 
Mull on Facebook.  Pugh testified she brought this information 
to investigators.   
¶17 On cross-examination, Pugh confirmed she did not know 
the person who sent her a Facebook message and photo of Smyth, 
nor the person who sent her a photo of Mull.  Pugh's responses 
included references to "they" or "them," which Mull's counsel 
sought to clarify for the court reporter.  His subsequent 
questions resulted in the following exchange and statement from 
Pugh: 
[Trial counsel]:  And then you talked about, "They."  
Is there another person the message is going to? 
[Pugh]:  It's not actually on my messenger.  It was 
just other people coming up to me about the situation 
and sending [their] love out I guess about talking to 
me and say they apologize for her death and stuff like 
that.  
And also another lady was telling me about him 
going -- being in the hood bragging about it saying 
that he hit a lick over there on 35th and he killed 
the stud bitch. 
[Trial counsel]:  I guess.  Just could you define what 
that means? 
[Pugh]:  Stud.  It's a female who dresses like a guy. 
Trial counsel did not move to strike Pugh's testimony, nor did 
he move for a mistrial.  Instead, trial counsel pivoted to 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
9 
 
explore Pugh's relationship to the investigation.  The jury 
heard additional testimony from Smyth, Sanchez Harris, Carter, 
Butler, and Hubbard.   
¶18 Smyth testified that he attended the party, and he 
described the events culminating in the "big brawl."  Smyth also 
testified that he saw two people with guns in the living room——
Mull and Tyler Harris.  Smyth told the jury he heard the shots 
fired, but that he did not actually see Mull fire a gun.   
¶19 Sanchez Harris testified that Mull rode to the party 
with Sanchez Harris and his brothers, and that Mull announced he 
had a gun on him.  Sanchez Harris stated he was in the living 
room when Ms. Walker was shot, and he saw one person wearing a 
red sweatshirt pointing a gun at the bedroom door.  Sanchez 
Harris testified Mull was also in the vehicle when they left the 
party and Mull said, "You better not say anything.  I know your 
faces."  He testified that Mull wore a red Wisconsin Badgers 
sweatshirt the night of the party, and the State entered Sanchez 
Harris's prior identification of Mull in a photo array from the 
investigation into evidence.6  He testified that Mull was "the 
person who probably did it." 
                                                 
6 Sanchez Harris testified he was shown only two photos in 
the photo array, and that he identified Mull's photo as the 
person who shot through the door.  Whether there was a problem 
with the photo array is not before us for review.  The 
prosecutor walked Sanchez Harris through the photo array 
identification form that he signed, where his circled responses 
indicate he viewed six photos.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
10 
 
¶20 Carter testified he was at the party and that he saw 
two men outside the bedroom door with guns.  One man told the 
other to "[s]hoot in there," and the other person shot through 
the 
door. 
 
The 
State 
admitted 
Carter's 
prior 
positive 
identification of Mull as the shooter in a photo array.  
¶21 Butler testified he was at the party and that he 
recalled the shooter wearing a red sweatshirt.  The prosecution 
admitted Butler's prior identification of Mull from a photo 
array.  However, after seeing Mull in the courtroom, Butler 
recanted his identification because he did not believe Mull 
looked like the person he identified in the photo array.  "As 
I'm looking at [Mull], the height even different like.  The body 
language.  I'm looking.  I don't want to convict nobody that's 
innocent."   
¶22 Hubbard did not attend the party, but he testified in 
accordance with the statements he made to officers during the 
investigation.  Namely, Hubbard affirmed that he previously told 
investigators that Mull told him "I got to shooting" at the 
party and "I shot through the door."   
¶23 The jury found Mull guilty of first-degree reckless 
homicide.  Mull subsequently received a bifurcated sentence of 
twenty-five years initial confinement and ten years extended 
supervision.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
11 
 
D.  Procedural History 
¶24 Mull timely filed for postconviction relief seeking a 
new trial based on grounds that included ineffective assistance 
of counsel and the interest of justice.  The circuit court 
denied the postconviction motion without a hearing,7 which Mull 
appealed.  The court of appeals reversed8 and ordered the circuit 
court to conduct a Machner9 hearing.  Specifically, the court 
concluded Mull was entitled to a Machner hearing regarding his 
allegations that trial counsel was ineffective for the two 
claims we review today. 
¶25 First, Mull asserted his trial counsel was ineffective 
for "failing to file a third-party perpetrator motion regarding 
any one of the viable alternate suspects."  (Emphasis in 
original.)  Mull identified Smyth, Tyler Harris, and/or Bankhead 
as potential third-party perpetrators that Mull could have named 
consistent with a Denny10 defense.   
                                                 
7 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen entered the order denying 
Mull's postconviction motion. 
8 State v. Mull (Mull I), No. 2018AP1349-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2019).  
9 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
 
"The 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
evaluate 
counsel's 
effectiveness, which includes counsel's testimony to explain his 
or her handling of the case, is . . . called a Machner hearing."  
State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶31, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 
334.  
10 State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 
1984).  A Denny defense permits a defendant to raise a third-
party 
perpetrator 
defense 
if 
the 
defendant 
can 
show 
"a 
'legitimate tendency' that the third person could have committed 
the crime."  Id. at 623.  A third-party perpetrator defense 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
12 
 
¶26 At the Machner hearing,11 trial counsel testified he 
thought pursuing a reasonable doubt defense was preferable to 
pursuing a third-party perpetrator defense because it was 
difficult to locate witnesses to interview them.  Trial counsel 
testified to an "inability to contact certain witnesses to 
prepare a Denny motion pretrial," even with the help of an 
investigator.  Trial counsel said "a lot of these people 
wouldn't return phone calls, went by nicknames, [and Mull] did 
not have phone numbers . . . or addresses."  Trial counsel was 
aware the State also had difficulty locating witnesses.  Based 
on this information, trial counsel determined there were a lot 
of 
credibility 
issues 
and 
inconsistent 
accounts 
of 
what 
happened, which he strategically thought presented a reasonable 
doubt defense.  Trial counsel also testified that he had 
prepared two Denny motions for clients in other cases, both of 
which were denied.  
¶27 Secondly, Mull argued trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object or move to strike Pugh's testimony.  Mull 
found his attorney's failure to strike Pugh's hearsay testimony 
that "he" was "saying that . . . he killed the stud bitch," 
particularly deficient and prejudicial.  At the Machner hearing, 
trial counsel testified that he "objected to the line of 
questioning," 
relative 
to 
the 
out-of-court 
messages 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
requires motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to the 
crime.  Id. at 625. 
11 The Honorable Joseph R. Wall presided at the hearing and 
issued the subsequent order.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
13 
 
prosecution presented through Pugh.  "The judge had overruled," 
both on foundation and hearsay grounds.  Relative to the hearsay 
objection, the court allowed Pugh's testimony as course-of-
investigation testimony.  Having been overruled, trial counsel 
explained he attempted to discredit Pugh's testimony through 
cross-examination by attacking her credibility and questioning 
Pugh's motive in testifying.  Trial counsel testified he did not 
object, as the statement came out on his own cross-examination 
of Pugh, and he did not move to strike the statement because he 
did not want to "[bring] too much attention to the jury" 
regarding Pugh's testimony.   
¶28 The circuit court made a number of relevant factual 
findings, which we discuss below.  The court found trial counsel 
credible, and it accepted his testimony.  The circuit court 
concluded "the errors asserted by the defense" did not rise to 
the established standard of prejudice for ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  The circuit court accordingly denied Mull's 
postconviction motion for a new trial following the Machner 
hearing. 
¶29 Mull appealed the circuit court's denial to the court 
of appeals.  Mull renewed his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and his argument seeking a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  The court of appeals reversed and granted Mull a new 
trial after it concluded Mull received ineffective assistance.  
State v. Mull (Mull II), No. 2020AP1362-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2022).  The court of appeals 
determined trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
14 
 
a third-party perpetrator defense, and for "failing to move to 
strike or move for a mistrial following hearsay testimony" from 
Pugh.  Id.  The court of appeals remanded for a new trial 
without addressing Mull's interest of justice claim.  
¶30 The State petitioned us for review on two questions 
that largely reflect the claims Mull raised below.  First, 
whether the court of appeals impermissibly failed to defer to 
trial counsel's strategic decisions; and second, whether this 
court should grant Mull a new trial in the interest of justice.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶31 "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a 
mixed question of fact and law."  State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 
¶13, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95.  We do not reverse a 
circuit court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous.  
Id.  "Findings of fact include 'the circumstances of the case 
and the counsel's conduct and strategy.'"  Id. (quoting State v. 
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305).  
Whether those facts demonstrate that counsel's performance fell 
below the constitutional standard is a matter of law subject to 
our independent review.  State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 
369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  
¶32 We may exercise our discretion to grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice "[u]nder both our inherent powers and 
our statutory authority."  State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 
¶114, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98; see also State v. Avery, 
2013 WI 13, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60; Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
15 
 
§ 751.06 (2021-22).12   We recognize that "a circuit court is in 
a better position than an appellate court to determine whether 
confidence in the correctness of the outcome at the original 
trial or hearing has been undermined."  Morden v. Cont'l AG, 
2000 WI 51, ¶87, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659.  Because of 
that, we approach a request for a new trial "with great 
caution."  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114.   
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶33 The court of appeals reviewed Mull's two arguments, 
which are renewed before us.  Mull asks us to affirm the court 
of appeals' conclusion that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to present a third-party perpetrator defense and for 
failing to move to strike or move for a mistrial in light of 
Pugh's testimony. 
¶34 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees the effective assistance of counsel to every criminal 
defendant.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶18.  
The purpose of the guarantee is "to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial," and "to justify reliance on 
the outcome of the proceeding."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 689, 692, (1984).  A defendant is denied the right to 
effective assistance of counsel when "his counsel performs 
deficiently" and "the deficiency prejudices his trial."  Pico, 
382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶18.  
                                                 
12 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
16 
 
¶35 Counsel performs deficiently if his "conduct falls 
outside [an] objectively reasonable range," which we recognize 
is "wide."  Id., ¶19.  We apply a "strong presumption" that 
counsel acts "reasonably within professional norms."  State v. 
Coleman, 2015 WI App 38, ¶20, 362 Wis. 2d 447, 865 N.W.2d 190.  
We are "highly deferential" to counsel's decisions, provided 
they are objectively reasonable and strategic.  State v. 
Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93.  
However, we do not review the reasonableness of trial counsel's 
decisions with "the benefit of hindsight."  Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 
273, ¶22.  We will not "second-guess a reasonable trial 
strategy, [unless] it was based on an irrational trial tactic or 
based upon caprice rather than upon judgment."  Breitzman, 378 
Wis. 2d 431, ¶65 (brackets in original).  We cannot decide 
after-the-fact that "a more appropriate decision could have been 
made."  State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 502-03, 329 N.W.2d 161 
(1983).   
¶36 On the other hand, it is not enough to merely "label" 
counsel's challenged decisions "a matter of choice and of trial 
strategy."  Id. at 502.  Rather, we examine trial counsel's 
choices "in the context of the circumstances as they existed at 
the time he made his decisions."  Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶22.  
See also Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 502-03.  
¶37 Counsel's deficient performance prejudices a criminal 
defendant when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
17 
 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 642 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
669).   
1.  Third-Party Perpetrator Defense 
¶38 We begin by reviewing whether trial counsel was 
deficient in choosing a "reasonable doubt" trial strategy over a 
"third-party perpetrator" defense strategy.  Before we proceed 
to the merits of Mull's argument, we first review the boundaries 
and requirements of a third-party perpetrator defense.   
¶39 Due process requires the government to bear the burden 
of proving an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
to convict.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  While an 
accused is not obligated to present a defense, the United States 
and Wisconsin Constitutions provide a criminal defendant the due 
process right to "present a theory of defense to the jury."  
State v. Wilson, 2015 WI 48, ¶3, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52.  
An accused may present a theory of defense that another party 
committed the crime for which an accused stands trial.  Such a 
defense, however, must be grounded in admissible evidence.  
Accordingly, an accused's right to present a defense does not 
encompass the right to present irrelevant evidence.  State v. 
Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 294, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999).   
¶40 When dealing with stakes as high as a defendant's 
liberty, third-party perpetrator evidence walks a bit of a 
tightrope.  On the one hand, evidence of another's guilt is 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
18 
 
always relevant to an accused's innocence;13 on the other hand, a 
trial 
should 
avoid 
"undue 
diversion . . . by 
injecting 
a 
collateral issue, and in avoiding unsupported jury speculation 
regarding the guilt of other suspects."14  Id. at 303.  "It is 
this tension between the defendant's rights and the relevancy 
requirement that the court of appeals addressed in Denny."  
Wilson, 362 Wis. 2d 193, ¶48 (referencing State v. Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d 614, 622, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984)); see also 
Wilson, 362 Wis. 2d 193, ¶102 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  There, 
the court adopted the "legitimate tendency" test to guide the 
admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence in Wisconsin.  
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623-24.15   
¶41 Denny established a three-prong test to ensure a 
defendant's proffered evidence does not change the proceedings 
"into a trial of collateral issues."  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 624.  
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 defines "[r]elevant evidence" as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."   
14 See also Wis. Stat. § 904.03, which states in pertinent 
part, "[R]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues, 
or 
misleading 
the 
jury . . . ." 
15 Although we ratified the Denny "legitimate tendency" test 
in State v. Knapp, and reaffirmed it in State v. Wilson, third-
party 
perpetrator 
evidence 
is 
commonly 
known 
as 
"Denny 
evidence," used to present a "Denny defense."  State v. Knapp, 
2003 WI 121, ¶¶175-183, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881 vacated 
on other grounds, 542 U.S. 952 (2004); State v. Wilson, 2015 WI 
48, ¶52, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
19 
 
To be admissible, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate 
that there is "a 'legitimate tendency' that the third person 
could have committed the crime" by establishing the third person 
had the motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to the 
crime charged.  Id. at 623, 624.16   
¶42 We have never addressed whether a criminal defendant 
may 
present 
a 
Denny 
defense 
implicating 
more 
than 
one 
alternative suspect.  Assuming, without deciding, that a 
criminal defendant may present a third-party perpetrator defense 
that implicates multiple alternative suspects, we turn to Mull's 
argument before us.17  Mull's postconviction counsel argues trial 
                                                 
16 See generally id, ¶¶62-72, for a detailed discussion of 
each 
requirement 
necessary 
to 
establishing 
"legitimate 
tendency."   
17 We have reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions where 
arguments 
regarding 
multiple 
alternative 
suspects 
were 
permitted.   
Often, a defendant was unable to present evidence regarding 
multiple alternative perpetrators merely because his proffered 
third-person perpetrator evidence did not pass the respective 
jurisdictional test for admissibility, not because of a per se 
rule prohibiting as much.  See generally Andrews v. United 
States, 179 A.3d 279, 294-95, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (defendant 
argued counsel was ineffective for not presenting third-party 
perpetrator 
defense 
regarding 
two 
alternative 
suspects; 
appellate court reviewed admissibility as to both and ultimately 
determined the evidence did not survive the jurisdiction's test 
for either person); United States v. Moore, 590 F. Supp. 3d 177, 
181-82 (D.D.C. 2022) (same); People v. Elmarr, 351 P.3d 431, 
¶¶5, 13 (Colo. 2015) (defendant proffered evidence of six 
alternative suspects in wife's homicide, which the circuit court 
held inadmissible; the court of appeals concluded that evidence 
of 
alternative 
suspects 
one 
and 
six 
were 
admissible); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2017) (accused's attempts to proffer evidence of two known 
alternative suspects deemed inadmissible because it did not meet 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
20 
 
counsel was deficient for failing to present a Denny defense 
that implicated one or more alternative suspects.  While we 
appreciate that is counsel's argument, what we review, however, 
is whether trial counsel's strategy to present a reasonable 
doubt defense was objectively reasonable. 
¶43 We begin with the circuit court's factual findings 
regarding Mull's trial counsel.  The circuit court found trial 
counsel credible and accepted his testimony at the Machner 
hearing.  The court also found that Mull was involved in the 
decision to pursue the reasonable doubt defense, and that 
preparing a Denny motion would have been difficult due to 
challenges in locating or interviewing individuals.   
¶44 Regarding a Denny defense that Smyth was the shooter, 
the circuit court found "it was difficult to locate witnesses 
who would have supported the defense."  The court found that 
Keshawna Wright, who identified Smyth as the shooter, had become 
uncooperative with authorities a few weeks after the shooting, 
and that the State showed numerous unsuccessful attempts to 
subpoena her.   
¶45 Mull's postconviction counsel argued a Denny defense 
implicating 
Bankhead 
could 
be 
premised 
on 
Jalyn 
Lynch's 
statement to police.  Lynch identified Bankhead as standing 
outside the door telling another individual to shoot through it.  
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdictional test of admissibility); State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 
445, 456 (Vt. 1998) (same, for two alternative suspects); Grady 
v. State, 197 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2008) (same, for three of four 
alternative suspects).   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
21 
 
The circuit court found "the only inference to be drawn from 
that is [Bankhead] is yelling that to somebody else," and was 
not the shooter.   
¶46 Regarding a Denny defense that Tyler Harris was the 
shooter, the circuit court made two findings.  First, that Smyth 
did not testify during Mull's trial that Tyler Harris told Smyth 
he "emptied his clip" because the State objected to the 
statement as hearsay, which objection was sustained.18  Secondly, 
the court noted Channel Howard identified Tyler Harris in a 
photo array as "in possession of a gun at [the] party."  Despite 
Howard's identification of Tyler Harris by his nickname, 
demonstrating she knew him, she did not identify him as the 
shooter.   
¶47 Our review of the record supports the circuit court's 
findings related to a Denny defense implicating Smyth, Bankhead, 
and/or Tyler Harris.  Accordingly, because the circuit court's 
findings are not clearly erroneous, we accept them.  State v. 
Tourville, 2016 WI 17, ¶16, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735.   
¶48 After accepting the circuit court's factual findings 
as not clearly erroneous, we independently determine whether 
trial counsel's decision to present a reasonable doubt defense 
                                                 
18 Mull's postconviction counsel contends trial counsel 
could have used Tyler Harris's statements at trial as admissible 
statements of an unavailable declarant pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.045.  We do not address this argument because we review 
whether counsel's defense strategy was objectively reasonable, 
not whether it was legally possible to present a different 
defense.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
22 
 
was objectively reasonable and therefore, not deficient.  We 
accordingly examine the record to assess whether trial counsel's 
decision falls within the "objectively reasonable range" we 
discussed in Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶19.  We do so "as if we 
were encountering [the circumstances] just as trial counsel did, 
making every effort to ensure our knowledge of the present does 
not affect how we assess what was known to him at the time."  
Id., ¶22.  We agree with Mull's counsel's statement at oral 
argument that we "have to look at counsel's reasoning process.  
It is not sufficient to just take his explanations at face 
value."  In determining whether trial counsel's performance was 
objectively reasonable, we do not rely on a "blanket policy of 
deference."  E.g., Coleman, 362 Wis. 2d 447, ¶20. 
¶49 After reviewing the investigatory materials available 
to trial counsel at the time he decided on Mull's defense, we 
agree with trial counsel's summary at the Machner hearing:  
[T]here 
was 
a 
lot 
of 
other 
people 
[] 
giving 
conflicting 
statements 
as 
to 
who 
the 
shooter 
was . . . other 
people 
with 
guns 
in 
the 
party . . . other people who were shooting outside 
after the incident.   
Different people had identified other shooters, 
[] there were different descriptions of outfits given 
by various people.   
. . . . 
When you got multiple people with guns, multiple 
people giving bad descriptions especially considering 
a lot of them had been smoking marijuana or drinking, 
it 
goes 
to 
their 
ability 
to 
perceive 
and 
recall . . . .   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
23 
 
The record demonstrates Mull's representation was reassigned to 
new trial counsel seven months after the shooting.  Combining 
all of those facts with the lapse of time since witnesses gave 
strikingly 
inconsistent 
statements, 
we 
recognize 
the 
circumstances trial counsel faced.  Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶19.  
We conclude that trial counsel's trial strategy to cast doubt on 
the State's case against Mull was not outside an objectively 
reasonable range of performance.  State v. Kimbrough, 2001 WI 
App 138, ¶31, 246 Wis. 2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752.  That a different 
trial strategy may look better in hindsight does not render a 
reasonable strategy deficient performance.  Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 
at 502.   
¶50 The court of appeals (Mull II) failed to review 
whether trial counsel's decision to pursue a reasonable doubt 
defense was objectively reasonable.  Instead, it determined a 
third-party perpetrator defense was preferable to the defense 
trial counsel presented.  The court of appeals stated:  
[I]n pursuing the reasonable doubt defense, trial 
counsel 
merely 
highlighted 
the 
discrepancies 
and 
inconsistences 
in 
the 
witness 
accounts 
without 
providing an alternative theory to explain those 
discrepancies.  A decision to present a third-party 
perpetrator defense would have turned an argument that 
the witnesses gave conflicting descriptions of what 
Mull was wearing and what Mull was doing into a 
defense that it was someone other than Mull who was 
firing shots at the bedroom door. 
Mull II, No. 2020AP1362-CR, ¶38.  However, the court of appeals 
did not "make 'every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
24 
 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time.'"  Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 
431, ¶65 (quoting State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶36, 337 Wis. 2d 
268, 805 N.W.2d 364).  Trial counsel was not obligated to make 
sense of the State's case or to "explain the discrepancies" in 
the State's evidence against Mull.19   
¶51 Rather, we review whether trial counsel's reasonable 
doubt defense strategy was objectively reasonable based on the 
totality of circumstances at the time counsel made the defense 
decision.  Brietzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶65.  We conclude that 
drawing attention to discrepancies in the State's case through 
vigorous cross-examination of witnesses who appeared was an 
objectively reasonable trial strategy under the circumstances 
trial counsel faced.   
¶52 Mull also argues trial counsel's investigation into 
witness statements was insufficient, and therefore deficient.  
"In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation 
[] a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence 
already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence 
would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further."  
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003).  Trial counsel 
reviewed more than 140 pages of witness statements provided to 
                                                 
19 See Wis. JI——Criminal 140 ("Defendants are not required 
to prove their innocence . . . .  The burden of establishing 
every 
fact 
necessary 
to 
constitute 
guilt 
is 
upon 
the 
State . . . .  If [the jury] can reconcile the evidence upon any 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence, 
[the jury] should do so and return a verdict of not guilty."). 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
25 
 
investigators, and the statements varied significantly.  An 
attorney's decision to refrain from investigating inconsistent 
witness statements further may be reasonable if he believed the 
statements differed enough to cast reasonable doubt on the 
State's case against his client.  Given the facts of this case, 
trial counsel's decision to refrain from expending resources on 
further investigation compared to preparing a reasonable doubt 
defense was objectively reasonable.   
¶53 Because 
Mull's 
trial 
attorney 
did 
not 
perform 
deficiently, we need not address whether trial counsel's 
performance prejudiced Mull at his trial.  Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 
273, ¶20 ("The court need not address [the prejudice] prong if 
the petitioner fails to satisfy the [deficient performance] 
prong.").  
2.  Pugh's Testimony 
¶54 The State appeals the court of appeals' (Mull II) 
determination that trial counsel was ineffective in handling 
Pugh's testimony.  Specifically, the court of appeals (Mull I) 
stated Mull was entitled to a Machner hearing on the allegation 
"that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
strike or for a mistrial following Cheyenne Pugh's statement on 
cross-examination to the effect that Mull had bragged about 
shooting [Ms. Walker]."  Mull I, No. 2018AP1349-CR, ¶49.  That 
is what the Machner hearing addressed, what the circuit court 
reviewed in determining that Mull received effective assistance, 
and what we must review on appeal.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
26 
 
¶55 Mull asks us to conclude that his attorney's failure 
to address Pugh's statement that she received a message stating 
Mull bragged about killing the "stud bitch" was "objectively 
unreasonable" as a matter of law.  Mull argues it casts him as 
confessing, boasting about killing, and using a disparaging term 
to describe the victim.   
¶56 We begin our review with the circuit court's order on 
Mull's postconviction motion; we accept the court's factual 
findings as true, unless clearly erroneous, and we independently 
decide whether the facts amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Kimbrough, 246 Wis. 2d 648, ¶27.  We do so because a 
trial court is "free to accept or reject all or any portion of 
defense counsel's testimony as it deemed credible."  Id., ¶29.  
Factual findings include "the circumstances of the case and the 
counsel's conduct and strategy."  State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 
¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786.   
¶57 The circuit court found trial counsel to be credible 
based on his testimony and the record as a whole.  The circuit 
court also made two factual findings regarding trial counsel's 
strategy:  (1) that his strategy was to discredit Pugh and to 
attack the foundation of the electronic messages; and (2) that 
trial counsel did not want to draw the jury's attention to 
Pugh's statement.  See id., ¶38 (stating "counsel's conduct and 
strategy" are findings of fact).  We do not reverse these 
findings because they are not clearly erroneous after our review 
of the record.  Kimbrough, 246 Wis. 2d 648, ¶27.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
27 
 
¶58 In light of those findings, we independently review 
whether 
counsel's 
decision 
to 
discredit 
Pugh 
via 
cross-
examination and whether electing not to object or move to strike 
were 
outside 
the 
"wide 
range 
of 
reasonable 
professional 
assistance."  Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶19 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689).  We recognize:  
There are [] 'countless ways to provide effective 
assistance in any given case.  Even the best criminal 
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client 
in the same way.'  Rare are the situations in which 
the 'wide latitude counsel must have in making 
tactical decisions' will be limited to any one 
technique or approach.   
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011) (internal 
citations omitted).  We must make "every effort to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, to evaluate 
the conduct from counsel's perspective and at the time."  
Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶36.  We next turn to the record to 
determine the circumstances trial counsel faced. 
¶59 On direct examination, the prosecution attempted to 
introduce screenshots of messages between witness Cheyenne Pugh 
and a person she knew only online by the name of Sack Casher.  
Defense counsel objected for lack of foundation.  He was 
overruled.  Pugh testified she did not really know who Sack 
Casher was.  Shortly after, Pugh read a message from that same 
unknown sender while testifying.  Trial counsel objected to the 
statement as hearsay and was overruled.  The prosecutor asserted 
the statement was offered to "explain further [officers'] 
investigation," and the court instructed the jury the statement 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
28 
 
was offered to demonstrate "merely that there's a statement that 
this witness received."  The court further explored trial 
counsel's initial objection based on foundation, and overruled 
it again.  In overruling trial counsel's objection, the court 
told trial counsel he could "cross-examine regarding the 
source."  Not long after, trial counsel maintained his objection 
based on foundation to admitting documentation of Pugh's 
conversation with Casher.  He was overruled again.  Pugh 
testified Kia Wade sent her a photo, "[a]nd after [Wade] sent me 
the picture, she told – she wrote comments that he was in the 
hood bragging about it."  The prosecutor clarified whether that 
was "all just rumor," to which Pugh replied "yes."  
¶60 While cross-examining Pugh, trial counsel asked Pugh a 
series of questions about the origin of the photos she received 
implicating Smyth and Mull.  Trial counsel elicited that Pugh 
did not know the person who sent her Smyth's photo.  Pugh 
testified about the likely meaning of one of Casher's messages, 
"I 
guess 
[Smyth] 
and 
the 
young 
gentlemen . . . had 
an 
altercation.  And I guess [Casher] was trying to say after that 
fight that's when I guess he shot through the door but he didn't 
know that it was Erika."   
¶61 These are the circumstances trial counsel faced, and 
what we must review relevant to his decisions regarding cross-
examination of Pugh.  Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶22.  The jury 
already heard the statement that "he was in the hood bragging 
about it" was a rumor.  Pugh's statement came out while trial 
counsel probed why a mysterious sender she knew only online 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
29 
 
blocked her immediately after providing accusatory information.  
This is consistent with his trial strategy to attack the 
foundation of Pugh's information.  Trial counsel had already 
objected 
and 
been 
overruled 
three 
times 
during 
Pugh's  
testimony——four if we consider the court's return to trial 
counsel's initial objection.   
¶62 We recognize this is a close call.  Applying the 
"strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance," we cannot say that 
counsel's strategy not to move to strike or move for a mistrial 
was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances he faced.  
Id., ¶19 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  Accordingly, 
trial counsel's performance was not deficient.  Even those 
decisions that appear "unwise in hindsight, will not constitute 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
so 
long 
as 
they 
are 
'reasonably founded on the facts and law under the circumstances 
existing at the time the decision was made.'"  State v. Smith, 
2016 WI App 8, ¶14, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610. 
¶63 Although Mull accurately argues that discrediting a 
witness and moving to strike "otherwise inflammatory and 
prejudicial material" are not "mutually exclusive" strategies, 
that is not what we review.  Rather, we review whether counsel's 
defense strategies were deficient as a matter of law and 
prejudicial to the defendant.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  
Mull must demonstrate that trial counsel's decision to refrain 
from moving to strike or for a mistrial was either irrational or 
based on caprice in order to overcome the strong presumption 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
30 
 
that his trial counsel's strategy was reasonable.  Breitzman, 
378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶65.  Mull has not done so. 
¶64 Because we conclude trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently, we do not review prejudice to Mull.  We conclude 
Mull had the necessary assistance to justify reliance on the 
jury's verdict.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
C.  The Interest of Justice 
¶65 In postconviction motions, Mull raised the interest of 
justice as a basis for a new trial.  The court of appeals did 
not consider this issue, but both the State and Mull ask us to 
review his request. 
¶66 An appellate court grants a new trial "(1) whenever 
the real controversy has not been fully tried; or (2) whenever 
it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."  
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 159-60, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).   
¶67 Under the first scenario, we have said the real 
controversy has not been fully tried in two situations.  First, 
when "the jury was erroneously not given the opportunity to hear 
important testimony that bore on an important issue of the 
case."  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶81, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 
N.W.2d 350.  Second, when "the jury had before it evidence not 
properly admitted which so clouded a crucial issue that it may 
be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried."20  
State v. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, ¶31, 370 Wis. 2d 661, 885 
                                                 
20 Mull does not argue that the circuit court had improperly 
admitted evidence that clouded a crucial issue.   
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
31 
 
N.W.2d 611.  Under this first category of cases, an appellate 
court need not make a determination that the "outcome would be 
different on retrial."  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 456 
N.W.2d 797 (1990).   
¶68 By contrast, when a claim is made of "a miscarriage of 
justice," an appellate court must conclude that there is a 
"substantial probability of a different result on retrial," 
before granting a new trial.  Id.; Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶81; 
State v. Zdzieblowski, 2014 WI App 130, ¶24, 359 Wis. 2d 102, 
857 N.W.2d 622.  We address each issue in turn.  
¶69 Mull argues the real controversy was not fully tried 
because "[i]mportant evidence was left out of the trial."  Mull 
identifies four categories of evidence that the jury was not 
given the opportunity to weigh.  First, evidence connecting 
Smyth and his friends to the shooting, and second, evidence 
directly implicating Smyth or one of his friends.  These two 
categories 
of 
evidence 
amount 
to 
third-party 
perpetrator 
evidence, which merely repackage Mull's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims.  We will not address these points further, as 
we addressed them above.  See State v. Goetsch, 186 Wis. 2d 1, 
23, 519 N.W.2d 634 (1994) (Arguments for a new trial in the 
interest of justice may fail if they simply rehash rejected 
arguments regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel.).   
¶70 Mull next asserts the jury erroneously was not given 
the opportunity to hear "other evidence tending to exonerate 
Mr. Mull," but the evidence he identifies focuses on four 
witnesses discussed earlier.  Keshawna Wright and Elicia Burrows 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
32 
 
could not be located.  While it is true that Charles Cantrell 
did not identify Mull in a photo array, he also told 
investigators he "only heard the gun shots but didn't see the 
shooter."  Lastly, Jalyn Lynch's statement to officers that he 
"didn't remember seeing [Mull] at the party," was based on a 
"single [Facebook] photo," that police had obtained from Pugh 
and showed Lynch.   
¶71 Finally, Mull argues the jury erroneously was denied 
the opportunity to hear "evidence tending to call into question 
Smyth's credibility and believability."  We disagree.  The jury 
heard that Smyth's answers were often noncommittal and that 
Smyth became "agitated with this shit" referring to the 
prosecutor's and defense counsel's questioning.  The jury also 
heard that Smyth and his friends had been involved in the fight, 
Smyth was inside the house at the time shots were fired, Smyth 
"[thought]" he had seen Tyler Harris with a gun in the living 
room, Smyth had a prior criminal record, had been on probation, 
was right-handed, and was originally arrested for Ms. Walker's 
homicide.  The jury heard other witnesses discuss the initial 
stages of the investigation, which focused on Smyth.  While Mull 
now identifies other ways Smyth's credibility could have been 
attacked while testifying, the jury had ample opportunity to 
weigh Smyth's credibility and believability.  Lastly, we note 
that whether Smyth was a credible or believable witness was not 
the "real controversy" of the trial we must review when 
considering whether to grant a new trial.  Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 
407, ¶39. 
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
33 
 
¶72 Rather, the real controversy of the trial was whether 
Mull was the person who shot through the door and killed 
Ms. Walker.  During closing argument the prosecutor stated, "The 
big question is identity. . . .  Is Mr. Mull the shooter or is 
the wrong person on trial?"  Mull's attorney reiterated "the 
State is right, this is an issue of identification."   
¶73 The jury had the opportunity to hear and consider a 
plethora of expected and unanticipated evidence over the course 
of the four-day trial.  Butler recanted his identification of 
Mull as the shooter while on the stand.  Hubbard, the person to 
whom Mull reportedly said, "I shot through the door," stated 
that a detective "basically like bribed me here" to testify.  
Witnesses testified about the shooter's clothing, which was not 
consistent with what witnesses claimed Mull wore that evening.  
Detectives testified regarding the photo array process and that 
they did not attempt to "conduct a photo array of the people who 
had guns" as identified by Smyth.   
¶74 The jury was given the opportunity to hear evidence 
that bore on the central issue of the case before the jury——
whether Mull was the shooter or an innocent man.  Henley, 328 
Wis. 2d 544, ¶81.  That was the real controversy.21  Based on the 
                                                 
21 Contrary to what may have seemed desirable to Mull, the 
prosecutor could not charge four people with Ms. Walker's death 
and put them on trial together for the jury to determine who was 
the shooter.  Other jurisdictions have rightfully failed to 
condone "[t]his gladiator-style trial."  People v. Gutierrez, 
499 P.3d 367, ¶40 (Colo. App. 2021).  "Under our system society 
carries 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
its 
charge 
against 
the 
accused . . . .  It must establish its case . . . by evidence 
independently secured through skillful investigation . . . ."  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
34 
 
evidence presented at trial, we conclude that Mull has "not 
demonstrated 
this 
is 
an 
exceptional 
case 
requiring 
our 
discretionary grant of a new trial because we are satisfied that 
the real controversy has been fully tried."  Cameron, 370 
Wis. 2d 661, ¶32.  
¶75 Mull asks for a new trial on the grounds that his 
first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  However, 
Mull's lone paragraph in his brief does little to convince us 
that a substantial probability of a different outcome awaits him 
in a new trial.  Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶81.  Instead, Mull 
rehashes his prior arguments:  that the jury did not hear 
"important evidence to the determination of [Mull's] guilt," and 
that Mull lacked a meaningful defense.  We have already 
addressed these arguments.  Mull also argues that Pugh's hearsay 
testimony was improperly admitted.  Without deciding the issue, 
we note that even if we assume Pugh's testimony were improperly 
admitted, it would not warrant the extraordinary remedy Mull 
seeks.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise our exceptional 
power to grant a new trial in the interest of justice.  
Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶76 We conclude that Mull's counsel at trial did not 
perform deficiently.  Because we make this determination, we 
need not assess whether counsel's performance prejudiced the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Watts v. State of Ind., 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).  Our system 
demands "[t]he requirement of specific charges, their proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ."  Id.  
No. 
2020AP1362-CR   
 
35 
 
defense.  Lastly, we decline Mull's request to grant him a new 
trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was 
fully tried below and it is not probable that justice has 
miscarried for any reason.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶77 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  When we 
evaluate whether an attorney's performance was constitutionally 
ineffective, we must defer to trial counsel's objectively 
reasonable strategic decisions.  See State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 
100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93.  But for that 
deference to apply, counsel's decisions must be the result of 
reasoned 
strategic 
judgment 
rather 
than 
a  
mere "post hoc rationalization" for counsel's conduct.  Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 (2003).    
¶78 In this case, Jovan Mull alleges two "strategic" 
decisions made by counsel at his first-degree reckless homicide 
trial were ineffective:  (1) Relying on a run-of-the-mill 
reasonable doubt defense when a far more compelling third-party 
perpetrator (Denny1) defense was possible based on the ample 
evidence that someone other than Mull committed the crime; and 
(2) not challenging the admission of Mull's alleged hearsay 
confession and then eliciting further details about it.  
¶79 I reluctantly agree with the majority that, in light 
of the circuit court's factual findings, counsel's decision to 
pursue a reasonable doubt defense was objectively reasonable.  
See majority op., ¶51.  The same cannot be said, however, of 
counsel's decisions regarding Mull's alleged hearsay confession.   
Because I conclude that counsel's performance on that score was 
deficient and prejudicial, I respectfully dissent.    
                                                 
1 See State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (setting forth various requirements for defendants 
who assert that a third party is responsible for the alleged 
crime).   
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
I 
¶80 Mull, Vashawn Smyth,2 Menjuan Bankhead, and Tyler 
Harris all attended a party at Ericka Walker's house.  A huge 
brawl erupted after Smyth and another partygoer, Davion Crumble 
bumped into each other.  Walker attempted to intervene and 
pulled Crumble into a bedroom adjacent to the main living room.  
Someone then fired through the bedroom door, killing Walker.     
¶81 More than twenty-five partygoers gave the police 
conflicting statements about what happened.  They described 
anywhere between two and eight people standing near the bedroom 
door at the time of the shooting.  And their descriptions of the 
shooter varied widely.  Witnesses described the shooter as 
wearing a red sweatshirt, a blue sweatshirt, a red and black 
hoodie, or a white t-shirt with blue jeans. Various eyewitness 
accounts place Smyth, Bankhead, and Harris in front of the door 
to the bedroom, two of them armed, with Bankhead shouting 
"[s]hoot through that motherfucker."  The police initially 
focused their attention on Smyth, who one witness identified as 
the shooter with "absolute[] certain[ty]."  But after Walker's 
former 
girlfriend, 
Cheyenne 
Pugh, 
showed 
police 
Facebook 
messages which said that Mull was the shooter, they turned their 
attention to him.  The State eventually charged Mull with first-
degree reckless homicide.   
                                                 
2 The record contains numerous alternate spellings for the 
names of those involved.  Both the majority and I use the 
spellings used at trial for those who testified and the 
spellings that appear most commonly in the record for those that 
did not.  See majority op., ¶7 n.3.   
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
¶82 Given the inconsistent eyewitness accounts and strong 
evidence pointing to multiple other possible shooters,3 any 
reasonable trial counsel should have at least considered 
mounting a third-party perpetrator defense.  See Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d at 624 (requiring evidence demonstrating a third party's 
motive, opportunity, and direct connection to the crime in order 
to assert such a defense).  After all, when it's available, a 
third-party perpetrator defense is much more compelling than 
attacking the sufficiency of the State's evidence through a mere 
reasonable doubt defense.  That is because a third-party 
perpetrator 
defense 
seeks 
affirmatively 
to 
disprove 
the 
defendant's guilt, and therefore answers the question left open 
by any reasonable doubt defense:  if not the defendant, then who 
committed the crime?  Indeed, research shows that "jurors tend 
to base decisions on the presentation of a persuasive story, the 
strength of which is judged in part on the completeness of key 
story elements."4  Thus, all else being equal, it's better to 
point to a third-party who had the motive, opportunity and a 
direct connection to the crime than simply to poke holes in the 
State's case.  
                                                 
3 The majority assumes without deciding that a third-party 
perpetrator 
defense 
can 
point 
to 
"multiple 
alternative 
suspects," rather than just one.  Majority op., ¶42.  I see no 
reason why Mull or any other defendant asserting a third-party 
perpetrator defense should be limited to just one alternative 
suspect if, as here, multiple people are directly connected to 
the crime and had both the motive and opportunity to commit it.  
See Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 624.   
4 David S. Schwartz and Chelsey B. Metcalf, Disfavored 
Treatment of Third-Party Guilt Evidence, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 337, 
341 (2016). 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
¶83 Yet Mull's attorney mounted a reasonable doubt defense 
at trial anyway.  He did not call any witnesses, and instead 
relied on cross-examination of the State's witnesses in an 
attempt to establish reasonable doubt that Mull was the shooter.  
That effort failed, and Mull was convicted.   
¶84 Mull filed a post-conviction motion alleging that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a third-
party perpetrator defense.  At the Machner5 hearing, counsel 
testified that although he considered it, he did not pursue a 
third-party perpetrator defense "because it was difficult to 
locate witnesses who would support that defense."  There are 
good 
reasons, 
however, 
to 
doubt 
whether 
counsel 
or 
his 
investigator made any effort whatsoever to reach key witnesses 
who would have supported a third-party perpetrator defense.  
When pressed for specifics, counsel's refrain was that he didn't 
remember or didn't have his files.  For example, counsel 
couldn't remember whether he tried to locate Keshawna Wright, 
who identified Smyth——not Mull——as the shooter in a police photo 
array 
with 
"absolute[] 
certain[ty]." 
 
Similarly, 
counsel 
couldn't recall any specific efforts he made to locate Jalyn 
Lynch, who saw Bankhead holding a handgun while trying to get 
into the bedroom, and heard him yell "shoot, shoot."  And 
despite his suggestion that his investigator might know more, as 
it turns out, she didn't have a file or notes either.  Nor did 
she remember anything about any witnesses in the case or even if 
she tried to contact or interview anyone.   
                                                 
5 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
¶85 Despite counsel's inability to remember much, if 
anything, about the efforts made to identify or locate witnesses 
to support a third-party perpetrator defense, the circuit court 
nevertheless "found him to be credible as to what he could 
remember and the things that he said."  Thus, the circuit court 
"accept[ed] his testimony as it was stated at the [Machner] 
hearing" that he decided to forego a third-party perpetrator 
defense "in consultation with Mr. Mull and . . . based upon the 
difficulty in locating and identifying witnesses."6  Accordingly, 
the circuit court concluded that counsel's decision to pursue a 
reasonable doubt defense was an objectively reasonable strategic 
decision and denied Mull's post-conviction motion.    
¶86 In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel we must accept the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 
¶13, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95.  And as credulous as the 
circuit court's findings are, I cannot say they are clearly 
erroneous.  Because the circuit court found that counsel tried 
and failed to locate witnesses to support a third-party 
                                                 
6 Even if we accept trial counsel's assertion that his 
decision to forego a third-party perpetrator defense was based 
on the difficulty locating witnesses, it nevertheless appears 
that counsel might have been able to assert such a defense with 
respect to Smyth, who testified at trial.  In order for that 
defense to have been compelling, however, counsel would have 
needed admissible evidence of Wright's statement to the police 
that she was "absolutely certain" that Smyth was the shooter.  
But as the circuit court concluded, counsel was unable to locate 
Wright, and without her appearing at trial, the police report 
containing her statement identifying Smyth would have been 
inadmissible. 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
perpetrator defense, counsel's decision to pursue a reasonable 
doubt defense was objectively reasonable, and his performance in 
that regard was therefore not deficient.  See id., ¶19.    
II 
¶87 Counsel's decision to pursue a reasonable doubt 
defense may have been within the bounds of reasonableness, but 
the same cannot be said of his decisions regarding Mull's 
alleged hearsay confession.7  In concluding otherwise, the 
majority relies on an incomplete picture of the facts and 
overemphasizes the presumption that counsel's actions were 
reasonable.  
 
¶88 The majority's analysis gets off on the wrong foot 
with an attempt to "reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
challenged conduct."  Majority op., ¶58.  It tries to show that 
counsel's failure to object to Pugh's testimony about Mull's 
                                                 
7 Mull's postconviction motion alleged that counsel was 
ineffective because he "fail[ed] to object to impermissible and 
unreliable hearsay testimony . . . that Mr. Mull was the shooter 
[and] . . . continu[ed] to elicit hearsay testimony of this 
nature 
during 
his 
cross-examination . . . without 
ever 
moving . . . to have the offending answer stricken." 
The circuit court denied that motion without a hearing. 
Mull appealed and the court of appeals reversed in part, 
concluding that Mull was entitled to a Machner hearing only on 
his claims that counsel was ineffective for "failing to move to 
strike or for a mistrial following hearsay testimony elicited on 
cross-examination." 
 
State 
v. 
Mull, 
No. 
2018AP1349-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2019).  The 
problem with the court of appeals' narrow framing is that the 
failure to move to strike or for a mistrial is inseparable from 
the rest of counsel's decisions regarding Mull's alleged hearsay 
confession.  Accordingly, I analyze all of those decisions 
together.  
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
alleged hearsay confession was reasonable because "[t]rial 
counsel had already objected and been overruled three times 
during Pugh's testimony."  Id., ¶61.  The implication is that it 
would have been futile for counsel to object again when Pugh 
testified about an alleged hearsay confession by Mull.  See id., 
¶59.  Based on this retelling, the majority concludes that 
counsel's 
strategy 
was 
objectively 
reasonable 
"under 
the 
circumstances he faced."  Id., ¶62.  
 
¶89 But the "circumstances he faced" demonstrate just the 
opposite.  Read in full, the transcript instead shows that 
counsel's prior objections were on substantially different 
grounds to a different line of questioning about a different 
exhibit that identified a different person as the shooter.  At 
trial, the State called Pugh, who did not attend the party, to 
testify about Facebook messages she received from a person named 
Sack Casher, regarding the identity of the shooter.  Screenshots 
of these messages appeared in exhibit 44.  Counsel first 
objected to exhibit 44 based on foundation, but the circuit 
court did not rule immediately.  When later given a chance to 
elaborate, counsel questioned the screenshot's authenticity and 
asked for the "http address" of the original message thread.  
The circuit court then overruled this objection to exhibit 44's 
foundation, noting that counsel could "cross-examine regarding 
the source."  Bizarrely, counsel's only hearsay objection was to 
one of the screenshots in exhibit 44 in which Casher said that 
Smyth——not Mull——was the shooter.  That objection was overruled 
on the grounds that the screenshot was not offered for the truth 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
of the matter asserted but instead to show why the investigation 
initially focused on Smyth.  When exhibit 44 was eventually 
offered into evidence, counsel reiterated his earlier objection 
to the foundation and authenticity of the exhibit and was 
overruled.    
¶90  None of these objections related to exhibit 40, the 
photo of Mull that Kia Wade——not Sack Casher——sent to Pugh.  It 
was in an exchange about that exhibit that Pugh first described 
an alleged hearsay confession by Mull, stating that "after 
[Wade] sent me the picture, she told –- she wrote comments that 
[Mull] was in the hood bragging about [the shooting]."  Counsel 
made no objection to that testimony.  In fact, counsel made no 
objections at all to any of Pugh's testimony about Mull.  Given 
the full context, there is no reason to assume, as the majority 
does, that it would have been futile for counsel to object to 
Pugh's testimony about exhibit 40 because he "had already 
objected and been overruled."  Majority op., ¶61.   
¶91 To establish deficient performance, a petitioner "must 
show that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'"  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 
86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688 (1984)).  
Once we take 
into account the important 
distinction between counsel's objections to exhibit 44 and 
Pugh's 
hearsay 
testimony 
regarding 
exhibit 
40, 
counsel's 
deficiencies become clear.  Most obviously, counsel should have 
objected to Pugh's inflammatory testimony about Mull's alleged 
hearsay confession.  And such an objection, had it been made, 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
should have been sustained.  That is because Pugh's statements 
that 
Mull 
bragged 
about 
committing 
the 
homicide 
were 
quintessential hearsay:  Pugh was relaying an out-of-court 
statement by Kia Wade for the truth of the matter asserted, 
namely that Mull was bragging about killing Walker.8  See Wis. 
Stat. § 908.01(3).  Counsel then compounded that error by asking 
Pugh during cross-examination for details about the alleged 
confession.  That led Pugh to reiterate and expand upon the 
hearsay testimony, stating that "another lady was telling me 
about [Mull] . . . being in the hood bragging about it saying 
that he hit a lick over there on 35th and he killed the stud 
bitch."  Finally, rather than move to strike the alleged hearsay 
confession, counsel appeared to give credence to it by asking 
the witness what Mull would have meant by the term "stud bitch," 
which Pugh said was a reference to "a female who dresses like a 
guy."  For these reasons, counsel's actions in this regard did 
not simply "deviate[] from best practices."  Richter, 562 U.S. 
at 
105. 
 
Instead, 
they 
"amounted 
to 
incompetence 
under 
'prevailing professional norms.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690).   
 
                                                 
8 The circuit court ruled that the Facebook messages in 
exhibit 44 pointing to Smyth as the shooter could not be used 
for their truth but could be used to explain how the police 
investigation unfolded.  Whatever the merits of that ruling, the 
same exception to the hearsay rule couldn't apply to Mull's 
alleged confession as "the dangers of prejudice" clearly 
outweigh its probative value.  Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 
1046 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Benitez-Avila, 
570 F.3d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 2009)("A prosecutor cannot justify 
the receipt of prejudicial, inadmissible evidence simply by 
calling it 'background' or 'context' evidence.").  
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
¶92 In reaching its contrary conclusion, the majority 
treats the "strong presumption" that counsel's conduct was 
reasonable as conclusive of the question before us.  See 
majority op., ¶62.  But the strong presumption that "the 
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy'" is 
not definitive.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  We must still analyze 
counsel's actions and decide whether they were, in fact, 
reasonable.  See State v. Hicks, 195 Wis. 2d 620, 629, 536 
N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 549 N.W.2d 
435 (1996).  The majority sets forth a lengthy account of what 
happened at trial but engages in virtually no analysis of why 
counsel's actions were not deficient.   
¶93 At best, the majority falls back on counsel's supposed 
strategic reasons for his actions:  that he chose to discredit 
Pugh's testimony through cross-examination and wanted to avoid 
drawing attention to it by objecting.  But these reasons don't 
excuse his deficient performance either.  For starters, defense 
counsel's goal is always to discredit the State's witnesses.  
But that cannot mean that an attorney can ignore obvious, highly 
inflammatory 
hearsay 
because 
his 
"trial 
strategy" 
is 
to 
discredit the witness later.  In any event, objecting to Pugh's 
testimony would have furthered, not undermined, his purported 
strategy of discrediting her.  And besides, counsel undermined 
his own alleged strategic goal of diverting the jury's attention 
away from these statements when he asked Pugh to elaborate on 
the alleged confession during cross-examination and to define 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
"stud bitch."  Indeed, by doing so, counsel gave credence to the 
alleged hearsay confession by treating it as if it actually 
occurred. 
 
Accordingly, 
counsel's 
purported 
"strategic 
decisions" appear to be nothing more than a "post hoc 
rationalization" for his clearly deficient performance, thus 
satisfying the first prong of Strickland.  See Wiggins, 539 U.S. 
at 526.   
¶94 As for the second prong, I conclude that counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced Mull.  Confessions are "the 
most compelling possible evidence of guilt,"  Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966), and have such a "profound 
impact on the jury, . . . that we may justifiably doubt its 
ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so."  Arizona 
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991).  And as explained 
previously, the admissible evidence of Mull's guilt was far from 
overwhelming.  There were numerous conflicting eyewitness 
accounts, many of which pointed to other perpetrators.  In that 
context, inflammatory testimony that the defendant was bragging 
about killing the "stud bitch" could easily have tipped the 
balance.  See Wiggins 539 U.S. at 534 ("In assessing prejudice, 
we reweigh the evidence."); English v. Romanowski, 602 F.3d 714, 
730 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that "the lack of overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, combined with the negative consequences of 
defense counsel's [deficient performance], sufficiently creates 
a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have 
struck a different balance.").  Accordingly, I conclude that 
counsel's 
actions 
with 
regard 
to 
Mull's 
alleged 
hearsay 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
12 
 
confession "undermine confidence in the outcome," and were 
therefore prejudicial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
¶95 Because Mull received ineffective assistance when his 
counsel failed to challenge the admission of an alleged hearsay 
confession and then elicited further details about it, I 
respectfully dissent.  
 
No.  2020AP1362-CR.rfd 
 
1