Title: Com. v. Hubbard

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

485 Pa. 353 (1979) 402 A.2d 999 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Kim Lee HUBBARD, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 19, 1979. Decided July 5, 1979. *354 Peter T. Campana, Campana & Campana, Williamsport, for appellant. Robert F. Banks, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., Williamsport, for appellee. *355 Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. LARSEN, Justice. In February of 1974, a jury found appellant guilty of murder of the second degree. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to ten to twenty years imprisonment. On direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977) (hereinafter Hubbard I), appellant contended, inter alia, that post-trial counsel[1] was ineffective because in the post-verdict motions he failed to raise the issue of trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to object to certain allegedly prejudicial comments made by the district attorney during summation.[2] After finding this contention to be of arguable merit, this Court *356 vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing stating: Following the evidentiary hearing at which both post-trial counsel and trial counsel testified, the lower court held that post-trial counsel rendered effective assistance to appellant, and therefore reinstated the judgment of sentence. Appellant now appeals from that order of the lower court. This Court held in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604-05, 235 A.2d 349, 352-3 (1967) that: An accurate summary of the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing appears in the trial court's opinion (pp. 2-3) as follows: We have reviewed the trial transcript and it establishes that trial counsel presented a well prepared and vigorous defense, and that trial counsel's failure to object to the *358 comments in question (Footnote 2, supra) was born of a reasonable, calculated, and apparently successful trial strategy.[3] Moreover, the post-verdict motions filed by post-trial counsel reflect thorough and untiring preparation. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence which would indicate that post-trial counsel's failure to raise the issue of trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness was the product of "sloth or lack of awareness of the available alternatives." Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975). We do not condone the remarks of the prosecutor in this case. However, after reviewing the entire record in this case we are convinced that the lower court properly concluded that post-trial counsel was effective. Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County reinstating the judgment of sentence is hereby affirmed. ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion. MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting. I must dissent. There was no reasonable basis for trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecution's prejudicial and inflammatory remarks about appellant's credibility. The prosecution referred to appellant's version of the facts as a "lie" which "kept getting bigger and bigger." There is no question that it is improper for the prosecutor to express a personal opinion about a defendant's guilt or credibility. See Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 477 Pa. 461, 384 A.2d 1179 (1978). This Court has said: Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 286-7, 285 A.2d 492, 493 (1971). We have also said that: Commonwealth v. Gilman, supra, 470 Pa. at 189, 368 A.2d at 258. In this case, defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecution's remarks as to appellant's credibility constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel, and appellant is entitled to a new trial. ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 286, 372 A.2d 687, 700 (1977) (Roberts, J., joined by Manderino, J., dissenting), I remain of the view that a remand for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness of counsel was useless. "No `reasonable basis designed to effectuate' appellant's interests" has been, or indeed, could have been, presented which would justify either trial counsel's failure to object when the district attorney expressly and repeatedly branded appellant a liar, or post-verdict counsel's failure to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Id., 472 Pa. at 288, 372 A.2d at 700-701. This case should be remanded for a new trial, just as it should have been twenty-nine months ago. [1] Appellant was represented at trial by privately retained counsel (trial counsel). Trial counsel was succeeded by a public defender (post-trial counsel), who filed supplemental post-verdict motions. On direct appeal, appellant was represented by another public defender (appellate counsel). [2] The comments of the district attorney quoted below appear in Hubbard I: "Only two people know where the scratch marks [on Jennifer's neck] came from, Jennifer Hill, who is never going to testify, and the killer. So we will never be able to explain everything in this case, obviously, because one party to the explanation is dead and the other party is not telling the truth." (N.T., summation, 10-11). "And once you conclude it didn't happen in that cornfield, where did it occur? Only two people know, one of them is Jennifer Hill, she will never tell you, and the killer, and we can't prove where that killing took place, but what we do know is that the Defendant has consistently fabricated in this case. Does he know?" (N.T., summation, 16). "How about some of the other lies? The Defendant said he had never been in that cornfield in his life." (N.T., summation, 21). "Now, let's talk about a few other things. The Defendant said, `I lied to get a job.' He said that sort of proud. Would he lie if he murdered? Certainly." (N.T., summation, 22). "But he made a mistake of the tire prints and the foot markings, and once he started to lie to cover it up, they kept getting bigger and bigger and he kept getting enmeshed in his own lies." (N.T., summation, 27). [3] During trial counsel's summation, which lasted approximately eighty-five minutes, he directly challenged the credibility of key Commonwealth witnesses and attempted to downplay the inconsistent statements which appellant made to police prior to trial. At one point trial counsel commented as follows; "The State said he made some inconsistent statements. About what? About where he was at a certain time, whether he paid this bill first or that bill second. You know what I think that is, Ladies and Gentlemen? Baloney." (N.T., summation, 13).