Title: State ex rel. Deiter v. McGuire

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Deiter v. McGuire, 119 Ohio St.3d 384, 2008-Ohio-4536.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DEITER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MCGUIRE,  
CHIEF, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Deiter v. McGuire, 119 Ohio St.3d 384, 2008-Ohio-4536.] 
Municipal civil service—Quo warranto to oust police chief—Mandamus to 
compel civil service exam. 
(No. 2008-0720 ─ Submitted August 26, 2008 ─ Decided September 18, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Seneca County, No. 13-07-23. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ 
of quo warranto to oust a police chief and a writ of mandamus to compel a 
competitive promotional examination for police chief.  Because the court of 
appeals erred in dismissing the petition, we reverse the judgment and remand the 
cause for further proceedings. 
Competitive Promotional Examination for Police Chief 
{¶ 2} In 2004, appellee city of Fostoria, Ohio, terminated the 
employment of its police chief, Dennis Day.  Pursuant to R.C. 124.44, appellees 
Fostoria and the Fostoria Civil Service Commission conducted a competitive 
promotional examination for police chief.  Phil Hobbs and appellant James Deiter 
took the examination, and Hobbs was the only one who passed it. 
{¶ 3} The city and its civil service commission appointed Hobbs as 
acting police chief, but Hobbs declined their offer to be appointed to the vacant, 
full-time police chief position. 
Suspension of Competitive-Examination Requirement 
and Appointment of New Police Chief 
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{¶ 4} After Hobbs declined to be appointed the permanent police chief, 
the civil service commission suspended the competitive-examination requirement 
of R.C. 124.44 and adopted revised job criteria for the police chief position.  In 
February 2006, the city and civil service commission hired appellee John 
McGuire, who was not an employee of the city’s police department, as its chief of 
police. 
Association Suit for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
{¶ 5} Before the hiring of Police Chief McGuire, the Ohio Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association, which is the collective-bargaining representative for the 
officers of the Fostoria Police Department, filed an action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas.  The association 
requested that the civil service commission abide by R.C. 124.44 and conduct a 
competitive promotional examination to fill the vacant police chief position. 
{¶ 6} In January 2006, the common pleas court denied the association’s 
request for injunctive and declaratory relief.  The court held that a competitive 
examination for the existing officials was impracticable to fill the police chief 
position and that the position could best be filled by a “designated person of high 
and recognized attainments in qualities of scientific, managerial, professional or 
educational character,” which justified suspension of the competitive-examination 
requirements of R.C. 124.44 under R.C. 124.30. 
Appeal of Common Pleas Court Judgment 
{¶ 7} The association appealed the common pleas court’s judgment, and 
the Court of Appeals for Seneca County held that the civil service commission 
had not “demonstrated the exceptional circumstances necessary to justify a 
suspension of the competitive examination pursuant to R.C. 124.30.”  Ohio 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Fostoria Civ. Serv. Comm., Seneca App. No. 13-
06-03, 2006-Ohio-4193, ¶ 14.  The court of appeals held that the common pleas 
court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed the 
January Term, 2008 
3 
judgment, and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with its 
opinion.  Id.  We did not accept the city and the civil service commission’s appeal 
for review.  Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Fostoria Civ. Serv. Comm., 
112 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2007-Ohio-152, 860 N.E.2d 767. 
Common Pleas Court Decision on Remand 
{¶ 8} In May 2007, the common pleas court entered its judgment on 
remand.  The common pleas court held: 
{¶ 9} “1.  No authority presently exists for this Court to remove Fostoria 
Police Chief John McGuire. 
{¶ 10} “2.  The City of Fostoria and the City of Fostoria Civil Service 
Commission are not allowed to suspend the use of competitive examinations for 
filling vacancies in their police department as required by R.C. Section 124.44 
which occurred prior to January 1, 2007 unless new or additional facts have arisen 
since October 10, 2005 to allow the suspension of such requirements pursuant to 
R.C. Section 124.30. 
{¶ 11} “3.  If necessary, the Fostoria Civil Service commission shall 
conduct competitive examinations required by R.C. Section 124.44 for any 
vacancy in the Fostoria Police Department which vacancy occurred prior to 
January 1, 2007.” 
{¶ 12} In a subsequent meeting of the civil service commission, the 
association requested that the commission remove Police Chief McGuire from 
office and offer a competitive examination to the current police officers to fill the 
vacancy.  The commission refused the association’s request and decided that the 
common pleas court’s decision authorized the commission to do nothing and 
allow Police Chief McGuire to continue in his position. 
Petition for Writs of Quo Warranto and Mandamus 
{¶ 13} In July 2007, appellants, James Deiter, William Brenner, Clayton 
Moore, and Jeff Huffman, filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Seneca 
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County.  Appellants are employees of the Fostoria Police Department, with Deiter 
and Brenner at the rank of captain, Moore at the rank of sergeant, and Huffman at 
the rank of patrol officer.  They named appellees, Fostoria, Fostoria Civil Service 
Commission, and Police Chief McGuire as respondents.  Appellants sought a writ 
of quo warranto to oust McGuire from the office of Fostoria Chief of Police and a 
writ of mandamus to compel the city and its civil service commission to comply 
with R.C. 124.44 by offering the officers of the Fostoria Police Department as it 
existed on October 3, 2005, a competitive examination for promotion to police 
chief.  Appellees filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the petition for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  In their motion, they claimed 
that appellants lacked standing to bring their quo warranto claim and that their 
mandamus claim lacked merit because of the recently adopted Fostoria Charter. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals granted appellees’ motion and dismissed the 
petition. 
{¶ 15} This cause is now before the court on appellants’ appeal as of 
right. 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Standard 
{¶ 16} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in dismissing their 
petition for writs of quo warranto and mandamus for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, after all factual 
allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in 
appellants’ favor, it appears beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts 
entitling them to the requested extraordinary relief in quo warranto and 
mandamus.  Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-1443, 884 N.E.2d 
1067, ¶ 10; see also State ex rel. Weaver v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 116 Ohio 
St.3d 340, 2007-Ohio-6435, 879 N.E.2d 191, ¶ 8 (“Dismissals of mandamus 
actions based upon the existence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
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5 
law are appropriate as long as it appears beyond doubt that relator can prove no 
set of facts warranting relief”). 
{¶ 17} We must determine whether the court of appeals correctly held that 
appellants can prove no set of facts entitling them to the requested writs of quo 
warranto and mandamus.  The court of appeals further held that appellants had 
had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law since their union could have 
appealed from the common pleas court’s final order on remand in the union’s 
action for injunctive and declaratory relief.  The court of appeals held that its 
previous opinion in Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., 2006-Ohio-4193, had 
been rendered moot by the city’s adoption of a charter, which superseded the 
competitive-examination procedure in R.C. 124.44. 
Quo Warranto 
{¶ 18} Appellants seek a writ of quo warranto to oust Police Chief 
McGuire.  As noted previously, the court of appeals held that appellants had had 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through an appeal by their 
collective-bargaining representative ─ the association ─ from the common pleas 
court’s decision on remand in the association’s action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief. 
{¶ 19} The court of appeals is correct that “[e]xtraordinary writs like quo 
warranto provide extraordinary, not alternative remedies, and they will not lie 
where there exists an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  State ex 
rel. Johnson v. Talikka (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 109, 110, 642 N.E.2d 353.  “The 
alternate remedy must be complete, beneficial, and speedy in order to be an 
adequate remedy at law.”  State ex rel. Beane v. Dayton, 112 Ohio St.3d 553, 
2007-Ohio-811, 862 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 31. 
{¶ 20} The association’s action for injunctive and declaratory relief and 
any motion by appellants to intervene and appeal therefrom, however, did not 
constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, because the alternate 
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actions would not have provided a complete remedy to appellants on their quo 
warranto claim to oust Police Chief McGuire.  That is, a ruling in the 
association’s favor in their action would not have resulted in McGuire’s ouster.  
In fact, it is well settled that “quo warranto is the exclusive remedy by which 
one’s right to hold a public office may be litigated.”  State ex rel. Battin v. Bush 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 236, 238-239, 533 N.E.2d 301; State ex rel. Hogan v. Hunt 
(1911), 84 Ohio St. 143, 95 N.E. 666, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 21} Appellees assert that the quo warranto claim lacks merit for the 
additional reason that appellants lack standing because they cannot reasonably 
claim to be entitled to be police chief.  The court of appeals did not rely on this 
argument to dismiss the claim, but we consider it because “[r]eviewing courts are 
not authorized to reverse a correct judgment on the basis that some or all of the 
lower court’s reasons are erroneous.”  State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole 
Auth., 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, 796 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 22} Appellees’ argument, however, lacks merit.  R.C. 2733.08 
provides, “When an action in quo warranto is brought against a person for 
usurping an office, the petition shall set forth the name of the person claiming to 
be entitled to the office, with an averment of his right thereto.  Judgment may be 
rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also on the right of the person 
averred to be so entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice 
requires.”  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, as we have long recognized, appellants’ 
potential failure to establish their entitlement to be appointed police chief does not 
necessarily preclude a writ of quo warranto to oust Police Chief McGuire.  State 
ex rel. Newell v. Jackson, 118 Ohio St.3d 138, 2008-Ohio-1965, 886 N.E.2d 846, 
¶ 8; State ex rel. Myers v. Brown (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 545, 547, 721 N.E.2d 
1053 (“If a relator in a quo warranto proceeding fails to establish entitlement to 
the office, judgment may still be rendered on the issue of whether respondent 
lawfully holds the disputed office”); State ex rel. Ethell v. Hendricks (1956), 165 
January Term, 2008 
7 
Ohio St. 217, 226, 59 O.O. 298, 135 N.E.2d 362 (“it is apparent that Section 
2733.08 recognizes that a relator’s proof may fail in regard to one element and yet 
succeed with respect to the other, and provides that in such instance the court, as 
representative of the state, shall step in and render whatever decision is required 
by justice”); see also Reed v. Rudnick (Dec. 13, 1995), Darke App. No. CA 1368, 
1995 WL 737911, in which a court of appeals granted a writ of quo warranto to 
oust a police chief and a writ of mandamus to compel a city’s civil service 
commission to conduct a new promotional examination for the position. 
{¶ 23} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing appellants’ quo 
warranto claim. 
Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 24} The court of appeals also dismissed appellants’ claim for a writ of 
mandamus to order a competitive promotional examination for police chief 
because appellants had an adequate remedy at law through the association’s 
action for injunctive and declaratory relief and an appeal from the common pleas 
court’s judgment on remand in that case. 
{¶ 25} Again, however, that case did not provide an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law, because it would not have been a complete remedy to 
appellants unless it had been coupled with ancillary extraordinary relief in the 
nature of a mandatory injunction to compel appellants to administer a competitive 
promotional examination for police chief.  See, e.g., State ex rel. N. Main St. 
Coalition v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 42; 
State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 698 N.E.2d 987. 
{¶ 26} The court of appeals also held that because of the adoption of the 
Fostoria Charter, any vacancy in the police chief position caused by the ouster or 
retirement of McGuire would be governed by the applicable charter provision, 
which does not require a competitive promotional examination pursuant to R.C. 
124.44.  See Fostoria Charter, Section 7.01.  The charter, however, became 
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effective on the date that the November 7, 2006 election was certified.  Id. at 
Section 12.01.  The charter provisions did not apply retroactively to a vacancy 
that should have been filled in accordance with the law in effect before the charter 
became effective.  See State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 73, 647 N.E.2d 769, citing State ex rel. Mirlisena v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 597, 600, 622 N.E.2d 329 
(plurality opinion) (the “constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws is 
equally applicable to charter amendments”).  In fact, Section 11.03(A) of the 
Fostoria Charter specifies that “[t]he adoption of this Charter shall not affect any 
pre-existing rights of the City nor any right, liability, pending suit or prosecution, 
either on behalf of or against the City or any officer thereof.” 
{¶ 27} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing appellants’ 
mandamus claim. 
Res Judicata 
{¶ 28} The court of appeals’ opinion and the parties’ merit briefs refer to 
the court’s dismissal of a previous petition filed by the same appellants for the 
same writs, but appellees have not yet properly raised the defense of res judicata.  
See, e.g., Jim’s Steak House, Inc. v. Cleveland (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 
688 N.E.2d 506 (affirmative defense of res judicata is waived if it is not raised in 
a responsive pleading).  Similarly, appellees’ claim on appeal that the 
association’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief barred appellants’ quo 
warranto and mandamus claims based on res judicata also was not properly raised 
in the court of appeals.  Id.  Nothing in our opinion bars appellees from raising res 
judicata based on the previously filed writ action or action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in a proper pleading on remand. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} After construing the material facts of appellants’ petition and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom most strongly in their favor, it appears that they 
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can prove a set of facts upon which they would be entitled to the requested writs 
of quo warranto and mandamus.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals dismissing appellants’ petition and remand the cause for further 
proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
 
CUPP, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I do not quarrel with the majority’s technical analysis of the great 
writs, but that legal analysis resolves nothing.  The citizens of Fostoria appear to 
have already addressed the merits of the issue by adopting a city charter that 
allows the selection of a police chief without a civil service exam.  This litigation 
has gone on far too long; it’s time to stop the music and the legal fees.  I would 
affirm the court of appeals’ dismissal. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals to dismiss this action for two reasons.   
{¶ 32} First, the relators lack standing to petition for a writ of quo 
warranto because they did not pass the competitive promotional examination for 
chief of police.  Second, and most compelling, is the fact that the matter is wholly 
moot, inasmuch as Fostoria has resolved this issue by adopting a charter that now 
permits a chief of police to be appointed without a civil service promotional 
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examination.  This is exactly the means by which Chief McGuire achieved the 
position of chief of police. 
{¶ 33} For these reasons, I dissent from the conclusion reached by the 
majority. 
__________________ 
 
Allotta, Farley & Widman Co., L.P.A., Marilyn L. Widman, and William 
D. Brady, for appellants. 
 
Spengler Nathanson, P.L.L., Lisa E. Pizza, and David M. Smigelski, for 
appellees. 
 
Manahan, Pietrykowski, Delaney & Wasielewski and Larry P. Meyer, for 
appellees city of Fostoria and Police Chief John McGuire. 
 
Timothy J. Hoover, Fostoria Law Director, for appellee Fostoria Civil 
Service Commission. 
______________________