Title: State v. Forte

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-061


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Bennington Superior Court

 Leonard Forte                                May Term, 1992


 Ellen H. Maloney, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
   General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Alan P. Biederman of Biederman & Rakow, P.C., Rutland, for defendant-
   appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   In this extraordinary relief proceeding, the Bennington
 superior court granted a writ of certiorari to set aside an order of the
 Vermont District Court, Bennington Circuit, granting defendant a new trial
 in a criminal case.  Defendant appeals, arguing that relief by way of
 certiorari is unavailable in this proceeding, that the court applied the
 wrong standard in granting the writ, and that the superior court was in
 error in its interpretation of the new trial decision of the district court.
 We agree that the superior court erred in granting relief based on its
 findings and remand for further findings and conclusions.
      Defendant Leonard Forte was charged, under 13 V.S.A. { 3252, with three
 counts of criminal sexual assault of a minor for allegedly assaulting his
 daughter's twelve-year-old female friend.  The incidents in question
 occurred on three nights in February of 1987, when defendant, his daughter
 and her friend were staying at his vacation home in Landgrove.  After a
 trial in December of 1988, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on each of
 the three counts.  Defendant then moved for a new trial and a judgment of
 acquittal on a number of grounds, including the "emotional involvement" of
 the deputy state's attorney who prosecuted the case.
      The post-trial motions were heard in June of 1989.  On October 14,
 1989, the court denied the motion for acquittal but granted the motion for a
 new trial.  It found that the emotional involvement of the prosecutor, which
 was manifested in various ways, deprived defendant of a fair trial.  On
 November 3, 1989, the State sought extraordinary relief in the Supreme
 Court, alleging that the trial judge had abused his discretion and
 requesting that the order for a new trial be set aside.  This Court
 dismissed the petition "without prejudice to bringing a petition for
 extraordinary relief in superior court."  State v. Forte, 154 Vt. 46, 50,
 572 A.2d 941, 943 (1990) (Forte I).  The State brought such a proceeding in
 the Bennington Superior Court in May of 1990.
      The case was heard in November of 1990.  The record consisted of the
 testimony of each of the jurors, both prosecutors, and the court reporter.
 It also included the decision of the district court granting a new trial and
 the transcript of proceedings in the criminal case.  This transcript
 consisted of the pretrial hearings and the trial up to the time the court
 reporter left the court and the tape of proceedings thereafter.
      The superior court examined the State's complaint and decided that it
 requested relief in the nature of certiorari.  Based on that conclusion, the
 court determined that it was required to adjudicate the matter solely on the
 basis of the official record made in the district court.  This preliminary
 decision led the superior court to refuse to consider the evidence that it
 took.  It made findings, however, based on part of that testimony in the
 event of appeal to this Court.
      Based solely on the record of the district court proceedings, the
 superior court set aside the new trial decision of the district court.  The
 superior court reasoned that the district court granted a new trial based on
 the cumulative impact of two actions of the prosecutor:  (1) the
 introduction of the personal beliefs of the prosecutor into closing
 argument, and (2) the emotional involvement of the prosecutor in trial
 examination and argument.  The superior court concluded that the latter
 ground could not be reviewed because it was based on the observations of the
 trial judge, but the former ground could be reviewed from the record.  Based
 on that review, the court concluded that the prosecutor never injected her
 personal beliefs into her closing argument.  Because one of the grounds
 supporting the new trial decision was not present, the superior court struck
 the grant of a new trial.
      Defendant attacks the superior court's characterization of the
 district court's decision, as well as its finding of error.  His main
 challenge, however, is to the superior court's approach.  He argues that our
 original decision narrowed the issue to whether there was bias or improper
 motivation in the district judge in granting the new trial.  In his view,
 the superior court could make this determination only by considering the
 testimony given before it, exactly what that court refused to do.  In the
 absence of a finding of bias or improper motivation, he argues, the superior
 court's order cannot be sustained.
      It is helpful at the outset to summarize our earlier decision in this
 case.  Although the rationale for that decision was that the State is
 required to seek extraordinary relief, in the first instance, in the
 superior court, we did provide some guidance about the nature of the
 proceeding.  First, we did not reject the proposition that, upon some
 showing that could not be described "with precision," extraordinary relief
 might be available to set aside the decision to grant a new trial.  Forte I,
 154 Vt. at 47-48, 572 A.2d  at 941-42.  Second, we noted that any review
 would be "narrow," and that extraordinary relief must be based on usurpation
 of judicial power, arbitrary abuse of power, or clear abuse of discretion.
 Id. at 48, 572 A.2d  at 942.  Third, we emphasized that review would be
 difficult, if not impossible, on the record alone because the new trial
 decision was based on the trial judge's observations of the demeanor of the
 participants and the reactions of the jurors.  Id. at 49, 572 A.2d  at 942.
      It is also helpful to summarize the status of extraordinary relief in
 Vermont.  Pursuant to statute, this Court and the superior courts have
 concurrent jurisdiction over "proceedings in certiorari, mandamus,
 prohibition and quo warranto."  4 V.S.A. {{ 2, 113.  These writs, however,
 were abolished by the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.  V.R.C.P. 81(b).
 Much of the relief available under these writs is now covered by Rules of
 Civil Procedure 74 and 75 on review of governmental action.  To the extent
 it is not provided by the Rules, however, relief formerly available under
 these writs is available in a normal civil action for extraordinary relief.
 See Reporter's Notes to V.R.C.P. 81; Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147
 Vt. 305, 308,