Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John Miller Carroll

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 130 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1426-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Miller Carroll, Attorney at Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
John Miller Carroll,  
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CARROLL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 6, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
September 17, 2001   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Gregg 
Herman, Matthew J. Price and Loeb & Herman, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by John 
Miller Carroll, Wind Lake. 
 
 
2001 WI 130 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No. 00-1426-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John Miller Carroll, Attorney at  
Law. 
 
Board of Attorneys Professional  
Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
John Miller Carroll,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 6, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
  
 
 
ATTORNEY Disciplinary proceeding.    Attorney's license 
suspended.   
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
2 
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM   The 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional 
Responsibility (the Board)1 has appealed from the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and disciplinary recommendation of a 
referee that the license to practice law in Wisconsin of 
Attorney John Miller Carroll be suspended for six months.   
¶2 
The referee's findings and conclusions addressed ten 
separate counts of professional misconduct set forth in the 
Board's complaint in this proceeding.  One count was dismissed 
on stipulation of the parties and the referee found that 
misconduct had occurred with respect to seven of the remaining 
nine counts, dismissing the remaining two counts.  
¶3 
We 
adopt 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law with respect to the seven counts on which 
misconduct was found to have occurred, as well as count nine 
which she recommended be dismissed.  However, we reject the 
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect 
to count ten which she recommended be dismissed after finding 
that no misconduct had occurred.  Finally, we agree with the 
referee that the seriousness of Attorney Carroll's professional 
                                                 
1 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was substantially restructured.  The name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation and the supreme court rules applicable to the lawyer 
regulation system were also revised in part.  The conduct 
underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000, but the 
referee's proceeding and the appeal occurred after that date.  
The complainant in this case will be referred to as "the Board" 
and all references to supreme court rules will be to those in 
effect prior to October 1, 2000.   
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
3 
 
misconduct warrants the suspension of his license to practice 
law in this state, although we do not follow her recommendation 
as to the length of the suspension.   
¶4 
Attorney John Miller Carroll was admitted to practice 
law in Wisconsin in 1987 and currently practices in Wind Lake.  
He has been disciplined for professional misconduct on three 
previous occasions: (1) a 1992 private reprimand for failing to 
hold funds in trust in which both he and his former law firm 
claimed an interest; (2) a 1997 private reprimand for performing 
work for a client after his services were terminated and for 
misrepresenting that he had filed a motion on behalf of the 
client; and (3) a public reprimand in 1999 for neglect of a 
matter, for failing to communicate with a client, and failing to 
return a retainer; see 72 Wisconsin Lawyer at 45-46 (July 1999). 
¶5 
The Board filed the instant disciplinary complaint 
against Carroll on April 28, 2000.  Attorney Joan F. Kessler was 
appointed to act as a referee in the matter.  In Attorney 
Carroll's answer to the complaint, he admitted some, and denied 
other, of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and 
sought either a dismissal of the matter in its entirety or, in 
the alternative, a sanction that was commensurate with the 
severity of the conduct that was found to have taken place.  
¶6 
The 
Board's 
allegations 
of 
misconduct 
and 
the 
referee's findings dealt with ten counts, involving four 
separate clients:  H.H., J.J., L.L., and R.A. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
4 
 
CLIENT H.H. 
¶7 
Attorney Carroll represented H.H. who was injured in 
1997 in an automobile rear end collision.  The matter was 
ultimately settled with the other party paying $2500 plus a 
medical bill of $292.  Attorney Carroll charged H.H. one-third 
of the $2500 plus costs of approximately $432 covering filing 
and service fees for the two lawsuits commenced, the first 
lawsuit having been improperly served and therefore dismissed. 
¶8 
Count one of the Board's complaint alleged that 
Attorney Carroll violated SCR 20:1.3,2 failure to diligently 
pursue the client's claim, by virtue of having permitted the 
first lawsuit to expire without service.  The referee concluded 
that misconduct had occurred with respect to this count.   
¶9 
Count two alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a),3 
failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status 
of the matter and failure to promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information, by virtue of Attorney Carroll's 
failure to keep H.H. adequately informed, despite her numerous 
requests for information, during the course of the litigation.  
The referee concluded that misconduct had occurred with respect 
to this count.   
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
5 
 
¶10 Count three alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.5(c),4 
failing to enter into a written contingent fee agreement with 
the client, by virtue of the alleged absence of such an 
agreement in this instance.  This count was dismissed by the 
referee upon stipulation of the parties. 
¶11 Count four alleged a violation of SCR 22.07(2),5 
failure to fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances 
pertaining to the alleged misconduct upon investigation by the 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.5(c) provides: 
 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter 
for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a 
contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law.  A 
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the 
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the 
event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such 
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee 
is calculated.  Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the 
lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating 
the outcome of the matter and if there is a recovery, showing 
the 
remittance 
to 
the 
client 
and 
the 
method 
of 
its 
determination. 
5 Former SCR 22.07(2) provided: 
 
(2) During 
the 
course 
of 
an 
investigation, 
the 
administrator or a committee may notify the respondent of the 
subject being investigated. The respondent shall fully and 
fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct or medical incapacity within 20 days of being 
served by ordinary mail a request for response to a grievance.  
The administrator in his or her discretion may allow additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Failure 
to 
provide 
information 
or 
misrepresentation 
in 
a 
disclosure 
is 
misconduct. 
 
The 
administrator or committee may make a further investigation 
before making a recommendation to the board. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
6 
 
Board, by virtue of Attorney Carroll's failure to disclose to 
the Board during its investigation that he had filed the earlier 
lawsuit 
that 
was 
ultimately 
dismissed 
and 
in 
general 
misrepresenting the nature of his representation of H.H.  The 
referee concluded that misconduct had occurred with respect to 
this count.6 
¶12 Neither Attorney Carroll nor the Board have raised on 
appeal any matters pertaining to the counts involving the 
representation of H.H., and we adopt the referee's findings and 
conclusions with respect to these counts.  
CLIENT J.J. 
¶13 Attorney Carroll represented J.J. in 1998 on a claim 
against an insurance company involving a motorcycle loss.  The 
company issued a check listing J.J., Attorney Carroll, and the 
lien holder on the motorcycle as payees.  Attorney Carroll's 
office unsuccessfully attempted to deposit the check without 
obtaining an endorsement from the lien holder.  After that 
Attorney Carroll asked the company to issue a new check deleting 
the lien holder's name, which it refused to do.  Attorney 
Carroll then gave the original check to J.J., instructing him to 
obtain the lien holder's signature.  J.J. returned it to Carroll 
with an illegible signature purporting to be that of the lien 
                                                 
6 The referee also stated that the misconduct that occurred 
with reference to counts one, two and four, in the absence of 
any 
other 
violations 
and 
given 
Attorney 
Carroll's 
prior 
disciplinary record, would alone have warranted recommendation 
of a 30-day suspension, plus a refund of $184 to H.H. for the 
unnecessary filing fee for the first action.   
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
7 
 
holder which Attorney Carroll then deposited in his trust 
account.  It was later determined that the lien holder had not 
actually endorsed the check.   
¶14 Attorney 
Carroll 
testified 
in 
the 
disciplinary 
proceeding before the referee that he had been told by J.J. that 
the lien would be satisfied and that is why the lien holder 
signed the check.  However, the referee found that Attorney 
Carroll should have known that this likely was untrue because he 
knew that his client had previously lied to him about the status 
of the lien and he also should have been suspicious when the 
check was returned with the illegible signature.   
¶15 The 
referee 
found 
that 
once 
Attorney 
Carroll 
discovered that his client had lied to him about a significant 
financial matter, it was unreasonable and irresponsible to 
deliver a negotiable instrument to him, given the obvious high 
risk of forgery.  The referee further stated that Attorney 
Carroll should not escape responsibility for the fraudulent 
conduct he set in motion under these circumstances.  Thus the 
referee concluded 
that 
Carroll had 
committed 
professional 
misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(c),7 engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, count five.8 
                                                 
7 SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
provides 
that 
"[I]t 
is 
professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 
8 The referee stated that if count five had been the only 
misconduct involved it was still sufficiently serious to warrant 
the recommendation of a 90-day suspension.  
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
8 
 
¶16 Neither the Board nor Attorney Carroll have appealed 
any aspect of the referee's determination with respect to this 
count, and we adopt the referee's findings and conclusions. 
CLIENT L.L. 
¶17 L.L. had hired Attorney Carroll's firm in 1998 to 
represent her husband on criminal charges.  She assigned $5000 
of the $10,000 bail she had posted, upon its release, to 
Attorney Carroll to cover his retainer.  However, she also later 
paid a $5000 retainer directly to him.  When her husband was 
eventually convicted, $9468 of the bail was released and sent to 
Attorney Carroll which he deposited in its entirety in his 
client trust account.  On the same day he returned $4468 to L.L. 
and moved the remaining $5000 of the bail to his business 
operations account.  L.L. demanded return of the $5000 and four 
months later Attorney Carroll returned $4589.75 to her.  (The 
$410.25 still retained by Attorney Carroll was apparently not a 
subject of dispute).  
¶18 Attorney Carroll testified that in his view both the 
$5000 bail assignment and the $5000 paid directly were supposed 
to have been a retainer.  The referee found to the contrary and 
concluded that professional misconduct had occurred with respect 
to four counts alleged by the Board with reference to L.L. 
¶19 The referee concluded that a violation of count six 
had occurred, involving a violation of SCR 20:1.15(a),9 failing 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:1.15(a) provides: 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
9 
 
to hold client funds in trust, by virtue of Attorney Carroll 
moving what the client considered to be refunded bail from his 
trust account into his business operations account.   
¶20 The referee further concluded that a violation of 
count seven had occurred, involving SCR 20:1.15(b),10 failing to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third 
persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity. Funds 
held in connection with a representation or in a fiduciary 
capacity include funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, 
personal representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds of 
clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law firm shall be 
deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts as provided 
in paragraph (c). The trust account shall be maintained in a 
bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, savings and 
loan association or other investment institution authorized to 
do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust account shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust Account" or 
words of similar import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law 
firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition of account service charges, may be deposited in such 
an account. Unless the client otherwise directs in writing, 
securities in bearer form shall be kept by the attorney in a 
safe deposit box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment 
institution authorized to do business and located in Wisconsin. 
The safe deposit box shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar import. Other 
property of a client or third person shall be identified as such 
and appropriately safeguarded. If a lawyer also licensed in 
another state is entrusted with funds or property in connection 
with an out-of-state representation, this provision shall not 
supersede the trust account rules of the other state. 
10 SCR 20:1.15(b) provides: 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
10 
 
render a full accounting of trust property and failing to 
properly return client trust funds, by virtue of Attorney 
Carroll's failure to respond to the client's request to return 
the refunded bail and to account for the funds within a 
reasonable period.  
¶21 Next, the referee concluded that a violation of count 
eight had occurred, relating to SCR 20:1.15(d),11 involving the 
proper treatment of disputed funds as trust property pending 
resolution of the dispute with a client, by virtue of Attorney 
Carroll's failure to retain the disputed bail amount in the 
client's trust account.   
¶22 Finally the referee recommended dismissal of count 
nine, pertaining to a violation of SCR 20:8.4(f),12 declaring 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly 
notify the client or third person in writing. Except as stated 
in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with 
the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or 
third person any funds or other property that the client or 
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client or third person, shall render a full accounting regarding 
such property. 
11 SCR 20:1.15(d) provides: 
(d) When, in the representation, a lawyer is in possession 
of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim 
interests, the property shall be treated by the lawyer as trust 
property until there is an accounting and severance of their 
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective 
interests, the portion in dispute shall continue to be treated 
as trust property until the dispute is resolved. 
12 SCR 
20:8.4(f) 
provides 
that 
"[I]t 
is 
professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (f) violate a statute, supreme court 
rule, supreme court order or supreme court decision regulating 
the conduct of lawyers."  
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
11 
 
professional misconduct to have occurred when an attorney 
violates a supreme court rule or decision, again relating to 
Attorney Carroll's retention of the refunded bail after there 
was a dispute.  The referee concluded that this count was 
duplicative of the other three counts.13 
¶23 Neither Attorney Carroll nor the Board has raised on 
appeal any issue with reference to counts six through nine, and 
we adopt the referee's findings and conclusions with respect to 
these counts.  
CLIENT R.A. 
¶24 R.A. paid Attorney Carroll $2500 in 1998 to represent 
her son in a criminal matter.  Shortly thereafter she retained a 
different attorney, discharged Attorney Carroll, and requested a 
refund of the retainer.  He agreed to return $1500 but did not 
do so.  R.A. then called Attorney Carroll's office numerous 
times during the following nine months but he never responded.  
Once R.A. filed a grievance with the Board, Attorney Carroll 
sent her the $1500.   
¶25 The referee found that a $1500 check had been made out 
to R.A. soon after Attorney Carroll agreed to refund that amount 
but that apparently the check was mislaid and never mailed.  The 
referee further found that Attorney Carroll's bookkeeper voided 
the check five months later and a new check was issued but never 
mailed.  Even though R.A. did not receive the $1500 for an 
                                                 
13 The referee indicated that if the three counts relating 
to L.L. had been the only misconduct involved, she would have 
recommended a public reprimand.  
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
12 
 
additional four months, during which her repeated calls to 
Attorney Carroll were ignored, the referee found that "a new 
check was promptly issued."  The referee recommended dismissal 
of this count, concluding that no violation of SCR 20:1.16(d),14 
which requires the timely refund of any advance payment of fees 
had occurred.  The referee stated:  
While better office practice would have disclosed the 
error earlier, I cannot find this to be an intentional 
violation of supreme court rules.  Nor can I find the 
failure to discover the error sooner to be such 
negligence as to rise to an ethical violation.  
Inadvertent 
misfilings 
probably 
occur 
in 
every 
lawyer's office. . . . It is unreasonable to expect 
perfection in every process.  I am satisfied that 
records maintained in the ordinary course of business 
in his office establish that Carroll made a good faith 
effort to promptly return this disputed fee. 
¶26 The Board has appealed the recommendation on this 
count.  It argues that the referee made a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact when she concluded that once Attorney Carroll's 
office discovered the mislaid check to R.A., a new check was 
"promptly issued."  The Board argues that a new check was not 
issued until approximately four months later and thus the 
                                                 
14 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take 
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's 
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, 
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering 
papers and property to which the client is entitled and 
refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. 
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the 
extent permitted by other law.  
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
13 
 
referee should not have concluded that Attorney Carroll made a 
good faith effort to promptly return the disputed fee.   
¶27 On a secondary note, the Board questions whether there 
was sufficient evidence that Carroll had ever mislaid the first 
check to begin with.  The Board contends that the referee should 
have found that Attorney Carroll fabricated the story about 
having promptly signed the check but then having mislaid it.   
¶28 In response, Attorney Carroll simply contends that the 
referee's findings and conclusions on this count were not in 
error.   
¶29 A referee's findings of fact on a disciplinary matter 
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 562 N.W.2d 137 
(1997).  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 388 N.W.2d 176 
(1986). 
¶30 The referee's findings and conclusions with respect to 
this count represent a mixture of both factual findings and 
legal conclusions.  To the extent that findings of fact are 
involved, we hold that they are clearly erroneous and we do not 
adopt them.  
¶31 We make no findings and reach no conclusions on 
whether Attorney Carroll might have fabricated the story about 
having promptly signed a refund check and then mislaid it.  But 
even if Attorney Carroll's mislaying of the check for five 
months was excusable, and even if a new check was indeed 
"issued" at that time, his failure to actually forward the check 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
14 
 
to the client for an additional four months, with his repeated 
failure to respond to R.A.'s inquiries during that time, does 
not represent a "good faith effort" to "promptly" return the 
fee.  
¶32 Thus we reject the referee's findings of fact with 
respect to this count and conclude that a violation of SCR 
20:1.16(d) occurred.  
SANCTION 
¶33 Having concluded that a violation of seven counts has 
occurred, and having noted that Attorney Carroll had three prior 
disciplinary actions for which he received reprimands, the 
referee stated that private discipline apparently had not 
sufficiently encouraged him to change his conduct:   
The totality of the offenses are more serious than 
their isolated parts.  The continuing pattern of 
conduct is disturbing. . . . [bad office] practices no 
doubt 
contributed 
to 
his 
extraordinarily 
bad 
judgment. . . . OLR 
seeks 
an 
unreasonably 
drastic 
penalty.  To move from private reprimands directly to 
a one year suspension is unreasonably harsh.  
(Emphasis added).  However, the referee's report to this court 
correctly indicated at another point that one of the three 
reprimands had been public.  In any event, the referee 
recommended a six-month suspension. 
¶34 The Board argues that the referee apparently relied on 
a misunderstanding of Attorney Carroll's prior disciplinary 
record in recommending a six-month suspension, i.e., the referee 
indicated she was hesitant to impose a one-year suspension when 
the prior reprimands had been private when, in fact, one of 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
15 
 
Attorney Carroll's three reprimands was public.  The Board 
argues that since the 1992 private reprimand involved one count, 
the 1997 private reprimand involved two counts, and the 1999 
public reprimand involved four counts, along with the original 
seven (now eight) violations in this case, Attorney Carroll has 
violated the rules of professional conduct multiple times and 
that this deserves a one-year suspension.  
¶35 In 
support, 
the 
Board 
points 
to 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Grunewald, 2000 WI 115, 238 Wis. 2d 881, 618 
N.W.2d 188 (one-year suspension for six violations, some similar 
to this case; attorney previously received a private reprimand 
and a six-month suspension); Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Evans, 2000 WI 124, 239 Wis. 2d 279, 618 N.W.2d 873 (two-year 
suspension for violations including trust account irregularities 
and fraud, some similar to this case; attorney previously 
received two private and one public reprimand); Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Jackson, 221 Wis. 2d 616, 585 N.W.2d 151 
(1998) (one-year suspension for multiple violations which the 
Board argued were not as serious as those committed here; 
attorney 
previously 
received 
a 
public 
reprimand); 
and 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hendree, 211 Wis. 2d 440, 565 
N.W.2d 119 (1997) (one-year suspension for multiple violations 
which the Board characterizes as similar to those here; attorney 
previously received one public reprimand). 
¶36 Attorney Carroll argues that a six-month suspension is 
appropriate here because he views the trust account violations 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
16 
 
in Evans as more severe than those here and because the attorney 
in Grunewald had previously received a six-month suspension.  
¶37 The recommended sanctions by a referee are accorded no 
deference by this court.  Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wolf, 
165 Wis. 2d 1, 476 N.W.2d 878 (1991).  It is this court's 
responsibility to impose discipline for professional misconduct.  
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 158 Wis. 2d 1, 460 
N.W.2d 749 (1990).   
¶38 It 
is 
apparent 
that 
the 
referee 
erred 
in 
her 
recitation of Attorney Carroll's prior disciplinary history.  
Even though she stated earlier in her report to this court that 
he had received two private reprimands followed by a public 
reprimand, 
her 
discussion 
of 
the 
sanction 
recommendation 
specifically characterized them as three private reprimands, 
after which she said it was excessive to move directly from 
private reprimands to a one-year suspension.  In addition, as we 
previously held, the referee erred in recommending that count 
ten be dismissed. 
¶39 It is, of course, unknown what the referee would have 
recommended even if she had properly recited Attorney Carroll's 
disciplinary history and if she had found a violation arising 
out of count ten.  It is possible she might have still 
recommended a six-month suspension given that Attorney Carroll 
had received no previous suspensions, unlike Grunewald where the 
one-year suspension followed a previous shorter suspension.  But 
we need not speculate on what the referee would have recommended 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
17 
 
had these errors not occurred.  As noted, the recommendation on 
sanction is not binding on this court in any event.  
¶40 The factors for this court to consider in imposing 
discipline were stated in Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993): (1) the 
seriousness, nature and extent of the misconduct; (2) the level 
of discipline needed to protect the public, the courts, and the 
legal 
system 
from 
repetition 
of 
the 
attorney's 
misconduct; (3) the need to impress upon the attorney the 
seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the need to deter other 
attorneys from committing similar misconduct. 
¶41 In this case we conclude that the one-year suspension 
sought by the Board is appropriate.  First, the misconduct 
committed by Attorney Carroll was serious and extensive.  In 
particular, 
it 
demonstrated 
a 
pattern 
of 
deception 
and 
misdealing with clients that runs to the very heart of the 
integrity of the attorney-client relationship.  Second, given 
the number of violations found here, as well as the previous 
violations for which Attorney Carroll was reprimanded, it is 
apparent that there is a substantial need for others to be 
protected from his propensity for misconduct.  Third, it is 
equally apparent, given his three prior reprimands, that 
Attorney Carroll has a substantial disregard for the rules of 
professional conduct and likely will commit future violations 
unless a serious sanction is imposed now.  Finally, if we allow 
this misconduct to pass without a substantial sanction, we will 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
18 
 
have sent the wrong message to the attorneys of this state with 
respect to their obligation under the rules.   
¶42 We also agree with the Board that previous cases 
involving similar conduct and/or disciplinary history have 
resulted in a suspension of this length, if not longer.  For 
example, in Hendree, the attorney only had a single public 
reprimand prior to the imposition of a one-year suspension for 
misconduct that included trust account violations similar to 
those here.  Further, Evans involved an attorney who, like 
Attorney Carroll, had previously received two private and one 
public reprimands, but received a suspension greater than that 
sought here by the Board for conduct that also included trust 
account discrepancies.   
¶43 Accordingly, we conclude that a one-year license 
suspension under these circumstances is necessary to satisfy the 
factors we are to consider under Charlton.   
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John Miller Carroll 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of one 
year, commencing January 10, 2002. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order John Miller Carroll pay the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding in the amount of 
$11,433.77, provided that if the costs are not paid within the 
time specified, and absent a showing to this court of his 
inability to pay the costs within that time, the license of John 
Miller Carroll to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain 
suspended until further order of the court. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
19 
 
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of 
reinstatement of his license to practice law, John Miller 
Carroll shall make restitution to client H.H. in the amount of 
$184. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John Miller Carroll comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
No. 
00-1426-D   
 
 
 
1