Title: Graham v. District Attorney for the Hampden District

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13386 
 
CHRIS GRAHAM & others1  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE 
HAMPDEN DISTRICT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 13, 2023. - January 23, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.2 
 
 
District Attorney.  Police, Records, Prosecution of criminal 
cases.  Witness, Police officer, Impeachment.  Due Process 
of Law, Disclosure of evidence.  Evidence, Disclosure of 
evidence, Exculpatory, Police report, Impeachment of 
credibility.  Practice, Criminal, District attorney, 
Disclosure of evidence, Conduct of government agents. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 6, 2021. 
 
 
The case was reported by Wendlandt, J. 
 
 
Matthew R. Segal (Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, & Jessica J. Lewis also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
Elizabeth N. Mulvey (Thomas M. Hoopes also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
1 Jorge Lopez; Meredith Ryan; Kelly Auer; Committee for 
Public Counsel Services; and Hampden County Lawyers for Justice. 
 
2 Justice Cypher participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Jaba Tsitsuashvili, of the District of Columbia, Anya 
Bidwell, of Texas, & Jay Marshall Wolman for Institute for 
Justice. 
Daniel S. Ruzumna & Eric Beinhorn, of New York, Joshua 
Tepfer, of Illinois, Kathrina Szymborski Wolfkot, of the 
District of Columbia, & Bharath Palle for Exoneration Project. 
Vanessa Potkin, of New York, Stephanie Roberts Hartung, 
Adya Kumar, & Sharon L. Beckman for New England Innocence 
Project & others. 
Luke Ryan for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell for Pioneer Valley Project & 
others. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 2020, the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) conducted an investigation of the Springfield 
police department (department) and found that the department's 
officers, particularly those within the narcotics bureau, 
routinely falsified police reports and engaged in a "pattern or 
practice of excessive force."  These findings raised questions 
about the integrity of the evidence used by the office of the 
district attorney for the Hampden district (district attorney's 
office) to obtain convictions.  We are called on to determine 
whether the district attorney's office failed to comply with his 
obligations to disclose and investigate evidence of the 
department's misconduct. 
The six plaintiffs -- two criminal defense organizations, 
two defense attorneys, and two former criminal defendants -- 
filed a petition with a single justice of this court, seeking 
global remedies for the alleged failures of the district 
3 
 
attorney's office, premised on the remedies provided in 
Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 97 (2015), and Commonwealth v. 
Ware, 471 Mass. 85 (2015).  The single justice appointed a 
special master to make and report factual findings and 
conclusions of law.  Ultimately, the single justice reserved and 
reported the case to the full court. 
The plaintiffs request that this court order the district 
attorney's office to investigate the effect of the department's 
misconduct on criminal prosecutions.  In the interim, the 
plaintiffs request that this court institute a range of 
remedies, including the creation of a list of officers in the 
department who are connected to the misconduct, jury 
instructions tailored to cases involving members of the former 
narcotics bureau within the department, and a judicial 
presumption favoring the admissibility of the DOJ report.  In 
opposition, the district attorney's office claims to have 
fulfilled its obligations to disclose and investigate the 
department's misconduct, such that "everybody knows what 
everybody knows.  There [are] no secrets in Springfield."  
Further, the district attorney's office has provided evidence of 
extensive efforts to obtain the materials reviewed by the DOJ 
and disclose them to affected criminal defendants. 
To remedy the troubling practices identified by the DOJ, 
which affect the proper administration of justice in Hampden 
4 
 
County, we determine that the district attorney's office, 
through certain discovery policies, committed a breach of both 
the duty of the district attorney's office to disclose evidence 
that tends to exculpate defendants and the duty of the district 
attorney's office to investigate or inquire about such evidence.  
First, the practice of the district attorney's office of 
disclosing adverse credibility findings made about the 
department's officer witnesses only on a discretionary basis 
violates the duty of the district attorney's office to disclose.  
Second, the practice of the district attorney's office of 
withholding instances of officer misconduct from disclosure 
where a particular bad act cannot be attributed clearly to a 
particular officer violates the duty of the district attorney's 
office to disclose.  Third, by failing to gain access to all 
documents known to have been reviewed by the DOJ, the district 
attorney's office failed in its duty to investigate.  
Accordingly, to remedy these breaches of the duties of the 
district attorney's office, we order the district attorney's 
office to obtain access to all categories of documents known to 
have been reviewed by the DOJ and disclose them to the 
plaintiffs.  From there, case-by-case adjudication can begin to 
address the claims of individual defendants affected by the 
department's misconduct. 
5 
 
In so ordering, this court reemphasizes the importance of a 
prosecutor's dual duties -- to disclose and to investigate -- in 
upholding the integrity of our criminal justice system.  See 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 
700, 702-704 (2018).  It is the responsibility of prosecutors 
and defense attorneys alike to ensure that the due process 
rights of every criminal defendant in Hampden County are 
vindicated and protected.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Parties.  Among the six plaintiffs are 
two legal organizations, the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (CPCS) and Hampden County Lawyers for Justice (HCLJ).  
CPCS is a Statewide entity established under G. L. c. 211D, and 
is responsible for providing representation to all indigent 
criminal defendants, whether directly through public counsel or 
indirectly through private, bar-appointed counsel.  HCLJ has 
approximately 150 attorney members, with four supervising 
attorneys.  HCLJ represents approximately seventy-five percent 
of indigent defendants in Hampden County.4 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Institute for Justice; the Exoneration Project; the New England 
Innocence Project, the Innocence Project, Inc., and the Boston 
College Innocence Program; the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers; and the Pioneer Valley Project, 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice, and the Criminal Justice 
Institute at Harvard Law School. 
 
4 The two defense attorney plaintiffs are Meredith Ryan and 
Kelly Auer.  Both serve as bar advocates through HCLJ, and Ryan 
6 
 
The district attorney's office is the defendant in this 
action.  The district attorney's office prosecutes cases in the 
Superior, District, and Juvenile Courts, with annual case 
filings ranging from approximately 20,000 in 2015 to over 15,000 
in 2021. 
Although the department is not a named party to this 
action, some background discussion of that department is 
warranted, given that the plaintiffs' claims necessarily 
implicate it.  As of the time of the DOJ's investigation, the 
department had approximately 500 sworn officers, organized into 
three major divisions.  The narcotics bureau, now disbanded, 
fell within the investigations division.  It was a small unit of 
 
is a board member and vice-president of HCLJ.  The two former 
defendant plaintiffs are Chris Graham and Jorge Lopez, both of 
whom allege that the district attorney's office wrongfully 
failed to disclose exculpatory material during their 
prosecutions. 
 
The district attorney's office challenges whether the 
plaintiffs have standing.  In her report, the special master 
found that, by virtue of their organizational functions, 
plaintiffs CPCS and HCLJ have proper representative standing for 
persons (including criminal defendants) whose rights are 
implicated by the issues underlying the petition.  See Planned 
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Bell, 424 Mass. 573, 578, 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819 (1997).  See also Committee for Pub. 
Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 
431, 447, S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020) (organizations 
representing incarcerated individuals had representative 
standing to challenge their continued incarceration during 
COVID-19 pandemic).  We agree.  Given that CPCS and HCLJ have 
standing, we decline to reach the unnecessary question of 
standing with regard to the remaining four plaintiffs. 
7 
 
plainclothes officers focused on narcotics offenses.  At full 
capacity, the unit consisted of twenty-four officers, three 
sergeants, one lieutenant, and one captain.  The narcotics 
bureau was the focal point of the DOJ's investigation. 
The department's internal investigations unit is charged 
with investigating allegations of misconduct made against both 
individual officers and the department itself. 
b.  Facts.  This court draws its facts from the findings of 
the special master, as memorialized in her October 2022 report, 
supplemented by other undisputed facts in the record.  See 
S.J.C. Rule 2:13, as appearing in 382 Mass. 749 (1981). 
i.  DOJ report.  In April 2018, the United States Attorney 
for the District of Massachusetts and the DOJ's civil rights 
division began investigating the narcotics bureau. 
Three main incidents sparked the DOJ's investigation.  
First, a narcotics bureau sergeant was federally indicted for 
"threatening juveniles" in February 2016.  In a civil suit 
subsequently commenced by one of the juveniles against the city 
of Springfield (city) and the sergeant, the juvenile alleged 
that he suffered a broken nose, two black eyes, and several 
contusions and abrasions as a result of the sergeant's use of 
excessive force.  Second, six off-duty officers from the 
department engaged in a violent brawl outside a Springfield 
restaurant in April 2015, prompting the Massachusetts Attorney 
8 
 
General to pursue criminal charges against the officers.  Third, 
a former narcotics bureau officer was indicted in January 2016 
for stealing almost $400,000 from the department's evidence 
room.  These incidents were widely publicized and raised 
concerns about the ability of the district attorney's office to 
rely on testimony from "discredited" officers in the department, 
as well as the "willingness of officers to cover up" 
constitutional violations and systemic deficiencies. 
The DOJ released a report of its findings in July 2020, 
concluding that there was "reasonable cause to believe" that the 
narcotics bureau engaged in a "pattern or practice of excessive 
force."  More specifically, on various occasions narcotics 
bureau officers punched individuals in the face, escalated 
encounters with civilians unnecessarily, and utilized 
"unreasonable takedown maneuvers."  The DOJ also concluded in 
its report that it was "not uncommon" for narcotics bureau 
officers to write "false or incomplete" reports to justify their 
use of force.  According to the DOJ report, officers often used 
"vague" or "rote" language in prisoner injury reports to prevent 
further investigation.  For example, the DOJ report cites a 
prisoner injury narrative in which narcotics bureau officers 
claim that they had to "bring . . . down" an individual 
resisting arrest "face first, onto the sidewalk," where she 
"sustained scrapes to her face area."  There were no further 
9 
 
details describing the individual's resistance, the officers' 
reactions, or the extent of her injuries. 
The DOJ report attributed its findings to systemic policy 
and training deficiencies within the department, such as a 
failure of senior command to report use of force incidents to 
the department's internal investigations unit.  Additionally, an 
April 2019 report issued by the Police Executive Research Forum 
found "significant departures" within the department from 
national guidelines for best practices issued by the DOJ in 
2008. 
In preparing its report, the DOJ reviewed "over 114,000 
pages in total, including [the department's] policies and 
procedures; training materials related to the use of force and 
accountability; [the department's] internal affairs protocols; 
and other materials relating to the general operations of the 
[d]epartment and use-of-force practices in particular."  This 
review included over one hundred reports from over one hundred 
internal investigations conducted by the internal investigations 
unit, as well as seventy-four personnel files.  The DOJ also 
interviewed a broad swath of officers, community members, city 
officials, and lawyers.  Significantly, the DOJ obtained every 
arrest report and use-of-force report drafted by the department 
from 2013 to 2018, and every prisoner injury file created from 
2013 to 2019. 
10 
 
However, the DOJ report provides minimal details concerning 
the incidents on which it is based and does not identify by name 
any officers or civilians involved with these incidents.  
Indeed, the DOJ report describes several "unadjudicated 
allegations of misconduct," which the special master 
subsequently deemed difficult to identify from the current 
record. 
Although the exact number cannot be known due to some 
factual overlap between the anonymized incidents, there are 
roughly twenty-three incidents of misconduct involving the 
department that are described within the DOJ report.  Sixteen 
incidents have been identified by the city solicitor, some of 
which are discussed infra, while the rest remain outstanding.  
Although the city solicitor has promised that "any and all 
records which can be made available to [the district attorney's 
office] that can be identified as reviewed by [the] DOJ will be 
provided to [the district attorney's office upon] request," 
neither the district attorney's office nor the department knows 
for certain the exact documents upon which the DOJ report is 
based.  The department opened its record management system to 
the DOJ but is "not sure" whether information technology 
professionals can accurately track what records the DOJ 
accessed, and the DOJ refuses to specifically identify the 
documents underlying its report. 
11 
 
 
As a result of the findings in the DOJ report, in April 
2022, the DOJ sued the city in Federal court.  The DOJ asserted 
that the department "had engaged in a pattern or practice of 
conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives persons of 
rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States."  Simultaneously, 
the DOJ and the city filed a settlement agreement, which was 
approved by a United States District Court judge shortly 
thereafter and entered as a consent decree.  While the city did 
not admit to any wrongdoing by the department, the consent 
decree outlines detailed policy reforms to be adopted by the 
department and calls for the appointment of a "compliance 
evaluator" to oversee the department's progress. 
 
Two incidents alluded to within the DOJ report are 
identifiable on their facts and are discussed infra:  first, an 
incident involving Officer Gregory Bigda, a member of the 
department; and second, an incident outside a Springfield 
restaurant. 
A.  Officer Bigda incident.  On the night of February 26, 
2016, Bigda arrested three juveniles for the theft of an 
unmarked police vehicle and interrogated them at the Palmer 
police station.  A video recording (video) of the interrogation 
shows that no parent or guardian was present during Bigda's 
questioning.  In the video, Bigda uses profane and racist 
12 
 
language, and threatens the juveniles with physical violence and 
a lengthy incarceration.  Further, Bigda can be heard 
threatening to plant evidence on the juveniles and assuring them 
that he would "get away with it." 
On February 29, 2016, the district attorney's office 
requested a copy of the interrogation video from the Palmer 
police department and, on receipt in March 2016, made the video 
available to defense counsel for the three juveniles.  In July 
2016, an assistant district attorney assigned to prosecute the 
juveniles viewed the video and brought it to the attention of 
his supervisor, who then alerted the first assistant district 
attorney, Jennifer Fitzgerald.  The district attorney's office 
subsequently disclosed the video in all cases where Bigda was 
involved. 
Aside from Bigda, two other officers from the department 
were present during the video recording of this interrogation:  
Luke Cournoyer and Jose Robles.  While Cournoyer was in the 
interrogation room, Robles was in the dispatch room, from which 
he could see and hear parts of the interrogation.  The two 
officers neither intervened nor reported the incident prior to 
the video's release to the public.  It is unclear from the 
record whether other officers from the department were present 
at the police station during this incident. 
13 
 
In addition to the video, a report by an officer from the 
Wilbraham police department involved in the arrest of the 
juveniles states that an unidentified plainclothes officer from 
the department kicked one of the juveniles.  The kicking was 
alleged to have occurred during the arrest.  Although the 
district attorney's office disclosed this report to defense 
counsel for the three juveniles, it did not disclose the report 
to defendants in any other cases -- reasoning that, without the 
clear and certain identification of the officer whose testimony 
might be subject to impeachment, the district attorney's office 
would be unable to identify any cases in which to make the 
necessary disclosure. 
Fitzgerald testified about this incident during an 
evidentiary hearing before the special master in September 2022.  
Responding to a scenario where one officer among several used 
excessive force, Fitzgerald stated that if "[the district 
attorney's office] can't identify who [the violating officer] 
is, I can't turn it over" to defense counsel.  Therefore, 
although other officers informed Fitzgerald that one of two 
officers in the department, either Steven Vigneault or Bigda, 
probably kicked the juvenile, the policy of the district 
attorney's office still did not require disclosure of this 
incident because there was "nothing concrete to prove" which 
officer kicked the juvenile. 
14 
 
Initially, Vigneault was federally indicted for kicking the 
juvenile.  This indictment was dismissed on January 22, 2020, 
after the juvenile identified Bigda as his assailant.  Bigda was 
then indicted in Federal court for civil rights violations in 
connection with the arrest and interrogation of the juveniles.  
He was acquitted in December 2021 and is no longer employed by 
the department. 
B.  Springfield restaurant incident.  In April 2015, 
multiple off-duty officers in the department physically 
assaulted patrons outside a Springfield restaurant.  After 
kicking and punching the patrons, the off-duty officers fled the 
scene.  The department investigated the incident, wrote a 
report, and referred the matter to the internal investigations 
unit for further investigation and reporting.  In October 2015, 
the department further referred the matter to the district 
attorney's office to determine whether to bring criminal charges 
against the officers involved in the incident.  It took "nearly 
a year" before the department provided the full file of the 
internal investigations unit's investigation to the district 
attorney's office. 
Ultimately, the district attorney's office concluded that 
it lacked probable cause to bring criminal complaints against 
any of the officers, because the evidence failed to sufficiently 
identify the perpetrators of any criminal acts.  The district 
15 
 
attorney's office publicly issued a report to this effect in 
February 2017, posting the report to the website of the district 
attorney's office and providing the report to media outlets.  
However, as in the Bigda incident, the district attorney's 
office did not provide the report to defense counsel in any 
cases involving the officers present at the restaurant, as the 
district attorney's office apparently was unable to attribute 
any criminal offenses to any particular officers. 
The district attorney's office then referred the matter to 
the United States Attorney's office, which in turn referred the 
matter to the Attorney General.  She presented the facts to a 
special Statewide grand jury, which issued indictments against 
fourteen of the department's officers for a variety of crimes, 
including assault, perjury, filing false reports, and 
conspiracy.  The department subsequently placed all fourteen 
officers on leave, although at least five have since been 
reinstated.  At the request of the district attorney's office, 
the Attorney General provided a letter describing the charges 
against each officer.  However, the Attorney General did not 
provide grand jury minutes, copies of the indictments, or any 
additional materials to the district attorney's office.  At the 
time of the special master's report, only two officers had been 
convicted, and charges remained pending against several others. 
16 
 
ii.  Efforts to investigate DOJ report allegations.  In the 
wake of the DOJ report, both the department and the district 
attorney's office have made attempts to investigate the 
anonymized findings of the DOJ report and link them to 
identifiable cases.  These efforts are summarized as follows. 
A.  Kent rebuttal.  Following the publication of the DOJ 
report, in October 2020, Deputy Chief Steven Kent of the 
department drafted a twenty-eight page internal document titled 
"Rebuttal to the Department of Justice Investigation of the 
Springfield, Massachusetts Narcotics Bureau" (Kent rebuttal).  
In this document, Kent identified many of the individuals and 
sixteen of the twenty-three incidents referred to in the DOJ 
report.  He concluded that "errors and discrepancies" in the DOJ 
report undermined its conclusions and wrongfully tarnished the 
department. 
The district attorney's office knew of the Kent rebuttal's 
existence as early as March 2021.5  However, as of October 18, 
2022, when the special master issued her report, the department 
 
5 Although the special master found that the district 
attorney's office knew of the Kent rebuttal's existence as of 
July 2, 2021, we do not accept the special master's finding as 
to this date.  See New England Oil Ref. Co. v. Canada Mexico Oil 
Co., 274 Mass. 191, 197-198 (1931) (facts within special 
master's report become indisputable only when special master's 
report is confirmed).  This error was pointed out by the 
plaintiffs in their objections to the special master's factual 
findings. 
17 
 
had "refused to divulge" the Kent rebuttal to the district 
attorney's office or anyone else.  Then, in March 2023, although 
the Kent rebuttal had been shielded from production by the work 
product privilege up to that point, it was released to the 
public by city officials. 
The plaintiffs take issue with the Kent rebuttal for three 
reasons.  First, Kent was implicated by the very report that he 
sought to debunk, undermining his credibility.  Second, the 
plaintiffs do not believe that Kent's investigation satisfied 
the Commonwealth's broader investigatory obligations following 
the DOJ report.  Third, the plaintiffs assert that the delayed 
disclosure of the Kent rebuttal is an example of the district 
attorney's failure to obtain and disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence. 
B.  District attorney's review of materials underlying DOJ 
report.  On May 19, 2021, the district attorney commenced suit 
against the United States Attorney in Federal court, seeking 
access to the falsified reports made by members of the 
department that underlie the DOJ report.  See generally Gulluni 
v. United States Attorney for Dist. of Mass., 626 F. Supp. 3d 
323 (D. Mass. 2022).  Ultimately, the court deferred to the 
executive branch decision to withhold the documents and granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit later upheld this 
18 
 
decision, noting that the district attorney "already has access 
to all the underlying documents on which DOJ relied in compiling 
its report."  See Gulluni v. Levy, 85 F.4th 76, 77, 84 (1st Cir. 
2023). 
During this time, the district attorney continued to seek 
from the department the materials underlying the DOJ report.  On 
July 2, 2021, in response to inquiries from Fitzgerald, the city 
solicitor sent her approximately 700 to 800 pages of materials, 
describing the sixteen incidents that the department had been 
able to identify from the DOJ report.  These materials included 
summaries of the incidents, arrest reports, and, where 
applicable, the internal investigations unit's case numbers.  
The city solicitor expressly indicated that the information 
provided by the city was "not exhaustive as to each incident."  
However, the city solicitor stated that the department was 
willing to provide the district attorney with access to all 
files known to have been reviewed by the DOJ. 
On receiving these materials, the district attorney began 
to link the identified officers and incidents to some 8,000 
pending or past cases.  From there, the district attorney 
endeavored to identify the attorney of record in each case.  The 
district attorney then sent each identified attorney of record 
redacted copies of the materials provided by the city solicitor.  
However, the district attorney did not make these same 
19 
 
disclosures to pro se litigants, and in the disclosures made, 
the district attorney did not explain that the review of each 
incident was not exhaustive.  There is some dispute as to the 
number of defendants who since have reached out to obtain 
unredacted materials. 
The plaintiffs allege that the district attorney has been 
deficient in the review of the materials underlying the DOJ 
report, having only reviewed 712 pages -- that is, "less than 
[one percent]" -- of the approximately 114,000 pages reviewed by 
the DOJ.  No further detail about these 712 pages has been 
provided.  However, the number of pages purportedly reviewed by 
the district attorney coincides with the approximate number of 
pages provided to the district attorney by the city solicitor.  
The plaintiffs also note that Fitzgerald's request for 
information from the city solicitor came two days after the 
plaintiffs commenced this action, which the plaintiffs allege 
reflects the district attorney's failure to act independently to 
satisfy its investigatory obligations. 
iii.  District attorney's withholding of adverse 
credibility determinations.  As a matter of policy, the district 
attorney's decision whether to disclose adverse credibility 
findings made against officers in the department is based, in 
part, on whether the district attorney agrees with the findings.  
The plaintiffs contend that this practice constitutes the 
20 
 
systematic withholding of exculpatory evidence related to police 
misconduct. 
In exploring this disclosure policy, the special master 
reviewed at least thirteen instances in the record in which the 
district attorney failed to disclose potentially exculpatory 
findings that an officer was untruthful.  Two such instances are 
described infra.6 
First, during an August 2018 hearing in connection with 
Commonwealth vs. Morales, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 1779CR00375 
(Hampden County Aug. 28, 2018), and Commonwealth vs. Santiago, 
Mass. Super. Ct., No. 1779CR00376 (Hampden County Aug. 28, 
2018), the motion judge found that the testimony of an officer 
"plainly stated was not credible," and went on to stress that 
the officer's testimony was "fanciful" and "a made up tale."  
Despite this strong language, the district attorney conducted an 
independent evaluation and found that the testifying officer had 
"misunderstood, but did not misrepresent" relevant facts during 
his testimony.  Therefore, the district attorney's office did 
 
6 The special master's discussion of other instances where 
the district attorney's office failed to disclose potentially 
exculpatory findings that an officer was untruthful breaks down 
into two main categories.  In the first category, judges 
discredited the testimony of officers from the department in 
granting a defendant's motion to suppress.  In the second 
category, officers who had served as prosecution witnesses 
either testified about their prior dishonest conduct or were 
later indicted for their misconduct. 
21 
 
not disclose the motion judge's findings in other cases 
involving the testifying officer. 
Second, in Commonwealth vs. Perez, Mass. Dist. Ct., No. 
1923CR000353 (Springfield Div. Feb. 7, 2019), a defendant was 
shot multiple times by arresting officers in the department.  
After a January 2019 hearing, a District Court judge found that 
the version of the shooting offered by the officers was "not 
consistent with the physical evidence," such that there was 
"substantial incongruity" between the officers' assertions and 
the location of the gunshot wounds.  The judge went so far as to 
say that the "incongruity defies the objective evidence and 
almost belies common sense."  Nonetheless, after an internal 
investigation of the incident, the department and the district 
attorney's office independently concluded that the shooting was 
lawful.  Therefore, the district attorney's office did not 
disclose the judge's comments in other cases in which the 
officer was involved. 
c.  Procedural history.  On April 6, 2021, the plaintiffs 
commenced this action, seeking relief from a single justice of 
this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and G. L. c. 231A, § 1.  On 
April 19, 2022, after the parties filed their briefs and after a 
series of hearings, interim orders, and status reports, the 
single justice appointed a special master to determine the 
relevant facts, make credibility determinations, and report any 
22 
 
recommendations and conclusions of law to the single justice.  
The special master then conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing 
and issued a report of her findings on October 18, 2022.  On 
January 30, 2023, the single justice reserved and reported the 
case to the full court. 
2.  Discussion.  The plaintiffs put forward numerous 
allegations concerning the failings of the district attorney's  
office.  Importantly, the plaintiffs assert that the district 
attorney's office has committed a breach of an ongoing duty to 
learn of the department's misconduct and, further, to disclose 
this misconduct to affected defendants in pending and past 
criminal cases. 
More specifically, the plaintiffs argue that several 
policies and practices of the district attorney's office 
demonstrate an overly narrow view of its disclosure obligations.  
Among these policies and practices, they challenge the practice 
of the district attorney's office of disclosing judicial 
findings of adverse credibility made against officers in the 
department on a discretionary basis to defendants and their 
counsel.  Similarly, the plaintiffs challenge the policy of the 
district attorney's office of withholding instances of officer 
misconduct where multiple officers are involved and the 
wrongdoer cannot be clearly identified.  They also allege that a 
"trifecta" of charges is routinely used to cover up excessive 
23 
 
force within the department:  resisting arrest, disorderly 
conduct, and assault and battery on a police officer. 
In addition to the disclosure-related failures of the 
district attorney's office, the plaintiffs also allege that the 
district attorney's office failed to adequately investigate the 
department following the DOJ's finding of a pattern or practice 
of misconduct within the department, as required by Cotto, 471 
Mass. at 112, and Ware, 471 Mass. at 95.  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs claim that the district attorney's office failed to 
obtain any documents from the department until the plaintiffs 
commenced this suit.  Then, after receiving "some" relevant 
documents from the department, the district attorney's office 
further failed to fulfill its investigatory obligations; instead 
of obtaining the outstanding documents and sending complete 
copies of any exculpatory material directly to all affected 
defendants, the district attorney's office sent redacted, 
limited exculpatory material en masse to the last attorneys of 
record for affected defendants. 
By way of relief, the plaintiffs request that this court 
"institute [interim] remedies" until the district attorney's 
office completes an investigation of the department.  The range 
of the requested relief sweeps broadly, including the creation 
and monitoring of a list of officers connected to the 
misconduct, ensuring that defendants receive evidence as it 
24 
 
becomes available, instituting a judicial presumption favoring 
the admissibility of the DOJ report, crafting jury instructions 
tailored to cases involving former narcotics bureau officers 
within the department, limiting the admissibility of police 
reports at hearings, and fashioning "other relief that the 
[c]ourt deems fit." 
In evaluating the plaintiffs' claims and requested relief, 
we must first discuss the legal obligations of prosecutors -- 
particularly their duty to disclose information that tends to 
exculpate criminal defendants and their duty to seek out such 
information.  We next determine whether the district attorney's 
office met its prosecutorial obligations here.  Where the 
district attorney's office has failed in either duty, and in 
response to the systemic issues within the department that have 
been identified by the DOJ report, we then craft the appropriate 
remedy under our supervisory authority.  See G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
See also Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 747 (2023), 
quoting Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Court 
Dep't, 457 Mass. 172, 183 (2010) ("Allegations of systemic 
abuses affecting the proper administration of justice are 
particularly appropriate for review pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3"). 
a.  Duty to disclose exculpatory material.  "The due 
process clauses of the Federal Constitution and the 
25 
 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require that the 
Commonwealth disclose to a defendant material, exculpatory 
evidence in its possession or control."  Committee for Pub. 
Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 731.  See art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (guaranteeing every criminal 
defendant "shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be 
favorable to him").  To be considered exculpatory, and therefore 
subject to automatic disclosure, evidence need only "tend to 
diminish [a defendant's] culpability."  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 485 Mass. 641, 647-649 (2020).  The defendant 
need not request exculpatory material to mandate this 
disclosure.  See Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131, 
135 (2001). 
The Commonwealth's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
criminal defendants is further reflected in our rules of 
criminal procedure and rules of professional conduct.  See 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 730-731.  See 
also Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004) 
(governing discovery procedures); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as 
appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016) (mandating that prosecutor 
"make timely disclosure" of all evidence that "tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused").  This duty to disclose derives from 
the core responsibility of a prosecutor "to administer justice 
26 
 
fairly."  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., supra at 730, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408 (1992). 
A prosecutor's duty to disclose extends to all facts within 
the "possession, custody, or control" of a member of the 
prosecution team.  Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. at 135.  The 
prosecution team generally is understood to include prosecutors 
and relevant law enforcement personnel.  See Commonwealth v. 
Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 531-532 (1999).  Put differently, "[a] 
prosecutor's obligations extend to information in possession of 
a person who has participated in the investigation or evaluation 
of the case and has reported to the prosecutor's office 
concerning the case."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 
824 (1998) (including State police crime laboratory chemists 
within prosecution team).  See Bing Sial Liang, supra (including 
victim and witness advocates within prosecution team); Beal, 
supra at 532-533 (excluding complainants and independent 
witnesses unaffiliated with investigation from prosecution 
team); Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 679 (1998) 
(including medical examiner within prosecution team). 
A prosecutor's duty to disclose necessarily encompasses 
information that may not even be known to the prosecutor or 
housed within his or her files, so long as the information is 
related directly to the crimes at issue and is in the possession 
of some prosecution team member.  See Martin, 427 Mass. at 823-
27 
 
824; Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 Mass. 17, 20 n.4 (1987).  
See also Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380-384 
(2017).  That is, prosecutors have a duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in possession of all members of the 
prosecution team -- including police officers on the team.  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 658-659.  As 
a result, when a prosecutor or any member of the prosecution 
team learns that police officers either "lied to conceal the 
unlawful use of excessive force" or lied about a defendant's 
conduct and the applicable charges, the prosecutor must disclose 
the untruthful conduct in any criminal case in which that 
officer prepared a report or may serve as a witness.  Id. at 
658. 
Importantly, neither a prosecutor's decision to disclose 
nor a prosecutor's constitutional obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), are dependent on the 
"ultimate admissibility of the information," but only on their 
tendency toward exculpating a defendant.  See  Matter of a Grand 
Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 653.  Indeed, Massachusetts 
prosecutors must "err on the side of caution" when deciding 
whether to disclose.  Id. at 650. 
Turning to United States Supreme Court precedent, the 
existence of exculpatory information known only to officers on 
the prosecution team and not to the individual prosecutor does 
28 
 
not alter this analysis.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
438 (1995) (prosecutors are still responsible for "evidence 
known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor");  
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Drumgold v. 
Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 2013) ("Subsequent to Brady, 
the Supreme Court clarified that this affirmative disclosure 
obligation also encompasses evidence known only to law 
enforcement officers and not to prosecutors").  Accordingly, to 
comply with its obligations under Giglio, supra, to disclose 
information known to the prosecution team, it behooves the 
prosecutor's office to institute formal disclosure procedures to 
ensure the communication of all material information to defense 
counsel.7 
However, as we have stated, "[w]e do not possess the 
authority to require the Attorney General and every district 
attorney in this Commonwealth to promulgate a comparable 
[Giglio] policy."  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 
Mass. at 660.  See art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Nonetheless, "we strongly recommend that they do."  Id.  
That said, it is important to recall that "[n]o checklist can 
 
7 Following Giglio, the DOJ promulgated a "Policy Regarding 
the Disclosure to Prosecutors of Potential Impeachment 
Information Concerning Law Enforcement Agency Witnesses" (also 
known as the "Giglio Policy") to better effect disclosure.  
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 658. 
29 
 
exhaust all potential sources of exculpatory evidence."  
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 733. 
We now examine two key practices of the district attorney's 
office that implicate a prosecutor's duty to disclose:  one, the 
practice of the district attorney's office of disclosing adverse 
credibility determinations made about witnesses from the 
department only on a discretionary basis; and, two, the practice 
of the district attorney's office of withholding misconduct of 
the department's officers where multiple officers are involved 
in an incident and no one action can be attributed to any one 
officer. 
i.  Discretionary disclosure of adverse credibility 
determinations.  In her testimony, Fitzgerald confirmed the 
plaintiffs' allegation that the district attorney's office does 
not automatically turn over every judicial finding of adverse 
credibility made against a police witness to defense counsel.  
Rather, the district attorney's office independently determines 
whether the judge's adverse credibility finding is exculpatory.  
This practice of disclosing adverse credibility findings only on 
a discretionary basis violates disclosure obligations. 
As discussed above, prosecutors' disclosure obligations 
extend to exculpatory information held by members of the 
prosecution team.  See Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. at 135.  
Officers involved in the prosecution of a case are members of 
30 
 
the prosecution team, such that prosecutors are duty-bound to 
disclose exculpatory facts in their possession.  See Beal, 429 
Mass. at 531-532.  Adverse credibility findings made about 
police witnesses are exculpatory, as they may undercut the 
prosecution's case and therefore tend to diminish the 
defendant's culpability.  See Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 485 Mass. at 647-649.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Diaz, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 588, 594 (2022) (to be exculpatory, 
evidence "must simply tend to negate the guilt, or to reinforce 
the innocence, of the accused").  Therefore, adverse credibility 
findings about a police witness fall within the scope of a 
prosecutor's disclosure obligations and must be shared with the 
defense.  Again, "the ultimate admissibility of the information 
is not determinative of the prosecutor's Brady obligation to 
disclose it."  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, supra at 
653. 
A prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory material 
is just that -- an obligation, not a decision.  See  Matter of a 
Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 646-647 (reiterating that 
prosecutor "must" disclose exculpatory information).  Therefore, 
prosecutors cannot, consistent with their obligation to disclose 
exculpatory information, withhold at their discretion the fact 
that a judge has determined that an officer's statements were 
not credible. 
31 
 
Whether the district attorney's office was on notice before 
of a pattern of dishonesty on the part of prosecution witnesses 
from the department, see Martin, 427 Mass. at 823-824 (duty to 
disclose applied to State police crime laboratory reports 
unknown to prosecutor but held by prosecution team member), it 
is now.  See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 177 (1982) 
(potentially exculpatory information known to prosecution cannot 
be withheld from defense with impunity).  Allowing a police 
officer to take the witness stand with knowledge of a prior 
determination as to the officer's dishonesty and without making 
the necessary disclosures of this determination violates the 
ethical and legal duties of a prosecutor.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (imposing duty to disclose any facts of exculpatory nature); 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (g) (prosecutor cannot avoid seeking 
evidence favorable to other side).  See also Matter of a Grand 
Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 658 (duty to disclose requires 
sharing police dishonesty with defendants "in any criminal case 
where the officer is a potential witness or prepared a report").  
See e.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(prosecutor's failure to disclose adverse credibility findings 
against police witness was "akin to active concealment"). 
ii.  Disclosure of incidents where officer remains 
unidentified.  Similarly, the practice of the district 
attorney's office of withholding known instances of police 
32 
 
misconduct when the district attorney's office cannot attribute 
particular criminal acts to particular officers -- as in the 
Springfield restaurant and Bigda incidents -- violates the duty 
of the district attorney's office of disclosure.  Put 
differently, when a subset of a known number of officers has 
committed misconduct, and it is unclear which officer or 
officers are the offenders, the district attorney's office 
cannot shirk its disclosure obligations, but rather must 
disclose the incident in any cases involving any of the officers 
who could be the possible offenders. 
Pending criminal investigations involving and known to 
members of the prosecution team require disclosure.  See Matter 
of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 647.  As discussed 
previously, officers from the department who are involved in the 
prosecution of a case are members of the prosecution team, and 
any exculpatory information known to them triggers the 
disclosure obligations of the district attorney's office.  See 
Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. at 135.  Because a pending criminal 
investigation against any member of the prosecution team holds 
possible impeachment value for a defendant, it is exculpatory.  
See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, supra.  Such 
investigations would require disclosure under the Federal Giglio 
policy, and we subscribe to an even broader understanding of the 
Commonwealth's disclosure obligations.  See id. at 649.  See 
33 
 
also United States Department of Justice, Justice Manual, tit. 
9-5.100(5)(c)(iii) (updated Jan. 2020) [https://perma.cc/NKL2-
YZ2J] (Justice Manual) ("any allegation of misconduct bearing 
upon truthfulness, bias, or integrity that is the subject of a 
pending investigation" requires disclosure).  Again, 
admissibility is not a prerequisite for disclosure.  "Rather, 
once the information is determined to be exculpatory, it should 
be disclosed -- period.  And where a prosecutor is uncertain 
whether information is exculpatory, the prosecutor should err on 
the side of caution and disclose it."  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, supra at 650. 
The requirement to disclose pending criminal investigations 
is distinct from our discussion of pending civil lawsuits in 
Commonwealth v. McFarlane, 493 Mass.    (2024), also released 
today.  Pending civil lawsuits are not subject to automatic 
disclosure obligations because, "until there is finding of civil 
liability, a pending lawsuit may well be without merit."  Id. 
at    .  In contrast, in the case of a pending criminal 
investigation such as the investigation following the 
Springfield restaurant incident, even if the extent of an 
officer's participation in criminal misconduct is unclear, an 
officer's known presence at the restaurant, coupled with reports 
of physical force by ten to fifteen off-duty officers causing 
the injuries of several victims at that scene, is potentially 
34 
 
exculpatory and enough to mandate disclosure.  See Matter of a 
Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 650 (evidence that would 
tend to exculpate defendant, including by impeaching credibility 
of key prosecution witness, must be disclosed).  Similarly, in 
the Bigda incident, where a police witness reported that a plain 
clothes officer kicked a juvenile, and multiple different 
officers reported to the district attorney's office that the 
offender was one of two plain clothes officers, see part 
1.b.i.A, supra, that information is potentially exculpatory, and 
the incident must be disclosed to defense counsel.  See  Matter 
of a Grand Jury Investigation, supra.  Neither allegation is 
unsubstantiated -- both are supported by witness statements, 
police investigation and reporting, and identifiable, injured 
victims.  Cf. Justice Manual, tit. 9-5.100(6) (unsubstantiated 
allegations of misconduct outside scope of impeachment 
material). 
In other words, the extent of an officer's involvement need 
not be clearly proven for the incident to be disclosed; instead, 
if evidence known to the prosecution team "would tend to 
exculpate the defendant or tend to diminish his or her 
culpability," it must be disclosed.  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 485 Mass. at 649 (Massachusetts has broader duty 
to disclose than Federal Brady requirements).  Because the 
current disclosure policy of the district attorney's office 
35 
 
trends toward requiring such clear proof, it imposes too high of 
a bar.  Once disclosure has been accomplished, defense counsel 
may then investigate further to clarify the extent of an 
officer's involvement.  See id. at 653 (disclosure allows 
defense counsel to "probe more deeply" for favorable evidence). 
To allow pending criminal investigations into police 
misconduct known to the prosecution team to go undisclosed would 
be to set up a system where a "prosecutor may hide, [and a] 
defendant must seek," exculpatory information.  Commonwealth v. 
Baran, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 299 (2009), quoting Banks v. 
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (troubling failure of 
prosecutor to produce materials that "might have supported 
[exculpatory] inference").  Rather, a prosecutor's duty of 
disclosure tacks toward sharing information and demands a 
concurrent duty, that of inquiring about the existence of 
potentially exculpatory information. 
b.  Duty to investigate police misconduct.  The 
Commonwealth's duty to disclose exculpatory information to 
defendants walks hand-in-hand with its duty to inquire about 
such information.  Learning that a member of the prosecution 
team has been accused of misconduct triggers the Commonwealth's 
"duty to conduct a thorough investigation to determine the 
nature and extent" of that misconduct.  Ware, 471 Mass. at 95.  
This duty of inquiry is premised on the prosecutor's duty to 
36 
 
"learn of and disclose" any exculpatory evidence held by any 
member of the prosecution team.  Id.  See Cotto, 471 Mass. at 
112.  In order to protect the integrity of the criminal justice 
system and the rights of individual defendants, this inquiry 
must be taken seriously by the prosecution and conducted in a 
timely fashion.  See Cotto, supra at 111-112. 
Relying on both Ware and Cotto, the plaintiffs claim that 
the findings in the DOJ report have triggered the duty of the 
district attorney's office to investigate the department.  The 
plaintiffs further invoke Cotto to seek this court's continued 
supervision over the investigation by the district attorney's 
office into the department.  Both Ware, 471 Mass. at 86, and 
Cotto, 471 Mass. at 98, concerned the actions of Sonja Farak, a 
chemist at the Department of Public Health's State Laboratory 
Institute (drug lab) whose misconduct ultimately compromised 
tens of thousands of drug-related convictions.  These two cases 
impose a duty on the Commonwealth to investigate known 
misconduct to determine its "timing and scope" and "remove the 
cloud that has been cast over the integrity" of the criminal 
justice system.  Cotto, supra at 115.  See Ware, supra at 95. 
In Ware, 471 Mass. at 86, the defendant had been convicted 
of various drug offenses during the period of Farak's employment 
as a drug lab chemist for the Commonwealth, and sought 
postconviction relief -- namely, the ability to retest drug 
37 
 
evidence taken by the department during the period of Farak's 
employment.  The defendant did not claim that Farak herself had 
tested the drug samples that led to his conviction.  See id.  
Rather, the defendant's goal was to determine when exactly 
Farak's misconduct began.  See id. at 92-93. 
On review, we determined that the Commonwealth had failed 
to conduct a thorough investigation of Farak's misconduct, such 
that the "magnitude and implications of the problem" had not 
been ascertained.  Id. at 96.  Although "[t]he State police 
spent a few days looking for missing evidence, searching Farak's 
vehicle, interviewing her colleagues, conducting an inventory of 
the facility, and searching a tote bag that had been seized from 
Farak's work station," id., this "cursory" investigation failed 
to completely capture Farak's misconduct, id. at 92, 96.  
Therefore, we allowed the defendant to conduct postconviction 
discovery and urged the Attorney General to lead an 
investigation into the Farak matter.  See id. at 96 & n.14. 
Our decision in Cotto, released the same day as Ware, 
similarly focused on the ramifications of Farak's misconduct.  
There, the defendant had been convicted of selling cocaine and 
sought to withdraw his guilty pleas because his alleged cocaine 
sample had been tested by Farak.  See Cotto, 471 Mass. at 98-
102.  This court again noted the "absence of a thorough 
investigation [into Farak's actions] by the Commonwealth," 
38 
 
particularly in comparison to the similar case of Annie Dookhan.  
Id. at 108-111.  Dookhan was a chemist at a different State drug 
laboratory who had engaged in a variety of misconduct, ranging 
from falsifying results and reports to wrongfully removing and 
contaminating drug samples.  See id. at 111.  In some instances, 
Dookhan provided test results without testing individual 
samples, a practice known as "dry labbing."  See id. at 106-107, 
111.  In the wake of Dookhan's misconduct, the State police 
detective unit in the Attorney General's office conducted a 
broad formal investigation of her time at that drug laboratory.  
See id. at 111.  Comparatively, by the time we issued our 
decision in Cotto, no such investigation had yet been undertaken 
of Farak's misconduct.  See id.  In light of the Commonwealth's 
failure to investigate, this court in Cotto entitled defendants 
affected by Farak's misconduct to retest their existing drug 
samples.  See id. at 114.  This court further demanded that the 
Commonwealth decide and report, within a month, whether it 
intended to pursue a more formal investigation of Farak's time 
as a chemist.  See id. at 115. 
While we expounded on the Commonwealth's duty of inquiry in 
Cotto and Ware, the duty of inquiry predated those cases.  See, 
e.g., Martin, 427 Mass. at 823.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 598 (1986) ("We have recognized, 
however, that, in some circumstances, the prosecutor should be 
39 
 
required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence").  
As we have previously emphasized, a prosecutor is expected to 
actively seek out any exculpatory evidence held by the 
Commonwealth or another member of the prosecution team.  See 
Martin, supra.  For example, in Martin, this court reversed a 
conviction because the prosecutor failed to turn over 
exculpatory evidence that was unknown to him but known to the 
Commonwealth's drug laboratory technician.  See id.  Despite his 
ignorance, the prosecutor nonetheless had violated his "duty to 
inquire" into the existence of tests conducted by the 
Commonwealth.  Id. 
"'Reasonableness' is the only limitation on the 
prosecutor's duty of inquiry."  Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 
434, 440-441 (2010) ("a prosecutor's belief that no inquiry is 
necessary or required in the circumstances of a particular case, 
based only on the prosecutor's assumption that he already has 
all of the items and information subject to discovery, does not 
comport" with duty of reasonable inquiry).  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (a) (3).  Reasonableness demands, at the very least, that 
prosecutors ask other members of the prosecution team whether 
exculpatory information exists, particularly any information 
specifically requested by defense counsel or required to be 
disclosed under rule 14.  See Diaz, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 594 
("The scope of reasonable inquiry for the prosecutor, informed 
40 
 
by the defense request for the call log data, extended to 
inquiring of the detectives whether that information was 
accessible to the government").  When a prosecutor is aware of 
potential misconduct involving a member of the prosecution team, 
the duty of reasonable inquiry also demands that he or she 
"conduct a thorough investigation to determine the nature and 
extent" of the misconduct.  Ware, 471 Mass. at 95.  See Cotto, 
471 Mass. at 115 (prosecutors should determine "timing and 
scope" of known misconduct). 
That is not to say that prosecutors must investigate on 
behalf of defense counsel, see Beal, 429 Mass. at 532, but 
rather that their duty of inquiry follows from the duty to 
disclose all exculpatory evidence held by members of the 
prosecution team.  See Hallinan, 491 Mass. at 746, quoting 
Martin, 427 Mass. at 823-824.  See also Frith, 458 Mass. at 441 
("it is incumbent on [a prosecutor] to ask a police prosecutor, 
or other similar official, whether all discoverable materials 
relating to a particular case have been given to the 
Commonwealth"). 
In discussing the discovery obligations of the Commonwealth 
in joint investigations with the Federal government, this court 
has outlined factors to determine "whether the prosecutor is 
obligated to seek requested exculpatory evidence" from Federal 
investigators.  Donahue, 396 Mass. at 599.  These factors -- 
41 
 
"potential unfairness to the defendant; the defendant's lack of 
access to the evidence; the burden on the prosecutor of 
obtaining the evidence; and the degree of cooperation between" 
members of the prosecution team -- may be relevant in outlining 
the duty of inquiry more broadly.  Id.  See generally Hochman, 
Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1673, 1691 (1996) ("The contextual location 
of the evidence, the ease with which the prosecutor can acquire 
it, and the potential impact on the case better describe when 
the prosecutor constructively possesses evidence than any 
artificial line drawing"). 
The Supreme Court has couched a prosecutor's duty in 
similar terms.  Because of the crucial truth-seeking role played 
by the prosecutor in criminal trials, "the individual prosecutor 
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government's behalf in a case, including 
the police."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.  See Strickler v. Greene, 
527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).  See also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (one 
prosecutor responsible for information known to another 
prosecutor in same office).  This duty to investigate is, again, 
inextricably tied to the prosecutorial duty to disclose -- 
whether a prosecutor succeeds or fails in learning of favorable 
evidence known to a member of the prosecution team, the 
prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose that 
42 
 
evidence to defendants is "inescapable."  Kyles, supra at 437-
438.  Therefore, a prosecutor's duty of inquiry necessarily 
reaches police misconduct that may not be otherwise known to the 
prosecutor. 
Other Federal courts agree that a prosecutor cannot avoid 
learning what other members of the prosecution team know "simply 
by declining to make reasonable inquiry of those in a position 
to have relevant knowledge."  United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 
753, 761 (1st Cir. 1991).  Rather, prosecutors carry an 
additional obligation to disclose what they "do[] not know but 
could have learned" (citation omitted).  United States v. Cano, 
934 F.3d 1002, 1023 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
2877 (2021).  To conclude otherwise would be to "substitute the 
police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, 
as the final arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure 
fair trials."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438. 
With the foregoing in mind, we now examine whether the duty 
of the district attorney's office to investigate the department 
was triggered by the DOJ report and, concurrently, the scope of 
that duty to investigate.  We then touch on how the duty to 
investigate interacts with police department internal affairs 
records, bearing in mind that internal affairs investigations 
rely on confidentiality to work as intended. 
43 
 
i.  Duty of district attorney's office to investigate 
department's records following DOJ report.  The DOJ's finding of 
a pattern or practice of misconduct within the department 
provides the Commonwealth with certain knowledge of misconduct 
on the part of members of the prosecution team, raising "serious 
questions" about the integrity of their work on behalf of the 
Commonwealth.  Cotto, 471 Mass. at 109-110.  Therefore, the duty 
of the district attorney's office to investigate unquestionably 
was triggered by the DOJ report's findings.  See Martin, 427 
Mass. at 823 (prosecutor committed breach of duty of inquiry by 
failing to ask about exculpatory information that was unknown to 
him but known to member of prosecution team).  The question then 
becomes the scope of the duty and whether the district 
attorney's office has satisfied that duty. 
In the aftermath of the DOJ report, the district attorney's 
office took various steps to investigate the department's 
misconduct.  After numerous attempts to have the DOJ share the 
materials from the department that were underlying the DOJ's 
report, the district attorney's office ultimately sued the DOJ 
for access.  The district attorney's office also directly 
contacted the department, requesting access to the documents 
underlying the DOJ's report.  The district attorney's office 
received between 700 and 800 documents from the city solicitor, 
which the district attorney's office then provided to counsel 
44 
 
for the impacted defendants that the district attorney's office 
could identify.  The 700 to 800 documents, mainly consisting of 
arrest reports or the internal investigations unit's case 
numbers, related to the sixteen incidents described in the DOJ 
report that could be reasonably identified by the department.  
By looking beyond its own files and asking members of the 
prosecution team, namely, the department, for access to any 
exculpatory materials, the district attorney's office took 
reasonable steps to inquire into the department's misconduct.  
See  Martin, 427 Mass. at 823-824. 
The duty of reasonable inquiry does not demand that the 
district attorney's office recreate the DOJ investigation.  See 
Beal, 429 Mass. at 532 (prosecutors need not act as defense 
investigators).  However, the district attorney's office was 
obligated to request that "all discoverable materials" be made 
available to the prosecution.  Frith, 458 Mass at 441.  By not 
following up on the city solicitor's offer to provide "any and 
all records" that were reviewed by the DOJ "at [the] request [of 
the district attorney's office]" and settling for the 700 to 800 
documents provided, the district attorney's office fell short of 
meeting its duty of inquiry.  See id. at 440 (where prosecutors 
have knowledge of additional records related to ongoing matters, 
they are duty-bound to conduct "further inquiry" into those 
records).  See also Martin, 427 Mass. at 823 ("The Commonwealth 
45 
 
had the obligation to produce all [exculpatory evidence 
specifically requested by the defendant] in its possession"). 
As the duty of inquiry is bounded by "reasonableness," it 
is reasonable for the district attorney's office to, at the very 
least, obtain access to all materials from the department that 
were known to have been reviewed by the DOJ.  Frith, 458 Mass at 
440-441.  Fairness dictates that the district attorney's office 
bears the burden of obtaining all evidence reviewed by the DOJ, 
rather than criminal defendants.  See Donahue, 396 Mass. at 600 
(inability of defendant to obtain access to records that "may 
well have been available to the prosecutor on request" was 
factor in determining prosecutor's obligation).  Not only do 
defendants and prosecutors have asymmetrical access to 
exculpatory information here, but the city solicitor has 
explicitly offered to give the district attorney's office all 
materials that "can be identified as reviewed" by the DOJ.  The 
district attorney's office had a duty to inquire into all 
exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution team -- including 
the department's records that formed the basis of the DOJ 
report. 
Because the exact documents reviewed by the DOJ cannot be 
known, the district attorney's office must gather all documents 
that fall within the general categories of documents identified 
by the DOJ to satisfy the investigatory obligations of the 
46 
 
district attorney's office.  That is, the DOJ listed the 
following categories of documents among those that it reviewed:  
the "[department's] policies and procedures; training materials 
related to the use of force and accountability; [the 
department's] internal affairs protocols; and other materials 
relating to the general operations of the [d]epartment and use-
of-force practices in particular."  The DOJ also reviewed all 
arrest and use-of-force reports from 2013 to 2018, and every 
prisoner injury file created between 2013 and 2019.  Therefore, 
to the extent that these materials are not internal affairs 
records, subject to the discovery procedures laid out in 
Commonwealth v. Wanis, 426 Mass. 639, 642-644 (1998), and 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 426 Mass. 647, 650 (1998), the 
district attorney's office must obtain all documents falling 
into these categories from the department in order to fulfill 
the duty of the district attorney's office of investigation.  
See Frith, 458 Mass at 441.  To the extent this gathering and 
review process yields more exculpatory information, that, too, 
must be obtained and disclosed by the district attorney's 
office.  See id. at 440-441. 
ii.  Limitations on duty to inquire into police internal 
affairs records.  In discussing the duty of the district 
attorney's office of inquiry, the plaintiffs seek to revisit two 
47 
 
cases decided by this court:  Wanis, 426 Mass. 639, and 
Rodriguez, 426 Mass. 647.8 
In Wanis, 426 Mass. at 640-642, the defendants attempted to 
compel the production of an internal police investigation about 
their arresting officer.  The question became whether police 
department internal affairs records fall within a prosecutor's 
automatic discovery obligations pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14.  See id. at 643.  This court deemed internal affairs 
divisions to be outside of the scope of the prosecution team and 
therefore "reject[ed] any suggestion" that internal affairs 
records, even if relevant and material, must be produced by the 
prosecution.  Id.  In so ruling, this court emphasized the 
 
8 The case of plaintiff Graham offers an example of the 
exculpatory materials that may be contained within police 
department internal affairs records.  In July 2017, Graham, a 
Black man, was in an altercation with two white off-duty 
officers.  One of the three men pointed a gun during this 
altercation, but it was unclear who did so, Graham or one of the 
officers.  When on-duty officers from the department arrived at 
the scene, Graham was arrested for, among other things, unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm.  However, during the 
altercation, an unidentified 911 caller stated that the Black 
man involved did not have the gun.  After Graham filed a 
complaint against the arresting officers for assault, the 
internal investigations unit followed up with the 911 caller, 
who reiterated that the only person with a gun was a "white 
guy."  Accordingly, the special master later deemed the 911 call 
"clearly exculpatory."  The prosecutor was unaware of the 
internal investigations unit's investigation, and defense 
counsel did not obtain the report of that investigation.  
Therefore, Graham was convicted without knowledge of this call 
and only obtained access to the internal investigation unit's 
file through the efforts of his appellate counsel. 
48 
 
importance of maintaining the integrity of internal affairs 
investigations and the morale of police officers.  See id. at 
645.  Subjecting internal investigations to automatic discovery 
would strip away any assurance of confidentiality, potentially 
chilling cooperation with investigation efforts.  See id. 
Even while shielding internal affairs records from 
automatic disclosure, this court provided criminal defendants 
with avenues to access any salient information contained within 
internal affairs files.  Under Wanis, 426 Mass. at 644, if a 
prosecutor actually possesses police department internal affairs 
records, the prosecutor must review that material in response to 
a rule 14 motion.  If a prosecutor does not possess such 
records, a defendant may obtain the statements of percipient 
witnesses contained within an internal affairs file via a motion 
under Mass. R. Crim P. 17, as appearing in 378 Mass. 885 (1979).  
See id.  If a defendant desires additional information, a 
summons for production must be sought and, if opposed, the 
defendant must make a specific, good faith showing of relevancy 
to a judge.  See id. at 644-645. 
Rodriguez, released together with Wanis, similarly involved 
a defendant's request for internal investigation records about 
an arresting police officer.  See Rodriguez, 426 Mass. at 647.  
This court in Rodriguez again ruled that police department 
internal affairs records are not subject to automatic discovery 
49 
 
and fall outside the prosecutor's possession.  See id. at 648.  
In lockstep with Wanis, this court ordered the keeper of the 
internal affairs records to produce all statements by percipient 
witnesses to the defendant, pursuant to rule 17.  See id. at 
650. 
Wanis and Rodriguez, together, place an explicit limitation 
on a prosecutor's duty of inquiry by deeming records from police 
department internal affairs divisions to be outside a 
prosecution team's possession, custody, or control and, 
therefore, outside the scope of prosecutors' disclosure 
obligations under rule 14.  This limitation does " nothing to 
relieve the Commonwealth of its ongoing duty to disclose 
exculpatory information -- including any material, exculpatory 
information related to past discipline or internal investigation 
of the officer in question -- to the extent such information is 
in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution team."  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 481 Mass. 1021, 1022 (2018). 
Our case law defines the scope of the prosecution team in a 
manner consistent with the limitations in Wanis.  The 
involvement of one police officer in a prosecution does not 
render the entire police department part of the prosecution 
team.  See Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734 (1992).  
Indeed, law enforcement agents or personnel who are not involved 
in the prosecution of a case do not become members of the 
50 
 
prosecution team merely because they hold potentially 
exculpatory materials.  See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 
680, 702 (1979) (prosecution had no duty to obtain potentially 
exculpatory records maintained by correction officials).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Torres, 479 Mass. 641, 647-648 (2018) 
(Attorney General was not member of prosecution team, despite 
possessing relevant records, because Attorney General was not 
involved in prosecutor's investigation). 
While some courts consider police "personnel records," 
including internal affairs reports, to fall within a 
prosecutor's disclosure obligations, see Milke, 711 F.3d at 1016 
(imputing knowledge of police officer's personnel files, 
including internal affairs files, to prosecution for purposes of 
disclosure), Massachusetts is not alone in its reticence to open 
internal affairs records to every criminal defendant.  See 
Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 
432, 437 (10th Cir. 1981) (using balancing test to "provide 
safeguards against unlimited review" of police personnel and 
inspection files).  See e.g., State v. Roy, 151 Vt. 17, 31-33 
(1989), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brillon, 
2008 VT 35, ¶¶ 14-15 (internal investigation records held by 
police were outside possession of prosecutor). 
Indeed, even courts that disagree and conclude that 
prosecutors constructively possess police department internal 
51 
 
affairs files acknowledge the importance of confidentiality 
here.  See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 309 (1999) 
("The confidentiality interest must be balanced, in this 
context, against the confrontation and due process rights of the 
defendant").  For example, United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 
1500, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cited by the plaintiffs, cabins a 
prosecutor's "duty to search" internal affairs files held by law 
enforcement agencies to where "there is an explicit request for 
an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect 
that the examination might yield material exculpatory 
information."  In ruling that internal affairs files may fall 
within the prosecution's duty of inquiry under these conditions, 
the Brooks court noted that "[a]s the burden of the proposed 
examination rises, clearly the likelihood of a pay-off must also 
rise before the government can be put to the effort."  Id.  In 
other words, even if a prosecutor's duty of inquiry does extend 
to internal affairs records, this duty is not automatically 
triggered by the mere existence of such records.  Rather, the 
court in Brooks was careful to avoid imposing an unconditional 
duty of inquiry on the prosecution. 
Wanis and Rodriguez properly impose limits on a 
prosecutor's duty of inquiry, specifically as it pertains to 
internal affairs records.  Therefore, we see no reason to 
overturn these decisions, and we decline the plaintiffs' 
52 
 
invitation to do so.  Accordingly, regarding the internal 
affairs records identified by the DOJ in its report -- that is, 
"over [one hundred] report files for over [one hundred] internal 
investigations conducted by the [internal investigations unit], 
as well as [seventy-four] personnel files" -- the affected 
defendants may avail themselves of the disclosure procedures set 
out in Wanis and Rodriguez. 
c.  Global remedy.  The plaintiffs seek a variety of 
remedies, mainly drawn from our actions in Bridgeman v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 315 (2017) 
(Bridgeman II). 
In Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 299, this court crafted 
procedures for relief in the face of Dookhan's misconduct and 
its impact on more than 20,000 defendants.  In deciding whether 
to grant a global remedy in Bridgeman II, id. at 315, we 
identified "four relevant principles of our criminal justice 
system."  First, the government alone bears the burden of taking 
reasonable steps, including providing notice, to remedy 
egregious misconduct in the investigation or prosecution of a 
criminal case.  Id. at 315-316.  Second, relief from conviction 
typically requires a defendant to file a motion for a new trial.  
Id. at 316.  Third, dismissal with prejudice is available where 
either (a) a prosecutor fails to disclose evidence that the 
defendant is entitled to receive and thereby "irremediabl[y]" 
53 
 
prejudices the defendant, or (b) the prosecutorial misconduct is 
egregious, deliberate, and intentional, or results in a 
violation of constitutional rights.  Id.  Fourth, where many 
have been wronged, "we do not throw up our hands and deny relief 
because it would be too difficult to accomplish."  Id. at 317-
318.  Rather, the remedy must be fair, timely, and practical.  
Id. at 317.  Together, these four principles guide our decision 
in "how best to balance the rights of defendants affected by 
governmental misconduct and society's interest in administering 
justice."  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 723. 
 
Global remedies are appropriate where, in their absence, 
defendants wrongly would be forced to "bear the burden of a 
systemic collapse" that is "entirely attributable to the 
government."  Hallinan, 491 Mass. at 748, quoting Bridgeman v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 476 
(2015) (Bridgeman I).  However, when possible, case-by-case 
adjudication remains "the fairest and best alternative" to 
resolve individual cases potentially tainted by government 
misconduct, as it is "most consistent and in harmony with the 
relevant principles of criminal justice."  Bridgeman II, 476 
Mass. at 326.  Case-by-case adjudication can be "adapted" as 
necessary to make the process both "fair and workable."  Id.  It 
is appropriate particularly where, as here, prosecutorial 
misconduct is at issue, such that remedies should be "tailored 
54 
 
to the injury suffered and should not unnecessarily infringe on 
competing interests."  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 
Mass. at 725, quoting Commonwealth v. Carney, 458 Mass. 418, 427 
(2010). 
When faced with 20,000 cases affected by the misconduct of 
Dookhan in Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 300-301, this court 
eschewed the use of a global remedy and instead adopted a new 
case-by-case protocol for adjudication.  The facts are similar 
here.  Much like in Bridgeman II, id. at 314-315, the plaintiffs 
allege that the district attorney's office has fallen short in 
its prosecutorial duty of disclosure, creating a risk of harm to 
criminal defendants.  Likewise, as in Bridgeman II, id. at 308, 
the need to identify the defendants who may have been affected 
by the misconduct remains urgent.  Therefore, as in Bridgeman 
II, id. at 322, a global remedy is "neither as just nor as 
practical" as case-by-case adjudication here. 
This is particularly true where the district attorney's 
office already has made necessary reforms to its disclosure 
policies in response to this litigation.  The district 
attorney's office now has an annual practice of requesting that 
police departments provide the names and supporting information 
of any officers who have been charged with a crime, found to be 
untruthful, or who have engaged in misconduct.  These officers 
then are included in the new internal database created and 
55 
 
maintained by the district attorney's office of Brady material, 
which is available to all assistant district attorneys and is 
organized by officer names.  The database includes law 
enforcement employees who have engaged in either criminal 
activity, deceitful behavior, or a pattern of discrimination.  
To put this database into action, the district attorney's office 
has developed a system to flag internal files for cases 
requiring disclosure.  Further, the district attorney's office 
has formed a "Brady Working Group" to formulate new disclosure 
practices.  This group developed a new "Brady Policy" for the 
district attorney's office that sets out disclosure obligations 
and procedures and "err[s] on the side of disclosure."  To 
ensure compliance and mitigate any risk of error, the district 
attorney's office has also instituted an "Exculpatory Evidence 
Team" to review disclosure questions. 
Even with the aforementioned reforms in place, the 
plaintiffs unsuccessfully have sought access to the information 
underlying the DOJ report for years.9  The remedy here is simple:  
 
9 The case of plaintiff Lopez provides an example of the 
plaintiffs' efforts to obtain the documents from the department 
that underlie the DOJ report.  Lopez was a defendant in two 
criminal cases in Hampden County.  After the publication of the 
DOJ report in July 2020, Lopez's CPCS defense attorney undertook 
efforts to determine whether the officers in Lopez's case were 
implicated by the DOJ report.  These efforts continued over the 
course of approximately eighteen months.  In January 2022, the 
district attorney's office sent over 1,000 pages of files from 
the department's internal investigations unit to Lopez's defense 
56 
 
all defendants affected by the department's misconduct should 
have access to all materials known to have been reviewed by the 
DOJ in drafting its report. 
To reiterate, because the DOJ will not divulge which 
specific documents it relied upon in drafting its report, the 
district attorney's office must "err on the side of caution and 
disclose" the five categories of the department's records that 
the DOJ is known to have reviewed:  (1) the department's 
policies and procedures; (2) the department's training materials 
related to the use of force and accountability; (3) the 
department's internal affairs protocols; (4) materials related 
to the general operations of the department and its use-of-force 
practices in particular; and (5) to the extent they do not fall 
within the ambit of Wanis and Rodriguez, arrest and use-of-force 
reports from 2013 to 2018 and prisoner injury files from 2013 to 
2019.  See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 
650.  The DOJ has provided no further information about the 
materials underlying its investigation, so the district 
attorney's office must disclose what evidence it knows to be 
discoverable. 
We realize that this necessarily entails the disclosure and 
subsequent review of a large number of the department's records.  
 
counsel.  In March 2022, while his defense counsel was combing 
through these documents, Lopez pleaded guilty. 
57 
 
However, in light of the DOJ's finding in its report of a 
pattern or practice of misconduct and excessive force within the 
department, every underlying document has the potential to hold 
exculpatory value for a criminal defendant.  See  Matter of a 
Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 650.  Moreover, handing 
over all information that tends to exculpate criminal 
defendants -- a so-called "information dump" -- is the very 
disclosure requested by the plaintiffs.  See id.  It is the role 
of defense counsel to then sort through the information provided 
by the district attorney's office for relevant and exculpatory 
evidence -- it is not the responsibility of the district 
attorney's office to investigate on their behalf.  See Beal, 429 
Mass. at 532.  See also Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 
595, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977) ("a prosecutor cannot be 
expected to appreciate the significance of every item of 
evidence in his possession to any possible defense which might 
be asserted by the defendant").  Indeed, through total 
disclosure of the information underlying the DOJ report, 
defendants can have access to all potentially exculpatory 
information, and need not rely on any other agency to conduct a 
preliminary review that may actually limit their access to 
relevant, exculpatory information. 
All records will be disclosed subject to a protective 
order.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (6) ("The judge may, for 
58 
 
cause shown, grant discovery to a defendant on the condition 
that the material to be discovered be available only to counsel 
for the defendant").  See also Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs., 480 Mass. at 733 ("Absent a protective order, no 
prosecutor, whether in the office of the Attorney General or in 
the office of a district attorney, has the authority to decline 
to disclose exculpatory information").  Because the plaintiffs 
sought relief from a single justice under our general 
supervisory authority, the district attorney's office and 
organizational plaintiffs will work together to disseminate the 
materials under the protective order.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 795 (2005) (judge "has some measure of 
inherent authority" to issue protective orders).  See also 
Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 300-301.  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 803, cert. denied sub nom. Mooltrey 
v. Massachusetts, 555 U.S. 947 (2008) (decisions surrounding 
protective order typically within discretion of trial judge).  
Any further determinations about the protective order also will 
be decided by the single justice.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (7) ("the judge may alter or amend the previous order or 
orders as the interests of justice may require").  This includes 
determining the scope of the five categories of documents 
identified within the DOJ report.  In order to ensure that such 
59 
 
a sweeping disclosure is usable by defense counsel, it will be 
made in an electronic format with optical character recognition. 
 
After the underlying categories of documents have been 
disclosed to the plaintiffs, and individual cases and defendants 
affected by the department's systemic misconduct have been 
identified, case-by-case adjudication can begin in earnest.  See 
Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 326 (success of case-by-case 
adjudication depends on cooperation of district attorneys and 
defense counsel alike).  This measure, together with the 
cessation of ongoing practice of the district attorney's office 
as detailed above, will provide criminal defendants in Hampden 
County with access to exculpatory information that they 
constitutionally are entitled to possess. 
3.  Conclusion.  We exercise our general superintendence 
authority to ensure that the disclosure and investigation 
procedures of the district attorney's office match the scope of 
the inescapable constitutional duties of that office.  See G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  First, the discretionary approach of the district 
attorney's office to disclosing adverse credibility 
determinations made about the department's officer witnesses 
violates the duty of the district attorney's office to disclose.  
Second, the policy of the district attorney's office of not 
disclosing instances of officer misconduct when the identity of 
the offending officer cannot be clearly proven violates the duty 
60 
 
of the district attorney's office to disclose.  Third, we 
require that the district attorney's office obtain all records 
from the department that are known to have been reviewed by the 
DOJ and, subsequently, disclose them in an electronic format 
with optical character recognition, subject to a protective 
order.  Through these measures, this court provides prosecutors 
across the Commonwealth with a clearer understanding of their 
obligations, and further provides defendants in Hampden County 
with the means of accessing potentially exculpatory materials 
underlying the DOJ report. 
The case is remanded to the single justice for the entry of 
a declaratory judgment as provided in this opinion and for 
further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
LOWY, J. (concurring, with whom Cypher, J., joins).  I 
agree that the practice of the  office of the district attorney 
for the Hampden district (district attorney) of disclosing 
adverse credibility determinations and instances of officer 
misconduct when the offending officer's identity is not clearly 
proven only on a discretionary basis is violative of the 
district attorney's duty of disclosure.  I also agree with the 
court's determination that the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) report's findings triggered the district 
attorney's duty to investigate.  I write separately for two 
reasons:  (1) to emphasize that, even though adverse credibility 
findings fall within a prosecutor's duty of disclosure, not 
every adverse credibility determination by a judge as to a 
police officer's credibility constitutes a finding that the 
officer was lying; and (2) to delineate the difference between 
the duty of investigation and the duty of inquiry. 
Adverse credibility findings.  The special master's report 
in this case importantly notes that a judge's credibility 
finding as to a police witness involves evaluating an amalgam of 
factors, including but not limited to the police witness's 
observations, perceptions, memories, and biases.  An adverse 
credibility finding that a judge elected not to "credit" a 
witness does not inherently reflect a conclusion that a witness 
was lying or that a witness was not credible with respect to 
2 
 
other matters.  There is danger in assuming otherwise, given the 
centrality of credibility determinations to a given police 
officer's career and, more importantly, to the integrity of a 
police department's criminal cases.  While all adverse 
credibility determinations are exculpatory and must be turned 
over, the nature of the finding may affect the admissibility of 
the evidence and the nature of rehabilitation of the police 
witness if so impeached. 
Where a judge fails to credit a police witness, and that 
finding is disclosed to the defendant, as it must be in cases in 
which that police officer has been or might be a witness, the 
special master recognized that "this standard means that every 
police officer's career is on the line every time the officer 
testifies before any judge.  That result . . . is inherent in 
the serious responsibility each police officer accepts in taking 
on the role."  When an adverse credibility determination is 
based upon a police witness's lack of testimonial faculties1 -- 
as opposed to a finding that a police witness testified 
untruthfully -- this is not the type of credibility finding that 
should hinder an officer's usefulness in investigations or end 
 
1 For instance, a finding that an officer was not wearing 
his prescription glasses at the time he made an observation. 
3 
 
an officer's career.2  And the nature of the adverse credibility 
finding may well affect the admissibility of such evidence. 
Although, "[i]n general, specific instances of misconduct 
showing the witness to be untruthful are not admissible for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility" 
under Mass. G. Evid. § 608(b) (2023), "we have 'chiseled a 
narrow exception' to this general rule, 'recognizing that in 
special circumstances the interest of justice forbids strict 
application of the rule.'"  Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 485 Mass. 641, 651 (2020), quoting Commonwealth 
v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 151 (1993).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982); 
Miller v. Curtis, 158 Mass. 127, 131 (1893).  Most recently, and 
most applicable in this instance, in Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, supra at 652, we addressed a variety of factors a 
 
2 In light of the centrality of an investigating police 
officer's credibility to effectively prosecuting a crime, an 
officer's credibility is often directly linked to his or her 
capacity to perform essential investigatory functions.  When a 
given officer's credibility is compromised, so too may the 
broader aims of past and present investigations linked to that 
officer be compromised.  Accordingly, police departments, to 
ensure the integrity of their cases, may elect not to use 
officers with adverse credibility determinations in 
investigations moving forward.  When an adverse credibility 
determination is based on a finding other than that a police 
officer lied, such intense consequences unjustifiably deprive an 
officer of his or her capacity to continue serving the public 
honestly, which in turn deprives the public of its interest in 
justice. 
4 
 
judge may consider is deciding whether a police officer witness 
may be impeached with prior misconduct.  In other words, a 
finding that the judge credited the testimony of a civilian 
witness over the testimony of a police officer may simply be the 
result of the judge's determination that the civilian witness 
was closer to the event or that the civilian witness's testimony 
was corroborated by another witness (who him- or herself may 
have lied).  Moreover, when adverse credibility findings are 
admissible for impeachment purposes against a police witness, 
rehabilitation of that witness may include evidence pointing out 
the nature of the finding or even calling a character witness 
for truthfulness under Mass. G. Evid. § 608(a) ("evidence of 
truthful character is admissible only after the witness's 
character for truthfulness has been attacked"). 
We all see things through the prism of our own experience, 
and witnesses may observe the same event differently for a 
multiplicity of reasons.  That does not make one witness a liar.  
If we want to encourage the best and brightest to consider law 
enforcement careers, we must distinguish between different kinds 
of adverse credibility findings.  That each adverse credibility 
finding is exculpatory to a certain extent does not, in and of 
itself, mean that each adverse credibility finding should be 
admissible in evidence or result in unwarranted or calamitous 
consequences for the officer, and ultimately the public. 
5 
 
The duty to learn of exculpatory information.  It is well 
established that a prosecutor has a "duty to learn of and 
disclose to a defendant any exculpatory evidence that is 'held 
by agents of the prosecution team.'"  Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 
Mass. 85, 95 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 
530, 532 (1999).  In general, however, our past delineation of 
the duty to learn of exculpatory information has at times 
suffered from a lack of precision, leaving prosecutors without 
clear guidance as to their obligations regarding what defense 
counsel is entitled to in discovery.  We have expounded upon a 
prosecutor's duty to learn of exculpatory information in a 
variety of contexts -- referring to this duty to learn as both a 
duty to inquire and a duty to investigate.  See Commonwealth v. 
Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 440–441 (2010) ("'Reasonableness' is the 
only limitation on the prosecutor's duty of inquiry").  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 702 (1979) (holding 
prosecutor had no "duty to investigate" Department of Correction 
records "in the remote hope of discovering something that might 
tend to exculpate the defendants"), with Commonwealth v. Cotto, 
471 Mass. 97, 115 (2015) ("It is imperative that the 
Commonwealth thoroughly investigate the timing and scope of 
[State chemist Sonja] Farak's misconduct at the [State 
Laboratory Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug lab)]"), and Ware, 
supra ("the Commonwealth had a duty to conduct a thorough 
6 
 
investigation to determine the nature and extent of [Farak's] 
misconduct").  Though somewhat murky, our case law implicitly 
reveals how a prosecutor's obligation to learn of exculpatory 
information takes shape differently depending on the context of 
a case.  One discernable distinguishing factor among these cases 
is the extent to which the district attorney is already aware of 
the existence of exculpatory information. 
In both Cotto and Ware, for example, we held that the 
Commonwealth's failure to investigate properly the scope of the 
known misconduct of Farak at the Amherst drug lab violated the 
duty to learn of exculpatory information.  See Cotto, 471 Mass. 
at 115 (duty of investigation case concerning Commonwealth's 
failure to investigate scope and timing of misconduct of State 
chemist); Ware, 471 Mass. at 95 (same).  Neither case used the 
phrase "duty of inquiry" or similar language, nor did either 
case discuss reasonableness as a pertinent limitation on the 
prosecutor's duty to learn of exculpatory information.  See 
generally Cotto, 471 Mass. 97; Ware, 471 Mass. 85. 
In Commonwealth v. McFarlane, 493 Mass.    (2024), 
unbeknownst to the prosecutor, one of the testifying police 
witnesses had had an allegation of misconduct unrelated to the 
prosecutor's case levied against him.  Id. at    .  There, we 
did consider the reasonableness of the prosecutor's inquiry, 
ultimately holding that no violation of the duty to learn of 
7 
 
exculpatory information had occurred.  Id. at    .  See Frith, 
458 Mass. at 440-441 (duty of inquiry case concerning 
prosecutor's failure to inquire of police department whether any 
additional reports related to incident that resulted in charges 
against defendant existed beyond one report prosecutor was aware 
of and had already disclosed to defense counsel); Commonwealth 
v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 598-599 (1986) (duty of inquiry case 
concerning circumstances under which prosecutor is not obligated 
to inquire of exculpatory evidence in Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's possession). 
From these cases, as well as from our broader jurisprudence 
in this area, we can discern an important, albeit implicit, 
principle about how a prosecutor can meet his or her obligation 
to learn of exculpatory information:  in cases involving a 
prosecutor knowing about certain exculpatory information and 
failing to investigate –- duty of investigation cases –- the 
limit of a prosecutor's duty is determined by a need to uncover 
the scope of the known misconduct; and in cases involving a 
prosecutor having no knowledge about certain exculpatory 
information –- duty of inquiry cases –- the limit of a 
prosecutor's duty is reasonableness. 
The instant case is most akin to Cotto and Ware, the duty 
of investigation cases.  Here, the district attorney already has 
knowledge of a pattern of misconduct in the Springfield police 
8 
 
department and has failed to investigate department records 
known to have been reviewed by the DOJ.  The district attorney 
is obligated to learn of the scope of the misconduct so that it 
can properly meet its duty to investigate and ultimately its 
duty to disclose.  The reasonableness of pretrial inquiries into 
what exculpatory information members of the prosecution team may 
be aware of –- the duty of inquiry -- is not at issue. 
I write separately to note that although our case law has 
been far from clear on this issue, we should avoid conflating 
the duty of investigation and the duty of inquiry and seek to 
develop the contours of the duty of inquiry only in cases 
involving potentially exculpatory information unknown to the 
prosecutor but possibly known to one or more members of the 
prosecution team.