Title: BIERMAN v. ARAMARK REFRESHMENT SERVICES, INC.

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

BIERMAN v. ARAMARK REFRESHMENT SERVICES, INC.  BIERMAN v. ARAMARK REFRESHMENT SERVICES, INC. 2008 OK 29 198 P.3d 877 Case Number: 104421; Consol. w/104434 Decided: 04/01/2008 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA DONALD J. BIERMAN, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ARAMARK REFRESHMENT SERVICES, INC., Defendant/Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY Honorable Barbara G. Swinton, Trial Judge ¶0 On May 13, 1998, a delivery van owned by Aramark Refreshment Services, Inc. (employer) and driven by its employee, Laura E. Konelick (employee) struck Donald Bierman's (injured party) vehicle, injuring him. The injured party brought suit against the employer and the employee. District Judge Daniel L. Owens entered default judgment against the employee and awarded the injured party $650,000 in compensatory and $650,000 in punitive damages. At the first trial, the jury found the employer was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment on liability and remanded the matter for a hearing on damages. We denied certiorari, and the cause was remanded. At the second trial, before District Judge Barbara G. Swinton, the jury awarded the injured party $81,100 in compensatory damages from the employer. Both parties appealed, and we retained the cause. We hold that: 1) the Court of Civil Appeals' finding that the employer is liable through respondeat superior is the law of the case; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by striking the injured party's claim for punitive damages; and 3) the trial court did not err by refusing to include jury instructions on mortality tables and aggravation of a pre-existing condition at the second trial. TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART. CAUSE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL SOLELY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. Matthew B. Free, Angela L. Smoot, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant. R. Stephen Haynes, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellees. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The issues presented are: 1) whether the employer is liable for the accident under the doctrine of respondeat superior; 2) whether the trial court erred by striking the injured party's claim for punitive damages; and 3) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on life expectancy and prior existing condition. We find that: 1) the Court of Civil Appeals' finding that the employer is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior is the law of the case; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by striking the claim for punitive damages; and 3) the trial court did not err by refusing the inclusion of jury instructions on mortality tables and aggravation of a pre-existing condition. FACTS ¶2 On May 13, 1998, the injured party, the appellee, was driving northbound on the access road on the east side of the Broadway Extension in north Oklahoma City. A delivery van owned by the employer, the appellant, and driven by the employee, struck the injured party's vehicle. The van was traveling south on the Broadway Extension and had crossed the northbound lanes of the highway and the southbound lanes of the east access road before colliding head-on with the injured party's vehicle. At the hospital, over two hours after the accident, the employee's blood alcohol content measured 0.122 gm/dl, a level above the legal limit. ¶3 On February 24, 1999, the injured party filed suit in Oklahoma County District Court against the employee. He alleged that her negligence was the cause of severe and permanent injuries to his person. ¶4 The employee could not be located for personal service and was served by publication. On October 15, 1999, the injured party moved for a default judgment against the employee because she had not filed an answer. On October 25, 1999, the employer's counsel filed an answer on the employee's behalf. On October 28, 1999, the injured party and the employer filed a joint motion for withdrawal of the injured party's motion for default judgment, which was granted by the trial court. On August 15, 2000, the employer's counsel withdrew from representation of the employee because she had still not been located by either party. On May 9, 2002, the injured party renewed his motion for a default judgment against the employee. On June 17, 2002, because he had located the employee, the injured party again withdrew his motion for default judgment against her, and served her with actual notice to appear at trial. ¶5 The first trial was held September 9-11, 2002. Prior to trial, the employer stipulated that the employee was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that her intoxication was the cause of the accident. The employee did not appear, and the trial court granted a default judgment against her. ¶6 On January 9, 2003, the trial court held a hearing for assessment of damages against the employee. The employee did not appear at the hearing. The employer's counsel did appear, but did not participate in the proceedings. On February 7, 2003, the trial court filed a journal entry of judgment assessing damages against the employee in the amount of $650,000 in compensatory damages and $650,000 in punitive damages. ¶7 On September 18, 2003, the cause was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals. ¶8 On October 6, 2004, the cause was transferred to the trial court for a new trial on damages. After several motions in limine filed by both parties, on November 10, 2005, the trial court entered an order striking the injured party's claim for punitive damages against the employer, and then certified a petition for certiorari of the interlocutory order. ¶9 The second trial was held on December 11-12, 2005. On December 12, 2005, the jury awarded the injured party $6,100 in property damages and $75,000 in personal injury damages. On February 16, 2007, the trial court filed its journal entry of judgment. On March 16, 2007, the employer filed its petition in error, and on March 19, 2007, the injured party filed his petition in error. The parties then filed countermotions to retain. On April 6, 2007, the appeals were consolidated. I. THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' FINDING THAT THE EMPLOYER IS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE ACCIDENT THROUGH THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. ¶10 The employer argues that the Court of Civil Appeals' determination in the first appeal that it was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior was erroneous. The injured party responds that the Court of Civil Appeals' finding is the law of the case and does not meet any of the exceptions to that doctrine. ¶11 Determinations made on a prior appeal of a cause are res judicata, ¶12 No question of law expressly decided or impliedly determined on a former appeal can be reversed on a second appeal between the same parties in regard to the same subject matter. ¶13 The exception to the doctrine of law of the case is that the doctrine is not applied if the prior decision is palpably erroneous and this Court is convinced that failure to reverse it will result in a gross or manifest injustice. ¶14 The employer renews its argument that the employee was not within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident because she may have deviated from her route to stop to drink alcohol. The Court of Civil Appeals found that there was undisputed testimony that the employee was traveling from her last delivery stop back to the employer's garage at the time of the accident and that there was no evidence presented by the employer that the employee deviated from her route or was using her vehicle for her own purposes at the time the accident occurred. ¶15 The Court of Civil Appeals rendered a final decision in the first appeal between these parties on this matter that, as a matter of law, the employer was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because the employee was acting within the scope of her employment at the time the accident occurred. We do not find that the final decision of the Court of Civil Appeals was palpably erroneous and will result in a gross or manifest injustice. Therefore, this conclusion of law is the law of the case, and we may not disturb it. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING THE INJURED PARTY'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. ¶16 In motion argument before the second trial, the employer requested that the trial court strike the injured party's claim for punitive damages. The employer argued that it did not condone, adopt, or endorse the employee's actions, and was therefore not liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The injured party responded that the employer was liable for punitive damages through respondeat superior and that the issue should be submitted to the jury. The trial court struck the injured party's claim and held: . . . In looking at the factual basis and understanding that the Court has found that Ms. Konelick was acting in the scope of her employment, I cannot make the next leap that I necessarily have to find that Aramark is liable for punitive damages . . . I cannot find that there could be found by a jury any willful conduct on the part of the corporation itself, even though it is the employer of the defendant that has already been found to have punitive damages . . . I know there's employer liability because (sic) respondeat superior, but not for punitive damages. . . . ¶17 All relevant evidence is admissible. ¶18 The Restatement (Second) of Torts §909 provides that punitive damages may be awarded against an employer because of an employee's conduct only if: 1) the employer authorized the doing and manner of the act; 2) the employer was reckless in employing an unfit employee; 3) the employee was employed in a managerial capacity and acting in the scope of employment; or 4) the employer ratified or approved the act. ¶19 We would have to overrule a myriad of cases to reach the result urged by the employer. ¶20 Here, it had already been established that the employee was liable for punitive damages and that the doctrine of respondeat superior was applicable to the employer. III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING TO INCLUDE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MORTALITY TABLES AND AGGRAVATION OF A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION. ¶21 The injured party argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on mortality tables and aggravation of a pre-existing condition in the second trial. The employer responds that the rulings on jury instructions were not erroneous. ¶22 Instructions are explanations of the law of a case enabling a jury to better understand its duty and to arrive at a correct conclusion. No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of this state in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. As we held in Woodall A. Instruction on Aggravation of Pre-existing Condition ¶23 The injured party requested the inclusion of Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil (OUJI-Civ.), Instruction 4.10, which provides: MEASURE OF DAMAGES- AGGRAVATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING CONDITION A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an injury is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of such pre-existing condition or disability directly caused by the injury. This is true even if the person's condition or disability made him more susceptible to the possibility of injury than a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial injury. When a pre-existing condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation. Throughout this cause, the injured party has alleged that the accident caused him to suffer severe, persistent tinnitus. ¶24 We find that, by the standard announced in Woodall, there is not a probability that the jury would have reached a different result if it had been given an instruction on the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the injured party's request to include OUJI-Civ. 4.10. B. Instruction on Life Expectancy ¶25 The injured party also requested the inclusion of OUJI-Civ. 5.12, which provides: MORTALITY TABLES- EXPLANATION According to life expectancy tables [(admitted in evidence)/(it is agreed that)] the life expectancy of a [male/female] person of the age of ______ years is ______ years. This figure is not conclusive. It is the average life expectancy of persons who have reached that age. This figure may be considered by you in connection with other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy of [Plaintiff/Decedent], including evidence of [his/her] occupation, health, habits and other activities. The trial court denied the request on the grounds that the instruction was to be given along with other evidence on life expectancy, and no such evidence was given during the trial. The trial court permitted the injured party's counsel to use a stipulated life expectancy figure in his closing arguments. ¶26 We find that, by the standard announced in Woodall, there is not a probability that the jury would have reached a different result if it had been given an instruction on mortality tables. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the injured party's request to include OUJI-Civ. 5.12. CONCLUSION ¶27 It is undisputed that the employee was assessed punitive damages for causing the accident. It is also undisputed that the employee was employed by the employer at the time of the accident. That the employer is liable for the accident under the doctrine of respondeat superior is the law of the case. Oklahoma law provides that an employer may be liable for punitive damages through the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury in the second trial based on its incorrect reading of Oklahoma law. However, the trial court did not err by refusing to include OUJI-Civ Instructions 4.10 and 5.12. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial solely on the issue of punitive damages. TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART. CAUSE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL SOLELY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. EDMONDSON, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, TAYLOR, COLBERT, REIF, JJ., concur. WINCHESTER, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part. FOOT