Title: Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

570 So. 2d 291 (1990)
Gary MOORE, Petitioner,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Respondent.
No. 75366.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 15, 1990.
*292 Norton Bond, Pensacola, for petitioner.
Larry Hill of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for respondent.
OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Moore v. Allstate Insurance Co., 553 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), in which the district court certified the following question as being of great public importance:
Id. at 1370. The district court found that section 626.727(8), Florida Statutes (1985), does limit the fee awardable under section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (1985), to the coverage issue, concluding that attorney's fees for other issues in the same action are not covered by the statute. For the reasons expressed, we agree with the district court's decision and answer the certified question in the affirmative.[1]
The question requires us to determine whether section 627.727(8), Florida Statutes (1985), directs payment of attorney's fees for work done on the issues of liability and damages when coverage has been an issue in the same proceedings. The facts, as articulated in the district court's opinion, are as follows:
Id. at 1368. Moore sought attorney's fees and costs for litigating all issues  coverage, liability, and damages. The parties stipulated that Allstate would pay a $1,000 fee if the court ruled that entitlement would be only for the coverage issue and that Allstate would pay a $35,000 fee if *293 entitlement was found for the entire litigation.
The trial court, in holding that the attorney's fees should be limited to $1,000 for the work performed by Moore's attorney prior to Allstate's admission to the amount of coverage, explained in its order:
The district court agreed with the trial court's reasoning and held:
553 So. 2d  at 1369-70 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stack, 543 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)).
The pertinent parts of the controlling statutes are set forth below. Section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (1985), reads as follows:
Section 627.727(8), Florida Statutes (1985), reads as follows:
Moore argues that a literal reading of section 627.727(8) requires the payment of attorney's fees and costs for all issues in an action which includes the coverage issue. He asserts that there is no authority for the trial court or the district court to carve out an award of attorney's fees solely for the coverage issue once the plaintiff has commenced an action that involves a coverage dispute and other claims.
We disagree and find that the trial court and the district court decisions correctly held that the uninsured motorist provisions of section 627.727 were, as the trial judge reasoned, intended to place the injured party in the same position as he would have been in had the tortfeasor been insured. Section 627.727(8) accomplishes this purpose by directing that an insurer pay attorney's fees for the coverage issue when the insured prevails. We can find no legislative intent to place the insured in a better position than he would have been in if the tortfeasor had been insured. While one could read subsection (8) of section 627.727 separately from the rest of the statute and arrive at Moore's literal interpretation, we find that, to arrive at the proper interpretation, one must read section 627.727's uninsured motorist provisions in their entirety. This is the manner in which the trial court and the district court of appeal construed the statute and reached the conclusion that attorney's fees were to be paid only for the coverage issue. We agree that their construction correctly expresses the legislative intent, particularly when we take into account the purpose of the uninsured motorist provisions of this statute.
*294 Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court of appeal.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, EHRLICH, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
[1]  We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.