Title: State v. Smith

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 233A96
FILED: 6 FEBRUARY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAMIE LAMONT SMITH
Appeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a
judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Downs, J., at
the 22 April 1996 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Buncombe
County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-
degree murder.  Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals
as to additional judgments imposed for first-degree arson,
conspiracy to commit first-degree arson, two counts of attempted
first-degree murder, misdemeanor larceny, and credit card fraud
was allowed 17 July 1997.  Heard in the Supreme Court 15 December
1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valérie B.
Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by
Marshall Dayan, Assistant Appellate Defender, for
defendant-appellant.
WHICHARD, Justice.
On 1 May 1995 the Buncombe County Grand Jury indicted
defendant Jamie Lamont Smith for the attempted first-degree
murder of and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury on Erin Conklin, conspiracy to commit
-2-
first-degree arson, first-degree murder of David Cotton,
attempted first-degree murder of Alison Kafer, first-degree
arson, misdemeanor larceny, and misdemeanor financial transaction
card fraud.  Defendant was tried capitally at the 22 April 1996
Criminal Session of Superior Court, Buncombe County.  He
presented no evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial.  The jury found defendant guilty of all charges.  
After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury found
the existence of five aggravating circumstances and seven
mitigating circumstances and recommended a sentence of death for
the first-degree murder of David Cotton.  The trial court imposed
the death sentence for this murder and further imposed
consecutive sentences of imprisonment for defendant’s other
convictions.  It arrested judgment on the conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury on Erin Conklin.  For the reasons set forth herein, we
conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free from
prejudicial error, and that the sentence of death is not
disproportionate.
The State’s evidence tended to show the following.  In
December 1994 defendant stole mail from Grace Apartments in
Asheville, North Carolina, and acquired Pamela Acheson’s Sears
credit card number from a Sears credit card bill in the stolen
mail.  Defendant used the credit card number to purchase clothes
valued at $268.98 from a Sears catalog on 19 December 1994.  
Early in the morning on 21 December 1994, defendant
began to worry that the police could connect him to his mail
-3-
theft.  Defendant and a companion decided to destroy the evidence
of the theft by setting fire to Grace Apartments.  They purchased
kerosene from the Hot Spot convenience store, put it in an
antifreeze jug, and went to Grace Apartments sometime around 3:00
a.m.  There, defendant poured half of the jug of kerosene along
the hallway in front of Pamela Acheson’s apartment.  Defendant
failed in his attempt to light this kerosene.  He then splashed
more kerosene up the stairs toward the second floor.  Defendant
laid the kerosene jug on the floor and lit it as he left the
apartment complex.  As defendant and his companion drove away,
they could see fire raging in the building.
The fire spread rapidly and caused significant
consequences.  David Cotton died in his second floor apartment
from smoke inhalation.  Erin Conklin suffered severe burns to her
hands and arms when the fire reached her as she hung out her
window.  She also suffered a broken neck when she fell from her
window after her burning hands could no longer cling to the
window ledge.  Alison Kafer suffered severe burns over seventy
percent of her body as well as severe inhalation injury to her
lungs from breathing smoke.
Defendant confessed to setting the fire and to setting
two other fires in apartment complexes.  The State presented
evidence of the additional fires during defendant’s sentencing
proceeding.  
In defendant’s first assignment of error, he argues
that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to inquire,
during jury selection, into the prospective jurors’ attitudes and
-4-
beliefs about parole.  Defendant asserts that empirical evidence
shows that jurors often do not believe that a defendant who is
sentenced to life imprisonment will actually spend the rest of
his or her life incarcerated.  Defendant points to the opinions
of this Court in State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995),
and State v. Quesinberry, 325 N.C. 125, 381 S.E.2d 681 (1989),
sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d
603 (1990), to support this assertion.  In both Robinson and
Quesinberry, the defendants collaterally attacked their death
sentences with juror affidavits that revealed the jurors’
conceptions of parole eligibility for defendants sentenced to
life imprisonment.  At least one juror in Robinson said she
believed the defendant would be released in five to ten years if
sentenced to life.  Robinson, 336 N.C. at 124, 443 S.E.2d at 329. 
Jurors in Quesinberry similarly believed that the defendant might
be paroled in ten years if given a life sentence.  Quesinberry,
325 N.C. at 132, 381 S.E.2d at 686.
Here, defendant was sentenced under our current capital
sentencing scheme in which the sentencing alternative to the
death penalty is life in prison without parole.  Under this
scheme the trial court is statutorily required to "instruct the
jury . . . that a sentence of life imprisonment means a sentence
of life without parole."  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 (1997).  The trial
court did instruct the jurors that "if you recommend a sentence
of life imprisonment, the Court will impose a sentence of life
-5-
imprisonment without parole."  Defendant’s trial counsel argued
to the jury:
[W]e’re not kidding you about life in prison
and life without parole. . . .  That’s what
this law says.  That’s what the [G]eneral
[A]ssembly says life without parole means,
and that’s what his Honor is going to tell
you life in prison is, life without parole.
The jury thus was properly informed of the law regarding parole
eligibility for defendants sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The jurors in Robinson and Quesinberry did not receive
such an instruction because they were sentenced under our
previous capital sentencing scheme in which a defendant sentenced
to life was eligible for parole consideration after twenty years. 
See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1371(a1) (1983) (repealed by Act of Mar. 23,
1994, ch. 21, sec. 3, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 59, 60).  In the
absence of an instruction regarding parole ineligibility, such as
the one given in this case, it is to be expected that "[m]ost
jurors, through their own experience and common knowledge, know
that a life sentence does not necessarily mean that the defendant
will remain in prison for the rest of his life."  Quesinberry,
325 N.C. at 135-36, 381 S.E.2d at 688.  Once the jury has been
instructed that life imprisonment means life without parole,
however, we presume that the jury listens closely to the
instruction, strives to understand and follow it, and does not
believe the trial court is misinforming it as to the law.  State
v. Neal, 346 N.C. 608, 618, 487 S.E.2d 734, 740 (1997).
We have held that a trial court does not err by
refusing to allow voir dire concerning prospective jurors’
-6-
conceptions of the parole eligibility of a defendant serving a
life sentence.  See State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 749, 467
S.E.2d 636, 640, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 136 L. Ed. 2d 133
(1996); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 24, 446 S.E.2d 252, 264
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). 
This issue was recently decided contrary to defendant’s position
in Neal, a case involving our current capital sentencing scheme
under which defendant here was sentenced.  Neal, 346 N.C. at 617-
18, 487 S.E.2d at 739-40.  We find no reason to revisit our prior
holdings on this issue.  This assignment of error is overruled. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
ordering disclosure of defendant’s medical records from jail.  He
contends this order violated his physician-patient privilege.  
This privilege has no common law predecessor; it is
entirely a creature of statute.  State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846,
849, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921).  The governing statute provides, in
pertinent part:
No person, duly authorized to practice
physic or surgery, shall be required to
disclose any information which he may have
acquired in attending a patient in a
professional character, and which information
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for
such patient as a physician . . . . 
Confidential information obtained in medical
records shall be furnished only on the
authorization of the patient . . . .  Any
resident or presiding judge . . . may . . .
compel disclosure if in his opinion
disclosure is necessary to a proper
administration of justice.
N.C.G.S. § 8-53 (1986) (emphasis added).  The decision that
disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice "is
-7-
one made in the discretion of the trial judge, and the defendant
must show an abuse of discretion in order to successfully
challenge the ruling."  State v. Drdak, 330 N.C. 587, 592, 411
S.E.2d 604, 607 (1992).  "A trial court may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision."  State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450,
465 (1985). 
Defendant does not argue that the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering the medical records disclosed but
rather that it failed to specifically find that disclosure was
necessary to a proper administration of justice.  N.C.G.S. § 8-53
does not require such an explicit finding.  The finding is
implicit in the admission of the evidence.
Defendant sought to suppress statements he made to the
police while in jail by arguing that he was suffering from
controlled substance withdrawal symptoms and would therefore have
been in no condition mentally to give statements to the police. 
Defendant thus placed at issue his state of mind during the time
he was in jail, and the State properly sought to rebut that
evidence with his medical records from jail.  Defendant makes no
argument, and we perceive no reason to believe, that the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering the medical records
disclosed.  This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by denying
his challenge to the State's peremptory strike of one black
prospective juror.  Defendant argued to the trial court that the
-8-
strike was racially motivated, in violation of the equal
protection principles recognized in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).  The trial court ruled that defendant
had not made the requisite prima facie showing of purposeful
racial discrimination.  Id. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88.  We
agree.
A three-step process has been
established for evaluating claims of racial
discrimination in the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges.  Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395,
405 (1991).  First, defendant must establish
a prima facie case that the peremptory
challenge was exercised on the basis of race. 
Id.  Second, if such a showing is made, the
burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a
racially neutral explanation to rebut
defendant's prima facie case.  Id.  Third,
the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has proven purposeful
discrimination.  Id.
State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 307-08, 488 S.E.2d 550, 560
(1997).  Defendant has shown only that he is black and that the
State peremptorily struck one black prospective juror.  This is
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.  See State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 145, 462
S.E.2d 186, 189 (1995) (concluding the State's peremptory excusal
of two of four black prospective jurors was insufficient to
establish a prima facie case); State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 286,
449 S.E.2d 556, 561 (1994) ("The mere facts that defendant is a
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor used
one peremptory challenge to exclude a member of defendant's race
do not raise the necessary inference of discrimination on account
of the juror's race."). 
-9-
The prosecutor and the trial court mentioned the
following race-neutral reasons as possibly supporting the State's
peremptory strike:  (1) this venireman had been arrested for
assault on a female; (2) defense counsel had once represented
this venireman in a traffic matter; (3) this venireman indicated
that he had a bachelor's degree in psychology, and there would be
psychological testimony in this case; and (4) a Hispanic
venireman had already been accepted for jury duty.  Defendant
argues that when the State provides race-neutral reasons for its
peremptory strike, the prima facie case inquiry becomes moot
under this Court's analysis in Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 488 S.E.2d
550.  We disagree.  While in Cummings we examined the race-
neutral reasons the State volunteered after the trial court had
found no prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, id. at
308-10, 488 S.E.2d at 560-62, it was not necessary to do so. 
Because we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination, we need not examine the validity of any race-
neutral reasons for the challenge.  This assignment of error is
overruled. 
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s
refusal to instruct the jury as to second-degree murder with
regard to one victim and attempted second-degree murder with
regard to another.  Murder in the first degree, the crime of
which defendant was convicted, is the "intentional and unlawful
killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and
deliberation."  State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 517, 350 S.E.2d
-10-
334, 337 (1986).  Murder in the second degree is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation
and deliberation.  State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 735, 268 S.E.2d
201, 204 (1980).  A defendant charged with first-degree murder
based on premeditation and deliberation is entitled to an
instruction on second-degree murder only if the evidence,
reasonably construed, tended to show a lack of premeditation and
deliberation or if it would permit a jury rationally to find the
defendant guilty of second-degree murder while acquitting him of
first-degree murder.  State v. Morston, 336 N.C. 381, 402, 445
S.E.2d 1, 13 (1994).
Defendant notes that the trial testimony of two law
enforcement officers regarding defendant's custodial statements
revealed that he claimed he had set the fire as a "prank."  He
argues that this is affirmative evidence of his lack of
premeditation and deliberation, thus entitling him to an
instruction on second-degree murder and attempted second-degree
murder.  We disagree.
The evidence, reasonably construed, indicates that
defendant burned the apartment building in an attempt to
eliminate witnesses who might be able to testify against him
regarding mail theft.  Defendant himself told a law enforcement
officer that he became concerned about the mail theft being
traced to him, so he and a companion decided to burn the
building.  The two men drove by the building late at night to
observe the area, bought kerosene, and then drove around before
returning between two and three in the morning when most of the
-11-
tenants would be at home and asleep.  Defendant admitted that he
poured kerosene directly in front of the apartment door of the
woman whose credit card number he had stolen, the one witness
necessary to convict him of his crime.  When the kerosene did not
ignite, he splashed it up the stairs and into the upper stairwell
and succeeded in igniting it.  
In light of these facts, defendant's self-serving
statement that he set the fire as a prank was not sufficient to
support an instruction on second-degree murder.  Any reasonable
construction of the evidence indicates that the murder was both
premeditated and deliberate.  No rational jury could have found
defendant guilty of second-degree murder while acquitting him of
first-degree murder, or guilty of attempted second-degree murder
while acquitting him of attempted first-degree murder.  This
assignment of error is overruled.  
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
allowing improper conduct by the State during the cross-
examination of one of defendant's witnesses as well as during the
State's closing arguments in both the guilt/innocence and penalty
phases.  Defendant's first complaint involves the State's cross-
examination of one of defendant's expert witnesses.  During
cross-examination Dr. Pete Sansbury testified that he had not
medicated defendant during his incarceration because it would
have interfered with diagnosis and was not necessary because
defendant had not had problems with violence.  The following
exchange then took place:
-12-
Q:  You didn't hear that he beat up Richard
Jackson or tried to rape him or anything like
that?
MR. AUMAN [defense counsel]:  Objection.
COURT:  Sustained.
MR. AUMAN:  Motion to strike.
COURT:  Don't consider that question 
just asked by the assistant district attorney.
Any improper conduct by the State during this exchange was
corrected by the trial court's prompt curative instructions.  See
State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 514, 173 S.E.2d 897, 907 (1970).
Defendant next complains about the State's later
questioning of this witness.  Referring to an intelligence test
administered to defendant, the State asked the witness about
several of the individual test questions.  Among these the State
asked about a question that read, "If you buy six dollars' worth
of gasoline and pay for it with a ten-dollar bill, how much
change should you get back?"  The witness affirmed that this
question was in the test, and the State then asked, "He knew that
one, didn't he?"  Defendant contends that the State asked this
question only for the rhetorical purpose of alluding to
defendant's purchase of the kerosene with which he set the fire. 
Defendant argues this was improper behavior similar to that
criticized by this Court in State v. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1, 442
S.E.2d 33 (1994).
In Sanderson this Court addressed a situation in which
the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct throughout the
sentencing proceeding.  Id. at 7, 442 S.E.2d at 37.  With regard
-13-
to the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant's expert
witness, we observed that "[h]e insulted her, degraded her, and
attempted to distort her testimony," id. at 11, 442 S.E.2d at 40,
and that he "maligned, continually interrupted and bullied" her,
id. at 15, 442 S.E.2d at 41.  The questions here do not at all
resemble the prosecutorial conduct condemned in Sanderson.  The
trial court did not err by allowing the questioning complained of
here.
 
Defendant next complains of a single statement made
during the State's closing argument.  In describing the evidence
presented to prove premeditation and deliberation, the State
referred to a videotape from the convenience store showing
defendant calmly purchasing kerosene.  The State then told the
jury, "This is one of the better cases, ladies and gentlemen,
that any jury in Buncombe County will ever see.  You can see
premeditation and deliberation."  Defendant argues this was an
improper argument which asked the jury to rely on the
prosecutor's judgment as an expert.  Defendant did not, however,
object to this argument at trial.  
"In deciding whether the trial court improperly failed
to intervene ex mero motu to correct an allegedly improper
argument of counsel at final argument, our review is limited to
discerning whether the statements were so grossly improper that
the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to intervene." 
State v. Holder, 331 N.C. 462, 489, 418 S.E.2d 197, 212 (1992). 
Viewed in context, the State's argument appears to focus on the
unique evidence of premeditation and deliberation presented here,
-14-
a videotape that the jury could actually see, rather than the
prosecutor's judgment about that evidence.  The State's argument
was not, in any event, so grossly improper as to require
intervention ex mero motu by the trial court.
Defendant next complains of three arguments made in the
State's final summation during the penalty phase.  Again,
defendant failed to object to any of these arguments at trial;
thus, we review the trial court's failure to intervene ex mero
motu for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
First, defendant argues that the State made improper
reference to another person murdered by defendant, a person whose
murder was not charged here.  At two points during the State's
final summation, the prosecutor referred to Kelli Froemke, a
woman whom defendant raped, murdered, and burned less than one
month after committing the crimes at issue here.  Defendant
contends these references amounted to improperly asking the jury
to sentence defendant to death for a crime for which he was not
being tried.  Evidence concerning the murder of Kelli Froemke and
the burning of her apartment building was properly admitted
during the sentencing phase to support the (e)(11) aggravating
circumstance that the murder in this case was part of a course of
conduct including other crimes of violence against other persons. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11) (1997).  The State was entitled to
argue to the jury that defendant deserved the death penalty based
on the evidence supporting this aggravating circumstance.  The
trial court did not err by allowing the State to refer to
defendant's other victim.
-15-
Second, defendant contends the following argument by
the State denigrated defendant's exercise of his constitutional
rights to trial, to counsel, and to due process of law:
Now we're getting to the justice part. 
This is where we get to the justice part. 
This is the law in civilized society in
Buncombe County and the state of North
Carolina, in Asheville, North Carolina.  This
is due process.  You have sat here, you have
watched it.  You have watched due process. 
We have our trials; we have them during the
daytime.  Anybody can come and watch.  That's
due process.  Anybody can call anybody they
want as a witness.  They can cross-examine
anyone they want.  Don't you think that
"Phillip" Cotton and Erin [Conklin] and
Alison Kafer would have liked just a little
bit of due process?  But no.  Your due
process is you can hang out a window or
suffocate or you can burn up . . ., and
you've got two seconds to decide.  You have a
few moments to decide.  That's the due
process that they were given.
Any denigration of defendant's constitutional rights that may be
implied from this argument was not so grossly improper as to
require intervention ex mero motu by the trial court.
Finally, defendant argues that the State improperly
argued to the jury that if defendant were sentenced to life in
prison, he would spend his time comfortably doing things such as
playing basketball, lifting weights, and watching television. 
Defendant concedes that this Court has rejected a similar
argument in State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 251-52, 461 S.E.2d
687, 716-17 (1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100
(1996).  Here, as in Alston, the State's argument "served to
emphasize the State's position that the defendant deserved the
penalty of death rather than a comfortable life in prison."  Id.
-16-
at 252, 461 S.E.2d at 717.  The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu.  This assignment
of error is overruled. 
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
submitting both the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance, that the
murder was committed while defendant was engaged in arson, and
the (e)(10) aggravating circumstance, that defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of
a weapon which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person.  Defendant argues it was impermissibly
duplicative to submit both circumstances because both were based
on the fact that defendant committed the murder by means of
arson.  While generally the same evidence may not be used to
support more than one aggravating circumstance, State v. Goodman,
298 N.C. 1, 29, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587 (1979), this Court has held
it permissible to use the same evidence to support multiple
aggravating circumstances when the circumstances are directed at
different aspects of a defendant's character or the murder for
which he is to be punished.  State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321,
354, 279 S.E.2d 788, 808 (1981).
Defendant argues that this case is similar to State v.
Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 354 S.E.2d 446 (1987), in which this
Court held it error to submit both the (e)(5) aggravating
circumstance, that the defendant committed the murder while
engaged in the commission of a robbery, and the (e)(6)
aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain.  Id. at 236, 354 S.E.2d at 451.  In Quesinberry,
-17-
given the particular facts of that case, this Court was not
persuaded that the (e)(6) circumstance, which addressed the
pecuniary gain motive of the murder, truly differed from the
(e)(5) circumstance, which addressed the act of armed robbery. 
The Court observed that "[t]he facts of this case . . . reveal
that defendant murdered the shopkeeper for the single purpose of
pecuniary gain by means of committing an armed robbery."  Id. at
238, 354 S.E.2d at 452.  The Court then noted that "[n]ot only is
it illogical to divorce the motive from the act under the facts
of this case, but the same evidence underlies proof of both
factors."  Id. at 239, 354 S.E.2d at 452.  Finally, in holding it
error to submit both circumstances, the Court observed that 
in the particular context of a premeditated
and deliberate robbery-murder where evidence
is presented that the robbery was attempted
or effectuated for pecuniary gain, the
submission of both the aggravating factors
enumerated at N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5) and (6)
is redundant and . . . one should be regarded
as surplusage.
Id. at 239, 354 S.E.2d at 453.  
This case differs from Quesinberry, however.  While in
Quesinberry the pecuniary gain motive could not be logically
separated from the act of armed robbery, in this case the (e)(5)
circumstance addresses a different aspect of defendant's crime
than does the (e)(10) circumstance.  The (e)(5) circumstance is
considered aggravating because it addresses the fact that
defendant committed the murder while engaging in another felony,
arson.  The (e)(10) circumstance, that defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of
-18-
a weapon which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person, on the other hand, addresses more than the fact
that defendant committed murder while perpetrating another
felony.  This circumstance speaks to a distinct aspect of
defendant's character, that he not only intended to kill a
particular person when he set fire to the apartment building, but
that he disregarded the value of every human life in the building
by using an accelerant to set the fire in the middle of the
night.  This aspect of defendant's character and actions is not
fully captured by the (e)(5) circumstance, though both rely on
the same evidence.  Therefore, it was not error for the trial
court to submit both circumstances.  This assignment of error is
overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
submitting to the jury the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance, that
defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
Defendant notes that he requested that the trial court not submit
this circumstance because the evidence showed that he had a
history of illegal drug use, had committed the crimes of breaking
and entering and larceny, had pled guilty to another arson, and
had previously been in prison.  Defendant contends that no
reasonable juror could have found this not to be a significant
history of prior criminal activity, thus making it error for the
trial court to submit the circumstance.
The statute governing capital sentencing proceedings
provides, in pertinent part:
-19-
In all cases in which the death penalty may
be authorized, the judge shall include in his
instructions to the jury that it must
consider any aggravating circumstance or
circumstances or mitigating circumstance or
circumstances from the lists provided in
subsections (e) and (f) which may be
supported by the evidence . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) (emphasis added).  This Court has
explained the law regarding submission of the (f)(1) mitigating
circumstance as follows:
The trial court is required to determine
whether the evidence will support a rational
jury finding that a defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal
activity.  State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 367
S.E.2d 589 (1988).  If so, the trial court
has no discretion; the statutory mitigating
circumstance must be submitted to the jury,
without regard to the wishes of the State or
the defendant.  State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301,
364 S.E.2d 316, vacated on other grounds, 488
U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988).
State v. Mahaley, 332 N.C. 583, 597, 423 S.E.2d 58, 66 (1992),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995).  "We have
also recognized that common sense, fundamental fairness, and
judicial economy require that any reasonable doubt regarding the
submission of a statutory or requested mitigating factor be
resolved in favor of the defendant."  State v. Brown, 315 N.C.
40, 62, 337 S.E.2d 808, 825 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164,
90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).  
We held, in a case with similar facts, that assuming
arguendo that it was error to submit the (f)(1) circumstance, it
was not prejudicial to the defendant.  State v. Walker, 343 N.C.
216, 222-24, 469 S.E.2d 919, 922-23 (defendant had an attempted
-20-
second-degree murder conviction and a history of illegal drug
dealing), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 136 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1996). 
We stated that "[a]bsent extraordinary facts not present in this
case, the erroneous submission of a mitigating circumstance is
harmless."  Id. at 223, 469 S.E.2d at 923.  There are no
extraordinary facts present that meaningfully distinguish this
case from Walker.  The State did not violate the Walker
proscription against arguing to the jury that defendant had
requested this mitigating circumstance when he in fact had
objected to it.  See id.  Accordingly, following Walker, we hold
that the trial court did not err to defendant's prejudice by
submitting the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance over his objection.
For the same reasons, we reject defendant's argument
that even if a reasonable juror could have found that defendant
had no significant prior criminal history, it was nevertheless a
violation of defendant's federal constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel for the trial court to submit
this circumstance over defendant's objection.  There are no
"extraordinary facts" present that establish harm to defendant
from the submission of this mitigating circumstance.  Id.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the "Issues and Recommendations as to Punishment" form
submitted to the jury was unconstitutional.  Defendant argues
that this form, in violation of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), required unanimity from jurors in
-21-
order to find the (f)(9) statutory catchall mitigating
circumstance.  This argument lacks merit.  
The form clearly explained that the jurors should
consider whether "[o]ne or more of us finds [the catchall]
mitigating circumstance to exist."  Further, the trial court
properly instructed the jury on this mitigating circumstance as
follows:
If any one or more of you find [the catchall
mitigating circumstance], by a preponderance
of the evidence, you would so indicate by
having your foreperson write "yes" in the
space provided after this mitigating
circumstance on the "Issues and
Recommendation" form.  And if none of you
find any such circumstance to exist, then you
would so indicate by writing “no” in that
space, and there are lines provided after
that if you care to articulate what that
circumstance or circumstances may be, any one
or more of you.  If you do not care to, then
you don’t have to insert anything.
Both the form and the instruction explaining it made clear that
the jury should find the circumstance if "one or more" of the
jurors found it to exist.  Neither required jury unanimity.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next raises two issues which he concedes this
Court has decided against his position:  (1) that the trial court
violated his constitutional rights when it instructed the jury
that it need not consider nonstatutory mitigators unless it found
that those circumstances had mitigating value, and (2) that the
trial court’s instruction giving jurors discretion to consider
mitigation under sentencing Issues Three and Four was
unconstitutional.  We have reviewed defendant’s arguments, and we
-22-
find no compelling reason to reconsider our prior holdings. 
These assignments are overruled.
Having found no error in either the guilt/innocence
phase of defendant's trial or the capital sentencing proceeding,
we are required to review the record and determine:  (1) whether
the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury; (2) whether passion, prejudice, or "any other arbitrary
factor" influenced the imposition of the death sentence; and (3)
whether the sentence "is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant."  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2).  We conclude that the
record fully supports the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury.  Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor.  We therefore turn to our final statutory
duty of proportionality review.
One purpose of proportionality review "is to eliminate
the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the
action of an aberrant jury."  State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125,
164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061,
100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988).  Another is to guard "against the
capricious or random imposition of the death penalty."  State v.
Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980).  We defined the
pool of cases for proportionality review in State v. Williams,
308 N.C. 47, 79-80, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983), and State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66,
-23-
106-07, 446 S.E.2d 542, 563-64 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1995).  We compare the instant case to
others in the pool that "are roughly similar with regard to the
crime and the defendant."  State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648,
314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 86 L.
Ed. 2d 267 (1985).  Whether the death penalty is disproportionate
"ultimately rest[s] upon the 'experienced judgments' of the
members of this Court."  State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 198, 443
S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547
(1994).
This Court has determined that the sentence of death
was disproportionate in seven cases:  State v. Benson, 323 N.C.
318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352
S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713
(1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C.
647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, --- L. Ed. 2d
---, 66 U.S.L.W. 3262 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C.
570, 573-74, 364 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C.
669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319
S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d
170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983). 
In our proportionality review, it is proper to compare the
present case to those cases in which this Court has concluded
that the death penalty was disproportionate.  State v. McCollum,
334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).  We find the instant case
distinguishable from each of the seven cases in which we found
-24-
the death penalty to be disproportionate.  In none of those cases
did the jury find the existence of five statutory aggravating
circumstances.  Here, the jury found each of the five aggravating
circumstances submitted to it, including:  (1) that defendant had
been previously convicted of a felony involving the threat of
violence to the person, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3); (2) that
defendant committed this murder for the purpose of avoiding
lawful arrest, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4); (3) that defendant
committed this murder while engaged in first-degree arson,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5); (4) that defendant knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(10); and (5) that the murder was
part of a course of conduct in which defendant committed crimes
of violence against other persons, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).
Further, multiple aggravating circumstances were found
to exist in only two of the disproportionate cases, Bondurant and
Young.  Both of these cases are distinguishable from the instant
case.  In Young this Court focused on the failure of the jury to
find the existence of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating circumstance.  Young, 312 N.C. at 691, 325
S.E.2d at 194.  Here, the jury found each aggravating
circumstance submitted to it.  In Bondurant this Court emphasized
that immediately after defendant’s senseless act of murder,
defendant exhibited a concern for the victim's life and remorse
for his action by seeking assistance for the victim.  Bondurant,
309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182-83.  Here, defendant
-25-
demonstrated no such concern or remorse.  He saw Grace Apartments
in flames but never called the fire department.  Further, he
admitted to setting additional fires.  For the foregoing reasons,
we conclude that each case where this Court has found a sentence
of death disproportionate is distinguishable from this case.
It is also proper for this Court to "compare this case
with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be
proportionate."  McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164.
Although this Court reviews all of the cases in the pool when
engaging in proportionality review, we have repeatedly stated
that "we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases
each time we carry out that duty."  Id.  It suffices to say here
that we conclude that the present case is more similar to cases
in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than
to those in which we have found the sentence of death
disproportionate or those in which juries have consistently
returned recommendations of life imprisonment.
 Finally, we noted in State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243,
446 S.E.2d 298 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d
895 (1995), that similarity of cases is not the last word on the
subject of proportionality.  Id. at 287, 446 S.E.2d at 325.
Similarity "merely serves as an initial point of inquiry."  Id.;
see also Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 46-47.  The issue
of whether the death penalty is proportionate in a particular
case ultimately rests "on the experienced judgment of the members
of this Court, not simply on a mere numerical comparison of
-26-
aggravators, mitigators, and other circumstances."  Daniels, 337
N.C. at 287, 446 S.E.2d at 325.
We cannot conclude as a matter of law that the sentence
of death was excessive or disproportionate.  We hold that the
defendant received a fair trial on the charge of first-degree
murder and a fair capital sentencing proceeding, free from
prejudicial error. 
NO ERROR.