Title: Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association v. Phillip B. (Phil) Williams

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC00-1860
____________
COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
PHILLIP B. (PHIL) WILLIAMS, etc.,
Respondent.
____________
No. SC00-2072
____________
PHILLIP B. (PHIL) WILLIAMS, etc.,
Petitioner,
vs.
COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Respondent.
[January 30, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Williams v. Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Ass’n,
765 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), wherein the district court certified the
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following question to be of great public importance:
ARE DEPUTY SHERIFFS CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDED
FROM HAVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS UNDER
CHAPTER 447?
Id. at 909.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida
Constitution.  For the reasons stated below, we rephrase the question, and, as
rephrased, we answer the certified question in the negative.  We rephrase the
question: 
ARE DEPUTY SHERIFFS CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDED
FROM HAVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS UNDER
THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?  
We answer this question in the negative and hold that deputy sheriffs, like all other
employees, are entitled to collective bargaining rights under the express provisions
of the Florida Constitution.  
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
This case arose out of a petition filed before the Public Employees Relations
Commission (PERC) by the Coastal Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc.
(CFPBA), seeking to represent certain public employees in the State of Florida for
purposes of collective bargaining.  PERC is the agency which oversees and
regulates public sector collective bargaining in Florida.  CFPBA filed a
representation-certification petition seeking certification as the exclusive collective
1Contemporaneous with this finding, PERC ordered a hearing to determine
facts and issues in relation to representation and unit determination.  PERC also
ordered Sheriff Phillip B. Williams (“Sheriff Williams” or “the sheriff”) to provide
the relevant list of employees and the relevant job classifications for purposes of
inclusion in or exclusion from the unit.
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bargaining agent for employees of the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office.  The
employees included deputy sheriffs in the positions of deputy, field training officer,
corporal, and sergeant.  After a preliminary investigation, PERC issued its “Notice
of Sufficiency” finding that the CFPBA’s petition was sufficient to allow it to
enforce the collective bargaining rights of the deputy sheriffs:
The Florida Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Service
Employees International Union Local 16, AFL-CIO v. Public
Employees Relations Commission, et al., No. SC 94427 (Fla. January
13, 2000), casts doubts as to the vitality of its prior decision in
Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978), holding that deputy
sheriffs are not public employees.  Therefore, we find this petition to
represent deputy sheriffs for the purpose of collective bargaining
sufficient in order to develop a record as to the deputies’ duties and
responsibilities vis-a-vis the sheriff himself.1
Subsequent to PERC’s Notice of Sufficiency, Sheriff Williams filed an application
for a writ of prohibition with the Fifth District Court of Appeal, asserting that
deputy sheriffs have no collective bargaining rights.  After initially granting relief in
part, the Fifth District reconsidered and denied prohibition.  The Fifth District
opined that this Court’s decision in Service Employees International Union, Local
16, AFL-CIO v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 752 So. 2d 569 (Fla.
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2000), substantially undercut the rationale of Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla.
1978):
In Service Employees, the Florida Supreme Court took another
look at the Murphy case.  It said that the name “deputy” and the fact
of “appointment” were meaningless distinctions in determining whether
a person is entitled to collective bargaining rights under chapter 447. 
Rather, the statute sets forth two basic categories of persons who
work for the public--the ordinary ones and the managerial ones.  Only
the managerial ones are not public employees for purposes of rights to
collective bargaining.
Williams, 765 So. 2d at 909.  Based on this analysis, the Fifth District denied the
petition for prohibition and certified the aforementioned question, which we have
rephrased for purposes of this opinion.
ANALYSIS
In Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978), the Court considered
whether the county sheriff was a “public employer” and deputy sheriffs “public
employees” under the Florida statutory scheme of collective bargaining.  The Court
held that the county sheriff was a public employer; however, it held that deputy
sheriffs were not public employees.  Id. at 824 (“[W]e find that the language
employed by the Legislature in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), does not
reveal a legislative intent to include appointed deputy sheriffs within the definition
[of] ‘public employee.’”). 
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In Service Employees this Court was presented with a similar question
certified by the Fifth District involving public employees who have historically been
categorized as “deputies”:
Are deputy court clerks, unlike deputy sheriffs, public employees
within the contemplation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes?
752 So. 2d at 570.  The Court answered affirmatively and held that deputy clerks
were in fact public employees entitled to collective bargaining rights under section
447.203, Florida Statutes (1997).  The Court acknowledged that in the past a
“deputy” may have occupied a special place inasmuch as a “deputy functioned as
the alter ego, so to speak, or second in command to the principal.”  Id. at 572.  In
this respect, the Court noted, deputies were in fact managerial-level employees who
could take charge in the principal’s absence.  However, the Court found:
Times have changed and the public officials who once required
one or two deputies to assist them in their tasks now might require a
host of assistants.  Further, the range of tasks performed by these
workers has expanded and the tasks themselves have become
specialized.  For instance, a clerk of court today might employ a score
or more skilled workers as bookkeepers, archivists, filing clerks,
typists, and receptionists.  In deference to tradition, such employees
are often still called "deputies," but their positions bear little
resemblance to the deputies of old.  As noted by the district court
below, the deputies of today often "look surprisingly like other public
employees."  Various public officials are currently authorized under
Florida Statutes to appoint deputies--e.g., sheriffs, clerks of court, 
property appraisers, and tax collectors. 
2Section 30.07, Florida Statutes (2002), states, “Sheriffs may appoint
deputies to act under them who shall have the same power as the sheriff appointing
them, and for the neglect and default of whom in the execution of their office the
sheriff shall be responsible.”  Section 30.071, Florida Statutes (2002),  further
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Id. (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).  In Service Employees, the Court further
observed that “Murphy appears to have exalted form over substance in
contravention of the plain language and broad purpose of the Act.”  The Court also
noted that the “appointed/employed” distinction was of little significance under
chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1997), because the definition of “public employee” in
section 447.203 itself drew no such distinction.  The Court explained that there was
simply no basis for excluding a “deputy” from the protection of chapter 447:
There are two basic categories of persons who work for the public:
(1) employees in the ordinary sense of the word, and (2) managerial
level employees (as well as various other specialized workers). 
Employees in the ordinary sense of the word are considered "public
employees" under the Act and their right to collectively bargain is
protected.  Managerial level employees, on the other hand, are not
considered "public employees" and their right to collectively bargain is
not protected by the Act.
752 So. 2d at 572.  We ultimately concluded that it would not be appropriate to
extend our prior ruling in Murphy to deputy clerks.   
On the other hand, consistent with our holding in Murphy, we note that other
statutory provisions reflect an apparent legislative intent to deny or control the right
to extend collective bargaining to deputy sheriffs.2  First, section 30.071(1) states
provides that “[t]his act does not change the alter ego relationship which exists
between a deputy sheriff and the appointing sheriff.”
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that chapter 30, Florida Statutes (2002), applies to all deputy sheriffs, except those
who, by special act of the Legislature or local law, are granted rights greater than
those provided in the chapter, including collective bargaining rights.  By necessary
implication, this evinces an intent that the Legislature has not otherwise granted the
right to collective bargaining to all deputy sheriffs, but local entities may do so if
they please.  To the extent that is not sufficiently clear, section 30.071(2)
unambiguously states, “This act does not grant to deputy sheriffs the right of
collective bargaining.”  In addition, section 112.535, Florida Statutes (2002),
provides:
The provisions of chapter 93-19, Laws of Florida, shall not be
construed to restrict or otherwise limit the discretion of the sheriff to
take any disciplinary action, without limitation, against a deputy sheriff,
including the demotion, reprimand, suspension, or dismissal thereof,
nor to limit the right of the sheriff to appoint deputy sheriffs or to
withdraw their appointment as provided in chapter 30.  Neither shall
the provisions of chapter 93-19, Laws of Florida, be construed to
grant collective bargaining rights to deputy sheriffs or to provide them
with a property interest or continued expectancy in their appointment
as a deputy sheriff.
Id. (emphasis added.)  It is important to note that the Murphy opinion considered
whether “a sheriff is a ‘public employer’ and whether a deputy sheriff is a ‘public
employee’ as such terms are utilized in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975).”  358
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So. 2d at 823.  The Murphy opinion did not consider any constitutional
considerations associated with the determination of the status of deputy sheriffs.  
Constitutional Construction
CFPBA asserts that the statutory provisions governing the collective
bargaining rights of law enforcement employees are conflicting and inconsistent. 
For example, CFPBA asserts that all police officers in Florida doing the same work
as deputy sheriffs have collective bargaining rights.  CFPBA also asserts that the
Florida statutory scheme is arbitrary and inconsistent in providing for bargaining
rights to deputy sheriffs in some counties in Florida while denying such rights in
other counties.  The sheriff does not attempt to refute these claims except to assert
that as to deputy sheriffs they reflect matters of legislative discretion. 
The right of employees in Florida to collective bargaining is expressly
provided for in the Florida Constitution.  Accordingly, even assuming a legislative
intent to deny collective bargaining rights to deputy sheriffs, the question remains as
to the constitutionality of any such exclusion, an issue not addressed in Murphy. 
Article I, section 6, of the Florida Constitution provides:
Right to Work. – The right of persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor
union or labor organization.  The right of employees, by and through a
labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or
abridged.  Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
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Id. (emphasis supplied).  This Court has deemed the right to collective bargaining
to be of a fundamental character and has applied a strict scrutiny test to any action
which tends to undermine this right.  See, e.g., State v. Police Benevolent Ass'n,
613 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992) (“[T]he compelling state interest test applies to
collective bargaining agreements . . . . ”).  Further, this Court has recognized that,
with the 1968 revision of the constitution, both private and public employees have
the same broad rights to collective bargaining.  See Dade County Teachers’ Ass'n
v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 1969) (“We hold that with the exception of the
right to strike, public employees have the same rights of collective bargaining as are
granted private employees by Section 6."); see also Chiles v. State Employees
Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 1999) (“The Legislature cannot,
however, abridge public employees’ right to bargain collectively, absent a
compelling state interest . . . .”).
PLAIN MEANING
The rules which govern the construction of statutes are generally applicable
to the construction of constitutional provisions.  See State ex rel. McKay v. Keller,
191 So. 542, 545 (Fla. 1939).  Accordingly, the basic rule requiring that the intent
of the framers and adopters be given effect equally controls in construing
constitutional provisions.  See State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d
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130, 135 (Fla. 1969).  Furthermore, we have consistently held that in order to
determine intent we must give effect to the plain meaning of the words actually used
in the Constitution:
Any inquiry into the proper interpretation of a constitutional
provision must begin with an examination of that provision’s explicit
language.  If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the
matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written. . . .  
. . . We recognize the rule that constitutional language must be
allowed to “speak for itself.”  Application of that rule, however, must
be tempered by judicial deference to offsetting and equally
constraining rules.  We refer to two fundamental principles of
constitutional adjudication.  First, constitutions “receive a broader and
more liberal construction than statutes.”  Second, constitutional
provisions should not be construed so as to defeat their underlying
objectives.  
Constitutions are “living documents,” not easily amended,
which demand greater flexibility in interpretation than that required by
legislatively enacted statutes.  Consequently, courts are far less
circumscribed in construing language in the area of constitutional
interpretation than in the realm of statutory construction.  When
adjudicating constitutional issues, the principles, rather than the direct
operation or literal meaning of the words used, measure the purpose
and scope of a provision.
Fla. Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass’n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119
(Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  Hence, we have an obligation to provide “a broader
and more liberal construction” of constitutional provisions, as well as being certain
not to construe the provisions “so as to defeat their underlying objectives.”
The right to collective bargaining was first provided in article I, section 12 of
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the 1885 Florida Constitution:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
labor organization, provided, that this clause shall not be construed to
deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor
organization to bargain collectively with their employer.
Id.  The collective bargaining right was revisited in the 1968 constitution, and the
revised provision provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
organization.  The right of employees, by and through a labor
organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. 
Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
Art. I, § 6, Fla. Const.  It is apparent to this Court that the plain meaning and use of
the term “employees” was intended to be applied in its broadest sense, to include
all employees, public and private, as recipients of the right to bargain collectively. 
That is, all employees who work for the government or for private business are
equally entitled to collectively bargain with their employers.  That is clearly the plain
meaning of the word “employees” as used in the constitution.
Ultimately, the sheriff is urging this Court to find that in order for deputy
sheriffs to have been included as “employees” in the constitution, there would have
to have been a specific constitutional provision singling out deputy sheriffs as
employees entitled to bargaining rights (i.e., "the right of employees, including
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deputy sheriffs").  Considering the simple and broad language used by the
constitution and its plain meaning, we reject that suggested requirement as an
unlikely and overly strained construction.  Such a construction does not comport
with our obligation to give the collective bargaining provisions a broad and liberal
construction consistent with the underlying objectives of the provision.
Indeed, such a construction would require all kinds of employees, such as
lawyers, deputy clerks, and others, to have been specifically listed, rather than
being presumed to have been included in the comprehensive term “employees.” 
We conclude there is simply nothing ambiguous about the constitutional provision
for the right of collective bargaining being extended to all employees, public and
private.  It would be hard to think of a broader, more inclusive phrase that could
have been used than “employees.”  The only limitation in the provision is on the
right to strike by public employees.  
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used in the constitution
means that we need not look at legislative history.  However, as is often the case
with statutory and constitutional provisions of that time, there is not much historical
material on whether the revision commission deliberated on the inclusion or
exclusion of specific categories of employees, such as deputy sheriffs, in the
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definition of employees.  However, some limited history of the movement of the
right to work provision through the Legislature after submission by the Florida
Constitution Revision Commission (“Commission”), sheds some light on this
determination. On November 10, 1966, the Commission proposed the following
constitutional language:
Section 12.  Right to work.–The right of persons to work shall
not be denied or abridged on account of membership nor non-
membership in any labor union or association.  The right of
employees, public or private, by and through a labor union or
association to bargain collectively shall not be denied nor abridged. 
Public employees shall not have the right to strike.
Florida Constitution Revision Commission, A Draft of a Proposed Revised
Constitution of Florida 3 (Nov. 10, 1966) (on file in the Florida Supreme Court
Library) (emphasis added).  Subsequent to submission by the Commission, the
section was taken up by separate interim constitution revision committees of the
house and the senate.  The senate committee kept the Commission’s proposed
revision substantially unchanged.  However, the house committee made a
substantial change in that its proposal limited the right to collective bargaining solely
to private employees.  The house committee version made the following alteration:
Section 6.  Right to Work.–The right of persons to work shall not be
denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in
any labor union or labor organization.  The right of employees, public
or private, by and through a labor union or labor organization private
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employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively
shall not be denied or abridged.  Public employees shall not have the
right to strike.
Fla. H.R. Jour. 6 (Spec. Sess. June 25, 1968).  Thus, there were two separate
versions of the section, the house version, limiting collective bargaining to private
employees, and the senate version, granting collective bargaining rights to both
private and public employees.  Ultimately, the Conference Committee of the House
and Senate voted to reject the house version and to accept and recommend the
senate version granting the right to collectively bargain to all employees, the final
result of which was the current version of the Right to Work provision of the
constitution.
As shown by the chronology and history of the Right to Work provision,
there was apparently ample deliberation as to whether public employees, as an
entire class, were to be extended the right to collectively bargain.  At the end of the
day, it was decided that all public employees would be entitled to that right. 
Notably, no exception was made in the constitution to exclude special categories of
employees such as deputies or lawyers.  
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
There is also no assertion here that the State has a compelling interest in
depriving deputy sheriffs of the right to collective bargaining.  Indeed, as noted
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above, all police officers and many deputy sheriffs have been exercising such rights
throughout Florida for some time.  The most recent case in which this Court has
reviewed a statutory restriction on a public employee’s right to collective bargaining
was in Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Fla.
1999), wherein we struck down a statutory attempt to deny collective bargaining
rights to lawyers employed by government.  
In Chiles, we addressed the constitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), Florida
Statutes (1997), which prohibited “ '[t]hose persons who by virtue of their
positions of employment are regulated by the Florida Supreme Court' from
engaging in collective bargaining with their government employer.”  734 So. 2d at
1031.  This section was enacted as an exception to the definition of “public
employee” in section 447.203(3).  In support of maintaining this statutory
exception, the State asserted the following as a compelling state interest:
This action by the Legislature should respond to the arguments
recently presented to the Florida Supreme Court in which the parties
questioned whether the exclusion of an exemption from collective
bargaining for government lawyers was evidence of the Legislature’s
intent to either waive or consent to “any conflicts with or alterations of
the traditional attorney-client relationship” between governmental
bodies and their lawyers.  The Legislature is constitutionally
empowered to provide the standards and guidelines for implementing
the collective bargaining rights of public employees as provided in
article I, section 6, Florida Constitution.  Therefore, the Legislature has
the authority to determine that the State has a compelling interest in
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excluding certain persons, including government lawyers, from the
collective bargaining process in the same manner in which it has
excluded other persons who have managerial, confidential or otherwise
unique employment relationships with the State.
By excluding government lawyers from collective bargaining,
the Legislature has determined that a necessity exists whereby
government attorneys give complete confidentiality, fidelity and loyalty
to a governmental body while conducting its legal affairs.  This
necessity aligns the attorney with the governmental body and
acknowledges the mutual trust, exchanges of confidence, reliance on
judgment and personal nature of the attorney-client relationship that
would not exist if the attorney were able to continuously sue his or her
client/employer to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. at 1032 (quoting Fla. H.R. Comm. on Empl. & Mgmt. Rel., HB 2281 (1994)
Staff Analysis 3 (final April 11, 1994) (on file with comm.)).  This Court rejected
this argument and found the statute unconstitutional.
In our opinion, we reaffirmed the principle that the right to bargain
collectively was a fundamental right and “[a] statute abridging the right of state
employees to bargain collectively is consonant with the constitution only if it
vindicates a compelling state interest by minimally necessary means.”  Id. at 1033. 
Then, adopting the trial court’s analysis, the Court reasoned that while the State
may have a compelling interest in preserving the lawyer-client relationship, there was
no evidence that interest was endangered by collective bargaining:
The compelling state interest in retaining competent, professional
attorneys does not support a finding of a compelling state interest in
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preventing any collective bargaining by state employed attorneys.  The
State presented no evidence to support the position that government
employed attorneys would abandon their ethical obligation of
confidentiality, fidelity and loyalty by becoming members of a labor
union.
Id. at 1034.  Based on our analysis in Chiles, and, to the extent that any provisions
of the Florida Statutes purport to prohibit deputy sheriffs from engaging in
collective bargaining, we conclude they are contrary to the plain provisions of
Florida’s Constitution and that no compelling government interest has been
demonstrated.  Indeed, the sheriff concedes that the overwhelming majority of law
enforcement employees in Florida enjoy collective bargaining rights. 
Clearly, maintaining a traditional relationship such as that existing between a
sheriff and a deputy sheriff does not meet the high standard of strict scrutiny and
compelling state interest necessary to justify infringement of the right to bargain
collectively.  In fact, the reverence for this traditional relationship borders on the
nostalgic, in light of the current circumstances surrounding that relationship as
noted in Service Employees.  As pointed out in Service Employees, a deputy
sheriff appears to work for his or her sheriff in the same fashion that a municipal
police officer works for his or her chief.  See 752 So. 2d at 573 n.9.  Yet, all police
officers freely enjoy the right to collective bargaining.  Certainly, if the State had to
find less restrictive means to preserve the obviously important and unique attorney-
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client relationship between government lawyers and their employers, less restrictive
means could be found to preserve the traditional relationship between sheriffs and
their deputies without depriving the latter of the right to collective bargaining.  Cf.
Chiles, 734 So. 2d at 1035 (“Even assuming some additional compartmentalization
will be required, the administrative interest in avoiding compartmentalization must
be viewed in light of the fundamental right to bargain collectively.”).
CONCLUSION
We must be ever vigilant in remembering that these are fundamental
constitutional rights that are in question, and we must be careful before depriving an
entire category of employees of those rights in the face of a provision giving those
rights to all employees.  As explained above, the right to collectively bargain is a
fundamental right explicitly vested in all Florida employees by the Florida
Constitution, and, therefore, any governmental action attempting to restrict the
enjoyment thereof is subject to strict scrutiny.  To the extent that the sheriff has
failed to demonstrate why a deputy sheriff does not come within the ambit of the
definition of an employee, and to the extent that the State has equally failed to
articulate a compelling interest, outside of merely maintaining some traditional status
between a sheriff and her deputies, a deputy sheriff may not be deprived of the
constitutional right to collectively bargain.  We answer the rephrased certified
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question in the negative and conclude that deputy sheriffs, like all other employees,
have the right to collectively bargain.
Because we conclude that the Florida Constitution explicitly grants all
employees the right to collective bargaining, including deputy sheriffs, we recede
from any implication to the contrary in our opinion in Murphy, and reaffirm our
decisions in Service Employees and Lawyers Guild.  The decision of the district
court of appeal is approved.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice,
concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs.
HARDING, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and
LEWIS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I join in Justice Harding’s dissent.  I also dissent because I do not find that
the majority has set out a basis upon which to recede from Murphy v. Mack, 358
So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978).  I do not believe that this present Court should change this
law when neither the Legislature nor the Constitutional Revision Commission has
3 Dohnal v. Syndicated Office Systems, 529 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1988).
4 State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1994).
5 Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Magaha, 769 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2000).
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acted to change the law since the decision was issued.
LEWIS, J., concurs.
HARDING, Senior Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  By rephrasing the certified question from one
pertaining to chapter 447 to one interpreting the Florida Constitution, the majority is
completely changing the nature of this case.  More importantly, the majority is
exceeding the constitutional bounds of this Court’s jurisdictional limits.  In the past,
this Court has rephrased questions “in the interest of clarity”;3 in order to “reflect
the issue presented”;4 and to “more accurately reflect the procedural posture and
underlying facts of th[e] case.”5  But this Court has never rephrased a certified
question for the purpose of turning a run-of-the-mill statutory construction case
into a full-blown constitutional interpretation case. 
Both PERC and the district court below made their decisions pursuant to
their interpretations of chapter 447; neither addressed the issue from a constitutional
6 Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 16, AFL-CIO v. Pub. Employees
Relations Comm’n, 752 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2000).
7 Murphy v. Mack, 358 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1978).
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perspective.  Moreover, this Court’s decisions in Service Employees,6 which the
majority relies on to reach today’s holding, and Murphy,7 which the majority now
recedes from, were primarily based on the Court’s interpretation of chapter 447,
not article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. 
This is a court of limited jurisdiction.  In Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v.
Jensen, 777 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 2001), this Court dismissed review of a case
because the district court had certified a question without ruling on the question
certified.  We explained that our jurisdiction in certified question cases was limited
to "any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified
by it to be of great public importance."  Id. (quoting art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.)
(emphasis added).  By applying the reasoning of Jensen to the instant case, it
follows that this Court can not both rephrase and answer a certified question if the
rephrased question was not previously ruled upon by the district court below.  For
this reason, I would not rephrase the certified question in this case.
WELLS and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Two Cases Consolidated:
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Applications for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance 
 Fifth District - Case No. 5D00-618 
G. "Hal" Johnson, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner/Respondent
Phillip P. Quaschnick of Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler, Evans & Dietzen,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen H. Grimes of Holland & Knight LLP,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent/Petitioner
James G. Brown and Dorothy F. Green of Brown & Green, P.A., Orlando,
Florida,
for Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Amicus Curiae
William E. Powers, Jr., of Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler, Evans & Dietzen,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for the Florida Sheriffs' Association, Amicus Curiae
Ellen Leonard, Tampa, Florida,
for Cal Henderson, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Amicus Curiae