Title: TRACEY FUENTES, individually; and NF, a minor child, by and through her next best friend, parent and guardian, TRACEY FUENTES V. MARGRED JEDNAT; PAUL JEDNAT; and JAMES LEWIS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TRACEY FUENTES, individually; and NF, a minor child, by and through her next best friend, parent and guardian, TRACEY FUENTES V. MARGRED JEDNAT; PAUL JEDNAT; and JAMES LEWIS2010 WY 40229 P.3d 949Case Number: S-09-0009Decided: 04/02/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
TRACEY 
FUENTES, individually; and NF, a minor child, by and through her next best 
friend, parent and guardian, TRACEY 
FUENTES,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.MARGRED JEDNAT; 
PAUL JEDNAT; and JAMES 
LEWIS,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

William 
R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of Wiliam R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Fix.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Katherine 
L. Mead and Bradford S. Mead of Mead & Mead, Jackson, Wyoming for Margred 
and Paul Jednat; and Laurence W. Stinson of Bonner Stinson, P.C., Cody, Wyoming 
for James Lewis.  Argument by 
Messrs. Mead and Stinson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      While they were 
driving in downtown Jackson, Appellants Tracy Fuentes (Ms. Fuentes) and her 
daughter were rear-ended by a drunk, eighteen-year-old Jonathan Jednat 
(Jonathan).  Ms. Fuentes recovered 
compensatory and punitive damages in a separate action against Jonathon, 
although that jury awarded zero damages in favor of her daughter.  Ms. Fuentes then filed this suit against 
Jonathan's parents, Paul and Margred Jednat (Jednats), and his uncle James Lewis 
(Lewis) asserting liability as to each of them individually.  The district court granted the Jednats' 
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Lewis from the case after he filed an 
affidavit of non-involvement.  Ms. 
Fuentes challenges those rulings.  
We will affirm the district court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Fuentes lists 
her issues as follows:

 
 

I.              
The 
lower court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants/appellees Margred and Paul Jednat.

II.            
The 
lower court erred in granting the affidavit of non-involvement in favor of the 
defendant/appellee James Lewis.

 
 
The 
Jednats frame the issues this way:

 
 

1.            
Can 
[Ms. Fuentes and her daughter], who obtained a jury verdict for damages which 
have been paid, sue another party for the same damages?

2.            
Can 
[Ms. Fuentes' and her daughter's] claims for punitive damages proceed without 
actual or compensatory damages?

 
 
Lewis 
states the issue, as related to him:

 
 
Did 
the District Court err when it dismissed without prejudice Appellee Jim Lewis 
pursuant to his Affidavit of Non-Involvement once all parties agreed that Lewis 
did not own or loan the vehicle alleged to be negligently entrusted at the time 
of the car accident involving [Ms. Fuentes and her 
daughter]?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      After 
experiencing some personal and legal trouble in his home state of Pennsylvania, 
eighteen-year-old Jonathan was sent by his parents to Jackson, Wyoming, to 
"change his life."1  His uncle, James Lewis, lived in Jackson 
and offered Jonathan a place to live.

 
 
[¶4]      After Jonathan 
arrived in Jackson, Lewis gave the Jednats a 1996 Chevrolet Tahoe.  The vehicle was licensed and registered 
in the state of Pennsylvania under Margred Jednat's name.  The Jednats also maintained the 
insurance on the vehicle, but the vehicle remained in Wyoming for their son to 
drive.

 
 
[¶5]      On December 9, 
2005, Jonathan was driving the Tahoe, while drunk, and rear-ended Ms. Fuentes 
and her three-year-old daughter.  
Ms. Fuentes suffered injuries from the accident, and subsequently sued 
Jonathan, asking for both punitive and compensatory damages on behalf of herself 
and her daughter.  After a trial, 
Ms. Fuentes was awarded $163,800.00 in compensatory damages and $50,000.00 in 
punitive damages, but her daughter was awarded nothing.

 
 
[¶6]      Ms. Fuentes and 
her daughter, then sued the Jednats and Lewis.  Ms. Fuentes sought relief upon a theory 
of negligent entrustment but essentially requested the same damages she sought 
(and received) from Jonathan.

 
 
[¶7]      Lewis filed an 
Affidavit of Non-Involvement pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-117 (LexisNexis 2009) and was dismissed from the 
case.  The Jednats filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment which was granted by the district court.2

 
 
[¶8]      This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]     When reviewing an 
order granting summary 
judgment,

 
 

We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and using the same materials as 
the district court. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 
126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo.2006). Thus, our review is plenary. Birt v. Wells 
Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 (Wyo. 
2003). 

 

 
Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
56 governs summary judgments. A 
summary judgment is appropriate 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, we consider the 
record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly 
drawn from the record. We review questions of law de novo without giving any 
deference to the district court's determinations.

 
 

Collings 
v. Lords, 
2009 WY 135, ¶ 5, 218 P.3d 654, 655-656 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Ms. Fuentes argues on appeal that 
her claim against Jonathan's relatives is a new claim, not simply a renewal of the case 
against Jonathan.  Specifically, Ms. 
Fuentes asserts a theory of negligent entrustment, not just negligence, and 
argues that because negligent entrustment is a different kind of breach of the 
duty of reasonable care than is driving while under the influence, the damages 
claimed are different.  In response, 
the Jednats argue that Ms. Fuentes and her daughter have recovered their damages 
once and they cannot recover them again.

 
 
[¶11]   On appeal, this Court must look at 
whether or not there are any genuine issues of material fact warranting 
reversal.  To do so, we look to see 
if the materials and law presented by the Jednats in support of the motion for 
summary judgment established that there were no such issues.  Fuentes argues that the Jednats and 
Lewis knew, or should have known, that Jonathan would operate the vehicle in a 
negligent manner that would endanger other drivers, 
and that his negligence, combined with the Jednats' and Lewis's negligent 
entrustment, were the proximate cause of the injuries.  Moreover, Fuentes argues that the 
resolution of this case on summary judgment motion was 
improper.

 
 
[¶12]   Because we are reviewing this case 
under the standard used for summary judgments, and because the district court 
did not give any explanation in its order granting the motion for summary 
judgment, we look to the parties' motions, reviewing the facts from the 
perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and reviewing the 
law de novo.  First, we focus our attention upon 
the law relative to this case.  The 
parties' arguments focus on a case formerly before us.  In Day v. Davidson, 951 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 
1997), the plaintiff brought suit 
against a store employee after having accepted an offer of judgment from the 
store, which judgment had been satisfied.  
The trial court ruled that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
barred the victim's claims, and granted summary judgment to the 
employee.  The plaintiff appealed, 
and this Court held that the store and its employee were not in privity for 
purposes of res judicata, thus it did 
not apply.  However, this Court 
affirmed the district court and said the damages obtained by the plaintiff 
against the store was the limit that she could claim, and that the employee was 
to be credited with that amount as to any judgment entered against him.  Under this rule, the plaintiff could 
recover no additional monies from the employer and, therefore, summary judgment 
was proper.  In Day, this Court decided that preclusion 
is not an issue simply limited to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and found the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments helpful on this issue.  We stated in Day:

 
 
The 
application of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS to an instance such as this 
resembles judicial estoppel although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS does 
not rely upon that doctrine.

 
 
When 
read together, the pertinent provisions of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 
50 and 51 in this instance provide the amount of damages obtained by the Days in 
the suit against Pamida, Inc. is the limit on the damages that may be claimed 
against Davidson, and Davidson is to be credited with that amount as to any 
judgment entered against him. Since it is apparent that in applying this rule 
the Days could recover no additional monies from Davidson, we agree with the 
decision of the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of 
Davidson.

 
 

Id., 951 P.2d  at 383.

 

[¶13]   
Another case cited by the Jednats in support of this issue is from 
the Arizona Court of Appeals.  It 
involves a very similar factual situation.  
In Edmond v. Fairfield Sunrise 
Village, 644 P.2d 296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), the victims/plaintiffs sued a 
driver after the car he was driving hit theirs.  The victims were awarded a judgment, 
which was satisfied.  However, the 
victims later filed an action against the owner of the vehicle involved in that 
same accident, alleging negligent entrustment and seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages.  The owners moved 
for summary judgment on the basis of the satisfaction of judgment against the 
driver, and the trial court granted the motion.  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that the victims' claim against the owners had been extinguished by the 
satisfaction of their judgment against the driver.  The court stated:

 
 
Any 
tortious conduct of the defendants in the instant case culminated in the 
plaintiffs' injuries, the damages for which have been adjudicated and reduced to 
judgment. The judgment has been satisfied. The satisfaction extinguished the 
cause of action. The Restatement sections cited by appellants are in accord with 
our conclusion.

 
 

Id., 644 P.2d  at 298.

 
 
[¶14]   In analyzing the Edmond case, the Arizona court looked to 
both the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, as did this Court in Day.  There, we found the Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments (1982) particularly 
helpful, affirming the lower court based on the principals in §§ 50-51.  Section 50 provides as 
follows:

 
 
§ 50 
Discharge of Judgment Against One of Several 
Co-Obligors

 
 
When 
a judgment has been rendered against one of several persons each of whom is 
liable for a loss claimed in the action on which the judgment is 
based:

(1)          
A 
satisfaction or release of the judgment, or covenant not to execute upon it, or 
other agreement terminating in whole or in part the judgment debtor's 
obligation, does not discharge the liability of any of the other persons liable 
for the loss, except:

(a)    
To 
the extent that the agreement may so provide; and 

(b)   To 
the extend required by the law of suretyship.

(2)          
Any 
consideration received by the judgment creditor in payment of the judgment 
debtor's obligation discharges, to the extent of the amount of value received, 
the liability to the judgment creditor of all other persons liable for the 
loss.

 
 
Section 
51 reads as follows:

 
 
§ 
51. Persons Having a Relationship in Which One Is Vicariously Responsible for 
the Conduct of the Other

 
 
If 
two persons have a relationship such that one of them is vicariously 
responsible for the conduct of the other, and an action is brought by the 
injured person against one of them, the judgment in the action has the following 
preclusive effects against the injured person in a subsequent action against the 
other.

(1)          
A 
judgment against the injured person that bars him from reasserting his claim 
against the defendant in the first action extinguishes any claim he has against 
the other person responsible for the conduct unless:

(a)  
The 
claim asserted in the second action is based upon grounds that could not have 
been asserted against the defendant in the first action; 
or

(b) The judgment in the first action was based on a 
defense that was personal to the defendant in the first 
action.

(2)       A judgment 
in favor of the injured person is conclusive upon him as to the amount of his 
damages, unless:

(a) There were limitations on the competence of the 
forum in the first action preventing him from obtaining the full measure of his 
damages, as stated in § 26(1)(c), or he exercised the option stated in § 
26(1)(e) to divide his claim; or

(b) Different rules govern the measure of damages 
in the two actions.

(3)       If the 
action is brought against the primary obligor and judgment is against the 
injured person, it extinguishes the claim against the person vicariously 
responsible if under applicable law the latter is an indemnitor whose liability 
arises only when the primary obligor is found liable to the injured 
person.

(4)       A judgment 
by consent for or against the injured person does not extinguish his claim 
against the person not sued in the first action except:

(a) In the circumstances stated in Subsection (3); 
and

(b) To the extent stated in § 
50.

 
 
[¶15]   As to each of these restatements, 
we stated in Day:

 
 
When 
read together, the pertinent provisions of Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§§ 50 and 51 in this instance provide the amount of damages obtained by the 
Days in the suit against Pamida, Inc. is the limit on the damages that may be 
claimed against Davidson, and Davidson is to be credited with that amount as to 
any judgment entered against him.  
Since it is apparent that in applying this rule the Days could recover no 
additional monies from Davidson, we agree with the decision of the district 
court to enter summary judgment in favor of Davidson.

 

Id., 951 P.2d  at 383.

 
 
[¶16]   Section 886 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1979) addresses this point:

 
 
§ 
886 Satisfaction of a Judgment Against One of Several 
Tortfeasors

 
 
The 
discharge of a judgment against one of several tortfeasors each of whom is 
liable for a single harm is treated like a release or covenant not to sue given 
to one of several tortfeasors for a claim not reduced to 
judgment.

 
 
[¶17]   The Arizona court thought Comment b 
to § 886 was particularly applicable in Edmond:

 
 
If 
the adjudication of the loss has the effect of delimiting the injured party's 
entitlement to redress on the ground that the actual litigation of the issue of 
damages results in the injured person's being precluded from relitigating the 
damages question (see Restatement Second, Judgments § 88) (Tent. Draft)), a 
payment in full of the judgment has the effect of satisfying in full the injured 
party's claim against any of the tortfeasors and there is no longer an 
enforceable claim.  (See Restatement 
Second of Judgments, § 95, Comment d (Tent. Draft)).

 
 

Id., 644 P.2d  at 297.

 
 
[¶18]   Section 95 of the tentative draft 
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
became § 50, the application of which the Jednats urge in the instant 
case.  Comment d to § 50 is 
helpful in analyzing the instant case:

 
 
The 
rule that payment of a loss, in whole or in part, by one of several obligors 
reduces the amount that may be obtained from other obligors also applies when 
the amount of the loss has been adjudicated.  The adjudication of the amount of the 
loss also has the effect of establishing the limit of the injured party's 
entitlement to redress, whoever the obligor may be.  This is because the determination of the 
amount of the loss resulting from actual litigation of the issue of damages 
results in the injured person's being precluded from relitigating the damages 
question.    Therefore, when a judgment is based on 
actual litigation of the measure of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid 
in full, the injured party has no enforceable claim against any other obligor 
who is responsible for the same loss.

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, supra 
§ 50, cmt. d.  See also, 
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 388 at 1082 (2000) ("When a defendant 
fully pays a judgment for all of the plaintiff's damages, the plaintiff's claim 
is satisfied and he has no further claim for the same injury.").  See also Gonzales v. Hernandez, 175 F.3d 1202, 
1205-1206 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[A] final 
judgment against a plaintiff extinguishes all rights to remedies against the 
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of 
connected transactions, out of which the action arose.").

 
 
[¶19]   Before we close our analysis, we 
note that in 1986, the Wyoming legislature abolished joint and 
several liability by amending Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 to provide 
that a party at fault be required to pay for his proportionate share of the 
fault.  1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24, 
§ 1; Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 708 (Wyo. 1993).  The adoption of comparative fault 
mandates that the trier of fact determine issues of proximate cause and allocate 
liability accordingly.  In a 
comparative fault case, the jury must consider the negligence of not only the 
parties but also all the participants in the transaction producing the injuries 
sued upon.  Board of County 
Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1191 (Wyo. 1981).  Counter to that principle, Ms. Fuentes 
argues that Wyoming law allows her to sue multiple defendants in serial actions 
for her damages arising from the accident.  
She thus contends that she has not been made whole through her prior 
litigation against Jonathan, and seeks to assert an independent claim against 
his relatives for their alleged culpability.

 
 
[¶20]   We reject Ms. Fuentes' position. 
 In her action against Jonathan, she 
presented evidence on all of her injuries and her daughter's injuries, and 
damages resulting from the accident.  The jury determined those damages and 
returned a verdict in her favor.  
Ms. Fuentes fails 
to establish how 
the damages caused by the Jednats' and Lewis's alleged fault 
differ from the damages resulting from Jonathan's fault.

 
 
[¶21]   When a judgment includes a 
determination of the entirety of recoverable damages suffered by the plaintiff 
for an indivisible injury and provides for their recovery by the plaintiff 
against one or more of the defendants, payment of the full amount of recoverable 
damages constitutes a satisfaction of the plaintiff's rights against all 
tortfeasors legally responsible for the plaintiff's indivisible injury.  Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, L.L.C., 
v. Naranjo, 206 Ariz. 447, ¶ 19, 79 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003). 

 
 
As 
comment c to that section points out: "When a plaintiff obtains a judgment for 
all recoverable damages, discharge of the judgment bars any further action 
against other potential tortfeasors . . . . By obtaining the full amount of 
recoverable damages, the plaintiff's legal rights are satisfied, and the 
plaintiff may not pursue any others for further recovery."  This "merely reflects the 
well-established and commonsense rule that plaintiffs may 
only obtain one recovery of their damages."  Restatement (Third) of Torts § 25, 
Reporter's Note, cmt. c;  see 
also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50 cmt. d (1982) ("When a judgment is based on actual litigation of the measure 
of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid in full, the injured party has no 
enforcible [sic] claim against any other obligor who is responsible for the same 
loss.").

 
 

Id., ¶ 14, 79 P.3d  at 
1209-1210.

 
 
[¶22]   We find these principles applicable 
here.  Ms. Fuentes had her day in 
court.   The jury in her case 
against Jonathan awarded her damages, and she was thus made "whole."  The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Jednats based upon the satisfaction of judgment in 
Fuentes' case against their son, Jonathan.  Applying the above legal principles to 
the instant claims, we are in agreement with the Jednats that the previous 
action was "based on actual litigation of the measure of a loss."  Day, 951 P.2d  at 383.  Any tortious conduct of the Jednats that 
culminated in Ms. Fuentes' injuries, the damages for which have been adjudicated 
and reduced to judgment, have been fully satisfied.  Neither Ms. Fuentes nor her daughter has 
a claim against the Jednats, or any other possible defendant in this case, 
including Lewis.  She collected all 
of the damages available to her in her claim against Jonathan 
Jednat.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   Finding no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the Jednats and Lewis were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, we affirm.  Neither 
Ms. Fuentes nor her daughter has a claim against the Jednats, or any other 
possible defendant in this case, including Lewis.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Jonathan apparently had a lengthy history of drug and alcohol 
abuse.

 
 

2Prior to filing their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Jednats filed a 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), which the district court 
denied.