Title: Preston v. Marathon Oil Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

YALE PRESTON v. MARATHON OIL COMPANY and THOMAS SMITH2012 WY 66Case Number: S-11-0166Decided: 05/10/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
 
YALE 
PRESTON,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.MARATHON OIL COMPANY and 
THOMAS SMITH,Appellees (Defendants).
 
Certified 
Question 
From 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit
The 
Honorable William C. Bryson, Circuit Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Philip 
A. Nicholas and Mitchell H. Edwards, Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Edwards.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Mark 
R. Ruppert, Joanna R. Vilos and Tyler J. Garrett, Holland & Hart LLP, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming; Shane P. Coleman, Holland & Hart LLP, Billings, 
Montana.  Argument by Mr. 
Ruppert.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
[¶1]      The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit certified a question to us 
regarding the validity of an assignment of intellectual property rights given by 
Yale Preston to Marathon Oil Company without any additional consideration other 
than continued at-will employment.   

CERTIFIED 
QUESTION
[¶2]      The certified 
question is:
Does 
continuing the employment of an existing at-will employee constitute adequate 
consideration to support an agreement containing an intellectual 
property-assignment provision? 
 
Our 
answer to the question is “yes,” continuation of at-will employment is 
sufficient consideration for an agreement requiring assignment of intellectual 
property.  
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The certification 
order contains the following statement of facts relevant to the question 
certified:
 
(b)       A 
statement of all facts relevant to the questions 
certified
 
While 
we do not believe that resolution of this question requires application of the 
facts of this particular case, below are selected underlying facts to provide 
context.  In a letter dated February 
22, 2001, Pennaco Energy, Inc. (“Pennaco”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Marathon (collectively, Pennaco and Marathon are referred to as “Marathon”), 
offered employment to Preston as a relief pumper in Marathon’s coal bed methane 
well operation in the Powder River Basin in northeastern Wyoming.  In addition to describing Preston’s 
proposed responsibilities, compensation, and benefits, the letter indicated that 
Preston was being hired “under the policy of 'employment at will’ whereby you or 
the Company is free to terminate the employment relationship at any time and for 
any reason without cause or liability other than as prescribed by law.”  Preston countersigned the letter on 
February 27, 2001.  

 
            
Thereafter, Preston started work for Marathon, although there is a 
factual dispute as to the precise date.  
After a bench trial, the district court in this case made a factual 
finding that Preston began employment with Marathon on March 30, 2001.  Preston contends that he began work on 
March 1, 2001.1
 
            
On April 5, 2001, Preston signed a document entitled Marathon Oil Company 
and Subsidiaries Employee Agreement (“the April 2001 Employee Agreement”).  Brenda Williams signed on behalf of 
Marathon on the same date.  The 
agreement contained the following provisions relevant to this 
dispute:
 
1.         
Definitions
* * * 
*
(d)       
“Intellectual Property” means all inventions, discoveries, developments, 
writings, computer programs and related documentation, designs, ideas, and any 
other work product made or conceived by EMPLOYEE during the term of employment 
with MARATHON which (1) relate to the present or reasonably anticipated business 
of the MARATHON GROUP, or (2) were made or created with the use of Confidential 
Information or any equipment, supplies, or facilities of the MARATHON 
GROUP.  Such property made or 
conceived by EMPLOYEE (or for which EMPLOYEE files a patent or copyright 
application) within one year after termination of employment with MARATHON will 
be presumed to have been made or conceived during such 
employment.
 
* 
* * *
3.         
Disclosure and Assignment of Intellectual 
Property
 
EMPLOYEE 
agrees to promptly disclose to MARATHON and does hereby assign to MARATHON all 
Intellectual Property, and EMPLOYEE agrees to execute such other documents as 
MARATHON may request in order to effectuate such 
assignment.
 
            
Although the agreement provides that it “shall be governed and construed 
in accordance with Ohio law,” both parties agree that Wyoming law applies 
pursuant to Wyoming’s choice of law rules.  
It is undisputed that Marathon did not provide any additional 
consideration to Preston for signing this document beyond continued 
employment.

[Reference 
to attached documents].
 
(c)        
The nature of the controversy in which the questions 
arose
 
            
The present dispute centers around allegations of patent infringement and 
questions of ownership of two patents that cover a baffle system Preston 
invented:  the '764 patent and the 
'385 patent.  Approximately two 
months after Preston ceased to be employed by Marathon, he filed a patent 
application for his invention, which ultimately issued on November 1, 2005 as 
the '764 patent.  Preston is listed 
as the sole inventor on the '764 patent.  
On June 14, 2004, Marathon filed a patent application for a similar 
invention that ultimately issued on April 24, 2007 as the '385 patent.  The patent names both Preston and 
Defendant-Cross-Appellant Thomas Smith (“Smith”), who was a Marathon employee at 
the time Preston worked at Marathon, as co-inventors.  

In 
the present litigation, Preston asserted counts for, among others, patent 
infringement and a declaration that Preston is the sole inventor of the '385 
patent.  Marathon raised affirmative 
defenses and counterclaimed for a declaration that Preston agreed to assign his 
rights in the '764 patent to Marathon pursuant to the April 2001 Employee 
Agreement.  Smith also 
counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that he is a co-inventor of the '764 
patent.
 
            
As it relates to the certified question, the district court entered a 
final judgment on August 30, 2010, finding that Preston was the sole inventor of 
the '764 and '385 patents, and that the April 2001 Employee Agreement is a valid 
contract, pursuant to which Preston was required to assign his ownership 
interest in the '764 and '385 patents to Marathon.
 
            
On appeal, Preston challenges, among other rulings, the district court’s 
ruling that the April 2001 Employee Agreement requires Preston to assign his 
rights in the '764 and '385 patents to Marathon, which necessarily requires this 
court to decide the validity and enforceability of that agreement.  Accordingly, the answer to the 
above-certified question of law may be determinative of one of the issues in 
this appeal.  
 
(footnote 
in original and record citation omitted).  

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶4]      W.R.A.P. 11 governs certified questions.  Rule 11.01 provides that we may answer a 
question of law “which may be determinative of the cause” pending in the 
certifying court and “concerning which it appears there is no controlling 
precedent” from this Court.   “[Q]uestions of the application of the 
law, including identification of the correct rule, are considered de 
novo.” Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 
2004 WY 150, ¶ 5, 100 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Wyo. 2004), 
quoting EOG 
Resources, Inc. v. State, 
2003 WY 34, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 757, 759 (Wyo. 2003).  See also, Prokop v. Hockhalter, 2006 WY 75, ¶ 6, 
137 P.3d 131, 133 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶5]      It is helpful to 
start our analysis of the certified question with a review of the general rights 
of an employee and an employer to intellectual property conceived by the 
employee during the term of employment.  

 
Generally 
an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and 
perfected it, and the law protects and enforces the inventor’s property rights 
in an invention unless he or she has contracted them away.  Hence, the mere fact that the inventor 
was an employee at the time of the invention does not mean that that inventor is 
required to assign the patent rights to the employer.  Thus, in the absence of a special 
agreement to the contrary, an invention and a patent secured for it belong to 
the inventor, even though the invention was made during the period of the 
inventor’s employment, and the invention relates to the matter in which the 
inventor was employed, although the absence of an agreement does not necessarily 
preclude an employer from claiming a right to the invention.  
19 
Williston on Contracts, § 54:20 
(4th ed. 2001).  See also, University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (E.D.Pa. 1991).  
The public policy underlying this general rule is to encourage 
individuals to exercise their inventive powers.  Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).  
However, “[i]f an employee’s job duties include the responsibility for 
inventing or for solving a particular problem that requires invention, any 
invention created by that employee during the performance of these 
responsibilities belongs to the employer. . . .”  19 Williston on Contracts, § 54:20.  
Thus, typically, an employee who is not hired to invent is the owner 
of any invention discovered during employment.  
[¶6]      Nevertheless, 
when an employee who was not hired to invent does invent something as part of 
his work duties, the employer is given a “shop right” to use the invention.  
27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 188 (2011) 
explains:  

            
Where the employee is not hired specifically to design or invent, but 
nevertheless conceives of a device during working hours with the use of the 
employer’s materials and equipment, the employer is granted an irrevocable but 
nonexclusive right to use the invention under the shop-right rule.  

s 
Definition:  The shop right is an employer’s royalty 
or fee, a nonexclusive and nontransferable license to use an employee’s patented 
invention.  
            
Notwithstanding the existence of the shop right, the invention remains 
the property of the employee, and the employee has the right, conferred by the 
patent, to exclude all but the employer from the benefits of the invention.  

[¶7]      Mr. Preston was 
hired by Marathon as a relief pumper and there is no indication that his 
specific job duties included inventing the baffle system.  So, under the general rules (without 
considering the impact of the assignment), Mr. Preston would be the owner of his 
invention and Marathon would be entitled to use the invention under the “shop 
right” principle.  

[¶8]      Mr. Preston, 
however, signed the April 2001 Employee Agreement, wherein he agreed to 
“promptly disclose to MARATHON and does hereby assign to MARATHON all 
Intellectual Property . . . .”2  It is undisputed that Mr. Preston was an 
at-will employee at the time he signed the agreement.  Marathon’s 
engagement letter to Mr. Preston specifically stated that he was being “hired 
under the policy of 'employment at will’ . . . .”  It is also undisputed that 
Marathon did not provide any additional consideration for the assignment 
agreement, other than continuation of at-will employment.  
 
[¶9]      In Wyoming, we have recognized that all employment occurs by either 
express or implied contract.  
Wilder 
v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).  There are two types of employment 
relationships–employment which requires cause for termination and at-will 
employment.  Id. at 217-19; Brodie  v. General Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997).  
“[E]mployment is presumed to be at will unless an express or implied 
contract states otherwise.”  McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 
WY 111, ¶ 21, 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo. 2001).  At-will employment may be terminated by 
either the employer or the employee at any time for any or no reason, with no 
legal consequence.  Finch v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co., 2005 WY 
41, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo. 2005); Brodie, 934 P.2d  at 1265.  By its nature, then, an at-will 
employment relationship “'is subject to modification at any moment by either 
party as a condition of it continuing at all.’”  Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242, 246 (Wyo. 
1943), quoting Norton v. Brookline, 
181 Mass. 360, 363, 63 N.E. 930, 931 (Mass. 1902).  
 
[¶10]   This legal and factual background 
sets up our current inquiry—whether an at-will employee’s assignment of 
intellectual property rights to his employer must be accompanied by additional 
consideration, beyond the continuation of his employment, to be 
enforceable.  Other jurisdictions 
have addressed that issue, with mixed results.   
 
[¶11]   Mr. Preston points to Hewett v. Samsonsite Corp., 507 P.2d 1119 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) and Harsco 
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3d. Cir. 1985) as support for his argument 
that additional consideration is required.  
Hewett was employed by Samsonite as “foreman of the model shop in which 
prototype models were fabricated from designs drawn by Samsonite’s design and 
engineering department.”  Id. at 1120.  Although he was not hired to invent, 
Hewett invented three products, and Samsonite required him to assign the patent 
rights.  Hewett contended that the 
assignment was not valid because no separate consideration was given by 
Samsonite for it.  Samsonite argued 
that, by allowing Hewett to continue working for the company, “sufficient 
consideration was given to make the assignment binding.”  Id. at 1121.  The Colorado Court of Appeals held that 
continued employment was not sufficient consideration for the patent assignment, 
rendering it invalid.  Hewett, 
therefore, owned the inventions, subject to Samsonite’s shop rights.  Id. at 1121-22.
 
[¶12]   In Harsco, Zlotnicki worked for Harsco as a 
staff engineer.  He conceived a new 
invention as part of his work duties, and Harsco required him to assign his 
patent rights to it.  Harsco, 779 F.2d  at 907-08.  The Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania 
law and upheld the assignment, but interpreted the assignment agreement as 
containing a promise by Harsco to employ Zlotnicki for a reasonable time.  Id. at 910-11.  That case, therefore, arguably stands 
for the proposition that additional consideration beyond continued at-will 
employment is required to support an assignment of patent rights to the 
employer.   

 
[¶13]   Marathon directs us to other cases 
which hold to the contrary—continued employment is sufficient consideration to 
support an agreement to assign intellectual property.  In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 
22 F.2d 353, 354-56 (9th Cir. 1927), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that continued employment was sufficient 
consideration to support a patent assignment agreement.  The court 
noted that at the time the assignment was presented to Miller, Goodyear was 
under no obligation to continue to employ him.  Goodyear, therefore, had the same right 
to make the assignment agreement a condition of retention as it would have had 
to impose it as a condition for hiring him in the first place.  The court observed that Goodyear did not 
bind itself to employ Miller for any stipulated period and Miller did not agree 
to remain for any designated length of time.  Thus, both parties were on the same 
footing and “their rights and obligations were reciprocal.”  Id. at 355.  See also, Hebbard v. American Zinc, Lead & 
Smelting Co., 161 F.2d 339, 345 (8th 
Cir. 1947) (refusing to rescind contracts for assignment of a patent where the 
consideration was simply “continued employment”)4; Edward L. Raymond, Jr., 
Annotation, Construction and Effect of 
Provision of Employment Contract Giving Employer Right to Inventions Made by 
Employee, 66 A.L.R. 4th 1135 § 
8[c] & [d] (orig. published 1988, with cum. supps).   
 
[¶14]   We are, therefore, faced with a 
split of authority on the question of whether additional consideration is 
required to support a post-employment assignment of intellectual property.  Preston argues that our decision in Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 
861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993) presents an analogous situation and obligates us to 
rule that consideration in addition to continued at-will employment is necessary 
to support a post-employment assignment of intellectual property rights.  
 
[¶15]   Hopper involved a covenant not to 
compete given by an employee after commencement of her employment.  In analyzing the effectiveness of the 
non-compete provision, we looked at public policy which generally disfavors such 
agreements.  
 
The 
common law policy against contracts in restraint of trade is one of the oldest 
and most firmly established. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts §§ 185-188 
(1981) 
(Introductory Note at 35). See Dutch 
Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher, 
58 Wyo. 374, 131 P.2d 630, 634 (1942). 
The traditional disfavor of such restraints means covenants not to compete are 
construed against the party seeking to enforce them. Commercial 
Bankers Life Ins. Co. of America v. Smith, 
516 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Ind.App.1987). 
The initial burden is on the employer to prove the covenant is reasonable and 
has a fair relation to, and is necessary for, the business interests for which 
protection is sought. Tench 
v. Weaver, 
374 P.2d 27, 29 (Wyo.1962).
 
            
Two principles, the freedom to contract and the freedom to work, conflict 
when courts test the enforceability of covenants not to compete. Ridley 
v. Krout, 
63 Wyo. 252, 180 P.2d 124, 128 (1947).  
 
Hopper, 
861 P.2d  at 539.  Thus, we closely 
scrutinize covenants not to compete, employing a rule of reason analysis, to 
ensure there is a proper balance between the competing interests of the employer 
and employee.  Id.  
“A valid and enforceable covenant not to 
compete requires a showing that the covenant is: (1) in writing; (2) part of a 
contract of employment; (3) based on reasonable consideration; (4) reasonable in 
durational and geographical limitations; and (5) not against public 
policy.”  Id. at 540 (citations omitted).  
 
[¶16]   Addressing the requirement that a 
covenant not to compete be supported by “reasonable consideration,” we held that 
public policy favored separate consideration and continued at-will employment 
was not sufficient consideration to support such an agreement.  Our ruling was based, in part, on the 
sanctity of the right to earn a living.  
We stated “the employee rarely 'bargains for’ continued employment in 
exchange for a potentially onerous restraint on the ability to earn a 
living.”  Id. at 541, quoting Howard A. Specter 
& Matthew W. Finin, Individual 
Employment Law and Litigation § 8.02 (1989).   
 
[¶17]   We explained the potential 
ramifications if we were to rule that continued at-will employment was 
sufficient consideration for an agreement not to compete:
 
The 
contract permitted either Dr. Hopper or her corporate employers to terminate her 
employment with notice. The agreement did not state a length of employment and 
it permitted termination at will. Without more, the terms present the potential 
for an unreasonable restraint of trade. For example, if an employer hired an 
employee at will, obtained a covenant not to compete, and then terminated the 
employee, without cause, to arbitrarily restrict competition, we believe such 
conduct would constitute bad faith. Simple justice requires that a termination 
by the employer of an at will employee be in good faith if a covenant not to 
compete is to be enforced. Dutch 
Maid Bakeries, 
131 P.2d at 635-36; 
American 
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coe, 
657 F. Supp. 718, 723 (E.D. Mo.1986). 
See Adrian 
N. Baker & Co. v. Demartino, 
733 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Mo.App.1987) 
(enforcing covenant not to compete when discharge of employee occurred with good 
cause).
 
Hopper, 
861 P.2d  at 541-42.  
 
[¶18]   Mr. Preston maintains that the same 
rule should apply to agreements to assign intellectual property, i.e., separate 
consideration should be required.  
Case law from other jurisdictions discusses the differences between 
covenants not to compete and agreements to assign intellectual property.  In MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 880 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1989), for example, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted New Mexico law and recognized that 
covenants not to compete are generally characterized as restrictive covenants; 
however, patent waiver agreements between employers and employees do not fall 
within that definition and must, therefore, be treated differently.  The court remarked that, with patent 
assignment agreements, employees remain free to work for “whomever they wish, 
wherever they wish, and at whatever they wish, subject only to . . . the 
requirement that [the employees] assign to [the employer] any work product 
relating to [the employer’s] business that was developed by [the employees] 
while they were employed by the [employer] or shortly thereafter.”  Id. at 287-88.  Because of those differences, unlike 
covenants not to compete, agreements to assign patents do not have to be 
supported by separate consideration.  
Id.   
 
[¶19]   Harsco, which in some aspects supports 
Mr. Preston’s position that additional consideration is required for patent 
assignment agreements, specifically stated that non-compete agreements are 
different than patent assignment agreements.  “[R]estrictive covenant 
[non-competition] cases differ from assignments of patent rights because 
restrictive covenants hamper a person’s ability to earn a living, whereas patent 
assignments affect only property rights to patents.”  Harsco, 779 F.2d  at 910.  The court, therefore, held that the 
rationale which requires additional consideration for non-competition agreements 
does not apply to patent assignment agreements.  Id.  
   
 
[¶20]   We agree that there is a 
fundamental difference between non-competition agreements and intellectual 
property assignment agreements.  The 
concerns with restraints on trade which attend non-competition agreements simply 
are not present for intellectual property assignment agreements.  That is particularly obvious here, where 
Mr. Preston only agreed to assign the rights to inventions that he made or 
conceived while employed by Marathon.  
The agreement did not limit his right to earn a living, or, for that 
matter, his rights to inventions that were not related to Marathon’s business or 
were not created with the use of Marathon’s confidential information, equipment, 
supplies or facilities.  The 
assignment agreement also did not affect Mr. Preston’s rights to inventions he 
created after his employment with Marathon was over, although intellectual 
property conceived or made by him within one year after termination was 
“presumed to have been made or conceived during” his employment.  Given that the intellectual property 
assignment agreement did not affect Mr. Preston’s right to earn a living or 
otherwise impose an improper restraint on trade, Hopper does not govern our decision in 
this case.  
 
[¶21]   We must, consequently, return to 
the basic precepts of at-will employment.  
As we mentioned earlier, at-will employment is terminable by either party 
at any time for any reason or no reason at all.  Because of its terminable nature, either 
party has the power to modify the terms of the employment at any time, and the 
other party may either accept the new terms and carry on with the employment 
relationship or reject the new terms and terminate the relationship.  The policies behind at-will employment 
were explained in Townsend v. Living 
Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo. 1997):   
 
            
Our jurisprudence in the employment context has developed from the 
premise that the stability of the business community is our primary 
consideration and that stability is best served by applying contract principles 
in the employment context. Based on that fundamental precept we have produced 
the rule that, unless an express or implied contract states or establishes 
otherwise, all employment is a contract for at-will employment. Brodie 
v. General Chemical Corp., 
934 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1997). 
An at-will employee can be terminated for any or no reason at all. Id. 
The at-will employment rule offers no remedy to an employee who has been 
arbitrarily or improperly discharged and has suffered adverse effects on his or 
her economic and social status regardless of how devastating those effects 
actually were. Stability in the business community is preserved because, at 
least at the state level, employers’ and employees’ decisions remain subject 
only to the express or implied contracts into which they have voluntarily 
entered or subject to statute.
 
[¶22]   We believe that the stability of 
the business community is best served by ruling, consistent with our at-will 
employment jurisprudence, that no additional consideration is required to 
support an employee’s post-employment execution of an agreement to assign 
intellectual property to his employer.  
If the employee does not agree to that modification of the terms of his 
employment, he can terminate the relationship without any penalties.  
 
[¶23]   The answer to the certified 
question is, therefore, “yes.”  

 
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1We express 
no opinion as to whether the district court’s finding that Preston began work on 
March 30, 2001 is clearly erroneous, and we do not believe that deciding that 
factual dispute is necessary to answer the certified question.  The parties both agree that the second 
employment agreement relevant to this lawsuit, the April 5, 2001 Marathon Oil 
Company and Subsidiaries Employee Agreement, was executed after Preston began 
employment.  
2The April 2001 Employee Agreement, which is attached to the certification 
order, contained a provision which allowed the employee to list “unpatented 
inventions and unpublished writings” he had created prior to the agreement and 
stated that Marathon agreed “such inventions and writings are NOT Intellectual 
Property [under the definition set forth in the agreement] and are NOT the 
property of MARATHON hereunder.”  
Mr. Preston listed a CH4 resonating manifold as an unpatented 
invention he had created prior to the agreement.  There is, therefore, a factual issue in 
this case as to whether Mr. Preston had invented the baffle system prior to 
signing the assignment agreement.  
Our decision in this case should not be construed as addressing 
assignments of pre-existing intellectual property rights.  We specifically limit our holding to 
intellectual property developed after the date of the assignment agreement.  
 
3In contrast, when the parties have entered into a contract which 
incorporates a requirement that cause be demonstrated before the employee can be 
dismissed, separate consideration is required before the employer can change the 
employment relationship to terminable at-will.  See, e.g., Brodie, 934 P.2d at 1268-69; McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876, 881 (10th Cir. 
1997).
4Both Goodyear and Hebbard involved employees who were 
hired specifically to invent products and, as such, could have been decided 
using the general rule that employers own any inventions created by employees 
who are hired to invent.  Goodyear, 22 F.2d at 354-56; Hebbard, 161 F.2d  at 342.  However, each of the cases also 
discussed the consideration issue, making the decisions relevant to our 
inquiry.