Title: Jones v. Sheridan County School Dist. No. 2

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jones v. Sheridan County School Dist. No. 21987 WY 1731 P.2d 29Case Number: 86-137Decided: 01/12/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
AGNES M. JONES, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 

SHERIDAN COUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT # 2 AND JERRY M. 
WILLETTE, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Charles E. Hamilton of 
Hamilton Law Associates, Riverton, for 
appellant.

 
 
Michael K. Davis of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for 
appellees.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS*, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Agnes M. 
Jones brought this negligence action against appellees Sheridan County School 
District Number Two and Jerry M. Willette seeking damages for injuries received 
in an automobile accident. A jury found that the parties were equally at fault, 
and judgment was entered for the appellees. Appellant claims that the verdict 
was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred in 
denying appellant's motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and a new trial.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     This case arose from an 
accident between an automobile driven by appellant and a thirty-five foot GMC 
school bus operated by appellee Jerry Willette, an employee of appellee Sheridan 
County School District Number Two. The accident occurred at the intersection of 
Main 
Street and Federal Boulevard in Riverton, Wyoming, on 
April 7, 1984 at about 11:00 a.m. Main is a 
four-lane street having a double left-hand turn lane which permits two lanes of 
traffic to turn left onto the two northbound lanes of Federal Boulevard. 
At the time of the accident, both appellant's car and the bus were turning north 
onto Federal 
Boulevard from Main Street. Mr. Willette, driving the GMC 
bus, had pulled up to the red light and stopped in the inside left-turn lane, 
signaling a left turn. He anticipated making a wide turn to avoid running over 
the concrete median which divided the east and west lanes of Main Street. He 
checked his mirrors and looked to his right to make sure that no one was in the 
outside left-turn lane. He saw no cars in that lane. When the light changed, he 
proceeded to make his turn onto the inside northbound lane of Federal Boulevard, 
moving at about five to six miles per hour.

 
 

[¶4.]     Meanwhile Mrs. Jones, 
who was also traveling east on Main 
Street, arrived at the intersection when the light 
was changing. Using the outside left-turn lane, she also turned north onto 
Federal 
Boulevard and apparently attempted to pass the bus as 
it made its turn. As the two vehicles went around the corner, Mr. Willette swung 
the front of the bus beyond the center line dividing the two northbound lanes of 
Federal 
Boulevard. In doing so, he struck Mrs. Jones' vehicle 
causing damage to the two doors on the driver's side of the automobile.1

 
 

[¶5.]     Sergeant Dale Adams and 
Officer Edward McAuslan conducted an on-the-scene investigation of the accident. 
When questioned by the investigating officers, Mr. Willette stated that he did 
not see the automobile driven by Mrs. Jones prior to making his turn and that he 
"probably used some of the [outside] left-turn lane to complete the turn as * * 
* his vehicle could not maneuver without doing so." No traffic citations were 
issued, as Sergeant Adams concluded that Mr. Willette "made the left turn as 
near[ly] as practicable to the inside lane" and that "[t]his is a situation 
where no driver is at fault and due caution, foresight and attention were not 
completely used by either party."2

 
 

[¶6.]     Mrs. Jones filed this 
negligence action against Mr. Willette and the school district, claiming that 
she sustained back injuries in the accident. After both sides presented evidence 
at trial, Mrs. Jones moved for a directed verdict on the issue of 
liability:

 
 
"MR. HAMILTON: * * * I 
would move for a directed verdict on the issue of liability in favor of the 
plaintiff.

 
 
"THE COURT: Do you have 
any objection to that?

 
 
"MR. DAVIS: I do, Your 
Honor. I believe that this is a comparative fault state, and that in this 
situation, although perhaps the jury will find the greater part of the fault 
falls on Mr. Willette, there's also an area there where a reasonable juror could 
determine that Mrs. Jones could also have taken actions reasonably to avoid the 
accident and I believe they should be allowed to decide 
that.

 
 
"THE COURT: Well, I don't 
agree with you, but I'll give the jury the whole thing and then when they come 
back with the verdict what will happen is, depending on what the verdict is, the 
Court can then adjust the verdict as it believes the law would require. Then if 
you don't like what I can do you can take it to the Supreme Court and they can 
reinstate the jury verdict if they want to, and we then won't have to try it 
again. That's what we'll do."

 
 

[¶7.]     Prior to closing 
arguments the jury was given the following instructions, among 
others:

 
 
"Wyoming law provides 
that whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked 
lanes for traffic, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly [as] practicable entirely 
within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that the movement can be made with 
safety."

 
 
"Wyoming law provides that 
the driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn in the 
extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of 
travel of the vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the 
left of the center of the intersection and so as to leave the intersection or 
other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic 
moving in the same direction as the vehicle on the roadway being 
entered."

 
 
"Wyoming law provides that 
any person driving a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a proper 
lookout for other persons using the highway. By a `proper lookout' is meant that 
lookout which would be maintained by an ordinarily careful person in light of 
all present conditions and those reasonabl[y] to be 
anticipated.

 
 
"`Proper lookout' 
includes a duty to see objects in plain sight and a driver is bound to see 
reasonabl[y] that which is open and apparent and he must take knowledge of 
obvious dangers. This duty is not merely one of looking, but of observing which 
imposes upon a motorist the necessity of being observant as to the traffic and 
general situation."

 
 
In his closing argument, 
counsel for appellees argued that Mr. Willette needed to use part of the outside 
lane to make the turn and that he had taken all reasonable steps to ensure that 
his turn could be made with safety. Counsel also argued that Mrs. Jones failed 
to keep a proper lookout and that an allocation of 50 percent negligence to each 
driver was appropriate.

 
 

[¶8.]     The jury was apparently 
persuaded by appellees' closing argument, as it returned a verdict apportioning 
50 percent of the fault to each party. Under our type of comparative negligence 
- § 1-1-109, W.S. 1977 - appellee who caused 50 percent of the loss pays 
nothing, and appellant who was responsible for just 50 percent of her own damage 
recovers nothing. Appellant timely filed a motion for JNOV or a new trial on the 
ground of insufficient evidence to support the jury's allocation of fault. This 
motion was denied, and appellant now appeals from the judgment and the order 
denying her motions for directed verdict, JNOV, and a new 
trial.

 
 

[¶9.]     As we recently stated 
in Reese v. Dow Chemical Company, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1118 (1986), we use the 
following standards in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
jury verdict:

 
 
"`[W]e assume the 
evidence in favor of a successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable inference to 
the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and fairly drawn 
from it. In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to the jury the 
duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflicts therein and drawing its 
own inferences if more than one inference is permissible. Also, when the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose 
which one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's 
choice will be held by us to be conclusive.'" Quoting Crown Cork & Seal 
Company, Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corporation, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-1275 
(1982).

 
 
In reviewing a trial 
court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, we must determine 
whether "there can be but one conclusion reasonable persons could have reached." 
Erickson v. Magill, 
Wyo., 713 P.2d 1182, 1186 
(1986).

 
 

[¶10.]  We conclude that the facts brought out at 
trial would allow reasonable persons to reach different conclusions and that the 
conclusion reached by the jury was supported by substantial evidence. The facts 
show that Mr. Willette encroached into Mrs. Jones' lane by approximately six 
feet, and the jury found that this conduct constituted negligence. Apparently 
the jury also concluded that if Mrs. Jones had kept a proper lookout, she would 
have anticipated the wide turn of the thirty-five foot bus and could have 
avoided the accident by either slowing down and allowing the bus to proceed or 
by using the far right side of her lane to avoid the collision. The jury had 
before it a police report introduced by appellant in which Officer Adams 
concluded, after interviewing the two drivers, that neither party exercised "due 
caution, foresight, and attention." We cannot say the inferences drawn by the 
jury were unreasonable. Although we might have reached a different verdict, that 
alone is not a sufficient ground for overturning the verdict of the jury. 
DeJulio v. Foster, Wyo., 715 P.2d 182, 185 
(1986).

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant contends that the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant a new trial because the jury verdict "fail[ed] to 
administer substantial justice to the parties in the case." Rule 59(a), 
W.R.C.P., lists eight grounds upon which a new trial may be granted. In essence, 
appellant seeks a new trial on the ground that the verdict was not supported by 
sufficient evidence. Rule 59(a)(6), W.R.C.P. We have already addressed this 
issue, and we conclude that the trial court's ruling on appellant's motion for a 
new trial did not constitute an abuse of discretion, as it was within the bounds 
of reason under the circumstances. Duffy v. State, Wyo., 730 P.2d 754 
(1986).

 
 

[¶12.]  Finally, appellant urges that the only 
possible explanation for the jury's verdict is that the jury was "influenced by 
the massive publicity campaign which had been promulgated by the insurance 
companies prior to and during the time of the trial." We can find nothing in the 
record to support this claim, and we decline to speculate on the effect, if any, 
of such publicity on this trial.

 
 

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 When the vehicles came 
to rest, the right front corner of the bus was approximately six feet, one inch 
over the center line, and the right rear corner of the bus was approximately 
four feet over the center line. The right front corner of the bus was 
approximately eight feet, nine inches from the right curb, while the right rear 
corner was approximately ten feet, seven inches from the curb. The automobile 
driven by Mrs. Jones was about five feet wide.

 
 

2 The investigating 
officers could not determine the "point of impact," which Officer McAuslan 
defined as "[t]he actual point where the collision 
occurs."

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶14.]  Philosophically, as discussed in DeJulio 
v. Foster, Wyo., 715 P.2d 182 (1986), maintenance and 
continuation of the trial jury process in the American system of civil 
controversy adjudication is dependent upon the rationality and reasonableness of 
the results achieved. Protection of society from the infrequently occurring but 
unjustified or irrationally derived verdict, through the exercise of judicial 
oversight, is indispensable to preserve the civil trial jury within the justice 
delivery mechanism.

 
 

[¶15.]  Rationally, practically, factually, and 
mechanically, there is no way that Mrs. Jones could have been 50 per cent 
negligent in the incident when the right front corner of the bus encroached from 
the designated driving lane into the adjoining lane, to occupy part of both, 
where it then struck the center of the side of her passenger automobile as she 
drove in her proper traveling lane.

 
 

[¶16.]  Lacking a more efficacious 
characterization, simplistically, the bus driver drove the large vehicle into 
the passenger car in failing to properly and reasonably maneuver the bus on a 
common and very heavily traveled main intersection in the City of Riverton. Neither looking 
nor apparently caring, he did what he did.

 
 

[¶17.]  For the reasons considered in DeJulio, 
more recently discussed in my dissenting opinion in England v. Simmons, Wyo., 
728 P.2d 1137 (1986), following Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. 
Johnston, Wyo., 717 P.2d 808 (1986), I disagree with the decision of this court. 
Unfortunately, we fail in both directions: by granting too many summary 
judgments to obviate resolution by jury trial, and also by failing to afford 
correction, in the unusual, but nonetheless existent, unjustified jury 
conclusion. As Justice Hand said, in discussing the reversal of a jury verdict 
and as he considered a quantitative standard for the measurement of 
incommensurable factors, "It is plain * * * that we cannot properly devolve the 
entire responsibility for a decision upon a jury." Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd 
on a gross-negligence criterion, 312 U.S. 492, 61 S. Ct. 634, 85 L. Ed. 969 
(1941).

 
 

[¶18.]  Given the facts here existent, I 
respectfully dissent from this court's decision to affirm the order denying the 
plaintiff a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new 
trial.