Title: Bethel v. Mount Anthony Union High School District

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Bethel v. Mount Anthony Union High School District (2001-276); 173 Vt. 633;
795 A.2d 1215

[Filed Mar-12-2002]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 16-Apr-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-276

                             JANUARY TERM, 2002

Michael Bethel	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Bennington Superior Court
                                       }	
Mount Anthony Union	               }	 
High School District	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 120-3-01 Bncv

                                                Trial Judge: John P. Wesley  

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Appellant, Michael Bethel, sought a declaratory judgment in superior
  court, brought pursuant  to 12 V.S.A. § 4711, to determine the validity of
  a 1998 amendment to an agreement which  established the Mount Anthony Union
  High School District.  Appellee, the Mount Anthony Union  High School
  District, filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b), premised
  on a claim that  the Appellant's complaint was time-barred.  In a
  subsequent motion for summary judgment,  Appellant asked the superior court
  to declare the amendments invalid.  The court below granted the  Appellee's
  motion to dismiss, and Appellant appeals.  We affirm.

       In 1962, the Bennington, North Bennington, Pownal, Shaftsbury, and
  Woodford School  Districts agreed to form the Mount Anthony Union High
  School District (MAU District) pursuant to  16 V.S.A. § 701.  The agreement
  authorized the MAU District to operate schools for the students in  each of
  the member districts, grades seven through twelve.  On March 2, 1998, an
  amendment  proposing to include grade six within the MAU District's
  authority was presented to the voters of  each member district.  The vote
  was conducted by Australian ballot and each member district's votes  were
  tallied separately.  The tallies revealed that a majority of the total
  voters supported expansion;  however, the majority of voters in the Pownal
  and Woodford districts opposed expansion.  As a  result of the tabulated
  votes, the MAU District announced that the amendment had been approved  and
  then proceeded with plans to construct a new middle school designed to
  accommodate grades six  through eight.  On August 22, 2000, the MAU
  District obtained voter approval for a $20 million  construction bond for a
  new middle school.  

       Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment on March 23, 2001,
  more than three years  after the amendment certification, disputing the
  validity of the amendment to the union school  district agreement. 
  Appellant argued that the amendment to the union agreement was void because
  it  was not ratified by a majority of the voters within each of the five
  respective member districts as 

 

  required by 16 V.S.A. § 706n(a) if the proposed amendment concerns the
  method of allocating  capital and operating expenses of the union.  The MAU
  District in turn filed a Rule 12(b) motion to  dismiss on March 30, 2001,
  claiming that the Appellant's complaint was not timely filed pursuant to 
  16 V.S.A. § 552, which establishes a six month statute of limitations for
  commencing actions that  challenge the formation or existence of a union
  school district.  In the alternative, the MAU District  argued that
  Appellant's complaint was a challenge pursuant to V.R.C.P. 75, which
  requires that such  complaint be made thirty days after notice of any
  action of which review is sought, and, therefore,  Appellant's complaint
  was time-barred.  

       Appellant countered that Rule 75 was not applicable, or, if
  applicable, that the facts in this case  presented a special situation
  where the six year limitation for general civil claims, 12 V.S.A. § 511, 
  would apply rather than the thirty day limitation under Rule 75.  Appellant
  did not address the  District's claims under 16 V.S.A. § 552 at the trial
  court level.  On appeal, Appellant contends that  the section does not
  apply.

       The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "to test the law of a claim,
  not the facts which  support it."  Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600,