Title: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Ford, et al., No. 16, September Term 2012.
CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPEALS – APPELLATE JURISDICTION – IN BANC
DETERMINATIONS 
Regardless of whether the in banc panel of the Court of Special Appeals lacked a
concurrence of a majority of the entire court in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals’s
grant of Respondents’ and Petitioner’s petitions for Writs of Certiorari enables the Court of
Appeals to consider and decide all issues that would have been cognizable by the
intermediate appellate court.
TORTS – DAMAGES – EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FOR FEAR OF DEVELOPING
DISEASE
To recover emotional distress damages for fear of developing a latent disease based on a
defendant’s tortious conduct, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was exposed actually
to the toxic substance due to the defendant’s tortious conduct; (2) which led him or her to
fear objectively and reasonably that he or she would contract a disease; and, (3) as a result
of the objective and reasonable fear, he or she manifested a physical injury capable of
objective determination. 
TORTS – DAMAGES – MEDICAL MONITORING
A plaintiff may recover damages for medical monitoring costs, usually through the
administration of an equitable fund, upon a showing of the following: (1) the plaintiff was
exposed significantly to a proven hazardous substance through the defendant’s tortious
conduct; (2) as a proximate result of significant exposure, the plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a latent disease greater than the general public; (3) the increased
risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary; and, (4)
monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the
disease possible and beneficial.  
TORTS – DAMAGES – EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FOR FEAR OF INJURY TO
REAL PROPERTY
A plaintiff may ordinarily recover emotional distress damages attendant to injury to real
property only in the presence of fraud, malice, or like motives.
DAMAGES – INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY – DUPLICATIVE COMPENSATION
PROHIBITED
Owners of real property are not precluded necessarily from recovering both permanent
diminution in value and loss of use and enjoyment damages, provided that the injuries for
which recovery is sought do not overlap, so as to result in duplicative compensation. Where
an alleged loss of use and enjoyment is “not distinguishable from” and “subsumed in” a
claim for diminution in value, the impaired market value of the real property presumably
reflects the complete injury, and a plaintiff may not recover damages for both loss of use and
enjoyment and diminution in value.
TORTS – INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY – NO PHYSICAL IMPACT TO LAND
In the absence of physical injury to real property resulting from a defendant’s tortious
actions, a plaintiff must demonstrate more than modest behavioral adjustments in his or her
use of his or her real property in order to recover damages.  Thus, a plaintiff who has not
provided present proof of contamination must show more than a possibility of future
contamination or mere annoyance in order to recover.  Absent a substantial interference with
a plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her land, any diminution in value suffered by a
plaintiff is not compensable.
DAMAGES – INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY – LOSS OF USE AND ENJOYMENT
An award for compensatory damages must be anchored to a rational basis on which to ensure
that the award is not merely speculative.  In the context of damages for loss of use and
enjoyment of real property, we determine that loss of use and enjoyment of real property
cannot exceed the fair market, unimpaired value of the property at issue.
EXPERT TESTIMONY – VALUATION OF REAL PROPERTY
Expert testimony is required ordinarily to establish diminution in property value resulting
from environmental contamination.  Testimony of  a real estate appraisal expert is admissible
where he supported his assessments by various, but rationally-based, methodologies, despite
the exclusion from ultimate consideration of comparable real estate market data.
LAY TESTIMONY – VALUATION OF REAL PROPERTY
Respondents’ lay testimony as to their properties’ diminution in value due to environmental
contamination was not admissible or probative where Respondents testified that they
believed their properties had decreased in value, but did not offer any substantive valuation
or any specialized valuation expertise, and therefore did not support the actual damage
awards made by the jury based on “zero sale value” of Respondents’ properties.   
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case # 03-C-06-010932
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 16
September Term, 2012
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION
v.
PAUL D. FORD, ET AL.
Bell, C.J.
                    Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Barbera
McDonald
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,            
            Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   February 26, 2013
1Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, __ Md. __, __ A.3d __(2013) (No. 15, September
2012) (filed 26 February 2013) is the other case, and arises from the same general factual
background as the present case.  The opinion in Albright was filed immediately prior to this
opinion.
2The impacted Jacksonville residents in the present case, as explained further in this
opinion, filed here as Respondents, Petitioners, Cross-Respondents, and Cross-Petitioners.
For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to them as Respondents, collectively.  The following
are the individuals and families (constituting eighty-four households) Exxon named as
Respondents in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which initiated the case in this Court:
Thomas and Christine Acchione; Jeff and Marsha Alban; David and Joyce Albert; Thomas
Anderson and Stacey Curtiss; Robert Babcock and family; George Badders and Mindy
Shoemaker; Mirza Baig and Amtul Baig and family; Roberty Denney Barnett and Louis
Lindsey; Thomas Benney and Louis Lindsey; Joseph and Palma Barone; Joseph and Sharon
Bateman; Scott and Andrea Batton; Thomas and Lisa Benney; Dennis and Lisa Berlin;
William Bieber; Martin and Joyce Blair; Martin and Cassandra Brady; Robert and Margaret
Butler; David and Jennifer Cadigan; Thomas and Karen Carroll; John and Gina Coffay;
Bartlett and Patricia Colgan; Carol Copeland; Brian Cormier and Karen Healey; Michael and
Susan Cremen and family; John and Martha Csicsek; Michael and Bobbie Davis and family;
Thomas and Liza Debolt; Mae DeDeo; Lisa De Koomen; Ricci and Sally Depasquale;
Ronald and Joan Diedeman; Dennis and Priscilla Digalbo; Jai Dixon and Janet Elkington;
Hilton Ryan and Amy Dobb; Barry and Susan Faber; Thomas and LaGina Facinoli; Gary and
Tracey Flora; Paul and Judith Ford; Matthew Fox; David and Stacy Fritz; Frank and
Kathleen Fulco; Claude and Janet Golihue; Allan and Barbara Gottschalck; Andrea Greco
and Veronica Greco; Martin Greenblatt and Elizabeth Robertson, David and Lisa Gregory;
Mildred Hahn; Herman and Laverne Hannan; Walter and Carolyn Heggie; James and Janet
Hourihan; Thomas and Jodi Howe; Jeffrey Jenkins and Nicole Ripken; Bernard and Christine
Kropfelder; Glen and Hope Kukucka; Mark and Mary Lamos; John and Yvonne Lanting;
Elaine Lindsay; David and Rosemarie Mahoney; Terry and Janice Martin; Edward and
Barbara Mclewee; Walter Merski; Anthony and Valerie Montone; Frank Mucha, III and
Jennifer Mucha; Leon Nickel, Jr. and Teresa Nickel; Michael and Linda Oberlin; Michael
and Gail Osmeyer; Joyce Pertee; Robert Peters; C. Boyd and Brenda Pfeiffer; John and
Jennifer Quinn; Gary and Kim Rosch; Leslie Rush and Joyce Rush; Michael Schech and
family; Christopher Schultz and Margaret McDevitt; Jeffrey and Amy Shimp; John and
Patricia Sipes; Mary Thompson; Kenneth Thompson and Maria Chavez; Anthony and Lilian
Tirocchi; Steven and Tracey Tizard; Roger Tolle, Jr., and family; Robert and Shawnee
Twardzik; Kurt and Cynthia Vacovsky; Michael and Lori Vogler; Christopher Wiedey and
(continued...)
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is a companion case1 brought by residents of Jacksonville, Maryland,2 against
2(...continued)
Christine Wilkinson; and Franz and Dolores Wittelsberger.  
3As explained later, Exxon Mobil (referred to also as Exxon in this opinion) is a
Petitioner, Cross-Respondent, and Cross-Petitioner. For purposes of simplicity, we  refer to
Exxon as Petitioner in this opinion.
4The history of this gasoline leak is explained in detail in Albright. __ Md. at __, __
A.3d at __ (slip op. at 1–13). To summarize, a  leak from underground service lines at the
Exxon Mobil-owned gasoline service station occurred on 13 January 2006.  A contractor who
responded to an electronic alarm surmised incorrectly that a pump motor triggered the alarm,
replaced the pump motor, and caused incidentally the leak detection system to require
recalibration.  Because the system was recalibrated improperly, it failed to detect the
continuing leak when placed back in service.  On 16 February 2006, the service station
operator reported a possible leak based an inventory discrepancy. The service station was
shut down thereafter. On February 17, Exxon confirmed the existence of the leak, which
amounted to approximately 26,000 gallons of gasoline, and notified the Maryland
Department of the Environment (MDE). In conjunction with and under the supervision of the
MDE, Exxon initiated remediation efforts, including constructing monitoring and/or recovery
wells used to monitor and recover contaminants. These remediation efforts are described in
Albright.
2
Exxon Mobil Corporation (Petitioner)3 for an underground gasoline leak from an Exxon
Mobil-owned gasoline service station, located at the corner of Jarrettsville Pike and Paper
Mill Road in the Jacksonville area of Baltimore County, that began on 13 January 2006.4
The leak detection system at the station failed to detect a punctured underground line leak,
which caused a gasoline leak of approximately 26,000 gallons into the underground aquifer
and resulted in the contamination of wells supplying water to a number of households over
a period of more than thirty days.
On the record of this case, there is a dispute as to when the residents of the impacted
Jacksonville neighborhood learned of the leak.  While Exxon contends that it notified Herbert
Meade, administrator for the oil control program in the Maryland Department of the
5MTBE is a toxic substance found in gasoline.  Since 1979, MTBE has been added
to gasoline to reduce emissions of air pollutants from exhaust systems.  There are no human
studies indicating the MTBE is a proven carcinogen.  The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) has identified MTBE as a possible carcinogen, in large doses, but not at low
exposure levels. Based on the absence of proven scientific studies showing that MTBE is a
human carcinogen, the EPA has not set a maximum contaminant level (“MCL”), but instead
(continued...)
3
Environment (MDE), of the spill on February 17, and that Meade contacted immediately the
president of the local community association, Respondents maintain that they learned of the
leak only after local media reported the story four days later.     
Following notification of the leak, the MDE, pursuant to its statutory authority,
ordered Exxon to submit an Interim Remedial Measure Plan.  See Md. Code (1982, 2007),
Environment Art., §§ 4-401–4-419.  As part of its immediate remediation efforts, Exxon
drilled wells for monitoring and recovery surrounding the proximate vicinity of the Exxon
station.  The monitoring wells were dug at various depths in order to conduct water samples
indicating the presence and extent of the contamination, also known as the “strike line.”  The
purpose of the recovery wells was to treat groundwater to prevent further expansion of the
strike line.  There were 227 monitoring wells installed by October 2007, and the MDE
ordered an additional thirty wells in order to conduct long-term monitoring. Since February
2006, water samples have been taken from the monitoring wells and residential potable wells.
Respondents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Exxon. Their
claims alleged that their properties had decreased in value, and that their health was
threatened as a result of exposure to toxic chemicals – specifically, methyl tertiary-butyl
ether (“MTBE”), a possible carcinogen, and benzene, a known carcinogen5 – in the gasoline
5(...continued)
has established a maximum MTBE level at 20-40 parts per billion (“ppb”) based on the
substance’s unpleasant taste and odor at and beyond that level.  The EPA has recognized that
a range of 20–40 ppb provides “a large margin of exposure (safety) from toxic effects.”
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water Advisory: Consumer
Acceptability Advice and Health Effects Analysis on Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether (MTBE)
2 (1997).  The MDE has adopted likewise an MCL of 20 ppb for MTBE based on the
chemical’s unpleasant odor and taste at and beyond that level, but has noted that any
contamination above the 20 ppb level is a matter of “concern.”  See COMAR
26.10.02.03(B)(3)(e).  MCL standards for  MTBE are different across the states, with some
lower and some higher than those adopted by the EPA and MDE. 
Benzene is a toxic chemical classified as a carcinogen. It has an MCL of 5 ppb, as
established by the EPA.  The MDE has promulgated the same standard for benzene.  See
COMAR 26.04.01.07(D).   
6The residents of Jacksonville who were plaintiffs in the underlying case comprised
eighty-eight households.  The plaintiffs who are Respondents in the present appeal, however,
comprise only eighty-four of those households, as some of the original plaintiffs settled or
dismissed their claims at various stages of this lengthy litigation. 
7The fraud claim was based on allegations that (1) the line leak detection system at the
(continued...)
4
leak.  The Respondents’ alleged exposure arose from their use of water from the potable
wells on their properties. The properties owned by Respondents were located at varying
distances from the source of the leak.  The overview of Respondents’ claims and summary
of the evidence at trial are discussed below.  
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 I. Respondents’ Claims
A single complaint was filed on 17 October 2006.  Respondents, composed of eighty-
four households,6 sought compensatory and punitive damages based on allegations of
fraudulent concealment,7 intentional infliction of emotional distress, strict liability, trespass,
7(...continued)
station was antiquated and unreliable, that Petitioner had concerns about the system, and that
Petitioner failed to disclose those facts to the Jacksonville residents; and (2) Petitioner failed
to notify immediately the residents when the leak was discovered and thereafter failed to
keep them informed fully.  We will not address further these claims because they are not
before us on appeal.
8The Respondents in the present case are those individuals who had emotional distress
claims remanded for a new trial, or whose damage claims for the full pre-leak value of their
properties were affirmed, by the Court of Special Appeals.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford,
204 Md. App. 1, 11, 40 A.3d 514, 520 (2012).  Certain individuals, who were plaintiffs in
the underlying case, but not Respondents currently, however, are Cross-Petitioners and
Cross-Respondents in the present case. The Libertini family is not before this Court in
any capacity because their claims were settled after suit was filed.  
5
private nuisance, and negligence.8  They sought punitive damages and three types of
compensatory damages: (1) monetary damages for diminution in the fair market value of
their real property; (2) non-economic damages for emotional distress, including fear of
contracting cancer; and (3) damages for the costs of future medical monitoring. 
The claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress were dismissed subsequently
by all Respondents, but the trespass counts were dismissed by only some Respondents.
Petitioner admitted liability for trespass, private nuisance, negligence, and strict liability, but
denied liability for fraud and punitive damages.  Petitioner further maintained that certain of
the compensatory damages claimed – non-economic emotional distress damages arising from
injury to property and fear of cancer, and damages for medical monitoring costs – were not
compensable under Maryland law.
The cases were consolidated by the Circuit Court for trial.  On 14 October 2008, a jury
trial began, presided over by the Honorable Maurice W. Baldwin, Jr., and lasted until 12
9Respondents called several witnesses with regard to the fraud claim, arguing that
Petitioner concealed information before and after the leak.  We will not further address this
evidence, however, because it is not necessary to do so in order to determine the issues raised
in the instant appeal. 
10These were wells on the Anderson and Fox properties, which indicated MTBE
concentrations of 20.4 ppb and 47.7 ppb, respectively .
11 Current (as of the trial) MTBE test results were not available for eleven wells.
12Specifically, these wells were owned by the following households and indicated the
following levels of benzene contamination: Dobb (0.42 ppb); Fritz (0.096 ppb); Rush (0.10
ppb); Vacovsky (0.13 ppb); and Wiedey (0.10 ppb).
6
March 2009.  Liability was not contested by Exxon, so the trial focused on whether any
Respondents suffered compensable injuries as a proximate result of the leak and, if so, what
compensatory damages should be awarded. The jury was asked also whether Exxon was
liable for fraud warranting the award of punitive damages.9 
II.  Contamination of Wells on Respondents’ Properties 
Of the eighty-four properties implicated in this case,  water testing of the residential
potable wells in 2006 indicated MTBE concentrations above the MDE action level of 20 ppb
in only two.10  Exxon paid for the installation of point of entry treatment (“POET”) systems
to filter well water entering those homes.  Measurable amounts of MTBE below 20 ppb were
found in samples from potable wells on sixty-three of the plaintiffs’ properties in 2006.   By
the time of trial, however, the most recent samples revealed no potable wells with MTBE
concentrations exceeding 20 ppb.11 Although five potable wells tested for detectable amounts
of benzene,12 none of the potable well samples tested for benzene at an amount exceeding the
MDE’s 5 ppb action level.  
13 These were:  the Baig property (317,000 ppb); the  Brady property (754 ppb); the
Dobb property (60.7 ppb); and the McLewee property  (37, 200 ppb).   
14These were: the Baig property (18,500 ppb); the Brady property (7.9 ppb); the
McLewee property (324 ppb); and the Tizard property (11.8 ppb). 
15Respondents’ testimony regarding property damage is amplified in Section V of this
opinion.
7
Monitoring wells installed on all properties were used also to measure the extent of
MTBE and benzene contamination. Monitoring wells were dug on at least thirteen of
Respondents’ properties, ranging from one to a maximum of nineteen monitoring wells on
each property. The samples from the monitoring wells showed MTBE concentrations
exceeding the action level on five properties.13  Benzene levels exceeding the 5 ppb action
level were found in samples from monitoring wells on four properties.14
III. Lay Testimony  
Respondents’ testimony involved: the nature, extent, and impact of remediation
activities on a particular property; the extent to which residents’ outdoors and/or indoors
activities were limited by the effects of the leak; the nature and extent of MTBE and/or
benzene contamination on a property, as reflected by well test readings; whether harmful
chemicals not attributable to gasoline were found in wells; the location of each property in
relation to the strike line; the nature and extent of use of well water; the impact of the leak
consequences on the value of each property;15 employment and other financial concerns of
Respondents; matters related to emotional distress; and Respondents’ perceived need for
future medical monitoring.
8
IV. Expert Testimony
Much of the expert testimony at trial turned on whether a property had been
contaminated by MTBE or benzene as a result of the leak, based on a property’s location in
relation to the strike line and the extent of contamination, if any.  
A. For Respondents
Respondents’ attorney arranged for any Respondent, who wished to, to see Abdul
Malik, M.D., a psychiatrist.  Eighty-seven individual plaintiffs accepted the offer. Thirteen
sought follow-up treatment in Dr. Malik’s office.  Dr. Malik, and his colleagues, interviewed
these Respondents individually for about forty-five minutes to an hour each.  The parties
stipulated at the beginning of trial that if a witness from Dr. Malik’s organization, Psych
Associates of Maryland, were called to testify, the witness would testify that each of these
Respondents was diagnosed with a disorder that was caused by, or exacerbated by, the leak.
The stipulation included a recitation that Petitioner disagreed with the proffered testimony
and asserted that none of the Respondents suffered permanent psychological injuries or long-
term emotional distress.    
Eight of the Respondents covered by the stipulation had pre-existing psychological
conditions that, at some point, required psychotherapy, counseling, or medication. Of those
other Respondents covered by the stipulation, Dr. Malik did not recommend therapy or
counseling for thirty-six of them, recommended treatment for twenty-one Respondents with
no prior history of treatment for emotional distress, and advised four Respondents with pre-
existing conditions to continue therapy. 
16The stipulation provided that Dr. Brautbar would testify: “[b]ased on the opinions
of Kenneth Rudo and my understanding of the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’ exposure to
MTBE, I believe the following tests for examinations should be performed as part of an
annual medical monitoring protocol.”  The tests are described above.
9
A second stipulation was entered by the parties as to the testimony of Nachman
Brautbar, M.D., where they agreed that, if Dr. Brautbar were called to testify, he would state
that all Respondents required medical monitoring.16  Dr. Brautbar recommended annual tests
for testicular cancer, kidney cancer, liver cancer, and hematolymphatic cancers, with
estimated total costs per Respondent of $2,000 per year.   
Another expert for Respondents was Harvey Cohen, a geologist with a specialty in
hydrogeology, who testified about the movement of ground water generally, the function of
potable wells, his mapping of the well test results, and his opinion about future contamination
of the aquifer. His opinion was that, from the time of commencement of the leak through
April 2007, sixty-six properties had detectable levels of MTBE, and five had a detectable
amount of benzene.  He also described the levels of contaminants found in monitoring wells
over the same time period.  His testimony was based on exhibits displaying the maximum
concentrations, without indicating the point in time at which those levels were recorded.  He
further opined that the area of contamination would be ever-changing because of the
movement of ground water. 
Edward Sullivan, a geologist with a specialty in hydrogeology, employed by the
Whitman Companies, also testified as an expert for Respondents. He described underground
fractures, aquifers, and the movement of ground water generally.  Sullivan opined that the
17On direct examination of Dr. Rudo, the following testimony was adduced regarding
thirty-nine plaintiffs who were exposed allegedly to the leak’s contamination in their potable
wells, prior to being notified of the leak: 
 
RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL:  . . . .you would agree that the
exposures to the various plaintiffs vary from plaintiff to
plaintiff? 
DR. RUDO: Yes. 
COUNSEL. And the amount of contamination in their wells
varies not only from plaintiff to plaintiff but from test to test? 
DR. RUDO: Yes, sir. 
(continued...)
10
detected levels of contamination were caused probably by the gasoline leak, that the Baigs’
potable well likely would be contaminated in the future, and that the gasoline forced down
in the deeper bedrock would likely not be recovered by remediation, and that it would be
difficult to determine its movement.  
Dr. Kenneth Rudo, a toxicologist employed by the State of North Carolina, also
testified as an expert witness for Respondents.  He stated that there is a relatively sparse body
of knowledge relating to MTBE because it has been used in gasoline for only about twenty
to thirty years.   He opined that MTBE is a probable human carcinogen and a probable
human mutagen, and that MTBE exposure can occur through ingestion, bathing or other skin
contact, or breathing vapor containing MTBE.  He stated that exposure produces an increased
risk of cancer.  Dr. Rudo testified that he could not state that any of the Respondents would,
more likely than not, contract cancer as a result of the leak, but that there is “no safe level”
of exposure to MTBE.17 
17(...continued)
COUNSEL:  Now, with that in mind, can you state to a
reasonable degree of probability in your field as a toxicologist
that each of the plaintiffs that I have just described is in fact at
an increased risk for developing these cancers in the future? 
DR. RUDO: Yes, they are. 
COUNSEL: And what is it about the exposure of any kind?
Because they do vary from levels that are below one part per
billion to levels that I think the highest level, 47.7 parts per
billion, explain to the jury the-how you parse through the levels
of exposure, the levels of contamination that they were exposed
to and how you were able to conclude that even at these low
levels in some of the plaintiffs’ wells they were exposed to a
level that will likely put them at increased risks for cancers in
the future? 
DR. RUDO:  Well, Number one, they were most certainly
exposed. They had the positive [well] tests, you know, had
exposure to a chemical that we consider more likely than not to
be carcinogenic. Because we also consider it to be more likely
than not a mutagenic chemical that can change DNA, that that
implies that in essence there is no safe level; there is no safe
level in terms of exposure time and there is no safe level in terms
of the amount of chemical that is there. So in essence, the safe
level would be considered zero. Anything over and above that
would increase the risk. 
 
(Emphasis added). Apart from this testimony, Dr. Rudo did not testify as to any other
Respondent’s increased risk to contracting cancer.
11
Kenneth Acks testified as an expert in real estate appraisal and “environmental
economics.”  Relying on a stipulation by the parties as to the pre-leak value of each property
and on information provided by the other experts, Acks’ testimony discussed the diminished
value of each property.  We discuss Acks’ testimony in greater detail in Section V.A. of this
opinion. 
18Dr. Whitman’s company performed air sampling in four homes, but did not further
pursue air sampling. He did not do a time series mapping of the effect of remediation
activities. He acknowledged that gasoline attenuates naturally, but stated that not all of it
does. He did not conduct an attenuation study in these cases. 
19Dr. Jaynes multiplied the remaining years of life expectancy for each Respondent
by $2,000 per year, and increased the cost per year assuming an inflation rate of 3.74 %.  He
then reduced the total to present value, assuming an interest rate of 5.2%. 
12
Dr. Ira Whitman, Ph.D, a civil engineer, and Dr. Jerold Jaynes, Ph.D, an economist,
were the last two experts who testified for Respondents.  Dr. Whitman testified as an expert
in environmental engineering and worked with the geologists, Cohen and Sullivan, to explain
that thirty-eight or thirty-nine potable wells were likely contaminated between 13 January
2006 and 17 February 2006.  He noted that, as of the date of his 2006 report, fifty homes
showed some contamination at some point in time, and that number later rose to sixty-six
homes.18  Dr. Jaynes testified about the present value of the cost of future medical monitoring
for Respondents.19  
B. For Petitioner
Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Gary Krieger, M.D., testified that all people in this country are
exposed to carcinogens and mutagens, including MTBE and benzene, every day, including
in food and water that is consumed. He emphasized that the dose is the real issue —
essentially, that mere exposure does not cause cancer. He further stated that the risk of
disease Respondents faced was no different than the risk of disease for the general
population.  
Ronald Lipman, a real estate appraiser, testified that, in 2007 and 2008, there was a
20Maguire based his opinion on the life cycle of a plume, which initially expands and
later reaches equilibrium.  The latter occurs when the rate at which the contaminants are
dissolving equals the rate of attenuation.
13
general downturn in the real estate market nationally, and that the effect of the gasoline leak
on property values in Jacksonville ranged from 0% to 15 %, depending on the property. 
Another expert for Petitioner was Gregory Martin, who described the remediation
efforts conducted pursuant to a consent order entered into between the MDE and Petitioner.
In compliance with the order, Petitioner filed a corrective action plan and intends to continue
efforts until the remediation goals are met. 
Herbert Meade, administrator for the oil control program in the MDE, testified
regarding the Maryland action level for MTBE.  He asserted that the MDE action level is
protective of human health.   Significantly, he noted that MTBE is the most frequently found
ground water contaminant in Maryland. With respect to the properties in this case, he stated
that some needed filter systems and others should have them as a precautionary matter, but
that the potable well water is safe to drink.  Meade also acknowledged that, because of the
lack of human studies, he did not know the long term effects of exposure to MTBE. 
Thomas Maguire, another expert testifying for Petitioner, discussed the nature of an
underground fuel leak and how gasoline and its contaminants are dispersed, removed, or
attenuated naturally.  He opined that the underground plume for this leak had stabilized,
meaning the residual contaminants were trapped and immobile.20 He acknowledged there
likely was still some residual contamination which, in the future, would be removed as part
of the remediation efforts, or would be attenuated naturally. 
21No exceptions were taken to that instruction.
14
 V. The Jury’s Verdicts
Before the trial court gave the jury instructions on causation and damages, the court
advised the jury that the instructions applied to each plaintiff, unless otherwise indicated.21
The instructions were all phrased in terms of what each plaintiff had to prove to be entitled
to recover.   In particular, the jury instruction as to recovery for emotional distress damages
based on fear of contracting cancer was as follows:
A Plaintiff may also recover non-economic damages for fear of
contracting a particular disease such as cancer. To recover for
such fear, however, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the fear
genuinely exists and that his or her fear of contracting the
disease in question is objectively reasonable. There can be no
compensation for fear and anxiety that is objectively
unreasonable. To be objectively reasonable, it is not enough that
a . . . Plaintiff’s fear be genuine and sincere. There must be
reliable medical or scientific evidence that it is more likely than
not that the substance can cause cancer.
The same format for the jury’s awards appeared in the verdict sheets for each plaintiff:
each asked essentially “(A) do you find . . . fraud by concealment? (B) do you find that
[Petitioner’s admitted liability for negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and trespass] caused
[the plaintiffs] any injuries and damages? and (C) if the answer to (A) or (B) is yes, how
much [compensatory] damages do you award?”   The last question was followed by
individual categories of damages to be filled-in if the jury responded “yes”:  
Economic Damages
Damages to Property Owner [name of property owner] 
Diminution in Property Value $ 
Medical Monitoring 
22The Roeterings and Williams families dismissed their claims during trial.
23Petitioner filed, specifically: (1) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) regarding the specific claims of nineteen households; (2) a motion for new trial or
remittitur regarding property damage awards for those families whose properties did not have
contamination at or above the State MCL for MTBE or benzene; (3) a motion for new trial
or remittitur on the claims for property damage; (4) a motion for a new trial based principally
on admission of prejudicial evidence, namely Dr. Kenneth Rudo’s testimony that he believed
MTBE to be a human carcinogen; (5) a motion for JNOV or a new trial on the emotional
distress claims; and, lastly, (6) a motion for JNOV on the damages for medical monitoring,
arguing that such a claim is not compensable in Maryland.
15
[names of plaintiffs] $ 
Non-Economic Loss (Emotional Distress) 
[names of plaintiffs] $ 
Punitive Damages 
If you answered “yes” to [question (A)], should the Plaintiffs be
awarded punitive damages? [names of plaintiffs] YES    NO
On 12 March 2009, the jury returned its verdicts. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Exxon with respect to the fraudulent concealment and punitive damage claims, but found
in favor of all remaining plaintiffs22 as to all other claims for compensatory damages.  The
jury found that each of the plaintiffs’ properties was worthless, and awarded  monetary
damages for diminution of real property value in an amount equal to the full value of the
properties before the leak.  The jury also awarded to all plaintiffs non-economic damages for
emotional distress, including fear of contracting cancer and damages for the cost of future
medical monitoring.  Generally, in households with children, the awards for the adults were
reduced by the amount of the awards for the minors. The total amount of damages awarded
to Respondents was approximately $147 million.
Petitioner filed six post-judgment motions23 for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
24In refusing to reverse the property value diminution awards, Judge Baldwin wrote:
This writer is very tempted to substitute my view of the
evidence for that of the jury and grant post trial relief.  I will
decline that strong temptation by keeping in mind that the jury’s
view of the admitted evidence should be respected unless the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, shocks the
conscience, is grossly excessive, or is excessive.  It is not, but is
a millimeter shy of those standards.
(Emphasis added).
16
for a new trial, or for remittitur, challenging the property damage awards, the emotional
distress awards, and the damages for medical monitoring, based on various grounds.
Although Judge Baldwin denied each motion,24 he reduced the awards for non-economic
damages for four plaintiffs because of the applicable statutory cap of $665,000, pursuant to
§ 11-108 of the Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Court and Judicial Proceedings
Article.  Respondents filed a motion arguing that Petitioner should be estopped from
challenging the jury verdicts because of seemingly concessionary statements made by its
counsel during opening and closing arguments; however, the Circuit Court denied the
motion.  
VI. Proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals
On 9 September 2009, Exxon noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  It
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s awards for complete
diminution of property value, damages for emotional distress, and damages for future
medical monitoring costs.  It also challenged the jury instructions regarding the legal
standards to be applied by the jury in deciding the claims for damages based on fear of
25We address further Respondents’ argument that the in banc decision was improper
in Section I of this opinion.
26The intermediate appellate court also agreed unanimously that the damage award for
(continued...)
17
developing cancer and future medical monitoring costs.  Respondents contended, in turn, that
Exxon’s attorney at trial waived Exxon’s right to challenge the compensatory damage awards
by certain things he said in opening statement and closing argument. 
 On 6 January 2010, the Court of Special Appeals consolidated the eighty-eight
appeals.  In January 2011, a three-judge panel of that court (consisting of Judges Meredith,
Zarnoch, and retired Judge Thieme, the latter specially assigned) heard argument.  The panel
did not issue a decision. Thus the court ordered rehearing in banc on 9 June 2011.25 
On 9 February 2012, the in banc panel, consisting of nine incumbent members of the
court, issued a per curiam opinion and a number of attributed opinions on various questions
presented by the appeal.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 204 Md. App. 1, 40 A.3d 514 (2012).
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, having the effect of reducing the $147 million in
damages awarded to the Respondents by more than half.   
The intermediate appellate court rejected unanimously the Respondents’ contention
that Petitioner was estopped from challenging the compensatory damages awards, and
concluded unanimously that the Circuit Court had not abused its discretion in admitting
Respondents’ expert testimony in support of their claims of diminution in property values.
See id. at 10–11, 40 A.3d at 519 (per curiam).26  
26(...continued)
one family (the Grecos) should be struck because the family sold their home for a profit and
had withdrawn their claim for diminution in value, but was awarded nonetheless $367,000
in damages.  See id. at 10, 40 A.3d at 519 (per curiam). Additionally, damages for $50,000
each to Luke DeKoomen and Seth DeKoomen (who are not Respondents in the present case)
were reversed as part of a ruling affecting fifty-one other plaintiffs, on the basis that the
awards were not supported by sufficient evidence.  See id. at 11-12, 40 A.3d at 519-20 (per
curiam). 
18
Different majorities of the sitting court explained, in various written opinions, their
support for the remaining portions of the judgment announced by the per curiam opinion.
Regarding the claims for diminution in property value, six of the nine judges affirmed the
portion of the judgments that awarded damages to each Respondent (whose judgments had
not been remitted by the Circuit Court or the Court of Special Appeals based on the post-leak
sale of the property for value) in an amount equal to the value of their property prior to the
leak.  See id. at 11, 40 A.3d at 519.  The reasoning for this result, however, differed in several
respects between the judges’ opinions.  See id. at 34–50, 40 A.3d 534–43 (Zarnoch, J., joined
by Meredith, Woodward, and Wright, JJ.),  id. at 148–68, 40 A.3d at 600–12; (J. Eyler, J.,
joined by Watts, J.);  id. at 241–44, 40 A.3d at 655 (Graeff, J.), id. at 247–52, 40 A.3d at
658–60 (Watts, J.); id. at 269–74, 40 A.3d at 671–74 (D. Eyler, J). 
The court’s decision as to the non-economic damages awards also resulted from
different views.  Most of the court concluded that a plaintiff may recover damages for
emotional distress based on fear of contracting cancer in certain circumstances, and that an
error in the jury instructions related to this issue required reversal of all of the judgments for
non-economic damages.  The judges disagreed, however, about whether the circumstances
27Judge Zarnoch adopted the standard of a substantial and medically verifiable
possibility of contracting a latent disease as the basis to recover emotional distress damages,
and would have affirmed the awards under that standard based on the conclusion that the
evidence was sufficient and that the jury instructions communicated fairly the correct legal
standard.  See id. at 51–62, 40 A.3d at 544–50.  (Zarnoch, J., joined by Meredith, Woodward,
and Wright, JJ.)
28Judge James Eyler adopted a standard of whether a plaintiff is “more likely than not”
susceptible to contracting cancer in order to recover damages based on fear of cancer, and
concluded that most of the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of emotional
distress, except for thirty-five plaintiffs, whose claims he would have remanded for a new
trial.  See id. at 105–32, 40 A.3d at 575–91 (J. Eyler, J., joined by Hotten, J.); see also id. at
168–241, 40 A.3d at 613–654 (appendix surveying evidence as to each plaintiff) (J. Eyler,
J.). 
29Judge Graeff agreed with Judge Zarnoch’s fear of cancer standard, but she found the
jury instruction did not convey adequately that standard, and she found that the evidence did
not warrant the judgments for four categories of plaintiffs identified by Judge Eyler.  See id.
at 244–47, 40 A.3d at 656–57.  As to the remaining plaintiffs, Judge Graeff believed there
was sufficient evidence to warrant their judgments.  See id.
30Judge Watts agreed generally with the standard endorsed by Judge James Eyler, but
concluded that one of the several plaintiffs identified by him presented sufficient evidence
of emotional distress to be granted a new trial. See id. at 252–55, 40 A.3d at 660–63.  
19
that would permit recovery had been established and about the legal standard that should
apply to such claims.  See id. at 52–53, 40 A.3d 541–42 (Zarnoch, J.).27  Nevertheless, a
majority voted to reverse judgment awarding damages for emotional distress for fifty-three
plaintiffs based on insufficient evidence, and reversed and remanded the remaining claims
for a new trial due to a faulty jury instruction.  See id. at 11, 40 A.3d at 519 (per curiam); 40
A.3d at 600–12 (J. Eyler, J., joined by Hotten, J.)28, id. at 245, 40 A.3d at 655–56 (Graeff,
J.),29 id. at 254, 40 A.3d at 671–78 (Watts, J.);30  id. at 259–69, 40 A.3d at 665–71 (D. Eyler,
31Judge Deborah Eyler concluded that none of the plaintiffs could recover damages
for fear of cancer because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs sustained a probability of
developing cancer and because none proffered evidence of a sufficiently demonstrable
physical injury.  Id. at 259–69, 40 A.3d at 665–71.  
32Judge Deborah Eyler did not discuss in her opinion the issue of recovery for future
medical monitoring costs.
20
J.).31  As a result, the court reversed all emotional distress judgments and ordered a new trial
for all but fifty-three of the plaintiffs on those claims, to be conducted consistent with the
views of the majority/plurality opinion.  Id. at 11–12, 40 A.3d at 520 (per curiam). 
Respondents’ awards for damages for future medical monitoring costs also produced
split majorities of the in banc panel.  Although a majority would recognize a claim for
monetary damages for medical monitoring, see id. at 63–70, 40 A.3d at 550–55 (Zarnoch,
J. joined by Meredith, Woodward, and Wright, JJ.), id. at 247, 40 A.3d at 658 (Graeff, J.),
a differently aligned majority decided that the evidence did not warrant any plaintiff’s
entitlement to this form of damages. See id. at 11 (per curiam); id. at 132–47, 40 A.3d at
591–600 (J. Eyler, J.), id. at 247, 40 A.3d at 658 (Graeff, J.), id. at 255–57, 40 A.3d at
663–64 (Watts, J.).32   Hence, the court reversed the portions of the judgments that awarded
damages for medical monitoring. 
On 27 February 2012, Respondents filed a motion under Maryland Rule 8-605
requesting that the Court of Special Appeals reconsider its February 9 in banc decision
because the portions of that decision that were supported by fewer than seven judges “violate
the clear mandate” of Section 1-403(c) of  Court and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”)
33In their motion, Respondents asserted that for a decision of a case heard by the court
in banc, a concurrence of a majority of the incumbent judges of the entire court is required.
Respondents claimed further that the three judges who had been scheduled originally to
participate on the in banc panel (Chief Judge Krauser, and Judges Mattricciani and Kehoe),
but who disqualified themselves from hearing the appeal, were nevertheless “incumbent
judges” who should be counted in determining whether a majority was reached.  We address
this issue in Section I of the Discussion section of this opinion.
34On 8 March 2012, Respondents filed a second motion under Rule 8-605, seeking
reconsideration of both the February 9 and March 6 decisions of the intermediate appellate
court.  Respondents reasserted their argument made in their first motion for reconsideration,
and offered a new issue, based in the March 6 opinion, indicating that “[a]ll incumbent
members of the Court joined in the decision to order in banc review, including the 9 judges
who eventually heard argument and decided the case.” Id. at 279 n.7, 40 A.3d at 677 n.7.
Respondents maintained that participation in this decision by the three judges who later
recused themselves “tainted the deliberative process” with the result that the entire in banc
procedure violated Rules 1.2 and 2.11 of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct in Rule 16-
814 and CJP § 1-403(c).  The intermediate appellate court denied the motion. 
21
authorizing the court to decide an appeal through the in banc mechanism.33  
On 6 March 2012, the Court of Special Appeals denied, in a per curiam opinion, the
plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs’ reading of § 1-403(c)
was “overly technical,” “inconsistent with sound rules of statutory construction,” and
“contrary to well-reasoned authorities.”  Ford, 204 Md. App. 274, 277, 40 A.3d 674, 675
(2012).  The court held that “disqualification is tantamount to a vacancy for the limited
purpose of determining voting requirements[,]” id. at 279 n.5, 40 A.3d at 677 n.5, that a 7-2
majority was not required to support the court’s ruling in this case, and that each part of the
court’s per curiam ruling was supported by a majority of the nine judges “qualified to act in
this case.” Id. at 281, 40 A.3d at 678.34  
35On 9 May 2012, we issued a Writ of Certiorari in Exxon Mobil Corp. v Albright, 426
Md. 427, 44 A. 3d 421 (2012), a pending case in the Court of Special Appeals.  The
Respondents in the instant case assert that resolution of the issues presented in Albright
would also resolve the substantive issues in this appeal (in this contention, they are correct),
and would allow this Court to “withdraw[] or declin[e] certiorari” on those issues if the Court
determines that the Court of Special Appeals’s per curiam opinion was not issued properly.
36In its petition for Writ of Certiorari, Exxon presented two questions:
1. Does Maryland permit award for emotional distress due to
fear of contracting cancer, and, if so, must the claimant prove
that his or her wrongful exposure to a carcinogen makes it more
likely than not that he or she will contract cancer?
2. May a jury’s verdict that all of Plaintiffs’ properties were
worthless be upheld where (a) the properties were all still
habitable and many had no contamination; (b) all experts
testified that the properties retained substantial value; and (c)
those properties which were sold all sold for a substantial price?
37As noted earlier, these Respondents, representing eighty-four households, are not
identical to those whose eighty-eight cases were consolidated on appeal and were awarded
damages at trial.   
38In their cross-petition for Writ of Certiorari, Respondents posed the following
questions:
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals violate the clear mandate of
Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Court and Judicial
Proceedings Article (CJP),  §1-403(c), when it issued its in banc
decision without a “concurrence of a majority of the incumbent
judges of the entire Court?”
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that counsel
for ExxonMobil did not waive his client’s right to challenge the
(continued...)
22
IV. Questions Presented and Parties’ Present Appellate Contentions35
On 26 March 2012, Exxon filed a Petition for Writ for Certiorari.36  Respondents37
filed a cross-petition on 27 March 2012.38  A conditional cross-petition by Exxon to
38(...continued)
compensatory damage awards, despite implicit acquiescence in
the jury’s decision?
3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the “fear
of cancer” jury instruction was erroneous and prejudicial?
4. Did the Court of Special Appeals reach a majority vote of the
sitting judges, on the issue of medical monitoring and, if they
did, was there error in holding that the evidence was insufficient
to support an award for medical monitoring?
39Exxon’s conditional cross-petition posed the following questions:
1. Assuming fear of cancer is compensable, did Plaintiffs
provide legally sufficient evidence of their emotional distress
claims?
2. Does Maryland law permit the recovery of damages for
medical monitoring and should it do so where (a) as to many
Plaintiffs there was no proof of exposure to MTBE or benzene;
(b) no Plaintiff claimed to have any current disease caused by
MTBE or benzene; and (c) there was no proof that any Plaintiff
has a significantly increased risk of contracting any disease
3. Should Plaintiffs’ property damage expert’s opinions have
been admitted where he failed to use any generally accepted
method of valuation and failed to consider actual sales?
4. Did ExxonMobil consent to the[] verdicts?
5. Did the in banc decision of the Court of Special Appeals
violate § 1-403(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article?
23
Respondents’ cross-petition questions was filed next.39  This Court granted all of the petitions
for certiorari (by whatever title) on 9 May 2012, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 426 Md. 427,
44 A.3d 421 (2012).  The consolidated questions presented by the petitions are as follows,
40We concluded that the Court of Special Appeals may have an institutional interest
in the resolution of this question, if reached by this Court. Thus, on 26 June 2012, we issued
an order inviting the Attorney General of Maryland to submit an Amicus Curiae brief to
address questions concerning the Court of Special Appeals’s in banc procedure in the present
case.  We specified in the order that the Attorney General’s brief “on behalf of the Court of
Special Appeals” address only the issues raised by Respondents regarding the procedural
posture of the intermediate appellate court’s in banc decision, not the substantive merits of
the case.  The Attorney General filed its Amicus Curiae brief on 9 October 2012. 
24
rephrased for purposes of brevity:
(1) Did the Court of Special Appeals violate Md. Code (1973,
2006 Repl. Vol.), Court and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP),
§1-403(c), by issuing its in banc decision without a
"concurrence of a majority of the incumbent judges of the entire
Court[,]” for each non-unanimous judgment, such that this Court
otherwise has no authority to review the merits of the current
appeal? 40 
(2) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that counsel
for Petitioner did not waive his client's right to challenge the
compensatory damage awards?
(4) Does Maryland permit awards for emotional distress due to
fear of developing cancer? If so, what is the appropriate
standard?
(5) Should the emotional distress verdicts be overturned where
the uniform awards ignored the substantial differences among
Plaintiffs, evidence satisfying the standards of Vance v. Vance,
286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979), for recovery of such
damages was not presented, and the jury instruction permitted
recovery for fear of cancer without any evidence of exposure to
the alleged carcinogen or that the exposure made it "reasonably
probable" that a Plaintiff would contract cancer? 
(6) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the "fear
of cancer" jury instruction given at trial was erroneous and
prejudicial? 
(7) Does Maryland permit damages for medical monitoring and,
41§ 1-403(c) provides, in relevant part:
A hearing or rehearing before the court in banc may be ordered
in any case by a majority of the incumbent judges of the court.
Six judges of the court constitute a quorum of the court in banc.
The concurrence of a majority of the incumbent judges of the
entire court is necessary for decision of a case heard or reheard
by the court in banc.
25
if so, may such damages be awarded where a) no Plaintiff
claimed to have any current disease caused by exposure to
contaminant, b) there was no proof that any Plaintiff had a
significantly increased risk of developing any disease, and c) as
to many Plaintiffs, there was no proof of exposure? 
(8) Should Respondents’ property damage expert's opinions
have been admitted where he did not use any generally accepted
method of valuation and he did not use actual sales or valuations
in his assessment of the diminution in value of Respondents’
properties? 
(9) May a jury's verdict that all of Plaintiffs' properties were
worthless be upheld where (a) the properties were all still
habitable and many had no contamination; (b) all experts
testified that the properties retained substantial value; and (c)
those properties which were sold all obtained a substantial
price? 
(10) Is a new damages only trial required when a jury's award of
compensatory damages is not based on the Plaintiff's alleged
injuries? 
DISCUSSION
I.  The Court of Special Appeals’s In Banc Decision 
We address first a threshold procedural issue raised by Respondents in their cross-
petition: whether the Court of Special Appeals violated CJP § 1-403(c)41 in its in banc
42In its conditional cross-petition, Petitioner urged this Court to grant plenary review
of this question.   
43Between the time that the three-judge panel heard argument in January 2011 and the
in banc hearing in September 2011, the Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee published an
opinion in response to requests from three undisclosed appellate judges who questioned
whether they should participate in an appeal involving a corporate appellant-litigant in which
two of the judges owned stock and in which the third had held recently stock that the judge
had since sold.  See 16 August 2011 Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion in Request
Nos. 2011-19, 2011-20, 2011-21.  The ethics opinion disclosed that the appeal in question
was from a judgment in “the amount of $147 million.”  The Committee opined that these
interests did not amount to express grounds for disqualification, but that the judges may wish
to consider whether recusal was appropriate based on a risk of a potential perception of
impropriety.
26
procedure here.42  Respondents and Petitioner agree that we have the authority to resolve all
issues in this case; however, Respondents contend that this Court has also the authority not
to decide the issues presented to the Court of Special Appeals and, instead, resolve only this
procedural issue, dismiss the Writ of Certiorari as to the others, and vacate the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals.  We decline Respondents’ invitation.
We begin our analysis with a brief summary of the in banc proceedings in the
intermediate appellate court.  As the court noted in its 6 March 2012 denial of the
Respondents’ second Motion for Reconsideration, the appeal before the in banc panel was
argued before nine incumbent qualified judges of the Court of Special Appeals, a majority
of which participated in deciding each of the issues on appeal.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford,
204 Md. App. 274, 281, 40 A.3d 674, 678 (2012).  The intermediate appellate court’s March
6 ruling stated that three members of the court elected to disqualify themselves under Rule
2.11 of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct,43 while another seat on the court was vacant
44Judge Ellen M. Hollander, formerly an incumbent judge on the intermediate
appellate court, was selected for a federal district court judgeship on the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland.  Her vacancy on the state court was filled by Judge Stuart R.
Berger, who was appointed in December 2011.  Neither Judge Hollander nor Judge Berger
participated in the court’s consideration of the appeal in this case.
45The Attorney General explained persuasively in its Amicus Curiae brief this
particular ground for our review of the present case.  
27
when the case was argued.44  Id. at 276 n.1, 40 A.3d at 675 n.1.   
Respondents contend that the in banc decisions that were not decided by a proper
majority of the Court of Special Appeals — requiring, in their view, a seven-member
majority — violate CJP § 1-403(c).  As a result of this violation, Respondents assert, this
Court should withdraw or decline certiorari on all other issues not decided by a seven-
member majority of the in banc panel, and reinstate the jury’s verdict.  We hold, however,
that the questions presented in the petitions that we granted bypassed the intermediate
appellate court and are properly before this Court for review, assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the arguments regarding CJP § 1-403(c) and the in banc decision have merit.
Even if we were to agree with Respondents’ argument that the in banc panel did not
decide certain issues by the requisite majority (which we do not so decide), our precedent
allows us to treat the present appeal as if a writ or writs of certiorari had been granted on
bypass “prior to entry of a proper judgment by the Court of Special Appeals.”  Wildwood
Med. Ctr., LLC v. Montgomery Cnty., 405 Md. 489, 496, 954 A.2d 457, 461 (2008).45   In
Wildwood, a member (Judge Theodore G. Bloom) of a three-judge panel of the Court of
Special Appeals, in a case decided purportedly by a 2-1 vote, died before the opinion (which
46That statute provides:
Sessions; panels; hearings in banc.  
(b) Panels. -- A case before the Court of Special Appeals shall
be heard by a panel of not less than three judges.  The
concurrence of a majority of a panel is necessary for the
decision of a case. 
28
facially reflected him as the author of the majority opinion) was filed, leaving the remaining
panel judges divided evenly as to the proper disposition of the appeal.  Id. at 493–94, 954
A.2d at 460.  Similar to the instant case, a threshold jurisdictional issue seemingly impeding
our review of the merits in Wildwood was whether a decision arising from an improperly-
constituted panel’s facial opinion, which lacked a concurrence in the majority, under Section
1-403(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code (1973,
2006 Repl. Vol.), prevents this Court from reviewing an appeal of that decision.46  Id. at
494–96, 954 A.2d at 460–61.  We determined that the consequence of Judge Bloom’s death
was to dissolve the “concurrence of a majority of the panel” that is “necessary for the
decision of a case.”  Id. (quoting Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), CJP § 1-403(b)).  We
held ultimately that the panel’s decision and its posthumously-issued opinion and mandate
were unauthorized because the judges had failed to achieve a concurrence of a panel
majority.  Id. at 495, 954 A.2d at 461.  Although we concluded that the lack of majority
nullified the intermediate three-member panel’s decision and mandate, we held that this
Court obtained jurisdiction to decide the merits by virtue of its authority to bypass the
intermediate appellate court and consider appeals not yet decided by that court.  Id.  
47 Maryland Rule 8-131(b)(2) provides the authority for this Court’s discretion to
bypass the Court of Special Appeals in choosing to hear an appeal not yet decided by the
intermediate appellate court: 
(2) [e]xcept as otherwise provided in Rule 8-304 (c), when the
Court of Appeals issues a writ of certiorari to review a case
pending in the Court of Special Appeals before a decision has
been rendered by that Court, the Court of Appeals will consider
those issues that would have been cognizable by the Court of
Special Appeals.
48This approach, as explained in its Amicus Curiae brief, is one of the Attorney
General’s suggested resolutions to this procedural issue. 
49Respondents argue that Lee v. State, 69 Md. App. 302, 305–07, 517 A.2d 774,
775–76 (1986), aff’d, 311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1987), supports their argument that the
trial court’s judgment must be affirmed.  We disagree, primarily because Lee and the present
case arise from two distinctly different procedural backgrounds.  In Lee, the Court of Special
Appeals was evenly divided on one issue, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Here, Respondents maintain that the decision of the intermediate appellate court is rendered
null by its lack of majority concurrence of a seven-member majority.  Id.  Lee does not
support the reasoning of Respondents’ argument.
29
Here, we granted both parties’ petitions for Writs of Certiorari, which, as in
Wildwood, enables us to consider and decide “all the issues that would have been cognizable
by the intermediate appellate court.” Id. (citing Md. R. 8-131(b)(2)).47, 48  Even if, as the
Respondents argue here, the in banc decision attributed majority status erroneously to 6-3
and 5-4 rulings, thereby lacking a concurrence of a majority of the entire court under a
possible reading of CJP § 1-403(c), then, under Wildwood, this Court nonetheless has the
authority to review the issues of this appeal.  Whether a majority of an in banc panel issued
the underlying decision is of no moment to whether we have authority to decide the instant
appeal.49  For these reasons, we hold that, regardless of whether the in banc panel had a
50Respondents contend also that the in banc panel did not constitute a quorum of the
eligible voting members.  Section 1-403(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
defines a quorum of an in banc panel as six members.  As there were nine members of the
intermediate appellate court who heard and decided the instant appeal, we need not address
further this issue.
30
concurrence of a majority under CJP § 1-403(c), our precedent allows us to consider (and we
shall) the merits of the appeals before us.50  Before moving to the next question, we reiterate
that we do not decide whether our intermediate appellate court brethren failed to comply with
CJP § 1-403(c).  We observe, however, that they gave thorough and comprehensive
consideration of all issues in a complex and difficult case. 
II. Petitioner Did Not Waive its Right to 
Appeal Compensatory Damages Awards
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s counsel waived Petitioner’s right to appeal the
compensatory damages awards when he made certain statements during opening and closing
arguments.  According to Respondents, Petitioner’s waiver arose when Petitioner sought a
“quid pro quo” arrangement with the jury, promising the jury that Exxon would pay any
compensatory damages awarded in exchange for the jury’s decision not to award punitive
damages.  We see it differently and agree with the unanimous in banc panel of the Court of
Special Appeals.
Respondents contend that, in Exxon’s opening statement, Exxon’s counsel “made it
abundantly clear that the trial was not about compensatory damages but was about punitive
damages[,]” quoting the following excerpt:
Well, it occurs to me at this point that you’re probably
wondering, if Exxon takes responsibility and accepts liability to
31
pay compensatory damages for that harm, then why are we
here? . . . So, [Respondents’ counsel] says we’re trying to blame
’em.  This, of course, is not true.  Blame ’em for the - for the
compensatory liability? No. I told you. We’re paying that.
Whatever you decide is right about that, we’re paying that.
Respondents’ claim relies also on the following excerpts of Petitioner’s closing
argument to the jury: 
[W]e accept responsibility to pay for whatever damages you find
occurred here, that’s not blaming somebody else. That’s saying
it’s us.  We’ve taken responsibility. We pay. You find that
people were hurt here, you charge us. We pay. Now, are we
blaming people for punitive damages. Of course, not. We spent
a lot of time proving to you they couldn’t be guilty of punitive
conduct because they didn’t know. 
[Respondents’ attorney] argues to you that your verdict should
send a message . . .But his message can’t be sent because he did
not prove to you what he said he was going to prove to you
about fraud.  I want you to send a message that when a company
makes a mistake and then does what it ought to do, which is take
responsibility, apologize and try to make it right, that if a
company stands up and does what it is supposed to do to make
things right, that it will not be punished if all there is an
accident. So it is not a reward, it is a withholding of punishment
in order to send the message we want you to behave like
ExxonMobil behaved in this case.
(Emphasis added).
Regarding the compensatory damages for diminution in property value, Petitioner’s
attorney told the jury, also in his closing argument: 
I’m not going to put up a chart where I tried to tell you what are
the suggested numbers for each household. My reasoning is this:
I do not want you to award even a dollar less than the amount
you think it takes to make it right for each plaintiff household
that you determine is actually harmed. 
32
That’s your call. I want you to make that decision. Not
[Respondents’ attorney]. Not somebody[’s] expert. I want you
to make that call. 
Now, obviously, some homes are not impacted and some are,
and you know the difference. Those with nondetects, those that
are now nondetect, there’s no impact. Those that have detections
. . . then it’s a question of how much.
These statements, Respondents contend, amounted to Petitioner forfeiting its right to
appeal by its counsel’s anticipatory acquiescence to the jury’s verdict.  We hold that these
statements did not indicate that Petitioner’s counsel acquiesced to the jury’s judgment or
waived Petitioner’s right to appeal the subsequent judgments.  
Waiver is conduct from which it may be inferred reasonably an express or implied
“intentional relinquishment” of a known right.  Gould v. Transamerican Assocs., 224 Md.
285, 294, 167 A.2d 905, 909 (1961).  “The doctrine of acquiescence — or waiver — is that
‘a voluntary act of a party which is inconsistent with the assignment of errors on appeal
normally precludes that party from obtaining appellate review.’”  Bd. of Physician Quality
Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 200, 725 A.2d 1027, 1032 (1999) (quoting Franzen v.
Dubinok , 290 Md. 65, 69, 427 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1981)) (emphasis in original).  The doctrine
of waiver is also known as “estoppel, acceptance of benefits creating mootness, and
acquiescence in judgment.”  Downtown Brewing Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City,
370 Md. 145, 149, 803 A.2d 545, 547 (2002).
A party’s right to appeal may be waived only “where there is acquiescence in the
decision from which the appeal is taken or by otherwise taking a position inconsistent with
the right to appeal.”  Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 765, 506 A.2d 580, 620 (1986).  The
33
waiver doctrine applies only to conduct that is necessarily "inconsistent" with the right to
appeal.  Downtown Brewing, 370 Md. at 149, 803 A.2d at 547; see Turner v. Turner, 47 Md.
App. 350, 381, 809 A.2d 18, 35–36 (2002).  “To take actions that are necessarily inconsistent
with challenging a judgment, a party must have knowledge of the nature and effect of the
judgment.”  Boyd v. Bowen, 145 Md. App. 635, 666, 806 A.2d 314, 331 (2002) (emphasis
added).     
We concluded that a waiver of a right to appeal was warranted where a party accepted
a condemnation award in the underlying proceeding, but later sought to appeal that same
judgment.  See Downtown Brewing, 370 Md. at 151, 803 A.2d at 548.   We recognized that
“the right to appeal may be lost by acquiescence in, or in recognition of, the validity of the
decision below from which an appeal is taken.’”  Id. at 149, 803 A.2d at 547 (quoting Rocks
v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630, 217 A.2d 531 (1966)).    
Moreover, waiver by acquiescence is limited to a party’s post-judgment conduct.
Except for consent to a judgment, we have not applied waiver by acquiescence to conduct
before entry of judgment, namely because a party cannot relinquish knowingly a right to
appeal the nature and effect of a judgment before that judgment is known and entered.  Boyd,
145 Md. App. at 666, 806 A.2d at 331.   
In the present case, Respondents maintain that, before the return of the jury’s verdicts
and the entry of judgment, the Petitioner’s counsel’s statements to the jury in argument
constituted acquiescence in what became the jury’s verdict and a waiver of Petitioner’s right
to appeal the resultant entry of final judgment. The Circuit Court and the Court of Special
34
Appeals rejected Respondents’ waiver argument.  We agree with their reasoning.  A
reasonable view of the closing argument of Petitioner’s counsel is that, by counsel saying
“we pay,”  Petitioner’s counsel asserted only his client’s intention to take responsibility for
its actionable and proven conduct affecting adversely Respondents.  Counsel’s other
statements, taken within their context, urged the jury to award an appropriate compensatory
award based on the properly admitted evidence at trial and proper jury instruction.  Counsel’s
arguments illustrate strategic advocacy, rather than a blatant offer of a quid pro quo
arrangement with the jury to avoid a punitive damage award.  
In any event, the conduct of Petitioner’s counsel occurred before the rendition of the
jury’s verdict and entry of judgment, and thus it is unreasonable for Respondents to argue
that Petitioner could relinquish knowingly the right to challenge the jury’s decision. As there
was no implicit or express consent to the jury’s actual judgment, we hold that the conduct
of Petitioner’s counsel was not inconsistent with the Petitioner’s right to appeal the final
judgment, and therefore did not amount to Petitioner’s waiver of the right to appeal. 
IV.  Emotional Distress Damages for 
Fear of Cancer
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, we addressed directly whether a plaintiff may
recover emotional distress damages based on a fear of contracting a latent disease after
tortious exposure to a toxic substance.  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at ___ (slip op. at 39–56).
Exxon seeks here also reversal of the trial judge’s denial of its motion for judgment not
withstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) regarding damages for fear of contracting cancer as well
as medical monitoring.  We review a trial court’s decision to allow or deny judgment or
35
JNOV to determine whether it was correct legally.  Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 8, 38 A.3d 333,
337 (2012); Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503, 16 A.3d 159, 163
(2011).  A party is entitled to JNOV “when the evidence at the close of the case, taken in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, does not legally support the nonmoving party’s
claim or defense.” Gallagher v. H.V. Pier Homes, 182 Md. App. 94, 101,  957 A.2d 628, 632
(2008).  Error in a denial of JNOV is found if the evidence "does not rise above speculation,
hypothesis, and conjecture, and does not lead to the jury's conclusion with reasonable
certainty." Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md. App. 34, 51, 651 A.2d 908, 916 (1994). 
Respondents argue that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it concluded that the
jury instruction on fear of cancer was erroneous and prejudicial.  “The standard of review for
jury instructions is that so long as the law is fairly covered by the jury instructions, reviewing
courts should not disturb them."  Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Malory, 143 Md. App. 327,
337, 795 A.2d 107, 113 (2001) (quoting Farley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 355 Md. 34, 46, 733 A.2d
1014 (1999)).  “This standard for reversible error places the burden on the complaining party
to show both prejudice and error."  Farley, 355 Md. at 46, 733 A.2d at 1020.  
In Albright, we held that, to recover emotional distress damages for fear of contracting
a latent disease, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was exposed actually to a toxic
substance due to the defendant’s tortious conduct; (2) which led him or her to fear objectively
and reasonably that he or she would contract a latent disease; and, (3) as a result of the
objective and reasonable fear, he or she manifested a physical injury capable of objective
determination.  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 56).   Hence, we hold that, viewed in
51There were other Respondents whose potable wells were labeled as “non-detects,”
but Petitioner appeals the damages awards for emotional distress and medical monitoring
costs for only seventeen of the total non-detect properties.  The other non-detect properties
are discussed in Section VI of this opinion. 
36
the light most favorable to the Respondents, the evidence in this record is insufficient as a
matter of law to support Respondents’ claims for emotional distress damages based on a fear
of contracting cancer.  We hold further that, as the trial court’s jury instructions did not cover
fairly the standard for recovery that we have adopted, the jury instructions were erroneous.
The test results, at the maximum detection levels, for the potable wells on the
Respondents’ properties showed that the potable wells of seventeen51 of the eighty-four
properties did not have any measurable MTBE contamination — labeled as “non-detects”
— as a result of the leak.  Results from the monitoring wells indicate that five of the
properties contained contamination above the MTBE action level of 20ppb.  Benzene above
the 5ppb action level was not found in any of the Respondents’ potable wells, although
results of the monitoring wells indicate that four had benzene contamination above the action
level. 
Dr. Rudo, the toxicologist who testified as an expert witness on Respondents’ behalf,
testified that MTBE is a mutagen that causes changes in DNA, and, therefore, there is “no
safe level” of exposure to MTBE.  In contrast, the MDE (consistent with the  EPA standard)
has set an action level for MTBE at 20 ppb.  Herbert Meade from the MDE testified that
aesthetic standards, such as the MTBE 20-40 ppb standard, which is consistent with the EPA
standard, do not evince any evidence of a risk to human health and are meant only to ensure
52Instead, Respondents testified to one or more (while others did not testify to any) of
the following complaints, some related and some unrelated to the leak’s impact: anxiety,
sleeplessness, anger, worry about health and finances, headaches anxiousness, stress,
frustration, embarrassment, depression, upset stomach, and panic attacks.  
37
acceptable odor and taste. 
It is significant that none of the Respondents claimed sickness or symptoms of a
disease attributable to the leak, despite their claims that they had a fear of contracting a latent
disease.  None of the Respondents claimed a physical injury, apart from emotional distress
caused allegedly by the leak.52  Some Respondents testified that they experienced  emotional
or psychological difficulties prior to the leak and some of them had sought treatment for their
problems.  Some Respondents stated that they had experienced stress unrelated to the leak,
such as problems in their marriage or other relationships, or concerns about their health or
health of family members.  Lastly, we note that for those Respondents who elected to consult
Dr. Malik regarding their emotional distress evaluations, each evaluator relied in his or her
later opinion on self-reported information from Respondents.  The evaluators did not have
medical records regarding those Respondents prior to February 2006, and did not speak to
any of the Respondents’ personal physicians.   
1.  No Evidence of Actual Exposure 
That Would Give Rise to Objective Reasonable Fear
As there are no air samples or vapor studies in evidence to demonstrate that breathing
vapors may have caused exposure to MTBE or benzene, the only evidence relevant to
assessing actual contamination and consequent exposure is that collected from the
Respondents’ potable wells and the monitoring wells.  No other evidence was presented to
53This group of Respondents is comprised of the Badders, Barnett/Lindsey, Benney,
Berlin, Butler, Colgan, Copeland, Cormier, Fulco, Gollihue, Greenblatt, Jenkins, Lindsay,
Merski, Montone, Nickel, and Oberlin households.
38
show that exposure could occur absent contamination in a potable well.  
The evidence reflects that there are seventeen properties for which there was no past
or current evidence that the potable wells were contaminated by the leak, or that would
become contaminated in the future.  Respondents’ experts testified that the chance of future
contamination of the wells for these properties was “low,” which they meant as unlikely to
occur.   Further, Respondents owning these particular properties did not adduce any evidence
that contamination was present in the ambient air or water vapor in any of their houses
(including those using well water for bathing).  Thus, without proof of contamination in the
potable wells on these 17 properties, there can be no ingestion or skin contact with
contaminated water.  As there is no indicia that these Respondents were in contact with any
form of contamination as a consequence of the leak, the likelihood of potential future
exposure is insufficient as a matter of law.
Despite the absence of proof of contamination, the Respondents who own these
seventeen properties received awards for emotional distress damages based on fear of
contracting cancer.  In the absence of any exposure, there can be no objective reasonable fear
of cancer.  The trial court erred in not granting Petitioner’s motion for JNOV with respect
to these Respondents’ emotional distress claims.53  We reverse the judgments and shall
remand to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to remand to the Circuit Court and
direct the entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner. 
54For example, Respondents’ expert, Dr. Rudo, testified that our food – such as
mushrooms, coffee, peanut butter, or bread – contain carcinogens, and that certain other
foods contain mutagens. 
39
b. Insufficient Evidence of Actual Exposure That Would 
Give Rise to an Objectively Reasonable Fear  
For the remaining Respondents’ fears to be objectively reasonable, they must have a
rational basis to apprehend reasonably  that they would develop cancer as a result of
exposure to the toxic substances of the leak.  The evidence presented at trial indicated that
all Marylanders are exposed to toxic substances (some carcinogens, some mutagens) in our
daily lives.54  As Judge James Eyler summarized aptly in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in this case in the intermediate appellate court:
People who pump their own gasoline are exposed to MTBE and
benzene, by contact with or by breathing vapors.  People who
drive many miles and fill their tanks often are more exposed
than those who drive less.  People who keep gasoline in their
homes for use in generators, lawn mowers, or other engines,
have greater exposure than those who do not.  In order to have
a valid tort claim, a claimant must be different from the general
population.
204 Md. App. 1, 128–29, 40 A.3d 514, 590 (2012) (J. Eyler, dissenting and concurring)
(emphasis added).  Claiming mere exposure to MTBE as a result of the leak is insufficient
under the standard we adopted in Albright.  Based on the evidence presented, mere exposure
to MTBE would not lead a reasonable person in the Respondents’ position to believe that
they will develop cancer.  
Respondents’ claims arise from the same factual background as in Albright.   In
Albright, we determined that the rational basis for an objective and reasonable fear arising
55We do not consider whether Respondents, as a matter of law, could fear reasonably
that they were exposed to MTBE and could develop cancer when Exxon’s agents/employees
distributed water bottles to the Jacksonville residents, or when they discovered the extent of
the leak through the media, neighborhood meetings, or by other means.  As discussed above,
the only form of undisputed evidence relevant to determining an objectively reasonable fear
in this case is the evidence of contamination in the properties’ potable wells and the results
of the properties’ monitoring wells.  
40
from the leak’s toxic exposure was at the point a reasonable person under these
circumstances would believe that a toxic chemical was actually present in their potable
water.55  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 57–58).  There is ample evidence and
testimony that the exposure to MTBE above the MDE’s action level of 20 ppb is still
considered safe; however, the MDE chose the 20 ppb standard to measure the point at which
an individual’s level of tolerance to odor and taste is triggered.  As we concluded in Albright,
assuming that an objective reasonable fear of developing cancer may arise when an
individual is exposed to a level of MTBE significantly beyond that which is deemed
aesthetically tolerable, based on the MDE’s 20 ppb level, we conclude that those individuals
exposed to MTBE at levels below the 20 ppb do not have a rational basis to fear they will
develop cancer.    __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 59–60).  Moreover, Meade, on
behalf of the MDE, stated at trial that the water was safe to use, and that he communicated
this information to several Respondents.
Hence, those Respondents belonging to the sixty-three households whose properties’
potable wells were tested with results below the MDE 20 ppb action level do not have an
objective reasonable fear, as a matter of law, that they may develop cancer as a result of
56These households are: Acchione, Alban, Albert, Babcock, Barone, Bateman, Batton,
Bieber, Blair, Cadigan, Carroll, Coffay, Cremen, Csicesek, Davis, Debolt, Dedeo, De
Koomen, Depasquale, Diedeman, DiGalbo, Dixon, Dobb, Faber, Facinoli, Flora, Ford, Fox,
Fritz, Gottschalck, Greco, Gregory, Hannan, Heggie, Hourihan, Howe, Kropfelder, Kukucka,
Lamos, Lanting, Mahoney, Martin, Mucha, Osmeyer, Peters, Pfieffer, Quinn, Rosch, Rush,
Schech, Schultz, Shimp, Sipes, Thompson, Tirocchi, Tolle, Twardzik, Vacovsky, Vogler,
Wiedey, and Wittelsberger. 
 
41
exposure to the leak.56  We reverse those judgments entered in favor of these Respondents
and remand to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to remand to the Circuit Court
and direct the entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner. 
c. Legally Insufficient Evidence of 
Demonstrable Physical Injury as a Result of Exposure
            None of the Respondents’ evidence or testimony provided sufficient manifestation
of physical injury as a matter of law.  As we discussed in Albright, to sustain an award for
emotional distress for fear of cancer, a plaintiff must prove that as a result of actual exposure
and his or her objective reasonable fear, he or she sustained an objectively demonstrable
physical injury manifesting emotional distress, which may include a mental state,
physiological or psychological symptoms, or an actual physical harm.  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d
at __ (slip op. at 49–56).  Pursuant to  Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500–01, 408 A.2d 728,
733–34 (1979), and Hunt v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 121 Md. App. 516, 524–25, 710 A.2d 362, 366
(1998), a physical injury is manifested and objective if the evidence is not conclusory or
speculative, and provides some quantifiable basis for the jury to determine the appropriate
award.  
The trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion for JNOV with respect to the
57These Respondents are:  David Fritz, Jr., Brendan Fritz, Aidan Fritz, and Melodie
Heggie.
58 These Respondents are: Thomas Anderson, Stacey Curtiss, Mirza Baig, Zain Baig,
Martin Brady, Cassandra Brady, Edward McLewee, Barbara McLewee, Steven Tizard, and
Tracey Tizard.  
42
emotional distress awards entered in favor of Respondents who did not testify, and therefore
presented no evidence to show that they experienced any emotional distress.57  We reverse
those judgments and remand to the Court of Special Appeals with direction that it remand
to the Circuit Court and direct the entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner.
The trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion for JNOV regarding the awards
for emotional distress entered in favor of Respondents who briefly and intermittently
mentioned in testimony and provided minimal-to-no evidence of emotional distress.58  These
Respondents’ evidence of physical injury, if any, did not demonstrate physical injuries of an
objective and quantifiable nature.  The evidence they did present did not indicate any
objective and demonstrable injury arising from exposure to the leak because it included only
the following: (1) proof that any emotional stress resulted from a concern about property
damages only, such as the loss of use and enjoyment, rather than human health or safety; 
(2) proof that any emotional stress was due to preexisting mental or emotional conditions or
was attributed to the maintenance of the litigation; and, (3) lack of sufficient physical
manifestation.  
Most of these Respondents did not provide any supporting medical testimony as to
their emotional distress.  Further, these Respondents, based on the opinion of their expert,
43
Dr. Rudo, asserted that their physical injuries included subcellular changes as a result of
exposure to MTBE’s likelihood of causing cell mutation and increasing the risk of cancer.
As discussed in Albright, however, such injuries are not compensable in Maryland without
symptoms of disease or actual impairment.  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 54).
There is no such evidence or testimony in this record. We reverse those judgments and
remand to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to order remand to the Circuit Court
for the entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner.  
Our holdings by no means exclude the filing of future actions by those Respondents
who may develop, unfortunately, a future latent disease as a result of exposure to the 2006
leak.  Such claims would not be barred by res judicata or the statute of limitations:  the tolling
period for causes of action for latent disease would begin to run only when a plaintiff knew
or should have discovered reasonably the nature and cause of the disease.  See Hecht v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 334, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (1994); Pierce v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 663, 464 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1983).
V. Compensatory Damages for Future Costs of Medical Monitoring
Maryland recognizes now a remedy of recovery for  medical monitoring costs due to
enhanced risk from sufficient exposure to toxic substances resulting from defendant’s
tortious conduct.  Albright,   __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 77).   Petitioner argues
that the trial court erred in denying its motion for JNOV regarding damages for medical
monitoring.  Respondents urge us to affirm the jury’s awards for medical monitoring costs
to all of the Respondents.  Our consideration of these contentions requires us to view the
44
evidence in the record “taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Gallagher,
182 Md. App. at 101,  957 A.2d at 632.   Viewing the evidence in that light, we conclude that
it was insufficient to sustain the jury’s awards for medical monitoring and thus hold that the
trial court was legally incorrect in denying Petitioner’s motion for JNOV.  
To sustain an award for recovery of medical monitoring costs, a plaintiff must show
that such costs are necessary due to a reasonably certain and significantly increased risk of
developing a latent disease as a result of exposure to a toxic chemical.  Albright,   __ Md. at
__, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 86–87).  In determining whether to award relief, a court must
consider whether the plaintiff has shown:  (1) that the plaintiff was exposed significantly to
a proven hazardous substance through the defendant’s tortious conduct; (2) that, as a
proximate result of significant exposure, the plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of
contracting a latent disease; (3) that increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical
examinations reasonably necessary; and (4) that monitoring and testing procedures exist
which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.  Id. (slip
op. at 86–87).  To determine what is a “significantly increased risk of contracting a latent
disease” for a particular plaintiff, the plaintiff must present quantifiable and reliable medical
expert testimony that indicates the individual plaintiff’s particularized chances of developing
the disease had he or she not been exposed, compared to the chances of the members of the
public at large of developing the disease.  Id.  (slip op. at 83–84). 
Here, the jury awards indicated that if, at any point in time, a household’s potable well
had a MTBE reading above 0.5 ppb, the members of that household received 100% of his or
59These households are: Badders, Barnett/Lindsey, Benney, Berlin, Butler, Colgan,
Copeland, Cormier, Fulco, Gollihue, Greenblatt, Jenkins, Lindsay, Merski, Montone, Nickel,
and Oberlin.  See supra note 51.
45
her claimed costs for future medical monitoring; if the MTBE reading was less than 0.5 ppb,
that individual received 50% of his or her claimed costs for future medical monitoring; and,
lastly, if a household’s potable well never tested positively for MTBE, each member of that
household nonetheless received 25% of his or her claimed future medical monitoring costs.
As discussed in our summary of the contamination results in Section II of the procedural
history of this case,  tests of the potable wells on the all properties showed that seventeen
properties did not suffer any contamination as a result of the leak.  Monitoring well results
show that benzene levels above the action level were found only in five of the Respondents’
potable wells, while six of the properties contained contamination above the MTBE action
level.
Those Respondents who owned and/or resided on properties where the potable well
lacked any contamination failed to show exposure to a toxic substance, which is a threshold
requirement to recover for medical monitoring.59  Although Cohen, one of Respondents’
hydrogeologist experts, testified that the potential for future contamination of these non-
detect properties was possible, he could not predict which well or wells might become
contaminated in the future or when.  The possibility of future contamination for these non-
detect properties is therefore too speculative. With respect to these claims, the trial court
erred in denying Petitioner’s motion for JNOV.  We reverse those judgments and remand to
the Court of Special Appeals with directions to remand to the Circuit Court for entry of
60This group of Respondents includes the following households: Alban, Albert,
Babcock, Barone, Bateman, Batton, Bieber, Blair, Cadigan, Carroll, Coffay, Cremen,
Csicsek, Davis, Debolt, DeDeo, De Koomen, DePasquale, Diedeman, Dixon/Elkington,
Faber, Facinoli, Flora, Ford, Fox, Fritz, Gottschalck, Gregory, Hannan, Heggie, Hourihan,
Howe,  Kuckucka, Lamos, Lanting, Martin, Mucha, Osmeyer, Peters, Pfeiffer, Quinn, Rosch,
Rush, Schech, Schultz, Shimp, Thompson, Tirocchi, Tizard, Tolle, Twardzik, Vacovsky,
Vogler, Wiedey/Wilkinson, Wittelsberger.
46
judgment in favor of Petitioner.
As discussed in our analysis related to emotional distress damages for fear of
contracting cancer, the evidence demonstrates that most Marylanders are exposed to MTBE
every day.  Evidence at trial demonstrated that exposure to MTBE above the 20 ppb action
level is still considered safe, and that the selected 20 ppb standard measures merely the point
at which an individual’s level of tolerance to the odor and taste of MTBE in water becomes
an impediment to its consumption.   Those who are exposed to MTBE at well-recognized
safety levels are no more at risk of developing a latent disease than the rest of the population
— much less face a significantly increased risk in relation to other Marylanders’ exposure
to MTBE.  Hence, those Respondents whose properties tested below 20 ppb are not
suffering, as a matter of law, a significantly increased risk of developing a latent disease for
which medical monitoring costs are necessary.60  We hold that the trial court erred in denying
the Petitioner’s motion for JNOV regarding these Respondents’ judgments, and thus reverse
those judgments, and remand to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to remand to
the Circuit Court for entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner. 
61These Respondents are Thomas Anderson, Stacey Curtiss, Mirza Baig, Zain Baig,
Martin Brady, Cassandra Brady, Matthew Fox, Edward McLewee, Barbara McLewee,
Steven Tizard, and Tracey Tizard.
47
Lastly,  Respondents from the remaining five households61 also have not demonstrated
a significant risk of developing a disease in the future because the expert testimony did not
indicate that any individual faced a particularized and significantly increased risk as a result
of the leak in relation to the public at large. We concluded in Albright that particularized
evidence is necessary to prove a “significantly” increased risk of developing a future disease,
such as medical testimony specifically noting a plaintiff’s individually increased risk to
develop cancer.  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip opinion at 77–84). 
 No such evidence was presented in this case.  Although some Respondents consulted
with Dr. Malik and were evaluated for their described symptoms, neither Dr. Malik nor Dr.
Brautbar indicated any particularized evidence that an individual Respondent faced an
increased risk of developing a future disease that was significantly higher than similar risks
posed to the general population.  Rather, Respondents’ expert testimony generalized that all
Respondents faced a significantly increased risk of developing a future disease, without
providing individual assessments of any Respondent.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in
denying the Petitioner’s motion for JNOV with regard to these Respondents. We reverse
those judgments and remand to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to direct entry
of judgment in favor of Petitioner. 
VI. Property Damages
Respondents sought damages for diminution in their property values as a result of the
62The Brady household sold their home for $679,500 (a 6.9% decline from its pre-leak
value).  The Csicsek household sold their home for $767,000 (a 10.3% decline from its pre-
leak value).  The Simms household sold their home for $505,000 (a 16.6% decline from its
pre-leak value).
48
leak.  The jury found that all of their properties had become worthless, and awarded the
owners of each home 100% of the pre-leak market value based on (1) the difference in
market value prior to and subsequent to when notice of the leak became public; and, (2) loss
of use and enjoyment for the time between the date of the leak to the commencement of trial.
Judge Baldwin granted Petitioner’s blanket post-trial motion challenging the award, but as
to only three Respondents’ households who had sold their homes following the leak,62
reducing the award to the difference between the full pre-leak value and the actual sales
price.  The court denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial or remittitur for the judgments
awarded to the remaining households whose properties had not been sold after the leak.  
 Petitioner appeals Judge Baldwin’s denial of its motion for a new trial or, in the
alternative, a remittitur (on the basis of excessive compensatory damages) because (1) the
testimony of Respondents’ real estate appraisal expert, Kenneth Acks, was inadmissible; (2)
Respondents produced insufficient evidence to warrant a jury verdict finding that their
properties were worthless; and (3) the evidence shows that those Respondents’ properties
retained substantial post-leak value. 
We hold that the trial court was correct in admitting Acks’ expert testimony.
Nevertheless, we hold also that, because no competent evidence in this record indicated that
Respondents’ properties had “zero value,” the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for
49
JNOV or a new trial was erroneous.  Thus, Respondents shall receive a new trial for their
claims of property damage based on diminution in value, in light of our decision in Albright,
 __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 93–129).
A. Standards of Review
Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion standard governs appellate scrutiny of the
admissibility of expert testimony and the denials of motions for a new trial or remittitur.  We
will find an abuse of discretion when the court’s ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect
of facts and inferences before the court[,]” when the decision is “clearly untenable, unfairly
depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result[,]” when the ruling is
“violative of fact and logic[,]" or when it constitutes an “untenable judicial act that defies
reason and works an injustice.”  Powell v. Breslin, __ Md. __,  __ A.3d __, __ (2013) (No.
__, September Term, 2013) (opinion filed 18 January 2013) (slip. op. at 12–13)  (citing North
v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13–14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  Thus, the admissibility of expert opinion “is within the sound discretion of the
trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”  Blackwell v. Wyeth,
408 Md. 575, 618, 971 A.2d 235, 261 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 200,
803 A.2d 1034, 1039 (2002)); see Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173, 367 A.2d 472, 476
(1977) (“[T]he trial court’s determination [regarding expert qualification] . . . may be
reversed if it is founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if the trial court
clearly abused its discretion.”).
When a trial judge denies a motion for a new trial and/or remittitur based on the
63Petitioner contends that “[u]nder Maryland Rule 5-702 and Frye-Reed, Acks’
opinion should not have been admitted.” The question of whether Acks’ testimony is
admissible is governed by Maryland Rule 5-702 rather than the Frye-Reed test.  The latter
is reserved for issues admissibility of expert testimony involving new or novel scientific
techniques.  Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 201 n.5, 803 A.2d 1034, 1040 n.5 (2002); see
CSX Transp. Inc. v. Miller, 159 Md. App. 123, 187–88, 858 A.2d 1025, 1061–62 (2004)
(explaining what is encompassed as a “new and novel scientific technique” under the Frye-
Reed test).  Maryland Rule 5-702, on the other hand, applies to the discretionary threshold
of admitting generally an expert’s testimony.  Id.  As Frye-Reed is not applicable to the
present situation, we review the admission of Acks’ testimony under an abuse of discretion
standard pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-702.   
50
excessiveness of compensatory damages, we consider his or her exercise of discretion based
on “whether the verdict is ’grossly excessive,’ or ’shocks the conscience of the court,’ or is
’inordinate’ or ’outrageously excessive,’ or even simply ’excessive.’”  Banegura v. Taylor,
312 Md. 609, 624, 541 A.2d 969, 976 (1988).  The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial
is “within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328
Md. 51, 56, 612 A.2d 1294, 1296 (1992) (quoting Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 292, 173
A.2d 203, 206 (1961)).    We reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial and/or
remittitur only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.  See Merritt v. State,
367 Md. 17, 28, 785 A.2d 756, 763 (2001).  
B. Admissibility of Kenneth Acks’ Testimony63 
The admissibility of expert testimony generally is subject to evaluation according to
three requirements: (1) the witness qualifies as an expert on the topic about which he or she
intends to testify; (2) the subject is appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) there is an
adequate factual basis supporting the testimony. Md. R. 5-702.  The last factor includes two
51
sub-issues: factual basis and methodology.  CSX Transp. Inc., 159 Md. App. at 189, 858 A.2d
at 1063.   “[S]imply because a witness has been tendered and qualified as an expert in a
particular occupation or profession, it does not follow that the expert may render an unbridled
opinion which does not otherwise comport with Maryland Rule 5-702.”  Giant Food, Inc. v.
Booker, 152 Md. App. 166, 182–83, 182, 831 A.2d 481, 490 (2003).  Instead, sufficient facts
must underlie the expert’s opinions that indicate the use of “reliable principles and
methodology in support of the expert’s conclusions” so that the opinion constitutes more than
mere speculation or conjecture. Id. 
“Expert testimony is required ordinarily to establish diminution in property value
resulting from environmental contamination.”  Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op.
at 121–22);  Hous. Auth. of City of New Brunswick v. Suydam Investors, LLC, 810 A.2d
1137, 1150 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he effect of environmental contamination
upon a property’s value must be determined on the basis of expert appraisal evidence.”), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 826 A.2d 673 (N.J. 2003). 
In evaluating the factual basis of an expert’s testimony, “[t]he facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.” Md. R. 5-703(a).  If those facts or
data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”
Id. 
Acks’ estimation of property values in the instant case was buttressed by the
64Additionally, Acks relied on test readings of wells on various properties taken after
the leak, but before trial, and an exhibit prepared by Sullivan, one of Respondents’
hydrogeology experts,  reflecting Sullivan’s opinion as to whether properties with no
contamination had a low, medium, or high chance of becoming contaminated in the future.
52
following facts and data: (1) the stipulated pre-leak appraised values of the Respondents’
homes; (2) the presence of actual potable well contamination; (3) another expert’s
determinations of the risk of future contamination;64  (4) whether people have been able to
sell homes within a one mile radius of the Exxon station; and (5) peer-reviewed articles
discussing diminution in property value in other contamination events.  Based on this
collection of facts and data, Acks concluded that properties with evidence of contamination
had decreased in value by 60%; properties with a high probability of future contamination
had decreased in value by 50%; properties with a medium probability of future contamination
had decreased in value by 45%; and properties with a low probability of future contamination
had decreased in value by 30%.  
Petitioner challenges the admission of Acks’ testimony under the third requirement
of Maryland Rule 5-702, asserting that (1) the methodology underlying his diminution in
value estimates was unreliable; and (2) those estimates lacked a sufficient factual basis
because he ignored actual comparable sales of real property within proximity of those
properties affected by the leak.  We disagree.
 Petitioner first asserts that Acks’ conclusions “ignored” the comparable sales of forty-
nine properties, five of which belonged to plaintiffs, located near or within a half-mile radius
of the strike line.   Comparable sales are often utilized in determining fair market value of
65These properties were owned and sold by the Brady, Csicsek, Simms, and Murray
households. The trial court granted Exxon’s motion for remittitur as to the diminution in
value claims of these households, reducing each award to an amount equal to the difference
between the pre-leak adjusted value and the actual sales price.
66Acks testified based on a map presented at trial that reflected forty-nine sales (the
most current number at the time of his deposition), but the map was updated for trial to
reflect fifty-two sales.  
67In Acks’ words, “A home could sell for a million dollars, and that might sound like
(continued...)
53
single-family residential properties, and “ha[ve] long been accepted in Maryland.”  Albright,
__ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 125); Bern-Shaw Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 377 Md. 277, 289, 833 A.2d 502, 509 (2003) (citing Brinsfield v. Mayor &
City Council of Balt., 236 Md. 66, 202 A.2d 335 (1964)) (discussing use of comparable sales
in condemnation cases).  The use of comparable sales data, however, is not the only
methodology accepted to appraise the fair market value of a residential property.  See
Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 125–26).  The record indicates that, rather
than ignoring the data of comparable sales in the strike line area, Acks thought the
comparable sales were of minimal use to his assessment of the value of Respondents’
properties, either because (1) the four properties sold by plaintiffs since the leak were “low-
hanging fruit,”65 and thus not indicative necessarily of the overall diminution in value of the
other properties, or (2) the lack of pre-leak appraisals for the other approximately forty-five
properties66 sold by non-parties between the date of the leak and the date of trial was not
available, and he believed it was impossible to conduct an accurate appraisal based only on
sales price.67 
67(...continued)
a lot, but if it’s really a $3 million home, then there’s a big diminution.” 
68Acks’ recognition, but exclusion, of the comparable sales data stands in stark
contrast to the exclusion of such data by the appraisal expert in Albright, who concluded
merely that such information was unreliable and the buyers for those properties were
uninformed.  __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 120–29). 
54
Acks recognized thus the existence of the comparable sales data and explained his
reasons for rejecting or minimizing the utility of that information in his appraisal
calculations, rather than completely rejecting the use of such data, as alleged by Petitioner.68
We agree with the view of Judge Zarnoch of the Court of Special Appeals in the present case,
that “there is no support in Maryland case law for the proposition that a reasoned decision
not to incorporate such data, due to the particular circumstances of the case, mandates the
exclusion of the expert’s testimony.”  Ford, 204 Md. at 29–30, 40 A.3d at 531 (Zarnoch, J.)
(emphasis added).  
Likewise, the exclusion of market fluctuations in Acks’ appraisals did not render his
testimony inadmissible. Acks considered the data of the 2006, 2007, and 2008 Baltimore
County housing market provided by the Maryland Association of Realtors, but concluded
that, as the market went up in 2006 and 2007, but dropped in 2008, the fluctuations were not
helpful in his assessments.  Petitioner’s claim that Acks did not reach the same conclusions
as its own expert, based on the same data, is a “critique going to the weight, not the
admissibility, of Acks’ testimony. [Petitioner] properly addressed it during cross-examination
of Acks and its direct examination of its own property value expert.”  Ford, 204 Md. at
28–29, 40 A.3d at 530. (Zarnoch, J).  We therefore conclude that Acks’ testimony was
69Robert Simons, Estimating Proximate Property Damage for PBC Contamination in
a Rural Market: A Multiple Techniques Approach, LXX Appraisal J. 388 (October 2002).
55
admissible, despite his minimization of market fluctuation data.
Lastly, we examine Petitioner’s assertion that Acks’ methodology rendered his
testimony inadmissible.  Petitioner contends that Acks used “‘combined’ aspects of various
methodologies,” instead of a single commonly accepted appraisal method.  To constitute
reliable methodology, “an expert opinion must provide a sound reasoning process for
inducing its conclusion from the factual data” and must have  “an adequate theory or rational
explanation of how the factual data led to the expert’s conclusion.”  CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Miller, 159 Md. App. at 202–03, 858 A.2d at1071.  The explanation must not be conclusory,
or constitute a “because I say so” approach.  Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App.
512, 525, 760 A.2d 315, 323 (2000) (concluding that the trial judge had not erred in
excluding an expert’s opinion where the expert determined that the cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries was the size and location of the vent holes in an air bag in a motor vehicle, but
provided no rational explanation why such information had anything to do with the injuries
sustained).  
Acks stated that he employed a combination of methods because, in his experience,
the leak presented an unusual situation requiring several methods to obtain the most accurate
appraisal of the leak-impacted properties.   Further, he cited a peer-reviewed publication that
recommended the use of several “techniques” of valuation in instances of toxic substance
contamination of groundwater in rural areas.69  In contrast to the expert testifying for the
70Robert A. Simons & Kimberly Winson-Geideman, Determining Market Perception
on Contamination of Residential Property Buyers Using Contingent Valuation Surveys, 27
J. Real Estate Research 193 (2005).  The authors of this article, according to Acks, discarded
the survey results of potential buyers because of their expressed belief that they would never
bid on the property or would bid only one percent of the property value.  Acks found the
latter basis unrealistic and “very conservative.”
71Robert Berrens et al., The Effect of Environmental Disclosure Requirements on
Willingness to Pay for Residential Properties in Borderlands Community, 84 Social Sci. Q.
359 (2003). 
56
respondents in Albright,   __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 124–29) (where he relied
on a nuanced view of “market price” and informal interviews with real estate agents to
conduct his estimations), Acks testified that his methodology included the peer-reviewed
PCB contamination study and other studies, such as one assessing, by surveying potential
buyers, how an underground storage tank leak impacted the value of residential properties.70
Acks considered also a study that examined the effect of pre-sale environmental disclosure
requirements, from which he concluded that “a lot of people use data points to come up with
relatively low value diminutions which really aren’t very relevant because [potential buyers]
don’t know about the contamination or don’t understand it.”71 
Respondents’ expert’s testimony indicates that, although he did not identify a peer-
reviewed article sanctioning the exact combination of methods he employed, he provided a
“sound reasoning process” for how his methodology produced his appraisals of the
diminution in value of Respondents’ properties.  See CSX Transp., 159 Md. App. at 202, 858
A.2d at 1071.  As Judge Zarnoch explained aptly for the unanimous Court of Special Appeals
in banc panel, “[r]eal estate appraisal is not an exact science in the same way as automobile
57
engineering or DNA comparison. [Petitioner] raises legitimate concerns about Acks’s
methods, but these criticisms go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony.”  Ford,
204 Md. at 31 , 540 A.3d at 532 (citing Thomassen Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Goldbaum, 45
Md. App. 297, 305, 413 A.2d 218, 223 (1980) (concluding that “appellant’s complaints about
the manner in which [an expert witness] derived and stated his opinion as to value go to the
weight to be accorded his testimony rather than to its admissibility.”)). 
   
For expert testimony to be admissible, his or her conclusions must be based on a
sound reasoning process explaining how the expert arrived at those conclusions.  Here, Acks’
calculations included consideration of market fluctuations and recognition of comparable
sales data, using a combination of reasonably explained methods, but did not reach the same
conclusions as Petitioner’s experts based on that information.  The trial court thus did not
abuse its discretion in finding Acks’ testimony admissible.  
C. Respondents May Not Recover Emotional Distress for 
Injury to Real Property, But May Recover for 
Damages for Diminution in Property Value
1. Emotional Distress Damages for Injury to Real Property
In addition to recovering for emotional distress damages for fear of cancer,
Respondents sought and recovered damages for the diminution in value of their properties;
the loss of use and enjoyment of their properties; nuisance due to annoyance, embarrassment,
inability to use their yards, noise, dust, and unusual traffic; and, anxiety about the loss in
value of their properties.  Petitioner challenges these judgments in its conditional cross-
petition, arguing that Maryland law denies compensation for emotional distress resulting
58
from damage (or fear of damage) to property.   Petitioner therefore asks us to adopt Judge
James Eyler’s dissenting and concurring opinion in Ford reversing the emotional distress
awards and allowing only thirty-five of the Respondents to pursue emotional distress claims
at a new trial.  In light of our decision in Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at
93–95), we hold that Maryland law does not recognize ordinarily recovery for emotional
distress resulting from injury to real property, and therefore reverse all judgments of such
awards to all Respondents.
 We recognized in Albright that ordinarily, absent evidence of fraud or malice in the
underlying tort, emotional distress resulting from property damage (or fear of property
damage) is not compensable in Maryland.   Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d __ at __ (slip op.
at 94); Ford, 204 Md. App. at 101, 40 A.3d at 573 (Eyler, J., concurring and dissenting in
part).  See also H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 48–49, 338 A.2d 48, 55 (1975),
abrogated on other grounds by Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633
(1992), (recognizing that “Maryland decisions have generally denied compensation for
mental anguish resulting from damage to property”); Zeigler v. F. Street Corp., 248 Md. 223,
226, 236 A.2d 703, 705 (1967) (emotional distress damages attendant to injury to property
may be recovered only where there is fraud or malice).  As the jury rendered judgment in
favor of Petitioner for Respondents’ claims of fraud (see supra Section V of procedural
history),  the judgments for emotional distress damages related to fear of lost property value
entered for the Respondents were erroneous. Those awards are therefore reversed.  
2. Recovery for Diminution in Property Value
72The Badders, Barnett/Lindsey, Benney, Berlin, Butler, Colgan, Copeland, Cormier,
Fulco, Gollihue, Greenblatt, Hahn, Jenkins, Lindsay, Merski, Montone, Nickel, and Oberlin,
and Pertee properties’ wells never showed any contamination.
59
 When trial began, Petitioners sought damages for diminution in their properties’
market values and the loss of use and enjoyment, with each owner claiming damages for the
difference between the fair market value of property before disclosure of the leak and its fair
market value after disclosure.  The evidence  at trial focused on the post-leak value because
the parties stipulated to the pre-leak value of those properties.    
First, we note that Andrea Greco and Veronica Greco withdrew their claims for
property damages and resulting diminution in value.  Nonetheless, they received property
damages equal to the full pre-leak value of their property.   Thus, the Circuit Court erred in
denying Petitioner’s motion for JNOV with respect to the Grecos’ claims.  We reverse that
judgment and remand to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to remand to the
Circuit Court for the entry of judgment in favor of Petitioner.
Second, in light of  Albright, those Respondents here who owned or resided in non-
detect properties72 failed similarly to show a substantial interference sufficient to sustain
actions for nuisance, trespass, negligence, or strict liability. Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d
at __ (slip op. at 109–16).  Apart from complaints of modest disturbances (such as using
bottled water, reducing the use of outdoor spaces, or taking shorter baths and showers) and
allegations that their properties are tainted by perceived stigma, the evidence indicates that
any adjustments Respondents made to the use of their properties was out of fear of possible
contamination.  As their properties lacked any tangible evidence of contamination, such fear
60
is not objectively reasonable for purposes of making a prima facie showing of nuisance.  Id.
at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 113–14).  There was no evidence that Respondents were
deprived of any part of their properties or that Exxon’s remediation efforts and the
consequences of the leak impaired greatly Respondents use and enjoyment of their
properties.  Hence, “[i]n the absence of physical injury to property resulting from Exxon’s
actions, [Respondents] must demonstrate more than modest adjustments in their use of their
real property resulting from the leak in order to establish nuisance.”  Albright, __ Md. at __,
__ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 114). 
Third, as the remaining Respondents requested damages for diminution in value based
on the difference between their properties’ pre-leak fair market value and fair post-leak
market value (essentially, full compensation for a permanent injury), we presume that
Respondents’ property damage claims were based on their properties’ allegedly permanent
diminutions in value.  The evidence presented at trial — namely, Acks’ expert testimony, the
evidence of contamination as to some of Respondents’ properties, the evidence and testimony
of Petitioner’s experts that there was substantial value retained by Respondents’ properties
— raises a question for the jury as to whether Respondents sustained damages for diminution
in value, in light of our holdings in Albright.  Hence, we hold, on remand, that those
Respondents may recover only for damages to their property resulting in diminution of his
or her property’s market value, in light of our decision in Albright,  __ Md. at  __ A.3d at
__ (slip op. at 93–129) .  
D. Respondents’ Lay Testimony Lacked 
Value Probative of Diminution in Market Value
73These were the Barone and Gregory families.  
74These were the Brady, Csicsek, Simms (not Respondents in the instant case), and
Murray (also not Respondents in this case) households.
75Respondents assert repeatedly that Petitioner did not object to the lay testimony,
thereby waiving the right to challenge the probative value of the testimony.  Whether
Petitioner objected to such testimony is irrelevant in determining the probative value of the
lay testimony.  As Judge Deborah Eyler noted succinctly in her concurring and dissenting
opinion in Ford:
The absence of an objection is meaningless to the analysis of
this issue, . . . The central sufficiency question on property
damage was whether the evidence was legally sufficient to
support a reasonable finding that the homes all were worth
nothing. As in any case, evidence to support a finding must be
probative of it.  Evidence that otherwise is not probative does
not become probative merely because it was not objected to. 
204 Md. App. at 272, 40 A.3d at 673 (D. Eyler, J.).
61
Petitioner asserts that the jury’s finding that each property was “worthless” was
contrary to all of the evidence.  Petitioner maintains, and we agree, there was evidence
showing that: Respondents’ properties retained some market value after disclosure of the
leak; although two of the eight Respondents who decided to sell their homes post-leak were
unsuccessful,73 four were successful in selling their properties;74 evidence showed that
owners of ten properties were able to procure refinancing; and approximately forty-five
properties sold by non-parties within the Jacksonville strike line were sold for substantial
prices after public disclosure of the leak.
Petitioner argues that the lay witness testimony had no probative value — or if it did,
that value was limited to the homes of those owners.75  We hold that none of the
76These Respondents’ testimony extended to the marketability of neighbors’ homes,
others homes close to the strike line, close to a  remediation site, or those properties
“completely surrounded . . . by positive results for gas.” 
77These Respondents did not express an opinion as to the value of their homes, or
made statements relevant to the issue, but not covered by the categories listed infra.  This
group included the following property owners: Acchione, Butler, Csicsek, DiGalbo, Dixon,
Elkington, Greco, Kropfelder, Lindsay, Mahoney, McDevitt, Shimp, Shultz, Sipes, and
Wittelsberger. 
78For example, one Respondent reported that she feared  that she would be unable to
sell her property because a neighbor failed to sell his home.  Another Respondent testified
that she and her family were “stunned” when their house was sold because they had not
expected any offers. 
79 This group of Respondents included the following households: Alban, Albert,
Anderson/Curtiss, Bateman, Benney, Berlin, Bieber, Brady, Cadigan, Coffay, Colgan,
Copeland, Davis, DePasquale, Dobb, Faber, Fox, Fritz, Gottschalk, Gregory, Hourihan,
Howe, Kukucka, Martin, McLewee, Merski, Montone, Mucha, Nickel, Oberlin, Osmeyer,
Pfeiffer, Quinn, Rosch, Rush, Tolle, Twardzik, Vacovsky, Vogler, and Wiedey/Wilkinson.
80These owners testified that they believed their homes had diminished in value, but
did not state by what amount.  They did not maintain expressly that their homes had no value.
For example, one Respondent testified that the value of his property had “gone down just a
huge amount,” but not to zero, as “someone would buy my house for $10.”  Other
(continued...)
62
Respondents’ lay testimony had any probative value as to the measure of damages for
diminution in property value and, thus, that the lay testimony was insufficient to support the
jury’s verdict that the Respondents’ properties were worthless. 
Owners of seventy-three of the eighty-four properties involved presently in this
litigation testified as to their own opinion of their properties’ post-leak value or as to the
marketability of other properties in the neighborhood.76  These owners either expressed no
opinion on the value of their properties,77, 78 or testified that (1) their property diminished in
value by some unspecified percentage;79, 80 (2) they believed that their properties were
80(...continued)
Respondents used terms like “greatly diminished” or “severely impacted” to describe their
properties’ value.  Twelve property owners questioned his or her property’s value, stating
they would not sell or that no sane person would buy, without actually stating that the
property was worthless.  Their explanations ran a gamut: (1) no sane person would buy the
property, (2) the person testifying would not buy it if they did not live there and were looking
for a house, and (3) the person testifying would not sell it either because he or she did not
want to move  or, as a matter of conscience and good morals, would refuse to sell it to
anyone.
81Respondents who offered such testimony were the owners of the following
properties: Babcock, Baig, Barone, Batton, Blair, Carroll, Cremen, DeBolt, DeDeo, De
Kooman, Diedeman, Facinoli, Ford, Flora, Hannan, Heggie, Howe, Jenkins, Lanting, Lamos,
Peters, Schech, Thompson, Tirocchi, and Tizard.   
82Owners of about twenty-five properties testified, either explicitly or implicitly, that
their properties were “worthless,” “had no value,” or were “worth “absolutely negative zero.”
 Many Respondents stated that if given the chance they would not purchase their own homes,
and thus could not imagine why anyone else would do so “whatever the amount of money.”
Even though one Respondent recognized that some of the leak-impacted properties had sold,
he observed “there [are] a limited number of fools out there that will pay money for a
property that is completely surrounded by . . . positive test results for gas.”   
83A significant number of Respondents testified they were unwilling to sell their
properties for “moral” or “good conscience” reasons, such as one Respondent who testified
that even if he and his wife could sell their home, they did not want “to put this problem, this
burden on someone else.”  Another Respondent reported that she was “morally
uncomfortable” with selling the house to a family with children. Ford, a Respondent who
is a real estate agent, testified that he would tell his clients s to “walk away” from purchasing
a property like his own.  
63
worthless;81, 82  or (3) that the owners were unwilling to sell for “moral” reasons.83 While
some Respondents stated that their neighbors could not sell their properties after publicity
about the leak, other Respondents testified that they had tried unsuccessfully to sell their
homes.  Almost all of the Respondents opined that the news coverage of the leak created a
“stigma” on their neighborhood, with some Respondents reporting that there was “an
84Another Respondent (not Ford), who was also a real estate agent, opined that there
was a stigma associated with the Jacksonville area.  Another Respondent asserted that
potential buyers would not consider his property even if he decided to sell, while others
testified that even though they desired to sell, they felt they could not do so because any sale
price would be insufficient to pay their home mortgages.  The Baig property had nineteen
monitoring wells with remediation equipment pumping twenty-four hours a day.  In closing
argument, Respondents’ counsel stated: “Who would buy this house? It is worthless . . . .”
85Respondents described the remediation as causing loud and constant noise, bright
lights, and the ruin of yards due to digging and heavy machinery.  
64
absolute stigma about real estate in the area.”84  
The reasons provided by the Respondents for the diminution in value of their homes
were: (1) the lack of or diminished safety and convenience due to actual contamination of
their properties’ wells and the potential risk for future contamination; (2) contamination-
induced stigma associated with the neighborhood; and, (3) the inconvenient and unsightly
remediation efforts.85    
Respondents described what they believed were the post-leak value of their properties;
however, their testimony was not probative to measure damages for a property’s diminution
in value.  Rather, such damages in a claimed toxic contamination situation must be measured
by the market value of property — a definite valuation produced by analysis of the property
in relation to any impact produced by contamination.  See Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d
at __ (slip op. at 121–22, 125).  This valuation may generally be made reliably only by expert
testimony.  Id. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip op. at 121–22).
A landowner who testifies as to the value of his or her property is “not opining as to
market value but rather is opining as to the effect of the contamination of the landowner’s
86See also  Player v. Motiva  Enters. LLC, 240 Fed. Appx. 513, 516–18, 522, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 16914 (3d Cir. July 13, 2007) (in a case involving contamination of
plaintiff property owners’ properties by hazardous substances, the Third Circuit concluded
that a plaintiff property owner’s testimony —  that a potential buyer had reneged on his offer
to buy her property after he learned about the contamination — was insufficient proof of a
decrease in property value.).   
65
property.” Ford, 204 Md. App. at 151, 40 A.3d at 602 (J., Eyler, J., concurring and
dissenting.).  It is well established that expert testimony is not required “on matters of which
the jurors would be aware by virtue of common knowledge.”  Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs., 109 Md. App. 217, 257, 674 A.2d 106, 125–26 (1996) (citing
Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 307, 138 A.2d 375, 379 (1958)).  As we recognized in
Albright, the effect of contamination on a  property’s value is ordinarily beyond common
knowledge and therefore requires expert testimony.  See __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at __ (slip
opinion at 121–22); see Ford, 204 Md. App. at 151, 40 A.3d at 602 (J., Eyler, J., concurring
and dissenting.); Cunningham v. Masterwear Corp.., 569 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that, even though a property owner knew his property value at certain time
periods, he could not offer a responsible opinion about the cause of a change in the value of
his property; rather, the landowner needed evidence by a real estate agent or real estate
appraiser to establish the contamination effect on his property’s value); Hous. Auth. v.
Suydam Investors, 810 A.2d 1137, 1149–50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part on other grounds,  826 A.2d 673 (N.J. 2003) (“[T]he effect of
environmental contamination upon a property’s value must be determined on the basis of
expert appraisal evidence.”).86  
66
Respondents’ testimony indicated that they believed their properties had decreased
in value, but did not offer substantive valuations.  Instead, several Respondents asserted in
a conclusory fashion that they could not sell their properties in good conscience, and they
believed therefore that their properties had zero sale value. While lay testimony may be
relevant to any possible loss of use and enjoyment suffered in conjunction with Respondents’
property damage claims, it offered no probative value as to the diminution in value claims.
None of the Respondents — even those who identified themselves as real estate agents —
testified as offered-and-accepted experts, and none testified based on any relevant training
or expertise to accredit their lay opinions.  While almost all Respondents maintained that a
stigma was associated with their properties because of the leak, there was no evidence that
there such stigma was permanent, which would be relevant to their claims of nuisance and
the level of substantial interference.   See Albright, __ Md. at __, __ A.3d at ___ (slip op. at
112–13).   Even Respondents’ expert, as discussed above, testified that the properties
retained some value after the leak.  See Section V.B of this opinion.  
No evidence in this record supports the jury’s verdict that Respondents’ properties
became worthless in terms of market value as a result of the leak; however, there is evidence
that the properties suffered diminution in value.  The trial court erred, however, in not
performing an individualized assessment of each verdict in ruling on the motion for new trial
or remittitur.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for a new
trial was legally incorrect.  We reverse the judgments in favor of Respondents who received
awards despite owning or residing on non-detect properties.  We reverse the jury’s verdicts
67
as to the remaining property diminution damage judgments, and direct remand of those cases
for a new trial in light of our opinion here and in Albright.
JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REVERSED IN PART; JUDGMENTS
FOR DIMINUTION IN PROPERTY VALUE
IN FAVOR OF GEORGE BADDERS,
MINDY SHOEMAKER, ROBERT DENNEY
BARNETT, LOUIS LINDSEY, THOMAS
BENNEY, DENNIS BERLIN, LISA BERLIN,
ROBERT BUTLER, MARGARET BUTLER,
BARLETT COLGAN, PATRICIA COLGAN,
CAROL COPELAND, BRIAN CORMIER,
KAREN HEALEY, FRANK FULCO,
KATHLEEN FULCO, CLAUDE GOLLIHUE,
J A N E T  
G O L L I H U E ,  
M A R T I N
GREENBLATT, ELIZABETH ROBERTSON,
MILDRED HAHN, JEFFREY JENKINS,
NICOLE RIPKEN, ELAINE LINDSAY,
WALTER MERSKI, ANTHONY MONTONE,
VALERIE MONTONE, LEON NICKEL, JR.,
TERESA NICKEL, MICHAEL OBERLIN,
LINDA OBERLIN, AND JOYCE PERTEE
REVERSED; 
JUDGM ENTS 
FOR
DIMINUTION IN PROPERTY VALUE AS
TO 
ALL 
OTHER 
RESPONDENTS
REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE 
THE
JUDGMENTS AND REMAND THE CASE
TO 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION; JUDGMENTS FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REVERSED;
J U D G M E N T S  
F O R  
M E D I C A L
MONITORING COSTS REVERSED. COSTS
TO 
BE 
PAID 
PRO 
RATA 
BY
RESPONDENTS.