Title: Ex parte Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation. PETITION FOR ( 302 ) WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: State of Alabama v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/01/2007 Ex parte Novartis
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1060224
_________________________
Ex parte Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  State of Alabama
v.
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-05-219)
PER CURIAM.
Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals 
Corporation, 
one 
of 
the
defendants in an action filed by the State of Alabama against
1060224
2
73 pharmaceutical companies, has filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus requesting that this Court direct the trial court
to vacate its order denying Novartis's motion to sever the
claims against it from the claims asserted against other
companies and to enter an order severing those claims.  We
grant the petition and issue the writ.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
The State sued 73 pharmaceutical companies, including
Novartis, alleging that those companies "engaged in false,
misleading, wanton, unfair, and deceptive acts and practices
in the pricing and marketing of their prescription drug
products" and that the Alabama Medicaid Agency ("the Agency")
relied on that pricing in reimbursing Alabama physicians and
pharmacies ("the providers") for prescription-drug costs for
approximately 1,300 drugs.  The State alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraudulent suppression, wantonness, and
unjust enrichment.  According to the State, each company
independently caused the Agency to pay the providers more for
dispensing that company's drugs to Medicaid patients than the
providers paid for the drugs, allowing the providers to profit
on their sale.  The companies did not receive any of the
1060224
3
alleged overpayments; rather, according to the State, each
company reported false pricing benchmarks and failed to
disclose to the Agency discounts or rebates that had been made
available to the providers.  The State claimed that each
company then marketed this profit margin to the providers to
encourage them to use that company's products rather than
those of its competitors.
Many of the companies filed motions to sever and/or for
separate trials.  The trial court summarily denied those
motions, stating in its order "that there are questions of law
and facts common to all the parties and that the transactions
and occurrences in question all dealt with the Alabama
Medicaid Agency."  Novartis and 43 other companies then filed
petitions for a writ of mandamus with this Court, asking us to
direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the motions
and to enter an order severing all claims against each
petitioning company from the claims asserted against other
companies or to order a separate trial for each petitioning
company.  The Court ordered the State to file an answer and
1060224
The petitions for the writ of mandamus filed by the other
1
43 companies have not been consolidated with Novartis's
petition.  Because, however, each company presents similar
arguments, we ordered one company to file a response to the
State's answer and brief.
4
brief and ordered counsel for Novartis to file a response on
behalf of the 44 companies.  
1
II. Standard of Review
"'Mandamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where
there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court.'"
Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)).  "A petition for a writ of mandamus is the
appropriate means for challenging a trial court's ruling on a
motion to sever claims."  Ex parte Alfa Life Ins. Corp., 923
So. 2d 272, 273 (Ala. 2005).  
III. Analysis
At issue in this case is whether the State has satisfied
the permissive-joinder requirements of Rule 20(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  Rule 20(a) states, in pertinent part:
1060224
5
"(a) Permissive Joinder.  ...  All persons may
be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, any right to relief in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action. ..."  
In order to join defendants pursuant to Rule 20(a), both
requirements imposed by the rule must be met:  (1) the
plaintiff must assert against each defendant a "right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences," and (2)
there will arise in the action "any question of law or fact
common to all defendants."  A misjoinder occurs if either of
the Rule 20(a) requirements is not satisfied.  Rule 21, Ala.
R. Civ. P., provides for severance of claims if joinder of the
claim was improper under Rule 20. 
The State contends that many common issues of law and
fact support its joinder of the various pharmaceutical
companies in this case, and it correctly argues that Rule
20(a) does not require that every question of law and fact be
common, only that there exist any common question of law or
fact.  Even if we were to assume that the State has satisfied
the second requirement for joinder under Rule 20(a), a more
1060224
6
difficult question is presented by the first requirement:
whether the State's alleged right to relief arises from the
same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences.  Novartis argues that the State's claims against
the different pharmaceutical companies do not arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions.  The State's
complaint alleges that over approximately 15 years each
company acted individually and independently of any other
company and at various times and in various ways.  The State
disavows any theory of conspiracy.  Novartis maintains that
permissive joinder requires that the claims arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions, not merely similar
types of independent transactions.  
Novartis relies on Ex parte Alfa Life Insurance Corp.,
supra, a case involving the misjoinder of plaintiffs, not
defendants as is the case here.  In Ex parte Alfa, this Court
held that severance of fraud claims asserted by several
plaintiffs against an insurance company was required under the
circumstances of that case.  We also concluded that even
though the alleged fraudulent representations were made by a
single defendant, the individual claims of each plaintiff
1060224
7
against that defendant could not be joined in one action.  923
So. 2d at 274-75.  In this case, where the State alleges that
it was misled by each of numerous companies, Novartis argues
that joinder cannot be proper.  
The State insists that its claims against the companies
arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences
and points out that Rule 20 encourages the joinder of claims,
parties, and remedies.  The State cites Ex parte Turpin Vise
Insurance Agency, Inc., 705 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. 1997), in
which this Court quoted the Committee Comments on 1973
Adoption of Rule 20 for the proposition that that rule "'is
intended to promote trial convenience, prevent a multiplicity
of suits, and expedite the final determination of litigation
by inclusion in one suit of all parties directly interested in
the controversy'"; the State maintains that the companies'
alleged reporting of false prices to national reporting
agencies occurred as a result of precisely the same type of
transaction or occurrence by each company. 
This Court has previously stated that "there is no
absolute rule for determining what constitutes 'a series of
transactions or occurrences' [under Rule 20].  Generally, that
1060224
Federal cases construing the Federal Rules of Civil
2
Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, which were patterned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Borders v. City of
Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1176 n.2 (Ala. 2003).  
8
is determined on a case by case basis and is left to the
discretion of the trial judge."  Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So. 2d
704, 706 (Ala. 1987).  In addition to the Alabama cases the
parties rely on, both parties have cited federal cases that
examine what constitutes "a series of transactions or
occurrences."   Federal courts have also adopted a case-by-
2
case approach in determining whether a case meets the "same
transaction or occurrence" requirement of Rule 20(a).  See 7
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
1653 (3d ed. 1998).
In the cases on which Novartis relies, federal courts
have applied Rule 20(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., which is identical
to Alabama's Rule 20(a) in all relevant respects, to hold that
joinder was improper in situations such as the one presented
here -- where one plaintiff sues multiple defendants for
economic loss, alleging independent, yet coincidentally
similar, acts based on the same legal theory.  In these cases,
a common theme emerges of lack of any conspiracy allegations
1060224
We are not here confronted with the situation of multiple
3
acts inflicting an ongoing personal injury by different
tortfeasors who are not acting in concert.  See, e.g., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1653 ("Illustrative of the liberal
approach to the concept of same transaction or occurrence
employed by many federal courts are cases in which the court
permits an injured plaintiff to join both the original
tortfeasor and a second tortfeasor whose subsequent negligence
aggravated plaintiff's original injuries.").
  
9
coupled with different entities engaging in coincidentally
similar yet separate transactions.   See, e.g., Nassau County
3
Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d
1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding in case where associations
of insurance agents sued 164 insurance companies that joinder
of the defendants was improper because the transactions
between the companies and the agents were different and there
were no allegations of conspiracy or other concerted action);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. 639, 642-43 (S.D. Iowa
2003) (joinder of individual purchasers of pirate-access
devices was improper in the absence of a common purpose among
the defendants); Wynn v. National Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (mere assertion that the 51
defendants were members of a common industry was not enough to
permit joinder of defendants); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew,
1060224
10
Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (in patent-
infringement action, claims against different companies with
different products in competition with each other had been
improperly joined); Rappoport v. Steven Spielberg, Inc., 16 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 496 (D.N.J. 1998) (joinder was improper where
each defendant allegedly used plaintiff's work separately and
differently); Tele-Media Co. of W. Connecticut v. Antidormi,
179 F.R.D. 75, 76 (D. Conn. 1998) (cable-television provider
sued 104 defendants alleging that they had used an illegal
converter; in absence of any claim of conspiracy or joint
action, same-transaction requirement was not satisfied);
Magnavox Co. v. APF Elecs., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 29, 34 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (joinder improper where defendants alleged to have
infringed same patent sold different products).  Novartis
contends that these cases demonstrate that the trial court
erred in concluding that the permissive-joinder requirements
of Rule 20 were met here merely because the transactions in
question all dealt with the Agency.  Novartis insists that the
fact that numerous separate transactions or occurrences all
took place with one entity, whether an insurance company as
was the case in Ex parte Alfa or a State agency as here, does
1060224
11
not satisfy the requirement of Rule 20 that the claims arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions. 
Conversely, the State argues that although the actual
pricing representations made by the pharmaceutical companies
necessarily vary because multiple drugs are involved, all of
the companies allegedly reported inflated prices to the
national reporting services, upon which the Agency relied in
reimbursing the providers, and the Agency's reliance did not
vary by company.  The State argues that Novartis has not
demonstrated that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
denying its motion for severance.  The cases relied on by the
State all involve allegations that the various parties joined
in the action were linked together in some way.  See, e.g.,
Moore v. Comfed Sav. Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 839 (11th Cir. 1990)
(plaintiffs alleged that the defendants took part in a similar
scheme that was maintained either by conspiracy or contract;
joinder was proper where connections between parties arose out
of a series of transactions initiated by defendant Land Bank);
City of New York v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 536,
549 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (City alleged systemic corruption of
City's sewer inspectors and various contractors in violation
1060224
12
of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); motion to sever filed by one contractor
was denied); Mack v. J.C. Penney Co., 108 F.R.D. 30, 31 (S.D.
Ga. 1985) (joinder of multiple plaintiffs allowed in action
against J.C. Penney alleging a pervasive policy of employment
discrimination in one store).  See also United States v. All
Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts Maintained at Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
citing City of New York v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc. (joinder of
numerous defendants permitted because complaint alleged that
property belonging to each defendant had been forfeited to the
government because of defendant's participation in illegal
drug-sales conspiracy).  
Another case relied on heavily by the State in arguing
that the trial court's denial of the motion to sever was
proper is Ex parte Flexible Products Co., 915 So. 2d 34 (Ala.
2005), in which this Court denied as premature a petition for
a writ of mandamus seeking to set aside a case-management
order consolidating actions for trial.  Flexible Products did
not arise in the context of the trial court's denial of a
motion to sever improperly joined claims pursuant to Rule 20;
instead, the Court in Flexible Products reviewed a trial
1060224
13
court's consolidation of claims pursuant to Rule 42, Ala. R.
Civ. P.  The Court never reached the question whether the
complaint 
complied 
with 
Rule 
20 
in 
joining 
multiple
defendants; therefore, it does not assist the Court in
deciding whether the State's claims against the companies
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
This Court has not only looked to the cases relied on by
the parties, but has also conducted its own research on the
crucial question whether the State's claims against the
pharmaceutical companies arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence or a series of transactions or occurrences.
Although Novartis cited DIRECTV, Inc. v. Loussaert, supra, in
its petition, it is but one of a series of DIRECTV cases with
facts strikingly similar to the facts before us.  DIRECTV,
Inc., a provider of television programming via satellite,
filed actions in several federal courts across the country,
suing, in each action, numerous individuals who allegedly
obtained the television programming illegally.  
Some courts faced with the joinder issue denied motions
filed by the defendants to sever DIRECTV's claims against
them.  See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hosey, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1259
(D. Kan. 2003); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Vanryckeghem, No. Civ. A. 04-
1060224
14
253 (E.D. La. August 10, 2004) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Russomanno, No. 03-2475 (D.N.J. November 12,
2003) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Essex,
No. C02-5503RJB (W.D. Wash. November 13, 2002) (not reported
in F. Supp. 2d).  In these cases, the court relied on the
presence of a common vendor selling illegal decoding devices
to each of the defendants.  No comparable factor is present in
this proceeding.  
Most courts, however, found joinder by DIRECTV of
multiple defendants improper and granted the defendants'
motions to sever.  See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boggess, 300 F.
Supp. 2d 444 (S.D. W.Va. 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Beecher, 296
F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Ind. 2003); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Loussaert,
28 F.R.D. at 642-43 (cited by Novartis); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Armellino, 216 F.R.D. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); In re DIRECTV,
Inc., No. C-02-5912-JW (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004) (not reported
in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 03-CV-6241CJS(F)
(W.D.N.Y. January 6, 2004) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Westerheide, No. 03-C3476 (N.D. Ill. February
4, 2004) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Davlantis, No. 03-C3506 (N.D. Ill. November 26, 2003) (not
reported in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Perez, No. 03-C3504
1060224
15
(N.D. Ill. November 12, 2003) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Geenen, No. 03-C3542 (N.D. Ill. November 10,
2003) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Gatsiolis, No. 03-C3534 (N.D. Ill. November 10, 2003) (not
reported in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Patel, No. 03-C3442
(N.D. Ill. November 10, 2003) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Long, No. SA-03-CA-360-XR (W.D. Tex. October
29, 2003) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Smith, No. 03-C3540 (N.D. Ill. September 18, 2003) (not
reported in F. Supp. 2d).  
We find the majority rule in these DIRECTV cases to be
persuasive.  We are led to this conclusion by language in
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926),
in which the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning
of the word "transaction" in the context of multiple events as
follows:
"'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning.  It
may comprehend a series of many occurrences,
depending not so much upon the immediateness of
their connection as upon their logical relationship.
The refusal to furnish the quotations is one of the
links in the chain which constitutes the transaction
upon which appellant here bases its cause of
action."
1060224
16
(Emphasis added.)  As Moore teaches and the DIRECTV cases
demonstrate, however, "to be reasonably related, the actions
must involve more than just similar goods that are used for a
similar purpose."  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boggess, 300 F. Supp. 2d
at 449. 
In the DIRECTV cases, most courts reviewing the joinder
issue reasoned that although the complaints asserted claims
against 
the 
various 
defendants 
arising 
from 
similar
transactions, they did not assert claims arising from the same
transaction, as Rule 20(a) requires.  Importantly, in the
DIRECTV cases, the plaintiff did not claim that any of the
defendants conspired together or acted in concert with one
another.  In Movie Systems, Inc. v. Abel, 99 F.R.D. 129, 130
(D. Minn. 1983), the plaintiff filed 18 lawsuits with
approximately 
100 
defendants each, alleging that each
defendant 
had 
illegally 
pirated 
television 
programs
distributed by the plaintiff.  The trial court held that the
defendants had been improperly joined because each complaint
stated a separate cause of action against each of the
defendants concerning a transaction with the plaintiff that
was distinct and unrelated to any other transaction, and the
complaint did not allege any type of conspiracy.  Absent
1060224
17
greater affinity, in such cases there are no links in a chain
necessary to form a series.  
Using the Supreme Court's analogy in Moore v. New York
Cotton Exchange, we cannot say that the claims against the
various pharmaceutical companies are links in the same chain.
As previously noted, the State has not alleged that the
companies conspired with each other or that they acted in
concert.  The transactions involved different companies,
different products, and different time periods over 15 years.
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
although the alleged transactions are similar, they are not
the same.  Put another way, the transactions in this case
constitute separate chains.  If we were to consider the
various transactions at issue to be links in the same chain,
we could expect that, taken to its logical extreme, the State
could amend its complaint to join the various providers (local
pharmacies, physicians, and others) as defendants on the
theory that they too engaged in the same transaction or series
of transactions in which the pharmaceutical companies engaged.
In the absence of combined and concurring tortious conduct
1060224
See note 3.
4
18
causing a single injury,  the same transaction or series of
4
transactions 
requires 
more 
than 
just 
similarity 
or
coincidence--some coordination between parties is required. 
To illustrate this conclusion, consider a hypothetical
plaintiff who makes multiple purchases (for example, a house,
a boat, an automobile, and a tractor) and finances those
purchases through different lenders.  Should the plaintiff be
able to join all the sellers and lenders in a single action,
alleging that each wronged him in a series of similar
transactions that happened to violate the same provision of
Alabama lending law?  It is easy to determine that in this
illustration, the plaintiff cannot join the various entities
he seeks to sue in one action because his claims do not arise
from the same transaction or series of transactions.  Although
the State's transactions with the pharmaceutical companies
have more similarities than the transactions in this
hypothetical, they clearly are not the same transaction or a
series of transactions with a logical relationship.  We hold,
therefore, that the State's joinder of the 73 companies was
improper because coincidental, but not coordinated, business
1060224
Rule 21, titled "Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties,"
5
states:  
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for
dismissal of an action.  Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party
or of its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just.  Any claim against a
party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
19
transactions giving rise to separate economic losses do not
constitute a series of transactions as contemplated by Rule
20.  Thus, the trial court erred when it denied the motions to
sever filed by the various pharmaceutical companies.  
Having found that the trial court erred in allowing the
joinder of the 73 pharmaceutical companies, we have two
options under Rule 21.   We can order that claims against all
5
defendants other than the first-named defendant, Abbott
Laboratories, Inc., be dismissed, or we can order that
misjoined parties be severed and proceeded against separately.
We opt for the latter course of requiring severance for
separate proceedings, thereby avoiding any unfair advantage
that might obtain by reason of applicability of defenses of
limitations if we ordered dismissal.  See DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006), in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
1060224
20
"The effect of each option [under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 21] is quite different.  When a court 'drops' a
defendant under Rule 21, that defendant is dismissed
from the case without prejudice.  Publicker Indus.,
Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1068
(3d Cir. 1979); see also Elmore v. Henderson, 227
F.3d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.).
When that occurs, the 'statute of limitations is not
tolled' because we treat the initial complaint 'as
if it never existed.'  Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d
603, 606 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  But when a court 'severs' a claim against
a defendant under Rule 21, the suit simply continues
against the severed defendant in another guise.
White v. ABCO Eng'g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 145 n.6 (3d
Cir. 1999); Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1012.  The statute
of limitations is held in abeyance, and the severed
suit can proceed so long as it initially was filed
within the limitations period.  Id."
(Footnote omitted.)
Because we are reversing the trial court's order denying
Novartis's motion for severance, we must vacate the trial
court's order creating four groups or "tracks" consisting of
18-19 defendants in each group to "track" and thereby
requiring four trials.  We do not therefore reach issues
relevant to consolidation under Rule 42(a).  
IV. Conclusion  
For the reasons previously stated, we conclude that the
State has misjoined the various pharmaceutical companies
because the State's claims against them do not arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions.  We therefore
1060224
21
grant Novartis's petition for a writ of mandamus and direct
the trial court to vacate its order denying Novartis's  motion
to sever.  We further direct the trial court to sever the
claims against all companies, leaving as the defendant in this
action only Abbott Laboratories, Inc., the first-named
defendant in the underlying action.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, J., concur specially.
1060224
22
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the main opinion.  I write specially to
make some observations about the prospect for further
proceedings after severance invoking Rule 42(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P., leading to an order of consolidation.  The availability of
consolidated trials under Rule 42(a) after a finding of
misjoinder under Rule 20 is well settled.  See 9 Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2382 n.14 (2d ed. 1995).  On remand, the trial court will be
guided solely by Rule 42(a), not Rule 20(b), in determining
the extent to which some number of trials less than 73 might
be appropriate in this case.
Should the trial court grant relief pursuant to Rule
42(a), whether the same parties will be back before us on
another petition for a writ of mandamus may well depend upon
the manner in which the trial court deals with consolidation.
In the proceedings that led to the present petitions, the
trial court, as best I can determine, announced that there
would be four trials consisting of four tracks of defendants.
The trial court then sought the assistance of two special
masters, placing them in what appears to be a procrustean bed
of four trials.  The special masters' report and any bases
1060224
23
therein for selecting the parties for the four trials was not
made available to the parties.  The trial court entered an
order based upon the report in which it created four tracks of
defendants without identifying its rationale for clustering
various defendants in the various tracks.  
The validity of the prior order of consolidation is not
before us because we have found a misjoinder of parties,
necessitating our setting aside the trial court's order.  I
will not speculate on the result that might have been reached
had it been necessary to address the order of consolidation.
Suffice it to say that, upon remand, a more transparent
proceeding not so ostensibly lacking in a principled basis
would better serve the ends of justice.  For example, if the
trial court once again seeks the input of special masters, its
announcement of the number of tracks without stating any basis
therefor before the masters' participation, its failure to
disclose to the parties the recommendation of the masters, and
its failure to identify the reasoning upon which any clusters
of defendants are created for resolution of this proceeding in
any order calling for fewer than 73 trials will substantially
increase the State's burden in sustaining its protestations
against this Court's micromanagement of the trial court's
1060224
24
exercise of discretion should there be a subsequent mandamus
proceeding challenging consolidation. 
Cobb, C.J., concurs.