Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Arnold

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. ARNOLD. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Arnold (1999), __ Ohio St.3d __.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension with credit for time 
served — Misappropriation of client funds. 
(No. 98-2663 — Submitted February 10, 1999 — Decided March 31, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-108. 
 
On December 8, 1997, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging respondent, S. Richard Arnold of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0012733, with violating several Disciplinary Rules.  Respondent  answered, 
and the matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
Based on the stipulations, testimony, and exhibits, the panel found that from 
July 27, 1994 through August 17, 1995, respondent, then a partner with the 
Cincinnati law firm Dinsmore & Shohl, falsely charged his client, Fifth Third 
Bank, for legal services that were never rendered and converted approximately 
$75,000 to his personal use.  As a result of his misappropriation of client funds, 
respondent pled guilty to bank fraud, in violation of Section 1344, Title 18, 
U.S.Code, and in January 1997, the federal district court convicted him, 
sentencing him to a term of actual imprisonment for six months, and upon release 
from imprisonment, to a three-year term of supervised release, with the first one 
hundred and eighty days of supervised release to be served in electronically 
monitored home confinement. 
 
In February 1997, respondent informed the federal court in a motion for 
reconsideration that he suffered from a crack cocaine addiction and had entered a 
treatment program for his addiction.  Respondent conceded at his disciplinary 
 
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hearing that his addiction to crack cocaine from 1992 until August 1995 adversely 
affected his ability to practice law during that period.  On July 9, 1997, we 
suspended respondent from the practice of law in Ohio for an interim period 
because of his felony conviction.  In re Arnold (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1454, 680 
N.E.2d 1254. 
 
The panel concluded that by his conduct, respondent committed two 
violations of DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), one violation of 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal 
conduct involving moral turpitude), and one violation of 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
 
In mitigation, respondent testified that in March 1991, he learned that he 
had tested positive for the HIV virus.  Shortly thereafter, in order to cope with 
stress over his test result, respondent became addicted to crack cocaine and 
subsequently misappropriated the funds that were the subject of his bank fraud 
conviction.  In August 1995, the law firm discovered respondent’s misconduct and 
forced him to resign. 
 
The panel found that respondent was candid and sincere in accepting full 
responsibility for his actions; that upon leaving his law firm, he had immediately 
entered into a residential drug treatment program; that he had been drug-free since 
that time; that he regularly attends Narcotics Anonymous meetings; and that 
pursuant to conditions of his supervised release, he submits to random drug testing 
and attends psychiatric counseling sessions.  Respondent also submitted five 
letters of persons noting his exemplary character, professional and community 
commitment, and his resolve to fight his addiction and conduct himself in a law-
abiding manner in the future. 
 
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The panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio, with credit for time served since his July 9, 1997 interim 
suspension.  The panel further recommended that respondent establish that he has 
remained drug-free in any petition for reinstatement. The board adopted the 
findings and conclusions of the panel, but modified the recommendation to add 
that in any petition for reinstatement, respondent must also show proof of full 
restitution to all parties found by a court to be entitled to restitution. 
__________________ 
 
Eagan, Wykoff & Healy Co., L.P.A., and Jack S. Healy; Rendigs, Fry, Kiely 
& Dennis, L.L.P., and Thomas S. Shore, Jr., for relator. 
 
John H. Burlew, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  In 
determining the proper sanction, we have held that absent mitigating 
circumstances, the appropriate sanction for misappropriation of client funds is 
disbarment.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Knowlton (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 76, 78, 689 
N.E.2d 538, 539.  In Miami Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hallows (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 75, 
77, 676 N.E.2d 517, 519, and Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 37, 577 N.E.2d 1075, we found mitigating circumstances, which included 
sincere attempts to overcome the alcohol and cocaine addictions that contributed 
to the misappropriation of client funds, sufficient to warrant indefinite suspension 
rather than disbarment. 
 
Similarly, we recently held that an attorney’s federal bank fraud conviction 
for misappropriating client funds totaling $230,900 and placing them in his 
account, which violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), and (6), and 9-102(A) (preserving 
identity of funds of a client), warranted an indefinite suspension because of 
 
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mitigating evidence that included the attorney’s attendance at alcohol treatment 
programs.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Sanborn (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 282, 690 
N.E.2d 1272. 
 
Consistent with the foregoing cases, we are persuaded that an indefinite 
suspension is the appropriate sanction here.  Respondent is hereby indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law in Ohio, and he is given credit for time served 
since his July 9, 1997 interim suspension.  Any petition for reinstatement must 
establish that respondent has remained drug-free and that he has made full 
restitution to all parties found by a court to be entitled to restitution.  Costs taxed 
to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.