Title: Commonwealth v. Lys

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12476 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRIST O. LYS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 5, 2018. - November 19, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance of 
counsel, New trial.  Constitutional Law, Plea, Assistance 
of counsel.  Due Process of Law, Plea, Assistance of 
counsel.  Alien. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Marlborough Division 
of the District Court Department on January 18, 2012. 
 
 
A motion for a new trial was heard by Robert G. Harbour, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick N. Long for the defendant. 
 
Gabriel Pell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Berkshire District & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant pleaded guilty in the District 
Court to violating multiple controlled substances laws.  He was 
2 
 
 
a lawful permanent resident who had emigrated from Haiti, and 
his plea rendered him deportable.1  The Federal government 
detained the defendant and initiated deportation proceedings 
against him.  The defendant then filed a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001), arguing that he had received ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  The defendant claimed, inter alia, that he would 
not have pleaded guilty if his counsel had properly advised him 
about the plea's immigration consequences.  The motion judge, 
who was also the plea judge, denied the motion after a 
nonevidentiary hearing.  The defendant appealed, and the Appeals 
Court affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Lys, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 718, 726 
(2017).  We allowed the defendant's application for further 
appellate review. 
 
In his written decision, the judge found that plea 
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient but that 
the deficient performance did not prejudice the defendant.  The 
Commonwealth now contends that the judge's finding of deficient 
                     
 
1 The defendant was deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (making aliens convicted of 
most controlled substances laws deportable) and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (making aliens convicted of 
"aggravated felony" deportable).  See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 
460 Mass. 30, 32 n.2, 46 (2011).  His aggravated felony 
conviction also precluded him from applying to the United States 
Attorney General for relief.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012). 
3 
 
 
performance was erroneous.2  The defendant contends that the 
judge erroneously found a lack of prejudice.  We do not reach 
the merits of either issue.  Rather, we conclude that the judge 
(1) might have failed to recognize his discretion to credit or 
discredit the defendant's affidavits as they pertained to plea 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance, even in the absence 
of an affidavit from plea counsel; and (2) failed to make 
factual findings about whether special circumstances relevant to 
the prejudice inquiry existed.  Therefore, we vacate the denial 
of the motion for a new trial and remand the case to the 
District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 
 
Background.  1.  Plea.  According to the prosecutor's 
summary of the Commonwealth's allegations at the plea hearing 
and other undisputed record materials, the defendant sold 
marijuana and cocaine to an undercover police officer on various 
occasions, often in a school zone; he offered to sell marijuana 
                     
 
2 Although the Commonwealth contests the judge's finding of 
deficiency before this court, it did not contest that finding 
before the Appeals Court.  The defendant argues that we should, 
therefore, not consider the issue.  We disagree.  Although the 
Appeals Court accepted the judge's deficiency finding "for 
purposes of [its] analysis," the court critiqued the judge's 
reasoning.  Commonwealth v. Lys, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 718, 721 
(2017).  Because the deficiency finding "was considered in the 
Appeals Court, we will address the matter" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 Mass. 160, 171 (2014). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by several 
district attorneys. 
4 
 
 
and cocaine to the same undercover officer multiple times; and 
he conspired to violate controlled substances laws when he 
distributed the cocaine. 
 
The defendant faced a twenty-eight-count complaint.  He 
ultimately pleaded guilty to three counts of distributing 
marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a); two counts of distributing 
cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a), as amended through St. 2010, 
c. 256, § 68; two counts of conspiring to violate controlled 
substances laws, G. L. c. 274, § 7; thirteen counts of 
attempting to distribute a class D substance, G. L. c. 274, § 6; 
and two counts of attempting to distribute a class B substance, 
G. L. c. 274, § 6.  The judge sentenced the defendant to 
eighteen months in a house of correction and a term of 
probation. 
 
As part of the plea, the Commonwealth entered nolle 
prosequis with respect to four counts of violating a controlled 
substances law near a school, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, as amended 
through St. 2010, c. 256, § 72; and dismissed two counts of 
possessing cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 34, as amended through St. 
2008, c. 387, § 5.  Each school zone charge would have carried a 
mandatory minimum sentence of two years in a jail or house of 
correction, from and after the defendant's sentences on the 
underlying drug crimes. 
5 
 
 
 
2.  Motion for new trial.  The defendant filed two 
affidavits in support of his motion for a new trial, both of 
which stated that plea counsel had not warned him about the 
plea's immigration consequences.  Neither plea counsel nor 
motion counsel submitted affidavits.4  The judge observed in his 
decision that plea counsel did not testify or provide an 
affidavit and declared that, "[f]aced with this paucity of 
factual information," "the [c]ourt feels strongly that it must 
give the [d]efendant's and his [motion] [a]ttorney's 
[a]ffidavits full credit."5  Accordingly, the judge found that 
plea counsel had performed deficiently.  But the judge went on 
to find that this deficient performance did not prejudice the 
defendant.  Without making any factual findings, he concluded 
that "the court does not find the presence of any special 
circumstances" suggesting that the defendant would have placed 
particular emphasis on immigration consequences when deciding 
whether to plead guilty. 
                     
 
4  At the nonevidentiary motion hearing, motion counsel 
provided unsworn testimony that she had asked plea counsel to 
testify or aver as to whether he had discussed the plea's 
immigration consequences with the defendant.  According to 
motion counsel, plea counsel refused her request. 
 
 
5 There is no affidavit from the defendant's motion attorney 
in the record.  The term "Attorney's Affidavit[]" in the judge's 
decision likely refers to the defendant's supplemental 
affidavit. 
6 
 
 
 
Discussion.  A motion for a new trial may be granted "if it 
appears that justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b).  We examine the granting or denial of a new trial motion 
"only to determine whether there has been a significant error of 
law or other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 
473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 
Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  We extend "substantial deference" to a 
motion judge who was also the plea judge.  Commonwealth v. 
Sylvain, 473 Mass. 832, 835 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 672 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 1001 (2003). 
 
1.  Performance.  "Both art. 12 of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution guarantee a right to the 
effective assistance of counsel."  Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 
Mass. 135, 138 (1989).  To provide effective representation 
under the Sixth Amendment, counsel must advise his or her 
clients about a guilty plea's "truly clear" deportation 
consequences.6  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369, 374 
(2010).  See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 424 (2013) 
                     
 
6 The defendant here brings a claim for ineffective 
assistance under only the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Because we find that remand is necessary under 
either the Sixth Amendment or art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, we once again "leave open the question of 
what differences, if any, exist between the two standards."  
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 256 n.3 (1985). 
7 
 
 
(Sylvain I), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016) (applying same rule 
under art. 12).  "Here, as in Padilla, the consequences of the 
defendant's plea were clear."  Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 
30, 46 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 180-
181 (2014). 
 
The judge found that the performance of the defendant's 
plea counsel was constitutionally deficient because plea counsel 
did not explain the plea's immigration consequences to the 
defendant.  We do not review this decision's merits.  Instead, 
we remand because the judge might not have recognized his 
discretion to credit or discredit the defendant's affidavits, 
even in the absence of an affidavit from plea counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lydon, 477 Mass. 1013, 1015 (2017) (remanding 
when "judge did not recognize his discretionary authority"); 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 728, 733 (2005) 
(remanding when judge "declin[ed] to exercise any discretion"). 
 
Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), a judge hearing a motion for a new trial must 
first decide whether the defendant's motion and affidavits 
present a "substantial issue."  In making this determination, a 
motion judge need not accept statements in the defendant's 
affidavits as true, even if the statements are undisputed.  
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 Mass. 398, 405 (2015).  Instead, a 
motion judge should consider "both the seriousness of the issue 
8 
 
 
itself and the adequacy of the defendant's showing on that 
issue."  Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 628 (2004).  
Although a defendant's motion and affidavits "need not prove the 
issue raised," to be adequate "they must at least contain 
sufficient credible information to cast doubt on the issue."  
Id. at 629. 
 
If a motion judge finds that the motion and affidavits do 
not present a substantial issue, then "[t]he judge may rule on a 
motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing."  Id. at 
628.  If a motion judge finds that they do present a substantial 
issue, then the judge must hold an evidentiary hearing.  Vaughn, 
471 Mass. at 404, quoting Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 
327, 334 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 840 (2016) ("Only when the 
motion and affidavits raise a 'substantial issue' is an 
evidentiary hearing required").  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 
Mass. 253, 257 (1981) (stating that if defendant's newly 
discovered evidence raises substantial issue, then "he is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing"). 
 
Here, the defendant claimed in his affidavits that his plea 
counsel did not explain to him the plea's immigration 
consequences.  "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
. . . readily qualifies as a serious issue."  Denis, 442 Mass. 
at 629.  The judge, therefore, needed to consider only the 
adequacy of the defendant's assertions when deciding whether the 
9 
 
 
defendant had raised a substantial issue.  It is unclear whether 
he did so.  After stating that plea counsel did not provide an 
affidavit or testify, the judge concluded that he "fe[lt] 
strongly that [he] must give the [d]efendant's and his [motion] 
[a]ttorney's [a]ffidavits full credit." 
 
A motion judge may consider the absence of an affidavit 
from allegedly ineffective counsel in the adequacy analysis.  
But this failure need not create an inference that the 
defendant's affidavit must be credited, as the judge here 
suggested.7  Indeed, a motion judge in some circumstances may 
infer that the absence of an affidavit from prior counsel makes 
the statements in the defendant's affidavit less likely to be 
true.  See Vaughn, 471 Mass. at 405, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 354 (2004) ("the judge may take into 
account the suspicious failure to provide pertinent information 
from an expected and available source").  But see Commonwealth 
v. Martinez, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 551 (2014) (lack of 
affidavit from trial counsel does not, "by itself, defeat[] a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel" when "successor 
                     
 
7 The defendant contends that the judge recognized his 
discretion to credit or discredit the defendant's affidavits and 
nonetheless credited them.  But the decision's plain language 
makes it equally plausible that the judge felt legally compelled 
to fully credit the defendant's affidavits absent testimony from 
plea counsel. 
10 
 
 
counsel filed affidavits attesting to plea counsel's lack of 
cooperation"). 
 
Because the judge might have failed to recognize his 
discretion to credit or discredit the defendant's affidavits in 
the absence of an affidavit from plea counsel, we remand "with 
instructions to provide findings relating to the issue of [plea 
counsel's deficient performance] and, if necessary, to hold an 
additional evidentiary hearing . . . for that purpose."  Sylvain 
I, 466 Mass. at 439.  We emphasize that the judge on remand 
should "provide some reasons for accepting or rejecting a 
particular affidavit . . . to assist the appellate court in 
understanding whether the judge acted within his or her 
discretion."  Vaughn, 471 Mass. at 405. 
 
2.  Prejudice.  To show prejudice when seeking to withdraw 
a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance, a 
defendant must provide sufficient "credible facts" to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that a reasonable person in 
the defendant's circumstances would have gone to trial if given 
constitutionally effective advice.  Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 55.  
See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 59 (1985).  "At a minimum, this means that the defendant 
must aver that to be the case."  Clarke, supra, citing Hill, 
supra at 60.  The defendant here stated in his affidavits that 
he would have pursued other options, including going to trial, 
11 
 
 
had he known about his plea's immigration consequences.  
Therefore, he satisfied this baseline requirement for raising an 
issue of prejudice. 
 
After establishing that a defendant has satisfied this 
baseline requirement, a judge should proceed in two steps.  The 
first step is to determine whether the defendant has shown "that 
a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 
under the circumstances."  Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47, quoting 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.  To prove rationality, the defendant 
bears the "substantial burden" of showing at least one of the 
following:  (1) an available, substantial ground of defense that 
the defendant would have pursued if given proper advice about 
the plea's dire immigration consequences; (2) a reasonable 
probability that the defendant could have negotiated a plea 
bargain that did not include those dire immigration 
consequences; or (3) special circumstances supporting the 
conclusion that the defendant "placed, or would have placed, 
particular emphasis on immigration consequences in deciding 
whether to plead guilty."  Clarke, supra at 47-48. 
 
If the defendant fails to establish any of these three 
Clarke factors, then the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
must fail for lack of prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Lastowski, 
478 Mass. 572, 577-579; Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-49.  If the 
defendant does establish at least one of the Clarke factors, 
12 
 
 
then the judge must move to the second step and evaluate 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a 
reasonable probability that a reasonable person in the 
defendant's circumstances would have gone to trial if given 
constitutionally effective advice.  See Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 
55, 59. 
 
The judge here found that the defendant did not establish 
any of the Clarke factors.  Although the defendant argued before 
the Appeals Court that the judge ruled improperly with regard to 
all three factors, before this court he focuses only on special 
circumstances.  Therefore, we address only that issue.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 27.1 (f), as amended, 441 Mass. 1601 (2004) ("If 
a new brief is filed [after further appellate review is 
granted], it will be considered in lieu of the Appeals Court 
brief").  See also Commonwealth v. Maguire, 476 Mass. 156, 156-
157 (2017). 
 
The judge found a lack of special circumstances without 
making any factual findings, stating only that "the court [did] 
not find the presence of any special circumstances" "despite the 
impassioned advocacy . . . regarding [the defendant's] history 
of abuse at the hands of his father and lack of family in his 
home [c]ountry."  As the Appeals Court observed, it is 
impossible to discern from this statement whether the judge 
disbelieved the defendant's affidavits as they pertained to the 
13 
 
 
special circumstances analysis or whether he decided that the 
defendant did not aver any facts that, even if believed, would 
qualify as special circumstances.  Lys, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 
725.  Therefore, as with the deficiency finding, we remand "with 
instructions to provide findings relating to the issue of 
[special circumstances] and, if necessary, to hold an additional 
evidentiary hearing . . . for that purpose."  Sylvain I, 466 
Mass. at 439. 
 
We also provide guidance for the judge on remand with 
regard to the special circumstances analysis.  In evaluating 
whether the defendant has established the existence of special 
circumstances, a judge must consider collectively all of the 
factors supporting the conclusion that the defendant "placed, or 
would have placed, particular emphasis on immigration 
consequences in deciding whether to plead guilty."  Clarke, 460 
Mass. at 47-48.  In DeJesus, 468 Mass. at 183-184, for example, 
the court found that special circumstances existed based on the 
confluence of three factors:  the defendant "had been in the 
country since he was eleven years old, his family was in Boston, 
and he had maintained steady employment in the Boston area."  
See Commonwealth v. Cano, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 247-248 (2015) 
(finding that defendant raised substantial issue concerning 
"special circumstances" because he "ha[d] not lived in Colombia 
since he moved to the United States in 1979, at age twelve"; was 
14 
 
 
"largely dependent on his family members in the United States 
for many of the basic requirements of daily life"; and 
"depend[ed] to a significant extent on governmental benefits to 
meet his financial needs"); Martinez, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 552-
553 (remanding for consideration of prejudice where defendant 
was "a United States resident since early childhood, employed 
with a family, including a common-law wife and three children 
who were all United States citizens"). 
 
Similarly, in Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968-
1969 (2017), the United States Supreme Court considered a 
confluence of factors in reversing the denial of the defendant's 
motion to vacate his guilty plea.  Although the Supreme Court 
did not use our parlance of "special circumstances," it noted 
that the defendant had not visited his birth country since 
moving to the United States at the age of thirteen, "had lived 
in the United States for nearly three decades, had established 
two businesses in Tennessee, and was the only family member in 
the United States who could care for his elderly parents."  Id. 
at 1962, 1968.  Cf. United States v. Gonzales, 884 F.3d 457, 
461-463 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (vacating defendant's guilty 
plea due to court's "failure to inform [defendant] of the 
immigration consequences of his plea" where defendant came to 
United States as child, lived in New York City near his children 
and their mothers for most of his life, had family in New York 
15 
 
 
City area, and had siblings serving in United States military); 
United States v. Ruiz, 548 Fed. Appx. 410, 411-412 (9th Cir. 
2013) (finding that "proper legal advice of which [defendant] 
was deprived could have at least plausibly motivated a 
reasonable person in her position not to have pled guilty" where 
defendant "ha[d] longstanding ties to the United States, having 
arrived here at the age of seven, having lived here for [thirty] 
years and having two U.S.-born children"). 
 
Here, the relevant factors as alleged during the motion 
hearing and in the defendant's affidavits are that the defendant 
moved to the United States from Haiti at the age of seven and 
has not since returned; that the defendant has friends, family, 
and a girlfriend in the United States; that the defendant has 
been unable to locate any family members in Haiti since the 
earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010; that the 
defendant is not proficient in the language of Creole or French; 
and that the defendant was diagnosed with a learning disability 
when he was young. 
 
A further relevant circumstance not discussed at the motion 
hearing is that at the time of the defendant's plea, Haitian 
nationals in the United States were granted temporary protected 
status (TPS) because of the earthquake.  See 75 Fed. Reg. 3476 
(2010) (designating Haiti for TPS); 76 Fed. Reg. 29,000 (2011) 
(extending Haiti's TPS through January 22, 2013).  The court may 
16 
 
 
take judicial notice of this designation by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security because notice of the designation was 
published in the Federal Register.  See Ralston v. Commissioner 
of Agric., 334 Mass. 51, 53 (1956) ("The contents of the Federal 
Register are the subject of judicial notice by this court").  
See also 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012) ("The contents of the Federal 
Register shall be judicially noticed . . .").  Cf. Mass. G. 
Evid. § 202(b) (2018) ("A court may take judicial notice of the 
contents of Federal regulations . . . not brought to its 
attention . . ."). 
 
If the judge were to find that all of these alleged factors 
existed at the time of the defendant's plea, then it would be an 
abuse of discretion to find that these factors, considered 
collectively, failed to constitute special circumstances.  A 
finding of special circumstances requires only a finding that 
the defendant "placed, or would have placed, particular emphasis 
on immigration consequences in deciding whether to plead 
guilty."  Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48.  It is hard to imagine any 
reasonable person who would not, in light of this confluence of 
factors, place "particular emphasis on immigration consequences 
in deciding whether to plead guilty."  Id. 
 
This is not to say that the judge must find prejudice if he 
or she finds that the above-listed factors existed at the time 
of the defendant's plea.  The existence of special circumstances 
17 
 
 
does not automatically result in prejudice.  Rather, "[t]he 
prejudice determination rests on the totality of the 
circumstances, in which special circumstances regarding 
immigration consequences should be given substantial weight."  
Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 59.  See Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966, 1968. 
 
We do not provide an exhaustive list of the particular 
factors that the judge should consider on remand if he or she 
reaches this totality of the circumstances analysis.  We 
emphasize that the judge may consider any factor that bears on 
the ultimate question of prejudice:  whether there is a 
reasonable probability that a reasonable person in the 
defendant's circumstances would have gone to trial if given 
constitutionally effective advice.  In answering this question, 
the judge should remember that, for some defendants, "even a 
small chance of acquittal may be sufficient to show that it was 
reasonably probable that a person in the position of the 
defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to 
trial."  Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 63.  This is because "[t]he 
decision whether to plead guilty . . . involves assessing the 
respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea.  
When those consequences are, from the defendant's perspective, 
18 
 
 
similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial may 
look attractive" (citation omitted).  Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966.8 
 
We reaffirm the Lavrinenko case's nonexhaustive list of 
potential factors:  the defendant's assessment of success at 
trial; the risks of going to trial rather than pleading guilty, 
including "the risk that a conviction [at trial] would result in 
a sentence at or close to the 'maximum allowable sentence'" or 
"the risk that a conviction at trial would result in a mandatory 
minimum sentence substantially more severe than the sentence 
offered through a guilty plea to a lesser charge"; whether 
conviction at trial would result in a house of correction 
sentence or a lengthy State prison sentence; and the defendant's 
deportability on acquittal.9  Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 59 n.20, 
                     
 
8 In Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1966-1967 
(2017), the United States Supreme Court found prejudice based on 
the "dire" immigration consequences of a guilty plea, where the 
defendant said, inter alia, that "he . . . would have rejected 
any plea leading to deportation -- even if it shaved off prison 
time -- in favor of throwing a 'Hail Mary' at trial."  In 
football, a "Hail Mary" is a long pass into the end zone with 
little time remaining.  The chance of success is meager, but not 
zero.  Doug Flutie did, after all, complete such a pass to 
secure a victory for Boston College in 1984. 
 
 
9 We recognize that the parties have briefed the 
applicability of various special circumstances and totality 
factors to the defendant in this case.  We also recognize that 
the Commonwealth has moved to (1) supplement the record with 
information relevant to the defendant's deportability on 
acquittal and (2) strike a portion of the defendant's brief 
relevant to the defendant's lack of ties with Haiti.  Although 
we do not reach these issues, they may be addressed on remand. 
19 
 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 365 (2015).  We 
also observe that the Clarke factors discussed supra are 
relevant to the totality analysis.  See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-
48.  But we emphasize that, "[u]ltimately, a defendant's 
decision to tender a guilty plea is a unique, individualized 
decision, and the relevant factors and their relative weight 
will differ from one case to the next."  Lavrinenko, supra, 
quoting Roberts, supra at 365-366. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial is vacated and the matter 
is remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.