Title: Curtis v. Highfill

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Goodwyn, Mims, Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, and Chafin, JJ., and Millette, S.J. 
 
SHEA CURTIS, ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF MARY JO CURTIS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 190117 
JUSTICE TERESA M. CHAFIN 
 
 
 
APRIL 9, 2020 
CHRISTOPHER HIGHFILL, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Kimberly A. Irving, Judge 
 
 
 
In this wrongful death case, we must determine whether the Circuit Court of Prince 
William County erred by striking the evidence supporting a claim for punitive damages against a 
physician who repeatedly prescribed narcotic pain medication to a patient.  Under the particular 
factual scenario presented, we reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to strike the plaintiff’s 
evidence, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and 
accord the plaintiff the benefit of any inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.  See 
Green v. Ingram, 269 Va. 281, 290 (2005). 
 
On March 6, 2011, Mary Jo Curtis broke her ankle.  Dr. Christopher Highfill examined 
Curtis and performed an emergency surgery to stabilize and repair her ankle.  Curtis’ ankle 
fracture did not heal properly.  Consequently, Highfill performed a second surgery on Curtis’ 
ankle on September 2, 2011.  Highfill performed a third surgery to remove “hardware” from 
Curtis’ ankle on November 16, 2012. 
 
2 
 
After the first surgery, Highfill prescribed Percocet to alleviate Curtis’ pain.  Over the 
next 40 months, Highfill wrote Curtis 144 prescriptions for Percocet.  Highfill generally 
prescribed between 40 and 60 five-milligram Percocet pills to Curtis on a weekly basis.  
Throughout the course of Curtis’ treatment, Highfill prescribed over 7,000 Percocet pills to 
Curtis. 
 
Percocet is a drug consisting of acetaminophen and oxycodone, a controlled narcotic 
substance.  Highfill and Curtis discussed the risks associated with the long-term use of Percocet 
on several occasions.  Significantly, Highfill knew that Curtis had an increased risk of 
developing an addiction to narcotic pain medication due to her history of bipolar disorder and 
alcohol use.1 
 
Despite Curtis’ increased risk of addiction, Highfill never attempted to treat her pain with 
a nonnarcotic medication.  Highfill and Curtis discussed lowering her Percocet dosage, but 
Curtis’ dosage remained fairly constant over the course of her treatment.  Curtis called Highfill’s 
office each week and requested a refill of her Percocet prescription, and Highfill wrote Curtis a 
new prescription after reviewing notes from his office staff and Curtis’ chart.  Curtis then came 
to Highfill’s office and picked up her prescription from a staff member. 
 
Highfill acknowledged that it was important to monitor patients who were taking 
narcotics for signs of abuse and addiction.  However, Highfill did not examine Curtis during the 
last fourteen months of her life.  Highfill examined Curtis for the last time on April 23, 2013.  
Nevertheless, he continued to write Curtis prescriptions for Percocet.  Between Curtis’ last 
                                                 
 
1 Although Highfill testified that he was unaware that Curtis was “abusing” alcohol, his 
office file contained medical records indicating that Curtis consumed vodka daily.  Furthermore, 
Highfill discussed Curtis’ alcohol use with her on multiple occasions. 
 
3 
examination on April 23, 2013, and her death on June 21, 2014, Highfill wrote Curtis 52 
prescriptions for approximately 2,400 Percocet pills. 
When Curtis requested a new Percocet prescription on March 17, 2014, a staff member 
wrote a note to Highfill explaining that Curtis had not been examined since April 23, 2013.  
Despite the note, Highfill wrote Curtis a new prescription for Percocet without examining her or 
scheduling a future examination.  While Highfill testified that he did not see the note from the 
staff member, he acknowledged that he had Curtis’ “chart in [his] hand” when he wrote the 
March 17, 2014, prescription. 
 
Highfill wrote Curtis 15 Percocet prescriptions after March 17, 2014.  Notably, Highfill 
wrote Curtis prescriptions for 40 five-milligram Percocet pills on both May 2, 2014, and May 5, 
2014.  Thus, Highfill prescribed 80 five-milligram Percocet pills to Curtis over a four-day 
period.  Highfill wrote Curtis’ last Percocet prescription on June 16, 2014.  Curtis picked up the 
prescription from Highfill’s office on June 19, 2014, and she was found dead in her home two 
days later.  Curtis’ autopsy indicated that her death was caused by an accidental overdose of 
oxycodone, alcohol, and other prescription medications. 
 
On June 13, 2016, the administrator of Curtis’ estate filed a wrongful death action against 
Highfill and other parties.  The administrator maintained that Highfill breached the applicable 
standard of care in numerous ways, and that Curtis “became addicted to narcotic pain 
medication, suffered an accidental overdose[,] and died” as a “direct and proximate result” of 
Highfill’s negligence.  In addition to the other damages permitted in wrongful death actions, the 
administrator requested an award of punitive damages.  In support of her punitive damages 
claim, the administrator argued that Highfill’s 
actions of prescribing massive amounts of clinically unwarranted, 
highly addictive and dangerous narcotic pain medication to a 
 
4 
patient suffering from alcoholism . . . and bipolar disorder without 
ever examining, evaluating, monitoring or even seeing the patient 
for a period of approximately 14 months demonstrated a willful 
and wanton disregard and a conscious indifference for . . . Curtis’ 
health and safety. 
 
 
At trial, Highfill conceded that he “breached the applicable standard of care with respect 
to his care and treatment of . . . Curtis.”  Highfill, however, argued that his negligence was not 
the proximate cause of Curtis’ death.  Highfill moved to strike the administrator’s punitive 
damages claim at the close of her case-in-chief, arguing that a plaintiff must show “willful, 
wanton, and egregious conduct” in order to state a prima facie case for punitive damages.  The 
circuit court agreed with Highfill’s argument and granted the motion to strike the administrator’s 
punitive damages claim.2  This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, the administrator contends that the circuit court erred by granting Highfill’s 
motion to strike the punitive damages claim.  Based on the evidence presented during her case-
in-chief, the administrator maintains that a jury could have concluded that Highfill’s actions 
constituted a “willful and wanton” disregard for Curtis’ health and safety.  Under the specific 
circumstances of this case, we agree that the administrator’s punitive damages claim should have 
been submitted to the jury. 
 
Code § 8.01-52 addresses the damages that are available to a plaintiff in a wrongful death 
action.  Pursuant to Code § 8.01-52(5), punitive damages “may be recovered for willful or 
wanton conduct, or such recklessness as evinces a conscious disregard for the safety of others.” 
                                                 
2 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the administrator on the remainder of the 
wrongful death claim at the conclusion of the trial. 
 
5 
This Court has addressed the definitions of “willful and wanton conduct” or “willful and 
wanton negligence” in numerous cases.  We have previously explained that “[w]illful and 
wanton negligence is acting consciously in disregard of another person’s rights or acting with 
reckless indifference to the consequences, with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of 
existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to another.”  
Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 581 (1990) (quoting Griffin v. Shively, 227 
Va. 317, 321 (1984)). 
“Willful and wanton negligence, unlike gross or ordinary negligence, requires an actual 
or constructive consciousness that injury will result from the act done or omitted.”  Alfonso v. 
Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 545 (1999).  “The hallmark of this species of tortious conduct is the 
defendant’s consciousness of his act, his awareness of the dangers or probable consequences, and 
his reckless decision to proceed notwithstanding that awareness.”  Infant C., 239 Va. at 581. 
In order that one may be held guilty of willful or wanton conduct, 
it must be shown that he was conscious of his conduct, and 
conscious, from his knowledge of existing conditions, that injury 
would likely or probably result from his conduct, and that with 
reckless indifference to consequences he consciously and 
intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty 
which produced the injurious result. 
 
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 660 (1934)). 
“Ill will is not a necessary element” of willful and wanton conduct.  Id.; see also Green, 
269 Va. at 292.  A tortfeasor may be guilty of willful and wanton conduct when he “intends his 
act, but not the resulting harm.”  Infant C., 239 Va. at 582.  If a tortfeasor “realizes or, from facts 
which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result” from his 
actions, the tortfeasor may be found to have acted in a willful and wanton or reckless manner 
 
6 
“even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless.”  Id. at 582-83 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. f, at 590 (1965)). 
When a defendant moves to strike a plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, the trial court 
must determine “whether the plaintiff’s evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, was 
sufficient to permit the jury to find that [the defendant] was so reckless or negligent as to evince 
a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.”  Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448, 453 (1978).  
“Each case raising an issue of willful and wanton negligence must be evaluated on its own facts, 
and a defendant’s entire conduct must be considered in determining whether his actions or 
omissions present such a question for a jury’s determination.”  Alfonso, 257 Va. at 545.  “A trial 
court should resolve any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence in the plaintiff’s 
favor and should grant the motion only when it is conclusively apparent that [the] plaintiff has 
proven no cause of action against [the] defendant.”  Green, 269 Va. at 290 (alterations in 
original).  “If reasonable persons, upon the facts presented, could differ regarding whether the 
conduct in question was so willful and wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of 
others, ‘the trial court may not remove the issue of punitive damages from the jury’s 
consideration.’”  PGI, Inc. v. Rathe Productions, Inc., 265 Va. 334, 346 (2003) (quoting 
Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 315 (1993)). 
Upon considering the evidence presented in this case under our established standard of 
review, see Green, 269 Va. at 290, we conclude that the jury could reasonably have found that 
Highfill’s actions evinced a reckless disregard for Curtis’ wellbeing, had the administrator’s 
punitive damages claim been submitted for their consideration.  On the record here, the jury 
reasonably could have determined that Highfill consciously disregarded a known risk to Curtis’ 
 
7 
health and safety when he continued to write Curtis prescriptions for Percocet under the 
circumstances of this case. 
The evidence presented established that Highfill, a medical doctor, was conscious of the 
risks posed by the long-term use of narcotic pain medication.  Moreover, Highfill admitted at 
trial that he knew that there was an increased risk that Curtis would abuse or become addicted to 
such medication due to her bipolar disorder and history of alcohol use.  Highfill discussed the 
risks associated with the ongoing use of Percocet with Curtis on several occasions and he 
contemplated lowering her dosage of the medication.  Despite Curtis’ heightened risk of 
addiction, Highfill continued to write Curtis prescriptions for Percocet for over three years 
without attempting to treat her pain with a nonnarcotic medication. 
Highfill acknowledged that a patient taking narcotic pain medication for an extended 
period of time needed to be monitored for signs of drug abuse and addiction.  Highfill, however, 
did not examine Curtis during the last 14 months of her life.  During this time period, Highfill 
wrote Curtis 52 prescriptions for Percocet.  While Highfill continued to write Percocet 
prescriptions for Curtis, he failed to examine her to ensure that she was not abusing the 
prescribed medication. 
Importantly, the evidence presented in this case could have supported the inference that 
Highfill wrote Curtis multiple prescriptions for Percocet when he knew that he had not regularly 
examined Curtis for signs of abuse or addiction.  On March 17, 2014, one of Highfill’s staff 
members wrote a note informing Highfill that he had not examined Curtis since April 23, 2013.  
Highfill wrote another Percocet prescription for Curtis on that day, notwithstanding the note 
attached to the request for the prescription.  Highfill wrote 15 additional Percocet prescriptions 
for Curtis after March 17, 2014. 
 
8 
Although Highfill testified that he never saw the note from his staff member, the jury 
could have rejected this testimony.  See, e.g., Shumate v. Mitchell, 296 Va. 532, 551 (2018) 
(observing that “[t]he jury, as the sole judge of [a witness’] credibility, was entitled to reject h[is] 
testimony”) (quoting Gilliam v. Immel, 293 Va. 18, 25 (2017)).  Highfill wrote Curtis a 
prescription for Percocet on March 17, 2014, based on the request attached to the note at issue.  
Highfill also admitted at trial that he had Curtis’ “chart in [his] hand” when he wrote the March 
17, 2014, prescription.  Under these circumstances, the jury could have reasonably inferred that 
Highfill consciously disregarded the note when he wrote the March 17, 2014 prescription. 
 
We acknowledge that the evidence presented in this case did not in any way establish that 
Highfill had “ill will” toward Curtis or that he intended her to suffer any harm.  As previously 
explained, however, “ill will” is not a required element of the willful and wanton conduct 
underlying a claim for punitive damages.  See Infant C., 239 Va. at 581; Green, 269 Va. at 292.  
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably determined that: (1) 
Highfill was conscious of the risks associated with the long-term use of Percocet and Curtis’ 
increased risk of drug abuse and addiction, and (2) Highfill consciously disregarded those risks 
when he continued to prescribe Percocet to Curtis while knowing that he had not examined her 
for signs of abuse or addiction for a significant period of time.  Accordingly, the administrator’s 
punitive damages claim should have been submitted to the jury. 
While reasonable juries might ultimately reach different conclusions concerning the 
propriety of an award of punitive damages under these particular circumstances, we conclude 
that the circuit court erred by granting Highfill’s motion to strike the evidence pertaining to the 
administrator’s claim for punitive damages. 
 
 
9 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s decision striking the evidence 
regarding the administrator’s claim for punitive damages and remand this case to the circuit court 
for a new trial pertaining to the administrator’s punitive damages claim, should the parties be so 
advised. 
Reversed and remanded.