Title: LADONNA J. CAROTHERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LADONNA J. CAROTHERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 58185 P.3d 1Case Number: S-07-0240Decided: 05/29/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
LADONNA 
J. CAROTHERS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Nicholas 
H. Carter and Miles A. Jacoby of The Nick Carter Law Firm, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Carter.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle after she caused the death of a 
ten-year-old girl in a motor vehicle collision in Gillette, Wyoming.  
The conviction was premised on the dual theories of driving with a 
blood-alcohol concentration in excess of 0.08%, and driving while under the 
influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely 
driving.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b) (LexisNexis 2007) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2007).  In this appeal, the appellant raises 
issues concerning jury selection, venue, prosecutorial misconduct, and the 
presentence investigation report (PSI).  
We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it did not excuse certain jurors for 
cause?

 
 
           
2.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion for a change of 
venue?

 
 
           
3.   Did certain 
statements by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument constitute plain 
error?

 
 
           
4.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion to strike from 
the PSI the recommendations of the probation and parole agent who prepared 
it?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The details of 
this tragic incident are not especially relevant to a determination of the 
issues presented.  Suffice it to say 
that on October 17, 2006, the appellant caused a multi-vehicle collision that 
killed ten-year-old Madison Scalzo.  The appellant, who had a blood-alcohol 
concentration in excess of 0.08% at the time, lost control of her vehicle while 
talking on her cellular phone and crashed into a parked car.  The appellant admitted that she was also 
taking prescription medications that were not to be consumed with alcohol.  Her unsuccessful trial defense was the 
collision was caused by "pedal error," rather than by alcohol 
use.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion

when it 
did not excuse certain jurors for cause?

 
 
[¶4]      Prospective 
jurors are questioned during the voir 
dire process for the sole purpose of selecting "a panel of jurors who will 
fairly and impartially hear the evidence and render a just verdict."1  W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(1).  For purposes of the present discussion, 
jurors may be excused "for cause" if they are biased or prejudiced against the 
defendant, or have formed or expressed an opinion as to guilt.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-105(a)(ii) and 
(b) (LexisNexis 2007); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-11-203(a)(vi) and (vii) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
            
The test we apply to determine if a prospective juror should be dismissed 
for cause is whether or not that juror would be able to render a fair and 
impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial and the court's 
instructions.  Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 635 
(Wyo. 1996) (citing Munoz v. State, 849 P.2d 1299, 1302 
(Wyo. 
1993)).  The question of whether a 
juror is biased is a question of fact reserved for the trial court.  Id.; Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1000 
(Wyo. 1984) [overruled in part on other grounds by Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998)].  We review the trial court's decision for 
an abuse of discretion.  Kerns, 920 P.2d  at 635; Munoz, 849 P.2d  at 
1302.

 
 

Klahn v. 
State, 2004 
WY 94, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d 472, 478 (Wyo. 2004).  
We defer to the judgment of the district court because it can personally 
observe the demeanor of the jurors and the tenor of their responses.  Schwenke v. State, 768 P.2d 1031, 1033 
(Wyo. 1989); Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1041 
(Wyo. 
1986).  Even where a prospective 
juror has previously formed or stated an opinion as to the defendant's guilt, 
the ultimate question is whether the juror can set aside that opinion and 
impartially determine the case based upon the evidence.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-106 (LexisNexis 2007); Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 23, 99 P.3d 928, 939 (Wyo. 2004); Klahn, 
2004 WY 94, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d  at 479; Sides 
v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 231 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant 
contends that the district court acted arbitrarily in the instant case by 
excusing some jurors, but seating others, when all gave similar responses when 
asked if they had formed an opinion as to the appellant's guilt.  There were six jurors, three of whom 
were excused and three of whom were not, that the appellant finds particularly 
troubling.  Because it is necessary 
to examine the questions and answers in full context when examining allegations 
of bias, we will set forth the challenged jurors' voir dire statements in detail, 
beginning with their initial responses to questions posed in regard to opinions 
they may have formulated.  See Schwenke, 768 P.2d  at 1034.  So as not to call undue attention to the 
jurors, we will identify the three excused jurors as Mr. W., Ms. R., and Ms. E., 
and the three non-excused jurors as Mr. C., Ms. B., and Ms. 
C.:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . .

 
 
            
Do any of you have any knowledge about those events and that collision 
that you bring with you to the courtroom today?  And if you'd hold up your hands for just 
a minute and keep them up I'll visit with you one at a 
time.

 
 
            
Mr. [W.]?

 
 
MR. 
[W.]:  Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  The information that you have did it 
come from firsthand knowledge or individuals involved in those 
events?

 
 
MR. 
[W.]:  No.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Did it come from the 
newspaper?

 
 
MR. 
[W.]:  Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Would you be able to set aside that 
information and base any decision that you make in this case on what you hear in 
the courtroom?

 
 
MR. 
[W.]:  No.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . .

 
 
            
Is there anybody  Ms. [R.], did you have your hand 
up?

 
 
MS. 
[R.]:  Yeah, I did.  I read about it in the newspaper and my 
daughter was friends with the deceased and I heard a lot.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  From that information have you 

 
 
MS. 
[R.]:  I don't think I can be 
fair.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . .  Anybody else?  Okay, I'm going to start 
here.

 
 
MS. 
[E.]:  I read it in the 
paper.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  All right.  Did you receive any information other 
than what you read?

 
 
MS. 
[E.]:  No.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Have you formulated an opinion based on 
that?

 
 
MS. 
[E.]:  Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Would you be able to set that 
aside?  That was No. 
1.

 
 
MS. 
[E.]:  Yes.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  All right.

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  I've read like everybody else 
has the stuff that was in the paper.  
I do have two kids that do go to WagonwheelSchool that bring me some other 
information that is relevant.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Did the information in this paper that 
you read cause you to formulate an opinion about the facts in this 
case?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  I'm afraid I probably would 
be pretty strong sided.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  . . . .  Ms. [B.]?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  I read about it in the 
newspaper.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Did you formulate any opinions about it 
after reading it in the newspaper?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Would you be able to set aside those 
opinions and base your opinion on what you hear in the court 
room?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  I don't know.  I probably could but I'm just not 
sure.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Ms. [C.]?

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  Read about it in the 
paper.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Did you formulate any opinions after 
reading it?

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Would you be able to set aside those 
opinions and that information and render a verdict on what you hear in the 
courtroom?

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  I can't honestly say that I 
would.

 
 
[¶6]      It is these 
passages upon which the appellant focuses in contending that the district court 
was arbitrary in excusing some, but not all, of these jurors.  There was, however, additional 
questioning that helped the district court analyze the jurors' ability to set 
aside any preconceived opinions:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Would you be able to set aside those 
feelings and that information and render a verdict based upon what you hear in 
the courtroom if you're selected as a juror?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  Yes, I believe I could.  I was in a situation five or six years 
ago that was kind of one-sided and you know I knew it, both sides.  I knew the people to both sides and I 
feel it wasn't fair to the other people involved.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Do you come into the case 
as a potential juror with an opinion as to my client's 
guilt?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  I guess, 
yeah.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Okay.  And what is that 
opinion?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  Well, I guess  my guess is 
that the woman  I have the feeling that what if that was my child.  Maybe I didn't understand your 
question.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  And I understand 
everybody would be upset about the death of a young child but the question is do 
you, would you take to the jury box, if you were selected as a juror, with an 
opinion as to my client's guilt as to these charges before you heard any 
evidence?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  No, I don't believe I 
would.  I would try to listen to the 
whole case.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Okay.  When you say try, would you follow the 
law that says you must presume her innocent and you must acquit if the State 
does not prove their case?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  Yes, I believe 
so.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Would you feel any 
pressure to convict my client based on your children or your knowledge of the 
case?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  That's a 
possibility.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Okay.  What kind of possibility, if you could 
explain that to the court.

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  I'm not a good speaker but I 
don't know, I guess I would have to view all sides of the, both sides of the 
case.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Do you think that the 
defendant would have to prove her innocence to you?

 
 
Mr. 
[C.]:  Yes.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Okay.  I have no further questions, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Mr. [C.], if the law 
requires the State to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt and that's the 
law and not the defendant proving innocence, could you follow the law that's 
given to you in the case?

 
 
MR. 
[C.]:  To the best of my knowledge, 
yes.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Even though it's against 
what you just said in your last answer, you would want her to prove her 
innocence?  It's not her obligation, 
it's the State's obligation to prove her guilt.  You would have to follow the law.  You would want to see her prove her 
innocence?

 
 
Mr. 
[C.]:  Yes, I would follow the 
law.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Would you be able to set that 
information aside and render a verdict only on what you hear in the 
courtroom?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Was there anything else about the case 
or information that you bring into the courtroom that causes you concern about 
serving as a juror?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  No.  There's always two sides to every story 
and a person should listen to both sides.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  I don't have any other questions.  Thank you, Judge.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  When you say  did you 
say that you have formed an opinion?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  I have formed an opinion but 
I really do need to listen to the other side.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  And what opinion is 
that?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  I just really had a hard time 
with the accident and her drinking but I'm willing to listen to her side of the 
story as well.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Let me ask you this.  Do you have such an opinion that if you 
were on trial you'd want you to sit on the jury?

 
 
Ms. 
[B.]:  No.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  And why is 
that?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  Because my opinion could be 
swayed either way.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Well, do you understand 
the concept as to, about presumption of innocence?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  Yes.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  And you would apply that 
to my client, the presumption of innocence, despite your previous 
opinion?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  Yes.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Do you think that you can 
give my client a fair trial?

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  I can sure try.  That's all I can say, I can sure 
try.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Well, I don't know if 
trying is good enough and I just want you to look into your heart as to whether 
you can sit as a juror and give my client a fair trial.

 
 
MS. 
[B.]:  I can do 
that.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  What is the source of your 
not being able to say you can set that aside and just make a decision based  upon what's heard in the 
courtroom?

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  Because her blood alcohol was 
printed in the paper.  She did take 
prescription drugs and you're not supposed to mix the two.  You are given the information by the 
doctor when you pick up the prescription.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay.  But let's suppose your information in 
court was different than what was in the paper would you be able to make a 
decision based upon what you hear in court and ignore what you read in the paper 
if the paper was wrong?  I don't 
know what the paper said.  Could you 
ignore it and only make a decision based on what's heard in the courtroom and 
which may or may not match?

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  I can do my best.  Like I said, I can't guarantee that I 
would.  I have 
children.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, okay.  You know, I know it's a difficult 
question.

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  It is 
hard.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  But I just need to 
know.  If there was something that 
was different from the paper than what you heard in the courtroom, the question 
is whether you would base it only upon what was heard in the 
courtroom?

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  Yes.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Okay.  Earlier [the prosecutor] asked you to 
presume [the defendant] innocent given the knowledge that they 
have.

 
 
MS. 
[C.]:  And I stated from what I've 
read in the paper  like I said, I can't honestly give that answer, that I think 
she's innocent at this point.

 
 
[¶7]      In addition to 
this individual questioning during the State's portion of voir dire, the entire panel was also 
asked many broad questions during the defense voir dire, including:  whether they felt they could not afford 
the appellant the presumption of innocence; whether they felt they could not set 
aside any information about the case they had read in the newspaper; whether the 
death of a child made them feel that someone should be convicted; whether the 
facts of the case were so sad that they could not fairly consider the evidence; 
and whether they felt that they could not be fair jurors.  Not a single juror, including Mr. C., 
Ms. B., and Ms. C., answered in the affirmative.

 
 
[¶8]      One way to 
evaluate the exercise of a district court's discretion in relation to juror 
challenges for cause is to ask, first, whether the court exercised any 
discretion at all.  In other words, 
did the district court simply disregard bias challenges?  That was certainly not true in this 
case, where thirteen jurors were dismissed for cause, with twelve of the 
thirteen dismissed for expressing an inability to be fair to the appellant. 
 Moreover, when explaining its 
reasoning for leaving Mr. C., Ms. B., and Ms. C. on the panel, the district 
court clearly enunciated that its decision making as to individual jurors was 
based upon its perception as to whether they truly could or would set aside any 
improper influences.  These are the 
precise circumstances where, based upon a cold record, we are not going to 
substitute our judgment for that of the district court.  One can, perhaps, pick out a word, or a 
phrase, or a sentence here and there and contend that, given that answer, the 
juror should have been dismissed.  
But viewed in its totality, the voir dire is revealed to have been a 
careful and deliberative process, designed to ferret out the truth.  There was no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion when

it 
denied the appellant's motion for a change of 
venue?

 
 
[¶9]      Article 1, 
Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that criminal defendants are 
entitled "to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed."  In turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-7-102(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007) requires that 
"[e]very criminal case shall be tried in the county in which the indictment or 
offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided by law."  Finally, W.R.Cr.P. 18 provides that, 
"[e]xcept as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution 
shall take place in the county in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed . . . ."  Notwithstanding 
these mandates, W.R.Cr.P. 21(a) allows for trial elsewhere in the event of local 
prejudice that is too great for the defendant to receive a fair 
trial:

 
 
            
(a)  Prejudice within county. --  Upon timely motion of the defendant, the 
court shall transfer the proceeding as to that defendant to another county, but 
only if the court is satisfied that there exists within the county where the 
prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the 
defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that 
county.

 
 
[¶10]   At the end of the voir dire questioning, but before the 
exercise of peremptory challenges, the appellant filed a motion for change of 
venue, which motion contained the following listed arguments:  (1) so great a prejudice existed locally 
against the appellant that she could not receive a fair trial; (2) there had 
been extensive pre-trial publicity about the case in the local media; (3) denial 
of the appellant's earlier motion for a jury questionnaire prevented earlier 
discovery of the extent of the prejudice; (4) until voir dire, the appellant did not 
discover the depth of knowledge and the intensity of opinions that would be held 
by prospective jurors; (5) failure to change venue would violate the appellant's 
constitutional rights to a fair trial; and (6) it would be in the best interests 
of justice to change the venue of the trial.  During the hearing on the motion in 
chambers, defense counsel emphasized the large number of prospective jurors who 
held strong opinions about the appellant's guilt as a result of the pre-trial 
publicity.  The district court said 
the following in denying the motion:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  All right.  In considering the fact that we've got 
31 who say they can grant the defendant the presumption of innocence and despite 
some last minute cross questioning or final questioning by the defense, no one 
even seemed to raise an eyebrow or an arm with this last questioning.  I think we have a panel that can fairly 
hear this case and that's why I'm going to deny the motion for change of 
venue.

 
 
[¶11]   We have identified the following 
standard for reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for change of 
venue:

 
 
            
We review the denial of a motion for change of venue under an abuse of 
discretion standard, meaning we will not interfere with the trial court's 
decision unless the trial court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances.  Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 326-27 
(Wyo. 
1999).  The party moving for change 
of venue has the burden of showing actual prejudice in the minds of the jurors 
so great that a fair trial cannot be obtained.  Id. 
at 327.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
            
This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a change 
of venue should be granted after voir 
dire because of pre-trial publicity:  
"First, the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered; 
second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with 
the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination.'"  Sides [v. State], 963 P.2d [227,]  231 [(Wyo. 1998)] (quoting Murry [v. State], 713 P.2d [202,] 208 
[(Wyo. 
1986)]).

 
 

Urbigkit 
v. State, 2003 
WY 57, ¶¶ 26-27, 67 P.3d 1207, 1220 (Wyo. 2003).  Prejudice will not be presumed from mere 
local publicity; such presumption will rarely be invoked and only in extreme 
circumstances.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 13, 142 P.3d 1134, 1139 (Wyo. 2006).  To 
require venue to be changed, pre-trial publicity must be so inflammatory as 
practically to  dictate the 
community's opinion.  Id.

 
 
[¶12]   We will somewhat summarily affirm 
the district court's denial of this motion for change of venue, for two 
reasons:  first, the nature and 
extent of the pre-trial publicity has not been shown; and second, an impartial 
jury was seated with relatively little difficulty.  No newspaper articles, or other forms of 
pre-trial publicity were presented below, or in this Court, so we do not know 
that such publicity was anything but factual, and factual accounts are not, in 
and of themselves, prejudicial.  Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1289 
(Wyo. 
1979).  This case is similar to Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 208 
(Wyo. 1986), 
where we said the following:

 
 
            
It is to be expected that most of the jury panel will have heard about a 
sensational case, but there is no requirement that a juror be ignorant of the 
facts and issues involved in a case.  
Wilcox v. State, [670 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wyo. 1983)].  The totality of the circumstances must 
indicate the presence of improper prejudice.  Weddle v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 
(1980).  The question focuses on 
whether a fair jury was ultimately seated.  
Shaffer v. State, [640 P.2d 88, 103 (Wyo. 
1982)].  We recently reaffirmed 
these basic principles in Pote v. 
State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 617 
(1985).

 
 
[¶13]   A fair and impartial jury was 
seated in this case when the requisite number of jurors, despite the existence 
of apparently substantial pre-trial publicity, declared themselves able to set 
aside anything they had read or heard about the case, and able to set aside any 
opinions they had previously reached, and declared themselves able to determine 
the matter based solely upon the evidence they heard in court and the 
instructions given them by the judge.  
We affirm the denial of the motion for change of 
venue.

 
 
Did 
certain statements by the prosecutor

during 
rebuttal closing argument constitute plain error?

 
 
[¶14]   Although she did not object to them 
below, the appellant contends in this appeal that certain statements of the 
prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument constituted plain error.  Our standard of review in such instances 
is as follows:

 
 
The 
general rule in Wyoming is that a failure to interpose a 
timely objection to improper argument is treated as a waiver, unless the 
prosecutor's misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error, requiring 
reversal.  Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1115 
(Wyo. 
1992).  A plain error analysis 
requires the appellant to demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the abridgment of a 
substantial right of the party to his material prejudice.  Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 
(Wyo. 
1997).  We are reluctant to find 
plain error in closing arguments "lest the trial court becomes required to 
control argument because opposing counsel does not object."  James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 
(Wyo. 1994) (quoting Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 
(Wyo. 
1993)).

 
 
In 
analyzing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we consider the prosecutor's 
argument in the context in which it was made and with regard to the evidence 
produced at trial.  Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Although counsel are allowed 
great latitude in the argument of cases, argument must be kept within the 
evidence.  Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Statements calculated to 
inflame, prejudice or mislead the jury are not permitted.  Taul, 862 P.2d  at 
659.

 
 

Montoya 
v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 136 (Wyo. 1998).2  Reversal is required where a reasonable 
probability exists that, absent the error, a verdict more favorable to the 
appellant would have resulted.  Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 27, 
166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
burden of proving plain error is upon the appellant.  Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant contends that several 
statements made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument violated two 
of her basic constitutional rights:  
that the prosecutor may not comment upon the defendant's exercise of her 
right to remain silent, and the prosecutor may not attempt to shift the burden 
of proof to the defendant.  See Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 17, 
100 P.3d 386, 390-91 (Wyo. 2004); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390-91 
(Wyo. 
1995).  The State counters with the 
argument that the prosecutor's statements were legitimate responses to defense 
counsel's arguments, and were legitimate comments about the state of the 
evidence.  Because this all must be 
viewed in context, we will quote at length from defense counsel's closing 
argument, and from the State's rebuttal, with the challenged statements being 
highlighted:

 
 
BY 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
So lets start there, lets talk about evidence, ladies and gentlemen, and 
lets talk about proof and lets talk about assumptions, presumptions, and hopes, 
and witnesses that you never heard or saw, and lets talk about the State's 
case.  The State's case is 
this.

 
 
            
They would have you believe that my client, who they've presented no 
evidence, would have any motive to do or to lie or that she's a known liar or is 
inconsistent or has lied in the past would be driving down the street, that she 
would get into a wreck, and then she would floor her car to 100 percent to get 
away from some sort of problem that she was in because she had consumed some 
amount of alcohol.  The problem with 
that presupposition is really twofold.

 
 
            
First of all, they have to convince you of that.  In other words, they have to only call 
witnesses that support that.  They 
have to get witnesses to say that version of events because if they don't they 
lose.  And why do they lose?  Because then the original wreck and the 
alcohol are not tied to the ultimate death of Madison Scalzo, then you must 
acquit according to the law.

 
 
            
So what does the State do?  
They call basically two witnesses to support the proposition that my 
client got into a wreck, that she didn't lose control of the vehicle but that 
she fled the scene.  [SP] was the 
first.  [SP] says, oh, I remember 
like it was yesterday, I saw it in my rearview mirror, I am 100 percent sure, 
absolutely no question about it that this is what took place, she backed up and 
then she sped off.

 
 
            
But we find out that only two days after the wreck  and this had not 
come out when Detective Wasson testified, first testified.  But two days after the wreck she had 
spoke to Detective Wasson who is investigating the wreck.  And what does she say?  She says that she sees it in the 
rearview mirror, she sees the wreck, she thought the vehicle might have slowed, 
didn't think it came to a stop, and then it sounded like the motor revved up and 
it went on.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
Another aspect of that that's very interesting is that you heard 
Detective Wasson say that he had consulted with Mark Ziska who is with the 
police department.  And that Mark 
Ziska is a crash reconstructionist that works for the Gillette Police 
Department.  Interesting that we 
didn't find any testimony and never saw Mr. Ziska testify because after all if 
he's a crash reconstructionist and he was observing the scene, he was there that 
night, certainly he could have gotten up on the stand under oath and showed you 
the pictures and showed you where my client backed up.

 
 
            
They don't call him.  You 
know why?  Because they know he 
wouldn't say that and that doesn't fit in with their case and that doesn't lead 
to a conviction, and then where are they because you've got to get a conviction, 
afterall [sic] something terrible has happened.

 
 
            
Most troubling, even more than Mr. Ziska, however, is that we know 
there's yet another eyewitness named [LSW].  She was listed in the State's 
pretrial.  Do we see her?  She didn't testify.  The State chose not to give you that 
evidence, and what do I ask Detective Wasson?  Hey, you interviewed several people, 
didn't you?  Yes.  You interviewed 
[LSW]?

 
 
Yes. 
 And she said she never saw the 
vehicle stop.  That, in fact, it 
slowed after the collision, roar of the engine, and it was off to the 
races.

 
 
            
Why do you think the State would not want you to hear that witness, 
eyewitness testimony?  Why do they 
cherry pick only the things that are good for them?  And I'll tell you why and it's quite, so 
simple.  Because they know if this 
is unintended acceleration they can't make their proximate cause and they lose 
the aggravated vehicular homicide case.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
The State doesn't want to talk about [unintended acceleration].  They are hoping that because of your 
overwhelming grief, just like mine, that you'll just kind of overlook the flaws 
in their case.  You'll overlook the 
fact that they don't call witnesses.  
You'll overlook the fact that they don't talk about the physical 
evidence. 

 
 
            
You'll overlook the fact that there was an eyewitness that could have 
testified to something different.  
You'll overlook the idea that Mark Ziska didn't testify.  That you'll overlook all of that because 
there must be a reckoning.  Yet, the 
law forbids you to be governed by sympathy, prejudice, or public 
opinion.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
Another issue about the intoxication, ladies and gentlemen, is that  and 
once again it goes to, it goes to why didn't we hear from someone?  And that is you heard [MM] testify, and 
he says, well, at 10 until 6 I saw her.  
She walked into the rec center, I chatted with her, nothing seemed up, I 
didn't smell any alcohol, she didn't seem intoxicated to me, she didn't seem to 
have any problem.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
By the same token Wasson works for the Gillette Police Department, and 
they certainly have an interest in the outcome of this case.  Take a look around in the courtroom.

There 
are at least six or eight different officers that are watching this closing 
argument.  They certainly have an 
interest in the outcome of the case.

 
 
            
What about the ER staff?  
Would they have an interest in the outcome of the case?  If she smelled of alcohol, if she was 
slurring her words, if she seemed so intoxicated following this wreck, where are 
the ER staff?  How come they're not 
called?

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
BY [THE 
PROSECUTOR]:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
You get to decide who you believe.  
You get to decide who is credible.  
You get to decide who's got an interest in this in making those 
determinations.  And does the fact 
that you only heard us call [SP] and [TM] mean there's got to be a reasonable 
doubt with respect to the facts?  
Absolutely not.

 
 
            
Ladies and gentlemen, those jury instructions say you can find the proof 
of one fact beyond a reasonable doubt from one witness that you find 
believable.  There is no minimum 
requirement.  There is no rule that 
says that every single witness who was involved in the case has to come to court 
and testify about that.

 
 
            
Can you imagine, ladies and gentlemen, if 
there was some evidence out there to establish that an EMT while rendering aid 
to LaDonna Carothers poured a beer in her mouth that somebody might have called 
that witness?  Probably very likely 
you would have heard from that person.

 
 

            
If there was evidence to establish that with respect to the telephone 
calls that she talked to Detective Wasson about actually got made and that 
there's a cell phone record documenting that cell phone call, do you think if 
that had actually happened there would be evidence to support that?  Probably, you would have heard 
that.

 
 

            
You 
heard the evidence from two eyewitnesses who watched her drive drown [sic] 
Brooks 
Avenue.  
You heard testimony from Detective Wasson who summarized the accident 
investigation.  You're right, you 
didn't hear from Mark Ziska.  
Instead the State of Wyoming called [GB] who is a mechanical engineer who 
looked at all of the evidence, who examined the vehicle, who has specialized 
training and is an expert in this field, and interestingly enough is not sitting 
in the audience and is not a member of the Gillette Police 
Department.

 
 
            
He is a person who has a very refined specific task and he was given the 
job of examining the evidence in an objective fashion and telling you what the 
facts mean.  Would it have been 
helpful to hear Mark Ziska come in and say the same thing?  Probably not.  If Mark Ziska had something different to 
say do you think that somebody might have called him and had him say that?  Probably so.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
Look at the evidence that you have and use your common sense and look 
about what you heard in the courtroom and don't start trying to decide if 
there's other stuff out there that might be because that's not your job.  Your job is to evaluate what you heard 
in this courtroom and evaluate the witnesses you heard in this courtroom, and 
when you do that the evidence is very easy to interpret and the verdict is very 
easy to reach because what you will find is there is no doubt that the defendant 
was drinking that day.

 
 
            
She even tells you how much she was drinking, the scientific evidence 
corroborates that.  There's no doubt 
that she hit a parked car.  There's 
no doubt she sped away from the scene.  
And, ladies and gentlemen, really the 
difficulty here with [Defense Counsel's] whole argument about unintended 
acceleration is there's no evidence even from the defendant that that's what 
happened.

 
 

            
You 
heard Mr. Schmidt tell you that the key to this entire phenomenon, if you will, 
is that the driver has to say I was pushing down on what I thought was the brake 
and my car was careening out of control.  
And you heard her statement, you heard what she told Detective Wasson 
within an hour, an hour an a hour after the wreck.

 
 
            
She didn't say she stepped on the wrong peddle [sic].  She said the car spontaneously, all by 
itself, it was touched or anything, it was some sort of high idle thing and it 
was going down the road at maximum throttle by itself.  And even Mr. Schmidt had to tell you 
that's not unintended acceleration.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶16]   We have quoted at such length from 
the closing arguments to show the context of the prosecutor's remarks in 
rebuttal.  Most of those remarks 
were clearly directed at refuting defense counsel's allegations that the State 
purposefully hid evidence from the jury by not producing certain witnesses.  The prosecutor was not suggesting that 
the appellant had a duty to call witnesses.  Rather, he was explaining why the State 
called the witnesses that it did, and not others.  In addition, the prosecutor's comment 
that "there's no evidence even from the defendant" that unintended acceleration 
caused the accident, was not a comment upon the appellant's right to remain 
silent, but was a comment about the contents of the statement that the appellant 
did give to the police.

 
 
[¶17]   Two cases clearly guide us to an 
affirmance on this issue.  In Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 641 (Wyo. 
2000), we found it proper for the State to comment upon the lack of factual 
support for the defendant's theory of the case.  That is exactly what happened here.  The appellant brought in an expert 
witness to explain to the jury the phenomenon known as "pedal error" or 
"unintended acceleration."  The 
point of the prosecutor's closing remarks was simply that there was insufficient 
evidence in the appellant's statement to police to support that theory.  That is not an attempt to call attention 
to her decision not to testify, nor is it an attempt to shift the burden of 
proof to her.

 
 
[¶18]   Similarly, in Sturgis v. State, 932 P.2d 199, 205 
(Wyo. 1997), 
we concluded that, where a defendant chooses not to testify, but chooses to 
introduce into evidence her earlier statement to police, "the door swings both 
ways, affording the prosecutor a similar opportunity to make some comment over 
what she said or neglected to say."  
As with the prosecutor's comments in Helm, this is not a comment upon the 
appellant's right not to testify.  
Id.  We find no prosecutorial misconduct in 
the rebuttal closing argument.

 
 
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion when it denied 
the

appellant's 
motion to strike from the PSI the recommendations

of the 
probation and parole agent who prepared it?

 
 
[¶19]   
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-407(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007) requires state probation 
and parole agents to "[i]nvestigate all cases referred by any court . . . 
and report to the court . . . in writing[.]"  One such investigation and report is the 
PSI mandated by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) for all felony cases.  The content of the report is dictated by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2):

 
 
(2)    Report.  The report of the 
presentence investigation shall contain:

 
 
(A)   Information about the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, 
financial condition, and any circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior 
that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the correctional treatment of the 
defendant.

 
 
(B)   Verified information stated in a 
nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the financial, social, 
psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom 
the offense has been committed and attaching a victim impact statement 
as provided in W.S. 7-21-103 if the victim chooses to make one in writing.  In any event the report shall state that 
the victim was advised of the right to make such a statement orally at the 
defendant's sentencing or in writing.  
If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall describe the 
efforts made to contact the victim.

 
 
(C)   Unless the court orders otherwise, 
information concerning the nature and extent of non-prison programs and 
resources available for the defendant; and

 
 
(D)   Such other information as may be 
required by the court.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶20]   The victim impact statement 
provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 (LexisNexis 2007) "may include but shall not be 
limited to" the matters listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-21-102(c):

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(i)      An explanation of 
the nature and extent of any physical, psychological or emotional harm or trauma 
suffered by the victim;

 
 
(ii)     An explanation of the 
extent of any economic loss or property damage suffered by the 
victim;

 
 
(iii)    The need for and extent of 
restitution and whether the victim has applied for or received compensation for 
loss or damage; and

 
 
(iv)    The victim's recommendation 
for an appropriate disposition.

 
 
[¶21]   We have quoted these statutes and 
court rules at length to show the "victim impact" evidence that is to be made 
available to the sentencing judge, and to contrast the information that should 
be provided by the probation and parole agent with the information that may be 
provided by a victim.3          
In the instant case, the deceased victim's father and brother produced 
written statements that were included in the presentence investigation report, 
and the victim's mother testified at the sentencing hearing.  The appellant did not object to any of 
those statements, and does not now appeal their inclusion in the sentencing 
process.  She did, however, object 
to the following portion of the "Evaluation" section of the PSI written by the 
probation and parole agent, and she filed an Objection and Motion to Strike 
Presentence Investigation Report:

 
 
Madison 
Scalzo was not just someone else's child.  
She was a sweet young girl with big dreams and an even bigger heart.  The silence that has now replaced her 
laughter will be a constant reminder to her family and loved ones that she is 
forever gone.  The world will never 
know what Madison could have accomplished in her 
lifetime.  All that she was and 
could have become was violently snuffed out by the reckless arrogance of a woman 
who made the self-involved choice to drive drunk.  

 
 
This 
Writer saved the following [Gillette] News-Record clipping from 10-24-07, in 
anticipation of this report, so as to impress upon the reader the personality, 
humanity and innocence of Madison (all of which instantly struck this Writer 
upon reading it).  These words, 
written by Madison's family so soon after her 
death, will be the final thoughts in this report:  "Our beautiful angel Madison was born on 
[D.O.B. omitted] in Alamosa, 
Colorado.  Madison 
went to Pre-K school at CottonwoodChristianSchool in Alamosa, Colorado.  In 2001, Madison moved to Gillette, Wyoming and enrolled in Wagonwheel 
Elementary.  She loved getting Laffy 
Taffy from Mr. Dave Freeland, her favorite principal.  Madison dearly loved all the teachers and staff 
members at the school.  Madison was known for her 
kindness.  She thought everyone 
should always be nice to each other.  
Growing up, Madison and her brother, Jasen, were inseparable.  Madison enjoyed mothering' her younger 
brother, Gibson.  Madison had a passion for 
playing basketball.  She always 
strived to be the best ball player she could be.  This past year, she started raising 
money to buy her own salon chair and dreamed of some day owning her own beauty 
salon  if she did not make it as a pop star and singer.  To date, she had $80 saved for her 
chair.  Madison was in swing choir 
at school.  She had also attended 
many cheerleading camps.  Madison loved Ladybugs and 
considered herself lucky every time she caught a live Ladybug.  Lately, she took a liking to collecting 
frogs.  She loved singing so much 
that, on family Karaoke nights, she would not let anyone else hold the 
microphone.  Madison was not one to sit 
around; she was always on the go; from making iced coffee with mommy to going to 
church with daddy every Sunday.  
Madison 
was a giver.'  Even in the event of 
her tragic death, some of her organs were given to someone special that was in 
need."

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 
[¶22]   In her objection and motion to 
strike, the appellant contended that the above-quoted passage, rather than being 
informative and nonargumentative, was nonobjective and inflammatory.  The motion was denied without a hearing, 
but with the following explanation:

 
 
            
The court is going to deny the motion without argument as the court's 
review finds that the offending, alleged offending information that's in the 
evaluation and recommendation, which the court gives wide latitude to probation 
officers to make the recommendations and comments that they feel is 
appropriate.  The rest of the report 
appears to be nonargumentative and verified and to the extent that it's not 
verified and we have questions about it we can correct those on the record 
today.  So I'm going to enter an 
order denying the motion to strike the presentence 
investigation.

 
 
The 
appellant made no further objections in regard to the motion, and offered no 
additions, corrections, or explanations as to the report.

 
 
[¶23]   Our standard for the review of 
alleged errors during sentencing is as follows:

 
 
            
Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 
(Wyo. 
1997).  "A sentence will not be 
disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an 
abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play."  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo. 
1997).  "An error warrants reversal 
only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.  The party who is appealing 
bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."  Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 
439-40 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted) [overruled in part on other grounds by Allen 
v. State, 2002 WY 48, 43 P.3d 551 (Wyo. 2002)]; see also Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 

Lee v. 
State, 2001 
WY 129, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 2001).  In respect to "erroneous" information 
contained in a PSI, we have said:

 
 
Smith's 
contention of prejudice is not supported by any evidence that the court relied 
on the erroneous information, and, in fact, is contradicted by the sentencing 
judge's accepting his corrections and then imposing a sentence less than that 
agreed to by Smith in his plea agreement.  
Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 
[1106], 1109 [(Wyo. 1996)] (appellant bears the burden of 
establishing this reliance).  Nor do 
we find that sentencing Smith after learning of the report's severe deficiencies 
and without ordering a new report is improper and requires remanding for a new 
sentencing hearing.  A sentencing 
judge's discretion permits him to order a new report or simply to accept 
corrections and proceed, as the judge did in this case.  See Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1117-18 
(Wyo. 
1993).  As for Smith's request that 
we set standards to ensure accurate, nonargumentative presentence reports, our 
standard of judicial discretion accomplishes this objective while giving the 
sentencing judge the greatest amount of flexibility to exercise the appropriate 
action towards these kinds of transgressions by the State.

 
 

Smith v. 
State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1997).  We have also declined to reverse a 
criminal conviction where the appellant has failed to prove that the district 
court relied on the allegedly erroneous or inflammatory comments of the 
probation and parole agent, where the writer's comments "merely summarized what 
was apparent elsewhere in the report and provided the rationale for the agent's 
sentencing recommendation."  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 34, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, ¶ 18, 120 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Wyo. 2005)).

 
 
[¶24]   Applying this very broad 
discretionary test, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion 
in denying the motion to strike.  We 
do so less from approbation of the probation and parole agent's comments, which 
we find extreme to say the least, than from these facts:  (1) there has been no showing that the 
district court relied upon the comments in deciding upon a sentence; (2) the 
comments basically repeated what was already contained in the victim impact 
portion of the report and in the mother's statements in court at sentencing; and 
(3) the sentence imposed was less than that requested by the State, which 
suggests that the court was not "inflamed" by the comments.4  Under these circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that the appellant was prejudiced by the written comments of the 
probation and parole agent.  At the 
same time, we would caution the writers of presentence investigation reports to 
limit those reports to the matters outlined in W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2).  It certainly makes more sense not to 
cross the line than it does to cross the line and hope prejudice is not found to 
have resulted therefrom.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in not excusing certain jurors challenged for cause or in denying 
the appellant's motion for change of venue.  Sufficient evidence in the record shows 
that the challenged jurors agreed to set aside any opinions they may have held, 
and to decide the case entirely upon the evidence produced in court, rather than 
upon pre-trial publicity.  A venue 
change was not necessary because a local jury was seated without undue 
difficulty.  The prosecutor's 
challenged statements in rebuttal closing argument did not constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct in that, rather than being comments upon the 
appellant's exercise of her right to remain silent, and rather than being an 
attempt to shift the burden of proof to the appellant, the comments were 
responsive to arguments made by defense counsel in closing argument, or were 
appropriate comments upon the evidence that was presented in support of the 
appellant's theory of the case.  
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
appellant's motion to strike the presentence investigation report, or to strike 
from it allegedly argumentative and inflammatory comments of the writer.  It has not been shown that the district 
court relied upon those comments or that the appellant was in any way prejudiced 
by their inclusion in the PSI.  We 
affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Voir dire 
is French 
for "to speak the truth."  Black's Law Dictionary 1605 (8th ed. 
2004).

 
 

2Whether 
the appellant's brief in this case contains a legitimate plain error analysis is 
a debatable question.  The lack of 
such analysis may cause us to disregard the argument.  Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 19, 169 P.3d 81, 87 (Wyo. 2007); Pena v. 
State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 44 n.7, 98 P.3d 857, 874 n.7 (Wyo. 2004); Doyle v. State, 954 P.2d 969, 975 (Wyo. 
1998); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 
433-34 (Wyo. 1990).  We have given 
the appellant the benefit of the doubt because, while the brief does not track 
normal plain error analysis, it does show that the record clearly reflects the 
alleged misconduct, and it identifies the constitutional rights that the alleged 
misconduct violated.  It is left for 
us to conjecture that, by claiming a fair trial was denied to her, the appellant 
is claiming that a fair trial would have resulted in a more favorable 
verdict.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-21-101(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2007) defines "victim" to include family members of a minor 
victim.

 
 

4The State 
requested a sentence of incarceration for a period of 12 to 20 years.  The district court sentenced the 
appellant to incarceration for a period of 8 to 16 
years.