Title: Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this case of first impression, the Court considers whether Michael Sisler, twenty-five years old at the time of his discharge, can invoke the anti-age-discrimination provision of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, as a basis for his claim that he was wrongfully terminated because of his employer's perception that he was too young for the job. In 1993, Michael Sisler was recruited by Bergen Commercial Bank (Bergen Bank) to operate its merchant credit-card programs. After Sisler accepted the position of vice-president of credit-card operations, and shortly before beginning his employment with Bergen Bank, he had lunch with Tony Bruno, Bergen Bank's chairman and co-founder. During that meeting, Bruno for the first time asked Sisler his age. When Sisler responded that he was twenty-five years old, Bruno appeared shocked and asked Sisler not to tell anyone else his age, indicating that it would be embarrassing to [Bruno] if other people in the bank found out how old [Sisler] was and what [he] had been hired for, both [his] responsibilities and [his] salary. Thereafter, eight days after commencing his employment with Bergen Bank, Bruno and Mark Campbell, president and chief executive officer of Bergen Bank, called Sisler into Bruno's office for a meeting, during which they informed Sisler that they didn't think this was going to work, that they wanted to make some changes, and that Sisler might be terminated. As an alternative, they suggested that Sisler relinquish his position and work for the bank in some other capacity. Sisler told Bruno and Campbell that he felt they had not given him an opportunity to prove himself and refused alternative employment. Sisler was terminated on January 21, 1994, less than five months after commencing his employment with Bergen Bank. During the brief course of his employment, he was never informed by Bruno or Campbell of any deficiencies in his performance. Rather, the termination followed a meeting during which Bruno and Campbell explained that it simply wasn't working out. Thereafter, the bank replaced Sisler with Kenneth Hardaker, aged thirty-one. After an unsuccessful attempt to settle his potential age discrimination claim, Sisler's attorney informed the bank that he intended to file a lawsuit. However, before the lawsuit could be filed, the bank filed a complaint against Sisler alleging conversion of bank files, breach of duty of loyalty, intentional interference with business relations, and trespass. Sisler filed an answer and a counterclaim, asserting employment discrimination on the basis of age, in violation of the LAD, and breach of contract. Thereafter, Bergen Bank filed a motion for summary judgment on Sisler's LAD counterclaim, asserting that LAD's prohibition against age discrimination does not apply to twenty-five-year-old claimants. The trial court granted the motion, holding that it was the legislature's intent to limit the age protected class to persons above forty years of age. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of Sisler's counterclaim, finding that the LAD does not limit its protection to older workers. In addition, the court found that because older workers from the presumptive protected class under the anti-age-discrimination provision of the LAD, Sisler's claim is appropriately analyzed on the basis of the reverse-discrimination formulation adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted Bergen Bank's petition for certification. HELD: The Law Against Discrimination's prohibition against age discrimination is not limited to the protection of older workers and is broad enough to accommodate Sisler's claim of age discrimination based on youth. 1. The purpose of the LAD is to ban employment discrimination on the basis of certain enumerated attributes, including age. (pp. 6-7) 2. Age discrimination claims under the LAD and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are governed by the same standards and burden of proof structures applicable under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (pp. 7-8) 3. Unlike the LAD, the ADEA by its terms limits its protection to older workers. (pp. 8-10) 4. Where a provision of the LAD differs substantively from Title VII or the ADEA a court must conduct its own analysis in order to discern the underlying legislative intent. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts will implement the statute as written without resort to judicial interpretation, rules of construction, or extrinsic matters. (pp. 10-11) 5. The divergent interpretations of the trial court, of the Appellate Division, and of other states militate against a finding that the meaning of the term age is facially obvious or self-evident. (pp. 11-14) 6. Reading the anti-age-discrimination provisions of the LAD as applying only to workers over forty would render portions of Section 2.1 inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless. (pp. 14-15) 7. Given the contradictory interpretations of the statute by the courts below, legislative intent may be sought by reliance on extrinsic aids such as legislative history, legal commentary and prior precedent. In this regard, the reports of special committees or commissions appointed to study and suggest legislation are considered valuable aids. (pp. 15-18) 8. In a case alleging age discrimination under the LAD, an employee must show, by either direct or circumstantial evidence, that the prohibited consideration played a role in the decision making process and that it had a determinative influence on the outcome of that process. (p. 19) 9. Direct evidence produced must demonstrate not only a hostility toward members of the employee's class, but also a direct causal connection between that hostility and the challenged employment decision. Where an employee is able to establish a direct prima facie case that age was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the burden then shifts to the employer to show it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the impermissible consideration. (pp. 19-22) 10. An employee may prove an employer's discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence using the burden-shifting methodology described by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which is a three-stage process throughout which the burden of production shifts - the employee at all phases retaining the burden of proof that the adverse employment action was caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination. (pp. 22-25) 11. The criteria of a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas provide only a general framework for analyzing unlawful discrimination claims and must be modified where appropriate in order to conform the test to differing factual contexts. (pp. 25-27) 12. Because the presumption of discrimination arising solely from one's membership in a historically disfavored group is not necessarily justified when the individual is a member of the majority, courts have required a showing of background circumstances supporting the suspicion that the employer discriminates against the majority. (pp. 27-28) 13. The LAD's prohibition against age discrimination is broad enough to accommodate Sisler's claim of age discrimination based on youth. To the extent that Burke v. Township of Franklin is inconsistent, it is overruled. (pp. 29-30) 14. There is no evidence of legislative intent to exclude younger workers from the LAD's anti-age-discrimination protection, and related state anti-discrimination legislation supports the conclusion that the LAD protects against age discrimination directed at young workers. (pp. 30-31) 15. A broad construction of the LAD is entirely consistent with the underlying purpose of anti-discrimination laws to discourage the use of categories in employment decisions that ignore the individual characteristics of particular applicants. (pp. 31-32) 16. Sisler failed to produce direct evidence of a causal link between Bruno's dismay on learning of his age, lacking which he must resort to the McDonnell Douglas standard in attempting to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. (pp. 32-33) 17. Because Sisler is not a member of a historically disadvantaged class, he must conform his proofs to a heightened reverse discrimination formulation. Although Sisler need not show that he was replaced by a member of the presumptive protected class of older workers, he must prove that he was doing his job well enough to rule out the possibility that he was fired for inadequate job performance, and that his employer sought a replacement with qualifications similar to his own, demonstrating a continued need for the same services and skills. (pp. 34-36) 18. The fact that many legitimate reasons for rejecting, terminating, or promoting an employee have a strong and natural correlation with age does not render those reasons suspect for purposes of LAD, so long as age, per se, is not a determinative factor. (pp. 36-38) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the opinion of the Appellate Division. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 179 September Term 1997 BERGEN COMMERCIAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL SISLER, Defendant-Respondent. Argued November 9, 1998 -- Decided February 24, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 307 N.J. Super. 333 (1998). Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for appellant (Genova, Burns & Vernoia, attorneys; James M. Burns, of counsel; Elizabeth A. Daly, on the brief). Kevin M. Kiernan argued the cause for respondent (McDonough, Kiernan & Campbell, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. This is a case of first impression requiring the Court to decide whether respondent Michael Sisler, twenty-five years old at the time of his discharge, can invoke the anti-age-discrimination provisions of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, as a basis for his claim that he was wrongfully terminated because of his employer's perception that he was too young for the job. Should the Court decide that such a claim is cognizable under the LAD, the Court must also determine the appropriate substantive and procedural framework under which a claim alleging employment discrimination on the basis of youth should be evaluated. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) in pertinent part provides: It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination . . . [f]or an employer, because of the . . . age . . . of any individual . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire . . . from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment . . . . The determination of whether those provisions protect only older workers from age discrimination is a question of statutory interpretation requiring the Court to construe N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 and -12(a) in a manner consistent with both the LAD's plain language and its underlying purpose. As a starting point, this Court in outlining approaches and infusing discrimination claims under the LAD with substantive content typically has looked to federal cases arising under analogous provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2 (Title VII) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see 29 U.S.C.A. 623(a) and 631(a) (ADEA). Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 96-97 (1990); see also Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (D.N.J. 1994) ( Age discrimination claims under the LAD and the ADEA are governed by the same standards and burden of proof structures applicable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . . ), rev'd on other grounds, 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 437 (1989) ( [The LAD] standards have been influenced markedly by the experience derived from litigation under federal anti-discrimination statutes. ); Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 203 N.J. Super. 356, 361 (App. Div.) (holding plaintiffs' LAD claim of age discrimination under disparate impact theory appropriately analyzed by reference to federal cases addressing disparate impact claims arising under [s]imilar provisions of the ADEA and Title VII), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 336 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S. Ct. 1791, 90 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1986). To the extent the federal standards are useful and fair, they will be applied in the interest of achieving a degree of uniformity in the discrimination laws. Peper, supra, 77 N.J. at 81. Consistent with that approach, Bergen Bank urges the Court to adopt the reasoning in Burke v. Township of Franklin, 261 N.J. Super. 592, 601 (App. Div. 1993), in which the Appellate Division held that the plaintiff, thirty-nine years old at the time of his application for a police promotion, did not fall within the LAD's protected age class. Relying on the proposition that LAD age discrimination claims should be 'analyzed by examination of federal cases arising under Title VII and the ADEA,' the Burke panel read the ADEA's at least 40 years of age restriction into the LAD. Id. at 601-02 (quoting Giammario, supra, 203 N.J. Super. at 361); cf. Fischer v. Allied Signal Corp., 974 F. Supp. 797, 805 (D.N.J. 1997) (predicting New Jersey would incorporate ADEA over-forty age specification into LAD). In this case, however, the Appellate Division disagreed with the holding in Burke, citing differences between the pertinent language of the LAD and that of the ADEA. The ADEA provides in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful for an employer -- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age . . . . Further, 29 U.S.C.A. 631(a) specifies that [t]he prohibitions in [the ADEA] shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. Thus, unlike the LAD, the ADEA by its terms limits its protection to older workers. See Robinson v. Sizes Unlimited, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 442, 446 n.8 (D.N.J. 1988) (recognizing that LAD, unlike ADEA, does not contain minimum age limit); Murray v. Newark Hous. Auth., 311 N.J. Super. 163, 172 n.6 (Law Div. 1998) (noting that factors derived from federal precedent must be modified to reflect fact that LAD, unlike ADEA, does not specify ages to which it applies). Where a provision of the LAD differs substantively from Title VII or the ADEA, a court must conduct its own analysis in order to discern the underlying legislative intent. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600-01 (1993); Grigoletti, supra, 118 N.J. at 107-08. The first step in any statutory analysis is to examine the statute's plain language as the clearest indication of its meaning. National Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex County Improvement Auth., 150 N.J. 209, 223 (1997); State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406, 421 (1994); Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 434 (1992). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts will implement the statute as written without resort to judicial interpretation, rules of construction, or extrinsic matters. In re Estate of Post, 282 N.J. Super. 59, 72 (App. Div. 1995). Sisler argues that because N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 and -12(a) protect [a]ll persons from employment discrimination on the basis of age and neither section, on its face, specifies an age at which persons qualify for this protection, the language of N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 and -12(a) is clear and does not create ambiguities. A statute's meaning is not self-evident, however, where varying interpretations of the statute are plausible. National Waste, supra, 150 N.J. at 223; Szemple, supra, 135 N.J. at 421-22. In this case, the trial court narrowly construed the term age as referring only to older workers. The Appellate Division disagreed and concluded that the LAD should be interpreted more broadly as protecting workers of any age from employment discrimination based upon that attribute. Those divergent interpretations militate against a finding that the meaning of the term age is facially obvious or self-evident. Szemple, supra, 135 N.J. at 421-22. Similarly, the courts of Washington and Oregon have disagreed on whether younger workers are protected by state anti-age-discrimination provisions that, like New Jersey's, do not facially limit the protected class to older workers. In Gross v. Lynnwood, 583 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Wash. 1978), the Supreme Court of Washington rejected the thirty-five-year-old plaintiff's claim that his application for employment as a firefighter was unlawfully rejected on the basis of his age. Although the state's law against age discrimination, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 49.60.180 (Section 180), on its face, did not limit its protection to persons of any particular age group, the court felt constrained to read Section 180 in pari materia with another section adopted in the same legislation, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 49.44.090 (Section 90), thereby limiting Section 180 to situations where the discriminatee is between the ages of 40 and 65. Id. at 1199. That interpretation, the court concluded, was consistent with the general purpose of an age discrimination statute . . . to provide protection for the mature worker who may encounter difficulty obtaining or maintaining employment in a youth oriented market. Ibid. Conversely, in Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 191-92 (Or. 1985), the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed that portion of an appellate court's holding that extended the state's anti-age-discrimination provisions to plaintiffs under forty years of age. See Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 682 P.2d 802, 807 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). In Ogden, the thirty-year-old plaintiff alleged she was not hired for a beautician position on the basis of her age. Oregon's anti-discrimination statute provided, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an employer, because of an individual's . . . age if the individual is 18 years of age or older and under 70 years of age . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment such individual. [Ogden, supra, 682 P.2d at 807 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. 659.030(1)(a)).] Based on a plain reading, the court found that the plaintiff, who was over the age of 18 and under the age of 70[, was] . . . entitled to rely on this statute. Ogden, supra, 682 P.2d at 807. Recognizing that the defendant's clientele averaging between 80 and 95 years of age [might] prefer the company of a person in mid-life, the court nonetheless concluded that there is nothing . . . to suggest that a younger person, otherwise qualified as a beautician, would disrupt the normal operation of [the defendant's] business. Id. at 810. Moreover, the court observed that [t]he purpose of employment discrimination statutes is to discourage the use of categories in employment decisions which ignore the individual characteristics of particular applicants. By declaring discrimination on the basis of age an unlawful employment practice, the legislature recognized that age alone may bear no relation to a person's ability to perform a job or contribute to society. This is not to deny that age indirectly figures into employment decisions based on experience requirements. Such requirements are valid when they relate to the demonstrated needs of the employer and the actual capabilities of an individual to perform the job. But, when, as here, a qualified applicant is not hired for an available position, no legitimate reason is offered for not hiring that person and age per se was a factor in the decision, we hold that the commissioner did not err in concluding that the decision constitutes an unlawful employment practice under ORS 659.030(1)(a). [Ibid.] Thus, whereas the Washington court felt constrained by policy considerations to limit its age discrimination provisions to mature workers, the Oregon court, reading its statute plainly, concluded that age should not be so narrowly construed, citing the broad legislative purpose behind discrimination laws of discouraging employer reliance on stereotypes rather than individual assessments. Those decisions lend support to Bergen Bank's position in this case that the legislative intent in proscribing age discrimination is not apparent on the statute's face. In interpreting a statute courts should avoid a construction that would render any word in the statute to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless, or to mean something other than its ordinary meaning. Estate of Post, supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 72. N.J.S.A. 10:5-2.1 (Section 2.1) which sets terms of General construction for the LAD, establishes certain acceptable age limitations: Nothing contained in this act . . . shall be construed to require . . . the employment of any person under the age of 18, nor to prohibit the establishment and maintenance of bona fide occupational qualifications or the establishment and maintenance of apprenticeship requirements based upon a reasonable minimum age, nor to prevent the termination or change of the employment of any person who in the opinion of the employer, reasonably arrived at, is unable to perform adequately the duties of employment, nor to preclude discrimination among individuals on the basis of competence, performance, conduct or any other reasonable standards . . . . Section 2.1 thus permits employers to deny employment to persons under the age of 18, but otherwise prohibits age discrimination unless an age limitation qualifies as a bona fide occupational qualification or a reasonable apprenticeship requirement. Arguably, reading the anti-age-discrimination provisions of the LAD as applying only to workers over forty would render those portions of Section 2.1 inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. Estate of Post, supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 72. Moreover, in the public employment sector the Legislature has explicitly stated its intent to limit discrimination protections to a particular age group. The Employment in Public Service Law, N.J.S.A. 10:3-1, provides in pertinent part: In the selection of persons for employment in the service of the State, or of any county or municipality thereof, no appointing officer shall discriminate against any such applicant because such applicant has attained the age of at least 40 years, at the time of his said application for employment. Given the contradictory interpretations of the statute by the courts below, we may rely upon extrinsic aids such as legislative history, legal commentary and prior precedent, if available, in seeking the legislative intent. National Waste, supra, 150 N.J. at 224. Unfortunately, the 1962 amendment to the LAD, which added age to the statute's list of protected classes, contains no statement of purpose. L. 1962, c. 37. The statute's legislative history is, as the Appellate Division noted, scant at best and unilluminating of the enactment's purpose. Therefore, Bergen Bank urges the Court to consider, as evidence of the Legislature's intent to limit the LAD's age discrimination provisions to persons forty years and older, two studies released prior to passage of the age amendment. Although there is no indication that the Legislature relied on or adopted these studies, they may bear on the legislative purpose in that they were issued just prior to passage of the amendment, and one of the studies was conducted by the New Jersey Commission on Aging (COA), established by the Legislature in 1959. See Shapiro v. Essex County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 177 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (Law Div. 1980) ( In seeking the intent of the Legislature, any history which may be of aid must be consulted. In this regard, the reports of special committees or commissions appointed to study and suggest legislation are considered valuable aids. ) (citations omitted). The first, A Positive Study Towards Aging, was published by the Old Age Study Commission (OASC) in 1957 as a collection of data compiled by the OASC through public hearings on the subject of aging. One chapter of the study entitled The Economics of Aging, considers the needs of older workers, the impact of outdated stereotypes about older workers on their ability to secure and maintain employment, and suggestions for increasing the number of older workers in the marketplace. Although the OASC study does not suggest expanding the LAD's protected class to include older workers, it does note substantial evidence that in the modern labor market workers were beginning to encounter 'age barriers' in job changes as early as 45, and that for women . . . this age discrimination was encountered as low as age 35. The second study, entitled Discrimination in Employment Because of Age, was published by COA in 1959. Citing several studies dispelling outdated stereotypes regarding the efficiency, judgment and work quality of older workers, as well as a trend toward enactment of state anti-age-discrimination legislation, the COA study concludes that [a]rbitrary discrimination in employment against persons solely because they are over 45 years of age is emerging as a major social and economic problem facing America today. Based on its findings, COA explicitly suggests that the Legislature include arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age between 45 and 65 as an unlawful employment practice. In support of its recommendation that the Legislature specify qualifying ages for the LAD's protections, the COA study notes that: A major issue in consideration of past proposed bills in New Jersey has been the definition of ages to be covered in the New Jersey statute. Specification of ages is needed because (1) anti-discrimination laws must not interfere with laws on child and female labor. (2) The problem of age discrimination is one of employers' setting arbitrary limits on maximum ages for hiring; but it is legitimate and justified for an employer frequently to set minimum age and experience requirements. Specification of age coverage in legislation can eliminate possible conflict with this sound practice, as minimum age specifications almost always center around ages of 25 to 30. (3) Substantially different problems are encountered when dealing with workers over 65 as compared with the 45 to 65 age group . . . . Although strong arguments exist in favor of raising the mandatory retirement age from 65 to a higher age . . . , the prevalence of 65 as normal retirement age both by the Social Security System and by the majority of private retirement plans makes it unwise to legislate anti-discrimination laws for persons over 65 years of age. The studies by COA and OASC do evidence the societal problems faced by older persons in the workplace at the time the 1962 amendment was passed. Given the timing of the studies, the Legislature may well have considered them, especially the COA study, in passing the 1962 amendment. On the other hand, even assuming the Legislature acted in direct response to COA's suggestion to amend the LAD, it is clear that COA's recommendation that the protected class be limited to persons aged 45 to 65 was not adopted even though [a] major issue in consideration of past proposed bills . . . ha[d] been the definition of ages. [Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 550 (brackets in original)(quoting Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 492).] Establishment of a prima facie case gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L. Ed 2d 207, 215 (1981) (recognizing that plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous ); Murray, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 172 (noting that because prima facie case is easily made out, existence of prima facie case is rarely focus of ultimate disagreement in employment discrimination case). In order to rebut the presumption, the employer in the second stage of the process must come forward with admissible evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its rejection of the employee. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. at 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 216; Goodman v. London Metals Exch., Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 31 (1981). Where the employer produces such evidence, the presumption of discrimination disappears. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 416 (1993). In the third and final stage of the process the burden of production then shifts back to the employee, who has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the defendant was not the true reason for the employment decision but was merely a pretext for discrimination. Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 (citation omitted). An employee may meet this burden either by persuading the court directly 'that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' Murray, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 173 (quoting Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 217). Although the burden of production shifts throughout the process, the employee at all phases retains the burden of proof that the adverse employment action was caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 217. In meeting that burden, the plaintiff need not prove that age was the sole or exclusive consideration in the determination to discharge him; rather, he need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that it made a difference in that decision. Murray, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 174 (quoting Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1990)). The specific holding in McDonnell Douglas applied to racial minorities in the context of a claim for failure to hire. Thus, the criteria of a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas provide only a general framework for analyzing unlawful discrimination claims and must be modified where appropriate in order to conform the test to differing factual contexts. Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 550 (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597 (1988)); see also McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13, 93 S. Ct. at 1824 n.13, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 677-78 n.13 (recognizing that specification of prima facie proof not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations); accord Peper, supra, 77 N.J. at 83. Although this Court has recognized a need to harmonize the LAD with Title VII in order to assure a reasonable degree of symmetry and uniformity in the law, we have not hesitated to depart from the McDonnell Douglas methodology if a rigid application of its standards is inappropriate under the circumstances. Grigoletti, supra, 118 N.J. at 107. Where as here, for example, the employee is alleging a discriminatory discharge under the LAD, the third element of a prima facie case has been modified to permit an employee to recover on proof of discharge rather than requiring proof of failure to hire. Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 551 (citing Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 597). Similarly, in the age-discrimination context, the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test has been altered to eliminate the requirement that the plaintiff be replaced with someone outside the protected class: The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is [] irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age. Or to put the point more concretely, there can be no greater inference of age discrimination (as opposed to 40 or over discrimination) when a 40 year-old is replaced by a 39 year-old than when a 56 year-old is replaced by a 40 year-old. Because it lacks probative value, the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. [O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L. Ed. 2d 433, 438 (1996).] See also McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting mechanistic application of fourth McDonnell Douglas element in the context of subtle discrimination practices typical of age discrimination, noting that because of the value of experience, [s]eldom will a sixty-year-old be replaced by a person in the twenties. Rather the sixty-year-old will be replaced by a fifty-five-year-old, who, in turn, is succeeded by a person in the forties, who also will be replaced by a younger person. ). The fourth element of a prima facie case in an age-discrimination case properly focuses not on whether the replacement is a member of the protected class but on whether the plaintiff has established a logical reason to believe that the decision rests on a legally forbidden ground. Murphy v. Milwaukee Area Technical College, 976 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, under the LAD, which specifies no qualifying age, courts have modified the fourth element to require a showing that the plaintiff was replaced with a candidate sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination. Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J. Super. 422, 429 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Waldron, supra, 849 F. Supp. at 1001). In this case, the primary dispute is whether Sisler has satisfied the first element of a prima facie case by showing that he is a member of a protected class. As Bergen Bank points out, if everyone, regardless of age, is in the protected class, proof of the first element of the McDonnell Douglas test would fail to raise an inference of age discrimination. This Court in Erickson, supra, also recognized that a literal application of the McDonnell Douglas standard, insofar as it requires proof of membership in a protected class, would consistently fail to raise an inference of discrimination against a majority plaintiff. For that reason, in Erickson we found it necessary to modify the first element of the test in order to accommodate a claim of reverse gender-based discrimination. 117 N.J. at 551. In Erickson, we noted that the rationale underlying the first element of a prima facie case reflects '[c]ongressional efforts to address this nation's history of discrimination against racial minorities, a legacy of racism so entrenched that we presume acts, otherwise unexplained, embody its effect. Ibid. (citation omitted). The presumption of discrimination arising solely from a plaintiff's membership in a historically disfavored group is not necessarily justified when the plaintiff is a member of the majority. Murphy, supra, 976 F. Supp. at 1216 (citing Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, under such circumstances courts have modified the first element of a prima facie case to require a showing of background circumstances support[ing] the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 551 (citations omitted); see also Murphy, supra, 976 F. Supp. at 1216 (collecting authorities in accord); cf. Rivera v. Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, 305 N.J. Super. 596, 604 (App. Div. 1997) (rejecting claim that employer's appearance policy mandating a specific hair length and style for men but not women constituted sufficient background circumstances to raise inference of gender-based reverse discrimination). A showing of background circumstances suggesting an unusual discriminatory environment is the functional equivalent of and substitutes for the minority plaintiff's burden to show that he is a member of a racial minority; both are criteria for determining when the employer's conduct raises an 'inference of discrimination.' Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). An employee can demonstrate background circumstances sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination by establishing either that the plaintiff was better qualified for the position than the minority candidate selected or that the defendant had some reason or inclination to discriminate against the majority class. Murphy, supra, 976 F. Supp. at 1217. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. NO. A-179 BERGEN COMMERCIAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL SISLER, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED