Title: Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923.] 
 
 
WHITMAN v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-
Ohio-5923.] 
Elections — Writs of prohibition and mandamus sought to prevent Hamilton 
County Board of Elections and Secretary of State from placing Republican 
Party’s candidate for judge of Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton 
County on the November 5, 2002 election ballot — Mandamus complaint 
dismissed and writ of prohibition denied, when. 
(No. 2002-1700 — Submitted October 25, 2002 — Decided October 30, 2002.) 
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In February 2002, Frederick D. Nelson filed a declaration of 
candidacy and a petition for the Republican Party nomination for judge of the 
Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, for the full term commencing 
February 10, 2003.  Nelson subsequently won the May 7, 2002 primary election 
and is the Republican Party candidate for that judgeship in the November 5, 2002 
general election.  Relator, Bruce B. Whitman, is the Democratic Party candidate 
in the same election. 
{¶2} 
On August 14, 2002, Whitman filed a written protest challenging 
Nelson’s candidacy with respondent Hamilton County Board of Elections.  In his 
protest, Whitman claimed that Nelson did not meet the eligibility criteria of R.C. 
2301.01 because Nelson will not have practiced law in Ohio for at least six years 
preceding the commencement of his term if he is elected judge.  At a hearing 
before the board, Nelson argued that the protest should be dismissed as untimely. 
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{¶3} 
On September 16, 2002, the board of elections deadlocked two-to-
two on the motion to dismiss Whitman’s protest.  On September 30, 2002, the 
board submitted the matter to respondent Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell 
pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(X). 
{¶4} 
On September 30, 2002, the Secretary of State dismissed 
Whitman’s protest.  The Secretary of State agreed with Nelson that the protest 
was not timely filed. 
{¶5} 
On October 3, 2002, Whitman filed this action for a writ of 
prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus to prevent the board and the 
Secretary of State from placing Nelson’s name on the November 5, 2002 election 
ballot, and if already placed, to strike his name from the ballot.  Respondents filed 
answers, and the parties filed evidence and briefs pursuant to the expedited 
schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
{¶6} 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the 
merits. 
{¶7} 
Whitman requests writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent 
the board of elections and the Secretary of State from placing Nelson’s name on 
the November 5, 2002 election ballot. 
Mandamus 
{¶8} 
Whitman’s mandamus claim is an ill-disguised request for 
prohibitory injunctive relief:  to prevent Nelson’s candidacy at the November 5, 
2002 general election.  “ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Phillips 
v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, 
quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 
N.E.2d 704. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶9} 
Like the relator in State ex rel. Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham 
Co., L.P.A. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 324, 762 N.E.2d 1012, Whitman attempts 
to couch his claim in terms of compelling affirmative duties on the part of 
respondents—to remove Nelson’s name from the ballot if it has already been 
placed on it.  But since the manifest objective of his claim is to prohibit Nelson’s 
candidacy, mandamus is as inappropriate as it was in Cunningham. 
{¶10} Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over Whitman’s mandamus claim, 
and as in comparable expedited election cases, we dismiss it.  Phillips, 93 Ohio 
St.3d at 537, 757 N.E.2d 319; State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 70-71, 647 N.E.2d 769. 
Prohibition 
{¶11} In extraordinary actions challenging the decisions of the Secretary 
of State and boards of elections, the standard is whether they engaged in fraud, 
corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal 
provisions.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Kelly v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 413, 414, 639 N.E.2d 78; State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 583, 651 N.E.2d 995.  There is no allegation of fraud 
or corruption here.  Consequently, the dispositive issue is whether the Secretary of 
State abused his discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law in dismissing 
Whitman’s protest as untimely. 
{¶12} The Secretary of State neither abused his discretion nor clearly 
disregarded applicable law in holding that Whitman’s protest was untimely and 
that at the time of the protest, the board of elections lacked authority to consider 
sua sponte Nelson’s qualifications under R.C. 2301.01.  “County boards of 
elections are of statutory creation, and the members thereof in the performance of 
their duties must comply with applicable statutory requirements.”  State ex rel. 
Babcock v. Perkins (1956), 165 Ohio St. 185, 187, 59 O.O. 258, 134 N.E.2d 839.  
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R.C. 3501.39 governs pre-election protests concerning petitions and candidacies 
in election matters by providing: 
{¶13} “(A) The secretary of state or a board of elections shall accept any 
petition described in section 3501.38 of the Revised Code unless one of the 
following occurs: 
{¶14} “(1) A written protest against the petition or candidacy, naming 
specific objections, is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made by the 
election officials with whom the protest is filed that the petition is invalid, in 
accordance with any section of the Revised Code providing a protest procedure. 
{¶15} “(2) A written protest against the petition or candidacy, naming 
specific objections, is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made by the 
election officials with whom the protest is filed that the petition violates any 
requirement established by law. 
{¶16} “(3) The candidate’s candidacy or the petition violates the 
requirements of this chapter, Chapter 3513. of the Revised Code, or any other 
requirements established by law.” 
{¶17} R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) requires a hearing on a written protest against 
any petition or candidacy, at which election officials can determine the validity of 
the petition “in accordance with any section of the Revised Code providing a 
protest procedure.”  R.C. 3513.05, which relates to declarations of candidacy and 
petitions in primary elections, governs the applicable statutory protest procedure 
here.  That statute provides that these protests must be filed by any qualified 
elector who is a member of the same political party as the candidate and is 
eligible to vote at the primary election “not later than four p.m. of the sixty-fourth 
day before the day of the primary election.”  Whitman is not a member of 
Nelson’s political party, and neither he nor anybody else filed a timely protest 
against Nelson’s candidacy on the issue of his experience pursuant to R.C. 
3513.05 and 3501.39(A)(1). 
January Term, 2002 
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{¶18} Furthermore, Whitman “cannot rely on the protest procedure in 
R.C. 3501.39(A)(2), which contains no time requirement, to circumvent the 
specific statutory protest procedure of R.C. 3513.05, as incorporated in R.C. 
3501.39(A)(1).”  State ex rel. Harbarger v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 661 N.E.2d 699. 
{¶19} Moreover, the board lacked authority under R.C. 3501.39(A)(3) to 
invalidate sua sponte Nelson's petition and candidacy at the time that Whitman 
filed his protest.  Under R.C. 3501.39(B), “[a] board of elections shall not 
invalidate any declaration of candidacy * * * under division (A)(3) of this section 
after the fiftieth day prior to the election at which the candidate seeks nomination 
to office, if the candidate filed a declaration of candidacy * * * .”  The board thus 
lacked authority to consider the merits of Whitman’s challenge either sua sponte 
or on the protest after the primary election.  See Harbarger, 75 Ohio St.3d at 46, 
661 N.E.2d 699; see, also, State ex rel. Klein v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 124, 127, 656 N.E.2d 1031 (“Under R.C. Chapter 3513 
the time specified for making a protest to a person’s candidacy is up to sixty-four 
days before the primary.  * * *  After that time the board of elections has no duty 
to consider protests.”). 
{¶20} Whitman relies on State ex rel. Carr v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 136, 586 N.E.2d 73, and 2000 Ohio 
Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2000-033, to support his contention that boards of elections 
are empowered to act on petitions regardless of the timeliness of the petition. 
{¶21} Whitman’s reliance on these authorities is misplaced.  Carr 
preceded the amendment to R.C. 3501.39 that added the express prohibition in 
subsection (B) against a board’s invalidating sua sponte any declaration of 
candidacy after the 50th day before the primary election at which the candidate 
seeks nomination to the office.  1995 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 99, 146 Ohio Laws, Part 
I, 549, 619-620.  And the Attorney General’s opinion actually concluded, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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consistent with the Secretary of State’s decision to dismiss the protest, that 
“[a]fter the primary election, a county board of elections has no authority to 
remove from the general election ballot the name of a candidate, who was elected 
at the primary election as a political party’s nominee for office * * * .”1  
Paragraph one of the syllabus.  In other words, “[a]ny determination by a board of 
elections as to the validity of a person’s candidacy must be made well before the 
primary election.”  Id. at 2-206. 
{¶22} Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with our duty to defer to 
the Secretary of State’s interpretation of election law if it is subject to two 
different, but equally reasonable, interpretations.  Herman, 72 Ohio St.3d at 586, 
651 N.E.2d 995. 
{¶23} In fact, Whitman’s construction of the pertinent statutes is 
unreasonable.  Adopting Whitman’s interpretation would render R.C. 3501.39(B) 
a nullity by having R.C. 2301.01 supersede it.  R.C. 2301.01, however, does not 
specify the procedure to raise a pre-election protest concerning the qualifications 
contained in R.C. 2301.01, so R.C. 3501.39 and incorporated statutory provisions 
like R.C. 3513.05 govern that procedure.  See State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 620, 622, 716 N.E.2d 204 (“in interpreting related and co-existing 
statutes, we must harmonize and accord full application to each of these statutes 
unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict”); R.C. 1.47(B) (“In 
enacting a statute, it is presumed that * * * [t]he entire statute is intended to be 
effective”). 
{¶24} Finally, despite Whitman’s claims to the contrary, he has a legal 
remedy should Nelson be elected and take office.  Whitman could file a quo 
warranto action to challenge Nelson’s right to hold office.  See, e.g., Carr, 63 
                                                 
1  The opinion was concerned with an allegation that a candidate was a classified employee 
engaged in partisan political activity in violation of R.C. 124.57 at the time he filed his declaration 
of candidacy and campaigned for office. 
January Term, 2002 
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Ohio St.3d at 138, 586 N.E.2d 73 (courts of common pleas and appellate courts 
may decide what constitutes the practice of law for purposes of statutory 
qualifications in quo warranto actions); see, also, State ex rel. Schenck v. Shattuck 
(1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 272, 1 OBR 382, 439 N.E.2d 891.  For example, in State ex 
rel. Peirce v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections (1958), 168 Ohio St. 249, 250, 6 O.O.2d 
339, 153 N.E.2d 393, we denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the candidacy of 
a person for common pleas court judge who allegedly did not meet the 
requirement of R.C. 2301.01 of six years of practicing law.  In so holding, we 
found that the relator’s unexplained lack of diligence prevented the requested 
extraordinary relief, but further noted that if the allegedly unqualified candidate 
was elected, “other remedies will be available to relator.”  Id. 
{¶25} Therefore, Whitman is not entitled to the requested writ of 
prohibition. 
{¶26} Accordingly, we dismiss Whitman’s claim for a writ of mandamus 
and deny the writ of prohibition. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶27} I concur in the judgment of the majority but for a reason different 
from those set forth by the majority opinion.  R.C. 3501.11(X) provides that in all 
cases of a tie vote or a disagreement in the board of elections, the matter in 
controversy shall be submitted to the Secretary of State, “who shall summarily 
decide the question, and the secretary of state’s decision shall be final.”  Thus, 
when the Secretary of State made his decision, the matter was at an end. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶28} This provision could not be clearer, and, therefore, further 
discussion by the majority in denying the requested writ is unwarranted.  
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Mark A. Vander Laan, for relator. 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, Gordon M. 
Strauss and Edward J. Geiser, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent 
Hamilton County Board of Elections. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Arthur J. Marziale Jr. and 
Elizabeth Luper Schuster, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary 
of State J. Kenneth Blackwell. 
__________________