Title: Washington v. Whitaker (Majority and Concurrence)

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
Respondent, No. 967776
v }
JOHN ALAN WHITAKER, }
Petitioner. ) Fited_MAR 19 2020

GONZALEZ, J.— Duress generally excuses a person who commits a crime if
they are threatened with immediate death or grievous bodily injury. RCW
9A.16.060. Faced with such grave danger, a person may be excused for choosing
the lesser evil. State v, Harvill, 169 Wn.2d 254, 262, 234 P.3d 1166 (2010). But
because killing an innocent person is never the lesser of two evils, a duress defense
is not available when a person is charged with murder. d.; RCW 9A.16.060(2)..
John Whitaker was convicted of aggravated first degree murder based on the
aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a

kidnapping. He unsuccessfully sought to argue to the jury that he committed the

 
‘State v, Whitaker, No. 96777-6

kidnapping under duress, Because Whitaker was charged with murder, not
kidnapping, the Court of Appeals held he was not entitled to assert a duress
defense, We affirm.

FACTS:

In 2002, Rachel Burkheimer was brutally murdered, Two years later, a jury
found Whitaker guilty of aggravated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit
‘murder based on his part in her death, Whitaker’s convictions were reversed on
collateral review in 2013 due to a public trial right violation.' On remand, the
State again charged Whitaker with one count of aggravated first degree murder
predicated on kidnapping and robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit first
degree murder. The State presented evidence that Whitaker helped his friend John
Anderson and several others kidnap and kill Burkheimer, Anderson’s ex-girlfriend,
in Everett in September 2002. Whitaker helped Anderson and others lure
Burkheimer to a home, beat and bind her, hide her in a garage, and take her to a
remote area. There, Whitaker helped to dig a grave, take her clothes and jewelry,
and bury her body after Anderson shot her.

At the close of the evidence, Whitaker unsuccessfully requested the jury be

instructed on duress as a defense to the robbery and kidnapping aggravators. His

" See In re Pers. Restraint of Whitaker, No. 61980-2-1 sip op. at2 (Wash. Ct. App. June 17,
2013) (unpublished), http:/www.cours.wa,gov/opinions/pd7619802.paf,

2

 
State v. Whitaker, No. 9677-6

theory was that he acted out of fear of Anderson. ‘The trial court concluded there

‘was insufficient evidence to support giving a duress instruction,

  

The jury found Whitaker guilty of premeditated first degree murder with an
aggravating circumstance of kidnapping? Whitaker appealed on numerous
‘grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See State v. Whitaker, 6 Wn. App. 2d
1, 10, 429 P.3d 512 (2018). Among other things, the Court of Appeals concluded
the trial court properly denied Whitaker's request for a duress instruction because
duress may not be asserted as a defense to an aggravating circumstance of murder.
Id, at 15, We granted Whitaker's petition for review on the issue of duress. See
State v. Whitaker, 193 Wn.2d 1012 (2019).

ANALYSIS

The duress defense is based on the principle that it may be excusable to
break the law if compelled to do so to avoid immediate death or grievous bodily
harm, State v. Mannering, 150 Wn.2d 277, 281, 75 P.3d 961 (2003) (citing
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALDN. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1059 (3d ed. 1982)).
However, at common law, duress was not a defense to murder on the principle that
it was better to die than to take an innocent person’s life. id. (citing WAYNE R.

LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(b) (2d ed. 1986); PERKINS

2 The jury also found him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and found he or an accomplice
‘was armed with a firearm. It did not reach the robbery agaravator. Clerk's Papers at 474, 477-
18

3
State v. Whitaker, No. 96777-6

& BOYCE, supra, at 1059), As we explained in Harvill, “Paced with danger to his

or another's safety, the defendant is excused for choosing the lesser evil of

 

perpetrating a crime, unless the crime involves killing an innocent person, whi
never the lesser of two evils.” 169 Wn.2d at 262.

ur legislature codified the common law duress defense as part of a
comprehensive criminal code in 1909. See LAWS OF 1909, ch. 249, §4, As
originally enacted, the duress statute incorporated the common law bar on duress
asa defense to murder. {d, The legislature subsequently extended the bar on
duress to manslaughter and homicide by abuse. See LAWS OF 1975, Ist Ex. Sess.,
ch, 260; LAWS OF 1999, ch. 60, § 1. Today, the statute provides in relevant part:

(1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:

(@) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another
who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor
that in case of refusal he or she or another would be liable to immediate death

or immediate grievous bodily injury; and

(b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor;
and

 

(©) That the actor would not have pai
the duress involved,

pated in the crime except for

(2) The defense of duress is not available ifthe crime charged is murder,
manslaughter, or homicide by abuse, i

(3) The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or |
recklessly places himself or herself in a situation in which it is probable that |
he or she will be subject to duress. |
State v. Whitaker, No. 96777-6

RCW 9A.16.060. By barring duress as a defense to murder and manslaughter and
requiring an apprehension of immediate death or grievous bodily injury, our duress
statute imposes stringent requirements, State v, Riker, 123 Wo.2d 351, 365-66,
869 P.2d 43 (1994). ‘Those stringent requirements reflect “the law’s traditional
skepticism regarding the defense of duress.” /d. As a matter of public policy, “the
defense should be limited” because one who successfully raises it “is freed from
criminal liability for harm caused to an innocent third party.” Jd.

Whitaker was charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW
10.95.020(11)(a). Under that statute, aggravated first degree murder consists of
premeditated first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) and a
statutory aggravating circumstance. In this case, the proven statutory aggravator
‘was that “{{Jhe murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in
immediate flight from ....(kJidnapping in the first degree.” RCW
10.95.020(11)(d). A person convicted of aggravated first degree murder was
eligible for the death penalty, RCW 10.95.040, .050. In State v. Gregory, 192
Wn.2d 1, 5,427 P.3d 621 (2018) (plurality opinion), we held the death penalty
provisions unconstitutional as applied because they have been administered in an

arbitrary and racially biased manner and have failed to serve any legitimate
‘State v, Whitaker, No. 96777-6

penological goals. As a result, the sentence for aggravated first degree murder is
now life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. RCW 10.95.090.

Whitaker argues that a criminal defendant charged with aggravated murder
under RCW 10.95.020(11)(4) may assert duress as a defense to the aggravating
circumstance of kidnapping. Whether the duress statute allows the defense to be
asserted to an aggravating circumstance that elevates premeditated first degree
‘murder to aggravated murder is a question of law that we review de novo. See
State v. Read, 147 Wo.2d 238, 243, 3 P.3d 26 (2002), When interpreting the
scope of a statute, our fundamental goal is to “ascertain and carry out the
Legislature's intent.” Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.24 1,
9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). To determine the legislature's intent, we begin with the
statute’s plain meaning as “discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at

issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions,

 

and the statutory scheme asa whole.” State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d $72, $78, 210
P.3d 1007 (2009). If the plain meaning is unambiguous, we give it effect. State v.
Armendariz, 160 Wn.24 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).

The plain meaning of the duress statute unambiguously bars duress as a
defense to the aggravating circumstance in RCW 10.95.020(11)(4). The statute
provides that “[iJn any prosecution for a crime,” it is a defense that the actor

“participated in the crime” under duress, unless “the crime charged is murder,
State v. Whitaker, No. 96777-6

manslaughter, or homicide by abuse.” RCW 9A.16,060(1}(a), (2). Under this plain
language, a criminal defendant may assert duress as a defense to a charged crime
so long as it is not murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse. A defendant who
is charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020(1) is not
charged with the underlying felony. Rather, the defendant is charged with
aggravated first degree murder, and the State is required to prove, as an element of

the murder charge, that the murder was committed “in the course of, in furtherance

 

of, or in immediate flight from” the underlying felony. RCW 10.95.020(11).

Whitaker argues that under State v. Allen, 192 Wn.2d 526, 431 P.3d 117
(2018), a kidnapping aggravating circumstance is effectively a separately charged
crime and that, as such, a defendant is entitled to all statutory defenses, including
duress. In Allen, we held that double jeopardy bars retrial on aggravating
circumstances under RCW 10.95.020 after acquittal. Za. at $34, We reasoned that
aggravating circumstances are elements of aggravated first degree murder for
double jeopardy purposes because they increase the mandatory minimum penalty
for the crime, Id, We did not find, as Whitaker argues, that aggravating,
circumstances are separately charged crimes.

This court held long ago that when a felony is an element of murder, duress
‘may not act as an affirmative defense to the underlying felony. See State v

Moretti, 66 Wash. 537, 539-41, 120 P. 102 (1912); State v, Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 39,
State v. Whitaker, No. 96777-6

750 P.2d 632 (1988). The legislature has indicated no discontent with these
decisions. In Moretti the defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder
predicated on robbery. 66 Wash. at 539-41. On appeal, he argued that the trial
court should have let the jury consider his claim that he participated in the robbery
resulting in the victim's death under duress. Id. This court cited the predecessor to
the modem duress statute, which provided that
“{wJhenever any crime, except murder, is committed or participated in by two
‘or more persons, any one of whom participates only under compulsion by
another engaged therein, who by threats creates a reasonable apprehension in
the mind of such participator that in case of refusal he is liable to instant death
or grievous bodily harm, such threats and apprehension constitute duress,
‘which will excuse such participator from criminal prosecution.”
Id, at $40 (quoting REM. & BAL. Cope § 2256). The court concluded that “the
very terms” of the statute precluded the defendant from asserting duress. Id, at
S41. Just like first degree felony murder, aggravated first degree murder
criminalizes killing in the course of committing another crime. Compare RCW
9A.32.030(c), with RCW 10.95.020(11). When a defendant is charged with either
type of murder, the underlying felony is not a freestanding, separately charged and
prosecuted crime for which a defendant may assert duress as a defense.
Whitaker contends that aggravated murder is not analogous to felony murder
because aggravated murder is defined in Washington’s capital punishment statute.

He argues that the legislature, to comply with the dictates ofthe constitution,

intended for the death penalty to be allowed only in narrow circumstances. See

8
‘State v. Whitaker, No. 9677-6

Suppl. Br. of Pet’rat I (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726,
33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L.
Bd, 2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring that juror discretion to impose the
death penalty be sufficiently narrow and directed in order to minimize the risk of
arbitrary and capricious action)). He reasons that the legislature must have
intended duress to be available as a defense in order to narrow death penalty
eligibility, But he cites no sources of legislative history to support this argument,
and the legislature's general intent to craft a constitutional death penalty statute
falls far short of showing that the legislature specifically intended to allow a duress
defense,

Related provisions of the capital punishment statute in fact support our
conclusion that the legislature did not intend to allow duress as a defense to
aggravating circumstances. The legislature expressly provided for duress to be
considered, not in determining whether a defendant is guilty of aggravated murder
but as a mitigating circumstance in deciding whether to impose a death sentence
for the crime. See LAWS OF 1981, ch, 138, § 7(5) (codified as RCW 10.95.070(5));
LAWS OF 1977, Ist Ex. Sess., ch. 206, § 4(2)(c) (codified as RCW 9A.32.045,
repealed by LAWS OF 1981, ch, 138, § 24). The legislature's inclusion of duress as
1 mitigating circumstance at sentencing suggests that had the legislature intended

duress to be a defense to an element of the crime, it would have said so,
‘State v. Whitaker, No. 96777-6

Our interpretation of the duress statute not only gives effect to its plain
meaning, but is also consistent with the public policy underlying the bar on duress
asa defense to murder and manslaughter. Whitaker argues that if he would
otherwise be excused from kidnapping due to duress, it makes little sense to treat
hhim as if he had no excuse for such conduct in the context of an aggravated murder
prosecution, But there is a critical difference between a freestanding kidnapping
charge and the kidnapping element in an aggravated first degree murder
prosecution, In an aggravated murder prosecution, the State is required to prove
that the murder was committed in the course of or in furtherance of the felony.
RCW 10.95.020(11). To meet this burden, the State must prove a sufficiently
“intimate connection’” between the killing and the felony. State v. Brown, 132
Wn.2d 529, 608, 940 P.2d $46 (1997) (quoting State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121,
132, 470 P.2d 191 (1970), overruled on other grounds by State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2é
374, 378, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976), and citing State v. Leech, 114 Wn.2d 700, 706,
790 P.2d 160 (1990)). As aresult, the felony aggravating circumstance necessarily
involves taking a life, Barring duress as a defense to the felony in this context is
consistent with the legislature's policy that duress does not excuse a crime that

involves killing an innocent person. See Harvill, 169 Wn.2d at 262.
State v. Whitaker, No. 96777-6
CoNcLusION

‘Under Washington law, the duress defense is not available if the crime

charged is murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse. RCW 9A.16.060(2).

Consistent with the plain language of RCW 9A.16.060 and the public p

 

underlying the exception to the defense, we hold that duress is not a defense to an
aggravating circumstance in RCW 10.95.020 because the charged crime is murder.

Accordingly, we affirm.>

2 The State also argues that the trial court properly found thore was insufficient evidence to
support a duress defense. Because we find the defense was not available as @ matter of law, we
need not consider the sufficieney of the evidence,

n
State v. Whitaker, No, 9677-6

lez,

WE CONCUR:

Step OT

False PT
State v. Whitaker (John A.)

 

defense to the crime of first degree kidnapping, which was applied in this case to elevate
defendant John Whitaker's first degree murder conviction to aggravated murder. 1
disagree that as a matter of law duress is not available to the crime of kidnapping in this
circumstance and would hold that a duress instruction would be available, provided the

particular facts of the case warrant the giving of such instruction. Here, as te trial court

 

properly determined, the facts of this case did not warrant giving a duress instruction and

for that reason, I concur thatthe trial court did not err in declining to give defendant's
proffered duress instruction,
I
Here, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

"To convict the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree as
‘charged in Count I, each of the following elements of the erime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) That on or about the 23rd day of September, 2002, the defendant
‘or a person to whom he was an accomplice acted with intent to cause the
death of Rachel Rose Burkheimer;

(2) That the intent to cause the death was premeditated;

G) That Rachel Rose Burkheimer died as a result of the defendant's
acts or the acts ofthe person to whom he was an accomplice; and

(4) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
No, 96777-6
Madsen, J, concurring

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a
verdict of guilty.

Clerk's Papers at 490 (Instr, 8). ‘The jury was then instructed:

 

Jf you find the defendant guilty of premeditated murder in the first
degree as defined in Instruction 8, you must rem determine whether any of
the following aggravating circumstances exist:

‘The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in
immediate fight from kidnapping in the first degree.

‘The State has the burden of proving the existence of an aggravating,
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. In order for you to find that there
is an aggravating citcumstance in this case, you must unanimously agree
thatthe aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.

 

 

Id. at 495 (Instr. 13A) (emphasis added), ‘The jury was also instructed:
‘A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the first degree when

he or she intentionally abducts another person with intent to inflict bodily

injury on the person or to inflict extreme mental distress on that person or

‘on a third person,

Jd. at 498 (Instr. 15) (emphasis added),

As can be seen, the instructions identify first degree kidnapping as a “erime,” the
application of which as an aggravator is to be considered only after the jury has
determined that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of premeditated first degree murder. Further, such aggravator is to be applied only
ifthe State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravator (that i,
proved all elements defining first degree kidnapping as contained in instruction 15), and
the jury must unanimously agree that the aggravating circumstance has been proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. As instructed, first degree kidnapping, while used as an
No. 9677-6
Madsen, J, concurring

 

aggravator, is identified asa separate crime with separate elements, In this circumstance,

in my view, the duress defense is aval

 

the distinet crime of first degree kidnapping.
‘The majority relies on the rule thatthe duress defense does not apply to murder.
But while the charge here is aggravated murder, defendant seeks to apply the duress
defense to the “crime of kidnapping in the first degree” as defined in instruction 15, not
murder. Jd, at 498, Notably, if the duress defense were successfully applied here, it
‘would not foreclose defendant's conviction for premeditated first degree murder; it would
only foreclose use ofthe etime of first degree kidnapping as an agaravator. Accordingly,

in this circumstanc

 

in my view the duress defense is available as to the asserted “crime”
of first degree kidnapping.

Nevertheless, as discussed below, although conceptually a

 

lable, I agree thatthe
trial court did not err in dectining to give an instruction on the duress defense. This is so
only because the evidence was insufficient to warrant such an instruction, as the trial
court correctly ruled. See Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (June 24, 2016) at 61-
2.

"

“A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction thy

 

is supported by substantial
evidence in the record,” State v, O'Dell, 183 Wn.24 680, 687, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). “In
determining whether the evidence is suficient to support a jury instruction on an

affirmative defense, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
No. 96777-6
Madsen, 5., concurring

defendant.” Jd, at 687-88. Where, as here, the trial court's refusal to give a jury
instruction is based on a factual determination, we review that decision for abuse of
discretion. State v, Schierman, 192 Wn.2d 577, 651, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018) (plurality
opinion); see also State v. Harvil, 169 Wn.2d 254, 259, 234 P.3d 1166 (2010) (trial
court’s decision to not give a duress instruction based on lack of evidentiary support is
reviewed for abuse of discretion). A trial court abuses its discretion ifits decision is
manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Lamb, 175
Wa.2d 121, 127, 285 P.3d 27 (2012), A court’s decision is based on untenable reasons if

is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the

    

correct standard. /d. A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if itis outside the
‘ange of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard, Jd.
RCW 9A.16.060, which defines the duress defense, provides in relevant part:

(1) Inany prosecution for a isa defense that:

(a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another
who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the
actor that in case of refusal he or she ot another would be liable to
immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and

(b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the
actor; and

(©) That the actor would not have patti
the duress involved.

(2) The defense of duress is not available ifthe crime charged is,
murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse.

(3) The defense of duress is not available ifthe actor intentionally or
recklessly places himself or herself ina situation in which itis probable that
he or she will be subject to duress.

  

 

fd in the crime except for

 

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a duress

instruction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Whitaker, a reasoneble

 
No. 96777-6
Madsen, 5., concurring

person could conclude there was not substantial evidence that Whitaker participated in
the kidnapping under a reasonable apprehension of immediate death or grievous bodily,
injury,

Whitaker did not testify, and there was no direet evidence proffered at tri

 

that
Whitaker was afraid he would be killed or injured iffhe did not participate in the events
that ultimately resulted in Rachel Burkheimer’s death. As the majority correctly notes,
‘Whitaker helped his fiend John Anderson and several others lure Anderson’s ex
Birlfiend, Burkheimer, to a home where she was bound, gagged, beaten, and then taken
toa remote area where Anderson shot her to death and Whitaker and others buried her.

The evidence presented at trial did show that Anderson carried a gun and told the
participants to take various actions throughout the night, The evidence also indicated that
‘Anderson struck Whitaker and another man (Jeffrey Barth) before Anderson attacked
Burkheimer.! Whitaker later told FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) agents that he
‘was intimidated by Anderson because Anderson was a larger man than Whitaker. 7 VRP
at 1386

Matt Durham, who was 17 years old, and 18-year-old Maurice Rivas testified that
they participated because they were afraid of Anderson, Durham, the driver, testified that

‘Anderson struck him in the back of the head to correct Durham’s erratic driving as they

" When Anderson arrived atthe home where Burkheimer had been lured, he found Whitaker and
Barth “kidding with Rachel [Burkheimer).” 7 VRP at 1386, After Anderson struck Whitaker in
the chest, he then punched Burkheimer in the face, knocking her to the floor, and sat on her to
subslue her he then continued to beat her. Whitaker joined in the beating, kicking Burkheimer as
she lay on the floor.

 
No. 96777-6
Madsen, J, concurring

traveled to the remote location where Burkheimer was killed, 6 VRP at 1256, He stated
that he didn’t leave because he was “young” and “scared.” Id. at 1262. Durham also
testified that after Burkheimer’s body had been burried, Anderson retumed to the car and
indicated that he “doesn’t tolerate snitches” and would kill anyone who talked. Id. at
1264, Rivas, who helped dig Burkheimer’s grave and bury her body, testified on
cross-examination that he participated because Anderson told him to and he was “trying,
not to get shot.” 11 VRP at 2064,

But the evidence also showed that unlike Durham and Rivas, who were the
‘youngest in the group and at the bottom of the informal hierarchy, Whitaker (22 years
cold) was older than Anderson (20 years old); he was also closer to the group’s oldest
member, Kevin Jihad (32 years old), and Anderson in the hierarchy. Whitaker had also
been Anderson's roommate for some time and was Andersons closest friend in the
group. 9 VRP at 1788. In addition, Whitaker observed other participants leave at various
times throughout the night without suffering any consequences. 8 VRP at 1563. When
Anderson started assaulting Burkheimer, for example, Barth walked out of the duplex.

Jd. at 1551, Later, asthe group held Burkheimer in the home’s garage while Anderson
contemplated what to do next, another participant, Tony Williams, decided he had had
enough and left the residence. Id. at 1563. By contrast, Whitaker, who had been sitting
on the sofa with Burkheimer talking and laughing with her prior to Anderson's arrival,
Joined in beating Burkheimer as she lay on the floor when Anderson attacked her. Id. at

1549-50. Whitaker then helped tie her up. 7 VRP at 1386.
No. 967776
Madsen, J, concurring,

This court has explained, ““[DJuress is a defense only where it is shown thatthe
threats of one person have created in the mind of another a reasonable apprehension of
instant death or grievous bodily harm, Mere fear or threat by another is not sufficient to
constitute a defense.” Harvill, 469 Wn.2d at 262 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v, Harris, 57 Wn.2d 383, 385, 357 P.24 719
(1960)). In Harvill, this court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to give a duress instruction. But there, the defendant “testified at length to the
history, circumstances, and conduct that gave rise to his perception of [the informant’s]
‘words as conveying an implicit threat. [And defendant's} testimony was in part
‘corroborated by [the informant's] testimony,” Jd, at 263. No similar evidence is present
this case,

On these facts, and given the provisions of the duress statute, which require a
reasonable apprehension of immediate death or grievous bodily injury, it cannot be said
that the trial courts refusal to give a duress instruction lay outside the range of acceptable
choices, in light of the facts and the applicable legal standard. See Lamb, 175 Wn.2d at
127; State v. Dixon, 159 Wn.2d 65, 76, 147 P.34 991 (2006); see also State v. Goss, 186
Wn.2d 372, 383, 378 P.3d 154 (2016) (“A court abuses its discretion only if no

reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (internal quot

 

‘marks omitted) (quoting State v. Wooten, 178 Wn.2d 890, 897, 312 P.3d 41 (2013)

For the reasons discussed, I concur.
No, 96777-6
Madsen, J., concurring