Title: Roethlisberger v. McNulty

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev., Advance Opinion 4B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BEN ROETHLISBERGER, No. 5
Appellant, 1

pe FILED
ANDREA MCNULTY, .
Respondent. AUG 9 20tt

wy,

Appeal from a district court order denying a motion for a
change of venue in a tort action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
County; Brent T. Adams, Judge.

Affirmed.

Echeverria Law Office and John P. Echeverria, Reno; Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP and Franklin Brockway Gowdy and Rollin B. Chippey, Il,

San Francisco, California,
for Appellant.

Dunlap & Laxalt and Calvin R.X, Dunlap and Monique Laxalt, Reno,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, GIBBONS, J.

Appellant moved for a change of venue pursuant to NRS
13.040, based on residence, and NRS 13.050, based on convenience, When
his motion was denied, he filed this appeal, arguing that none of the
defendants reside in the county where the action is to be tried and that
because the alleged events occurred in a different county, venue should be

transferred there for reasons of convenience and justice. We conclude,

 

W- A344]
however, that as venue was not improper as to appellant, he lacked
standing to challenge venue based on his codefendant’s place of residence.
Also, as to the discretionary venue provision concerning convenience and
the ends of justice, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
wide discretion in refusing to change the place of trial. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court's order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Andrea McNulty filed a complaint in the Second
Judicial Distriet Court, located in Washoe County, alleging tort claims
against appellant Ben Roethlisberger and eight other defendants. ‘The
events on which the allegations were based occurred in Douglas County,
but Roethlisberger is a resident of Pennsylvania.

Only one of the defendants, Dave Monroe, was alleged to be a
resident of Washoe County, where the complaint was filed. Monroe owns
1 house in Washoe County and a house in Douglas County. Monroe

spends approximately five days a week at the Douglas County home

 

because it is closer to his work. Monroe's wife and children primarily live
in the Washoe County home, with some holidays spent at the Douglas
County home, Monroe is registered to vote in Washoe County and has
registered numerous vehicles to his Washoe County address, which is also
the addre
service of process of the summons and complaint on his behalf at the

listed on his driver's license. Finally, Monroe's wife received

 

Washoe County house.

In the Washoe County court, Roethlisberger filed a demand
and a motion to change venue to Douglas County. In his motion, he
argued, in part, that venue was improper in Washoe County because no
defendant resided there. Roethlisberger asserted that while Monroe
owned a house in Washoe County, he actually resided in Douglas County.

 
7

 

Monroe also filed a motion to change venue. The remaining defendants
either joined in Roethlisberger’s motion or filed their own similar motion.

‘The district court denied the motions to change venue. Only
Roethlisberger and Monroe appealed, and the district court stayed all
proceedings pending the resolution of the appeal. Monroe, however, later
voluntarily dismissed his appeal, thus we consider only the appellate
arguments of Roethlisberger.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Roethlisberger asserts that because Monroe
actually resides in Douglas County, not Washoe County, and because no
other defendant resides in Washoe County, venue is improper there under
NRS 13.040. He also asserts that the district court abused its discretion
in concluding that convenience and the ends of justice did not require
removal to Douglas County under NRS 18.050(2).

MeNulty, however, raises a threshold argument, contending
that because venue is proper as to Roethlisberger, he lacked standing to
seek a change of venue under NRS 13.040. We agree.

Roethlis! standing to request venue under NRS
13,040

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in
motion.” Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456,
460, 98 P.3d 746, 749 (2004) (quoting Smith v. Snyder, 839 A.2d 589, 594
(Conn. 2004)). Because standing concerns a question of law, we conduct de
novo review. Arguello v, Sunset Station, Inc,, 127 Nev. _, __, 252 P.3d
206, 208 (2011).

With respect to tort actions, NRS 13.040 provides that if no
defendants reside within the state, then the plaintiff can choose any

 

Nevada county in which to file the complaint. Thus, if Roethlisberger was
the only defendant, McNulty could have filed the action in any county in

3

 
ee

Nevada, meaning that venue in Washoe County is proper under NRS
18.040 as to Roethlisberger. But when an action is also brought against
Nevada residents, it “shall be tried in the county in which the defendants,
or any one of them, may reside at the commencement of the action.” Id.
Correspondingly, here, Roethlisberger bases his request for a change of
venue pursuant to NRS 13.040 on the residence of another defendant,
Monroe. That, he cannot do.

Venue based on one’s residence is a privilege personal to each
defendant. See Pratt v. Rowland, 769 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (N.D. Cal.
1991); 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 42 (2006). If we were to allow a defendant
to assert improper venue on behalf of one of his codefendants, we would be
revoking that codefendant’s right to waive improper venue. See NRS
13.050(1) ("If the county designated ...be not the proper county, the
action may, notwithstanding, be tried therein, unless the
defendant ...demand in writing that the trial be had in the proper
county.”). Thus, when venue is proper as to one defendant, that defendant
may not argue that venue is improper based on a codefendant’s residence.
See, e.g., Pratt, 769 F. Supp. at 1132 ([Ojne defendant may not challenge
venue on the ground that it is improper as to a co-defendant.”); Mitchell v,
dones, 158 S.E.2d 706, 709 (N.C. 1968) (concluding that a defendant
lacked standing to

 

 

wt that venue should be transferred to a
codefendant’s county of residence after that codefendant had been
dismissed from the action and citing to Allen-Fleming Co, v. Southern Ry.
Co,, 58 8.E. 793 (N.C. 1907), for the proposition that a defendant as to
whom venue is proper cannot complain as to the propriety of venue for
another defendant); 924 C.J.S. Venue § 68 (2010) (“A defendant may
object to the venue on his or her own behalf but may not object on the

ground that the venue is erroneously laid as to a codefendant.”).

 

 
Because venue in Washoe County was not improper as to
Roethlisberger, he lacked standing to request a change of venue pursuant
to NRS 13.040. Only a defendant who claims to be a resident of Douglas
County, such as Monroe, could have requested the change in venue
pursuant to NRS 13.040.!_ Because Roethlisberger lacked standing to
move for a change in venue, the district court properly denied his NRS
13.040 motion, and we affirm that denial. Accordingly, we turn now to
Roethlisberger’s other argument, that venue should be transferred to
Douglas County under NRS 13.050(2) for reasons of convenience and

justice.

 

strict court properly ransfer venue under NI
NRS 13.050(2)(c) gives the district court wide discretion to

 

grant a motion to change venue “[wJhen the convenience of the witnesses
and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” We review a
district court's ruling on a motion brought under NRS 13.050(2)(¢) for an
abuse of discretion. Fabbi v. First National Bank, 62 Nev. 405, 414, 163
P.2d 122, 125 (1944).

‘The record contains no evidence demonstrating that the
convenience of the witnesses compels a change in venue or that holding
the trial in Douglas County rather than in Washoe County would promote
the interests of justice. ‘The difference in travel times to the courts in
either county are, for many witnesses, relatively minimal, And while
Roethlisberger may receive a speedier trial in Douglas County, it is not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that the ends of justice

‘When a defendant requests a change of venue, the district court
must consider if that defendant has the right to assert that venue is
improper and, thus, to request the change of venue.

 

 
oe

are adequately served by keeping venue in Washoe County and would not
be furthered by a change of venue to Douglas County. We conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roethlisberger's
motion to transfer venue under NRS 13.050(2).

Accordingly, because Roethlisberger lacked standing to
demand that venue be changed under NRS 13.040 and has shown no
abuse of discretion with regard to the district court's NRS 13.050(2)
determination, we affirm the district court's order refusing to change

venue.