Title: Krucheck v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Krucheck v. State1983 WY 103671 P.2d 1222Case Number: 83-35Case Number: 83-35Decided: 10/20/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARTIN KRUCHECK, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

Thos. J. Fagan 
and James W. Fagan of Fagan & Fagan, Casper, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen.; Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen.; Mary B. Guthrie, and John W. 
Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER*, THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983. 

BROWN, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
by a jury of second-degree murder which is defined in § 6-2-104, W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement). In his appeal, he has raised several issues. Because of our 
disposition of the case, we only address whether the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that "the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous 
manner raises a presumption of malice."

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     At approximately six 
o'clock p.m. on February 20, 1982, appellant called his girl friend, Dianne 
Welsh, because the preceding day she had informed him she was returning to her 
ex-husband, John Welsh. During their telephone conversation on the 20th, Dianne 
Welsh told appellant that her ex-husband had arrived and spent the previous 
night with her. Appellant became angry and threatened to kill John 
Welsh.

[¶4.]     Shortly after the 
telephone conversation, appellant arrived at the residence of Dianne Welsh and 
rang the doorbell. John Welsh answered the door, and appellant struck him. As 
Welsh started to fall, appellant swung his arm around and pointed a gun at him. 
The gun fired mortally wounding Welsh. Thereafter appellant was charged with 
first-degree murder.

[¶5.]     The case then proceeded 
to trial on September 20, 1982. The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, and manslaughter. It was also instructed over an objection 
that: "You are instructed that the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or 
dangerous manner raises a presumption of malice."

[¶6.]     After the jury retired 
for its deliberations, it requested additional instruction. The district court 
provided it with the following supplemental instruction:

"The Jury having 
submitted to the Court the following question: `Does the presence of malice 
preclude a manslaughter conviction?'; the Court instructs the Jury as follows: 
`Not necessarily', but a finding of malice, where the other elements for 
voluntary manslaughter have also been found, would preclude a manslaughter 
conviction."

The jury found 
appellant guilty of second-degree murder after receiving the additional 
instruction.

[¶7.]     Rule 303(c) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence provides:

"Whenever the existence 
of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the court shall instruct the jury that it may 
regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but is not 
required to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an 
element of the offense or negatives a defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its 
existence, on all the evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(Emphasis added.)

By using the 
words "the court shall instruct," the rule mandates that when the rule becomes 
applicable, the court must instruct the jury as is provided.

[¶8.]     Here, the jury was 
instructed that "the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner 
raises a presumption of malice." That constituted the submission to the jury of 
"the existence of a presumed fact," thus triggering the operation of Rule 
303(c), supra. Under that rule the jury then must have been told explicitly that 
the presumption was permissive and not mandatory in nature.

[¶9.]     Rule 303(c), W.R.E., 
also requires that when the existence of an element of a crime may be presumed, 
the jury shall be instructed that the element must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Here, malice was an element of the offense of second degree murder. 
Accordingly, contemporaneous with a jury instruction that malice may be presumed 
from the use of a deadly weapon, the jury should also have been told that the 
existence of malice must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's 
failure to so instruct in this case constituted error. 

[¶10.]  Further, not only was the court's failure 
to so instruct error under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, it was also error 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires states to "prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512, 
99 S. Ct. 2450, 2453, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 43 (1979).1 This principle was expounded upon 
at length in the Sandstrom decision and held to prohibit not only a mandatory 
presumption, but any presumption which a reasonable juror may read as 
mandatory.

[¶11.]  In that case, Sandstrom was charged with 
the crime of "purposely or knowingly caus[ing] the death of Annie Jessen." The 
jury was instructed that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts." Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S. 512, 99 S. Ct. 2453, 61 L. Ed. 2d 43. The Supreme Court observed that it was 
possible for the jury to have viewed that instruction as requiring it to apply 
the presumption. Specifically, that court noted:

"* * * They [the jurors] 
were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; 
they were told only that the law presumed it. It is clear that a reasonable 
juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory. [Citations.]" 
Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S. 515, 99 S. Ct. 2454, 61 L. Ed. 2d 45.

[¶12.]  In a case decided within two weeks of Sandstrom, the United States Supreme 
Court set out an example of a presumption that the constitution sanctioned. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 
442 U.S. 140, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979). There, three males were 
prosecuted for possession of a firearm. The New York statute in question 
specifically provided that the presence of a firearm in an automobile was 
presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying the vehicle. The 
judge instructed the jury that:

"`Our Penal Law also 
provides that the presence in an automobile of any machine gun or of any handgun 
or firearm which is loaded is presumptive evidence of their unlawful 
possession.

"`In other words, those 
presumptions or this latter presumption upon proof of the presence of the 
machine gun and the hand weapons, you may 
infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by 
each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such 
instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is [sic] effective only 
so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing 
from the presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when such 
contradictory evidence is adduced.

"`The presumption or 
presumptions which I discussed with the jury relative to the drugs or weapons in 
this case need not be rebutted by affirmative proof or affirmative evidence but 
may be rebutted by any evidence or lack of evidence in the case.'" (Emphasis 
added.) County Court of Ulster County v. 
Allen, supra, 442 U.S. 161, 99 S. Ct. 2227, 60 L. Ed. 2d 794, fn. 
20.

The Court 
concluded that the instructions comported with the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

[¶13.]  The case before us, however, cannot be 
distinguished from Sandstrom, supra, 
on the basis of County Court of Ulster 
County, supra. Here the challenged instruction indicated that the use of a 
deadly weapon raised a presumption of malice. The word "may" was not included as 
it had been in County Court of Ulster 
County v. Allen, supra. Nothing in the instructions told the jurors that the 
presumption was not mandatory in nature. Granted, other instructions were given 
requiring the jury to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
in order to convict. But that was also done in Sandstrom, and the Supreme Court stated 
that that was not enough. 

"The potential for these 
interpretations of the presumption was not removed by the other instructions 
given at the trial. It is true that the jury was instructed generally that the 
accused was presumed innocent until proved guilty, and that the State had the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death 
of the deceased purposely or knowingly. [Citation.] But this is not rhetorically 
inconsistent with a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. The jury could 
have interpreted the two sets of instructions as indicating that the presumption 
was a means by which proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to intent could be 
satisfied. For example, if the presumption were viewed as conclusive, the jury 
could have believed that although intent must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, proof of the voluntary slaying and its ordinary consequences constituted 
proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *" Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 518, 99 S. Ct. 2457, 61 L. Ed. 2d 47, fn. 7.

[¶14.]  Clearly the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
were violated, as was the Fourteenth Amendment. When a jury is authorized to 
make use of presumptions, it must be informed that it may refuse to use them. As 
this court has previously said:

"* * * The use of the 
presumption assists the prosecutor in not having to produce evidence of 
intention, at least until the presumption is rebutted. But it clearly denies the 
jury of the opportunity to make up its own minds on the question of intention 
because there is no probative evidence introduced from which it can base its own 
finding. In this respect, the presumption instruction is diametrically opposite 
that of the use of deductions and inferences which the jury may logically and 
properly draw from facts and circumstances introduced which point toward 
intention. [Citations.]" Stuebgen v. 
State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870, 884-885 (1976).

[¶15.]  The only question remaining is whether 
the error should be considered harmless. There is some dispute concerning 
whether the harmless error doctrine may ever be used to ignore the Sandstrom 
error. In Connecticut v. Johnson, ___ 
U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 969, 74 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1983), the Court split on the question 
and failed to resolve it. We do not now need to decide this question since the 
error cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶16.]  In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), the Court held "that before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." We have previously 
adopted and applied this test in Wyoming. Ortega v. State, Wyo., 669 P.2d 935 
(1983).

[¶17.]  From the jury's question to the judge 
during its deliberation it is clear that they were concerned about malice. The 
question would indicate that the jury felt compelled to find malice, but wanted 
only to convict appellant of voluntary manslaughter. Despite the judge's opening 
disclaimer, his instruction to the jury provided that if it had found all the 
elements of voluntary manslaughter, as well as malice, it must convict appellant 
of second-degree murder.

[¶18.]  The resulting conviction of second-degree 
murder is a demonstration that the jury found malice and all of the elements for 
voluntary manslaughter. In light of the jury's apparent hesitancy in finding 
defendant guilty of second degree murder, one logical conclusion is that they 
felt compelled to presume malice from the use of the gun because of the 
instructions in the case. It is then reasonable to conclude that if the jury had 
known that the presumption of malice was not mandatory, it may not have 
convicted appellant of second-degree murder. The error, then, cannot be regarded 
as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be 
reversed.

[¶19.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 We commend the state for 
bringing this case to our attention.

RAPER, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting, with whom ROONEY, Chief 
Justice, joins.

[¶20.]  I dissent and would have affirmed. 

[¶21.]  The substance of what follows was 
intended to be the opinion of the court when first circulated but, due to the 
vicissitudes of the appellate process could not gather a majority, so it now 
assumes a dissenting posture. There is more to this case than has been discerned 
by the superficial and airily abstract views of the majority. The weakness of 
the majority lies in the facts and all the procedure, including instructions, 
followed by the trial judge so I will considerably enlarge upon 
them.

[¶22.]  I will also discuss all of the issues 
because they may arise again during the course of the new trial which is 
mandated as well as be raised again on appeal, if the defendant is again found 
guilty of murder in the second degree. It is proper for this court to decide 
questions which are bound to arise again in a new trial of the case. Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, 
Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983); Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. 
State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163 (1982); Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 
(1980); McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278 (1980); Chicago & N.W. Ry. 
Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 84, 119, 247 P.2d 660 (1952). As said in Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of 
Riverton, supra, it is this court's duty to do so. While the above citations 
are to civil cases, the same principle would apply to criminal cases. Besides 
that, for the purposes of this appeal, it accords an opportunity to examine more 
facts which support my position.

[¶23.]  For those, if any, who want only to read 
my views with respect to the majority's bare-bones disposition, see Parts IV and 
V of this dissent. I strongly suggest that at least the trial judge and counsel 
read this dissent in its entirety and note in particular the discussion with 
respect to WPJIC § 7.502, in which there is an error in the second element in 
that it does not follow the statute, prompting the trial judge to give the 
corrective instruction about which appellant complains in his fifth 
issue.

[¶24.]  In this appeal, we are called on to 
review the second-degree murder1 conviction of Martin L. Krucheck 
(appellant). He was tried for first-degree murder and found guilty by a jury of 
the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Appellant phrases the 
issues to be in the order stated:

1. "Whether the defendant 
should have been allowed to change his plea from `not guilty' to that of `not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency' and/or `unfit to proceed by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency', which Motion was denied by the 
Court?"

2. "Whether the evidence 
supported the jury's verdict of `guilty' of Murder in the Second 
Degree?"

3. "Whether the Court 
properly refused to give defendant's requested instructions designated `A', `B', 
`C', and `D'?"

4. "Whether the Court 
erred in giving instructions numbered `10', `21' and `22' over the objections of 
the defendant?"

5. "Whether the Court 
erred in instructing the jury, during the jury's deliberations, on the issue of 
malice, as contained in the supplemental instruction?"

It should be 
noted that one of the bases upon which the majority founds its decision is Rule 
303(c), W.R.E., which caused me concern and I first pointed that out to the 
court. In the case of Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979), the other basis 
for the majority was cited to the court by the State as it ethically should have 
been. But both are easily overcome, in my view of the whole case.

[¶25.]  On February 20, 1982, appellant shot and 
killed John Welsh at the apartment where Dianne Welsh, John's ex-wife, was 
residing. In doing so, appellant brought to a close, once and for all, a 
triangle relationship involving appellant, Dianne Welsh, and John 
Welsh.

[¶26.]  John and Dianne Welsh had been married; 
they were divorced in June, 1981 after a year of marriage. Beginning in July, 
1981, one month after her divorce, Dianne and appellant began a relationship 
that soon became intimate. Their relationship developed to the point that 
marriage was contemplated, but never took place because Dianne still had strong 
feelings for her ex-husband, John, and so was unable to make a commitment to 
appellant.

[¶27.]  During the fall and winter of 1981, 
Dianne vacillated between her ex-husband, John, and appellant. She, at various 
times during that period, enjoyed an intimate relationship with both men. 
Although Dianne lived with appellant off and on during their relationship, she 
moved out several times to live with her ex-husband, John. In early January, 
1982, she moved out of appellant's residence for the last time and accompanied 
her ex-husband to Evanston, Wyoming.

[¶28.]  Dianne remained in Evanston with John for 
six or seven weeks with brief visits back to Casper. On those return visits, she 
saw and spoke to appellant. The week before John's death, John and Dianne 
decided to resume residence in Casper. Dianne first returned to Casper and there 
awaited John's arrival. On February 19, 1982, the night before John's death, 
Dianne saw appellant. She told appellant that although she still had "feelings" 
for him, she was back together with John. Later that night, John arrived from 
Evanston and spent the night with Dianne.

[¶29.]  On February 20, appellant called Dianne. 
He asked her if John had arrived the night before and if they had slept 
together. When Dianne told him that John had arrived the night before and that 
they had indeed slept together, appellant became very angry. Appellant's anger 
rose to the point that he made threatening statements to Dianne. He threatened 
to kill John. John, upon learning of the threats, made plans to leave town to 
avoid a confrontation with appellant. He never had time to carry out that 
plan.

[¶30.]  Shortly after that telephone 
conversation, appellant knocked on the door where Dianne and John were staying. 
John answered the door and was confronted by appellant. Appellant greeted John 
with the remark, "`Hi, zit face,'" and struck him, knocking him down. As John 
was falling, appellant's arm swung around and a revolver that he was holding 
discharged. The shot hit John in the chest, fatally wounding him.

[¶31.]  After the shooting, appellant expressed 
remorse and disbelief at what had just transpired. He remained at the scene and 
awaited the police. When the police arrived, he was arrested and charged with 
the murder of John Welsh.

[¶32.]  The criminal complaint and subsequent 
information filed in this case charged appellant with first-degree murder. At 
his arraignment in June 1982, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. In July 
1982, appellant filed the first of several motions requesting the court to allow 
him to change his plea from "`not guilty'" to "`not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency' and/or `unfit to proceed by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency.'" All were denied.

[¶33.]  The case proceeded to trial. Appellant 
was tried before a jury on the charge of first-degree murder. The jury was 
instructed on first-degree murder as well as the lesser-included offenses of 
second-degree murder and manslaughter. After deliberation, in which the court 
was requested to give and did give a supplemental instruction on manslaughter, 
the jury found appellant guilty of second-degree murder. This appeal followed. 
Other facts pertinent to an adequate discussion of the issues will be developed 
as necessary.

I

[¶34.]  The appellant waived a preliminary 
hearing before the county court. An information was thereupon filed in the 
district court. Thereafter at arraignment appellant entered a plea of not 
guilty. Appellant then filed a motion for an order allowing him to enter a plea 
of "`not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency' and/or `unfit to 
proceed by reason of mental illness or deficiency'" on the ground that "the best 
interests of justice would be served." From the court file it appears an order 
was entered denying the motion for the reason no cause was shown as required by 
§ 7-11-304(c), W.S. 1977. It also appears that the presence of a reporter was 
waived. Apparently, the only showing was that appellant's counsel had talked 
with a psychiatrist and she agreed appellant should be permitted to change his 
plea. No evidence was taken or documentary support presented. There was then 
filed a motion for rehearing of the motion for change of plea, supported by a 
memorandum by counsel for appellant. In it are related various conversations 
with the same local psychiatrist indicating a present mental condition of some 
undefined sort. It appears the doctor was not conveniently available for more 
precise information.

[¶35.]  A second motion for rehearing was filed 
but no action was taken. As a preliminary matter, on the trial date appellant's 
counsel renewed the motion for rehearing. The trial transcript discloses it was 
then overruled.

[¶36.]  Section 7-11-304(c), supra, 
provides:

"(c) Evidence that a 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct by reason of mental illness or 
deficiency is not admissible at the trial of the defendant unless a plea of `not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency' is made. A plea of `not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency' may be pleaded orally or in writing by the defendant or 
his counsel at the time of his arraignment. The court, for good cause shown, may 
also allow such a plea to be entered at a later time. Such a plea does not 
deprive the defendant of other defenses." (Emphasis added).

The appellant 
must make more of a showing of good cause than that presented at the unreported 
hearing, as reflected by the court's order overruling the motion. If the local 
psychiatrist who made an examination of appellant had been present to testify, 
or her deposition had been taken and filed, appellant's position might have some 
basis. Counsel should not impose upon a court his personal views or ask a court 
to accept his vague hearsay representations about his client's mental condition 
requiring expert testimony. The motion was filed on July 8, 1982. The case was 
tried beginning on September 20, 1982. While motions for rehearing were made, no 
supporting material was presented; no medical report and no affidavit of the 
psychiatrist as to mental condition were ever filed.2 Appellant had plenty of opportunity 
to gather such information. In such matters, a court is not required to rely 
alone upon the hazy representations of counsel.

[¶37.]  Colorado has a statute identical in 
pertinent part to § 7-11-304(c), supra. In Garza v. People, 200 Colo. 62, 612 P.2d 85 (1980), the court held that ultimately the question of good cause is one 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and absent a clear abuse of 
discretion, his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. In the case now before 
this court, the record shows no abuse of discretion.

[¶38.]  Section 7-11-302, W.S. 1977, covers a 
lack of capacity, "as a result of mental illness or deficiency" to be tried, 
sentenced or punished if an accused is unable to comprehend his position, 
understand the proceedings against him, conduct his defense rationally and 
cooperate with his counsel. This question may be raised at any stage, even by 
the court on its own motion, but again there must be "reasonable cause to 
believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to 
proceed." Section 7-11-303(a), W.S. 1977. I place the same standard on resolving 
the issue. There must be more than a lawyer's assertions to justify an inference 
that appellant was not competent to stand trial. State v. Williams, 122 Ariz. 
146, 593 P.2d 896 (1979). It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge 
and a court should not disturb his ruling in the absence of a clear abuse of 
that discretion.

[¶39.]  The trial judge simply had no reliable 
information before him that the appellant was suffering from the required 
disability. The reluctance of counsel to present qualified evidence and what 
even appears to be flimsy excuses why the psychiatrist was unavailable were not 
helpful. As indicated, a medical report or affidavit of the psychiatrist would 
have helped the trial judge. He had nothing upon which to base a ruling 
sustaining the motion. A further reason for doubting the substance of 
appellant's position is that on the trial date, in preliminary matters, 
appellant's counsel advised the court that "on behalf of the defendant we would 
enter a plea of guilty to manslaughter in this particular case without any 
conditions of any nature being attached to that plea." If the appellant was 
incapable of standing trial, he was incapable of pleading guilty to a lesser 
offense. He cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath.

II

[¶40.]  Appellant asserts that the evidence will 
not support second-degree murder. I would hold that it is more than sufficient. 
It would even support first-degree murder in that there was premeditation. When 
reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, various standards 
have been routinely applied by this court. The evidence favoring the prevailing 
party is accepted as true and the evidence of the appellant in conflict 
therewith is entirely left out of consideration. Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 
(1982). The State is given the benefit of those inferences which may be fairly 
and reasonably drawn from the evidence. Tillett v. State, Wyo., 637 P.2d 261 
(1981). In Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 (1983), it was held in quoting from a wealth of authority that it is 
not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for this 
court but whether it is sufficient to form the essential basis of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the jury when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State.

[¶41.]  In second-degree murder the essential 
elements which must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt are that 
the killing, without premeditation, of a human being was done by the accused 
both purposely and maliciously. Section 6-4-104, supra note 1. The jury had 
before it all the evidence it needed to reach a verdict of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

[¶42.]  The testimony of the State was that 
appellant threatened to kill Welsh; appellant in his direct testimony declared 
that he had threatened to kill Welsh. On cross-examination appellant testified 
that he always carried a loaded gun in his pickup, as well as several other hand 
guns and rifles. He considered himself a safe handler of firearms. The firearms 
examiner from the State Crime Laboratory testified that the double action hand 
gun used to kill Welsh was a .38 caliber revolver completely functional having 
no defects, with a trigger pull of ten pounds if the hammer is down and three 
and one-half pounds if cocked (hammer back). It was not prone to accidental 
discharge but would require that the trigger be pulled to effect firing. From 
the foregoing, a reasonable jury inference would be that the killing was done on 
purpose and with malice.

[¶43.]  Further, as to malice, the evidence 
discloses that on the day of the homicide, appellant called his lover at the 
apartment of the victim's brother where the victim was staying. The conversation 
was not favorable to his continued relationship with her. Appellant, according 
to his own testimony, threw down the telephone. When he picked it up to resume 
the conversation, he twice threatened Welsh's life, and said he was coming to 
the apartment with a gun and would use it. 

[¶44.]  Appellant's acts at the time of the 
murder permit an overwhelming inference of malice for the jury. His first action 
upon encountering Welsh's brother's apartment was utterance of a provocative 
epithet to the victim, followed by a violent physical assault, knocking the 
victim to the floor. Finally, appellant's behavior at the time of the shooting 
itself allows a climatical inference of malice. His firearm held in his right 
hand followed the fall from the assault. There was a deliberate pointing of the 
revolver at Welsh as it was discharged. There could be no better evidence of 
malice than this accumulation of acts manifesting an inference of malice by 
rational jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.

III

[¶45.]  The trial judge refused to give 
appellant's offered Instructions A, B, C and D. I will treat them in that 
order.

[¶46.]  Offered Instruction No. A read: "If two 
conclusions can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, one of innocence, and one 
of guilt, the jury should adopt the one of innocence." The appellant cites Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942).

[¶47.]  This court has specifically rejected and 
disapproved the use of such instruction in Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 453 
(1977), where it was held:

"* * * That instruction 
is included in principle in the court's frequent charge to the jury that the 
defendant must be proven `guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' This court has held 
that `reasonable doubt' needs no definition because it has a common meaning. Cosco v. State, Wyo. 1974, 521 P.2d 1345. The offered instruction is therefore included in other instructions. We 
disapprove of any use of the offered instruction."

[¶48.]  No error that I can see.

[¶49.]  Offered and refused Instruction No. B 
was:

"If two conclusions can 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, guilty of one offense, and guilty of a 
lesser, included offense, the jury should find the defendant guilty of the 
lesser, included offense."

The trial judge 
gave an instruction which authorized the jury to find the appellant guilty of a 
lesser-included offense:

"If you are not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, 
he may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which 
is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to 
establish his guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

"The offense of murder in 
the first degree, with which the defendant is charged, includes the lesser 
offense of murder in the second degree and also includes the lesser offense of 
manslaughter."

This is WPJIC § 
1.301. The jury was instructed as to the elements of first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, and manslaughter, both voluntary and 
involuntary.

[¶50.]  In Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412, 
416 (1976), this court pointed out that for a lesser offense to be "`necessarily 
included'"3 in the offense charged, it must be 
such that the greater offense cannot be committed without committing the lesser. 
When first-degree murder as here is charged, there are lesser-included offenses 
in that the elements overlap. That was explained in State v. Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786, 790-791 (1981):

"The elements of the 
lesser offense of manslaughter are identical to part of the elements of murder 
in the second degree, and to part of those of murder in the first degree. All 
three crimes contain the element of killing of a human being. The elements of 
the lesser offense of murder in the second degree are identical to part of the 
elements of murder in the first degree. Both contain the elements of the killing 
of a human being with malice and purpose. [Citations.]" (Footnotes 
omitted.)

The effect of 
appellant's offered instruction would have been, then, to direct a verdict of 
manslaughter and remove from the jury its function of determining the offense, 
if any, committed by the appellant. The facts in this case are subject to three 
conclusions which can be drawn: first-degree murder; second-degree murder; and 
manslaughter. The jury must not be deprived of performing its duty. The trial 
judge was correct in refusing the instruction.

[¶51.]  No error appears to me.

[¶52.]  Appellant's offered Instruction No. C 
was:

"The killing of a human 
being by accident, misadventure or misfortune, by one exercising due care, and 
in the performance of a lawful act, and without harmful intent, is not a 
criminal act if all such facts concur."

This offered 
instruction is WPJIC § 5.101. The use note and comment demonstrate the 
impropriety of that instruction in this case:

"* * * `The taking of 
human life by accident, misadventure, or misfortune, while in the performance of 
a lawful act, exercising due care, and without harmful intent, is excusable; but 
all such facts must concur [in order for the act not to be criminal], and the 
absence of any one of them will involve guilt. The homicide must have been 
committed while the accused was engaged in doing a lawful act, and by lawful 
means, with ordinary and reasonable care, and without any unlawful or harmful 
intent. * * *'

"* * * `Where the theory 
of the defendant is that the killing or assault was the result of accident or 
misfortune, and was unintentional, and such theory finds support in the 
evidence, it is the duty of the court to instruct fully and clearly as to the 
law relating to accident or misfortune. Such an instruction is, however, 
unnecessary and properly refused in the absence of evidence tending to show 
accident or misfortune.'" Eagan v. 
State, supra, 128 P.2d  at 222-223.

"* * * The accidental 
killing of a human being by another is not a defense, unless caused in the doing 
of some lawful act. [Citations.]" Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 120 P. 471, 478 (1912).

[¶53.]  The appellant in this case was doing 
nothing that was lawful. The evidence emphatically discloses that he threatened, 
assaulted and shot his victim, without provocation. A defendant has a right to 
an instruction upon the theory of his case only if there is competent evidence 
to sustain it. Jackson v. State, Wyo., 624 P.2d 751, cert. denied 451 U.S. 989, 
101 S. Ct. 2327, 68 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1981), and cases there cited.

[¶54.]  I see no error.

[¶55.]  Appellant's offered Instruction No. D 
read:

"`Heat of passion' means 
such passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances as those in question 
which would cause him to act rashly, without reflection and deliberation, and 
from passion rather than from judgment."

This is WPJIC § 
7.509. Instruction No. 22 given by the trial judge added the emphasized 
sentence:

"`Heat of passion' means 
such passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances as those in question 
which would cause him to act rashly, without reflection and deliberation, and 
from passion rather than from judgment. Such passion must have been aroused by 
provocation of the Defendant by the person who was killed." (Emphasis 
added.)

Appellant 
contends that it makes no difference how heat of passion is aroused as long as 
it is present. He further asserts that it was Dianne Welsh rather than John 
Welsh who aroused his passion through her provocation and the victim was only 
the innocent beneficiary of that provocation. Appellant cites no authority for 
his position.

[¶56.]  Appellant's position is not sound. The 
general rule is that in order to reduce murder to manslaughter, the victim must 
have been the source of the defendant's provocation generating heat of passion. 
State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979); State v. Fowler, Iowa, 268 N.W.2d 220 (1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1072, 99 S. Ct. 842, 59 L. Ed. 2d 37 
(1979); Tripp v. State, 36 Md. App. 459, 374 A.2d 384 (1977); People v. Wax, 75 
Ill. App.2d 163, 220 N.E.2d 600 (1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 930, 87 S. Ct. 2051, 18 L. Ed. 2d 991; State v. Connor, Mo., 252 S.W. 713 (1923); 40 C.J.S. 
Homicide § 53; 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 57. There is no Wyoming Pattern Jury 
Instruction, Criminal, covering this principle.

[¶57.]  No error, in my view.

[¶58.]  Such holding would also dispose of 
appellant's objection to the court's Instruction No. 22 raised in his fifth 
issue before this court.

IV

[¶59.]  It is in this part that the majority and 
I part company. As to appellant's fourth issue, I will first consider 
appellant's claim of error in the court's giving Instruction No. 10: "You are 
instructed that the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner 
raises a presumption of malice."

Appellant 
objects that the instruction:

"* * * places the 
defendant in a position where he has the burden of proving that he is not guilty 
of malice. * * * [A] defendant in a criminal case, especially a murder case, has 
no duty to prove anything, much less to prove that he is not guilty of 
malice."

This objection 
was sufficient to preserve the question for appellate consideration.

[¶60.]  The State has called to our attention Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, which 
raises the real issue as to Instruction No. 10 for this court to decide. Do the 
facts and the trial judge's instructions in the case before us fall within the 
proscriptions of Sandstrom?

[¶61.]  The defendant in Sandstrom was charged 
with "deliberate homicide" in that he "purposely or knowingly" caused the 
victim's death. The defendant at trial took the position that though he killed 
the victim, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly." The trial judge 
instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts" over the objection that such an instruction 
had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose and 
knowledge. The Montana Supreme Court held that due process standards were not 
violated by the instruction.

[¶62.]  The United States Supreme Court held that 
because the jury may have interpreted the challenged instruction as conclusive 
or shifting the burden of persuasion, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 
(1970), and that the instruction was therefore unconstitutional.

[¶63.]  The presence of malice is a required 
element of first and second-degree murder in Wyoming. Scheikofsky v. State, 
Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981).4 The trial judge's instruction on 
the presumption of malice raised as indicated above thus arguably calls for an 
analysis as governed by Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court's most recent authoritative pronouncement on the validity of evidentiary 
presumptions in criminal cases. In analyzing the totality of the instructions, 
we find no constitutional error in the trial court's presumption 
instruction.

[¶64.]  As Sandstrom mandates:

[¶65.]  "The threshold inquiry in ascertaining 
the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to 
determine the nature of the presumption it describes. See Ulster County Court v. 
Allen, ante, at 157-163 [442 U.S. 140, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979)]. 
That determination requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to 
the jury, see ante, at 157-159, n. 16, for whether a defendant has been accorded 
his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could 
have interpreted the instruction." Sandstrom, supra, 442 U.S.  at 514, 99 S. Ct. 
at 2454.

[¶66.]  The Court in Sandstrom then proceeded to 
show that even if the presumption as given in the instruction were truly 
"permissive,"5 which it found the Sandstrom 
presumption of intent from an act's natural consequences not to be, the 
presumption must be disallowed on Winship grounds since a reasonable juror 
"could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory." Sandstrom, supra, 
442 U.S.  at 515, 99 S. Ct.  at 2454. I would sustain the presumption instruction 
since I can and will demonstrate that the presumption as articulated by the 
court's instructions is truly permissive, and also that a reasonable juror could 
not have construed such a presumption as mandatory.

[¶67.]  A genuinely permissive presumption "could 
not conceivably have run afoul of the constitutional decisions cited by the 
Court in its opinion" (Sandstrom, supra, 442 U.S.  at 527, 99 S. Ct.  at 2461, 
Rehnquist, Justice, concurring) for the reasons indicated in County Court of 
Ulster County, New York v. Allen, supra note 5. To manifest the genuinely 
permissive character of the malice presumption instruction, we must examine the 
"words actually spoken to the jury" as Sandstrom requires.

[¶68.]  The court's instructions, considered in 
relation to the constitutional propriety of the malice presumption, may be 
viewed in three contexts, i.e., jurors' duties and responsibilities, defendants' 
rights, and evidentiary requirements for the establishment of a fact or element 
of the crime charged. These contexts, taken together as they must be6, clearly demonstrate the permissive 
nature of the malice presumption. In the first context, jurors' duties and 
responsibilities are included in the court's instructions. Here the court 
instructed the jury on its nature as exclusive trier of fact; such facts to be 
determined solely from the evidence presented.7 Furthermore, the court closely 
admonished the jury to consider each of its instructions in the light of all the 
others; no instruction was to receive undue emphasis derived from a single 
sentence or individual point.8 The court also instructed 
unmistakably on the nature of the defendant's constitutional rights to due 
process in the fact-finding process. Instructions were given both on the 
presumption of innocence and, to emphasize the prosecution's responsibility to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense charged, 
on the fact that defendant is not required to prove his innocence.9 Finally, the court's instructions 
made amply manifest the rigorous standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
required for the establishment of every fact and element of the crime charged. 
The jurors were repeatedly informed that every element of the principal crime 
charged, first-degree murder, as well as of every possible lesser-included 
offense, had to be found by them beyond a reasonable doubt, and further that if 
any element were not so found by them, that element, and necessarily the crime 
thereby implicated, could not and must not be established.10 Any reasonable juror who had 
received these instructions was thus clearly aware of his duty to find all the 
required elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and his duty 
to acquit if he could not do so from and only from the prosecution's evidentiary 
case in chief.11

[¶69.]  Pursuing the Sandstrom analysis along 
another line of development, I pass to a consideration of the conceptual 
assumptions underlying the use of the malice presumption as indicated by the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence, particularly Rules 301 and 303.12 The differences between our rules 
and the Montana rules, the United States Supreme Court characterized as either 
creating a mandatory presumption or tending to lead a reasonable juror to 
believe a mandatory presumption had been intended or created,13 are striking and significant. 
First to be noticed is the fact that the Montana rules relating to presumptions 
are intended to apply in undifferentiated fashion to both civil and criminal 
proceedings. This is not the case in Wyoming; Wyoming Rule of Evidence 301 gives 
the civil (noncriminal) rule, establishing that only in such noncriminal actions shall a presumption 
have the effect of shifting the burden of going forward to the opponent of the 
presumption, while Wyoming Rule of Evidence 303 mandates a different treatment 
for presumptions employed in criminal trials. Second, in stark contrast to 
Montana's Rule 301(a), establishing an apparently universal rule of mandatory 
presumptions in Montana jurisprudence, nowhere do the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
characterize the nature of presumptions as mandatory, or other than 
permissive.14 And finally, the Wyoming rules 
specifically provide the special constitutionally required safeguards necessary 
where presumptions of common-law descent are applied in the criminal context. 
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 303 provides in terms that the court, when sending a 
question of fact supported by a presumption to the jury in a criminal trial, 
shall instruct the jury that they may 
rely on the presumption, but are not required to do so, and furthermore that, 
if reliance is had on the presumption, the fact must still be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, the constitutional perils encountered by a Montana 
defendant are effectively eliminated by the Wyoming practice, and a Winship error is avoided.15 Thus, the permissive character of 
the malice presumption as contained in all the court's instructions is well and 
fairly established. All instructions must be read as one instruction. 
Instruction No. 10 was not in the same conclusory language as the instruction 
considered in Sandstrom.

[¶70.]  Of course, the Sandstrom court was not to be persuaded 
by a theoretically permissive presumption. The evil to be avoided was the jury's 
possible understanding of the 
presumption as either mandatory ("conclusive"), or resulting in a burden shift 
to defendant on the issue of intent. Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S.  at 
518-525, 99 S. Ct.  at 2456-2459. As indicated, I find no possibility that a 
reasonable juror, receiving the court's instructions on the malice presumption 
in this case, could reach such conclusions. First, on the question of a 
reasonable juror's possible understanding of the presumption as mandatory or 
conclusive, in addition to the indications of permissiveness given by the 
court's instructions, there is the wholly persuasive fact that the court also 
carefully defined malice for the jury.16 The obvious and natural 
interpretation of this event is that the fact finder would need such a 
definition to find the fact by 
itself. No reasonable juror could possibly understand the definition to be 
surplusage in light of the court's other instructions on his duties and 
responsibilities. A reasonable juror could reasonably receive such an 
instructional definition only on the assumption that he was intended to use the 
definition to find the fact so 
defined. Thus, the mere possibility that the jury would consider the 
presumption mandatory is diminished to the vanishing point. Likewise, the 
anticipatory fear of the Sandstrom 
court that this jury might understand the malice presumption as causing a burden 
shift to defendant on the issue of malice is obviated by the court's clear 
instruction that the defendant cannot 
be made to prove his own innocence (see note 9), and by the understanding a 
reasonable juror would have of the distinctions created by Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence 301 and 303 that control this case (see note 12). Where the language of 
instructions in their entirety is clearly permissive, and the underlying 
evidentiary statutes establish as a matter of law that no burden shift may occur 
as a result of the employment of presumptions in criminal cases, there need be 
no anxiety of a reasonable juror making such a mistake. Unlike in Sandstrom, no burden of proof or 
persuasion was shifted to the appellant. I do not take, nor did the trial judge 
take, a position like that of the Supreme Court of Montana that allocation of 
"`some burden of proof'" (emphasis in original) to a defendant is permissible. 
Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S. 
at 513, 99 S. Ct.  at 2454.

[¶71.]  I thus conclude that no constitutional 
error occurred in this case as a result of the court's instruction to the jury 
on the presumption of malice arising from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly 
or dangerous manner. As indicated throughout this dissenting opinion, I reach 
this conclusion inasmuch as the twin Sandstrom dangers of a statutorily 
conclusive presumption and the possibility of a mistaken jury on the questions, 
either of the nature of the presumption as conclusive or permissive, or the 
possibility of the presumption causing a burden shift to defendant, are entirely 
absent from this case.

[¶72.]  In Sandstrom, the question of harmless 
error was not reached because the Montana court had not considered it. I would 
make no holding in that regard because I find no error. However, I have explored 
the subject and pass along the discoveries. Even if there was error, it was 
harmless and thus not ground for reversal. Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P.

[¶73.]  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967), reh. denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed. 2d 241; and Hays v. 
State, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1004 (1974), inform our judgment that not all trial 
errors of constitutional magnitude require reversal. Chapman, in establishing 
the federal rule for harmless error, mandates a reviewing appellate court to 
inquire whether it may say "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." It is not what the appellate 
court may think but whether a rational juror could conclude guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 

[¶74.]  I note the recent United States Supreme 
Court holding in Connecticut v. 
Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 969, 74 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1983), in which 
certiorari was granted to answer the question as left open by Sandstrom, as to whether such 
instructional error operates per se to deprive a defendant of due process. The 
plurality would hold that a conclusive presumption is never harmless.17 It is a plurality opinion of the 
most indecisive sort which, while entitled to our highest respect, does not 
compel any conclusion. It was a four-four split. Stevens, Justice, only 
concurred in the judgment. The dissent, entitled to the same respect, would have 
held that "[b]ecause the presumption does not remove the issue * * from the 
jury's consideration, it does not preclude a reviewing court from determining 
whether the error was `harmless beyond a reasonable doubt'" and "[w]hile a jury 
may rely on the presumption instruction as a means of finding [the required 
element of the charged crime], there may be many cases in which the facts and 
circumstances so conclusively establish this element that the instruction is wholly superfluous." 
(Emphasis added.) An equally divided court results in an affirmance and has no 
precedential value. Ringsby v. Dixon, 
Wyo., 496 P.2d 179 (1972); Town of Lovell 
v. Menhall, Wyo., 386 P.2d 109 (1963). The question was thus not decided in 
that the Connecticut Supreme Court never discussed harmless error. State v. Johnson, Conn., 440 A.2d 858 
(1981). The plurality opinion in Connecticut is at variance with the 
overwhelming proportion of cases deciding this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 
(1st Cir. 1981); Healy v. Maggio, 706 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1983); Engle v. 
Koehler, 707 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983); Conway v. Anderson, 698 F.2d 282 (6th 
Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Balkcom, 695 F.2d 1320 (11th Cir. 1983); Rock v. 
Coombe, 694 F.2d 908 (2nd Cir. 1982); Phillips v. Rose, 690 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 
1982); Glenn v. Dallman, 686 F.2d 418 
(6th Cir. 1982); Tweety v. Mitchell, 
682 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1982); Mancuso v. 
Harris, 677 F.2d 206 (2nd Cir. 1982); Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 
1982); Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1980); Hammontree v. 
Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1979); People v. Mitchell, 58 N.Y.2d 368, 461 N.Y.S.2d 267, 448 N.E.2d 121 (1983); People v. Woods, 416 Mich. 581, 331 N.W.2d 707 (1983); People v. Roder, 
33 Cal. 3d 491, 189 Cal. Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302 (1983); State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); State v. Forrester, 
134 Ariz. 444, 657 P.2d 432 (1982); Johnson v. State, 249 Ga. 621, 292 S.E.2d 696 (1982); State v. Hardy, 
Mont., 604 P.2d 792 (1980); State v. 
Heads, La., 385 So. 2d 230 (1980).

[¶75.]  The instruction on presumption was in all 
likelihood superfluous because of the overwhelming evidence of malice other than 
use of the firearm, which I have heretofore set out in some detail but summarize 
for this part of the dissent. On the day of the homicide, appellant telephoned 
his lover at an apartment where his victim was staying. He became angry when she 
professed her plan to remain with the victim. Appellant then threw down the 
telephone, picked it up, twice threatened Welsh's life and said he was coming to 
kill him. At the time of the murder, he called Welsh a "`zit face,'" followed by 
a violent assault knocking Welsh to the floor, deliberately pointed the handgun 
at Welsh and fired. What more in Heaven's name must we demand to prove malice 
and convict of murder!

[¶76.]  As a part of his fourth issue, appellant 
challenges the court's Instruction No. 21 on the ground that "he cannot be found 
`guilty' of either Murder in the First Degree or Murder in the Second Degree, 
regardless of what his intent or mental condition prior to the homicide was." He 
argues that the words in the instruction "intent to kill" force the jury to find 
there was a previous intent to kill and that it was "abandoned before the 
homicidal act was committed."

[¶77.]  Instruction No. 21: 

"The sudden heat of 
passion on the part of the defendant will not reduce the crime from murder to 
manslaughter where the defendant entertained a previous intent to kill, unless 
it appears that such intent was abandoned before the homicidal act was 
committed."

That instruction 
came verbatim from WPJIC § 7.506. It is a correct statement of the law with 
respect to manslaughter when charged as a lesser-included offense to murder. State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 566 (1956). Section 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, defines manslaughter:

"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion, or 
involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, or by any culpable 
neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter, and shall be 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty (20) years." (Emphasis 
added.)

Under the facts 
of this case the heat of passion was not a sudden flareup caused by the 
provocation of his victim when encountered face to face. The evidence indicates 
that his intent to kill was formed when he telephoned the Welsh apartment and at 
that time announced his intent to kill, armed himself, traveled to the victim's 
location and proceeded to carry out his threat. There is no evidence that at any 
time his intent was abandoned. A "sudden heat of passion" is inconsistent with 
an already formed intent.

[¶78.]  The rule is of long standing and was 
announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Collins v. United States, 150 U.S. 62, 
14 S. Ct. 9, 37 L. Ed. 998 (1893), where it was articulated in a little different 
fashion to say that if the defendant in a moment of passion, and without any 
previous preparation, did the shooting, the offense would be manslaughter and 
not murder; but, if he prepared himself to kill, and had a previous purpose to 
do so, then the mere fact of passion would not reduce the crime below 
manslaughter.

[¶79.]  It was a jury decision as to whether 
there was a previous intent to kill, whether there was a sudden heat of passion, 
and whether there had been an abandonment of a previously formed intent to kill. 
No error here that I can see.

[¶80.]  I have in Part III disposed of 
appellant's issue with respect to Instruction No. 22 and would have found no 
error.

V

[¶81.]  Finally, appellant protests as error the 
court's giving of a supplemental instruction in response to a question by the 
jury after it had returned:

"The Jury having 
submitted to the Court the following question: `Does the presence of malice 
preclude a manslaughter conviction?'; the Court instructs the Jury as follows: 
`Not necessarily', but a finding of malice, where the other elements for 
voluntary manslaughter have also been found, would preclude a manslaughter 
conviction."

[¶82.]  Before responding to the jury's question, 
the trial judge conferred in chambers with all counsel. At that time, he advised 
counsel of his proposed response. Appellant's counsel objected on the ground 
that the court's proposal was "an automatic direction by the Court for the jury 
to find the defendant guilty of second degree murder, at least." Appellant also 
thought there was some relationship between this instruction and Instruction No. 
10 (see Part IV) in that it compounded what appellant conceived to be error in 
Instruction No. 10. He further suggested that the court's response should only 
refer the jury to the instructions already given and state them to be adequate 
for a full consideration of the case.

[¶83.]  In Hoskins v. State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342 
(1976), this court approved the rule that in reviewing the propriety of a 
supplemental instruction given the jury, the instructions have to be considered 
as a whole and the supplemental instruction examined in the light of the other 
instructions previously given.

[¶84.]  Section 6-4-107, supra, defining 
manslaughter, quoted in an instruction, specifically states, "[w]hoever 
unlawfully kills any human being without 
malice * * * is guilty of manslaughter." (Emphasis added.) It is obvious 
then that even though the other elements of manslaughter may be present, if the 
killing was with malice, then it is not manslaughter but murder. The absence of 
malice is essential to the crime of manslaughter. See 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 
45.

[¶85.]  I am puzzled (a euphemism) by the 
majority's offhand statement in this regard that the

"* * * logical conclusion 
is that they [the jury] felt compelled to presume malice from the use of the gun 
because of the instructions in the case. It is then reasonable to conclude that 
if the jury had known that the presumption of malice was not mandatory, it may 
not have convicted appellant of second-degree murder. * * *"

That is a 
speculative sophism.

[¶86.]  The real reason for the question lies in 
conflicting instructions as originally given to the jury. The trial judge first 
gave WPJIC § 7.501:

"Pertinent portions of 
the Wyoming statutes provide as follows:

"`Whoever unlawfully 
kills any human being without malice, 
expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion, or 
involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, or by any culpable 
neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter . . .'" (Emphasis 
added.)

He followed that 
with WPJIC § 7.502:

"The necessary elements 
of voluntary manslaughter are:

"1. The crime occurred 
within the county of ____ on or about the date of ____; and

"2. The defendant killed 
a human being [words `without malice' 
missing!]; and

"3. The defendant acted 
voluntarily

"4. Upon a sudden heat of 
passion.

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty.

"If, on the other hand, 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty." (Bracketed material and emphasis added.)

[¶87.]  Note that WPJIC § 7.502 in the second 
element omits the words of the statute, "without malice." The trial judge did no 
more in his corrective language than straighten out a pattern instruction that 
is incomplete in part. It bears no relation whatsoever as to any 
presumption.

[¶88.]  I would have 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant was found 
guilty of second-degree murder as defined in § 6-4-104, W.S. 1977:

"Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of 
murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any 
term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life."

He was sentenced 
to serve not less than 20 years nor more than 20 years and one month in the 
State Penitentiary.

2 I note, however, that in 
the county court transcript, filed with the district court when appellant was 
bound over, there appears a letter to appellant's counsel from the same 
psychiatrist whom counsel relied upon which states, "[m]ental status examination 
revealed no evidence of major mental disorder including thought disorder, 
auditory or visual hallucinations, paranoid ideation, delusions or 
uncontrollable behavior." It was also noted appellant was depressed by events 
that had transpired.

3 Rule 32(c), W.R.Cr.P., a 
counterpart of Rule 31(c), F.R.Cr.P., authorizes the jury consideration of 
lesser-included offenses: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense 
necessarily included in the offense charged. * * *"

4 Instruction No. 7, in 
pertinent part, given in this case:

"The necessary elements 
of the crime of murder in the first degree are:

"1. The crime occurred 
within the county of Natrona on or about the date of February, [sic] 20, 1982; 
and

"2. The defendant killed 
a human being; and

"3. The defendant acted 
purposely; and

"4. With premeditation; 
and

"5. With 
malice."

Instruction No. 
16, in pertinent part, given in this case:

"The necessary elements 
of the crime of murder in the second degree are:

"1. The crime occurred 
within the county of Natrona on or about the date of February 20, 1982; 
and

"2. The defendant killed 
a human being; and

"3. The defendant acted 
purposely; and

"4. With 
malice."

5 The definition of 
permissive presumptions in County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-158, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979), is instructive 
here:

"The most common 
evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which 
allows - but does not require - the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact 
from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any 
kind on the defendant. See, e.g., Barnes 
v. United States, supra, [412 U.S. [837] at] 840 n. 3 [93 S. Ct. 2357, 2360 
n. 3, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380]. In that situation the basic fact may constitute prima 
facie evidence of the elemental fact. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 
402 n. 2 [90 S. Ct. 642, 645 n. 2, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610]. When reviewing this type of 
device, the Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate its 
invalidity as applied to him. E.g., Barnes v. United States, supra, [412 
U.S.,] at 845 [93 S. Ct.  at 2362]; Turner 
v. United States, supra, [396 U.S.,] at 419-424 [90 S.Ct. at 653-656]. See 
also United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67-68, 69-70 [85 S. Ct. 754, 757-758, 758-759, 13 L. Ed. 2d 658]. Because 
this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject 
the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application 
of the `beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if, under the facts of the 
case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by 
the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation 
of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the 
presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous factual 
determination."

6 "[A] single instruction 
to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the 
context of the overall charge." Cupp v. 
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 S. Ct. 396 [400], 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1973). 
Accord, Scheikofsky v. State, supra, 
636 P.2d 1107; Loy v. State, 26 Wyo. 
381, 185 P. 796 (1919); Flanders v. 
State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 1121 (1916); Roberts v. State, 11 Wyo. 66, 70 P. 803 
(1902).

7 Instruction No. 1, in 
pertinent part:

"You are the exclusive 
triers of the facts and of the effect and value of the evidence, but you must 
determine the facts from the evidence produced here in Court. * * *

* * * * * *

"In determining any of 
the questions before you in this case, you should be governed solely by the 
evidence. * * *"

8 Instruction No. 1, in 
pertinent part:

"* * * For that reason, 
you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point but are 
to regard all the instructions as a whole, and are to regard each in the light 
of all the others. * * *"

9 Instruction No. 5, in 
pertinent part:

"The law places the 
burden upon the state to prove the defendant is guilty. The law does not require 
the defendant to prove his innocence. Accordingly, you must assume that the 
defendant is innocent unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and 
from all of the evidence in the case that he is guilty."

10 Instruction No. 5 
included:

"* * * The test you must 
use is this: If you have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of any of the 
elements to be proved, you should find the defendant not guilty. If you have no 
reasonable doubt as to the proof of any of them, you should find the defendant 
guilty."

Instruction No. 
7 (instruction on first-degree murder) included:

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty."

Instruction No. 
16 (instruction on second-degree murder) included:

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty."

Instruction No. 
18 (instruction on voluntary manslaughter) included:

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty."

Instruction No. 
19 (instruction on involuntary manslaughter) included:

"If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty."

11 The sufficiency of these 
instructions to indicate a purely permissive presumption should be properly 
compared with those found adequate in County Court of Ulster County, New York v. 
Allen, supra, 442 U.S.  at 161-163, 99 S. Ct.  at 2227, to guarantee a purely 
permissive presumption. The similarities are striking. While the instructions in 
County Court of Ulster County, New York 
v. Allen, supra, used the words "may infer and draw a conclusion" from the 
presumption, it is my position that all the instructions in the case before us 
were permissive. To allow a 
permissive use of a presumption need not be expressed in a single word, as 
enunciated in all the language of County 
Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, supra, which went through the 
same exercise as I do in looking at all the instructions.

12 Rule 301, Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence, in pertinent part, provides:

"(a) Effect. - In all civil actions and 
proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of 
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its 
existence."

Rule 303, 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence, in pertinent part, provides:

"(a) Scope. - Except as otherwise provided by 
statute, in criminal cases, presumptions against an accused, recognized at 
common law or created by statute, including statutory provisions that certain 
facts are prima facie evidence of other facts or of guilt, are governed by this 
rule.

* * * * * *

"(c) Instructing the jury. - Whenever the 
existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the 
court shall instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as sufficient 
evidence of the presumed fact but is not required to do so. In addition, if the 
presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a 
defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the 
evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

13 Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S.  at 516-517, 99 S. Ct.  at 
2455.

14 In fact, no definition 
of presumptions is given by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence except the 
"operational" definition given in Rule 301 requiring a shift in the burden of 
production in civil actions. It may be noted that the effect of this policy 
decision not to define presumptions is to create maximum discretion in the 
interpretation of the effect of presumptions in the fact finder.

15 I cite the Wyoming 
practice similarly in intent to the United States Supreme Court's citation of 
the Montana rules in Sandstrom, i.e., not to demonstrate their defectiveness or 
exemplary quality, but as evidence of their probable effect on a reasonable 
juror. In passing, I note my confidence that the trial judge fully complied with 
the requirements of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 303 when the instructions are 
considered as a whole.

16 Instruction No. 9 
provides:

"`With malice' means the 
commission of a wrongful act done intentionally without legal justification or 
excuse. The term `malice' conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility 
toward another and implies a wicked condition of mind."

17 The court in Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, does not 
so hold in terms; it merely affirms the state court decision.