Title: Baldwin v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
DEMETRIUS D. BALDWIN 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
v. 
Record No. 061264 
 
 
 
 
June 8, 2007 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Demetrius D. Baldwin appeals from the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed his conviction in the 
Circuit Court of Chesterfield County for attempted murder in 
violation of Code §§ 18.2-32 and 18.2-26.  The sole issue in 
this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the 
necessary intent to kill to support a conviction for attempted 
murder.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we 
consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  “We 
also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences 
fairly deducible from the evidence.”  Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 
Va. 296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2004). 
 
The evidence adduced at trial showed that on the June 16, 
2004, Mark D. Bowen, a Chesterfield County police officer, 
observed Baldwin traveling approximately 25 miles per hour over 
the posted speed limit in a residential area.  Bowen followed 
 
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Baldwin in his police cruiser and both vehicles turned onto 
Route 10 before Bowen activated his emergency equipment.  
Baldwin brought his car to a stop on the paved right-hand turn 
lane of the road with a clear path in the turn lane in front of 
his vehicle.  Bowen parked “about a vehicle and a half length” 
behind Baldwin, and then approached Baldwin’s vehicle on foot.  
Bowen stopped by the “driver’s side rear passenger window” and 
“the driver’s door” of Baldwin’s vehicle, keeping his “hand down 
on the vehicle in case [Baldwin] tried to pop the vehicle or 
open his door.” 
Bowen observed Baldwin speaking on a cellular telephone, so 
he tapped on Baldwin’s window.  Rather than acknowledging Bowen, 
Baldwin “put both hands on the steering wheel and turned his 
vehicle towards [Bowen], and then proceeded over two lanes of 
traffic and sped off.”  In order to prevent the back wheels of 
Baldwin’s vehicle from running over his feet as the car 
accelerated, Bowen perceived he “had to push off the back of the 
car.”  Joined by several other police officers, Bowen then 
pursued Baldwin and was able to stop and arrest him 
approximately seven miles from the location of the initial stop. 
At trial in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, 
Baldwin testified he fled from the initial stop after 
“panick[ing]” because of an outstanding warrant for his arrest 
for violating the terms of his probation for a DUI conviction.  
 
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Baldwin testified he last saw Bowen “[a]t the rim of [Baldwin’s] 
car” and that he did not hear Bowen tap on the window.  Baldwin 
also denied intending to strike Bowen with his vehicle. 
 
After a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Baldwin of 
attempted murder, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-32 and 18.2-26, 
and eluding police, in violation of Code § 46.2-817.1  The 
circuit court sentenced Baldwin to 15 years incarceration on the 
attempted murder conviction, with 11 years suspended.  Baldwin 
appealed his conviction for attempted murder to the Court of 
Appeals.  Upon reviewing “all the facts and circumstances” in 
the record, and noting “[h]ad [Baldwin] intended only to escape, 
he could have driven away in the turn lane without turning the 
car in Bowen’s direction,” the Court of Appeals determined “the 
evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
appellant possessed the intent to kill Bowen by striking him 
with a motor vehicle.”2 
We awarded Baldwin this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Baldwin makes the same argument on appeal to this Court as 
he made in the Court of Appeals: that because the evidence does 
                                                 
1 Baldwin did not appeal his conviction for eluding police. 
2 The Court of Appeals also remanded the case to the circuit 
court for resentencing because the “sentence imposed upon 
[Baldwin] for his conviction of attempted murder under Code 
§§ 18.2-26 and 18.2-32 exceed[ed] the statutory maximum for a 
Class 4 felony.” 
 
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not show he had the specific intent to kill Bowen, he cannot be 
guilty of attempted murder.  Baldwin contends Bowen’s testimony 
supports the reasonable hypothesis that Baldwin merely panicked 
and was fleeing the scene rather than taking any action directed 
toward Bowen.  In particular, Baldwin draws attention to Bowen’s 
testimony that he was standing beside Baldwin’s vehicle and “had 
to push off the back of the car so [Baldwin’s vehicle’s] back 
wheels didn’t run over [his] feet.”  (Emphasis added.)  Baldwin 
asserts “given Officer Bowen’s position beside and behind 
[Baldwin’s] vehicle, [Baldwin] could not have even intended to 
run over Bowen for being in his way.”   
Baldwin distinguishes other vehicle-pedestrian cases in 
which defendants have been convicted for attempted murder based 
on the evidence in those cases that “the defendant[s] 
deliberately pointed [their] vehicle[s] toward a potential 
victim.”  Baldwin analogizes the facts in the case at bar to 
those in Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 
606 (1995), where the Court of Appeals reversed Haywood’s 
conviction “because the Commonwealth presented no direct 
evidence that Haywood in running the road blocks intended to 
murder the police officers and because its circumstantial 
evidence did not exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”  
Id. at 568, 458 S.E.2d at 609. 
 
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The Commonwealth responds the evidence supports the fact-
finder’s conclusion as to Baldwin’s intent, which must be given 
deference on appeal.  It contends the evidence supports the 
reasonable inference that “Baldwin intended to kill [Bowen] to 
effectuate his escape.”  This is so, the Commonwealth avers, 
because “[n]othing prevented Baldwin from ‘going straight’ as he 
pulled away,” yet Baldwin “grabbed the steering wheel with both 
hands, turned his car toward [Bowen] and sped away.”  The 
Commonwealth concludes the circuit court was free to weigh the 
credibility of witnesses and ignore Baldwin’s self-serving 
explanation in light of Bowen’s testimony supporting the 
conviction.   
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction, this Court will “affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court unless that judgment is without evidence to support it or 
is plainly wrong.”  Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 337, 541 
S.E.2d 872, 892 (2001).  Under this standard, we find the Court 
of Appeals erred in affirming Baldwin’s conviction for attempted 
murder because the evidence does not support the conclusion that 
Baldwin had the intent to kill Bowen with his vehicle.  “[W]hile 
a person may be guilty of murder though there was no actual 
intent to kill, he cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit 
murder unless he has a specific intent to kill.”  Merritt v. 
Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 660, 180 S.E. 395, 398 (1935); see 
 
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also Howard v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 904, 906, 275 S.E.2d 602, 
603 (1981) (evidence “must establish a specific intent to commit 
the crime”).  The Commonwealth thus had the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that Baldwin acted with the 
specific intent to kill Bowen.  This, it failed to do.   
Bowen and Baldwin were the only two witnesses to testify at 
trial.  By Bowen’s own account, he was standing beside and 
slightly behind the driver’s side door when Baldwin “put both 
hands on the steering wheel and turned his vehicle towards me, . 
. . proceed[ing] over two lanes of traffic and [speeding] off, 
at which time [he] had to push off the back of the car so [the 
vehicle’s] back wheels didn’t run over [his] feet.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  And on cross-examination Bowen agreed that Baldwin 
“didn’t put the car in reverse and try to strike [Bowen] with 
[the] vehicle” and that Baldwin “never tried to strike [Bowen’s] 
vehicle with his vehicle.”  Bowen’s testimony simply does not 
support the circuit court’s finding that Baldwin formed the 
intent to kill Bowen by using his vehicle as a weapon.   
The case at bar is clearly distinguished from Coles v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 585, 621 S.E.2d 109 (2005), and cases from 
the Court of Appeals affirming convictions for attempted murder 
in somewhat similar circumstances involving a motor vehicle as a 
potential weapon.  In Coles, a case with unique facts, the Court 
observed: 
 
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Important [to the conclusion that Coles formed 
the requisite specific intent] are the relative 
positions of [Coles’ vehicle], [the police officer’s] 
cruiser, and [the police officer] when the vehicles 
were stopped and before [Coles] accelerated [his 
vehicle]. 
[The police officer and his vehicle were located 
at an angle to the left and front of the defendant’s 
vehicle.] 
As [the officer] was confronting the defendant, 
[Coles] assumed a surrender position, and [the 
officer] believed the pursuit had ended. . . . 
[Coles’] contention [that he was merely trying to 
escape] is belied by the clear evidence that [Coles] 
drove [his vehicle], not straight ahead where there 
was plenty of room to make a right turn, but swerved 
to the left and aimed the [vehicle] directly toward 
the officer and the police vehicle. 
 
Id. at 590-91, 621 S.E.2d at 112.3  Thus, in Coles, the defendant 
“aimed [his vehicle] directly toward” the police officer, who 
was standing in front of the defendant’s vehicle.  In contrast, 
the evidence in the case at bar shows that Baldwin turned his 
car into traffic in order to flee while Bowen was standing 
toward the rear of the vehicle and slightly behind the driver’s 
side door.  There was no evidence that Baldwin aimed his vehicle 
directly toward Bowen or otherwise had any intent to inflict 
bodily harm on Bowen, much less that he had formed the intent to 
murder Bowen.  Indeed, Bowen’s testimony indicates that even if 
                                                 
3 See also Holley v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 228, 604 
S.E.2d 127 (2004) (defendant accelerated toward police officer 
standing in defendant’s path); Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. 
App. 528, 567 S.E.2d 537 (2002) (defendant turned his vehicle 
toward police officer, who was riding a motorcycle, and 
accelerated rapidly); Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 
508 S.E.2d 354 (1998) (defendant accelerated toward pedestrian). 
 
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he had not pushed away from Baldwin’s vehicle, the vehicle would 
at most have struck his feet.  When viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence does not support 
the conclusion that Baldwin possessed the requisite specific 
intent to kill Bowen necessary to support a conviction for 
attempted murder. 
 
As Baldwin contends, the facts of this case are more 
analogous to Haywood, which only supported the conclusion that 
the defendant was attempting to escape.  Similarly, the facts 
before us in this case are insufficient as a matter of law to 
prove an intent to kill.  Thus, the Commonwealth failed to prove 
a necessary element of the crime of attempted murder.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Baldwin’s 
conviction for attempted murder because the evidence does not 
show Baldwin possessed the requisite specific intent to kill 
Bowen. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the indictment.4 
Reversed and dismissed. 
                                                 
4 In light of our disposition on the merits of Baldwin’s 
conviction, the portion of Court of Appeals’ judgment regarding 
the trial court’s error in sentencing Baldwin beyond the 
statutory maximum becomes moot.  Neither this opinion nor the 
Court of Appeals’ judgment has any effect on Baldwin’s 
contemporaneous conviction for eluding the police, in violation 
of Code § 46.2-817.