Title: Pellatz v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pellatz v. State1986 WY 1711 P.2d 1138Case Number: 85-107Decided: 01/02/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT DEAN PELLATZ, 
A/K/A ROBERT D. PELLATZ, A/K/A ROBERT PELLATZ, A/K/A BOB PELLATZ, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NiobraraCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard Munker, State 
Public Defender, Cheyenne, Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Wyo. Defender Aid Program, Laramie, John C. Smiley, Student Intern, Wyo. 
Defender Aid Program, for appellant (defendant). 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Darold W. Killmer, Legal Intern, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY*, BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is a 
purloined-backhoe case. Appellant, Robert Dean Pellatz (Pellatz) was convicted 
in a jury trial of larceny theft, and brings the appeal from the claimed 
unconstitutional intrusion without a search warrant, wherein the law enforcement 
officer determined ownership of the missing equipment by directing a mechanic to 
climb upon a lowboy semi truck trailer parked in a public parking lot, to locate 
identification information. The case comes to this court on appeal on the 
inquiry as to whether the activity of the law enforcement officer was 
constitutionally impermissible in arranging, without first securing a search 
warrant, to identify a backhoe, on a trailer in plain sight, as the suspected 
stolen property.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Pellatz was arrested 
under an outstanding warrant for a bad-check charge, which is unrelated to this 
case, as he was driving a semi truck with trailer south on the Interstate 
highway from Cheyenne, Wyoming, toward Fort Collins, Colorado. On the open 
lowboy trailer which he was pulling was a Case Caterpillar-type backhoe. Pellatz 
was taken to jail, and the truck and trailer first parked after arrest on the 
Interstate highway was moved by Sheriff personnel to a nearby truck stop and 
then taken by an acquaintance of Pellatz to the parking lot at the Bunkhouse 
Bar, a public bar facility some 15 miles west of Cheyenne.

 
 

[¶4.]     The backhoe had been 
removed by Pellatz and a woman driver from an oil-well drilling site in Niobrara 
County, more than 100 miles north from Cheyenne, and then taken sometime before 
the arrest incident to the Bunkhouse Bar, where Pellatz had attempted to remove 
identification data. At the time of the arrest of Pellatz, the LaramieCounty (Cheyenne) 
Sheriff's office was not aware of the theft of the backhoe in NiobraraCounty. However, before his release could 
be accomplished on the unrelated warrant, information came to the Laramie County 
Sheriff's office about the theft, with a suggestion that Pellatz might be 
involved.

 
 

[¶5.]     This was not a lucky 
time for him, as evidenced by the accidental arrest on the unrelated charge as 
he was attempting to move the backhoe out of Wyoming, but, additionally, because 
the equipment vendor, Wilson Equipment and Supply Company, had installed a 
special vendor sticker to the equipment for their separate identification. The 
Sheriff's officer, recalling the equipment which had been on the trailer when 
Pellatz was arrested, secured a Wilson Equipment mechanic for assistance and 
went to the Bunkhouse Bar "to examine the equipment." The two men found the 
tractor-trailer unit in the public parking area of the Bunkhouse Bar, with the 
backhoe located on the trailer in clear sight.

 
 

[¶6.]     The mechanic, Marvin 
Graham, proceeded to try to find identification numbers on the equipment, and 
discovered that most of the identification information had either been removed 
by attempting to erase the stamped numbers or by extricating identification 
tags. After stepping upon the trailer and crawling under the backhoe, he found 
an unremoved, stamped transaxle number and the Wilson Equipment and Supply 
Company product identification number which identified the unit and permitted 
ownership determination.

 
 

[¶7.]     Based on this 
identification of the equipment as the missing NiobraraCounty backhoe, there followed a search 
warrant, rearrest, trial and conviction. Pellatz made a timely motion to 
suppress all evidence resulting from the identification examination on the 
lowboy trailer, on the basis of a contended warrantless, illegal search, and the 
motion was denied by the trial court. 

 
 

[¶8.]     We will affirm the 
decision and conviction.

 
 

[¶9.]     In affirming the trial 
court's rejection of the motion to suppress, and consequently approving the 
resulting conviction, this court will first determine that no "search" of the 
trailer, which was the property of the accused, was ever made. The activity 
which is subject to the constitutional inquiry consisted of the mechanic 
climbing on the trailer only to inspect the backhoe in order to check for 
ownership identification of the potentially stolen property. No real property 
trespass occurred, since the parking area at the Bunkhouse Bar afforded public 
access.

 
 

[¶10.]  The issue we reach is whether the 
activity of the Wilson mechanic involved in examining the Case 
backhoe, as undertaken at the direction of the investigative officer, violated 
constitutional rights of Pellatz as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 
 

[¶11.]  In all contended impermissible-search 
questions, the court must first consider the threshold question of whether a 
search, in the constitutional sense, occurred at all, before reaching the issue 
as to whether or not the search was unreasonable. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984); 
McCutcheon v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 537 
(1979).

 
 

[¶12.]  That case and comparable decisions are 
decisive on the issue, and consequently this court will not undertake further 
pursuit of the second-phase improper or unjustified search legal inquiry.1 United 
States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970); 
68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures § 88, pp. 678, 742.

 
 

[¶13.]  Prior to entry on the trailer, both the 
deputy sheriff and the mechanic were where they had a right to be. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, reh. denied 404 U.S. 874, 92 S. Ct. 26, 30 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971); McCutcheon v. State, 
supra.

 
 
"* * * Thus, so long as 
their initial intrusion is justified, the police while within the 

legitimate scope of their 
entry may search the premises with their eyes." Ortega v. State, Wyo., 669 P.2d 935, 941 
(1983).

 
 

[¶14.]  Standing there in the public parking lot 
with the Case backhoe in clear and unrestricted view, what were the alternatives 
of the law-enforcement officer in his investigation? Although a search case 
after arrest, the rule of Alcala v. 
State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 997, 92 S. Ct. 1259, 31 L. Ed. 2d 466, reh. denied 406 U.S. 911, 92 S. Ct. 1613, 31 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1972), is not inapposite.

 
 

[¶15.]  The officer, in this case, in making his 
observation, did not infringe physically upon the structured integrity of any 
vehicle. See United States v. Amuny, 
767 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.), reh. denied 775 F.2d 301 (1985). At that time and 
place, the investigating police officer was faced with three responsibilities as 
he looked at the Case backhoe in front of him on the 
trailer.

 
 

[¶16.]  (1) He had a duty to Pellatz, then in 
jail, to either prove or disprove the suspicion of grand larceny. Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); People v. Thiret, Colo., 
685 P.2d 193 (1984).

 
 

[¶17.]  (2) Likewise, he had a duty to Steve's 
Roustabout, the owner, whose backhoe had been stolen, to locate, protect and 
return a significantly valuable construction machine. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683 
(1924).

 
 

[¶18.]  (3) Finally, he had a duty to the 
Sheriff's office, the county and the state of Wyoming, to complete his investigation by 
identification of that equipment, or conversely to determine that it was not the 
equipment and then to pursue alternative directions for his investigation.2 In re Petition of Olson, 211 Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 
(1941); 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables § 42, p. 211.

 
 

[¶19.]  What he did was to determine whether it 
was or was not, and all three duties within his job responsibility were 
consequently satisfied with the knowledge gained.

 
 

[¶20.]  Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion 
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), articulated the most frequently used 
standard by which Fourth Amendment claims are measured. The requirement is 
twofold. First, a person must have exhibited an actual subjective expectation of 
privacy. Second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United 
States, supra, 389 U.S.  at 361, 88 S. Ct.  at 
516.

 
 

[¶21.]  The Wyoming Supreme Court has previously 
adopted standards for determining when an individual possesses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The factors to be considered include: (1) the 
precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of 
the drafters of the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the 
property rights a claimant possesses in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of 
the individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or 
seized. Parkhurst v. State, 
Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369, cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981); Ortega v. State, 
supra.

 
 

[¶22.]  Applying the factors which this court 
adopted in Parkhurst and Ortega to the facts in this case, it is clear to this 
court that there was no search of the backhoe in a constitutional context. 
First, appellant Pellatz took no precautions in order to maintain his privacy in 
the trailer or the backhoe. Both were in plain view. Both were intransit on 
Interstate 25, which would have enabled any curious passerby to see the stolen 
backhoe. Even after Pellatz was arrested, the backhoe and the trailer were 
parked in a place to which the public had access, both when the truck, trailer 
and backhoe were parked at the truck stop and later when the truck, trailer and 
backhoe were parked at the Bunkhouse Bar parking lot. These parking lots may be 
likened to open fields, and "open fields do not provide the setting for those 
intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from 
government interference or surveillance." Oliver v. United States, supra, 104 S. Ct.  at 1741. The subject was discussed by Justice Blume in State v. George, supra, 61 years ago, 
with comments that remain equally valid today:

 
 
"`The special protection 
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their "persons, houses, papers 
and effects," is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the 
latter and the house is as old as the common law. 4 Bl.Comm. 223, 225, 226.'" 
231 P.  at 688, quoting from Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898 
(1924).

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant contends that neither the 
officer nor Mr. Graham, the Wilson Equipment and Supply Company employee, had 
any right to climb on the trailer to examine the backhoe for vehicle 
identification, or, more accurately stated, that the activity constitutionally 
tainted the information obtained when prosecution for theft thereafter followed. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Polk, supra, found 
otherwise. That court held, in regard to the issue, that there can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the identity of a vehicle 
identification number:

 
 
"* * * Opening the car 
door, looking under the hood, or crawling under the car to inspect the rear axle 
does not independently bring an inspection of the VIN within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment." 433 F.2d  at 647.

 
 

[¶24.]  Even if the activity of the mechanic 
constituted a technical trespass, such conduct would still not necessarily be a 
Fourth Amendment search when no expectation of privacy is disappointed. Edwards v. State, 38 Wis.2d 332, 156 N.W.2d 397 (1968).

 
 

[¶25.]  The case of United States v. Amuny, supra, is 
strongly presented by appellant in argument in support of his position. The 
factual situation is not comparable, and would afford a different "view" if the 
airplane itself had been stolen and the investigation conducted to determine its 
identification. In Amuny, the officer 
climbed on an airplane to look in the front window for contraband. Here, the 
backhoe was in clear view, with the only question being that 
identification.

 
 

[¶26.]  The court said in Amuny:

 
 
"We agree with the 
government that to determine whether Agent Castro was in a place where he had a 
lawful right to be we must focus upon whether Castro's conduct invaded the 
appellant's legitimate expectations of privacy in the aircraft." (Emphasis added.) 767 F.2d  at 1126.

 
 

[¶27.]  The present case involves looking at and 
not in, and the object was open and notoriously available for inspection. See 
special concurrence of Chief Justice Thomas in Hunter v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 713, 718 
(1985). Oliver v. United States, 
supra; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974).

 
 

[¶28.]  In holding that no constitutionally 
impermissive search occurred in the circumstance in the investigative effort to 
identify potentially stolen property which is open to public view, this court 
will not pursue the alternative issue of standing. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), reh. denied 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979); 
Williams v. State, Wyo., 557 P.2d 135 
(1976). The contested police activity consisted of examination for 
identification as differentiated from search and seizure for evidence. Cf. 
"plain view" cases: Kish v. State, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 453 (1982), and McCutcheon v. State, 
supra.

 
 

[¶29.]  Likewise, this opinion will not be 
extended to warrantless-search cases with the attendant rules which are involved 
as incident to arrest or otherwise justified or unjustified in the particular 
search conditions. See Patterson v. 
State, Wyo., 691 P.2d 253 (1984), cert. denied in Spoon v. Wyoming, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 2048, 85 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1985); Parkhurst v. State, supra; Alcala v. State, supra. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982); Texas v. White, 
423 U.S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 
(1975), reh. denied 423 U.S. 1081, 96 S. Ct. 869, 47 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S. Ct. 881, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1964); Jessee v. State, 
Wyo., 640 P.2d 56 (1982).

 
 

[¶30.]  We hold that the identification was 
constitutionally permissible.

 
 

[¶31.]  Affirmed.

 
 

1 This is not to suggest 
that probable cause did not exist for the warrantless search in the context of 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). See also California v. Carney, ___ 
U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985).

 
 

2"* * * Blackstone says (1 
Com. 344): `He may and is bound ex officio to pursue and take all traitors, 
murderers, felons and other misdoers and to commit them to gaol for safe 
custody. He is also to defend his county against any of the king's enemies when 
they come into the land; and for this purpose as well as for keeping the peace 
and pursuing felons, he may command all of the people of his county to attend 
him.'" Maxwell v. AndrewCounty, 347 Mo. 156, 146 S.W.2d 621, 
625 (1940).