Title: STATE EX REL WOODAHL v DISTRICT C

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12240 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A on the r e l a t i o n of R O B E R T L. W O O D A H L , Attorney General of the S t a t e of Montana, Rela t o r , THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A i n and f o r the County of Lewis and Clark and H O N O R A B L E N A T ALLEN, the Acting Judge thereof, Respondents, Counsel of Recordc For Rela t o r : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. John P. Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana. Poore, McKenzie and Roth, Butte, Montana. Robert Poore argued, Special Deputy Attorney General, Butte, Montana. Donald Robinson appeared, Butte, Montana. For Respondents: Sandall, Moses and Cavan, Billings, Montana. Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana. A M I C U S CURIAE H a James Oleson, argued, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana. Submitted: March 28, 1972 4 Decided : MAR 8 1 1 9 7 2 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The attorney g e n e r a l ' s application t o t h i s Court f o r supervisory control o r o t h e r appropriate r e l i e f presents b u t a s i n g l e l e g a l issue: whether t h e attorney general, under t h e f a c t s and circumstances of t h i s case, has t h e power t o i n i t i a t e a criminal felony prosecution i n t h e d i s t r i c t court independent of t h e county attorney. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t held t h e attorney general has no such l e g a l power. W e agree. The f a c t s of t h i s case a r e not complex. The attorney general applied t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lewis and Clark County, the Hon. N a t Allen, d i s t r i c t judge presiding, f o r leave t o f i l e a d i r e c t information charging one George McGaffick with e i g h t felony counts involving t h e presentation of fraudulent b i l l s o r claims t o t h e state f o r allowance and payment. The a p p l i c a t i o n w a s signed by John P. Connor, Jr., a s s i s t a n t chief deputy attorney general of t h e s t a t e of Montana. The county attorney of Lewis and Clark County w a s not consulted and d i d n o t sign t h e appli- c a t i o n f o r leave t o f i l e t h e charges nor d i d he sign t h e infor- mation tendered t o t h e c o u r t with t h e application. O n March 3 , 1972, Judge Allen held a hearing on t h e appli- c a t i o n of t h e attorney general. Judge Allen heard d e t a i l e d proof of probable cause f o r f i l i n g the information d i r e c t and made an express finding t h a t probable cause e x i s t e d and had been proven. However Judge Allen denied t h e application on the s o l e ground t h a t t h e attorney general d i d not have a u t h o r i t y t o f i l e t h e in- formation himself independent of t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n and signature. Following t h i s d e n i a l by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t h e a t t o r n e y general applied to t h i s Court f o r supervisory c o n t r o l o r o t h e r appropriate r e l i e f t o review t h i s determination by t h e d i s t r i c t court. W e issued an o r d e r t o show cause and t h e r e a f t e r b r i e f s w e r e f i l e d and o r a l argument heard on behalf of t h e a t t o r n e y general, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , and t h e Montana County Attorneys' Association a s amicus c u r i a e . Additionally a motion t o quash was f i l e d by t h e Montana County Attorneys' Association, A t t h e o u t s e t we hold t h a t t h e w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l is a v a i l a b l e a s a remedy t o test t h e power of t h e a t t o r n e y general i n t h i s regard. The a t t o r n e y general has no remedy i n t h e ordin- a r y course of law by appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r , It w i l l n o t do t o say t h a t he has an a v a i l a b l e remedy by d i r e c t i n g t h e county a t t o r n e y t o s i g n t h e information and f i l e it, f o r t o do s o would amount t o an abdication of t h e l e g a l power claimed by t h e a t t o r n e y general and would f u r n i s h no answer t o t h e l e g a l i s s u e he seeks t o r a i s e . Proceeding t o t h e merits, t h e b a s i c p o s i t i o n of t h e a t - torney general is t h a t he has power t o f i l e t h e s e c r i m i n a l charges and i n i t i a t e t h i s prosecution independent of t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s power t o do so; t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s power i n t h i s regard is derived from t h e common law which has n o t been abrogated by c o n s t i t u t i o n o r s t a t u t e . On t h e o t h e r hand, respondent's p o s i t i o n is simply t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s common law power t o i n i t i a t e a criminal prosecution independently of t h e county a t t o r n e y has been super- seded by s t a t u t e i n Montana. The common law power of t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l to f i l e c r i m i n a l charges and i n i t i a t e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c t u i o n s i s t a c i t l y conceded. Nor can t h e r e be any real i s s u e i n t h i s regard. Sec- t i o n 12-103, R.C.M. 1947 provides: "The common law o f England, so f a r a s it is n o t repu.gnant t o o r i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e United S t a t e s , or t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o r l a w s o f t h i s s t a t e , o r of t h e codes, is t h e r u l e of d e c i s i o n i n a l l t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e . " The Montana Supreme Court, i n S t a t e e x rel. Ford v. Young, 54 Mont. 401, 170 P. 947, had t h i s t o s a y concerning t h e n a t u r e and o r i g i n of t h e powers of t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l : "The o f f i c e of a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l is of a n c i e n t o r i g i n . The powers and d u t i e s a p p e r t a i n i n g t o it were recognized by t h e common law, and t h e common law h a s been a p a r t of our system o f jurisprudence from t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of Montana t e r r i t o r y t o t h e p r e s e n t day. (Bannack S t a t u t e s , p. 356; Comp. S t a t s . p. 647; Rev. Codes, sec, 3552). I n t h i s state t h e o f f i c e o f a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l is c r e a t e d by our state C o n s t i t u t i o n (sec. 1, A r t . V I I I ) , which a l s o provides t h a t t h e incumbent o f t h e o f f i c e ' s h a l l perform such - d u t i e s a s a r e p r e s c r i b e d i n t h i s Consti- t u t i o n and by t h e laws of t h i s s t a t e . ' The C o n s t i t u t i o n enumerates c e r t a i n d u t i e s , and s e c t i o n 193, Revised Codes,(now s e c t i o n 82- 401-11, R.C.M. 1947) c e r t a i n o t h e r s , and t h e n concludes by imposing upon t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' o t h e r d u t i e s p r e s c r i b e d by law.' I t is t h e g e n e r a l consensus of o p i n i o n t h a t i n p r a c t i c a l l y every s t a t e of t h i s Union whose b a s i s of jurisprudence is t h e common l a w , t h e o f f i c e of a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , a s it e x i s t e d i n England, was adopted a s a p a r t of t h e governmental machinery, and t h a t i n t h e absence of e x p r e s s r e s t r i c t i o n s , t h e common-law d u t i e s a t t a c h themselves t o t h e o f f i c e so f a r as t h e y a r e a p p l i c a b l e and i n harmony with o u r system of government." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d .) To t h e same e f f e c t see S t a t e v. P u b l i c S e r v i c e Comm., 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594. The underlying i s s u e h e r e is whether or n o t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s common l a w power i n t h i s r e s p e c t h a s been abrogated by s t a t u t e . A t t h e o u t s e t i n a c r i m i n a l case w e n o t e a complete absence o f any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or s t a t u t o r y power v e s t e d i n t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l t o f i l e an information or i n i t i a t e a p r o s e c u t i o n independent o f t h e county a t t o r n e y . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e are numerous s t a t u t e s r e q u i r i n g t h e county a t t o r n e y to f i l e c r i m i n a l charges and i n s t i t u t e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s . S e c t i o n 16-3101, R.C.M. 1947, lists t h e powers of t h e county a t t o r n e y and t h i s s e c t i o n r e a d s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t a s follows: "16-3101. Duties o f county a t t o r n e y . The - county a t t o r n e y is t h e p u b l i c p r o s e c u t o r , and must: - "1. Attend t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and conduct, on behalf of t h e state, a l l p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r - p u b l i c o f f e n s e s and r e p r e s e n t t h e state i n a l l m a t t e r s and proceedings t o which it is a p a r t y , or i n which it may b e b e n e f i c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d , a t a l l t i m e s and i n a l l p l a c e s within' t h e l i m i t s of h i s county; * * * "3. Draw a l l * * * informations * * * "9. When ordered o r d i r e c t e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l so t o d o , t o promptly i n s t i t u t e and d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e i n t h e proper c o u r t , and i n t h e name of t h e s t a t e of Montana, any c r i m i n a l or c i v i l a c t i o n o r s p e c i a l proceeding, it being hereby d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e s u p e r v i s o r y powers g r a n t e d t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l by s e c t i o n 82- 4 0 1 ( 5 ) , i n c l u d e t h e power t o o r d e r and d i r e c t s a i d county a t t o r n e y s i n a l l m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e d u t i e s o f t h e i r o f f i c e . " (Emphasis supplied. ) S e c t i o n 95-1302, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t a s follows: " * * * a f t e r leave of court has been granted * * * t h e county attorney must f i l e , within t h i r t y (30) days, i n t h e proper d i s t r i c t c o u r t an information charging t h e defendant with t h e offense f o r which he is held t o answer, o r any o t h e r offense disclosed by t h e evidence. * * *" ( ~ m p h a s i s supplied. ) Section 95-1503[53 (e) provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "If t h e charge is by complaint it s h a l l be signed on oath by a person having knowledge of t h e f a c t s o r by t h e county attorney; i f by information, it s h a l l be signed by t h e county attorney o r by h i s deputy * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) F i n a l l y , s e c t i o n 95-101 governs t h e scope of t h e new Code of Criminal Procedure and provides a s follows: "95-101. Scope. These provisions s h a l l govern t h e procedure i n t h e courts of Montana i n a l l - criminal proceedings except where provision f o r a d i f f e r e n t procedure is s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by law." W e hold t h a t t h e foregoing s t a t u t e s expressly supersede and abrogate the common l a w powers of t h e attorney general t o f i l e informations i n h i s own name and i n s t i t u t e criminal proceed- ings independent of t h e county attorney. This opinion is not t o be construed as any l i m i t a t i o n on t h e supervisory powers and c o n t r o l of t h e attorney general over t h e county attorneys of t h i s state a s provided by law. This opinion simply holds t h a t under t h e f a c t s and circumstances here, t h e attorney general has no l e g a l power t o + f i l e an information signed only by himself o r t o i n s t i t u t e a criminal felony prosecu- t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t independent of t h e county attorney. This proceeding has already delayed t h e i n s t i t u t i o n and prosecution of charges a g a i n s t George McGaffick s i n c e March 3 . As probable cause for the prosecution has already been found by the district court, the prosecution of the case should not be delayed further. Accordingly, the attorney general should immediately direct the county attorney of Lewis and Clark County to sign and file the necessary information and proceed with prosecution of the case. Associate ~Zstice M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles Specially Concurring: I concur i n J u s t i c e asw well's view of the law t h a t T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, supersedes the common law i n criminal procedure. I, however, would not accept j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s proceeding because no j u s t i c i a b l e issue appears because the Attorney General has an ade- quate route by using the regular processes o f . law. Thus, I concur i n t h e r e s u l t . ~ s s o c N . t e J u s t i c e M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison Dissenting: I am not, under the record before us here, prepared t o qualify, r e s t r i c t or lessen what I believe t o be the powers of the Attorney General of Montana. This Court has discussed these powers of the Attorney General a s granted by our Constitution, under the s t a t u t o r y law and under the common law and I do not intend t o further discuss them but Z do wish t o point out t h i s wording from the opinion i n S t a t e ex r e l . Nolan v. D i s t r i c t Court, 22 Mont. 25, 29, 55 P. 916, to-wit: "The Attorney General i s the principal law o f f i c e r of the State. H i s duties a r e general; h i s authority i s co-extensive with public legal a f f a i r s of the whole community. H i s advice often a f f e c t s the r i g h t s of a l l persons within the S t a t e , and, excepting judg- ments and .orders of court, h i s opinions control public i n t e r e s t s more largely than do t h e a c t s of any other o f f i c i a l of the State. Responsibilities of s o high a character a r e usually put upon a lawyer of a b i l i t y , experience and character, and, presuming the Attorney General t o be such, the s t a t u t e has given him the s i g n i f i c a n t , yet extensive, powers referred t o . Again, exigent times occasionally a r i s e in t h e a f f a i r s of a s t a t e , where l o c a l considerations render it i m - p o l i t i c t o i n t r u s t a county attorney with the d i s - charge of h i s duty unaided by learned counsel repre- senting the supreme authority of the State." In the instant case the Attorney General s t a t e s t h a t i n h i s opinion it is impolitic t o i n t r u s t the matter with the County Attorney, and while I may not agree with the Attorney General's reasoning i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r , I do f e e l t h a t such a decision is within h i s discretion and one of h i s prerogatives. The same l i n e of reasoning a s quoted i n Nolan seems t o m e t o be repeated i n S t a t e ex r e l . Ford v. Young, 54 Mont. 401, 170 P. 947, a s well a s i n S t a t e ex r e l . Olsen v. Public Service Commission, 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594. M y dissent