Title: State v. Linnen

State: south-carolina

Issuer: South Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

278 S.C. 175 (1982) 293 S.E.2d 851 The STATE, Respondent, v. Monroe Jefferson LINNEN a/k/a Jeffery Monroe Linnen, Appellant. 21754 Supreme Court of South Carolina. July 8, 1982. Deputy Appellate Defender David W. Carpenter, of S.C. Commission of Appellate Defense, Columbia, and Jeffrey H. Gray, Hilton Head, for appellant. Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Preston F. McDaniel, Columbia, and Sol. Randolph Murdaugh, Jr., Hampton, for respondent. *176 July 8, 1982. LITTLEJOHN, Justice: The defendant, Monroe Jefferson Linnen, was tried by jury and found guilty of housebreaking and larceny from the residence of Colonel Stanley Butts. After sentencing to imprisonment by the court, he appealed, alleging three grounds of error warranting a new trial. As copied from his brief, the questions are as follows: The facts leading up to the Defendant's interrogation and subsequent trial are as follows: On the following day, officers decided to talk with him again, brought him from the jail, and, for the second time, gave him his Miranda rights warning. The interrogation was taped and translated and is a part of the record before us. At the inception, the following taped conversation took place between Officer George Wagner and the Defendant, Monroe Jefferson Linnen: The Defendant then affirmed that his rights had been explained to him and the following took place: The Defendant thereafter talked freely implicating two of his cohorts in several of the illegal break-ins. He also implicated himself as relates to the breaking, entering and stealing from the home of Colonel Butts. Thereafter, he accompanied the officers and directed them to the Butts house and a portion of the ill-gotten gain taken therefrom. The statements given at the second interrogation were used at the trial over the objection of counsel for the Defendant. He contended then and argues now that the use of his statement violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights as enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, *178 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed. (2d) 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed. (2d) 378 (1981). Miranda determined that interrogation may not occur if an accused person invokes his right to counsel and, even if he submits to interrogation without his attorney being present, such must cease if, during the interrogation, he invokes the right. Edwards discusses and sets forth the requirements under which officers may continue to interrogate after the right has been invoked. We hold, as did the lower court, that the right to counsel was not invoked. A reading of the taped and translated interview taken as a whole is devoid of any effort on the part of the Defendant to even be reluctant to testify after he stated he was willing to proceed without the presence of an attorney. In ruling upon this matter, the trial judge said: Having disposed of the first question set forth hereinabove, adversely to the Defendant, we proceed to discuss questions II and III. Question II submits that the statements were involuntarily given and question III submits that the judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury to make a factual determination regarding whether appellant's statements were voluntary or were acquired in violation of the Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The answer to both questions is to be found in the transcript of the record. The Defendant testifying in his own defense said: Counsel for the Defendant argues that the Defendant's statement is not conclusive and that the "voluntary" issue should have been submitted to the jury. We recognize that when an issue of fact is in dispute the matter must be submitted to the jury. However, a search of the entire record reveals, to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences, that the Defendant's statements were, just as he admitted, voluntary. The determination must be made on the bases of the totality of the circumstances including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. We point out that the Defendant was not entirely unfamiliar with court proceedings. At the time of the interrogation, he was on probation from a Florida conviction for housebreaking. The trial judge's finding that the statements were free and voluntary cannot be seriously challenged in the light of the Defendant's admissions. While the interrogating officers no doubt encouraged the statements, their action cannot be said to be coercive or threatening, nor were the statements procured by improper influence. We hold that the statements were admissible in evidence. The constitutional rights of the Defendant, as set forth in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, as well as the corresponding sections of the Constitution of South Carolina, were not violated. Having found all exceptions without merit, it follows that the conviction and sentence of the lower court are Affirmed. LEWIS, C.J., and NESS and GREGORY, JJ., concur. HARWELL, J., not participating.