Title: Ex parte Hensel Phelps Construction Company. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Thomas Childers v. Carter-Burgess, Inc., et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 10/17/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070877
____________________
Ex parte Hensel Phelps Construction Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Thomas Childers
v.
Carter-Burgess, Inc., et al.)
(Pike Circuit Court, CV-05-301)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Hensel Phelps Construction Company ("Hensel Phelps")
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
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2
trial court to vacate its February 14, 2008, order denying
Hensel Phelps's motion to dismiss Thomas Childers's claim
against it and to enter a dismissal in its favor.  We grant
the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 28, 2003, while acting within the line and
scope of his employment with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Childers
injured his leg when he fell while performing maintenance on
the roof of the Wal-Mart distribution-center building in Pike
County.  Childers filed a complaint on October 27, 2005, one
day before the expiration of the statute of limitations,
against 
Carter-Burgess, 
Inc. 
("Carter-Burgess"), 
Nixon 
& 
Laird
Architects/Engineers, P.C. ("Nixon & Laird"), his supervisor
at Wal-Mart, Charles Murray, and several fictitiously named
defendants allegedly "responsible for constructing, building
and/or maintaining the premises in question, including the
stairwell-hatch-area, where the accident which is the subject
of this case occurred."  The complaint stated with regard to
the fictitiously named defendants that their "true and correct
names are unknown at present but will be added by amendment
when ascertained."  
1070877
Childers states that, at that time, Nixon & Laird was a
1
subsidiary of Carter-Burgess.
3
The summons and complaint were mailed to the location
Childers believed to be the principal address of Carter-
Burgess and Nixon & Laird on October 27, 2005.   Childers did
1
not serve any discovery with the summons and complaint.
Childers's counsel claims that the Pike County circuit clerk
informed him on November 3, 2005, that service had been
perfected on Nixon & Laird, and that on November 7, 2005, the
clerk's office informed him that service had been perfected on
Carter-Burgess.  The service copies of the summons and
complaint intended for Nixon & Laird and for Carter-Burgess,
however, were returned as undeliverable on November 15, 2005.
Murray was served, and on November 28, 2005, he filed a
motion to dismiss the claims against him.  The motion was set
for a hearing several times; Hensel Phelps alleges —— and
Childers does not dispute —— that each time the hearing date
neared, Childers requested that it be postponed to allow for
service of Carter-Burgess and Nixon & Laird.  Childers's
counsel contends that he made numerous attempts to serve both
Nixon & Laird and Carter-Burgess, but that, at the time,
Carter-Burgess 
maintained 
approximately 
40 
locations
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4
nationwide, making service difficult.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
moved to intervene on February 23, 2006, and the trial court
granted Wal-Mart's motion on February 27, 2006.  
On July 5, 2006, Childers served The Corporation Company,
the registered agent for Carter-Burgess.  On August 3, 2006,
Carter-Burgess and Nixon & Laird filed a motion to dismiss the
claims against them, alleging that Childers failed to serve
them in a timely manner.  Following a January 9, 2007,
hearing, the trial court denied the motion, provided that
Childers perfect service on Nixon & Laird within 30 days.
Service was perfected on Nixon & Laird on February 5, 2007.
Childers's counsel avers that, once service was perfected on
Nixon & Laird, he began talking with Carter-Burgess's
attorneys about the identities of other possible entities
involved with the construction of the Pike County Wal-Mart
distribution-center building, and that in these conversations
Hensel Phelps's name was mentioned for the first time.  
On February 6, 2007, Carter-Burgess and Nixon & Laird
filed a notice to serve discovery on Childers, Murray, and
intervenor Wal-Mart.  On March 9, 2007, counsel for Carter-
Burgess wrote Childers's counsel and Wal-Mart's counsel to
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5
alert them that their clients were overdue in responding to
Carter-Burgess's discovery motion.  Carter-Burgess filed a
motion to compel discovery against Childers on March 22, 2007.
The trial court granted this motion on May 8, 2007, ordering
Childers to respond within 30 days.  Childers responded to the
Carter-Burgess discovery request on June 7, 2007.  On May 10,
2007, Carter-Burgess filed a notice of intent to serve
subpoena on nonparties, including Hensel Phelps.  On June 6,
2007, Carter-Burgess served a nonparty subpoena on Hensel
Phelps.  
On September 13, 2007, 23 months after the filing of the
original complaint, Childers filed an amended complaint that
added Hensel Phelps as a defendant, asserting a claim of
negligence and/or wantonness against all the defendants named
in the amended complaint.  It is undisputed that Childers
never filed any formal discovery before filing the amended
complaint.  
Hensel Phelps filed its motion to dismiss on October 31,
2007, asking the trial court to dismiss the claim against it
on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired with
regard to any claims against it.  Childers did not file a
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6
response to the motion to dismiss.  On February 14, 2008, the
trial court denied Hensel Phelps's motion to dismiss, stating,
in pertinent part: "[T]he Court having reviewed and considered
the [motion to dismiss], the supporting brief, and argument of
counsel, and not being persuaded that [Hensel Phelps] is
entitled to the requested relief, it is ... ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED that the above referred to motion to dismiss is
denied."  (Capitalization in original.)  Hensel Phelps
subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
"'"A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and it 'will be
issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"'
"Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 604 (Ala.
2003) .... A writ of mandamus is the proper means by
which to seek review of a denial of a motion to
dismiss filed by a party originally listed as a
fictitiously named defendant 'when "the undisputed
evidence shows that the plaintiff failed to act with
due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named
defendant as the party the plaintiff intended to
sue."' Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916
So. 2d 594, 596-97 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte
Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 537 (Ala.1999))...."
1070877
7
Ex parte Nationwide Ins. Co., [Ms. 1061708, April 18, 2008]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008).
Analysis
The question presented is whether the trial court
exceeded its discretion in denying Hensel Phelps's motion to
dismiss, in essence determining that Childers's substitution
of Hensel Phelps for one of the fictitiously named defendants
in the amended complaint of September 13, 2007, relates back
to the filing of the original complaint of October 27, 2005.
This Court has previously stated that Rule 9(h) and Rule
15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., "'allow a plaintiff to avoid the
bar of a statute of limitations by fictitiously naming
defendants 
for 
which 
actual 
parties 
can 
later 
be
substituted.'"  Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., 916
So. 2d 594, 597 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Fulmer v. Clark Equip.
Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995)).  Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ.
P., provides: 
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when that party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name." 
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Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that "[a]n amendment
of a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles
applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h),
Ala. R. Civ. P."  
In order to invoke the relation-back principle of Rule
15(c) in regard to fictitious-party practice under Rule 9(h),
a plaintiff
"(1) must state a cause of action against the party
named fictitiously in the body of the original
complaint and (2) must be ignorant of the identity
of the fictitiously named party, in the sense of
having no knowledge at the time of the filing that
the later-named party was in fact the party intended
to be sued."
Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1059 (Ala. 1996).  
"A plaintiff is ignorant of the identity of a
fictitiously named defendant when, after exercising
due diligence to ascertain the identity of the party
intended to be sued, he lacks knowledge at the time
of the filing of the complaint of facts indicating
to him that the substituted party was the party
intended to be sued.  Likewise, to invoke the
relation-back principle of Rule 15(c), a plaintiff,
after filing suit, must proceed in a reasonably
diligent manner to determine the true identity of a
fictitiously named defendant and to amend his
complaint accordingly."
Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 593-94 (Ala. 1992)
(emphasis added).  Thus, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
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9
exercise due diligence to determine the true identity of
defendants both before and after filing the original
complaint.  It is also incumbent upon the plaintiff to
"substitute the named defendant for the fictitious party
within a reasonable time after determining the defendant's
true identity," and "'the same policy considerations which
require a plaintiff to amend his complaint within a reasonable
time after learning the defendant's true identity also require
the plaintiff to proceed in a reasonably diligent manner in
determining the true identity of the defendant.'"  Crawford,
678 So. 2d at 1060 (quoting Kinard v. C.A. Kelly & Co., 468
So. 2d 133, 135 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis added)).
Hensel Phelps contends that the evidence is undisputed
that Childers did not exercise due diligence in attempting to
ascertain its true identity and that Childers did not amend
his complaint within a reasonable time after determining
Hensel Phelps's true identity.  For his part, Childers
contends that it is "very much in dispute" whether he "did
nothing to ascertain the names of fictitiously named parties."
He 
argues 
that 
"[f]ormal 
discovery 
is 
not 
the 
only
investigative means by which to determine the identity of a
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10
party" and that Hensel Phelps "cannot know what steps were
taken ... to determine the identity of the fictitiously named
parties."  (Childers's brief at 6.)
In making this argument, Childers lowers the standard for
ascertaining the true identity of a fictitiously named
defendant from "due diligence" to doing "something."  He
attempts to force Hensel Phelps into the impossible position
of proving a negative: demonstrating that Childers did
absolutely nothing to obtain the company's true identity when
a defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's activity is
necessarily limited to evidence in the record.  
The facts before us show that 23 months elapsed between
the filing of the original complaint and the filing of the
amended complaint that named Hensel Phelps as a defendant.
For all that appears from the materials before us and from the
briefs of the parties, during this 23 months, Childers
conducted little, if any, informal discovery in an effort to
determine the identity of Hensel Phelps as one of the
fictitiously named defendants.  In that period, Childers also
failed to conduct any formal discovery for the purpose of
ascertaining the true identities of the fictitiously named
1070877
Childers's only defense to this lack of filing discovery
2
is the length of time it took him to properly serve Carter-
Burgess and Nixon & Laird.  The facts show, however, that
Childers must shoulder a large part of the blame for the
significant delay in perfecting service on these entities.
11
defendants.   Although it is true that formal discovery is not
2
the only method of determining the identity of a fictitiously
named defendant, it commonly is vital to demonstrating due
diligence because it provides objective evidence of the
plaintiff's case activity.  Furthermore, Childers did not
amend his complaint and specifically name Hensel Phelps as a
defendant until seven months after he discovered its identity
and over three months after Carter-Burgess filed a nonparty
subpoena on Hensel Phelps.  
"The recalcitrant plaintiff cannot ... use the [relation-
back] rule to gain what might otherwise amount to an
open-ended statute of limitations."  Kinard, 468 So. 2d at
135.  This Court has determined on numerous occasions that
case activity similar to or even greater than Childers's
demonstrated activity in this case constituted a lack of due
diligence on the part of the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Crowl v.
Kayo Oil Co., 848 So. 2d 930 (Ala. 2002) (finding that
plaintiff's failure to do anything for over a year and a half
1070877
12
to ascertain the identity of the defendant constituted a lack
of due diligence); Jones v. Resorcon, Inc., 604 So. 2d 370
(Ala. 1992) (finding lack of due diligence in determining the
identity of a fictitiously named manufacturer of a fan when
plaintiff failed to seek an order from the court compelling
inspection of the fan at issue); Ex parte Klemawesch, 549 So.
2d 62 (Ala. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff did not act with
due diligence when she did not initiate any discovery until
over two years after filing the original complaint); and Bowen
v. Cummings, 517 So. 2d 617 (Ala. 1987) (holding that
plaintiff failed to comply with the spirit or letter of Rule
9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., when he made no
effort to ascertain the identity of fictitiously named
defendant doctor).  
In short, "[f]ictitious party practice ... was not
intended for use whenever it is merely inconvenient for the
plaintiff to learn the name of the true defendant."  Bowen,
517 So. 2d at 618.  Childers plainly failed to comply with the
rules governing fictitious-party practice in his overall delay
in ascertaining Hensel Phelps's identity and in waiting seven
months after obtaining knowledge of the identity of Hensel
1070877
13
Phelps as a defendant to amend his complaint.  Accordingly,
the petition for the writ of mandamus is granted. The trial
court is directed to vacate its order denying Hensel Phelps's
motion to dismiss and to enter a dismissal for Hensel Phelps
on Childers's claim against it.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.