Title: STATE v BAKER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

Xo. 82-474 Iid THE SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1983 THE STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- MARTIN K. BAKER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of G a l l a t i n , The Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Goetz, Madden & Dunn; James Goetz argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Atty. General, Helena, Montana Sarah Power argued, A s s t . Atty. General, Helena A. Michael Salvagni, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana ---- Submitted: A p r i l 18, 1983 Decided: August 2 , 1983 -- Clerk Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant, Martln K. Baker, p l e d g u i l t y t o two c o u n t s of s a l e of dangerous d r u g s on September 1 5 , 1982, b e f o r e t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court. Following a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g on t h e same day, Baker was sentenced t o t e n y e a r s on each c o u n t , t h e terms t o run c o n s e c u t i v e l y . Baker f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n and r e s e n t e n c i n g which was d e n i e d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ' s motion f o r f o r f e i t u r e of d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e . H e now a p p e a l s t h e s e n t e n c e and t h e f o r f e i t u r e . Defendant and two o t h e r s , Nark E l l s w o r t h and Donald Pawlack, were a r r e s t e d a t t h e Ramada Inn i n Bozeman on J a n u a r y 1 3 , 1982, and were charged w i t h c r i m i n a l s a l e of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s . The s a l e had b e e n a r r a n g e d by a n undercover a g e n t who had c o n t a c t e d E l l s w o r t h about buying around 100 pounds of marijuana. The "buy" was scheduled f o r J a n u a r y 1 3 , 1982. Agents S k u l e t i c h and Adamo checked i n t o t h e Ramada Inn t h a t morning and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r r e c e i v e d a c a l l from Ellsworth. A f t e r s e v e r a l meetings back and f o r t h , d e f e n d a n t Baker was g i v e n $29,500 i n exchange f o r 82 pounds of marijuana. Upon h i s a r r e s t , t h e $29,500 was recovered from B a k e r ' s boot. During t h e c o u r s e of t h e meetings, d e f e n d a n t s n o r t e d a l i n e of cocaine and o f f e r e a some t o Agent S k u l e t i c h , who d e c l i n e d . That o f f e r was t h e b a s i s of t h e second count of c r i m i n a l s a l e of a dangerous drug. Other a g e n t s were i n a n o t h e r room a t t h e Kamada Inn l i s t e n i n g t o t h e t r a n s a c t i o n through e l e c t r o n i c s u r v e i l - l a n c e . I t is a l l e g e d t h a t a t a p e r e c o r d i n g of t h e drug d e a l was made b u t never produced. L e t t e r s between d e f e n s e c o u n s e l and t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d i d n o t have a t a p e of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n because t h e high l e v e l of background n o i s e i n t h e room whlch made it d i f f i c u l t t o l l s t e n t o t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e , " t h e r e is no t a p e r e c o r d i n g of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n i n t h e room." E l l s w o r t h p l e d g u i l t y t o h i s s a l e s charge and p l e a bargalned by g i v i n g a s t a t e m e n t i m p l i c a t i n g Baker a s t h e "main man." E l l s w o r t h was s e n t e n c e d t o a t h r e e - y e a r d e f e r r e a s e n t e n c e w i t h s e v e n t y d a y s i n t h e county j a i l and a $2,000 f i n e . C o n f l i c t i n g evidence was o f f e r e d a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g . E l l s w o r t h t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had been purchasing marijuana from Baker monthly s i n c e A p r i l o r May 1981; t h a t he had o b t a i n e d one, two and f i v e pounds of marijuana from Baker; and t h a t he had once purchased a q u a r t e r gram of c o c a i n e from Baker. E l l s w o r t h f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n had been focused on Baker and t h a t when he had been p r e s s u r e d i n t o d i v u l g i n g t h e s o u r c e of h i s marijuana, he gave B a k e r ' s name. Agent d k u l e t i c h ' s testimony t h a t Baker o f f e r e d t o s e l l him a lilgher g r a d e of marijuana o r t h e same g r a d e a t a cheaper p r i c e i f S k u l e t i c h would come t o h i s " w a r e h o u s e " i n Mlssoula c o r r o b o r a t e s E l l s w o r t h ' s identification of Baker a s t h e "main man." Baker, however, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t o l d S k u l e t i c h h e could probably buy t h e marijuana cheaper i n Missoula because h l s $15 a pound t r a v e l i n g f e e would be e l i m i n a t e d . H e denied supplying E l l s w o r t h with t h e marijuana b u t admitted d e l i v e r - l n g EPlsworth, Pawlack and t h e m a r i j u a n a t o Bozeman f o r $15 per pound of marijuana d e l i v e r e d and a pound of marijuana. O r i g i n a l l y , he was n o t t o have been involved with t h e "buy." H e agreed t o r e p l a c e Pawlack when Pawlack became t o o nervous t o p a r t i c i p a t e . J i m Weinberg c o r r o b o r a t e d B a k e r ' s t e s t i m o n y . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t on J a n u a r y 6 o r 7 , 1982, he was a t B a k e r ' s house when E l l s w o r t h came over and o f f e r e d t o s e l l marijuana t o them and i n q u i r e d i f e i t h e r of them would g i v e him a r i d e t o Bozeman i n t h e near f u t u r e . J o e S t a a k s a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t E l l s w o r t h had o f f e r e d t o s e l l l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of marijuana t o both he and Baker. The evidence f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h i s was B a k e r ' s f i r s t o f f e n s e ; t h a t he had been a p r o f e s s o r a t Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y and t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Montana; t h a t he had t a k e n s t u d e n t s on a f i e l d t r i p t o Mexico; t h a t he p r e s e n t l y owned a rug and t e x t i l e b u s i n e s s i n Missoula; and t h a t h i s b u s i n e s s r e q u i r e d s e v e r a l t r i p s t o Mexico f o r s u p p l i e s . A t t h e end of t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e judge immediately sentenced Baker, s t a t i n g : "I am convinced t h a t you a r e an o p e r a t o r i n d r u g s and t h a t $29,000 worth of d r u g s may n o t have been r o u t i n e b u t t h a t you've done it f o r a long p e r i o d of t i m e . And t h e abuse t h a t comes and t h a t you a r e a danger t o t h e community and t o t h e s t a t e . The s e l f - a b u s e t h a t comes from t h e use of d r u g s is i n c a l c u l a b l e . I d o n ' t t h i n k w e can stem it b u t when w e g e t someone t h a t d e a l s i n t h i s amount of d r u g s , w e can c e r t a i n l y s e n t e n c e them a n d I--he is remanded t o t h e custody of t h e S h e r i f f who i s n ' t here." A motion f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n was immediately f i l e d . A t t h e h e a r i n g on t h a t motion, t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge admitted t h a t he had r e c e i v e d an anonymous phone c a l l on B a k e r ' s behalf p r i o r t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g and t h a t he t h e n made a s i n g l e phone c a l l t o t h e former department head of t h e S o c i o l o g y Department t o d e t e r m i n e B a k e r ' s l e n g t h of t e n u r e a t MSU. P r i o r evidence had been p r e s e n t e d t h a t i n d i c a t e d Baker had been a t MSU o n l y one q u a r t e r . The phone c a l l e r s t a t e d : " I ' m j u s t a f a c u l t y member and I d o n ' t want t o r e v e a l my i d e n t i t y , b u t , t h i s man is a good man. He's never been i n t r o u b l e b e f o r e and h e ' s been h e r e on campus f o r a long t i m e t e a c h i n g . . ." The p r o f e s s o r t o l d t h e judge t h a t Baker had t a u g h t one q u a r t e r , t h a t he had t a k e n a number of t o u r s i n Mexico, and t h a t he had one youngster who was i n t r o u b l e w i t h m a r i j u a n a i n Mexico. The judge s a i d , " t h a t can happen t o anybody," and hung up. H e a l s o c o n s i d e r e d a l e t t e r s e n t on b e h a l f of Baker. A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e judge p e r s o n a l l y q u e s t i o n e d Baker a t l e n g t h r e g a r d i n g t h e s t u d e n t t r i p s t o Mexico. The motion f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n was s u b s e q u e n t l y d e n i e d , and t h e f o r f e i t u r e was g r a n t e d . Baker p r e s e n t s t h r e e i s s u e s on a p p e a l : 1. Whether r e s e n t e n c i n g is r e q u i r e d because t h e judge p e r s o n a l l y o b t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n o f f - t h e - r e c o r d ; 2. Whether t h e county a t t o r n e y w i t h h e l d a t a p e r e c o r d i n g t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p r e j u d i c e ; and, 3 . Whether f o r f e i t u r e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s van was p r o p e r l y o r d e r e d . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e o u t - o f - c o u r t c o n t a c t made by t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge i n v a l i d a t e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e d u r e , t h a t t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s and conclu- s i o n s of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e is g r o s s l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e o f f e n s e s , and t h a t t h e j u d g e ' s e n t r y of t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s some t h i r t y d a y s a f t e r s e n t e n c i n g amounts t o a " p o s t hoc r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " of h i s " e a r l i e r , h a s t i l y - r e a c h e d " d e c i s i o n . W e a g r e e t h a t t h e out-of-court c o n t a c t made by t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge i n v a l i - d a t e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e d u r e , and w e remand f o r r e s e n t e n c - i n g under a d i f f e r e n t D i s t r i c t Court judge. T h i s Court h a s l o n g recognized t h a t a s e n t e n c i n g judge c a n n o t s e n t e n c e on t h e b a s i s of p r i v a t e , o u t - o f - c o u r t i n f o r - mation, communications o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Kuhl v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 536, 3 6 6 P.2d 347; S t a t e v. Simtob ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873; S t a t e v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138; S t a t e ex r e l . G r e e l y v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 317, 590 P.2d 1104. The t r i a l judge i n S t e w a r t p e r s o n a l l y i n t e r v i e w e d s e v e r a l p e r s o n s who had t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l a t u n d i s c l o s e d l o c a t i o n s , o f f t h e r e c o r d , and w i t h o u t n o t i c e t o d e f e n d a n t of t h e c o u r t ' s i n t e n t t o conduct t h e i n t e r v i e w s . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Court d i s t i n g u i s h e d S t a t e v. Orsborn ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509, where t h e C o u r t had found t h a t i f a d e f e n d a n t was p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t a s e n t e n c e p r e d i c a t e d upon m i s i n f o r m a t i o n , no d u e p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n o c c u r r e d when p r e s e n t e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n came from a s o u r c e n o t s u b j e c t t o cross-examination i n c o u r t . I n Orsborn, t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e b u t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and c h o s e t o a f f i r m t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . I n S t e w a r t , we recognized t h a t t h e t r i a l judge had become i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r e s e n t e n c e f a c t - g a t h e r i n g p r o c e s s and h e l d t h a t where t h e judge becomes a f a c t g a t h e r e r , as w e l l as a f a c t f i n d e r , he s u b j e c t s t h e defen- d a n t t o an i m p o s s i b l e burden. The p r o p e r c o u r s e is f o r t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge t o d e l e g a t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o o t h e r o f f i c i a l s . I n Simtob, n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d s u p p o r t e d t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t " t h i s is n o t [ d e f e n d a n t ' s ] f i r s t e x p e r i e n c e i n t h i s s o r t of t h i n g . " T h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t " t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge must be based on h i s view of t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d i n open c o u r t . . . and may n o t be e x e r c i s e d on t h e b a s i s of unsworn r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s p r i v a t e l y r e c e i v e d by t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge." F i n a l l y , i n Kuhl, t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge h e l d p r i v a t e c o n f e r e n c e i n chambers w i t h u n s p e c i f i e d p a r t i e s , a l l i n t h e absence o f b o t h d e f e n d a n t and h i s c o u n s e l . Here, it is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e p r i v a t e out-of-court c o n t a c t by t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge a f f e c t e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e s s . D u r i n g t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e j u d g e p e r s o n a l l y q u e s t i o n e d Baker a t l e n g t h a b o u t t h e t r i p he took t o Mexico w i t h s t u d e n t s from Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y and e x h i b i t e d a keen i n t e r e s t i n t h a t t r i p : "Q. [BY THE COURT]: Did you t a k e a t o u r of s t u d e n t s when you were h e r e i n 1980 a t Montana S t a t e C o l l e g e ? A. No s i r , I d i d n ' t . "Q. You d i d n ' t t a k e any t h e n ? A. No. "Q. You w e r e n ' t i n Mexico a t a l l when you were -- w h i l e -- d u r i n g t h a t summer o r j u s t b e f o r e t h a t ? A. I t a u g h t h e r e t h e s p r i n g of '79. "Q. I d o n ' t know -- A. No, I d i d n ' t -- you were -- "Q. You were i n t h e s o c i o l o g y d e p a r t - ment? A. Y e s s i r I was. Those s t u d e n t s t h e n were t o r e t u r n t o t h e United S t a t e s on t h e i r own j u s t a s t h e y were -- j u s t a s t h e y g o t t o Mexico on t h e i r own. "Q. Did any of them g e t i n j a i l ? A. None o f them ended up i n -- "a. For u s i n g marijuana? A. No, none o f them d i d . "Q. Not a one? A. One of them, a woman of 27 o r 28 y e a r s o l d , t h e woman was found i n -- found t o be m e n t a l l y -- s h e was running around somewhere i n Mexico. She was u n s t a b l e and h e r p a r e n t s went t o g e t h e r b u t it t u r n e d o u t a f t e r a l o t o f u p s e t by t h e p a r e n t s t h a t t h e woman had a h i s t o r y of mental i l l n e s s t h a t was n o t d i s c l o s e d t o us p r i o r -- "Q . Was s h e p u t i n j a i l because o f drugs? I d o n ' t c a r e a b o u t h e r mental. A. N o s i r , n o t t h a t I know. "Q. You were n o t -- A. I was never. "Q. You were i n c h a r g e of t h i s group? A. T h i s h a p p e n e d s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e q u a r t e r . "Q. Oh, I s e e . A l l r i g h t . A. She was down t h e r e a f t e r t h e q u a r t e r had ended." The p r i v a t e out-of-court c o n t a c t a f f e c t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s d u r i n g h i s s e n t e n c i n g . W e remand f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g . D e f e n d a n t n e x t c h a r g e s p r e j u d i c e b a s e d upon t h e f a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e t o produce a t a p e r e c o r d i n g a l l e g e d l y made of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n which took p l a c e i n t h e Ramada Inn d u r i n g t h e drug t r a n s a c t i o n . Baker a r g u e s t h a t w h i l e a g e n t S k u l e t i c h t e s t i f i e d t h a t Baker had claimed t o have a "ware- house" i n Missoula, t h e t a p e r e c o r d i n g would tend t o cor- r o b o r a t e h i s c l a i m t h a t he never mentioned a "warehouse." T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e c o r d i n g would r e s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t i n t e s t i m o n y and could prove t o be e x c u l p a t o r y evidence. T h i s argument is w i t h o u t merit. Where t h e r e is no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t made any w r i t t e n motion t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o r e q u i r e produc- t i o n of such a t a p e p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n s 46-15-302 o r 46-15- 311, MCA, t h e i s s u e is n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court. S t a t e v . Hansen ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. , 633 P.2d 1202, 38 St.Rep. 1 5 4 1 . A s i d e f r o m t h i s p r o c e d u r a l d e f e c t , t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h e r e is no t a p e r e c o r d i n g o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . I n response t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e t a p e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g response: "You a r e c o r r e c t i n t h a t t h e r e were law enforcement o f f i c e r s a t t h e Ramada Inn i n a n a d j a c e n t room t o where your c l i e n t d e a l t t h e d r u g s t o t h e a g e n t of t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s o f f i c e . O f f i c e r s Green and Tymrak o f t h e Bozeman P o l i c e Depart- ment d i d l i s t e n t o t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t took p l a c e i n t h e room between Baker, E l l s w o r t h and t h e S t a t e ' s a g e n t . However, w e have no t a p e of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . The o f f i c e r s t e l l me t h a t t h e r e was a l o t o f e x t r a n o i s e i n t h e room and t h a t it was d i f f i c u l t f o r them t o l i s t e n t o t h e con- v e r s a t i o n s i n t h e room, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e is no t a p e r e c o r d i n g of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n i n t h e room. I a m s u r e t h a t O f f i c e r s Green and Tymrak w i l l be more t h a n happy t o r e l a y t o you what t h e y can r e c a l l of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t took p l a c e i n t h e room . . ." (Emphasis added.) There is no d u t y on t h e p a r t of t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o produce t h a t which does n o t e x i s t . S i n c e t h e r e is no t a p e , g a r b l e d o r o t h e r w i s e , d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m of p r e j u d i c e from nonproduc- t i o n t h e r e o f is w i t h o u t merit. D e f e n d a n t ' s f i n a l argument is t h a t f o r f e i t u r e of h i s v e h i c l e p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n s 44-12-201 through -203, MCA, is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . H e contends t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s ' r e q u i r e - ment t h a t he f i l e a v e r i f i e d answer on t h e f o r f e i t u r e w i t h i n twenty d a y s a f t e r t h e S t a t e g i v e s n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o i n s t i - t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s f o r c e s him t o g i v e e v i d e n c e which can be used a g a i n s t himself o r f o r c e s him t o f o r f e i t h i s p r o p e r t y . The f o r f e i t u r e proceeding r e q u i r e s : (1) i n s t i t u t i o n of f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e d a y s of s e i z u r e of t h e p r o p e r t y ; ( 2 ) f i l i n g of a v e r i f i e d answer by d e f e n d a n t w i t h i n twenty days; and, ( 3 ) h e a r i n g n o t less t h a n t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e v e r i f i e d answer is f i l e d . Baker c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e due p r o c e s s r i g h t s of a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t t o remain s i l e n t d u r i n g t h e pendency of t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e pro- ceeding t o be completed long b e f o r e most c r i m i n a l c a s e s would be t r i e d . T h i s argument f a i l s . G e n e r a l l y , f o r f e i t u r e s of p r o p e r t y such a s t h e van i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e a r e p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e l e g a l f i c t i o n t h a t t h e S t a t e is proceeding a g a i n s t t h e v e h i c l e through an i n - rem p r o c e e d i n g because t h e v e h i c l e i t s e l f is g u i l t y of b e i n g used i n drug t r a f f i c k i n g , b o o t l e g g i n g , o r o t h e r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . The Palmyra ( 1 8 2 7 ) , 12 Wheat (U.S.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 531, People v. One 1933 Plymouth Sedan Deluxe Auto. ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 1 3 Cal.2d 565, 90 P.2d 799. The p r o c e e d i n g is c o n s i d e r e d c i v i l r a t h e r t h a n c r i m i n a l and o n l y a c i v i l burden of proof need be e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e S t a t e , even though t h e e f f e c t of t h e s t a t u t e ' s o p e r a t i o n is t o d e p r i v e a d e f e n d a n t of h i s p r o p e r t y based upon its p r o b a b l e u s e i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . United S t a t e s v. One 1970 P o n t i a c 670, 2-Door Hardtop ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 529 F.2d 65. S t a t u t e s e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e d u r e s g e n e r a l l y a t t e m p t t o b a l a n c e t h e r i g h t of a p r o p e r t y owner t o a h e a r - ing a f t e r s e i z u r e " a t a meaningful t i m e and i n a meaningful manner" w i t h t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . Once p r o b a b l e c a u s e is e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e v e h i c l e w a s used i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , some c o u r t s have p e r m i t t e d immediate s e i z u r e w i t h o u t n o t i c e and h e a r i n g a s long as n o t i c e and h e a r i n g i n a meaningful t i m e and manner is t h e n p r o v i d e d . United S t a t e s v. K i m a k ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 624 F.2d 903. For d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t f a v o r l e a v i n g t h e v a r i o u s a p p l i - c a t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e s under t h e s t a t u t e w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , see, United S t a t e s v. U.S. Currency ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 6 2 6 F.2d 11, cert. d e n i e d , 449 U.S. 993; United S t a t e s v. $3,799.00 in U. S. Currency (10th Cir. 1982), 684 F.2d 674. See also, Annot., "Forfeiture of property for unlawful use before trial of individual offender," 3 ALR2d 738; Annot., "Relief to owner of motor vehicle subject to state forfei- ture for use in violation of narcotic laws," 50 ALR3d 172; Annot., "Forfeiture of personal property used in illegal manufacture, processing, or sale of controlled substances under S511 of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 USCA S881)," 59 A.L.R.Fed. 765. Courts have also held that forfeiture statutes should be strictly complied with and have forfeited the property where a defendant failed to prove a verified answer within the statutory period or to otherwise comply with the statute. Matter of 1969 Ford Truck, Etc. (1979), 122 Ariz. 442, 595 P.2d 674. Here, the statutes require a notice of forfeiture within forty-five days of seizure of the property, Defen- dant must file a verified answer within twenty days of that. The proceeding must then be set for hearing "not less than 30 days" after the answer is filed. We hold that these statutes are not unconstitutional on their face. Nor are they unconstitutional as applied in this case. The statutes afford due process through notice and hearing to the property owner whose possession has been seized. The statutes do not require that a defendant incriminate himself in his verified answer. Nor did defen- dant do so here. Baker filed a general denial. He admitted ownership of the vehicle but refused to respond to the allegations that it had been used in criminal activity. Nor was it necessary to hold forfeiture proceedings p r i o r t o Baker's t r i a l . The p r o c e e d i n g s must be set f o r h e a r i n g " n o t l e s s than" t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e answer. While a f o r f e i t u r e h e a r i n g p o t e n t i a l l y could be set t h i r t y o r more days a f t e r t h e v e r i f i e d answer was f i l e d and s t i l l be h e l d b e f o r e a d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l on t h e c r i m i n a l m a t t e r , such was n o t t h e c a s e h e r e . Hearing on t h e f o r f e i t u r e was n o t h e l d u n t i l a f t e r d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d h i s p l e a of g u i l t y and had been sentenced. W e w i l l n o t hold a s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on t h e premise t h a t it might be a p p l i e d a t some f u t u r e t i m e i n a manner r e q u i r i n g a d e f e n d a n t t o i n c r i m i n a t e h i m s e l f . W e l e a v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e ' s a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s and w i l l review t h e i r a c t i o n s a s n e c e s s a r y . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . U . S . C u r r e n c y , s u p r a . W e h o l d t h e f o r f e i t u r e of t h e van p r o p e r i n t h i s c a s e . C o n v i c t i o n a f f i r m e d b u t c a u s e remanded f o r r e s e n t e n c - i n g . R-ec $ . & d 4 Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy: I concur. T h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t show a t a p e e x i s t e d . Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., concurs in part and dissents in part as follows: I concur with the majority in vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. However, I dissent from the majority holding with respect to the tape recording. The majority opinion quotes the County Attorney's letter indicating that no tape was made of the conversation in the motel. I believe that this is refuted by the testimony of Agent Skuletich given at the sentencing hearing. Agent Skuletich testified as follows: "Q. You informed me that there was a tape recorder? A. I didn't say there was, I said there was a microphone in the room and that the tape recorder itself was located two rooms away. Q. Didn't you indicate there was a tape recorder in the drawer A. No, no I did not. Q. But, there was a microphone in the room? A. Yes. Q. Where was the microphone? A. It was under the bed. Q. After you arrested Mr. Baker, you indicated rather gleefully that, 'We have this on tape'? A. I don't recall indicating that. Q. Did you say anything about it, a tape, at that time? A. I don't recall saying anything about a tape. Q. You could have but you just don't recall? A. I don't recall. *** Q. Now, where is the tape of the conversation now? A. I have no idea where it's at. *** Q . Well, you don't know what happened to the tape, I take it? A. I never did see the tape. It was in the -- the instrument that was used to record it was in another room. I never seen the tape." The testimony above-quoted indicates that a tape recording was made of the conversation. Apparently the County Attorney felt the conversations on the tape were garbled. However, production of the tape should be ordered so that defense counsel is permitted to listen to the tape and have the opportunity to have the tape examined by an expert. I should add that counsel for the prosecution was questioned at the time of oral argument concerning the apparent conflict between the County Attorney's letter and the testimony given at the sentencing hearing. The responses reinforced my feeling that a tape does exist but that the position of the County Attorney's office was that the voices were inaudible. Under these circumstances the defendant must be given his opportunity to have the tape listened to by a speech pathologist or other expert trained in unscrambling garbled language. Mr. Justice ~aniel J. Shea: I concur with Mr. Justice Morrison. Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber respectfully concurs and dissents as follows: I concur in the conclusions of the majority opinion with regard to the tape recording and the forfeiture of the defendant's van. I respectfully dissent from the conclusion on the part of the majority that the private out-of-court contact affected the defendant's substantial right to due process during his sentencing and therefore constituted a basis for remanding for resentencing. The majority cites several Montana cases as authority for the conclusion that a sentencing judge cannot sentence on the basis of private, out-of-court information, communications or investigation. The majority does not distinguish between the various cases and the statutes which have been substantially changed over the years. As pointed out by this Court in State v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509, in Kuhl this Court was required to follow the provisions of sections 94-7813 and 7814 R.C.M. 1947 which in substance provided that no affidavit, testimony or representation could be received by the court in aggravation or mitigation of punishment unless these matters had been presented "by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court." This Court concluded that the district judge therefore could not consider reports from the police department, sheriff's records, or other sources because they had not been presented by the testimony of witnesses in open court. However, that rule no longer is appropriate. As pointed out in Orsborn, subsequent to Kuhl these statutory provisions were repealed. The provisions in effect under Orsborn were sections 95-2203, 2204 and 2205, R.C.M. 1947 (now sections 46-18-111, 112, and 113, MCA) . The statutes disclose a distinct change in policy. Section 46-18-113, MCA, in pertinent part states: "The judge may, in his discretion, make the investigative reportor'arts of it available to the defendants or others, while concealing the identity of persons who provided confidential information. If the court discloses the identitv A of persons who provided information, the judge may, in his discretion, allow the defendant to - - cross-examine those who rendered the information." (Emphasis added) Under the old statutes as interpreted in Kuhl, testimony was required by witnesses in open court which guaranteed the right of cross-examination as to all elements of evidence received in either aggravation or mitigation of punishment. In contrast, as enacted in 1967, the present law gives the district judge the discretion to refuse to make the investigative report available and to conceal or disclose identity of persons providing confidential information. In addition, section 46-18-113, MCA, provides that the judge may, in his discretion, allow cross-examination by the defendant if the court has disclosed the identity of persons who provided information. There is no specific right of cross-examination under other circumstances. In making a similar analysis, this Court in Orsborn referred to Kuhl and stated: "However, this does not mean that the spirit of Kuhl is dead. A convicted defendant still has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation. The real question before us is whether defendant received that protection." The court then concluded in Orsborn that the defendant was represented by counsel, had the opportunity to rebut the information and chose to affirm the information, and thus any danger of utilizing this information in sentencing was averted. I would apply the Orsborn test to the present case. Here there initially was an anonymous call from a person speaking favorably of the defendant. Thereafter the trial judge called a university professor of his acquaintance. The details of that telephone conversation with the university professor were disclosed by the trial judge in open court. Following that disclosure, the counsel for defendant had ample opportunity to question the judge and to present any explanatory information which he deemed to be advisable. Note that the information obtained by the judge was not actually significant. At most, as pointed out in the majority opinion, the information may have triggered questions about the defendant's trip to Mexico. While such questions may have been triggered, no misinformation or prejudicial information is shown to have been obtained. As stated in Orsborn, the convicted defendant has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation. No misinformation has been shown here. I agree with the conclusion of the majority that the proper course is for a sentencing judge to delegate investigation responsibilities to others. Even the trial judge here admitted that his single phone call may have been inadvisable. The majority has concluded that the private out-of-court telephone contact affected defendant's substantial right to due process during the sentencing. I am unable to see how that conclusion is substantiated by the facts. I believe the majority is setting up a rule which is not consistent with the procedure provided by the legislature in section 46-18-113, MCA, where the judge may choose not to disclose parts of an investigation report to the defendant and may also choose not to allow cross-examination. I would hold here that no misinformation was received and that in fact no information prejudicial to the defendant was presented by the telephone call and that the due process g u a r a n t e e d e s c r i b e d i n Orsborn w a s a f f o r d e d t h e defendant. I would a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court.