Title: Lovato v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ANDY LEE LOVATO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 10Case Number: S-11-0104Decided: 01/31/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
ANDY 
LEE LOVATO,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Elisabeth 
M.W. Trefonas, Trefonas Law, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sue Chatfield, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Chatfield.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Andy Lee Lovato, entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of 
methamphetamine.  In this appeal, he 
claims the district court incorrectly concluded that his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and article 1 section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution was not 
violated when he was seized by the police.  
Finding no error, we affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court erred when it concluded that the appellant’s rights under the 
United States and Wyoming constitutions were not violated when he was seized, 
arrested, and ultimately searched by the police.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On June 8, 
2010, Detectives Willmarth and Sekerka with the Cheyenne Police Department began 
conducting surveillance on a house after receiving information that possible 
drug-related activity was occurring there.  
As the detectives approached the house, they saw a white Lincoln Town Car 
parked directly in front of the house, approximately 3-5 feet from the 
curb.  An unidentified male was 
seated in the driver’s seat of the car and the engine was running.  There were no license plates on the car 
and, while there was a piece of white paper attached to the rear window of the 
car, the detectives could not read it.  
The detectives drove around the block and took a surveillance position 
where they could clearly see the car, although they did not have a clear view of 
the house.  Shortly thereafter, a 
passenger entered the car and it left the residence.
 
[¶4]      The detectives 
followed the Town Car in their unmarked vehicle with the hopes of identifying 
the occupants.  While following the 
car, they observed the driver engage in several traffic violations, including an 
illegal lane change and failure to use a turn signal.  The detectives requested a marked unit 
to pull the Town Car over for the traffic violations, but learned that no units 
were available in the area.  They 
continued to follow the Town Car until it stopped abruptly in the middle of the 
road.  The passenger of the Town Car 
exited the vehicle and stared intently at, and proceeded to walk toward, 
Detective Sekerka, who had gotten out of the passenger side of the unmarked 
police car.  Detective Sekerka said, 
“Cheyenne Police.  I need to talk to 
you, sir.”  The passenger continued 
to walk toward the detective until he got to the end of the Town Car, where he 
began to run away.  After a short 
chase, Detective Sekerka caught up with the passenger and was eventually 
assisted by Detective Willmarth.  
The passenger struggled with the detectives, but was eventually placed in 
handcuffs and arrested for interference with a peace officer.  During this time, the driver of the Town 
Car left the scene.  Detective 
Willmarth conducted a pat-down search and discovered a red metal canister, which 
contained methamphetamine, a digital scale, and $180 in the passenger’s 
left-front pocket.  The passenger 
was identified as the appellant.
 
[¶5]      The appellant 
filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming he was seized by the detectives in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution 
and article 1 section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  He argued that, at most, the interaction 
between himself and Detective Sekerka was a consensual encounter that he was 
free to terminate at any time.  
Therefore, the detectives did not have probable cause to arrest him for 
interference with a peace officer because the appellant was under no legal 
obligation to submit to Detective Sekerka’s request.  The district court disagreed and 
concluded that the detectives could have lawfully stopped the Town Car for the 
traffic violations and would have also had the authority to control the 
appellant’s movements during the traffic stop.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶6]      When reviewing a 
district court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress, this Court uses a 
two-part standard of review.  We 
will not disturb the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Feeney v. State, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 9, 208 P.3d 50, 53 (Wyo. 2009).  If the 
district court did not make a finding of fact on a specific issue, we will 
“uphold the general ruling of the court below if supported by any reasonable 
view of the evidence.”  Id.  The issue of whether an unreasonable 
search or seizure occurred is a question of law we review de novo.  Id.  “A district court judgment may be 
affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the record.”  Id.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]      The appellant 
does not appear to contend the detectives did not have the authority to pull the 
Town Car over for the observed traffic violations.  Instead, he claims the detectives did 
not execute a traffic stop and, therefore, any authority the detectives may have 
had over a passenger in a traffic stop did not apply.  Accordingly, the detectives needed 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity separate from the traffic violations 
to justify the seizure.  While we 
agree that the detectives did not execute a traffic stop, we hold that the 
detectives did have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the 
appellant’s seizure which, after the appellant disobeyed and struggled with the 
detectives, led to probable cause for his arrest for interference with a peace 
officer.1
 
Independent 
State Constitutional Analysis
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
claims his seizure was a violation of article 1 section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  However, he has not 
provided any independent analysis that the outcome under the Wyoming 
Constitution would differ from the federal constitution.  We have consistently held that, when a 
party fails to provide “proper argument and briefing using a precise and 
analytically sound approach” when claiming a violation of article 1 section 4 of 
the Wyoming Constitution, we will decline to consider the issue.  Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005).  Therefore, we decline to consider whether 
the seizure was a violation of the Wyoming Constitution.
 
Fourth 
Amendment
 
[¶9]      The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
 
            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.
 
U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  This Court has 
recognized three separate categories, or tiers, of interaction between a law 
enforcement officer and a citizen for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment 
analysis:
 
The 
least intrusive contact between a citizen and police is a consensual 
encounter.  Custer [v. State, 2006 WY 72], ¶ 13, 135 P.3d 
[620], 624-25 [(Wyo. 2006)].  A 
consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment 
protections.  The second tier is the 
investigatory or Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An 
investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25.  However, because of its limited nature, 
a law enforcement officer is only required to show “the presence of specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime” in order to 
justify the detention.  Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 330 (Wyo. 
1994).  The most intrusive encounter 
between police and a citizen is an arrest.  
An arrest “'requires justification by probable cause to believe that a 
person has committed or is committing a crime.’”  Id. at 625, 135 P.3d 620 quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
219-20.
 
Feeney, 
2009 WY 67, ¶ 13, 208 P.3d  at 54 (quoting Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007)) (brackets in original).  
 
[¶10]   We have held that “a traffic stop 
is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest[.]”  Id.  Therefore, we analyze the reasonableness 
of the traffic stop under the two-part test from Terry v. Ohio:  “1) whether the initial stop was 
justified; and 2) whether the officer’s actions during the detention were 
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance.’”  
Id. (quoting Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 705 (Wyo. 2003)).  The 
United States Supreme Court has further held that the first requirement of Terry is “met whenever it is lawful for 
police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a 
vehicular violation.  The police 
need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is 
involved in criminal activity.”  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 
129 S. Ct. 781, 784, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009).
 
[¶11]   The district court’s conclusion 
that the detectives’ seizure of the appellant was constitutional was based upon 
the premise that, because the detectives had observed several traffic 
violations, the stop was justified and, therefore, the appellant could be 
detained as a passenger pending inquiry into the traffic violation.  It is undisputed that the detectives 
did, in fact, observe several traffic violations that would have justified an 
investigative detention by way of a traffic stop.  And, if they had effectuated a traffic 
stop, they could have detained the appellant as a passenger in the vehicle while 
they investigated the traffic violation.  
Id.  The problem with the district court’s 
reliance upon this legal conclusion, however, is that a traffic stop never 
occurred.  Instead, it is premised 
on a string of hypothetical situations that simply did not occur.  The driver of the Town Car in which the 
appellant was a passenger abruptly stopped the car in the middle of the street 
without any show of authority by the detectives.  Further, the only contact made with the 
occupants of the Town Car was with the appellant, and no contact was made with 
the driver.  For these reasons, we 
do not believe the appellant’s seizure was justified by being a passenger during 
a traffic stop.
 
[¶12]   However, we do hold the detectives 
had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the appellant’s 
seizure, which led to probable cause for his eventual arrest.  When determining whether reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity exists, this court must find “a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity.”  McGarvey v. State, 2009 WY 8, ¶ 15, 200 P.3d 785, 790 (Wyo. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  When doing so, we take into account the 
totality of the circumstances, including an officer’s training, experience, and 
expertise.  Id. 
 
[¶13]   Under the totality of the 
circumstances, the detectives had reasonable suspicion to believe the appellant 
was engaged in criminal activity.  
Both detectives testified that they were conducting surveillance on the 
house in front of which the Town Car was parked because of information they had 
received about possible drug related activity at the house.  They observed the Town Car parked 3-5 
feet from the curb directly in front of the house, with the engine running and a 
man sitting in the driver’s seat.  
Detective Willmarth testified that when a vehicle is parked outside of a 
residence for a short period of time, it is indicative of drug activity.  The appellant then got into the 
passenger side of the Town Car and the car drove away. 
 
[¶14]   The detectives followed the Town 
Car in an unmarked vehicle for some time until the driver abruptly stopped the 
car in the middle of the road.  
Detective Willmarth testified that the driver’s sudden stop could be a 
countersurveillance tactic that is used when someone knows he is being followed 
by the police.  Detective Sekerka 
testified that, in his experience, “if a vehicle just stops in the middle of the 
street they assume police are behind it.  
They stop the car, and they run, then you have a foot pursuit.”  After the Town Car stopped in the middle 
of the road, the appellant got out of the car, stared “intently” at Detective 
Sekerka, and began walking towards him.  
After Detective Sekerka identified himself as a police officer and asked 
the appellant to stop, he continued walking toward the detective until he 
reached the end of the car and then began to run away.2
 
[¶15]   As is often the case, each of these 
observations and behaviors could be interpreted as innocent if reviewed in 
isolation.  See Feeney, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 22, 208 P.3d  
at 57.  However, seemingly innocent 
behavior may give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when 
considered together under the totality of the circumstances.  The fact that the detectives observed 
the Town Car parked in front of a house that was the target of drug surveillance 
and the driver eventually engaged in what could be considered a 
countersurveillance maneuver, coupled with the appellant’s bizarre and 
aggressive behavior towards Detective Sekerka and his headlong flight after 
discovering he was being confronted by law enforcement officers, justifies a 
finding of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot.
 
[¶16]   The appellant generally describes 
his flight from the detectives as an exercise of his right not to cooperate with 
law enforcement, and argues that his refusal to cooperate cannot be the basis 
for reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  This description, however, does not 
accurately describe the appellant’s actions when confronted by Detective 
Sekerka.  This was not a situation 
where the detective asked the appellant if he would answer some questions and 
the appellant refused.  Instead, the 
appellant came toward Detective Sekerka in a hostile fashion and, once he 
learned that Detective Sekerka was a police officer, he fled.  As the United States Supreme Court 
recognized in Illinois v. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000), “[h]eadlong flight—wherever 
it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion:  it is not necessarily indicative of 
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”  Id. at 124, 120 S. Ct.  at 676.  The court explained that, “[a]llowing 
officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate 
further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business 
or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.”  Id. at 125, 120 S. Ct.  at 676.  Further, the court acknowledged that 
there may be innocent reasons for the flight of an individual confronted by an 
officer, but that the officer may detain the individual to resolve the 
ambiguity.  Id. at 125, 120 S. Ct.  at 677.  Therefore, the appellant’s flight from 
Detective Sekerka is an appropriate consideration when determining whether the 
detectives had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.3
 
[¶17]   Furthermore, because the 
detectives’ pursuit and seizure of the appellant was justified, they were acting 
within the lawful performance of their duties.  Therefore, they also had probable cause 
to arrest the appellant for interference with a peace officer, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204 (LexisNexis 2011), when he failed to obey Detective 
Sekerka’s orders to stop running and when he struggled with the detectives once 
physical contact was made.  
Accordingly, the arrest was supported by probable cause and the district 
court did not err when it denied the appellant’s motion to 
suppress.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶18]   The district court did not err when 
it denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence because the detectives had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying briefly detaining the 
appellant for further investigation.  
Further, the detectives had probable cause to arrest the appellant for 
interference with a peace officer after he failed to obey Detective Sekerka’s 
commands to stop and then struggled with the detectives.  We affirm.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1The 
appellant’s argument focuses on the constitutional nature of his seizure and 
does not challenge the constitutionality of the search independently.  In other words, the appellant does not 
argue that the search was unconstitutional if the seizure was justified.  Therefore, we focus our analysis only on 
whether the appellant’s seizure was justified.
2The 
appellant chose not to present any witnesses at the motion hearing.  Therefore, the detectives’ testimony was 
not controverted.
3This 
should not be interpreted as a bright-line rule that an individual’s flight is 
sufficient on its own to be the basis of reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.  Instead, it is simply an 
appropriate factor to be weighed under the totality of the circumstances.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S.  at 126-27, 120 S. Ct.  at 677 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).