Title: Willie Horne et al. v. TGM Associates, L.P., et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 08/20/2010 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
____________________
1070766
____________________
Willie Horne et al.
v.
TGM Associates, L.P., et al.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-05-4531)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Willie Horne and 44 other former tenants of the Harbor
Landing apartment complex ("Harbor Landing") appeal from a
summary judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court on their
claims of breach of contract, wrongful eviction, breach of the
1070766
TGM Harbor Landing sold the property to another property-
1
development corporation in January 2007.
2
covenant 
of 
quiet 
enjoyment, 
conversion, 
fraudulent
suppression, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
or the tort of outrage against TGM Associates, L.P., the
entity that 
managed the 
complex ("TGM 
Associates"), 
TGM Harbor
Landing, Inc., the owner of Harbor Landing ("TGM Harbor
Landing"), and several other defendants.  We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Harbor Landing consisted of a 200-unit complex that
comprised 13 two-story apartment buildings, an office, and a
common area containing a swimming pool, tennis courts, and
basketball courts.  The complex fronted Mobile Bay to the west
and the mouth of Dog River to the north.  TGM Associates
operated the complex pursuant to a 1995 management agreement
with TGM Harbor Landing.   All but 7 of the plaintiffs in this
1
action rented apartments in buildings 8 through 13 of the
complex.  
Paragraph 13 of the lease agreement signed by every
tenant residing at Harbor 
Landing 
provided, in pertinent part:
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3
"13. STRUCTURAL DAMAGE: If the leased premises, or
the building in which the leased premises is located
shall be damaged by fire or by other unforeseen
events, without fault of the lessee, then, and in
that event, the lessor shall have the option to
decide whether the lessor shall or shall not repair
and restore said building or leased premises to
their original shape; and if the lessor decides to
repair and restore the building or the rented
premises as aforesaid, then, from the time such
damages occur until the repairs are completed, an
equitable abatement of the monthly installments will
be allowed.  It is agreed, however, that if the
damage is such as not to render the leased premises
uninhabitable for the purpose for which they are
rented, then there shall be no abatement of the rent
while the repairs are being made."
Paragraph 15 of the lease agreement provided, in
pertinent part:
"15. TERMINATING LEASE: If either the Lessee or [TGM
Associates] desires that this lease terminate at the
expiration of its term, including month to month
tenancy, one must give to the other WRITTEN NOTICE
TO BE RECEIVED NOT LESS THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS PRIOR
TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE LEASE TERM.  If the written
notice is given less than thirty (30) days prior to
the expiration date, the Lessee's obligation to pay
rent shall extend to the number of days required to
fulfill the thirty (30) day notice period."
(Capitalization in original.)
In the early morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane
Katrina made landfall as a category 5 hurricane near the
Louisiana-Mississippi border.  Hurricane Katrina inflicted
1070766
The notice to the residents also stated that a separate
2
form was available for each tenant to sign if the tenant
decided to accept a return of his or her security deposit "and
4
substantial damage to Harbor Landing, resulting in the
condemnation of buildings 1 through 7 in the complex. 
Immediately after Hurricane Katrina, TGM Associates,
which 
maintains its headquarters 
in 
New 
York, 
dispatched teams
to help the residents of Harbor Landing, to make damage
assessments, and 
to 
determine whether 
the complex 
could 
remain
open.  The record indicates, and the plaintiffs do not
dispute, that TGM Associates spent over $200,000 at Harbor
Landing in the first month following Hurricane Katrina to
clean up debris, to remove excess water from the property, to
hire security guards, and to provide direct aid to the
residents of the complex.  
On August 31, 2005, TGM Associates sent a notice to all
the residents of Harbor Landing informing them that TGM
Associates was offering each of them a "$500 relocation gift
check ... to help during these hard times."  All the
plaintiffs accepted these "relocation gift" checks, and each
signed a document "acknowledg[ing] the receipt of the above
referenced relocation gift in the amount of $500."   TGM
2
1070766
move out." 
5
Associates 
also 
informed 
the 
residents 
in 
early 
September 
that
no rent would be charged in September.  
On September 8, 2005, TGM Associates provided written
notice to the occupants of buildings 1 through 7 that they
must vacate their apartments immediately, which they did.  The
trial court found, and the parties do not dispute, that the
units in buildings 8 through 13 sustained varying degrees of
damage, but that all of those units were habitable after
Hurricane Katrina.
On September 28, 2005, TGM Associates issued a "Lease
Termination Notice" to the remaining tenants at Harbor
Landing, including the plaintiffs still residing in buildings
8 through 13.  The termination notice stated that because
Harbor Landing had "sustained significant structural damage
caused by Hurricane Katrina," TGM Associates judged every
apartment in the complex to be "uninhabitable."  Consequently,
the termination notice stated that each resident's lease
agreement "will terminate ten (10) days from the date hereof,"
i.e., October 8, 2005.  The residents were ordered to
"surrender possession of the premises ten (10) days from the
1070766
6
date of this notice" and to "remove all personal property from
the premises and surrender the keys within the time allowed in
this notice."  The termination notice informed residents that
"[u]pon timely surrender of possession of the premises, your
security deposit will be refunded to you."  
Deposition testimony in the record reveals that before
the termination notice was issued, a few of the plaintiffs had
been told by TGM Associates' staff members at Harbor Landing
that they would not have to move out of their apartments.
When some of the plaintiffs questioned TGM Associates' staff
members at Harbor Landing about the termination notice, at
least six of them were told that, if they did not vacate their
apartments by October 8, 2005, they would be arrested for
criminal trespass, their personal property would be forcibly
removed from their apartments, and/or their credit would be
ruined by the process of eviction.  
On September 29, 2005, the toilet in the apartment of one
of the plaintiffs, James Williams, who resided in building 8,
was overflowing with raw sewage.  Williams went outside and
unscrewed an overflow valve adjacent to building 8, which
caused raw sewage to flow throughout buildings 8 and 9.  The
1070766
7
Mobile County Health Department issued an immediate evacuation
order for residents in those two buildings as a result of the
health hazard caused by the release of the raw sewage.  The
evacuation order informed residents in buildings 8 and 9 that
efforts would be made to "remediate the current threat to
public health" so that residents would have "the opportunity
to return to these complexes and retrieve their belongings
prior to the lease termination date, October 8, 2005."  
As the trial court related in its summary-judgment order:
"Every plaintiff in this case departed by the
scheduled October 8 date, with the exception of
Willie Horne and Demetrius Dudley, who voluntarily
left the next day.  TGM [Associates] did not
initiate eviction proceedings against any of the
plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs turned in their keys and
received a full refund of their original security
deposits, with the exception of several plaintiffs
who owed back rent."
Each of the plaintiffs who received a security deposit signed
a receipt acknowledging that he or she was "entitled to
receive the return of the security deposit" and had "received
the security deposit check in the amount detailed above."  
On December 13, 2005, the plaintiffs filed this action
against TGM Associates, TGM Harbor Landing, several employees
of TGM Associates, and others, alleging breach of contract,
1070766
8
wrongful eviction, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
trespass, conversion, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress or the tort of outrage.  The plaintiffs
acknowledged that they vacated the premises within the time
stipulated in the termination notice, but they alleged that
they did so only because they were threatened by the staff of
TGM Associates with lockouts, utility cutoffs, the forfeiture
of personal belongings, loss of security deposits, injury to
their credit, and/or arrest for criminal trespass.  They also
alleged that staff members of TGM Associates told several of
the plaintiffs that they would not have to move out of their
apartments,  and, as a result, those plaintiffs did not
attempt to find alternate living arrangements between August
31, 2005, and the date of the termination notice, September
28, 2005.  
On April 20, 2007, the defendants filed a motion for a
summary judgment as to all claims.  The plaintiffs filed a
response, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion on
July 13, 2007.  Following the hearing, the trial court entered
an order on September 25, 2007, granting the defendants'
motion for a summary judgment as to all claims.  On
1070766
9
October 25, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R.
Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which
the trial court denied on January 22, 2008.  The plaintiffs
appeal the summary judgment against them on all claims except
their claim alleging trespass.  
II.  Standard of Review
"The standard by which this Court will review a
motion for summary judgment is well established:
"'The principles of law applicable to
a motion for summary judgment are well
settled.  To grant such a motion, the trial
court 
must determine that the evidence does
not create a genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When the movant
makes a prima facie showing that those two
conditions 
are 
satisfied, 
the 
burden 
shifts
to the nonmovant to present "substantial
evidence" creating a genuine issue of
material fact.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of
Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala.1989); § 12-21-12(d)[,] Ala. Code
1975.  Evidence is "substantial" if it is
of 
"such 
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
"'In our review of a summary judgment,
we apply the same standard as the trial
court.  Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462,
465 (Ala. 1997).  Our review is subject to
1070766
10
the caveat that we must review the record
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant
and must resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant.  Hanners v. Balfour
Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412 (Ala.
1990).'"
Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 832-33 (Ala. 2001)
(quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184
(Ala. 1999)).
III.  Analysis
The arguments presented by the plaintiffs on appeal refer
only to the circumstances faced by those plaintiffs who
resided in buildings 8 through 13.  The trial court's judgment
therefore is affirmed as it relates to the plaintiffs who
resided in buildings 1 through 7.  The balance of the analysis
as set forth below is provided, therefore, only in reference
to those plaintiffs who resided in buildings 8 through 13.
Likewise, except as expressly noted, references hereinafter to
the plaintiffs are references to those plaintiffs who resided
in buildings 8 through 13.
A.  Breach of Contract
The plaintiffs first contend, as they did before the
trial court, that TGM Associates breached their lease
agreements by issuing the 10-day termination notice despite
1070766
11
the fact that paragraph 15 of the lease agreement requires
notice of at least 30 days by either party wishing to
terminate the lease.  The defendants' first response, as it
was before the trial court, is that paragraph 13 of the lease
agreement authorized TGM Associates to determine that each of
the buildings at Harbor Landing was uninhabitable and,
therefore, that early termination of the leases was
permissible under the lease agreement.  
The trial court noted that paragraph 13 "entitled TGM
[Associates] to determine, following [Hurricane] Katrina,
whether or not to repair the plaintiffs' units."  The trial
court admitted, however, that paragraph 13 was "silent on what
would occur in a situation such as that presented in Katrina,"
where half of the apartment buildings were practically
destroyed.  The trial court concluded that "the only
reasonable meaning of [p]aragraph 13 of the lease is that
following an unforseen disaster of Katrina's magnitude, which
destroyed a large portion of the Harbor Landing complex and
left the remainder subject to health and safety issues, TGM
[Associates] could terminate the leases."  The trial court
cited the spillage of raw sewage that occurred in buildings 8
1070766
12
and 9 the day after TGM Associates issued its termination
notice as "evidence to support [TGM Associates'] decision to
terminate the leases."
"It is well settled that lease agreements are contracts
and that the general principles of contract construction apply
in ascertaining the scope and meaning of a lease agreement."
Bowdoin Square, L.L.C. v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 873 So.
2d 1091, 1098 (Ala. 2003).  A contract "'"must be given
effect, if at all, according to its plain and inescapable
meaning."'"  James A. Head & Co. v. Rolling, 265 Ala. 328,
338, 90 So. 2d 828, 836 (1956) (quoting Oates v. Lee, 222 Ala.
506, 507, 133 So. 44, 45 (1931), quoting in turn Union Central
Relief Ass'n v. Thomas, 213 Ala. 666, 667, 106 So. 133, 134
(1925)).  Moreover, where the terms of a contract are "plain
and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, and the
parties thereto 'may stand upon the letter' of the contract."
Dunlap v. Macke, 233 Ala. 297, 300, 171 So. 721, 724 (1937).
The trial court's interpretation of paragraph 13 of the
lease agreement ignores the plain meaning of the provision.
Paragraph 13 provides, in part, that 
"[i]f the leased premises, or the building in which
the leased premises is located shall be damaged by
1070766
13
fire or by other unforeseen events, without fault of
the lessee, then, and in that event, the lessor
shall have the option to decide whether the lessor
shall or shall not repair and restore said building
or leased premises to their original shape ...."
Paragraph 13 clearly addresses the lessor's right to elect to
repair or not to repair with respect to an apartment within a
building or with respect to a building within the apartment
complex.  It does not provide TGM Associates the right to
elect to repair or not to repair with respect to the entire
apartment complex.  As the trial court itself noted,
paragraph 13 is silent in that respect.  The trial court
essentially inserted a clause into paragraph 13 that permits
TGM Associates to terminate the leases of all tenants in the
complex at its election because Hurricane Katrina caused
severe damage to portions of the apartment complex.  It did so
despite acknowledging the undisputed fact that the apartments
in buildings 8 through 13 were habitable in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.  In short, the trial court failed to give
effect to paragraph 13 according to its plain meaning.
To some degree, the trial court's interpretation of the
lease agreement and the defendants' first argument regarding
the plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim 
rely 
on 
the fact 
that
1070766
14
Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic event not accounted for
in the ordinary course of business of the landlord-tenant
relationship.  In essence, the defendants contend that
Hurricane Katrina provided TGM Associates with a bona fide
legal reason to terminate the plaintiffs' leases early.  The
trial court stated -- and the defendants argue on appeal --
that, under the circumstances created by Hurricane Katrina,
"if TGM [Associates] sought to enforce a tenant's lease when
he or she wished to cancel it, this Court would have concluded
that the lessee had the right to terminate the lease."  The
implication is that the converse also ought to be true, i.e.,
that under these circumstances TGM Associates had the right to
invoke early termination of its lease agreements with the
plaintiffs.  
The premise of the defendants' argument and the trial
court's reasoning does not accurately reflect Alabama law,
however.  Indeed, the very reason paragraph 13 exists in the
lease agreement is that, without such a provision, lessees
like the plaintiffs would remain responsible for paying rent
on their leases after an event like a hurricane, precisely
because their apartments were not destroyed.
1070766
15
"'The settled rule is that a lessee of premises
destroyed during the term by unavoidable accident is
not relieved from an express promise or covenant to
pay 
rent, 
unless 
he 
protects 
himself 
by 
a
stipulation that the rent shall cease in such event,
or unless the lessor covenants to rebuild or repair,
or unless the destruction is of the entire
subject-matter of the lease, so that nothing remains
capable of being held or enjoyed, which operates a
dissolution of the tenancy.'" 
Brown v. Williams, 576 So. 2d 195, 197 (Ala. 1991) (quoting
Cook v. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99, 103, 4 So. 713, 714 (1887))
(citations and some emphasis omitted; other emphasis added).
See also Pizitz-Smolian Co-op. Stores v. Randolph, 221 Ala.
458, 464, 129 So. 26, 31-32 (1930) (noting the general rule
that the lessee of premises destroyed by an unavoidable
accident is not relieved from an express covenant to pay rent
(subject to an agreement otherwise), but noting "well-
recognized exceptions, such as where the sole subject-matter
of the lease is an apartment, room, or building, without
interest in the land other than the right of subjacent
support, and the entire subject-matter of the lease is
destroyed so that nothing remains capable of being held or
enjoyed, rendering performance impossible ...." (citations
omitted)). 
1070766
16
Although it is true that Hurricane Katrina was an unusual
weather event in terms of the scale of the damage it caused,
TGM Associates could have accounted for the occurrence of the
partial destruction of the apartment complex in its lease
agreements just as it accounted for damage sustained to a
building or an apartment.  It did not do so, and a court
cannot change the lease agreement after the fact to justify
the landlord's action.
The trial court held, in the alternative, that the
plaintiffs terminated their leases by their own actions and,
therefore, that their breach-of-contract claim cannot be
sustained.  For support of this holding, the trial court cited
a provision of the lease agreements titled "Security Deposit
Return," which provided in part that TGM Associates was not
obligated to refund a lessee's security deposit until "the
full term of the lease has expired" and "[a]ll keys are
returned."  It then noted that the plaintiffs who were
eligible received full refunds of their security deposits and
all the plaintiffs turned in their keys and vacated their
apartments by the date provided in the termination notice or
the day after that date.  
1070766
Indeed, 
the 
lease 
agreement 
lists 
11 
such 
conditions, 
one
3
of which is that "THIRTY DAYS written notice was given by the
Lessee to the Lessor."  (Capitalization in original.)  That
condition clearly was not fulfilled by many of the tenants of
Harbor Landing who vacated the premises in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, and yet TGM Associates chose to refund the
security deposits of several of those tenants.
17
The fact that the "Security Deposit Return" provision of
the lease agreement provided that TGM Associates "shall not be
obligated to release the Security Deposit" unless certain
conditions were met does not, 
however, 
prohibit 
TGM Associates
from 
choosing 
to 
refund 
tenants' 
security 
deposits 
without 
all
the listed conditions being met.   The "Security Deposit
3
Return" provision does not operate as a lease-termination
provision.  It simply spells out the conditions under which
TGM Associates legally must refund a lessee's security
deposit.
More generally, the mere fact that the plaintiffs
accepted the return of their security deposits and moved out
of their apartments does not necessarily mean that they
voluntarily terminated their leases.  In essence, the trial
court in its alternate holding concerning the breach-of-
contract claim concluded that the plaintiffs, by accepting
their security deposits and vacating their apartments, waived
1070766
The acceptance of the "relocation gift" likewise does not
4
establish an intentional waiver.  The receipt signed by all
the 
plaintiffs 
acknowledging 
that 
they 
received 
the
"relocation gift" did not state in any way that acceptance of
the gift constituted acknowledgment of a waiver of rights.
Moreover, the concept of a gift is incompatible with the
notion of a reciprocal obligation or waiver of rights; TGM
Associates may have meant for residents to use the check
toward relocation expenses, but the recipients were not
legally bound to do so.  In fact, the August 31, 2005,
memorandum in which TGM Associates first informed tenants of
18
TGM Associates' breach of the lease agreement resulting from
its early termination notice.  But "[a] waiver consists of a
'voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a
known right,' Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047, 1058
(Ala. 1984), and the burden of proof in establishing a waiver
rests upon the party asserting the claim."  Bentley Sys., Inc.
v. Intergraph Corp., 922 So. 2d 61, 93 (Ala. 2005).  Moreover,
whether a party has voluntarily or intentionally waived a
known right is normally a jury question.  See  Edwards v.
Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp., 962 So. 2d 194, 209 (Ala.
2007).  
The receipt signed by plaintiffs acknowledging that they
received their security deposits does not state in any way
that the 
recipient 
was waiving 
any possible contractual breach
by TGM Associates.   No provision in the lease agreement,
4
1070766
Harbor Landing of the "relocation gift check" stated that the
purpose of the check was simply "to help during these hard
times."
Sections 35-9-80 through 35-9-88, Ala. Code 1975, were
5
repealed by Act No. 2006-316, effective January 1, 2007.
19
including 
the 
"Security 
Deposit 
Return" 
provision, 
states 
that
by accepting his or her security deposit and vacating the
premises a lessee waives any possible breach of the lease
agreement by the lessor.  Thus, the record as a whole
indicates that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether, by vacating their apartments by the deadline given in
the termination notice, the plaintiffs intentionally waived
the alleged breach of the lease agreement committed by TGM
Associates when it issued the 10-day notice of termination.
B.  Wrongful Eviction
The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the
plaintiffs' claim alleging wrongful eviction.  Specifically,
the plaintiffs contend that TGM Associates violated the
eviction statutes in force at the time -- the unlawful-
detainer statutes, § 6-6-310 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and the
Sanderson Act, § 35-9-80 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.   
5
1070766
20
The unlawful-detainer statutes permit a landlord to
recover double the annual rent from a tenant who "forcibly or
unlawfully retains possession" of a tenement "after the
expiration of his term or refuses to surrender the same on the
written demand of lessor ...."  § 6-6-314, Ala. Code 1975.
The Sanderson Act, in force at the time, "serve[d] essentially
the same function as an ejectment action -- it provide[d] a
landlord with a means to evict a tenant wrongfully detaining
possession."  Ex parte Moore, 880 So. 2d 1131, 1138 (Ala.
2003).  It applied "[i]n all cases where a tenant shall hold
possession of lands or tenements over and beyond the term for
which the same were rented or leased to him, or after his
right of possession has terminated or been forfeited ...."
§ 35-9-80, Ala. Code 1975.
As we noted in the rendition of the facts, none of the
plaintiffs forcefully held over or retained possession of
their apartments more than a day after the deadline set in the
termination notice, and TGM Associates never initiated
eviction 
proceedings 
against 
any 
of 
the 
plaintiffs.
Therefore, there was not, and could not be, a violation of the
eviction statutes at issue.  Therefore, the trial court
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The inclusion of the concepts of a breach of the covenant
6
of quiet enjoyment in the count of the complaint alleging a
21
correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants as to this claim.
C.  Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the
defendants 
"unilaterally, 
willfully, 
and 
non-judicially
engaged in self-help eviction of plaintiffs from their homes
and, perforce, necessarily interfered with their peaceful
enjoyment of same....  As such, defendants constructively
evicted plaintiffs."  The trial court concluded that the
defendants' action
"does not rise to the level of constructi[ve]
eviction, which occurs when the landlord's actions
do not result in the actual dispossession of the
tenant.  Had TGM [Associates] created a nuisance to
force out the plaintiffs without issuing the ten-day
notice to quit, such an action may have constituted
a constructive eviction, but such did not occur."
(Citations omitted.)  
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court failed to
acknowledge the full nature of the allegations in the
complaint, particularly the plaintiffs' allegation that the
defendants' "interfered with their peaceful enjoyment" of the
leased premises.6
1070766
constructive eviction is understandable given the nexus in our
law between these two concepts.  See Bowdoin Square, L.L.C. v.
Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 873 So. 2d 1091, 1104 (Ala.
2003). 
22
Concerning 
the 
covenant 
of 
quiet 
enjoyment, 
the
plaintiffs rely upon this Court's decision in Johnson v.
Northpointe Apartments, 744 So. 2d 899 (Ala. 1999).  In
Johnson, this Court explained the covenant of quiet enjoyment
as follows: 
"'It is both a covenant and a warranty.  The
landlord warrants that the tenant will not be
disturbed in possession by any other person with a
superior 
legal 
right 
to 
possession.' 
[Roger
Cunningham, William Stoebuck, & Dale Whitman, The
Law of Property § 6.30, pp. 292-93 (1984)] (footnote
omitted); see also Abrams v. Watson, 59 Ala. 524
(1877).  'Moreover, the landlord covenants not to
evict 
the 
tenant 
himself, 
actually 
or
constructively.  Thus, the covenant is breached ...
if, during his term, the tenant is disturbed by a
third person or by the landlord.'  Cunningham,
Stoebuck, & Whitman, supra, at § 6.30, p. 293 ....
'A breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment occurs
when the landlord substantially interferes with the
tenant's 
beneficial 
use 
or 
enjoyment 
of 
the
premises.'  Echo Consulting Servs., Inc. v. North
Conway Bank, 140 N.H. 566, 669 A.2d 227 (1995)
(citing 2 R. Powell, Powell on Real Property ¶
232[1] (1994)).  'Even if not substantial enough to
rise to the level of a constructive eviction ...,
such interference may constitute a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment entitling the tenant to
damages.'  Id."
Johnson, 744 So. 2d at 902 (emphasis omitted).
1070766
The defendants contend that Johnson represents precedent
7
for changing the termination date under a lease as the result
of extreme circumstances, just as they did because of
Hurricane Katrina.  Johnson is distinguishable for several
reasons, however, the most apparent being that the Court
"assum[ed] the efficacy of the back-dated Notice to terminate
the tenancy under the circumstances of this case," 744 So. 2d
at 902, but it did not evaluate that issue because it reversed
the trial court's ruling on the breach-of-contract claim on
another basis.  In other words, the Johnson Court assumed the
efficacy of the backdated notice without settling whether it
was, in fact, legitimate.  Thus, Johnson does not provide
support for TGM Associates' action of shortening the notice of
termination provided in the lease agreement from 30 days to 10
days.  
23
In Johnson, Keith Johnson and his wife Renee were leasing
an 
apartment 
from 
Northpointe 
Apartments 
in 
Saraland
("Northpointe") on a month-to-month basis.  They had paid
their rent through May 31, 1996.  On the night of May 19, the
Johnsons became involved in a domestic dispute, and Keith
Johnson was arrested.  On May 20, Renee Johnson signed a
"Notice to Vacate" the apartment.  Because a provision of the
lease agreement required a 30-day notice to vacate, Renee
Johnson and the manager at Northpointe agreed to backdate the
notice to May 1, 1996, so Renee Johnson would not have to pay
additional rent beyond the rent already paid to lease the
apartment through May 31.   Renee Johnson vacated the
7
apartment a few days later.
1070766
24
On May 24, 1996, the manager at Northpointe ordered a
Northpointe employee to remove the remaining personal property
in the apartment and to place it in the "breezeway" of the
apartment complex.  The Northpointe manager then telephoned
Keith Johnson and informed him that his personal belongings
had been removed from the apartment and that if he did not
have them picked up by the end of the business day,
Northpointe would not be responsible for them.  The manager
also told Keith Johnson that he could not retrieve the
property personally because he was not allowed on the premises
and that he would be arrested if he showed up on complex
property.  When a friend of Keith Johnson's arrived to pick up
Johnson's belongings, the manager "presented him with 'a
couple of garbage sacks' of clothes and assorted items, one
three-piece sofa, and a mattress."  744 So. 2d at 901.  The
friend then sought entrance into the Johnsons' apartment, but
the manager denied him access.  
Keith Johnson subsequently sued Northpointe, alleging,
among other things, breach of contract for "'denying [him] his
right of possession of the leased property for eleven days,'
and, 'by interfering with [his] covenant of quiet enjoyment of
1070766
25
the leased property.'"  744 So. 2d at 902.  The trial court
entered a summary judgment in favor of Northpointe.  This
Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the breach-of-
contract claim, explaining:
"Pursuant to the 
backdated 
Notice, 
the 
Johnsons'
tenancy period did not terminate until May 31.
Northpointe does not -- indeed, could not -- contend
that it had a right to interfere with Renee's right
of possession before the lease terminated on May 31.
This is so because, as we noted earlier in this
opinion, the lease contract prohibited Northpointe
from 
terminating 
a 
tenancy 
without 
a 
30-day
pretermination notice.  In other words, Northpointe
could not have demanded that Renee vacate the
premises before May 31.  ...
"Similarly, Northpointe had no legal right to
interfere with Keith 's possessory interest between
the time Renee relocated and May 31.  Thus, a
fortiori, Northpointe had no right to bar Keith's
access to his leasehold before Renee relocated.  In
other words, Northpointe had no right to threaten
Keith with arrest if he attempted to return to the
Johnsons' apartment.  To interfere with Keith's
access to his apartment by threats or other forms of
intimidation before the expiration of the tenancy
subjected Northpointe to liability for breach of the
lease contract and for breach of the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment in particular."
Johnson v. Northpointe Apartments, 744 So. 2d at 902 (some
emphasis omitted; final emphasis added).  
The Court in Johnson concluded that the covenant of quiet
enjoyment is breached "by threats or other forms of
1070766
On appeal, the defendants seek to discount the testimony
8
of some of these plaintiffs on more than one claim by noting
that their leases had expired by October 8, 2005.  The
defendants thus contend that these plaintiffs cannot have
viable claims against the defendants.  Paragraph 16 of the
lease agreement provides in pertinent part, however, that 
"[f]ailure 
of 
either 
party 
to 
give 
proper
termination notice will automatically renew this
lease for an additional term an a MONTH-TO-MONTH
basis, 
at 
the 
month-to-month 
rental 
rate 
as
established 
by 
the 
lessor, 
and 
under 
such
circumstances, either the Lessor or the Lessee shall
be required to give a thirty (30) day written notice
in order to terminate the lease."
It is undisputed that TGM Associates did not give "proper
termination notice" as provided by paragraph 15 of the lease
agreement.  Therefore, when the leases of some of the
plaintiffs expired, they were automatically renewed on a
month-to-month basis, and TGM Associates still needed to
provide 30 days' notice to terminate their leases.
26
intimidation before the expiration of the tenancy."  744 So.
2d at 902.  In the present case, the plaintiffs presented
uncontradicted evidence that staff members at Harbor Landing
threatened at least six of them with arrest, the removal of
their property, and/or ruining their credit if they did not
leave the premises by October 8, 2005, a date earlier than the
expiration of their tenancies.   Under Johnson, the plaintiffs
8
presented substantial evidence that TGM Associates interfered
with the plaintiffs' right to quiet enjoyment through the
10-day termination notice and ensuing threats that led them to
1070766
27
vacate their apartments.  Accordingly, the trial court erred
in entering a summary judgment for the defendants as to this
count of the complaint.  
D.  Conversion
The trial court entered a summary judgment for the
defendants on the plaintiffs' conversion claim because it
found that the "defendants gave plaintiffs ample opportunity
to remove their possessions from the lease premises, both
before and after the October 8 deadline" and because the
plaintiffs did not present substantial evidence of a demand by
the plaintiffs for their property and a refusal by TGM
Associates to allow the plaintiffs to recover their property.
"To constitute conversion, there must be a
wrongful 
taking 
or 
a 
wrongful 
detention 
or
interference, an illegal assumption of ownership, or
an illegal use or misuse of another's property.
Covington v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 551 So. 2d 935, 938
(Ala. 1989).  'The gist of the action is the
wrongful exercise of dominion over property in
exclusion or defiance of a plaintiff's rights, where
said plaintiff has general or special title to the
property or the immediate right to possession.'  Ott
v. Fox, 362 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1978) (emphasis
added)."
Baxter v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, 584 So. 2d 801, 804-05
(Ala. 1991).
1070766
28
We have already determined that the plaintiffs presented
substantial evidence that the defendants breached the lease
agreement through the early termination notice and related
actions.  The plaintiffs also presented evidence indicating
that TGM Associates gained possession of personal property
left behind by some of the plaintiffs as a result of the early
termination.  Therefore, a genuine issue of fact was presented
as to whether the defendants wrongfully took possession of the
personal property left behind by the plaintiffs.  
The defendants contend that the deposition testimony of
the vast majority of the plaintiffs demonstrates that they
either did not want the property they left behind or that they
did not demand that TGM Associates return the property.
"[A]bandonment is a defense to an action for
conversion.  However, in Alabama, there is 'a
presumption that one does not intend to abandon'
property of value.  'Abandonment of property
requires intent plus an act.  A sufficient act is
one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention
of the owner of personal property neither to use nor
to retake the property into his possession.'
Obviously, '[a] determination of abandonment is a
finding of fact.'"
Johnson, 744 So. 2d at 905 (citations omitted).  Although it
is true that some of the plaintiffs testified that they did
not care whether their property was returned, others stated
1070766
29
that they did want their property returned.  At the very
least, a factual dispute exists concerning whether some of the
plaintiffs had abandoned their property.  
As for the failure of some of the plaintiffs to demand
their property:  "'A demand is not necessary when there has
been a wrongful taking or an exercise of dominion and control
over the property inconsistent with the rights of the owner.'"
Citizens Bank, Enterprise v. Coffee County Bank, Enterprise,
431 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Ala. 1983) (quoting Southeastern Mach.
Co. v. Tarpley, 398 So. 2d 700, 702 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981),
cert. denied, 398 So. 2d 703 (Ala. 1981)) (emphasis added).
Thus, because the plaintiffs presented substantial evidence
that the defendants wrongfully took dominion and control of
their personal property, they were not required to demand its
return 
in 
order 
to 
maintain 
their 
conversion 
claim.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering a summary
judgment for the defendants as to the plaintiffs' claim
alleging conversion of their personal property.  
E.  Fraudulent Suppression
The plaintiffs contend that before the defendants issued
the termination notice on September 28, 2005, the defendants
1070766
30
fraudulently misrepresented to the plaintiffs that they would
be allowed to continue living in their apartments.  Inherent
in this contention is an allegation that the defendants knew
that the plaintiffs would not be allowed to stay in their
apartments, yet TGM Associates purposefully or recklessly told
at least some of the plaintiffs that they would be able to
remain living in their apartments in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.  The plaintiffs claim that the defendants
had decided even before Hurricane Katrina to cease operating
Harbor Landing and to sell the property to the highest bidder
and that the defendants used Hurricane Katrina as an excuse to
effectuate this plan more expeditiously.  
The Court finds the plaintiffs' claim concerning the sale
of Harbor Landing to be mere speculation for which the
plaintiffs lack substantial evidence.  Indeed, as the trial
court observed, the fact that the defendants spent over
$200,000 in the month after Hurricane Katrina to clean up
Harbor Landing and to provide aid to tenants starkly undercuts
the plaintiffs' theory that the defendants used the occurrence
of Hurricane Katrina to speed up their supposed plan to
liquidate the Harbor Landing property as soon as possible.
1070766
31
Even the fact -- not considered by the trial court in making
its ruling -- that the property on which Harbor Landing
resided eventually was sold does not help the plaintiffs in
this regard, because it may merely demonstrate that the
apartment complex eventually was deemed not worth repairing in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  
As the trial court explained, the claim that the
defendants' surreptitiously planned to terminate the lease
agreements
"required plaintiffs to submit substantial evidence
that TGM [Associates] had a duty to disclose as soon
as it determined to terminate the leases; that TGM
[Associates] concealed this material fact from the
plaintiffs; that by concealing this from plaintiffs,
TGM [Associates] induced plaintiffs to stay at
Harbor 
Landing 
rather 
than 
seek 
alternative
accommodations; and that because of this concealment
the plaintiffs were injured by not having more time
to look for new living arrangements.  Auto-Owners
Ins. Co. v. Abston, 822 So. 2d [1187, 1197 (Ala.
2001)], citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So.
2d 409 , 423 (Ala. 1997).  In the absence of any
substantial evidence that TGM withheld any material
information from the plaintiffs concerning the lease
termination, the suppression claim fails.  No
substantial evidence supports the allegation that
TGM [Associates] or its employees on site (the
individual defendants and Roderick Bonner) knew that
TGM [Associates] was planning to shut down Harbor
Landing on October 8, 2005 and failed to communicate
it."
1070766
32
We find no error in the trial court's conclusion in this
regard.  The record simply does not support a finding that TGM
Associates' staff members at Harbor Landing, regardless of
what they told various plaintiffs concerning whether they
could stay in their apartments, knew what would happen and
made misrepresentations based on that knowledge.  
F.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress or Tort of
Outrage
The trial court concluded that the actions by the
defendants in this case did not rise to a level commensurate
with the intentional infliction of emotional distress or the
tort of outrage.  The plaintiffs disagree, emphasizing the
fact that the defendants' conduct occurred in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.
"This Court, in 1980, recognized the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or the
tort of outrage, and defined the parameters for such
an action:
"'[O]ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional
distress and for bodily harm resulting from
the distress.  The emotional distress
thereunder must be so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to
endure it.  Any recovery must be reasonable
and justified under the circumstances,
1070766
33
liability ensuing only when the conduct is
extreme.  Comment, Restatement [(Second) of
Torts], supra, at 78 [(1948)].  By extreme
we refer to conduct so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable 
in 
a 
civilized 
society.
Comment (d), Restatement, supra at 72.'
"American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361,
365 (Ala. 1980).  Furthermore, this Court explained:
"'It should also be noted that this
tort does not recognize recovery for "mere
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppressions, or other trivialities."
Comment, Restatement, supra, at 73.  The
principle applies only to unprivileged,
intentional or reckless conduct of an
extreme and outrageous nature, and only
that 
which 
causes 
severe 
emotional
distress.'
"American Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 364-65.
"Thus, 
in 
order 
to 
prevail 
on 
[a]
tort-of-outrage claim, [the plaintiff is] required
to present substantial evidence indicating that [the
defendant's] 
conduct 
'(1) 
was 
intentional 
or
reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3)
caused 
emotional 
distress 
so 
severe 
that 
no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.'
Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d
1041, 1043 (Ala. 1993)."
Harrelson v. R.J., 882 So. 2d 317, 321-22 (Ala. 2003).
The plaintiffs contend that the 10-day notice of the
termination of their leases coupled with the threats expressed
1070766
34
to some of the plaintiffs that they would be arrested, their
personal property would be would be forcibly removed from
their apartments, and/or their credit would be ruined by the
process of eviction constituted the kind of conduct actionable
under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress
or the tort of outrage.  They fail to offer any analogous
cases to support this contention, however.
In American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361
(Ala. 1980), the case in which this Court recognized the tort
of outrage, the facts showed that the defendant-employer had
"harassed, investigated without cause, humiliated, accused of
improper dealings, and ultimately terminated from his job,
without justification," the plaintiff-employee.  394 So. 2d at
367.  Despite all of these actions, the Inmon Court still
found that the defendant's conduct was not outrageous.  In
Potts v. Hayes, 771 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000), this Court
stated that the tort of outrage is
"so limited that this Court has recognized it in
regard to only three kinds of conduct: (1) wrongful
conduct in the family-burial context, Whitt v.
Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1987); (2) barbaric
methods employed to coerce an insurance settlement,
National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 447 So. 2d
133 
(Ala. 
1983); 
and 
(3) 
egregious 
sexual
1070766
It should not be forgotten, in this regard, that the
9
defendants permitted the plaintiffs and the rest of the
tenants residing at Harbor Landing to remain in their
apartments rent-free throughout September and provided all of
them with the $500 "relocation gift" checks.  
35
harassment, Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d
322 (Ala. 1989)."
Though the defendants' conduct may have made the
plaintiffs' lives more difficult -- and, in some cases
extremely difficult -- the 10-day termination notice and even
the threats toward some of the plaintiffs that accompanied it
do not constitute conduct "so outrageous in character and so
extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized society."   Inmon, 394 So. 2d at
9
365.  The trial court did not err in so finding.
IV.  Conclusion
As previously stated, we affirm the summary judgment in
favor of the defendants insofar as it relates to claims made
by those plaintiffs who resided in buildings 1 through 7.  As
to those plaintiffs who resided in buildings 8 through 13, we
conclude that there was introduced substantial evidence to
create genuine issues of material fact as to their claims
alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of quiet
1070766
36
enjoyment, and conversion, and, as to those claims, we reverse
the trial court's judgment.  The trial court, however,
correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants as to the claims alleging wrongful eviction, fraud,
and the intentional infliction of emotional distress or the
tort of outrage asserted by those plaintiffs who resided in
buildings 8 through 13; its judgment in that regard is
affirmed.  Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment in
part, reverse it in part, and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur.