Title: Linda Phillips and Marvin Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, Arkansas et al.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Linda PHILLIPS and Marvin Phillips v. TOWN OF
OAK GROVE, Arkansas, and Jean Morgan, Mayor,
Sam Jones, Alderman, Gary High, Alderman, Pat
Davis, Alderwoman, Vicki Allen, Alderwoman,
and Willard Standlee, Alderman, in Their
Official Capacities as the Mayor and Town
Council of the Town of Oak Grove, Arkansas

97-898                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                  Opinion delivered May 7, 1998


1.   Municipal corporations -- powers of -- expressly conferred by
     legislature. -- Municipal corporations derive their
     legislative powers from the general laws of the state; a
     municipality has no powers except those expressly conferred by
     the legislature and those necessarily or fairly implied as
     incident to or essential for the attainment of the purpose
     expressly declared. 

2.   Municipal corporations -- exercise of police power -- when
     justified. -- A city has a plenary duty to exercise its police
     power in the interest of the public health and safety of its
     inhabitants; the police power of the State is founded in
     public necessity, and this necessity must exist in order to
     justify its exercise; it is always justified when it can be
     said to be in the interest of the public health, public
     safety, public comfort, and when it is, private rights must
     yield to public security, under reasonable laws; the State 
     authorized the municipalities to legislate under the police
     power in Ark. Code Ann.  14-55-102 (1987). 

3.   Municipal corporations -- Ark. Code Ann.  14-54-102(1987) --
     power granted. -- Under the grant of power of Ark. Code Ann.
      14-55-102(1987), cities and incorporated towns can prevent
     injury or annoyance within the limits of the municipal
     corporation from anything dangerous, offensive, or unhealthy
     and cause any nuisance to be abated within the jurisdiction
     given the board of health.  

4.   Municipal corporations -- power granted -- appellee town could
     legislate for protection of public health. -- In light of
     statutory authority, appellee town had the authority to
     legislate for the protection of the public health; the
     preamble to the ordinance made clear that appellee was
     legislating under its police power when it stated that its
     purpose was to protect the residents of the town from the
     deleterious effects of commercial broiler activities, to
     protect against offensive or noxious odors, and to protect 
     order, peace, comfort, convenience, safety, general welfare,
     health, and prevent injury from offensive or unhealthy
     matters.
  
5.   Municipal corporations -- regulation under police power --
     mere possibility of public harm is sufficient basis for. --
     The mere possibility of a public harm is sufficient basis for
     the municipality to regulate under its police power; the
     United States Supreme Court, in affirming an Arkansas Supreme
     Court decision, said that a business lawful today may, in the
     future, because of a changed situation, the growth of
     population, or other causes, become a menace to the public
     health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public
     good.

6.   Municipal corporations -- lawful business that poses
     possibility of harm can be regulated even if ordinance
     excludes operation of business within city limits -- ordinance
     here does so. -- A lawful business that poses the possibility
     of harm can be regulated, even if the effect of the ordinance
     excludes the operation of the business within the city limits;
     here, an emu farm is a lawful business, and it is subject to
     all appropriate laws relating to farm animals; the express
     language of the ordinance acts as a complete bar to the
     commercial keeping of fowl and swine within the town limits.

7.   Municipal corporations -- "regulation versus prohibition" rule
     not rigidly applied -- appellee may regulate and prohibit
     commercial swine and fowl businesses under its police power
     unless such deprivation without rational basis. -- The supreme
     court has repeatedly used the "regulation versus prohibition"
     rule, but without rigid application; the rational-basis test
     is applied to ordinances that purport to prohibit lawful
     businesses under the police power; the police power of the
     state extends to the regulation or even the prohibition of the
     business except on such terms as the state may prescribe; the
     State may regulate business that affects public health,
     safety, and welfare, but it may not deprive an individual of
     his right to conduct lawful business unless it can be shown
     that such deprivation is reasonably related to the State
     interests sought to be protected; here the appellee town may
     regulate and even prohibit commercial swine and fowl
     businesses under its police power unless it can be shown that
     there is no rational basis for the deprivation.

8.   Constitutional law -- equal protection clause does not require
     that all persons be dealt with identically -- application of
     rational-basis test. -- The issue was not, as appellant
     attempted to argue, whether the legislation allowed difference
     in treatment of activities generally similar in character, but
     whether there was a rational basis for the difference; the
     equal protection clause does not require that all persons be
     dealt with identically, only that classifications rest on real
     rather than feigned differences, that the distinctions have
     some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is
     made, and that the treatment be not so disparate as to be
     wholly arbitrary; when examining the distinction, the supreme
     court considers whether any rational basis exists that shows
     the possibility of a deliberate nexus with state objectives. 

9.   Constitutional law -- rational-basis test -- burden of proof -
     - presumption of validity. -- The party alleging that
     legislation is arbitrary has the burden of proving that there
     is no rational basis for the legislative act, and regardless
     of the evidence introduced by the moving party, the
     legislation is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if the
     court finds a rational basis for it.  

10.  Municipal corporations -- distinction based on keeping fowl
     for commercial or private purposes -- rational nexus for
     distinction apparent. -- Upon observing the usual presumption
     of constitutional validity, the supreme court concluded that
     there was a rational nexus between the ordinance's stated
     purposes to protect the peace, health, safety, comfort, and
     welfare of the public, and its distinction between keeping
     fowl for commercial operations and limited activities for
     personal consumption; the private keeping of birds would have
     a less harmful effect on the public's health.    

11.  Municipal corporations -- equal protection allows legislation
     that recognizes degrees of evil -- appellee did not act
     arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in enacting
     ordinance. -- The law of equal protection allows legislation
     that recognizes degrees of evil; the supreme court could not
     say that the appellee acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
     unreasonably when it chose to prevent the keeping of fowl for
     commercial purposes within the town limits, while permitting
     limited activities strictly for private consumption.

12.  Constitutional law -- appellant's argument without merit --
     classification does not fail rational-basis review because in
     practice it results in some inequality.-- The appellants'
     argument that a rational basis did not exist when the town
     could have accomplished its purposes through zoning
     ordinances, or numerical restrictions, minimum property sizes,
     and concentration limits, was without merit; under rational-
     basis review, the United States Supreme Court has held that
     the courts are bound to accept a legislature's generalizations
     even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends; a
     classification does not fail rational-basis review because it
     is not made with mathematical precision or because, in
     practice it results in some inequality.

13.  Appeal & error -- erroneous application of law by chancellor
     will result in reversal -- no error in law or fact found in
     chancellor's ruling. -- On appellate review of legislative
     enactments, the supreme court will not reverse a chancellor's
     finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous; however, if a
     chancellor erroneously applies the law and the appellant
     suffers prejudice, the erroneous ruling is reversed; here, the
     chancellor found that keeping a large number of birds within
     the town limits constituted a threat to the peace, health,
     safety, comfort, and welfare of the town's residents; the
     supreme court could not say that the chancellor committed
     error in his judgement, either in fact, or in law when he
     ruled that the ordinance was rationally related to a
     legitimate governmental purpose. 

14.  Municipal corporations -- appellant's assertion without merit
     -- court's role not to discover actual basis for legislation -
     - court considers whether rational basis for law exists. --
     Appellant's assertion that prohibiting all animals of the Aves
     class was overbroad for the purpose of preventing the
     encroachment of large-broiler houses and hog farms into the
     town, and that the town did not even contemplate emu farms
     when they enacted the ordinance, was without merit; an
     enterprise may not ostensibly threaten the problems that led
     to the enactment of the ordinance; the Supreme Court has
     stated that the mere fact that the ordinance may embrace some
     innocent objects, that of itself neither invalidates the law
     nor removes the objects from the grasp of the law; it is not
     the supreme court's role to discover the actual basis for the
     legislation, but rather to consider if any rational basis
     exists that demonstrates the possibility of a deliberate
     nexus; here the court could reasonably conceive that the emu
     operation may grow and present the same concerns for the
     health, safety, and welfare of town residents as large-poultry
     operations.  


     Appeal from Carroll Chancery Court; Donald R. Huffman,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Lisle Law Firm, P.C., by:  Stephen Lisle, for appellants.
     Epley, Epley & Parker, Ltd., by:  Lewis E. Epley, Jr. and Tim
S. Parker, for appellees.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     In 1987, the town of Oak Grove adopted Ordinance 20, which
prohibits the keeping of swine or fowl for commercial purposes
within the town limits.  Appellants Marvin and Linda Phillips breed
emus for sale on their property in Oak Grove.  The appellees are
the town of Oak Grove, the mayor, and members of the town council. 
When the Town charged them with violating the Ordinance, the
Phillipses responded with a motion for summary judgment challenging
the Ordinance's constitutional validity.  Oak Grove counterclaimed,
asking for a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was valid. 
The chancellor granted Oak Grove's motion for summary judgment,
ruling that the Ordinance was a valid enactment that was rationally
related to Oak Grove's legitimate-government concerns for the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.  We affirm the
chancellor's ruling.
     In attacking the constitutional validity of the Ordinance, the
Phillipses raise the following three arguments on appeal:  Oak
Grove cannot prohibit a lawful business when it does not constitute
a nuisance; an ordinance that classifies on the basis of commerce
is an arbitrary exercise of Oak Grove's police power; and
prohibiting all animals of the Aves class is overbroad for the
purpose of preventing the encroachment of large-broiler houses into
the Town.
     Oak Grove is an incorporated town with a population of about
230 residents.  In 1987, its town council passed Ordinance 20 in
response to concerns arising from commercial fowl and hog
operations in the Northwest Arkansas area.  The stated purposes of
the Ordinance are as follow:
          WHEREAS, the Town of Oak Grove, Arkansas, is located in
     close proximity to areas of expanding commercial broiler
     houses and other commercial activities, and it is necessary to
     enact measures to protect the citizens of the Town of Oak
     Grove from the deleterious effects of such commercial
     activities if carried on within the town limits; and
          WHEREAS, the Council of the Town of Oak Grove has
     determined that this Ordinance is necessary in order to
     protect the residents of the Town of Oak Grove from offensive
     or noxious odors, and
          WHEREAS, the passage and approval of this Ordinance will
     improve and protect the order, peace, comfort, convenience,
     safety, general welfare, health and prevent injury from
     offensive or unhealthy matters[.]
     This ordinance makes unlawful the "raising, keeping, growing,
maintenance, husbandry or quartering of either swine or fowl within
the town limits of the Town of Oak Grove, by any person for any
commercial purpose."  As defined in the ordinance, the term "fowl"
includes all members of the zoological class "Aves," including
chickens, turkeys, ducks, geese, quail, guineas, and other domestic
or wild birds.  The Ordinance expressly allows "limited activities
strictly for personal consumption by an individual and not
involving other parties."
     The Phillipses purchased emus and began raising them for
commercial purposes on their property within the town limits.  Emus
are members of the Aves zoological class and are second in size
only to the ostrich, weighing in excess of one hundred pounds at
maturity.  In 1995, Mayor Morgan ordered the Phillipses to remove
their emus from the town limits.  When the Phillipses refused, Oak
Grove filed a criminal misdemeanor action in municipal court for
keeping emus in violation of Ordinance 20.  The Phillipses
countered by filing this action in chancery court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid.  Oak Grove
counterclaimed, asking for a declaratory judgment that the
Ordinance was a valid, rationally related exercise of Oak Grove's
power to enact laws for the general health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens.  Oak Grove suspended its criminal complaint pending
the outcome of the chancery court decision.  The chancellor granted
Oak Grove's motion for summary judgment and this appeal ensued.
                               I.
     Municipal corporations derive their legislative powers from
the general laws of the state.  Ark. Const. art. 12,  4.  A
municipality has no powers except those expressly conferred by the
legislature, and those necessarily or fairly implied as incident to
or essential for the attainment of the purpose expressly declared. 
City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 336,
916 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1996).  
     In Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462,