Title: FELIX NAJERA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FELIX NAJERA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 105214 P.3d 990Case Number: No. S-08-0203Decided: 08/21/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
FELIX 
NAJERA,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman.

 
 

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant 
was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault, four counts of 
third-degree sexual assault, and six counts of incest.  He contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain his convictions on five of the six sexual assault 
counts.  He also contends that the 
sentences for the incest convictions should merge with the sexual assault 
sentences.  We find that sufficient 
evidence exists to support the convictions and affirm all of the 
convictions.  We also determine that 
five of the six incest sentences should merge with the corresponding sexual 
assault sentences and reverse and remand for entry of a new Judgment and 
Sentence.

ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Appellant 
presents these issues:

1.         
Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant]'s motion for acquittal on 
counts I and III-VI?

2.         
Should the incest counts merge for charging and sentencing with the 
sexual assault charges?

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Appellant 
was convicted of twelve felony counts involving improper sexual conduct with his 
two daughters.1  The twelve counts included: two counts 
of second-degree sexual assault (counts I and IV) in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2005); one count of third-degree sexual 
assault (count II) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii); and three 
counts of third-degree sexual assault (counts III, V, and VI) in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-304(a)(iii) and 6-2-303(a)(vi).  Five of the sexual assault counts 
involve the use of Appellant's authority to gain compliance of the victims, 
while the sixth was predicated upon the difference in age between Appellant and 
his victim.  Appellant contends that 
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on the five counts 
involving the use of his authority.  
The remaining six convictions (counts VII through XII) are for felony 
incest in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-402(a).2  Appellant does not challenge his 
convictions on those counts.

[¶4]        
On 
April 17, 2006, the youngest victim (age 13) told her brother and older sister 
(age 15) that Appellant had sexually abused her the previous night.  The older sister responded by revealing 
that she had also been abused in the past by Appellant.  They called their mother and told her 
what had happened.  Mother 
telephoned the family doctor.  The 
doctor was not in and the office manager advised mother to take the girls to the 
emergency room and to call the police.  
In response to that suggestion, Mother told the office manager that she 
would "wait to see if it happened again."  The next day, Mother apparently changed 
her mind and took the girls to the doctor's office.  The staff at the office called the 
police, and the investigation began.  Appellant was subsequently charged and 
tried.  He was found guilty on all 
counts and was sentenced to: 10-20 years on each count of second-degree sexual 
assault to be served concurrently; 10-15 years on each count of third-degree 
sexual assault to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to 
his sentences for second-degree sexual assault; and 3-5 years on each count of 
incest to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to his 
sentences for all other counts.  He 
then filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 

[¶5]        
Appellant 
moved for judgment of acquittal following the State's case-in-chief.3  The district court denied the 
motion.  Appellant contends that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the challenged convictions.  We apply the following standard of 
review:

In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a denial of a motion 
for judgment of acquittal, we examine and accept as true the State's evidence 
and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the defendant.  We do 
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a 
jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or 
circumstantial.

Martin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

[¶6]        
Appellant 
contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain 
convictions on counts I, III, IV, V, and VI.  Each of these counts required the jury 
to find that Appellant was "in a position of authority over the victim and 
use[d] this position of authority to cause the victim to submit."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-303(a)(vi), 
6-2-304(a)(iii).  It is uncontested 
that Appellant, as the victims' father, occupied a position of authority over 
the victims.  It is also uncontested 
that he committed the sexual acts that provided the foundation for the 
charges.  He contends only that the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence that he used his position of 
authority to cause the victims' submission.

[¶7]        
We 
addressed this argument in Brown v. 
State, 817 P.2d 429, 439-40 (Wyo. 1991).  In Brown, the defendant was the victims' 
stepfather.  He was convicted of 
multiple counts of sexual assault and taking indecent liberties with a 
minor.  Id. at 432-33.  On appeal, he contended that his 
convictions should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to prove 
he used his position of authority to cause the victims to submit to sexual 
abuse.  Id. at 439-40.  We affirmed the convictions after 
finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove this element.  In doing so, we 
stated:

A 
stepfather, as a parental figure, generally is in a position to exercise authority and control over stepchildren.  The testimony in this case showed that 
Brown was directly involved with 
discipline of C.P.  At least one 
of the charged crimes occurred when the 
children's mother was absent, and Brown was, in fact, supervising C.P.  Brown's role as a stepfather gave him both access (in the context of 
opportunity) to, and influence over, 
these children.  It is evident 
that the children understood this, because it was unnecessary that Brown 
threaten them in order to obtain coerced obedience to his outrageous sexual 
demands.  In most instances, those 
threats occurred only after the children had submitted. There is no question 
that, given these circumstances, the jury reasonably could have inferred, as it 
did, that any resistance by these 
children was undermined by Brown's authority and his role in the 
household.  Clearly, that was 
enough to satisfy the statutory requirement of use of a position of 
authority.  We hold that the jury 
properly found, under the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant 
invoked his position of authority to commit the counts of sexual assault against 
C.P.

Id. 
at 
440 (emphasis added).

[¶8]        
Brown 
is not a perfect parallel for the current case because the facts are 
different.  The quoted portion, 
however, is just as applicable here.  
The record in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
establishes that Appellant exercised considerable control over the 
children.  He disciplined them on 
occasion.  He also threatened 
them.  The victims testified that 
they were afraid that Appellant would either punish them or that they would 
otherwise get into trouble if they told anyone about the abuse.  On one occasion, Appellant explicitly 
told the older victim that "if I would ever say anything, it would be my fault 
that me and my mom were out on the streets."  The facts surrounding the incidents 
themselves are evidence that Appellant used his status as the victims' father to 
gain compliance.  With one 
exception, all incidents of abuse occurred in each victim's bedroom.  For the most part, Mother was absent 
when the assaults occurred, leaving Appellant as the sole authority figure in 
the house. 

[¶9]        
Appellant's 
argument in this appeal appears to be founded upon the premise that the statute 
requires the defendant to have overtly threatened the victim prior to committing 
each act.  Appellant cites no 
authority for this proposition, nor does he present compelling reasons that we 
should interpret the statute in this manner.  We conclude that the State presented 
sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Appellant used his position of authority to cause the victims' 
submission.

Merger 
of Sentences

 
 

[¶10]     
In 
his second issue, Appellant contends that the incest sentences should be merged 
with the sexual assault sentences.  
He did not raise this argument below.  Accordingly, we review for plain 
error.  Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 29, 193 P.3d 203, 210 (Wyo. 2008).  "Plain 
error exists when: 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 
2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him."  Id., ¶ 29, at 
210-11.

[¶11]     
Appellant 
contends that the six incest convictions, counts VII through XII, should merge 
with their respective sexual assault charges, counts I through VI, for 
sentencing.4  Merger of sentences implicates a 
defendant's constitutional right to be free of multiple punishments for the same 
offense.  Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253 
(Wyo. 2000).  This right is one 
component of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.  Id.  Consequently, the analytical framework 
necessary to resolve this issue is derived from the elements test set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), and subsequently adopted by 
this Court.  Bilderback, 13 P.3d  at 253.  Pursuant to the elements test, two 
offenses are different when each requires proof of an element that the other 
does not.  Id.  Although the elements test is ordinarily 
applied to the statutory text, questions involving merger of sentences require 
this test to be applied somewhat differently.  Id. at 253-54.  Specifically, "the focus necessarily 
expands to embrace those facts proven at trial.  The ultimate question becomes whether 
those facts reveal a single criminal act or multiple and distinct 
offenses."  Id. at 254.

[¶12]     
In 
Owen v. State, the defendant was 
alleged to have inflicted sexual intrusion on his daughter.  902 P.2d 190, 192 (Wyo. 1995).  He was convicted of three counts: 
second-degree sexual assault based upon the age of the victim, indecent 
liberties, and incest.  Id.  On appeal, we found error in the fact 
that the defendant received three separate sentences.  Id. at 194-95.  The charge of indecent liberties, 
according to the bill of particulars filed by the State, was based upon the 
defendant pulling down his daughter's panties, engaging in sexual contact, and 
engaging in digital penetration.  Id. at 194.  We held that "the pulling down of [the 
victim]'s panties and the touching of her in the area of her vagina were a part 
of, and necessary to, the accomplishment of the second-degree sexual 
assault.  The penetration could not 
have been otherwise accomplished."  
Id.  We determined that the indecent 
liberties conviction should have merged into the sexual assault conviction for 
sentencing purposes.  Id. at 194-95.  We reached the opposite conclusion 
regarding the incest conviction.  
The family relationship element of incest, which was absent from the 
particular provision of second-degree sexual assault with which the defendant 
was charged, prevented the merger of the incest sentence.  Id. at 195.

[¶13]     
In 
the current case, we are presented with a mirror image of the situation in Owen.  In Owen, the incest conviction did not 
merge for sentencing because the family relationship element of that crime was 
not an element of either sexual assault or indecent liberties as charged.  In this case, however, five of the six 
sexual assault charges (counts I and III through VI) required proof that 
Appellant was the father of the victims and was, therefore, in a position of 
authority as required by the applicable statute.  The incest charges also required the 
State to prove that Appellant was the father of the victims.  All sexual assault charges required 
either sexual intrusion or sexual contact, and so did the incest charges.  In short, it would be impossible for 
Appellant to commit second- or third-degree sexual assault based upon the use of 
his position of authority as father of the victims without also committing 
incest.  We conclude that the incest 
counts VII, IX, X, XI, and XII merge, for the purpose of sentencing, into the 
sexual assault counts I, III, IV, V, and VI, respectively.

[¶14]     
We 
reach the opposite conclusion regarding counts II and VIII.  In count II, Appellant was charged with 
third-degree sexual assault pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) on the 
basis that the victim was under the age of fourteen years and Appellant was an 
adult.  The State was not required 
to prove that Appellant was the victim's father or that he used his position as 
her father to cause submission.  In 
count VIII, incest, the State was required to prove that Appellant was the 
victim's father.  In securing the 
conviction for incest as charged in count VIII, the State was not required to 
prove that she was younger than fourteen or that Appellant was an adult.  Simply put, the two crimes have 
different elements.  Each requires 
proof of an element that the other does not.  The conviction on count VIII does not 
merge with the conviction on count II for the purpose of sentencing. 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶15]     
Sufficient 
evidence was presented to support Appellant's conviction of second-degree sexual 
assault, as alleged in counts I and IV, and third-degree sexual assault, as 
alleged in counts III, V, and VI.  
Five of the six incest convictions, counts VII, IX, X, XI, and XII, merge 
for the purpose of sentencing into the respective sexual assault convictions, 
counts I, III, IV, V, and VI.  

[¶16]     
We 
affirm the convictions on all counts.  
We reverse and remand for entry of a new Judgment and Sentence consistent 
with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellant 
adopted the victims in 2001.

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303 states, in pertinent part:

(a)           
Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the 
second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

. 
. .

(vi)        The 
actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this position of 
authority to cause the victim to submit . . . .

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304 states, in pertinent part:

(a)        An 
actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first or second degree:

. 
. .

(ii)         
The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age of fourteen 
(14) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim 
and without causing serious bodily injury to the victim;

(iii)        The 
actor subjects a victim to sexual contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 
6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting 
sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim.

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-402(a) states, in pertinent part:

A 
person is guilty of incest if he knowingly commits sexual intrusion . . . or 
sexual contact . . . with an ancestor or descendant or a brother or sister of 
the whole or half blood.  The 
relationships referred to herein include relationships of:

(i)         
Parent and child by adoption . . . .

Although 
it does not affect our resolution of this case, we note that the second- and 
third-degree sexual assault statutes were significantly revised in 2007.  2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 
159.

 
 

3Appellant's 
motion at trial was equivocal at best.  
He moved for a judgment of acquittal on only four of the six sexual 
assault counts.  Also, it appeared 
that counsel admitted that conflicting evidence existed on all counts.  Nevertheless, this does not preclude our 
review.  "[T]he proposition that a 
defendant's guilt must be proved with competent evidence bearing upon each of 
the crime's elements always involves a fundamental right. . . . [A] defendant is 
always prejudiced if he is found guilty and the evidence is not sufficient to 
establish his guilt."  Garay v. State, 2007 WY 130, ¶ 2 n.1, 
165 P.3d 99, 101 n.1 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

4Appellant's 
statement of the issue suggests that he also contends that they should merge for 
the purpose of charging.  His 
argument in this respect consists of two paragraphs with one citation to a court 
decision that is of little use.  We 
find this argument to be inadequate and do not address it.  Instead, we focus solely upon the 
question of merger of the sentences.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

[¶17]   I concur with the majority opinion 
out of respect for the doctrine of stare 
decisis.  I am concerned, 
however, that in cases such as Bilderback 
v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000); Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 
1998); and Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1995), we have strayed from application of the statutory elements test 
of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) into the "conduct" or "evidence" 
test of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993).  I believe that the law correctly is as 
it is recited in State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1130 (Wyo. 1993):

The 
[United States Supreme Court] has settled upon the application of the familiar 
Blockburger . . . statutory elements 
test which directs:

The 
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does 
not.

The 
Blockburger test is the one chosen to 
determine if offenses have identical statutory elements of [sic] if the elements 
of an offense are identical to some of the elements of a greater offense in 
reaching a conclusion as to whether it is a lesser included 
offense.

            
It is clear that the Blockburger analysis parallels the 
statutory elements test for lesser included offenses.  The application of the Blockburger test has nothing to do with 
the evidence presented at trial.  As 
Blockburger is traced through . . . 
it is clear that its role is to bar a subsequent prosecution if one of the two 
offenses is a lesser included offense of the other.  That determination is made solely upon a 
comparison of the statutory elements.

            
Logically, the protection accorded by the double jeopardy clause with 
respect to multiple punishments should be based upon the same test.  The double jeopardy clause prevents a 
"sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature 
intended."  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 
103 S. Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983). . . .  Historical review of the origin of the 
Blockburger test discloses that its 
use for multiple prosecution and cumulative punishments is 
consistent.

(Some 
citations omitted.)  It is my view 
that, if two crimes do not bear a lesser- and greater-offense relationship to 
one another because they each contain an element not contained in the other, the 
legislature intended that multiple punishments could be imposed, even if the two 
separate offenses are based upon one underlying set of facts.  In the instant case, the appellant could 
have been sentenced on each and every count upon which he was 
convicted.