Title: Broberg v. Boling

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

183 Kan. 627 (1958)
331 P.2d 570
ANNA E. BROBERG, Appellee,
v.
OMA A. BOLING and SCOTT STUCKEY, a Sole Proprietor Doing Business under the Firm Name and Style of "Scott Stuckey Realty Company," Appellants.
No. 41,066

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 8, 1958.
Verne M. Laing, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Lester L. Morris, Ferd E. Evans, Jr., Ralph R. Brock, and J. Edward Taylor, Jr., all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Gerald Sawatzky, of Wichita, argued the cause and George B. Powers, Carl T. Smith, John F. Eberhardt, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert N. Partridge, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris, and Anthony T. Dealy, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an appeal from orders overruling a motion to require the plaintiff to separately state and number her causes of action, a motion to strike or directing the plaintiff to make her petition definite and certain, and a demurrer to the petition.
The petition identifies the parties, outlines the factual situation on which plaintiff bases her right to relief, and contains everything necessary and essential to a proper disposition of the appellate issues involved. Therefore, omitting formal averments and the prayer, we are impelled to quote and summarize from such pleading at length.
The real estate purchase contract attached as Exhibit "A" is on a printed form, is dated September 17, 1955, names Anna Broberg as seller and Benny H. Rush and Helen Rush, his wife, as buyer, and the salient provisions are as follows:
..............
*630 Exhibit "B" attached to the petition is a typewritten agreement dated September 26, 1955, between the plaintiff Anna Broberg as party of the first part and Benny H. Rush and Helen Rush as party of the second part, and it provides as follows:
..............
A notation appearing on the foregoing Exhibit reads:
Then the petition (Par. 8) alleges in substance that without her knowledge, consent or approval said Benny H. Rush and Helen Doyle Rush on November 25, 1955, executed a $10,000 mortgage on the property at 1130 North Broadway, to secure a personal indebtedness of the Rushes, which mortgage was promptly recorded; that no payment of principal or interest has ever been made with respect to said mortgage indebtedness, and that the mortgagee threatens immediate foreclosure of said mortgage; and that on July 9, 1956, upon the demand of this plaintiff Benny H. Rush and Helen Doyle Rush reconveyed to this plaintiff said 1130 North Broadway property, subject, however, to said outstanding mortgage, which deed was by this plaintiff recorded on July 25, 1956, but that said property remains subject to said $10,000 mortgage indebtedness and accrued interest thereon.
The petition (Par. 9) further alleges that on or about January 24, 1956, the Rushes executed a mortgage covering the property at 1940 North Broadway, to secure a personal indebtedness of $4,500, out of which a mortgage theretofore placed on said property *631 by plaintiff in the amount of $2,200 was discharged; that on or about May 29, 1956, the Rushes deeded said property, subject to said mortgage, to Ken Stowell, which deed was recorded June 4, 1956: and that plaintiff has contemporaneously herewith instituted a separate action against said Ken Stowell and others to recover title to and possession of said 1940 North Broadway property, subject, however, to said outstanding mortgage, and that even if plaintiff prevails in said action she will nevertheless sustain minimum damages equal to the difference between $2,200 and the then unpaid principal balance of said outstanding mortgage.
Further allegations of the petition read:
Following the filing of the foregoing petition defendants moved that plaintiff be required to separately state and number her alleged causes of action. This motion was overruled under an order wherein the trial court stated in substance that its action in that respect was based, in part at least, on the admission of plaintiff's counsel in open court that the action was based upon alleged fraudulent acts and misrepresentations and not contract.
Subsequently defendants moved the court for an order to strike or directing the plaintiff to make her petition definite and certain in particulars set forth in a twenty-eight paragraph motion. This motion was overruled in its entirety.
Thereupon defendants demurred to the petition on grounds that several causes of action were improperly joined and that such pleading did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. When this demurrer was overruled they perfected their appeal from each of the foregoing rulings, which will now be considered and disposed of in order as above noted.
*633 Although they do not abandon it appellants spend little time on the point the overruling of their motion to separately state and number alleged causes of action constituted error. In our opinion a careful reading of the petition is all that is required to establish that appellee bases her right to relief on a single theory, i.e., the alleged fraudulent acts and false and fraudulent representations of the appellants. Moreover, appellee's admission to that effect, at the time such motion was being argued in the court below, in binding upon her and she cannot go beyond it. Under the circumstances the appeal from the order overruling the motion lacks merit and cannot be upheld.
It will add nothing to the body of our law or serve any useful purpose to here detail the contents of appellants' long and tedious motion to strike or make the petition more definite and certain. Nor do we propose to further labor allegations of the petition. It suffices to say we have reviewed all grounds of such motion, along with the petition, in the light of the well-established rule, which we pause here to note springs from statutory fiat (G.S. 1949, 60-706 and 60-3317), that motions to strike and to make definite and certain rest so much in the sound discretion of the trial court that rulings with respect thereto will not be reversed unless it appears they have prejudiced or will prejudice the substantial rights of a party. For a few of our many decisions adhering to the foregoing rule see Marshall v. Duncan, 182 Kan. 540, 322 P.2d 762; Nausley v. Nausley, 181 Kan. 543, 545, 313 P.2d 302; Wilson v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 181 Kan. 1025, 1028, 317 P.2d 843; Smith v. Wright, 180 Kan. 584, 586, 305 P.2d 810; Nardyz v. Fulton Fire Ins. Co., 151 Kan. 907, 101 P.2d 1045; Nelson v. Schippel, 143 Kan. 546, 56 P.2d 469. Having reviewed the record as above indicated we are convinced the overruling of such motion did not constitute abuse of discretion or result in prejudice to appellants' substantial rights. It follows the trial court's action in that regard will not be reversed.
We turn now to questions raised relating to the propriety of the ruling on the demurrer.
One contention advanced by appellants to the effect the petition discloses such a confusion of theories it fails to state a cause of action has been answered by our conclusion, heretofore announced, that appellee bases her right to recovery on a single theory, namely, the appellants' alleged fraud. Moreover, the same conclusion, *634 coupled with the fact the Rushes are not parties to the action, requires rejection of another contention the demurrer should have been sustained on the basis of misjoinder of causes of action.
Appellants principal contentions, and we may add those most strenuously argued, are based on the premise the petition fails to state a cause of action. These, keeping in mind that under the circumstances the extent of our power is to determine whether a cause of action has been stated (See Simmons v. Reynolds, 179 Kan. 785, 788, 298 P.2d 345) will be considered in the order in which they are raised.
First, it is argued that the petition alleges no fraudulent representations upon which appellee could reasonably rely and therefore alleges no cause of action. Let us see.
Without again repeating the allegations of the petition, which we pause here to note have been detailed at length for informative purposes and not because we regard such petition as a paragon of pleading, we direct attention to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11, as heretofore quoted. When the allegations of the foregoing paragraphs are considered together with the allegations of paragraph 10 and the provisions of section 4 of the contract (Exhibit "A"), which is a part of the petition and has been heretofore outlined for purposes of emphasis, we are convinced appellants' position on the point now under consideration cannot be upheld. Moreover, we do not believe it can be successfully argued the petition fails to allege actionable grounds for fraud under the rule, heretofore approved by this court (See Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Weber, 138 Kan. 89, 91, 23 P.2d 479), announced in 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, p. 773 § 20, and 12 R.C.L., Fraud and Deceit, p. 240 § 10, where it is said:
The conclusion just announced, in our opinion, is particularly applicable in a case where  as here  under allegations of a petition it is clear that the persons alleged to have made the fraudulent representations relied on were acting in a fiduciary capacity as real estate agents (See, e.g., Merchant v. Foreman, 182 Kan. 550, 322 *635 P.2d 740) and the person to whom the alleged representations were made relied and acted upon those representations by entering into a contract, which it is to be noted was witnessed by one of the parties charged with the fraud, containing provisions such as are to be found in Exhibit "A," section 4, of the involved pleading.
Next, it is urged the petition shows on its face there was no wrongful delivery of the deeds as alleged. The petition (paragraphs 7 and 11) alleges there was and the most that can be said for the contracts, from appellants' standpoint, is that the contents of those instruments with respect to escrow delivery were so ambiguous as to require proof regarding their import. The trial court may well have so considered. Under the circumstances it was not required to hold as a matter of law, as claimed by appellants, that the petition showed on its face there was no wrongful delivery of the deeds.
Finally, it is claimed the petition does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a conspiracy. For purposes of ruling on the demurrer the short and simple answer to this claim is that conspiracy, or no conspiracy, the petition stated a cause of action for fraud which, in and of itself, would require the overruling of the demurrer.
We find nothing in the foregoing contentions or in others advanced by appellants, all of which have been carefully considered, warranting the conclusion that, when all its allegations are surveyed in their entirety and the facts therein set forth are given proper import, the involved petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for actionable fraud against the appellants. And this, we may add, holds true whether that pleading is liberally or strictly construed. Therefore the trial court's action in overruling the demurrer was proper and must be sustained.
In conclusion it should perhaps be stated that in view of the limited scope of review on appeal from issues such as are here involved we have disregarded, not overlooked, many contentions advanced by the parties respecting the existence of both affirmative and defensive facts and circumstances which they seek to have considered in connection with the involved rulings. Indeed, we have purposely refrained from mentioning such matters in order to avoid saying anything that may prejudice either party in further proceedings relating to the merits of this action, in which we are satisfied issues must be joined under proper pleadings and the cause, if it is tried, submitted under proper instructions based on *636 facts disclosed by evidence. Whether appellee can obtain all or only part of the relief sought in her petition or sustain the burden of proving her allegations, or appellants establish their defenses with respect thereto, which they have sought to argue in connection with questions pertaining to the propriety of the rulings on the motions and demurrer involved, are not matters with which we are presently concerned under the limited appellate issues involved. They must first be determined by the trial court. All we here hold is that under the facts, conditions and circumstances, set forth and described in the petition, the trial court, for reasons stated in the opinion, did not err in overruling the motions or the demurrer to that pleading.
The rulings and orders from which the appeal was perfected are affirmed.