Title: The City of Alabaster v. Shelby Land Partners, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 01/24/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
_________________________
1120677
_________________________
The City of Alabaster et al.
v.
Shelby Land Partners, LLC, and Alabaster Land Company, LLC
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-10-900144)
MAIN, Justice.
This is a zoning case.  Shelby Land Partners, LLC
("Shelby Land"), and Alabaster Land Company, LLC ("Alabaster
Land"), each own a 50% undivided interest in a 19.4-acre
parcel of undeveloped real property located within the
1120677
2
municipal limits of the City of Alabaster ("the City").  In
2004, at the request of Shelby Land, the property was zoned as
a "community business district," permitting only commercial
uses.  In 2009, Shelby Land petitioned the City to rezone the
land to permit multifamily residential use in order to pursue
the development of a low-income apartment complex for senior
citizens on the property.  The Alabaster City Council ("the
City Council") denied Shelby Land's rezoning application.
Shelby Land and Alabaster Land then brought this action
seeking relief from the denial of the rezoning request.  The
trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Shelby Land
and Alabaster Land and ordered the City and the City Council
to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential
development.  The City and the members of the City Council,
who were sued in their official capacities, appeal.  We
reverse and remand.
I.  Facts & Procedural History
In June 2003, the City adopted a community-renewal plan
("the plan").  The plan called for redevelopment of more than
300 acres of underdeveloped or undeveloped land near the
intersection of Highway 31 and Interstate 65 at Exit 238 in
1120677
3
Alabaster ("the project area").   The 19.4-acre parcel is
within the project area.  The plan noted that the older homes,
mobile homes, and buildings existing in the project area
portrayed an image of decay and blight and expressed concern
that the blight might spread to adjoining residential areas.
In addition to alleviating the perceived blight, the plan
sought to encourage commercial development at the project area
"in order to increase employment opportunities, promote a
diversified economy and expand the City's tax base."  The plan
further sought to improve the safe and efficient flow of
traffic through and near the project area.  Although the plan
indicated the potential for mixed-use development, including
residential use, the plan stated that "it is projected that
the entire Project Area is best suited for General Business
District development and it is the plan to redevelop the
entire Project Area as a General Business District."  An
attached "proposed land use map" indicated that the entire
project area would be zoned "B-3 General Business."  The City
Council approved and adopted the plan on June 16, 2003.
In furtherance of the plan, the City entered into a
redevelopment agreement with Shelby Land.  The City agreed
1120677
4
that it would acquire certain properties included within the
project area that were not already owned by Shelby Land and
convey those properties to Shelby Land.  In return, Shelby
Land agreed to convey a parcel of land to the City to be used
as a site for the construction of City facilities.  The City
also agreed to construct a road, Alabaster Boulevard, through
the project area.  The agreement recited the City's aspiration
that the redevelopment project would stimulate residential
construction and aid in the development of more desirable
neighborhoods in the City.  The agreement also required that
Shelby Land develop the property in conformity with the plan.
In order to implement the plan, it was necessary that the
land encompassed by the project area be rezoned from an
agricultural 
designation 
to 
a 
zoning 
classification 
permitting
the planned commercial use.  In July 2004, Shelby Land applied
to 
the 
Alabaster 
Planning 
Commission 
("the 
planning
commission") to have the entirety of the project area zoned as
a B-3 "community business district."  According to Shelby
Land, the uniform B-3 zoning classification throughout the
project area was selected because, at that time, it was
uncertain as to the amount of acreage needed for a planned
1120677
5
commercial development.  With its application, Shelby Land
stated:
"The zoning of the balance of our property to B-3
will allow us to pursue commercial uses consistent
with the concept of highest and best use and
therefore enable us to maximize the economic
potential of the property for us, the City of
Alabaster, developers and future property owners.
While we have a Master Plan, it is not possible to
know what future uses we may have and accordingly we
understand it may be necessary to change zoning to
lower classifications at a later date."
The rezoning request went through the City's standard
zoning 
process, 
and, 
after 
receiving 
a 
favorable
recommendation from the planning commission, Shelby Land's
request that the entire project area be rezoned as a B-3
community business district was approved by the City Council.
Redevelopment of a portion of the project area moved forward,
and the developed site now contains a large commercial
development known as the Colonial Promenade, which includes a
Wal-Mart Super Center; a 14-auditorium movie theater; a Bed,
Bath & Beyond home-goods store; a Books-a-Million bookstore;
and a number of other retailers and restaurants.  The area
represents 
Alabaster's 
largest 
commercial 
and 
retail
development.
1120677
6
The current commercial development, however, does not
encompass the entirety of the project area, and several
parcels of property totaling approximately 195 acres remain
undeveloped.  The undeveloped areas include the 19.4-acre site
made the basis of this appeal.  That property fronts the
eastern side of Alabaster Boulevard.  The contiguous parcels
also remain undeveloped.  The only developed properties
fronting Alabaster Boulevard are a restaurant, a hotel, and a
church.  With the exception of the church constructed at the
northern end of Alabaster Boulevard, all properties fronting
Alabaster Boulevard remain zoned B-3, and all development
within the project area has been commercial.
In November 2009, Shelby Land filed an application for
rezoning of the 19.4-acre site.  The application sought to
rezone the property from a B-3 community business district to
a multifamily residential R-6 designation, which allows for
multifamily 
residential 
uses, 
such 
as 
apartments,
condominiums, and assisted-living facilities.  The request to
rezone the property was made in anticipation of developing a
potential apartment community for senior citizens proposed for
the 19.4-acre site.  The proposed senior apartment complex was
1120677
7
to consist of 144 units, which would be limited to residents
aged 55 and older.  Children were to be excluded from living
in the apartments.  Along with its application, Shelby Land
included the conclusions of a traffic study conducted by a
retained consultant.  The study indicated that senior
apartment communities generate five times less traffic than
conventional apartment complexes and thus concluded that the
apartment-complex development would have a negligible affect
on the public roadways surrounding the proposed development.
On November 24, 2009, the planning commission held a
hearing 
on 
Shelby 
Land's 
rezoning 
application.
Representatives from Shelby Land and the developer of the
proposed apartment complex made a presentation.  In the
presentation it was noted that, as a senior apartment
community, which prohibited children from residing in the
complex, the project would have no impact on the City's
schools; that similar senior citizens' apartments have
negligible crime rates; and that seniors drive 25% less than
their younger counterparts, thus limiting the effect of the
development on area traffic.  It was further stated in the
presentation that the developers intended to seek financing
1120677
8
for the project from the State of Alabama, which required a
30-year land-use restriction limiting the use of the project
to senior housing and also required rent controls. 
Alabaster's City planner, Harry Still, submitted a
memorandum to the planning commission recommending that the
rezoning request be denied.  The memorandum stated:
"Shelby Land Partners LLC is requesting to rezone
19.40 acres from B-3 (Community Business District)
to R-6 (Multi-Family District).
"The proposed rezoning will take property that has
the potential to create jobs for the community and
put revenue back into the economy and create more
rooftops, something that our community has more than
enough of.  More residential development in this
area will create traffic that will frustrate the
intent of Alabaster Boulevard which is to make the
Colonial Promenade and the surrounding commercial
property a convenient place to do business, not a
convenient place to live.
"Staff recommends against down-zoning any property
in this area."
During the hearing, the planning commission expressed
concern with regard to the requirement that the apartment
complex remain a low-income senior complex for 30 years.  One
member generally expressed concern in permitting any type of
apartment complex at the proposed location.  The planning
commission indicated that it did not "want to back off the
1120677
9
hope of this property being an all-commercial corridor one
day."  Accordingly, the planning commission unanimously voted
to 
recommend 
that 
the 
City 
Council 
deny 
the 
zoning
application.
On January 21, 2010, the City Council heard Shelby Land's
rezoning request.  The minutes of the council meeting indicate
that representatives of Shelby Land and the developer spoke in
favor of the rezoning request.  Several members of the public
spoke against the rezoning.  The City Council voted 4-3 to
deny the rezoning request.
On February 2, 2010, Shelby Land and Alabaster Land filed
this action against the City and the individual members of the
City Council in their official capacities.  The complaint
sought relief from the City Council's denial of the rezoning
request and specifically sought a judgment declaring that the
City's failure to rezone the property constituted a violation
of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land's constitutional rights; an
injunction prohibiting the City from preventing Shelby Land
and Alabaster Land from developing the property under an R-6
zoning classification; and an order directing the City to
1120677
10
approve Shelby Land's application to rezone the property to an
R-6 classification.
On September 20, 2010, the parties filed cross-motions
for a summary judgment.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land argued
that they were due a summary judgment because the City Council
failed to demonstrate that the reason for the denial of the
rezoning request was a substantially related to the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the citizens of the
City.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land further argued that the
City's denial of the rezoning application was arbitrary and
capricious.  The City, on the other hand, argued that it had
a "fairly debatable" reason for denying the rezoning
application and that, under the highly deferential standard
for judicial review of its zoning decisions, it was due a
summary judgment.  
In support of their respective motions, the parties
submitted evidence and affidavits.  Shelby Land and Alabaster
Land submitted the affidavit of James Jackson, the managing
member of Shelby Land, who testified that the City's
redevelopment agreement with the Shelby Land contemplated that
the project area would contain mixed uses, including
1120677
11
residential.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land also submitted
the affidavit of a former member of the City Council, who
testified that the City and the developer had always intended
the project area to include mixed uses, including multifamily
residential.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land also submitted a
proposed-use map that was attached to Shelby Land's 2003
redevelopment agreement with the City.  That map indicated a
proposed residential use of the 19.4-acre property.  Finally,
Shelby Land and Alabaster Land submitted an affidavit of an
expert real-estate appraiser, who testified that there
appeared to be no current demand for commercial use of the
19.4-acre parcel and that the proposed apartment complex would
be a good use of the property.
The City submitted affidavits of the four members of the
City Council who voted against the rezoning request.
Generally, each indicated that he or she was opposed to zoning
a relatively small parcel of the community-business-district
area as multifamily residential.  They also noted the
speculative nature of the proposed senior housing complex and
questioned 
the 
enforceability 
of 
the 
residential 
age
restriction.  They noted that without such restrictions they
1120677
12
could not be certain that the apartments would not have an
adverse impact on traffic and the City's schools.  Each member
testified 
that 
he 
or 
she 
listened 
to 
Shelby 
Land's
presentation with an open mind and voted in accordance with
what he or she thought was in the best interest of the health,
safety, and welfare of the citizens of the City.  The City
also submitted an affidavit of an expert real-estate
appraiser, who testified that the highest and best use of the
property in question would be the permissible uses allowed
under the current B-3 community-business-district zoning
classification.
A hearing on the motions for a summary judgment was held,
and on October 31, 2012, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land and denied
the City and the City Council members' cross-motion for a
summary judgment.  The trial court held:
"3.
Under the City of Alabaster's zoning ordinance,
Plaintiffs' requested change in the Property zoning
classification from B-3 to R-6 is a reasonable
request which does not contravene the public
interest.
"4.
The 
City's 
denial 
of 
Plaintiffs' 
zoning
application, which requested a change in the
Property zoning from B-3 to R-6, was arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable and had no relationship to
1120677
13
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of
the City of Alabaster, and is contrary to law.
"5.
The City's denial of Plaintiffs' request to
change the zoning of the Property is an arbitrary
restriction of the use of the Property; improperly
deprives Plaintiffs of their reasonable use of the
Property without just compensation or due process of
law; and is, therefore, a violation of Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.
"6.
Plaintiffs have the legal right to use the
Property pursuant to the R-6 zoning classification.
"7.
The City, its elected officials and their
successors in office are enjoined and restrained
from interfering with or preventing Plaintiffs from
using or developing the Property under the R-6
zoning classification.
"8.
The City, its elected officials and their
successors in office are enjoined and restrained
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the present
B-3 zoning classification against the Property, and
the use of the Property can be no more restrictive
than 
that 
allowed 
under 
the 
R-6 
zoning
classification.
"9.
Defendants 
shall 
approve 
Plaintiffs' 
application
to 
rezone 
the 
Property 
from 
the 
B-3 
zoning
classification to the R-6 zoning classification so
that the Plaintiffs may reasonably use the Property,
subject to Plaintiffs' compliance with the other
orders, ordinances, rules, and regulations of the
City 
of 
Alabaster 
regarding 
the 
development,
construction, maintenance and operation of the
Property."
1120677
14
Following the denial of the their postjudgment motions,
the City and the individual members of the City Council
appealed.
II.  Standard of Review
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ala. v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).
III.  Analysis
"Judicial review of municipal decisions regarding zoning
ordinances is severely limited."  H.H.B., L.L.C. v. D & F,
L.L.C., 843 So. 2d 116, 120 (Ala. 2002).
1120677
15
"'It is settled law that the Alabama Legislature
has delegated to municipal legislative bodies, such
as city councils, the power and authority to enact
zoning ordinances.  Section 11-52-76, Ala. Code
[1975], provides that "[t]he legislative body of
such municipality shall provide for the manner in
which such [zoning] regulations and restrictions and
the 
boundaries 
of 
such 
districts 
shall 
be
determined, established and enforced."  The power to
amend, supplement, or change zoning ordinances "as
may be necessary" from "time to time" is also
delegated to municipal legislative bodies.  Id.  See
BP Oil Co. v. Jefferson County, 571 So. 2d 1026,
1028 (Ala. 1990), citing Village of Euclid, Ohio v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71
L.Ed. 303 (1926).
"'In Homewood Citizens Association v. City of
Homewood, 548 So. 2d 142 (Ala. 1989), this Court
discussed the law applicable to a court's review of
a city's action in zoning cases, stating that
"[w]hen a municipal body acts either to adopt or to
amend a zoning ordinance, it acts in a legislative
capacity and the scope of judicial review of such
action is quite restricted."  548 So. 2d at 143.
The restrictions on this Court's review of the
validity of a zoning ordinance have been explained
as follows:
"'"'Zoning is a legislative matter,
and, as a general proposition, the exercise
of the zoning power should not be subjected
to judicial interference unless clearly
necessary.  In enacting or amending zoning
legislation, the local authorities are
vested with broad discretion, and, in cases
where the validity of a zoning ordinance is
fairly 
debatable, 
the 
court 
cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the
legislative authority.  If there is a
rational and justifiable basis for the
enactment and it does not violate any state
1120677
16
statute 
or 
positive 
constitutional
guaranty, 
the 
wisdom 
of 
the 
zoning
regulation is a matter exclusively for
legislative determination.
"'"'In 
accordance 
with 
these
principles, it has been stated that the
courts should not interfere with the
exercise of the zoning power and hold a
zoning 
enactment 
invalid, 
unless 
the
enactment, in whole or in relation to any
particular property, is shown to be clearly
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, or welfare, or ...
plainly contrary to the zoning laws.'"
"'Homewood Citizens Association, 548 So. 2d at 143
(quoting 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning, 338
(1976)).  The Court further stated in Homewood
Citizens Association that "[t]he burden is upon the
party seeking relief from an ordinance to show that
the ordinance was not a fairly debatable issue
before the municipal governing body."  548 So. 2d
144.'"
H.H.B., L.L.C., 843 So. 2d at 120-21 (quoting American
Petroleum Equip. & Constr., Inc. v. Fancher, 708 So. 2d 129,
131 (Ala. 1997)). 
In zoning cases, we have noted that there are two
applicable rules: the "substantial relationship rule" and the
"fairly debatable rule."  We explained the applicability of
these two rules in BP Oil Co. v. Jefferson County, 571 So. 2d
1026 (Ala. 1990):
1120677
17
"'The substantial relationship rule is a substantive
law, and may be simply stated as follows: In order
for a zoning ordinance or regulation to be valid, it
must have some substantial relationship to the
promotion of the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.  When correctly applied, this rule
is not in any manner modified by the fairly
debatable rule.  The latter rule, being a rule of
procedure or application, may be simply stated as
follows: 
If 
the 
application 
of 
a 
zoning
classification to a specific parcel of property is
reasonably subject to disagreement, that is, if the
application 
is 
fairly 
debatable, 
then 
the
application of the ordinance by the zoning authority
should not be disturbed by the courts.  Of course,
it is always a matter for the court to determine
whether a zoning authority acted reasonably or
fairly, or whether capriciously or arbitrarily.  The
fairly debatable rule applies to the application of
the ordinance and does not modify the requirement
that the ordinance itself and the application
therefore must have a reasonable relationship to the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.'"
571 So. 2d at 1028-29 (quoting Byrd Cos. v. Jefferson Cnty.,
445 So. 2d 239, 247 (Ala. 1983)). We have further described
the "fairly debatable" rule as follows:
"'The "fairly debatable" rule concerns the
application of a zoning classification to a specific
parcel of property.  Byrd Companies v. Jefferson
County, 445 So. 2d 239, 247 (Ala. 1983).  "'[I]f the
application of a zoning classification to a specific
parcel 
of 
property 
is 
reasonably 
subject 
to
disagreement, that is, if its application is fairly
debatable, then the application of the ordinance by
the zoning authority should not be disturbed by the
courts.'" Id., quoting Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d
214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).  Thus, if the zoning
ordinance is "subject to controversy or contention"
1120677
18
or "open to question or dispute," it is "fairly
debatable" and should not be disturbed by the
courts.  Aldridge v. Grund, 293 Ala. 333, 343, 302
So. 2d 847, 854 (1974); Cudd v. City of Homewood,
284 Ala. 268, 271, 224 So. 2d 625, 628 (1969).'"
H.H.B., L.L.C., 843 So. 2d at 121 (quoting American Petroleum,
708 So. 2d at 131).
Shelby Land and Alabaster Land argue that the judgment of
the trial court is due to be affirmed because, they say, the
City and the City Council members failed to prove that the
denial 
of 
Shelby 
Land's 
rezoning 
application 
bore 
a
substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the City.  Thus, they argue that the
inquiry ends in their favor, and there is no need to analyze
whether the City's denial of their rezoning request was
"fairly debatable."  This misstates the inquiry.  Rather, when
reviewing a city's denial of rezoning petition, the court must
determine whether the existing zoning classification, in this
case a B-3 community business district, is substantively valid
and bears a reasonable relationship to the promotion of the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community
before turning to the "fairly debatable" analysis.  See
Pollard v. Unus Props., LLC, 902 So. 2d 18, 31-32 (Ala. 2004)
1120677
19
(See, J., concurring specially).  In other words, if the
existing 
zoning 
classification 
bears 
a 
substantial
relationship to the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare, the "substantial relationship" test is satisfied.
Moreover, the burden of proving a zoning ordinance
invalid rests squarely on the party challenging the ordinance.
This is because the passage of a zoning ordinance is a
legislative act, which is presumed to be valid and reasonable.
Pollard, 902 So. 2d at 24.  Therefore, a property owner
challenging the denial of its rezoning petition on the ground
that the existing zoning classification is no longer
reasonable bears the burden of clearly demonstrating that the
existing classification is no longer valid or reasonable.
See, e.g., St. Clair Cnty. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Pell
City, 61 So. 3d 992, 1008 (Ala. 2010) ("It is ... axiomatic
that 'an ordinance enacted by a local governing body "is
presumed reasonable and valid, and that the burden is on the
one 
challenging 
the 
ordinance 
to 
clearly 
show 
its
invalidity."'" (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery,
863 So. 2d 73, 75 (Ala. 2003))).
1120677
20
In the present case, the evidence was overwhelming, and
apparently undisputed, that the 2004 zoning ordinance, which
placed the entirety of the project area within a B-3 zoning
classification, was reasonable and substantially related to
the general welfare of the community.  That zoning ordinance,
made at the request of Shelby Land, was adopted in accord with
the plan previously approved by the City Council in 2003.  The
plan provided that a purpose of the redevelopment project was
"to increase employment opportunities, promote a diversified
economy and expand the City's tax base."  As such, it was
determined that "the entire Project Area is best suited for
General Business District development and it is the plan to
redevelop the entire Project Area as a General Business
District," and the plan reflected that determination.  The
record before us does not disclose any new factors suggesting
that the B-3 classification is no longer substantively valid,
other than the fact that a landowner has presented a
reasonable 
alternative 
multifamily 
residential 
use 
for 
certain
property now within that B-3 classification.  The mere fact
that a proposed new zoning classification is reasonable,
however, does not itself invalidate a likewise reasonable
1120677
21
existing zoning classification.  The purposes for which the B-
3 zoning classification was adopted in 2004 were, and remain,
substantially related to the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community.  Thus, we conclude that the
trial court erred in holding the current B-3 zoning of the
property had no relationship to the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare of the City.
Nor does the evidence support a conclusion that the
City's denial of the rezoning application was arbitrary or
capricious.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land's chief argument
in this regard is that there was no evidence before the trial
court indicating that the City Council gave the rezoning
application a fair debate.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land
contend that the trial court was limited to consideration of
the minutes of a meeting of the City Council -- a one-
paragraph entry describing the request to rezone the property,
those speaking in favor and against the rezoning request, a
notation of a "lengthy discussion," and a record of the
members of the City Council voting for and against the
rezoning request.  Shelby Land and Alabaster Land argue that
a city council "can only speak through its record minutes,"
1120677
22
and, therefore, they assert the court cannot consider ex post
facto affidavits of the City Council members or the City and
the City Council members' expert to justify the denial of the
rezoning application.  Thus, Shelby Land and Alabaster Land
argue that, because there is no evidence contained in the
minutes of the City Council's meeting of a debate or the
grounds for denying Shelby Land's application to rezone the
property, we are left with no choice but to conclude that the
denial of the rezoning application was arbitrary.  We
disagree.
Zoning ordinances are not validated or invalidated based
on the quality of the minutes of a council meeting.  Rather,
they are invalidated because they lack a "fairly debatable"
purpose or application.  Moreover, courts are free to consider
evidence that was not before the governmental body at the time
of the decision, so long as it is relevant to the issues
considered by the governmental body when making its decisions.
In the present case, Shelby Land's rezoning request went
before the planning commission, which, after hearing a
presentation from Shelby Land, unanimously recommended that
the petition be denied on the ground that the planning
1120677
23
commission did not "want to back off the hope of this property
being an all-commercial corridor one day."  Shelby Land's
petition to rezone the property was then heard by the City
Council, which considered Shelby Land's application and
presentation, public comments, and the recommendation of the
planning commission.  The City Council then denied the
rezoning application by a 4-3 vote.  The testimony submitted
to the trial court indicated that the members of the City
Council who voted against the rezoning request were concerned
with zoning a relatively small parcel of property located in
a business district as multifamily residential and questioned
the enforceability of the age-limit restrictions of the
proposed senior apartment complex.  Given the highly
deferential standard we must apply, we cannot say that the
City's decision to deny the application to rezone a portion of
the City's largest commercial area for multifamily residential
use was not "fairly debatable," particularly given the
expressed desire to maintain the commercial character of the
community business district.
"Although the trial court obviously found reasons to
disagree with the city council's decision, it is not the
1120677
24
province of the court to substitute its judgment for that of
a legislative body vested with the power to make such
decisions."  Pollard, 902 So. 2d at 29.  As we did in Pollard,
we find the following language from Episcopal Foundation of
Jefferson County v. Williams, 281 Ala. 363, 202 So. 2d 726
(1967), applicable:
"While the court is given the power to review
the validity vel non of an ordinance or other
legislative act, it is not given the power to review
the wisdom or unwisdom, or the rightness or
wrongness of laws passed by the legislative power
delegated to the City Council or the City of
Birmingham, or like bodies. ...
"'Every intendment is to be made in favor of the
zoning ordinance and the matter was largely in the
legislative discretion of the municipal authorities.
...  Here, the city Commission is acting in the
exercise of a legislative function and with a wide
degree of discretion.' ...
"In the instant case, the City Council of the
City of Birmingham, although without recommendation
of the Zoning Advisory Committee, in our judgment,
acted within constitutional bounds and did not take
arbitrary, unreasonable or unlawful action.  The
Council had a superior opportunity to know and
consider varied conflicting interests involved, to
balance the burdens and the benefits, and to
consider the general welfare of the area involved.
There was procedural compliance with the requirement
for a public hearing.
"The courts should be slow to set up their own
opinions as against those charged with and in
position rightfully to perform such duty.  The fact
1120677
25
that the complainants (appellees) may suffer some
financial loss and depreciation in the value of
their 
property 
is 
not 
a 
test 
of 
the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance; nor is it
a test to determine if the zoning ordinance is
arbitrary, 
capricious, 
inequitable 
and
discriminatory. ...
"The question is 
whether 
the 
reclassification 
of
[the property at issue] is sound and fair.  If the
question is fairly debatable, the court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the City Council
... in exercise of its legislative power. ...
"The duties of the local authorities ...,
charged with zoning property, are evidently arduous
and of a delicate character, requiring sensitive
insight and perspicuity as to the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare incident to
zoning.  We cannot say that their judgment is always
free from error, but before the courts will
interfere, it must be made to appear that such an
ordinance passes the bounds of reason and assumes
the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.
"We think that men may reasonably differ as to
the advisability of a zoning change or in a change
affecting zoning districts.  We are unwilling in the
instant case to substitute our opinion for that of
the City Council upon whom the responsibility of
weighing all factors devolved, and who had access to
full information and acted accordingly.  We have no
reason to say that the City Coun[cil] did not act
with enlightened judgment in consideration of the
ordinance here under attack."
281 Ala. at 367, 202 So. 2d at 729-30.
Based on the evidence before us and the "severely
limited" judicial review of legislative zoning ordinances, we
1120677
26
conclude that the trial court erred in entering a summary
judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land.
IV.  Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand
this cause to the trial court for that court to grant the
cross-motion for a summary judgment filed by the City and the
members of the City Council.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Stuart, Bolin, and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., concur specially.  
Moore, C.J., and Parker and Bryan, JJ., concur in the
result.
1120677
27
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
In discussing the interplay between the so-called
"substantial relationship rule" and the "fairly debatable
rule," the main opinion at one juncture states that "the court
must determine whether the existing zoning classification ...
bears a reasonable relationship to the promotion of the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community
before turning to the 'fairly debatable' analysis."  ___
So. 3d at ___.  Although I concur in the main opinion, I write
separately to state my understanding that the "substantial
relationship rule" is the rule that governs the decision of
the legislative body and that the Court's evaluation of that
decision as it relates to either an existing classification of
property or the legislative body's decision in response to a
request to change that classification is governed by the
"fairly debatable rule."  I would state the matter as follows:
It is for the Court to assess whether the legislative body has
correctly determined whether a "substantial relationship"
exists between a given zoning designation and the promotion of
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and the
Court may not disturb the legislative body's decision in this
regard if that decision is "fairly debatable."
Shaw, J., concurs.