Title: Tarmac Mid-Atlantic Inc. v. Smiley Block Co.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
TARMAC MID-ATLANTIC, INC. 
 
v.  Record No. 941648 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                      June 9, 1995 
SMILEY BLOCK COMPANY 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 
 
Richard S. Miller, Judge 
 
 
In this case, we consider whether the trial court properly 
sustained a motion to strike, and whether, in connection with 
that ruling, the court abused its discretion in excluding expert 
testimony on the basis that it lacked an adequate foundation. 
 
Smiley Block Company, Inc. (Smiley), filed a motion for 
judgment to recover sums due from Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. 
(Tarmac) in payment for "cupola slag."  Tarmac denied it was 
indebted to Smiley and filed a counterclaim asserting various 
theories, including breach of express and implied warranties.  
Tarmac alleged that the slag Smiley provided did not conform to 
industry standards, and that when Tarmac used the slag in its 
manufacture of concrete masonry block, the block developed 
defects known as "pop-outs." 
 
At the jury trial, Tarmac's evidence on its counterclaim 
also constituted its sole evidence in defense of Smiley's breach 
of contract action.  When the trial court sustained Smiley's 
motion to strike Tarmac's evidence on the counterclaim, it also 
ruled in favor of Smiley on the motion for judgment, finding that 
there were no issues remaining for the jury's determination.  We 
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
the light most favorable to Tarmac.  See Medcom, Inc. v. C. 
 
 
 
 
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Arthur Weaver Co., 232 Va. 80, 82, 348 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1986). 
 
James E. Ritter, operations manager of Tarmac's Richmond 
Block plant, testified that he began purchasing slag from Smiley 
around May 1992.  Slag is a lightweight aggregate that is 
incorporated together with other materials in the manufacture of 
concrete products.  Over the next year, pumice and the slag 
purchased from Smiley were the only lightweight aggregates that 
the Richmond Block plant used in its production. 
 
Before Tarmac began to order the slag, Henry Smiley had 
provided Ritter with a bag of the aggregate, a piece of concrete 
block, and a certification stating that the slag met the criteria 
for lightweight aggregates established by the American Society 
for Testing and Materials.  In particular, the certification 
stated that the material tested exhibited no pop-outs.  Ritter 
testified that, in buying the slag, Tarmac relied on the 
certification and on Smiley's representations as to the quality 
of the material. 
 
In early 1993, Tarmac's customers complained to Ritter about 
the block Tarmac had manufactured using Smiley's slag.  Ritter 
examined the block used in construction projects and noted pop-
outs, or "small chunks that popped out of the face of the block." 
 To remedy the problem, Tarmac went to the construction projects 
and repaired the block.  
 
Ritter then submitted several samples to a laboratory, 
Froehling & Robertson, Inc., to determine the cause of the pop-
 
 
 
 
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outs.  He identified three reports received from Froehling & 
Robertson showing its test results.  Ritter stated that he and 
Richard Wright, Tarmac's production manager, obtained the samples 
that were the subject of two reports made in July 1993.  The 
first sample was a block containing pop-outs, taken from Tarmac's 
stock, and the second was a bag of slag, taken from slag received 
from Smiley and stockpiled in Tarmac's yard.  Wright delivered 
both these samples to Froehling & Robertson.  A third report, 
made in September 1993, provided an analysis of two slag samples, 
which Ritter stated he collected from Tarmac's stockpile and 
personally delivered to Froehling & Robertson.  
 
Ritter stated that Tarmac regularly hired a trucking company 
to deliver shipments of slag purchased from Smiley to Tarmac's 
plant, where Tarmac stored the slag in open bins.  The samples of 
slag provided to Froehling & Robertson came from these 
stockpiles.  Ritter did not obtain a sample directly from 
Smiley's yard for testing.  He said that he did not know what 
other materials might have been carried in the delivery trucks, 
nor whether foreign materials such as seeds or dust might have 
blown into the slag while it was in Tarmac's stockpiles.  Ritter 
acknowledged that pop-outs in the block could be caused by the 
introduction of any material that tends to expand, such as a 
seed. 
 
August A. Thieme of Froehling & Robertson, the author of the 
test reports, qualified as an expert in inorganic and analytical 
 
 
 
 
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chemistry.  Thieme stated that each sample provided to him by 
Tarmac contained high levels of magnesium.
*  He concluded that 
magnesium compounds in the slag had caused the pop-outs in the 
manufactured block.  Thieme explained that when slag is derived 
from dolomitic-type limestone, the magnesium contained in the 
stone may be subjected to excessive temperatures, or 
"overburning."  As a result, the magnesium is slow to rehydrate 
upon exposure to moisture and carbon dioxide, and it remains in 
an unstable state.  In the process of rehydration, the material 
expands, increases in volume, and exerts pressure, leading to a 
"propelling of the surface from the block." 
 
     
*Ritter testified that when he provided two slag samples to 
Thieme for his September 1993 report, he also delivered a sample 
of bottom ash received from a Tarmac plant in South Carolina, 
which was submitted to be tested for reasons not revealed by the 
record.  Thieme found high levels of magnesium in all three 
samples.  He stated that the entire group of samples tested for 
his September 1993 report was labeled "slag aggregate," and that 
he was not aware that one of the samples was actually bottom ash. 
 Smiley cites these facts in support of its argument that 
Thieme's testimony did not have an adequate foundation.  However, 
we do not consider this evidence in evaluating the admissibility 
of the testimony, because neither the record nor Smiley's 
argument on appeal explains the significance of the cited facts. 
 
 
 
 
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Thieme stated that he had considered whether other 
components of the block, such as cement and additives, or the 
presence of contaminants in the slag, could have been the source 
of the pop-outs.  He acknowledged that in testing material such 
as this, it is necessary to consider matters such as handling, 
sampling, storage, and transportation.  However, Thieme testified 
that he had not identified any other cause of the high magnesium 
content he observed, and he concluded that the slag material must 
have been the only source, since any source other than the slag 
"would almost have to be a burned lime of some sort."  Thieme 
also stated that, although unstable burned lime is manufactured 
for certain uses, it is shipped in individually sealed containers 
and typically is not carried in open trucks. 
 
Thieme stated that all the materials tested were delivered 
to him in his laboratory.  He acknowledged that he would have 
preferred to draw a slag sample directly from Smiley's yard for 
testing. 
 
During trial, the court took under advisement Smiley's 
motions to exclude Thieme's testimony based on a lack of adequate 
foundation.  Smiley argued that the samples Thieme analyzed had 
been exposed to many sources of contamination while they were out 
of Smiley's possession and control, so that Thieme's testimony 
was unreliable and speculative.  After Ritter and Thieme had 
testified, and before Tarmac presented evidence of damages, 
Smiley moved to strike Tarmac's evidence on its counterclaim.  
 
 
 
 
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Although Smiley raised various arguments, the trial court's 
comments show that it sustained the motion based on its 
conclusion that Thieme's testimony was inadmissible. 
 
Citing Mary Washington Hospital, Inc. v. Gibson, 228 Va. 95, 
319 S.E.2d 741 (1984), the trial court stated that, in the 
present case, "too many variables" rendered the expert's 
testimony "open to speculation," because the evidence raised 
questions about conditions that may have affected the slag during 
its transportation and storage.  The trial court noted that 
Tarmac's "own expert is saying that he would have preferred to 
have come up here and gotten it at Smiley, and [it] is obvious 
why he would have preferred that, because the test itself would 
have been much more reliable."  The trial court granted the 
motion to strike, concluding that "in this case, because of the 
nature of the claim[,] fundamental fairness dictates that you 
have got to show a better chain than that." 
 
On appeal, Tarmac argues that the trial court erred in 
granting Smiley's motion to strike.  In particular, Tarmac 
contends that Thieme's testimony regarding the nature of the 
substances he tested was admissible, and if the trial court had 
not improperly excluded it, Tarmac would have presented a prima 
facie case on its breach of warranty claim.  In response, Smiley 
reasserts the arguments it raised in the trial court, contending 
that Thieme's testimony was speculative because it was based on 
an assumption, not supported by the evidence, that the slag 
 
 
 
 
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samples he examined were in the same condition as when they left 
Smiley's yard.  We disagree with Smiley. 
 
"The admission of expert testimony is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse a trial 
court's decision only where that court has abused its 
discretion."  Brown v. Corbin, 244 Va. 528, 531, 423 S.E.2d 176, 
178 (1992).  As a general rule, a litigant is entitled to 
introduce all competent, material, and relevant evidence tending 
to prove or disprove any material issue raised, unless the 
evidence violates a specific rule of admissibility.  Barnette v. 
Dickens, 205 Va. 12, 15, 135 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1964); McNeir v. 
Greer-Hale Chinchilla Ranch, 194 Va. 623, 628-29, 74 S.E.2d 165, 
168-69 (1953). 
 
Expert testimony is admissible in civil cases to assist the 
trier of fact, if the evidence meets certain fundamental 
requirements, including the requirement that it be based on an 
adequate foundation.  See Code §§ 8.01-401.1, 8.01-401.3; Lawson 
v. Doe, 239 Va. 477, 482-83, 391 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1990); Clark v. 
Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 664-65, 385 S.E.2d 885, 891 (1989).  Expert 
testimony is inadmissible if it is speculative or founded on 
assumptions that have no basis in fact.  See Gilbert v. Summers, 
240 Va. 155, 159-60, 393 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1990); Cassady v. 
Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 1100, 266 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1980). 
 
In addition, such testimony should not be admitted unless 
the trial court is satisfied that the expert has considered all 
 
 
 
 
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the variables bearing on the inferences to be drawn from the 
facts observed.  See Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 231, 233-34, 377 
S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989); Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 727, 146 
S.E.2d 252, 255 (1966).  Finally, the trial court should refuse 
to admit expert testimony unless there is proof of a similarity 
of conditions existing at the time of the expert's tests and at 
the time relevant to the facts at issue.  Runyon v. Geldner, 237 
Va. 460, 463-64, 377 S.E.2d 456, 458-59 (1989). 
 
These principles were applied in Mary Washington Hospital, 
228 Va. at 99, 319 S.E.2d at 743.  In that case, this Court held 
inadmissible evidence regarding an architect's tests made at the 
location where the plaintiff had fallen on a sidewalk, because 
there was insufficient proof that the site had not changed 
materially during the 23 months between the accident and the 
inspection.  The uncontradicted evidence showed there had been 
construction work in the area during that time, and that the 
section of concrete on which the plaintiff slipped had been 
destroyed.  These changes constituted "missing variables" not 
considered by the architect, so that the delayed inspection of 
the sidewalk was not reliable and probative evidence of its 
condition at the time of the accident.  Id. 
 
In contrast, the evidence in the present case showed that 
the condition of the slag was essentially the same at the time of 
its shipment and at the time of the expert's testing.  Ritter's 
testimony regarding the transportation, storage, and sampling of 
 
 
 
 
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the slag was prima facie evidence that the samples Thieme tested 
had originated in the slag supplied by Smiley.  Further, it could 
be inferred that, with the passage of time, the samples would 
become more stable rather than less so, due to the tendency of 
the overburned magnesium to rehydrate slowly.  Thus, unstable 
magnesium found at the time of testing would have been unstable 
at an earlier time, as well. 
 
In addition, there was no positive evidence showing any 
alteration of the slag or any intermixture of foreign materials, 
other than the fact that, in one of the samples, the slag was 
present together with other materials in a finished concrete 
block.  Further, the evidence showed that Thieme had considered 
and excluded other variables that would affect his conclusions, 
such as the possibility that materials other than slag were the 
source of the high levels of magnesium.  Thus, we hold that 
Tarmac adequately provided a foundation for the admission of 
Thieme's test results. 
 
Although Smiley argues that in various respects Thieme's 
conclusions were open to challenge, any such weaknesses in his 
testimony were not grounds for its exclusion, but were matters 
properly to be considered by the jury in determining the weight 
to be given the evidence.  See Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 
Va. 421, 430, 297 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1982); Martin v. Penn, 204 Va. 
822, 826, 134 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1964).  Therefore, we conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit 
 
 
 
 
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Thieme's testimony. 
 
Smiley further argues that, even if Thieme's testimony had 
been admitted at trial, Tarmac failed to present a prima facie 
case on its breach of warranty counterclaim.  Smiley contends 
that Tarmac's evidence did not show either that a warranty was 
made or that Tarmac relied on any such warranty.  We disagree.  
Tarmac presented evidence that Ritter received and relied on 
samples of block and slag and a certification stating, among 
other things, that the material tested had no pop-outs.  Granting 
Tarmac the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence, we find that Tarmac presented sufficient evidence 
on these issues to create a question for the jury's 
determination.  See Code § 8.2-313. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
sustaining Smiley's motion to strike Tarmac's counterclaim.  We 
will reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for 
a new trial consistent with the principles expressed in this 
opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.