Title: SCHADE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SCHADE v. STATE2002 WY 13353 P.3d 551Case Number: 01-52Decided: 09/06/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

SIDNEY 
R. SCHADE,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

* 
Chief Justice at time of expedited conference

            
KITE, Justice.

[¶1]      Sidney Schade 
pleaded guilty to two counts of immoral or indecent acts with a minor pursuant 
to a plea agreement by which the state agreed to recommend probation and Mr. 
Schade agreed to obtain a sex offender evaluation. Several months after his 
release on bond pending sentencing, Mr. Schade violated a bond condition which 
prohibited contact with the victims.  The state petitioned to revoke his bond, 
and Mr. Schade was arrested.  Mr. 
Schade and the state entered into a second plea agreement which provided the 
state would continue to recommend probation on the condition Mr. Schade was 
accepted into a community alternative placement program such as the Intensive 
Supervision Program (ISP).  
Sentencing was delayed while Mr. Schade unsuccessfully attempted to gain 
entrance into a variety of such programs.  
He was ultimately sentenced to two consecutive terms of three to five 
years of imprisonment. Mr. Schade appeals contending the state violated the 
first plea agreement and the district court failed to advise him he would be 
unable to withdraw his guilty plea.  
Finding no error, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Mr. Schade 
presents these issues for our review:

ISSUE 
I

Whether 
Mr. Schade's sentence is an illegal sentence because the interim probationary 
terms were illegal?

ISSUE 
II

Whether 
the state breached the plea agreement when it interfered with Mr. Schade's 
ability to complete the terms of the interim probation?

ISSUE 
III

Whether 
Mr. Schade should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the court did 
not properly follow Rule 11, W.R.Cr.P., when it failed to properly advise Mr. 
Schade?

ISSUE 
IV

Whether 
Mr. Schade was denied due process when the court failed to sentence him within 
one year of adjudication of guilt?

The 
state phrases the issues as:

I.  Did 
the state breach the plea agreement?

II.  Did 
the district court fail to comply with the mandates of Rule 11 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Appellant's 
pleas?

III.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in imposing 
sentence?

FACTS

[¶3]      Between May 1, 
1999, and August 8, 1999, Mr. Schade inappropriately touched the victims, both 
age fourteen, on separate occasions.  
He was charged with one count of third-degree sexual assault under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), two counts of immoral or indecent 
acts with a minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 2001), and two 
counts of causing or encouraging a child to commit with him any immoral or 
indecent act under § 14-3-105(a).  
On December 29, 1999, at his arraignment, Mr. Schade pleaded guilty to 
two counts of indecent or immoral acts with a minor.  In exchange for his guilty pleas, the 
state agreed to dismiss the remaining three charges and recommend 
probation.  Pursuant to both his 
bond conditions and this first plea agreement, Mr. Schade was prohibited from 
contacting his victims.  The first 
plea agreement also required that he complete a sex offender evaluation prior to 
sentencing.  

[¶4]      On February 16, 
2000, the state petitioned to revoke his bond because Mr. Schade had contact 
with one of the victims, and the district court thereafter issued a bench 
warrant for his arrest.  On May 12, 
2000, Mr. Schade appeared before the district court for sentencing and 
acknowledged that a sex offender evaluation had not been completed.  The parties reached a second agreement 
wherein the state would continue to recommend probation provided Mr. Schade was 
accepted in the ISP or a comparable program to ensure that (1) he had no further 
contact with the victims and (2) he enrolled in a sex offender treatment 
program.  Although Mr. Schade was 
given approximately six months of continuances for his sentencing hearing to 
pursue admission into an ISP-type program, he was not accepted in any 
program.  His inability to enroll in 
an acceptable program, coupled with his previous failure to abide by the terms 
of his bond release and plea agreement, caused the state to argue against 
probation at the sentencing hearing and to urge the court to impose consecutive 
imprisonment terms of four to six years.  
Concluding probation was not appropriate, on January 12, 2001, the 
district court sentenced Mr. Schade to serve consecutive imprisonment terms of 
not less than three years nor more than five years with credit against the 
minimum and maximum for time served while awaiting disposition.  Mr. Schade now appeals his judgment and 
sentence.

DISCUSSION

A.        Plea 
Agreement

[¶5]      Mr. Schade 
contends the state breached the first plea agreement when it interfered with his 
ability to comply with its terms by incarcerating him and preventing him from 
being able to obtain the sex offender evaluation.  Our standard concerning a plea agreement 
breach is as follows:

[W]hether 
the government has breached a plea agreement is reviewed de novo.  In determining whether a breach has 
occurred, we:  (1) examine the 
nature of the promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's 
reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered.  "Principles of general contract law 
guide our analysis of the government's obligations under the agreement.'"  Clingman [v. State], 2001 WY 46, ¶ 20, 23 P.3d [27,] 31 
[(Wyo. 2001)] (quoting [United States v.] Peterson, 225 F.3d [1167,] 1170-71 
[(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1131 (2001)]).  It follows that, "as in contract," a 
party should not be released from its obligations under a plea agreement absent 
another party's material or substantial breach of that agreement.  A material or substantial breach is one 
that goes to the whole consideration of the agreement.  Several factors are relevant to whether 
a breach is material or substantial, including the extent to which the 
non-breaching party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected and 
the extent to which the breaching party's conduct comports with the standards of 
good faith and fair dealing.  

Browning 
v. State, 
2001 WY 93, ¶32, 32 P.3d 1061, ¶32 (Wyo. 2001) (some citations 
omitted).

[¶6]      Mr. Schade 
asserts general principles of contract law prohibit a party's interference with 
another party's ability to perform its contract obligations.  In this instance, he argues the 
prosecution's actions in revoking his bond made it impossible for him to fulfill 
a requirement of the first plea agreementthat he obtain a sex offender 
evaluation.  He asserts the state 
should not be permitted to rely on his nonperformance to revoke the plea 
agreement when the state's actions directly caused his nonperformance.  However, the plea agreement was revoked 
because he contacted a victim.  In 
addition, Mr. Schade had almost three months from the entry of his pleas on 
December 29, 1999, to the date of his arrest on March 22, 2000, for violation of 
his bond condition in which to complete the sex offender evaluation, and he 
failed to do so.  

[¶7]           
Furthermore, 
Mr. Schade ignores the fact the plea agreement was renegotiated.  The second agreement did not require a 
sex offender evaluation and, instead, was contingent on him being accepted into 
the ISP or a comparable program.  
Consequently, his completion of a sex offender evaluation was no longer a 
prerequisite for the state's probation recommendation and was irrelevant. 

B.        
W.R.Cr.P.  
11

[¶8]      Mr. Schade also 
contends, without citing any authority, the district court did not advise him 
that, if he failed to comply with the interim probation conditions, the state 
could not be forced to abide by the plea agreement.  As an initial matter, there were no 
interim probation conditions; rather, no contact with the victims was a bond 
condition for Mr. Schade being released on his own recognizance.  Although this bond condition was 
mentioned at the arraignment where Mr. Schade advised the court he accepted the 
first plea agreement, it was not an independent condition of the agreement.  The "no contact" provision was mentioned 
merely in the context of a reminder to all parties that it was a requirement for 
bond.  Furthermore, as the state 
points out, W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) does not require a district court, as a condition of 
ensuring a plea is voluntary, to specifically advise a defendant of the 
consequences of failing to comply with a plea agreement's terms.  It is axiomatic that, if a defendant 
fails to comply with a plea agreement, the state is not bound by that 
agreement.

  

[¶9]      W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) 
requires a district court to assure that a plea is voluntary and not the result 
of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.  The purpose of this rule is to allow the 
judge to determine whether the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and with 
an understanding of the consequences of the plea. Smallwood v. State, 748 P.2d 1141, 1143 
(Wyo. 1988).  This court looks to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a plea.  Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶9, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  The well 
defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary 
provides:

"[A] 
plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including 
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his 
own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. 
bribes)."

Brady 
v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton 
v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 
(1958)); see also State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 139 
(Wyo. 1998).

[¶10]   For a determination of whether Mr. 
Schade's pleas were made voluntarily, we set forth the applicable portions of 
the plea hearing:

THE 
COURT:  Good morning.  Mr. Schade is here for re-arraignment; 
is that correct[?]

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  That's correct, Your 
Hono[r].

THE 
COURT:  Are there any charge 
concessions or arrangements we should make of record concerning that 
change?

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor.  It's my understanding that Mr. Schade 
will enter a plea of guilty to one count of the immoral acts for each minor 
victim, a total of two; that the prosecution and defense -- that the prosecution 
is prepared to supplement factual basis, if necessary, but the prosecution and 
the defense will jointly recommend probationary disposition with a requirement 
to participate in an acceptable sex offender therapy program, to follow their 
recommendations and the other normal conditions of probation, no drugs, alcohol, 
no other crimes, DNA draw, etc.  In 
exchange for that, the prosecution agrees to dismiss one count of immoral acts 
with a minor.

THE 
COURT:  Is that the State's 
agreement?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, Your Honor.  Just to specify two additional 
things.  One is that this would be a 
plea to Counts II and III of the currently existing Information and that the 
conditions of recommending probation include that he get a sex offender 
evaluation pending sentencing and that he continue to abide by the no contact with the 
victims provision.

THE 
COURT:  Do you understand those to 
be the conditions of this probation, Mr. Schade?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  I have never heard these 
conditions.  I guess I need a 
clarification.  My understanding is 
that the probationary disposition would not depend on any recommendations or 
findings pursuant to the sex offender evaluation.  We've had no discussions as to 
that.

THE 
COURT:  As I understand what [the 
prosecutor] said, the only condition is that he participate in that sort of 
evaluation immediately pending sentencing.

[PROSECUTOR]: 
Correct.  I didn't premise the 
recommendation of probation on that, just that I want that.  That was part of the agreement that the 
sex offender evaluation actually be done prior to 
sentencing.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  We have no problem with 
that.

THE 
COURT:  So are you clear on this, 
Mr. Schade, -

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

THE 
COURT:  -- how we are 
proceeding?  Do you have any 
questions about it?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, 
sir.

THE 
COURT:  Apparently and, I guess it 
goes without saying, this arrangement was made with your knowledge and consent; 
is that correct?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

THE 
COURT:  So Mr. Schade will be 
offering pleas of guilty to Counts II and III.  And those carry maximum penalties of up 
to 15 years' imprisonment for each count; is that correct?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Ten years, Your 
Honor.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Ten 
years.

THE 
COURT:  Ten 
years.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Also apparently, Your 
Honor, there are more counts to be dismissed than just one other count, there's 
three other counts being dismissed.

THE 
COURT:  I gather all but II and III 
will be dismissed.

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  That's 
correct.

[PROSECUTOR]:  Correct.

THE 
COURT:  Mr. Schade, it's been stated 
here that one of [the] features of this agreement is that your counsel and the 
counsel for the State will jointly recommend probation.  The Court will seriously consider that 
recommendation but it is not necessarily bound by it.  Do you understand 
that?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

(Emphasis 
added.)  After Mr. Schade entered 
his pleas, the following colloquy occurred:

THE 
COURT:  Finally then, Mr. Schade, 
other than the arrangement that has been talked about here this morning on the 
record, have there been any threats of any kind made to you or any promises of 
any kind to induce you to offer your pleas of guilty?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, 
sir.

THE 
COURT:  You offer these pleas 
voluntarily and of your own volition?

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, 
sir.

THE 
COURT:  There is a factual basis 
underlying the pleas as to both counts and they are not improperly induced.  Therefore, they are accepted and 
entered, and the Court will order a pre-sentence investigation report and 
require that Mr. Schade commence with the evaluation immediately or as soon as 
possible.

[¶11]   This dialogue reflects that Mr. 
Schade entered his plea freely and voluntarily without threats or promises being 
made against or to him.  It is 
evident he was informed the state's probation recommendation was contingent upon 
his completing a sex offender evaluation before his sentencing and having no 
contact with the victims.  Under the 
totality of the circumstances, we hold Mr. Schade entered his plea knowingly and 
voluntarily.  

[¶12]   Mr. Schade additionally claims the 
district court violated W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2) by failing to advise him that he 
would be unable to withdraw his plea in the event it refused to accept the 
sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2) provides in pertinent 
part:  "If the agreement is of the 
type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B),[1] the court shall advise the 
defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request, the 
defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea."  In Stowe v. State, 10 P.3d 551, 552 n.1 
(Wyo. 2000), the trial court advised Mr. Stowe that it was not bound by the plea 
agreement but failed to inform him that he did not have a right to withdraw his 
plea in the event it did not accept the recommendation.  Citing W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2), we cautioned 
that failure to comply with the provision may require reversal of a conviction 
and remand to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea though we recognized it 
may also be treated as harmless error.2  Id.  

[¶13]   Mr. Schade's whole tack in this 
argument is ill-founded because the first plea agreement was fully replaced and 
superseded by the second plea agreement.  
The judge did not fail to accept the sentencing recommendation 
contemplated by the second plea agreement because it was never made.  At the sentencing, Mr. Schade was unable 
to comply with the condition of the second plea agreement that he be admitted 
into the ISP or an equivalent program, and, consequently, the state did not, and 
was not obligated to, make any probation recommendation.  As a result, there was no requirement 
for the court to inform Mr. Schade he would not have the right to withdraw his 
plea if it declined to accept the state's probation recommendation.  No recommendation was made or denied 
because Mr. Schade was unable to qualify for an acceptable alternative placement 
program, and so the option to withdraw the guilty plea on those grounds never 
materialized.  

            
 

[¶14]   Mr. Schade maintains he suffered an 
impermissible delay in sentencing because he pleaded guilty on December 29, 
1999, but was not sentenced until January 12, 2001.

We 
review speedy sentencing claims under an abuse of discretion standard. Reagan v. State, 14 P.3d 925, 927 (Wyo. 
2000).  "Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).'"  Reagan, 14 P.3d  at 927 (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998)). 

Daugherty 
v. State, 
2002 WY 52, ¶29, 44 P.3d 28, ¶29 (Wyo. 2002).

[A] 
delay in sentencing in excess of a calendar year from the date guilt is 
established, whether by trial to a jury or the court or by plea, is 
presumptively unreasonable. . . . "The rule that we espouse 
protects important rights of the convicted defendant.  It serves to prevent the possibility 
that a greater punishment than is deserved will be imposed because of subsequent 
conduct that results in a violation of the probation.  It also serves to ensure that any 
vagaries of memory will not interfere with the imposition of a sentence 
appropriate to the individual and the crime."

Reagan 
v. State, 
14 P.3d 925, 927-28 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 
1990) (citation omitted)).  "The 
state bears the burden of demonstrating that the delay does not exceed the 
bounds of reason and the court should not be foreclosed from imposing sentence 
after the one year period of time."  
Detheridge v. State, 963 P.2d 233, 235 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶15]   We conclude the state carried its 
burden by demonstrating the sentencing delays were caused by Mr. Schade's 
multiple requests for continuances.  
We summarize these requests:



Sentencing 
      Hearing Set

Reason 
      for Continuance

New 
      Sentencing Hearing Set

4/20/00

Continued 
      at Mr. Schade's request so he could have more time to review the 
      presentence investigation report. 

5/12/00

5/12/00

Mr. 
      Schade's counsel advised the court a new sentencing agreement had been 
      reached and requested an ISP referral and a postponement for an 
      eligibility determination.

7/7/00

7/7/00

Mr. 
      Schade did not qualify for ISP so his counsel requested a continuance to 
      determine his eligibility for the Frontier Corrections 
      program.

7/20/00

7/20/00

Hearing 
      continued to permit resolution of Mr. Schade's motion filed July 19, 2000, 
      requesting the district court to require the prosecution to abide by the 
      initial agreement to recommend probationary disposition.3

1/12/01

1/12/01

Eligibility 
      evaluations were ordered in November 2000 for the community alternatives 
      programs in Casper, Rock Springs, and Gillette. Sentencing hearing was 
      held approximately two weeks after the filing of the final program denial 
      letter.

  

The 
district court permitted Mr. Schade and his counsel to thoroughly pursue a wide 
range of alternative community placement options prior to sentencing.  It is evident from the record that Mr. 
Schade wanted to avoid serving a penitentiary sentence and was given the 
opportunity to investigate and apply for acceptance in a variety of 
programs.  The time  between the guilty plea and sentencing 
was extended as a direct result of Mr. Schade's actions.  The court could have limited this 
process, but the failure to cut short these inquiries was not an abuse of 
discretion or unreasonable under the circumstances.  

[¶16]   Mr. Schade also contends he was 
prejudiced by loss of good time credits as a result of the sentencing 
delay.  Whether he would have 
qualified for such an award is wholly speculative.  Further, he directly caused the time 
delay through the drawn out efforts to find an alternative to penitentiary 
confinement.  

            
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1) contains clear guidance for trial courts wishing to 
overcome the presumption that a delay in sentencing for over a year is 
unreasonable: "Sentence shall be imposed without unnecessary delay, the court 
may, when there is a factor important to the sentencing determination that is 
not then capable of being resolved, postpone the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable time until the factor is capable of being resolved."  If sentence is not to be imposed at the 
time guilt is established or soon thereafter, the trial court must ensure that 
the record clearly indicates the reason for the delay and the circumstances 
under which the matter will be reset for sentencing.

Daugherty, 
2002 WY 52, ¶44.  The reasons for 
the delay are apparent in the record and indicate no abuse of discretion or 
prejudice.  

[¶17]   We, therefore, affirm the district 
court's decision in all regards.

FOOTNOTES

1W.R.Cr.P.  11(e)(1)(B) 
provides:  

            
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.

(1) In General.  The attorney 
for the state and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting 
pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, 
upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or 
to a lesser related offense, the attorney for the state will do any of the 
following:

                                    
. . . 

(B) Make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's 
request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such 
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court 
. . .

2The harmless error standard is set forth in W.R.A.P. 9.04:  "Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  See also W.R.Cr.P. 52(a).  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 
(Wyo. 1990).  

3It is unclear from the record provided how this motion was 
resolved.