Title: Devine v. Buki

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 
 
 
Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
DONALD M. DEVINE, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 140301 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
JANUARY 8, 2015 
CHARLES Z. BUKI, ET AL. 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 
Harry T. Taliaferro, III, Judge 
 
 
Donald M. Devine, Jr. (“Donald”) appeals the judgment of 
the trial court rescinding the sale of the property known as 
Rock Hall to Charles Z. Buki (“Buki”) and Kimberly A. Marsho 
(“Marsho”).  He further appeals the trial court’s award of 
consequential damages and attorney’s fees.  Buki and Marsho 
assign cross-error to the trial court’s denial of their claim 
under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”), Code § 
59.1-196, et seq., and their request for attorney’s fees. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Rock Hall is a wood frame house that is more than 200 years 
old.  The main structure of the house is supported by a large 
wood beam (the “foundation sill”) resting on a masonry wall.  In 
March, 2004, Rock Hall was bought by Acorn Properties, a company 
owned by Donald.  In January, 2005, Acorn Properties transferred 
ownership of Rock Hall to Donald and his wife, Nancy W. Devine 
(“Nancy”). 
 
2 
 
Donald subsequently began the process of renovating and 
restoring Rock Hall.  Donald performed some of the work by 
himself and hired contractors to do the rest.  In June, 2005, 
Shannon Swindell (“Swindell”) was hired by Donald to remove the 
aluminum siding and re-paint the original wooden siding found 
underneath.  According to Swindell, all of the siding appeared 
to be old and there were no new boards on the bottom of the 
house.  Donald also hired Danny Beall (“Beall”) to perform a 
number of tasks, including rebuilding the front and rear 
porches; reframing, insulating and rehanging sheetrock on the 
interior walls; repainting the living room; installing three new 
bathrooms and a kitchen; and some masonry work.  Beall did not 
do any work on the wooden siding or corner posts of Rock Hall. 
 
In December, 2006, Donald decided to sell Rock Hall to 
generate the cash necessary to purchase another property.  
Donald listed Rock Hall for sale with Rebecca Lemmon (“Lemmon”), 
a local realtor.  Lemmon, with Donald’s input, created 
promotional literature that was given to potential buyers, 
including Buki and Marsho.  The promotional literature stated: 
• Rock Hall had been “completely restored;” 
• Rock Hall’s foundation had been restored; 
• Rock Hall was “completely renovated and restored 
between 2004 and 2005 from the wood plank floors and 
molding to the portico, and from the brick foundations 
to the roof and chimney.” 
 
 
3 
The promotional literature also cautioned that the information 
was provided by the seller and deemed accurate, but it was not 
guaranteed. 
 
On January 22, 2007, Buki and Marsho signed a contract 
agreeing to purchase Rock Hall for $590,000 (the “Real Estate 
Contract”).  The Real Estate Contract included a “Disclaimer 
Statement” which stated that the owners made no representations 
or warranties as to the condition of the property and the 
purchaser would be receiving the property “‘as is’ . . . with 
all defects which may exist, if any, except as otherwise 
provided in the real estate purchase contract.” 
 
On February 2, 2007, William Knight (“Knight”), a home 
inspector, inspected the property with Buki and Marsho present.  
He noticed that some of the window frames were warped, allowing 
air to enter.  As a result, Knight determined that the windows 
and siding were only in “marginal” condition, meaning that they 
were “functional” but required “immediate maintenance” and 
likely would need to be replaced within five years.  
Additionally, he found a water stain and mold forming on the 
living room ceiling.  Knight also noted some moisture damage in 
the basement and some evidence of boring insect damage to the 
rear sill.  Overall, however, he “told [Buki and Marsho] that he 
found nothing that would cause him to tell a potential purchaser 
not to buy Rock Hall.” 
 
4 
 
Due to Knight’s report, Buki and Marsho had Jeffrey T. Cox, 
Sr. (“Cox”), perform a subsequent inspection on the property, 
focusing primarily on the insect damage.  Cox also noted the 
moisture and insect damage in the basement.  However, according 
to Cox, the termite damage was limited to one basement window 
and a baseboard.  Cox stated that, based on what he could see at 
the time, there was no evidence of termite damage anywhere else 
in the house or that there was an active termite infestation in 
the home.  Regarding the moisture damage, Cox stated that it was 
not out of the ordinary for that area. 
 
On February 4, 2007, an addendum was added to the Real 
Estate Contract.  In the addendum, Buki and Marsho requested a 
number of repairs based on the results of the home inspection.  
Referring to the stain on the living room ceiling, Buki and 
Marsho requested that Donald and Nancy “find [the] source of 
[the] moisture and repair/replace.  Treat mold and 
paint/repair.”  Lemmon informed Buki and Marsho’s agent that the 
stain on the living room ceiling was caused by a window being 
left open during Hurricane Ernesto, which struck the area on 
September 1, 2006.  The stain was repaired and painted. 
 
The real estate closing occurred on March 9, 2007.  Shortly 
thereafter, Buki and Marsho noticed water leaking from the east 
wall and the east- and south-facing windows when there was wind-
driven rain from the east or south.  They also noticed water 
 
5 
leaking from the living room ceiling.  Buki and Marsho hired Tom 
Brown (“Brown”) to install new windows.  Brown discovered mold 
and sheet rock damage around all of the windows on the east 
wall.  According to Brown, the damage was not from a single 
event, but likely had been on-going for some time.  
Additionally, Brown discovered that the exterior siding had 
significant cracks and recommended that it be replaced.  He 
recommended another contractor, Bruce Stanley (“Stanley”). 
 
On September 4, 2007, Brown and Stanley inspected the 
siding of Rock Hall.  They noticed that the lower courses of 
siding, as well as portions of the corner posts, had been 
replaced with new material.  After removing the lower courses, 
they discovered that the foundation sill and corner boards were 
substantially damaged by rot and termite damage.  As a result, 
the structural integrity of the house was significantly 
compromised. 
 
On December 6, 2007, Buki and Marsho brought suit against 
Donald and Nancy.  Buki and Marsho alleged that Donald and Nancy 
fraudulently induced them to enter into the Real Estate Contract 
and to close on Rock Hall by misrepresenting and concealing the 
true condition of Rock Hall.  Initially, they only sought 
rescission of the Real Estate Contract or, in the alternative, 
compensatory damages for replacement of the windows and repairs 
 
6 
to the sill.  In their second amended complaint, they added a 
claim under the VCPA. 
 
The trial court referred the matter to a commissioner in 
chancery.  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the 
commissioner found that Buki and Marsho had been fraudulently 
induced into entering the Real Estate Contract and closing on 
Rock Hall.  He further determined that Buki and Marsho were 
entitled to rescission of the Real Estate Contract and damages 
in the amount of $163,099.79, representing the cost of the 
replacement windows ($27,970.38), the interest Buki and Marsho 
paid on their first ($106,936) and second ($17,667) mortgages on 
the property, the property insurance expended by Buki and Marsho 
($4,301.41), and the real estate taxes Buki and Marsho paid on 
the property ($6,225).  Finding that the fraud was a willful 
violation of the VCPA, the commissioner doubled the damages 
pursuant to Code § 59.1-204(A) and awarded attorney’s fees and 
costs pursuant to Code § 59.1-204(B).  As the damages were 
doubled under the VCPA, the commissioner declined to award 
punitive damages. 
 
Donald and Nancy filed several exceptions to the 
commissioner’s report.  After considering the matter, the trial 
court determined that there was sufficient evidence to find that 
Donald had fraudulently induced Buki and Marsho to buy Rock 
Hall.  The trial court focused on the false statements in the 
 
7 
promotional literature, the concealment of the damage to the 
sill and misrepresentation as to the source of the living room 
ceiling stain. 
 
However, the trial court also found that Buki and Marsho 
had failed to allege or prove that Nancy had committed any 
fraudulent acts.  The trial court noted that there was no 
evidence that Nancy took any part in the fraud, aside from 
signing the Real Estate Contract and the other documents 
pertaining to the sale of Rock Hall.  The trial court pointed 
out that the commissioner made no findings with regard to Nancy 
or attributed any fraud, misrepresentation or concealment to 
her.  The trial court determined that, at most, Nancy “reaped 
the benefit” of the sale of Rock Hall. 
 
Ultimately, the trial court granted rescission of the Real 
Estate Contract.  Although it found that there was no evidence 
Nancy committed any fraud, the trial court determined that it 
would be fair and equitable to require her “to be responsible 
jointly and severally with her husband for the repayment of the 
purchase price” of Rock Hall.  The trial court noted that, upon 
repayment, Donald and Nancy would receive Rock Hall and, 
therefore, be returned to the status quo ante.  In conjunction 
with awarding rescission, the trial court also awarded 
prejudgment interest on the purchase price of Rock Hall, running 
from the date of closing. 
 
8 
 
The trial court also affirmed, in large part, the 
commissioner’s decision to award consequential damages.  
However, the trial court determined that Buki and Marsho should 
not be reimbursed for the replacement windows.  According to the 
trial court, by replacing the windows instead of immediately 
bringing an action for rescission, Buki and Marsho were limited 
to seeking actual damages for the money they expended on the 
windows.  The trial court noted that Buki and Marsho had dropped 
their claim for actual damages, therefore, the trial court 
decided it would be inequitable to award consequential damages 
for the window replacement.  Furthermore, in light of the fact 
that there was no evidence that Nancy had committed any wrong, 
the award of consequential damages was only a judgment against 
Donald. 
 
The trial court initially affirmed the commissioner’s 
decision to double the consequential damages and award 
attorney’s fees under the VCPA.  However, upon a motion for 
reconsideration, the trial court reasoned that the damages 
contemplated by the VCPA did not include the consequential 
damages awarded in this case because the consequential damages 
were awarded as part of the award of rescission.  The trial 
court further noted that Buki and Marsho did not actually 
incorporate the consequential damages sought in their rescission 
claim as part of their VCPA claim.  Therefore, the trial court 
 
9 
reversed its decision as to the VCPA claim.  Similarly, the 
trial court reversed the award of attorney’s fees under the 
VCPA.  However, it reinstated those fees “based on fraud and not 
pursuant to the VCPA.” 
 
In response to the trial court’s denial of damages under 
the VCPA, Buki and Marsho moved the trial court to reconsider 
the commissioner’s ruling on punitive damages.  After hearing 
argument on the matter, the trial court affirmatively stated 
that it considered the matter, but stood by its decision to not 
grant punitive damages. 
 
On November 21, 2013, the trial court entered its final 
order on the matter.  The trial court 
• Ordered Donald and Nancy to refund the “purchase price 
of $590,000 with interest at the statutory rate from 
the date of closing (March 9, 2007) until fully paid;” 
 
• Ordered Buki and Marsho to reconvey the property to 
Donald and Nancy upon refund of the purchase price; 
and 
 
• Entered judgment against Donald in the amount of 
$135,129.41 “for consequential damages together with 
interest . . . plus attorney’s fees and related 
expenses in the amount of $98,575.66.” 
 
 
This appeal followed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Donald contends that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter a decree against him.  He further argues 
that Buki and Marsho failed to prove that he fraudulently 
 
10 
induced them to purchase Rock Hall and that the trial court 
erred in awarding consequential damages, attorney’s fees and 
prejudgment interest.  In their assignments of cross-error, Buki 
and Marsho assert that the trial court erred in dismissing their 
VCPA claim and in not awarding punitive damages. 
A.  JURISDICTION 
 
Donald’s first argument concerns the trial court’s 
“equitable jurisdiction.”  Specifically, Donald argues that, 
because Buki and Marsho failed to prove that Nancy committed any 
fraud, the trial court lost its jurisdiction to award the 
equitable remedy of rescission against him.  In making this 
argument, Donald primarily relies on Larkey v. Gardner, 105 Va. 
718, 54 S.E. 886 (1906), where this Court held: 
Where the bill alleges proper matter for the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity, so that a 
demurrer will not lie, if it appears on the 
hearing that the allegations are unfounded, 
and that such matter does not in fact exist, 
the result must be the same as if it had not 
been alleged, and the bill should be 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Id. at 722, 54 S.E. at 887. 
 
Donald, however, takes this holding out of context.  We 
have explained that Larkey only stands for the limited notion 
that a circuit court lost “equitable jurisdiction” when it was 
revealed that the equitable remedy sought was merely a pretext 
to bring an action at law in a chancery court.  See Iron City 
 
11 
Sav. Bank v. Isaacsen, 158 Va. 609, 626, 164 S.E. 520, 525 
(1932).  We note, however, that with the abolition of “sides of 
court” and repeal of former Code § 8.01-270, the jurisdiction 
question at issue in Larkey does not arise in the same fashion 
today.  See 2005 Acts ch. 681.  There is also no evidence in the 
record, nor does Donald argue, that the relief sought by Buki 
and Marsho was a pretext to bring an action at law in a court of 
chancery.  Therefore, Larkey is simply inapposite to the present 
case.  Moreover, Donald has not cited, nor can we locate, any 
authority supporting the notion that, when a plaintiff seeks 
equitable relief against two defendants but only makes out a 
case for relief against one, the trial court somehow loses 
jurisdiction over the matter or would be barred from entering 
relief against the party as to whom proper grounds for relief 
was established.1 
 
Furthermore, we have recognized that, in awarding 
rescission, “[i]t is immaterial that the status quo cannot be 
literally restored.”  Millboro Lumber Co. v. Augusta Wood 
Products Corp., 140 Va. 409, 421, 125 S.E. 306, 310 (1924).  
                     
 
1 Donald’s reliance on Hurst v. Williams, 157 Va. 124, 160 
S.E. 24 (1931), is similarly unavailing.  In Hurst, this Court 
confirmed that, in the absence of a showing of fraudulent 
conduct by the wife, “there could be no personal judgment 
against [her].”  Id. at 130-31, 160 S.E. at 27.  However, the 
Court then returned the case to the trial court so that 
appropriate decrees could be imposed against the husband.  Id. 
at 131, 160 S.E. at 27. 
 
12 
Rather, the trial court need only “be able substantially to 
restore the parties to the position they occupied before 
entering into the contract.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, when 
awarding rescission, “the aim of equity is to award complete, 
just and equitable relief, with a view to restoring the parties 
to the status quo and equitably adjusting their interests under 
the circumstances of the case.”  Newton v. Newton, 199 Va. 654, 
660, 101 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 
Ultimately, the fact that Donald and Nancy originally owned 
Rock Hall as tenants by the entirety has no bearing on whether a 
remedy can be granted as to Donald alone.  Indeed, as far as 
equity is concerned, their ownership as tenants by the entirety 
was extinguished when they executed the Real Estate Contract.  
See Ferry v. Clarke, 77 Va. 397, 407 (1883) (“[A]s soon as a 
contract is made for the sale of an estate, equity considers the 
buyer as the owner of the land, and the seller as the trustee 
for him.”). 
 
Additionally, the rescission of the Real Estate Contract 
does not restore the tenancy by the entirety.  We have long 
recognized that the title to real property is transferred by the 
deed, whereas the contract preceding the execution of the deed 
merely requires that the deed be delivered.  See Miller v. 
Reynolds, 216 Va. 852, 855, 223 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1976) (“A deed 
is a mere transfer of title, a delivery so to speak of the 
 
13 
subject-matter of the contract.”).  Once the deed is conveyed, 
the provisions of the underlying contract governing the transfer 
of the property are extinguished.  See Beck v. Smith, 260 Va. 
452, 455, 538 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2000) (“Under the doctrine of 
merger, provisions in a contract for sale are extinguished and 
merged into the deed, an instrument of higher dignity.”).  Thus, 
because the provisions governing the transfer of ownership have 
been extinguished and merged into the deed, rescission of the 
underlying contract does not automatically transfer ownership of 
real property back to the original owners.  In other words, 
ownership of Rock Hall did not automatically revert to Nancy and 
Donald as tenants by the entirety when the trial court granted 
rescission. 
 
Rather, it is through the trial court’s exercise of 
discretion in fashioning its award that ownership is 
transferred.  In exercising such discretion, this Court has 
recognized that a trial court can adjust the interests of the 
parties as the circumstances of the case demand, see Newton, 199 
Va. at 660, 101 S.E.2d at 585, and “fashion a remedy that would 
eliminate or lessen the hardship imposed upon a party by a 
particular decision.”  Frank Shop v. Crown Cent. Petroleum 
Corp., 264 Va. 1, 7, 564 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2002).  Accordingly, 
the fact that Buki and Marsho failed to prove their claim 
against Nancy does not remove the trial court’s jurisdiction 
 
14 
over Donald; it simply prevents the trial court from entering an 
award against Nancy.  It is still within the trial court’s 
discretion to “adjust” the interests of the parties such that 
Donald, as the sole wrongdoer, is solely responsible for 
refunding the purchase price in return for his sole ownership of 
Rock Hall. 
B.  FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
 
 
Donald next argues that the trial court erred in awarding 
rescission because Buki and Marsho failed to properly plead or 
prove that Donald fraudulently induced them to purchase Rock 
Hall.  Donald contends that his statements about the stain on 
the living room ceiling were made pursuant to a contractual 
obligation and, therefore, they could only be the basis of a 
breach of contract action, not a fraud claim.  He further claims 
that the advertisements Buki and Marsho allegedly relied on in 
purchasing Rock Hall do not serve as a legitimate basis for a 
fraud claim because Buki and Marsho did not and could not, as a 
matter of law, have relied on those advertisements.  Finally, 
Donald asserts that he had no duty to reveal the damage to the 
foundation because the Disclaimer Statement in the Real Estate 
Contract specifically informed Buki and Marsho that they were 
buying Rock Hall “‘as is,’ that is, with all defects which may 
exist.”  We disagree with this last argument and, therefore, 
need not address the first two arguments. 
 
15 
 
 In the present case, Donald does not dispute the trial 
court’s finding that he concealed the damage to the foundation 
sill.  Rather, his argument focuses on the fact that Buki and 
Marsho did not allege that his concealment induced them to enter 
into the contract, only to go to closing.2  He contends that, at 
that point, Buki and Marsho had already entered into the Real 
Estate Contract, therefore, the Disclosure Statement absolved 
him of any duty to inform them of the condition of the 
foundation sill.  We disagree. 
 
In Ware v. Scott, 220 Va. 317, 320, 257 S.E.2d 855, 857 
(1979), we recognized that “[a]n action for fraudulent 
inducement need not . . . be limited to formation of the 
contract.”  Accordingly, we held that “performance of an 
executory contract may be fraudulently induced.”  Id. (emphasis 
omitted).  We also specifically recognized that “fraudulent 
inducement to perform may arise when one party induces the other 
to perform by concealing some fact which excuses performance by 
the latter.”  Id. at 320, 257 S.E.2d at 857 (collecting cases) 
(emphasis added).  Furthermore, as the present case 
demonstrates, the concealment that induces a party to perform 
may exist prior to the contract being performed.  Regardless of 
                     
 
2 In their complaint, Buki and Marsho alleged that they 
“changed their position as a result of [Donald’s] concealment 
and fraud regarding the deteriorated sill to their detriment by 
closing on the property.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
16 
when the concealment occurs (i.e., before or after the contract 
has been entered into), the wrong is still the same.  Therefore, 
unlike fraudulent inducement to contract, where the concealment 
must necessarily precede the formation of the contract, the 
concealment at issue in a fraudulent inducement to perform claim 
may occur either before or after the contract has been entered 
into. 
 
As with a fraudulently induced contractual agreement, where 
the performance of a contractual agreement is fraudulently 
induced, “the entire instrument -- the whole contract -- is 
rendered voidable at the instance of the defrauded party.”  
Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 564, 95 S.E.2d 
207, 212 (1956).  Furthermore, “[a] seller may not rely upon and 
claim the benefits of a contract and at the same time through 
that instrument contract against and relieve himself of the 
consequences of his fraud that induced the other party.”  Id.  
In other words, the entire contract is rescinded including any 
language indicating that the sale was made “as is.”  See George 
Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 220 Va. 109, 
112, 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1979) (“A buyer can show that a 
contract of sale was induced by the seller's fraud, 
notwithstanding the fact the sale was made ‘as is.’”).  This is 
because such disclaimer language “‘stands no higher than the 
 
17 
contract which is vitiated by the fraud.’”  Id. (quoting Packard 
Norfolk, 198 Va. at 565, 95 S.E.2d at 213). 
 
Here, as previously noted, Donald concealed the condition 
of the foundation sill.  “If a party conceals a fact that is 
material to the transaction, knowing that the other party is 
acting on the assumption that no such fact exists, the 
concealment is as much a fraud as if the existence of the fact 
were expressly denied, or the reverse of it expressly stated.”  
Clay v. Butler, 132 Va. 464, 474, 112 S.E. 697, 700 (1922).  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting rescission 
based on Donald’s fraudulent concealment of the damage to the 
foundation sill. 
C.  MONETARY DAMAGES 
 
Donald argues that the trial court erred in awarding 
consequential damages and attorney’s fees in addition to 
granting rescission.  Specifically, Donald takes issue with the 
trial court’s decision to reimburse Buki and Marsho for the 
interest they paid on the mortgages they took out on the 
property, the taxes they paid on the property and the property 
insurance they had on the property.  He further claims that the 
trial court should not have awarded Buki and Marsho their 
attorney’s fees. 
 
 
 
18 
1.  CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
 
Addressing the consequential damages first, Donald argues 
that the trial court’s monetary award, in addition to granting 
rescission, was erroneous.  Donald notes that, under the facts 
of this case, the purpose of the consequential damages was to 
reimburse Buki and Marsho for expenses they paid to third 
parties and not for any benefits they bestowed upon him.  
Therefore, he contends that the award of consequential damages 
goes above and beyond the award of rescission sought by Buki and 
Marsho.  We agree. 
 
Rescission is the abrogation or annulling of a contract.  
See Chamberlaine v. Marsh, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 283, 287 (1819).  
“If rescission is granted, the contract is terminated for all 
purposes, and the parties are restored to the status quo ante.”  
McLeskey v. Ocean Park Investors, Ltd., 242 Va. 51, 54, 405 
S.E.2d 846, 847 (1991).  As previously stated, rescission only 
requires that the parties be restored to “substantially” the 
same position they occupied before entering into the contract.  
Millboro Lumber, 140 Va. at 421, 125 S.E. at 310. 
[W]here, on account of the act of the 
adverse party, complete restitution cannot 
be had, rescission will not be denied and 
the court will, so far as practicable, 
require the party profiting by the fraud to 
surrender the benefit he has received in the 
transaction. 
Id. (collecting authorities) (emphasis added). 
 
19 
 
Thus, we have expressly limited the amount of restitution 
to the amount of benefit received by the adverse party.  A party 
seeking restitution beyond that amount is required to bring a 
separate cause of action for damages resulting from the 
fraudulent inducement.  Indeed, we have specifically recognized 
that, in a suit for rescission of real estate, “‘[i]nterest on 
the amount paid by the plaintiffs is recoverable only as damages 
for the wrongful detention of the money by the defendant.’”  Lee 
v. Laprade, 106 Va. 594, 602, 56 S.E. 719, 722 (1907) (quoting  
Talbot v. Bank, 129 Mass. 67, 70 (1880)) (emphasis added). 
 
In the present case, there is no evidence that Donald 
received any benefit from Buki and Marsho beyond the sale price 
of Rock Hall.  Obviously, he did not receive any benefit from 
Buki and Marsho paying interest on their mortgages or from their 
payment of their property taxes and property insurance.  These 
payments were not made to him, but to unrelated third parties. 
 
Further, the consequential damages awarded to Buki and 
Marsho relate to matters that, under the facts of this case, are 
only indirectly related to the trial court’s award of 
rescission.  The trial court’s award only voided the Real Estate 
Contract; it had no bearing on the mortgages taken out by Buki 
and Marsho.  The mortgages still exist and, therefore, Buki and 
Marsho are still required to pay interest on them.  
Additionally, the effect of the trial court’s order was not to 
 
20 
immediately void the Real Estate Contract; rather, Buki and 
Marsho will continue to own Rock Hall until Donald pays them the 
purchase price plus interest.  Only then will Rock Hall be 
reconveyed.  During the interim, Buki and Marsho will still be 
required to pay taxes on the property.  They will also likely be 
required to carry insurance on the property.  Thus, the 
consequential damages are not restitution related to the 
rescission; rather, they are more akin to an award of 
compensatory damages.  As Buki and Marsho abandoned their claim 
for such damages, it was error for the trial court to have 
awarded them such damages in the form of consequential damages. 
2.  ATTORNEY’S FEES 
 
Donald next claims that the trial court erroneously awarded 
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Real Estate Contract.  According 
to Donald, Buki and Marsho only requested attorney’s fees “as 
provided by the [Real Estate Contract].”  Donald asserts that 
the Real Estate Contract cannot serve as a valid basis for the 
award of attorney’s fees because it was ultimately rescinded.  
If Buki and Marsho’s request for attorney’s fees was limited to 
the Real Estate Contract, Donald’s argument would likely be 
correct.  See Bank of Giles County v. Mason, 199 Va. 176, 180, 
98 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1957) (holding that “no relief should be 
granted that does not substantially accord with the case as made 
in the pleading”).  However, Donald overlooks the fact that Buki 
 
21 
and Marsho did not only request attorney’s fees pursuant to the 
Real Estate Contract.  Rather, Buki and Marsho also requested 
attorney’s fees independent of any individual claim.3 
 
This Court has repeatedly recognized that, “in a fraud 
suit, a chancellor, in the exercise of his discretion, may award 
attorney’s fees to a defrauded party.”  Prospect Dev. Co. v. 
Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 92, 515 S.E.2d 291, 301 (1999).  Here, 
the trial court was clearly exercising its discretion when it 
stated that it was awarding attorney’s fees “based on fraud.”  
Donald has made no showing that the trial court abused its 
discretion.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
awarding attorney’s fees. 
D.  PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
 
Donald contends that the trial court erred in awarding 
prejudgment interest because Buki and Marsho failed to 
specifically request it in their pleadings.  We agree. 
 
Code § 8.01-3824 authorizes a trial court to award 
prejudgment interest.  This Court has recognized that Code § 
                     
 
3 Specifically, in the prayer for relief in their second 
amended complaint, Buki and Marsho requested that the trial 
court provide, “with regard to any count, for a recovery of 
their reasonable attorney’s fees incurred herein.” 
 
 
4 Code § 8.01-382 states, in relevant part: 
In any . . . action at law or suit in 
equity, the final order, verdict of the 
jury, or if no jury the judgment or decree 
of the court, may provide for interest on 
 
22 
8.01-382 “leaves the assessment of interest in the discretion of 
the fact-finder.”  J.W. Creech, Inc. v. Norfolk Air Conditioning 
Corp., 237 Va. 320, 325, 377 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1989).  However, 
although the award of prejudgment interest is discretionary, it 
is still “part of the actual damages sought to be recovered.”  
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Douthat, 248 Va. 627, 631, 449 S.E.2d 799, 
801 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting 
cases).  As such, prejudgment interest, like other damages, must 
be requested in a pleading before it can be awarded by a trial 
court.  See Davis v. Beury, 134 Va. 322, 354, 115 S.E. 527 
(1923) (“[I]nterest prior to verdict or decree, if recoverable 
at all, would be recoverable as special damages, and hence would 
have to be specially alleged in order to be recoverable.”). 
 
In the present case, Buki and Marsho’s second amended 
complaint contains no request for prejudgment interest.  As “a 
plaintiff cannot recover more than he sues for,” Powell v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 Va. 464, 469, 344 S.E.2d 916, 919 
(1986), the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest 
on the sale of Rock Hall. 
 
 
                                                                  
any principal sum awarded, or any part 
thereof, and fix the period at which the 
interest shall commence. 
 
23 
E. CROSS ERROR 
 
In their assignments of cross-error, Buki and Marsho take 
issue with the trial court’s refusal to multiply the 
consequential damages under the VCPA and its denial of punitive 
damages.  With regard to their VCPA claim, Buki and Marsho 
contend that the trial court erred in determining that 
consequential damages were not a form of loss that could be 
doubled under the VCPA.  However, in light of our above decision 
reversing the award of consequential damages, this issue is 
moot. 
 
Buki and Marsho next argue that the trial court erred in 
failing to award punitive damages after it struck their VCPA 
claim.  According to Buki and Marsho, “it was clear error for 
the trial court to fail to impose equivalent damages on [Donald] 
as punitive damages.”  We disagree. 
 
“A punitive damages award is generally left to the 
[factfinder’s] discretion because there is no set standard for 
determining the amount of punitive damages.”  Coalson v. 
Canchola, 287 Va. 242, 249, 754 S.E.2d 525, 528 (2014).  As such 
an award is entirely discretionary, Buki and Marsho are required 
to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to award punitive damages.  Here, Buki and Marsho fail to raise 
any argument indicating that such an abuse of discretion 
 
24 
occurred.  Accordingly, we will not reverse the decision of the 
trial court on this issue. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court granting rescission of the Real Estate Contract 
and its award of attorney’s fees.  Furthermore, no abuse of 
discretion has been shown regarding the circuit court's refusal 
to award punitive damages in this case.  However, we will 
reverse the trial court’s award of consequential damages and 
prejudgment interest.  Accordingly, we will remand the matter to 
the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion or the opinion expressed in the companion case of 
Nancy W. Devine v. Charles Z. Buki, et al., ___ Va. ___, ___ 
S.E.2d ___ (2015) (this day decided). 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                            and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
While agreeing with Parts II.B. through E. of the majority 
opinion, I disagree with the analysis and conclusions regarding 
the issue of rescission in Part II.A.  I would affirm the 
circuit court in fully rescinding the subject real estate 
contract, and ordering repayment of the purchase price by Donald 
 
25 
and Nancy Devine in exchange for the reconveyance of the subject 
property by the appellees. 
 
The Devines, as husband and wife, acquired the property "as 
tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship as at common 
law."  Accordingly, it was in that capacity that they 
subsequently conveyed the property to the appellees under the 
terms of the contract.  Upon the circuit court finding in this 
case that Donald fraudulently induced the appellees to both 
enter into the contract to purchase the property and to close on 
the sale, the court ordered, inter alia, the following: (i) the 
contract was rescinded, (ii) the Devines "shall refund to the 
[appellees] their purchase price," and (iii) upon "receipt of 
such refund," the appellees "shall reconvey the property to 
Donald W. Devine, Jr. and Nancy W. Devine, husband and wife, as 
tenants by the entireties with the right of survivorship as at 
common law." 
 
The majority opinion purports in its conclusion to affirm 
the circuit court's rescission of the contract.  In Part II.A., 
however, the majority makes clear that it is only approving 
partial rescission, i.e., rescission of the contract "as to 
Donald alone"; that the property is to be reconveyed "sole[ly]" 
to Donald; and that Donald is "solely responsible for refunding 
the purchase price."  These holdings arise from the majority's 
determination that ownership of the property did not 
 
26 
"automatically revert to Nancy and Donald as tenants by the 
entirety" upon rescission of the contract - or indeed to Nancy 
at all.  I disagree. 
 
In holding title to the property as tenants by the 
entirety, Donald and Nancy were deemed in this "unity" of 
marital ownership to have possessed the property as "one."  
Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1999) 
(quoting Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This, of course, is 
the essential and centuries old feature of a tenancy by the 
entirety.  See 7 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property §§ 
52.01[2] & 52.02[1] (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2014).  The 
transfer of the property by Donald and Nancy to the appellees 
was therefore a unitary conveyance, and not accomplished through 
individual conveyances, as neither of them was capable of 
conveying any part of the property by acting alone.  Hausman v. 
Hausman, 233 Va. 1, 3, 353 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1987); Vasilion v. 
Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951).  
Furthermore, absent evidence to the contrary, the purchase 
proceeds Donald and Nancy received from their sale of the 
property, "which [they] had owned as tenants by the entireties, 
were likewise owned and held by them as tenants by the 
entireties."  Oliver v. Givens, 204 Va. 123, 127, 129 S.E.2d 
 
27 
661, 663 (1963); see Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 260-62 
408 S.E.2d 901, 904-06 (1991) (applying Oliver). 
 
This Court has repeatedly stated that "[i]f rescission is 
granted, the contract is terminated for all purposes, and the 
parties are restored to the status quo ante."  McLeskey v. Ocean 
Park Investors, Ltd., 242 Va. 51, 54, 405 S.E.2d 846, 847 
(1991); see also Schmidt v. Household Fin. Corp., 276 Va. 108, 
115, 661 S.E.2d 834, 837-38 (2008).  Thus, in rescinding the 
contract in this case, the circuit court correctly ordered the 
return of ownership of the property to Donald and Nancy as 
tenants by the entirety.  Because they acquired and sold the 
property in this unitary capacity, Donald's fraud did not enable 
the court to transform their tenancy into something different, 
much less exclude Nancy altogether from the reconveyance.  
Rather, the taint of Donald's fraud upon their tenancy rendered 
both Donald and Nancy liable for repayment of the purchase price 
in exchange for both regaining ownership of the property as 
originally possessed. 
 
In an effort to avoid this result, the majority advances a 
non sequitur.  The majority asserts that because the contract 
merged into the deed from Donald and Nancy to the appellees, 
thereby "extinguishing" the contract (citing Beck v. Smith, 260 
Va. 452, 455, 538 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2000)), the subsequent 
rescission of the contract somehow obviated the requirement of 
 
28 
restoring the parties to the status quo ante.  But just the 
opposite is true.  By definition, rescission of the parties' 
previously "extinguished" contract necessarily placed them in 
the position they occupied before the execution and delivery of 
the deed - as the "unmaking" of the contract, of course, also 
nullified the deed to the appellees.  Black's Law Dictionary 
1149 (10th ed. 2014) (defining rescission).  Consequently, the 
circuit court did not have the discretion, as the majority 
asserts, to order the reconveyance of the property other than to 
Donald and Nancy as tenants by the entirety in conjunction with 
the satisfaction of their joint obligation to repay the purchase 
price to the appellees. 
 
For these reasons, I dissent with respect to Part II.A. of 
the majority opinion, but concur with respect to the other 
parts.