Title: IN RE ESTATE OF FOSLER v. COLLINS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN RE ESTATE OF FOSLER v. COLLINS2000 WY 20413 P.3d 686Case Number: 00-55Decided: 11/30/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CONSTANCE LOUISE FOSLER, Deceased:

 

DANIEL D. FOSLER and his heirs, Appellants 
(Respondents),

v.

WILLIAM J. COLLINS, Personal Representative, Appellee 
(Petitioner), and RICHARD O. PUTHOFF, Appellee.

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Natrona County The Honorable David

B. Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants: Thomas N. Long of Thomas 
N. Long, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

   Representing Appellants: 
Thomas N. Long of Thomas N. Long, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

    
Representing Appellee Collins: No 
appearance.

    
Representing Appellee Puthoff: Gregory C. Dyekman and Kristen J. 
Schlattmann of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, 
JJ.

 

   
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]       Constance Louise Fosler died intestate 
leaving a significant estate.  Her 
only surviving relatives were first cousins and their descendants.  The personal representative asked the 
district court to determine the method for distributing the assets to the 
collateral heirs and to issue an order for partial distribution. The district 
court construed the controlling statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(c)(iii) 
(LEXIS 1999), to require distribution to the nearest living generation (the 
first cousins) as the root generation per capita and to their descendants per 
stirpes. It is from this decision that 
Daniel D. Fosler,1 a first cousin, and his heirs 
appeal. Mr. Folser asserts the appropriate distribution is to the root 
generation comprised of the deceased grandfather, grandmother, uncles, and aunts 
per capita and then to their descendants per stirpes. We reverse and remand to 
the district court with the direction that the distribution be made to the root 
generation comprised of the deceased grandfather, grandmother, uncles, and aunts 
per capita and then to their descendants per stirpes.

 

                                    
ISSUES

 

   [¶2]   Mr. Fosler presents the following 
issue for our review:

 

How is Wyo. Stat. § 2-4-101(c)(iii) to be applied to 
the distribution of assets of a decedent whose next of kin are the descendants 
of aunts and uncles?

 

  [¶3]    Richard Puthoff2 rephrases the issue as 
follows:

 

I. In its Order for Partial Distribution dated 
January 4, 2000, the District Court properly determined that, pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 2-4-101(c)(iii), the root generation to which the initial distribution 
of the estate of Constance Louise Fosler should be made is the first generation 
in which there are living heirs.

 

 

                                    
FACTS

 

 [¶4]       There are no facts in dispute, and no 
evidentiary proceedings were held. Ms. Fosler died intestate in Casper on 
December 23, 1998, leaving an estate in excess of $19,000,000. At the time of 
her death, no children, grandchildren, or other lineal descendants survived her. 
A personal representative was appointed on January 5, 1999, to administer the 
estate. Through the use of a genealogical search service, the personal 
representative identified one living first cousin-Mr. Fosler-and his descendants 
on the paternal side and six living first cousins and their descendants on the 
maternal side.3 In all, twenty-six collateral 
relatives were identified by the search. On October 18, 1999, the personal 
representative filed a petition for partial distribution requesting that the 
court determine the appropriate method of distribution to the collateral heirs. 
In the memorandum of law, the personal representative set out four possible 
methods of distribution referred to 
as 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b). Method 1(a) used the statutorily named 
generation-grandfather, grandmother, uncles, and aunts-as the root4 generation. Because the aunts and 
uncles would take per stirpes from the grandparents, the grandparents are 
ignored. The aunts and uncles form the root generation and would take per 
capita,5 and their descendants would take 
per stirpes. Method 1(b) did not ignore the grandparents and used "grandfather, 
grandmother, uncles, aunts"6 as the root generation with each 
member taking per capita and their descendants taking per stirpes. Method 2(a) 
used the first generation with 
living members-the first cousins in this case-as the root generation who would 
take per capita, and their descendants would take per stirpes.  Finally, Method 2(b) used a per capita 
distribution to all living heirs.7 Mr. Fosler filed a response on 
November 17, 1999, in which he urged the district court to adopt Method 1(b). A 
hearing was held on November 18, 1999.8 The district court issued a 
decision letter selecting Method 2(a) (the first cousins as the root generation 
taking per capita, and their descendants taking per stirpes), and Mr. Fosler 
filed a motion for reconsideration. A second hearing was held on December 15, 
1999. On January 4, 2000, the district court issued an order denying the motion 
for reconsideration and a separate order for partial distribution which required 
distribution in keeping with Method 2(a). Mr. Fosler filed his notice of appeal 
from these orders.

 

                              
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

 [¶5]       The issue to be addressed is whether the 
district court properly applied § 2-4-101(c)(iii) in selecting the first 
generation with living members as the root generation to take per capita, with 
their descendants to take per stirpes (Method 2(a)). "The question is one of 
statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law; 
therefore, our standard of review is de novo." Anderson Highway Signs and 
Supply, Inc. v. Close, 6 P.3d 123, 124 (Wyo. 2000). As we have 
noted:

 

"In interpreting statutes, we primarily determine the 
legislature's intent. If the language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to 
rules of construction. We apply our general rule that we look to the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is 
unambiguous."

 

 Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & 
Investment Co. v. County of Laramie County, 5 P.3d 774, 779 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting 
Kirbens v. Wyoming State Board of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo. 1999) 
(citations omitted)).  We 
construe together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, and, in 
ascertaining the meaning of a given law, we consider and construe in harmony all 
statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose. 
Id.

 

When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the 
court must look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical 
setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the 
conclusions of law, and other prior and 
contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of 
construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent.

 

State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983). When the legislature adopts a 
statute, we presume it did so with full knowledge of the existing state of the 
law with reference to the statute's subject matter. Thunderbasin Land, Livestock 
& Investment Co., 5 P.3d  at 780.

 

All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the 
legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference 
thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing 
law, and as a part of an overall and 
uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be 
determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but 
also with reference to the decisions of the courts.

 

 Voss v. 
Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976).

 

                                  
DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]        In drafting intestate laws, legislatures 
have tried . . . to provide for a scheme of distribution that would likely 
coincide with the desires of the average man who owns an average size estate 
composed of ordinary property to be distributed among a usual number and kind of 
relatives who are of equal need and friendly toward each 
other.

 

 1 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. 
Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 1.6 at 20 (1960); see also Lawrence H. 
Averill, Jr., Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A 
Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code - Part I , VII Land & Water L. Rev. 
169, 176 (1972). When a person dies without a will (or other estate planning 
instrument) that explains the manner in which the estate is to be divided among 
relatives and friends, the intestacy statutes provide a default plan. These 
provisions have often been criticized as being imperfect and unfair. Among the 
fifty states, the statutes are widely disparate, and many of the provisions were 
drafted over one hundred years ago.9 There have been significant changes 
in the organization of families and communities in this passage of time marked 
by the transition from primarily agrarian to predominately urban lifestyles. 
This has consequently led to the fragmentation of family ties and the concept of 
kinship. Although it was once true that extended families often lived their 
entire lives in the same small community or in relatively close proximity to one 
another, it is not the usual case today. In addition, the population has been 
aging and has become more mobile, thus changing family dynamics.10

 

[¶7]         Efforts have been made to reform 
probate codes and to address these societal changes and the perceived inequities 
of descent to extremely remote relations.11 These have been primarily changes 
to ensure per capita distribution to relations of the same degree and 
restrictions on the inheritance rights of very distant relatives. In this vein, 
a majority of jurisdictions have selected the generation nearest in degree of 
relationship to the intestate of which a member is living as the generation from 
which the stocks will be selected.12 The policy consideration behind 
this move is an effort to better effect what is considered to be the intention 
of a contemporary intestate to have his estate descend to known relatives and 
not be ractionalized among unknown shirt-tail relatives.

 

 [¶8]       The construction of § 2-4-101(c)(iii) is 
a matter of first impression, which is somewhat remarkable as Wyoming's 
intestacy provisions have remained essentially unchanged since their initial 
enactment in 1869.13 This is despite a significant 
revision of the Probate Code in 1980,14 which incorporated certain 
provisions of the Uniform Probate Code.15 The relevant portions of the 
statute provide:

 

(a) Whenever any person having title to any real or 
personal property having the nature or legal character of real estate or 
personal estate undisposed of, and not otherwise limited by marriage settlement, 
dies

intestate, the estate shall descend and be 
distributed in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment 
of his debts, in the following course and manner:

 

            
. . . .

 

(c) Except in cases above enumerated, the estate of 
any intestate shall descend and be distributed as follows:

 

(i) 
To his children surviving, and the descendents of his children who are dead, the 
descendents collectively taking the share which their parents would have taken 
if living;

 

(ii) If there are no children, nor their descendents, 
then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of 
brothers and sisters who are dead, the descendents collectively taking the share 
which their parents would have taken if living, in equal 
parts;

 

(iii) If there are no children nor their descendents, 
nor father, mother, brothers, sisters, nor descendents of deceased brothers and 
sisters, nor husband nor wife, living, then to the grandfather, grandmother, 
uncles, aunts and their descendents, the descendents taking collectively, the 
share of their immediate ancestors, in equal parts .

 

 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101 (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added).

 

 [¶9]     To resolve this case, 
we must determine the meaning of the phrase "then to the grandfather, 
grandmother, uncles, aunts and their descendents, the descendents taking 
collectively, the share of their immediate ancestors, in equal parts." In this 
regard, the case of Moralee v. Cadwell, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499 (1920), although 
applying a different subsection of what is now § 2-4-101, assists in 
identification of the root generation and proper application of the phrases "in 
equal parts" and "the descendents taking collectively, the share of their 
immediate ancestors." The court examined the provision "`[i]f there be no 
children, nor their descendents, then to his father, mother, brothers and 
sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are dead (the 
descendents, collectively, taking the share their parents would have taken if 
living) , in equal parts.'"16 Moralee, 186 P.2d  at 500 (emphasis 
added). The language is almost identical, except for the use of parentheses, to 
the current provision of § 2-4-101(c)(ii). Mr. Cadwell's only living heirs were 
two nephews-sons of his deceased sister-and an adopted nephew-the adopted son of 
his deceased brother.17 The district court determined that 
the adopted nephew was entitled to the same share the deceased brother would 
have received had he survived the intestate. In holding that the term 
"descendant" includes an adopted child, this Court affirmed the district court's 
distribution of one-half of the estate to the adopted nephew and one-half of the 
estate to the other two nephews. 186 P.  at 501. This is relevant to the current 
matter because the Moralee court identified the root generation as the deceased 
brother and sister with descendants,18 which were the relations 
specifically named in the statutory language.  The phrase "in equal parts" applied to a 
per capita division to the root generation. The estate was divided by two - "in 
equal parts" (per capita) between the two members of the statutorily identified 
root generation (one-half to the deceased sister and one-half to the deceased 
brother). The phrase "the descendents, collectively, taking the share their 
parents would have taken if living" dictated a per stirpes or proportional 
division to the descendants of the root generation. The descendants of the 
sister and brother took the shares their parents would have taken if alive, 
which resulted in the sister's two sons each receiving one-fourth and the 
brother's adopted son receiving one-half. The result is consistent with the 
following authority:

 

Ordinarily, if the statute contains a provision 
amounting specifically, or in effect, to a declaration that nephews and nieces 
shall "stand in the place of" or "represent" or "take the share of " their 
deceased parent, the devolution to nephews and nieces will occur per stirpes, 
notwithstanding all brothers and sisters of the intestate had predeceased 
him.

 

  W. W. Allen, Annotation, Descent and 
distribution to nieces and nephews as per stirpes or per capita, 19 A.L.R.2d 
191, 206 (1951).

 

[¶10]      It has been argued that Moralee 
only represents a determination that adopted children are heirs within the law 
and is not an acknowledgement of per capita division among the statutorily 
identified members of the deceased root generation and subsequent per stirpes 
division among the root generation descendants. However, the language of the 
holding, "[t]herefore the district court rightly held that William P. Cadwell 
[the adopted nephew], the defendant in error, was entitled to inherit one-half 
of the property left by the decedent, William H. Cadwell [the intestate]," is 
persuasive that the decision confirmed both the inheritance of the adopted 
nephew and the proper distribution to the statutorily identified root generation 
per capita and then to their descendants per stirpes. Moralee, 186 P.  at 
501.

 

 [¶11]    
Mr. Puthoff argues that Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Eadie 
(Gilchrist's Estate), 50 Wyo. 153, 58 P.2d 431 (1936), supports distribution to 
the nearest living generation (the first cousins) as the root generation per 
capita and to their descendants per stirpes. We disagree. The Eadie case 
involved an individual who died with a will in place leaving an estate of 
$40,000. 58 P.2d  at 435. The testatrix had no children or descendants, and her 
father, mother, brothers, and sisters were dead. 58 P.2d  at 434. The only 
question before the Court was the meaning of a will provision which read: "To 
any of my living blood relations, I give one hundred dollars each." 58 P.2d  at 
433. Four hundred eighty-five people claimed to be "living blood relations," and 
the district court ordered that each person receive the devised $100. 58 P.2d  at 
434. This Court limited the term "blood relations" to those relatives who could 
properly establish they were descendants of the brothers and sisters. Those 
individuals were to receive $100 each in keeping with the terms of the will. 58 P.2d  at 439. Mr. Puthoff contends that the order of distribution required a per 
capita distribution to the first generation with surviving heirs. It does not. 
The Eadie Court, in an effort to discern the meaning of the ambiguous testate 
devise to "living blood relations," looked to the intestacy statutes (the same 
provision applied in Moralee) to determine which descendants would have 
benefited had the testatrix died intestate. It concluded, based on the statutory 
language "and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are dead," that 
only descendants of the brothers and sisters would have been entitled to 
distribution. Then it ordered distribution to those descendants on the basis of 
the per capita devise "one hundred dollars each" as set out in the 
will.

 

[¶12]      This conclusion is supported by 
the subsequent decision on a petition for rehearing filed in the same case. 
Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Eadie (Gilchrist's Estate), 50 Wyo. 153, 60 P.2d 364 (1936). One party requested clarification of who was entitled to 
participate as a legacy claimant and whether an intervening descendant in the 
line would intercept the inheritance. This Court said in 
part:

 

We answered the point in the affirmative in the 
original opinion, and we think clearly so; for, after stating the contention of 
the trustees to the effect that the money should be distributed per stirpes, we 
concluded that "the authorities cited leave no room for doubt that we must hold 
that the blood relatives, in so far as they come within the statute of descent 
and distribution, take under the will in question here per capita and not 
per stirpes."

 

 60 P.2d  at 364 (emphasis added). And said 
further in the decision:

 

If 
there had been a doubt as to whether the testatrix intended to include such 
claimant, we could then have gone to the statute of distribution, and have 
held that the distribution should be per stirpes. But the language of the 
testatrix using the term "any" and "each" precluded such doubt. . . 
.

 

 60 P.2d  at 365 (emphasis added). This 
language supports the conclusion, pursuant to the statutes of descent and 
distribution which were in effect in 1911 (Moralee), in 1936 (Eadie), and which 
continue to the present, that proper distribution to descendants of the 
statutorily named root generation is per stirpes.

 

[¶13]      It is left to be determined which 
persons constitute the statutorily named root generation as set out in § 
2-4-101(c)(iii). The statutory language provides for "grandfather, grandmother, 
uncles, aunts." Mr. Puthoff maintains in this case that the first cousins, as 
the first generation with surviving members, constitute the root generation. 
This cannot be the case because neither the word "cousin" nor the word "cousins" 
appears in the statutory language.

 

With respect to the manner of taking as per capita or 
per stirpes, the question is governed ordinarily by statutes prescribing the 
manner of taking by collateral relatives generally, the terms and provisions of 
which vary more or less in the different 
jurisdictions, and it is hardly practicable to make any general statement with 
respect to the application of such provisions in the case of cousins, other than 
that, unless it is otherwise provided, those who take in their own right as 
the intestate's next of kin ordinarily take per capita, and those who take as 
representatives of deceased ancestors ordinarily take per 
stirpes.

 

 C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Descent and 
distribution to and among cousins, 54 A.L.R.2d 1009, 1033 (1957) (emphasis 
added). Absent specific statutory language naming "cousins" to receive as a root 
generation or as part of those defined as next of kin, the cousins can take only 
by representation as descendants of the uncles and aunts.

 

[¶14]      On the other hand, Mr. Fosler 
contends that the proper root generation is the "grandfather, grandmother, 
uncles, aunts" (Method 1(b)). We agree with this interpretation because 
"grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts" are specifically named in the statute 
and therefore must constitute the statutorily named root generation. It is of no 
consequence to the proper interpretation of the statute that, upon the death of 
the grandparents, the uncles and aunts take their parents' share per stirpes as 
descendants. It is merely the effect of the statutory language selected by the 
legislature. Furthermore, to ignore the grandfather,  grandmother" in the event they predecease 
the intestate would make the statutory reference in that circumstance 
meaningless. "We will not construe a statute in a way that renders a portion of 
the statute meaningless." US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service 
Commission, 989 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Wyo. 1999); see also McClellan v. State, 933 P.2d 461, 465 (Wyo. 1997). The reference to "grandfather, grandmother, uncles, 
aunts" is not qualified by a requirement that they survive the intestate, and we 
decline to read such a condition into the statute. "This court has no power to 
add to, or to substitute, words in the statute. That authority is vested in the 
legislature, and we will not, nor should we, encroach upon its proper 
authority." Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1991) (citations 
omitted); see also Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 
(Wyo.1999). The legislature, having provided through the preceding provisions of 
§ 2-4-101 for the reasonable distribution of an intestate's estate (through 
several levels of kindred) ended the designation of root generations in § 
2-4-101(c)(iii) at "grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts." We conclude, for 
the language to have meaning, the statutorily mandated root generation must be 
"grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts" regardless of whether they survive the 
intestate.

 

 [¶15]    
Based on the facts of this specific case, we hold that the proper 
distribution of Ms. Fosler's estate pursuant to § 2-4-101(c)(iii) is to the 
deceased "grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts" per capita and to their 
descendants per stirpes (Method 1(b)). In so holding, we recognize that many 
state legislatures have adopted intestacy provisions which identify the root 
generation as the nearest generation with living members. However, our 
131-year-old statute and case law do not support such an interpretation. The 
intestacy statutes represent a good faith effort by the legislature to provide a 
form of estate distribution when the intestate fails to make such arrangements 
prior to death. Absent such provisions, the estate would escheat to the state. 
This case presents the unusual circumstance of an intestate dying without lineal 
descendants and having a very large estate. These facts magnify the deficiencies 
of remote intestate succession caused by the intestate's failure to provide for 
a devise of the estate. Although some may perceive this result as being unfair, 
others may well conclude that the statute accurately reflects what the majority 
of people would intend.  However, we 
cannot sua sponte revise the statutes through interpretation to satisfy our 
individual views of contemporary family ties and equitable distribution. 
"`Courts are not at liberty to impose their views of the way things ought to be 
simply because that's what must have been intended, otherwise no statute, 
contract or recorded word, no matter how explicit, could be saved from judicial 
tinkering.'" Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 625 (Wyo. 1974) (quoting 
Kilpatrick v. Superior Court in and for County of Maricopa, 466 P.2d 18, 27 
(Ariz. 1970)); see also Byington v. Fuller, 587 P.2d 636, 638 (Wyo. 1978). It is 
notable that the parties relied on two Wyoming law review articles which 
anticipated the conclusion we have reached in this decision and suggested the 
issues poised by the language of the intestacy statutes are for the legislature 
to decide. See Morris R. Massey, Note, Probable Interpretation of Wyoming Rules 
of Descent, 11 Wyoming L.J. 120 (1957); Averill, VII Land & Water L. Rev., 
supra, at 172.

 

 [¶16]    
We reverse and remand to the district court for entry of an order 
consistent with this decision.

 

                  

FOOTNOTES

1 The appellants are Mr. Fosler and his 
heirs. For clarity, the appellants shall be referred to collectively by 
reference to Mr. Fosler.

  

2 The appellees are the personal 
representative and Mr. Puthoff. The personal representative did not file a brief 
or appear at oral arguments.  Mr. 
Puthoff is Ms. Fosler's first cousin and, therefore, an heir who will take a 
portion of the estate.

  

3 Mr. Puthoff asserts that the use of the 
terms "second" and "third" cousins in the district court proceedings was error. 
He contends the appropriate descriptions are "first cousins once removed" and 
"first cousins twice removed." For the purposes of this decision, we will 
utilize the descriptor "first cousins and their 
descendants."

  

4 Per stirpes is defined as: 
"Proportionally divided between beneficiaries according to their deceased 
ancestor's share."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1164 (7th ed. 1999). The terms "root" and "stock" are used 
interchangeably by various authorities.

  

5 Per capita division means: "Divided 
equally among all individuals."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (7th ed. 1999).

  

6 Section 
2-4-101(c)(iii).

  

7 The four methods would result in the 
following aggregate distribution percentages to Mr. Fosler: 1(a)-11.1111%; 
1(b)-12.8205%; 2(a)-6.25%; and 2(b)-3.8462%.

 

8 The record does not contain a 
transcript of the November 18, 1999, hearing.

 

9 Averill, VII Land & Water L. Rev., 
supra, at 170.

 

 

10 David F. Cavers, Change in the American 
Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 Iowa L. Rev. 203 
(1935).

  

11 See Morris R. Massey, Note, Probable 
Interpretation of Wyoming Rules of Descent, 11 Wyoming L.J. 120, 125 (1957); 
Charles A. Heckman, The Treatment of Some Traditional Problems of Intestate 
Succession in the North Dakota Century Code, 45 N.D. L. Rev. 465 (1969); 
Averill, VII Land & Water L. Rev., supra, at 170; Earl M. Curry, Jr., 
Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article II of the 
Uniform Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 114 
(1973).

  

12 Massey, supra, at 
122.

  

13 "Wyoming's intestacy provisions were 
enacted during the first session of the legislative assembly on December 10, 
1869. . . . Other than a minor amendment in 1877 and a little more significant 
one in 1915, the basic distribution provisions have remained unchanged."  Averill, VII Land & Water L. Rev., 
supra, at 172.

  

14 What is now called the Wyoming Probate 
Code of 1980 originally was enacted as the Wyoming Probate Code of 1979. In 1979 
the 45th Wyoming State Legislature enacted Chapter 142 which substantially 
altered prior Wyoming law. Because of a significant number of technical and 
substantive problems with that code, the 45th Wyoming State Legislature, in its 
second session, reenacted a full and substantially amended 
version.

 

   Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The 
Wyoming Probate Code of 1980: An Analysis and Critique, XVI Land & Water L. 
Rev. 103, 105-06 (1981).

  

15 "The new Code does not alter the basic 
pattern of intestate succession. The designated beneficiaries and their shares 
remain the same as under the prior law." Averill, XVI Land & Water L. Rev., 
supra, at 109.

  

16 Subdivision 2 of § 5727 of the Compiled 
Statutes of 1910.

  

17 From the language of the case to the 
effect that "all of his brothers and sisters died prior to the time of his 
death," it appears Mr. Cadwell had multiple brothers and sisters. It also 
appears from the facts that only one deceased sister (two sons) and one deceased 
brother (an adopted son) had heirs who survived the intestate's death. Moralee, 
186 P.  at 499.

  

18 "and to the descendents of brothers and 
sisters who are dead."  Moralee, 186 P.2d  at 500.