Title: Claman v. Popp

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
MONICA 
S. CLAMAN,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JEAN M. 
POPP,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge 
 

Representing 
Appellant:
Michael 
Stulken, Attorney at Law, Green River, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
James 
K. Lubing and Leah K. Corrigan of Lubing & Corrigan, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Corrigan. 

 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      In July 2008, 
Monica Claman (Claman) purchased a house in Rock Springs, Wyoming, from Jean 
Popp (Popp).  In September 2008, 
Claman filed an action against Popp based on subsidence-caused defects in the 
house.  The district court entered 
summary judgment against Claman on her breach of contract and negligent 
misrepresentation claims, and following a bench trial, it entered judgment 
against her on her fraudulent inducement claim.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Claman presents 
the following issues on appeal:
 
            
1.         
Whether the trial court appropriately entered summary judgment against 
Appellant as to her breach of contract claim.
 
            
2.         
Whether the trial court appropriately entered summary judgment against 
Appellant as to her claim for negligence/negligent 
misrepresentation.
 
            
3.         
The legal conclusions reached by the district court as to the facts 
presented relating to the Appellee’s claims to the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality were improper.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In 1970, Popp and 
her husband purchased a house located at 517 Walnut Street in Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.  They lived there together 
until 2007, when Mr. Popp passed away.  
In 2008, Popp decided to sell the property so she could move to Elko, 
Nevada, to be closer to her son and his family.  
 
[¶4]      The house at 517 
Walnut Street is located in an area of Rock Springs that has been designated as 
a subsidence area, with at least some of the subsidence in the area caused by 
abandoned mines that are under the jurisdiction of the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ).  During 
the time that they lived at 517 Walnut Street, Popp, or Popp and her husband, 
submitted two claims to the DEQ Subsidence Insurance Program.  Following the first claim on August 12, 
1993, a DEQ claims adjuster inspected the property.  The claims adjuster identified 
subsidence damage to the property, but he concluded that the damage was not 
attributable to mine subsidence and was therefore not a covered claim.  He presented the subsidence damage in a 
list of thirteen required repairs to the home ranging in cost from a low of 
$25.00 and a high of $205.00, for a total cost of repair of $1,197.40.  
 
[¶5]      On December 14, 
1993, the Department notified the Popps that their subsidence claim was 
denied.  It 
explained:
 
            
Enclosed please find a copy of Manville Claims Service claim 
investigation report detailing the claim on your property. The adjuster’s 
investigation and subsequent conclusions indicate they are of the opinion that 
the damage to your home is the result of water saturation in the yard and under 
the cement as well as normal expansion and contraction cracks in the 
cement.
 
            
Based on the investigations and reports completed by Manville Claim 
Service, the damage cannot be covered by the Wyoming Mine Subsidence Insurance 
Program.  Therefore, I must advise 
you that your claim will be denied under the rules and regulations of the 
Wyoming Mine Subsidence Insurance Program.  
The regulations require the damage to be mine subsidence 
related.  (Emphasis in 
original.) 
 
[¶6]      Popp’s second DEQ 
claim was not a claim for damages, but was instead an application for subsidence 
insurance submitted in response to the following October 2, 2007, notice from 
the DEQ:
 
The 
Department of Environmental Quality, Abandoned Mine Lands Division (DEQ, AML) is 
preparing to resume subsidence mitigation efforts of the John Park/Excelsior 
Mines (Tract H) as early as the week of October 8, 2007.  The area of reclamation is bounded by 
Blair Avenue, Willow Street, Walnut Street and the South Side Belt Loop.  The subsidence mitigation efforts will 
be completed by mass excavation of approximately 600,000 cubic yards of 
earthwork to expose, remove, and compact the mine workings.  The work will be sequentially staged to 
minimize the total area of disturbance at any one time.
 
You 
are receiving this notice because your residence has been identified as being 
within an area that may potentially be impacted by the subsidence mitigation 
efforts.  Because your residence may 
potentially be impacted by the mitigation project, the project contractors will 
be offering to pay subsidence insurance premiums through the AML subsidence 
insurance program for the next two years.  
The contractor for this year[’]s work is Coleman 
Construction.
 
In 
order for you to receive the subsidence insurance coverage, a baseline 
inspection of your home will need to be conducted by an AML contractor.  Please note that subsidence insurance 
coverage can not [sic] be provided unless a baseline inspection is conducted. . 
. . 
 
[¶7]      Popp submitted 
her subsidence insurance application on October 13, 2007, followed by a 
“Property Loss Claim Form,” dated November 9, 2007.  The Property Loss Claim Form identified 
minor existing subsidence damage to the property and noted that a report would 
be provided by Wilbert Engineering, Inc., the engineering firm that inspected 
the property pursuant to a contract with DEQ.  Wilbert Engineering provided DEQ a 
“Pre-Policy Inspection Report” based on the firm’s inspection of the Popp 
property on October 24, 2007.  That 
report identified a vertical crack in the curb of the sidewalk, several cracks 
in the driveway with upheaval of concrete, several cracks in the property’s 
retaining walls, cracks and settling in the concrete patio, and sagging in the 
ceilings of the master bedroom and bathroom.  The report described the general 
condition of the exterior property as “nice condition,” and the interior 
condition as “very nice condition.”  

 
[¶8]      In the spring of 
2008, after she made the decision to sell her home, Popp hired realtor Mary 
Manatos of High Country Realty to assist with the sale.  On April 29, 2008, in conjunction with 
the property listing, Ms. Manatos instructed Popp to complete a document 
entitled “Seller’s Property Disclosure to Prospective Buyers” (Property 
Disclosure).  Included in the 
questions presented by the document was the question, “Does the property or 
neighborhood have any known or suspected subsidence problems?”  Popp answered the question by checking 
the box marked “yes.”  She did not 
provide additional information concerning the subsidence issues or reference the 
submissions to DEQ regarding the property.  
Also included in the questions presented by the document was the 
question, “Are there any structural problems with the improvements?” to which 
Popp responded by checking the box marked “no.”  
 
[¶9]      Popp signed the 
Property Disclosure on April 29, 2008.  
Her signature appeared below the following 
acknowledgement:
 
            
The above description and statement of condition of the subject property 
is based on my knowledge of the property and all representations are made to the 
best of my current actual knowledge.  
I ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT I SHALL IMMEDIATELY INFORM BUYER AND BROKER 
OF ANY CHANGE IN SUCH CONDITIONS THAT MAY APPEAR OR BECOME KNOWN TO ME AFTER 
THIS DATE.  I FURTHER AGREE TO 
INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS ALL BROKERS INVOLVED IN ANY SALE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DAMAGES, COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S 
FEES, ARISING FROM MY FAILURE TO COMPLETELY AND TRUTHFULLY DISCLOSE THE 
CONDITIONS OF MY PROPERTY AS SET FORTH ABOVE.  THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS 
DISCLOSURE HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY SELLER.  
(Emphasis in original.) 
 
[¶10]   On April 29, 2008, Ms. Manatos 
listed the Popp property for sale on the Multiple Listing Service (MLS).  The MLS listing provided a general 
description of the property and included an attached copy of the Property 
Disclosure.  The listing described 
the property as a single level home with no basement and did not indicate 
whether the property had a crawlspace.  

 
[¶11]   On May 27, 2008, Claman viewed the 
Popp property for the first time with her own realtor, Maria Davis of Coldwell 
Banker Carrier Realty.  Popp was 
present for the initial walk-through, which lasted approximately an hour.  Neither Claman nor Ms. Davis asked Popp 
any questions concerning the property’s condition during that first visit.  
 
[¶12]   On May 30, 2008, Claman offered to 
purchase the Popp property for the full asking price of $168,900.00, and Popp 
accepted the offer.  Claman and Popp 
then executed on that same date a “Contract to Buy and Sell Real Estate” 
(Contract).  The Contract specified 
a closing date of June 30, 2008, and authorized Claman, as the Buyer, to have 
the property inspected on or before June 15, 2008.  
 
[¶13]   Under the section of the Contract 
governing the property’s condition, Section X.A.3 
provided:
 
Seller 
represents that upon execution of this Contract:
 
**** 
 
The 
condition of the property is as stated in the Property Disclosure (WAR Form 
900R), an accurate and complete copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated by this reference.
 
Immediately 
following Section X.A.3, Sections X.B.1 and X.B.2 of the Contract disclaimed any 
Buyer reliance on Seller’s representations:
 
Buyer 
acknowledges and agrees that, upon execution of this 
Contract:
 
1.         
Buyer is not relying upon any representations of Seller or Seller’s 
Agents or representatives as to any condition which Buyer deems to be material 
to Buyer’s decision to purchase this property; and
 
2.         
Buyer has been advised by Selling Broker of the opportunity to seek 
legal, financial, construction, air quality (such as mold), environmental (such 
as radon and lead-based paint) and/or professional home inspection services 
regarding this purchase.
 
[¶14]   Under the section of the Contract 
governing Buyer inspections, the Contract, in Section XII.A, authorized the 
Buyer to obtain “electrical, mechanical, structural, air quality . . . , 
environmental . . . , and/or other inspections of the Property by qualified 
professional inspectors and/or engineers[.]”  Section XII.C concluded this provision 
with the following waiver:
 
            
Waiver of Defects.  Buyer 
acknowledges that Buyer has been given ample opportunity to inspect the 
property.  Other than repairs or 
defects submitted to the Seller in writing pursuant to XII (A) or XI above 
[Lender or Appraiser Inspections], or in the event no repairs or inspections are 
required by Buyer, Buyer accepts the Property in its entirety in “as is, where 
is” condition without any implied or express warranty by Seller or by any 
Broker.
 
[¶15]   The Contract ended with a consents 
and acknowledgements section, Section XVIII.A, which contained the following 
merger clause: 
 
            
All prior representations made in the negotiations of this sale have been 
incorporated herein, and there are no oral agreements or representations between 
Buyer, Seller or Brokers to modify the terms and conditions of this 
Contract.
 
[¶16]   On June 14, 2008, Claman had the 
Popp property inspected by Richard Wright of Rocky Mountain Home Inspection 
Services.  In his inspection report, 
Mr. Wright described the property’s interior as in “good/fair overall condition 
with small repairs needed.”  He made 
the following additional comments concerning the property:  
 
--the 
ground is sloped toward the house in areas;
 
--the 
concrete retaining wall has cracks;
 
--the 
pavements are in fair condition with some repairs needed in the sidewalk 
area;
 
--a 
rafter upright in the attic is cracked and needs repaired;
 
--the 
ceilings and walls require small repairs; and
 
--the 
property “has no basement or crawl space area.  An inspection could not be 
performed.”  
 
[¶17]   On July 10, 2008, the parties 
closed on the property.  Claman took 
possession of the property on that same date, and shortly after that, while 
working in her yard, Claman was visited by an individual who identified himself 
as Harry Moore.  Mr. Moore informed 
Claman he was an engineer and was investigating a claim Popp had made for 
dynamite compaction damage.  
Following her conversation with Mr. Moore, Claman contacted DEQ and 
obtained copies of its documentation relating to the property.  She thereafter hired a structural 
engineering firm, Reeve & Associates, Inc., to prepare a structural 
assessment of the property.  
Following its assessment of the property, Reeve & Associates 
submitted a report to Claman that detailed the following findings and 
conclusions, with the references to attached photographs 
omitted:
 
-          
The front wall of the residence is tilting out of plane away from the 
house.  The concrete slab adjacent 
to the wall has a noticeable slope towards the exterior wall with the wall and 
slab sloping to a low point towards the middle of the front 
wall.
 
-          
The North exterior wall is tilting out of plane away from the house with 
the interior slab at the wall beginning to slope towards the exterior wall about 
4' to 6' out from the wall.
 
-          
The South half of the back wall of the residence is tilting out of plane 
into the house.
 
-          
The East half of the South wall is bowing in and the West half of the 
South wall is tilting out of plane away from the house.
 
-          
The South West corner of the residence at the front entry is slumping in 
towards the house.
 
-          
The exterior doors on the front and back of the house do not close 
properly as the door jambs are no longer plumb.
 
-          
Many sections of the floor adjacent to the exterior walls abruptly slope 
down towards the exterior wall starting approximately 6" from the wall 
indicating the wood floor in these sections has been 
damaged.
 
-          
The roof appears to be sound with no leaking or damage noted upon a 
visual inspection of the interior of the roof.
 
-          
Large silver maple stumps of approximately 24" in diameter are in close 
proximity to the house.  One stump 
is about 4' away from the South East corner of the house with a roof drain from 
the adjacent property and two in the front lawn are within 13' to 15' of the 
house.  A number of smaller stumps 
were also present in the front lawn near the house.
 
-          
The retaining walls as noted on the Uinta Engineering and Surveying, Inc. 
report were also reviewed.  The 
South wall also has a large section to the East that has tilted about 15 degrees 
out of plane that was not noted on their report.
 
-          
There is no positive drainage for runoff away from the house on all sides 
and the adjacent properties drain on the North, South, and East drain onto the 
property as noted in Harry L. Moore’s report dated May 9, 2008.  The front lawn and slab slope towards 
the house with a low spot towards the middle of the wall.  Differential settlement of the exterior 
slabs was also noted at the South East corner of the 
house.
 
-          
The floor system is composed of 2x4 floor joists at 16" O.C. with wood 
planking oversheathed with a layer of 3/4" OSB and a layer of 1/4" OSB.  A small access to the plumbing space has 
been made near the master bedroom with a single wood support on a piece of OSB 
on the North East corner.  The wood 
floor is suspended with an average of 2" of clearance above a concrete slab on 
the West side of the access, and an average of 2" of clearance above the soil on 
the East side of the access.  The 
floor joists appear to come into contact with the ground and sections of slab at 
the perimeter of the residence.  Any 
wood in the floor system in contact with concrete or soil that is not 
preservative-treated or redwood shall be considered damage.  As there were no visible markings on the 
wood joists and the deflection of the floor around the perimeter of the 
residence, we must assume that the wood floor system has been damaged along the 
entire perimeter of the residence.
 
-          
The existing slab-on-grade has been busted up at the access point to 
expose some of the plumbing.  The 
slab edge has also been undermined by up to 6" with the soil grade under the 
exposed sections of the slab forming a shallow point near the center of the 
residence.  The slab also bows down 
towards the center of the residence at a shallower angle than the soil it is 
suspended over.
 
From 
our investigation, we have concluded that there are three possible causes of 
damage to the foundation. They are as follows with their corresponding 
probabilities:
 
            
1.         
Frost heave settlement – high probability.  Due to the negative (i.e. towards the 
structure) drainage around the house, the shallow point in the soil below the 
residence, and lack of adequate frost protection, settlement may have occurred 
due to water penetration under the foundation and subsequent frost heave from 
water under the uninsulated shallow foundation.
 
            
2.         
Close vegetation proximity – high probability.  Due to the close proximity of the silver 
maple trees to affected areas of the foundation, it appears that the foundation 
has been damaged by the tree roots undermining the foundation.  The silver maple tree has a shallow root 
system that can extend up to and past the branch diameter of 40' and has been 
known to break through foundation walls.
 
            
3.         
Mine subsidence settlement – low probability.  Due to the proximity to abandoned mine 
tunnels in the area, settlement due to active mine subsidence is possible but 
not probable because the structure is six blocks away from the site of the State 
of Wyoming dynamic compaction project.
 
From 
our conclusions, we recommend that foundation insulation and a perimeter drain 
be installed around the residence to prevent further damage to the 
structure.  We also recommend the 
existing wood flooring be replaced with a 4" concrete slab or the wood floor 
joists be supported at 5'-0" O.C. with proper clearance between the soil and the 
joists to prevent further deterioration.  

 
[¶18]   On September 10, 2008, Claman filed 
a Complaint against Popp alleging claims for breach of contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement.  Claman’s specific allegations were that 
the property was not in the condition represented by the Property Disclosure, 
and, in particular, the foundation was “completely broken.”  Claman alleged she would not have 
purchased the home if she had been informed of the defects or if she had been 
informed of the submissions to the DEQ concerning property subsidence.  Through her Complaint, Claman sought 
damages of $300,000 to correct the property’s structural defects, or, in the 
alternative, rescission of the Contract.  

 
[¶19]   On December 17, 2009, Claman filed 
an Amended Complaint, adding Richard Wright and Rocky Mountain Home Inspection 
Services as defendants.  Claman 
eventually settled her claims against the inspector and his company, leaving 
only her claims against Popp.  On 
October 1, 2010, Popp moved for summary judgment on all of the claims, and on 
February 14, 2011, the district court entered an Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment.  In granting partial 
summary judgment, the district court found no breach of contract based on the 
Contract’s merger clause and on its provision disclaiming any buyer reliance on 
seller representations.  The court 
granted summary judgment on Claman’s negligent misrepresentation claim based on 
the same Contract provisions, ruling that the Contract’s merger and disclaimer 
clauses barred a claim for negligent misrepresentation.  The court found issues of material fact 
existed on the question of fraudulent inducement, and it thus denied summary 
judgment on that claim. 
 
[¶20]   The district court held a bench 
trial on the fraudulent inducement claim on June 21 and 22, 2011, and on July 7, 
2011, it issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order rejecting 
the claim and finding in favor of Popp.  
Claman thereafter appealed the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶21]   We consider the district court’s 
rulings on Claman’s breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation claims 
under our summary judgment standard of review.  Motions for 
summary judgment come before the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides 
that
 
[t]he 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 
Formisano 
v. Gaston, 
2011 WY 8, ¶ 3, 246 P.3d 286, 288 (Wyo. 2011). We review a grant of summary 
judgment as follows:
 
We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same materials and following the same standards. [Synder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 
1083 (Wyo. 1999)]; 40 
North Corp. v. Morrell, 
964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998). 
We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. 
A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by 
the parties. Id. 
If the moving party presents supporting summary judgment materials demonstrating no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is shifted to the non-moving 
party to present appropriate supporting materials posing a genuine issue of a 
material fact for trial. Roberts 
v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1999); 
Downen 
v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 
887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). 
We review a grant of summary 
judgment deciding a question of 
law de novo and afford no deference to the district court’s ruling. Roberts 
v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d  at 156; 
Blagrove 
v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).
 
Lindsey 
v. Harriet, 
2011 WY 80, ¶ 18, 255 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2011).
 
[¶22]   Because Claman’s fraudulent 
inducement claim was tried to the court, we apply the following standard of 
review:
 
Following 
a bench trial, this court reviews a district 
court’s findings and conclusions using a clearly erroneous standard for the 
factual findings and a de novo standard for the conclusions of law. 
Piroschak 
v. Whelan, 
2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 
given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A 
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
 
Piroschak, 
¶ 7, 106 P.3d  at 890. 
Findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a different result. 
Harber 
v. Jensen, 
2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004). 
Further,
 
we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; 
instead we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or 
erroneous as a matter of law.
 
Id.
 
Pennant 
Service Co., Inc. v. True Oil Co., LLC, 2011 
WY 40, ¶ 7, 249 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Hofstad 
v. Christie, 
2010 WY 134, ¶ 7, 240 P.3d 816, 818 (Wyo. 2010)) 
(some citations omitted).  We review 
the district court’s conclusions of law de novo.  Lieberman 
v. Mossbrook, 
2009 WY 65, ¶ 40, 208 P.3d 1296, 1308 (Wyo. 2009).
 
[¶23]   When summary judgment is entered 
based on interpretation of a contract, the following standard of review 
applies:
 
            
The initial question of whether the contract is capable of being 
understood in only one way is a question of law for the court. If the court 
determines that the contract is capable of being understood in only one way, 
then the language used in the contract expresses and controls the intent of the 
parties. In such case, the next question, what is that understanding or meaning, 
is also a question of law. When we review the district court’s summary judgment 
decisions that a contract is capable of being understood in only one way and 
what that understanding is, we accord no deference to those 
decisions.
 
Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Caballo Coal Co., 
2011 WY 24, ¶ 13, 246 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting M&M Auto Outlet v. Hill Inv. Corp., 
2010 WY 56, ¶ 12, 230 P.3d 1099, 1104 (Wyo. 2010)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.        
Breach of Contract Claim
 
[¶24]   Claman asserts that Popp breached 
the parties’ Contract by failing to disclose the property’s structural 
defects.  She contends this failure 
occurred both in Popp’s negative response to the Property Disclosure’s question 
concerning structural problems and in Popp’s failure to disclose subsidence 
claims that had been submitted to the DEQ.  
The district court rejected Claman’s breach of contract argument.  Based on the court’s interpretation of 
the Contract’s language, which it found to be unambiguous, the court 
concluded:
 
Regardless 
of whether any disclosure was made by Defendant, there is no issue of fact over 
whether Plaintiff contracted to not 
rely upon any representation by Defendant.  
Summary judgment is granted on the breach of contract claim.  (Emphasis in 
original.)
 
[¶25]     On appeal, Claman argues the district 
court erred in finding the Contract’s language unambiguous.  She contends that conflicting Contract 
provisions, and the parties’ disagreement over the meaning of those provisions, 
create an ambiguity and a question of material fact precluding summary 
judgment.  
 
[¶26]   In keeping with our settled rules 
of contract interpretation, we begin our analysis of any contract with the 
document’s plain language.  Hunter v. Reece, 2011 WY 97, ¶ 17, 253 P.3d 497, 501-02 (Wyo. 2011).
 
[T]he 
words used in the contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable 
person would give to them. Doctors’ 
Co. v. Insurance Corp. of America, 
864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993). 
When the provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks 
only to the “four corners” of the document in arriving at the intent of the 
parties. Union 
Pacific Resources Co. [v. 
Texaco], 
882 P.2d [212,] 220 [(Wyo. 1994)]; 
Prudential 
Preferred Properties 
[v. 
J and J Ventures], 
859 P.2d [1267,] 1271 [(Wyo. 1993)]. 
In the absence of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its 
terms because no construction is appropriate. Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 
929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996).
 
Hunter, 
¶ 17, 253 P.3d  at 502 (quoting Amoco 
Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 
2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo. 2000)).
 
[¶27]   “When 
contractual language is clear and unambiguous, the interpretation and 
construction of contracts is a matter of law for the courts.”  Hunter, ¶ 18, 253 P.3d  at 502 (quoting 
Thorkildsen 
v. Belden, 
2011 WY 26, ¶ 8, 247 P.3d 60, 62 (Wyo. 2011)).  
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a matter of law for the court 
to decide, and disagreement among the parties to a 
contract as to the contract’s meaning does not mean that contract is 
ambiguous.  Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 
WY 36, ¶ 23, 226 P.3d 889, 905 (Wyo. 2010).  Because we use an objective approach to 
interpret contracts, evidence of the parties’ subjective intent is not relevant 
or admissible in interpreting a contract.  
Hunter, ¶ 16, 253 P.3d  at 
501.
 
[¶28]   Our rules of interpretation require 
that we interpret a contract as a whole, reading each provision in light of all 
the others to find their plain meaning.  
Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, ¶ 
40, 201 P.3d 1127, 1138 (Wyo. 2009); see 
also Caballo Coal Co. v. Fid. 
Exploration & Prod. Co., 2004 WY 6, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 311, 314-15 (Wyo. 
2004).  We presume each provision in 
a contract has a purpose, and we avoid interpreting a contract so as to find 
inconsistent provisions or so as to render any provision meaningless.  Scherer v. Laramie Reg’l Airport Bd., 
2010 WY 105, ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 996, 1003 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶29]   Using these rules of 
interpretation, we turn to Claman’s argument on appeal.  Claman’s specific contention is that the 
Contract’s Property Disclosure provision conflicts with the Contract’s provision 
disclaiming any buyer reliance on seller representations and its warranty 
disclaimer provisions.  She argues 
that the conflicting contract language, coupled with the parties’ disagreement 
over which provision should control, means the Contract is ambiguous.  As we noted above, the parties’ 
disagreement as to the meaning of a contract’s language does not alone render 
that contract ambiguous.  See Ultra Resources, Inc., ¶ 23, 226 P.3d  at 905.  
Instead, we must consider the Contract as a whole and the relationship 
between each of its provisions, and only if the Contract’s plain meaning cannot 
be determined do we find the Contract to be 
ambiguous.
 
[¶30]   This Court has on a number of 
occasions interpreted real estate contracts containing merger clauses and 
disclaimers acknowledging that the buyer is not relying on representations by 
the seller.  We have explained the 
meaning and effect of such provisions as follows:
 
When 
purchasers of realty sign contracts with disclaimers and merger clauses stating 
that the purchaser is not relying on the representations of the sellers or their 
agents as to the condition of the property, the contract has allocated the risks 
of loss resulting from the purchaser’s reliance on the seller’s representations 
to the purchaser.
 
Hulse 
v. First American Title Co. of Crook Cty., 
2001 WY 95, ¶ 54, 33 P.3d 122, 139 (Wyo. 2001); see also Foxley & Co. v. Ellis, 2009 WY 16, ¶ 
21, 201 P.3d 425, 431 (Wyo. 2009) (non-reliance clause placed risk of 
nondisclosure on buyer); Snyder v. 
Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1089 (Wyo. 1999) (“The contract clearly and 
unambiguously states that [Buyer] is not relying on any representations made by 
[Seller]. This clause validly allocates the risk of loss resulting from 
[Buyer’s] reliance on [Seller’s] representations.”).
 
[¶31]   We have also considered the meaning 
and effect of an “as is” clause in a real estate contract, holding that “absent 
an allegation of fraud, an 'as is’ clause bars a claim for nondisclosure.”  Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 804 
(Wyo. 1995).  
 
[W]hile 
the “as is” clause is not a complete bar to these causes of action, its effect 
is to put the burden upon a buyer to determine the condition of the property 
purchased. [Omernik 
v. Bushman, 
151 Wis.2d 299, 444 N.W.2d 409 (1989).] 
This shifting of the burden, with nothing more [i.e., misrepresentations 
or fraud], protects a seller and his or her agent from claims premised upon 
nondisclosure. 
 
Richey, 
904 P.2d  at 803 (quoting Grube v. 
Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 117 (Wis.App. 1992)); see also Hulse, ¶ 53, 33 P.3d  at 138-39 
(contract’s “as is” clause “placed the risk of discovery of adverse material 
facts” on buyer).
 
[¶32]   The plain meaning of the Contract’s 
“as is,” merger, and disclaimer provisions is thus clear.  The provisions place the responsibility 
for discovering adverse material facts concerning the property on the buyer, and 
likewise place the risk of loss for those adverse material facts on the 
buyer.  The next task then is to 
determine whether the Contract’s Property Disclosure provision somehow alters 
that plain meaning.  To answer this 
question, we must determine the meaning of the Property Disclosure 
provision.  
 
[¶33]   The Contract’s Property Disclosure 
provision states, “Seller represents that upon execution of this Contract . . . 
[t]he condition of the property is as stated in the Property Disclosure.”  Before addressing the purpose of this 
provision, we will address what we know the provision is not.  We know the provision is not a warranty 
because the Contract’s plain language clearly and specifically disclaims any 
seller warranties, express or implied, concerning the property’s condition.  The Property Disclosure itself confirms 
this interpretation.  The document’s 
front page specifies that it is “Seller’s Property Disclosure to Prospective 
Buyers,” and the document describes itself as a “statement and representation” 
disclosing designated conditions “to the best of Seller’s current actual 
knowledge.”  The Property Disclosure 
details the Seller’s knowledge of the property, but it contains no language that 
could be interpreted as a warranty or promise, assurance or guarantee of any 
type.  
 
[¶34]   The Property Disclosure’s 
incorporation into the Contract does not change or elevate the document’s 
status.  The Property Disclosure is 
by its own description and by the Contract’s terms a representation by the 
seller.  The sentence immediately 
following the Property Disclosure’s incorporation into the Contract then 
specifies that the buyer is not relying on the seller’s representation as to any 
condition the buyer deems material to her decision to purchase the 
property.  The Property Disclosure 
thus cannot by its own terms or by its incorporation into the Contract be 
interpreted as a guarantee, promise or warranty of the property’s 
condition.
 
[¶35]   The final question then is what 
meaning to give the Contract’s Property Disclosure provision.  The Contract provision sets forth two 
options concerning Property Disclosure:  
option A specifies that the condition of the property is as stated in the 
attached and incorporated Property Disclosure form, and option B specifies that 
a Property Disclosure is not available.  
Given its immediate proximity to the buyer’s disclaimer of reliance on 
any seller representation, and to the provisions advising of the buyer’s 
opportunity to seek legal and technical advice, including professional home 
inspection services, we conclude the Property Disclosure provision is simply 
notice that a Property Disclosure form setting forth the seller’s current actual 
knowledge is available.  The buyer 
may use the Property Disclosure as she wishes during the time period before 
closing on the property, including in obtaining legal, technical or professional 
inspection services, or, of course, not at all.  What the Contract bars by its clear 
terms, however, is holding the Property Disclosure forth as a representation of 
conditions the buyer deemed material to her decision to purchase the 
property.
 
[¶36]   We thus conclude that the Contract 
is unambiguous, and based on its plain meaning, Claman may not assert a breach 
of contract claim based on the accuracy of any representation by Popp or any 
nondisclosure by Popp, or Claman’s reliance on the alleged representation or 
nondisclosure.
 
B.        
Negligent Misrepresentation Claim
 
[¶37]   Claman’s second cause of action 
against Popp was a negligent misrepresentation claim.  Claman asserted that Popp undertook to 
make property condition disclosures and in doing so assumed a duty to “fully, 
accurately, and completely” disclose her prior knowledge of any defects in the 
property.  Claman argues that Popp 
breached that duty by not disclosing the claims submitted to the DEQ concerning 
the property’s subsidence damage.  

 
[¶38]   The district court granted summary 
judgment against Claman’s negligent misrepresentation claim, ruling that the 
Contract’s merger and disclaimer provisions barred the claim.  On appeal, Claman argues that the court 
erred because the Contract’s Property Disclosure provision distinguishes this 
case from those on which the district court relied.  We disagree.
 
[¶39]   This Court has repeatedly held that 
when a purchaser of realty signs a contract with 
disclaimer and merger clauses providing that the purchaser is not relying on the 
representations of the seller as to the condition of the property, the contract 
bars a claim for negligent misrepresentation.  Hulse, ¶ 54, 33 P.3d  at 139; Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., 
Inc., 8 P.3d 324, 332 (Wyo. 2000); Snyder, 992 P.2d  at 1089.  We have 
explained:
 
Tort 
law proceeds from a long historical evolution of externally imposed duties and 
liabilities. Contract law proceeds from an even longer historical evolution of 
bargained-for duties and liabilities. The careless and unnecessary blanket 
confusion of tort and contract would undermine the carefully evolved utility of 
both.
 
            
In tort, the legislatures and the courts have set the parameters of 
social policy and imposed them on individual members of society without their 
consent. The social policy in the field of contract has been left to the parties 
themselves to determine, with judicial and legislative intervention tolerated 
only in the most extreme cases. Where there has been intervention, it has been 
by the application of well established contract doctrines, most of which focus 
on threats to the integrity of the bargaining process itself such as fraud or 
extreme imbalance in bargaining power
 
Hulse, 
¶ 54, 33 P.3d  at 139 (quoting Snyder, 
992 P.2d at 1087).
 
[¶40]   As we noted above in our discussion 
of Claman’s breach of contract claim, the Contract’s Property Disclosure 
provision is simply a notice provision.  
The provision did not alter or dilute in any fashion the Contract’s 
merger and disclaimer provisions, and it did nothing to undermine the policy 
justifications for not allowing a tort claim to nullify the parties’ bargained 
for allocation of risk.  See Snyder, 992 P.2d  at 
1087 (“[P]arties are not permitted to assert actions in tort in an attempt to 
circumvent the bargain they agreed upon.”).  We thus affirm the district court’s 
entry of summary judgment rejecting Claman’s negligent misrepresentation 
claim.1
 
C.        
Fraudulent Inducement Claim
 
[¶41]   Claman’s final claim for relief was 
a fraudulent inducement claim, which she based on two alleged fraudulent acts by 
Popp.  First, Claman alleged that 
Popp intentionally withheld information concerning the 1993 and 2007 DEQ 
submissions with the intention of inducing Claman to purchase the property.  Second, she alleged that Popp 
intentionally misrepresented to Claman that the property did not have a 
crawlspace in an effort to conceal the failing foundation.  
 
[¶42]   Following a bench trial, the 
district court ruled against Claman on both allegations of fraud.  With respect to the allegation relating 
to the crawlspace, the court found Popp’s testimony more credible than that of 
Claman, and it concluded that Popp had in fact informed Claman of the crawlspace 
and offered to show her the crawlspace.  
On appeal, Claman does not challenge the district court’s findings on the 
crawlspace allegation.  Claman 
instead appeals only the ruling on the fraud allegations relating to Popp’s 
failure to disclose the DEQ claims.
 
[¶43]   A plaintiff alleging fraudulent 
inducement carries the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that 
1) the defendant made a false representation intending to induce action by the 
plaintiff; 2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the representation to be true; 
and 3) the plaintiff suffered damages in relying on the false 
representation.  Bitker v. First Nat’l Bank in Evanston, 
2004 WY 114, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d 853, 856 (Wyo. 2004).  “Clear and 
convincing evidence is the 'kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact 
that the truth of the contention is highly probable.’”  Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 83, ¶ 29, 
47 P.3d 206, 216 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting MacGuire 
v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 
612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980)).  
 
Conduct 
or words which tend to produce an erroneous impression may satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden. In addition, even if someone is not under a duty to 
speak, if he does speak, he is under a duty to speak truthfully and to make a 
full and fair disclosure. Reliance is reasonable when false 
representations have occurred prior to the execution of the contract which is 
sought to be avoided or for which damages are sought to be 
recovered.
 
Alexander, 
¶ 25, 47 P.3d  at 215 (quoting Sundown, 
Inc., 8 P.3d at 330-31) (emphasis in original).
 
[¶44]   Applying these principles to 
Claman’s allegation that Popp fraudulently failed to disclose the 1993 and 2007 
DEQ submissions, the district court rejected the claim based on the following 
conclusions (citations to trial exhibits omitted):  
 
            
Plaintiff has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that 
Defendant committed fraud when Defendant did not reveal that she made the 1993 
and the 2007 claims.  There was no 
demonstration that Defendant made a false representation intended to induce 
action by Plaintiff.  Even though 
Defendant admitted that she did not reveal the claims to Plaintiff, or even to 
her own real estate agent, Defendant testified that she intended to disclose the 
property’s subsidence issues when she checked the affirmative box on the 
disclosure statement.  The Parties’ 
contract to buy specified that Plaintiff was “not relying upon any 
representation of Seller . . . as to any condition” that she deemed material to 
her decision to purchase the property.  
Likewise, the contract indicated that Plaintiff was accepting the 
property “in its entirety in 'as is, where is’ condition.”  The evidence does not support a finding 
that it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely upon Defendant’s representations as 
a disclosure of every issue necessary for Plaintiff to consider before closing 
on the house.
 
            
Both real estate agents testified that the seller had no duty to expound 
on the information provided in the property disclosure statement.  Mary Manatos said that in her work as a 
real estate agent, she had seen some disclosure statements with many comments, 
some without any additional comments, and some were waived altogether.  Ms. Manatos testified that even if the 
disclosure statement exposed every problem with the house, the buyer still would 
have had the duty to have an appropriate inspection of the house to make sure 
she would be getting what she paid for.  
Although Defendant was not required to complete the property condition 
statement, because she did complete it, she was under a duty to speak truthfully 
and to make a full and fair disclosure.  
By checking “yes” under the question of whether the house was in a 
subsidence area, Defendant made a truthful, full, and fair disclosure of the 
conditions necessary for which Plaintiff should have been aware.  Even though the claims had not been 
specifically disclosed, the completion of the property disclosure statement was 
based upon Defendant’s “knowledge of the property” with representations made to 
the best of her “current actual knowledge.”
 
            
It was the revelation of the location of the house in a subsidence area, 
rather than the 1993 and 2007 claims, which if not revealed, could have 
conceivably misled Plaintiff into damages.  
Ultimately, the concealed subsidence and dynamic compaction claims did 
not result in the damages that Plaintiff alleges.  Plaintiff argues that if she had known 
of the claims, she would have backed out of closing on the house and would have 
been saved the headache of owning a structurally damaged house.  Both Plaintiff and Defendant testified 
that the structural damage to the house was not related to the subsidence or 
compaction issues.
 
            
The evidence indicates that the clues of structural damage to the house 
were visible even though the 1993 and 2007 claims were hidden.  For example, grouting work was being 
done on nearby properties around the time Plaintiff began visiting 517 
Walnut.  Similarly, Rick Wright’s 
inspection report acknowledged the cracked walkways, the cracked retaining wall, 
and that the yard sloped toward the house.  
These issues, interestingly, reflect some of the condition issues raised 
by the 1993 and 2007 claims.  
Additionally, Mr. Wright’s inspection revealed that a rafter support beam 
in the attic was cracked and required repair.  He testified that the cracked rafter 
support could have indicated structural damage, but not necessarily so.  Plaintiff testified that during her many 
visits to the house, Defendant would discuss the house including the drainage 
issues coming from nearby Pine Street.  
Defendant testified that during one of Plaintiff’s visits, Defendant 
pointed out to Plaintiff a sunken portion of the patio and warned Plaintiff to 
make sure her chair did not slip into it.  
Defendant remembered Plaintiff commenting that she knew people who could 
fix that sort of thing.  The 
evidence indicates that Plaintiff could have been alerted to potential problems 
without knowing about the 1993 and 2007 claim, which would have notified her to 
hire a structural engineer to inspect the property.  Defendant’s omission of information 
about the 1993 and the 2007 claims was not a misrepresentation intended to 
induce action by Plaintiff and did not result in damages to 
Plaintiff.
 
* 
* * * 
 
            
Plaintiff has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that 
Defendant committed fraud in not revealing that she had made the 1993 and 2007 
claims with the DEQ.  There has been 
no demonstration that Defendant made a false representation intended to induce 
action by Plaintiff, that it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely upon such a 
representation, or that the representation resulted in damages to 
Plaintiff.  Likewise, Plaintiff has 
not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant committed fraud 
as to the presence of the crawlspace.  
Not only did the evidence indicate that Defendant offered to show 
Plaintiff the entrance to the crawlspace but also that Defendant did not know 
that an examination of the crawlspace would have exposed the house’s structural 
damage.  Plaintiff has not met her 
burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, intentional 
misrepresentation or fraud.
 
[¶45]   On appeal, Claman does not 
challenge the evidentiary basis for the district court’s conclusions, but 
instead, in her brief, argues:
 
Because 
the Appellee took on this obligation of full, fair, and complete disclosure, the 
Appellant should not have had to look for “clues” as to the complaints relating 
[to] the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality claims.  Instead, the Appellee should have made 
full and truthful disclosure relating to these claims so that the Appellant 
would have had an opportunity to weigh her options relating to the claims before 
closing on the residence.
 
Claman’s 
argument misunderstands the showing required to prove a claim for fraudulent 
inducement and the import of the district court’s 
findings.
 
[¶46]   The court’s findings and 
conclusions illustrate first that Popp’s failure to disclose the DEQ claims was 
not motivated by a fraudulent intent.  
Simply put, the court concluded that Popp was not trying to hide a latent 
defect.  On the Property Disclosure, 
Popp reported that the property had known or suspected subsidence problems.  And the subsidence problems reported in 
the DEQ claim forms were not latent defects that could be learned only from 
reviewing those forms.  The DEQ 
submissions revealed drainage issues, issues that the court found Popp had 
disclosed and were otherwise apparent, and they revealed minor repairs that were 
required to the property, repairs that cost less than $1,200.00.  The forms did not disclose anything that 
would suggest the home’s foundation was failing and would require the 
$300,000.00 in repairs Claman has demanded.  Based on Popp’s affirmative disclosure 
of the property’s subsidence problems, the open indicators of the subsidence 
problems covered by the DEQ claims, and the district court’s determination that 
Popp was a credible witness, the court concluded that Popp did not know of the 
failing foundation and had no intent to misrepresent the property’s condition by 
not disclosing the DEQ claims.  

 
[¶47]   The district court’s findings also 
undercut Claman’s allegation of reliance on the nondisclosure and her allegation 
that her damages were caused by that reliance.  This Court has held that a contract’s 
“as is” disclaimer provision will not bar a claim for fraudulent 
nondisclosure.  Richey, 904 P.2d  at 803-04.  Nonetheless, a buyer of property cannot 
ignore available evidence of a defect, such as physical evidence on the property 
and the seller’s property condition disclosures, and then assert a claim for 
fraud because the same information was not provided in a different form.  Under these circumstances, the evidence 
does not support a claim of reliance on the nondisclosure.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶48]   The district court’s summary 
judgment against Claman’s breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation 
claims was in accordance with law and the undisputed facts.  We also conclude that the court’s 
findings of fact on Claman’s fraudulent inducement claim were not clearly 
erroneous and its conclusions and order were in accordance with law.  We thus affirm.
 
FOOTNOTES
1Even if we were to conclude that the Contract does not bar the negligent 
misrepresentation claim, we would nonetheless uphold the district court’s 
summary judgment ruling.  Wyoming 
does not recognize a claim for negligent nondisclosure, and because no 
representation is made in the case of a nondisclosure, a nondisclosure cannot 
support a claim for negligent misrepresentation.  Throckmartin v. Century 21 Top Realty, 
2010 WY 23, ¶ 26, 226 P.3d 793, 808 (Wyo. 2010); Sundown, Inc., 8 P.3d  at 
332.