Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CRIMINAL (In re: State of Alabama v. Dennis Lee Jones)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/21/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070536
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Dennis Lee Jones)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-06-1996)
SMITH, Justice.
The State of Alabama seeks a writ of mandamus directing
Judge Tommy Nail to vacate his order suspending the
confinement portion of the split sentence he imposed upon
Dennis Lee Jones's conviction.  We deny the petition.
1070536
The Commission was established by the legislature in
1
2000.  Act No. 2000-596, Ala. Acts 2000, codified at §§ 12-25-
1 to -12, Ala. Code 1975.
2
Facts and Procedural History
This petition for the writ of mandamus involves the
Alabama Sentence Reform Act of 2003.  Act No. 2003-354, Ala.
Acts 2003.  As amended by Act No. 2006-312, Ala. Acts 2006,
the Alabama Sentence Reform Act of 2003 is codified at §§ 12-
25-30 to -38, Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act").  Section 12-25-31(a)
states the legislature's conclusion that the following are
necessary for the provision of "a fair, effective, and
efficient criminal justice system":
"(1) Voluntary sentencing standards used to
guide judicial decision makers in determining the
most appropriate sentence for convicted felony
offenders.
"(2) The abolition of traditional parole and
good time credits for convicted felons.
"(3) 
The 
availability 
of 
a 
continuum 
of
punishment options."
Section 
12-25-34 
directed 
the 
Alabama 
Sentencing
Commission ("the Commission")  to develop statewide voluntary
1
sentencing standards and to present those standards to the
legislature over a three-year period beginning in 2004.  On
September 30, 2005, the Commission adopted the "initial
1070536
On the date this opinion was released, a copy of those
2
standards 
and 
worksheets 
could 
be 
found 
at:
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov 
(as 
visited 
on
November 21, 2008; the material quoted in this opinion from
those standards and worksheets is available in the case file
of the clerk of the Supreme Court).
3
voluntary sentencing standards" (hereinafter "the standards,"
"the initial standards," 
or 
"the 
voluntary 
sentencing
standards"), 
along 
with 
accompanying 
worksheets 
and
instructions.  See § 12-25-34(a)(3); § 12-25-34.1.  The
legislature approved the initial standards, along with the
accompanying worksheets and instructions, for implementation
effective October 1, 2006.  § 12-25-34.1, Ala. Code 1975.
According to § 12-25-34(a)(4), the initial standards are
scheduled to be replaced by the "voluntary truth-in-sentencing
standards," which the Commission is to present for approval
during the 2009 regular session of the Alabama Legislature; if
approved, the voluntary truth-in-sentencing standards will be
effective October 1, 2009. 
The general instructions for the initial standards and
the accompanying worksheets state that the initial standards
"cover the 26 most frequently sentenced offenses and 87% of
sentenced cases."  Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards &
Worksheets 22 (2006).   If an offense is covered by the
2
1070536
4
initial 
standards, 
the 
applicable 
worksheets 
must 
be
completed.  § 12-25-35, Ala. Code 1975.   Specifically, there
are "three sets of worksheets and prison sentence length
tables that divide the covered offenses into three offense
types designated property, drug, and personal offenses."
Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 22.
"For each offense type, there is an In/Out Worksheet
and a Sentence Length Worksheet.  Each sheet has a
set of statistically relevant sentencing factors
specific to each offense type.  Examples of factors
include: 
most 
serious 
current 
offense, 
other
offenses being sentenced at the current sentencing
event, prior convictions, previous incarcerations,
juvenile/youthful offender adjudications, etc.  The
worksheets will result in a score that is calculated
based on the information provided for each factor.
"....
"The 
In/Out 
Worksheet 
produces 
a 
score 
that
recommends either a prison or a non-prison sentence.
The Sentence Length Worksheet score tells the judge
what sentence range (in months) is recommended based
on the defendant’s characteristics."
Id. at 122.  Thus, each offender sentenced under the initial
standards is given a sentence-disposition recommendation
(prison or non-prison) and a sentence-length recommendation.
Although the sentencing court must "consider" the initial
standards and the worksheets, the court may decline to follow
the recommendations resulting from the application of the
1070536
The case-action summary does not indicate that Jones
3
admitted to violating § 13A-12-250.  However, the petitioner
and the respondents (Judge Nail and Jones) assume that Jones
did so, and portions of the transcript of the hearing at which
Jones entered his plea suggest that he did.
The instructions state that "[w]orksheets must be
4
completed and considered when the 'most serious offense' at a
sentencing event is a worksheet offense."  Initial Voluntary
Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 26.  Unlawful distribution
of a controlled substance is a Class B felony. § 13A-12-
211(b), Ala. Code 1975.  Failure to affix tax stamps is a
Class C felony.  § 40-17A-9(a), Ala. Code 1975.  Therefore, in
Jones's case, the unlawful-distribution charge was the "most
5
initial standards and instead impose a sentence "outside the
voluntary sentencing standards in accordance with existing
law."  § 12-25-35(c), Ala. Code 1975.  
In the underlying case, the grand jury indicted Jones on
charges of the unlawful distribution of clonazepam, a
controlled substance, in violation of § 13A-12-211, Ala. Code
1975, within a three-mile radius of a school, in violation of
§ 13A-12-250, Ala. Code 1975, and failure to affix tax stamps,
a violation of § 40-17A-4, Ala. Code 1975.  On November 5,
2007, Jones pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to
violating § 13A-12-211  and § 40-17A-4.  
3
A violation of § 13A-12-211 is a Class B felony and a
"covered offense" under the initial standards; consequently,
the worksheets were completed for Jones.   The instructions
4
1070536
serious offense."
6
for the in/out worksheet for a drug offense recommend "prison"
if the in/out score is eight or more.  Jones's in/out score
was 14; therefore, the in/out worksheet recommended "prison"
for Jones.
The in/out worksheet has three recommended alternatives
of sentence disposition if a recommendation of prison results
from the completion of the worksheet:  "Department of
Corrections," "DOC at Community Corrections," or "DOC Split
Sentence." 
 
Initial 
Voluntary 
Sentencing 
Standards 
&
Worksheets 35-36.  The instructions state as follows regarding
those alternatives:
"Several prison alternatives are provided.  
"Department of Corrections should be checked if the
sentence is a straight prison sentence.
"DOC at Community Corrections should be checked if
the offender is sentenced to DOC and ordered to a
community corrections program.
"DOC Split Sentence should be checked if the
sentence is a split sentence.  Any split to be
served in DOC or DOC Community Corrections is
considered a prison sentence.
"The sentence disposition type should be checked
even if it is not consistent with the recommended
disposition.  This information will be useful for
1070536
The list of scores on the Prison Sentence Length Ranges
5
Table is from "actual cases analyzed by the Alabama Sentencing
Commission in developing the worksheets and standards."
Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 32.
The three columns under the "Total Sentence" heading
6
"list the recommended sentence ranges from which a sentence
may be chosen."  Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards &
Worksheets 32.  The three columns under the "Time to Serve On
Split" 
heading 
"list 
the 
recommended 
ranges 
for 
the
incarceration portion of a split sentence in the event the
judge chooses to impose a split sentence."  Id.
7
possible 
modification 
of 
the 
worksheet
recommendations."
Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 36
(emphasis in original).
The instructions state that "[w]here Prison is the
sentence disposition on the In/Out Worksheet, the prison
sentence must be chosen from within the recommended range for
the corresponding score on the Prison Sentence Length Ranges
Table ...."  Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards &
Worksheets 27.  Jones's score on the prison-sentence-length
worksheet for a drug offense was 199.   The Prison Sentence
5
Length Ranges Table recommends the number of months--
designated low, mid, and high--to serve for the "Total
Sentence" and the "Time to Serve On Split."   For Jones's
6
score of 199, the recommendations are as follows:
1070536
8
"Total Sentence
Time to Serve On Split
"Low  Mid  High
Low  Mid  High
"45   87   130
24   30
 36."
Judge Nail sentenced Jones to serve 5 years (60 months);
that sentence was split, and Jones was to serve 24 months in
the penitentiary followed by 2 years on supervised probation.
Judge Nail then "probated" the "split portion of [Jones's]
sentence ... condition[ed] on [the] completion of [an]
alternate sentencing plan."  State's brief, Exhibit B.  Judge
Nail cited Soles v. State, 820 So. 2d 163 (Ala. Crim. App.
2001), in support of his decision to probate the confinement
portion of Jones's split sentence.
The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a
writ of mandamus directing Judge Nail to set aside the
sentence and "to enter a sentence consistent with either the
Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards or to sentence under
applicable law without regard to the Sentencing Standards." 
State's brief, p. 6.  In an unpublished order, the Court of
Criminal Appeals denied the petition.  Jones v. State (No. CR-
07-0293, Jan. 7, 2008), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
The State has filed a similar petition in this Court.
1070536
9
Standard of Review
"Our review of a decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals on an original petition for a writ
of mandamus is de novo.  Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R. App.
P.; Ex parte Sharp, 893 So. 2d 571, 573 (Ala. 2003).
The standard for issuance of a writ of mandamus is
well settled:
"'A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate
when the petitioner can show (1) a clear
legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction
of the court.'
"Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001) (citing Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co.,
775 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala. 2000))."
Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 127-28 (Ala. 2005).
Discussion
The State contends that the sentence imposed on Jones is
an illegal sentence because, the State argues, it complies
with neither the initial standards nor existing law outside
the initial standards.  Citing § 12-25-35(c) and (f), Ala.
Code 1975, Judge Nail and Jones contend that because Judge
Nail indicated that he sentenced Jones under the initial
standards, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
1070536
Section 19.2-298.01.F provides: "The failure to follow
7
any or all of the provisions of this section or the failure to
follow any or all of the provisions of this section in the
prescribed manner shall not be reviewable on appeal or the
basis of any other post-conviction relief."
10
the State's petition challenging the legality of Jones's
sentence. 
Generally "[t]he State may file a mandamus petition
challenging an illegal sentence."  State v. Monette, 887 So.
2d 314, 315 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Smith v. State, 447
So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1984)).  Section § 12-25-35(f) provides:
"Failure to follow any or all of the provisions of this
section, or failure to follow any or all of the provisions of
this section in the prescribed manner, shall not be reviewable
on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief."
The 
initial 
standards were patterned after Virginia's
Sentencing Guidelines, and § 12-25-35(f) is nearly identical
to § 19.2-298.01.F, Va. Code Ann.   See Initial Voluntary
7
Sentencing 
Standards 
& 
Worksheets 
124 
("[The 
initial
standards] were patterned after Virginia's guidelines and are
voluntary and not subject to appellate review.").  Virginia's
courts 
have 
interpreted 
§ 19.2-298.01.F as permitting
appellate review of a sentence imposed under Virginia's
1070536
11
guidelines for the limited purpose of determining if the
sentence is within the range recommended by the those
guidelines.  In Hunt v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 395, 404-05,
488 S.E.2d 672, 677 (1997), the Court of Appeals of Virginia
stated:
"The sentencing guidelines are not binding on
the trial judge.  Belcher v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.
App. 44, 45, 435 S.E.2d 160, 161 (1993).  Rather,
they are a tool designed to assist the judge in
fixing an appropriate punishment.  Id.  It is
well-settled that '[i]f the sentence was within the
range set by the Legislature [for the crime with
which the defendant was convicted], an appellate
court will not interfere with the judgment.'  Hudson
v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 158, 160-61, 390 S.E.2d
509, 510 (1990)."  
Thus, under Virginia's corresponding provision to § 12-35-
25(f), Ala. Code 1975, an appellate court's review of a
sentence imposed under the initial standards is "limited to
whether the sentence fell within the permissible statutory
range."  Smith v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 620, 626, 496
S.E.2d 117, 120 (1998). 
In the present case, the State acknowledges that the
total sentence Judge Nail imposed--5 years--and the time Jones
was ordered to serve on the split--24 months--complied with
the recommended sentence ranges of the initial standards.
1070536
Specifically, the State argues that if Jones had been
8
sentenced outside the standards and in accordance with
existing law, he would have faced a minimum prison sentence of
25 years.  A 25-year sentence would make Jones's sentence
ineligible for consideration under Alabama's Split-Sentence
Act, § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, which authorizes sentencing
courts to split certain sentences of not more than 20 years.
12
However, the State argues that Judge Nail did not have
authority under the initial standards to suspend or probate
the confinement portion of the split sentence.  Therefore, the
State contends, the sentence is not a sentence under the
initial standards; instead, it argues, the sentence is, in the
language 
of 
§ 
12-35-25(c), 
"outside 
the 
standards."
Consequently, the State contends that this Court has
jurisdiction to consider whether the sentence imposed on Jones
is "in accordance with existing law."8
In 
arguing 
that 
the 
sentence 
imposed 
on 
Jones's
conviction is outside the initial standards but not in
accordance with existing law, the State seeks to avoid
application of the bar on appellate review in § 12-25-35(c),
Ala. Code 1975, which provides: 
"In any felony case in which the trial court imposes
a 
sentence 
that 
departs 
from 
the 
voluntary
standards, and sentences outside the voluntary
sentencing standards in accordance with existing
law, the court may provide a brief written reason
for the departure.  Neither the departure nor the
1070536
13
reason stated for the departure shall be subject to
appellate review ...."  
The flaw in the State's argument, however, is that the initial
standards in fact authorized the sentence imposed; therefore
Jones's sentence is not "outside the standards."
By suspending the confinement portion of Jones's split
sentence, Judge Nail imposed a "reverse split" sentence.  See
Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d at 139 n.18 ("In a 'reverse
split' sentence, the sentencing court orders a defendant to
serve the probationary period of the split sentence first,
with the period of incarceration to follow.").  As noted,
Judge Nail relied on Soles v. State, supra, in which the Court
of Criminal Appeals unanimously held that the Split-Sentence
Act, § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, "allows a trial court to
suspend a sentence imposed pursuant to the school/housing
enhancements [in §§ 13A-12-250 and 13A-12-270, Ala. Code 1975]
notwithstanding that those provisions disallow probation."
820 So. 2d at 165.  In Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d at 139,
which Judge Nail cites in his brief to this Court, we held
that the authority of a sentencing court under § 15-18-8(c)
"'to suspend that portion of the minimum sentence that remains
[under § 15-18-8(a)] and place the defendant on probation'"
1070536
14
also includes "the authority to suspend the 3-year minimum
term of confinement required by § 15-18-8(a)(1) for sentences
of more than 15 years but not more than 20 years" (quoting §
15-18-8(c), Ala. Code 1975).
The State contends, however, that the initial standards
deny a sentencing court the authority to suspend the
confinement portion of a split sentence imposed under the
initial standards.  In support of that contention, the State
cites the 2007 Judges' Sentencing Reference Manual published
by the Commission.  Specifically, page 78 of that manual
states that if the in/out worksheet recommends "prison," the
sentencing court is "[n]oncompliant if entire sentence is
suspended." 
In this case, however, Judge Nail did not suspend the
entire five-year prison sentence.  Rather, he suspended  the
24-month confinement portion of the split sentence--i.e., he
essentially imposed a reverse split sentence.  The Alabama
Sentence Reform Act of 2003 and the initial standards
expressly incorporate the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.
Code 1975.  Section 12-25-32(2)b. of the Act lists "[a] split
sentence pursuant to Section 15-18-8" as an "intermediate
1070536
15
punishment" that is available to sentencing courts using the
initial standards.  Moreover, the instructions for completing
the worksheets that accompany the initial standards state:
"Where Prison is the sentence disposition on the
In/Out Worksheet, the prison sentence must be chosen
from 
within 
the 
recommended 
range 
for 
the
corresponding score on the Prison Sentence Length
Ranges Table for the most serious offense worksheet
offense type.
"....
"When choosing a sentence from the recommended
sentence range, the sentence chosen must not be less
than the statutory sentences specified in Section
13A-5-6(a)(1)-(3), provided, however, the minimum
sentence may still be 'split' pursuant to Section
15-18-8.
"1.
For a Class A felony, the minimum
sentence imposed must be at least 120
months.
"2.
For a Class B felony, the minimum
sentence imposed must be at least 24
months.
"3.
For a Class C felony, the minimum
sentence imposed must be at least 12
months and 1 day."
Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 27-28
(emphasis added).
As noted, the split sentence imposed by Judge Nail was 24
months, which was within the sentence range recommended by the
1070536
We note that the 24-month sentence of confinement was
9
consistent with the 2-year minimum required under § 13A-5-
6(a)(1)-(3), Ala. Code 1975, for a Class B felony.
16
Prison Sentence Length Ranges Table in the initial standards
and which was compliant with the worksheet instructions quoted
above.   Additionally, page 78 of the manual cited by the
9
State specifically states that if the "In/Out" recommendation
is prison, a reverse split is "[c]ompliant if within sentence
range."  Thus, the sentence that Judge Nail imposed was not
outside the initial standards and was within the recommended
ranges of the initial standards.  Consequently, our review of
the sentence can go no further.  See § 12-35-25(c) and (f),
Ala. Code 1975.
Conclusion
The petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.