Title: Commonwealth v. Kelly

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12710 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL R. KELLY. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 2, 2019. - January 30, 2020. 
 
Present (Sitting at Barnstable):  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, 
Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Intent.  Public Welfare Offense.  Constitutional Law, 
Right to bear arms.  Due Process of Law, Public welfare 
offense.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Natick Division of 
the District Court Department on January 22, 2013. 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Framingham Division 
of the District Court Department on February 20, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before David W. Cunis, J., and a 
motion for a required finding was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Edward R. Molari for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Keith G. Langer, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  While showing a firearm to one of his friends 
as a potential purchaser of the weapon, the defendant accidently 
discharged it in a bedroom, shooting his friend through the 
hand.  The defendant challenges his convictions of discharging a 
firearm within 500 feet of a building, in violation of G. L. 
c. 269, § 12E, and unlawful possession of a firearm, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).  In a matter of first 
impression, the defendant argues that G. L. c. 269, § 12E, 
includes a mens rea requirement for the element of discharge.  
The defendant also argues that the trial judge erred in 
declining to instruct the jury on G. L. c. 140, § 129C (m), 
which exempts from licensing requirements the "temporary 
holding, handling or firing of a firearm for examination, trial 
or instruction in the presence of a holder of a license to carry 
firearms."  We conclude that G. L. c. 269, § 12E, does not 
require any mens rea as to the element of discharge.  Because 
the evidence in this case did not support a finding that the 
defendant's possession was temporary and in the presence of a 
holder of a license to carry, we conclude as well that the judge 
did not abuse his discretion in declining to instruct on an 
exemption for temporarily holding a firearm.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Commonwealth 
Second Amendment, Inc. 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving some details for later discussion.  In January 
of 2013, the defendant was living, at least part of the time, at 
his father's home in Massachusetts.  The defendant also spent 
part of his time in Maine, where he had a driver's license.  The 
defendant owned a Springfield XD .40 caliber semiautomatic 
handgun; when in his father's house, the firearm was kept inside 
a case in a hallway closet.  The defendant's father had a 
license to carry a firearm in Massachusetts, but the defendant 
did not have a license to carry in Massachusetts or a firearm 
identification card; he did meet the minimal requirements for 
possession of a firearm in Maine, where a license to own a 
firearm is not required. 
 
At some point on January 20, 2013, the defendant took the 
case, with the firearm in it, out of the hallway closet and 
brought it into a bedroom.  He unlocked and opened the case.  
Later that day, the victim and several other of the defendant's 
friends came to the house to watch a football game on 
television.  The defendant hoped to sell the firearm to the 
victim, who a short time previously had acquired a license to 
carry a firearm in the Commonwealth.  The two men went into the 
bedroom, where the defendant demonstrated various features of 
the firearm.  He handed the firearm to the victim, who soon 
handed it back.  The defendant and a police lieutenant both 
4 
 
 
testified that the design of the firearm required the user to 
depress the trigger to disassemble the weapon.  Believing that 
the chamber was empty, the defendant depressed the trigger in 
order to disassemble the firearm; this discharged a bullet, 
which struck the victim in the hand. 
 
The defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); possession of a 
high capacity feeding device, in violation of G. L. 269, 
§ 10 (m); discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 12E; assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (b); and two counts of witness intimidation (of the victim 
and the investigating officer), in violation of G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13B.2  At trial, the defendant requested the jury be instructed 
on the statutory licensing exemption set forth in G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129C (m), which permits "[t]he temporary holding, handling or 
firing of a firearm for examination, trial or instruction in the 
presence of a holder of a license to carry firearms, or the 
temporary holding, handling or firing of a rifle or shotgun for 
examination, trial or instruction in the presence of a holder of 
a firearm identification card, or where such holding, handling 
                     
 
2 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi 
on the charge of possession of a high capacity feeding device. 
5 
 
 
or firing is for a lawful purpose."  The judge declined to give 
such an instruction.  The defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case 
was denied.  A District Court jury convicted the defendant of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, discharging a firearm within 
500 feet of a building, and one count of witness intimidation 
(the investigating officer).  The jury acquitted him of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and the other count 
of witness intimidation (the victim).  The defendant renewed his 
motion for a required finding of not guilty; the judge again 
denied the motion. 
 
The defendant filed a postconviction motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on the charges of discharging a firearm 
and witness intimidation.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (b) (2), 378 
Mass. 896 (1979).  The Commonwealth conceded that, under 
Commonwealth v. Muckle, 478 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2017), which had 
been decided while the defendant's appeal was pending, the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction over the charge of witness 
intimidation and agreed to dismiss that charge.  The defendant 
argued that G. L. c. 269, § 12E, includes a requirement that the 
discharge be done knowingly, and that there was insufficient 
evidence to show knowledge.  The judge denied the motion because 
he concluded that G. L. c. 269, § 12E, does not contain any mens 
rea requirement for the act of discharge. 
6 
 
 
 
The defendant appealed from the denial of the motion for a 
required finding and from his convictions.  We transferred the 
consolidated appeal from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mens rea for discharging a firearm 
with 500 feet of a building.  The defendant argues that G. L. 
c. 269, § 12E, requires proof that he discharged the firearm 
knowingly.  He maintains that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he knowingly discharged the firearm and that the 
judge therefore erred in denying his motion for a required 
finding. 
 
In a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 608 (2018), 
citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  The 
undisputed evidence in this case established that the defendant 
discharged the weapon, but that he did not do so knowingly or 
intentionally.  Therefore, the question before us is whether 
G. L. c. 269, § 12E, contains the requirement that the discharge 
of the firearm be knowing.3 
                     
 
3 General Laws c. 269, § 12E, provides: 
 
"Whoever discharges a firearm as defined in [G. L. c. 140, 
§ 121], a rifle or shotgun within [500] feet of a dwelling 
or other building in use, except with the consent of the 
owner or legal occupant thereof, shall be punished by a 
fine of not less than fifty nor more than one hundred 
7 
 
 
 
In the mid-Nineteenth Century, legislatures in the United 
States began imposing strict liability for certain offenses in 
the areas of public health and safety.  See Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 256-257 (1952) (collecting cases from 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 
Mass. 141, 142–143 (1910) (same).  These offenses came to be 
known as "public welfare offenses."  See Morissette, supra 
at 255.  Public welfare statutes "[t]ypically . . . regulate 
potentially harmful or injurious items."  Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994).  Rather than criminalizing 
conduct that already has resulted in harm, these statutes 
criminalize behavior that "create[s] the danger or probability 
of it which the law seeks to minimize."  Morissette, supra 
at 255–256. 
                     
dollars or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction 
for not more than three months, or both.  The provisions of 
this section shall not apply to (a) the lawful defense of 
life and property; (b) any law enforcement officer acting 
in the discharge of his duties; (c) persons using 
underground or indoor target or test ranges with the 
consent of the owner or legal occupant thereof; (d) persons 
using outdoor skeet, trap, target or test ranges with the 
consent of the owner or legal occupant of the land on which 
the range is established; (e) persons using shooting 
galleries, licensed and defined under the provisions of 
[G. L. c. 140, § 56A]; and (f) the discharge of blank 
cartridges for theatrical, athletic, ceremonial, firing 
squad, or other purposes in accordance with [G. L. c. 148, 
§ 39]." 
8 
 
 
 
This court repeatedly upheld strict liability statutes in 
early cases involving the sale of intoxicating liquor, see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Goodman, 97 Mass. 117, 119 (1867); the 
sale of adulterated food, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 103 
Mass. 444, 445 (1869); and violations of motor vehicle laws, 
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500, 509 (1924).  In 
more recent years, we have continued to uphold the power of the 
Legislature to create strict liability, public welfare offenses.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tart, 408 Mass. 249, 265 (1990) 
(landing raw fish for sale without permit). 
 
We first address the question of statutory interpretation:  
whether G. L. c. 269, § 12E, contains an implied mens rea 
requirement for the element of discharge.  We then turn to a 
consideration of whether imposing strict liability for the 
element of discharge would infringe on constitutional 
protections. 
 
i.  Statutory interpretation.  "Our primary duty in 
interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting it" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 633 (2018).  "[W]here the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to the legislative intent" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019).  When, as here, the 
language is unclear, we "must interpret the statute so as to 
9 
 
 
render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason 
and common sense."  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 
777 (2017), quoting Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477 
(2008).  We examine the "cause of [the statute's] enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 793 
(2019), quoting Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76–77 (2011). 
 
We generally presume that criminal liability will not be 
imposed without some level of mens rea.  See Commonwealth v. 
Miller, 385 Mass. 521, 524 (1982), quoting Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) ("[the] existence of a mens rea 
is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of 
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence").  Given this, the 
absence of explicit language involving mens rea in a statute is 
not dispositive of a legislative intent to create a strict 
liability offense.  See Brown, 479 Mass. at 606-607. 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 12E, does not contain any language 
specifying a requisite mens rea.  Therefore, we must determine 
whether, in enacting it, the Legislature intended to create a 
strict liability, public welfare offense.  As discussed, public 
welfare statutes criminalize conduct that has not necessarily 
caused harm but is "potentially harmful or injurious" (emphasis 
added).  See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607.  See also Morissette, 342 
10 
 
 
U.S. at 255-256 ("Many violations of [public welfare offenses] 
result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property 
but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law 
seeks to minimize"); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 567, 569 
(1867) ("[strict liability] is the general rule where acts which 
are not mala in se are made mala prohibita from motives of 
public policy, and not because of their moral turpitude or the 
criminal intent with which they are committed"). 
 
The discharge of a firearm within 500 feet of a building is 
such conduct.  Firearms do not cause harm merely by existing.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 714 (2009) 
("unlicensed possession of a firearm itself is a regulatory 
crime.  It is passive and victimless"); Commonwealth v. 
Alvarado, 423 Mass. 266, 270 (1996) ("carrying a concealed 
weapon is not, standing alone, an indication that criminal 
conduct has occurred or is contemplated").  Neither is the 
discharge of a firearm inherently harmful.  Cf. Ezell v. 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 709 (7th Cir. 2011) (government failed to 
show that "civilian target practice at a firing range creates 
such genuine and serious risks to public safety that prohibiting 
range training throughout the city is justified").  Rather, when 
firearms are discharged, they create a risk of harm.  It is 
important to note that the statute at issue here only 
criminalizes discharges within 500 feet of a dwelling or 
11 
 
 
building in use, not within 500 feet of any building.  See G. L. 
c. 269, § 12E.  This indicates that the Legislature intended to 
reduce the risk of injuries to people who might be nearby, a 
risk that regrettably came to fruition here.  The statute is 
consistent with a public welfare offense because it punishes 
risky behavior, not behavior that necessarily has caused a harm. 
 
One important factor to consider in determining whether the 
Legislature intended to create a strict liability offense, 
albeit not dispositive, is the potential length of punishment.  
Early public welfare offenses "almost uniformly involved 
statutes that provided for only light penalties such as fines or 
short jail sentences."  Staples, 511 U.S. at 616, citing 
Raymond, 97 Mass. at 567 (fine of $200, six months in jail, or 
both, under St. 1866, c. 253, § 1, for killing calf less than 
four weeks old for purpose of sale), Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 
Allen 489, 490 (1864) (fine for selling adulterated milk), and 
People v. Snowburger, 113 Mich. 86, 87-88, 90 (1897) (fine of 
$500 or incarceration in county jail for selling adulterated 
food).  Because our system of criminal law generally presumes 
that mens rea is required, "imposing severe punishments for 
offenses that require no mens rea would seem incongruous."  See 
Staples, supra at 616-617. 
 
Therefore, we have interpreted statutes that contain no 
specific mens rea requirement, but that provide a harsh penalty, 
12 
 
 
to contain an implicit requirement of a particular mens rea.  
See Commonwealth v. Collier, 427 Mass. 385, 388 (1998) (two and 
one-half year maximum sentence for violating protective order); 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 907, 916 (1976) (five-
year maximum penalty and one-year mandatory minimum for carrying 
firearm without license); Commonwealth v. Boone, 356 Mass. 85, 
87 (1969), citing G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 
1957, c. 688, § 23 (then five-year maximum sentence for carrying 
firearm in vehicle without license); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 
354 Mass. 508, 511-512 (1968) (five-year maximum sentence for 
being present where narcotic drug was held).4 
 
The United States Supreme Court similarly has inferred a 
mens rea requirement where statutes contain severe penalties.  
See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72, 78 
(1994) (X-Citement) (ten-year maximum for violation of act 
protecting children against sexual exploitation); Staples, 511 
U.S. at 615 (ten-year maximum period of incarceration for 
possessing unregistered machine gun); Liparota v. United States, 
471 U.S. 419, 420 n.1, 433 (1985) (five-year maximum penalty for 
unlawfully acquiring or possessing food stamps).  See also 
                     
 
4 On occasion, we have held that crimes with very harsh 
penalties may be strict liability offenses, but only where there 
is "clear legislative language indicating that mens rea was not 
required for conviction."  Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 
224, 228-229 (1992), citing Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 
508, 511-512 (1968). 
13 
 
 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 
n.18 (1978) (noting that new maximum penalty of three years and 
$100,000, which was not applicable to defendants in that case, 
weighed towards implying mens rea requirement in antitrust 
violations of Sherman Act). 
 
On the other hand, in Tart, 408 Mass. at 265, we declined 
to imply a mens rea requirement in part because "[t]he maximum 
penalties . . . , imprisonment for thirty days and a $50 fine, 
[were] relatively small" (quotation omitted).  Similarly, in 
Commonwealth v. Minicost Car Rental, Inc., 354 Mass. 746, 748 
(1968), we held that violation of a parking regulation was a 
strict liability offense because "the penalty of a fine not 
exceeding $20 is very definitely minor." 
 
Here, G. L. c. 269, § 12E, provides a maximum penalty of 
one hundred dollars, three months' incarceration, or both.  
Incarceration for any length of time is a serious consequence 
that we do not wish to trivialize.  Nonetheless, given our 
existing jurisprudence, imprisonment for three months falls 
squarely within the category of "fines or short jail sentences" 
that are characteristic of public welfare offenses.  See 
Staples, 511 U.S. at 616.  The length of punishment here thus 
14 
 
 
does not compel us to impose a mens rea requirement that is not 
present in the plain language of the statute.5 
 
Another relevant factor is the ability of a defendant to 
take actions to avoid violating the statute.  In Dean v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 568, 570 (2009), the Court examined a statute 
that criminalized discharge of a firearm during the commission 
of certain crimes.  The Court held that no mens rea for the 
discharge was necessary, because "[t]hose criminals wishing to 
avoid the penalty for an inadvertent discharge can lock or 
unload the firearm, handle it with care during the underlying 
violent or drug trafficking crime, leave the gun at home, or --
best yet -- avoid committing the felony in the first place."  
Id. at 576.  Similarly, in X-Citement, 513 U.S. at 76 n.5, the 
Court noted that imposing strict liability on pornography 
producers regarding the age of the performers was logical 
because "producers are more conveniently able to ascertain the 
age of performers." 
                     
 
5 Another factor that has appeared occasionally in our 
common law is whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor.  
"Close adherence to the early cases . . . might suggest that 
punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with 
the theory of the public welfare offense."  Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994).  But the offense here, 
discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, is a 
misdemeanor.  Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 
721 (2008).  Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of 
implying a mens rea requirement. 
15 
 
 
 
Conversely, if a statute is likely to criminalize behavior 
by those who cannot easily avoid violating the statute, strict 
liability is impermissible.  See X-Citement, 513 U.S. at 76 n.5, 
78.  In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148 (1959), the 
Supreme Court examined a statute that criminalized the sale of 
books containing any "obscene or indecent writing."  The Court 
reasoned that, without a mens rea requirement, "[e]very 
bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself 
[or herself] aware of the contents of every book in his [or her] 
shop.  It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an 
approach to omniscience."  Id. at 153. 
 
With the statute at issue here, by contrast, firearm owners 
can take simple steps to ensure compliance.  Firearm owners 
generally have control over whether they discharge their 
weapons.  Additionally, many firearms have features designed to 
reduce accidental discharges.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131K ("Any 
firearm . . . without a safety device designed to prevent the 
discharge of such weapon by unauthorized users . . . including, 
but not limited to, mechanical locks or devices designed to 
recognize and authorize, or otherwise allow the firearm to be 
discharged only by its owner or authorized user, . . . provided, 
that such device is commercially available, shall be defective 
and the sale of such a weapon shall constitute a breach of 
warranty . . .").  See, e.g., Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 973 
16 
 
 
(9th Cir. 2018) ("Two [California statutes] require that a 
handgun have a chamber load indicator and a magazine detachment 
mechanism, both of which are designed to limit accidental 
firearm discharges"); United States v. Richardson, 51 Fed. Appx. 
90, 92 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1240 (2003) 
("weapon had three safety features to prevent an unintended 
firing"); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Brooks, 14 F.2d 
307, 308 (8th Cir. 1926) (noting "many safety features of the 
gun which would tend to prevent [discharge] from occurring 
accidentally"). 
 
Here, the undisputed evidence was that the Springfield 
XD .40 firearm required the user to depress the trigger in order 
to disassemble the weapon.  At trial, the defendant described 
the weapon as having a "terrible design."  A police lieutenant 
testified that the firearm was risky to disassemble because it 
required pulling the trigger in order to do so.  He also 
testified that this model of firearm was not approved for 
civilian use in Massachusetts. 
 
Despite the dangers associated with this particular type of 
firearm, the defendant stored it in Massachusetts, and he 
demonstrated its features to the victim inside his father's 
house.  The defendant testified that he handed the firearm to 
the victim and was not paying attention to the victim for part 
of the time while the victim was holding the firearm.  When the 
17 
 
 
victim handed it back, the defendant became aware that it 
"wasn't fed properly," but he nonetheless depressed the trigger 
in order to disassemble the weapon.  There were many precautions 
that the defendant could have taken to avoid the subsequent 
accidental discharge.6 
 
In light of all the above, we conclude that the Legislature 
intended to create a strict liability, public welfare offense.7 
 
ii.  Second Amendment.  Where fairly possible, a statute 
must be construed "so as to avoid not only the conclusion that 
it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 
Mass. 209, 214 (2011).  Therefore, "where [rights under the 
                     
 
6 Among other things, the defendant easily could have 
learned that this particular firearm was not approved for 
ownership in Massachusetts by examining the publicly posted list 
of approved firearms.  See Executive Office of Public Safety and 
Security, Approved Firearms Roster (Sept. 2019), https://www 
.mass.gov/doc/approved-firearms-roster-6/download [https://perma 
.cc/H7C6-ASF5].  See also G. L. c. 140, § 123 (prescribing 
testing requirements that firearm models must undergo before 
being approved for sale); G. L. c.  140, § 131 3/4 (delegating 
duty to Secretary of Public Safety to promulgate list of 
approved firearms); 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.00 (2016) 
(regulating promulgation of approved firearms roster). 
 
 
7 As the defendant points out, in Alvarez, 413 Mass. at 230, 
a case involving G. L. c. 94C, § 34J, which then established a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years for certain 
drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a school, we 
mentioned G. L. c. 269, § 12E, in language that suggested we 
considered it to have a mens rea requirement for the element of 
discharge.  To the extent the dicta in Alvarez, supra, made that 
suggestion, we now conclude otherwise, for the reasons discussed 
supra. 
18 
 
 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution] are at issue, 
we presume 'that some form of scienter is to be implied in a 
criminal statute even if not expressed.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 471 Mass. 138, 143 (2015), quoting X-Citement, 513 U.S. 
at 69.  The defendant argues that we should apply this principle 
of statutory interpretation here because the Second Amendment to 
the United States Constitution is implicated.  The regulated 
activity, however, falls outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment. 
 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-629 
(2008), the United States Supreme Court struck down parts of the 
District of Columbia's statutory scheme for handgun possession 
because "banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the 
nation to keep and use for protection of one's home and family 
would fail constitutional muster" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) 
(incorporating Second Amendment against States).  "Since Heller, 
'[c]ourts have consistently recognized that Heller established 
that the possession of operative firearms for use in defense of 
the home constitutes the 'core' of the Second Amendment.'"  
Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 235 (2013), quoting 
Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2012).  See Gould 
v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018), citing Kachalsky 
v. Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub 
19 
 
 
nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 569 U.S. 918 (2013); Drake v. Filko, 
724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. 
Jerejian, 572 U.S. 1100 (2014); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865, 876 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 952 (2013); National 
Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 206 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 1196 (2014); Tyler v. Hillsdale County 
Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); 
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011); and United States v. Focia, 
869 F.3d 1269, 1285 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
846 (2019). 
 
Here, however, the conduct at issue clearly falls outside 
the core Second Amendment right; by its terms, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 12E, does not punish the discharge of a firearm within a home 
where it is discharged in the "lawful defense of life and 
property."  Additionally, the statute does not prohibit 
discharge when the owner of the building in question has given 
permission.  Id.  Here, however, the defendant's father 
testified that he had not given the defendant permission to 
discharge the firearm in his home.  The statute also does not 
apply to "any law enforcement officer acting in the discharge of 
his [or her] duties."  Id.  Neither does the statute prohibit 
the discharge of a firearm at a licensed shooting gallery.  Id.  
20 
 
 
Cf. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 690 (ban on shooting ranges violated 
Second Amendment).  Therefore, we need not infer a mens rea 
requirement on this ground.  Cf. McGowan, 464 Mass. at 233 
(statute that "allows the owner of a firearm to carry or 
otherwise keep the firearm under the owner's immediate control 
within the home . . . falls outside the scope of the right to 
bear arms protected by the Second Amendment").8 
 
Rather, G. L. c. 269, § 12E, falls squarely within the 
category of firearm regulations not proscribed by the Second 
Amendment.  "From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, 
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was 
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any 
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."  McGowan, 464 Mass. 
at 237, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  The Second Amendment 
"does not imperil every law regulating firearms."  McDonald, 561 
U.S. at 786. 
 
In Heller, 554 U.S. at 632-633, the Supreme Court 
explicitly distinguished between laws that infringe on the right 
to bear arms for self-defense, which implicate the Second 
                     
 
8 Even under a broader reading of the Second Amendment that 
includes a right to bear arms for purposes of self-defense 
outside the home, see Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1070 (9th 
Cir. 2018), reh'g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019); 
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), our 
reasoning is not disturbed, as G. L. c. 269, § 12E, does not 
restrict the discharge of a firearm in lawful self-defense. 
21 
 
 
Amendment, and laws similar to the one at issue here, which do 
not.  The Court analyzed "founding-era laws" that prohibited the 
discharge of firearms "in certain places (including houses) on 
New Year's Eve and the first two days of January" in New York, 
the discharge of firearms "in streets and taverns" in Rhode 
Island, and the discharge of firearms within Boston.  See id.  
The Court stated that it was unlikely that these laws would have 
been enforced against a person who acted in self-defense.  Id. 
at 633.  The Court also noted that all these laws "punished the 
discharge (or loading) of guns with a small fine and forfeiture 
of the weapon (or in a few cases a very brief stay in the local 
jail), not with significant criminal penalties."  Id.  Based on 
this analysis, the Court determined that these founding-era 
statutes were consistent with its holding that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms in the home 
for the purposes of self-defense.  See id. at 635-636. 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 12E, is quite similar to the 
founding-era statutes discussed in Heller, 554 U.S. at 632-633.  
The statute prohibits discharge in certain locations, and it 
sanctions that discharge with a relatively minor punishment.  
Because the founding-era statutes are consistent with the Second 
Amendment right, G. L. c. 269, § 12E, the Massachusetts statute 
prohibiting discharge within 500 feet of a dwelling, is as well.  
See Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 346 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. 
22 
 
 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016), citing Heller, supra at 626–627, 
and McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 ("Nowhere in its dual decisions 
did the Supreme Court impugn legislative designs that comprise 
so-called general prohibition or public welfare regulations 
aimed at addressing perceived inherent dangers and risks 
surrounding the public possession of loaded, operable 
firearms"); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–703 ("if the government can 
establish that a challenged firearms law regulates activity 
falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it 
was understood at the relevant historical moment -- 1791 or 
1868 -- then the analysis can stop there; the regulated activity 
is categorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to 
further Second Amendment review").  In light of the above, we 
need not imply a mens rea requirement based on the Second 
Amendment. 
 
iii.  Due process.  Although not raised by the defendant, 
we briefly address the question of due process.  "Strict 
criminal liability is not necessarily a denial of due process of 
law . . . ."  Miller, 385 Mass. at 525.  Nonetheless, some 
strict liability statutes may run afoul of due process.  See 
Buckley, 354 Mass. at 510-511, citing Lambert v. California, 355 
U.S. 225, 228-230 (1957). 
 
In Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226, the United States Supreme 
Court considered a statute that required all residents of Los 
23 
 
 
Angeles who previously had been convicted of felonies to 
register with the chief of police within five days of moving 
into the city.  The Court held that the strict liability 
registration requirement violated due process because 
"[v]iolation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity 
whatever, mere presence in the city being the test," and because 
the defendant did not have "an opportunity . . . to avoid the 
consequences of the law."  See id. at 229.  See also United 
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438 (holding strict liability for 
Sherman Act violations unconstitutional because act "does not, 
in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify the conduct 
which it proscribes"). 
 
The statute in this case is readily distinguishable.  
First, violation of the statute requires an action, namely, the 
discharging of a firearm.  Cf. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229 
("Violation . . . is unaccompanied by any activity whatever 
. . .").  Additionally, as discussed, there are many ways for 
individuals to avoid accidental firearm discharges, thereby 
"avoid[ing] the consequences of the law."  Cf. id.  Lastly, the 
statute precisely "identif[ies] the conduct which it 
proscribes."  Cf. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438. 
 
In Staples, 511 U.S. at 610-611, the Supreme Court held 
that imposing strict liability for possession of a machine gun 
was unconstitutional.  The Court observed that, due to the "long 
24 
 
 
tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private 
individuals in this country," gun owners were not "on notice 
that they stand 'in responsible relation to a public danger'" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  Here, however, the regulated conduct 
is discharge, which implicates dangers not present in the simple 
possession of a firearm.  Additionally, as discussed, other 
States throughout the United States have a long history of 
regulating the locations in which firearms may be discharged for 
purposes other than self-defense or defense of another.  
Therefore, the reasoning in Staples, supra, does not apply. 
 
Having determined that the element of discharge in G. L. 
c. 269, § 12E, does not contain a mens rea requirement, and thus 
that the denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding 
was not erroneous, we turn to the charge of possession in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). 
 
b.  Instruction on statutory exemption.  The defendant 
argues that the trial judge erred in declining to instruct the 
jury on the statutory exemption of G. L. c. 140, § 129C (m).  
That exemption is relevant to the defendant's conviction under 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h), which provides, in relevant part, 
"Whoever owns, possesses or transfers a firearm, rifle, shotgun 
or ammunition without complying with the provisions of [G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C,] shall be punished . . . ."  Under G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129C, "[n]o person, other than . . . an exempt person . . . 
25 
 
 
shall own or possess any firearm . . . unless he [or she] has 
been issued a firearm identification card" pursuant to § 129B.  
Permissible exemptions include the "temporary holding, handling 
or firing of a firearm for examination, trial or instruction in 
the presence of a holder of a license to carry firearms."  G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C (m). 
 
The defendant requested an instruction concerning the 
exemption in G. L. c. 140, § 129C (m), and objected when the 
judge denied the request.  Therefore, we review for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 67 (2015).  The 
defendant thus is entitled to relief if (1) there was error and 
(2) the error was prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 
Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  An error is prejudicial unless "we can 
say with confidence that it did not influence the jury, or had 
but very slight effect" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 767, 777 (2019). 
 
The asserted error here was the decision not to give an 
instruction on a statutory exemption.  We treat the existence of 
a statutory exemption as equivalent to an affirmative defense.  
See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 214 (2005).  
Therefore, the decision not to instruct is error if the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, 
provided support for the affirmative defense.  See Commonwealth 
v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442-443 (2006).  Here, there was no 
26 
 
 
error; the undisputed evidence showed that the defendant's 
possession of the firearm was neither temporary nor exclusively 
in the presence of a holder of a license to carry. 
 
The defendant and the Commonwealth both compare the 
circumstances here to those in Commonwealth v. Bachman, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 757, 758, 760 (1996).  The defendant in that case met a 
man, who had a firearm identification card, in the home of the 
defendant's mother.  Id. at 758, 761.  The defendant showed the 
man multiple handguns and rifles, fired one of the rifles, and 
gave the man one of the handguns.  Id. at 758.  The defendant 
was charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of rifles 
and firearms.  Id. at 757. 
 
The Appeals Court explained that G. L. c. 140, § 129C (m), 
contains two provisions.  See Bachman, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 761-
762.  First, the statute exempts the temporary possession of a 
firearm in the presence of a holder of a license to carry for 
the purpose of examination, trial, or instruction.  See id.  
Second, the statute exempts the temporary possession of a rifle 
in the presence of a holder of a firearm identification card for 
the purpose of examination, trial, or instruction.  See id.  The 
court concluded that the exemption did not apply to the firearm 
charges because the man shown the weapons only possessed a 
firearm identification card, not a license to carry.  Id. 
at 760-761.  The defendant relies on this distinction in his 
27 
 
 
argument that both his father and the victim here had licenses 
to carry.  This argument disregards the Appeal Court's 
reasoning, which is directly applicable here, concerning the 
rifle charges.  The Appeals Court noted that the defendant owned 
the weapons and retained all but one of them.  See id. at 761.  
Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant's possession 
was not temporary, making the exemption inapplicable.  See id. 
at 762. 
 
The facts here are similar.  The defendant testified that 
he had owned the firearm in question for at least three months 
prior to the incident.  During the period immediately preceding 
the incident, the firearm was located in the Massachusetts home 
of the defendant's father, where the defendant lived at least 
part of the time.  Although the defendant's father and the 
victim each had licenses to carry, the defendant did not.  The 
defendant's father testified that the defendant was able to 
access the firearm at any time, even when his father was not 
present, so long as the firearm remained in the house.  The 
defendant testified similarly, but differed in his statement 
that, while he could access the firearm when his father was not 
present, he first had to obtain permission to do so, as he had 
on the day in question.  The defendant testified that on January 
20, 2013, he removed the weapon, in its case, from the closet, 
carried it to the bedroom, and then unlocked the case and took 
28 
 
 
out the weapon.  There was no testimony that anyone with a 
license to carry a firearm was present. 
 
Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the 
defendant does not assist his case.  The defendant's possession 
of the firearm was not temporary, as he had owned it for several 
months prior to the incident.  Additionally, when the defendant 
moved the firearm from the closet to the bedroom, he possessed 
it while not in the presence of a holder of a license to carry.  
See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 796 (2012) (evidence 
that defendant carried bag containing firearm was sufficient to 
establish possession).  The defendant argues, as he testified, 
that he had permission from his father, the holder of a license 
to carry, to remove the firearm from the locked box and display 
it to the victim.  General Laws c. 140, § 129C (m), however, 
requires the physical presence of a holder of a license to 
carry.  No reasonable view of the evidence would support the 
conclusion that the defendant's possession was temporary and 
solely in the presence of a holder of a license to carry.  
Accordingly, the judge did not err in declining to give the 
requested instruction on the exemption for temporary possession. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions and the order 
denying his postconviction motion for a required finding of not 
guilty are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.