Title: Commonwealth v. Hastings

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-13495 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  QUASIM HASTINGS & another.1 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     January 8, 2024. – May 13, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Indigent.  Parole.  Imprisonment, Parole, Disabled prisoner.  
Constitutional Law, Parole.  Practice, Criminal, Parole.  
Statute, Construction.  Mental Health.  Social Worker. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 14, 2003. 
 
An ex parte motion for funds to retain an expert, filed on 
August 12, 2022, was considered by Douglas H. Wilkins, J.; a 
motion for reconsideration was heard by him; and the case was 
reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Sharon Dehmand for the defendant. 
Andre A. Janiszewski, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
intervener. 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 Massachusetts Parole Board, intervener. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This appeal concerns the scope of the 
constitutionally mandated exception to G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G 
(indigency statute), carved out in Diatchenko v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 26-27 (2015) 
(Diatchenko II).  In particular, we address whether the 
exception authorizes a judge to allow an indigent prisoner's 
motion for funds to retain an expert witness for an upcoming 
parole hearing. 
Quasim Hastings, convicted of murder in the second degree 
in 2004, is eligible to be considered for release on parole.  He 
has been diagnosed with a mental disability and, therefore, is 
entitled to a parole hearing that affords him protections 
secured by art. 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution as well as Federal and State statutes prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of disability.  See Crowell v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 477 Mass. 106, 110-112 (2017). 
Prior to a 2023 parole hearing, appointed counsel for 
Hastings filed, in the original criminal case, a motion for 
funds to retain a forensic psychologist under Crowell.  A 
Superior Court judge allowed the motion. 
Hastings's counsel filed a second motion for funds to 
retain a social services advocate to assist with preparing a 
prerelease plan.  A different Superior Court judge denied this 
request for public funds.  The judge reasoned that the plain 
3 
 
language of the indigency statute limits his authority to 
approve funds to pending proceedings or appeals in any court.  
He found also that this court's constitutionally mandated 
exception does not extend to Hastings's statutory right to 
parole consideration.  The judge reported to the Appeals Court 
his denial of the motion for funds, and we granted Hastings's 
application for direct appellate review. 
For the following reasons, we conclude that Hastings's 
motion for funds to retain a social services advocate implicates 
his State constitutional right to reasonable disability 
accommodations.  Because the constitutionally mandated exception 
to the indigency statute applies, the order denying Hastings's 
motion for funds is reversed.2 
Background.  In 2004, Hastings pleaded guilty in the 
Superior Court to murder in the second degree and was sentenced 
to life with the possibility of parole in fifteen years.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 2; G. L. c. 127, § 133A.  Hastings, in 2015, was 
diagnosed with mental illnesses, including major depressive 
disorder with psychotic features.  Prior to Hastings's initial 
2019 parole hearing, the Massachusetts Parole Board (board) 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services in support of Hastings and the 
amicus letter submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services and Prisoners' Legal Services of Massachusetts. 
 
4 
 
requested an appointment of counsel from the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services (CPCS) based on Hastings's mental health 
disability.  CPCS assigned Hastings counsel.  In 2018, 
Hastings's counsel filed in his Superior Court criminal case a 
motion for funds to retain the services of a forensic 
psychiatrist to assist in the parole hearing.  See Commonwealth 
vs. Hastings, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 0376CR00106 (Berkshire 
County May 14, 2003).  A Superior Court judge allowed the 
motion.  The board denied Hastings's petition for parole in 
2019, and he was given a four-year setback.  See Roberio v. 
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 483 Mass. 429, 432 (2019) (period 
between board's denial of parole and prisoner's statutory right 
to subsequent review is referred to as "setback"). 
Hastings's counsel, in advance of the 2023 parole hearing, 
filed two additional motions for funds in Hastings's Superior 
Court criminal case.  In the first motion, filed on June 6, 
2022, $5,000 was requested to retain a forensic psychologist.  
Counsel represented that "[a]n updated evaluation and testimony 
by a forensic psychologist are necessary for . . . Hastings to 
adequately present his case for parole."  A Superior Court judge 
allowed the motion on June 10, 2022. 
Next, on August 12, 2022, Hastings's counsel filed a motion 
for funds to retain a social services advocate to assist with 
preparing a release plan.  According to counsel, "[p]art of 
5 
 
. . . Hastings'[s] application for parole will involve having an 
extensive release plan which requires application and acceptance 
by the Department of Mental Health as well as placement, 
housing, and other mental health services."  A different 
Superior Court judge (motion judge), on September 22, 2022, 
denied the motion for funds as exceeding the Superior Court's 
statutory authority.  He explained, "The [c]ourt's authority 
under G. L. c. 261, [§ 27B,] is limited to 'any civil, criminal 
or juvenile proceeding or . . . appeal in any court.'  A parole 
hearing is not 'in any court.'" 
Hastings's counsel, on October 19, 2022, moved for 
reconsideration.  The motion was supported by affidavits of a 
social worker and the director of the CPCS parole advocacy unit.  
The social worker noted that "[c]lients with disabilities often 
require experts specialized in services for people with 
disabilities."  She explained the advantages of retaining a 
clinician to identify appropriate support networks and services 
to assist a client's successful reentry into the community.  The 
director of the CPCS parole advocacy unit noted that the board 
"often relies upon expert evaluations and reports obtained by 
counsel via a motion for funds in determining the suitability of 
disabled prisoners for release on parole."  She added that it 
therefore is "imperative" for disabled parole candidates to 
present comprehensive release plans crafted by social services 
6 
 
experts capable of navigating complex intra-agency referrals, 
assessments, and specialized residential care.  She also 
submitted a list of docket numbers of over thirty cases in which 
Superior Court judges across the Commonwealth had allowed 
motions for funds to retain experts, including social workers, 
psychiatrists, and psychologists, to assist nonjuvenile disabled 
prisoners in parole hearings. 
The motion judge denied Hastings's motion for 
reconsideration.  The phrase "in any court" within G. L. c. 261, 
§ 27B, he reasoned, "limits the authority to authorize payment 
by the Commonwealth" to pending court proceedings.  Moreover, he 
determined that the constitutional exception to this rule, set 
forth in Diatchenko II, does not apply.  The motion judge stated 
that Hastings's right to parole consideration after serving 
fifteen years of a life sentence "arises by statute."  See G. L. 
c. 127, § 133A.  In contrast, he stated, a juvenile homicide 
offender's parole eligibility arises out of "a constitutional 
limitation on the court's authority to order a life sentence."  
While recognizing the board's duty to accommodate Hastings's 
disability, the motion judge concluded that "[t]he fact that the 
Legislature and [board] had provided no statutory avenue for 
relief against the Executive does not require disregarding the 
plain language of G. L. c. 261, § 27B[,] or the controlling 
7 
 
authority under that statute."  The motion judge reported the 
denial of the motion for funds for appellate consideration.3 
Discussion.  The indigency statute provides a mechanism for 
indigent litigants to obtain public funds to hire expert 
witnesses.  See Reade v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 472 
Mass. 573, 574, 578 (2015), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 946 (2016).  
Under G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4), on a finding of indigency, the 
court "shall not deny any request with respect to extra fees and 
costs if it finds the document, service or object is reasonably 
necessary to assure the applicant as effective a prosecution, 
defense or appeal as he would have if he were financially able 
to pay."  "Extra fees and costs" include the costs of "expert 
assistance."  G. L. c. 261, § 27A.  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Matranga, 455 Mass. 45, 50-51 (2009) (discussing judge's role 
in approving request for expert witness funds).  The indigency 
statute embodies the principle of "equal justice under the law" 
by ensuring that court house doors are not closed to the poor.  
Edwards, petitioner, 464 Mass. 454, 461 (2013). 
The text of G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, as the motion judge 
determined, refers solely to fees and costs associated with 
 
3 The motion judge expressed some doubt as to whether Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), was the 
proper mechanism by which his ruling could be reported.  In any 
event, Hastings subsequently consented to the reporting of the 
case to the Appeals Court.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as 
amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). 
8 
 
pending trials and appeals.  Despite its salutary purpose, the 
indigency statute does not apply every time an indigent litigant 
seeks public funds to assert a legal claim.  See Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
452 Mass. 764, 779 (2008) ("G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, read as a 
whole, makes clear that it is concerned with fees and costs that 
relate directly to the prosecution or defense of actions and 
appeals pending in a court . . . not an underlying adjudicatory 
proceeding before an administrative agency").  Section 27B 
provides in relevant part:  "Upon or after commencing or 
answering to any civil, criminal or juvenile proceeding or 
appeal in any court," a party may file an affidavit of indigency 
and request "waiver, substitution or payment by the commonwealth 
of fees and costs" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 261, § 27B.  
Section 27C (4) authorizes the payment of expert witness fees 
that are reasonably necessary "to assure the applicant as 
effective a prosecution, defense or appeal as he would have if 
he were financially able to pay" (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 261, § 27C (4).  And § 27A defines "extra fees and costs" as 
fees and costs "in addition to those a party is normally 
required to pay in order to prosecute or defend his case" 
(emphasis added).  G. L. c. 261, § 27A.  See Commonwealth v. 
Dubois, 451 Mass. 20, 33 (2008) (G. L. c. 261, § 27C, does not 
authorize payment of funds to hire handwriting expert for motion 
9 
 
for new trial); Commonwealth v. Carter, 429 Mass. 266, 270 
(1999) ("Section 27C does not authorize a judge to allow costs 
in connection with the presentation of a new trial motion based 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel").4 
In Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 25-26, we held that the 
indigency statute did not, on its face, authorize the 
expenditure of public funds for expert witnesses to assist 
juveniles in the context of an administrative hearing.  
"[General Laws] c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, the statutory provisions 
generally authorizing the payment of public funds to cover costs 
and fees of indigent litigants, apply most directly to costs and 
fees relating to court proceedings, not proceedings before 
administrative or executive agencies like the [parole] board."  
Id. at 26. 
The next question to address is whether Hastings's request 
for funds for expert witness services falls within the 
constitutionally mandated exception to the indigency statute 
carved out in Diatchenko II.  Notwithstanding the plain language 
of §§ 27A, 27B, and 27C (4), we held in Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. 
at 27-28, that a judge is authorized to grant funds for an 
expert witness whose assistance the judge deems "reasonably 
 
4 By amendment in 2001, Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (5), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), allows for the payment of 
costs associated with preparation of a new trial motion.  See 
Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30. 
10 
 
necessary" to protect an indigent juvenile homicide offender's 
constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity for release" 
at an initial parole hearing. 
This holding was foreshadowed by prior case law.  In 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 410 Mass. 680, 681-682 (1991), the 
defendant filed a postappeal motion in the Superior Court for 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of physical evidence in the 
Commonwealth's possession.  He maintained that the test results 
would constitute newly discovered evidence sufficient to support 
a motion for a new trial.  Id. at 682.  A Superior Court judge 
denied the motion.  Id.  In opining on the defendant's 
substantive claim, this court stated that the defendant's motion 
for DNA testing costs "is not cognizable under [G. L.] c. 261, 
§ 27C (4), because the funds sought are not related to a pending 
trial or appeal."  Id. at 684.  We acknowledged that this 
interpretation of § 27C "may work a hardship on convicted 
indigents seeking the funds to carry out a newly discovered 
scientific technique which could yield exculpatory evidence."  
Id.  We concluded that "[w]here the Legislature has chosen not 
to fund certain procedures not constitutionally mandated, 
however, this court may not rewrite the statute to do so."  Id.  
Likewise, in Carter, 429 Mass. at 270, we observed that the 
defendant "makes no claim that he was entitled constitutionally 
to funds for an investigator." 
11 
 
The Diatchenko II court carved out an exception to the 
indigency statute to safeguard a parole-eligible, indigent 
juvenile homicide offender's right under art. 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to a meaningful parole 
review.  See Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 27-28.  We explained: 
"Because the postconviction proceeding at issue here, a 
parole hearing for a juvenile homicide offender, is 
required in order to ensure that an offender's life 
sentence conforms to the proportionality requirements of 
art. 26, the proceeding is not available solely at the 
discretion of the State.  Rather, it is constitutionally 
mandated, and as such, it requires certain protections not 
guaranteed in all postconviction procedures.  It is 
appropriate, therefore, to construe G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-
27G, to authorize a Superior Court judge, upon motion of a 
parole-eligible, indigent juvenile homicide offender, to 
allow for the payment of fees to an expert witness . . . ." 
 
Id. at 27.5 
 
In this case, we agree with the motion judge's conclusion 
that Hastings's right to parole consideration arises by 
operation of G. L. c. 127, § 133A.  Statutory parole eligibility 
stands in contrast to parole eligibility that is "required in 
order to ensure that an offender's life sentence conforms to the 
proportionality requirements of art. 26."  Diatchenko II, 471 
Mass. at 27.  The constitutionally mandated exception to the 
 
5 In 2018, as part of the comprehensive criminal justice 
reform act, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 127, § 133A, to 
provide indigent juvenile homicide offenders with the "right to 
have appointed counsel at the parole hearing" and "the right to 
funds for experts pursuant to chapter 261."  G. L. c. 127, 
§ 133A, as amended through St. 2018, c. 69, § 98. 
12 
 
indigency statute, as outlined in Diatchenko II, does not sweep 
so broadly as to fund all requests for fees and costs whenever 
an indigent prisoner reaches statutory parole eligibility. 
Article 114, however, adds a "constitutional dimension" to 
Hastings's funding request "that does not exist for other 
offenders whose sentences include parole eligibility."  
Diatchenko II, 471 Mass. at 19.  Accordingly, we hold that a 
judge has the discretion to allow a motion for funds to pay for 
expert assistance as reasonably necessary to safeguard the 
indigent prisoner's constitutional rights prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of disability. 
We examined the board's duty to accommodate prisoners with 
disabilities in Crowell, 477 Mass. at 112-113.  In that case, 
Crowell asserted that the board's failure to properly consider 
the effects of his traumatic brain injury violated art. 114 as 
well as rights secured by Federal and State handicapped 
discrimination statutes.  Id. at 110.  See G. L. c. 93, § 103; 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Americans with Disabilities Act or 
ADA).6  This court vacated the dismissal of Crowell's complaint 
 
6 Article 114, ratified in 1980, provides:  "No otherwise 
qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, denied the 
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program 
or activity within the commonwealth."  See Carleton v. 
Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 791, 811 (2006).  "Actions to enforce 
the rights guaranteed by art. 114 . . . are authorized by G. L. 
c. 93, § 103," the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act.  Shedlock v. 
13 
 
challenging the denial of parole on procedural grounds and 
remanded for further findings.  Crowell, supra at 110-111.  
Nonetheless, we took the opportunity to discuss the board's 
constitutional and statutory obligations to accommodate 
Crowell's mental disability.  See id. at 111-112 ("the only open 
question is whether the plaintiff was excluded from the program 
[a fair hearing and parole review decision process], or 
discriminated against in the form of denial of parole, by reason 
of his disability").  See also Shedlock v. Department of 
Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 855-856 (2004) (art. 114 and ADA 
require reasonable accommodation in prison setting with due 
regard for penological concerns); Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., 406 Mass. 156, 160 (1989) (art. 114 claim 
brought by disabled prisoners unable to access library). 
As an example of a reasonable disability accommodation, the 
Crowell court cited expert witness funds, such as those sought 
by Hastings in advance of his 2023 parole hearing.  See Crowell, 
477 Mass. at 112.  Discussing the board's duty to accommodate 
disabled prisoners, we stated that "[w]here the board is aware 
 
Department of Correction, 442 Mass. 844, 852 n.6 (2004).  See 
Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar 
Junction, 406 Mass. 156, 159-160 (1989). 
 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act also 
prohibits public entities from excluding qualified disabled 
persons from participation in, or being denied the benefits of, 
services, programs, or activities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
14 
 
that a mental disability may affect a prisoner's ability to 
prepare an appropriate release plan in advance of a parole 
hearing, the board should make reasonable modifications to its 
policy, for example, by providing an expert or other assistance 
to help the prisoner identify appropriate postrelease 
programming."  Id.  The Crowell court did not, as the issues 
were not raised, identify a source of funding for needed expert 
assistance or consider that the board neither receives funds nor 
has a mechanism to authorize expert witness expenditures. 
This case squarely presents that issue.  A failure to fund 
a disabled prisoner's access to expert witness services would 
render hollow the constitutional right to "participat[e] in" and 
not be "denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination 
under any program or activity within the commonwealth."  Art. 
114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  
Applying the constitutionally mandated exception set forth in 
Diatchenko II, we construe the indigency statute to authorize a 
Superior Court judge, on motion by a parole-eligible, disabled 
prisoner, to allow for the payment of funds for expert services 
that are reasonably necessary to safeguard the prisoner's 
constitutional right to a parole hearing free of discrimination 
on the basis of disability. 
Conclusion.  The order dated September 22, 2022, denying 
Hastings's motion for funds to retain a social services advocate 
15 
 
to assist with preparing a prerelease plan for his upcoming 
parole hearing, is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.