Title: Marquiss v. Marquiss

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Marquiss v. Marquiss1992 WY 75837 P.2d 25Case Number: 90-184Decided: 07/07/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Janie S. MARQUISS, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Gary C. MARQUISS, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

John A. Coppede 
and Lawrence A. Yonkee, Redle, Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

Dwight F. Hurich 
of Preuit, Sowada & Hurich, Gillette, for appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, 
District Judge.

* Chief Justice at time of 
conference.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This court 
reviews a complex and highly-charged post-divorce child custody and visitation 
conflict which provides a general jurisdictional field of inquiry.1 The dispositive questions are: (1) 
whether a Wyoming divorce court has jurisdiction to enforce a non-custodial 
father's visitation rights when the custodial mother and the litigants' children 
have resided out-of-state for five years; and (2) if so, how? 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's jurisdictional authority to issue a civil contempt citation to 
enforce the father's visitation rights. We affirm the district court's order 
requiring delivery of the children to Wyoming for visitation as a proper 
exercise of discretion under the court's continuing jurisdiction as the divorce 
decree state. We accept the father's constructive stipulation in his appellate 
brief that the mother was improperly assessed attorney's fees and, as a result, 
we reverse that portion of the district court order. Finally, we determine that 
a provision in the district court order stating that a warrant would be 
issued for the mother's arrest if she failed to either bring the children 
to Wyoming or to show cause why she should not be required to do so does not 
constitute a final order and, consequently, is not subject to present appeal.2

I. FACTS

[¶3]      This case 
combines the concerns of a divorced husband and wife who cultivate all of the 
unreasonableness which is too often produced by domestic intranquillity. Janie 
S. Marquiss (mother) and Gary C. Marquiss (father) were married in Wyoming on 
August 23, 1973. Two sons, Christopher Scott Marquiss and Merritt Lee Marquiss, 
were born during the marriage which ended by a 1984 Campbell County, Wyoming 
divorce decree. The mother, in contesting the father's petition, was awarded 
custody, while the non-custodial father received explicitly-stated visitation 
rights providing:

     THE COURT DOES FURTHER 
FIND AND HEREBY ORDERS that both parties are fit and proper persons to have the 
care, custody and control of the parties['] two minor children. It is, however, 
hereby decreed that the [mother] shall have the general care, custody and 
control of the parties['] minor children, subject, however, to reasonable 
visitation rights in the [father]. Reasonable visitation for the [father] shall 
include alternate major holidays to coincide with school vacation times, 
including Easter, Thanksgiving and the Christmas-New Years holiday period. IT IS 
FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the [mother] is to have the minor children with her 
for the 1984 Christmas and New Year holiday and that the [father] is to have the 
minor children with him for the 1984 Thanksgiving holiday. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the children's birthdays are to be included among the alternate major 
holidays hereinabove set forth, provided, however, that the exercise of such 
visitation does not unduly interfere with the children's schooling.

     AND IT IS FURTHER 
HEREBY ORDERED that for the summer of 1984, the [father] shall have the minor 
children with him for the last week of June and the full month of July, and IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that for all summers beginning with 1985, that the [father] 
shall have the minor children with him for a period of six weeks during the 
summertime, said time to be between June 15th and August 15th of each year, 
subject however during such times to reasonable rights of visitation in the 
[mother].

     AND IT IS FURTHER 
HEREBY ORDERED that the [father] shall be entitled to have the children with him 
for two (2) weekends per month, beginning at 5:00 o'clock p.m. on Friday and 
continuing until 5:00 o'clock p.m. on Sunday. * * *

* * * * * *

     AND IT IS FURTHER 
HEREBY ORDERED that the Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the 
parties and the subject matter of this action for purposes of enforcing this 
Decree of Divorce and for purposes of exercising continuing jurisdiction over 
matters of alimony, child custody and support and related matters.

[¶4]      Soon after the 
divorce, the two boys moved with their mother to Texas where she resumed her 
career as a home demonstration agent for the Texas Department of Agricultural 
Extension Service. The father, a Wyoming rancher, remarried and thereafter 
maintained a continuous Wyoming residency. This protracted battle started when 
the divorce decree visitation provision was not honored by the mother following 
her move to Texas with the children shortly after the divorce and has, for 
almost eight years, never abated.

II. PRIOR 
PROCEEDINGS

[¶5]      In 1985 the 
father travelled to Texas to get his children for a visit to Wyoming, but was 
not allowed to see them. Upon returning home, he filed a motion in the Wyoming 
district court which had jurisdiction over his divorce for an order to show 
cause why the mother should not be held in contempt. Citing Wyoming's Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-5-101 through 20-5-125 
(1987), and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 
1738A (1989), the mother resisted with a motion asking the district court to 
dismiss the father's show cause motion and to decline jurisdiction in favor of a 
Texas court. In the alternative, she requested that the Wyoming district court 
vacate the hearing scheduled for her to show cause pending the outcome of her 
Tyler County, Texas District Court motion to modify the divorce decree and for a 
restraining order.3 Finally, the mother filed a 
petition in the Wyoming court to modify the divorce decree via a request for a 
restraining order and discontinuance of the father's right of 
visitation.

[¶6]      The Wyoming 
district court refused to decline jurisdiction and, instead, ordered the mother 
to bring the children to Wyoming. The order included a provision for a June 18, 
1985 hearing on the order to show cause. With the children present in Wyoming 
when the mother appeared at the hearing, the district court granted the father 
summer visitation rights. Later that fall, the father and mother stipulated to 
the following:

Janie S. Marquiss and 
Gary C. Marquiss agree that all previously ordered visitation shall be abided by 
the parties. To clarify the visitation as to the holidays, the parties agree 
that Gary C. Marquiss shall have the Christmas/New Years Holiday to coincide 
with the school vacation in 1985 and that Janie S. Marquiss shall have the 
Thanksgiving 1985 holiday vacation and the Easter/Spring Break vacation in 1986. 
In 1986 Gary C. Marquiss will have the Thanksgiving holiday vacation and in 1987 
the Easter/Spring Break vacation whichever is longer and Janie S. Marquiss shall 
have the Christmas/New Years holiday in 1986. The parties shall alternate 
holiday vacations thereafter. The parties shall alternate the children's 
birthdays if practical.

[¶7]      The stipulation 
was followed by a conforming order to dismiss which provided:

     This matter having 
been set down for hearing on August 16, 1985 and prior to that time the parties 
having entered into a stipulation whereby [mother] is agreeing to dismiss her 
petition and to provide for counseling and as the court has other concerns 
beyond the stipulation,

     IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY 
ORDERED that the Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree filed by Janie S. 
Marquiss shall be and is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the parties shall abide by all previously ordered visitation.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that Gary C. Marquiss shall have the Christmas/New Years Holiday to coincide 
with the school vacation in 1985 and that Janie S. Marquiss shall have the 
Thanksgiving 1985 holiday vacation and the Easter/Spring Break vacation in 1986. 
In 1986 Gary C. Marquiss will have the Thanksgiving holiday vacation and in 1987 
the Easter/Spring Break vacation whichever is longer and Janie S. Marquiss shall 
have the Christmas/New Years holiday in 1986. The parties shall alternate 
holiday vacations thereafter. The parties shall alternate the children's 
birthdays if practical.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the [mother] be evaluated by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist and 
the evaluation report to be sent to the court and counsel within four (4) months 
of the date of this order. The counselor shall address the issues as to whether 
or not Janie S. Marquiss is stable enough to be the custodial parent of the boys 
and further whether or not she is emotionally mature enough and able to insulate 
the children from her trauma as a result of the divorce. Janie S. Marquiss is to 
bear the expenses of the evaluation.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that all psychiatric reports shall be sealed subject to court order.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
the minor children of the parties, * * * are to continue in counseling at least 
bimonthly as long as the counselor feels it is necessary. [The father] is to 
bear the expenses of said counseling.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that Gary C. Marquiss and Janie S. Marquiss are to get additional counseling as 
is needed and prescribed as a result of the evaluations that have been performed 
and will be performed in the future. In addition to the counseling, Gary C. 
Marquiss is to take the parent effectiveness class offered by the Juvenile 
Planning Counsel * * * within the next three (3) months. Further, Janie S. 
Marquiss is to take an equivalent class if offered in the area of her residence 
or read the book Parent Effectiveness Training or its equivalent within 
the next three months.

[¶8]      Despite the 
stipulated intentions of the parents and the 1985 conforming order, it appears 
that the father has not enjoyed visitation privileges with his sons since 
1986.4

III. THE CURRENT 
SESSION

[¶9]      Because of the 
mother's apparent continued refusal to permit visitation, the father moved the 
Wyoming district court for another order to show cause on April 30, 1990. On May 
2, 1990, the district court issued a show cause order to be served on the mother 
in Texas. The order stated in part:

     This matter having 
come before the Court upon the Motion and Affidavit of the [father], praying for 
an Order requiring that the [mother] appear and show cause why she should not be 
held in Contempt of Court for her willful failure to obey the Decree of Divorce 
entered in this matter, and the Court being advised in the premises, and good 
cause shown therefore:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 
that the [mother] shall appear before the above named Court in the Campbell 
County Courthouse at Gillette, Wyoming on the 19th day of June, 1990 at the hour 
of 2:00 o'clock P.M. then and there to show cause, if she has any, why [the 
mother] should not be adjudged guilty of Contempt of Court and punished 
accordingly for willful disobedience of the Decree of Divorce entered in this 
matter which the Order and the disobedience of the [mother] are more fully 
described in the Affidavit of the [father], filed and contained in the Court 
files.

[¶10]   The mother responded with a motion 
to dismiss. In addition to asserting several technical objections, she contended 
that the order to show cause failed to state a claim and that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction in the proceeding. She elected not to appear for the June 
19, 1990 show cause hearing, but she was represented at the hearing by counsel. 
She also filed a supporting memorandum with the district court the day after the 
scheduled show cause hearing, which stated in part:

     Furthermore, Texas is 
the "home state" of the children under the provisions of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act. W.S. § 20-5-101 et seq. It is held that the provisions 
of a divorce decree remain open throughout the minority of the children 
involved, and the District Court granting the divorce retains continuing 
jurisdiction to the custody aspect of the decree, Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, Wyo. 
756 P.2d 1338 (1988); however, the Child Custody Act provides that litigation 
concerning the custody of children should take place in the state in which the 
children have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning 
care, protection, and personal relationships is most readily available. In this 
case a Wyoming court should decline to exercise jurisdiction regarding the 
Marquiss children who have been residents of Texas since August 
1984.

[¶11]   Relying on the continuing 
jurisdiction provisions of the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the district court 
denied the mother's motion to dismiss and issued the following order on June 27, 
1990:

JUDGMENT, ORDER OF 
CONTEMPT, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND ORDER TO PROVIDE 
VISITATION

     This matter having 
come on for hearing upon the Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause this 
19th day of June 1990. The [father] being present, represented by his attorney, 
* * *, the [mother] having failed to appear but represented by her attorney, * * 
*. The court after hearing the evidence finds as follows:

     1. That a motion was 
filed on April 30, 1990 requesting an Order to Show Cause accompanied by * * * 
an affidavit.

     2. An Order to Show 
Cause was issued to Janie S. Marquiss on May 2, 1990, directing Janie Marquiss 
to appear on June 19, 1990 in Campbell County, Wyoming before this 
court.

     3. That the motion was 
served on Janie Marquiss in the State of Texas personally on May 22, 
1990.

     4. Janie S. Marquiss 
has failed to appear as ordered in the Order to Show Cause and, therefore, is in 
contempt of this court.

     5. That [the father's] 
attorney's fees in the sum of seven hundred seventy-two dollars and fifty cents 
($772.50) should be paid by the [mother] to the [father].

     IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY 
ORDERED that * * * Janie S. Marquiss is in contempt of this court for failing to 
appear on the Order to Show Cause as ordered by this court.

     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that * * * Gary C. Marquiss, shall have judgment against Janie S. Marquiss, * * 
*, in the sum of seven hundred seventy-two dollars and fifty cents ($772.50) for 
attorney's fees.

     The court further 
finds that based on the evidence offered by the [father], that Janie S. Marquiss 
has not willfully violated the court's decree, but that there has been 
sufficient evidence presented to the court to raise the court's suspicions as to 
Janie S. Marquiss's motives.

     IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY 
ORDERED IN THE ALTERNATIVE that Janie S. Marquiss produce the minor children of 
the parties, * * * for visitation with the [father] no later than June 30, 1990 
by producing the children in Campbell County, Wyoming. Upon delivery of the 
minor children by the [mother] to the [father], [the father] shall reimburse the 
[mother] for costs of transportation. In the alternative, Janie S. Marquiss may 
appear before this court and show cause no later than June 30, 1990 as to why 
she should not comply with this order. Failing to produce the children or show 
cause why she should not comply, this court will issue a warrant for her 
arrest.

It is from this 
order that the mother appeals.

IV. ISSUES

[¶12]   The mother presents the following 
issues for review:

I.

Whether the sanction 
imposed by the district court's order of June 27, 1990, amounted to an order of 
criminal contempt rendering it null and void for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because in adjudicating whether the appellant should be found in 
contempt of court for failing to appear at a scheduled show cause hearing the 
district court failed to follow Rule 41(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure

     A. Whether the 
district court's June 27, 1990, order of contempt was criminal in nature because 
by lacking a "purge clause" the order unconditionally punished the 
Appellant.

     B. Whether in 
adjudicating the Appellant's alleged contempt for failing to appear at the June 
19 hearing, the district court was required to follow Wyo. R.Crim.P. 
41(b).

II.

Whether the district 
court abused its discretion because it was without power to impose an 
unconditional sanction that inured to the benefit of a private 
party.

III.

Assuming the district 
court's contempt citation is civil in nature, whether the court's order was 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse[] of discretion because in summarily issuing 
the order the court deprived the appellant of property without procedural due 
process in violation of her constitutional rights under both the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions

IV.

Whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it ordered that the appellant send her children 
to Wyoming

     A. Whether the 
district court could issue a civil contempt citation absent a finding that the 
Appellant wil[l]fully disobeyed the child visitation provisions of the divorce 
decree.[5]

 

The mother also 
included a request for appellate attorney's fees.

[¶13]   In response, the father adopted the 
issues set forth by the mother. With regard to the mother's first three issues, 
the father stated:

     Appellee concedes that 
the court's finding Janie Marquiss in contempt for failing to appear on the June 
19, 1990 hearing should be regarded as a criminal contempt rather than a civil 
contempt and that the court failed to follow the procedures in Rule 41(b) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellee would request the Supreme Court to 
remand to the District Court to follow the procedures set forth in Rule 41(b) 
and give Janie Marquiss an opportunity to be heard on why she failed to appear 
on the June 19, 1990 hearing.

The father 
expressly contested the mother's fourth issue as well as her request for 
appellate attorney's fees.

V. ANALYSIS AND 
RESOLUTION

[¶14]   This case achieves an unusual 
perspective in resolution. We begin by considering the fundamental aspects of 
the mother's fourth issue - jurisdiction and discretion for the divorce decree 
state court to enforce child visitation against a custodial parent who, with the 
children, has established residency in a different state following entry of a 
divorce decree. Next, we summarily dispose of the attorney's fee issue for 
present purposes on the basis of the father's concessions in his appellate 
brief. Finally, we decide whether a possible future arrest for contempt upon a 
failure to comply with a present court order seeking to enforce child visitation 
is a final order subject to appeal.

[¶15]   We follow the same standard of 
review enunciated in other child custody cases. In Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 
313 (Wyo. 1989), we said that "[w]e will not disturb the decision of the trial 
court * * * in the absence of some serious procedural error, a violation of a 
principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse of discretion." See also Deen v. 
Deen, 774 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1989) and Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 
1986).

A. Visitation 
Enforcement Jurisdiction - Validity of the Contempt Citation - UCCJA and 
PKPA

[¶16]   This case does not involve an 
initial custody determination or subsequent custody modification; rather, the 
case involves the jurisdiction of a decree state district court to enforce 
non-custodial visitation. In order to determine a Wyoming state court's 
jurisdictional authority to enforce non-custodial visitation, we begin by taking 
a brief historical look at the legislation designed to resolve child custody 
problems.

1. Historical 
Overview

[¶17]   Though we resolve the 
jurisdictional question in this case on the narrow basis of a divorce decree 
court's authority to enforce its own decree absent modification in another 
state, we necessarily begin our analysis by examining applicable state and 
federal laws governing child custody and visitation within the context of 
interstate enforcement.

[¶18]   Probably the foundational case 
investigating and discussing interstate responsibilities in custody and 
visitation was authored by California Supreme Court Justice Tobriner in Ferreira 
v. Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80, 512 P.2d 304 (1973). The decision 
was not based on either the UCCJA or the later-enacted PKPA, but defined its 
concept as "the courts have often observed, in resolving the issue `The 
leitmotif of all the cases of dealing with child custody is that the 
primary, paramount and controlling consideration is the welfare of the child.'" 
Ferreira, 109 Cal. Rptr.  at 86, 512 P.2d  at 310 (quoting In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 223, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243, 247 (1964)). Justice Tobriner further 
recognized:

An across-the-board 
application of that principle, however, would compel California courts to 
re-examine foreign decrees on the merits in all cases in order to 
ascertain if those decrees promoted the best interests of the child. With 
jurisdiction conferred by the physical presence of the child, this policy would 
denigrate the law of child custody in what Justice Jackson described as "a rule 
of seize-and-run." (May v. Anderson (1953) 345 U.S. 528, 542, 73 S. Ct. 840, 847, 
97 L. Ed. 1221 (dissenting opn. of Jackson, J.)).

Ferreira, 109 Cal. Rptr.  at 86, 512 P.2d  at 310 (emphasis in original).

[¶19]   Ferreira was complicated by an 
Idaho divorce, a San Francisco, California Superior Court modification, 
subsequent residence in Alabama and Delaware and, finally, dual proceedings in 
San Francisco and Orange County in California. The appeal came from the San 
Francisco court's determination to dismiss based on forum non conveniens 
which the California Supreme Court determined to be in error. The temporary 
custody ordered by the Orange County Superior Court was approved and the 
proceeding in San Francisco, which was reversed, was transferred in venue to be 
consolidated for further proceedings. Finitely, the court 
determined:

     We conclude, 
therefore, that ordinarily the California court should exercise its discretion 
to issue a stay of the proceedings in this state to permit a final adjudication 
in the state of the parent entitled to custody under existing decrees. Having 
retained jurisdiction of the cause, the California court may then issue its 
writs to enforce that judgment.

Ferreira, 109 Cal. Rptr.  at 92, 512 P.2d  at 316.

[¶20]   It was within the perspective of 
retained jurisdictional discretion that the operative concepts of both the UCCJA 
and PKPA essentially developed. The concerns afforded by Justice Tobriner in 
1973 remain equally persuasive almost twenty years later following enactment of 
the two pervasive sets of laws, one uniform by state enactment and the other 
preclusive by federal supremacy.

[¶21]   In response to the multitude of 
jurisdictional applications of full faith and credit and non-finality of custody 
concerns where dependent upon "best interest" examinations, the UCCJA has been 
enacted in all state jurisdictions. Am.Jur.2d Desk Book, Item No. 282 (1992). 
The principle provided by the Uniform Act accorded flexibility built around the 
children's "home state." Wheeler v. District Court In and For City and County of 
Denver, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974); In re LeMond, 182 Ind. App. 626, 395 N.E.2d 1287 (1979); Brooks v. Brooks, 20 Or. App. 43, 530 P.2d 547 (1975); 
McAtee v. McAtee, 174 W. Va. 129, 323 S.E.2d 611 (1984); Sheldon R. Shapiro, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, 96 A.L.R.3d 968 (1979).

[¶22]   Wyoming adopted its version of the 
UCCJA in 1973. The Wyoming UCCJA confines jurisdiction only to matters 
pertaining to "custody determination." Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104. "Custody 
determination" is defined in Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-103(a)(ii) as "a court order and 
instructions providing for the custody of a child including visitation 
rights, but does not include a decision relating to child support or any other 
monetary obligation of any person * * *." (Emphasis added.) See also Rodgers v. 
Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶23]   The PKPA, Wyoming Senator Wallop's 
insertion into a completely different law,6 is essentially directed to finality 
and certainly contrary to the UCCJA's inherent changeability and the possibility 
of concurrent jurisdiction in more than one state. The federal act provides 
preeminence and equivalent predominance to the rendering (decree) state. Two 
different analyses are found concerning the relationship between the UCCJA and 
the PKPA; one of which is that the PKPA "strengthens" the Uniform Act and the 
other is that it substantially alters the state statutes under the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitution jurisdictional aspect of federal law. 
Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody Cases § 9.11, at 121-22 (1983) 
(footnotes omitted) stated:

The federal Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) strengthens § 14 [of the UCCJA] by 
permitting modification in the second state only where the rendering state no 
longer has jurisdiction.

     Some courts have held 
that where a child and one contestant have established a new home state pursuant 
to § 3, the rendering court and the new home state court have concurrent 
modification jurisdiction. Some courts have gone further by holding that the 
original court loses its jurisdiction once the child acquires a new home state. 
This view, however, is a minority position.

     The so-called 
Bodenheimer theory [a principal author of the UCCJA] interprets § 14 as 
positing exclusive modification jurisdiction in the rendering state unless the 
rendering state has declined to exercise jurisdiction. This view has been 
followed by the majority of jurisdictions.

     The PKPA has adopted 
the Bodenheimer theory, applying the exclusive jurisdiction provisions as a 
matter of federal law even to the few states which have not adopted the UCCJA. 
However, in order to merit such treatment, the rendering court must have 
acquired its original jurisdiction consistent with the federal 
requirements.

Further analysis 
is found in Jane Moran, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: An Analysis 
of Its History, a Prediction of Its Future, 84 W. Va.L.Rev. 135, 137-38 
(1981):

     State court decisions 
demonstrate a high history of inconsistent law, conflicting decisions on an 
often unpredictable and arbitrary approach by judges in their search for a 
custody jurisdiction formula serving the best interests of the child and of the 
contestants. Too often the decisions indicate that the court's sympathy was 
swayed more by the ongoing battle of the parents then by the needs of their 
child.

[¶24]   The PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, quoted 
in full text by the court in Appendix A to Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 
306-08 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 1436, 75 L. Ed. 2d 794 
(1983), provides in specific detail:

     "(a) The appropriate 
authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not 
modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody 
determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court 
of another State.

     (b) As used in this 
section, the term -

* * * * * *

     (3) `custody 
determination' means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for 
the custody or visitation of a child, and includes a permanent and temporary 
orders, and initial orders and modifications;[7]

     (4) `home State' means 
the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived 
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six 
consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the 
State in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of 
temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or 
other period;[8] 

     (5) `modification' and 
`modify' refer to a custody determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, 
or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the 
same child, whether made by the same court or not;

* * * * * *

     (7) `physical custody' 
means actual possession and control of a child; and

* * * * * *

(c) A child custody 
determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of 
this section only if -

(1) such court has 
jurisdiction under the law of such State; and

(2) one of the following 
conditions is met:

* * * * * *

(E) the court has 
continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.

     (d) The jurisdiction 
of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently 
with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of 
subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the 
residence of the child or of any contestant.

     (e) Before a child 
custody determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard 
shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not 
been previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a 
child.

     (f) A court of a State 
may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of 
another State[.]"

2. Case Law and Analysis 
- Decree State - Original Home State - Present Home State

[¶25]   It is recognized that within the 
supremacy attribute of federal law, the enactment of the PKPA generally 
eliminated concurrent jurisdiction by conferring exclusive modification 
jurisdiction to the decree state which was originally the home 
state.

     The P.K.P.A. is not a 
radical departure from the U.C.C.J.A.; in fact, the two acts are similar if not 
identical on a number of points. Significant differences exist, however, because 
the P.K.P.A. was drafted, in part, to fill the gaps which existed under the 
U.C.C.J.A.

     The key distinction 
between the two acts is that under the U.C.C.J.A., the existence of any one of 
the conditions set forth in subsections (c)(2)(A), (B)(ii), (C) or (D) of the 
P.K.P.A. is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a state court. As a result, 
there may be concurrent jurisdiction between two states.

     Subsection 
(c)(2)(B)(i) of the P.K.P.A. eliminates the possibility of concurrent 
jurisdiction by conferring exclusive modification jurisdiction upon the home 
state of the child (i.e., the state which rendered the initial decree). 
That subsection, coupled with the continuing jurisdiction provision of 
subsection (d), reflects a bias on the part of the P.K.P.A. in favor of the home 
state. The P.K.P.A. is a departure from the jurisdictional requirements of the 
U.C.C.J.A. and this departure is critical to the efficacy of the new Act because 
a state court may no longer modify existing decrees of other states pursuant to 
the various and flexible bases of jurisdiction provided in the U.C.C.J.A. 
Instead, in order to modify a decree, the home state must no longer have 
jurisdiction or must have declined to exercise such jurisdiction.

Scott T. 
Dickens, Note, The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act: Application and 
Interpretation, 23 J.Fam.L. 419, 426 (1984-85) (emphasis added and footnotes 
omitted). For a similar analysis, see Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child 
Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 Minn.L.Rev. 711, 853 
(1982).9

[¶26]   The dichotomy between home state 
and state of original jurisdiction was forcefully dissected in Voninski v. 
Voninski, 661 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn. App. 1982). The case considered a New York 
divorce and subsequent home state status in Tennessee with a proceeding to 
modify visitation later pursued in both states. The Tennessee court examined the 
1980 PKPA in conjunction with the UCCJA and the state law of both New York 
(decree state) and Tennessee (present home state). The court recognized that 
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. 
VI, § 2, the PKPA "establishes a policy of federal pre-emption in the area of 
custody jurisdiction." Voninski, 661 S.W.2d  at 876. The application of the UCCJA 
and the PKPA made in Voninski was called into question regarding the decree 
state primacy and it was effectively superseded by adoption in State ex rel. 
Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1985). See also Steven M. Schuetze, 
Note, Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S. Ct. 513, 98 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1988): 
The Jurisdictional Dilemma of Child Custody Cases Under the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act, 16 Pepperdine L.Rev. 409 (1989).

[¶27]   There are three Wyoming cases that 
require review; reconciliation is not possible. The first was State ex rel. 
Klopotek v. District Court of Sheridan County, 621 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1980) (decided 
December 10, 1980). The PKPA became effective December 28, 1980 (or a later date 
since there is confusion in the statute) so that Klopotek to the extent of any 
discussion included in decision is subject to supersession by the subsequent 
federal statute. Actually, the result in the case is not particularly 
inconsistent, but the federal statute was obviously not discussed since not then 
effective.

[¶28]   The second case, which is well 
cited in literature and as precedent in other cases, is Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 
authored by Justice Thomas, in which the PKPA was liberally cited and 
specifically added in haec verba as Appendix A.

[¶29]   There is a third case more recently 
written which also comes within the scope of law covered by the preclusive PKPA 
- Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1987). Quenzer and the UCCJA are 
liberally cited in Rosics, but the determinative and preclusive PKPA is not 
mentioned. Law professors, students and some judges have failed to reconcile 
Rosics to either Quenzer or the PKPA.10 We cannot either. This decision 
will be consistent with Quenzer in general, although a somewhat different 
factual situation on jurisdiction was presented and expressly supersedes Rosics 
in regard to the unmentioned PKPA-defined retained decree state jurisdiction. In 
most recent time, we have added a fourth case, State ex rel. Griffin v. District 
Court of the Fifth District, 831 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1992).

B. Contempt 
Citation.

[¶30]   The original custody decree is 
valid until superseded by a properly entered and finalized custody modification 
order by a court with jurisdiction. Daily v. Dombroski, 250 Ga. 236, 297 S.E.2d 246 (1982); Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990). See also Nicholaus v. 
Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338 (Wyo. 1988). This record does not show that any 
modification order, valid or invalid, had been entered by a Texas court at the 
time this current proceeding was heard and decided in Wyoming. Daily, 297 S.E.2d 246. Accord Hanson v. Leckey, 754 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App. 1988).

[¶31]   Where no modification is sought or 
obtained, the courts have consistently held that the UCCJA does not apply to 
contempt proceedings, generally reasoning that the Uniform Act does not affect a 
court's inherent power to enforce its own custody order. See Danny R. Veilleux, 
Annotation, What Types of Proceedings or Determinations are Governed by the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA), 78 A.L.R.4th 1028, §§ 14 and 15 (1990). See also Daily, 
297 S.E.2d 246. Such is the case here.

     The ordinary method of 
enforcing custody and visitation rights is a contempt proceeding. For example, 
where a wife refuses to permit her husband to exercise his visitation rights she 
is guilty of an indirect contempt of court, and the husband may institute a 
civil contempt proceeding to enforce his rights. * * *

* * * * * *

     Jurisdiction over 
contempt proceedings related to a child custody order remains in the court which 
had jurisdiction over the custody proceeding.

24 Am.Jur.2d, 
Divorce and Separation, § 997 at 990-91 (1983) (footnotes omitted).

[¶32]   Both subject matter and in personam 
jurisdiction must be present before a child visitation enforcement matter can be 
heard by a court. The Marquiss divorce decree stated that "the Court shall 
retain continuing jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this 
action for purposes of * * * exercising continuing jurisdiction over matters of 
* * * child custody * * * and related matters." Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-106 provides 
for notice to be given to out-of-state parties prior to the exercise of decree 
enforcement or modification under the court's continuing jurisdiction. See also 
Wyo. Stat. § 5-1-107 (1977) (Wyoming's long-arm statute).

[¶33]   Graham v. Fenno, 734 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 
1987) involved a contempt proceeding for nonpayment of child support. We held 
that minimum contact principles of personal jurisdiction applied only to 
jurisdiction in the original divorce proceeding. We noted that a contempt action 
is an appropriate remedy for failure to make support payments pursuant to a 
divorce decree. Graham also points out that it is well-settled law in Wyoming 
that "once a court obtains proper jurisdiction, that court retains jurisdiction 
to modify or enforce support obligations provided for in the decree." Id. at 
985. Once jurisdiction in a divorce action attaches, the district court's power 
over the defendant's person continues until all matters arising out of that 
litigation are resolved and is not lost by removal of the defendant from the 
state.

[¶34]   In a case with facts similar to the 
case at bar, the court in In re Paternity of J.L.V., 145 Wis.2d 308, 426 N.W.2d 112 (1988) rejected a father's contention that the trial court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions for his contempt of court in 
response to his refusal to comply with visitation rights established in an 
earlier order. The parties were divorced in Wisconsin and the father was granted 
custody of the minor child and visitation rights were granted to the mother. The 
father moved to Texas with the child, cut off communications with the mother 
and, contrary to court orders regarding visitation, would not allow the mother 
to have Christmas visitation. The mother filed motions for contempt and expanded 
visitation. The father was served and counsel for the father appeared at the 
hearing and objected to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court 
granted the mother's motion for contempt and denied the father's subsequent 
motion to dismiss. The appellate court found that the appeal did not involve a 
child custody determination or modification, but rather an enforcement 
proceeding because the court only granted the mother's motion for contempt. 
Therefore, a determination of jurisdiction under the Wisconsin UCCJA was 
unnecessary. In affirming, the court concluded that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to impose remedial or punitive sanctions on the father for contempt 
of court.

[¶35]   In Levis v. Markee, 771 S.W.2d 928 
(Mo. App. 1989), a Missouri appellate court held that a contempt hearing did not 
constitute a custody determination governed by the UCCJA. The court held that 
the lower court acted within its discretion in hearing a motion for contempt 
since it had continuing subject matter jurisdiction and the inherent power to 
enforce its own custody order. According to the appellate court, there was no 
determination regarding the child's best interests and thus no requirement for 
modification jurisdiction. The court concluded that there was a great difference 
between modification jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction, stating that 
modification jurisdiction involved holding an evidentiary hearing to determine a 
change in circumstances and the child's best interests, whereas enforcement 
jurisdiction was limited to determining whether a custody order was valid when 
entered. See also In re Marriage of Corrie, 32 Wn. App. 592, 648 P.2d 501 
(1982).

[¶36]   Finally, in Com. ex rel. Taylor By 
and Through Taylor v. Taylor, 332 Pa. Super. 67, 480 A.2d 1188 (1984), the 
court, while acknowledging that the lower court had lost its jurisdiction to 
modify its prior custody order under the UCCJA, held that it did not lose its 
jurisdiction to enforce the prior custody decree. "`There can be no question 
that courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful 
orders through civil contempt.'" Id. 480 A.2d  at 1189 (quoting Simmons v. 
Simmons, 232 Pa. Super. 365, 369, 335 A.2d 764, 766 (1975)). If the original 
custody order was validly modified, then the court of original jurisdiction 
cannot enforce the initial custody order. On the other hand, however, if it was 
not validly modified then the original court can enforce the initial 
order.

[¶37]   In the present case, the validity 
of the original decree and custody determination is not contested. In addition, 
the question of whether or not the Wyoming district court had continuing subject 
matter jurisdiction of the underlying custody matter under the UCCJA for 
purposes of modifying custody is irrelevant to a determination of whether the 
Wyoming district court has continuing enforcement jurisdiction. If either party 
had petitioned the Wyoming district court for modification of the original 
decree, even to the extent of seeking to extend or clarify visitation rights, 
the district court would have been required to examine its jurisdictional basis. 
However, because no such modification was sought by either party, no examination 
under Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104 was necessary. Daily, 297 S.E.2d 246. In any event, 
the PKPA controls and supports contempt jurisdiction for the Wyoming court. 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A(d). See also Dobbins v. Maner, 517 So. 2d 619 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1987).

[¶38]   We conclude that the Wyoming 
district court, where the original decree was granted, had continuing subject 
matter and in personam jurisdiction to enforce its original visitation order by 
issuing an order to show cause why the mother should not be held in contempt for 
denying the father court-ordered visitation. As in Graham, 734 P.2d 983, we hold 
that the Wyoming district court retains in personam jurisdiction over the mother 
to enforce the visitation provisions of the original divorce decree through a 
contempt action even though she left the jurisdiction. De La Pena v. Torrone, 
467 So. 2d 336 (Fla.App. 1985) (a case with similar facts except involving 
non-return instead of denied visitation). See also Dobbins, 517 So. 2d 619. This 
decision is consistent, although postured with a different decree state status, 
with State ex rel. Griffin, 831 P.2d 233.

[¶39]   Both parties in this case concluded 
that the district court's contempt citation was criminal in nature and, as such, 
failed to provide the requisite due process protections in W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) (now 
W.R.Cr.P. 42). We disagree and hold that the contempt was civil, not criminal, 
because the litigant could purge herself by either bringing the children to 
Wyoming for visitation or by appearing before the district court to show just 
cause why she refused to present the children for their period of visitation. 
Dobbins, 517 So. 2d 619; Hayes v. Hayes, 472 So. 2d 646 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). See 
also Honan v. Honan, 809 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1991). Failure of a parent to comply 
with visitation provisions of a divorce decree constitutes indirect civil 
contempt. Jaramillo v. State, 802 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1990); Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶40]   The district court had continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce its original divorce decree by issuing a show cause 
order. Civil contempt is an appropriate judicial remedy for the mother's failure 
to attend the show cause hearing.

C. Abuse of 
Discretion

[¶41]   After the mother failed to attend 
the June 19, 1990 show cause hearing and the district court found her in 
contempt, the court ordered her to either bring the children to Wyoming or, in 
the alternative, show cause by June 30, 1990 why she should not be required to 
do so. The mother contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction and thus 
abused its discretion when it issued the order absent a preliminary finding that 
she had willfully disobeyed the child visitation provisions in the divorce 
decree. In other words, the mother presents a circular argument which says in 
effect that the mother cannot be ordered to deliver the children until the court 
finds her "willfully disobedient," and, at the same time, the court cannot find 
her "willfully disobedient" until she refuses to deliver the children. We do not 
accept this reasoning.

[¶42]   After the father's 1990 summer 
visitation period with his children was due to begin and since the mother was 
already in contempt for failing to attend the June 19, 1990 hearing to show 
cause, the district court order provided one of two means by which the mother 
could purge herself of the civil contempt citation. See Levis, 771 S.W.2d 928 
(having been found in contempt for violating temporary child custody provisions, 
the custodial mother was required to pay the cost of an airline ticket to 
transport the child for visitation). The order requiring the mother to deliver 
the children to Wyoming was essentially part and parcel of the contempt 
proceeding and since the court had inherent power to enforce its own decree, the 
Wyoming version of the UCCJA, Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-5-101 through 20-5-125, does not 
apply to the contempt proceeding. See Levis, 771 S.W.2d  at 931 and Annotation, 
supra, 78 A.L.R.4th at 1063.

[¶43]   "Our rule is that we can uphold the 
decision of a district court if it is sustainable on any theory supported by the 
record." Goss, 780 P.2d  at 310. "The trial court does not abuse its 
discretionary authority if, under the circumstances found from the record, it 
could have reasonably concluded as it did." Id. at 313. The district court's 
order compelling the mother to bring the children to Wyoming constituted an 
appropriate attempt at enforcement of the father's visitation right.11 The district court's order in 
addressing benefit to the children was proper under the circumstances. Bachand 
v. Walters, 809 P.2d 284, 286 (Wyo. 1991). There was no abuse of 
discretion.

VI. 
ENFORCEMENT

[¶44]   Resolution of the district court 
jurisdiction still leaves explicit and implicit questions created by this appeal 
for future action required to enforce the court decree visitation provisions now 
unresolved for nearly eight years. If the mother does not adhere to this 
decision by arranging for visitation by the father, one ultimate risk to her can 
be loss of custody. Similarly, assuming voluntary compliance does not occur and 
she does not present herself in Gillette, Wyoming to answer the show cause 
order, including providing the two Marquiss sons for decree mandated visitation, 
general directions are indicated by the case law and adaptation of the federal 
and state statutory provisions.

[¶45]   Predominating is a general 
discretion of the trial court over any categorized or brightline approaches, 
concepts or requirements. Uhls v. Uhls, 794 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1990); Yates v. 
Yates, 702 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1985). At the same time, statutory implementation and 
implications should provide direction. This includes the PKPA, the Wyoming code 
in general and, in particular, Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-5-101, 20-5-107, 20-5-108, 
20-5-117 and 20-5-120. It should first be recognized that total discretion to 
address enforcement of the court order is not solely vested in the Wyoming court 
since the parent who has been denied visitation can alternatively elect to seek 
direct action in the present home state.

[¶46]   Remedies in the present home state 
would include enforcement by habeas corpus or full faith and credit proceedings 
based on the Wyoming decree. For a court to have jurisdiction in a habeas corpus 
proceeding for child custody, the children must either be physically present in 
the state, resident in the state, or be domiciled in the state. Adriance v. 
Adriance, 329 Pa. Super. 168, 478 A.2d 16 (1984). In addition to habeas corpus 
to be initiated in the Texas jurisdiction, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1980), 
assuming no modification of the Wyoming decree has been pursued in that state, 
another available procedure is to file the Wyoming decree in the new home state 
and then pursue enforcement by contempt processes. In re Marriage of Alush, 172 
Ill. App.3d 646, 122 Ill.Dec. 694, 527 N.E.2d 66 (1988); Funk v. Macaulay, 457 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. App. 1983).12

[¶47]   A more invidious and decisive 
remedy in forum jurisdiction exists for the father to petition in Wyoming for 
the district court to exercise its discretion and amend the visitation and 
custody provisions provided by the divorce decree. Based upon contempt in 
non-compliance with the existing decree provisions for visitation, the amendment 
could terminate the mother's custody either in total or in part. See, e.g., 
Steele v. Steele, 250 Ga. 101, 296 S.E.2d 570 (1982); Clark v. Clark, 404 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. App. 1980); and State ex rel. Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578 P.2d 814 (1978). Cf. Connors, 769 P.2d 336.

[¶48]   Initially, to supplement or augment 
this record, the decree state court should initiate contact with the new "home 
state" jurisdiction (Texas in this case). Such contact may be direct contact by 
the district court and its officers or indirect contact through advice and 
certification by counsel including the filing of appropriate stipulated or 
authenticated documentation reflecting the status and effect of any proceedings 
presently pending in another jurisdiction. Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-5-107(b) and (c) and 
20-5-108. See In re Marriage of Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. 1989). Interstate 
jurisdictional cooperation should be a primary effort before any actual 
modification of the visitation decree or general custody change as a last answer 
is undertaken.13 Matter of Appeal in Pima County 
Juvenile Action No. J-78632, 147 Ariz. 584, 712 P.2d 431 (1986). See also Waller 
v. Richardson, 757 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1988) and Tiscornia v. Tiscornia, 154 Ariz. 
376, 742 P.2d 1362 (1987).

[¶49]   Finally, before determining that an 
arrest warrant should actually issue, efforts which have been taken to achieve 
inter-jurisdictional accommodation provisions with the Texas court should be 
made a matter of record. Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-5-108; 20-5-102(a)(iv); 28 U.S.C. § 
1738A(d). This accommodation and inquiry effort would be provident whether the 
Texas action is initiated by the father through a habeas corpus proceeding in 
that jurisdiction, cf. Adriance, 478 A.2d 16, by Wyoming decree enforcement, 
Funk, 457 N.E.2d 223, or, conversely, by the mother in attempting to modify the 
Wyoming decree visitation rights in a Texas court without pursuing that course 
of claim to finality by an application in Wyoming where the original decree was 
written. Matter of Custody of Bhatti, 98 N.C. App. 493, 391 S.E.2d 201 
(1990).

VII. DECLINATION TO 
EXERCISE PRIMARY JURISDICTION

[¶50]   Although it is clearly recognized 
that the PKPA amended the UCCJA by creating a decree forum state predominance, 
Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122, it should not be considered that for modification, Wyo. 
Stat. § 20-5-107 is rendered completely ineffective. Of even more significance, 
Wyoming jurisdiction as the decree court in seeking to remain informed can elect 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-108 in meeting the 
alternative condition of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (declination to exercise 
jurisdiction to modify or by yielding to the new home state to 
enforce).

[¶51]   The courts have uniformly affirmed 
a trial court discretion to yield jurisdiction to a present home state, whether 
based on PKPA primacy decree jurisdiction, Murphy v. Woerner, 748 P.2d 749 
(Alaska 1988),14 or UCCJA concurrent jurisdiction. 
Zellat v. Zellat, 351 Pa. Super. 623, 506 A.2d 946 (1986) (where Pennsylvania 
yielded to a mother's new home state in Tennessee). There is also authority that 
even with jurisdiction as the decree state, the court should, at least 
initially, yield to the present home state. Schlumpf v. Superior Court of 
Trinity County, 79 Cal. App. 3d 892, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1978). For a "best 
interest consideration," see Clark v. Superior Court In and For Mendocino 
County, 73 Cal. App. 3d 298, 140 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1977). A contrary result to find 
abuse of discretion results if the trial court decision was apparently based on 
jurisdiction instead of discretion. In re Marriage of McEvoy, 414 N.W.2d 855 
(Iowa App. 1987); In re Marriage of Corrie, 648 P.2d 501.15

[¶52]   The factual basis for the decision 
to exercise predominant jurisdiction or the converse determination to abstain 
should be authenticated by a statement in the record for appeal purposes if 
further considered by this court and for the specific information of the present 
home state jurisdiction which should then be responsible to recognize and 
enforce the Wyoming decree except to the extent that a relinquishment for its 
more specific enforcement processes might be established. The home state 
jurisdiction which has the responsibility to recognize and enforce the Wyoming 
decree under the supremacy concept of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A continues to exist until 
the Wyoming court no longer has jurisdiction (e.g., neither parent nor the 
children live in Wyoming), or the Wyoming court declines to exercise 
jurisdiction to modify. See State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 
1990). Alternatively, the original divorce forum state has discretion to yield 
to the present UCCJA/PKPA home state even when the inherent power to enforce 
through civil contempt remains. Kirylik v. Kirylik, 292 S.C. 475, 357 S.E.2d 449 
(1987).

[¶53]   We would follow the direction 
delineated in Arbogast v. Arbogast, 174 W. Va. 498, 327 S.E.2d 675 (1984). That 
case presented an initial Kansas decree granting custody to the soon-to-become 
non-resident mother and awarded visitation to the Kansas residing father. After 
the mother left Kansas, every effort of the father to exercise visitation was 
rebuffed until finally the Kansas court changed custody to the father and 
divested the mother of visitation rights unless she would apply to the Kansas 
court. The mother refused to relinquish custody or provide for visitation, and 
the father sought enforcement in West Virginia where the mother then lived. The 
West Virginia trial court rejected its enforcement authority of the modified 
Kansas decree. The issue on appeal was enforcement of that modification and 
change of custody under the purview of the West Virginia UCCJA and the federal 
PKPA legislation. The West Virginia court observed:

     The federal and the 
uniform acts both attempt to eliminate judicial competition and conflicting 
decrees in interstate child custody disputes by establishing clear, definite 
rules about which state has jurisdiction of a custody dispute and enforcing 
orders of that state. However, the PKPA is more than a mere codification of the 
UCCJA. "The federal act is more rigid, allows less judicial discretion, and has 
attempted to provide more certainty as to the jurisdiction of courts. It 
eliminates many instances of concurrent jurisdiction which can, and did, occur 
under the uniform act. . . ." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122, 126 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1982). As a federal jurisdictional statute, the PKPA establishes a 
policy of federal preemption in enforcement of out-of-state custody disputes 
which, under the Supremacy Clause, takes precedence over state law and must be 
consulted first in determining whether the Kansas decree is entitled to 
enforcement here. * * *

     One of the primary 
distinctions between the PKPA and the UCCJA is that the federal act seems to 
more clearly prefer continuing jurisdiction in the state that issued a valid 
initial decree. Under the PKPA, enforcement of the Kansas modification decree is 
required if: (1) the initial custody decree was consistent with the provisions 
of the PKPA; (2) the Kansas court had jurisdiction under Kansas law to modify 
the initial decree; and (3) the child or one of the contestants has remained a 
resident of Kansas.

Id. 327 S.E.2d  
at 679-80 (footnote omitted).

[¶54]   The West Virginia court examined 
documents regarding the Kansas modification and determined the decree state 
retained jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the decision 
of the West Virginia trial court and remanded for enforcement - without stay for 
rehearing petition.

[¶55]   West Virginia did recognize and we 
agree that a punitive provision introduced as a decree modification may not 
require PKPA/UCCJA enforcement. Consequently, care should be exercised in what 
is done in Wyoming since Texas compliance enforcement may ultimately be desired 
or required. Brooks, 530 P.2d 547; In re LeMond, 395 N.E.2d 1287; Holt v. 
District Court for Twentieth Judicial Dist., Ardmore, Carter County, 626 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1981). Modification as an effort to enforce the original decree is 
not, for that reason alone, punitive. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675. The punitive 
change non-enforcement principle is confined in scope with the test being 
punishment. Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360 (Me. 1983). The concepts are 
otherwise defined as enforcement to be appropriate compared to punitive 
discipline of the offending parent as contempt of the court which is 
inappropriate and particularly so if in contravention of what may be the best 
interest of the child.

     This principle, 
however, is narrow; foreign decrees are punitive only if a sister state changes 
or awards custody, without regard to the best interest of the child, solely to 
punish one parent for disregarding its authority.

Id. at 1367 
(citing Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and 
Excessive Modifications, 65 Cal. L.Rev. 978 (1977)). See also Matter of Marriage 
of Settle, 25 Or. App. 579, 550 P.2d 445 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 276 Or. 
759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976) and Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of 
Laws, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207 (1969).

[¶56]   For the action previously taken by 
the district court in this case or hereafter required to enforce decree directed 
rights of visitation, we find that the district court has UCCJA and PKPA 
contempt jurisdiction.

VIII. ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

[¶57]   The district court awarded the 
father $772.50 for attorney's fees because the mother failed to appear in person 
at the June 19, 1990 show cause hearing. Because the father conceded three (of 
five) issues raised by the mother in this appeal, the father apparently conceded 
the issue of the propriety of the district court's attorney's fee award. 
However, since the issue may reoccur in further proceedings, we will briefly 
address the subject.

[¶58]   The award of attorney's fees in 
this case need not be defined to constitute a sanction for civil (or criminal) 
contempt. The district court had jurisdiction, both subject matter and in 
personam, to issue an order to show cause. Because the mother's non-appearance 
at the hearing amounts to a default, the district court can properly order the 
defaulting party to pay the father's attorney's fees. As in any divorce or child 
support proceeding, authority is derived from equitable powers in a marital 
proceeding, Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-111 (1987); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265 (Wyo. 1978); Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1977); Hanson, 754 S.W.2d 292; In re Marriage of Corrie, 648 P.2d 501. See also Jessen v. Jessen, 
802 P.2d 901 (Wyo. 1990). Cf. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. 
Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Wyo. 1989), where neither contract nor 
statute existed (including rule of procedure), imposition of attorney's fees 
became punitive and consequently determined the character of contempt as 
criminal. Non-compliance with a court order justifies award of attorney fees. 
Homeland Development Co. v. Holly Tp., 178 Mich. App. 239, 443 N.W.2d 385 
(1989).

[¶59]   For these purposes, the award of 
attorney's fees rests within the discretion of the trial court as an allocation 
of cost between litigants and was neither a sanction nor a penalty. Hendrickson, 
583 P.2d 1265. See also Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876 (Wyo. 1988) and Duxstad 
v. Duxstad, 16 Wyo. 396, 94 P. 463 (1908).

[¶60]   With regard to the related question 
of appellate attorney's fees, the mother requested this court to award 
attorney's fees in the event we reverse the district court's order. Award of 
attorney's fees to a litigant on a divorce case appeal is discretionary with 
this court. W.R.A.P. 10.04 and 10.05. See also Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265. Since 
the mother intentionally and willfully refused to appear at the June 19, 1990 
hearing to show cause and has failed (at least to some extent) to permit 
visitation between the father and his children, we will not award attorney's 
fees to the mother for her costs in pursuit of this appeal. Nothing we can find 
from this record provides justification for her failure to arrange for 
visitation between the father and his sons as established in the original 
divorce decree and subsequent stipulated amendment.

IX. UNISSUED ARREST 
WARRANT

[¶61]   In Madden v. Madden, 558 P.2d 669 
(Wyo. 1977), we considered the question of whether a non-custodial parent 
allegedly in default of child support and health insurance obligations (among 
other things) could be ordered to show cause why he should not be found in 
contempt for failure to comply with the divorce decree. We said:

[W]e hold that the Order 
from which this appeal is attempted lacks the requisite finality to be an 
appealable order.

     This Court has held 
that an order imposing punishment for contempt of court is a final order which 
is appealable pursuant to the language in Rule 72(a), W.R.C.P., which defines as 
a final order, "* * * (2) an order affecting a substantial right, made in a 
special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action, after judgment; 
* * *." * * * The District Court in this instance did not by its order impose 
any punishment upon the Appellant; in fact the order does not even find the 
Appellant to be in contempt of court.

     A majority of courts 
hold that when contempt proceedings are brought any order short of the order 
which imposes punishment by fine or imprisonment is interlocutory in nature, and 
is not a final order from which an appeal can be taken. * * *

     * * * We therefore 
hold that this appeal must be dismissed because the Order from which this appeal 
is attempted is interlocutory only, and the absence of a final order in the 
contempt proceedings results in this court having no jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal on its merits.

Madden, 558 P.2d  
at 670-71.

[¶62]   In Madden, as with the prospective 
arrest warrant portion of the district court's order in this case, the district 
court did not adjudge appellant in contempt and did not impose any punishment. 
Without an issued arrest warrant, we decline to consider any possible future 
arrest to presently provide a final order. See also Biscoe v. Biscoe, 443 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Minn.App. 1989) and Tell v. Tell, 383 N.W.2d 678 (Minn. 1986). 

X. CONCLUSION

[¶63]   The district court in this case was 
judicially acting to provide redress for a non-custodial father who desired 
enforcement of court-ordered visitation. We are saddened that parental 
intransigence has caused these years to pass without contact between the father 
and his children and this course of litigation to be a totally undesirable 
substitute. Hanson, 754 S.W.2d 292.

[¶64]   We hold that the contempt citation 
was a jurisdictionally-appropriate judicial response to the custodial mother's 
non-attendance at the June 19, 1990 show cause hearing. Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-112(b) 
and (c). Similarly, the district court's order compelling the mother to deliver 
the children to Wyoming for visitation was a proper exercise of discretion under 
the district court's continuing jurisdiction as the decree court. Under the 
circumstances in this case, we hold that the district court's order was 
appropriate to enforce visitation and, consequently, not some character of child 
custody decree modification. Specifically, the district court's issuance of a 
civil contempt citation (for the mother's failure to appear at the June 19, 1990 
hearing to show cause) and the subsequent order requiring delivery of the 
children to Wyoming neither abused the district court's discretion nor violated 
any legal principle. Consequently, the judgment is generally affirmed with the 
exceptions noted. Quenzer, 653 P.2d  at 306.

[¶65]   The father's concession regarding 
award of attorney's fees will suffice to require reversal on that issue as 
presented in this appeal. This court will not award costs or attorney's fees to 
either litigant for this appeal.

[¶66]   The district court's prospective 
order - that it would issue a warrant for the mother's arrest if she either 
failed to bring the children to Wyoming or, in the alternative, if she failed to 
show cause as to why she should not be required to do so - does not constitute a 
final order and, thus, is not subject to present appeal. In any event, the 
district court order pertaining to 1990 summer visitation is now 
moot.

[¶67]   Affirmed except as herein provided, 
with remand, consistent with this opinion, for further proceedings which may be 
required to secure the father's right of visitation with his two sons.16

KALOKATHIS, District Judge, 
concurring, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.

[¶68]   I agree with the result of the 
majority in its thoroughly researched and wide ranging opinion. However, I would 
reach the same result by a more direct route.

[¶69]   The district court is empowered 
with continuing jurisdiction to modify and enforce custody and visitation 
orders. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113 (1989). Because one of the contestants, the 
father, continues to reside in Wyoming, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, did not deprive the district court of its continuing 
jurisdiction.1 Section (d) of the PKPA 
states:

The jurisdiction of a 
court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with 
the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of 
subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met [i.e., that the court has 
jurisdiction under the law of its state] and such State remains the residence of 
the child or of any contestant. 

[¶70]   Since the mother did not initiate 
modification proceedings in Texas under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act (UCCJA), that legislation has no bearing on the issue presented for 
review.2

[¶71]   Under the facts of this case, 
neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA deprived the district court of continuing 
jurisdiction. Hence, the only issues which require resolution are those 
involving the claimed abuse of discretion by the district court, especially the 
propriety of requiring the mother to present the children in Wyoming. The 
majority sustains that order and as to the grounds stated, I am in accord. What 
may happen in the future, and the possible legal ramifications, should the 
mother decide to defy the order of the district court, is best left for another 
day.

FOOTNOTES

1 Although factually 
distinguishable from the present case, we empathize with the Mississippi Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24, 25 (Miss. 
1990):

     This case is of a genre that 
tests the law's capacity to regulate human behavior. Interstate parental 
kidnappings following family breakups have been a scourge upon society. A decade 
ago the federal government and then this (and every other) state enacted 
comprehensive laws designed to end interstate jurisdictional wars wherein the 
courts of the several states had treated kidnapped children like cross-country 
ping pong balls.

     This case presents a 
classic case of the parental and judicial behavior the statutes were designed to 
and do proscribe. A valid Utah decree granted custody of four children to their 
mother. Ten weeks later, the father took advantage of his weekend visitation and 
wrongfully brought the children to Mississippi and enlisted the aid of this 
state's courts to give him custody. The children have since been caught in the 
middle of a tug of war.

     We hold the Utah 
courts never lost jurisdiction of the matter of the permanent custody of the 
children. With this we adjudge the legal issues tendered. In doing this almost 
three years after the fact, we have no illusion that we have ability to put 
Humpty Dumpty back together again. We hope from this fall all may know of our 
seriousness of purpose that the law's injunction be respected.

See 
also Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah App. 1990). Sometimes adulthood 
appears to be the only answer for visitation conflict.

2 It is obvious from the 
briefs that the mother did not comply with the district court's June 27, 1990 
order that on or before June 30, 1990 she either deliver the children to Wyoming 
or, in the alternative, show cause why she should not be required to do so. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the district court ever actually 
issued a warrant for the mother's arrest.

3 The record shows copies 
of unauthenticated documents that the mother retained Texas counsel to prepare 
several instruments, including a "Motion to Modify in Suit Affecting the 
Parent-Child Relationship" and a "Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting 
Hearing for Temporary Orders." In response, the father (also represented by 
Texas counsel) prepared a document entitled "Respondent's Original Answer." 
Apparently, all of these documents were to be filed in the district court of 
Tyler County, Texas. However, copies of these documents contained in this record 
were never file stamped by the Texas court and none were ever executed by a 
presiding judge. Thus, there is nothing in the record to indicate that an order 
modifying the divorce decree was ever initiated, considered or entered by the 
Texas court. Absence of certified or authenticated court records is for our 
purpose preclusive that no definitive Texas order was entered. Speculation on 
probabilities suggests that probably the proceeding was started but not 
favorably resolved to favor the mother for one reason or another. Otherwise, 
with the careful counsel involved, we would no doubt have a copy of the 
appropriate court order.

4 It is unclear from the 
record to what extent the lack of paternal visitation since 1986 is primarily 
attributable to the mother's denial of visitation or the father's failure to 
aggressively pursue his visitation rights.

The 
record contains an August 15, 1988 "Order to Show Cause" executed by the 
Campbell County Judicial District Court. The court ordered the mother to appear 
on September 15, 1988 to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for 
willful disobedience of the divorce decree. Also included in the record is an 
affidavit of service on the mother in Texas dated August 19, 1988. On September 
14, 1988 the district court ordered that the September 15, 1988 hearing be 
vacated because the parties had settled the matter.

Neither party mentions 
the significance of these 1988 proceedings in appellate briefing. The 
non-visitation result is inexcusable; assessment of blame between the parents is 
initially a trial court responsibility.

5 In formulating her 
fourth issue, the mother confuses two distinct aspects of the district court's 
order. In this case, whether or not the district court has jurisdiction to 
exercise discretion in ordering the mother to send her children to Wyoming 
involves the court's statutory and equitable authority to enforce its own 
custody determination. Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-2-113(a) (1989); 20-5-103(a)(ii); and 
20-5-112(b). See also Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 1990); Wardle v. 
Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 856 (Wyo. 1970); and Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 226, 
73 P.2d 953, 960 (1937) (the court possesses inherent equitable powers in child 
custody and visitation matters).

The 
civil contempt citation referred to in "sub-issue A" of the mother's fourth 
issue fails to recognize that the district court issued the contempt citation 
solely because of the mother's failure to appear at the June 19, 1990 
show cause hearing. The "absent willful disobedience" language in the district 
court order referenced in "sub-issue A" did not involve the 
failure-to-appear contempt citation; rather, it applied to the district court's 
perception of the mother's motives and behavior in hindering the father's 
visitation efforts.

6 The PKPA was attached by 
an amendment sponsored by Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming to the pneumococcal 
vaccine bill amending Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, PL #96-611 and was 
then codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The proposed legislation had been 
the subject of an extensive comment and initial introduction and final 
enactment. See Finding No. 7 of PL 96-611, 94 Stats 3566, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, p. 
8 appendix. For a historical discussion, see Henry H. Foster, Child Custody 
Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L.Sch. L.Rev. 297 (1981). Compare, however, 
the earlier historical perspective in Leonard G. Ratner, Child Custody in a 
Federal System, 62 Mich. L.Rev. 795 (1964).

7 Thus, both the UCCJA and 
the PKPA specify the circumstances under which a court has jurisdiction to make 
a child "custody determination." Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-103(a)(ii). See also Kumar v. 
Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 32 Cal. 3d 689, 186 Cal. Rptr. 772, 652 P.2d 1003 (1982); Funk v. Macaulay, 457 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. App. 1983); Matter of 
Custody of Bhatti, 98 N.C. App. 493, 391 S.E.2d 201 (1990); and Barbara Ann 
Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 Ohio St.L.J. 369 
(1991).

8 In order to understand 
apparent and actual conflict in case decisions, the appearance of dysfunctional 
terminology provides some cause for confusion. That confusion results from the 
failure to distinguish the original home state which is also the decree state 
from the present home state where the child or children are now in residence. 
The decree state is variously referred to as the decretal state, state of 
initial decree and, erroneously on occasion, as the home state when it no longer 
has that status. We will use the term (although obviously not completely proper 
English) decree state for consistency of language in the opinion.

The 
home state is transitory, changing with each new jurisdiction where the child or 
children move to reside. The decree state is reasonably fixed, but a presently 
valid decree state can be different from the original decree state if no 
significant contacts remain in the original jurisdiction which entered the 
custody order or there is a relinquishment of jurisdiction which can create a 
second valid decree jurisdiction.

In 
this opinion, the decree state is Wyoming where home state existed when the 
divorce decree was entered, where one parent continues to live and jurisdiction 
has not been relinquished. Present home state is Texas where the mother and 
children have continually resided since leaving Wyoming shortly after the 
divorce. In jurisdictional concepts of movement of families, witness Quenzer, 
653 P.2d 295, this is a simple case involving multiple jurisdictional 
involvement. See also a case identical in jurisdictional application to this 
present proceeding, McArthur v. Superior Court (Wells), 235 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (1991). Because of its complexity, Quenzer received extensive 
consideration and case comparison examination in 1 Homer H. Clark, The Law of 
Domestic Relations ch. 13, at 820 (2d ed. 1987).

9Rather than resolving the 
disputed policy question concerning the duration of jurisdiction, Congress in 
the Wallop Act allocated control over the question to the state that had already 
determined custody of the child. There is no reason to suppose that any other 
state would be better qualified than the rendering state to decide when 
jurisdiction should shift from itself to another state. Allocating authority 
over this question to the law of the rendering state has the advantage that the 
rendering state is identifiable and singular.

Coombs, supra, 66 
Minn.L.Rev. at 853.

10 Neither brief in Rosics 
cited the federal act (PKPA) in alternative reliance solely for decision on the 
earlier uniform state act, UCCJA, enacted as Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-5-101 through 
20-5-125. This comment does not serve as an excuse, it is only a partial 
explanation. The confusion about what Wyoming law came to be was incidentally 
manifested in comment by counsel during this Marquiss trial hearing.

11 Where neither parent had 
previously secured a custody modification in either decree or present home 
state, Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (1989) would control in this jurisdiction for 
procedure:

In granting a divorce or 
annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as 
appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. The 
court shall consider the relative competency of both parents and no award of 
custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent. Either 
parent may petition the court to enforce or revise the decree. The court has 
continuing subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the 
decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children 
as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires.

(Emphasis added.) Without 
a motion or other filing, the district court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
20-2-113(a), would not have had jurisdiction to modify sua sponte. See Connors, 
769 P.2d  at 349. Since this is not a modification case, the requirement for a 
petition or motion is not an issue presented here.

     If it is conversely 
argued that the requirement to bring the children to Wyoming was a modification, 
the preclusive provisions of the PKPA would still apply to provide jurisdiction 
in the Wyoming court.

12 How far the Wyoming 
district court can go in effectively enforcing visitation until assisted by 
order of the Texas court remains a subject not comprehensively addressed here. 
See Hanson, 754 S.W.2d 292. The menu for enforcement was stated:

     "It (a sister state's 
judgment) can be enforced by habeas corpus, contempt, injunction, a civil 
action, a petition or motion, or any other method available under the law of 
this state for the enforcement of a custody judgment rendered by a court of this 
state."

Mitchell, 437 So. 2d  at 
126 (quoting Wyatt v. Falhsing, 396 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)). See 
also Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876 (Wyo. 1988).

13 The trend of decisions 
in predominance of case law establishes that a discretional contact with the 
court of the present home state always exists as a choice by the court. In re 
Marriage of Kehres, 164 Ill. App.3d 148, 115 Ill.Dec. 206, 517 N.E.2d 617 
(1987); Zellat v. Zellat, 351 Pa. Super. 623, 506 A.2d 946 (1986). Mandatory 
contact is required before an arrest warrant is issued which would otherwise 
constitute abuse of discretion. Findley v. Findley, 441 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.App. 
1983); Vanneck v. Vanneck, 49 N.Y.2d 602, 427 N.Y.S.2d 735, 404 N.E.2d 1278 
(1980). It may be that assistance of the Texas courts may inevitably be required 
if the mother neither permits visitation nor returns with the children to 
Wyoming and an arrest warrant is subsequently issued. Roberts v. Fuhr, 523 So. 2d 20, 29 (Miss. 1987). This court has already forcefully spoken on 
inter-jurisdictional contact. Quenzer, 653 P.2d  at 303.

14 Alaska Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Rabinowitz's dissent would have elevated to the statutorily stated 
"significant connection" to be something beyond continued residence of a parent 
and periodic visitation. Murphy, 748 P.2d  at 750. His argument parallels the 
minority rule. See Voninski, 661 S.W.2d 872.

15 There is also a minority 
rule which finds jurisdiction exists in the non-decree present home state 
without relinquishment by the decree state despite PKPA and UCCJA controlling 
language. Voninski, 661 S.W.2d 872 (where the Tennessee court would not yield to 
the decree jurisdiction of New York, but then superseded in Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 
821). In most current decision, see Kemp v. Sharp, 261 Ga. 600, 409 S.E.2d 204 
(1991), where the Georgia Supreme Court reversed its own trial court (which had 
exercised jurisdiction) by ruling in jurisdictional favor of the present home 
state of Texas based on UCCJA provisions without citing the PKPA at all. The 
Oklahoma law provides an interesting perspective where the minority rule settled 
in Breaux v. Mays, 746 P.2d 708 (Okla.App. 1987) was overruled by G.S. v. Ewing, 
786 P.2d 65 (Okla. 1990) without a single citation in majority or dissent to the 
preclusive federal law in the PKPA. For confusion confounded, compare Fuge v. 
Uiterwyk, 542 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1989) with Uiterwyk v. Uiterwyk, 592 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. App. 1992) and then Lamon v. Rewis, 592 So. 2d 1223 (Fla.App. 1992). 
None of these three cases cite the PKPA. Furthermore, see Earles v. Ahlstedt, 
591 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 1991) and Reppond v. Blake, 822 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 
1992). For a converse recognition and enforcement of the PKPA in a most recent 
consideration and a very complex factual situation, see Giambrone v. Giambrone, 
32 Mass. App. Ct. 118, 586 N.E.2d 23 (1992).

16 We would agree with 
Chief District Judge Hobbs' specially concurring opinion in McDougald v. Jenson, 
786 F.2d 1465, 1490 (11th Cir.) cert. denied 479 U.S. 860, 107 S. Ct. 207, 93 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1986):

The legal issues are 
necessarily so puzzling and absorbing that the parties and their attorneys can 
forget that they are dealing with matters as basic as the right of a divorced 
father and mother to continue a loving and meaningful relationship with their 
young son. I hope it is not bad judicial form to suggest to the parties that 
there are better ways to look to the future welfare of their child than a 
continuation of their expensive, transcontinental legal battles, which have now 
gone on for nearly seven years.

 

FOOTNOTES for the 
Concurrance

1 Those who are mystified 
by this field of law may find comfort in Henry H. Foster, Child Custody 
Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 297 (1981), particularly at 
309-10.

2 In a comprehensive and 
energetic search of the record, the majority sets out its conclusions in 
footnote 3 that formal modification of the divorce decree was not initiated in 
Texas.