Title: Leyba v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Leyba v. State1994 WY 99882 P.2d 863Case Number: 93-255Decided: 10/06/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Brian 
LEYBA,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from District Court, Johnson County, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, of the 
Public Defender Program.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Georgia L. Tibbetts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program, and Gina Gradecki, Student 
Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., and CARDINE, J. 
(Retired).

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Brian 
Leyba appeals from the district court's order which revoked his probation and 
reinstated his original sentence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents three issues:

ISSUE 
I

Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion when it revoked Appellant's probation 
because of his refusal to sign an unconstitutional treatment 
contract?

ISSUE 
II

Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing an arbitrary and capricious 
sentence?

ISSUE 
III

Was 
Appellant's sentence illegal?

 

FACTS

[¶4]      A jury found 
Appellant guilty of two counts of knowingly taking immodest, immoral, or 
indecent liberties with a child, and the district court sentenced him to serve a 
term of not less than eighteen months nor more than sixty months in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary. The district court suspended Appellant's sentence and placed 
him on supervised probation for a period of eight years. When the district court 
sentenced him, Appellant was living in North Platte, Nebraska, and the district 
court allowed him to serve his probation in the state of 
Nebraska.

[¶5]      Appellant's 
probation conditions included requirements that he enroll in an inpatient 
treatment facility for counseling, that he receive individual counseling, and 
that he attend a sex offenders counseling program. Appellant met with his 
Nebraska probation officer on June 17, 1993, at which time he and the probation 
officer discussed the terms of the district court's probation order. The 
probation officer informed Appellant that North Platte had a sex offenders group 
program and advised Appellant that he should register for the 
program.

[¶6]      Appellant 
consulted with a psychotherapist at Mental Health Specialists, P.C. on June 29, 
1993. The psychotherapist told Appellant that he would not be allowed to 
participate in the outpatient adult sexual perpetrator program unless he signed 
a "Treatment Contract for Adult Sex Offenders." After the psychotherapist 
explained the terms of the treatment contract, Appellant objected to the 
contract's provisions which required him

· 
to be financially responsible for his treatment;

· 
to have no contact with children;

· 
to take and be financially responsible for polygraph 
examinations;

· 
to have no pornographic material and view no violent material; 
and

· 
to participate in and pay for penile plethysmograph 
evaluations.

Appellant 
also objected to the contract's requirement that his wife participate in his 
therapy.

[¶7]      Appellant asked 
for two copies of the contract. The psychotherapist gave Appellant two copies, 
and Appellant left without signing the contract. The next day, Appellant 
informed his probation officer that he planned to contact his attorney to 
discuss the treatment contract.

[¶8]      Appellant sent a 
copy of the treatment contract to his attorney and informed him that he objected 
to the contract. The attorney advised Appellant that his probation could be 
revoked if he failed to sign the contract. The attorney suggested, 
alternatively, that Appellant move back to Wyoming so he could attend a 
different program.

[¶9]      During the week 
of July 19, 1993, Appellant informed the receptionist at Mental Health 
Specialists that he would not sign the treatment contract. Appellant also 
informed his probation officer that he refused to sign the contract. He claimed 
that the contract violated his constitutional rights. The probation officer and 
Appellant reviewed the treatment requirements which were contained in the 
probation order, and the probation officer advised Appellant that, if he did not 
sign the contract and participate in the sex offenders group program, he would 
probably be arrested for violating the conditions of his 
probation.

[¶10]   The prosecutor filed a motion for 
probation revocation on August 9, 1993, which alleged that Appellant had 
violated the sex offenders counseling condition of his probation. A probation 
revocation hearing was held on October 19, 1993. At the hearing, Appellant 
admitted that he had refused to sign the treatment contract. Appellant's 
attorney asked the district court to modify the probation order to permit 
Appellant to continue to be on probation without being required to attend the 
treatment program. After the hearing, the district court revoked Appellant's 
probation for "failing and/or refusing to complete counseling as 
ordered."

TREATMENT 
CONTRACT

[¶11]   Appellant contends that the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation on the basis 
that he had refused to sign the treatment contract which was required before he 
could participate in the sex offenders group program at Mental Health 
Specialists in North Platte. Appellant argues that he should not have been 
required to sign a treatment contract which he felt was unconstitutional. We 
decline to consider the merits of Appellant's objections to the terms of the 
treatment contract since Appellant did not seek review of his probation 
conditions before his probation revocation hearing was held. See United 
States v. Nolan, 932 F.2d 1005, 1007 (1st Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam).

"The 
integrity of the judicial process demands compliance with court orders until 
such time as they are altered by orderly appellate review. Litigants are not 
entitled to sit in judgment on their own cases, and they must follow the 
appropriate channels for review of decisions they believe to be invalid. Unless 
and until an invalid order is set aside, it must be 
obeyed."

GN 
v. State (In re C.N.), 
816 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting State ex rel. Mix v. Newland, 
277 Or. 191, 560 P.2d 255, 260 (1977)). As this Court stated in Begley v. 
Nall, 62 Wyo. 254, 166 P.2d 466 (1946), cited in GN, 816 P.2d at 
1285:

[N]o 
move was made on the part of appellant to modify or dissolve the injunction 
order here in question. If he thought it erroneous or too broad he should have 
pursued that course. He had full knowledge of what he was required by it to do. 
His remedy was certainly not that of disobedience. There is abundant evidence in 
the record that he disregarded the terms of the order. The district court had 
jurisdiction both of the subject matter of the action and the parties thereto. 
Its order should have been obeyed so long as it remained 
operative.

62 
Wyo. at 264, 166 P.2d 466.

[¶12]   Appellant does not dispute the 
district court's jurisdiction. He made no attempt to challenge the treatment 
contract in court before he refused to sign it. Although Appellant may have 
found the terms of the treatment contract to be repugnant, he, as a probationer, 
could not take the law into his own hands and defy the conditions of his 
probation by not attending a sex offenders counseling 
program.

[¶13]   Appellant did not ask the district 
court to modify the conditions of his probation before the revocation hearing 
was held. See W.R.Cr.P. 39(b). Appellant failed to "`follow the 
appropriate channels for review.'" GN, 816 P.2d  at 1284 (quoting State ex 
rel. Mix, 560 P.2d at 260)). Both the probation officer and Appellant's 
attorney warned Appellant about what could happen if he refused to sign the 
treatment contract which was required before he could attend the sex offenders 
group program at Mental Health Specialists. Appellant does not dispute that he 
willfully refused to sign the treatment contract. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant's probation.

SEX 
OFFENDERS COUNSELING PROGRAM

[¶14]   Appellant claims alternatively that 
the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to attend a sex 
offenders counseling program as a probation condition. We 
disagree.

[¶15]   The district court has wide 
discretion in determining appropriate conditions of probation. Burke v. 
State, 746 P.2d 852, 859 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Lansing v. State, 669 P.2d 923, 927 (Wyo. 1983)). A probation condition is valid if it is "reasonably 
related to . . . rehabilitation"; it should be deleted if it is "unrelated to 
the criminal conduct for which [the probationer] was convicted and is not 
reasonably related to future criminal conduct." Hamburg v. State, 820 P.2d 523, 531 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶16]   The probation condition which 
required Appellant to attend a sex offenders counseling program was valid. He 
had been convicted of a sex offense; i.e., knowingly taking immodest, immoral, 
or indecent liberties with a child. The probation condition was, consequently, 
reasonably related to rehabilitating Appellant and deterring him from engaging 
in similar conduct in the future. Since the probation condition was 
valid,

it 
[was] within the trial court's discretion to determine whether [the] probationer 
violated his probation conditions, and that determination will not be reversed 
unless the discretion was abused. . . . All that is necessary for a probation to 
be revoked is the court's conscientious conclusion, after the court hears the 
facts, that the violation occurred.

Kupec 
v. State, 
835 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1992). Appellant admitted that he had refused to sign 
the treatment contract which was a pre-requisite for attending the sex offenders 
group program at Mental Health Specialists. Not attending a sex offenders 
counseling program was a violation of Appellant's probation condition. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it required Appellant to attend 
a sex offenders counseling program or when it revoked Appellant's probation 
because he failed to attend such a program.

ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE

[¶17]   Appellant claims that his sentence 
was illegal because the sum of his term of incarceration and his period of 
probation exceeded the maximum penalty authorized by statute. We 
disagree.

"[T]he 
restraints of probation cannot exceed a period in excess of the maximum term of 
imprisonment authorized by the statute violated." Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 753 (Wyo. 1975). In Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184 (Wyo. 
1991), however, this Court stated: "[I]t does not violate the probation statutes 
when a defendant, having served time on probation, has [his] probation validly 
revoked and then receives the maximum sentence for [his] crime." 823 P.2d  at 
1191. As long as neither the period of probation nor the term of incarceration 
exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the sentence is not illegal. 
Id.

[¶18]   Appellant's maximum term of 
imprisonment for each of the two convictions was ten years. WYO. STAT. § 
14-3-105(a) (1994). Appellant was placed on probation for a period of eight 
years. Approximately five months after the original sentencing hearing had been 
held, the district court revoked Appellant's probation and reinstated his 
original sentence. Appellant was originally sentenced to be imprisoned for not 
less than eighteen months (one and one-half years) nor more than sixty months 
(five years).

[¶19]   Neither Appellant's period of 
probation nor his term of incarceration exceeded the maximum term of 
imprisonment authorized by statute. Appellant's sentence was, therefore, legal. 
See also WYO. STAT. § 7-13-305(c) (1987).1

CONCLUSION

[¶20]   The district court did not err when 
it revoked Appellant's probation and reinstated his original 
sentence.

[¶21]   Affirmed.

Footnote

1 Section 7-13-305(c) (emphasis added) 
states:

(c) For a violation of a condition of probation occurring during the 
probationary period, revocation proceedings may be commenced at any time during 
the period of suspension of sentence or probation under W.S. 7-13-302, or within 
thirty (30) days thereafter, in which case the court may issue a warrant and 
cause the defendant to be arrested. If after hearing the court determines that 
the defendant violated any of the terms of probation or suspension of 
sentence, the court may proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of 
sentence or probation had been ordered.