Title: People v. Jones

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93511-Agenda 7-January 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								ESMON VINCI JONES, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The State charged defendant, Esmon Vinci Jones, with three
counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), (b)(8), (b)(10)
(West 2000)), one count of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West
2000)), and one count of mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1)
(West 2000)). A jury acquitted him of aggravated battery,
convicted him of mob action, and could not reach a verdict on
robbery. The circuit court of Macon County vacated the mob
action conviction as inconsistent with the aggravated battery
acquittals and set the case for retrial on the mob action and robbery
counts. The case was assigned to a different trial judge, and
defendant moved to bar further prosecution on collateral estoppel
grounds. The circuit court denied defendant's motion and ruled
that the previous judge had erred in setting aside the mob action
conviction because the verdicts were not inconsistent. Defendant
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. No. 4-01-0078
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed
defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

BACKGROUND
	Sixty-four-year-old Patricia Wheeler-Ward testified that, on
May 21, 2000, she was walking home from a pub where she had
been socializing. She was walking north on Van Dyke street when
she noticed three men walking towards her. One of them, who was
wearing a grey sweatshirt, separated from the group and said to
her, "Know what we want?" Wheeler-Ward responded, "Go on
and leave me alone. I'm going home." The man who had spoken
to her asked for her purse and tried to take it from her. Wheeler-Ward identified defendant as the person who had tried to take her
purse.
	Wheeler-Ward began to run away, and someone pushed her
from behind. She fell forward on her face and hurt her knee. The
man in the gray sweatshirt and one of the others tried to take her
purse. The third one went through her pockets and then said, "Shut
up bitch!" and hit her in the mouth. The men made off with her
purse, and she later recovered it at the police station.
	The defense did not deny that defendant was present when
Wheeler-Ward was attacked, but denied that he was criminally
responsible for the attack. Defendant's attorney impeached
Wheeler-Ward with contradictory statements that she gave the
police on the night of the attack. Additionally, defendant testified
to his version of the incident in question. According to defendant,
he was walking down Van Dyke Street with Demetrius Reed and
Anthony Johnson, a/k/a/ Knockout. The three had met up earlier
at an apartment complex. When they were on Van Dyke Street,
defendant was on his way home, while the other two were going
to a girl's house. At some point, defendant noticed an elderly
woman walking towards them on the other side of the street. Reed
and Knockout crossed the street and got behind her. They did not
tell defendant what they were doing.
	Knockout told the woman that they wanted her purse. She
began to run, and Knockout shoved her in the back. Defendant
claimed that he never touched her. He could see Knockout taking
the purse away from her. When defendant saw what Reed and
Knockout were doing, he tried to run away. Reed ran after him and
tackled him to the ground. Reed had the victim's purse with him.
Reed threw items out of the purse until he found the victim's
wallet. Knockout caught up with defendant and Reed, and Reed
and Knockout made defendant take some of the victim's money.
Defendant did not take the money willingly. Reed and Knockout
did not want defendant to tell what happened, so they threatened
him with an "a-whipping" if he did not take some of the money.
Defendant interpreted "a-whipping" as meaning that he would be
beaten if he did not take some of the money. Defendant
acknowledged that he was wearing a gray sweatshirt on the night
in question. He explained that he ran from the police because he
did not want to "go down" for something he did not do.
	The jury convicted defendant of mob action and acquitted him
on all three counts of aggravated battery. The jurors could not
reach a verdict on the robbery charge. A few days later, following
an oral motion by defendant, the trial court set aside the mob
action conviction as inconsistent with the aggravated battery
acquittals. The court entered an order stating that the cause was
"realloted for pre-trial" on the mob action and robbery counts.
	Defendant moved to bar reprosecution, arguing that the State
was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether
defendant had used force against the victim. Defendant pointed out
that the mob action and aggravated battery counts both alleged that
he pushed and struck the victim. The robbery count alleged that he
took the victim's purse by the use of force. Defendant argued that,
because he was acquitted of pushing and striking the victim, the
State was estopped from prosecuting him on the mob action count
as it was also based on his pushing and striking the victim.
Similarly, the State could not prosecute him for robbery predicated
on the use of force because a jury had found that he did not push
or strike the victim.
	This motion was considered by a different trial judge, who
ultimately ruled that the previous judge had erred in vacating the
mob action conviction. The second judge found that the verdicts
were not inconsistent. Mob action does not require the infliction
of injury, and the allegations of infliction of injury in the mob
action charge were surplusage. The jury was properly instructed on
the essential elements of mob action. The court specifically found
that "the verdicts were not legally inconsistent as the jury was
instructed and would not have been legally inconsistent if the jury
had been instructed with all elements in the information."
Accordingly, the court ruled that collateral estoppel did not bar
retrial.
	Defendant appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f)
(188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)), and the appellate court affirmed. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the mob action
conviction was not inconsistent with the aggravated battery
acquittals. The court held that the essential elements of mob action
and aggravated battery were different and that it was not
inconsistent for the jury to acquit on one and convict on the other.
According to the appellate court, the State would not have to prove
on retrial that defendant pushed and struck Wheeler-Ward to
obtain a mob action conviction. Although the court found that the
first trial judge had erred in vacating the mob action conviction,
the court found that it had no authority to reinstate the conviction
because the appeal was from the grant of defendant's motion to
bar retrial.
	As to the robbery charge, the court noted that the elements of
robbery and aggravated battery are different. To obtain a
conviction on the robbery charge, the State would have to prove
that defendant took property from Wheeler-Ward by the use of
force. It would not be necessary for the State to relitigate the issue
of whether defendant pushed or struck Wheeler-Ward. The
testimony showed that Wheeler-Ward's purse was pulled from her
by the use of force, and a robbery conviction could stand based on
this use of force. Accordingly, collateral estoppel did not bar
retrial on the robbery count either.

ANALYSIS
	Defendant argues that the appellate court erred in holding that
he could be retried on the mob action and the robbery counts.
Defendant broadly asserts that the jury's acquittal on the
aggravated battery counts shows that the jurors believed that he
was not involved in the incident at all. More specifically,
defendant contends that the mob action conviction was
inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals because the
aggravated battery and mob action counts all included allegations
that defendant pushed and struck Wheeler-Ward. Considering the
evidence before the jurors, their acquittal on the aggravated battery
counts could have been based only on their belief that defendant
did not push or strike Wheeler-Ward, and likewise he was not
accountable for the actions of whoever did do so. Similarly,
defendant contends that the jury's finding in this regard should
prevent a retrial on the robbery charge, which would require the
jury to find that defendant took property from Wheeler-Ward by
the use of force.
	The State responds that the mob action conviction was not
inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals. Alternatively,
the State contends that this court should overrule People v.
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270 (1996), in which this court reaffirmed
its view that inconsistent verdicts are unreliable and declined to
follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S. Ct. 471
(1984). The State argues that Powell supplies the better rule and
that this court should follow the approach taken by the Supreme
Court. As to the robbery count, the State contends that collateral
estoppel does not bar retrial because the jury would not be asked
to resolve an issue decided by the previous jury.

Mob Action
	We agree with the State that we erred in Klingenberg when
we declined to follow Powell. We thus do not need to reach the
issue of whether the mob action conviction was inconsistent with
the aggravated battery acquittal because, either way, the mob
action conviction did not need to be vacated. If the verdicts were
consistent, then obviously there was no problem. If they were
inconsistent, we still believe the mob action conviction could
stand under the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Powell.
	In Powell, a jury acquitted the defendant of possessing
cocaine with the intent to distribute it and conspiring to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine. However, the same jury convicted
the defendant of using a telephone to commit those same felonies.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the verdicts were
inconsistent: if she did not commit the underlying felonies, she
could not have been guilty of using a telephone to commit those
same felonies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed and reversed the defendant's convictions. The Court
of Appeals acknowledged that the Supreme Court had held in
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 76 L. Ed. 356, 52 S. Ct. 189
(1932), that inconsistent verdicts need not be set aside, but held
that there should be an exception for situations in which a jury
convicts a defendant of a compound offense while acquitting him
of the predicate offense.
	The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that
there was no such exception to the Dunn rule. The Court reiterated
that consistency in the verdicts is not required as a matter of
constitutional law and that inconsistent verdicts can often be
explained as a product of juror lenity:
			" ' "The most that can be said in such cases is that the
verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction
the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does
not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's
guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their
assumption of a power which they had no right to
exercise, but to which they were disposed through
lenity." ' " Powell, 469 U.S.  at 63, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 467,
105 S. Ct.  at 475, quoting Dunn, 284 U.S.  at 393, 76 L. Ed.  at 359, 52 S. Ct.  at 190, quoting Steckler v. United
States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925).
	The Court gave three additional reasons for refusing to allow
defendants to challenge convictions on the basis of inconsistency.
First, when a jury enters inconsistent verdicts, no one knows who
the error benefits. Or, as the court put it, "it is unclear whose ox
has been gored." Powell, 469 U.S.  at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 469, 105 S. Ct.  at 477. All that a reviewing court knows is that either in the
conviction or the acquittal the jury did not follow the instructions.
Second, the court was concerned with fashioning a rule that would
allow only the defendant to challenge an inconsistent verdict. Even
though the inconsistency could harm either side, the government
is precluded from challenging an acquittal on inconsistency
grounds. Powell, 469 U.S.  at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 469, 105 S. Ct.  at
477. Finally, a defendant is still protected from jury irrationality
because the defendant can always challenge his or her conviction
on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Powell, 469 U.S.  at 67, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 470, 105 S. Ct.  at 478.
	The Powell Court noted that it was not grounding its decision
in the Constitution. Rather, the issue was addressed under the
court's supervisory power over the federal criminal process, and
the decision is thus not binding on state courts. Powell, 469 U.S. 
at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 469, 105 S. Ct.  at 477. Although the states
are not required to apply the Powell rule, most have chosen to do
so. See 5 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure
§24.10(b), at 616 (2d ed. 1999).
	In Klingenberg, this court expressly declined to join the
federal courts and the majority of state courts in following Powell.
In that case, we agreed with the appellate court that the
defendant's conviction of official misconduct was legally
inconsistent with a verdict acquitting him of theft when the charge
of official misconduct was based on the same theft. Klingenberg,
172 Ill. 2d  at 276-77. The State relied on Powell in arguing that the
defendant's official misconduct conviction did not have to be
reversed.
	Klingenberg conceded that this court's previous rationale for
vacating inconsistent verdicts was incorrect. This court had held
previously that inconsistent verdicts rendered in the same
proceeding had to be vacated on collateral estoppel grounds.
People v. Frias, 99 Ill. 2d 193 (1983). In Klingenberg, this court
acknowledged that this rationale was incorrect and that the
purpose of the collateral estoppel doctrine is "to protect an accused
from the unfairness of being required to relitigate an issue which
has once been determined in his favor by a verdict of acquittal in
a second proceeding." (Emphases in original.) Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 281.
	Although this court acknowledged that its previous rationale
for vacating inconsistent verdicts was incorrect, this court
nevertheless declined to adopt the United States Supreme Court's
approach to inconsistent verdicts for three new reasons. First, this
court stated that jury verdicts can be explained away as a showing
of jury lenity only in those cases in which the jury convicts on the
predicate offense but acquits on a compound offense. Klingenberg,
172 Ill. 2d  at 278. Second, the court acknowledged Powell's
concern that the defendant but not the State would be able to
challenge an inconsistent verdict, but stated that we were not
"persuaded that the framers of the double jeopardy clause intended
to achieve the symmetry between defendants and the prosecution
that the Powell decision creates." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 279.
Finally, this court said that it did not want to permit legally
inconsistent verdicts as a means of achieving "folk justice," and
that the defendant should not be required to bear the burden of the
trial court's error in accepting the verdicts. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 279.
	Klingenberg was not unanimous. Two justices dissented and
urged this court to stop adhering to "an outmoded and unnecessary
state rule" and to follow Powell. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 285-89 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.). These justices
argued that the Powell rule was preferable and asserted that the
majority's reasons for failing to follow it were not persuasive.
First, the dissent argued that the majority was mistaken in
contending that juror lenity could be assumed only in those cases
in which the jury convicts on the predicate offense and acquits on
a compound offense. The dissent contended that the majority erred
in looking for a rational explanation for juror lenity because lenity
does not necessarily operate in a rational manner. Klingenberg,
172 Ill. 2d  at 287 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.).
Second, the dissent argued that the majority too easily dismissed
the Supreme Court's concern that the defendant could challenge
an inconsistent verdict while the State could not. The dissenting
justices argued that the Powell Court's concern was not
necessarily a desire to see perfect symmetry, as the majority
contended, but rather was based on the reality that there is no
reason to assume that the acquittal is the "correct" verdict.
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 287-88 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by
Freeman, J.). Third, the dissent argued that the majority ignored
the fact that a defendant always remains free to challenge his
conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Klingenberg,
172 Ill. 2d  at 288 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.).
Finally, the dissenting justices argued that the majority's assertion
that the defendant should not bear the burden of the trial court's
inaction in accepting a legally inconsistent verdict rested on the
faulty assumption that the acquittal was the jury's true verdict.
According to the dissent, in these situations it is just as likely that
the acquittal is a boon given to the defendant by a jury convinced
of his guilt. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 288 (Miller, J., dissenting,
joined by Freeman, J.).
	We have concluded that the views expressed by Justices
Miller and Freeman in their Klingenberg dissent were correct and
should have been followed. We are further persuaded by the
reasons set forth in Powell as to why inconsistent verdicts in
criminal cases should not be vacated, and we now overrule
Klingenberg. This will bring Illinois in line with the majority of
states that have concluded that the Powell decision is correct and
should be followed. Thus, defendants in Illinois can no longer
challenge convictions on the sole basis that they are legally
inconsistent with acquittals on other charges.
	We recognize that we are departing from stare decisis in
changing our approach to inconsistent verdicts. Normally, we will
adhere to established precedent, even if certain members of this
court disagree with it. Stare decisis, however, "is not an inexorable
command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision.' "Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 828, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-10 (1991), quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 84 L. Ed. 604, 612, 60 S. Ct. 444, 451 (1940). In Payne, the Supreme
Court further explained that:
		"Adhering to precedent 'is usually the wise policy,
because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.' "
[Citation.] Nevertheless, when governing decisions are
unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never
felt constrained to follow precedent.'[Citation.]" Payne,
501 U.S.  at 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d  at 737, 111 S. Ct.  at 2609.
	Upon reexamining our decision in Klingenberg, we have
determined that one of the reasons we gave for rejecting Powell
was based on a fundamental misstatement of the law. Because we
have determined that this particular reason for rejecting Powell
was not valid, we have reevaluated the arguments for and against
the Powell and Klingenberg approaches.
	As stated, this court's original objection to inconsistent
verdicts was based on collateral estoppel grounds. Once we
determined that we had erred in applying collateral estoppel to
verdicts rendered in a single proceeding, we decided to reject
Powell for three new reasons. One of the reasons this court
rejected the Powell approach was because this court believed that
it forced defendants to bear the burden of a trial judge's error:
		"The Powell decision requires the defendant to bear the
consequences of an error properly attributed to the trial
court. Where a jury returns legally inconsistent verdicts,
it is the trial court's duty to refuse the verdicts and to
require the jury to deliberate further. People v. Almo, 108 Ill. 2d 54 (1985). In this case, however, the trial court
entered the inconsistent verdicts, presumably because it
failed to recognize the inconsistency. We do not believe
that the defendant should suffer the consequences of the
trial court's error, particularly where an unlawful
conviction may have resulted from that error."
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 279.
	This assertion by the Klingenberg court confused two
different lines of cases. The rule that a trial judge has a duty to
refuse inconsistent verdicts and should order the jury to keep
deliberating is the rule for cases in which the jury returns
inconsistent guilty verdicts. For instance, this is the situation that
would arise when the defendant is found guilty of two crimes, but
the jury found that the defendant acted with two different mental
states. In Almo, the case cited by Klingenberg, this court held that
a trial judge acted properly in sending a jury back to deliberate
further after it found the defendant guilty of both murder and
voluntary manslaughter. This court held that the trial judge had a
duty to refuse the verdicts and to send the jury back to deliberate
because the judge would not know which of the two verdicts to
enter. The judge could not usurp the jury's function by second
guessing what the jury really meant. People v. Almo, 108 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1985). See also People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 534
(1997); People v. Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201, 214 (1995); People v.
Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 229-31 (1990); People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396, 409-10 (1986) (all holding that a trial court has a duty to
refuse inconsistent guilty verdicts and to instruct the jury to
resolve the inconsistency).
	The inconsistencies at issue in Powell and Klingenberg are
different. Those cases involve situations in which a jury's
conviction of the defendant on one count is inconsistent with its
acquittal of him on another count because the jury found that the
same essential element both did and did not exist. This court has
never held that a trial judge has a duty in these situations to send
the jury back for further deliberations. We have asked only that the
trial courts ask jurors to reconcile inconsistent guilty verdicts.
Indeed, requiring trial judges to order jurors to reconsider verdicts
of acquittal would raise questions of due process and double
jeopardy that this court has not yet addressed. Thus, contrary to
Klingenberg's assertion, Powell in no way requires defendants to
bear the consequences of a trial court error.
	Because one of the principal reasons given by the Klingenberg
court for rejecting Powell was based on a fundamental
misstatement of the law, we have reexamined whether
Klingenberg still supplies the better approach or whether we
should join the majority of jurisdictions in following Powell. As
stated previously, our reexamination of the issue leads us to
conclude that the reasons given by Powell and by the Klingenberg
dissent were correct and should have been followed.
	Having determined that the trial court erred in vacating
defendant's mob action conviction, we must now consider the
appropriate remedy. The State asks that we reinstate the
conviction. Although the appellate court believed that the trial
court had erred in vacating the mob action conviction, it concluded
that it had no authority to reinstate the conviction because it arose
in the context of an interlocutory appeal from the denial of
defendant's motion to bar reprosecution. This is not correct.
	Upon determining that the first trial judge erred in vacating
defendant's mob action conviction and setting the case for retrial,
both the subsequent trial judge and the appellate court had the
authority to reinstate the conviction. The first judge's order
vacating the conviction and setting the cause for a retrial was an
interlocutory order. See People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 171
(1990). A court in a criminal case has the inherent power to
reconsider and correct its rulings, and this power extends to
interlocutory rulings as well as to final judgments. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d  at 171. Here, after the matter was set for retrial, the circuit court
retained jurisdiction over the cause and thus had the authority to
reconsider any order that had previously been entered. See Mink,
141 Ill. 2d  at 171 (second trial judge had the authority to vacate
first trial judge's order, which granted defendant a new trial, and
to reinstate the conviction). Thus, upon ruling that the previous
judge had erred in vacating the conviction on inconsistency
grounds, the new judge should have reinstated the conviction.
	Likewise, the appellate court had the authority to reinstate the
conviction. Although agreeing that the first trial judge had erred in
vacating the conviction, the appellate court concluded that it had
no authority to reinstate it because the case was on appeal from the
order of the circuit court denying defendant's motion to bar retrial.
However, the circuit court's ruling that the previous trial judge had
erred in vacating the conviction formed the basis for its decision
to deny defendant's motion to bar reprosecution. In response to
defendant's motion to bar reprosecution, the subsequent trial judge
entered an order in which he specifically ruled that the previous
judge had erred in setting aside the mob action conviction because
it was not inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals.
Because there was no inconsistency, the judge ruled that defendant
could be prosecuted again for mob action. These were not separate
and distinct rulings on different issues. There was only one issue
before the trial court, and the order resolving this issue was the one
under review. The appellate court had the authority to reverse,
affirm, or modify this order. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(1). Because the
appellate court agreed with the trial court's order that stated that
the previous judge had erred in vacating the conviction, the court
could have modified that order to reinstate the mob action
conviction, which is the action the circuit court should have taken.
	Further, the previous judge's order was brought up for review
by the defendant's appeal from the order denying his motion to bar
reprosecution. This court held in Burtell v. First Charter Service
Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 434-35 (1979), that a notice of appeal brings
up for review unspecified orders and judgments that were a step in
the procedural progression leading to the judgment or order
specified in the notice of appeal. The first judge's ruling was a step
in the procedural progression leading to the subsequent judge's
ruling denying defendant's motion to bar reprosecution. The trial
court's erroneous action in vacating the mob action conviction
caused defendant to file the motion to bar reprosecution. Thus, the
first trial judge's order was reviewable as a step in the procedural
progression leading to the denial of defendant's motion.
	Both the circuit court and the appellate court had the authority
to reinstate defendant's conviction upon determining that the trial
court had erred in vacating it. For the reasons stated above, we
agree with the lower courts that defendant's mob action conviction
was improperly vacated. We thus reinstate defendant's conviction
for mob action.

Robbery
	We next address whether defendant can be retried for robbery
after the jury could not reach a verdict on that count. Defendant
contends that his acquittal of aggravated battery collaterally estops
the State from reprosecuting him for robbery.
	Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, "when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same
parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443,
25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 475, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970). The party
seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show that: (1) the issue
was raised and litigated in a previous proceeding; (2) that the
determination of the issue was a critical and necessary part of the
final judgment in a prior trial; and (3) the issue sought to be
precluded in a later trial is the same one decided in the previous
trial. People v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 321 (1999). Where a
defendant claims that a previous acquittal bars a subsequent
prosecution for a related offense, the collateral estoppel rule
requires a court to examine the record of the prior proceeding and
determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict
on an issue other than the one which the defendant seeks to
foreclose from consideration. Ashe, 397 U.S.  at 444, 25 L. Ed. 2d 
at 475-76, 90 S. Ct.  at 1194.
	Defendant contends that his case is "directly analogous" to
Ashe. We disagree. In Ashe, six men playing poker were robbed by
three or four masked men. The defendant was charged with six
counts of robbery-one count for each of the victims. Defendant
went to trial on one of the counts and was acquitted. The State
then sought to try defendant on one of the robbery counts relating
to one of the other victims. Ashe, 397 U.S.  at 437-39, 25 L. Ed. 2d 
at 472-73, 90 S. Ct.  at 1191-92. The Supreme Court held that the
State was barred from pursuing this prosecution on collateral
estoppel grounds. The court examined the record in the previous
proceeding and determined that the jury could not rationally have
found that no robbery occurred or that the named victim was not
in fact a victim of that robbery. The only possible basis for the
jury's acquittal was that there was not sufficient evidence that
defendant participated in the robbery. Thus, collateral estoppel
would preclude prosecuting defendant for one of the other counts
because another jury would be asked to decide if defendant
participated in the robbery. Ashe, 397 U.S.  at 445, 25 L. Ed. 2d  at
476, 90 S. Ct.  at 1195.
	Defendant contends that his case is directly analogous to Ashe
because "the jury's acquittals of the defendant on the aggravated
battery counts equate to a finding that he was not a participant in
this incident." This is obviously false and fails to consider that the
jury's conviction of him for mob action shows that the jury
believed that he was involved.
	Further, as the State correctly notes, all that the aggravated
battery acquittals show is that the jury concluded that neither
defendant nor one for whose conduct defendant was legally
accountable pushed or struck Wheeler-Ward with the intent to
commit bodily harm or the knowledge that it would cause bodily
harm. A retrial for robbery would ask the jury to consider whether
defendant took property from Wheeler-Ward by the use of force
or threatening the imminent use of force, both of which can be
accomplished without defendant actually pushing or striking
Wheeler-Ward.
	Indeed, as the appellate court properly noted, Wheeler-Ward
testified that her purse was pulled from her. She did not give her
purse to the robbers when they asked for it. She testified that one
of them grabbed at her purse and failed to get it off her arm,
following which one of the others pulled it away from her. A jury
could find defendant guilty of robbery if it found that he forcibly
pulled her purse away from her. A jury would not have to relitigate
whether defendant pushed or struck Wheeler-Ward. Accordingly,
defendant can be retried for robbery.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we vacate those portions of the
appellate court and circuit court orders that reset the mob action
count for retrial, and we reinstate defendant's mob action
conviction. We affirm the appellate court's holding that collateral
estoppel does not bar retrial on the robbery count, and we remand
the cause for further proceedings.
Appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part;
circuit court affirmed in part and vacated in part;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD, specially concurring:
	This court has long held that we will depart from the doctrine
of stare decisis upon a showing of "good cause." Heimgaertner v.
Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 167 (1955).
This is true because "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis is a basic tenet
of our legal system" which promotes the consistent development
of the law. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003), citing
Hoffman v. Lehnhausen, 48 Ill. 2d 323, 329 (1971). I write
separately today because I believe that good cause exists, in
addition to that identified by the majority, which compels this
court to revisit the issue presented in this case.
	In People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270 (1996), we
examined whether the defendant's acquittal of theft over $300 was
legally inconsistent with his conviction of official misconduct.
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 274. As a first step in resolving that
issue, it is apparent that this court determined whether the charge
of theft over $300 was a lesser-included offense of official
misconduct. The opinion examined the crimes as defined by
statute (Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d at 275), as charged in the
indictment (Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d at 276), and also as argued by
the State at trial and set forth in the jury instructions (Klingenberg,
172 Ill. 2d at 276) to ascertain whether theft over $300 was
included within official misconduct. Ultimately, we held that the
trial court's reconciliation of the verdicts, including its finding that
theft over $300 was not a lesser-included offense to official
misconduct, was "belied by the record" and the charging
instrument. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 275-76.
	Importantly, I observe that the lesser-included offense analysis
we applied was inconsistent with our case law present at that time.
Specifically, two years before we decided Klingenberg, we
expressed our preference for the charging instrument approach to
determine whether a particular offense is a lesser-included offense
of another. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93 (1994). Novak did not
"first adopt" or create the charging instrument approach (People
v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 326-27 (1997)), but rather created
uniformity by implicitly rejecting other methods employed at the
time. Before Novak, trial courts applied one of several methods to
examine whether charged offenses were comprised of lesser-included offenses. In most instances, trial courts compared the
abstract statutory definitions of the crimes, otherwise called the
"abstract elements" approach, or examined the facts adduced at
trial, otherwise called the "inherent relationship" approach. People
v. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 503 (1986); People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (1982). However, in Klingenberg, despite our holding in
Novak, this court clearly applied an unusual combination of
approaches to examine the lesser-included issue.
	This combined approach demonstrates a confusion that was
not limited to this court. In Novak, this court's stated preference
for the charging instrument approach fundamentally altered the
method followed by both trial and appellate courts to determine
the existence of lesser-included offenses. However, because we
did not expressly rule that courts were required to follow the
charging instrument approach, courts were slow to correctly apply
the charging instrument approach. See, e.g., Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 323. As a result, the full impact of the charging instrument
approach was unknown at the time this court decided Klingenberg.
	Today, we better understand the impact. The charging
instrument approach is a flexible approach that permits courts to
recognize the existence of a lesser-included offense even if the
charging instrument does not expressly allege all of the elements
of the lesser crime, but only implies the elements. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107; Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 325. Put another way, the lesser
crime need only relate to the greater to the extent that the charging
instrument describes the lesser. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107. This is
a significant departure from the earlier essential elements
approach. Under the essential elements approach, trial courts only
examined the language of the statute. Therefore, absent a change
in the language of the statute it was theoretically possible to
identify in finite terms the total number of existing lesser-included
offenses included within the criminal code. Conversely, the
charging instrument approach removes any limitation on the
potential number of lesser-included offenses. Illinois
jurisprudence, in the years following Klingenberg, illustrates that
the charging instrument approach has opened the door to the
possibility of a greater number of lesser-included offenses. Under
the charging instrument approach, depending upon the language
in the charging instrument, theft may be a lesser-included offense
of residential burglary (People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319 (1997);
People v. Monroe, 294 Ill. App. 3d 697 (1998)), unlawful restraint
may be a lesser-included offense of home invasion (People v.
Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 10-11), and arson may be a lesser-included
offense of burglary (People v. Oparah, 318 Ill. App. 3d 886
(2001)). Under the essential elements approach, theft, unlawful
restraint, and arson are not, and would never be, lesser-included
offenses of residential burglary, home invasion, and burglary,
respectively. We recently recognized the wide breadth of possible
lesser-included offenses as a result of the charging instrument
approach in People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1 (2002). In Baldwin,
we held that the facts alleged in the charging instrument did not set
forth sufficient facts to support the allegation that aggravated
unlawful restraint was a lesser- included offense of home invasion.
Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d  at 10-11. However, we also stated:
			"That is not to say that these crimes [aggravated
unlawful restraint, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, or aggravated criminal
sexual abuse] could never constitute lesser-included
offenses of home invasion. To the contrary, they could,
depending on the context of the allegations contained in
the charging instrument." Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d  at 10-11.
	This change in how courts evaluate the existence of lesser-included offenses is important to the issue we discuss today-the
issue of legally inconsistent verdicts. Specifically, any discussion
of legal inconsistencies also involves a discussion of lesser-included offenses, and therefore, it is important to recognize the
impact of the charging instrument approach. Legally inconsistent
verdicts necessarily involve a lesser-included offense because
legally inconsistent verdicts by definition involve acquittal on the
predicate offense and conviction on the compound offense. People
v. Frias, 99 Ill. 2d 193 (1983). In order to ascertain the existence
of a predicate and compound offense, courts must evaluate the
existence of a lesser-included offense using the appropriate lesser-included analysis. Therefore, a finding of a lesser-included offense
may be the first step to discussing the issue of legally inconsistent
verdicts. See Frias, 99 Ill. 2d  at 198. Accordingly, because the
charging instrument approach opened the door to the possibility of
a greater number of lesser-included offenses, it also opened the
door to a greater number of verdict challenges based upon a
purported legal inconsistency.
	It was imperative for this court to consider this impact at the
time we decided Klingenberg. This is true because when we
decided Klingenberg, and declined to follow United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S. Ct. 471 (1984), our
decision was based in large part upon our examination of verdicts
and the manner in which legal inconsistencies develop. As noted,
lesser-included offenses are an inherent part of legal
inconsistencies; therefore, our examination of the issue was based
upon incomplete information. The insight we now have, due in
part to time, compels that we revisit Klingenberg.
	Additionally, I believe our current awareness that the charging
instrument approach has opened the door to a greater number of
lesser-included offenses, and consequently opened the door to a
greater number of verdict challenges based upon a purported legal
inconsistency, compels us to reverse our position in Klingenberg
and follow United States v. Powell, 469 U.S 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461,
105 S. Ct. 471 (1984). It is more likely true that these purported
legal inconsistencies are correlated to the change in how we
analyze lesser-included offenses, rather than a reflection of juror
confusion or arbitrariness.
	In People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270 (1996), this court
reaffirmed a rule that has been the law of this state since at least
1983: "where a jury returns legally inconsistent verdicts acquitting
a defendant of one offense and convicting him of another, the
conviction must be reversed." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 277,
citing People v. Frias, 99 Ill. 2d 193 (1983). In so holding, the
Klingenberg court expressly rejected the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S. Ct. 471 (1984), which holds that verdicts need not
be consistent. Today the majority overrules Klingenberg and
reverses a rule of law that has been adhered to for two decades and
adopts in its place Powell. Because the majority offers no
principled basis for this departure from prior precedent, I disagree
with the majority's decision, and therefore respectfully dissent.
	The allegedly inconsistent verdicts in the case at bar consisted
of defendant's conviction for mob action, on the one hand, and his
acquittals on charges of aggravated battery, on the other. The
original trial court judge vacated the mob action conviction,
finding that it was inconsistent with the acquittals for aggravated
battery, and he set the mob action charge for retrial. Defendant's
motion to bar reprosecution was denied by a different trial court
judge, who found no inconsistency between defendant's acquittals
and his conviction. The original order setting the mob action
charge for retrial was allowed to stand. A divided appellate court
affirmed the circuit court's finding that defendant's conviction and
acquittals were legally consistent. However, the appellate court
concluded that it lacked authority to reinstate the mob action
conviction, which was left for retrial. Defendant appealed.
	Before this court, defendant argues, inter alia, that his
conviction for mob action is legally inconsistent with his acquittals
for aggravated battery, and the mob action conviction should not
be reinstated. The majority, however, concludes that it does not
matter whether the conviction and the acquittals are legally
consistent. The majority overrules Klingenberg and adopts the rule
in Powell that legally inconsistent verdicts should be shielded
from review.

I. KLINGENBERG AND POWELL
	In Powell, as in Klingenberg, the defendant was convicted of
a compound offense but was acquitted of the predicate offense
upon which the compound offense was based. The defendant in
Powell was found not guilty of the predicate offenses of
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and of conspiring
to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, but was found
guilty of the compound offense of using a telephone to commit
these same felonies. The Court in Powell did not dispute that these
verdicts were inconsistent. Instead, pointing to Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 390, 76 L. Ed. 356, 52 S. Ct. 189 (1932), the
Court reaffirmed the holding in Dunn that " '[c]onsistency in the
verdict is not necessary.' " Powell, 469 U.S.  at 62, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at
467, 105 S. Ct.  at 475, quoting Dunn, 284 U.S.  at 393, 76 L. Ed. 
at 358, 52 S. Ct.  at 190.
	The Court in Powell acknowledged that, in support of this
holding, the Court in Dunn made a statement about res judicata
that "can no longer be accepted." Powell, 469 U.S.  at 64, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 468, 105 S. Ct.  at 476. However, the Court in Powell
nonetheless reaffirmed Dunn. The Court stated:
			"We believe that the Dunn rule rests on a sound
rationale that is independent of its theories of res judicata,
and that it therefore survives an attack based upon its
presently erroneous reliance on such theories." Powell,
469 U.S.  at 64, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 468, 105 S. Ct.  at 476.
The Court in Powell then explained this independent rationale.
	According to Powell, the inevitable uncertainty that is
inherent in inconsistent verdicts argues in favor of leaving them
intact. When a court of review is faced with inconsistent verdicts,
the court is necessarily uncertain whether the error lies in the
acquittal or the conviction. If the error lies in the acquittal, the
jury's "true" verdict was the conviction, and it is the State that is
harmed by the inconsistent verdicts. Conversely, if the true verdict
was the acquittal, then it is the conviction that was in error, and the
defendant is the one harmed by the inconsistent verdicts. Because
of this uncertainty as to "whose ox has been gored" (Powell, 469 U.S.  at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 469, 105 S. Ct. at 477), Powell
concludes that the best course is simply to leave the verdicts
untouched.
	In support of this conclusion, the Court in Powell suggests
that the error in inconsistent verdicts usually lies in the acquittal
rather than the conviction, i.e., it is the State that is usually
harmed. Citing Dunn, the Court asserts that "such inconsistencies
often are a product of jury lenity." Powell, 469 U.S.  at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 469, 105 S. Ct.  at 477. In other words, an inconsistent
acquittal often represents the jury's attempt to be merciful. Under
this view, the jury's true verdict was the conviction, but the jury
apparently believed that this conviction was punishment enough.
As the Court stated in Dunn:
			" 'The most that can be said in such cases is that the
verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction
the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does
not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's
guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their
assumption of a power which they had no right to
exercise, but to which they were disposed through
lenity.' " Dunn, 284 U.S.  at 393, 76 L. Ed.  at 359, 52 S. Ct.  at 190 (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60
(2d Cir. 1925), and quoted with approval in Powell, 469 U.S.  at 63, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 467, 105 S. Ct. at 475).
	In further support of shielding inconsistent verdicts from
review, Powell asserted that it would be unfair to the State if such
verdicts were reviewable. According to Powell, if a defendant
were allowed to challenge a legally inconsistent conviction, this
would leave the State at a disadvantage because the State is barred
by the double jeopardy clause from challenging an acquittal.
Because of this imbalance in favor of the defendant, Powell
concluded that, in fairness, neither side should be allowed to
challenge inconsistent verdicts.
	Finally, Powell explained that, even though a defendant may
not challenge legally inconsistent verdicts, he still is afforded a
measure of protection against the jury irrationality or error that is
inherent in such verdicts. The defendant may always challenge his
conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. According to
Powell, such sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is protection
enough, even where the verdicts are legally inconsistent. "We do
not believe that further safeguards against jury irrationality are
necessary." Powell, 469 U.S.  at 67, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 470, 105 S. Ct. 
at 478.
	In Klingenberg, as in the case at bar, the State argued that this
court should adopt the approach set forth in Powell. However, in
Klingenberg this court rejected every argument put forth in Powell
for shielding inconsistent verdicts from review. Instead of
following Powell, Klingenberg reaffirmed the rule from People v.
Frias that "where a jury returns legally inconsistent verdicts
acquitting a defendant of one offense and convicting him of
another, the conviction must be reversed." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 
at 277, citing Frias, 99 Ill. 2d 193.
	Explaining our rejection of Powell, this court in Klingenberg
specifically objected to Powell's assumption that the error in
inconsistent verdicts "would generally lie in the acquittal alone,
rather than in the conviction." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 278.
Responding to this assumption, the Klingenberg court stated: "we
cannot simply presume that the jury recognized the defendant's
guilt and chose to be merciful, where it is equally possible that the
jury, through mistake or error, convicted an innocent defendant."
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 278.
	According to Klingenberg, if it could be said with assurance
that inconsistent acquittals always arose from jury lenity, then
perhaps it would be acceptable to leave inconsistent verdicts
untouched. However, as the Court in Powell conceded (see
Powell, 469 U.S.  at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 468, 105 S. Ct. at 476), it
is equally possible that an inconsistent acquittal did not arise from
jury lenity but instead represented the jury's true verdict. In such
a case, the error would lie in the conviction rather than the
acquittal, and the jury, "through mistake or error, [would have]
convicted an innocent defendant." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 278.
	Klingenberg also took issue with Powell's argument that it
would be unfair to the State to allow review of inconsistent
verdicts. According to Powell, because the double jeopardy clause
bars the State from challenging an inconsistent acquittal, a
defendant should also be prohibited from challenging an
inconsistent conviction. In response to this contention, this court
in Klingenberg stated: "We are not persuaded that the framers of
the double jeopardy clause intended to achieve the symmetry
between defendants and the prosecution that the Powell decision
creates." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 279; see also E. Muller, The
Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 772, 806 (1998) ("The Double
Jeopardy Clause, like the other criminal protections in the Bill of
Rights, quite obviously benefits the criminal defendant. That was
its purpose. If the Double Jeopardy Clause creates an imbalance
favoring the criminal defendant on appeal, perhaps the Court
should treat this disadvantage to the government as a
constitutionally designed cost of being the government").
	A similar view is expressed in an article cited by the majority
in Klingenberg. The author summarizes Powell's fairness
argument as follows:
			"In other words, although a defendant's conviction
might be erroneous, he or she may not challenge it
because the framers of the Constitution afforded him or
her the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause (thereby
precluding the Government from challenging the
defendant's possibly erroneous acquittal). Seeking a
symmetry that the framers of the Double Jeopardy Clause
failed to provide, the Supreme Court hammered the
defendant's shield into the prosecutor's sword. Partly
because of her constitutional privilege, the defendant in
Powell went to prison; without it, she might have been
free." A. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 213 (1989).
	In Klingenberg's view, Powell gives too little consideration
to the possibility that a jury that renders inconsistent verdicts
might be convicting an innocent defendant, rather than simply
granting the defendant a merciful acquittal on some charges.
Conversely, the Court in Powell is overly concerned that the State
might be at an unfair disadvantage because the double jeopardy
clause bars it from challenging a possibly erroneous acquittal.
Klingenberg concludes that it is extremely doubtful that the
symmetry the Powell decision creates between defendants and the
State was intended by the framers of the double jeopardy clause.
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 279; 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 213; 111
Harv. L. Rev. at 806; see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223 (1957) ("The
underlying idea [of the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy], one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty" (emphasis added)), quoted with
approval in111 Harv. L. Rev. at 806 n.186.
	Having rejected the rule in Powell regarding inconsistent
verdicts, Klingenberg articulated the rationale underlying the
opposite rule, which Klingenberg asserts is based on "common
sense and sound logic." Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 281.
		"Legally inconsistent verdicts cannot stand because they
are unreliable. At a minimum, such verdicts suggest
confusion or misunderstanding on the part of the jury.
Legally inconsistent verdicts are particularly unreliable in
cases such as this, where the jury acquits a defendant of a
predicate offense and convicts of the compound offense.
In such a case, the former verdict necessarily suggests that
the evidence failed to establish an essential element of the
compound offense. At the very least, the inconsistency
constitutes evidence of arbitrariness that undermines
confidence in the quality of the jury's conclusion. We can
have no confidence in a judgment convicting the
defendant of one crime when the jury, by its acquittal on
another crime, has rejected an essential element needed to
support the conviction. In such circumstances, the
conviction, as a matter of law, cannot stand."
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 281-82.

II. STARE DECISIS
	In the case at bar, the State argues that we should overrule
Klingenberg and adopt Powell in its place. As Justice Kilbride
notes, the majority addresses this argument without ever resolving
the narrower issue of whether the verdicts are legally inconsistent.
I agree with Justice Kilbride that the legal inconsistency question
should have been decided first. If the majority had concluded, as
did the appellate court below, that the verdicts were consistent,
there would have been no need to address the State's alternative
and more far-reaching contention that Klingenberg should be
overruled.
	The State's argument that we should overrule Klingenberg
necessarily implicates the doctrine of stare decisis. "The doctrine
of stare decisis 'proceeds from the first principle of justice, that,
absent powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike.' " People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2002)
(McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.),
quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §599 (1995); see also
People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 363 (2000) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J., and McMorrow, J.)
(" ' "precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd
or unjust" ' "), quoting J. Stein, The Hobgoblin Doctrine:
Identifying "Foolish" Consistency in the Law, 29 Tex. Tech. L.
Rev. 1017, 1019 (1998), quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*70. "The doctrine of stare decisis is the means by which courts
ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. Stare decisis
permits society to presume that fundamental principles are
established in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of
Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994); see also Wakulich v. Mraz,
203 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003) ("The doctrine 'promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991)"). It is well established that prior precedent
should be overruled "only on the showing of good cause"
(Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 167 (1955)) and only where there are "compelling reasons"
for the departure (People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64
(1999)). This court has recognized that it will not depart from prior
precedent " 'merely because the court is of the opinion that it
might decide otherwise were the question a new one.' " Robinson,
187 Ill. 2d  at 464, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97
(1968), citing Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19 (1921).
	In the case at bar, the arguments advanced by the State in
support of Powell are no different from the arguments that were
rejected in Klingenberg. The State presents nothing to indicate that
in the seven years since Klingenberg was decided, the decision has
become unworkable, nor does the State present any other reason
for ignoring stare decisis. Indeed, though the State urges us to
overrule Klingenberg, it makes no mention of the doctrine of stare
decisis whatsoever.
	This court has recently held that where the grounds raised in
support of a change in the law "are identical to the grounds we
considered and rejected" in a previous decision, that decision
should not be overruled. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 231,
237 (2003). In the case at bar, the State's arguments in support of
changing the law of inconsistent verdicts were considered and
rejected in Klingenberg. Accordingly, there is no basis for granting
the State's request to overrule Klingenberg.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority today chooses to
depart from stare decisis and overrule Klingenberg in favor of
Powell. Although the State has failed to present any justification
for this departure, the majority and the special concurrence
nevertheless advance reasons of their own. As is discussed more
fully below, the justifications offered by the majority and the
special concurrence fall far short of the "good cause"
(Heimgaertner, 6 Ill. 2d at 167) or "compelling reason[]"
(Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d at 463-64) that we have held is necessary to
justify overruling prior precedent.

A. The Majority's Explanation
	In the case at bar, the majority explains its departure from
stare decisis by noting that one of the reasons given in
Klingenberg for rejecting Powell "was based on a fundamental
misstatement of the law." Slip op. at 9. Given this misstatement of
the law, the majority concludes that Klingenberg must be
reexamined to determine whether it "still supplies the better
approach or whether we should join the majority of jurisdictions
in following Powell." Slip op. at 11.
	The majority points to the assertion in Klingenberg that, if
Powell were followed and all legally inconsistent convictions were
affirmed, this would force defendants to bear the burden of a trial
judge's error. According to Klingenberg, "[w]here a jury returns
legally inconsistent verdicts, it is the trial court's duty to refuse the
verdicts and to require the jury to deliberate further." Klingenberg,
172 Ill. 2d  at 279. Under this view, inconsistent verdicts result
when the trial court fails to recognize the inconsistency and fails
to direct the jury to continue deliberating. The error in this
approach, according to the majority, lies in its assumption that a
trial judge faced with a conviction that is legally inconsistent with
an acquittal should direct the jury to deliberate further. In the
majority's view, while such a procedure is perfectly proper where
two legally inconsistent guilty verdicts are returned, it may be
inappropriate where the inconsistent verdicts consist of an
acquittal and a conviction. Indeed, requiring a jury to reconsider
a verdict of acquittal would implicate double jeopardy concerns
that are not present if the jury is reconsidering inconsistent guilty
verdicts. The majority asserts that where inconsistent verdicts
consist of an acquittal and a conviction, a trial judge has no duty
to send the jury back for further deliberations. According to the
majority, Klingenberg's assertion that there is such a duty was a
misstatement of the law. Therefore, the majority contends,
Klingenberg must be overruled.
	The main difficulty with the majority's explanation for
overturning Klingenberg is that it fails to address Klingenberg's
other reasons for rejecting Powell. Even if Klingenberg were
incorrect in assuming that a trial judge faced with inconsistent
acquittals and convictions should require the jury to deliberate
further, this does nothing to weaken the force of Klingenberg's
other objections to Powell's reasoning. Nor does it invalidate
Klingenberg's rationale in support of the rule that legally
inconsistent verdicts cannot stand. Klingenberg's objections to
Powell's "jury lenity" and "fairness to the State" arguments remain
unaffected, as does its assertion that legally inconsistent verdicts
cannot stand because they are unreliable. Further, Klingenberg's
argument that the arbitrariness evidenced by such verdicts
"undermines confidence in the quality of the jury's conclusion"
(Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d at 281) is no less valid in light of the
alleged defect in Klingenberg's reasoning identified by the
majority. Regardless of this single alleged defect, Klingenberg's
rejection of Powell and its reaffirmation of the rule requiring the
reversal of inconsistent convictions rest on a rationale that is
independent of its further-deliberations argument.
	Significantly, an argument identical to the majority's "single-defect" contention was rejected by the Supreme Court in Powell.
As noted, in Powell the Court reaffirmed the inconsistent-verdicts
rule set forth in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 76 L. Ed. 356, 52 S. Ct. 189 (1932). In explaining this decision, the Court in
Powell acknowledged that there was a defect in Dunn's rationale.
Powell conceded that a statement about res judicata made by
Dunn in support of its holding that verdicts need not be consistent
"can no longer be accepted." Powell, 469 U.S.  at 64, 83 L. Ed. 2d 
at 468, 105 S. Ct.  at 476. However, this did not prevent the Court
from reaffirming Dunn. As the Court in Powell stated:
			"We believe that the Dunn rule rests on a sound
rationale that is independent of its theories of res judicata,
and that it therefore survives an attack based upon its
presently erroneous reliance on such theories." Powell,
469 U.S.  at 64, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 468, 105 S. Ct.  at 476.
	By contrast, in the case at bar the majority points to a defect
in Klingenberg's rationale and concludes, unlike the Court in
Powell, that Klingenberg cannot be reaffirmed but instead must be
overruled. This position is taken even though, as stated previously,
Klingenberg's other objections to Powell's reasoning remain
viable, as does Klingenberg's rationale in support of the rule it
reaffirms. Thus the majority in the case at bar does the opposite of
what the Court in Powell did under the same circumstances.
Ironically, the majority does this in the name of adopting Powell.
	In sum, the majority concludes that Klingenberg cannot
survive an attack based on the alleged single defect that the
majority identifies in Klingenberg's reasoning. The majority fails
to explain how this alleged defect weakens or invalidates
Klingenberg's remaining objections to Powell, or how it
undermines Klingenberg's rationale in support of the rule that
legally inconsistent verdicts cannot stand. Moreover, the
majority's explanation for departing from stare decisis is premised
upon on an argument that, as noted, has been rejected by the
Supreme Court in Powell, the very decision that the majority
purports to adopt. The majority's justification for overruling
Klingenberg falls far short of constituting the "good cause"
(Heimgaertner, 6 Ill. 2d at 167), " 'special justification' "
(Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994), quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212,
81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984)), or
"compelling reason[ ]" (Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d at 463-64) that has
been held necessary to justify such a departure from stare decisis.

B. The Special Concurrence
	Perhaps recognizing the weakness of the majority's reasoning,
Justice Fitzgerald offers an additional justification-again, one that
was not advanced by the State-for departing from stare decisis.
This explanation also is insufficient to justify overruling
Klingenberg.
	The special concurrence correctly notes that in People v.
Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93 (1994), we expressed a preference for the
charging instrument approach in determining whether a particular
offense is a lesser-included offense of another. In expressing this
preference, we disapproved of the other two approaches that had
been in use: the abstract elements approach, which focuses on the
text of the statutes defining the offenses, and the inherent
relationship approach, which examines the facts adduced at trial
on the offense charged. The charging instrument approach, by
contrast, looks to the facts alleged in the indictment or information
in order to determine whether a particular offense is a lesser-included offense of another. If the lesser offense is described by
the instrument charging the greater, this lesser offense is
considered a lesser-included offense of the greater. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107. Under this approach, the indictment or information need
not expressly allege all the elements of the lesser offense so long
as those elements may be inferred from the charging instrument.
People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2002).
	The special concurrence notes further that, compared to the
abstract elements approach, the charging instrument approach "has
opened the door to the possibility of a greater number of lesser-included offenses." Slip op. at 16 (Fitzgerald, J., specially
concurring). This, the special concurrence asserts, has resulted in
a corresponding increase in the number of possible inconsistent
verdicts. This correspondence between lesser-included offenses
and inconsistent verdicts exists, according to the special
concurrence, because inconsistent verdicts, "by definition,"
involve a conviction on a compound offense and an acquittal on
the predicate offense. Slip op. at 17 (Fitzgerald, J., specially
concurring). "In order to ascertain the existence of a predicate and
compound offense," the special concurrence continues, "courts
must evaluate the existence of a lesser-included offense using the
appropriate lesser included analysis." Slip op. at 17 (Fitzgerald, J.,
specially concurring). According to this view, such an
inconsistent-verdicts analysis necessarily involves a determination
as to whether the purported predicate offense is also a lesser-included offense of the compound offense. The special
concurrence concludes that, because lesser-included-offense
determinations are inherent in inconsistent-verdicts analysis, the
greater number of possible lesser-included offenses created by the
shift to the charging instrument approach has resulted in a
correspondingly "greater number of verdict challenges based upon
a purported legal inconsistency." Slip op. at 18 (Fitzgerald, J.,
specially concurring).
	According to the special concurrence, this result was
insufficiently appreciated by the majority in Klingenberg, which
was decided only two years after Novak. In the view of the special
concurrence, if the full impact of the shift to the charging
instrument approach had been realized, the majority in
Klingenberg might not have rejected Powell, which simply
dispenses with all inconsistent-verdicts review. The special
concurrence therefore asserts that, because the decision in
Klingenberg was based on "incomplete information," Klingenberg
must now be revisited and overruled. Slip op. at 18 (Fitzgerald, J.,
specially concurring).
	The flaw in the special concurrence's reasoning is the
emphasis it places on the charging instrument in an inconsistent-verdicts analysis. By definition, an inconsistent-verdicts analysis
must focus on the findings of the jury. The charging instrument,
however, is rarely, if ever, dispositive as to these findings. Indeed,
in most cases, the jury does not even see the charging instrument.
In the case at bar, for example, there is no indication that the jurors
ever saw the information or that it was ever read to them. In this
case involving inconsistent verdicts, the only logically relevant
documents for a reviewing court are the jury instructions and the
verdict forms.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, the special concurrence points
to Klingenberg in support of its argument that lesser-included-offense determinations, which necessarily involve an examination
of the charging instrument, are inherent in inconsistent-verdicts
analysis. This is incorrect.
	The defendant in Klingenberg was charged by indictment with
two counts of official misconduct predicated on theft (counts II
and III) and one count of the predicate offense of theft over $300
(count I). The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of
official misconduct (count III) and not guilty of the other two
counts, including the charge of theft (count I). The trial court
attempted to reconcile the verdicts by finding that the theft that
was charged in count I was not the predicate offense for the
official misconduct charged in count III. The trial court reasoned
that the theft count required the jury to find that the defendant
committed a theft of property valued in excess of $300, while the
official misconduct count could have been based on theft of less
than $300.
	Klingenberg rejected this reasoning. The issues instruction for
official misconduct stated: " 'To sustain the charge of Official
Misconduct as to count III, regarding the amount of $1,015.00
***.' (Emphasis added.)" Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 276.
Similarly, the verdict for official misconduct noted: " 'Official
Misconduct, count III-$1015.00.' " Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at
276.
	Thus the jury could have convicted the defendant of official
misconduct as charged in count III only if it believed that he had
committed a theft of property worth more than $300. The theft of
property valued at more than $300 was therefore the predicate
offense of the official misconduct for which the defendant was
convicted. Accordingly, the defendant's acquittal of theft was
legally inconsistent with his conviction for official misconduct
predicated on theft. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 277.
	The court in Klingenberg did discuss the indictment in its
inconsistent-verdicts analysis. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 276. The
special concurrence seizes upon this fact as evidence that
Klingenberg relied on the indictment in making a lesser-included-offense determination as a first step in its inconsistent-verdicts
analysis. There are two problems with this assumption. First, the
majority opinion in Klingenberg makes no mention of lesser-included offenses. Second, a careful reading of Klingenberg shows
that the examination of the indictment came in response to the trial
court's finding that "the theft charged in count I was not the
predicate offense for the official misconduct charged in count III."
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 275. It was the trial court's finding that
brought the indictment into the picture, and the majority in
Klingenberg was simply responding to this finding. Klingenberg's
holding that the verdicts were legally inconsistent did not rest on
the indictment. As is clear in the opinion, this holding could only
have been based on an examination of the jury instructions and the
verdict forms.
	In sum, the special concurrence argues that Klingenberg must
be overturned because of the previously unappreciated impact that
the charging instrument approach to defining lesser-included
offenses has on inconsistent-verdicts analysis. I disagree with this
contention. As noted, the charging instrument is rarely, if ever,
conclusive in determining whether a jury's verdicts are
inconsistent. The special concurrence fails to explain why a
document that the jury usually never sees is dispositive as to what
the jury found. As was the case with the majority's justification for
overruling Klingenberg, the explanation offered by the special
concurrence does not constitute the "good cause" (Heimgaertner,
6 Ill. 2d at 167), " 'special justification' " (Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d  at 510, quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984)), or "compelling
reason[ ]" (Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d at 463-64) that is needed to
justify departing from prior precedent.

III. HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
	Accepting that a majority of this court has concluded that
Klingenberg must be revisited, I note that there is a less drastic
alternative to overruling this decision which the majority chooses
not to address: namely, the application of harmless error review to
inconsistent verdicts. Under such review, if the inconsistency
between a conviction and an acquittal could be shown to be
harmless, the conviction could be affirmed. This option would
allow the majority to step back from Klingenberg without taking
the extraordinary step of overruling Klingenberg.
	Legally inconsistent verdicts unquestionably constitute error.
Powell, 469 U.S.  at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d  at 468-69, 105 S. Ct.  at 477
("Inconsistent verdicts *** present a situation where 'error,' in the
sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most
certainly has occurred"). Where trial error has occurred, harmless
error review is a well-established method for determining whether
the conviction must be reversed. 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 822. "It is
a commonplace of appellate practice that when a defendant is able
to show that an error has infected the proceedings in the trial court,
the appellate court must reverse the conviction unless the error
was harmless." 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 822.
	In the inconsistent-verdicts context, the question to be
answered by such review is whether it is the defendant or the State
that has been harmed by the inconsistent verdicts, i.e., whether it
is the conviction or the acquittal that is in error. This question is
answered by determining the strength of the State's case against
the defendant. 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 825. If the evidence in support
of the defendant's guilt is so overwhelming as to leave beyond a
reasonable doubt that his conviction would have been the same
absent the error, the reviewing court can be reasonably certain that
the defendant was not likely the one harmed by the inconsistent
verdicts. In other words, it was the acquittal, not the conviction,
that was in error. In such a case, the inconsistent conviction may
be affirmed.
	I recognize that the application of harmless error review in
these circumstances constitutes a departure from Klingenberg's
conclusion that "[l]egally inconsistent verdicts cannot stand."
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 281. However, it is not nearly so severe
a departure as the course advocated by the majority: the overruling
of Klingenberg and the adoption of Powell. In view of my
colleagues' apparent dissatisfaction with Klingenberg, I submit
that this proposal provides a more measured response than the path
chosen by the majority. It would permit the majority to step away
from Klingenberg without taking the extreme position that a
reviewing court should do nothing in the face of legally
inconsistent verdicts, regardless of how egregious or troubling the
inconsistency might be.

IV. CONCLUSION
	The majority today overrules Klingenberg for reasons that do
not withstand scrutiny. No argument is made that Klingenberg has
become unworkable, nor is any other compelling reason given for
overturning at least two decades of prior precedent. Given these
circumstances, the unavoidable conclusion is that the reason for
overruling Klingenberg lies elsewhere. Unfortunately, it appears
that a majority of the justices of this court have simply concluded
that, were Klingenberg being argued for the first time today, they
would decide the case differently. This is not a principled reason
for overruling a prior decision. See People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999).
	Finally, I note that the majority's decision in this case is one
of several opinions in recent months in which this court has
departed from controlling precedent for reasons that have been
called into question. In People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210 (2002), we
explicitly overruled People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89 (1990), and
overruled, sub silentio, People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155 (1992). As
in the case at bar, inadequate justification was provided for this
departure from stare decisis. See Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d  at 221
(McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.).
In People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), this court implicitly
overturned People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59 (2002).(1) See Boclair,
202 Ill. 2d  at 127 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by
Freeman, J.). Earlier, in Collins, the continued viability of People
v. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 1 (1970), was called into question. See
Collins, 202 Ill. 2d  at 75 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by
Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.) ("The majority has offered no reason
to depart from [the] settled holding [of Williams]"); Collins, 202 Ill. 2d  at 86 (McMorrow, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing,
joined by Freeman, J.). Most recently, in In re James E., No.
93608 (May 22, 2003), we created a "narrow exception" (slip op.
at 7) to the rule in In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314 (1984), regarding
involuntary commitment of a voluntarily admitted patient of a
mental health facility. This exception effectively swallowed the
rule, resulting in our implicitly overruling Hays.(2) See James E.,
slip op. at 8 (Thomas, J., specially concurring); James E., slip op.
at 11 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.).
	Stare decisis is not an inexorable command (Wakulich, 203
Ill. 2d at 230), and I do not suggest that departure from previous
case law is always unacceptable. I merely emphasize that any
departure from stare decisis must be supported by good cause.
Heimgaertner, 6 Ill. 2d  at 166-67. I would remind my colleagues
that if the law were to change each time a decision is revisited or
"with each change in the makeup of the court, then the concept
that ours is a government of law and not of men would be nothing
more than a pious cliche." People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 167
(1981) (Ryan, J., concurring). I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in parts I, II and IV of this
dissent.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in parts I and II of this dissent.
	I find myself in a somewhat unusual situation in this case, for
I agree with the majority that the better rule is that inconsistent
verdicts should simply be allowed to stand. This is how I believed
the issue should have been resolved in Klingenberg. See
Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d  at 285-89 (Miller, J, dissenting, joined by
Freeman, J.). And yet I must dissent.
	The basis for my departure from the majority is the doctrine
of stare decisis.(3) I must agree with Justice McMorrow that neither
the majority nor the special concurrence has given sufficient
reason that stare decisis should not dictate our result.
Disagreement with the analysis employed in previous cases is
simply not sufficient-such an exception would wholly swallow the
rule.
	Accordingly, I join parts I, II, and IV of Justice McMorrow's
dissent. I do not join part III of her dissent, because I believe that
if stare decisis is to be abandoned, the better course is to do away
with inconsistent verdict analysis altogether, as the majority does.
	I respectfully dissent, joining parts I and II of Justice
McMorrow's dissent. I also write separately, however, because I
believe there is another, even more critical, basis for rejecting the
majority's decision to overrule our established precedent in People
v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270 (1996). In addition to its
unwarranted abandonment of the fundamental principles of stare
decisis, the majority has unjustifiably elected to address the
question of Klingenberg's continued viability despite its
acknowledgment of an alternative basis for reviewing this appeal.
Slip op. at 5. This alternative basis is the appellate court's holding
that the conviction for mob action was not legally inconsistent
with the aggravated battery acquittal. See slip op. at 3. This issue
was argued by the parties, but the majority has chosen to bypass it
altogether in favor of the State's alternative argument, asking us
to overrule our prior case law in the absence of any rationale even
vaguely approaching "good cause," "special justification," or
"compelling reason[ ]" (slip op. at 25, 28, 32 (McMorrow, C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.). See slip op. at 8-9.
	Because I believe that this case can be, and should have been,
analyzed on an entirely different basis, as argued by both parties
and properly ruled on by the appellate court, the State's alternative
argument should not have been reached on its merits. The
appellate court's holding that the verdicts are not legally
inconsistent is correct and dispositive of the principle issue raised
by the parties. Under these circumstances, the majority's
reconsideration of Klingenberg is both unnecessary and unwise
(see slip op. at 24-26 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by
Freeman and Kilbride, JJ.). For this reason, I write separately, as
well as join in parts I and II of Justice McMorrow's dissent. I
decline to join part III of that dissent because the parties did not
raise or argue the issue of harmless error review, and it is
unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal.
	 
	 
1.      1Although two justices wrote separately stating that Boclair did not
overrule Collins, the majority opinion did not speak to this issue.

2.      2One member of the court, Justice Rarick, did not participate in the
decision in James E. Accordingly, there is no majority holding in James
E. as to whether Hays has been overruled.

3.      3This doctrine did not dictate my vote in Klingenberg, which was the
first Illinois case to consider whether we should continue to reverse
inconsistent verdicts in the wake of Powell. That decision by the high
court, reanalyzing and reaffirming the repudiation of the doctrine in the
federal courts, was sufficient cause to reweigh the issue's merits.