Title: State v. Line

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

se+7oR PUBLICATION IN WES?’

   

MAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

a--000-==

 

STATE OF HAWAT'L,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee

MELODY C. LINE,
Petitioner/Defendant Appellant

 

No. 27850

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 05=1-0429(3))

August 11, 2009

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.,
AND CIRCUIT’ JUDGE ALM’ ASSIGNED DUE TO a’ VACANCY
‘OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Melodie C. Line
(Petitioner) filed 2 petition for writ of certiorari on May 22,
2009, seeking review of the judgment of the Intermediate Court of
Appeals (ICA) filed on April 28, 2009, pursuant to its April 7,
2009 Sunmary Disposition Order (S00)! affirming the March 3, 2006

Judgment of Conviction and Probation for Hindering Prosecution in

 

the First Degree under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 710-1029

‘The 800 was filed by Presiding Judge Corinne K.A. Watanabe and
Associate Juiges Daniel R, Foley and Alexa D.M. Fujise.

aams
‘S++POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WANAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER‘ ++

(Supp. 2008),? filed by the circuit court of the second circuit
(the court).? See State v. Line, No. 27850, 2009 wt 924509 (App.
Apr. 7, 2009).

We hold that (1) unlawful police conduct is not a
defense to a charge of Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree
under HRS § 710-1029, however, (2) there was insufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction for such an offense in this
case, and therefore, the April 28, 2009 judgment of the ICA and
the March 3, 2006 judgment of conviction of the court are
vacated; but (3) the case is remanded to the court for entry of a
Judgment of conviction on the lesser included offense of
Hindering Prosecution in the Second Degre:

te
a

On July 12, 2005, police discovered Petitioner’s son,
Dean Line, Jr. (Dean), with a glass crystal methamphetamine
smoking pipe and a tiny Ziploc packet in his vehicle outside his
residence.‘ Police did not immediately arrest Dean, who told the

officers he would arrange for his dealer to come to his house and

+ urs $ 710-1029(1), indering prosecution in the first degree,
provides in relevant part that

[a] person commits the offense of hindering prosecution in
the first degree if, with the intent to hinder the
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, oF puniehsent of
another for a class A, 8 orc felony or murder in any
degree, the person renders assistance to the other person:

 

 

» The Honorable Joseph E. Cardoza presided.

+ the pipe tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.
However, there 42 no evidence that the packet was ever tested.

 

2
 

RAMA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER:

 

POR PUBLICATION IN WEST”

 

make a transaction.? officer Clifton Perreira (Officer Perreiral
consented to Dean's setting up a transaction. Dean went into his
residence purportedly to arrange the transaction, returned a few
minutes later, and sat at the rear of his house. Officers drove
to the end of the cul de sac to conduct surveillance, keeping
Dean in their view. After ten minutes, Dean went back into his
home and did not return, After five more minutes, the officers
drove to the back of the house Dean had entered and called for
him to come outside. A wonan’s voice from the house said, “He's
ot home." Police did not attempt to enter the residence to
search for Dean.

‘The next day, July 13, 2005, in the daytime, officer
Perreira and other officers returned to Dean's residence to
arrest Dean, Officer Perreira saw Dean when they pulled up to
the residence, and Oean inmediately ran. Police made visual
checks from outside the fence Line of the property and called for
Dean to come out, and police heard a female voice from inside the
house say, “He's not home.” Officer Perreira and other officers
spoke to Dean's father and sister briefly outside the property,
and both Dean's father and sister were argumentative with police.

Police left the area and, for a second time, Dean evaded arrest.

 

+ the facts essentially reflect findings that were part of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lau: Order Denying [Petitioner's] Motion
in Limine, filed by the court on March 3, 2006, Petitioner does not challenge
any of she findings in ner Application for Writ of Certsorars. Hence, he
findings are binding. Kelly v. 1260 Oceanside Zartoara, 111 Hawai'i 205, 227,
140'P.3a 585, 1007 (2006) (*Generaliy, a court finaing that is not challenged
fon appeal is’ binding upon [the appellate court].").

   

 

 

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Police made no arrest attempts at Dean‘s residence on July 14,
2008.

on July 15, 2005, Officer Perreira, Officer aylett
Wallwork (Officer Wallwork), and Sergeant Kenneth Kikuchi
(Sergeant Kikuchi) returned to Dean's residence in the daytine.
Police did not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant for the
premises at 564 Ekolu Street. when the officers’ vehicle stopped
in front of Dean's driveway, Dean and another male who was in the
front of the house ran into the yard through a front wooden gate
fon the side of the house

‘The officers pursuing Dean were yelling, “Stop,

 

police." Officer Perreira and Sergeant Kikuchi ran around the

house towards the back. Officer Perreira and Sergeant Kikuchi

 

were in plain clothes, with shirts tucked in, exposing their

guns, Tal

 

, and badges worn on their belts. Officer Perreira
then saw Dean running on a second-story balcony and entering the

house through a sliding glass door. Sergeant Kikuchi saw Dean

 

come out fron a side door of the residence, yell for Dean’s
mother, and run to the east side of the house. Sergeant Kikuchi
saw Dean scale a makeshift stairway to the second floor balcony
and enter the house through @ sliding glass door.

officer Pecreiza jumped on the balcony, yelled at Dean
to stop, and identified the officers as police. officer Pereira
saw Dean’s mother, Petitioner, brace herself into the sliding
glass door's opening with her hands on the slider and her back
against the door frane, blocking Officer Perreira’s entry.

4
   

YOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®:

 

Officer Perreira told Petitioner to “get out of the way,” “we've
got to arrest him,” and “police.” Petitioner did not move and

responded, “Get the £-

 

out of here. You need a search
warrant.”

Sergeant Kikuchi got to the second-floor balcony and
saw Officer Ferreira struggling with Petitioner. Sergeant
Kikuchi yelled, “Police(, glet out of the way,” but Petitioner
refused to move. Sergeant Kikuchi then pushed Officer Perreira
into Petitioner, knocking her down and allowing officer Perreira
to enter the house

Petitioner then grabbed Sergeant Kikuchi’s shire and
yelled at hin to get out. Sergeant Kikuchi told Petitioner to
Let go, “We're police,” and “We're after Dean, he needs to be
arrested." The officers did not locate Dean in the residence or
on the property. Officer Perreira noticed his arm was scratched
and attributed it to Petitioner's struggle with him at the
doorway. Sergeant Kikuchi's shirt sleeve had a tear in it that
Petitioner caused while holding his sleeve after he pushed into
Petitioner and Officer Ferreira at the door.

officer Perreira and Sergeant Kikuchi were acting under
the color of their official authority when attempting to arrest
Dean on July 15, 2005.

Ea
on September 6, 2006, Petitioner was charged by

indictment with the following counts:
 

VOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER!*#

 

Count one: Hiizdering Prosecution in the Fizet Degree
in violation of (HRS 720-1029(1)}7 and

Count Two: Assault Against a Law Enforcenent officer
in the Second Degree in vsslation of HRS § 707-112.6 ( (Sopp.
2008)*).

 

 

 

on January 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion in

 

limine, arguing that the “[plolice had no right to arrest [Dean]
without a warrant.” She moved the court for an order “precluding
any evidence [from trial] regarding police contact with [Dean],
as irrelevant and prejudiciai[,]” or alternatively, for a
dismissal of her case with prejudice.

The court denied Petitioner's motion in limine. In
denying Petitioner's motion, the court determined that the police
entry had been lawful. Alternatively, the court stated that
“{elven sf the attempt to arrest Dean on July 15, 2005, is viewed
as unlawful, the appropriate remedy can be found in suppression
of evidence against Dean or the pursuit of civil damages.” The
court concluded that “the interest of maintaining a well-ordered
society far outweigh [sic] any benefit that might be derived fron
allowing a person to physically challenge or obstruct the police

as they are attempting to arrest another person.”

wns § 707-712.6 provides:

Assault against a law enforcement officer in the
second degree. (1} A person commite the offense of assault
against a low enforcement officer in the second degree if
the person recklessly causes boaily injury to a Law
onforcenent offscer who is engaged in the perforzance of
uty.

 

(2) Assault of a law enforcement officer in the second
dogree is 8 misdeneanar. The court shall sentence the
person sho has been convicted of this offense to a definite
fern of imprisonment, pursusnt to section 706-663, of not
less than thirty days without po:

suspension of sentence

 
 

}FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

 

on January 5, 2006, after a jury trial, Petitioner vas
found guilty of Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree.’ she
was acquitted of the charge of Assault Against a Law Enforcement

Officer in the Second Degr

 

Petitioner was sentenced to probation, and judgment was
entered on March 3, 2006. On March 31, 2006, Petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued, inter
alia, that she had a right to refuse an unlawful intrusion by

police into her hom

 

In its April 7, 2009 800, the ICA affirmed Petitioner’
conviction and sentence of probation. See Line, 2009 WL 924509

at 1. The ICA concluded that the alleged unlawful intrusion by
police did not vitiate the Hindering Prosecution charge, stating
that,

(alssuming, arguendo, the police had no right to enter
{fet itioner’} none and arrest her sony the, charge of
Nindering Prosecution was not affected by the al
Snlawfal intrusion and arrest. gtate-e. Saghanian, 78
Hawai's 475, 896 P.24 931 (App. 1995). Tm Kachanaan, this
court held that an illegal arvest did not affect @
“resisting arrest charge.” Id, Similarly, the alleged
unlawfol intrusion and acrest in the instant ease did not
affect the Hindering Prosecution charge.

   

 

Id.
Petitioner filed an Application for Writ of Certiorari

on April 16, 2009, which was dismissed without prejudice on

* at trial, the court instructed the jury that

[tine use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest
that the defendant knows is being nade by a police officer,

wiful. ‘On the other hand, if the
Police officer threatens to use or uses unlawful force, the
Taw regarding use of protective force would apply:

(Emphasis added.)
‘s++POR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

 

April 20, 2009, because the ICA’s judgment had not been filed.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Second Application for

Writ of Certiorari to this court on May 22, 2009 (Application),

requesting that her conviction of Hindering Prosecution in the

First Degree be reversed.

 

II.

In her Application, Petitioner presented the following

 

 

questions:

2. Does a citizen at home, have a right to refuse entry
to plain clothes police who have ao Warrant?

2, Canva citizen be convicted of ARS S 710-1029 Hindoring
Prosecution in the First Degree, for refusing hone
entry £0 police, who have neither arrest nor search
warrant?

3. Whether the governnent has unfettered authority to

Force entry enone foie) without any warrant
(Emphasis omitted.)

Petitioner's second question of whether a citizen can
be convicted of HRS § 710-1029 for refusing home entry to police
who have no arrest or search warrant, and third question of

whether the government has “unfettered authority to force entry

 

into a home without a warrant,” are both subsumed by the first
question. Therefore, neither need be addressed separately and
may be resolved by considering the first question.

11.

Respondent /Plaintiff-Aappellee State of Hawai'i
(Respondent) did not file a menorandum in opposition. on July 6,
2009, this court ordered supplenental briefing to address the
issue of whether this court should recognize plain error on the

part of the court and the ICA on the issue of whether a jury
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

 

instruction should have been issued on the lesser included
offense of hindering prosecution in the second degree, under HRS
§ 710-1030 (1993), On July 15, 2009, Respondent filed its

supplemental brief, On July 16, 2009, Petitioner filed her

 

supplemental brief.

 

In Petitioner's supplenental brief, she easentially
argued that a hindering prosecution charge in any degree was not
supported, and, therefore, “{a] strategic decision was made not
to request a lesser included instruction on Hindering Prosecution
An the Second Degree[,]" because “[t]o request an instruction on
the lesser included offense was seen as a risk that the jury
would make a compromise verdict on the lesser included charge
rather than acquit.”

Petitioner further emphasizes in her supplenental brief
the lack of sufficiency of the overall evidence to support either
charge. In that connection, Petitioner states that “[a]ecording
to police, [Petitioner’s] ‘criminal act’ consisted of standing
inside her hone and blocking entry to the two plain clothes
police who were looking for her son to use in 2 sting operation.”

But, according to Petitioner,

[s)he testified that che was sitting on the couch with her
Grandson when seddeniy Sergeant Kikuchi “opens the sliding
Glass door, cones plowing in. I’m sitting on the couch
Ealking to sy grandson. He cones in, and he backhand me.
o.. Casey {her grandson] on the side of ne was appalled
fe’ went to.~ by the pantry area right by the stairway, and
he was going, ‘What are you doing? Don’t de this to ay
hana’ and tnat’s when the officer pushed ne back on the
couch, Z got back up and said, ‘what are you doing up here?
Get the heck out of nere.!"

 

 
/+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*+#

Based on the foregoing version of the facts, “and the belief that
[Petitioner] was credible(,]" Petitioner's counsel did not

request the lesser included offense.

 

In its supplemental brief, Respondent argues (1) that
an instruction on hindering prosecution in the second degree was

not warranted, and, (2) alternatively, any error in failing to

 

give such an instruction was harmless. Respondent maintains that
“in the instant case, there was no rational basis in the evidence
that the offenses committed by (Dean) were felonies [sic,]""
because “(t]he evidence was clear that the underlying offenses
committed by [Dean] were [felonies).”
c

on July 17, 2008, Respondent filed an amended
supplemental brief, With regard to whether a lesser included
offense instruction should have been given, Respondent
acknowledges that “there was evidence that [Petitioner] did not
know that the charges pending against her son were felonies|,]”
and “[t)hus, it was plain error for the trial court and the ICA
not to find that the lesser included offense instruction was
necessary.”

Respondent went on to admit that “[t]here was no

substantial evidence to support [Petitioner's] conviction[,]”

+ Based on the o:
chat here it intended ¢
offenses wore nat feloni

   

sty of Respondent’s argument, it can be assumed
‘that there was no rational basis that che

 

  

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because “[bJoth Officer Perreira and (Sergeant) Kikuchi testified
that they did not tell [Petitioner] about the nature of the

charges pending against her son{,

 

and “there was no evidence
Presented that she was aware or believed or hoped that the

Pending charges against her son were feloni

 

Based on the
foregoing, “(Respondent] requested] that this matter be reversed
and the matter remanded to the trial court for dismissal with

prejudici

 

Oral argument on the merits was heard on July 20, 2009.
wv.

‘This court has stated that

   
   

prosecutor concedes error,
Lets incuabene on the appel

that the confession of error is supported by t
Fecoia and well-founded in law and second to determine that
Such error is properly preserves and prejudicial. In other
words, a confession of error by the prosecution ia not
Binding upon an appellate court, nor may a conviction be
reversed on the strength of the prosecutor's official action
alone:

 

 

 

State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai'i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 02 (2000)
(quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted). Thus, we
address Petitioner's points of error raised in the application,
and consider whether the error conceded by Respondent is
supported by the record.
a.

As to Petitioner's first question, Petitioner maintains
that she was “constitutionally protected to stand inside [her]
doorway and request’ plain-clothes police to produce a warrant.”

She argues that although her actions -- standing firm in her

un
 

‘+48OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIPIC REPORTER®

doorway and requesting police to produce a warrant -- “rendered
assistance”* under HRS § 710-1029, those acts are protected under
the Hawai'i Constitution.! Petitioner argues that the ICA erred
by relying solely on Kachanian, because Kachanian is
distinguishable on the law and the facts.

As noted before, the ICA cited Kachanian to support its
conclusion that “the charge of Hindering Prosecution was not
affected by the alleged unlawful intrusion and arrest.” See

Line, 2009 wi 924509, at *1. Kachanian held that, although the

+ wRS $ 720-2028 (1993) defines “rendering assistance” as used in
the hindering prosecution statutes, ARS §§ 710-1029 and 710-1030. MRS
$"720-1028 provides that

(flor the purposes of sections 720-1029 and 710-1030,
person renders assistance to ancther if he:

(2) tarbore or conceals such persons

(2) Warns’ such person of impending discovery,
apprehension, prosecution, or conviction, except
this does not epply eo a warning given in
Connection with an effort to Bring another into
Compliance with the Law;

(3) Provides such person with money, transportation,
Nespon, disguise, or other means of avoiaing
Biecovery, apprehension, prosecution, oF
conviction:

(4) Prevents oF obstructs, by means of force,
Seception, o intimidation, anyone from
performing an act that might aid in the
Elecovery, apprehension, prosecution, or
conviction of such person; oF

(S) Suppresses by an act of concealment, alteration,
or destruction eny physical evidence that might
Sig in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
Sr conviction of such person.

 

 

 

 

 

(Brackets omitted.)
article Z, Section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides:

‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures. and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and
bo warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons cr things to be seized
Or the communications sought to be intercepted.

 

 

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‘++P0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#+

 

initial seizure of the appellant and his subsequent arrest were
illegal, “such illegality would not affect the ‘resisting arrest’
charge under HRS § 710-1026,""' 78 Hawai'i at 485, 896 P.2d at
941, In Kachanian, the appellant swung and kicked at a police
officer during the appellant's arrest at the Kahului Airport.
Id. at 479, 896 P.2d at 938, ‘The appellant was convicted, inter
alla, of Resisting Arrest in violation of HRS § 710-1026." Id.
at 477, 896 P.2d at 933.

According to the Kachanian court, under HRS § 710-1026,
it is no defense that the officer was making an unlawful arrest
if the officer was acting under color of law. Id. (citing
Commentary to HRS § 710-1026 (1985)). Kachanian stated that the
rationale underlying the statute “requires that the lawfulness of
an arrest be resolved in the courts because, ‘the evils involved
in allowing such resistance far outweigh the infrequent and
usually minor inconvenience of submitting to any arrest made

under color of law and disputing it within the legal franework.1”

“the defendant in Kachanian was convicted under #88 § 710-1026
(3985). The current version of the statute is substantially the sane,

URS § 710-1026 (1993 & Supp. 2008) provides:

(2) _A person connite the offense of resisting arrest
Af the person Intentionally prevents a law enforcement
bésicer acting onder color of the law enforcement officer’ =
offioial authority fzon effecting an arrest by!
a)" Using or threatening to use physical force
against the law enforcenent officer or ancthers
(b) Oaing any other means creating » substantial
Fisk of causing Beaily injury te the law
enforcenent officer of anather.
(2) Resisting arrest is a misdemeanor.

 

 

 

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‘e470R PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#

 

Ida at 485, 896 P.2d at 941 (quoting Conmentary to HRS $ 710-1026
(1988)).
8

 

Petitioner argues that Kachanian is distinguishable
from the cage at bar because it involves a resisting arrest
statute which has “little or no interpretive value in construing
the constitutional limits of HRS $ 710-1029.” According to

Petitioner, Kachanian is also different on the facts because it

 

involved an airport arrest, not an entry into a home.
However, Kachanian’s interpretation of the resisting
arrest statute is analogous to the case at bar. As Respondent
noted, the resisting arrest statute, HRS § 710-1026, is located
in the same statutory chapter, entitled “Offenses Against Public

Administration,” and was enacted at the same tine as the
hindering prosecution statutes. The commentaries to both the
resisting arrest statute and the hindering prosecution statutes
describe the prohibited conduct as a form of obstructing

justice.® Moreover, the commentary to the resisting arrest

 

the commentary to HRS § 710-1026 provides that “(rJesisting arrest
is one of the commonest forms of obstructing government cperation.” (emphasis
Added.) ‘The commentary to HRS §§ 710-1028 through #0 pfovides, tA relevant
pare:

These sections would have been treated at common law
Gnder the heading of Sccessory after the fact. However, in
Keeping with the philosophy stated in those earlier
Sections, liability for conduct relating to sn offense which
Bas already been consummated ought to be determined nore
with regard to the sangerousness of the particular
Post-offense acts involved than with regard to the
Sangerousness of the pricr substantive offense. Thus, the
welved in = sh

 

 

tion focuses on the #200 aa

 

a4
 

/FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

 

statute provides the following:

 

an was act
American jurisdictions have almost univers
Pejected the connon-iaw doctrine that it is permissible to
Fesist an unlawful arrest with a9 mich force as one has at,
one's disposal. In'a well-ordered society, the evils
Involved in allowing such resistance far outweigh the
{neregsent and usually sinor inconvenience of submitting to
any arrest sade under color of iaw and dsspoting 2 within
the legal. framework. Th
Under dolar of the officer's official authority obvi!
necessity for a separate section barring such a defen:

 

 

 

    

Commentary to HRS § 710-1026 (emphasis added). The resisting
arrest statute, according to the commentary, requires use of
force or risk of bodily injury. The commentary additionally
notes that, “[clases of interference which do not involve force
or risk of bodily injury, but which present serious social

dangers are included under §§ 710-1029 and 1030 as cases of

 

hindering prosecution.” Id, That reference indicates that the
hindering prosecution statutes are complementary to the resisting
arrest statute, covering a related, yet different type of
conduct, inasmuch as hindering prosecution, unlike resisting
arrest, covers situations that “present serious social dangers.”

See id, Additionally, the resisting arzi

 

fe statute's application

®,, .continve

 

‘The underlying conduct Lnvolved in th
sections is that of rendering assistance to another.
Soch assistance is defined in terms of attenpta to
evade or inoeds justice at any stage of the
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or gunishaent

 

 

18 added.) (Footnote omitted.

1s
 

}1FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*+#

 

to the arrest of a third person demonstrates the close relation
between resisting arrest and the instant case.
Here, the officers were acting under color of law when

they attempted to arrest Dean on July 15, 2005. Although the

 

officers were dressed in plain clothes, they had their shirts
tucked in, exposing their guns, Tasers, and badges on their
belts. The officers also identified themselves as police
officers while chasing Dean. when Officer Perreira tried to
enter the house to arrest Dean, Petitioner blocked the doorway.
Officer Perreira told Petitioner to move, or to “get out of the
way," “Police,” and “we've got to arrest hin," but Petitioner
refused to move. Sergeant Kikuchi saw Officer Perreira
struggling with Petitioner and pushed Officer Perreira into
Petitioner, knocking her down. After Officer Perreira entered
the house, Petitioner then grabbed Sergeant Kikuchi’s shirt

sleeve, ultimately tearing it.

 

Similar to resisting arrest, Petitioner’s actions
including her physical struggle with the officers -- were
intended to prevent police fron entering the house and presumably
arresting her son. As stated in the resisting arrest statute,
“the arrest may be either of the actor or of a third person: the
social and individual harms involved are the sane in either
case.” Commentary to HRS § 710-1026 (enphasis added). Thus, the
essential rationale underlying the resisting arrest statute may

apply to situations, such as in the instant case, where an

16
 

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individual hinders a law enforcement officer’s apprehension of

another.

 

Petitioner also argues that her conviction under HRS
§ 710-1029 violates her constitutional right to be secure in her
house. She maintains that the police had no right to enter her
home without her permission, and thus, “it was not a crime to
stand firm and request a warrant.”
a.

Petitioner relies in part on State v, Jim, 105 Hawai'i
319, 97 P.3d 395 (App. 2004). Petitioner states that Jim
“implied that the government acts must be lawful in order for a
violation of HRS § 710-1010(1)(,]** while interpreting
{HRS} § 710-1010(1) (a) {,]" an obstructing government operations
statute similar to the hindering prosecution statute. According
to Petitioner, Jim “implied” the requirement that government acts

be lawful by stating that,

itioner could have been charged with resisting arrest under HRS
§ 710-1026, a risdensancr, but instead was charged with hindering prosecstion
in the first degree under HRS § 71071023, which is 2 Class C felony.

    

 

ARS § 720-1010(1) (Supp. 2008), Obstructing government operations,
provides in pertinent part:

(2)_ A person comits the offense of cbstructing
governaent operations if, by using or threatening to dee
Wolence, force, of physics! interference cr apstacie, the
Person intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders:
(a). The perfornance of a governmental function by a
public servant acting under color of the public
Servant’s official authority; or
(o) The enforcement of the penal law or the
preservation of the peace by a peace officer
Eeting under color of the peace officer's
Sffseial autnority(]

vv

   
‘#470R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#+

 

[clonsistent with the above precedent, we conclude that
Gina continuing physical sbatruction of the Lawful work by
the [County of Hawaii Oepartment of Water Supply] op the
property constitutes conduct clearly outside the scope of
Sny first anendrent right to freedom of speech.

 

Id. at 334, 97 P.3d at 410 (emphasis added). The Model Penal
Code (MPC) language for “Obstructing Administration of Law or
Other Governmental Function” is similar to HRS § 720-1010,
entitled “Obstructing government operations.” Petitioner's
argument is unpersuasive inasmuch as the commentary to the MPC
provision specifies that an actor will be liable for obstruction
even if the government function involved is unlawful. Model
Penal Code & Commentaries, Part II § 242.1 (Comment 7), American
Law Institute 1980."

[t]he object of the obstruct:
governnent function, which effectively from this
Section interference with a public servant engaged an
patently ultra vires activity. But the existence of sone
Eechnical illegality or irregularity in the operation of
Government dove not relieve the actor from Liability for
Purposive obstruction, In most contexts, this result 15
Suite unexceptional.
‘Thus. purecaeiul cbatruction of a tay enforcement
£5. zt ct

  

uarcant is defective and the search consequently unlawful.
This result accords with the trend In Fecent Fecodification
efforts.
Furthermore, it aeens sensible on policy grounds.
of other defect in a search

gry suited e9 testing the validity of &

MRS § 720-1010 is similar to Model Penal Code $ 242.1. HPC
5 242.1, Obstructing Adzinistration of Law of Other Governmental Function,
Brovides:

A person commits a miadeeanor if he purposely obstructs,
impairs or perverts the administration of law of other
governmental function by force, violence, physical
Incerterence of obstacle, breach of official duty, or any
other unlawful act, except that this Section does not apply
fo flight by 8 perdon chasged with crime, refusal co submit
to arrest, failure to perform # legal duty cther than sn
official duty, oF any Sther seans of avoiding complian
ith law without aftizmetive interference wien governmental
fonctions

 

 

18
‘spon PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER®*%

 

als occasions confrontation with law enforcenent officers
hat nay well escalate inte viclenea, Thysical sbstruerion
Ee act likely 20 dissuade aa officer trom executing a
warrant valid on ita face. re Le likely to prompe him to
se whatever force ig necessary to overcome the
interference.

 

Id, (emphases added), Therefore, contrary to Petitioner's
argument, it would appear that it is not required that a
government action be only lawful for a violation of HRS § 710-

1010 to eceur.

 

Petitioner also cites State v. Garcia, 77 Hawai'i 461,
887 P.2d 671 (App. 1995), which held that HRS § 803-37"
“violates the Hawai'i Constitution to the extent that it permits
the police to break into the place to be searched if ‘bars’ to
their entrance are not immediately opened.” Id. at 467, 887 P.2d
at 677. Petitioner argues that the application of HRS § 710-1029
similarly violates the Hawai'i Constitution “to the extent that.
it permits the police to break into a home of @ grandmother
standing up for her constitutional right against a warrantless

invasion.”

ARS § 603-37 (1993), Power of officer serving, provides that

[e)he officer charged with the warrant, if a house, store,
oF other building 1s designated as the place to be searched,
ay enter it without denanding permission if the officer
Finds it open. If the doore are ehst the officer must
declare the officer's office and the officer's business, and
Senand entrance. If the doors, gates, or other bars to the
entrance are not nsediately opened, the officer may break
then, When entered, the officer say denand that any other
part of the house, or any closet, cr other closed place in
Which the officer has reason to believe the property 13
Concealed, may be opened for the officer's inspection, and
{f'retused the officer say break then,

 

 

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However, Garcia is distinguishable from the case at bar
because HRS § 203-37 governs the conduct of an officer who is
charged with executing a warrant and expressly allows an officer
under certain circumstances to break doors, gates, or other bars
to entrance, In other words, while Garcia concerns a statute
that directly prescribes the procedure for police searches, the
present case is about a statute that prohibits certain actions in
response to a police search, Therefore, Garcia is not applicable
or persuasive.
c.

contzazy to Petitioner's constitutional argunent,
Limiting an individual's ability to resist an unlawful arrest

“does not contetbute £0 or effectuate (a) deprivation of

Liberty,” but only withdraws a remedy which "aot

oféicer and’ che suspect than does the uniawésl arrest.

{teelt" and requires the arrestee "eo submit peacefully to

the inevitable and to pursue his available remedies through
the orderly judicial process."("")

 

 

Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Terael, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr,
Criminal Procadure § 3.1(0) (34 ed. 2007) (quoting People vs
Curtis, 450 P.2d 33 (1969). “But, ‘circumstances are readily
imaginable in which an arrest would be so flagrant an intrusion

on a citizen's rights that his resistance would be virtually

te ghould be noted that unlawful police intrusion into the hone $=

never 2 “minor inconvenience.” See Kachanian, 78 Hawai's at 485, 696 .2¢ at
541, Pursuing @ civil renedy for such an invasion through judicial prox
after the fact, a2 suggested by the court, is often ineffective. Civil
appear to have little effect. Seg Mayne &. LaFave, Search and Seisure
ith ed. 2004) (*Much fas bean written concerning those other remedies for
police misconduct which involve proceeding directly against the oF
Séficer, such as tort actions for trespass or battery, criminal pr:
Sed cisciplinary action. Ihe conclusion uevally reached is that these other
Fonedies are inedequate . . . "(Footnotes omitted.) )«

 

   

 

        

   

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

inevitable,’ in which case it well may be that conviction for the
resistance would violate due process.” Id, (quoting United

States ex rel, Horelick v, Criminal Court, 366 F. Supp. 1140

(S.D.N.¥. 1973)). ‘The same rationale “applies to other forms of
self-help undertaken in active resistance to a Fourth Amendment
violation, such as forcible opposition to the execution of an

invalid

 

rch warrant(,)" but that does not mean that criminal
punishment may be imposed for a “mere failure to surrender
rights.” Id. (footnotes onitted).
D.
Petitioner also argues that the circumstances in the
present case called for obtaining a warrant before entering

Petitioner's residence.” The court determined that in

 

% plainly the officers were not in ‘hot pursuit” of pean during
their warrantless entry Into Petitioner's hone. The United States Suprene
Court hag viewed “hot pursuit’ as an exception to the warrant requlrenent,
riahan City y, Stuart, $47 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing U.S. v, Santana, 427
U.s. 38, 42-43 (1976). But this cobct in State v. Elderts stated that chot
pursuit ts not an exception to the warrant requirement but “merely 0
Eriterion to be considered in deternining if, given probable cause, exigency
oxists co justisy a warrantless search.” 62\ Have. 495) 498, 617 ®,24 89, 92
(1380). sowevers subsequent cases have implied that “hot pursuit” is ah
exception to the warrant requirement. See a.g., State <. Vallestarca, ®4
Hawai's 295, 933 p.2d 622 (1397). In Yallesterog, this court stated that the
Splain view doctrine dictates that: if the original intrusion 42 justified,
uch as by consent, hot pursuit, warrant or aa incident to an arrest, objects
‘Sighted in plain view Will Se admissible so long as the view was inadvertent.”
Hd, at 20¢,°933 v.24 at 641 (quoting State v, Wallace, €0 Hawai'i 382, 295,
50 b.2d 685, 708” (1996)) (emphasis aged)
in Eldarts, the officers, responding to an early morning report of

burglarized hotel rooms, weot to an aparement into which the Rotel manager sou
ewe men carry a television. 62 Haw. at 496-97, 617 P24 at 91. Police
knocked repeatedly on the door with no response and learned that the tenant of
the apartnent was on another island. Id. at 497, 617 P.2d at 91. Aft

ing the Lanai door partially open, one of the’ officers climbed on the
Balcony, knocked several tines, and announced he was a police officer. Ids
Receiving no response, the officer entered the apartnen' ‘This court
held that “under the Circumstances, the constitution does not require the
police officers to break off their pursuit to seek a warrant ana chance
Violence or escape by the suspects.” Id, at 500, 617 P.2d at 93.

 

 

 

 

 

 

      

 

 

 

 

 

continue.

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“pursu[ing] Dean into his home on July 18th,” an arrest warrant
was not required and that the attempt to effect a warrantless
arrest of Dean was lawful. The court’s conclusion that the July
15, 2005 attempt to effect an arrest on Dean in entering
Petitioner’s home was lawful is clearly wrong.

In its decision the court relied on Keawe. In Keawe, a

police officer assigned to investigate prostitution at a nud

 

dancing establishment paid for and received two “lap dances” by
the appellant. 107 Hawai" at 3, 108 P.3d at 306, The officer
did not arrest the appellant that evening; police arrested the
appellant twenty days later as part of an arrest raid of the
establishment. Id, It was held that the warrantless arrest of
the appellant was unlawful because police had “probable cause to
arrest, [had] no obstacle preventing then from making the arrest,
and wait [ed] a significant amount of time before making the
arrest.” Id. at 6, 108 P.3d at 309 (emphasis added). It was
also said that “[i]f the police believe that waiting days or
weeks to arrest a defendant is the most appropriate action under

the circumstances, . . . then the police cannot rely upon HRS

%., seontinue
‘The present case is distinguishable, however, as police discovered
Dean with a pipe that contained crystal sethanphetamine cn July 12) 2005, 63
hours before officers located and pursued Dean ante his home of Jaly 15, 2005.
Under those facts, it does not appear that exigent circumstances existed such
that the officers were prevented fron obtaining a warrant prior to arresting
bean. thus, manifestly, a warrant shovla have been cotained. Sas
Kegue, 107 hayat'i 1, 8-7, 108 P.34 304, 308-20 (2008) (holding that ©
2 "temporal restriction on the police's {] power to make a warrantle:
nd “if the police believe that waiting days or weeks to arrest a defendant is
the most appropriate action under the circusstances, . then the police
“past obtain a warrant”)

 

 

     

 

    

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s#4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

 

§ 803-5 and must obtain a warrant pursuant to HRS $ 803-1.
Id. at 7, 108 P.3d at 310.

‘The court held that, unlike Keawe, Dean’s actions
caused the initial delay in his arrest, and the police did not
wait a “significant amount of tine” from the inception of
probable cause to arrest Dean. The court in effect attempted to
establish a new exception to the warrant requirement, by
concluding that police do not need a warrant to enter a home as
long as they do not delay “significant (1y}” in effectuating the
arrest. To the contrary, the 63 hours between the inception of
probable cause and the July 15, 2005 attempted arrest afforded
police ample time to obtain an arrest warrant and they were
plainly required to do so before invading Petitioner's home. See
Keawe, 107 Hawai'i at 7, 108 P.3d at 310.

More significantly, the court's reliance on Keawe is
misplaced, as that case did not deal with entry into a hone.

% HRS § 803-5 (1993), ontitied “ey police officer without a
warrant," provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) A police officer or other officer of justice, may,
without warrant, arrest and detain for examination any.
person when the officer has probable cause to believe that
Such persen has committed any offense, whether in the
Officer's presence o otherwise.

(b] For purposes of this section, a police officer has
probable cause to make an arrest. when the facts and
Elrcunstances within the officer's knowledge and of

jonably trustworthy infornation
ves to warrant a peracn of re
Caution in the belief that 2 crine has been or is being
Sommitted

 

   

 

HRS § 803-1. (1933), “Arros

 

by warrant,” provides that:

No arrest of any person shall be made without first
Obtaining a warrant or other process therefor from sone
magistrate, except in the cases provided in this chapter oF
otherwise provided by law.

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Hawai"

 

courts and the United States Supreme Court have both long
held that there is a unique interest in privacy in the home.
Both this court and the ICA have emphasized the “tradition of
kespect for the privacy of the hone” in holding that, “before
attempting forcible entry, the police must specifically ‘denand
entrance,’ under HRS § 603-37, and that, under article t,
section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution,” police must give

occupants a “re

 

jonable opportunity” to r

 

spond when entering a
home pursuant to a valid warrant, State v. Monay, 85 Hawai'i
202, 284, 285, 943 P.2d 908, 910, 911 (1997) (emphasis added);
Garcia, 77 Hawai'i at 466, 467, 887 P.2d at 676, 677 (emphasis
added) «

Similarly, this court has adopted the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States, $33 U.S. 27 (2001),
recognizing that “‘the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the
entrance to the house, and in the hone all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes.’” State v. Detroy, 102 Hawai'i 13, 21, 72 P.3d
485, 493 (2003) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37, 40) (internal
quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)
(emphasis added). In Detroy, in agreeing with the U.S. Supreme
Court that “the warrantless use of the thermal imager to neasure

heat emanating from the interior of [the dJefendant’s apartment

* pee supra note 17
‘sag sumza note 10,
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was a prohibited search that violated the Fourth Amendment (,1”
and was therefore illegal, ida, this court “h[e]1d, additionally,
that the same result would be reached on independent state

constitutional grounds under article T, section 7 of the Hawai'i

 

State Constitution.” Id, In so holding, this court emphasized
that “(i]t has long been recognized in Hawai'l that generally, a
person has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in his or
her home.” Id. at 22, 72 P.3d at 494 (citation omitted).
Because of the special privacy interest in the home, “{iJt is now
settled that any warrantless entrance of a private dwelling by
the police can only be justified under the ‘exigent
circumstances’ exceptions to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment (,]” State v, Fauver, 1 Haw. App. 3, 5, 612 P.2d
119, 121 (1980), which manifestly were not present in this case.

‘The ICA in its S00 did not answer this issue, affirming
Petitioner’s conviction on the holding in Kachanian, but only
after “assuming arguendo [that] the police had no right to enter
Petitioner’s hone to arrest her son.” See Line, 2009 WL 924509,
at *1 (emphasis added).

In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) the United States
Supreme Court recognized the paramount importance of the Fourth
Amendment and expressed cogent disapproval of the illegal police
action in that case. In Mapp, the police forcibly entered the
petitioner’s hone after she refused entry absent a warrant, ids
at 644, and subsequently discovered “lewd and lascivious books
and pictures[,]" for which the petitioner was subsequently

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prosecuted, id, at 643. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the evidence should have been excluded
because “{a]t the trial no search warrant was produced by the

prosecution, nor was the failure to produce one explained or

 

accounted for[,]” ids at 645, and “quite simply, [] conviction by

means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts[,]” id. at 648. The

Mapp court recognized that

failure to cbaerve its own laws, oF worse, its dof
The chatter of itu cunexiatence. As Mr. ‘Justice Brandeis,
dissenting, sald in Qlistead v. United States, (277 0.8)

438, 485 (1926)]: “Our government 1s the potent, the
Sanipresent teacher. For good of for ill, ie teaches the
whole people by its example. - . If the government becomes
Adanbreaker, it breads contenot for Taw it invites every

Manto becone a law unto hisself; it invites anarchy.”
Id, at 659 (footnote, citation, and some internal quotation marks

 

omitted) (emphases added).

In this case, as in Mapp, police forcibly entered
Petitioner’s hone without 2 warrant. We do not condone the
illegal entry by the police into the hone of Petitioner without a
warrant and in the absence of any exigent circumstances. there
was no conceivable basis in the law to uphold the entry as valid
and so we reverse the court's conclusion to the contrary.

vi.

Although the entry by the police into the hone was
illegal, we are constrained to apply the hindering prosecution
statute inasmuch as the risk of dangers associated with

physically resisting such an intrusion at the time it occurs,

26
 

outweighs whatever vindication of personal rights might be

accomplished through physical resistance at that moment.
a.

There is some authority in other jurisdictions holding
that an illegal detention or search ordinarily will not bar a
conviction for an unlawful response conmitted by the person
subjected to an illegal police action. For example, in New
Jersey v. Casimono, state troopers conducted pat down searches of
the defendant and his co-defendant after a traffic stop. 593

A.2d 827, 829 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). The defendant

 

and co-defendant resisted, and the defendant threw a bag from the
car over the roadway guardrail. Id, The defendant was
convicted, inter alia, of hindering apprehension by destroying or

concealing evidenc

 

9 and resisting arrest. Id. at 828-29, The

© indering apprehension by destroying or concealing evidence ts
violation of New Jersey statutes Annotated 2¢:23-3b(1), which provides. that

[al person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder his
own detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution,
Conviction or punishment for an offense or violation of
Tele 39 of the Revised Statutes or a violation of chapter
35h of Title 17 of the Revised statutes, ne

 

(1) Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any
evidence of the crine of tanpers with a document or other
Source of information, regardless of its admissibility in
evidence, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension
oF in the lodging of a charge against him{.)

Although this section of the Neu Jersey statute concerns hindering one’s own
apprebensicn of prosecation, Lf 13 ainilar’to Havali’a hindering prosecution
Statutes, which List preventing apprehension and suppressing evidence
prohibited conduct. HRS § 710-1028(4) and (5) provides that

 

 

flor the purposes of sections 1710-1029 ang 720-1030], =
person renders assistance to another if he

(4) Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, deception, or

intimidation, anyone fron petforming an ace chat might aid.

in the discovery, apprenension, prosecution, or conviction
ont sna

 

 

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Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division held that the
pat down searches of the defendant were illegal. Id, at 832.
But that court also held that the defendant’s “convictions for
resisting arrest and hindering apprehension were for new offenses
committed subsequent to the unlawful pat down searches and
therefore were not subject to the taint of police misconduct.”
Eds at 833.

In United States v, Ferrone, the Third Circuit Court of
Apps

 

1s held that a person does not have a right to forcibly
resist the execution of a search warrant by a peace officer or
government agent, even though the warrant may subsequently be
found invalid. 438 F.2d 381, 390 (34 Cir. 1971), In Barrons,
the appellant was convicted of, inter alia, assaulting, resisting
and opposing Internal Revenue Service agents who were attempting
to execute a search warrant of his apartment and a search warrant
for his person, Id. at 383. The appellant contended that the
searches were unlawful and therefore he had a right to resist
arrest. Id, at 387. The Third Circuit stated that

(eloctety has an interest in securing for its mesbers the
Eight to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
Society also has an interest, however, in the orderly
Settlement of disputes between citizens and their
Government; is ha an especially atrona interest in

 

continue
Of such persons or
(5) Suppresses by an act of concealment, alteration, or
destruction any physical evidence that might aid in'the
Aiscovery, apprehension, prosecution, oF conviction of such
person.

the Farxone court stated thet “despite appellant's insistence thet
we are dealing with the right to resist an illegal arrest in this case, it 1s
Dlear chat we are Teally desiing with one’s right to resist an illegal
feasah.” 438 F.2d at 390/n-18 (emphasis added).

28

 

 
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hose dlapatea. We think « proper accomnodation of those
Interests requires that a person claiming to be aggrieved by
‘search conducted bys peace officer pursuant t

Gilegealy invalid warrant test tha clsin in a =
find not forcibly resist the execution of the warrant at the
place of search, The development of Lega) safeguards in the
Eourth, Gifth, Sixth and Fousteenth Bnenduens fields in

      

Eocene years fae prov) = auful earch
Heaiatance.

Id, at 390 (emphases added), The Eerrone court, however,
expressly stated that it was not deciding whether a person would,
under some circumstances, have a right to resist an unlawful
warrantless search. Id. at 390 n.19.

In United States v. Prescott, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a home occupant can refuse admission to an
officer who demands entry but presents no warrant, but limited
its holding to “passive” refusals rather than forcible
resistance. $81 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (Sth Cir. 1978). In
Prescott, federal agents asked the appellant for permission to
search her apartment for a mail fraud suspect. Id. at 1347. The
appellant, who had lied when she told the agents the suspect was
not in her apartment, asked the agent if he had a warrant. Id.
linen he replied that he did not, the appellant said nothing in
response but “steadfastly declined to unlock her door.” Id.
After another home occupant refused to let the agents enter the
apartment, the agents warned that if the door were not unlocked
in three seconds they would enter the apartment forcibly. Id.
The officers kicked the door in and immediately located the
suspect. Id. The appellant was charged with assisting a federal
offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension in

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violation of 18 U.S.C, § 3, which defines an accessory after the
fact. Id. at 1346.

The Ninth Cizcuit held that the appellant’s refusal to
allow the agents to enter her apartment without a warrant was

privileged conduct that should not have been considered as

 

evidence of the crime charged. Id, at 1353, The Ninth Circuit

 

stated that,

{hlad the respondent not objected to the officer's entry of
her house without a search warrant, she might thereby heve
waived her constitutional objections. The right to privacy,
Tn the hone nolds too high a place in our system of Laws to
justity a statutory interpretation that would impose 2
Zeininai puntahsent on one who does nothing sore than
Fespondent did bere.

xiang, Fegardiess of one’s notivacaon.
Id. at 1351 (emphasis added). However, the Ninth Circuit also
stated that had the appellant “forcibly resisted the entry into
her apartment, we might have a different case. We express no
opinion on that question.” Id.

8.

In the present case, the facts as found by the court in
the motion in limine and as indicated by the jury verdict at
trial, indicate that Petitioner’s conduct exceeded a mere passive
assertion of a right against a warrantless search of her home.
Unlike the appellant in Prescott, Petitioner did not nerely
refuse to unlock her door? she braced herself into the sliding
glass door's opening with her hands on the slider and her back
against the door frame, blocking the officer's entry. She
responded to the officers’ orders to move with words to the

effect of “Get the f

 

out of here, you need a search warrant.”

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Petitioner continued to refuse the officers’ orders to move
although they identified themselves aa police. Sergeant Kikuchi
saw Officer Ferreira “struggling” with Petitioner.

After Sergeant Kikuchi pushed Officer Perreira into
Petitioner, knocking her down and allowing Officer Perreira to
enter the house, Petitioner grabbed Sergeant Kikuchi’e shirt and

out.” After the incident was over, officer

 

yelled, “Get the
Perreira noticed his arm was scratched and attributed it to
Petitioner, and Sexgeant Kikuchi's shirt sleeve had a tear in it
that Petitioner caused while holding his sleeve. Such conduct on
the part of Petitioner demonstrates a form of resistance that is
more than merely failing to surrender rights. In attempting to
hinder the officers’ apprehension of her son, Petitioner did not
just passively refuse to open the door to her home: she
intentionally used physical force to obstruct the officers.
vir.
Despite the foregoing, as Respondent concedes, based on
the record in this case, there is insufficient evidence as a
matter of law to convict Petitioner of Hindering Prosecution in
the First Degree under HRS § 710-1023.
a.
This court has stated the standard of review for
sufficiency of the evidence as folloxs:

Eridence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to

support a convictions the same standard applies whether the
Gace was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but

 

 

 

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Soneiusionef the trier of (act. substantial evidence as to
Svery material elonent of the offence charged is credible

SSackunian
State x. Bayly, 118 Hawai'i 1, 6, 185 P.3d 186, 192 (2008)

ns, quotation marks, and intern:

 

(brackets, cita

 

quotation
marks omitted) (emphases added) .
8

In this case, Petitioner's conviction for hindering

prosecution in the first degree, under HRS § 710-1029, hinged on

 

her awareness that Dean was being pursued “for a class A, B, or C
felony(.]” HRS § 710-1029. HRS $ 710-1029 requires that, in
order for a conviction to stand, Petitioner must have acted “with
the Antent to hinder the apprehension . . . of another for a
class A. B, or C felony!.J” (Emphases added.) HRS § 702-206
(1993), entitled “Definitions of states of mind,” provides that,

(a) person acts intentionally with respect to attendant

circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.” (Emphasis

added.) Thus, HRS § 710-1029 requires that Petitioner was “aware
of the existence” of the attendant circumstance that Dean was
being “apprehen(ded) . . . fora... felony.”

The court's Instruction 16, regarding the hindering
prosecution charge, indicated that Petitioner must have rendered
assistance to Dean “with the intent to hinder the apprehension,
prosecution, conviction or punishnent of that person for a

felony.” (Emphasis added.) Instruction 17 provided that “[a]

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person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances
when he is aware of the existence of such cixcumstances|.]”
(Emphasis added.) Thus, read together, those instructions
indicate that the jury had to find that Petitioner was “aware” of
the circumstance that Dean was being arrested “for a felony.”

However, there was no evidence in the trial record that

Petitioner was aware of such circumstanc

 

‘That attendant circumstance is a vital element of the
offense inasmuch as, without it, Petitioner could only have been
convicted of the lesser, misdemeanor offense of hindering
prosecution in the second degree, pursuant to HRS § 710-1030.
Although there was evidence presented that the “charges” against
Dean were felonies, there was no evidence presented that
Petitioner herself was aware at the time of the conduct at issue
that any crime for which Dean was being pursued was a felony. At
trial, Officer Ferreira speculated as to “what offenses would
{pean’s] be under Hawai'i law(,]" stating that

(wiell, the crystal methamphetamine would be pronoting 2
dangerous drug in the third degree for any amount of crystal
methamphetasine. And the pipe and the packet would actually
be paraphernalia which is promoting prohibited acts related
Ee drug paraphernalia, and they are both Class C felonies

 

 

(Emphases added.)** Subsequently, the following exchange

 

= bespite the court’# general instructions on this issue, the jury
was not specifically inserscted that the language sn HRS § 120-1029 requiring
Sa class A, B, or C felony” is an attendant cicunstance.” Thus, it is not)
clear chat tho jury would have onderstood that it needed to find that
Petiticner was aware of that circumstance in order to sustain a conviction,

 

 

the jury subsequently submitted a question to Officer Ferreira,
vwat wore the tio charges?” He replied that “(t]he two charges for Dean Line
ould be prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia and promoting a
Gangerous drug in the thira degree.” (emphasis adsed.) No evidence was over
ont ine. +

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transpired upon redirect examination of Officer Perreira by the

prosecution:

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY SHEFPARD (PROSECUTION) ]: The two
charges that you just described, prohibited scte related to
Grug paraphernal‘a and promoting 4 sangerous drug in the
third degree, what level of crimes are those under Hawa (']{
Lae

 

 

[OFFICER FERREIRA): Felonies, Clase C felcntes:
Qe Both individually?

BI ve

 

 

 

‘The following recross-examination by defense counsel immediately

followed:

 

rho

Connect.
(Emphases added.) The court subsequently took judicial notice

that those crimes are classified as Class C felonies under the
Hawai'i Revised statutes.”
Defense counsel additionally elicited testimony from

Sergeant Kikuchi, the only other prosecution witness, that he did

continue
presented as to what the charges against Dean actually ware or whether felony
Sharges were actually pursued. The comentary to HRS §§ 7110-1028 to -1030
provides that "(w]here the underlying offense ig a class Ay Bor C felony,
Bindering prosecution is a class © felony. where the underlying offense ia =
misdeneancr or petty misdemeano

hindering crosecution isa sisdeneancr.* (Gepnases addec

The following exchange transpired:

 

 

 

 

(PROSECUTION): Actually, I'm going to ask the (e)oure
to judicially notice that prohibited acts related to drug
paraphernalia and pronoting a dangerous drug in the third
Segree are Class C felonies under Hawai": law.

(COURT)! Me. Sshnwon.

(DEFENSE COUNSEL SOHSON (JOHNSON) }: 1121 object to
chat.

 

 

[COURT]: ALL right. Well, the Hawai'i Revised
Statutes provides that those are Class C feicales under the
State of Hawaii, and as a result under the laws of the
State of Hawai'i, the (clourt will take judicial notice of
that. "T could élso incorporate that into Jury instructions
ifs requested. All right. Thank you.

   

 

 

34
‘S*APOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY*#

not inform Petitioner of the charges:

 

Q. Have you ever met [Petitioner]
Rl vast
Q. Now, did you ever tell [Petitioner] that there
wore charges against ner son en July 1seh?
Be at

prior to guly 15eh?

(Emphasis added.) The prosecution further questioned Petitioner

 

@. Mow, you don't watch Dean 24/7; right? He's an
AL ets an adult.
Q:_ 0 you really can’t account for what he was doing
at 9:58 p.m, on July 1th, 20087
Au Wo) I was at MOTK then any ways (etc).

‘Thus, the trial record was absent of any evidence that Petitioner
was aware of any particular crime committed by Dean. Instead,
there was evidence only that she was generally informed by the
officers that “We're after Dean, he needs to be arrested.”
Based on the foregoing, there was no evidence presented

that Petitioner was aware of the attendant circumstance that Dean

% Additionalty, the prosecutor made statements in her closing
argument that could have’ Led to jury confusion as to what evidence was
Actually required to convict Petitioner of the first degree offense. in her
Closing argument, the prosecutor indicated that the court had net only taken
hotice of the mere fact thst the two crimes discussed by Officer Perreire are
Gotined as Cl but implied thae
tthe court had iso taken Judicial notice that Dean hed sctuelly committed to
Felonies!

 

 

 

 

This all kind of started on July 12th when [Patitionar’s)
son was found committing to Class ¢ felonies, that was the
‘posession of crus caraphemalia and the possession of
Styatal metbnohetanine cacket and che drugs in the pipe as
ell. So is's tuo Class telonies. “the iudae took

Fad in your instructions, it says

Judicial notice of that.
that you may "~ You May accept iudicial aotice a proving
shat gubeiahs.

(Sxphaces added.) Those statensnts are misleading inasmuch as the court did
ot take judicial notice that Dean comaitted those crimes, but only that the
Grines are defined a5 Class C felonies under the code ~ a matter proper for
Sostesal notice inasmuch as st can be detersined merely by consulting the
Hawai'i Revised Statutes. Moreover, the prosecutor's statements incorrectly
indicate that cha sudge''s stavenants were enough to prove that element of the
eine “outright,” regardless of Petitioner's state of mind,

 

 

 

 

35
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY+#
committed a felony, and thus, there was an insufficient basis for

 

her conviction of a felony under HRS § 710-1029.
vit.
a

HRS § 701-109(4) (a) (1993) provides that

a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an
sifense charged in the indictment or the intcrmation. Av
Sffense ae #9 anclosed when?

J “Te'Ts established by proof of the sane or lest

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) HRS § 710-1029 provides:

(2) A person commits the offense of hindering
prosecution in the first degree if, with the intent to
Ringer the anpxehension, prosecution, conviction, or
Punishaent of ansther Zora class A, 8, orc felony or
‘uxdex_in anv decree,

; the person rendete assistance to the

 

   

Sther person,
[2], Hindering prosecution in the first degree 12

(Emphases added.) Similarly, HRS § 710-1030 provides that:

 

(2) A person connits the offense of hindering
prosecution in the second degree if, with the intent to
hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
Punishment of another {ora cripe, he renders
Such person.

(2) Hindering prosecution in the

misdeneancr.

 
    

cond dege!

(Emphases added.) ‘Thus, the two offenses differ only in that the
first degree offense requires that the “crime” be a felony or
murder, and that HAS § 710-1029 is a felony offense, while HRS
§ 710-1030 is a misdemeanor. Thus, HRS $ 710-1030 is manifestly
included in HRS § 710-1029, as “[HRS § 710-1030) is established
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of (HRS § 710-1029.]” (Emphasis added.)
8
Tt is established that “if an appellate court

36
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determines that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient

to support a conviction of a greater offense but sufficient

 

support a conviction of a lesser included offense; the court may
remand for entry of judgment of conviction on the lesser included
offense[.]” Malufau, 30 Hawai'i at 136, 906 P.2d at 622. For
example, in State v, Mattiello, this court concluded that

the prosecution adduced insufficient evidence that the

Amount of the methadone alxtare sold by Mattlelio was

Sthree-eighths ounce or more(,|* (as required for conviction

of the greater offense of promoeing a dangerous deug in the
first degree.) Because, hevever, there was substantial

 

svidence that wattiello distributed sethadone “in any
Snount. "we semand for entey of conviction of the Lesser

‘degree, In violation of HRS § TI2-1202 1) te)
90 Hawaii 255, 262, 978 P.2d 693, 700 (1999) (emphases added) +
see alo State v. Mueller, 102 Hawai'i 391, 397-98, 76 P.3d 943,
949-50 (2003) (*deen{ing) the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law to support a jury’s guilty verdict on a greater offense”
of sexual assault in the first degree, but concluding that “the
evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense of
sexual assault in the third degree,” and, therefore, “remand| ing]
this matter to the circuit court for the entry of a judgment of
conviction of the included offense of sexual assault in the third
degree” (citation omitted)); State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai'i 382,
414-16, 910 P.24 695, 727-29 (1996) (holding that, “having
vacated Wallace's conviction of promoting a dangerous drug in the
first degree . . . for evidentiary insufficiency, the double
jeopardy clause . . . bars a retrial of that offense[,]” but

concluding that, “there was sufficient evidence presented at

2
   

/'FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'Z REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

trial to support th{e] lesser included offense . . . of promoting
a dangerous drug in the third degree(,]” and therefore “holdting]
that, upon remand . . . co the circuit court, a judgment should
be entered convicting Wallace of promoting a dangerous drug in
the third degree” (brackets, ellipsis, and citation onitted));
State x, Maddox, 116 Hawai'i 445, 449-50, 173 P.3d 592, 596-97
(app. 2007) (“holdfing) that there was insufficient evidence to
Prove that [the victim's] injury created a substantial risk of
death and therefore vacat[ing] Maddox’s conviction for first
degree assauit {,]” but “{blecause . . . there was ample evidence

© included offense of

 

to prove that Maddox committed the le:

 

second degree assault, [] remand(ing] the case with instructions
that the circuit court enter a judgment of conviction on the
lesser included offense”); State v. Say, 95 Hawai'i 169, 176, 19
P.3d 752, 789 (App. 2000) (concluding that “the evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction of the charged offense of
‘Theft in the Second Degree” but “the evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction of the lesser included offense of Theft in
the Fourth Degree[,}” and “[alccordingly, we vacate . . . and
remand with instructions to enter a judgment convicting [the
defendant) of the petty misdemeanor of Theft in the Fourth
Degree”); State v. Arlt, 9 Haw. App. 263, 278, 833 P.2d 902, 904
(1992) (“{cloncluding that [the dlefendant did not use force ‘in
‘the course of committing theft’ and that First Degree Robbery was
thus not proved, [and] vacat[ing the djefendant’s conviction,”
but, “as there is overwhelming evidence on the record that [the

38
 

‘+4POR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

dlefendant committed the lesser-included offense of Theft in the
Fourth Degree, [] remand[ing] the case . . . with instructions to
enter a judgment convicting [the djefendant of Theft in the

Fourth Degree”).

 

In this case, although there as insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for hindering prosecution in the first
degree, there was sufficient evidence adduced to convict
Petitioner of the lesser included offense of hindering

‘There was evidence adduced

 

prosecution in the second degre
that Petitioner used physical force to prevent the officers fron
pursuing Dean, that the officers were acting under color of law,
and that the officers informed Petitioner that they were seeking
to arrest Dean, Thus, there was substantial evidence that
Petitioner “render[ed] assistance” to Dean “with the intent to
hinder the apprehension . . . of [Dean] for a crine.” See HRS
§ 710-1030. Because the officers informed Petitioner that they
were seeking to arrest Dean, there was sufficient evidence that
she was aware of the attendant circumstance that Dean was being

apprehended for “a crime,” as required for the second degree

offense.
m
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the ICA is
™ tt does not appear that in any of the foregoing cases the Lesser

 

Sncludad offense of which the defendant wae ultamately convicted was chazged
by the prosecution.

39
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reversed, the court's Narch 3, 2006 Order Denying Motion in
Limine and Judgment of Conviction are vacated, and the case is
remanded to the court for entry of a judgment of conviction on

the lesser included offense of Hindering Prosecution in the

  

Second Degree under HRS § 710-1030.

Gerald T. Johnson for Gro
pet itioner/defendant-
appellant. Seeaeee

Richard K. Minatoya,

Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, County of

Maui (Brandon L.K.

Paredes, Deputy Youre Cultyi hr *
Prosecuting Attorney,

County of Maui, on the =
anawering brief) for

respondent /plaintiff-

appellee.

40