Title: Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP496 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Coulee Catholic Schools, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, Department 
of Workforce Development and Wendy Ostlund, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 68 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 331, 752 N.W.2d 341 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale T. Pasell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by James G. Birnbaum, Ross A. Seymour, Jessica T. Kirchner, and 
Birnhaum, Seymour, Kirchner & Birnbaum, LLP, La Crosse, and oral 
argument by James G. Birnbaum. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, the cause was argued by David C. Rice, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, 
attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, Wendy Ostlund, there was a 
brief by Dawn Marie Harris and D.M. Harris Law, L.L.C., La 
Crosse, and oral argument by Dawn Marie Harris. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP496  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV193) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Coulee Catholic Schools   
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner   
 
 
v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
Department of Workforce Development and Wendy 
Ostlund   
 
 
Respondents-Respondents   
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.  Wendy Ostlund ("Ostlund") 
brought a claim alleging that she was terminated from her first-
grade teaching position at a Catholic school on the basis of her 
age in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act ("WFEA").  
The school responded that her position was "ministerial," 
maintaining therefore, that her suit was barred by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The La Crosse 
County Circuit Court, Dale T. Pasell, Judge, determined that her 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
2 
 
position was not ministerial.  In a published decision,1 the 
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
¶2 
The question before us is whether Ostlund's age 
discrimination claim under the WFEA is precluded by the First 
Amendment and/or the Freedom of Conscience Clauses in Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶3 
We conclude that both the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Freedom of Conscience Clauses in Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution preclude employment discrimination claims 
under §§ 111.31 to 111.395 of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act 
for employees whose positions are important and closely linked 
to the religious mission of a religious organization.  In the 
case at bar, Ostlund's school was committed to a religious 
mission——the inculcation of the Catholic faith and worldview——
and Ostlund's position was important and closely linked to that 
mission.  Therefore, Ostlund's age discrimination claim under 
the WFEA unconstitutionally impinges upon her employer's right 
to religious freedom.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals' decision and remand to the circuit court to dismiss 
Ostlund's claim. 
I. FACTS 
¶4 
Wendy Ostlund began working as a first-grade teacher 
at St. Patrick's Elementary School, a Catholic school located in 
                                                 
1 Coulee Catholic Schs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 
Dep't of Workforce Dev., 2008 WI App 68, 312 Wis. 2d 331, 752 
N.W.2d 341. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
3 
 
Onalaska, Wisconsin, in 1974.  St. Patrick's is a member school 
of Coulee Catholic Schools ("CCS"), which is a cooperative 
effort between area Catholic schools to share resources, 
streamline administration, and unify curriculum.  CCS is owned, 
operated, and subject to the authority of the Diocese of La 
Crosse, Wisconsin, and is therefore an entity of the Catholic 
Church.  In 2003, CCS consisted of one high school, one middle 
school, five primary/elementary schools, and one early childhood 
center. 
¶5 
The Catholic school is considered a "ministry" of the 
Catholic Church.  According to documents submitted in the course 
of 
this 
litigation, 
the 
Catholic 
Church 
considers 
"the 
foundation of the whole educational enterprise in a Catholic 
school" to be Jesus Christ.  The Catholic school aims at "a 
Christian concept of life centered on Jesus Christ."  Teachers 
are believed to be essential to this ministry.  As Archbishop 
Emeritus of St. Louis, Raymond L. Burke, the Bishop of La Crosse 
at 
the 
time 
of 
Ostlund's 
termination, 
testified 
in 
his 
deposition: 
[I]t's the teachers who make the Catholic school 
happen.  In other words, the students first learn the 
integration of faith and culture, the integration of 
faith and learning the practice of their faith from 
their active learning from the witness that their 
teachers give.  And to teach a Catholic spirit, a 
Christian spirit in a whole school, the teachers have 
to reflect this, first of all, in their own lives. 
¶6 
During her tenure with CCS, Ostlund's typical school 
day would run from approximately 7:30 a.m. until 3:30 p.m.  
No. 
2007AP496   
 
4 
 
Before students arrived, Ostlund would finish preparations for 
the day, including finalizing her lesson plans.  After students 
arrived, Ostlund began the day with prayer and the Pledge of 
Allegiance. 
¶7 
The first subject of the day was reading.  After 
reading, students had recess, followed by either computer 
instruction or art class.  Both of these were taught by another 
teacher.  Ostlund would then teach science and social studies on 
alternating days.  Her social studies instruction contained a 
Christmas unit during which Ostlund had the students make a 
booklet that discussed ways other countries celebrate Christmas. 
¶8 
After this, students had lunch, followed by recess.  
Ostlund did not supervise lunch, but did sometimes go out to the 
playground with the students.  Following lunch, Ostlund again 
led the students in prayer.  The afternoon schedule consisted of 
math and handwriting.  The students then went to physical 
education or music class, which were taught by another teacher. 
¶9 
During this more traditional academic curriculum, 
Ostlund made efforts to incorporate religious examples, symbols, 
and values into the lessons.  For example, in a reading exercise 
involving word recognition that required students to match 
colors with corresponding numbers on a worksheet, the colors 
corresponded to different objects in the Garden of Eden.  Or in 
math, some of the exercises involved worksheets where students 
connected dots that formed religious images. 
¶10 The final period of the day was religion, which 
usually lasted thirty minutes.  Ostlund taught religion on her 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
5 
 
own three days per week.  A priest or deacon accompanied Ostlund 
on the fourth day.  During religion class, Ostlund taught the 
Catholic faith, not comparative religion.  Ostlund taught her 
students about prayer, and was often the first person to teach 
the first graders certain Catholic prayers.  She taught them 
basic Catholic doctrine, and specific worship practices like the 
Stations of the Cross.  Ostlund also helped her students 
celebrate school-wide religious holidays such as St. Patrick's 
Day, Advent,2 May crowning,3 and Lent.4 
¶11 On the fifth day of the week, Ostlund attended a 
school-wide Mass with her students.  Approximately every fourth 
week, Ostlund was responsible for helping to plan the Mass with 
her class.  When planning Mass, Ostlund was in charge of 
choosing appropriate readings from the Bible.  She was also 
responsible for the petitions that would be read and prayed 
during Mass.  These she would either choose from a liturgy 
guide, or at times, write herself.  Ostlund also participated in 
various aspects of the Mass, including reading responsorial 
                                                 
2 During the Christmas season, Ostlund put up a nativity 
scene, and celebrated Advent with the traditional wreath. 
3 May crowning is a day of devotion to Mary when a statue of 
Mary 
is 
ceremonially 
crowned. 
 
See 
http://campus.udayton.edu/mary//meditations/crowned.html. 
 
On 
that day, Ostlund would lead her children in crowning a statue 
of Mary. 
4 During Lent, Ostlund facilitated the giving up of some 
activity or food (beginning on Ash Wednesday), displayed palms 
in her class during Holy Week, and had her students collect 
money for Catholic missions. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
6 
 
psalms and carrying the bread and wine.  Thus, Ostlund played an 
important role in planning the all-school Mass and in teaching 
her students about the Mass——one of the central acts of worship 
in the Catholic faith. 
¶12 In addition to these specific duties, Ostlund's 
classroom incorporated objects of the Catholic faith into the 
learning environment, such as a crucifix and statue of Mary.  
The classroom had a prayer corner where the Bible, a rosary, and 
religious candles were displayed.  She also incorporated certain 
seasonal displays such as palm leaves around Palm Sunday and a 
nativity scene during Christmas. 
¶13 Each year, Ostlund was required to sign an employment 
contract, which provided in pertinent part: 
The Employee agrees to faithfully and conscientiously 
perform any and all duties of the position(s) for 
which he/she is hired and all other duties as directed 
by the Employer including, but not limited to . . .  
comply with the requirements of the Diocese of La 
Crosse and the State of Wisconsin regarding the 
educational preparation of teachers. 
It also provided: 
The Employee as a teacher in a Catholic educational 
system agrees that as a condition of employment he/she 
will support and exemplify in conduct both Catholic 
doctrine and morality.  He/She must be consistent in 
expression and example, with the teaching and practice 
of the Catholic faith and shall not teach, advocate, 
encourage or counsel beliefs or practices contrary to 
the Catholic faith. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
7 
 
¶14 The CCS Faculty and Staff Handbook included written 
rules, regulations, and policies adopted by the Diocese of La 
Crosse and approved by its Bishop.  These policies required 
teachers to comply with certain standards.  A preamble to these 
standards stated in pertinent part: 
The primary mission of the Catholic Church is to 
continue the mission of Jesus: PROCLAIMING THE KINGDOM 
OF GOD.  Central to this mission is the teaching of 
the Word of God.  This ministry of the Word is given 
expression in the education efforts of the Church. 
It is the goal of the five dioceses in the state of 
Wisconsin to promote and support a comprehensive 
educational ministry.  The ministry extends to people 
of all ages: adults, youth and children. 
Following their long tradition of service to the 
people of Wisconsin, Catholic elementary and secondary 
schools and religious education programs continue to 
be an essential part of the educational ministry of 
the Church. 
By virtue of their ministry, personnel in Catholic 
education are role models for other adults, youth and 
children.  Therefore, they are called to be well-
informed in Catholic teachings and committed to a 
Catholic way of life. 
¶15 The standards themselves contain several requirements 
for teachers.  Notably, elementary school teachers of religion 
were required to have both basic and advanced certifications in 
religion, which Ostlund acquired and maintained.  Both the basic 
and advanced certifications involved yearly continuing education 
sessions where Ostlund was instructed on how to teach Catholic 
principles and doctrine. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
8 
 
¶16 Teachers were also required to "have appropriate 
certification 
with 
the Department of Public Instruction."  
Ostlund had a Bachelor of Science degree in physical education, 
but was not a licensed teacher.  She was working to obtain her 
teaching license, however, which at some point had become a new 
requirement for CCS elementary school teachers. 
¶17 Additionally, 
the 
standards 
required 
teachers 
of 
religion to be "Catholics who have admission to the full 
sacramental life of the Church and are engaged in the community 
of the faithful."  However, the reviewing agency in this case 
concluded that, as a matter of practice, CCS did not require 
elementary school teachers to be members of a religious order or 
members of the Catholic Church.  As discussed below, we defer to 
this finding as long as it is substantially supported by the 
record, which it appears to be.  Ostlund herself was Catholic 
and a member of St. Patrick's parish. 
¶18 CCS provided a formal job description to Ostlund, 
which she signed.5  The job description also served as a template 
for her yearly performance evaluation.  Ostlund had six main 
areas of responsibility, broadly categorized as: (1) providing a 
"Religious Atmosphere," (2) "Teaching Responsibilities," (3) 
"Supervising Responsibilities," (4) "Professional" duties, (5) 
"Grade Level Responsibilities," and (6) complying "with all 
areas addressed in the contract and policies of the Diocese of 
La Crosse." 
                                                 
5 The last record of her signing was on August 30, 2000.   
No. 
2007AP496   
 
9 
 
¶19 The "Religious Atmosphere" component contained the 
following standards: 
A. 
Provide a good Christian model and example 
in one's attitudes and actions.   
B. 
Encourage spiritual growth in students by 
developing 
inner 
discipline, 
character, 
morals, and values.   
C. 
Provide leadership in living and celebrating 
life and liturgies.   
¶20 Her "Professional" duties required her to, among other 
things, "Earn and maintain Religious Certification."  
¶21 As part of her yearly evaluation, Ostlund and a 
supervisor commented on various aspects of her job performance 
as outlined in her job description.  Some of Ostlund's comments 
regarding the "Religious Atmosphere" component of her job duties 
are relevant here.  In her 1997 job evaluation, Ostlund stated: 
"When I teach prayer or religion class, attend or prepare 
liturgy or talk about morals and values, I know that I am 
dealing with things that are not found in a public school."  
With regard to her teaching technique, Ostlund commented in that 
same evaluation: "I am able to incorporate Catholic values into 
all of the subjects that I teach."  In her 2001 job evaluation, 
she commented: "I encourage spiritual growth during religion 
class as well as throughout the day."  In her 2002 evaluation, 
Ostlund stated: "I have taught religion daily and prepared 
liturgies, which are well thought out and appropriate for first 
graders."  Ostlund's evaluator stated that Ostlund "prepares 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
10 
 
students for participation in liturgies and prayer services 
celebrated during the school year." 
¶22 In the spring of 2002, CCS closed one of its 
elementary schools due to low enrollment.  This required the 
school system to lay off several teachers.  On March 27, 2002, 
Ostlund received a letter from the president of CCS stating 
that, due to the staff reductions, Ostlund would not be offered 
a contract for the 2002-03 school year.  She was one of ten 
teachers not to receive contract extensions from CCS.6  Ostlund 
was age 53 when she was terminated, and was replaced with a 35-
year-old teacher who was certified to teach elementary school.7 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶23 Following 
her termination, Ostlund filed an age 
discrimination complaint with the Equal Rights Division of the 
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development ("Equal Rights 
Division").  Ostlund alleged that CCS terminated her because of 
her age in violation of the WFEA, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.31 to 
111.3958 (2007-08).9  The Equal Rights Officer did not find 
                                                 
6 Of the ten teachers who did not receive contract 
extensions, six were over age 40 and four were under age 40. 
7 At the time of her termination, Ostlund had not completed 
her state teaching certification, though she was working on it.  
After her termination, all of the remaining teachers at St. 
Patrick's were certified to teach elementary school. 
8 The WFEA prohibits employers from denying employment to 
individuals 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
certain 
enumerated 
grounds.  
Relevant provisions are as follows: 
 Wis. Stat. § 111.31 Declaration of Policy 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) 
The legislature finds that the practice of 
unfair discrimination in employment against 
properly qualified individuals by reason of 
their age, race, creed, color, disability, 
marital 
status, 
sex, 
national 
origin, 
ancestry, sexual orientation, arrest record, 
conviction record, military service, or use 
or 
nonuse 
of 
lawful 
products 
off 
the 
employer's premises during nonworking hours, 
substantially 
and 
adversely 
affects 
the 
general 
welfare 
of 
the 
state.  
Employers . . . that 
deny 
employment 
opportunities and discriminate in employment 
against 
properly 
qualified 
individuals 
solely because of their age . . . deprive 
those individuals of the earnings that are 
necessary to maintain a just and decent 
standard of living. 
(2) 
It is the intent of the legislature to 
protect by law the rights of all individuals 
to obtain gainful employment and to enjoy 
privileges 
free 
from 
employment 
discrimination because of age, . . . and to 
encourage 
the 
full, 
nondiscriminatory 
utilization of the productive resources of 
the state to the benefit of the state, the 
family, and all the people of the state.  
Wis. Stat. § 111.321 Prohibited bases of discrimination. 
Subject 
to 
ss. 
111.33 
to 
111.36, 
no 
employer . . . may 
engage 
in 
any 
act 
of 
employment discrimination as specified in s. 
111.322 against any individual on the basis of 
age . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 111.322 Discriminatory actions prohibited. 
Subject to ss. 111.33 to 111.36, it is an act of 
employment 
discrimination to do any of the 
following: 
(1)  To refuse to hire, employ, admit or license 
any individual, to bar or terminate from 
employment . . . any 
individual, 
or 
to 
discriminate 
against 
any 
individual 
in 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
12 
 
probable cause that CCS violated the WFEA when it terminated 
Ostlund. 
¶24 Ostlund then appealed this initial determination and 
received a formal administrative hearing with the Equal Rights 
Division to address her claim.  CCS moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the grounds that the Equal Rights Division lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction.  CCS argued that Ostlund's position 
was "ministerial" under Jocz v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 273, 538 
N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995), and therefore that adjudication of 
the complaint would infringe upon its First Amendment rights. 
¶25 The Equal Rights Division Administrative Law Judge, 
("ALJ"), John L. Brown, made several findings of fact and 
concluded that Ostlund's position was not ministerial.  ALJ 
Brown found that, though Ostlund did engage in religiously-
related activities, her primary duty was to instruct her 
students in a core of secular disciplines.  Therefore, ALJ Brown 
dismissed 
CCS's 
motion, 
concluding 
that 
adjudication 
of 
Ostlund's complaint would not violate CCS's Free Exercise 
rights, and that the Equal Rights Division had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Ostlund's age discrimination claim.  ALJ Brown 
then ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable 
cause that CCS violated the WFEA when it terminated Ostlund. 
                                                                                                                                                             
promotion, 
compensation 
or 
in 
terms, 
conditions 
or 
privileges 
of 
employment . . . because 
of 
any 
basis 
enumerated in s. 111.321. 
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
13 
 
¶26 CCS appealed the Equal Rights Division ruling to the 
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission ("LIRC") 
for administrative review.  LIRC held that ALJ Brown's decision 
was not final, and that the pending Equal Rights Division 
proceeding on probable cause prevented it from hearing CCS's 
appeal.  Therefore, LIRC concluded that Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
218.21(1) 
(April 
2004)10 
prevented 
it 
from 
reviewing 
the 
administrative decision. 
¶27 CCS then sought judicial review in the La Crosse 
County Circuit Court, Dennis G. Montabon, Judge.  CCS petitioned 
for reversal of LIRC's decision not to review the Equal Rights 
Division decision and for a declaratory judgment and writ of 
prohibition 
to 
prevent 
adjudication 
of 
the 
claim 
until 
administrative review was complete.  The circuit court concluded 
that any investigation or judicial review of the discrimination 
claim would have to wait until LIRC made its decision on whether 
Ostlund's position was ministerial or not.  The circuit court 
therefore granted CCS's writ of prohibition and remanded to LIRC 
                                                 
10 Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 218.21(1) (April 2004) Petition 
for review by the Labor and Industry Review Commission. 
APPEALS LIMITED TO FINAL DECISION AND ORDERS. Any 
party may file a written petition for review of a 
final decision and order of the administrative 
law judge by the labor and industry review 
commission.  Only final decisions and orders of 
the administrative law judge may be appealed.  A 
final decision is one that disposes of the entire 
complaint and leaves no further proceedings on 
the complaint pending before the division. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
14 
 
for review of ALJ Brown's decision that Ostlund's position was 
not ministerial. 
¶28 LIRC then reviewed the administrative decision of ALJ 
Brown and affirmed.  Specifically, LIRC agreed with ALJ Brown's 
conclusion that Ostlund's primary duty as a first-grade teacher 
was to instruct her students in a core of secular disciplines.  
LIRC agreed that teaching religion four times a week, leading 
prayers, referring to religious symbols, incorporating religious 
themes into classes, preparing liturgy, and supervising liturgy 
did not constitute Ostlund's primary duty.  LIRC thus concluded 
that, Ostlund's position was not ministerial and adjudication of 
Ostlund's complaint would not violate CCS's First Amendment 
rights.  Because LIRC determined that the DWD had jurisdiction, 
it concluded that a hearing should be held to determine whether 
there was probable cause that CCS engaged in age discrimination 
against Ostlund.  CCS again sought judicial review of LIRC's 
decision in the La Crosse County Circuit Court. 
¶29 The circuit court, now presided over by Judge Dale T. 
Pasell, 
agreed 
with 
LIRC 
that, 
despite 
Ostlund 
teaching 
religion, participating in religious activities with students, 
and using religious examples in her lessons, her primary duty 
was to teach secular subject matters to her students.  Hence, 
the circuit court held that she was not a ministerial employee, 
and that adjudication of Ostlund's age discrimination claim 
under the WFEA could proceed. 
¶30 CCS appealed, and the court of appeals also concluded 
that her position was not ministerial.  Coulee Catholic Schs. v. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
15 
 
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, Dep't of Workforce Dev., 2008 WI 
App 68, ¶36, 312 Wis. 2d 331, 752 N.W.2d 341.  In determining 
whether a teacher has a ministerial function, the court of 
appeals considered the "primary duties" test in Jocz and the 
three-factor test in Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 
1999).  It chose to apply the primary duties test with an 
additional factor from Starkman, asking whether there were 
"largely religious" criteria for hiring teachers.  Coulee 
Catholic Schs., 312 Wis. 2d 331, ¶¶31, 39.  The court of appeals 
ultimately concluded: 
The religion class, prayers, and participation with 
her students in liturgies do not constitute the 
primary part of her work day and they are not the 
primary focus either of the job description or the job 
evaluation . . . . There is no evidence that there 
were any religious criteria for Ostlund to obtain the 
job, although there was required in-service religious 
training for all elementary teachers . . . . We 
conclude the hiring and in-service criteria support 
the conclusion that, while Ostlund had religious 
duties, they were not her primary duties. 
Id., ¶39.  CCS then sought review before this court. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶31 In reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, 
we review the agency decision and not the decision of the 
circuit court.  Liberty Trucking Co. v. Dep't of Indus. Labor & 
Human Relations, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973).  
Thus, we apply the same standard and scope of review as applied 
by the circuit court.  Id.  This case requires us to determine 
whether LIRC's decision infringes on the rights of CCS under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
16 
 
Freedom of Conscience Clauses in Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  This is an issue of constitutional law, 
which we review de novo.  Jocz, 196 Wis. 2d at 304.  Our scope 
of review is limited by Wis. Stat. § 227.57, which prohibits us 
from substituting our judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact.  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(6).  However, we may set aside a finding of fact 
that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.  
Id. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
¶32 The right to practice one's religion according to the 
dictates 
of 
conscience 
is 
fundamental 
to 
our 
system 
of 
government.  See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Each person's 
right to believe as he wishes and to practice that belief 
according to the dictates of his conscience so long as he does 
not violate the personal rights of others, is fundamental to our 
system.").  We are a nation committed to and founded upon 
religious freedom.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that we are 
a "Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to 
religious freedom"). 
¶33 This right is fundamental in a court of law not 
because religious freedom is broadly understood to be a basic 
human right, but because our nation's founders recognized and 
enshrined this right in our nation's Constitution.  Roughly 60 
years later, Wisconsinites saw fit to include more specific and 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
17 
 
more extensive protections for religious liberty in our state 
constitution. 
¶34 We begin by analyzing religious freedom in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Then, we analyze 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution's 
religious 
freedom 
guarantees.  
Finally, 
we 
apply 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional 
provisions to Ostlund and her claim, ultimately concluding that 
her age discrimination claim impinges upon CCS's religious 
freedom 
in 
violation 
of 
both 
the 
U.S. 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions. 
A. 
Religious Freedom under the U.S. Constitution 
¶35 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The first portion of this 
provision contains what is called the "Establishment Clause," 
and the second portion is called the "Free Exercise Clause." 
¶36 Ostlund asserts that the Establishment Clause provides 
the adjudicatory principles for this case.  She argues, for 
example, that giving religious employers an exemption from non-
discrimination 
laws 
"dangerously 
encroaches 
upon 
the 
Establishment Clause's prohibition against furthering religion."  
Ostlund further asserts that the three-part Establishment Clause 
test announced by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971), should govern our determination of whether 
application of the WFEA here violates CCS's constitutional 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
18 
 
rights.11  Though at times mentioning the Free Exercise Clause, 
Ostlund argues that the only relevant question here is whether 
the WFEA creates excessive government entanglement with religion 
under the third prong of the Lemon test. 
¶37 Supreme Court case law and common sense, however, lead 
to the conclusion that it is the Free Exercise Clause, and not 
the Establishment Clause, that is implicated in this case.  The 
Supreme Court has stated that religious organizations generally 
have the "power to decide for themselves, free from state 
interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine."  Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).  The 
Supreme 
Court 
then 
went 
further, 
explaining 
that 
the 
Constitution forbids the state from interfering with a church's 
selection of its leaders, and that this protection was grounded 
in "the free exercise of religion."  Id.; see also Rayburn, 772 
F.2d at 1168 ("Any attempt by government to restrict a church's 
free choice of its leaders thus constitutes a burden on the 
church's free exercise rights.").  This approach makes sense.  We 
do not see how granting churches and religious organizations 
control over the selection of their leaders implicates the 
establishment of religion or the favoring of one religion over 
another.  While excessive entanglement with religion is in some 
                                                 
11 The Lemon test states that any statute (1) must have a 
secular purpose, (2) the principal or primary effect of which is 
neither to advance nor inhibit religion, and (3) which does not 
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.  Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
19 
 
sense at issue, it is at issue only to the extent it burdens 
CCS's right to practice its faith freely.  Thus, we analyze this 
case under the Free Exercise Clause. 
¶38 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states 
that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise" of religion.  U.S. Const. amend. I.  This provision 
was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, made 
applicable to the states as well as the federal government, in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  It is well 
settled that this provision protects not only the right to 
freedom in what one believes, but extends (with limitations) to 
acting on those beliefs.  See Employment Div., Dep't of Human 
Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).  This most 
basic of freedoms is not just an individual right, but a 
collective right.  That is, both individuals and communities of 
individuals have a right to the freedom of religion.12  See 
                                                 
12 The extent of the Constitution's protection for freedom 
of religion presents vexing questions made all the more salient 
by the development of American society on two fronts.  First, 
religious practice in the United States has become exceedingly 
more diverse than it was at the time of the founding.  Sch. 
Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240-41 
(1963) ("[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more 
diverse people than were our forefathers.").  General laws are 
more likely to burden or prohibit aspects of religious practice 
because of this increasing diversity.  Second, government has 
become significantly more intrusive and more involved in 
everyday life, including its regulation of churches.  See 
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion 
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1373 (1981) (noting 
that "secular regulation of churches has increased substantially 
in recent years," and discussing the increasing litigation 
resulting from this trend). 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
20 
 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167 (stating that religious freedom "is 
guaranteed not only to individuals but also to churches in their 
collective capacities"). 
¶39 Courts around the country have universally recognized 
that the First Amendment protects houses of worship from state 
interference with the decision of who will teach and lead a 
congregation.  Every jurisdiction to consider the question has 
adopted what had been called the "ministerial exception."13  The 
ministerial 
exception 
is 
grounded 
in 
the 
idea 
that 
the 
"introduction of government standards [in]to the selection of 
spiritual 
leaders 
would 
significantly, 
and 
perniciously, 
rearrange the relationship between church and state."  Rayburn, 
772 F.2d at 1168-69.  It recognizes that "perpetuation of a 
church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to 
preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its 
doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at large."  
Id. 
¶40 The 
state 
certainly 
has 
a 
strong 
interest 
in 
eradicating 
discrimination, 
but 
courts 
"must 
distinguish 
                                                 
13 Though on first glance it appears problematic, few courts 
have been troubled by the Supreme Court's decision in Employment 
Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, which held that 
there is no individual religious exemption from neutral laws of 
general applicability.  494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).  It is one 
thing to say that individuals may not disregard an otherwise 
neutral criminal law on the grounds that their conscience or 
religion require them to disobey it.  It is quite another thing 
for 
the 
government 
to 
adjudicate, 
for 
example, 
an 
age 
discrimination 
claim 
against 
a 
denomination's 
mandatory 
retirement age for pastors. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
21 
 
incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a 
compelling state interest from burdens where the 'inroad on 
religious liberty' is too substantial to be permissible."  Id. 
at 1169 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).  Recognition of a church's 
authority to make hiring and firing decisions does remove the 
church's decisions in these matters from the jurisdiction of the 
courts with respect to anti-discrimination laws, laws that are a 
compelling part of our national character in their own right. 
But this freedom does provide protection for the church's First 
Amendment-sanctioned autonomy.  Id. 
¶41 The ministerial exception has deep roots in American 
history, but was first articulated in the context of non-
discrimination claims in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 
553 (5th Cir. 1972).14  The ministerial exception was clarified 
and so named in Rayburn.  Ordination is not required to be 
considered "ministerial."15  See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69.  
                                                 
14 McClure was an officer in the Salvation Army, a church, 
and brought a gender discrimination suit after being discharged.  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that McClure was 
functionally a minister and that application of Title VII to the 
Salvation Army under these facts would violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.  McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 
F.2d 553, 558-61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
15 The dissent decides that the nomenclature "ministerial 
exception" is not very precise, opting instead for the phrase 
"ecclesiastical exception."  Dissent, ¶89 n.1.  One cannot help 
but note that this departure in terminology from virtually every 
other case seems intended to make the exception exceedingly 
narrow. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
22 
 
Rather, it is the function of the position that is primary.16  
See id. 
¶42 The Rayburn court proposed a test for deciding when a 
position should be considered ministerial.  It suggested an 
employee is ministerial if his or her "primary duties consist of 
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of 
a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious 
ritual and worship."  Id. at 1169.  This inquiry "necessarily 
requires a court to determine whether a position is important to 
the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."  Id.  The 
court in Rayburn ultimately concluded that a pastoral care 
associate at a Seventh-day Adventist Church was "so significant 
in the expression and realization of Seventh-day Adventist 
beliefs that state intervention in the appointment process would 
excessively inhibit religious liberty."  Id. at 1168. 
¶43 This test for determining whether a position is 
ministerial has subsequently been called the "primary duties 
test."  In practice, the primary duties test has proved to be a 
flexible test without an answer key and has not yielded 
predictable results.  See Note, The Ministerial Exception to 
Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 
                                                 
16 The dissent is very clear to say that a "lay" religious 
school teacher does not fall within the ministerial exception.  
See, e.g., dissent, ¶¶89, 90, 97, 99, 122.  One wonders how the 
dissent's analysis would change if Ostlund had been a nun 
instead of a lay teacher.  The focus, however, should be on the 
function of the position, not the title or a categorization of 
job duties. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
23 
 
Harv. L. Rev. 1776, 1788 (2008) ("[J]udicial evaluation of the 
role of employees——from parochial school teachers to church 
organists——has not created any discernibly consistent pattern.") 
(footnotes 
omitted); 
Janet 
S. 
Belcove-Shalin, 
Ministerial 
Exception and Title VII Claims:  
L.J. 86, 115 (2002) ("Applying these guidelines to specific 
cases has not yielded consistent results."). 
¶44 The crux of the problem with the application of the 
primary duties test is what the word "primary" means.  Some 
courts have interpreted it to mean that religious tasks must 
encompass the largest share of the position, what might be 
called the "quantitative approach."  These courts will look, in 
the education context, for example, at the amount of time spent 
on particular subjects deemed "secular" versus subjects deemed 
"religious," or at the number of job duties that can be 
classified as "religious" or deemed "secular."  See, e.g., 
Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. 
Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that ministerial status 
did not apply to a teacher at a Catholic elementary school where 
"the vast majority" of her duties involved teaching secular 
classes); Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists,  440 
F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that ministerial 
status did not apply to an elementary school teacher because 
"plaintiff's teaching duties were primarily secular," and "those 
religious in nature were limited to only one hour of Bible 
instruction per day and attending religious ceremonies with 
students only once per year.").  This line of argument is the 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
24 
 
approach advanced by Ostlund in this case, and adopted by ALJ 
Brown,17 LIRC,18 the circuit court,19 and the court of appeals.20   
¶45 Another, and we think better, way to view the 
ministerial 
exception 
is 
from 
what 
might 
be 
called 
the 
"functional" approach.  This perspective focuses more on the 
second statement in Rayburn: "whether a position is important to 
the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."  Rayburn, 772 
F.2d at 1169.  This is a more holistic approach in which 
activities such as teaching, church governance, and supervision 
of or participation in worship are relevant evidence as to the 
importance of the position to the spiritual and pastoral mission 
of a house of worship or religious organization.  The primary 
concern here is the function of the employee, not only the 
enumerated tasks themselves. 
                                                 
17 ALJ Brown concluded:   
Measured by the amount of time Ms. Ostlund spent in 
non-religious versus religious activities, or by the 
number of religious versus non-religious functions 
contained in her job description and the evaluations 
of her performance of those functions, Ms. Ostlund's 
job was not primarily ministerial. 
18 LIRC quoted ALJ Brown's statement in footnote 17 above as 
part of its own conclusion. 
19 The 
circuit 
court insisted it was not trying to 
compartmentalize religion by dismissing the claimed integration 
of faith and learning in everything.  It concluded nonetheless 
that her primary duties were still to teach secular subjects. 
20 The court of appeals found that Ostlund's religious 
duties "do not constitute the primary part of her work day and 
they are not the primary focus either of the job description or 
job evaluation."  Coulee Catholic Schs., 312 Wis. 2d 331, ¶39. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
25 
 
¶46 We reject a primary duties test that looks to see if 
the "vast majority" of tasks are religious, or whether a 
majority of the employee's time is spent on quintessentially 
religious tasks.  This narrow view does not, in our view, 
sufficiently respect the constitutional imperatives of the free 
exercise of religion.  It also serves to minimize or privatize 
religion by calling a faith-centered social studies class, for 
example, "secular" because it does not involve worship and 
prayer.  What the quantitative approach means as a practical 
matter is that the state can interfere with the hiring and 
firing of the leaders of religious organizations and houses of 
worship so long as the leaders are spending (presumably) 49 
percent or less of their time or tasks on whatever the court 
determines to be "religious" activities.  This redounds in an 
intrusiveness inconsistent with the free exercise of religion.21 
¶47 A functional analysis of the ministerial exception 
involves significantly less intrusion into the affairs of houses 
of worship and religious organizations.  It envisages a more 
limited role for courts in determining whether activities or 
positions are religious.  A functional analysis avoids reducing 
the significance of a position to a rote quantitative formula.  
                                                 
21 The dissent asserts that we alter the primary duties 
test.  Dissent, ¶89.  What we have done is reject a version of 
the primary duties test used by some courts that reduces the 
inquiry into 
the 
ministerial role of an employee to a 
quantitative analysis and thus misses the bigger picture. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
26 
 
In 
short, 
a 
functional analysis is truer to the First 
Amendment's protection of religious freedom.22 
¶48 A functional analysis of the ministerial exception has 
two steps.  The first step is an inquiry into whether the 
organization in both statement and practice has a fundamentally 
religious mission.  That is, does the organization exist 
primarily to worship and spread the faith?  Any inquiry will be 
highly fact-sensitive.  It may be, for example, that one 
religiously-affiliated organization committed to feeding the 
homeless has only a nominal tie to religion, while another 
religiously-affiliated organization committed to feeding the 
homeless has a religiously infused mission involving teaching, 
evangelism, and worship.  Similarly, one religious school may 
have some affiliation with a church but not attempt to ground 
the teaching and life of the school in the religious faith, 
while another similarly situated school may be committed to life 
and learning grounded in a religious worldview. 
¶49 The second step in the analysis is an inquiry into how 
important or closely linked the employee's work is to the 
fundamental mission of that organization.  This again will be 
                                                 
22 The dissent contains numerous statements suggesting, 
though not stating outright, that we ought to defer to the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals opinion in Jocz v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 
273, 538 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995), which outlined a framing of 
the primary duties test.  See, e.g., dissent, ¶109.  As the 
dissent 
knows, 
our 
constitutional 
interpretation, 
though 
benefiting from previous courts, is de novo.  See Jocz, 196 
Wis. 2d at 304.  Moreover, this opinion clearly explains why we 
depart from the framing of the issues outlined in Jocz. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
27 
 
highly fact-specific.  Relevant evidence as to the employee's 
importance to the religious mission of the organization will 
include objective employment indicators such as hiring criteria, 
the job application, the employment contract, actual job duties, 
performance 
evaluations, 
and 
the 
understanding 
or 
characterization of a position by the organization.23  Teaching, 
evangelizing, church governance, supervision of a religious 
order, and overseeing, leading, or participating in religious 
rituals, 
worship, 
and/or 
worship 
services 
will 
serve 
as 
important factors, rather than the only evidence we measure or 
consider 
as 
under 
the 
quantitative 
approach. 
 
These 
quintessentially religious tasks will evince a close link and 
importance to an organization's religious mission. 
¶50 It is helpful to review two cases that illustrate the 
approach we adopt today.  In Pardue v. Center City Consortium 
Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669 
(D.C. 2005), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that 
the ministerial exception applied to a Catholic elementary 
school principal, thereby precluding her race discrimination and 
                                                 
23 CCS 
argues 
that 
courts 
should 
defer 
to 
the 
characterization of a position by the organization or church.  
We believe courts should certainly consider the organization's 
understanding or characterization of a position, and it is 
likely that this will provide great insight into the centrality 
of a position to the organization's mission.  The weight of this 
evidence is for the court to determine, however.  We are not 
persuaded that an organization's characterization should be 
determinative or, by definition, be accorded greater weight than 
all other relevant evidence. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
28 
 
retaliation claims against the Archdiocese of Washington.  Id. 
at 670. 
¶51 The court's analysis focused, correctly in our view, 
on the directive in Rayburn to "determine whether a position is 
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."  
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.  Thus, the court's analysis initially 
focused on the school's mission, concluding that the Catholic 
schools in the Archdiocese had a "pervasive religious mission" 
where instruction on faith and morals was "part of the total 
educational process."  These Catholic schools were, the court 
found, "an integral part of the religious mission of the 
Catholic Church."  Pardue, 875 A.2d at 675 (quoting Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 615-16). 
¶52 After 
this, 
the 
court 
examined 
the 
principal's 
function, which the lower court concluded was to communicate the 
school's message, one founded on religious belief, to the staff, 
students, and parents.  Id. at 676-77.  The court rejected the 
argument that because most of her daily responsibilities were no 
different from a public school principal, she could not have 
been a ministerial employee.  The court explained: "[M]erely 
enumerating the duties in Pardue's job description, many under 
secular-sounding headings such as 'materials management' and 
'office management,' tells us little about whether her 'position 
is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the 
church.'"  Id. at 677 (citing Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169).  
Instead, the court concluded that her responsibilities when 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
29 
 
viewed as a whole were "inextricably intertwined in the school's 
mission."  Id. 
¶53 Similarly, in an unpublished opinion, the Fourth 
Circuit looked primarily at the mission of a Seventh-day 
Adventist school in determining that the ministerial exception 
precluded an elementary school teacher's discrimination claims. 
Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, No. 
97-2648, 166 F.3d 1208 (table), 1998 WL 904528, *8 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 29, 1998).  The court noted that the school's mission, or 
primary purpose, was "the salvation of each student's soul 
through his or her indoctrination in Seventh-day Adventist 
theological beliefs."  Id. at *1.  Teachers were a vital part of 
this mission, and were encouraged to look at teaching "as a holy 
vocation."  Id. at *3.  The court explicitly rejected the 
teacher's arguments that he was not ministerial because only one 
of his thirteen stated responsibilities was religious in nature.  
Id. at *6.  It found that the teacher taught the Bible, 
incorporated church teachings throughout the curriculum, and led 
the students in prayer, worship, and witnessing activities.  Id. 
at *7. 
¶54 In short, the court applied a functional analysis, 
choosing to understand teaching a "secular" class as not purely 
secular in the context of that religious school.  Teachers were 
considered to have significant roles in the propagation of the 
faith even though a majority of their tasks and time was spent 
teaching a traditional academic curriculum.  Id.  The primary 
duties test was not a quantitative test, the court stated.  Id.  
No. 
2007AP496   
 
30 
 
Instead, based on a total view of the facts, the central 
constitutional question is whether enforcement of the teacher's 
action 
"would 
substantially 
infringe 
upon 
the 
Chesapeake 
Conference's right to choose its spiritual leaders."  Id.  The 
court explained: 
While the relative quantity of time an employee of a 
religious 
entity 
spends 
directly 
teaching 
and 
spreading the faith, providing church governance, 
supervising a religious order, or supervising or 
participating in religious ritual and worship is 
important in determining whether those activities are 
the primary duties of such employee, the degree of the 
church 
entity's 
reliance 
upon 
such 
employee 
to 
indoctrinate persons in its theology is equally 
important. 
Id.  The court then concluded that "for the reasons previously 
set forth, the quantitative and qualitative combination of 
factual circumstances in the present case compels us to conclude 
that the primary duties test is satisfied."  Id. 
¶55 A functional analysis of the ministerial exception 
makes sense because, though it departs in form from the analysis 
used by many other courts, it gets to the real heart of the 
ministerial exception, which is preventing the state from 
intruding into the mission of religious organizations or houses 
of worship.  The state surely has a strong interest in ensuring 
fair employment opportunities regardless of age, race, and other 
such factors.  Nonetheless, we conclude that the Wisconsin 
legislature oversteps its constitutional authority when its 
otherwise laudable efforts at fairness interfere with the hiring 
and firing of employees who are important and closely linked to 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
31 
 
the religious mission of a religious organization.  Such actions 
impermissibly 
intrude upon the organization's exercise of 
religious liberty. 
B. 
Religious Freedom under the Wisconsin Constitution 
¶56 Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
was included as part of Wisconsin's original constitution in 
1848.24  It provides as follows: 
Freedom of worship; liberty of conscience; state 
religion; public funds.  Section 18.  The right of 
every person to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor 
shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, 
or interference with, the rights of conscience be 
permitted, or any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor 
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the 
benefit of religious societies, or religious or 
theological seminaries. 
¶57 As with any document, the interpretive task is to 
"ascertain its true intent and meaning."  State v. Beno, 116 
Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984).  The authoritative, 
and usually final, indicator of the meaning of a provision is 
the text——the actual words used.25  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
                                                 
24 The clause was amended in 1982 to change gender-specific 
language to gender-neutral language. 
25 In 
Beno, 
we 
discussed 
a 
three-step 
process 
for 
interpreting our constitution.  The court is to examine: 
 (1) The plain meaning of the words in the context 
used; 
 (2) The historical analysis of the constitutional 
debates and of what practices were in existence 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
32 
 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (discussing statutory interpretation). 
¶58 The text here contains several clauses applying in 
different factual scenarios.  It contains two clauses referring 
to the rights of conscience (the "Freedom of Conscience 
Clauses"), which we understand to refer generally to the 
exercise of religious freedom.26  The main right protected is to 
"worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience."  
This right is accorded to "every person."  By logical extension 
                                                                                                                                                             
in 1848, which the court may reasonably presume 
were also known to the framers of the 1848 
constitution; and 
 (3) The earliest interpretation of this section by 
the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed 
following 
the 
adoption 
of 
the 
constitution. 
State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984) 
(citations omitted).  In this case, we see little reason to 
extend our interpretation beyond the text.  And even if we did 
engage in steps two and three, there is little historical 
evidence regarding the meaning of this provision in 1848 or 
shortly thereafter.  
26 In 1848, the year the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided a case under its 
constitution, which contained nearly identical language with 
respect to the rights of conscience as our own.  The court there 
defined the rights of conscience as "simply a right to worship 
the Supreme Being according to the dictates of the heart; to 
adopt any creed or hold any opinion whatever, or to support any 
religion; and to do, or forbear to do, any act for conscience' 
sake, the doing or forbearing of which is not prejudicial to the 
public."  Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, *9 (1848).  That is 
to say, the "rights of conscience" was another way of describing 
the right to believe and practice one's faith according to one's 
convictions. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
33 
 
and as affirmed by the Supreme Court with respect to First 
Amendment rights (see Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167), individuals 
also have the right to practice their religious faith in groups, 
as collections of individuals, and to form houses of worship and 
faith-based organizations committed to achieving their faith-
based ends. 
¶59 The Wisconsin Constitution uses the strongest possible 
language in the protection of this right.  It provides that the 
right to worship as one is so convinced "shall never be 
infringed."  It goes even further, stating, "nor shall any 
control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be 
permitted."  It is difficult to conceive of language being 
stronger than this.  The question is, how do these strong 
prohibitions on state government apply here? 
¶60 This court has stated that Article I, Section 18 
serves the same dual purposes as the Establishment Clause and 
Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  State ex rel. 
Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 332, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972).  
However, we have also recognized that these provisions, though 
sharing some similarities with the federal provisions, are not 
the same.  State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 63-66, 549 
N.W.2d 235 (1996).  The protections and prohibitions in the 
Wisconsin Constitution are far more specific.  And with regard 
to the rights of conscience, this clause contains extremely 
strong language, providing expansive protections for religious 
liberty.  Thus, we are not limited to current First Amendment 
jurisprudence 
when 
interpreting 
our 
own 
constitutional 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
34 
 
protections for religious liberty; rather, we are required to 
give effect to the more explicit guarantees set forth in our 
state constitution.  Id. at 65-66. 
¶61 When faced with a claim that a state law violates an 
individual or organization's freedom of conscience, we have 
generally 
applied 
the 
compelling 
state 
interest/least 
restrictive alternative test.  Id. at 66.  Under this test, the 
religious organization has to prove (1) that it has a sincerely 
held religious belief, and (2) that such belief is burdened by 
the application of the state law at issue.  Upon this showing, 
the burden shifts to the state to prove (3) that the law is 
based upon a compelling state interest (4) that cannot be served 
by a less restrictive alternative.  Id. 
¶62 This 
analysis——though 
appropriate 
in 
most 
circumstances27 
regarding 
laws 
burdening 
the 
rights 
of 
conscience——is not helpful here.  The law at issue in this case 
is not simply a burden on an individual's or organization's 
religious beliefs; it is an effort by the state to intrude into 
the hiring and firing decisions of a religious organization.  As 
we have previously stated, Article I, Section 18 "operate[s] as 
a perpetual bar to the state from the infringement, control, or 
                                                 
27 When Miller was decided, this was a correct statement of 
the law applicable to the First Amendment's protection for 
religious freedom.  However, the Supreme Court overturned this 
as it applies to state laws in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997).  We still believe, however, that this is the 
appropriate standard under the Wisconsin Constitution for most 
laws burdening religious belief. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
35 
 
interference with" the rights of conscience.  State ex rel. 
Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch.-Dist. No. 8 of City of Edgerton, 76 
Wis. 177, 210-11, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). 
¶63 No one could legitimately claim, for example, that the 
state's compelling interest in prohibiting racial discrimination 
(and a law narrowly tailored to doing precisely that) would 
allow the state to adjudicate a race discrimination claim in the 
selection of a religious leader such as a priest, pastor, rabbi, 
imam, etc.  There is no weighing of the state's interest or 
examination of whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.  The state simply has no authority to control or 
interfere with the selection of spiritual leaders of a religious 
organization with a religious mission.  The text of our 
constitution states that the state cannot do it——at all.  The 
main inquiry is not how important the right in question is, but 
whether the law is "controlling" or "interfering with" religious 
freedom. 
¶64 By analogy, the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution 
provides: 
"Neither 
slavery 
nor 
involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIII.  We think it inconceivable that one might 
conclude slavery can exist in the United States as long as the 
state has a compelling interest.  The text is clear——slavery is 
not allowed. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
36 
 
¶65 We do not mean to suggest that anything interfering 
with a religious organization is totally prohibited.  General 
laws related to building licensing, taxes, social security, and 
the like are normally acceptable.  Similarly, employment 
discrimination laws applying to employees who are not in 
positions that are important and closely linked to the religious 
mission of a religious organization also do not rise to the 
level of control or interference with the free exercise of 
religion. 
¶66 The Wisconsin Constitution, with its specific and 
expansive 
language, 
provides much broader protections for 
religious liberty than the First Amendment.  Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 
at 64.  We need not explore the outer boundaries of those 
protections here. 
 
But it is clear that the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides at least the protections contained in the 
First Amendment as outlined earlier in this opinion. 
¶67 Thus, the state may not interfere with the hiring or 
firing decisions of religious organizations with a religious 
mission with respect to employees who are important and closely 
linked to that mission.  These employees are "ministerial."  
With respect to these ministerial employees, laws such as the 
WFEA constitute an impermissible effort to control or interfere 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
37 
 
with the organization's rights of conscience in violation of 
Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.28 
C. 
Application to Ostlund 
¶68 This case is heavily fact-dependent.  As such, our 
treatment of the facts is important to our disposition of the 
case.  As discussed above, we defer to facts found by the agency 
(in this case, LIRC adopted the ALJ's findings of fact) as long 
as they are substantially supported by the record.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(6). 
¶69 However, two caveats are relevant.  First, our review 
is of the entire record.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.57(1).  We thus 
consider unrebutted facts in the record so long as they do not 
conflict with those found by LIRC.  Additionally, we will not 
defer to characterizations of facts found by LIRC, particularly 
where those characterizations are couched as legal judgments.  
Here, there are at least two findings of fact that are 
characterizations or legal judgments.  LIRC finding of fact 16 
states that the textbooks were not religious and that, except 
for a Christmas unit, "her instruction in social studies was not 
primarily religious."  However, Ostlund testified that she 
incorporated (or attempted to incorporate) religious examples 
and values into everything she taught.  Whether or not her 
                                                 
28 Even if the Supreme Court were to construe the First 
Amendment in a fashion inconsistent with our application today, 
our 
holding 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides 
an 
independent basis 
for the ministerial exception's broader 
application would clearly remain the standard in Wisconsin.  
This is so because the text warrants it. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
38 
 
teaching of social studies was "primarily religious" is more a 
characterization or legal judgment than a factual finding to 
which we owe deference. 
¶70 LIRC 
finding 
of 
fact 
25 
similarly 
states 
that 
"religious related activities did not constitute her primary 
duty."  This finding of fact is particularly intriguing in that 
it uses the language of the primary duties test.  To the extent 
finding of fact 25 purports to answer the question before us, we 
reject that finding of fact as to its characterization or legal 
judgment.  While it may be that the majority of her duties were 
teaching "secular" subjects, it does not follow that her 
"primary duties" were secular for purposes of determining 
whether the ministerial exception applies. 
¶71 In our previous analysis, we concluded that the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides 
at 
least 
the 
protections 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.  Thus, we proceed under the 
functional analysis of the ministerial exception as outlined in 
the First Amendment discussion above.  That is, we look to 
whether Ostlund's position was important and closely linked to 
the religious mission of a religious organization.  We conclude 
that it was. 
¶72 Our first inquiry is into the nature and mission of 
Ostlund's employer——Coulee Catholic Schools.  The record is 
clear that CCS has a religious mission and substantially 
practices it.  CCS is an entity committed to marshalling the 
resources and expertise of the Catholic schools in the Diocese 
of La Crosse.  CCS is an entity of the Catholic Church itself, 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
39 
 
subject to the authority of the Bishop of La Crosse, who himself 
approved certain CCS rules and policies. 
¶73 CCS is committed to a distinctly Catholic education 
aimed at a "Christian concept of life."  The preamble to the CCS 
Faculty and Staff Handbook explicitly stated that Catholic 
school education is an essential part of the Catholic Church's 
efforts to live out its mission "to proclaim the kingdom of 
God."  Consistent with this mission, Catholic elementary and 
secondary schools are called "educational ministry."  CCS is 
committed to an "education rooted in the Gospel of Jesus Christ" 
that "celebrates the development of Gospel faith and identity 
through sacrament and service."  It aims to be a worship-filled 
educational environment with a faith-centered approach to 
learning.  It is beyond dispute, then, that CCS has a religious 
mission. 
¶74 The actual practice of Ostlund's school substantially 
affirms that CCS gives life to the words of its mission.  
Teachers made efforts to integrate Catholic values into various 
aspects 
of 
the 
curricula.29 
 
This 
included 
integrating 
                                                 
29 Based on facts such as this, the dissent argues that our 
decision today somehow implicates the constitutionality of the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("MPCP"), which this court 
upheld in Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(1998).  Dissent, ¶112.  This argument is mistaken, reflecting a 
misreading of this court's decision in Jackson and a failure to 
apply subsequent Supreme Court precedent that has now settled 
the matter. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, we did not make the facts up in this case.  The 
dissent is troubled not by our reasoning or even our approach to 
the facts, but by the facts themselves.  Indeed, the dissent 
never challenges the unrebutted evidence from the record that 
CCS was aiming to integrate the Catholic faith into the whole 
educational process, and Ostlund testified that she made efforts 
to do this.  These are the facts before us and upon which we 
must base our decision. 
Second, contrary to the dissent's assertions, the opt-out 
provision played only a minor, inconsequential role in our 
opinion in Jackson.  As the dissent acknowledges but never 
grapples with, Jackson was decided on the basis of the 
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the "benefits 
clause" and "compelled support clause" of Article I, Section 18 
of the Wisconsin Constitution (other issues were discussed, but 
are not relevant here).  See Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 875-76. 
In its analysis under the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause, the court in Jackson applied the Lemon test (see supra 
¶36 and n.11).  See Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 856.  The main 
question in the analysis was whether the program had the primary 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.  Id. at 858-73.  
Analyzing Supreme Court precedent, we identified the dual 
principles of neutrality and indirect aid.  Id. at 860.  We thus 
stated the rule as follows: 
[S]tate educational assistance programs do not have 
the primary effect of advancing religion if those 
programs provide public aid to both sectarian and 
nonsectarian institutions (1) on the basis of neutral, 
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor 
religion; and (2) only as a result of numerous private 
choices of the individual parents of school age 
children. 
Id. at 869.  The analysis was straightforward based on these 
criteria.  The MPCP was neutral and offered aid to religious 
schools only through individual parental choice.  Id. at 872-73.   
We further stated that the program did not create excessive 
government entanglement with religion merely because the state 
would have some minimal oversight, auditing, health, and other 
such obligations.  Id. at 874. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
41 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is true that the opt-out provision was mentioned in the 
analysis, but this needs to be placed in perspective.  The 
Establishment Clause analysis in Jackson is contained in ¶¶20-52 
and pages 853-76 of the official Wisconsin Reports.  In 33 
paragraphs covering 24 pages of analysis under the U.S. 
Constitution, the court mentioned the opt-out provision exactly 
one time in one sentence.  The opt-out clause was a factor, but 
merely a negligible one in the court's analysis.  
Our analysis of the benefits clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution queried whether the MPCP had the principal or 
primary effect of advancing religion.  Id. at 878.  Employing 
the same analysis as under the Establishment Clause, namely, the 
neutrality and indirect aid principles, we concluded that the 
MPCP did not violate the benefits clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See id. at 876-82.  The opt-out provision which 
so preoccupies the dissent, was not mentioned at all in the 10 
paragraphs and 7 pages of this analysis in the Wisconsin 
Reports. 
Finally, the Jackson court determined that the provision 
did not violate the compelled support clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The court did reference the opt-out provision as 
relevant to this analysis, but it seems clear that the program 
compels no child to attend or participate in religious classes 
or activities unless the parent chooses to send them to that 
religious school.  See id. at 883. 
Even so, the MPCP was not upheld because the court 
concluded that religious schools are not really all that 
religious anyway.  There is no evidence that the integration of 
religious values into classes and school life was unknown to the 
court, or conversely, that the court considered the opt-out 
provision sufficient to keep all religious influences away from 
participating children. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
42 
 
theological and moral principles into each subject, as well as 
use of religious examples and symbols that would not be found in 
a public school.  Students were taught the Catholic faith in a 
daily religion class, and celebrated Mass weekly.  The students 
also prayed at points throughout the day and celebrated 
religious holidays.  Teachers were required to teach, support, 
and exemplify Catholic doctrine and morality, and they were to 
help foster spiritual growth among their students. 
¶75 In short, CCS member schools are not just public 
schools with a few supplemental religious extras.  CCS was 
explicitly and intentionally faith-centered, and the record 
supports that CCS tried to live out its mission. 
¶76 The second step in our inquiry is an examination of 
Ostlund's position itself and the degree to which it is 
important and closely linked to CCS's mission.  As a first-grade 
teacher at St. Patrick's Elementary School, one of the CCS 
                                                                                                                                                             
Possibly the most confusing aspect of the dissent's 
discussion on this point is that it completely ignores Supreme 
Court precedent that has since settled this issue.  In Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 
536 
U.S. 
639 
(2002), 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
considered the constitutionality of Cleveland's school voucher 
program.  There is no evidence that Cleveland's program had a 
similar opt-out provision.  Yet, the Supreme Court took the same 
approach as this court did in Jackson, identifying the two 
governing principles as neutrality and private choice, and found 
that the Cleveland program was neutral and a program of true 
private choice, and thus did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63.  Therefore, even if the 
dissenters are not comfortable with a school choice program that 
does not completely insulate children in religious schools from 
religion, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
spoken: 
There 
is 
no 
Establishment Clause violation.   
No. 
2007AP496   
 
43 
 
schools, it is obvious that Ostlund's role was of high 
importance and closely linked to the mission of the school——the 
inculcation of a Christ-centered concept of life. 
¶77 The record supports this characterization.  Ostlund 
led prayer with her students, incorporated religious examples, 
symbols, and stories into other subjects, and helped celebrate 
school-wide celebrations of religious holidays.  Significantly, 
Ostlund was a catechist for four days per week; that is, she 
taught Catholic doctrine and practice to her students.  Ostlund 
also took her students to Mass each week, sometimes planning 
Bible readings and writing prayers for worship services.  
Ostlund was important and closely linked to the religious 
mission of CCS with regard to her first-grade students. 
¶78 Ostlund was required to obtain basic and advanced 
certifications in religious instruction.  This means she was 
required to and did receive ongoing training and instruction on 
how to teach the Catholic faith to her students.  She further 
agreed to model and support Catholic teaching.  In her job 
description, 
which 
also 
served 
as 
the 
template 
for 
her 
performance evaluation, her first responsibility was to maintain 
a "Religious Atmosphere," which required her to "[p]rovide a 
good Christian model and example," "[e]ncourage spiritual growth 
in 
students," 
and 
"[p]rovide 
leadership 
in 
living 
and 
celebrating life and liturgies."  Ostlund acknowledged her 
efforts to incorporate Catholic values and encourage spiritual 
growth throughout the day, not just in religion class. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
44 
 
¶79 The evidence shows that Ostlund's position as a first-
grade 
teacher 
was 
important 
and 
closely 
linked 
to 
the 
religiously-infused mission of the school.  In particular, her 
specific obligations to contribute to worship services and teach 
Catholic doctrine to her students point to her significance in 
the religious mission of the school.  Ostlund was required to 
perform quintessentially religious tasks as a central part of 
her job, and her role was an essential part of the Catholic 
Church's educational ministry to its youth. 
¶80 In sum, Ostlund was not simply a public school teacher 
with an added obligation to teach religion.  She was an 
important instrument in a faith-based organization's efforts to 
pass on its faith to the next generation.  The state and federal 
constitutions do not permit the state to interfere with 
employment decisions regarding teachers, like Ostlund, who are 
important and closely linked to the religious mission of CCS. 
¶81 Our jurisprudential approach and outcome are not 
novel.  Other courts have reached similar results to our holding 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
45 
 
today.30  Other courts who have considered similar cases have 
reached the opposite result.31 
                                                 
30 In addition to those discussed in supra ¶¶50-54, see, 
e.g., EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 
582 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that the 
ministerial exception applied to a kindergarten teacher who 
taught 
at 
a 
Lutheran 
school 
offering 
a 
"Christ-centered 
education" and where she received the title of "commissioned 
minister" from the Lutheran Church——Missouri Synod, even though 
she did not need to be Lutheran and the teacher's religious-
oriented tasks took up only about 45 minutes of her 7 hour day); 
Stately v. Indian Cmty. Sch. of Milwaukee, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 
858, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (holding that the ministerial 
exception applied to an elementary school teacher because the 
school required the teacher to integrate Native American culture 
and religion into her classes, she participated in and sometimes 
led the school's religious ceremonies and cultural activities, 
and she helped develop her students spiritually); Porth v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995) 
(holding 
that 
an 
elementary 
school 
teacher's 
discrimination claims were barred by the First Amendment, and 
even though the balance of her duties was teaching secular 
subjects, 
the 
teacher's 
overall 
duties 
were 
"inexorably 
intertwined with the primary function of defendants' school, 
which is the education of its students consistent with the 
Catholic faith"). 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
46 
 
¶82 We address two factual counterarguments.  First, the 
lower courts were particularly affected by the fact that Ostlund 
was not required to be Catholic (a finding adopted by LIRC and 
binding upon us if, as it is, substantially supported by the 
record).  It may seem, at first blush, counterintuitive to call 
a position "ministerial" when the person occupying it is not 
required to be a member of the faith she is ministering.  But 
this ignores the fact that Ostlund was still required to engage 
in Catholic worship, model Catholic living, and impart Catholic 
teaching.  Thus, though it may be that she was not required to 
be Catholic (the record is clear, however, that she was a 
practicing member of the church connected to the school), she 
was required to live, embody, and teach Catholicism in her role 
as a teacher consistent with the mission of the school. 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the ministerial exception did not 
apply to a lay teacher who brought an ADEA action against a 
parochial 
school 
even 
though 
the 
teacher 
performed 
some 
religious duties, including leading his students in prayers and 
taking them to Mass); Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-day 
Adventists,  440 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that 
the ministerial exception did not apply to an elementary school 
teacher who taught primarily secular subjects but also taught 
religion for an hour a day and attended religious ceremonies 
with 
students 
once 
per 
year); 
Guinan 
v. 
Roman 
Catholic 
Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998) 
(holding that the ministerial exception did not apply to a 
teacher at a Catholic elementary school because teachers at this 
school were not required to be Catholic, the vast majority of 
classes she taught were secular, and she did not lead worship 
services); EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 
700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that the ministerial exception did 
not apply to parochial school teachers and administrators). 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
47 
 
¶83 Previous courts also pointed to the "secular" teaching 
materials as important.  But as discussed above, Ostlund 
testified that she made efforts to integrate Catholicism into 
all her subjects.  The fact that she used a secular social 
studies book does not mean that the social studies class was 
"secular."  Ostlund claims she used religious examples and 
brought Catholic teaching into all of her subjects. 
¶84 In our holding today, we are not giving a blanket 
exception to all religious school teachers.  Future cases along 
these lines will necessarily be very fact-sensitive.  But here, 
the state has no constitutional authority to regulate the hiring 
and firing decisions of CCS for this first-grade teaching 
position.32 
¶85 Some also might argue that religious organizations 
should not be accorded deference or special freedoms to which 
other 
non-religious 
but 
otherwise 
similarly 
situated 
organizations are not entitled.  That may or may not be true as 
                                                 
32 Ostlund also argues that even if she is held to be a 
ministerial employee, LIRC may nonetheless hear the claim 
because CCS does not assert that Ostlund was terminated for 
religious reasons.  We disagree.  Ostlund mistakenly assumes 
that the only constitutional right at stake is non-establishment 
of religion, whereby the state must make a decision as to the 
theological views of a church.  This, as we have explained, is 
the wrong question.  Therefore, Ostlund may not pursue her claim 
under the WFEA.  See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
the role of the employee, not the reason for the employee's 
dismissal, is the operative question).  As the court in Rayburn 
stated, "In these sensitive areas, the state may no more require 
a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning [for the dismissal] than 
it may supervise doctrinal content."  Id. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
48 
 
a matter of policy, but it is not relevant to our analysis 
because religious freedom is accorded a special status in both 
our state and federal constitutions. 
¶86 The 
U.S. 
Constitution 
is 
a 
supermajoritarian 
document.33  See generally, John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 
703 (2002).  That is, when a supermajority of citizens believes 
that our framework of government needs to be changed, or that a 
fundamental right or protection or value is needed, it can be 
changed.  And this change binds future generations, including 
the acts of future legislatures.  As a court, our job is to 
interpret and apply the law the people adopt, not to make it up 
in accord with ours or society's current policy preferences. 
¶87 We recognize that the state has a strong interest in 
preventing age discrimination in society as a whole.  Our 
opinion today is a determination that Ostlund's role is 
ministerial and is therefore an expression of CCS's free 
exercise of religion.  This, the people of Wisconsin and the 
people of the United States have chosen to protect as a 
fundamental 
constitutional 
right. 
 
The 
state's 
attempted 
interference with and control of CCS's hiring decisions is 
prohibited not as a matter of policy, but as a matter of 
constitutional law. 
                                                 
33 The Wisconsin Constitution can be amended either by a 
constitutional convention, which has never been used, or by 
majority votes in each house of the legislature in two 
consecutive legislatures followed by a majority vote of the 
electorate.  Wisconsin Const. art. XII. 
No. 
2007AP496   
 
49 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶88 We conclude that both the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Freedom of Conscience Clauses in Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution preclude employment discrimination claims 
under §§ 111.31 to 111.395 of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act 
for employees whose positions are important and closely linked 
to the religious mission of a religious organization.  In the 
case at bar, Ostlund's school was committed to a religious 
mission——the inculcation of the Catholic faith and worldview—— 
and Ostlund's position was important and closely linked to that 
mission.  Therefore, Ostlund's age discrimination claim under 
the WFEA unconstitutionally impinges upon her employer's right 
to religious freedom.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals decision and remand to the circuit court to dismiss 
Ostlund's claim. 
By the Court.—The decision by the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
1 
 
¶89 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  As a result of 
the majority opinion, our court is reaching the anomalous 
conclusion that a first-grade lay schoolteacher at a Catholic 
school fits within the narrow "ecclesiastical"1 exception barring 
adjudication 
of 
her 
age 
discrimination 
suit 
against 
her 
employer.  To reach that conclusion, the majority improvidently 
alters the primary duties test that Wisconsin courts and a 
significant majority of other jurisdictions have applied when 
confronted 
with 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
to 
apply 
the 
ecclesiastical exception.  I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and the freedom of conscience 
clauses in Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
preclude adjudication of this claim. 
¶90 Moreover, while I recognize the majority's analysis 
under the First Amendment centers on the Free Exercise Clause, 
the 
majority's 
sweeping language and analysis nonetheless 
jeopardizes this court's long-standing decisions under the 
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, and the 
benefits clause and compelled support clause in Article I, 
                                                 
1 Courts 
have 
used 
the 
terms 
"ministerial" 
and 
"ecclesiastical" interchangeably to describe the function of 
employment positions that fall within the exception.  See, e.g., 
Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 
2d 1174, 1180 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Jocz v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 273, 
301, 538 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995).  Although most courts have 
described the exception as the "ministerial exception," I use 
the word "ecclesiastical" (rather than "ministerial") throughout 
this dissent because it is a more precise term than ministerial 
and avoids confusion with an exception to immunity in other 
contexts. 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
2 
 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Specifically, the 
majority's conclusion that based on the facts here CCS infuses 
its secular subjects with religion effectively extends a free 
pass to religious schools to discriminate against their lay 
employees; moreover, it undoubtedly threatens this court's 
decision in Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(1998), and, consequently, the continued viability of the 
Milwaukee school choice program.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶91 As an initial matter, I cannot subscribe to the 
majority's view that the primary duties test should be altered 
by supplementing it with its self-styled "functional analysis."  
Indeed, given that "our job is to interpret and apply the law 
the people adopt, not to make it up in accord with ours or 
society's current policy preferences," majority op., ¶86, an 
examination of Wisconsin court precedent, and the majority of 
other jurisdictions that use that test, counsels for our 
continued use of the primary duties test.  Wisconsin courts and 
a majority of other jurisdictions have applied the test to 
determine whether the ecclesiastical exception should apply to a 
lay teacher2 at a religious school. 
¶92 As a matter of context, the law, as it stood when this 
case moved its way up through the administrative hearings, the 
                                                 
2 The facts presented here involve a lay teacher. It is 
unnecessary in this case to speculate on the question of how the 
ecclesiastical exception would apply "if Ostlund had been a nun 
instead of a lay teacher."  Majority op., ¶41 n.16.  A nun who 
is a teacher may very well have primary duties that would differ 
from the primary duties of a lay teacher.  In any event, that 
question is not before us.   
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
3 
 
circuit court, and the court of appeals, was well-established: 
The United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution do 
not categorically deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear and adjudicate employment discrimination claims against 
religious organizations because doing so "would dangerously 
encroach upon the Establishment Clause's prohibition against 
furthering religion by providing a benefit exclusively to a 
religious association."  Jocz v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 273, 300, 538 
N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Sacred Heart Sch. Bd. v. 
LIRC, 157 Wis. 2d 638, 644, 460 N.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1990).  
However, our courts have also recognized that the First 
Amendment and Wisconsin Constitution may preclude investigation 
and adjudication of discrimination complaints in some cases 
where doing so would impinge on a religious organization's 
ability to choose ministers to teach and interpret its doctrine 
and policy.  Jocz, 196 Wis. 2d at 300.  The rationale for that 
exception 
reflects 
an 
interest 
in 
allowing 
religious 
associations the right to choose ministers or persons in similar 
positions without interference by state courts or quasi-judicial 
agencies interpreting religious canons, doctrines, or policies.  
Id. at 300-01. 
¶93 Accordingly, when confronted with the question of 
whether an employee of a religious organization fits within the 
ecclesiastical exception, our agencies and courts apply the 
primary duties test: An employee fits within the ecclesiastical 
exception if "the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, 
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
4 
 
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious 
ritual or worship . . . ."  Jocz, 196 Wis. 2d at 303 (citing 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 
1164 (4th Cir. 1985)).  As the factors demonstrate, the central 
purpose of this test is to allow a court to distinguish between 
individuals for whom employment decisions by a religious group 
are likely to require a court to interpret matters of religious 
faith, doctrine, and governance, and those for whom employment 
decisions are highly unlikely to require a court to investigate 
such matters.  See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 
Wis. 2d 302, 327, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995). 
¶94 Given that background, ALJ Brown, LIRC, the circuit 
court, and the court of appeals all applied that law and 
ultimately 
concluded 
that 
Ostlund's 
position 
was 
not 
ecclesiastical.  ALJ Brown's reasoning, as adopted by LIRC, is 
particularly cogent in its explanation of why Ostlund's position 
properly fell outside the ecclesiastical exception under the 
primary duties test: 
In practical terms, the idea that, as a teacher, Ms. 
Ostlund should try to infuse religion into her secular 
subjects, and should strive to create a religious 
"atmosphere" in her class, meant that, while she 
performed her primary duty of teaching the typical, 
secular 
school 
curriculum, 
she 
occasionally 
made 
references to moral or religious lessons, or to 
religious symbols or rituals.  This did not make her 
job ministerial.  Not one example in case law has been 
cited for holding that a teacher employed by a 
religious association who taught something other than 
exclusively 
religious 
subjects 
has 
a 
ministerial 
position, preventing adjudication of a complaint under 
an employment discrimination law (other than for 
discrimination on the basis of religion).  On the 
other hand, a number of court decisions considering 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
5 
 
this issue have found that the position was not 
ministerial and/or that there was no unconstitutional 
entanglement with the free exercise clause. 
¶95 Of course, that is not to say that the primary duties 
test is definitive.  As tests designed for agencies and courts 
to apply on a case-by-case basis often go, the test speaks in 
some degree of generality.  See Jocz, 196 Wis. 2d at 303 ("While 
this test is not meant to provide the exclusive definition of 
'ministerial' or 'ecclesiastical' functions, it should provide a 
basic framework for reviewing agencies or courts to follow when 
addressing the prima facie question of whether a position is 
entitled 
to 
constitutional 
protection 
from 
state 
interference.").  For example, when confronted with the facts 
here, it is not patently clear when one of Ostlund's specific 
duties falls within the categories identified in the primary 
duties test, and what makes a particular duty "primary."  
¶96 Thus, our task is to identify how broadly or narrowly 
we resolve those questions.  To accomplish that, I believe that 
the correct approach is much like that taken by the court of 
appeals3 in this case: examining the sources of the primary 
duties test for a guiding principle, and supplementing that 
examination by considering other jurisdictions' decisions in 
which 
those 
courts 
determined 
whether 
the 
ecclesiastical 
                                                 
3 In an appeal following an administrative agency decision, 
this court reviews the decision of the agency, in this case, 
LIRC.  See County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶14, 315 
Wis. 2d 295, 759 N.W.2d 571.  However, this court benefits from 
the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659.  
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
6 
 
exception applied in circumstances similar to those presented 
here.  
¶97 The source of the primary duties test in Wisconsin is 
Jocz, 196 Wis. 2d at 301.  In that case, the court relied on 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), and 
Rayburn in adopting the primary duties test.  Of those two 
cases, Rayburn provides an especially helpful analysis of the 
constitutional basis for the ecclesiastical exception.  In that 
case, which involved allegations of discrimination under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act by a woman who was denied an 
associate pastor position in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, 
the court observed that the primary duties test "necessarily 
requires a court to determine whether a position is important to 
the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."  Rayburn, 772 
F.2d at 1169.  After concluding that the associate pastor 
position was of that nature, the court observed that the Free 
Exercise 
Clause 
properly 
precludes 
adjudication 
of 
"quintessentially 
religious" 
matters 
because 
those 
matters 
present a danger of adjudicative bodies making an "inroad on 
religious liberty" that is "too substantial to be permissible."  
Id.  However, the court also emphasized that the state's 
interest in enforcing discrimination laws was one "of the 
highest order," and that courts could properly adjudicate "the 
secular employment decisions of a religious institution," such 
as a lay teacher at a religious school or an editorial secretary 
in a sectarian-based publishing house.  Id. (citations omitted). 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
7 
 
¶98 I derive from Rayburn, as did the court of appeals, 
the principle that in cases involving discrimination claims the 
ecclesiastical exception properly overrides enforcement of those 
claims only when the employee's position is quintessentially 
religious.  In other words, the ecclesiastical exception is 
designed 
to 
remain 
just 
that——an 
exception——reserved 
for 
positions of spiritual leadership. 
¶99 Moreover, other jurisdictions evaluating whether the 
ecclesiastical exception applied to lay teachers at primary or 
secondary religious schools alleging employment discrimination 
against their employers have held, consistently with that 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
8 
 
principle from Rayburn, that those employees did not fit within 
the ecclesiastical exception.4 
¶100 Significantly, Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998), offers nearly 
identical duties——and, if anything, even more directly religious 
duties——than the instant case does, yet that court concluded 
that the ecclesiastical exception did not apply.  That case 
                                                 
4 Although not all of those courts expressly applied the 
primary duties test, those cases are relevant to this court's 
analysis.  For example, several courts, in addressing whether 
the exception applies to lay teachers, looked to Rayburn v. 
General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th 
Cir. 1985), for guidance on defining the scope of the exception 
but did not expressly apply the primary duties test.  See, e.g., 
Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(no ecclesiastical exception for elementary and high school 
teachers in Baptist school system who teach Bible study and 
integrate biblical material into secular subjects, but who did 
not perform sacerdotal functions, serve as church governors, or 
belong to a clearly delineated religious order); EEOC v. Fremont 
Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (no ecclesiastical 
exception for elementary and high school teachers required to 
follow specific tenets of faith); EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian 
Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (no ecclesiastical 
exception for primary through secondary school teachers, even 
though they view their primary responsibility to be inculcating 
the students with Christianity).  Nonetheless, those decisions 
are consistent with the underlying principle in Rayburn and with 
the reasoning by other courts that have expressly applied the 
primary duties test to a lay teacher at a religious primary or 
secondary school.  See, e.g., Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D. N.Y. 2006) (no 
exception applies where Seventh-day Adventist school's lay 
teacher had generally secular duties except for one daily hour 
of Bible instruction and attendance at a religious ceremony once 
a year); Gallo v. Salesian Soc'y, Inc., 676 A.2d 580 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (no exception applies to a secondary 
English and history teacher who was required to exemplify 
Christian principles in her teaching and to begin class with a 
prayer, and who taught at a school with a religious philosophy 
and purpose). 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
9 
 
involved a fifth-grade Catholic school teacher, Guinan, who 
taught religion class and secular courses, was a "Catechist," 
identified one of her principal duties to be "an example of 
Christianity" and an "evangelist" to her students, and organized 
one Mass per month.  The court concluded that because the vast 
majority of her duties were teaching secular courses and because 
the school did not require its instructors to be Catholic, 
Guinan did not fit within the ecclesiastical exception.  Id. at 
853. 
¶101 That court went on to emphasize, "Moreover, the 
application of the ministerial exception to non-ministers has 
been reserved generally for those positions that are, at the 
very least, close to being exclusively religious based, such as 
a chaplain or pastor's assistant."  Id. (citing Scharon v. St. 
Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 
1991), and Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1164). 
¶102 From the cases discussed, I cull, as did the court of 
appeals, several persuasive points: First, those cases reject 
the proposition that the primary duties test may be satisfied in 
favor of the employer school simply because that school has a 
religious mission.  See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Tree 
of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 706 (S.D. Ohio 1990).  
Second, those cases also reject, as a determinative factor, a 
stated duty by teachers to serve as a model of particular 
religious values.  See, e.g., Guinan, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 852 n.6; 
Gallo v. Salesian Soc'y, Inc., 676 A.2d 580, 588 (N.J. Super. 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
10 
 
Ct. App. Div. 1996).  Indeed, neither of those factors would 
appear 
to 
distinguish 
between 
ecclesiastical 
and 
non-
ecclesiastical positions; those conclusions are consistent with 
Rayburn and offer assistance to the analysis here.  
¶103 In contrast, the majority cannot identify one opinion 
implementing the primary duties test as developed under Rayburn, 
and as applied by Wisconsin courts and a majority of other 
courts, that concludes that the ecclesiastical exception applies 
in a lay teacher/religious school context.5  That is not 
surprising.  As the principles stated in Rayburn show, courts 
have recognized that the point of the primary duties test is to 
distinguish 
between 
employees 
of 
churches 
or 
religious 
                                                 
5 Stately v. Indian Community School of Milwaukee, Inc., 351 
F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Wis. 2004), which is the only published 
case that appears to go the other way under the primary duties 
test, is of limited utility.  In that case, the school in 
question taught Native American culture and practices to Native 
American children; it is not clear from that case the degree to 
which that school or the teacher taught secular subjects or was 
required to inculcate Native American culture and practices into 
those subjects. 
Furthermore, one can easily distinguish the other published 
cases that the majority invokes for support for the case at 
hand.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(ecclesiastical 
exception applied to a teacher designated 
"commissioned minister," as opposed to its non-titled lay 
teachers); 
Pardue 
v. 
Ctr. 
City 
Consortium 
Sch. 
of 
the 
Archdiocese 
of 
Wash., 
Inc., 
875 
A.2d 
669 
(D.C. 
2005) 
(determining that exception applied to elementary Catholic 
school principal).  Cf. Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to 
allow state religious discrimination laws to apply to parochial 
schools).  But see Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 
N.W.2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that Porth is not 
controlling of question of whether ecclesiastical exception 
exists in Michigan). 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
11 
 
organizations for whom employment decisions are likely to 
involve 
ecclesiastical 
decisions 
or 
matters 
of 
church 
governance, faith, and doctrine, and those other employees for 
whom such employment decisions are unlikely to implicate such 
matters.  In other words, the ecclesiastical exception is 
intended to apply narrowly in situations where lay teachers 
assert claims alleging employment discrimination by a religious 
school employer.   
¶104 Hence, given the facts in this case, I conclude, as 
did ALJ Brown, LIRC, the circuit court, and the court of 
appeals, that Ostlund does not fit within the ecclesiastical 
exception.  As an initial matter, the focus of the primary 
duties test is, as its name indicates, the employee's duties, 
not the religious mission of the group, the school, or its 
teachers.  To conclude otherwise would impermissibly broaden the 
ecclesiastical exception, given that all sectarian schools are 
likely to identify a religious purpose that is integral to the 
particular religion's mission. 
¶105 In addition, I conclude, as did the court of appeals, 
that Ostlund's duty to model and support Catholic values is not 
a distinguishing factor to be included within the primary duties 
test.  Again, undoubtedly all sectarian schools ask many, if not 
all, of their employees to serve as models of particular values.  
That factor does not operate to distinguish between employees 
whose positions fit within the ecclesiastical exception and 
those whose positions do not. 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
12 
 
¶106 Further, I am not persuaded that the facts here 
present a situation where the secular subjects taught by Ostlund 
are so infused with religious doctrine that that instruction can 
be characterized as teaching the faith in each secular subject.  
CCS uses non-religious textbooks for its secular classes; the 
isolated instances in which religious images and concepts 
crossed over into secular subjects——the "Christmas around the 
world" unit in social studies, the use of connect-the-dots 
religious images in math class, and the reading exercise using 
images from the Garden of Eden——cannot logically be said to 
"infuse" the first-graders' secular education with religious 
doctrine.  Furthermore, I conclude, as did the court of appeals, 
that evaluations of Ostlund's job performance generally refer 
not to specific Catholic doctrine, but to moral qualities and 
values (such as honesty, fairness, and following rules) that are 
not exclusive to Catholicism. 
¶107 Moreover, in light of the above conclusions, I reach a 
different result than the majority reaches when I apply the 
primary duties test to the undisputed facts here.  Although 
Ostlund had religious duties as part of her job, those duties 
cannot be considered "primary," which I use in both the 
quantitative and qualitative sense.  The religion class, 
prayers, and participation in and planning of liturgies did not 
come close to making up a major portion of Ostlund's work day, 
nor 
was 
inculcating 
children 
with 
Catholic 
doctrine 
and 
practices a central focus of her job description or evaluation.  
Further, CCS did not require its teachers to be Catholic.  We 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
13 
 
are aware, however, that Ostlund and other elementary school 
teachers 
were 
required 
to 
complete 
in-service 
religious 
training.  I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that such 
information certainly is not enough to lead me to the conclusion 
that Ostlund's religious duties were her primary duties.6 
¶108 Finally, the conclusion that Ostlund's circumstances 
do not satisfy the ecclesiastical exception is consistent with 
the underlying principle that the exception should be applied to 
quintessentially 
religious 
positions 
for 
which 
employment 
decisions are likely to implicate matters of religious canons, 
doctrines, 
or 
policies. 
 
In 
short, 
employment 
decisions 
involving Ostlund's position are unlikely to implicate matters 
of Catholic governance, faith, or doctrine.  Thus, neither the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution nor Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution operate, in this 
situation, to bar adjudication of Ostlund's discrimination 
claim.  Hence, LIRC did not err in concluding as much. 
¶109 Indeed, the majority and I appear to agree that a fair 
application of the primary duties test, as our courts and a 
majority of others have applied it, yields only one sensible 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals, in an effort to increase the utility 
of the primary duties test, adopted the school's "hiring 
criteria" as an additional factor to supplement the primary 
duties test, based on Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176-77 
(5th Cir. 1999).  Because our review is limited to LIRC's 
decision, we need not decide whether evidence of such hiring 
criteria supplements the primary duties test.  Moreover, 
evidence of an employer's hiring criteria or the individual's 
job description seemingly would be relevant to an analysis under 
the primary duties test as indicative of what the parties 
considered to be the primary duties.   
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
14 
 
result: that Ostlund's position is not "ecclesiastical."  Yet 
rather than accept that result, the majority opts to gild the 
primary duties test with a functional analysis that produces a 
significantly broader approach, see majority op., ¶47, and to 
apply the facts selectively to that approach.  I disagree with 
the majority's view for three primary reasons. 
¶110 First, the majority, in advocating for its so-called 
functional analysis, fails to identify——nor can I point to——a 
principle in Wisconsin law justifying its adoption as an 
addendum that significantly alters the primary duties test.7  
More specifically, it fails to explain persuasively why this 
court should toss out the analysis that Wisconsin courts and a 
                                                 
7 The majority appears to support its reasoning in great 
part with the freedom of conscience clauses in Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution and those clauses' use 
of the "strongest possible" language to ensure autonomy for 
religious groups and individuals.  Majority op., ¶59.  However, 
it is worth noting that Article I, Section 18 uses identically 
strong language ("nor shall any person be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support a place of worship, or to maintain any 
ministry, without consent; nor shall . . . any preference be 
given by law to any religious establishments or modes of 
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the 
benefit 
of 
religious 
societies . . . ") in 
describing 
its 
prohibitions against state advancement of religion.   
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
15 
 
majority of other courts have been applying8 and replace it with 
an 
approach 
that 
has 
little 
or 
no 
support 
from 
other 
jurisdictions and that appears to be merely a matter of 
preference for the majority.  The majority furthermore uses its 
new test to reach a result that is an utter anomaly compared 
with the results reached by nearly every other court that has 
confronted a similar issue.  Here, the majority extends the 
ecclesiastical exception, which has traditionally been reserved 
for ordained clergy and ministers, to a first-grade lay teacher 
at a Catholic school. 
¶111 Second, 
what 
is 
of 
great 
concern 
is 
that 
the 
majority's 
overbroad 
and 
sweeping 
language 
implicates 
significantly far-reaching consequences beyond simply calling 
Ostlund "ecclesiastical" for purposes of applying the exception.  
                                                 
8 The majority appears to conflate the concept of de novo 
review of the application of constitutional principles to a 
given set of facts with the concept of overruling precedent.  
Majority op., ¶47 n.22.  Jocz is a decision of the court of 
appeals, in which the court adopted the primary duties test.  In 
Cook v. Cook, we stated, "[Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2)] provides that 
officially published opinions of the court of appeals shall have 
statewide precedential effect.  Thus, the principle of stare 
decisis is applicable to the decisions of the court of appeals."  
Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) 
(citing Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2) (1995-96)).  Therefore, while we 
of course review de novo the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts of this case, that concept in no way 
authorizes wholesale disregard of the principle of stare 
decisis.  In other words, though we, in essence, "start over" in 
the analysis of the application of the law to this case, we do 
not "start over" with respect to determining whether the primary 
duties test is the right test unless we are prepared to 
undertake a full explanation of the reasons we are disregarding 
precedent.  Otherwise, it is entirely appropriate to follow the 
approach in Jocz. 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
16 
 
As an initial matter, I cannot take comfort in the majority's 
assurances that its proposed analysis will be very fact-
sensitive, majority op., ¶¶48-49, and that its holding is "not 
giving a blanket exception to all religious school teachers," 
id., ¶84.  CCS's mission is not unique among Catholic schools, 
and 
Ostlund's 
duties 
are 
not 
unique 
among 
lay 
Catholic 
schoolteachers.  If this case is to serve as an example of how a 
Catholic school infuses Catholic doctrine into every secular 
subject taught there, I fail to see how any lay Catholic 
schoolteacher will fall outside of this broad "exception" 
devised by the majority. 
¶112 Third, and of greatest concern, as noted previously, 
while I recognize the majority's analysis under the First 
Amendment centers on the Free Exercise Clause, the majority's 
sweeping language and analysis nonetheless jeopardizes this 
court's long-standing decisions under the Establishment Clause 
of the United States Constitution, and under Article I, Section 
18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Specifically, thanks to the 
majority's opinion, the continued viability of Jackson v. 
Benson, which upheld the Milwaukee school choice program, is in 
grave danger. 
¶113 In Jackson v. Benson, the central issue before our 
court was the constitutionality, under the Establishment Clause 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 18 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, of the amended Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (amended MPCP), a school choice program that 
enables children in low-income families to attend private 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
17 
 
schools through a voucher system.  The participating schools in 
that program include both nonsectarian and sectarian schools.  
Significantly, the program also includes an "opt-out" provision 
that prohibits private schools from requiring children to 
participate 
in 
religious 
activities 
if 
their 
parents 
or 
guardians wish their children to be exempt from such activities.  
Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 849.  The program also requires 
participating private schools to comply with nondiscrimination 
laws.  Id. at 846-47.  We ultimately concluded that the amended 
MPCP did not run afoul of either the Establishment Clause or 
Article I, Section 18.  Id. at 875-76, 883-84. 
¶114 Those features of the Milwaukee school choice program 
were not remarkably different from those in a Cleveland school 
voucher program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002).  Notably, compliance with nondiscrimination laws was 
also a requirement of the school choice program upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court in that case.  The majority 
correctly states that in Zelman, the Court "found that the 
Cleveland [school voucher] program was neutral and a program of 
true private choice, and thus did not violate the Establishment 
Clause."  Majority op., ¶74 n.29.  However, the majority omits 
the fact that the United States Supreme Court expressly noted in 
that case that participating private schools were required by 
statute to comply with nondiscrimination laws.  Zelman, 536 U.S. 
639, 645 (citing to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976).  In 
contrast, under the majority's overly broad interpretation of 
the ecclesiastical exception here, a participating private 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
18 
 
school may, in fact, disregard such nondiscrimination laws with 
impunity where lay teachers are concerned because no claim of 
discrimination——whether 
based 
on 
race, 
religion, 
ethnic 
background, or other forbidden grounds of discrimination——can be 
pursued. 
¶115 I believe that the majority opinion, by its holdings, 
undermines our court's conclusions in Jackson v. Benson in 
multiple respects.  First, as to our conclusion that the amended 
MPCP did not violate the Establishment Clause, the majority 
opinion here cannot be squared with our analyses in Jackson v. 
Benson under (a) the second prong of the Lemon test, under which 
we assessed whether the school choice program had a primary 
effect of advancing religion, and (b) the third prong of the 
Lemon test, under which we assessed whether the school choice 
program would result in excessive government entanglement.  See 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).  Second, as to 
our conclusion in Jackson v. Benson that the amended MPCP did 
not violate Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
the majority opinion likewise runs counter to our analyses under 
both (a) the benefits clause and (b) the compelled support 
clause of that constitutional provision.  Below, I revisit all 
four of those portions of our analysis in Jackson v. Benson and 
explain in detail why I believe the majority opinion here 
undermines those conclusions.  
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
19 
 
¶116 As an initial matter, as to our Establishment Clause9 
analysis in Jackson v. Benson, we applied the test first 
established in Lemon.  In the context of a public benefit such 
as a school voucher program, that benefit does not run afoul of 
the Establishment Clause if (1) it has a secular legislative 
purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not create excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.  Jackson, 218 
Wis. 2d at 856 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).  Our analysis 
in Jackson v. Benson under the second prong of that test——
whether the benefit in question has a principal or primary 
effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion——cannot be 
squared with the majority opinion here. 
¶117 In assessing the constitutionality of the amended MPCP 
under the second prong of the Lemon test, we first explained 
that benefits under the amended MPCP needed to be "determined by 
'neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor 
religion,' and aid 'is made available to both religious and 
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.'"  Jackson, 
218 Wis. 2d at 869 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997)).  We observed that the criteria for selecting schools 
eligible to participate in the program were established on a 
religion-neutral basis——that is, both sectarian and nonsectarian 
schools could participate in the program.  However, we also 
emphasized that the "opt-out" provision, preventing religious 
                                                 
9 The Establishment Clause to the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
20 
 
private schools from requiring students to participate in any 
religious activity provided at the school, was a significant 
factor in finding the amended MPCP did not have a primary effect 
of advancing religion.  Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 869-70.  We 
further concluded that, because of those features in the 
program, the amended MPCP "provides a neutral benefit to 
beneficiaries 
selected 
on 
religious-neutral 
criteria" 
and 
"neither leads to religious indoctrination, nor creates [a] 
financial incentive for students to undertake a sectarian 
education."  Id. at 871 (quotation marks and citations omitted; 
brackets in Jackson v. Benson). 
¶118 Yet, the majority in the instant case reaches its 
conclusion by conflating selected evidence that, taken together, 
creates the false impression that the teaching of secular 
subjects at CCS is infused with religion.  For example, the 
majority particularly emphasizes the school's stated mission, 
which, as I observed earlier, see supra, ¶102, does not 
differentiate 
at 
all 
between 
ecclesiastical 
and 
non-
ecclesiastical positions at the school.  See, e.g., majority 
op., ¶5 ("The Catholic school is considered a 'ministry' of the 
Catholic Church. . . .  [T]he Catholic Church considers 'the 
foundation of the whole educational enterprise in a Catholic 
school' to be Jesus Christ.  The Catholic school aims at 'a 
Christian concept of life centered on Jesus Christ.'"); id., ¶73 
(citing 
CCS's 
mission 
to 
provide 
"a 
distinctly 
Catholic 
education aimed at a 'Christian concept of life'"); id. ("[CCS] 
aims to be a worship-filled educational environment with a 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
21 
 
faith-centered approach to learning."). Likewise, the majority 
puts great weight on CCS's view that teachers should attempt to 
incorporate religious material into teaching secular subjects.  
See id., ¶74 ("Teachers made efforts to integrate Catholic 
values into various aspects of the curricula," including the 
integration of "theological and moral principles into each 
subject, as well as the use of religious examples and symbols 
that would not be found in a public school.").   
¶119 The majority then overgeneralizes the evidence of the 
school's actual practices, see id., ¶77, to support its 
statements that CCS infuses the teaching of its subjects with 
religious doctrine where the actual evidence of faith-based 
instruction and activity is unremarkable for a Catholic or any 
other religious primary or secondary school.  See, e.g., id. 
¶¶7, 9 (evidence of incorporated religious examples and symbols 
and 
values 
into 
lessons 
included 
a 
unit 
on 
Christmas 
celebrations around the world in social studies, a reading 
exercise using objects in the Garden of Eden, and a math 
exercise connecting dots to form "religious images"); id. ¶¶6, 8 
(Ostlund led students in prayer before school and after lunch); 
id., ¶10 (Ostlund taught 30 minutes of religion three days a 
week and participated in school-wide recognition of several 
Catholic holidays); id., ¶12 (the classroom had a prayer corner, 
crucifix, 
and 
other 
seasonal 
religious 
objects). 
 
Those 
instances of religious activity fuel the majority's conclusion 
that "it is obvious that Ostlund's role was of high importance 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
22 
 
and closely linked to the mission of the school——the inculcation 
of a Christ-centered concept of life."  Id., ¶76. 
¶120 Put bluntly, the majority's conclusions here are based 
on facts that do not distinguish CCS's practices and Ostlund's 
duties from those of any other Catholic school or schoolteacher 
in Wisconsin, or, for that matter, from any other religious 
school and its approach toward education.  If the majority is 
correct in its conclusions, I fail to see how it can continue to 
be maintained that benefits flowing from the Milwaukee school 
choice program do not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion.  If indeed a Catholic school infuses religion into all 
of its subjects, including courses thought to be secular, as the 
majority claims, how can the jurisprudential reasoning of 
Jackson v. Benson survive the majority's holding in this case? 
¶121 Further, we concluded in Jackson v. Benson that the 
amended MPCP does not create excessive entanglement between the 
state and religion under the third prong of the Lemon test.  See 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.  Although that program requires 
participating schools to be subject to some state oversight, 
including the requirement that "[p]articipating private schools 
are subject to . . . applicable nondiscrimination, health, and 
safety obligations," Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 874 (emphasis 
added), we concluded that standard oversight activities, such as 
the requirement to comply with nondiscrimination laws, do not 
create 
excessive 
entanglement. 
 
Quoting 
Hernandez 
v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989), we observed: 
[R]outine regulatory interaction which involves no 
inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
23 
 
state power to a religious body, and no detailed 
monitoring and close administrative contact between 
secular and religious bodies, does not of itself 
violate the nonentanglement command. 
Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 875. 
¶122 Again, if it is unconstitutional for a court to 
adjudicate a claim for discrimination by a lay teacher against a 
Catholic school, as the majority holds here, surely the amended 
MPCP's provision requiring participating schools to comply with 
nondiscrimination laws must then also be unconstitutional. 
¶123 Likewise, 
the 
majority's 
decision 
endangers 
our 
holding in Jackson v. Benson under the benefits clause in 
Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  That 
clause, which is the Wisconsin equivalent of the federal 
Establishment Clause, provides: "nor shall any money be drawn 
from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or 
religious or theological seminaries."  See Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d 
at 876 n.20.  Our inquiry under the benefits clause is identical 
to our analysis under the second prong of the Lemon test.  See 
id. at 878 (the ultimate question under the benefits clause is 
"whether 
[a 
benefit's] 
primary 
effect 
advances 
religion" 
(citation omitted)).  Additionally, our courts have treated that 
clause as such.  Compare State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 64 
Wis. 2d 314, 325, 219 N.W.2d 577 (1974) (Nusbaum II) (no 
violation of benefits clause where a state program subsidized 
special-needs children's attendance at sectarian private schools 
where the program chose students through a neutral process and 
the legislature went to "great lengths" to ensure "that the 
inculcation of religious tenets [did] not take place"), with 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
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State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 
(1890) (public funds may not be used to fund a school that 
requires students to read from the Bible). 
¶124 Thus, just as with the above analysis under the second 
prong of the Lemon test, the majority's characterization of 
facts 
that religion is central to every part of CCS's 
curriculum, see, e.g., majority op., ¶¶5, 72, 73, 75-77, and, by 
extension, any other Catholic or otherwise religious school, 
likewise jeopardizes our holding in Jackson v. Benson that the 
amended MPCP does not violate the benefits clause in Article I, 
Section 18. 
¶125 Finally, the majority's conclusion implicates our 
holding in Jackson v. Benson under the compelled support clause 
in Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  That 
clause provides: "nor shall any person be compelled to attend, 
erect or support any place of worship."  In upholding school 
choice, it was very significant to our court that the program 
prohibited "a sectarian private school from requiring students 
attending 
under 
the 
program 
to 
participate 
in 
religious 
activities offered at such school."  Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 
883.  Hence, a query: If secular subjects at CCS are so infused 
with religion (see majority op., ¶¶5, 72, 73, 75-77), how does a 
student 
whose 
parents 
wish 
to 
exempt 
him 
or 
her 
from 
participation in religious activities escape inculcation?  The 
answer to such a question, if the position of the majority is 
followed 
here, 
clearly 
jeopardizes 
our 
analysis 
of 
the 
constitutionality of the Milwaukee school choice program under 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
25 
 
the compelled support clause.  I disagree with the majority, see 
majority op., ¶74 n.29, that the opt-out provision was not 
important to our holding in Jackson v. Benson. 
¶126 In conclusion, I disagree with the majority's view 
that the primary duties test needs to be altered with its self-
styled "functional analysis."  The primary duties test is the 
test that Wisconsin courts and most other courts in the country 
have been applying.  To the extent courts have applied that test 
to lay teachers at religious schools, the results have been 
consistent: The ecclesiastical exception is not intended to be 
applied to such individuals.  That result is consistent with the 
underlying rationale for the ecclesiastical exception and in no 
way implicates state interference with matters of religious 
polity or doctrine.  Additionally, the majority fails to 
identify a compelling reason to change how Wisconsin courts have 
approached such cases.  Finally, the majority's conclusion that, 
based on the facts here, CCS infuses its secular subjects with 
religion effectively extends a free pass to religious schools to 
violate 
nondiscrimination 
laws 
with 
regard 
to 
their 
lay 
employees; moreover, it undoubtedly threatens this court's 
decision in Jackson v. Benson and, consequently, the continued 
viability of the Milwaukee school choice program. 
¶127 For those reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶128 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2007AP496.npc 
 
 
 
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