Title: NORMA KELLY V BUILDERS SQUARE INC

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 24, 2001  
NORMA KELLY,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 113314  
BUILDERS SQUARE, INC.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CORRIGAN, C.J.  
We granted leave in this premises liability case to  
determine whether the trial court erroneously granted a new  
trial on damages following the original jury verdict.  The  
original jury found defendant negligent, but awarded only  
plaintiff’s medical expenses without rendering any award for  
pain and suffering.  The trial court, in response to a  
specific 
inquiry 
from the first jury during deliberations, and  
with the agreement of both parties, had earlier instructed  
that the jury had no duty to award any damages, even if it  
found defendant negligent.  In response to plaintiff’s motion  
for new trial, the trial court thereafter ordered a partial  
retrial on damages only to determine an appropriate award for  
pain and suffering.  On retrial, the jury awarded plaintiff  
$150,000 in noneconomic damages.  The Court of Appeals  
affirmed in an unpublished, two-to-one decision.1  We reverse  
and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment on the  
original verdict because the trial judge had no legal basis to  
set it aside.  
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
On May 17, 1991, plaintiff Norma Kelly and her husband  
patronized defendant’s store in Ypsilanti.  As plaintiff  
walked down an aisle containing a stack of large boxes of  
electric fans, some boxes fell.  At least one box struck  
plaintiff’s head and right shoulder.  Neither plaintiff nor  
her husband knew how or why the boxes had fallen.  
Plaintiff reported pain in her right shoulder. She was  
transported by ambulance to a local hospital.  Examination  
there reflected that plaintiff had full range of motion in her  
right shoulder.  An x-ray of plaintiff’s shoulder also  
revealed no abnormality.  Plaintiff was released from the  
1 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 31, 1998 
(Docket No. 199501).  
2  
 
hospital the same day.  She later followed up with her family  
physician who prescribed physical therapy.  
It was not until thirty months following the accident  
that plaintiff first began treating with Dr. Ralph Blasier, an  
orthopedic surgeon. After examining plaintiff and reviewing  
an MRI, Dr. Blasier diagnosed a tear in the rotator cuff  
muscle of plaintiff’s right shoulder and muscle impingement.  
Dr. Blasier surgically removed part of the bone to relieve the  
impingement.  However, he saw no evidence of a rotator cuff  
tear during surgery. 
He testified that “common sense”  
suggested that the incident at defendant’s store had caused  
plaintiff’s injury.  
Plaintiff testified that the operation alleviated her  
pain only “a little bit.” She claimed that her injury still  
prevented her from various activities such as driving,  
swimming, shopping, and crocheting.  
Dr. Paul Kelly, another orthopedic surgeon, examined  
plaintiff for the defense. He saw no reason to restrict any  
of plaintiff’s activities. He opined that it would be quite  
unusual for a blow to the top of the shoulder to cause a  
rotator cuff injury or impingement.  He stated: “I’ve never  
seen a mechanism injury to the rotator cuff as a direct result  
of a blow to the top of the shoulder.”  
After retiring to deliberate, the jury forwarded  
3  
 
  
 
questions: “Can we agree on negligence and offer no money?  
What is the minimum monetary amount . . . if there is  
negligence?”
 Plaintiff and defense counsel thereafter  
specifically agreed to an instruction that the jury could find  
negligence but not award damages and that the jury need not  
award any amount of damages.  The court then furnished a  
written instruction to the jury consistent with the parties’  
agreement.2  
The jury thereafter returned a verdict finding defendant  
negligent. 
The jury awarded plaintiff medical expenses  
totaling 
$10,227, 
but 
awarded 
nothing 
for 
noneconomic 
damages.  
Plaintiff then moved for a new trial on damages only. Relying  
on Fordon v Bender, 363 Mich 124; 108 NW2d 896 (1961), and  
Mosley v Dati, 363 Mich 690; 110 NW2d 637 (1961), she asserted  
that wherever a jury finds negligence and awards medical  
expenses, it must also award damages for pain and suffering.  
In its reply, the defense countered that a jury is not  
required to award damages for pain and suffering.  
The trial court granted a new trial on damages only.  The  
court did not mention the parties’ stipulated instruction in  
its ruling:  
2 The judge who presided over the trial and granted the 
new trial motion was not present during deliberations when the 
jury sent this note.  A substitute judge gave the jury the 
written instruction to which the parties had agreed.  
4  
 
I did follow this case.  I did have the  
opportunity to personally observe the credibility 
and the demeanor of the complaining witnesses in 
this case.  And there was extensive testimony about 
the damages that occurred as the result of the 
alleged negligence of the defendants.  
* * *  
Once 
having 
established 
that 
there 
was  
negligence and establishing proximate cause and 
accepting the validity–and we had a special verdict 
form as to what that $10,227 constituted, i.e., the 
medical 
expenses 
including 
surgery 
for 
the  
treatment 
of 
this 
woman, 
it 
is 
absolutely 
incongruous, it is absolutely inconsistent to then, 
based on that evidence, conclude there was no pain 
and suffering, there was no disability, there was 
no other “non-economic damages” that they were 
instructed on in the past, the present or the 
future.  
Following retrial, a second jury awarded plaintiff  
$150,000 for “physical pain and suffering, mental anguish,  
denial 
of 
social 
pleasure and enjoyments and embarrassment” in  
the past, present, and future.  
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed  
the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial.  The  
dissenting judge opined:  
There is no legal requirement that a jury 
award damages simply because liability was found. 
Joerger v Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 
167, 173; 568 NW2d 365 (1997). 
Indeed, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving damages, and 
a jury is free to accept or reject such proofs. 
Id. at 172-173.  The original jury in this case had 
the best opportunity to understand all the issues 
and evidence involved, and its refusal to award 
noneconomic damages should have been respected. I  
would affirm the original jury verdict. 
The  
granting of a new trial on the issue of damages was  
5  
 
 
 
wholly gratuitous.  If in fact a new trial was  
warranted, the entire case should have been  
submitted to the jury. [Slip op, p 1.]  
This Court granted leave to appeal “limited to whether  
the trial court erred in ordering a second trial on the issue  
of damages.” 462 Mich 861 (2000).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision whether to  
grant a new trial for an abuse of discretion.  Bean v  
Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 34; 609 NW2d 567  
(2000); Brown v Arnold, 303 Mich 616, 627; 6 NW2d 914 (1942).  
We review de novo any questions of law that arise. Cardinal  
Mooney High School v Michigan High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 437  
Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. The jury’s prerogative to assess pain and suffering  
This Court has long recognized that the authority to  
measure damages for pain and suffering inheres in the jury’s  
role as trier of fact.  See, e.g., Griggs v Saginaw & F R Co,  
196 Mich 258; 162 NW 960 (1917); Michaels v Smith, 240 Mich  
671; 216 NW 413 (1927).  
In Brown, supra, a jury awarded only the amount of the  
medical expenses to a severely injured plaintiff.3 The  
3 
 The verdict form had not differentiated medical  
expenses from pain and suffering.  
6 
 
 
 
 
plaintiff sought a new trial on the ground that the verdict  
was grossly inadequate and against the great weight of the  
evidence. This Court affirmed the denial of a new trial:  
“The adequacy of amount of a verdict is also 
generally a matter for the jury.  We do not  
substitute our judgment on this question unless a 
verdict has been secured by improper methods, 
prejudice, or sympathy.  Michaels v Smith, 240 Mich 
671 [216 NW 413 (1927)]. No such showing has been 
made, nor is the verdict so inadequate as to shock 
the judicial conscience.  Watrous v Conor, 266 Mich 
397 [254 NW 143 (1934)].”  Campbell v Brown, 276 
Mich 449, 454 [267 NW 877 (1936)].  
In Sebring v Mawby, 251 Mich 628[232 NW 194 
(1930)] this court said: “The law furnishes no 
exact rule by which damages for pain and suffering 
can 
be 
measured. 
Their 
determination 
must  
necessarily be left to the good sense and sound 
judgment of the jury in their view of the evidence. 
It has frequently been said by courts and text­
writers that the award of the jury will not be 
disturbed unless it is so great as to shock the 
judicial conscience or unless it was induced by 
something outside of the evidence, such as passion 
or prejudice. 
There is no claim of any such 
influence in this case.  In view of the evidence, 
we cannot say that the verdict was excessive.”  
In Cleven v Griffin, 298 Mich 139 [141; 298 NW 
482 (1941)] we also said: “No complaint is made by 
appellants 
that 
the 
jury 
was 
not 
properly 
instructed as to the element of damages. No claim  
is made that the verdict was obtained by improper 
methods, prejudice or sympathy.  There is no  
absolute standard by which we can measure the 
amount of damages in personal injury cases.  The  
amount allowed for pain and suffering must rest in 
the sound judgment of the triers of the facts. 
Watrous v Conor, 266 Mich 397 [254 NW 143 (1934)]; 
Weil v Longyear, 263 Mich 22 [248 NW 536 (1933)]. 
Courts are reluctant to disturb verdicts of juries 
for personal injuries on the ground that the amount 
is excessive.  Cawood v Earl Paige & Co, 239 Mich 
485 [214 NW 402 (1927)].  We do not usually  
7  
 
 
 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless 
the verdict shocks the conscience or has been  
secured by improper means, prejudice or sympathy. 
Watrous v Conor, supra, Michaels v Smith, 240 Mich 
671 [216 NW 413 (1934)].  The verdict was within  
the range of the testimony and not excessive.  
See, also, Nezworski v Mazanec, 301 Mich 43 [2  
NW2d 912 (1942)].  
We cannot substitute our opinion for that of 
the jury as to the proper amount of damages to 
allow plaintiff for pain and suffering. [Brown at  
627-629.]  
In a trio of cases decided between 1958 and 1961, Weller  
v Mancha, 353 Mich 189; 91 NW2d 352 (1958), Fordon, supra, and  
Mosley, supra, this Court ordered new trials where a jury had  
failed to award damages for pain and suffering.  This Court  
did not acknowledge the Brown case in any of those opinions.  
In Weller, the plaintiff sued for automobile negligence  
and obtained a jury verdict “in the exact amount of the out­
of-pocket 
expenses 
for medical, hospital and funeral bills and  
damage to the automobile, [but] nothing was allowed for pain  
and suffering and nothing for loss of support.”  Id. at 195  
(citations omitted). This Court ordered a new trial:  
The jury verdict was for the exact amount of 
the stipulated special damages of the deceased. It  
is apparent that no consideration was given by the 
jury to the additional elements of the pain and 
suffering of the deceased and the future damages of 
the widow and minor child, and, therefore, the 
damages awarded to plaintiff were overwhelmingly 
against the evidence, and, under the evidence, 
grossly inadequate. [Id. at 195-196.]  
8  
 
 
 
In Fordon, the defendants admitted liability for damages  
resulting from an automobile accident. The issue of damages  
was tried before a jury, leading to an award for the medical  
expenses and damage to the vehicle, but not for pain and  
suffering.  This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial,  
relying in part on Weller:  
In allowing plaintiff to recover for his 
special damages, the jury must necessarily have 
found that he suffered injuries proximately caused 
by defendant’s negligence.  The court properly 
instructed the jury with respect to its duty to 
award such special damages in the event it found 
that defendants proximately caused plaintiff’s 
injuries. The court also properly charged that in 
that 
event 
plaintiff 
should 
be 
awarded, 
in  
addition, an “amount that will compensate him as 
far as money can compensate him for the pain and 
suffering that he has endured.”  There was much  
disputed testimony relating to plaintiff’s medical 
history and physical condition both prior and 
subsequent 
to 
the 
collision 
here 
involved.  
Defendants 
sought 
to 
prove 
that 
plaintiff’s 
injuries 
had 
been 
caused 
by 
other 
events, 
principally 
athletic 
and 
body 
conditioning 
activities in which he engaged rather extensively, 
and, of course, plaintiff sought to prove his claim 
that the injuries were caused by defendants.  The  
jury resolved the dispute in plaintiff’s favor by 
its verdict, which included damages for plaintiff’s 
medical expenses.  The jury’s verdict, however, 
manifests a disregard of the court’s quoted 
instruction by its failure to award damages for 
pain and suffering. 
Once the jury resolved the 
causation dispute, the great weight of the evidence 
compelled it to award plaintiff damages for the 
pain and suffering which naturally followed such 
injuries found by the jury to have been proximately 
caused by defendants. [Fordon at 125-126.]  
In Mosley, this Court again ordered a new trial after the  
jury awarded the precise amount of medical expenses resulting  
9  
 
 
from automobile negligence.  This Court reviewed the evidence  
of pain and suffering and, relying on Fordon, concluded that  
“the great weight of the evidence preponderates in favor of a  
finding that plaintiff did, in fact, endure pain and suffering  
as a result of the injuries caused by defendants’ negligence.”  
Mosley at 692.  
Weller, Fordon, and Mosley did not create a legal rule  
mandating pain and suffering damages whenever a jury finds  
negligence and awards medical expenses. 
Rather, those  
decisions analyzed the great weight of the evidence on the  
facts presented. 
Subsequent cases have emphasized the  
deference traditionally accorded to a jury’s assessment of  
damages in accordance with the principles discussed in Brown,  
supra. See, e.g., A’eno v Lowry, 367 Mich 657; 116 NW2d 730  
(1962); Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360; 258 NW2d 34 (1977).  
B. CODIFICATION OF BASES FOR GRANTING A NEW TRIAL  
The grounds for granting a new trial, including a verdict  
contrary to the great weight of the evidence, are now codified  
at MCR 2.611(A)(1).  The court rule provides the only bases  
upon which a jury verdict may be set aside.  Thus, Weller,  
Fordon, and Mosley are no longer relevant.  A jury’s award of  
medical expenses that does not include damages for pain and  
suffering does not entitle a plaintiff to a new trial unless  
the movant proves one of the grounds articulated in the court  
10  
 
rule.  
Plaintiff has not shown why she was entitled to a new  
trial under the court rule.  She instead relies on Fordon and  
Mosley.  
Similarly, the trial court did not cite any basis in the  
court rule for setting aside the original jury verdict.  It  
merely stated that the failure to award pain and suffering  
damages 
was 
“inconsistent” 
and 
“incongruous.” 
 
MCR 
2.611(A)(1)  
does not identify inconsistency or incongruity as a ground for  
granting a new trial.  The court abused its discretion by  
granting a new trial without finding a basis in the court  
rule.  
We reject, in any event, the principle that a jury  
behaves inconsistently when it awards medical expenses, but  
nothing for pain and suffering. Plaintiff had the burden to  
prove each element of her case, including every item of  
claimed damages.  Medical expenses and pain and suffering are  
distinct categories of damages.  Each category may have a  
distinct evidentiary basis.  For example, a claimant’s own  
testimony about her subjective experiences is generally  
offered to prove pain and suffering.  When a jury believes  
that a plaintiff has suffered an injury and incurred medical  
expenses, it may still assess separately any distinct proofs  
regarding pain and suffering.  
11  
 
In short, the jury is free to credit or discredit any  
testimony.  It may evaluate the evidence on pain and suffering  
differently from the proof of other damages.  No legal  
principle requires the jury to award one item of damages  
merely because it has awarded another item.  
Instead of finding a basis in the court rule for granting  
a new trial, the trial court and Court of Appeals majority  
expressed views regarding the credibility of witnesses.  
Assessing 
credibility 
and 
weighing 
testimony 
is 
the  
prerogative of the trier of fact. The trial court therefore  
abused its discretion in granting a new trial.  
IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent opines that the great weight of the  
evidence-
-
-a basis for setting aside a jury verdict under our  
current rule-
-
-justified the grant of a new trial in this case.  
But the trial court did not review the evidence under that  
standard;4 thus, there is no exercise of discretion by the  
4 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the record does 
not reflect that the trial court applied the great weight of 
the evidence standard.  Because Weller, Fordon, and Mosley 
referred to the great weight of the evidence, the dissent 
speculates that the trial court here applied that standard. 
This rationalization of the trial court’s decision has no  
basis in the court’s actual ruling. Moreover, Weller, Fordon, 
and Mosley were decided on other bases in addition to the  
great weight of the evidence, thus further undermining the 
dissent’s chain of reasoning.  
12  
 
trial court under that standard for us to review.5  
The dissent also states that our application of MCR  
2.611(A)(1) “puts us out of step with the position embraced by  
virtually every other state.”  Slip op at 1.  We are not “out  
of step” with other states when we reinstate a jury verdict  
that the trial court lacked a legal basis to set aside.  We  
have satisfied our duty to apply our court rule codifying the  
bases for granting a new trial.  
Next, the dissent observes that a jury verdict may be set  
aside where it is “contrary to law.”  MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e). The  
dissent views an inconsistent or incongruent verdict as  
“contrary to law.” Slip op at 2, n 2. We need not construe  
that phrase because the trial court did not employ the  
dissent’s interpretation as a basis for granting a new trial.  
The court did not find that the verdict was “contrary to law.”  
But even if a jury verdict may be set aside on the basis  
of inconsistency under our current rule, the trial court did  
not apply the standard in existing case law for reviewing  
inconsistent verdicts. If a verdict appears inconsistent, a  
5 
 The dissent states that our description of the 
underlying facts and procedural history, “impliedly casts” 
doubt 
on 
plaintiff’s 
credibility. 
We 
reject 
this  
characterization.  The original jury in this case resolved 
credibility issues when it declined to award damages for pain 
and suffering.  We base our decision solely on the trial 
court’s failure to find a basis in the governing court rule to 
upset the jury’s verdict.  
13  
 
 
 
court must “make every effort to reconcile the seemingly  
inconsistent verdicts.” Bean, supra at 31, quoting Lagalo v  
Allied Corp, 457 Mich 278, 282; 577 NW2d 462 (1998). A new  
trial may not be granted if an interpretation of the evidence  
logically explains the jury’s findings.  Id. The trial court  
did not apply this standard.  
V. CONCLUSION  
A court may grant a new trial following a jury verdict  
only for one of the reasons stated in MCR 2.611(A)(1).  On the  
facts presented here, the trial judge lacked a legal basis to  
grant a new trial.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of  
Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment  
consistent with the original jury verdict.  
TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.  
WEAVER, J., concurred in the result only.  
14  
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
NORMA KELLY, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 113314 
BUILDERS SQUARE, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
___________________________________ 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
Today the majority ignores the command of settled 
Michigan precedent and puts us out of step with the position  
embraced by virtually every other state.1  Because the initial  
jury rendered a flawed verdict, it was altogether appropriate  
for the trial court to grant a partial new trial.  No error is  
alleged 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
second 
jury's 
verdict.  
Accordingly, I would sustain it and affirm the opinion of the  
Court of Appeals.  
1 See Anno: Validity of Verdict Awarding Medical Expenses  
to Personal Injury Plaintiff, But Failing to Award Damages for  
Pain and Suffering, 55 ALR4th, pp 186-232.  
 
I  
Where a verdict in a civil case is inconsistent, self­
contradictory or incongruent, it must be set aside and a new  
trial granted.  Harrington v Velat, 395 Mich 359, 360; 235  
NW2d  357 (1975), quoting 66 CJS, New Trial, § 66, pp 197-198.  
See also Bias v Asbury, 369 Mich 378; 120 NW2d 233 (1963); 58  
Am Jur 2d, New Trial, § 129, pp 335-336; Bartholomew v Walsh,  
191 Mich 252, 261-262; 157 NW 575 (1916). The first jury in  
this case rendered such a verdict.2  
Also, it is without question that Michigan law requires  
a new trial where the verdict is against the great weight of  
the 
evidence. 
 
See 
MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e). Longstanding precedent  
establishes that a personal injury jury verdict that awards  
damages for medical expenses, yet awards nothing for pain and  
suffering is against the great weight of the evidence.  Weller  
v Mancha, 353 Mich 189; 91 NW2d 352 (1958); Fordon v Bender,  
363 Mich 124; 108 NW2d 896 (1961); Mosley v Dati, 363 Mich  
690; 110 NW2d 637 (1961). In this case, as in Fordon:  
2 The majority submits that inconsistent and incongruent 
verdicts are invalid grounds for granting a new trial because 
those very words do not appear in MCR 2.611. I find this 
approach unduly rigid. Under Michigan law, an inconsistent 
verdict means a legally irreconcilable one.  Hence, a legally  
irreconcilable 
verdict is contrary to law.  MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e) 
provides that a verdict contrary to law is grounds for a new 
trial.  
2  
The jury resolved the dispute in plaintiff's 
favor by its verdict, which included damages for 
plaintiff's medical expenses. The jury's verdict, 
however, manifests a disregard of the court's 
quoted instruction by its failure to award damages 
for pain and suffering. Once the jury resolved the  
causation dispute, the great weight of the evidence  
compelled it to award plaintiff damages for the  
pain and suffering which naturally followed such  
injuries found by the jury to have been proximately  
caused by defendants. [Id. at 125-126 (emphasis 
added).]  
In this case, the court instructed the first jury on the  
elements of damages that it was required to consider, pursuant  
to SJI2d 50.01, 50.02. That instruction provided, in part:  
You should include each of the following 
elements of damage which you decide has been 
sustained by plaintiff to the present time:  
a. 
physical pain and suffering  
b. 
mental anguish . . . .  
The jury disregarded these instructions.  It found  
defendant liable and awarded damages that matched the exact  
amount of plaintiff's medical expenses. Its award of actual  
damages, coupled with the nature of plaintiff's injuries  
necessitating surgery, compels the conclusion that the jury  
found injuries that included pain and suffering.  Its verdict  
was both inconsistent with the judge's instructions and  
contrary to the great weight of the evidence under the clear  
holdings of Weller, Fordon, and Mosley.  
The cases relied on by the majority do not support its  
conclusion.  They leave undisturbed the rule that a verdict  
3  
 
 
 
against the great weight of the evidence requires a new trial.  
Instead, they stand for the general proposition that the court  
should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on  
factual questions.  In fact, the reasoning they employ appears  
to support, not conflict with, the trial judge's decision in  
this case.  
Brown,3 the case relied on most heavily by the majority,  
is distinguishable from this case.  The distinction lies in  
the fact that the verdict in Brown was not for actual damages,  
alone, but exceeded actual damages by $9.50.  There was  
evidence that the excess was the amount of the plaintiff's  
ambulance fare, but there was no evidence that the plaintiff  
was charged for ambulance services.  
Moreover, there was evidence in Brown that the defendant  
paid for various of the plaintiff's expenses during the two  
months after her release from the hospital.  The Court  
considered this evidence and decided that the jury may have  
believed this adequate compensation for present pain and  
suffering 
and 
thus 
awarded only a minuscule additional amount.  
Additionally, the Court pointed to other factors suggesting  
that the jury actually had followed its instructions that it  
consider awarding compensatory damages.  
3 Brown v Arnold, 303 Mich 616; 6 NW2d 914 (1942).  
4  
 
 
 
 
It concluded that the jury may have determined a higher  
award to be unjustified by the proofs.  The judge observed  
that the lower award could have been derived from the paucity  
of evidence showing that the plaintiff's pain and suffering  
was permanent.  Thus, the Brown Court denied a new trial,  
refusing to speculate on the purpose behind the jury's  
decision to award a small amount of excess compensation.  
By contrast, in this case, plaintiff received nothing  
whatsoever beyond her medical expenses.  Hence, there was  
nothing about which the trial court could speculate.  Clearly,  
no damages for pain and suffering were awarded.  
II  
Defendant insists that the issue before us centers on the  
trial judge's response to the question submitted by the first  
jury shortly before it rendered its decision.4  The jury's  
question was whether damages must be awarded upon a finding of  
negligence. The response was: a jury may find negligence and  
award no damages.  It was legally correct.5  If, for example,  
4 The majority notes that all parties agreed to the 
substance of the judge's written response to the jury's query. 
I find this fact unremarkable, given the propriety of, and the 
lack of grounds for objection to, the judge's answer.  
5 The majority fails to acknowledge that the jury found 
more than mere "negligence," given its decision to award 
actual damages. It is blackletter law that plaintiff would not 
be entitled to any award at all if defendant's "negligence" 
did not proximately cause her injuries. Therefore, we must 
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
the jury found that the defendant's acts were negligent, but  
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, it would  
find no damages.  It could make the same finding in the  
presence of negligence and proximate cause where no damages  
had been proven.  Here, because the jury failed to award  
compensatory 
damages 
despite 
clear 
instructions 
and  
unrebutted, credible evidence6 of pain and suffering, the  
5 (...continued) 
conclude that the first jury found proximate cause as well as 
negligence. This resulted in liability.  
Indeed, there is a distinction between the concept of 
negligence in the broadest sense, encompassing all four 
traditional elements, and negligence in the sense that it is 
commonly used. In common usage, "negligence" describes a mere 
breach of duty, a notion entirely severable from the elements 
of proximate cause and damages. As Prosser & Keeton, Torts  
(5th ed), §30, pp 164-165, observes:  
A failure on the person's part to conform to 
the standard required: a breach of the duty. These  
two elements go to make up what the courts usually 
have 
called 
negligence, 
but 
the 
term 
quite 
frequently is applied to the second alone. Thus it 
may be said that the defendant was negligent, but  
is not liable because he was under no duty to the 
plaintiff not to be. [Emphasis added.]  
See also Davis v Thornton, 384 Mich 138, 146; 180 NW 2d 
11 (1970) (finding that once negligence is found, "[t]he jury 
must then bridge the gap between the plaintiff's injuries and 
the 
defendant's 
negligence. This is the determination of cause 
and the remoteness of effect.").  
6 Had the jury not found plaintiff credible, it would not 
have awarded her actual damages. Having found an injury caused 
by defendant's negligence and an injury and surgery that 
naturally occasion pain, it was improper for the jury to avoid 
some award of noneconomic damages. That is the law of our 
(continued...)  
6  
 
 
 
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.  
III  
The majority contends that later revision of the bases  
for granting new trials resulted in the de facto overruling of  
Weller, Fordon, and Mosley. It postulates that the decisions  
"are no longer relevant" because MCR 2.611(A) alone provides  
the basis for awarding a jury verdict. I disagree.  
The court rule allows for a new trial where a verdict is  
contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  Weller, Fordon,  
and Mosley identify factual instances where a court found a  
verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  As  
the majority indicates, Weller provides:  
It is apparent that no consideration was given 
by the jury to the additional elements of the pain 
and suffering of the deceased . . . and, therefore, 
the 
damages 
awarded 
to 
plaintiff 
were  
overwhelmingly against the evidence. . . . [Weller,  
supra at 195-196.]  
MCR 2.611(A) represents a codification of the principles in  
Weller, Fordon, and Mosley. 
It is consistent with those  
opinions and does not in the least nullify them.  
The jury verdict in this case was virtually identical in  
form to those generated in Weller, Fordon, and Mosley.  
Plaintiff justifiably relied on the principles found in those  
6 (...continued) 
state as set forth in Weller, Fordon, and Mosley, and the law 
that should govern our analysis of this case.  
7  
 
 
 
    
 
cases for valid reasoning to demonstrate that the first jury  
returned a verdict contrary to the great weight of the  
evidence. Since the judge's decision to award a partial new  
trial on damages was consistent with those cases and with the  
court rule, it was not an abuse of discretion.7  
IV  
The majority concludes that the trial court abused its  
discretion by failing to review the evidence for a violation  
of the court rule.  The opinion suggests that the judge  
improperly substituted his opinion for that of the jury when  
he "expressed views regarding the credibility of witnesses."  
Slip op at 13.  However, the majority does its own indirect  
assessment of witness credibility when referencing selective  
portions of the testimony that reflect plaintiff's case as too  
weak to warrant a new trial.  Slip op at 2-3. 
Thus, the  
majority states that its decision is based on the court rule.  
However, it intimates that defendant produced sufficient  
evidence to avoid a finding that the verdict went against the  
7 The majority contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not granting a new trial on one of the bases 
codified in MCR 2.611.  The trial court based its ruling on 
the principles found in the Weller trio of cases. Those cases  
involved 
decisions 
granting new trials because the verdict was 
against the great weight of the evidence. Such verdicts are 
grounds for a new trial under MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e). The 
majority's statement to the contrary, this is the standard 
under which the trial court reviewed the evidence in this  
case.  
8  
 
 
great weight of the evidence. It stresses that the question  
centered on credibility, something exclusively in the domain  
of the trier of fact.  By so casting the evidence and  
analysis, 
the 
majority 
avoids 
showing 
appropriate 
deference 
to  
the trial judge's fitting efforts to rule on the legality of  
the verdict.  
As our Court of Appeals has observed:  
[T]he standard used in this case is different 
than 
that 
involved 
in 
reviewing 
a 
summary 
disposition, 
directed 
verdict, 
or 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and we are not of the  
view that the existence of any competent evidence  
to support the verdict compels reversal of the  
grant of a new trial. [Arrington v Detroit  
Osteopathic Hosp (On Remand), 196 Mich App 544, 
560-561; 493 NW2d 492 (1992) (emphasis added).][8]  
Reflecting on the struggle to give appropriate deference  
to the trial court's judgment and respect for the collective  
wisdom of the jury, one legal scholar has written:  
If, having given full respect to the jury's 
findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a  
mistake has been committed, it is to be expected 
that he will grant a new trial. [Wright, Law of 
Federal Courts (4th ed), § 95, p 635.]  
8 See also Davis v Belmont Creamery Co, 281 Mich 165, 
169; 274 NW 749 (1937) (finding a jury verdict to be against 
the great weight of the evidence despite the existence of a 
question 
of 
fact 
sufficient 
to 
avoid 
a 
judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict); 
Dean 
& 
Longhofer, 
Michigan 
Court 
Rules Practice, New Trials § 2611.7 (West, 1998) ("Between 
these extremes lies an area in which the proof begins to weigh 
heavily against the verdict, where the trial judge's 
discretion must be accepted as the best guide to whether 
fairness requires a new trial.").  
9  
I believe the proper standard to apply to this case allows  
considerable 
deference to the trial judge's decision while, at  
the same time, respecting the collective wisdom of the jury.  
That deference was given by Michigan courts in Davis and  
Arrington and was described by Professor Wright.  
Without question, the mere fact that defendant produced  
an expert witness does not foreclose the possibility that the  
first verdict was contrary to the great weight of the  
evidence.
 Consider the substance of the testimony from  
defendant's only witness, Dr. Kelly.   The defense's physician  
acknowledged on cross-examination that he had not performed a  
shoulder surgery of the type at issue in "five or six years."  
He admitted that only forty percent of his professional time  
is spent dealing with patients directly.  
In evaluating plaintiff, Dr. Kelly spent only twenty to  
twenty-five minutes.  He declined to review her medical  
records 
or 
operative 
notes from plaintiff's surgery; he failed  
to review her physical therapy records; he declined to order  
orthopedic tests, such as an MRI or an arthrogram; he had no  
knowledge of the prior tests that had been performed on the  
patient.  
Hence, when the majority references select portions of  
Dr. Kelly's testimony it misleads the reader with the  
implication that they constitute a basis for reversal of the  
10  
lower court's grant of new trial.  Such a conclusion is  
unsubstantiated, 
given  the majority's disregard for the need,  
when reviewing the grant of a new trial, to balance the  
deference due the jury with that due the judge.
 In my  
opinion, the testimony of Dr. Kelly, standing alone, is  
insufficient to support a conclusion that the trial judge  
abused his discretion in granting a new trial.  
The majority's "underlying facts" section cites Dr.  
Blasier's inability to locate the tear in plaintiff's rotator  
cuff during surgery. It implies that the nondiscovery lends  
support to its finding that the trial judge erred. The same  
section also notes that X-rays failed to show evidence of the  
torn rotator cuff. This is a lopsided version of the evidence.  
As Dr. Blasier explained in his testimony, and Dr. Kelly  
acknowledged, the tear suffered by plaintiff would not have  
been visible from the vantage point of the surgeon during  
surgery.  This is because it occurred on the underside of the  
rotator cuff muscle and would have been obscured from the  
surgeon's view by the top of the muscle. Moreover, Dr. Kelly  
acknowledged on cross-examination that X-rays do not show  
partial muscle tears or impingements of the kind complained of  
by plaintiff.  Therefore, the doubt that the majority  
impliedly casts on plaintiff's credibility by suggesting that  
her injuries, if real, would have appeared on an X-ray is  
11  
 
 
unavailing.9  
Indeed, the evidence of pain and suffering is undisputed  
and unimpeached.  Dr. Kelly, the only defense witness,  
addressed the subject of pain three times, each time only to  
acknowledge 
its 
existence. 
Plaintiff's 
witnesses, 
on 
the 
other  
hand, testified in great detail about the pain Ms. Kelly  
endured. Dr. Blasier stated that each time plaintiff merely  
raised her arm, she experienced pain.  There was testimony  
from Donald Kuck, plaintiff's physical therapist, Ernest  
Kelly, plaintiff's husband, and plaintiff, herself.  Each  
presented the jury with a detailed description of the nature  
and severity of the pain.  
Therefore, I disagree that the trial judge erroneously  
granted  a new trial, and I reject the proposition that the  
trial court reviewed the evidence under an inapplicable  
standard.  Inasmuch as the first jury failed to consider an  
award of noneconomic damages, its verdict was properly found  
to be contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The  
testimony of a lone defense witness does not render the trial  
court's finding unreasonable.  Rather, the great weight of the  
9 The record reflects that MRI tests, viewed by medical 
professionals as the most accurate means of diagnosing and 
identifying partial muscle tears, showed plaintiff's torn 
muscle before and after surgery. Additionally, Dr. Blasier 
testified 
that, 
once 
he injected dye into plaintiff's shoulder 
muscle, he was able to view the tear in an X-ray.  
12  
evidence easily could have been found to militate against the  
first jury verdict, notwithstanding the brief testimony  
offered by Dr. Kelly. There was no abuse of discretion.  
V  
I agree with the majority that "the jury is free to  
credit or discredit any testimony" offered at trial.  Slip op  
at 12.  However, the jury may not disregard or misapply clear  
instructions from the court.  In this case, the jury was  
instructed to include in its verdict "elements of damages" for  
"physical pain and suffering" as well as "mental anguish." It  
neglected to do so.  
The settled law of our state requires an award of  
noneconomic damages where a jury finds actual damages that  
necessarily involve pain and suffering.  A verdict that fails  
to consider these aspects is contrary to the great weight of  
the evidence.  Such a verdict was rendered in this case. That  
fact alone provides a sufficient basis to affirm the trial  
judge's decision to award plaintiff a new trial.  
The majority's finding that the trial court abused its  
discretion by not citing one of the bases in MCR 2.611 as  
support for its decision is in error.  The court rule codifies  
the great weight of the evidence standard applied in the  
Weller trio of cases. The trial court did review the evidence  
under a great weight of the evidence standard.  That is, after  
13  
 
all, the standard for which the Weller cases are known.  
The evidence of plaintiff's pain and suffering in this  
case was unrebutted and unimpeached. 
The only witness  
testifying against plaintiff was a physician who acknowledged  
that plaintiff had experienced rotator cuff pain.  Even if  
defendant's expert had denied the pain, denial of the motion  
for new trial would have been unjustified, given the quality  
and quantity of the evidence of plaintiff's pain.  
Thus, if a factual dispute existed, as suggested by the  
majority's "underlying facts and procedural history" section,  
it is of no consequence.  It could not render the trial  
judge's decision an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the  
trial court's decision to grant a partial new trial was  
correct. The Court of Appeals decision upholding the second  
jury's verdict should be affirmed.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
14