Title: Commonwealth v. Ware

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11709 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRYANT WARE. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 4, 2014. - April 8, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct 
of government agents, Discovery, Disclosure of evidence. 
Evidence, Guilty plea, Certificate of drug analysis, 
Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence.  Constitutional Law, 
Plea, Conduct of government agents.  Due Process of Law, 
Plea, Disclosure of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 29, 2007; November 25, 2009; and March 9, 
2010.  
 
 
A motion for leave to conduct postconviction discovery and 
for funds, filed on February 14, 2014, was considered by 
C. Jeffrey Kinder, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
James P. McKenna for the defendant. 
 
Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, we consider whether a Superior 
Court judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for leave 
to conduct postconviction discovery and for funds, filed by the 
defendant, Bryant Ware.  The defendant sought retesting of drug 
evidence maintained by the Springfield police department in 
countless cases brought by the Commonwealth between July, 2004, 
and January 18, 2013.  During that time period, Sonja Farak was 
a chemist at the Department of Public Health's State Laboratory 
Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug lab).  Also during that time 
period, the defendant was indicted on drug charges in three 
separate cases.  His motion for postconviction discovery was 
predicated on the fact that Farak pleaded guilty on January 6, 
2014, to four counts of tampering with evidence, G. L. c. 268, 
§ 13E; four counts of theft of a controlled substance (cocaine) 
from a dispensary, G. L. c. 94C, § 37; and two counts of 
unlawful possession of a class B substance (cocaine), G. L. 
c. 94C, § 34.  In denying the motion, the judge concluded that 
the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case for 
relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  We conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion, and affirm his order.  At the same time, based on 
what we learn from the record in this case about Farak's 
misconduct at the Amherst drug lab and the Commonwealth's 
failure to investigate the scope and timing of such misconduct, 
3 
 
we further conclude that the defendant is entitled to retest the 
controlled substance that gave rise to his 2009 indictment 
charging distribution of cocaine as a subsequent offense. 
 
1.  Background on the Amherst drug lab.1  The Amherst drug 
lab began operation in 1987 with the primary function of 
analyzing suspected controlled substances for law enforcement 
agencies involved in the prosecution of criminal cases in 
western Massachusetts.2  As of January, 2013, there were four 
                     
 
1 In the fall of 2013, the judge in the present case also 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on postconviction motions filed 
by fifteen defendants who claimed that alleged criminal conduct 
by Sonja Farak rendered their guilty pleas to various drug 
charges unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, and that this 
newly discovered evidence cast doubt on the justice of their 
convictions.  The evidence presented at the hearing was limited 
to (1) the timing and scope of Farak's alleged criminal conduct; 
(2) the timing and scope of conduct underlying negative findings 
in an October, 2012, quality assurance audit of the Department 
of Public Health's State Laboratory Institute in Amherst 
(Amherst drug lab) by the State police; and (3) the extent to 
which Farak's alleged criminal conduct and the audit findings 
might relate to the testing of drug evidence in the fifteen 
defendants' cases.  Although Bryant Ware was not one of these 
defendants, his record appendix in the present appeal includes 
the memoranda of decision and orders issued by the judge in six 
of those cases.  The judge's description of events at the 
Amherst drug lab is fundamentally the same in each decision and 
forms the basis for our recitation of the background on that 
facility.  The judge issued each memorandum of decision and 
order in the fall of 2013, several months before he issued his 
order in the present case on March 12, 2014.  Neither the 
Commonwealth nor the defendant has challenged the essential 
facts regarding events that transpired at the Amherst drug lab 
concerning Farak. 
 
 
2 On July 1, 2012, the responsibility for oversight of the 
Amherst drug lab was transferred from the Department of Public 
Health to the State police.  
 
4 
 
employees at the facility, and each one could access the 
evidence safe by means of an electronic card or a key.  On 
January 17, 2013, the evidence officer at the Amherst drug lab, 
Sharon Salem, was attempting to match certificates of drug 
analysis (drug certificates) with the corresponding samples when 
she realized that she was missing the samples in two cases.  
Records reflected that Farak had completed testing on those 
samples earlier in the month and had confirmed that the 
substances were cocaine.  On January 18, Salem reported the 
missing evidence to her supervisor, James Hanchett, who searched 
Farak's work station and discovered, among other items, a manila 
envelope containing the packaging for the two missing samples, 
which had been cut open.  Testing of the substances in the 
packaging was negative for cocaine, contrary to Farak's earlier 
analysis.  
 
Hanchett immediately contacted the State police, who shut 
down the Amherst drug lab and began an investigation.  They 
discovered two additional case envelopes in a temporary storage 
locker used by Farak, a location where evidence was not allowed 
to be stored overnight.  Although each envelope was supposed to 
contain suspected cocaine, neither did, and a search for those 
substances was unsuccessful.  Investigators also interviewed 
Farak's colleagues who said that, beginning in September, 2012, 
they observed a change in Farak's behavior, including frequent 
5 
 
unexplained absences from her work station and a decrease in 
productivity.   
 
On January 19, 2013, the State police forensic services 
conducted an inventory of all drug evidence at the Amherst drug 
lab.  Only the four above-described samples were missing.  A 
similar inventory conducted approximately four months earlier 
had not uncovered any missing samples.  Also on January 19, the 
State police searched Farak's vehicle pursuant to a warrant and 
seized, among other items, manila envelopes bearing case 
numbers, paperwork relating to the Amherst drug lab, a plastic 
bag containing a white powdery substance and a brown tar-like 
substance, a plastic bag containing assorted pills, and 
photocopies of three newspaper articles about individuals who 
had been investigated, charged, or sentenced for the illegal 
possession or theft of controlled substances.3  Attached to one 
                     
 
3 One of the newspaper articles, dated March 29, 2011, had 
been printed from a computer on September 20, 2011, and was a 
story about the illegal possession of steroids by law 
enforcement officers.  A second newspaper article, dated October 
25, 2011, had been printed from a computer on October 28, 2011, 
and was a story about a Pittsfield pharmacist being sentenced to 
three years in prison for stealing OxyContin from her workplace.  
The article mentioned that the pharmacist had replaced the 
OxyContin with other medications.  A third newspaper article, 
dated December 2, 2011, had been printed from a computer on 
December 6, 2011, and was a story about a former San Francisco 
police department drug laboratory technician who stole cocaine 
from her workplace.  These articles have not been included in 
the record in the present case.  See note 1, supra. 
 
6 
 
of the articles was a handwritten note stating, "Thank [G]od I'm 
not a law enforcement officer" (emphasis in original).   
 
Farak was arrested at her home that same day.  She was 
charged by criminal complaint in the District Court with 
unlawful possession of a class A substance (heroin), unlawful 
possession of a class B substance (cocaine), and two counts of 
tampering with evidence.  On January 25, 2013, the State police 
searched a tote bag that had been seized from Farak's work 
station pursuant to a warrant.  The bag contained a variety of 
substances that could be used to dilute or replace cocaine 
(soap, baking soda, soy candle flakes, and oven-baked clay), 
other items commonly used in the drug trade (plastic laboratory 
dishes, waxed paper, and fragments of copper wire), and several 
evidence bags that had been cut open.  The evidence bags bore 
diverse dates from December 16, 2012, to January 6, 2013.   
 
On April 1, 2013, a State grand jury indicted Farak on four 
counts of tampering with evidence at the Amherst drug lab, four 
counts of stealing cocaine from that facility, and two counts of 
unlawful possession of cocaine.  While proceedings were ongoing 
in the Superior Court with respect to these charges, four 
additional cases surfaced in which it seemed, based on 
retesting, that Farak may have removed cocaine from samples that 
were submitted to the Amherst drug lab for analysis between June 
15, 2012, and October 10, 2012, and replaced at least some of 
7 
 
the cocaine with a counterfeit substance.  It is not clear from 
the record why this particular evidence was selected for 
retesting.  Nonetheless, it does appear that no charges were 
brought against Farak with respect to these four additional 
cases.  On January 6, 2014, Farak pleaded guilty to all ten 
charges.4   
 
2.  Factual and procedural history.  In the present case, 
on August 29, 2007, a Hampden County grand jury indicted the 
defendant for possession of a class B controlled substance 
(cocaine) with intent to distribute (count one), possession of a 
Class D controlled substance (count two), violation of the 
controlled substances laws in proximity to a school or park 
(count three), possession of a firearm without a firearm 
identification card (count four), and conspiracy to violate the 
                     
 
4 With respect to the first count of tampering with evidence 
(Count I), Farak was sentenced to two and one-half years in a 
house of correction, with eighteen months to be served, and the 
balance suspended with probation for five years, with special 
conditions.  Farak was given the same sentence on the second and 
third counts of tampering with evidence, as well as on three 
counts of theft of a controlled substance, each sentence to run 
concurrently with the sentence on Count I.  With respect to each 
of the two counts of unlawful possession of a class B substance, 
Farak was sentenced to serve one year in a house of correction, 
each sentence to run concurrently with the sentence on Count I.  
With respect to the fourth count of tampering with evidence and 
the fourth count of theft of a controlled substance, Farak was 
sentenced to five years' probation, to run concurrently with her 
probation on the other charges.    
 
8 
 
drug laws (count five) (collectively, 2007 charges).5  On May 21, 
2008, the defendant pleaded guilty to counts one, two, and four.6    
 
On November 25, 2009, a Hampden County grand jury indicted 
the defendant for distribution of a class B controlled substance 
(cocaine) as a subsequent offense (2009 charge).  The indictment 
arose from an incident on July 31, 2009, when the defendant 
purportedly sold two pieces of an off-white rock-like substance, 
later determined to be "crack" cocaine, to an undercover State 
trooper for twenty dollars.  The defendant also was charged with 
violating the terms of his probation, which had been imposed 
when he pleaded guilty to the 2007 charges.    
 
Then, on March 9, 2010, a Hampden County grand jury 
indicted the defendant for possession of a class A controlled 
substance (heroin) with intent to distribute as a subsequent 
offense (count one), violation of the controlled substances laws 
in proximity to a school or park (count two), five counts of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a vehicle) 
                     
 
5 The defendant has not claimed that Farak was the analyst 
who tested the substances that served as the bases for his 
indictments on the 2007 charges. 
 
 
6 The Superior Court docket states that the defendant 
pleaded not guilty to counts three and five of the indictments, 
but it does not indicate the ultimate disposition of those 
charges.  With respect to count one, the defendant was sentenced 
to two and one-half years in a house of correction, with one 
year to serve, and the balance suspended with probation for two 
years.  With respect to counts two and four, he was sentenced to 
six months in a house of correction, to be served concurrently 
with the committed sentence on count one.    
 
9 
 
(counts three through seven), and resisting arrest (count eight) 
(collectively, 2010 charges).  The indictments arose from an 
incident on December 22, 2009, when Springfield police officers 
attempted to stop the defendant's vehicle and execute an arrest 
warrant, the defendant rammed his vehicle into three police 
cruisers while fleeing the scene, the officers eventually 
stopped and searched the vehicle, they discovered therein eight 
bags of a substance that subsequently was determined to be 
heroin, and the defendant resisted efforts to place him under 
arrest.7  On February 4, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
count one and counts three through eight of the 2010 charges, he 
pleaded guilty to the 2009 charge,8 and he pleaded guilty to the 
probation violation.9   
                     
 
7 The defendant has not claimed that Farak was the analyst 
who tested the substances that were seized from his vehicle on 
December 22, 2009, and that served as the bases for the 2010 
charges. 
 
 
8 According to an affidavit signed by the defendant on 
November 18, 2013, he understood that if this case had gone to 
trial, the Commonwealth would have offered a certificate of drug 
analysis signed by Farak, indicating that the substance sold to 
the undercover State trooper was cocaine.  Consequently, the 
defendant tendered his guilty plea in material part because of 
his understanding of the likelihood of success of the 
Commonwealth's case.    
 
 
9 With respect to the 2009 charge, the defendant was 
sentenced to from five to seven years in the State prison.  With 
respect to count one of the 2010 charges, he was sentenced to 
from five to seven years in the State prison, to run 
concurrently with his sentence on the 2009 charge.  The 
Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi with respect to count two of 
the 2010 charges.  With respect to count three of the 2010 
10 
 
 
On August 12, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial with respect to the 2009 charge.  Six months later, on 
February 14, 2014, he filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30 (c) (4) for leave to conduct postconviction discovery and 
for funds, with respect to all three cases that had been brought 
against him.10  The defendant sought retesting of drug evidence 
maintained by the Springfield police department that related to 
cases brought by the Commonwealth between July, 2004, and 
January 18, 2013.11  He claimed that, given the lack of 
                                                                  
charges, the defendant was sentenced to eighteen months' 
probation, to be served from and after his sentence on count 
one.  With respect to counts four through eight of the 2010 
charges, he was sentenced to eighteen months' probation, to be 
served concurrently with his sentence of probation on count 
three.  As to the probation violation, the defendant was 
committed to a house of correction to serve the eighteen-month 
suspended portion of his sentence on the 2007 charges, to run 
concurrently with his State prison sentence on the 2009 charge.    
 
 
10 Rule 30 (c) (4) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), provides: 
 
 
"Discovery.  Where affidavits filed by the moving 
party under subdivision (c)(3) establish a prima facie case 
for relief, the judge on motion of any party, after notice 
to the opposing party and an opportunity to be heard, may 
authorize such discovery as is deemed appropriate, subject 
to appropriate protective order." 
 
 
11 In a memorandum of law in support of his motion to 
conduct postconviction discovery, the defendant proposed that 
all drug samples produced from July, 2004, through January 18, 
2013, be visually inspected to see whether it readily could be 
determined that they contained two distinct substances.  The 
defendant also proposed that one hundred randomly selected 
samples from 2004, and two hundred randomly selected samples 
from each succeeding year, be retested to determine whether 
evidence of tampering could be identified.  It was the 
11 
 
investigation by the Commonwealth, there was no reason to 
believe that the full extent of Farak's criminal conduct had 
been identified.  In the defendant's view, the eight cases in 
which Farak had compromised the integrity of the Commonwealth's 
evidence were the proverbial tip of the iceberg.  In his motion, 
the defendant asserted that the requested postconviction 
discovery was "reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might 
warrant granting a new trial."  The Commonwealth opposed the 
motion.    
 
On March 12, 2014, the defendant's motion for leave to 
conduct postconviction discovery was denied.  The judge 
concluded that the defendant had failed to establish a prima 
facie case for relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4).  He 
stated that there was no evidence that the drug analyses in the 
defendant's cases were inaccurate, or that Farak had been 
involved in any misconduct at the time the defendant pleaded 
guilty on February 4, 2011.  Moreover, the judge continued, 
separate and apart from the timing of Farak's misconduct, there 
were good reasons for the defendant to have accepted the plea 
agreement, including a more favorable sentencing disposition 
than would have been available after a trial.  The judge 
                                                                  
defendant's understanding that in light of the Springfield 
police department's procedures for the disposal of drug 
evidence, the evidence that the defendant sought to have 
retested had not yet been destroyed.    
 
12 
 
determined that, given the strength of the Commonwealth's cases, 
the significant benefit the defendant received from the plea 
agreement, and the absence of evidence that Farak's misconduct 
affected the drug analyses in the defendant's cases, her 
misconduct would not have been material to his decision to plead 
guilty.  The defendant appealed from the order denying his 
motion for postconviction discovery, and we granted his 
application for direct appellate review.    
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant contends that he has made a 
prima facie showing that his motion for postconviction discovery 
is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant 
granting him a new trial.  He emphasizes that the focus of his 
motion is to determine precisely when Farak began to engage in 
misconduct at the Amherst drug lab and, consequently, when she 
first compromised the Commonwealth's evidence in drug cases.  
The defendant asserts that, although common sense would suggest 
that Farak was tampering with evidence well before the summer of 
2012, the Commonwealth has failed to conduct more than a brief, 
cursory investigation into the matter.  That being the case, the 
retesting of drug samples would, in the defendant's view, 
establish the time frame of Farak's wrongdoing, potentially 
furnishing the defendant with evidence to support his motion for 
a new trial.  Given the likelihood of uncovering such important 
evidence, the defendant argues that the judge abused his 
13 
 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion for postconviction 
discovery.  We disagree. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we point out that, generally 
speaking, "discovery orders are interlocutory and not 
appealable."  Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 528 (1984).  See 
Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687 (1999) (in most cases, 
interlocutory rulings "are not appealable until the ultimate 
disposition of the case because they are not 'final orders'"); 
Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597 (1988) (no right of 
appeal from interlocutory order unless authorized by statute or 
rule); Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779 (1979).  In the 
ordinary course, an established route for a defendant to "obtain 
appellate review of the denial of his motion for postconviction 
discovery would be in connection with an appeal from the denial 
of his motion for a new trial, if the new trial motion is in 
fact denied."  Donald v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1007, 1007 
(2002).  See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 261 (1981) 
(reviewing postconviction discovery issue on appeal from denial 
of motion for new trial). 
 
The circumstances in the present case, however, necessitate 
an exception to the established route for obtaining appellate 
review of an order denying postconviction discovery.  General 
Laws c. 211, § 3, provides that "[t]he supreme judicial court 
shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior 
14 
 
jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if 
no other remedy is expressly provided."  This court's 
superintendence powers are discretionary, are exercised only in 
exceptional circumstances, and are not intended to circumvent 
the regular appellate process.  See Planned Parenthood League of 
Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706 (1990); 
Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679 (1978).  In the 
past, we have exercised our general superintendence powers to 
resolve, among other things, "important issues with implications 
for the effective administration of justice" and "matter[s] of 
public interest that may cause further uncertainty within the 
courts."  First Justice of the Bristol Div. of the Juvenile 
Court Dep't v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Bristol Div. of the 
Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. 387, 391 (2003) (resolving 
internal dispute between members of judicial department).  See 
Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 88-89 (2013) (allegations 
of misconduct by chemist at William A. Hinton State Laboratory 
Institute in Jamaica Plain, and implications of such misconduct 
on defendants convicted of drug offenses, warranted court's 
exercise of superintendence powers to review certain procedures 
adopted by trial court to handle postconviction matters). 
 
Here, it is undisputed that Farak pleaded guilty to 
numerous criminal charges that arose from her work as a chemist 
at the Amherst drug lab.  Her misconduct has raised significant 
15 
 
concerns about the administration of justice in criminal cases 
where a defendant was convicted of a drug offense and she was 
the analyst.  Given the very limited nature of the State police 
investigation into Farak's activities at the drug lab, the 
precise time frame and scope of her misconduct are unknown.12  
Nonetheless, Farak's criminal behavior, and the potential 
implications of such behavior on defendants who have been 
convicted of drug offenses based on evidence that she analyzed, 
present exceptional circumstances warranting this court's 
immediate attention.  In accordance with our general 
superintendence powers under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we proceed to 
review the judge's order denying the defendant's motion for 
leave to conduct postconviction discovery. 
 
"The purpose of postconviction discovery is to allow a 
defendant to gather evidence to support 'an apparently 
meritorious claim . . . [where] the evidence that can be adduced 
to support the claim is unknown to the court.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 406 (2005), quoting 4 ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Postconviction Remedies Commentary to Standard 
22-4.5, at 22-48 (2d ed. 1986).  When requesting such discovery, 
a defendant by affidavit "must make a sufficient showing that 
the discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that 
                     
 
12 As far as we can tell, Farak has not provided any details 
concerning the timing and scope of her misconduct, apart from 
pleading guilty to the ten indictments. 
16 
 
might warrant granting a new trial."  Daniels, supra at 407.  
See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 453 Mass. 54, 61-62 (2009); 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 97 (2002).  See also 
Reporters' Notes to Rule 30, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 1710 (LexisNexis 2014-2015) ("Discovery is 
appropriate where specific allegations before the court show 
reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are 
fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he or she is 
entitled to relief").  A defendant cannot use a motion for 
postconviction discovery to engage in a "fishing expedition."  
See generally E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§ 42:30 (4th ed. 2014).  A trial judge has broad discretion in 
deciding whether a defendant has established a prima facie case 
for relief such that a postconviction discovery motion should be 
allowed.  See Commonwealth v. Lynch, 439 Mass. 532, 545, cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 1059 (2003); Martinez, supra at 97-98. 
 
In this case, given the breadth of the defendant's motion 
for leave to conduct postconviction discovery, we conclude that 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion.  
The defendant made no showing that his wide-ranging request for 
the visual inspection of thousands of drug samples analyzed by 
Farak between July, 2004, and January 18, 2013, as well as for 
the retesting of approximately 1,700 of those samples, would be 
reasonably likely to uncover tainted evidence.  See note 11, 
17 
 
supra.  Nothing has been presented to suggest that Farak engaged 
in misconduct at the Amherst drug lab prior to perhaps the fall 
of 2011, at the earliest, when the newspaper articles seized 
from her vehicle were printed from a computer,13 see note 3, 
supra, or that the drug analyses she performed before that time 
were inaccurate or subsequently altered. 
 
That said, the precise timing and scope of Farak's 
wrongdoing are unclear.  When personnel at the Amherst drug lab 
notified the State police in January, 2013, that Farak may have 
compromised the evidence in two drug cases, the Commonwealth had 
a duty to conduct a thorough investigation to determine the 
nature and extent of her misconduct, and its effect both on 
pending cases and on cases in which defendants already had been 
convicted of crimes involving controlled substances that Farak 
had analyzed.  It is well established that the Commonwealth has 
a duty to learn of and disclose to a defendant any exculpatory 
evidence that is "held by agents of the prosecution team."  
                     
 
13 In Commonwealth v. Cotto, post     ,    n.13 (2015), we 
note that the motion judge in that case "was not persuaded that 
it was reasonable to infer from Farak's possession of the 
newspaper articles that were printed in the fall of 2011 . . . 
that she was stealing controlled substances at that time."  We 
conclude there that "the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
making this determination."  Id.  Here, the motion judge did not 
make any findings regarding the significance of the newspaper 
articles, presumably because they were not part of the record in 
this case.  See note 3, supra.  Generally speaking, absent a 
specific finding to the contrary, the newspaper articles could 
serve as a basis for concluding that Farak engaged in misconduct 
at the Amherst drug lab earlier than the summer of 2012. 
18 
 
Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 532 (1999).  See 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 349 (2014); Commonwealth 
v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 327 (2008).  Such agents include not 
only prosecutors and police, but also chemists working in State 
drug laboratories who analyze purported drug samples and report 
their findings to the prosecutor's office.  See Scott, supra.  
See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 823-824 (1998) 
(prosecution had duty to inquire about existence of scientific 
tests conducted by Commonwealth's own police crime laboratory 
and to produce exculpatory evidence sought by defendant).  In 
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 402-403 (1992), a case 
where the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 
that was in its possession but was never specifically requested 
by the defendant, we acknowledged that these disclosure 
requirements "are inconsistent with the traditional adversary 
role of litigants."  Id. at 408.  However, in concluding that 
the nondisclosure of the evidence required the ordering of a new 
trial, we stated that "the duties of a prosecutor to administer 
justice fairly, and particularly concerning requested or 
obviously exculpatory evidence, go beyond winning convictions."  
Id.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), 426 Mass. 1397 (1998) ("The 
prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure 
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
19 
 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense . . ."). 
 
As far as can be gleaned from the record, the Commonwealth 
never conducted a thorough investigation of the Amherst drug 
lab.  The State police spent a few days looking for missing 
evidence, searching Farak's vehicle, interviewing her 
colleagues, conducting an inventory of the facility, and 
searching a tote bag that had been seized from Farak's work 
station.  The inquiry appeared to end there, until it came to 
light several months later that Farak might have tampered with 
evidence in four more cases.  Drug samples were retested in 
those additional cases, and the results indicated that at least 
some of the cocaine had been replaced with a counterfeit 
substance.  It is apparent that the Commonwealth clearly had 
information suggesting that Farak had engaged in misconduct at 
the Amherst drug lab, but the magnitude and implications of the 
problem have not been ascertained.14 
 
The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion as it was presented, given its wide-ranging 
sweep.  Nonetheless, based on what is known about Farak's 
misconduct and on the failure of the Commonwealth to pursue a 
                     
 
14 Given that the matter of Farak's misconduct at the 
Amherst drug lab involves defendants in multiple counties, the 
State police detective unit of the Attorney General's office 
might be best suited to lead an investigation. 
 
20 
 
thorough investigation into the matter, we conclude that the 
defendant should be afforded an opportunity to conduct 
postconviction discovery relating to the 2009 charge, the only 
one in which the Commonwealth would have offered a drug 
certificate signed by Farak, indicating that the substance 
allegedly sold to an undercover State trooper was cocaine.  See 
notes 5, 7, & 8, supra.  See also Commonwealth v. Cotto, 
post    ,     (2015) (describing procedure for retesting drug 
samples not yet destroyed).  The defendant may file a new motion 
for postconviction discovery and for funds, pertaining 
specifically to that case.  Such discovery may include, among 
other things, visual inspection and retesting of the controlled 
substance at issue, and funds may be allocated as appropriate. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judge's denial of the defendant's 
motion for postconviction discovery and for funds is affirmed.  
This case is remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.