Title: Hassan-El v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AKBAR HASSAN-EL,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 472, 2005 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. 0107017049 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  October 18, 2006 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  October 26, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire (argued), Wilmington, Delaware and 
Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Esquire (argued) and Thomas E. Brown, 
Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Akbar Hassan-El, and Tyrone Guy, were 
indicted on charges of Murder in the First Degree (intentional murder); 
Murder in the First Degree (felony murder); Possession of a Firearm During 
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”); Attempted Robbery in the First 
Degree; and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  The State advised both 
defendants that it intended to seek a death sentence in the event of a 
conviction for Murder in the First Degree.   
 
In November 2003, Hassan-El and Guy were tried together.  That 
proceeding ended in a mistrial after the jury informed the trial court that it 
was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to either defendant.  After the 
mistrial, the State elected to try the defendants separately. Guy’s retrial took 
place first and Guy was convicted on all charges.1 
 
Hassan-El’s retrial commenced on May 17, 2005. The jury found 
Hassan-El guilty of Murder in the First Degree (felony murder); Murder in 
the Second degree (a lesser-included offense of intentional murder); PFDCF; 
Attempted Robbery in the First Degree; and Conspiracy in the Second 
Degree.  Following a penalty hearing, the jury found, unanimously and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the felony-murder statutory 
aggravating circumstance.  The jury also found, by a vote of eleven to one, 
                                          
 
1 See State v. Guy, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 333, at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005). 
 
3
that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances.  
On September 30, 2005, Hassan-El was sentenced to life imprisonment on 
the Felony Murder conviction and to a total of forty-five years at Level 5 for 
the remaining convictions.2 
Issues on Appeal 
 
Hassen-El raises three arguments in this direct appeal.  First, he 
submits that his conviction for felony murder should be vacated because the 
homicide was not “in furtherance of” the underlying felony of Attempted 
Robbery.  Second, Hassan-El contends that the trial judge committed legal 
error when he instructed the jury that Hassan-El could be found guilty of 
felony murder provided that the jury found that Hassan-El intended to 
commit the underlying robbery and that the death of the victim occurred 
during the course of the attempted robbery and was a “foreseeable 
consequence” of the attempted robbery.  Although Hassan-El acknowledges 
that the jury instruction given is consistent with this Court’s holding in 
Claudio v. State,3 Hassan-El argues that Claudio is inconsistent with 
Delaware’s felony-murder statute and should be overruled.  Finally, Hassan-
El argues that the trial judge should not have allowed in as evidence the out-
of-court interrogation by the police of Robert Zayas, who was the State’s 
                                          
 
2 See State v. Hassan-El, 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 337, at *23 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005). 
3 Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 1991). 
 
4
main witness, because the statement included the interrogating police 
officers’ opinion as to whether Zayas was telling the truth. 
 
We have concluded that Hassan-El’s first two arguments are without 
merit.  The third issue raised by Hassan-El properly identified an error, but 
under the circumstances of this case, that error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed. 
Facts4 
 
Shortly after 10 p.m. on July 18, 2001, the Wilmington Police 
responded to a 911 call concerning a shooting at 10th and Madison streets.  
When the police arrived, they found a man who had sustained an apparent 
gunshot wound lying inside a Jack and Jill Ice Cream truck.  The victim, 
Abdullah Alameri, was unresponsive and was pronounced dead a short time 
after he was transported to Christiana Hospital.  Following an autopsy, it 
was determined that Alameri had died as a result of a single gunshot wound 
to his chest. 
 
Inside the ice cream truck, the police recovered a 9mm shell casing 
near the driver’s seat and a 25-caliber casing under a floor mat.  The police 
also found a 25-caliber projectile that had lodged itself in the track of a 
                                          
 
4 This factual recitation is taken substantially from Hassan-El’s opening brief.   
 
5
sliding window on the passenger side of the truck.  After the truck was 
processed by the police, it was returned to the Jack and Jill Company in 
Philadelphia.  In the course of cleaning the truck, one of the Company’s 
employees found a second projectile, a 9mm bullet, embedded in a shirt that 
was located on a shelf in the rear of the truck.  The projectile was then 
turned over to the police. 
 
Shortly after the shooting, the police conducted a neighborhood 
canvass to find out if anyone living nearby the shooting scene had seen or 
heard anything.  The police also learned that an individual named Keith 
Flowers had called 911 about the shooting.  When the police interviewed 
Keith Flowers, he told them about an individual named Robert “Whiteboy” 
Zayas.   
During the course of the investigation, the police learned that Zayas 
had purchased a soda from the ice cream truck driver at 9th and Madison 
streets just minutes before the shooting.  The police also learned from a 
Tracida Bailey that her boyfriend Marcus Archy may have had information 
about the shooting.  At the time of the shooting, Archy was living on 9th 
Street, near the corner of 9th and Madison.   
In October 2001, Archy was in jail and asked Bailey to contact the 
police and tell them Archy had information about the shooting.  At trial, 
 
6
Archy testified that he knew Zayas, Guy and Hassan-El from the 
neighborhood.  Archy testified that on the night of the shooting, he first saw 
the ice cream truck at the corner of 9th and Madison.  He also saw Hassan-
El, who told him that “something crazy was about to go down,” but did not 
say what it was.   
Archy testified that he saw Guy and Zayas on the sidewalk in front of 
Guy’s house, which was on Madison, midway between 9th and 10th streets.  
He also saw Hassan-El walking toward Guy and Zayas.  Archy then began 
walking west on 9th Street, toward his house, when he heard gunshots.  He 
looked up the street and saw Zayas, Guy and Hassan-El running toward 10th 
Street headed east.   
Several minutes later, Archy saw Hassan-El coming down Madison 
Street. Archy testified that Hassan-El told him that Guy shot the ice cream 
man.  Hassan-El told Archy that Guy had a 25-caliber weapon.  Hassan-El 
also told Archy that he too had fired a shot, but that it did not hit the ice 
cream man.  Archy testified that he did not see any of the three men with a 
weapon that evening and that Hassan-El seemed shocked about what had 
happened.  A short time after this conversation with Hassan-El, Archy saw 
Zayas, who also told him that Guy had shot the ice cream man. 
 
7
 
Keith Flowers testified at the trial that he had made a 911 call to the 
police just after the shooting.  He also testified that when the police first 
contacted him, he did not want to get involved with the case and initially 
told them that he did not know anything about the shooting.  At trial, 
Flowers testified that he lived next door to Guy and that he also knew 
Hassan-El, who lived around the corner on 9th Street.  On the evening of the 
shooting, Flowers had been out looking to buy some marijuana.  When he 
came out of his house, Flowers saw Guy, Hassan-El and Zayas standing on 
the sidewalk.   
Flowers testified that as he was walking toward his house, he saw the 
ice cream truck parked at the corner of 9th and Madison.  He saw the truck 
continue up Madison Street to 10th Street and then he heard gunshots.  He 
did not see who had fired the shots.  He saw three people near the truck, 
whom he identified as Zayas, Guy and Hassan-El.  Flowers testified that he 
did not see their faces, but recognized them by the clothing they were 
wearing.  He then saw the three men run east on 10th Street.  He returned to 
his house to call 911. 
 
Zayas testified that just before the shooting, he had bought a soda and 
a pretzel from the ice cream man at 9th and Madison.  He then realized that 
the soda was frozen and he wanted to return it.  He walked up Madison 
 
8
Street, where he saw Guy and Hassan-El “laying low in-between the steps” 
and “in the bushes a little bit.”  According to Zayas, Hassan-El told him 
about a plan to rob the ice cream man.  Zayas saw that Guy had a 25-caliber 
handgun.  Zayas told them their idea was stupid.  They asked Zayas to flag 
down the ice cream truck.  Zayas testified that he did not want to do it, but 
he also wanted to exchange his soda.   
The ice cream truck pulled over at 10th and Madison, and Zayas went 
up to the truck and asked to exchange his soda.  As Zayas was standing at 
the window, he watched Guy and Hassan-El come up to the truck.  They had 
t-shirts around their faces.  He saw Guy with a gun.  He did not see Hassan-
El with a gun.  Hassan-El tried to boost Guy up through the window of the 
truck.  Zayas heard two shots and saw Guy fire a shot that hit the ice cream 
man.   
All three of them then fled down an alleyway that ran behind Guy’s 
house, parallel to Madison Street.  Zayas then ran back to the ice cream 
truck to see about the condition of the ice cream man.  A short time later, 
Zayas approached Archy, and, according to Archy, was upset.  Zayas told 
Archy that both Hassan-El and Guy had fired their guns, but that Guy had 
shot the ice cream man.  Zayas also told Archy that he was scared because 
 
9
he had been the one who had flagged down the truck.  Zayas then went 
home because he was scared.5 
“In Furtherance of” Attempted Robbery 
 
At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, the defense moved to 
dismiss Count II (felony murder).  The motion was based on the defense’s 
application of this Court’s holding in Williams v. State6 to the evidence 
presented by the State.  The defense’s motion was denied by the trial judge.   
Hassan-El renews the same arguments in this appeal. 
 
When this homicide was committed in 2001, title 11, section 
636(a)(2) of the Delaware Code provided that a person is guilty of “felony-
murder” when “[I]n the course of and in furtherance of the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony or immediate flight therefrom, the person 
recklessly causes the death of another person.”  This statute was 
subsequently amended.7  Hassan-El notes that although any “felony” or 
“attempted felony” will suffice, the statute also required that the death must 
be “in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted 
                                          
 
5 After Zayas completed his testimony on direct examination, the jury saw a videotape of 
an out-of-court interrogation of Zayas by the police that took place on July 24, 2001. 
6 Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2003). 
7 Effective May 19, 2004, section 636(a)(2) was amended by eliminating the phrase “in 
the course of and in furtherance of.”  That section now provides that a person is guilty of 
“felony-murder” when, “[w]hile engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit any felony, the person recklessly causes 
the death of another person.”  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2) (2006). 
 
10
commission of a felony. . . .”8  In this case, the “attempted felony” was 
robbery.   
Hassan-El acknowledges that the murder was clearly “in the course 
of” the attempted robbery, and submits that the real issue is whether the 
murder was also “in furtherance of” the attempted robbery.  The meaning of 
the “in furtherance of” requirement in the felony-murder statute was 
explained by this Court in Williams: 
In our view, the statutory language of the Delaware felony 
murder statute not only requires that the murder occur during 
the course of the felony but also that the murder occur to 
facilitate commission of the felony.  To the extent that the 
Chao9 opinion states that the “in furtherance of” language of the 
statute addresses solely the identity of the person who is 
committing the actual killing, it is overruled.  Accordingly, we 
adhere to the holding of Weick10 and hold that the felony 
murder language requires not only that the defendant, or his 
accomplices, if any, commit the killing but also that the murder 
helps to move the felony forward.11 
 
 
Applying the Williams test, Hassan-El frames the question presented 
in this appeal as:  How did the murder “help to move the felony (attempted 
robbery) forward?”  In denying Hassan-El’s motion for acquittal, the trial 
judge reasoned that the killing did satisfy the “in furtherance of” requirement 
in Williams: 
                                          
 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2). 
9 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
10 Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 162 (Del. 1980). 
11 Williams v. State, 818 A.2d at 913. 
 
11
The killing of Mr. Alameri, since he no longer would be in a 
position to prevent the robbery from taking place, in essence, 
has furtherance – has furthered the robbery process, has moved 
the robbery process along.  Now, simply because the 
defendants, either because they got scared, or they decided it 
wasn’t worth it anymore, moved on, and did not complete the 
robbery, I don’t believe has any bearing upon the Williams 
decision.  Once the murder has taken place, it has facilitated 
and moved forward the robbery.  It is the defendant’s decision 
at that point in time to complete the act. But Williams doesn’t 
say it prevents a felony murder from proceeding forward. 
 
 
Hassan-El argues that the trial judge’s interpretation of the “in 
furtherance of” requirement allowed a conviction for felony murder based 
entirely on the “supposition” that the killing cleared the way for the 
underlying felony of robbery to proceed to completion.  According to 
Hassan-El, the trial judge’s reasoning “ignores what actually happened.  If 
the killing was intended to further the commission of the robbery, then why 
did Zayas, Hassan-El and Guy all run away after the shots were fired?”   
Hassan-El’s argument fails to recognize that the felony-murder charge 
was based upon an attempted robbery not a completed robbery.  Hassan-El’s 
contention is contrary to the express statutory language that makes 
homicides during an attempted felony the crime of felony murder.  The 
discussion concerning the law of “attempts” in Hassan-El’s opening brief 
explains why the homicide in this case served to “further” the attempted 
robbery and was, therefore felony murder.   
 
12
Under the Criminal Code, an “attempt” to commit a crime occurs 
when the defendant’s conduct is a “‘substantial step’ in a course of conduct 
planned to culminate in the commission of the crime.”12  A “substantial 
step,” in turn, is defined as an “act or omission which leaves no reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant’s intention to commit the crime.13  The law of 
“attempts” under the Criminal Code “seeks to prevent even the preparations 
from crime by threatening punishment prior to the completion of the 
crime.”14  In other words, the crime of “attempt” is completed whenever the 
defendant has taken a “substantial step” toward the commission of the crime, 
whether or not the crime itself ever actually occurs.15   
Hassan-El and Guy were clearly engaged in an attempted robbery 
because they had taken substantial steps toward the commission of a robbery 
when the homicide occurred.  The record reflects that Hassan-El and Guy 
both approached the ice cream truck with their faces covered by shirts.  They 
each carried loaded handguns.  They both fired their weapons immediately 
upon reaching the ice cream truck.   
                                          
 
12 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 531(2). 
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 532. 
14 Del. Crim. Code With Commentary, § 531, at 151 (1973). 
15 Id. § 532, at 156 (“The problem is to identify the point at which the police are to be 
authorized to arrest a person who is preparing to commit a crime”). 
 
13
The General Assembly anticipated the fact that every intended felony 
(in this case robbery) might not be completed.  The felony-murder statute 
expressly provides that a homicide committed during an attempted felony 
can constitute felony murder.  When Hassan-El attempted to commit a 
robbery of the ice cream man, the homicide that resulted was felony murder 
because it occurred “in the course of and in furtherance of the . . . attempted 
commission of a felony,” even if the separate felony of robbery was not 
accomplished – for whatever reason. 
In a related argument, Hassan-El contends the homicide must have 
been an accident since the robbery was never completed and an “accidental” 
killing is insufficient to satisfy the state of mind needed by the “in 
furtherance of” requirement in the felony-murder statute.  Hassan-El 
correctly notes that this Court has recognized that a defendant’s claim of 
accident is a defense that the defendant’s culpable state of mind was a lesser 
degree than that required for a conviction of felony murder.16  The fact that 
Hassan-El or any other defendant could present a “state of mind” defense 
based upon a claim of accident, however, does not mean the defendant is 
entitled to have a felony-murder charge dismissed as a matter of law.   
                                          
 
16 Hall v. State, 431 A.2d 1258, 1260 (Del. 1981). 
 
14
The State’s evidence presented a strong case that Hassan-El was 
guilty of felony murder because the homicide occurred in furtherance of an 
attempted robbery.  Hassan-El’s state of mind was a question for the jury to 
decide.  The record supports the trial judge’s ruling that the jury could 
rationally conclude the shooting occurred “in furtherance of” the attempt to 
commit a robbery.   
Homicide Was “Foreseeable Consequence” 
In this appeal, Hassan-El acknowledges that, “viewing the evidence 
most favorably to the State, it is clear that [he] was an accomplice to the 
planned robbery of the ice cream man.”  Although there is no evidence that 
any of the participants intended a killing to occur, Hassan-El had a loaded 
gun and was aware that Guy had a handgun when they approached the ice 
cream truck.  Zayas testified that Guy and Hassan-El both fired their guns 
almost immediately. 
 
Defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that 
Hassan-El could only be found guilty of felony murder if his intent as an 
accomplice was equivalent to the state of mind required for a conviction of 
felony murder, i.e., that Hassan-El had to have acted either “recklessly” or 
with “criminal negligence” with respect to the risk that death would result 
from the underlying felony of robbery.  Hassan-El’s defense also proffered a 
 
15
proposed instruction to the trial judge.  Defense counsel acknowledged that 
the proposed instruction was contrary to this Court’s holding in Claudio v. 
State.17   
Based upon Claudio,18 the trial judge instructed the jury members that 
they could convict the defendant of felony murder as an accomplice if the 
murder was a “foreseeable consequence” of the robbery, regardless of 
whether the defendant specifically intended that the murder occur.  The 
felony murder instruction to the jury contained the following language: 
 
It is also the law of the state that all persons who join 
together with a common intent and purpose to commit an 
unlawful act which, in itself, makes it foreseeable that a 
criminal offense not specifically agreed upon in advance might 
be committed are responsible for the commission of such 
incidental or consequential criminal offenses whenever the 
second offense is one in furtherance of or an aid to the original 
contemplated unlawful act.  And in that regard, if you 
unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a principal-
accomplice relationship existed between the defendant and Mr. 
Guy to rob the victim, and you find it is reasonably foreseeable 
that as a consequence of the robbery, that another offense might 
be committed in furtherance of the robbery, then all participants 
are responsible for the consequential criminal offense without 
the jury having to find that the defendant specifically intended 
the result of that consequential criminal offense. 
 
                                          
 
17 Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1281-82 (Del. 1991).   
18 Id. 
 
16
In this appeal, Hassan-El asks this Court to overrule Claudio and hold that 
the trial judge’s “foreseeable consequence” instruction in this case was 
reversible error. 
 
In Claudio, as in this case, the defendant was convicted of felony 
murder based on “accomplice liability.”  In Claudio, we addressed the 
elements necessary to impose liability on a defendant who was an 
“accomplice” to the felony murder: 
The inquiry under § 271 is not whether each accomplice had the 
specific intent to commit murder, but whether he intended to 
promote or facilitate the principal’s conduct constituting the 
offense.  The defendants did not have to specifically intend that 
the result, a killing, should occur.  As long as the result was a 
foreseeable consequence of the underlying felonious conduct 
their intent as accomplices includes the intent to facilitate the 
happening of this result (internal citations omitted). 
 
Thus, Delaware law requires the jury to unanimously find that a 
principal-accomplice 
relationship 
existed 
between 
the 
participants with respect to a particular charge, e.g., in this case, 
robbery at knife point.  Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 123 (Del. 
1988).  However, the jury is not required thereafter to find that 
the 
defendants 
specifically 
intended 
the 
result 
of 
a 
consequential crime which occurs, e.g., in this case, murder and 
attempted murder.  Id.  In Martin, for example, the defendants 
originally agreed to burglarize a home for the purpose of 
stealing weapons.  Martin v. State, 433 A.2d at 1028.  This 
Court held that both were properly charged, pursuant to 11 Del. 
C. § 271, with the murder committed in furtherance of the 
burglary.19 
 
                                          
 
19 Id.  
 
17
 
Hassan-El argues that this Court misinterpreted the accomplice 
liability statute20 in Claudio, as applied to felony murder.  In the felony- 
murder context, Hassan-El argues that the “offense” referred to in section 
271, the offense that Hassan-El intends to “promote or facilitate,” is not the 
underlying felony of robbery, but the murder.  That argument was rejected 
by this Court in Hooks v. State,21 where we stated: 
 
The inquiry under § 271 is not whether each accomplice 
had the specific intent to commit murder, but whether he 
intended to promote or facilitate the principal’s conduct 
constituting the offense.  The defendants did not have to 
specifically intend that the result, a killing, should occur.  As 
long as the result was a foreseeable consequence of the 
underlying felonious conduct their intent as accomplices 
includes the intent to facilitate the happening of this result.22 
   
The facts in Hassan-El’s case are directly applicable to the ultimate holding 
in Hooks: 
. . . all the defendants knew that guns were to be carried and if 
necessary used in the course of the robbery.  Therefore, under 
the evidence, including the use of guns to aid the criminal 
activity, appellants could be found guilty as accomplices to first 
degree felony murder committed by the act of another person.23 
 
 
Hassan-El also argues that the “foreseeable consequence” instruction 
given to the jury based upon this Court’s holding in Claudio and Hooks 
                                          
 
20 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 271. 
21 Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 197 (Del. 1980). 
22 Id. at 197. 
23 Id. 
 
18
relieves the jury of the need to find a mens rea element to convict the 
defendant of felony murder.  That argument is not supported by the record.  
Hassan-El’s quotation of the “foreseeable consequence” portion of the jury 
instruction must be read in the context of the entire charge to the jury.   
The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the mens rea requirement 
as follows: 
 
The third element is that the defendant acted recklessly.  
And a person acts recklessly with respect to the act causing 
death again when the person is aware of and consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will 
occur as a result of his conduct.  The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the disregard thereof constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 
would have observed in the situation. 
 
If one “is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that death will occur as a result of his conduct,” then death is a 
“foreseeable consequence” of that conduct.  Similarly, if death is a 
“foreseeable consequence” of certain conduct and an individual nevertheless 
engages in that conduct, then that individual acts recklessly, as defined in the 
trial judge’s instruction to the jury. 
 
The concept of criminal liability embodied in Claudio and Hooks is 
that if the “accomplice” intended to commit the underlying felony, i.e., 
armed robbery, then he or she is also guilty of any “consequential crime” 
that is committed, i.e., murder, as long as the consequential crime was a 
 
19
“foreseeable consequence” of the armed robbery.  In Claudio, the felony 
murder resulted after the defendants agreed to commit a robbery at 
knifepoint.  In Hooks, the felony murder was accomplished when the 
defendants agreed to commit an armed robbery and then shot a store clerk 
with a handgun.   
In this case, the homicide occurred during an attempted robbery that 
was committed by two masked men who each discharged the gun he was 
carrying.  We adhere to our holdings in Claudio and Hooks.  The 
instructions to the jury at Hassan-El’s trial correctly stated those well-
established provisions of the Delaware law, which were applicable at the 
time.  
Section 3507 Violation Harmless Error 
 
Zayas testified as a witness for the State.  He testified that Guy and 
Hassan-El told him they planned to rob the ice cream man.  Zayas testified 
that he was an eyewitness to the shooting.  Zayas’ testimony also touched on 
an “interview” between Zayas and the Wilmington Police which occurred on 
July 24, 2001.   
Before the jury heard Zayas’ out-of-court statement, the defense 
objected to its admissibility.  According to Hassan-El’s attorney, the 
statement was outside the scope of title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware 
 
20
Code24 because it was a videotape of a police interrogation of Zayas, as 
opposed to a “voluntary statement.”  The trial judge overruled the defense’s 
objection but gave the jury a limiting instruction. 
 
The issue presented by Hassan-El is whether a “voluntary statement of 
a witness” under section 3507 includes the “give and take” that occurs 
between a police interrogator and a suspect/witness during the course of an 
interrogation.  Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides:   
 
(a) 
In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-
court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to 
cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value. 
 
 
(b) 
The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall 
apply regardless of whether the witness’ in-court testimony is 
consistent with the prior statement or not.  The rule shall 
likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the 
introducing party. 
 
Hassan-El submits that “the videotape of Zayas’ interrogation by the police, 
when viewed in its totality, allowed the jury to consider not just the content 
of what Zayas was saying to the police, but also impermissibly allowed the 
jury to hear and be influenced by statements by the police to Zayas where 
the police expressed their own opinions as to whether Zayas was being 
truthful with them.”  Hassan-El contends that allowing the jury to consider 
the opinions of the police when it assessed the credibility of the out-of-court 
                                          
 
24 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507. 
 
21
statement takes the statement outside of the intended purpose of section 
3507 and renders the statement inadmissible. 
 
A “statement” is admissible under section 3507, provided a proper 
foundation is made, even though the “statement” would be inadmissible 
under the Delaware Rules of Evidence.25  Nevertheless, this Court has held 
that a “narrow interpretation” of the statute is required because of a 
defendant’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
providing testimonial evidence.26  One type of statement that is beyond the 
scope of section 3507 is an “interpretive narrative:” 
The Statute admits as affirmative evidence “the voluntary out-
of-court prior statement of a witness.”  It is the statement of the 
declarant that is being admitted, not the interpretative narrative 
of the person who heard the statement.  Care should be taken to 
guarantee that the Statute is not abused by permitting a witness, 
such as a police officer, to embellish the prior statement by his 
own interpretation, even if the embellishment is made in the 
utmost good faith.  Obviously, the best protection in this regard 
is a written statement.27 
 
 
A corollary to the prohibition against using section 3507 to present an 
“interpretive narrative” is the well-established principle that a statement 
admitted under section 3507 must not include a police officer’s opinion 
                                          
 
25 Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1152, 1160-61 (Del. 1997) (The enactment of the Delaware 
Rules of Evidence did not affect section 3507.). 
26 Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18, 22 (Del. 1975).  See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), more recently explained in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5185, 
at *133 (U.S. June 29, 2006).    
27 Huggins v. State, 337 A.2d 28, 29 (Del. 1975). 
 
22
concerning the credibility of the witness.28  In Holtzman, the jury viewed a 
videotaped interrogation of the defendant by the police.  During the 
interrogation, the police officer expressed her personal belief that the 
defendant was guilty and that she believed the victim.  This Court held that 
the police officer’s statements in the interrogation concerning the credibility 
of the defendant were beyond the scope of section 3507 and, therefore, 
inadmissible.29   
 
According to Hassan-El, the facts in his case are a mirror image of 
Holtzman because the police interrogation of Zayas is “replete” with 
statements by the police interrogators that they know what happened and 
whether Zayas was being truthful or untruthful with them: 
POLICE OFFICER:  We’ve been workin’ on this since it came 
in. . . . We know what the other people were doing and what 
they did. . . . [W]e know what happened. . . . [W]e know what 
your part was. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  We know you were there . . . [a]nd we 
know the other people involved  . . . [a]nd that’s why we need 
to know your specific part. . . . I know what you did. . . .  I 
know what the other people did . . . [a]nd you have to be honest 
with us. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  [B]ut you’re leaving parts out.  We know 
everything that happened.  We have witnesses, we talked to 
witnesses.  How do you think we came up with you? 
 
                                          
 
28 See Holtzman v. State, 1998 Del. LEXIS 288, at *11-12 (Del. Supr. 1998). 
29 Id. at *5. 
 
23
* * * 
 
And we know what happened. . . . Now, I don’t think you 
intended for Abdul to die. . . . I don’t think you wanted that to 
happen. 
 
* * * 
 
And I don’t think you realized what these two guys were gonna 
do as far as kill him. . . . [Y]ou have to be honest with us and 
tell us everything . . . because you haven’t told us everything.  
We know the two other guys. . . . We know them. . . . Today is 
your only chance. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  I don’t think you intended on killin’ ‘im. . 
. .  And I know you didn’t pull the trigger.  I know that. . . .  But 
you have to tell me your part, because we know what your part 
is. . . . Get it off your chest. . . .  I know you’re not a bad guy. . . 
.  Ya have to talk to us and tell us the truth. 
 
* * * 
 
[Y]ou have to tell us everything, because we know all the facts. 
We’ve been puttin’ the puzzle all together. . . . We know what 
both o’ them did, but we know which one actually did it.   
 
* * * 
 
We know what you did, but you have to tell us. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  Who were the two guys, Robert?  C’mon, 
tell me . . . who were the two guys? 
 
ZAYAS:  I don’t know ‘em, man!”  I don’t know ‘em. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  We know ‘em.  You’re not gonna be 
tellin’ us something we don’t know, but we need to hear you 
say it. 
 
* * * 
 
24
 
ZAYAS:  I didn’t have nothin’ to do with it, man! 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  Who were the two guys? . . . Don’t tell me 
you don’t know, ‘cause I know you know. 
 
* * * 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  Can you identify them? 
 
ZAYAS:  No. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  You’re a liar. 
 
* * * 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  What’s his name? 
 
ZAYAS:  I don’t know. . . . I think its “T.Y.” or something like 
that.   
 
POLICE OFFICER:  [Y]ou’re doin’ fine.  OK?  Robert, you’re 
doin’ fine. . . .  But you have to do a little bit better to help 
yourself out. 
 
* * *  
 
POLICE OFFICER:  Give us his name.  We know you know 
‘im.  God!  I’m tired to throwin’ you so many hints. 
 
* * * 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  We know that the other guy you’re 
probably more afraid of . . . [b]ecause we know what the other 
guy does . . . [a]nd we know he’s that kind of person. . . . OK?   
I know what’s goin’ on here.  We know the other guy.  
 
POLICE OFFICER:  [T]ell me the two guys’ names.  And 
don’t tell me you don’t know now.  No more o’ that!  Tell me 
the two guys’ names now. 
 
25
 
ZAYAS:  It was T.Y. and some boy named Ak, I think. 
 
POLICE OFFICER:  Ak.  A’ight.  We’re making progress.  
You’re not finished with Ak’s name.  
 
In this appeal, Hassan-El contends that all of the foregoing excerpts from 
Zayas’ interrogation served to enhance Zayas’ credibility with the jury 
because the jury was told that what Zayas told the police about the 
involvement of Hassan-El and Guy was consistent with what the police 
already “knew” concerning the identity of the persons who shot the ice 
cream man.   
After the jury saw the videotape, the trial judge gave the following 
instruction to the jury: 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I have to give you this instruction 
concerning the tape that you just heard.  On the tape, you’ve 
heard Detective Lawson, as well as the other detective who was 
there, say on numerous occasions words something to the effect 
we know who was involved; we know who did it; we know 
who fired the gun.  These statements and others that are similar 
like them that were made by the detectives are investigative 
techniques that are frequently used by the police in questioning 
possible suspects or witnesses.  Those statements that are made 
by the police are not evidence and are not reflective of whether 
or not anyone is guilty.  And you should not give any weight 
whatsoever to those particular statements. They were simply an 
investigative technique used by the police. You are, however, 
free to consider the actions taken by the police in assessing the 
credibility of the statements made by the witness and in 
determining the weight you believe should be given to this 
witness’ statements. 
 
 
26
 
Hassan-El acknowledges the general rule that a limiting or curative 
instruction is usually sufficient to remedy any prejudice that results when 
admissible but prejudicial evidence is properly presented or inadmissible 
evidence is erroneously presented to a jury.30  Nevertheless, Hassan-El 
argues that the curative instructions given in his case were insufficient to 
remedy the resulting prejudice.31  Given the strength of the State’s case, 
however, we disagree. 
We hold that the questions and statements by the police were beyond 
the scope of section 3507 and should have been excluded.32  Just a few 
months ago, we held that the State’s argument that the jury needed to see the 
whole videotape to understand the full context of the questioning is “lacking 
in substance.”33  The only evidence permitted by section 3507 is the 
“voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and 
subject to cross-examination.”34   
 
The admission of the police statements and questions requires reversal 
of Hassan-El’s convictions unless it was “harmless beyond a reasonable 
                                          
 
30 Zimmerman v. State, 628 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1993).   
31 See Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 612 (Del. 1988).  See also State v. Savage, 
2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 71, at *9-10 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2002) (curative instruction 
insufficient to remedy error caused by police witness vouching for credibility of 
informant). 
32 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 950-52 (Del. 2006). 
33 Miller v. State, 893 A.2d at 951, n.49. 
34 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507. 
 
27
doubt.”35  The State has the “burden of showing the absence of prejudice.”36  
Although the State did not argue harmless error in its Answering Brief, we 
have the discretion to consider that issue sua sponte.37  In this appeal, we 
directed the parties to brief the question of harmless error prior to hearing 
oral argument en Banc.   
The best way to properly present section 3507 evidence is by a written 
statement from the declarant38 or a redacted recorded statement of only the 
declarant’s words.  Nevertheless, in view of the limiting instruction, and the 
strength of the State’s case, the admission of the police statements and 
questions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.39  Accordingly, we hold 
that error did not deprive Hassan-El of a fair trial.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.40 
 
                                          
 
35 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
36 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993). 
37 See United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1997). 
38 Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1975).  
39 Van Arsdall v. Delaware, 524 A.2d 3 (Del.  1987). 
40 The prior panel opinion issued on July 13, 2006 is withdrawn.