Title: Walker, II v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-638 
____________ 
 
ROBERT SHANNON WALKER, II,  
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
[April 19, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Robert Shannon Walker, II, was convicted of the 2003 first-degree murder, 
kidnapping, and aggravated battery of David “Opie” Hamman and sentenced to 
death.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Walker‟s convictions and death 
sentence.  Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 570 (Fla. 2007).  Walker later filed a 
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851.  Walker appeals from the postconviction court‟s denial of his guilt-phase 
claims, and the State cross-appeals the postconviction court‟s grant of a new 
penalty phase.1 
                                         
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts of this case were fully set out in this Court‟s opinion on direct 
appeal: 
In the late evening hours of January 26, 2003, the victim, David 
“Opie” Hamman, arrived at the second-floor apartment of Joel Gibson 
in the city of Palm Bay, located in Brevard County, Florida.  
Accompanying Hamman were two women, Leslie Ritter and 
Hamman‟s girlfriend, Loriann Gibson.  The appellant, Robert 
Shannon Walker, II, was waiting inside the apartment with his 
girlfriend, Leigh Valorie Ford, and Joel Gibson. 
Immediately after Hamman entered Joel‟s apartment, Walker 
and Ford viciously attacked Hamman, beating him with various 
objects including the head of a metal Maglite flashlight, a baton type 
weapon, and a blackjack.  Although not actively participating, Joel 
seemed to be supervising the attack.  The attack on Hamman was 
drug-related.  About a half hour into the attack, Joel, Walker, and Ford 
forced Hamman to strip down to only his socks to ensure he was not 
wearing a wire because they suspected that Hamman was a Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent.  They also forced Ritter 
and Loriann Gibson to strip down to their underwear in order to check 
for wires but permitted the women to redress. 
After being searched, the women went to the back bedroom.  
They last saw Hamman lying on a bloody sheet on the living room 
floor, naked, with one of his eyes halfway hanging out.  There was 
blood all over the apartment.  From the back bedroom, the women 
heard Walker and Ford asking Hamman, “Are you ready to die?” and 
heard Joel saying Hamman was going to die that night.  They also 
heard Hamman plead for his life and scream, “Please, stop, I don't 
want to die.  Please don‟t kill me.  It hurts.” 
The attack on Hamman at Joel‟s apartment lasted between two 
and three hours.  Sometime around midnight, Hamman tried to 
escape.  While Walker and Ford were distracted, Hamman ran out of 
the apartment and made his way down the stairs, leaving a trail of 
blood behind him.  When Walker and Ford discovered Hamman had 
escaped, Ford said, “Get the bag and stuff and put them in the trunk,” 
and “get the tarp and lay it in the trunk.”  Hamman made it a short 
distance down the road leading away from Joel‟s apartment before 
 
 
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being caught by Walker and Ford.  He had left drops of blood on the 
parking lot and the road at the point where Walker and Ford caught 
him, near the apartment mailboxes.  
Walker and Ford put the tarp in the trunk of Ford‟s automobile 
and forced Hamman to get in.  Walker told Ford to find a remote spot 
to take Hamman.  Ford drove her car with Hamman in the trunk, and 
Walker drove Hamman‟s pickup truck.  On the way, they stopped at 
the house of Joel Gibson‟s girlfriend, Lisa Protz.  Protz saw that 
Walker had a gun.  Walker asked Protz for gasoline, rope, and tape, 
but she only gave him tape.  A few minutes later, Ford arrived, and 
not long after that, Joel called on Protz‟s phone.  While talking to Joel, 
Walker wrapped the tape around his fingers. 
Walker and Ford then left and drove to a remote area down a 
dirt road just outside the gates to the Tom Lawton Recreation Area, a 
state park.  At some point between Joel Gibson‟s apartment and the 
park, Hamman‟s hands were bound behind his back with a plastic 
cable tie.  Just outside the park gates, Hamman was taken out of the 
trunk and forced to lie down with his back on the ground.  Walker 
then shot Hamman six times in the face with a Llama .45 pistol.  
Walker left Hamman on the road and drove back to Joel Gibson‟s 
apartment. 
. . . . 
After waiving his Miranda rights and signing a waiver-of-rights 
form, Walker gave a taped statement to Agents Herrera and Heyn in 
which he confessed to beating, kidnapping, and shooting David 
Hamman.  Walker admitted to beating Hamman with a Maglite 
flashlight when Hamman arrived at Joel‟s apartment but claimed that 
they mainly argued.  Walker said that he made Hamman sit on the 
couch and questioned Hamman about being wired and about being a 
“cop.”  He told Hamman to strip, and Hamman complied.  Walker 
claimed that he hit Hamman only three to four more times before 
Hamman ran naked from the apartment.  Walker explained he “just 
wanted to slap the piss out of [Hamman] because he scared me.” 
Walker also admitted to chasing Hamman down and taking him 
for a ride in the trunk of Ford‟s car, but claimed that Hamman got in 
and out of the trunk on his own.  Walker claimed that when they 
arrived outside the state park, Hamman told Walker that he knew the 
address of Walker‟s parents and was going to rape Walker‟s mother 
while he videotaped it.  Walker then admitted to binding Hamman‟s 
hands and shooting Hamman with the Llama .45.  Walker said that 
 
 
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Hamman‟s body was lying face up beside the truck at the time he was 
shot.  Walker said that he only meant to scare Hamman and humiliate 
him by driving him out to a remote location and forcing him to walk 
back naked.  He explained that he only killed Hamman after Hamman 
scared him by making threats to harm his family.  After that, Walker 
confirmed that he went back to Joel Gibson‟s apartment and asked 
Ritter and Loriann Gibson to take him for a ride in Hamman‟s truck. 
When they stopped in Live Oak, the women left Walker at the gas 
station. 
 
Walker, 957 So. 2d at 565-67 (footnotes omitted).     
 
At the penalty phase, Walker presented testimony from two mental health 
experts, which this Court summarized as follows: 
Both Dr. Radin and Dr. Bernstein diagnosed Walker as having bipolar 
disorder.  Dr. Radin admitted that he “hardly observed” Walker‟s 
mood swings and did not really have evidence of bipolar disorder 
apart from Walker‟s self-reporting.  Walker had never been previously 
diagnosed as bipolar.  Although Walker reported that he had seen 
someone for therapy for eight to ten months when he was fifteen years 
old, Dr. Radin did not perceive Walker‟s condition as being 
longstanding. 
Dr. Radin also testified that people facing serious charges often 
manifest anxiety or depression and that some people with Walker‟s 
bipolar condition might self-medicate with alcohol, marijuana, 
cocaine, or methamphetamines.  He testified that consumption of 
these types of drugs alters one‟s thinking capacity.  Dr. Bernstein also 
testified that people who are depressed tend to self-medicate with 
something that is fast acting, such as crack cocaine, 
methamphetamines, or “speed.”  He further testified that speed is not 
a narcotic but a central nervous system stimulant, and if a bipolar 
person used speed for a few days, the person‟s mental activity would 
likely become more hyperactive.  He further testified that ingestion of 
drugs would aggravate the bipolar disorder. 
 
Id. at 583.  The jury recommended death by a seven to five vote.  Id. at 569. 
 
 
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At the Spencer2 hearing, the trial court indicated that it received letters from 
Walker‟s sister and Walker‟s friend requesting that the trial court show mercy on 
Walker.  At the sentencing hearing, another one of Walker‟s friends, Jean Rebert, 
testified that Walker had been addicted to drugs and that the drugs made him 
violent.  Rebert had a counseling background but had only, in her words, a 
“grandmotherly-type” relationship with Walker that lasted “on and off for about 
three years.”    
The trial court found three aggravators3 and four mitigators.4  The trial court 
followed the jury‟s recommendation and imposed the death penalty.  And on direct 
appeal, this Court affirmed Walker‟s convictions and death sentence.  Id. at 570. 5 
                                         
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
3.  The trial court found the following aggravators:  (1) the murder was 
committed during the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (2) the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); and (3) the murder was cold, 
calculated, and premeditated (great weight).   
 
4.  The trial court found the following mitigators:  (1) Walker was affected 
by the use of drugs, bipolar disorder, and sleep deprivation on the night of the 
murder (moderate weight); (2) Walker‟s codefendant received a life sentence 
(some weight); (3) Walker gave a statement to the police (moderate weight); and 
(4) Walker showed remorse (slight weight).   
 
5.  On direct appeal, Walker argued that (1) the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement because his statement was 
involuntary; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare Florida‟s 
capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because a judge rather than a 
unanimous jury determines death penalty aggravators; (3) the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in weighing 
the aggravating and mitigating factors; (5) the trial court erred by admitting 
 
 
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Walker subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court 
alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He also raised 
various constitutional challenges to the death penalty.  The postconviction court 
denied the guilt-phase and constitutional claims but granted a new penalty phase 
after finding that defense counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to 
investigate mitigating evidence.  Walker now appeals the denial of postconviction 
relief on his guilt-phase claims.  The State cross-appeals the trial court‟s decision 
to grant relief on Walker‟s penalty-phase claim. 
II.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
 
On appeal from the partial denial of postconviction relief, Walker claims 
that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for (A) failing to object to evidence on possible blood stains outside the 
apartment; and (B) failing to present evidence to the jury that Walker‟s statement 
to law enforcement was involuntary.  Walker also alleges (C) cumulative error.  
We affirm the trial court‟s denial of relief on these issues.     
                                                                                                                                   
photographic evidence which was either irrelevant or gruesome and unduly 
prejudicial; (6) the trial court erred in denying Walker‟s motion for a statement of 
particulars regarding the aggravating circumstances and the State‟s theory of 
prosecution; and (7) the trial court erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), by denying Walker‟s 
motion for findings of facts by the jury in a special verdict form.  Walker, 957 So. 
2d at 569. 
 
 
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Following the United State Supreme Court‟s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).  Where this Court previously has rejected a 
substantive claim on the merits, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 
make a meritless argument.  Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992). 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‟s performance was not 
deficient.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  “A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‟s challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel‟s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action „might be considered sound trial strategy.‟ ” 
Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  “Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel‟s performance must be highly deferential.”  Id.  In Occhicone v. State, 768 
So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000), this Court held that “strategic decisions do not 
 
 
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constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 
considered and rejected and counsel‟s decision was reasonable under the norms of 
professional conduct.” 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court‟s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court‟s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
In determining entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, this Court has provided 
the following standard: 
Because a court‟s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing 
on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before 
the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to 
de novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003) 
(holding that “pure questions of law” that are discernible from the 
record “are subject to de novo review”).  Accordingly, when 
reviewing a court‟s summary denial of an initial rule 3.851 motion, 
the Court must accept the movant‟s factual allegations as true, and the 
Court will affirm the ruling only if the filings show that the movant 
has failed to state a facially sufficient claim or that there is no issue of 
material fact to be determined.  See Amendments to Fla. Rules of 
Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 n.2 (Fla. 2000) 
(Amendments I).  However, to the extent there is any question as to 
whether a rule 3.851 movant has made a facially sufficient claim 
requiring a factual determination, the Court will presume that an 
evidentiary hearing is required.  See id. 
. . . In other words, a postconviction claim may be summarily 
denied only when the claim is “legally insufficient, should have been 
brought on direct appeal, or [is] positively refuted by the record.”  
Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 868 (Fla. 2007). 
 
 
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Seibert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 75 (Fla. 2010) (footnote omitted). 
A.  Failure to object to possible blood stains 
 
Walker argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his 
claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object in a timely manner 
to the admission of photographs depicting possible blood stains outside the 
apartment on the stairs.  Specifically, he alleges that, although defense counsel 
objected when the prosecution sought to admit the photographs at trial, his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the photographs earlier, before the jury 
heard the crime scene detective characterize the photographs as depicting 
“apparent blood stains.”  We disagree. 
 
Walker‟s defense counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to lodge an 
earlier objection to the photographs because an earlier objection, like the later 
objection, would have been meritless.  See Raleigh v. State, 932 So. 2d 1054, 1064 
(Fla. 2006) (“[D]efense counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to make a 
meritless objection.”).  As Walker recognized in his postconviction motion, 
defense counsel objected to the admission of the photographs of the apartment 
stairs at trial, and the trial court‟s decision to admit the photographs over defense 
counsel‟s objection was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.  Walker, 957 So. 
2d at 569.  Walker‟s attempt to focus his argument on the timing of counsel‟s 
 
 
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objection to the same evidence does not alter the underlying issue of admissibility 
of the photographs. 
Even if defense counsel should have objected prior to the witness‟s 
description of the photographs, Walker cannot establish prejudice.  “Under 
Strickland, a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel‟s deficient performance if 
„there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.‟ ”  Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. 
Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).  “A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Here, this prejudice prong of Strickland cannot be 
satisfied because Walker confessed to the murder and, specifically, to beating the 
victim in the apartment, chasing him down, and putting him in the trunk of Ford‟s 
car.  The prosecution presented evidence independent of the photographs to 
demonstrate that the victim was severely beaten and bloodied and that blood 
matching the victim‟s DNA profile was located inside the upstairs apartment and 
in Ford‟s trunk.6 
                                         
 
6.  Walker also argues that a postconviction evidentiary hearing was 
necessary so that the trial court could hear evidence of an unrelated fight on the 
same steps, suggesting that counsel was also ineffective for failing to investigate 
the possibility that the blood could be attributed to another source.  However, even 
if blood from another source was also found on the trail between the apartment and 
the trunk, Walker could not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.  And, to any 
extent that Walker attempts to present newly discovered evidence, the claim fails 
 
 
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Therefore, Walker‟s claim was properly denied without a hearing by the trial 
court.    
B.  Failure to present evidence to the jury that Walker’s confession was 
involuntary 
 
Walker also argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 
his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence to the 
jury that Walker‟s confession was involuntary.  Prior to trial, Walker moved to 
suppress his statement to law enforcement on the ground that it was involuntarily 
made under the influence of mind-altering drugs.  The trial court viewed the 
videotaped interrogation and heard evidence on Walker‟s drug use on the day of 
his arrest.  Ultimately, the trial court found that “there was insufficient evidence as 
to the exact drugs used or the amount” and ruled that, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, Walker‟s waiver and confession were knowingly and intelligently 
given.  This Court affirmed, determining that the trial court‟s ruling on 
voluntariness was supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Walker, 957 So. 
2d at 575. 
Walker asserts that defense counsel should have presented the same 
information to the jury during the trial because the jury could have decided that the 
confession was involuntary.  In support, he references Florida Standard Instruction 
                                                                                                                                   
because the evidence is not “of such nature that it would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial.”  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). 
 
 
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in Criminal Cases 3.9(e), which was given prior to deliberations in this case and 
advises the jury as follows: 
A statement claimed to have been made by the defendant 
outside of court has been placed before you.  Such a statement should 
always be considered with caution and be weighed with great care to 
make certain it was freely and voluntarily made. 
Therefore, you must determine from the evidence that the 
defendant‟s alleged statement was knowingly, voluntarily, and freely 
made. 
In making this determination, you should consider the total 
circumstances, including but not limited to: 
1.  whether, when the defendant made the statement, [he] had 
been threatened in order to get [him] to make it, and 
2.  whether anyone had promised [him] anything in order to get 
[him] to make it. 
If you conclude the defendant‟s out of court statement was not 
freely and voluntarily made, you should disregard it. 
 
Emphasis added. 
The trial court did not err in summarily denying Walker‟s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel because the underlying claim that Walker‟s 
statement was involuntary is meritless.  On direct appeal, this Court concluded that 
there was “competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court‟s conclusion 
that Walker made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive his 
Miranda rights and give his statement to police.”  Walker, 957 So. 2d at 576.  
Walker is not permitted to relitigate the voluntariness of his confession on 
postconviction appeal.  See Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1106 (Fla. 2008) 
 
 
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(“Because the . . . issue was raised on direct appeal, Green is not permitted to 
relitigate it on postconviction appeal.”).   
However, even if defense counsel was deficient for failing to present 
evidence of intoxication to the jury, Walker cannot establish prejudice.  The 
available evidence on drug impairment and sleeplessness was, as the trial court 
found, insufficient to show lack of voluntariness and conflicted with testimony 
from officers that Walker showed no signs of drug influence at questioning.  See 
Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1984) (“[T]he drunken condition of an 
accused when making a confession, unless such drunkenness goes to the extent of 
mania, does not affect the admissibility in evidence of such confession . . . .”) 
(quoting Lindsey v. State, 63 So. 832, 833 (Fla. 1913) (emphasis added)).  Walker 
does not allege that counsel should have advanced any evidence beyond that 
previously presented to the trial court at the suppression hearing.  Therefore, even 
if defense counsel was deficient for failing to present evidence of intoxication to 
the jury, there is no “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Porter, 130 S. Ct. 
at 453 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).  Our confidence is not undermined.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 
 
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Accordingly, the trial court did not err in summarily denying this claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
C.  Cumulative error 
 
Because Walker has failed to provide this Court with any basis for relief in 
any of his postconviction claims, Walker is not entitled to relief based on 
cumulative error.  See Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010). 
III.  STATE’S CROSS-APPEAL 
The State argues that the postconviction court erred in finding that defense 
counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase.  We disagree and affirm the 
postconviction court‟s order granting a new penalty phase. 
In evaluating alleged deficiency during the penalty phase, this Court has 
recognized that “an attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation 
of a defendant‟s background for possible mitigating evidence.”  State v. 
Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 (Fla. 2000).  “In the penalty phase of a trial, „[t]he 
major requirement . . . is that the sentence be individualized by focusing on the 
particularized characteristics of the individual.‟ ”  Cooper v. Sec‟y, Dep‟t of Corr., 
646 F.3d 1328, 1354 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 
1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987)).  “Therefore, „[i]t is unreasonable to discount to 
irrelevance the evidence of [a defendant‟s] abusive childhood.‟ ”  Id. (quoting 
Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 455).  We have specified that “investigations into mitigating 
 
 
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evidence „should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating 
evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced 
by the prosecutor.‟ ”  Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 974 (Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003)).  This Court has also specifically 
noted that “both Wiggins[, 539 U.S. at 524,] and the ABA Guidelines for 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 10.11 (rev. ed. 
2003) on counsel‟s duties mandate mitigation investigation and preparation, even if 
the client objects.”  Henry v. State, 937 So. 2d 563, 573 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
To show prejudice under Strickland, the defendant “must show that but for 
his counsel‟s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a 
different sentence.  To assess that probability, we consider „the totality of the 
available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence 
adduced in the [postconviction] proceeding‟—and „reweig[h] it against the 
evidence in aggravation.‟ ”  Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 453-54 (quoting Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)).  “A reasonable probability is a „probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‟ ”  Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 
609, 617 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
In this case, defense counsel testified that he investigated potential 
mitigation evidence by conducting five phone conversations with Walker‟s mother 
 
 
- 16 - 
and sister and by talking to some mostly unidentified “local people.”  Defense 
counsel never sought medical, educational, criminal, drug treatment, or social 
service records.7  He did not seek background information from any other 
immediate or extended family members prior to trial.  Walker‟s counsel also 
declined to contact Christopher Walker, Walker‟s cousin, who provided extensive 
testimony on Walker‟s family background at the evidentiary hearing, even though 
Walker was using Christopher‟s name and identification at the time of his arrest.  
Once Walker‟s trial began, defense counsel met with Walker‟s mother and father, 
observed that “they were pathetic looking,” but did not do any research regarding 
the family‟s background.  Defense counsel did not attempt to speak with any 
former neighbors, correctional officers, or teachers familiar with Walker.   
Defense counsel presented just two witnesses at the penalty phase, Dr. Radin 
and Dr. Bernstein, both of whom diagnosed Walker with bipolar disorder while in 
jail awaiting trial.   Walker, 957 So. 2d at 583.  The experts together provided 
generalized information regarding the tendency of those with bipolar disorder to 
“self-medicate” with drugs and the likelihood that such drugs would aggravate the 
disorder.  Id.  Neither expert, however, discussed Walker‟s history with drugs or 
                                         
 
7.  Records from a social worker who worked with Walker as a child were 
found in defense counsel‟s file during postconviction proceedings.  But defense 
counsel did not remember receiving or viewing those records in preparation for the 
penalty phase, leading the postconviction court to find that defense counsel “never 
pursued that lead.” 
 
 
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their role in the crime.  At the Spencer hearing, defense counsel declined to present 
any additional evidence and did not request a continuance to review the letters 
received by the judge, letters that defense counsel had not seen before. 
In contrast, at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Walker presented 
extensive testimony from family and friends concerning his background and family 
history as well as testimony from two additional experts with knowledge specific 
to Walker‟s drug addiction and lifelong emotional and educational problems.  First, 
Walker‟s cousin, Anita Morris, testified that she was available and would have 
testified at the penalty phase if asked.  She was “very close” with Walker growing 
up and frequently visited his home until she was a teenager.  Morris testified that 
Walker‟s parents hosted frequent, chaotic parties in which 30-40 visitors abused 
alcohol, marijuana, and hallucinogens.  She remembered the environment as a 
scary one in which adults engaged in routine violence and laid on the floor 
intoxicated as the children were neglected and allowed to sample drugs.  She 
would retreat from the home whenever possible. 
Morris observed Walker taking drugs as a child and knew him to be exposed 
to drugs on a daily basis.  According to Morris, Walker‟s parents did not provide 
for his basic needs and instead spent money on drugs and alcohol.  Walker‟s 
mother believed she could talk to spirits and regularly abused marijuana and 
hallucinogenic mushrooms.  One of Walker‟s sisters was retarded, one had mental 
 
 
- 18 - 
illness problems, and all three of his sisters had drug problems.  Morris testified 
that when Walker was a child, he was overweight and had regular bowel control 
problems.  His parents and other family members made fun of him, and Walker 
would frequently lose control and attack people. 
Another cousin, Christopher Walker, testified that he was available and 
would have testified at the penalty phase if asked.  Christopher was a year older 
than Walker, and the two grew up together like brothers.  He too observed chaotic 
parties involving cocaine, LSD, and marijuana use and witnessed numerous 
occasions in which violence, sometimes involving Walker‟s parents, resulted in 
severe injuries requiring hospitalization.  Christopher remembered adults openly 
using drugs in front of them and recalled leaving the house to get away from 
violence.  He said that Walker‟s father abused drugs and alcohol and that Walker‟s 
mother practiced witchcraft, abused LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, and would give 
drugs to members of the family.  Christopher further testified that when he and 
Walker were children, Walker‟s family would provide them with drugs if the 
children were unable to take it from the table.  By age eleven, he and Walker were 
involved in the parties and were drinking and taking drugs on a daily basis.  
Christopher testified that Walker was using LSD at age fourteen or fifteen.  He 
recalled all of Walker‟s family members engaged in substance abuse and two of 
Walker‟s sisters having serious mental issues. 
 
 
- 19 - 
Christopher testified that Walker‟s parents did not provide for Walker and 
would only occasionally provide Walker with food.  He and Walker had to find 
their own meals and were not supervised as children.  Christopher recalled Walker 
and his parents getting physically violent with one another and remembers running 
from the house with Walker to escape.  He also testified that Walker would bite his 
teachers and pull their hair.  Christopher said that Walker‟s bowel control problems 
persisted until Walker was a teenager and that he developed “violent tendencies.”  
Christopher testified that Walker was in special education classes.  When Walker 
was a teenager, an older man “took [Walker] under his wing” and introduced him 
to a criminal motorcycle gang known for dealing drugs, bombing cars, and 
shooting people.  During this time, the quantity and types of drugs Christopher and 
Walker ingested started to increase and expanded to include crystal 
methamphetamines, “a lot of PCP,” and “lots of cocaine.”  Christopher testified 
that he and Walker continued to abuse drugs together throughout their teenage 
years and into their twenties.  Walker moved to Florida when Walker was in his 
mid- to late-twenties.  When he came to visit once, however, Christopher observed 
that Walker was using crystal methamphetamines and not sleeping.  Walker 
appeared to be scared and “running from something.” 
 
Jean Rebert, the friend who testified at the sentencing hearing, testified at 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing that she was not contacted until after the 
 
 
- 20 - 
trial but that she would have been available and willing to testify at the penalty 
phase if asked.  Rebert‟s son knew Walker when Walker was a teenager and the 
two were involved in the motorcycle gang.  Her son was later incarcerated for 
racketeering and drug dealing associated with that involvement.  She testified that 
she met Walker when he came to Florida with his wife and that she never saw 
Walker using drugs.  However, she learned from Walker‟s sister that he was 
allowed to use drugs and alcohol as a toddler and that she saw Walker experience 
dramatic weight loss and begin to resemble someone addicted to crack cocaine or 
methamphetamine.   
 
Another friend, Gene D‟Oria, testified that he was never contacted but was 
willing and available to testify at the penalty phase.  He met Walker when Walker 
was in the motorcycle gang, and the two started using drugs together.  At first, he 
said, the methamphetamine use was “casual” and confined to weekends.  After a 
year of methamphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana use, however, Walker 
was staying awake to use methamphetamine for days at a time, had “dope sores” 
on his stomach and arms, developed bad teeth, and lost a significant amount of 
weight.  Six to eight months prior to the murders, Walker appeared “scary” and no 
longer trusted anyone.  D‟Oria‟s friendship with Walker ended about a week 
before the murder because Walker became so paranoid that he attacked a mutual 
friend. 
 
 
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Walker also presented expert testimony from Edward Gratzick, a social 
worker and therapist to whom Walker was referred by the juvenile court when 
Walker was fifteen.  Gratzick testified that Walker had no physical problems but 
would lose control of his bowels daily or every other day until he was nine years 
old.  Gratzick testified that Walker started receiving special education as an 
emotionally disturbed child in second grade and that attempts to place him in 
mainstream classes did not work because of Walker‟s “emotional verbal 
outbursts.”  He said that Walker dropped out of school and quit therapy at age 
sixteen.  
Finally, Walker presented expert testimony from Dr. William Morton, a 
psychopharmacologist, who reviewed records, interviewed Walker and others 
familiar with Walker, and testified regarding Walker‟s addiction to 
methamphetamine and the effects of various drugs on Walker‟s brain.  Dr. Morton 
testified that Walker put methamphetamines in his coffee in the morning and 
swallowed and sniffed it throughout the day.  He testified that Walker was using 
two to four grams of methamphetamine every day, a level of abuse that typically 
results in drug-induced delirium, pronounced paranoia, and psychosis.  His 
discussions with witnesses and information gathered from police reports confirmed 
 
 
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that at the time of the crime, Walker was suffering from impulsivity, distorted 
perceptions, persistent paranoia, hallucinations, and very high anxiety.8   
In its order granting relief on this claim, the postconviction court found that 
the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, unlike the evidence at the 
penalty phase, “gave considerable insight into [Walker‟s] childhood and young 
adulthood,” serving to humanize him to the jury.  The postconviction court 
concluded that if the evidence had been presented at trial, it was likely to constitute 
“strong” and “important” mitigation likely to influence at least one juror.  
Furthermore, the postconviction court considered the information regarding 
Walker‟s substance abuse to be a mitigator under these circumstances. 
The postconviction court did not err in concluding that counsel was 
ineffective.  Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1264 (Fla. 2005) (“In the past, 
this Court has found ineffectiveness where no attempt was made to investigate 
mitigation even though substantial mitigating evidence could have been 
presented”).9  First, even if Walker was resistant to defense counsel‟s efforts, 
                                         
 
8.  Walker also presented expert testimony from Dr. Joseph Sesta concerning 
possible brain injury.  But, because Walker refused to receive an MRI in 
preparation for the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court found no basis to 
conclude that the testimony would have constituted significant mitigation 
evidence.  
9.  Additionally, the trial court correctly determined that Walker did not 
make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of mitigation evidence.  See 
State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002).  Because defense counsel failed 
 
 
- 23 - 
defense counsel‟s failure to attempt to collect background records and testimony 
from available family members and friends supports the conclusion that counsel‟s 
performance was deficient.  See Cooper, 646 F.3d at 1354; Henry, 937 So. 2d at 
573 (noting that counsel must investigate mitigation “even if the client objects”); 
cf. Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 493 (Fla. 2007) (finding counsel not ineffective 
where “the record supports both the finding of lack of cooperation by Peede and 
counsel‟s efforts notwithstanding Peede‟s recalcitrance”) (emphasis added).  
Defense counsel‟s failure to attempt to obtain reasonably available mitigating 
evidence from available sources precludes the State‟s argument that counsel 
reasonably chose against advancing the potentially detrimental testimony presented 
at the evidentiary hearing.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572-73 (Fla. 1996) 
(finding counsel‟s decision neither informed nor strategic where “there was no 
investigation of options or meaningful choice”).  
                                                                                                                                   
to reasonably investigate mitigating evidence as set forth above, Walker did not 
have the opportunity to make an informed, intelligent decision.  See id. at 1113-14 
(“Although a defendant may waive mitigation, he cannot do so blindly; counsel 
must first investigate all avenues and advise the defendant so that the defendant 
reasonably understands what is being waived and its ramifications and hence is 
able to make an informed, intelligent decision.”); see also Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 
3d 959, 983 (Fla. 2010) (determining that the defendant‟s waiver was invalid 
where there was “no indication that trial counsel performed any investigation into 
the penalty phase”); State v. Pearce, 994 So. 2d 1094, 1102 (Fla. 2008) 
(determining that the defendant‟s waiver was invalid where “counsel never 
investigated Pearce‟s background, never interviewed members of Pearce‟s family, 
and never investigated mental health issues”). 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Second, Walker has established prejudice.  After reweighing the evidence in 
aggravation against the mitigation evidence presented during the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing and the penalty phase, our confidence in the outcome of the 
penalty phase trial is undermined.  See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 453-54.  Walker had a 
troubled history that was at minimum relevant to assessing his moral culpability.  
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“Evidence about the defendant‟s 
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this 
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have no 
such excuse.”) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O‟Connor, 
J., concurring)); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (noting that 
consideration of the capital defendant‟s background is a “part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death”) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 304 (1976)).  Considering the lack of background evidence produced at trial, 
the wealth of such evidence produced at the postconviction hearing, and the trial 
court‟s determination that its presentation was likely to result in “strong” or 
“important” mitigators, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase trial is 
undermined.  See Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 453-54; Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 985 
(Fla. 2010) (affirming a finding of prejudice because “there was substantial 
mitigating evidence which was available but undiscovered”) (quoting State v. 
 
 
- 25 - 
Pearce, 994 So. 2d 1094, 1103 (Fla. 2008)).  The State‟s argument that the 
evidence presented at the postconviction hearing was cumulative is unsupported by 
the record, which demonstrates a lack of penalty-phase testimony on Walker‟s 
turbulent background, family history, and drug addiction. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that defense counsel 
was ineffective during the penalty phase and in granting Walker a new penalty 
phase. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court‟s order denying Walker‟s 
guilt-phase claims and granting a new penalty phase.   
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,  
Charles m. Holcomb, Judge - Case No. 05-2003-CF-3250 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Raheela Ahmed and Carol C. 
Rodriguez, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
 
Pamela, Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara Curtis 
Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant