Title: State v. Gabriel Derango

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 89 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Gabriel Derango,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 1, 599 N.W.2d 27 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Emmanuel Vuvunas 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating: PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Robert G. LeBell, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Robert G. LeBell. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 89 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0642-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Gabriel Derango, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   This is a child enticement and 
sexual exploitation case arising out of an incident in which the 
defendant telephoned a 15-year-old girl and offered her $300 to 
perform a striptease and other sexual acts on video.  The 
defendant, Gabriel Derango, was convicted of one count each of 
child enticement and attempted child sexual exploitation, and 
now challenges those convictions on unanimity, multiplicity and 
sufficiency of the evidence grounds.  He has other claims of 
error as well: the admission of other acts evidence against him, 
and the filing of an amended information conforming the charges 
to the proof at the close of the evidence.  We affirm. 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
On February 7, 1997, 15-year-old Jessica E. and 
several of her friends were waiting for a ride outside a 
McDonald's restaurant in Kenosha when they were approached by 
the 
defendant, 
Gabriel 
Derango, 
a 
68-year-old 
McDonald's 
employee.  Derango asked Jessica what grade she was in.  Jessica 
replied that she was in tenth grade and asked Derango why he 
wanted to know.  Derango said he was just curious and went back 
inside the restaurant.   
¶3 
A short time later, Derango returned outside and asked 
Jessica if she had ever modeled.  Jessica told him that she had, 
and that she was enrolled in modeling school.  Derango then 
asked her if she was interested in modeling in magazines and 
catalogs.  When Jessica said yes, Derango told her that he would 
first need her mother's permission because she was underage, and 
asked for her telephone number.  Jessica gave Derango her home 
telephone number, and Derango said he would call her soon.   
¶4 
Two days later, Derango called Jessica and asked if 
she was still interested in modeling for him.  Jessica inquired 
what kind of modeling was involved.  Derango told her that the 
job was "risque."  He then offered her $300 to perform a 
striptease and other nude sexual acts on video.  Derango told 
Jessica that at some point, he or one of his friends would get 
in the video with her and perform sexual acts.  Derango said he 
would pick Jessica up and take her somewhere to shoot the video. 
¶5 
In the course of the telephone call, Derango began 
asking Jessica personal questions, including whether she had a 
boyfriend, whether she and her boyfriend ever had sex, and 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
3 
whether she had tried oral sex.  Jessica told Derango that it 
was none of his business, but Derango persisted, eventually 
telling Jessica that she should try having sex with an older 
man, hinting that she should try it with him.  Jessica testified 
that Derango was "very persistent in offering me $300 in 
exchange for him filming me doing sex acts" and "would not take 
no for an answer."  Derango told Jessica to think about his 
offer and he would call her the following day.   
¶6 
Jessica immediately told her mother about the call and 
the next morning went to the police to report the incident.  On 
February 15, 1997, City of Kenosha Police Detective Russell 
Beckman went to Derango's home to question him.  During the 
interview, Beckman noticed several videotapes with distinctive 
lettering scattered around Derango's living room.  The tapes 
were labeled with women's names, including "Theresa," "Cindy," 
"Abbey," and "Vicky," and the words, "Parkside," "Milwaukee 
College," "Visitor Exchange Czech Republic," and "Racine."  
These titles corresponded to a handwritten list also found in 
Derango's home.  Beckman asked Derango if he could take the 
tapes, and Derango consented.   
¶7 
The tapes were amateur productions depicting girls who 
appeared to be in their middle to late teens performing 
stripteases and other sexual acts.  One video featured a girl in 
a bedroom that appeared to be that of a teenager or preteenager. 
 On the tape, the girl is seen removing her clothes and 
performing sexually explicit acts, stating that she is 18, but 
that the viewer could pretend that she is 14, 15 or 16, and 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
4 
encouraging the viewer to remember what it was like to have a 
girl of her age. 
¶8 
On February 18, 1997, Beckman returned to Derango's 
home to take a statement.  Derango told Beckman that, contrary 
to Jessica's version of events, Jessica had actually approached 
him while he was working and told him that she was taking 
modeling classes and wanted to be a model.  Derango said Jessica 
then gave him her telephone number.  Derango told Beckman that 
when he called Jessica they talked about trouble she was having 
in school and with her boyfriend.  He said Jessica told him that 
she was pregnant and needed money, and then offered to have sex 
with him for $50. 
¶9 
Derango was charged with one count of child sexual 
exploitation (using, persuading, inducing, or enticing a child 
to 
engage 
in 
sexually 
explicit 
conduct 
for 
purposes 
of 
videotaping the conduct)  contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1)(a) 
(1995-96).1  After the preliminary hearing, the State filed a 
two-count 
information 
that 
restated 
the 
child 
sexual 
exploitation charge and added a charge of child enticement 
(causing or attempting to cause a child to go into a secluded 
place with intent to have sexual contact or intercourse) 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1). 
¶10 Derango pled not guilty and moved to dismiss, alleging 
that the counts were multiplicitous and that the evidence was 
                     
1 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version.  
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
5 
insufficient to support the bindover.  The Circuit Court for 
Kenosha County, Judge Emmanuel J. Vuvunas, presiding, denied the 
motion.  Derango then unsuccessfully petitioned the court of 
appeals for leave to appeal.  Derango also moved to exclude the 
videotapes from evidence.  The circuit court denied that motion 
as well. 
¶11 On July 17 and 18, 1997, the case was tried to a jury. 
 At the close of the evidence, the court permitted the State to 
amend the information to conform to the proof, downgrading count 
one to attempted sexual exploitation, and changing count two to 
add violations of subsections (3) and (4) (intent to expose or 
cause a child to expose a sex organ, or take a picture of a 
child engaging in sexually explicit conduct) to the previously 
alleged violation of subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 948.07 as 
the basis for the child enticement charge.  The jury found 
Derango guilty of both counts, and he was placed on four years 
probation.  Derango appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. 
 State v. Derango, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶12 Derango argues five grounds for reversal:2 1) he was 
denied the right to a unanimous jury verdict on count two, 
contrary to art. I, sec. 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 2) his 
conviction for both attempted child sexual exploitation and 
child enticement as a result of a single telephone call is 
multiplicitous, 3) the circuit court erred in admitting the 
                     
2 He has dropped his claims of error, made in the court of 
appeals, regarding the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing 
and the denial of a lesser included offense instruction. 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
6 
videotapes as other acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2), 4) the circuit court erred by permitting the State to 
amend the information at the close of the evidence, and 5) the 
evidence was not sufficient to support the guilty verdicts.  We 
address each argument in turn. 
I.  Unanimity 
¶13 The Wisconsin Constitution's guarantee of a right to 
trial by jury includes the right to a unanimous verdict with 
respect to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Wis. 
Const., art. I, §§ 5 and 7; Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 
138, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979); Vogel v. State, 138 Wis. 315, 332-
33, 119 N.W. 190 (1909); Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 14-16, 38 
N.W. 177 (1888). "The principal justification for the unanimity 
requirement is that it ensures that each juror is convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved each 
essential element of the offense."  State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 
2d 582, 591, 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983); see also Holland, 91 Wis. 2d 
at 138 (requirement of jury unanimity linked to due process 
requirement of proof of each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, citing In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
¶14 Jury 
unanimity, 
however, 
is 
required 
"only 
with 
respect to the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence of the crime charged, and . . . not . . . with respect 
to the alternative means or ways in which the crime can be 
committed."  Holland, 91 Wis. 2d at 143.  The threshold question 
in a unanimity challenge, therefore, is whether the statute 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
7 
creates multiple offenses or a single offense with multiple 
modes of commission.  Id.; see also State v. Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d 
214, 219, 576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶15 To resolve the question, we examine four factors: 1) 
the language of the statute, 2) the legislative history and 
context of the statute, 3) the nature of the proscribed conduct, 
and 4) the appropriateness of multiple punishment for the 
conduct.  Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d at 220 (citing Manson v. State, 
101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981)).  The point is to 
determine legislative intent: did the legislature intend to 
create multiple, separate offenses, or a single offense capable 
of being committed in several different ways?  Id. 
¶16 As always, we look first at the language of the 
statute.  The offense of child enticement, Wis. Stat. § 948.07, 
is defined as:   
 
Whoever, with intent to commit any of the following 
acts, causes or attempts to cause any child who has 
not attained the age of 18 years to go into any 
vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of 
a Class BC felony: 
 
(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of s. 948.02 or 948.095. 
 
(2) Causing the child to engage in prostitution. 
 
(3) Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing the 
child to expose a sex organ in violation of s. 
948.10.  
 
(4) Taking a picture or making an audio recording of 
the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
 
(5) Causing bodily or mental harm to the child. 
 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
8 
(6) Giving or selling to the child a controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
in 
violation of ch. 961. 
¶17 The statute, by its straightforward language, creates 
one offense with multiple modes of commission.  It criminalizes 
the act of causing or attempting to cause a child to go into a 
vehicle, building, room or other secluded place with any of six 
possible prohibited intents.  The act of enticement is the 
crime, not the underlying intended sexual or other misconduct. 
¶18 This reading of the statute is consistent with prior 
interpretations, all of which have concluded that the act (or 
attempt) of enticementluring a child to a secluded place, away 
from the protections of the general publicis itself the 
prohibited act.  In State v. Hanson, 182 Wis. 2d 481, 513 N.W.2d 
700 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals considered a 
defendant's claim that the statutory penalty scheme of the child 
enticement statute was irrational.  The defendant argued that 
there was no legitimate reason that enticement to commit the act 
of indecent exposure should have a greater penalty than indecent 
exposure itself.  Id. at 485-86. 
¶19 The 
court 
concluded 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient 
justification for the disparity because:    
 
[The] enticement of a child is "a social evil in and 
of itself regardless of the specific sexual motive 
which causes the defendant to act."  The gravamen of 
the crime is not the commission of an enumerated act, 
but succeeding in getting a child to enter a place 
with intent to commit such a crime.  
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
9 
Id. at 487 (citation omitted).   See also Huebner v. State, 33 
Wis. 2d 505, 513, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967)(interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.12 (1965), the predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 948.07). 
¶20 The legislative history of the statute also supports 
our conclusion that the child enticement statute creates a 
single crime with multiple modes of commission, rather than 
multiple, separate offenses.  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.07 was 
created by 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 55 as part of a revision of 
state law relating to crimes against children.  The predecessor 
to § 948.07 did not set forth a specific list of requisite 
intents, but referred to the general intent to "commit a crime 
against sexual morality."3  The drafting file indicates that the 
list of enumerated purposes in the current version of the 
statute was intended to replace and clarify the "crime against 
sexual morality" language with a more specific elucidation of 
prohibited intents which, if present, satisfy the mens rea or 
state of mind element of this offense.  1987 S.B. 203.  There is 
no indication in the legislative history that the legislature 
intended to take what was once a single crime and replace it 
with six.   
¶21 Finally, 
our 
assessment 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
proscribed 
conduct 
and 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
multiple 
punishments leads us to conclude that one crime with separate 
                     
3  Wis. Stat. § 944.12 (1985-86):  "Enticing a child for 
immoral purposes.  Any person 18 years of age or older who, with 
intent to commit a crime against sexual morality, persuades or 
entices any child under 18 years of age into any vehicle, 
building, room or secluded place is guilty of a Class C felony." 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
10
modes of commission was intended.  The proscribed conduct here 
is the enticement of a child to a secluded place for some 
improper, usually sexual, purpose.  We have previously concluded 
that acts warrant separate punishment when they are separate in 
time or are significantly different in nature.  State v. 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 499-500, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992) (quoting 
State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 31, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980)).  
Here, there is only one act, enticing a child, committed with 
one or more of six possible mental states.  We think it likely 
in this context that a defendant might very often possess more 
than one prohibited intention when enticing a child.  Intent to 
have sexual intercourse, for example, obviously also encompasses 
intent to expose or cause the child to expose a sex organ; or, a 
defendant may entice a child with the dual purpose of giving her 
drugs and exploiting her sexually.  Yet, only one crime is 
committed.  Multiple punishments for a single act committed with 
more than one prohibited intent would not be appropriate under 
this statute.   
¶22 Where, as here, the statute creates one crime with 
alternate modes of commission, our cases have held that 
unanimity is not required unless the alternate modes of 
commission are conceptually distinct.  Manson, 101 Wis. 2d at 
430; Holland, 91 Wis. 2d at 139.  See also State v. Seymour, 183 
Wis. 2d 683, 697-98, 515 N.W.2d 874 (1994); State v. Gomaz, 141 
Wis. 2d 302, 312, 414 N.W.2d 626 (1987); State v. Gustafson, 119 
Wis. 2d 676, 695-96, 351 N.W.2d 653 (1984); Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 591-98; State v. Giwosky, 109 Wis. 2d 446, 453-56, 326 N.W.2d 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
11
232 (1982); State v. Cheers, 102 Wis. 2d 367, 399-402, 306 
N.W.2d 676 (1981); State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 449-50, 
304 N.W.2d 742 (1981).  This "conceptually distinct" test, 
however, is derived from United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 
456-59 (5th Cir. 1977), a once influential unanimity case.  
However, in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 635 (1991), the 
United States Supreme Court rejected Gipson's approach in favor 
of a constitutional test for unanimity challenges that focuses 
on an evaluation of the fundamental fairness and rationality of 
the legislature's choice to provide for a single offense with 
alternate modes of commission.  Id. at 637.  More specifically, 
the Supreme Court in Schad held: 
 
We are convinced, however, of the impracticability of 
trying to derive any single test for the level of 
definitional and verdict specificity permitted by the 
Constitution, and we think that instead of such a test 
our sense of appropriate specificity is a distillate 
of the concept of due process with its demands for 
fundamental fairness and for the rationality that is 
an 
essential 
component 
of 
that 
fairness. 
 
In 
translating these demands for fairness and rationality 
into 
concrete 
judgments 
about 
the 
adequacy 
of 
legislative determinations, we look both to history 
and wide practice as guides to fundamental values, as 
well as to narrower analytical methods of testing the 
moral and practical equivalence of the different 
mental states that may satisfy the mens rea element of 
a single offense.  The enquiry is undertaken with a 
threshold presumption of legislative competence to 
determine the appropriate relationship between means 
and ends in defining the elements of a crime. 
Id. at 637-38 (citation omitted).  
¶23 Schad was a capital murder case in which the jury was 
not required to unanimously agree on either of two alternate 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
12
mental states for the crime: premeditation and felony murder 
(murder committed in the course of a felony, in that case, a 
robbery).  The Supreme Court noted that the acceptability of 
alternate mental states for the crime of murder had lengthy 
historical 
roots, 
and 
the 
alternate 
mental 
states 
were 
essentially 
morally 
equivalent. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
Court 
concluded 
that 
due 
processfundamental 
fairness 
and 
rationalitydid not require unanimity.  Id. at 645. 
¶24 Applying Schad's due process test of fundamental 
fairness and rationality here, we conclude that unanimity was 
not required.  We start with Schad's presumption in favor of the 
legislative 
determination 
to 
create 
a 
single 
crime 
with 
alternate modes of commission, for which unanimity is not 
required.  The child enticement statute as currently written 
does not have a lengthy history to look to as an indicia of what 
is acceptable as fundamentally fair; but Schad recognized that 
this might often be the case with modern criminal statutes.  Id. 
at 640 n.7.  The alternate mental states for the crime of child 
enticement are clearly conceptually and morally equivalent: they 
all relate to causing physical, sexual or mental harm to a 
child.  Accordingly, fundamental fairness does not require 
unanimity as to the alternate modes of commission of the crime 
of child enticement under the due process test established in 
Schad. 
¶25 Therefore, 
because 
the 
child 
enticement 
statute 
creates one crime with multiple modes of commission, and the 
alternate modes of commission are not so dissimilar in concept 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
13
or moral equivalency as to implicate fundamental fairness, 
unanimity was not required.  The circuit court properly 
instructed the jury that they could find Derango guilty of child 
enticement if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
attempted to cause Jessica to go into a secluded place with the 
intent to "have sexual contact with Jessica, expose a sex organ 
to Jessica, cause Jessica to expose a sex organ, or take 
pictures of Jessica engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 
II.  Multiplicity 
¶26 Derango also contends that his conviction for both 
attempted child sexual exploitation and child enticement as a 
result of a single telephone call is multiplicitous and 
therefore violates his protection against double jeopardy under 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.4  The double 
jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions are 
"intended to provide three protections: protection against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 
                     
4 
The 
double 
jeopardy 
clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb."  
U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Wisconsin Constitution's double 
jeopardy clause is essentially the same: "[N]o person for the 
same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 8.  Given this similarity, this court has 
accepted the double jeopardy jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court as controlling the interpretation of both clauses. 
 State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 401 n.5, 576 N.W.2d 912 
(1998).   
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
14
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments 
for the same offense."  Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 492, (citing 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 
¶27 Multiplicity challenges fall into the third category, 
and usually arise in two different situations: 1) when a single 
course of conduct is charged in multiple counts of the same 
statutory offense (the "continuous offense" cases), and 2) when 
a single criminal act encompasses the elements of more than one 
distinct statutory crime.  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 
401-02, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998); State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 65, 
291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).  This case presents the second situation. 
¶28 Multiplicity 
(and 
therefore 
double 
jeopardy) 
is 
implicated only to the extent of preventing a court from 
imposing a greater penalty than the legislature intended. 
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 402 ("[a] defendant may be charged and 
convicted of multiple counts or crimes arising out of one 
criminal act only if the legislature intends it"); see also 
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); Sauceda, 168 Wis. 
2d at 492; State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 137, 330 N.W.2d 564 
(1983).  In other words, because double jeopardy protection 
prohibits double punishment for the "same offense," the focus of 
the inquiry is whether the "same offense" is actually being 
punished twice, or whether the legislature indeed intended to 
establish separate offenses subjecting an offender to separate, 
although cumulative, punishments for the same act. 
 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
15
The United States Supreme Court has determined that 
where a court imposes multiple punishment in a single 
trial for violations of two or more criminal statutes 
arising 
from 
the 
same 
criminal 
conduct, 
the 
constitutionality of the multiple punishment depends 
on whether the state legislature intended that the 
violations 
constitute 
a 
single 
offense 
or 
two 
offenses, that is whether the legislature intended one 
punishment or multiple punishment. 
Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 137 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, and 
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717). 
¶29 We have established a two-part test for analyzing 
multiplicity challenges.  Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 63.  The first 
part consists of an analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), to determine whether the offenses are 
identical in law and fact.  "[W]here the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, 
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of 
an additional fact which the other does not."  Blockburger, 284 
U.S. at 304.  The second part, which we reach if the offenses 
are not identical in law and fact, is an inquiry into 
legislative intent.  Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 63.     
¶30 The Blockburger test requires us to consider whether 
each of the offenses in this case requires proof of an element 
or fact that the other does not.  Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493 
n.8.  If, under this test, the offenses are identical in law and 
fact, then charging both is multiplicitous and therefore 
unconstitutional.  State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159, 493 
N.W.2d 23 (1992).  If under the Blockburger test the offenses 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
16
are different in law or fact, a presumption arises that the 
legislature intended to permit cumulative punishments for both 
offenses.  Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 407; Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 
496.  This presumption can only be rebutted by clear legislative 
intent to the contrary.  Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 407; State v. 
Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 755, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991).   
¶31 The defendant concedes that the offenses of child 
enticement and child sexual exploitation are not identical in 
law, and we agree.  The child enticement statute is set forth 
above and requires proof of the following elements: 1) that the 
defendant caused or attempted to cause a child to go into a 
vehicle, building, room or secluded place; 2) that the defendant 
did so with any one of the six enumerated intents, generally 
relating to sex and drug crimes; and 3) that the victim had not 
attained the age of 18.  Wis. Stat. § 948.07; Wis JI-Criminal 
2134. 
¶32 Child sexual exploitation, on the other hand, is 
defined as follows:  
 
Sexual exploitation of a child. (1) Whoever does any 
of the following with knowledge of the character and 
content of the sexually explicit conduct involving the 
child is guilty of a Class C felony: 
 
(a) Employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices or 
coerces any child to engage in sexually explicit 
conduct for the purpose of photographing, filming, 
videotaping, recording the sound of or displaying in 
any way the conduct. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1)(a).  This requires proof of different 
elements: 1) that the defendant employed, used, persuaded, 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
17
induced, enticed or coerced the victim to engage in sexually 
explicit conduct; 2) that the defendant did so for the purpose 
of photographing, filming, videotaping or otherwise recording 
the conduct; and 3) that the victim had not attained the age of 
18.  Wis. Stat. § 948.05(1)(a).5 
¶33 These two statutes undeniably contain the same element 
regarding the victim's underage status.  There is also some 
overlap in mental states: the intent or purpose to engage a 
child in sexual conduct, variously defined, as well as the 
intent or purpose to photograph the conduct in one way or 
another.  However, the first element of each offense is 
significantly different.  As we have noted in our discussion of 
the unanimity question, the focus of the child enticement 
statutecaptured in its first elementis not the underlying sex 
crime itself but the act of removing or attempting to remove a 
child into a secluded place, whether a vehicle, a building, a 
room or another place of seclusion, with the purpose of 
committing the underlying sex crime.  The focus of the child 
sexual exploitation statute, in contrast, is the sex crime 
itselfthe act of engaging a child (or in this case attempting 
                     
5 This case involves a charge of attempted child sexual 
exploitation, which requires proof not of a completed act of 
exploitation, 
but, 
rather, 
"acts 
which 
demonstrate 
unequivocally, under all of the circumstances, that [the 
defendant] intended to and would have committed the crime [of 
child exploitation] except for the intervention of another 
person or some other extraneous factor."  Wis. Stat. § 939.32; 
Wis JI-Criminal 580.  
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
18
to engage a child) in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose 
of photographing it.   
¶34 The two offenses are, therefore, legally distinct, and 
so we presume the legislature intended to allow cumulative 
punishment.  The presumption can be overcome only by a "clear 
indication of legislative intent to the contrary."  Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d at 756.  As in the jury unanimity analysis, legislative 
intent is evaluated by reference to the statutory language, the 
legislative history, the nature of the proscribed conduct and 
the appropriateness of multiple punishment.  Lechner, 217 Wis. 
2d at 407; Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 160; Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 
756.   
¶35 Nothing in the statutory language leads us to conclude 
that the legislature intended these two separate and distinct 
statutes to create the same offense and therefore a single 
punishment.  Derango argues that both statutes proscribe the 
identical conductthe act of procuring a child for performance 
of a sex actbut this, as noted above, is clearly not true.  He 
cites no legislative history in support of his position.  His 
only argument on the nature of the offenses and the propriety of 
multiple punishment is that the two statutes are "inextricably 
intertwined," effectively punishing the same conduct twice when 
the legislative intent to protect children from this sort of 
conduct could just as well be accomplished by a single count. 
¶36 But the legislature is entitled to attack a discrete 
social 
problem 
by 
writing 
multiple 
statutes 
with 
subtle 
elemental differences in order to capture and criminalize the 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
19
widest possible variety of conduct (here, the many variations of 
sexual abuse and exploitation of children).  And prosecutors are 
entitled to charge one act as more than one statutory offense, 
if the legislative intent to permit multiple punishment is 
apparent.  Here, each statute prohibits conduct of a different 
nature.  Prosecution of Derango's single telephone call under 
both statutes is therefore not multiplicitous.   
III.  Other Acts Evidence 
¶37 Derango also contends that the circuit court erred in 
admitting the videotapes confiscated from his home as other acts 
evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  Like other 
evidentiary decisions, the admission of other acts evidence is a 
matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the circuit court, 
and will be sustained on appellate review if the record reflects 
that the circuit court "examined the relevant facts; applied a 
proper standard of law; and using a demonstrative rational 
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
reach."  State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 780-81, 576 N.W.2d 
30 (1998).  If the circuit court failed to articulate its 
reasoning, we independently examine the record to determine if 
there was a reasonable basis for the circuit court's decision.  
Id. at 781. 
¶38 In admitting the videotapes, the court stated: 
 
[W]hole question in a case of enticement is the intent 
of the defendant.  Now to me, if you have films that 
he was soliciting this young lady or asking her to 
participate in these films, and you have films which 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
20
show the type of behavior that he was endeavoring to 
induce her to do, that certainly goes to his, the 
issue of intent and his motive in making these 
statements to this young girl. 
 
. . . .  
 
Obviously the issue [is] what do you want to do with 
this young lady and it goes to intent.  The issue in 
this case is what he intended and what he wanted to 
accomplish.  His motive for talking to this girl and 
his intent in talking to this girl . . . I can't think 
of any evidence that's more relevant, especially to 
those issues, especially in the type of case it is as 
to his intent and to his motive and in talking to this 
young lady and doing the things that he, that is 
alleged to by the state.  As toand then the Court 
must take a look and judge is it unfairly prejudicial. 
 Well, I assume the state does want to prejudice the 
jury.  They want to prejudice the jury to accepting 
their version of the facts, but is it unfair?  
Certainly it's not unfair.  We have a situation here 
where what is being used is not something that's being 
manufactured by the District Attorney or being brought 
in from some third source, but things that he keeps 
and deems to be available and are found in, I take it, 
a search warrant of his particular place.  I don't see 
any unfair prejudice.  I will allow this evidence. 
¶39 We 
have 
established 
a 
three-step 
framework 
for 
analyzing other acts evidence: 1) Is the other acts evidence 
offered for a permitted purpose under Rule 904.04(2), 2) is the 
other acts evidence relevant under Rule 904.01, and 3) is the 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay under Rule 
904.03?  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73.6  
                     
6 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2):  
(2) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that 
the person acted in conformity therewith.  This 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
21
¶40 The circuit court admitted the videotapes on the issue 
of the defendant's intent and motive, which are enumerated 
permitted purposes under Rule 904.04(2).  Derango does not argue 
that intent and motive are not permitted purposes for the 
admission of "other acts" evidence, only that his possession of 
"adult" videotapes does nothing to demonstrate that he had the 
motive 
and 
intent 
to 
engage 
in 
child 
enticement 
and 
exploitation, since no witnesses could establish the age of the 
girls on the tapes.  This is an argument about relevance and 
relative probative value. 
¶41 Sullivan explained that the relevance inquiry for 
these purposes has two facets.  Id. at 785.  The first asks 
whether the evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.  Id.  The second 
                                                                  
subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered 
for 
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.01: 
904.01 Definition of "relevant evidence."  "'Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." 
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.03: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.   
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
22
measures the probative valuewhether the evidence has a tendency 
to make a consequential fact more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.  Id. at 785-86.  Probative value of 
other acts evidence depends upon the other act's nearness in 
time, place and circumstance to the crime charged or the fact or 
proposition the State seeks to prove.  Id. at 786.   
¶42 The record reflects, and the circuit court found, 
striking similarities between what Derango propositioned Jessica 
to do and what was depicted on the videotapes.  Derango offered 
Jessica $300 to perform a striptease and other sex acts on 
videotape.  The "other acts" videotapes, which appeared to be 
homemade, depicted girls apparently in their mid- to late-teens 
(some posing as adolescent girls) performing stripteases and 
other sex acts.  To convict Derango of attempted child sexual 
exploitation, the State had to show that he attempted to 
persuade Jessica to engage in sexually explicit conduct, and 
that he intended to videotape the conduct.  To convict Derango 
of child enticement, the State had to show that Derango 
attempted to cause Jessica to go to a secluded place with the 
intent to engage in sexual contact or intercourse, to expose a 
sex organ or cause her to expose a sex organ, or to take a 
picture of her engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  Clearly 
the videotapes relate to a fact or proposition of consequence to 
the determination. 
¶43 They are also highly probative, based upon the strong 
identity of circumstances: the videotapes depict girls of 
approximately Jessica's age doing precisely what Derango was 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
23
propositioning Jessica to do.  That the exact age of the girls 
on the videotapes was not established does not diminish the 
probative value of the videotapes one iota.  As the court of 
appeals noted here: "[o]ther acts evidence need not be identical 
to the charged conduct."  Derango, 229 Wis. 2d at 21.  Sullivan 
requires only similarity between the charged offense and the 
other acts evidence, and the stronger the similarity, the higher 
the probative value.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786-87.  By this 
measure, the videotapes were enormously probative. 
¶44 The real issue here is whether the probative value of 
the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.   
 
Unfair 
prejudice 
results 
when 
the 
proffered 
evidence has a tendency to influence the outcome by 
improper means or if it appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base 
its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case.   
Id. at 789-90.  Derango argues that the evidence was unfairly 
prejudicial because it appealed to the jury's sense of morality 
and decency, aroused disdain for him, and produced an instinct 
to punish.   
¶45 We conclude that the strong probative value of the 
videotapes was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice in this case.  As the court of appeals 
observed, "[o]n the one hand, the sexually explicit nature of 
the 
tapes 
likely 
provoked 
a 
strong 
reaction 
from 
the 
jury . . . [but] [o]n the other hand, the nature of the crimes 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
24
was highly sensitive to begin with," so the jury was probably 
prepared to deal appropriately with this graphic kind of 
evidence.  Derango, 229 Wis. 2d at 24. The record suggests that 
the State attempted to tailor the videotape evidence in order to 
reduce the possibility of prejudice.  The State did not play the 
tapes in their entirety, but instead excluded some of the more 
explicit scenes, leaving Detective Beckman to briefly describe 
them in general terms. 
¶46 Furthermore, 
the 
circuit 
court 
gave 
a 
proper 
cautionary instruction.  Sullivan affirmed that cautionary 
instructions "can go '"far to cure any adverse effect attendant 
with the admission of the [other acts] evidence."'"  Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 791 (citation omitted).  Here, the circuit court 
instructed the jurors that: 
 
Evidence 
has 
been 
received 
regarding 
other 
conduct of the defendant for which the defendant is 
not on trial. 
 
Specifically, evidence has been received that the 
defendant had in his possession videotapes showing 
sexually explicit conduct and a handwritten list.  If 
you find that this conduct did occur, you should 
consider it only on the issues of motive, opportunity, 
intent, and preparation or plan. 
 
You may not consider this evidence to conclude that 
the defendant has a certain character or certain 
character trait and that the defendant acted in 
conformity with that trait or character with respect 
to the offense charged in this case.  The evidence was 
received on the issues of motive, that is whether the 
defendant had a reason to desire the result of the 
crime, opportunity, that is whether the defendant had 
the opportunity to commit offense charged, intent that 
is whether the defendant acted with a state of mind 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
25
that is required for this offense, preparation or 
plan, that is whether such other conduct of the 
defendant was part of a design or scheme that led to 
the commission of the offense charged. 
 
You may consider this evidence only for the purposes I 
have described, giving to it the weight you determine 
it deserves.  It is not to be used to conclude that 
the defendant is a bad person and for that reason is 
guilty of the offense charged.   
¶47 Although some cautionary instructions may be so broad 
that 
their 
effectiveness 
is 
significantly 
diminished, 
we 
conclude that this cautionary instruction was not.  It derives 
from the pattern jury instruction suggested for use in this 
situation, and specifically advised the jurors of the exact 
purposes for which they were permitted, in their discretion, to 
consider the videotape evidence.7  See Wis JI-Criminal 275.  The 
instruction properly told the jurors what not to conclude from 
the videotapes, that is, explicitly cautioned against the 
prohibited character and propensity inferences.  Under these 
circumstances, we can find no erroneous exercise of discretion 
on the part of the circuit court in admitting the videotape 
evidence.   
IV.  Amendment of the Information 
¶48 Derango also argues that the circuit court erred by 
permitting the State to file an amended information, at the 
                     
7 The cautionary instruction here went beyond the purposes 
for which the circuit court received the evidence.  The better 
practice is to include in the jury instruction reference to only 
those purposes for which the court has received the other acts 
evidence.    
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
26
close of the evidence, changing the child enticement count to 
allege additional mental states under Wis. Stat. § 948.07(3) and 
(4).  Derango contends that he was prejudiced by the amendment 
because the late filing deprived him of the opportunity to 
defend the charge.  Specifically, Derango asks us to consider 
whether Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2) ever permits the amendment of 
criminal charges after testimony concludes.   
¶49 We have previously declined to adopt a blanket rule 
automatically assuming prejudice when an amendment is made at a 
particular point in the proceedings, and we decline to do so 
here.  See Whitaker v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 
(1978) (Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29 cannot be construed to deny the 
State, upon leave of court, the discretion to amend an 
information before trial as long as defendant's rights were not 
prejudiced).  There is no need for a per se rule, as the statute 
amply 
protects 
defendants 
by 
requiring 
a 
case-by-case 
examination of prejudice.   
¶50 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29(2) provides that a court "may 
allow amendment of the complaint, indictment or information to 
conform to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to 
the defendant."  The purpose of a charging document is to inform 
the accused of the acts he is alleged to have committed in order 
to enable him to prepare a defense.  State v. Waste Management 
of Wisconsin, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 566, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978). 
 We have previously concluded that when the defendant has 
adequate notice of the amended countin that the amendment does 
not change the crime charged and the alleged offense remains the 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
27
same and results from the same transactiona defendant is not 
prejudiced.  State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 517 n.9, 525 
N.W.2d 718 (1995).  See also State v. Wickstrom, 118 Wis. 2d 
339, 348, 348 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1984). 
¶51 Here, the prosecution did not charge Derango with an 
additional crime, nor did it change the crimes originally 
charged. 
 
The 
amended 
information 
merely 
added 
several 
statutorily defined possible mental states which might satisfy 
the intent element of the original child enticement offense 
charged in count two, conforming that charge to the proof in the 
case.  The additional intents alleged were closely related to 
the original (intent to have sexual contact or intercourse, 
intent to expose a sex organ, and intent to photograph sexually 
explicit conduct), and derived from facts that were alleged in 
the original complaint and testified to at the preliminary 
hearing, and therefore were clearly available to the defendant 
from the beginning.  In short, the amended information did not 
fundamentally change the legal or factual parameters of the case 
at all: the charged offenses in the original and amended 
information remained the same and all resulted from the same 
transaction.  Under these circumstances, Derango cannot possibly 
have been prejudiced, and the circuit court did not err by 
permitting the amendment.   
V.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
¶52 Finally, Derango alleges that the evidence in this 
case was insufficient to convict him of child enticement and 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
28
attempted child sexual exploitation.  The defendant bears a 
heavy burden.  We do not substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury, and therefore will not reverse unless the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, "is so 
lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, 
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 
752 (1990) (citation omitted).   
¶53 Derango asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the convictions because the whole case rested on one 
telephone call.  He claims there was insufficient evidence to 
establish his intent to follow through with either crime. 
¶54 The singular telephone call, however, was absolutely 
unambiguous and quite enough on its own to support the verdicts. 
In it, Derango persistently offered 15-year-old Jessica $300 to 
perform a striptease and other sex acts on videotape, "would not 
take no for an answer," and said he would call her back in order 
to arrange it.  The jury reasonably inferred that he did not 
mean to do the videotaping in a public place. 
¶55 Besides, the telephone call was not the only evidence. 
 Derango's criminal purposeand his intent to follow through 
with the crimes but for Jessica's refusal to go alongwas 
corroborated by (1) the evidence regarding his initial encounter 
with Jessica at McDonald's, (2) the videotapes depicting young 
girls in secluded places doing exactly what he was trying to get 
Jessica to do, and (3) his own, rather incredible statement to 
the police detective in which he suggested it was Jessica who 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
29
propositioned him rather than the other way around.  Viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was 
sufficient to support Derango's convictions for attempted child 
sexual exploitation and child enticement beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
¶56 Therefore, we hold that 1) jury unanimity was not 
required on the intent component of the charge of child 
enticement 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.07, 
2) 
convicting 
the 
defendant of both child enticement and attempted child sexual 
exploitation as a result of a single telephone call was not 
multiplicitous, 3) the circuit court did not err by admitting 
the videotapes as "other acts" evidence, 4) the defendant was 
not prejudiced by the circuit court's acceptance of the amended 
information at the close of testimony, and 5) the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Derango of both child enticement and 
attempted child sexual exploitation.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶57 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0642-CR 
 
 
1