Title: State v. Bethel

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BETHEL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2003-1766 – Submitted November 9, 2005 – Decided October 4, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, No. 00CR-11-
6600. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} On June 25, 1996, James Reynolds and his girlfriend, Shannon 
Hawks, were shot to death in an isolated field in Columbus.  Appellant, Robert W. 
Bethel, was convicted of the aggravated murders of Reynolds and Hawks and was 
sentenced to death. 
{¶ 2} Bethel was a member of the Crips street gang, as was Bethel’s 
friend Jeremy Chavis.  Tyrone Green and Donald Langbein were also members of 
the Crips gang.  Jeremy’s brother, Cheveldes Chavis, although a member of a 
different gang, “hung with” Jeremy, Langbein, Green, and Bethel.  In the latter 
part of 1996, Bethel, Langbein, and the Chavis brothers lived together in a trailer 
on West Run Street in Columbus. 
{¶ 3} Langbein is a cousin of the Chavis brothers; they have a 
grandfather in common.  Their grandfather kept a garden in a field located behind 
562 Stambaugh Road in Columbus (“the Stambaugh field”).  Langbein and 
Jeremy Chavis sometimes went to that field to shoot guns. 
{¶ 4} In 1995, Tyrone Green shot Rodney Cain to death during a 
burglary.  James Reynolds and Donald Pryor were also involved in the burglary.  
Reynolds later told Pryor that he had seen Green shoot Cain.  Pryor repeated 
Reynolds’s story to the police. 
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{¶ 5} Green was subsequently indicted for aggravated murder with death 
specifications.  During the discovery process in Green’s case, the state gave 
Green’s attorney supplemental discovery materials that included a copy of a 
search warrant with its supporting affidavit.  The affidavit stated that Reynolds 
had told Pryor that Green had shot the victim.  The state sent the supplemental 
discovery materials to Green’s attorney on May 29, 1996, about four weeks 
before Reynolds and Hawks were murdered. 
{¶ 6} Langbein testified that he and Bethel had been concerned about the 
witnesses against Green and that they had discussed “tak(ing) steps to get rid of 
them.”  On June 13, 1996, about two weeks before Reynolds and Hawks were 
murdered, Bethel and Cheveldes Chavis each bought a Maverick Model 88 12-
gauge shotgun from Hamilton’s Gun Shop in Obetz. 
{¶ 7} According to Langbein, the day before the bodies of Reynolds and 
Hawks were discovered, a group of people “from the neighborhood,” including 
Reynolds, gathered on the corner of 4th and Morrill to hang out.  Langbein, 
Bethel, and the Chavises arrived around 2:00 p.m. in Bethel’s car. 
{¶ 8} When Langbein was ready to leave, he offered Reynolds a ride 
home, because Reynolds lived near him.  But Bethel and Jeremy Chavis said they 
would drive Reynolds home, even though Reynolds did not live near Jeremy.  
Langbein saw Reynolds and Hawks with Bethel and Jeremy in Bethel’s car. 
{¶ 9} Traci Queen, f.k.a. Traci Jordan, was a friend of Shannon Hawks.  
Queen recalled Hawks’s and Reynolds’s visiting her sometime between 3:00 and 
5:00 p.m. the day before their deaths were reported on a news broadcast.  When 
they entered Queen’s home, Reynolds looked at his pager and went into the 
kitchen to use the phone.  Hawks told Queen that she and Reynolds were “going 
to go out and shoot guns.”  She invited Queen to come along, but Queen declined. 
{¶ 10} When Reynolds emerged from the kitchen, he and Hawks left the 
house and got into a car waiting in front of the house next door.  Queen saw two 
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other persons, who appeared to be male, in the front seat of that car.  She never 
saw Hawks or Reynolds alive again. 
{¶ 11} Ron Bass, who lived near the Stambaugh field, told police that 
sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., June 25, 1996, he heard five or six 
gunshots while lying in bed.  Then he heard one louder gunshot, and after that 
another series of shots. 
{¶ 12} On June 26, 1996, the bodies of Reynolds and Hawks were found 
lying in the Stambaugh field.  They had been shot to death. 
{¶ 13} Reynolds had been shot ten times, four times in the head.  
Reynolds also had one neck wound.  One of the gunshots fired into Reynolds’s 
head, from a distance of six inches to three feet, would have killed him at once.  
Five bullets were recovered from Reynolds’s body, all of which could have been 
fired from a 9 mm firearm.  Reynolds also had one wound caused by a shotgun 
slug fired into his back. 
{¶ 14} Hawks was shot four times, twice in the head.  One of the head 
wounds was a back-to-front wound through her brain.  This wound would have 
incapacitated Hawks almost immediately.  The other head wound entered 
Hawks’s right cheek and exited through her left ear.  Stippling indicated that this 
shot was fired from a distance of two to four feet. 
{¶ 15} At the crime scene, police recovered twenty 9 mm shell casings 
and ten 12-gauge shotgun shell casings.  The murder weapons were never found. 
{¶ 16} Reynolds was the sole eyewitness known to the prosecuting 
attorney in Tyrone Green’s aggravated-murder case.  After Reynolds was 
murdered, Green was offered a plea bargain to a reduced charge of manslaughter. 
{¶ 17} A couple of weeks after the murders, Bethel told Langbein that 
Bethel, Jeremy Chavis, “Doughboy” (Reynolds), and Hawks had been “partying” 
in the field where Langbein’s grandfather kept a garden.  Bethel told Langbein 
that he drew a 9 mm pistol and began firing at Reynolds and Hawks.  After 
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emptying his clip, Bethel reloaded and continued to shoot Reynolds and Hawks.  
Bethel told Langbein that Jeremy Chavis shot Reynolds in the back with a 
shotgun.  Langbein stated that in later conversations, Bethel expressed concern 
about being caught. 
{¶ 18} Some time before January 1997, Bethel told his girlfriend Theresa 
Campbell, f.k.a. Theresa Cobb, about the murders.  He told her that on the night 
of the murders, he, Jeremy Chavis, Reynolds, and Hawks went to “practice 
shooting guns.”  He said he “had a feeling to shoot” and shot Reynolds and 
Hawks “because he felt like it.”  Bethel told her that he had laughed and then 
called Jeremy over to “see what he had done.”  According to Campbell, when 
Jeremy Chavis saw what Bethel had done, Chavis began to cry and went back to 
the car.  Bethel then reloaded his gun and continued to shoot.  Bethel told 
Campbell that he “couldn’t stop shooting,” and that when Chavis wanted to leave, 
Bethel “just stood there looking.” 
{¶ 19} In January 1997, police executed a search warrant at the trailer on 
West Run Street.  There they found a Maverick Model 88 12-gauge shotgun 
belonging to Cheveldes Chavis.  Bethel’s identical shotgun was never found.  
This type of shotgun could have fired the type of shells found at the crime scene. 
{¶ 20} Also found at the trailer was a gun box with a “Ruger” logo on the 
lid.  Although the box contained no gun, it did contain an instruction manual for a 
9 mm Ruger P95 semiautomatic pistol.  According to Langbein, after the trailer 
was searched, Bethel became nervous about being caught and “started acting real 
weird.” 
{¶ 21} In 2000, Langbein was charged with an unrelated federal firearms 
violation.  He told police and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) 
agents what he knew about the Reynolds-Hawks murders and agreed to wear a 
concealed tape recorder during conversations with Bethel. 
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{¶ 22} On October 19, 2000, Langbein and Bethel had a conversation at 
the Subway restaurant where Bethel worked.  Langbein wore a recorder, and the 
Subway was under ATF surveillance.  During this conversation, Bethel talked 
about the investigation.  He told Langbein, “I wanted to talk to Jeremy * * * 
’cause I knew the [police] were going to go down and * * * try and tell him some 
shit.”  Bethel believed that detectives had “been havin’ phones tapped,” and he 
was hesitant to talk anywhere “they got anything.” 
{¶ 23} On November 1, 2000, police executed a search warrant at 656 
East Jenkins Street, Columbus.  Although the record does not show who lived at 
this address, some of the property seized pursuant to the warrant was later 
returned to Cheveldes Chavis.  In a wastebasket at that site, police found papers 
with a cover sheet captioned “Supplemental Discovery” from the case of State v. 
Tyrone Green.  Jeremy Chavis’s fingerprints were found on that paper.  In the 
same wastebasket, police found a copy of a search warrant given to Green during 
discovery in his case, along with its attached affidavit – the affidavit that named 
Reynolds as the source of Pryor’s information. 
{¶ 24} Bethel was arrested on November 6, 2000.  He was indicted on two 
counts of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A) (prior calculation and 
design).  Each count had two death specifications.  The specifications for Count 
One, the murder of Shannon Hawks, alleged that the offense was committed to 
escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense 
committed by the offender, in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), and that it was 
part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more 
persons, in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  The specifications for Count Two, 
the murder of James Reynolds, were that Reynolds was killed to prevent his 
testimony in another criminal proceeding, in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(8), and 
that his murder was part of a course of conduct, in violation of R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5). 
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{¶ 25} The trial court appointed Ronald B. Janes and W. Joseph Edwards 
as Bethel’s counsel.  After receiving discovery from the state, Janes and Edwards 
concluded that a death sentence was a strong possibility.  Accordingly, they 
negotiated with the prosecutor’s office to reach a plea bargain. 
{¶ 26} At a meeting on August 29, 2000, Janes and Edwards discussed a 
proposed plea bargain with Bethel.  Bethel’s mother was also present with 
Sanford Cohan, an attorney she had hired.  Janes and Edwards showed Bethel 
videotaped witness statements that they had received from the prosecution in 
discovery.  After seeing these, Bethel softened his position and ultimately agreed 
to a plea bargain and to testify against Jeremy Chavis. 
{¶ 27} As part of the bargain, Bethel agreed to make an “off-the-record” 
proffer of his testimony against Jeremy Chavis.  The prosecutor prepared a proffer 
letter to clarify the ground rules for the proffer.  The letter specifically provided 
that “no statements made or other information provided by your client during the 
‘off-the-record’ proffer or discussion will be used against your client in any 
criminal case.”  The state reserved the right to make derivative use of Bethel’s 
statement and to use it on cross-examination if his testimony was inconsistent 
with his proffer. 
{¶ 28} On August 30, 2000, Bethel was taken to the Franklin County 
Sheriff’s Office.  There, in the presence of his attorney, Bethel signed the proffer 
letter.  Bethel then made a statement that was tape-recorded. 
{¶ 29} In his proffer, Bethel stated that killing Reynolds had been Jeremy 
Chavis’s idea.  Before the murders, Bethel said, he and Chavis discussed what 
they were going to do.  After this conversation, they picked up Reynolds and 
Hawks and drove to the field belonging to Chavis’s grandfather, where Bethel and 
others sometimes went to fire guns or to just hang out. 
{¶ 30} When they got to the field, the four got out of the car and walked 
through some trees to a clearing.  Bethel had a 9 mm handgun; Chavis had the 12-
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gauge shotgun that Bethel had purchased.  A few shots were fired into the air.  
Bethel and Chavis then turned their guns on Reynolds and Hawks. 
{¶ 31} Reynolds and Hawks were standing together; Reynolds had his 
arm around Hawks.  Bethel claimed that he and Chavis simultaneously fired their 
guns at Reynolds and Hawks from a distance of 30 to 40 feet.  The two victims 
fell to the ground.  Bethel emptied the clip of his handgun. 
{¶ 32} According to Bethel, he thought that Reynolds and Hawks were 
probably dead, so he said, “Let’s go.”  But Chavis wanted to “make sure.”  Chavis 
gave Bethel a fresh clip containing “maybe” six rounds.  Bethel then walked over 
to the victims and emptied the second clip into them at “close range.” 
{¶ 33} On August 30, 2001, after making the proffer, Bethel entered into a 
plea agreement with the state.  The agreement was embodied in a three-page 
document signed by Bethel, his attorneys, and the prosecutors and filed with the 
trial court.  Bethel discussed the terms with his attorneys for 30 to 45 minutes 
before signing. 
{¶ 34} Bethel agreed to plead to two counts of aggravated murder with 
firearm specifications.  He further agreed to cooperate with the investigation and 
to testify truthfully against Jeremy Chavis and anyone else involved in killing 
Reynolds and Hawks.  In return, the state agreed to dismiss the death 
specifications. 
{¶ 35} The agreement contained a specific provision dealing with Bethel’s 
proffer:  
{¶ 36} “1. Defendant and the State agree that the proffer taken of the 
defendant on August 30, 2001 will be admissible in a criminal trial against the 
defendant in the event that the defendant does not abide by the terms and 
conditions of this agreement set forth below.” 
{¶ 37} The agreement also included the following provision: 
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{¶ 38} “6. * * * Should it be judged by the Franklin County Prosecutor’s 
Office at any time that the defendant has failed to cooperate fully; refused to 
testify or testifies falsely in any proceeding(s); has intentionally given false, 
misleading or incomplete information or testimony; or has otherwise violated any 
provision of this agreement, then the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office may 
declare this Agreement null and void.  The Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office 
may then automatically reinstate the original charges against the defendant, as 
well as file any additional charges. * * * In the event this Agreement becomes 
null and void, then the parties will be returned to the position they were in before 
this Agreement.” 
{¶ 39} After the parties signed the agreement, the trial court held a closed 
hearing.  The terms of the agreement were placed on record, and Bethel 
confirmed that he understood them.  The trial court accepted the agreement and 
placed it in the record under seal.  After a recess, and in open court, the trial court 
accepted Bethel’s plea of guilty to two counts of aggravated murder with gun 
specifications. 
{¶ 40} On November 13, 2001, Bethel refused to testify against Jeremy 
Chavis.  On December 18, 2001, the state filed a motion to have the plea 
agreement declared void.  The trial court granted the state’s motion, thereby 
reinstating the charges.  Janes and Edwards withdrew from the case on December 
3, 2001, and Bethel was assigned other counsel. 
{¶ 41} Bethel filed a motion to suppress his proffer.  His former counsel, 
Janes and Edwards, testified at the motion hearing.  The trial judge denied the 
motion and allowed the state to introduce Bethel’s proffer into evidence. 
{¶ 42} At trial, Bethel expressly denied his guilt.  In his testimony, he 
repudiated the proffer, claiming that he had lied in order to obtain the benefit of 
the plea bargain.  He admitted that he had never intended to fulfill his end of the 
bargain by testifying against Chavis, but claimed that he had merely wanted to 
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delay his trial because he felt that Janes and Edwards were unprepared.  He 
claimed to have believed the proffer could not be used against him at trial even if 
he violated the agreement. 
{¶ 43} Bethel admitted that Reynolds and Hawks had been in his car after 
the gathering at 4th and Morrill, but he claimed to have dropped them off on the 
west side of Columbus around 9:00 p.m.  Bethel and his mother, Deborah Bibler, 
testified that Bethel and Chavis had been at Bibler’s house on the south side of 
Columbus between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., June 25, 1996, at the time that Ron 
Bass heard the gunshots. 
{¶ 44} The jury found Bethel guilty of all charges and specifications.  
After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended death sentences for both killings, 
and the trial court sentenced Bethel to death.  The cause is now before us upon an 
appeal as of right. 
{¶ 45} In this appeal, Bethel sets forth 20 propositions of law, each devoid 
of merit.  We overrule his propositions of law and affirm his convictions and his 
sentences of death. 
I. Bethel’s Proffer 
A. The Plea Agreement 
{¶ 46} Paragraph One of the plea agreement specifically provided that 
“the proffer taken of the defendant on August 30, 2001 will be admissible in a 
criminal trial against the defendant in the event that the defendant does not abide 
by the terms and conditions of this agreement * * * .”  In his first proposition of 
law, Bethel contends that, despite the seemingly clear language of the first 
paragraph, once the plea agreement was declared void, the state could not use his 
proffer against him at trial.  Thus, he contends, its introduction into evidence 
violated the plea agreement. 
{¶ 47} According to Bethel, Paragraph One is meaningless.  He argues 
that Paragraph Six of the agreement permitted the charges to be reinstated only if 
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the prosecutor declared the entire agreement void.  And if the entire agreement 
was void, Bethel argues, Paragraph One was also void and could not be enforced. 
{¶ 48} Bethel argues that his interpretation is supported by the following 
sentence in Paragraph Six: “In the event this Agreement becomes null and void, 
then the parties will be returned to the position they were in before this 
Agreement.”  According to Bethel, returning the parties to their pre-agreement 
position means that the proffer letter, which preceded the agreement, controlled 
the state’s use of the proffer.  And under the terms of the proffer letter, the state 
could have introduced Bethel’s proffer only in order to impeach his testimony, if 
necessary. 
{¶ 49} If Bethel’s construction of the agreement is correct, it is clear that 
under no circumstances could Paragraph One ever be implemented.  Bethel agrees 
that this is so.  Indeed, his brief expressly contends that the null-and-void 
language of Paragraph Six renders Paragraph One meaningless. 
{¶ 50} Principles of contract law are generally applicable to the 
interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements.  See, generally, United States 
v. Wells (C.A.6, 2000), 211 F.3d 988, 995.  Bethel’s proposed interpretation of the 
agreement is at odds with a basic principle of contract law: “In the construction of 
a contract courts should give effect, if possible, to every provision therein 
contained, and if one construction of a doubtful condition written in a contract 
would make that condition meaningless, and it is possible to give it another 
construction that would give it meaning and purpose, then the latter construction 
must obtain.”  (Emphasis added.) Farmers’ Natl. Bank v. Delaware Ins. Co. 
(1911), 83 Ohio St. 309, 94 N.E. 834, paragraph six of the syllabus. 
{¶ 51} This well-settled principle applies to plea agreements.  United 
States v. Rourke (C.A.7, 1996), 74 F.3d 802, 807; see, also, United States v. Brye 
(C.A.10, 1998), 146 F.3d 1207, 1211 (rejecting interpretation that would render 
part of plea agreement superfluous).  Thus, an interpretation that would render a 
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provision meaningless – as Bethel’s proposed interpretation would – “is neither 
acceptable nor desirable under the normal rules of contract construction.”  Hybud 
Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 666, 597 
N.E.2d 1096. 
{¶ 52} Pointing out that the state drafted the plea agreement in this case, 
Bethel cites the well-known principle that ambiguities in a plea agreement are to 
be construed against the state.  See United States v. Johnson (C.A.6, 1992), 979 
F.2d 396, 399. 
{¶ 53} However, the cited principle applies only to ambiguous agreements 
or portions of agreements.  It has no application here, because there is no 
ambiguity in the agreement before us.  An agreement is ambiguous if it is “subject 
to more than one reasonable interpretation.”  Hillsboro v. Fraternal Order of 
Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 174, 177, 556 N.E.2d 
1186.  Accord United States v. Gebbie (C.A.3, 2002), 294 F.3d 540, 551 (plea 
agreement).  Given the clear language of Paragraph One, and the need to ensure 
that the paragraph is not rendered meaningless, the agreement before us is subject 
to only one reasonable interpretation.  The breach by Bethel voided the plea 
agreement and returned the parties to their previous position as stated in 
Paragraph Six, except that Bethel’s proffer could then be used against him, as 
plainly provided by Paragraph One.  This construction addresses the entire 
agreement and avoids the incorrect result of rendering Paragraph One 
meaningless. 
{¶ 54} Bethel’s plea agreement clearly provided that the state could use 
Bethel’s proffer at trial if Bethel breached the agreement.  Hence, the state did not 
violate the agreement by introducing the proffer.  Bethel’s first proposition of law 
is therefore overruled. 
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B. Evid.R. 410(A) 
{¶ 55} Evid.R. 410(A)(5) provides that “any statement made in the course 
of plea discussions in which counsel for the prosecuting authority or for the 
defendant was a participant and * * * that result in a plea of guilty later 
withdrawn” is not admissible “against the defendant who made the plea or who 
was a participant personally or through counsel in the plea discussions.”  In his 
second proposition of law, Bethel claims that the admission of his plea agreement 
and proffer violated Evid.R. 410(A)(5). However, since Bethel specifically agreed 
that his proffer could be admitted into evidence against him in the event that he 
breached the plea agreement, he has waived any claim under Evid.R. 410(A)(5). 
{¶ 56} Evid.R. 410(A)(1) provides that a withdrawn plea of guilty is 
inadmissible.  Evid.R. 410(A)(4) provides that any statement made during 
proceedings under Crim.R. 11 regarding a plea is inadmissible.  Bethel claims that 
the state violated these rules at trial when it elicited testimony that he had 
previously entered a plea of guilty in this case.  Columbus Police Detective 
Edward Kallay gave the following testimony on redirect examination: 
{¶ 57} “Q. * * * After the proffer, was there a plea agreement in this case? 
{¶ 58} “A. Yes, sir. 
{¶ 59} “Q. Signed by the defendant? 
{¶ 60} “A. Yes, sir. 
{¶ 61} “ * * *  
{¶ 62} “Q. Plea in this case in open court? 
{¶ 63} “A. Yes, sir, there was a plea.” 
{¶ 64} Bethel did not object to this evidence at trial.  Further, defendant’s 
attorneys first inserted the issue of the guilty plea into the case, in opening 
statement.  This issue, raised in defendant’s second proposition of law, is 
therefore waived. 
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C. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver 
{¶ 65} In his 19th proposition of law, Bethel contends that when he 
entered into the plea agreement, he did not understand that it allowed the state to 
use his proffer against him if he breached the agreement.  Thus, he claims that he 
did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination, and his proffer should have been suppressed. 
{¶ 66} At the suppression hearing, both Edwards and Janes testified that 
they explained the agreement to Bethel and that he understood it, including the 
first paragraph.  Both attorneys understood the agreement to mean that if Bethel 
violated it, his proffer could be used against him at trial.  Edwards specifically 
explained to Bethel that the proffer was no longer off the record once he signed 
the plea agreement.  “I just specifically said to him, Bobby, if you sign this 
agreement, then if you back out, meaning you don’t testify against Jeremy, or if 
you testify untruthfully, * * * not only will the deal be revoked but then they’re 
going to have this statement to be used against you.” 
{¶ 67} Bethel denied that he understood that the agreement would allow 
the use of his proffered statements.  He testified that Janes and Edwards told him 
that Paragraph One was meaningless and that it left him free to renege with no 
adverse consequences other than reinstatement of the original charges. 
{¶ 68} The trial court found that Janes and Edwards were credible and 
that Bethel was not.  The court specifically found that “Bethel understood and 
agreed to the plea agreement,” that Janes and Edwards did not advise Bethel to lie 
about his willingness to testify, and that “Bethel understood the potential uses of 
the proffer, and [understood that] pursuant to the plea agreement the prosecution 
[was permitted to] use the proffer against Bethel in a trial on the original 
charges.” 
{¶ 69} “Voluntariness is a legal question for a reviewing court to 
determine independently. * * * However, this court must defer to the trial court’s 
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factual findings, if those are supported by the record.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. 
Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 647, 656, 693 N.E.2d 246.  The testimony of Janes 
and Edwards amply supports the trial court’s findings of fact.  On the basis of 
those findings, we conclude that Bethel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered into the plea agreement.  Bethel was represented by counsel, who advised 
him of the consequences of breaching the agreement, and he understood those 
consequences. 
D. Lack of Miranda Warnings 
{¶ 70} Bethel also claims that his proffer was inadmissible because it was 
not preceded by Miranda warnings.  Bethel’s claim under Miranda is waived, 
however, because he did not bring it to the attention of the trial court. 
{¶ 71} In order to overcome this waiver, Bethel must show plain error 
under Crim.R. 52(B).  An error is plain error only if it is obvious, State v. Barnes 
(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240, and, “but for the error, the 
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.”  State v. Long (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The 
trial court’s failure to suppress the proffer on Miranda grounds was not plain 
error, as the error, if any, was neither obvious nor outcome-determinative. 
{¶ 72} The outcome of Bethel’s trial would not clearly have been different 
had the proffer been excluded, since Bethel had admitted his guilt to two of the 
state’s witnesses, Langbein and Cobb. 
{¶ 73} Nor do we find that the trial court’s admission of the proffer was 
an obvious error.  Bethel’s attorneys were present during the proffer, and there is 
substantial authority for the proposition that Miranda warnings are not necessary 
when counsel is present.  In Miranda itself, the United States Supreme Court 
observed that “[t]he presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would 
be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police 
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”  
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Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.  
Indeed, it is generally accepted that the presence of counsel during interrogation 
“obviates the need for the warnings.”  2 LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal 
Procedure (1999) 573, Section 6.8(e).  See United States v. Guariglia 
(S.D.N.Y.1991), 757 F.Supp. 259, 264; Virgin Islands v. Ruiz (D.V.I.1973), 354 
F.Supp. 245, 247-248; People v. Mounts (Colo.1990), 784 P.2d 792, 795-796; 
Collins v. State (Del.1980), 420 A.2d 170, 176; Baxter v. State (1985), 254 Ga. 
538, 543, 331 S.E.2d 561.  Contra State v. DeWeese (2003), 213 W.Va. 339, 348-
349, 582 S.E.2d 786; see Sweeney v. Carter (C.A.7, 2004), 361 F.3d 327, 331. 
{¶ 74} Therefore, Bethel’s 19th proposition of law is overruled. 
E. Imposing Death after Bethel Breached the Agreement 
{¶ 75} In his ninth proposition of law, Bethel contends that imposition of 
the death sentence was arbitrary, given the trial court’s willingness to accept his 
plea of guilty to a noncapital charge as part of the plea bargain.  Bethel argues 
that, by accepting his guilty plea to aggravated murder without death 
specifications, the trial court effectively determined that a sentence of life 
imprisonment was appropriate.  Citing Adamson v. Ricketts (C.A.9, 1988), 865 
F.2d 1011, 1022, Bethel contends that he was sentenced to death simply because 
he violated his plea agreement, not because he deserved a death sentence. 
{¶ 76} We find Adamson unpersuasive.  The trial court’s acceptance of 
the plea agreement in this case did not necessarily imply that it considered a life 
sentence “appropriate.”  We concur in the view expressed by a different panel of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in another capital case: “That the sentence 
imposed after trial is more severe than one the judge would have been willing to 
impose as part of a plea bargain does not * * * impeach the legitimacy of the 
sentence.  * * * [T]he judge could well have approved a settlement calling for a 
sentence lighter than he himself would have chosen to impose.”  McKenzie v. 
Risley (C.A.9, 1988), 842 F.2d 1525, 1537.  The reasoning of McKenzie is 
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consistent with our own reasoning in State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 
336, 638 N.E.2d 1023, that a prosecutor’s offer of a plea bargain to a capital 
defendant did not constitute a concession by the prosecutor that a death sentence 
was inappropriate.  Bethel’s ninth proposition of law is therefore overruled. 
F. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness 
{¶ 77} In his tenth proposition of law, Bethel claims to be a victim of 
“prosecutorial vindictiveness.”  See, generally, Blackledge v. Perry (1974), 417 
U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (prosecutor may not retaliate against 
defendant for exercising right to appeal).  Bethel argues that, in refusing to testify 
against Chavis, he was exercising his constitutional right to remain silent.  He 
contends that reinstatement of the original charges in response to his refusal to 
testify amounted to “retaliation” for his exercise of that right. 
{¶ 78} Bethel’s claim lacks merit.  “[W]hen a plea agreement is vacated, 
no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the prosecutor simply reinstates the 
indictment that was in effect before the plea agreement was entered.”  Taylor v. 
Kincheloe (C.A.9, 1990), 920 F.2d 599, 606.  Accord United States v. Anderson 
(C.A.7, 1975), 514 F.2d 583, 588.  When a defendant goes back on his promise, 
“it is hardly surprising, and scarcely suggestive of vindictiveness, that the district 
attorney in turn withdr[aws] his consent to the reduced charge.”  United States ex 
rel. Williams v. McMann (C.A.2, 1970), 436 F.2d 103, 106. 
{¶ 79} In essence, Bethel claims a constitutional right to renege on his 
plea agreement, retain the benefit of the bargain that he broke, and avoid the 
agreed sanction for his breach.  We decline to create such a right.  To do so 
“would encourage gamesmanship of a most offensive nature.  Defendants would 
be rewarded for prevailing upon the prosecutor to accept a reduced charge and to 
recommend a lighter punishment in return for a guilty plea, when the defendant 
intended at the time he entered that plea to attack it at some future date. * * * This 
January Term, 2006 
17 
is nothing more than a ‘heads-I-win-tails-you-lose’ gamble.”  Id. at 106-107.  
Bethel’s tenth proposition is overruled. 
II. Nonpublic Proceeding to Determine Defendant’s Understanding of Plea 
Agreement 
{¶ 80} In his third proposition of law, Bethel contends that he should 
receive a new trial because a hearing where the plea agreement was discussed was 
closed to the public. 
A. Constitutional Issues 
{¶ 81} The right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and by Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Although Bethel did not object to the closing of the hearing, the 
right to a public trial under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution cannot 
be waived by the defendant’s silence.  State v. Hensley (1906), 75 Ohio St. 255, 
266, 79 N.E. 462.  Nor does anything in the record show that the defense 
consented to the closing of the hearing.  Cf. State v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 
73, 110, 2 O.O.3d 249, 357 N.E.2d 1035 (waiver by consent of defense counsel); 
State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 64 (error 
invited by defense counsel). 
{¶ 82} The violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error.  It is 
not subjected to harmless-error analysis.  Waller v. Georgia (1984), 467 U.S. 39, 
49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31.  In Waller, the court held that in order to 
justify closure of a hearing in a criminal case, “the party seeking to close the 
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the 
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court 
must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make 
findings adequate to support the closure.”  467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 
L.Ed.2d 31. 
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{¶ 83} The record in this case does not show that any of these 
requirements were addressed.  Thus, it does not appear that the closing of the 
hearing was justified.  Bethel argues that because the closing of the hearing was 
unjustified, he is entitled to a new trial.  We disagree. 
{¶ 84} In Waller, a suppression hearing was improperly closed.  The 
remedy, however, was not a new trial, but a new suppression hearing: “[T]he 
remedy should be appropriate to the violation. * * * A new trial need be held only 
if a new, public suppression hearing results in the suppression of material 
evidence not suppressed at the first trial, or in some other material change in the 
positions of the parties.” 467 U.S. at 49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31. 
{¶ 85} Therefore, the remedy for the improper closing of the hearing in 
this case would be a new, public hearing.  A new trial would follow only if the 
new hearing resulted in some “material change in the positions of the parties.” 
{¶ 86} However, under the present circumstances, a new hearing could 
not result in any change.  The purpose of the hearing was to ensure that Bethel 
understood the terms of the plea agreement before he entered a plea.  This 
purpose no longer has any relevance.  Bethel’s guilty plea was withdrawn.  The 
plea agreement was voided by Bethel’s breach. 
{¶ 87} Because a new hearing could not materially change the position of 
the parties, there is no need for either a new hearing or a new trial.  A new hearing 
would be an empty formality; a new trial would be a “windfall.”  Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 49, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31.  Accordingly, we overrule Bethel’s third 
proposition of law. 
B. Crim.R. 11(F) 
{¶ 88} Crim.R. 11(F) provides that when a negotiated plea of guilty is 
offered in a felony case, “the underlying agreement upon which the plea is based 
shall be stated on the record in open court.”  In this case, the underlying 
January Term, 2006 
19 
agreement was stated on the record, but not in “open court,” as the court was 
closed while the plea agreement was being discussed. 
{¶ 89} However, Bethel did not object to the closure of the courtroom 
during the discussion of the plea agreement.  While Bethel’s silence did not waive 
his constitutional right to a public trial, see State v. Hensley (1906), 75 Ohio St. 
255, 266, 79 N.E. 462, a contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve error 
for appellate review of a violation of Crim.R. 11(F). 
{¶ 90} Thus, Bethel cannot prevail on his claim under Crim.R. 11(F) 
unless he shows plain error.  To do this, he must show that the outcome of the 
trial clearly would have been otherwise without the alleged error.  State v. Long, 
53 Ohio St.2d at 97, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804.  Bethel does not explain how 
he was prejudiced by the trial court’s violation of Crim.R. 11(F). Cf. State v. 
Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 418, 692 N.E.2d 151 (violation of Crim.R. 
11(F) not prejudicial where terms of the plea were stated on the record in 
chambers). We overrule Bethel’s fifth proposition of law. 
III. Evidentiary Issues 
A. Gang-Affiliation Evidence 
{¶ 91} State’s witness Donald Langbein testified that Bethel was a 
member of the Crips street gang.  Langbein also identified a photograph of 
himself and Bethel making hand signals that, according to Langbein, were “gang 
signs” of the Crips.  This photo was published to the jury after Langbein 
identified it.  In his seventh and eighth propositions of law, Bethel claims that this 
evidence was inadmissible. 
{¶ 92} Bethel did not object to the gang-affiliation testimony at trial.  Nor 
did he object to the photo when Langbein identified it in court, even though it was 
published to the jury at that time.  He objected only after the state’s case had 
concluded, when the court was considering the admission of exhibits.  Bethel’s 
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failure to timely object to the testimony, or to the photo, waives the issues raised 
in his seventh and eighth propositions of law.  We overrule these propositions. 
B. Tape-Recorded Conversations 
{¶ 93} In his 18th proposition of law, Bethel contends that the trial court 
erred when it refused to provide State’s Exhibit T-1, the tape recording of the 
Bethel-Langbein conversation on October 19, 2000, to the jury. 
{¶ 94} Parts of the tape were played during the state’s case and during 
Bethel’s cross-examination.  However, the tape was never offered nor formally 
admitted into evidence.  During its guilt-phase deliberations, the jury requested 
the tape.  Before responding, the trial court consulted counsel for both parties, and 
they “collectively agreed that the appropriate response is [that] you have all of the 
evidence which has been admitted.”  Accordingly, the trial court told the jury: 
“You have everything you need. * * * [Y]ou have everything that’s been admitted 
into evidence, and the rest you will have to rely on your collective memory for.” 
{¶ 95} Since the defense did not object and agreed that this was “the 
appropriate response” to the jury’s request for the tape, the issue is waived.  See 
State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 738 N.E.2d 1178.  Neither did 
the trial court commit plain error.  When the jury asks to see an exhibit, it is 
within the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny that request.  See State v. 
McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 396, 686 N.E.2d 1112; State v. Clark (1988), 
38 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 527 N.E.2d 844.  “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * 
implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”  
State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144, 
citing Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448, 19 O.O. 148, 31 N.E.2d 855.  
The trial court’s refusal to send the tape to the jury was not unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable. 
{¶ 96} Bethel also claims that the trial court, having allowed the state to 
play parts of one tape, should have allowed the defense to play tapes of other 
January Term, 2006 
21 
conversations between Bethel and Langbein during Langbein’s cross-
examination.  Bethel argues that excluding the other tapes violated Evid.R. 106: 
“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an 
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other 
writing or recorded statement which is otherwise admissible and which ought in 
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” 
{¶ 97} However, Bethel did not proffer the tapes he wanted the jury to 
hear at his trial.  Because the other tapes are not in the record, we cannot 
determine whether they should in fairness “be considered contemporaneously 
with” Exhibit T-1.  See State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d at 337, 638 N.E.2d 1023.  
Hence, Bethel has also failed to preserve this issue. 
{¶ 98} Bethel also argues that the exclusion of the other conversations 
violated his right to confront Langbein with statements made by Langbein during 
those conversations.  But at trial Bethel did not argue that he was entitled to use 
the tapes to confront Langbein with Langbein’s statements.  Bethel argued only 
that the jury should hear the tapes because they contained Bethel’s denials of 
involvement in the murders.  Bethel’s confrontation claim is waived by his failure 
to present it to the trial court as well as by his failure to proffer the tapes. 
{¶ 99} Because the issues presented by Bethel’s 18th proposition of law 
were not preserved at trial, we overrule that proposition. 
C. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence 
{¶ 100} In his 16th proposition of law, Bethel contends that the verdict 
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  See R.C. 2953.02.  A court 
considering a manifest-weight claim “review[s] the entire record, weighs the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences, [and] considers the credibility of 
witnesses.”  State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 
N.E.2d 717.  The question to be determined is “whether in resolving conflicts in 
the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.  The 
discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the 
exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”  
Id. at 175, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717. 
{¶ 101} The key evidence supporting Bethel’s conviction was his own 
statements to Langbein and Campbell and his proffer of August 30, 2001.  On 
each occasion, Bethel admitted killing Reynolds and Hawks with a 9 mm 
handgun. 
{¶ 102} Langbein also testified, and Bethel admitted, that Bethel offered 
to take Reynolds home on June 25, 1996.  A friend of Hawks testified that the last 
time she saw Hawks and Reynolds, they were getting into Bethel’s car.  Bethel 
also admits that he picked up Hawks at some point on June 25, 1996, but claims 
that he dropped off both victims at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. 
{¶ 103} Bethel had purchased a shotgun like the one used in the murders 
less than two weeks earlier.  While police found a similar shotgun purchased by 
Bethel’s friend during a search of Bethel’s trailer, Bethel’s shotgun was never 
located.  Bethel claimed that it had been stolen. 
{¶ 104} When police searched the home of Cheveldes Chavis (Jeremy’s 
brother and Bethel’s friend), they found a document captioned “Supplemental 
Discovery,” which had Jeremy Chavis’s fingerprints on it, and a copy of an 
affidavit in Tyrone Green’s aggravated-murder case that claimed that Reynolds 
said that he had seen Green shoot a man. 
{¶ 105} Bethel’s proffer, explaining how the murders were committed, 
supports a finding of prior calculation and design.  Bethel admitted that before 
picking up Reynolds and Hawks, he and Jeremy discussed what they were going 
to do.  After Bethel fired an entire clip at Reynolds and Hawks, even though he 
wanted to leave, Bethel accepted a fresh clip from Jeremy, reloaded, approached 
the victims, and emptied a second clip into them from close range. 
January Term, 2006 
23 
{¶ 106} The autopsies showed that Reynolds was shot ten times, once 
with a shotgun, and Hawks was shot four times.  Nine mm bullets were recovered 
from both bodies.  Reynolds had four head wounds, at least one of which was 
inflicted at close range.  Hawks had two head wounds, at least one of which was 
inflicted at close range.  These wounds confirm Bethel’s statement in his proffer 
that he fired several shots at Reynolds and Hawks from a distance, approached 
them as they lay on the ground, and shot them again at close range. 
{¶ 107} Bethel argues that the account in his proffer is inconsistent with 
the victims’ wounds and the crime-scene evidence.  However, his claims are 
vague and largely conjectural.  Bethel claims that some of the victims’ wounds 
could not have been inflicted from a distance of 30 to 40 feet.  But this fact is not 
inconsistent with Bethel’s proffer; Bethel never said he fired all his shots from 
that distance.  Rather, after firing his initial fusillade, he reloaded his gun, 
approached the victims, and shot them at close range. 
{¶ 108} Bethel’s argument that his proffer is inconsistent with the 
physical evidence is partially based on wound angles that he claims are 
inconsistent with those from shots fired at a distance.  However, his argument 
assumes that the victims were standing upright when these wounds were inflicted.  
Bethel fails to take into account his own admission that the victims fell to the 
ground when they were shot. 
{¶ 109} Bethel also argues that the lack of bleeding from Reynolds’s 
shotgun wound indicates that this wound was inflicted after Reynolds’s death and 
that this evidence is inconsistent with the proffer, which states that Chavis fired 
his shotgun at the same time Bethel began firing.  However, the coroner testified 
that the wound could have been inflicted either “very soon before or immediately 
after” Reynolds’s fatal head wound.  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 110} Bethel argues in his brief that his statement to Campbell placed 
Chavis in the car during the shootings, thus contradicting his other statements that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Chavis fired the shotgun.  But there is no contradiction.  The Campbell statement 
does not place Chavis in the car during the entire crime.  To the contrary, 
Campbell testified that Bethel told her that Chavis “started crying and went to the 
car” after the initial shooting.  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 111} This is not a case in which the evidence weighs heavily against 
conviction; the jury’s verdict was not a manifest miscarriage of justice.  Martin, 
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717.  Rather, it is a case in which 
the defendant admitted guilt on three separate occasions, in which those 
admissions are fully consistent with the physical evidence, and in which the 
defendant had a strong motive to kill the victims.  We overrule Bethel’s 16th 
proposition of law. 
{¶ 112} In his 17th proposition of law, Bethel contends that the evidence 
was legally insufficient to support his conviction.  The test of sufficiency of the 
evidence is whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the state, could have found the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 
61 L.Ed.2d 560. 
{¶ 113} Bethel’s statements provide legally sufficient evidence of his 
guilt.  Bethel’s 17th proposition of law is overruled. 
IV. Voir Dire 
{¶ 114} In his 15th proposition of law, Bethel identifies ten prospective 
jurors who were excused for cause because the trial court concluded that their 
difficulties with capital punishment rendered them unable to fairly consider the 
death penalty.  Bethel contends that each of these excusals was improper.  Bethel 
also claims that the trial court erroneously overruled his challenges of two 
prospective jurors for cause. 
A. Prosecution Challenges for Cause 
January Term, 2006 
25 
{¶ 115} In each case for which Bethel alleges that the trial court 
improperly excused a venireman for cause, Bethel objected to the excusal.  
Nevertheless, the state argues that Bethel waived all but plain error by failing to 
state specific grounds for his objections. 
{¶ 116} Bethel based his objections as to four veniremen, Eaton, 
Johnston, O’Harra, and Carpenter, solely on his claim that death qualification is 
unconstitutional.  He articulated no other objection to excusing these veniremen 
for cause.  Bethel has thus waived any objections based on other grounds, such as 
the voir dire responses of the veniremen in question. 
{¶ 117} The state’s contention is incorrect with regard to the other six 
prospective jurors.  In the cases of Shultz, Rhatigan, Poindexter, and Hilty, Bethel 
specifically objected to excusal on the grounds that the prospective juror’s voir 
dire responses did not support a challenge for cause.  Therefore, these objections 
were not waived. 
{¶ 118} A juror may be excused for cause if his views on capital 
punishment “would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”  Adams v. Texas 
(1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581; State v. Williams, 99 
Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 40.  A trial court’s resolution 
of a challenge for cause will be upheld on appeal unless it is unsupported by 
substantial testimony.  State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 
409, 280 N.E.2d 915. 
{¶ 119} Venireman Rhatigan never stated that she was categorically 
opposed to capital punishment.  Asked whether she would give capital 
punishment “a fair shake,” she said: “I think maybe.  But it would be very 
difficult.”  She did not know whether she could sign a death verdict.  She thought 
“maybe” she could follow the law, but “wouldn’t promise” to do so.  Later, she 
said she would try to be fair and to follow the law, but “with only two murders I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
would be predisposed to weigh the mitigating factors more heavily.”  She 
reiterated that it would be very difficult to sign a death verdict, although she 
allowed that it was “possible” that she would do so. 
{¶ 120} Rhatigan’s refusal to promise to follow the law and fairly 
consider a death sentence supports a finding that her ability to follow the law was 
substantially impaired.  Thus, the record supports the trial court’s decision to 
excuse her for cause. 
{¶ 121} Venireman Shultz was “completely against” capital punishment, 
although he believed that some people deserved it.  Even though he “would do 
whatever [he was] charged to do legally,” he did not think that he could sign a 
death verdict. 
{¶ 122} In response to a question by defense counsel, Shultz mentioned 
Susan Smith and Timothy McVeigh as examples of persons who deserved the 
death penalty.  Asked whether he could have voted for a death sentence in the 
Susan Smith case, Shultz said: “My mind is telling me yes right now.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  He said he could “absolutely” follow the judge’s instructions “as a civic 
duty” and could consider each of the possible sentences. 
{¶ 123} Shultz’s final statements, viewed in isolation, do not suggest 
impairment.  “However, where a prospective juror gives contradictory answers on 
voir dire, the trial judge need not accept the last answer elicited by counsel as the 
prospective juror's definitive word. * * * Rather, ‘it is for the trial court to 
determine which answer reflects the juror's true state of mind.’ ”  State v. Group, 
98 Ohio St.3d 248, 2002-Ohio-7247, 781 N.E.2d 980, ¶ 66, quoting State v. Jones 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 339, 744 N.E.2d 1163.  Shultz had already said that he 
was completely against capital punishment, even though he claimed he could 
follow the judge’s instructions.  Thus, substantial testimony supported excluding 
Shultz.  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by so doing.  See State v. 
Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d at 339, 638 N.E.2d 1023. 
January Term, 2006 
27 
{¶ 124} Poindexter and Hilty also gave contradictory answers.  
Poindexter  was not completely against capital punishment.  However, she said on 
voir dire that she could not and “probably wouldn’t sign” a death verdict if she 
were the last juror to sign the verdict form.  She also said that “maybe” she could 
do it after hearing the evidence, but that she did not know.  Later she said that she 
could follow the trial court’s instructions and “would have to” vote for a death 
sentence if the state proved its case.  She stated that she could sign a death verdict, 
although she did not retract her earlier statement that she could not provide the 
final signature.  The trial judge granted the state’s challenge for cause because 
Poindexter “said everything on both sides of this issue.” 
{¶ 125} Hilty initially said she possibly could sign a death verdict, but 
then said: “I couldn’t do it.”  Later, she said, “I guess I could do it.” 
{¶ 126} The record supports the trial judge’s decision to grant these 
challenges.  Both Poindexter and Hilty expressed severe doubts about their ability 
to participate in a death sentence.  The record justifies a finding that their ability 
to perform in accordance with their instructions and oath was substantially 
impaired.  To the extent that they contradicted themselves on this point, the trial 
judge’s resolution of the question is entitled to deference. Webb, supra. 
{¶ 127} Finally, although Bethel did not state specific grounds for 
objecting to the excusals of Hackney and Stynchula, the basis of Bethel’s 
objections can be fairly discerned from the record.  Hence, Bethel’s objections to 
these excusals were not waived. 
{¶ 128} These challenges were also properly granted under the 
substantial-impairment standard.  Hackney believed that she could follow the law, 
although it would be difficult.  But she said she could not actually sign a death 
verdict, even if that was “the right thing to do.”  Signing would make her feel 
guilty: “[M]orally, I would have a real hard time dealing with it.”  The only 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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circumstance in which she would be willing to sign would be if the defendant had 
committed a murder in prison. 
{¶ 129} Stynchula was not challenged for cause by either party during the 
death-qualification voir dire.  However, two days later, she disclosed, without 
prompting, that she did not know whether she could sign a death verdict.  She 
said: “[T]he past two days just thinking and thinking of it just gives me a – gets 
me in the pit of my stomach.”  She even worried that she might be 
excommunicated from her church if she signed a death verdict. 
{¶ 130} We hold that the trial court’s decision to excuse these six 
prospective jurors for cause was supported by substantial testimony.  In each case, 
voir dire provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude that the juror’s 
views on capital punishment would either prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of the juror’s duties in accordance with his instructions and oath. 
B. Defense Challenges for Cause 
{¶ 131} A defendant has a constitutional right to exclude for cause any 
prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty.  Morgan v. 
Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492.  Bethel 
challenged veniremen Ford and Collier for cause on this basis.  The trial court 
overruled both challenges, although it sustained several other challenges for cause 
by Bethel. 
{¶ 132} Venireman Ford said on voir dire: “I believe in capital 
punishment, I definitely believe that there are circumstances and factors that must 
be weighed out and I definitely fall in the middle” between an automatic death 
sentence and an automatic rejection of death.  He said that if life were the 
appropriate sentence, he could sign a life verdict.  When asked whether he would 
be “predisposed to the death penalty if he found that the defendant did purposely 
kill two people,” he said, “Yes.”  However, he added, “I [would] totally try to do 
January Term, 2006 
29 
my best to clearly accept all the evidence and factors that are presented,” and “I 
would definitely try my very best to be open-minded about the process.” 
{¶ 133} Based on the totality of Ford’s voir dire, the trial court could 
properly conclude that Ford understood the importance of considering all the 
evidence and the relevant factors and that he would not automatically vote for 
death.  Thus, substantial testimony supports the trial court’s decision not to 
exclude him for cause. 
{¶ 134} As for venireman Collier, Bethel was not prejudiced by the 
denial of his challenge to Collier.  Although Bethel’s challenge for cause was 
denied, Collier did not sit on the jury, and Bethel was not forced to use a 
peremptory challenge to eliminate him.  See State v. Eaton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 
145, 48 O.O.2d 188, 249 N.E.2d 897, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 135} No reversible error attaches to the trial court’s rulings on the 
defendant’s challenges for cause, which were raised in Bethel’s 15th proposition 
of law.  That proposition is therefore overruled. 
V. Lesser Included Offense 
{¶ 136} In his 14th proposition of law, Bethel contends that the trial court 
should have granted his request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
murder.  “Murder (R.C. 2903.02) is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder (R.C. 2903.01[A]). * * * The sole difference is that prior calculation and 
design is absent from murder.”  State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-
2282, 827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 36.  Bethel claims that the evidence reasonably supports 
a finding that the killings were purposeful, and thus constituted murder, but were 
not committed with prior calculation and design. 
{¶ 137} However, Bethel’s defense was alibi; he and his mother testified 
that he was at his mother’s house between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., June 25, 1996 
(i.e., at the time Ron Bass heard gunshots).  Ordinarily, when a defendant presents 
a complete defense to the substantive elements of the crime, such as an alibi, an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
instruction on a lesser included offense is improper.  See, e.g., State v. Strodes 
(1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 113, 117, 2 O.O.3d 271, 357 N.E.2d 375. 
{¶ 138} In such cases, a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense 
instruction “only if, based on the evidence adduced by the state, the trier of fact 
can find for the defendant * * * on some element of the greater offense which is 
not required to prove the commission of the lesser offense and for the state on the 
elements required to prove the commission of the lesser offense.”  State v. 
Solomon (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 214, 20 O.O.3d 213, 421 N.E.2d 139, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  “[I]f due to some ambiguity in the state’s version of the 
events involved in a case the jury could have a reasonable doubt regarding the 
presence of an element required to prove the greater but not the lesser offense, an 
instruction on the lesser included offense is ordinarily warranted.” Id. at 221, 20 
O.O.3d 213, 421 N.E.2d 139.  Thus, Bethel was entitled to a murder instruction 
only if the state’s evidence was ambiguous on the element of prior calculation and 
design, such that a trier of fact could reasonably have found that Bethel killed the 
victims purposefully but without prior calculation and design. 
{¶ 139} Bethel cites a portion of the testimony of one of the state’s 
witnesses, Theresa Cobb Campbell, in support of his argument.  According to 
Campbell, when Bethel confessed the murders to her, he told her that when he, 
Chavis, and the victims went to shoot guns, he “had a feeling to shoot” and that he 
shot the victims “because he felt like it.”  Bethel contends that these statements, 
construed in the light most favorable to him, negated the element of prior 
calculation and design and could have led a trier of fact to conclude that the 
shootings were murders rather than aggravated murders. 
{¶ 140} The portion of Campbell’s testimony cited by Bethel does not 
create an ambiguity in the state’s case.  In Solomon, “[t]he sole evidence of a 
scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill * * * was the 
passage of time” between two incidents. (Emphasis added.) 66 Ohio St.2d at 221, 
January Term, 2006 
31 
20 O.O.3d 213, 421 N.E.2d 139.  The court found that “[a]lthough such evidence 
might have provided the jury with a reasonable basis for finding prior calculation 
and design, it is ambiguous in nature and did not necessarily lead to that 
conclusion.” Id. 
{¶ 141} Here, Campbell’s testimony was far from being the sole evidence 
of Bethel’s prior calculation and design.  The fact that each witness does not 
provide testimony conclusively proving every element of a crime does not mean 
that a defendant is entitled to instructions on every lesser included offense.  The 
whole of the state’s case should be considered in determining whether an 
instruction on a lesser included offense should reasonably be given. State v. 
Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 345, 703 N.E.2d 1251. 
{¶ 142} Campbell’s testimony actually supports the conclusion that 
Bethel planned the murders.  He took the victims to a secluded spot.  He shot 
them both in quick succession from close range.  He then reloaded his gun and 
shot some more.  He expressed to Campbell no regret or confusion as to his 
motivation. 
{¶ 143} Even when considering Campbell’s testimony in a light most 
favorable to Bethel, we conclude that under all the evidence presented, no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found that Bethel killed the victims 
purposefully but without prior calculation and design.  Hence, Bethel was not 
entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on murder.  Bethel’s 14th 
proposition is overruled. 
VI. Penalty-Phase Issues 
A. Ashworth Issue 
{¶ 144} In his sixth proposition of law, Bethel contends that the trial 
court erred by allowing Bethel to waive the presentation of mitigation evidence 
without inquiring into the knowing and voluntary character of Bethel’s decision.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
See, generally, State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 145} In the penalty phase, Bethel made a brief unsworn statement in 
which he maintained his innocence.  He expressed sympathy for the families of 
Reynolds and Hawks.  He told the jury that he had made efforts to change and 
was not the same person he had been at age 18.  He pointed out that at the time of 
his arrest, he had been working and leading “basically a normal life.”  Defense 
counsel then presented the testimony of Joseph S. Burke Jr., the manager of a 
Subway restaurant where Bethel had worked.  Burke testified that Bethel was a 
good worker who had begun as a crew member and was promoted within three or 
four months to assistant manager. 
{¶ 146} After both parties rested in the penalty phase, defense counsel 
explained to the judge that the evidence presented was “all that [Bethel] would let 
us put on.”  Counsel informed the court that they had performed an investigation 
and had prepared a mitigation case.  They had planned to present several 
witnesses: Bethel’s mother, a teacher, social workers, and a guard at a juvenile 
facility.  Counsel had also obtained reports from Children Services and the 
Hannah Neil House pertaining to Bethel’s childhood.  They were prepared to 
show that parental abandonment and neglect had denied Bethel guidance and 
discipline, but that Bethel had behaved unusually well in juvenile detention and 
had qualified for early release. 
{¶ 147} Because Bethel would not allow his counsel to put on the case 
they had prepared, counsel consulted Jeffrey Smalldon, Ph.D., a psychologist, 
who concluded that Bethel was competent to waive mitigation. 
{¶ 148} In State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231, at 
paragraph one of the syllabus, we held: “In a capital case, when a defendant 
wishes to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence, a trial court must 
conduct an inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether the waiver 
January Term, 2006 
33 
is knowing and voluntary.”  (Emphasis sic.)  In State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 
384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 74, we explained: “Given our emphasis 
in Ashworth on the word ‘all,’ it is clear that we intended to require an inquiry of 
a defendant only in those situations where the defendant chooses to present no 
mitigating evidence whatsoever.” 
{¶ 149} In this case, Bethel did not waive the presentation of all 
mitigating evidence.  He presented mitigating evidence to the jury: his unsworn 
statement and the testimony of his former supervisor.  Therefore, no Ashworth 
inquiry was required.  Bethel’s sixth proposition is overruled. 
B. Instructions 
{¶ 150} In his 12th proposition of law, Bethel contends that the trial 
court’s penalty-phase instructions were inadequate and improper. 
{¶ 151} The trial court admitted all the guilt-phase evidence in the 
penalty phase.  The court instructed the jury to “consider all of the evidence, the 
arguments of counsel, and all the other information and reports which are relevant 
to the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors.”  The court further 
instructed that “evidence” included “all of the testimony and exhibits produced at 
the first trial [i.e., the guilt phase] which is relevant to the aggravating 
circumstances and or the mitigating factors.”  However, by agreement of the 
prosecutor, none of the exhibits from the guilt-phase proceedings were ultimately 
provided to the jurors in their deliberations. 
{¶ 152} Citing State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 702 N.E.2d 866, 
Bethel contends that the trial court had the responsibility to determine what 
evidence was relevant rather than leaving that determination to the jury.  
However, the trial court in its instructions did not specifically leave it to the jury 
to determine what evidence was relevant, as the trial court did in Getsy.  The trial 
court in Getsy instructed the jury to consider “ ‘all the evidence, including 
exhibits presented in the first phase of this trial which you deem to be relevant.’ ”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
(Emphasis deleted.)  Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 201, 702 N.E.2d 866.  Here, the jury 
understood that they would see only the evidence that the trial judge deemed 
relevant. 
{¶ 153} Further, in Getsy, “[t]he trial court denied the defense request to 
exclude certain items (i.e., shotgun, ballistic reports, and blood) from the penalty-
phase deliberations.  The defense renewed the request after the jury instructions 
were given and specifically objected to the instruction regarding the exhibits.” Id.  
Here, Bethel failed to specifically object to the trial court’s instruction at trial.  
Absent plain error, this issue is waived. 
{¶ 154} Most guilt-phase evidence is relevant to the penalty phase.  See 
State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 282-283, 528 N.E.2d 542.  The only 
guilt-phase evidence Bethel sought to have removed from the consideration of the 
jurors in the penalty phase were the photographs.  Those exhibits were not 
provided to the jury during their penalty-phase deliberations.  Hence, Bethel fails 
to demonstrate plain error. 
{¶ 155} Bethel also complains that the jury was not instructed to 
“recommend the appropriate sentence as though your recommendation will, in 
fact, be carried out.”  See State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 375, 582 
N.E.2d 972 (commending such an instruction as clear and accurate).  Again, 
Bethel never proposed such an instruction at trial, nor did he object to the trial 
court’s failure to give it.  Absent plain error, this issue is waived. 
{¶ 156} No plain error exists here.  Although we commended the trial 
court in Mills for giving the above instruction, we did not require that it be given.  
Moreover, the instructions that were actually given at trial did not misstate the 
jury’s role in any way.  See State v. Rogers (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 429-431, 
28 OBR 480, 504 N.E.2d 52.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows: “You 
are not to construe the use of that word [recommend] to in any way diminish your 
sense of responsibility in this matter.”  We approved such an instruction in State 
January Term, 2006 
35 
v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 84, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  Thus, there was no 
“obvious” error.  State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240. 
{¶ 157} Since Bethel put on little evidence in mitigation, neither is it 
clear that giving the Mills instruction would have brought about a different 
outcome.  Bethel’s 12th proposition is overruled. 
VII. Ineffective Assistance 
{¶ 158} In his fourth proposition of law, Bethel claims that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel both before and at his trial. 
{¶ 159} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Bethel must show (1) deficient performance, i.e., performance falling below an 
objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) resulting prejudice, i.e., a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would 
have been different.  See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-
688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Williams v. Taylor (2000), 529 U.S. 
362, 390-391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.  Bethel 
alleges that his original counsel, Ronald Janes and Joseph Edwards, rendered 
ineffective assistance before trial and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance during trial. 
A. Alleged Errors by Janes and Edwards 
{¶ 160} Bethel claims that Janes and Edwards never prepared to try his 
case.  This lack of preparation was prejudicial, he claims, because it compelled 
him to make a proffer and enter a guilty plea in order to buy time and to avoid 
having to go to trial with unprepared counsel. 
{¶ 161} According to Bethel, Janes actually admitted at the suppression 
hearing that, as of August 30, 2001, the defense was not prepared for the 
upcoming trial.  On cross-examination, Janes was asked: “Do you know if at the 
time of his plea agreement he [i.e., Bethel] was prepared – whether or not he was 
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prepared for trial?”  Janes replied: “No, I don’t believe he was.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶ 162} This exchange does not support Bethel’s interpretation of Janes’s 
testimony as a confession that the defense was inadequately prepared.  Janes may 
well have meant only that Bethel himself was not willing to go to trial when a 
death sentence was a possibility. 
{¶ 163} Bethel also cites his own guilt-phase testimony and that of 
private investigator Gary Phillips to support his claim that Janes and Edwards 
were unprepared.  Phillips testified that three weeks before the scheduled start of 
the trial, Janes contacted him “in somewhat of a panic mode” and asked for 
Phillips’s assistance in investigating the case.  Phillips admitted, however, that he 
did not know whether Janes and Edwards had sought a continuance of the 
scheduled trial date and said that it would have been “kind of rare” for Bethel’s 
case to have gone to trial within a year of his indictment.  Moreover, after 
reviewing evidence in the case, Phillips recommended to Bethel that he agree to 
the offered plea bargain. 
{¶ 164} Bethel testified that his attorneys were unprepared, but he also 
testified that he never sought a continuance in the case.  He had also testified that 
the plea agreement was “a good idea” and that his only problem with the plea 
agreement was that he would have to testify against Jeremy Chavis.  Besides 
Janes, Edwards, and Phillips, Bethel’s mother, Sanford Cohan, the attorney hired 
by Bethel’s mother to monitor the case, and Jim Crites, Bethel’s mitigation 
expert, all urged Bethel to accept the plea agreement. 
{¶ 165} We reject Bethel’s contention that Janes and Edwards were 
unprepared for trial and forced Bethel into a plea agreement.  Bethel’s claim that 
his attorneys would betray him in order to avoid trial is incredible and has no 
evidentiary support.  All indications are that Janes and Edwards sought and 
January Term, 2006 
37 
recommended a plea agreement because they were working in Bethel’s best 
interest. 
{¶ 166} Bethel also contends that Janes and Edwards were ineffective 
because they “fail[ed] to adequately and completely explain [the] plea agreement” 
to him.  Janes and Edwards testified at the suppression hearing that they did not 
specifically recall explaining Paragraph Six of the plea agreement (the “null and 
void” language) to Bethel.  However, the trial court found that Bethel fully 
understood that his proffer could be used against him if he breached the 
agreement.  Although Bethel claimed that he was misled by counsel and confused 
by the alleged conflict between Paragraphs One and Six, the trial court found that 
his suppression-hearing testimony lacked credibility, while the testimony of Janes 
and Edwards was credible. 
{¶ 167} In sum, we lack a factual basis for finding that Janes and 
Edwards committed errors amounting to deficient performance.  Thus, we reject 
Bethel’s claims that Janes and Edwards provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
B. Alleged Errors by Trial Counsel 
{¶ 168} Bethel contends that his trial counsel were ineffective because 
they failed to obtain defense experts on false confessions, ballistics, forensics, and 
crime-scene reconstruction.  We find that Bethel was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s actions.  In State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 721 N.E.2d 52, 
we rejected a similar claim that counsel should have obtained an expert on 
eyewitness identification: “[R]esolving this issue in Madrigal’s favor would be 
purely speculative.  Nothing in the record indicates what kind of testimony an 
eyewitness identification expert could have provided.  Establishing that would 
require proof outside the record * * *.  Such a claim is not appropriately 
considered on a direct appeal.”  Id. at 390-391, 721 N.E.2d 52. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
{¶ 169} Bethel contends that his counsel should have objected to 
evidence concerning his gang membership on the ground that it was irrelevant.  
We reject this claim because counsel had no valid basis to object to the evidence 
of Bethel’s gang affiliation. 
{¶ 170} A defendant’s gang affiliation can be relevant and is admissible 
in cases “ ‘where the interrelationship between people is a central issue.’ ”  United 
States v. Gibbs (C.A.6, 1999), 182 F.3d 408, 430, quoting United States v. 
Thomas (C.A.7, 1996), 86 F.3d 647, 652.  See, also, United States v. Sloan 
(C.A.10, 1995), 65 F.3d 149, 150-151.  Here, the evidence showed that Reynolds 
was killed by two members of the Crips gang because he was a witness to the 
criminal activity of a third member.  The gang affiliation of Bethel, Jeremy 
Chavis, and Tyrone Green strengthens Bethel’s motive to commit the shootings.  
See People v. Miller (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1034-1035, 57 Ill.Dec. 358, 
428 N.E.2d 1038 (evidence implying gang membership admissible to show 
defendant’s motive for becoming involved in dispute between defendant’s 
associate and victim).  The gang evidence thereby makes Bethel’s guilt more 
likely than it would be without that evidence.  Thus, it was relevant under Evid.R. 
401.  See Sloan, 65 F.3d at 151. 
{¶ 171} Bethel also argues that the probative value of the gang-affiliation 
evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  “Although 
relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice * * *.”  Evid.R. 403(A).  The trial 
court has broad discretion in determining whether unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs probative value under Evid.R. 403(A).  A reviewing court will not 
interfere absent a clear abuse of that discretion.  State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 
227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 172} Even had there been an objection, the trial court would not have 
committed a clear abuse of discretion by admitting the gang evidence.  It is true, 
January Term, 2006 
39 
as Bethel argues, that evidence of gang membership creates some risk of unfair 
prejudice.  See, e.g., United States v. Jobson (C.A.6, 1996), 102 F.3d 214, 219, fn. 
4.  On the other hand, the state’s use of the evidence was restrained. 
{¶ 173} The evidence regarding Bethel’s gang membership consisted of 
Langbein’s bare statement that Bethel was a member of the Crips and one 
photograph of Bethel flashing gang signs with his hands.  Beyond the information 
that the Crips were a gang, the state introduced no evidence about the 
organization – for instance, about its general criminal propensities or about 
unrelated criminal enterprises – that might have inflamed the jury.  Nor did the 
state discuss the Crips in its opening or closing statements.  In light of the 
relevance of Bethel’s gang affiliation and the state’s minimal use of that evidence, 
the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value 
of the gang evidence. 
{¶ 174} Bethel also argues that the gang evidence constituted improper 
“other acts” evidence.  Evid.R. 404(B) provides: “Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
state, however, made no attempt to use the gang evidence as proof of Bethel’s 
character.  Moreover, as already noted, the evidence was probative of Bethel’s 
motive.  Accordingly, its admission did not violate Evid.R. 404(B). 
{¶ 175} Finally, Bethel argues that the gang evidence violated the First 
Amendment.  Citing Dawson v. Delaware (1992), 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 
117 L.Ed.2d 309, Bethel contends that gang membership is protected by the First 
Amendment right of association and that the state could not introduce evidence of 
his gang membership without showing its relevance. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
{¶ 176} Bethel’s First Amendment claim lacks merit.  Dawson held that 
the First Amendment precludes a state “from employing evidence of a 
defendant’s abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no 
bearing on the issue being tried.”  503 U.S. at 168, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 
309.  At Dawson’s penalty phase, the jury was told that he belonged to the Aryan 
Brotherhood, which was described as “a white racist prison gang”; the gang’s 
racism was not relevant to the case, and the jury was told nothing about the gang 
that was relevant.  Moreover, the gang’s beliefs were of a sort that the jury was 
apt to find “morally reprehensible.”  Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309. 
{¶ 177} Dawson, then, is a case about using a defendant’s irrelevant 
abstract beliefs to prejudice his sentencing proceeding.  In this case, the state 
introduced no evidence concerning any abstract beliefs held by the Crips.  Thus, 
evidence of Crips membership had no tendency to associate Bethel with beliefs 
that “the jury would find * * * morally reprehensible.”  Moreover, unlike 
Dawson’s gang membership, Bethel’s membership was relevant to his criminal 
activity. 
{¶ 178} Bethel next contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance because they failed to object to Detective Kallay’s testimony that 
Bethel had initially pleaded guilty to the aggravated murders of Reynolds and 
Hawks.  The record indicates that counsel had a reasonable strategic purpose for 
not objecting to this testimony.  At trial, Bethel repudiated his proffer and claimed 
that his admission of guilt was a lie.  It was therefore crucial for the defense to 
explain why Bethel had lied in his proffer.  Accordingly, Bethel’s trial counsel 
undertook to set forth in detail the course of the plea negotiations that resulted in 
the proffer.  It was the defense that first raised the subject of the plea agreement in 
its opening statement (“As a last resort, this young man capitulated and he agreed 
to enter into a plea bargain.”)   and returned to this topic in closing argument.  The 
defense also elicited Bethel’s testimony that Janes and Edwards had pressured 
January Term, 2006 
41 
him to plead guilty because they were unprepared for trial.  Having adopted this 
strategy and having already informed the jury that Bethel had entered into a plea 
bargain with the state, the defense had no reason to object to Kallay’s brief 
testimony concerning Bethel’s guilty plea. 
{¶ 179} Bethel argues that his trial counsel should have introduced Traci 
Queen’s prior inconsistent statement under Evid.R. 613(B).  On cross-
examination, Queen testified that she had never heard Reynolds and Joey 
Northrup argue, nor had she seen them fight.  Defense counsel then asked Queen 
whether she had told defense investigator Martha Phillips that she had seen 
Reynolds and Northrup fighting about two weeks before the murders.  She again 
denied having seen them fight.  Counsel asked Queen whether she had told 
Phillips that Reynolds had thrown a handful of rocks at Northrup’s window.  
Queen denied telling Phillips that. 
{¶ 180} Under Evid.R. 613(B), a party may introduce extrinsic evidence 
of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement to impeach the witness’s credibility.  
Bethel argues that counsel should have called Martha Phillips to testify to 
Queen’s prior inconsistent statement under Evid.R. 613(B), because Queen’s prior 
statement would have corroborated a defense theory that Northrup may have been 
the real killer. 
{¶ 181} Bethel’s argument is flawed.  First, his claim that Phillips would 
have testified that Queen made the statements in question is pure speculation, 
unsupported by anything in the record. 
{¶ 182} Second, Bethel’s argument disregards the difference between 
using a prior statement to impeach its maker under Evid.R. 613(B) and using it as 
substantive evidence – i.e., to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement – under Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(a).  Bethel cites Evid.R. 613(B), which 
permits extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement only to impeach.  But 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
he argues that his counsel should have used the statement substantively to prove 
that Northrup and Reynolds had fought. 
{¶ 183} Substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement is covered by 
Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(a).  Under that rule, there are limited circumstances in which a 
prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay and may be used as substantive 
evidence – i.e., to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.  A prior 
inconsistent statement is not hearsay if it “was given under oath subject to cross-
examination by the party against whom the statement is offered and subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.”  
Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(a).  See State v. Julian (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 828, 836, 719 
N.E.2d 96, fn. 12. 
{¶ 184} Queen’s alleged prior inconsistent statements to Phillips meet 
none of the criteria for substantive admissibility under Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(a).  
They were neither under oath, subject to cross-examination, nor given at a 
proceeding or deposition.  Hence, her statements could not have been used 
substantively to show that Northrup and Reynolds had fought. See Julian, supra.  
Defense counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to attempt a maneuver that 
the Rules of Evidence preclude. 
{¶ 185} Moreover, while the defense could have introduced the prior 
statements under Evid.R. 613(B) simply to impeach Queen, failing to do so did 
not constitute deficient performance, nor was it prejudicial.  Defense counsel 
impeached Queen’s testimony by other means – Queen admitted on cross-
examination that she had been convicted of a misdemeanor involving check 
forgery.  Further, as Bethel concedes, Queen’s credibility was not critical to the 
state’s case, which rested principally on Bethel’s having admitted three different 
times to committing the murders. 
{¶ 186} Bethel also claims that his trial counsel’s assistance was 
ineffective because they failed to object to the prosecutor’s alleged vouching for 
January Term, 2006 
43 
the credibility of Traci Queen during closing argument.  However, no vouching 
took place, and no valid objection could have been made by Bethel’s counsel to 
the prosecutor’s remark. 
{¶ 187} Bethel claims that his trial counsel should have objected to 
allegedly improper jury instructions.  We held that the jury instructions were 
proper, and thus no valid objection could have been made to them. 
{¶ 188} Finally, Bethel claims ineffective assistance because trial counsel 
failed, when making their arguments to the jury in the penalty phase, to utilize all 
the available mitigating evidence.  He contends that trial counsel should have 
cited as mitigating factors (1) the state’s willingness to offer a plea bargain, (2) 
Jeremy Chavis’s life sentence, and (3) Bethel’s cooperation with law 
enforcement. 
{¶ 189} Bethel contends that the state’s willingness to offer him a plea 
bargain was “the single most mitigating factor” in this case and that trial counsel 
should have argued that point to the jury.  But we have held that the state’s offer 
of a plea bargain is not a mitigating factor at all.  State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d at 
336, 638 N.E.2d 1023.  A plea offer does not constitute a concession by the state 
that death is not the appropriate penalty for a given offense.  Because a plea offer 
is not a mitigating factor, defense counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to 
argue that it was. 
{¶ 190} In 2001, Jeremy Chavis was convicted of the aggravated murders 
of Reynolds and Hawks and was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison, plus three 
years for a firearm specification.  See State v. Chavis, Franklin App. Nos. 01AP-
1456 and 01AP-1466, 2003-Ohio-512, 2003 WL 231265, ¶ 17 (affirming 
conviction).  Bethel argues that Chavis’s life sentence was a mitigating factor that 
counsel should have presented in the penalty phase.  However, since Chavis was 
not yet 18 years old at the time of the murders, he was not even eligible for the 
death penalty. R.C. 2929.02(A).  Bethel’s counsel could not have credibly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
attempted to essentially use the age of Bethel’s accomplice as mitigation.  Further, 
we have held that a codefendant’s life sentence is not a mitigating factor.  State v. 
Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 366, 650 N.E.2d 433. 
{¶ 191} Bethel also argues that his trial counsel should have presented as 
a mitigating factor the fact that he gave a proffer confessing to the murders.  A 
defendant’s confession and cooperation with law enforcement are mitigating 
factors.  State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 300, 731 N.E.2d 159; State 
v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 34, 716 N.E.2d 1126. 
{¶ 192} However, defense counsel could have reasonably thought it 
inadvisable to present “cooperation with law enforcement” as a mitigating factor.  
First, Bethel’s “cooperation” says little about his character, because it was 
obtained only as the result of a plea bargain.  Cf. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 72, 
706 N.E.2d 1231 (willingness to plead guilty without offer of leniency indicates 
remorse).  Second, Bethel claimed at trial that his proffer was involuntary.  
Finally, given Bethel’s adamant refusal to testify against Chavis, a claim of 
“cooperation” would have rung hollow. 
{¶ 193} Bethel’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit. 
We overrule his fourth proposition of law. 
VIII. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
{¶ 194} In his 20th proposition of law, Bethel claims prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Bethel contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Traci 
Queen’s credibility when he said: “And Traci Queen, there is absolutely no reason 
that the defense can come up with, that I can conceive, that she would come in 
here and lie.” 
{¶ 195} Bethel failed to object to this statement at trial, thereby waiving 
any objection.  The prosecutor’s comment did not amount to plain error.  He did 
not vouch for Queen’s credibility; he merely pointed out that the defense had not 
cited any reason why she would lie.  Moreover, Queen was not a crucial witness. 
January Term, 2006 
45 
{¶ 196} Bethel also contends that the introduction of gang evidence by 
the prosecution was misconduct.  This claim lacks merit, as the evidence was  not 
objected to and was admissible.  (See discussion of fourth proposition of law.)  
Bethel’s 20th proposition of law is overruled. 
IX. Cumulative Error 
{¶ 197} In his 11th proposition, Bethel claims that the cumulative effect 
of the alleged errors denied him a fair trial.  We have recognized the doctrine of 
cumulative error.  See State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-Ohio-5059, 796 
N.E.2d 506, ¶ 48.  However, it is not enough simply to intone the phrase 
“cumulative error.”  “As [Bethel] offers no further analysis, this proposition lacks 
substance * * *.”   State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, 822 
N.E.2d 1239, ¶ 103.  Bethel fails to show that the alleged errors denied him a fair 
trial.  This proposition is overruled. 
X. Settled Issue 
{¶ 198} In his 13th proposition, Bethel contends that Ohio’s death-
penalty statutes are unconstitutional.  We summarily overrule this proposition.  
See State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568. 
XI. Independent Sentence Review 
{¶ 199} Under R.C. 2929.05(A), we must independently review the death 
sentence on each count of aggravated murder.  As to each count, we must 
determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of aggravating 
circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
factors, and whether the death sentence is proportionate to those affirmed in 
similar cases. 
{¶ 200} Aggravating circumstances.  The jury found Bethel guilty of 
two aggravating circumstances as to each murder.  The aggravating circumstances 
of Reynolds’s murder were (1) that the aggravated murder was part of a course of 
conduct involving two or more intentional killings, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and (2) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
that the victim was a  witness to another offense and was purposely killed to 
prevent his testimony, R.C. 2929.04(A)(8).  The aggravating circumstances of 
Hawks’s murder were (1) that the murder was part of a course of conduct 
involving two or more intentional killings, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and (2) that the 
defendant committed the murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or 
punishment for another offense, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). 
{¶ 201} The evidence supports each of these aggravating circumstances.  
Bethel’s simultaneous killing of two victims in a single incident clearly 
established the course-of-conduct specifications.  See, generally, State v. Sapp, 
105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, 822 N.E.2d 1239.  Moreover, the evidence 
shows that Reynolds was purposely killed to prevent him from testifying in 
Tyrone Green’s aggravated murder trial, thus establishing the specification under 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(8).  Near the end of May 1996, Green learned that Reynolds had 
told Pryor that he had seen Green commit murder; at some point, Jeremy Chavis 
came into possession of Green’s discovery materials; Bethel and Langbein had 
discussed that they were going to “take steps to get rid of” Reynolds and Pryor; in 
mid-June, Bethel and Chavis’s brother bought guns; before June had ended, 
Bethel and Chavis killed Reynolds. 
{¶ 202} Finally, the evidence supports the specification under R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) attached to Hawks’s murder.  Hawks was the sole nonparticipating 
witness to the murder of Reynolds.  That supports a finding that Bethel and 
Jeremy Chavis killed her to hide the commission of Reynolds’s murder.  State v. 
Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 149, 512 N.E.2d 962. 
{¶ 203} Mitigating factors. Bethel was born on March 23, 1978.  Thus, 
he was only a few months over 18 when he committed these murders.  Under R.C. 
2929.04(B)(4), the youth of the offender is a mitigating factor.  “This factor is 
entitled to some weight, especially since eighteen is the minimum age for death 
penalty eligibility.”  State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 
January Term, 2006 
47 
N.E.2d 26, ¶ 98.  See, also, State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 335, 595 
N.E.2d 884.  However, there is no evidence to support any of the other statutory 
mitigating factors.  Nor do the nature and circumstances of these crimes offer 
anything in mitigation.  To the contrary, this was a coldly calculated double 
murder. 
{¶ 204} Bethel’s history and background reflect some minimal mitigating 
factors, although his character does not.  The record shows that Bethel’s parents 
separated when he was about nine and divorced when he was 11.  We give this 
factor little weight. 
{¶ 205} In the penalty phase, Bethel made a brief unsworn statement in 
which he continued to claim innocence.  He expressed sympathy for the families 
of Reynolds and Hawks.  He told the jury that he had made efforts to change and 
was not the same person he had been at age 18.  He pointed out that, at the time of 
his arrest, he had been working and leading “basically a normal life.” 
{¶ 206} The record shows that Bethel was employed at a BP gas station 
at the time of the murders.  Bethel also worked for about a year at a Subway 
restaurant in Columbus.  Bethel testified in the guilt phase that he had worked 40 
to 50 hours a week at the BP station and 60 hours a week at the Subway.  In the 
interim, he had held a variety of other jobs, often holding two jobs at a time and 
putting in 70 to 80 hours a week. 
{¶ 207} In late 1999 or early 2000, Joseph S. Burke Jr. hired Bethel to 
work at the Subway restaurant that Burke managed.  Three or four months later, 
Burke promoted him to assistant manager because Bethel was a good worker and 
“worked the hours an assistant manager would work.” 
{¶ 208} Bethel’s work record is entitled to slight weight.  At the very 
time that Bethel was employed at BP, he murdered two people.  However, in the 
year prior to his arrest, Bethel appeared to be a reliable worker. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
{¶ 209} In the penalty phase, Bethel introduced evidence about his 
disciplinary record during his pretrial incarceration in the Franklin County Jail.  
See, generally, Skipper v. South Carolina (1986), 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 
L.Ed.2d 1; State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 121-122, 684 N.E.2d 668.  
Jail records show that between November 6, 2000, and July 7, 2003, Bethel was 
given two “disciplinary write-ups.”  On April 28, 2001, he received a written 
warning for manufacturing an item without permission and possessing 
contraband.  On September 27, 2002, he received a five-day “disciplinary 
lockdown” for smoking in a prohibited area and possessing contraband. 
{¶ 210} Bethel argued at trial that this was a good disciplinary record.  
According to Bethel, his commission of only two nonviolent, relatively minor 
infractions during two years and nine months in jail indicated a growing maturity 
and ability to follow rules.  While this factor is entitled to weight, we do not 
regard this as an impressive record and give it only “slight weight.”  Smith, 80 
Ohio St.3d at 121-122, 684 N.E.2d 668. See, also, State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio 
St.3d 71, 95, 571 N.E.2d 97. 
{¶ 211} The aggravating circumstances of multiple murder and witness 
murder outweigh the totality of Bethel’s mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Thus, his death sentence for Reynolds’s murder is appropriate.  The 
aggravating circumstances of multiple murder and murder to escape detection, 
apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense also outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, his death sentence for 
Hawks’s murder is appropriate as well. 
{¶ 212} Finally, the death sentences here are proportionate to other 
sentences that we have approved.  We have approved death sentences in cases 
presenting a course of conduct involving two murders.  See State v. Awkal (1996), 
76 Ohio St.3d 324, 667 N.E.2d 960; State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-
Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439; State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 581 
January Term, 2006 
49 
N.E.2d 1071.  Moreover, we “have approved death sentences in cases where the 
witness-murder specification was present alone or in combination with one other 
specification, even when substantial mitigation existed.”  State v. Turner, 105 
Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 101.  See State v. Coleman 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 707 N.E.2d 476; State v. Smith (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 
424, 721 N.E.2d 93.  Finally, we upheld the death sentence in State v. White 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 709 N.E.2d 140, which combined the same 
aggravating circumstances involved in Hawks’s murder: course of conduct and 
murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another 
offense.  Thus, we hold that Bethel’s death sentences are not disproportionate to 
death sentences approved in similar cases. 
{¶ 213} We affirm Bethel’s convictions and sentences of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor 
and Richard Termuhlen II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
Ravert J. Clark, for appellant.