Title: Ex parte Walter Griffin. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Mary Howard v. Mac Equipment Company, Inc., et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:08/29/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
_________________________
1070727
_________________________
Ex parte Walter Griffin
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Mary Howard
v.
Mac Equipment Company, Inc., et al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-03-1707)
BOLIN, Justice.
Walter Griffin petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss as untimely Mary
Howard's claims against him.  We deny the petition.   
1070727
It is unclear what type of business entity Southeast
1
Pallet is.
2
Facts and Procedural History
Southeast Pallet and Box  is in the business of recycling
1
wooden pallets and producing new pallets.  In 2002, Southeast
Pallet hired Mac Equipment Company, Inc. ("Mac"), to design a
certain board-cutting machine for its plant.  On April 23,
2003, Howard, who was employed by Southeast Pallet, was
injured while working at the machine designed by Mac.  She had
never worked on this machine before the day she was injured.
A conveyor belt fed wooden boards into the machine.  Howard
was told to keep the wooden boards in a straight line on the
conveyor belt and that if any boards fell to the ground, to
pick them up and place them back on the conveyor belt.  While
Howard was working at the machine, Mark Fuhrlong, an employee
of Mac, was adjusting the machine.  When Howard bent down to
pick up a board that had fallen from the conveyor belt, the
sleeve of her shirt got caught in the chain and sprocket of
the machine, severing her arm.  The safety guard designed to
cover the chain and sprocket was not installed on the machine.
On the day of the accident, Walter  Griffin was employed by
Southeast Pallet as a "gopher," picking up the mail, taking
1070727
3
deposits to the bank, and other  small jobs.   Walter had
recently sold his interest in Southeast Pallet to his son,
Woody Griffin.
Howard sued Southeast Pallet, seeking to recover worker's
compensation benefits for her injury.  On June 27, 2003, in a
separate action Howard sued Mac and Fuhrlong, alleging
negligence and wantonness in designing, building, installing,
and adjusting the machine.  She also sued several fictitiously
named defendants, including "the person, firm, corporation who
designed, manufactured, installed, set-up, and adjusted a
piece of machinery at Southeast Pallet and Box which caused
[Howard] to suffer serious bodily injury on the occasion
complained of in [Howard's] complaint" and "those persons,
firms or corporations responsible for providing and installing
a guard for the chain and sprockets for the machine
manufactured by the defendant Mac Equipment Co., all of whose
true names are otherwise unknown but will be substituted by
amendment when ascertained."  
In response to discovery requests, Mac, on December 15,
2003, produced documents containing written quotes and
contracts prepared by Mac and sent to Southeast Pallet
1070727
4
regarding the design and specifications for the machine on
which Howard was injured.  Two of the documents were addressed
to Walter Griffin at Southeast Pallet and one of the documents
was addressed to  Woody Griffin at Southeast Pallet.  
On February 3, 2004, Southeast Pallet filed a motion to
intervene in Howard's action against Mac and Fuhrlong, seeking
subrogation from Mac of the worker's compensation and medical
benefits Southeast Pallet paid to Howard.  On August 19, 2004,
the trial court granted the motion.
On October 7, 2004, Howard filed a motion to amend her
complaint to assert a claim against her supervisor, Tony
Randall Emfinger, and other fictitiously named defendants.
Howard identified the fictitiously named defendants as "that
person or persons who were the supervisor(s) of [Howard] on
the occasion complained of in [Howard's] complaint" and "those
persons, firms, or corporations who violated § 25-5-11 of the
Code of Alabama 1975, on the occasion complained of in
[Howard's] complaint, all of whose true names are otherwise
unknown 
but 
will 
be 
substituted 
by 
amendment 
when
ascertained." 
 
Howard 
alleged 
that 
Emfinger 
and 
the
fictitiously named defendants had violated § 25-5-11(c)(2),
1070727
5
Ala. Code 1975, by requiring her to work on a machine without
the safety guard in place with the knowledge that injury would
likely occur.  On December 17, 2004, the trial court granted
the motion to amend.  
Howard attempted to serve Emfinger on several occasions
at various addresses, but Emfinger had moved often, and
ultimately Howard served Emfinger on January 7, 2006.  On
January 25, 2006, Emfinger filed an answer, pro se, stating
that he was not responsible for Howard's injuries and that
Walter Griffin had assigned Howard to work at the machine.  On
January 31, 2006, Emfinger filed an affidavit stating, in
pertinent part:
"I was employed as a machine operator and
maintenance man.  Mary Howard was taken to the back
of a board cutting machine by Walter Griffin.  The
machine was kicking the boards sideways because the
blades were dull.  Walter Griffin slid the machine
guard back which exposed the hydraulics and chain
drive.  Management did not like to shut the machine
down because it cut into production time.  Walter
Griffin had placed people here for about a week.
They were to keep the boards straight as they passed
through the machine.  Several people had gotten
their hand caught in the machine doing this.  I
reported this to Walter Griffin and Wayne Gill.
They did nothing about this.  About two hours later
I heard one of the employees scream 'shut it off.'
I looked up and saw Mary caught up in the machine."
1070727
6
That same day, Howard filed a motion to again amend her
complaint, to substitute Walter Griffin as the fictitiously
named defendant who had supervised Howard and the fictitiously
named defendant who had violated § 25-5-11 by removing a
safety guard from the machine.      
Mac had attempted to depose Walter Griffin in 2003 or
2004.  On April 12, 2004, Mac sent Walter a "re-notice" of his
deposition set for May 19, 2004. Mac attempted to depose
Walter on July 22, 2005, but that deposition was canceled
because of work schedules at Southeast Pallet.  Walter's
deposition was to be scheduled for September 2005, but the
deposition did not take place.  On May 29, 2007, Walter was
deposed; he stated that he was not at the plant on the day of
Howard's accident, and he denied removing the safety guard
from the machine.
On October 1, 2007, Walter filed a motion for a summary
judgment, arguing that Howard's claims against him were time-
barred because Howard was not ignorant of his identity well
before she amended her complaint to name him as a defendant
and she did not use due diligence in substituting him for a
fictitiously named defendant so as to invoke the relation-back
1070727
7
principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Specifically, Walter argues that Howard was aware that he was
involved with the design, performance, installation, and
operation of the board-cutting machine because of the
materials produced in discovery on December 15, 2003, which
were specifications and contracts regarding the machine and
which were addressed to Walter.  Walter stated in the brief in
support of his summary-judgment motion:
"Shortly after her accident on April 23, 2003,
[Howard] retained an attorney.  Her attorney advised
Southeast Pallet by way of a letter dated May 2,
2003, that [Howard] had retained his services....
The 
letter 
further 
refers 
to: 
'Willful 
and
intentional conduct on the part of your supervisors,
managers and officers in causing serious bodily
injury to Mary Howard in violation of 25-5-11 of the
Code of Alabama, 1975.'  This letter further states
that 'the [board-cutting] machine was designed by
certain management employees [of Southeast Pallet]
with the assistance of Mac Equipment' and that it
'was designed in such a hazardous manner that it was
overwhelmingly foreseeable that someone would get
seriously injured while operating the machine.'...
Clearly [Howard] knew that someone at Southeast
Pallet was involved in the design of the machine
that injured her and that this person should be a
defendant.
"By December of 2003, [Howard] also had in her
possession the contracts/quotes between Mac and
Southeast Pallet regarding the design, requirements,
performance, construction and installation of the
machine 
that 
eventually injured her.... These
contract documents clearly reflect that Walter
1070727
8
Griffin 
and 
his 
son 
Woody 
Griffin 
were 
the
representatives of Southeast Pallet who were working
with Mac.
"[Howard] also had the address of Southeast
Pallet and could have propounded subpoenas or taken
depositions to develop this information further.
She knew of the identity of Walter Griffin by
December 15, 2003, and could have deposed Mr.
Griffin and his son Woody Griffin at that time.
[Howard] also knew employees at Southeast Pallet,
one of whom was her own cousin from whom she could
have obtained information.  Exactly as in McGhee [v.
Martin, 892 So. 2d 398 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)],
[Howard] could have easily obtained information from
these sources--which she was quite aware of--prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The fact that she did not shows that she did not
exercise due diligence in adding Walter Griffin as
a defendant in this case."
In response, Howard argued that after she received
discovery materials from Mac, she amended her complaint to add
Emfinger, the fictitiously named defendant who supervised
Howard, and the fictitiously named defendant who had violated
§ 25-5-11 by removing a safety guard from the machine.  She
stated that several attempts were made to depose Walter, but
those depositions were canceled by Walter's attorney.  On
February 7, 2008, the trial court denied Walter's summary-
1070727
Howard has settled her claims against Mac and Fuhrlong,
2
and she has settled her worker's compensation claim against
Southeast Pallet.  
9
judgment motion.  Walter timely filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus with this Court.2
Standard of Review
"Mandamus is an extraordinary writ by which 'a
party seeks emergency and immediate appellate review
of an order that is otherwise interlocutory and not
appealable.'  Rule 21(e)(4), Ala. R. App. P.
Mandamus is appropriate
"'"where there is (1) a clear legal right
in the petitioner to the order sought; (2)
an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court."'
"Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307,
309-10 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex parte Integon Corp.,
672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995)).  In part, this
Court may issue a writ of mandamus 'to prevent an
abuse of discretion, or to correct an arbitrary
action outside of the exercise of a reasonable
discretion.'  Foshee v. State, 210 Ala. 155, 157, 97
So. 565, 566 (1923)."
Ex parte Brookwood Med. Ctr., [Ms. 1061307, May 23, 2008]   
So. 2d     ,      (Ala. 2008).  Generally, the denial of a
motion for a summary judgment is not reviewable by a petition
for a writ of mandamus.  A petition for a writ of mandamus,
however, is an appropriate means for challenging a trial
1070727
10
court's denial of a motion for a summary judgment when that
motion asserts a statute-of-limitations defense based on the
plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action against the
defendant who was initially named fictitiously.  Ex parte
International Refining & Mfg. Co., 972 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 2007).
Discussion
In his petition, Walter argues that Howard's claims
against him pursuant to § 25-5-11(c), Ala. Code 1975, which
provides for actions against co-employees for "willful
conduct" in the removal of a safety guard, are governed by a
two-year statute of limitations as set out in § 6-2-38(g),
Ala. Code 1975.  Because Howard was injured on April 23, 2003,
and Walter was not added as a defendant until January 31,
2006, Walter claims that the two-year statute of limitations
bars Howard's claims against him.  Walter acknowledges that a
claim substituting a defendant for a fictitiously named
defendant will relate back to the date of the filing of the
original complaint if: (1) the plaintiff was ignorant of the
identity of the fictitiously named defendant at the time the
original complaint was filed and (2) if the plaintiff used due
diligence to discover the defendant's true identity before the
1070727
11
statute of limitations expired.  Therefore, Walter argues, if
Howard knew, or should have known or was on notice, that
Walter was the party she described fictitiously in her first
amended complaint, her amendment adding Walter as a defendant
does not relate back.
Walter also argues that Howard was aware or should have
been aware of Walter's identity at the time she asserted her
claims 
against 
Emfinger 
and 
other 
fictitiously 
named
defendants on October 7, 2004.  Walter further argues that
Howard failed to use due diligence in determining the identity
of the fictitiously named defendants added in the October 7,
2004, complaint.  He points out that shortly after her
accident, Howard retained legal counsel, who advised Southeast
Pallet by letter that Howard had been injured using a machine
that had been designed by Mac with the assistance of certain
management employees of Southeast Pallet and that the conduct
of those employees constituted "willful conduct" under § 25-5-
11.  Walter again argues that by December 2003, Howard had
documents in her possession that indicated Walter had worked
on the design of the machine. 
1070727
12
Last, Walter argues that the amendment adding him as a
defendant will significantly prejudice him because, he argues,
there was such a long delay in adding him that he was
justified in believing that he was not going to be named as a
defendant in this case.
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when that party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
This Court has held with regard to Rule 9(h) and the relation-
back principles of Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., that the
plaintiff 
must 
state 
a 
cause 
of 
action 
against 
the
fictitiously named party in the body of the original
complaint; that the plaintiff's ignorance of the true identity
of the party intended to be sued is "in the sense of having no
knowledge" of the party's  identity at the time the complaint
was filed; and that the plaintiff must have used due diligence
in attempting to discover the identity of the fictitiously
named party.  Columbia Eng'g Int'l Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So. 2d
955, 958 (Ala. 1983).  To be entitled to the benefit of the
1070727
13
relation-back principles, the plaintiff must act with due
diligence to ascertain the fictitiously named defendant's true
name and to promptly amend the complaint to correctly identify
that defendant.  The due-diligence standard, as stated in
Davis v. Mims, 510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987), "is whether
the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice,
that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties
described fictitiously."
In the present case, Howard added Walter as the
fictitiously named defendant who was supervising her on the
day of the accident and the fictitiously named defendant who
had violated § 25-5-11(c)(2), Ala. Code 1975, by removing the
safety guard.  Section 25-5-11, provides, among other things,
an employee the right to maintain an action against an
employer for workers' compensation benefits while at the same
time pursuing an action for damages against a third party for
that same injury.  Section 25-5-11(b), provides, in pertinent
part, that "[i]f personal injury ... to any employee results
from the willful conduct, as defined in subsection (c) herein,
of any ... employee of the same employer ..., the employee
1070727
14
shall have a cause of action against the person ...."
Subsection (c) provides:
"(c) As used herein, 'willful conduct' means any
of the following:
"....
"(2) 
The 
willful 
and 
intentional
removal from a machine of a safety guard or
safety device provided by the manufacturer
of the machine with knowledge that injury
or death would likely or probably result
from the removal; provided, however, that
removal of a guard or device shall not be
willful conduct unless the removal did, in
fact, increase the danger in the use of the
machine and was not done for the purpose of
repair of the machine or was not part of an
improvement or modification of the machine
which 
rendered 
the 
safety 
device
unnecessary or ineffective."   
We agree with Walter that Howard knew on December 15,
2003, that Walter was, at the very least, Mac's contact at
Southeast Pallet and that he could have knowledge of who had
designed or set out the specifications for the machine on
behalf of Southeast Pallet.  With due diligence, Howard could
have discovered Walter's role in the design of the machine.
However, Howard did not substitute Walter for a fictitiously
named defendant that had designed the machine.  Instead,
Howard subsequently obtained information from Emfinger that
1070727
15
indicated Walter had been Howard's supervisor on the day of
the accident, that there had been a safety guard on the
machine, and that Walter had removed the safety guard on the
machine.  Howard then substituted Walter as the fictitiously
named defendant who had supervised her on the day of the
accident and the fictitiously named defendant who had violated
§ 25-5-11(c)(2) by removing the safety guard.  Any claim that
Howard would have had against Walter arising out of the design
of the machine would now be barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.  Nevertheless, Howard's claim against Walter
arises out of his supervising her on the day of the accident
and the removal of the safety guard.
In Ex parte Bowman, [Ms. 1061079, December 7, 2007]   
So. 2d     (Ala. 2007), the employee was injured while working
on a fermenter tank.  The employee and his wife sued the
manufacturer of the tank and several fictitiously named
defendants, alleging that they had been negligent in
designing, manufacturing, and installing the tank.  After the
statute of limitations had run, the employee and his wife
filed a motion to amend their complaint to substitute the
quality-assurance manager for one of the fictitiously named
1070727
16
defendants.  The quality-assurance manager filed a motion to
dismiss the claims against him on the ground that the amended
complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, which
the trial court denied.  The manager then petitioned this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to
dismiss him as a defendant.  We held that although the
employee knew the identity of the quality-assurance manager at
the time the original complaint was filed, he was unaware that
the manager had also been responsible for acquiring,
installing, and modifying the tank.  The fact that the
employee knew that the manager was in charge of quality
control of the product produced was not related to the
plaintiffs' claim.  "There is no logical and necessary linkage
between knowledge that such an individual [responsible for
quality control] was a participant in acquiring, installing,
and modifying the machine that makes the product."      So. 2d
at    .  This Court denied the manager's petition. Similarly,
in the present case, Howard knew, as early as December 2003,
that Walter had some involvement in the design of the machine.
However, she did not know, until Emfinger filed his affidavit,
that Walter allegedly had been her supervisor on the day of
1070727
17
the accident and that he allegedly had removed a safety guard
from the machine. 
We recognize that the evidence is disputed as to whether
the machine was designed without a safety guard or designed
with a safety guard that Southeast Pallet failed to install,
or whether someone had removed the safety guard.  However,
that factual dispute is not dispositive of this procedural
issue.  We leave those factual questions for a jury to decide.
The issue then becomes whether Howard used due diligence
in discovering Walter's identity as her supervisor on the day
of the accident or as the person who removed the safety guard.
In Oliver v. Woodward, 824 So. 2d 693 (Ala. 2001), the patient
brought a medical-malpractice action against certain real and
fictitiously named doctors arising out of the improper
placement of a catheter, which resulted in the amputation of
the patient's arm.  The patient amended her complaint to
substitute Dr. Woodward for one of the fictitiously named
doctors.  The trial court granted Dr. Woodward's motion for a
summary judgment, and the patient appealed.  This Court
stated:
"The issue before the Court is when [the patient]
knew or should have known Dr. Woodward's identity as
1070727
18
a 
tortfeasor 
'described 
fictitiously' 
in 
the
complaint. ... Dr. Woodward claims that [the
patient] knew his identity on November 25, 1998,
when [the hospital] identified Drs. Pepper and
Woodward as emergency-room doctors on duty between
8:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on March 25, 1995. [The
patient] 
asserts 
that 
she 
did 
not 
know 
Dr.
Woodward's identity as the emergency-room doctor who
read [her] X-ray until April 28, 1999, when [the
radiographer] 
identified 
Dr. 
Woodward 
as 
the
emergency-room doctor who read [the patient's] X-ray
and verified placement of [the patient's] central
venous catheter.  We agree with [the patient].
"Although on November 25, 1998, [the hospital]
identified Dr. Woodward as an emergency-room doctor
on duty on March 25, 1995, [the hospital] did not
identify Dr. Woodward as the emergency-room doctor
who read [the patient's] X-ray and who verified
placement of [her] central venous catheter. [The
patient] diligently and reasonably began serially
deposing the four doctors identified as working in
the emergency room on March 25, 1995.  Three of the
four doctors, including Dr. Woodward, denied being
the emergency-room doctor who read [the patient's]
X-ray.  Not until [the patient] deposed [the
radiographer] did [the patient] have any notice that
Dr. 
Woodward 
was 
the 
emergency-room 
doctor
responsible for verifying placement of her central
venous catheter."
824 So. 2d at 698-99.    
In the present case, Howard discovered that Emfinger had
been a supervisor and on October 7, 2004, well within the
applicable two-year statute of limitations, she amended her
complaint to add Emfinger, along with two fictitiously named
defendants who had supervised Howard or who had removed the
1070727
19
safety device in contravention of § 25-5-11(c)(2).  She
attempted to serve Emfinger on several occasions.  Very
shortly after she served Emfinger, Emfinger provided her with
the information that Walter had been Howard's supervisor and
that Walter had removed the safety guard.  We also note that
Mac attempted to depose Walter on several occasions, but that
would have been to no avail in discovering Walter's alleged
involvement as one of the fictitiously named defendants
because, when Walter was deposed, he denied being at the plant
on the day of the accident and denied removing the safety
guard.  
This Court stated in Ex parte Stover, 663 So. 2d 948, 952
(Ala. 1989):
"As to Stover's contention that the plaintiffs
failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining his
identity, we hold that our standard of reviewing
summary judgments prevents us from holding, as a
matter of law, that the Chaverses were not diligent
in substituting him as one of the fictitiously named
defendants.  Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592
(Ala. 1992). In Ex parte FMC Corp., this Court
wrote:
"'Although 
the 
record 
indicates 
that
reasonable people could differ as to
whether the plaintiffs proceeded in a
reasonably diligent manner in identifying
[the fictitiously named defendant added by
amendment], a writ of mandamus would be
1070727
20
proper in this case only if undisputed
evidence showed that the plaintiffs had
failed to act with due diligence in
identifying 
[the 
fictitiously 
named
defendant] as the party intended to be
sued. 599 So. 2d at 595. See Ex parte
Klemawesch, 549 So. 2d 62 (Ala. 1989).'"
Walter has not presented undisputed evidence that Howard
failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining his identity.
Last, Walter argues that he would be prejudiced if he
were substituted for one of the fictitiously named defendants
because, he says,  he was justified in believing that he was
not going to be a defendant in Howard's action because it had
been pending since 2003 and there were already defendants
named in the complaint.  "This court has recognized that delay
in amending a complaint to substitute a named party for a
fictitiously named party once information is available can
defeat the availability of relation back."  Ex parte Bowman,
     So. 2d at     .  The accident occurred on April 23, 2003,
and Howard brought her action on June 27, 2003.  The statute
of limitations would have run on or about April 23, 2005, and
Walter was substituted as a defendant on January 31, 2006,
very shortly after Howard learned of Walter's alleged
involvement.  Walter was aware of the action because Mac had
1070727
21
attempted to depose him on several occasions.  The purpose of
a statute of limitations was not defeated by applying the
doctrine of relation-back where Walter was sufficiently
alerted to the proceedings from an early stage and Howard
promptly amended her complaint.  
Because Walter has failed to establish a clear legal
right to the relief sought, we deny the petition for a writ of
mandamus.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Woodall, J., dissents.
1070727
22
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
In my opinion, the undisputed evidence shows that Howard
failed to act with due diligence in identifying Walter Griffin
as the party intended to be sued.  Within a few days of the
accident, Howard's attorney was given information identifying
Emfinger as Howard's supervisor and identifying Walter Griffin
as a person of authority at Southeast Pallet.  Howard did
nothing to determine the extent of the responsibilities of
Emfinger or Walter and added Walter as a defendant only after
Emfinger volunteered information in an affidavit filed in
January 2006.