Title: Denman v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

179 Kan. 180 (1956)
294 P.2d 207
BENJAMIN DENMAN, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
v.
COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS COMPANY, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
No. 39,850

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 29, 1956.
Shelley Graybill, of Elkhart, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant and cross-appellee.
A.E. Kramer, of Hugoton, argued the cause and Bernard E. Nordling, of Hugoton, was with him on the briefs for the appellee and cross-appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.:
This was a proceeding to condemn a right-of-way across a quarter section of land for a gas pipe line. Appraisers were appointed and made an award. The owner appealed to the district court. From that judgment in the district court the condemner has appealed and the owner has cross-appealed.
The facts are substantially as follows: The right-of-way was *181 154.7 rods long and 50 feet wide. It extended diagonally across the northwest corner of the quarter and contained 2.93 acres. It ran within 200 feet of some of the owner's outbuildings and within 500 feet of his house. The appraisers gave for land taken $309.40 and for crop loss $39.91, or a total of $346.31.
It was stipulated at the outset that the amount of damages to the owner for the taking was the only issue.
At the close of the evidence the condemner requested questions to be submitted to the jury. They are with the jurors' answers as follows:
The owner objected to the submission of questions 1 and 2 because they did not tend to establish any proper measure of damages on any question, which was the proper subject of determination for the jury. The objection was overruled and the questions submitted. The general verdict was as follows:
The owner filed a motion to set aside the general verdict and answers to special questions and for a new trial on the grounds of abuse of discretion, answers to special questions contrary to the *182 evidence, erroneous rulings and instructions, and verdict given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
The condemner asked an order setting aside the general verdict and for judgment on the answers to special questions. Both these motions were overruled and judgment rendered pursuant to the general verdict. Hence this appeal and cross-appeal.
The condemner's specifications of error are the court erred in overruling its motion to set aside the verdict and to enter judgment on the answers to special questions.
We shall first deal with the owner's cross-appeal wherein he argues he should have been granted a new trial. He did not file any specifications of error but states the questions involved to be  Did the trial court err in submitting questions 1 and 2 to the jury?; Are the answers to these questions supported by substantial evidence? and Was the general verdict in whole or in part contrary to the evidence?
He argues first the trial court erred in submitting questions 1 and 2 to the jury because the questions tended to confuse the jury and did not encompass any proper measure of damages in the trial of the case. He argues the action was tried on another theory altogether. We are unable to follow the owner in this argument. Among the instructions given by the trial court was No. 6. There was no objection to it and it became the law of the case. It was as follows:
Questions 1 and 2 were propounded to the jury based on the above instruction. The instruction followed the rule laid down in 18 Am. Jur. 889, Sec. 251. There it is said:
See, also, United Power & Light Corp. v. Murphy, 135 Kan. 100, 9 P.2d 658.
See, also, Yagel v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 131 Kan. 267, 291 Pac. 768, where an instruction was approved, which stated:
Questions 1 and 2 were plain and direct in form and within the issues of the case.
The owner, cross-appellant, next argues the answers to special questions were not supported by the evidence. He argues there was no evidence as to the exact amounts found by the jury while there was expert testimony as to other amounts. He argues in effect under such circumstances the jury was bound to answer the questions in accordance with the expert testimony. Expert testimony uncontradicted is sufficient to support a verdict, but the jury is not bound by it.
In C.K. & W. Rld. Co. v. Drake, 46 Kan. 568, 26 Pac. 1039, we said in considering an analogous question:
See, also, Smith v. Tri-County Light & Power Co., 120 Kan. 123, 241 Pac. 1090. There we said:
Here there was evidence as to the nature and general characteristics of the land, a plat of the property, and aerial photographs of it. There was substantial evidence to sustain the answers.
The owner next argues there was no evidence to sustain the general verdict. We shall consider this question when dealing with appellant's argument on its appeal.
We turn now to condemner's argument, the trial court erred in overruling its motion to set aside the general verdict and enter judgment on the special questions. At the outset of this argument it must be noted there is no dispute whatever about the item of $76.28 in the general verdict for actual personal property damage caused by construction of pipe lines. Both sides concede the amount to be correct.
Since we decided in considering the owner's cross-appeal that the trial court did not err in submitting questions 1 and 2 and the owner did not object to questions 3, 4 and 5, we have only to consider now whether the motion for judgment on the special questions should have been sustained.
Here we are met with the fact, the answers to the special questions cannot be reconciled. The answers to questions 1 and 2 when calculated show the jury found the value of the land actually taken, subject to the owner's right to use, to be $51.27.
In answer to questions 4 and 5, the jury found the difference in the value of the whole tract between the time immediately before condemnation and immediately after to be $50.32.
Inherent in these two questions and answers is a finding of damage to the land. This answer is irreconcilable with the answers to question 3, and the general verdict where the jury found no damage to the residue of the land.
Where the answers to special questions are inconsistent with each other and with the general verdict, a judgment cannot be rendered on them. Neither can the general verdict stand. (See Berry v. *185 Weeks, 146 Kan. 969, 73 P.2d 1086; also Willis v. Skinner, 89 Kan. 145, 130 Pac. 673; also Roediger v. Railroad Co., 95 Kan. 146, 147 Pac. 837.) It follows a new trial must be had.
The judgment is affirmed as to the appeal and reversed as to the cross-appeal, with directions to grant both parties a new trial in accordance with the views expressed herein.
HARVEY, C.J., not participating.
PARKER and PRICE, JJ., concur in the result.
SMITH, J., (concurring specially):
I agree the case should be sent back for a new trial. I cannot agree, however, with what the court says about the answers to questions 4 and 5. I would not bother to write anything since the end result is the same were it not for my conviction that the treatment given these two answers will cause the court trouble some time in the future.
Questions 3 and 4 have nothing whatever to do with damages to the land. In proceedings of this sort there are only two questions, actually. One is the value of the land taken and the other is damage to the residue. That is all the damages ever proper to consider aside from damages to personal property, about which there is no dispute here.
Questions 1 and 2 and questions 4 and 5 each present a different formula for ascertaining the same result. Questions 1 and 2 are proper to enable the parties to be sure the jury, in the case of condemnation of a right-of-way for a gas pipe line, gives the condemner the benefit of the value of the right to use, remaining in the landowner after the pipe line is built.
In a record such as this, where the jury found no damage to the residue, question 5 should have been answered by subtracting the value of the land taken, that is, in this case, $51.27, from the value of the entire quarter section. Thus the answer to question 5 should have been $13,948.73. Had the jury intended to find any damage to the residue it could have added whatever amount it found to the value of the land taken, and subtracted that amount from $14,000, the amount found to be the original value of the quarter section. This plus the item for damages to personal property should have been calculated to give the amount of the general verdict. Since this jury twice found no damage to the residue, the general *186 verdict should, to be consistent with the answers to questions 1 and 2 and questions 4 and 5, have been for $51.27, plus the amount agreed upon for damages to personal property. Since there was a discrepancy between the answers to questions 1 and 2 and questions 4 and 5, I agree there should be a new trial.
My only reason for writing this specially concurring opinion is, I am sure confusion in the future will result from what is said in the prevailing opinion.
THIELE, J., concurring specially.
With respect to the motion of the defendant company for judgment on the answers to the special questions and its appeal which is solely from the ruling denying the motion, I desire to state my own views.
Briefly stated the jury by its answer to Question No. 3 found there was no damage to the land not taken, but by its answers to Questions Nos. 4 and 5 it did find damage in the amount of $50.32. These answers cannot be reconciled with each other nor with the statement contained in the general verdict that there was no damage to the lands not taken. The rule applicable under such a situation is that stated in McCoy v. Weber, 168 Kan. 241, 212 P.2d 281, that:
Under that rule the motion for judgment on the special findings was properly denied, but under that same rule a new trial should have been granted and ordered by the trial court on its own motion.
With respect to the cross-appeal I note that plaintiff appealed only from the denial of his motion for a new trial and I agree that there was no error in that ruling  even though a new trial must be had.
I do not believe the concluding paragraph of the opinion is accurate. Our judgment should affirm that part of the judgment of the trial court denying the appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings; should affirm the ruling of the trial court denying the cross-appellant's motion for a new trial for the reasons therein stated, but for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered.