Title: DeRolph v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as DeRolph v. State, 94 Ohio St.3d 40, 2001-Ohio-5092.] 
 
 
DEROLPH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (2001), 94 Ohio St.3d 40.] 
Constitutional law — Education — School funding — Attorney General’s request 
for clarification of Supreme Court’s November 16, 2001 order and request 
for a status conference denied. 
(No. 99-570 — Submitted November 26, 2001 — Decided December 13, 2001.) 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  On November 16, 2001, this court entered an order referring 
the instant cause to a settlement conference to be presided over by a master 
commissioner.  93 Ohio St.3d 628, 758 N.E.2d 1113.  We reviewed the record and 
identified, for purposes of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6), the parties and counsel we deemed 
to be appropriate participants in mediation. 
 
In addition, the court identified nine mediators of national reputation as 
candidates for appointment as master commissioner and invited the parties to submit 
to the court comments on, or challenges for cause to, any of the candidates. 
 
On November 26, defendants-appellants, the state of Ohio,  the Ohio Board 
of Education, the Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Ohio 
Department of Education (collectively, “the state”) filed a memorandum in response 
to the order.  The Attorney General, as legal counsel for the state, requested 
clarification of the November 16 order and a status conference at which both 
procedural and substantive issues relating to the initiation and progress of the 
ordered mediation could be discussed. 
 
On the same day, plaintiffs-appellees, joined by counsel for members of the 
minority party of the General Assembly, filed a memorandum providing helpful 
comment regarding candidates named in the November 16 order, which they 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
described as a “ ‘blue ribbon panel.’ “  They have not, however, filed a response to 
the state’s requests for clarification and for a status conference. 
 
The state’s characterization of its request as one for clarification is 
euphemistic—the state clearly takes issue with the substance of this court’s order 
rather than with any alleged ambiguity.  Having requested, and been granted, 
reconsideration of our decision on the merits in DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 309, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (“DeRolph III”), the state now takes issue with the 
court’s designation of the counsel who will participate in the mediation ordered 
upon reconsideration. 
 
The state’s dissatisfaction with our November 16 order is based on three 
arguments. It first asserts that “only the Attorney General can represent the state” 
and contends that no counsel other than Assistant Attorneys General or appointed 
special counsel should be permitted to participate in the mediation on behalf of any 
entity of the state and specifically on behalf of the Governor and members of the 
General Assembly.  The state thereby challenges this court’s initial identification of 
the counsel to participate in the mediation. 
 
Second, the state contends that “including amici counsel in the mediation 
inappropriately elevates the amici to party status.” The state thereby challenges this 
court’s identification of parties to be included in the mediation. 
 
Third, the state contends that “[t]he General Assembly cannot negotiate 
against itself” or “be bifurcated and represented on both sides of the negotiating 
table.”  The state thereby challenges the court’s inclusion in the mediation of 
members of the minority party. 
 
We reject these contentions. 
I 
January Term, 2001 
3 
The State Has Waived Any Objection to the Appearance of Counsel for the 
Governor, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and 
Representatives of the Minority Caucus As Identified in the Record 
 
The state draws our attention to three provisions of the Revised Code.  R.C. 
109.02 provides, “The attorney general is the chief law officer for the state and all 
its departments * * *.  [With certain exceptions], no state officer * * * or head of 
[an] * * * institution of the state shall employ, or be represented by, other counsel or 
attorneys at law.”  R.C. 109.03 authorizes the Attorney General to appoint Assistant 
Attorneys General.  R.C. 109.07 authorizes the Attorney General to appoint special 
counsel to represent the state in civil actions in which the state is a party or directly 
interested. 
 
We acknowledge the import of these statutory provisions.  What is 
surprising, however, is that the Attorney General in her November 26 response 
acknowledges that the counsel who have represented two Governors and four 
leaders of the houses of the General Assembly over the course of this appeal were 
not appointed special counsel pursuant to this statutory authority.  She had not, 
however, objected before November 26 to the representation of any elected official 
as an amicus curiae by private counsel or rebutted the inference that the counsel had 
been appointed special counsel. 
 
When we initially identified counsel for the participants in our order of 
November 16, this court did no more than examine the record and incorporate the 
designations of attorney-client relationships as they have appeared since this appeal 
was filed in this court in 1995.  For six years, neither the Attorney General nor 
anyone else objected to those designations. 
 
Moreover, the Attorney General has accepted the benefits inherent in the 
separate appearances of, and filing of separate amicus curiae briefs in support of the 
state’s position by, two Governors and the leaders of the majority party.  The time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
has now passed for the Attorney General to object, and we find that the state has 
waived its right to challenge the separate appearance of the officials identified in our 
order of November 16 or their representation by separate counsel. 
 
Of course, nothing precludes the Governor, or any of the legislators who 
have appeared with the designation of amicus curiae, from now choosing the 
Attorney General rather than private counsel to represent them, assuming that such 
representation does not create a conflict of interest. But the amicus briefs filed by 
the Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the 
Senate vary dramatically from the briefs filed by certain minority party members of 
the General Assembly: while the minority members support the plaintiffs-appellees’ 
position, the other state officials support the position of defendants-appellants. The 
Attorney General simply cannot represent both sides at the same time during 
mediation without placing herself in an unacceptable position of conflict of interest. 
 To avoid such a conflict, she could, as she has in the past, appoint special counsel 
pursuant to R.C. 109.07.1 
 
The Attorney General also argues that the Governor and the members of the 
General Assembly who have filed amicus briefs are appearing as individuals rather 
than in their official capacities.  The briefs refute that contention.  In DeRolph v. 
State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”), then Governor 
Voinovich filed an amicus brief in which he represented himself as appearing in his 
capacity as “the state’s chief executive officer responsible for preparing and 
proposing to the legislature the biennial budget bill.”  Similarly, Governor Taft filed 
an amicus brief in DeRolph III, 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 754 N.E.2d 1184, in which he 
described his initiatives as Governor, in collaboration with the General Assembly, to 
                                            
1. 
On November 7, 1995, the Attorney General filed notice in this court of the appointment 
of special counsel for a codefendant, the Ohio Board of Education, although the Attorney General 
now claims that she represents all four named defendants, including the Ohio Board of Education. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
reform assessment, academic standards, and accountability and to improve school 
facilities. 
 
In addition, then President of the Ohio Senate Stanley J. Aronoff and then 
Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives Jo Ann Davidson filed a joint 
amicus brief in DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733.  In that brief, 
President Aronoff and Speaker Davidson emphasized that they “and the Ohio 
General Assembly ha[d] made a strong fiscal commitment to public education and 
equity in funding during the past 15 years.”  More recently, in their official 
capacities as President of the Ohio Senate and Speaker of the Ohio House of 
Representatives, respectively, Richard H. Finan and Larry Householder have 
submitted a similar brief in DeRolph III. 
 
Finally, members of the minority party of the Ohio Senate and House of 
Representatives filed an amicus brief through counsel Ben Espy in DeRolph I, 
stating that their reason for filing was to make clear that the brief filed by then 
president Aronoff and then Speaker Davidson “did not state the position of these 
Amici, the Ohio Senate, or the Ohio House of Representatives.”  Members of the 
minority party in the Ohio House of Representatives and Senate had also filed an 
amicus brief in DeRolph III.  That brief clarified their position that “the State’s 
brief and the briefs of Amicus Curiae for the State do not state the position of 
these Amici as they argue that the General Assembly has complied with the 
mandates of the Ohio Constitution and this Court.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
In short, Governors Voinovich and Taft, Presidents of the Ohio Senate 
Aronoff and Finan, Speakers of the Ohio House of Representatives Davidson and 
Householder, and selected members of the Ohio General Assembly have filed 
amicus briefs throughout the litigation of DeRolph v. State and have overtly done 
so in their official capacities rather than as individual citizens of the state of Ohio. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
The Attorney General has failed to timely object to numerous elected 
officials’ appearing as amici in their official capacities, but now objects to including 
at the mediation the counsel who have represented the interests of their clients 
throughout the litigation.  In view of our firm belief that ultimate success of the 
mediation we have ordered is dependent upon full representation of interests at the 
mediation table, see discussion below at section II, we find no reason to order a 
change of legal counsel of the members of the minority party identified in our 
November 16 order.  We perceive no reason, however, why Governor Taft and the 
members of the General Assembly identified in that order should be precluded from 
asking the Attorney General to represent them or to invoke R.C. 109.07 and appoint 
special counsel for them, should they so desire.  Should such a change in 
representation occur, the court should be promptly notified of the substitution. 
II 
A Court-Ordered Settlement Conference Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)  Is a 
Separate and Independent Alternate Dispute Resolution  Mechanism: It is Not 
Litigation 
 
Each aspect of our order of November 16 was motivated solely by our desire 
to create an opportunity for the interested parties to achieve a full, final, and lasting 
resolution of this long-lived litigation.  Experience has demonstrated that a 
satisfactory result is fostered in public-policy mediations―as contrasted with 
private dispute mediations involving individuals―by including representatives 
expressing the full range of competing interests. 
 
The state acknowledges as “constitutionally true” that “any settlement on 
behalf of the State of Ohio must involve both the Governor and the General 
Assembly.”  It contends, however, that the inclusion of members of the General 
Assembly who have appeared as amici will impede mediation and implies that their 
inclusion reduces the chance that mediation will succeed. 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
We disagree.  Mediation is not litigation.  It is appropriate that the Governor, 
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and a representative of the 
minority party all participate in mediation. 
 
One of the four defendants named in this litigation is “the State of Ohio.”  
Clearly, for purposes of this case, the defendant “state of Ohio” includes the 
General Assembly.  In our November 16 order, we noted that the plaintiffs-
appellees in their first amended complaint alleged that “ ‘Defendant State of Ohio, 
through the Ohio General Assembly, is required to provide for a system of public 
education in the State of Ohio’ ” and that in so doing, they “effectively made all 
members of the General Assembly defendants.”  (Emphasis added in November 
16 order.)  DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 628, 758 N.E.2d 1113, at fn. 2. 
 
The burden of meeting the constitutional standard announced by a majority 
of this court in DeRolph I and DeRolph II does not fall only upon the leaders of 
the General Assembly or only upon one party’s caucuses. The Ohio General 
Assembly is composed of one hundred thirty-two members and not just the 
majority caucuses or the majority leadership.  It is not for this court to determine 
or presuppose the precise combination of votes that produce any legislation—and 
certainly not the legislation that is the subject of this case.  All members of the 
General Assembly are entitled to be represented by legal counsel. 
 
Of course, ensuring representation of the minority party at the mediation 
table will not alter political realities, nor should one infer that its presence in 
mediation necessitates its assent to achieve  settlement. Clearly, any resolution 
reached through mediation (or as the result of court order, should mediation fail) 
must ultimately be implemented by the adoption of legislation by majorities in 
both chambers of the General Assembly.  Accordingly, including representatives 
of both the majority and the minority parties is a practical and appropriate step to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
improve the chances that the mediation process will produce a result to which the 
greatest possible majority of the single entity of the General Assembly will assent. 
 
Nor does inclusion of representatives of the majority and minority parties in 
the mediation elevate or otherwise alter the status of the members of the General 
Assembly, as argued by the state, as that status existed before our order of 
November 16.  The presence of representatives of both parties will, however, ensure 
that a more complete representation of the views of the General Assembly, a party in 
the cause before us, is brought to the mediation. 
 
A vital component of mediation of public-policy disputes is that those with 
authority to implement a settlement agreement must be fully represented at the 
mediation table.2  For example, in our order of November 16, we cited the 
settlement agreement in Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. Minnesota and Xiong 
v. Minnesota (2000), Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct. Nos. 95-14800 and 98-2816, 
consolidated, unreported.  That settlement was obtained only by the addition to 
mediation of school districts that were not parties to the suit.3 
 
The possibility of a mediated settlement decreases when key stakeholders 
are not at the table.4  In Alabama, a court-ordered mediator helped parties reach 
agreement on a remedial plan to restructure the entire state educational system.5  
Unfortunately, the lack of participation by some groups caused implementation of 
the agreement to fail.  Id. 
                                            
2. 
Brett A. Williams, Comment, Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 
(2000), 2000 J.Disp.Resol. 135, 141, citing Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking 
the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes (1987) 186-236. 
3. 
See Anne O’Connor, NAACP Lawsuit Settlement Enlists Suburban Schools: 
Minneapolis―St. Paul Star Tribune (Mar. 21, 2000). See Appendix. 
4. 
Brett A. Williams, Comment, Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 
(2000), 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 135, 146, citing Nancy Kubasek & Gary Silverman, Environmental 
Mediation (1988), 26 Am. Bus. L.J. 533, 550. 
5. 
Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A 
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform (1996), 14 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 99, 161. 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
One should not misunderstand the manner in which mediations of the 
nature that we anticipate here may be conducted.  Typically in mediations 
involving multiple disputing parties, the mediator meets separately with the 
parties in what are termed “private caucuses.”  In the private caucuses, the 
mediator attempts to determine the actual positions of the parties—what they must 
have in a final agreement and what they are willing to yield.  A party in a caucus 
may limit the information the mediator may share with opposing parties.  Only the 
mediator may know the strategy, the motivation, and the ultimate settlement 
position of each party.  After the mediator has met in private caucuses with the 
parties a joint meeting may be conducted.  In some mediations, the parties never 
meet in a joint meeting. 
 
The important point is that any party to the mediation has control over the 
sharing of information that it may consider sensitive and may thereby protect the 
confidentiality of its position in the mediation. 
 
For this reason, no party in this mediation should be concerned that an 
attorney representing another party who may ultimately share in the responsibility 
of approving a settlement will gain some undue advantage by participating in the 
mediation. 
 
We trust that the parties identified in our November 16 order will devote 
their resources to the mediation.  The task is difficult, but disputing parties and 
their lawyers all across this country have demonstrated that it is not impossible. 
III 
Status Conference Denied 
 
The Attorney General’s request for a status conference is denied at this time. 
 As is clear from the order of November 16, issues of both the procedure and 
substance of the mediation will be a primary focus of the mediation participants 
under the guidance of the master commissioner at the initial stage of the mediation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Requests denied. 
 
DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I dissent from today’s opinion of 
the majority for the same reasons I dissented from the majority’s order of 
November 16, 2001, in this matter.  At that time, I stated that the “issue of 
transforming the basic funding system, of necessity, requires the participation of 
the Governor and every member of the General Assembly, not simply a select 
group facilitated by an individual from outside the state of Ohio.”  93 Ohio St.3d , 
628, 641, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1123 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
 
Obviously, the state defendants can settle this case only by enacting 
legislation that will bring our state’s system for funding public schools into 
compliance with the Ohio Constitution.  The majority seems to recognize this 
inescapable fact in its opinion today, stating, “The burden of meeting the 
constitutional standard announced by a majority of this court in DeRolph I and 
DeRolph II does not fall only upon the leaders of the General Assembly or only 
upon one party’s caucuses.  The Ohio General Assembly is composed of one 
hundred thirty-two members * * *.  Clearly, any resolution reached through 
mediation * * * must ultimately be implemented by the adoption of legislation by 
majorities in both chambers of the General Assembly.” 
 
As I have stated numerous times at every phase of this litigation, it is 
crystal clear to me that only a complete systematic overhaul of the funding system 
will make the system “thorough and efficient.”  See Section 2, Article VI of the 
Ohio Constitution.  I continue to question how, given the scope of the legislation 
that would have to be enacted to bring about a complete overhaul of the system, a 
January Term, 2001 
11 
comprehensive solution can emerge from mediation.  Perhaps at mediation the 
defendants can commit to proposing specific legislation, or to attempting to enact 
something, but I do not see how the defendants can definitively agree to any 
specific solution. 
 
As we have seen in the past, the promise of the General Assembly’s 
leadership to deliver votes from caucus members on any particular piece of 
legislation can be very different from the reality of actually amassing sufficient 
votes.  This difference would seem to be particularly acute when, as here, the 
necessary legislation must be so extensive.  Thus far, the attempts to restructure 
the funding system have lasted for many years and have involved many different 
members of the General Assembly as the years have passed.  The present 
members of the General Assembly can in no way obligate future members to vote 
a certain way on prospective legislation.  Mediation is not a viable solution if the 
funding system is to be truly reformed. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from today’s order regarding the 
details of the court-ordered, court-supervised settlement proceedings.  The fact that 
this court’s rule of practice regarding settlement conferences would, if followed, 
exclude individuals from the negotiating table whom the majority finds necessary 
reveals how inherently ill suited judicial proceedings are to this case. 
 
The majority does not explicitly find that the Attorney General is wrong to 
seek to exclude the amici from settlement proceedings based on the status of those 
individuals.  Rather, the majority contends that it is simply too late to object to the 
involvement of the amici to keep them from the negotiating table.  But nowhere 
does the law accord amici the status of parties. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The definition of an “amicus curiae” is “[a] person who is not a party to a 
lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the 
action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 83.  See, also, Lakewood v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 387, 394, 584 N.E.2d 70, 74 (“Amici curiae 
are not parties to an action.”).  Amici should not participate in a settlement 
conference, then, because this court’s own rules of practice provide for participation 
in settlement conferences only by parties.  S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(A), for example, 
provides that “[a]t the settlement conference, the parties shall explore settling the 
case, simplifying the issues, and expediting the procedure, and may consider any 
other matter that might aid in resolving the case.”  (Emphasis added.)  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
XIV(6)(B) states that “[i]f a case is referred for a settlement conference, each party 
to the case, or the representative of each party who has full settlement authority, and 
the attorney for each party shall attend the conference.”  (Emphasis added.)  See, 
also, S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(C) (“On motion by a party, the Supreme Court may * * * 
extend filing deadlines.”). 
 
Given that this court’s rules of practice provide for the participation only of 
parties in a settlement conference, the majority’s order—despite claiming 
otherwise—stands for the proposition that “a person who is not a party to a lawsuit” 
can be transformed into a party by operation of law, if he or she stays around the 
proceedings long enough.  And the Attorney General should have, according to this 
reasoning, objected earlier in these proceedings to the presence of the amici as 
parties, though they were not.  To treat the amici as if they were parties ignores this 
court’s own rules and law on the subject.  See Civ.R. 17 to 25. 
 
This order compounds the prior missteps of this court in this case.  See 
DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 380-383, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1245-1247 
(Cook, J., dissenting). 
January Term, 2001