Title: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

393 So. 2d 1290 (1980) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE et al. v. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE COMPANY et al. No. 51488. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 10, 1980. Rehearings Denied March 4, 1981. *1291 Alix H. Sanders, Greenwood, William R. Richardson, Jr., Arthur M. Weisburd, James Robertson, Lloyd N. Cutler, Washington, D.C., Frank R. Parker, Julie Ann Epps, Royals, *1292 Taylor & Epps, A. Spencer Gilbert, III, Gilbert & Moore, Jackson, for appellants. Crane D. Kipp, Shell, Buford, Bufkin, Callicutt & Perry, Christopher J. Walker, Upshaw & Ladner, Dixon L. Pyles, Pyles & Tucker, Jackson, W.E. Gore, Jr., Jackson, for appellees. Before SMITH, P.J., and SUGG and COFER, JJ. COFER, Justice, for the Court: Beginning April 1, 1966, a boycott of retail merchants of Port Gibson and Claiborne County was in effect for some length of time. This suit, in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, resulted from the boycott. The suit, brought by Claiborne Hardware Company and twenty-three other complainants, retail merchants in Claiborne County, and filed October 31, 1969, named as defendants the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Mississippi Action for Progress (MAP), a domestic nonprofit corporation and 146 individual defendants (individuals), (NAACP, and individuals, NAACP, et al.), these individual defendants largely making common cause with defendant NAACP in the suit. The bill of complaint charged defendants with conspiracy to injure and ruin the businesses of the several complainants by tortious involvement with complainants' rights to pursue their lawful trade and business through defendants' conspiracy, boycott, interference, and restraint of trade. In their suit complainants alleged and charged: (These allegations were used as complainants' basis for charging interference and restraint of trade on defendants' part, also.) After delay in the United States District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals [Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 50 F.R.D. 251 (N.D.Miss. 1970), 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019, 92 S. Ct. 1284, 31 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1972), rehearing denied, 406 U.S. 963, 92 S. Ct. 2057, 32 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1972)], trial was begun on June 11, 1973, on the Bill of Complaint and Cross Bills of some of the defendants. After testimony was taken over a long period of time, the chancellor rendered opinion August 9, 1976, which was followed by decree consistent therewith dated and filed on August 19, 1976. The complainants had prayed for actual damages alleged to be in the amount of $3,542,466.04. The chancellor awarded aggregate money decree to them in the amount of $950,699 plus solicitor fees in the amount of $300,000, a total recovery of $1,250,699. Chancery jurisdiction was availed of for use of the attachment in chancery statute [Miss. Code Ann., § 11-31-1 (1972)] and for injunction. Injunction against use of guards at stores, persuading or otherwise procuring potential customers to withhold their patronage, and against individual activity by the defendants was ordered by the decree. (Although the granting of injunction has been assigned as error, the error has not been argued, and NAACP, et al. say, at the conclusion of their brief "... the injunctive aspects of the case are now moot... ."). Appeal was taken therefrom to this Court. Defendants-appellants successfully invoked the aid of the federal court for relief against full compliance with our appeals supersedeas statute [Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale, 424 F. Supp. 633 (N.D.Miss. 1976), aff'd 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.1979)]. Appellants do not assign as error the chancellor's failure to award relief on their cross bills, nor is there a cross appeal by the complainants as to amount of the decree nor as to the court's dismissal of the cause as to certain of the defendants. On appeal, twenty-eight errors are assigned, but appellants' arguments are made as to the following propositions: On liability, we affirm the Chancellor's decision as to some defendants, and reverse it as to others, as hereinafter indicated. We reverse as to damages and remand the case to the lower court for trial on the issue of damages only. (MAP has filed its own assignment of errors and separate brief, all of which will be noticed later in this opinion.) Reaching early appellants' Point VI, attacking the Chancery Court's failure to grant appellants' request for a change of venue to Claiborne County, we find no error in the retention of the case in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. The suit might properly have been brought "in the Chancery Court of any county where the defendant, or any necessary party defendant, may reside or be found." Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 11-5-1 (1972). The suit was for injunction and recovery of damages against multiple defendants largely resident of Claiborne County. However, at least three defendants, including NAACP and MAP "resided" in the First Judicial District of Hinds County. Appellants, in support of this assignment of error have cited Gillard v. Great Southern Mortgage & Loan Corp., 354 So. 2d 794 (Miss. 1978), and Illinois Central Gulf RR v. Stedman, Admrx., 344 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1977). The Gillard case involved no resident of the county wherein the suit was brought. The Stedman case was brought in a county permissible for venue purposes by Section 11-5-1, but far from the county of the accident claiming the life of Mrs. Stedman's *1295 deceased. This Court did not hold it to be error not to grant a change of venue on that account, but pointed out that, on retrial, the reversal being on faulty instruction, the circuit court should again consider the motion for change of venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The granting of the motion was addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and, in order to assert error in refusing the change, it is necessary for the movant to show prejudice to him in the refusal, such prejudice not appearing here. Gillard, supra; Mississippi State Highway Comm. v. Rogers, 240 Miss. 529, 128 So. 2d 353 (1961); Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 128 So. 2d 341 (1961). No reversible error was committed in the court's denial of the requested change of venue. Black people number more than three-fourths of the population of Claiborne County. With the momentous weight of civil rights progress augmented in great measure by federal civil rights laws and led by dedicated activists, by the time the boycott here involved had begun the blacks had obtained overpowering authority in the ballot box. In the elections which took place in 1967 they from their number elected the chancery clerk, and might easily have put members of their ranks in practically all of the county's elective offices. Late in 1965, a group of their numbers, whether spontaneously or by authority of some group is not clear, had put together certain complaints and areas of relief which concerned them. About the same time, the NAACP movement had taken hold in Claiborne County which movement resulted in the organization of a chapter whose power and desires were being expressed. The late 1965 points of relief and the exponents of them were silenced or otherwise replaced by a group which had the leadership of Charles Evers, Field Secretary for the NAACP. In two missives they delineated and articulated to the addressees thereof their immediate concerns. The first of the communications, dated March 14, 1966, was addressed to the mayor and board of aldermen (obviously of the City of Port Gibson), the Claiborne County Board of Supervisors, the Board of Education and Sheriff McKay (both obviously of Claiborne County). The needs therein expressed were prefaced by a frank consideration of what may be correctly regarded as an alternative or an option probably facing those who had the power to satisfy those needs: There followed twenty-one needs (less two left blank therein, Numbers 4 and 5), as follows: The letter closed with the request, "Please communicate with the undersigned so that we may arrange a meeting to discuss the details of solutions to these problems." It was signed by Calvin C. Williams, Chairman, Alexander Collins, Secretary, and James N. Dorsey, Floyd D. Rollins, Nathaniel H. Jones, Walter L. Griffin, Sr., and Mack Tisdale. On March 23, 1966, a letter was addressed to all addressees of the March 14, 1966, letter, and to the Chamber of Commerce. It conveyed to its addresses the needs 4 and 5, omitted in the March 14, 1966, letter, expressed as follows: It ended with the statement, "We shall be awaiting your answer by April 1, 1966." In addition to the signatories to the earlier letter it was signed by Charles Evers. *1297 This group and these objectives appear from the record to have been duly appointed and to have been arrived at and adopted by the NAACP in regular meeting. Satisfactory response was not made during the interval prior to April 1, 1966, and, led by Evers, the boycott was begun on April 1, 1966, with a march along the white business area of Port Gibson and with a speech by Mr. Evers on the undertaking being launched. Upward of a hundred witnesses were put on the stand during the trial, (most of them defendants called adversely by the complaints), and testified, and as to be expected in such case, varying accounts of the boycott were discussed from which the conclusion is overwhelmingly warranted that it was conducted in serious fashion with planning, and expertise in control. The NAACP met about weekly at First Baptist Church of which the Reverend Dorsey, one of the signatories of the March 14, 1966, and March 23, 1966, letters noticed above, was pastor. There were the marches and the pep speeches usually a part of such undertaking. There were the pickets with their signs; the group of men almost fifty in number who were specially conspicuous because they wore black headwear and perhaps other black clothing, so that they would be easily distinguishable. There were the "Black Times" publications, enshrouded by very little mystery as to editorship, etc., wherein the names of those being boycotted periodically appeared as well as names of some observed breaking the boycott. Eastern States Retail Lbr. Dealers v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S. Ct. 951, 58 L. Ed. 1490 (1913). There came into being the successful black store, "Our Mart." The picket signs, among other messages, gave information that the boycott was that of the NAACP. Many of the picketing personnel were young children. Regrettable and lamentable events which took place during the boycott, including the following: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968, at Memphis under circumstances of common knowledge. On April 18, 1969, one Roosevelt Jackson was accused of interfering with law enforcement officers of Port Gibson in their effort to make an arrest of another. Later in that day policemen, one black and the other white, went to arrest him on the charge and a struggle resulted, details of which are clouded, ending in the fatal shooting of Jackson. At Dr. King's slaying there arose generally an attitude of frustration among the blacks for whom he had worked and lived. This sense of loss is shown to have intensified the Claiborne County boycott as it also gained expression in incidents of significance. (It should be said here that there is evidence also in the record from which it might be concluded that the unfortunate event caused not even a ripple in the blacks' undertaking.) The Jackson occurrence caused the boycotting blacks to become highly incensed resulting in their demand that the policemen involved be instantly discharged and even in their requirement that the entire police force be removed. Black activity took place at Jackson's home, at the hospital to which he was taken in an act of futility, at the Courthouse, and at First Baptist Church. Members of the Mississippi State Highway Patrol were sent in to help control the situation. There was weapons' firing, by whom is not clearly detailed in the record. Physical searches netted nothing in the way of weapons, but a search of a musical instrument in the church uncovered a number of weapons. The boycott which had reduced itself to some extent by the time of Jackson's death was then intensified and the entire Claiborne County's group of white merchants were brought within its prohibitions. The group of men above noticed came into organized being about a month after the boycott was begun. They were variously called "Black Hats," "watchers," "guards," "enforcers," "Deacons," or "Deacons for Defense." Their assignment, or their reasons for existence, was described as for the purpose of seeing to it that blacks who would trade with the boycotted white merchants were made aware of the boycott and that their cooperation was desired, and *1298 for the blacks' protection. There is testimony that these "watchers" organized themselves into a quasi-military group, drilled, bought weapons and ammunition, had target practice, two-way radios (automobile and "walkie-talkie" types), and they were sufficiently shown to have stood at corners or walked assigned areas, and stopping and interviewing would-be customers entering stores, within the area of the "watchers'" assigned patrols. The chancellor rendered an able, detailed, analyzing opinion, fully covering the voluminous testimony. His portrayal, well supported in the record, presents a facet of the enforcement of the boycott: [It should be here noted that Evers promised, in what appears to have been a nationwide televised speech, that "if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we're gonna break your... neck."] Mrs. Leesco Guster, one of the appellants, testifying as to Preacher White's alleged experience as a boycott breaker, said, "It was just talk, and I can't recall where it came from, because when talk starts in a small town, it goes everywhere." *1300 Testimony by some of the appellant MAP's witnesses tended to show fright on the part of the cooks in the kitchens of Head Start, a service supplied by MAP, causing them to refrain from handling groceries from white grocers. Attorneys for appellees put into the record that they "will stipulate that all of the Head Start MAP employees in Claiborne County were afraid to do business with white merchants." The chancellor found, as he was bound to do from the record, that: In Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees, 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765 (1949), a decision involving a labor strike attended by violence against which, in part, an injunction was being sought by appellant, this Court said in quoting from Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local No. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 295, 61 S. Ct. 552, 555, 556, 85 L. Ed. 836, 842 (1941): It appears from the demand letters noticed hereinabove that some of the areas for remedial action were within the power of the boycotted, and that others of them were public in their nature within the purview of the Port Gibson officials, the Claiborne County officials, and the Chancery Court. As to these public complaints, the merchants could only use the power of their influence to whatever degree such influence reached. The blacks expected the application of that influence and pressed into operation the boycott of the white merchants with that goal in mind. On April 18, 1969, when Jackson was killed, as noted above, at the hands of two policemen, one black and the other white, there was demand articulated that these officers be discharged, and the boycott was intensified and made again applicable countywide. Ira Thomas testified that, "the white merchants didn't have anything to do with Jackson's death but you've got to hurt who you can... ." There was extended testimony relative to the demands for the employment of black citizens at responsible jobs, and witnesses expressed the view that these demands should be met even if either it meant the discharge of white employees already on these jobs or that there would be two employees doing the job requiring only one employee to do, demands for reverse racial discrimination, as found to be true in Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950). Appellees rely in part on Mississippi Code Annotated, section 97-23-85 (1972), which was adopted by the 1968 session of the Legislature and became effective July 30, 1968. Its constitutionality is vigorously attacked by appellants who assert that it is contrary to the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The boycott began April 1, 1966. Section 97-23-85 was adopted in the 1968 legislative session, and went into effect July 30, 1968, when the boycott had been in operation for upward of two years. The statute *1301 clearly reflects no retrospective force, but only prospective. Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481 (Miss. 1966), and the many decisions therein contained. We are of the opinion that the statute is not applicable to the present decision. Appellees likewise, in part, rely upon our restraint of trade statute, section 75-21-1, et seq., and argue that the activity complained of operated to restrain their trade and their right to trade. The United States Supreme Court has seen fit to hold boycotts to achieve political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), after which our statute is patterned. We, in turn, have been influenced by the decisions of that Court in interpreting and applying it. While economic goals were sought by appellants and while economic good was challenged and endangered in and caused to suffer by, the boycott, we find that the present decision may be made without application of the restraint of trade statute. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961). See also, State of Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.1980), appeal for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (June 25, 1980), No. 79-2039; and Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.1969). The bill of complaint relies in part upon the common law protections which had formed the base for this Court's decisions in Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970), and Southern Bus Lines, Inc., supra. We regard that law as determinative here. Judge (now Chief Judge) Coleman of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly stated in Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181, 187 (5th Cir.1969), that: "Any kind of boycott is unlawful if executed with force or violence or threats... ." If any of these factors force, violence, or threats is present, then the boycott is illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, political, social or other. All of these factors are here present, and the boycott was illegally operated and we do not need to examine into its type, whether primary or other. The presence of a conspiracy is beyond peradventure. Southern Christian Leadership Conf., supra; Wagley v. Colonial Baking Co., 208 Miss. 815, 45 So. 2d 717 (1950); New York Mailers Unions v. National Labor Relations Board, 316 F.2d 371 (D.C. Cir.1963). An examination of our statute, section 97-1-1, and our decisions in Southern Christian Leadership Conf., supra; Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Town of Coldwater, 234 Miss. 615, 106 So. 2d 375 (1958); and Southern Bus Lines, Inc., supra, will reveal the fact that a conspiracy to be a conspiracy, must be tainted with illegality, there must be an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, or an agreement to accomplish a legal objective by the use of illegal means. The agreed use of illegal force, violence, and threats against the peace to achieve a goal makes the present state of facts a conspiracy. We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to no decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment includes in its protection the right to commit crime. The SCLC opinion, supra, brought under unfavorable study the matter of boycotts without advance warning as to grievances held against the boycott victim, the same as here exists. Mississippi Code Annotated, section 97-23-83 (1972), adopted and effective from February 9, 1966, a date antedating the beginning of the boycott, makes it a criminal offense to threaten with bodily harm, intimidate, or coerce a person to prevent the offended person from doing business with another. This statute was applied in Shields v. State, 203 So. 2d 78 (Miss. 1967). Shields was one of those activists helping in the boycott, and was convicted of violating this statute. His case was reversed, however, because of deficiency in the jury list from which the convicting jury had been drawn. *1302 That statute declares it to be a misdemeanor and punishable: That statute applied to, and was violated in, the coercion, intimidation, and threats which were a part of the boycott activity and contributed to its almost complete success. The present case, in the relief sought and granted, the conduct of the boycott, and the applicable law, is so strikingly similar to this Court's decision in Southern Christian Leadership Conference, supra, that that decision and the law therein held to be applicable are compelling here, and by it we are impelled to find that liability for damages attached to NAACP and, subject to some exceptions hereinafter noticed, to the individual defendants. MAP, as earlier herein noticed, filed its own assignments of error incorporating those of NAACP, et al. It also assigned as error the holding that MAP was a part of the conspiracy to boycott illegally, and the chancellor's rejection of its defense of duress, and further assigned as error the failure of appellees to furnish bill of particulars and the Court's finding that it was subject to suit and damages award in the absence of consent by the United States Government. MAP is a creature of Mississippi statute as a nonprofit corporation. Mississippi Code Annotated, section 79-11-1, et seq. (1972). It was incorporated on September 13, 1966, for implementation of the government's Head Start program, 42 U.S.C. § 2928, et seq., its participation therein being the provision of food, educational and other services to needy children in twenty counties of the state of which Claiborne County is one. The program is aimed specially at pre-school children of low-income families. It began operation in Claiborne County on January 16, 1967, with the intention to buy groceries from black and white stores, which groceries would be needed for meals for the children being benefited by the program. This plan was immediately foundered by the boycott, causing inquiries, investigations, conferences, and planning within MAP and between MAP and boycott leaders and others. A program arrived at to buy from four black groceries and four white groceries was immediately abandoned because the Head Start cooks were afraid to do business with the white merchants (this fact established in the record by stipulation of counsel for appellees), and Evers threatened to banish the program from the county rather than to permit the expenditure of government money with white merchants contrary to the very boycott itself. Finally, MAP adopted formally a course of action which required the purchase of all groceries from black stores, and, if these could not meet the MAP needs, then purchases would be made outside the county. MAP sought and obtained an opinion or opinions from its attorneys, upon which it issued non-participation guidelines in political matters. The record does not warrant a finding that MAP conspired with any of the co-conspirators, nor that it acted as a principal or as a willing participant in the boycott program. Rather, in our view, it operated as it did through fear on the part of its cooks (all black) for their safety, and to avoid the destruction or great impairment of its beneficial program in the county. We are of the view that the able chancellor erred in including it as a judgment defendant, and, as to it, the decree will be reversed and judgment will be rendered here for MAP. An adequate search of the record reveals to our satisfaction, also, that for insufficient proof, lack of proof, or otherwise, appellees did not establish their case against certain of the defendants, and that including them among those against whom money decree and injunction were awarded *1303 was erroneous. As to them, the cause will be reversed and judgment will be rendered here for them. These are: Priscilla Brooks, Mack Louis Davis, Ethel Graise, Charlie Harris, Albert Jackson, Bessie Newman, D.A. Newman, Henry Otis Preston, Roman Shorter, Leon Tarleton, Alex Dorsey, Ella Dorsey, Bobby Kelly, Beatrice Atlas, Lela Jones, Viola Robinson, Dora Shorter, Rosa Shorter, Annie B. Smith, Alonzo Warner, Bonnie Wells, Eli Brooks, Maggie Clark, Mary Durham, John Eggleston, John Ellis, Rachel Ellis, Mrs. E.J. Jennings, Clarence Lucas, Early Wren, Roosevelt Owens, Delores Smith, Lessie Mae Walls, Ethel Warner, Gussie Pearl Wilson, Willie Wilson, and Ruby Wren. We next consider the amount of damages awarded by the chancellor to 12 complainants as detailed in the following schedule: In addition, the chancellor allowed complainants $300,000 attorneys' fees under section 93-23-85, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972). The award of attorneys' fees was improper because the statute has no *1304 retroactive effect as stated earlier in this opinion. We also hold that the chancellor was in error in allowing a penalty of $500 to each of the 12 complainants under section 75-21-9, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), because our restraint of trade statute, section 75-21-1, et seq., Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), has no application to boycotts to achieve political goals. The chancellor also allowed $121,029 for loss of interest on earnings from 1966 to 1972. Reduced to its essential elements, this is simply an allowance for prejudgment interest and is not permitted under our decisions. In cases involving unliquidated claims for damages, interest can be allowed only from the time of judgment. Alton v. Wood, 300 So. 2d 786 (Miss. 1974); McDaniel Bros. Construction Co. v. Jordy, 195 So. 2d 922 (Miss. 1967). The chancellor allowed the 12 complainants $606,357 for loss of earnings from business for the years 1966 to 1972 in the exact dollar amount set forth in Exhibit C-63 entitled, "Special Report Determination of Losses of 12 Business Establishments of Port Gibson, Mississippi, for the years 1966-1972 inclusive." The report was prepared by a firm of CPA's who calculated lost earnings upon the projection by Dr. Paul T. Oliver of the sales lost during the period. Complainants' claim for damages must stand or fall on the accuracy of Dr. Oliver's projection of sales, the underlying data upon which the projection was based, and the application by the accountants to each of the individual businesses. Dr. Oliver, an associate professor of Economics at the University of Mississippi, testified as an expert and explained the graphs and computations made by him. Dr. Oliver made graphs of sales for the years 1960-65 and projected the sales for each business for the years 1966-72. The graphs depicted a trend line for sales which included an inflation factor of 3.2%. The difference between actual sales and the trend line sales represent his conclusions as to the dollar amount of lost sales for the years 1966-72. The accounting firm of Chapman, Redditt and Grantham then converted lost sales into lost earnings. The accountants explained the basis for converting lost sales into earnings as follows: In computing lost earnings resulting from lost sales, the accountants added the gross sales for the base period, 1960-65, and divided this into the total net earnings for the *1305 base period resulting in a percentage representing net earnings. The projected sales with inflation were multiplied by the percentage of net earnings for the base period, the result being projected earnings. Actual earnings for each year, where applicable, were deducted from the projected earnings leaving the earnings lost. This method did not take into consideration any change in the pricing structure or mark-up of goods for sale. We note that gross profit, which is sales less cost of goods sold, decreased in some of the businesses for the period 1966-1972, which leads us to the conclusion that pricing structure of some of the businesses must have changed. When gross profits are reduced net earnings are affected. In order for the computation of lost earnings to be accurate, pricing policies of the businesses involved must be taken into consideration. The conversion of lost sales into lost earnings was based on Dr. Oliver's calculations of projected sales with inflation. Dr. Oliver was furnished gross sales for each of the businesses for the base period and from this date projected sales with an inflation factor added. Dr. Oliver candidly admitted that he made no study of all facts relevant to management of the businesses to determine what caused deviations in the base period. He said his study showed that something happened to all 12 businesses almost simultaneously, and if he were to make a study to discover all facts relevant to the fluctuation in gross sales he would consider population growth, disasters, and other things of like nature. He stated he would have included a number of factors other than gross sales and specifically listed: managerial skills, a change in amounts spent on advertising, increases in fixed costs of employees and decline in the availability of money to spend. He said the only factor communicated to him was the boycott and that there might well be other factors. He assumed the impact on sales was caused by the boycott and concluded the boycott, as an economic sanction, had a very dramatic impact, which was its goal. He testified that there was a recession in 1970 and he would not exclude this factor from the trend sales line but did not show that the effect of the recession was included. He stated the recession would have had a dramatic effect on the business of Claiborne Hardware. One of the problems with the projected sales as calculated by Dr. Oliver is that his calculations failed to take into consideration other facts which we feel would affect the estimate of future sales. (1) Would additional inventory be required to increase sales? (2) Would the individual complainants have the capital necessary to increase the inventory, if necessary? (3) What would the additional capital cost? (4) Would the physical plant of each business be large enough to house an increased inventory or would additions be necessary? (5) Was there any change in management or employees that would affect the volume of sales? We are of the opinion that these factors, together with the factors mentioned by Dr. Oliver, should be taken into consideration in making an estimate of future sales and that inclusion of all of these factors, or their exclusion with an explanation, if not applicable, is necessary for one attempting to prove lost earnings. Another problem with the projected sales with inflation is that the gross sales furnished Dr. Oliver for the base period are not consistent. In some gross sales included sales taxes, in other sales taxes were excluded, and in some the inclusion or exclusion of sales tax varied from year to year. We recognize that these variations might have a minimal effect on the projections, but since this case is being reversed for retrial on the issue of damages, the gross sales for the base period should be stated accurately and consistently. The chancellor also allowed some of the complainants damages for the loss of good will. Good will was defined in the transmittal letter as follows: When a business was sold by a willing buyer to a willing seller, good will is the amount of the purchase price in excess of the tangible assets of the business. The accountants also explained, in their letter of transmittal, their method of arriving at good will. As we understand the exhibits and testimony of the accountants they did not employ the method set forth in their transmittal letter. We fail to find that the accountants computed the percentage return on the tangible assets of the businesses involved in this case and deducted this amount from net earnings. We also note that Revenue Ruling 68-609 requires sole proprietorships or partnerships to deduct from earnings a reasonable amount for services performed *1307 by the owners or partners engaged in the business. This was not done. Failure to compute good will properly resulted in an overvaluation of good will. For example, Barbara B. Ellis and Norman N. Ellis, doing business as Ellis Variety Store, were awarded $96,633 for loss of good will. The income tax returns for these complainants show a beginning inventory for the years 1960-68 as follows: The tax return for 1968 also showed other tangible assets used in the business amounted to $3,000. Adding these tangible assets to the beginning inventory for 1968 makes a total of $12,998.93 of tangible assets used in the business. An allowance of $96,633 damages for loss of good will is a gross overvaluation of good will. We reverse the allowance for loss of good will to each complainant and remand for further evidence on loss of good will. On retrial the court should determine whether a business should be permitted to recover profits on lost sales plus loss of good will. It appears to us there is a strong probability that allowing recovery of profits on lost sales plus loss of good will would pyramid damages and amount to double recovery. We express no opinion on this question but expert testimony should deal with the question on retrial. We are satisfied that complainants suffered some damages resulting from the boycott but are of the opinion that the amount allowed was excessive under the evidence presented. We hold the chancellor erred in failing to reduce the award of damages to complainants McDaniel, Norman N. Ellis and Barbara B. Ellis for the amount earned by them while they were out of business. Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970). Complainants were under a duty to mitigate damages and any award made to complainants shall be reduced by their earnings. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART ON LIABILITY; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART ON DAMAGES; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART ON DAMAGES. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur. [1] Whitney v. State, 205 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1967).