Title: ERPELDING v. LISEK

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ERPELDING v. LISEK2003 WY 8071 P.3d 754Case Number: 02-67Decided: 06/27/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

CHRISTOPHER 
ERPELDING,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

 

v.

 

VICTOR 
LISEK and VICTOR LISEK, P.C.,

 

Appellee(Defendants) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

John 
A. Coppede and Andrea L. Richard of Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons, LLP, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Richard.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and SANDERSON, 
D.J.

 

 

SANDERSON, 
D.J.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Christopher Erpelding (Erpelding), has appealed from a summary judgment in favor 
of Appellee Victor Lisek, individually, and Victor Lisek, P.C. (Lisek).  The district court found there was no 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lisek breached a duty of care owed 
to Erpelding, and that the statute of limitations had expired.  We hold that the district court 
correctly concluded that Lisek breached no duty of care owed to Erpelding and 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Erpelding 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

A.  Where 
an employee is referred to a counselor because "everyone has problems" and the 
counselor prescribes treatment, is there sufficient evidence of a relationship 
upon which a duty of care may be imposed?

 

B.  Was 
the statute of limitations met?

 

[¶3]      Lisek frames the 
issues as follows:

 

            
I.  Whether [Erpelding's] causes of action for alleged 
professional negligence were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for 
the rendering of licensed professional services where [he] knew or should have 
known of the alleged act, error or omission nearly four (4) years before he 
filed his complaint?

 

            
II.  Whether [Lisek] owed a duty to [Erpelding] in performing 
an independent mental evaluation of [him], other than to avoid causing an injury 
to him during the course of the evaluation itself, where [Lisek] neither 
counseled nor treated  [Erpelding], 
but only evaluated [him] at the request of his employer?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The Wyoming 
Department of Transportation (WYDOT) employed Erpelding from 1991 to May of 
1998.  His tenure with WYDOT was 
punctuated by combative arguments and confrontations with co-workers, 
supervisors, and contractors working for WYDOT.  As a result, Erpelding received written 
warnings and reprimands from his supervisors.

 

[¶5]      Erpelding's 
supervisors sent him to Lisek, a licensed psychological counselor, to obtain an 
assessment of Erpelding's psychological condition and recommendations as to what 
the employer could do to alleviate the problems at the workplace.  In all, Erpelding met with Lisek on 
three occasions beginning in August of 1997.  At the beginning of each of these 
meetings Erpelding signed a "Permission for Release of Confidential Information" 
so that any information obtained by Lisek and any records or reports generated 
by him would be provided to WYDOT.  
After each visit, Lisek sent a report to Mr. Dover, which gave his 
assessment of Erpelding.  Following 
the first visit, Lisek recommended that Erpelding receive psychological 
counseling and that WYDOT make a "change in work environment."  Lisek's recommendation was based on 
interviews and psychological tests known as the Minnesota Multiaxial 
Inventory.  As a result, Erpelding 
went to the Veterans Administration in Sheridan for psychological 
counseling.

 

[¶6]      Erpelding 
continued to have confrontations with his co-workers.  In April of 1998, Erpelding's immediate 
supervisor again sent him to Lisek for the second assessment and Lisek sent a 
report of the second evaluation to WYDOT.  
Lisek's report characterized Erpelding's personality patterns as outside 
of "societal and acceptable performance norms" which would cause him to continue 
to have difficulties in getting along with his co-workers and supervisors.  Lisek recommended that WYDOT place 
Erpelding in a highly structured and highly restricted work environment which 
would minimize his interaction with co-workers.  In June of 1998, WYDOT terminated 
Erpelding citing his disruptive, hostile and combative behavior in the workplace 
and claiming that there were no available assignments "which were highly 
restrictive, highly structured and in a setting where the duties assigned would 
not require consistent interaction with his co-workers."

 

[¶7]      Erpelding 
successfully appealed his dismissal because WYDOT's rules did not permit WYDOT 
to utilize the opinion of licensed professional counselors in determining 
whether an employee was medically ineligible for employment.  He was reinstated to his employment in 
May of 1999.

 

[¶8]      WYDOT sent 
Erpelding to Lisek for a third assessment in June of 1999.  WYDOT had, in the interim, changed its 
personnel rules to allow licensed professional counselors to conduct 
examinations and make recommendations to WYDOT.  Erpelding objected to going to Lisek 
again, but ultimately relented and attended.  Following Lisek's third report, 
Erpelding was again dismissed on June 30, 1999.  Another appeal followed and the hearing 
examiner again reversed WYDOT's decision to dismiss Erpelding, and WYDOT 
appealed.  While the appeal was 
pending, Erpelding sued WYDOT alleging his dismissal violated the Americans With 
Disabilities Act.  WYDOT settled, 
resulting in a monetary settlement and dismissal of Erpelding's suit against 
WYDOT and WYDOT's appeal.

 

[¶9]      Erpelding then 
focused his attention on  Lisek and 
brought a malpractice suit against  
him on March 7, 2001.  
Following discovery, Lisek moved for summary judgment on the basis that 
Erpelding's claims were time barred by the statute of limitations and because 
there was no counselor/patient relationship between the two.  Concluding there was no 
counselor/patient relationship between them and therefore no duty owed to 
Erpelding as a matter of law, and that the claims were barred under the two-year 
statute of limitations, the district court granted summary judgment to 
Lisek.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Standard of Review

 

[¶10]                           
Summary judgment is proper, even in negligence cases, when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  When 
we review a motion for summary judgment, we view the record on appeal in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and accept all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record in favor of that 
part.

 

Valance 
v. VI-Doug, Inc., 
2002 WY 113 ¶7, 50 P.3d 697, ¶7 (Wyo. 2002).  We have often 
stated:

 

Summary 
judgments are not favored in negligence actions and are subject to exacting scrutiny.  However, even in a negligence action, 
summary judgment may be appropriate, especially if a plaintiff cannot establish 
existence of a duty on the part of the defendant.

 

Valance, 
¶7 (quoting Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 
1995)).

 

[¶11]   The elements of a negligence action 
are:  (1)  The defendant 
owed a duty to the plaintiff to conform to a specified standard of care; 
(2)  The defendant breached a duty of care to the plaintiff; 
(3)  The breach of the duty proximately caused the injury to the 
plaintiff; and (4)  The injury sustained by the plaintiff is 
compensable by money damages.  
Valance, ¶8.

 

B.        
Duty

 

[¶12]   This case presents an issue of 
first impression in Wyoming: Whether a professional counselor who is hired by 
the employer to perform a psychological evaluation on an employee for the 
benefit of the employer has a duty of care to the 
employee?

 

[¶13] 
"Without duty, negligence is not actionable.  The existence of duty is a question of 
law, making an absence of duty the surest route to summary judgment in 
negligence actions."  Dailey v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 
(Wyo. 1995) (citing MacKrell v. Bell 
H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990); Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 
1325 (Wyo. 1995)).

 

[¶14]   Duty focuses on the relationship of 
individuals and imposes on one an obligation for the benefit of the other.  "A duty exists where, upon the facts in 
evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the community will 
impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other  or, more 
simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was 
entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant.' Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 37 at 236 (5th ed. 1984)."  Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739,742 (Wyo. 1999).  Conversely, if no such relationship exists, 
then an obligation for the benefit of another is not 
imposed.

 

[¶15]   In a malpractice action, a 
physician/patient relationship is normally required to establish a duty to act 
for the patient's benefit.  Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 109 (Wyo. 
1989); Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Wyo. 1983).  This 
analysis of a physician/patient relationship applies equally to mental health 
professionals.  Hafner v. Beck, 916 P.2d 1105, 1107 
(Ariz.App.Div.2 1995).  However, 
since Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986), we have refused to 
be constrained by the "privity" test as the sole determinant of whether a duty 
exists.

 

[¶16]   Erpelding contends that the 
district court erroneously limited itself to a privity analysis when it found 
that Lisek owed him no duty of care because a counselor/patient relationship did 
not exist.  He argues that courts 
should apply the balancing test most recently utilized by this Court in Duncan, 991 P.2d  at 
739.

 

[¶17]   Lisek relies on the reasoning 
contained in Hafner, 916 P.2d  at 1108 and Martinez v. Lewis,  969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998).  Hafner held there was no duty because there 
was no physician/patient relationship, in other words, no privity.  However, Martinez rejected the 
privity analysis and utilized a balancing of pertinent factors test to determine 
whether a physician, who conducted an independent medical examination for an 
insurer, had a duty to the patient.1  The court in Martinez held that while the absence of 
a physician/patient relationship is not dispositive as to the existence of a 
duty, under the factors considered, the physician in that case did not owe 
Martinez a duty of care.

 

[¶18]   Since Gates, we have 
utilized a test which balances several factors to determine whether a defendant 
should owe a duty of care to a plaintiff:  
(1)  The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 
(2)  The closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered; (3)  The degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury; (4)  The moral blame attached to the 
defendant's conduct; (5)  The policy of preventing future harm; 
(6)  The extent of the burden upon the defendant; (7)  The 
consequences to the community and the court system; and (8)  The 
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  Duncan, 991 P.2d  at 744.  We now apply this eight-factor test to 
the circumstances of this case.  We 
assume, for purposes of this analysis, that Lisek was negligent in the conduct 
of his examination and report to WYDOT.

 

[¶19]   1.  The forseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff.  Should Lisek 
have foreseen that Erpelding would be fired?  It must have been apparent that 
Erpelding's tenure was in jeopardy because of his history of disputes with his 
co-workers.  Erpelding contends that 
it was "foreseeable" that Lisek's reports, "right or wrong" could cause harm to 
him because WYDOT would rely on those reports in dismissing him.  That, it is argued, is sufficient to 
impose a duty of care.  We do not 
agree.

 

[¶20]   Lisek was not hired by WYDOT to 
make a recommendation as to whether  
Erpelding should remain employed.  
He was employed to conduct a psychological assessment and make 
recommendations as to what could be done to reduce conflicts at the 
workplace.  He was an independent 
examiner who was working primarily for the benefit of the employer.  Lisek recommended, in essence, that 
Erpelding's contact with co-workers be kept to a minimum and that Erpelding see 
another psychologist to deal with his mental or emotional issues.  Erpelding and WYDOT were in greater 
control of the circumstances that determined whether Erpelding would keep his 
job.  It was not necessarily 
foreseeable that  Lisek's 
recommendation would have resulted in Erpelding's dismissal.  This case is not like the facts in 
Duncan where the outcome of a drug or alcohol test was the sole 
determinant of whether an employee kept his job.  There, the consequence of a test which 
revealed an unacceptable level of alcohol was predictable and 
severe.

 

[¶21]   Even if financial harm to an 
examinee is a foreseeable consequence of an independent examiner's opinion, that 
is not as important a consideration as it may be in other relationships.  For example, independent examiners are 
often employed to verify the accuracy of a plaintiff's claims.  It is entirely foreseeable that the 
independent examiner may conclude that the plaintiff's claims are exaggerated 
with the result being that the plaintiff receives less than he might have.  The very nature of the independent 
examiner's role may result in economic harm to the 
examinee.

 

[¶22]   Even if dismissal of Erpelding was 
a foreseeable consequence of Lisek's negligently formed opinion, litigation 
involving wrongful termination is also a foreseeable consequence.  Either of these consequences should 
cause an independent examiner to perform his tasks with reasonable care.  The foreseeability of harm does not, 
under these circumstances, weigh in favor of imposing a 
duty.

 

[¶23]   2.  The closeness of the 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered.  WYDOT attempted to fire Erpelding after 
a period of continued flare-ups at the work place and immediately after 
receiving the second and third assessment reports from Lisek.  However, WYDOT fired Erpelding even 
though there was no recommendation from Lisek to do so.  The record reflects that WYDOT relied 
upon several reasons to dismiss Erpelding, including incapacity to perform 
assigned duties, unsatisfactory work performance, and insubordination, and 
because there was no position available where Erpelding would work alone.  We conclude that while  Lisek's report was a factor in the 
decision to dismiss, we cannot say that it was the overriding or motivating 
factor behind the decision.  This 
factor does not weigh in favor of imposing a duty.

 

[¶24]   3.  The degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury.  
That Erpelding suffered injury is not disputed.  He lost his job.

 

[¶25]   4.  The moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct.  
Serious misconduct may increase the scope of persons who are entitled 
to protection afforded by the imposition of duty.  For example, the class of persons that 
fall within the scope of an actor's duty is larger if a misrepresentation is 
fraudulent than the class of persons where the misrepresentation is 
negligent.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552, cmt. h (1977).  (The negligent supplier of information 
is liable only to those persons for whose benefit and guidance it is 
supplied.  The maker of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation is liable to any person the maker has reason to expect to act 
in reliance upon it.)  Here, 
Erpelding contends that Lisek acted negligently.

 

[¶26]   Whether or not the defendant 
receives financial benefit or has control over how his opinion is utilized are 
considerations that may weigh in favor of imposing duty.  Duncan, 991 P.2d  at 745; Restatement, supra, § 552, cmt. 
c.  (If the information is given 
gratuitously, the supplier is under no duty to exercise reasonable care and 
competence in giving it.)  Lisek was 
compensated for his services.  
However, unless the misrepresentation is the product of misconduct, which 
is more serious than ordinary negligence, there is no moral blame sufficient to 
impose a duty even if the supplier is compensated.  Id., cmt. h.

 

[¶27]   5.  The policy of preventing 
future harm.  We are considering 
the harm to an examinee created by an unfavorable report upon which the employer 
will rely in deciding whether the examinee will keep his job.  While this scenario raises significant 
concerns, the employee's alternative avenues of relief against the employer for 
wrongful termination provide strong incentives for an employer to hire and rely 
upon psychologists who will perform their independent examination adequately and 
competently.

 

[¶28]   6.  The extent of the burden on 
the defendant.  There would 
undoubtedly be a serious impact on the objectivity of an independent examiner 
and on his willingness to even undertake the responsibility of making a 
recommendation if the examination must be made with one eye studying the 
prospect of being sued by the examinee.  
Other courts have expressed this concern.  "If an IME practitioner's evaluations, 
opinions, and reports could lead not only to vehement disagreement with and 
vigorous cross-examination of the practitioner in the claims or litigation 
process, but also to his or her potential liability for negligence, the 
resulting chilling effect would be severe."  Martinez, 969 P.2d  at 219 
(quoting Hafner, 916 P.2d at 1107).  
This factor weighs against the imposition of duty.

 

[¶29]   7.  The consequences to the 
community and the court system.  
The primary concern here is the burden on the courts that a new class 
of eligible litigants would bring.  
Justice Cardine once observed, "[I]f the only purpose of our law was to 
unburden the court system, then we would reach the zenith of judicial 
achievement simply by closing the district courts to all litigants and allowing 
all wrongs to come to rest on innocent victims."  Gates, 719 P.2d at 197.  He later described the effects of being 
too liberal in imposing a duty: "It has long been a practice to join as a party 
defendant every person with any potential liability for injuries suffered in an 
accident."  Mostert v. CBL & 
Associates, 741 P.2d l090, 1104 (Wyo. 1987) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting).

 

[¶30]   Erpelding simply asserts that there 
would be "no flood of litigation."  
We are not comforted by that assurance.  We are more persuaded by the concern of 
the New York Supreme Court in a case where parents sued a psychiatrist who was 
hired by a school district to evaluate a child in order to aid the district in 
deciding whether the child should be transferred to another type of educational 
placement.  Unhappy with the 
psychiatrist's opinion, the parents sued him for malpractice.  The court refused to impose a duty 
because there was no physician/patient relationship 
explaining:

 

To 
permit such an action would make it impossible to find any expert witness 
willing to risk a lawsuit based on his testimony as to his opinions and 
conclusions before any tribunal.  
And such cause of action if permitted would lead to an endless stream of 
litigation wherein defeated litigants would seek to redeem loss of the main 
action by suing to recover damages from those witnesses whose adverse testimony 
might have brought about the adverse result.

 

Davis 
v. Tirrell, 
110 Misc. 2d 889, 443 N.Y.S.2d 136, 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1991).

 

[¶31]   8.  The availability, cost and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  The parties make no argument with 
regard to the availability of cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.  We will, therefore, not 
consider this factor. 

 

[¶32]   "Duty is an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is entitled to protection."  
Duncan, 991 P.2d  at 746.  After examining the question of whether 
or not a duty should be found to exist by balancing the factors established in 
Gates, we hold, under the particular facts of this case, that Lisek, in 
performing an independent psychological evaluation for the benefit of  Erpelding's employer, did not owe  Erpelding a duty of care.  We observe that this conclusion is in 
accord with virtually every other court that has considered this issue.  See Felton v. Shaeffer, 229 Cal. App. 3d 229, 279 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (Cal. App. 1991).2

 

C.        
Statute of Limitations

 

[¶33]   Having found that no duty existed, 
there is no need to review the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the 
basis that Erpelding did not file his suit within the governing statute of 
limitations.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶34]   A licensed professional counselor 
who negligently conducts an examination of an employee at the request of the 
employer and who submits to the employer a report of his examination conclusions 
and recommendations does not owe a duty of care to the employee.  The trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Lisek is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Martinez 
utilized a test which contained the following factors in determining whether a 
duty of care exists:  The risk 
involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed against the 
social utility of the defendant's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of 
guarding against the harm, and the consequences of placing the burden of a duty 
on the defendant.  Martinez, 
969 P.2d  at 218 (citing Greenburg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530 at 536 (Colo. 
1993)).

  2There may be 
situations where a duty is found to exist even though the examination was done 
at the behest of an employer or other third party.  Felton, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 717-718; Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530, 537 
(Colo. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 
(1977).