Title: People v. Vargas

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
EDUARDO DAVID VARGAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S101247 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
99CF0831 
 
 
July 13, 2020 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
S101247 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
Defendant Eduardo David Vargas was convicted of one 
count of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), six 
counts of robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), one count of 
attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211), two counts of active 
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), 
defined at the time of the offense as “street terrorism”), and one 
count of possessing a firearm while on probation (former § 
12021, subd. (d)).  The jury also found true a robbery-murder 
special-circumstance allegation.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)  The 
People alleged as well, and the jury found true, allegations that 
defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death during 
the robbery murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that the crimes 
were committed with the intent to promote a criminal street 
gang (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)).  After a 
penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial 
court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict 
(§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and, on October 4, 2001, sentenced defendant 
to death.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We 
affirm the judgment. 
                                               
 
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
a.  March 30, 1999 
i. Baek and Kim 
 
Realtor John Baek met with contractor Hong Kim on 
March 30, 1999 to inspect an abandoned property in Santa Ana.  
While Baek and Kim spoke, two men entered the property.  One 
of the men, whom Baek later identified as defendant, pointed a 
gun at Baek and ordered him to give the men everything he had.  
Baek gave the men his pager and wallet, which contained cash 
and credit cards.2  Kim raised his hands in the air after seeing 
the two men enter with a gun, and his cell phone and checkbook 
were taken from him.  After the two men left, Baek called the 
police using the cell phone in his car.     
 
Perly Abdulnour, owner of WorldNet Pager, testified that 
on the afternoon of March 30, 1999, three men came into his 
store.  One of them, Eloy Gonzalez, with whom Abdulnour was 
familiar, wanted to pay his bill.  The other two men wished to 
purchase pagers.  Abdulnour accepted a $27.00 credit card 
payment on Gonzalez’s account for “air time.”  The other two 
men, Matthew Miller,3 and a man who identified himself on the 
                                               
 
2  
Baek later learned two unauthorized purchases were 
made using his credit cards, both at WorldNet Pager, in the 
amounts of $27.00 and $329.99.   
3  
Abdulnour testified that he did not know Miller’s name at 
the time the pager was purchased, but he learned it while 
testifying at a different trial three months before defendant’s 
trial.  
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
pager application as “Carlos Juan Rodriguez,” each purchased a 
pager.  The pagers were collectively worth approximately 
$240.00.     
 
Baek described the gunman to police as a black-haired 
male with a “light complexion,” about five feet 10 inches tall, 
weighing 150 pounds.  Baek described the individual who was 
not wielding the gun as a black-haired Caucasian male weighing 
approximately 180 pounds, with a height of five feet nine inches.  
On April 8, 1999, Baek was shown a photo lineup, and he 
identified defendant as the gunman.  Baek also identified two 
photographs, including one of Matthew Miller, as possible 
images of the nongunman involved in the robbery.  Baek 
attended a live lineup at the Orange County Jail, where he again 
identified defendant as the gunman.  On April 12, 1999, 
Abdulnour identified the three men through a photo lineup as 
defendant, Gonzalez, and Miller, and he identified defendant at 
trial.   
ii. Hill and Wilson 
 
Shortly before midnight on March 30, 1999, Leavon Hill 
and his stepson Cornelius Wilson were working on Hill’s truck 
in front of his home in Santa Ana.  Three men walked up to Hill, 
whose back was to the street, and Wilson — who was getting 
jumper cables from the trunk.  By the time Hill noticed the three 
men, they were directly in front of his truck.  As Hill commented 
that it was a strange time of night to be out walking, “one of the 
gentlemen pulled [a] gun on” Hill.  Hill described the gun as “all 
black.”  The man holding the gun then “left [Hill] and he went 
after [Hill’s] son,” and one of the two other men who had walked 
up to Hill and Wilson told Hill, “ ‘if you move, I am going to shoot 
you.’ ”   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
 
Hill had been slowly walking backwards toward his home 
and, despite the warnings that he would be shot if he moved, 
decided to run into his home anyway to call the police.  After Hill 
ran into his home, Wilson ran away down the street.  At some 
point during the altercation, the first man, who had been 
holding the black gun, stole Hill’s wallet.  One of the men, the 
one who had told Hill he would be shot if he tried to move, 
attempted to take the stereo from Hill’s truck but was unable to 
complete the task before all three men left the area; the stereo 
was found on the seat of the truck, although it had been installed 
prior to Hill and Wilson’s altercation with the three men.   
 
Hill described the gunman as about five foot nine or ten, 
and 165 or 170 pounds.  Hill identified defendant as the gunman 
at a photo lineup on April 13, 1999, and also identified the 
gunman as defendant at trial.  Hill described the man who 
removed the stereo and told Hill he would be shot if he tried to 
move as the tallest of the three men, standing at about six feet.  
Hill was unable to identify anyone else at the photo lineup.  
Wilson recognized images of both Miller and Gonzalez from the 
April 13, 1999 photo lineup, but he failed to make a positive 
identification of either.  Fingerprints taken from the stereo in 
Hill’s truck matched Gonzalez.   
b.  April 1, 1999 
 
In the early evening hours of April 1, 1999, Laura 
Espinoza and Amor Gonzalez4 used drugs together and went to 
a shopping mall, after which they responded to Gonzalez’s page 
and picked up Gonzalez, defendant, and Miller from defendant’s 
                                               
 
4  
Amor Gonzalez and Eloy Gonzalez are unrelated.  For ease 
of reference, Amor Gonzalez will be referred to by her first name, 
and Eloy Gonzalez by his last name. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
apartment.  Espinoza stopped to pick up an additional 
passenger, but that person was not home.  She then went to her 
apartment complex in Tustin, across the street from the Santa 
Ana Zoo, to pick up a sweater and some CDs.  Espinoza parked 
in the zoo parking lot, then went into her home at around 8:45 
p.m. to retrieve the items for which she had stopped, and to page 
a friend.  Once Espinoza left the car, defendant and Miller also 
got out of the car and walked across the street.  When Espinoza 
returned to the car, the three men — defendant, Miller, and 
Gonzalez — were gone.   
 
At around 8:00 p.m., Matthew Stukkie and Jesse Muro 
were walking down Main Street in Tustin, headed away from 
Stukkie’s house, which was located approximately two blocks 
from the Santa Ana Zoo.  As Stukkie and Muro walked past the 
zoo, they saw Espinoza’s car parked across the street in the zoo’s 
parking lot.  Muro noticed “a couple people” with shaved heads 
near the car, and he pointed them out to Stukkie because he 
“didn’t want [any] trouble.”  Stukkie noted one of the men was 
tall and slender, while another was stockier and wore a red, 
Pendleton-style shirt.  Immediately after noticing the men, “a 
couple guys” approached Stukkie and Muro, held “guns to [their] 
heads, . . . and told [them], ‘don’t look back; don’t look at our 
face.’ ”   
 
The man who held a gun to Stukkie’s head repeatedly 
asked Stukkie for money, and Stukkie told him he had none.  
The gunman took Stukkie’s bracelet and pager.  Stukkie 
realized that there were three men behind him at some point, 
although a gun was pointed at the back of his head and he was 
unable to fully view the men.  Stukkie then heard a gunshot and 
a scream.  Prior to hearing these sounds, Stukkie had only been 
able to hear the man who held the gun to his head, and he had 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
lost sight of Muro.  Immediately after hearing the gunshot, the 
gunman told Stukkie to lay on the ground, keep his head down, 
and not look back or Stukkie would be shot.  After lying on the 
ground for a few minutes, Stukkie got up and went over to Muro.  
Stukkie told Muro to get up and, when Muro did not respond, 
Stukkie realized Muro had been shot.    
 
Police arrived a few minutes after Muro was shot.  Stukkie 
flagged down Tustin Police Officer Robert Wright, the first 
responder to the scene, and directed him toward Muro, who was 
lying face down on the sidewalk with a pool of blood coming from 
his head.  Muro was breathing when Officer Wright first arrived, 
and he was transported to the hospital.  He died there shortly 
afterwards from the two gunshot wounds to his head.   
 
Shortly before 9:00 p.m. that same night, Simon Cruz 
returned to his apartment complex on Main Street in Tustin, 
across the street from the zoo.  As Cruz entered the complex, a 
man walked up behind Cruz, pointed a black gun at the back of 
Cruz’s head, and told Cruz to give him “the money.”  He told 
Cruz to remove his watch, searched his pockets, and took his 
wallet.  A second man walked up to the gunman and told Cruz’s 
assailant, in Spanish, that they needed to leave.  The two men 
began walking away and Cruz followed, asking that they take 
the money from his wallet but leave the wallet itself because it 
contained important paperwork.  The gunman turned to Cruz, 
warning him to “ ‘go back or I will shoot you.’ ”   
 
Cruz tried to report the theft to the apartment complex’s 
manager, who told him to call the police.  Before doing so, Cruz 
decided to search the complex to see if his assailants had 
discarded his wallet while fleeing.  During his search, Cruz saw 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
a body on the ground near the apartment complex’s exit, with 
paramedics and police already on the scene.   
 
Cruz later described the gunman to the police as a 
Spanish-speaking male between the age of 18 and 20, who was 
approximately six feet tall, and thin, wearing a red Pendleton-
style shirt and bandana.   
 
 
On April 1, 1999, Alexei Sandoval, who lived with his wife 
at the Park Place Apartments on Main Street, was watching 
television when he heard two gunshots, about three seconds 
apart, at around 8:40 or 8:50 p.m.  Amor also heard two gunshots 
in rapid succession, and she heard a scream.   
 
Shortly before the gunshots had sounded, Espinoza 
returned to the car and was waiting with Amor for Gonzalez, 
Miller, and defendant to return.  After the gunshots sounded, 
Gonzalez and Miller ran back across the street and got into the 
car.  Espinoza remembered Gonzalez and Miller acted in an 
excited fashion.  Amor testified that Gonzalez and Miller 
“sounded like they were in a hurry and . . . serious.”  Espinoza 
heard Miller say something to the effect that he saw “his brains 
come out of his head.”   
 
Although defendant had not returned to the car with 
Gonzalez and Miller, Amor saw defendant standing near a motel 
shortly after Espinoza drove out of the parking lot and down Elk 
Lane.  Defendant rushed over to the car and got in.  Amor 
recalled Miller and Gonzalez mutter, “ ‘fucking Peewee,’ ” and 
Espinoza heard the two men yelling at defendant, saying they 
“should kick his ass for this,” that he would “regret it for the rest 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
of his life,” and “he was going to get taxed for” it.5  Espinoza 
overheard defendant explain that one of the reasons he shot 
Muro was that Muro was getting up.   
 
Espinoza drove to defendant’s apartment and dropped him 
off.  Espinoza, Gonzalez, Miller, and Amor then rented a room 
at a Motel 6 in Stanton, and consumed drugs and alcohol 
together.   
c.  Investigation and Arrests 
 
Just after midnight on April 2, 1999, Orange County 
Deputy Sheriff Christopher Cejka was patrolling the parking lot 
of the Motel 6 in Stanton, where he had previously made 
numerous stolen vehicle and narcotics-related arrests.  Deputy 
Cejka saw Espinoza, Amor, and Miller sitting inside a grey 
Nissan Maxima and Gonzalez standing outside of it.  Deputy 
Cejka asked Gonzalez what the four were doing, and Gonzalez 
responded that they were motel guests and were planning to get 
something to eat.  Deputy Cejka “noticed some . . . beer bottles 
sitting around.  [He] asked [Gonzalez] about that.  [Gonzalez] 
said that he and Miller had been drinking a beer in the room 
earlier.”  This prompted Deputy Cejka to call for backup, 
conduct patdowns of Gonzalez and Miller, and search the car.6     
 
During the search, Deputy Cejka found the wallet that 
had been stolen from Cruz under the front passenger seat.  He 
                                               
 
5 
Espinoza explained that “to get taxed” meant that 
defendant was “going to get his ass kicked.” 
 
6  
Although Espinoza asserted to Deputy Cejka in the Motel 
6 parking lot that the Maxima belonged to her brother, and she 
consented to the deputy’s search of the car, Amor testified that 
she and Espinoza knew the car was stolen. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
also searched Miller, finding a key to a room at the Motel 6.  
Deputy Cejka’s search of Gonzalez revealed $950 in cash.  
Tustin Police Officer Jeff Blair searched Gonzalez, finding the 
bracelet stolen from Matthew Stukkie in Gonzalez’s pants 
pocket.  A search of room 133 at the Motel 6 revealed defendant’s 
driver’s license and Amor’s phone book.  The phone book 
appeared to have gang style writing on it.  On the back of the 
book was written the name “Scrappy,” coperpetrator Gonzalez’s 
moniker, along with the date of Muro’s murder:  April 1, 1999.   
 
Police interviewed Amor and Espinoza in the early 
morning hours of April 2, 1999, and Espinoza told them about 
picking up defendant, Miller, and Gonzalez the day before.  
Ultimately, Espinoza brought the police to defendant’s home.7  
Detective Donnie Kennedy testified that the Tustin Police 
Department determined that defendant was on probation8 and 
subject to a search condition.  Later that morning, Detective 
Kennedy and other law enforcement personnel went to 
defendant’s home to conduct a search, found defendant lying on 
                                               
 
7  
Amor and Espinoza were interviewed again about a year 
later, on May 9, 2000 and April 4, 2000, respectively.  Both had 
been charged with murder and robbery, but became the primary 
witnesses against defendant through plea bargains.  Amor 
ultimately pleaded guilty to two charges of robbery, and was 
released from juvenile custody after truthfully testifying, 
consistent with her agreement.  Espinoza pleaded to a time-
served sentence for two counts of robbery in exchange for her 
testimony.    
8  
Defendant’s probation arose from an unrelated 1998 case 
in which defendant pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors, 
possession of a deadly weapon (§ 12020, subd. (a), reduced 
according to the People’s § 17, subd. (b) motion) and possession 
of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, 
subd. (b)).   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
a pullout couch in the living room, and recovered a gun from 
under a chair cushion in the living room.  A further term of 
defendant’s probation prohibited him from possessing a firearm.  
Also found in defendant’s home were depictions of gang-related 
graffiti, specifically referencing Southside — the gang to which 
Miller, Gonzalez, and defendant belonged, according to Officer 
Blair’s testimony — along with defendant’s and coperpetrator’s 
monikers.  A search of Miller’s home revealed further evidence 
of gang participation, including an image of a Southside roster 
listing Gonzalez, Miller, and defendant’s monikers.  
 
Bullets and shell casings recovered from the scene of 
Muro’s murder were matched to the .380-caliber Lorcin semi-
automatic, magazine-fed pistol with a missing safety, which was 
found in defendant’s home.  The autopsy report revealed that 
Muro suffered two gunshots to his head, one potentially and the 
other certainly lethal.  Police also lifted a palm print from the 
trunk of a Nissan Sentra parked near where Muro was shot, 
which was later matched to defendant.  The parties stipulated 
that the wallet belonging to Muro was found in some bushes 
near the Santa Ana Zoo along Elk Lane, near where defendant 
returned to the car with Amor, Espinoza, Miller, and Gonzalez.  
 
 
2. Defense Case 
a. March 30, 1999 
 
Hugo Vargas, defendant’s older brother, testified that on 
March 30, 1999, he attended his grandmother’s birthday party 
at his mother’s apartment, where defendant also lived.  
Defendant was present at the party when Hugo arrived about 
6:00 p.m.  Defendant, known to his family as “Eddie” and “Lalo,” 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
but not “Peewee,” stayed for the entire party.  When Hugo left 
around 9:00 p.m., defendant was sitting on the couch watching 
television.  
 
Defendant’s sister, Nylda Anaya, testified that she lived 
in the apartment next to her mother’s.  On March 30, 1999, she 
attended her grandmother’s birthday party with her children, 
staying from about 6:00 p.m. until about 9:00 p.m.  Defendant 
was at the party the entire time she was there and remained in 
his mother’s apartment after Anaya left.  Defendant’s mother, 
Nilda Quintana, testified that she, her mother, and defendant 
remained in the apartment after the gathering ended at around 
9:00 p.m. on March 30.  Quintana went to bed around 10:30 p.m.; 
defendant was sitting on the living room couch watching 
television.   
b. April 1, 1999 — April 2, 1999 
 
When Quintana returned home from work at 3:30 p.m. on 
April 1, 1999, defendant was at their apartment with Miller and 
Gonzalez.  Quintana went to her bedroom and closed the door to 
watch videos privately because she did not like Gonzalez.  She 
left her room to make herself dinner around 7:00 or 7:30 p.m., 
noting that defendant was still home but his friends had, by 
then, left the apartment.  Quintana returned to her room to 
watch television, leaving her bedroom door open.  Quintana 
could not see defendant from her bedroom, but she was able to 
hear him talking on the telephone.  Around 8:30 p.m., she heard 
the front door open and assumed it was defendant leaving.  
About 15 minutes later, she heard the front door again, and 
assumed it was defendant returning home.  At 10:00 p.m., she 
left her room to go to the kitchen and saw defendant standing 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
on the patio smoking a cigarette.  She joined him on the patio, 
and they talked for 15 or 20 minutes.    
 
Around 4:30 a.m., Quintana woke up and saw a light on in 
the living room.  Defendant was cleaning his shoes, and he told 
her he was getting ready for an appointment the next day at 
Target.  When she left the house to go to work at 7:00 a.m., 
defendant was sleeping.   
 
Guadalupe Tinoco, defendant’s neighbor, testified that she 
saw defendant in the apartment complex on April 1, 1999 
around 5:30 p.m. and again four hours later, when defendant 
was on his patio talking on the telephone.  
 
Defendant’s girlfriend, Mireida Hermosa, met defendant 
days before his arrest, on March 28, 1999.  Hermosa testified 
that the two were contemplating marriage at the time of his 
trial.  Defendant and Hermosa met at a Carl’s Jr. restaurant 
where they exchanged phone numbers.  She and defendant 
spoke on the phone for hours every evening after that.  On April 
1, Hermosa had a series of phone calls with defendant beginning 
around 7:00 p.m.  The first conversation lasted for about an 
hour; the second conversation occurred 20 to 30 minutes after 
the first and also lasted for about one hour; and the third phone 
call spanned several hours, with the couple concluding their 
conversation at 3:30 a.m.  Hermosa believed defendant was 
drinking throughout the night because his speech became more 
slurred during each conversation.   
 
 
Robert Phillips testified that on April 1, 1999, he was 
living and working at the Park Place apartments.  Around 5:30 
to 6:00 p.m., he observed a group of three Hispanic men standing 
by the front gate of the apartment complex, one of whom was 
wearing a red plaid flannel shirt and a red bandana.  He later 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
identified defendant from a photographic lineup, but was unable 
to definitively identify anyone else, although he noted one other 
photograph was reminiscent of one of the men he saw that day.   
 
Nannie Marshall, the Park Place apartment complex 
manager, testified that she also encountered a group of three 
men in the early evening hours of April 1, including a man in a 
red flannel shirt and bandana.  As she tried to leave the 
apartment complex’s parking lot around 6:00 p.m., the men 
stood in the driveway blocking her exit, eventually moving to let 
her pass.  She was gone for approximately 30 minutes.  When 
she returned to the apartment complex, one of the residents, 
Cruz, informed her he had just been robbed by a man who placed 
a red bandana across his face and demanded his wallet.  She 
advised Cruz to call the police and, as she was doing so, heard 
two gunshots “very close together.”  Marshall, Cruz, and other 
apartment residents ran to the front of the building; Marshall 
saw someone lying on the ground, and she spoke to the police 
shortly thereafter.   
 
Officer Charles Celano spoke with witness Santiago 
Martinez, who was driving near the Park Place apartment 
complex looking for a parking spot on April 1, when he saw four 
men involved in a fight.  Martinez identified two of the men as 
Stukkie and Muro, although he acknowledged he was not paying 
significant attention to the fight as he wished to leave the area 
as quickly as possible out of fear for his family’s safety.     
 
Marlon Aguirre owned the Nissan Sentra from which 
police recovered defendant’s palm print.  The Sentra was 
impounded on April 1, 1999; Aguirre had no recollection of 
when, prior to that date, the car had been washed.     
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
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Detective Michael Lamoureux seized several items of 
clothing from defendant’s home on April 2, 1999.  Detective 
Lamoureux showed the seized clothing, including black pants, a 
white shirt, a blue jacket, and a black jacket, to Stukkie, who 
was unable to identify any of the items as having been worn by 
his assailant.   
 
Dr. Scott Fraser, a neurologist and expert in eyewitness 
identification, testified about the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, enumerating several reasons why an eyewitness 
identification might be incorrect.   
 
Michelle Stevens, a forensic scientist for the Orange 
County Coroner’s Office, testified about defendant’s level of 
intoxication around the time of the murder and his possible 
impairment.   
 
David Carpenter, a private investigator hired by the 
defense, testified about the distance between defendant’s home 
and the site of the Baek and Kim robbery, as well as the site of 
the WorldNet Pager store.  Carpenter testified that the Baek 
and Kim robbery site was less than a minute from defendant’s 
home, and that it could have taken defendant about 12 minutes 
to reach the WorldNet Pager store after returning home from 
that robbery and remaining inside his home for about two 
minutes.   
 
On October 27, 1999, Baek participated in a live lineup at 
the Orange County jail, observed by defendant’s former defense 
attorney Donald Rubright.  Rubright testified that defendant 
was in the third position in the lineup and Baek, who had been 
instructed to be silent, “said audibly so that everyone in the 
room could hear ‘maybe number 3.’ ”  Baek was told not to 
audibly comment and was given a form to indicate whether he 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
could make an identification from the lineup.  As the form was 
being taken from Baek, Rubright heard him say, “ ‘maybe.’ ”  
Rubright noted that Baek failed to positively identify any 
suspect on the form he was given, but in the comment section of 
the form Baek had written, “ ‘maybe number 3,’ and he put a 
dash ‘younger’ and then a question mark.”  Finally, as Baek was 
walking out, Rubright heard him ask, “ ‘Did I pick the right guy,’ 
” to which no negative response was given.   
3. Rebuttal 
 
Sergeant Tarpley testified that he spoke with defendant’s 
mother on April 2, 1999 and asked her about her son’s 
whereabouts between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. the night before.  She 
told him she did not know, because defendant had been “in and 
out of the house throughout the evening.”  She also told him that 
defendant had been with Gonzalez and Miller on the night of 
April 1, 1999.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Case 
 
Jesse Muro’s family described the impact of his death on 
them.  Three of Muro’s cousins and his father testified about his 
life and his connection to the family. 
 
Leticia Orosco, Muro’s cousin and godmother, testified she 
was close to Muro and thought of him as a younger brother.  
Muro had been very close to her children and he had “a special 
bond with animals.”  Orosco described the tragedy of losing 
Muro two weeks before his 18th birthday, testifying that the 
family held Muro’s birthday celebration despite his death.  
Orosco testified that she learned of Muro’s death, had to tell her 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
mother, and rushed to the hospital “too late.”  The holidays — 
particularly Easter and Muro’s birthday — are difficult for the 
family, but Orosco said they “cope” by going “to his tombstone.  
That is all we have left.”   
 
Gloria Cervantes testified that Muro was the “baby cousin 
of the family” and they got along well, enjoying a humor-filled 
relationship.  Muro was “just fun loving, a big kid,” who loved 
Cervantes’s two children, and had a fondness for baseball.  
Cervantes thinks of Muro daily, particularly about the manner 
of his death, and she most misses “his smile, his goofiness.”   
 
Arturo Jimenez, Muro’s cousin, also testified.  Because 
Jimenez did not have a younger brother and Muro lacked an 
older brother, the two “formed this big brother, little brother 
relationship, and that is how [they] referred to each other.”  
Jimenez, along with Muro’s father, coached Muro’s little league 
team, Muro and Jimenez went on hikes and dirt bike rides in 
the desert, and Muro assisted with Jimenez’s photography work.  
Jimenez testified that finding out Muro had died “was almost 
like [an] ethereal situation.”  He explained that he and family 
members learned of Muro’s death, drove to the hospital, met 
with a bereavement counselor, and prayed.  Jimenez testified 
about the impact Muro’s death had on him, and his difficulty 
coping with it.  Finally, he described the “terrific kid” Muro had 
been, echoing his cousin’s testimony that Muro was an animal 
lover and good with children.   
 
Finally, Muro’s father, Jesse Muro, Sr., testified about the 
impact his son’s death had on him, explaining what it was like 
when police came to his door to tell him his son had been shot 
and later, at the hospital, when he was told to “sit down” because 
his “ ‘son didn’t [make] it.’ ”  Muro, Sr., testified he “went a little 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
bit crazy like anybody would” in that moment.  He had to call 
his relatives to tell them that his son was dead, and he had to 
identify his son, which “was probably one of the hardest things 
[he] ever had to do in [his] lifetime.”  Muro, Sr., testified that 
“they took [him] away from the family, and then they showed 
[him] the picture of his [son’s] face, and it was full of blood.  They 
asked [him] if this was my son, and [he] told them yes, it is.”  
Muro, Sr., described the many people that came to his house to 
pray for his son, explaining that there is always at least one 
candle burning for him.  Muro, Sr., testified that he often goes 
to the cemetery to lay flowers at his son’s gravesite, and prays 
there before work almost daily.  Muro, Sr., was deeply affected 
by his son’s death, in part because, after his son’s death, he 
continued to go every morning to the local 7-Eleven near where 
his son was murdered, and he saw “there is still . . . paint where 
they painted to cover the blood.  And [he] can’t help [having to 
pass the location] because [he] live[s] around there.  Every[]time 
[he] pass[es he] tell[s] him, ‘Rest in peace, my son.  May the Lord 
be with you in Heaven.’ ”   
2. Defense Case 
 
Quintana testified defendant was the youngest of her five 
children.  Defendant’s parents divorced when he was young and 
Quintana moved with four of her children to the United States, 
with her eldest son remaining in Mexico.  Quintana moved in 
with her mother, Bertha Barocios, with whom defendant was 
still living at the time of his arrest.   
 
Defendant was a “pretty good” student in elementary and 
junior high school.  In high school, he began to get in trouble and 
use marijuana; his grades became “flaky,” and he was 
suspended.  After changing high schools three times due to 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
various moves, suspensions, and expulsions, defendant was 
referred to continuation school, where he completed the units for 
12th grade, but never received a high school diploma.   
 
In 1995, defendant’s family tried to convince him to visit 
his father in Mexico; defendant refused to take the trip and ran 
away from home for several days.  Defendant again refused to 
visit his father in 1997, a trip his mother thought would be 
helpful to “straighten[ him] out,” which she thought was 
necessary due to his poor attitude toward her and the inferences 
she drew from his preference for wearing baggy clothing.  
Despite her concerns, she testified that defendant consistently 
treated children and his elders with respect.   
 
Cesar Vargas, one of defendant’s brothers, testified that 
their father had been strict with all of the children, but was most 
lenient with defendant.  Although Cesar’s contact with 
defendant was limited after he moved out of Quintana’s home in 
the early 1990’s, he recalls both from the time he lived with 
defendant and from the time after he moved that defendant was 
respectful and courteous toward others.   
 
Hugo Vargas, another of defendant’s brothers, testified 
that he visited his mother weekly and saw defendant during 
those visits.  Although defendant “had a little change in his 
attitude” between the ages of 13 and 15, and failed to listen to 
his mother, Hugo “intervene[d] in a good, positive way” to 
remind his brother “to kind of follow our values that we had with 
our father like respect the house and everything.”  His 
intervention was successful; other than wearing baggy clothing, 
Hugo noted no change of behavior later in defendant’s teen 
years, around age 18 or 19.  Hugo testified that defendant was 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
not disrespectful, and was particularly respectful toward his 
elders and good with children.   
 
Nylda Anaya, defendant’s sister, testified that defendant 
was a playful child who earned good grades in school.  Anaya 
recalled that defendant was babied and given special privileges 
because he was the youngest child in the family.  Anaya moved 
out of their mother’s house in 1991; between 1991 and 1994 she 
saw defendant regularly and his behavior was good.  She moved 
out of state for a year and when she moved next door to her 
mother’s apartment upon her return to California in 1996, the 
only changes she noted in her brother were his “shaved head” 
and “baggy clothes, too big for him.”  Between 1996 and 1999, 
defendant spent much of his free time drinking and hanging out 
with friends; he did not have a steady job.  Since his arrest, 
defendant had expressed sorrow and become more religious.   
 
Chris Miller, Matthew Miller’s father, testified that 
defendant worked on two or three jobs as a “helper” on Chris’s 
paint crew, and that between 1988 and 1997 defendant was a 
courteous young man.9  In 1995, Chris noticed Miller and 
defendant began wearing baggy clothing and cut their hair 
short, which he thought could lead to “some trouble,” and he 
warned them they could be “involved in . . . a drive-by or 
something just because of the way they looked.”  Just before 
Christmas 1998, Chris noticed Miller and defendant both had a 
“harder edge”; they were more serious and not as “happy-go-
lucky.”   
                                               
 
9  
Because we refer to Matthew Miller by his last name, 
Chris Miller will be referred to using his first name, to avoid 
confusion. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
 
Mark Kent, defendant’s youth pastor, testified he saw 
defendant, at most, twice monthly between 1991 and 1993.  
During that time, defendant was a respectful young man who 
did not have issues with authority.  The last time Kent saw 
defendant was in 1995.  Although Kent did not notice a change 
in defendant’s demeanor, Kent observed a change in defendant’s 
appearance:  He had a shaved head and was wearing baggy 
clothing.   
 
Dr. Ted Greenzang, a psychiatrist, testified for the defense 
after reviewing defendant’s history and interviewing defendant 
and his family.  In Dr. Greenzang’s opinion, defendant was an 
“at risk youth.”  He based this opinion on numerous factors, 
including defendant’s family’s low socioeconomic status.  Dr. 
Greenzang also found relevant the fact that defendant’s mother 
had an intrauterine device implanted to prevent pregnancy 
when she became pregnant with defendant, which he inferred 
meant that defendant “was the product of an unplanned, 
unwanted pregnancy.”  Other factors included “separation of the 
family, breakup of the home, [and] lack of male role models.”  Dr. 
Greenzang characterized defendant as an “underachiever” of 
“low-average” intelligence.  Finally, defendant’s self-esteem 
issues, impulsivity, heavy drinking, daily use of marijuana, and 
use of amphetamines and cocaine brought about, in Dr. 
Greenzang’s opinion, some paranoia, irritability, and impaired 
judgment.   
 
Dr. Ines Colison, a forensic toxicologist charged with 
looking for drugs in biological samples, testified that defendant’s 
blood sample — taken on April 2, 1999, at 11:50 a.m. — 
contained 
a 
nearly 
undetectable 
amount 
of 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
methamphetamine.10  Defendant’s blood was negative for 
opiates, cocaine, and barbiturates.   
 
Defense Investigator David Carpenter testified he met 
with defendant 15 to 20 times in face-to-face meetings.  Prior to 
his conviction, defendant expressed remorse on multiple 
occasions.  On February 15, 2000, defendant asked Carpenter, 
unsolicited, if he could speak to the Muros.  Defendant wanted 
to communicate with the Muros “off the record” because “he 
wanted to convey to them that he was sorry that they lost a 
family member. . . .  That he felt very badly for what they were 
going through.”  Carpenter explained it was unlikely defendant 
would be granted permission to speak with the Muro family.  
Defendant told Carpenter he hoped the family would forgive 
him; he tried to say something else but began crying and could 
not finish his thought.  Carpenter attempted to provide 
defendant with as much privacy as the small visiting space 
allowed, ultimately suggesting that defendant write a letter to 
the Muro family, which he did.   
II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Motion to Suppress Evidence  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless 
probation search of his home on April 2, 1999.  He argues the 
                                               
 
10  
The concentration of methamphetamine in defendant’s 
blood was 33 nanograms per milliliter.  The cutoff for detection 
is 
25 
nanograms 
per 
milliliter; 
any 
amount 
of 
methamphetamine 
below 
that 
amount 
is 
considered 
undetectable.  The half-life of methamphetamine is between 
seven and 15 hours, rendering it impossible to determine 
precisely when defendant ingested the drug.   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
search was improper, because he did not provide a valid waiver 
of his Fourth Amendment rights when he was placed on 
probation.  We conclude the condition of probation was valid, 
rendering the warrantless search constitutionally permissible.  
1. Background 
 
On April 2, 1999, before traveling to defendant’s home 
intending to conduct a search, Detective Lamoureux reviewed a 
court order indicating defendant was on probation and subject 
to a search condition.  Then, at around 8:30 a.m., he and other 
officers conducted a warrantless probation search of defendant’s 
home.  Detective Lamoureux knocked on defendant’s slightly 
ajar door.  From his vantage point outside the house, Detective 
Lamoureux could see defendant laying on a fold-out couch; 
Lamoureux then saw defendant’s hand begin moving.  After 
waiting 20-30 seconds, the detective entered defendant’s 
apartment, then “climbed up on to the bed . . . and secured 
[defendant’s] 
hands 
because 
of . . . suspicion 
[detectives] . . . hadn’t recovered [a firearm] yet.”     
 
Detective Kennedy entered defendant’s home after 
Detective Lamoureux, placed handcuffs on defendant, and 
formally arrested him; he then asked defendant if he was on 
probation and subject to a search condition.  Defendant 
answered those questions affirmatively.  Detectives searched 
defendant’s home and seized two firearms, both found in a chair 
near the bed:  a Lorcin semiautomatic and an AK-47.  Although 
the AK-47 was alleged not to have been used in connection with 
the crimes in this case, the Lorcin was purportedly used in the 
Muro homicide, and bullet casings matching that weapon were 
found at the scene of the Muro shooting. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
 
In a motion under section 1538.5, filed in the trial court, 
defendant sought to suppress the firearms seized from his 
residence, arguing that the search was invalid because it arose 
from a defective condition of probation.  In his motion to 
suppress, defendant asserted that he did not “read or receive[] a 
copy of his summary probation order,” and he urged the trial 
court to find the search condition invalid because he did not sign 
the disposition/minute order placing him on probation and 
subjecting him to a search condition.   
 
The trial court rejected this argument, stating that “before 
there is a plea, . . . defendants know what they are pleading to 
and what the consequences of the plea are going to be.  And the 
judge made those findings, and then goes through the conditions 
of probation, specifically spelling out the search and seizure 
condition.  And there is no objection by either counsel or your 
defendant, so there is no — [defendant] was aware of and agreed 
to voluntarily because of the disposition reached in that case to 
accept the search and seizure condition.”  The court suggested 
defendant “could get on the stand and say, ‘I wasn’t there, and 
nobody told me [I would be subject to a search condition],’ but 
we don’t have that evidence.”  Defense counsel acknowledged his 
understanding, and the court replied, “I know you understand 
that.  But you are not going to submit your client to perjury.  I 
understand that. . . .  It is clear that there was a valid order and 
a waiver.”  The motion to suppress was denied.   
2. Discussion 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects “ ‘[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures’ by police officers 
and other government officials.”  (People v. Robles (2000) 23 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
Cal.4th 789, 794, quoting U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)  The crux of 
Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 
reasonable, constitutionally protected expectation of privacy:  “a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.  
[Citations.]  [¶]  ‘[P]rivate residences are places in which the 
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental 
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is 
plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.’ ”  
(People v. Robles, supra, at p. 795, quoting United States v. Karo 
(1984) 468 U.S. 705, 714.)   
 
A search without a warrant is unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, unless it fits in one of a few narrow 
exceptions allowing for warrantless searches.    (People v. 
Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916.)  One such exception is a 
valid probation condition authorizing warrantless searches.  
(People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 795; see also People v. 
Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 506.)  In exchange for avoiding 
service of a prison term, a probationer may consent to future 
warrantless searches.  (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 
675.)   
 
Defendant argues, as he did at the trial court, that the 
probation search condition here was invalid because it was not 
furnished to him in writing as he alleges was required under 
section 1203.12,11 and there was no direct evidence presented at 
                                               
 
11 
Section 1203.12 provides, “The probation officer shall 
furnish to each person who has been released on probation, and 
committed to his care, a written statement of the terms and 
conditions of his probation unless such a statement has been 
furnished by the court, and shall report to the court, or judge, 
releasing such person on probation, any violation or breach of 
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
the suppression hearing — whether through the sentencing 
transcript or witness testimony — that he knowingly, freely, 
and voluntarily consented to warrantless searches when agreed 
to be placed on probation.  Defendant’s argument lacks merit.   
 
The trial court’s process of analyzing a motion to suppress, 
we have explained, calls for a three-step inquiry:  The trial court 
“ ‘find[s] the historical facts, select[s] the rule of law, and 
appl[ies] it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as 
applied has been violated.’ ”  (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 99, 145.)  We review de novo a trial court’s resolution 
of the legal questions resolved in a suppression motion, and we 
review the trial court’s resolution of factual issues under the 
more deferential substantial evidence standard.  (Ibid.)  We are 
concerned with the propriety of “the trial court’s ruling itself, not 
the correctness of the trial court’s reasons for reaching its 
decision.”  (Ibid.)   
 
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
determination that when defendant was placed on probation he 
freely, 
voluntarily, 
and 
knowingly 
waived 
his 
Fourth 
Amendment rights as a condition of probation.  The clerk’s 
minutes indicate that defendant had been advised of his plea’s 
consequences.  To wit, he was “ordered to SUBMIT your 
PERSON and PROPERTY including any residence, premises, 
                                               
 
the terms and conditions imposed by such court on the person 
placed in his care.”  By its terms, section 1203.12 addresses only 
formal probation; defendant was placed on informal probation, 
and it is not clear that section 1203.12 applies.  We note also 
that the rights conferred under section 1203.12 are “statutory; 
not of constitutional dimension.”  (Freytas v. Superior Court 
(1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 958, 962.)  That is, even were we to find a 
statutory violation — and we do not — defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights may not be implicated. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
container, or vehicle under your control to SEARCH and 
SEIZURE at anytime [sic] of the day or night by a police or 
probation officer with or without a warrant or probable cause.”  
The trial court was able to consider the clerk’s minutes in 
evaluating defendant’s suppression motion because they were 
attached as an exhibit to the district attorney’s opposition to the 
motion.  Defense counsel acknowledged as much when 
conceding before the trial court that the “clerk’s minutes 
indicate[d] maybe there might have been some communication” 
to defendant concerning the search condition.   
 
Defendant now argues that it is improper to conflate 
defendant’s change of plea proceedings with his grant of 
probation proceedings.  Defendant contends that the plea 
agreement did not address his sentence; it simply indicated the 
possible consequences of a guilty plea.  Thereafter, a probation 
recommendation with a search condition was made, which does 
not, in defendant’s view, evince defendant’s knowledge or 
consent of the probation condition.  Defendant’s argument is 
unpersuasive.  The clerk’s minutes reflect that defendant 
“underst[ood] the nature of the charge(s) against him[],” 
“WITHDR[E]W[] [HIS]  PLEA OF NOT GUILTY . . . AND 
ENTER[ED] A PLEA OF GUILTY,” was “placed on INFORMAL 
PROBATION for a period of 3 YEAR(S),” and a had a search 
condition imposed — all during the same proceedings.  To the 
extent defendant contends the forms imposing a probation 
condition are distinct from those evincing a change of plea, that 
is certainly true.  But that distinction is without difference as to 
the propriety of the suppression motion.  Indeed, the proceeding 
during which defendant changed his plea and accepted a search 
condition were one and the same.   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
 
While it does not appear the trial court gave significant 
weight to the clerk’s minutes, we need not agree with the trial 
court’s reasoning to find its ruling proper.  (People v. Letner and 
Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 145.)  The trial court concluded 
that a plea cannot be taken without certain advisals, including 
one regarding imposition of a search condition, which it 
presumed was provided here.  The court explained, “the history 
and practice of the courts” is to ensure defendants understand 
the nature of a plea so they “know what they are pleading to and 
what the consequences of the plea are going to be.”  The court 
added that, after advising a defendant regarding the nature of 
the plea, they would be apprised of “the conditions of probation, 
specifically spelling out the search and seizure condition.”  The 
trial court ruled that there was “no question in this court’s mind 
that [defendant] was aware of and agreed to voluntarily . . . 
accept the search and seizure condition.”   
 
Taking into account the totality of this record, we find the 
trial court’s ruling proper.  (See People v. Letner and Tobin, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 145 [considering “correctness of the trial 
court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial court’s 
reasons for reaching its decision”].)  In addition to the clerk’s 
minutes indicating the court advised defendant of the 
consequences of his plea, defendant told officers he was subject 
to a probation search condition when they entered his home.  His 
acknowledgment of the condition to officers suggested he 
understood the advisals applied.  The clerk’s minutes and 
defendant’s acknowledgment belie his assertion that he was not 
furnished with or did not sign the disposition/minute order.  
Defendant was also invited to present evidence that ordinary 
advisements were not provided, and he declined to do so.  We 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
conclude the trial court committed no error denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress. 
B.  Denial of Motion to Sever the Capital Charges  
Defendant contends the trial court’s denial of his motion 
to sever the capital charges stemming from the Muro robbery 
and murder, the Stukkie robbery, and the firearm possession 
(counts 1, 2, 3, and 5) from his remaining charges constituted an 
abuse of discretion under state law and violated his federal 
constitutional right to due process and his right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment.  We conclude this claim lacks 
merit:  No abuse of discretion occurred at the time the trial court 
denied the motion, nor did joinder of the charges result in gross 
unfairness. 
1. Background 
 
 
Before trial, defendant moved to sever the Muro, Stukkie, 
and firearm charges — which made him eligible for a sentence 
of death — from the remaining charges.  In his severance 
motion, he argued the types of charges were not distinctive 
enough to be cross-admissible as to identity,12 the murder 
charge was likely to inflame the passions of the jury, and joinder 
would bolster the weaker charges.  The prosecution opposed the 
motion, arguing that the evidence was cross-admissible to show 
identity, common plan or scheme, that the murder occurred 
during a robbery, and that the crimes were committed in 
furtherance of gang activities.  The prosecution further argued 
                                               
 
12  
The remaining charges defendant sought to sever were the 
Cruz robbery (count 4), two counts of active participation in a 
criminal street gang (counts 7 and 12), the Hill robbery (count 
8), the Wilson robbery (count 9), the Baek robbery (count 10), 
and the Kim robbery (count 11).   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
that none of the charges were weak and that there was not a 
substantial likelihood of prejudice.  At the hearing on the 
motion, the court indicated it did not “know how in good 
conscious [sic] [it] could sever” the Muro, Stukkie, and firearm 
counts from the remaining charges, but provided defense 
counsel an opportunity to argue the motion; defense counsel 
declined, submitting on the moving papers alone.  The court 
denied severance, explaining that the capital and noncapital 
charges were essentially the same type.  Defense counsel 
inquired whether the denial was without prejudice, and the 
court confirmed all severance denials were without prejudice.   
2. Discussion 
 
Because consolidating or joining actions is efficient, there 
is a preference to do so.  (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
944, 967 (O’Malley).)  As we explained in O’Malley, section 954 
furthers this efficiency goal by permitting different types of 
offenses to be charged in the same pleading if they are “ 
‘connected together in their commission’ ” or if they are “ ‘the 
same class of crimes or offenses.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting § 954.)  Here, 
as in O’Malley, the “murder[, robberies,] and the related charges 
. . . are of the same class, because they are all ‘ “assaultive crimes 
against the person.” ’ ”  (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 967.)  
The charges would therefore be properly joined unless the 
defense could have made such a “ ‘ “clear showing of potential 
prejudice” ’ ” that denying the severance motion would have 
constituted an abuse of discretion.  (Id. at p. 968.)  That did not 
occur in this case. 
 
We review a trial court’s denial of a severance motion for 
abuse of discretion based on the record before it at the time of 
that denial.  (People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 456; 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 968.)  We assess four factors; 
first, we consider “whether evidence of the crimes to be jointly 
tried is cross-admissible.”  (O’Malley, supra, at p. 968.)  Second, 
we address whether the charges are especially inflammatory.  
Third, we consider whether a weak case has been joined to a 
strong one “so that the spillover effect of aggregate evidence 
might alter the outcome of some or all of the charges.”  (Ibid.)  
Finally, we consider whether joinder renders the case capital 
when it would not otherwise have been.  (Ibid.)  If the evidence 
of any of the charged offenses would be “ ‘cross-admissible’ ” in 
hypothetical separate trials of any of the other charges, that is 
enough “standing alone, to dispel any prejudice and justify a 
trial court’s refusal to sever the charged offenses.”  (Alcala v. 
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1221.)   
 
Here, in its opposition to the severance motion, the 
prosecution argued the evidence was cross-admissible to show 
common plan or scheme, identity, and that the crimes were 
committed in furtherance of the criminal street gang.  
“ ‘ “[O]ther crimes” evidence is admissible under Evidence Code 
section 1101, subdivision (b) “when offered as evidence of a 
defendant’s motive, common scheme or plan, preparation, 
intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident in 
the charged crimes.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘In this inquiry, the degree of 
similarity of criminal acts is often a key factor, and “there exists 
a continuum concerning the degree of similarity required for 
cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which 
introduction of the evidence is sought:  ‘The least degree of 
similarity . . . is required in order to prove intent . . . .’  . . . By 
contrast, a higher degree of similarity is required to prove 
common design or plan, and the highest degree of similarity is 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
required to prove identity.” ’ ”  (People v. Erskine (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 279, 295 (Erksine).)   
 
Here, a series of armed robberies took place.  This gave 
rise to seven charged robbery offenses, two of which defendant 
sought to sever from the remaining five.  The prosecution argued 
against this parsing of offenses, reasoning that all four robberies 
took place in the same geographic area, occurred over just three 
days, and involved the same three perpetrators threatening 
their victims with firearms.  Evidence concerning defendant’s 
gang affiliation was admissible across charges to prove both the 
gang enhancements and active participation counts.  As the 
Attorney General points out, the offenses shared additional 
similar characteristics, including defendant approaching a 
victim, brandishing a black gun, and demanding money.   
 
Defendant argues these similarities are not sufficiently 
specific to demonstrate identity — the purpose under Evidence 
Code section 1101, subdivision (b) demanding “ ‘the highest 
degree of similarity’ ” between criminal acts — and the evidence 
is thus not cross-admissible.  (Erksine, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 
295.)  He argues that none of the evidence to which the 
prosecution refers is unique to this set of crimes, claiming his 
were 
“typical 
armed 
robberies” 
lacking 
“distinctive 
characteristics to prove that anyone other than [defendant] 
could have committed them.”     
 
Although we are inclined to conclude that the 
characteristics of the offenses are sufficiently similar to find that 
the evidence would be cross-admissible even for identity (see 
Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221), those 
similarities would certainly be cross-admissible on the issues of 
common plan or design and of intent.  (People v. Daveggio and 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 827.)  As we have explained, “ 
‘[t]he least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and 
the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent.’  
[Citation.]  Evidence is admissible for these purposes if there is 
‘sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant committed 
both sets of acts, and sufficient similarities to demonstrate that 
in each instance the perpetrator acted with the same intent or 
motive.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In order to demonstrate the existence of a 
common design or plan, the prosecutor must show that “ ‘the 
common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather 
than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus 
revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.’ ”  (Id. at p. 828, 
quoting People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403 (Ewoldt).)  
 
The same three assailants — defendant, Miller, and 
Gonzalez — were involved in four robberies.  In both the Baek 
and Hill robberies, defendant pointed a gun at his victims and 
stole their wallets.  Cruz and Stukkie were similarly robbed at 
gunpoint, with weapons held to the backs of their heads.  
Finally, the crimes were temporally and physically proximate.  
The similarities between the four robberies — that they 
occurred at gunpoint by the same assailants in physically 
proximate areas within the span of a few days — “provided a 
sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that defendant[] acted 
with the same criminal intent or motive, rather than by 
‘ “accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other 
innocent mental state.” ’ ”  (People v. Daveggio and Michaud, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 827.)   
 
Likewise, this evidence is enough to support the jury’s 
conclusion that defendant was pursuing a common plan or 
scheme.  As we described in Ewoldt, “evidence that the 
defendant has committed uncharged criminal acts that are 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
similar to the charged offense may be relevant if these acts 
demonstrate circumstantially that the defendant committed the 
charged offense pursuant to the same design or plan he or she 
used in committing the uncharged acts.”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 403.)  Defendant’s robbery charges arose from acts 
occurring before the Muro crime but followed a substantially 
similar design:  defendant approached victims, brandished a 
black gun, and asked them to give him money.  Defendant’s 
assertion that the similarities shared by the offenses is not 
sufficient fails because, “[u]nlike evidence of uncharged acts 
used to prove identity,” the common design or plan alleged “need 
not be unusual or distinctive; it need only exist to support the 
inference that the defendant employed that plan in committing 
the charged offense.”  (Ibid.)   
 
Even if we conclude that the trial court was well within its 
discretion in denying severance pretrial, we must also discern 
“ ‘whether events after the court’s ruling demonstrate that 
joinder actually resulted in “gross unfairness” amounting to a 
denial of defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due 
process of law.’ ”  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 129.)  
Whether joinder worked a gross unfairness turns upon 
assessing whether it was “reasonably probable that the jury was 
influenced by the joinder in its verdict of guilt.”  (Id. at p. 130.)  
Here, “strong evidence warranting conviction” supported all the 
charges — the Muro murder and robbery offenses, the four 
charged robbery offenses that defendant conceded were 
supported by strong evidence, and the remaining firearm and 
gang offenses.  (Ibid.)  Defendant argues it was beyond the 
bounds of reason for the court to have denied his severance 
motion, and ultimately for the jury to have convicted him on 
these joined charges, but that is simply not the case.  This 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
argument lacks any meaningful support:  Defendant fails to 
articulate a basis demonstrating how joinder was so unfair as to 
violate his federal constitutional rights, and we find none.   
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Claims of Insufficient Evidence 
 
Defendant claims insufficient evidence supports his 
convictions of active participation in a criminal street gang, his 
robbery of Simon Cruz, and his personal discharge of a firearm.  
Each of these contentions lacks merit.   
 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence for a jury finding, we review the entire record in the 
light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court.  We 
evaluate whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable 
and credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, 
permitting the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 323–324.)  “ ‘The 
standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution 
relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 324.)   
 
We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
convictions and enhancements using the same standard, 
presuming “ ‘every fact in support of the judgment the trier of 
fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.’ ” (People 
v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 331.)   If the finder of fact’s 
determination is supported, whether the prosecutor relied upon 
direct or circumstantial evidence, we have held that reversal is 
not warranted, even where “ ‘the circumstances might also 
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
1. Evidence of Active Gang Participation  
a. Gang Evidence Presented at Trial  
 
Tustin Police Officer Jeff Blair, “Tustin’s first and only 
gang investigator” at the time, presented expert testimony that 
Miller, Gonzalez, and defendant were all members of the 
Southside gang, a criminal street gang.  Officer Blair worked on 
over 500 gang cases and had had contact with over 1,000 gang 
members.  Officer Blair was familiar with a number of gang 
tattoos, which he noted were seen less frequently than in years 
past because they may be evidence of gang membership when 
viewed by a jury.  Officer Blair testified that a tattoo depicting 
three dots meaning “my crazy life” was typical of gang 
membership.  Defendant had a tattoo of three dots on his hand. 
 
Officer Blair testified that criminal street gangs 
habitually maintained rosters regarding membership, and a 
name would not be listed on a roster if the individual was not a 
member of a gang.  Blair testified that an image of a gang roster 
found at Miller’s home listed Miller, Gonzalez, and defendant13 
as members of the Southside gang.   
                                               
 
13  
Defendant’s name was listed on the roster using the 
moniker “Peewee,” spelled with the letter P, followed by an x 
intended to signify a period, and then the letters w-e-e.  
Evidence was presented indicating defendant used this 
nickname; for instance, in a drawing seized from defendant’s 
home depicting gang signs with the words “brown pride 
Mexicano” written across it and showing a character wearing a 
stocking cap, sunglasses, and a revolver pointed at the viewer, 
the nickname written on the trigger guard of the weapon was 
“Mr. Pewee [sic].”   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
b. Discussion 
 
Section 186.22, subdivision (a) states in relevant part:  
“Any person who actively participates in any criminal street 
gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or have 
engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully 
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct 
by members of that gang, shall be punished.”  Section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1), the so-called “gang enhancement,” provides 
in pertinent part, “any person who is convicted of a felony 
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and 
consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or 
attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be 
punished.” 
 
The statutory enhancement is applicable to “ ‘any person’ 
convicted of a number of enumerated felonies, including 
murder” and being a felon in possession of a firearm, provided 
certain conditions are present.  (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 331; § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)   The crime must be “(1) 
‘committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
with any criminal street gang,’ and (2) ‘with the specific intent 
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members.’ ”  (Rivera, at p. 331.)   If a gang-related crime is 
committed for the particular purpose of helping members of the 
gang, the enhancement is applicable, although we have 
cautioned that “ ‘[n]ot every crime committed by gang members 
is related to a gang.’ ”  (Ibid.)   
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
37 
  
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence he 
was an “active participant” in a criminal street gang rather 
than, simply, associated with gang members.  Specifically, 
defendant argues he had no history of documented gang 
affiliation.  He claims to have been devoid of any personal 
knowledge of information exclusive to a gang member, nor did 
he possess tattoos linking him to a gang.  Moreover, he claims 
the drawings of gang graffiti found in his and Miller’s homes and 
in the Motel 6 room suggested only that he was an aspiring gang 
member.  Defendant’s argument misses the point.  Our review 
tests whether the evidence was sufficient, not whether 
hypothetical 
evidence 
would 
have 
strengthened 
the 
prosecution’s case.  We conclude it was.  As with all sufficiency 
claims, “ ‘[w]e presume every fact in support of the judgment’ ” 
that can be “ ‘reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]  
If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s 
findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply 
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled 
with a contrary finding.’ ”  (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 331.) 
 
Defendant argues that no evidence was presented at trial 
indicating he had prior gang affiliation.  He also conveys that 
Amor and Espinoza — both Southside gang members — testified 
that defendant was from “nowhere,” meaning he had no gang 
affiliation.  But concluding defendant was unaffiliated with a 
gang was not the only possible interpretation of the evidence 
presented at trial; indeed, ample additional evidence was 
presented showing, or permitting a finder of fact to infer, that 
defendant (1) actively participated in the Southside gang, (2) 
was aware that its members — including Miller and Gonzalez 
— “engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,” and (3) 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
38 
promoted the felonious conduct of its members.  Officer Blair 
testified that defendant’s name appeared on a roster of 
Southside gang members.  (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 331.)  Quintana, defendant’s mother, testified that defendant 
and Miller, another Southside gang member, had been friends 
since 1987.  While in custody awaiting trial, defendant wrote 
three letters to Miller containing language and slang used by 
gang members.  Quintana also testified that defendant and 
Gonzalez had been acquainted for some time.  Miller and 
Gonzalez were both known to be Southside gang members.   
   
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
demonstrate that he was an active gang participant, as required 
by section 186.22, and he argued the statute does not penalize 
“a person’s fantasies of being part of a criminal underworld.”  We 
conclude sufficient evidence existed for a factfinder to find 
defendant’s involvement extended beyond the realm of fantasy.  
A factfinder could surmise that defendant, Miller, and Gonzalez 
engaged in a pattern of criminal activity together; indeed, all 
three were present when Baek’s stolen credit cards were used at 
WorldNet Pager.  All three participated in the robbery of Hill 
and attempted robbery of Wilson, and all three were also present 
during the robbery of Stukkie and the robbery and murder of 
Muro.  Officer Blair testified that gang members regularly 
commit crimes together to provide each other with “backup.”  
The robberies in this case, he explained, were committed for the 
benefit of, i.e., to promote the felonious conduct of, the Southside 
gang.  He also testified that the robberies would have financially 
benefitted the Southside gang, permitting its members to 
purchase alcohol, drugs, and motel rooms.  He also opined that 
the robberies would have enhanced the gang’s reputation as 
dangerous by instilling fear in community members.  
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
39 
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, this 
evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to have concluded 
that defendant was an active participant in the Southside gang.   
c. Request to Reconsider Castenada 
 
In addition to arguing that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury’s verdict, defendant contends that our 
holding in People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743 
(Castenada), in which we concluded that the phrase “active 
participation” used in section 186.22 was not unconstitutionally 
vague, should be reconsidered.  Defendant argues the statute is 
unconstitutional and violates principles of due process because 
it fails to define what constitutes “active participation,” and 
Castenada, while upholding the statute, does not sufficiently 
clarify what is considered “active participation.”  (Castenada, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 746–747.)  Defendant argues he was 
harmed by the statute’s vagueness because his association with 
Miller and Gonzalez, along with drawings found in his 
possession, permitted his conviction under section 186.22 when 
he and individuals like him would not otherwise have been on 
notice that such activities would have constituted active 
participation.  Defendant also contends the statute permits 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  He claims, by way of 
example, that police possess the power to stop any vehicle 
because it contains an individual wearing a red or blue bandana 
— transforming that person into a suspected gang member, 
even if the purpose for wearing such a bandana is as innocuous 
as gym-going or performing outdoor activities, rather than 
membership in the Crips or Bloods gangs — simply by justifying 
the stop under the auspices of presumed active participation 
under section 186.22.   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
40 
 
Defendant’s arguments were considered and rejected in 
Castenada, with the exception of the gang member traffic stop 
hypothetical, and he presents us with no reason to reconsider 
our holding here.  Indeed, in People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 
47, relying on Castenada, we reaffirmed that section 186.22 is 
not facially ambiguous, which the defendants there conceded.  
(Albillar, at p. 55.)  We held that section 186.22’s plain language 
“targets felonious criminal conduct, not felonious gang-related 
conduct.”  (Albillar, at p. 55.)  Here, defendant was not convicted 
simply because he possessed some drawings and knew gang 
members.  He participated in multiple felonious criminal 
enterprises with gang members, communicated from prison to 
gang members, was listed on a gang roster, and had a gang 
tattoo.  Section 186.22 places defendant, and those similarly 
situated, on notice regarding what conduct is prohibited, raising 
no due process concerns, and we need not reconsider our holding 
in Castenada concluding the same.  (Castenada, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at pp. 746–747.) 
2.  Evidence of Defendant’s Involvement in the Robbery 
of Simon Cruz 
 
Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence 
presented at trial for the jury to convict him of the robbery of 
Simon Cruz.  He argues that Cruz did not identify him, and that 
two other witnesses, Robert Phillips and Nannie Marshall, 
described another individual in the area at the time of the 
robbery, as the more likely perpetrator.  We conclude, for the 
reasons that follow, that defendant’s claim lacks merit. 
 
As noted above, we review the record in the light most 
favorable to the judgment, evaluating “ ‘ “ ‘ “whether it discloses 
. . . evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value[,] 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
41 
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Rivera, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 323.)  Defendant complains the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of robbery because Cruz did not 
identify defendant as the assailant, the clothing seized from 
defendant’s apartment did not match the clothing Cruz 
described his assailant as having worn, no photo array was 
conducted, and Cruz did not identify defendant or indicate 
defendant looked like his assailant.   
 
Defendant’s argument does not persuade us.  What 
defendant manufactures is essentially a list of evidence that 
would buttress the prosecution’s case.  To treat this as 
dispositive would be to ignore the full range of evidence the jury 
actually considered.  Here, although Cruz did not identify 
defendant as the assailant, Cruz did convey that there were two 
of them, both Hispanic males between the ages of 18 and 20 
years old.  Cruz also testified that one of his assailants wore a 
red, Pendleton-style shirt, which is consistent with Stukkie’s 
description of one of the assailants on the night of Muro’s 
murder.  Cruz’s description of the offense was similar to the 
evidence adduced concerning each of the robberies with which 
defendant was charged:  namely, that an assailant approached 
brandishing a black firearm and demanding money.     
 
Jurors were also able to credit Amor’s testimony that 
around the time Cruz was robbed, defendant and Miller exited 
her vehicle, which was parked at the Santa Ana Zoo across the 
street from the apartment complex where Cruz lived, and they 
walked toward Cruz’s apartment building.  She told police she 
observed defendant and Miller return a short while later 
carrying a wallet.  About four hours after that, the vehicle was 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
42 
searched, and Cruz’s wallet was recovered from under the 
driver’s seat.   
 
Viewing all of this evidence in the light most favorable to 
the judgment, see People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pages 
323–324, it supports the jury’s finding that defendant, perhaps 
along with Miller, entered the apartment complex, robbed Cruz, 
and returned to the car with his wallet.  We cannot, as a matter 
of law, say that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict 
defendant of this crime.   
3. Evidence Defendant Personally Discharged a 
Firearm 
 
Defendant claims insufficient evidence supported the 
jury’s findings that he personally discharged a firearm within 
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d)14 in the Muro 
robbery and murder.  We disagree.     
 
We review the record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment, evaluating “ ‘ “ ‘ “whether it discloses . . . evidence 
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value[,] such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 323.)  “ ‘We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
an enhancement using the same standard we apply to a 
conviction.’ ”  (Id. at p. 331.)   
                                               
 
14  
Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) states in relevant part:  
“any person who, in the commission of a felony specified in 
subdivision (a), Section 246, or subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 
26100 [murder is enumerated in subdivision (a)], personally and 
intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great 
bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, or death, to any 
person other than an accomplice, shall be punished . . . .” 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
43 
 
Defendant argues the jury’s true finding is not supported 
by sufficient evidence because Stukkie failed to identify him as 
the shooter and failed to identify his clothing.  He also argues 
that Espinoza’s and Amor’s testimony is unreliable because they 
were biased in favor of the prosecution.  Finally, he argues that 
a latent palm print found on the trunk of a nearby car does not 
suggest he was the shooter because the print might not have 
been fresh.  None of these arguments are meritorious.  Once 
again, defendant has merely pointed to other theoretical 
evidence that would have made the prosecution’s case stronger, 
and to inferences (that Espinoza and Amor lied and the palm 
print could have been old) that the jury could have, but was not 
compelled, to draw.  This does not establish a valid insufficiency 
of the evidence claim. 
 
To the contrary:  Ample evidence was presented placing 
defendant at the scene of the shooting and pointing to him as 
the shooter.  Espinoza and Amor, whom the jury could have 
believed despite defendant’s claim of bias, testified that 
defendant was in the area where Muro was shot around the time 
he was shot.  Defendant’s location, and Espinoza’s and Amor’s 
testimony regarding his location, was corroborated by the 
presence of defendant’s palm print on a car parked near where 
Muro was murdered, and the jury could have rejected the notion 
that defendant had somehow put his hand on that car at some 
earlier time.  Espinoza also testified that, after the shooting 
occurred, Gonzalez and Miller ran back to Espinoza’s car 
without defendant, shouting “let’s go; let’s go; start the car.”  The 
group then left the parking lot and picked up defendant on the 
east side of Elk Lane next to the Santa Ana Zoo fence, with 
Gonzalez and Miller yelling “fucking Peewee; fucking Peewee” 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
44 
while hitting the backs of the seats in front of them.  When police 
searched that area the next day, they found Muro’s wallet.   
 
Once defendant was in the car, Gonzalez and Miller told 
defendant he would “regret it for the rest of his life,” he was 
“going to get taxed for that,” and that they “should kick his ass 
for this.”  While in the car, defendant told the group he shot 
Muro because Muro “was going to fight back,” “he got up,” and 
“he came back at” defendant.  Defendant was arrested the next 
morning, and the firearm used in the Muro shooting was found 
in his apartment.   
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
evidence described above is sufficient for a jury to have 
concluded defendant personally discharged a firearm during 
Muro’s robbery and murder.   
B.  Asserted Instructional Errors  
 
Defendant mounts numerous challenges to the trial 
court’s guilt phase instructions.  We assume for the sake of 
argument that all claims are cognizable to the extent 
defendant’s substantial rights could have been affected.  
(§ 1259.)  Regardless, they are without merit. 
1.  Failure to Give Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction  
Defendant contends the trial court reversibly erred by 
failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter, the lesser included offense of murder, because 
there existed sufficient evidence that he committed the homicide 
in the heat of passion.  This claim lacks merit.  
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
45 
a.  Background 
 
Martinez purportedly witnessed an altercation on April 1, 
1999, that resulted in Muro’s death:  As he slowly drove past his 
apartment complex, he saw four people struggling, although 
several parked cars partially blocked his view.  Martinez could 
not see the faces of the people engaged in the fight, and he was 
only able to tell they wore loose clothing.  As he continued to 
drive down the street, Martinez noticed a fifth person cross the 
street and walk toward the fight.  Martinez drove away from the 
fight to a store, from which he called the police to report the 
incident.  While at the store, he could no longer see the fight and 
he did not hear any gunshots.  When he returned to the scene of 
the fight, Martinez saw someone lying on the ground, and he 
believed that person to be one of the people who had been 
involved in the fight.   
The court held a colloquy with the parties regarding jury 
instructions on theories of murder, during which the parties 
agreed the jury should be instructed — and it was — on murder 
(CALJIC No. 8.10), first degree premeditated murder (CALJIC 
No. 8.20), first degree felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21), second 
degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 17.10, 8.30, 8.31), and robbery-
murder special circumstances (CALJIC No. 8.81.17).  The court 
asked defense counsel whether he had “any theory at all . . . for 
a manslaughter” instruction.  The court added, “I couldn’t think 
of any.  I looked back through some cases.  I couldn’t find any.  
You can’t either?”  Defendant’s attorney replied, “No.”  No 
manslaughter instruction was given. 
b.  Discussion  
 
Defendant claims that because substantial evidence 
supported an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
46 
voluntary manslaughter, the trial court erred by failing to 
provide that instruction to the jury sua sponte.  A trial court 
must instruct a jury on lesser included offenses when the 
evidence raises questions regarding whether every element of a 
charged offense is present.  (People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 446, 477.)  No instruction on lesser included offenses 
is required if there is no evidence that there was any offense less 
than that charged.  Instructing the jury on a lesser included 
offense is not required when the evidence supporting such an 
instruction is weak, but “ ‘ “whenever evidence that the 
defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is ‘substantial 
enough to merit consideration’ by the jury,” ’ ” such an 
instruction is required.  (Ibid.)  Whether the evidence is 
substantial is tested by considering whether a jury would 
conclude the lesser but not the greater offense was committed.  
(Ibid.) 
 
Voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of 
murder, is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice.  (§ 192; see People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 
465 [acknowledging the judicially developed theory not 
enumerated in § 192 that “manslaughter is a killing which, 
though criminal, lacks the murder element of malice”].)  
Manslaughter instructions are warranted when substantial 
evidence exists to support a jury’s determination that the killing 
was committed in the heat of passion and thus does not 
constitute a first degree murder.  (See People v. Smith (2018) 
4 Cal.5th 1134, 1164–1167.)  
 
“Heat of passion is a mental state that precludes the 
formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from 
murder to manslaughter.”  (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
935, 942.)  Heat of passion killing is distinct from malice murder 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
47 
because thought in some form is necessary “to form either an 
intent to kill or a conscious disregard for human life.”  (Ibid.)  A 
heat of passion killing, we have explained, is one caused by an 
unconsidered reaction to provocation rather than the result of 
rational thought.  If reason “ ‘ “was obscured or disturbed by 
passion” ’ ” to so great a degree that an ordinary person would “ 
‘ “act rashly and without deliberation and reflection,” ’ ” we have 
concluded that killing arose from “ ‘ “passion rather than from 
judgment.” ’ ” (Ibid.)   
 
Defendant argues substantial evidence existed to 
demonstrate that he killed in the heat of passion, requiring that 
the court give a voluntary manslaughter instruction.  Defendant 
claims that Martinez’s observation of a “struggl[e]” between, 
presumably, defendant and the victim, sufficed to demonstrate 
that passion.  This contention falls short of the mark.  Martinez 
was unable to see more than outlines of individuals involved in 
the fight; he testified that several parked cars blocked his view 
of the altercation.  Martinez had no information regarding what 
precipitated the struggle, who might have been the aggressor, 
or how violent the altercation became.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Enraca 
(2012) 
53 Cal.4th 
735, 760 
[“[p]redictable 
and 
reasonable conduct by a victim resisting felonious assault is not 
sufficient provocation to merit an instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter”].)  Martinez’s scant evidence regarding the 
struggle would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that 
defendant acted under the influence of a strong passion 
inflamed by the victim, nor that this was the sort of fight that 
would lead an ordinary person to act rashly and without 
deliberation and reflection, and from a heat of passion rather 
from judgment.  Accordingly, defendant’s claim that the trial 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
48 
court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter is without merit.   
2.  Constitutionality of CALJIC No. 2.51  
 
Defendant reiterates two often repeated challenges to 
CALJIC No. 2.51 regarding evidence of motive:15  that the 
instruction permitted the jury to determine guilt based on 
motive alone in violation of due process, and that it 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense to prove 
innocence.  To the extent defendant’s challenges to CALJIC No. 
2.51 are not forfeited for failing to object to the instruction or 
request it be modified, there was no error.  “This court has 
previously rejected the argument that it is necessary to instruct 
the jury that motive alone is insufficient to establish guilt.”  
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 711.)  Likewise, “as 
we have in the past,” we reject the argument that “CALJIC No. 
2.51 lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof.”  (People v. Tate 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 699.) 
3.  Failure to Give a Unanimity Instruction on Theory 
of First Degree Murder  
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that “it had to agree unanimously whether [he] 
committed malice murder or felony-murder.”  He acknowledges 
the many decisions of this court rejecting the claim and urges us 
                                               
 
15  
The trial court instructed the jury that “[m]otive is not an 
element of the crimes charged and need not be shown.  However, 
you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in 
this case.  Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt.  
Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence.  You will 
therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the 
weight to which you find it to be entitled.”   
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
49 
to reconsider them, but he provides no basis to do so.  As we 
explained in People v. Sattiewhite, the two types of murder at 
issue in that case — premeditated murder and felony murder — 
were not different crimes but were instead alternate 
mechanisms of determining liability.  (People v. Sattiewhite, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 479; see also People v. Milan (1973) 9 
Cal.3d 185, 194–195.)  In People v. Milan, we noted a similar 
rule had been applied in burglary cases with respect to the 
underlying felonious theory of entry (see People v. Failla (1966) 
64 Cal.2d 560, 569) and theft cases with respect to the type of 
taking, whether by false pretenses, larceny by trick, 
embezzlement, or otherwise (see People v. Nor Woods (1951) 37 
Cal.2d 584, 586).  We adhere to our previously expressed view.  
“[A]s long as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant is guilty of murder as that offense is defined by 
statute, it need not decide unanimously by which theory he is 
guilty.”  (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918; see 
also People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1048.)       
IV.  PENALTY PHASE AND SENTENCING ISSUES 
A. Instructional Error Pertaining to CALJIC No. 
8.85  
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 8.85, the standard 
instruction 
identifying 
the 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
circumstances, is “constitutionally flawed.”  The defect, 
according to defendant, is that the instruction’s “prefatory” use 
of the phrase “whether or not” in conjunction with certain 
factors caused the jury confusion as to which factors were 
aggravating, mitigating, or either — depending on the jury’s 
view of the evidence.  That is, the instruction’s language 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
50 
permitted the jury to consider factors in mitigation as 
aggravating.     
As defendant acknowledges, “ ‘[t]he trial court had no 
obligation to advise the jury which sentencing factors were 
aggravating, which were mitigating, or which could be either 
aggravating or mitigating depending on the jury’s appraisal of 
the evidence.’  [Citation.]  ‘The phrase “whether or not” in section 
190.3, factors (d)–(h) and (j) does not unconstitutionally suggest 
that the absence of a mitigating factor is to be considered as an 
aggravating circumstance.’ ”  (People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 
318, 354.)  We decline to reconsider this precedent.   
B. Claimed Violation of the Vienna Convention 
 
When law enforcement officials questioned Vargas, they 
failed to inform him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate 
and failed to notify the consulate of his arrest until after the jury 
returned a death verdict.  As a result, defendant claims, law 
enforcement officials violated his rights under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Vienna Convention).  After the verdict, 
defendant unsuccessfully moved for a new trial.  Defendant 
conceded during oral argument that a showing of prejudice is 
required to prevail on a Vienna Convention claim, and he 
asserts he suffered prejudice.16  We conclude defendant suffered 
                                               
 
16  
Defendant argued initially that prejudice could not be 
determined on the appellate record and raised the issue to 
preserve it for habeas corpus review.  (See People v. Mendoza 
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 917; People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
686, 710.)  The Attorney General argued defendant would be 
barred from habeas corpus relief because he had an opportunity 
to present evidence before the trial court that he suffered 
prejudice due to a violation of the Vienna Convention when he 
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
51 
no prejudice, and although law enforcement officials involved in 
questioning Vargas technically violated the Vienna Convention, 
reversal is not warranted. 
1. Background 
  
 
Before he was sentenced, defendant filed a motion for new 
trial, claiming he was denied due process of law when law 
enforcement officials failed to follow the Vienna Convention and 
notify consular officials of his arrest.  Mexican consular officials 
did not become aware of defendant’s case until after defendant 
was convicted and the jury recommended a death sentence.  
Defendant argues that had the Mexican consulate been notified 
of his arrest, a consular official would have advised him, 
consistent with Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
(Miranda), to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to silence.  
Instead, defendant spoke with police.  Although he did not 
incriminate himself, he claims to have made statements he 
alleges were factually inconsistent with evidence adduced at 
trial.  Had he remained silent, defendant argues, he would have 
felt more free to testify at his trial.  But because his statements 
to police contained self-described factual inconsistencies, any 
testimony he might have given would have been subject to 
impeachment.   
 
In support of his motion for new trial, defendant presented 
evidence that he was a Mexican national, and presented 
testimony 
from 
two 
witnesses 
regarding 
the 
benefits 
                                               
 
filed a motion for new trial.  The trial court denied that motion, 
however, finding a violation of the Vienna Convention occurred, 
but that defendant suffered no prejudice.  The matter has now 
been fully briefed for appellate consideration. 
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
52 
preconviction consular assistance might have provided to him.17  
Defendant argued that he was not notified upon arrest of his 
right to speak with a consular official.  Indeed, no consular 
official ever contacted defendant, although, as defense counsel 
argued, “almost 12 hours after [defendant] was arrested, an 
Immigration and Naturalization Service official showed up . . . 
to see whether or not he was deportable.”  After determining 
defendant was a “lawful, permanent resident,” Diane Booker, 
the immigration agent who interviewed defendant, advised him 
of his rights to counsel and consular services in connection with 
his immigration proceedings.  Booker testified that she did not 
routinely record whether consular services were requested by 
arrestees, and that Mexico’s consulate was not one Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) officials were under an 
obligation to contact.   
 
The prosecution maintained that defendant made no offer 
of proof regarding what specific evidence would have been 
presented in the guilt or penalty phases had consular assistance 
been provided.  Despite the “technical violation” of the Vienna 
Convention, the prosecutor argued defendant would not have 
sought consular assistance because he did not contact an 
attorney even after he was advised by the I.N.S. to do so.   
                                               
 
17  
Specifically, defendant relied on the testimony of Sandra 
Babcock, an attorney enlisted by the Mexican government to 
assist defendant, who testified that she was the director of a 
legal assistance program for Mexican nationals facing the death 
penalty.  Babcock suggested that defendant retain the services 
of a bilingual mental health expert.  That expert, Dr. Ricardo 
Weinstein, also testified on defendant’s behalf, criticizing a 
great deal of the psychological and social evidence that was 
presented at trial.   
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
53 
 
After hearing argument, the court concluded that the 
notice of rights provided by the I.N.S. official — i.e., handing 
defendant “a copy of the immigration rights form” — did not 
“satisf[y] the requirements of the Vienna Convention, but it did 
put [defendant] on notice that the Mexican Consulate was 
available.”  The trial court ruled that “there was a technical 
violation of the Vienna Convention,” noting:  “There are no 
remedies set out in the Treaty.”  Sandra Babcock, a witness for 
defendant in support of his motion for new trial, urged the court 
to return defendant “to the status he was in at the time of the 
violation, meaning immediately post arrest,” a remedy that was, 
in the court’s view, “unreasonable” and “not based upon law.  [¶]  
If there is a violation of the statute, due process requires 
prejudice before any remedy should be imposed.”  The court 
ruled that it was defendant’s burden to demonstrate that 
prejudice, and because he failed to meet his burden no remedy 
was warranted. 
2. Discussion   
 
The Vienna Convention requires that law enforcement 
officers convey to arrested foreign nationals, “without delay,” 
that they have the right to have their consulate notified of their 
arrest.  (Vienna Convention, supra, art. 36, par. 1(b), at p. 101 
(Article 36); see § 834c, subd. (b).)  
Should the arrestee request consular notification, the law 
enforcement officer must promptly inform the consulate of the 
arrest.  (Article 36, at p. 101.)  These requirements of the Vienna 
Convention were enacted as state statutory law in 2000, but the 
California Legislature did not specify a remedy for their 
violation.  (§ 834c; see Comment, A Proposal for U.S. 
Implementation 
of 
the 
Vienna 
Convention’s 
Consular 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
54 
Notification Requirement (2013) 60 UCLA L.Rev. 1324, 1366.)  
Section 834c provides that any “ ‘known or suspected foreign 
national’ ” must be informed of the right to consular notification 
within two hours of arrest, booking, or detention.  (People v. Leon 
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 845 (Leon), quoting § 834c, subd. (a)(1).)  
Although defendant argues his rights under that statute were 
violated, we conclude no violation of section 834c occurred, since 
it was not effective until after defendant’s arrest. 
 
As we have in other cases, we assume here that Article 36 
of the Vienna Convention created rights enforceable by 
individuals.  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 917.)  A 
defendant is entitled to relief under the Vienna Convention if 
the defendant can show that a violation occurred, and that the 
violation resulted in prejudice.  (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 711; see also Breard v. Greene (1998) 523 U.S. 
371, 377.)  Although Article 36 “ ‘secures only a right of foreign 
nationals to have their consulate informed of their arrest or 
detention—not to have their consulate intervene, or to have law 
enforcement authorities cease their investigation pending any 
such notice or intervention’ ” (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846), 
consular notification may facilitate a defendant’s access to 
assistance, advice, and legal services.  If a defendant is unable 
to make “some showing that the violation had an effect on the 
trial,” the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that even with a 
“properly raised and proved” Vienna Convention claim, “it is 
extremely doubtful that [a] violation should result in the 
overturning of a final judgment of conviction.”  (Breard v. 
Greene, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 377.)  “ ‘In most circumstances, 
there is likely to be little connection between an Article 36 
violation and evidence or statements obtained by police.’  
(Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 548 U.S. 331, 349, [165 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
55 
L.Ed.2d 557, 126 S.Ct. 2669] (Sanchez-Llamas).)  Accordingly, 
the ‘failure to notify a suspect of his or her consular rights does 
not, in itself, render a confession inadmissible’ under Article 36.  
(People v. Enraca[, supra,] 53 Cal.4th [at p. ]756 [137 
Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 269 P.3d 543] (Enraca); see Sanchez-Llamas, 
at p. 349.)”  (Leon, supra, at p. 846.)   
 
A consular notification claim may be raised as part of a 
broader challenge to a confession’s voluntariness.  (Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 350.)  Defendant argues 
that had he received consular assistance, he would not have 
waived his right to silence under Miranda.  Yet defendant did 
not confess; he made statements to police following a Miranda 
waiver that he acknowledges were not incriminating.  He 
contends that he did not testify because those statements 
contained inconsistencies with facts developed at trial and could 
have been used for impeachment purposes.  In Leon, the 
defendant did not contend “his statements to police were 
involuntary;” but instead “assert[ed] the lack of consular notice 
is a circumstance that rendered his Miranda waiver invalid.”  
(Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846.)  We concluded the defendant’s 
argument lacked merit because he did not establish a link 
between his confession and lack of consular notice.  (Ibid.) 
 
The link between defendant’s statements to law 
enforcement and the lack of consular notice is even more 
tenuous here.  Defendant’s Article 36 claim fails for that reason.  
Defendant’s argument — that he might have testified at trial 
had a consular official advised him to remain silent when 
questioned by the police — is far too speculative given the record 
in this case.  (See Leon, at p. 846; see also Breard v. Greene, 
supra, 523 U.S. at p. 377 [speculative Vienna Convention claim 
rejected where it could not “arguably” be shown that the treaty’s 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
56 
“violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of 
conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect 
on the trial”].)  Defendant made no incriminating statements 
but 
argues 
his 
“uncounseled” 
“misstatements” 
to 
law 
enforcement rendered testifying an impossibility.  That is, he 
claims that while the consular notification failure did not cause 
him to waive his Miranda rights, the notification failure 
nonetheless left him unable to understand and exercise his right 
to silence.    
 
We considered and rejected this argument in Leon.  (Leon, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 846.)   In that case, the defendant argued 
that a consular official would have provided a more “ ‘full[] and 
careful[]’ ” recitation of Miranda advisements than those 
delivered by an officer and he would have been better situated 
to heed the advice of a consular official due to his “poor[] 
acculturat[ion] and inexperience[].”  (Ibid.)  The defendant in 
Leon alleged that a consular official would have advised him to 
exercise his right to silence under Miranda.  In order to find any 
resulting statement subject to suppression, we concluded in 
Leon that there must be a link between the treaty violation and 
statement made to law enforcement.  (Leon, at p. 846.)   We did 
not find the situation in Leon precluded defendant from 
exercising the right to silence or compelled his confession to law 
enforcement officials, and we likewise find no link here.  (Ibid.)  
 
Defendant also argues that, without the Vienna 
Convention violation, he would have availed himself of consular 
resources in the form of mitigation specialists and other officials 
who would have dissuaded prosecutors from seeking the death 
penalty, and he did not obtain similar assistance elsewhere.  
Specifically, defendant claims the Mexican consulate would 
have provided him with a bilingual mitigation specialist 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
57 
familiar with Mexican culture, an addiction specialist, a 
bilingual psychologist familiar with standardized testing biases, 
and a neuropsychologist.  He argues the notification failure also 
prejudicially deprived him of the financial benefit associated 
with the preparation and presentation of his defense.   
  
 
This argument fails, too.  To the extent this claim asserts 
prejudice based on material outside the record, it should be 
raised in a petition for habeas corpus, as defendant notes.  
(People v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p.  918; see People v. 
Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 710.)  To the extent the claim 
is based on evidence presented at his motion for new trial, we 
conclude the trial court did not err.  In his motion for a new trial, 
defendant presented evidence from Dr. Ricardo Weinstein, one 
of the experts that attorney-witness Babcock had recommended.  
Weinstein testified that defendant’s family was dysfunctional, 
that defendant suffered a history of trauma, and that defendant 
was addicted to drugs and alcohol; Weinstein also opined that 
the disparity between defendant’s verbal and performance 
ability, as well as his cultural background, rendered the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory an invalid test.  
Defendant argues that this evidence would have been available 
had the consulate been notified, because the consulate would 
have provided him with a host of trial specialists.   
 
Even without consular assistance, defendant managed to 
present a great deal of evidence during the guilt and penalty 
phases of his trial.  (See ante, at pp. 9-13, 15-19.)  Much of this 
evidence concerned topics Weinstein proposed to raise, 
including defendant’s drug and alcohol dependency and his 
family dysfunction.  Defendant argues it is “highly likely the 
outcome of [his] trial would have been different” had consular 
assistance been available because of “Mexico’s unequaled track 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
58 
record in defending its nationals.”  In particular, defendant 
explains that the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program 
experienced a great deal of success in defending its clients, 
although he does not assert whether or to what extent he was 
eligible for their services.  He also fails to articulate what 
evidence, specifically, the program would have assisted him 
with developing or presenting, and how such evidence would 
have affected the outcome of his trial.  Despite defendant’s lack 
of consular assistance, he was able to present evidence in 
mitigation concerning his family history and cognitive abilities.  
Defendant is unable to demonstrate he suffered prejudice 
because he has neither shown that the Mexican consulate would 
have provided him with resources that were not otherwise 
accessible, nor that those resources would have affected the 
outcome of his trial.  (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th 
at p. 711.)   
 
Though no prejudice resulted from the consular 
notification failure here, we are mindful that “the United States 
Supreme Court has articulated several possible remedies for a 
consular notification violation.”  (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 856 
(conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  Those remedies can range from 
“mak[ing] accommodations to secure for the defendant the 
benefits of consular assistance” to suppressing a confession 
made to law enforcement in the absence of such assistance.  
(Ibid.)  Too often ignored, the nation’s Article 36 obligations 
remain enormously important.  Where courts become 
“concerned [that a] consular notification failure may be part of 
a scheme to deprive the national of any meaningful choice . . . , 
a remedy for the consular notification violation is surely 
warranted.”  (Leon, at p. 857 (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  That a 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
59 
failure of consular notification occurred here is beyond dispute, 
but on the record before us we find no prejudice resulted from it. 
C. Denial of Application to Modify the Jury’s 
Verdict  
 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his 
automatic motion to modify the jury’s death verdict and seeks 
either a reduction of his sentence to life without the possibility 
of parole or, in the alternative, remand for a new sentence 
modification hearing.  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)18  Defendant appears 
to have forfeited this claim by failing to raise it at trial (People 
v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 514); we also conclude neither 
form of relief sought is warranted. 
                                               
 
18  
In its entirety, section 190.4, subdivision (e) provides:  “In 
every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or 
finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be 
deemed to have made an application for modification of such 
verdict or finding pursuant to Subdivision 7 of Section 11.  In 
ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, 
consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and 
shall make a determination as to whether the jury’s findings and 
verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence 
presented.  The judge shall state on the record the reasons for 
his findings.  [¶]  The judge shall set forth the reasons for his 
ruling on the application and direct that they be entered on the 
Clerk’s minutes.  The denial of the modification of the death 
penalty verdict pursuant to subdivision (7) of Section 1181 shall 
be reviewed on the defendant’s automatic appeal pursuant to 
subdivision (b) of Section 1239.  The granting of the application 
shall be reviewed on the People’s appeal pursuant to paragraph 
(6).” 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
60 
1. Background 
 
Following his death sentence, defendant filed a motion 
under section 190.4, subdivision (e), seeking a reduction of his 
sentence to life without parole.  The People did not file a written 
opposition, but noted their position at the hearing on the motion 
“that the facts that the jury was presented [sic] did support the 
verdict and the recommendation of death.”  The trial court held 
a thorough hearing on the motion, explaining that the burden 
was on the court to “make findings” on the evidence, which the 
court noted it had done contemporaneously, “when the facts 
were still fresh.”  The trial court subsequently denied the 
motion, extensively reviewing and discussing the factors in 
aggravation and mitigation prior to reaching its decision.   
 
The trial court concluded that Muro’s murder was 
“senseless,” and done simply to avoid Muro’s ability to identify 
defendant.  The court found aggravating that defendant fired a 
second shot when a single shot could have accomplished his goal 
and noted that just days before the crime defendant and his 
friends were involved in multiple armed robberies.  The court 
also noted the existence of mitigating factors, including 
defendant’s age and lack of criminal background.  Throughout 
the hearing the court offered the parties an opportunity to be 
heard, although defense counsel declined on numerous 
occasions.   
 
After denying the motion and stating its findings on the 
record, the court directed that the reasons for its ruling “be 
entered on the clerk’s minutes” consistent with section 190.4, 
subdivision (e), which directive was followed in an October 11, 
2001 minute order.   
  
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
61 
2. Discussion 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in violation of 
section 190.4, subdivision (e) by not properly reweighing the 
aggravating and mitigating factors before denying the 
automatic motion under that statute, and by failing to set forth 
the reasons for its denial of the motion in the clerk’s minutes as 
the statute requires.  The record reveals the invalidity of these 
claims.   
As the statute makes clear, “the trial court must set forth 
reasons [for denying an application to modify a sentence] on the 
record and direct that they be entered in the clerk’s minutes.  
[Citation.]  On appeal, we review the trial court’s ruling 
independently, but it is not our role to redetermine the penalty 
in the first instance.”  (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 
403.)  The trial court is not required to “recount ‘every detail’ 
supporting its determination.”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1064; see People v. Landry (2016) 2 
Cal.5th 52, 124.)  “ ‘Where the record shows the trial court 
properly performed its duty under section 190.4, subdivision (e), 
to conduct an independent reweighing of the aggravating and 
mitigating evidence, the court’s ruling will be upheld.’ ”  
(Landry, at p. 124.) 
The record here demonstrates the trial court appropriately 
reweighed the mitigating and aggravating evidence.  The trial 
court discussed, at length, the various factors supporting the 
jury’s verdict.  The trial court found compelling that the Muro 
robbery and murder were “senseless,” and that defendant shot 
the victim twice when one bullet would have sufficed.  The court 
noted the presence of other aggravating factors, including the 
armed robberies defendant, Miller, and Gonzalez committed in 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
62 
the days preceding the murder.  In mitigation, the trial court 
noted defendant’s relative youth and his family background.  
The trial court also asked whether counsel wished to be heard 
as to each factor; defense counsel generally “submit[ted]” 
argument.  Defendant’s assertion that the trial court failed to 
properly reweigh the circumstances in aggravation and 
mitigation is not borne out by the record — the mere fact that 
the court gave more significant weight to certain facts it found 
aggravating than those that were mitigating does not make its 
decision improper.   
 
The record also does not support defendant’s assertion 
that the court failed to record its findings in the clerk’s record.  
The minute order, dated October 11, 2001, contains a near 
verbatim recitation of the court’s recounting of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances.  Section 190.4, subdivision (e) 
provides that “[t]he judge shall set forth the reasons for his 
ruling on the application and direct that they be entered on the 
Clerk’s minutes.”  The court did precisely this, ordering:  “The 
court’s reasons for these findings will be — or shall be entered 
on the clerk’s minutes.”  The minute order reflects that the 
findings were entered.  Defendant’s claim that “[t]he minutes 
only reiterated [the] factors in aggravation and mitigation but 
failed to state why the aggravating factors substantially 
outweighed the factors in mitigation” is derivative of the claim 
rejected above.  Accordingly, there was no error in the court’s 
denial of the motion to modify the verdict. 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
63 
V.  OTHER ISSUES 
A.  General Challenges to California’s Death Penalty 
Law  
Defendant 
raises 
several 
objections 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme.  We 
decline to reconsider our existing precedent and reject these 
objections, on the merits, as follows: 
 
The special circumstances set forth in section 190.2 that 
render a defendant eligible “for the death penalty [citation] are 
not unconstitutionally overbroad.”  (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 
Cal.4th 110, 153; see also People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 130 
[“ ‘Section 190.2 adequately narrows the category of death-
eligible defendants and is not impermissibly overbroad under 
the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution’ ”].)  Further, 
there are not so many special circumstances enumerated that 
they “fail to perform the constitutionally required narrowing 
function.”  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 469.)   
 
Allowing the jury to consider the “circumstances of the 
crime” under section 190.3, factor (a) does not result in the 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.  
(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 806.) 
 
This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the 
adjectives “extreme” and “substantial,” as they relate to factors 
in 
mitigation, 
“impose 
an 
unconstitutional 
threshold 
requirement before the jury may consider mitigating evidence.”  
(People v. Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 122.)  Likewise, the 
phrase “so substantial” in the instruction on comparing 
aggravating and mitigating factors does not yield unlimited 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
64 
discretion in the sentencing process, nor does it raise such a 
prospect of an arbitrary or capricious sentencing outcome that it 
would risk the instruction’s constitutionality.  (Id. at p. 123.) 
 
The jury’s instruction to consider whether or not some 
factors in mitigation “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ “were present did not impermissibly 
invite the jury to aggravate the sentence upon the basis of 
nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors.” ’ ” ’ ” ’ ”  (Erskine, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 304.)  The federal Constitution does not 
require that a jury be instructed on whether a section 190.3 
factor is aggravating or mitigating, or whether the factor could 
be either of those.  (Ibid.) 
 
We have not held the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to “require a jury instruction regarding the burden of proof in 
capital sentencing.”  (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 
1015.) The only burden of proof consideration made during the 
penalty phase concerns aggravating evidence under section 
190.3, factors (b) and (c), of other crimes and prior convictions, 
respectively.  Decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee do not 
alter the basis for our conclusion.  (People v. Debose (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 177, 213.) 
 
Similarly unavailing is defendant’s contention that a jury 
is required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
appropriate penalty is death, that aggravating factors outweigh 
those in mitigation, or that all aggravating factors have been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Mendez (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 680, 717.)  There is no requirement that the jury make 
written findings of aggravating and mitigating factors.  (Ibid.)  
And juries are not subject to a unanimity requirement when 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
65 
they are deciding whether a particular factor in aggravation is 
present.  (Ibid.)    
 
Nor is there support for the conclusion that existing 
international law prohibits imposition of the death penalty in 
the United States.  (People v. Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 
1017.)  When the United States signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it expressly reserved the 
right to impose capital punishment subject to certain 
constraints not applicable here.  (Ibid.)   
 
The federal and state Constitutions, and the state’s death 
penalty laws, do not require intercase proportionality review.  
(People v. Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1016–1017.) 
 
A delay between the time a defendant is sentenced and 
executed does not violate the California or federal Constitutions.  
(People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1078.) 
B.  Cumulative Prejudice 
 
Defendant contends the combined guilt and penalty phase 
errors require reversal of his conviction and death sentence, 
even if the errors are not prejudicial when considered 
individually.  We have found no error, so no prejudice can 
accumulate. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. VARGAS 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
66 
VI.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Vargas   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted   
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S101247  
Date Filed: July 13, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Orange   
Judge:  John Ryan    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Michael T. Murphy, Holly D. 
Wilkens and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Russell S. Babcock 
Law Offices of Russell S. Babcock 
1901 First Avenue, First Floor 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 531-0887 
 
Michael T. Murphy 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92186-5266 
(619) 738-9211