Title: Walker v. Campanelli

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ELMORE WALKER, JR. and  
) 
ERNESTINE WALKER, 
 
 
)  No.  78, 2004 
husband and wife,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 00C-09-146 
JOHN N. CAMPANELLI, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  August 4, 2004 
Decided:  October 12, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of October 2004, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
In this personal injury action stemming from an auto accident, 
appellant, plaintiff below, Elmore Walker appeals the jury’s finding that the 
appellee, defendant below, John Campanelli was negligent; but that his negligence 
did not proximately cause Walker’s injuries.1  Walker appeals that ruling and the 
trial judge’s evidentiary ruling refusing to admit photographs of the cars involved.  
We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to admit 
the photographs of the cars because Walker offered no expert testimony that would 
                                                 
1 The jury answered special interrogatories. 
 
2
tie the extent of damage to the car to the severity of his injuries.  The trial judge 
also denied Walker’s motion for a new trial.  Walker moved for a new trial on the 
grounds that in order to return a verdict of zero damages, the jury must have 
improperly ignored the objective findings of his medical experts.  We find that the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Walker’s motion for a new 
trial because medical evidence in the record contradicted Walker’s experts’ 
opinion based on the objective findings and the jury’s verdict was therefore not 
against the great weight of the evidence.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
The Trial Judge’s Refusal To Admit The Photographs Of The Vehicles 
 
2. 
The standard of review for evidentiary rulings on appeal is abuse of 
discretion.2  Walker argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he 
refused to admit photographs of Walker’s car.  Additionally, Walker claims the 
trial judge misconstrued Davis v. Maute3 and disregarded the admonition in Eskin 
v. Carden4 that “Davis has been misinterpreted as a bar to the admission of 
photographs without expert testimony” and that “there may be many helpful 
purposes for admitting photographs . . . where these purposes do not require 
supporting expert opinion.”5  Under a 403 analysis, it is proper to admit relevant 
                                                 
2 Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36, 38 (Del. 2001). 
3 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2000). 
4 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004). 
5 Id. at 1223. 
 
3
photographs of damaged vehicles when their probative value outweighs the risk of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or possible misleading of the jury.6    
3. 
Walker sought to introduce photographs of his damaged car in an 
attempt to link the amount of damage to his vehicle to the injuries he allegedly 
suffered as a result of the accident.  Walker argued that during cross-examination 
of the police officer that investigated the accident, the following exchange “opened 
the door” to the admission of the photographs into evidence: 
Q: 
In the scheme of things, do you consider it a relatively minor 
accident? 
 
A: 
Relatively unremarkable 
Q: 
Unremarkable.  You talked to the parties.  You had different versions 
of what happened? 
A: 
Correct. 
*** 
Q: 
I take it then from what you are telling me because it was an 
unremarkable accident, you did not make any effort to determine 
speed? 
A: 
No. 
 
Walker sought to introduce the photographs to show that the damage to his vehicle 
was not minor, but “moderate.”  Walker also argued that one of his experts had 
seen the photographs and had characterized the impact as “significant.”7  The trial 
judge refused to admit photographs because Walker offered no expert testimony 
                                                 
6  D.R.E. 403 (2004). 
7 The physician apparently formulated his opinion before seeing the pictures, as Walker’s 
attorney quoted the following testimony from the physician’s deposition, “I asked Dr. King at 
page 6 of his deposition, do you have an understanding from talking to Mr. Walker about the 
nature of the impact?  Yes.  What was your understanding?  It was a significant impact.  I 
subsequently saw pictures of his vehicle.”  Appellant’s App. Op. Br. p. 31. (emphasis added). 
 
4
that would tie the extent of damage to the car to the severity of his injuries.  
Although the photographs may have contradicted the police officer’s testimony 
that the accident was “ unremarkable,” thus leaving the jury free to infer that 
Walker’s injuries could not have been serious, admitting the photographs to rebut 
that testimony would have correspondingly created an inference that based upon 
the vehicular damage depicted the injury to Walker must have been serious.   
4. 
Walker’s purpose in offering the photographs was either to show a 
nexus between vehicle damage and his personal injuries, or to demonstrate that 
there was debris on the road at the time the accident occurred.8  However, the 
photographs would have been cumulative and unnecessary to establish road debris 
because multiple witnesses testified to that fact.  Had the photographs been 
admitted for either purpose, the trial judge would have run the risk that the jury 
might infer that the extent of Walker’s injuries could be determined from the 
damage to his vehicle.  No expert testimony supported such an inference.  
Walker’s own accident reconstruction expert was unable to provide a link between 
the photographs and severity of personal injuries.  Walker could not demonstrate 
how the photographs were relevant beyond his attempt to equate damage to 
personal injury or to contradict the police officer to show how speed may have 
                                                 
8 Walker argued that the door was opened because of the police officer’s testimony about the 
nature of the accident and Campanelli’s testimony that, as a result of the accident, the only 
damage to his vehicle was that the bumper of his vehicle had about five or six scratches.  Trial Tr. 
at 24-25, 59. 
 
5
related to causation.  The trial judge correctly decided that the risk of unfair 
prejudice or jury confusion outweighed the photographs’ probative value and the 
trial judge’s cautionary instruction to disregard the officer’s characterization of the 
accident as minor informed the jury that there was no correlation between the 
extent of damage to the vehicle and the injury to the occupant.  The trial judge, 
therefore, did not abuse his discretion when he correctly concluded that admitting 
the photographs would confuse or mislead the jury into accepting an unsupported 
inference. 
The Trial Judge’s Denial Of Walker’s Motion For A New Trial 
5. 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of  
discretion.9  A new trial is warranted only if the jury’s verdict is “clearly the result 
of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or that it was manifestly in disregard 
of the evidence or applicable rules of law.”10  Therefore, “unless the evidence 
preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable juror could not 
have reached the result,” the jury’s findings will not be disturbed. 11   
6. 
In a personal injury suit, “if a plaintiff conclusively proves an injury 
worthy of compensation resulting from the defendant’s tortious conduct, the 
                                                 
9 Storey  v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458 (Del. 1979). 
10 Young v. Fraise, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997). 
11 Amalfitano v. Baker, 794 A.2d 575 (Del. 2001). 
 
6
plaintiff is entitled to at least some amount of damages.”12  Where uncontested 
medical evidence links on injury to its proximate cause and is confirmed by 
independent objective testing, a jury award of zero damages is against the weight 
of the evidence.13  The law, however, does not compensate for every loss and the 
jury serves as the conscience of the community, sending a message to exaggerating 
and overly litigious claimants.14  In determining whether a compensable injury 
resulted from the defendant’s tortious conduct, a jury may reject an expert’s 
medical opinion when the opinion is substantially based on the subjective 
complaints of the patient.15  Further, when medical experts differ on objective 
findings, the jury is free to believe whichever expert they find to be more credible.  
“The determination of the credibility and reliability of different experts is an area 
uniquely left to the jury to decide and may not be overturned unless there is no 
reasonable basis to support that decision.”16 
7. 
At trial, Walker and Campanelli each presented two medical experts.  
Walker’s experts testified that both objective testing and subjective complaints 
confirmed that he had sustained severe, permanent injuries as a result of the 
accident.  Campanelli’s experts, however, opined that the objective testing relied 
                                                 
12 Hall v. Dorsey, No. 96C-06-045, 1998 WL 960774 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 1998).  
13 Amalfitano, 794 A.2d at 577. 
14 Hall, 1998 WL 960774 at *6 citing Furek v. Univ. of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506, 525 (Del. 
1990). 
15 Kossol v. Duffy, 765 A.2d 952 (Del. 2000). 
16  Mumford v. Paris, No. 00C-05-022WLW, 2003 WL 231611 at *4 (Del. Super Ct. Jan. 31, 
2003). 
 
7
upon by Walker’s experts did not support causation and that Walker’s subjective 
complaints alone supported residual injuries related to the accident. 
8. 
At trial, Dr. Alan J. Fink, a neurologist, and Dr. Conrad K. King Jr., a 
pain medicine specialist, testified for Walker.  Dr. King stated that Walker, as a 
result of the accident, sustained “an annual tear at his disk at C4-5, a small” central 
disk “herniation C5-6 with C5-6 radiculopathy” evidenced by an EMG and an 
MRI.  Dr. Fink opined that Walker had an abnormal EMG study that “correlated 
with the abnormal MRI findings of a herniated disk at C5-6.”17  
9. 
Dr. David Stephens, a defense expert, refuted Dr. Fink’s testimony by 
stating that the positive finding on the MRI was not “clinically relevant” because 
there was no confirmation that it resulted from an injury. 18  Moreover, Dr. 
Stephens explained that Walker did not have a herniated disk and that the “central 
disk” that he did have would not cause radicular pain.19  He contradicted Walker’s 
experts’ views on the significance of the objective test results.  He opined that the 
only objective findings were inconsistent.  He concluded that the positive finding 
on the MRI did not necessarily result from the injury, but, rather, more likely 
resulted from normal wear-and-tear. 20 
                                                 
17 Appellant’s App. Op. Br. at 25.  
18  Appellant’s App. Op. Br. at 55. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
 
8
10. 
Dr. Stephens stated that Walker had suffered a flexion/extension 
injury of his cervical spine and a lumbar strain as a result of the accident but he 
based his diagnosis solely on Walker’s subjective complaints.  His examinations of 
Walker, which occurred a year after the accident, revealed complaints of pain by 
Walker but produced no objective findings of injury.   
 
11. 
A second defense expert, Dr. John Meyers, testified that Walker 
exacerbated his pain symptoms during examination.21  Dr. Meyers also testified 
that during a second examination of Walker, he noted a “dramatic overreaction of 
pain behavior,” an “overreaction and exaggeration” by Walker, and signs of 
“possibly even malingering.”  Additionally, Dr. Meyers noted that while Walker 
was in the office, he demonstrated an “exaggerated, antalgic gait,” and complained 
of left hip pain.  However, when Dr. Meyers observed Walker after he had left the 
office, his gait was normal and his cane did not even touch the ground. 
12. 
At trial, both defense experts at least initially agreed that Walker had 
suffered some degree of injury as a result of the accident.22  When Dr. Stephens 
was questioned about the basis for his opinion, he explained that he based that 
initial opinion on the patients’ history, which, he took “at face value”.23  However, 
Dr. Stephens testified that any possible initial injury had to have completely healed 
                                                 
21  Walker was being treated for his preexisting back and neck problems for up until two months 
before the accident. 
22  Appellant’s App. Op. Br. at 56.   
23  Id. 
 
9
since he believed the objective tests did not corroborate Walker’s subjective 
complaints.      
13. 
Walker’s experts did introduce objective findings of injury which they 
causally related to the accident, but Campanelli’s experts’ testimony contradicted 
Walker’s experts’ conclusions from those findings and their relevance to the 
accident.  Although Walker urges that both defense medical experts agreed that he 
suffered some injury at the time of the crash, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that those experts based that conclusion on Walker’s subjective 
complaints.  Walker testified that immediately after the accident he was in severe 
pain and was taken to the hospital, x-rayed, and then released with instructions to 
follow up with his family doctor.24  This was not a case where uncontested medical 
evidence confirmed by objective testing causally linked the injury to the accident.25  
Here, the significance of the objective tests was hotly contested.  The trial judge 
correctly ruled that the jury could freely disregard medical opinion based on 
Walker’s subjective complaints.  Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion when he denied Walker’s motion for a new trial because Campanelli’s 
experts provided credible testimony allowing the jury to reach the reasonable 
                                                 
24 Instead of going to his family doctor, he testified that he met with his attorney two days later 
and then was seen by a physician recommended by his attorney. 
25  Cf. Amalfitano, 794 A.2d at 578 (holding that uncontradicted medical testimony based on 
objective findings requires the jury to return a minimal damages award).  
 
10
conclusion that Campanelli’s negligence did not proximately cause Walker’s 
injuries.  
 
14. 
For these reasons we conclude that the trial judge neither abused his 
discretion by denying the motion for a new trial nor by excluding the photographs.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice