Title: State v. Kinney

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Kinney (99-122); 171 Vt. 239; 762 A.2d 833 

[Filed 13-Oct-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-122

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit

Steven L. Kinney	                         December Term, 1999

Ben W. Joseph, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Lisa B. Shelkrot of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Steven Kinney was convicted by a jury on
  charges of kidnapping,  aggravated sexual assault, and lewd and lascivious
  behavior.  He was sentenced to two concurrent  terms of forty-years-to-life
  imprisonment and one concurrent term of four-to-five-years  imprisonment. 
  On appeal he argues that (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct
  the jury on  diminished capacity as a result of intoxication, (2) there was
  insufficient evidence to support the  conclusion that defendant had the
  mental state required for conviction of each crime, and (3) the trial 
  court erred in admitting expert testimony about rape trauma syndrome. 
  Defendant also appeals the  length of the sentence imposed, claiming that
  it violates his constitutional right to due process and 

 

  that the judge imposed it without statutory authority.  We affirm both the
  jury verdicts and the  sentence.

       According to the testimony presented at trial, defendant committed the
  offenses during the   night of October 9, 1998.  He began drinking with
  friends around 6:00 p.m., and according to his  testimony, consumed at
  least twelve beers during the course of the evening.  He also used,
  together  with some friends, three grams of cocaine and two "bowls" of
  marijuana.  One of his friends testified  that defendant appeared
  intoxicated.  Defendant admitted during cross-examination that "[his] 
  faculties would have been fairly clouded given the amount of coke, alcohol
  and pot [he] had  consumed over the course of the evening."  

       At some time after 1:00 a.m, defendant and three friends drove to the
  home of Lucas  Sweetser, hoping to buy some more cocaine.  When they
  arrived, defendant went into the home and  emerged a short time later,
  carrying the victim over his shoulder.  He put her in the back seat of the 
  car, and they drove away.  The testimony as to what happened inside the
  house is conflicting.   Defendant claims he found Sweetser and the victim
  asleep in bed.  The victim happened to wake up,  and they began to talk. 
  The victim said she might be able to help him find some drugs to buy.  When 
  his friends pressed him to leave, defendant picked up the victim, put her
  over his shoulder, and  carried her to the car.  According to defendant,
  the victim was giggling, and went in the car willingly. 
 
       The victim testified that she did not go with defendant willingly. 
  She testified that when  defendant woke her, he asked her to come with him,
  but she refused.  Defendant then pulled her out  of bed and threw her over
  his shoulder.  She resisted, but defendant carried her out of the house and 
  put her in the backseat of the car.  According to the victim, she
  repeatedly said she did not want to go  with them and asked to be let out
  of the car.

       Once they were all back in the car, defendant and his friends gave up
  on finding more 

 

  cocaine.  Instead, they went back to the house where they had been earlier,
  and all five people,  including the victim, drank more beer and smoked
  marijuana.  Defendant and one of his friends  testified that the victim got
  out of the car and walked into the house ahead of them, of her own 
  volition.  The victim testified that defendant pulled her into the house by
  her arm, and another of  defendant's friends testified that defendant
  dragged her into the house "like a puppy dog."  The  victim also testified
  that she drank the beer and smoked the marijuana because she did not want 
  defendant and his friends to think she was scared.  

       Eventually, the party broke up, and the victim went with defendant to
  his house, where he  lived with his parents, because he offered to drive
  her home from there.  According to defendant's  testimony, he planned to
  ask his parents to drive her home, but when they got there, he decided it 
  was too late to wake his parents.  He and the victim got into bed, where
  "one thing led to another,"  and they had consensual sex.  The victim, on
  the other hand, testified that when they got to  defendant's house, he took
  her to his room and raped her.  Afterwards, she fell asleep.  In the 
  morning when she woke up, she asked to be taken home, and he arranged for a
  friend to give her a  ride.

       Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
  instruct the jury on diminished  capacity as a result of intoxication.  The
  issue was raised first by the trial court at the charge  conference, but
  defense counsel indicated that he did not want such an instruction.  He
  reconsidered  and later told the court that he did want the instruction. 
  By this time, the charge had been drafted,  and the court said the new
  request was too late.  Defense counsel formally objected to the lack of an 
  intoxication instruction following the delivery of the charge to the jury. 
  He did not argue in the  closing argument that defendant did not have the
  requisite intent for any of the charges because of his  intoxication.

       Intoxication may affect a person's ability to form the mental state
  requisite for conviction of 

 

  certain crimes.  "When specific intent is an element of a crime, evidence
  of either voluntary or  involuntary intoxication may be introduced to show
  that the defendant could not have formed the  necessary intent." State v.
  Joyce, 139 Vt. 638, 639-40,