Title: Commonwealth v. Miranda

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12058 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WAYNE MIRANDA. 
 
 
 
May 12, 2016. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief.  Joint Enterprise.  
Evidence, Joint venturer. 
 
 
 
Wayne Miranda was convicted of murder in the second degree 
and other offenses in 2008, and this court affirmed the 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100 (2010), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  Miranda has filed a 
petition in the Federal District Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  A Federal judge stayed the petition and held it in 
abeyance to permit Miranda to exhaust State remedies.  Miranda 
accordingly filed a motion for relief from unlawful restraint 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001), and a judge in the Superior Court denied the 
motion.  We granted Miranda's application for direct appellate 
review.  We affirm. 
 
 
At issue is whether, on direct appeal, we properly applied 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (2009), to determine that 
the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions.  In 
Zanetti, we clarified the legal principles concerning joint 
venture liability.  Id. at 461-468.  In particular, we stated 
that, in an appeal following a conviction, we will "examine 
whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational juror to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime charged, with the 
intent required to commit the crime, rather than examine the 
sufficiency of the evidence separately as to principal and joint 
venture liability."  Id. at 468.  Miranda argues that this 
reformulation applies only to cases tried after we decided 
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Zanetti and that our application of it to his case violated ex 
post facto principles and his due process rights. 
 
 
Since deciding Zanetti, we have made it clear that "[w]e 
apply the principles clarified in [Zanetti] to claims concerning 
the sufficiency of the evidence of joint venture, even though 
the trial preceded that decision."  Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 
Mass. 686, 689 n.5 (2013).  "[T]he only prospective application 
of the principles announced in our Zanetti decision pertains to 
our recommended jury instruction."  Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 
Mass. 21, 28 n.20 (2011).  Moreover, our decision in Zanetti 
"d[id] not enlarge or diminish the scope of existing joint 
venture liability," but was intended simply "to provide clearer 
guidance to jurors and diminish the risk of juror confusion in 
cases where two or more persons may have committed criminal 
acts."  Zanetti, supra.  Nothing in Zanetti criminalized any 
action that was lawful when Miranda committed it or deprived 
Miranda of any previously available defense.  Nor can it be said 
that our decision in Zanetti was "unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the 
conduct at issue."  Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 461 
(2001), quoting Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964).  As 
our discussion in Zanetti makes clear, our decision was an 
outgrowth of decades, even centuries, of common law.  Zanetti, 
supra at 461-468. 
 
 
Finally, even if, as Miranda argues, he was entitled to 
have the evidence of principal liability and joint venture 
liability evaluated separately, the outcome would have been no 
different.  As we said in Miranda's direct appeal, the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Miranda as either 
the principal shooter or as a joint venturer.  There were three 
witnesses, Reis, Andrade, and Rodriguez, all of whom "observed 
events that immediately preceded the shooting but did not see 
the shooting itself."  Miranda, supra at 101.  Reis testified 
that she "saw [Miranda] hand the gun to [his brother] Fagbemi, 
saw Fagbemi raise his arm and point the gun . . . and then heard 
two shots."  Id. at 103.  Andrade and Rodriguez heard the shots, 
saw the two brothers, but "did not see [Miranda] hand the gun 
over to anyone else."  Id.  "Andrade saw one of the Miranda 
brothers pass the gun to the other, but could not say which one 
passed the gun or which one received the gun."  Id. at 103-104.  
Based on this testimony, "[t]he jury reasonably could have 
inferred the defendant knowingly participated in the shooting by 
committing the shooting himself (crediting the testimony of 
Andrade and Rodriguez) or by supplying Fagbemi with the means to 
commit the shooting (handing him the gun), with the intent that 
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Fagbemi do so (crediting Reis's testimony."  Id. at 114.  Even 
under the pre-Zanetti formulation, the evidence was sufficient 
to establish either principal or joint venture liability under 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). 
 
 
The order denying Miranda's motion for relief from unlawful 
restraint is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.