Title: Attorney Grievance v. Reno

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Sandra Lynn Reno, Misc. Docket AG 
No. 5, September Term, 2013 
 
ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINE 
– 
MARYLAND 
LAWYERS’ 
RULE 
OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4 – Court of Appeals denied Attorney Grievance 
Commission‟s request to dismiss attorney discipline proceeding and held that lawyer 
violated Maryland Lawyers‟ Rule of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.4 (d) (Conduct 
Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC) by giving 
handgun to person who could not legally possess regulated firearm.  Court gave parties 
opportunity to file recommendations as to appropriate sanction. 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 5 
 
September Term, 2013 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
SANDRA LYNN RENO 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Harrell 
Battaglia 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  January 24, 2014 
 
Circuit Court for Cecil County 
Case No. 07-C-13-000559  
 
Argued: December 10, 2013  
 
 
This attorney discipline proceeding concerns a Maryland lawyer who purchased 
and gave a handgun to a person who could not legally possess a regulated firearm. 
 
The State charged Sandra Lynn Reno (“Reno”), Respondent, a member of the Bar 
of Maryland, with violating the statute that is currently codified as Md. Code Ann., Pub. 
Safety (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2013 Supp.) (“PS”) § 5-144.1  Reno pled not guilty 
pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, which stated that Reno had given a handgun to 
Cortney Stevens (“Stevens”), who could not legally possess a regulated firearm.  Reno 
was found guilty, received probation before judgment, and reported herself to the 
Attorney Grievance Commission (“the Commission”), Petitioner.  
 
On March 19, 2013, in this Court, the Commission, through Bar Counsel, filed a 
“Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Reno, charging her with violating 
Maryland Lawyers‟ Rule of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.4 (Misconduct).  On 
March 22, 2013, we referred the attorney discipline proceeding to the Honorable Jane 
Cairns Murray (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Cecil County.  On 
September 4, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a hearing.  On October 25, 2013, the 
hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of fact, and conclusions of 
law indicating that Reno did not violate MLRPC 8.4(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c) 
(Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the 
Administration of Justice), or 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).  
                                              
1The State charged Reno with violating the statute that, at the time, was codified as 
Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol.) § 5-143.  To avoid confusion, we 
refer to the current version of the statute. 
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On November 8, 2013, in this Court, the Commission filed a “Notice of 
Dismissal,” requesting that this Court dismiss the attorney discipline proceeding.  On 
December 10, 2013, we heard oral argument.  For the below reasons, we: decline to 
dismiss the attorney discipline proceeding; conclude that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(d) 
and 8.4(a); and give the parties an opportunity to recommend sanctions.2 
BACKGROUND 
Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact 
 
In her opinion, the hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize. 
 
On December 19, 1991, this Court admitted Reno to the Bar of Maryland.  In 
2002, Reno began practicing criminal law at the Law Offices of Jim Baldwin.   
On or about February 18, 2004, Cortney Stevens was convicted of possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana.  In 2005, Reno met Stevens and 
later served as his lawyer.  In 2008, while represented by someone other than Reno, 
Stevens was convicted of making a false prescription.  Sometime before 2010, Stevens 
informed Reno “that he had a prior drug charge for which he received probation before 
judgment.”  “Stevens also informed [Reno] of a prescription forgery charge.”   
On or about September 14, 2010, Stevens visited Chesapeake Guns, a firearms 
store in Stevensville.  At Chesapeake Guns, Stevens completed an application to buy a 
                                              
2Generally, this Court grants a request by the Commission to dismiss an attorney 
discipline proceeding.  See generally Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 
707, 73 A.3d 161, 174 (2013).  Nonetheless, this Court has the discretion to deny such a 
request.  See generally Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Mahone, 435 Md. 84, 102, 76 
A.3d 1198, 1209 (2013) (“This Court[ has] original and complete jurisdiction over 
attorney disciplinary proceedings[.]”  (Citations omitted)). 
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.45 caliber 1911 handgun.  In a letter dated September 22, 2010, the Firearms 
Registration Section of the Maryland State Police informed Stevens that his application 
had been disapproved.   The letter did not include the reasons for Stevens‟s application‟s 
disapproval.  Reno learned of the letter and testified that she thought that the reason for 
Stevens‟s application‟s disapproval was “a minor issue such as a failure [by] Stevens to 
have paid a fine.”   
On November 6, 2010, Reno visited On Target, a firearms store in Severn.  At On 
Target, Reno obtained a .45 caliber 1911 handgun (“the handgun”).  Reno immediately 
transported the handgun to Stevens‟s place of employment, where she gave the handgun 
to Stevens.  
On November 16, 2010, at her home, Reno was visited by Corporal Marcus 
Jackson and Senior Trooper First Class Ryan List (“the troopers”) of the Gun 
Enforcement Unit of the Maryland State Police.  The troopers told Reno that they were 
conducting a handgun investigation.  Reno “escorted the troopers to [] Stevens‟[s home] 
and retrieved the” handgun, which the troopers confiscated.  
Sometime between November 4, 2011, and November 16, 2011, Reno learned that 
the State had charged her with violating the statute that is currently codified at PS § 5-
144.  On February 28, 2012, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Reno pled 
not guilty and joined the agreed statement of facts.  The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County granted Reno probation before judgment.  Sometime before October 21, 2013, 
the records of Reno‟s criminal case were expunged.  
 
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Testimony and Findings as to Reno’s Knowledge 
 
At the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding, as a witness for the 
Commission, Reno testified: 
[A]t the time that I asked [] Stevens to hold the gun for me, I was not aware 
that he was a prohibited person[, i.e., a person who cannot legally possess a 
regulated firearm].  I took that plea anyway because I felt like I should 
have known better.  The statute that I pled not guilty to and agreed 
statement of facts said that I knowingly participated in the receipt of a 
regulated firearm by a prohibited person.  The truth is I did not know he 
was a prohibited person, but I felt that it was appropriate to accept 
responsibility because I should have known.  
 
(Emphasis added). 
In her opinion, the hearing judge stated: “The evidence . . . merely shows a set of 
circumstances that [Reno] should have known [that] Stevens was a prohibited person, 
but it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that [Reno] in fact knew [that 
Stevens] was a prohibited person.”  (Emphasis added).  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 
judge‟s findings of fact, and reviews without deference the hearing judge‟s conclusions 
of law.   See Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B) (“The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity 
of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney Grievance 
Comm‟n v. Mahone, 435 Md. 84, 104, 76 A.3d 1198, 1210 (2013) (“[A] hearing court‟s 
findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that they are clearly 
erroneous.”  (Citation omitted)); Md. R. 16-759 (b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall 
review de novo the circuit court judge‟s conclusions of law.”). 
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DISCUSSION 
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge‟s findings of fact.  We, therefore, 
“treat the findings of fact as established[.]”  Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(A). 
 
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge‟s conclusions of law.  
“Ordinarily, we will not look for additional violations where [the Commission] file[s] no 
exceptions.”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 707, 73 A.3d 161, 174 
(2013).  Nonetheless, here, clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the 
hearing judge‟s conclusion that Reno did not violate MLRPC 8.4(d), which states: “It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice[.]”  “In general, an attorney violates M[L]RPC 8.4(d) when his 
or her conduct impacts negatively the public‟s perception or efficacy of the courts of 
legal profession.”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Rand, 411 Md. 83, 96, 981 A.2d 1234, 
1242 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 
Reno negatively impacted the public‟s perception of the legal profession through 
committing an illegal act.  As the hearing judge found, it is undisputed that Reno gave the 
handgun (i.e., a regulated firearm)3 to Stevens, who had been convicted of disqualifying 
crimes.4  We do not address the hearing judge‟s finding that Reno did not know that 
                                              
3“„Regulated firearm‟ means[ ] a handgun[.]”  PS § 5-101(r)(1). 
4Specifically, Stevens was convicted of two disqualifying crimes: (1) possession 
of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana; and (2) making a false 
prescription.  See PS § 5-101(g) (“„Disqualifying crime‟ means: (1) a crime of violence; 
(2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a 
misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years.”  
(Paragraph breaks omitted)); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“CL”) 
(Continued...) 
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Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime; thus, we do not conclude that Reno 
violated PS § 5-144(a)(1), which states: “[A] . . . person may not[ ] knowingly participate 
in the illegal . . . transfer . . . of a regulated firearm in violation of this subtitle[.]”  
(Emphasis added).   
That finding of fact–that Reno did not knowingly participate in transferring the 
handgun–does not preclude us from determining that Reno violated PS § 5-134(b)(2),5 a 
regulatory provision, which states that: “A . . . person may not . . . transfer a regulated 
firearm to a . . . transferee who the . . . person knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
. . . has been convicted of a disqualifying crime[.]”  (Emphasis added).  Although the 
hearing judge did not address whether Reno had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens 
had been convicted of a disqualifying crime, we need not remand for the hearing judge to 
make additional findings of fact.  As a conclusion of law–applying the facts found by the 
hearing judge to PS § 5-134(b)(2)‟s legal standard of “reasonable cause”–we conclude 
that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Reno violated PS § 5-134(b)(2).  
For two reasons, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Reno had reasonable 
cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime.   
                                                                                                                                                  
§ 5-601(c)(1) (Possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana is a 
misdemeanor that is punishable by up to four years of incarceration.); CL §§ 5-606(a), 5-
607(a) (Making a false prescription is a felony that is at least punishable by up to five 
years of incarceration.). 
5It does not matter that Reno was not charged with violating PS § 5-134(b)(2).  
“[T]he absence of criminal prosecution does not necessarily mean [MLRPC 8.4(d)] has 
not been violated[.]”  Attorney Grievance Comm‟n v. Katz, 429 Md. 308, 320, 55 A.3d 
909, 915 (2012) (second alteration and emphasis in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
- 7 - 
First, in Reno‟s criminal case, based on the agreed statement of facts that Reno 
joined, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Reno had violated PS § 5-144(a)(1) by knowingly participating in the illegal transfer 
of a regulated firearm.6  If the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that Reno 
violated PS § 5-144(a)(1) by knowingly participating in the illegal transfer of a regulated 
firearm, then Reno necessarily had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been 
convicted of a disqualifying crime and violated PS § 5-134(b)(2) by transferring the 
handgun to him. 
Second, independent of the findings of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County, Stevens‟s statements to Reno, credited in the hearing judge‟s findings of fact, 
provided reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying 
crime.  The hearing judge found that: (1) Stevens informed Reno “that he had a prior 
drug charge for which he received probation before judgment”; and (2) “Stevens also 
informed [Reno] of a prescription forgery charge.”  Even if Stevens did not tell Reno that 
he had been convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than 
marijuana and making a false prescription, it was incumbent upon Reno to ask Stevens 
whether one or both charges resulted in convictions before giving the handgun to 
Stevens.  Indeed–as Reno explicitly conceded, and as the hearing judge explicitly found–
                                              
6The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County could not have placed Reno on 
probation before judgment without first having “found [Reno] guilty[.]”  Md. Code Ann., 
Crim. Proc. (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2013 Supp.) § 6-220(b)(1).  Indeed, at oral argument, 
Reno‟s counsel stated that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that Reno 
“knew or should have known.”  
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Reno “should have known” that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime.  
(Emphasis added).7  For the above reasons, we are satisfied that clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that Reno committed an illegal act in violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2). 
It is abundantly clear that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(d), which provides: “It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice[.]”  We have described “[a]n act prejudicial to the administration 
of justice [as] one that „tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute.‟”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm‟n v. Goodman, 426 Md. 115, 128, 43 A.2d 988, 995 (2012) (citation 
omitted).  As the hearing judge found, Reno knew that: (1) Stevens had applied to buy a 
.45 caliber 1911 handgun; and (2) the Firearms Registration Section of the Maryland 
State Police disapproved Stevens‟s application.  Nonetheless, Reno gave Stevens a 
handgun of the exact type for which he had applied.  Even if (as the hearing judge found) 
Reno thought that the reason for Stevens‟s application‟s disapproval was “a minor issue 
such as a failure [by] Stevens to have paid a fine[,]” Reno nonetheless circumvented the 
law by giving the handgun to Stevens.  As such, Reno, a criminal defense attorney, 
provided a gun to a person, a former client, whom she had reason to know was prohibited 
from possessing a firearm.  Reno circumvented the law–and, indeed, violated the law–as 
to a prohibited person‟s possession of a firearm.  Thus, Reno engaged in behavior 
                                              
7We reject any notion that Reno lacked reasonable cause to believe that Stevens 
had been convicted of a disqualifying crime because Reno did not know whether 
possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana and/or making a 
false prescription were disqualifying crimes.  Ignorance of the law is no excuse, 
especially for an experienced criminal defense lawyer.   
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prejudicial to the administration of justice as well as conduct “impact[ing] negatively the 
public‟s perception . . . of the . . . legal profession.”  Rand, 411 Md. at 96, 981 A.2d at 
1242 (citations omitted).   
We also conclude that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(a), which states: “It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate . . . the” MLRPC. 
From the hearing judge‟s findings of fact, we ascertain no basis to conclude, 
however, that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(b) (criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer‟s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects) or 8.4(c) 
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  Although Reno 
committed an illegal act by violating PS § 5-134(b)(2), a violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2) 
alone does not appear to be a criminal act as Title 5 (“Firearms”) of the Public Safety 
Article does not set a penalty for violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2). 
 
Because the Commission moved to dismiss, neither party recommended a sanction 
for Reno‟s misconduct.  Instead of determining an appropriate sanction on our own 
initiative, we give Reno and the Commission the opportunity to recommend a sanction 
for Reno‟s violation of MLRPC 8.4(d) and 8.4(a).  The parties shall file 
recommendations within thirty days of the date on which this opinion is filed.  “Within 
15 days after service of . . . recommendations, the adverse party may file a response.”  
Md. R. 16-758(c).  After receiving recommendations and responses (if any), we will 
schedule oral argument regarding the appropriate sanction. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.