Title: Webb v. Giant of Maryland, LLC

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Karen Webb v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, No. 12, September Term, 2021.  Opinion by 
Harrell, J. 
 
APPEAL AND ERROR – REVIEW – SCOPE AND EXTENT OF REVIEW – 
JUDGMENT IN GENERAL – IN GENERAL 
 
Court of Special Appeals correctly applied a de novo standard when reviewing circuit 
court’s denial of a motion for judgment filed by Respondent at the close of evidence.  In 
reviewing the circuit court’s decision, the Court conducted the same analysis as the circuit 
court and reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to Petitioner (the non-moving 
party).   Based on that review, which the Court conducted without deference to the circuit 
court, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient to submit Petitioner’s negligence 
claim to the jury and that, as a result, Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  The Court’s analysis was sound and consistent with established precedent. 
 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT – RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO THIRD 
PARTIES – WORK OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR – IN GENERAL 
 
Court of Special Appeals did not err in reversing circuit court’s denial of Respondent’s 
motion for judgment.  The evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
Petitioner, did not permit an inference that Respondent retained sufficient control over the 
work of the independent contractor who caused Petitioner’s injuries.  The evidence 
established that Respondent had only a general control over the contractor’s work, which 
was insufficient to establish Respondent’s liability.  Moreover, any control Respondent 
may have had over the contractor’s work did not extend to the very thing from which 
Petitioner’s injuries arose. 
 
TRIAL – INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY – NECESSITY AND SUBJECT MATTER – 
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO TESTIFY OR TO CALL WITNESS OR PRODUCE 
EVIDENCE 
 
APPEAL AND ERROR – HARMLESS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR – 
PARTICULAR ERRORS – INSTRUCTIONS – IN GENERAL 
 
Court of Special Appeals did not err in holding that the circuit court’s spoliation instruction 
was improper and prejudicial.  The Court properly reviewed the circuit court’s decision to 
give the instruction for abuse of discretion.  The Court then correctly determined that the 
instruction was not applicable under the facts of the case given that there was no indication 
that the evidence at issue – a video recording of the incident that caused Petitioner’s injuries 
– had ever existed.  The Court likewise did not err in holding that the instruction was 
prejudicial.  Not only was the instruction misleading, but it required the jury to speculate 
about the applicability of a legal principle, i.e., the inference to be drawn from the 
destruction or concealment of evidence, regarding evidence that was never shown to exist 
in the first place.   
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. C-02-CV-17-003054 
Argued: October 6, 2021 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
No. 12 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KAREN WEBB 
 
v. 
 
GIANT OF MARYLAND, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Getty, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
 
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. 
     (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),  
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: December 21, 2021
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-12-21 11:46-05:00
 
 
 
 
 Petitioner, Karen Webb, was injured while shopping at a supermarket owned and 
operated by Giant of Maryland, LLC, Respondent (“Giant”).  Petitioner filed suit against 
Giant in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County alleging negligence and negligent 
hiring, training, and supervision.  A jury returned a verdict in Petitioner’s favor.  Giant 
noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  That Court, in a reported opinion, reversed 
the circuit court’s judgment.  The intermediate appellate court held that the circuit court 
erred in denying a motion for judgment made by Giant at the close of evidence and that the 
circuit court erred in giving a jury instruction on spoliation.  Giant of Maryland, LLC v. 
Webb, 249 Md. App. 545 (2021).  Petitioner sought certiorari review by this Court.  We 
granted a writ, Webb v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 474 Md. 633 (2021), to consider the 
following questions, which we have rephrased for clarity: 
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals apply the correct standard of review 
when reviewing the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s motion for judgment? 
 
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in reversing the circuit court’s 
judgment on the grounds that the circuit court had erroneously denied 
Giant’s motion for judgment? 
 
3. Did the Court of Special Appeals, in reviewing the circuit court’s decision 
to instruct the jury on spoliation, fail to address whether the circuit court’s 
decision was an abuse of discretion and then err in holding that the 
instruction was prejudicial? 
 
For reasons to be explained, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
 
On 4 December 2014, Petitioner was injured while shopping in the frozen-foods 
section of a Giant supermarket.  The injury occurred when Petitioner came in contact with 
a non-motorized pallet jack that was being operated by Keydonne Winzer, a PepsiCo 
2 
 
(“Pepsi”) employee.  At the time, Winzer, acting as a deliveryman for Pepsi, was using the 
pallet jack to transport pallets of Pepsi products through the store to re-stock shelves.  
According to Petitioner, the pallet jack struck her in the back, which caused her to fall to 
the ground and become injured.  It is now undisputed that, at the time of the incident, 
Winzer was an employee of Pepsi, not Giant.   
 
Petitioner sued Giant for negligence and negligent hiring, training, and supervision.1  
Petitioner claimed, among other things, that Giant was liable vicariously for Winzer’s 
actions.   
Motion for Summary Judgment 
 
Prior to trial, Giant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Giant could 
not be held liable for the actions of Winzer.  Petitioner responded that, even if Winzer was 
not a Giant employee, Giant nevertheless controlled many aspects of his work, including 
his use of the pallet jack and, thus, was liable for his actions.  The circuit court denied 
Giant’s motion, without a hearing.   
Trial Testimony 
 
At trial, Winzer testified that he was, at all relevant times, an employee of Pepsi and 
that he received all of his training from Pepsi.  He testified further that, on the day of the 
incident, he was at the Giant supermarket to make sure Pepsi products were stocked.  
Winzer maintained that no one from Giant ever told him how to stock the Pepsi products.   
He added that the pallet jack he used to stock the shelves was owned by Giant and that 
 
1 Petitioner attempted later to join Pepsi as a defendant.  Pepsi moved to dismiss 
based on limitations.  The circuit court granted the motion.   
3 
 
Giant had given him permission to use the pallet jack for that purpose.  Upon arriving that 
day at the store, he checked in with a Giant employee, as required.   
 
Kevin Corradini, Giant’s designated Corporate Representative, testified during a 
video deposition (played at trial) that vendors’ employees, like Winzer, are permitted to 
use the non-motorized pallet jacks while in the store.  Corradini stated that the store also 
has motorized pallet jacks, which may only be used by certified store employees.   Vendors, 
like Winzer, are not instructed generally “where to move and how to move throughout the 
store[,]” but they are expected to do so safely while in the store.  A vendor could be 
removed from a store if he is “not doing something properly.”  
Motion for Judgment2 
 
At the conclusion of Petitioner’s case-in-chief, Giant moved for judgment on the 
grounds that there was no evidence to support a claim for vicarious liability, given that 
Winzer was not an agent, servant, or employee of Giant.  The circuit court denied the 
motion and found that there was sufficient evidence to show that Giant had the necessary 
control over Winzer’s actions while he was in the store.   
 
2 The Amicus brief in this case focuses on a premises liability theory of recovery.  
This argument is not before us, however.  Although such a theory was advanced in the trial 
court, the trial judge rejected it at the close of the evidence.  The appeal did not challenge 
that ruling.  To be sure, such a theory does not appear to be frivolous on this record.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts states, in relevant part at Section 415: “A possessor of land 
who holds it open to the public for any purpose is subject to liability to members of the 
public entering for that purpose for physical harm caused to them by his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to protect them against unreasonably dangerous activities of, or 
unreasonably dangerous conditions created by, an independent contractor or 
concessionaire employed or permitted to do work or carry on an activity on the land.”  
Whether Giant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this record will not be 
considered here.  
4 
 
Spoliation 
 
During his video deposition, Corradini stated that the Giant store where the incident 
occurred had video cameras “throughout the entire store[,]” including in the area of the 
frozen food section where Petitioner was injured.  Prior to trial, he requested that the 
company that maintained Giant’s security cameras retain any video of the incident.  Later, 
he learned that no such video existed.   
 
Prior to jury instructions, Petitioner asked the circuit court to give a spoliation 
instruction in light of the fact that Giant did not produce a video of the incident.  Giant 
objected, arguing that such an instruction would be prejudicial, given that there was no 
evidence that a video of the incident ever existed.  The circuit court agreed with Petitioner 
and instructed the jury as follows: 
The destruction … of or the failure to preserve evidence by a party 
may give rise to an inference unfavorable to that party.  If you find that the 
intent was to conceal the evidence, this destruction or failure to preserve must 
be inferred to indicate that the party believes that his or her case is weak and 
that he or she would not prevail if the evidence was preserved.  If you find 
that the destruction or failure to preserve the evidence was negligent you may 
but are not required to infer that the evidence, if preserved, would have been 
unfavorable to that party. 
 
 
During closing argument, Petitioner’s counsel emphasized the circuit court’s 
spoliation instruction: 
Another thing I really want you to pay close attention to is a spoliation 
instruction that the Judge gave you and I think this one is absolutely critical.  
You heard testimony from Giant’s rep about a couple different things.  You 
heard they have 30 plus some odd cameras in the store that point – some 
cameras that point directly to the frozen food section.  You had the incident 
report.  You know they were on notice that day. … We asked them to 
preserve the evidence. … And then we hear for the first time at trial … [that] 
it definitely doesn’t exist. 
5 
 
* * * 
Do we really believe that there’s no video footage of this incident?  
There’s almost always video footage.  And what I would submit is if there 
was footage it would probably corroborate and be consistent with Ms. 
Webb’s description but we don’t have it and that benefits them.  So when 
you’re thinking about that, what makes sense and what doesn’t, just bear that 
instruction in mind because I do think it’s really important. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner, and Giant noted an appeal to the 
Court of Special Appeals.  Giant argued that the circuit court erred in denying its motion 
for summary judgment prior to trial and in denying its subsequent motion for judgment at 
the close of evidence.  Giant also argued that the court erred in giving the spoliation 
instruction.3   
 
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment and held that, 
although the circuit court did not err in denying Giant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court did err in denying Giant’s motion for judgment.  Giant, 249 Md. App. at 560-66.  
Regarding the motion for summary judgment, the Court noted that the denial of a motion 
for summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 559.  The Court noted 
further that a trial court may exercise its discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment 
even though there are no disputes of material fact and the moving party may be entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 560.  The Court explained that it was “not persuaded” 
that the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s “technically sufficient motion for summary 
 
3 Giant raised a third challenge, but that argument is not before this Court. 
6 
 
judgment in favor of a full hearing on the merits” constituted an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
(quotations omitted). 
 
As to its consideration of Giant’s argument regarding the motion for judgment, the 
Court set forth the following standard of review: 
 
When we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment, we ask: 
 
whether on the evidence adduced, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, any reasonable trier of fact could find the elements of the 
tort by a preponderance of the evidence. … If there is even a slight amount 
of evidence that would support a finding by the trier of fact in favor of the 
plaintiff, the motion for judgment should be denied. 
 
Id. at 560-61 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). 
 
The Court evaluated Giant’s contention that “there was insufficient evidence to 
support the existence of an employment relationship between Giant and [] Winzer and 
therefore no grounds for Giant to be vicariously liable for [] Winzer’s actions.”  Id. at 561 
(quotations omitted).  The Court agreed, explaining that, because Winzer was an 
independent contractor (and not an employee) of Giant, Petitioner needed to show that 
Giant “had retained control over the operative detail and methods of [] Winzer’s work, 
including the very thing from which the injury arose.”  Id. at 565-66 (quotations omitted) 
(emphasis removed).  The Court concluded that Petitioner failed to carry that burden: 
To the extent that Ms. Webb’s injury “arose” out of Mr. Winzer’s use of an 
unpowered pallet jack in his work, Giant’s control extended only to a 
prohibition against the use of powered jacks by any vendor. 
 
In sum, correcting a vendor observed using a pallet jack improperly, 
requiring a vendor to check in and out, to stock in a particular location of the 
store, permitting only non-powered jacks, and “sometimes” checking the 
vendor’s work – do not indicate sufficient control over the “methods” and 
“operative detail” of Mr. Winzer’s work to extend liability on Giant for his 
7 
 
actions.  Rather than a right to supervise Mr. Winzer’s work, these are general 
rights that a possessor of the premises on which the work is being done would 
ordinarily retain for itself.  For this reason, we hold, as a matter of law, that 
the evidence was insufficient to submit the vicarious liability claim to the 
jury, and that Giant’s motion for judgment should have been granted. 
 
Id. at 566 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 
In addition, the Court held that, had it not reversed the circuit court’s judgment based 
on its evaluation of the denial of Giant’s motion for judgment, it would have reversed the 
judgment based on the spoilation instruction.  Id. at 573.  The Court explained that the 
instruction was improper because there was “no direct evidence that a video of the incident 
actually existed or that it was destroyed or otherwise not preserved.”  Id. at 571.  The Court 
stated that the instruction was also prejudicial because “the jury was invited and permitted 
… to engage in speculation regarding concealment, destruction, and failure to preserve 
evidence that was not shown to actually exist.”  Id. at 573. 
 
Petitioner turned next to this Court.  We granted certiorari, Webb v. Giant of 
Maryland, LLC, 474 Md. 633 (2021), to determine: whether the Court of Special Appeals 
applied the correct standard of review in evaluating the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s 
motion for judgment; whether the Court erred in reversing the circuit court’s judgment on 
the grounds that the circuit court denied erroneously Giant’s motion for judgment; and, 
whether the Court erred in holding that the circuit court committed reversible error in 
giving the spoliation instruction.   
8 
 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
 
Petitioner contends first that the Court of Special Appeals did not apply the correct 
standard of review in evaluating the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s motion for judgment.  
She argues that the Court “should have, but did not, apply an abuse of discretion standard 
in determining whether the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment was proper.”  
Petitioner notes that the Court applied correctly the abuse of discretion standard in 
affirming the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s pre-trial motion for summary judgment, and   
should have applied the same standard to determine that the circuit court did not err in 
denying Giant’s motion for judgment.  She asserts that it was “illogical” for the Court to 
hold that the facts were sufficient to affirm the denial of Giant’s motion for summary 
judgment but were insufficient somehow to affirm the denial of Giant’s motion for 
judgment.   
Giant responds that the Court of Special Appeals applied the correct standard of 
review.  It asserts that there was nothing “illogical” about the Court’s decision to affirm 
the denial of the motion for summary judgment but reverse the circuit court’s denial of the 
motion for judgment.  
Analysis 
 
Maryland Rule 2-501 states that, in reviewing a pre-trial motion for summary 
judgment, the court “shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the 
motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that 
9 
 
the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Md. Rule 2-501(f).  “With respect to the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, the standard of review is de novo.”  Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 163 (2006).  
“Only when there is an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact will the appellate court 
determine whether the trial court was correct as a matter of law.”  Id.  A trial court does 
not have any discretionary power in granting a motion for summary judgment when there 
are no disputes of material fact.  Id. at 164. 
 
A trial court has, however, discretionary power “when affirmatively denying a 
motion for summary judgment or denying summary judgment in favor of a full hearing on 
the merits.”  Id.  This discretionary power “exists even though the technical requirements 
for the entry of such a judgment have been met.”  Metro. Mortg. Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 
Md. 25, 28 (1980).  That is, “no party is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.  
It is within the discretion of the judge hearing the motion, if he finds no uncontroverted 
material facts, to grant summary judgment or to require a trial on the merits.”  Foy v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 316 Md. 418, 424 (1989).  “Thus, on appeal, the standard 
of review for a denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial judge abused 
his discretion and in the absence of such a showing, the decision of the trial judge will not 
be disturbed.”  Dashiell, 396 Md. at 165. 
 
As to a motion for judgment, Maryland Rule 2-519 states that “[a] party may move 
for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered 
by an opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.”  Md. Rule 2-
519(a).  “[W]hen a defendant moves for judgment based on … the legal insufficiency of 
10 
 
the plaintiff’s evidence, the trial judge must determine if there is any evidence, no matter 
how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question[.]”  Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. 
of Maryland, LLC, 423 Md. 387, 394 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).  “Where 
the defendant, in a jury trial for negligence, argues that plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient 
to create a triable issue, the court determines whether any inference of negligence is 
permissible; that is, whether the evidence demonstrates that it is more probable than not 
that the defendant was negligent.”  District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 407 
(2012).  “The court considers the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Sugarman v. Liles, 460 Md. 
396, 413 (2018).  “It is only when the facts and circumstances only permit one inference 
with regard to the issue presented, that the issue is one of law for the court and not one of 
fact for the jury.”  Thomas, 423 Md. at 394 (citation and quotations omitted).   
“We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment in a 
civil case without deference.”  Sugarman, 460 Md. at 413.  In so doing, “[w]e conduct the 
same analysis that [the] trial court should make when considering the motion for 
judgment.”  Singleton, 425 Md. at 406-07. 
 
In light of those legal principles, we hold that the analysis carried-out by the Court 
of Special Appeals was appropriate.  First, Petitioner is mistaken in claiming that the Court 
should have reviewed the circuit court’s decisions regarding Giant’s motion for judgment 
and its pre-trial motion for summary judgment under the same standard.  As this Court’s 
caselaw makes clear, the standard of review for a summary judgment motion depends on 
how the trial court rules.  If the trial court grants the motion, that is, if the court determines 
11 
 
that there are no genuine disputes as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law, an appellate court reviews that decision without 
deference.  If, on the other hand, the trial court denies the motion, an appellate court reviews 
that decision for abuse of discretion.  When determining whether a trial court abused its 
discretion in denying a summary judgment motion, an appellate court should be mindful 
of the fact that the trial court has the discretionary power to deny the motion and require a 
trial on the merits “even though the technical requirements for the entry of such a judgment 
have been met.”  Basiliko, 288 Md. at 28. 
 
The trial court’s decision regarding a motion for judgment, by contrast, is reviewed 
without deference, regardless of the outcome.  In effectuating that review, an appellate 
court conducts the same analysis as the trial court.  Specifically, the appellate court looks 
at the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and evaluates whether 
the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to generate a jury question as to the cause of 
action at issue.  If the appellate court determines that the evidence permits only an inference 
in favor of the moving party regarding the issue presented, then that party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
 
We are persuaded that the Court of Special Appeals applied the correct standard of 
review in the present case.  The Court reviewed the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s motion 
for summary judgment for abuse of discretion, holding that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion even though the motion may have been “technically 
sufficient.”  Then, in reviewing the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s motion for judgment, 
the Court conducted the same analysis as the circuit court and reviewed the evidence in a 
12 
 
light most favorable to Petitioner (the non-moving party).  Based on that review, which the 
appellate court conducted without deference to the circuit court, the Court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to submit the vicarious liability claim to the jury and that, as a 
result, Giant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The Court’s analysis was sound 
and consistent with our established precedent. 
 
As noted, Petitioner claims that it was “illogical” for the Court of Special Appeals 
to hold that the facts were sufficient to affirm the circuit court’s denial of Giant’s motion 
for summary judgment and, yet, were insufficient to affirm the circuit court’s denial of the 
motion for judgment.  We disagree.  The Court of Special Appeals did not hold that the 
facts were sufficient to affirm the denial of the motion for summary judgment.  Rather, the 
Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for 
summary judgment, in favor of a full hearing on the merits.  At no point did the Court 
suggest that the underlying facts of the case had anything to do with its holding.  
Regardless, there is nothing “illogical” about affirming the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment and then reversing the denial of a subsequent motion for judgment, even in cases 
in which the underlying material facts remain largely unchanged from one to the other.    
II. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
 
Petitioner claims next that the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the circuit 
court’s denial of Giant’s motion for judgment.  She asserts that her claim of negligence 
against Giant was submitted properly to the jury because the evidence permitted an 
inference that Giant had sufficient control over Winzer and thus was liable for his actions.  
13 
 
Giant counters that the Court of Special Appeals reached the proper legal conclusion in 
holding that Giant did not retain or exercise sufficient control over Winzer’s actions.   
Analysis 
 
“Generally, an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence 
of the contractor or his employees.”  Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 558 (2010) (citation and 
quotations omitted).  However, today, countless exceptions have all but eroded the general 
rule.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409, comment b.  (“[The exceptions] are so 
numerous, and they have so far eroded the ‘general rule,’ that it can now be said to be 
‘general’ only in the sense that it is applied where no good reason is found for departing 
from it.”).  Before the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner pointed to one such exception, 
which is “[w]hen an employer has retained control of the details of the work, however, 
liability is permitted under a theory of actual fault.”  Appiah, 416 Md. at 563; see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414. 
Under this exception, “the retention of control is an absolute prerequisite to an 
employer’s liability for harm caused by the work of an independent contractor.”  Id. 
“General control over an independent contractor’s work, [moreover], is insufficient to 
establish liability.”  Id.  To fall under the § 414 exception, ‘“[i]t is not enough that [an 
employer] has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its 
progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not 
necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations.”’  Id. at 563-64 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c).  There must instead be ‘“such a retention of 
a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.”’  
14 
 
Id. at 564 (quoting Restatement § 414 cmt. c).  “We have characterized these principles as 
requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the employer not only has retained control over the 
operative detail and methods of the work but also that this control extends to the very thing 
from which the injury arose.”  Id. (citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Here, it is undisputed that Winzer was a Pepsi employee (not an employee of Giant) 
when Petitioner’s injury occurred.  It is also undisputed that Petitioner’s injury arose from 
Winzer’s use of Giant’s pallet jack, which, at the time of the injury, he was pushing along 
a Giant supermarket aisle in an effort to stock the supermarket’s shelves with Pepsi 
products.  Given that Petitioner relied on § 414 for a theory of liability, the question is 
whether Giant retained sufficient control as to Winzer’s “methods of work” or “operative 
detail” while he was using the pallet jack to stock the shelves.  Petitioner highlights the 
following as indicative of Giant’s “control” over Winzer’s work: (1) Giant required Winzer 
to use only non-powered jacks; (2) Giant required Winzer to “check in and out[;]” (3) Giant 
could correct Winzer if he was seen using a pallet jack improperly; (4) Giant could instruct 
Winzer on where to go in the store; and, (5) Winzer could be removed from the premises 
for failing to operate safely Giant’s equipment.4   
We hold that the evidence was insufficient to submit Petitioner’s negligence claim 
to the jury.  The evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Petitioner, did 
not permit an inference that Giant retained sufficient control over Winzer’s work.  At best, 
 
4 Petitioner claims that Winzer testified that “he operated the pallet jack under 
Giant’s instruction, direction and supervision.”  That claim is not supported by the record.   
Winzer testified merely that a Giant store receiver or manager “could” give him directions, 
instructions and supervision “in terms of where to go.”   
15 
 
the evidence established that Giant had only a general right to order the work stopped, to 
inspect its progress, to make suggestions or recommendations, and to prescribe alterations 
and deviations.  As the Court of Special Appeals noted, such rights “are general rights that 
a possessor of the premises on which the work is being done would ordinarily retain for 
itself” and “do not indicate sufficient control over the ‘methods’ and ‘operative detail’ of 
[] Winzer’s work to extend liability on Giant for his actions.”  Webb, 249 Md. App. at 566.  
Moreover, none of the general rights noted by Petitioner, aside from Giant’s prohibition on 
the use of powered pallet jacks by non-Giant certified persons, extended to the “very thing 
from which the injury arose,” i.e., Winzer’s use of Giant’s non-motorized pallet jack to 
stock the store’s shelves.  Rather, those rights exhibit only a general control over Winzer’s 
work, which is insufficient to establish liability.  See Appiah, 416 Md. at 563-64. 
To be sure, the evidence did establish that Giant retained some control over Mr. 
Winzer’s actions while he was in the store.  Petitioner, citing Appiah, supra, argues that 
that control was sufficient because Winzer was “not entirely free to do the work in his own 
way.”  Appiah, 416 Md. at 564 (citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
We remain unpersuaded.  We do not read the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
language relied on by Petitioner, which we quoted earlier, as requiring an employer to have 
absolutely no control over a contractor’s work in order to be shielded from liability.  Such 
a result would be nonsensical and would be at odds with the requirement that an employer 
have more than just general control over the contractor’s work.  Petitioner’s reading would 
be at odds also with our holding in Appiah, in which we declared that the employer’s 
control must be “over the operative detail and methods of the work” and must extend “to 
16 
 
the very thing from which the injury arose.”  Id. at 564 (citation, quotations and emphasis 
omitted).  The evidence was insufficient to impart liability upon Giant for Winzer’s actions. 
III. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
 
Petitioner’s final claim is that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the 
circuit court’s spoliation instruction was prejudicial.  Petitioner argues that, before finding 
that the instruction was prejudicial, the Court was required to find that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in giving the instruction.  Petitioner argues that the Court failed to 
make such a finding.  Petitioner argues further that there was nothing unduly prejudicial 
about the instruction.   
 
Giant contends that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the circuit 
court’s spoliation instruction was improper and prejudicial.  Giant argues that the 
instruction was improper because Petitioner failed to establish that the evidence supposedly 
destroyed – a video recording of the incident – ever actually existed.  Giant argues that 
giving the instruction under those circumstances was likewise prejudicial because it invited 
the jury “to speculate not only as to whether evidence actually existed, but also as to what 
such video might have depicted assuming it existed.”5   
 
5 Ordinarily, we would not need to reach and decide Petitioner’s spoliation question, 
in view of our disposition of her first two questions.  We exercise our discretion to consider 
it, however, in order to clarify language in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
regarding what types of evidence may satisfy a plaintiff’s burden in laying a foundation for 
such a spoliation instruction. 
17 
 
Analysis 
 
“This Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a requested jury instruction for 
abuse of discretion.”  Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch., 469 Md. 704, 739 
(2020).  “When applying the abuse of discretion standard in this context, we look to the 
following factors: (1) whether the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law; 
(2) whether it was applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) whether it was fairly 
covered in the instructions actually given.”  Id. (citation and quotations omitted).  “Whether 
the evidence is sufficient to generate the requested instruction in the first instance is a 
question of law for the judge.”  Fleming v. State, 373 Md. 426, 433 (2003).  “Error will be 
found if the given instruction is not supported by evidence in the case.”  CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Pitts, 430 Md. 431, 458 (2013). 
 
In addition, “[t]he proven error must … be prejudicial, not harmless.”  Id.  “An 
erroneous instruction may be prejudicial if it is misleading or distracting for the jury, and 
permits the jury members to speculate about inapplicable legal principles.”  Barksdale v. 
Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 669 (2011).  “Moreover, in certain cases, the mere inability of a 
reviewing court to rule out prejudice, given the facts of the case, may be enough to declare 
an error reversible.”  Id. at 670.  Nevertheless, to establish reversible error, “the 
complainant must show that prejudice was ‘likely’ or ‘substantial.’”  Id. at 662.  “[T]he 
general rule is that a complainant who has proved error must show more than that prejudice 
was possible; she must show instead that it was probable.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
“Maryland recognizes some form of jury instructions regarding missing or 
destroyed evidence in both civil and the criminal contexts.”  Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 
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370 (2010).  “In the civil context, we give a jury instruction for the ‘spoliation of evidence’ 
where a party has destroyed or failed to produce evidence.”  Id.  That instruction reads: 
The destruction of or the failure to preserve evidence by a party may give 
rise to an inference unfavorable to that party.  If you find that the intent was 
to conceal the evidence, the destruction or failure to preserve must be inferred 
to indicate that the party believes that his or her case is weak and that he or 
she would not prevail if the evidence was preserved.  If you find that the 
destruction or failure to preserve the evidence was negligent, you may, but 
are not required to, infer that the evidence, if preserved, would have been 
unfavorable to that party. 
 
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 1:16 (“MPJI-CV”).  “Such an instruction is 
designed to draw a jury’s attention to a simple, straightforward premise: that one does not 
ordinarily withhold evidence that is beneficial to one’s case.”  Cost, 417 Md. at 370 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
 
A similar inference, known as the “missing witness inference,” is embodied in 
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 3:29 (“MPJI-CR”) and provides that, where a 
party in a criminal case fails to call a particular witness that is within that party’s power to 
produce, then the jury may decide that the witness’s testimony would have been 
unfavorable to that party.  See Harris v. State, 458 Md. 370, 388-411 (2018).  That 
inference arises generally in one of two contexts: either a party requests that the trial court 
instruct the jury on the inference, or a party raises the inference during closing arguments.  
Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 52 (1993) (overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. State, 
437 Md. 350 (2014)).  As we have explained, trial courts should be cautious when the 
inference is raised in the context of a jury instruction, as opposed to during closing 
argument: 
19 
 
Where a party raises the missing witness rule during closing argument, its 
use is just that – an argument.  Trial judges typically instruct the jury … that 
the parties’ arguments do not constitute evidence.  Furthermore, the opposing 
side also has an opportunity to refute the argument and counter with reasons 
why the inference is inappropriate. 
 
In contrast to the argument context is the trial judge’s instruction to 
the jury.  In the latter case, the inference is communicated to the jury as part 
of the judge’s binding jury instructions, creating the danger that the jury may 
give the inference undue weight.  At the very least, a trial judge’s jury 
instruction on the missing witness inference may have the effect of 
overemphasizing just one of the many proper inferences that a jury may 
draw.  As a result, where the jury instruction is the vehicle by which the 
missing witness inference is brought to the jury’s attention, the trial court 
should be especially cautious[.] … A trial judge has discretion to deny a 
missing witness instruction, leaving the matter to closing arguments, even 
when the facts would support the inference. 
 
Id.; see also Harris, 458 Md. at 404-05 (“A trial court should be ‘especially cautious’ in 
considering whether to give a missing witness instruction adverse to a defendant in a 
criminal case.”).  Importantly, “[a] trial court has no discretion to give a missing witness 
instruction where the facts do not support the inference.”  Harris, 458 Md. at 406. 
 
Against that backdrop, we conclude that the Court of Special Appeals’s holding as 
to the impropriety of the circuit court’s spoliation instruction was not erroneous.  Despite 
Petitioner’s claims to the contrary, the appellate court was not required to make any express 
finding that the circuit court abused its discretion.  Rather, it was required to review the 
circuit court’s decision for abuse of discretion and determine, among other things, whether 
the instruction was applicable under the evidence of the case.  The Court did just that, 
explaining in some detail how the facts of the case did not support a spoliation instruction.  
Webb, 249 Md. App. at 571-72.  The intermediate appellate court noted that there was “no 
direct evidence that a video of the incident actually existed or that it was destroyed or 
20 
 
otherwise not preserved.”  Id. at 571.6  The Court noted further that, although there was 
evidence of the existence of a number of video cameras in the vicinity of where the injury 
occurred, that evidence only supported “the video’s possible existence, but not its actual 
existence.”  Id. at 572 (emphasis in original).  The Court reasoned that “[t]here can be no 
act of destruction or failure to preserve evidence not proven to exist, and therefore no act 
or omission from which inferences can arise.”  Id. at 571.  Noting the influence that a trial 
court’s instructions have on the jury, the Court reasoned further that “[t]he failure of the 
multiple cameras to capture the incident could be grist for credibility and argument mills, 
but it would not justify a spoliation instruction.”  Id. at 572. 
 
The Court of Special Appeals’s analysis was sound and its holding proper.  We 
agree that, for a spoliation instruction to be supported by the evidence, there must be some 
indication that the destroyed evidence existed at some prior point in time.  The inference 
to be drawn from a spoliation instruction is clear: that a party destroyed or failed, either 
negligently or deliberately, to produce evidence that was unfavorable to that party.  Such 
an inference requires necessarily that the party had the evidence in his or her possession, 
or, at the very least, that the party knew about the evidence’s contents or existence at some 
point prior to the destruction (or lack of production) of the potential evidence.  Here, there 
was no testimony or other evidence to show that the video ever existed.7  To the contrary, 
 
6 Circumstantial evidence, in addition to direct evidence, may satisfy the burden. 
See, e.g., Steamfitters, 469 Md. at 738-45. 
7 For this reason, Petitioner’s reliance on Steamfitters, supra, is misplaced.  There, 
it was undisputed that the video in question had existed and was destroyed by one of the 
parties.  Steamfitters, 469 Md. at 738. 
21 
 
the only evidence on that issue was the testimony of Giant’s corporate representative, 
Kevin Corradini, who stated conclusively that the video never existed.  It was, therefore, 
improper for the circuit court to instruct the jury that it could draw an inference as to Giant’s 
destruction of the video, where there was no evidence that such a video existed previously.  
Giving such an instruction under the circumstances was legally erroneous and an abuse of 
discretion. 
Petitioner argues that the instruction was warranted because the jury could infer the 
existence of the video based on the fact that Giant had security cameras mounted in the 
area where the injury occurred.  We remain unpersuaded.  Were we to accept Petitioner’s 
argument, the jury would be required to draw a preliminary inference as to the existence of 
the evidence before it could draw an inference as to a party’s destruction or failure to 
produce that evidence.  Requiring the jury to make that preliminary inference is not 
supported by the language of the jury instruction or by the principles embodied in the 
“missing evidence” rule.  Again, the purpose of the instruction is to permit the jury to draw 
inferences about missing evidence, not to require the jury to speculate as to whether the 
evidence existed in the first place. 
Petitioner argues also that the Court of Special Appeals contradicted itself in holding 
that the spoliation instruction was improper, although, at the same time, recognizing that 
“[t]he failure of the multiple cameras to capture the incident could be grist for credibility 
and argument mills[.]”  Webb, 249 Md. App. at 572.  We reject that argument.  As noted, 
there is an important distinction between a trial court instructing the jury on spoliation and 
a trial court allowing a party to argue spoliation during closing argument.  In a jury 
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instruction, the inference is communicated to the jury by the trial judge, which may result 
in the jury giving the inference undue weight.  Such a result is much less likely in the 
context of an argument by counsel, as opposing counsel is provided the opportunity to 
respond and the jury is instructed that counsels’ arguments do not constitute evidence.  
Thus, it may be perfectly reasonable for a court to refuse a spoliation instruction, but allow 
the parties to argue the point during closing argument.   
Finally, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that the spoliation 
instruction was prejudicial.  The instruction was misleading and required the jury to 
speculate about the existence of potentially damning evidence.  The instruction also invited 
the jury to speculate about the applicability of a legal principle – the inference to be drawn 
from the destruction or concealment of evidence – regarding evidence that was never 
shown to exist in the first place.  And, although the instruction did not mention specifically 
the video or Giant, Petitioner’s counsel shone a spotlight on that point during closing.  
Counsel told the jury to “pay close attention to” the spoliation instruction, suggesting that 
Giant was lying about the existence of the video because “[t]here’s almost always video 
footage.”  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that such a video “would probably corroborate and be 
consistent with Ms. Webb’s description” of the incident.  Plaintiff’s counsel concluded by 
arguing that “we don’t have it and that benefits them.” 
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Given those circumstances, we are persuaded that the prejudice resulting from the 
erroneous spoliation instruction was probable.  Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals 
did not err in holding that reversal was warranted based on that instruction. 
 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS 
IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY 
PETITIONER.