Title: State v. Chatman

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN IEST HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®

 

No. 26763
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

 
   

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintift-Appellee

vs.

3d

ANTHONY CHATMAN, Defendant-Appellant }
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT couRT §| =
(FC-CR. NO, 02-1-0011; CR. NO, 02-1-2383)

Jd.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy,

(By: Moon, C.J.
J. Concurring Separately)

With Acoba,
Defendant-appellant Anthony Chatman appeals fron the

Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s July 19, 2004 judgment of

conviction and sentence’ of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole and a fifteen-year mandatory minimun for

attempted murder in the second degree, Hawai'i Revised statutes

(HRS) §§ 707-701.5 (1993)? and 705-500(2) (1993)? in FC-cr.

 

\ the Honorable Karen 5.5. Ahn presided over this matter
} Rs § 707-701.5, entitled "Murder in the second degree,” provides in

relevant part
(2)... (81 person commits the offense of aurder in the second
degree if the person intentionally oF knowingly causes the death of

another person:
+ RS $ 708-500(2) provides in relevant part:
nen cousing a particular result is an element of the crine, 2
person se guilty of an attempt to commit the crise if, acting with
Che state of mind required to establish liability with respect to
the attendant circunstances specified in the definition of the
Grine, he person intentionally engages in conduct which 1s 2
(continued.

 

 

 
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No. 021-0011; and sentences of five years’ imprisonment each for
bribery of a witness, HRS § 710-1070(1) (1993),* intimidating 2
witness, HRS § 710-1071 (1993),* and extortion in the second
degree, HRS $§ 707-766(1) (b) (1993) and 707-764(2) (Supp. 2001)"
in Cr, No. 02-1-2353, to run concurrently with each other and
consecutively with the sentence in FC-Cr. No. 02-1-0011. On

D1. scontinved)

Cubstantial step in = course of conduct intended or known to cause
such a result.

“Rs § 710-1070(2) provides in relevant part

A person commits the offense of bribing 2 witness if he
confers, or offers oF agrees to confer, directly or indirectiy,
Gny benefit pon a witness or a person he believes is about to’ be
Galled af a witness in any official proceedings with intent to

 

 

{al Influence the testimony of that person:

[B} Induce that person to avoid legal process sunnoning him to
testify: oF

fc) Tnduce thst person to absent himself from an official

proceeding to which he hi

 

been legally susmoned,
+ Re § 720-2071 provides in relevant part:

(2) A person commits the offense of int: a witness
Af ne Uses force upon or a threat directed to a witness or a
person he believes ss about to be called as a witness in any
Stticlal proceeding with intent to:

(a) Influence the testimony of that person:

(b) Induce that person to avoid legal process summoning

 

 

 

him to testify; oe

(c) Induce that person to absent himself from an official
proceading to which he has been legally. summoned.

(2) "threat" ae usec in this section means any threat

proscribed by section 707

 

eat)

uns § 707-766(2) (B) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of
extortion in the second degree if the person commits extortion... [als set
forth in section 107-764(2) <=

wns § 707-7642) provides that a person commits extortion if the
person “[i]atentionally compels or induces another person to engage in conduct
Prem which another hase legel right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in
hich another has a legal right to engage by threatening by word or conduct te
Up any of the actions fet forth in {HRS '§ 707-764(1) (a) through (k) J”

   

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eee

appeal, Chatman contends that the circuit court: (1) erred when
ie requested that Chatman’s brother Wesley and Wesley's
girlfriend, Victoria Filoteo, leave the courtroom, in violation
of Chatman’s constitutional right to a public trial, based on the
fact that Filoteo and one of the jurors, Jacom Reyes, were
acquainted; (2) abused its discretion when it denied Chatman‘ s
motion for a mistrial after Asahi Suzuki (Suzuki) testified to a
prior bad act by Chatman in violation of Hawai'i Rules of
Evidence (HRE) Rules 402, 403, and 404(b); (3) abused its
discretion when it excluded the written statement of an
unavailable witness, Eri Gunji, when the statement was relevant
and admissible under a catch-all exception to the hearsay rule,
HRE Rule 804(b) (8); (4) abused its discretion when it ellowed a
police officer, Tai Nguyen, to testify as to his opinion and
impression regarding Suzuki's state of mind; (5) plainly erred
when it allowed testimony that witness for the defense, Eugene
Rupak, had been arrested and was in custody in that such
testimony was irrelevant and overwhelmingly prejudicial;

(6) erred when it allowed Chatman’s ex-wife, Kaori Takenaka, to
give @ lay opinion on rebuttal that a letter purportedly written
by suzuki did not appear to be written in language natural for
Japanese person; (7) abused its discretion in admitting evidence

that Chatman had previously assaulted Suzuki because such
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evidence was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and improper
character-propensity evidence: (8) violated Chatman’s right to a
fair trial due to the individual and cumulative impact of the
foregoing seven errors; (9) erred when it failed to instruct the
jury on the merger of the intimidation and extortion counts as
required by HRS § 701-109 (1993); and (10) erred when it denied
his motion for a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct based
con (a) Amproper elicitation, during cross-examination, of
references to Chatman’ s assertion of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and (b) several improper,
prejudicial renarks made during closing argument. For his
eleventh point of error, Chatman argues that his trial counsel's
failure to secure the attendance and testimony of Gunji at trial
and other witnesses at the hearing on his motion for a new trial
due to juror misconduct constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. The State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, the prosecution]
counters that there was no error or alternatively that any error
was harmless, and, in the case of the alleged merger error, the
proper renedy, assuming the jury instruction was flawed, would be
vacatur of one of the convictions rather than remand for 2 new
trial.

Based on the following, we affirm the circuit court's

judgment, except that: (1) Chatman’s conviction and sentence for
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—_—_— SSeS

extortion in the second degree in Cr. No. 2-1-2353 is vacated:
and (2) Chatman’s ineffective assistance claim is denied without
prejudice to a subsequent Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)
Rule 40 petition.
T. BACKGROUND

on April 26, 2002, the prosecution filed a complaint in
the family court of the first circuit, docketed as FC-Cr.
tio, 2-1-0011, charging Chatman with the attempted murder of his
infant son, Taigon Suzuki (Taison), based on conduct occurring
between April 6 and April 8, 2002. On October 29, 2002, the
prosecution secured a grand jury indictment against Chatman,
docketed in the circuit court of the first circuit as Cr.
No, 02-21-2353, for bribing, extorting, and intimidating Taison’s
mother, Suzuki, between September 3 and October 20, 2002, in
order to influence or prevent her testimony at his upcoming trial
in FC-Cr, No. 02-1-0011.' On December 30, 2002, the circuit
court orally granted the prosecution’s motion to consolidate
cr. No. 02-1-2353 for trial with FC-Cr. No. 02~1-0011, which had

already been committed from family court to circuit court.

Chatman was e120 charged in Cr. No. 02-1-2353 with abuse of
househoid menber in violation of HRS § 708-806 (1993), but was found not
BaLItp oe that charge at teiel due to its merger with the intimidation charge.
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A, The Prosecution’s Case

Chatman’s four-week jury trial began on May 29, 2003,
and the prosecution, after opening statenents, presented the
following case in chief.
Suzuki's Testimony, Part 1°

Through an interpreter, Suzuki gave the following
testimony, She met Chatman at a WaikIkI nightclub in June 2000
while on vacation from her native Japan. Chatman accompanied her
and a friend back to their room at the Ambassador Hotel, where
Chatman spent a long time, mostly talking with Suzuki's friend.
When the prosecution asked whether she saw Chatman after he left
the room, she replied, “I think I had alcohol that night and 1
fell asleep. And the next thing I noticed that he was on top of
me and -~[.1"

Suzuki's reply was interrupted at this point by
defense counsel's objection. When the trial judge called counsel
for a bench conference, the defense moved for a mistrial, arguing
that Suzuki's response could be construed as improper evidence of
a prior bad act of Chatman. The prosecuting attorney explained
that he did not know what Suzuki's response to his question would

have been if completed, but that he had cautioned her prior to

* sugukt’s testimony was not actually given in two parts, but Ls divides
herein to maintain narrative structure.

 

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testifying that she should “not talk about any other incidents
unless she’s specifically asked about them.” The circwit court
denied Chatman’s motion, but instructed the jury to disregard
both the prosecution's question and Suzuki's partial response.

After corresponding with Chatman by phone, Suzuki
returned to Hawai'i in August 2000, again staying at the
Ambassador Hotel. It was during this vieit that she and Chatman
first became intimate. she visited again in October 2000,
staying at the Ambassador initially and then at Chatman’ s
apartment, where Chatman's ex-wife, Kaori Takenaka, and daughter
also resided. In December 2000, she made another visit, staying
at Chatman's apartment for approximately two weeks.

In February 2001, Suzuki discovered she was pregnant
with Taisen. Chatman asked her via email not to have an abortion
and stated that he would like to marry her. At that tine, Suzuki
too wanted them to be married, and had asked Chatman to leave his
ex-wife. She visited Hawai'i again in April 2001 and stayed with
Chatman at his new apartment, where he lived alone. She returned
to Japan and gave birth to Taison in September 2001. In October
2001, Chatman visited her and Taison in Japan, applying for a
birth certificate and passport for Taison. Suzuki, Taison, and
her family then visited Chatman in Hawai'i in Novenber 2001. In

December 2001, just prior to returning to Japan, Suzuki decided
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that she would not return to Hawai'i, and that she would not see
Chatman again, but she did not tell Chatman of her intentions.
In February 2002, Suzuki changed her mind after Chatman

called her in Japan and told her that “because Taison is a boy,

 

he needs @ father(.]” Suzuki subsequently returned to Hawai'i
with Taison and her sister-in-law Noriko" to stay with Chatman
at his apartment. Upon arriving in Hawai'i on April 2, 2002,
however, Chatman told her they could not stay at his apartment.
After her sister-in-law returned to Japan on April 6, 2002, she
and Taison ended up back at the Ambassador Hotel.

on their firet night at the Ambassador, Taison vas
being fussy. Chatman pushed Taison’s chin upwards with his hand
and said, “Shut your mouth.” When Taisen began to cry more,
Chatman flipped him face down onto the bed and pressed his head
and neck into the bed. Fearing that the situation might escalate
Af she said anything, Suzuki pretended as if nothing was
happening and went into the bathroom. Chatman told her to cone
out, and eventually Taison cried himself to sleep.

‘he next afternoon, Sunday, April 7, at around 3 or
4 pem., Chatman came to the Anbassador and net with Taison and

Suzuki at the front desk. Chatman carried Taison as they

 

1 Noriko also testified at trial. She confirmed that she arrived in
Hewaiti on April 2, 2002, ané left on April 6, 2002.” She added that she
thought prier to arriving that Suzuki and Chatman were going to get married,
Sno thet Susuki, Taigon, ang Chatman would stay at his apartment while Noriko
Stayed at a hotel,

 

 
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proceeded upstairs to their rooms Taison began crying when
Chatman took him. When the room key did not work, Suzuki went
back to the front desk, leaving Chatman and Taison waiting by the
door, After she returned about five to eight minutes later with
a new key, Taison was still crying and had a reddish, raised
bruise above hie right eyebrow. Chatman told Suzuki that Taison
got the bruise when Chatman had held him up in the air and Taison
kicked Chatman's shoulder, sending Taison backwards.

When Taison continued to cry after they had entered the
room, Chatman pushed Taison’s chin upwards in the same manner as
he had done the previous evening, and again said, “Shut your
mouth, Taison.” When Taiscn’s crying only increased, Chatman
loudly said, "No, Taison.” As Suzuki again pretended not to see
what was happening, Chatman again flipped Taison onto the bed,
pushing him face-down into the bed. After a while, Chatman
flipped him face-up again.

Chatman told Suzuki to come closer and watch, saying
that a “mother should be near the baby.” When she approached,
Chatman again pushed Taison’s chin upwards, causing a loud sound
that “sounded like somebody bit really hard. It sound[ed] like 2
snappy sound. And [Taison] looked really uncomfortable because
his chin was pressed upwards(.]” She saw some bubbles coming

from Taison’s mouth. Suzuki then went to the veranda because she
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could not bear to watch, covered her ears, closed her eyes, and
prayed that Taison would go to sleep.

When Suzuki he

 

rd banging noises coming from inside the
room, she looked over and saw Chatman hitting Taison in the
stomach. She again did nothing, feeling that she could not stop
Chatman. She remained on the patio for about fifteen minute:
while Taison cried loudly. When Taison then abruptly stopped
crying, she looked into the room and saw that he appeared to be
sleeping.

Suzuki then went back into the room, and saw Chatman

sitting on the bed with his hand over his forehead, looking down.

 

lle said in a faint voice, “I’m no good.” Suzuki then went to
check on Taison, and noticed that the tip of his tongue was dark.
She told Chatman, who put his finger in Taison’s mouth, saying
that Taison could not breathe.

Later, Chatman and Suzuki decided to go out to dinner,
and the three of them went down to the car. When Suzuki put
Taison in the car seat, he vomited. Suzuki told Chatman that
they could not go out since Taison was sick. Suzuki and Chatman
showered together, during which time Suzuki told Chatman that
they should take Taison to the hospital, but he did not respond.

Suzuki thought about taking Taison to a hospital in

Japan, given that her English was poor, she was unfamiliar with

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the American medical system, and was unsure whether her Japanese
health insurance would work outside of Japan. then she told
Chatman that she wanted to take Taison back to Japan, he agreed
Suzvki then called her sister-in-law Noriko in Japan and arranged
for her flight reservation to be changed so that she and Taison
could return to Japan the next day since Taison vas sick.”
Chatman told Suzuki that Taison might have internal bleeding in
his head and that “if anything should happen to Taison, [she] had
to be strong.” Chatman left the hotel after Suzuki told him to
because “Taigon would be stressed out when he wakes up and see(s]
him.”

During the night, Taison vonited several times and ran
a fever. Suzuki placed a sticker on Taison’s forehead in an
attempt to reduce his fever. Also, she tried to feed him milk
and juice, but he continued to vomit. Suzuki did not attempt to
go for help because she did not “know anything about 911," could
not speak English well “enough to really express [herself], and
was dependent upon Chatman, the only person she knew in Hawai'i.

The next day, April 8, Taison’s appearance was changed.

His eyes were open, but he was unresponsive when spoken to.

 

4 Noriko confirmed that Suzuki called her in Japan, sounding a “Iittle
fearful.” Suzuki requested that Noriko find a hospital near the airport i
Japan and have Taigon’s health certificate ready so that they coula go te the
hospital as soon aa she arrived, Noriko did not make the preparations,
however, because Suzuki called her the next cay “and saig they went on the
Sabulance.”

 

 

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Chatman picked her and Taison up at the hotel and took then to
the airport. Before leaving them, he told her that if anything
were to happen, she could call him. Chatman did not interact
with Teison at all. From April 6 to April 8, 2002, Suzuki and
Chatman were the only people to interact with Taison.

At the Airport (Jeanne Kaiinoto’s and Suzuki*s Teotimony)

Suzuki proceeded with Taison to the departure gate at
around 10 a.m. on April 8, 2002, but Jeanne Kajimoto, an airline
supervisor, prevented her from boarding based on Taisen’ s
condition. Airport medical personnel were summoned and, after
they reconnended that Taison be taken to a hospital, an ambulance
transported Taisen and Suzuki to Kapiolani Medical Center
(Kapiolani). child Protective Services and police met Suzuki and
Taison at the hospital
Robert D. gart’s Testimony

Robert D. Bart, N.D., @ child neurologist at Kapiolani,
testified that Taison was admitted in a comatose condition on
April 8, 2002. He had three bruises, one on each cheek and one
on the right side of his forehead. In examining Taison’s eyes,
he found blood at the back of each eye, indicating that Teison
had been shaken vigorously. He added that a CAT scan showed
swelling along the right side of Taison’s brain, suggesting

either blunt-force trauma or lack of oxygen to the brain. While

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in the ICU, Taison stopped breathing and had to be placed on a
respirator. Dr. Bart noted that he was concerned that Taison
night die due to the swelling in his brain, or suffer permanent
impairment even if he survived. He concluded his testimony by
opining, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Taison
had been shaken and had sustained his injuries within 48 hours
prior to his admission to Kapiolani.

Dimas Amon

Robert DiNauro, M.D., a pediatric radiologist at

Kapiolani, testified that Taison had suffered brain hemorrhages
in areas which almost always lead to death to those parts of the
brain, “the baby will have a stroke. And this part of the brain
will just disappear. It will turn to water." Dr. DiMauro’s
opinion, like Or. Bart's, ‘was that this was a case of shaken
baby syndrome.” He added that the injuries were consistent with
the baby’s head having been rapidly and violently shaken back and
forth and slanned down onto a bed or other soft surface. In his
opinion, the injuries occurred between 11:45 a.m. on April 6,
2002, and 11:45 a.m. on April 8, 2002. Dr. DiMauro concluded, to
2 reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Taison, when
admitted on April 8, 2002, “was either in a coma or a semicoma,”

and at a significant risk of death.

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Peggy Liao’s Testimony

Peggy Liao, M.D., a pediatric ophthalmologist at
Kapiolani, testified that Taison’s retinas were covered with
fresh blood and hemorrhages when she examined them on April 9,
2002. Or. Liao concluded that, due to the hemorrhages and to
brain damage, Taison was almost blind in his right eye and his
vision in his left eye was also impaired. She also concluded
that the injuries were caused by shaking.

rt nay

victoria Schneider, M.D., @ pediatrician and child
abuse expert at Kapiolani, also evaluated Taison on April 8,
2002. She testified that Taison had bruises on his chest and
abdomen consistent with having been grabbed from under his arms
and flipped over. Taison’s brain injuries were, she opined, the
result of shaking that occurred on April 7, 2002. She also
concluded that the injury inside Taison’s mouth was unlikely to
have been caused accidentally, and was an additional indication
that Taison had been abused.

Test:

After Chatman was charged with Taison’s attempted
murder, Suzuki briefly returned to Japan. The family court
entered a protective order enjoining Chatman and Suzuki from

seeing each other. Suzuki subsequently returned to Hawaii to

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complete conditions set by the family court for her to regain
custody of Taison, who had been placed in foster care.

on September 2, 2002, Suzuki ran into Chatman while
waiting at a bus stop. Chatman told her to get in his car and
she agreed. ‘They ended up talking, and spent the night at the
Hawaiian Monarch Hotel. Thereafter, they maintained daily
contact and stayed together at various hotels and Chatman’ s
apartment. Chatman was the kindest toward her that he had ever
been, taking her clothes shopping, to the nail salon, and various
other places.

At some point after she had begun staying at Chatman’s
apartment, they had a conversation regarding the criminal charges

pending against him. Chatman told Suzuki thet the case was “a
very serious problem.” He asked her to return to Japan, but she
refused. He asked her on two other occasions to return to Japan,
but she again refused. In asking her to return, Chatman told her
that if she did not testify, the case would be dismissed. He
also told her thet “this was an accident.” During the same time
period, Chatman showed her two diamond rings, said that he had
been meaning to give them to her for over a year, and asked her
Af she wanted them. Suzuki was very happy and said she would
accept them when they were married.

Toward the end of Septenber, Chatman began asking her
to write @ letter for him so that the criminal case “would

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disappear.” At around 1 p.m. on October 20, 2002, while at
Chatman’'s apartment, Suzuki told him that she wanted some space

apart from him. Chatman then struck her in the eye," telling

 

8 on cross-exanination, Suruki was unable to recall which eye Chatman
had struck her io

 

(DEFENSE): Okay. Lets You testified... that you got
Snte an srgunent and Antheny Chatman got sad” and' that
he hit you in your left eye) is that correct?

[s020K7): Now 2 don't renenber whether it was the left eye or
Fight eye, but I zenenber him hiteing me with nie

 

(DEFENSE): So =~ so you [are] testifying that today you don’
Fecall what eye ne hit you, what eye was hits a8 that
Fight? “is that right? “I'm sorry.

 

[s020KT): Weld, he ALE me in the past on my eye, 40.
(DEFENSE): 1'm going to ~~
(suruer): I'm confused as to -~

[DEFENSE]: I'm going to object, You Honor; ask to approach the
bench:

At the bench, Chatman cbjected that her testimony was non-responsive and
Brejudicial {o that it referred co a prior bad act’ (duge, suggested that
Ehetman had hit her in the eye on an occasion other than Octeser 20, 2002, the
Gate of the charged offense) that he had not asked about, and moved for 0
Rictrial, in the alternative, he asked that the testimony be stricken and the
Jury be instructed to disregard it. The circuit court overruled the
abjdctioar Finding that the answer was responsive co why she could not recall
Shien eye hed been struck:

(THE couRT): ‘I don’t think it’s non-responsive because the
question was, “You testifying today you don't
Fecal which eye he hit you, which eye was Bit;
fe that right?

And she said, “Yeah, can’t remenber
because he it me another time in the eye,” oF
something to that effect. I think it's
Fesponsive to why you can't == she cant
Eenenber. That was yosr question, “You're
Eestifying you can’t renenber?” She saial,)
“yeah.”

(oBeense)

 

I was asking specifically about October the 20 -
(contanved.«.)

 

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her not to “think about enjoying just yourself. why are you here
for?” He then dragged her by her hair into the next room,
pulling her head backwards. Suzuki heard her neck snapping and
screamed, but Chatman told her, “I can hurt you," adding, “[oh,
yeah, just come.”

Chatman led Suzuki to a small table, gave her sone
white, unlined paper, and told her to write that he “didn’t do
anything,” that she had lied to the police, and that she would
tell her parents the truth. The undated letter, which was
adnitted into evidence, wae written in Japanese and was read on
the stand by Suzuki as follows:

To Tony, How are you? it ie your Birthday. It's a good day
ioday. "i'm sorry I wrote you's letter. 1 wanted to apologize.
hat trouble cane up Because 7 Lied to the police. know thet
you didn't hit Taisen or hurt Taison st that hotel. T'was scered
Because you have trouble with the police. I don’t want to lose

Faison, ‘Ivwas scares and 1 was ‘nervous. I talked to many people

 

 

8, .continved)
= you look at the follow-up question. That
question refers to October the 20th, no other
Gate. . + (s)hat is not a responsive answer
Because that goes beyond what happened on
October the 20th, 2002.

 

(THE COURT]: That ds true, but the question was, “Are you
testitying you can't remember which eye he Rit
you in," and that was her answer

[oBFENSE) On October the 20th. She gives an explanation
Of what heppened to her other than October the
2oen, which 1s prejudicial.

(THE COURT]: Okay. We have different interpretations of what
fa regponsive answer is.

(DEFENSE): 0 you're going to ~~

(2HE court] 1m going to Leave st in. 1 think it's
responsive.

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at the hospital. I couldn't quite understood what happened,

 

wg this thing happened. After I went back to
‘Japan, I will coll the prosecutor's office and Cell then that you
Sidn't burt Taison, that you didn't hurt him at the hotel. And T
SLIT Cell my mother and father eruth

P.5., To Tony's friend, thank you for translating. Asahi Suzuki
Suzuki explained that she usually uses lined paper, and chooses
stationery with a matching envelope.”? After she had written the
letter, Chatman allowed her to leave the apartment. The
following day, she went to the prosecutor's office to file a
complaint against Chatman.
‘Tai Nouven’s Testimony

Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Tai Nguyen
testified that on October 21, 2002, he took Suzuki's statenent
via a Japanese interpreter regarding Chatman's conduct the
previous day. He stated that during the interview, Suzuki
“seemed really distraught” and was “constantly crying.” Without
objection, he continued that it was his impression that she “was
really scared, scared of [Chatman], and seemed like she was
really scared to lose her child.” Based on her statenents,
mannerisms, and demeanor, Officer Nguyen further opined that
Suzuki “was a girl that was afraid for her life, afraid for her
child, afraid to lose her child.” After a defense objection, the

circuit court struck the statenent and instructed the jury to

 

} At thie point, the prosecution introduced a sample letter from Suzuki
that was on lines paper, dated, and had picture of a flower

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disregard it. In response to 2 subsequent question, Officer
Nguyen again stated that it was his impression that Suzuki was

afraid “she was going to lose her son.”

A defense objection that
the testimony was non-responsive was overruled.
5B. Afossible Problem with a Juror

on the second day of the trial, one of the jurors,
Jacom Reyes, recognized a woman, Victoria Filoteo, in the
courtroom. As the jury was exiting during a recess, he gave
Filoteo a kiss as he passed her. tt turned out that Chatman’s
brother, Wesley, was Filoteo’s boyfriend and was standing next to
her at the tine of the kiss. After learning of the incident, the
prosecution requested that Reyes be excused from the jury and
replaced with an alternate juror.

Counsel for Chatman acknowledged that Reyes, and
possibly other jurors, might have been affected by the incident,
but proposed that Reyes and the other jurors be questioned by the
court to determine whether this was in fact the case. The
circuit court agreed to find out whether Reyes had recognized
Wesley or realized the connection between Filoteo, Wesley, and
Chatman. The court indicated that if no connection had yet been
made, it was inclined to ask Wesley not to return to the trial in
order to avoid the possibility that Reyes might eventually make
the connection from Filoteo to her boyfriend, Wesley, to Wesley's
brother, Chatman, and form a bias based thereon. Chatman’s

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counsel responded that Wesley had a right to attend the trial,
which the court acknowledged.

linen the court questioned Reyes, he revealed thet he
knew Filoteo as a childhood acquaintance, but had not seen her
for over a year, He stated that his relationship with her would
not impair his ability to be fair in the case, but asked if there
was a reason why she was in the courtroom. The circuit court
told him not to concern himself with that.

After this interview, the circuit court indicated that
it was inclined to replace Reyes due to the danger that, over the
course of the trial, Reyes would eventually connect the dots
between his childhood acquaintance and Chatman, possibly
affecting his impartiality. Counsel for Chatman offered an
alternative proposal, stating, “Maybe [Wesley] would agree not to
be here in court, along with [his girlfriend)." The circuit
court balked, noting, “this is a public proceeding. And I don’t
want to bar anyone from the courtroom.” However, the court added
that if Chatman’s counsel could persuade Wesley and Filoteo
voluntarily not to return, it would be willing to retain Reyes.

The prosecution, however, maintained its position that
it was better to replace Reyes, to which the defense objected
that a juror could not be replaced “willy-nilly” without evidence
that he had “been infected.” After an extended back-and-forth,
the circuit court decided to excuse Reyes over the defense’s

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——_—_ SSS

objection. The defense continued to object, however, arguing
that there was not a sufficient basis to do so. Finally, while
voicing its continuing disagreement, the circuit court offered

another choic:

 

t would instruct Reyes to “bar the incident
from his memory,” question the other jurors individually to see
if they had witnessed the incident and formed a bias, and follow
the proposal to have Wesley and Filoteo not attend the trial.
chatman's counsel was agreeable to this alternative, and the
circuit court stated, “I'm [going to] ask [the couple] to leave,
please, If that’s with their consent, because I'm not (going to]
bar anyone from this courtroom.”
c De: 20

After the prosecution ended its case in chief, Chatman
‘opened his case on June 18, 2003.
‘the Unavailable witne:

on June 9, 2003, Chatman had made submissions in
support of the admission of the statement of an unavailable
witness, Eri Gunji. Prior to trial, on February 14, 2003,
Chatman had moved in limine to have the written statement of
Gunji, @ Japanese national, admitted at trial. The statement,
which was written in Japanese, signed by Gunji, witnessed by Greg
Tavares, an investigator at the Office of the Public Defender,

and dated June 12, 2002, was officially translated as follows:

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1, Ei Gunji, give the following information freely and
Woluntarily.” On the evening of April 6, 2002] ardund 8:30, T met
Tonis [eicl in front of the front desk of the Aubassedor Hotel.
At that tine, Iwas doing monetary exchange [aie] at the front
Gesk. Coming from tne outside, Toni: Walked into the notel,
Roticed me, tapped ne on my shoulders and talked to ne. while
Chatting, “Why sre you here?" and "iow ore you?,” [sic] Tonii, who
Sas carrying @ baby, accompanies by 2 ledy, was waiting for the
Clevaters “The elevator came, and just when Tonily who was
Eafeying ‘the Baby, and the other lacy, west ineiae, I saw th:
{aay slap the left cheek of the baby with her tight hand. The
baby began to cry. Because I hag gotten into the elevator quickly
from the back, the sound of the slap sounded strong. 1 got off at
the 6 floce,’ vnsle the three of then continued eo ascena in the
slevator

 

 

 

   

Chatman had argued that the statement was relevant because it
established Suzuki's motive to lie as well as reasonable doubt as
to the identity of the person who had caused Taison’s injuries.
In response to the prosecution’s objection that the statenent was
hearsay, Chatman had countered that Gunji would be in Japan and
thus unavailable for trial, bringing the statenent under an
exception to the hearsay rule for statenents by unavailable
declarants. The circuit court deferred its ruling on the
adnissibility of the statement until the presentation of the
defense’s case at trial in light of the possibility that Gunji
might be availeble

‘the defense now duly renewed its motion and the circuit
court held a hearing outaide the presence of the jury.
Investigator Tavares testified that Gunji had told him she would
be unavailable for the originally scheduled trial date of March
2003 because she planned to return to Japan in December 2002. He

recalled discussions about taking a video deposition of Gunji,

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but it was never done. He did not know if a motion for material
witness had been filed with respect to Gunji. Finally, he
admitted that he could not attest to Gunji’s truthfulness,
reliability, or competency.

During argument, defense counse} represented that
efforts had been made to secure Gunji’s presence at trial.
Specifically, counsel argued that he had contacted Gunji in
Novenber 2002, whereupon she told him that she had changed her
plans and would not be returning to Japan until late April or
early May 2003. He also represented that she had been served
with a subpoena before she eventually left Hawai‘ in February
2003. Finally, counsel added that her statement would be
corroborated by other defense evidence and was therefore
reliable, accurate, and truthful.

‘The prosecution countered that the statement was not
probative because it did not specifically identify Chatman,
Suzuki, or the baby. Also, the prosecution noted that, after the
trial had started, the defense had contacted Gunji in Japan, but
she refused to return to Hawai'i due to the late notice and
because she expected to be paid for her appearance.

After hearing the preceding evidence and argument, the

circuit court excluded Gunji’s statement, ruling:

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(Elven if this wonan is unavailable, . . . (HRE Rule 806
(1993) }) catchall requires equivalent circumstantial guerentees
of trustworthiness = the other hearsay exceptions unger [HRE Rule
808)

In addition, [MRE Rule £04) requires that the Court must
find that the statenent 1s more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evisence which the Defense can
procure as to the equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness, Here,
fre pave an apparent Japanese National abost whom no one knows
Shuch, except. that she may have been « student in Hawaii at one
Eine. "Neither state nor Defense knows thie individual or anyening
about this individuel. (Chatman) supposedly knew this witness,
But there's, really, ot auch nore available about her, And oo
that basis, Jt would be very difficult to test her motive, Biss,
Intelligence, of memory. This individual statenent was provided
about tuo nonthe after the incident st issue and adentifies 3
Tonii, Teornei-i, a lady anda baby about #130 in the evening on
April’ 6th. ‘There's no veal certainty about wno Toni, the Lacy,
GF the baby are. Aleo(] unidentified() are many sther devaile
Sneluding the witness's perspective, what she sew [tnat] is celled
3 slap, how hard the slap was, and eny surrounding eizcunstances
This Individual defied a court order to spear at First circuit
Court and, apparently, offered to consider returning eo Hewois for
sufficient monetary compensation. These do not suggest
Erustworthiness. These factors, the Court cannot find rise to the
Lelvel} of the guarantees of trustworthiness discussed in the
other [MRE Rule 60d] ‘exceptions, such as cress-examination. These
Sre four instances from the other [HRE Rule 604) exceptions:
Grossmexanination with motive and interest similar te the Party
against whom the hearsay statonent is offered, 2 statenent mace
Gnder belie! thet desth was imminent, corrcboration required where
3 eclarant exculpates an accused and takes the lame himself, oP
& statenent of recent perception not provided in response to the
Instigation of ® person investigating’ a case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Now, [the defense) has represented that there’ s ancther
witness available to testify to this sane matter. Further, Mr.
Chatman, who plans to teke the stand, anyway, can testify co thie
incident.” So the Court is hard put to find that Ms. Gungi’s
Statement is nore probative than any other evidence that ie
Svailable on this matter. And because the [IRE Rule #08)
Fequirenents are not net, even if ve assume unavailability, the
Court cannot Let the statement go in

 

2 WRE Rule £04(b) (8) (ines the “eatchail") is an exception to the
hearsay rule providing in relevant part that a statement of an unavailable
witness is ednissible
GE the court determines that (A) the statement is more probative
fon the point for which it is offered chan any other evicence wnsch
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (B) the
‘eneral purposes of these rules and the intersste of justice will
Bert be served by adsission of the statenent into evidence.

 

 

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Chatman's Testimony

Chatman took the stand in his own defense, and gave
testimony which differed from or expanded upon Suzuki's testimony
in the following material respects. With respect to Suzuki's
April 2001 visit, he stated that the two discussed marriage.
When she expressed her desire for then to be married, he told her

he loved her but was not ready to commit to marriage. He told

 

her the same thing during his October 2001 visit to Japan and
asked her to tell her family this, given that he could not
communicate with them in Japanese, When Suzuki brought her
family to visit Hawas‘i in Novenber 2001 and her parents asked
through an interpreter about their wedding date, he told them
that in America having a child does not necessarily mean
marriage, but that he would be responsible for his son. When he
asked Suzuki whether she had told her parents they were getting
married, she began crying. After her parents left, Suzuki became
depressed; she cried a lot and lost her appetite.

the couple broke off contact for a time after this
visit, but began corresponding again prior to Suzuki's April 2002
trip to Hawai'i. The subject of marriage again came up, with
Suzuki reiterating her desire to get married while Chatman
expressed his ambivalence.

As to thé events of April 6-8, 2002, Chatman denied

that he caused Taison’s injurie:

 

instead, he gave the following

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version of events. On the evening of April 6, 2002, Chatman,
Suzuki, and Taisen returned fron dinner to the Ambassador Hotel.
on the way up to the room, they ran into Gunji, an acquaintance
of Chatman’s, and Gunji and Chatman engaged in some brief chit-
chat, As all four were entering the elevator, Suzuki, who “had

got angry for some r

 

son," slapped Taison in the face.”
Chatman believed that at this time Suzuki was intoxicated due to
the two beers she had consumed at dinner.

In the room, they again talked about marriage. Chatman
told Suzuki that he could not do it, that he was not ready te
make that commitment. Suzuki reacted in a “hostile, violent,
[and] depressed” manner. To calm her down, Chatman took @ shower
together with her. Throughout this time, Taisen was mainly
asleep on the next bed. Chatman did not push Taison’s chin up,
flip him onto the bed, hit, or slap him. He left the room at
approximately 3 a.m. At that time, he did not see any marks or
injuries to Taison.

on Sunday, April 7, 2002, Chatman returned to the hotel
around 3 or 4 p.m. He met Suzuki, who was carrying Taison, in
the lobby. Chatman, “took Taison and . . . noticed that Taison
had a small bump on his head.” Suzuki explained that he had been

crawling on the bed and had bunped his forehead.

 

% suauki denied striking Taisen in the elevator:

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———

The three went up te the room, and Chatman played with
Taison on the bed. Chatman and Suzuki talked, and the subject of
marriage came up again, After about 15 minutes, during which
time Chatman again expressed his unwillingness to commit to
marriage, Chatman left the hotel because he did not want to
Listen to Suzuki's complaining.

Wanting to see hie son, Chatman returned to the hotel
around 6 pom. Suzuki was intoxicated and would not let hin enter
the room. Chatman left. He did not push Taison’s chin up, flip
him onto the bed, hit, or slap him on Sunday evening. On cross~
exanination, Chatman agreed that he was “aware that shaking @
baby could cause the child's death(.]”

on Monday, April 8, 2002, at about 7:30 of 7:45 a.m.,
suzuki called Chatman and asked him “for the ticket to the
airport.” He went to the hotel to pick her up and take her to
the airport for her flight, which was at 10:30 a.m. oF
thereabouts. He met her in the lobby: Taison was with her, but
he did not notice any injury to Taison at that time. When he
dropped Suzuki and Taison off curbside at the airport, he hugged
and kissed Suzuki, and kissed Taison, who was in his stroller.
‘taison appeared to be asleep, but had a sticker on his forehead.
when Chatman asked what it was, Suzuki explained that Taison had

a fever. Needing to move the car, Chatman left it at that and

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eee

drove off. He never told Suzuki, at any time, that Taison was
bleeding on the brain.

As to the evente of September and October 2002, Chatman
testified as follows. Contrary to Suzuki's version, Chatman
stated that she called him three tines beginning in mid- or late
‘August, and they talked on two occasions, despite the family
court restraining order. On September 3, 2002, Suzuki called him
and asked if he could pick her up at the bus stop. He picked he
up, they talked, went shopping, and he bought Suzuki a pair of
shoes at her request. When Suzuki expressed the desire to spend
the night with him, they went to the Hawaiian Monarch, where she
got then 2 roon.”* They stayed together at various places
thereafter, spending almost every day together.

Chatman stated that on each of Suzuki's visits in 2000
land 2001, he would do things for her such as take her shopping
land to the salon, take her to dinner, and buy her things. During
their time together in Septenber 2002, they did much the same,
going shopping, to dinner, and other “{t]ypical things that
lovers do{.]” The subject of marriage came up very often, but he

never showed or gave Suzuki any diamond rings.

\ the parties stipulated that, if called to testify, the records

custodien of the Hawaiian Monarch would state that Asahi Sozuki registered
(0 ain. on September ¢, 2002.

 

 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

Chatman’ birthday was on October 9. Within a day or
two thereafter, he received a birthday card from Suzuki along
with a letter in Japanese, which he could not read. This was the

letter x

 

\é by Suzuki on the stand and allegedly written on
october 20, 2002. On or about October 12, 2002, Suzuki explained
to him that the letter was an apology for Lying to the
prosecution.

on or about October 15, 2002, Chatman gave the original
copy of the letter to his friend Anthony Brown, keeping copies
for himself, because he wanted to find out exactly what it said,
but was afraid that Suzuki might take the letter back. on
october 18, 2002, Chatman had lunch with Phillip Meiave and
another friend, during which he showed them the birthday card”
and a copy of the letter, which he explained were from Suzuki.
Later that evening, he called Brown to get the original so that 2
woman named Junko could translate the letter. After Junko

translated the letter," Chatman and Brown made more copies.

 

Y the birthday card and envelope were not introduced at the trial
Chatnan testifies that he believed Suzuki tosk then, although he did not see

on crose-examinetion, Chatman agreed that he had had his ex-wife,
Kaori Takenats, translate the letter for him on October 22, 2002, but denied
that he had asked her "[I]e st okay?” On redirect and rectoss, Chatman stated
that he had Takenaks translate the letter on Octeser 17, 2002.” In denying
that Takenaka hed translated the letter for him on the night of October 21,
2002, ‘Chatman engaged in the following colloquy with the prosecution:

 

 

{PROSECUTION}: Tent st true, atx, that at that particular time
hen (Takenaka) read the letter, she hac
(cont snue

 

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Also on the night of October 18, Suzuki called and
asked for the letter back because she was afraid of losing
Taison. Having found out what the letter said, Chatman refused,
stating that he intended to give it to his attorney.

fon october 20, 2002, Chatman met with Akiko Wong at
around 9:00 a.m. for an hour or an hour and a half. He then got
in touch with Eugene Carroll, meeting him around 11:00 a.m. and
staying at Carroll's place for two or three hours. Chatman
denied being with Suzuki at or around 1 p.m. on October 20, 2002,
denied striking her in the eye, grabbing her hair, or forcing her
to write a letter that day.

During cross-examination, a bench conference was held
at which the prosecution requested a ruling on whether it could
impeach Chatman using a prior out-of-court statement made to the

police on April 10, 2002. In the statement, Chatman failed to

 

 

sesontsnues) questions ebout the letter?

onan) : She had questions ebout the letter.

PROSECUTION): She didn't think At sounded Like senething &
Sspanese person wovld write, isn’t that correct?

(cnnman 1 don't think 20.

[PROSECUTION]: Didn't she express those concerns to you?

onary) 1 don’t think 20

PROSECUTION): Didn't ahe pointedly ask you at that monent(,]
(Dita you rake [Suscki] write this Letter?

(cnaruan 1... don't gecsll her making that statenent.

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ee

mention that he had seen Suzuki strike Taison in the elevator on
April 6, 2002; instead, while opining that Suzuki had caused
Taison’s injuries, he repeatedly stated, “I don't want to get
inte that{,]" when pressed a to how Taison’s injuries might have
cccurred. Accordingly, the prosecution asked for clarification
as to whether such a response was “tantamount to an assertion of
[chatman’s} Fifth Anendnent right” Limiting the prosecution's
ability to use the prior statement. Defense counsel noted that
there would not be @ problen and that he would object on @
squestion-by-question basis{.)" The circuit court then withheld
a blanket ruling.

linen trial resumed, the prosecution asked whether it
was true that Chatman, when speaking to police on April 10, 2002,
had failed to mention seeing Suzuki strike Taison in the elevator

on April 6, 2002, Chatman replied, “At the time, I

 

I dign't
want to get her in trouble so I asserted my Fifth Amendment right
privilege [sic].” The defense did not object to either the
question or the answer, but another bench conference ensued at
the prosecution's request, and the prosecution again requested a
ruling as to how to proceed.

The circuit court stated that it did not really see a
Fifth Amendment issue, but that it could not give 2 definite
ruling in advance. When questioning resumed, the following
exchange occurred:

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(PROSECUTTON}: So you never told [the police] anythi
seeing this alleged incident in the e!
April th, correct?

   

(vereNse) Asked and enewered.

(Twe county Sustained,

PROSECUTION): Now, your testimony {8 thet you didn't want to
get Asahi Suzuki in trouble?” Ie that your
fest imony?

CHATHA) And 1 asserted my Fifth Amendment right.

 

(PROSECUTION): You're saying that when you spoke to the
(police), you aid not sant to get Ash: Suzuki
in trouble, correct?

cHaTMAR : ‘And 1 asserted ay Fifth Amendment right.
IPROSECUTION]: Listen to -- and just anewer the question I'm

asking. T understand wast you're saying about
your Fifth Amendment,

 

(cHATHAR : vee

[PROSECUTION]: You're saying that you dia not want to get Aeané
Suzuki in crouble when you nade these statenente
oF you spoke to [the police]?

 

(DEFENSE): Objection. Asked and answered. Ask to approach
the bench.

At the bench, the defense objected to the entire line
of questioning and moved for a mistrial based on the
impermissible negative inferences that could be drayn from
Chatman’s testimony regarding his assertion of a Fifth Amendnent
privilege. Defense counsel conceded, however, that the way in

which Chatman was testifying made it unclear as to whether he had

 

asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege on April 10, 2002, or wa
currently attempting to raise the privilege in response to the

prosecution’s questions. Counsel and the court also agreed that:

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(2) Chatman clearly had no Fifth Amendnent privilege regarding
what Suzuki had allegedly done: and (2) no one had eny idea why
Chatman was persisting in such responses. Ultimately, the
circuit court was concerned that “by asserting the Fifth,
[chatman was] making the jury think that he's hiding
sonething[,]” and stated that it would instruct the jury not to
Graw any negative inference from Chatman’s assertion of a Fifth
Amendment privilege, and strike the problematic questions and
answers. The circuit court then denied the motion for a
mistrial, the testimony was stricken, and the jury was duly
instructed to disregard it.
Eugene Rupak's Testimony

Eugene Rupak testified that he was working at a car
wash on Saturday; April 6, 2002, when he saw Chatman arrive in a
Corvette following a light-colored van occupied by Japanese
lady and a baby some time between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. Rupak
looked over again when he heard the baby crying and saw the
sapanese lady slap the baby's face and choke his neck for
approximately five seconds. The lady stopped choking the baby
when she noticed Rupak observing. He observed the incident from

a distance of approximately 30 feet.

° gunukd denied etriking or choking Taison at the car wash that day.

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On crose-examination, Rupak stated that he could not
remember exactly when he began working at the car wash. Among a
series of questions ained at testing Rupak’s menory for dates and
whether he could be certain that the incident had occurred on
April 6, 2002, the prosecution asked Rupak if he was currently
incarcerated and the date on which he was arrested. without
defense objection, Rupak replied that he had been arrested on
May 24, 2002, but admitted that when he was earlier questioned by
the prosecution on May 23, 2003, he could not remenber the
specific date of his arrest even though it was almost precisely a
year to the day. He also admitted that in his May 23, 2003
statement, he did not give a precise date for the slapping
incident, stating only that it occurred during the first week of
April 2002. He added that he could not renember the specific
date when he immigrated to Hawai'i in 1997 or the date when he
got his first job in Hawai'i, although those were important dates
to hin.

Chatman’ s Other Witnesses

Guy Okada stated that he saw Chatman vith Taison and a

 

Japanese woman on the morning of April 6, 2002, around

 

0 a.m.
but did net notice any injuries to Taison. Anthony Brown

testified that Chatman asked him to keep Suzuki's apology letter
for him some time between October 15 and October 18, 2002. Brown
added that he met with Chatman and a woman named Junko a few days

2%
“NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

later so that Junko could translate the letter, Phillip Meiava
testified that on October 18, 2002, Chatman showed him “a normal~
size birthday card,” written in Japanese, from the Japanese “wife
of his son.” On re-direct, Maiava clarified that he only saw an
envelope, not an actual card. Eugene Carroll declared that
Chatman visited him on October 20, 2002, arriving at around
31:18 a.m, and renaining for approximately 2.5 hours.
D. The a al
ori 1. mon

The prosecution called Chatman's ex-wife, Kaori
‘Takenaka, to challenge Chatman's testimony that she had not told
him that she did not think Suzuki's letter sounded like something
a Japanese person would write. Takenaka, originally from Japan
and a native Japanese speaker, gave the following testimony
regarding the letter. On October 21, 2002, Chatman called her at
work and told her that he needed to see her after work. hen he
picked her up, he told her that he had a letter written by Suzuki
that he wanted her to translate into English. ‘This was the first
time she had seen the letter, but Chatman told her that Junko had
translated the letter for him earlier thet day.

linen the prosecution asked Takenake whether she had

asked Chatman about how the letter was prepared, the defense

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objected that it was improper rebuttal. The circuit court,

before allowing her to answer, instructed the jury as follow:

 

T]he answer you're about to hear, you cannot consider to prove
Any matters asserted within whatever 18 going to be asserted,

this 42 only fo De considered... on the issue of
bility ang for no ether purpose: “You cannot consider it as
Sroct of any substantive matteré. Iv'e enly relevant ang to be
Considered by you on the issue of credibility and for no other
purpose.

 

 

‘Takenaka then answered that she asked Chatman whether he had
forced Suzuki to write it, but he denied it. When the
prosecution asked why Takenaka was concerned about the letter,
the defense again objected, and the circuit court again gave the
seme instruction te the jury regarding the forthcoming answer
‘Takenaka then answered that she was concerned because the
Japanese used in the letter “was not natural for Japanese would
write. ‘That wae interpreted from English.” The defense
objected, arguing that there was no basis for Takenaka to give
such an opinion. The circuit court sustained the objection and
instructed the jury to disregard Takenaka’s response in total.
When questioning resumed, Takenaka verified that, after
translating the letter, she had told Chatman that the letter did
not “sound like something @ Japanese person would write[.]" The
circuit court again instructed the jury that this answer could
only be used on the issue of Chatman's credibility. Takenaka
concluded her testimony, over objection, by stating that Chatman

told her that he had pulled Suzuki’s hair in anger, telling

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Suzuki he was upset with her for being selfish and concerned only
with herself and Taison.
E. Closing Argument

In its closing argunent, the prosecution referred,
without objection, to the fact that Rupak had been in custody
during his questioning:

Saturday might mean different things for different people. It
Bight mean a weekend for many. It doesn’t mean a weexend for

Br. fupak. Be works seven days @ week. He worked the sane heure
every day. Every day was the same. iothing, he cells you,
happened around the date of April éth that’s. significant

Bife cther than thie alleged incident thet he sees. Ke cen
Eenenber that dete. But how ironic that this same inaivisual
Ean’ even renenber the date that he had been arrestes and wes in
custody when he was questioned one day short of # year of thet
sate

 

nse

 

  

The prosecution also described defense counsel as
having “played up” allegations that Suzuki had slapped Taison.
In response to the defense’s closing argument that “the defense
position is that [Suzuki) did this to (Taison, but] we also
submit that (Suzvki] did not mean to kill Taison,” the

prosecution, over the defense objection that the remarks were

 

personal and demeaning, argued:

(Defense counsel} tells you about Asahi Suzuki doing this te
[vaison] and tells youl,] Dut she didn’t mean it. Where did he
get that fron? If you believe Asahi Suzuki did it, isn’t there
Every reason to believe that she would have done thie purposely?
What's the reason to say she didn’t mean it?) Why does he say
This?” Why does he Rake these comments? Why does he cone forward,
by does Hr. Kanai suggest to you that, well, Asahi Suzuki
Wovldn't have meant it, nobody would have meant it? Because you
Know why? He wants (Co have) his cake and est it, toe.

   

 

 

You see, ladies and gentlenen, when counsel made that
argunent, he wants You to say, well, you know, if Anthony Chatman

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Af you tind that Anthony Chatean is guilty or did the act
against (Taison), I want to give you an cot. I want to let you
think that you can consider the included offenses.” 1 got to find
a way to do that. I got to find a way Eo argue out of both sides
Gf'my mouth, and that’s really what be did. 'So he cane up with,
well, Asahi’ suzuki cidn’t mean it, just like no one would have
Beant it. But there's no evidence of any of that

 

With regard to the letter and whether Chatman had
compelled Suzuki to write it, the prosecution argued:

He had just assaulted her. He told her what to write. He's
sitting there witn his imposing presence next to ner.” He
Snsaulted her in the past." These are. things that jou cen
Consider in determining whether or not the defendent sae
Compelling [Suzuki] to write the letter

 

‘The prosecution also mentioned, without objection, the effect of
shame on Japanese people, arguing:

Fear of the letter by [Suzuki] meant she was controlled. was it
intent to induce [Suzuki] to avoid legal process? Well, the
contents of the Letter ill shane her. che has to tell’ her
family, ‘the prosecutors, the policel,] I'ma liar. shane- Now,
ladies and gentlemen, you can use your life experiences. shane’ is
a'very big thing. I¢ means o Lot.” Now, ladies and gentlemen, to
People in Japan, to people in Japan, shane is even grester

 

 

Finally, the prosecution asked rhetorically, “Why is it that the

defense attorney didn't really want to address how that letter

 

4 prior to closing, the defense objected to the prosecution's use of a
Power Foint slide referring to this evidence, arguing thet it was prejudicial.
‘The prosecution respondes that Suzuki had testified on cross-examination that
he had been struck in the eye by Chatman in the past and the court hea denied
the motion for # nistrial ang request to strike, so the testimony wae in
evicence. The circuit court overruled the defense objection, reasoning that
The evidence of the past assault was relevant to che exterticn count onder
State vs Valdivia, 95 Hawai's 465, 24 P32 661 (2001), because 1t would
Satablisn the genuineness of the threat and compulsicn te write the letter.
‘The defense argued that because Suzuki's statement Was Made in the context of
‘Gxplaining way she could not recall which eye she had been struck in, it was
Sneoanected ta any fear she may have nag at the time she wrote the letter.

The circuit court remained unmoved, and the slide was allowed. In total, the
slide in question, titled "Defendant Compelled Asahi to Write the Letter,”
Contained four numbered points: (1) “He had Just assaulted ner"; (2) “He told
her what to write’) (3) "He was sitting next to her") and (4) "He had
asequlted her in the past.”

 

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was made and why there’s all these [sic] inconsistent evidence

with respect to that?”

At the close of argument, defense counsel noted for the
record that he objected to all of the prosecution's personal
references to him as unnecessarily demeaning.

F.  dury Instructions

hen instructions were settled, the defense requested a
merger instruction for the extortion, intimidation, and abuse
counts. Counsel explained his request as follows:

IW]e'ze saying that (the intimidation count) along with (the
extortion count and atuse of = househeld member count] provides
Shat I call e merger problem, In other word ‘under the
Rete" aGduced, "We taxe the position that nether you're telking
[in] terms of conduct of intent, it's clear that there wes just a
singular ineident or occurrence’... « such that. [Chetman] 1s
being overcharges. And the impact upon the Jury of being
overcharged 12 quite significant. Tt is significant in the sense
Ekta jury woule tend to believe thet -- they believe chat
Gefendant charges with & greater nunber of offenses 1s more likely
fo be guilty than net.

 

 

 

 

The circuit court rejected Chatman’s request in part, but did
allow 2 merger instruction as to the ebuse count. On the
intimidation and extortion counts, the circuit court instructed
the jury as follows:

A person connite the offense of Intimideting a witness if he
uses force upon a person he believes is about to be called as &
Mdtness in any official proceeding, with intent to influence the
"Sstinony of thet witness or £0 induce that person to avoid Legal
process sunnoning her to testify.

 

There are two material elenents of the offense of
Intimidating a Witness, cach of which the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt.

‘These tho elements are:

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1, That, on oF about the 20th day of October, 2002,
wani)_used' farce upon Asahi Suzuki, a person he believed is|
o be called ass witness in any official proceedings and

cha
500

 

 

2. That (Chatman) did so with the intent to influence the
testimony of Asahi Suruki oF to induce Asahi Survei to avoid legal
process summoning her to testify.

 

 

A person comite the offense of Extortion in the Second
Degree if he intentionally conpels or incuces ancther person to
‘engage in conduct from which she has a legal right to abstain by
Ehzeatening sy word or conduct to cause Bodily injury in the
futore to the person threatened,

 

 

There are three elenents of the offense of Extortion in the
Second Degree, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable couse

‘These three elements are
2, that, on or about the 20th day of October, 2002, .

Chatnan{) coapelied or induced Asahi Suzuki to engage in conduct,
from which she had a Legal right to ebstaini and

 

2. That (Chatman) did so by threatening by word or conduct
to cause bodily injury in the future to Asahi Sotuki; and

 

3. Tat (Chataan) did so sntentionslly.
The circuit court also charged the jury to consider the lesser
included offenses of assault in the first degree and assault in
the second degree in the event it could not reach @ unaninous
verdict on the attempted murder charge. In addition, the court
cautioned the jury that “[yJou must not be influenced by pity for

the defendant or for any other person[.)”

 

Verdict and Post-Tria:
The jury retired for deliberations on June 26, 2003.
on June 30, 2003, the jury found Chatman guilty as charged. On
July 24, 2003, Chatman filed a motion for a new trial, alleging,
{inter alia, juror misconduct by Jacom Reyes. The motion came on

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for hearing on Septenber 15, 2003, and November 17, 2003, was
continued for further hearing on February 9, 2004, April 19,
2004, and May 10, 2004, and continued again to duly 19, 2004. In
between episodes of the new trial saga, Chatman filed a motion on
April 20, 2006 for reconsideration of the request for a mistrial
due to prosecutorial misconduct in eliciting references to
Chatman’s Fifth Anendnent privilege.

With respect to the juror misconduct issue, Wesley
testified at length that juror Reyes had spoken to him about the
case at @ graduation party in ‘Eva Beach on June 21, 2003.
Filoteo also testified that Reyes and Wesley had talked. Reyes,
fon the other hand, denied that a conversation had taken place
Chatman then asked for a two- or three-week continuance to secure
witnesses to rebut Reyes’ testimony. At the July 19 hearing,
Chatman moved for another continuance of the hearing in order to
secure the appearance of witnesses. Counsel represented that one
of the witnesses, according to the sheriff, was avoiding process.
The cixcuit court denied the continuance, stating that the motion
had now been pending for nearly a year. Defense counsel then
moved to withdraw from the case, and Chatman addressed the court
in support of the motion, stating that he had lost confidence in
counsel due to his failure to procure the attendance of witnesses
he considered crucial to his defense. The circuit court denied
the motion to withdraw and request for new counsel, denied the

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motion for reconsideration of the request for mistrial as already

ruled upon, and denied the motion for a new trial based upon the

following findings of fact:

1

acon Reyes... sat a5 a juror in the consolidated trials
[ef Chatman) fom May 29, 2003, through Jone 26, 2003) Sury
deliberations begen on the afternoon ef June 26, 2003.
During trial, Reyes occupied Chait Ho, 10,

 

fon May 30, 2003, as he filed out of the courtroom with other
Jurors duting 2’ trial recess, Reyes greetea with @ nelle end
ities on the cheek a wonan who wae sitting in the back tow of
the courtroom gallery. This woaan, identified ae Victoria
Filotes, was @ distant childhood friend of Mr. Reyes’ [ese]
and sat with (Chataan's] brother, Wesley Chathan, After
Questioning of Mr. Reyes by Court and counsel, at th
Fequest of the defense, the Court permittes Mr. Reyes to
Hesain on the Jury

 

 

(on June 30, 2003, the jury returned verdicts of guiity.
=) These verdicts were read in open ccurt, with Jury,
Counsel, and Defenaant present. Then, pursuant to a request
for a poll of the Jury, the Court anstractes the Jury that,
as to each count of cage, the clerk would call each juror,
Who should answer "yee" if he or she agreed with the verdict
Fead, and "no" if he or she cig not agree with the veraict
Feed. “During the polling, Reyes, together with all ether
Sleven jurors, responded that he agreeo with each and all of
the guilty verdicts unich had been read.” As to each count
or case, Reyes answered in the affirmative.

 

 

 

During the hearing on the motion, Wesley Chatman testified
tthat, on the evening of June 21, 2003, Reyes told hin that
Reyes did not think [Chatman] was guilty; no one Listened te
Reyes during “conferences,” which therefore were
eaningless; Reyes slept during sone proceedings; and Reye:
“sometimes” cane to court “stoned,” the three terms within
apostrophes [sic] being undefined.

 

 

fon June 21, 2003, during trial, Reyes, at the invitation of
his brother, ateended for ® to'10 minutes a party, whose
Purpose and whose honoree Reyes dic not know. He’ say have
Naved to Filoteo, who was present at the party with Mm
Chatman, whose last nane Reyes did not know

Filotes' and Chatman were about 30 £

   

Reyes had a plate of food nade up, then left the party. He
told his brother that he had to leave the get-together “now”
because two persons somehow connected to the trial for which
Reyes was serving as a Juror were present, Reyes hed been
instructed by the Court not to have contact with the two
Sdiviguals, and Reyes was “under cath.”

 

 

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20

n

a.

2.

During the 5 to 10 minutes at the party, Reyes had stout

ial of a Budweiser Light beers He was not under the
{neluence of any substance st the time. Filoteo did not
introduce Reyes to Wesley Chatman, nor did either exchange
any words with Reyes. Reyes has hot otherwise seen either
{ndvviaualy prior to trial, he had last seen Filoteo about
10 years earlier:

   

 

During the party, Reyes did not say or suggest that
Tehatmen] wee net guilty, or that he dia not pay full
attention of slept during trial, or that he was under the
{influence of ony substance during trial, or that he felt his
Opinions would tot be listened of were rot listened to by
SEher Jurors. On dune 21, 2003, jury deliberations had not
yer begun

 

fihen Reyes responded during the jury polling that he agreed
Muth the gullty verdicts which had been read, his answers
weflected Reyes! considered opinion in sccordance with the
Evidence and instructions of law, ond reflected the vote of
the Susy

fon March 10, 2004, in response to the Court's subpoena,
Reyes speared and answered all questions fut to hin by the
Court ond both counsel. Reyes, @ college student, sppeared
Sober ond sppropristely responsive

 

 

According to the verdict forms and the polling of the Jurys
the jory’s veraicts . . , were unanimous.

lesley Chatnan's testimony was incredible, and Reyes"
Sestimony was credible,

Based upon the credible evidence and the totality of the
Circumstances, Reyes wee not under the influence of any
Substance during trial or deliberations, ang he did not
Wiolate the Court's inetruction to him that h

Contact with Filotes.

    

 

‘The court then entered its judgment of conviction and sentence as

indicated in the introduction above. Chatman filed a timely

notice of appeal on August 18, 2004.

on February 24, 2005, the clerk of this court filed

letter from Chatman in which he alleged that his trial counsel,

Chester Kanai, had failed to appear at a scheduled February 7,

2005 parole hearing, failed to communicate with him, failed to

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diligently pursue his appeal, and failed to effectively assist
him at trial. Chatman attached @ letter, dated Novenber 16,
2004, and addressed to Kanai regarding: (1) Kenai's failure to
take a video deposition of Gunji in Japan when he had taken a
video deposition of Rupsks (2) Kanai’s failure to subpoena a
witness named Akiko Wong who would have provided an alibi for
Chatman and testified that she translated Suzuki's letter for him
on October 18, 20027 (3) Kanai’s failure, due to alleged
unwillingness to delay his trip to Japan, to raise the issue of
Jacom Reyes’ alleged misconduct before the defense rested or the
jury retired for deliberations; and (4) Kanai’s slow pace in
pursuing the appeal. On February 25, 2005, Kanai filed @ motion
for withdrawal and substitution of counsel based upon his belief
that Chatman intended to claim on appeal that Kanai provided
ineffective assistance. He agreed in an attached declaration
that Chatman had complained to him regarding the points raised
above. After remand by order of this court, the motion was
granted and Chatman’s current counsel, Linda Jameson, was
appointed.

IT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Lon: ions, Statutor: nd

Questions of Law
"A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de

nove, under the right/wrong standard of review.” Child Support,

 

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Enforcement Agency v. Ros, 96 Hawai'i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70
(2001) (quoting State v, Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i 207, 209, 10 P.3d
728, 730 (2000)) (brackets omitted). Questions of constitutional
law and statutory interpretation are reviewed under the sane
standard, State v, Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 411, 984 P.2d 1231,
1237 (1999); State vs Arcee, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 926 F.2d 843, 852
(1996).
B. Motion for a Mistrial

A trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335,
349, 926 P.2d 1258, 1272 (1996). “Generally, to constitute an
abuse [of discretion] it must appear that the court clearly
exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party
litigant.” Sapp v. Wong, 62 Haw. 34, 41, 609 P.2d 137, 142
(1980) (quoting State v. Sacoco, 45 Haw. 288, 292, 367 P.2d 11,
33 (1962))-
C. Erosecutorial Misconduct

“prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial or the
setting aside of a guilty verdict only where the actions of the
prosecutor have caused prejudice to the defendant's right to a
fair trial.” State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai'i 148, 158, 971 P.2d
782, 792 (1994) (citations omitted). “Allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under the harmless beyond a

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reasonable doubt standard, which requires an examination of the
record and a determination of ‘whether there ie a reasonable
possibility that the error complained of might have contributed
to the conviction.’" State vs Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 36, 47, 79 P.3d
131, 140 (2003) (citations omitted). In determining whether such
fa reasonable possibility exists, the appellate court considers:
(1) the nature of the alleged conduct: (2) the promptness or lack
of a curative instruction; and (3) the strength or weakness of
the evidence against the defendant. State v, Aorabante, 13 Haw.
179, 198, 830 P.2d 492, 502 (1992).

Evidentiary Rulings

 

[D]itferent stancarde of review must be applied te trial court
Gecisions regarding the scmicsibslity of evidence, depending cn
the requirenents of the particular rule of eviaence st issue.
nen application of a particular evidentiary ule can yield only
fone correct result, the proper standard of appellate review 12 the
Fignt/usong Stangats. However, the traditiens: abuse of
Giscretion standard should be applied in the case of those rules
of evidence that regeire “Judgment call” on the part of the
trial court.

 

 

Kealoha v. County of Hawai'i, 74 Haw. 308, 319-20, 844 P.2d 670,
676 (1993). Evidentiary rulings on relevance under HRE Rules 401
and 402 are reviewed under the right/wrong standard. Tabieres v
Clark Buin, Cou, 65 Hawai'i 336, 350-51, 944 P.2d 1279, 1293-94
(1997). Similarly, the adnissibility of evidence based on the
hearsay rules is generally reviewed under the right /wrong
stondard, State v, Moore, 82 Hawai'i 202, 217, 921 P.2d 122, 197

(1996). However, determinations of trustworthiness under HRE

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Rule 604(b) (8) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. ev
Haili, 103 Hawai'i 69, 99-100, 79 P.3d 1263, 1273-74 (2003).

Admission of opinion testimony is also reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Ferrer, 95 Hawai'i
409, 422, 23 P.3d 744, 757 (App. 2001). Similarly, the decision
to exclude otherwise relevant evidence under HRE Rule 403 because
of the potential for prejudice “is eminently suited to the trial
court's exercise of ite discretion because it requires a cost-
benefit calculus and a delicate balance between probative value
and prejudicial effect.” Haili, 103 Hawai'i at 101, 79 P.3d at
1275 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, absent plain error, a party may not assign as
error the admission or exclusion of evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected and a timely objection, stating
the specific grounds, was made. HRE Rule 103(a). Whether an
error in admitting or excluding witness testimony is harmless
beyond @ reasonable doubt or affects a substantial right depends
on various factors including: (1) the importance of the witness
to the party's case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative:
(3) the presence or absence of testimony corroborating the
testimony on material points: and (4) the overall strength of the
party's case. State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 420, 56 P.3¢
692, 722 (2002).

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E.  dury Instructions

lien jury instructions or the omission thereof are et issue on
‘appeal, the standard of review ie whether, when read and
Goneicered as 2 whole, the instructions given are prejudicially
Insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or mislesding. Erronecus
instructions’ are presumptively harmful andere a ground for
Feverssl unless it affirmatively appears from the record a2 &
hole that the error was not prejudicial. (However, ejrror is not
fo'be viewes in isciaticn and considered purely in the abstract
Tt must be examined in the Light of the entire proceedings and
given the effect unich the whole record shoe it to be entitled
In that context, the real question becones whether there i# 8
Feasonable possibility that error might Reve coneedbutes to
Conviction. If there ie such @ reasonable possibility ina
Erininal case, then the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable
Goubt, and che Sudanent of conviction on which iz may have Deen
Bared must be set aeide:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

State v. Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289, 292-93, 119 P.3d 597, 600-01
(2005) (internal citations, quotation marks, indentations, and
paragraphing omitted; bracketed material added) .
F. Improper Remarks by a Witness

Whether a witness's improper remarks constitute
reversible error depends on: (1) the nature of the impropriety;
(2) the promptness of a curative instruction; and (3) the

strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant.

State v. Samuel, 74 Haw. 141, 148-49, 838 P.2d 1374, 1378 (1992).
G. Ine! vs e]

‘the defendant has the burden of establishing ineffective
asistance of counsel and must meet the following two-part test:
i}"that there vere errors or omissions reflecting counsel's lack
of skill, Judguent, or ailigence: and 2) thet such errors or
Omissions resulted’ in either the withdrawal or substantial
impairment of «potentially meritorious defense. To satisfy this
second prong, the defendant needs to show a possible impairment,
Eather than a probable ispaimment, of a potentially neritorious
Gofense. A defendant need not prove actual prejudice.

 

 

 

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State v. Wakisake, 102 Hawai'i 504, 514, 78 P.3d 317, 327 (2003)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted)
TIT. piscussion
A. The Circuit Court Did Not elainly Err in Acceding to the
fonse Request. in Jt Sleva
Eiloteo Voluntarily Not Attend the Trial.
Chatman first argues that the circuit court violated
his constitutional right to a public trial when it excluded

Wesley and Filoteo from the trial. The pro:

 

cution counters that
this claim ie without merit because it was in fact at the
strenuous insistence of the defense that Reyes was retained as a
juror in conjunction with Wesley and Filoteo’s voluntary
agreement not to return to court, Based on the following, we
hold that the circuit court did not plainly err in acceding to
the defense request to keep Reyes as 2 juror and secure the
voluntary departure of Wesley and Filoteo.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that not only did
the defense not object to the retention of Reyes as a juror when
it was determined that he was acquainted with Filoteo, but it
expressly requested his retention even after the circuit court
and prosecution indicated their desire to have him excused. As
such, any error can only be considered invited, and, as a general
rule, invited errors are not reversible. State v, Jones,

96 Hawai'i 161, 166, 29 P.3d 351, 356 (2001); State v. Puaoi,
78 Hawai'i 185, 189, 891 P.2d 272, 276 (1995); State v. smith,
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68 Haw. 304, 313-24, 712 P.24 496, $02 (1986). However, it is
also true that this court will still reverse where an invited
error is so prejudicial as to be plain error or to constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. Smith, 68 Haw. at 314, 712
P.2d at 502.

In this case, however, there was no error at all. A
defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed by state and federal
constitution the right to a public trial. State v. ortiz,

91 Hawai's 181, 190, 981 P.2d 1127, 1136 (1999). Ae set forth
above, the circuit court in this case acknowledged this right,
stating, “This is a public proceeding. And I don’t want to bar
anyone from the courtroom." After agreeing to the defense
proposal to keep Reyes, the court also stated, “I’m (going tol
ask [the couple} te leave, please. If that’s with their consent
(Emphasis added.) Based on the facts of this case, therefore, it
cannot be said that the trial court's assent to the defense
proposal to have Chatman’s brother and Filoteo leave can even be
considered a closure of the courtroom: had the couple or the
defense requested that they be allowed to stay, it appears from
Pie note that the focus on the spectators’ consent rather than
chatnan'S consent woe misplaced. It s¢\ well settied that the sixth chendnent
sour ins," Bebseauale, €49 G-5. 366, 399080 11575): ‘Sinilerly, article se
Section i7 of the Hawai's Constitution, entitied “Rights of Accused,” provides

thet “the secused shall enjoy the right toa speedy and public trusl(.]"
(Emphasis added.)

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———
the record that Reyes would have been excused as a juror and
their attendance would have been permitted. Because the circuit
court did not bar anyone from the courtroom, Chatman’s right to a
public trial was not violated and there was no error, much less
plain error.
B, The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denving
Chatman’ s Mot ea Misi ed on SUZUKI" mon’
# 4 +

Chatman next argues that the circuit court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial based on Suzuki's
testimony that, after falling asleep the first night she met
Chatman, the next thing she noticed was that he “was on top of
[her.]” Chatman argues that the prejudicial effect of this
testimony, which constituted evidence of a prior bad act, could

not be cured because this case ultimately boiled down to &

4 alternatively, we believe that Chatman's right to a public tri
should be decned waived,” Although it does not appear thet this court has ever
Eassed on the issue, other courte have held chat, unlike other constitutional:

 

 

 

Plghes, walver cf the right to public trial need not be made by the defencant
Zefesneily. See Levine v, United Steves, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960) (holding

Bhat the failure to object to closure of the courtroom constitutes waiver of
the right tes public trial)? see also People v. Stadiarg, 929 P.2a $44, $70
(esi. 1897), (hofding that no personal waiver By the cefendant is required to
Acive the figne toa public trial and defense counsel's failure to object to
“osure ss sufficient for weiver to be found); Berkuts v. State, 788 So. 24
{obi, 1082-63 (ria. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("A defense counsel's affirmative
Eeprésentation to the court chat the defendant consents to excluding persons
Etherwise entitled to be in the courtroom ie sufficient to effectively waive
fhe defendens's right te a public trial"); People vs Hayden, 786 N.£.2d 106,
SESAU"TEi, app, cts 2003) (etaing that the rignt to a public trial may be
“dived by counsel or by failure to ebject to closure); Besple vy, Oauahtry, 664
Riv.s.26 30e, 308 (1997) (fSnding that defense counsel effectively waived the
Sofendant’s fight to a fair trial by consenting to closure of the courtroom).
‘esuning arguendo that the courtroen was Constructively closed in part,
counsel not only failed to object but affirmatively requested and
to the partial closure. Accordingly, he waived Chatman’ s right to
have Wesley and Filotes present

 

 

   

 

 
  

 

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credibility contest between Suzuki and Chatman? as such, the
effect of her testimony damaged his credibility and could easily
have tipped the contest in her favor. The prosecution responds

that

   

(2) the incomplete response given by Suzuki was not p:
bad act evidence: and (2) even assuming that it was improper
prior bad act evidence, the circuit court’s prompt curative
instruction was an adequate renedy in light of the strength of
the evidence. Based on the following, we conclude that the
prosecution's response has merit.

The controlling case regarding this point of error is
Samuel. In that case, an expert witness for the prosecution, who
had previously been warned not to mention prior bad acts,
testified that the defendant had a history of violence. 74 Haw.
at 149, 838 P.2d at 1378. After the defense objected, the trial
court struck the remark and instructed the jury to disregard it.
Jd. 0n appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court's
response was inadequate to remedy the prejudicial effect of the

witness’s improper remarks and a mistrial should have been

 

granted. Id, at 148, 838 P.2d at 1378. This court disagreed,
applying the three-pronged prosecutorial misconduct analysis and
concluding that the curative instruction was sufficient. Id. at
148-43, 838 P.2d at 1376-79.
The circumstances of the instant case are
indistinguishable from Samuel. Having been cautioned by the
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prosecution not to refer to other incidents unless specifically
asked, Suzuki nevertheless began to describe what could be
construed as Chatman's initiation of a sexual act without
consent. Also as in Samuel, the defense promptly objected and
the trial court struck the remark, instructing the jury te
disregard it.

Tt must also be acknowledged, however, that while the
circumstances here and in Samuel are similar, the substance of
the analysis is different, As Chatman correctly notes, the
principal issue in this case was the identity of the person who
caused Taison’s injuries. the prosecution's only substantive
evidence on this point was the testimony of Suzuki, which the
defense countered with the denials of Chatman. In short, the
jury was tasked with weighing the credibility of Suzuki against
that of Chatman. Thus the third prong of the misconduct analysis
points in Chatman's favor.

on the other hand, the first two prongs point in the
prosecution's favor. First, the harm to Chatman was less than in
Samuel in that Suzuki, unlike the expert in Samuel, who clearly
stated that the defendant had a history of prior bad acts, was
not allowed to finish her response. Therefore, although Suzuki's
testimony might suggest non-consensual sexual activity, there was
no definitive introduction of prior bad act evidence. Moreover,
the testimony did not bear on Chatman’s character for

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truthfulness, nor were there any charges of sexual misconduct in
this case such that there was 2 danger that the testimony could
be used as improper propensity evidence. Finally, the circuit
court responded promptly by striking the testimony and
instructing the jury to disregard it. Accordingly, we hold that
the circuit court's remedy was adequate, and thus no abuse of
discretion was committed in denying the motion for a mistrial.
c. cut e

to he Statenent of G ‘ton

touthe Hearsay Rule

Chatman’s third point of error is that the circuit
court abused its discretion in refusing to admit Gunji's
statement that she saw a woman, presumably Suzuki, strike a baby,
presumably Taison, in the hotel elevator on April 6, 2002.
Chatman argues that the hearsay analysis is less stringent when
it is the defense seeking admission of an out-of-court statement
because the defendant’ s constitutional right to confront
witnesses is not implicated, only the rules of evidence. The
prosecution counters that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion because Chatman failed to show that Gunji's statement
was trustworthy and more probative on the point for which it was
offered than any other evidence that Chatman could procure.
Again, the prosecution’s argument has merit.
First, it is true that the hearsay analysis in this

case is both simpler and less stringent because it is the

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defendant who seeks to introduce the out-of-court statement. In
Haili, this court noted, “Evidence may be admissible pursuant to
the hearsay rules and yet violate a defendant’s constitutional
right to confront adverse witnesses.” Haili, 103 Hawai'i at 100,
79 P.3d at 1274 (citations onitted). Here, only the catchall
exception to the hearsay rule, HRE 804(b) (8), is implicated,
because it is the defendant proffering the evidence. To be
admissible under HRE Rule 804(b) (8), a statement must be
“trustworthy.” Id. at 102, 79 P.3d at 1276.

As set forth above, the circuit court engaged in a
detailed inquiry as to the trustworthiness of Gunji's statement.

‘The court found the statement untrustworthy on the grounds that

 

(1) Ae did not clearly identity Chatman, Suzuki, or Taison:

(2) various material details were lacking and (3) Gunji had
refused to obey subpoena and had indicated a willingness to
testify only upon sufficient compensation. We do not believe
that the foregoing analysis clearly exceeds the bounds of reason;
as such, it cannot be said that the circuit court's decision to
exclude the statement constituted an abuse of discretion.

D. Chatman’s Araument that Officer Nauven’s Testimony Was
‘Improper Opinion Should Be Deened Waived.

Chatman next contends that the circuit court abused its
discretion in allowing Officer Nguyen to give his lay opinion

that Suzuki was afraid she was going to lose Taison. He argues

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that Nguyen’s opinion was not helpful to the jury and was unduly
prejudicial in that, due to Nguyen’s status as a police officer,

the opinion had the effect of improperly bolstering Suzuki's

 

credibility. The prosecution argues that: (1) this objection

should be deemed waived because Chatman failed to raise it in the

 

trial court; (2) the objection fails on the merits; and (3) even
Af the testimony was improperly adnitted, any error was harmless.
We agree with the prosecution that Chatman failed to preserve an
objection.

As set forth above, Officer Nouyen gave what could be

considered opinion testimony at three points:

 

(1) he testifies,
without objection, that Suzuki “was really scared, scared of
[Chatman], and seemed like she was really scared to lose her
child”; (2) he testified that Suzuki “was a girl that was afraid
for her life, afraid for her child, afraid to lose her child{,1”
but that testimony was stricken in response to a defense
objection and the jury was instructed to disregard ity and (3) in
response to @ subsequent question, he gave his impression that
Suzuki was afraid “she vas going to lose her son{,]” and a
defense objection that the testimony was non-responsive was
overruled.

It is well settled that testimonial objections not
raised or properly preserved at trial will generally not be

considered on appeal. See, £.c., State v. Crisostono, 94 Hawai’
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282, 290, 12 F.3d 873, 881 (2000) ("A hearsay objection not
raised or properly preserved in the trial court will net be
considered on appeal.” (Citation omitted.)}. Moreover, “(where
specific grounds are stated in an objection, the implication is
that there are no others or, if there are others, that they are
waived." State , 57 Haw, 96, 101, $50 P.24 900, 904
(1976) (citations omitted). See also Crisostome, 94 Hawai'i at
290, 12 P.3d at 681 (holding that even if an objection to
testimony was made on other grounds, a hearsay objection on
appeal was waived). Here, Chatman did not object to the first
opinion statement, and objected only on responsiveness grounds to
the third. In between, his objection to the second statement was
sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard the statement.
Accordingly, his objection on appeal is waived in two cases and
moot in the third.

EB. the Court Did Wi p Allowing Evidence
of Rupak’s Arrest and imprisonment.

Chatman’s £i£th assignment of error is that, even
though he did not object, the circuit court plainly erred in

allowing the prosecution to elicit testimony from Rupak that he
had been arrested and imprisoned. The prosecution responds that

the evidence was relevant to Rupak’s memory for specific dates

 

and, therefore, also to his credibility. Chatman counters that

even if the evidence tended to undermine Rupak’s memory as to the

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precise date, April 6, 2002, of the slapping incident, it was
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Based on the
following, we hold that the circuit court did not plainly err in
allowing the testimony.

Evidence of the date of Rupak's arrest was relevant
both to Rupak’s memory and to his credibility, It is well
established that on cross-examination, a party is entitled to
test a witness's perception, memory, and credibility. State v
Beseti, 101 Hawai'i 172, 180, 65 P.3d 119, 127 (2003). on
May 23, 2003, Rupak testified in his deposition that he had seen
the wonan slap the child sone time during the first week of
April. Consistent with this level of precision for dates, he
also testified that he did not remember the precise date on which
he was arrested (even though it was almost a year to the day) or
the day on which he first came to Hawai'i, though he acknowledged
that these were important dates in his life. However, less than
a month later, Rupak testified at trial that the date of the
slapping incident was April 6, 2002. Accordingly, the
prosecution asked a question designed to show that, if Rupak
could not even renenber the day on which he was arrested, May 24,
2002, it was unlikely that he could suddenly remember the precise
date of an event that occurred one month earlier and was

presumably of less significance in his life.

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Of course, this question also implicated Rupak's

credibility (e.a., it suggested that perhaps he had been coached

 

subsequent to his deposition and prior to trial). With respect

to attacks on credibility, this court has held:

 

Evidence to be adnissible for the purpose of affecting the
credibility of a witness must be such as bears directly upon his
character for truth and veracity. Otherwise it would be

ferelevant. It is not competent if it parely tends to aisgrs

 

   

 

 

Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 294, 474 P.2d 288, 295 (1970)
(citation omitted; emphasis added). Here, however, the evidence
did not tend merely to disgrace Rupak; rather, it also
demonstrated his memory for dates. Moreover, its probative value
could not clearly be said to be outweighed by any unfair
prejudice because the prosecution did not dwell on the arrest,
nor did it reveal the nature of the crime for which it had been
made or whether @ conviction had resulted. Accordingly, there
was no error, much less plain error, in admitting it.
Fr
Ws Rebuttal Test izony Regarding He:
Whether the Apology Letter Was Translated from English.
Chatman next contends that the circuit court abused its

discretion in allowing Takenaka to give her opinion as to whether
the letter appeared to have been translated from English. He
argues that Takenaka was not qualified to give such an opinion
and that the opinion was not relevant to impeachment. The

prosecution counters that: (1) Takenaka’s testimony was relevant

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to impeachment; and (2) her testimony did not constitute an
opinion, but was simply her statement as to the conversation that
took place between her and Chatman regarding the letter (ie,

whether or not it was in fact Takenaka’s opinion that the letter

 

appeared to have been translated from English, the point vas that
Chatman had denied that Takenaka had expressed such concerns and
Takenaka on rebuttal impeached that denial by stating that she
had expressed such concerns). The prosecution’s argument is
convincing.

Assuming without deciding that Takenaka’s testimony
would have been an improper opinion if considered for substantive
purposes, Takenaka’s testimony was nevertheless properly adnitted
for impeachment purposes to contradict Chatman’s version of the
facts. As set forth above, Chatman denied on cross-examination
that Takenaka had expressed the concerns that the letter did not
sound like something a Japanese person would write and thet
Chatman had forced Suzuki to write it. On rebuttal, Takenaka
testified to the exact opposite, and the circuit court instructed
the jury that it could consider her testimony for the purposes of
impeachment. The contradiction of Chatman’s version of events --
dst., that no opinion had been given by Takenaka regarding the
origin of the letter -- with impeachment testimony to the effect
‘that an opinion had been given does not constitute a substantive
opinion. C£, State v, Rabe, 5 Haw. App. 251, 260, 687 P.24 $54,

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561 (1984) (noting that “mere contradiction of 2 witness's
version of the facts does not constitute” an attack on that
witness's character) (citations omitted). Here, Takenaka’ s
testimony, which directly contradicted Chatman’s, was highly
relevant to the events that occurred during the meeting where
Takenaka translated the letter and was clearly framed with a
Limiting instruction. As such, its probative value was not
compromised by any danger that the jury might consider Takenaka’ s
testimony as a substantive opinion on the nature of the letter:
thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
see
s i Ni

Chatman’s objec Zaki" ‘on_Cross-

amin ra ev

Exe.

Chatman next argues that the circuit court abused its
discretion in failing to strike (or grant a mistriel based on)
Suzuki's testimony that Chatman had previously struck her in the
‘eye when her testimony was non-responsive to the question asked
by the defense. In response, the prosecution argues that:

(1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

that the testimony was responsive as to why Suzuki could not

 

remember which eye Chatman had struck her in on October 20, 2002;
(2) in the alternative, the testimony was relevant to the

question of whether Chatman’s threat to harm Suzuki was genuine,

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and therefore admissible: and (3) assuming arguendo thet the
circuit court erred in admitting the testimony, the error vas
harmless in light of the “overwhelming and compelling evidence”
of Chatman’s guilt. For the reagons set forth below, we hold

that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

 

To review, Suzuki was unable to recall on cross-
examination which eye Chatman had struck her in during the
letter-writing incident of October 20, 2002. Chatman’s counsel
then pressed her, “So. . . you [are] testifying that today you
don't recall what eye he hit you, what eye was hit; is that
right? Is that right? I’m sorry.” Suzuki replied, “Well, he
hit me in the past on my eye, so... . I’m confused{.]* The
circuit court denied chatmen’s request to strike and motion for a
mistrial, finding that the answer was responsive to why she could
not recall which eye had heen struck.

We do not believe that there is a fair basis on which
to conclude that the trial judge's determination regarding the
responsiveness of Suzuki's answer constituted an abuse of
discretion. See State v, Corella, 79 Hawai'i 255, 265, 900 P.2d
1322, 1332 (App. 1995) (concluding that @ trial court’s rulings
on the scope of cross-examination and the admission of testimony
generally are reviewed for abuse of discretion). while it may
appear from the transcript that the defense asked a yes-no
question as to Suzuki’s recall of the incident, not for an

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explanation, the transcript of course provides no indication as
to the tone or manner in which the question was asked. The trial
judge, who was there to hear the question as posed, concluded
that the defense’s question called for an explanation as to why
Suzuki could not recall which eye Chatman had struck her in. See
State vs. McElroy, 105 Hawai'i 352, 357 n.1, 97 P.3d 1004, 1009
1.1 (2004) (stating by implication that a witness’s answer to a
question on cross-examination is responsive where the question
calls for or requires the witness to answer as he or she did)
Given that the defense’s purportedly desired answer ("I don’t
remember”) had already been elicited from the witness in response
to the previous question, and given that the trial judge, unlike
this court, had the benefit of hearing both the question and
response live and in full context, it cannot be said that the
circuit court’s determination of the answer's responsiveness
clearly exceeded the bounds of reason.

Assuming arguendo, however, that the circuit court
abused its discretion in finding the answer responsive,
“responsiveness is not the ultimate test of admissibility.”
State v. Batts, 277 S.B.2d 385, 388 (N.C. 1981). “If an
unresponsive answer is otherwise competent as evidence, it need
not be stricken.” State v. Williams, 305 S.£.2d 519, 522 (N.C.
1983) (citations omitted). To put it another way, the erroneous
admission of non-responsive testimony is harmless error if the

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——

testimony would have otherwise been admissible. Here, Chatman
argues that the “alleged prior assault was not relevant and its
only [effect] was to prejudice the jury against [him].”
Accordingly, he contends that the evidence should have been
excluded under HRE Rules 402 (relevancy),” 403 (prejudice),* and
404(b)" (prior bad act). The prosecution counters that: (1) as
the circuit court found, the evidence was relevant not as
improper character-propensity evidence but to establish an
element of the extortion count because it showed Suzuki's fear of
Chatman and compulsion she was under to write the letters and
(2) the probative value of the testimony was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The prosecution’ s
argument has merit.

First, the evidence was not precluded by HRE Rule

404(b) because it was not used for improper character-propensity

 

2 RE Rule 402 provides in pertinent part that all irrelevant evidence
Ae inacniseible:

2c HR Rule 403 provides in relevant part that a trial court may exclude
otherwise relevant evidence
UP dts probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
Of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
ir by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, oF
presentation of cumulative evidence.

    

 

% GRE Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part
Evidence ot Sther erines, wrongs, or acts is not adnissible to
prove tne charecter of @ person in order to shew action in
Bontoraity therewith. It may, however, be admissible where such
evidence is probative of any other fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action, such as proof of motive,
Speortuaity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus
Sperandi, of absence of mistake or accident.

 

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purposes (i,e., no attempt was made to use the impermissible
inference that because Chatman had struck Suzuki in the past, it
is therefore more probable that he struck her on October 20,
2002). Second, the evidence was not precluded as irrelevant
under HRE Rule 402 because it vas used to establish that suzuki
was under threat from Chatman to write the letter. Because the
evidence was relevant for a permissible purpose, the real
question is the applicability of the HRE Rule 403 balancing test,

4

  

did the danger of unfair prejudice (the risk that the jury
would on its own draw an impermissible character-propensity
inference or conclude that Chatman was a bad person generally and
therefore must be guilty) substantially outweigh the probative
value of the evidence (that Suzuki was under a genuine compulsion
to write the letter). See State v. Castro, 69 Haw. 633, 643, 756
P.2d 1033, 104 (2988) (holding that the use of the word “nay” in
HAE Rule 404(b) was designed to trigger the HRE Rule 403
balancing test).

In applying the balancing test to prior bad act
evidence, this court has identified various, non-exclusive
factors, such as: “the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other [bad act], the similarities between the
[bad acts], the interval of tine that has elapsed between the
(bad acts}, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably

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will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.” Castro, 69 Haw.
at 644, 756 P.2d at 1041 (citation omitted). Here, the mults-
factor analysis can be sinplified. While there was no compelling
need for the testimony in that Suzuki had already testified to
various other acts to establish threat or compulsion, it was also
unlikely that the jury was roused to overmastering hostility
against Chatman based on the context in which the response was

given. Unlike in Castro, where the prosecution deliberately

 

elicited testimony from the complaining witness of multiple prior
bad acts including threats, assault, and rape, id. at 641, 756
P.2d at 1039-40, the prior bad act evidence here constituted only
one isolated response not solicited by the prosecution. As such,
it could not be considered clearly beyond the bounds of reason to
conclude that the prejudicial effect of the testimony did not
substantially outweigh its probative value. Accordingly, the
cizeuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Suzuki's
response because it was otherwise adnissible.

H. ve & ts Errors pot

Require Reversal.

Chatman argues that the cumulative effect of the
foregoing errors justifies a reversal. As this court has
recognized, there are cases where the cumulative weight of
individually harmless errors can prejudice the defendant's right

toa fair trial such that reversal is warranted. State v.

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Pemberton, 71 Haw. 466, 475-76, 796 P.2d 80, 84-85 (1990).
Chatman contends that this is one such case because the
“credibility of [Suzuki] was pitted against the credibility of
[Chatman]. Yet each of the evidentiary rulings, individually and
cumulatively, unfairly bolstered [Suzuki's] credibility.” The
prosecution counters that because each of the errors alleged by
Chatman is individually without substance, it necessarily follows
that his claim of cumblative error fails as well. Because we
agree that none of Chatman’s first seven assignments of error has
merit individvally, we also agree that there is necessarily no

cumulative effect to consider, See Samuel, 74 Haw. at 160, 938

 

P.2d at 1383 (declining to address the cumulative effect of
errors where each alleged error was individually insubstantial).
I. ‘The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denving
Chatman: Wotica fees Wietaal Gis te Erocscutosial
Chatman argues that the prosecution engaged in
misconduct when it: (1) deliberately induced Chatman on cross-
examination to invoke his Fifth Amendnent privilege, thereby
allowing the jury to draw negative inferences (i.e., that Chatman
was hiding something); and (2) made a variety of improper remarks
during closing argument. The prosecution responds that there was
no misconduct, and even if there was, it was harmless. For the

reasons set forth below, we agree with the prosecution.

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a. Chatman’s reference to his Fifth Amendment
privilege during cross-examination

Chatman’'s first point

 

that the prosecution committed
misconduct by asking questions designed to induce him into
invoking or referencing his Fifth Amendment privilege -- is
without merit. First, the prosecution did not “unfairly, by
implication, conent(] on (Chatman's) Fifth Amendment rights
thereby committing misconduct," because it did not induce Chatman
into invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-
inerimination. As set forth above, Chatman did not clearly
invoke the Fifth Amendnent in his April 10, 2002 statement to
police: instead, he deflected inquiries into the cause of
‘Taison’s injuries by stating, “I don’t want to get into that.”
when the prosecution advised the circuit court and defense
counsel of its intent to inguize into the April 10 statement and
asked whether Chatman’s refusal to answer certain questions
should be considered the equivalent of a Fifth Amendment
invocation, the defense did not raise a general objection,
agreeing instead to proceed on a questicn-by-questien basis.
‘Then, when the prosecution asked Chatman to confirm that, in
contrast to his trial testimony, he never mentioned in his

April 10 statement that he had seen Suzuki strike Taison in the
elevator, the defense did not object either before or after

Chatman’s response that he did not want to get Suzuki into

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trouble and so asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege
Accordingly, the error, if any, must be plain for this court to
consider it.

Second, Chatman’ s volunteered references to the Fifth
Amendment were non-responsive to the questions posed by the
prosecution. As set forth above, the prosecution asked a series
of yes-or-no questions about the conduct of a party other than
Chatman. Even assuming that Chatman was reasonable in his belief
that the questions called for an explanation other than or in
addition to a yes or no, he could easily have answered, “I didn’t
want to get her in trouble|,]” without volunteering a reference
to the Fifth Amendment. Contrary to Chatman’s assertions that
the prosecution persisted in this line of questioning to bait him
inte a Fifth Amendment assertion, the record clearly shows thet
the prosecution persisted only because Chatman initiated the
exchange by refusing to listen to and address the questions
asked. See People v. Brigaman, 316 N.E.2¢ 121, 127 (T11. App.
ct. 1974) (finding that it was proper for the prosecution to
pursue a line of questioning that was initiated by the
defendant). Moreover, the prosecution made every effort to
notify the defense and the court of its intended line of
questioning (both bench conferences were initiated by the
prosecution), and thus to the extent it erred, it was a mistake,

not misconduct. See State v, McElroy, 105 Hawai'i 379, 285,
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98 F.3d 250, 256 (App. 2004) ("It is settled that a mere mistake
relative to the admissibility of proffered evidence is not

misconduct in the absence of a showing that the prosecutor was

not acting in good faith.” (Citation omitted.)), overruled on
other grounds, 10$ Hawai'i 352, 97 P.3d 1004 (2004)

Assuming arguendo, however, that the prosecution did
engage in misconduct or induce error, application of the three~
pronged misconduct analysis demonstrates that reversal is not
required. While the third prong favors Chatman for the reasons
set forth above, see Section III.B, gupra, the first two prongs
favor the prosecution
As to the first prong, the nature of Chatman's

testimony and the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from

it are harmless, if not beneficial, to Chatman. In contrast to

 

the typical fact pattern where a witness is asked, did you do
such-and-such (bad) act, and remains silent or invokes the Fifth
Amendment, Chatman was asked about an inconsistency in his
statements regarding the conduct of another, Suzuki. Thus, to
the extent that the jury might draw an inference from the Fifth
Amendment reference (as distinct from the inconsistency in
chatnan’s two statements, which does not derive from or arise out
of the voluntary Fifth Anendnent assertion at trial), the
reasonable inferences would be (1) Chatman was trying to protect
Suzuki even at his own expense (which might in turn cause them to

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—_——
believe, to Chatman’s benefit, that he was a stand-up, credible
person), or (2) Chatman was simply confused, because there was,
in context, no reason to refuse to answer a question, on self-
incrimination grounds, about something someone else did. As
such, Chatman’s concern that he was prejudiced because the jury
might have drawn an inference that he was hiding something is
unfounded.

‘The second prong also favors the prosecution. The
circuit court struck the whole line of testimony and instructed
the jury to disregard it. Given that the jury is presumed to
follow the court's instructions, v. Kupthea, 80 Hawai‘
307, 317-18, 909 P.2d 1122, 1132-33 (2996), any prejudicial
effect was cured. On balance, therefore, it cannot be said that
the prosecutorial conduct complained of rises to the level of

plain error.

 

The prosecution’ s closing argument
Chatman also argues that the prosecution “committed
misconduct by repeatedly disparaging defense counsel during
closing and rebuttal{,} and argued evidence that should not have
been adnitted.” The prosecution counters that prosecutors have
broad latitude in closing arguments and comitted no impropriety

here. The prosecution’s arguments have nerit.

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First, the prosecution correctly states the applicable

law:

IA] prosecutor, during closing argument, is permitted to draw
Hoesoneble inferences tren the evidence and wide latitude 1s
Allowed in discussing the evidence. it is also within the bounds
Sf legitimate argunent for prosecstors to state, discuss, and
Sorento the evidence sz well as to draw all ressonsble
Enterences from the evidence

 

State v. Clark, @3 Hawai‘! 269, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209 (1996)
(citations omitted). Where no objection was made to closing
renarks, this court reviews only for plain error. Id, The
application of this law to the alleged inproprieties raised by
Chatman is considered next.

i. Reference to Rupak being in custody

As set forth above, the prosecution referred to the
fact that Rupak had been in custody during his questioning:

Saturday might mean different things for different people. Tt
might mean s weekend for many. It doesn’t mesn s weekend for
Hrs Rupes. “Ke works aeven days @ week. He worked the sane hours
Gvery Gay. Every day was the sone. Nothing, he tells yoo,
Rappened around the date of April 6® that’s significant’ in his
Iie other than this alleged incident that he sees. He cen
Femenber that dete. But Row ironic that this sane individual

 

 

However, testimony that Rupak had been arrested and was in
custody was properly admitted. See Section ITI.£, supra.
Moreover, the prosecution in its closing used the evidence in
precisely the sane way it had on cross-examination -~ to impeach

Rupak’s menory (and, by implication, his credibility). Because

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the prosecution, without objection, drew a reasonable inference
from properly admitted evidence, this argument was not improper.

Si. Reference to a prior bad act of Chatman

Riso as set forth above, the prosecution used a Power
Point slide stating that Chatman “had assaulted Suzuki in the
past” to establish that Suzuki was under @ genuine compulsion
from Chatman to write the apology letter. However, testimony
that Chatman had struck her in the eye before was properly
admitted. Moreover, the prosecution in its closing used the
evidence to establish compulsion, not to encourage an improper
character-propensity inference. Because the prosecution drew a
reasonable inference from properly admitted evidence, this
argument was not improper.

ALi, Characterizations of defense arguments

The prosecution also described defense counsel as
having “played up” allegations that Suzuki had slapped Taison and
asked, “why is it that the defense attorney didn’t really want to
address how that letter was made and why there’s all these [sic]
inconsistent evidence with respect to that?” Defense counsel
objected below that the prosecution's remarks were unnecessarily
personal and demeaning. The circuit court overruled the
objection, stating that this was argunent. As set forth below,
we hold these remarks were within the bounds of permissible

closing argument.

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In Clark, this court cited with approval Eeople vs
Sutton, 631 8.£.2d 1326 (I11, App. Ct. 1994). Clark, 83 Hawai'i
at 305, 926 P.2d at 210. In Sutton, the court held that in its
closing argument, “(t]he prosecution may . . . xespond to
comments by defense counsel which invite or provoke response,
denounce the activities of defendant and highlight the
inconsistencies in defendant's argument.” 631 N.E.2d at 1335
(emphases added). the prosecution's comments here were made for
precisely those purposes. They were not improper ad hominem
attacks on defense counsels rather, they were attacks on defense
counsel's argument.

iv. Reference to the importance of shane in Japan

Although no objection was made below, Chatman argues on
appeal that the prosecution's argument that Japanese people like
Suzuki are powerfully influenced by shame was an improper
emotional and racist appeal. He cites no authority for this
point, and we conclude that it does not constitute plain error.

Assuming arguendo that the prosecution's remarks
constituted an unfairly prejudicial enotional appeal, ** any

prejudicial effect was preempted by the circuit court's prior

 

¥ the remark was not racist, at least as that word ie commonly
underatosd, Because st connot be understood to contain a view that, the
Gapanese “race” 2 superior or inferior to any other. Sea Webster’ e Third New
Int'l Dictionary at 1870 (1993) (stating that racism "is usulallyl coupled
Sith a belief in the inherent superiority of a particular race and its right
fo doninstion over others”).
“NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

ee
instruction to the jury that “[y]ou must not be influenced by
pity for the defendant or for any other person{.]” Accordingly,
we aze unable to identify any harm from the prosecution's remarks
that rises to the level of plain error.

v. Negative characterizations of the defense’s
inconsistent argument

Chatman also contends that the prosecution's criticism
that his counsel was arguing “out of both sides of [his] mouth”
was an improper criticism of his right to argue inconsistent
defenses. The prosecution responds that the allegedly offending
remark “was not a negative comment on (Chatman's] inconsistent
Gefenses(,)” but was merely a characterization of defense
counsel's statement that Asahi injured Taison but without intent
to kill. We hold that the prosecution’s remark was improper, but
harmless.

As a preliminary matter, the prosecution acknowledges,
that “{iJt is the rule in Hawai'i that a defendant has the right
to argue inconsistent defenses(.]” State v. Smith, 91 Hawai'i
450, 457, 984 P.2d 1276, 1283 (App. 1999) (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and emphasis omitted). The prosecution also
recognizes that “it is improper for the State to speak negatively
to the jury about such an argument by the defendant.” Id. Here,

the prosecution clearly offended that rule when it argued:

 

you see, ladies and gentlemen, when counsel made that argument, he
Xahes yoo to say, well, you know, if Anthony Chatman -~ if you!

 

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find thet Anthony Chatman is guilty of did the act against
(Tatson}, Tivant to give yoo sn cut.
ior the included off Se

ang that’s really what he dig, So he cane up with, well, Avani
Suzuki cidn't mean it, just like no one ould have meant it. But
there’s no evidence of any of that:

It {8 commonly understood that “to talk out of both sides of
one's mouth” is dishonorable, and the prosecution used that
phrase in connection with Chatman’s attempt to argue the lesser
included offense of assault, based on lack of the requisite state
of mind for the greater offense, while simultaneously maintaining
that he did not commit any offense. Accordingly, the remark was
an improper negative characterization of Chatman’s inconsistent
defenses.

However, this case is distinguishable from Smith. In
Smith, the defense timely cbjected to the prosecution’ s
pejorative characterizations of its inconsistent arguments for
acquittal and conviction of a lesser included offense. Id. at
455, 984 P.2d at 1281. Here, on the other hand, defense counsel
below did not raise the correct objections instead, counsel
objected only on the ground that the conments constituted an
improper ad hominem attack. Accordingly, the objection now
raised was forfeited and this court may reverse only if the error
is plain.

As Chatman himself repeatedly points out, this case was

a credibility contest; either the jury would believe his story,

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eee
in which case he would be acquitted, or it would believe Suzuki,
in which case he would be convicted of the charged offense of

attempted murder. Accordingly, it cannot be said that there is

 

sonable possibility that the prosecutions improper comments
on his lesser included offense defense contributed to Chatman’s
conviction on the attempted murder count.
J. The Circuit co n

a ‘ounts were Si mand

Required

Chatman next argues that the circuit court erred in not
giving the jury his requested instruction regarding the mezger of
the extortion and intimidation counts. The prosecution
disagrees, arguing that the evidence supports the conclusion that
Chatman acted with two distinct intents: (1) “to intimidate
[suzuki] from appearing as a witness against him or influence her
testimony when he pulled her hair and dragged her across the
room{:] and later, [(2) to) compel] her to write @ letter
exonerating him when he “threaten[ed], by word or conduct, to
cause bodily injury in the future’ to (Suzuki) by telling her ‘I
can hurt you.'" We hold that the prosecution's argument is
without merit, but that remand for a new trial is not required.

Both parties appear to concede the issue is controlled
by HRS § 701-109(1) (e) (1993), That statute provides that a
defendant cannot be convicted of more than one offense where
“[ethe offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and

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the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the
law provides that specific periods of conduct constitute separate
offenses.” This court, in turn, has interpreted the statute as
follows:

ne
wienin

F 3 course of conduct gives rise to more than one crime
fe nearing of HRS 701-109(1) te)] depends in part on the
intent end cbjective of the defendant. The test to deversine
whether the defendant intended to comit nore than one offense Le
“nether the evicence discloses one general intent of discloses
Separate and distinct intents. Where there is one intention, one
General impulse, ana one plan, there is but one offense. All

ihe trier of fae
State v. Matias, 102 Hawai'i 300, 305, 75 P.3d 1191, 1196 (2003)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(citations omitted) (bracketed material and emphasis in
original). In Matias, we held that a merger instruction should
have been given where place to keep and felon in possession of @
firearm charges “arose out of the same factual circumstances[.]”
Id. at 306, 75 P.3d st 1197. In so doing, we emphasized that
“the question whether [the defendant's] conduct constituted
separate and distinct culpable acts or an uninterrupted
continuous course of conduct . . . was one of fact that should
have been submitted to the jury[.]” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

In this case, as in Matias, the two offenses have
similar elements and arise out of the same factual conduct.
First, the offense of extortion is committed if a defendant

“[{]ntentionally compels or induces another person to engage in

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eee

conduct from which another has a legal right to abstain or to
abstain from conduct in which another has a legal right to engage
by threatening by word or conduct [.]" HRS § 707-764(2), supra
note 7, Similarly, intimidating a witness is committed if

defendant “vs

 

s force upon or a threat directed to a witness or a
person he believes is about to be called as a witness in any
official proceeding” in order to influence the witness's
testimony or cause the witness to avoid legal process. HRS
§ 710-1071, supra note 5

Second, the two charges arise out of the same factual
circumstances -- the events of October 20, 2002, when Chatman
assaulted and threatened Suzuki, who he knew or believed would be
a witness at his upcoming attenpted murder trial, in order to
nake her write the exculpatory letter and influence (i.ee,
prevent or discredit) her testimony. To the extent the
prosecution attempts to isolate discrete points in time and
separate Chatman’s intent to compel Suzuki to write the letter
from his intent to influence or prevent her testimony, it merely
raises @ question of fact that should, under Matias, have been
decided by the jury. First, whether the hair-pulling and
Gragging can be separated from Chatman’s statement, “I can hurt
you," is a question for the jury as to whether each act was or
was not part of one course of conduct designed to end in Suzuki
writing a letter exculpating Chatman. Second, the fact that

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Chatman acted with the intent to compel Suzuki to write the
exculpatory letter begs the question, “To what end?” Again, the
jury should have decided whether his intent to make her write the
letter could be separated from his intent to use the letter to
dissuade her fron testifying or, in the event she did testify, to
undermine the credibility of her testimony. In other words, it
was for the jury to decide whether there was an overriding

general intent connecting

 

ch of Chatman’s acts during an
uninterrupted span in order to prevent or influence Suzuki's
testimony as a witness against him in the attempted murder trial.
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in not giving the jury a
merger instruction as requested by Chatman.

‘The next question, however, is with regard to the
appropriate remedy for the circuit court’s error. the
prosecution requests that this court vacate one of the
convictions rather than remand. We agree that this is the
appropriate renedy based on a review of two cases in which the
same statute at issue here, HRS § 701-109, was violated, albeit
in different part.

The case most closely on point is Matias because it
involves an HRS § 701-109(1) (e) merger violation, as does this
case. In that case, we renedied the violation by remanding for a
new trial, 102 Hawai'i at 306, 75 P.3d at 1197. However, it
does not appear in Matias that the prosecution requested vacatur

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See

instead of remand in the event error was found, and the court in
any case did not discuss the renedy issue at all.

Instead of citing Matias, the prosecution directs us to
a case, this one involving HRS § 703-109(1) (a) mezger error,
where vacatur, rather than remand, was found to be the
appropriate remedy. In State v. Jumila, this court, finding that
the defendant had been improperly convicted of both an offense
(use of a firearm in commission of felony murder in the second
degree) and an included offense (murder in the second degree) as
defined by HRS § 701-109(1) (a), vacated the conviction for the
firearm offense. 67 Hawai'i 1, 3-4, 950 P.2d 1202, 1203-04
(2998), overruled on o rounds by State v. Brantley, 99
pawai'i 463, 56 P-3d 1252 (2002). The Jumila Court reasoned,
wthis solution is fair to the defendant because it remedies the
RS § 701-109 violation, and it is fair to the prosecution and
the public because it sustains the conviction of the offense of
the highest class and grade of which the defendant was
convicted.” Id, at 4, 950 P.2d at 1208.

The precise question presented on these facts, then, is
whether Matias forecloses vacatur as a renedy where there is 2
subsection 109(1) (e) merger error, but the prosecution indicates
its willingness to give up one conviction rather than retry both.
based on the rationale espoused by this court in umila, we hold
that the prosecution may avoid remand by offering to give up the

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extra, improper conviction.” Such a solution remedies the
violation while avoiding the hardship of a retrial on the victims
and witnesses and conserving judicial and prosecutorial
resources. Here, both the intimidation and extortion in the
second degree offenses are of equal grade. See HRS § 707-766(2)
(providing that extortion in the second degree is a class C
felony); HRS $ 710-1072(3) (providing that intimidating a witness
isa class C felony). Accordingly, this court may vacate either:
however, we believe that it is more appropriate to vacate the
extortion conviction and leave intact the intimidation
conviction, as that offense more precisely covers the conduct
committed by Chatman.

. Chatmant fective Asst. e) CL
Exemature,

Chatman’s final assignnent of error is that hie trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to secure: (1) the presence
and testimony of Gunji at trial: and (2) the attendance and
testimony of witnesses to support his allegations of juror
misconduct in his motion for a new trial. The prosecution argues
that this claim is without merit ox, in the alternative,

premature. We agree that the claim is premature. Accordingly,

 

P of course, had the prosecution elected to pursue both convictions,
‘then renand would be required, Moreover, if, as in Matiag, 102 Hawaii at 206
pill, 15 P.3d at 1187 nll, the defendant’s inproper conviction had served as
the basis for extended tern or other enhances, multiple offender sentencing,

jcution's willingness to give up the conviction could net aveia the
ity of renand for resentencing.

 

 

 

 

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ee

Chatman’s claim is denied without prejudice to a subsequent post-
conviction petition on ineffectiveness grounds.
Iv. gowcuusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
guly 19, 2004 judgments of conviction and sentences, except that
(2) Chatman’'s conviction and sentence in Cr. No. 02-1-2353 for

extortion in the second degr

 

ie vacated, and (2) Chatman’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is denied without
prejudice to a HREP Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief
on that ground.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawas", August 3, 2006.

on the briefs: erm

Linda C.R. Jameson d (

for defendant-appellant ba.

Anthony Chatman

Stephen K. Tsushima, Pesci Caen fi.
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for plaintiff-appellee Yorn, Duty: hy

state of Hawai'i

CONCURRENCE BY ACOBA,

I concur in the result only,

BS

cy