Title: State v. Paul J. Stuart

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 47 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2001AP1345-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Paul J. Stuart,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 541, 674 N.W.2d 680 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 21, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2004 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins the dissent. 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the dissent. 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Christopher W. Rose and Rose & Rose, Kenosha, and oral argument 
by Christopher W. Rose. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michele A. Tjader and 
Tjader & Chirafisi, LLC, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
 
2
 
2005 WI 47 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2001AP1345-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 000708) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul J. Stuart,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 21, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Paul Stuart, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
and 
order 
denying 
postconviction relief.1  Stuart was convicted in 1999 of first-
degree intentional homicide for the shooting death of Gary 
Reagles.  This is the third time that Stuart's case has come 
before this court.   
                                                 
1 State v. Stuart, No. 01-1345, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. December 10, 2003) (affirming a judgment and order of 
the circuit court for Kenosha County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge). 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Stuart now asks us to reexamine our decision in State 
v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82.  There, 
we rejected his claim that the preliminary hearing testimony of 
his brother, who implicated Stuart in the murder, was improperly 
admitted at trial after the brother refused to testify on Fifth 
Amendment grounds.  Stuart asserts that the use of such 
testimony violated his right to confrontation, as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶3 
In light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004), we agree with Stuart that the testimony in question 
should not have been admitted in his case.2  Such evidence 
violated Stuart's right to confrontation, as he did not have the 
opportunity to question his brother about a potential motive to 
testify falsely.  We also conclude that the error was not 
harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand for a new trial. 
                                                 
2 Under the law of the case doctrine, "'a decision on a 
legal issue by an appellate court establishes the law of the 
case, which must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in 
the trial court or on later appeal.'"  State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 
73, ¶23, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82 (quoting Univest Corp. 
v. General Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 38, 435 N.W.2d 234 
(1989)).  This rule, however, is not absolute.  Id., ¶24.  An 
appellate court may disregard the doctrine in the interest of 
justice or in certain circumstances when "'cogent, substantial, 
and proper reasons exist.'"  Id., ¶24 (quoting Univest, 148 Wis. 
2d at 39).  Because Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 
represents 
a 
change 
in 
controlling 
authority, 
the 
State 
acknowledges that the law of the case doctrine does not preclude 
us from revisiting Stuart's Confrontation Clause claim.  We 
agree. 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
3 
 
I  
¶4 
On March 27, 1990, Gary Reagles was found dead in his 
apartment with a single gunshot wound to the chest.  A Berretta 
nine-millimeter gun lay on the floor near his body.  Reagles had 
a history of emotional problems, including prior suicide 
attempts.  His girlfriend told police that he had been 
threatening suicide because of their impending breakup.  Reagles 
used cocaine on the night of his death and had a blood alcohol 
content of .393%.  Initially, his death was ruled a suicide. 
¶5 
In 1998, Stuart was charged with the first-degree 
intentional homicide of Reagles.  At the preliminary hearing, 
his brother John Stuart (hereinafter John) implicated him in the 
shooting. 
¶6 
John testified that on the morning Reagles's body was 
found, Stuart spoke with him at his residence.  Stuart indicated 
that during the night he partied with Reagles, drinking and 
getting high on cocaine.  According to John, Stuart confessed to 
shooting Reagles because of cocaine and because Reagles was 
going to say something about a recent burglary perpetrated by 
the two brothers. 
¶7 
As questioning continued, John admitted that he and 
Stuart burglarized a home in Illinois a short time before 
Reagles's death.  They stole coins, pocketknives, and some guns.  
One of the guns stolen was a Berretta nine-millimeter.  John 
indicated that Stuart had possession of that weapon following 
the burglary.  He described Stuart to be "very confused, very 
distraught" and "scared" when talking about the shooting.  
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
4 
 
Stuart told him that after he shot Reagles, he "fixed it to look 
like a suicide." 
¶8 
John 
testified 
that 
George 
Stuart 
(hereinafter 
George), another brother, came over later that day and told John 
and Stuart that Reagles had been found dead in his apartment. 
According to John, Stuart acted surprised when informed about 
the shooting, as if he knew nothing about it.  Later, Stuart 
asked John to provide him with an alibi.  Specifically, he asked 
John to say that he had been at John's home at the time of the 
shooting.  John testified that Stuart left the state on a trip 
to Arizona within a week of Reagles's death. 
¶9 
On cross-examination, John acknowledged that Stuart's 
trip to Arizona was not unusual because their mother lived 
there.  He said that he first told police about the information 
he had regarding Reagles's death when he was stopped for a 
routine traffic offense in 1992 or 1993.3  He indicated that he 
gave another statement to police in June of 1998.  Defense 
counsel then asked about the circumstances under which John gave 
this statement, which drew an objection from the State.  The 
exchange regarding that June 1998 statement was as follows: 
Q:  Did you have occasion to give that [information 
you testified to today] to Detective Tappa in June of 
this year? 
A:  Did I? 
                                                 
3 Detective Tappa testified at trial that he stopped John's 
vehicle in 1992 because he thought John was his brother Larry, 
for whom there was an outstanding warrant.   
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
5 
 
Q:  Yes. 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And under what circumstances did you do that? 
[Prosecutor]:  Objection.  Irrelevant. 
[Defense Counsel]:  It's very relevant under what 
circumstances the statements that he has testified to 
as they relate to the criminal complaint in the 
statement in June 1, 1998.  
[Prosecutor]:  It's discovery.  Your Honor, it 
pertains to credibility, but not to plausibility. 
Court: I think it goes to the credibility issue 
certainly, and it certainly is discovery. So the 
objection is sustained. 
¶10 After the objection, defense counsel continued his 
cross-examination.  John admitted that he was "stoned" when 
Stuart told him about the shooting.  He testified to smoking 
five 
or 
six 
additional 
marijuana 
cigarettes 
after 
his 
conversation with Stuart.  John stated that he was confused 
during the conversation and did not believe what Stuart told 
him.  He was also confused when George came over with the news 
of Reagles's death because Stuart acted like he had no prior 
knowledge of it. 
¶11 Finally, John acknowledged telling police that Stuart 
told him that there were two shots fired.  He further admitted 
lying for Stuart when he told officers that Stuart was at his 
home the day of the shooting.  After hearing testimony from John 
and another witness, Arthur Parramoure, who testified that 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
6 
 
Stuart confessed to shooting Reagles, the court bound the 
defendant over for trial.4   
¶12 On February 8, 1999, the trial began.  On the third 
day of the trial, John took the witness stand and asserted his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  He refused to 
answer questions, and persisted in the refusal despite the 
State's offer of use immunity for his testimony and the circuit 
court's warning that he could be held in contempt of court.  
According to his attorney, John believed that he had a plea 
bargain in exchange for his cooperation with the police, and 
that the State did not keep its part of the bargain.  
Accordingly, although the plea bargain called upon him to 
testify at trial in Stuart's case, he nevertheless refused to do 
so.5   
                                                 
4 Arthur Parramoure, whose ex-wife is Stuart's niece, 
testified that he and Stuart drove to Arizona a few days after 
the death of Reagles.  He stated that while they were driving 
through Oklahoma, Stuart said that he shot Reagles during an 
argument over a gun.  According to Parramoure, Stuart told him 
the next day that he was "bullshitting" him about killing 
Reagles.  When Stuart testified in his own defense at trial, he 
explained that he was trying to scare Parramoure so that 
Parramoure would not mistreat Stuart's niece.  
5 At Stuart's trial, John indicated through his attorney 
that he "believe[d] there was a plea bargain that was supposedly 
made with regard to his pleading to certain charges that also 
involved him testifying in this case.  It was his opinion or 
belief that that plea bargain was not honored at the time of 
sentencing."  The prosecutor denied that the charges against 
John had been reduced on June 2, 1998, as a result of Stuart's 
case.  In doing so, however, she admitted, "I can tell you when 
I spoke to [John] he told me he was shafted by me personally 
because I was the prosecutor on his case.  He stated his belief 
was 
that 
I 
was 
to 
come 
into 
court 
and 
recommend 
probation . . . ." 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 The circuit court held John in contempt of court.  The 
State then moved to have John's preliminary hearing testimony 
admitted into evidence.  Stuart's attorney objected, claiming 
that there was no effective cross-examination of John allowed at 
the preliminary hearing. 
¶14 On February 11, 1999, after a motion hearing, the 
circuit court ruled that John's preliminary hearing testimony 
was inadmissible.  The State immediately appealed.  By order 
dated February 16, 1999, the court of appeals summarily affirmed  
the circuit court's ruling, determining that the opportunity to 
cross-examine at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to 
satisfy the constitutional right to confrontation.   
¶15 The State subsequently filed an emergency petition for 
review.  This court ordered the trial stayed, pending its 
decision.  Thus, in the middle of the trial, everything in the 
case stopped to await an answer from this court on the issue of 
the admissibility of John's preliminary hearing testimony.  The 
parties submitted briefs and this court held oral argument on 
                                                                                                                                                             
John's understanding of the existence of a deal is 
buttressed by a letter dated May 12, 1998 from the Kenosha 
County District Attorney, indicating that it would not pursue 
charges against him for truthful information he provided 
regarding Reagles's death.  It is also supported by a report by 
Detective 
Tappa 
dated 
June 
1, 
1998, 
acknowledging 
that 
arrangements were also made with the Illinois State's Attorney, 
granting John immunity from a burglary he committed before 
Reagles's death.  The Illinois burglary charge was not pursued.  
Ultimately, we need not resolve what, if any, agreement existed 
between the parties.   
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
8 
 
February 23, 1999.  The same day, following oral argument, we 
issued an order reversing the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶16 After this court's ruling, the trial resumed.  Based 
on our reversal of the court of appeals' decision, the circuit 
court had John's preliminary hearing testimony read into the 
record.  Defense counsel moved the court "to take judicial 
notice" that there were two open Kenosha County felony cases 
against John at the time he was cooperating with the prosecution 
in its investigation of Stuart.  The court refused this request, 
stating that "[t]he jury will be informed that John had four 
prior convictions, and that will be the end of what we know 
about John Stuart." 
¶17 Additional witnesses were called at trial regarding 
purported confessions by Stuart.  Michael Schultz testified that 
in March of 1990, he met Stuart in a bar and Stuart told him 
that he had to kill Reagles.  Likewise, David Small testified 
that when he shared a jail cell with Stuart in September of 
1998, Stuart told him details of the shooting.  Benjamin Woody 
also testified that Stuart admitted killing Reagles in a 
conversation on October 5, 1998.  Finally, Damian Simpson was 
present during Stuart's statements to Woody and stated that 
Stuart admitted killing Reagles.   
¶18 On February 26, 1999, Stuart was found guilty of 
first-degree intentional homicide.  He filed a motion for 
postconviction relief, which was denied.  Stuart appealed, and 
the court of appeals certified the case to this court, 
identifying two specific issues: 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
9 
 
When an appellate court issues an opinion resolving a 
discretionary ruling of the circuit court, is its 
decision the law-of-the–case?   
Whether an unpublished Wisconsin Supreme Court order 
reversing a decision of the court of appeals, without 
providing 
legal 
reasoning 
or 
legal 
authorities, 
establishes the law-of-the-case? 
¶19 This court held that its 1999 decision established the 
law of the case with regard to the Confrontation Clause issue.  
See Stuart, 262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶43.  It also determined that there 
were no extraordinary circumstances present that would justify a 
departure from the law of the case doctrine because the 
testimony was properly admitted under Confrontation Clause 
precedent.  See id., ¶¶32-41.  However, this court did not 
decide the other issues raised by Stuart and remanded those for 
consideration by the court of appeals.  Id., ¶4.6   
                                                 
6 Those questions included: 
1) 
Whether trial counsel was ineffective where he 
failed to stipulate to a pending subornation of 
perjury charge by John Stuart? 
2) 
Whether the trial court erred for failing to inform 
the 
jury 
concerning 
the 
significant 
criminal 
charges John Stuart was facing at the time he gave 
a statement? 
3) 
Whether the trial court erred when it barred the 
defendant from arguing John Stuart's bias? 
4) 
Whether or not new evidence warrants a new trial? 
5) 
Whether the failure of defense counsel to inform 
the jury that Arthur Parramoure had a criminal 
conviction would entitle defendant to a new trial? 
6) 
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to evidence of the nature of Paul 
Stuart's criminal convictions? 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
10 
 
¶20 On remand, the court of appeals rejected all of 
Stuart's other claims and affirmed the judgment of conviction 
and order denying postconviction relief.  Stuart then filed a 
petition for review in which he asked this court, among other 
things, to reexamine its 2003 decision.   
¶21 While that petition was pending, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 
which altered Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  When granting 
Stuart's petition, this court limited its review to the impact 
Crawford had on his case. 
II 
¶22 The central question we address in this case is an 
evidentiary one.  It concerns the admissibility of John's 
preliminary hearing testimony at Stuart's trial.  Whether the 
admission of this evidence violated Stuart's constitutional 
right to confrontation is a question of law subject to 
independent appellate review.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, 
¶7, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919 (citing State v. Ballos, 230 
Wis. 2d 495, 504, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
III 
¶23 We 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
issue 
of 
Stuart's 
constitutional right to confrontation.  The relevant principles 
and precedent guiding our analysis were recently set forth in 
                                                                                                                                                             
7) 
Whether Paul Stuart's conviction should be reversed 
in the interest of justice? 
Stuart, 262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶4, n. 2. 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
11 
 
State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶¶43-58, __ Wis. 2d __, 691 N.W.2d 
637.  Although we do not replicate that discussion in full, we 
highlight some of it here. 
¶24 At the time of Stuart's trial and first appeal, the 
reliability analysis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), 
provided the general framework for determining the admissibility 
of out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause.  This 
court adopted the Roberts approach in State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 
2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), when it held that the admission 
of an unavailable witness's preliminary examination did not 
violate the defendant's right to confrontation.  See Bauer, 109 
Wis. 2d at 208-22.   
¶25 Applying the Roberts/Bauer framework in our previous 
decision, we concluded that the admission of John's preliminary 
hearing 
testimony 
did 
not 
violate 
Stuart's 
right 
to 
confrontation.  See Stuart, 262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶¶32-41.  In doing 
so, we reasoned that, "John's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing and the circumstances surrounding it were sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement that there be indicia of reliability."  
Id., ¶41. 
¶26 As noted in Hale, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶52, "[w]ith the 
Crawford decision, a new day has dawned for Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence."  Thus, the reliability analysis of Roberts/Bauer 
is no longer good law with respect to the admission of 
testimonial hearsay evidence.  Under Crawford, where testimonial 
hearsay evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
12 
 
the common law required:  (1) unavailability and (2) a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.7  541 U.S. at 68. 
¶27 Like the defendant in Hale, Stuart is the beneficiary 
of this change in the law because he properly preserved the 
confrontation issue and his case is still on direct appeal.  
State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993) 
(citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).  
Accordingly, we consider the applicability of Crawford to his 
case. 
¶28 The threshold question for applying the Crawford 
framework is whether the State is proffering "testimonial" 
hearsay evidence.  Although the Crawford Court declined to 
provide 
a 
comprehensive 
definition 
of 
what 
constitutes 
testimonial evidence, it noted that "it applies at a minimum to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing . . . ."   Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 68.  Thus, there is no dispute that John's testimony 
at the preliminary hearing constituted testimonial hearsay 
evidence.  
¶29  Because John's hearsay evidence was testimonial, we 
turn next to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause as 
interpreted by Crawford:  (1) unavailability of the declarant 
and (2) a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  Id.  In this 
case, there is no dispute that John was unavailable.  Both 
                                                 
7 Cross-examination has been described as the "'greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.'"  
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 Wigmore 
§ 1367).   
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
13 
 
parties also agree that Stuart's limited cross-examination of 
his brother at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to 
satisfy his right to confrontation.  We too concur with this 
conclusion. 
¶30 In Wisconsin, a defendant has a statutory right at a 
preliminary hearing to cross-examine witnesses against him.  
Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).8  However, the scope of that cross-
examination 
is 
limited 
to 
issues 
of 
plausibility, 
not 
credibility.  State ex rel. Huser v. Rasmussen, 84 Wis. 2d 600, 
614, 267 N.W.2d 285 (1978).  This is because the preliminary 
hearing "is intended to be a summary proceeding to determine 
essential or basic facts" relating to probable cause, not a 
"full evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 396-97, 359 
N.W.2d 151 (1984). 
¶31 Cross-examination at a preliminary examination is not 
to 
be 
used 
"for 
the 
purpose 
of 
exploring 
the 
general 
trustworthiness of the witness."  Huser, 84 Wis. 2d at 614.  
Indeed, "[t]hat kind of attack is off limits in a preliminary 
hearing setting."  State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 605 
N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1999).  When this restriction is enforced, 
as it was in the present case, and the State attempts to use the 
preliminary hearing testimony at a later trial, a Confrontation 
Clause problem arises. 
                                                 
8 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
14 
 
 
¶32 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to confrontation was 
violated 
when 
he 
was 
prohibited 
from 
cross-examining 
a 
prosecution witness about possible motive to testify falsely as 
a result of the State's dismissal of a pending charge against 
him.  The Court explained that "'the exposure of a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of 
the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.'"  
Id. at 678-79 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 
(1974)). 
 
¶33 Likewise, in State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 448, 
247 N.W.2d 80 (1976), this court observed that a "defendant, as 
an ingredient of meaningful cross-examination, must have the 
right to explore the subjective motives for the witness' 
testimony."  There, defense counsel was not permitted to cross-
examine a witness about a charge against that witness that had 
been dismissed while the defendant's case was pending.  Id. at 
446.  Although no promises had been made to the witness, this 
court nevertheless 
recognized 
the 
potential 
motivation to 
testify falsely: 
[The witness] may well have been testifying favorably 
to the state in the hope and expectation that the 
state would reward him by dropping or reducing pending 
charges.  Even though that expectation were absurd, 
defense counsel had the right and duty to explore the 
witness' motives.  When a witness has been criminally 
charged by the state, he is subject to the coercive 
power of the state and can also be the object of its 
leniency.  The witness is aware of that fact, and it 
may well influence his testimony. 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
15 
 
Id. at 447-48. 
 
¶34 In this case, the jury was informed by the court that 
John had four criminal convictions.  Furthermore, it learned 
from John's direct examination at the preliminary hearing that 
he committed a burglary a short time before Reagles's death and 
that he lied to police.  Defense counsel also obtained 
admissions from John that he was "stoned" and "confused" when he 
spoke with Stuart about the killing and believed Stuart told him 
that there were two shots fired. 
 
¶35 However, Stuart did not have the opportunity at the 
preliminary hearing to question his brother about a potential 
motive to testify falsely.  Thus, he was unable to elicit 
evidence that John had been facing criminal charges in 1998 when 
he gave his statement to police implicating Stuart in the death 
of Reagles.9   
¶36 Admittedly, the record is unclear as to what, if any, 
deal was reached between John and the Kenosha County District 
Attorney.  The facts indicate that while stopped for a traffic 
matter in 1992, John gave a statement implicating Stuart in a 
homicide.  He agreed to cooperate with authorities and gave 
another statement in jail on June 1, 1998, one day before he was 
to appear in Kenosha County Circuit Court to enter pleas in a 
case where he faced 52 years in prison.  The State filed an 
amended information in that case the next day, June 2, 1998, 
                                                 
9 Although defense counsel tried to ameliorate this problem 
through 
the 
use 
of 
judicial 
notice, 
his 
attempt 
proved 
unsuccessful. 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
16 
 
reducing his exposure by 40 years, from 52 to 12.  Additionally, 
charges relating to an Illinois burglary were not pursued.  All 
of these actions took place prior to John's testimony at 
Stuart's preliminary hearing on August 13, 1998. 
¶37 At the very least, these facts demonstrate a potential 
motivation to testify falsely on the part of John.  Had John 
testified at trial and Stuart been precluded from exploring the 
motivation to testify falsely, such a restriction would be 
considered a Confrontation Clause violation.  See, e.g., Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679; see also State v. Barreau, 2002 WI App 
198, ¶55, 257 Wis. 2d 203, 651 N.W.2d 12. 
 
¶38 As a result, like the State, we agree with Stuart that 
the use of his brother's preliminary hearing testimony at trial 
violated his right to confrontation.  The circuit court properly 
did not allow Stuart to cross-examine John at the preliminary 
hearing about the effect the pending charges had on his decision 
to cooperate.  Accordingly, John's preliminary hearing testimony 
should not have been admitted at trial.  
IV 
 
¶39 Having determined that Stuart's right to confrontation 
was violated, we examine next whether the error warrants a new 
trial.  Violation of the Confrontation Clause "does not result 
in automatic reversal, but rather is subject to harmless error 
analysis."  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶28, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485 (quoting State v. Williams, 2002 WI 118, ¶2, 256 Wis. 
2d 56, 652 N.W.2d 391).   
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
17 
 
¶40 The test for this harmless error was set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), 
reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).  There, the Court explained 
that, "before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 24.    An error is 
harmless if the beneficiary of the error proves "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."  Id.10  Here, the State must carry the 
burden of proof. 
¶41 As noted in Hale, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶61, this court has 
articulated several factors to aid in its harmless error 
analysis.  These include the frequency of the error, the 
importance of the erroneously admitted evidence, the presence or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously admitted evidence, whether the erroneously admitted 
evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the nature of the 
defense, the nature of the State's case, and the overall 
strength of the State's case.  Id. (citing State v. Norman, 2003 
                                                 
10 In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and this court, 
while adhering to the Chapman test, have also articulated 
alternative wording.  See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 2-3 (1999); State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 
434, 666 N.W.2d 485; State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶48, n. 14, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.   
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
18 
 
WI 72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97; State v. Billings, 
110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 N.W.2d 192 (1983)).11   
¶42 In this case, the State contends that Stuart is not 
entitled to a new trial because the error in admitting John's 
preliminary hearing testimony was harmless.  The State's 
reasoning is twofold.  First, it submits that Stuart would not 
have 
been 
able 
to 
effectively 
impeach 
John 
with 
the 
circumstances surrounding the 1998 convictions because John 
testified that he had given the same information to the police 
in 1992 when no charges were pending.  Second, it notes that 
there were five witnesses other than John who testified that 
Stuart admitted shooting Reagles. 
¶43 We are not persuaded by the State's argument.  To 
begin, John never testified that the information was the same.  
Rather, when asked whether it was "pretty much the same," he 
responded in the affirmative.  The record is unclear as to the 
substance of John's 1992 conversation with police.  It was not 
testified to at trial, and no police report memorializing the 
contact was ever entered into evidence.  Thus, it is impossible 
to know if the information given in 1992 was "the same" as that 
given in 1998. 
                                                 
11 This multifactor approach has been utilized by other 
jurisdictions in recent cases involving Confrontation Clause 
violations.  E.g., State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 939 (3rd Cir. 
2004); Richardson v. Newland, 342 F. Supp. 2d 900, 925, n. 15 
(E.D. Cal. 2004); People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 980 (Colo. 2004); 
Jones v. U.S., 853 A.2d 146, 153-54 (D.C. 2004); Hannon v. 
State, 84 P.3d 320, 332-33 (Wyo. 2004).  See also United States 
v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2004). 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
19 
 
¶44 We 
do 
know, 
however, 
that 
prosecution 
was 
not 
commenced against Stuart until after John's second conversation 
with authorities in 1998.  It is reasonable to assume that 
John's first statement to police did not provide enough 
information to charge Stuart.  The second statement apparently 
differed 
sufficiently 
to 
enable 
the 
commencement 
of 
the 
prosecution.  Contrary to the State's assertion, such a 
circumstance provides fodder for cross-examination and effective 
impeachment.   
¶45 Next, the State contends that the error was harmless 
because five witnesses, other than John, testified that Stuart 
admitted shooting Reagles.  At first blush this appears to be a 
strong, if not a conclusive, argument.  However, the record 
reveals that the witnesses' testimony had some weaknesses.  To 
begin, of the five witnesses who testified that Stuart admitted 
shooting Reagles, four acknowledged having criminal records.  
The fifth witness, Arthur Parramoure, also had a criminal 
record, but the jury was not informed of this fact. 
¶46 Of the four witnesses, the number of convictions 
between them totaled 37.12  The law presumes that the number of 
criminal convictions is relevant to a witness's credibility.  
State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 297-98, 533 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  "The assumption is that the longer the criminal 
record, the less credible the individual."  Id. at 297 (citing 
                                                 
12 David Small had 12 convictions, Michael Schultz had 11 
convictions, Benjamin Woody had 7 convictions, and Damian 
Simpson had 7 convictions. 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
20 
 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence § 609.1 at 311 (West's 
Wisconsin Practice Series, Vol. 7, 1991)). 
¶47 In addition to hearing their criminal records, the 
jury heard the testimony of the witnesses contradicted or 
challenged by witnesses for the defense.  Both Benjamin Woody 
and Damian Simpson testified that on October 5, l998, while 
incarcerated in the Kenosha County Jail, they heard Stuart admit 
to killing Reagles.  Yet witnesses for the defense, Miroslav 
Romanic and William McCracken, were present during Stuart's 
alleged confession to Benjamin Woody and Damian Simpson and 
denied that it ever took place. 
¶48 Michael Schultz testified that he met Stuart in a bar 
in Kenosha and that Stuart admitted to killing Reagles.  Yet, 
the testimony of defense witnesses Robert Landerman III and 
Scott Finely was offered to attack Schultz's credibility.  They 
testified that they overheard Schultz, who previously testified 
for the State, tell Stuart that he had never signed statements 
implicating Stuart in Reagles's death. 
¶49 David Small, a former cellmate of Stuart, testified 
that Stuart admitted to killing Reagles.  His testimony was 
contradicted by the testimony of the defendant.  Furthermore, 
Small's credibility could be undermined because he had 12 prior 
convictions, the most of any of the State's witnesses.   
¶50 Admittedly, the fifth witness, Arthur Parramoure, 
testified truthfully when he stated that Stuart admitted to 
killing Reagles.  Stuart acknowledged telling Parramoure that 
and then subsequently telling him that it was not true.  
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
21 
 
According to Stuart, he told Parramoure of the murder in order 
to frighten Parramoure.  He wanted Parramoure to be afraid of 
him, hoping that the fear would keep Parramoure from mistreating 
Stuart's niece, who was Parramoure's ex-wife.  Given these 
discrepancies and explanation, the impact of the several 
witnesses' testimony is diminished, while the effect of the 
uncontroverted erroneously admitted evidence is enhanced. 
¶51 In analyzing whether the error was harmless, this 
court considers several factors, including the importance of the 
erroneously admitted evidence.  Here, the importance of John's 
preliminary hearing testimony is reflected in the action and 
words of the prosecutor.  The action, of course, was the 
emergency petition filed with this court in the middle of trial, 
which dealt exclusively with the admission of John's preliminary 
hearing testimony.  The words, meanwhile, were the nearly dozen 
references made to John's testimony during opening, closing, and 
rebuttal.  Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury that the 
"most important evidence all came in through John Stuart's 
testimony and Art Parramoure's testimony." 
¶52 Apparently, both the jury and judge agreed with the 
prosecutor's 
assessment 
of 
the 
evidence. 
 
A 
day 
into 
deliberations, the jury asked that the testimony of two 
witnesses, John and Arthur Parramoure, be read to it.  The 
request was denied with the admonition that the jury should use 
its collective memories.  Later in the morning, the jury again 
asked for the testimony.  This time, it was read back to them.  
The exchange between the judge and foreman was as follows: 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
22 
 
Court:  All right.  You have indicated in your note 
you 
have 
exhausted 
your 
collective and 
personal 
memories.  There are still some issues you can't 
resolve. 
[Foreperson]:  Yes. 
Court:  We are prepared to read back to you the 
testimony that was given in court by Mr. Parramoure 
and 
John 
Stuart 
through 
both 
himself 
and 
the 
transcript of some testimony he had given at a 
preliminary hearing. 
The Court reporter will read that back to you. 
(Record read) 
Court:  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would advise you that 
the transcript that was read to you of the preliminary 
hearing was conducted on August 13, 1998.  That is the 
testimony that you have asked for that we have read 
back to you. 
Lunch has been ordered.  You may go back to the jury 
room now and continue your deliberations. 
¶53 Immediately after lunch, at 1:05 p.m., the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty.  Later at postconviction, the 
judge who presided at trial remarked, "I don't think this was a 
close case after they read [John's] statement into the record." 
¶54 The court also considers the overall strength of the 
State's case.  Without the admission of John's preliminary 
hearing testimony, the overall strength of the State's case 
would have diminished appreciably.  In part, this is because of 
the nature of the State's case.  Here, there was no physical 
evidence, no DNA or fingerprints, linking Stuart to the 
shooting.  There were no eyewitnesses.  As a result, the State 
relied on circumstantial evidence to prove its case.   
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
23 
 
¶55 We also consider whether there was untainted evidence 
that 
corroborates 
or 
duplicates 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
evidence.  Although the testimony of the several witnesses 
corroborates John's statement, it can hardly be described as 
untainted for the reasons listed above.  Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that the cumulative effect benefits the State's 
case. 
¶56 Finally, we examine the nature of the defense in 
assessing whether the error was harmless.  Here, the theory of 
Stuart's defense was that Reagles had committed suicide.  This 
was certainly plausible given Reagles's prior suicide attempts, 
his more immediate threatened suicide due to an impending 
breakup with his girlfriend, and the presence of cocaine and 
alcohol in his bloodstream.  Indeed, Reagles's death was 
initially ruled a suicide. 
¶57 In considering these facts and factors, we are 
impelled to the conclusion that the error in admitting the 
preliminary hearing testimony, in violation of the defendant's 
right to confrontation, was not harmless.  The State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that "the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  The State failed to meet that burden 
here.  The action and words of the prosecutors, judge, and jury 
underscore the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence.  
We are unable to conclude that this evidence did not contribute 
to the verdict.  
 
No. 
2001AP1345-CR   
 
24 
 
V 
¶58 In sum, in light of Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, we agree 
with Stuart that the testimony in question should not have been 
admitted in his case.  Such evidence violated Stuart's right to 
confrontation, as he did not have the opportunity to question 
his brother about a potential motive to testify falsely.  We 
also conclude that the error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for a 
new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded.   
 
No.  2001AP1345.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's opinion.  For my discussion of 
Chapman, Neder, and harmless error, see my concurrence in State 
v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 691 N.W.2d 637. 
 
 
2001AP1345.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
¶60 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  With great 
reluctance, I concur in the decision to reverse the defendant's 
conviction and remand for a new trial.  I agree with the 
conclusion that the admission of John Stuart's preliminary 
examination 
testimony 
violated 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
and that admission of this testimony did not constitute harmless 
error.  Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant did 
not have an adequate opportunity to challenge the credibility of 
the witness's testimony.  This does not mean that John Stuart's 
testimony would not have been admissible under different 
circumstances; nor does it mean that I am backing away from the 
court's articulation of the harmless error rule in State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  I write 
separately to reiterate that under Crawford, confrontation 
requirements may be relaxed in situations where a defendant 
forfeits the right to cross-examination by wrongdoing or 
collusion.   
I 
 
¶61 The lead opinion correctly notes that this is the 
third time this case has come to our court.  Lead op., ¶1.  The 
first time was on February 23, 1999.  After an emergency hearing 
in the midst of Paul Stuart's trial, a majority of this court 
voted to reverse the court of appeals, which had affirmed the 
circuit court's decision to exclude the preliminary hearing 
testimony of John Stuart. 
2001AP1345.dtp 
2 
 
¶62 John Stuart had testified at a preliminary examination 
on August 13, 1998.  He had been cross-examined by his brother's 
attorney, though not extensively.  At trial, however, he made 
himself "unavailable" by asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
¶63 Called to testify on February 10, 1999, John asked for 
a brief delay so that he could consult with his attorney.  Upon 
his return, the following colloquy occurred: 
The Court: 
Are you intending to plead the Fifth in 
regard to all questions asked of you? 
Mr. Stuart: 
Yes, sir.  I've been advised to plead 
the Fifth. 
The Court: 
Okay.  I'm not sure what the State 
intends to do here. 
Ms. Karaskiewicz: 
The 
State 
would 
give 
him 
use 
immunity. 
The Court: 
The State is willing to offer you use 
immunity, which means whatever you say 
cannot be used against you to prosecute 
you in regard to those matters. 
 
¶64 John Stuart continued to refuse to testify.  This 
prompted Assistant District Attorney Susan Karaskiewicz to 
explain that "when I spoke to Mr. Stuart he told me he was 
shafted by me personally because I was the prosecutor on his 
case."  She pointedly denied this claim. 
¶65 Paul 
Stuart's 
attorney 
then 
inquired 
about 
"transactional immunity" for John, so that if he testified in a 
manner 
different 
from 
his 
testimony 
at 
the 
preliminary 
examination, he could not be prosecuted for perjury.  The State 
refused that request. 
2001AP1345.dtp 
3 
 
¶66 District Attorney Robert Jambois reasoned that the 
court could not give the defendant a license to commit perjury.  
He added: "The witness [John Stuart] has given statements that 
he fears his brother, that he believes his brother is a 
homicidal maniac and dangerous."  A few moments later, in open 
court, John asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination before the jury. 
¶67 The 
following 
morning, 
February 
11, 
the 
court 
addressed John Stuart again.  Still he refused to testify.  
District Attorney Jambois was permitted to ask the witness 
whether he had met with a person named Art Herbst, and John 
admitted that he had.  This produced an explosive exchange among 
John's attorney (Douglas Henderson), Paul's attorney (Robert 
Bramscher), and the district attorney. 
Mr. Bramscher: 
Perhaps Mr. Jambois should make an 
offer of proof why he wants that 
question answered and why it is 
relevant. 
 
. . . .  
Mr. Jambois: 
. . .  
I 
will 
indicate 
the 
relevance of this line of inquiry.  
It 
is 
the 
State's 
view, 
your 
Honor, 
that 
this 
witness's 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right 
is 
a 
ruse. . . .  
He's 
involved in a conspiracy involving 
Mr. Art Herbst and involving Mr. 
Henderson and Mr. Bramscher.  He 
does not want to testify in a 
manner 
that 
incriminates 
his 
brother 
or 
having 
his 
brother 
convicted 
of 
first 
degree 
intentional homicide.  He met with 
Mr. Herbst a number of hours on 
Saturday and last night. 
2001AP1345.dtp 
4 
 
Mr. Bramscher: 
It was Sunday.  Perhaps you want 
to get your facts correct. 
Mr. Jambois: 
Sunday.  He met with Mr. Art 
Herbst last night [Wednesday].  I 
believe Mr. Bramscher would not 
have his representative meet with 
a 
represented 
witness 
without 
getting the authorization from Mr. 
Henderson to meet with him.  The 
fact such a meeting took place 
further indicates this witness is 
not in good faith asserting the 
Fifth Amendment right. 
 
. . . .  
Mr. Jambois: 
. . . I believe Mr. Henderson and 
Mr. Bramscher are working together 
in keeping this witness off the 
stand. 
 
The 
witness 
is 
not 
legitimately 
pursuing 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  He does not 
want 
to 
testify 
against 
his 
brother. 
 
. . . .  
Mr. Jambois: 
I think, your Honor, in deciding 
about . . . the admission of his 
preliminary 
hearing 
testimony . . . as 
a 
practical 
matter 
the 
Court 
would 
be 
interested in knowing whether this 
witness's 
unavailability 
was 
strongly 
encouraged 
by 
the 
defense. . . .  
If 
that 
is 
a 
factor 
that 
influences 
his 
unavailability, it would seem that 
would be a factor the Court would 
consider 
in 
deciding 
whether . . . to 
admit 
his 
preliminary 
hearing 
testimony.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶68 At this point, Attorney Bramscher acknowledged meeting 
with John Stuart but he asserted that the witness wanted to 
change his testimony. 
2001AP1345.dtp 
5 
 
¶69 In the end, John would not testify.  As a result, he 
was held in contempt.  After the court denied the State's motion 
to admit John's preliminary examination testimony, the State 
filed an emergency appeal.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  On February 23, a majority of this court 
reversed after learning that John's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing was subject to some cross-examination, was consistent 
with a prior statement he made to police, and was also 
consistent with the testimony of several other witnesses.   
¶70 When the trial resumed, the circuit court admitted 
John Stuart's testimony.  Unable to cross-examine the witness, 
the defendant's attorney sought to discredit his testimony by 
other means.  He moved the court to take judicial notice that 
there were two open Kenosha County felony cases against John 
Stuart at the time he was cooperating with the prosecution.  The 
court denied the motion, stating that the "jury will be informed 
that John Stuart had four prior convictions, and that will be 
the end of what we know about John Stuart."  Lead op., ¶16. 
¶71 Paul Stuart was eventually convicted. 
¶72 Two years later, claiming newly discovered evidence, 
Paul's attorney arranged for John to be brought to Kenosha from 
the Waupun Correctional 
Institution 
for a 
post-conviction 
hearing.  The following exchange occurred:   
Mr. McLinden: 
Did your brother Paul tell you at 
Waupun words to the effect, quote, 
hey, I never told you that I shot 
that guy, how could you do this to 
me, close quote?  And did you tell 
your brother Paul words to the 
effect, quote, I know you didn't 
shoot him but it was the only way 
2001AP1345.dtp 
6 
 
they 
would 
drop 
the 
charges 
against me, close quote? 
Mr. Stuart: 
You have part of that right and 
part of that wrong.  The part 
about Paul stating that he said to 
me that I never shot that man, he 
did say the words to me while I 
was 
walking 
back 
from 
school. . . .  And Paul did state 
what 
you 
just 
said, 
but 
my 
comments back to him was I'm sorry 
about what happened but that's 
what happened and you know what 
happened and I'm not going to buy 
11 years to lie for you so you can 
go free and I have to do another 
11 years, one being five years for 
perjury and the other six years 
added on for repeater . . . . 
 
. . . . 
Mr. Stuart: 
I love my brother, but he's going 
to have to stand up to the fact 
that he did what he did and you 
cannot continue trying to bring 
others down for him. 
 
I 
already 
bought 
two 
years 
already.  The judge himself knows 
that 
he 
had 
to 
hit 
me 
with 
contempt of court, and I already 
bought two years for trying to 
help him [Paul] in the first place 
and I'm not going to buy no more.  
And I'm being honest.  I'll put my 
hand on a Bible and I'll take a 
lie 
detector 
test. 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
¶73 This 
later 
testimony 
of 
John 
Stuart 
completely 
confirmed the State's suspicions about John's motivation for 
making himself unavailable at his brother's trial. 
 
 
2001AP1345.dtp 
7 
 
II 
¶74 In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that an out-of-
court statement that qualifies as testimonial is not admissible 
under the Confrontation Clause, unless (1) the witness is 
unavailable; and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness.  In this case, there is no dispute 
that the witness, John Stuart, made himself unavailable.  There 
is also no dispute that the defendant cross-examined the witness 
at the preliminary examination.  The issue is whether the prior 
cross-examination presented an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine, in conformity with standards described in Mancusi v. 
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1972), California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
406-08 (1965). 
¶75 This court properly concludes that the defendant's 
confrontation rights were violated because he did not have 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination. 
¶76 In hindsight, the State had the benefit of this 
court's ruling on the preliminary examination testimony.  It did 
not have to develop a new theory to justify the admissibility of 
John's testimony, because it could rely on our ruling plus Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and State v. Bauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982).   
¶77 In my view, the State could have argued that John 
Stuart's 
preliminary 
examination 
testimony 
was 
admissible 
because of the transparent collusion between the witness and the 
defendant.  The judicial system cannot be rendered powerless to 
deal with wrongdoing designed to benefit a defendant on trial. 
2001AP1345.dtp 
8 
 
¶78 The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this 
situation.  See State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶¶91-98, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 691 N.W.2d 637 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 158-59 (1878)).   
¶79 Confrontation rules may be relaxed in situations where 
the defendant forfeits the right to cross-examination by 
wrongdoing or collusion. 
¶80 Here the witness was the defendant's brother.  He met 
with the defendant's attorney and/or his representative for 
several hours immediately before and during trial.  He told the 
court he was "advised" to plead the Fifth Amendment.  The State 
offered use immunity so that the witness had no legitimate fear 
of prosecution for anything other than perjury.  Still he would 
not testify.  It is very hard to imagine that the witness would 
not have testified if the defendant had not been a brother whom 
he either loved or feared. 
¶81 This case is exceptional and permits a departure from 
the strict rules of Crawford, yet the circuit court's denial of 
the defendant's motion to impeach the witness was an error too 
serious to ignore under Harvey.  Had the defendant's motion to 
impeach his brother's credibility through third parties been 
granted, I would be voting differently, not because the error 
would have been harmless but because there would have been no 
error.  To conclude otherwise would undermine the fact-finding 
process in our judicial system. 
¶82 I therefore respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2001AP1345-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶83 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join the 
decision and the mandate of the court.  I agree with the court's 
interpretation and analysis of the Confrontation Clause under 
the facts of this case.  While I disagree with the majority's 
statement of the harmless error test for the reasons stated in 
part II of my concurrence in State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, __ Wis. 
2d ___, 691 N.W.2d 637, I agree with its application of the 
harmless error analysis in this case.  I also conclude that the 
State has failed to meet its burden beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.  I therefore respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2001AP1345-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
¶84 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I dissent.  As I 
explained in my concurrence in State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶¶86-
90, ___Wis. 2d ___, 691 N.W.2d 637, the proper method for 
assessing harmless error for Confrontation Clause violations in 
the aftermath of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), is 
the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999), which was adopted by 
this court in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶47, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
647 N.W.2d 189.  As this court explained in Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶47, the formulation of harmless error in Neder was 
a clarification of the test for harmless error described in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  "[I]n order to 
conclude that an error 'did not contribute to the verdict' 
within the meaning of Chapman, a court must be able to conclude 
'beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the 
defendant 
guilty 
absent 
the 
error.'" 
 
Harvey, 
254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶48 n.14 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  
¶85 The test for harmless error as set forth in Neder has 
been applied to Confrontation Clause violations by this court in 
State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶¶28-29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485, and more recently by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 
2004).  I see no reason to deviate from this test when analyzing 
Crawford Confrontation Clause violations.  
No.  2001AP1345-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
¶86 I agree with Justice Crooks' analysis of the evidence 
in this case and his conclusion that the error here was harmless 
under Neder.  Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶98.  In light of the 
testimony from five separate witnesses that Paul Stuart admitted 
to shooting Gary Reagles, "it is 'clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have convicted absent the 
error'" and that therefore "the error did not '"contribute to 
the verdict"'" obtained.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶29 (quoting 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 18).  Simply put, the State presented 
consistent, cumulative, and compelling evidence that Stuart 
killed Reagles.   
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this dissent.   
 
 
 
No.  2001AP1345.npc 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶88 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  I strongly 
disagree with the majority that the petitioner, Paul J. Stuart, 
is entitled to a new trial.  In order to arrive at that holding, 
the majority has to dismiss the consistent testimony of five 
witnesses, each one having testified at trial that Paul Stuart 
admitted that he killed Gary Reagles.  Although I agree that the 
admission of his brother John Stuart’s preliminary hearing 
testimony violated the petitioner's right to confrontation under 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), I 
conclude that the error under the circumstances in this case was 
clearly harmless.   
¶89 "The hallmark of reliability is the consistency of 
facts and details."  United States v. Zehm, 217 F.3d 506, 514 
(7th Cir. 2000).  Here, five prosecution witnesses, in addition 
to John, were consistent in their testimony that Paul Stuart 
admitted to shooting Gary Reagles.  One of the most notable 
witnesses to testify against Stuart at trial was Arthur 
Parramoure.  He accompanied Stuart on a trip to Arizona, which 
took place a few days after the death of Reagles.  He testified 
that Stuart had decided, on the spur of the moment, that they 
should leave early on the trip.  Parramoure stated that during 
this trip, Stuart admitted to shooting Reagles, because Reagles 
could not pay for a gun Stuart had sold him.  Stuart admitted 
during his testimony at trial, that he had confessed to 
Parramoure, but claimed that he did so in order to frighten 
Parramoure.   
No.  2001AP1345.npc 
 
2 
 
¶90 Michael Schultz also testified at trial that Stuart 
admitted to shooting Reagles.  The night after the shooting, 
Schultz encountered Stuart in a bar and overheard Stuart admit 
that he had killed Reagles.  Schultz stated that he saw Stuart 
with Reagles in the same bar on the night of the shooting.       
¶91 David Small testified at trial that Stuart talked 
about the shooting while the two men shared a cellblock.  Stuart 
told Small that he was in jail for murder, and that he had shot 
a man in the chest with a .9 millimeter gun.  Stuart talked 
about the gunpowder found on the victim's hands and by his feet, 
and then said that he had made Reagles' death look like a 
suicide.     
¶92 Benjamin Woody also shared a cellblock with Stuart.  
He too testified at the trial that Stuart stated that the 
killing of Reagles had been initially ruled a suicide.  Stuart 
commented to Woody about the lack of physical evidence that the 
State had against him.  Stuart then stated that he shot Reagles, 
and that he would do it again. 
¶93 Finally, Damian Simpson testified at the trial that 
while Simpson shared a cellblock with Stuart, Stuart admitted to 
shooting Reagles.  Simpson overheard another inmate ask Stuart 
whether he had shot the man he was in jail for murdering.  
Stuart replied that he killed him, and that he would do it 
again.   
¶94 The majority relies on the harmless error test 
outlined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), in order 
to hold that the Crawford violation was not harmless.  There, 
No.  2001AP1345.npc 
 
3 
 
the United States Supreme Court held that "before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id. at 24.  I am satisfied that the 
alternative wording in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 2-3 
(1999), State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485, and State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶48, n. 14, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, sets forth the applicable test.  
Under either test, however, the error here was harmless.   
¶95 In attempting to apply the Chapman test, the majority 
undertakes a lengthy analysis involving factors such as the 
frequency of the error, the importance of the erroneously 
admitted 
evidence, 
the 
presence 
or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
evidence, whether the erroneously admitted evidence duplicates 
untainted evidence, the nature of the defense, the nature of the 
State’s case, and the overall strength of the State’s case.  
Majority op., ¶¶41, 43-58.  As noted previously, both this court 
and the United States Supreme Court have analyzed harmless error 
by utilizing a more recent alternative test.  See Neder, 527 
U.S. 1; Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434; and Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442.  
Rather than undertake the lengthy approach of the majority, this 
court should consider only the error’s effect on the jury 
verdict in light of the fact that five additional witnesses 
provided testimony, consistent with the testimony of John 
Stuart, that Paul Stuart admitted his guilt to them.  If "it 
appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
No.  2001AP1345.npc 
 
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did not contribute to the verdict obtained,'" then the error was 
harmless.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶29 (citation omitted).  In 
order to hold that an error was harmless, a court must be able 
to conclude "'beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.'"  Id.; 
see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.  I am satisfied that whichever 
test is applied that the facts of this case establish that the 
Crawford 
confrontation 
error 
was 
harmless, 
given 
the 
overwhelming evidence of Stuart's guilt with or without his 
brother John's testimony.    
¶96 The testimony of the five additional witnesses was 
persuasive 
and consistent 
with John’s 
preliminary hearing 
testimony that Paul Stuart admitted killing Reagles.  John's 
testimony was, in effect, "frosting on the cake."  It was nice 
to have, but not necessary to establish that Paul Stuart killed 
Gary Reagles.     
¶97 The majority attempts to inflate the importance of 
John’s testimony and attempts to minimize the importance of 
Arthur Parramoure's testimony, as well as the testimony of the 
other prosecution witnesses.  The record reflects that the jury 
requested that Parramoure's testimony, along with the testimony 
of John, be read back to them.  The jury rendered a verdict of 
guilty soon after the reading was completed.  This time sequence 
clearly demonstrates that the jury found Parramoure’s testimony 
material, persuasive, and consistent with the other witnesses' 
testimony.  
No.  2001AP1345.npc 
 
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¶98 The Crawford violation was harmless error under Weed, 
Neder, Harvey, and Chapman.  Even without John’s testimony, the 
State presented an overwhelming case in regard to Paul Stuart's 
guilt.  It appears clear that the jury relied on the consistent 
testimony of the five additional witnesses, and placed special 
importance on Parramoure’s testimony.  I have no difficulty 
concluding "'beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.'"  Weed, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶29 (citation omitted).  Therefore, I conclude 
that the Crawford confrontation error was harmless, and that the 
petitioner, Paul Stuart, is not entitled to a new trial.   
¶99 For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶100 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
AND PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2001AP1345.npc 
 
 
 
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