Title: Com. v. Yost

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

348 Pa. Superior Ct. 297 (1985) 502 A.2d 216 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Elwood Lamar YOST. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted August 5, 1985. Filed December 13, 1985. *298 Anthony J. Rosini, Assistant District Attorney, Shamokin, for Com., appellant. Vincent V. Rovito, Jr., Shamokin, for appellee. Before WICKERSHAM, BROSKY and ROBERTS, JJ. *299 PER CURIAM: On September 9, 1984, Elwood Lamar Yost was charged by the Shamokin Police Department, in a criminal complaint,[1] of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and underage consumption of alchohol. A reckless driving charge was also involved. A motion to compel discovery pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. No. 305 A was granted by court order dated November 21, 1984. On January 29, 1985 the court, by the Honorable Peter Krehel, President Judge, issued the following Order: The Commonwealth filed the instant appeal from the January 29, 1985 order dismissing the charges. Judge Krehel, in an opinion dated February 5, 1983, explained his action in this manner: In this case, appellant presents the following issue for our consideration: Brief for Appellant at 1. In its brief before this Court, the Commonwealth maintains that: Brief for Appellant at 7-9. (Citations omitted). The Rule in question (Rule 305 Pa.R.Crim.P.) provides for [B(1)] mandatory disclosure by the Commonwealth of various *303 listed items or information and [B(2)] discretionary disclosure of names and addresses of eyewitnesses, all written or recorded statements of Commonwealth witnesses and statements of co-defendants, co-conspirators or accomplices and "any other evidence specifically identified by the defendant, provided the defendant can additionally establish that its disclosure would be in the interests of justice." In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 310 Pa.Super. 385, 456 A.2d 988, 993, (1983) our Judge Spaeth (now President Judge) indicated an appropriate remedy for failure of the Commonwealth to comply with Rule 305: We believe that dismissing the charges against the defendant is an abuse of discretion and uncalled for under the circumstances of this case. A continuance would have been much more appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Melendez, 326 Pa.Super. 531, 474 A.2d 617 (1984); where we granted a new trial based upon a prosecutor's nondisclosure. The purpose of the rule has been said to afford defendant the opportunity to discover evidence which he did not know existed, as well as to seek possession of evidence of which he was aware. Commonwealth v. Brocco, 263 Pa.Super. 51, 396 A.2d 1371 (1979). Case remanded for trial. Order reversed. The Commonwealth shall fully comply with Rule 305 forthwith. Jurisdiction relinquished. ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion. ROBERTS, Judge, dissenting: I would affirm the trial court. Its order dismissing the charges was a proper discretionary remedy under Pa.R. Crim.P. 305 E. As the rule states: Here, the Commonwealth's failure for ten weeks to comply with the court's discovery order supports the sanction of dismissal. In all respects, it is an order "just under the circumstances." The record reveals that the trial court initially directed discovery on November 21, 1984. Yet, it was not until *305 January 29, 1985, the day of trial, that the Commonwealth made any response to the order. The Commonwealth never noted its exception to the order until that day. It now would be anamolous to reward the Commonwealth with a continuance after its ten week disregard of a direct court order. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra, now President Judge Spaeth observed that Rule 305 E "gives the trial court broad discretion in formulating remedies for a failure to comply with discovery requirements." 310 Pa.Super. at 395, 456 A.2d at 933. On this record, it cannot be concluded that an abuse of discretion occurred. Because of the Commonwealth's failure to provide the requested discovery materials, the court found that the defendant would have been deprived of his constitutional right to fair trial. Plainly, where such significant infringement has been occasioned, the Commonwealth has not established its entitlement to a continuance. Accord Johnson, supra, 310 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 456 A.2d at 993. Thus, the trial court's dismissal was indeed a sound exercise of discretion. In its dismissal order, the trial court noted: This well formulated order properly considered the circumstances surrounding the Commonwealth's failure to comply *306 with the discovery order and the absence of admissible evidence to deny a demurrer. The majority apparently accepts the Commonwealth's argument that the trial court should have held a hearing on the merits of defendant's motion for sanctions. The record, however, discloses that neither a written nor oral request for a hearing was made in the trial court. This issue having been presented here for the first time is not properly preserved for appeal. See Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). Accordingly, I dissent. [1] Section 5503(a)(3) obscene language or obscene gestures a misdemeanor of the third degree if the intent of the actor is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience.