Title: Doe v. Shaffer

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 2000-Ohio-186.] 
 
 
 
 
 
DOE ET AL.; INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. SHAFFER ET 
AL.; DIOCESE OF COLUMBUS ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Doe v. Shaffer (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 388.] 
Insurance — Ohio public policy permits a party to obtain liability insurance 
coverage for negligence related to sexual molestation when that party has 
not committed the act of sexual molestation. 
Ohio public policy permits a party to obtain liability insurance coverage for 
negligence related to sexual molestation when that party has not committed 
the act of sexual molestation.  (Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co. [1996], 76 
Ohio St.3d 34, 665 N.E.2d 1115, paragraph two of the syllabus, construed; 
Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. [1996], 76 Ohio St.3d 41, 665 N.E.2d 1121, 
and Westfield Cos. v. Kette [1996], 77 Ohio St.3d 154, 672 N.E.2d 166, 
modified.) 
(No. 99-1986 — Submitted September 13, 2000 — Decided December 20, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-980729. 
 
John Doe1 was a mentally retarded man who, until 1992, had resided for 
over twenty years in Pike County at the Good Shepherd Manor (“Manor”), a 
residential care facility for the mentally retarded.  The Manor was formerly 
operated by a Roman Catholic religious order known as the Little Brothers of the 
 
2 
Good Shepherd (“the Brothers”).  In 1985, following allegations that there had 
been incidents of financial mismanagement and sexual abuse at the Manor, the 
Brothers were removed from the Manor by order of the Superior General of the 
Brothers, who was based in New Mexico. 
 
In late 1992, after Doe was diagnosed as having contracted the human 
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), he moved from the Manor to his parents’ 
residence in Hamilton County.  Doe and his parents, acting individually and on his 
behalf, filed suit in 1993 against the Brothers, individual employees of that order, 
the Catholic Diocese of Columbus (“the Diocese”), Bishop James A. Griffin, and 
others,2 alleging that Doe had been sexually molested and infected with HIV by 
Manor employees under the control of the Diocese and Griffin.  The Does alleged 
several causes of action against the various parties, including negligent hiring, 
transmission of a communicable sexually transmitted disease, fraud, and sexual 
molestation.3  During the pendency of this suit, Doe died of complications related 
to acquired immune deficiency syndrome.4 
 
Doe’s parents settled with Griffin and the Diocese.  Prior to settlement, 
however, appellee Interstate Fire & Casualty Company (“Interstate”) intervened, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the 
Diocese or Griffin under three separate insurance policies in effect during the 
 
3 
pertinent time frame.  The policies provided liability indemnity coverage in excess 
of the limits of coverage afforded by a number of underlying insurance policies. 
 
The Diocese and Griffin filed an answer that included a counterclaim for 
declaratory judgment that Interstate possessed a duty to defend and indemnify 
them.  Interstate then moved for summary judgment.  The trial court denied the 
motion, but then granted judgment for Interstate upon reconsideration.  The court 
entered summary judgment for Interstate on the grounds that public policy barred 
coverage both for intentional acts of sexual molestation and for negligence claims 
that flowed from the molestation.  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, 
because intentional acts of sexual molestation and negligence claims that are 
derived from such acts are uninsurable pursuant to Ohio public policy, Interstate 
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
 
The cause is before this court upon allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Reminger & Reminger, Clifford C. Masch and David Ross, for appellee. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Thomas W. Hill, Robert G. Schuler and Paul 
D. Ritter, Jr., for appellants. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  This case presents the issue of whether the public policy 
precluding liability insurance coverage for acts of sexual molestation also prohibits 
 
4 
coverage for a nonmolester for related claims alleging negligent supervision, 
negligent retention, and negligent failure to warn.  Because we conclude that such 
coverage does not violate public policy, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand this cause for further proceedings. 
I.  Standard of Review 
 
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.  Grafton v. Ohio Edison 
Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241, 245.  Therefore, Interstate 
may prevail under Civ.R. 56(C) only if “(1) there is no genuine issue of material 
fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it 
appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion 
when viewing evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and that conclusion is 
adverse to the nonmoving party.”  Id., citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 631 N.E.2d 150, 152. 
II.  Application of Ohio Public Policy 
 
We now consider whether, as a matter of law, Ohio public policy precludes 
insurance coverage for the negligence alleged here.  We conclude that it does not. 
 
As early as 1938, this court found that it was “well settled from the 
standpoint of public policy that the act of intentionally inflicting an injury cannot 
be covered by insurance in anywise protecting the person who inflicts such injury.”  
Rothman v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. (1938), 134 Ohio St. 241, 246, 12 O.O. 50, 52, 16 
 
5 
N.E.2d 417, 420.  See, also, Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers (1928), 118 Ohio 
St. 429, 161 N.E. 278.  Accordingly, we have long adhered to the view that Ohio 
prohibits insuring against liability for one’s own intentional torts.  See Buckeye 
Union Ins. Co. v. New England Ins. Co. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 280, 283, 720 
N.E.2d 495, 498; Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 38, 665 
N.E.2d 1115, 1118; Wedge Products, Inc. v. Hartford Equity Sales Co. (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 65, 67, 31 OBR 180, 181, 509 N.E.2d 74, 76 (no coverage for tort 
where employer was substantially certain that employees would be injured); 
Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 23 OBR 208, 
210, 491 N.E.2d 688, 691. 
 
Application of this public policy has not always been absolute.  In Harasyn 
v. Normandy Metals, Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 173, 551 N.E.2d 962, for example, 
we addressed whether the general public policy precluding insuring against 
liability for intentional torts prevented an employer from procuring insurance for a 
tortious act performed not with purpose to injure but with the knowledge that 
injury was substantially certain to occur.  We concluded that it did not.5  We 
reasoned: 
 
“It is often said that public policy prohibits liability insurance for intentional 
torts.  This statement is based on ‘the assumption that such conduct would be 
encouraged if insurance were available to shift the financial cost of the loss from 
 
6 
the wrongdoer to his insurer.  * * *’  Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the 
Commission of Intentional Torts (1969), 20 Hastings L.J. 1219, 1245-1246.  
However, this blanket prohibition ‘makes no distinctions as to the various forms of 
intentional wrongdoing and does not admit the possibility that some torts might not 
be particularly encouraged if insurance were available for them.’  Id. at 1251.  The 
better view is to prohibit insurance only for those intentional torts where ‘the fact 
of insurance coverage can be related in some substantial way to the commission of 
wrongful acts of that character.  * * *’  Isenhart v. General Cas. Co. (1962), 233 
Ore. 49, 52-53, 377 P.2d 26, 28.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. at 176, 551 N.E.2d at 
965. 
 
In Gearing, we then analyzed the general public policy in the context of 
sexual molestation claims.  There, this court was asked to decide whether courts 
should infer intent to injure as a matter of law from the sexual abuse of a child.  
We held, as have the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions, that courts 
should infer such intent.  Gearing, 76 Ohio St.3d at 37-38, 665 N.E.2d at 1118.  As 
a result, we concluded that public policy precluded the issuance of coverage for 
this intentional tort.  Id. at 40, 665 N.E.2d at 1119. 
 
We issued our decision in Gearing on the same day that we issued Cuervo v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 41, 665 N.E.2d 1121.  In Cuervo, this 
court addressed whether a father could be indemnified under his homeowner’s 
 
7 
policy for claims of negligence brought because his son, who was also an insured 
on the policy, molested a child. After first deciding that Gearing forbids 
indemnification of the son, this court went on to hold that public policy also 
forecloses indemnification of the father, saying: 
 
“Similarly, the damages for which the Cuervos seek compensation flow 
from [the son’s] intentional acts of sexual molestation of a minor.  Thus, and on 
this record, the obligation of Cincinnati to pay the judgment entered against his 
father * * * is precluded as well.”  Id. at 44, 665 N.E.2d at 1122-1123. 
 
The Diocese and Griffin interpret the Cuervo holding to say that the 
negligent insured is foreclosed from indemnification only when the intentional 
tortfeasor is an insured under the policy through which the negligent insured 
claims coverage.  They assert that, unless the intentional tortfeasor is on the same 
policy as the negligent insured, insurance extends to negligence related to sexual 
molestation. 
 
This court’s opinion in Cuervo did not, however, analyze the language of the 
Cuervos’ insurance policy.  So, says Interstate, Cuervo cannot stand for the rule 
that coverage is denied only when the sexual molester is an insured on the same 
policy.  Rather, Interstate argues, Cuervo stands for the proposition that “insurance 
to anyone for injuries flowing from sexual molestation is against public policy.”6  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
8 
 
In order to resolve this debate between the parties, we reevaluate the Cuervo 
judgment that imputes the sexual molester’s intent to one whose conduct is only 
negligent with regard to the sexual molestation.  In so doing, we continue to adhere 
to Cuervo’s holding that public policy precludes liability insurance coverage for 
intentional acts of sexual abuse.  For the following reasons, however, we decline to 
adhere to that portion of Cuervo that precludes insurance coverage for a 
nonmolester’s negligence related to sexual molestation. 
 
In Gearing, we stated that “[l]iability insurance does not exist to relieve 
wrongdoers of liability for intentional, antisocial, criminal conduct.”  Gearing, 76 
Ohio St.3d at 38, 665 N.E.2d at 1118.  We also opined that “[s]exual abuse of 
children constitutes conduct so reprehensible that the General Assembly has 
categorized such conduct as felonious upon commission of the proscribed acts 
themselves[.]”  Id. at 38-39, 665 N.E.2d at 1119, citing R.C. 2907.05.  The express 
societal condemnation that animates the public policy forbidding insurance for the 
intentional tort of sexual molestation, however, does not exist for the tort of 
negligence.  Many of the claims against the Diocese and Griffin sound in 
negligence, and to deny them coverage as an extension of this public policy would 
be untenable. 
 
This is so because the intentions of the molester are immaterial to 
determining whether the allegedly negligent party has coverage. Silverball 
 
9 
Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. (W.D.Ark.1994), 842 F.Supp. 1151, 
1160, affirmed (C.A.8, 1994), 33 F.3d 1476 (permitting coverage for alleged 
negligent hiring and supervision by an insured despite molestation by another 
insured), citing Sena v. Travelers Ins. Co. (D.N.M.1992), 801 F.Supp. 471, 475. In 
reaching this conclusion, we find the rationale employed in Silverball informative.  
While acknowledging that jurisdictions have arrived at different conclusions as to 
whether alleged negligence related to sexual molestation can constitute a policy 
occurrence, the Silverball court reasoned that the intentions or expectations of the 
negligent insured must control the coverage determination, and not the intentions 
or expectations of the molester.  Id. at 1160. The court explained that a contrary 
practice would be unreasonable, saying: 
 
“The ultimate effect of [those opinions denying coverage] leads to a 
metamorphosis in which certain negligent actions are transformed by the court into 
intentional actions for the purposes of deciding negligent hiring cases involving 
sexual abuse.  Such a decision effectively dissolves the distinction between 
intentional and negligent conduct, allowing the intentional act to devour the 
negligent act for the purpose of determining coverage.  The correct method of 
analyzing this issue in cases with the factual setting and insurance policy 
provisions involved * * * would deal with each act on its own merits and 
 
10 
recognize that employers who make negligent hiring decisions clearly do not 
intend the employees to inflict harm.”  Id. at 1163. 
 
A contrary interpretation that refuses to distinguish between the abuser’s 
intentional conduct and the insured’s alleged negligence would impermissibly 
ignore the plain language of an insurance policy that excludes from coverage 
bodily injury that was expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.  See 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Open Sesame Child Care Ctr. (N.D.Ill.1993), 
819 F.Supp. 756, 760.7  Here, Interstate does not dispute that neither the Brothers 
nor the individual members of the Brothers against whom claims were brought 
qualify as insureds under the terms of the involved policies.  Accordingly, 
concluding that the Diocese or Griffin, the actual insureds, expected or intended 
the injuries that Doe sustained would not only be a tortured interpretation of the 
facts of this case, but an inherently illogical interpretation as well.  See Silverball, 
842 F.Supp. at 1158 (“It would require a tortured interpretation of this case to 
decide that when Silverball hired [the molester] it intended or expected that he 
would molest children”). 
 
Further, unlike in instances of sexual molestation, permitting coverage for 
the type of conduct alleged here does not “ ‘subsidiz[e] the episodes of child sexual 
abuse of which its victims complain, at the ultimate expense of other insureds to 
whom the added costs of indemnifying child molesters will be passed.’ ”  Gearing, 
 
11 
76 Ohio St.3d at 39, 665 N.E.2d at 1119, quoting Horace Mann. Ins. Co. v. Fore 
(M.D.Ala.1992), 785 F.Supp. 947, 956.  Rather, the critical issue is the nature of 
the intent—inferred or otherwise—of the party seeking coverage.  Cf. Preferred 
Mut. Ins. Co., 23 Ohio St.3d at 81, 23 OBR at 210, 491 N.E.2d at 691, and 
Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere (1984), 143 Ariz. 351, 356, 694 P.2d 181, 186 
(both finding the public policy precluding liability insurance for intentional torts 
inapplicable to self-defense because the concern over indemnifying wrongful 
action is negated by the purpose of the actor).  Society does not want to encourage 
or indemnify the wrongful conduct of the molester, but precluding coverage for a 
negligent party would not further this goal.  See Silverball, 842 F.Supp. at 1164 
(“This public policy [against coverage] does not apply when the wrongdoer is not 
helped and an insured who did not commit the wrong receives the protection of the 
insurance contract”).  Instead, precluding coverage would risk preventing the 
victim from obtaining a fair and adequate recovery, in contravention of the purpose 
of modern tort law.  See Harasyn, 49 Ohio St.3d at 176, 551 N.E.2d at 965 
(explaining that “public policy [has come] to favor liability insurance for negligent 
acts as a means of assuring that innocent persons are made whole”). 
 
Finally, here, unlike in Gearing, we do not believe that “ ‘the average person 
purchasing homeowner’s insurance would cringe at the very suggestion that he was 
paying for such coverage * * * [a]nd certainly * * * would not want to share that 
 
12 
type of risk with other homeowner’s policyholders.’ ”  Gearing, 76 Ohio St.3d at 
39, 665 N.E.2d at 1119, quoting Rodriguez v. Williams (1986), 42 Wash.App. 633, 
636, 713 P.2d 135, 137-138.  While it is indeed true that the average person would 
likely find liability coverage for the intentional tort of sexual molestation 
loathsome, the same rationale cannot extend to negligence.  The average person 
would no doubt find such coverage to be the purpose for which he obtained 
insurance. 
 
Accordingly, we modify Cuervo and Westfield to hold that Ohio public 
policy permits a party to obtain liability insurance coverage for negligence related 
to sexual molestation when that party has not committed the act of sexual 
molestation.  In light of this holding, we find that the court of appeals erred in 
holding that the acts of negligence alleged here could not constitute occurrences 
under an insurance policy as a matter of law. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
Because we now hold that coverage under the Interstate policies would not 
violate public policy, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in favor of 
Interstate that was based on our prior holdings in Gearing and Cuervo.  The cause 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.8 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
13 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
This individual’s name has been changed. 
 
2. 
The Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe and 
related parties were dismissed with prejudice following a stipulation by the Does 
that these parties had resolved the dispute. 
 
3. 
The second amended complaint filed by the Does alleged the 
following causes of action and claims against the Diocese and Griffin: fraud; 
negligent and/or reckless supervision and/or retention; violation of statutory duty 
of care; negligent or reckless and wanton failure to warn; respondeat superior and 
agency; misrepresentation with negligent, reckless, and wanton retention and 
supervision; loss of society; fraud in inducement of contract; breach of implied 
contract and warranty; breach of contract with damages to third-party beneficiary; 
breach of fiduciary duty; punitive damages; and wrongful death. 
 
4. 
Doe’s father also died while the suit was pending. 
 
5. 
We recognize that there is debate within this court concerning the 
current state of the law on whether “substantial-certainty” torts fall within the 
public policy exclusion for insurance coverage.  See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. 
 
14 
New England Ins. Co. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 280, 288, 720 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Cook, 
J., dissenting).  In this case, however, this question is not implicated.  Rather, this 
court’s explication of the public policy in Harasyn is used only to inform today’s 
decision as to whether the purpose of the public policy extends to negligent 
conduct. 
 
6. 
Support for this interpretation lies in this court’s only application of 
Cuervo. In Westfield Cos. v. Kette (Mar. 29, 1996), Erie App. No. E-95-051, 
unreported, 1996 WL 139636, the Sixth District found that coverage for the wife of 
an alleged molester existed under a homeowner’s policy that provided coverage for 
an insured’s negligence, “irrespective of whether a co-insured’s intentional acts 
give rise to an exclusion for him.”  Id. at 9, 1996 WL 139636, at *4.  We 
summarily reversed, based on the authority of Cuervo.  Westfield Cos. v. Kette 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 154, 672 N.E.2d 166.  To the extent that Cuervo is modified 
this day, so too is Westfield modified. 
 
7. 
See, also, Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. 
Co. (C.A.5, 1999), 169 F.3d 947 (finding that a duty to defend insured existed 
under policy excluding bodily injuries expected or intended by the insured, 
because the negligence alleged was not an intentional tort, and the molester’s acts 
should not be considered the insured’s acts); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Schrum (C.A.8, 1998), 149 F.3d 878, 881 (holding that molestation by third party 
 
15 
is “merely incidental” to claim of negligent supervision despite exclusion for 
bodily injury “arising out of any sexual act, including but not limited to 
molestation”); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Borbor (C.A.9, 1987), 826 F.2d 888, 895 
(permitting coverage because, under California law, allegedly negligent, separately 
insured wife of molester was an “innocent” insured and “[l]iability insurance 
policies are typically sold and purchased to provide indemnification for liability 
which may be imposed as a result of negligence”). 
 
8. 
Because other issues argued by the parties in the proceedings below 
are either not before this court or are not material to the issue of whether public 
policy precludes coverage of the sort sought here, we express no opinion as to 
these issues and their effect on whether indemnification is warranted under the 
facts of this case. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that it is not against public policy to 
allow a person to insure against liability for negligence related to sexual 
molestation, I believe this holding should be applied prospectively only. 
 
The law in Ohio has been that negligent acts that are associated with 
intentional acts of sexual molestation or other intentional harms do not constitute 
“occurrences” under a policy of liability insurance.  Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. 
 
16 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 41, 44, 665 N.E.2d 1121, 1122-1123.  Insurance has not 
been available to indemnify damages that flow from intentional torts.  Gearing v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 38, 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1118.  This 
has included the denial of coverage for damages from the intentional acts as well 
as from the negligent acts that are associated with the intentional acts because 
“incidents of intentional acts of sexual molestation of a minor do not constitute 
‘occurrences’ for purposes of determining insurance coverage.”  Cuervo, 76 Ohio 
St.3d at 43, 665 N.E.2d at 1122-1123.  We previously held that an act committed 
with an intent to harm is inconsistent with an insurance policy’s definition of 
“occurrence” that is based upon the concept of an accident.  Thus, an intentional 
harm is not even an “occurrence.”  Likewise, in Cuervo, we extended this 
reasoning to include negligent acts where the damages flow from an intentional 
tort.  The alleged negligence of the parents of a minor who committed acts of 
sexual abuse in Cuervo was not an “occurrence” within the meaning of a liability 
insurance policy. 
 
Now this court has reevaluated its interpretation of public policy.  The new 
interpretation rests on the conclusion that the “occurrence” for purposes of liability 
insurance coverage can be the alleged negligence of the insured that is related to 
the underlying act of sexual molestation, not the intentional act itself.  Because this 
 
17 
reverses our previous position on this legal issue, I believe we should apply this 
interpretation prospectively only. 
 
Therefore, while I believe that the negligence related to intentional acts of 
sexual molestation could be insurable, such a change should apply only to future 
incidents.