Title: RASMUSSEN v GIBSON PRODUCTS CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12714 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 MAXINE I. RASMUSSEN , Claimant and Respondent, -vs - GIBSON PRODUCTS C O M P A N Y O F B O Z E M A N , Employer and Appellant, UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE C O M P A N Y , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth ~ u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Keefer and Roybal, B i l l i n g s , Montana N e i l S. Keefer argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Drysdale, McLean and Scully, Bozeman, Montana James A. McLean argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: September 16, 1974 Decided : , ; r - - - : 8 .+ M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court . This is an appeal from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of G a l l a t i n County reversing an order of t h e Worlunen's Compensa- t i o n Division (the Division). The Division had denied t h e p e t i - t i o n of respondent, Maxine Rasmussen, f o r a d d i t i o n a l workmen's compensation b e n e f i t s f o r an old i n j u r y she sustained on October 1 4 , 1969, while employed by Gibsons i n Bozeman, Montana. The hearing before t h e Division was held f i r s t on June 11, 1973, and again on August 22, 1973, when it was concluded. A t t h i s hearing t h e following evidence w a s presented: Respondent t e s t i f i e d t h a t on October 1 4 , 1969, she suffered an i n j u r y t o her back during t h e course of her employment with Gibsons i n Bozeman; t h a t t h e I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board (now t h e Workmen's Compensation Division) compensated her f o r wages l o s t from October 16 through October 27, 1969, and f o r medical expenses incurred from October 20 through December 8 , 1969; t h a t she returned t o work a t Gibsons a f t e r October 27, 1969, but p e r s i s t e n t back t r o u b l e compelled her t o q u i t during t h e summer of 1970; t h a t i n June 1970, during a t r a i n r i d e t o Oregon her back problems i n t e n s i f i e d and she there- a f t e r v i s i t e d a chiropractor i n Oregon who gave minor r e l i e f ; t h a t on August 3 , 1970, she commenced work a t A r t c r a f t P r i n t e r s i n Bozeman, but i n a b i l i t y t o l i f t anything and back pain from j u s t s i t t i n g caused her t o q u i t on October 30, 1970; t h a t from December 1970, t o September 1971, she attempted s e v e r a l l i g h t housekeep- i n g jobs, but was forced t o q u i t a l l of them on account of her back; t h a t i n December 1 9 7 1 , she obtained employment on Tom Holdsworthls egg farm near Bozeman, but her back bothered her doing t h e work; t h a t i n June 1972, she took another t r i p t o Oregon, but t h e s i t t i n g bothered her so severely t h a t she could hardly walk, and when she returned home she was unable t o l i f t anything; t h a t i n J u l y 1972, Holdsworth f i n a l l y l e t her go because her back simply would not permit her t o do any work; t h a t on J u l y 1 4 , 1972, she f i l e d a claim with t h e Division a l l e g i n g an i n j u r y o r a recurrence thereof on J u l y 5, 1972; t h a t she knew Holdsworth d i d not c a r r y workmen's compensation insurance but he d i d c a r r y medical insurance t h a t he thought might cover her, but she was unfamiliar with t h e procedures f o r f i l i n g workmen's compensation claims. D r . De Heetderks, who t r e a t e d respondent f o r her 1969 i n j u r y a t Gibsons, diagnosed respondent's condition then a s a muscle s t r a i n and released her from h i s c a r e i n December 1969. Respondent d i d not see a doctor again u n t i l sometime i n 1972, but t e s t i f i e d t h i s was because D r . D e Heetderks s a i d she would j u s t have t o l i v e with her condition. After seeing D r . D e Heetderks again i n 1972, respondent a l s o v i s i t e d D r s . Varberg, Hurnberger, and Robinson a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s beginning i n June 1972, and ending April 1973. D r . Humberger t e s t i f i e d t h a t respondent t o l d him she was unsuccessful i n work because of back pain; t h a t i n December 1972, he diagnosed respondent's condition a s a possible herniated d i s c ; but t h a t he could not say with any degree of c e r t a i n t y whether t h e r e w a s a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e in- jury sustained by respondent on October 1 4 , 1969 and her condition i n J u l y 1972, but more w i l l be s a i d about t h i s h e r e a f t e r . O n t h e b a s i s of t h i s evidence, t h e Division found t h a t a preponderance of c r e d i b l e evidence f a i l e d t o s u s t a i n a finding of proximate cause between respondent's present d i s a b i l i t y and her i n j u r y of October 1 4 , 1969, and concluded t h a t respondent was not e n t i t l e d t o f u r t h e r workmen's compensation benefits. Respondent timely petitioned f o r a rehearing but t h e Div- i s i o n on October 30, 1973,denied t h e p e t i t i o n . Thereafter respond- e n t perfected an appeal t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t under t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 92-833, R.C.M. 1947. The hearing before t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was held on Jan- uary 1 4 , 1974. I n addition t o having t h e c e r t i f i e d record of t h e Division, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t heard testimony from respond- e n t , D r . Humberger, Roberta Adams, a former co-worker of re- spondent's a t A r t c r a f t , and Tom Holdsworth, her l a s t employer. Respondent's testimony was more orderly than t h a t heard by t h e Division, but i n substance contained nothing new except f o r t h e f a c t she had undergone surgery f o r a herniated d i s c a f t e r t h e Division proceedings had closed. Adams t e s t i f i e d t h a t respondent complained of back t r o u b l e a f t e r only two weeks a t A r t c r a f t and again before she q u i t . Holdsworth t e s t i f i e d t h a t respondent t o l d him about her back problems before she took t h e job; t h a t respondent t h e r e a f t e r con- tinued t o complain about her back, which became progressively worse, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r her June 1 9 7 2 , t r i p t o Oregon; and t h a t s i n c e respondent f e l t she had aggravated t h e o l d i n j u r y suffered a t Gibsons, a f t e r he found she was not covered by h i s own medical insurance he advised her t o reopen t h e matter with t h e Division. D r . Humberger t e s t i f i e d t h a t on November 7, 1973, he per- formed surgery on respondent f o r removal of a herniated d i s c ; t h a t t h e herniated d i s c could be r e l a t e d back t o t h e 1969 i n j u r y a t Gibsons; and t h a t t h e symptoms i n general of respondent's back trouble dated back t o t h e i n j u r y a t Gibsons. The d i s t r i c t court found t h a t respondent continued t o s u f f e r from and complain of i n t e r m i t t e n t low back pain from t h e t i m e of her i n j u r y a t Gibsons i n 1969 t o t h e present; t h a t t h i s condition prevented her from working a t length a t any job; and t h a t a preponderance of t h e evidence established t h a t respondent's present back condition w a s c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e i n j u r y a t Gibsons. The c o u r t concluded t h a t appellant Universal Underwriters Insur- ance Company w a s responsible f o r any compensation due respondent and that the cause should be remanded to the Division in order to determine the extent of respondent's disability and the amount of her award. It is from this decision that appellants appeal. Two issues are presented to us for review: (1) Did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting additional evi- dence? (2) Was there a preponderance of credible evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the district court? A district court has authority to take "additional evidence" in the workmen's compensation cases it hears on appeal from the Division. Section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947 provides: " * * * The court may, upon the hearing, for good cause shown, permit additional evidence to be introduced, but, in the absence of such permission from the court, the cause shall be heard on the record of the board, as certified to the court by it. The trial of the matter shall be de novo, and upon such trial the court shall determine whether or not the board regularly pursued its authority, and whether or not the findings of the board ought to be sustained, and whether or not such findings are reasonable under all the cir- cumstances of the case." It should be noted that appellants timely objected to all the "additional evidence" in the instant case--the testimony of respondent, Adams, Holdsworth, and Dr. Humberger. We think respondent's testimony as a whole is beyond the scope of "additional evidence" as that term is used in the stat- ute. Except for clarifying a few dates and relating the fact of her subsequent back operation, respondent simply gave a repeat of her performance before the Diuision. Similar testimony has met with our approval in the past, but only because of exigent circumstances not present here. -See, for example, Best v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., 100 Mont. 332, 47 P.2d 656 (claimant neither personally present nor represented by counsel, board's decision denying compensation was based on insurance carrier's version of t h e f a c t s ) and Tweedie v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 101 Mont. 256, 53 P.2d 1145 (claimant not represented by counsel a t board hearing, evidence adduced was so incomplete and confus- ing t h a t an i n t e l l i g e n t decision could not have been reached). O n t h e other hand, t h e testimony of Adams, Holdsworth, and D r . Humberger i s a d d i t i o n a l evidence f o r good cause shown. D r . Humberger d i d nothing e l s e than r e p o r t respondent's medical condition from t h e c l o s e of t h e Division hearing t o t h e d a t e of t h e d i s t r i c t court hearing. It is well s e t t l e d t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may receive evidence bringing t h e f a c t u a l record up t o d a t e . Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239, 244, 22 P.2d 157. Appellants contend t h a t respondent was negligent i n f a i l i n g t o have Adams and Holdsworth t e s t i f y before t h e Division and conse- quently has not demonstrated "good cause" under section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947. Had these witnesses merely corroborated respondent's testimony t h a t she o f t e n suffered back pain a f t e r t h e i n j u r y a t Gibsons i n 1969, w e might be inclined t o agree. However, Adams and Holdsworth a l s o spoke t o t h e important i s s u e of whether t h e r e w a s an intervening i n j u r y which could have been responsible f o r respondent's back trouble. The testimony of Holdsworth is par- t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s regard: "Q. P r i o r t o M r s . Rasmussen commencing work f o r you, d i d she t e l l you about any of her previous background? A. Yes. She applied f o r t h e job and I t o l d her we would l i k e her t o look over t h e job and see what she w a s expected t o do. She d i d come o u t and overlook t h e work. She - t o l d me a t t h a t t i m e she had been injured while working a t Gibsons, t h a t she thought she would be a b l e t o handle t h e job, and she would l i k e t o t r y . "Q. Did she say anything about her back bother- i n g her a t that-time? AI Not s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . She s a i d she had been injured a t Gibsons, and t h a t her back had bother- ed her. And again she d i d n ' t say it was a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r time. She j u s t s a i d she hoped she would be a b l e t o handle t h i s p a r t i c u l a r work. "Q. After she worked f o r you f o r w h i l e , did she complain about her back? A . Y e s , she did. "Q. Do you r e c a l l when t h i s was, f i r s t ? A. She complained of her back j u s t gradually. h d i n watching her work, I could see her back was bothering her, W e began t o restrict t h e type of work t h a t she w a s doing. I n other words, t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n jobs i n t h e process- ing p l a n t , t h e candling job, t h e r e is no l i f t - ing a t a l l . I n unloading t h e egg processing machines, t h e l i f t i n g i s very r e s t r i c t e d . W e began t o r e s t r i c t t h e amount of t h e a r e a i n which she worked. She began t o complain very severely of her back problems a f t e r she came back from t h i s vacation. Her work then was r e s t r i c t e d e n t i r e l y t o t h e candling. And a f t e r a s h o r t while, it became apparent she couldn't do t h a t , and had t o q u i t . " (Emphasis added) Obviously t h i s testimony lends independent support t o D r . Humberger's opinion t h a t a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p existed between respondent's back trouble i n 1972 and her i n j u r y a t Gibsons i n 1969. I n s h o r t , t h e testimony took on added relevance i n l i g h t of what D r . Humberger had t o say a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing. Respondent could not reasonably have forseen t h i s a t t h e t i m e t h e Division conducted its proceedings; accordingly, a p p e l l a n t s ' objection on t h i s point i s not well taken. W e think t h e d i s t r i c t court could f i n d a preponderance of c r e d i b l e evidence t o s u s t a i n respondent's claim, both from t h e a d d i t i o n a l evidence presented a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing and t h e record of t h e Division. The crucial element of respondent's case w a s whether she could show t h a t her back trouble i n 1972 was causally r e l a t e d t o her i n j u r y a t Gibsons i n 1969. D r . Humberger t e s t i f i e d a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing that i n h i s opinion, based on a medi- c a l h i s t o r y of respondent and t h e f a c t of her operation f o r a herniated d i s c , such a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p d i d indeed e x i s t . This opinion was supported not only by t h e testimony of Adams and Holds- worth, a s discussed above, but a l s o by two o t h e r doctors. D r . D e Heetderks wrote a l e t t e r dated September 1, 1972, t o Douglas Drysdale, respondent's attorney, wherein he s t a t e d i n substance t h a t i n 1969 he f e l t respondent's i n j u r y a t Gibsons w a s r e l a t i v e - l y minor and apparently resolved i t s e l f ; t h a t h i s examination of respondent i n 1972 was inconclusive a s t o t h e nature and cause of her back d i f f i c u l t i e s then; and t h a t he r e f e r r e d respon- dent t o D r . Varberg who, a f t e r examination, f e l t she might have some discogenic disease. The l a s t paragraph of t h i s l e t t e r , however, q u a l i f i e s any u n c e r t a i n t i e s D r . De Heetderks may have had and c l e a r l y supports D r . Humberger's opinion: "It i s d i f f i c u l t t o say with c e r t a i n t y whether o r not t h e low back trouble of October, 1969 i s r e l a t e d t o t h e July, 1972 back problems. - How- ever, i f t h e p a t i e n t t r u l y does have discogenlc disease i n t h e low back area, it very probably is r e l a t e d . I would encourage you t o consult with D r . Varberg on t h i s matter." (Emphasis added) O n October 6, 1972, D r . Varberg a l s o wrote t o Drysdale and r e l a t e d h i s examination of respondent. H e concluded with t h i s paragraph: " I t is highly l i k e l y t h e r e is a causal r e l a t i o n - s h i p between t h e accident of October 1 4 , 1969 and her present condition. I f she does undergo a myelogram and t h i s is p o s i t i v e toward t h i s disease then it would be m y opinion t h a t t h e r e i s a d i r e c t causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e incident of October 1 4 , 1969 and her present condition. I would have t o reserve an absolute d e f i n i t e opinion, however, u n t i l the myelogram was accomplished." (Emphasis added) While t h e r e s u l t s of t h e myelogram w e r e not p o s i t i v e , t h e r e i s no g e t t i n g around t h e f a c t t h a t respondent i n November, 1973, was found t o have a herniated d i s c and underwent surgery f o r t h a t reason. It does not seem u n f a i r t o say D r . Varberg would concur i n D r . Humberger's opinion as t o t h e cause of respondent's back trouble. The Division i n deciding a g a i n s t respondent apparently gave considerable weight t o t h e f a c t t h a t before f i l i n g t h e present claim a g a i n s t Gibsons respondent f i l e d a claim a g a i n s t Holdsworth who c a r r i e d no workmen's compensation insurance. This a c t i o n might imply t h a t respondent was aware she suffered a new i n j u r y while working at Holdsworth's and that the claim against Gibsons was founded upon something less than good faith. At the Division hearing respondent explained she really did not know the correct procedures for filing a workmen's compensation claim; but the Division was not convinced. However, we think the record is replete with evidence from which the district court could find assurance respondent was telling the whole story. For one thing, both Adams and Holdsworth testified that respondent complained of back trouble during her employment with Artcraft and the egg farm. For another, the Division's interoffice communications of July 10 and July 28, 1972, reveal that respondent phoned the office to inquire about eligibility for workmen's compensation benefits, saying she "(was) having difficulty with her back resulting from her accident of October 14, 1969'' and "did not feel she had a new injury but that it was a recurrence of the accident she had on October 14, 1969, while employed by Gibsons * * *". The case of Vetsch v. Helena Transf. & Stor. Co., 154 Mont. 106, 460 P.2d 757, was relied on by the Division as controlling, but in our view this reliance is misplaced because of factual distinctions from the instant case. Vetsch involved a workmen's compensation claimant who in 1964 fell on a flight of stairs. He claimed injuries to his back and elbows, but the accident was not reported or compensated as an industrial accident. Eventually he quit Helena Transfer & Storage over a commission dispute. There- after during a period of more than two years claimant worked for nine firms as a heavy construction worker. He never complained to any of these employers of back trouble, nor did he ever give it as a reason for quitting. During the winter of 1967, claim- ant strained his back while shoveling snow. In holding that claimant failed to show the 1964 fall was the proximate cause of his present condition, the Court stressed the fact that claimant subsequently performed heavy construction work and his working ability was not impaired until after the winter of 1967. Here the situation is very different: (1) respondent suffered a previous industrial accident and received benefits therefor; (2) she thereafter regularly complained of back trouble to sub- sequent employers; and (3) she attempted to do only relatively light work, and her back would not even permit her to do that for any length of time. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. .............................. Chief Justice We concur: .............................. Justices