Title: Piney Meeting House Invs., Inc. v. Hart

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
PINEY MEETING HOUSE INVESTMENTS, INC. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
     
 
      OPINION BY  
v. 
Record No. 111548 
 
 
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     June 7, 2012 
FRED A. HART, JR., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
David H. Beck, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in sustaining exceptions to the report of a commissioner in 
chancery.  Specifically, we review the circuit court’s 
conclusion that a buried propane tank and well under an easement 
for ingress and egress constituted unreasonable interference 
with the easement owner’s rights as a matter of law, even if the 
improvements did not affect vehicular access.  We also consider 
whether the circuit court erred in awarding costs and attorney’s 
fees to the prevailing party.   
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Fred A. Hart, Jr. and Mary Ann Hart (“the Harts”) filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County against 
Piney Meeting House Investments, Inc. (“PMH”).  The Harts owned 
real property on Lake Anna that included a 30-foot easement.  
The Harts’ grantor conveyed to them “an easement and right-of-
way for ingress, egress, and related utilities over the 
remaining lands of the party of the first part, said easement 
and right-of-way to be thirty (30) feet in width and run from 
2 
 
the property herein conveyed” to State Route 612.  PMH later 
acquired property adjacent to the Harts’ which was encumbered by 
15 feet of the 30-foot wide easement.  The Harts alleged that 
PMH placed various obstructions in the 15-foot-wide easement area 
on PMH’s property, including an electric box, generator, well, 
propane tank, trees, and mulch.  The Harts alleged that the 
presence of the obstructions in the easement negatively affected 
their effort to market their property.  In its answer, PMH 
denied that the obstructions interfered with the Harts’ full use 
and enjoyment of the easement.   
 
The circuit court referred the matter to a commissioner in 
chancery, who conducted an evidentiary hearing.  The Harts 
testified that the items obstructed their use of the easement, 
and narrowed it in one place to eight feet in width.  Mr. Hart 
testified that a buyer offered a contract on the Harts’ property 
for $675,000 but “backed out of the deal because they were 
afraid that they were not going to have full access” due to the 
obstructions.  On cross-examination, Mr. Hart admitted that the 
buried propane tank did not create any impediment, though he 
speculated that it would be difficult to access the tank if the 
Harts were to pave the easement.     
 
At the conclusion of the hearing before the commissioner, 
PMH conceded that the electric box and generator interfered with 
the use of the easement, but maintained that the well and 
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propane tank did not materially interfere with the Harts’ use of 
the easement.  In his written report, the commissioner found 
that the electric box, the generator, the mulch, and the trees 
materially encroached into the easement and significantly 
reduced the area of the easement available to the Harts.  The 
commissioner concluded that PMH “is to be enjoined from 
maintaining these encroachments.”     
 
The commissioner found that the well and propane tank were 
both located below ground level.  However, the well had an 
above-ground fixture that was a significant encroachment, and 
the propane tank had a cap at ground level.  Regarding the 
well’s fixture, the commissioner referenced testimony regarding 
a modification which would remove the above-ground obstruction 
while permitting continuing use of the well.  The commissioner 
found that PMH should be given a reasonable period, not to 
exceed 90 days, (1) to either remove the above-ground well 
obstruction or relocate the well and (2) to satisfy the circuit 
court the ground-level propane tank cap was strong enough for 
vehicular traffic or relocate the tank.  The commissioner 
ordered that 2/3 of the costs of the proceedings would be borne 
by PMH and 1/3 by the Harts.   
 
Only the Harts filed exceptions to the commissioner’s 
report, objecting to the findings regarding the well and propane 
tank.  They argued that pursuant to settled Virginia law, the 
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commissioner erred in allowing the fixtures to remain 
underground because “‘where a reservation is of a certain 
width[,] that cannot be encroached upon, period.’”  The Harts 
also argued that the well and propane tank created significant 
liability questions.   
The circuit court thereafter heard argument on the Harts’ 
exceptions to the report.  The Harts argued that they were 
entitled to their attorney’s fees because PMH had denied their 
request for admission that stated: “Admit that you have no 
defenses to the Plaintiff’s claims.”  The Harts noted that if a 
party fails to admit the truth of any matters requested under 
Rule 4:11, the party requesting admission may recover reasonable 
expenses, including attorney’s fees, in successfully making the 
proof.  Rule 4:12(c).   
The circuit court sustained the Harts’ exceptions and 
ratified the remainder of the report.  The court ordered PMH to 
remove all items placed in the easement, including the well and 
propane tank, and permanently enjoined PMH from placing anything 
within the easement which would in any way affect the Harts’ use 
of the entire width of the easement.   
The court found that pursuant to Rules 4:11(a) and 4:12(c) 
the Harts were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees from 
PMH in the amount of $6,000.  The court also found that the 
Harts were entitled to recover their costs from PMH, including 
5 
 
filing and service fees, the costs of the court reporter, and 
the commissioner’s fee.    
DISCUSSION 
On appeal, PMH argues that the circuit court erred in 
sustaining the Harts’ exceptions to the commissioner’s report 
because the propane tank and well, as modified by the 
commissioner’s directive, would not unreasonably interfere with 
the Harts use and enjoyment of the easement for ingress and 
egress.  PMH also assigns error to the circuit court’s 
assessment of all costs of the proceedings against PMH, 
including the Harts’ attorney’s fees and the commissioner’s fee. 
A. UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE 
We review the circuit court’s sustaining of the Harts’ 
exceptions to the commissioner’s report in accord with familiar 
principles: 
While the report of a commissioner in 
chancery does not carry the weight of a 
jury’s verdict, it should be sustained 
unless the trial court concludes that the 
commissioner’s findings are not supported by 
the evidence.  This rule applies with 
particular force to a commissioner’s 
findings of fact based upon evidence taken 
in his presence, but is not applicable to 
pure conclusions of law contained in the 
report.  
 
Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 576-77, 318 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1984) 
(internal citations omitted).  Because the circuit court 
disapproved of the commissioner’s findings, this Court must 
6 
 
review the evidence and ascertain whether, under a correct 
application of the law, the evidence supports the findings of 
the commissioner or the conclusions of the trial court.  See id. 
at 577, 318 S.E.2d at 296-97.  Having heard the testimony and 
reviewed the evidence at the hearing, the commissioner found 
that the modified well and propane tank would not unreasonably 
interfere with the Harts’ use of the easement.  The circuit 
court should have sustained the commissioner’s conclusion unless 
it was not supported by the evidence or was based on an 
erroneous application of the law. 
 
The circuit court relied on Pizzarelle v. Dempsey, 259 Va. 
521, 526 S.E.2d 260 (2000), and Snead v. C&S Properties Holding 
Co., 279 Va. 607, 692 S.E.2d 212 (2010), in reaching its 
conclusion that the propane tank and well encroached upon the 
Harts’ easement.  PMH argues that the circuit court erred in its 
reliance on these cases because they address encroachments that 
block all or part of an easement, which would not be the case 
here after the modifications required by the commissioner.  
According to PMH, the circuit court should have analyzed whether 
its use was reasonable.  By contrast, the Harts interpret 
Pizzarelle and Snead to mean that questions of reasonableness 
are irrelevant in cases involving platted easements that have a 
certain width. 
7 
 
 
In Pizzarelle, the owner of the servient estate erected a 
fence and planted trees several feet within an easement, but 
outside of the gravel driveway used for ingress and egress.  259 
Va. at 525, 526 S.E.2d at 262.  The circuit court found that the 
encroachment was insubstantial and did not warrant injunctive 
relief.  Id. at 530, 526 S.E.2d at 265.  We reversed the circuit 
court, holding that “[t]o affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
injunctive relief in this case would in effect allow the 
[servient tenant] to appropriate a portion of the easement and 
reduce a 24-foot easement to one of 19 to 20 feet in width.”  
Id. at 531, 526 S.E.2d at 265.  We explained: “Unlike some 
cases, the question here is not one of ‘reasonableness’ or 
whether the easement is now ‘less useful or less convenient.’”  
Id. (quoting Willing v. Booker, 160 Va. 461, 466, 168 S.E. 417, 
418 (1933)). 
 
In Snead, the servient landowner erected a chain-link 
fence, placed signs, and installed riprap within the bounds of a 
60-foot-wide easement, narrowing the effective width to 40 feet.  
279 Va. at 610-11, 692 S.E.2d at 213-14.  The circuit court held 
that the placement of these items did not unreasonably interfere 
with the use of the easement because the objects did not block 
the use of the gravel road in the easement.  Id. at 612, 692 
S.E.2d at 214.  Relying on Pizzarelle, we reversed the circuit 
court, holding that the objects created “a material encroachment 
8 
 
on the dominant owners’ rights because a significant portion of 
the easement would be rendered unusable for ingress and egress 
if injunctive relief were denied.”  Id. at 616, 692 S.E.2d at 
216 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).   
 
These cases establish that a servient landowner may not 
effectively narrow the defined width of an easement by placing 
obstructions amounting to “a material encroachment on the 
dominant owner[‘s] rights,” 259 Va. at 530, 526 S.E.2d at 265 
(emphasis added), even when the encroachment does not interfere 
with ingress and egress at that time.  The Harts, however, do 
not contend that the propane tank and well, as modified, will 
effectively narrow their 30-foot easement.  Rather, they rely on 
our observation in Willing that “where a reservation is of a 
certain width, that width cannot be encroached upon.”  160 Va. 
at 465, 168 S.E. at 418.  In the Harts’ view, every 
encroachment, no matter how minor, is material when the easement 
is of an express width.   
 
We do not agree.  Our cases make clear that the owner of a 
servient estate may still make reasonable use of land burdened 
by an easement of defined width.  See id. at 467-68, 168 S.E. at 
419 (observing that servient tenant may place half of a fence of 
reasonable dimensions on dominant estate).  An encroachment that 
does not narrow the width of an easement or unreasonably 
interfere with its use is not a material encroachment.   
9 
 
 
The Harts made no allegation that the tank and well would 
narrow their easement.  Thus, the proper inquiry for the 
commissioner and the circuit court was whether the buried 
propane tank and well, if modified, would unreasonably interfere 
with the Harts’ use.  As we explained in Willing, “[w]hether or 
not [an] encroachment makes the way less useful or less 
convenient is usually a jury question,” and “the test is 
reasonableness.”  Id. at 466, 168 S.E. at 418.  As finder of 
fact, the commissioner concluded that the improvements would not 
constitute unreasonable interference if the well were modified 
and the propane tank were tested to ensure suitability for 
vehicular access.  The circuit court should have ratified this 
conclusion unless it was not supported by the evidence.  Hill, 
227 Va. at 576-77, 318 S.E.2d at 296. 
 
The Harts do not argue that the commissioner’s finding is 
not supported by the evidence.  Rather, they argue that even if 
PMH modified the well and took precautions with the propane 
tank, the improvements still would constitute unreasonable 
interference with the easement because of the possibility of a 
“catastrophe” occurring.  The Harts cite the prospect of the 
propane tank exploding and the well cracking and becoming 
contaminated.  According to the Harts, the tank and well present 
10 
 
risks of harm and liability to them and their invitees, and 
these risks lowered the value of their property.1 
 
The Harts’ arguments on appeal, however, are speculative.  
They are not based on any evidence adduced at the hearing.  We 
will limit our review to the facts adduced before the 
commissioner.2  PMH presented evidence that the fixtures could be 
modified and tested to ensure normal vehicular access with the 
approval of the local health department.  By contrast, the 
Harts’ only evidence relevant to their argument on appeal 
related to a potential buyer’s concern about the narrowing of 
the easement, not an exploding propane tank or collapsing well. 
 
Upon review of the record and under a correct application 
of the controlling law, we find that the evidence supports the 
findings of the commissioner and not the conclusions of the 
circuit court.  Id. at 577, 318 S.E.2d at 296-97.  The circuit 
court erred in sustaining the Harts’ exceptions.   
B. AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES 
                         
1 Because the issue is not properly before us, we do not 
decide whether conduct by a servient landowner affecting the 
value of the dominant estate alone constitutes a basis for a 
finding of unreasonable interference and awarding injunctive 
relief. 
2 The Harts advance no evidence or argument regarding state 
regulations or local ordinances relating to wells or propane 
tanks being located in an easement.  We do not address the issue 
of whether it is permissible under state or local regulations to 
bury a propane tank or drill and maintain a well in an easement 
used for vehicular access. 
11 
 
 
We now turn to PMH’s argument regarding the imposition of 
costs and attorney’s fees.  Because the circuit court’s basis 
for the award of attorney’s fees was distinct from its decision 
to award costs, we will address the issues separately.   
1. COSTS 
 
It is well-established that “[i]n equity, the trial court 
has discretion in the award of costs; nevertheless, we have 
found an abuse of that discretion if costs are not awarded in 
favor of the party or parties substantially prevailing.”  Smith 
v. Woodlawn Constr. Co., 235 Va. 424, 431, 368 S.E.2d 699, 703 
(1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Because the circuit court erred in ordering PMH to remove the 
propane tank and well from the easement, the Harts did not 
prevail entirely in their suit.  The Harts did, however, 
substantially prevail because the commissioner concluded that 
the electric box, generator, trees and mulch interfered with the 
use of the easement and ordered their removal.  The circuit 
court ratified those findings.  Consequently, the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to the Harts.   
2. ATTORNEY’S FEES 
The “American rule” provides that “‘attorneys’ fees are 
[ordinarily] not recoverable by a prevailing litigant in the 
absence of a specific contractual or statutory provision to the 
contrary.’”  Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 400, 641 S.E.2d 
12 
 
494, 501 (2007).  The circuit court awarded the Harts their 
attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 4:12(c) because PMH failed to 
admit that it “[had] no defenses to the [Harts’] claims.”  We 
review the circuit court’s decision to award attorney’s fees for 
an abuse of discretion.  Erie Ins. Exchange v. Jones, 236 Va. 
10, 14, 372 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1988).   
Rule 4:12(c) states:  
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any 
document or the truth of any matter as requested 
under Rule 4:11, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of 
the document or the truth of the matter, he may 
apply to the court for an order requiring the 
other party to pay him the reasonable expenses 
incurred in making that proof, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request 
was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 4:11(a), 
or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had 
reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other 
good reason for the failure to admit. 
 
Rule 4:11(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] party 
may serve upon any other party a written request for the 
admission . . . of the truth of any matters within the scope of 
Rule 4:1(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements 
or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact.”   
The Harts’ request for admission did not comply with this 
rule.  Their argument, in conjunction with Rule 4:12(c), would 
render the American Rule of attorney’s fees defunct in many 
13 
 
contested proceedings when the requesting party ultimately 
prevailed on the merits of a case.  We find that the Harts’ 
request was not a proper discovery request under Rule 4:11 and 
therefore that “there was other good reason for the failure [of 
PMH] to admit” that it had no defenses.  Rule 4:12(c)(4).  
Consequently, we hold that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the Harts. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court insofar as it sustained the Harts’ exceptions 
regarding the buried propane tank and well.  We will affirm the 
circuit court in its award of costs to the Harts and reverse the 
circuit court in its award of attorney’s fees to the Harts.  We 
will remand the case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
Reversed in part, 
affirmed in part,  
and remanded.