Title: KEVIN JOSEPH BIBBINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEVIN JOSEPH BIBBINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 44696 P.2d 1300Case Number: 84-67Decided: 03/20/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
KEVIN JOSEPH BIBBINS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne; and K. Leslie Delk, Asst. Public Defender, 
Wyoming Public Defender Program, Laramie, for appellant.

Kevin Joseph 
Bibbins, pro 
se.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen.; Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Division; John 
Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.; Roger Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
district court's denial of appellant's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Appellant contends that his constitutional rights were violated before his plea 
of guilty and at sentencing. The issue, according to appellant, is, "Whether the 
district court erred in dismissing on its face appellant's petition for 
post-conviction relief."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On July 2, 1982, on the 
basis of a negotiated plea, appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated 
assault. In exchange for this plea, another count of aggravated assault was 
dismissed. After a presentence report was received and a sentencing hearing, 
sentence was imposed September 9, 1982. Appellant was sentenced to not less than 
two years and not more than six years in the penitentiary. The court considered 
the sentence a "high maximum and relatively low minimum." On February 9, 1984, 
appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief according to § 7-14-101, 
et seq., W.S. 1977. On February 14, 1984, the district court filed an order 
denying appellant the relief prayed for in his petition.1

[¶4.]     In appellant's pro se 
petition for post-conviction relief, he states:

"* * * [T]he defendant 
was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial when these 2 
court appointed public pretenders [sic] failed to adequately and competently to 
represent the defendant for the following reasons set out below * * 
*."

Appellant then 
lists 25 complaints against his court-appointed lawyers.2 Appellant also contends that he 
was

"* * * denied his 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, sentencing hearing when the 
prosecutor either by knowingly using such perjured testimony and or by knowingly 
using a perjured pre-sentence investigation report * * * or actively suppressing 
such evidence known to be exculpatory."

[¶5.]     Appellant further 
claims that his plea of guilty was procured by fraud, coercion and was 
involuntary. He also lists seventeen separate provisions in the 
United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions that he 
maintains were violated. However, he does not explain in any way how these 
seventeen constitutional provisions were violated; he only reminds us of the 
rights protected.

[¶6.]     The essence of 
appellant's petition is:

A. His plea of guilty was 
induced by fraud, and coercion and was not voluntarily 
made.

B. The prosecutor used 
perjured testimony and/or a perjured presentence investigation report and 
suppressed exculpatory evidence.

C. Inadequate 
court-appointed counsel resulted in a denial of a fair and impartial 
trial.

[¶7.]     Section 7-14-101, W.S. 
1977, provides in part:

"Any person imprisoned in 
the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his 
conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution 
of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute 
proceedings under this act [§§ 7-14-101 to 7-14-108]. The proceeding shall be 
commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took 
place a petition verified by affidavit. * * * The clerk shall docket the 
petition upon his receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention 
of the court. * * *"

[¶8.]     Section 7-14-106, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"The court may receive 
proof by affidavits, deposition, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its 
discretion the court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the 
hearing. If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an 
appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former 
proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, 
bail or discharge as may be necessary and proper."

[¶9.]     Appellant complains 
that five days after the petition was filed, the court dismissed it. He 
concludes from the court's disposition that "the court's action can only be 
classified as either a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted or a judgment on the pleadings." The record does not support 
appellant's characterization of the court's disposition of his petition. The 
court recited in its order that it had inquired into the matter, found no legal 
basis for the motion (petition) and denied the motion (petition) - not dismissed 
it.

[¶10.]  We conclude from the recitation in the 
trial court's order of denial that the court did more than deny the petition on 
its face. We must assume that the court's inquiry included an examination of the 
court file. The file contained the arraignment, change of plea, sentencing 
hearing, and the innumerable materials referred to in footnote 
1.

[¶11.]  The post-conviction procedure set out in 
§§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108, W.S. 1977, does not mandate a formal hearing nor 
does it require that a petitioner be brought back into court for a hearing. 
Whether a formal hearing is held or a petitioner is brought personally before 
the court seems to depend on the circumstances of each case. Whether oral 
testimony, depositions, affidavits or other evidence is produced, likewise 
depends on the circumstances of each case. Here, the trial court acted on the 
petition before it, considering only the court file. It was apparently 
determined from the court file that there was no legal basis for the petition. 
We cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong.

[¶12.]  In Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711, 715 
(1971), we said:

"* * * Before a person is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing he must present initially a substantial 
claim, and some specificity is required. An application is properly denied 
without a hearing where it states only bald legal conclusions with no supporting 
factual allegations. [Citation.] Here there were no factual allegations 
supporting the contention which was in conclusory form. The law does not grant 
an absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on the application. 
[Citations.]"

[¶13.]  In this case the allegations in 
appellant's petition consist principally of bald legal conclusions sans 
specificity.

A.

[¶14.]  Appellant contends that his "plea of 
guilty was produced fraudulently, coercively and involuntarily." This accusation 
is an unwarranted conclusion, and lacks specificity, but more significantly, 
flies in the face of the record. On July 2, 1982, at the change-of-plea hearing, 
the record reveals the following:

"THE COURT: * * * [D]o 
you make this plea under any threat or any coercion?

"THE DEFENDANT: I make it 
voluntarily, Your Honor."

[¶15.]  The trial court was abundantly justified 
in determining that there was no merit to appellant's claim that his guilty plea 
was obtained improperly.

B.

[¶16.]  Appellant contends that the prosecutor 
used perjured testimony and/or a perjured presentence investigation report. 
Alternatively, appellant says the prosecutor actively suppressed evidence known 
to be exculpatory. We have difficulty identifying the "testimony" that appellant 
alludes to.

"* * * `Testimony' is a 
particular kind or species of evidence, namely, that which comes to the tribunal 
through living witnesses speaking under oath or affirmation in the presence of 
the tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial. [Citations.]" State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582, 268 A.2d 692, 697 (1970).

"* * * [F]requently the 
word `testimony' and `evidence' are used synonymously, although technically the 
word `testimony' has a more limited meaning than the word `evidence.' * * *" Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Company, 
73 Wyo. 287, 
278 P.2d 605, 615 (1955).

[¶17.]  At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor 
and defense counsel argued the case to the court, but neither produced testimony 
or introduced evidence. The nearest thing to testimony produced at the hearing 
was from the mouth of the appellant. The court invited, nay urged, appellant to 
tell the court anything and everything he desired. Appellant addressed the court 
at length. He characterized his case as one of self-defense and related some of 
the circumstances. However, he did not recant on his guilty plea nor did he say 
he was not guilty. In fact, he said twice that he was wrong in what he 
did.

[¶18.]  In his address to the court, appellant 
did not disagree with the information in the presentence investigation report 
which recited that he had been convicted of (1) "kidnap, assault with intent to 
rape, assault with intent to murder" in November, 1976; (2) "assault with a 
deadly weapon" in March, 1978; and (3) also juvenile 
offenses.

[¶19.]  As nearly as we can tell, the alleged 
perjured testimony that appellant alludes to was the presentence investigation 
report which was placed in the court file eighteen days before the sentencing 
hearing. We say this because when appellant addressed the court at the 
sentencing hearing, he disputed the prosecutor's characterization of some of the 
information in the report. Specifically, appellant was wroth because his 
association with a woman was not recognized as a common-law marriage. Also, he 
was in disagreement with the prosecutor regarding his status as a parolee from 
California, and claims that whether he 
absconded from parole in California or whether 
he had permission to leave California affected the severity of his 
sentence. In view of the serious nature of the offense to which appellant pled 
guilty and his prior criminal convictions, it is inconceivable that this made 
any difference in his sentence.

[¶20.]  If there was something other than the two 
matters we have identified that appellant claims were perjured, he kept it a 
secret from the trial court and this court. The trial court recognized the 
common-law relationship that seemed very important to appellant. The judge then 
said, "I have an inclination to believe a good deal of what you say, Mr. 
Bibbins."

[¶21.]  With respect to the so-called perjured 
testimony, appellant also says the prosecutor suppressed such evidence known to 
be exculpatory. Here again the only thing he ever talked about were entries in 
the presentence investigation report. There is nothing exculpatory in that 
report; some of it, however, is favorable to appellant. Based on the court file, 
the court could determine, as it did, that there was no basis for a serious 
claim of perjured testimony or suppression of exculpatory 
evidence.

C.

[¶22.]  Appellant's 25 numbered complaints 
against assigned counsel are directed primarily against the lawyer who handled 
his case through a change of plea to guilty. The complaints against counsel at 
the time of sentencing generally pertain to the alleged perjured testimony and 
exculpatory evidence which we have already addressed.

[¶23.]  In appellant's change-of-plea hearing, 
the court inquired:

"THE COURT: Are you fully 
satisfied with her [defendant's counsel] representation of you? 

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your 
Honor."

[¶24.]  At the sentencing hearing, appellant's 
counsel made a vigorous plea and argument for probation. As we have indicated 
before, there was no merit to appellant's claim of perjured testimony or 
suppressed exculpatory evidence. These latter two matters seem to be appellant's 
principal complaint against his counsel at the time of sentencing. Appellant did 
not complain about his current counsel at the sentencing hearing. We see nothing 
in the record that suggests incompetent counsel or any dereliction in handling 
appellant's case.

[¶25.]  Although this claim is obscured in the 
25-count indictment of his two lawyers, appellant says that he was mentally 
incompetent at the change-of-plea hearing and at the sentencing. This diagnosis 
is subjective and self-serving, and has absolutely no basis so far as we can 
ascertain from the record. Upon inquiry by the court appellant repeatedly said 
he understood the proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 410 F.2d 1128 
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 868, 91 S. Ct. 111, 27 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1970). 
We do not see any merit to appellant's claim of 
incompetency.

[¶26.]  It would appear that appellant found a 
digest that cataloged possible constitutional violations, copied this list in 
his petition for post-conviction relief, and stated that this litany of 
violations applied to him. For example, appellant talks about "the verdict." 
There was no verdict. He mentions search and seizure; there was no search or 
seizure problem. He talks about rights reserved to the people. It appears that 
appellant charged in his petition every constitutional violation that he had 
ever heard of or could learn about, hoping that the trial court or this court 
could find one or more that might fit his circumstances.

[¶27.]  We have carefully reviewed the entire 
record of proceedings. Nothing is disclosed which would support appellant's 
allegations that his guilty plea was induced by fraud, coercion and was 
involuntary. Also, the claimed use of perjured testimony and the suppression of 
testimony is without merit. The denial of a fair and impartial trial because of 
inadequate counsel has no support in the record.

[¶28.]  We hold, therefore, that the petition for 
post-conviction relief was properly denied.

[¶29.]  Affirmed.

1 Between September 9, 
1982, and February 9, 1984, appellant was not in hibernation. He inundated the 
trial court with motions, petitions, affidavits, letters, advice, questions, 
requests, and every conceivable complaint. In one letter, for example, he asked 
the trial judge how much he was paid on the side to send him to 
prison.

2 Appellant has nearly 
depleted the staff of the public defender's office. A second lawyer from the 
public defender's office was appointed at appellant's insistence after his plea 
of guilty. Two other lawyers prepared his trial brief, and two different lawyers 
represented appellant at oral argument.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶30.]  I would have reversed the denial of 
post-conviction relief and remanded this case to the district court with 
directions to afford appellant an opportunity to amend his petition so as to 
include specific factual allegations, supported by attached affidavits or other 
evidence.

[¶31.]  As the majority note, appellant Kevin 
Bibbins' petition for post-conviction relief consists primarily of general 
allegations and legal conclusions. However, instead of permitting appellant an 
opportunity to amend his petition to include factual specificity and evidentiary 
support, the majority conclude that the court file provided a sufficient basis 
upon which to determine the merits of the petition. The majority 
reason:

"* * * Whether oral 
testimony, depositions, affidavits or other evidence is produced, likewise 
depends on the circumstances of each case. Here, the trial court acted on the 
petition before it, considering only the court file. It was apparently 
determined from the court file that there was no legal basis for the petition. 
We cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong." 696 P.2d  at 
1303.

[¶32.]  While the court records of a petitioner's 
guilty plea may, under some circumstances, adequately support a claim for 
post-conviction relief,1 such evidence had little, if any, 
relevance to the claims raised in the case at bar. Appellant alleges that his 
guilty plea was obtained through coercion and fraud. Evidence of such wrongdoing 
could hardly be expected to appear in the hearing transcripts. Similarly, the 
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel alluded to by petitioner could 
have occurred outside the record. The majority readily admit that the alleged 
perjured documents or testimony cannot be discerned from the bare 
record.

[¶33.]  The need for definite factual allegations 
and supporting evidence from one in appellant's position is apparent, and our 
post-conviction-relief statutes, §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108, W.S. 1977, demand 
such specificity. Section 7-14-101 requires the filing of a verified petition 
for the redress of constitutional violations:

"Any person imprisoned in 
the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his 
conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution 
of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute 
proceedings under this act [§§ 7-14-101 to 7-14-108]. The proceeding shall be 
commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took 
place a petition verified by affidavit * * *."

Section 7-14-102 
directs the petitioner to state his claim clearly and to attach supporting 
evidence if possible:

"The petition shall * * * 
clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were 
violated. The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting the allegations or shall state why the same are not 
attached. * * *"

We recently 
reviewed these statutes in Hopkinson v. 
District Court, Wyo., 696 P.2d 54 (1985), and 
concluded:

"* * * Before a person is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for post-conviction relief, 
there must be set forth in the text of the petition and the required supporting 
attachments a substantial claim plus some specificity in support of the claim. 
Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711 
(1971). In order to justify a hearing, there must be more than a naked statement 
of a conclusion unsupported by an evidentiary basis. Cook v. State, 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 985 
(1976); State v. Gillihan, 85 N.M. 
514, 514 P.2d 33 (1973). There must not only be verified factual allegations in 
the petition, § 7-14-101, but the statutory requirement is that they must be 
supported, likewise with some specificity, § 7-14-102." 696 P.2d  at 
61.

[¶34.]  We recognized in that case the 
extraordinary nature of post-conviction relief, but said:

"However, if a petitioner 
makes a showing of innocence or probability of a different verdict by 
appropriate attachments to his petition which indicates a need for verification 
at a hearing, then a hearing may be granted. If good cause is shown, a review is 
available." 696 P.2d  at 65.

The court in the 
instant case attempted to review petitioner's bald conclusions using only the 
court file, a process doomed from the start.

[¶35.]  The proper solution for the trial court, 
when presented with a deficient petition for post-conviction relief, is to allow 
the petitioner an opportunity to amend. We recommended this course in Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711, 714 
(1971):

"Where there are 
insufficient factual allegations in support of an application to warrant an 
evidentiary hearing, it is usually better practice to permit the petitioner to 
amend his petition than to dismiss it. Oliver v. United 
States, 9 Cir., 398 F.2d 353."

The ability to 
amend is important in post-conviction-relief proceedings since a prisoner waives 
all claims not raised in the original or an amended petition. Section 7-14-103 
provides:

"Any claim of substantial 
denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended 
petition is waived."

Thus, our 
statutes contemplate amendment as a procedural right which protects the prisoner 
against the loss of claims inadvertently omitted or ineffectively articulated in 
the original petition.

[¶36.]  In summary, Wyoming's 
post-conviction-relief statutes, as interpreted by this court in previous cases, 
entitle a prisoner to an evidentiary hearing on a claimed constitutional 
violation if his petition contains specific factual allegations supported by 
affidavits or other evidence. The statutory scheme contemplates the amendment of 
inadequate petitions. As a general rule the trial court should allow a 
petitioner a specified time within which to amend his petition to reflect the 
necessary factual specificity and support. If a petition remains deficient after 
an opportunity for amendment, the court may justifiably dismiss without holding 
a hearing. Boggs v. State, supra. 
However, an amended petition which complies with statutory requirements should, 
typically, entitle the applicant to a hearing. In this way, courts can encourage 
and properly review potentially meritorious claims and, at the same time, avoid 
having to rule upon vague, inadequately supported 
contentions.

[¶37.]  I do not intend to suggest by this 
dissent that the district court must, in every situation, allow an opportunity 
for amendment of a deficient petition for post-conviction relief. Where, for 
example, a petition presents the identical issues already fully, and perhaps 
repeatedly, reviewed by this court, the applicant should be expected to include 
in his original petition the factual basis for reconsideration of his claims. Hopkinson v. District Court, supra. 
However, in the present case, where the petitioner's claims have never been 
considered by this court and where the court record provided an obviously 
inadequate basis for review, the petition should not have been dismissed or 
denied without allowing an opportunity for amendment.

1 See, for example, Hoggatt v. State, Wyo., 606 P.2d 718 
(1980).