Title: KENNEDY OIL, and THE RESTATED JEAN P. HARRIET MARITAL TRUST and HONARA A. HARRIET, SUSAN I. HARRIET, ALEX S. HARRIET, CHRISTOPHER J. HARRIET, CASEY J. HARRIET, MARTIN S. HARRIET; THE LOHSE SECURITY TRUST and LACI HARRIET; THE MIKE HARRIET TRUST and MIKE HARRIET; CHARLES B. MARTON; PATRICIA MARTON; JOHN P. MARTON; BERNADETTE MARTON ARNO; JOHN W. ARNO; CELESTE C. ARNO-BESEL; THE ARNO MINERAL TRUST and Bernadette C. Arno, John W. Arno and Celeste C. Arno-Besel; S9 MINERALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; JOHN P. MARTON MINERALS LLC; CHARLES B. MARTON MINERALS LLC; CATHERINE NO. 1, LLC V. LANCE OIL & GAS COMPANY, INC., and WILLIAMS PRODUCTION RMT COMPANY, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENNEDY OIL, and THE RESTATED JEAN P. HARRIET MARITAL TRUST and HONARA A. HARRIET, SUSAN I. HARRIET, ALEX S. HARRIET, CHRISTOPHER J. HARRIET, CASEY J. HARRIET, MARTIN S. HARRIET; THE LOHSE SECURITY TRUST and LACI HARRIET; THE MIKE HARRIET TRUST and MIKE HARRIET; CHARLES B. MARTON; PATRICIA MARTON; JOHN P. MARTON; BERNADETTE MARTON ARNO; JOHN W. ARNO; CELESTE C. ARNO-BESEL; THE ARNO MINERAL TRUST and Bernadette C. Arno, John W. Arno and Celeste C. Arno-Besel; S9 MINERALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; JOHN P. MARTON MINERALS LLC; CHARLES B. MARTON MINERALS LLC; CATHERINE NO. 1, LLC V. LANCE OIL & GAS COMPANY, INC., and WILLIAMS PRODUCTION RMT COMPANY, INC.2006 WY 9126 P.3d 875Case Number: 05-95Decided: 01/17/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KENNEDY 
OIL, a Wyoming Corporation,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
and

 
 
THE 
RESTATED JEAN P. HARRIET MARITAL

TRUST 
and its trustees HONARA A. HARRIET,

SUSAN I. 
HARRIET, ALEX S. HARRIET,

CHRISTOPHER 
J. HARRIET, CASEY J. HARRIET,

MARTIN 
S. HARRIET; THE LOHSE SECURITY

TRUST 
and its Trustee LACI HARRIET; THE MIKE

HARRIET 
TRUST and its Trustee MIKE)

HARRIET; 
CHARLES B. MARTON; PATRICIA

MARTON; 
JOHN P. MARTON; BERNADETTE

MARTON 
ARNO; JOHN W. ARNO; CELESTE

C. 
ARNO-BESEL; THE ARNO MINERAL TRUST

and 
Bernadette C. Arno, John W. Arno and Celeste

C. 
Arno-Besel as its Trustees; S9 MINERALS

LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; JOHN P. MARTON

MINERALS 
LLC; CHARLES B. MARTON

MINERALS 
LLC; CATHERINE NO. 1, LLC, a

Wyoming 
Limited Liability Company and each of

its 
members including S9 MINERALS LIMITED

PARTNERSHIIP, 
THE RESTATED JEAN P.

HARRIET 
MARITAL TRUST, THE RESTATED

MARTIN 
S. HARRIET REVOCABLE TRUST,

THE 
LOHSE SECURITY TRUST, THE MIKE

HARRIET 
TRUST, JOHN P. MARTON

MINERALS, 
LLC,

 
 
Appellants

(Third 
Party Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
LANCE 
OIL & GAS COMPANY, INC., a

Delaware 
Corporation, and WILLIAMS

PRODUCTION 
RMT COMPANY, INC., a

Delaware 
Corporation,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants/Third 
Party Plaintiffs).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Morris R. Massey of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming; and 
Timothy J. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Patrick R. Day, P.C., and James R. Belcher, P.C., of Holland & Hart, 
LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In a quiet title 
dispute involving mineral interest lessees, the district court relied upon the 
relation-back doctrine in granting summary judgment to the appellees.  We affirm, but on the related doctrine 
of after-acquired title or estoppel by deed.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      In pursuing their 
respective summary judgment motions in the district court, the parties entered 
into a Joint Stipulation of Facts, from which we have gleaned the following 
information:

 
 
[¶3]      As of 1975, 
members of the Harriet and Marton families (collectively Harriet-Marton) owned 
the oil, gas, and other minerals, except coal, lying in and under the N1/2 of 
Section 19, Township 48 North, Range 78 West, 6th P.M., in Johnson County, 
Wyoming (the subject property).  On 
December 11, 1975, Harriet-Marton executed a lease in favor of William D. Gibbs, 
Sophia D. Gibbs, Robert M. Gibbs, and Martha W. Gibbs (collectively Gibbs), in 
which Harriet-Marton averred that they owned and could provide marketable title 
to all of the oil and gas in and under the subject property.1  In exchange for rights under the lease, 
Gibbs obligated themselves to commence drilling an exploratory well into the 
Shannon Formation.  Upon completion 
of the well, Gibbs was to receive the oil and gas as lessee for three years and 
as long thereafter as oil and gas was produced in paying quantities.  In addition, the lease agreement spelled 
out the parties' rights and obligations regarding expenses and production, and 
the effects of non-production.  
Although the lease agreement was not recorded, a memorandum referring to 
it was recorded on March 30, 1976.  Pursuant to this lease agreement, the 
Catherine No. 1 and Catherine No. 2 wells were completed as productive on April 
1, 1976, and May 12, 1977, respectively.

 
 
[¶4]      Upon William D. 
Gibbs' death, his estate was probated in JohnsonCounty.  On September 23, 1991, Harriet-Marton 
filed creditors' claims in the probate proceedings based upon the 1975 lease 
agreement, seeking an accounting of income received and expenses paid, and 
payment of any sums due in regard to the Catherine No. 1 well.  Those creditors' claims were settled on 
June 7, 1994, in an Agreement Concerning Creditor's Claims entered into between 
the personal representatives of the estate and the then-current Harriet-Marton 
entities.  The gist of that 
agreement was that Harriet-Marton were not entitled to a share of the production 
proceeds because expenses ($552,397.17) exceeded production ($283,803.42), but 
that Harriet-Marton might in the future be entitled to distributions in the 
event Gibbs' successors recovered costs and production continued.  To ensure such distributions, the 
personal representatives obligated the estate's distributees to provide 
Harriet-Marton an annual accounting concerning the well.  The settlement terms were made part of 
the estate's distribution plan.

 
 
[¶5]      On May 21, 1998, 
the appellees (Lance-Williams) obtained, through their agent, Baseline Minerals, 
Inc., oil and gas leases from Harriet-Marton covering the subject property. 
 The lessors were the same as, or 
the successors in interest to, the Harriet-Marton mineral owners that were 
parties to the 1975 lease agreement with Gibbs.  In each of the four separate 1998 
leases, Harriet-Marton struck the following form language:  "Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to 
defend the title to said land."  The 
primary term of the leases was five years, subject to extension for an 
additional two years.  A concurrent 
title opinion prepared for Baseline indicated that there were no current 
unreleased oil and gas leases of record covering the 
property.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 17, 
2002, Harriet-Marton recorded with the Johnson County Clerk a "Notice of Claim 
of Interest in Real Property."  The 
notice, signed under oath by John P. Marton, declared that Harriet-Marton 
claimed an interest in the subject property based upon the 1975 lease agreement 
and the Gibbs distributees' failure to abide by the terms and conditions of the 
probate settlement agreement.  The 
notice indicated that it was given pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-10-107 and 
34-11-101 (LexisNexis 2005).2  A few months later, Harriet-Marton filed 
a civil action against the Gibbs distributees, with the verified complaint 
containing the following factual allegations and legal 
conclusions:

 
 
            
1.         
The plaintiffs are the successors in interest to the Harriet-Marton 
interests under the 1975 lease.

 
 
            
2.         
Upon Gibbs' drilling of the Catherine No. 1 well, the oil and gas in and 
under the subject property was leased to Gibbs for three years and as long 
thereafter as such was produced in paying quantities.

 
 
            
3.         
If production ceased, Gibbs' interest would not terminate if Gibbs 
commenced additional drilling or reworking operations within sixty days.  Furthermore, if there was no production 
at the end of the primary term of the lease, the agreement would remain in 
effect only so long as Gibbs continued drilling or reworking operations with no 
cessation thereof for more than thirty days.

 
 
            
4.         
Gibbs was required under the lease agreement to keep and make available 
to Harriet-Marton an accurate record of costs, expenses, charges, and 
credits.

 
 
            
5.         
The 1975 lease agreement has "terminated by reason of the fact that the 
primary term of the lease of three (3) years has expired and that neither oil 
nor gas is being produced in paying quantities from the N1/2 of said Section 
19."

 
 
            
6.         
The 1975 lease agreement "has terminated according to its terms and [the 
Gibbs distributees] have no further interest therein."

 
 
            
7.         
The 1975 lease agreement has terminated because, "[a]fter initial 
discovery of oil in the Catherine No. 1 [w]ell, the production thereof has 
ceased and [the Gibbs distributees] have not commenced additional drilling or 
reworking operations within sixty (60) days after the cessation of 
production."

 
 
            
8.         
The 1975 lease agreement has terminated because the Gibbs distributees 
have failed to maintain the records and to provide to Harriet-Marton the 
information required in the probate settlement agreement.

 
 
[¶7]      Finally, as the 
concluding paragraph in three separate causes of action, the Verified Complaint 
stated as follows:

 
 
            
[Harriet-Marton] are entitled to a declaration of the respective legal 
rights of [Harriet-Marton] and [the Gibbs distributees] and [to] a determination 
that the 1975 Agreement between [Harriet-Marton and the Gibbs distributees] is 
terminated  and [the Gibbs distributees] have no further right, claim or title 
under the terms of said 1975 Agreement; nor to the oil, gas or other minerals 
lying in or under the [subject property].

 
 
[¶8]      During the 
pendency of their lawsuit against the Gibbs distributees, Harriet-Marton formed 
a limited liability company called Catherine No. 1, LLC.  The members of Catherine No. 1, LLC are 
either the original mineral owners or the successors in interest to the original 
mineral owners who signed the 1975 lease agreement, and are either the original 
lessors or the successors in interest to the original lessors who signed the 
1998 Baseline leases.

 
 
[¶9]      Harriet-Marton's 
civil action against the Gibbs distributees was dismissed with prejudice, prior 
to any adjudication, on August 8, 2003.  
Dismissal followed the parties' filing of their Stipulation for Dismissal 
With Prejudice on July 31, 2003, which stipulation recited only that "the 
parties herein have agreed to a settlement of all claims of the parties[.]" It 
is undisputed that, as part of the settlement, the Gibbs distributees assigned 
their interests in the 1975 lease agreement to Catherine No. 1, LLC, leaving 
Catherine No. 1, LLC with a 96% interest in rights granted by the 1975 lease 
agreement.

 
 
[¶10]   The current controversy has its 
genesis in what happened next.  On 
December 8, 2003, Harriet-Marton and Catherine No. 1, LLC assigned to the 
appellant (Kennedy) all of their right, title, and interest in and to the 1975 
lease agreement, covering the subject property from the surface to the base of 
the Fort Union Formation.  That 
assignment was one of the terms of a broader agreement entered into on that same 
date by Harriet-Marton, Catherine No. 1, LLC, and Kennedy, whereby Kennedy 
leased the oil and gas on the subject property.  Significantly, Kennedy undertook as part 
of the agreement to pursue for itself and the lessors, a quiet title action 
against "conflicting claimants."  
Those "conflicting claimants" were, of course, Lance-Williams, who were 
Harriet-Marton's lessees under the 1998 lease agreements.

 
 
[¶11]   True to its word, on February 3, 
2004, Kennedy filed the quiet title action that underlies this appeal, naming 
Lance-Williams as the only defendants. The focal allegation of Kennedy's 
complaint is that,

 
 
[t]hrough 
oil and gas leases dated May 21, 1998, as extended, executed while the subject oil and gas 
leasehold estate under the December 11, 1975 oil and gas lease remained in force 
and effect by virtue of production from or allocated to the leased lands, 
[Lance-Williams] claim an estate or interest in the oil and gas 
leasehold estate which is adverse to the claim of Kennedy.[3]

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Harriet-Marton are now also 
parties to the action, as a result of Lance-Williams' third party 
complaint.

 
 

[¶12]   After hearing cross motions for 
summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Lance-Williams.  The district court found that:  (1) Harriet-Marton manifested an 
unequivocal intention to enter into the 1998 Baseline leases; (2) Harriet-Marton 
accepted both the initial bonus payments and the extension payments under those 
leases; (3) at the time of the 1998 leases, Baseline had no actual knowledge of 
the 1975 lease agreement; (4) at the time of the 2003 leases, Kennedy had actual 
knowledge of the 1998 Baseline leases; (5) Harriet-Marton's attempt to re-lease 
minerals to Kennedy that were already leased to Lance-Williams offends notions 
of justice and equity; and (6) equity demands application of the doctrine of 
relation as set forth in Walliker v. 
Escott, 608 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Wyo. 1980).

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶13]   In their appellate briefs, the 
parties have identified ten interrelated issues and arguments for appellate 
review, with the primary issue being the district court's application of the 
relation-back doctrine.  We find the 
dispositive issue to be whether Harriet-Marton and Kennedy are estopped from 
denying Lance-Williams' title.  In 
answering that question, we will contrast the doctrines of relation and estoppel 
by deed, and we will briefly discuss the recording act.  Given our resolution of those issues, it 
will be unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the parties. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶14]   We have often restated our standard 
for the review of a summary judgment and we will not repeat it at length 
here.  See Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 
2005 WY 63, ¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005); Lewis v. Community First Nat. Bank, N.A., 
2004 WY 152, ¶ 8, 101 P.3d 457, 459 (Wyo. 2004); and Bidache, Inc. v. Martin, 899 P.2d 872, 
873-74 (Wyo. 1995).  We will note, in particular, that we 
will uphold a summary judgment on the basis of any proper legal theory appearing 
in the record.  Lewis, 2004 WY 152, ¶ 8, 101 P.3d  at 
459; Bitker v. First Nat. Bank in Evanston, 
2004 WY 114, ¶ 8, 98 P.3d 853, 855 (Wyo. 2004); and Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 
2004 WY 22, ¶ 12, 85 P.3d 1010, 1013 (Wyo. 2004).  Although decisions made in equity after 
a bench trial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, the same is not true 
where summary judgment has been entered; in such cases, our review is de novo.  Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶ 30, 75 P.3d 640, 652 (Wyo. 2003); McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 
2003 WY 2, ¶¶ 9-10, 60 P.3d 1277, 1282 (Wyo. 2003); and Thompson v. Board of County Com'rs of the 
County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, ¶¶ 6-7, 34 P.3d 278, 280-81 (Wyo. 
2001).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
The Relation-Back Doctrine

 
 
[¶15]   The district court granted summary 
judgment to Lance-Williams on the basis of the doctrine of relation set forth in 
Walliker.  Also sometimes referred to as 
"relation-back," the doctrine as used in Walliker has its origins in the 
multi-step process necessary to perfect title to lands homesteaded under the 
various public land laws.  We have 
described the doctrine in that context as follows:

 
 
The 
legal title thereafter conveyed to him by the patent was based upon that 
equitable one, and without which no patent could rightfully issue.  In United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321-334, 26 Sup. Ct. 282, 286 (50 L.Ed. 499) 
the court said:

 
 
"A 
patent from the United 
States operates to transfer the title, not 
merely from the date of the patent, but from the inception of the equitable 
right upon which it is based.  Shipley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330 [23 L. Ed. 424].  Indeed, this is generally 
true in case of the merging of an equitable right into a legal 
title."

 
 
            
This doctrine of relation is a fiction of law resorted to whenever 
justice requires.  In Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348, 13 L. Ed. 449, it is said:

 
 
"To 
protect purchasers, the rule applies that where there are divers acts 
concurrent to make a conveyance estate, or other thing, the original act shall 
be preferred, and to this the other acts shall have relation,' as stated in 
Viner's Abr. tit. Relation, 290.  
* * *  Cruise on Real 
Property, vol. 5, pp. 510, 511, lays down the doctrine with great 
distinctness.  He says:  There is no rule better founded in law, 
reason, and convenience than this, that all the several parts and ceremonies 
necessary to complete a conveyance shall be taken together as one act, and 
operate from the substantial part by relation.'"

 
 
This 
doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich. 356-372, in which 
case Chief Justice Cooley said:

 
 
"A 
further objection arises upon the conveyance made of the land by Conant.  It appears that he conveyed to one 
Russell before he received a patent.  
The conveyance was by quitclaim, and defendant claims that as Conant had 
no legal title at the time, his deed conveyed none, and the title he 
subsequently acquired by the patent did not inure to the benefit of Russell, 
inasmuch as there were no covenants in his deed to transfer the title by way of 
estoppel.  The general principle 
unquestionably is that a government patent, when issued, relates back to the 
original entry, and perfects and makes valid any attempted transfer by the 
patentee intermediate the entry and patent."

 
 

Roberts 
v. Hudson, 25 
Wyo. 505, 173 P. 786, 787-88 (1918).  More succinctly, we stated in Tendolle v. Eureka Oil Syndicate, 38 
Wyo. 442, 268 P. 185, 187 (1928):

 
 
The 
principle of such authorities does not interfere with the operation of the 
doctrine of relation so often applied in cases where the entryman of public 
lands gives a deed thereto before obtaining a patent from the government.  This doctrine of relation is fully 
explained in Roberts v. Hudson, 25 
Wyo. 505, 173 P. 786, and cases there cited.  When 
it becomes necessary in furtherance of justice, a transfer of title that is the 
result of several steps or transactions is held to take effect by relation from 
the first substantive act.  Note, 15 
Am. Dec. 253.  The patent, which is 
the consummation of title, in equity relates back to the entry which is the 
inception of title.

 
 

See also 
Robinson Mercantile Co. v. Davis, 
26 
Wyo. 484, 187 P. 931, 932 (1920) and Demars v. Hickey, 13 Wyo. 371, 80 P. 521, 521-522, reh. denied 81 P. 705 (1905) (disapproved of on other grounds in Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 859 
(Wyo. 
1987)).

 
 
[¶16]   Similar to the problem of 
establishing title to land from entry to patent is the problem of establishing a 
water right from permit application to actual appropriation.  The doctrine of relation, consequently, 
has been adapted to and applied to the latter situation:

 
 
            
The doctrine of relation back has been long recognized in Wyoming jurisprudence in 
both case law and statute.  See Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 
55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124 (1940); Van 
Tassel Real Estate & Live Stock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333, 54 P.2d 906 (1936); Moyer v. Preston, 6 
Wyo. 308, 44 P. 845 (1896); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4-506, 41-3-401(a), 41-4-512 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The doctrine 
invokes the "principle by which, when an act is done at one time, it is 
considered, by a fiction of law, as if done at some antecedent time."  2 Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise on the 
Law of Irrigation and Water Rights § 743 at 1284-85 (2d ed.1912).  The courts adopted the doctrine solely 
for the purpose of justice founded in law, reason, and convenience based on 
broad equitable principles.  
Id. at 
1285.  Water law borrowed this 
property doctrine to protect the appropriator against intervening filings that 
could subordinate his expected priority between the filing of the permit for an 
appropriation and the actual physical appropriation.  A. Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and 
Resources § 5:62 at 5-104 
(2001).  Hence, "[p]riority is 
determined from the date of the manifestation of intent, not the date of actual 
application of the water to beneficial use."  Id.

 
 
            
Relation back has always been a flexible doctrine generally used to 
protect the parties' expectations when an unexpected event occurs.  Id. at 5-105.   * * *

 
 
            
* * *  In Campbell, we referred to the doctrine of 
relation back as the "right of gradual development[.]"

 
 

In re 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River System, 
2002 WY 
89, ¶¶ 20-22, 48 P.3d 1040, 1048-49 (Wyo. 2002) (footnote omitted).  Clearly, as in the context of an entry 
upon public land and a later patent, the relation-back doctrine was applied to 
water rights because of the sequential process involved from permit application 
to actual appropriation.  No doubt, 
the same reasoning fostered the legislature's adoption of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
29-1-305(b) (LexisNexis 2005), which provides, in substance, that the priority 
of a perfected materialman's lien relates back and attaches to the improvements 
made from the commencement of a construction project over liens later 
perfected.  See Thatcher & Sons, Inc. v. Norwest 
Bank Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324, 1327 
(Wyo. 
1988).

 
 

[¶17]   Finally, before we discuss Walliker and its application to this 
case, we will note application of the relation-back doctrine in our own rules of 
civil procedure.  In W.R.C.P. 15(c), 
this Court specifically applied the doctrine to amended court pleadings.  See Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶¶ 19-22, 101 P.3d 465, 470-71 (Wyo. 2004).  Further, although not stated by name, 
relation-back is incorporated into W.R.C.P. 3(b), where commencement of an 
action relates back to the date the complaint was filed, so long as service upon 
the defendant occurs within sixty days thereafter.

 
 
[¶18]   In the instant case, the district 
court concluded that the doctrine of relation "as set forth in Walliker," controlled the outcome.  Therefore, we will address that case in 
specific detail, the basic facts being gleaned from 608 P.2d at 1273:  On some unidentified date, one Geneva 
Walliker entered upon certain property in Park County, Wyoming, under the Carey Act.  She contracted for shares in a canal 
association to provide water to the land, she paid the State one-half of a 
required land fee, and she was in possession of a certificate of location and a 
receipt from the Wyoming land commissioner.  Shortly thereafter, on July 14, 1928, 
she issued a conveyance to two grantees named Pearson and Robertson, which 
conveyance read, in pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
". . 
.  That the said party of the first 
part, for and in consideration of One and no/100 ($1.00) . . . has Remised, 
Released and Quit Claimed . . . an undivided one-third interest in and to all 
oil and/or gas . . . ."

 
 
Walliker 
was not issued a patent to the land until some three years after this 
conveyance.

 
 

[¶19]   Walliker was a quiet title action 
brought by the successors in interest to Pearson and Robertson, with the 
defendant being Walliker's heir.  In 
affirming the district court, we held that Walliker's equitable title was 
sufficient to apply the doctrine of relation.  Walliker, 608 P.2d  at 1277.  In other words, when Walliker acquired 
legal title to the lands in 1931, that title related back so as to give effect 
to her 1928 conveyance.  To that 
extent, Walliker is a classic 
relation-back case, founded in the traditional land entry to patent 
rationale.  Obviously, its logic, if 
limited to that circumstance, cannot be imported into the present controversy, 
where the issues have nothing to do with "proving up" ownership to government 
land.

 
 

[¶20]   There is another aspect of Walliker, however, that does more nearly 
equate the present facts.  The 1928 
conveyance "Remised, Released and Quit Claimed . . . an undivided one-third 
interest in and to all oil and/or gas . . .."  Walliker, 608 P.2d  at 1273.  That wording raised two questions for 
this Court:  (1) what was the effect 
of the "quitclaim" language; and (2) what was the effect of quitclaiming only a 
fractional mineral interest?   We will explain our resolution of those 
questions in Walliker, after which we 
will discuss how that resolution affects this case.

 
 
[¶21]   The defendant in Walliker contended that, inasmuch as the 
1928 conveyance was by quitclaim deed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-105 (1977) barred 
application of the relation-back doctrine.  
That statute, now Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-105 (LexisNexis 2005), and 
presently worded the same, provides as follows:

 
 
            
Every deed in substance in the form prescribed in the foregoing section 
[§ 34-2-104], when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a 
sufficient conveyance, release and quitclaim to the grantee, his heirs and 
assigns, in fee of all the then existing legal or equitable rights of the 
grantor in the premises therein described, but 
shall not extend to after acquired title unless words are added expressing such 
intention.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  In turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-2-104 (LexisNexis 2005), also unchanged since Walliker, provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
            
A.B., Grantor (here insert grantor's name or names, and place of 
residence) for the consideration of (here insert consideration) conveys and 
quitclaims to (here insert grantee's name or names) all 
interest in the following described real estate, (here insert 
description) situate in the county of , in the State of Wyoming.

 
 
Dated 
this  day of ............... A.D. ...............

 
 
                                    
. A.B.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶22]   We applied the relation-back 
doctrine in Walliker despite this 
statute.  We held that a document 
conveying only a partial mineral interest, rather than all 
interest, is not a "deed in substance in the form prescribed" by 
statute, and is not, therefore, a quitclaim deed within the meaning of the 
statute.  Walliker, 608 P.2d  at 
1274-76.  The ratio decidendi of that holding was as 
follows:

 
 
There is 
an obvious and substantial difference between a deed which conveys the grantor's 
entire interest and one which conveys only a portion of the grantor's 
interest.  Consistent with the 
after-acquired-title philosophy of §§ 34-2-104  and 34-2-105, supra, when a grantor who 
does not possess legal title quitclaims his entire interest in a piece of real 
property, the grantee cannot then expect that such a grant carries with it the 
implication that grantor has retained an equitable interest capable of ripening 
into legal title from which the grantee will then be permitted to claim.  But when a desert-land entrywoman 
quitclaims a portion of the mineral estate, while 
retaining an equitable interest in the surface estate, it is then logical for 
the grantee to expect that the grantor will later perfect legal title and thus 
perfect the grantee's mineral interest.  
We said as much in a 1918 opinion which involved a similar issue.  Roberts v. Hudson[.]

 
 

Walliker, 608 P.2d  at 1274-75 (emphasis in original).

 
 
[¶23]   The conveyances at issue in the 
present case are the 1998 Baseline leases.   Each of the four leases is a multi-page 
oil and gas lease containing numerous terms and conditions detailing the lease 
term and the parties' obligations.  
Despite the Harriet-Marton faction having edited out the form warranty 
language, these leases in no way resemble the quitclaim deed form prescribed in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-104.  
Therefore, just as in Walliker, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-105 does not bar application of the relation 
doctrine.  The question remains, 
however, whether the doctrine is otherwise applicable.  

 
 
[¶24]   The common element in all of the 
applications of the relation doctrine is the establishment of a right or 
interest through multiple steps:  
entry and patent, permit application and physical appropriation, 
materials supplied and completion of construction project, and filing a 
complaint followed by service of process.  
The central precept of the relation-back doctrine, in the property 
context, is that legal title obtained via patent relates back to equitable title 
obtained via entry, thereby giving effect to conveyances such as mineral leases 
occurring in the interim. That element is not present in the instant case.  Here, there are no issues of entry or 
patent; the question, rather, is the effect of a series of leases emanating from 
the same grantor.  We cannot help 
but conclude that the relation-back doctrine in the sense that it was used in Walliker is not applicable to the facts 
of this case.

 
 
            
Estoppel by Deed/After-acquired 
Title

 
 
[¶25]   We will briefly reiterate those 
facts that are particularly pertinent to this discussion:  In 1975, Harriet-Marton owned the oil, 
gas, and other minerals, except coal, underlying the subject property.  On December 11 of that year, 
Harriet-Marton entered into the above-mentioned agreement leasing to Gibbs the 
oil and gas for three years and as long as production continued in paying 
quantities.  There is no dispute 
that Gibbs drilled productive wells.

 
 
[¶26]   On May 21, 1998, Harriet-Marton 
executed oil and gas leases in favor of Lance-Williams covering the same 
property.  These leases were for 
five year terms as extended by production, and provided that the lessor "grants, 
leases and lets exclusively unto Lessee for the purpose of investigating, 
exploring by geophysical and other methods, prospecting, drilling and mining for 
and producing oil and gas . . .."  
Harriet-Marton deleted from the lease forms the following language:  "Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to 
defend the title to said land."  It 
is undisputed that Lance-Williams paid Harriet-Marton initial bonus payments of 
$40.00 per acre for 320 acres, and extension payments of $25.00 per 
acre.

 
 
[¶27]   As described in detail above, 
Harriet-Marton then sued the Gibbs distributees in 2003 for the avowed purpose 
of having the 1975 agreement judicially declared to be terminated.  That effort was, however, abandoned in 
mid-stream by a stipulated dismissal, as a result of which the Gibbs 
distributees assigned their interests in the Gibbs agreement to Harriet-Marton 
and the latter's newly formed limited liability corporation, Catherine No. 1, 
LLC.4  On December 8, 2003, Harriet-Marton and 
Catherine No. 1, LLC, in turn, assigned to Kennedy their right, title, and 
interest in and to the Gibbs agreement.  Significantly, even though the 
consideration under the Kennedy agreement was styled "consideration for 
assignment," royalties and other payments to Harriet-Marton were made as 
payments to the "owners," and were proportioned to their fee ownership.  In substance, if not in name, the 
Kennedy "assignment" was in reality simply a new lease.

 
 
[¶28]   The district court concluded that, 
under these facts, any interest in the mineral estate obtained by Harriet-Marton 
and Catherine No. 1, LLC, as a result of the 2003 assignment from the Gibbs 
distributees related back in time so as to give effect to the 1998 leases from 
Harriet-Marton to Lance-Williams.  
It is our conclusion that, while the relation-back doctrine as enunciated 
in Roberts does not apply under these 
circumstances, a similar result is dictated by necessary application of the 
doctrines of estoppel by deed and after-acquired title.5  Estoppel by deed has been described as 
follows:

 
 
            
Estoppel by deed has been well defined as the estoppel or bar which 
precludes a party from denying the truth of his deed, but one which may be 
invoked only in a suit on the deed or concerning a right growing out of it.  It precludes a party to the deed and 
also those in privity with him from asserting as against the other party thereto 
and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed or from denying the 
truth of any material fact asserted in it.  
Though an estoppel may be created by the record of other conveyancing 
instruments than a deed, the most common are those estopping a grantor to assert 
a title which he acquires subsequent to a conveyance by 
him.

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
It is the general rule that one who acquires a title or estate which he 
has previously conveyed is estopped to assert his after-acquired title as 
against the grantee or his successors.

 
 

3 American Law of Property §§ 15.18, 15.19 
(A. James Casner ed., 1952) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
            
Estoppel by deed binds not only the grantor but also those in privity 
with him.  The well-established 
general principle is that a grantor and his privies are estopped as against the 
grantee and those in privity with him to assert anything in derogation of the 
grant or from denying the truth of any material facts stated in the 
conveyance.  A grantor is generally 
estopped from denying the title of his grantee or his own authority to 
sell.  One who assumes to convey an 
estate by deed will not be heard, for the purpose of defeating the title of the 
grantee, to say that at the time of the conveyance he had no title, or that none 
passed by the deed, and he cannot deny the full operation and effect of the deed 
as a conveyance.  In other words, he 
is estopped to dispute the title granted.

 
 

28 Am. 
Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 11 (2d 
ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted).  The doctrine applies not just to deeds, 
but also to leases.  Id. at § 4.

 
 

[¶29]   Estoppel by deed generally is based 
upon the covenants contained in a warranty deed, and does not, therefore, arise 
from a conveyance via quitclaim.  3 
American Law of Property, supra, § 
15.19; 28 Am. 
Jur. 2d, supra, § 6; 4 
 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 1231 (3d ed. 
1975); 26A 
C.J.S. Deeds § 261 (2001).  This rule is not absolute, however, and 
despite being a quitclaim in form, a conveyance may give rise to estoppel by 
deed when it "contains language showing that the grantor intended to convey and 
the grantee expected to acquire a particular estate."  28 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 6; 4 The Law of Real Property, supra, 
§§ 1230-31.  Alternatively stated, a "quitclaim deed 
is one which purports to convey, and is understood to convey, nothing more than 
the interest or estate in the property described of which the grantor is seized 
or possessed, if any, at the time, rather than the property itself."  26A C.J.S., supra, § 17 (footnote 
omitted).  In that sense, a document that purports 
to convey a particular interest simply is not a quitclaim deed.  The nature of a particular conveyance is 
determined by the intent of the parties:

 
 
Whether 
or not an instrument constitutes a quitclaim deed depends on the intent of the 
parties to it as gathered from the language of the instrument itself, and the 
attending circumstances, such as the adequacy of the price given, and is not to 
be determined by the mere omission or presence of a covenant of warranty, 
although ordinary quitclaim deeds omit warranties of 
title.

 
 

Id. 
(footnotes 
omitted).  See also Sabine Production Co. v. Guaranty 
Bank & Trust Co., 432 So. 2d 1047, 1052 (La. Ct.App. 1983).

 
 

[¶30]   A grantor may also be statutorily 
estopped from asserting after-acquired title, despite the lack of warranties in 
a quitclaim deed.  3 American Law of Property, supra, § 
15.19.  In addressing the Walliker decision, we have already 
discussed Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2-104 and 34-2-105, wherein the bar to 
conveyance of after-acquired title via quitclaim deed is specifically limited to 
those quitclaim deeds that appear in the statutory form.  Furthermore, we have already concluded 
that the 1998 Baseline leases at issue in the present case do not resemble the 
statutory quitclaim deed, and therefore the statutes do not apply in this case 
to bar application of the related doctrines of estoppel by deed and 
after-acquired title.

 
 

[¶31]   The general principles of law 
discussed above were long ago established as the law of this state.  See Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 71 Wyo. 
414, 259 P.2d 766, 769 (1953); Sharples Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 
62 Wyo. 370, 168 P.2d 565, 566-569 (1946); Roberts, 173 P.  at 788; and Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434, 
435-36 (1899).  The 1998 Baseline leases conveyed certain 
and particular mineral interests; despite the grantors' excision of the warranty 
language, they were not intended to be quitclaim deeds.  Therefore, Harriet-Marton and Catherine 
No. 1, LLC, are estopped from denying the title Lance-Williams obtained 
therefrom, and they are estopped from raising their after-acquired title in 
derogation of Lance-Williams' interests.  
The district court's equitable resolution of this dispute is more 
properly founded in the doctrine of estoppel by deed than in the doctrine of 
relation.  Furthermore, that 
equitable resolution offends no rule of law and is particularly suited to a 
quiet title action where the competing claimants derive title from a common 
source; in such case, the party with "the superior title or equity must 
prevail."  Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63, 73 
(Wyo. 
1959).

 
 
            
The Recording 
Act

 
 
[¶32]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides as follows:

 
 
            
Every conveyance of real estate within this state, hereafter made, which 
shall not be recorded as required by law, shall be void, as against any 
subsequent purchaser or purchasers in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance 
shall be first duly recorded.

 
 
[¶33]   In its primary and reply briefs, 
Kennedy cites the statute, notes its "race notice" effect, and notes the 
numerous documents of record that gave constructive notice to Lance-Williams of 
the existence of the Gibbs agreement.  
Kennedy's argument is summed up in the following sentence from its 
primary appellate brief:  "By 
operation of this statute, the 1975 lease takes precedence of the 1998 leases 
acquired by Lance and Williams absent bases for application of the doctrine of 
after-acquired title or relation back and regardless of notions of justice and 
equity."  Lance-Williams provide a 
two-pronged response:  first, that 
the Gibbs agreement, itself, never was recorded, and second, that the other 
documents of record were insufficient as a matter of law to provide constructive 
notice of the Gibbs agreement.  In 
applying its equitable resolution of the matter, the district court apparently 
did not consider this statute and the concept of record or constructive 
notice.  It did, however, premise 
that equitable resolution upon Kennedy's actual notice of the Lance-Williams 
leases, in contrast to Lance-Williams' lack of actual notice of the Gibbs 
agreement.

 
 

[¶34]   We will not further consider this 
issue because to do so would violate the fundamental principle of the doctrine 
of estoppel by deed.  In 1998, 
Harriet-Marton leased the subject property to Lance-Williams and is estopped 
from challenging the efficacy of those conveyances.  That estoppel applies also to Kennedy, 
as Harriet-Marton's successor in interest.  
Body v. McDonald, 79 
Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513, 515 (1959).  If Harriet-Marton and Kennedy cannot 
assert their after-acquired title, there are no conflicting documents upon which 
the recording act can operate.  
Kennedy conceded as much in its appellate brief by acknowledging that the 
recording act would give precedence to the Gibbs agreement "absent bases for 
application of the doctrine of after-acquired title[.]"6

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶35]   In 1998, Harriet-Marton leased the 
subject property to Lance-Williams.  
In 2003, Harriet-Marton leased the subject property to Kennedy.  Harriet-Marton and Kennedy are estopped 
from contesting the title that passed to Lance-Williams and from asserting their 
after-acquired title.

 
 
[¶36]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
parties entered into a similar agreement in June of the same year, but the 
December agreement has been treated throughout these and related proceedings as 
the operative agreement.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34-10-107 is part of the marketable record title act, the purpose of 
which legislation is to allow "persons to rely on a record chain of title."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-10-102 (LexisNexis 2005).  In turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-11-101 
provides for the recording of affidavits "stating facts relating to matters 
which may affect the title to real estate[.]"

 
 

3No doubt, 
the "or allocated to" language appears because, on June 1, 1983, a portion of 
the subject property was committed to the Indian Creek (Shannon C Sand) Unit as 
Unit Tract 15, the Indian Creek Unit having been created for secondary recovery 
operations in the Shannon Formation.  
Pursuant to the Unit Agreement, a specified percentage of unit production 
was allocated to the working interest owners in Unit Tract 
15.

 
 

4Kennedy 
does not defend the after-acquired title argument by asserting that Gibbs' 
rights went to Catherine No. 1, LLC, rather than to Harriet-Marton in settlement 
of the probate dispute.

 
 

5We are 
not called upon in this case to state whether there is any distinction between 
the doctrines of estoppel by deed and after-acquired title and we have used them 
interchangeably.  See Wood v. Sympson, 
1992 OK 90, 833 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Okla. 1992) ("the doctrine of after-acquired title or 
estoppel by deed"); and Hays v. King, 
109 N.M. 202, 784 P.2d 21, 23 (1989) ("doctrine of after-acquired title is 
sub-category of general doctrine of estoppel by deed"). 

 
 

6Beyond all that is the fundamental 
question, not addressed by the parties, of whether Kennedy, who had both actual 
and record notice of Lance-Williams' interests, was a good-faith purchaser to 
whom the protections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 are available.  See Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 
402-03 (Wyo. 1997); Soppe v. Breed, 504 P.2d 1077, 1080 
(Wyo. 1973); North Am. Uranium, Inc. v. Johnston, 77 
Wyo. 332, 316 P.2d 325, 328-29 (1957); and York v. James, 60 Wyo. 222, 148 P.2d 596, 598 (1944).