Title: Attorney Grievance v. Hess

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Stanford Donald Hess, Misc. Docket AG
No. 55, September Term, 1997
[Bar Discipline - Attorney who promised client fifteen percent discount on time-based
billings falsely and systematically inflated time by fifteen percent before applying discount.
Held:  Three year suspension imposed.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 55
September Term, 1997
_________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
STANFORD  DONALD HESS
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Karwacki, Robert L.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   January 14, 1999
     This Court adopted the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct effective
1
January 1, 1987.  Inasmuch as the misconduct charged by Bar Counsel included 1985 and
1986 when the Code of Professional Responsibility was in effect, the petition for disciplinary
action charges violations of DR 1-102A(4), the predecessor to present Rule 8.4(c), and of
DR 2-106, the predecessor to present Rule 1.5.  In this opinion references to Rules 8.4(c) and
1.5 should be read to include the respective predecessor rules.
An additional charge alleging violation of Rule 1.8(h) is not material to the issues
before us.  That charge is discussed, infra, at note 5. 
Between 1985 and 1987 the respondent, Stanford Donald Hess (Hess), while a partner
in a major Baltimore law firm, consistently and falsely inflated the hours worked by
attorneys at the firm on the matters of a dominant, but difficult, client.  At least one purpose
of the artificial increase was to offset a fifteen percent discount which the firm had agreed
to give to the client for prompt payment which, as Hess anticipated, never materialized.  The
basic facts are not in dispute.  Although each party has filed exceptions, our rulings thereon
do not bear materially on the ultimate disposition.  What the sanction should be is the
principal issue in this matter where Bar Counsel argues for disbarment, and Hess argues for
a reprimand.
In its petition for disciplinary action the Attorney Grievance Commission charged
Hess with violating the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(c)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and Rule 1.5
(requiring that fees be reasonable).   This Court referred the charges for hearing to Judge
1
Albert J. Matricciani, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  Judge Matricciani found
that Hess had violated Rule 8.4(c).  Hess does not take exception to that conclusion, but he
-2-
does except to perceived overstatement or understatement in certain factual findings.  Judge
Matricciani found no violation of Rule 1.5, to which Bar Counsel excepts.
I
Hess was admitted to the bar of this Court in 1966.  He engaged in private practice
and later served in the Maryland Attorney General's Office.  In 1974, he joined the Baltimore
law firm then known as Weinberg & Green (W & G).
Hess's principal client and one of the principal clients of W & G was Malcolm
Berman (Berman).  His stable of enterprises included a holding company which owned
Fairfax Savings and Loan Association (Fairfax) and in which Berman held 77.5% of the
stock.  Hess's representation of Berman and his ventures involved hundreds of matters over
the years.  W & G's billings for fees to Berman ranged between approximately $400,000 and
as much as $900,000 annually and represented between twenty percent and sixty percent of
Hess's total annual billings.  In terms of fees billed, Berman was one of W & G's major
clients.  
In addition to their professional relationship, Hess and Berman were personal friends.
Hess, nevertheless, described Berman as an "impossible" client.  He regularly failed to pay
his legal bills promptly and often paid less than the full amount that was due, although during
the relevant period, he never complained about the professional services rendered by W & G.
Berman was exceedingly demanding as a client, telephoning Hess at night at his home on the
average of six nights a week.  Berman even called Hess virtually every day while Hess was
-3-
on his honeymoon.  These telephone conversations initiated by Berman would last between
one and two hours.  Judge Matricciani found that Berman was never billed for the time
expended on these evening telephone conversations.  Judge Matricciani characterized the
Berman-Hess relationship as "an intense and demanding one in which the client retained
control and manipulated the situation to his benefit at all times." 
The misconduct in question arose from Berman's request for a fifteen percent discount
on his bills.  Berman falsely indicated to Hess that he had received a similar discount from
another large Baltimore law firm.  Hess discussed the request with the chairman of W & G's
finance committee and with the firm's managing partner, and the discount was ultimately
approved, effective January 1, 1986.  This oral agreement between Berman and W & G was
conditioned upon Berman's prompt and full payment of his bills.
II
W & G's time records were maintained by electronic data processing, and Berman's
enterprises, including Fairfax, usually were billed monthly.  Hess was the billing attorney
for Berman's accounts with W & G.   Early in a given month the time report for the prior
month was printed.  With respect to Fairfax and other Berman entities that had a number of
active matters with W & G during the same period, the attorneys' time was recorded under
separate subfiles for each active matter within the particular account.  For each subfile the
reports showed the date on which services were rendered, the initials of the individual
rendering the service, the amount of time expended, expressed in tenths of an hour, that
person's hourly rate, and the product of the time multiplied by the rate.  We shall call that
-4-
product "the standard fee."  The data processing program also, within each matter or subfile,
totaled the standard fees for each person who had worked on the matter during the reporting
period. 
These monthly data processing reports, which W & G called "pre-bills," contained a
summary section in which there were consolidated, matter by matter, the total number of
hours worked by all attorneys and the total of standard fees for the respective matters
included in the pre-bill for the account.  In this summary section of the report, the data
processing program added the total of time expended and added the standard fees for all
subfiles in the account to produce the sum total of hours and the sum total of standard fees
for the client's account for the reporting period.  The summary section of the computer-
generated report for each account contains a blank space for the manual insertion of a fee,
different from the standard fee, for each matter included in the report for the account,
together with a blank space for an explanation of the increase or decrease.  An upward
adjustment of the standard fee on a particular matter might result from the transfer of time,
e.g., when an attorney erroneously recorded work as having been done on a different matter
from that to which the work actually related.  Reductions in the standard fee might result
from a determination by the billing attorney or department head that the product of hours
times rate produced an inappropriately high fee.  
It appears from Bar Counsel's exhibits that pre-bills were not transmitted to clients
when their accounts were billed.  Rather, the bills that were sent to Berman were typewritten.
They contained a description of services, presented by account, by matter, or by attorney,
-5-
     Two of the pre-bills introduced into evidence by Bar Counsel are reports for September
2
1983 and June 1984, respectively.  On each of these the standard fee for almost all of the
matters, as printed out on the account summary, has been increased in handwriting.  This is
well before 1985, when Judge Matricciani found the scheme to have begun, and well before
January 1, 1986, when W & G's management approved the discount.  Neither Bar Counsel
(continued...)
and they contained simply a total of the time devoted to the account or matter by named
attorneys.
Hess does not deny that he caused the total hours on billings to Berman's enterprises
to be inflated over those contemporaneously recorded by W & G attorneys and reported in
the pre-bills.
Against the foregoing background Judge Matricciani made the following findings: 
"Despite [Berman's] promise to bring his accounts up to date after the
discount agreement had been reached, Mr. Berman continued to be delinquent
in his accounts, sometimes neglecting to pay the firm for as long as thirteen
months.  Nevertheless, at no time did [Hess or W & G] ever terminate the
discount agreement or refuse to continue to represent Mr. Berman.  Rather,
[Hess and W & G] continued their relationship with the client and reaped the
benefits of his business.  The Court finds that neither [Hess nor W & G]
wanted to risk losing Berman or Fairfax as a client and tolerated his behavior
accordingly.
"In an attempt to cause the client to pay his bills, [Hess] resorted to
what he himself has termed 'rough justice,' and in 1985 he began increasing the
amounts on several pre-bills by 15%, then discounting those bills by 15%.
The net result of this increase-decrease process was to bill Fairfax for slightly
less than 100% of the actual services rendered at standard billing rates."
(Record reference and footnote omitted).
We interpret this finding to mean that it was Hess's purpose in inflating the bills to
offset the discount for prompt payment.   Hess did not, however, simply mathematically add
2
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     (...continued)
2
nor Judge Matricciani, however, treated these earlier increases as significant.
     One of these is the pre-bill covering September and October 1986 for Harbor Keys
3
Corporation.  Attached to the pre-bill is a typewritten tabulation reading as set forth below.
(Beginning with ATTY JCL the "NEW HRS" do not equal the sum of "HOURS" plus
"INCREASE."  For those attorneys where the "NEW HRS" equals the sum of "HOURS" plus
"INCREASE," the increase is greater than fifteen percent.).
"(ATTY017) [Hess]
18-Nov-86
  09:23 AM
ATTY
HOURS
RATE
INCREASE
NEW HRS
NEW $ AMT
EFL
  72.3
 185
 12.8
  85.10T
15,743.50
WTB
  68.7
 140
 12.2
  80.90T
11,326.00
SDH
    9.9
 175
   1.8
  11.70T
  2,047.50
JDO
146.4
 165
 25.9
172.30T
28,429.50
SVK
  90.9
 110
 16.1
107.00T
11,770.00
JCL
   8.2
   85
 16.1
107.00
11,770.00
MPS
   4.5
   90
   1.5
    9.70T
     824.50
SHF
 74.6
   90  
   0.8
    5.30T
     477.00
WLW
 37.7
   70
  13.2
  87.80T
  7,902.00
AEL
 31.2
   65
   6.7
  44.40T
  3,108.00
(continued...)
fifteen percent of the standard fee in order to reach the amount billed.  On some of the pre-
bills in evidence the increases in time spent over the time recorded by W & G attorneys is
written in longhand in the sections of the pre-bill presenting the daily detail, matter by
matter, and on other of the pre-bills the increases appear in longhand on the summary of all
matters covered by the pre-bill of the account.  In two instances the increases appear on a
typewritten sheet that is separate from the pre-bill.3
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     (...continued)
3
WEST
   0.7
 250
  5.6
  36.80T
  2,392.00
RED
 20.6
47.5
  0.2
    0.90T
     225.00
JPF
 14.8
   50
  3.7
  24.30T
  1,154.25
    0.00
         0.00
FILE NO  27016.1
TOTALS
            773.20
97,169.25
15% DISCOUNT
14,575.39
BILL TOTAL
82,593.86"
Immediately beneath these typewritten tabulations there is written in longhand, "15%
up per SDH only."  
Attached to the pre-bill for Harbor Keys Corporation for the period ending December
31, 1986, is a similar typewritten tabulation on which the items "15% discount" and "bill
total" are scratched through.  Below that typewritten tabulation appears in longhand:  "[B]ill
file at 15% increase per SDH.  [D]o not bring back down."  
Hess testified that these bills may have been sent in an amount exceeding the standard
fee, and without showing any discount, in order to use granting the "discount" as a
bargaining chip in attempting to collect.
In 1987 W & G represented Fairfax in litigation known as the "Ellerin case," an action
by Fairfax against guarantors on a loan.  Fairfax's claims included one for attorneys' fees
incurred by it in the litigation.  When the guarantors sought production of W & G's time
records on the matter, Judith O'Neill, a W & G litigator and trial counsel for Fairfax,
discovered, prior to Labor Day of 1987, that some of the time data had been altered in
billing.  She advised James Carbine, the head of W & G's litigation department, who
investigated billing of Berman's enterprises back to 1983.  Based on that investigation
Carbine concluded that the false billing had to be disclosed to Berman and that Berman
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should be reimbursed for any loss.  W & G's executive committee agreed.  In addition, W &
G abandoned the claim for legal fees in the Ellerin litigation and in another litigation known
as the "Zurich matter."
It appears that the artificial increases in the time records became so systematic on
Berman matters that, at some point in the life of the scheme, a computer program was
devised and used to implement the increases to the recorded data.  Judge Matricciani was
satisfied that one other member of W & G's management, who is not a party to these
proceedings, knew of the billing fraud.  Judge Matricciani also found that the altered billing
scheme continued until approximately May 1987.  This finding means that Hess discontinued
the scheme before the O'Neill-Carbine investigation was undertaken, although there is no
finding as to the reason for discontinuance at that time. 
On or about September 8, 1987, Hess disclosed to Berman what had happened.
According to Berman's partner, Berman's reaction at that time was simply a desire to be made
whole.  He continued his business relationship with W & G.
Ultimately, W & G paid Berman $475,599.  This amount consisted of $265,000 and
$90,000 in refunds of legal fees paid by Berman that would have been claimed, respectively,
in the Ellerin and Zurich litigations, if W & G's time records had not been falsified; $110,599
to make Berman whole, with a cushion favorable to him, for the direct loss to him in
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     Calculation of the $110,599, representing the direct loss to Berman from overbilling,
4
other than in the Ellerin and Zurich matters, is explained in Fairfax Sav., F.S.B. v. Weinberg
& Green, 112 Md. App. 587, 685 A.2d 1189 (1996).  
"'Carbine's intent was to accomplish payback on a logical, reasonable basis.
His formula analyzed nineteen Berman-related entities, setting as a baseline
the fees charged at standard rate.  The total amount was compared to the fees
actually paid by the nineteen entities.  A percentage realization rate was then
compared to the total [W & G] would have received had a fifteen percent
discount been in place.  The difference between the two amounts was refunded
to Fairfax [i.e., $110,599].'"
Id. at 621-22, 685 A.2d at 1206 (footnote omitted) (quoting opinion of trial court).
     Bar Counsel also charges in the instant matter that Hess had violated Rule 1.8(h) in that
5
Hess's advice to Berman to obtain independent counsel for the negotiation of the release was
not given in writing.  Judge Matricciani found that the violation was purely technical, and
Bar Counsel has not excepted to that characterization.  We give the Rule 1.8(h) violation no
weight in assessing the sanction.
increasing fees over standard fees before deducting the promised discount; and $10,000 paid
to secure a release by Fairfax of any malpractice claim against W & G.4
In 1992 Fairfax sued W & G and, in 1994, amended its complaint to add claims based
on billing fraud.  See Fairfax Sav., F.S.B. v. Weinberg & Green, 112 Md. App. 587, 685
A.2d 1189 (1996).  Hess left W & G in 1994.  W & G's defense to the Fairfax claim, based
on the release signed by Berman, was sustained.  Id.   
5
III
W & G did not advise Bar Counsel of Hess's misconduct contemporaneously with the
conclusion of the O'Neill-Carbine investigation.  In reaching that decision it appears that
W & G relied upon the opinion of independent counsel.  We infer that Bar Counsel initiated
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a file on this matter based upon the suit brought by Fairfax against W & G.  As is customary,
Bar Counsel awaited the outcome of the civil litigation between Berman and W & G before
determining to proceed against Hess.  An inquiry panel was convened in April 1997.  The
inquiry panel found that Hess had violated Rule 8.4(a) and (c), but that violation of Rule 1.5
was not supported by the evidence.  A private reprimand was the sanction recommended by
the inquiry panel.  At the level of the Review Board that body recommended the filing of
charges that would include violations of Rules 1.5 and 8.4(c). 
In this Court Hess moves to dismiss the charges, alleging a failure by the Review
Board to adhere to Maryland Rules 16-701 through 16-718, that is, to the entire chapter of
Title 16 dealing with discipline and inactive status of attorneys.  Hess also moves to dismiss
on the ground that his right to due process has been violated.  As best we can tell, Hess's
point is that the Review Board may not recommend that charges be brought where an inquiry
panel has recommended only a reprimand as a sanction.  The argument is frivolous,
inasmuch as it is not a function of an inquiry panel or of the Review Board to recommend
a sanction.  Further, any procedural error prior to the filing in this Court of the petition for
disciplinary  action ordinarily is cured by the due process afforded at the plenary hearing
before a circuit court judge.  See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harris, 310 Md. 197, 202,
528 A.2d 895, 897 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1062, 108 S. Ct. 1020, 98 L. Ed. 2d 985
(1988).
IV
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Hess's exceptions to Judge Matricciani's report allege overstatement or understatement
of factual matters.  These exceptions do not raise defenses to the Rule 8.4(c) violation, and
they are essentially arguments directed to mitigation of the sanction.  For example, contrary
to Hess's exception, Judge Matricciani did find that Berman did not pay his bills promptly,
even if the hearing judge did not specifically refer to payment within a thirty-day period.  
Hess also objects to the use of the term "overbilling," pointing out that the effect of
a fifteen percent inflation above the standard fee, followed by a fifteen percent reduction in
the inflated amount, actually produces slightly less than the standard fee.  Hess also uses this
same argument in answer to Bar Counsel's exception, discussed in Part V, infra, that an
excessive fee was charged by Hess.  By presenting to Berman a bill for services that
misrepresented an amount fifteen percent in excess of the standard fee as being the standard
fee, Hess perpetrated a fraud on his client.  "Overbilling" is simply one of a number of terms
that may be used to describe that misconduct.
Further, once thirty days had passed after a billing, without payment from Berman,
Hess did not cause W & G to send a revised bill that eliminated the discount.  Had Hess done
so, he would only have compounded his violation, because there never had been any discount
from the standard fee in the "net" amount initially billed for the period covered by the bill.
V
Bar Counsel excepts to Judge Matricciani's failure to find that Hess charged an
excessive fee.  Judge Matricciani reached this conclusion by comparing the net amount billed
to Berman, which, on the average, was slightly less than W & G's standard fees for the
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services, to the standard fees for the services.  Because the standard fees were reasonable,
Judge Matricciani concluded that the fees charged were not excessive.  This reasoning
ignores the fact that the amounts billed were, on the average, nearly fifteen percent in excess
of the amount that W & G had promised to charge, at least if payment were made promptly.
An attorney who intentionally charges a fee knowing it to be in excess of the fee agreed upon
between the attorney and the client charges an excessive fee in violation of Rule 1.5.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harlan, 320 Md. 571, 578 A.2d 1196 (1990).  
In Harlan a judgment had been entered by default against the client to the use of an
injured party and to the use of that party's subrogated workers' compensation carrier, all due
to the negligence of the client's former attorney.  The attorney in the reported case, after
successfully representing the client in a malpractice claim against the former attorney, was
paid the agreed contingent fee.  The attorney was also authorized by the client to pay out of
the recovery 100% of that portion of the judgment in favor of the subrogated compensation
carrier, but the attorney was able to discharge that liability by paying two-thirds of its face
value.  The attorney kept the remaining one-third.  We held that "the most charitable
characterization" of the attorney's retention of the client's funds was that it was an additional
fee from the client to the attorney.  Id. at 581, 578 A.2d at 1201.  Inasmuch as that additional
fee exceeded the fee agreement without the knowledge or consent of the client, it violated
the predecessor of Rule 1.5.   Id. at 581, 578 A.2d at 1200-01.
Similarly, in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Eisenstein, 333 Md. 464, 635 A.2d 1327
(1994), we held that an attorney violated Rule 1.5 by retaining a portion of a client's recovery
-13-
under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act in excess of the amount
approved under that statute, even though the attorney intended to seek approval of an
increase in fee.  
We said in Eisenstein, however, the following:
"The focus of Rule 1.5 is clearly upon excessive fees.  Although a fee that is
not permitted by law is by definition an unreasonable fee, we believe that
where, as here, other Rules more specifically and completely address the
improper conduct, adding a cumulative violation for the same conduct will
serve no useful purpose.  Under the particular circumstances of this case, we
overrule Bar Counsel's exception to this finding."
Id. at 481-83, 635 A.2d at 1336.
Here, the Rule 1.5 violation is also cumulative.  Here, the cumulative violation
likewise serves no useful purpose since it neither deflects the misconduct from being a Rule
8.4(c) violation nor affects the sanction for that violation.  We turn to the sanction.
VI
In the instant case the fraud was perpetrated month after month for over two years and
involved hundreds of matters that W & G was handling for Hess's client.  Moreover,
considerable effort was required to spread the false increases across the time actually worked
by particular attorneys on particular matters in order that the fraud would not be detected by
the client.  The amount expended by W & G to rectify the fraud was $465,599, plus an
additional $10,000 to secure a release.  There is no evidence that Hess, individually, was the
source of any of the monies paid to make Berman whole. 
On the other hand, Judge Matricciani found the following factors to be mitigating:
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C
The circumstances leading to the misconduct arose during the Maryland
savings and loan crisis when Hess, who represented approximately twenty
savings and loan associations, was under tremendous pressure.  The
demanding nature of his relationship with Berman compounded the pressure
on Hess.
C
W & G's "tenuous financial situation in the mid-1980's" directly impacted
Hess, who was constantly under pressure to get Berman to pay his bills.
C
About the same time as the misconduct Hess was undergoing an extremely
bitter and embarrassing divorce as a result of which he became the primary
caretaker of his three children.
C
Hess "has exhibited genuine regret and remorse for his actions" and "has
endured almost eleven years of embarrassment as a result of his conduct."
C
There is no suggestion that Hess had previously, or would in the future, engage
in the same conduct.
There is no precedent in this Court that is substantially analogous to the instant matter.
In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Edward S. Digges, Jr., Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No.
38, September Term, 1989, there was an unreported consent to disbarment based on
"overbilling of a client, falsification of business records, and misuse of funds of law
partners."  We take judicial notice that Digges involved the false increase in bills without,
as here, an offsetting reduction, designed to give the illusion that a discount was being
granted.  
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In cases where the attorney falsely inflated the amount of work done in order to
increase the fee, but where there was no offsetting purported discount, the highest courts of
some of our sister states have disbarred the attorneys.  See Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v.
Okocha, 82 Ohio St. 3d 3, 697 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1998) ("[O]btaining fees by padding client
bills with hours not worked ... is equivalent to misappropriation of the funds of a client and
warrants disbarment."); Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St. 3d 189, 677 N.E.2d 349 (1997)
(same); In re Miller, 303 Or. 253, 735 P.2d 591 (1987) (where attorney regularly added five
to fifteen hours to clients' billing statements disbarment was appropriate, despite Bar's
stipulation with attorney that Bar would seek only a two-year suspension); Matter of
Jennings, 468 S.E.2d 869 (S.C. 1996) (repeated doubling of associated attorneys' time
without justification, coupled with other violations, warranted disbarment).
In Kalled's Case, 135 N.H. 557, 609 A.2d 613 (1992), the billings to the client,
purportedly on an hourly rate basis, in excess of the time actually expended amounted to
$72,976.50 out of total billings of $150,313.50.  The attorney was suspended for a minimum
of five years.  Kalled's Case, 609 A.2d at 616.
In In re Disciplinary Proceeding against Dann, 136 Wash. 2d 67, 960 P.2d 416
(1998), the attorney engaged in "initial switching."   On bills to the client for each of three
months in 1990 the attorney substituted his initials for those of an associate whose time was
recorded on the equivalent of a W & G pre-bill.  The effect was to increase the hourly rate
by $35.  Dann, 960 P.2d at 418.  In the same three months in 1990 and in an additional
month, the attorney switched his initials for those of an associate working on the matter of
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a different client.  The effect on the client in the latter matter was to increase the hourly rate
by $25.  For neither violation does the reported decision reflect the total amount of the
overbilling.  Id.  Under Washington's bar discipline procedure, a disciplinary board
recommends a sanction to the Supreme Court of Washington.  Although the court can
increase or decrease the recommended sanction, the rule in Washington is that the court
"'should not lightly depart from recommendations shaped by [the disciplinary board's]
experience and perspective.'"  Id. at 423 (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Noble,
100 Wash. 2d 88, 94, 667 P.2d 608, 612 (1983)).  The "initial-switching" attorney was
suspended for one year, in accordance with the recommendation of the disciplinary board.
For violations of the predecessors to Rules 8.4(c) and 1.5, the attorney in Committee
on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Zimmerman, 465 N.W.2d
288 (Iowa 1991), was suspended for six months.  The attorney was counsel for his wife, as
conservator of the property of an elderly person whose estate was valued in 1987-88 at
between $350,000 and $500,000.  Utilizing a percentage of assets method for determining
the conservator's fee, the attorney applied for a fee for his wife of $3,595.12 and also sought
approval for attorney's fees of $8,077.50 based on 89.75 hours of service at $90 per hour.
The court alertly set the matter in for hearing, and at the hearing the attorney amended the
request, reducing his claim for services to $3,350 and the fee for the conservator to
$3,421.45.  The court reduced the conservator's fee to $250, because most of the
conservator's duties were performed by her husband or his paralegal.  The amended
attorney's fee petition was approved.  In the resulting disciplinary proceedings the fact finder
-17-
rejected the attorney's explanations that he had overlooked the duplication in the
conservator's and attorney's fees, and the fact finder rejected the attorney's explanation that
he mistakenly multiplied the paralegal's time by his standard rate.  Id. at 292.
In the matter before us we remain mindful that the purpose of sanctions "is not to
punish the errant lawyer but rather to protect the public, to maintain the integrity of the legal
profession and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct."  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Webster, 348 Md. 662, 678, 705
A.2d 1135, 1143  (1998).  Further, we view billing on a time basis as a particularly sensitive
subject.  In order to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the profession, it is
essential that fraud in the recording of time expended on a client's matter, or in the
determination of the amount to be billed based on time expended, be treated as a serious
violation.  It is only because the systematic inflating of time expended in the instant matter
was offset by the purported discount that we do not disbar Hess.  
Nevertheless, weighing the scope and duration of the fraud and its impact on Hess's
client and on his partners against the mitigating factors found by Judge Matricciani, we
conclude that the appropriate sanction is a suspension for three years, beginning thirty days
from the date of the filing of this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715.c FOR WHICH
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SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND AGAINST STANFORD
DONALD HESS.