Title: PRN Associates LLC v. DOA

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 53 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
PRN Associates LLC and PGN Associates LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Administration, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
PRN Associates LLC and PGN Associates LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Administration, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 103 
Reported at: 313 Wis. 2d 263, 756 N.W.2d 580 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
and 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 812, 754 N.W.2d 254 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 17, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee & Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy & Maryann Sumi   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Joseph R. Cincotta and the Law Offices of Joseph R. Cincotta, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Joseph R. Cincotta. 
 
For the defendant-respondent the cause was argued by 
Richard E. Braun, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2009 WI 53
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP476 & 2007AP751  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV312 & 2005CV4179) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PRN Associates LLC and PGN Associates LLC, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of 
Administration, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 17, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
PRN Associates LLC and PGN Associates LLC, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of 
Administration, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of decisions of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Prism,1 seeks 
review of two decisions of the court of appeals: (1) affirming 
the dismissal of Prism's petition for judicial review of an 
agency decision; and (2) affirming the dismissal of Prism's 
amended complaint for declaratory judgment.2  These consolidated 
cases arise out of a dispute over a state procurement.  Prism 
submitted a bid, but the contract was ultimately awarded to 
another developer.  The Wisconsin Department of Administration 
("DOA") denied Prism's protest, concluding that Prism was not 
entitled to the contract.     
¶2 
Prism asserts that its petition for judicial review of 
the DOA's determination was erroneously dismissed as moot.  
Specifically, Prism contends that it is entitled to relief——
either money damages or the award of a state contract.  It 
argues that the circuit court erroneously determined that Prism 
was required to enjoin the DOA from awarding the contract to 
another bidder in order to preserve its remedies. 
¶3 
Prism also contends that its amended complaint for a 
declaratory judgment was erroneously dismissed because sovereign 
immunity is not a bar to the action.  In addition, it argues 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs PRN Associates LLC and PGN Associates LLC are 
collectively referred to as "Prism" throughout this opinion. 
2 See PRN Associates v. Wis. Dep't Admin., 2008 WI App 103, 
313 Wis. 2d 263, 756 N.W.2d 580, affirming orders of the circuit 
court for Ozaukee County, Paul V. Malloy, Judge; PRN Associates 
v. Wis. Dep't Admin., No. 2007AP751, unpublished slip op. (Ct. 
App. May 15, 2008), affirming a judgment of the circuit court 
for Dane County, Maryann Sumi, Judge. 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
3 
 
that the type of relief it seeks can be maintained as a 
declaratory action and that the legislature has consented to 
suit under Wis. Stat. § 775.01 (2007-08).3  
¶4 
We conclude Prism's petition for judicial review of 
the DOA's decision was properly dismissed.  Even assuming that 
all of Prism's allegations are true, there is no relief that 
Prism can receive at this point.  Although Prism could have 
sought an injunction to protect its interest, it failed to do 
so.  Therefore, we determine that resolution of Prism's protest 
cannot have any practical effect on this existing controversy 
and it is therefore moot.   
¶5 
We further conclude that Prism's amended complaint for 
declaratory judgment was properly dismissed.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.01 does not waive sovereign immunity in this case because 
Prism has not complied with the statutory conditions precedent 
for initiating an action.  Even if it had, a claim for the 
damages Prism seeks cannot be maintained in an action under 
§ 775.01.  Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶6 
These consolidated cases originated with a document 
Prism filed in Ozaukee County entitled "Petition for Review 
Pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 227.52 and § 227.53 and/or for 
Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04."  The 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
4 
 
action was subsequently split into two separate cases, which 
have been reconsolidated for our review.  The facts recounted 
below are primarily taken from the petition for review of the 
agency decision filed in Ozaukee County and the amended 
complaint for declaratory judgment filed in Dane County.    
¶7 
In October 2002, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
("UWM") and the University of Wisconsin System ("the System") 
sought a developer to completely renovate the Kenilworth 
Building, located on Milwaukee's east side.  They issued a 
request for proposals ("the first RFP") pursuant to Wis. Admin. 
Code Adm Ch. 10.4  In addition and also pursuant to Adm Ch. 10, 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 16.705(2) authorizes the DOA to promulgate 
rules regulating "the procurement of contractual services."  
These rules are contained in Wis. Admin. Code Adm Ch. 10.  
In relevant part, Adm § 10.15 states: 
(1) 
Right 
to 
protest. 
 
Any 
bidder 
or 
proposer . . . who is aggrieved in connection with a 
solicitation or a notice of intent to award a contract 
may protest to the procuring agency. . . .  
(2) Authority to resolve protests.  The head of the 
procuring 
agency, 
or 
designee, 
shall 
have 
the 
authority to settle and resolve a protest of an 
aggrieved 
bidder 
or 
proposer 
concerning 
the 
solicitation or intent to award a contract. 
 . . .  
(5) Appeal. The protester may appeal a decision of the 
procuring agency . . . to the secretary . . . . 
(6) State of procurements during protests.  In the 
event of the filing of a timely notice of intent to 
protest, protest, or appeal . . . the state shall not 
proceed further with the solicitation or with the 
award of the contract until a decision is rendered in 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
5 
 
they 
established 
an 
evaluation 
committee 
to 
review 
the 
proposals.   
¶8 
Prism submitted a bid which was selected by the 
evaluation committee.  The Vice Chancellor of UWM sent Prism a 
letter which stated in part: 
I am pleased to inform you that, after careful review 
and 
consideration 
of 
the 
final 
proposals, 
the 
University and the Evaluation Team has selected Prism 
Development Company as the developer UWM would like to 
pursue negotiations with regarding the Kenilworth 
redevelopment project.   
On September 5, 2003, a resolution was passed granting the 
System the authority to negotiate a contract with Prism.  
Because of a lease-back provision in Prism's proposal, the State 
Building Commission's approval was also required.   
¶9 
A developer who had submitted a losing bid protested 
the selection of Prism pursuant to Adm Ch. 10.  The developer 
argued that the selection process had been faulty.  At the 
Building Commission's February 18, 2004 meeting, the System 
withdrew its request for approval.  Subsequently, the System 
sent a letter to Prism explaining that the request had been 
withdrawn because "it became apparent that there was no support 
by [the State Building Commission].  That body's approval was 
                                                                                                                                                             
response to the protest or appeal, or unless the 
secretary, after consultation with the head of the 
contracting agency, makes a written determination that 
the award of the contract without delay is necessary 
to protect substantial interests of the state.  
 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
6 
 
essential to moving forward."  The letter invited Prism to 
participate in a second round of bidding. 
¶10 In March 2004, a second request for proposals ("the 
second RFP") was issued by the DOA Division of State Facilities 
at the direction of the State Building Commission.  Prism again 
submitted a bid.  At the same time and pursuant to Wis. Admin. 
Code Adm § 10.15, Prism filed Notices of Intent to protest the 
decision to withdraw consideration of the first RFP.   
¶11 Prism's protest was denied and it appealed to DOA 
Secretary Mark Marotta.  He denied the appeal as untimely, 
stating in part: 
You have also indicated that you believe s. Adm 
10.15(1), Code, allows you to both protest and appeal 
the decision of the University not to proceed further 
with the procurement.  Section Adm 10.15, Code, allows 
a protest to be filed within 10 days after the 
issuance of a solicitation or after issuance of the 
letter 
of 
intent 
to 
award 
a 
contract. 
 
The 
solicitation in this matter was issued in October, 
2002.  Thus, your opportunity to protest and appeal 
decisions relating to the issuance of the solicitation 
are passed.  No letter of intent [for the second RFP] 
has been issued.     
Prism did not seek judicial review of this decision. 
¶12 Prism alleges that it was "lulled into a belief that a 
Letter of Intent pursuant to Adm § 10.08 would be forthcoming" 
to alert those who had submitted bids that a developer had been 
selected.  It believed that this letter was necessary to trigger 
its right to protest the selection of another developer.  As 
Prism 
awaited 
the 
issuance 
of 
a 
letter 
of 
intent, 
it 
simultaneously participated in the second RFP. 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
7 
 
¶13 In response to a January 26, 2005 letter requesting 
information, the DOA informed Prism that another developer, 
WEAS, had been selected as the winning bidder.  The DOA's letter 
explained that Adm Ch. 10 did not apply to the second RFP 
process because the State Building Commission, a legislative 
body, authorized the RFP.  Therefore, it concluded Prism was not 
entitled to protest the award under Adm Ch. 10. 
¶14 Prism viewed the DOA's assertion that Adm Ch. 10 did 
not apply as "incorrect and incredible."  In February 2005, 
Prism filed a Notice of Intent to Protest and a Protest pursuant 
to Adm § 10.15.  The protest made the following claims: (a) Adm 
Ch. 10 did not permit the initial award to Prism to be 
rescinded, and by rescinding the award the System acted ultra 
vires;5 (b) the System's withdrawal of the award to Prism was 
arbitrary and therefore void; (c) the issuance of the second RFP 
was contrary to law, ultra vires, and void; (d) the State should 
award the contract to Prism because it submitted the best 
proposal; and (e) the disclosure of Prism's initial bid was a 
violation of Adm Ch. 10, rendering the selection process for the 
second RFP void.   
¶15 The System denied Prism's protest on March 25, 2005.  
It 
determined 
that 
the protest did not fit within the 
requirements of Adm Ch. 10 and that Adm Ch. 10 does not prohibit 
a procuring agency from abandoning a RFP prior to the issuance 
                                                 
5 "Ultra vires" is defined as: "Unauthorized; beyond the 
scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by 
law."  Black's Law Dictionary 1525 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
8 
 
of a contract.  It further determined that the second RFP, 
issued by the Building Commission, was not covered under Adm Ch. 
10 and therefore could not be protested.6  Prism appealed to the 
Secretary of the DOA pursuant to Adm § 10.15(5). 
¶16 On June 6, 2005, DOA Secretary Mark Marotta issued a 
seven-page decision denying Prism's appeal.  This decision is 
the subject of Prism's petition for judicial review, and it was 
attached to the petition.   
¶17 Secretary Marotta's decision concluded that the System 
had the authority to withdraw its letter of intent to award 
Prism the project during the February Building Commission 
meeting.  It further determined that because Prism did not 
appeal this decision on time, it had waived its right to object 
to the first RFP process.  Additionally, it concluded that the 
second RFP was not governed by Adm Ch. 10 because it was issued 
by the Building Commission, which is a legislative rather than 
an executive commission. 
                                                 
6 The DOA continued to advance the position that Adm Ch. 10 
was inapplicable to the circuit court, the court of appeals, and 
in its brief to this court.  Prism argues that even if Adm Ch. 
10 was an inappropriate procedure to use, the State initiated 
the second RFP under Adm Ch. 10 and was bound to follow the Adm 
Ch. 10 procedures when Prism filed its protest.   
At oral argument, counsel for the DOA acknowledged: "Judge, 
I couldn't make a cogent argument that [the State did not 
initiate the second RFP under Adm Ch. 10].  Does it apply in 
these types of cases?  No.  I think it applies here [however] 
because that's the way [the DOA initially] treated it."  
 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
9 
 
¶18 Meanwhile, on March 15, 2005, the State and WEAS 
signed the contract.  At no point did Prism seek an injunction 
in circuit court alleging that the DOA was acting beyond its 
authority.  The parties acknowledge that the contract was 
subsequently executed by WEAS and the redeveloped Kenilworth 
Building was completed in August 2006.     
¶19 On July 6, 2005, Prism filed a "Petition for Review 
Pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 227.52 and § 227.53 and/or for 
Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04."  Prism 
asserted that it was entitled to a remedy because the System and 
the DOA's actions to abandon the first RFP process and then 
award the contract to WEAS were "ultra vires of their delegated 
power under Ch. 16 stats. and Adm. 10."7  
                                                 
7 Prism sought the following relief in paragraph 24 of its 
petition:  
 
a. a determination that the State was estopped from 
arguing that "Prism is precluded, for any reason, from 
challenging . . . [the actions of UWM and the System] 
to withdraw and/or rescind the award of the Kenilworth 
contract to Prism"; 
 
b. a determination that the procedures used in both RFPs 
were irregular and not in compliance with law;  
 
c. a determination that the DOA's conclusion that the 
matter is not governed by Adm Ch. 10 was erroneous; 
 
d. a determination that it was improper to rescind the 
initial 
selection 
of 
Prism 
because 
Adm 
§ 10.08 
provides that the contract shall be awarded to the 
bidder selected by the evaluation committee; 
 
e. a determination that the actions of the System and the 
DOA were ultra vires;   
 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
10 
 
¶20 The Ozaukee County circuit court severed Prism's 
petition into two independent actions——one for judicial review 
of the DOA's administrative decision under Wis. Stat. Ch. 227, 
and one for declaratory judgment.  The Ozaukee County court 
retained jurisdiction of the Chapter 227 case ("the Ozaukee 
County case").  The court granted the State's motion for a 
change 
in 
venue 
in 
the 
declaratory 
judgment 
action 
and 
transferred it to Dane County circuit court ("the Dane County 
case").  
¶21 In Ozaukee County, the DOA filed a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim.  It asserted that even if all of 
the allegations contained in the petition for judicial review of 
the agency's decision were true, the case was moot because there 
was no relief that could be granted.   
¶22 After a hearing on the merits, the circuit court 
granted the DOA's motion to dismiss.8  The court stated, "in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
f. a determination that Prism is entitled to a remedy——
either the award of the contract or economic damages. 
  
8 The circuit court granted the DOA's motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  It 
is unclear whether dismissal for failure to state a claim is an 
appropriate procedure for dismissing a petition for judicial 
review of an agency decision.   
 
In Wisconsin Envtl. Decade Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, we 
determined that the summary judgment procedure was inapplicable 
to 
proceedings 
for 
judicial 
review 
of 
an 
administrative 
decision.  79 Wis. 2d 161, 170, 255 N.W.2d 917 (1977).  We 
explained that Chapter 227 provides for review of an agency 
decision rather than a new trial of the merits of a new claim.  
Id. ("[J]udicial review of administrative decisions under ch. 
227 envisages a review upon the [agency] record, and there is no 
trial de novo in the circuit court during such proceedings.")  
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
11 
 
Chapter 227 proceeding the question has to become what practical 
effect would a favorable decision to the plaintiffs have."  It 
concluded that injunctive relief was not available——the contract 
had already been let to another bidder and performed.  It 
further concluded that a wronged bidder was not entitled to a 
monetary (damages) remedy from the State under the relevant 
statutes, administrative code provisions, and the common law.  
Therefore, even if everything that Prism alleged was correct, 
the court concluded that there was no relief that could be 
granted and the claim was moot.  Prism's motion to reconsider 
this decision was denied.9  
                                                                                                                                                             
The summary judgment procedure was inapplicable in a Chapter 227 
review because there were no new facts to be tested.   
 
Nevertheless, a petition for review of an agency decision 
can be dismissed if it is moot:  
A motion to dismiss for mootness . . . does not 
request a determination on the merits.  When a case is 
dismissed because the issues therein have become moot, 
the rights of the parties are not adjudicated, and 
neither party is entitled to judgment.  All that is 
involved . . . is a conclusion by the court that the 
determination sought cannot have any practical effect 
upon an existing controversy.   
Id. at 171. 
 
We proceed to examine the circuit court's determination 
that Prism's protest is moot because it is the essence of the 
circuit court's decision. 
 
9 Under Wis. Stat. § 227.55, the agency under review must 
transmit the record to the reviewing court.  Yet, in this case 
the agency's record was never transmitted to the circuit court 
and is therefore not part of the record on appeal.  Normally, 
the absence of the agency's record would foreclose our ability 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
12 
 
¶23 In Dane County, the DOA also filed a motion to dismiss 
Prism's amended complaint for declaratory judgment for failure 
to state a claim.  Among other arguments, it asserted that 
Prism's amended complaint should be dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity.    The DOA 
argued that Wis. Stat. § 775.01, which permits some claims to be 
brought against the State, did not constitute consent to this 
suit.  The circuit court concluded, "the state's motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on its immunity 
from suit must be granted because the state has not consented to 
this declaratory judgment action."10   
II 
¶24 These consolidated cases require us to address whether 
Prism's petition for judicial review was properly dismissed as 
moot.  We are also required to address whether Prism's amended 
                                                                                                                                                             
to review the agency's decision.  Here, however, the basis for 
the circuit court's dismissal of the case, mootness, is a legal 
determination that does not address the merits of the agency's 
decision.  The circuit court commented, "The record should be 
here.  But, legally, the matter would be moot, whether or not 
the record is filed."    
 
10 After oral argument in this court, Prism filed a motion 
to supplement the record with the Department of Justice's 
investigation into Secretary Marotta and the Kenilworth Building 
Project.  We granted Prism's motion over the objection of the 
DOA.  The investigation concluded that "[t]here is no evidence, 
either from the investigation and interviews or from the case 
documents, to substantiate Prism's allegations against Marotta."  
We 
do 
not 
further 
discuss 
the 
facts 
contained 
in 
the 
investigation because they do not illuminate our task of 
determining whether Prism's petition for judicial review and 
amended complaint were properly dismissed. 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
13 
 
complaint for declaratory judgment was properly dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
¶25 An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
practical effect on the underlying controversy.  State ex rel. 
Riesch v. Schwartz, 2005 WI 11, ¶11, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 
N.W.2d 219.  Mootness is a question of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep't 
Agriculture, 560 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 2009). 
¶26 Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is also a question of law.  Meyers v. Bayer AG, 
2007 WI 99, ¶21, 303 Wis. 2d 295, 735 N.W.2d 448.  A motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency 
of the complaint.  Id.   
¶27 We accept as true both the facts in the complaint and 
the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such facts.  
Id.  "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears certain that no relief can be granted 
under any set of facts that a plaintiff can prove in support of 
[the] allegations."  Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 
N.W.2d 303 (1987).  We review a grant or denial of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.  Shannon E.T. v. 
Alicia M. 
V.M., 2007 WI 29, ¶31, 299 Wis. 2d 601, 728 
N.W.2d 636. 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
14 
 
III  
Ozaukee County Review of an Agency Decision 
¶28 We turn now to the question of whether the circuit 
court properly dismissed as moot Prism's petition for judicial 
review.  "The general rule is that the court will not determine 
abstract principles of law."  City of Racine v. J-T Enters. of 
Am., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 700, 221 N.W.2d 869 (1974).   
¶29 An issue is moot when the court concludes that its 
resolution cannot have any practical effect on the existing 
controversy.  Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11.  The court of appeals 
has explained that "a moot question is one which circumstances 
have rendered purely academic."  State ex rel. Olson v. 
Litscher, 2000 WI App 61, ¶3, 233 Wis. 2d 685, 608 N.W.2d 425.  
Appellate courts generally decline to reach the merits of an 
issue that has become moot.11  Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶12.   
¶30 The State argues that even if Prism is correct on the 
merits of its protest, a court resolution would have no effect 
on the existing controversy because there is no remedy that can 
be granted to Prism at this point.  It contends that the 
petition for judicial review is therefore rendered moot.  Thus, 
the question we must answer is: even if Prism's protest was 
                                                 
11 A court will make an exception and consider a moot issue 
under certain circumstances.  For instance, a court may decide a 
moot issue if it is of great public importance or arises 
frequently enough to warrant a definitive decision to guide the 
circuit courts.  State ex rel. Riesch v. Schwartz, 2005 WI 11, 
¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 N.W.2d 219.  Prism does not contend 
that this case falls under one of these exceptions.  Rather, 
Prism argues that the issue is not moot.   
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
15 
 
improperly denied, is there any relief that it can receive now, 
almost three years after the project has been completed?   
¶31 To determine whether the resolution sought can have 
any practical effect on the existing controversy, we do not 
address the factual and legal issues implicated in Prism's 
petition for judicial review.  For purposes of this review, we 
assume that Prism would be able to prove every fact and support 
every legal allegation in its protest and petition for judicial 
review.  Rather, we examine Prism's requested relief.  In its 
petition for judicial review, Prism requested two distinct 
remedies: money damages for "the value of its winning proposal" 
in the first RFP or award of the contract.  We address each 
potential remedy in turn. 
A 
¶32 Prism asserts that it is entitled to money damages 
because it should have been awarded the contract under Adm Ch. 
10, and the agency acted improperly when it instead let the 
contract to WEAS.  Prism asserts that Adm § 10.15(2), which 
gives the DOA the authority to "settle and resolve" a protest, 
envisions a damages remedy for wronged bidders.12  Yet, a money 
damages remedy would be contrary to the explicit purposes of Adm 
Ch. 10.   
                                                 
12 Adm § 10.15(2) provides: "The head of the procuring 
agency, or designee, shall have the authority to settle and 
resolve a protest of an aggrieved bidder or proposer concerning 
the solicitation or intent to award a contract."  
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
16 
 
¶33 Adm Ch. 10 provides rules governing the State's 
procurement of contractual services.  The purposes of the rules 
are, in part, "[t]o ensure that contracts for contractual 
services are entered into only in the best interests of the 
state," and "[t]o ensure that the state will procure at the 
lowest possible price, without sacrifice in quality, the 
contractual services required[.]"  Adm § 10.02.  Further, Wis. 
Stat. § 16.75 provides that with certain limited exceptions, 
contracts should be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder."   
¶34 It is an 
established proposition that procuring 
statutes and regulations such as Adm Ch. 10 "are designed to 
prevent fraud, collusion, favoritism and improvidence in the 
administration of public business, as well as to ensure that the 
public receives the best work . . . at the most reasonable price 
practicable."  Aqua-Tech, Inc. v. Como Lake Prot. & Rehab. 
Dist., 71 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 239 N.W.2d 25 (1976).  As such, 
these regulations "are intended for the benefit and protection 
of the public and not of the individual bidder."  Id.   
¶35 Even though protection for an aggrieved bidder is not 
within the purposes of a procurement regulation, a bidder has 
standing to contest an agency's decision to award the contract 
to another developer.  This is because a bidder "is in a 
particularly good position to challenge the bidding authority's 
action and thereby protect the rights of the public."  Id. at 
553.  The bidder has a valuable business interest at stake and 
it is expected that the bidder will "zealously protect" the 
public interest as well as its own.  Id.    
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
17 
 
¶36 A 
damages 
remedy, 
however, 
thwarts 
the 
purpose 
underlying the procurement statutes because it would require the 
taxpayers to pay twice for just one completed project.  The 
court of appeals addressed a similar situation in D.M.K., Inc. 
v. Town of Pittsfield, 2006 WI App 40, 290 Wis. 2d 474, 711 
N.W.2d 672.   In that case, D.M.K. was the lowest bidder on four 
municipal projects.  Id., ¶3.  The town, however, concluded that 
D.M.K. was not a responsible bidder, and it offered only two of 
the projects to D.M.K.  Id., ¶7. 
¶37 D.M.K. sued the town for lost profits.  Id., ¶9.  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the town, and 
the court of appeals affirmed.  After recognizing that the 
regulations were intended to protect the public, not the 
individual bidder, the court of appeals concluded that requiring 
the town to pay twice for the same project is contrary to the 
public interest: 
If D.M.K. were successful in [recovering its purported 
damages], the Town and its taxpayers would pay 
D.M.K.'s $216,000 in lost profits in addition to the 
contract price paid to the contractor who performed 
the work.  On its face, this result fails to benefit 
or protect the public.    
Id., ¶26. 
¶38 Prism argues that because Aqua-Tech and D.M.K. both 
involved 
lawsuits 
against 
municipalities, 
they 
have 
no 
application to lawsuits against the State.  This argument is 
unavailing.  Like the statutes discussed in Aqua-Tech and 
D.M.K., the stated purpose of Adm Ch. 10 is to protect the 
taxpayer from unnecessary expenditures.  Taxpayers are not 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
18 
 
protected when any governmental body pays twice for the 
performance 
of 
one 
contract——regardless 
of 
whether 
that 
governmental body is a municipality or the State.  We conclude 
that the reasoning in Aqua-Tech and D.M.K. applies to this case 
and that Prism is not entitled to a damages remedy.  
B 
¶39 Prism also seeks as a remedy the award of the 
contract.  It contends that as the winning bidder of the first 
RFP process, it is entitled to the contract.13  By the time Prism 
filed its petition for judicial review of the agency decision, 
however, the contract had already been signed.14  In State ex 
rel. Hron Bros. Co. v. City of Port Washington, 265 Wis. 507, 
509, 62 N.W.2d 1 (1953), we stated, "[T]he fact that the 
contract has actually been awarded to another is sufficient to 
induce the courts to decline to interfere to further complicate 
the matter, even though they might otherwise have done so." 
(quoting State ex rel. Phelan v. Bd. of Educ., 24 Wis. 2d 683, 
684 (1869)).  
¶40 Moreover, as the parties acknowledge, the Kenilworth 
redevelopment project is finished and the Kenilworth Building 
has been fully in use for nearly three years.  We cannot unravel 
a contract when it has already been fully performed.  As a 
                                                 
13 As authority for this proposition, Prism cites Adm 
§ 10.08(7), 
which 
states: 
"Award 
shall 
be 
based 
on 
the 
evaluation committee recommendation . . . ."  
14 The contract was signed on March 15, 2005, and Prism 
filed its petition for review with the circuit court in Ozaukee 
County on July 6, 2005.   
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2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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practical matter, Prism cannot perform this contract.  It makes 
no sense to award a contract for building a project which has 
already been completed.  
¶41 Because Prism cannot receive either money damages or 
an award of the contract at this point, there is no remedy that 
Prism can receive even if all of its factual and legal 
allegations are true.  This does not mean, however, that Prism 
was always without a remedy. 
¶42 It is undisputed that the DOA informed Prism that it 
was going ahead with contract negotiations with WEAS and that it 
did not intend to stay the negotiations to permit for resolution 
of Prism's protest.15  Nearly six weeks elapsed between the date 
Prism was put on notice that there would be no automatic stay 
and the date that the contract with WEAS was signed.  Yet Prism 
did not seek an injunction to prevent the contract from being 
awarded to WEAS.16  
                                                 
15 Adm § 10.15(6) provides that the DOA will impose a stay 
in a procurement proceeding while a protest is pending: 
In the event of the filing of a timely notice of 
intent to protest, protest or appeal . . . , the state 
shall not proceed further with the solicitation or 
with the award of the contract until a decision is 
rendered in response to the protest or appeal, or 
unless 
the 
secretary . . . makes 
a 
written 
determination that the award of the contract without 
delay is necessary to protect substantial interests of 
the state.   
 
16 Prism asserts that under Adm Ch. 10, a stay should have 
been automatically imposed and that a stay would have relieved 
it of the necessity of seeking an injunction to prevent the 
award of the contract.  However, Prism acknowledges that it was 
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2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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¶43 It 
is 
expected 
that 
an 
aggrieved 
bidder 
will 
"zealously protect" the public interest and the public purse by 
taking legal action to ensure that a contract is not awarded to 
the wrong bidder.  See Aqua-Tech, 71 Wis. 2d at 553.  If Prism 
believed that it was entitled to the contract, Prism was 
required to seek a temporary injunction to prevent the award of 
the contract to WEAS.  In so doing, Prism would have preserved 
any entitlement it had to the contract.    
¶44 Prism asserts that an injunction would not have been 
available because sovereign immunity precludes a lawsuit against 
the State unless the legislature consents to the suit.17  Here, 
there is no statute giving legislative consent for a suit to 
enjoin the State from awarding a contract to another bidder.   
¶45 However, there is a "general exception to the rule of 
state immunity" that would have been applicable here.  See City 
of Kenosha v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 317, 323, 151 N.W.2d 36 (1967).  
In Kenosha, we explained: 
A general exception to the rule of state immunity for 
agencies or arms of the state, however, is that courts 
may entertain suits to enjoin state officers and state 
                                                                                                                                                             
put on notice that the DOA did not plan to impose a stay.  At 
oral argument, counsel for the DOA explained: "February 3 of 
2005, before the contract is signed, the DOA sends a letter to 
Prism. . . . The DOA's position——right or wrong——was that Adm 10 
did not apply and therefore there would be no automatic stay.  
This was six weeks before the contract was signed.  It was four 
months, five months before Prism ever started an action, and 
even then it did not seek injunctive relief."   
17 See Wisconsin Constitution art. IV ("The legislature 
shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may 
be brought against the state."). 
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2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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agencies from acting beyond their constitutional or 
jurisdictional authority.  These suits are permitted 
because they are suits against individuals acting in 
excess of their authority. 
Id. at 323-24.  
¶46 In Prism's protest, filed before the contract was 
signed with WEAS, Prism contended that the System and the DOA 
were acting "ultra vires" because they did not follow the 
provisions of Adm Ch. 10 when they: (1) rescinded the initial 
award of the contract to Prism; (2) issued a second proposal; 
and (3) disclosed information from Prism's first bid.  That is, 
Prism asserted that the DOA was acting without authority, which 
would have allowed Prism to seek an injunction against the 
agency.  See id.  Yet it did not do so. 
¶47 It appears that Prism was aware of the necessity of 
seeking an injunction to preserve its interest in the contract.  
Instead of filing for an injunction, however, Prism sought 
assurances from attorneys for the DOA that it need not seek an 
injunction and would be permitted to seek a damages remedy.18  
Based on the correspondence provided by Prism, these assurances 
were not given.  Ultimately, Prism attained neither an assurance 
that a damage remedy was available nor an injunction that could 
have preserved its interest in the contract.   
                                                 
18 This allegation does not appear in either the petition 
for judicial review or the amended complaint.  Prism attempted 
to submit correspondence in support of this argument in the 
Ozaukee County case.  Although the correspondence between Prism 
and the DOA was stricken from the record by the circuit court, 
both parties relied on this correspondence in their arguments 
here.  
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2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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¶48 It should have been apparent to Prism that under 
Wisconsin law, a damages remedy likely was unavailable and that 
an injunction was required to protect any interest it had in the 
Kenilworth contract.  In Aqua-Tech, the court stated that a 
temporary injunction might be necessary to "avoid rendering 
ineffective a possible judgment" in the aggrieved bidder's 
favor.  71 Wis. 2d at 552.  An injunction would prevent the 
procuring agency from awarding the contract to another bidder 
pending a decision on the merits of the protest.  Id.  Aqua-Tech 
stands for the proposition that a disappointed bidder must seek 
a temporary injunction before the issue becomes moot.19    
¶49 We conclude that the Ozaukee County circuit court 
properly dismissed as moot Prism's petition for judicial review 
of the DOA's decision.  Even assuming that all of Prism's 
allegations are true, there is no relief that Prism can receive 
at this point.  Prism is not entitled to money damages.  
Further, the DOA cannot be enjoined to award the contract to 
Prism because the contract has already been fully performed.  
Although Prism could have sought an injunction to protect any 
                                                 
19 Prism requests that we send the case back to the DOA to 
ask the Secretary to "settle and resolve" its protest under Adm 
§ 10.15(2).  We fail to see how this action would accomplish 
anything other than to further extend this already protracted 
dispute.  The DOA cannot award the contract to Prism when it has 
been let to another bidder and fully performed.  Further, 
awarding Prism money damages would be contrary to the purposes 
of the procurement regulations as discussed above. 
Under these circumstances, sending the case back for the 
DOA to "settle and resolve" a protest that it has already denied 
would amount to an exercise in futility.   
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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interest it had in the contract, it did not do so.  Therefore, 
we conclude that resolution of Prism's protest cannot have any 
practical effect on this existing controversy.   
IV 
Dane County Declaratory Judgment Action 
¶50 We turn next to the action for declaratory judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 804.06, which was dismissed on the grounds of 
sovereign immunity.  Prism filed an amended complaint in Dane 
County seeking the following relief: (1) a declaration that the 
DOA should have awarded the contract to Prism and violated Adm 
Ch. 10 by not doing so; (2) a declaration that the DOA prevented 
and denied Prism the opportunity to protest under Adm Ch. 10; 
(3) a declaration that as the winning bidder of the first RFP, 
Prism had either a contract or an exclusive right to negotiate 
for a contract; (4) a declaration that the DOA violated Adm Ch. 
10 by releasing the contents of Prism's first proposal to the 
public; and (5) a declaration that the DOA acted ultra vires by 
authorizing and conducting the second RFP.   
¶51 As discussed above, the State cannot be sued without 
its consent, and the legislature directs the manner in which 
suits may be brought against the State.  See Kenosha, 35 
Wis. 2d at 322; Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 
240 
N.W.2d 610 
(1976).  A suit against a state agency 
constitutes a suit against the State for purposes of sovereign 
immunity.  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 291.  If the legislature has 
not specifically consented to the suit, then sovereign immunity 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the State, 
assuming that the defense has been properly raised.  Id. at 291. 
¶52 Like other lawsuits, actions for declaratory relief 
can 
be 
dismissed 
on 
the 
grounds 
of 
sovereign 
immunity.  
Nonetheless, there are occasions when a suit for declaratory 
judgment against a state agency is permissible.  In Lister, we 
explained:  
[T]he court has [] recognized that the declaratory 
judgment procedure is particularly well-suited (in 
cases where such relief is otherwise appropriate) for 
resolving controversies as to the constitutionality or 
proper 
construction 
and 
application 
of 
statutory 
provisions.  As a result, it has been necessary to 
engage in a fiction that allows such actions to be 
brought against the officer or agency charged with 
administering the statute[.]  
Id. at 303. 
¶53 Declaratory judgment provides prospective rather than 
remedial relief.  The purpose of declaratory relief and Wis. 
Stat. § 806.04, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, is:  
to enable controversies of a justiciable nature to be 
brought 
before 
the 
courts 
for 
settlement 
and 
determination prior to the time that a wrong has been 
threatened or committed.  The purpose is facilitated 
by authorizing a court to take jurisdiction at a point 
earlier in time than it would do under ordinary 
remedial rules and procedures. 
Id. at 307 (emphasis added).  Declaratory judgment "provides a 
remedy which is primarily anticipatory or preventative in 
nature."  Id.  
¶54 In Lister, a group of students brought suit against 
the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents.  The students 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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argued that they had been classified as non-residents contrary 
to the Wisconsin Statutes and therefore had to pay tuition at a 
higher rate.  Among other remedies, they sought a declaratory 
judgment of their right to have been classified as residents.  
Id. at 305. 
¶55 This court concluded that the action for a declaratory 
judgment could not be maintained.  We said: 
A court cannot close its eyes to the purpose which a 
declaration of rights will serve in the particular 
case.  It is not a sufficient ground for declaratory 
relief that the parties have a difference of opinion 
as to the proper construction and application of a 
particular statute.  No anticipatory or preventative 
relief is sought in this action.  To the extent that 
the complaint attempts to state a claim to relief 
under state law, the only consequence which the 
desired declaration of rights could have would be to 
settle the plaintiffs' rights to recover the amounts 
paid in nonresident tuition.  The action is, in 
effect, one for damages.  
Id. at 308 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. State, 230 
Wis. 2d 355, 382, 602 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1999) ("We acknowledge 
that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for a declaratory 
ruling that an individual state official or agency has violated 
a statute when there is an anticipatory or preventative purpose 
for the ruling . . . .  It is therefore not apparent from the 
complaint . . . that there is any purpose for the declaratory 
judgment other than to establish the State's liability for 
damages on a claim barred by sovereign immunity." (emphasis 
added)). 
¶56 The situation here is analogous to the situation in 
Lister.  The declarations Prism seeks all relate to the DOA's 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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past actions, such as failing to award the contract to Prism, 
rescinding the first RFP, and issuing a second RFP.  None 
relates to the State's future conduct.  In effect, Prism seeks a 
declaration that its rights were violated during the procurement 
procedure so it can pursue a damage remedy against the State.20 
¶57 "A 
declaration 
which 
seeks 
to 
fix 
the 
state's 
responsibility to respond to a monetary claim is not authorized 
by Wisconsin's Declaratory Judgments Act."  Lister at 308.  We 
conclude that a declaratory action cannot be maintained because 
Prism is seeking money damages rather than anticipatory or 
preventative relief.    
¶58 Nonetheless, Prism argues that its amended complaint 
is justiciable because Wis. Stat. § 775.01 waives sovereign 
immunity and authorizes suit against the State for contract 
actions that would render the state a debtor.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.01 provides: 
                                                 
20 In its brief, Prism stated: "The ultimate objective is a 
money judgment against the State," and that "The declaratory 
judgment is prefatory to further action for actual relief."    
At oral argument, Prism's attorney clarified that it sought 
a declaratory judgment so it could ultimately receive money 
damages: "[Damages] are contemplated strongly in [Adm Ch. 10]. 
There is really no other meaningful relief that can be 
granted. . . . What 
I 
would 
cite 
to 
is 
775 
certainly 
contemplates money being paid to contracting parties who lose 
out and their contract is breached."  Counsel later continued: 
"What I need the court to say is Adm 10 applies; Adm 10.08 says 
the contract shall be awarded to the winner[.] . . . and [the 
court] should I think——I hope it does——address the issue of the 
type of relief available in the Adm 10.15 protest and appeal 
proceedings."    
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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Upon the refusal of the legislature to allow a claim 
against the state the claimant may commence an action 
against the state by service . . . and by filing with 
the clerk of court a bond . . . to the effect that the 
claimant will indemnify the state against all costs 
that may accrue in such action . . . in case the 
claimant fails to obtain judgment against the state.   
Chapter 775 is limited to claims which, "if valid, would render 
the State a debtor to the claimant."  Brown, 230 Wis. 2d at 364 
(citing Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 50, 214 N.W.2d 405 
(1974).  The chapter does not authorize tort claims against the 
State.  See id.; Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 487, 74 N.W. 111 
(1898). 
¶59 Prism's argument that Section 775.01 authorizes this 
lawsuit is unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, Prism is 
procedurally barred from relying on Wis. Stat. Ch. 775 because 
it has not met the conditions precedent for filing such a claim.  
Before a Chapter 775 claim can be filed, the following 
conditions must be met: (1) the claim must be submitted to the 
legislature; (2) the claim must be denied; and (3) the claimant 
must file a bond with the clerk of courts.  Wis. Stat. § 775.01.   
¶60 Prism acknowledges that it has not satisfied these 
statutory requirements.  Rather, it contends that the Claims 
Board declined to take any action on the claim until the court 
case was completed because the Claims Board is a forum of last 
resort.  Prism argues that it was placed in a Catch-22 situation 
because it could not file a claim until this court case was 
complete, but it could not be granted relief in court unless it 
could demonstrate that the legislature authorized suit.   
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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¶61 This argument is not persuasive.  Here, Prism filed an 
action in court seeking a declaration of rights, presumably so 
that it could later file a claim for money damages with the 
legislature.  In order to have personal jurisdiction over the 
DOA, however, we must first conclude that the legislature 
authorized this suit.   The legislature has not authorized this 
suit against the State unless Prism has followed the conditions 
precedent for bringing suit.  It has not done so here. 
¶62 Second, the damages Prism seeks are not the type that 
are authorized under Section 775.01 as that statute has been 
interpreted by the courts.  In Koshick v. State, 2005 WI App 
232, 287 Wis. 2d 608, 706 N.W.2d 174, the plaintiff brought a 
breach of contract action against the State.  He asserted that 
he entered into a contract with the State permitting him to 
lease the Wisconsin State Fair Park for an event.  Id., ¶2.  The 
State reneged on its promise.  Id.  Koshick followed the 
statutory procedures necessary to bring a claim against the 
State.  Id., ¶4 n.3.  When the legislature rejected his claim, 
he then filed a civil suit in circuit court seeking damages for 
lost profits and expenses incurred.  Id., ¶1. 
¶63 The court of appeals interpreted a long line of cases 
to determine whether Koshick could maintain a breach of contract 
claim under § 775.01 for lost profits and expenses incurred.  
Relying on a 1952 case, Trempealeau County v. State, 260 Wis. 
602, 51 N.W.2d 499 (1952), the court concluded that § 775.01 
authorizes suits to recover "a specific sum of money which is 
due or owing from [the State] to another."  Koshick, 287 
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2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
29 
 
Wis. 2d 608, ¶11.  The court concluded that Koshick could not 
maintain an action under § 775.01 because he was not seeking "an 
amount due for goods or services that he has sold or delivered 
to the State" or "money that the State has received that he 
asserts he is entitled to."21  Id., ¶12.  
¶64 The facts in this case are similar to the facts in 
Koshick.  As in Koshick, Prism claims that it had a contract 
with the State and it seeks damages for the cost of preparing 
its winning bid and for "the value of the contract."22   
¶65 Prism does not assert that its ch. 775 action can be 
maintained under the holding of Koshick.  Instead, it contends 
that Koshick was wrongly decided.  In essence, Prism concedes 
that we must overrule Koshick to permit Prism's claim under 
Section 775.01 to go forward.   
¶66 We decline to do so here.  It is the role of the 
legislature, rather than that of the court, to consent to suit 
against the State.  The Koshick court relied on the text of the 
                                                 
21 See Trempealeau County v. State, 260 Wis. 602, 51 
N.W.2d 499 (1952) (permitting the county to bring an action 
under the predecessor to the current § 775.01 to recover money 
mistakenly paid to the State for hunting and fishing licenses 
issued by the county); Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 568, 305 
N.W.2d 133 (1981) (permitting a claim for recovery of certain 
Social 
Security 
payments 
the 
State 
had 
received 
on 
the 
plaintiff's behalf). 
22 At oral argument, one of the justices commented, "What 
you're asking for here as I understand it is the money damages 
for the cost of putting together a proposal."  Prism's counsel 
responded, "We want at least that.  We also want the value of 
that proposal.  Which is——I mean, don't say lost profits, but I 
think there is some value to that proposal that is substantial."  
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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statute and existing case law when it concluded that a breach of 
contract action for lost profits and expenses incurred could not 
be maintained under § 775.01.23   
¶67 We conclude that Prism cannot maintain a declaratory 
action against the DOA because Prism is seeking money damages 
rather than anticipatory or preventative relief.  We further 
determine that Wis. Stat. § 775.01 does not waive sovereign 
immunity in this case because Prism has not complied with the 
statutory conditions precedent of that section and because even 
if it had, the damages Prism seeks cannot be maintained in an 
action under § 775.01.   
V 
¶68 In sum, we conclude Prism's petition for judicial 
review of the DOA's decision was properly dismissed.  Even 
assuming that all of Prism's allegations are true, there is no 
relief that Prism can receive at this point.  Although Prism 
could have sought an injunction to protect its interest, it 
failed to do so.  Therefore, we determine that resolution of 
                                                 
23 Prism also argues that the takings clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution is an exception to sovereign immunity 
that applies in this case.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 13.  Its 
brief spends less than one page discussing the takings exception 
before moving on to other issues.  It cites just one case 
relating to the law of eminent domain and real estate law.  See 
Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 324 N.W.2d 67 (1983).  More 
importantly, Prism's amended complaint did not even assert a 
takings claim.  Under these circumstances, we decline to address 
the argument.  See State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, n.5, 270 
Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276 (noting that we generally decline to 
address issues that are not fully presented by the parties). 
No. 
2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
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Prism's protest cannot have any practical effect on this 
existing controversy and is therefore moot.   
¶69 We further conclude that Prism's amended complaint for 
declaratory judgment was properly dismissed.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.01 does not waive sovereign immunity in this case because 
Prism has not complied with the statutory conditions precedent 
for initiating an action.  Even if it had, a claim for the 
damages Prism seeks cannot be maintained in an action under 
§ 775.01.  Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.—The decisions of the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
  
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2007AP476 & 2007AP751   
 
 
 
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