Title: Attorney Grievance v. Thaxton

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ronnie Thaxton, Misc. Docket AG No. 53, September
Term, 2009.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE
An indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction in a reciprocal discipline case from the
District of Columbia involving a Respondent who was suspended from the practice of law
for one year, with six months stayed, followed by a three year probationary period, as a result
of the negligent misappropriation of settlement funds in one case and the interference with
the administration of justice in another in violation of several District of Columbia Rules of
Professional Conduct corresponding to Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.4(b), 1.5(c), 1.15(a),
1.15(d), 1.15(e), and 8.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 53
September Term, 2009
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
RONNIE THAXTON
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   July 28, 2010
This is a reciprocal discipline action concerning Ronnie Thaxton, Respondent, who
was admitted to the Bar of this Court on July 1, 2002, and to the Bar of the District of
Columbia on December 4, 1995.  On September 10, 2009, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals ordered Thaxton be suspended from the practice of law for one year with six months
stayed, followed by a three year probationary period, in which he was required to participate
in the District Bar’s Practice Management Advisory Service.  The Court of Appeals based
its decision on Thaxton’s violation of District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct
1.2(a),  
1.4(a),  
1.4(b),  
1.4(c),  
1.5(c),  
1.15(a),  
1.15(b),  
1.15(c),  
 
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) provides:
1
A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d), and
(e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf
of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(a) provides:
2
A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(b) provides:
3
A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
(continued...)
(...continued)
3
regarding the representation.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(c) provides:
4
A lawyer who receives an offer of settlement in a civil case or
a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case shall inform the client
promptly of the substance of the communication.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c) provides:
5
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which
the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent
fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee
agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by
which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial, or appeal, litigation, other expenses to be
deducted from the recovery, whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated, and
whether the client will be liable for expenses regardless of the
outcome of the matter. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee
matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the outcome of the matter, and if there is a
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of
its determination.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a) provides:
6
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in
the lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained in a financial institution which is
authorized by federal, District of Columbia, or state law to do
business in the jurisdiction where the account is maintained and
which is a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, or successor agencies. Other property shall be
identified as such and appropriately safeguarded; provided,
however, that funds need not be held in an account in a financial
(continued...)
2
and 8.4(d),  to which Thaxton admitted his wrongdoing, and upon the District of Columbia
9
(...continued)
6
institution if such funds (1) are permitted to be held elsewhere
or in a different manner by law or court order, or (2) are held by
a lawyer under an escrow or similar agreement in connection
with a commercial transaction. Complete records of such
account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and
shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of
the representation.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(b) provides:
7
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render
a full accounting regarding such property, subject to Rule 1.6.
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(c) provides:
8
When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession
of property in which interests are claimed by the lawyer and
another person, or by two or more persons to each of whom the
lawyer may have an obligation, the property shall be kept
separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance
of interests in the property. If a dispute arises concerning the
respective interests among persons claiming an interest in such
property, the undisputed portion shall be distributed and the
portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the
dispute is resolved. Any funds in dispute shall be deposited in a
separate account meeting the requirements of paragraph (a).
District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) provides:
9
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(continued...)
3
Court of Appeals Board on Professional Responsibility’s Report and Recommendation for
discipline.
On December 11, 2009, the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission, acting
pursuant to Rules 16-751(a)(2)  and 16-773(b),  filed a Petition for Disciplinary or
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11
Remedial Action against Thaxton to which a certified copy of the District of Columbia Court
(...continued)
9
* * *
(d) Engage in conduct that seriously interferes with the
administration of justice . . . .
Rule 16-751(a)(2) provides:
10
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.
* * *
(2) Conviction of crime; reciprocal action.  If authorized by Rule
16-771(b) or 16-773(b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals
without prior approval of the Commission. Bar Counsel
promptly shall notify the Commission of the filing.  The
Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a petition
that was filed pursuant to this subsection.
Rule 16-773(b) provides:
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(b) Petition in Court of Appeals. Upon receiving and verifying
information from any source that in another jurisdiction an
attorney has been disciplined or placed on inactive status based
on incapacity, Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary
or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule
16-751(a)(2). A certified copy of the disciplinary or remedial
order shall be attached to the Petition, and a copy of the Petition
and order shall be served on the attorney in accordance with
Rule 16-753.
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of Appeals Opinion and the Hearing Committee’s Report were attached.  Bar Counsel
incorporated by reference into its Petition the Opinion of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and the findings of fact of the Hearing Committee.  The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals’ opinion, filed on September 10, 2009, provided:
PER CURIAM: Respondent Ronnie Thaxton, a member
of the bar of this court, has admitted to the negligent
misappropriation of settlement funds in one case and interfering
with the administration of justice in another.  Respondent admits
that in his representation of Ms. Terri Roberts, he (1) did not
notify his client when a settlement was offered or secure her
consent to accept the settlement offer; (2) failed to notify his
client when the settlement funds had been received and
deposited into his trust account; (3) failed to timely pay Doctor
Ashkan Aazmi’s fee, which he was entitled to receive from the
settlement for healthcare services rendered; and (4) withdrew
$5,000 as his attorney’s fees from his trust account immediately
upon depositing them in 2006 without notifying his client that
he did so.  In his representation of Ms. Janice Arkue,
Respondent admits that he interfered with the administration of
justice when he failed to appear at a status hearing and a show
cause hearing, resulting in the dismissal of Ms. Arkue’s civil
action for want of prosecution.
Respondent made the aforementioned admissions
voluntarily, with the advice of counsel in connection with a
petition for negotiated discipline, and supporting affidavit that
was prepared by Bar Counsel and jointly filed on April 30,
2009.  The Board on Professional Responsibility referred the
petition to Hearing Committee Number Four, and following a
hearing on May 29, 2009, where Respondent (1) reaffirmed his
admission to all of the factual allegations in the petition; (2)
acknowledged that each constituted a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct; (3) stated that he understood the
ramifications of the proposed sanction; and (4) confirmed that
he was entering into the disposition freely and voluntarily, and
not as the result of any coercion or duress, the Committee issued
the report now before this court that recommends the negotiated
5
sanction be imposed.
We have the report and recommendation in accordance
with our procedure in uncontested disciplinary cases, and hereby
accept the Hearing Committee’s Report and Recommendation
approving the petition for negotiated discipline.  Accordingly,
it is,
ORDERED that Ronnie Thaxton is hereby suspended
from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for the
period of one year with six months stayed, followed by a three
year probationary period to include participation in the District
of Columbia Bar’s Practice Management Advisory Service.  The
conditions of Respondent’s probation are as outlined by the
Hearing Committee’s Report and Recommendation: if a new
complaint is filed against Respondent within one year of the
date of the beginning of the period of suspension, and such
complaint results in a finding that Respondent violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct, Respondent will be required to serve
the remaining six months of the suspension consecutively with
whatever other sanction may be imposed on him in the new
matter or matters.  Further, Respondent must return Ms.
Robert’s attorney’s fees with interest and remit interest on
money he has already delivered to her, prior to the expiration of
the three-year probationary period.  Finally, for the purpose of
seeking reinstatement to the Bar, Respondent’s suspension shall
not begin until he complies with the affidavit requirements of
D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 14(g) (2001 & 2008 Supp.).
So ordered.
(Footnotes omitted).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals based its opinion on the Report and
Recommendation of Hearing Committee Number Four Approving Petition for Negotiated
Discipline, filed on July 10, 2009:
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter came before Hearing Committee Number
Four on May 29, 2009, for a limited hearing on a Petition for
Negotiated Discipline (the “Petition”).  The members of the
6
Hearing Committee were Eric L. Yaffee, Esquire, Chair, Ms.
Janice A. Buie, and Karen E. Branson, Esquire.  The Office of
Bar Counsel was represented by Assistant Bar Counsel, Clayton
Smith III, Esquire.  Respondent, Ronnie Thaxton, Esquire, was
represented by Wendell Robinson, Esquire, and was present
throughout the limited hearing.
The Hearing Committee has carefully considered the
Petition filed by Bar Counsel, the supporting affidavit filed by
Respondent (the “Affidavit”), and the representations made
during the limited hearing by Respondent and Bar Counsel.  The
Chairman of the Hearing Committee also has fully considered
Bar Counsel’s investigative files ex parte.
II. 
FINDINGS PURSUANT TO D.C. BAR R. XI, § 12.1(c) 
AND BOARD RULE 17.5
The Hearing Committee, after full and careful consideration,
finds that:
1.
The Petition and Affidavit are full, complete, and
in proper order.
2.
Respondent is aware that there is currently
pending against him an investigation into allegations of his
conduct.
3.
The nature of the allegations that were brought to
the attention of Bar Counsel were that, in connection with Bar
Docket No. 2007-D118, Respondent failed to notify Dr. Ashkan
Aazami, a healthcare provider who provided medical services to
Respondent’s client, Ms. Terri Roberts, of the settlement of Ms.
Roberts’ claim, and failed to deliver to Dr. Aazami funds which
he was entitled to receive from the settlement.  In connection
with Bar Docket No. 2009-D051, Respondent failed to appear
at a status hearing and a show cause hearing, which resulted in
the dismissal of Ms. Janice Arkue’s civil action for want of
prosecution.
4.
Respondent has knowingly and voluntarily
acknowledged that the material facts and misconduct reflected
in the Petition are true.
5.
Respondent is agreeing to the disposition because
Respondent believes that he cannot successfully defend against
charges of misconduct based on the stipulated facts set forth in
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the Petition.
6.
Bar Counsel has made no promises to Respondent
other than what is contained in the Petition for Negotiated
Discipline.  Those promises and inducements are that Bar
Counsel will not pursue against Respondent any other
disciplinary charges that could have been brought against him in
Bar Docket No. 2007-D118 or Bar Docket No. 2009-D051. 
Respondent stated during the limited hearing that no other
promises or inducements were made to him other than those set
forth in the Petition.
7.
Respondent has conferred with his counsel.
8.
Respondent has freely and voluntarily entered into
this negotiated discipline.
9.
Respondent has not been subjected to coercion or
duress.
10.
Respondent is competent and not under the
influence of any substance or medication.
11.
Respondent is fully aware of the implications of
the disposition being entered into, including, but not limited to,
the following:
a)
he will have waived his right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses and to compel
witnesses to appear on his behalf;
b)
he will have waived his right to have Bar
Counsel prove each and every charge by
clear and convincing evidence;
c)
he will have waived his right to file
e x c e p t i o n s  
t o  
r e p o r t s  
a n d
recommendations filed with the Board and
with the Court;
d)
the negotiated disposition, if approved,
may affect his present and future ability to
practice law;
e)
the negotiated disposition, if approved,
may affect his bar memberships in other
jurisdictions; and
f)
any sworn statement by Respondent in his
affidavit may be used to impeach his
testimony if there is a subsequent hearing
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on the merits.  
g)
Respondent understands the conditions of
his probation as set forth in Paragraph 12,
below.
12.
Respondent and Bar Counsel have agreed that the
sanction in this matter should be suspension from the practice of
law for one year with six months stayed, followed by three years
of probation.  However, if a new complaint is filed against
Respondent within one year of the date of the beginning of the
period of suspension, and such complaint results in a finding
that Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct,
Respondent will be required to serve the remaining six months
of the suspension consecutively with whatever other sanction
may be imposed against him, in the new matter or matters.  The
issue of probation revocation is acknowledged by Respondent
and later clarified by the Hearing Committee at the limited
hearing, and agreed to by Respondent’s attorney and Assistant
Bar Counsel, to mean that if a new complaint is filed during
Respondent’s six month suspension and the first six months of
his probation and the Hearing Committee, the Board on
Professional Responsibility and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals find a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
then the probation will automatically be revoked without a
probation revocation hearing.
Respondent will disgorge the $5,000 attorney’s fees he
collected in connection with his representation of Ms. Roberts. 
Respondent will pay Ms. Roberts the $5,000 with interest at a
rate of 6% per annum for the period beginning April 16, 2006,
until the amount is paid to her in full.  Respondent will repay the
$5,000 plus interest within three years from the beginning of his
probation.  At the limited hearing, the parties clarified the
disgorgement requirement to mean that if Respondent makes a
partial payment of the $5,000, he will only pay interest at a rate
of 6% per annum on the remaining balance.  If Respondent fails
to provide proof that he repaid the money within the three-year
probationary period, he will be required to serve the remaining
six months of his suspension, and may be required to show
cause why he should not be subject to further discipline.
Respondent will also pay interest to Ms. Roberts, at a rate
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of 6% per annum, on the $9,340 that he has already delivered to
her for the period of April 26, 2006, through November 26,
2008, which totals $1,447.70.  Respondent will pay this interest
within three years from the beginning of his probation.  If
Respondent fails to provide proof that he repaid the money
within the three-year probationary period, he will be required to
serve the remaining six months of his suspension, and may be
required to show cause why he should not be subject to further
discipline.
Respondent will consult with the District of Columbia
Bar’s Practice Management Advisory Service (“PMAS”) and
within one month of the beginning of his probation will submit
a copy of any program or plan recommended by PMAS and
proof of compliance with such program or plan to the Office of
Bar Counsel and the Board including the submission of
quarterly reports, should PMAS appoint him a monitor.  If
Respondent fails to provide proof that he has complied with the
PMAS program or plan, he will serve the remaining six months
of his suspension, and may be required to show cause why he
should not be subjected to further discipline.
13.
Bar 
Counsel 
has 
provided 
a 
statement
demonstrating the following circumstance in aggravation, which
the Hearing Committee has taken into consideration:
Respondent was issued an Informal Admonition on November
3, 2008, for violating Rule 5.5(a), for assisting a person who
was not a member of the District of Columbia Bar in the
performance of activities that constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law.
14.
Respondent and Bar Counsel have provided the
following circumstances in mitigation which the Hearing
Committee has taken into consideration:
a)
Respondent took full responsibility for his
misconduct and demonstrated remorse;
b)
Respondent cooperated with Bar Counsel;
c)
In connection with Bar Docket No. 2007-
D118, Respondent’s misconduct was the
product of poor judgment, in that his
decision to settle the case without
obtaining 
his 
client’s 
consent 
was
motivated by the imminent expiration of
10
the statute of limitations in his client’s
claim; his failure to promptly notify and
pay Dr. Aazami or his client was based
upon his poor law office management
rather than a dishonest attempt to deprive
them of their funds; and, Respondent’s
trust account records revealed that the
balance in Respondent’s trust account
never fell below that which he owed Dr.
Aazami or his client; and
d)
In connection with Bar Docket No. 2009-
D051, Respondent’s failure to appear was
based upon poor office management rather
than a deliberate attempt to frustrate the
operations of the court.
15.
During the limited hearing, the following
additional evidence was presented by Bar Counsel and taken
into consideration: letter to Dr. Ashkan Aazami dated May 19,
2009, in Bar Docket No. 2007-D118; letter to Ms. Terri Roberts
dated May 19, 2009, in Bar Docket No. 2007-D118; and, letter
to Ms. Janice Arkue in Bar Docket No. 2009-D051.
Bar Counsel and Respondent have submitted the
following statement of relevant precedent in the Petition in
support of the agreed upon sanction:  “The Respondent’s
misappropriation in this matter is comparable to that of the
attorney in In re Haar, 698 A.2d 412 (D.C. 1997), [where] the
attorney was suspended for . . . negligent misappropriation of
entrusted funds.”  The petition asserts that Respondent engaged
in the same “special kind of misappropriation” that the attorney
in Haar did because both the Respondent and the attorney in
Haar earned the fee and had a good faith, mistaken belief that
they were authorized to take the funds.  The usual sanction for
negligent misappropriation is suspension from the practice of
law for six months.
In addition to the above negligent misappropriation cases,
the Petition cites the following cases in support of the stipulated
sanction: In re Outlaw, 917 A.2d 684 (D.C. 2007) (per curiam)
(60-day suspension for, inter alia, lack of communication with
client, neglect of client’s case resulting in the running of the
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statute of limitations and dishonesty, for the failure to notify
client of the dismissal); In re Ross, 658 A.2d 209 (D.C. 1995)
(30-day suspension for, inter alia, commingling and failure to
promptly notify and pay a third party with an interest in
entrusted funds held by attorney); In re Choroszej, [624 A.2d
434 (D.C. 1992)] (six-month suspension for negligent
misappropriation and failing to maintain complete records).
III. 
DISCUSSION
The Hearing Committee shall approve an agreed
negotiated discipline if it finds:
a)
that the attorney has knowingly and
voluntarily acknowledged the facts and
misconduct reflected in the Petition and
agreed to the sanction therein;
b) 
that the facts set forth in the Petition or as
shown during the limited hearing support
the attorney’s admission of misconduct
and the agreed upon sanction; and
c) 
that the agreed upon sanction is justified.
With regard to the first factor, this Hearing Committee
finds that Respondent has knowingly and voluntarily
acknowledged the facts and misconduct reflected in the Petition
and has agreed to the sanction therein.  Respondent, after being
placed under oath, admitted the stipulated facts and charges set
forth in the Petition and denied that he was under duress or had
been coerced into entering into this disposition.  Respondent
understands the implications and consequences of entering into
this negotiated discipline.
Respondent has acknowledged that any and all promises
that have been made to him by Bar Counsel as part of this
negotiated discipline are set forth in writing in the Petition and
that there are no other promises or inducements that have been
made to him.  Moreover, Respondent is agreeing to this
negotiated discipline because he believes that he could not
successfully defend against the misconduct described in the
Petition.
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The Hearing Committee has carefully reviewed the facts
set forth in the Petition, and we conclude that they support the
admissions of misconduct and the agreed upon sanction.
With regard to the second factor, the Petition states, in
connection with Bar Docket No. 2007-D118, that Respondent
violated Rule 1.2(a), in that Respondent failed to abide by his
client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement in a
matter.  The evidence supports Respondent’s admission that he
violated this Rule in that the stipulated facts describe that
Respondent did not discuss with Ms. Roberts GEICO’s
settlement offer or secure Ms. Roberts’ consent to accept
GEICO’s settlement offer.
Second, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.4(a), in that Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter.  The evidence supports
Respondent’s admission that he violated this Rule in that the
stipulated facts describe that Respondent agreed to settle with
GEICO on or about March 24, 2006, without discussing the
settlement offer or securing Ms. Roberts’ consent to accept the
settlement offer.  On or about April 24, 2006, Respondent
deposited the settlement check into the trust account without
notifying Ms. Roberts that the settlement funds had been
received.  On or about April 30, 2006, Respondent also
withdrew $5,000 as his attorney’s fees from the trust account
without notifying Ms. Roberts that he would be doing so.
Third, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.4(b), in that Respondent failed to explain a matter to his client
to the extent reasonably necessary for her to make an informed
decision about the matter.  The evidence supports Respondent’s
admission that he violated this Rule in that the stipulated facts
describe that the contingent fee agreement provided “attorney
agrees not to settle Client’s claims without Client’s consent.” 
Respondent did not discuss with Ms. Roberts GEICO’s
settlement offer or secure Ms. Roberts’ consent to accept
GEICO’s offer to settle the claim.
Fourth, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.4(c), in that upon receiving an offer of settlement in a civil
case, Respondent failed to inform his client promptly of the
substance of the communication.  The evidence supports
Respondent’s admission that he violated this Rule in that the
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stipulated facts describe that Respondent did not notify Ms.
Roberts that he had received funds from GEICO in settlement of
her claims.
Fifth, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.5(c), in that Respondent represented his client on a contingent
fee basis, but upon conclusion of the matter failed to timely
provide the client with a written statement stting the outcome of
the matter, the remittance to the client from the recovery or the
method of its determination.  The evidence supports
Respondent’s admission that he violated this Rule in that the
stipulated facts describe that Respondent and Ms. Roberts
entered into a contingent fee agreement.  While Respondent
deposited the $15,000 settlement check into his trust account on
or about April 24, 2006, he did not provide Ms. Roberts with a
writing that showed the disbursement from the settlement until
about November 26, 2008.
Sixth, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.15(b), in that upon receiving funds in which the client and a
third person had an interest, Respondent failed to promptly
notify and deliver to the client and third person funds they were
entitled to receive.  The evidence supports Respondent’s
admission that he violated this Rule in that the stipulated facts
describe that on or about April 24, 2006, Respondent did not
notify THFC or Ms. Roberts that he had received GEICO’s
settlement funds.  On or about September 14, 2006, THFC sent
correspondence by regular mail to Respondent, inquiring about
payment or discussion of payment options, to which Respondent
did not respond.  On or about January 24, 2007, THFC sent
further correspondence by certified mail to Respondent about
Ms. Roberts’ outstanding balance of $660.00 due February 7,
2007.  Respondent did not claim the certified mail, pay the bill,
or reply to THFC’s correspondence.  Respondent did not pay
THFC until on or about May 11, 2007.  Ms. Roberts was not
notified of the distribution amount until November 26, 2008, at
which time the funds were disbursed to her.
Seventh, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.15(c), in that by taking his fee without his client’s prior
authorization or consent, Respondent engaged in the negligent
misappropriation of entrusted funds.  The evidence supports
Respondent’s admission that he violated this Rule in that the
14
stipulated facts establish that Respondent withdrew from the
trust account $5,000 as his attorney’s fees without notifying Ms.
Roberts of the withdrawal, but that he acted based on a good-
faith belief that he was entitled to the funds under the terms of
his retainer agreement.  See In re Haar, 698 A.2d 412.
Eighth, the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule
1.15(a) and Rule XI, § 19(f), in that Respondent failed to
maintain complete records of his handling, maintaining, and
disposition of entrusted funds.  The evidence supports
Respondent’s admission that he violated this Rule in that the
stipulated facts describe that when Bar Counsel conducted its
investigation, Respondent was unable to produce records about
the disposition of funds from Ms. Roberts’ settlement.
Finally, in connection with Bar Docket No. 2009-D051,
the Petition states that Respondent violated Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.4(d), in that Respondent engaged in conduct that
seriously interferes with the administration of justice.  The
evidence supports Respondent’s admission that he violated this
Rule in that the stipulated facts describe that Respondent failed
to appear at a status hearing on October 10, 2008, or appear at
a show cause hearing on November 14, 2008, which caused the
Court to dismiss his client’s case for want of prosecution.
The third factor the Hearing Committee must consider is
whether the sanction agreed upon is justified.  Under In re
Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 192 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), the
presumptive 
sanction 
for 
intentional 
or 
reckless
misappropriation is disbarment unless the misconduct resulted
from no more than simple negligence.  Bar Counsel bears the
burden to establish the requisite level of intent.  See In re
Anderson, 778 A.2d 330, 338 (D.C. 2001) (“If [the attorney’s]
conduct was not deliberate or reckless, then Bar Counsel [has]
proved no more than simple negligence.”).  Id. at 338 (quoting
In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. 1996)).  The Court has
found negligent misappropriation where an attorney has taken
a legal fee based on a good-faith belief that he was entitled to
the fee.  See, e.g., In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381.
The parties assert that Respondent engaged in a “special
kind of [negligent] misappropriation” under Rule 1.15(c), when
he took his legal fee pursuant to the terms of the retainer
agreement with his client, but without her consent, citing In re
15
Haar, 698 A.2d 412.  The fact that Respondent took the legal
fee from a settlement that was not authorized by his client gives
us pause in accepting the parties’ stipulation that the
misappropriation was negligent.  However, given Bar Counsel’s
assertion that evidence at a contested proceeding could persuade
a trier of fact that Respondent took the fee in good faith, the fact
that Respondent did not take anything more than the fee he was
eligible to receive under the retainer, and that he did so under
circumstances strongly suggesting negligence and poor case
management, we concur in the parties’ stipulation that the
misappropriation was negligent.
Negligent misappropriation usually results in a six-month
suspension.  See, e.g., In re Edwards, 870 A.2d 90 (D.C. 2005). 
Specifically, the Court has imposed a six-month suspension for
negligent misappropriation based on the improper taking of a
legal fee based on a good-faith belief of entitlement to the fee. 
See, e.g., In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381.
In Haar, the Court imposed a 30-day suspension, instead
of the usual six months.  During a fee dispute, the client would
only pay $4,000 to the attorney.  While the attorney and client
were resolving the dispute, but before the dispute had been
formally resolved, the attorney took $4,000 from the trust
account.  Id. at 414-15.  The Court found that Haar had engaged
in a “special kind of misappropriation” where he had earned the
fee and had a good faith, mistaken belief that he was authorized
to take the funds, since the client had agreed to pay at least the
amount withdrawn.  698 A.2d at 424.  Se also In re Midlen, 885
A.2d 1280 (D.C. 2005).
Respondent’s misconduct is more similar to the attorney
in Haar who committed negligent misappropriation.  While
Respondent took the agreed upon attorney’s fees without
authorization, he did so under circumstances strongly suggesting
negligence and poor case management.  The facts do not
establish clear and convincing evidence of intentional or
reckless misappropriation.  Thus, suspension, as opposed to
disbarment, is appropriate.
We further conclude that a suspension greater than the
six-month norm for negligent misappropriation is appropriate
and find the sanction to which the parties have stipulated – a one
year suspension with six months stayed and three years’
16
probation with conditions – justified.  Respondent’s misconduct
was more aggravated than a single negligent misappropriation
in that he not only took an unauthorized fee in a case and settled
it without the client’s consent, but he also interfered in the
administration of justice in a different case by failing to appear
at a hearing, which led to a dismissal of the case.  A greater
sanction may be warranted when a disciplinary matter involves
more than negligent misappropriation.  See In re Midlen, supra
(attorney 
suspended 
for 
18 
months 
for 
negligent
misappropriation in violating Rules 1.15(a) and (c) and also
engaging in dishonesty).  Upon consideration of the entire
record in this matter including the circumstances in aggravation
and mitigation and the relevant precedent, we conclude that the
agreed upon negotiated discipline is justified.
IV. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
It is the conclusion of the Hearing Committee that the
discipline negotiated in this matter is appropriate.
For the reasons stated above, it is the recommendation of
this Hearing Committee that the negotiated discipline be
approved.
(Citations omitted and alterations in original).
In the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Bar Counsel cited the D.C. Court
of Appeals’ conclusion that Thaxton violated several District of Columbia Rules of 
17
Professional Conduct corresponding to Rules 1.2(a),  1.4(a)(2) and (3),  1.4(b),  1.5(c),  
12
13
14
15
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) provides:
12
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation
and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such
action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry
out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decision whether to settle a matter.  In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury
trial and whether the client will testify.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(a)(2) and (3) provide:
13
A lawyer shall:
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information . . . .
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(b) provides:
14
A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
We note that unlike the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, the MRPC do
not include a Rule 1.4(c), but the language of the equivalent D.C. Rule is incorporated into
Comment 2 to Maryland Rule 1.4:
[2] If these Rules require that a particular decision about the
representation be made by the client, [Rule 1.4](a)(1) requires
that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client’s
consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the
client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to
take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing
(continued...)
18
1.15(a),  1.15(d),  1.15(e),  and 8.4(d)  of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 
16
17
18
19
(...continued)
14
counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a
proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform
the client of its substance unless the client has previously
indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or
has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. 
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(c) provides:
15
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which
the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent
fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law.  A contingent fee
agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall
state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in
the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other
expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated.  The agreement must clearly notify the client of any
expenses for which the client will be responsible whether or not
the client is the prevailing party.  Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a
written statement stating the outcome of the matter, and, if there
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the
method of its determination.
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a) provides:
16
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in
a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600
of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and
maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other
property shall be identified specifically as such and
appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and
distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records
(continued...)
19
(“MRPC” or “Rule”) and requested that we issue a Show Cause Order.  On January 27, 2010,
we issued a Show Cause Order pursuant to Rule 16-773(e)  to which Bar Counsel
20
(...continued)
16
of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years
after the date the record was created.  
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(d) provides:
17
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly
a full accounting regarding such property.  
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(e) provides:
18
When a lawyer in the course of representing a client is in
possession of property in which two or more persons (one of
whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The
lawyer shall distribute promptly all portions of the property as
to which the interests are not in dispute.  
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) provides:
19
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice . . . .
Rule 16-773(e) provides:
20
(continued...)
20
responded, by stating that Respondent’s misconduct “warrant[ed] a different discipline in
Maryland from that which he received in the District of Columbia” and requested that we
order an indefinite suspension with the right to apply upon readmission to the District of
Columbia Bar.  Thaxton did not respond to the Show Cause Order and did not appear for oral
argument.
DISCUSSION
In reciprocal discipline cases, pursuant to Rule 16-773(g), we generally treat the
factual findings and conclusions of law from the original jurisdiction as conclusive evidence
of an attorney’s misconduct:
(g) Conclusive effect of adjudication. Except as provided in
subsections (e) (1) and (e) (2) of this Rule, a final adjudication
(...continued)
20
(e) Exceptional circumstances. Reciprocal discipline shall not
be ordered if Bar Counsel or the attorney demonstrates by clear
and convincing evidence that:
(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a
deprivation of due process;
(2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing
the misconduct as to give rise to a clear
conviction that the Court, consistent with its duty,
cannot accept as final the determination of
misconduct;
(3) the imposition of corresponding discipline
would result in grave injustice;
(4) the conduct established does not constitute
misconduct in this State or it warrants
substantially different discipline in this State; or
(5) the reason for inactive status no longer exists.
21
in a disciplinary or remedial proceeding by another court,
agency, or tribunal that an attorney has been guilty of
professional misconduct or is incapacitated is conclusive
evidence of that misconduct or incapacity in any proceeding
under this Chapter. The introduction of such evidence does not
preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing
additional evidence or preclude the attorney from introducing
evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline or lesser
discipline should be imposed.
See also Attorney Grievance v. Haas, 412 Md. 536, 988 A.2d 1033 (2010); Attorney
Grievance v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 669, 890 A.2d 751, 754-55 (2006). 
In the present case, Respondent admitted to misconduct amounting to negligent
misappropriation of settlement funds in one case and interference with the administration of
justice in another.  In the first case, Respondent failed to obtain his client’s consent to a
settlement, failed to notify his client when the settlement funds were received and deposited
into his escrow account, failed to timely pay his client’s doctor’s share of the settlement
funds, and failed to notify his client that he was withdrawing attorney’s fees from the
settlement funds.  In the second case, Respondent failed to appear at a status hearing and a
show cause hearing, which resulted in the dismissal of his client’s case for want of
prosecution.  These are the findings of the D.C. Court of Appeals and are further supported
by Thaxton’s own admission of wrongdoing; they are clearly violative of MRPC 1.2(a),
1.4(a)(2) and (3), 1.4(b), 1.5(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.15(e), and 8.4(d).
SANCTION
In terms of sanction, we recently explained our approach to reciprocal discipline cases
22
in Attorney Grievance v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55-58, 991 A.2d 51, 56-58 (2010):
We have often stated the well established principle that in
reciprocal discipline cases, we are prone or inclined, but not
required, to impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction
imposed.  See Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663,
671, 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Weiss,
389 Md. 531, 546, 886 A.2d 606, 615 (2005).  As we explained
in Whitehead, 390 Md. at 668, 890 A.2d at 754,  our rules state
that we may impose “corresponding discipline,” not that we
shall impose “identical discipline.”  See Rule 16-773(f).  
16
 
Rule 16-773(f) (“Action by Court of Appeals”) states that
16
we “may immediately impose corresponding discipline,” “may
enter an order designating a judge [for a hearing],” or “may
enter any other appropriate order.” (emphasis added):
Upon consideration of the petition and any answer
to the order to show cause, the Court of Appeals
may immediately impose corresponding discipline
or inactive status, may enter an order designating
a judge pursuant to Rule 16-752 to hold a hearing
in accordance with Rule 16-757, or may enter any
other appropriate order. The provisions of Rule
16-760 apply to an order under this section that
disbars or suspends an attorney or that places the
attorney on inactive status.
Our use of the words “inclined,” “prone,” “tend to,” and “often,”
explicitly indicate our reluctance to adopt a blanket rule of
reciprocity, Weiss, 389 Md. at 547, 886 A.2d at 615.  We are
required to analyze each case individually and decide whether
to deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction.  Id. at 547,
886 A.2d at 615; see also Attorney Grievance v. Scroggs, 387
Md. 238, 254, 874 A.2d 985, 995 (2005) (“We are required to
assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the
other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission.”).
We, generally, follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction
“when the purpose for the discipline in the original jurisdiction
is congruent with ours.”  Weiss, 389 Md. at 547, 886 A.2d at
23
615.  Our purpose in attorney discipline cases is the protection
of the public, rather than the punishment of the erring attorney. 
Id., citing Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg, 385 Md. 696, 703,
870 A.2d 603, 607 (2005) (other citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, we find that although most jurisdictions have the
same purpose as we do, “[w]e have recognized that the public
interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which
demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of
conduct that will not be tolerated. . . .”  Attorney Grievance v.
Sperling, 380 Md. 180, 191, 844 A.2d 397, 404 (2004)
(quotations omitted).  
Obviously, in so demonstrating, we are concerned with
what sanction a lawyer in Maryland could expect in response to
similar conduct, were it to have occurred in Maryland.  We have
consistently stated that when considering an appropriate
sanction in a reciprocal discipline case, we are duty bound to
look “not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction
but to our own cases as well.  The sanction will depend on the
unique facts and circumstances of each case, but with a view
toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct.”  Weiss,
389 Md. at 548, 886 A.2d at 616, quoting Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Parsons & Reback, 310 Md. 132, 142, 527 A.2d 325,
330 (1987).  In this regard, and in an effort to avoid inconsistent
sanctions, we need not follow the original jurisdiction’s sanction
when our cases demonstrate that we would apply a different
sanction, had the conduct occurred or the case originated here. 
Whitehead, 390 Md. at 673, 890 A.2d at 757.  “[W]e must
balance our tendency to follow the original jurisdiction’s
sanction under our reciprocal discipline doctrine, against our
prior cases and the sanctions imposed upon members of this Bar
for similar misconduct committed in this jurisdiction, always
with a view towards the protection of the public.”  Weiss, 389
Md. at 546, 886 A.2d at 614.  
All this being said, we acknowledge that there have been
cases in which we have deferred to the sanction of the original
jurisdiction, despite the different sanction we may have imposed
had the proceedings originated in this jurisdiction, see Attorney
Grievance v. Ayres-Fountain, 379 Md. 44, 58-59, 838 A.2d
1238, 1246-47 (2003) (imposing identical three year suspension
sanction as Delaware Supreme Court for the lawyer’s knowing
24
misrepresentations to that court regarding her certifications in
annual tax filings even though the sanction that may have been
imposed by this Court would not have been identical had the
conduct occurred in Maryland); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Gittens, 346 Md. 316, 327, 697 A.2d 83, 88-89 (1997)
(imposing identical indefinite suspension sanction of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals on an attorney who was
convicted of theft of client funds from his escrow account citing
that deference should be paid to the District of Columbia court). 
We have, nevertheless, also declared that we have
become “much less lenient towards any misconduct involving
theft, misappropriation, fraud, or deceit.”  Weiss, 389 Md. at
551, 886 A.2d at 617.  When attorney misconduct has been more
serious, and “when the conduct involved is of such nature that
it would not be tolerated from any member of the Bar in this
State if the conduct occurred here,” we have deviated from the
original jurisdiction’s sanction and imposed a more severe
sanction.  Id. at 551-52, 886 A.2d at 618, citing Attorney
Grievance v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 191, 193, 747 A.2d 657,
660-61 (2000) (substituting disbarment for California’s sanction
of suspension, after the attorney was convicted of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute); Attorney Grievance v.
White, 354 Md. 346, 367, 731 A.2d 447, 459 (1999) (imposing
disbarment instead of indefinite suspension for attorney’s false
testimony under oath).  See Attorney Grievance v. Beatty, 409
Md. 11, 18, 972 A.2d 840, 843-44 (2009) (imposing indefinite
suspension in a reciprocal discipline case on an attorney
convicted of fourth degree stalking in New Jersey in spite of
lesser sanction of three month suspension imposed by the
Supreme Court of that state).
(Footnote in original).
Because the sanction imposed by the D.C. Court of Appeals, a one year suspension
with six months suspended, is not within our spectrum of sanctions, we address what
discipline to impose—a six month suspension, a one year suspension, or a more serious
alternative, an indefinite suspension with the right to apply after readmittance to the D.C.
25
Bar.  We will impose an indefinite suspension.  
Our review of the D.C. Court Rules persuades us that the D.C. Court of Appeals’
Order is the functional equivalent to our sanction of indefinite suspension.  More
importantly, however, “exceptional circumstances” exist under Rule 16-773(e) as a result of
the fact that were the conduct to have occurred in Maryland, an indefinite suspension would
be imposed.
Under D.C. Bar Rule XI, disciplinary sanctions include “Suspension for an
appropriate fixed period of time not to exceed three years” and may include terms of
probation and conditions imposed upon reinstatement:
Section 3. Disciplinary sanctions.
(a) Types of discipline. -- Any of the following sanctions may
be imposed on an attorney for a disciplinary violation:
(1) Disbarment;
(2) Suspension for an appropriate fixed period of
time not to exceed three years. Any order of
suspension may include a requirement that the
attorney furnish proof of rehabilitation as a
condition of reinstatement. In the absence of such
a requirement, the attorney may resume practice
at the end of the period of suspension;
(3) Censure;
(4) Reprimand;
(5) Informal admonition;
(6) Revocation or suspension of a license to
practice as a Special Legal Consultant; or
(7) Probation for not more than three years.
Probation may be imposed in lieu of or in
addition to any other disciplinary sanction. Any
conditions of probation shall be stated in writing
in the order imposing probation. The order shall
also state whether, and to what extent, the
26
attorney shall be required to notify clients of the
probation. The Board by rule shall establish
procedures for the supervision of probation.
Violation of any condition of probation shall
make the attorney subject to revocation of
probation and the imposition of any other
disciplinary sanction listed in this subsection, but
only to the extent stated in the order imposing
probation.
(b) Conditions imposed with discipline. -- When imposing
discipline, the Court or the Board may require an attorney to
make restitution either to persons financially injured by the
attorney’s conduct or to the Clients’ Security Trust Fund (see
Rule XII), or both, as a condition of probation or of
reinstatement. The Court or the Board may also impose any
other reasonable condition, including a requirement that the
attorney take and pass a professional responsibility examination
as a condition of probation or of reinstatement.
In this case, the D.C. Court of Appeals ordered that Respondent’s suspension period of one
year with six months suspended be conditioned upon maintaining a clean disciplinary
record:
if a new complaint is filed against Respondent within one year
of the date of the beginning of the period of suspension, and
such complaint results in a finding that Respondent violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct, Respondent will be required to
serve the remaining six months of the suspension consecutively
with whatever other sanction may be imposed on him in the new
matter or matters.  
The Court also conditioned Respondent’s reinstatement upon the return of his client’s
attorney’s fees with interest prior to the expiration of this three-year probationary period. 
Respondent will not be reinstated to the D.C. Bar until the D.C. Court of Appeals finds that
he has met their conditions of discipline and satisfactorily completed the requirements of
27
probation.  
We do not have an equivalent sanction option, permitting us to place Respondent on
probation.  An indefinite suspension, as laid out in Maryland Rule 16-721, appears to be its
most appropriate equivalent:
Rule 16-721. Sanctions and remedies for misconduct or
incapacity.
(a)  Professional misconduct.  One or more of the following
sanctions or remedies may be imposed upon an attorney for
professional misconduct: 
(1) disbarment by the Court of Appeals; 
(2) suspension by the Court of Appeals; 
(3) reprimand by the Court of Appeals or, with the
attorney’s consent, by the Commission; 
(4) conditional diversion in accordance with a
Conditional Diversion Agreement entered into
pursuant to Rule 16-736; and 
(5) termination of a disciplinary or remedial
proceeding accompanied by a warning pursuant to
Rule 16-735(b). 
(b)  Incapacity.  One of the following remedies may be imposed
upon an attorney for incapacity: 
(1) placement on inactive status, subject to further
order of the Court, or 
(2) conditional diversion in accordance with a
Conditional 
Diversion 
Agreement 
entered
pursuant to Rule 16-736. 
(c)  Conditions.  An order, decision, or agreement that imposes
a disciplinary sanction upon an attorney or places an attorney on
inactive status may include one or more specified conditions, as
authorized by Rules 16-736, 16-760, and 16-781.  
See also Attorney Grievance v. Beatty, 409 Md. 11, 13-17, 972 A.2d 840, 841-43 (2009)
(imposing indefinite suspension in reciprocal discipline case when New Jersey Supreme
Court imposed three month suspension with conditions for readmission).
28
In determining the appropriate sanction, we also recognize the different framework
within which we determine the appropriate sanction in misappropriation cases were the
conduct to have occurred in Maryland, to insure consistency in our disciplinary actions.  We
have consistently stated that
when considering an appropriate sanction in a reciprocal
discipline case, we are duty bound to look “not only to the
sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction but to our own cases
as well.  The sanction will depend on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent
dispositions for similar misconduct.”
Gordon, 413 Md. at 56, 991 A.2d at 57, quoting Attorney Grievance v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531,
548, 886 A.2d 606, 616 (2005).  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance v. Cafferty, 376 Md. 700, 724,
831 A.2d 1042, 1057 (2003) (distinguishing D.C.’s “three-tiered categorization of
misappropriation misconduct” from Maryland’s two-tiered system in which we distinguish
“between the intentional misappropriation of client funds and the misappropriation of client
funds resulting from negligent or otherwise unintentional behavior”).  
In the instant case, the D.C. Hearing Committee found that  Mr. Thaxton’s misconduct
was negligent, rather than intentional:
Respondent’s misconduct was the product of poor judgment, in
that his decision to settle the case without obtaining his client’s
consent was motivated by the imminent expiration of the statute
of limitations in his client’s claim; his failure to promptly notify
and pay Dr. Aazami or his client was based upon his poor law
office management rather than a dishonest attempt to deprive
them of their funds; and, Respondent’s trust account records
revealed that the balance in Respondent’s trust account never
fell below that which he owed Dr. Aazami or his client . . . .
29
In addition, the Hearing Committee found that “Respondent’s failure to appear was based
upon poor office management rather than a deliberate attempt to frustrate the operations of
the court.”  
When there has been a finding of intentional misappropriation, we typically impose
the sanction of disbarment.  When a violation of Rule 8.4(d) has “fallen short of proof of
fraudulent intent,” however, and there is a finding that the attorney engaged in negligent
misappropriation without the clear intent to defraud clients, we have imposed a less severe
sanction.  Attorney Grievance v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 601, 911 A.2d 440, 449 (2006)
(citations omitted).
In Beatty, we held that when an indefinite suspension would be the appropriate
sanction in the case, even if the original state court allowed the Respondent to resume
practice immediately following the expiration of his suspension, “[i]t would be grave
injustice in allowing a member of this Bar to . . . be given a lesser sanction because another
jurisdiction did so, while other members of the Maryland Bar would be sanctioned more
severely.”  Beatty, 409 Md. at 18, 972 A.2d at 843-44, quoting Weiss, 389 Md. at 555, 886
A.2d at 620.  In this regard, we note that in similar cases in Maryland with Rule 8.4(d)
violations, we have imposed the sanction of an indefinite suspension.  See, e.g., Attorney
Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 872 A.2d 693 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Seiden,
373 Md. 409, 818 A.2d 1108 (2003).
In Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 341, 872 A.2d at 693, we indefinitely suspended an
30
attorney and granted him the right to reapply after thirty days after finding that his lack of
established procedures to properly maintain his trust account led to his routine failure to
deposit trust money in his trust account, failure to pay clients, medical providers, and himself
money due from personal injury settlements, and failure to notify clients and medical
providers that he was holding funds for them.  We found that Mr. Zuckerman’s actions were
negligent, rather than intentional, because “there [was] no evidence that [he] acted with an
intent to steal money,” he did not benefit personally from the misappropriation of the funds,
and “none of his clients suffered any financial loss . . . .”  Id. at 379, 872 A.2d at 716.
In Seiden, 373 Md. at 409, 818 A.2d at 1108, we reviewed the actions of an attorney
who, while acting as the representative of an estate, deposited his client’s settlement check
into his escrow account and deducted his fee without submitting a fee petition to the Orphans
Court and without his client’s written consent.  We found that Mr. Seiden “may have failed
to follow proper procedures, but his conduct did not rise to that of an intentional misuse of
his client’s funds,” because he did not have “the requisite intent to constitute intentional
misappropriation or theft,” and was neither “dishonest [n]or deceitful.”  Id. at 423, 818 A.2d
at 1116.  As a result of his negligent misappropriation, and a record “replete with mitigating
evidence” including his 24-year clean disciplinary record, remorse, and prolonged illness, 
we imposed the sanction of an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after thirty
days.  Id. at 424-25, 818 A.2d at 1117.
We conclude that because Thaxton negligently misappropriated settlement funds and
31
interfered with the administration of justice, his violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(2) and (3),
1.4(b), 1.5(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 1.15(e), and 8.4(d) of the MRPC are akin to the attorneys’
actions in Zuckerman and Seiden, thereby warranting an indefinite suspension in Maryland
with the right to apply for readmission in Maryland after reinstatement to the Bar of the
District of Columbia. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, PURSUANT
TO RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF
T H E  
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
RONNIE THAXTON.
32