Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DARIN HENDRICK

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
FILES JUNE 14, 2005 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 126371 
DARIN HENDRICK, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J.  
In this case, we consider whether the legislative 
sentencing guidelines apply to sentences imposed after a 
probation violation and whether a defendant’s conduct while 
on probation can be considered as a substantial and 
compelling reason for departure from the legislative 
sentencing guidelines. 
The legislative sentencing guidelines apply to certain 
enumerated felonies committed on or after January 1, 1999. 
MCL 777.1 et seq.; MCL 769.34(2). The language of MCL 
769.34(2) is very clear. 
It lists no exceptions. 
Thus, 
the legislative guidelines would apply to defendant’s 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
sentence, even if the sentence follows the imposition and 
revocation of probation. 
Further, MCL 771.4 states that if probation is 
revoked, the court may sentence the probationer to the same 
penalty as if probation had never been granted, but does 
not require that the same penalty be imposed. 
Thus, the 
sentencing court is not precluded from considering events 
surrounding the probation violation when sentencing the 
defendant on the original offense. 
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals1 
correctly 
held 
that 
the 
sentencing guidelines apply to sentences imposed after a 
probation violation and that acts giving rise to the 
probation 
violation 
may 
constitute 
substantial 
and 
compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines. It 
incorrectly held that the acts giving rise to the probation 
violation 
in 
this 
case 
were 
already 
considered 
in 
connection with the prior record variables and offense 
variables. 
We thus affirm in part and reverse in part the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the sentence, and 
remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 20, 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to a 
charge of attempted first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.92; 
1 261 Mich App 673; 683 NW2d 218 (2004). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant was sentenced to a five-year 
term of probation, with the first year to be served in 
jail. 
On April 9, 2001, defendant pleaded guilty to a 
charge of possession of a Molotov cocktail, MCL 750.211a. 
The trial court again sentenced him to a five-year term of 
probation, with the first year to be served in jail. 
On 
July 23, 2001, defendant was arrested yet again for 
violating the terms of his probation by possessing a 
shotgun while walking on a public street. 
On 
August 
23, 
2001, 
the 
trial 
court 
revoked 
defendant’s two probationary sentences and sentenced him to 
one to five years of imprisonment for the attempted home 
invasion and ten to twenty years of imprisonment for 
possession 
of 
a 
Molotov 
cocktail. 
The 
legislative 
sentencing guidelines range for the Molotov cocktail 
conviction was twelve to forty-eight months in prison, thus 
making defendant’s ten-year minimum sentence a departure if 
the guidelines applied. 
The trial court, however, did not 
believe that the guidelines applied to sentences imposed 
after probation violation. 
Accordingly, it did not apply 
the guidelines in determining defendant’s sentence. 
The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 
In lieu 
of granting leave to appeal, we remanded this case to the 
Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted and 
directed it to consider (1) whether the legislative 
3  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
sentencing guidelines apply to sentences imposed after a 
probation violation, and (2) if not, whether a sentencing 
court may consider the principles of proportionality 
discussed in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 
(1990).2 
The Court of Appeals held that the legislative 
sentencing guidelines were indeed applicable to sentences 
imposed after probation revocation. 
The panel further 
noted that in “exceptional cases,” the circumstances 
causing 
the 
probation 
revocation 
could 
constitute 
a 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” 
reason 
for 
an 
upward 
departure. The Court of Appeals, however, remanded for 
resentencing, concluding that the reasons articulated by 
the trial court were not “substantial and compelling.” 
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal, contending that 
the legislative sentencing guidelines do not apply to 
sentences imposed after a probation violation. 
In the 
alternative, the prosecution argued that if the guidelines 
were applicable, the conduct constituting the probation 
violation provided an automatic substantial and compelling 
reason for departure from the guidelines. 
2 468 Mich 918 (2003). 
4  
 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                 
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to 
appeal.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the legislative sentencing guidelines apply to 
sentences imposed after probation revocation is a question 
of law that we review de novo. People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 
466, 471; 620 NW2d 13 (2000). 
Similarly, whether conduct 
resulting in the revocation of probation may constitute a 
“substantial and compelling” reason for an upward departure 
from the legislative sentencing guidelines is also a 
question of law subject to review de novo. Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The legislative sentencing guidelines apply to sentences
imposed after probation revocation. 
The legislative sentencing guidelines apply to certain 
enumerated felonies committed on or after January 1, 1999. 
MCL 777.1 et seq.; MCL 769.34(2).4
 It is undisputed that 
the guidelines apply to the felonies defendant committed in 
this case—possession of a Molotov cocktail and attempted 
3 471 Mich 914 (2004). 
4 MCL 769.34(2) provides, in relevant part, that “the
minimum sentence imposed by a court of this state for a
felony enumerated in part 2 of chapter XVII committed on or
after January 1, 1999 shall be within the appropriate
sentence range under the version of those sentencing
guidelines in effect on the date the crime was committed.” 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
home invasion. It is also undisputed that defendant’s 
underlying crimes were committed after January 1, 1999. 
Thus, the legislative sentencing guidelines apply, even if 
the sentence follows the imposition and revocation of 
probation, because the language of MCL 769.34(2) is clear 
and lists no exceptions. We therefore agree with the Court 
of Appeals that the guidelines apply to all enumerated 
felonies committed on or after the effective date, whether 
or not the sentence is imposed after probation revocation.5 
B. The act giving rise to the probation violation may
provide a substantial and compelling reason to depart from
the legislative sentencing guidelines. 
MCL 771.4, which governs probation and revocation of 
probation, states: 
It is the intent of the legislature that the
granting of probation is a matter of grace
conferring no vested right to its continuance. If
during the probation period the sentencing court
determines that the probationer is likely again
to engage in an offensive or criminal course of
conduct 
or 
that 
the 
public 
good 
requires
revocation of probation, the court may revoke 
probation. All probation orders are revocable in
any manner the court that imposed probation 
considers applicable either for a violation or
attempted violation of a probation condition or
for any other type of antisocial conduct or 
action on the probationer's part for which the
court determines that revocation is proper in the
public interest. Hearings on the revocation shall
be summary and informal and not subject to the 
5 
The 
judicially 
created 
sentencing 
guidelines,
however, do not apply to probation revocation cases. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
rules of evidence or of pleadings applicable in
criminal trials. In its probation order or by
general rule, the court may provide for the 
apprehension, detention, and confinement of a 
probationer accused of violating a probation
condition or conduct inconsistent with the public
good. The method of hearing and presentation of
charges are within the court's discretion, except
that the probationer is entitled to a written
copy of the charges constituting the claim that
he or she violated probation and to a probation
revocation hearing. The court may investigate and
enter a disposition of the probationer as the
court determines best serves the public interest.
If a probation order is revoked, the court 
may
sentence the probationer in the same manner and
to the same penalty as the court might have done 
if the probation order had never been made. This 
section does not apply to a juvenile placed on
probation and committed under section 1(3) or (4)
of chapter IX to an institution or agency
described in the youth rehabilitation services
act, 1974 PA 150, MCL 803.301 to 803.309. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The sentence at issue in MCL 771.4 is clearly 
permissive, not mandatory. It states that “if” probation is 
revoked, the court “may” sentence the defendant as if 
probation had never been granted. While the sentencing 
court may sentence the probationer in the same manner and 
to the same penalty, nothing in the statute requires it to 
do so. 
In fact, the statute places an affirmative 
obligation on the trial court to take only two actions—to 
provide the probationer with a written copy of the charges 
constituting the probation violation and to conduct a 
probation revocation hearing. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the court may continue, extend, or revoke 
probation. 
In 
the 
event 
that 
the 
court 
revokes 
a 
defendant’s probation, it may sentence the defendant “in 
the same manner and to the same penalty as the court might 
have done if the probation order had never been made.” A 
judge, however, is not required to sentence the defendant 
“in the same manner.”6 
Further, 
the 
Legislature 
did 
not 
alter 
our 
jurisprudence on probation in the statutory codification of 
sentencing guidelines.7  That is, a probation violation does 
“not constitute a separate felony . . . .” 
Id. at 482. 
Rather, “revocation of probation simply clears the way for 
a resentencing on the original offense.”8  Defendant here is 
thus being sentenced on the original offense—possession of 
a Molotov cocktail. Without a mandate to impose a sentence 
6 MCL 771.7(1), which deals with revocation of 
probation for a juvenile following certain convictions,
specifically requires a trial court to “order the juvenile
committed to the department of corrections for a term of
years that does not exceed the penalty that could have been
imposed for the offense for which the juvenile was 
originally convicted and placed on probation.” 
(Emphasis
added.) 
The Legislature could have incorporated similar 
language in MCL 771.4 if it intended to preclude the trial
court from sentencing adult probationers to a term of years
that exceeds the penalty that could have originally been
imposed, but it did not do so. 
7 People v Kaczmarek, 464 Mich 478, 482; 628 NW2d 484
(2001). 
8 Id. at 483. 
8  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
on the probationer in the same manner and to the same 
penalty that could have been imposed if the probation order 
had never been made, it is perfectly acceptable to consider 
postprobation factors in determining whether substantial 
and compelling reasons exist to warrant an upward departure 
from the legislative sentencing guidelines.9 
Of 
course, 
not 
every 
probation 
violation 
and 
revocation warrants an upward departure. A trial court has 
broad latitude in deciding whether to revoke probation. It 
has less latitude in imposing a sentence in excess of the 
guidelines. 
The sentencing court must always follow the 
requirements set forth in MCL 769.34, as interpreted in 
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). 
MCL 769.34(3) permits a court to “depart from the 
appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing 
guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and 
compelling reason for that departure and states on the 
record the reasons for departure.” 
Babcock defines a 
“substantial 
and 
compelling” 
reason 
as 
requiring 
an 
9 We recognize that in Kaczmarek, supra at 483, we
noted that “‘[i]f a judge finds that a probationer violated
his probation by committing an offense, the probationer is
neither burdened with a new conviction nor exposed to
punishment other than that to which he was already exposed
. . . .’” 
(Citation omitted.)  The issue in Kaczmarek,
however, was whether a probation violation is a “crime”; it 
was not, as it is in this case, how a defendant should be
sentenced after violating probation. 
9  
 
 
                                                 
 
objective 
and 
verifiable 
reason 
that 
“keenly” 
or 
"irresistibly" grabs the court’s attention and is of 
"considerable worth." 
Moreover, Babcock requires that the 
“substantial and compelling” reasons articulated by the 
trial court justify that particular departure. 
The Court 
of Appeals held that the trial court’s reasons for 
departing 
from 
the 
sentencing 
guidelines 
were 
not 
substantial and compelling because they were already 
considered when scoring the prior record variables and 
offense variables. 
C. Application of Babcock to defendant’s postprobation 
violation sentence. 
Although the trial court considered several reasons 
for 
its 
upward 
departure, 
it 
did 
not 
sufficiently 
articulate its reasons on the record, because it believed 
that Babcock did not apply to sentences imposed after 
revocation of probation. Some of the trial court’s reasons 
were already considered in scoring the prior record 
variables and offense variables.10
 Some of the trial 
10 The trial court referred to defendant’s prior
criminal history and recidivist history as factors to 
support defendant’s sentence. These factors, however, were
included in the scoring of the prior record variables and
offense variables and, thus, were insufficient to support
an upward departure absent a finding by the trial court
that the factors were given inadequate weight when scored.
MCL 769.34(3)(b). 
The trial court did not believe the 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
court’s reasons, however, were not considered in connection 
with the prior record variables and offense variables, such 
as defendant’s intent to explode the Molotov cocktail in 
order to harm his sister. Further, the trial court did not 
consider 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
defendant’s 
probation violation–defendant’s possession of a shotgun 
while walking down the street near his sister’s home–in 
scoring the variables. 
The Court of Appeals erroneously implied that all of 
defendant’s conduct noted by the trial court was considered 
in 
scoring 
the 
prior 
record 
variables 
and 
offense 
variables. 
Because of this erroneous conclusion and 
because the trial court did not apply the legislative 
sentencing guidelines in imposing defendant’s sentence, we 
remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. Upon 
resentencing, the trial court may consider whether the 
conduct 
underlying 
defendant’s 
probation 
violation 
constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart 
from the legislative sentencing guidelines. 
legislative sentencing guidelines applied to sentences 
imposed after revocation of probation and, thus, did not
deem it necessary to state that the above factors were
given inadequate weight. 
To the extent that the trial 
court 
failed 
to 
apply 
the 
guidelines 
when 
imposing
defendant’s sentence, it erred. 
11  
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
The 
legislative 
sentencing 
guidelines 
apply 
to 
sentences imposed after probation revocation. 
Thus, 
defendant 
is 
entitled 
to 
be 
resentenced 
under 
the 
legislative sentencing guidelines. 
Further, a defendant’s 
conduct 
while 
on 
probation 
can 
be 
considered 
as 
a 
substantial and compelling reason for departure from the 
legislative sentencing guidelines. Defendant’s sentence is 
thus vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
12