Title: ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 4174 P.3d 1270Case Number: 06-246Decided: 01/14/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

ANDREW 
JOHN YELLOWBEAR, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofHot SpringsCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Delicath.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of two counts of felony murder, and two counts of being an accessory 
to felony murder, all based upon the physical abuse and death of his 
daughter.  In this appeal, he 
questions whether the State of Wyoming had jurisdiction to prosecute him, 
whether the jury was properly instructed, and whether the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during rebuttal closing argument.  We affirm, but remand for amendment of 
the Judgment and Sentence.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the crime occur in "Indian 
country," as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, thereby depriving 
the State of Wyoming of jurisdiction over the 
appellant?

 
 
           
2.   Did the district 
court commit reversible error by instructing the jury as to a parent's duty to 
protect his or her child?

 
 
           
3.   Did the prosecutor 
commit misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by inserting his own 
credibility and beliefs, by arguing facts not in evidence, and by presenting an 
argument that was not properly a rebuttal argument?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      When she died on 
July 2, 2004, Marcella1 Hope Yellowbear was the 
twenty-two-month-old daughter of the appellant and Macalia Blackburn.  Marcella lived with her parents and two 
siblings in Riverton, 
Wyoming.  On the night Marcella died, the 
appellant telephoned the emergency room of RivertonMemorialHospital and reported that Blackburn was bringing their daughter, who was not 
breathing, to the hospital.  Very 
soon after mother and daughter arrived, hospital staff determined that the 
infant was deceased.

 
 
[¶4]      Given the nature 
and extent of Marcella's injuries, the hospital staff suspected child abuse. 
 An autopsy performed the following 
day revealed almost innumerable abrasions, wounds, burns, and broken bones.  The cause of Marcella's death was 
determined to be "repetitive, abusive, blunt-force injuries."  The manner of death was determined to be 
homicide.

 
 
[¶5]      After a 
preliminary investigation, including interviews of Blackburn and the appellant, both were arrested and 
charged with felony murder.  The 
appellant eventually was convicted of two counts of felony murder and two counts 
of accessory before the fact to felony murder.  He was tried on four counts, rather than 
one, as a result of a series of defense motions and court rulings that will be 
discussed infra.  The State sought the death penalty, but 
the appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
 Blackburn entered into a plea 
agreement with the State whereby she pled guilty to an amended count of 
accessory before the fact to second-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 6-1-201(a) and 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2007), and whereby she agreed to 
testify in the appellant's case.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the crime occur in "Indian country," as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
1151, thereby depriving the State of Wyoming of jurisdiction over the 
appellant?

 
 
[¶6]      The question of 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.  Messer v. State, 2004 WY 98, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 12, 15 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
specific question of whether the scene of the crime in this case was under the 
jurisdiction of the United States or the jurisdiction of the State of Wyoming is also a 
question of law to be reviewed de 
novo.  State v. Moss, 471 P.2d 333, 334 
(Wyo. 
1970).

 
 
[¶7]      The Wind River 
Indian Reservation lies in north-central Wyoming. The Reservation was established by a 
treaty between the United 
States and the Shoshone and Bannock Tribes, 
concluded in 1868 and ratified in 1869.  
15 Stat. 673 (July 3, 1868).  
Today, the Reservation is inhabited by the Eastern Shoshone and Northern 
Arapaho Tribes.  The appellant and 
Blackburn are both enrolled members of the 
Northern Arapaho Tribe, as was their daughter Marcella.

 
 
[¶8]      Marcella was 
killed in Riverton, 
Wyoming.  The City of Riverton lies within the 
original external boundaries of the Reservation.  The question before the Court is whether 
the place Marcella was killed remains "Indian country," and therefore subject to 
federal jurisdiction, or whether the Reservation has been "diminished" since the 
treaty, so as to allow the exercise of Wyoming state court jurisdiction.  Resolution of that issue requires a 
review of the post-treaty history of the Reservation, as well as review of the 
federal jurisprudence that has developed concerning federal and state 
jurisdiction in "diminished" reservations.  
Seymour v. Superintendent of  Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 353, 
82 S. Ct. 424, 426, 7 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1962).

 
 
[¶9]      The question of 
jurisdiction for the prosecution of criminal offenses on Indian reservations 
arose in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030 
(1883), overruled in part on other 
grounds by State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D. 426, 113 N.W. 374 (N.D. 1907).  The United States Supreme Court held 
that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a murder 
occurring in Indian country.  
Id., 109 U.S.  at 572, 
3 S.Ct. at 407.  Congress 
responded by passing the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq., granting the 
United 
States exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute 
Indians for major crimes in "Indian country."  See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383, 
6 S.Ct. 1109, 1113, 30 L. Ed. 228 (1886); Keeble v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 205, 209, 
93 S. Ct. 1993, 1996, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973).

 
 
[¶10]   18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000) provides in 
pertinent part that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the 
general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in 
any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, 
except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country."  In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) 
defines the term "Indian country" as it relates to the present controversy as 
follows:

 
 
(a) 
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation.

 
 
[¶11]   As the people of the 
United States moved ever-westward across the 
continent, increasing numbers of native tribes were displaced from their 
ancestral grounds in the early to mid-nineteenth century and eventually were 
"settled" on reservations.  
Population increases and westward movement continued, however, and by the 
late nineteenth century, the federal government changed its policies toward the 
tribes and toward reservations.  The 
General Allotment Act of 1887 permitted the federal government to allot tracts 
of reservation land to individual tribal members and, with tribal consent, to 
sell the surplus lands to non-Indian settlers.  Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 
388 (1887).  This policy reflected a 
broader attitudinal change:

 
 
Within 
a generation or two, it was thought, the tribes would dissolve, their 
reservations would disappear, and individual Indians would be absorbed into the 
larger community of white settlers.  
See Hearings on H.R. 7902 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 428 (1934) (statement of D.S. Otis on the history of the 
allotment policy).

 
 

South 
Dakota 
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 
522 U.S. 329, 335, 118 S. Ct. 789, 794, 
139 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1998).

 
 
[¶12]   Developments on the Wind River 
Indian Reservation followed the national pattern.  Article 11 of the 1868 treaty had 
provided as follows:

 
 
            
No treaty for the cession of any portion of the reservations herein 
described which may be held in common shall be of any force or validity as 
against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least a majority of 
all the adult male Indians occupying or interested in the same; and no cession 
by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive 
without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his right to any 
tract of land selected by him, as provided in Article 6 of this 
treaty.

 
 
[¶13]   In 1904, James McLaughlin, United 
States Indian Inspector for the Reservation, negotiated a new treaty with the 
Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes.  That 
treaty was ratified, as amended, by the Surplus Land Act of 1905, ch. 1452, 33 
Stat. 1016 (1905).  Because it is 
the focus of this controversy, we will set it forth in its entirety as it was 
ratified:

 
 
ARTICLE 
I.  The said Indians belonging on 
the Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, for the consideration 
hereinafter named, do hereby cede, grant, and relinquish to the 
United States, all right, title, and interest which they may have to all 
the lands embraced within the said reservation, except the lands within and 
bounded by the following described lines:  
Beginning in the midchannel of the Big Wind River at a point where said 
stream crosses the western boundary of the said reservation; thence in a 
southeasterly direction following the midchannel of the Big Wind River to its 
conjunction with the Little Wind or Big Popo-Agie River, near the northeast 
corner of township one south, range four east; thence up the midchannel of the 
said Big Popo-Agie River in a southwesterly direction to the mouth of the North 
Fork of the said Big Popo-Agie River to its intersection with the southern 
boundary of the said reservation, near the southwest corner of section 
twenty-one, township two south, range one west; thence due west along the said 
southern boundary of the said reservation to the southwest corner of the same; 
thence north along the western boundary of said reservation to the place of 
beginning:  Provided, That any individual Indian, a 
member of the Shoshone or Arapahoe tribes, who has, under existing laws or 
treaty stipulations, selected a tract of land within the portion of said 
reservation hereby ceded, shall be entitled to have the same allotted and 
confirmed to him or her, and any Indian who has made or received an allotment of 
land within the ceded territory shall have the right to surrender such allotment 
and select other lands within the diminished reserve in lieu thereof 
at any time before the lands hereby ceded shall be opened for 
entry.

 
 
ARTICLE 
II.  In consideration of the lands 
ceded, granted, relinquished, and 
conveyed by Article I of this agreement, the United States stipulates 
and agrees to dispose of the same, as hereinafter provided, under the provisions 
of the homestead, town-site, coal and mineral land laws, or by sale for cash, as 
hereinafter provided, at the following prices per acre:  All lands entered under the homestead 
law within two years after the same shall be opened for entry shall be paid for 
at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents per acre; after the expiration of this 
period, two years, all lands entered under the homestead law within three years 
therefrom shall be paid for at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per 
acre; that all homestead entrymen who shall make entry of the lands herein ceded 
within two years after the opening of the same to entry shall pay one dollar and 
fifty cents per acre for the land embraced in their entry, and for all of the 
said lands thereafter entered under the homestead law the sum of one dollar and 
twenty-five cents per acre shall be paid; payment in all cases to be made as 
follows:  Fifty cents per acre at 
the time of making entry and twenty-five cents per acre each year thereafter 
until the price per acre hereinbefore provided shall have been fully paid; that 
lands entered under the town-site, coal and mineral land laws shall be paid for 
in an amount and manner as provided by said laws; and in case any entryman fails 
to make the payments herein provided for, or any of them, within the time 
stated, all rights of the said entryman to the lands covered by his or her entry 
shall at once cease and any payments therebefore made shall be forfeited and the 
entry shall be held for cancellation and canceled, and all lands, except mineral 
and coal lands herein ceded, remaining undisposed of at the expiration of five 
years from the opening of said lands to entry shall be sold to the highest 
bidder for cash, at not less than one dollar per acre, under rules and 
regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior;  And provided, That nothing herein contained 
shall impair the rights under the lease to Asmus Boysen, which has been approved 
by the Secretary of the Interior; but said lessee shall have for thirty days 
from the date of the approval of the surveys of said land a preferential right 
to locate, following the Government surveys, not to exceed six hundred and forty 
acres in the form of a square, of mineral or coal lands in said reservation; 
that said Boysen at the time of entry of such lands shall pay cash therefore at 
the rate of ten dollars per acre and surrender said lease and the same shall be 
canceled; Provided further, That any 
lands remaining unsold eight years after the said lands shall have been opened 
to entry may be sold to the highest bidder for cash without regard to the above 
minimum limit of price; that lands disposed of under the town-site, coal and 
mineral land laws shall be paid for at the prices provided for by law, and the 
United States agrees to pay the said Indians the proceeds derived from the sales 
of said lands, the amount so realized to be paid to and expended for said 
Indians in the manner hereinafter provided.

 
 
ARTICLE 
III.  It is further agreed that of 
the amount to be derived from the sale of said lands, as stipulated in Article 
II of this agreement, the sum of eighty-five thousand dollars shall be devoted 
to making a per capita payment to the said Indians of fifty dollars each in cash 
within sixty days after the opening of the ceded lands to settlement, or as soon 
thereafter as such sum shall be available; And provided further, That upon the 
completion of the said fifty dollars per capita payment any balance remaining in 
the said fund of eighty-five thousand dollars shall at once become available and 
shall be devoted to surveying, platting, making of maps, payment of the fees, 
and the performance of such acts as are required by the statutes of the State of 
Wyoming in securing water rights from said State for the irrigation of such 
lands as shall remain the property of said Indians, whether located within the 
territory intended to be ceded by this agreement or within the diminished 
reserve.

 
 
ARTICLE 
IV.  It is further agreed that of 
the moneys derived from the sale of said lands the sum of one hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be expended 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the construction and 
extension of an irrigation system within the diminished reservation for the 
irrigation of the lands of the said Indians; Provided, That in the employment of 
persons for the construction, enlargement, repair and management of such 
irrigation system, members of the said Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes shall be 
employed wherever practicable.

 
 
ARTICLE 
V.  It is agreed that at least fifty 
thousand dollars of the moneys derived from the sale of the ceded lands shall be 
expended, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in the purchase 
of live stock for issue to said Indians, to be distributed as equally as 
possible among the men, women and children of the Shoshone or Wind River 
Reservation.

 
 
ARTICLE 
VI.  It is further agreed that the 
sum of fifty thousand dollars of the moneys derived from the sales of said ceded 
lands shall be set aside as a school fund, the principal and interest on which 
at four per centum per annum shall be expended under the direction of the 
Secretary of the Interior for the erection of school buildings and maintenance 
of schools on the diminished reservation, which 
schools shall be under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the 
Interior.

 
 
ARTICLE 
VII.  It is further agreed that all 
the moneys received in payment for the lands hereby ceded and relinquished, not 
set aside as required for the various specific purposes and uses herein provided 
for, shall constitute a general welfare and improvement fund, the interest on 
which at four per centum per annum shall be annually expended under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the said Indians; 
the same to be expended for such purposes and in the purchase of such articles 
as the Indians in council may decide upon and the Secretary of the Interior 
approve; Provided, however, That a 
reasonable amount of the principal of said fund may also be expended each year 
for the erection, repair and maintenance of bridges needed on the reservation, 
in the subsistence of indigent and infirm persons belonging on the reservation, 
or for such other purposes for the comfort, benefit, improvement, or education 
of said Indians as the Indians in council may direct and the Secretary of the 
Interior approve.  And it is further 
agreed that an accounting shall be made to said Indians in the month of July in 
each year until the lands are fully paid for, and the funds hereinbefore 
referred to shall, for the period of ten years after the opening of the lands 
herein ceded to settlement, be used in the manner and for the purposes herein 
provided, and the future disposition of the balance of said funds remaining on 
hand shall then be the subject of further agreement between the United States 
and the said Indians.

 
 
ARTICLE 
VIII.  It is further agreed that the 
proceeds received from the sales of said lands, in conformity with the 
provisions of this agreement, shall be paid into the Treasury of the 
United 
States and paid to the Indians belonging on the 
Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, or expended on their account only as 
provided in this agreement.

 
 
ARTICLE 
IX.  It is understood that nothing 
in this agreement contained shall in any manner bind the United States to 
purchase any portion of the lands herein described or to dispose of said lands 
except as provided herein, or to guarantee to find purchasers for said lands or 
any portion thereof, it being the understanding that the United States shall act 
as trustee for said Indians to dispose of said lands and to expend for said 
Indians and pay over to them the proceeds received from the sale thereof only as 
received, as herein provided.

SEC. 
2  That the lands ceded to the 
United States under the said agreement shall be disposed of under the provisions 
of the homestead, town-site, coal and mineral land laws of the United States and 
shall be opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President of the 
United States on June fifteenth, nineteen hundred and six, which proclamation 
shall prescribe the manner in which these lands may be settled upon, occupied, 
and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof, and no person shall be 
permitted to settle upon, occupy, and enter said lands except as prescribed in 
said proclamation until after the expiration of sixty days from the time when 
the same are opened to settlement and entry, and the rights of honorably 
discharged Union soldiers and sailors of the late civil and of the Spanish wars, 
as defined and described in sections twenty-three hundred and four and 
twenty-three hundred and five of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as 
amended by the Act of March first, nineteen hundred and one, shall not be 
abridged.

            
All homestead entrymen who shall make entry of the lands herein ceded 
within two years after the opening of the same to entry shall pay one dollar and 
fifty cents per acre for the land embraced in their entry, and for all of the 
said lands thereafter entered under the homestead law the sum of one dollar and 
twenty-five cents per acre shall be paid, payment in all cases to be made as 
follows:  Fifty cents per acre at 
the time of making entry and twenty-five cents per acre each year thereafter 
until the price per acre hereinbefore provided shall have been fully paid.  Upon all entries the usual fees and 
commissions shall be paid as provided for in homestead entries on lands the 
price of which is one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.  Lands entered under the town-site, coal, 
and mineral land laws shall be paid for in amount and manner as provided by said 
laws.  Notice of location of all 
mineral entries shall be filed in the local land office of the district in which 
the lands covered by the location are situated, and unless entry and payment 
shall be made within three years from the date of location all rights thereunder 
shall cease; and in case any entryman fails to make the payments herein provided 
for, or any of them, within the time stated, all rights of the said entryman to 
the lands covered by his or her entry shall cease, and any payments therebefore 
made shall be forfeited, and the entry shall be held for cancellation and 
canceled; that nothing in this Act shall prevent homestead settlers from 
commuting their entries under section twenty-three hundred and one of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States by paying for the land entered the price 
fixed herein; that all lands, except mineral and coal lands, herein ceded 
remaining undisposed of at the expiration of five years from the opening of said 
lands to entry shall be sold to the highest bidder for cash at not less than one 
dollar per acre under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of 
the Interior; Provided, That any 
lands remaining unsold eight years after the said lands shall have been opened 
to entry may be sold to the highest bidder for cash without regard to the above 
minimum limit of price.

            
SEC. 3.  That there is hereby 
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not 
otherwise appropriated, the sum of eighty-five thousand dollars to make the per 
capita payment provided in article three of the agreement herein ratified, the 
same to be reimbursed from the first money received from the sale of the lands 
herein ceded and relinquished.  And 
the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 
is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States 
not otherwise appropriated, the same to be reimbursed from the proceeds of the 
sale of said lands, for the survey and field and office examination of the 
unsurveyed portion of the ceded lands, and the survey and marking of the 
outboundaries of the diminished reservation, where the 
same is not a natural water boundary; and the sum of twenty-five thousand 
dollars is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury of the United 
States not otherwise appropriated, the same to be reimbursed from the proceeds 
of the sale of said lands, to be used in the construction and extension of an 
irrigation system on the diminished reservation, as provided 
in article four of the agreement.

 
 
ARTICLE 
X.  It is further understood that 
nothing in this agreement shall be construed to deprive the said Indians of the 
Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, of any benefits to which they are 
entitled under existing treaties or agreements, not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this agreement.

 
 
ARTICLE 
XI.  This agreement shall take 
effect and be in force when signed by U.S. Indian Inspector James McLaughlin and 
by a majority of the male adult Indians parties hereto, and when accepted and 
ratified by the Congress of the United 
States.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added in bold italics.)  It is 
uncontested that the City of Riverton lies north of the Big Wind River on 
land that was ceded in the 1905 Act.

 
 
[¶14]   The pivotal question in cases such 
as this is whether the federal government or the state government has 
jurisdiction to prosecute the criminal offense.  In a long series of cases, the United 
States Supreme Court has fashioned a process for determining whether a surplus 
land act intended to diminish a reservation or simply intended to allow 
non-Indians to settle within an established reservation.  In the former situation, the state 
government gains jurisdiction in the ceded area, while in the latter situation, 
jurisdiction remains with the federal government.  Our task now is to determine what intent 
the 1905 Act quoted above had as to the ceded lands of the Wind River Indian 
Reservation.  A review of Supreme 
Court precedent will place our case in perspective and help answer that 
question.

 
 
[¶15]   The Colville Indian Reservation in 
Washington, 
created in 1872, was diminished by an act of Congress in 1892, providing that 
the northern half of the reservation would be "vacated and restored to the 
public domain."  In 1906, a 
subsequent act of Congress allotted a parcel of the diminished reservation to 
each member of the Colville tribe, and opened 
the remainder of the diminished reservation for settlement under the homestead 
laws.  Seymour, 368 U.S.  at 354-55, 
82 S. Ct.  at 426-27.  Years later, a 
tribal member, Paul Seymour, was convicted in state court of an attempted 
burglary that occurred on unallotted land in the diminished area of the 
reservation.  Id., 368 U.S.  at 352, 82 S. Ct.  at 425.  In federal habeas corpus proceedings, 
the Supreme Court looked to the definition of "Indian country" found in 18 
U.S.C. § 1151, and found that the 1906 Act did not dissolve the reservation 
because, unlike the 1892 Act, it did not expressly vacate the land and restore 
it to the public domain.  Rather, 
the Court concluded that the Act "did no more than open the way for non-Indian 
settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal 
Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as 
beneficial to the development of its wards."  Id., 368 U.S.  at 356, 82 S. Ct.  at 427.

 
 
[¶16]   An 1891 executive order expanded 
the Hoopa Valley Reservation in California to include the previously 
established Klamath River Reservation.  
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 493, 93 S. Ct. 2245, 2252, 
37 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1973).  A year later, 
Congress opened the land that had been the Klamath River Reservation to 
settlement.  Id., 412 U.S.  at 494-95, 
93 S. Ct.  at 2253.  The Act of 1892 
also allowed tribal members to receive individual allotments of land, and it 
provided that the federal government would use the land sale proceeds for the 
"maintenance and education" of the tribal members.  Id., 412 U.S.  at 495, 93 S. Ct.  at 2253.  This case arose when 
Raymond Mattz, a member of the Klamath tribe, was prosecuted by the State of 
California for 
a fishing violation that occurred on unallotted land in what had been the 
Klamath River Reservation.  Mattz 
defended on the ground that the area was "Indian country" over which the state 
had no jurisdiction.  Id., 412 U.S.  at 484, 93 S. Ct.  at 2248.  Relying once again on the definition of 
"Indian country" found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the Supreme Court determined that 
the 1892 Act did not terminate the reservation because it did not do so 
expressly on its face, and such intent was not clear from the surrounding 
circumstances or legislative history.  
Id., 412 U.S.  at 505, 93 S. Ct.  at 2258.  Consequently, the 
land remained "Indian country."

 
 
[¶17]   Two years after Mattz, the Supreme Court examined very 
different legislative language in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S. Ct. 1082, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1975).  The Lake Traverse Indian Reservation was 
created in present-day South Dakota in 1867 by 
a treaty between the United States and the Sisseton-Wahpeton tribe. 
Id., 
420 U.S.  at 426, 95 S. Ct.  at 1084.  In 1891, Congress ratified a treaty 
whereby the tribe agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the 
United States all the unallotted land within the 
reservation remaining after the allotments[,]" in exchange for $2.50 per acre 
ceded.  Id., 420 U.S.  at 436-37, 95 S. Ct.  at 1088-89.  When state authorities removed Cheryl 
DeCoteau's children from her home for alleged neglect, the subsequent habeas 
corpus proceedings once again raised the jurisdictional issue.  In DeCoteau, the Supreme Court 
distinguished Seymour and Mattz, found that the treaty at issue 
was a negotiated agreement providing a sum certain payment, and found that its 
language was "precisely suited" to disestablishment.  Id., 420 U.S.  at 447-48, 
95 S. Ct.  at 1094-95.  In reaching 
that conclusion, the Supreme Court found the treaty's language comparable to the 
following language from other agreements:

 
 
"cede, 
relinquish, and forever and absolutely surrender to the United States 
all their claim, title and interest of every kind and character . . . 
."

 
 
"cede, 
relinquish and surrender, forever and absolutely, to the United States, 
all their claim, title and interest of every kind and character . . . 
."

 
 
"cede, 
convey, transfer, relinquish, and surrender forever and absolutely, without any 
reservation whatever, express or implied, all their claim, title, and interest 
of every kind and character . . . ."

 
 
"cede, 
grant, relinquish, and quitclaim to the United 
States all right, 
title, and claim which they now have, or ever had . . . ."

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
"cede, 
sell, and relinquish to the United 
States all their right, title, 
and interest . . . ."

 
 
"agree 
to dispose of and sell to the Government of the United States, 
for certain considerations hereinafter mentioned . . . ."

 
 

Id., 
420 U.S.  at 439 n.22, 95 S. Ct.  at 1090 
n.22.

 
 
[¶18]   The Rosebud Reservation was created 
in South Dakota in 1889.  
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
430 U.S. 584, 589, 97 S. Ct. 1361, 1364, 
51 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1977).  In 1904, 
Congress ratified a treaty under which the tribe would "cede, surrender, grant, 
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in 
and to" a specified portion of the reservation.  Id., 430 U.S.  at 597, 97 S. Ct.  at 1368.  The United States 
opened the ceded lands to settlement, and acted as trustee for the tribe in 
selling those lands, but did not guarantee that it would find buyers, or promise 
that the tribe would receive a specific amount of compensation in return.  Id., 430 U.S.  at 596, 97 S. Ct.  at 1368.  In 1972, the Rosebud 
Sioux tribe brought a federal action seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
1904 Act had not diminished the reservation.  The Supreme Court, however, found the 
Act's language, like that in DeCoteau, to be "precisely suited' to 
disestablishment," and concluded that the land was no longer "Indian country." 
Id., 
430 U.S.  at 597, 97 S. Ct.  at 1368.  In addition, the Court noted that the 
lack of a "sum certain" payment was just one of multiple factors to be 
considered in determining the intent of the Act, with another of those 
factors being the "longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the State 
over an area that is over 90% non-Indian both in population and in land use . . 
. ."  Id., 430 U.S.  at 598 
n.20, 603-05, 97 S. Ct.  at 1369 n.20, 1371-72.

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 104 S. Ct. 1161, 79 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984), the Supreme Court explained in detail the 
appropriate method for determining whether ceded reservation land ceases to be 
"Indian country."  The Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation was created in 1889.  In 1908, Congress opened part of the 
reservation to settlement, with the operative language of the Act authorizing 
the Secretary of the Interior to "sell and dispose of" certain lands, and 
providing that the proceeds from such sales would be deposited in the United 
States Treasury to the credit of the tribe.  Id., 465 U.S.  at 472-73, 
104 S. Ct.  at 1167.  Later, John 
Bartlett was convicted in state court of attempted rape and he challenged state 
jurisdiction in a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging that the crime 
occurred in "Indian country."  
Id., 465 U.S.  at 465, 104 S. Ct.  at 1163.  The Court's 
recitation of the proper analysis of the jurisdictional issue was as 
follows:

 
 
            
Our precedents in the area have established a fairly clean analytical 
structure for distinguishing those surplus land Acts that diminished 
reservations from those Acts that simply offered non-Indians the opportunity to 
purchase land within established reservation boundaries.  The first and governing principle is 
that only Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its 
boundaries.  Once a block of land is 
set aside for an Indian Reservation and no matter what happens to the title of 
individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation 
status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.

 
 
            
Diminishment, moreover, will not be lightly inferred.  Our analysis of surplus land Acts 
requires that Congress clearly evince an "intent . . . to change . . . 
boundaries" before diminishment will be found.  The most probative evidence of 
congressional intent is the statutory language used to open the Indian 
lands.  Explicit reference to 
cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all 
tribal interests strongly suggests that Congress meant to divest from the 
reservation all unalloted opened lands.  
When such language of cession is buttressed by an unconditional 
commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land, 
there is an almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the 
tribe's reservation to be diminished.

 
 
            
As our opinion in Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe demonstrates, however, explicit language of cession and unconditional 
compensation are not prerequisites for a finding of diminishment.  When events surrounding the passage of a 
surplus land Actparticularly the manner in which the transaction was negotiated 
with the tribes involved and the tenor of Legislative Reports presented to 
Congressunequivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous understanding that 
the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the proposed legislation, 
we have been willing to infer that Congress shared the understanding that its 
action would diminish the reservation, notwithstanding the presence of statutory 
language that would otherwise suggest reservation boundaries remained 
unchanged.  To a lesser extent, we 
have also looked to events that occurred after the passage of a surplus land Act 
to decipher Congress' intentions.  
Congress' own treatment of the affected areas, particularly in the years 
immediately following the opening, has some evidentiary value, as does the 
manner in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs and local judicial authorities 
dealt with unalloted open lands.

 
 
            
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized that who actually moved 
onto opened reservation lands is also relevant to deciding whether a surplus 
land Act diminished a reservation.  
Where non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a 
reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we have 
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have 
occurred.  In addition to the 
obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to de facto diminishment, we look to the 
subsequent demographic history of opened lands as one additional clue as to what 
Congress expected would happen once land on a particular reservation was opened 
to non-Indian settlers.

 
 
            
There are, of course, limits to how far we will go to decipher Congress' 
intention in any particular surplus land Act.  When both an Act and its legislative 
history fail to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional 
intention to diminish Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude 
for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place and that the 
old reservation boundaries survived the opening.

 
 

Id., 
465 U.S.  at 470-72, 104 S. Ct.  at 1166-67 
(internal citations and footnotes omitted).

 
 
[¶20]   In applying this standard to the 
facts in Solem, the Supreme Court 
first found that the "sell and dispose" language in the 1908 Act, along with the 
simple provision that sale proceeds be deposited in the federal treasury, did 
not show congressional intent to disestablish the reservation, but showed only 
that Congress was allowing non-Indian settlers to own land on the 
reservation.  Id., 465 U.S.  at 473, 104 S. Ct.  at 1167.  Further, the Court noted that the Act 
made no specific reference to cession of the land or any change in the 
reservation's boundaries.  
Id., 465 U.S.  at 474, 104 S. Ct.  at 1168.  In looking at the 
events surrounding passage of the act, the Court noted that the Act did not 
begin with an agreement between the United 
States and the tribes, and 
that the tribes clearly opposed the Act.  
Id., 465 U.S.  at 476-77, 
104 S. Ct.  at 1169-70.  
Significantly, in comparison to the situation on the Wind River Indian 
Reservation, most of the tribe obtained allotments and two-thirds of the tribe 
lived on the opened lands, strong tribal presence (including the seat of 
government) remained in the opened lands, and white settlement had failed.  Id., 465 U.S.  at 480, 104 S. Ct.  at 
1171.  Finally, 
the Court found the history of events occurring after passage of the Act so 
contradictory as to be of little evidentiary value.  Id., 465 U.S.  at 478-79, 104 S. Ct. 
at 1170.  In 
the end, the Court found "it is impossible to say that the opened areas of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation have lost their Indian character." Id., 465 U.S.  at 480, 104 S. Ct.  at 
1171.

 
 
[¶21]   Ten years after Solem, the Supreme 
Court again used its analytical approach in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. 958, 
127 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1994).  The Uintah Valley Reservation in Utah was established by Congress in 
1864.  
Id., 
510 U.S.  at 402, 114 S. Ct.  at 
961.  A 
congressional act of 1902 provided that if a majority of adult male tribal 
members agreed, lands within the reservation would be allotted to tribal 
members, with the remaining lands to be restored to the public domain and opened 
for settlement.  
Proceeds from the land sales were to be used for the benefit of the 
tribes, and about $70,000 was appropriated for direct payment to the tribe after 
its approval of the agreement.  Id., 
510 U.S.  at 403 n.1, 114 S. Ct. 961 n.1.  
Subsequently, Congress set aside sufficient land for the grazing needs of 
tribal members remaining on the reservation, and clarified that the $70,000 
appropriation was to be paid without waiting for tribal approval of the 
allotment and cession process.  Id., 
510 U.S.  at 404, 114 S. Ct.  at 
962.  Later 
still, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to allot the reservation 
with or without tribal consent, and in 1905 a presidential proclamation opened 
unallotted lands and restored them to the public domain.  Id., 510 U.S.  at 407, 114 S. Ct.  at 
963.

 
 
[¶22]   Robert Hagen, a member of the Uintah 
tribe, pled guilty in state court to a controlled substance violation that 
occurred in Myton, Utah, which lies within the area 
opened for settlement by the presidential proclamation.  Hagen later sought to withdraw his 
plea on the ground that the state court lacked jurisdiction of "Indian country." 
 Id., 510 U.S.  at 408, 114 S. Ct.  at 
964.  The case 
eventually reached the United States Supreme Court.  In determining 
whether the opened lands were still "Indian country," the Court looked first to 
the language of the 1902 Act and held that "restoration of unalloted reservation 
lands to the public domain evidences a congressional intent with respect to 
those lands inconsistent with continuation of reservation status."  Id., 510 U.S.  at 414, 114 S. Ct.  at 
967.  The Court 
also concluded that contemporary evidence, including the language of the 
presidential proclamation, demonstrated an understanding that the reservation 
would be diminished with or without the tribe's consent.  Id., 510 U.S.  at 416-20, 114 S. Ct. 
at 968-70.  
Although the Court did note that subsequent events were "less 
illuminating" as to congressional intent, it did note the following factors that 
suggested the reservation had been diminished and that the opened lands no 
longer were "Indian country":  (1) the current population of the opened lands 
was about 85% non-Indian; (2) the population of the largest city in the 
area was about 93% non-Indian;  (3) the seat of tribal government was not in 
the opened lands; and (4) the State of Utah had exercised jurisdiction over the 
area in question since the lands were opened.  Id., 
510 U.S.  at 420-21, 114 S. Ct. 
at 970.

 
 
[¶23]   The Solem factors again 
were applied to resolve a similar issue in South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 118 S. Ct. 789, 139 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1998).  The Yankton Sioux 
Reservation was established by treaty in 1858.  Id., 
522 U.S.  at 333, 118 S. Ct.  at 
793.  In an 
1892 treaty, the tribe agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the 
United States" all of its 
unallotted lands for $600,000.  Id., 
522 U.S.  at 336-38, 118 S. Ct. 
at 795.  The 
treaty was ratified by Congress in 1894 and non-Indian settlers soon acquired 
the ceded lands.  
Id., 
522 U.S.  at 339, 118 S. Ct.  at 
796.  The 1998 
case began when state authorities attempted to apply state environmental 
regulations to a solid waste disposal facility on the ceded lands.  The tribe sought a 
declaratory judgment that the facility was located on land that remained "Indian 
country."  
Id., 
522 U.S.  at 340-41, 118 S. Ct. 
at 796.  The 
United States Supreme Court disagreed with the tribe, holding that the plain 
language of the 1894 Act clearly demonstrated congressional intent to diminish 
the reservation.  
Citing DeCoteau, the Court held that the phrase "cede, sell, 
relinquish, and convey," along with the sum-certain payment of $600,000, was 
"precisely suited" to diminishing the reservation.  Id., 522 U.S.  at 344, 118 S. Ct.  at 
798.  Further, 
the Court found nothing in the events surrounding passage of the Act that could 
overcome the strong presumption of diminishment arising from the plain language 
of the Act.  
Id., 
522 U.S.  at 351-54, 118 S. Ct. 
at 802-03.  The 
Court concluded by noting that, while current status of ceded lands is the least 
compelling factor in determining congressional intent, the population of the 
ceded area was over two-thirds non-Indian, and municipalities had been 
incorporated under state law within the ceded lands, both of which factors 
signified a diminished reservation.  Id., 
522 U.S.  at 356-57, 118 S. Ct. 
at 804.

 
 
[¶24]   When we apply the United States Supreme 
Court's analytical construct to the 1905 Act that ratified the 1904 Wind River 
Indian Reservation Agreement, we cannot help but conclude that Congress intended 
a diminished reservation, with the ceded lands losing their status as "Indian 
country."  We 
begin by looking at the language of the Act itself.  Clearly, the words 
"do hereby cede, grant, and relinquish to the United States, all right, title, 
and interest which they may have" are indistinguishable from the language of DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 
at 445, 95 S. Ct.  at 1093.  Beyond that, the phrases "diminished reserve" 
or "diminished reservation" appear six times in the Act, and $35,000 is 
appropriated to survey the "outboundaries of the diminished reservation," which 
survey would not seem necessary absent diminishment.

 
 
[¶25]   The government's payment obligations 
under the Act, although perhaps not so clearly as the language mentioned above, 
also point toward the intention of a diminished reservation.  While some of the 
payments, such as those for schools, and for the tribes' "welfare and 
improvement," were to be made out of sales proceeds, indicating that they were 
not necessarily a "sum certain," the Act also appropriated specific amounts for 
certain payments, including $85,000 for per capita payments, $35,000 for 
surveying, and $25,000 for an irrigation system "on the diminished 
reservation."

 
 
[¶26]   The next inquiry in the Solem analysis is 
the question of whether events and circumstances surrounding passage of the Act 
reflect one way or the other upon congressional intent regarding 
diminishment.  
Those events and circumstances pertaining to the 1905 Act were set forth 
and examined in great detail in In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in 
the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 119-35 (Wyo. 1988) (Thomas, J., dissenting), judgment aff'd sub nom. 
Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 106 L. Ed. 2d 342 
(1989), overruled on 
other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998), 
and we will not attempt here to recreate that exhaustive treatment.  Suffice it to say 
that, while they disagreed over whether reserved water rights continued to exist 
in the ceded lands, the majority and dissent in Big Horn River 
agreed that the reservation had been diminished.  Id., 753 P.2d  at 84, 112, 114, 
119-35.

 
 
[¶27]   In 1960, Chief Justice Blume, writing 
for a unanimous court in Blackburn v. State, 357 P.2d 174, 176-78 (Wyo. 
1960), concluded that certain lands located within the Riverton Reclamation 
Project a few miles north of Riverton in the ceded area, were no longer "Indian 
country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151.  The fact that the crime scene in Blackburn was not 
located within the City of Riverton, and the fact 
that subsequent acts of Congress were considered by the Court in determining 
congressional intent, prevent it from compelling a particular result in the 
instant case.  
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Blume's analysis suggests that the result 
would have been the same, had only the 1905 Act been considered.  Blackburn, 357 P.2d  
at 179; Big HornRiver, 753 P.2d  at 121 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).

 
 
[¶28]   The issue of state court versus federal 
court jurisdiction in former "Indian country" arose directly in State v. Moss, 471 P.2d 333 (Wyo. 1970).  Moss, a Northern 
Arapaho, killed a woman within the City of Riverton on land that once had been 
part of an allotment held by an Indian.  At the time of the murder, however, the land 
was owned by a non-Indian and had been annexed into the City of Riverton.  Id. at 334.  The state trial 
court had held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the murder case because the 
land was "Indian country."  After reviewing the 1905 Act, similar acts, 
and pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent, we concluded that Congress 
had placed the ceded land outside the reservation and it was no longer "Indian 
country."  
Id. at 339.  The facts in Moss are nearly 
identical to those in the instant case, and we would be hard-pressed to reach a 
different conclusion.

 
 
[¶29]   Finally, Solem directs us to 
examine events subsequent to passage of the Act that may shed light upon its 
intent.  In 
that regard, the record evidence in the instant case is notably similar to the 
evidence in Yankton 
Sioux, 522 U.S.  at 356-57, 118 S. Ct.  at 804, and in Hagen, 510 U.S.  at 
420-21, 114 S. Ct.  at 970, where the Supreme Court found intent to diminish the 
reservation:  
(1) the seat of tribal government on the Wind River Indian Reservation is 
not within the ceded lands; (2) about 92% of the population of the City of 
Riverton is non-Indian; and (3) the City of Riverton and State of Wyoming 
provide sanitation, street maintenance, water and sewer service, planning and 
zoning, and law enforcement.

 
 
[¶30]   In addition to these demographic 
factors, certain events subsequent to the 1905 Act also indicate that the 
reservation was diminished.  In 1907, for instance, Congress passed an act 
in which it referred to the ceded portion of the reservation as "lands formerly 
embraced in the Wind River 
or Shoshone Indian Reservation."  Act of Jan. 17, 1907, ch. 151, 34 Stat. 849 
(1907).  In the 
1930's, the Shoshone tribe sued the United 
States for placing the Northern Arapaho tribe 
on the reservation without the Shoshone's permission.  Shoshone Tribe of 
Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v. United States, 82 Ct.Cl. 23 
(1935), remanded on 
other grounds, 299 U.S. 476, 57 S. Ct. 244, 81 L. Ed. 360 (1937).  
In its decision in that case, the Court of Claims referred to the portion 
of the reservation that had not been ceded as the "diminished reservation." 
 Id. at 23.  Included with the 
decision was a map that identified the area north of the Big Wind River as 
"ceded by agreement of April 21, 1904," and identified the area south of the Big 
Wind River as the "present Wind 
River or Shoshone Indian Reservation."  Id. at 30.  In deciding 
cross-petitions for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court used the 
term "diminished reservation."  Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in 
Wyoming v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 489, 57 S. Ct. 244, 248, 81 L. Ed. 360 
(1937), aff'd 
304 U.S. 111, 58 S. Ct. 794, 82 L. Ed. 1213 (1938).  
As perhaps a more direct example of congressional intent that the 
reservation had been diminished, the restoration of certain lands to the 
reservation was noted in 9 Fed. Reg. 9746-9754 (August 10, 1944), by stating 
that the lands "are hereby restored to tribal ownership for the use and benefit 
of the Shoshone-Arapahoe Tribes of Indians of the Wind River Reservation, 
Wyoming, and are added to and made a part of the existing Wind River 
Reservation, subject to any valid existing rights."  Clearly, lands that 
remained part of a reservation would not have to be added to it.

 
 
[¶31]   We conclude from all these factors that 
it was the intent of Congress in passing the 1905 Act to diminish the Wind River 
Indian Reservation and to remove from it the lands described as "ceded, granted, 
and relinquished" thereunder.  While the City of Riverton may be located on lands 
that at one time were within the external boundaries of the reservation, those 
lands are no longer part of the reservation, and are not "Indian country."  Therefore, the 
State of Wyoming has jurisdiction in this 
criminal case.

 
 
Did the district court commit reversible error by 
instructing the jury as to a parent's duty to protect his or her child?

 
 
[¶32]   We recently reiterated our standard for 
the review of jury instructions in Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d 401, 404 (Wyo. 2007):

 
 
Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the 
applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to 
the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and 
legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any 
one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give 
an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental 
error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a 
jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is 
whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the 
crime can be found to have been committed.

 
 

Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 
134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 
2001) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 23, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo. 2001) and Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo. 
2000).  We 
analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual 
instructions or parts thereof.  Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 
2001).  We give 
trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and "will not find reversible 
error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the 
law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were 
presented at the trial.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. 
State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 
(Wyo. 1997)).  Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
[¶33]   This analysis will be convoluted 
because of the tortuous path this case took from a one-count charging document 
to a four-count conviction.  Before we even begin to discuss the 
challenged instruction, it will be necessary to re-tread that path, with 
excursions into applicable law.  The major complication is that the challenged 
instruction defines a duty that is not relevant to the single crime originally 
charged, unless that crime, as alleged, is read broadly enough to encompass two 
allegations as a principal and two allegations as an accessory before the 
fact.

 
 
[¶34]   At the outset of this case, Blackburn and the appellant were 
jointly charged under a Felony Information that alleged in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
1.   On or about July 2, 2004,

2.   in Fremont 
County, Wyoming,

3.   MACALIA MARCINE BLACKBURN, (D.O.B. 12/20/1981) and

ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR, JR. (D.O.B. 09/05/1974),

4.   while perpetrating the crime of abuse 
of a child under the age of sixteen (16),

5.   killed Marcella Hope Yellowbear, D.O.B. 
08/15/2002,

 
 
such facts constituting a violation of W.S. § 6-2-101(a) 
& (b) (1977) as amended[.]2

 
 
A preliminary hearing was held on February 14, 2005, in the 
CircuitCourtofFremontCounty, and the appellant was 
bound over to district court for trial on this single count of felony 
murder.

 
 
[¶35]   As a necessary aside, we will point out 
that the requirement of a preliminary hearing is well-established in Wyoming law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-8-105 (LexisNexis 2007) provides that, "[i]n all cases triable in district 
court, except upon indictment, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary 
hearing."  In 
turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-132(b) (LexisNexis 2007) provides that 
"[p]reliminary examinations for persons charged with a felony shall be conducted 
by the circuit court judge or magistrate."  These statutory mandates are carried out 
primarily in W.R.Cr. P. 5 and 5.1.  W.R.Cr.P. 5(c) delineates the procedures that 
are to be followed at a defendant's initial appearance in circuit court when he 
is charged with an offense that is triable in district court:

 
 
            
(c)  Offenses charged by 
information or citation and required to be tried in district court.  If the 
charge against the defendant is required to be tried in district court, the 
defendant shall not be called upon to plead until arraignment in district 
court.  

 
 
            
At the initial appearance, the defendant shall be given a copy of the 
information or citation and any supporting affidavits.  The judicial 
officer shall read the information or citation to the defendant or state to the 
defendant the substance of the charge, and shall explain the defendant's right 
to retain counsel or to request the assignment of counsel if the defendant is 
unable to obtain counsel, and of the general circumstances under which the 
defendant may secure pretrial release.  The judicial officer shall inform the 
defendant that the defendant is not required to make a statement and that any 
statement made by the defendant may be used against the defendant.  The judicial officer 
shall also inform the defendant of the right to a preliminary examination.  The 
judicial officer shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to 
consult counsel and shall detain or conditionally release the defendant as 
authorized by statute or these rules.

 
 
            
A defendant is entitled 
to a preliminary examination, unless waived, when charged by information or 
citation with any offense required to be tried in the district court.  If the 
defendant waives 
preliminary examination, the case shall be transferred to the district 
court.  If the 
defendant does not waive the preliminary examination, the judicial officer shall 
schedule a preliminary examination. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶36]   W.R.Cr.P. 5.1 details the purposes and 
procedures of the preliminary hearing:

 
 
(a)    Right.  In all 
cases required to be tried in the district court, except upon indictment, the 
defendant shall be entitled to a preliminary examination in the circuit 
court.  The 
defendant may waive preliminary examination but the waiver must be written or on 
the record.  If 
the preliminary examination is waived, the case shall be transferred to district 
court for further proceedings.

 
 
(b)    Probable cause 
finding.  If from the evidence it appears that there is probable cause to 
believe that the charged offense or 
lesser included offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it, the judicial officer shall enter an order so finding and the case 
shall be transferred to the district court for further proceedings. . . .

 
 
(c)    Discharge of 
defendant.  If from the evidence it appears that there is no probable cause 
to believe that an offense has been committed or that the defendant committed 
it, the judicial officer shall dismiss the information and discharge the 
defendant.  The 
discharge of the defendant shall not preclude the state from instituting a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶37]   The purpose of a preliminary hearing is 
to have a neutral fact-finder determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed that 
crime.  
Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1343 
(Wyo. 1996).  The circuit court 
is without authority to transfer to the district court charges other than those 
contained in the charging document, or lesser-included offenses, and the 
district court lacks jurisdiction to consider uncharged offenses that are bound 
over.  
Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70, 73-74 
(Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶38]   Next, we must consider the rules that 
govern the amendment of a criminal information because that process played an 
equivalent role in creating the multi-faceted issue now facing the Court.  The information, 
which is the document that provides notice to the defendant of the crime or 
crimes with which he has been charged, must meet the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 
3(b)(2):

 
 
(2)     Information.  The 
information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged.  It shall be 
signed by the attorney for the state.  It need not contain a formal commencement, a 
formal conclusion or any other matter not necessary to such statement.  Allegations made in 
one count may be incorporated by reference in another count.  It may be alleged 
in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense 
are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified 
means.  The 
information shall state:

 
 
(A)     The name of the court where 
it was filed;

 
 
(B)     The names of the state and 
the defendant if the defendant is known, and, if not, then any names or 
description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty; 
and

 
 
(C)    For each count the 
official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other 
provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶39]   W.R.Cr.P. 3(e) governs the amendment of 
informations:

 
 
            
(e)     Amendment of 
information or citation.  Without leave of the court, the attorney for the 
state may amend an information or citation until five days before a preliminary 
examination in a case required to be tried in district court or until five days 
before trial for a case not required to be tried in district court.  The court may 
permit an information or citation to be amended:

 
 
(1)   With the defendant's consent, at any 
time before sentencing.

 
 
(2)   Whether or not the defendant 
consents:

 
 
(A)    At any time before trial if 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

 
 
(B)    At any time before verdict or 
finding if no additional or 
different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶40]   We will now consider how these rules of 
law apply to the particular facts of this case.  As stated above, the original Felony 
Information charged the appellant with one count of felony murder for killing 
his daughter "while perpetrating the crime of abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen (16) [years.]."  See supra at ¶ 34.  On March 24, 2005, the State filed an Amended 
Felony Information, with the first count being similar to, but worded 
differently from the original charge, and with an additional second count.  The two counts of 
the Amended Felony Information read in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
COUNT 1  FIRST DEGREE MURDER

 
 
1.    On or about July 2, 2004,

2.    in Fremont 
County, Wyoming,ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR JR. (D.O.B. 09/05/1974),

3.    while perpetrating or attempting 
to perpetrate the abuse of Marcella  Hope Yellowbear, D.O.B. 08/15/2002, a child 
under the age of sixteen (16) years,

4.    killed Marcella  Hope Yellowbear, a 
human being.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
COUNT 2  ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT TO FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER

 
 
1.    On or between May 15, 2004 and 
July 2, 2004,

2.    in Fremont 
County, Wyoming,

3.    ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR JR., 
(D.O.B.    
09/05/1974),

4.    knowingly aided or abetted 
another person, Macalia Marcine Blackburn, in the commission of a felony, 
specifically the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the abuse of Marcella 
Hope Yellowbear, D.O.B. 08/15/2002, a child under the age of sixteen (16) years 
and said abuse resulted in the death of Marcella Hope Yellowbear, a human 
being.

 
 
such facts constituting a violation of W.S. § 6-1-201, 
(1977) as amended[.]

 
 
[¶41]   Almost immediately, the appellant filed 
a motion to strike the amended information, alleging:  (1) the State did 
not have leave of court to file the amended information; (2) the appellant had 
not consented to the amendment; (3) the appellant's rights were prejudiced by 
the amendment; (4) the first count in the new information alleged new elements; 
and (5) the second count alleged a new charge for which there had been no 
preliminary hearing.  At the arraignment held soon thereafter, the 
district court noted these difficulties with the amended information and chose 
to arraign the appellant on the single original charge.  The State responded 
by filing a motion to strike its own amended information.  In what can only be 
described as a strange turn of events, the appellant then contested the State's 
motion to strike, arguing that, by its statements during the arraignment, the 
district court had, in effect, remanded the entire matter to the circuit court 
for another preliminary hearing.  The court granted the State's motion and the 
case continued under the original single-count information.

 
 
[¶42]   On May 20, 2005, the appellant filed 
another motion to dismiss the information.  The contentions of that motion may be 
summarized as follows:  (1) the information is not explicit as 
to the manner in which the appellant is alleged to have violated the 
child abuse statute, which statute is complex and can be violated in a 
number of ways; and (2) Blackburn and the appellant are charged in the 
conjunctive, with no indication of what acts either allegedly committed.  Fundamentally, the 
appellant alleges that the information is so inadequate as to violate his 
constitutional due process right to notice of the charges being made against 
him.  On the 
same date, the appellant filed a motion for bill of particulars stating 
essentially the same grievances.

 
 
[¶43]   The motion for bill of particulars was 
heard on June 16, 2005.  The appellant set forth in detail the 
arguments contained in his motions, and the State responded with the contention 
that the appellant, rather than seeking clarification of the charge, was seeking 
"evidence, facts, theories, and strategies."  The district court resolved the dispute by 
ordering the State to provide a bill of particulars specifying which subsection 
of the child abuse statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 (LexisNexis 2007), was the 
basis for the underlying felony.

 
 
[¶44]   The State complied with the district 
court's order by filing a one-sentence bill of particulars declaring that "the 
State asserts the Defendant, in the alternative, violated W.S. § 6-2-503(a) or 
W.S. § 6-2-503(b)."3  Concurrently, the State filed a response to 
the appellant's earlier motion to dismiss the information, which motion had not 
been heard at the time the motion for bill of particulars was heard.  The appellant 
replied almost immediately with another motion to dismiss the information.  In addition to the 
contentions raised in his earlier motion, the appellant added the following:

 
 
3.   It is improper for child abuse to serve 
as the predicate for felony murder.  This underlying charge could not have 
involved conduct with a felonious purpose other than that the alleged conduct 
purportedly killed the victim.

 
 
4.   To permit such a felony-murder charge 
of this nature would eliminate the need for the State to prove an intentional or 
knowing killing in most murder cases.

 
 
5.   It would be improper to find anyone 
similarly charged to be a first degree murderer when the predicate felony was 
inherent in the killing and when the State fails or cannot prove another form of 
first degree murder to the jury.

 
 
[¶45]   The appellant fleshed out these 
arguments in a memorandum of law outlining the perceived difficulty that results 
from basing a first-degree murder charge upon an underlying assaultive-type 
crime:  the 
distinctions among homicides would be rendered meaningless because all 
second-degree murders and manslaughters would become first-degree felony 
murders.  The 
State countered these arguments by repeating its earlier response to the motion 
for a bill of particularsthat the notice provided by the information was 
sufficientby pointing out that the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-101(a) clearly includes child abuse as a predicate felony for felony 
murder, and by citing Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, ¶ 34, 61 P.3d 1234, 1248 (Wyo. 2003), for the proposition that the statute gives fair notice 
that if a child dies as the result of child abuse, then the potential penalties 
include execution or life in prison.

 
 
[¶46]   The appellant's first motion to dismiss 
the information was heard on August 12, 2005.  Primarily, the appellant argued that he was 
unable to prepare a defense to the crime as charged, even as clarified by the 
bill of particulars, because the child abuse statute can be violated in so many 
separate ways.  The State argued that the information was 
sufficient because it alleged all the necessary elements of the crime of felony 
murder, and that the bill of particulars was sufficient because it apprised the 
appellant of the fact that the State intended to allege in the alternative in 
regard to the child abuse statute.4  The district court took the issue under 
advisement for issuance of a written decision.

 
 
[¶47]   All that we have written so far on this 
issue has been prologue to what happened next.  On August 25, 2005, the district court 
authored a decision letter siding largely with the appellant.  Although the court 
denied the motion to dismiss, it did agree with the appellant that the existing 
felony information was insufficient to provide notice to him as to what crime 
was charged, and that it would create a "Tanner problem" when it came time to instruct the 
jury.5  To remedy the situation, the district court 
ordered as follows:

 
 
            
The Motion to Dismiss is denied; however, the State is to file an Amended 
Information specifying in detail the exact nature of the charges against the 
Defendant.  The 
Amended Information must include the specific portions of the child abuse 
statute upon which the State relies.  Nothing in this letter precludes the State 
from pleading in the alternative; however, if the State is choosing to do so, it 
must set out the alternative theories in the Information.  Furthermore, the 
State must draft a proposed verdict form and proper elements 
instruction(s).  
The proposed verdict form and elements instruction(s) are to be 
consistent with the Amended Information and should be drafted under the guidance 
provided in the Tanner line of cases. . . .

 
 
[¶48]   Even before the order implementing the 
decision letter was filed, the State had filed a single document entitled 
"Amended Felony Information, Proposed Verdict Form and Proposed Jury 
Instructions."  It is this instrument that changed the course 
of these proceedings and resulted in the issue that we now address.  Instead of charging 
a single count of felony murder under alternative theories, it charged four 
separate crimes:  
one count of felony murder based upon intentional physical injury child 
abuse, one count of felony murder based upon reckless physical injury child 
abuse, one count of accessory before the fact to felony murder based upon aiding 
and abetting Blackburn in intentional physical injury child abuse, and one count 
of accessory before the fact to felony murder based upon aiding and abetting 
Blackburn in reckless physical injury child abuse.

 
 
[¶49]   Perhaps not surprisingly, the appellant 
filed yet another motion to dismiss.  In addition to all of his earlier arguments, 
the appellant now averred that the amended information alleged new and different 
crimes.  The 
State's response disavowed any intent to charge new crimes and declared that the 
purpose of the amended information, filed at the court's direction, was to 
separate out what the appellant had always known:  that the State would allege, alternatively, 
that the appellant had recklessly or intentionally abused his daughter and 
killed her, or that Blackburn had done so, with the appellant aiding and 
abetting her in such a fashion that he associated himself with her in commission 
of the crime.  In particular, the State noted that Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-201(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) allows an accessory before the fact to be 
"informed against" as if he were the principal.6

 
 
[¶50]   We will not detail the appellant's 
reply to the State's response to its motion to dismiss, except to note that the 
appellant asserted his right to a preliminary hearing on the amended 
information.  He did so again when the motion to dismiss was 
heard on October 10, 2005.  The motion to dismiss was denied on the ground 
that the amended information did not add new crimes or materially change the 
allegations of the original felony information.  The district court's conclusion that new 
crimes had not been added likely explains why the district court did not remand 
the case for a preliminary hearing, or arraign the appellant on the four charges 
of the amended information, or require the appellant to enter a plea to each 
charge.7  The logical inference that must be drawn from 
all of this, despite the verdict form which we will discuss more in detail 
later, is that the appellant actually was only convicted of one crimefelony 
murderwhich crime the jury found he committed in more than one of the 
alternative methods alleged by the State.  See infra at ¶ 58.

 
 
[¶51]   It is this conclusion that brings us 
full circle because it brings us to the point where we must ask whether the 
contested instruction had any improper effect upon the verdict.  The contested 
instruction began as the State's proposed Instruction No. 30, entitled "Aiding 
and Abetting by Violating Duty to Protect Child."  As proposed, it read as follows:

 
 
            
When considering whether defendant aided or abetted Macalia Blackburn in 
the crime of felony child abuse murder, you may consider whether defendant knew 
of a serious and immediate threat to the welfare of Marcel[l]a Yellowbear and 
failed to act to protect Marcel[l]a Yellowbear from that harm.  That is, whether 
there is evidence from which it can be inferred that the defendant knew that 
Marcel[l]a Yellowbear was sustaining injury and, based on the severity of the 
injuries being sustained, knew that there was a substantial risk that death or 
great bodily injury would result if the defendant did not act to protect 
Marcel[l]a Yellowbear.

 
 
            
Parents are required to intercede on their child's behalf and, if they 
fail to act, they risk being held responsible for the other person's criminal 
conduct.  By 
failing to act, the parent may be deemed to have implicitly sanctioned the 
criminal behavior and, therefore, may be held accountable for the abusive 
conduct.  Even 
in situations where the parent is not present at the time when the abuse 
resulting in death takes place, the parent may be held accountable for the 
criminal conduct resulting in death, if it is proved that the parent knew that 
the child had been abused by the principal in the past and, because of the 
nature of previous injuries sustained by the child, also knew there was a 
substantial risk of serious harm, yet took no action to protect the child from 
future injury by the abuser.

 
 
[¶52]   As authority for the proposed 
instruction, the State cited People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 215-16, 780 N.E.2d 669, 684 (2002).  
The State also filed a lengthy memorandum of law in support of the 
instruction, in which it cited Wyoming statutes and cases, and 
cases from numerous other jurisdictions, that establish a parent's duty to 
protect his or her child.  The appellant objected to the proposed 
instruction by filing his own memorandum of law, with its principal argument 
being that a parent's duty to protect his or her child is not an element of the 
underlying felony of child abuse or of the accessory before the fact 
statute.  In 
other words, in the view of the appellant, the State's proposed instruction 
would add a crime of omission to the crimes of commission defined by the 
statutes.  During the instruction conference held at the 
end of the guilt phase of the trial, the appellant refined this argument by 
noting that the giving of a parental duty instruction would, in effect, replace 
the underlying crime of child abuse with the crime of child endangerment, with 
which he had not been charged.8

 
 
[¶53]   After much debate, and over the 
appellant's objection, the district court decided to instruct the jury as to 
"parental duty."  
Before we quote the two instructions that he gave in lieu of the State's 
proposed instruction, we will first set forth Wyoming's pattern jury instructions 
that normally would be given in a case alleging that the defendant aided and 
abetted in the commission of a crime:

 
 
W.P.J.I.C. 7.01A       ACCESSORY 
BEFORE THE FACT  RESPONSIBILITY

 
 
It is not necessary that the defendant personally did every 
act necessary to constitute the crime of _________.  It is enough if [he 
knowingly aided and abetted someone else to commit the crime of __________] [he 
counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured some other person to commit 
the crime of ___________, and the crime was attempted or committed.

 
 
W.P.J.I.C. 7.01B  ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACTELEMENTS

 
 
            
The elements of being an Accessory Before the Fact to the Crime of 
___________ are:

 
 
1.   On or about the ____ day of __________, 
200__

2.   In ___________ 
County, Wyoming

3.   The Defendant, ____________

4.   Knowingly [aided or abetted another 
person in the {commission of} {attempt to commit} the crime of _________]

[counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured the 
crime of ___________ to be committed by another person], and

5.   That other person [committed] 
[attempted to commit] the crime of _____________.

. . . .

 
 
W.P.J.I.C. 7.01C  ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT  MERE PRESENCE AT 
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

 
 
            
Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a 
crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct 
for the jury to find that the defendant was an accessory before the fact to that 
crime.  The 
State must prove that the defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime 
in some way as a participant  someone who wanted the crime to be committed  
and not as a mere spectator.

 
 
[¶54]   We have identified the basic elements 
of the crime of accessory before the fact as being (1) someone committed the 
underlying felony; and (2) the defendant participated in that crime.  Hawkes v. State, 626 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Wyo. 
1981); see also 
Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624, 627-28 (10th Cir. 1971) (To prove aiding 
and abetting, the State must prove that the crime "was committed by someone and 
that the person charged as an aider and abettor associated himself and 
participated in the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture").  In the instant 
case, the district court did not give these pattern instructions and it did not 
define the crime of being an accessory before the fact as we did in Hawkes.  Instead, the 
district court instructed the jury as follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30

 
 
            
To convict a person of aiding or abetting (accessory before the fact), it 
must be proved that the crime was committed by someone and that the aider or 
abettor associated himself with and participated in the accomplishment and 
success of the criminal venture.

 
 
            
Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a 
crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct 
for the jury to find that the Defendant was an accessory before the fact to the 
crime unless the Defendant 
had a duty to prevent the crime and a reasonable opportunity to do so, and the 
jury finds that the Defendant's failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the 
crime constituted knowingly aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime 
or counseling, encouraging or commanding someone to commit the 
crime.

 
 
            
The State must prove either:

 
 
1.   That the Defendant knowingly associated 
himself with the crime in some way as a participant  someone who wanted the 
crime to be committed  and not as a mere spectator; or

 
 

2.   That the Defendant knew that the child 
had been abused in the past, and because of the nature of the previous injuries, 
knew there was an imminent danger to the physical health or welfare of the 
child, and took no action to protect the child from the abuser; and that the 
Defendant's failure to act constituted knowingly aiding or abetting in the 
commission of the crime or counseling, encouraging or commanding someone to 
commit the crime.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31

 
 
            
It is the duty of a parent to protect their children and to do whatever 
may be reasonably necessary for their care and their safety.

 
 
[¶55]   Before deciding to give these 
instructions, the district court heard at length from both counsel, described 
its own research into the matter, and literally agonized on the record as to 
whether the instructions should be given.  Its final decision was based upon the 
following rationale:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  
This  as I indicated, this is a very difficult problem.  And quite frankly, 
as I've gone through it from the moment I first got the State's memorandum to 
the defendant's memorandum, I have gone back and forth.  My first reaction 
was not to instruct on a duty.  And I did some substantial research.

 
 
            
Obviously, there is no  nothing in Wyoming that directs us to do this 
or directs us not to do it; but certainly there is no authority for giving this 
instruction.

 
 
            
Maybe the initial question is does Wyoming  does the common law of 
Wyoming provide that the 
parents have a duty to protect and care for their children.  It seems to me that 
they do.

 
 
            
Now, the statutes are all civil statutes, but there are adoption 
statutes; for example, In re, Adoption TLC, which is at 46 Pacific 3d, they talk 
about the customary parental duties of a parent who is not incarcerated.  And a termination 
case, MBB versus ERW, the State talks about its duty to supervise the welfare of 
the children and promote their best interest when the State takes over 
custody.  Now, 
it seems to me if the State has that duty, the parent has at least as great a 
duty.  The 
Dellapenta case talks about the duty to buckle in, which implies there is some 
duty to provide the safety of the children.

 
 
            
One of the statutes, 14-2-403, talks about parental rights or 
duties.  So I  
I think in Wyoming, by implication, at least, 
there is a parental duty to protect and care for their children.

 
 
            
Then the question is, 
Should the jury be instructed on them?  In other words, would the Supreme Court, if 
it were to address this, say, Is there an exception to the general rule that 
mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make a person an accomplice; or 
would they say that there is an exception that where there's an affirmative 
common-law duty, they may be guilty of criminal conduct by failure to act, or 
what I think the State referred to as an act of omission?

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶56]   The district court's instincts were 
correct; these instructions should not have been given.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-102(a) (LexisNexis 2007) provides in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
(a)    Common-law crimes are 
abolished.  No 
conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in 
this act or in another statute of this state. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  We have recognized this principle many 
times.  See Mares v. State, 
939 P.2d 724, 727 
(Wyo. 1997); Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 965-66 
(Wyo. 1995); and Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 
(Wyo. 1985).  Consequently, the 
important question is not what may have constituted a common-law crime, but what 
the crime is under the language of the statute alleged in the charging 
document.  Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 25, 64 P.3d 104, 112 (Wyo. 
2003).  The 
words of the statute emphasized above"as a crime"make it clear that conduct 
may not be charged as a crime unless it is made a crime by statute.  Furthermore,

 
 
[I]t is well settled that criminal statutes are to be 
strictly construed, which means that they are not to be enlarged by implication 
or extended by inference or construction * * *.  This rule, said to be based upon a conception 
of manifest justice and the plain principle that the power of punishment is 
vested primarily in the Legislature, requires a sufficient degree of certainty 
in a criminal statute, that will place it outside the necessity of judicial 
determination, through mere implication or construction, of who or what acts are 
punishable under it. . . .

 
 

State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 350 (Wyo. 1974), 
quoting State v. 
A.H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 212-13 
(1925).

 
 
[¶57]   It was error for the district court to 
instruct the jury as it did about parental duty because neither the crime of 
child abuse, nor the crime of accessory before the fact contains that duty as an 
element, or makes criminal a violation of such duty.  Therefore, we must 
evaluate, in the context of the charging-document complexities described above, 
whether the error prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.  Mainville v. State, 
607 P.2d 339, 343 
(Wyo. 1980); W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 
 
[¶58]   Succinctly stated, the four theories of 
guilt to be separately considered by the jury were:  (1) the appellant 
killed Marcella by intentionally physically abusing her; (2) the appellant 
killed Marcella by recklessly physically abusing her; (3) the appellant aided 
and abetted Blackburn, who killed Marcella by intentionally physically abusing 
her; and (4) the appellant aided and abetted Blackburn, who killed Marcella by 
recklessly physically abusing her.  The verdict form clearly delineated these 
theories and required the jury to decide each of them separately.  The jury found the 
appellant guilty under all four theories.  Without more, we would have to conclude that 
the appellant was prejudiced as to both accessory theories, due to inclusion of 
the parental-duty instructions.  However, the verdict form in this case was 
very thorough and complete, and as to each accessory count, the jury was 
required to answer the following special interrogatory:

 
 
            
Do you find that the Defendant knowingly associated himself with the 
crime in some way as a participantsomeone who wanted the crime to be 
committedand not as a mere spectator? 

 
 
By twice answering this question in the affirmative, the 
jury effectively negated any harm that may have occurred as a result of 
inclusion of the parental-duty concept.  That is, the jury found that the appellant's 
crimes were crimes of commission, and not crimes of omission or lapse in duty, 
and therefore satisfied the dictates of the statute and Hawkes.  See supra at ¶¶ 49, 
54.

 
 
[¶59]   We will summarize our conclusions in 
this section of the opinion as follows:

 
 
1.   While the statute allows a person 
charged with aiding and abetting to be informed against and convicted as if he 
were a principal, that is not what the State did in this case.  Rather, the State 
charged the appellant with four theories of liability under one count:  two as a principal 
and two as an accessory.  The verdict form and judgment and sentence 
make it appear as though the appellant were charged with, and convicted of, four 
separate crimes.

 
 
2.   The appellant was afforded a 
preliminary hearing on only one crime, was arraigned on only one crime, and 
entered a plea to only one crime, leading to the inexorable conclusion that he 
could be convicted of only one crime.

 
 
3.   The jury separately considered and 
determined each theory of guilt.  Our review of the record indicates that there 
was sufficient evidence to support each of those findings of guilt.

 
 
4.   Inclusion of the parental-duty 
instruction was erroneous, but such error was harmless, given the circumstances 
set forth above.

 
 
[¶60]   Finally, we will note that the language 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201(b)(i) that allows an accessory before the fact to 
"be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a principal," 
is fraught with danger, given the need for notice, specificity, and due process 
in criminal proceedings.  This case should be adequate evidence of that 
fact.  We have 
previously stated that the rationale behind this language, which "abrogated the 
common-law distinctions between principal, aider and abettor, and accessory 
before the fact," was to allow all to be treated as a principal for purposes of 
punishment.  Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 920-21 
(Wyo. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998).  It might have been 
better simply to say the latter.  At the very least, prosecutors must be aware 
that they cannot charge both that a defendant acted as a principal and that he 
acted as an accessory before the fact, as two separate crimes, in one count.

 
 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during rebuttal 
closing argument by inserting his own credibility and beliefs, by arguing facts 
not in evidence, and by presenting an argument that was not properly a rebuttal 
argument?

 
 
[¶61]   The district judge met with counsel in 
chambers after the trial phase verdict was received, at which time the following 
colloquy occurred:

 
 
            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Although we did not do so at the time the 
rebuttal closing was made, we would object to the improper form and nature of 
the rebuttal closing.  
I believe that it constituted prosecutorial misconduct, and we would move 
the Court for a mistrial based on that at this time.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  
All right.  
The Court agrees that it was not appropriate rebuttal.  It was not rebuttal 
in the sense that it did not address comments made by the defense during its 
closing and not reasonably anticipated; however, I don't have any reason to 
believe and the defense has not stated anything that indicates that it is 
prejudicial.  I 
treat it almost like a plain-error analysis, and I will deny that motion.

 
 
[¶62]   After the penalty phase of the trial, 
but prior to sentencing, the appellant filed a motion for new trial, based upon 
the same grounds, but with more detail as to the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct:

 
 
            
3.   
During the state's "rebuttal closing," the prosecution did not respond to 
the defense closing argument.  Instead, the prosecution made improper 
comments, such as calling Mr. Yellowbear "the father from hell" and injecting 
his personal opinions about Mr. Yellowbear's guilt by stating that he had spoken 
to his mother about the case who stated something to the effect of "sometimes 
the weak and the defenseless children only find refuge in the grave."  Such statements 
also constituted arguing facts not in evidence before the jury.  Thus, the rebuttal 
closing was improper, inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. Yellowbear.

 
 
[¶63]   The motion was heard on May 9, 
2006.  After 
brief argument from counsel, the district court ruled as follows:

 
 
I agree with [the prosecutor] that this has to receive a 
plain-error analysis since there was no contemporaneous objection to [the 
prosecutor's] remarks.  The record does reflect that the incident 
alleged occurred.

 
 
The movant in this case, Mr. Yellowbear, through counsel, 
must demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  That's a little 
more close, but I also think that counsel has met that obstacle.

 
 
            
[The prosecutor] did say, "Her first line was, There is no credible 
evidence that my client wished harm on Marcella in any way."  That, perhaps, is 
proper rebuttal.  
The balance of the argument I don't believe is appropriate rebuttal.  It does not address 
factual issues raised by [defense counsel] in her closing argument.  It basically is a 
conclusion that should have been given at the Stateat the close of the State's 
primary argument, at least in large part.

 
 
Having said that I don't think it's proper rebuttal and I'm 
convinced that it is not proper rebuttal, Yellowbear has to showMr. Yellowbear 
has to show that his substantial rights have been abridged.  And I don't think 
this is the case in this situation for a number of reasons.

 
 
First, the remarks were relatively succinct.  [The prosecutor] 
didn't drag it out.  
While he wasn't making rebuttal, he just made a brief repetition of the 
closing or the conclusion of the primary argument.  He did not call 
into question his [sic] credibility of the witnesses to any extent.  He didn't insert 
his own personal belief.  And given the evidence that was presented, I 
don't believe that even if [defense counsel] had objected that this would have 
affected the outcome of the trial.  Frankly, if [defense counsel] had objected, I 
probably would have stopped [the prosecutor].  I'm not being critical of counsel and I don't 
think it's ineffective counsel not to object.  I recognize that there is a substantial 
school of law thator school of thought that in legal arguments, counsel should 
be given sufficient and substantial latitude, and I think that's what [defense 
counsel] was doing.  
And having ruled that I don't think this is significant, I think her 
failure to object is fairly inconsequential.

 
 
So I'm going to deny the motion for a new trial.

 
 
[¶64]   It is customary for us, before 
discussing an issue, to set forth the standard of review that will be 
applied.  That 
is harder to do in this case than it usually is.  The appellant presents the issue as if it 
were simply one of prosecutorial misconduct to which there was no objection, 
meaning our review would be for plain error.  See Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo. 
2005).  The 
State, perhaps understandably, agrees that plain error review is appropriate, 
citing Seymore v. 
State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2007) for the proposition that a contemporaneous 
objection is required to avoid plain error analysis.  The purpose of the 
plain error rule, however, is to allow us to review errors that "were not 
brought to the attention of the trial court."  W.R.A.P. 9.05.  It seems to go without saying that, where the 
issue was raised and 
decided below, the first two elements of the plain error test are 
inapplicable.9

 
 
[¶65]   The problem with plain error review in 
this case is that the district court considered and decided the question of 
prosecutorial misconduct in the rebuttal closing, not once, but twice.  In denying the 
appellant's oral motion for a mistrial, the district court found that the 
rebuttal closing was not proper rebuttal, but that it was not prejudicial.  Similarly, in 
denying the appellant's subsequent written motion for a new trial, the district 
court concluded that the appellant's substantial rights had not been abridged by 
the rebuttal closing, even if it were improper.  Consequently, what we are really doing here 
is reviewing the denial of the motion for mistrial and the denial of the motion 
for a new trial.

 
 
[¶66]   We review the denial of a motion for 
mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 11, 149 P.3d 707, 710 (Wyo. 
2007).  The 
same standard applies to review of the denial of a motion for a new trial.  Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 106, 112 (Wyo. 2006).  In either case, an abuse of discretion occurs 
where the district court could not have reasonably concluded as it did.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo. 
2006); Gunnett v. 
State, 2005 WY 8, ¶ 15, 104 P.3d 775, 779 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶67]   It is important to remember that there 
is a distinction between the role of this Court and the role of the district 
court in regard to both of these motions.  The district court is not applying a standard 
of review when it determines the motion.  Rather, in the case of a motion for mistrial, 
the district court is governed by the following principles:

 
 
            
Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be 
resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by 
proceeding with trial.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 
(Wyo. 1995); see also Martin, 2007 WY 2, ¶¶ 18-19, 149 P.3d  at 712.  
This is similar to the district court's role in determining a motion for 
a new trial, where W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) dictates that the court may grant such a 
motion "if required in the interest of justice."  In discussing this rule, we have repeatedly 
stated that it is the appellant's burden to show how he was prejudiced by the 
denial.  See, e.g., Doherty v. 
State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 27, 131 P.3d 963, 972 (Wyo. 
2006); Gunnett, 
2005 WY 8, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d  
at 780; Black v. 
State, 869 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Wyo. 
1994); Calene v. 
State, 846 P.2d 679, 684 (Wyo. 
1993); Garcia v. 
State, 777 P.2d 603, 609 (Wyo. 
1989); Gist v. 
State, 737 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 
[¶68]   Boiled down to its essence, the process 
is this:  (1) 
when a motion for mistrial or new trial is presented, the district court 
considers the motion and grants it if justice so requires; (2) justice requires 
that the motion be granted only if the appellant has been prejudiced because his 
or her substantial rights were abridged; (3) if the motion is denied, and that 
denial is appealed, we review that denial for an abuse of discretion; (4) abuse 
of discretion has occurred where the district court could not have reasonably 
concluded as it did.  
With specific regard to claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument, we consider the alleged misconduct in the context of the entire 
argument, and the entire record, with the determinative factor being whether, in 
the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused.  Phillips v. State, 
2007 WY 25, ¶ 8, 151 P.3d 1131, 1133-34 
(Wyo. 2007); see 
also Talley v. State, 2007 WY 
37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 
2007); Butcher v. 
State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005); Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶¶ 11-12, 46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo. 
2002).  
Although the district court in the instant case stated that it was 
applying plain error analysis to its determination of both motions, the record 
reveals that what it actually did was to consider the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct under the above standard and to find that the appellant was not 
prejudiced, which process was appropriate.

 
 
[¶69]   Because the prosecutor's rebuttal 
closing argument was brief, and because the allegations of misconduct must be 
viewed in context, we will set forth the entire rebuttal closing:

 
 
            
[PROSECUTOR:]  
Thank you, Judge.

 
 
            
Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard much evidence and testimony over the 
last few days.  
I won't repeat it to you.

 
 
            
What counsel has said is not evidence, and there's a reason for 
that.  Her 
first line was, There is no credible evidence that my client wished harm on 
Marcella in any way.  
Look at those pictures.  That man is the father from hell.  The defendant did 
to Marcella what he wanted.  She took it for as long as she could, and she 
died.  She died 
because of him.

 
 
            
And now is the time to hold him responsible.  Only you can do 
that.  I ask 
you, on behalf of the people of the state of Wyoming, to go into that jury room, 
to deliberate, to think about this case thoroughly, to consider each and every 
piece of evidence, including that murder weapon right there, and to mark guilty 
as to each of those four counts on that verdict form, and to answer yes as to 
each of those three questions that follow the verdicts on Counts 3 and 4.

 
 
            
An old Greek philosopher said, The strong do as they will; the weak 
endure what they must.

 
 
            
This case is over.  This case is over for Marcella, but it is not 
over until justice is done.

 
 
            
My mom said  when I talked to her about this case, she said, Some of 
these kids have no refuge but the grave.  And Marcella is crying out to you from the 
grave today.

 
 
            
Now is the time to hold Mr. Yellowbear  to hold Mr. Yellowbear 
responsible for his conduct; not to shift the blame to someone who isn't present 
in this courtroom, but to hold him responsible for what he did and what he 
didn't do.  He 
is guilty.  The 
evidence shows you he is guilty of each of these four counts.

 
 
            
And when you're back there deliberating, I hope you'll do one thing for 
me.  Pick out 
State's Exhibit 72.  
Pick it out and set it someplace where you all can see it.  And you'll know, 
when you look at that exhibit, what must be done in this case.[10]

 
 
            
Now is the time to hold the defendant responsible, to make him 
accountable for what he did, for the choices he made, for everything that he 
permitted to happen, that he chose not to stop.  And there's a laundry list nine days 
long.  Nine 
days long, the evidence showing that that defendant is responsible for the 
murder of his daughter, who was not even two years old, a baby.  And that man is 
responsible for her murder.  And he wants to walk out of here a free 
man?  I don't 
think so.

 
 
            
Thank you very much.

 
 
[¶70]   The appellant challenges this rebuttal 
argument on several grounds:  (1) that it was not proper rebuttal in that 
it did not respond to comments or arguments raised in the appellant's closing 
argument; (2) that it argued facts not in evidence; (3) that the prosecutor 
inserted his own beliefs and credibility; (4) that it appealed to the jury's 
passions; and (5) that it told the jury it had a duty to convict the appellant. 
 When the 
district court orally denied the motion for new trial, it first agreed with 
defense counsel that the prosecutor "wasn't making rebuttal," and that his 
statements were, to that extent, improper.  The district court concluded, however, that 
the appellant was not prejudiced because the rebuttal closing was brief, that 
the prosecutor did not call into question the credibility of any witnesses, and 
that he did not insert his own personal beliefs into the argument.  Further, the 
district court opined that, even had an objection to the rebuttal closing been 
made and sustained, it would not have affected the outcome of the trial, given 
the evidence that was presented.  Instead, the district court characterized the 
matter as not being significant and as being "fairly inconsequential."

 
 
[¶71]   We cannot find that the district court 
abused its discretion in reaching these conclusions.  This was a nine-day 
jury trial with dozens of witnesses and dozens of exhibits.  The incriminating 
evidence was powerful and overwhelming.  The State's closing argument consumes 
twenty-eight transcript pages.  The defense closing is thirty-five pages in 
length.  It is 
not reasonably likely or probable that the prosecutor's few words in rebuttal 
had any prejudicial effect upon the outcome of the trial.

 
 
[¶72]   While the prosecutor's description of 
the appellant as the "father from hell" and the reference to the conversation 
the prosecutor had with his mother were not well-advised, they are comparable to 
comments that we previously have found not to constitute reversible error.  See James v. State, 
888 P.2d 200, 207 
(Wyo. 1994) (prosecutor 
calls defendant a leech and a predator); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 
(Wyo. 1990) (prosecutor calls 
defendant a leech, a bloodsucker, and a predator).  In the context of 
the entire record of the present case, we reach the same conclusion here:  this brief rebuttal 
closing was not reversible error.  Furthermore, while the characterization of 
the appellant was extreme, it was made in response to defense counsel's argument 
that "there is no credible evidence that my client wished harm on Marcella in 
any way," and the prosecutor followed the characterization with a direction to 
the jury to "[l]ook at the pictures."  Though perhaps inartful and extreme, this was 
an attempt to connect the characterization to the evidence.

 
 
[¶73]   We have often stated that the purpose 
of closing argument is to allow counsel to suggest ways for the jury to view the 
evidence, and that prosecutors, like defense counsel, have the right to review 
the evidence and to explore the logical inferences that arise therefrom.  See, e.g., Moe v. 
State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 20, 110 P.3d 1206, 1214 (Wyo. 
2005); Leiker v. 
State, 994 P.2d 917, 919 
(Wyo. 1999).  In Trujillo v. State, 
2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, 24-25 (Wyo. 2002), we adopted the following ABA standards as guidelines for 
prosecutorial argument:

 
 
(a)    The prosecutor may argue all 
reasonable inferences from evidence in the record.  It is 
unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence 
or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.

 
 
(b)    It is unprofessional conduct for 
the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth 
or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.

 
 
(c)    The prosecutor should not use 
arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.

 
 
(d)    The prosecutor should refrain 
from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on 
the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the 
accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences 
of the jury's verdict.

 
 
(e)    It is the responsibility of the 
court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept within proper, accepted 
bounds.

 
 
This last guideline is consistent with our previous 
observation that the scope of permissible argument is best determined by the 
trial judge because he or she is in the best position to assess the 
appropriateness of the argument and any prejudice that may result.  See Harper v. 
State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 
(Wyo. 1998); Mintun v. State, 966 P.2d 954, 959-60 
(Wyo. 1998); Dennis v. State, 963 P.2d 972, 976 
(Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶74]   Our assessment of the State's closing 
argument in the instant case is that it violated neither the spirit nor the 
letter of the above guidelines, even though it may have approached the line in 
places.  The 
"father from hell" and "no refuge but the grave" comments were better left 
unsaid, but we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 
finding that they were not prejudicial under these circumstances.  Similarly, asking 
the jury to hold the appellant responsible for the crime because the "evidence 
shows you he is guilty," is not the same as telling the jury that it has a duty 
to convict the defendant.  And despite the guidelines set forth above, 
it is too much to expect that a certain amount of hyperbole does not find itself 
into a prosecutor's closing argument in a death penalty case.  So long as that 
hyperbole is fairly grounded in the evidence and does not violate one of the 
specific rules set forth above, it does not constitute reversible error.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶75]   This crime occurred in a location that 
is not part of the diminished Wind River Indian Reservationa location that is 
no longer "Indian country" under guiding federal precedent.  Therefore, the 
State of Wyoming had jurisdiction to pursue 
the criminal charge.  
It was error for the district court to instruct the jury as to common law 
parental duties that are not encompassed within the charged crime.  The error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, because the completed verdict form 
reveals juror unanimity as to the appellant's guilt on all of the theories 
properly alleged under the statutes.  Nevertheless, the Judgment and Sentence must 
be amended to reflect the fact that only one charge was brought, that the 
appellant was bound over and arraigned and pled to only one charge, and that he 
was, therefore, only convicted of one charge.  Finally, the State's rebuttal closing 
argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in that nothing said 
therein was unfairly prejudicial so as to deprive the appellant of his right to 
a fair trial or otherwise impinge upon his substantial rights.

 
 
[¶76]   Affirmed, but remanded to the district 
court for amendment of the Judgment and Sentence to reflect conviction of the 
appellant on only one count of felony murder resulting from child abuse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The victim's name is spelled alternatively as "Marcela" and 
"Marcella" throughout the record.  We will refer to her as "Marcella," as that 
spelling seems to predominate.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2007) reads as 
follows:

 
 
Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, sexual abuse of a 
minor, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse 
of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, kills any human being is guilty 
of murder in the first degree.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 (LexisNexis 2007) reads as 
follows:

 
 
(a)     Except under circumstances 
constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, a person who is not responsible for a 
child's welfare as defined by W.S. 14-3-202(a)(i), is guilty of child abuse, a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, if:

(i)    The actor is an adult or is at 
least six (6) years older than the victim; and

(ii)   The actor intentionally or recklessly 
inflicts upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) years:

(A)    Physical injury as defined in 
W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B); or

(B)    Mental injury as defined in W.S. 
14-3-202(a)(ii)(A).

(b)    Except under circumstances 
constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-502, a person is guilty of child abuse, a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, if a person 
responsible for a child's welfare as defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(i) 
intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child under the age of eighteen (18) 
years:

(i)    Physical injury as defined in 
W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B), excluding reasonable corporal punishment; or

(ii)   Mental injury as defined in W.S. 
14-3-202(a)(ii)(A).

 
 

4The State indicated that it needed to allege in the 
alternative both Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(a) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b) 
because Tribal Social Services had legal custody of Marcella at the time she 
died, leaving open the question of whether Blackburn and the appellant were 
"responsible for [the] child's welfare" under the statute.

 
 

5In Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶¶ 8-14, 57 P.3d 1245-46 (Wyo. 2002), we held that, in cases where the State charges 
alternative theories of guilt, the information, the instructions, and the 
verdict form must be constructed to leave no doubt, if guilt is found, as to 
jury unanimity upon a particular alternative.

 
 

6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201 (LexisNexis 2007) reads in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
(a)   A person who knowingly aids or abets in 
the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or 
procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the fact.

(b)   An accessory before the fact:

(i)    May be indicted, informed 
against, tried and convicted as if he were a principal;

. . . .

 
 

7The district judge who presided over the arraignment, and 
who suggested then that a remand to the circuit court for another preliminary 
hearing on the amended information was necessary, was peremptorily disqualified 
under W.R.Cr.P. 21.1, and had been replaced by another district judge.

 

8Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-403 (LexisNexis 2007) reads in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
(a)   No parent, guardian or custodian of a 
child shall:

(i)    Abandon the child without just 
cause; or

(ii)   Knowingly or with criminal negligence cause, permit or 
contribute to the endangering of the child's life or health by violating a duty 
of care, protection or support.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

9Plain error analysis requires the 
appellant to show (1) the record clearly reflects; (2) the violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law; (3) resulting in the abridgment of a substantial 
right to the appellant's material prejudice.  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 18, 131 P.3d 963, 969 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 
2000)).

 
 

10According to 
the Index to Jury Trial Proceedings, Exhibit 72 is a "Life photograph of 
Marcella Hope Yellowbear."