Title: Liford v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

247 Ind. 149 (1965)
210 N.E.2d 366
LIFORD
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,276.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 30, 1965.
Petition for rehearing denied February 1, 1966.
*150 Dane E. Mann, of Marion, and William C. Erbecker and Sam Blum, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Samuel R. Rosen, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
MYERS, J.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with committing the crime of second-degree burglary. He pleaded not guilty and was tried by jury in the Grant Superior Court. A verdict was returned against him finding him guilty as charged. He was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for not less than two years nor more than five years. A timely motion for new trial was filed which was overruled. This appeal followed.
It appears that appellant and two other defendants by name of James Koons and Edwin Altes were all charged with *151 unlawfully having broken and entered the building of the Meshingomesia Country Club in Marion, Indiana, with intent to commit a felony. Appellant and Edwin Altes, following their arrest, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, appellant moved for a separate trial, alleging that the defendant, James Koons, had not been taken into custody and so was unavailable for trial; that defendant Altes had entered a plea of guilty to a criminal charge brought under a Federal statute; that if appellant was required to stand trial with the other two defendants his defense would be prejudiced in the eyes of the jury. This motion was granted.
At time of trial, Edwin Altes had been asked to testify on behalf of appellant. He was instructed by appellant's counsel that in so doing, Altes could incriminate himself. On the witness stand, Altes stated that during the trial he had talked with a certain detective in the hall outside the presence of counsel. After that, Altes refused to testify in favor of appellant. At the close of the evidence, appellant moved for a mistrial wherein he made the following statement:
The motion for mistrial was overruled with remarks by the court as follows:
Appellant's motion for new trial was based on this alleged irregularity, upon the court's giving General Instruction No. 7, and upon the grounds that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law. Appellant's assignment of errors avers manifest error in overruling the motion for new trial.
It is appellant's argument that he was prevented from having a fair trial because a witness (Altes) was "pressured" *152 into claiming his privilege against self-incrimination which denied appellant due process of law. He claims this was set forth in his attorney's affidavit in support of the motion for new trial which was not contradicted by counter-affidavit. He also says that the testimony of Altes supports this contention.
The affidavit filed by appellant's counsel in support of the motion for new trial, in pertinent part, is as follows:
The bill of exceptions containing the recital of testimony given by Edward Altes is as follows:
We cannot find from the affidavit, the testimony of Altes, or any other part of the record that there was any evidence of "pressure" or of prejudicial irregularity. Even appellant's counsel admits he did not know what the detective and Altes discussed in their conversation. The trial court, or this court on appeal, cannot guess or speculate what was spoken between the two at that time. The affidavit of appellant's counsel required no contradiction. The testimony of Altes at the trial merely reflected a change of position on his part, at most, to which he was entitled at all times. His plea of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not deny appellant his testimony as a witness, because he appeared at the request of appellant and did testify.
Appellant argues that an error of law occurred in giving Court's General Instruction No. 7 over objection. This instruction is as follows:
Appellant says that a charge of commission of a felony and a conspiracy to commit the same felony are separate and not within the doctrine of included offenses, citing as authority Steffler v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 557, 104 N.E.2d 729, and Taylor, Bryant v. State (1956), 235 Ind. 126, 131 N.E.2d 297. There is no question as to the correct statement of the law by these cases. However, appellant has attempted to enlarge his objections on appeal. This cannot be done. Richeson alias etc. v. State (1953), 233 Ind. 1, 116 N.E.2d 101. At the trial, appellant's objection to Instruction No. 7 was as follows:
We find no crime known as "confederacy" in the Indiana Criminal Code. Regardless of this, appellant cannot now substitute on appeal his objections to the instruction by alleging a crime which is recognized by our Code and which was not presented to the trial court. Patton et al. v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 364, 165 N.E.2d 377; Howard v. State (1921), 191 Ind. 232, 131 N.E. 403. Objections not raised *157 by appellant at the trial are therefore considered waived. Patton et al. v. State, supra; Sekularac v. State (1933), 205 Ind. 98, 185 N.E. 898.
Appellant states that the instruction is not clear as to the crime concerned therein. He says:
That this instruction was not erroneous is supported by the case of Breaz v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 31, 13 N.E.2d 952, which states generally that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is criminally liable for all probable and natural consequences, including everything done by confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design though not intended as a part of the original design.
The instruction was clear and unequivocal and could not authorize conviction of an offense not charged in the affidavit.
The other points set forth in the motion for new trial are not argued and are waived. Supreme Court Rule 2-17 (e, f). Gernhart v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 470, 120 N.E.2d 265.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn and Landis, JJ., concur. Jackson, C.J., and Achor, J., not participating.
MYERS, C.J.
Petitioner, Junior Liford, has filed a petition in which he asserts that a judgment of the Grant Superior Court, which convicted him of second-degree burglary, was upheld and affirmed by this court on September 30, 1965 (see Liford v. State [1965], 247 Ind. 149, 210 N.E.2d 366), but that the records are barren of any petition for rehearing *158 having been filed. It is claimed in this petition that Junior Liford had no knowledge of the affirmation of the judgment until December 28, 1965, at which time he contacted his attorneys, who informed him that Supreme Court Rule 2-22 requires a petition for rehearing to be filed within twenty days of the rendition of the decision, stating concisely the reasons why the decision is thought to be erroneous. He now asks that he be permitted to file a petition for rehearing because of his lack of knowledge of the law.
The record shows that petitioner was represented by counsel during the trial, other than those he has employed since then to file this petition. There is nothing to indicate that his counsel was incompetent or did not properly perform his duties. We have said that:
Petitioner is now attempting to set aside and hold for naught a Supreme Court Rule of which his counsel had knowledge. He does not accuse his former counsel of negligence in failing to file the petition for rehearing. He comes to this court long after the twenty days provided for in Rule 2-22, and asks for permission to file the petition through new counsel. If we are to follow this theory, the time limits on appeals and petitions for rehearing would be wholly superfluous. There would be no end to final determination of appeals and such interpretation could only lead to chaos in the administration of justice.
The petition is denied.
Arterburn and Rakestraw, JJ., concur. Achor and Jackson, JJ., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 210 N.E.2d 366. Rehearing denied in 213 N.E.2d 704.