Title: P. ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. El Dorado Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 8/8/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT 
) 
OF CONSERVATION et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S116870 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C039428 
EL DORADO COUNTY et al., 
) 
 
) 
El Dorado County 
 
Defendants and Respondents; ) 
Super. Ct. Nos.  
 
 
) 
PV002958 & PV002959 
LORING BRUNIUS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest and 
) 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
CALIFORNIA MINING ASSOCIATION 
) 
et al., 
 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Interveners and Respondents. ) 
___________________________________ ) 
Does the Director of the Department of Conservation (Director) have 
standing to file a petition for a writ of mandate challenging reclamation plans and 
financial assurances for surface mining operations approved by defendant El 
Dorado County (County) under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 
(SMARA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 2710 et seq.)?1  We conclude he has. 
                                              
1  
Unlabeled statutory references are to the Public Resources Code. 
 
 
2
Background2 
SMARA, enacted in 1975 (Stats. 1975, ch. 1131, § 11, p. 2793), requires 
that California surface miners provide reclamation plans for their mining 
operations and financial assurances to implement those plans.  (§ 2770, subd. 
(a).)  A reclamation plan under SMARA is a written plan specifying how mined 
land will be treated so as to minimize the environmental impacts of mining and 
render a mined site usable in the future for alternative purposes.  (See § 2733.)  
Financial assurances are a mine operator’s pledges of funds sufficient to perform 
reclamation in accordance with an approved reclamation plan.  (§ 2773.1, subd. 
(a)(1).)  SMARA prohibits the continuation past stated dates of any surface 
mining operation not covered by a reclamation plan and financial assurances that 
have been approved by the “lead agency” responsible for that operation.  
(§ 2770, subd. (d).) 
Respondent and real party in interest Loring Brunius operates two surface 
mines, Weber Creek Quarry and Diamond Quarry, in respondent County.  
County, as designated lead agency, was primarily responsible for ensuring 
compliance with SMARA in its jurisdiction.  (§ 2774.1, subd. (f).)  The Director 
is vested with control of the Department of Conservation (Department) (see 
§ 601) and also is assigned various responsibilities under SMARA (see, e.g., 
§§ 2774, 2774.1, 2796, 2796.5), as will be explained. 
                                              
2  
The requests for judicial notice filed on January 30, 2004 (by County and 
the Board of Supervisors of County), April 8, 2004 (by California State 
Association of Counties and Regional Counsel for Rural Counties), October 15, 
2004 (by County and the Board of Supervisors of County), and November 29, 
2004 (by California Building Industry Association et al.) are granted. 
 
 
3
Both the Director and the State Mining and Geology Board (Board) (see 
§ 660 et seq.) in the mid-1990’s sought to enforce SMARA against Brunius, who 
at the time was operating both of his quarries without approved reclamation plans 
or financial assurances.  In June 1995, the Director obtained a stipulated 
judgment requiring Brunius to pay $70,000 in administrative penalties subject to 
reduction if Brunius complied with SMARA by certain dates.  When Brunius 
failed timely to comply, the Director ordered him to cease all mining activity at 
Weber Creek Quarry and Diamond Quarry.  Brunius, however, having 
subsequently submitted reclamation plans and financial assurances, obtained a 
preliminary injunction against operation of the Director’s order, in light of 
Brunius’s pending applications for County’s approval of his plans and 
assurances.  The Board, for its part, finding that County had, in violation of 
SMARA, allowed Weber Creek Quarry to operate since 1982 without an 
approved reclamation plan and since 1994 without approved financial 
assurances, commenced SMARA’s prescribed procedures for assuming lead 
agency powers in the County.  (§ 2774.4.) 
As part of the review process of Brunius’s reclamation plans and financial 
assurances, the Director submitted extensive comments as to their inadequacy.  
In July 1997, County’s Planning Commission nevertheless approved the plans 
and assurances, as well as a mitigated negative declaration under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.; see also Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 14, § 15000 et seq., especially id., § 15070), for both Weber Creek Quarry 
and Diamond Quarry.  The Director appealed these approvals to County’s Board 
of Supervisors, which adopted the mitigated negative declarations and approved 
the plans and assurances. 
Our question arises out of the Director’s filing, in September 1997, two 
petitions for writs of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) against 
 
 
4
County and Brunius, seeking to vacate County’s approvals as in violation of both 
SMARA and CEQA.  The Director alleged that Brunius’s reclamation plans did 
not meet SMARA’s specifications and that his financial assurances were 
inadequate.  The Director also alleged that County had violated CEQA in 
approving the mitigated negative declarations for Brunius’s operations. 
The Director’s two petitions subsequently were consolidated.  In 
March 1998, the Director filed amended petitions, adding allegations that County 
had (1) erroneously concluded Brunius possessed a vested right to operate Weber 
Creek Quarry without a permit, and (2) allowed Brunius unlawfully to expand 
operations at Diamond Quarry. 
The California Mining Association, the Construction Materials 
Association of California, and the Southern California Rock Products 
Association (Interveners), all trade associations, were granted leave to intervene.  
County, Brunius, and Interveners each demurred on the ground the Director 
lacked standing.  The trial court overruled the demurrers, and the Court of 
Appeal denied Interveners’ and County’s petitions for writs of mandate or other 
relief from the trial court’s ruling. 
In answering the Director’s petitions, County and Brunius alleged the 
Director’s lack of standing as an affirmative defense; the Interveners’ complaint 
also alleged the Director’s lack of standing.  The trial court granted County 
summary adjudication on the Director’s claim in the Weber Creek Quarry writ that 
County erred in finding the Weber Creek Quarry was a “vested use,” exempt from 
various SMARA and permitting requirements.  The trial court then granted County 
and Brunius’s motion to dismiss the CEQA claims for the Director’s failure timely 
to request a hearing (§ 21167.4).  Finally, the trial court dismissed the Director’s 
remaining SMARA claims on the ground the Director lacked standing to maintain 
 
 
5
them.  The trial court awarded attorney fees to County, Brunius, and the 
Interveners under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. 
A divided Court of Appeal affirmed on standing grounds the dismissal of 
the Director’s SMARA and CEQA claims, but reversed the trial court’s attorney 
fees award.  The Department, Brunius, and County each filed a petition for review.  
We granted all three petitions.3 
Discussion 
We are concerned here not with the merits of the underlying dispute, but 
only with the procedural question whether the Director has standing to petition for 
a writ of mandate.  Answering this question requires us to examine the Director’s 
role, generally, as the executive officer of a state department and, more 
specifically, within SMARA. 
A. 
Statutory Background 
The majority in the Court of Appeal below accurately detailed the relevant 
statutory background:   
“Within the Resources Agency is the Department of Conservation (the 
Department).  The head of the Department is an executive officer appointed by the 
Governor, known as the Director.  (§ 601.)  The Department’s work is divided into 
at least four divisions:  mines and geology; oil, gas, and geothermal resources; 
land conservation; and recycling.  (§ 607.) 
                                              
3  
We initially limited briefing to the question whether the Director has 
standing; subsequently, we requested that the parties also discuss the standard of 
review a reviewing court should apply in determining whether an action enforces 
an important right affecting the public interest so as to justify an award of attorney 
fees.  As will appear, in light of our resolution of the standing issue, we have no 
occasion to reach the attorney fees issue. 
 
 
6
“Also in the Department is the nine-member State Mining and Geology 
Board.  (§ 660.)  . . .  The Board represents the state’s interests in the development, 
utilization, and conservation of mineral resources in California and the 
reclamation of mined lands, and in federal matters pertaining to mining.  The 
Board also determines, establishes, and maintains an adequate surface mining and 
reclamation policy.  (§ 672.)  Although the Director is the head of the Department, 
he does not control the Board; the Director has no power to amend or repeal any 
order, ruling, or directive of the Board.  (§ 671.)  [¶] . . . [¶]  
“The Legislature [in adopting SMARA] intended to create and maintain an 
effective surface mining and reclamation policy to prevent or minimize adverse 
environmental effects, reclaim mined lands to a usable condition which is 
ad[a]ptable to alternative uses, and encourage the production and conservation of 
minerals while giving consideration to values relating to recreation, watershed, 
wildlife, range and forage, and aesthetic enjoyment.  (§ 2712.) 
“At the heart of SMARA is the requirement that every surface mining 
operation have a permit, a reclamation plan, and financial assurances.  (§ 2770, 
subd. (a).)  . . .  The financial assurances must remain in effect for the duration of 
the mining operation and until reclamation is complete and shall be made payable 
to the lead agency and the Department.  (§ 2773.1, subd. (a)(2).)  The financial 
assurances may be forfeited if the lead agency or the Board determines the 
operator is financially incapable of performing reclamation in accordance with the 
approved reclamation plan, or has abandoned its surface mining operation without 
commencing reclamation.  (§ 2773.1, subd. (b).) 
“In keeping with the recognition of the diverse conditions throughout the 
state, SMARA provides for ‘home rule,’ with the local lead agency having 
primary responsibility.  A lead agency is usually the city or county.  (§ 2728.)  The 
mining operator submits the reclamation plan and financial assurances to the lead 
 
 
7
agency for review.  (§§ 2770, subd. (d), 2772.)  The Board, through regulations, 
specifies minimum statewide reclamation standards.  (§ 2773.)  A lead agency, 
however, may permit a mining operation to deviate from these standards, if 
necessary based on the approved end use.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 3700.) 
“To implement its review of proposed reclamation plans and financial 
assurances, every lead agency is to adopt ordinances in accordance with state 
policy.  (§ 2774, subd. (a).)  The Board shall review these ordinances and certify 
that they are in compliance with state policy.  (§ 2774.3.)  If the Board finds 
deficiencies in the lead agency’s ordinance, the Board shall communicate the 
deficiencies to the lead agency.  (§ 2774.5, subd. (a).)  After an opportunity to 
revise the ordinance to comply with state policy, if the Board finds the ordinance 
is still deficient, the Board shall assume full responsibility for review of 
reclamation plans.  (§ 2774.5, subd. (b).)  If the lead agency does not have a 
certified ordinance, reclamation plans shall be submitted to and approved by the 
Board.  (§ 2774.5, subd. (c).)  The Board may amend any reclamation plan that 
was approved by a lead agency at the time the lead agency’s ordinance did not 
comply with state policy.  (§ 2774.5, subd. (c).) 
“Prior to approving reclamation plans and financial assurances, the lead 
agency submits the proposals and all supporting documentation, including 
information from any document prepared, adopted or certified pursuant to CEQA, 
to the Director for review.  (§ 2774, subd. (c).)  The Director then may prepare 
written comments, if he chooses, within 30 days for reclamation plans and 45 days 
for financial assurances.  (§ 2774, subd. (d)(1).)  The lead agency shall prepare 
written responses to the Director’s comments, describing disposition of the major 
issues raised.  In particular, the lead agency shall explain in detail why any 
specific comments and suggestions were not accepted.  (§ 2774, subd. (d)(2).)  
 
 
8
Thus, although the lead agency must evaluate and respond to the Director’s 
comments, it need not always accept them. 
“If a lead agency fails to approve a reclamation plan or financial 
assurances, an appeal may be taken to the Board.  (§ 2770, subd. (e).)  As 
originally enacted, SMARA did not contain enforcement provisions.  (Stats. 1975, 
ch. 1131, § 11, pp. 2793-2803.)  As the author explained, SMARA did not contain 
enforcement provisions ‘because the bill provides for a local regulatory program. 
Enforcement provisions would be embodied in local ordinances.’ 
“In 1990, in response to concerns about deficiencies of lead agencies in 
carrying out their responsibilities under SMARA, the Legislature substantially 
amended SMARA.  The amendments provided for various types of enforcement, 
against both mine operators and lead agencies.  Enforcement against mine 
operators includes notices of violations and fines.  (§ 2774.1, subds. (a)-(c).)  The 
lead agency has primary responsibility for enforcing SMARA against mine 
operators.  (§ 2774.1, subd. (f)(1).)  Where the Board is not acting as the lead 
agency, the Director may initiate enforcement actions where (1) the Director has 
notified the lead agency of the violation and the lead agency fails to take action 
within 15 days, or (2) the Director determines the violation amounts to imminent 
and substantial endangerment to the public health or safety, or to the environment.  
(§ 2774.1, subd. (f)(1).)  Similarly, the Director may take actions to seek forfeiture 
of financial assurances where the lead agency has failed to act or has been 
unsuccessful.  (§ 2773.1, subd. (d).) 
“Where the lead agency fails to fulfill its duties under SMARA, the Board 
may take over the powers of a lead agency, except for permitting authority.  The 
Board may step in if it finds that a lead agency has:  (1) approved reclamation 
plans and financial assurances that are not consistent with SMARA; (2) failed to 
inspect mines as required by SMARA; (3) failed to seek forfeiture of financial 
 
 
9
assurances to carry out reclamation; (4) failed to take appropriate enforcement 
actions; (5) intentionally misrepresented the results of inspections; or (6) failed to 
submit the required information to the Department.  (§ 2774, subd. (a).)  The 
Board may take over as lead agency where the lead agency fails to submit a copy 
of the mining permit for every surface mining operation within its jurisdiction by 
July 1, 1991, or fails to submit amendments to the permit or reclamation plans for 
such mines by July 1 of each subsequent year.  (§ 2774, subd. (e).) 
“SMARA contains three specific provisions for petitioning for a writ of 
mandate.  Any person may petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Board, the 
state geologist, [fn. omitted] or the Director to carry out any duty imposed on them 
by SMARA.  (§ 2716.)  An operator may petition for a writ of mandate to review 
any administrative penalties imposed.  (§ 2774.2, subd. (e).)  A lead agency, an 
operator, or an interested party may obtain writ review of the Board’s action in 
taking over as lead agency.  (§ 2774.4, subd. (f).)” 
The parties highlight three considerations bearing on the question whether 
the Director has standing:  (1) that a writ of mandate “must be issued upon the 
verified petition of the party beneficially interested” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086);4 
(2) that the Director is vested with significant, but limited, powers and 
responsibilities under SMARA; and (3) that “[t]he head of each [state] department 
may make investigations and prosecute actions concerning . . . matters relating to 
the business activities and subjects under the jurisdiction of the department” (Gov. 
Code, § 11180, subd. (a)).  We briefly explain each. 
                                              
4  
In its entirety, Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 provides:  “The writ 
must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy, in the ordinary course of law.  It must be issued upon the verified petition 
of the party beneficially interested.” 
 
 
10
Beneficial interest requirement 
As noted, standing to seek a writ of mandate ordinarily requires that a party 
be “beneficially interested” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086), i.e., have “some special 
interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and 
above the interest held in common with the public at large.”  (Carsten v. 
Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796.)  This standard, we have 
stated, “is equivalent to the federal ‘injury in fact’ test, which requires a party to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered ‘an invasion of a 
legally protected interest that is [both] “(a) concrete and particularized, and 
(b) actual or imminent . . . .” ’ ”  (Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San 
Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 362.) 
Director’s role under SMARA 
The majority in the Court of Appeal below based its decision primarily on 
“deference to the legislative scheme” and what it discerned therein to be “the 
Legislature’s delicate balancing between home rule, which permits local elected 
officials to make land use decisions, and effective and consistent statewide 
enforcement of SMARA.”  The majority saw as especially significant “the limited 
advisory role of the Director” as compared to the Board’s ability to take over the 
powers of a lead agency.  It reasoned that “the Director’s limited role under 
SMARA, especially when compared to the Board’s role in overseeing lead 
agencies, establishes that SMARA does not give the Director standing to petition 
for judicial review of a lead agency’s actions in approving reclamation plans and 
financial assurances that do not comply with SMARA.”  We examine the 
Director’s role under SMARA in detail below. 
Government Code section 11180 
In concluding the Director had standing to pursue this mandate action, the 
dissenting justice below relied primarily on Government Code section 11180.  The 
 
 
11
statute provides that the head of each state department “may make investigations 
and prosecute actions concerning:  [¶] (a) All matters relating to the business 
activities and subjects under the jurisdiction of the department.”5  In the dissenting 
justice’s view, the statute confers standing on a department head if the department 
head is bringing an action “relating to” the business of the department. 
While we have construed Government Code section 11180’s grant of 
investigatory powers liberally (see Shively v. Stewart (1966) 65 Cal.2d 475, 479-
480), we have not addressed whether the statute’s grant of prosecutorial powers 
warrants similar construction.  And while the two California courts that have 
considered Government Code section 11180’s implications for standing have 
concluded that the department head involved had standing to pursue the action at 
issue, neither court relied exclusively on Government Code section 11180 in 
reaching that conclusion.  (See People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. Triplett 
(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 233, 252-256 (Triplett) [Department’s standing rested in 
part on interest in Williamson Act cancellation fees]; Tieberg v. Superior Court 
(1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 277, 282-284 (Tieberg) [Director of Department of 
Employment’s standing to challenge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
decision rested in part on interest in proper administration of unemployment 
insurance fund].)  As will appear, we likewise eschew exclusive reliance on 
Government Code section 11180 in concluding the Director had standing to bring 
the actions at issue here. 
                                              
5 
In its entirety, Government Code section 11180 provides:  “The head of 
each department may make investigations and prosecute actions concerning:  
[¶] (a) All matters relating to the business activities and subjects under the 
jurisdiction of the department.  [¶] (b) Violations of any law or rule or order of the 
department.  [¶] (c) Such other matters as may be provided by law.” 
 
 
12
B. 
Standing 
As we shall explain, neither standing analysis proffered in the Court of 
Appeal below is entirely correct.  The majority misread SMARA as impliedly 
depriving the Director of standing to seek judicial review of inadequate 
reclamation plans and financial assurances and too narrowly construed the concept 
of “beneficial interest” with respect to the Director’s responsibilities.  The 
dissenting justice, in turn, while reaching the right result, mistakenly identified 
Government Code section 11180 as an independent source of the Director’s 
standing. 
As the majority below discerned, Government Code section 11180 only 
authorizes the Director to sue; it does not of itself confer standing.  “ ‘There is a 
difference between the capacity to sue, which is the right to come into court, and 
the standing to sue, which is the right to relief in court.’ ”  (Color-Vue, Inc. v. 
Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1604.)  The statutory authorization granted 
department heads to sue, no matter how broadly construed, cannot alone confer on 
the Director standing to pursue a writ of mandate here, because such authorization 
does not necessarily create in him a “beneficial interest” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086) 
in the writ’s issuance.  Notwithstanding Government Code section 11180, nothing 
logically precludes the Legislature from crafting a departmental director’s powers 
and duties such that he or she lacks a beneficial interest sufficient to confer 
standing to sue respecting some particular “business activities and subjects under 
the jurisdiction of the department” (Gov. Code, § 11180, subd. (a)). 
No party or amicus curiae identifies an instance of the Legislature’s having 
so limited a department head’s authority, however, nor are we aware of any.  We 
conclude that, in any event, the Legislature has not crafted SMARA to deprive the 
Director of standing to seek mandate as a remedy when a local lead agency 
approves allegedly inadequate reclamation plans or financial assurances.  Rather, 
 
 
13
correctly understood, the Director’s standing to prosecute this petition for a writ of 
mandate derives from his “beneficial interest” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086)—under 
SMARA and, generally, as a state officer charged with serving the public 
interest—in the adequacy of approved reclamation plans and financial assurances.   
First, the Director’s powers and responsibilities under SMARA raise in him 
a beneficial interest in lead agencies’ approving adequate plans and assurances.  
As noted, the Director is entitled to review and comment on every reclamation 
plan submitted to a lead agency for approval.  (Pub. Resources Code, § 2774, 
subds. (c), (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 3805.)  It is on this basis, 
presumably, that the majority below characterized the Director’s responsibilities as 
“primarily advisory.”  But the Director’s review and comment power is not merely 
advisory; rather, its exercise triggers significant statutory obligations on the part of 
the lead agency. 
Initially, the lead agency must submit to the Director for review the mining 
operator’s reclamation plan or plan amendments and financial assurances, together 
with any related documents prepared, adopted, or certified pursuant to CEQA.  
(§ 2774, subd. (c).)  In so doing, the lead agency is required to certify to the 
Director that the reclamation plan is “in compliance with the applicable 
requirements . . . of the California Code of Regulations” implementing SMARA.6  
(§ 2774, subd. (c).)  The lead agency also is required to evaluate, “within a 
reasonable amount of time” (id., subd. (d)(1)), the Director’s written comments 
                                              
6  
The statute’s specific reference is to title 14, section 3500, of the California 
Code of Regulations, which provides in its entirety:  “It is the purpose of this 
subchapter to establish state policy for the reclamation of mined lands and the 
conduct of surface mining operations in accord with the general provisions set 
forth in [SMARA].” 
 
 
14
relating to the submitted plan or assurances and must prepare a written response 
describing its disposition of the major issues raised (id., subd. (d)(2)).  In this 
response, the lead agency must “address, in detail, why specific comments and 
suggestions were not accepted” (ibid.).  While the Director’s responsibilities in 
this part of the SMARA process are advisory in form (in that the lead agency is 
not required to accept his suggestions), the general interest his review serves, 
patently, is SMARA compliance. 
We note that, even were the Director’s responsibilities limited to an 
advisory role, that would not necessarily deprive him of a beneficial interest in the 
approval by local agencies of adequate reclamation plans and financial assurances.  
As one California court has recognized in the related context of agricultural land 
conservation, the Legislature’s having invested the Department with power to 
“advise any interested person or entity” about a conservation statute’s purposes 
and implementation “points to the conclusion that the State has standing” to 
enforce the statute’s substantive provisions, even if a local agency has the primary 
responsibility for implementing the statute.  (Triplett, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
253-254; see Gov. Code, § 51206.)7 
In any event, the Director’s powers and responsibilities under SMARA are 
not limited to advice and comment.  Once a reclamation plan has been approved, 
the Director has express authority to ensure that state law and the reclamation plan 
                                              
7  
Government Code section 51206 provides in its entirety:  “The Department 
of Conservation may meet with and assist local, regional, state, and federal 
agencies, organizations, landowners, or any other person or entity in the 
interpretation of this chapter [i.e., the Williamson Act, concerning agricultural 
land conservation].  The department may research, publish, and disseminate 
information regarding the policies, purposes, procedures, administration, and 
implementation of this chapter.  This section shall be liberally construed to permit 
the department to advise any interested person or entity regarding this chapter.” 
 
 
15
are implemented.  (See generally § 2774.1.)  The Director has power to inspect 
any mining operation and, if he determines it is not in compliance with SMARA, 
he is empowered to order the operator to comply (id., subd. (a)).  If after a hearing 
before the Board the operator fails to comply, the Director may impose 
administrative penalties of up to $5,000 per day (id., subds. (b), (c)).  And if the 
Director determines the violation “presents an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the public health or the environment,” he may request the 
Attorney General on his behalf to seek a court order enjoining the operation.  (Id., 
subd. (d).)  Finally, upon the Director’s complaint, the Attorney General may 
bring an action to recover administrative penalties against a person violating 
SMARA or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto.  (Id., subd. (e).)8   
Plainly, these broad enforcement powers and responsibilities, directed as 
they are towards overall SMARA compliance and the fulfillment of state 
reclamation policy generally, confer on the Director a “special interest to be 
served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the 
interest held in common with the public at large” (Carsten v. Psychology 
Examining Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 796).   
For instance, if a mine operator manages, through whatever device, to 
obtain local lead agency approval of reclamation plans that do not comply with 
SMARA or its attendant regulations, or that lack safeguards sufficient to facilitate 
effective administrative oversight and implementation, the Director may be 
                                              
8  
The local lead agency has primary responsibility for enforcing SMARA.  
The Director’s power to initiate the described enforcement actions exists when the 
Board is the lead agency or, when it is not, if a SMARA violation comes to his 
attention and the local lead agency defaults, or the Director discerns an imminent 
public health or environmental threat.  (§ 2774.1, subd. (f).) 
 
 
16
hampered or frustrated in subsequent efforts to enjoin or penalize mining that, on 
inspection, he determines compromises or threatens to compromise SMARA’s 
public health and environmental goals.  Under such circumstances, of course, 
simply enforcing the mine operator’s statutory obligation to perform reclamation 
in accordance with his approved reclamation plan (§ 2773.1, subd. (b)) would by 
hypothesis be inadequate.  Accordingly, the Director has an interest in adequate 
review of the original approval. 
Similarly, the Director may be hampered or frustrated in the execution of 
his statutory powers and responsibilities if he is not permitted to seek judicial 
review when a lead agency approves allegedly inadequate financial assurances.  
A fundamental purpose of SMARA is that surface mine operators, rather than the 
taxpaying public, bear the expense of reclaiming lands disturbed by surface 
mining.  To that end, lead agencies must require that a mine operator’s financial 
assurances be sufficient to perform reclamation.  (§ 2770, subd. (d).)  The mine 
operator is responsible for posting adequate assurances (§ 2773.1, subd. (a)) and 
for payment of any costs of reclamation in accordance with the approved plan that 
are in excess of the assurances (id., subd. (b)(4)).   
The Director’s statutory powers and responsibilities relating to financial 
assurances submitted under SMARA reveal his substantial interest in their 
adequacy.  Pursuant to SMARA, such assurances are to be made payable to the 
Department, as well as to the lead agency.  (§ 2773.1, subd. (a)(4).)  Under 
specified circumstances, the Director may seek forfeiture of financial assurances 
and undertake reclamation of mines.  (Id., subd. (d).)  Specifically, if the lead 
agency or the Board, following a public hearing, determines an operator is 
financially incapable of performing reclamation in accordance with its approved 
plan, or has abandoned its mining operation without commencing reclamation, the 
Director may notify the operator that he intends to take appropriate action to 
 
 
17
forfeit the financial assurances and, after allowing the operator 60 days to 
commence reclamation, may “[p]roceed to take appropriate action to require 
forfeiture of the financial assurances if the operator does not substantially comply” 
(id., subd. (b)(3)), using the proceeds from the forfeited financial assurances to 
“conduct and complete reclamation in accordance with the approved reclamation 
plan” (id., subd. (b)(4)).9 
Obviously, if in a case implicating the Director’s statutory power to seek 
forfeiture of financial assurances and conduct reclamation, those assurances prove 
inadequate to accomplish the task, the Director cannot effectively discharge his 
responsibility.  In such circumstances, instead of the operator paying the full cost 
of reclamation, the taxpaying public likely will bear part or all of the burden.  
Accordingly, whenever a local lead agency approves allegedly inadequate 
financial assurances, the Director has an interest in obtaining a writ of mandate to 
address the deficiencies. 
                                              
9  
The Director’s role here is a “backup” one:  “The lead agency shall have 
primary responsibility to seek forfeiture of financial assurances and to reclaim 
mine sites” in such circumstances.  (§ 2773.1, subd. (d).)  The Director may act “if 
both of the following occurs:  [¶] (1) The financial incapability of the operator or 
the abandonment of the mining operation has come to the attention of the 
[D]irector.  [¶] (2) The lead agency has been notified in writing by the [D]irector 
of the financial incapability of the operator or the abandonment of the mining 
operation for at least 15 days, and has not taken appropriate measures to seek 
forfeiture of the financial assurances and reclaim the mine site; and one of the 
following has occurred:  [¶] (A) The lead agency has been notified in writing by 
the [D]irector that failure to take appropriate measures to seek forfeiture of the 
financial assurances or to reclaim the mine site shall result in actions being taken 
against the lead agency under Section 2774.4.  [¶] (B) The [D]irector determines 
that there is a violation that amounts to an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the public health, safety, or to the environment.  [¶] (C) The lead agency notifies 
the [D]irector in writing that its good faith attempts to seek forfeiture of the 
financial assurances have not been successful.”  (Ibid.) 
 
 
18
Thus, the Director’s statutorily conferred powers and responsibilities—
those expressly granted him under SMARA, as well as those inhering in his 
capacity as the executive officer of the state department charged with SMARA’s 
implementation—create in him a substantial interest in reclamation plans and 
financial assurances being both legally consistent with SMARA and practically 
adequate to accomplish SMARA’s goals and state reclamation policy promulgated 
thereunder.10  Therefore, when a local lead agency approves allegedly illegal or 
inadequate plans or assurances, the Director is “beneficially interested” (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1086) in the issuance of a writ of mandate to address the deficiencies.   
Second, while it is true, as the majority below observed, that the lead 
agency has primary responsibility for enforcing SMARA while the Director’s role 
is a backup one (see fns. 8 and 9, ante), that fact is not determinative.  Primary 
responsibility is not exclusive responsibility.  Generally, “where the Legislature 
wants only one agency to have jurisdiction over a matter, it says so unequivocally” 
(Triplett, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [discussing Pub. Util. Code, § 1759]).  
SMARA contains no such statement.  On the contrary, the Legislature expressly 
has provided that the remedies SMARA accords the Director “are in addition to, 
and do not supersede or limit, any and all other remedies, civil or criminal” (Pub. 
Resources Code, § 2774.1, subd. (g)).  The writ of administrative mandate, a civil 
remedy, is thus preserved for the Director’s use when he is beneficially interested 
                                              
10  
Contrary to the Court of Appeal majority’s implication, Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1086 does not require mandate plaintiffs to demonstrate a 
pecuniary interest in the writ’s issuance.  Whether or not SMARA’s goals of 
actually reclaiming mined land so as to minimize adverse environmental effects 
(Pub. Resources Code, § 2712, subd. (a)), encouraging production and 
conservation of mineral resources (id., subd. (b)), and protecting public health and 
safety (id., subd. (c)) generate interests that properly may be characterized as 
pecuniary, they certainly offer interests that are beneficial. 
 
 
19
and “must be issued in all [such] cases” where he lacks “a plain, speedy, adequate 
remedy, in the ordinary course of law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086). 
SMARA contains several specific mandate-related provisions, but none 
affords a remedy when an operator obtains lead agency approval of allegedly 
inadequate reclamation plans or financial assurances.11  This omission, however, 
does not signify that lead agencies are immune from judicial review, as “ ‘it has 
never been held that all laws must be contained, or references thereto made, in 
one statute.  It is sufficient that a remedy exists whether it is expressed in the 
statute expressing the power or in another statute.’ ”  (Tieberg, supra, 243 
Cal.App.2d at p. 282, citing inter alia Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. 
Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 324, 325.)  Here, the Director’s mandate remedy is 
expressed in the Code of Civil Procedure and in the Government Code.  (Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 1086 [circumstances under which writ must issue], 1094.5 
[administrative mandate]; Gov. Code, § 11180 [capacity to sue]; see also Brown 
v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 509, 514 [official with responsibility to 
implement disclosure laws has standing to seek a writ of mandate to enforce 
them].) 
Our acknowledging the Director’s beneficial interest in obtaining a writ of 
mandate neither diminishes the Board’s authority as conferred by SMARA nor 
upsets any implicit legislative balance in the statute.12  While the Director has no 
                                              
11  
Any person may petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Board or the 
Director to carry out a duty imposed on them by SMARA.  (§ 2716.)  An operator 
may petition for a writ of mandate to review the imposition of administrative 
penalties.  (§ 2774.2, subd. (e).)  A lead agency, an operator, or an interested party 
may obtain writ review of the Board’s action in taking over lead agency 
responsibilities.  (§ 2774.4, subd. (f).)   
12  
Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d 793, relied on by 
defendants, is not authority to the contrary.  Carsten in its own terms addressed the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
20
power to amend or repeal any order of the Board (§ 671), here the Director seeks 
no such thing.  In fact, as the Court of Appeal observed, the record contains no 
evidence the Board disapproves of the instant lawsuits.  Nor, contrary to the 
majority’s suggestion below, does the Director seek authority to commence a 
mandate proceeding against a lead agency in place of the Board’s authority to 
take over a lead agency’s powers under section 2774.4.  Indeed, after the 
Director filed the instant petitions, the Board assumed lead agency functions 
from County.  But the Board’s takeover authority includes no power retroactively 
to alter a reclamation plan that has been approved by a local lead agency under a 
certified ordinance; the Board may amend approved reclamation plans only when 
they were approved by the Board in the first instance because the lead agency in 
the jurisdiction did not have a certified ordinance or were approved by the 
agency under an ordinance that was not in accordance with state policy 
(§ 2774.5, subd. (c)).  And even reclamation plans the Board amends in the 
exercise of this power must be remanded to the lead agency upon certification of 
the lead agency’s ordinance (id., subd. (d)). 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
“unique issue” presented by a board member’s suing “the very board on which he 
or she serves as a member” (id. at p. 795); obviously, the relationship between the 
parties here is not analogous.  The possibility exists, of course, that the Board may 
seek a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to the same general authorities 
under which the Director has proceeded.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1086, 1094.5.)  We 
are not called upon in this case to express an opinion as to the viability of any such 
petition by the Board.  Nor are we considering a situation in which the Director is 
challenging plans and assurances that were approved by the Board, rather than a 
local lead agency.  We anticipate that the Director and the Board will coordinate 
their efforts in situations where SMARA grants the Board authority to amend a 
reclamation plan. 
 
 
21
In determining whether the Director has standing to enforce SMARA, we 
“ ‘must consider the consequences that might flow from a particular construction 
and should construe the statute so as to promote rather than defeat the statute’s 
purpose and policy.’ ”  (Escobedo v. Estate of Snider (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1214, 
1223.)  One possible result of the foregoing scheme, as County acknowledges, is 
that a SMARA violation, like County’s approval of allegedly inadequate 
reclamation plans and financial assurances in this case, could remain in place 
even after the Board exercises its takeover authority.13  Accordingly, unless we 
acknowledge the Director’s interest in exercising his capacity to seek judicial 
review (Gov. Code, § 11180), such lead agency approvals could become final 
despite their noncompliance with SMARA standards.  We thus agree with the 
Attorney General that the Legislature cannot have intended the Board’s limited 
lead agency takeover authority to substitute, generally, for the Director’s 
authority to seek judicial review of a local lead agency’s approval of inadequate 
reclamation plans or financial assurances. 
The statutes that permit a beneficially interested party to obtain a writ of 
mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086) and a state department head to bring an action 
relating to the department’s business (Gov. Code, § 11180, subd. (a)) both had 
been in effect many decades when the Legislature enacted SMARA.14  The 
                                              
13 
While the parties’ briefing indicates disagreement about the remedial utility 
of the Board’s amendment powers in this particular case, there is no dispute that, 
as a general matter, a local lead agency’s approval of an inadequate reclamation 
plan when a SMARA-compliant ordinance is in place escapes administrative 
review. 
14  
SMARA, as previously noted, was enacted in 1975.  (Stats. 1975, ch. 1131, 
§ 11, p. 2793.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 was enacted in 1872 and 
amended in 1907.  (See Stats. 1907, ch. 244, § 1, p. 307.)  Government Code 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
22
Legislature is deemed to have been aware of those laws and to have enacted 
SMARA in light of them.  (See Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
602, 609.)  And the Legislature’s having authorized each department head to 
prosecute actions concerning matters related to the business activities and 
subjects under the department’s jurisdiction (Gov. Code, § 11180, subd. (a)), 
while not of itself creating the beneficial interest, nevertheless constitutes “a 
recognition” that such an executive ordinarily “has an interest which is proper to 
be determined in [such] proceedings” (Tieberg, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d at p. 283).  
Our conclusion that the Director has standing to seek judicial review of allegedly 
unlawful local lead agency decisionmaking thus reflects discernable legislative 
intent. 
Third, recognizing the Director’s beneficial interest in a writ of mandate 
accords with our prior pronouncements, and the pronouncements of other 
California courts, in similar situations.  (See, e.g., People ex rel. Younger v. 
County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491-492 [Attorney General had 
standing to enforce People’s “beneficial right” to compel counties to pay regional 
planning expenses]; Triplett, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 254-255 [state through 
Department had standing to seek writ inter alia because Department was 
authorized to interpret Williamson Act]; State Board of Pharmacy v. Superior 
Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 641, 645-646 [State Board of Pharmacy’s standing to 
seek writ of mandate derived from its beneficial interest in proceeding to 
determine attorney fees]; Tieberg, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d at p. 284 [Director of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
section 11180, derived from section 353 of the former Political Code, was enacted 
in 1921.  (See Stats. 1921, ch. 602, § 1, p. 1023.) 
 
 
23
Department of Employment had sufficient interest in Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board proceedings to justify seeking mandamus review].) 
To deny the Director standing here would free surface mine operators who 
manage to obtain local lead agency approval of inadequate reclamation plans or 
financial assurances to do less than SMARA requires.  If the reclamation plan does 
not require the operator to reclaim the site in accordance with SMARA, 
accomplishment of SMARA’s goal of protecting public health and safety, as well 
as the environment, is at risk.  And if the operator’s financial assurances are 
inadequate to accomplish the reclamation plan, taxpayers are at risk of bearing the 
burden.  Thus, the Director’s standing to pursue a writ of mandate is essential to 
protect his—and the public’s—interest in adequate reclamation, paid for by the 
operator. 
C. 
Related Vested Use and CEQA Issues 
The Director, as earlier noted, also has contested County’s vested use 
determination (viz., that Brunius had a vested nonconforming use and, therefore, 
did not require a permit; see generally §§ 2776, 2792), as well as the adequacy, 
under both CEQA and SMARA, of certain CEQA disclosure documentation that 
County submitted as part of the SMARA process.  The majority below concluded 
the Director lacks standing to maintain these claims for essentially the same reason 
it concluded he lacked standing to challenge County’s SMARA approvals—that 
SMARA defines the Director’s role so as impliedly to deprive him of standing to 
challenge a lead agency’s actions.  On the grounds already reviewed at length, we  
reject that reasoning and, therefore, the Court of Appeal’s application of it to these 
claims as well.  For the same reasons, generally, that the Director is beneficially 
interested in obtaining writ review when a lead agency approves reclamation plans 
or financial assurances that do not comply with SMARA, he may be beneficially 
interested in obtaining a writ when a lead agency allegedly violates SMARA by 
 
 
24
making an erroneous vested use determination or by failing to include adequate 
CEQA disclosure documentation in the reclamation plan approval process. 
SMARA exempts anyone with a “vested right to conduct surface mining 
operations prior to January 1, 1976,” from obtaining a SMARA permit for such, 
“so long as the vested right continues and as long as no substantial changes are 
made in the operation except in accordance with” SMARA.  (§ 2776.)  Moreover, 
SMARA expressly does not require “the filing of a reclamation plan for, or the 
reclamation of, mined lands on which surface mining operations were conducted 
prior to January 1, 1976.”  (Ibid.)  If a local lead agency’s erroneous recognition of 
a vested right to mine were immune from judicial review, the Department could 
find itself without leverage to enforce the Legislature’s intention that the operator 
conduct and pay for reclamation. 
Similarly, the resolution of the CEQA issue, in its standing aspect, depends 
on our conclusion respecting the Director’s interest under SMARA in obtaining a 
writ of mandate to challenge an inadequate reclamation plan.  CEQA, of course, is 
aimed at ensuring full disclosure of environmental impacts of projects it governs.  
(County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 810.)  SMARA requires that 
the local lead agency, at the time it submits a reclamation plan and financial 
assurances to the Director for review, also submit all information regarding the 
project that has been prepared pursuant to CEQA.  (§ 2774, subd. (c).)   
All concede the Director’s core SMARA role includes responsibility to 
review and power to comment on reclamation plans and financial assurances 
proposed for lead agency approval (see generally § 2774).  When a local lead 
agency, in fulfilling its SMARA documentation responsibilities to the Director, 
relies, as SMARA permits it to do (see § 2774, subd. (c)), on documentation it has 
prepared pursuant to CEQA, but that documentation does not comply with 
CEQA’s disclosure requirements, the Director may be deprived of the information 
 
 
25
he requires in order to fulfill his SMARA review and comment responsibilities.  
Unless something else in the materials alerts the Director and his staff to matters 
proper CEQA disclosure would have revealed, the Director will be denied the 
opportunity to provide comprehensive comments as he is empowered and 
obligated to do under section 2774, subdivision (d)(1). 
In sum, the Director, under SMARA, was entitled to adequate CEQA 
information.  If, as the Director alleges here, County failed in violation both of 
SMARA and CEQA to provide such, the Director has an interest in the issuance of 
a writ of mandate to correct the deficiency and effect the Legislature’s intention 
that adequate CEQA disclosure inform the SMARA process. 
D. 
Attorney Fees 
Because we have concluded that the trial court’s dismissal, on standing 
grounds, of the Director’s SMARA and CEQA claims was erroneous, we have no 
occasion to address questions relating to the attorney fees award that was based on 
the dismissal. 
Disposition 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR:  
GEORGE, C. J 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People ex rel. Department of Conservation v. El Dorado County 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 108 Cal.App.4th 672 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S116870 
Date Filed: August 8, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: El Dorado 
Judge: Winslow Christian* 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank and Tom 
Greene, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, and 
Richard M. Thalhammer, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Law Offices of Robert Cooper and Robert Cooper for Paramount NE as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Louis B. Green, County Counsel, Edward L. Knapp, Chief Assistant County Counsel; The Diepenbrock 
Law Firm, Mark D. Harrison, Gene K. Cheever, Michael V. Brady, Jeffrey K. Dorso, Andrea A. Matarazzo 
and Michael E. Vinding for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Bingham McCutchen, Peter N. Morrisette; Ebbin Moser + Skaggs and David E. Moser for Interveners and 
Respondents. 
 
Becker & Runkle and David C. Becker for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Robin L. Rivett and Emma T. Suárez Pawlicki for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents, Interveners and Respondents and Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning; McDonough, Holland & Allen and John R. Briggs for California State Association of 
Counties and Regional Council for Rural Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents, Interveners and Respondents and Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Hatch & Parent and Lisabeth D. Rothman for California Building Industry Association, Building Industry 
Legal Defense Foundation and Home Builders Association of Northern California as Amici Curiae. 
 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard M. Thalhammer 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 327-7850 
 
Mark D. Harrison 
The Diepenbrock Law Firm 
400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1800 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 446-4469