Title: Schmalz v. ND Workers Compensation Bureau

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

449 N.W.2d 817 (1989) Lee M. SCHMALZ, Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU, Appellee. Civ. No. 890269. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 20, 1989. Evans & Moench, Ltd., Bismarck, for appellant; argued by Kenneth S. Rau. Dean J. Haas (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, Bismarck, for appellee. *818 ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. Lee Schmalz appeals from a district court judgment upholding the North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau's dismissal of his claim for benefits for injuries resulting from a heart attack he suffered during the course of his employment. We affirm. Schmalz is a self-employed appliance, service, and refrigerator technician doing business under the name of Schmalz Appliance Service. He does his work in a garage which is approximately ten by twenty feet in size and twelve feet high. At the time of the heart attack, the garage did not provide for any fresh air ventilation. Schmalz's work requires the use of an acetylene-oxygen torch to unsweat pipe connections. Some freon generally remains in the refrigeration tubing, and when heated, produces an odor and breaks down into a number of gases. The acetylene-oxygen torch also produces several gases including nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide. When reassembling the units, silver solder and cadmium flux are used which may produce gases when heated. On November 29, 1984, Schmalz went into his shop at about 8:00 or 8:30 a.m. He began installing a compressor, using his acetylene torch, a task which is entirely usual and routine for him. He testified that he had been working on the compressor only minutes before experiencing chest pain. Schmalz sustained a heart attack, which was defined as death of heart muscle attributable to an inadequate supply of oxygen to the heart muscle. Schmalz filed an application for workers compensation benefits on December 10, 1984. The Bureau dismissed the claim by order dated February 8, 1985. Schmalz failed to present any additional evidence and the order of dismissal was affirmed on December 10, 1986. He requested a formal hearing which was held on August 17, 1988. The Bureau issued an order reaffirming dismissal, based on additional evidence introduced at the hearing and its review of the entire record, on February 8, 1989. The Bureau, in its order reaffirming dismissal, determined: Schmalz appealed from the Bureau's decision to the district court. The district court affirmed the decision of the Bureau in a judgment dated June 7, 1989. Schmalz then appealed to this Court. In an appeal from a judgment of the district court involving the decision of an administrative agency, our review is limited to an examination of the decision of the agency and not the decision of the district court. Grace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 395 N.W.2d 576 (N.D.1986); Skjefte v. Job Service North Dakota, 392 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1986); Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D.1979). Our review of administrative agency decisions involves a three-step process: (1) Are the findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence? (2) Are the conclusions of law sustained by the findings of fact? (3) Is the agency decision supported by the conclusions of law? Falcon v. Williams County Social Service Board, 430 N.W.2d 569 (N.D.1988); Otto v. Job Service North Dakota, 390 N.W.2d 550 (N.D.1986). In Skjefte, supra, this Court summarized the standards we use in reviewing administrative agency decisions as follows: Skjefte at 817-18. Section 65-05-05, N.D.C.C., provides for the payment of compensation and other benefits to employees who have "been injured in the course of their employment." The term "injury," as used in section 65-05-05, N.D.C.C., has been construed by this Court to mean "compensable injury" as defined in section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C.[2]See Grace, supra. The relevant part of the definition that controls this case reads: Section 65-01-02(7), N.D.C.C. The legislative history of the 1977 amendment to section 65-01-02(7), N.D. *821 C.C., to require "unusual stress" in cases of heart attacks or strokes is well documented: Kroh v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 899, 901 (N.D. 1988). It has long been a basic tenet of workers compensation law that a claimant seeking benefits from the Bureau has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to participate in the fund. Section 65-01-11, N.D.C.C.; Kroh, supra; Claim of Bromley, 304 N.W.2d 412 (N.D. 1981). Therefore, Schmalz has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his heart attack was causally related to his employment with reasonable medical certainty, and that the heart attack was precipitated by unusual stress. The Bureau concluded that Schmalz had failed to prove both the causal relationship and the unusual stress requirement. Schmalz argues that the unusual stress requirement is satisfied in that his heart attack was caused by unusual working circumstances which combined to expose him to much higher levels of gases than he had previously experienced in his work. Beginning in 1980, when Schmalz first began doing work on refrigeration units, he worked out of a garage attached to his house on thirteenth street in Dickinson, which had ventilation. In 1982, Schmalz sold his house on Thirteenth Street and bought a home on First Street in Dickinson. From 1982 until 1984, Schmalz worked out of a rented shop. In 1984, Schmalz relocated his shop to a garage attached to his house, which was not properly ventilated. Schmalz contends that at the time of his heart attack, he was in the midst of the busiest appliance repair season of the year. Because the weather was cold, he contends he had to keep his doors and windows shut to save on his heating bill and, therefore, with no ventilation, the gases produced from his work were trapped in his small shop. Schmalz contends that these facts show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exposed to a concentration of gases which was at least several times higher than he had previously experienced in his work. We have previously explained our view of the unusual stress requirement as follows: Professor Larson explains unusualness as follows: Grace, supra at 580-81. Our examination for unusual stress must be applied according to the employee's complete work history. Grace, supra at 581; Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 316 N.W.2d 790, 796 (N.D.1982). Schmalz had been repairing refrigeration units for approximately five years before his heart attack. He had been working in his unventilated garage, however, for less than one year before his heart attack. There is no evidence, however, to disclose the amount of the gases which Schmalz was exposed to before or after his relocation to his unventilated garage. Schmalz contends that because his shop was not properly ventilated, he was exposed to a higher amount of the gases than otherwise. We conclude that a reasoning mind could have found, as did the Bureau, that Schmalz failed to prove by the weight of the evidence from the entire record that his heart attack was precipitated by unusual stress. Schmalz also needs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his heart attack was causally related to his employment, with reasonable medical certainty. We do not believe that reasoning minds could conclude that he has accomplished that feat. There is no evidence even of the extent of noxious gases that may have been produced by the soldering under the peculiar circumstances of this case, nor is there any evidence of the amount of the gases that may have been absorbed in the blood stream of a person of same age, size, and physical condition of Mr. Schmalz. There is conflicting medical evidence as to the effect of the gases upon Schmalz. Dr. Mark Hinrichs was Schmalz's physician. Schmalz asserts that Dr. Hinrichs' opinion is enhanced due to his research and the number of people he had consulted regarding the nature of the gases. However, in checking his references, we note that they are not efforts of research by Dr. Hinrichs, but rather are reports provided to Dr. Hinrichs by Schmalz's attorney.[3] After a lengthy hypothetical question, which assumed a number of facts, Dr. Hinrichs was asked by Mr. Schmalz's attorney whether or not the toxic fumes would be a causative factor in Mr. Schmalz's heart attack on November 29, 1984. Dr. Hinrichs responded: During cross-examination, Dr. Hinrichs testified: There is no evidence in the record as to the amount of the gases in the air nor as to the amount of the gases in Schmalz's blood at the time of the heart attack. In response to questions, Dr. Hinrichs had previously testified: The Bureau deposed a cardiologist, Dr. Walter Frank. In response to questioning, Dr. Frank testified: In assessing such medical evidence, we have previously said: Hayden v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 447 N.W.2d 489, 498 (N.D.1989). In Syverson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 406 N.W.2d 688 (N.D.1987), we discussed the "causally related to employment" requirement. Syverson asserted that his arthritic shoulder condition was brought on or worsened by his employment as a furniture and appliance handler. In rejecting Syverson's claim, the Bureau asserted that "`the evidence does no more than speculate as to a possible causal relationship between any lifting and the arthritic injury.'" In affirming the district court's reversal of the denial of benefits we said: Thus, an undisputed medical opinion as to the causal relationship between the alleged course and the injury was not required in Syverson. Syverson is distinguishable, however, from the case at hand. Schmalz's injury was a heart attack, which is such a common occurrence that the legislature has adopted special rules for recovery. In Syverson, the claimant had not previously suffered from any shoulder disability. Schmalz, on the other hand, had suffered from an atherosclerotic heart disease, had high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and was overweight. Finally, there was evidence in Syverson that the claimant's continual lifting had a "wear and tear" effect on his shoulder. There is no evidence in the instant case of the amounts of gases Schmalz was exposed to, nor of the effect of any of the gases upon him. As we do not make independent findings of fact, but ask only whether or not a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined, as did the Bureau, that Schmalz's heart attack was not precipitated by unusual stress, and was not causally related to his employment, we must affirm the Bureau's findings. As the district court affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the Workers Compensation Bureau, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur. LEVINE, Justice, concurring in result. There was no evidence at all about what volume of toxic gases in the environment is necessary to reduce the level of oxygen in the claimant's bloodstream so as to contribute to a heart attack. The Bureau's Finding No. VII acknowledges that the presence of certain gases in the environment "in sufficient quantities," will affect the health of the heart muscle. The problem is that no one told the Bureau what these "sufficient quantities" were, as a general proposition. While it would be unrealistic to require blood-gas studies of a claimant at the time of heart attack or the precise *825 level of noxious fumes in the environment at the time of heart attack to support a claim for compensation, it is not unrealistic to require a claimant to provide the Bureau with the scientific data necessary to inform its decision on causation and to warrant its reliance on circumstantial evidence. I therefore agree that the Bureau did not err in determining that the claimant did not prove a causal relationship between his heart attack and an exposure to noxious gases. Accordingly, I concur in the result. MESCHKE, J., concurs. [1] Dr. Hinrichs was Board Certified in Internal Medicine, not a general practitioner. [2] At the time of Schmalz's claim, in 1984, the relevant workers compensation statute dealing with heart attacks was section 65-01-02(7), N.D. C.C. The legislature subsequently amended the statute in 1989 through S.B. 2256. We do not consider whether or not that amendment will make a difference in our analysis of section 65-01-02, N.D.C.C., in the future. [3] Dr. Hinrichs testified that he relied on information provided to him by Schmalz's attorney. While this information may have been helpful to him, we do not give it as much credence as we would have had it been personal research done by Dr. Hinrichs.