Title: Davis v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1122 
____________ 
 
LEON DAVIS, JR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 10, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from two judgments of conviction of 
first-degree murder and two sentences of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Leon Davis, Jr. (Davis), was convicted in Polk County of the 
murders of Yvonne Bustamante and Juanita Luciano.  Davis now pursues the direct 
appeal of his convictions and sentences which are subject to automatic review by 
this Court.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s judgments 
of conviction and sentences of death.  We first set forth the facts of this case and 
we then address Davis’s claims on direct appeal.  We conclude by evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence used to convict Davis, the proportionality of Davis’s 
 
 
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death sentences, and Davis’s assertion that he is entitled to relief under Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (Hurst v. Florida). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Events at Headley Insurance 
The evidence introduced at Davis’s trial revealed the following.  Around 
3 p.m. on December 13, 2007, Davis entered the Lake Wales location of the 
Headley Insurance Agency (Headley) with the intent to commit robbery.  Davis 
was armed with a loaded .357 magnum revolver and equipped with duct tape, a 
cigarette lighter, gloves, a gasoline can that contained gasoline, and a lunch cooler 
to conceal the revolver. 
That afternoon, two Headley employees, Yvonne Bustamante (Bustamante) 
and Juanita Luciano (Luciano), were working.  Bustamante, a licensed customer 
service representative, had worked at Headley for nine years.  Luciano, a customer 
service representative, had worked at Headley for about three years.  At the time, 
Luciano was twenty-four weeks pregnant.  Upon entering the business, Davis 
locked the front door to prevent other customers from entering.  He also placed 
duct tape over the lens of a security camera.  Davis demanded money from the 
women, who initially refused to comply. 
Davis then forced the women to open the company’s safe and cash box, 
which contained a combined amount of about $900.  During the course of the 
 
 
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robbery, Davis bound the women with duct tape, poured gasoline on them, and set 
them on fire.  At 3:35 p.m., one of the women activated the office’s panic alarm, 
which sent a signal to the alarm company.  The Lake Wales Police Department was 
contacted one minute later. 
Victims Seek Help; Davis Shoots Bystander 
Bustamante and Luciano escaped the burning building and ran in separate 
directions seeking help.  Bustamante eventually ran to the parking lot of the 
Headley building, and Luciano ran to a nearby restaurant, Havana Nights.  As 
Bustamante tried to escape, Davis shot her in her left hand. 
By this time, concerned people who lived nearby had noticed the presence of 
smoke and walked to the area to investigate.  These people, Fran Murray, Brandon 
Greisman, and Carlos Ortiz, were on the scene before emergency personnel arrived 
and became eyewitnesses to the aftermath of the robbery.  Another eyewitness, 
Evelyn Anderson, was a Headley customer who arrived at Headley while the 
robbery was in progress.  At trial, these eyewitnesses testified about the events at 
Headley, including their various encounters with Davis. 
Fran Murray (formerly Fran Branch) testified that at the time of the robbery, 
she was sitting outside of her apartment and saw smoke nearby.  She walked 
toward the smoke to investigate its source.  Around the same time, her neighbors, 
 
 
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including Greisman and Ortiz, also noticed the smoke.  They all proceeded to walk 
toward the smoke to investigate. 
As Murray approached the smoke, she realized that it was coming from the 
Headley building.  She then saw Bustamante, who was yelling for help and whose 
body was burning.  Murray observed that Bustamante was wriggling her wrists to 
free them of a thick gray tape, and that Bustamante’s “skin was falling off of her.”  
“And, just, she wasn’t screaming, but she wasn’t talking lightly either.  She was 
just trying to get away.” 
As Greisman approached the building, he saw a woman whose body was 
burning, and he went to help her.  At the same time, Greisman saw Davis walking 
towards them, and he originally thought that Davis was coming to help the 
distressed woman.  Greisman made eye contact with Davis, who pulled a gun out 
of the cooler that he was carrying and pointed it at Greisman.  Greisman tried to 
get away, but Davis shot him in the face, hitting him in the nose.  The gunshot 
caused profuse bleeding and removed the tip of Greisman’s nose. 
Murray, who was still in the vicinity, heard popping sounds and saw 
Greisman fall to the ground and catch himself with his hands.  She saw Davis walk 
away and place a gun into his lunch cooler.  Murray then assisted Greisman, who 
was getting up from the ground. 
 
 
- 5 - 
Carlos Ortiz also heard the popping sounds as he approached the Headley 
building.  As he got closer to the building, Greisman was walking back toward him 
with a bloody face.  Greisman told Ortiz that he had been shot, and Ortiz saw 
Davis behind Greisman.  Ortiz saw a part of the gun that Davis was carrying, and 
he saw Davis stick his hand into the lunch cooler.  Ortiz made eye contact with 
Davis while trying to help Greisman as well as make sure that Davis was not 
following them.  Greisman walked back to his home, and Ortiz and Murray 
assisted him while awaiting the arrival of emergency help. 
Evelyn Anderson, a Headley customer, arrived at Headley to pay her 
insurance bill during the time that the robbery was taking place.  Anderson parked 
her sport utility vehicle in front of Headley, and her teenage granddaughter and 
infant grandson remained inside the vehicle.  When Anderson tried to open the 
front door of the Headley building, she discovered that it was locked.  Anderson 
walked to the side of the building to try and determine why she was unable to enter 
the building during normal business hours.  While walking, she noticed that smoke 
was coming out of the building.  Anderson also heard popping sounds, and shortly 
thereafter, Davis walked out of the building and placed the cooler under his arm.  
Anderson asked Davis what was happening.  Davis continued walking away but 
responded that there was a fire in the building.  Davis then walked to his vehicle, a 
 
 
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black Nissan Altima, that was parked at a vacant house nearby.  Davis got inside of 
the vehicle and drove away.1 
Shortly thereafter, Anderson came into contact with Bustamante.  Anderson 
received a minor burn on her hand when she touched Bustamante, who was 
screaming for help and was severely burned.  Bustamante walked towards 
Anderson’s vehicle, and Anderson’s granddaughter, who was seated in the front 
seat of the vehicle, ran away from the vehicle after seeing Bustamante’s burning 
body.  Bustamante walked to the open vehicle door and climbed inside the vehicle.  
Anderson encouraged Bustamante to get out of the vehicle because the paramedics 
were on the way.  Bustamante got out of the vehicle and leaned on the hood. 
By this time, Murray had finished attending to Greisman, and she returned to 
Headley to see if she could provide further help.  Murray saw Bustamante leaning 
against Anderson’s SUV.  Murray described the scene as follows: 
She [Bustamante] was um, screaming she was hot.  And that 
her skin was rolling off of her body at this time.  It was disgusting.  
You could smell the burnt skin and flesh.  And she was screaming she 
was really, really hot and she was thirsty.  And so I ran across the 
street at that time to Havana Nights, which was a restaurant, a Cuban 
                                          
 
 
1.  Earlier that afternoon, Murray saw a black car sitting on a back street 
near a vacant house.  After the robbery, she noticed that the car was not there.  
Additionally, Ortiz saw Davis walk away from the scene and towards the back of 
the vacant house.  Ortiz also noticed a black Nissan that he had not seen parked in 
that location before.  Ortiz saw the Nissan being driven away, but he did not see 
the driver. 
 
 
 
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restaurant, across the street of Headley, off of the other corner of 
Phillips, and got a cup of ice water in a to go cup. 
 
Murray returned to Bustamante with the cup of water, and Bustamante sipped from 
the cup while awaiting the arrival of emergency personnel.  Murray talked with 
Bustamante, and Murray described their conversation as follows: 
I introduced myself as Fran and she introduced herself as 
Yvonne.  We sat there talking a minute and she started to say—and I 
gave her water.  And, um, she said that she didn’t understand how 
anybody would rob her, she didn’t have any money.  And that her 
kids, please pray, I’m not going to make this Fran.  And I told her that 
I would get to the hospital if I could to see her, if it was allowed and 
that I would keep her in my prayers, that with God everything was 
possible.  She wanted to talk about her children.  And I cannot 
remember clearly if I asked her who did it, or if she was just talking.  
And she said that it was a black gentleman, and that he should be on 
video tape.  She then started crying again and said she loved her 
babies very much, and she doesn’t understand how anybody could do 
this to her. 
 
Bustamante also told Murray that she had been bound with tape, doused with 
gasoline, pushed into a bathroom, and set on fire. 
In the meantime, Luciano escaped the Headley building and ran to the 
nearby Havana Nights restaurant.  The restaurant’s owner, Jaidy Jiminez, heard a 
loud boom, and shortly thereafter, Luciano ran into the restaurant.  Although 
Luciano was a Havana Nights customer, she was so badly burned that Jiminez did 
not recognize her: “I saw a woman that was naked, burned, um, burned from head 
to toe, no shoes on, or any clothes on, just underwear.  But I couldn’t recognize 
her.” 
 
 
- 8 - 
Luciano asked for help and begged Jiminez to close the door because “he” 
was coming.  Jiminez helped Luciano, whom she realized was pregnant, sit down.  
Additionally, other people inside the restaurant were trying to call 9-1-1 and to 
assist Luciano.  Luciano asked what was taking so long for help to arrive and 
stated that she could not feel her baby moving.  Jiminez tried to reassure her.  It 
was during this time that Murray came into the restaurant asking for water, and 
Jiminez provided it to her.  Jiminez walked outside the restaurant to get help, and 
she saw the severely burned Bustamante.  Once the paramedics arrived and began 
to assist Bustamante, Jiminez told them that another injured woman, Luciano, was 
inside of the restaurant. 
Emergency Personnel Response 
Emergency dispatches increased in their sense of urgency as the initial report 
of a fire gave way to additional reports of injuries and a shooting.  Lt. Joe Elrod of 
the Lake Wales Police Department first encountered Greisman, who explained that 
he was shot while attempting to help a woman whom he heard screaming for help 
and soon discovered was on fire. 
Lt. Elrod determined that Greisman’s injuries were not life-threatening, and 
because emergency medical personnel were on the way to assist Greisman, he 
proceeded to the Headley building.  When Lt. Elrod arrived at Headley, emergency 
medical personnel were already on the scene and were assisting Bustamante in the 
 
 
- 9 - 
parking lot.  Lt. Elrod observed Bustamante’s severe burns, and he estimated that 
the burns covered about eighty percent of her body.  Lt. Elrod immediately 
understood the gravity of Bustamante’s injuries, and he decided not to wait until 
later to obtain Bustamante’s statement.  Lt. Elrod testified: “I knew she was going 
to die, so I tried to get information from her on who did it to her.”  “I asked her 
who did it to her.  And she told me it was Leon Davis.  And then I asked her, how 
she knew him.  And she said that she knows him and that he was [a] prior client of 
theirs in the Insurance Company.”  Bustamante explained that Davis tried to rob 
them, and when they did not give him money, he threw gasoline on them and set 
them on fire.  When they tried to run, Davis continued to throw gasoline on them. 
Lt. Elrod then located Luciano inside of the Havana Nights restaurant.  
When he walked inside the restaurant, he saw Luciano, who was “obviously 
pregnant,” sitting down.  Lt. Elrod characterized Luciano’s burn injuries as even 
worse than Bustamante’s.  Lt. Elrod went outside and told emergency personnel 
that another victim needed help who was in even worse condition than Bustamante.  
He then began dispatching the name “Leon Davis” to law enforcement and 
conducting routine duties at the crime scene. 
Paramedic John “Chip” Johnson and emergency medical technician Ernest 
Froehlich were the first emergency medical personnel to arrive on the scene.  Upon 
arrival, they first saw Bustamante, who was in the parking lot and leaning on 
 
 
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Anderson’s SUV.  Johnson observed: “the skin, everywhere I could see it, it was 
peeling back, and she had suffered major burns.  Also she had darkened hands, and 
a further injury to her left hand, [t]hat was my observations at that time.”  
Froehlich testified that Bustamante “looked like she had burns all over her body, 
hair singed off, most of her clothing was burned off, skin was hanging off her back 
and buttocks.” 
Froehlich was present when Lt. Elrod asked Bustamante if she knew who the 
perpetrator was, and he overheard Bustamante say “Leon Davis.”  Johnson also 
heard Bustamante state that Davis was the perpetrator, although he was unable to 
clearly hear Bustamante say Davis’s first name.  Anderson also heard Bustamante 
identify Davis as the perpetrator. 
After initially assisting Bustamante, Johnson went to Havana Nights to assist 
Luciano.  When Johnson entered the restaurant, he noticed water on the floor and 
saw Luciano, who was severely burned and “basically naked.”  There was a plastic 
substance on her wrists, neck area, and feet.  Luciano, who was conscious, 
breathing, and able to talk clearly, told Johnson that she was pregnant and that 
while working in her office, someone poured gasoline on her and set her on fire.  
Luciano also told Johnson that her wrists were burning, and Johnson went to the 
ambulance to get sterile water to alleviate her pain. 
 
 
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By this time, additional emergency medical personnel were dispatched to the 
scene.  Upon arrival, paramedic George Bailey assumed primary responsibility for 
Luciano’s care, and Johnson went back to the parking lot to continue assisting 
Bustamante.  Luciano was conscious and able to respond to questions.  She 
explained to Bailey “that there had been a robbery, at the business where she was 
at, she had been tied up or bound with tape, and had gasoline poured on her and 
had been lit on fire.”  Bailey did not ask her who harmed her, but Luciano told him 
that the person was a man and that she knew who it was.  Luciano also told Bailey 
that she was twenty-four weeks pregnant.  Bailey estimated that eighty percent of 
Luciano’s body was burned with second- and third-degree burns. 
Both Bustamante and Luciano were airlifted to the Orlando Regional 
Medical Center for treatment in the burn unit.  Luciano underwent an emergency 
caesarean section, during which she gave birth to her son, Michael Bustamante, Jr.2  
Although detectives went to the hospital in hopes of interviewing Bustamante and 
Luciano, the severity of their injuries prevented the detectives from ever meeting 
with them. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Yvonne Bustamante’s brother, Michael Bustamante, was in a relationship 
with Luciano and was the father of baby Michael. 
 
 
 
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Michael lived for three days after his emergency delivery.  He died as the 
result of extreme prematurity.  Bustamante lived for five days, and Luciano lived 
for three weeks.  Autopsies of both women revealed that they died from 
complications of thermal burns due to the fire.  According to the medical examiner, 
Bustamante suffered burns that covered eighty to ninety percent of her body.  
Luciano suffered burns that covered about ninety percent of her body.  
Additionally, the autopsy of Bustamante revealed bullet fragments from the 
gunshot to her left hand, although the gunshot was not a cause of her death. 
Events after the Robbery 
After leaving the scene, Davis went to a branch of the Mid Florida Credit 
Union, where he was an established customer.  At 4:19 p.m., less than forty-five 
minutes after the alarm was activated at Headley, Davis walked into the credit 
union to make a cash deposit.  Jessica Lacy, the teller who assisted Davis, was 
familiar with him as a customer and knew Davis by name.  Davis deposited $148 
in cash into his account that previously had a balance of $5.33.  While processing 
Davis’s transaction, Lacy observed that Davis’s face was bloody and appeared to 
have scratches and marks on the nose, lip, and chin.  The credit union branch 
manager, Valerie Dollison, was also working that afternoon.  She did not 
personally know Davis, but she heard someone call him “Leon.” 
 
 
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Davis also went to the house where his brother, Garrion Davis (Garrion), 
and Garrion’s girlfriend, Melissa Sellers, resided.3  Garrion testified that on the 
afternoon of December 13, “my brother came to my house.  He wanted to—he 
needed some soap to wash his face.  And he went outside my house and washed his 
face.  I noticed he had a scratch on his face.  He told me he had robbed somebody.”  
Garrion testified that Davis also came inside the house and took a shower.  Garrion 
estimated that Davis was at the house for ten to fifteen minutes. 
Sellers, who was at home with Garrion at the time, testified about Davis’s 
visit to their house that afternoon.  Sellers wished Davis, whose birthday was the 
next day, a happy early birthday.  She estimated that Davis was at her house for ten 
minutes or less, and although she was not certain whether he had taken a shower, 
she knew that he had been in their bathroom.  When Davis left, Sellers observed 
that Garrion’s demeanor had changed.  Garrion seemed upset and was teary-eyed.   
Later, Davis went to a friend’s home, where he used the cell phone of a 
woman named Fonda Roberts.  Roberts was unable to hear Davis’s conversation, 
which lasted a couple of minutes.  When Davis was finished using the phone, he 
started to hand the phone to Roberts and then pulled it back from her.  Davis then 
                                          
 
 
3.  By the time of trial, Sellers and Garrion were married. 
 
 
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erased the number that he called.  Roberts observed that at the time, Davis was 
driving a black vehicle. 
Davis Turns Himself In 
As the afternoon progressed, a massive investigation began.  Davis’s 
photograph was shown on television as media began to report the events at 
Headley, and Davis’s family and friends became increasingly aware of Davis’s 
status as a suspect in the day’s events.  Davis’s family and friends frantically began 
trying to locate him in hopes that they could convince him to turn himself in safely. 
That evening, Davis called his sister, Noniece DeCosey, and asked her to 
come and pick him up near a McDonald’s.  Their mother, Linda Davis, 
accompanied DeCosey to meet Davis.  DeCosey drove them to a Circle K 
convenience store to meet Davis’s and DeCosey’s other sister, India Owens, and 
family friend Barry Gaston.  Upon arrival, Davis walked up to Gaston, hugged 
him, and said: “I hurt someone.”  When Gaston asked Davis what he did, Davis 
said that he did not know.  Davis and his mother got into a car with Owens and 
Gaston. 
Gaston, a former law enforcement officer, helped facilitate Davis turning 
himself in at the Polk County Sheriff’s substation.  Gaston testified that on the way 
to the substation, Davis laid his head on his mother’s lap in the backseat of the car 
and cried and sobbed.  Davis again said that he hurt somebody, but Gaston told 
 
 
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him not to say anything more.  Davis was turned over to the Polk County Sheriff’s 
Office without incident.  Davis was later transported from the Sheriff’s Office 
substation to the Bartow Air Base for further processing. 
A number of people with whom Davis came into contact later in the day 
testified at trial that Davis appeared to have some sort of injury to his nose.  The 
crime scene technician who photographed Davis after he was taken into custody 
and a law enforcement officer who interacted with Davis upon his transfer to the 
Bartow Air Base both testified that Davis appeared to have either scratches or a 
burn on his nose.  Additionally, Davis’s sister, Noniece DeCosey, saw a red mark 
on Davis’s nose that could have been a burn. 
That night, a black Nissan Altima was found at the Lagoon nightclub in 
Winter Haven.  Law enforcement officers were dispatched to the location, and the 
car was seized pending a warrant to search the car’s interior.  Searches conducted 
in the vicinity of where the car was located, in particular to look for a firearm, did 
not reveal any additional evidence.  The following day, after the search warrant 
was signed, law enforcement conducted an interior search of the Altima.  Davis’s 
driver license was found inside the car. 
Davis was later tried for three counts of first-degree murder (Bustamante, 
Luciano, and baby Michael), one count of attempted first-degree murder 
(Greisman), one count of armed robbery, and one count of first-degree arson. 
 
 
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The Guilt Phase 
The State’s theory at trial was that Davis, a man driven by mounting 
financial pressures, planned the robbery of Headley, a business with which he was 
familiar.  Davis’s business relationship with Headley dated back to 2004, and as 
reflected in various records, Davis’s insurance needs were primarily handled by 
Bustamante.  The State introduced evidence that established a timeline of events 
leading up to the robbery, including Davis’s actions on the day of the robbery.  A 
summary of this evidence follows. 
 
In the months leading up to the robbery, Davis experienced increasing 
financial difficulty.  Davis, who at the time was married to his wife Victoria, was 
primarily responsible for the family obligations, including the mortgage payment 
on their home.  At the time, Davis and his wife had two cars: a blue Nissan 
Maxima owned by Davis, and a black Nissan Altima owned by Victoria.  Both 
vehicles were insured under policies written by Headley.  In June 2007, during a 
visit to the Mid Florida Credit Union, Davis became aware that the amount of the 
automatic debit from his account for his insurance coverage had been increasing 
over time.  Davis was also informed that his account was overdrawn and became 
irate. 
Unable to afford insurance for both cars, Davis and Victoria removed the 
license plate from the Maxima, canceled the car’s insurance policy, and relied 
 
 
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solely on the Altima for transportation.  The couple was also unable to afford cell 
phone service during this time.  Victoria had been working, but she became 
pregnant and was forced to stop working because of pregnancy complications. 
Davis’s Plan to Rob Headley 
Davis’s plan to rob Headley began to coalesce in early December.  By this 
time, the couple had reached the limits on their credit cards, and the mortgage 
payment was delinquent.  One week before the robbery, Headley customer 
Virginia Vazquez saw Davis at Headley.  She first saw Davis in the parking lot 
looking in the back of a black car.  Then, Davis went inside and began talking with 
Bustamante.  Vazquez and her husband waited inside the insurance agency for 
fifteen to twenty minutes before Bustamante finished talking with Davis.  Vazquez 
later recognized Davis from news coverage as the person she saw during her visit 
to Headley. 
Davis’s preparation for the robbery also involved acquiring various items 
that he would need in order to carry out the robbery, including a gun and 
ammunition.  On December 7, 2007, six days before the robbery, Davis went to 
visit his cousin, Randy Black.  Davis told Black that he needed a gun for personal 
protection because he was going to travel to Miami.  Black owned two guns, 
including a recently purchased Dan Wesson .357 magnum revolver.  Black showed 
Davis both guns, and Davis opted to purchase the .357 magnum for around $200.  
 
 
- 18 - 
Black also gave Davis .38 caliber bullets which were compatible with the .357 
magnum.  Davis and Black fired the revolver, which was operating normally.  
Later, Davis showed his mother the revolver.  Davis told her that he got the 
revolver from Black and that he and Black fired it.4 
Davis’s Actions on the Day of the Robbery 
 
The evidence introduced at trial also established a detailed timeline of 
Davis’s actions on the day of the robbery, which included a visit to Walmart to 
purchase supplies that he would use later that day.  On the morning of 
December 13, Victoria Davis last saw her husband at about 6 a.m.  Before 7 a.m., 
Davis took his son, who had spent the previous night with Davis and Victoria, 
home to the boy’s mother, Dawn Henry.  His son’s birthday was that day. 
Davis then went to the Lake Wales Walmart, where surveillance video and 
still photographs showed him making three separate purchases around 7 a.m.  The 
first purchase included a cap, long-sleeved shirt, and soft, orange lunch cooler.  
Davis’s second purchase was a pair of gloves, and the third purchase was a Bic 
cigarette lighter.  All of the purchases were cash transactions. 
                                          
 
 
4.  After Black realized that law enforcement was looking for Davis, he 
immediately contacted law enforcement to advise that he recently sold Davis a 
gun.  Black also provided law enforcement with two .38 caliber bullets and the 
receipt documenting his original purchase of the gun. 
  
 
 
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While at Walmart, Davis spoke with the store manager, Mark Gammons, 
and a store employee, Jennifer DeBarros.  Gammons testified that Davis 
approached him and asked where gloves were located in the store.  When 
Gammons saw Davis’s picture on the news that evening, he realized that he had 
seen Davis in Walmart that morning.  Walmart employee Jennifer DeBarros had 
known Davis for more than ten years and was a family friend.  DeBarros testified 
that on the morning of December 13, she talked with Davis during his visit to 
Walmart.  DeBarros talked with Davis about his son’s birthday. 
Some time after leaving Walmart, Davis drove to the home of his sister, 
India Owens.  Davis then accompanied Owens to take her car for repairs and pick 
up a rental car.  They later went to pick up some furniture, and they stopped at a 
restaurant for lunch.  Davis seemed agitated while eating lunch.   
Video surveillance showed that Davis left the restaurant at 1:38 p.m.  Davis 
and Owens then delivered the furniture to Owens’s house.  During that time, 
Owens noticed that Davis began acting strangely, obsessively locking doors in the 
house.  Davis also asked for a piece of duct tape but did not say why he needed it.  
A short time later, Davis left Owens’s house.  Although Davis’s son had a birthday 
party at school that afternoon, Davis did not attend.  Davis entered the Headley 
building sometime around 3 p.m. 
 
 
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The Investigation 
In addition to evidence surrounding the events at Headley, their aftermath, 
and Davis’s behavior leading up to and including the day of the robbery, the State 
introduced evidence regarding various aspects of the investigation.   
The expansive crime scene investigation spanned several days, and the 
numerous crime scene photographs entered into evidence depicted a gruesome 
series of events that began inside the Headley building and continued outside.    
The exterior photographs depict the entrance to Headley, the parking lot, 
Anderson’s vehicle, and the trail of bloody footprints and burnt skin that led from 
the Headley building to Havana Nights.  Anderson’s SUV was smeared with blood 
on both sides of the hood and was marked by blood stains on the vehicle doors and 
in the passenger side interior.   
The interior photographs captured the damage in various areas of the 
Headley building, including fire damage in the office area, the storage area, and the 
extensively damaged bathroom.  Among the widespread fire damage to and debris 
in the Headley building, the interior crime scene photographs revealed the presence 
of blood, a severely burnt chair, two cigarette lighters (one of which was identified 
as a Bic lighter), burnt duct tape, a burnt plastic gasoline can, an open cash box that 
contained only coins, an open and empty safe, a bloody alarm key pad, and burnt 
 
 
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surveillance equipment.  The photographs also showed bullet holes in a wall, a 
door, and an exterior shed door.  A bullet was retrieved from the shed floor.   
Detective Jeff Batz, an arson investigator, detected the odor of gasoline 
inside the Headley building, and noted that it was particularly strong near the rear 
of the building.  Batz identified three areas of fire origin inside the Headley 
building: a chair located near the front door, the storage room, and the bathroom.  
Batz testified as follows: “Three-points of origin, separate in nature[,] neither one 
of them had connections with each other, directly through flame impingement. 
They all started with an open flame type device and accelerant was used on all 
three areas.”   
The investigation also included an examination of the seized Nissan Altima.  
When the car’s floor mats were analyzed for the presence of an accelerant, a 
certified accelerant detection K-9 alerted to the presence of accelerant on the 
driver’s floor mat and the passenger rear floor mat.   
Several days after the robbery, a search warrant was executed at Davis’s 
home.  Although trial testimony revealed that Davis was responsible for the yard 
work at his home and that he kept a lawn mower and a gasoline can in the garage, 
law enforcement located only the lawn mower.  No gasoline can was found at 
Davis’s home.   
 
 
- 22 - 
The gun used in the Headley crimes was never recovered.  However, the 
rifling characteristics of the projectiles retrieved from the crime scene and from 
Bustamante’s hand were determined to be consistent with the rifling characteristics 
of handgun manufacturer Dan Wesson, the manufacturer of the .357 magnum 
revolver that Davis bought several days before the robbery.   
The Verdict and the Penalty Phase 
 
On February 15, 2011, the jury convicted Davis of six counts: the           
first-degree murders of Bustamante, Luciano, and baby Michael; the attempted 
first-degree murder of Greisman; armed robbery; and first-degree arson.  The 
penalty phase began two days after the jury rendered its guilty verdicts, wherein 
the State sought to prove seven aggravating circumstances.  In addition to 
testimony from Davis’s probation officer and the medical examiner, the State 
presented victim impact testimony from Bustamante’s and Luciano’s families. 
Angela Bryson, the State’s first witness, was Davis’s felony probation 
officer.  Bryson testified that Davis was placed on probation for grand theft on    
July 6, 2007.  Davis was still on probation at the time of the Headley crimes.      
Dr. Stephen Nelson, the medical examiner, returned to the stand as the State’s 
second witness.  Dr. Nelson provided further testimony regarding the injuries 
sustained by Bustamante and Luciano:  
They would begin to feel pain immediately upon the fire starting to 
consume their skin.  The burns that are present on these victims is 
 
 
- 23 - 
approximately 80 to 90% of the body surface area.  It is third and 
fourth degree burns.  First-degree burn is a sunburn, a second-degree 
burn is a blistered sunburn, a third-degree would be a full thickness 
burn that goes through the full thickness of the skin, involves nerve 
endings.  And fourth degree burns would largely be charred, burns 
where the skin is charred.  So, the first-degree and second-degree 
burns, I think we have all had sunburns, we know how painful those 
are.  If we have a sunburn, a second degree burn that has fluid filled 
vessel that pops, that’s painful.  The third-degree burn, again, it 
involves the degree of thickness that is burned through skin.  And the 
third-degree burns are painful in that they produce the burning 
sensation itself, up to a point at which point the nerve endings under 
their skin are damaged.  And then there is no more pain or nerve 
signal that is sent from the fire.  However in addition to the burn being 
produced by the gasoline, whatever it is that is on their skin that’s 
flaming, the subsequent treatment for a burn is also painful. 
 
Dr. Nelson also testified that both women would have been capable of feeling pain 
in some areas even if their nerve endings were destroyed in others.  Both women, 
who were so severely injured that an IV could not be inserted into their veins, 
would have experienced pain when intraosseous catheters were inserted into their 
leg bones to receive medication.  The women would have stopped experiencing 
pain once they received the medication or were medically induced into a coma, but 
they could have been conscious of what was going on until that point.    
After the State’s penalty phase presentation, Davis offered evidence in 
mitigation and alleged the existence of two statutory mitigating circumstances and 
fifteen non-statutory mitigating circumstances.   
Multiple witnesses testified that Davis’s childhood was marked by abuse.  
When Davis was eight years old, he was sexually assaulted by another child.  The 
 
 
- 24 - 
following year, a woman named Ms. Clark moved into the family home as a 
roommate.  Sometime later, Davis and his brother Garrion moved out of the family 
home and began staying with Clark, who was an alcoholic and was physically and 
verbally abusive.  Clark routinely beat Davis, and on one occasion, she caused 
severe injuries to the back of his body by beating him with an extension cord.  
Clark taunted Davis with physical and verbal abuse because he was bullied by 
other children, and she also hit him with water hoses and punched him in the chest.  
Family members observed physical injuries such as welts, bleeding, and open 
scabs and sores on Davis’s body.   
Additionally, Davis suffered from ongoing depressive and mood episodes, in 
part due to the bullying he suffered from elementary school through high school.  
In middle school, Davis began talking about suicide, and his mother encouraged 
him not to take his life.  Davis received mental health counseling for two to three 
months, but his problems continued.  After graduating from high school, Davis 
joined the United States Marine Corps.  However, the following year, Davis was 
involved in a vehicle accident and he revealed that he intentionally crashed the 
vehicle that he was driving.  Pursuant to a recommendation for an administrative 
separation, Davis was discharged from military service.     
Although Davis was only about one year old when his father moved out of 
the family home, his father remained a part of Davis’s life.  While growing up, 
 
 
- 25 - 
Davis and his siblings were separated and placed in foster care, but Davis remained 
close with his mother and siblings.  Davis’s sister, India Owens, described him as 
compassionate, loving, and selfless.  After Davis’s discharge from the military, he 
met a woman named Dawn Henry, with whom he had a son.  The child was born 
with Down Syndrome.  Henry testified that while she had trouble adjusting to 
being a mother of a child with special needs, Davis immediately accepted their son 
and was consistently present in his life.   
Around the time of the robbery, Davis was depressed and upset that he could 
not afford to do anything for his son’s birthday.  Davis’s mother testified that when 
Davis purchased the revolver shortly before the robbery, she was concerned that 
Davis might use it to commit suicide.   
Jury Recommendations and Spencer Hearing 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended 
that Davis be sentenced to death for the murders of Bustamante and Luciano.  By a 
vote of eight to four, the jury recommended that Davis be sentenced to death for 
the murder of baby Michael.  The Court subsequently held a Spencer5 hearing at 
which both parties presented additional argument but did not present additional 
evidence.  
                                          
 
 
5.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
- 26 - 
Sentencing 
 
The trial court sentenced Davis to death for the murders of Bustamante and 
Luciano.  In its sentencing order, the trial court found the existence of six 
aggravating circumstances as to the murders of both women: (1) the capital felony 
was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and on felony 
probation (some weight); (2) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed 
in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or 
legal justification (CCP) (great weight); (3) the defendant was contemporaneously 
convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to the person (very great weight); (4) the capital felony was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or in 
flight after committing or attempting to commit any robbery or arson (moderate 
weight); (5) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain (little weight); 
and (6) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great 
weight).6  The trial court found a seventh aggravating circumstance as to the 
murder of Bustamante; the felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest (some weight).  The court also evaluated this 
                                          
 
 
6.  The trial court noted that improper doubling did not occur with the trial 
court’s finding of both murder in the course of a robbery and pecuniary gain, 
because the jury convicted Davis of separate offenses of armed robbery and first-
degree arson. 
 
 
- 27 - 
aggravating circumstance with respect to the murder of Luciano but rejected it as 
not proven. 
The trial court also considered two statutory mitigating circumstances.  Due 
to Davis’s prior felony convictions, the trial court rejected as statutory mitigation 
his argument that he had no significant prior criminal history.  However, the trial 
court did find that the crime was committed while Davis was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight).  As nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances, the trial court found the following: (1) the defendant was 
the victim of bullying throughout his childhood (slight to moderate weight); (2) the 
defendant was the victim of sexual assault as a child (slight to moderate weight); 
(3) the defendant was the victim of both physical and emotional child abuse by a 
caretaker (moderate weight); (4) the defendant was the victim of overall family 
dynamics (very little weight); (5) the defendant served in the United States Marine 
Corps (very little weight); (6) the defendant had a history of being suicidal, both as 
a child and as an adult (slight weight); (7) the defendant was diagnosed with a 
personality disorder (slight weight); (8) the defendant had a history of depression 
(slight weight); (9) stress the defendant was dealing with at the time of the incident 
(little weight); (10) the defendant was a good person in general (very slight 
weight); (11) the defendant was a good worker (very slight weight); (12) the 
defendant was a good son, good sibling, and good husband (very slight weight); 
 
 
- 28 - 
(13) the defendant was a good father to a child with Down Syndrome (moderate 
weight); (14) the defendant exhibited good behavior during the trial and other court 
proceedings (very slight weight); and (15) the defendant exhibited good behavior 
while in jail (little weight).   
The trial court overrode the jury’s recommendation of death and imposed a 
sentence of life imprisonment for the murder of Michael.  Davis now challenges 
his convictions and sentences and raises multiple issues for this Court’s 
consideration. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Davis raises four issues, which we address in turn:   
(1) whether the trial court erred when it admitted the statements of victim 
Bustamante as a dying declaration; (2) whether the photopack identifications of 
Davis, made by victim Greisman and eyewitness Ortiz, should have been excluded; 
(3) whether photographs of the murder victims were unfairly prejudicial; and      
(4) whether the trial court improperly found that Davis committed the murder of 
Bustamante in order to avoid arrest.  The State also raises two issues on cross-
appeal.  However, given our resolution of this direct appeal, we decline to reach 
the State’s cross-appeal. 
 
 
- 29 - 
I.  Dying Declaration of Yvonne Bustamante 
 
Davis argues that the trial court erred when it admitted, as a dying 
declaration, statements made by Bustamante to Lt. Elrod.  While at the scene,      
Lt. Elrod questioned Bustamante about the events at Headley.  When Lt. Elrod 
asked Bustamante whether she knew the perpetrator’s identity, Bustamante 
identified Davis.  Before trial, Davis filed a motion to exclude Bustamante’s 
statements, and the trial court held an extensive evidentiary hearing during which it 
received testimony from multiple witnesses.   
At the hearing, Lt. Elrod testified that when he first approached Bustamante, 
he observed a badly burned woman lying on a gurney who appeared to be burned 
over about eighty percent of her body.  Lt. Elrod quickly surmised that Bustamante 
would not survive her injuries.  As a result, he began to ask Bustamante pointed 
questions for the purpose of obtaining her statement.  Lt. Elrod testified as follows: 
Lt. Elrod:  At that point, I knew she wasn’t going to survive the 
burns. 
 
State: 
Did that affect the way that you then began to handle 
your responsibilities as the first Lake Wales officer to 
have contact with her? 
 
Lt. Elrod:  Yes, sir. 
 
State:  
What—what did you do?  Why did you do it? 
 
Lt. Elrod:  I wanted to get her statement before it wouldn’t ever be 
gotten. 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
State: 
Now, normally, if you were the first officer on the scene, 
someone is being treated by medical personnel, would 
you just go ahead and start asking them questions if you 
thought they were going to survive and be in the 
hospital? 
 
Lt. Elrod:  No, sir.  I would have let the medical people try to take 
care of them. 
 
State: 
But in this case, did you go ahead and begin to actually 
speak with the woman on the gurney and ask her very 
pointed questions? 
 
Lt. Elrod:  Yes, sir. 
 
When Lt. Elrod asked Bustamante what happened, Bustamante explained 
that she and Luciano were working when Davis entered their office, demanded 
money from them, and tried to rob them.  She said that when they did not give 
Davis the money that he wanted, he threw gasoline on them and set them on fire.  
Lt. Elrod asked her if she knew the perpetrator’s identity.  Bustamante told him, 
“yes, it was Leon Davis,” and that he was a client of their insurance business.  
Bustamante appeared coherent and alert, and she spoke clearly in response to Lt. 
Elrod’s questions.   
Other witnesses at the evidentiary hearing also testified that they heard 
Bustamante describe the events at Headley and identify Davis.  Additionally, 
medical personnel testified about Bustamante’s grave physical condition, and 
eyewitness Fran Murray testified that Bustamante stated that she was going to die.  
Following the hearing, the trial court determined that Bustamante’s statements 
 
 
- 31 - 
were admissible as a dying declaration.  Her statements were admitted at trial 
through the testimony of Lt. Elrod and other witnesses.  
Davis’s argument as to the admission of Bustamante’s dying declaration is 
twofold.  First, he encourages this Court to hold that, as a matter of law, the dying 
declaration is no longer a valid hearsay exception in Florida.  Davis argues that the 
dying declaration is not an exception to the United States Supreme Court’s holding 
in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the admission of a 
testimonial statement violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation where the declarant is unavailable and the defendant lacked a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant).  Second, Davis argues that even if the 
dying declaration survived Crawford, Bustamante’s statements to Lt. Elrod did not 
constitute a valid dying declaration because Bustamante did not have a fear of 
impending death.  As we explain below, we reject both arguments.7 
                                          
 
 
7.  Davis also contends that the trial court erroneously admitted 
Bustamante’s statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.  This 
argument is without merit.  The trial court observed that one of the cases it 
reviewed while evaluating Davis’s dying declaration arguments contained a 
discussion on forfeiture by wrongdoing, but the court in no way suggested that this 
doctrine was the basis for its decision.  The trial court set forth its conclusions as to 
the admissibility of Bustamante’s statements, and it specified the bases under 
which it deemed her statements admissible.  We therefore reject this argument 
without further discussion.  
 
 
- 32 - 
The Dying Declaration and Crawford 
 
Ratified in 1791, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  This 
protection extends to prosecutions in both federal and state courts.  See Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).  “Indeed, [the United States Supreme Court] 
ha[s] expressly declared that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine 
the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
due process of law.”  Id. at 405.  However, “the [Confrontation] Clause permits, 
where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant 
despite the defendant’s inability to confront the declarant at trial.”  Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990).  One example where such a necessity may 
arise is in the context of the admission of a declarant’s dying declaration.   
The admissibility of the dying declaration was recognized at common law on 
the grounds that such declarations are “made in extremity, when the party is at the 
point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to 
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations 
to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as 
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath 
administered in a court of justice.”  King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 
 
 
- 33 - 
Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (K.B. 1789).  More than a century ago, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that “from time immemorial [dying declarations] have 
been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this 
day to question their admissibility.  They are admitted, not in conformity with any 
general rule regarding the admission of testimony, but as an exception to such 
rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure of 
justice.”  Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).  “[The dying declaration] 
exception was well established before the adoption of the constitution, and was not 
intended to be abrogated.  The ground upon which such exception rests is that, 
from the circumstances under which dying declarations are made, they are 
equivalent to the evidence of a living witness upon oath[.]”  Kirby v. U.S., 174 
U.S. 47, 61 (1899). 
Similarly, Florida has long recognized the dying declaration as a valid 
exception to the rule against hearsay: 
Dying declarations in cases of homicide form an exception to the rule 
against the admissibility of hearsay evidence.  The law regards the 
declarant, when in the presence of imminent and inevitable death, as 
being under as solemn an inspiration to tell the truth as though he 
were pledged thereto by oath.  To render such declaration admissible, 
however, the court must be satisfied that the deceased declarant, at the 
time of their utterance, knew that his death was imminent and 
inevitable, and that he entertained no hope whatever of recovery.  This 
absence of all hope of recovery, and appreciation by the declarant of 
his speedy and inevitable death, are a preliminary foundation that 
must always be laid to make such declarations admissible. 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
Lester v. State, 20 So. 232, 233 (Fla. 1896).  
However, Davis argues that in light of the United States Supreme Court’s 
2004 decision in Crawford, the admission of a testimonial dying declaration 
violates the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.  This Court has previously 
recognized that in Crawford the U.S. Supreme Court “held that the introduction of 
a hearsay statement will result in a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation if (1) the statement is testimonial; (2) the declarant is 
unavailable; and (3) the defendant lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination 
of the declarant.”  Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 32 (Fla. 2009).  In the present 
case, the State introduced, as a dying declaration, out-of-court testimonial 
statements of the declarant, Bustamante.  Bustamante was unavailable to testify at 
trial, and Davis lacked a prior opportunity to cross-examine her.  Thus, Davis 
argues that Bustamante’s statements were inadmissible under the holding in 
Crawford.   
 
Following the evidentiary hearing on Davis’s motion to exclude 
Bustamante’s statements, the trial court issued a detailed order in which it found 
that Bustamante’s statements were admissible as a dying declaration.  Further, the 
trial court expressly rejected Davis’s argument that Florida’s dying declaration 
exception did not survive Crawford: “This Court specifically finds that the dying 
declaration has survived Crawford.  A dying declaration is an exception to the 
 
 
- 35 - 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”  The trial court concluded that “the 
statements made by Ms. Bustamante to Frances Murray, Vicky Rivera, Evelyn 
Anderson, Ashley Smith, Lt. Joe E. Elrod, Jr., other law enforcement personnel, or 
medical personnel, that may be considered to be testimonial in nature, would still 
be admissible under the hearsay exception for dying declarations, because the 
dying declaration rule has remained valid post-Crawford.”   
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not answered whether the 
dying declaration exception remains viable in light of Crawford.  Yet, in dicta, the 
Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the matter.  Notably, in Crawford, 
although the facts of that case did not involve a dying declaration, the Court 
observed that dying declarations have been the “one deviation” to the rule 
excluding testimonial hearsay in criminal cases: 
The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations. 
The existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay 
law cannot be disputed. . . .  Although many dying declarations may 
not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that 
clearly are. . . .  We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth 
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying 
declarations.  If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, 
it is sui generis. 
 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (internal citations omitted).  Subsequently, in Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008), the Supreme Court stated: “We have 
previously acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements were admitted 
at common law even though they were unconfronted.  The first of these were 
 
 
- 36 - 
declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and aware that 
he was dying.”  Courts that have confronted the post-Crawford viability of the 
dying declaration have generally interpreted these statements as strong suggestions 
by the United States Supreme Court that the dying declaration exception does not 
run afoul of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.8  Davis now calls upon 
                                          
 
 
8.  See, e.g., People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004) 
(concluding that “the common law pedigree of the exception for dying declarations 
poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment.”); Walton v. State, 603 S.E.2d 263, 
265-66 (Ga. 2004) (recognizing that Crawford did not extend its holding to dying 
declarations); People v. Gilmore, 828 N.E.2d 293, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(concluding “that the [United States Supreme] Court does not believe that 
admitting testimonial dying declarations violates the confrontation clause.”); 
Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 993-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting 
appellant’s argument that the dying declaration offends an accused’s right to 
confrontation); State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 821-22 (Kan. 2008) (concluding that 
“the [United States] Supreme Court would confirm that a dying declaration may be 
admitted into evidence, even when it is testimonial in nature and is 
unconfronted.”); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310-11 (Mass. 2008) 
(recognizing Crawford’s acknowledgment of the dying declaration as an exception 
under the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation); State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 
578, 585-86 (Minn. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Moua Her, 750 
N.W.2d 258, 265 n.5 (Minn. 2008) (holding “that the admission into evidence of a 
dying declaration does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation within the meaning of Crawford because an exception for dying 
declarations existed at common law and was not repudiated by the Sixth 
Amendment.”); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006) (holding that 
the dying declaration is an exception to the Confrontation Clause); State v. 
Calhoun, 657 S.E.2d 424, 426-28 (N.C. 2008) (holding that dying declarations do 
not violate the Sixth Amendment); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 147-48 (Tenn. 
2007) (holding “that this single hearsay exception survives the mandate of 
Crawford regardless of its testimonial nature”); State v. Beauchamp, 796 N.W.2d 
780, 795 (Wis. 2011) (concluding that “a hearsay exception as long-standing, well-
established and still necessary as [the dying declaration], . . . cannot lightly be 
dismissed.”).  
 
 
- 37 - 
this Court to determine whether Florida’s dying declaration exception remains 
viable post-Crawford. 
Majority View vs. Minority View 
Davis acknowledges that although there is a split of authority on whether the 
dying declaration survived Crawford, his position, that the exception is no longer 
viable, reflects the minority view.  Nonetheless, he asserts two main points in 
support of his position.  First, Davis argues that Florida’s dying declaration 
exception is inconsistent with the dying declaration that existed at common law, 
and thus, it does not satisfy Crawford’s historical grounds exception.  Second, 
Davis maintains that the dying declaration is not a valid hearsay exception because 
dying declarations are inherently unreliable.  Today, Davis’s arguments 
notwithstanding, this Court joins the overwhelming majority view that the dying 
declaration exception remains viable post-Crawford.  The unique nature and 
purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, 
justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against 
hearsay.  We therefore reaffirm the continued use of the dying declaration in this 
state in a manner that is consistent with the applicable law that defines the 
exception.  
                                          
 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
Historical Grounds 
Davis first argues that Florida’s dying declaration exception is no longer 
valid because the modern exception has evolved from that which existed at 
common law.  Davis asserts that at common law, the justification for admitting a 
declarant’s dying declaration was the declarant’s religious belief in the afterlife, 
and he maintains that in contrast to a justification based on the declarant’s religious 
belief, Florida’s existing dying declaration is secular and nondenominational.  See 
§ 90.804(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (requiring an unavailable declarant’s reasonable belief 
“that his or her death was imminent, concerning the physical cause or 
instrumentalities of what the declarant believed to be impending death or the 
circumstances surrounding impending death.”).  Consequently, Davis argues, 
Crawford’s “historical grounds” for Florida’s dying declaration exception can no 
longer be used to justify the admission of a dying declaration in Florida’s courts.  
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.  
It is true that “[t]he [dying declaration] hearsay exception has sometimes 
been justified on the grounds that a dying person was presumed under the common 
law to have, due to commonly held religious beliefs concerning the afterlife, such a 
fear of dying without the opportunity to expiate a lie that the reliability of any 
statement made in those circumstances was deemed equivalent to that of sworn 
testimony.”  State v. Beauchamp, 796 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 2011).  Thus, Davis 
 
 
- 39 - 
argues that Florida’s dying declaration exception does not fall under the “historical 
grounds” suggested in Crawford, because it lacks the religious justification that 
existed at common law.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
Davis cites to a footnote in State v. Hailes, 92 A.3d 544 (Md. Ct. App. 
2014), aff’d, 113 A.3d 608 (Md. 2015), a Maryland intermediate appellate court 
decision wherein the court suggests that if the United States Supreme Court were 
to define “the precise contours of the Dying Declaration that enjoys the exemption 
. . . it is overwhelmingly probable that the object of the exemption will be the 
common law Dying Declaration as it was understood to be in 1791.”  Id. at 567 
n.11.9  Davis also cites to U.S. v. Jordan, No. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501 
(D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2005), an unpublished memorandum and order in which a federal 
district court suggests that historical underpinnings do not continue to justify the 
dying declaration.  The court concludes that “there is no rationale in Crawford or 
otherwise under which dying declarations should be treated differently than any 
other testimonial statement.  This is so especially since the historical underpinnings 
of the exception fail to justify it.”  Id. at *3. 
                                          
 
 
9.  This dicta is consistent with the minority view that Davis urges this Court 
to adopt.  However, the court ultimately held in Hailes that the dying declaration in 
Maryland remains viable post-Crawford: “This juggernaut of persuasive authority 
is irresistible.  Maryland hereby joins the ranks.  We hold that the Dying 
Declaration, like Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, is exempted from the coverage of the 
Confrontation Clause.”  Id. at 567 (footnote omitted). 
 
 
- 40 - 
However, the religious justification as the sole or primary justification of the 
dying declaration has not been universally accepted.  In 1860, Wigmore on 
Evidence included the following analysis:  
[A dying declaration] is not received upon any other ground 
than that of necessity, in order to prevent murder going unpunished. 
What is said in the books about the situation of the declarant, he being 
virtually under the most solemn sanction to speak the truth, is far from 
presenting the true ground of the admission. . . .  [T]he rule is no 
doubt based upon the presumption that in the majority of cases there 
will be no other equally satisfactory proof of the same facts.  This 
presumption and the consequent probability of the crime going 
unpunished is unquestionably the chief ground of this exception in the 
law of evidence. 
 
Wigmore on Evidence, § 1431 (quoting 1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 156, editorial note 
(1860) (emphasis supplied)).  “It is scarcely necessary to say that, to the rule that 
an accused is entitled to be confronted with witnesses against him, the admission 
of dying declarations is an exception which arises from the necessity of the cause.”  
Kirby, 174 U.S. at 61.  A declarant’s religious belief notwithstanding, the dying 
declaration exception recognizes the extraordinary nature of the dying person’s 
ability to speak to the circumstances that placed her in that grave position, and 
quite possibly to identify the perpetrator and ensure that the one who commits 
murder is held accountable.  As such, we reject Davis’s argument.   
Reliability of the Dying Declaration 
Davis also argues that dying declarations are inherently unreliable.  He cites 
to U.S. v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (S.D. Ohio 2005), where a federal 
 
 
- 41 - 
district court expressly “reject[ed] the government’s argument that dying 
declarations are an exception to the Confrontation Clause.”  Id. at 965.  The court 
stated that it “doubts the inherent reliability of such statements,” and it noted the 
incentives that even a dying person might have to offer false dying statements.  Id. 
at 965 n.5.  The court observed: 
For example, the declarant might have been in a revengeful 
state of mind which would color his dying statements.  No longer 
subject to the fear of retaliation by his enemies, the declarant might 
falsely incriminate those persons whom he disliked.  If the decedent 
had no religious belief or fear of punishment after death, the 
statements made while dying would seem to lose much of the 
trustworthiness traditionally attributed to them.  In general, self-
serving declarations would be particularly suspect, for the decedent 
could thereby exculpate himself from questionable association with 
the circumstances surrounding his death.  The declarant’s physical and 
mental state of mind at the moment of death may weaken the 
reliability of his statements. 
 
Id. (quoting Note, Affidavits, Depositions, and Prior Testimony, 46 Iowa L. R. 
356, 375-76 (1961)). 
 
While not impossible, we do think it improbable that a dying person would 
use the fleeting moments of her earthly existence to, rather than place blame at the 
feet of her actual murderer, intentionally falsely incriminate someone else.  After 
all, “[t]he admission of the [dying declaration] is justified upon the ground of 
necessity, and in view of the consideration that the certain expectation of almost 
immediate death will remove all temptation to falsehood and enforce as strict 
adherence to the truth as the obligation of an oath could impose.”  Mattox v. U.S., 
 
 
- 42 - 
146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892).  Consequently, we reject Davis’s challenge to the 
reliability of the dying declaration. 
Having concluded that both of Davis’s arguments are without merit, we 
reject his invitation to abrogate Florida’s dying declaration exception.  Our 
analysis and the conclusion that we reach today are consistent with that of other 
jurisdictions that have considered the post-Crawford viability of the dying 
declaration.  For instance, shortly after Crawford was decided, the California 
Supreme Court decided People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956 (2004), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 834 (2005).  In Monterroso, the court rejected the defendant’s claim “that 
Crawford has abrogated the exception for dying declarations.”  Id. at 972.  
Concluding that “the holding of Crawford does no such thing,” the court observed: 
To exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation 
would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and here, 
acquiesced in long since the adoption of these constitutional 
provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and 
regard for individual security and public safety which its exclusion in 
some cases would inevitably set at naught.   
 
Monterroso, 101 P.3d at 972 (quoting State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 438 (Mo. 
1858)).  The court concluded: “it follows that the common law pedigree of the 
exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).   
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the post-Crawford viability of the 
dying declaration in Beauchamp, 796 N.W.2d 780.  The court reasoned: “If we 
 
 
- 43 - 
were to accept that the Confrontation Clause, as set forth in Crawford’s seemingly 
unbending declaration, requires that all testimonial statements be subject to 
confrontation to test their reliability, we would exclude dying declarations as, by 
definition, unconfrontable, and therefore, statements whose reliability cannot be 
tested.”  Id. at 791.  We agree with the court in Beauchamp that “such a seemingly 
rigid approach cannot prevail here.”  Id.   
Most recently, the highest appellate court in Maryland, the Special Court of 
Appeals, affirmed the judgment in Hailes and held that the dying declaration 
remains viable in Maryland.  The state’s high court explained:  
Here, we reach the same conclusion that the Supreme Court has 
consistently endorsed for more than a century, and hold that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to dying declarations. . . . 
Although it is accurate that, in Crawford and its progeny, the Supreme 
Court has not yet held that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to 
dying declarations, our holding is entirely consistent with Crawford 
and its progeny.   
 
Hailes v. State, 113 A.3d 608, 611 (Md. 2015).      
Although Crawford “deliberately avoided the question of how [the holding 
in Crawford] would apply in a dying declaration case,” we are persuaded that the 
United States Supreme Court has nonetheless “made clear that notwithstanding the 
categorical language employed in Crawford, there remain situations in which a 
defendant may not successfully invoke the Confrontation Clause to exclude 
testimonial hearsay statements.”  Beauchamp, 796 N.W.2d at 791.  The 
 
 
- 44 - 
introduction of a valid dying declaration is such a situation.  Thus, we reject 
Davis’s urging to abrogate the dying declaration exception, and we join the 
majority of courts that have considered the post-Crawford viability of the dying 
declaration and have concluded that the dying declaration did survive Crawford.   
Whether Bustamante’s Statements Qualify as a Dying Declaration 
 
In light of our holding that Crawford did not abrogate the dying declaration 
exception in Florida, we now turn to whether Bustamante’s statements to Lt. Elrod 
constituted a dying declaration.  Davis argues that her statements did not satisfy the 
requirements of a dying declaration, and thus, that the trial court erred in admitting 
them.  “In considering a trial court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence over an 
objection based on the Confrontation Clause, [this Court’s] standard of review is 
de novo.”  McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 637 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Milton v. 
State, 993 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). 
In order for the dying declaration exception to apply, “the deceased must 
have known and ‘appreciated his condition as being that of an approach to certain 
and immediate death,’ although it is not necessary that the declarant ‘make express 
utterances’ that he would never recover.”  Hayward, 24 So. 3d at 30 (quoting 
Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429, 431 (Fla. 1992)).  In determining whether to admit 
hearsay as a dying declaration, “ ‘the court should satisfy itself, on the totality of 
the circumstances,’ that the deceased knew he was dying.”  Id. at 30-31 (quoting 
 
 
- 45 - 
Henry, 613 So. 2d at 431).  The “absence of all hope of recovery, and appreciation 
by the declarant of his speedy and inevitable death, are a preliminary foundation 
that must always be laid to make such declarations admissible.”  Id. at 31 (quoting 
McRane v. State, 194 So. 632, 636 (Fla. 1940)).  Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Bustamante’s dying 
declaration. 
Before trial, the trial court held an extensive evidentiary hearing during 
which the State presented the testimony of witnesses who were in contact with 
Bustamante at the scene.  One of these witnesses was Fran Murray, who testified 
as follows: 
She started talking about her kids.  And she said she was in so 
much pain.  She kept saying it over and over, and that her body hurt 
so bad, and that she knew that she wasn’t going to make it.  She said, 
please keep me in your prayers.  I’m not going to make it. 
 
The trial court also heard from other witnesses who provided consistent testimony 
relating to multiple relevant circumstances: (1) Bustamante received extensive 
burns of the second, third, and fourth degree; (2) she was burned over at least 
eighty percent of her body; (3) her flesh was falling off of her body; (4) she was in 
severe pain; and (5) the severity of her burns was indicative of a high probability of 
death. 
Following the hearing, in a detailed order, the trial court ruled as follows 
regarding the admissibility of Bustamante’s statements: 
 
 
- 46 - 
The Court finds that any statements made by Ms. Bustamante to      
Lt. Joe E. Elrod, Jr., or other law enforcement personnel would be 
admissible under one of the following hearsay exceptions; a 
spontaneous statement, an excited utterance, or as a dying declaration. 
The Court specifically finds that the statements made by Ms. 
Bustamante qualify as dying declarations.  The evidence shows that 
Ms. Bustamante reasonably believed her death from her injuries was 
imminent, particularly in light of her statements to Frances Murray 
that she was not going to make it, and she should pray for her. 
 
While Bustamante’s statement that “she wasn’t going to make it” was 
certainly an important factor for the trial court’s consideration, as we did in 
Hayward, we emphasize that a verbal acknowledgment of impending death is not 
required in order to find that a declarant’s statement constitutes a dying 
declaration.  In this case, the trial court’s conclusion was ably supported by 
testimony of multiple witnesses, who all revealed the dire circumstances that 
Bustamante faced after Davis set her body on fire.   
Davis argues that the testimony of the medical examiner refutes the trial 
court’s conclusion that Bustamante believed that her death was imminent.           
The medical examiner, Dr. Nelson, testified that Bustamante’s pain would have 
subsided in the areas where she received third- and fourth-degree burns because at 
that stage of injury, her nerve endings were destroyed.  Thus, Davis argues that 
because Bustamante was burned so severely that she could not feel pain in those 
areas, she could not have believed that her death was imminent.   
 
 
- 47 - 
We unequivocally reject Davis’s argument.  Although Bustamante was 
eventually unable to feel pain in the areas where she sustained third- and fourth-
degree burns, she remained capable of feeling pain in areas where her nerve 
endings remained intact.  Bustamante, whom medical personnel testified was 
oriented and alert at the scene, was aware of her extensively burned body.  
Assessing her own deeply grave condition, Bustamante told Fran Murray that she 
did not think that was going to survive. 
Davis’s assertion that Bustamante’s statements were not properly admitted 
as a dying declaration is simply without merit in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.  The trial court received a substantial amount of witness testimony 
about Bustamante’s condition that was consistent from witness to witness and also 
consistent with Bustamante’s own observation of her dire circumstances.  
Moreover, Bustamante clearly expressed her belief that she was not going to 
survive.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted Bustamante’s 
statements as a dying declaration. 
II.  Identifications by Greisman and Ortiz 
At separate times within days of the robbery, eyewitnesses Greisman 
(shooting victim) and Ortiz offered out-of-court identifications of Davis after 
viewing his photograph in a photopack (also known as a photographic lineup).  
Both men also identified Davis in court during their trial testimony.  Davis argues 
 
 
- 48 - 
that these identifications were unreliable and should have been excluded as 
evidence.  As we explain, we find that this argument is without merit.  The 
circumstances surrounding each witness’s identification are as follows. 
Greisman testified that upon reaching the vicinity of the Headley building, 
he observed Davis walking towards him.  Greisman saw Davis’s face clearly and 
made eye contact with him.  Greisman thought that Davis was responding to the 
fire and that he intended to offer assistance.  Instead, Davis shot him in the face.  
After being transported to the hospital, Greisman underwent surgery and remained 
in the hospital overnight.  He was not allowed to watch television, and he denied 
seeing any newspaper or other media accounts during his hospital stay.  When 
Greisman was released from the hospital, his mother drove him to the Lake Wales 
Police Department to speak to two detectives.  While at the police station, 
Greisman viewed a photopack containing six photographs, one of which was a 
photograph of Davis.  When asked if he recognized the person who shot him, 
Greisman quickly recognized Davis’s photograph, and he placed his initials next to 
it.  Greisman identified Davis again from the witness stand at trial. 
Similarly, Ortiz identified Davis as the shooter and testified that he saw 
Davis’s face clearly.  After Greisman was shot, Ortiz looked Davis in the eyes and 
maintained his view of Davis because he was concerned that Davis would attack 
him.  Four days after the events at Headley, Ortiz viewed a photopack containing 
 
 
- 49 - 
Davis’s photograph.  Ortiz easily identified Davis as the perpetrator.  In addition to 
Ortiz’s observations of Davis at the time of the shooting, Ortiz testified that he 
recognized Davis as someone whom he saw at the Florida Natural Growers juice 
plant.  Ortiz, who previously worked at Florida Natural Growers as a temporary 
worker, testified that he saw Davis near a gate where workers enter and exit. 
Validity of the Out-of-Court Identifications/Photopacks 
First, Davis contends that the photopacks shown to Greisman and Ortiz were 
unnecessarily suggestive and that as a result, their out-of-court identifications of 
Davis were invalid.  Greisman and Ortiz were each shown a photopack that was 
printed on a piece of letter-sized paper and contained six photographs.  The 
photographs were divided into two rows, with three photographs on each row.  The 
lower left corner of each photograph contained an identifying number ranging from 
one through six.  Below the bottom row of photographs were six sets of book-in 
numbers, each of which corresponded to one of the photographs.  Each of the 
numbers contained between seven and eleven digits and was printed in small font.  
Davis’s book-in number contained the number 2007, and the other photographs 
each contained the number 93 or 94, representing the year that the photograph was 
taken.  As a result, Davis argues that the more recent number, 2007, unnecessarily 
suggested that his was the suspect’s photograph.   
 
 
- 50 - 
  
“This Court has adopted a two-part test to determine whether an out-of-court 
identification may be admitted: First, whether police used an unnecessarily 
suggestive procedure to obtain an out-of-court identification, and, second, if so, 
considering all the circumstances, whether the suggestive procedure gave rise to a 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 
391, 394 (Fla. 1994) (citing Grant v. State, 390 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. 1980)).  
When evaluating the likelihood of misidentification, a court should consider:  
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ 
prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated 
by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation. 
 
Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 316 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Grant, 390 So. 2d at 
343).  However, where the procedure used to obtain the out-of-court identification 
was not unnecessarily suggestive, the likelihood of irreparable misidentification 
need not be explored.  See id.  As we explain, we conclude that the out-of-court 
identifications made by Greisman and Ortiz were not unnecessarily suggestive.  
Davis argues that the placement of the number 2007 in his book-in number 
distinguished it from the other book-in numbers that contained the numbers 93 and 
94.  To that end, he cites three cases that also involved the use of a date in a 
photographic lineup: Henderson v. U.S., 527 A.2d 1262 (D.C. App. 1987), State v. 
Davis, 504 A.2d 1372 (Conn. 1986), and Brown v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 
 
 
- 51 - 
24 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).  However, in each of these cases, the year or the date was 
placed on the suspect’s photograph.   
One of these cases, Brown, is especially demonstrative of an unnecessarily 
suggestive photographic lineup.  In Brown, a case involving the appeal of two 
defendants’ robbery convictions, the appellate court detailed the following facts: 
The seven photographs shown Lineberry and Scott were mug 
shots from the files of the Jefferson County Police Department.         
In each photograph a board was suspended from around the neck of 
the individual.  Each board contained information for identification 
purposes.  In the case of Brown and Hill [the appellants], each board 
contained the abbreviation “ROB” and the date “November 17, 1975.” 
In the other five photographs, the boards did not contain the robbery 
date of November 17, 1975, nor were any two dates the same.  Only 
one of the other five photographs contained the abbreviation “ROB.” 
 
Id. at 26.  These facts, which include the unequivocal use of the date of the crime 
and the abbreviation “ROB” within the suspects’ photographs, demonstrate an 
unnecessarily suggestive photograph.  Davis’s facts fall far short of these. 
The photopacks shown to Greisman and Ortiz contained, beneath the entire 
set of photographs, six sets of book-in numbers that corresponded to the 
photographs above.  The numbers were printed in small font and were innocuous. 
Both Greisman and Ortiz quickly identified Davis’s photograph.  Therefore, we 
reject Davis’s argument that the book-in numbers rendered the photopacks 
unnecessarily suggestive.  Because the photopacks were not unnecessarily 
 
 
- 52 - 
suggestive, the trial court did not err in admitting the out-of-court identifications 
made by Greisman and Ortiz.   
Validity of the In-Court Identifications 
Second, Davis argues that the in-court identifications made by Greisman and 
Ortiz are invalid.  He primarily asserts that the in-court identifications were 
rendered unreliable by the earlier use of unnecessarily suggestive photopacks.  
However, because the photopacks were not unnecessarily suggestive and did not 
invalidate Greisman’s and Ortiz’s out-of-court identifications, Davis’s argument 
that the photopacks rendered their in-court identifications invalid is without merit. 
Davis’s remaining challenges to Ortiz’s in-court identification similarly do 
not warrant relief.  First, Davis contends that Ortiz’s identification is unreliable 
because of inconsistencies in Ortiz’s various statements regarding whether he saw 
Davis in news coverage before viewing the photopack.  However, Ortiz had an 
independent opportunity to view Davis at the crime scene.  Moreover, the defense 
had ample opportunity to attack Ortiz’s identification at trial. 
Second, Davis contends that Ortiz’s in-court identification was unreliable 
because Ortiz insisted that the car he saw near the crime scene was a black Nissan 
Maxima, not a Nissan Altima.  This discrepancy does not render Ortiz’s 
identification of Davis himself unreliable.  Just as the trial court did not err when it 
 
 
- 53 - 
admitted the out-of-court identifications made by Greisman and Ortiz, the court 
likewise did not err when it admitted their in-court identifications. 
III.  Victim Photographs 
Davis argues that the trial court erred in admitting nearly four dozen autopsy 
and hospital photographs of Bustamante, Luciano, and Michael, and he maintains 
that the photographs were irrelevant to any material fact in issue.  Davis did not 
object to the admission of these photographs at trial.  As such, if this Court 
concluded that the admission of the photographs was erroneous, Davis would only 
be entitled to relief upon a showing of fundamental error.  See Harrell v. State, 894 
So. 2d 935, 941 (Fla. 2005) (“As we have noted, the sole exception to the 
contemporaneous objection requirement is fundamental error.”).  However, as we 
explain below, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the victims’ 
photographs.  Therefore, Davis is not entitled to relief.   
“The test for the admissibility of photographic evidence is relevance, not 
necessity.”  Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000).  This Court has 
explained the following regarding the admissibility of gruesome photographs: 
This Court has long followed the rule that photographs are 
admissible if they are relevant and not so shocking in nature as to 
defeat the value of their relevance.  Where photographs are relevant, 
“then the trial judge in the first [instance] and this Court on appeal 
must determine whether the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so 
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the jury 
and [distract] them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the 
evidence.”  We have consistently upheld the admission of allegedly 
 
 
- 54 - 
gruesome photographs where they were independently relevant or 
corroborative of other evidence.   
 
Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990) (citations omitted).  For example, 
photographs are admissible if “they assist the medical examiner in explaining to 
the jury the nature and manner in which the wounds were inflicted.”  Bush v. State, 
461 So. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 1984).  Moreover, photographs are admissible “to show 
the manner of death, location of wounds, and the identity of the victim.”  Larkins 
v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1995).   
There was no error—fundamental or otherwise—in the admission of the 
victims’ photographs.  The photographs were relevant to explain the nature of the 
victims’ injuries and manner of death.  Five color photographs of Michael’s body 
were introduced as well as two x-ray photographs.  The photographs were relevant 
to Dr. Nelson’s testimony regarding Michael’s death from extreme prematurity.     
 
Eighteen autopsy photographs of Bustamante were admitted into evidence.  
These photographs assisted the medical examiner in testifying about the degree of 
Bustamante’s burns, the percentage of body surface area burned, the incisions that 
were necessary to enable blood flow, the swelling caused by extensive fluid loss, 
the absence of burns consistent with being bound, and the cause of death from 
thermal burns. 
 
Fourteen autopsy photographs and seven hospital photographs of Luciano 
were admitted into evidence.  The photographs assisted the medical examiner in 
 
 
- 55 - 
testifying about the percentage of body surface area burned, the degree of burns, 
the skin grafts that were done to try to treat her severe burns, the absence of burns 
consistent with being bound, and the cause of death from thermal burns.   
Davis is correct in that the photographs of the severely burned women and 
the deceased infant in this case are gruesome.  However, the photographs were 
relevant to prove the nature and extent of each victim’s injuries, and their causes of 
death, and were not “so inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds 
of the jury and [distract] them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the 
evidence.”  Czubak, 570 So. 2d at 928.  What is more, “[t]hose whose work 
products are murdered human beings should expect to be confronted by 
photographs of their accomplishments.”  Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 44 (Fla. 
2005) (quoting Henderson v. State, 463 So. 2d 196, 200 (Fla. 1985)).  Thus, there 
was no error in admitting the photographs.          
IV.  Avoid Arrest 
Davis also argues that the trial court improperly found that the murder of 
Bustamante was committed to avoid arrest.  We disagree.  “The avoid arrest 
aggravating circumstance, which is also referred to as witness elimination, applies 
when the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or to effectuate an escape from custody.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 
277, 301 (Fla. 2009).  While this aggravating circumstance is usually applied to the 
 
 
- 56 - 
murder of law enforcement personnel, it has also been applied to the murder of a 
witness to a crime.  Id. (citing Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 819 (Fla. 1996)).  
“Where the victim is not a law enforcement officer, the evidence must demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the sole or dominant motive for the murder was 
the elimination of the witness.’ ”  Id. (quoting Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 409 
(Fla. 1992)).  The State sought to prove the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance 
as to both Bustamante and Luciano.  However, the court found “that the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the 
murder of Juanita Luciano was to eliminate a witness.”   
“In reviewing the trial court’s finding of an aggravating circumstance, this 
Court’s ‘task on appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial court 
applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether 
competent substantial evidence supports its finding.’ ”  Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 
178 (Fla. 2011) (quoting McWatters, 36 So. 3d at 642). 
While the evidence that Davis’s dominant motive for the murder of 
Bustamante was to eliminate her as a witness is circumstantial, this Court has 
upheld trial court findings of the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance based on 
circumstantial evidence.  See Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 667 (Fla. 2009).  
“Even without direct evidence of the offender’s thought process, the arrest 
avoidance factor can be supported by circumstantial evidence through inference 
 
 
- 57 - 
from the facts shown.”  Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 276 n.6 (Fla. 1988).  
Such circumstantial evidence includes “whether the victim knew and could 
identify the killer.”  Hernandez, 4 So. 3d at 667.  Other factors include “whether 
the defendant used gloves, wore a mask, or made any incriminating statements 
about witness elimination; whether the victims offered resistance; and whether the 
victims were confined or were in a position to pose a threat to the defendant.”  
Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 2001).  
The trial court’s finding that Davis murdered Bustamante in order to avoid 
arrest is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  One, the State presented 
evidence that Davis knew Bustamante and had an established business relationship 
with her at Headley.  The court relied on testimony regarding Bustamante’s long-
term employment at Headley and her specific involvement with Davis’s insurance 
matters.  Two, when Davis entered the Headley building, he placed duct tape over 
the surveillance camera lens.  Such conduct, like wearing a mask, is an act of 
attempting to hide one’s identity.  Three, the trial court concluded that after being 
bound with duct tape, Bustamante did not pose a threat to Davis.  Four, Davis shot 
Bustamante in addition to setting her body on fire.  The trial court’s finding that 
Davis murdered Bustamante in order to eliminate her as a witness was based on 
competent, substantial evidence.  Thus, we affirm the trial court’s finding of this 
aggravating circumstance.    
 
 
- 58 - 
V.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Although Davis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on which 
the State relied to obtain the convictions, in every death case, this Court must 
independently evaluate for the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon to convict 
the defendant.  See Caylor v. State, 78 So. 3d 482, 500 (Fla. 2011).  “In conducting 
this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 
655, 674 (Fla. 2006) (citing Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).  In 
this case, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Davis’s convictions.   
The facts indicate that Davis, while suffering financial distress, planned the 
robbery of the Headley Insurance Agency.  Less than one week before the robbery, 
he obtained a .357 magnum revolver, and on the morning of the robbery, he 
purchased multiple items from Walmart that he used during the commission of his 
crimes.  These items included a cigarette lighter and a cooler to conceal the 
revolver.  Two witnesses testified that they spoke with Davis in Walmart that 
morning.  One of the witnesses, Jennifer DeBarros, had known Davis and his 
family for years, and she easily recalled the conversation because she knew that 
they talked on Davis’s son’s birthday.    
 
 
- 59 - 
While being treated at the crime scene, Bustamante identified Davis as the 
person who, around 3 p.m., entered Headley and demanded money from her and 
from Luciano.  Bustamante also stated that when they refused to give him money, 
Davis bound them with duct tape, doused them in gasoline, and set them on fire. 
Multiple eyewitnesses observed a man fitting Davis’s description leaving 
Headley while the building was still on fire.  These eyewitnesses saw Davis 
placing a gun into a cooler, the description of which was consistent with the one 
that Davis purchased at Walmart that morning.  Additionally, two eyewitnesses, 
Greisman and Ortiz, quickly identified Davis after being shown a photopack that 
contained Davis’s photograph. 
The description of a car seen near Headley at the time of the robbery was 
consistent with that of the black Nissan Altima driven by Davis.  That car, which 
was later found in the parking lot of a nightclub, was searched.  Two floormats 
retrieved from the car tested positive for the presence of gasoline.  Gasoline was 
the accelerant used to ignite the fires at Headley.  Davis’s driver license was found 
inside of the car.    
The projectile retrieved from Bustamante’s hand was consistent with having 
been fired from the .357 magnum revolver that Davis purchased just days before 
the robbery.  Additionally, the projectiles retrieved from the crime scene were also 
consistent with having been fired from that weapon.   
 
 
- 60 - 
Davis’s conduct after the robbery also adds to the competent, substantial 
evidence of his guilt.  He entered a credit union branch less than forty-five minutes 
after the Headley alarm was activated and deposited $148 in his account that 
previously had a balance of $5.33.  The bank teller, who was familiar with Davis, 
observed an injury to his face as did others who observed him after the robbery.  
Witnesses, including members of Davis’s family, testified regarding his suspicious 
behavior following the robbery.  Competent, substantial evidence of guilt supports 
Davis’s convictions.   
VI.  Proportionality of Davis’s Death Sentences 
This Court is required to conduct “a comprehensive analysis in order to 
determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated 
and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application 
of the sentence.”  Offord v. State, 959 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007) (quoting 
Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003)).  “This entails ‘a qualitative 
review . . . of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a 
quantitative analysis.’ ”  Id. (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 417 (Fla. 
1998)).  Thus, in determining whether a death sentence is proportionate, this Court 
does not simply compare the number of aggravating circumstances versus the 
number of mitigating circumstances.  See id.  
 
 
- 61 - 
The trial court found seven aggravating circumstances as to the murder of 
Bustamante: (1) committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and on 
felony probation (some weight); (2) CCP (great weight); (3) Davis was 
contemporaneously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the  
use or threat of violence to the person (very great weight); (4) committed while 
Davis was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or in flight after 
committing or attempting to commit any robbery or arson (moderate weight);      
(5) committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (some 
weight); (6) capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain (little weight); and 
(7) HAC (great weight).  The trial court noted that improper doubling did not occur 
with the trial court’s finding of both murder in the course of a robbery and 
pecuniary gain, because the jury convicted Davis of separate offenses of first-
degree arson and armed robbery.  As to the murder of Luciano, the trial court 
found all of the same aggravating circumstances except for the avoid arrest 
aggravator.  The trial court also found as a statutory mitigating circumstance that 
Davis was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little 
weight); and fifteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, which ranged from 
very slight weight to moderate weight.   
This case is truly among the most aggravated and least mitigated.  Two of 
the aggravating circumstances found in this case, HAC and CCP, have repeatedly 
 
 
- 62 - 
been identified by this Court as “two of the most serious aggravators set out in the 
statutory sentencing scheme.”  Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).  “As 
a result, when these two aggravators are present, the mitigating circumstances must 
be of considerable weight to overcome them.”  Brown v. State, 143 So. 3d 392, 
405-06 (Fla.) (citing Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 224 (Fla. 2010)), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 726 (2014).  
This Court has affirmed sentences of death in similar cases.  In this Court’s 
decision in Brown, the defendant poured gasoline on the victim and used a lighter 
to set her on fire.  Brown, 143 So. 3d at 396.  After sixteen days in a burn unit, the 
victim died from her injuries.  Id. at 397.  As aggravating circumstances, the trial 
court found CCP, HAC, and that the murder was committed while Brown was 
engaged in the commission of a kidnapping.  Id. at 401.  Similar to the present 
case, the trial court found the existence of one statutory mitigating circumstance 
(no significant history of prior criminal activity).  Id.  The trial court also found 
twenty-seven nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  Id.   
Brown is both factually comparable and comparable in terms of the weighty 
aggravating circumstances found by the trial court.  Brown is also similar in terms 
of the nature of the mitigating circumstances found by the trial court.  Yet, as in 
Brown, we conclude here that “[t]he mitigation . . . pales in comparison to the 
weighty aggravation.”  Id. at 406. 
 
 
- 63 - 
In another comparable case, during the course of a robbery, the defendant set 
two women on fire in a fabric store.  Henry, 613 So. 2d at 430.  The trial court 
found as aggravating circumstances that the murders were “committed during the 
commission of robbery and arson, to avoid or prevent arrest, for pecuniary gain, 
and in a cold, calculated, and cruel manner and that they were heinous, atrocious, 
or cruel.”  Id. at 432.  The trial court found the existence of one statutory 
mitigating circumstance (no prior criminal history) and one nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstance (prior military service).  This Court upheld Henry’s death sentences 
and determined that the aggravating circumstances were “established beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 433.  In the present case, the trial court’s finding of 
greater nonstatutory mitigation than in Henry does not render Davis’s death 
sentences disproportionate.  For just as the trial court found greater nonstatutory 
mitigation, it also found significantly greater aggravation.    
We agree that the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court in this 
case were established beyond a reasonable doubt and that they exceedingly 
outweigh Davis’s mitigating circumstances.  Thus, Davis’s death sentences satisfy 
this Court’s proportionality requirement. 
VII.  Hurst v. Florida 
While Davis’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued 
Hurst v. Florida, in which it held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated 
 
 
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the Sixth Amendment.  See 136 S. Ct. at 621.  The Supreme Court concluded that 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to 
impose a sentence of death.  A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  Id. at 
619.  Davis’s request to file supplemental briefing to address the impact of Hurst v. 
Florida on his sentences was granted.  On remand from the Supreme Court, we 
held that “in addition to unanimously finding the existence of any aggravating 
factor, the jury must also unanimously find that the aggravating factors are 
sufficient for the imposition of death and unanimously find that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigation before a sentence of death may be considered by 
the judge.”  Hurst v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S433, S437 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) 
(Hurst).  We further held that a unanimous jury recommendation is required before 
a trial court may impose a sentence of death.  See id.  Finally, we determined that 
Hurst v. Florida error is capable of harmless error review.  See id. at S442. 
Accordingly, at issue is whether any Hurst v. Florida error during Davis’s 
penalty phase proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In Hurst, we 
explained the standard by which harmless error should be evaluated:  
Where the error concerns sentencing, the error is harmless only if 
there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
sentence.  See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20 (Fla. 2000).  
Although the harmless error test applies to both constitutional errors 
and errors not based on constitutional grounds, “the harmless error 
test is to be rigorously applied,” [State v. ]DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 
[1129,] 1137 [Fla. 1986], and the State bears an extremely heavy 
burden in cases involving constitutional error.  Therefore, in the 
 
 
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context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the burden is on the State, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury’s failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to Hurst’s death 
sentence in this case.  We reiterate: 
 
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct 
result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more 
probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an 
overwhelming evidence test.  Harmless error is not a 
device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the 
trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  
 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139.  “The question is whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the [sentence].”  Id. 
 
Id. (alteration in original).  As applied to the right to a jury trial with regard to the 
facts necessary to impose the death penalty, it must be clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that there were sufficient 
aggravating factors that outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 
With regard to Davis’s sentences, we emphasize the unanimous jury 
recommendations of death.  These recommendations allow us to conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that there 
were sufficient aggravators to outweigh the mitigating factors.  The instructions 
that were given informed the jury that it needed to determine whether sufficient 
aggravators existed and whether the aggravation outweighed the mitigation before 
it could recommend a sentence of death.  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 (“If 
. . . you determine that no aggravating circumstances are found to exist, or that the 
 
 
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mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, or, in the 
absence of mitigating factors, that the aggravating factors alone are not sufficient, 
you must recommend imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole rather than a sentence of death.”).  The jury was presented 
with evidence of mitigating circumstances and was properly informed that it may 
consider mitigating circumstances that are proven by the greater weight of the 
evidence.  See id. (“If you determine by the greater weight of the evidence that a 
mitigating circumstance exists, you may consider it established and give that 
evidence such weight as you determine it should receive in reaching your 
conclusion as to the sentence to be imposed.”).   
Even though the jury was not informed that the finding that sufficient 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances must be 
unanimous, and even though it was instructed that it was not required to 
recommend death even if the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the jury did, 
in fact, unanimously recommend death.  See id. (“If, after weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you determine that at least one 
aggravating circumstance is found to exist and that the mitigating circumstances do 
not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, or, in the absence of mitigating 
factors, that the aggravating factors alone are sufficient, you may recommend that 
a sentence of death be imposed rather than a sentence of life in prison without the 
 
 
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possibility of parole.  Regardless of your findings in this respect, however, you are 
neither compelled nor required to recommend a sentence of death.”).  From these 
instructions, we can conclude that the jury unanimously made the requisite factual 
findings to impose death before it issued the unanimous recommendations.  Further 
supporting our conclusion that any Hurst v. Florida error here was harmless are the 
egregious facts of this case—Davis set two women on fire, one of whom was 
pregnant, during an armed robbery, and shot in the face a Good Samaritan who 
was responding to the scene.  The evidence in support of the six aggravating 
circumstances found as to both victims was significant and essentially 
uncontroverted.10 
We conclude that the State can sustain its burden of demonstrating that any 
Hurst v. Florida error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Here, the jury 
unanimously found all of the necessary facts for the imposition of death sentences 
by virtue of its unanimous recommendations.  In fact, although the jury was 
informed that it was not required to recommend death unanimously, and despite 
the mitigation presented, the jury still unanimously recommended that Davis be 
sentenced to death for the murders of Bustamante and Luciano.  The unanimous 
                                          
 
 
10.  Additionally, as previously discussed, the avoid arrest aggravating 
circumstance as to victim Bustamante is supported by competent, substantial 
evidence. 
 
 
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recommendations here are precisely what we determined in Hurst to be 
constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of death.   Accordingly, Davis is 
not entitled to a new penalty phase. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we affirm Davis’s convictions and sentences.  It is so 
ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
PERRY, J., concurs in part with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PERRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s finding that the evidence here is sufficient to 
sustain Davis’s convictions; however, I cannot agree with the majority’s finding 
that the Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt simply because the evidence supporting the aggravators was 
“significant and essentially uncontroverted.”  See majority op. at 67.  To the extent 
that I would not find the error harmless, I dissent. 
In Hurst v. State (Hurst), 41 Fla. L. Weekly S433 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016), we 
declined to speculate why the jurors voted the way they did; yet, because here the 
jury vote was unanimous, the majority is comfortable substituting its weighing of 
the evidence to determine which aggravators each of the jurors found.  Even 
 
 
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though the jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, whether the jury 
unanimously found each aggravating factor remains unknown. 
 
In Hurst, we held that for a defendant to be eligible for a death sentence, a 
jury must unanimously find the existence of each aggravating factor, that the 
aggravating factors are sufficient, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances.  Hurst, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S442.  Additionally, we 
held that the jury’s death sentence recommendation must be unanimous.  Id.  While 
I agreed in Hurst that Hurst v. Florida errors are subject to harmless error review, 
see Hurst, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at S441-442, I believe the majority’s conclusion that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case is mistaken. 
 
Davis was convicted for three murders, and despite the same jury hearing the 
aggravation and mitigation in all three cases, the jury only voted unanimously to 
recommend a death sentence for two of the victims.  For the remaining sentence, 
the jury vote was eight to four, and the trial judge reduced the sentence to life 
imprisonment. 
For each of the three murders, the jury was presented with evidence to 
support and instructed on eight aggravating circumstances: (1) that Davis was 
previously convicted of a felony and on felony probation; (2) that Davis was 
contemporaneously convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence; (3) that the capital felony was committed during the 
 
 
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course of a felony (robbery/arson); (4) that the capital felony was committed for 
the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; (5) that the capital felony was committed for 
pecuniary gain; (6) that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel; (7) that the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner; and (8) that the victim of the capital felony was under the 
age of twelve.  Of these aggravators, three are clearly established by the 
evidence—previous felony conviction, contemporaneous felony, and committed 
during the course of a robbery.  The remaining aggravators for each required 
factual finding that under Hurst must now be considered and weighed by a jury.  
The majority concludes that the error is harmless because no reasonable jury would 
have failed to find the aggravating factors given the evidence.  Yet, even with the 
additional circumstance of the age of the victim that applied to Michael 
Bustamante, Jr., the jury nevertheless did not unanimously recommend a death 
sentence as it related to Michael Bustamante.  We simply cannot assume that every 
juror found every aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The majority’s reweighing of the evidence to support its conclusion is not an 
appropriate harmless error review.  The harmless error review is not a sufficiency 
of the evidence test, and the majority’s analysis should instead focus on the effect 
of the error on the trier of fact.  State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 
1986).  By ignoring the record and concluding that all aggravators were 
 
 
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unanimously found by the jury, the majority is engaging in the exact type of 
conduct the United States Supreme Court cautioned against in Hurst v. Florida.  
See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 622. 
Because the harmless error review is neither a sufficiency of the evidence 
review “nor a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact 
by simply weighing the evidence,” see DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138, I conclude 
that the error here was harmful. 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
J. Michael Hunter, Judge - Case No. 532007CF00938601XXXX 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Marilyn Muir 
Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee