Title: Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Investment Co.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
 
 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice  
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
OF AUGUSTA COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 990031 
November 5, 1999 
 
COUNTRYSIDE INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.C. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether certain provisions in 
a county's subdivision ordinance violate the Dillon Rule. 
 
The facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal are 
not in dispute.  Countryside Investment Company, L.C. 
(Countryside Investment), is the contract purchaser of a 
parcel of land consisting of approximately 140 acres located 
in Augusta County.  The parcel was given an R-10 residential 
zoning classification under the Augusta County Zoning 
Ordinance in effect in 1973.  This ordinance, which 
established minimum lot size and minimum floor space 
requirements, provided for a minimum lot area of 9,000 square 
feet for property having an R-10 zoning classification. 
 
In 1995, the Augusta County Board of Supervisors enacted 
a new zoning ordinance which prescribed a minimum lot area 
requirement of 12,000 square feet.  Pursuant to the terms of 
the new ordinance, the parcel at issue in this appeal enjoyed 
the benefit of a "grandfather" clause which retained the 
minimum lot area requirement of 9,000 square feet for lots 
which might be subdivided within the parcel until the year 
2006. 
 
In September 1997, Countryside Investment submitted to 
the Augusta County Department of Community Development a 
master plan for a proposed subdivision of the parcel which 
would contain approximately 427 residential lots.  The 
Department reviewed the master plan and concluded that the 
plan complied with the technical requirements of the County's 
Subdivision Ordinance.  The Augusta County Planning Commission 
reviewed the master plan and unanimously recommended approval 
by the Board of Supervisors. 
 
The Board discussed the master plan during several 
meetings.  The Board also considered comments from the public 
and evidence about the impact that the proposed subdivision 
would have upon the County's water and sewer capacity, public 
school division, transportation capacities, drainage, and 
adjacent neighborhoods. 
 
At a meeting in November 1997, the Board tentatively 
denied approval of the master plan.  The Board enumerated 
several reasons for its tentative denial:  (1) "a subdivision 
of this size located in an area that is predominantly rural in 
character should, consistent with good planning practice, 
anticipate, account for and accommodate some of the needs for 
 
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non-residential community-type facilities [such as] . . . 
sites for religious institutions, passive and active 
recreational facilities, and day-care centers"; (2) "the 
overall density" of the subdivision and "its potential 
significant impact on public facilities and public utilities 
in the northern sector of Augusta County, should not exceed a 
figure of about two residences per acre, or approximately 270 
single-family residences for the entire tract"; (3) some of 
the property may not be suitable for residential development 
and; the "current proposal to construct 427 residences . . . 
would result in an increase in population that cannot be 
readily accommodated by the existing public facilities and 
utilities serving [that] area." 
 
The Board, in an attempt to modify the master plan, 
recommended that Countryside Development:  increase the size 
of the residential lots; create a "number of large lots of 
varying sizes suitable for the construction of community-type 
facilities such as churches, nursery schools, and/or day care 
centers"; set aside portions of the property "which are least 
suitable for development as open space designed to preserve 
natural areas where the residents can engage in passive and 
active leisure and recreational activities"; and devote "more 
space, if necessary, to adequately deal with storm water 
drainage and detention." 
 
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Countryside Investment initiated this proceeding against 
the Board and Augusta County (collectively the Board) in the 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 15.2-2260, seeking judicial 
review of the Board's disapproval of the preliminary master 
plan.  The Board filed responsive pleadings, the parties 
stipulated certain evidence, and the circuit court conducted 
an ore tenus hearing.  
 
The circuit court ruled, among other things, that §§ 21-6 
and -7 of the Augusta County Subdivision Ordinance, upon which 
the Board relied when it tentatively denied the master plan, 
violated the Dillon Rule because those sections were not 
authorized by the enabling legislation in Code §§ 15.2-2241 
and -2242.  The court entered a decree which ordered approval 
of the master plan, and enjoined the Board from taking any 
action inconsistent with the decree.  The Board appeals. 
 
Code § 15.2-2240, which is a part of the Virginia Land 
Subdivision and Development Act, states that "[t]he governing 
body of every locality shall adopt an ordinance to assure the 
orderly subdivision of land and its development."1  Code 
§ 15.2-2241, which prescribes the mandatory provisions which 
must be included in a subdivision ordinance enacted by a 
governing body, states in relevant part: 
                     
1 The Virginia Land Subdivision and Development Act 
consists of Code §§ 15.2-2240 through -2279. 
 
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"A subdivision ordinance shall include 
reasonable regulations and provisions that apply to 
or provide: 
 
. . . . 
 
"3.  For adequate provisions for drainage and 
flood control and other public purposes, and for 
light and air, and for identifying soil 
characteristics; . . . ." 
 
 
The Board, purportedly relying upon Code § 15.2-2241, 
enacted the Augusta County Subdivision Ordinance which 
contained the following provisions pertinent to our resolution 
of this appeal: 
"§ 21-6. 
 
"A.  All lots shall be of sufficient size, 
shape and dimension to meet all the [zoning] 
requirements of . . . this Code. 
 
"B.  Size and shape of all lots shall be 
subject to approval of the Board of Supervisors.  In 
no case shall the area or dimensions be less than 
that required by Chapter 25 or by approved proffered 
conditions applicable to any zoning district. 
"§ 21-7. 
 
"If in the opinion of the Board of Supervisors 
any tract of land is unsuitable for subdivision, it 
shall not be subdivided.  A tract shall be deemed 
unsuitable for subdivision if adequate provision 
cannot be made for any public purpose, including, 
but not limited to:  drainage and flood control, 
protection of light and air, and the preservation of 
a rural environment which is also conducive to a 
diverse agricultural, industrial, commercial and 
residential economy." 
 
 
The Board argues that the circuit court erred by holding 
that §§ 21-6 and -7 of the Subdivision Ordinance are void 
because they violate the Dillon Rule.  Continuing, the Board 
states that when "the General Assembly has delegated the 
state's police power, the locality is not required to have 
 
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specific authority for every provision in its ordinance.  
Considerable discretion is left to the local government in 
such matters."  The Board also asserts that even if specific 
authority for §§ 21-6 and -7 is necessary, such authority does 
exist.  Responding, Countryside Investment asserts that even 
though the power of subdivision control is a delegation of the 
State's police power to a local governing body, such authority 
is subject to statutorily prescribed limitations; §§ 21-6 and 
-7 of Augusta County Subdivision Ordinance exceed those 
limitations and, thus, violate the Dillon Rule.  We agree with 
Countryside Investment. 
 
We have held that the General Assembly, in providing for 
local control of land subdivision, delegated to each locality 
a portion of the police power of this Commonwealth.  National 
Realty Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach, 209 Va. 172, 174-75, 
163 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1968); Bd. of Supervisors v. Georgetown 
Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 383, 131 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1963).  
However, we have also recognized that "[t]he power of a 
municipality, unlike that of the State legislature, must be 
exercised pursuant to an express grant."  National Realty 
Corp., 209 Va. at 175, 163 S.E.2d at 156; see also Bd. of 
Supervisors v. Reed's Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 400, 463 
S.E.2d 668, 669 (1995); Hylton Enterprises v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 440, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979). 
 
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We stated in City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enterprises, 
253 Va. 243, 246, 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1997), that 
 
"[t]he Dillon Rule of strict construction 
controls our determination of the powers of local 
governing bodies.  This rule provides that municipal 
corporations have only those powers that are 
expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly 
implied from expressly granted powers, and those 
that are essential and indispensable.  Ticonderoga 
Farms v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va. 170, 173-74, 409 
S.E.2d 446, 448 (1991); City of Richmond v. Confrere 
Club of Richmond, 239 Va. 77, 79, 387 S.E.2d 471, 
473 (1990).  When a local ordinance exceeds the 
scope of this authority, the ordinance is invalid.  
See City of Richmond, 239 Va. at 80, 387 S.E.2d at 
473; Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Va. 200, 
204, 269 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1980)." 
We specifically discussed the application of the Dillon Rule 
to counties in Bd. of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 
215 S.E.2d 453, 455-56 (1975):   
 
"In Virginia the powers of boards of 
supervisors are fixed by statute and are limited to 
those conferred expressly or by necessary 
implication.  Gordon v. Fairfax County, 207 Va. 827, 
832, 153 S.E.2d 270, 274 (1967); Johnson v. 
Goochland County, 206 Va. 235, 237, 142 S.E.2d 501, 
502 (1965).  This rule is a corollary to Dillon's 
Rule that municipal corporations have only those 
powers expressly granted, those necessarily or 
fairly implied therefrom, and those that are 
essential and indispensable.  City of Richmond v. 
County Board, 199 Va. 679, 684-85, 101 S.E.2d 641, 
644-45 (1958)." 
 
 
In National Realty Corp., supra, we considered whether an 
ordinance which imposed a fee for the examination and approval 
of final subdivision plats and made payment of the fee a 
prerequisite to the recording of the plat by the clerk of the 
 
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circuit court contravened the Virginia Land Subdivision and 
Development Act.  In National Realty Corp., we acknowledged, 
as we recognize here, that the General Assembly, in providing 
for local control of land subdivision, delegated a portion of 
its police power to local governing bodies.  Provisions in a 
local subdivision ordinance, however, must derive power from 
an authorization from the General Assembly.  209 Va. at 177, 
163 S.E.2d at 157-58.  Since the local governing body was not 
empowered to impose the fee, we held the ordinance invalid.  
Id., 163 S.E.2d at 158. 
 
We hold that §§ 21-6 and -7 of the County's Subdivision 
Ordinance are void because the General Assembly did not 
authorize the Board to enact the challenged requirements in a 
subdivision ordinance.  Neither Code § 15.2-2241, which 
prescribes the mandatory provisions which must be included in 
a subdivision ordinance, nor Code § 15.2-2242, which 
prescribes optional provisions that may be included in a 
subdivision ordinance, authorizes a governing body to enact 
provisions in a subdivision ordinance which specify the size 
and shapes of lots to be subdivided.  Additionally, neither 
Code § 15.2-2241 nor -2242 authorizes a governing body to 
 
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prohibit a subdivision of property if the proposed subdivision 
is not conducive to the preservation of a rural environment.2
 
The Board asserts that it has considerable discretion 
when deciding what to include in a subdivision ordinance.  We 
disagree.  As we have already stated, pursuant to the strict 
construction required by the Dillon Rule, the Board does not 
have unfettered discretion when deciding what matters it may 
include in its subdivision ordinance.  Rather, the Board must 
include those requisites which are mandated in Code § 15.2-
2241 and may, at the Board's discretion, include the optional 
provisions of a subdivision ordinance contained in Code 
§ 15.2-2242.  Additionally, the Board is entitled to exercise 
discretion only to the extent permitted by Code §§ 15.2-2241 
and -2242.  See Helmick v. Town of Warrenton, 254 Va. 225, 
232-33, 492 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1997).  The Board is not, 
however, permitted to ignore the requisites contained in Code 
§§ 15.2-2241 and -2242 and, under the guise of a subdivision 
ordinance, enact standards which would effectively permit it 
                     
 
2 Our holding does not impair the County's power to enact 
zoning ordinances which prescribe minimum lot area 
requirements, Code § 15.2-2280, or standards which would 
permit the County to consider the rural character of a 
community when making zoning decisions, Code § 15.2-2283; 
Byrum v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 37, 39, 225 S.E.2d 369, 
371 (1976). 
 
 
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to rezone property in a manner inconsistent with the uses 
permitted by the property's zoning classification. 
 
We find no merit in the Board's argument that Code 
§ 15.2-2200 authorizes the challenged provisions in the 
County's Subdivision Ordinance.  Code § 15.2-2200 states: 
 
"This chapter is intended to encourage 
localities to improve the public health, safety, 
convenience and welfare of its citizens and to plan 
for the future development of communities to the end 
that transportation systems be carefully planned; 
that new community centers be developed with 
adequate highway, utility, health, educational, and 
recreational facilities; that the need for mineral 
resources and the needs of agriculture, industry and 
business be recognized in future growth; that 
residential areas be provided with healthy 
surroundings for family life; that agricultural and 
forestal land be preserved; and that the growth of 
the community be consonant with the efficient and 
economical use of public funds." 
 
This statute, a general declaration of the General Assembly's 
intent for Chapter 22 of Title 15.2 concerning planning, 
subdivision of land, and zoning, does not confer upon the 
Board the power to enact a subdivision ordinance which is more 
expansive than the enumerated requisites contained in Code 
§§ 15.2-2241 and -2242. 
 
In view of the foregoing, we do not consider the Board's 
remaining assignments of error or Countryside Investment's 
assignments of cross-error.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
decree of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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