Title: Ex parte Timothy Lamar Trawick. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Timothy Lamar Trawick v. State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/02/2007 Ex parte Trawick
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051563
_________________________
Ex parte Timothy Lamar Trawick
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Timothy Lamar Trawick 
v.
State of Alabama)
(Dale Circuit Court, CC-86-256.62;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1095)
LYONS, Justice.
Timothy Lamar Trawick petitions for certiorari review  of
the affirmance by the Court of Criminal Appeals of the trial
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court's dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition.
Trawick alleged in his Rule 32 petition that his sentence had
been illegally enhanced under the Habitual Felony Offender
Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975 ("the HFOA"). We affirm.
Trawick was convicted in 1986 of two counts of rape in
the first degree and two counts of sodomy in the first degree.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the HFOA based on
three prior felony convictions in 1976 for the sale of
controlled substances. In July 1987, the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed Trawick's convictions and sentences, Trawick
v. State, 512 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), and issued a
certificate of judgment. In October 1987, April 1988, and
March 2001, Trawick filed petitions for postconviction relief
under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. All three petitions were
denied by the trial court; those denials that Trawick appealed
were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
In November 2001, Trawick filed a fourth Rule 32
petition, alleging, among other things, that his enhanced
sentence under the HFOA was illegal because, he argued, prior
drug-related felonies could not be used to enhance the
sentence for a non-drug-related offense. The trial court
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denied the petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed its judgment in an unpublished memorandum on the
basis that the claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(4),
32.2(b), and 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P. Trawick v. State (No.
CR-05-1095, June 23, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2006) (table). Trawick petitions this Court for a writ of
certiorari on the grounds that the denial of his fourth Rule
32 petition conflicted with prior caselaw and that the Rule 32
petition presented an issue of first impression.
Before we consider the merits of Trawick's position, we
must first determine whether the Court of Criminals correctly
held that the issue raised in the Rule 32 petition was
precluded.  If so, our inquiry need go no further. The State's
brief in this proceeding, which Trawick has not contradicted,
states that Trawick raised this same issue -- that under the
HFOA a felony conviction for a drug-related offense could not
be used to enhance a sentence for a non-drug-related offense
--  in his Rule 32 petition filed in March 2001 ("the third
petition"). In its brief the State contends that in the third
petition, "Trawick argued that his 1986 convictions of sodomy
and rape were due to be set aside on grounds of a defective
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indictment and excessive sentence."  The trial court denied
Trawick's third petition, in part, on the basis that "prior
felony drug offenses may be used to enhance a sentence under
the [HFOA] following a conviction for a felony that was not
drug related. Justo v. State, 568 So. 2d 312 ([Ala.] 1990);
Powell v. State, 624 So. 2d 220 ([Ala.] 1993)."  When the
trial court dismissed the third petition, Trawick appealed,
and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's
dismissal. Trawick did not file an application for rehearing
in the Court of Criminal Appeals; thus, he did not file a
petition for certiorari review with this Court in response to
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the
dismissal of his third petition.
Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., generally precludes a
trial court from granting relief in response to a successive
Rule 32 petition. Rule 32.2(b) defines a "successive petition"
as follows: "If a petitioner has previously filed a petition
that challenges any judgment, all subsequent petitions by that
petitioner challenging any judgment arising out of the same
trial or guilty-plea proceeding shall be treated as successive
petitions under this rule." Rule 32.2(b) creates a two-pronged
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approach to addressing successive petitions. The first
inquiry, under Rule 32.2(b), is whether the grounds raised in
the successive petition are duplicative, that is, have the
same grounds been raised in a prior petition. Under Rule
32.2(b), "[t]he Court shall not grant relief on a successive
petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the
petitioner."
The second prong of Rule 32.2(b) states that "[a]
successive petition on different grounds shall be denied"
unless one of two exceptions apply. (Emphasis added.) The
exception that Trawick attempts to invoke in this case allows
the trial court to consider a successive petition when "the
petitioner is entitled to relief on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction to render a judgment or to impose
sentence."  Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.  Trawick's claim
that his sentence is illegal under the HFOA presents a
jurisdictional claim. See, e.g., Ex parte Robey, 920 So. 2d
1069, 1071-72 (Ala. 2004) (holding that because multiple
punishments for the same offense constitute a sentence that
exceeds the maximum allowed by law and an illegal sentence
affects the trial court's jurisdiction, "Robey is not barred
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from asserting in this successive Rule 32 petition the
violation of his double-jeopardy rights"); Ex parte Sanders,
792 So. 2d 1087, 1091 (Ala. 2001) ("'[w]hether a sentence is
excessive ... is a jurisdictional issue' that is not precluded
by the limitations period of Rule 32, by the rule against
successive petitions, or by Rule 32.2(a)(3)"). However,
Trawick's fourth Rule 32 petition asserts a ground Trawick has
previously asserted, even if it is a jurisdictional issue.
Therefore, the second prong of Rule 32.2(b), which  is limited
to successive petitions on different grounds, does not apply.
The first prong of Rule 32.2(b) precludes Trawick from
reasserting a jurisdictional claim "on the same or similar
grounds." 
Because 
Trawick's 
jurisdictional 
claim 
is
duplicative, the issue having already been raised and
adjudicated on its merits by the trial court in his third
petition, we do not reach the second prong of Rule 32
containing the jurisdictional exception. Compare Grady v.
State, 831 So. 2d 646, 648-49 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)
("[A]lthough this is a successive petition ... jurisdictional
claims are not 'precluded by the limitations period or by the
rule against successive petitions.' ... Moreover, from the
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record before us, Grady did not claim that his sentence was
illegal in his first Rule 32 petition." (emphasis added)).
Although our cases have previously stated that jurisdictional
claims cannot be precluded as "successive," that exception to
Rule 32.2(b) applies only to jurisdictional claims not
previously raised and adjudicated on the merits.
Because 
the 
trial 
court 
adjudicated 
Trawick's
jurisdictional claim on the merits in a prior petition,
Trawick is precluded from reasserting that jurisdictional
claim in a successive petition. Accordingly, the Court of
Criminal Appeals properly found that his claim that he had
been illegally sentenced under the HFOA was precluded, and
that judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.