Title: Commonwealth v. Celester

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-07874 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JERMAINE CELESTER. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 9, 2015. - February 10, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Public trial.  Evidence, 
Spontaneous utterance.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
New trial, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Conduct of prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, 
Public trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 19, 1994. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 
L. Steadman, J.; the cases were tried before Gordon L. Doerfer, 
J.; a motion for a new trial, filed on November 2, 2005, was 
heard by Robert C. Rufo, J.; and a second motion for a new 
trial, filed on June 20, 2013, was considered by Thomas F. 
McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
 
Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Kirsten V. Mayer, Maria M. Carboni, David J. Derusha, Mark 
S. Gaioni, & David Lewis, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In September, 1995, a Plymouth County jury 
convicted the defendant, Jermaine Celester, of murder in the 
first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and of armed assault with intent to murder.  
The victims, Wakime Woods and Derek Gibbs, were shot while 
walking with the defendant on the night of February 18, 1994.  
Woods died as a result of his injuries; Gibbs lived, but was 
rendered a quadriplegic.  On appeal, the defendant challenges 
the admission in evidence of the decedent's out-of-court 
statement about who had shot him; the admission of the 
defendant's statement to police; the prosecutor's conduct, and 
in particular her closing argument; and the closure of the court 
room during jury empanelment.  For the reasons discussed in this 
opinion, we affirm the defendant's convictions, but vacate the 
order denying his first motion for a new trial and remand the 
case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing on that 
motion. 
 
Background.  From the evidence presented at trial, the jury 
could have found the following facts.1  On the evening of 
February 18, 1994, Wakime Woods and Derek Gibbs were shot near 
the corner of Green and Newbury Streets in Brockton.  The 
Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the defendant shot 
                                                          
 
 
1 We discuss additional evidence in connection with the 
issues raised. 
3 
 
both victims because he was seeking revenge for the murder, 
approximately four months earlier, of his good friend Robert 
Moses, and believed that Gibbs was refusing to reveal the 
identity of the person who had murdered Moses.2 
 
On the day Gibbs and Woods were shot, Gibbs, Woods, and 
their friend Demetrious Lynch had been at the Boys & Girls Club 
in Brockton until 6 P.M.  Afterward, they went to a house across 
the street from the club, where they smoked marijuana and then 
started walking to Gibbs's house.  As the three were walking, 
two young women drove up in an automobile, and Gibbs and Woods 
spoke to them.  Another vehicle with young women soon arrived, 
                                                          
 
 
2 Robert Moses had been shot and killed in September, 1993, 
in front of the defendant's house on Newbury Street in Brockton.  
Derek Gibbs and two other young men, Calvin Dyous and Larry 
Brown, were present when Moses was murdered.  The defendant, who 
was not present, came out of his house immediately after Moses 
was shot; he was "real upset" and holding a pistol.  The 
defendant considered Moses his "god brother."  After Moses was 
killed, the defendant asked Gibbs for details about Moses's 
murder "[p]retty much every time [Gibbs] saw him."  On one 
particular occasion in early February, 1994, two weeks before 
Gibbs and Wakime Woods were shot, the defendant brought Gibbs, 
Dyous, and Brown together to talk about what had happened the 
night Moses was killed.  The defendant was uneasy, breathing 
heavily, and pacing.  He kept going over and over again what had 
happened that night, asking Dyous and Brown "to describe 
. . . everything the way the shooter approached [Moses], just 
how everything happened . . . .  [T]hey kind of had to draw a 
mental picture."  As the conversation continued, it grew louder 
and participants seemed upset.  The defendant insisted that they 
all go to Boston to look at police photographs in order to 
identify Moses's killer.  (Gibbs and Brown went to Boston with 
the defendant, but Dyous refused.)  At one point, the defendant 
made reference to "tak[ing] out" all the witnesses to Moses's 
murder. 
4 
 
and one of its occupants began to argue with one of the young 
women in the first vehicle.  Both automobiles then left.  When 
Gibbs, Woods, and Lynch reached Gibbs's house, Lynch continued 
on to his own house to change his clothes.  Gibbs and Woods went 
into Gibbs's house.  Thereafter, Gibbs and Woods went outside a 
few times to see if Lynch and another friend had arrived.  Gibbs 
at one point was standing alone on the sidewalk in front of his 
house, and the defendant approached from the side of Gibbs's 
house through a small alleyway between a store and the house; 
the defendant "kind of surprised [Gibbs]."  The defendant was 
wearing a black jacket and dark clothes.  He mentioned that he 
wanted to go see another friend, Larry Brown (see note 2, 
supra), and Gibbs agreed.  Woods at that point walked out of 
Gibbs's house.  The defendant did not know Woods; the two had 
never met.  Gibbs introduced them:  "This is Bear,[3] . . . this 
is Wakime." 
 
The three started off toward Brown's house, walking along 
Green Street.  As they were walking, Gibbs's father pulled up in 
a van and told them to get out of the street, and the defendant 
"slipped off to the side," away from the van.  After Gibbs's 
father drove off, the three resumed walking, with Gibbs in the 
middle, Woods on the left, and the defendant on the right side 
of Gibbs.  Suddenly the defendant was no longer in Gibbs's view; 
                                                          
 
 
3 The defendant's nickname was "Bear." 
5 
 
"it seemed like [the defendant] just stopped short."  
Immediately thereafter, Gibbs heard a "pop" -- a gunshot -- and 
he fell to the ground; he had been shot.4 
 
Marlene Scott, who was at her mother's house on Newbury 
Street, heard gunshots in rapid succession and looked out the 
window to see a man in dark clothing and a hood running down 
Green Street toward Newbury Street.  Scott jumped back from the 
window and then went outside.  She recognized Gibbs, who was 
lying in the street, and began to scream.  She did not 
immediately notice anyone else, but then heard a voice from 
behind a snowbank calling for help; it was Woods.  Scott ran 
over to Woods and asked, "Who shot you?  Who shot you?" to which 
Woods replied, "The kid I was with."  Scott followed up, "Do you 
know him?" and Woods replied, "No." 
 
Sergeant Kenneth LaGrice of the Brockton police department 
arrived on the scene very soon after the shooting.  He first 
went over to Gibbs, who was lying unconscious in the center of 
Green Street; he observed a large pool of blood around Gibbs's 
head and several shell casings in the area of Gibbs's body.  
Soon after he arrived, LaGrice called for ambulances and medical 
assistance, and then heard Woods calling for help.  He found 
Woods lying at the base of a snow bank with a tall, thin, 
                                                          
 
 
4 Before he heard the shot and fell, Gibbs did not see any 
motor vehicles or other people in the area, nor did he hear 
anyone call out to them. 
6 
 
African-American woman nearby -- Marlene Scott, whom he knew.  
LaGrice asked Woods who had shot him, and Woods initially 
responded that he did not know, but when asked again, said, "I 
don't know his name."  Woods was "very excited, very scared," 
and kept repeating that he had been shot and needed help. 
 
Woods was taken by ambulance to the emergency department of 
Cardinal Cushing Hospital.  He was awake and following commands 
when he arrived, but also was in respiratory distress, having 
suffered multiple gunshot wounds, including one that had pierced 
his lung.  He was able to speak in short, coherent sentences for 
a brief period of time, but was deteriorating quickly.  Dr. 
David Mudd, who first treated Woods, asked Woods what had 
happened to him.  Dr. Mudd remembered Woods saying something to 
the effect of "he had been smoking with some friends and 
somebody came up to him and shot him."  Woods did not say who 
had shot him.  Because the hospital was not able to treat 
Woods's injuries fully, he was taken by helicopter to Brigham 
and Women's Hospital, where he died the next morning. 
 
Gibbs, meanwhile, was taken to Brockton Hospital and then 
transported to Boston City Hospital.  He had suffered a bullet 
wound to the neck.  The bullet entered the right side of Gibbs's 
jaw and exited through the back left side of his neck, tracking 
from front to back in a slightly downward direction; it 
fractured Gibbs's second and third vertebrae and severed his 
7 
 
spinal cord at that location, instantly paralyzing him from the 
neck down. 
 
In the early morning hours of February 20, 1994, while 
Gibbs was still in the hospital, Brockton police Detective 
Clifford Hunt showed Gibbs a photographic array.  Gibbs 
identified the defendant,5 and an arrest warrant for murder 
(murder warrant) for the defendant was issued.  The defendant 
learned that the police were looking for him, and at 
approximately 10 A.M. on February 20, the defendant went to the 
Brockton police station, accompanied by an attorney, James 
Gilden.  With Gilden present, the defendant was given Miranda 
warnings, signed a form acknowledging that he understood his 
rights, agreed to speak to the police, and gave a statement, 
predominantly in narrative form, in which he described meeting 
Gibbs and Woods (whom he said he did not previously know) on 
February 18 outside Gibbs's house, walking with Gibbs and Woods 
toward Brown's house, and encountering young women who arrived 
in two different automobiles.  As the defendant, Gibbs, and 
Woods approached Newbury Street, the defendant noticed an old 
Cougar automobile pulled over at the corner of Newbury and Green 
Streets, and saw the passenger in the vehicle, an African-
                                                          
 
 
5 Detective Clifford Hunt was not asked, and he did not 
state, whom Gibbs had been asked to identify -- for example, 
whether Gibbs had been asked to identify the person who had been 
walking with Gibbs and Woods, or the person who had shot Gibbs 
and Wood, or perhaps both. 
8 
 
American man who looked like a "body builder," get out, after 
which Gibbs said, "I feel like something is going to happen 
tonight."  The defendant then heard a gunshot and saw Gibbs 
fall.  The defendant did not see anyone in front of them, but 
thought he saw an automobile up on the hill in the distance with 
its lights on.  He started running through back yards to get to 
his house; while running, he heard two more shots and an 
automobile take off.  The defendant did not call police and did 
not go outside when he heard police arrive because he did not 
want to be a witness. 
 
State Trooper Michael Robert Arnold investigated the scene 
of the shooting and found four spent cartridge casings clustered 
together and one spent projectile.  Another spent projectile was 
recovered from Woods's body.  Arnold opined that the four 
cartridge casings were fired from the same weapon and that the 
two projectiles were fired from the same weapon.  He further 
opined that the locations of the casings and projectile at the 
scene and the results of ballistics testing were consistent with 
one gun being used, although he could not scientifically connect 
the projectiles and the casings to one gun.  Arnold found no 
damage to the projectiles that would suggest that they had 
ricocheted off any solid objects before striking the two 
victims.  The casings, which were from a nine millimeter weapon, 
would travel only a distance of fifteen feet or usually less 
9 
 
when fired, meaning that the shooter was in close proximity to 
where the casings were found.  Testing on the victims' clothes 
revealed no gunshot residue, suggesting that the muzzle of the 
weapon used was further than three feet from the victims at the 
time it was fired. 
 
Woods had suffered three, possibly four gunshot wounds, 
three of which were entrance wounds into his back and one of 
which was an entrance wound into his left thigh.  The entrance 
wound on Woods's thigh was atypical in appearance.  The entrance 
point was irregularly round with irregular scraping around it, 
which could have been caused by the bullet passing through 
another object or ricocheting off something before hitting the 
thigh.  In the opinion of Dr. James Weiner, the medical examiner 
who performed the autopsy, one of the bullets likely entered 
Woods's back and exited through the abdomen, then "reentered the 
left groin area and this [was] one continuous wound track if the 
left leg was raised away from the body and lifted up." 
 
The defendant's statement to the police was introduced in 
evidence as part of the Commonwealth's case.  The defense theory 
at trial was that while the defendant was walking with Gibbs and 
Woods on February 18, 1994, an unknown assailant or assailants 
had appeared suddenly and shot Woods and Gibbs, causing the 
defendant immediately to flee toward his own house.  The 
defendant did not testify, but called Officer Mark Reardon of 
10 
 
the Brockton police as a witness.  Reardon testified that on 
February 18, he received a police radio transmission about a 
shooting on Green Street and an alert to be on the lookout for a 
dark colored, four-door vehicle with tinted windows that had 
fled the scene.  Shortly thereafter, he observed a vehicle with 
three African-American male occupants who appeared uneasy as a 
result of Reardon's observation.  The vehicle was a red, two-
door Ford Tempo.  Over the police radio, Reardon described the 
vehicle; he was told that the vehicle did not appear to be the 
one that fled the scene of the shooting, but a request was made 
to pull the vehicle over because it was wanted in connection 
with an incident that had occurred earlier in the evening.  
Reardon pulled over the vehicle on Eagle Avenue and ordered the 
occupants out; the operator and one occupant ran from the scene.  
Reardon held the other occupant at the scene.  He then searched 
the vehicle but did not find a gun or any casings in it.  The 
one occupant who had remained was arrested for several motor 
vehicle offenses.  The other occupants of the vehicle ultimately 
were identified.6  The woman who reported seeing a vehicle 
fleeing the scene of the shooting, Corrina Defrancesco, was 
taken to Eagle Avenue by another Brockton police officer, 
Michael Mather; she observed the vehicle that Reardon had pulled 
                                                          
 
 
6 No evidence was introduced at trial concerning the 
identities of the occupants of the stopped motor vehicle. 
11 
 
over, and then went to the Brockton police station to give a 
statement or make a report.7 
 
Procedural history.  On April 19, 1994, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with murder in the 
first degree and armed assault with intent to murder.  The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements on 
voluntariness grounds as well as ineffective assistance of his 
first counsel, Gilden.  An evidentiary hearing was held on March 
28, 1995, and the motion was denied by a Superior Court judge 
(first motion judge).  A different Superior Court judge (trial 
judge) presided over the defendant's jury trial that took place 
in September, 1995.  Following his convictions, the defendant 
filed an appeal and then moved to stay the appeal pending a 
motion for a new trial. 
 
The defendant filed his first motion for a new trial in 
November, 2005.8  He claimed, among other issues, that his 
                                                          
 
 
7 No report was introduced in evidence.  A report of a 
statement by Corrina Defrancesco was introduced as an exhibit 
for identification.  In preparing its response to the 
defendant's appeal now before this court, the Commonwealth 
located a second page of that report, and has filed a motion to 
expand the record to include this page.  The motion is allowed.  
The second page indicates that Defrancesco, on viewing the 
stopped vehicle on Eagle Avenue, identified it as the same 
vehicle she had observed backing down Green Street. 
 
 
8 The defendant was convicted more than twenty years ago.  
Most of the delay in this case accrued between the defendant's 
trial in 1995 and his first motion for a new trial in 2005.  The 
record does not indicate the reason for this inordinate delay, 
12 
 
statement to police was admitted improperly because of the 
ineffective assistance provided by the defendant's first 
attorney, Gilden; that the Commonwealth failed to give proper 
notice of expert testimony; that the defendant's trial counsel 
was ineffective; that Woods's statement, relied upon to identify 
the defendant as the shooter, was erroneously admitted as an 
excited utterance; and that the Commonwealth failed to produce a 
critical witness, Defrancesco, thus depriving the defendant of a 
substantial defense.  After discovery, a nonevidentiary hearing 
on the motion was held in April, 2008, before a different 
Superior Court judge (second motion judge), the trial judge 
being no longer available.  The second motion judge denied the 
motion for a new trial in October, 2009, and the defendant's 
appeal from that denial was consolidated with his direct appeal.  
In 2013, the defendant filed a second motion for a new trial on 
the ground that the court room was improperly closed during jury 
empanelment; yet another Superior Court judge (third motion 
judge) denied this motion without a hearing in November, 2014.  
The defendant's appeal from that denial also was consolidated 
with his direct appeal. 
 
Discussion.  The issues the defendant raises in this appeal 
are ones that he raised in his two motions for a new trial.  A 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but unquestionably a delay of this length can pose significant 
difficulties, and does in this case. 
13 
 
motion for a new trial that is considered in conjunction with a 
defendant's direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the 
first degree is reviewed pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 353 (2007). 
 
1.  Admission of Woods's statement.  The Commonwealth filed 
a motion in limine before trial to admit as a spontaneous 
utterance or dying declaration Woods's statement to Marlene 
Scott that "the kid [he] was with" shot him.  At a hearing on 
the motion, defense counsel did not object to its being admitted 
as a spontaneous utterance.  The judge allowed the statement to 
come in without specifically deciding whether it qualified as a 
spontaneous utterance because of defense counsel's concession 
that it did. 
 
The defendant now argues on appeal that Woods's statement 
to Scott was so unreliable that its admission violated his due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  He also contends that Woods's statement to Scott was 
testimonial, as the term is described in Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 51-53 & n.4 (2004),9 and therefore admitted in 
                                                          
 
 
9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was decided 
nine years after the trial in this case.  Crawford is applicable 
to this case because the direct appeal was still pending at the 
time that decision was issued.  See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 
Mass. 422, 426 (2008). 
14 
 
violation of his right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
a.  Reliability of Scott's testimony.  The defendant 
challenges the existence of sufficiently reliable evidence that 
Scott in fact spoke to Woods on February 18, 1994, to permit her 
to testify at trial to Woods's alleged statement about who shot 
him.  He asserts that the trial judge, in his role as 
gatekeeper, should have prevented the evidence from reaching the 
jury because of its unreliability.  As support, the defendant 
notes, first, that Sergeant LaGrice arrived moments after 
Woods's alleged statement to Scott and asked Woods who had shot 
him, to which Woods replied that he did not know; second, that 
Woods also told Dr. Mudd, who initially treated him at the 
hospital, that he did not know who shot him; and finally, that 
LaGrice testified that only one civilian was at the scene of the 
crime when he arrived and he ultimately identified that person 
as Defrancesco, not Scott, thereby suggesting that Scott was not 
at the scene. 
 
The defendant's argument fails.  Scott testified without 
equivocation that on the night of the shootings, she encountered 
Woods lying behind the snowbank and talked to him while waiting 
for the police to arrive.  Although the jury certainly were not 
required to believe Scott, nothing in the record suggests that 
she was incompetent to testify as a trial witness, or that she 
15 
 
may have been impaired in any way on the date of the shootings.  
Cf. Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 563-564 (1998).  
Moreover, contrary to the defense's argument, Scott's testimony 
was not contradicted at all by the testimony of LaGrice, and 
only weakly contradicted by Mudd. 
 
LaGrice testified that Woods stated that he did not know 
who shot him or, more specifically, did not know the name of the 
person who shot him, while, according to Scott, Woods stated 
that "the kid" he was with shot him, but he did not know the 
person.  Woods and the defendant had met for the first time on 
the evening of the shooting, and the defendant was introduced to 
Woods by his nickname, "Bear."  Thus, the jury reasonably could 
have found that Woods's statements to Scott and LaGrice were 
substantively consistent.  See Commonwealth v. Bush, 427 Mass. 
26, 30-31 (1998).  Mudd testified that he could not recall 
Woods's exact words, but "remember[ed] [Woods] saying something 
about smoking that day and not knowing who had shot him."  In 
contrast to Scott and LaGrice, however, Mudd did not ask Woods 
who shot him, and his conversation with Woods occurred in the 
hospital at a point where Woods was in respiratory distress and 
deteriorating quickly.  To suggest that the lack of congruence, 
in some respects, between Scott's and Mudd's testimony renders 
the former so unreliable that it was incompetent expands the 
concept of testimonial incompetence completely beyond 
16 
 
recognition.  That two different witnesses may provide 
inconsistent or conflicting testimony does not turn one of them 
into an unreliable witness; making judgments about witness 
credibility and the weight of witness testimony is the function 
of the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 311 
(1992), citing Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 272 
(1992). 
 
Finally, the defendant's claim that LaGrice identified 
Defrancesco, not Scott, as the person at the scene with Woods 
when he arrived is not supported by the record.  LaGrice 
testified that he arrived on the scene forty-five seconds after 
hearing of the shooting, and observed a tall, thin, African-
American woman assisting Woods.  He identified the woman as 
Scott, who is African-American, and whom LaGrice knew.  LaGrice 
then mistakenly testified that Scott had reported seeing a 
vehicle in the area of the shooting, but after his recollection 
was refreshed, he testified that Scott was not the woman who 
made the report about the vehicle.  The woman who reported the 
vehicle ultimately was identified as Defrancesco, who is white.10 
 
b.  Testimonial nature of Woods's statement.  Testimonial 
statements are inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable 
                                                          
 
 
10 Although, as the defendant contends, there may be some 
inconsistencies in some of the testimony of Brockton police 
Sergeant Kenneth LaGrice, considered as a whole those 
inconsistencies do not render Marlene Scott's testimony that she 
saw and spoke with Wakime Woods unreliable. 
17 
 
for trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  "'[O]ut-of-court 
statements made in response to questions from people who are not 
law enforcement agents' . . . are not testimonial per se" 
(emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 
429 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 11 
(2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).  A statement 
nevertheless may be testimonial in fact if a "reasonable person 
in the declarant's position would anticipate his statement being 
used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a 
crime."  Gonsalves, supra at 3.  See Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 
452 Mass. 236, 244 (2008). 
 
Woods's statement to Scott clearly was not testimonial per 
se because she was not a law enforcement agent.  See Burgess, 
450 Mass. at 429.  Nor was it testimonial in fact.  When Scott 
found Woods, he had just been shot at least three times.  One 
bullet tore through Woods's liver and right lung, and another 
tore through several loops of Woods's bowel.  The gravity of 
these injuries, and the immediate threat they posed, likely 
would "preclude a reasonable person in [Woods's] position from 
anticipating any nonimmediate future event, including a police 
investigation or a prosecution of the perpetrator."  Nesbitt, 
452 Mass. at 249.  At the time that Scott and then LaGrice found 
Woods lying against the snowbank, Woods was "very excited, very 
18 
 
scared" and kept repeating that he had been shot and needed 
help.  In such circumstances, Woods's statement that the "kid" 
Wood was with shot him was not testimonial in fact, and was 
admissible.  See id.11 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of defendant's first attorney 
and admission of defendant's prearraignment statement to police.  
The defendant argues that the advice he received from his 
attorney, Gilden, at the time the defendant gave a statement to 
the police, was constitutionally ineffective under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and constituted "error" 
warranting reversal of his convictions under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).12 
                                                          
 
 
11 The defendant asserts that Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 
Mass. 236 (2008), is factually very distinct from this case, in 
that the victim there was closer to death than was Woods -- she 
died fifteen minutes after making the statement at issue, as 
compared to ten hours in Woods's case.  We view the factual 
differences as ones of degree, not kind.  Given the severity of 
Woods's injuries, the extreme pain that he was highly likely to 
be experiencing (as testified to by Dr. David Mudd), and the 
excited and frightened state that Woods was in when he spoke to 
Scott and LaGrice, we do not accept the defendant's premise that 
the factual differences between this case and Nesbitt make that 
case wholly distinguishable. 
 
12 The defendant raised a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in his pretrial motion to suppress his statement and 
again in his first motion for a new trial.  In denying the 
motion to suppress, the first motion judge concluded that the 
defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and 
19 
 
 
a.  Background.  The first motion judge held an evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his statement.  We 
summarize here his findings.13  Detective Hunt responded to the 
scene of the shootings on February 18, 1994, and as a result of 
his interviews of witnesses and investigation, he sought and 
obtained a murder warrant for the defendant in the early morning 
of February 20.  The defendant's uncle contacted Gilden and 
asked him to represent the defendant.  Gilden telephoned the 
defendant, who told Gilden about a shooting that had taken place 
in Brockton and stated he was scared to go to the police station 
and tell what had happened.14  Gilden then telephoned the 
Brockton police around 8 A.M. on February 20.  He spoke to Hunt, 
who informed him that Hunt had a murder warrant for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
voluntary, that his statement was voluntary, and that he had 
received competent assistance of counsel.  The second motion 
judge also denied the claim, although he did not affirmatively 
determine whether the defendant's counsel at the time of making 
his statement had been ineffective. 
 
 
13 The only witness to testify at the evidentiary hearing on 
the defendant's motion to suppress was Detective Hunt.  The 
defendant submitted an affidavit in support of his motion to 
suppress and the Commonwealth introduced an affidavit of James 
Gilden as an exhibit at the motion hearing, but neither the 
defendant nor Gilden testified at that hearing. 
 
 
14 The first motion judge's memorandum of decision includes 
these findings about the defendant's uncle contacting Gilden as 
well as about the exchange between Gilden and the defendant 
concerning the defendant's desire to have a lawyer accompany him 
to the Brockton police station.  Because Gilden did not testify 
at the motion hearing, we infer that the judge based these 
findings on Gilden's affidavit. 
20 
 
defendant.  Gilden picked up the defendant and drove him to the 
Brockton police station around 10 A.M. on the same day.  On the 
way, Gilden advised the defendant that he should tell the truth 
if he gave a statement. 
 
The first motion judge further found that, when the 
defendant and Gilden arrived at the police station, they were 
taken to the interrogation room.  Hunt showed both Gilden and 
the defendant the murder warrant, and both reviewed it without 
comment.  Hunt then placed the defendant under arrest.15  Hunt 
next read the defendant the Miranda rights from a sheet while 
Gilden was present and listening.  The defendant signed a waiver 
form that stated that he understood his rights.  Gilden 
witnessed the waiver.  Thereafter, the defendant gave a 
statement to Hunt.  Gilden was present throughout, but at no 
time did the defendant ask to speak privately to Gilden.  Hunt 
did not record the statement, but took notes of what the 
defendant said.  The interview was approximately one hour long, 
and thereafter the defendant was taken to be booked.  At the 
time of making the statement, the defendant was twenty-one years 
old and of average intelligence, appeared calm and responsive, 
                                                          
 
 
15 Hunt did not testify explicitly that he had placed the 
defendant under arrest before the defendant had made his 
statement, but Hunt did testify that he had advised the 
defendant that he was under arrest before the defendant's 
statement. 
21 
 
and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol. 
 
Based on these findings, the first motion judge denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the defendant's 
waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary, that the 
defendant's statement was voluntary, and that he had received 
competent assistance of counsel.  The judge's memorandum of 
decision does not mention or refer to the defendant's affidavit 
filed in support of his motion to suppress.  That affidavit, 
dated February 7, 1995, sets out a number of the facts contained 
in the judge's findings, but also adds the following.  While 
being driven by Gilden to the Brockton police station, the 
defendant told Gilden what he knew about the shooting, and 
Gilden told the defendant that all he had to do was explain to 
the police what happened, which the defendant understood to mean 
that if he told the police what he had told Gilden, he would be 
free to leave the police station thereafter.  When they arrived 
at the police station, the defendant was taken into an 
interrogation room, accompanied by Gilden and a police officer.  
Gilden and the police officer spoke together outside the room, 
and when they returned to the room, Gilden told the defendant, 
"[T]ell him what you told me," and the defendant did so.  When 
the defendant finished, the officer arrested him for murder.  If 
the defendant had known that he was a suspect in the murder 
22 
 
investigation, and not simply a witness, he never would have 
made a statement; he had been arrested many times in the past 
and was aware that a person under arrest has the right not to 
make any statement. 
 
Gilden's affidavit, dated March 23, 1995, stated that after 
he contacted the defendant at the request of the defendant's 
uncle, the defendant said that the police were looking for him 
in connection with a shooting in Brockton, and asked Gilden to 
accompany him to the police station because he was scared to go 
alone.  Gilden then called the Brockton police and spoke to 
Hunt, who informed him of the murder warrant for the defendant.  
Gilden indicated that he would bring his client to the station.  
Gilden picked up the defendant in Boston and drove to Brockton.  
On the way, the defendant showed Gilden where the shooting had 
taken place and "told [him] how the shooting had occurred."  The 
two also talked about the defendant speaking to the police and 
telling the police what the defendant had told Gilden concerning 
the shooting.  The defendant never asked Gilden whether he 
should speak to police, and "[t]he only advi[c]e that [Gilden] 
gave [the defendant], before [they] went to the police station, 
was that [the defendant] should tell the truth if he gave a 
statement to police."  When they arrived at the police station, 
Hunt showed Gilden the Miranda form and Gilden witnessed the 
defendant read and sign it; the defendant did not ask Gilden any 
23 
 
questions about the Miranda rights he was given.  Gilden was 
present throughout the time the defendant spoke to Hunt, but the 
defendant never asked to speak to Gilden while he was giving his 
statement.  After the defendant completed his statement, he was 
taken by Hunt to be booked, and just before he left, the 
defendant said, "'You mean they are really going to hold me?,' 
or words to that effect."16  Gilden left the police station after 
the defendant was booked, but the next day, Hunt telephoned and 
told him that the defendant wanted to speak to the police again 
and asked Gilden to come to the station.  Gilden did so, spoke 
privately with the defendant, suggested to the defendant that 
"further conversation with the police would not be helpful," and 
told the police that the defendant would not be speaking with 
them.17 
                                                          
 
 
16 Although Gilden's affidavit did not so state, at trial, 
Hunt testified that during the police interview of the 
defendant, Gilden, in Hunt's presence, told the defendant to 
"tell the police officer what you told me," and the defendant 
then gave his statement. 
 
 
17 In connection with the defendant's first motion for a new 
trial, the defendant and Gilden each filed an additional 
affidavit, dated October 4, 2005, and October 6, 2005, 
respectively.  These affidavits include, among other topics, 
information relating to the defendant's giving of his statement 
to Hunt on February 20, 1994, and the interactions between the 
defendant and Gilden in connection with that event.  There are 
some differences between the 1995 and 2005 affidavits of each 
person, but at least with respect to the defendant, the 
differences are not substantial, and do not affect our analysis 
of his claim of ineffective assistance.  (Gilden's 2005 
affidavit appears to to be somewhat more consistent than his 
24 
 
 
b.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that he was entitled 
to the effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth Amendment 
and art. 12 in connection with his giving a statement during 
Hunt's custodial interrogation of him on February 20, 1994. 
 
The right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment does 
not come into play until the time of arraignment.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984).  To date, 
this court has followed the same rule with respect to art. 12.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 Mass. 548, 553-554 
(2007).  See also Commonwealth v. Lavallee v. Justices in the 
Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 234-235 (2004) ("The 
right to trial counsel under art. 12 attaches at least by the 
time of arraignment").  However, a defendant is entitled to the 
assistance of counsel under the Fifth Amendment to protect his 
or her right against self-incrimination.  In Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966), the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that the right to have counsel present at a custodial 
interrogation is "indispensable to the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege."  See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1995 affidavit was with the defendant's averments that the 
defendant did not learn he was being charged with murder until 
after he had made his statement to the police, but this 
difference also does not affect our analysis.)  Moreover, it is 
clear from the defendant's brief on appeal that he has relied on 
his own and Gilden's 1995 affidavits in presenting his 
arguments.  Accordingly, we do not summarize or discuss here the 
contents of the two affidavits prepared in 2005. 
25 
 
729 (1966) ("Our opinion in Miranda makes it clear that the 
prime purpose of these rulings is to guarantee full effectuation 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the mainstay of our 
adversary system of criminal justice").  The same is true to an 
even greater extent under art. 12.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 858-860 (2000).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 345-346 (2012); 
Commonwealth v. McNulty, 458 Mass. 305, 314-319 (2010).  This 
court has emphasized the need under art. 12 to ensure that the 
abstract rights listed in Miranda, including the right to speak 
with an attorney, are "actualize[d]" and "substantively 
meaningful."  Mavredakis, supra at 860. 
 
With respect to art. 12, we have not before explicitly 
considered whether the right to the assistance of counsel that 
art. 12 provides in connection with a prearraignment, custodial 
interrogation is a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.18,19  We do so here, and in that connection, we agree 
                                                          
 
 
18 In Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 480-481 (2000), 
the defendant, who, after consulting counsel but before 
arraignment, had given a statement to police, argued that the 
statement should be suppressed because it was the product of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Quoting Commonwealth v. 
Griffin, 404 Mass. 372, 374 (1989), a case concerning a 
statutory right to counsel, we noted that a right to counsel is 
of little value if the assistance given is not effective.  
Smiley, supra at 481. We ultimately upheld the motion judge's 
denial of the suppression motion because there was no showing of 
ineffectiveness on the part of defendant's counsel.  Id. at 481-
482.  We did not address specifically whether the constitutional 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
entitlement to counsel in connection with a custodial 
interrogation includes an entitlement to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
19 We focus only on art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  There do not appear to be many Federal cases 
considering whether the right under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution to assistance of counsel in 
connection with a custodial interrogation is a right to 
effective assistance of counsel, and those that have considered 
the question have not answered it affirmatively.  See, e.g., 
United States v. You Hong Chen, 104 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333-334 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  See also Claudio v. Scully, 791 F. Supp. 985, 
988 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 982 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 
1992).  The United States Supreme Court does not appear to have 
considered specifically whether the Fifth Amendment right to 
assistance of counsel in connection with a custodial 
interrogation is a right to effective assistance of counsel.  
See Sweeney v. Carter, 361 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 1020 (2004) ("as far as we can tell, the 
Supreme Court has not mentioned effective assistance of counsel 
[in the Strickland (v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 
[1984],) sense] and the Fifth Amendment in the same breath, let 
alone set forth a clearly established right to that effect"). 
 
With respect to other States, again the issue we consider 
does not appear to have been addressed in many cases.  Compare 
Claudio, 982 F.2d at 804-805 (reversing denial of Federal habeas 
corpus relief because reasonable probability existed that 
defendant would have succeeded on claim that New York law 
required defendant receive effective assistance of counsel 
during precharge custodial interrogation), and State v. Joseph, 
109 Haw. 482, 501 (2006) (Nakayama, J., concurring) (taking 
position that defendant's statement during custodial 
interrogation should be suppressed because defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when attorney advised him to 
speak with police), with People vs. Frazier, No. 95-052613-FC 
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1998) (no right to effective assistance 
of counsel during postarrest, prearraignment custodial 
interrogation).  Cf. Phelps v. State, 435 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1983) (lawyer's advice over telephone to defendant to 
confess to crime before being charged not ineffective assistance 
as matter of law); Riddle v. State, 580 So. 2d 1195, 1201-1202 
(1991) (not per se ineffective assistance of counsel for lawyer 
to advise defendant to confess to crime during precharge 
custodial interrogation). 
27 
 
with the defendant that a person's right to speak with counsel 
is not "actualize[d]" or "substantively meaningful" if counsel 
fails to provide at least minimally competent advice.  
Otherwise, counsel is not meeting the purpose of ensuring that a 
defendant have a right to consult counsel in connection with a 
custodial interrogation.  See Mavredakis, 430 Mass. at 859-860.  
See also Commonwealth v. Morales, 461 Mass. 765, 779-780 (2012) 
(discussing Mavredakis, supra, and McNulty, 458 Mass. at 314-
319).20 
 
Our case law concerning the right to counsel in other 
settings supports this conclusion.  For example, when a statute 
provides a right to the assistance of counsel, we have held that 
it is a right to the effective assistance of counsel, governed 
                                                          
 
 
20 In Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, cert. denied, 
562 U.S. 874 (2010), the defendant, accompanied by his attorney 
and after having had the opportunity to speak with his attorney, 
agreed to speak with the police in what was a custodial 
interrogation taking place in the early stages of a murder 
investigation.  The police did not give the defendant Miranda 
warnings before the interrogation began.  In reviewing an 
interlocutory appeal of the denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress his statement, we held that in the context of a 
custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect, "the presence of 
an attorney during questioning, when combined with the 
opportunity to consult with the attorney beforehand, substitutes 
adequately for Miranda warnings."  Id. at 289.  In Simon, the 
defendant did not claim that the attorney accompanying him had 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, our 
conclusion in that case -- that the presence of an opportunity 
to consult an attorney renders the administration of Miranda 
warnings unnecessary -- underscores the need to recognize that 
the right to the assistance of counsel articulated in Miranda 
and Mavredakis is a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
28 
 
by the standard in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 
(1974).  See, e.g., Poe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
801, 811–812 (2010) (sex offender classification hearing); 
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 404 Mass. 372, 374-375 (1989) 
(appearance before grand jury).  In Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 
Mass. 119, 128 (2010), which raised the issue whether a 
defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in 
a probation revocation proceeding, in discussing cases such as 
Poe and Griffin, we concluded that "[t]he principle that emerges 
from these cases is that in a proceeding that involves a 
person's liberty or a fundamental liberty interest, in which a 
person has a right to appointed counsel, from whatever source, 
the person is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel 
whether counsel is appointed or retained."  A custodial 
interrogation of a criminal suspect certainly involves a 
fundamental liberty interest.  It follows that the 
constitutionally based right to counsel in this setting must be 
recognized as a right to the effective assistance of counsel.  
See Commonwealth v. Moreau, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 677-679 (1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1049 (1992).21 
                                                          
 
 
21 In Commonwealth v. Moreau, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 677 (1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1049 (1992), the defendant appealed from 
the denial of his motion to vacate his guilty pleas to charges 
of armed burglary and related crimes on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  One of his claims was that counsel was 
ineffective in advising him, after he had been arrested but 
29 
 
 
The defendant contends that Gilden provided ineffective 
assistance by instructing or advising him to make a statement to 
police that had an inculpatory effect -- at a minimum, it placed 
the defendant at the scene of the crime -- and by providing such 
advice without conducting any investigation of the case and 
despite the fact that the defendant had been arrested for 
murder.22  Although it appears, if we accept the averments in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
before arraignment on the charges, to make a statement to the 
police describing his involvement.  Id. at 678-680.  The judge 
denying the motion to vacate had done so without an evidentiary 
hearing; the Appeals Court vacated the denial and remanded the 
case for such a hearing, stating:  "The defendant was, however, 
entitled to the aid of counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona 
. . . .  Since 'a right to counsel is of little value unless 
there is an expectation that counsel's assistance will be 
effective,' . . . the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be examined" (citations omitted).  
Id. at 679, quoting Commonwealth v. Griffin, 404 Mass. 372, 374 
(1989). 
 
 
22 The defendant argues also that Gilden had an actual 
conflict of interest that rendered his assistance ineffective.  
Gilden apparently served as surety for the appointed conservator 
of the defendant's father, at least when the father was alive 
(the father died in 1990).  In addition, according to affidavits 
filed in connection with the defendant's first motion for a new 
trial, Gilden may have had some continuing role in connection 
with the administration of the defendant's father's estate, 
although the actual facts are not at all clear from the record.  
In January, 1992, a brother of the defendant raised a challenge 
to the administration of the father's estate.  The defendant 
argues that Gilden's interests were antagonistic to all of the 
heirs of the father's estate, including the defendant, because 
of this challenge.  There is no evidence, however, of an actual 
conflict of interest, see Commonwealth v. Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 
271-272 (2000), and according to Gilden, he did not learn of any 
dispute involving the father's estate until at least two years 
30 
 
Gilden's affidavit, that Gilden, with the guidance of the 
defendant, conducted some investigation of the scene of the 
shootings, we agree that the advice he thereafter gave the 
defendant was constitutionally ineffective under art. 12. 
 
According to the first motion judge's findings, Gilden had 
been informed that the police held a murder warrant for the 
defendant by the time Gilden picked up the defendant to drive to 
the Brockton police station, and Gilden was actually shown the 
warrant when he arrived at the station.  We understand Gilden's 
affidavit to indicate that Gilden never discussed with the 
defendant his right against self-incrimination or any of the 
risks inherent in giving a statement to the police before the 
defendant made his statement, and also said nothing to the 
defendant before, during, or after Hunt read him the Miranda 
rights and inquired about the defendant's understanding and 
willingness to speak to the police.  Rather, it appears from the 
record before us that the only statement Gilden made during the 
defendant's interview with Hunt was to direct the defendant to 
tell Hunt what the defendant had told Gilden. 
 
In this context, as the defendant's lawyer, Gilden had an 
obligation at the very least to discuss with his client the 
self-incrimination privilege and the potential consequences of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
after the defendant gave his statement to police.  We do not 
consider the claim of conflict of interest further. 
31 
 
giving a statement to the police.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 481 (2000) (counsel not ineffective where 
he appropriately advised defendant of consequences of making 
statement to police and of waiving privilege against 
incrimination).  This was especially true in light of Gilden's 
very brief and very limited investigation of the facts of the 
case, namely, driving by the location where the shooting had 
occurred and hearing the defendant's version of the events.  In 
that version, the defendant denied any involvement in the 
shooting, and instead placed the blame on a third-party culprit.  
Given that Gilden already knew of the murder warrant, it should 
have been obvious to him that the defendant's description of 
events differed materially from the view of the case taken by 
the police.  Before advising the defendant during the drive to 
the police station simply to "tell the truth if he gave a 
statement to the police," and particularly before stating to the 
defendant during the police interview to "tell [the police] what 
[he] told [Gilden]," Gilden should have made an effort at a 
minimum to understand the factual basis for the murder charge 
that had been lodged against the defendant.23  Although, 
                                                          
 
 
23 We do not suggest here that counsel for a criminal 
defendant has an obligation always to advise his or her client 
not to speak to the police, or that counsel may never properly 
advise a client to make a statement to the police.  The point is 
that in a case such as this, where counsel's client was being 
charged with murder, before affirmatively advising a client to 
32 
 
according to Gilden, the defendant did not ask Gilden any 
questions while he was reviewing the Miranda form or giving his 
statement, this did not relieve counsel of the affirmative duty 
to discuss the risks and consequences of making a statement to 
the police with the defendant.  See American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard § 4-
3.7(a) (4th ed. 2015) ("Defense counsel should inform the client 
of his or her rights in the criminal process at the earliest 
opportunity, and . . . take necessary actions to vindicate such 
rights . . .").24 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with 
the police, as both the first and second motion judges 
determined to be the case, and therefore the defendant's 
statement to the police is admissible without more.  We do not 
agree.  It is of course true that a suspect with whom the police 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
speak about the case to the police, it is necessary for counsel 
to undertake some investigation of the charge and the 
government's evidence.  See Moreau, 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 683 n.4 
(in determining whether to advise client to speak with police, 
counsel had to undertake some investigation as to basis of 
information given by police). 
 
24 In certain circumstances, it may not be possible for 
counsel to undertake any investigation of charges pending 
against the client before counsel is obliged to provide advice 
concerning whether to speak to the police.  In such a situation, 
the need to advise the client about the risks of speaking with 
the police appear to be even stronger.  See E. Blumenson & A.B. 
Leavens, Massachusetts Criminal Practice § 19.2 (4th ed. 2012). 
33 
 
seek to conduct a custodial interrogation may validly waive his 
or her Miranda rights, including the right to counsel, without 
an attorney being present and without having first been advised 
by an attorney.  But where, as here, the suspect, accompanied by 
his attorney, appears for what will be a custodial interview, 
the suspect has already exercised his right to have an attorney 
present to assist him, and he is entitled to receive effective 
legal assistance from that attorney.  See Moreau, 30 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 679.  It would undermine the promise of Miranda and 
Mavredakis if it were otherwise.  The affidavits of the 
defendant and Gilden are consistent in terms of the advice 
Gilden gave to his client on February 20, 1994.  Together, these 
affidavits indicate, and we conclude, that Gilden's performance 
as the defendant's attorney on that date fell "measurably below 
that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer."  
Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  In the context of a case of murder 
in the first degree, the question that arises is whether 
Gilden's error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See Wright, 411 Mass. at 681.  The answer requires 
consideration of two further points:  (1) whether Gilden's 
erroneous legal advice caused the defendant to give his 
statement to the police; and (2) if so, whether the evidence of 
the statement at trial "was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  Id. at 682. 
34 
 
 
We focus on the second point first, because if the jury 
were not likely to have been influenced by the defendant's 
statement, there would be no need to consider the first point.  
If we assume that the defendant's statement to the police was a 
direct consequence of Gilden's ineffective assistance, the error 
did create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The defendant's statement, admitted at trial, placed him 
directly at the scene of the crime at the exact time the crime 
was committed, strongly reinforcing Gibbs's trial testimony.  
This was significant because the actual shooting incident here 
happened very quickly, and Gibbs did not see who shot him.  And 
although Woods identified the shooter as "the kid [he] was 
with," the strength of the identification may have been subject 
to question, given Woods's condition at the time he was speaking 
and the fact that he had been shot in the back, suggesting the 
shooter was behind him and out of view.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor, in her closing, was able to use the statement 
extremely effectively, pointing out the differences between what 
the defendant had stated in comparison to Gibbs, and arguing 
that the differences demonstrated that the defendant was lying 
and pointed to consciousness of guilt on his part; based on 
these statements, the judge gave a consciousness of guilt 
instruction to the jury.25  In all these circumstances, the jury 
                                                          
 
 
25 The prosecutor also was able to make a persuasive 
35 
 
were likely to have been influenced by the defendant's statement 
in reaching their verdicts. 
 
Given this result, we must consider the first point, that 
is, whether Gilden's ineffective legal advice caused the 
defendant to give his statement to the police.  The defendant 
states in his affidavit that he would not have made a statement 
if he had understood the police had identified him as a suspect 
who may have committed the murder, and that he only made the 
statement because he assumed that he was merely a witness -- an 
assumption he states was based directly on Gilden's ineffective 
advice to tell the police what he had told Gilden.  However, the 
first motion judge found -- presumably based on the testimony of 
Hunt, the sole witness at the motion hearing -- that before he 
gave his statement, the defendant was both shown the murder 
warrant and placed under arrest, or advised that he was (see 
note 15, supra) -- circumstances that certainly might suggest 
the defendant in fact did know that he was a suspect when he 
spoke.  More significantly, these circumstances also might 
suggest -- given the defendant's acknowledgement in his 
affidavit that he was well aware a criminal suspect has the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
argument that if the defendant heard the interchange among 
Gibbs, Woods, and various young women in one or two automobiles 
-- as the defendant told Hunt in his statement that he did -- it 
must have been because the defendant was secretly following 
Gibbs and Woods, "lying in wait" until they were alone, because, 
as Gibbs testified, the defendant was not with Gibbs and Woods 
when they encountered the young women. 
36 
 
right not to speak to the police -- that the defendant chose to 
speak independently of any advice or directive from Gilden.26  
However, the defendant did not testify at the evidentiary 
hearing held by the first motion judge, and nothing in the 
judge's opinion indicates that the judge considered or had even 
read the defendant's affidavit, which, in contrast to Gilden's, 
was not introduced as a motion exhibit.  As for the second 
motion judge, he did not hold an evidentiary hearing.27  In any 
event, neither the first nor the second motion judge could 
appropriately make findings of fact concerning the defendant's 
knowledge or the reasons he gave his statement based on the 
defendant's affidavit or affidavits alone. 
 
In these circumstances, we conclude that it is necessary to 
vacate the denial of the defendant's first motion for a new 
trial and to remand the case to the Superior Court for an 
evidentiary hearing before the second motion judge.  This 
hearing has a narrow purpose.  The second motion judge must 
                                                          
 
 
26 It is also possible that the defendant might have chosen 
to give a statement because it gave him an opportunity to put 
forth his claim of a third-party culprit -- i.e., that an 
unknown man the defendant saw get out of a Cougar automobile on 
the corner of Green and Newbury Streets was the likely shooter. 
 
 
27 The second motion judge concluded that no hearing was 
necessary because the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak to the police.  
For the reasons earlier discussed in the text, however, we do 
not consider the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights to be 
dispositive of his ineffective assistance claim. 
37 
 
determine whether the defendant's statement to the police on 
that date was the direct consequence of Gilden's deficient legal 
advice, or whether, independently of Gilden's advice, the 
defendant made his own voluntary and knowing decision to waive 
his right against self-incrimination and to speak to the 
police.28  If the judge finds that the defendant gave his 
statement directly because of Gilden's deficient advice, the 
defendant's first motion for a new trial should be allowed; if 
the judge, however, determines that the defendant independently 
decided to give his statement, the motion should be denied. 
 
We turn to the defendant's remaining arguments. 
 
3.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant contends that 
his due process rights were violated because the prosecutor in 
her closing argument misused the facts at trial to such an 
extent that she rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.  He 
argues that in her closing, the prosecutor misrepresented "the 
most exculpatory" set of facts in the case, which he claims 
included (1) Defrancesco's observation of a vehicle driving away 
from the scene of the shooting with its lights off; (2) Officer 
Reardon's stop of a vehicle matching the description soon 
thereafter and the immediate flight taken by two of the 
                                                          
 
 
28 At the evidentiary hearing, we anticipate that the judge 
will hear testimony from the defendant and Gilden, who appears 
to continue to be an active member of the Massachusetts bar, and 
perhaps Hunt, if he is available. 
38 
 
automobile's occupants; and (3) Defrancesco's inspection of the 
vehicle stopped by Reardon to determine whether it was the same 
one -- which, in fact, Defrancesco had stated it was, as shown 
by the recently discovered second page of Hunt's written summary 
of his interview of Defrancesco.29  The defendant's claim in this 
regard is that the prosecutor first misrepresented specific 
points of evidence concerning these facts, culminating in her 
misleading statement that the automobile that Reardon stopped 
"had nothing to do with this [case]."  We disagree that this 
statement was improper.  What the evidence showed was that, 
after stopping the vehicle, Reardon found no evidence of a gun 
or any shell casings.  It was also shown that the police 
eventually determined the identities of the passengers, but 
there was no evidence suggesting that the passengers had 
anything to do with the shooting of Woods and Gibbs.  Based on 
this information, it was not improper for the prosecutor to draw 
and argue the inference that the vehicle had nothing to do with 
the shooting.  See Commonwealth v. Murchison, 418 Mass. 58, 59-
60 (1994). 
 
The defendant also contends that the reason Defrancesco 
could not be located and therefore could not be called to 
testify about the vehicle leaving the scene of the shooting was 
that the prosecutor negligently or intentionally suppressed 
                                                          
 
29 See note 7, supra. 
39 
 
evidence of the fact that Defrancesco had a criminal record, 
which might have led to information concerning Defrancesco's 
then current address or location.  The defendant analogizes this 
to those situations in which a prosecutor "exploit[s] the 
absence of evidence that had been excluded at his request."  
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 555 (2003). 
 
The record does not support the defendant's argument.  
Rather, it reflects that the prosecutor had tried a number of 
times to subpoena Defrancesco to appear at the trial, with no 
success.30  It is true that Defrancesco actually had three 
pending charges in the Brockton Division of the District Court 
Department at the time of the trial in this case, presumably 
being prosecuted by others in the prosecutor's office.  It also 
might be the case that an examination of case records associated 
with those charges may have revealed a more accurate address for 
                                                          
 
 
30 With respect to locating Defrancesco, the record contains 
the following.  On the first day of trial, the prosecutor told 
the trial judge and the defense that she had summonsed 
DeFrancesco, but had not heard from her.  Two days later, the 
prosecutor indicated that she had summonsed Defrancesco again, 
but could not ensure Defrancesco's appearance because she was 
not sure she had located the correct woman.  On the fourth day 
of trial, the prosecutor stated that a State police trooper went 
to the last known address of Defrancesco, but the house was 
abandoned.  The trooper then sought to find Defrancesco in the 
registry of motor vehicles data base; a "Corrina Defrancesco" 
was located in Taunton, and the prosecutor summonsed her there, 
but there was no response.  The prosecutor stated to the judge 
that she did not believe Defrancesco had a criminal record, 
meaning that she could not locate Defrancesco through a criminal 
registry. 
40 
 
DeFrancesco than the ones used by the prosecutor in this case.  
However, there is nothing in this record to indicate that the 
prosecutor herself knew of these pending charges, and in the 
absence of information showing that the charges had been entered 
in a probation record for Defrancesco or some similar database, 
we cannot say that she intentionally or negligently failed to 
take appropriate steps to discover them.  In fact, defense 
counsel, with the assistance of an investigator, sought 
unsuccessfully to locate Defrancesco throughout the trial. 
 
The defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor's 
statement during closing that Trooper Arnold, who testified on 
behalf of the Commonwealth as an expert witness concerning 
ballistics, opined that only one gun was used during the 
shooting.31  We agree that the prosecutor's statement was 
improper.  During trial, the jury heard from Arnold that the 
                                                          
 
 
31 In her closing, the prosecutor stated: 
 
"You also heard, ladies and gentlemen, from Trooper Arnold.  
And Trooper Arnold, from his qualifications and his years 
is definitely an expert.  And what did Trooper Arnold tell 
you, ladies and gentlemen? . . .  Number one, Trooper 
Arnold told you that the four casings in this case were the 
same type, that they all had CCI-NR 9mm Luger written on 
the bottom. . . .  And the two projectiles were of the same 
type, I believe the term was full metal jacket. . . .  And 
what did he tell you about these, ladies and gentlemen?  He 
told you that the projectile, the projectile of this type, 
a full metal jacket projectile is only manufactured by CCI.  
CCI.  And what did that tell Trooper Arnold?  What was his 
opinion?  That there was one gun.  One gun.  Not two, not 
three, not four.  One.  That was his opinion. . ." 
(emphasis added). 
41 
 
evidence was consistent with a single gun being used, but that 
he could not say scientifically that this was the case.32  The 
trial judge then instructed the prosecutor that she could not 
elicit Arnold's opinion whether one gun had been used.  Defense 
counsel, however, did not object to the prosecutor's reference 
in her closing to Arnold having an opinion that there was only 
one gun; the question, therefore, is whether the prosecutor's 
improper remark created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  It did not. 
                                                          
 
 
32 At trial, the following exchange took place following a 
question by the prosecutor whether, from all the evidence at the 
scene that he observed and the ballistic testing he performed, 
the ballistic items taken from the scene were consistent with 
one gun being used: 
 
Trooper Arnold:  "First of all, the microscopic comparison 
of the four cartridge casings, with that I was able to 
determine they were all fired by one individual weapon.  
The microscopic comparison of the two spent projectiles I 
was able to determine that they were all fired through the 
same unknown barrel or same unknown weapon.  Scientifically 
I cannot tie those two spent projectiles and the four 
cartridge casings together.  In other words, without a 
suspect weapon I can't scientifically say that one weapon 
was used.  However, examining -- physically examining and 
doing some work on the projectiles, I can determine that 
they are consistent with those cartridge casings 
manufactured by CCI.  The total metal jacketed projectile, 
the only manufacturer that I've ever seen using that is 
CCI" (emphasis added). 
 
. . . 
 
The prosecutor:  "And is CCI the casings that were in this 
case?" 
 
Trooper Arnold:  "Correct." 
42 
 
 
The trial judge instructed the jury that closing arguments 
were not evidence and only facts in evidence could be considered 
during deliberations.  More significantly, as Arnold's quoted 
testimony reflected (see note 32, supra), in his view, the 
ballistics evidence in the case strongly supported a conclusion 
that only one gun had been used, but Arnold could not so opine 
as a matter of ballistics certainty.  In the circumstances, 
there appears to be little risk that the prosecutor's comment 
improperly led the jury to accept a conclusion about Arnold's 
opinions that was not supported by evidence properly before 
them. 
 
4.  Right to a public trial.  In his second motion for a 
new trial, the defendant argued for the first time that his 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when his 
brother and mother were prevented from entering the court room 
during jury empanelment.  "It is well settled that the violation 
of a defendant's right to a public trial is structural error 
requiring reversal."  Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 672 
(2014).  Nevertheless, even structural error is subject to 
waiver.  Id.  The third motion judge determined that the 
defendant's failure to raise this issue in his first motion for 
a new trial constituted waiver. 
 
In Wall, we stated that "[w]here defense counsel did not 
object to any alleged court room closure at trial, and the 
43 
 
defendant failed to raise the claim in his first motion for a 
new trial, . . . the defendant's right to a public trial during 
jury empanelment has been waived."  Wall, 469 Mass. at 673.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102-103, cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 356 (2014); Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 106, 
112-113, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2830 (2014).  The defendant 
argues, however, that Wall is inapplicable to his case because 
any waiver amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Specifically, he asserts that trial counsel and counsel handling 
his first motion for a new trial provided ineffective assistance 
because they were unaware that exclusion of the public from jury 
selection violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right.33  This 
ignorance of the law, the defendant claims, constituted 
unreasonable performance requiring reversal of his convictions.  
See Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014). 
The defendant's argument fails.  In light of our decisions 
in Morganti and Alebord -- cases that, like this one, were tried 
in the Superior Court in Brockton before 2007 -- there is little 
if any basis to claim that either trial counsel or the 
defendant's counsel at the time of his first motion for a new 
                                                          
 
 
33 Each counsel provided an affidavit in connection with the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial admitting that he had 
been unaware that the right to a public trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution extended to jury 
empanelment. 
44 
 
trial was ineffective.  See Morganti, 467 Mass. at 97-98, 103-
105.  See also Alebord, 467 Mass. at 114.34 
 
In any event, the defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel fails because he has not shown prejudice.  
Where a defendant procedurally waives his Sixth Amendment public 
trial claim, and later raises the claim as one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, as is the case here, "the defendant is 
required to show prejudice from counsel's inadequate 
performance" -- that is, a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice -- and "the presumption of prejudice that 
would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error 
does not apply."  Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 856 
(2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015).  See Commonwealth 
v. Jackson, 471 Mass. 262, 268-269 (2015).  The defendant has 
not presented any evidence of prejudice, that is, evidence 
                                                          
 
 
34 We reject the defendant's suggestion that Hinton v. 
Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014), overruled Morganti or 
Alebord.  In Hinton, supra at 1089, the United States Supreme 
Court held that "[a]n attorney's ignorance of a point of law 
that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to 
perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example 
of unreasonable performance."  In Hinton, the indigent 
defendant's trial counsel failed to seek additional funds that 
were available under State law to hire a legitimate firearms 
expert in a death penalty case where the only evidence linking 
the defendant to the crimes was ballistics testing from a 
firearm.  Id. at 1083-1087.  The attorney's ignorance of the law 
in Hinton went to the fundamental issue of the case.  In 
Morganti and Alebord, there was no evidence that the court room 
closure was fundamental to the defendants' receipt of a fair 
trial.  The same is true in this case. 
45 
 
tending to show that closure of the court room during 
empanelment may have had "an 'effect on the judgment,' or 
undermine[d] our 'reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.'"  
LaChance, supra at 859, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 691, 692 (1984).  Nor do we find such evidence on 
independent review.  The defendant's Sixth Amendment public 
trial claim therefore is waived, and his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for waiving his Sixth Amendment right 
fails. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we 
conclude as follows.  With respect to the defendant's direct 
appeal, the convictions of murder in the first degree and armed 
assault with intent to murder are affirmed.  With respect to the 
defendant's appeal from the order denying his second motion for 
a new trial, that order is affirmed.  Finally, with respect to 
the defendant's appeal from the order denying his first motion 
for a new trial, that order is vacated, and the case is remanded 
to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.