Title: Combs v. Groener

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

472 P.2d 281 (1970)
Harold D. COMBS, Wilda Combs, Erik O. Berglund, Ingrid Berglund, Contestants-Appellants,
v.
Richard GROENER, Contestee-Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted March 4, 1970.
Decided July 22, 1970.
Rehearing Denied September 9, 1970.
Donald C. Walker, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.
Keith Burns, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before PERRY, C.J.,[*] and McALLISTER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, DENECKE and TONGUE, JJ.
*282 SLOAN, Justice.
This is an election contest. The petition alleges the contestants are qualified voters in Clackamas county and relates to the election campaign between the contestee, Richard Groener, and his opponent, Mrs. Richard Sundeleaf, for the office of State Representative, Seventh Representative District, Clackamas County, Position No. 4, in the general election of November 5, 1968. It is alleged that the winner of the largest number of votes, Richard Groener, violated the Corrupt Practices Act by advertisements and other representations similar to those involved in Cook v. Corbett, 1968, 251 Or. 263, 446 P.2d 179. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. Contestants appeal. We affirm.
Article IV, § 11, of the Oregon Constitution requires:
The courts have uniformly held, with little exception, that statutes which purport to empower the judicial branch of a state government to try and decide the "election, qualifications and returns" of the members of a legislature is in violation of similar constitutional requirements. Annotation 107 A.L.R. 205.
The most persuasive case on the subject is Dinan v. Swig, 1916, 223 Mass. 516, 112 N.E. 91. The Dinan case involved an alleged violation of a Massachusetts corrupt practices statute which, like our own statute, ORS 251.070, directed the court to declare void the election of a person found to have violated the act. In answering the question of "* * * whether the statute is constitutional so far as it imposes duties upon the court with reference to the election of a member of the Legislature" the court responded:
In our own case of Lessard v. Snell, 1937, 155 Or. 293, 63 P.2d 893, we held that the court had no jurisdiction, by reason of Art. IV, § 11, to determine the qualifications of one elected to the Oregon State Senate. See subseqeunt approval of Lessard in Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 1957, 211 Or. 360, 363, 315 P.2d 797.
The contestants, in the instant case, rely upon Cook v. Corbett, supra, for obvious reasons. Cook v. Corbett involved a primary election. The issue decided here was not presented and was not considered or decided in Cook v. Corbett, supra. However, several courts have held that the constitutional requirement does not apply to primary elections. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 1966, 68 Wash. 2d 553, 413 P.2d 972; State ex rel. Gramelspacher v. Martin Cir. Ct., 1952, 231 Ind. 114, 107 N.E. *283 2d 666; Leu v. Montgomery, 1914, 31 N.D. 1, 148 N.W. 662.
There is justification for a distinction between a primary and general election contest. The primary election does not make the winner of that election a member of the legislative assembly. It is no more than a form of party nomination. It is not the exclusive process for getting an aspirant's name on the general election ballot. ORS 249.310 et seq.
The result of the general election is conclusive. It is the only election that determines who shall receive the certificate of election. ORS 250.840. As stated by the Indiana court in the Gramelspacher case:
Powell v. McCormack, 1969, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, requires comment. Powell, it will be remembered, was denied his seat in the 90th Congress pursuant to a resolution of the House of Representatives. This action of the House was taken because of alleged prior misconduct of Powell in earlier sessions of the Congress. The Powell case did not involve alleged fraudulent conduct influencing his election to Congress. The case is not apposite to the question decided here. Neither is Bond v. Floyd, 1966, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S. Ct. 339, 17 L. Ed. 2d 235, also cited. Bond held that the Georgia House of Representatives could not violate First Amendment rights of free speech in refusing to seat a person who had been elected to the Georgia House of Representatives.
Contestants' second assignment disputes the allowance of an attorney's fee. In their brief contestants state:
Our decision does not declare the statutes to be unconstitutional. We hold only that the constitution does vest the sole jurisdiction of this contest to be within the House of Representatives of the Legislative Assembly. Regardless of that, ORS 251.060 (2)[1] is clearly independent and severable. Gilbertson et al. v. Culinary Alliance et al., 1955, 204 Or. 326, at 355, 282 P.2d 632.
[*]  Perry, C.J., retired June 1, 1970.
[1]  "The prevailing party in the contest proceeding shall recover his costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney's fees against the losing party, * * *."