Title: Laymon v. Braddock

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

544 So. 2d 900 (1989)
Cecil LAYMON and Linda J. Laymon
v.
Kenneth BRADDOCK, et al.
88-230.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 10, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1989.
*901 Barry N. McCrary, Talladega, and Donald W. Stewart, Anniston, for appellants.
George A. Monk of Merrill, Porch, Doster & Dillon, Anniston, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
This is an action brought by Cecil Laymon and Linda J. Laymon, individually, and as parents of Lesia Gayle Laymon, their deceased minor daughter, against Kenneth Braddock; James A. Carson, d/b/a Carson Spur Station; and Michele Jones,[1] for the wrongful death of Lesia.
Lesia was killed when the automobile she was driving ran off the road and turned over. Lesia was 16 and was not a licensed driver but had her learner's permit. Lesia's former sister-in-law, defendant Michele Jones, who drove the automobile for most of the night of the accident, was in the automobile as a passenger at the time of the accident. Ms. Jones testified that she had purchased a carton containing four bottles of "wine cooler" from Braddock, who was a clerk at the Carson Spur Station, on three different occasions on the night of the accident; that during the first two purchases, Lesia remained in the automobile; that during the third purchase, both Lesia and Ms. Jones went into the Spur Station; that at that time, they were giggling, and that Lesia asked if her eyes were red, if bubble gum would take the alcohol smell off her breath, and made the statement: "I can't go home like this. Mama will slap my face." There was testimony that this statement was made in the presence of Braddock, and that he responded to Lesia's statement by laughing. Braddock and his wife, who was present at the Spur Station, denied that Ms. Jones had purchased any wine coolers from the Spur Station on the night of the accident. Evidence was presented that on the night of the accident Lesia had attended a social function at which alcoholic beverages were served; that Ms. Jones drove most of the night, but that Ms. Jones became emotional and Lesia then drove. After the accident, tests showed that Lesia had a .03% blood alcohol content and that Ms. Jones had a .155% blood alcohol content.
*902 The Laymons' complaint charged Ms. Jones, Braddock, and Carson with negligence, wantonness, and violations of Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-5-70 and 6-5-71. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Braddock and Carson on the common law counts of negligence and wantonness and on the claim under § 6-5-70. Thereafter, the Laymons voluntarily dismissed their common law counts and claim under § 6-5-70 against Ms. Jones. The Laymons' claim under § 6-5-71 was submitted to a jury.
The Laymons' motion for a new trial was denied.
One of the two issues presented for review is whether the trial court erroneously charged the jury regarding the requisite standard of causation under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-71. This issue does not involve the failure to give a written requested instruction; it involves only the trial court's oral charge.
In McElmurry v. Uniroyal, Inc., 531 So. 2d 859, 859-60, (Ala.1988), this Court held:
In the case at issue, the Laymons made the following objections, and these are the only objections that pertain in any way to this issue for review:
In support of their contention that the oral charge was erroneous, the Laymons cite Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 111 N.W. 422 (1907); McClay v. Worrell, 18 Neb. 44, 24 N.W. 429 (1885); Wilcox v. Conti, 174 Misc. 230, 20 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.1940); Cross v. Ryan, 124 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 682, 62 *903 S. Ct. 1269, 86 L. Ed. 1755 (1942); Weisguth v. Stack, 165 Ill.App. 462 (1911). They also cite Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala.App. 244, 246, 54 So. 2d 320, 321 (1951), which refers to Bistline v. Ney Bros., supra, in support of the following:
In the case at issue, the trial court charged:
The trial court further instructed the jury that:
We believe that the trial court's charge sufficiently complied with the following proposition of law in Phillips v. Derrick, supra:
Likewise, we believe that the trial court instructed that a person selling alcoholic beverages could be responsible for remote or possible consequences, if the damages complained of were "in consequence of" the intoxication of the person.
The Laymons did not adequately state any other specific grounds for their objection to the trial court's oral charge, and we cannot review further this alleged error. Rule 51, A.R.Civ.P.; McElmurry v. Uniroyal, Inc., supra.
The other issue presented for review was whether the trial court erred in granting Braddock and Carson's motion for directed verdict on the Laymons' claim under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-70, which provides in pertinent part:
If there is a purchase of spirituous liquors, the seller has a duty to ascertain that the purchaser is not a minor. There is not a scintilla of evidence that Braddock or Carson sold the wine coolers to Lesia. Wade v. State, 170 Ala. 32, 54 So. 171 (1911), and Liles v. State, 88 Ala. 139, 7 So. 196 (1890), involved a second-party sale subterfuge that was known to, and in Liles participated in by, the seller of spirituous liquor. Those cases are distinguishable from the case at issue. What constitutes "furnishing" spirituous liquors to a minor? Ms. Jones did not purchase the wine coolers and hand one to the minor for her to drink in the presence of the seller, as happened in Page v. State, 84 *904 Ala. 446, 4 So. 697 (1888), and in Salvia's Bar, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 211 Pa.Super. 275, 236 A.2d 839 (1967). There was evidence that Ms. Jones had previously purchased eight wine coolers from Carson Spur Station on the night of the accident, while Lesia remained in the automobile. There was no evidence that would impose liability on Braddock or Carson under § 6-5-70 for either of these purchases. Ms. Jones testified that she shared these eight wine coolers with Lesia. Ms. Jones testified that the following took place when she purchased wine coolers the third time: Lesia and Ms. Jones both went into the Spur Station; in the presence of Braddock, they were giggling; Lesia asked Ms. Jones if Lesia's eyes were red and if bubble gum would take the alcohol smell off of her breath; Lesia said, "I can't go home like this. Mama will slap my face"; and Braddock laughed in response to Lesia's comment. We interpret the words "furnishes" and "furnishing" in § 6-5-70 to extend liability under § 6-5-70 to a seller or furnisher of spirituous liquors, who, from the totality of the circumstances, must reasonably infer that the person to whom the spirituous liquor is sold or furnished will permit a minor to consume some of this spirituous liquor. Page v. State, 84 Ala. 446, 448, 4 So. 697, 698 (1888), contains the following statement:
Page was a criminal case; this is a civil case tried under the "scintilla of evidence" rule. Clearly, if there had been evidence that Braddock sold spirituous liquor to Ms. Jones and that Ms. Jones shared it with Lesia, it would have been error for the trial court to direct a verdict for Braddock and Carson on the § 6-5-70 count. However, there is no evidence, or reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence, to indicate that Lesia consumed any of the wine coolers purchased during this third visit to the Spur Station. Such evidence is essential to establish liability of a seller or furnisher under § 6-5-70.
In accordance with our standard of review, we will affirm a judgment based on a directed verdict when there is a complete absence of proof of one or more elements of the non-movants' cause of action, or when there are no disputed questions of fact on which reasonable people can differ. Kizziah v. Golden Rule Insurance Co., 536 So. 2d 943 (Ala.1988); Armstrong v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 454 So. 2d 1377 (Ala.1984).
The trial court did not err in directing the verdict for Braddock and Carson on the Laymons' § 6-5-70 claim.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
JONES, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur specially.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the per curiam opinion; however, I would extend the opinion. Therefore, I concur specially.
*905 There was no evidence that the "California wine coolers" that were allegedly purchased from the Carson Spur Station were "spirituous liquors." There is nothing in the record to show that a wine cooler is a "spirituous liquor," as this term was defined by this Court when Alabama Code 1975, § 6-5-70, was enacted; or as it is defined generally; or as it is defined in Ala.Code 1975, Chapter 3, Title 28, "Regulation and Control of Alcoholic Beverages in Wet Counties." This Court in Tinker v. State, 90 Ala. 647, 648, 8 So. 855 (1891), defined "spirituous liquor" as "that which, in whole or in part, is composed of alcohol extracted by distillation," citing Allred v. State, 89 Ala. 112, 8 So. 56 (1890), and Bishop on Statutory Crimes, § 1009. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969) and the American Heritage Dictionary (2d college ed. 1985) define "spirituous" as "[h]aving the nature of or containing alcohol; alcoholic"; and "liquor" as "[a]n alcoholic beverage made by distillation rather than by fermentation." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976) defines "spirituous" as "containing or of the nature of spirit: impregnated with alcohol obtained by distillation;" and it defines "liquor" as: "something drunk as a beverage (as water, milk, fruit juice); esp: a usually strong distilled alcoholic beverage (as whiskey, rum) rather than a fermented one (as wine, beer)." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1973) defines "spirituous" as "containing, of the nature of, or pertaining to alcohol; alcoholic[;] (of alcoholic beverages) distilled, rather than fermented"; and it defines "liquor" as "a distilled or spirituous beverage, as brandy or whiskey, as distinguished from a fermented beverage, as wine or beer." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "liquor" as an "[a]lcoholic beverage made by distillation; to be contrasted with wines which are made by fermentation."
In Ala.Code 1975, § 28-3-1, the following definitions appear:
Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-70, only authorizes a right of action against a "person who unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors to" a minor. It appears that under the general definition of "spirituous liquor," wine, a fermented beverage, would not be included. Likewise, for the control of alcoholic beverages in Alabama "spirituous" liquor is considered something different from "vinous" liquor, for "vinous" is in a set of alternatives with "spirituous" in the definitions of "LIQUOR" and "TABLE WINE"; and any wine containing not more than 14 percent alcohol is not "liquor, spirituous or vinous." This is consistent with the general definition of wine in the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, which defines "wine" as "[t]he fermented juice of any of various kinds of grapes, usually containing from 10 to 15 percent alcohol by volume," and with this Court's definition in Tinker v. State, supra: "Vinous liquor is liquor made from the juice of the grape.... Spirituous liquor, vinous liquor, and malt liquor are not synonymous terms, but each refers to a liquor separate and distinct from the others." 90 Ala. at 648, 8 So.  at 856.
It is not for us to surmise why, at the beginning of this century, the Legislature, in what is now § 6-5-70, restricted the right of action to an action against one "who unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors to [a] minor" (which language, according to the definitions of spirituous liquors, would not include wine or beer), and permits, in § 6-5-71, a right of action against one who unlawfully sells, gives, or otherwise disposes of any liquors or beverages that cause intoxication. The Legislature *906 did so, and it is for us to interpret, not to rewrite, such legislation; but it is for us to bring this to the attention of the present Legislature for its evaluation, since, to the judicial mind, it would seem that wine and beer should be included in § 6-5-70.
JONES and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  There were other defendants, who were dismissed, who are not parties to this appeal.