Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FROST. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870.] 
Attorney misconduct, including engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, and knowingly making false accusations against 
a judge — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2009-0069 — Submitted March 25, 2009 — Decided June 24, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 07-079. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Merrie Maurine Frost of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0059642, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1992. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we indefinitely suspend respondent’s license to practice, based 
on findings that she filed in court false accusations of bias and corruption against 
judges and a county prosecutor and also persisted in pursuing a baseless 
defamation suit.  We accept the board’s findings and agree that the acts 
constituted professional misconduct as found by the board and that an indefinite 
suspension of respondent’s license is appropriate.  Moreover, to safeguard the 
public, we order as one condition of reinstatement that respondent provide 
medical proof that she is mentally fit to return to the competent, professional, and 
ethical practice of law. 
{¶ 3} Respondent, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with three 
counts of professional misconduct, alleging multiple violations of the Disciplinary 
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Rules of the former Code of Professional Responsibility and Gov.Bar R. IV(2) 
(requiring lawyers to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts).  A panel of 
board members heard the case, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
recommended the indefinite suspension of respondent’s license.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶ 4} Respondent has objected to the board’s report, arguing that an 
indefinite suspension from practice is too harsh in view of her heretofore 
unblemished professional record.  And rather than attack the board’s findings of 
misconduct as unfounded, she asserts that charges she made alleging corruption 
and bias are constitutionally protected and impervious to the disciplinary process.  
We reject both arguments. 
Misconduct 
 Count One 
{¶ 5} Respondent engaged in professional misconduct first by falsely 
accusing several Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judges and the county 
prosecutor of corruption and bias in the execution of their official duties.  Because 
respondent had no reasonable basis for leveling these charges, the board found her 
in violation of the following ethical standards: DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) 
(prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-
102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law), 7-102(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from taking action on behalf of a 
client that the lawyer knows or should know would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another), 7-106(C)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer appearing in a 
professional capacity before a tribunal from making an assertion that the lawyer 
“has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence”), and 8-102(B) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
January Term, 2009 
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knowingly making  false accusations against a judge) and Gov.Bar R. IV(2).  We 
accept these findings of misconduct. 
{¶ 6} In 2003, respondent filed race-discrimination and related claims 
against the Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners, among other defendants, 
on behalf of Jennifer Simmons-Means and Norman Rice as employees of the 
Cuyahoga County Department of Justice Affairs (the “Simmons-Means” and 
“Rice” cases).  The Simmons-Means case was assigned to Judge Timothy 
McCormick; Judge William J. Coyne presided in the Rice case. 
{¶ 7} In November 2004, Judge Coyne granted summary judgment 
against Rice, and approximately one year later, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  In December 2004, defendants in the Simmons-Means case 
moved for summary judgment, and in October 2005, Judge McCormick granted 
that motion.  Approximately one year later, Judge McCormick’s decision was also 
affirmed. 
{¶ 8} Respondent did not initially file a response to the motions for 
summary judgment in the Simmons-Means case.  On January 12, 2005, she 
instead filed an affidavit of disqualification with this court, seeking to remove 
Judge McCormick, who had by that time presided in the case for nearly two years.  
Relator aptly characterized the affidavit as follows: “[A] rambling narration that is 
for the most part, entirely irrelevant to Judge McCormick or Simmons-Means.  
Respondent used the affidavit solely as a platform to broadcast her false 
allegations against * * * judges and public officials.” 
{¶ 9} Respondent claimed to be “competent to testify to the facts” and to 
have “first hand knowledge of the facts alleged” in the affidavit of 
disqualification.  From respondent’s testimony at the panel hearing, however, it is 
clear that she had nothing beyond conjecture, rumor, and innuendo to support her 
charges.  Respondent’s affidavit alleged the following: 
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{¶ 10} 1. The Cuyahoga County prosecutor had information that 
government employees were engaging in race discrimination and illegal conduct, 
including crimes of forgery, fraud, and falsification of public documents, yet 
failed to investigate. 
{¶ 11} 2. Judge McCormick denied Simmons-Means due process with his 
“outright blatant special treatment for the defendants.” 
{¶ 12} 3. Judge Coyne, in the Rice case, had an “an ex parte 
communication with defense counsel regarding a discovery dispute” and then 
dismissed the action for political reasons and refused to reduce his reasoning to 
writing.  (At the panel hearing, defense counsel in the Rice case specifically 
denied any ex parte communication, and respondent conceded that she had never 
requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the judge.)   
{¶ 13} 4. Judge McCormick showed bias for the defense in the Simmons-
Means case by granting a six-month stay of proceedings.  Respondent claimed 
that “political connections” motivated the judge and that his ruling “conveniently 
slowed down the case so that nothing could be decided until after the November 
election.”  (Evidence presented at the hearing, however, established that Judge 
McCormick had granted the stay to allow one defendant to care for her terminally 
ill spouse.)   
{¶ 14} 5. Judge McCormick was “biased and intend[ed] to rule against” 
Simmons-Means “regardless of what evidence [she] can provide to support her 
case.”  (Evidence presented at hearing substantiated that respondent leveled this 
charge because Judge McCormick had asked her to try to obtain the discovery she 
needed from county commissioners first through written requests and then decide 
whether she still needed to conduct depositions of the commissioners.)   
{¶ 15} 6. In an unrelated race-discrimination case, Judge Mary Jane Boyle 
delayed in ruling on respondent’s motion for attorney fees because she was 
“afraid” that her ruling would cost a certain “politically connected person” 
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thousands of dollars.  (Though respondent purportedly received this information 
from a court employee, she presented no witness or other evidence at the panel 
hearing to corroborate her claim.) 
{¶ 16} “A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and 
the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 
presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-
Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Respondent failed to carry this burden, and on 
January 28, 2005, her request for Judge McCormick’s disqualification was 
denied. 
{¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, we find the requisite clear and convincing 
proof that respondent had no justification for accusing Judges McCormick, 
Coyne, and Boyle and the county prosecutor of bias and corruption. 
 Count Two 
{¶ 18} Respondent also engaged in professional misconduct by repeatedly 
leveling unfounded accusations of racial bias and other impropriety against a 
federal district court judge.  Because respondent had no reasonable basis for these 
charges, the board found that she had breached numerous ethical standards: DR 1-
102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 7-102(A)(1), 7-106(C)(1), and 8-102(B) 
and Gov.Bar R. IV(2).  We accept these findings of misconduct. 
{¶ 19} Respondent leveled her accusations against the federal judge after 
he granted summary judgment against her clients (14 African-Americans) in a 
race-discrimination case against administrators and supervisors employed by the 
Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court.  She had filed the discrimination case in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, and in early 2003, 
the case came before Judge John R. Adams.  In January 2005, after granting 
summary judgment against 11 plaintiffs, Judge Adams held a status conference 
and encouraged the parties to discuss settlement, but no settlement could be 
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reached.  In March 2005, Judge Adams granted summary judgment against the 
remaining plaintiffs. 
{¶ 20} Respondent then filed a series of grievances against Judge Adams 
in 2005 with the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, all of which were dismissed for lack of merit.  In the first two, she 
asserted that Judge Adams’s adverse rulings and remarks during the status 
conference showed racial bias and favoritism.  In the third grievance, she claimed 
that the judge had obtained nomination to his judicial seat through improper 
financial contributions to prominent politicians.  Testifying before the hearing 
panel, Judge Adams firmly denied any prejudice or other impropriety.  He also 
noted that all of his rulings on the motions for summary judgment had been 
affirmed on appeal. 
{¶ 21} Respondent also filed a motion to disqualify and an affidavit of 
prejudice in 2005, asking Judge Adams to step down.  Her motion again leveled 
unfounded charges that the judge had made racist remarks.  Judge Adams 
declined to recuse himself, insisting that “[t]he Court did not and would not make 
such statements.” 
{¶ 22} After the denial of her motion to disqualify, respondent sought a 
writ of mandamus in the Sixth Circuit, seeking an order of removal.  In July 2005, 
the court of appeals denied the motion. 
{¶ 23} In 2006, respondent moved to vacate the order denying the motion 
to disqualify.  In support, she falsely claimed that Judge Adams knew he was 
under investigation by the FBI for racist conduct and criminal activity and that an 
agent had “sworn out a complaint” against him based on her charges.  Before the 
hearing panel, the agent who had allegedly filed the complaint refuted 
respondent’s claim, explaining that he had merely received and forwarded the 
respondent’s accusations for investigative review.  Another agent later determined 
that the information did not warrant any investigation. 
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{¶ 24} Respondent never succeeded in obtaining Judge Adams’s removal.  
Based on the foregoing, we find the requisite clear and convincing proof showing 
that respondent had no justification for accusing Judge Adams of racial bias or 
other impropriety. 
 Count Three 
{¶ 25} Respondent also engaged in professional misconduct by filing a 
baseless defamation suit against two lawyers who were her opposing counsel in a 
sexual-harassment action.  Because respondent had no reasonable basis for the 
suit, the board found her in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-
102(A)(6), 7-102(A)(1), 7-102(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly 
advancing a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, with an 
exception not relevant here), and 7-106(C)(1).  We accept these findings of 
misconduct. 
{¶ 26} Respondent filed the sexual-harassment case in August 2004 
against her client’s employer and five of its employees in the Lake County 
Common Pleas Court.  The common pleas court granted the employer’s motion 
for a protective order, forbidding the parties or their counsel to comment publicly. 
{¶ 27} In mid-August 2005, respondent sent a threatening e-mail to two 
defense counsel in the case, accusing them of commenting unfavorably about her 
client in public.  She warned that a witness had overheard one or both of them 
talking about the case and that their statements possibly violated the protective 
order.  When the two lawyers replied that they did not know what respondent was 
talking about, she sent a second threatening e-mail. 
{¶ 28} By the end of August, respondent had filed a defamation suit in the 
Lake County Common Pleas Court against the two attorneys, claiming that they 
had made “numerous slanderous remarks about plaintiff including, but not limited 
to, ‘plaintiff was crazy,’ ‘plaintiff was out of her head,’ ‘plaintiff was a liar.’ ”  
Upon learning of the lawsuit, the witness who had allegedly overheard these 
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remarks called respondent and insisted that she dismiss the case immediately.  He 
told her that she had completely misconstrued what were merely casual comments 
regarding rumors he had heard about how the defense intended to discredit her 
client.  Respondent did not dismiss the case. 
{¶ 29} The witness appeared in November 2005 pursuant to subpoena at a 
hearing in the underlying sexual-harassment case.  He testified that he did not 
know the defense attorneys, that he had not overheard either of them talking about 
the case, and that he had never told respondent that he had.  The witness said he 
had for these reasons strongly urged respondent not to pursue the defamation 
action, but she had refused to listen. 
{¶ 30} After this hearing, respondent finally did dismiss the defamation 
action.  The defendants moved for sanctions, and the common pleas court agreed 
that respondent’s suit was frivolous.  The court ordered respondent to pay the two 
defendants $500 each and to pay their counsel $3,000.  The imposition of these 
sanctions was upheld on appeal. 
{¶ 31} Based on the foregoing, we find the requisite clear and convincing 
proof that respondent’s defamation action against opposing counsel was 
completely frivolous. 
Sanction 
Respondent’s False Statements Are Subject to Disciplinary Sanction 
{¶ 32} Respondent offers no legal precedent to support her argument that 
her statements about the judges and county prosecutor are constitutionally 
protected speech.  As relator observes, however, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, settled the 
question.  We summarized Gardner in Shimko v. Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-
Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 58: 
{¶ 33} “In Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, * * * this court held that the 
Free Speech Clause of the Ohio Constitution, Section II [11], Article I, although 
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broader than the federal Constitution in protecting certain false statements, does 
not forbid the imposition of discipline on an attorney for violating DR 8-102(B) 
by falsely accusing an appellate panel of judicial impropriety during a pending 
court proceeding.  In that case, the court adopted an objective standard to 
determine whether a lawyer’s statement about a judicial officer was made with 
knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity, rather than the subjective ‘actual 
malice’ standard applicable in defamation cases under New York Times v. Sullivan 
(1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686.  In so doing, we explained 
that DR 8-102(B) is designed ‘to preserve public confidence in the fairness and 
impartiality of our system of justice’ and specifically concluded that ‘the state’s 
compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary supports 
applying a standard in disciplinary proceedings different from that applicable in 
defamation cases.’  (Emphasis added.) Id., 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 
793 N.E.2d 425, at ¶ 29 and 31.” 
{¶ 34} The standard adopted in Gardner evaluates an attorney’s 
statements in terms of “ ‘“what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all 
his professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances” * * * 
[and] focuses on whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making 
the statements, considering their nature and the context in which they were made.’ 
”  Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, at ¶ 26, quoting 
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman (C.A.9, 1995), 55 F.3d 1430, 1437, 
quoting United States Dist. Court, E. Dist. of Wash. v. Sandlin (C.A.9, 1993), 12 
F.3d 861, 867.  Under this standard, attorneys may still “freely exercise free 
speech rights and make statements supported by a reasonable factual basis, even if 
the attorney turns out to be mistaken.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  But plainly, Gardner stands 
for the proposition that when an attorney levels accusations of judicial 
impropriety that a reasonable attorney would consider to be untrue, disciplinary 
sanctions are permissible. 
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{¶ 35} Respondent’s accusations were baseless.  Given the complete lack 
of substantiation, no reasonable attorney would accept her charges of bias and 
corruption as true.  The imposition of disciplinary measures in this case, therefore, 
poses no constitutional implications. 
An Indefinite Suspension Is Appropriate 
{¶ 36} In recommending the indefinite suspension of respondent’s license 
to practice, the board weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  The board found only the single mitigating factor on 
which respondent urges us to rely – lack of a prior record of professional 
discipline.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  Respondent’s record, however, 
does little to offset the aggravating factors that are also present. 
{¶ 37} As the board found, respondent committed acts of dishonesty, 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and has failed 
to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her conduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), 
(c), (d), and (g).  Her attacks on the public officials caused considerable harm.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h).  False statements impugning the integrity of 
members of the judiciary and judicial system erode public confidence.  Gardner, 
99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 38} Also factoring into our decision is respondent’s failure to inquire 
into the truth of alleged racial discrimination and other claims and the cost to her 
clients.  After an unsuccessful appeal of decisions granting summary judgment, 
Judge Adams assessed attorney fees and costs against respondent and her clients, 
jointly and severally, a decision that the Sixth Circuit affirmed but remanded for a 
new calculation of the amounts owed by each on an individual basis.  See Garner 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Juvenile Court (2009), 554 F.3d 624. 
{¶ 39} Moreover, respondent seems unable to understand fundamental 
evidentiary and procedural rules, a problem manifested by her disjointed efforts to 
present her case before the hearing panel.  When questioned about the firsthand 
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knowledge she claimed to have of the improprieties she had alleged, respondent 
referred to having learned the information from “someone else” or by “looking at 
documents,” thereby erroneously implying that unreliable hearsay may serve as 
competent proof.  She argued in closing, “If there is any question as to whether 
respondent had a basis for her allegations, you only have to look at the 
newspapers.”  Respondent has further maintained that in requiring her to set forth 
the basis for her claims, the statutory provisions or court rules for obtaining a 
judge’s disqualification or recusal required her to level the charges that she did. 
{¶ 40} In Gardner, the lawyer attacked court of appeals judges in a 
request for reconsideration, objecting to a decision affirming his client’s criminal 
conviction.  He accused the panel of having a prosecutorial bias, distorting the 
truth, being result-driven, and ignoring well-established law.  Even at the 
disciplinary hearing, the lawyer confirmed his continued belief that the judges had 
“skewed and ignored the facts, disregarded honesty and truth, and violated their 
oaths to decide cases fairly and impartially.”  Id., 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-
4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, ¶ 11.  Because such unfounded attacks on the judiciary 
warranted an actual suspension from practice, we suspended the lawyer’s license 
for six months. 
{¶ 41} But Gardner leveled his attacks in a single case.  He did not, as 
respondent has, keep resorting to such improprieties in case after case as a defense 
to irrational suspicions of corruption and discrimination in government.  We have 
seen such misconduct before and have dealt with it severely.  For making 
numerous false accusations of criminal and unethical activity against public 
officials and private citizens, compromising her clients' interests, and 
manipulating the legal system to harass and intimidate, we permanently disbarred 
the attorney in Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003-
Ohio-4756, 796 N.E.2d 495. 
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{¶ 42} Baumgartner made accusations against anyone she perceived as a 
detractor.  Respondent’s accusations were not as pervasive as Baumgartner’s, but 
they were also not as restricted as Gardner’s one-time expression of frustration, 
and Gardner later apologized and acknowledged that his accusations had been 
unprofessional.  The intermediate sanction of indefinite suspension is therefore 
appropriate. 
{¶ 43} Respondent is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio and, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B), may not petition for reinstatement 
until at least two years from the date of our order.  Moreover, because of our 
concerns that respondent’s misconduct may be a by-product of unaddressed 
mental-health issues, we impose a condition of reinstatement in addition to the 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B) through (E): any petition for reinstatement 
that respondent files must also include proof that to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, she is mentally fit to return to the competent, professional, and 
ethical practice of law. 
{¶ 44} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
J.K. Roberts Law Group, Ltd., Jacqueline Roberts, and Lawrence J. 
Kramer, for respondent. 
______________________