Title: Town of Mesilla v. Mesilla Design Center & Book Store

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

376 P.2d 183 (1962) 71 N.M. 124 The TOWN OF MESILLA, a New Mexico Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MESILLA DESIGN CENTER AND BOOK STORE, INC., a New Mexico Corporation, and Robert E. Stovall and Ruth Stovall, d/b/a La Joya Gift Shop, Defendants-Appellees. No. 7053. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 13, 1962. *184 J. R. Crouch and E.E. Triviz, Las Cruces, for appellant. William W. Bivins and Mary Simpson Goggin, Las Cruces, for appellees. CHAVEZ, Justice. Suit was filed in district court on December 2, 1960, by plaintiff-appellant, The Town of Mesilla, hereinafter referred to as The Town of Mesilla, against defendant-appellees, Mesilla Design Center and Book Store, Inc., hereinafter referred to as appellee Design Center, and Robert E. Stovall and Ruth Stovall, d/b/a La Joya Gift Shop, hereinafter referred to as appellee La Joya Gift Shop, to enforce one of its municipal ordinances. The case was tried by the court without a jury who, after making its findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered judgment for appellees, Design Center and La Joya Gift Shop, dismissing The Town of Mesilla's complaint. From this judgment the Town of Mesilla appeals. The Town of Mesilla relies on the following points to support its appeal: The ordinance in question, Chapter No. 1, Ordinance No. 7, of the Town of Mesilla, was enacted August 4, 1959, by its mayor and board of trustees, and imposed a license fee on: and purported to regulate "the pursuits, vocations and trades" therein named. The trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact, among which are *185 those attacked by The Town of Mesilla, each of which is indicated by an asterisk: We note that one of the defendants, Mesilla Design Center, Inc., was improperly designated as "Mesilla Design Center and Book Store, Inc.," but the trial court *186 found it had jurisdiction of said defendant. The trial court concluded: At no place in its brief does The Town of Mesilla set out the text of its requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. The court's entire findings of fact and conclusions of law are set out as the statement of facts in The Town of Mesilla's brief and nowhere else. In Bogle v. Potter, 68 N.M. 239, 360 P.2d 650, we held that it is necessary, in order to comply with our rules, to set out findings of fact and conclusions of law under the point wherein they are attacked. Each point must present a legal proposition and be supported by legal authority and argument. Lea County Fair Ass'n v. Elkan, 52 N.M. 250, 197 P.2d 228. Nor may appellant attack the court's findings and conclusions generally. Hugh K. Gale, Post No. 2182 Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Norris, 53 N.M. 58, 201 P.2d 777. For these reasons we need not consider The Town of Mesilla's contentions. However, because of the importance of the question of whether The Town of Mesilla had the legal power to enact the ordinance, not only to The Town of Mesilla but to other cities and towns within the state, we have decided to consider the case on its merits. We are aided by two factors in making this decision and are not actually forced to search the record. The Town of Mesilla did set out all of the trial court's findings and conclusions under its statement of the facts. Appellees, Design Center and La Joya Gift Shop, in their brief have supplied many, if not all, of the deficiencies otherwise existing in The Town of Mesilla's brief. Therefore, despite the difficulties always present when this court's rules have not been followed, we have been able to decide the case on its merits. The powers of a municipal corporation are derived solely from the state. Munro v. City of Albuquerque, 48 N.M. 306, 150 P.2d 733. Since the ordinance in question is purported to have been enacted under its police power to license and regulate the activities of its citizens, we examine the only source from which The Town of Mesilla could have obtained such power. Section 14-42-7, N.M.S.A., 1961 Pocket Supp., governing cities, towns and villages, reads as follows: Section 14-42-8, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., governing cities, towns and villages, provides: The legislative purpose implicit in these statutes is shown by: The categories enumerated; *188 the requirement of § 14-42-8, supra, that an ordinance passed under its authorization shall declare the licensing or regulation to be conducive to the promotion of the health and general welfare of the municipality enacting it; and the declaration by § 14-42-8, supra, that it is not to be used as a means of double taxation of those businesses covered by the occupation tax imposed by § 14-42-7, supra. Occupations in no way affecting the safety, health, morals, or general welfare of a municipality will not undergo metamorphosis, merely by the recitation of these words. City of Lovington v. Hall, 68 N.M. 143, 359 P.2d 769. Otherwise, as stated in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, and cited with approval in City of Lovington v. Hall, supra: "* * * In the absence of any specific duty imposed on any officer or employee of the city with respect to such regulation or of any regulations or rules of conduct for such business it is apparent that the ordinance, notwithstanding inclusion of the welfare clause, was enacted as a revenue measure and as such is invalid. * * *" The ordinance herein involved provides in Sec. 7-101 that its purpose is to promote the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the town, and that all persons engaging in such businesses shall obtain a license therefor. Section 7-102 provides that any person, firm or corporation shall first obtain a license by making applications on forms furnished by the town clerk before engaging in such business. Section 7-103 provides that the license fee shall be one per cent of the gross annual business done by such person, firm or corporation. Section 7-104 provides that the payment shall be made monthly and filed with the clerk not later than the 15th day of the month following the reporting period. Section 7-105 provides that the person making a false statement shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and whenever, in the judgment of the board of trustees, the public welfare shall require, such license may be revoked. Section 7-107 provides that any person violating any provision of the ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than $25 and not more than $300. The instant ordinance is not distinguishable from the ordinance involved in City of Lovington v. Hall, supra, and upon the authority of that case, we hold that the ordinance involved in this case is invalid. The action of the district court is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. COMPTON, C.J., and MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., concur. *189 CARMODY, Justice (concurring specially). Although I agree with the majority that the ordinance involved is invalid, I do not believe that it should be determined on the basis of City of Lovington v. Hall, 1961, 68 N.M. 143, 359 P.2d 769. Quite obviously, the ordinance is deficient in failing to provide for regulation as we determined in the Lovington case. Nevertheless, the Lovington case concerned a tax on coin-operated machines, which are specifically mentioned in § 14-42-8, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., whereas the instant case is an attempt to license a type of business expressly mentioned in § 14-42-7, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., namely, "wholesale and retail merchants of all kinds." Inasmuch as the business here involved is particularly named or specified in § 14-42-7, it may not be taxed under the plain provisions of the last sentence of § 14-42-8. In other words, the legislature has authorized, in effect, the imposition of an occupation tax upon the type of business operated by the appellees, but has provided that they may not be licensed or regulated otherwise by the municipality. In my judgment, therefore, the case should be determined purely on a basis of statutory construction. The two statutes are plain and unambiguous, making reliance upon the Lovington case unnecessary. The ordinance is invalid on its face, and no regulatory provisions, even if enacted, could make it otherwise. The appellant has only those powers granted to it by the legislature. Here, the authority to license, other than by the imposition of an occupation tax, is not granted and, on the contrary, is expressly prohibited; therefore, further consideration of the ordinance is unnecessary. For the reasons stated, I cannot concur in the opinion of the majority, but do concur only in the result.