Title: Genaro v. Cent. Transport, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Genaro v. Cent. Transport, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293, 1999-Ohio-353.] 
 
 
 
 
 
GENARO v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC. ET AL. 
BALDWIN ET AL. v. FUTURE ELECTRONICS ET AL. 
GREER v. BALLY TOTAL FITNESS ET AL. 
[Cite as Genaro v. Cent. Transport, Inc. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 293.] 
Labor and industry — Civil Rights Commission — Supervisor/manager may be 
held jointly and/or severally liable with employer for discriminatory 
conduct of the supervisor/manager in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112. 
For purposes of R.C. Chapter 4112, a supervisor/manager may be held jointly 
and/or severally liable with her/his employer for discriminatory conduct of 
the supervisor/manager in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112. 
(No. 97-1595 — Submitted September 15, 1998 — Decided January 13, 1999.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, Certifying Question of State Law, Nos. 1:97-CV-00598, 1:96-
CV-2282, and 1:97-CV-601. 
 
This matter is before the court as a certified question of state law from the 
United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.  The 
underlying cases pending before the district court involve three separate actions 
wherein petitioners filed claims alleging various violations of Chapter 4112 of the 
Ohio Revised Code and certain state common-law claims1 against supervisory or 
managerial employees in their individual capacities, as well as claims against the 
petitioners’ corporate employers.  In its certification order, the district court set 
forth the following procedural facts and history: 
 
“All three matters were originally filed in state court alleging claims solely 
under [R.C. Chapter] 4112 and/or state common law.  In each case, the Defendants 
removed the cases to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) and (b) and 28 
 
 
2
U.S.C. §1332 because the Petitioners and corporate defendants in all cases were 
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeded the 
jurisdictional limit [footnote omitted].  Defendants sought to exclude the 
individual supervisor/manager defendants, who were Ohio citizens, for purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the individual defendants were fraudulently 
joined because [R.C. Chapter] 4112, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
§701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e et seq., does not permit individual 
supervisor liability.  The Petitioners filed Motions to Remand the cases to state 
court.” 
 
The district court denied the petitioners’ motions to remand, determining 
that R.C. Chapter 4112 does not provide for claims against supervisors and/or 
managers in their individual capacities, and thus held in each case that petitioners 
had no basis for recovery against their respective supervisors in their individual 
capacities.  The district court found that the inclusion of these supervisors as 
defendants was intended solely to defeat proper removals of state court actions to 
federal district court.  The district court deemed that the individual supervisor 
defendants were fraudulently joined and therefore concluded that removal of these 
actions to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship was proper. 
 
The Genaro and Baldwin petitioners2 filed motions for reconsideration with 
the district court and, in the alternative, sought to certify a question to this court on 
the issue of supervisor individual liability under R.C. Chapter 4112.  In 
accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII, the district court has certified to us, and we 
have agreed to answer, a specific question of state law arising in the context of the 
above-referenced litigation. 
__________________ 
 
 
3
 
Lancione & Simon, P.L.L., Ellen S. Simon and Christopher P. Thorman, for 
petitioner Michael J. Genaro, Sr. 
 
Sindell, Young & Guidubaldi and Steven A. Sindell, for petitioners Susan 
Baldwin, Katrina M. Brill, and Colleen Lynn Kulka. 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Joy B. Sonnhalter, for petitioner 
Kim Greer. 
 
Duvin, Cahn & Hutton, Lee J. Hutton and Michael T. Pearson, for 
respondents Central Transport, Inc., Central Cartage Company, and Alan Bassetti. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Sandra J. Anderson, Julia A. Davis and 
David A. Campbell;  Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., Kenneth 
M. Bello and Keith Wexelblatt, for respondents Future Electronics, Inc. and Bonita 
Russell. 
 
Duvin, Cahn & Hutton, Richard C. Hubbard III, Suellen Oswald and Mark 
F. Humenik, for respondents Bally Total Fitness and Charles Comparato. 
 
Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman, Frederick M. Gittes and Michael S. 
Kolman; and Louis Jacobs, in support of petitioners for amici curiae, Ohio 
Employment Lawyers Association et al. 
 
Manley, Burke, Lipton & Cook and Robert H. Mitchell, in support of 
petitioners for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Cooper, Walinski & Cramer, Cary R. Cooper and Terrell A. Allen; Jenner 
& Block, Richard C. Bollow, Kenneth R. Dolin and Christine E. Kessler, in 
support of respondents for amici curiae, Tenneco Automotive, Inc. et al. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Charles C. Warner, David A. Bell and 
Margaret M. Koesel, in support of respondents for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
 
4
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Kevin E. Griffith and Denise M. Johnson, 
in support of respondents for amicus curiae, Huntington National Bank; and 
Jeffrey Quayle, in support of respondents for amicus curiae, Ohio Bankers 
Association. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio, Eastern Division, has certified the following question to this court for our 
determination: 
 
“For purposes of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. [Chapter] 4112, may a 
supervisor/manager be held jointly and/or severally liable with his employer for 
his conduct in violation of [R.C. Chapter] 4112?” 
 
With respect to this question, the district court issued the following 
findings: 
 
“The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that federal case law interpreting and 
applying Title VII is generally applicable to cases involving [R.C. Chapter] 4112.  
Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Ingram, (1994) 69 Ohio St.[3d 89, 93, 630 N.E.2d 
669, 672]; Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil 
Rights Comm’n, (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 [20 O.O.3d 200, 202-203, 421 
N.E.2d 128, 131]. 
 
“The Sixth Circuit has determined that an individual employee/supervisor 
may not be held personally liable under Title VII.  Wathen v. General Electric Co., 
[C.A.6, 1997], 115 F.3d 400. 
 
“Federal courts in the Northern District of Ohio have addressed the issue of 
supervisor liability under both Title VII and [R.C. Chapter] 4112 and have 
determined that neither Title VII nor [R.C. Chapter] 4112 provide[s] for claims 
against supervisors in their individual capacity.  The Courts determined that the 
 
 
5
reasoning behind precluding individual capacity suits under Title VII applies 
equally to preclude such suits under [R.C. Chapter] 4112.  The agent provision in 
the statutory definition of employer in Title VII only ensures that employers 
cannot escape respondeat superior or agency liability.  Likewise, [R.C. Chapter] 
4112’s definition of employer including ‘any person acting directly or indirectly in 
the interest of an employer,’ instead of the term ‘agent’ is meant only to ensure 
that employers cannot escape respondeat superior or agency liability.  Czupih v. 
Card Pak, Inc. [N.D.Ohio 1996], 916 F.Supp. 687; Gausmann v. City of Ashland 
[N.D.Ohio 1996], 926 F.Supp. 635.  But see DeLoach v. American Red Cross 
[N.D.Ohio 1997, 967 F.Supp. 265] * * *; Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc. 
[N.D.Ohio 1997, 964 F.Supp. 1166] * * *. 
 
“Absent a contrary ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court, the Court finds that 
[R.C. Chapter] 4112, like Title VII, does not provide for claims against 
supervisors in their individual capacities.” 
 
The question of state law certified by the district court presupposes 
employer liability.  Considering the question as it arose in the context of the 
underlying litigation, the issue before the court may be more directly phrased as 
whether supervisors and managers are named proper party defendants for claims 
brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112?  In other words, may supervisors and 
managers be held personally liable for unlawful discriminatory acts committed by 
such persons in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112? 
 
For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the 
affirmative. 
 
Petitioners argue that the plain language of R.C. Chapter 4112 imposes 
individual liability on managers and supervisors for their discriminatory conduct 
found to be in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112.  We agree. 
 
 
6
 
R.C. 4112.02 provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory 
practice:  (A) [f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, * * * to discriminate against that 
person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.”  R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) 
defines “employer” as “any person employing four or more persons within the 
state, and any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Further, the term “person” is defined very broadly by R.C. 
4112.01(A)(1) as including “one or more individuals, * * * any owner, lessor, 
assignor, * * * agent, [and] employee.”  It is clear that the R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) 
definition of “employer,” by its very terms, encompasses individual supervisors 
and managers whose conduct violates the provisions of  R.C. Chapter 4112. 
 
Moreover, R.C. 4112.08 mandates that “[t]his chapter [4112] shall be 
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes * * *.”  This court has 
noted in numerous cases the existence of a strong public policy against 
discrimination.  A majority of this court have, time and time again, found that 
there is no place in this state for any sort of discrimination no matter its size, 
shape, or form or in what clothes it might masquerade.  This, of course, includes 
discrimination in the workplace.  For instance in Helmick v. Cincinnati Word 
Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1215, we 
stated that “there appears to be little question that R.C. Chapter 4112 is 
comprehensive legislation designed to provide a wide variety of remedies for 
employment discrimination in its various forms.”  See, also, Kerans v. Porter 
Paint Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 486, 575 N.E.2d 428, and Collins v. Rizkana 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653, indicating that Ohio’s statutory 
framework and case law reflect Ohio’s strong public policy against workplace 
 
 
7
discrimination.  By holding supervisors and managers individually liable for their 
discriminatory actions, the antidiscrimination purposes of R.C. Chapter 4112 are 
facilitated, thereby furthering the public policy goals of this state regarding 
workplace discrimination. 
 
Further, while this court has not previously spoken on this issue, three  
decisions from courts of appeals of this state have held that liability may be 
imposed against supervisors and managers in their individual capacity for conduct 
in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112.  See Davis v. Black (1991), 70 Ohio App.3d 
359, 370, 591 N.E.2d 11, 19 (“Clearly, the supervisor for whom an employer may 
be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior is also an employer 
within this definition [R.C. 4112.01(A)(2)].”);  Seiber v. Wilder (Oct. 12, 1994), 
Greene App. No. 94CA32, unreported, 1994 WL 558969 (individual supervisor 
defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because “[t]he definition of 
‘employer’ in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) has been construed to include supervisors,” 
citing Davis, 70 Ohio App.3d  at 370, 591 N.E.2d at 19); and Cisneros v. Birck 
(Apr. 11, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APE08-1255, unreported, 1995 WL 222156 
(individual liability could exist against defendant in his individual capacity, where 
defendant, who was essentially a one-man corporation, was also considered an 
employer under R.C. 4112.01[A][2] by acting directly or indirectly in the interest 
of his own corporation). 
 
It is well settled that “[a] Federal Court should not disregard the decisions of 
intermediate appellate state courts unless it is convinced by other persuasive data 
that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.”  Garraway v. 
Diversified Material Handling, Inc. (N.D.Ohio 1997), 975 F.Supp. 1026, 1030, 
citing Commr. of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch (1967), 387 U.S. 456, 465, 
87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782, 18 L.Ed.2d 886, 893.  The “persuasive data” that the district 
 
 
8
court relied upon, and which respondents have set forth as part of their arguments, 
can be readily distinguished. 
 
The district court, in its certification order, cited Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. 
David Richard Ingram, D.C., Inc. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 89, 630 N.E.2d 669, and 
Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 20 O.O.3d 200, 421 N.E.2d 128, for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that federal case law interpreting and 
applying Title VII is generally applicable to cases involving R.C. Chapter 4112. 
 
In Plumbers, the court considered whether the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that the findings of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission were not 
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as required by R.C. 
4112.05(G).  In relying on federal case law in Plumbers, the court reasoned that 
the phrase “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence” was not defined by R.C. 
Chapter 4112.  Id. at 196, 20 O.O.3d at 202-203, 421 N.E.2d at 131.  The reverse 
implication is, of course, that in an action where the statutory terms at issue are 
defined by R.C. Chapter 4112, as in the instant case, it would not be necessary to 
resort to federal case law interpretation of Title VII to construe an analogous R.C. 
Chapter 4112 provision. 
 
In Ingram, the court cited Plumbers as well as State ex rel. Republic Steel 
Corp. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 178, 73 O.O.2d 478, 339 
N.E.2d 658, in support of the proposition that Title VII case law is generally 
applicable to cases involving violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.  Ingram, 69 Ohio 
St.3d at 92-93, 630 N.E.2d at 672.  The issue in Republic Steel involved an 
interpretation of former R.C. 4112.05(B)3 concerning whether efforts to resolve 
alleged discriminatory practices by conciliation were a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to the proper issuance of a complaint by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.  The 
 
 
9
court applied federal case law interpreting Title VII in Republic Steel and in so 
doing reasoned that because Title VII contained a provision4 analogous to R.C. 
4112.05(B), which “employ[ed] mandatory language identical to R.C. 
4112.05(B),” it is proper to apply the rationale of those cases interpreting Title VII 
to R.C. 4112.05(B).  (Emphasis added.)  Republic Steel, 44 Ohio St.2d at 182-184, 
73 O.O.2d at 480-481, 339 N.E.2d at 661-662.  Unlike the situation in Republic 
Steel, the dispositive issue in the present action, R.C. 4112.01(A)(2)’s definition of 
“employer” is markedly different from the analogous Title VII provision. 
 
As previously set forth herein, R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) defines “employer” as 
“any person employing four or more persons within the state, * * * and any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.”  (Emphasis added.)  In 
contrast, under Title VII, “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees * * * and any 
agent of such a person.”  (Emphasis added.)  Section 2000e(b), Title 42, U.S. 
Code.  The differing numerosity requirements and uses of agency terminology 
indicate that Title VII’s definition of “employer” is far less reaching than the 
encompassing language of R.C. 4112.01(A)(2).  Without doubt, the language 
employed by the General Assembly with regard to R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) is much 
broader in scope than that employed by the analogous Title VII provision. 
 
The certifying district court and the respondents rely heavily on Wathen v. 
Gen. Elec. Co. (C.A.6, 1997), 115 F.3d 400.  Wathen involved various claims of 
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 
344, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, against General Electric Company and three 
individual employees in their official and individual capacities.  The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that an individual employee/supervisor may not be held 
personally liable under Title VII absent meeting the definitional requirement of 
 
 
10
“employer” as defined by Section 2000e(b), Title 42, U.S. Code.  The court of 
appeals further concluded that “[b]ecause KRS Chapter 344 mirrors Title VII,” 
individual employees/supervisors were not individually liable under Kentucky 
state law.  Id. at 405. 
 
Wathen is inapplicable to the instant action.  The definitions of “employer” 
under Title VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act are essentially identical.5  As 
we have seen, the statutory definition of “employer” found in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) 
differs in several critical aspects from its Title VII counterpart.  Moreover, unlike 
R.C. Chapter 4112, the Kentucky statute was modeled after, and is virtually 
identical to, Title VII.  Consequently, Kentucky courts have consistently followed 
federal law in interpreting its antidiscrimination statute.  See Kentucky Comm. on 
Human Rights v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Justice, Bur. of State Police 
(Ky.App.1979), 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (The Kentucky statute [Kentucky Rev. 
Statute 344.040] is virtually identical to the corresponding section of Title VII and 
therefore United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the federal provision 
are “most persuasive, if not controlling, in interpreting the Kentucky statute.”)  
(Emphasis added.); and Harker v. Fed. Land Bank of Louisville (Ky.1984), 679 
S.W.2d 226, 229 (“The Kentucky age discrimination statute is specially modeled 
after the Federal law.  Consequently, in this particular area we must consider the 
way the Federal act has been interpreted.”).  Federal case law clearly has a greater 
controlling effect interpreting Kentucky’s antidiscrimination statute than it does in 
regard to R.C. Chapter 4112. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we believe that the clear and unambiguous 
language of R.C. 4112.01(A)(1) and (A)(2), as well as the salutary 
antidiscrimination 
purposes 
of 
R.C. 
Chapter 
4112, 
and 
this 
court’s 
pronouncements in cases involving workplace discrimination, all evidence that 
 
 
11
individual supervisors and managers are accountable for their own discriminatory 
conduct occurring in the workplace environment.  Accordingly, we answer the 
certified question in the affirmative and hold that for purposes of R.C. Chapter 
4112, a supervisor/manager may be held jointly and/or severally liable with her/his 
employer for discriminatory conduct of the supervisor/manager in violation of 
R.C. Chapter 4112. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The state common-law claims are not relevant for a determination of the 
certified question. 
2. 
Following the denial of her motion to remand, and since the issue was 
identical to the issue presented by Baldwin and Genaro, petitioner Greer was sua 
sponte joined as a party to the certified question. 
3. 
Former R.C. 4112.05(B) is substantially similar to its current version (R.C. 
4112.05[B][4]), and provided in pertinent part that “[w]henever it is charged * * * 
that any person * * * has engaged or is engaging in unlawful discriminatory 
practices, * * * the commission may initiate a preliminary investigation.  * * *  If 
it determines after such investigation that it is probable that unlawful 
discriminatory practices have been or are being engaged in, it shall endeavor to 
eliminate such practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.”  (135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1892-1893.) 
4. 
Section 2000e-5(b), Title 42, U.S.Code provides in part that “[w]henever a 
charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved * * * alleging 
that an employer * * * has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the 
 
 
12
Commission * * * shall make an investigation thereof.  * * * If the Commission 
determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged 
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, 
and persuasion. * * * ” 
5. 
Pursuant to Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann 344.030(2), “employer” is defined as 
including “a person who has engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
fifteen (15) or more employees * * * and any agent of that person.” 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
because I cannot agree that R.C. Chapter 4112 imposes liability on managers and 
supervisors.  Several clauses in this chapter of the Revised Code indicate that the 
General Assembly did not intend to create liability for supervisors and managers.  
When analyzing the meaning of a statute, the court should give the words of the 
statute their plain and ordinary meaning unless the legislative intent indicates 
otherwise.  Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 
18 OBR 151, 152, 480 N.E.2d 412, 414.  Applying this principle to R.C. Chapter 
4112, it is clear that the statute does not impose liability upon supervisors and 
managers. 
 
R.C. Chapter 4112 is Ohio’s antidiscrimination statute.  Unlawful 
discriminatory practices are defined as follows: 
 
“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: 
 
“(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to 
refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 4112.02. 
 
 
13
 
This section clearly imposes liability upon employers for discriminatory 
practices in the workplace.  However, the statute conspicuously fails to include a 
provision imposing liability upon employees who participate in discriminatory 
practices.  The majority asserts that the public policy against discrimination 
supports its argument that R.C. Chapter 4112 should be construed to impose 
liability on supervisors and managers.  However, when the language of a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to apply the statute as written, 
making neither additions to the statute nor deletions therefrom.  Dougherty v. 
Torrence (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 2 OBR 625, 626, 442 N.E.2d 1295, 1296; 
Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 
1, 4, 12 O.O.3d 1, 3, 387 N.E.2d 1222, 1224; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield 
(1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 24, 28, 53 O.O.2d 13, 15, 263 N.E.2d 249, 251.  Applying 
this principle of statutory interpretation to R.C. Chapter 4112 causes me to 
conclude that this court should not expand the liability imposed under R.C. 
4112.02 to individual employees.  Had the General Assembly wished to extend 
individual liability to managerial personnel it could have easily included the word 
“employee” in R.C. 4112.02(A). 
 
Petitioners argue that supervisors and managers should be considered 
employers under the definition of “employer” contained in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2).  
That section reads as follows: 
 
“(2)  ‘Employer’ includes the state, any political subdivision of the state, 
any person employing four or more persons within the state, and any person 
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Petitioner’s argument that managerial personnel should be considered 
“employers” under this section fails for several reasons.  First, petitioners contend 
that the phrase “and any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
 
 
14
employer” should be read to include managerial personnel in the definition of 
“employer.”  However, this phrase was more likely included in R.C. 4112.01 in 
order to impose vicarious liability on employers for discriminatory acts of their 
employees.  This court has previously stated that federal case law interpreting 
Title VII is generally applicable to interpretations of R.C. Chapter 4112.  
Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. 
(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196, 20 O.O.3d 200, 202, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131.  Title 
VII is the federal antidiscrimination statute.  Title VII defines “employer” as “a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees * * * and any agent of such a person.”  (Emphasis added.)  Section 
2000e(b), Title 42, U.S.Code. 
 
Numerous federal courts have held that the agency clause of Title VII does 
not impose liability on individual employees, but instead imposes vicarious 
liability on employers for the discriminatory acts of their employees.  See Miller v. 
Maxwell’s Internatl., Inc. (C.A.9, 1993), 991 F.2d 583; Gary v. Long 
(C.A.D.C.1995), 59 F.3d 1391; Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co. (C.A.6, 1997), 115 F.3d 
400.  While R.C. Chapter 4112 and Title VII contain slightly different language, 
the language of both statutes indicates an intent to hold employers vicariously 
liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees. 
 
In Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, Inc. (C.A.8, 1995), 55 F.3d 377, 
379, the court of appeals held that Missouri’s antidiscrimination statute did not 
impose liability on individual employees.  The Missouri antidiscrimination statute 
contains a definition of “employer” that is similar to that contained in R.C. 
Chapter 4112.  The Missouri statute reads: 
 
“ ‘Employer’ includes the state, or any political subdivision thereof, or any 
person employing six or more persons within the state, and any person directly 
 
 
15
acting in the interest of an employer * * *.” (Emphasis added.)  Mo.Rev.Stat. 
213.010(6) (1994). 
 
In Lenhardt, the court of appeals determined that this language was not 
meant to impose liability on managers and supervisors, but was instead meant to 
create vicarious liability for employers whose employees commit violations of the 
statute. 
 
The majority refers to minor differences between the definitions of 
“employer” found in Title VII and R.C. 4112(A)(2), stating that these differences 
clearly broaden the scope of liability imposed under R.C. Chapter 4112.  In 
emphasizing the differences between Title VII and R.C. Chapter 4112, the 
majority criticizes respondent’s reliance on Wathen.  Wathen involved sexual 
harassment claims in violation of Title VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.  In 
Wathen, the court of appeals held that Title VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act 
were analogous.  Here, the majority opinion correctly points out that Title VII and 
the Kentucky statute are almost identical, unlike Title VII and R.C. Chapter 4112.  
For this reason, the majority finds that Wathen is not controlling.  However, as the 
court of appeals concluded in Lenhardt, the agency clause in Title VII and the 
phrases “any person directly acting” and “any person acting directly or indirectly” 
contained in the Missouri civil rights statute and R.C. 4112.01(A)(2), respectively, 
are sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that both were meant only to 
impose vicarious liability on employers for the acts of their employees. 
 
The majority also relies on the fact that Title VII defines “employer” to 
include “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or 
more employees,” while R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) includes “any person employing four 
or more persons within the state.”  The majority’s contention is that the lower 
numerosity requirement included in R.C. 4112.01 obviously was meant to broaden 
 
 
16
the scope of liability under R.C. Chapter 4112 to include individual employees.  
However, this reasoning is flawed, in that it precludes liability under R.C. Chapter 
4112 for employers with fewer than four employees, while imposing liability on 
supervisors overseeing the activities of as few as one employee.  This clearly 
cannot be what the General Assembly intended when it enacted R.C. Chapter 
4112. 
 
R.C. 1.47 is intended to assist courts in applying statutes to the facts of a 
specific case.  It reads: 
 
“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:   
 
“ * * * 
 
“(C)  A just and reasonable result is intended[.]” 
 
Application of R.C. 1.47 to the issue here does not support the majority 
decision.  By imposing liability upon supervisors and managers for violations of 
R.C. Chapter 4112, the majority exposes virtually all managerial employees to the 
risk that they will be forced to bear the cost of defending themselves in claims 
alleging violations of R.C. Chapter 4112. 
 
Taking into account the fact that R.C. Chapter 4112 fails to include the term 
“employee” in the clause prohibiting unlawful discriminatory practices, and the 
applicable case law interpreting Title VII, R.C. Chapter 4112, and other state 
antidiscrimination statutes, I conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to 
impose liability on managerial personnel when it enacted R.C. Chapter 4112.  I 
would affirm the original decision of the district court. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
 
17
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with Chief Justice Moyer’s dissenting 
opinion.  I write separately to further support the position that R.C. Chapter 4112 
imposes liability on employers only, not on employees. 
 
R.C. 4112.02(A) prohibits Ohio employers from discriminating against 
current or prospective employees.  The statutory language does not similarly speak 
to liability of employees.  Instead, the statutory definition of “employer” “includes 
* * * any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer,” see 
R.C. 4112.01(A)(2), thereby framing an employer’s accountability as comprising 
both direct and vicarious liability. 
 
The same statutory phrase cannot simultaneously mean to impose both 
individual liability on employees and vicarious liability on employers.  If the 
phrase at issue is construed as the majority suggests, then there is no provision in 
R.C. Chapter 4112 for vicarious liability of an employer. 
 
The majority rationale centers on a rudimentary syllogism that goes like 
this: “persons” acting directly or indirectly in the interest of employers are 
“employers”; all “employees” are “persons”; therefore, employees are “employers” 
and thus liable to pay damages to a fellow employee for discriminatory conduct.  
This analysis holds that “persons” are individually liable though the General 
Assembly did not expressly prohibit “persons” from engaging in discriminatory 
employment practices, just “employers.”  See R.C. 4112.02(A). 
 
Moreover, the majority abandons its language-based reasoning when it 
decides that only managerial employees are subject to individual liability. Its 
syllogism envelops all employees, not just supervisory employees.  To limit 
employee liability to managers necessitates that the majority superimpose a 
qualifying word, “supervisory,” on R.C. 4112.01(A)(2).  But because the statute 
prohibits discrimination “with respect to * * * any matter * * * indirectly related 
 
 
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to employment,” under the court’s rationale, it would encompass even 
nonsupervisory conduct. 
 
Had the General Assembly intended R.C. 4112.02(A) to burden individual 
employees, it could have expressed that intention.  See, e.g., R.C. 4112.02(G).  
The majority’s contention that the General Assembly chose to accomplish this 
same end by defining “employer” as equating with “employee” is unconvincing.  I 
read R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) as confirming that employers are legally responsible for 
the discriminatory conduct of individual employees. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.