Title: LAFOND v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LAFOND v. STATE2004 WY 5189 P.3d 324Case Number: 03-25Decided: 05/05/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

ANITA 
LAFOND,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, WY.  Argument by 
Mr. Cornia.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Clinic; and Julie K. Jenkins, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Jenkins.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

 LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Anita 
Lafond (Lafond) appeals her conviction of one count of obtaining a controlled 
substance by fraud in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1033(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2003).1  Lafond argues she was denied her right 
to due process and a fair trial.  
Her argument focuses on various comments made by the prosecutor during 
the course of the trial that she claims were improper.  Lafond additionally asserts the court 
erred in not admitting the written statement of an alibi witness who was out of 
the country on active military duty and that the Wyoming constitution provides 
more protection for bank records than the federal constitution.   We affirm.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Lafond presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  Was 
the appellant denied her right to due process and a fair trial due to the 
prosecutors repeatedly telling the jury to do their duty and convict, expressing 
his opinion of appellant's guilt, by repeatedly telling the jury "she did it," 
telling the jury that appellant and her counsel were deserving of shame and 
forcing the appellant to call the credibility of the State's witnesses into 
question?

 

II.  Was 
it reversible error for the court to refuse the admission of the affidavit of 
the Appellant's alibi witness given that the witness was unavailable due to 
being called up to active military service and that the State chose to focus on 
the lack of an alibi witness?

 

III.  Will 
this court sanction and condone the unfettered access of the government into the 
bank records of the citizens of this state?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues as: 

 

I.  Was 
Appellant denied due process and a fair trial by the prosecutor's remarks in 
opening statement or closing argument, or did the prosecutor personally attack 
defense counsel or improperly force appellant to assert that the State's 
witnesses were part of a "vast conspiracy"?

 

II.  Did 
the district court err in excluding from evidence the written statement of 
Appellant's witness who had been called into active military 
service?

 

III.  Did 
Appellant's right to privacy in her bank records preclude the State from 
obtaining those records by subpoena duces tecum?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In August 2001, 
Lafond worked as a supervising registered nurse at Cheyenne OB/GYN and was a 
captain in the Air National Guard.  
At Cheyenne OB/GYN, Lafond worked with a medical assistant named Erin 
Meyen.  Ms. Meyen's son suffered 
from cerebral palsy and had recently undergone surgery.  On August 7, 2001, Lafond allowed Ms. 
Meyen to borrow her car to take Ms. Meyen's son to the hospital in Denver due to 
a medical emergency. Because of her son's condition, when Ms. Meyen arrived at 
the hospital she parked in a handicapped zone even though she had no handicap 
permit.  Ms. Meyen decided to write 
a note to explain the situation, asking that she not be towed.  Looking for a piece of paper on which to 
write her note, Ms. Meyen checked the console of the car and found a folded 
piece of paper.  

 

[¶4]      When Ms. Meyen 
unfolded the paper, she found that it was a prescription for Percocet made out 
to Lafond.  The prescription looked 
to have Dr. Storey's signature, but the handwriting on the prescription was 
Lafond's.  After viewing the 
prescription, Ms. Meyen continued her search for paper and found another piece 
of paper on which were several doctors' stamped signatures.  Ms. Meyen did not take these papers from 
the car, and they were never introduced at trial. 

 

[¶5]      Upon Ms. Meyen's 
return to Cheyenne, she said nothing to Lafond about what she had found.  However, Ms. Meyen's curiosity was 
kindled, and she sought to find out whether or not Lafond had passed a 
prescription for Percocet at any of the pharmacies in Cheyenne by calling area 
pharmacies to ask about such prescriptions.  She began with Walgreen's.  The pharmacist at Walgreen's told Ms. 
Meyen that just a few days prior a prescription for Percocet had been filled for 
Lafond.  

 

[¶6]      At that point, 
Ms. Meyen asked the pharmacist to fax her a copy of the prescription, and the 
doctors at Cheyenne OB/GYN were made aware of the situation.  The prescription was dated August 5, 
2001, and appeared to have the signature of Dr. Eskam.  However, Dr. Eskam had never prescribed 
Percocet for Lafond, the signature on the prescription was not hers, and she was 
not even working on the day that the prescription was supposedly prepared.  After seeing the forged prescription, 
Dr. Eskam went to Walgreen's to view the store's videotape of the person passing 
the prescription.  While Dr. Eskam 
could not absolutely identify Lafond from the video, she noted that if someone 
were impersonating Lafond they did a good job of imitating her.  The matter was then referred to the 
state nursing board. 

 

[¶7]      At trial, the 
pharmacist who filled the prescription, Leah Scadden, testified.  Ms. Scadden stated that on the morning 
of August 5, 2001, she was presented with and filled a prescription for Percocet 
made out to Lafond.  Ms. Scadden 
recalled that the customer was dressed in a camouflage military uniform and paid 
for the $5 prescription by check, which Ms. Scadden saw the customer write out 
and take from a checkbook.  This 
check bore the name and address of Lafond and was run through the register at 
7:44 a.m.  Ms. Scadden identified 
Lafond as the customer who presented the prescription and further related that, 
when she was presented with the prescription, the person said she was "Anita 
from OB/GYN" and that she talked to Ms. Scadden "all the time on the 
phone."  Ms. Scadden testified that 
she talked to the woman for two or three minutes and that the woman had said 
that she was in the National Guard and was working that weekend.  The woman's voice sounded the same as 
that of the woman from Cheyenne OB/GYN to whom Ms. Scadden had talked numerous 
times.  In addition to her testimony 
about the events, Ms. Scadden authenticated the videotape of the purchase.  The tape shows the person purchasing the 
Percocet entered the store at 7:39 a.m. and departed at 7:47 a.m. 

 

[¶8]      Detective Puente 
of the Cheyenne Police Department also testified.  Detective Puente conducted the 
investigation of this matter after receiving a report from the state nursing 
board.  During his investigation 
Detective Puente interviewed Lafond.  
He testified that Lafond stated she was missing some checks and that she 
had reported these missing checks to the bank.  The check written to Walgreen's on 
August 5 was not one of those Lafond reported missing.  However, Lafond maintained that the $5 
check to Walgreen's must have been forged.  
Detective Puente also testified that he had timed how long it took to get 
from the National Guard to Walgreen's and that it varied depending on the 
traffic lights; but the two times he had done it he timed it at 7 minutes and 34 
seconds and 8 minutes and 14 seconds.  
The defense presented James Rasnake, a private investigator who had also 
timed the trip, to refute this testimony; and he testified that it would take 30 
to 32 minutes round trip, though his estimate included walking into and out of 
Walgreen's and Lafond's Air Guard third-floor office. 

 

[¶9]      Robin Kreir from 
Lafond's bank also testified.  She 
stated that the actual check written for the forged prescription, as well as the 
checks numerically close to that check, was destroyed.  Microfilm copies of the checks were 
available, however, and these were admitted into evidence.  Ms. Krier also testified that the bank 
had no record of a stop payment order on any of Lafond's checks, including the 
ones Lafond had told Detective Puente were stolen. 

 

[¶10]   Lafond denied being the person who 
purchased the Percocet.  She claimed 
that she could not have made the purchase because she was at Guard training that 
day.  Lafond called several 
witnesses to testify to her whereabouts between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. on August 
5.  Lyle Orr testified that Lafond 
was at roll call at 7:00 a.m. and that roll call takes 5 to 20 minutes.  He then saw her again at 7:30, and then 
again at an 8:00 a.m. "intel" meeting.  
Debra Mutter also testified that, while she could not specifically recall 
seeing Lafond on August 5, she would have remembered her not being at the 
commander's call at 7:30, which usually lasts 15 to 20 minutes.  Renee Mulberry also testified that she 
recalled seeing Lafond at the base that Sunday morning.  Linda Sergeant testified that, based on 
Guard records, Lafond was there that day.  
However, it appeared no one at trial could specifically account for 
Lafond's whereabouts between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m.  

 

[¶11]   Lafond testified on her own 
behalf.  She testified that she felt 
she was set up and essentially implicated Ms. Meyen.  In explaining her theory, Lafond 
testified that the two had originally gotten along very well, however, problems 
developed between Ms. Meyen and Lafond.  
In detailing the reasons for the change in their relationship, Lafond 
testified Ms. Meyen claimed to be leaving for a medical appointment, but got her 
nails done.  Lafond also testified 
that Ms. Meyen would leave work early on Fridays so she could drop her son off 
with his father in Glendo and be back in time for happy hour.  Additionally, Lafond related that she 
had to discipline Ms. Meyen on several occasions for making inappropriate 
comments to patients and for holding herself out as a nurse.  

 

[¶12]   Lafond further testified that she 
was at the Guard on August 5 wearing her flight suit and boots, not her 
camouflage uniform, because she was scheduled to fly.  She stated she went to roll call at 7:00 
a.m. and then worked at her desk and talked to Julie Major-Funz until 7:30 a.m. 
when she went to commander's call.  
She then stated that she remained in the classroom until she went to an 
intel meeting at 8:00 a.m.  Lafond 
denied she was the person on the videotape and stated that she did not remember 
having gone to Walgreen's on August 5, although she had been there the day 
before.  She denied forging the 
signature on the prescription and writing the check to pay for it.  She also denied that there had been 
prescription notes and doctors' signatures in her car. 

 

[¶13]   After deliberation, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict; and the district court entered judgment and sentence 
on October 23, 2002.  Lafond was 
sentenced to a term of not less than two years nor more than four years in the 
custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections.  The sentence was suspended, and Lafond 
was placed on three years supervised probation.  Lafond appeals that judgment and 
sentence.

 

 

DISUSSION

 

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 

[¶14]   In her first claim of error, Lafond 
asserts she was denied a fair trial due to various inappropriate statements made 
by the prosecutors during the course of trial.  At trial Lafond did not object to any of 
the prosecutors' statements that she now alleges were improper.   We therefore apply our plain error 
standard of review.  Dysthe v. 
State, 2003 WY 20, ¶23, 63 P.3d 875, ¶23 (Wyo. 2003).  "Plain error exists when 1) the record 
is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him."  Id.  

 

[¶15]   When reviewing allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, we review the entire record to determine whether the 
improper comments so prejudiced the defendant's case that they resulted in the 
denial of a fair trial.  Wilks v. 
State, 2002 WY 100, ¶26, 49 P.3d 975, ¶26 (Wyo. 2002); Burton v. 
State, 2002 WY 71, ¶11, 46 P.3d 309, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).  Additionally, we judge the challenged 
comments not in isolation but in the context of the prosecutor's entire 
argument, considering the context of the comments and comparing them with the 
evidence produced at trial.  
Wilks, ¶26; Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 
2000).   Reversal is not 
warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Dysthe, ¶22; Mazurek v. 
State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶16]   Lafond makes her claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct in four distinct areas.  We note that all the comments Lafond 
asserts as improper are clearly set forth in the record.  As such, the first requirement of our 
plain error standard is met.  Our 
focus in all Lafond's claims of misconduct will therefore be the second and 
third elements of plain error.  

 

[¶17]   Lafond's first claim of misconduct 
is that the prosecution repeatedly exhorted the jury to "do their duty" and 
convict her.  The first instance to 
which Lafond points occurred at the end of opening argument.  However, as noted above, we review the 
prosecutor's comments in the context in which they were made.  We, therefore, must consider not only 
the specific comments Lafond claims show error but also the context surrounding 
those comments.   In doing so 
it becomes necessary to set out a portion of the proceedings.  This will add to the length of the 
opinion, but we feel it is important to show the atmosphere in which the 
statements were made.  In order to 
get the full context of the statements Lafond emphasizes in this area, we must 
begin with comments made before opening statements in voir dire.  

 

[¶18]   The prosecutor began his voir dire 
by asking the potential jurors several questions about holding people 
accountable.2  The prosecutor then questioned the 
jurors about whether they would want the prosecution to prove why Lafond would 
do that with which she was charged.  
Several potential jurors indicated that they would be curious about 
why.  The prosecutor then stated: 

 

            
And that's a natural thing, isn't it?  That's a fair and natural thing, but 
folks, it's not one of the five things the State has to prove.  It's not why she did it, isn't something 
we got to prove.  Is anybody going 
to make me provewe want to know why, but maybe we never will.  Maybe we won't. 
. . .

. . .

 

            
Is anybody going to make us prove it, no?  Doesn't everybody agree, if we prove the 
five elements, that's all we have to prove?  Does everybody agree with that? 

 

[¶19]   In his voir dire, defense counsel 
questioned the potential jurors along somewhat similar lines.   

 

            
Now, [the prosecutor] talked to you about if a person comes in here, 
being a good person, if they commit a crime, we have to hold them 
accountable.  Does everyone agree 
that in a case where you're deciding whether or not a person committed a crime, 
that their background would be important to you, their character?  

 

. . .

 

            
[The prosecutor] talked about the State not having to prove why a crime 
was committed, and I'm going to talk to you a bit about that, and it's true they 
do not have to prove why a crime was committed.  Let me ask you this:  In the general sense of your familiarity 
with crimes that are committed, usually think there's a reason behind it?  . . .

 

. . .

 

            
In deciding a case, as [the prosecutor] stated, they don't have to prove 
a motive or why, but do you think it's important if you are trying to decide if 
a person committed a crime to know whether or not why they were doing it; is 
that important to anyone? 

 

[¶20]   It was against this background that 
the trial then progressed to opening statements, and we find the first statement 
to which Lafond objects.  The 
prosecutor stated:

 

            
Folks, that will be the State's evidence in this case.  The State intends to prove each and 
every element of this case against Anita Lafond beyond a reasonable doubt.  At the conclusion of this case, we will 
have another opportunity to visit with you and speak with you.  At that time, we will ask you to do your 
duty.  We will ask you to hold this 
defendant accountable, and we're going to ask you to find her guilty of 
prescription fraud. 

 

[¶21]   Following the prosecutor's opening 
statement, defense counsel presented his opening statement.  Defense counsel stated: 

 

            
There's a reason behind every crime that's committed.  No matter if it's a ridiculous reason, 
if it's a reason motivated out of anger, out of hatred, one for money, one for 
drug abuse, whatever it is, there is always a reason why someone commits a crime 
no matter how ridiculous it may be.  
There is always a reason, and in this case, there was a crime 
committed.  There's no question 
about that, but Anita Lafond did not commit the crime. 

 

            
. . . You'll see that she has absolutely no reason whatsoever 
to have gone into Walgreen's to purchase 30 pills, $5 worth of Percocet, 
absolutely none.  

 

            
She has never had a drug addiction problem.  She's never abused or used any type of 
drug, for that matter; has never had anything in her background to indicate that 
she would commit a crime of this nature.  
There's absolutely nothing there.  
In fact, you will see that it would be tantamount to professional suicide 
for her to want and try to commit this crime.

 

[¶22]   At trial, in addition to the 
evidence about the incident itself, evidence relating to Lafond's character and 
the possible reasons or lack thereof for committing such a crime was 
presented.  Dr. Eskam testified that 
she had known Lafond for some time, that she could not believe that Lafond would 
do this, that Lafond was "one of the best people" that had ever worked there, 
and that Lafond was a "wonderful person."   Ms. Meyen testified that Lafond 
was the kind of person who, out of the goodness of her heart, allowed a friend 
to take her car to Denver and was the kind of person that would give you the 
shirt off her back.  She also 
testified that she knew of no reason why Lafond would need Percocet.  Ms. Mulberry testified that Lafond was 
"a wonderful person," very honest and truthworthy, a very kind-hearted person 
with no drug addiction problems.  
Linda Sergeant testified that Lafond had integrity, "the biggest heart," 
and was an honest person with no drug problems.  Ms. Flores, her current employer, 
testified that Lafond was loyal and trustworthy with no drug addiction.  Negative drug tests taken by Lafond were 
also admitted, as were Lafond's National Guard performance reports which 
detailed some of her volunteer and charity work.  Lafond testified that both her military 
and nursing careers would end with a felony conviction.  She additionally noted that she would 
lose her military retirement benefits.  

 

[¶23]   Following the evidence portion of 
the trial, the attorneys presented closing arguments.  The prosecutor's closing argument 
contains the second statement Lafond claims is error.  Again we will provide additional 
comments for context.   

 

            
The final thing you heard in this case from the defense witnesses, Anita 
Lafond is a good person.  I'm not 
going to stand here and tell you that Anita Lafond is a bad person.  That's not what we're here to 
establish.  We're not here to 
establish that.  That's not the 
issue in this case.

 

. . .

 

            
Last thing I'd like to talk to you about is some of the instructions 
Judge Grant gave to you.  The State 
has the burden of proof in this case.  
We accept that burden of proof.  
It is our burden, but it's important for you to understand what our 
burden is, and what our burden is not.

 

. . .

 

            
And finally, what is it that we have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt?  Judge Grant told you about 
that we have to prove the elements, and we talked about that in voir dire, as 
well.  There's five elements in this 
case.

 

            
On or about the 5th day of August in Laramie County, Wyoming, 
the defendant, Anita Lafond, acquired or obtained possession of a controlled 
substance, Percocet or Roxicet by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, or 
deception.  Those five things.  Those five things.

 

            
If the State proves to you those five elements, then by law by the oath 
you took in this case the verdict you have to return is a verdict of 
guilty.  We talked about this in 
voir dire, as well.  We're not 
required to prove why she did it.  
We're not required to prove why she did it.  We don't even have to prove that she 
actually forged a prescription.

 

. . .

 

            
Clearly, all of those elements have been proven to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The evidence in 
this case is overwhelming.

 

            
Now, you've heard from the defense and boil away their argument down to a 
nutshell, it's essentially this:  
"Yeah, yeah, the State has presented a lot of evidence, overwhelming 
evidence, but you know what, Anita Lafond's a good person.  Anita Lafond's a good person.  This is going to impact her 
tremendously, look the other way, look the other way.  Find a reason to find her not 
guilty."

 

            
That's the defense in this case.  
Find a reason, look the other way.  
You know, folks, you have the ability if you want to do that.  You have the ability if you want to do 
that.  You can always go back into 
the courtroom and say, "Well, yeah, we've got this evidence of guilt over here, 
and it's overwhelming.  It's a 
mountain of evidence, but you know, we got to really like to have this or that, 
so you know what, that's a reasonable doubt.  She's a nice 
person."

 

            
Folks, that wouldn't be the right thing to do, and that would be to 
violate the oath that you took at the start of this case.

 

            
I would leave you with this final thought.  I think you find yourself today in much 
the same situation that Erin Meyen found herself on August the 
7th.  You find yourself 
being confronted with overwhelming evidence that somebody who's otherwise a good 
person committed a crime, tremendous lapse of judgment, tremendous lapse of 
judgment, and now you've got to decide what you're going to do about 
it.

 

            
Remember, Erin Meyen said she went back to her office, she talked to the 
other nurses about what should she do, and one of the other nurses said, "Forget 
it.  Look the other way.  Don't get involved.  Look the other way," but Erin Meyen knew 
that that wasn't the right thing to do.  
She knew that Anita Lafond's a nurse, she could hurt herself, she could 
hurt somebody else in her position.

 

            
Folks, you know that that's not the right thing to do, either.  I don't envy you, your job.  I don't envy it at all; I don't.  I hope none of you thought when you 
walked into this courtroom on Monday that your job was going to be easy, as if 
you thought that then, you know better now; it's not.  It's not easy.

 

            
It's like it is in this; doing the right thing very often is a hard thing 
to do.  It's always easy to look the 
other way.  Don't do 
that.

 

            
On behalf of the State, I would ask in this case that you do the right 
thing.  I would ask that you follow 
the oath you took as jurors.  I 
would ask that you do your duty, and I would ask that you find Anita Lafond 
guilty and hold her accountable.

 

[¶24]   As can be seen by the above 
excerpts, the prosecutor did in fact ask the jury to do its duty.  In Hart v. State, 2003 WY 12, 
¶14, 62 P.3d 566, ¶14 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Wilks, ¶28), we 
said:

 

"Generally, 
an exhortation to the jury to do the right thing,' to do your job' or to do 
your duty' is error if it implies that, in order to do so, it can only reach a 
certain verdict, regardless of its duty to weigh the evidence and follow the 
court's instructions on the law.'"  
Jackson v. State, 791 So. 2d 979, 1029 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), 
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 934, 121 S. Ct. 1387, 149 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2001) 
(quoting Arthur v. State, 575 So. 2d 1165, 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 
1990)).  Such a statement may also 
run afoul of the admonition against injecting issues broader than the guilt or 
innocence of the accused.  See [I 
A.B.A] Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(d) [2d ed. 1980].  

 

[¶25]   Additionally, "[i]t is 
. . . improper for the prosecutor to state that the duty of the jury 
is to find the defendant guilty."  
Dysthe, ¶27 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999)).   Although the 
prosecutor did ask the jury to "do its duty," the context of the statements as 
shown by the excerpts above convinces us that in this case the prosecutor was 
not asking the jurors to convict without considering the evidence or implying 
that the jury could only do its duty through a guilty verdict.  We reach this conclusion for several 
reasons.

 

[¶26]   Specifically, before the 
prosecutor's comments in his opening statement, the prosecutor spent a great 
deal of the time outlining the evidence he intended to present and clearly 
acknowledged that the State carried the burden of proof in this matter.  In context, we find the prosecutor's 
argument not unlike those found in Hart, ¶13.  In Hart, the prosecutor stated, 
"I trust that you'll follow your oath and return a finding of guilty."  Id.  In that case we found that the 
prosecutor did not expressly tell the jury that, in order to perform its duty, 
it must return a guilty verdict.  
After reviewing the entire closing argument, we found that the prosecutor 
likewise did not make such an implication.  
Hart, ¶15.  In context 
it is clear that the prosecutor was not expressly telling or implying to the 
jury that fulfillment of its duty could be achieved only through a 
conviction.  The prosecutor prefaced 
his comments regarding the jury's "duty" with his recognition of his burden and 
the statement of his intent to meet that burden.  The prosecutor did not ask the jury to 
disregard that burden, but referenced the facts and essentially asked the jury 
to apply the evidence to the law.  
See Wilks, ¶28.    

 

[¶27]   The prosecutor's comments are of a 
similar vein in closing argument.  
There the prosecutor set forth the five elements the State needed to 
prove and then said, "If the State proves to you those five elements, then by 
law by the oath you took in this case the verdict you have to return is a 
verdict of guilty."  It was shortly 
after these comments that the prosecutor made the "duty" statements.  Once again, taken in context, the 
prosecutor did not ask the jury to convict without weighing the evidence.  The comments show that the duty to 
convict was contingent on the State proving the five elements he just 
outlined.  In context, the 
prosecutor's statements seem not to be aimed at asking the jury to disregard the 
evidence but rather to dispel the notion that the prosecutor had to prove why 
Lafond would have done that with which she was charged.  Indeed, the prosecutor's remarks appear 
to be an attempt to remind the jurors that "why" was not an additional element 
of the charged crime in light of the evidence introduced at trial.  Thus, in this case, we cannot say that 
the comments transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  

 

[¶28]   Furthermore, while the propriety of 
a prosecutor's actions is not dependent on the actions of defense counsel, the 
prosecutor's reminder seems less objectionable in the context of defense 
counsel's comments in closing argument.  
Defense counsel started by saying:

 

            
This case comes down to two questions.  I ask you to consider these two 
questions before you decide to convict Miss Lafond.  If anyone tries to get out of the 
courtroomout of the deliberation room without answering these questions, I ask 
you to stop them and say, "Tell me"to explain these two questions, why and 
how?  That's it.  Why and how?  Why on earth would this person, Anita 
Lafond, do this?  Why would she, a 
nurse 10 years, educated, head nurse, supervisory role, in the military 20 
years, benefits for those 20 years, husband, wife, mother, not addicted to 
Percocet, not addicted to any type of drug.  Why?  Why on earth would she do 
this?

 

            
I didn't hear [the prosecutor] address that issue once in his closing 
argument, and you know why, because that is the most compelling question in this 
case, why would she do it.  Remember 
we talked about that in voir dire.  
Every case there is a reason why a crime is committed.  No matter how stupid, no matter how 
ridiculous, no matter what it is, there is a reason behind it.  You can see it.  Money, addiction, drug abuse, substance 
abuse.  

 

. . .

 

            
Again, ask yourselves, make yourselves answer that question.  If you cannot answer that question, you 
cannot convict heralthough the State doesn't have to prove motive to prove that 
she did it; to prove that she was the person who did it.  You have to answer that question because 
why on earth would someone do something like that?  

 

. . .

 

            
[The prosecutor] said, "Do the right thing," and I agree.  Do the right thing, ladies and 
gentlemen.  Let Miss Lafond go home, 
let her continue in helping people as she does on a daily basis, and as she has 
done with her entire life.  Let her 
go home.  It is your decision. 

 

[¶29]   As can be seen, in addition to 
focusing on "why," defense counsel specifically addressed the prosecutor's 
comments.  Each party had a 
different take on what "the right thing" or the jury's "duty" was.   We have stated several times that 
we do not approve of the prosecutor's use of these types of "do your duty" 
statements.  Indeed we find their 
continued use problematic.   
See Hart, ¶15, and Dysthe, ¶27.  However, we cannot say that, when taken 
in context of this entire trial, the statements implied that the jury could only 
do their duty or the right thing by convicting.  Because both sides made these types of 
statements, they were likely to be recognized by the jury as nothing more than 
each side attempting to persuade the jury to view the evidence its way.  Certainly defense counsel's own use of 
similar phrasing aided in dispelling the idea that the "right thing" could only 
be done through conviction.  The 
statements were made in the context of what had previously been alluded to and 
argued by the parties.  Accordingly, 
as noted above, the comments did not transgress a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law and consequently do not meet the second requirement of plain 
error.

 

[¶30]   We cannot leave this topic without 
once again pointing out that we continue to review these "do your duty" comments 
with a careful and, where appropriate, jaundiced eye. Hart, ¶15.  We have noted, "prosecutors would do 
well to avoid the tightrope between non-prejudicial and reversible error.  The ethical duty of the prosecutor is an 
extraordinary obligation which exceeds that imposed upon the defense 
counsel."  Montoya v. State, 
971 P.2d 134, 137 (Wyo. 1998); Joseph F. Lawless, Jr., Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, § 9.09 (1985).  In 
the face of our repeated warnings about the use of these types of statements, 
our patience with their repeated use grows increasingly thin. "Prosecutors must 
always keep in mind that their duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict, 
which is most certainly a difficult duty to be carried out carefully and 
cautiously.'  Jeschke v. 
State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1303 (Wyo. 1982)."  Montoya, at 137.  

 

[¶31]   In, Dysthe, 
¶25, we stated:

 

            
Because the goal of the criminal justice system is the attainment of 
justice, the role of the prosecuting attorney differs from that of an advocate 
in a civil case. The prosecutor's special role has been described in Berger 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 
(1935):

 

            
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall 
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. 
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. 
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one.

 

[¶32]   We continue to stand by these 
statements.  There 
are limits on prosecutors' closing arguments.  These limits are designed to insure the 
fairness of the trial and prevent compromise of the judicial system. 
Dysthe, ¶24.  We would once 
again encourage prosecutors to note our recently adopted broad guidelines found 
in I A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 at 3.87 to 3.88 (2d ed. 
1980):

 

(a)  The 
prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. It 
is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the 
evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may 
draw.

 

(b)  It 
is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal 
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the 
guilt of the defendant.

 

(c)  The 
prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or 
prejudices of the jury.

 

(d)  The 
prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the 
guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making 
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.

 

Wilks, 
¶27.

 

[¶33]   Lafond's second claim of misconduct 
is that the prosecutor repeatedly expressed his opinion that Lafond "did it," 
and she points to specific excerpts from closing argument.  However, we will once again provide more 
than just the phrases to which Lafond points, as we must consider 
"the prosecutor's argument in its entirety, not just the sentences and phrases 
taken out of context.  Wheeler v. 
State, 691 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 1984)."  Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 
1115 (Wyo. 1992).  During the 
prosecutor's closing argument he stated: 

 

            
We know very significantly that the check that is used to pay for the 
Percocet on August 5th, that that check is drawn on the account of 
Anita Lafond, and it is signed by Anita Lafond.  

 

. . .

 

            
Folks, it's that defendant that's on that video.  No question about it.  If it's not her, it's got to be her evil 
twin sister because it looks exactly like her. 

 

[¶34]   Lafond also points to the 
prosecutor's comments made in rebuttal.  

 

People do 
things that make no sense.  Good 
people commit crimes for no reason.  
Did Miss Lafond?  Yes.  Yes, she did. Why did she do it? Folks, 
I don't know why she did it.

 

            
[Defense counsel] wants you to believe we have to prove that beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but we don't.  I 
challenge you to look at the elements.  
I challenge you to look at the elements, and say, "Oh, that's what the 
State had to prove.  Why."  We don't have to prove that.  Maybemaybe the grief from her child 
passing away had gotten to her.  I 
don't know.  Maybe the Prozac she 
was taking wasn't working enough.  I 
don't know.  Maybe she was feeling 
internal pain from the stresses and pressures of her life.  I don't know.  I don't know.

 

            
Did she do it? Yes. Does it make any sense for her to do it?  Well, no, but folks, neither does 
anything else she did in this case make any sense.  Nothing she did made 
sense. . . . 

 

. . . 

 

            
Erin says she saw it in there.  
Do you believe her testimony? Do you believe her?  That's for you to decide.  Do you believe her?  It's for you to decide whether or not 
you believe Anita Lafond when she testified.  

 

. . .

 

            
[Defense counsel] says, "Well, the video doesn't prove conclusively 100 
percent that it's Anita Lafond walking into Walgreen's."  Well, no, folks, it doesn't.  Leah Scadden says 100 percent, "It was 
Anita Lafond who walked into Walgreen's on August 5th and who gave me 
the prescription."  Leah Scadden 
says it was, and she tells you how she knows her, and she tells you about the 
conversation the following day, which verifies it was her, and [defense counsel] 
wants to make a big deal of who has motive to lie.  No question who's got motive to 
lie.

 

            
There's no question as we sit here who has the motive to lie.  It's not Leah Scadden; it's Anita 
Lafond.  Good people when they 
commit a crime have a lot to lose; not by the criminal justice system, but 
perhaps by what they've acquired in their lives, nursing license, captain status 
in the Air National Guard, retirement benefits.  They want to make you feel guilty.  

 

            
Well, you know she's going to lose all that if you find her guilty.  You folks didn't walk into Walgreen's on 
August 5th.  Wasn't you 
who did that.  Though decisions have 
to be made every day.  You folks did 
not walk into Walgreen's and pass a forged prescription.  For whatever reason, on August 
5th, you did not do it; she did it.  Anita Lafond did it.  

 

. . .

 

            
Nothing she did in this case makes any sense, and there are lots and lots 
of senseless crimes.  I differ from 
[defense counsel].  People do 
things, you have no idea why they did them.  You walk into court, and you get a case, 
and you look at it, and you go, "Why in the heck would someone do something like 
this?" 

 

. . .

 

            
Good people do bad things, and when they do, they must he held 
accountable for them.  Our justice 
system isn't just to try people who have committed other crimes, isn't just to 
try people who haveI don't knowHispanic surnames, to try people who you can 
look at, and they have tattoos and mustaches, and their mama wouldn't even come 
and say they're a good kid.  If 
that's all it's for, then it falls apart.  
If we don't hold accountable everybody, then it falls apart.  

 

            
Pledge of Allegiance has been in the newspapers lately.  Some judge in California says, "Well, 
you can't say the Pledge of Allegiance in a classroom."  Folks, I said the Pledge of Allegiance 
when I was a kid, and the last line of the Pledge of Allegiance, I believe in it 
says, "liberty and justice for all," and justice for all; not just the poor 
defendant, but every defendant who walks into thisdefendant must be held 
accountable.

 

            
The evidence in this case is overwhelming.  It is a mountain.  There is no question.  There is no question but that Anita 
Lafond did what she is charged with, and I ask you to find her guilty of the 
crime of prescription fraud. Thank you. 

 

[¶35]   "We are reluctant to find plain 
error in closing arguments lest the trial court becomes required to control 
argument because opposing counsel does not object.'"  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d  at 639 
(quoting Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d at 136).   However, "it is 
unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief 
or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt 
of the defendant.'  ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8 (1980)."  Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 542.  Both prosecutors and attorneys, acting 
as counsel, are prohibited from attesting to facts or asserting as fact their 
personal beliefs relating to matters in issue.  Id.  The attorneys in a case are not to be 
witnesses testifying through their closing.  Id.

 

[¶36]   Additionally, "[c]losing 
arguments must be based upon the evidence submitted to the jury. The purpose of 
closing argument is to allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance 
of the evidence."  Dysthe, 
¶24 (citing Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 145 (Wyo. 1981)).  Prosecutors, just like defense counsel, 
may review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based thereon.  Dysthe, ¶24.  However, we have noted our concern for 
what we generally know about a jury's view of a prosecutor.  Specifically, "[j]urors recognize the 
prosecutor's role as a leader of law enforcement in their community; they 
naturally regard the prosecutor as a symbol of authority; that recognition and 
regard may impress a jury, causing jurors to give significant weight to the 
words of a prosecutor."  Williams 
v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶27, 54 P.3d 248, ¶27 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting 
Earll v. 
State, 2001 WY 
66, ¶12, 29 P.3d 787, ¶12 (Wyo. 2001)).

 

[¶37]   In Williams, we observed 
that the prosecutor's expressing his personal opinion concerning the guilt of 
the accused posed two dangers: 

 

[S]uch 
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but 
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus 
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence 
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the 
imprimatur of the government and may induce the jury to trust the government's 
judgment rather than its own.  

 

Williams, 
¶31.  Therefore we must review the 
prosecutor's comments with a careful eye.  

 

[¶38]   In the context of this case, it 
appears the prosecutor's 
comments were not made to imply that he was relying upon information outside the 
evidence presented at trial.  The 
prosecutor's comments likewise appear not to be a statement of the prosecutor's 
personal beliefs but instead suggested findings of fact and conclusions that 
could be drawn from those facts.  
The prosecutor's statements in rebuttal clearly relate and tie into 
defense counsel's closing arguments regarding Lafond's character and 
motive.  Additionally, we find that 
the prosecutor's statements did not have the tendency to mislead because the 
comments were related to the evidence presented at trial not the implication of 
other evidence.  See 
Williams, ¶31.  The 
prosecutor's comments are an offer 
of a way to view the significance of the evidence, not a call 
for the jury to believe his own special insight to the facts.  Dysthe, 
¶24.  We, therefore, cannot find that the 
prosecutor transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  

 

[¶39]   Lafond's third claim of misconduct 
is that the prosecutor personally attacked defense counsel and stated that 
Lafond and defense counsel were deserving of shame.  "A prosecutor may not launch personal 
attacks against defense counsel to inflame the passions and prejudices of the 
jury."  Burton v. State, 
¶31.  Additionally, "[i]t is firmly 
established that the lawyer should abstain from any allusion to the personal 
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel."  Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 920 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985) and ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
4-7.8 at 4.97).

 

[¶40]   As set forth above, one of the 
witnesses for the State was Ms. Meyen who testified to finding a forged 
prescription and a paper with various doctors' signatures on it.  Evidence was also presented concerning 
Lafond's relationship with Ms. Meyen, including Lafond's statement that Ms. 
Meyen left work early sometimes because she wanted to get to happy hour.  In closing argument the prosecutor 
commented: 

 

            
What does she [Erin Meyen] get for doing the right thing?  She gets the opportunity to sit on that 
witness stand and be basically attacked and vilified by the defense.  She's a lush.  She's somebody who went to get her nails 
done at work.

 

            
Shame on them.  Shame on the 
defense for their laugh at her name.  
She did the right thing. 

 

[¶41]   Although we find these comments 
overdramatic and unnecessary, we do not think that, in context, they can be 
classified as a personal attack on the defense used to inflame the passions and 
prejudice of the jury.  On 
cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Ms. Meyen rather pointedly about 
her relationship with Lafond and why she felt compelled to report what she 
found, as well as how she was able to call the exact pharmacy where the 
prescription was passed.  The 
implication from defense counsel's questioning was Ms. Meyen was involved in 
some sort of set up.  

 

[¶42]   Additionally, a portion of Lafond's 
cross-examination contains the following exchange.  

 

Q.  Now, 
I mean, Erin's not a drunk, right?

 

A.  Not 
that I know of.  I know she goes out 
a lot.

 

Q.  And 
she's not a totally irresponsible person who's going off work to get her hair 
and nails done, just totally irresponsible?

 

A.  Yes, 
she is.

 

Q.  Lush, 
drunk?

 

A.  I 
didn't say she was a drunk.  Yes, 
she was going off work to get her nails done, get her hair permed, yes. 

 

As shown 
above, Lafond's comments regarding Meyen were relatively minor.  The prosecutor's comments appear to be 
made to counter the idea that Ms. Meyen was irresponsible and a drunk.  They were the only of their kind and 
appear in isolation.  As such we do 
not think that the jury thought much of this argument other than it was an 
overly dramatic attempt to counter Lafond's "set-up" defense.   Considering the context of the 
statement, we again cannot find them to be transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal principle of law.  

 

[¶43]   Lafond's fourth and final argument 
regarding the prosecutor's conduct is that the prosecutor forced Lafond to call 
the credibility of the State's witnesses into question by essentially forcing 
her to allege that the State's witnesses were all part of some vast 
conspiracy.  It is improper to ask 
if the other witnesses are lying.  
Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶¶20-21, 17 P.3d 715, ¶¶20-21 (Wyo. 
2001).  The questioning Lafond 
points to proceeded as follows:

 

Q.  So 
you feel strongly that whoever did this, Erin Meyen is involved in 
it?

 

A.  I 
believe so.  She's the only one that 
has seen the original prescription that was supposedly in my 
car.

 

Q.  So 
we have Erin Meyen that might be involved in it, right? And we know because it's 
not Erin on that video that there's someone else involved in it, right?  Leah Scadden testified and she said it 
was you?

 

A.  She 
didn't ask for any photo identification.  
I didn't see Leah Scadden before that.  I mean, I wouldn't be able to, after not 
seeing her in court.

 

Q.  She 
didn't say, "I think"?

 

A.  But 
she also didn't say anything about my name tag before, because I asked those 
questions.

 

Q.  She 
didn't say, "I think."  She didn't 
say, "Maybe." She said it was you on that?

 

A.  She 
didn't say that a year ago.

 

Q.  Is 
Leah Scadden now involved in this conspiracy?

 

A.  I 
have no idea. 

 

[¶44]   When looking at the questioning, we 
find that the prosecutor was not forcing Lafond to comment on the credibility of 
the witnesses but instead questioning Lafond about the defense she had put forth 
at trial.  The prosecutor is well 
within his right to question the rationality and viability of the defense.  Lafond's defense was that somebody had 
framed her.  She testified that 
someone went into that store and purchased Percocet pills under a fraudulent 
prescription, but she was not that person.  
Therefore the questions were reasonably related to the subject matter of 
the direct examination and were not intended as an improper search for opinion 
testimony.  The questions were not 
aimed at an evaluation of the credibility of the State's witnesses, but instead 
a search for an explanation of the evidence against her.  We accordingly hold that these comments 
did not transgress a clear and unequivocal rule of law and consequently do not 
meet the second requirement of the plain error standard.    

 

[¶45]   For the reasons stated above, we 
hold that Lafond was not denied a fair trial by the actions of the 
prosecutor.  As explained, the 
comments to which Lafond objects on appeal do not meet the requirements of plain 
error.  Therefore, reversal is not 
warranted.   

 

Written 
Statement

 

[¶46]   Rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court.  English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 
143 (Wyo. 1999).  As such, decisions 
of the trial court are entitled to considerable deference; and, as long as a 
legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling exists, that ruling will not be 
reversed on appeal.  Id.  Additionally, we will not overturn a 
trial court's discretionary decision unless the court acted in a manner 
exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as it did.  Id.; Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo. 1997); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Wyo. 
1996).  Furthermore, a district 
court's judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the 
record.  English, at 143. 

 

[¶47]   Lafond's second issue involves a 
written statement prepared by Ms. Major-Frunz. Prior to trial, Lafond provided 
the prosecution with a notice of alibi witness list.  One of the people on this list was Ms. 
Major-Frunz.  Before trial 
commenced, however, Ms. Major-Frunz was deployed overseas with her Guard 
unit.  Several days prior to trial 
Lafond made a motion to admit a written statement from Ms. Major Frunz.  The written statement reads as 
follows:

 

To Whom It 
May Concern:

 

I Julie 
Major-Frunz do state that the following is true to the best of my 
knowledge.  My name is Julie 
Major-Frunz and I am a Technical Sergeant in the Wyoming Air National Guard, 
assigned to the 187th AES.  I was attending my drill weekend during 
the date of Aug 4-5, 2001.  I 
reported for duty at 0700 on 8-5-01.  
I remember seeing Capt Anita LaFond in the hallway by the bathroom after 
roll call.  The time was at 0715 
am.  We were both getting ready to 
go to the commander's call at 0730.  
I remember our conversation because we were talking about my child.  Anita's son watches my child on drill 
weekend and she had been with her father during the summer.  Anita was questioning if she was okay 
and if she would be home soon.  I 
explained to Anita that she would be there the following month (Sep UTA) and 
that her son would have to watch her and they could go swimming in the Holiday 
Inn pool.  We both went to 
commander's call together, which was at 0730.  I know that Capt. LaFond was wearing her 
flight suit as it was Sunday of drill and we are usually scheduled to fly.  Commander's call was approximately 15 or 
20 Minutes that Sunday.  We had 
Intel scheduled at 0800 that morning so we sat in the classroom.  I do not remember Anita leaving or 
mentioning the fact that she had to leave for any reason. 

 

Lafond 
claims it was error for the district court to rule that this written statement 
was inadmissible.  We disagree.  

 

[¶48]   The written statement is clearly 
hearsay.3 Hearsay evidence is ordinarily 
inadmissible, but can be received if it falls within one of the hearsay 
exceptions.  Johnson v. 
State, 930 P.2d 358, 361-62 (Wyo. 1996).  One of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, and the one Lafond claims the written statement falls under, is W.R.E. 
804(b)(6).4  A statement may be admitted under this 
section if it meets the following requirements:

 

First, the 
declarant must be unavailable.  
Second, the adverse party must either have been given pretrial notice or 
a sufficient opportunity to prepare for and contest the admission of the 
hearsay.  Third, the truth of the 
matter asserted must be evidence of a material fact.  Fourth, the hearsay statement must be 
more probative than any other evidence which could be procured through 
reasonable efforts.  Fifth, and 
finally, the statement must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness; this may be established either through other corroborating 
evidence or by considering the motivation and/or behavior pattern of the 
declarant. 

 

Johnson, at 366. 

 

[¶49]   The district court's first 
opportunity to consider the written statement occurred when, several days prior 
to trial, the defense made a motion to admit it.  At a pretrial motion hearing on the 
motion, defense counsel stated that Ms. Major-Frunz was unavailable due to 
deployment and that the written statement met the criteria of Rule 804.  Defense counsel then concluded with, "I 
can tell you in addition to this, Your Honor, we are calling four or five other 
witnesses that also will testify approximately to the same thing, and so this is 
just consistent with what other people are going to testify to this Court."  

 

[¶50]   After argument the court 
ruled:  "Then going to the written 
statement, it seems to me that that clearly is inadmissible.  It being a hearsay statement and made by 
[Defense Counsel] by his own admission is cumulative, but I think in the absence 
of any record, it's fairly easy to arrive at the conclusion that [the written 
statement] is inadmissible."  We 
cannot find that this ruling was an abuse of discretion.  Defense counsel did in fact state that 
other witnesses would testify to approximately the same thing.  It was thus perfectly logical that the 
district court found the written statement to be cumulative and not "more 
probative on the point for which it [was] offered" than any other evidence.  The district court consequently did not 
abuse its discretion by excluding the written statement at that time.  

 

[¶51]   Lafond also claims that the 
statement should have been admitted following the prosecutor's comments at 
trial.  During cross-examination of 
Lafond the prosecutor asked, "Basically, as I heard the testimony, nobody can 
really vouch for your whereabouts between roll call and commanders call?"  This question produced an objection that 
was overruled.  At the end of 
cross-examination, defense counsel asked that the court reconsider its previous 
ruling on the admissibility of the written statement.  Counsel argued that the prosecutor had 
opened the door when he asked whether someone could account for Lafond's 
whereabouts.  The district court 
responded by saying, "This case has been pending for a year almost.  There would have been other ways under 
the circumstances you described to get this witness' testimony preserved.  There's, just to record here, supporting 
thetheoretically, a hearsay statement offered for the truth and veracity of the 
matters in the statement, it's not admissible."  

 

[¶52]   We once again find the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the written statement did not 
qualify for admission.  Lafond 
failed to meet several of the requirements for admission under this 
section.  Specifically, notice 
regarding the written statement was not given to the prosecutor until six days 
before trial.  The written 
statement, in the form of a notarized letter, was dated in March, but the 
prosecutor did not get notice that defense counsel intended to use it until July 
2, 2002.  Lafond claims that notice 
was given to the State back in December.  
However, the notice given at that time was not that Lafond would be using 
the written statement, only that Ms. Major-Frunz was an alibi witness.  The necessary notice must include the 
"intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it" so that the adverse 
party has a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.  W.R.E. 804(b)(6).      

 

[¶53]   Additionally, the written statement 
was not more probative than other evidence on the matter.   The assertion in Ms. Major-Frunz's 
statement was that she went with Lafond to commander's call at 7:30 and sat with 
her in the classroom and did not recall Lafond leaving.  This was not more probative than the 
live testimony of Mr. Orr who stated that both he and Lafond went to their desks 
at 7:30 and he did not notice her leaving prior to 8:00 a.m.5  Additionally, more probative evidence 
could have been procured on this point through the use of a deposition.  See W.R.Cr.P. 15.  A deposition would have been more 
probative because it would have been under oath and subject to 
cross-examination.  Clearly the fact 
that no deposition was taken was part of the district court's concern when it 
noted that the defense had over a year to get the testimony preserved. 

 

[¶54]   Furthermore, the written statement 
does not contain circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  It was simply a notarized letter.  The statement was not sworn to under 
oath, there is no indication of the circumstances under which it was made, no 
indication if the statement remained consistent, and no indication if it was 
ever retracted.  See 
Johnson, 930 P.2d  at 366.  
Furthermore, there is an indication that there was a significant lapse of 
time from the date of the incident to the date the letter was prepared.  Such a lapse in time does not enhance 
the trustworthiness of the statement. Considering all these factors, we thus 
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion.  

 

Bank 
Records

 

[¶55]   Lafond lastly argues that this 
court must not condone the State's unfettered access to her bank records.  In this case the State introduced 21 
checks written by the defendant.  
Lafond, however, claims that the government obtained and used these 
checks at trial in violation of her rights under the Wyoming constitution.  She argues that the citizens of Wyoming 
have a legitimate expectation that their bank records will be protected under 
Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming constitution.  

 

[¶56]   While Lafond has presented the 
analysis we have directed parties should supply when claiming that the Wyoming 
constitution provides more protection than the federal constitution, Lafond made 
no such argument to the trial court.  
See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999).  This 
court generally does not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal.  Belden v. State, 
2003 WY 89, ¶55, 73 P.3d 1041, ¶55 (Wyo.  
2003).  Additionally, "[t]he 
burden of establishing plain error is assigned to the appellant even when the 
claimed error would constitute a violation of a constitutional right."  Id.; see also Bailey v. 
State, 12 P.3d 173, 177-78 (Wyo. 2000).  As a result, we again review the claim 
for plain error.  

 

[¶57]   The first requirement of the plain 
error standard is that the record must be clear as to the incident alleged as 
error.   It is not 
completely clear how Lafond's checks were obtained.  The record shows that there was a 
precipe for a subpoena deuces tecum and a returned subpoena.  However, that subpoena did not include 
all the checks that were eventually introduced at trial.  Ms. Krier testified that the checks were 
produced as a result of a warrant.  
Nevertheless, the record contains no such warrant.  This puzzle aside, portions of Lafond's 
bank records are clearly in the record and were introduced at trial.  For argument sake, and because it is not 
essential to our holding, we will thus proceed as if the first requirement of 
the plain error standard were met.  

 

[¶58]   The second requirement of the plain 
error standard is that there must be a transgression of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law.  The United State 
Supreme Court has decided that a person does not have a Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy in their banking or financial records.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1622-24, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976).  In Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572, 577 (Wyo. 1979), we expressly adopted this rule.  We therefore hold that Lafond cannot 
meet the second requirement of the plain error standard.  While, as Lafond points out, our opinion 
in Fitzgerald provided no analysis of the Wyoming constitution and it is 
possible that such an argument could be made, such an argument must be made at 
the trial level first.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶59]   For the reasons stated above, we 
affirm.  

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. 
Stat Ann. § 35-7-1033(a)(iii) provides:

 

(a)  It 
is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally:

 

(iii)  To 
acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, 
fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge[.]

 

2Two 
attorneys from the prosecutor's office took part in the prosecution of this 
case.  Lafond's arguments encompass 
comments made by both attorneys.  
For simplicity sake, we will not distinguish between the two attorneys 
and will simply refer to them collectively as the prosecutor.  

 

3"Hearsay' 
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted."  W.R.E. 801(c).  

 

4W.R.E 
804(b)(6) provides:  

 

(b)  Hearsay 
exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarent is unavailable as a witness:

 

(6)  Other 
Exceptions  A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, 
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence.  However, a statement may 
not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to 
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of 
the declarant.

5While 
these statements may seem somewhat contradictory because one states that she was 
in the classroom and the other states she was at her desk, Lafond testified that 
her desk is in the classroom.