Title: State v. Fraley

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Fraley, 105 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. FRALEY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Fraley, 105 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110.] 
Criminal law – Sentencing – R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B) – Trial court 
must notify offender at sentencing hearing of the specific prison term that 
may be imposed if the offender violates community control sanctions – 
Trial court may not impose prison term for subsequent violation without 
such notification. 
(Nos. 2004-0225 and 2004-0276 — Submitted October 13, 2004 — Decided 
December 30, 2004.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Erie County, Nos. E-02-
050 and E-02-051, 2003-Ohio-6976. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B), a trial court sentencing an 
offender upon a violation of the offender’s community control sanction 
must, at the time of such sentencing, notify the offender of the specific 
prison term that may be imposed for an additional violation of the 
conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on 
the offender for such a subsequent violation. 
____________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellee, Earl Fraley, was indicted on, and pleaded 
guilty to, one count of gross sexual imposition, a felony of the third degree, in 
violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), under case No. 97-CR-479 in the Erie County 
Court of Common Pleas.  He was sentenced in March 1998 to five years of 
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community control and was notified that should he fail to comply with 
community control, harsher sanctions could be imposed, including up to five 
years of imprisonment.  The specific term of five years was set forth in the journal 
entry but was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing.  Fraley was also 
adjudicated to be a sexually oriented offender and was notified of his duties to 
register as such pursuant to R.C. 2950.03 and 2950.04. 
{¶ 2} In December 1999, Fraley entered a guilty plea to the charge of 
failure to register, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2950.05 (Erie 
Common Pleas case No. 99-CR-504).  The trial court stated that the community 
control violation was not of such a nature as to require termination of Fraley’s 
community control sanctions.  The court ordered that community control 
sanctions be continued under the terms and conditions previously ordered.  For 
his conviction for failure to register under case No. 99-CR-504, the court 
sentenced Fraley to a term of community control to run concurrently with the 
sanctions imposed in case No. 97-CR-479.  The court also notified Fraley, in the 
journal entry but not at the sentencing hearing, that “further, harsher sanctions, 
including prison time up to twelve (12) months, could be imposed if defendant 
does not comply with community sanctions [under case No. 99-CR-504].” 
{¶ 3} On May 8, the court found that Fraley had again violated the terms 
and conditions of his community control in case No. 97-CR-479.  The court held 
that the violations were not so serious as to require the termination of community 
control sanctions. 
{¶ 4} On April 9, 2002, Fraley again pleaded guilty to violating the 
terms and conditions of his community control in both case No. 97-CR-479 and 
No. 99-CR-504.  The trial court found that Fraley had violated the terms and 
conditions of community control but that again, the violations were not of such a 
nature as to require the termination of his community-control sanctions.  For the 
first time, the trial court notified Fraley at the hearing that if he violated the 
January Term, 2004 
3 
community control sanctions again, a prison term would be imposed of four years 
in case No. 97-CR-479 and nine months in case No. 99-CR-504, and the 
sentences would run consecutively. 
{¶ 5} On November 12, 2002, a hearing was held to determine whether 
Fraley had again violated the terms and conditions of his community control 
sanctions in both cases.  Fraley admitted to a new DUI offense, which violated the 
terms and conditions of his community control sanctions in both case No. 97-CR-
479 and No. 99-CR-504.  The court terminated Fraley’s community control in 
both cases and found that “pursuant to O.R.C. §2929.14(B) * * * the shortest 
prison term will demean the seriousness of the offender’s conduct or will not 
adequately protect the public from future crimes by the offender or others.”  The 
court also found that Fraley met the criteria for the imposition of consecutive 
sentences under R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) et seq.  As a result of his DUI offense, the 
court sentenced Fraley to four years in prison for his case No. 97-CR-479 
community control violation and to nine months for his case No. 99-CR-504 
community control violation, to be served consecutively. 
{¶ 6} The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District reversed the judgment 
of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  The appellate 
court held that the trial court must notify a defendant at the initial sentencing 
hearing of a specific term of imprisonment that may be imposed for violating 
community control sanctions.  Because the trial court did not specify a specific 
term until the April 9, 2002 hearing, the appellate court found that the trial judge 
was without the authority to impose prison terms. 
{¶ 7} The Sixth District Court of Appeals certified that a conflict existed 
with the decision of the Ninth District Court of Appeals in State v. Sutherlin, 154 
Ohio App.3d 765, 2003-Ohio-5265, 798 N.E.2d 1137.  The cause is now before 
us upon our determination that a conflict exists and upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
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II.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B) 
{¶ 8} The question certified to us for determination is whether R.C. 
2929.19(B)(5) requires a judge to notify a defendant at his initial sentencing 
hearing, as opposed to any subsequent sentencing hearings, of the specific prison 
term that may be imposed as a sanction for a subsequent community control 
violation. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) provides that if a sentencing court decides to 
impose an authorized community control sanction at a sentencing hearing, “[t]he 
court shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, if 
the offender commits a violation of any law, or if the offender leaves this state 
without the permission of the court or the offender's probation officer, the court 
may impose a longer time under the same sanction, may impose a more restrictive 
sanction, or may impose a prison term on the offender and shall indicate the 
specific prison term that may be imposed as a sanction for the violation, as 
selected by the court from the range of prison terms for the offense pursuant to 
section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 10} R.C. 2929.15(B), which details procedures for a trial court to 
follow when an offender has violated the conditions of community control, 
reiterates the three options available to the sentencing court mentioned in R.C. 
2929.19(B)(5).  R.C. 2929.15(B) further provides that if a prison term is imposed 
upon an offender for violating a community control sanction, the prison term 
specified shall be within the range of prison terms available for the offense for 
which the sanction was imposed and “shall not exceed the prison term specified in 
the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing hearing pursuant to division 
(B)(3) [sic, (B)(5)] of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 11} We have held, “Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B), a 
trial court sentencing an offender to a community control sanction must, at the 
time of the sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term that may be 
January Term, 2004 
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imposed for a violation of the conditions of the sanction, as a prerequisite to 
imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation.”  State v. 
Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  This case requires us to consider whether a trial court is mandated to 
notify a defendant at the initial sentencing hearing of a specific term of 
imprisonment that could be imposed if a defendant violates the terms and 
conditions of his community control, or whether such notification may come at a 
later sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 12} In State v. Sutherlin, 154 Ohio App.3d 765, 2003-Ohio-5265, 798 
N.E.2d 1137, the First District Court of Appeals held that a trial court judge had 
complied with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) when he notified a defendant at the 
defendant’s second sentencing hearing of the specific prison term that could be 
imposed as a sanction for a violation of a community control sanction.  Sutherlin 
was originally sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and four years’ community 
control for robbery and kidnapping convictions.  He subsequently violated the 
conditions of his community control by failing to notify his probation officer of 
his change of address and by failing to perform his community service.  At the 
sentencing hearing on the community control violation, the court continued 
community control but warned Sutherlin that another violation would result in the 
maximum term of imprisonment. 
{¶ 13} In this case, the Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court must notify the defendant at his initial sentencing hearing of the specific 
prison term that may be imposed as a sanction for a violation of a community 
control sanction in order to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5).  Without such 
notice, the appellate court held, the trial court cannot impose a term of 
imprisonment for a subsequent violation. 
III. An Element of Statutory Compliance: Time of Notification 
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{¶ 14} Fraley does not allege a constitutional violation.  Our examination 
is limited to statutory interpretation.  We examined full compliance and 
substantial compliance with sentencing statutes in State v. Brooks, and we noted 
that there are two main variables to examine in evaluating compliance with the 
notification requirement of R.C. 2929.19(B)(5): first, when the notification was 
given, and second, what language the trial court used in the notification.  Brooks, 
103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, ¶ 13.  The first variable is 
at issue here. 
A. Time of Notification When Only One Community Control Violation Occurs 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) states that when a sentencing court determines 
that a community control sanction should be imposed, “[t]he court shall notify the 
offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, * * * the court * * * 
may impose a prison term on the offender and shall indicate the specific prison 
term that may be imposed as a sanction for the violation.”  In interpreting this 
language in combination with R.C. 2929.15(B), we held in Brooks that “a trial 
court sentencing an offender to a community control sanction must, at the time of 
the sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term that may be 
imposed for a violation of the conditions of the sanction, as a prerequisite to 
imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation.”   Id. at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Thus, in order to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), 
the original sentencing hearing is the time when the notification must be given for 
the court to impose a prison term upon a defendant’s first community control 
violation.  However, this court has not ruled on the timing of notification required 
by the statute in order to impose a prison term when an offender violates his 
community control sanctions multiple times. 
B. Notification When There Are Multiple Violations of Community Control 
{¶ 16} Our holding in Brooks did not address “whether a trial judge who, 
* * * at the time of the R.C. 2929.15(B) sentencing, informs the offender of the 
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specific term he or she faces for a violation of the conditions of community 
control may subsequently impose a prison term if the offender violates the 
conditions of community control a second time.”  Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 
2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, fn. 2. 
{¶ 17} The notification requirement in R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) is meant to put 
the offender on notice of the specific prison term he or she faces if a violation of 
the conditions occurs.  Following a community control violation, the trial court 
conducts a second sentencing hearing.  At this second hearing, the court sentences 
the offender anew and must comply with the relevant sentencing statutes.  State v. 
Martin, 8th Dist. No. 82140, 2003-Ohio-3381, 2003 WL 21474154, at ¶ 35.  The 
trial court could therefore comply with both the sentencing statutes and our 
holding in Brooks if at this second hearing the court notifies the offender of the 
specific prison term that may be imposed for a subsequent violation occurring 
after this second hearing.  We believe that this process complies with the letter 
and spirit of R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B). 
{¶ 18} We therefore hold that pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 
2929.15(B), a trial court sentencing an offender upon a violation of the offender’s 
community control sanction must, at the time of such sentencing, notify the 
offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed for an additional 
violation of the conditions of the sanction as a prerequisite to imposing a prison 
term on the offender for a subsequent violation. 
{¶ 19} In the case at bar, Fraley, at his initial sentencing hearing in March 
1998, was sentenced to five years’ community control.  He was notified only by 
journal entry that harsher sanctions, including up to five years of imprisonment, 
could be imposed if he failed to comply with the sanctions.  After this original 
sentencing hearing, Fraley violated community control four times.  After each of 
the first two violations, the sentencing court continued the previous sanctions and 
failed to notify Fraley at the sentencing hearings of any specific prison term.  At 
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his third violation hearing in April 2002, however, the trial court additionally 
notified Fraley that if he violated the community sanctions again, specific prison 
terms would be imposed.  Accordingly, at the April 2002 hearing, Fraley was 
notified of a specific term of imprisonment, in compliance with the requirements 
under R.C. 2929.19(B)(5).  When Fraley was found to have violated his 
community control sanctions in November 2002, the trial court proceeded 
properly in imposing a prison sentence on him. 
{¶ 20} Based on all the foregoing, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) requires a trial court to state at the sentencing 
hearing the specific prison term that may be imposed for the violation of a 
community control sanction. R.C. 2929.15(B) restates this requirement as it 
explains how a trial court may respond to a community control violation. If a trial 
court sentences an offender to a community control sanction and does not specify 
at the sentencing hearing a possible prison term that may be imposed for violation 
of the sanction, a court may not impose a prison term upon a violating offender. 
R.C. 2929.15(B); State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 
N.E.2d 837, paragraph two of the syllabus. That section of the statute is consistent 
with the purpose of 1996 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 to provide “truth in sentencing.” 146 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136. All parties and the victim of the crime are to know at 
January Term, 2004 
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the time of sentencing the precise sanction, whether it is prison or community 
control, that the court is imposing on the defendant. 
{¶ 22} In the instant case, the trial court notified Fraley of the specific 
prison term that could be imposed for a violation of his community control 
sanction at his third community-control-violation hearing. The majority holds that 
this notification satisfied R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), concluding that each hearing that 
follows a violation of community control is a new sentencing hearing. Because I 
believe that community-control-violation hearings are not sentencing hearings, I 
dissent. 
{¶ 23} As the majority relates, R.C. 2929.15(B) specifies the procedures 
that a trial court must follow when a felony offender has violated the conditions of 
a community control sanction. The General Assembly could have required trial 
courts to conduct full sentencing hearings, pursuant to the detailed requirements 
of R.C. 2929.19. Instead, it enacted R.C. 2929.15(B), which merely specifies that 
when an offender has violated a condition of community control, a court may 
impose a longer time under the same sanction, a more restrictive sanction, or a 
prison term. The majority is correct when it says that “relevant sentencing 
statutes” apply at community-control-violation hearings. But those relevant 
sentencing statutes require only that the trial court comply with the purposes of 
felony sentencing and not be discriminatory, pursuant to R.C. 2929.11, and that 
the imposition of a prison term comply with the strictures of R.C. 2929.13 and 
2929.14. The application of these basic principles of felony sentencing in an R.C. 
2929.15(B) hearing does not transform that proceeding into an R.C. 2929.19 
sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 24} We must give meaning to the words of R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 
2929.15(B) as they are written. Funk v. Rent-All Mart, Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
78, 80, 742 N.E.2d 127. R.C. 2929.15(B) prohibits the trial court from imposing a 
prison term greater than “the prison term specified in the notice provided to the 
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offender at the sentencing hearing.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.15(B) contains 
no language signifying that a community-control-violation hearing is a sentencing 
hearing. Therefore, I do not believe that the notification of the specific prison 
term by the trial court at Fraley’s third community-control-violation hearing can 
cure the error of not advising Fraley pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) at his 
sentencing hearing.  In view of this failure, the trial court was not permitted to 
impose a prison term upon Fraley. This application of the statute is consistent 
with the attempt by the General Assembly to create a felony-sentencing scheme 
that complies with the principle of “truth in sentencing.” 
{¶ 25} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} Recently, in State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 
814 N.E.2d 837, we very clearly interpreted R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B).  
We held that “a trial court sentencing an offender to a community control sanction 
must, at the time of the sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term 
that may be imposed for a violation of the conditions of the sanction, as a 
prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Brooks at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 27} The failure to set forth with specificity the term of incarceration for 
a violation of community control at sentencing means that an offender can never 
receive incarceration for violating his community control related to that offense.  
The authority to order incarceration comes at the sentencing hearing on the 
original charge.  Repeated violations of community control do not invest the trial 
court with any additional authority to order incarceration. 
{¶ 28} Our holding in Brooks was tough, but correct.  The majority 
decision signals this court’s hasty retreat from it. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2004 
11 
 
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Ann 
Barylski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Jeffrey J. Whitacre, Erie County Public Defender, for appellee. 
_____________________