Title: Stiles v. Amundson

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 43289 
 
 
DAVID WAYNE STILES, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
WALTER A. AMUNDSON, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
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Boise, June 2016 Term 
 
2016 Opinion No.  75 
 
Filed:  July 7, 2016 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
    
 
       
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  Costs on appeal are 
awarded to respondent. 
 
Johnson and Monteleone, L.L.P., Boise, and Giles Law Office, P.L.L.C., 
Boise, attorneys for appellant.  Jason R. Monteleone argued. 
 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, L.L.P., Boise, attorneys for respondent. Michael  
P. Stefanic argued. 
_________________________________ 
 
W. JONES, Justice. 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a premises liability action brought against Walter Amundson 
(“Walter”), the owner of a piece of property in Kuna, Idaho (the “Property”), by David Stiles 
(“Stiles”), a social guest of one of Walter’s tenants. The district court dismissed the case on 
summary judgment, reasoning that: (1) Walter had neither a general duty of care nor a duty to 
warn with respect to Stiles; and (2) although Walter could be liable for any injury resulting from 
the negligent repair of the Property, Walter’s repair was not the proximate cause of Stiles’ injury. 
We now affirm. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Walter is the owner of the Property, which is located at 756 W. 4th Street, Kuna, Idaho. In 
June and July of 2011, Walter rented the Property to three tenants: Jon Sullivan (“Sullivan”), 
Wayne Jenkins (“Jenkins”), and Walter’s son, Roger Amundson (“Roger”). Sometime in mid-
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June 2011, Walter and Roger removed a bay window from the house located on the Property in 
order to install a garage door. The bay window was approximately eight feet long and four feet 
high. It weighed at least 200 pounds. After removing the bay window, Roger and Walter left it 
leaning against a white picket fence at the front of the Property. Walter then posted a listing on 
Craigslist.com in an attempt to sell the bay window. At some point after removing the bay 
window, one of the glass panes in the window was shattered. This left shards of glass protruding 
from the frame. Within two days of the window pane breaking, the bay window was moved from 
the picket fence in front of the Property to a cedar fence bordering a walkway along the side of 
the Property. The parties disagree as to who moved the window and whether or not Walter was 
aware that the window was broken and moved. 
As of July 8, 2011, a piece of wood, which has been referred to at different times as a 
“stump,” “branch,” and “root,” was lying on the ground in the walkway in the general proximity 
of the bay window. No party presented evidence as to how the stump got into the walkway or 
how long it had been there.  
At approximately 1:00 A.M. on July 8, 2011, Stiles attended a social gathering at the 
Property. Walter was not present. Although Walter was generally aware that the tenants held 
social gatherings in the backyard of the Property from time to time, there is no evidence that 
Walter was notified on this particular instance. Roughly two hours later, while exiting through 
the walkway, Stiles tripped over the stump, fell forward, and severely lacerated his arm on the 
shards of glass protruding from the bay window.  
On July 3, 2013, Stiles filed a complaint against Walter (the “Complaint”), alleging that: 
(1) Walter had known or should have known that a dangerous condition existed on the Property1; 
(2) Walter had either owed Stiles a general duty of care or a duty to warn; (3) Walter had neither 
remedied the dangerous condition nor warned Stiles, thus breaching his duty of care;  and (4) 
Walter’s breach of his duty of care was the actual and proximate cause of Stiles’ injuries.  
At a hearing on March 9, 2015, the district court dismissed the case on summary 
judgment. It reasoned that a landlord has no duty of care towards the social guests of his or her 
tenants, except where said landlord had carried out a negligent repair; and, while removing the 
bay window could be considered a repair, it was not the proximate cause of Stiles’ injury. In 
                                                 
1 It is evident from the facts of the case that there were two conditions, the broken window and the stump, which 
contributed to the injury.  
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coming to its decision, the district court expressly took all facts and inferences in favor of Stiles, 
including the fact that Walter had knowledge that the broken window had been moved beside the 
walkway.  
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Did the district court err in holding that Walter did not owe a general duty of care to 
Stiles?  
2. 
Did the district court err in holding that Walter did not have a duty to warn Stiles of 
dangerous conditions existing on the Property? 
3. 
Did the district court err in holding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether 
Walter’s repair of the Property was the cause of the harm to Stiles? 
4. 
Is Walter entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court 
utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on 
the motion. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). When considering whether the 
evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the 
trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in 
favor of the nonmoving party.  
 
Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 75–76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082–83 (2015) (quoting 
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014)).  
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
The district court did not err in holding that Walter did not owe a duty of care 
towards Stiles.2 
“The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with 
the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land.” Ball v. City of 
Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012).3 In different cases, Idaho Courts 
                                                 
2 As a preliminary matter, there are no contested issues of fact that will affect whether or not Walter had a duty of 
care with respect to Stiles. Accordingly, the issue of Walter’s duty of care was appropriately determined by the 
district court, and did not require a jury trial. 
3 Stiles argues on appeal that in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984), this Court 
abandoned the tripartite (invitee, licensee, trespasser) premises liability framework, and established a general duty of 
reasonable care for landowners/landlords with respect to all parties. A brief review of this Court’s precedent since 
Stephens shows that this argument is without merit. See e.g. Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 
1266, 1270 (2012) (“the duty of owners and possessors of land is determined by the status of the person injured on 
the land (i.e., whether the person is a [sic] invitee, licensee or trespasser).”) (quoting Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 
Idaho 397, 399–400, 871 P.2d 814, 816–17 (1994)) (internal citations omitted)); see also  Peterson v. Romine, 131 
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expressed this duty to warn as one owed by an “owner” (see Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 
768 P.2d 1321 (1989), a “landowner” (see Ball, 152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270), or a 
“possessor” (see Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 399, 871 P.2d at 816). However, it is often true that 
the “owner” of a piece of property and the “possessor” of that property are not the same party. 
This raises the issue of who, between a landlord and a tenant, owes the relevant duty of care to a 
tenant’s social guests. 
This issue was recently addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Mueller, 
156 Idaho 237, 241, 322 P.3d 319, 323 (Ct. App. 2014). In that case, a tenant and a third party 
met at a local bar. Id. at 238, 322 P.3d at 320. The two shared drinks and returned to the tenant’s 
apartment. Id. The tenant then opened a door that led out onto a window dormer in order to let 
some air into the apartment. Id. The dormer had no railings; a condition which the landlord had 
warned the tenant about earlier. Id. As the tenant’s guest walked towards the doorway she 
tripped and rolled off of the dormer falling twelve feet to the ground. Id. The tenant’s guest 
brought suit against the landlord for damages resulting from the fall. Id. The Court of Appeals 
held that the landlord was not liable to the social guest. Id. at 241, 322 P.3d at 323. It reasoned 
that: 
In the context at issue in this case—as between a tenant’s social guest and 
the landlord—the landlord owes a duty only to the extent that, if the landlord 
voluntarily undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord must exercise 
reasonable care in performing such repairs. However, the tenant essentially 
occupies the position of landowner with respect to guests of the tenant. This is 
because the tenant is the individual in control of the premises during the lease and 
the tenant has control over the guests hosted in the apartment.  
Id. In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that “Idaho Courts have never 
directly addressed the issue of what duty a landlord owes the social guests of a tenant.” Id. at 
240, 322 P.3d at 322. However, “existing case law demonstrates it is the entity having control 
over the property that bears the burden of warning social guests and licensees of dangerous 
conditions on the property.” Id.  Specifically, the Court of Appeals discussed this Court’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (plaintiff was a trespasser rather than an invitee and, accordingly, was 
not owed duty by the owners to keep the land in reasonably safe condition); O’Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 
9, 14, 72 P.3d 849, 854 (2003) (same); Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 171, 296 P.3d 373, 377 
(2013) (owners and operators of baseball stadiums owe invitees a duty to keep the premises in reasonably safe 
condition). 
 
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decision in Harrison, a case in which this Court abolished the open and obvious danger doctrine4 
and confirmed that owners and occupiers of land will be under a duty of ordinary care toward 
invitees who come upon their premises. 115 Idaho at  595–96, 768 P.2d at 1328–29. In Harrison, 
this Court stated that:  
a tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties 
are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by 
the condition or use of the premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee 
may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. 
Id. In its analysis in Robinson, the Court of Appeals put special emphasis on the above passage, 
noting that:  
This passage reveals. . . . [that] tenants are held responsible as if they were the 
owner with respect to third parties. . . . A landlord generally is not responsible for 
injuries to third persons in privity with the tenant which are caused by failure to 
keep or put the demised premises in good repair. 
156 Idaho at 240, 322 P.3d at 322.  
We now adopt the reasoning set forth by the Court of Appeals in Robinson. This Court’s 
opinion in Harrison clearly establishes that tenants are liable to injured third parties, including 
the tenant’s social guests, as if they were the owner of the property. This stands to reason, 
because the tenant, as the possessor of the property, is in the best position to eliminate dangers or 
to make those dangers known to third parties. Landlords, on the other hand, are not in a 
comparable position because they do not have possessory control over the land. Likewise, they 
do not have control over the guests hosted by the tenants, and they likely will not even be aware 
when a tenant’s social guest is on the premises.  
Further, landlords, who do not generally have unfettered access to the premises, cannot 
reasonably be expected to be aware of all potential hazards on the property while the tenancy is 
in effect, especially in the event that the tenant creates the hazard. It would create an unfair 
burden on landlords to give them a responsibility to warn social guests to whom they have no 
connection of dangers of which they have no way of learning. 
The exception to this reasoning is where the landlord created the hazard him or herself. 
Accordingly, this Court has recognized an exception to the general rule as follows:  
                                                 
4 Under the open and obvious danger doctrine, an invitee assumed all normal, obvious, and ordinary risks attendant 
on the use of the premises and the owner was under no duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate 
known or obvious dangers. Alsup v. Saratoga Hotel, 71 Idaho 229, 236, 229 P.2d 985, 989 (1951). 
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Either a tenant, or a landlord, or both, may be liable to a third party for injuries 
resulting from negligent repairs or failure to repair. Even in the absence of a 
specific lease provision, and with no controlling statute requiring him to make 
repairs, if a landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs he is bound to use reasonable 
and ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. 
Harrison, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329.  
B. 
The district court did not err when it held that there was no issue of material fact as 
to whether Walter’s repair of the Property was the cause of the harm to Stiles. 
As noted above, this Court recognized in Harrison that where a landlord is negligent in 
voluntarily making “repairs” on a piece of property, that landlord will be liable for injuries 
arising out of any negligence in that repair. 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “repair,” as “[t]o restore to a sound or good condition.” 
Repair, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In order to complete a repair (i.e. restore a piece 
of property to a sound good condition), the restoring party must not only fix the defective 
element of the property, but must leave the property itself in good condition. In other words, a 
“repair” includes the safe disposal of the by-products of the repair process. Accordingly, a 
landlord who attempts to repair a glass window and in doing so leaves jagged shards of glass on 
the floor will likely be liable for any injuries caused by that glass. 
In this case however, even taking all facts and inferences in favor of Stiles, a reasonable 
jury could not find that Walter’s repair was the proximate cause of the injury. The injury in this 
case was not caused by the repair itself, but rather was caused by a combination of the stump and 
the broken window. Neither the placement of the stump, which neither party has attempted to 
explain, nor moving the window from the front fence to the walkway, could reasonably be 
considered part of the repair. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it dismissed the 
case on summary judgment.  
C. 
Walter’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. 
Attorney’s fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121 are appropriate where the 
appeal is “frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.” In this instance both parties made 
arguments which were well-reasoned and had at least some precedential support. Attorney’s fees 
on appeal are denied.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We hereby affirm the district court’s summary judgment. Costs on appeal to Respondent.  
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices EISMANN, BURDICK and HORTON, concur.