Title: Ilan-Harper v. DFS

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HEYDON ILAN-HARPER,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DIVISON OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 315, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File No. 18-02-10TN  
§  CPI No. 18-05601 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 11, 2019 
Decided: 
May 8, 2019 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s brief and motion to withdraw filed by 
the appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the responses, and the 
Family Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
This is an appeal from the Family Court’s order dated May 17, 2018 
that terminated the appellant’s (“Father”) parental rights in his son (“Child”).  The 
Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s mother 
(“Mother”), who is not a party to this appeal.  We therefore focus on the facts in the 
record as they relate to Father’s appeal. 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
2 
(2) 
Father’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under 
Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c).  Father’s counsel asserts that, based upon a 
conscientious review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Counsel 
informed Father of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c) and provided him with a copy of 
the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Father 
of his right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  Father did not respond with any 
points that he wanted to present for the Court’s consideration.  The appellee, the 
Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families, Division of Family 
Services (“DFS”), and the counsel who was appointed to represent the interests of 
the Child have responded to the Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the Family Court’s 
judgment should be affirmed. 
(3) 
The Child was born in January 2017.  Mother had three other children, 
none of whom were in her custody; her parental rights in one child had been 
involuntarily terminated, and her parental rights in another child, who had been 
seriously abused, had been voluntarily terminated.  While the Child was still in the 
hospital, DFS received a call reporting that the Child suffered from withdrawal 
because of prenatal exposure to methadone and that Mother had fallen asleep 
multiple times with the Child in her arms, even after hospital staff warned her that 
such conduct was dangerous to the Child.  The Family Court granted ex parte 
custody of the Child to DFS on January 27, 2017.   
 
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(4) 
At the preliminary protective hearing on February 1, 2017, the Family 
Court appointed counsel to represent Mother.  That morning, Mother identified 
Father as the putative father of the Child.  Father did not dispute being the Child’s 
father and agreed to submit to genetic testing; the court ordered that Father also 
would be appointed counsel.  The court found there was probable cause to believe 
the Child was dependent.  The court also found that DFS had exercised reasonable 
efforts to prevent the Child’s removal from the home. 
(5) 
At an adjudicatory hearing on March 16, 2017, Father was adjudicated 
to be the father of the Child as a result of paternity testing.  The Family Court found 
that the Child was dependent based on Mother’s recent drug use and her DFS history 
and because Father had pending criminal charges and resided with Mother.  The 
Family Court found that DFS had exercised due diligence in trying to find a relative 
placement for the Child. 
(6) 
On March 31, 2017, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing.  DFS 
filed a motion seeking to be excused from case planning with Mother because of her 
history with DFS, including the involuntary termination of her parental rights in one 
of her older children, and her substance abuse history.  The court deferred ruling on 
the motion in order to allow Mother to submit a formal response.  DFS submitted a 
proposed case plan for Father, which included such elements as maintaining stable 
 
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employment and suitable housing, ruling out mental health and substance abuse 
issues, and resolving his criminal charges.   
(7) 
On June 19, 2017, the Family Court held a review hearing.  Both 
parents were participating in supervised visits with the Child once each week, during 
which they were interacting appropriately with the Child.  Father was working with 
a family interventionist as part of his case plan, had enrolled in a parenting class, and 
was employed as a construction worker.  His criminal charges remained outstanding.  
The Family Court granted DFS’s motion to be excused from case planning with 
Mother.  The permanency goal for the Child remained reunification.  The Family 
Court held another review hearing on September 12, 2017, at which time Father’s 
criminal charges were still pending. 
(8) 
In October 2017, Father pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine 
and was sentenced to probation.  In January 2018, while on probation, Father was 
arrested on additional drug charges and incarcerated.  As a result, and because the 
Child had been in foster care for more than a year, at a permanency hearing on 
February 2, 2018, the Child’s attorney moved to change the permanency goal to 
termination of parental rights (“TPR”) and adoption.  DFS supported the goal 
change.  Because Father had made significant progress toward reunification before 
incurring the new criminal charges, however, the Family Court changed the 
permanency goal to concurrent goals of reunification and TPR/adoption.  The court 
 
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scheduled a review hearing for April 23, 2018, and ordered that if DFS filed and 
served a TPR petition at least twenty days in advance, the court would hear the TPR 
petition at that hearing. 
(9) 
DFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on February 22, 
2018.  In March 2018, Father pleaded guilty to one count of Drug Dealing under 16 
Del. C. § 4754.  Mother was personally served with the TPR petition on March 27, 
2018, and publication for Mother and Father appeared in the newspaper on March 
30, April 6, and April 13, 2018.   
(10) Mother and Father appeared with counsel for the TPR hearing on April 
23, 2018.  At the time, Father was incarcerated and expected to be released no earlier 
than October 2018.  The court heard testimony from Father, Mother, and two social 
workers who were familiar with the family and the Child’s foster family.  The court 
also admitted documentary evidence including the parents’ criminal histories, a 
social report, information from Mother’s Facebook account, and information 
relating to Mother’s DFS history.  The testimony reflected that Father had made 
significant progress on his case plan before he became incarcerated after nearly eight 
grams of heroin were found in his home in January 2018.  The evidence further 
suggested that Father maintained an ongoing relationship with Mother, despite his 
knowledge of her DFS history and his claim that they were no longer in a 
relationship.  Based primarily on Father’s back-to-back drug convictions and his 
 
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incarceration, the Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father 
was unable to plan adequately for the Child’s physical, mental, and emotional 
needs.2  The Family Court further found by clear and convincing evidence that (i) 
the Child had entered DFS’s care as an infant and had been in care for more than six 
months;3 (ii) Father was incapable of discharging his parental responsibilities due to 
extended or repeated incarceration;4 (iii) because of Father’s incarceration, he was 
unable to promptly assume legal and physical custody of the Child and to pay for 
the Child’s support;5 and (iv) failure to terminate Father’s relationship with the Child 
would result in continued emotional instability or physical risk to the Child because 
Child had been in care for sixteen months, Father was not able to care for the Child 
because of Father’s incarceration, and the Child had been in the care of a foster 
family that was an adoptive resource for more than a year.6  The Family Court next 
found that DFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.  Finally, the 
Family Court considered the best interest factors under 13 Del. C. § 722 and found, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights was in the 
Child’s best interests. 
                                                 
2 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). 
3 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a.1. 
4 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a.3. 
5 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a.4. 
6 Id. § 1103(a)(5)a.5. 
 
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(11) On appeal, this Court reviews the Family Court’s factual and legal 
determinations as well as its inferences and deductions.7  We will not disturb the 
Family Court’s rulings if the court’s findings of fact are supported by the record and 
result from an orderly and logical deductive process.8  We review legal rulings de 
novo.9  If the Family Court correctly applied the law, then our standard of review is 
abuse of discretion.10 
(12) The statutory procedure for terminating parental rights requires two 
separate inquiries.11  First, the Family Court must determine whether the evidence 
presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.12  Second, the Family 
Court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests 
of the child.13  Both of these requirements must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.14  After careful consideration of the parties’ positions and the 
record on appeal, we conclude that there is ample evidence supporting the Family 
Court’s termination of Father’s parental rights.  There was no error or abuse of 
discretion by the Family Court. 
                                                 
7 Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 41 A.3d 367, 370 (Del. 2012). 
8 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
9 Id. 
10 CASA v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66 (Del. 2003). 
11 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000). 
12 Id. at 537. See 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (listing the grounds for termination of parental rights). 
13 Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 537.  See 13 Del. C. § 722(a) (listing factors for consideration when 
determining the best interests of the child). 
14 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice