Title: Bonnell v. Lawrence

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

428 Nev, Advance Opinion 37
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

FRANCIE A. BONNELL, | No. 56542

‘ein FILED

SABRINA D. LAWRENCE AND
STEVEN LAWRENCE, AUG 89 2012
Respondents.

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a complaint
seeking relief from a judgment by independent action pursuant to NRCP
60(by's savings clause. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Michael Villani, Judge.

Affirmed,
Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and Carol L. Harris and J. Randall Jones,
Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC and James A. Kohl, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

BEFORE CHERRY, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

‘This is an appeal from an order dismissing an independent

action to obtain relief from an otherwise unreviewable final judgment.

JA 25083

 
orn

 

Such an action will lie only when needed to prevent a grave miscarriage of
justice, Because the allegations and record in this case do not meet this
demanding standard, we affirm.

 

‘This is the second of two lawsuits brought by appellant
Francie Bonnell against her daughter and son-in-law, respondents
Sabrina and Steven Lawrence, The first suit ended in summary judgment
against Bonnell. The second suit underlies this appeal. In it, Bonnell
secks to undo the summary judgment in the first suit, along with its
associated feo award.

‘This family stand-off traces back to a $135,000 payment that
Bonnell made to retire the mortgage debt on her daughter's home
(sometimes called “the Lindell premises"). Bonnell saw the payment as an
advance on what her daughter would eventually inherit anyway, but with
a catch: She expected, in return, a life estate in the Lindell premises,
allowing her to live in the home, rent-free, for the rest of her life. The

 

daughter acknowledges the $135,000 payment. However, she viewed it as
a loan—which she and her husband repaid when they deeded Bonnell a
different home (the Arbor premises) with equity of $135,000+. No writing
memorializes the agreement, if indeed there was one.

In her first suit, Bonnell asserted a variety of legal and
equitable claims, all premised on her claimed life estate in the Lindell
premises, After 14 months of litigation, Bonnell’s lawyer withdrew,
leaving her to proceed in proper person. Not long after, the Lawrences,
who have had counsel throughout, moved for summary judgment. Their
motion was supported by, among other documents, Sabrina Lawrence's
affidavit. The affidavit lays out the parties’ competing views of the
$135,000 payment (Bonnell alleges “she has an unwritten life estate in the

2

 
 

[Lindell] premises’ that she “claims she received...in exchange for
$135,000 that she gave Sabrina to pay off an existing mortgage on the
Lindell premises’; the Lawrences maintain that the $135,000 was a “loan”
they “repaid . .. when [Bonnell] received a $135,000 credit on the purchase
of the Arbor Premises.”). It also discloses that, for a time, Bonnell lived
rent-free in the Lindell premises

Bonnell received the motion for summary judgment, but

 

e
did not file a written opposition to it, and it was granted by written order.
In the order, the district judge determined that Bonnell’s claims were
“meritless” because they were based on a fully repaid loan; he further held
that the statute of frauds, NRS 111,205, defeated Bonnell's oral life estate
claim, Additional motion practice followed, in which Bonnell represented
herself, whereby the Lawrences recovered their attorney fees and costs.
Bonnell received written notice of entry of the summary judgment and foe
award, She neither moved for reconsideration under NRCP 59 or relief
from judgment under NRCP 60(b), nor appealed.

More than a year later, Bonnell obtained new counsel, who
filed this second suit on her behalf, Although filed in the same judicial
district and repeating the claims in the first suit, the second suit went toa
new district court judge. Attaching excerpts from the summary judgment
record in the first suit as exhibits, the second-suit complaint acknowledges
that the prior summary judgment ordinarily would preclude Bonnell from
suing again on the same claims, Nonetheless, Bonnell alleges that she can
proceed by “independent action pursuant to Rule 60(b)” to vacate the prior
judgment because the Lawrences obtained it when she was between
lawyers and unfairly exploited her unrepresented status. Specifically,
Bonnell alleges that the Lawrences gave her faulty notice of the summary

 

 
judgment hearing, which prevented her from orally opposing the motion.
She further alleges, “A meritorious defense [i.e., the doctrine of ‘partial
performance'] exists to [the Lawrences'] argument that NRS 111.205
defeats (Bonnell’s] claim to a life estate in the Lindell Property, and the
interests of justice demand that this issue be litigated on the merits.”

‘The Lawrences moved to dismiss the second suit for failure to
state a claim under NRCP 12(b)(5). They argued that res judicata’ bars
relitigation of Bonnell’ claims and that, to the extent Bonnell identified

 

grounds for avoiding the prior summary judgment, she could and should
have assorted them by motion under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3) within the six-
month deadline specified in the rule, Bonnell countered that
“misrepresentation [and/Jor other misconduct of the adverse party” can

serve as the basis for either a motion or an independent action for relief

 

from judgment and that, since an independent action is not subject to
NRCP 60(b)'s time limits on motions, she deserves to proceed past the
pleadings.

‘The district court credited the Lawrences’ arguments, rejected
Bonnell’s, and dismissed the second suit with prejudice. Bonnell timely
appeals,

1g
Some background is helpful to place the issues presented by

this appeal in context. Rule 60(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure

Mn Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1051-56, 194
P.3d 709, 711-14 (2008), we replaced res judicata terminology with claim
and issue preclusion. Addressing affirmative defenses, NRCP 8(c) retains
res judicata terminology, which the parties used in briefing this matter,

 

 
0 100 Be

 

is modeled on Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
written before the latter’s amendment in 2007. See NC-DSH, Inc. v.
Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 650-51 nn.1 & 2, 218 P.3d 853, 856 nn.1 & 2 (2009).
Like its federal counterpart, NRCP 60(b) permits relief from judgment by
motion or by independent action. Addressing motions, the rule specifies
both the permissible grounds, see NRCP 60(b)(1).(6)? and the time
deadlines that apply, see NRCP 60(b) (a motion under Rule 60(b) “shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (8) not more
than 6 months after... written notice of entry of the judgment or order
was served"), The rule's reference to relief by independent action, by
contrast, provides no specifics. It appears in a “savings clause,” which
states only: “This rule [i.e,, NRCP 60(b)] does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,

order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.”

 

Bonnell bases her independent action on “misrepresentation

or other misconduct of an adverse party"—recognized grounds for relief

2NRCP 60(b) provides as grounds for relief by motion: “(1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; or, (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that an injunction should have prospective application.” ‘These track the
grounds for relief by motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), except that
Nevada omits the “catchall” provision in Fed. R. Civ, P. 60(b\6), which
allows “any other reason that justifies relief” as a basis for a Federal Rule
60() motion, Nevada also shortens the time limit for bringing a motion
for reasons (1) through (3) from one year to six months.

 

 
os

 

from judgment by motion under NRCP 60(b)(3)° However, despite
knowing about the judgment, Bonnell did not timely pursue motion-based
relief under NRCP 60(b)(8). Because NRCP 60(by's text makes its time
deadlines applicable only to motions, not independent actions, see Nevada
Industrial Dev. v, Benedetti, 103 Nev. 360, 365, 741 P.2d 802, 805 (1987)
C[thhe only time limitations on independent actions under Rule 60() are

 

laches or a relevant state of limitations"), Bonnell argues that she can

 

proceed by independent action to set aside the summary judgment and

In essence, Bonnell argues that a

 

associated foe award, despite her del

 

litigant who seeks relief from a final judgment but lets the time for doing
80 by motion under NRCP 60(b}(1)-(3) expire, can do so by independent
action, so long as she alleges facts that might qualify for motion-based
rolief under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3).

But this is not the law. “Resort to an independent action may
bo had only rarely, and then only under unusual and exceptional
circumstances.” 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2868, at 397-98 (2d ed. 1995). To
obtain relief by independent action after a judgment has become final and
otherwise unreviewable, a claimant must meet the traditional
requirements of such an equitable action, which are considerably more
exacting than required for relief by motion under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3)-+

“Bonnell argues on appeal that the facts might also support relief
based on mistake. We do not address this argument because it was not
made to the district court. Old Aztec Mine, Inc, v, Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52,
623 P.2d 981, 983 (198)).

‘The classic formulation of the pre-Civil Rules requirements for an
action in equity seeking relief from judgment appears in National Surety
continued on next page

 

 
 

Furthermore, “under the Rule, an independent action [is] available only to
prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Beggerly, 524
U.S. 38, 47 (1998). This is a “demanding standard,” id., that Bonnell’s
allegations of overreaching and legal error do not nearly approach.
A

We review the district court’s order of dismissal under the
standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment, because the
Lawrences’ motion to dismiss, like Bonnell’s complaint, attached excerpts
from the first-suit record that the district court considered without

=. continued

Co, v, State Bank, 120 F, 593, 599 (8th Cir. 1903), quoted in 11 Wright,
Miller & Kane, supra, § 2868, at 397:

‘The indispensable elements of such a cause of

action are (1) a judgment which ought not, in

equity and good conscience, to be enforced; (2) a

good defense to the alleged cause of action on

which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident,

or mistake which prevented the [party seeking to

undo} the judgment from obtaining the benefit of

his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence

on the part of [said party]; and (5) the absence of

any adequate remedy at law.
Nevada's pre-Civil Rules formulation is similar. See, eg., Royce v.
Hampton, 16 Nev. 25, 30 (1881) (“To entitle a party to relief from a
judgment or decree, it must be made evident that he had a defense upon
the merits; and that such defense has been lost to him, without such loss
being attributable to his own omission, neglect, or default. The loss of a
defense, to justify a court of equity in removing a judgment, must, in all
cases, be occasioned by the fraud or act of the prevailing party, or by
mistake or accident on the part of the losing party, unmixed with any fault
of himself or his agent.” (quoting Freeman on Judgments § 486))..

 
cn Be

   
 
    
   
   
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  

objection. See Witherow v. State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, 123 Nev. 305,
3808, 167 P.3d 408, 409 (2007) (when the district court considers outside
matters in deciding a motion to dismiss, this court reviews the disposition
“as if it (had) granted summary judgment”). The question remains,
though, whether our review is de novo, as Bonnell argues it should be, see
at 307-08, 167 P.3d at 409, or deferential, utilizing the “abuse of
discretion” standard that applies to an appeal from an order granting or
denying a motion for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(b), see
NC-DSH, 125 Nev. at 657 n.4, 218 P.3d at 860 n4, as the Lawrences
maintain,

‘This is not a case in which the aggrieved party returned to the
same judge who entered judgment to ask for relief from it. See Superior
Seafoods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 620 F.3d 873, 879 (Sth Cir. 2010)
(‘Application of the abuse-of-discretion standard is particularly
appropriate” when the same judge presided over the original and
succeeding independent action; this judge “not only had a front-row seat
for, and personal involvement in, the underlying matter” that produced
the targeted judgment, “but he expressly drew upon his personal
knowledge and stated in his ruling fon summary judgment in the
independent action] that he was not defrauded by any of the alleged
instances of malfeasance.”). Nor is this a case in which the district court
decided the equitable claim for relief from judgment on the merits after a
plenary hearing. Cf, Mitchell v, Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2011)
(because an independent action for relief from judgment “is an equitable
action, we would ordinarily review the district court’s decision for an
abuse of discretion”; nonetheless deciding, as a question of law, whether
the allegations in the independent action were sufficient, under Beggerly’s

 
 

ome

 

“demanding standard” of a “grave miscarriage of justice,” 524 U.S. at 47,
for the action to proceed). On the contrary, Bonnell brought this suit as an
independent action, before a new district court judge, who determined its
viability as a matter of law, on a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. In this setting, “de novo review clearly applies.” Herring v.
United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005).

Of note, applying review appropriate to summary judgment
does not lessen the “demanding” substantive law that applies to
independent actions seeking review from judgment. Id, The policy
supporting the finality of judgments recognizes that, “in most instances
society is best served by putting an end to litigation after a case has been
tried and judgment entered.” NC-DSH, 125 Nev. at 653, 218 P.3d at 858,
(quoting Hazel-Atlas Co, v. Hartford Co,, 322 US. 238, 244 (1944),
abrogated on other grounds by Standard Oil Co, of Cal, v. United States,
429 U.S. 17 (1976). Similar to a qualified immunity or other privilege
defense, the bar against relitigation of already-decided issues is, in
essence, “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation” and “should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in
.” Butler v, Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 458, 168 P.3d 1055, 1061 (2007)
(internal quotations omitted), “Summary judgment is appropriate when
[claim or] issue preclusion bars a claim,” Elyousef v, O'Reilly & Ferrario,
LLG, 126 Nev. _, _, 245 P.8d 547, 548 (2010),

B

‘The Supreme Court comprehensively reviewed Rule 60(b) in
its 1998 decision in United States v. Beggerly, focusing, in particular, on
the independent action for relief from judgment preserved by its “savings
clause.” As Beggerly notes, the 1946 amendments to Federal Rule 60(b)
expressly abolished ‘nearly all of the old forms of obtaining relief from a

litigatio

 

 

 

9

 
mes a

 

judgment, i.e., coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, bills of review,
and bills in the nature of review”; only “one of the old forms, i.e., the
‘independent action,’ still survived.” 524 U.S. at 45 (footnote omitted).
Because it was preserved by “savings clause,” not created by grant, Rule
60(b) did not specify the requirements for a viable independent action.
‘The Advisory Committee notes acknowledged, though, that the time limits
imposed on motions for relief for judgment did not apply to the
independent action preserved by Rule 60(by’s savings clause. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60 advisory committee's note (1946 amendment) (“If the right to
make a motion is lost by the expiration of the time limits fixed in these
rules, the only other procedural remedy is by a new or independent action
to set aside a judgment upon those principles which have heretofore been
applied in such an action.”), quoted in Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 45; accord

Pickett v. Comanche Construction, Inc., 108 Nev. 422, 426-27, 836 P.2d 42,
45 (1992),

Rule 60(b) thus contains an inherent dichotomy: “If relief may
be obtained through an independent action in a [routine] case ..., where
the most that may be charged against the [judgment vietor] is a failure to
furnish relevant information that would at best form the basis for a Rule
60(b\(3) motion, the strict 1-year [in Nevada,
motions would be set at naught.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46. Addressing
this dichotomy, Beggerly holds that “{iJndependent actions must, if Rule

 

month] time limit on such

60(b) is to be interpreted as a coherent whole, be reserved for those cases
of ‘injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to
demand a departure’ from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.”
Id, (quoting Hazel-Atlas Co,, 322 U.S. at 244), See also NC-DSH, 125 Nev.
at 654, 218 P.3d at 858 (upholding, under NRCP 60's savings clause, relief

 

10

 

 
eo

from judgment for “fraud upon the court” but limiting it to “that species of
fraud which does, or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself”;
rejecting argument that “fraud upon the court” means “any conduct of a
party or lawyer of which the court disapproves; among other evils, such a
formulation ‘would render meaningless the [time] limitation on motions
under [Rule] 60(bX3)" (alterations in original) (quoting Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1993); Kupferman v. Consolidated
Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.)).
“(Under the Rule, an independent action should be available only to
prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47.

The claimants in Beggerly sought relief by independent action
from a 12-year-old quiet-title judgment. They “allegeld) only that the
United States failed to ‘thoroughly search the records and make a full
disclosure to the Court regarding {an early land patent] grant,” that, had
it been disclosed before judgment, might have defeated the United States’
claim of superior title. Id. The Court deemed it “obvious” that the
Beggerly claimaints’ “allegations do not nearly approach (the] demanding
[grave-miscarriage-of-justice] standard.” Id, “Whether such a claim might
succeed under Rule 60(bX3),” the Court continued, “we need not now
decide; it surely would work no ‘grave miscarriage of justice,’ and perhaps
‘no miscarriage of justice at all, to allow the judgment to stand.” Jd, Thus,
the Court rejected the claimants’ independent action for relief from
judgment and reversed the court of appeals decision allowing the action to
set aside the judgment to proceed.

GQ

Bonnell’s allegations do not establish a basis for an
independent action for relief from judgment. Her claim is that the
Lawrences and/or their lawyer committed “misconduct and/or

a

 

 
misrepresentation” that led the first district judge into legal error when
they invoked NRS 111.205, Nevada's statute of frauds, as grounds for
summary judgment but failed to acknowledge—or ask the district court to
consider—that partial performance might defeat the statute’s application,
She also asserts that the motion practice leading to entry of summary
judgment against her in the first suit was flawed because she did not
receive proper notice of the hearing time.

These allegations do not meet the requirements of a
traditional equitable action for relief from judgment, much less Beggerly’s
“demanding standard” of a “grave miscarriage of justice.” As noted, supra
note 4, the equitable action for relief from judgment was traditionally
available to redress “fraud or act of the prevailing party, or ... mistake or
accident on the part of the losing party, unmixed with any fault of himself
or his agent,” Royce, 16 Nev. at 30 (quotation omitted); in adi
losing party had to show that she did not have an adequate remedy at law

 

jon, the

and that the judgment “ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be
enforced.” National Surety, 120 F. at 599, Under these standards, “a
party's failure voluntarily to disclose to the court or to his adversary the
weakness of his own case or defense [was not considered] justification for
vacating a judgment.” Villalon v, Bowen, 70 Nev. 456, 467, 278 P.2d 409,
414 (1954) (dictum).

Bonnell had legal remedies available, moreover, that she
neglected. When she received notice of entry of the summary judgment,
she had the right to move within 10 days for a new trial and/or to alter or
amend the judgment under NRCP 59; the right to file within 30 days a
notice of appeal under NRAP 4(a)(1); and arguably the right to move for

relief from judgment based on excusable neglect or “misrepresentation or

 

 
 

other misconduct of an adverse party” within six months under NRCP
60(bX(1) and (3). We recognize that Bonnell was self-represented during
these time periods and that, in the summary judgment setting at least,
lack of explanation to a proper person litigant as to what is required to
defeat a properly supported summary judgment has been held in some

Vital v. Interfaith

  

Jurisdictions to be error cognizable on direct appeal, see
‘Medical Center, 168 F.8d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1999); but ef. King v. Cartli
121 Nev. 926, 928, 124 P.3d 1161, 1163 (2005).

‘Nonetheless, while Bonnell alleges confusion as to the time for
the summary judgment hearing, for which she blames the Lawrences and
their lawyer, she does not allege that misconduct by them, personal
incapacity, or other extenuating circumstance excuses her failure to act
after summary judgment was entered, while her post-judgment motion
and appeal times ran, Cf, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 72 (1982)
(incapacity plus lack of representation may provide a basis to avoid a
judgment). Fundamental rules governing the finality of judgments
“cannot be applied differently merely because a party not learned in the
Jaw is acting pro se.” Raymond J. German, Ltd, v. Brossart, 816 N.W.2d
47, __ (N.D. 2012) (quoting MeWethy v, MeWethy, 366 N.W.2d 796, 798
(ND. 1985)); Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Even
pro se litigants must follow the rules.”); see Vanisi v, State, 117 Nev. 330,
340, 22 P.3d 1164, 1171 (2001) (party proceeding proper person in a
criminal case must comply with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law).

Finally, and most fundamentally, Bonnell alleged nothing that
suggests that allowing the prior summary judgment to stand works a

“grave miscarriage of justice.” While the Lawrences did not make

13.

 

 
 

Bonnell’s legal argument for her, they did disclose, through Sabrina
Lawrence's affidavit, the facts on which Bonnell might establish a partial-
performance defense to the statute of frauds. Thus, the Lawrence
affidavit acknowledged both Bonnell’s $135,000 payment and the fact that
Bonnell had lived, rent-free, in the Lindell premises for a time after
making it,

What Bonnell is arguing, therefore, is legal error: that she had
 partial-performance argument that might have defeated summary
judgment that the Lawrences did not suggest to the first judge. Bonnell’s
chances of success with this argument are not as great as she seems to
assume, Compare Zunino v, Paramore, 83 Nev, 506, 509, 435 P.2d 196,
197 (1967) (partial performance will not overcome the statute of frauds

 

unless “proved by some extraordinary measure or quantum of evidence”),

with Anderson v, Liberty Lobby, Inc,, 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (“in ruling
ww the evidence

 

on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden”), and
Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev, 724, 781, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005)
(adopting Liberty Lobby and Celotex Corp, v, Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986)). Even assuming Bonnell had a partial-performance defense to the
statute of frauds, the most that can be said in terms of its nondisclosure’s
impact on the summary judgment is that legal error may have occurred in
the first suit. If so, Bonnell’s remedy was by timely NRCP 59 motion or
appeal, Misty Management v. District Ct., 83 Nev. 180, 182, 426 P.2d 728,
729 (1967), not independent action for relief from judgment. Mitchell, 651
F.3d at 599 (a party's claim of prior legal error does not involve a “grave
miscarriage of justice” such that “enforcement of the judgment would be

manifestly unconscionable or (present such] unusual and exceptional

 

 
os

 

circumstances” to merit disturbing the judgment’s finality, especially
where the party “failed to raise his claim at earlier available
opportunities”).

D

Citing two pre-Beggerly decisions, Pickett_v. Comanche
Construction, Inc., 108 Nev. at 426-27, 836 P.2d at 45, and Nevada
Industrial Development v. Benedetti, 103 Nev. at 364, 741 P.2d at 805,
Bonnell argues that she can overcome the preclusive effect of the prior
summary judgment and her delay because she is proceeding by
independent action, not by motion. She over-reads both decisions. In
Pickett, relief by independent action was allowed in favor of nonparties to
the underlying action who did not have notice of the judgment adversely
affecting them until the time for post-judgment motions and appeal had
passed. And Benedetti was a suit for restitutionary relief from a
stipulated judgment calculated on the basis of a mutual mathematical
mistake, Despite the broad language in these cases, neither holds, as
Bonnell argues, that relief from judgment is available by independent
action without regard to the grounds asserted therefor and the failure to
have pursued other adequate legal remedies.

mL.

For these reasons, we conclude that nothing in the record of
the first or second suit or the pleadings suggests the threat of a “grave
miscarriage of justice” needed to sustain an independent action for relief
after all available avenues for legal relief were bypassed. Our disposition
also obviates Bonnell's further argument that leave should have been

15

 
given to amend the complaint, for such amendment would have been
futile,
Accordingly, we affirm.

Pickering

We concur:

bua Ca.

Cherry

[Need J

Hardesty