Title: State v. Davis

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  OCTOBER 2, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
	v.
CORNELIUS KEY DAVIS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 96051015; CA A106019; SC S49523)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 11, 2003.
	Andy Simrin, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.  On the petition for review were Ingrid A.
MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, and David E. Groom, Acting
Executive Director.
	Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
	DURHAM, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Linn County Circuit Court, Daniel R. Murphy, Judge. 181 Or App 467, 46 P3d 229 (2002).
	**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	DURHAM, J.
	In this criminal case, defendant challenges his
conviction for murder, ORS 163.115.  He contends that the trial
court erred in excluding certain statements that the victim made
more than two months before her death.  According to defendant,
the statements supported his factual theory that the victim had
committed suicide. (1)  The trial court determined that the
statements were not relevant to the victim's state of mind at the
time of the shooting and, therefore, were not admissible.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed that decision without an opinion. 
State v. Davis, 181 Or App 467, 46 P3d 229 (2002).  On review, we
conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the statements
and that that error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
	The record discloses the following facts.  On January
14, 1999, a jury convicted defendant of the murder of the victim. 
The victim died on May 7, 1996, from a single gunshot wound to
the center of her forehead.  Defendant and the victim had had an
"on again, off again" relationship from 1992 until the victim's
death.  During his relationship with the victim, defendant was
married to Davis, with whom he also had had an "on again, off
again" relationship.  Defendant also had intimate relationships
with other women during that time.  
	Defendant and the victim had three children together,
including a son who died in April 1996 from sudden infant death
syndrome.  Shortly after the death of their son, defendant moved
out of the apartment that he had shared with the victim and moved
in with his friend Ward.  At about the same time, defendant began
an intimate relationship with Hoffman, who lived with him
sporadically at Ward's townhouse.
	On May 7, 1996, defendant and Ward invited several
people to a party at Ward's townhouse.  During the evening, the
victim arrived and confronted defendant about their relationship. 
Defendant went upstairs.  After retrieving a gun that defendant
intended to trade for drugs that night, defendant entered an
upstairs bathroom.  The victim followed him.  A short while
later, witnesses in the house heard what sounded like a door
slamming.  The victim suffered the fatal gunshot wound to the
forehead while in the bathroom.  Defendant then proceeded
downstairs and asked everyone to leave.  The only witnesses to
the shooting were defendant and the victim. 
	Defendant and his brother disposed of the victim's body
in a remote location.  Aided by Ward, they also cleaned Ward's
townhouse in an attempt to cover up the victim's death.  After
the discovery of the victim's body, and an investigation, the
state charged defendant with murder, ORS 163.115, and felon in
possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270.
	The disputed factual issue at defendant's trial was
whether defendant shot the victim or whether the victim shot
herself.  Defendant testified that, while in the bathroom, he had
told the victim that their relationship was over and that he had
"replaced" her.  He further testified that the victim then
grabbed the gun, which was lying near the sink, and, after
pointing it at him, turned the gun on herself and fired.  The
state presented evidence supporting its theory that defendant
shot the victim.
Before the trial, the state had appealed an order of
the trial court excluding evidence of defendant's prior acts of
violence towards the victim and statements that defendant and the
victim made during and regarding those incidents.  The trial
court had excluded the evidence under OEC 404(3) (2) and OEC 802. (3) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
State v. Davis, 156 Or App 117, 967 P2d 485 (1998) (Davis I). 
The court held that evidence of defendant's prior abuse of the
victim was not relevant to whether he had shot her with a gun on
May 7, 1996.  Id. at 125.  However, the court concluded that
certain evidence concerning events in March 1996 and thereafter
was admissible because it "could be relevant to prove that
defendant had a motive to kill [the victim] in May 1996."  Id. at
126.  Neither party sought review of that decision of the Court
of Appeals in this court.
	On remand, the trial court admitted the evidence that
the Court of Appeals had determined was relevant to show
defendant's motive.  The state then sought to exclude evidence
that defendant claimed would support his factual theory that the
victim had committed suicide.  That evidence consisted of
statements that the victim had made more than a month before her
death.  The state argued that the court should exclude those
statements because they were "too remote to be relevant and would
unduly prejudice a jury."  Relying on the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, the trial court granted the state's motion in part and
excluded evidence of statements that the victim had made before
March 1996.  The trial court ruled:
		"The court allows part 2 of the State's Motion to
Exclude Evidence (Evidence of victim's state of mind)
to the extent such evidence consists of events
occurring prior to March 1996.  * * *  Evidence prior
to March 1996 of the conduct of a witness to prove
intent, plan or otherwise under OEC 404 is too remote
in time for its probative value, if any, to outweigh
its prejudicial effect." 
	During trial, defendant submitted ten separate offers
of proof regarding evidence of statements that the victim had
made before March 1996 to one or another of four witnesses.  We
summarize below the contested evidence that defendant offered
according to the offer of proof number assigned at trial. (4)
	Offer of Proof #1:  Heidt, a friend of defendant, would
have testified that, in December 1992, following a miscarriage,
the victim stated that "she didn't know if she could continue
going without [defendant]" and that "she didn't know if she could
go on."
	Offer of Proof #3:  VanDehey, a woman with whom
defendant had cohabited between the summer of 1992 and December
1993, would have testified that, during the time of her
cohabitation with defendant, the victim had stated that she would
kill herself because of defendant's other relationships and that,
if she could not be with defendant, then she would kill herself
and defendant "would be sorry for it."
	Offer of Proof #4:  VanDehey would have testified that,
between 1992 and 1993, the victim would claim every month that
she was pregnant and had had a miscarriage, and that the victim
had stated that she was taking medication for depression.
	Offer of Proof #5:  VanDehey would have testified that
the victim "was always threatening to kill herself if she
couldn't have [defendant]."
	Offer of Proof #6:  VanDehey would have testified as to
the contents of a letter that she claimed that the victim wrote
in November 1993.  In the letter, the victim made several
statements about not wanting to lose defendant and that she
thought that she should just disappear.
	Offer of Proof #7:  Cariati, a former girlfriend of
defendant, would have testified that, between December 1992 and
May 1993, the victim had stated that defendant was hers and
Cariati could not have him, and that the victim threatened to
kill herself.  
	Offer of Proof #8:  Davis, defendant's wife, would have
testified that, between late 1993 and early 1994, she and the
victim would get into physical altercations, during which the
victim would state that defendant was hers and that it was "time
to settle this."
	Offer of Proof #9:  Davis would have testified that, in
1994, the victim left a note for defendant that stated that their
son was in the hospital dying and that defendant should go to the
hospital before the son died.
	Offer of Proof #10:  Davis would have testified (1)
that, in April 1995, the victim stated that defendant was hers
and, although it was not true, that the victim and defendant were
engaged and that she had asked her mother for money so that
defendant could divorce Davis; (2) that, in 1995, the victim
stated that if she could not have defendant, no one could; and
(3) that the victim had stated that defendant could not take her
son with Davis and that she would "kill him first."
	The trial court excluded all the proffered evidence,
ruling that 
		"* * * I think it is pretty clear that both --
that based on the Court of Appeals' decision in State
v. Davis, that none of this evidence would be
admissible because of its age.  It's all too old.  It
all occurred before March 1996.  At least that ruling
would be consistent with what the Court of Appeals
ruled, even though the Court of Appeals didn't address
all these statements, and so absent anything new or
additional, that's the ruling of the Court."  
	As noted, the jury convicted defendant of murder and
felon in possession of a firearm.  Defendant appealed his murder
conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding the
proffered evidence of the victim's statements.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed, and this court allowed defendant's petition for
review.
	On review, we first address whether the evidence that
defendant sought to introduce was relevant under OEC 401.  That
rule provides:  
		"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
OEC 401 provides a "very low threshold" for the admission of
evidence, that is, "evidence is relevant so long as it increases
or decreases, even slightly, the probability of the existence of
a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action."  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 238, 986 P2d 5 (1999),
cert den, 528 US 1086 (2000).  We review a trial court's
determination of relevance under OEC 401 for error of law.  State
v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, 982 P2d 1133 (1999).  
Defendant argues that the evidence showing that the
victim, for years before her death, was obsessed with defendant
and threatened to kill herself because of their relationship was
related to the victim's state of mind and relevant to prove
defendant's factual claim that she committed suicide in May 1996. 
The state now concedes that the evidence in defendant's nine
offers of proof, described above, was relevant to the question
whether the victim committed suicide and that evidence of the
victim's statements fell within the "state of mind" exception to
the hearsay rule, OEC 803(3). (5)  The state's concession, which we
accept, obviates the need for this court to decide whether all
the evidence in defendant's nine offers of proof was relevant and
satisfied the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule, or
whether any of the proffered evidence was vulnerable to any other
evidentiary objection.  On the basis of the state's concession,
we assume that the evidence offered in defendant's nine offers of
proof was admissible and that the trial court committed legal
error in concluding otherwise.
		Nevertheless, the state asserts that the trial court
ultimately did not err, because the court properly excluded the
victim's statements based on considerations listed in OEC 403. 
That rule provides:
		"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
The state argues that the trial court determined that the
evidence was unfairly prejudicial and needlessly cumulative, and
that this court cannot reverse that ruling unless it amounts to
an abuse of discretion.
After reviewing the record, we do not agree with the
state's characterization of the trial court's rulings.  The court
stated in its letter opinion that the evidence "is too remote in
time for its probative value, if any, to outweigh its prejudicial
effect."  However, that court never ruled that defendant's
proffered evidence was "unfairly prejudicial" or "needlessly
cumulative," nor did it rule that the evidence ought to be
excluded under OEC 403. (6)  Further, the trial court's express
reliance on Davis I, in which the Court of Appeals determined
that older evidence offered by the state was irrelevant,
demonstrates that the trial court was concerned about the
relevance of defendant's proffered evidence, not whether the
court should exclude it based on a consideration set out in OEC
403.  We will not speculate about how the trial court could have
exercised its discretion under OEC 403 if it had chosen to do so. 
See Titus, 328 Or at 480 n 1 (refusing to speculate about how
trial court could have exercised its discretion under OEC 403);
Macy v. Blatchford, 330 Or 444, 455, 8 P3d 204 (2000)
(disagreeing that trial court made OEC 403 ruling when court did
not do so expressly, although it labeled evidence as "highly
inflammatory" and "prejudicial").
		Having decided that the trial court erred in excluding
the victim's statements made before March 1996, we now must
decide whether that error requires that we reverse and remand the
case for a new trial.  The state argues that reversal is
unnecessary here because, even if the trial court erred in
excluding the proffered statements of the victim, the error was a
"harmless error."
		The phrase "harmless error" is a shorthand reference to
a legal standard, discussed below, that the Oregon Constitution
requires this court to apply after determining in an appeal or on
review that a trial court has erred.  "Harmless error" is not a
phrase that appears in the Oregon Constitution, nor is it an
entirely accurate descriptor of the legal analysis that the
constitution requires.  
		Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution states the standard that governs whether this court
must affirm a conviction, despite the occurrence of legal error
during the trial.  That provision, which the voters adopted by
initiative in 1910, provides in part:
	"If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after
consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that
the judgment of the court appealed from was such as
should have been rendered in the case, such judgment
shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed
during the trial[.]" 
	Under that provision, this court must affirm a
judgment, despite any error committed at trial, if, after
considering all the matters submitted, the court is of the
opinion that the judgment "was such as should have been rendered
in the case."  However, the constitutional provision does not
describe how this court should determine whether the judgment was
one that the trial court should have rendered.  This court has
discussed in prior cases the analysis that it will follow in
conducting that inquiry.  However, as we discuss below, our cases
have not described that analysis in a consistent manner. 
	In State v. McLean, 255 Or 464, 468 P2d 521 (1970),
this court examined Article VII (Amended), section 3, and stated: 


		"We hold, however, in accordance with the terms
and purposes of * * * the constitutional provision,
that in a case in which, despite some conflict in the
testimony, there is substantial and convincing evidence
of guilt and the error, if any, was either so technical
in nature or so unsubstantial that this court can
affirmatively find, as a practical matter, that there
was 'little, if any, likelihood of having changed the
result of the trial',6 this court may then, in its
discretion, exercise its power to affirm the verdict
and judgment of the trial court, notwithstanding the
existence of such error."
		"6 See Chapman v. California, 386 US 18 at 22, 87
S Ct 824, 17 L ed 2d 705 (1967), as also quoted from
above."
Id. at 478-79. 
		In 1973, this court revisited the statement from
McLean, quoted above, and corrected two potentially misleading
inferences in the statement, neither of which is pertinent here. 
State v. Van Hooser, 266 Or 19; 23, 511 P2d 359 (1973).  The Van
Hooser court then stated:
		"In McLean we laid down two requirements for
affirmance despite error: (1) that there was
substantial and convincing evidence of guilt; and (2)
that the error committed was very unlikely to have
changed the result of the trial.  While in McLean we
were of the opinion that these were a composite of the
requirements of both the amendment and the statute we
believe that they are reasonable criteria to use in
complying with the constitutional mandate." 
Id. at 25-26 (footnote omitted).
	The foregoing statement indicates that this court in
Van Hooser reconsidered and revised its analysis of Article VII
(Amended), section 3, in McLean, and condensed, in a two-part
test, the "reasonable criteria" that McLean had indicated were
appropriate for use in complying with the mandate of that
constitutional provision. (7)  Neither McLean nor Van Hooser,
however, explained whether or how the two criteria should
interact.  And, in regard to the first criterion (i.e., whether
the evidence of guilt is substantial and convincing), neither
case explained how the court should engage in that determination
or whether that criterion had any basis in or was a response to
any of the text of Article VII (Amended), section 3.
	This court turned to those issues in State v. Hansen,
304 Or 169, 743 P2d 157 (1987).  The court in Hansen quoted OEC
103(1) and acknowledged that the court had held that an error at
trial does not affect a substantial right of a criminal defendant
under that rule of evidence if there is (1) substantial and
convincing evidence of guilt and (2) little likelihood that the
error affected the verdict.  Id. at 180 (citing State v. Miller,
300 Or 203, 220-21, 709 P2d 225 (1985)).  The Hansen court also
stated that that interpretation of OEC 103(1) "is consistent with
the standard for reversible error set forth in Article VII
(Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution."  Id.  The
Hansen court then stated:
	"Although this court has in the past analyzed these two
criteria separately, see, e.g., State v. Van Hooser,
266 Or 19, 25-27, 511 P2d 359 (1973), there is no
justification for doing so, because it is apparent that
the constitutional and statutory standards are fully
expressed by the second criterion. Whether there was
substantial and convincing evidence of guilt is not the
issue; the issue is whether the error was likely to
have affected the result.  Of course, the less
substantial the evidence of guilt, the more likely it
is that an error affected the result, but that is an
additional reason not to bifurcate the standard so as
to require two independent inquiries."  
Id. at 180.
	The Hansen court, in unmistakable terms, eliminated the
first of the two criteria from Van Hooser as an independent
consideration in the court's application of Article VII
(Amended), section 3.  Instead, the court held, the only
appropriate criterion in the application of that constitutional
provision is whether the error was likely to have affected the
result.  In part due to that determination in Hansen, this court,
in several cases that involved widely varying examples of
asserted trial error, has held that a trial error required a new
trial despite the presence of other evidence of guilt that one
might characterize as substantial and convincing.  See, e.g.,
State v. Joslin, 332 Or 373, 387-88, 29 P3d 1112 (2001)
(reversing when trial court erred in refusing to suppress
evidence that strengthened state's refutation of insanity
defense; "In light of that determination, even if there were
substantial and convincing evidence of defendant's guilt, we
cannot say that there was little, if any, likelihood that the
error in denying defendant's motion to suppress affected the
verdict."); State v. Kitzman, 323 Or 589, 613-15, 920 P2d 134
(1996) (competing inferences regarding whether erroneous
admission of hearsay testimony was harmful to defendant presented
"a close case.  On balance, we are unable to hold that there is
little likelihood that the error in admitting M's hearsay
statements at trial affected the verdict as to the charges
involving L and L2."); State v. Langley, 314 Or 511, 518, 840 P2d
691 (1992) (citing Hansen for harmless error standard; "Even
though there was substantial and convincing evidence on which a
reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty of the
Rockenbrant murder without the evidence of the Gray murder, we
cannot say that there was little likelihood that the error in
admitting other crime's evidence, so pervasive in this trial,
affected the verdict.  * * *  The extensive reliance by the state
on the Gray murder in this trial could have affected the verdict
and, therefore, was not harmless."); State v. Isom, 306 Or 587,
596, 761 P2d 524 (1988) (trial court erred in admitting
defendant's statements that he deserved maximum penalty;
"Although the state's case against defendant is strong even in
the absence of defendant's statements, we cannot say that there
was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict.").   
	Unfortunately, during the same period of time in which
this court decided the foregoing cases, a few of this court's
decisions that have discussed the application of Article VII
(Amended), section 3, have cited and quoted pre-Hansen
formulations of the constitutional test, including the bifurcated
criteria that Hansen expressly modified.  In State v. Walton, 311
Or 223, 230, 809 P2d 81 (1991), for example, the court quoted
both the Hansen single-criterion formulation and the bifurcated
two-part formulation from Miller and Van Hooser.  Moreover,
contrary to the message in Hansen, the court in Walton purported
to examine the record and concluded "that there is substantial
and convincing evidence of defendant's guilt in the record as a
whole * * *."  Id. at 231.  
	One later case, citing Walton, repeated the bifurcated
test for affirmance despite error, but stated:
		"Although we discuss 'harmless error' in a two-pronged analysis, it is equally permissible to truncate
that analysis into a single test, viz., 'whether there
is 'little likelihood' that [a particular error] * * *
'affected the verdict.''"
State v. Parker, 317 Or 225, 234 n 10, 855 P2d 636 (1993)
(alteration in original) (citing, without explanation, dissenting
opinion that, in turn, cited Hansen).
	Despite those erroneous references to the bifurcated
criteria that Van Hooser had discussed, we reiterate that, in
light of Hansen, Oregon's constitutional test for affirmance
despite error consists of a single inquiry:  Is there little
likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict?  The
correct focus of the inquiry regarding affirmance despite error
is on the possible influence of the error on the verdict
rendered, not whether this court, sitting as a fact-finder, would
regard the evidence of guilt as substantial and compelling.
	In determining whether the error affected the verdict,
it is necessary that we review the record.  However, in so doing,
we do not determine, as a fact-finder, whether the defendant is
guilty.  That inquiry would invite this court to engage
improperly in weighing the evidence and, essentially, retrying
the case, while disregarding the error committed at trial, to
determine whether the defendant is guilty.  Rather, when we
review the record, we do so in light of the error at issue.  We
ask whether there was little likelihood that the error affected
the jury's verdict.  We recognize that, if the particular issue
to which the error pertains has no relationship to the jury's
determination of its verdict, then there is little likelihood
that the error affected the verdict.  However, that is not a
finding about how the court views the weight of the evidence of
the defendant's guilt.  It is a legal conclusion about the likely
effect of the error on the verdict.
	Returning to our analysis of this case, the question is
whether, after we review the record, we can say that there was
little likelihood that the erroneous exclusion of the witness
statements affected the jury's verdict.  We conclude that we
cannot.
	We consider first the nature of the error that occurred
below.  Here, the trial court erred in refusing to admit into
evidence certain statements by witnesses about the victim and her
statements about defendant.  Defendant offered the statements
into evidence to support his factual theory:  the victim was so
obsessed with defendant that, on hearing his rejection of their
relationship, she killed herself.				
	The context of the legal error also is significant. 
Although the ultimate issue under Article VII (Amended), section
3, will not vary -- i.e., whether there was little likelihood
that the error affected the verdict -- the court's analysis under
that provision of the effect of an error may vary depending on
the context of the error in question, such as error in admission
of evidence, jury instructions, or other matters of trial
procedure.  To repeat what may be obvious, the error here
occurred during a criminal trial in which the state had the
burden to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant had no burden of proof.  Defendant's objective in
offering the statements was to induce the jury to conclude that
reasonable doubt existed about defendant's guilt.  As we discuss
below, nothing about the context of the legal error here
indicates that the jury, in deciding whether the state had
carried its burden of proof, would have regarded the excluded
evidence as duplicative or unhelpful to its deliberations.
	The state points out that the court admitted at trial
other evidence of the victim's suicidal obsession with defendant
and, thus, argues that the excluded statements did not affect the
jury's assessment of defendant's version of events because they
were merely cumulative of the admitted evidence.  
	The state's argument pertains to the following evidence
that defendant offered and the court received into the
evidentiary record:  (1) Defendant's mother testified that, in
the month before the victim's death, the victim had stated that,
after her child's death, she did not think she could lose
defendant, that she did not think she could live without
defendant, and that, on the night of her death, she said that she
had to bring defendant home; (2) Heidt testified that,
immediately after the death of the victim's child, the victim
said that she wanted to die and that she did not want to go on;
and (3) Dr. Larsen, who conducted a post-mortem psychological
evaluation of the victim, testified about the content of the
victim's medical records, which indicated that the victim
suffered from depression and received antidepressant medication
in 1994 and 1996, but was not suicidal.  Defendant also
testified, and Hoffman corroborated, that the victim would call
defendant several times a day and would threaten Hoffman because
of Hoffman's relationship with defendant.
	Although some of the evidence described above indicates
that the victim was depressed and obsessed with defendant, we
cannot say that the excluded statements were merely cumulative of
that evidence.  The statements that defendant proffered were
qualitatively different than the evidence that the jury heard. 
Nothing in the admitted evidence expressly indicated that the
victim threatened to kill herself because of her relationship
with defendant.  Heidt testified that the victim said she wanted
to die.  However, the victim made that statement in reaction to
the recent death of her child.  The medical reports from 1994 and
1996, on which Dr. Larsen relied, did not include suicidal
threats and stated that the victim did not have suicidal
ideation.  The older excluded statements tended to show that the
victim's depression and suicidal obsession were long-term and
connected to her turbulent relationship with defendant.  By
contrast, the victim's recent statements occurred shortly after
her child's death and tended to show that she was suffering from
an understandable grief for her child and a general apathy about
life. 
	Finally, the excluded evidence goes directly to the
heart of defendant's factual theory of the case.  See State v.
Marrington, 335 Or 555, 566, 73 P3d 911 (2003) ("The victim's
delayed reporting was not a tangential issue, but a central
factual issue in this case.").  Defendant sought to show that the
victim was suicidal and obsessed with defendant and that, when
defendant rejected her, she shot herself.  The evidence at issue
here potentially was influential because it tended to complete
the picture of defendant's version of the events.  Defendant was
entitled to prove his theory of the case by presenting relevant,
admissible evidence to the jury.  We cannot say, on the record
before us, that there was little likelihood that the erroneous
exclusion of the victim's statements made before March 1996
affected the jury's verdict.  The error could have affected the
jury's determination whether there was reasonable doubt that
defendant murdered the victim, as the state claimed.  Because we
cannot conclude, in the terms of Article VII (Amended), section
3, that the judgment "was such as should have been rendered in
this case," we must reverse and remand for a new trial.  
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.	


1. 	Defendant also argues that his sentence under Ballot Measure 11 (1994) is
unconstitutional.  Because we reverse the judgment of the circuit court that imposed the sentence,
we do not address defendant's argument regarding that sentence. 

2. 	OEC 404(3) provides:
		"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident."

3. 	OEC 802 provides that "[h]earsay is not admissible" except as otherwise
provided.

4. 	On review, defendant does not assign as error the exclusion of the evidence
described in his second offer of proof.  To avoid confusion, we have retained the numbering of
the offers of proof that the court assigned at trial.

5. 	OEC 803(3) provides: 
		"The following are not excluded by [OEC 802, the rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay evidence], even though the declarant is available as a
witness:
		"* * * * *
		"(3) A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain or bodily health, but not including a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant's will."

6. 	We note that, in its ruling, the trial court mistakenly stated that the evidence was
inadmissible under OEC 404 (prior bad acts).  However, OEC 404 is not applicable to the
evidence at issue here, because it is not evidence of the victim's prior bad acts.  Rather, defendant
offered evidence of the victim's prior statements regarding her obsession with defendant and
suicidal threats to prove the victim's state of mind at the time of the shooting.

7. McLean and Van Hooser referred to statutes that, like Article VII (Amended),
section 3, preclude reversal of a judgment for trial error in the absence of a demonstration that
the error affected the substantial right of a party.  See Hansen, 304 Or at 180 (citing OEC 103(1),
which provides, in part, that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]"); Van Hooser, 266 Or at
22 (citing ORS 138.230, which provides, in part, that "[a]fter hearing the appeal, the court shall
give judgment, without regard * * * to technical errors, defects or exceptions which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.").  See also Shoup v. Wal Mart, Inc., 335 Or 164, 168, 61 P3d
928 (2003) (applying ORS 19.415(2), which provides that "[n]o judgment shall be reversed or
modified except for error substantially affecting the rights of a party.").  Under those statutes, the
analysis whether an appellate court must affirm a judgment despite trial error is similar to the
analysis that Article VII (Amended), section 3, requires.  This opinion addresses the proper
application of Article VII (Amended), section 3, rather than all or one of those statutes, because
the question whether this court's case law has followed a consistent analysis arises from cases
applying Article VII (Amended), section 3.