Title: Jones v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Kerwin Jones v. State of Maryland, No. 59, September Term, 2004.
Criminal Law and Procedure.  Jury Verdicts–The Return of the Verdict.  For a verdict to be
properly returned by a jury, it must be orally announced in open court; the jury must be
polled, if requested, and hearkened to its verdict.  If the verdict is not orally announced, and
the jury is neither polled nor hearkened to that verdict, it does not constitute a final verdict.
Therefore, any sentence imposed for such a verdict is an illegal sentence.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 59
September Term 2004
__________________________________
KERWIN JONES
V.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:    January 20, 2005
1
Hearken is defined by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language as “to
give heed or attention to what is said.” RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, “hearken” (2 ed. unabridged 1987).  Although there is an alternate spelling, i.e.
“harken,” in prior opinions of this Court, when using “hearken” as a term of art, we have
consistently used this spelling.  See Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 404, 809 A.2d 653, 669
(2002); Bishop v. State, 341 Md. 288, 290, 670 A.2d 452, 454 (1996); Hoffert v. State, 319
Md. 377, 381, 572 A.2d 536, 539 (1990); Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 129, 532 A.2d 1357,
1363 (1987).   
2
Maryland Rule 4-327(b) provides that the parties may consent to a sealed verdict,
which permits the jury to separate during a temporary adjournment of the court and
reassemble when then the court is again in session. These verdicts are not final, however,
until the jury is recalled and the verdicts are “received as other verdicts,”  Md. Rule 4-327(b),
which we hold requires oral announcement, polling, if requested, and hearkening.
This case requires us to determine whether a guilty verdict must be orally given prior
to a request to have the jury polled and hearkened1 to its verdict.  We conclude a sentence is
illegal if based upon a verdict of guilt that is not orally announced2 in open court in order to
permit the jury to be polled and hearkened to the verdict.   
I.  Background
On November 5, 2001, Kerwin Jones held up Mohammed Shaik at gunpoint as Shaik
was walking to the First Union Bank at 1515 Reisterstown Road to make a deposit encased
in a money bag from the gas station where he was employed.  Shaik struggled with Jones,
and within moments, Jones had shot Shaik in the leg, had run from the scene, and entered a
car driven by Samuel Murray.  Through their investigation, the police determined that Jones
was the individual who shot Shaik. 
On November 19, 2001, Jones was arrested; the police executed a search warrant on
Jones’s home and discovered a bulletproof vest, ammunition, and a box for a .380
3
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §12A-1 defines first degree assault as:
(a) Serious physical injury; use of a firearm. – (1) A person may
not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious injury to
another.
(2) A person may not commit an assault with a firearm,
including:
(i) A handgun, antique firearm, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled
shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, as those terms are defined in §
36F of this article;
(ii) An assault pistol, as defined in § 36H-1 of this article;
(iii) A pistol, revolver, or antique pistol or revolver, as those
terms are defined in § 441 of this article;
(iv) An assault weapon, as defined in § 481E of this article;
(v) A machine gun, as defined in § 372 of this article.
(b) Penalty. – A person who violates this section is guilty of the
felony of assault in the first degree and on conviction is subject
to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.
Section 12A-1 was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002, 2004 Supp.),
§ 3-202 of the Criminal Law Article.
4
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 488 provides:
Every person convicted of the crime of robbery or attempt to rob
with a dangerous or deadly weapon or accessory thereto is guilty
of a felony, shall restore to the owner thereof the thing robbed
or taken, or shall pay him the full value thereof, and be
sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years.
Section 488 was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002, 2004 Supp.), 
§ 3-403 of the Criminal Law Article.
5
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 486 provides:
Every person convicted of the crime of robbery or attempt to
(continued...)
2
semiautomatic handgun.  Thereafter, Jones and Murray were charged in one indictment:
Jones was charged with two counts of assault in the first degree,3 attempted robbery with a
dangerous and deadly weapon,4 attempted robbery,5 attempted theft and theft,6 three counts
5
(...continued)
rob, or as accessory thereto before the fact, is guilty of a felony,
shall restore the thing taken to the owner, or shall pay to him the
full value thereof, and be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than 15 years.
Section 486 was recodified without substantive change as M d. Code (2002, 2004 Supp.), 
§ 3-402 of the Criminal Law Code. 
6
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 342 provides:
(a) Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control. – A person
commits the offense of theft when he willfully or knowingly
obtains control which is unauthorized or exerts control which is
unauthorized over property of the owner, and:
(1) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(2) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the
property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property;
or
(3) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use,
concealment, or abandonment will probably deprive the owner
of the property.
* * *
(f) Penalty. – (1) A person convicted of theft where the property
or services that was the subject of the theft has a value of $300
or greater is guilty of a felony and shall restore the property
taken to the owner or pay him the value of the property or
services, and be fined not more than $1,000, or be imprisoned
for not more than 15 years, or be both fined and imprisoned in
the discretion of the court. 
Section 342 was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002, 2004 Supp.), 
§ 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article.
7
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 36B provides in pertinent part:
(b) Unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting of handguns;
penalties. – Any person who shall wear, carry, or transport any
handgun, whether concealed or open, upon or about his person,
(continued...)
3
of wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun,7 and three counts of possession of a restricted
7
(...continued)
and any person who shall wear, carry or knowingly transport any
handgun, whether concealed or open in any vehicle traveling
upon the public roads, highways, waterways, or airways or upon
roads or parking lots generally used by the public of this State
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and it shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the person is knowingly transporting the
handgun; and on conviction of the misdemeanor shall be fined
or imprisoned . . . .
(d) Unlawful use of handgun or antique firearm in commission
of crime; penalties. – Any person who shall use a handgun or an
antique firearm capable of being concealed on the person in the
commission of any felony or any crime of violence as defined in
§ 441 of this article, whether operable or inoperable at the time
of the offense, shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor . . . .
Section 36B was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002, 2004 Supp.),
§§ 4-202 to 4-205 of the Criminal Law Article.
8
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 445(d) provides:
(d) Restrictions on possession – In general. – A person may not
possess a regulated firearm if the person:
(1) Has been convicted of:
(i) A crime of violence;
(ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State;
(iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that
carried a statutory penalty of more than 2 years; . . . 
Section 445(d) was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2003), § 5-133 of
the Public Safety Article.
4
firearm.8  The charges against Murray were identical to those against Jones, except that
Murray was not charged with three counts of possession of a firearm by a person previously
convicted of a felony or crime of violence or the theft count.  On September 30, 2002, trial
began, and on its third day, the State abandoned Counts one (assault - in the first degree),
four (assault in the first degree), five (attempted theft), and eight (use of a handgun in the
9
Although the completed verdict sheet, signed by the foreperson, was filed in the
record, no mention of mechanically how that was accomplished appears in the trial transcript.
We presume, as does the State, that the foreperson handed it to the courtroom clerk who, in
turn, filed it in the court jacket.  The verdict sheet reflected that Jones was found guilty of
each of the four counts submitted.
5
commission of a felony).  The Court also entered judgments of acquittal for Counts six
(wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun) and twelve (theft); and entered  judgments
nolle prosequi at the request of the State for Counts ten (possession of a firearm by a person
convicted of a violent crime classified as a felony) and eleven (possession of a firearm by a
person convicted of a violent crime classified as a misdemeanor).  On the same day, the jury
received instructions from the judge, a verdict sheet, and began its deliberations on the
remaining four counts against Jones: attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon
(Count two), attempted robbery (Count three), possession of a firearm by a person convicted
of a crime of violence (Count nine), and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of
violence (Count seven), and three counts against Murray: attempted robbery with a dangerous
and deadly weapon (Count two), attempted robbery (Count three), and the use of a handgun
in the commission of a crime of violence (Count seven).
After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury returned a guilty verdict
against Murray on all three counts and was polled and hearkened to the verdict.  In the
proceedings pertaining to Jones,9 the following dialogue ensued:
THE CLERK: Madam forelady, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, have you agreed upon a verdict in the case of State v.
Kerwin Jones, case number 01-CR-4391.
6
JUROR: We have.
THE CLERK: Who shall say for you?
JUROR: Our forelady.
THE CLERK: Madam forelady, if you would stand.  As to the
case 01-CR-4391, State of Maryland v. Kerwin Jones, how do
you find as to attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly
weapon, not guilty or guilty as charged?
MADAM FORELADY: Guilty as charged.
THE CLERK: As to Count two, attempted robbery, not guilty or
guilty as charged?
MADAM FORELADY: Guilty as charged.
THE CLERK: As to possession of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence, not guilty or guilty as charged?
MADAM FORELADY: Guilty as charged.
MR. PARVIZIAN [counsel for Jones]: Would you poll the
ladies and gentlemen of the jury please.
THE CLERK: You can be seated.  The Court has recorded in the
aforesaid case, in case number 01-CR-4391, State of Maryland
v. Kerwin Jones you have found a verdict of guilty of attempted
robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, you have found
him guilty of attempted robbery, and you have found him guilty
of the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime of
violence.  Is that your verdict juror number 1?
The clerk polled the jurors individually and each juror responded affirmatively.  The
clerk then hearkened the jury to the verdict stating:
Hearken to the verdict as the Court has recorded it, in case No.
01-CR-4319, State of Maryland v. Kerwin Jones, your forelady
10
The attempted robbery conviction (Count three) merged with the attempted robbery
with a dangerous and deadly weapon conviction (Count seven) for the purposes of
sentencing.
7
said that you find him guilty of attempted robbery with a
dangerous and deadly weapon; find him guilty of attempted
robbery, find him guilty of possession of a handgun in the
commission of a crime of violence and so say you all?
JUROR[S]: Yes.
The trial court then excused the jury and postponed sentencing for Jones until November 6,
2002, without there having been any acknowledgment of the discrepancy between the verdict
sheet upon which Jones was found guilty of the four Counts submitted and the hearkened
verdicts.   
On November 6, 2002, Jones was sentenced to twenty years incarceration for the
charge of attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon (Count two), twenty years
incarceration without the possibility of parole for the first five years for the use of a handgun
in the commission of a crime of violence (Count seven), and five years incarceration for the
possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony or crime of violence
(Count nine).10  Each of the sentences was to be served concurrently.  Jones did not object
to the imposition of the sentence for the use of a firearm after a conviction, which had not
been orally conveyed in the courtroom and to which the jury had not been polled or
hearkened.
On March 26, 2003, Jones noted his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before
8
that court, Jones argued that “his conviction for possession of a firearm by a person
previously convicted of a felony or crime of violence should not stand because the jury
foreman did not announce the guilty verdict in open court.”  In an unpublished opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals noted, where it is unmistakable that the jury found the defendant
guilty, “substance will prevail over form even if the guilty verdict is not announced and even
if it is neglected again when the jury is polled.”  Ultimately, the court declined to disturb the
sentence imposed for the firearm possession charge and concluded that the issue was not
properly preserved by Jones because he had failed to object at any time when the verdict was
delivered or when he was sentenced. 
Jones filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court for consideration of the
following question:
When a jury returns a verdict sheet showing a guilty verdict, but
fails to announce the verdict in open court, does the trial court
violate Maryland Rule 4-327 by accepting the verdict, and does
such a violation render the imposed subsequent sentence illegal?
On August 25, 2004, we granted Jones’s petition and issued the writ of certiorari.  Jones v.
State, 382 Md. 688, 856 A.2d 723 (2004).  We hold that the trial court could not legally
impose a sentence for a verdict that was not orally conveyed in open court and to which the
jury was neither polled nor hearkened.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals. 
II.  Standard of Review
A court’s revisory power over a defendant’s sentence is provided in Maryland Rule
9
4-345, which states in relevant part:
(a) Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.
As we have oftentimes stated, a sentence may be corrected even on appeal.  See Evans v.
State, 382 Md. 248, 278, 855 A.2d 291, 308 (2004); Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171,
797 A.2d 1287, 1290 (2002); State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183-84, 742 A.2d 508, 516
(1999); State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995); Matthews v. State,
304 Md. 281, 288, 498 A.2d 65, 658 (1985), quoting Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427,
488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985).  In Ridgeway, we explained that “when the trial court has
allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed
on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the trial court.  Such review and correction
of an illegal sentence is especially appropriate in light of the fact that Rule 4-345(a) . . .
provides that ‘[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.’” Ridgeway, 369 Md.
at 171, 797 A.2d at 1290, quoting Walczak, 302 Md. at 427, 488 A.2d at 951; see also Evans,
382 Md. at 278, 855 A.2d at 308-09.  
III.  Discussion
Jones argues that because the verdict for the charge of possession of a firearm by a
person previously convicted of a felony or crime of violence was not orally announced in
open court, the trial court’s imposition of sentence on that count was illegal.  He asserts that
11
Maryland Rule 4-327(a) states:
(a) Return.  The verdict of a jury shall be unanimous and shall
be returned in open court.
10
Maryland Rule 4-327 (a)11 requires that the verdict not merely be handed to the clerk but that
it also be read aloud into the record.  He maintains that announcement in open court is
required because of its relationship to a party’s right to poll the jury as a means of ensuring
the unanimity of the verdict.  Alternatively, Jones states, the announcing in open court
permits polling of jurors to that verdict if requested to do so and hearkening of the jury to that
verdict.  He asserts that because the verdict was not announced in open court, he was
deprived of his opportunity to poll the jury and the jury was never properly hearkened to
Count nine of the indictment, possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a
felony or crime of violence.  As such, Jones notes that there was no assurance that the guilty
verdict on the verdict sheet with respect to Count nine was in fact unanimous.  Jones argues
that the use of “shall” in Rule 4-327(a) makes the announcing of the verdict in open court
mandatory for the verdict to be effective. 
Conversely, the State urges this Court to affirm the decision reached by the Court of
Special Appeals.  The State asserts that Jones did not properly preserve this issue for appeal
because he did not bring the missing verdict for Count nine to the trial court’s attention and
did not object at the time the trial court imposed the sentence.  Moreover, the State contends
that Jones should have objected to the trial court’s instruction that the jury was to return its
verdict on the verdict sheet if he intended to argue that to “return” a verdict requires it to be
11
announced in open court rather than simply recorded on a form that appears in the record.
The State argues that the probable handing of the verdict sheet to the clerk should be
considered “returning” the verdict in open court for the purposes of Rule 4-327(a).  It
maintains that Jones’s claim regarding the failure to announce the verdict with respect to
Count nine should only be considered an attack on the form of the verdict rather than its
substance.  The State asserts that the delivery of the verdict sheet to the clerk in open court
in Jones’s presence satisfied the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-327.  Therefore, according
to the State, there is no support for Jones’s claim that the verdict at issue is invalid.
A.  Historic Procedures for Returning the Verdict
The protocol for the return of verdicts at trial in Maryland in the late Nineteenth
Century was articulated in Givens v. State, 76 Md. 485, 487, 25 A. 689, 689 (1893):
When the jury have come to a unanimous determination with
respect to their verdict, they return to the box to deliver it.  The
clerk then calls them over, by their names, and asks them
whether they agree on this verdict, to which they reply in the
affirmative.  He then demands who shall say for them, to which
they answer, their foreman.  This being done, he desires the
prisoner to hold up his right hand and addresses them: ‘Look
upon the prisoner at the bar; how say you, is he guilty of the
matter whereof he indicted or not guilty?’  The foreman then
answers guilty or not guilty, as the verdict may be.  The officer
then writes the word ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ as the verdict is, on
the record and again addresses the jury: ‘Hearken to your verdict
as the court hath recorded it.  You say that _____ is guilty (or
not guilty) of the matter whereof he stands indicted, and so say
you all.’
This procedure for returning a verdict is nearly identical to those used in the Provincial Court
12
Maryland Rule 4-327 (a) and (e) provide:
(a) Return.  The verdict of a jury shall be unanimous and shall
be returned in open court.
* * * 
(e) Poll of jury.  On request of a party or on the court’s own
initiative, the jury shall be polled after it has returned a verdict
and before it is discharged.  If the jurors do not unanimously
concur in the verdict, the court may direct the jury to retire for
further deliberation, or may discharge the jury if satisfied that a
unanimous verdict cannot be reached.
12
established during the colonial period.  See Proceedings of The Provincial Court, 1666-1667,
at 64 (describing how the jurors returned to the courtroom, the clerk called their names, asked
if they agreed on their verdict, and who was to speak for them).  Moreover, it was standard
practice throughout the rest of the United States as long ago as the early Nineteenth century.
See James Parker, The Conductor Generalis, 323-24 (1801) (providing procedures identical
to those used in the Provincial Court); Samuel Freeman, The Massachusetts Justice, 40
(1802) (same); Samuel Bayard, An Abstract of those Laws of the United States Which Relate
Chiefly to the Duties and Authority of the Judges of the Inferior State Courts, and the
Justices of the Peace, Throughout the Union, 230 (1804) (same); 1 Joseph Chitty, A Practical
Treatise on the Criminal Law, 436-37 (1819) (stating that verdicts in criminal cases must be
given publicly, not privately, in the accused’s presence); 4 Joseph Chitty, A Practical
Treatise on The Criminal Law, 318, 421 (1819) (providing procedures identical to those used
in the Provincial Court of Maryland). 
Maryland Rule 4-327 (a) and (e)12 embody the essence of this historical procedure for
13
Former Md. Rule 759 provided in pertinent part:
(a) Return.  The verdict of a jury shall be unanimous and shall
be returned in open court.
* * *
(e) Poll of Jury.  Upon the request of a party or upon the court’s
own motion, the jury shall be polled after it has returned a
verdict and before the jury is discharged. If upon the poll the
jury do not unanimously concur in the verdict, the court may
direct the jury to retire for further deliberation or may discharge
the jury.
14
Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 40 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Return.  The verdict shall be unanimous [except as otherwise
provided by law].  It shall be returned by the jury to the judge in
open court.
* * * 
(e) Poll of jury.  When a verdict is returned and before it is
recorded the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or
upon the court’s own motion.  If upon the poll there is not
unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for
further deliberations or may be discharged.    
13
“returning” a verdict.  This Rule is identical to former Maryland Rule 759,13 which was
derived from Rule 40 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.14  Former Md. Rule 759, ed.
note.  Former Rule 759 (a) and (e) were recodified without any change on April 7, 1986 as
Maryland Rule 4-327 (a) and (e).  Md. Rule 4-327 (a), (e).  Throughout the Rule’s many
incarnations there has been no comment on what procedures are necessary for a jury to
“return” a verdict. 
Nevertheless, we do know that the “return” of a verdict by a jury has been comprised
of three distinct procedures, each fulfilling a specific purpose.  After the jury returned to the
15
The right to a unanimous verdict, however, may be duly waived by the express
consent of the defendant, State, and court.  See State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 567, 375 A.2d
228, 233 (1977).
14
jury box to deliver its verdict, the foreman, speaking for the jury, orally answered the inquiry
of the clerk and stated the verdict to the trial court.  Givens, 76 Md. at 487, 25 A. at 689.
Although in the colonial period, polling occurred immediately upon the jury’s return to the
court regardless of a failure to request to do so, id., at some point after 1893, the request to
poll the jury came to be made after the oral announcement of the verdict.  Smith v. State, 299
Md. 158, 166, 472 A.2d 988, 992 (1984).  A poll of the jury is conducted to ensure the
unanimity of the verdict prior to its entry on the record.  Id. at 166, 472 A.2d at 991.  “The
underlying requirement of a final verdict is that it be unanimous.”  Id. at 163, 472 A.2d at
990.  The requirement of unanimity is, of course, a constitutional right set forth in Article 21
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states that “every man hath a right . . . to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found
guilty,” and implemented through Rule 4-327(a).  This Court explained this constitutional
right in Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (1859):
‘The verdict is the unanimous decision made by the jury and
reported to the court, on the matters lawfully submitted to them
in the course of the trial.’  Unanimity is indispensable to the
sufficiency of the verdict.
Id. at 549, quoting 10 Bacon’s Abridged Title Verdict, 306 (emphasis in original).15
A defendant has the absolute right to poll the jury, Smith, 299 Md. at 165, 472 A.2d
15
at 991.  As this Court asserted over a century ago in Williams v. State, 60 Md. 402, 403
(1883): “[A defendant is] entitled, as a matter of right, to a poll of the jury, and he [may] not
be convicted, except upon the concurrence of each juror.”   See L. HOCHHEIMER, The Law
of Crimes and Criminal Procedure (2d ed. 1904) § 179.   In order to exercise the right to poll,
the defendant must request to poll the jury.  Md. Rule 4-327 (e).  The procedure for polling
is set forth in Maryland Rule 4-327(e), which provides:
(e) Poll of jury.  On request of a party or on the court’s own
initiative, the jury shall be polled after it has returned a verdict
and before it is discharged.  If the jurors do not unanimously
concur in the verdict, the court may direct the jury to retire for
further deliberation, or may discharge the jury if satisfied that a
unanimous verdict cannot be reached.
“The assent of each juror [polled] must be free and unqualified.”  Smith, 299 Md. at 167, 472
A.2d at 992, quoting Hochheimer § 179.  When a poll is demanded, the verdict becomes final
only upon its acceptance after the poll.  Smith, 299 Md. at 168, 472 A.2d at 993.  
After polling, the third step occurs when the jury is hearkened to its verdict as “the
traditional formality announcing the recording of the verdict.”  Id.  It was once required that
“a demand to poll the jury had to precede the recordation of the verdict upon hearkening.
Once a verdict was hearkened it was ‘too late to poll the panel.’” Id. at 166, 472 A.2d at 992,
quoting Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514, 546 (1859).  We since have determined that a demand to
poll the jury may be made at any time in the proceeding prior to the discharge of the jury.
Id. at 167, 472 A.2d at 992.  Hearkening of the jury to the verdict, like polling the jury, is
conducted to “secure certainty and accuracy, and to enable the jury to correct a verdict, which
16
they have mistaken, or which their foreman has improperly delivered.”  Id. at 165, 472 A.2d
at 991,citing Givens, 76 Md. at 488, 25 A. at 689-90.  It is in the absence of a demand for a
poll that a hearkening is required for the proper recordation of a verdict.  Id. at 166, 472 A.2d
at 992.  As previously stated, “Under our practice the hearkening of a verdict is the
traditional formality announcing the recording of the verdict.  A jury poll has the same
effect.”  Id., citing Ross v. State, 24 Md. App. 246, 254, 330 A.2d 507, 512 (1975).
Traditionally, hearkening removed the case from the jury’s consideration; however, because
the parties and the trial court retain the right to poll the jury until its discharge after
hearkening, where polling the jury follows its hearkening, the poll of the jury performs the
same function.  Smith, 299 Md. at 168, 472 A.2d at 993. 
B. 
The State argues that the probable handing of the verdict sheet to the clerk constitutes
a proper “return” of the jury’s verdict for Count nine.  We, however, disagree.  “Returning”
the verdict in open court mandates an oral announcement of the verdict upon the conclusion
of the jury’s deliberations to enable the defendant to exercise the right to poll the jury as to
the verdicts.  Furthermore, orally announcing each count of the verdict prevents possible
confusion during polling and hearkening where there are multiple counts considered by the
jury, as in the present case.  This conclusion is not only consistent with our own
jurisprudence, but also has been recognized by those of our sister jurisdictions which have
16
See State v. Williams, 794 N.E.2d 27, 38 (Ohio 2003) (holding that “[a] verdict is final
if (1) the deliberations are over, (2) the result is announced in open court, and (3) the jury is
polled and no dissent is registered.”); Daniley v. State, 554 S.E.2d 483, 485 (Ga. 2001)
(stating that “no legal verdict occurs until it is received and published in open court.”); State
v. Hightower, 680 A.2d 649,659 (N.J. 1996) (observing that neither a stalemate nor a verdict
becomes final until announced in open court); State v. Kiper, 887 P.2d 592, 598 (Ariz. 1994)
(holding that a verdict is final when announced in open court); State v. Taylor, 544 So.2d
1387, 1389 (Miss. 1989) (setting forth procedures for rendering verdicts which include
announcement in open court); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 573 N.E.2d 989, 995 (Mass. App.
1991) (stating that a “jury verdict in a criminal case is not effective unless there has been oral
affirmance of the verdict by the jurors.”); State v. Reid, 479 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Wis. App.
1991) (concluding that “[a] jury’s verdict is not accepted until it is received in open court,
the results announced, the jury polled, if requested, and the judgment entered.”).  
Where the courts determined that the jury must “announce” the verdict without
specifying whether it was required to be submitted orally, it appears that an oral
announcement was assumed based on the history of the procedures for returning a verdict.
See, e.g., Daniley v. State, 554 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. 2001); State v. Hightower, 680 A.2d 649
(N.J. 1996); State v. Reid, 479 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. App. 1991).  Thus, it appears to be
generally accepted throughout our sister states that the verdict must be announced orally for
it to be properly accepted by the court.  
17
The State relies on Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 558 F.2d 691 (1977),
to support its argument that a written verdict is sufficient to be considered a final verdict.
The issue, however, is not the form in which the verdict was returned but rather whether
proper mechanisms were utilized to ensure the unanimity of the verdict.  In Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Smith, the jury returned a verdict slip signed by all of the jurors, which
ensured the unanimity of the verdict.  Id. at 694.  In the case at bar, only the foreperson
signed the verdict sheet; there were no means to determine whether all of the jurors agreed
with the verdict marked for Count nine on the verdict sheet.  Thus, the verdict sheet in the
present case did not ensure a unanimous verdict and the verdict at issue could not properly
be accepted, thereby rendering any sentence imposed for Count nine illegal.
17
addressed the issue.16  Therefore, we conclude that for a verdict to be considered final in a
criminal case it must be announced orally to permit the defendant the opportunity to exercise
the right to poll the jury to ensure the verdict’s unanimity.17  This was not done with respect
to Count nine, the possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony or
18
Jones does not contend that the other verdicts are improper.  We have previously held
that where verdicts are returned as to some Counts but not others, those verdicts to which the
jury is hearkened or polled are legally proper.  See Hoffert, 319 Md. at 386, 572 A.2d at 541.
18
crime of violence, against Jones.18  Therefore, because the jury was not polled and hearkened
to that Count in absence of its oral announcement, the verdict of guilt cannot stand and any
sentence apportioned thereto must be vacated.  We hold that Jones’s sentence of five years
imprisonment for the possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony
or crime of violence is an illegal sentence.  The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
is reversed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED AS TO COUNT
NINE. CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REMAND
THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT W ITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.