Title: Dave v. Valdez

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHIP DAVE v. BILL VALDEZ2012 WY 59Case Number: S-11-0231Decided: 04/13/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
 
CHIP 
DAVE,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.BILL VALDEZ, 
individually,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Michael 
W. Stulken of Mathey Law Office, Green River, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Richard 
H. Honaker of Honaker Law Offices, LC, Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Chip Dave (the 
appellant) purchased a car on eBay.  
Before he took possession of the vehicle, the seller sold it to another 
buyer, Bill Valdez (the appellee).  
The appellant filed a complaint against the appellee citing a number of 
causes of action, including replevin.  
Following the appellee’s failure to respond to the appellant’s second 
amended complaint, a default judgment was entered and the appellant was granted 
a writ of replevin ordering the appellee to relinquish possession of the 
vehicle.  The appellant now appeals 
the district court’s denial of an award of attorney fees.  We affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Did the 
district court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s request for 
attorney fees?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In October 2006, 
the appellant purchased a car through a transaction on eBay.  The appellant paid the seller $2,580 and 
received a bill of sale.  The seller 
agreed to hold the car until the appellant could arrange for the car to be 
transported to California.  The 
following month, before the vehicle was picked up, the appellee offered the 
seller several hundred dollars more for the vehicle.  The seller accepted and the appellee 
took possession of the car and later obtained title to the 
vehicle.
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
filed a complaint in circuit court.  
This action was later transferred to district court due to the amount of 
money in controversy.  The 
appellant’s second amended complaint alleged five causes of action--replevin, 
tortious interference with contract, conversion, violation of motor vehicle 
statutes fraudulently to obtain title, and abuse of process.  The appellee failed to answer the second 
amended complaint and a Certificate of Default was entered.  At the final default hearing, the entry 
of default was upheld and the court issued a writ of replevin ordering the 
appellee to surrender the vehicle to the appellant.  The district court scheduled a hearing 
on the appellant’s request for attorney fees.  At that hearing the district court 
denied the appellant’s request.  The 
appellant now appeals that determination.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      A denial of 
attorney fees will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Am. Nat’l Bank v. Sara, 2011 WY 9, ¶ 14, 246 P.3d 294, 299 (Wyo. 2011).  “A court abuses its discretion only when 
it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.”  Id. (quoting Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 
2000)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      Wyoming law 
abides by the American rule, providing that each party is responsible for his or 
her own attorney fees.  Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2012 WY 8, ¶ 10, 269 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo. 2012).  “A prevailing party may, however, be 
reimbursed for attorney fees when provided for by contract or statute.”  Id.  The appellant argues that the appellee 
violated the appellant’s rights as a lien holder by failing to give proper 
notice prior to pursuing a title to the vehicle.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-105(b) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  The appellant 
relies on the following subsection in making his claim for attorney fees:  “A lien claimant is liable for damages caused by failure to comply 
with this section.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 29-7-105(j) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added).  The appellant argues that the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to consider that an award of damages may 
include attorney fees.
 
[¶7]      We disagree with 
the appellant.  The statutory 
exception to the American rule arises where a statute explicitly makes available 
an award of attorney fees.  Here, 
the statute relied upon by the defendant refers only to damages.  Where the legislature has chosen to 
allow for attorney fees, either independently or as a portion of damages, it has 
done so explicitly.  For example, 
the legislature has made use of the statutory exception by permitting recovery 
of “damages sustained and the costs of the action, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee” and “damages plus court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.” 
 Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-9-116(c) and 
12-33-23-103(b) (LexisNexis 2011).  
See also, e.g., Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-1-115(c), 1-1-126(a), 1-1-128(a), 1-15-509(b), 1-16-605(a)(ii)(B), 
1-40-303(d), 3-1-111(g), 6-3-901(d), 7-3-504(a), 12-9-119, 30-2-210(b), 
31-2-105(d), 31­16-114, 33-44-113(a) (LexisNexis 2011).  Here, the legislature elected not to 
include attorney fees with an award of damages for a violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann.  § 
29-7-105(b).
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
also argues that there is an exception to the American rule in replevin actions 
where fraud is involved.  In the 
instant case, the district court issued a writ of replevin requiring that the 
appellee surrender the vehicle to the appellant following an entry of default 
due to the appellee’s failure to respond to the appellant’s second amended 
complaint.  As a result of the 
default judgment, the facts as alleged in the appellant’s complaint are deemed 
admitted by the appellee, including that the appellee fraudulently obtained 
title to the vehicle at issue.  The 
appellant argues that he is entitled to an award of attorney fees under this 
exception because the appellee fraudulently obtained title to the 
vehicle.
 
[¶9]      We find that the 
appellant’s contention is not entirely correct.  There is an exception to the American 
rule in replevin actions where fraud is involved, but only where fraud exists in 
the bringing of the action.  “[W]e 
find there is substantial agreement among the cited authorities that there is an 
exception to the rule against recovery of attorneys’ fees where there is fraud, 
malice, oppression, or willful wrong in the bringing of an action in 
replevin.”  Olds v. Hosford, 354 P.2d 947, 950 (Wyo. 1960) 
(emphasis added).  The appellant, 
however, was the party who brought the replevin action currently under 
review.  This exception is, 
therefore, inapplicable.
 
[¶10]   Olds also suggests that “punitive 
damages are properly allowed in cases where there have been particular 
circumstances of fraud, oppression, or wrong in the taking or detention of the 
property.”  354 P.2d  at 950.  In the instant case, however, there was 
no award of punitive damages; the appellant was granted possession of the 
vehicle and was awarded damages only to cover the cost of vehicle 
transportation.  “[W]e have never 
ordered payment of attorney fees in a case that did not involve either punitive 
damages or a statutory or contractual provision for fees.”  Wells Fargo Bank Wyo., N.A. v. Hodder, 
2006 WY 128, ¶ 59, 144 P.3d 401, 420 (Wyo. 
2006).
 
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶11]   Following an entry of default 
against the appellee, the district court issued a writ of replevin requiring the 
appellee to relinquish possession of a vehicle previously purchased by the 
appellant, but the district court denied the appellant’s request for attorney 
fees.  The appellant appealed that 
denial, arguing that the American rule, requiring each party to pay his or her 
own attorney fees, was inapplicable.  
We disagree.  The statutory 
exception to the American rule applies only where the legislature has made it 
explicit that attorney fees will be allowed; here, the statute relied upon by 
the appellant makes reference only to damages.  The exception for certain replevin 
actions involving fraud is also inapplicable.  This exception only allows for attorney 
fees when the replevin action was initiated fraudulently.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the appellant’s request for attorney fees and we therefore 
affirm.