Title: STATE v HANSEN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-407 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1981 T H E STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . MICKEY GENE HANSEN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln. Honorable Robert M. Holter, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hood and Sherwood, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana William Douglas, County Attorney, Libby, Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : June 1 0 , 1981 Decided: Sept. 15, 1981 1 5 1981 Filed: - Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant, Mickey Gene Hansen, a p p e a l s from a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e N i n e t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Lincoln. Four i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l : 1. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o use, f o r t h e purposes of impeachment, s t a t e m e n t s made by t h e d e f e n d a n t when e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r withdrawn by t h e c o u r t . 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e , o v e r d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n a s t o r e l e v a n c y , S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No. 1, a mug s h o t photograph of d e f e n d a n t . 3 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d when it r e f u s e d t o review p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o determine i f t h e r e p o r t s con- t a i n e d e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l and were, t h e r e f o r e , d i s c o v e r - a b l e t o defendant under s e c t i o n 46-15-302, MCA. 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a change of venue and motion f o r i n d i v i d u a l l y s e q u e s t e r e d v o i r d i r e . T h i s i s t h e second time t h i s c a s e h a s been b e f o r e t h i s Court. O n a p r e v i o u s a p p e a l , t h e c a s e was r e v e r s e d , a l b e i t on o t h e r grounds. S t a t e v. Hansen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 608 P.2d 1083, 37 St.Rep. 657. The f a c t s of t h e c a s e a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t o p i n i o n and w i l l n o t be s e t f o r t h h e r e e x c e p t where it is n e c e s s a r y t o do s o i n d i s c u s s i n g an i s s u e t h a t h a s been r a i s e d . To d i s c u s s t h e f i r s t i s s u e it is n e c e s s a r y t o con- s i d e r t h e background of t h e f a c t s l e a d i n g t o t h e problem r a i s e d by it. Defendant was a r r e s t e d on September 6 , 1978, and a n i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d c h a r g i n g him w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r - c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . Defendant was a r r a i g n e d on t h a t c h a r g e , p l e a d n o t g u i l t y , and t r i a l was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1979. On January 2, 1979, d e f e n d a n t , w i t h c o u n s e l , moved t o withdraw h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a o f g u i l t y . During t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s , i n response t o q u e s t i o n s from t h e c o u r t , d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d having s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining w i t n e s s . A t t h a t time, d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i v a t e l y - r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l moved t h e c o u r t t o withdraw a s c o u n s e l , and t h e motion was g r a n t e d . A f t e r f u r t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n c o u r t , d e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e , and t h e c o u r t allowed h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . The r e c o r d shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l t h e n withdrew h i s motion t o withdraw a s c o u n s e l . S e n t e n c i n g was set f o r J a n u a r y 1 5 , f o l l o w i n g consid- e r a t i o n of a p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e c o u r t . T h a t p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t c o n t a i n e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e n i a l of any s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining w i t n e s s . The c o u r t , on J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1979, because of t h e r e p o r t , e n t e r e d a n o t g u i l t y p l e a f o r d e f e n d a n t and s e t t h e t r i a l f o r February 6 , 1979. On J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court a p p o i n t e d a s u b s t i t u t e c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t , and t h e t r i a l was r e s e t f o r March 6 , 1979. Following t r i a l and g u i l t y v e r d i c t on March 8 , 1979, d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o f o r t y y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n and d e s i g n a t e d a dangerous o f f e n d e r f o r p a r o l e p u r p o s e s . A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h i s Court r e v e r s e d t h a t convic- t i o n . A new t r i a l was s e t f o r May 6 , 1980, which was c o n t i n u e d u n t i l June 1 7 , 1980, when d e f e n d a n t h i r e d new c o u n s e l . N e w c o u n s e l p r e s e n t e d motions f o r a change of venue and t o r e q u i r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n of evidence on June 6 , 1980. The change of venue motion was denied t h a t day and a p o r t i o n of t h e motion t o produce t h e r e p o r t s of i n v e s t i - g a t i n g o f f i c e r s was denied l a t e r . Following t r i a l , a g u i l t y v e r d i c t was r e t u r n e d on June 1 8 , 1980, and t h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t e d . I n h i s f i r s t i s s u e d e f e n d a n t contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o i n t r o d u c e , f o r impeach- ment purposes, s t a t e m e n t s d e f e n d a n t made while e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r withdrawn by t h e c o u r t . T h i s i s s u e d i r e c t l y concerns answers d e f e n d a n t gave t o q u e s t i o n s posed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t when he pleaded g u i l t y on J a n u a r y 2 , 1979. I t r a i s e s f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e problem of t h e use of t h e s t a t e m e n t s under Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., which p r o v i d e s : " O f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y ; n o l o c o n t e n d e r e ; withdrawn p l e a of g u i l t y . Evidence of a p l e a of g u i l t y , l a t e r withdrawn, o r a p l e a of n o l o contendere, or of an o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y o r n o l o contendere t o t h e crime charged o r any o t h e r c r i m e , o r o f s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any of t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s or o f f e r s , is n o t a d m i s s i b l e i n any c i v i l o r c r i m i n a l a c t i o n , c a s e , or proceeding a g a i n s t t h e person who made t h e p l e a o r o f f e r . T h i s r u l e s h a l l n o t a p p l y t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o u r t on t h e r e c o r d i n connection w i t h any of t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s or o f f e r s where o f f e r e d f o r impeachment purposes or i n a subsequent p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e d e c l a r a n t f o r p e r j u r y o r f a l s e s t a t e m e n t . " A t t h e second t r i a l , f o l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s testimony t h a t he d i d n o t have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining w i t n e s s without her c o n s e n t , t h e S t a t e used t h e s t a t e m e n t s made on January 2, 1979, f o r impeachment purposes, t h e r e b y showing t h a t on a p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t had admitted t o such s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . Our q u e s t i o n is whether such s t a t e m e n t s a r e a d m i s s i b l e under t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e of Rule 410, M0nt.R.Evi.d. The s t a t e m e n t s were made i n connection w i t h a withdrawn g u i l t y p l e a and were used f o r impeachment purposes and s o meet t h o s e requirements of t h e s t a t u t e . The remaining q u e s t i o n is whether or n o t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were " v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e " w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e r u l e . Hutto v. Ross ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 429 U . S . 28, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194, is r e l i e d on by d e f e n d a n t . I t should be noted t h a t t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s of evidence do n o t a l l o w use of s t a t e m e n t s except i n p e r j u r y h e a r i n g s , a s c o n t r a s t e d t o Montana's Rule 410, which a l l o w s t h e use of t h e s t a t e m e n t s f o r impeachment purposes a s w e l l a s f o r a p r o s e c u t i o n f o r p e r j u r y or f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s . I n Hutto, t h e Court s a i d : "The t e s t i s w h e t h e r t h e c o n f e s s i o n was ' e x t r a c t e d by a n y s o r t of t h r e a t s o r v i o l e n c e , [ o r ] o b t a i n e d by any d i r e c t o r implied promises, however s l i g h t , [ o r ] by t h e e x e r t ion of any improper i n f l u e n c e . ' " 429 U.S. a t 30, 97 S.Ct. a t 203, 50 L.Ed.2d a t 197. I n many ways t h e f a c t s of Hutto a r e comparable t o t h o s e h e r e . I n Hutto a f t e r e n t e r i n g a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement with t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y w i t h r e g a r d t o a c r i m i n a l charge under Arkansas law, t h e d e f e n d a n t , a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e q u e s t , made a s t a t e m e n t c o n f e s s i n g t o t h e crime of embezzlement. The c o n f e s s i o n was made i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y , who a d v i s e d t h e d e f e n d a n t of h i s F i f t h Amendment pr i v i l e g e and i n f ormed him t h a t t h e terms of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g were a v a i l a b l e regard- l e s s of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e r e q u e s t f o r c o n f e s s i o n . Subsequently, t h e d e f e n d a n t withdrew t h e p l e a b a r g a i n , r e t a i n e d new c o u n s e l , and demanded a j u r y t r i a l . I n t h e c o u r s e of t h a t t r i a l the s t a t e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e defendant had confessed v o l u n t a r i l y and admitted h i s s t a t e m e n t a t t h e t r i a l . The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d . S u b s e q u e n t a p p e a l s t o o k t h e d e f e n d a n t i n H u t t o through t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t systems t o t h e Supreme Court of t h e United S t a t e s . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court unanimously r e v e r s e d t h e C i r c u i t Court of Appeals and h e l d t h a t (1) t h e c o n f e s s i o n was n o t per s e i n a d m i s s i b l e i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l merely because it was made subsequent t o and a s a r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement t h a t d i d n o t c a l l f o r such c o n f e s s i o n , and ( 2 ) t h a t t h e c o n f e s s i o n was n o t i n v o l u n t a r y s i n c e it had been made i n t h e p r e s e n c e of d e f e n s e counsel who had informed t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e terms of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d l e s s of h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e c o n f e s s i o n . Such s t a n d a r d s i n Hutto a r e p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . See a l s o , J e n k i n s v. Anderson ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 447 U . S . 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86; R a f f e l v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 271 U.S. 496, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054. I n t h i s c a s e defendant was appearing f o r t h e purpose of changing a n o t g u i l t y p l e a t o a g u i l t y p l e a p u r s u a n t t o a p l e a b a r g a i n i n which t h e p r o s e c u t i o n would n o t seek an i n c r e a s e d s e n t e n c e under t h e p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r laws. A t t h e January 2, 1979, proceeding, d e f e n d a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d by p r i v a t e c o u n s e l . The c o u r t advised d e f e n d a n t of t h e charge a g a i n s t h i m , t h e maximum punishment t h a t he could r e c e i v e , and h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r , speedy and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . A t t h a t s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , defendant appar- e n t l y became confused or r e l u c t a n t t o proceed, or d i d n o t understand t h e concept of a l e s s e r included o f f e n s e r e f e r r e d t o by t h e t r i a l judge. A r e c e s s was taken and upon recon- vening, t h e c o u r t continued t o a d v i s e d e f e n d a n t of h i s r i g h t s . The f o l l o w i n g is an e x c e r p t from t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e January 2 , 1979, proceeding: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, a t t h i s p o i n t I b e l i e v e t h a t I am going t o have t o move t o withdraw a s counsel f o r t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t t o proceed t o a t r i a l of t h i s m a t t e r would incur a breach of m y e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . The a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e h a s dropped down t o a p o i n t where I f e e l I c o u l d n ' t r e p r e s e n t him. "THE COURT: I u n d e r s t a n d , c o u n s e l and I am going t o p e r m i t t h e withdrawal. I am going t o a p p o i n t someone. T h i s m a t t e r is set f o r t r i a l - - "THE DEFENDANT: Ya, I d i d it. "THE COURT: NOW, Mr. Hansen, it is n o t t h e purpose of t h i s proceeding t o t r y t o g e t a c o n f e s s i o n o u t of you. T h a t i s n ' t t h e purpose of it. But t h e purpose is t o make s u r e you understand your r i g h t s f u l l y and c o m p l e t e l y and t h a t you a r e n ' t p l e a d i n g g u i l t y t o a crime t h a t indeed you f e e l you should have a d e f e n s e t o . And it p u t s counsel i n a v e r y , very s t r a n g e p l a c e . And i f you wish o t h e r counsel I w i l l g e t you o t h e r c o u n s e l . B e c a u s e s o m e t i m e s p e o p l e d o n ' t s e e eye t o eye on t h e s e t h i n g s . But it i s n ' t t h e purpose of t h i s type of proceeding t o t r y t o g e t you t o c o n f e s s . I n o t h e r words, I r e a l l y d o n ' t c a r e . It d o e s n ' t make any d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e Court, b u t I want t o be s u r e t h a t i f indeed you e n t e r a p l e a , a s you have done, t h a t t h e p l e a is informed and w i l l i n g on your p a r t and you a r e n o t going t o s a y f o r e v e r more ' I was r a i l r o a d e d . ' That is t h e purpose of t h i s t h i n g . And n o t any o t h e r purpose. These a r e r i g h t s of y o u r s under t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t we a r e h e r e d a b b l i n g w i t h t h i s morning, and your counsel knows and t h e Judge presumably knows them, and w e d o n ' t want t o e x t r a c t from you a p l e a t h a t you d o n ' t f e e l is p r o p e r . I f I d o n ' t ask you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and e s t a b l i s h i n m y own mind t h e f a c t t h a t something d i d or d i d n o t occur t h e n I am n o t doing m y job, you see. And t h a t is why I am a s k i n g you them. So i f you do n o t a g r e e w i t h your c o u n s e l , s a y s o . Because he is n o t embarrassed. He h a s been i n t h i s courtroom a l o t , i n courtrooms b e f o r e , and he u n d e r s t a n d s and he knows. And perhaps you d o n ' t see eye t o eye a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e game, and t h a t is two d i f f e r e n t people i n t h i s world r e a c t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t ways t o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . So I am n o t t r y i n g t o g e t you t o s a y ' Y e s , I d i d it' o r 'No, I d i d n ' t . ' I am j u s t t r y i n g t o ask you i f i n your own mind you f e l t t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was-- i n o t h e r words t h a t you d i d t h e o f f e n s e , t h a t y e s , indeed, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y is t h a t you a r e g u i l t y . "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am g u i l t y . "THE COURT: And i f you had a t r i a l by j u r y t h e p r o b a b i l i t y would be v e r y g r e a t t h a t t h e y would f i n d you g u i l t y . That is what I am t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h and t h a t is why I am a s k i n g you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . And I d o n ' t want t o embarrass you, b u t t h e y must be t h e r e , s o w i t h t h a t i n mind do you wish t o proceed, Mr. Hansen? "THE DEFENDAivT: Yes. "THE COURT: Now, I d i d ask you i n regard t o t h i s m a t t e r , you d i d have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h i s person named? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes. "THE COURT: And t h a t person was n o t your spouse? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: And s h e d i d n o t c o n s e n t t o such i n t e r c o u r s e ? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g Mr. Hansen that--I have e x p l a i n e d t o you t h i s m a t t e r of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and I w a n t you w e l l r e p r e s e n t e d . Is t h e r e anything about t h a t a t t h i s t i m e t h a t you b e l i e v e you want t o make a s t a t e m e n t t o t h e Court about? "THE DEFENDANT: No. "THE COURT: And s u b j e c t t o t h e v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s t h e n you a r e f r e e l y a n d v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r i n g y o u r p l e a i n t h i s m a t t e r , is t h a t r i g h t ? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes. "THE COURT: I am going t o a c c e p t it. I know s o m e t i m e s it is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d counsel i n some of t h e s e c a s e s and t h e y t r y t o make t h e m s e l v e s known, b u t we d e p e n d somewhat on t h e counsel--in f a c t w e depend a g r e a t d e a l on t h e c o u n s e l i n t h e s e m a t t e r s , Mr. Hansen. And because I know t h e c h a r a c t e r o f your r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I know t h a t he would t r y very hard t o work i n your i n t e r e s t s , your b e s t i n t e r e s t s . But t h a t is why I am a s k i n g you t h a t q u e s t i o n , because even t h e b e s t lawyer o c c a s i o n a l l y d o e s n ' t q u i t e see eye t o eye with h i s c l i e n t . You understand t h a t ? "THE DEFENDANT: Y e s . "THE COURT: And you would f e e l you a r e on t h e same wave l e n g t h now? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes." A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h e above d i s c u s s i o n took p l a c e b e f o r e t h e f i r s t t r i a l and was n o t used by t h e S t a t e u n t i l t h e second t r i a l a f t e r d e f e n d a n t , i n h i s d i r e c t t e s t i m o n y , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had never had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining w i t n e s s . With t h a t , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r impeachment under Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., was p r o p e r l y l a i d . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s Court s h o u l d a d o p t any one of t h e f o l l o w i n g four per se r u l e s concerning t h e v o l u n t a r i - n e s s of t h e q u e s t i o n e d s t a t e m e n t s : (1) s i n c e t h e s e s t a t e - ments were g i v e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a p l e a t h a t t h e c o u r t l a t e r allowed t o be withdrawn, t h e y were made i n v o l u n t a r i l y ; ( 2 ) s i n c e t h e s t a t e m e n t s were g i v e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a p l e a b a r g a i n agreement, which is i n e f f e c t a promise, t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y ; ( 3 ) s i n c e d e f e n d a n t was n o t warned by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a t t h e time o f t h e change of p l e a of h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y ; and ( 4 ) s i n c e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l withdrew p r i o r t o t h e t i m e d e f e n d a n t made t h e s t a t e m e n t s , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y . I n r e p l y , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t we should examine t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e ques- t i o n e d s t a t e m e n t s were v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . I t m a i n t a i n s t h a t , g i v e n t h e q u a l i t y of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of r i g h t s and p r o c e d u r e by t h e t r i a l judge, t h e complete l a c k o f c o e r c i v e environment, and t h e l a c k of any inducement t o d e f e n d a n t , t h e s t a t e m e n t was v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e S t a t e contends, t h e s t a t e m e n t was a d m i s s i b l e t o impeach t h e t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by d e f e n d a n t a t t r i a l . I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i s s u e w e a g a i n t u r n t o Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., and t o t h e commission comment on t h a t r u l e . The commission noted t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e f e d e r a l r u l e and t h e Montana r u l e : "This r u l e is i d e n t i c a l t o a v e r s i o n o f F e d e r a l Rule 410 c o n d i t i o n a l l y adopted by Congress. The c o n d i t i o n was t h a t t h e r u l e would be superseded by any amendment t o t h e F e d e r a l Rules of C r i m i n a l Procedure i n c o n s i s - t e n t w i t h t h e r u l e . Such an amendment was made i n Rule 6 1 1 ( e ) (6), F e d e r a l Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was later s u b s t i - t u t e d f o r t h i s v e r s i o n of t h e r u l e . The Commission p r e f e r s t h e superseded v e r s i o n of t h e r u l e because it a l l o w s u s e of s t a t e m e n t s w h e t h e r o r n o t made u n d e r o a t h , on t h e r e c o r d , o r i n t h e p r e s e n c e of c o u n s e l , and m o s t i m p o r t a n t , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s . The Uniform Rule 410 (1974) is s i m i l a r t o t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e of t h e r u l e b u t does n o t i n c l u d e a p r o v i s i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e second s e n t e n c e of t h e r u l e . " T h i s r u l e a l l o w s an accused t o o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y or n o l o c o n t e n d e r e o r t o with- draw such p l e a w i t h o u t e i t h e r a c t i o n being used a g a i n s t him i n any subsequent t r i a l . T h i s is i n t e n d e d t o a i d t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , under s i m i l a r p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s g i v e n t o o f f e r s of compromise under Rule 408, and t o a l l o w h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l evidence t o be excluded under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e r e a s o n s f o r o f f e r i n g t o p l e a d o r withdrawing p l e a s of g u i l t y and n o l o c o n t e n d e r e would n o t be understood by a j u r y and would almost p r e - c l u d e a f a i r t r i a l . The second s e n t e n c e of t h i s r u l e is added t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e accused d o e s n o t a b u s e t h i s r u l e and c o n t r a d i c t e a r l i e r s t a t e m e n t s . See H a r r i s v. N e w York, 401 U.S. 222 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t is r e q u i r e d t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were ' v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e ' and i f c o n t r a d i c t e d , t h e s t a t e m e n t s may be i n t r o d u c e d f o r t h e purposes of impeachment or p r o s e c u t i o n f o r per j u r y . " E x i s t i n g Montana law has n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t with t h e problem of o f f e r s t o plead o r withdraw p l e a s , a l t h o u g h a p l e a of g u i l t y t h a t is n o t w i t h d r a w n is a d m i s s i b l e i n subsequent proceedings. S i k o r a v. S i k o r a , 1 6 0 Mont. 27, 3 3 , 499 P.2d 808 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . T h e r e f o r e t h i s r u l e is new t o Montana law. I t should be noted t h a t Montana law does n o t a l l o w p l e a s of nolo contendere; however, such a p l e a is included i n t h e r u l e because it h a s been recognized by Montana c o u r t s i n a c a s e where such a p l e a was e n t e r e d i n f e d e r a l c o u r t and was r e l e v a n t t o a s t a t e c a s e . S t a t e ex r e l . McElliot v. Fousek, 9 1 Mont. 457, 461, 8 P.2d 795 ( 1 9 3 2 ) . " I t is obvious from t h e above comment t h a t t h e commis- s i o n chose t o a l l o w c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t s g i v e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h g u i l t y p l e a s and p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s t o be used f o r impeachment purposes. Rule 410 is an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t admissions by a party-defendant a r e admis- s i b l e . T h i s e x c e p t i o n , according t o t h e comment, was g r a n t e d t o encourage t h e use of p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreements. But, t h e r u l e was n o t designed t o a l l o w a d e f e n d a n t t o abuse t h e p l e a b a r g a i n p r o c e s s with no p e n a l t y . Here defendant is no s t r a n g e r i n c o u r t , a l t h o u g h r e a d i n g h i s testimony a t t h e h e a r i n g on January 2 one would t h i n k it had been h i s f i r s t time i n c o u r t . The t r i a l c o u r t c a r e f u l l y and e x t e n s i v e l y q u e s t i o n e d d e f e n d a n t on t h e volun- t a r i n e s s of t h e p l e a , h i s understanding of t h e c h a r g e , t h e consequences of t h e p l e a and t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r h i s p l e a . When d e f e n d a n t went back on t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g arrangements a g a i n s t h i s c o u n s e l ' s wishes, counsel r e q u e s t e d t h e c o u r t t o withdraw a s counsel because of a breach of p r o f e s s i o n a l e t h i c s t h a t he f e l t was v i o l a t e d . The c o u r t s t a t e d it would g e t d e f e n d a n t a new a t t o r n e y , and d e f e n d a n t t h e n v o l u n t a r i l y a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had committed t h e act. C l e a r l y d e f e n d a n t abused t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s h e r e , and w e s u s t a i n t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e t r i a l judge i n a l l o w i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t t o be i n t r o d u c e d . I n r e p l y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r per se r u l e s a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s argued by t h e S t a t e , t h e S t a t e n o t e s t h a t it was d e f e n d a n t h e r e who moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o a l l o w him t o withdraw h i s n o t g u i l t y p l e a and t o p l e a d g u i l t y , and t o move t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o a c c e p t t h e p l e a of g u i l t y , d e f e n d a n t must e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e g u i l t y p l e a was being knowingly and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d . The c o u r t must t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o r e t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s on t h e p a r t of a d e f e n d a n t p r i o r t o a c c e p t i n g a g u i l t y p l e a . See s e c t i o n 46-12-204, MCA. I n S t a t e v. Azure ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d 179, t h i s Court noted t h a t t h e b e s t method t o e s t a b l i s h v o l u n t a r i n e s s is on a f a c t u a l b a s i s and t h a t t h i s should be done a t t h e time of t h e e n t e r i n g of t h e p l e a . Here t h e t r i a l judge d i d a l l i n h i s power t o e s t a b l i s h a f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e p l e a . Defendant a d m i t t e d t h a t he had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e complaining w i t n e s s , t h a t s h e was n o t h i s spouse and t h a t t h e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e had t a k e n p l a c e w i t h o u t her c o n s e n t . A r e c e n t c a s e of t h i s C o u r t , S t a t e v. August L e e White ( 1 9 8 1 ) , , Mont. - 1 - P.2d I - S t .Rep. (No. 80-351, d e c i d e d August 31, 1 9 8 1 ) , noted t h a t S t a t e v. Azure, s u p r a , r e q u i r e s t h e r e c o r d t o d i s c l o s e t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c r i m e t o which he p l e a d s . Absent such u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h i s Court w i l l n o t presume t h a t t h e p l e a was made "with an under- s t a n d i n g of t h e charge." The S t a t e a g r e e s t h a t Azure r e q u i r e s a d e f e n d a n t have f u l l knowledge of t h e c h a r g e admitted by p l e a d i n g g u i l t y . W e a r e s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t c a s e meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Azure and t h a t t h e d i s p a r a t e outcomes of t h i s c a s e and Azure - a r e mandated by t h e d i f f e r e n t circum- s t a n c e s of each c a s e . F i n a l l y we n o t e t h a t , a s p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , t h e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t was s u f f i c i e n t l y informed t o e n t e r a p l e a t h a t was " v o l u n t a r y w i t h understanding of t h e c h a r g e , " s e c t i o n 46-12- 204, MCA. I n Azure t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t s o informed. W e f i n d no m e r i t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n h e r e t h a t he was n o t p r o p e r l y informed and s u s t a i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s admission of t h e d i s p u t e evidence. The n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d is whether S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No. 1, a photograph of d e f e n d a n t , was p r o p e r l y admitted by t h e t r i a l c o u r t over d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n . Defendant cites S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969, f o r s u p p o r t of h i s p o s i t i o n . I t s t a t e s : ". . . photographs s t a n d on t h e same f o o t i n g a s diagrams, maps, p l a n s and t h e l i k e , and a s a g e n e r a l r u l e , whenever r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e a p e r s o n , p l a c e , o r t h i n g , t h e y a r e a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e purpose of e x p l a i n i n g and a p p l y i n g t h e evidence and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and j u r y i n understanding t h e c a s e . "Photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o a r o u s e t h e sympathies o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e j u r y a r e p r o p e r l y excluded, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e y a r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y n e c e s s a r y or i n s t r u c t i v e t o show m a t e r i a l f a c t s or c o n d i t i o n s . " 1 3 1 Mont. a t 159, 308 P.2d a t 973. Here, t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d a photograph t a k e n a t t h e t i m e of d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t . The e x h i b i t was a mug s h o t of d e f e n d a n t i n an unkept, messy s t a t e . Defendant contends t h a t t h e photo was i r r e l e v a n t and d i d n o t go t o showing any m a t e r i a l f a c t . B i s c h e r t was a homicide c a s e i n v o l v i n g a s m a l l c h i l d . The fact situation there is not applicable to the fact situ- ation here. In this case the photo was taken at the time of defendant's arrest. It was admitted as part of the identi- fication testimony of the victim and was corroborative of the victim's ability to identify defendant both at trial and at the time of the incident. A view of the photograph cer- tainly does not arouse anyone's passion or prejudice, nor is it inflammatory. Therefore, we find no merit to this issue. The next issue for review is whether the trial court erred in refusing to review police reports to determine if they contained exclupatory material and were, therefore, discoverable to the defendant under section 46-15-302, MCA. Prior to trial defendant filed a motion to produce, pursuant to section 46-15-302, MCA, asking to inspect and copy "all papers, documents, oral or written statements . . ." in the hands of the prosecutor. At a hearing on the motion the State took the position that all police reports were work product and not discoverable. Defendant relies on section 46-15-302(2), MCA, which provides in part: "(2) . . . This subsection does not apply to the work product of the prosecution, which is documents drawn up by law enforcement officials for internal communications and law enforcement officers' field notes, except that any exculpatory information contained in such documents or notes must be produced." Defendant argues that because the offense was alleged to have occurred some twenty-one months prior to defendant's request at the second trial, because several officers, including Woods and Spain, were no longer employed by the law enforcement officials of Lincoln County, and because there was no independent record of their investigation, defendant was unable to determine whether their statements c o n t a i n e d any e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l . H e , t h e r e f o r e , r e q u e s t e d t h e c o u r t t o review t h e s e p o l i c e r e p o r t s and determine i f t h e r e was d i s c o v e r a b l e m a t e r i a l i n them. He a l l e g e s t h a t t h e c o u r t denied t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s merely on t n e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n t a i n e d no excul- p a t o r y m a t t e r s . A t t h e omnibus h e a r i n g on June 6, 1980, d e f e n d a n t r e q u e s t e d t h e c o u r t t o review t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o d e t e r - mine i f t h e r e were i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e v i c t i m ' s e a r l y s t a t e m e n t s and her t r i a l testimony. The c o u r t agreed t o do s o and d i d . The record does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t focused on t h e testimony of Spain and Woods or made any w r i t t e n motion f o r t h e c o u r t t o s o review t h o s e r e p o r t s . For t h a t reason, t h e i s s u e is n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s Court. The m a t t e r cannot be used t o p u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n e r r o r i f it was n o t brought s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n . The f i n a l i s s u e b e f o r e us is whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a change of venue and a motion f o r i n d i v i d u a l l y s e q u e s t e r e d v o i r d i r e . Defendant f i l e d a motion f o r a change of venue w i t h a s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t on May 30, 1980, which was heard and denied on June 6, 1980. The motion was renewed, heard and denied on June 16, 1980. Both of t h e s e motions r a i s e d t h e same i s s u e s of p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y and t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n which c l e a r l y would n o t have been a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l . T h i s Court r e c e n t l y set f o r t h t h e change of venue i s s u e s which a r e addressed h e r e a s going t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . See, S t a t e v. Bashor ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. - , 614 P.2d 470, 37 St.Rep. 1098. I n S t a t e v. Board ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 135 Mont. 139, 143-144, 337 P.2d 924, 927, we s e t f o r t h t h e t e s t a s f o l l o w s : "Our c o u r t l o o k s f o r a c h a i n r e a c t i o n . I t s t a r t s w i t h t h e b a s i c p r e m i s e t h a t t h e accused is e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r t r i a l . Next it checks t h e p u b l i c i t y complained o f , a s t o its c o n t e n t s and more i m p o r t a n t , a s t o its t o t a l e f f e c t upon t h e ' f a i r t r i a l r i g h t . ' . . . F i n a l l y , it o b j e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r s t h e end resulk-was a f a i r t r i a l denied a s a r e s u l t of t h e p u b l i c i t y and its e f f e c t s ? . . ." W e have examined c a r e f u l l y t h e a l l e g a t i o n s g i v e n f o r t h e r e q u e s t e d change of venue and f i n d t h e y f a i l t o e s t a b - l i s h any p o s s i b i l i t y of j u r y p r e j u d i c e due t o p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . A s noted by t h e S t a t e , o n l y two p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , Mr. Cook and Mrs. S e e k i n s , responded t h a t t h e y had read or heard anything about t h e c a s e i n t h e newspaper o r on t h e r a d i o . There were two M i s t e r s Cook on t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r y panel and both M i s t e r s Cook and Mrs. S e e k i n s were e l i m i n a t e d by peremptory c h a l l e n g e and t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t s e r v e on t h e t r i a l j u r y . I n a d d i t i o n , Mr. S t e b a n s , who was s e l e c t e d a s an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r , s a i d t h a t he had read some newspapers a r t i c l e s b u t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d . However, t h e a l t e r n a t e j u r o r d i d n o t s i t a s a j u r o r i n t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , no p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t h a s been shown. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d . We concur: