Title: State v. LeClair

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. LeClair  (96-420); 167 Vt. 32; 702 A.2d 628

[Filed 1-Aug-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-420

State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

Jeffrey L. LeClair                           June Term, 1997

James R. Crucitti, J.

       Robert L. Sand, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier, for
  plaintiff-appellant

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   The State brings this interlocutory appeal from an order
  of the Vermont District Court of Franklin Circuit, dismissing a
  repeat-offender prosecution for driving with a suspended license (DLS) in
  violation of 23 V.S.A. § 674(c) because one of the prior predicate
  adjudications was vacated.  The State argues that the third DLS
  adjudication allows criminal penalties under § 674(c) even if one or both
  of the earlier adjudications were invalid.  The trial court rejected the
  State's arguments and granted defendant's motion to dismiss.  We agree and
  affirm.

       Defendant was charged with criminal DLS in violation of 23 V.S.A. §
  674(c), which states: "A person who violates section 676 of this title for
  the third or subsequent time shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
  subsection (a) of this section."  The penalty set forth in § 674(a) is
  imprisonment for not more than two years, or a fine of not more than $5000,
  or both. Section 676 provides that in certain circumstances a person who
  operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle when his or her license or
  privilege to operate is revoked, suspended or refused

 

  commits a civil traffic violation.

       These charges against defendant were predicated upon two prior civil
  DLS violations under 23 V.S.A. § 676, one occurring on October 4, 1991 and
  the other on January 3, 1994. Following arraignment on the § 674(c) charge,
  defendant moved in the Vermont Traffic Bureau to reopen the civil § 676
  adjudications.  The Traffic Bureau hearing officer granted the motions to
  reopen the § 676 cases and set them for rehearings.  Defendant then filed a
  motion to dismiss the § 674(c) prosecution under V.R.Cr.P. 12(d) (lack of
  prima facie case) on the ground that the State would be unable to prove the
  alleged predicate violations.  Before the hearing on the 12(d) motion, the
  Traffic Bureau vacated one of the two § 676 convictions.  Thereafter, the
  trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the § 674(c) charge.(FN1)

       The State phrases this as a temporal question, arguing that the two
  former adjudications must exist at the time of the third instance of DLS,
  rather than at trial.(FN2)  The effect of the State's position is, however,
  that the State can rely on invalid predicate adjudications except when they
  are stricken prior to the motor vehicle operation that forms the basis for
  the criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, we prefer to phrase the issue as
  whether the State can rely on invalid predicate adjudications to fulfill
  the element of the offense created by § 674(c).

       Repeat-offender statutes can be classified into two different types:
  status-offense statutes

 

  and penalty-enhancement statutes.  For status-offense statutes, the element
  of the offense is the fact of the prior conviction, irrespective of its
  validity.  The primary case on which the State relies, Lewis v. United
  States,