Title: Green v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

249 Ind. 86 (1967)
229 N.E.2d 726
GREEN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,641.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 26, 1967.
Rehearing denied November 14, 1967.
*87 Olsen and Niederhaus, of Evansville, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Douglas B. McFadden, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
Appellant was charged by indictment with the crime of murder in the second degree, and was tried by jury in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, which returned its verdict finding the appellant guilty of manslaughter. Thereafter, on April 13, 1964, appellant was sentenced by the court to the Indiana State Prison for not less than two (2) years nor more than twenty-one (21) years.
The indictment, omitting caption, formal parts, endorsements on the back and signatures, reads as follows:
Appellant tested the sufficiency of the indictment by Motion to Quash on the grounds:
The motion was supported by a memorandum containing fifteen specifications.
Such Motion to Quash was submitted without argument and was overruled by the court, whereupon appellant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and requested trial by jury, which request was granted and a jury ordered.
On February 25, 1963, appellant filed motion and affidavit for change of venue from the judge. The motion was sustained. Willard Schrode was selected as Special Judge and thereafter qualified as such.
On March 18, 1963, appellant filed a motion for change of venue from the county, such motion alleging in substance that he could not have a fair and impartial trial of the cause in said county on account of the excitement and prejudice existing in Vanderburgh County against him.
*89 Thereafter, by leave of court, appellant filed his amended affidavit for a change of venue from the county. Said affidavit, omitting caption, formal parts, signature and exhibits filed in support thereof reads as follows:
On May 2, 1963, the State of Indiana filed a counter affidavit to appellant's Motion for Change of Venue, the same, omitting caption, formal parts and signature, reads as follows:
Thereupon the court denied appellant's motion and reset the cause for trial.
After continuances had by both the appellant and the State, this matter came to trial March 18, 1964, before a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by the State, the appellant filed a motion for a directed verdict, which motion was overruled by the court. The appellant rested without introducing any evidence and again filed a motion for a directed verdict asserting that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had killed Lillian Green as charged in the indictment nor had it proved that he had committed any crime that would be an included offense under said indictment.
The court again overruled appellant's motion for directed verdict, whereupon the jury retired and thereafter returned its verdict finding appellant guilty of manslaughter as hereinabove stated. Thereupon the court ordered a pre-sentence investigation of appellant and deferred sentence until a later date. On April 13, 1964, the Probation Officer filed his pre-sentence *93 investigation report, and the court imposed a two to twenty-one year sentence on appellant as heretofore stated.
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial, omitting caption, formal parts and signatures contains five (5) grounds as follows:
Appellant's Assignment of Errors, omitting caption, formal parts and signatures contains four (4) specifications as follows:
In the argument section of his brief on appeal, appellant relies on two issues for reversal, viz., (1) The trial court *94 abused its discretion in overruling the Amended Affidavit for a Change of Venue from the County, and (2) The evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. All other issues raised in the Motion for New Trial and in the Assignment of Errors have been waived by appellant's failure to support them with argument.
The first point on which appellant relies is the contention that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his amended affidavit. He argues the amended affidavit contained clear and uncontradicted evidence that there was excitement and prejudice against him in Vanderburgh County as a result of the notoriety which had been attached to the case by the local news media. We disagree with the conclusion reached by the appellant that the rule of law that facts not denied are admitted is applicable here because the facts alleged in his amended affidavit and the exhibits were not contradicted by the State in any manner. The State filed its counter affidavit in three paragraphs categorically denying the averments of appellant's amended affidavit. Admittedly, the State did not, and, we think we may fairly say, could not, file an equal or greater number of exhibits with the counter affidavit showing appellant to be the man of the year, the outstanding citizen in the community, the darling of the press, or the champion of the people. Few persons accused of crime are able to produce such extravagant press or other releases in their behalf. The question presented to this Court for judicial determination is, did the moving party, appellant, by his affidavit and exhibits make such a showing as would require this Court to say the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant a change of venue from the county?
Appellant admits that Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 207, p. 584, § 9-1305, Burns 1956 Replacement, specifically provides that it is discretionary with the court in non-capital cases to grant a change of venue from the county. While some of the exhibits are repetitious, and while the names of *95 appellant, decedent and other members of the family appear in many of the articles, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for change of venue from the county.
The second point upon which appellant relies is that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by sufficient evidence. He contends that the State failed to prove every essential element of either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
Appellant was indicted for the crime of second degree murder. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter which is defined by Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 2, p. 447, § 10-3405, Burns' 1956 Replacement, as follows:
In the above statute, manslaughter is divided into two grades, to-wit: voluntary and involuntary. Although being classed and defined in the same section, they are widely and essentially different. Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a human being without malice in a sudden heat. Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being while in the commission of an unlawful act.
Appellant contends that a close review and analysis of the transcript fails to show any substantial evidence to sustain the conviction of voluntary manslaughter. He contends the shooting which caused the death of Lillian Green was not intentional, nor was it committed in a sudden heat. Appellant further contends there is no evidence presented by the State that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had an intention to kill. Finally, he contends the State did not prove the essential elements of involuntary manslaughter, namely, the killing of a human being in the commission of some unlawful act. It being his contention that *96 there was a total lack of evidence as to the commission of any unlawful act on his part.
This cause was tried by a jury. The jury is the sole judge of the law and the evidence. They determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. On appeal, we will not weigh the evidence. We only consider the evidence most favorable to the State and the reasonable and logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Willoughby v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 210, 214 N.E.2d 169; Swartz v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 166, 214 N.E.2d 165; Gilmore v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 359, 98 N.E.2d 677; Oldham v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 150, 65 N.E.2d 414.
The evidence most favorable to the State shows that Lillian Ruth Green died as a result of a bullet wound that destroyed part of her brain. There is no controversy over the fact that the gun, from which the fatal bullet was discharged, was in the hand of the decedent and was being contested for by appellant and decedent at the time it fired. Appellant admitted that he had drunk five or six beers and a shot of whiskey in a period of about two hours prior to the shooting. The decedent, appellant's wife, was a prostitute. She told appellant she had met a guy who was going to give her some money. She refused to go home or elsewhere with appellant. Finally, she pulled a gun and pointed it at him saying, "I'm going back to the bar room and you go on home." When appellant told her to put the gun up saying it was silly, she said, "I'll show you how silly it is." She then cocked the gun. Appellant grabbed for the gun trying to aim it toward the ceiling, and it went off. Appellant left the tavern and fled with his son to Colorado where he left the boy with relatives. He then went to his sister's home in Hermiston, Oregon, where he surrendered to the police. Most of the above evidence was contained in a statement made by the appellant to the police in Oregon. The statement was admitted into evidence by the State without objection by appellant. A second statement made by the appellant, which *97 was also introduced into evidence without objections, was quite similar, but it contained additional comments by appellant as follows:
From all the facts and circumstances brought out at the trial, the jury may have determined that appellant was jealous of his wife, angry because she would not leave with him, incensed because she pointed a loaded pistol at him and in a sudden heat committed the crime of which he was convicted.
In any event, there is sufficient evidence of probative value in the record to sustain the verdict of the jury. It necessarily follows that to sustain the conviction on the theory of an included offense it must be on the theory that appellant was convicted of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Lewis and Arterburn, JJ., concur.
Mote, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 229 N.E.2d 726.