Title: People v. O'Malley

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 2/18/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S024046 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
JAMES FRANCIS O‘MALLEY, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 131339 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
Defendant James Francis O‘Malley was convicted at trial of three counts of 
first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 one count of conspiracy to 
commit murder (§ 182.1), and one count of robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (b)).  
The jury acquitted defendant of a second charge of conspiracy to commit murder.  
The jury also found true special circumstances alleging murder for financial gain, 
multiple murder, and robbery murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1), (3), (17)(A).)  
Additionally, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a 
firearm and a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the offenses.  
(former §§ 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).)  Following a penalty trial, the 
jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court denied the automatic application to 
                                              
1  
All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
2 
 
modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death.  This 
appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Summary 
In 1986 and 1987, defendant was a member of a Hayward-based 
motorcycle club called the Freedom Riders, as well as president of its San Jose 
chapter.  The evidence presented at trial showed that the three murders of which 
defendant was convicted all had some connection to his involvement in the club.  
The first victim, Sharley Ann German, was married to Geary German, a fellow 
Freedom Rider, who paid defendant to kill Sharley Ann to prevent her from 
divorcing him and claiming their marital assets.2  The second victim, Herbert Parr, 
was a Freedom Rider ―wannabe‖ whom defendant and Rex Sheffield, another 
Freedom Rider, killed to obtain Parr‘s motorcycle.  The third victim, Michael 
Robertson, was a friend of defendant‘s whom defendant and Sheffield killed 
because defendant suspected him of being a ―snitch.‖  Defendant either admitted 
the killings or implicated himself in them in statements he made to various people, 
including one of his girlfriends, Brandi Hohman. 
2.  Prosecution Case-in-Chief 
a.  The Sharley Ann German Murder 
Sharley Ann German was married to Geary German, who, like defendant, 
was a member of the Freedom Riders.  They lived with Thomas M. (Sharley 
Ann‘s teenage son), Judith Flemate (a friend of Sharley Ann‘s), and Flemate‘s 
                                              
2  
To avoid confusion, we refer to the victim and her husband by their first 
names. 
 
3 
 
husband.  Defendant and Geary were good friends.  In 1985, another Freedom 
Rider, Rex Sheffield, fatally shot Geary‘s neighbor Frank Ramos, with whom 
Geary had had a dispute.  The killing occurred in the Germans‘ garage with a gun 
belonging to Geary.  Sharley Ann told police Sheffield was the shooter and 
showed them where the gun was concealed.  Sheffield was arrested and pled guilty 
to involuntary manslaughter.  Geary was angry that Sharley Ann had snitched on 
Sheffield and their marriage began to deteriorate.  
In April 1986, Sharley Ann confided to her friend Judith Flemate that she 
wanted to divorce Geary because he was having an affair with a coworker named 
Sandra Lithgow.  Sharley Ann confronted Geary about the affair and also told 
Lithgow‘s husband about it.  Flemate later heard the couple quarrelling in the 
garage and when they emerged, Sharley Ann had a black eye and her throat was 
bruised.  A few weeks later, Sharley Ann told Flemate, in Geary‘s presence, that 
when she married Geary she had paid off his debts and paid for work on their 
house, and she would see to it that he lost the house and their bank accounts.  
Geary was very angry.  Sharley Ann also told her friend Joan Whitworth that she 
wanted to divorce Geary and keep the house, and mentioned that she had a life 
insurance policy.   
Geary was scheduled to return to jail and serve his sentence for his part in 
the Ramos killing while Judith Flemate and her husband remained with Sharley 
Ann, who was worried about retaliation from Ramos‘s family.3  Geary, however, 
wanted them to leave, so they moved out a few days before April 25. 
                                              
3  
Geary, who was charged as an accessory, was sentenced to 10 months in 
county jail for his involvement in the Ramos killing, but his sentence was stayed 
until April 30, 1986.  After Sharley Ann‘s murder, he received a further stay to 
July 30, 1986.  He was released from jail on October 14, 1986.  At the time of 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
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On the morning of April 25, a Friday, Thomas M. woke up at 6:00 a.m., 
and talked to Sharley Ann before leaving for school.  Geary had already gone to 
work, clocking in at 6:45 a.m.  Daniel Whitworth, Joan‘s husband, talked briefly 
to Sharley Ann on the phone around 9:40 a.m., when he called and asked to 
borrow a battery charger, and again a few minutes later when she called back and 
asked to borrow a book.  She seemed normal and was apparently alone.  Her 
mother also spoke with her briefly by phone around the same time.  Thomas 
returned home from school around 4:00 p.m.  The front door was unlocked, which 
was unusual.  He went into his bedroom to change clothes, where he discovered 
Sharley Ann‘s body on the floor between the dresser and the bed.  He went to the 
home of Reni Jensen, the next-door neighbor, for help.  Jensen called 911.   
Sergeants Philip Beltran and Charles Hahn and Officer Herb Brown of the 
San Jose Police Department were dispatched to the German residence.  All were 
present when Geary appeared around 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., which was later than he 
usually arrived home on Fridays.  According to Officer Brown, Geary showed no 
emotion upon the discovery of his wife‘s murder.  It appeared to Sergeants Beltran 
and Hahn that he was pretending to be anguished.   
Sharley Ann‘s autopsy revealed she had been stabbed on the left side of her 
neck, severing her carotid artery, and shot in the head with a .25-caliber handgun.  
The medical examiner attributed her death to both wounds.   
Geary received the proceeds of Sharley Ann‘s insurance policy and bought 
a red Corvette with the license place ―CRIKET4.‖  ―Cricket‖ was his pet name for 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
defendant‘s trial, Geary had not been arrested for or charged with his wife‘s 
murder. 
 
5 
 
Sandra Lithgow, whom he continued to see after Sharley Ann‘s death.  Sharley 
Ann‘s silver Honda went missing after her death.  On July 25, 1986, it was found 
abandoned just off the Dumbarton Bridge near Interstate 580. 
On the day his mother was killed, Thomas M. told police he thought a 
member of the Ramos family might have killed her because of the ongoing feud 
between the families in the wake of Frank Ramos‘s death.  Police investigated 
Ramos‘s wife, Connie, but Sharley Ann‘s murder remained unsolved until 
defendant was arrested in 1988 on other charges. 
Following defendant‘s 1988 arrest, Theodore Grandstedt, with whom 
defendant sold drugs, told police that Geary had hired defendant to kill his wife.  
Grandstedt told police he saw defendant the day of the killing.  Defendant was 
excited and agitated and told Grandstedt he had finished doing the job, which 
Grandstedt understood to mean that he had killed Sharley Ann.  Grandstedt said 
defendant and Geary had a dispute over payments for the killing.  He told police 
that defendant and Karen Dolan (one of defendant‘s girlfriends, the mother of his 
children, and eventually his wife) argued about Geary owing money to defendant 
for his part of the job. 
In July 1987, defendant described how he killed Sharley Ann to Robert 
Fulton, a one-time Freedom Rider.  He said he went to her house, talked to her for 
a while, then went into another room and stabbed her in the neck.  After he 
stabbed her, he shot her.  He told Fulton that Sharley Ann ―was a tough bitch to 
kill,‖ and that Geary had hired him to kill Sharley Ann because she was going to 
divorce Geary and ―take everything.‖  Defendant said Geary paid him $2,500 and 
gave him Sharley Ann‘s silver Honda, which Fulton had seen in the Germans‘ 
driveway before Sharley Ann was killed.  Defendant called him when the car 
broke down on the side of the Dumbarton Bridge and asked Fulton to help him fix 
or move it.  Fulton declined and defendant abandoned the car. 
 
6 
 
Marlene Fulton, Robert Fulton‘s wife, saw defendant driving Sharley Ann‘s 
car after the murder.  Defendant subsequently told her he had killed Sharley Ann.  
She agreed with her husband that defendant showed up at their residence after the 
car broke down on the Dumbarton Bridge. 
According to Brandi Hohman, one of defendant‘s girlfriends, defendant 
told her he was hired by Geary to kill Sharley Ann, which he did by shooting her 
and cutting her throat.  Defendant also told Hohman he sold the .25-caliber 
handgun he had used to a girl he met at the home of their mutual friend, Laurel 
Beiling.  In December 1986, Alison Hurst, who was living with Beiling, bought a 
.25-caliber semiautomatic handgun from defendant.  
At trial, defendant‘s friend Richard Balthazar testified that around the 
summer of 1986 he cleaned a gun for defendant, who gave him the box the gun 
came in.  Police obtained the box from Balthazar.  Edward Peterson, an expert in 
firearm identification, testified that the bullet that killed Sharley Ann German had 
characteristics consistent with a bullet fired from the gun that would have been 
contained in the box. 
b.  The Christopher Walsh Robbery 
To provide context for subsequent events related to the charged offenses, 
the prosecution, over defendant‘s objection, presented evidence that defendant 
robbed Christopher Walsh.  In December 1986, Walsh, who aspired to join the 
Freedom Riders, was staying with defendant and Hohman at a motel in Mountain 
View.  Walsh and defendant had a falling out after Walsh kicked defendant‘s dog 
and Walsh moved out of the motel room.  Later, he called defendant and asked if 
he could return to pick up some of his belongings.  Defendant agreed.  Walsh 
returned to the motel and he and defendant used methamphetamine.  Defendant 
then pistol-whipped Walsh and forced him to write a phony bill of sale for his 
 
7 
 
motorcycle, turning it over to defendant.  Defendant told Walsh that if he went to 
the police, defendant would hunt him down and kill him.  Walsh nonetheless 
reported the robbery to the police, and a warrant was issued for defendant‘s arrest. 
c.  The Herbert Parr Murder 
According to his girlfriend, Linda Magner, Herbert Parr was a motorcycle 
club wannabe.  In late 1986 or early 1987, Parr met Joseph Martinez, a member of 
the Freedom Riders, and through Martinez he met defendant, who sold marijuana 
to Parr.  Magner sensed that the two men disliked each other, an impression 
confirmed by defendant‘s girlfriend Brandi Hohman, who said that defendant 
usually used the derogatory term ―lop‖ to describe Parr.   
Linda Magner bought Parr a Harley Davidson motorcycle.  Parr was proud 
of the motorcycle and liked showing it off to his Freedom Rider acquaintances, 
including defendant.  On the night of August 14, 1987, Parr told Magner he was 
going to Joseph Martinez‘s house and would return in a couple of hours.  She 
never saw him or the motorcycle again.  That night, Parr showed up at a party at 
his brother David‘s house.  A number of Freedom Riders were at the party, 
including defendant and his friend Rex Sheffield, the man who had killed Frank 
Ramos.  When David went to bed between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. that morning, 
Parr was still at the party.  
Defendant was selling drugs at the party.  He had earlier told Brandi 
Hohman he knew Herbert Parr was going to be there and that he wanted Parr‘s 
motorcycle.  He said he was going to wait for Parr at the party and intimidate him.  
When defendant and Parr encountered each other, defendant made ―mean‖ 
comments to Parr, who seemed afraid of defendant.  Hohman heard defendant and 
Rex Sheffield talking about taking Parr‘s motorcycle for a ride.  Sheffield became 
 
8 
 
offended when Parr bragged about knowing a member of the Hells Angels whom 
Sheffield knew was dead.  
Defendant and Parr disappeared into a back room for an hour and when 
they emerged they acted like buddies.  Defendant decided to move the party to the 
home of his friend Laurel Beiling and invited Parr to come along.  Brandi Hohman 
and defendant left in his car while Parr followed on his motorcycle.  On the drive 
to Beiling‘s, defendant told Hohman he was going to beat up Parr and take his 
motorcycle.  
There was no party when defendant, Hohman, and Parr arrived at Beiling‘s 
residence; everyone there was asleep.  Defendant, Hohman, and Parr went into 
Beiling‘s bedroom, where they used methamphetamine.  Hohman was sent to the 
store.  When she returned, Sheffield and his wife, Gail, had arrived.  Defendant, 
Sheffield, and Parr went into the backyard.  Defendant asked Parr if he wanted his 
last cigarette before they went out.  Hohman and Gail Sheffield were told to go to 
the front of the house.  While they waited there, Hohman heard a high pitched 
voice and strange noises that sounded like gurgling, coming from the backyard.  
Defendant and Sheffield entered the house without Parr and went into a bathroom.  
Hohman heard running water and defendant told her he and Sheffield had been 
washing up.  Defendant told Hohman to take Yoshi — a friend of Beiling‘s 
staying at her house — to the store in Sheffield‘s car and keep him there for a 
while.  When they returned, Hohman and defendant went to the motel where they 
were staying. 
The next day, Laurel Beiling went into her backyard and noticed that a pile 
of wood beside the shed had been ―knocked around.‖  Inside the shed she found 
further disarray.  She was rearranging a stack of lumber when she found a bloody 
board with between 17 and 27 ―knife stabs‖ in it, made by a double-edged blade.  
She also discovered that a double-edged utility knife she customarily wore on her 
 
9 
 
belt was missing.  Beiling tried to call defendant but reached Brandi Hohman, 
whom she told about the bloody board.  When Hohman told defendant about the 
call, he was angry that Beiling had mentioned the subject over the phone.  Later 
Beiling spoke to defendant, who told her to calm down and come to his house.  He 
apologized for leaving her house ―in a mess‖ and said he would clean it up.  He 
returned her knife, telling her it was clean and she had nothing to worry about.  
Later that day, defendant went to Beiling‘s home and together they cleaned up the 
board and the shed.  As they did, defendant told her the less she knew, the better. 
A day or so later, defendant brought a U-Haul truck to the motel at which 
he and Brandi Hohman were staying.  With him was Freedom Rider Steven 
Dyson.  Accompanied by Hohman, defendant drove the truck to a house in 
Fremont because, he told her, ―[t]hey had to tear down [Parr‘s] bike.‖  Defendant 
said another Freedom Rider was going to buy the dismantled motorcycle from 
Sheffield and defendant.  Hohman did not see Parr‘s motorcycle in the back of the 
truck because defendant told her to remain in the cab, but she heard and felt a 
heavy object being lifted and removed from the back.  Defendant and the men who 
were assisting him went into the garage and closed the door.  Eventually, 
defendant and Hohman returned to their motel. 
Sometime after Laurel Beiling‘s call, defendant told Brandi Hohman he had 
killed Parr in Beiling‘s backyard.  He said he stabbed Parr, then cut his throat and 
―step[ped] on him trying to push the blood‖ out of his body ―because he wasn‘t 
dying.‖  Defendant acted out the killing for her.  Defendant gave Beiling various 
versions of Parr‘s death but in the most specific and detailed account he said he 
had killed Parr. 
Not long after the Fremont trip, defendant, still driving the U-Haul truck, 
took Hohman to the house in San Jose defendant sometimes shared with Karen 
Dolan and their children.  It was there, he said, that he intended to ―bury [Parr].‖ 
 
10 
 
At the house, defendant directed Hohman to the garage.  She saw Steven Dyson 
digging a hole in back of the garage.  Defendant helped with the digging.  When 
he and Dyson finished, Dyson backed defendant‘s car — a white Cadillac — up to 
the hole and opened the trunk.  He and defendant removed Parr‘s body, lowered it 
into the hole, and buried it.  Later, defendant asked Laurel Beiling and his friend 
Michael Robertson to buy baking soda and apples to put in his trunk to remove the 
smell of Parr‘s body.  
After defendant‘s arrest, police recovered Parr‘s body from behind the 
garage of the San Jose residence.  A search of defendant‘s car revealed baking 
soda and dried apples in the trunk. 
At trial, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Parr‘s body testified 
he had died after receiving 18 stab wounds.  
d.  The Michael Robertson Murder 
Defendant was arrested for the Christopher Walsh robbery on April 18, 
1987.  A bail bondsman posted his bail on April 20; the bail was secured by 
certificates of title to cars and motorcycles belonging to members of the Freedom 
Riders.  Defendant was scheduled to appear in court on October 7, but failed to do 
so.  Bail was forfeited and an arrest warrant issued.  According to Laurel Beiling, 
one of the Freedom Riders who put up vehicles as security for defendant‘s bail 
was ―pissed‖ by defendant‘s failure to appear.  Around the same time in early 
October, defendant got into an accident while riding a motorcycle belonging to 
Freedom Rider Joseph Martinez.  Defendant hid the motorcycle at Beiling‘s house 
and told her not to let Martinez know about the accident until he could repair the 
damage to the vehicle.  Martinez was very angry when he learned about the 
accident. 
 
11 
 
As a result of these incidents, defendant began avoiding direct contact with 
his fellow Freedom Riders and communicated with them through his close friend 
Michael Robertson.  Robertson and defendant were together almost every day and 
Robertson sometimes shared a motel room with defendant and Brandi Hohman.  
At some point, however, defendant began to suspect Robertson of being a snitch.  
Defendant told Hohman that Robertson, who had recently been released from jail, 
must have made a deal to insinuate himself into defendant‘s life and to provide 
information on him in exchange for Robertson‘s release.  Defendant told Hohman 
snitches ―should be killed and that snitches breed snitches and their kids should be 
killed too.‖  Matters came to a head on October 24, 1987, when defendant wrote a 
note to Hohman about Robertson that said ―[t]he serious mother fucker has to go.‖  
That same day he told Camolyn Ramsfield, Beiling‘s daughter, that he believed 
Robertson was a ―federal snitch‖ and he was going to ―take [Robertson] out.‖  She 
understood that to mean defendant planned to kill Robertson. 
That evening, Brandi Hohman went with defendant to a bar in Mountain 
View where they met two Freedom Riders, Greg Hosac and Rex Sheffield.  
Defendant had asked them to meet him there to talk about whether Michael 
Robertson had been lying about the messages he was carrying back and forth 
between defendant and club members.  After defendant talked to Hosac he told 
Hohman that Hosac had confirmed his suspicion that Robertson ―had been lying to 
him and the club.‖  Shortly afterwards, Robertson appeared at the bar, to 
defendant‘s and Hosac‘s evident displeasure.  Robertson did not join them but 
remained at the other end of the bar.  Later, defendant disappeared and Hohman 
went looking for him.  She found him behind the bar, talking to Sheffield.  
Defendant told her to leave them.  According to Hohman, when defendant and 
Sheffield returned to the bar, they invited Robertson to join them and ―everybody 
all of a sudden was best friends again.‖  Defendant invited Robertson to drive with 
 
12 
 
him and Sheffield to Santa Cruz to buy drugs.  Robertson said he preferred to 
return to the motel with Hohman, but defendant shamed him into going with a 
remark about ―being one of them women.‖  Defendant, Sheffield, and Robertson 
departed in a car Sheffield had borrowed from Joseph Martinez; the three men 
were all in the front seat, with Robertson in the middle.  Hohman returned to the 
motel where she, defendant, and Robertson had been staying.  
Around 8:15 p.m., Ellen McDonough and her husband were driving to 
dinner on Highway 17 when she saw a car on the shoulder and a man running 
around it.  The man‘s hair was cut in an unusual style that looked like a horse‘s 
mane; the hair ran down the middle of his head with the sides shaved.  This was 
defendant‘s hairstyle.  When she and her husband returned from dinner, she saw a 
sheriff‘s car and highway patrol car beside the vehicle.  She told her husband to 
stop so she could report what she had seen earlier.  Santa Cruz County Deputy 
Sheriff Joseph Hemingway was one of the officers at the scene.  He observed 
blood smears on the front seat, window, and doorjamb, as well as a blood-soaked 
bedsheet on the passenger side floorboard.  The car was registered to Gilbert 
Martinez, who was the uncle of Joseph Martinez.  Defendant‘s and Sheffield‘s 
fingerprints were found in the car. 
Around 3:00 a.m. on October 25, Brandi Hohman was awakened by 
knocking at the door of the motel room.  When she opened it, defendant and Rex 
Sheffield came in.  They were later joined by Greg Hosac.  Hosac said the police 
had found the car with blood in it and said ―something about they thought that 
[defendant] had done it.‖  Hosac and Sheffield were discussing alibis when 
defendant interrupted and ―told them they didn‘t have to tell the police anything.‖  
At some point they realized that one of the motel room keys must still be on 
Michael Robertson‘s body and they quickly vacated the room.  Defendant and 
Hohman went to Der Ghan, another motel. 
 
13 
 
At Der Ghan, defendant shaved his head so he was completely bald.  He 
told Brandi Hohman he had shot Michael Robertson in the head while Rex 
Sheffield was driving because Robertson had said something that offended one or 
both of them, and that after removing Robertson‘s body from the car he slit 
Robertson‘s throat.  When the car ran out of gas, he and Sheffield abandoned it 
and walked to a restaurant, where they called a friend who came for them.  Later 
that day, Greg Hosac and his wife came to the motel and defendant acted out for 
them ―shooting [Robertson] in the head and cutting [his] throat.‖  Defendant hid a 
bag containing his and Sheffield‘s bloody clothes and his knife behind a ceiling 
tile in the room.  
The next day, defendant was arrested for failure to appear in the 
Christopher Walsh case.  Brandi Hohman called her mother to pick her up.  She 
took the bag from the ceiling and hid it in her mother‘s attic, where police 
eventually recovered it.  
e.  Defendant’s Flight and Arrest 
Following his arrest on October 26, defendant again made bail.  A 
Massachusetts native, defendant fled to the East Coast with his girlfriend Karen 
Dolan, their three children, and his other girlfriend Brandi Hohman.  Hohman was 
arrested at an airport in Boston as she was attempting to return to California.  
Dolan and her children stayed in Massachusetts with Dolan‘s sister, who 
prevented defendant from communicating with Dolan.  Angered by this, he told 
Laurel Beiling in a phone call he was going to kill Dolan‘s sister and her four 
children.  Beiling, fearing for the children‘s lives, informed the Santa Cruz County 
District Attorney‘s Office of defendant‘s location.  On January 28, 1988, 
defendant was arrested in a New York City hotel. 
 
14 
 
3.  Defense Guilt Phase Case 
As to the murder of Sharley Ann German, the defense offered evidence that 
defendant was in Massachusetts when she was murdered and insinuated that she 
was killed by Connie Ramos, the widow of Frank Ramos.  The defense maintained 
that Rex Sheffield killed Parr and Robertson,4 and presented evidence attacking 
the credibility of prosecution witnesses Brandi Hohman and Laurel Beiling.  
Another theme of the defense was that defendant was a braggart who took credit 
for crimes he had not committed.  
Defendant testified he was in Massachusetts and New Jersey when Sharley 
Ann was killed on April 25, 1986, and he did not return to California until two 
days before her funeral.  He claimed he learned of her death in a phone call from 
Karen Dolan.  Dolan corroborated his alibi.  While in Massachusetts, defendant 
saw some old friends, three of whom testified they remembered seeing him in late 
April.  Defendant testified that when he returned to California, a friend named 
Glenn Johnson picked him up at the San Francisco airport and drove him home.  
Johnson testified that he picked defendant up three or four weeks before Johnson‘s 
birthday, which falls on May 27. 
The defense also presented evidence that Connie Ramos was investigated 
for Sharley Ann‘s murder because of the feud between the two families following 
Frank Ramos‘s death.  Police investigated inconsistencies in Ramos‘s account of 
her whereabouts the day Sharley Ann was killed.  Police also received an 
anonymous tip that a woman matching Ramos‘s description was observed entering 
Sharley Ann‘s house the day of the murder, that sounds of a quarrel were heard, 
                                              
4  
Rex Sheffield was originally charged with the Parr and Robertson murders 
along with defendant but their cases were severed.  At the time of defendant‘s 
trial, Sheffield had not been tried.  
 
15 
 
and the woman emerged carrying a rust-colored towel.5  A search warrant was 
executed on Ramos‘s car and residence and police recovered a rust-colored towel 
from the car.  Police also removed knives from the residence. 
Defendant denied telling Brandi Hohman that he had killed Sharley Ann.  
He claimed she was lying to avoid being charged as an accessory to the Parr and 
Robertson murders and because he had ended his relationship with her and 
returned to Karen Dolan.  He admitted talking to Theodore Grandstedt about the 
murder but denied telling Grandstedt he had committed it.  He testified, however, 
that he had told both Hohman and Grandstedt about crimes he had not actually 
committed to impress them.  Defendant also denied having told Robert Fulton or 
his wife, Marlene, that he had killed Sharley Ann.  He claimed they were part of a 
conspiracy against him by the Freedom Riders that developed after the Parr 
murder.  Finally, defendant testified that he came into possession of Sharley Ann‘s 
car after her death because Geary loaned it to him. 
Defendant acknowledged that he and Brandi Hohman had gone to a party at 
David Parr‘s house attended by murder victim Herbert Parr, but he denied having 
any animosity toward Herbert Parr and claimed there was friction between Parr 
and Rex Sheffield, who was also at the party.  Like Hohman, he testified that he 
invited Parr to Laurel Beiling‘s house to continue the party and that at some point 
Sheffield and his wife arrived.  He asserted that Sheffield was upset with Parr and 
wanted to beat him up because Parr claimed to know people he did not know.  
Defendant said he defended Parr.  He testified that he, Parr, and Sheffield went to 
the backyard, where Parr began talking about a tattoo he claimed to have gotten in 
Vietnam.  Sheffield then ―snapped‖ and began stabbing Parr.  Defendant started to 
                                              
5  
At least one officer investigating Sharley Ann‘s murder believed that Geary 
had arranged for someone to make the anonymous call implicating Connie Ramos.   
 
16 
 
leave but then returned and saw Parr was dead.  He admitted helping to remove 
Parr‘s body from Beiling‘s residence, burying it, and renting a U-Haul truck for 
Parr‘s motorcycle, which he dismantled.  
Danny Payne, who had been in county jail with Sheffield, testified that 
Sheffield told him about two murders he had committed, one of them involving a 
person Sheffield shot and buried in a backyard.  
Defendant testified that after the Parr murder, which occurred on August 
14, 1987, he began to distance himself from the Freedom Riders.  In September 
1987, he met Michael Robertson, who had just been released from prison.  
Robertson became his best friend and acted as his go-between with the Freedom 
Riders, carrying messages back and forth.  He and Robertson met with Rex 
Sheffield — who at this point was not a Freedom Rider — and resolved their 
differences.  Defendant, however, remained wary of the Freedom Riders.  On 
October 24, he returned a page from Greg Hosac, president of the Freedom Riders, 
who told defendant he had Karen Dolan and her (and defendant‘s) children and 
wanted to talk to defendant.  Defendant agreed to meet Hosac at J.W.‘s bar in 
Mountain View. 
Defendant went alone, but later both Michael Robertson and Rex Sheffield 
separately showed up at the bar.  Defendant resolved his differences with Greg 
Hosac and then spoke to Sheffield.  Defendant told Sheffield he had not told 
Robertson anything about Parr‘s killing and burial.  Sheffield said Robertson was 
―no good.‖  Nonetheless, the three men — defendant, Sheffield and Robertson — 
left the bar in Sheffield‘s car to drive to Santa Cruz to buy drugs.  On the way, the 
car stopped.  Sheffield got out and looked under the hood.  He returned to the car, 
took a gun from beneath the driver‘s seat, and shot Robertson in the face.  
Defendant was shocked and ―scared,‖ but he assisted Sheffield in moving the car 
out of the road and disposing of Robertson‘s body. 
 
17 
 
Defendant denied telling Brandi Hohman to conceal his knife and clothes, 
and he denied telling her that Robertson had died more easily than Sharley Ann.  
The defense presented two witnesses who testified Hohman was promiscuous, a 
drug user, and a liar.  Another defense witness portrayed Laurel Beiling as 
mentally unstable and untruthful, while still another testified Beiling told her 
defendant killed Parr but later recanted.  
4.  Rebuttal 
Using phone records, the prosecution presented evidence that in the week 
up to and including April 10, 1986 (15 days before Sharley Ann German was 
murdered), a number of collect telephone calls were made from the East Coast to 
defendant‘s home in San Jose, and that on April 10, a collect call was made from a 
public telephone at the San Francisco airport to defendant‘s home (indicating that 
defendant may have returned from the East Coast on that date, and was trying to 
obtain transportation back to his home), but that no long distance calls from the 
East Coast were charged to defendant‘s telephone after April 10.  Karen O‘Neal, 
who had been married to defendant‘s friend John Mercuri, testified that defendant 
threatened to kill her and members of her family if she laid claim to any marital 
assets during the divorce proceedings.  As a result, she signed away everything to 
Mercuri.  Paul Doty worked as a night clerk at a Massachusetts motel where 
defendant and Karen Dolan were staying.  The police arrived at the motel and took 
Dolan and their children, defendant not being present.  Defendant called Doty and 
threatened to ―blow [his] brains out‖ because he evidently believed Doty had 
informed the police of defendant‘s whereabouts.  John Acord, a police officer 
from defendant‘s home town of Wrentham, testified to a 1979 incident during 
which defendant attempted to slash him with a knife, leading to defendant‘s arrest 
and conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. 
 
18 
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case  
At the penalty phase, the prosecution primarily relied on evidence it had 
presented at the guilt phase:  the circumstances of the charged crimes (see § 190.3, 
factor (a)) and other episodes involving defendant‘s use of force or threat of force, 
including his threats to kill Karen O‘Neal and members of her family, his attack 
on Christopher Walsh, and his threat to kill Paul Doty (id., factor (b)).  The 
prosecution presented a certified copy of defendant‘s 1979 felony conviction for 
assault with a deadly weapon on Officer Acord. 
2.  Defense Case  
Defendant presented evidence of his religious conversion, his positive 
influence on other inmates while in custody, his harsh upbringing, and his 
addiction to drugs and alcohol, as well as expert testimony that he suffered from a 
form of fetal alcohol syndrome. 
Reverend Lawrence Walsh, a jail chaplain, testified that defendant had 
become a ―born again Christian,‖ with an understanding of his faith equivalent to a 
first-year Bible college student.  Defendant, he said, had taken Bibles to other 
inmates and had been and would continue to be a positive influence on others.  
Father Jim Mifsud, a Catholic priest, described defendant as ―probably the best 
prisoner‖ he had ever seen.  
Seven law enforcement officers testified about defendant‘s behavior while 
in custody in this case.  They said that he had behaved well, respected staff and 
other inmates, and had not created any problems for staff.  They predicted that he 
would continue to benefit the inmate population.  A fellow inmate testified that 
defendant had a calming influence on the witness and other inmates.  The program 
manager for education programs at the jail testified that defendant had earned his 
GED and high school diploma while in custody.  James W. L. Park, a prison 
 
19 
 
consultant, testified that a person sentenced to life without possibility of parole 
would be assigned to a level 4 or maximum security prison, which he described.  
He believed defendant would be a useful member of prison society. 
Vincent Schiraldi (a social worker with expertise in criminal justice), Gail 
Stewart (defendant‘s elder half sister), and Ellen Muzzy (the first wife of 
defendant‘s father) testified about defendant‘s family and upbringing.  They 
portrayed defendant‘s father as a violent man who physically abused his first wife, 
defendant, and defendant‘s mother.  As a result of his abuse, defendant‘s mother 
became an alcoholic.  Defendant‘s father pushed defendant into playing hockey, 
lying about defendant‘s age so he could play in a semiprofessional hockey league.  
When defendant was 14, he began to drink, with his father‘s permission, and to 
come and go unsupervised.  At 15, he dropped out of school and began to abuse 
drugs.  When he was 18, he moved out of the family home and left for California.  
Dr. Eugene Schoenfeld, a psychiatrist, testified that, based on his 
examination of defendant, he had found ―evidence of a type of fetal alcohol 
syndrome‖ attributable to defendant‘s mother‘s drinking while pregnant with 
defendant.  In Dr. Schoenfeld‘s view, fetal alcohol syndrome might lead a person 
to become antisocial.   
3.  Prosecution Rebuttal 
The prosecution called witnesses from Massachusetts who had known 
defendant and his family.  They testified that defendant‘s father was a kind-
hearted person and that they never saw evidence of, nor did defendant ever 
complain about, his father‘s violence.   
 
20 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Severance Motion  
Defendant contends the trial court‘s denial of his motion to sever the three 
murder counts constituted an abuse of discretion under state law and also violated 
his federal constitutional right to due process.6  The claims lack merit. 
1.  Background 
Defendant and Rex Sheffield were initially charged in the same information 
with the Herbert Parr and Michael Robertson murders, while defendant alone was 
charged with the murder of Sharley Ann German.  Defendant and Sheffield each 
moved to sever their cases, and defendant sought separate trials on each of the 
three murder counts.  At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued the 
three murders were unconnected by time, by motive, or by the method of killing, 
and that trying them together would prejudice defendant because the jury would be 
influenced to his detriment by the number of murder counts.   
                                              
6  
As to this and other federal constitutional claims, defendant does not 
specify which federal constitutional provisions he relies on, nor does he say 
whether he raised the federal claims below.  Nonetheless, as to each of his federal 
constitutional claims, ―it appears that (1) the appellate claim is the kind that 
required no trial court action to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke 
facts or legal standards different from those the trial court was asked to apply, but 
merely assert that the trial court‘s act or omission, in addition to being wrong for 
reasons actually presented to that court, had the legal consequence of violating the 
United States and California Constitutions.  To that extent, defendant‘s new 
constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  [Citations.]  In the latter 
case, no separate constitutional discussion is required or provided where rejection 
of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue presented to that court necessarily 
leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or ‗gloss‘ raised for the first time 
here.‖  (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 139, fn. 17.)  We apply this 
principle throughout this opinion in considering federal constitutional claims that 
were not advanced below. 
 
21 
 
The trial court severed defendant‘s case from Sheffield‘s but denied 
defendant‘s request to sever the murder counts.  It reasoned that all of the counts 
were ―of the same class,‖ that they were ―related factually to some extent,‖ and 
that ―in some respects the circumstances of each case [were] similar and some of 
the evidence of one count [was] cross-admissible and interwoven with the others.‖  
The court stated:  ―The only real possibility of prejudice . . . would be from the 
jury adding up counts against a defendant and letting the evidence of one murder 
eliminate the possible reasonable doubt as to another . . . .  [¶]  But because of the 
jury instructions to the contrary and the fact that this Court will pre-instruct the 
jury as to adding up [sic] each count separately without regard to the verdicts on 
the other counts, prejudice will be so diminished as to guarantee . . . defendant a 
fair and separate trial on all counts charged against him.‖  
Although the trial court did not preinstruct the jury regarding its obligation 
to decide each count separately, its closing charge included this instruction:  ―Each 
count charges a distinct crime.  You must decide each count separately.  The 
defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the crimes charged.  
Your finding as to each count must be stated in a separate verdict.‖ 
2.  Discussion 
― ‗ ―[B]ecause consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily 
promotes efficiency, that is the course of action preferred by the law.‖ ‘ ‖  (People 
v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 848.)  This preference is embodied in Penal 
Code section 954, which states in pertinent part:  ―An accusatory pleading may 
charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, . . . 
or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under 
separate counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the 
interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the 
 
22 
 
different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately 
or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.‖  
Here, the three murders and the related charges (conspiracy to commit murder and 
robbery) are of the same class, because they are all ― ‗assaultive crimes against the 
person.‘ ‖  (Capistrano, supra, at p. 848.)  Thus, they were properly joined unless 
the defense made such a ― ‗clear showing of potential prejudice‘ ‖ that the trial 
court‘s denial of defendant‘s severance motion amounted to an abuse of discretion.  
(People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 855.) 
In determining whether a trial court‘s refusal to sever charges amounts to 
an abuse of discretion, we consider four factors:  (1) whether evidence of the 
crimes to be jointly tried is cross-admissible; (2) whether some charges are 
unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case 
has been joined with a stronger case so that the spillover effect of aggregate 
evidence might alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether 
any charge carries the death penalty or the joinder of charges converts the matter 
into a capital case.  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 575.) 
Defendant argues joinder was improper because the evidence of the three 
murders was not cross-admissible.  Cross-admissibility is not, however, a 
precondition to joinder of charges.  ―[S]ection 954.1 expressly provides that 
‗where two or more accusatory pleadings charging offenses of the same class of 
crimes or offenses have been consolidated, evidence concerning the one offense or 
offenses need not be admissible as to the other offense or offenses before the same 
trier of fact.‘  (Italics added.)  Thus, ‗cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of 
joint trials.‘ ‖  (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 575.)  While the presence 
of such evidence ― ‗is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and 
to justify a trial court‘s refusal to sever properly joined charges‘ ‖ (People v. 
 
23 
 
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 38), the absence of cross-admissible evidence does 
not bar joinder.   
There was, in any event, significant cross-admissible evidence here.  For 
example, Brandi Hohman testified that defendant compared the murder of Sharley 
Ann German with the Michael Robertson murder and told her Robertson had died 
more easily.  This evidence would have been admissible at separate trials of 
defendant for each of these murders.  Hohman also testified defendant told her that 
after killing Robertson he removed the boots Robertson was wearing, which 
defendant had loaned to him, because defendant had worn them when he killed 
Herbert Parr.  This evidence would have been admissible at separate trials of the 
murders of Robertson and Parr.  The three murders also involved a deeply 
interwoven cast of characters and web of circumstances:  Defendant, the victims 
and the prosecution‘s witnesses were all in some manner connected to the 
Freedom Riders and the subculture it represented.  The events surrounding the 
crimes and the crimes themselves took place within the territory in which the club 
was active and within a time span that essentially paralleled defendant‘s 
involvement with the club.  
Moreover, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by joinder of 
the charged offenses.  None of the charges was more inflammatory than the others.  
Defendant argues Sharley Ann was more sympathetic than the other two victims, 
asserting that, unlike Parr and Robertson, she had no criminal record and was not 
―entrenched in the ‗biker‘ lifestyle and familiar with the violence that 
accompanied that lifestyle.‖  But there was no evidence that either Parr or 
Robertson was a hardcore biker.  Parr emerges from the trial testimony as 
someone ridiculed by the Freedom Riders for his desperate desire to be taken 
seriously as a biker and Robertson, whatever his criminal past, as slavishly 
devoted to a man who deceived and killed him.  Sharley Ann, who was married to 
 
24 
 
a Freedom Rider and participated in the club‘s activities, was certainly as 
―entrenched in the ‗biker‘ lifestyle‖ as Parr and Robertson.  Moreover, given her 
husband‘s involvement in the Frank Ramos murder, she was ―familiar with the 
violence that accompanied that lifestyle.‖  Accordingly, she was not necessarily a 
more sympathetic victim than Parr or Robertson. 
Nor do we agree with defendant that the evidence that he murdered Sharley 
Ann was significantly weaker than the evidence of the other two murders.  
Defendant repeatedly told witnesses he had killed Sharley Ann, describing facts 
about the crime that the killer would know.  Even if the Parr and Robertson cases 
were relatively stronger in that there was more evidence of defendant‘s guilt 
besides his admissions, the evidence that he murdered Sharley Ann was not so 
weak that the jury would be unable to follow the instruction to consider the 
evidence as to each count separately.  And given that the evidence of each murder 
charge was strong, we reject defendant‘s claim that joinder was improper because 
this was a capital case.  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 423 [―Even 
where the People present capital charges, joinder is proper so long as evidence of 
each charge is so strong that consolidation is unlikely to affect the verdict.‖].)   
In short, the trial court, after evaluating the relevant factors, found no 
reason to depart from the statutory preference in favor of joinder of the murder 
charges.  Because, for the reasons described above, defendant failed to make a 
clear showing of potential prejudice, the court did not abuse its discretion under 
state law when it denied defendant‘s motion to sever the charges.  
Defendant maintains that joinder, even if proper under state law, resulted in 
violation of his federal constitutional rights.  In evaluating that claim, ―we must 
. . . inquire whether events after the court‘s ruling demonstrate that joinder actually 
resulted in ‗gross unfairness‘ amounting to a denial of defendant‘s constitutional 
right to fair trial or due process of law.‖  (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
 
25 
 
p. 46, italics omitted.)  Here, defendant fails to point to any specific event or 
events that would demonstrate gross unfairness.  He argues that the court failed to 
preinstruct the jury about its duty to consider each charge separately.  This 
omission, however, does not demonstrate unfairness.  As defendant concedes, the 
jury was so instructed at the end of the guilt trial and before it began its 
deliberations, and defense counsel reiterated the point in his closing argument to 
the jury.  ―We presume the jury understood and followed the instruction.‖  (People 
v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 873.)   
Defendant also asserts the trial court‘s instruction was insufficient to 
prevent the jury from using evidence of one murder to find he had a predisposition 
to commit the other murders, likening this case to Bean v. Calderon (9th Cir. 
1998) 163 F.3d 1073.  In Bean, the trial court denied the defendant‘s motion to 
sever two counts of murder, each involving a residential robbery during which the 
defendant allegedly murdered a female victim.  The evidence of the defendant‘s 
participation in the first murder was significantly stronger than his participation in 
the second murder and, even though the evidence was not cross-admissible, the 
prosecutor argued the modus operandi for both was the same, thus ―repeatedly 
encourag[ing] the jury to consider the two sets of charges in concert.‖  (Bean, 
supra, 163 F.3d at p. 1084.)  Emphasizing the weakness of the evidence of the 
second murder as compared to the first, the lack of cross-admissible evidence, and 
the prosecutor‘s modus operandi argument, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
joinder of the charges violated the defendant‘s due process rights.  (Id. at 
pp. 1085-1086.)  Given those circumstances, it rejected as inadequate the 
instruction directing the jury to consider the evidence of each count separately.  
(Id. at p. 1084.) 
Here, by contrast, there was no joinder of a weak case to a strong case and 
there was cross-admissible evidence.  Although the prosecutor briefly noted in his 
 
26 
 
closing argument the similarities in the manner in which Robertson and Sharley 
Ann were killed, he made no serious attempt to persuade the jury that these 
similarities demonstrated defendant‘s guilt of the two crimes, nor did he suggest 
any similarity between those crimes and the murder of Parr.  And the jury‘s 
acquittal of defendant on the charge that he conspired to murder Parr provides an 
additional indication of its ability to consider the evidence of each charge 
separately.  Thus, he ―has not met his high burden of establishing that the trial was 
grossly unfair and that he was denied due process of law.‖  (People v. Soper 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 783.)  
B.  Jury Issues 
1.  Wheeler/Batson Motion  
Defendant contends, as he did at trial, that the prosecutor improperly 
exercised two racially based peremptory challenges against African American 
prospective jurors, in violation of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 
(Wheeler) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson).  We disagree.  
a.  Background 
Voir dire of the prospective jurors began on March 19, 1991.  Over the 
course of the voir dire, 163 prospective jurors were questioned.  
Defendant‘s challenge focuses on Prospective Jurors D.C. and R.A., both 
African American men.  In his juror questionnaire, D.C. noted his father had been 
a police officer in Louisiana from the 1960s to the 1980s.  In response to question 
47, which asked about favorable or unfavorable experiences with law 
enforcement, he wrote ―Ticket for expired liscence [sic] tags.  1 day exp[ired].‖  
Question 55(J) asked whether the prospective juror strongly or somewhat agreed, 
was neutral, or strongly or somewhat disagreed with the statement:  ―I think that I 
would require that the prosecution prove its case not only beyond a reasonable 
 
27 
 
doubt, as the law requires, but beyond all possible doubt  and to an absolute 
certainty before I would convict anyone of a serious crime.‖  D.C. checked the line 
for ―Somewhat agree.‖  Question 58(B) asked whether the prospective juror 
strongly or somewhat agreed, was neutral, or strongly or somewhat disagreed with 
the statement:  ―If someone brags about doing something wrong, he should be 
punished — whether or not he actually did it.‖  D.C. checked the ―Strongly 
disagree‖ line.  In the space provided for an additional explanation, he wrote:  
―Someone could be joking around[.]  [H]ow do you know if they are telling the 
truth.‖  
D.C. was voir dired on April 4.  The prosecutor asked if he held any 
grudges because he was ticketed for his expired license plate one day after the 
registration expired.  D.C. said he did not, explaining:  ―It was my fault.  I was one 
day — I was late.‖  The prosecutor inquired whether anything about his father‘s 
career in law enforcement would make him ―tend to gravitate toward one side or 
the other,‖ to which he responded, ―No, there isn‘t.‖  The prosecutor also asked a 
number of other questions about his ability to be an impartial juror.   
As to Prospective Juror R.A., in his juror questionnaire he checked 
―Strongly agree‖ on question 55(J), which asked whether the prospective juror 
would require more than proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict.  With 
respect to personal information, R.A. indicated in response to question 11 that, 
although his son lived with him, he did not know what educational level his son 
had completed or his occupation, if any.  For hobbies, he wrote:  ―My hobby is 
amateur magic.‖  R.A. had also been a state capitol police officer in Pennsylvania 
for two years.  
R.A. was voir dired on April 3.  In response to a question from the trial 
court about whether, if defendant was convicted, he could consider both life 
without the possibility of parole and death, R.A. answered, ―Yes, but I would have 
 
28 
 
to be convinced pretty well,‖  presumably before voting for death.  He went on to 
say, however, that he would not automatically vote for one penalty over another.  
During his questioning of R.A., the prosecutor focused on R.A.‘s understanding of 
the burden of proof.  With respect to R.A.‘s response to question 55(J), which 
indicated he strongly agreed that the prosecutor would have to prove its case 
beyond all possible doubt, the prosecutor asked:  ―You recognize that that would 
mean that your personal standard is higher than the law requires?‖  R.A. answered, 
―No.  But I just wouldn‘t want to have any doubt in my mind.‖  The prosecutor 
read him the reasonable doubt instruction and said, ―We‘re not talking about being 
convinced beyond all possible doubt.  [¶]  Do you see that difference?‖  R.A. 
responded, ―I see the difference, but still I just have to feel satisfied with myself 
that — ‖  The prosecutor broke in, saying, ―Okay.  And that‘s understandable,‖ but 
asked if R.A. could follow the law.  He answered, ―Well, I would be inclined to 
feel that I need to feel the certainty within myself, you know.‖ 
The trial court resumed questioning.  To illustrate the reasonable doubt 
standard, it gave the example of R.A. putting his garbage out on the night before 
collection and returning from work to find it gone, and suggested that in this 
scenario there would be no reasonable doubt the garbage collectors had collected it 
even though it was also possible the garbage can had been knocked over and the 
garbage eaten by a ―pack of wild dogs.‖  The court asked, ―Does that help you out 
at all?‖  R.A. replied, ―Sure.‖  The prosecutor concluded his voir dire by asking 
some additional questions about R.A.‘s ability to be impartial.  
On April 29, selection of the 12 jurors and four alternates began.  Twelve 
prospective jurors were called to the jury box and the parties were permitted to 
exercise peremptory challenges.  D.C. was among the first 12 prospective jurors.  
The prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to excuse D.C.  Both sides 
exercised additional peremptory challenges and additional prospective jurors were 
 
29 
 
seated to replace those who had been excused.  The prosecutor used his fifteenth 
peremptory challenge to excuse R.A.  At that point, defense counsel asked for a 
sidebar conference to ―put on the record that the district attorney has excused the 
second and only remaining black juror from the panel.‖  He continued, ―the 
defendant is denied a representative cross-section.  Those were the only two black 
jurors in the panel out of the four panels called from this entire area.  They both 
have been eliminated by peremptories.‖  The prosecutor replied:  ―Your Honor, I 
would be more than happy to respond as to the reasons, but I don‘t think that it 
would be appropriate to do it here.‖  He asked for an in camera conference.  The 
trial court denied his request and directed him to proceed.   
The prosecutor prefaced his remarks with the observation, ―I think that it‘s 
interesting [defendant] is objecting is that the People have excluded the two black 
jurors and the People are conscientiously [sic] discriminating against a particular 
class.  [¶]  I think [defendant] has been involved in white supremacy.  If anything, 
he would like not to have black members on this particular jury.‖7 
Regarding D.C., the prosecutor said, ―[H]e is a 33-year-old black male, 
married, three kids, renting.  [¶]  There were answers in his questionnaire that 
talked about that his father was a police officer back in the 60‘s.  However, he 
recalled and spoke of the prejudice.  He mentioned the license tag and so on.  [¶]  
But primarily there was a question which asked how he felt about if somebody 
bragged about something, whether they could be punished — whether or not they 
actually did it.  He put down in response to that, in effect, that a bragger could 
simply be joking about something.  [¶]  [Defendant‘s] defense in this particular 
case is that his confessing to all three murders is that he was only bragging, he was 
                                              
7  
No evidence of defendant‘s participation in any White supremacy group 
was presented at trial. 
 
30 
 
not actually telling the truth about what it was he was confessing to.  And I didn‘t 
like the answer in terms of a bragger could be joking.  [¶]  In connection with the 
demographics in connection with some other answers, 55-J, he was talking about 
strongly agreeing . . . proof should be more than beyond a reasonable doubt, to an 
absolute certainty.‖ 
The court then asked about R.A.  The prosecutor said:  ―[R.A.] is a 59-year-
old black male, divorced with two kids, he rents.  As I indicated, the other juror is 
a renter.  [¶]  In terms of the demographics with not owning a home, and answer 
11 on the questionnaire, the question about his children, and it was something in 
the answer indicating that lack of knowledge or something about certain 
circumstances regarding his children.  [¶]  [R.A.], for what it‘s worth, had a hobby 
as an amateur magician, which, in any event, I don‘t like the situation of one of the 
potential jurors being involved in magic, sleight-of-hand.  [¶]  He also indicated in 
terms of the burden of proof involved, a phrase during the voir dire where he said, 
‗I‘d have to be convinced pretty well,‘ and my feeling from that was, the context 
of which it was said . . . something about the way that he said it in connection with 
the questioning that he believed that he may require burden of proof over and 
above what the law required.  [¶]  As far as the death penalty was concerned — 
and I had another note down here.  My impression was he wanted more than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  [¶]  In terms of the death penalty he was somewhat 
equivocal.  As I recall, I summarized rather than giving him a rating on the death 
penalty how he felt.  He was not sure of his feelings, except that he was 
ambivalent about that.  [¶]  And quite frankly, I would like people a little bit more, 
in this particular case, more indicative one way or the other how they feel about it 
rather than a question mark, that can‘t indicate how they feel about it.‖  
 
31 
 
 
At the conclusion of the prosecutor‘s presentation, the trial court ruled:  
―The court finds that the People are not intentionally excluding one class of 
people, and the People‘s reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges are 
valid reasons.‖  
b. Discussion 
―Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate‘s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.  [Citation.]  
Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution.‖  (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612.) 
―A three-step procedure applies at trial when a defendant alleges 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.  First, the defendant must make a 
prima facie showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on 
impermissible criteria.  Second, if the trial court finds a prima facie case, then the 
prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge.  Third, the 
trial court must determine whether the prosecution‘s offered justification is 
credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has 
shown purposeful race discrimination.  [Citation.]  ‗The ultimate burden of 
persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, 
the [defendant].‘ ‖  (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 75.)   
Here, the trial court did not determine whether a prima facie case had been 
established.  Instead, after the prosecutor gave his reasons for excusing the 
prospective jurors, the court found those reasons to be credible and ruled that the 
defense had not demonstrated that they were based on race.  Because the court 
never decided whether defendant had made a prima facie showing that the 
 
32 
 
challenges were impermissible, the Attorney General correctly acknowledges that 
the question whether he did so is moot.  (See People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
363, 387, fn. 1 [―When a trial court solicits an explanation of the strike without 
first declaring its views on the first stage, we infer an ‗implied prima finding‘ of 
discrimination and proceed directly to review of the ultimate question of 
purposeful discrimination.‖]; People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 280-281.)  
Thus, the sole question before us is whether the trial court correctly ruled that the 
defense did not satisfy its burden of demonstrating discriminatory motivation at 
the third stage of the Batson inquiry. 
The prosecutor‘s ― ‗justification need not support a challenge for cause, and 
even a ―trivial‖ reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.‘  [Citation.]  A 
prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, 
hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.‖  (People v. Lenix, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 613.)  ―The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry, of course, is 
on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory 
challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons. . . .  All that 
matters is that the prosecutor‘s reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is 
sincere and legitimate, legitimate in the sense of being nondiscriminatory.‖  
(People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924.) 
― ‗We review a trial court‘s determination regarding the sufficiency of a 
prosecutor‘s justification for exercising peremptory challenges ― ‗with great 
restraint.‘ ‖  [Citation].  We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges 
in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court‘s ability to 
distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.  [Citation.]  So long as the trial 
court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory  
 
33 
 
 
justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.  
[Citation.]‘ ‖  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 571.) 
Also relevant here, in light of defendant‘s appellate arguments, are 
principles pertaining to comparative juror analysis, which, on a claim of race 
based peremptory challenges, compares the voir dire responses of the challenged 
prospective jurors with those of similar jurors who were not members of the 
challenged jurors‘ racial group, whom the prosecutor did not challenge.  (Miller-El 
v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241 (Miller-El) [―If a prosecutor‘s proffered reason 
for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack 
who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 
discrimination to be considered at Batson‘s third step.‖].)  ―[C]omparative juror 
analysis is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not 
necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination.‖  (People v. 
Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622.)  Where, as here, the comparative analysis was 
not made at trial, ―the prosecutor generally has not provided, and was not asked to 
provide, an explanation for nonchallenges.‖  (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
346, 365.)  Therefore, ―an appellate court must be mindful that an exploration of 
the alleged similarities at the time of trial might have shown that the jurors in 
question were not really comparable.‖  (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 
483.)  When a defendant asks for comparative juror analysis for the first time on 
appeal, we have held that ―such evidence will be considered in view of the 
deference accorded the trial court‘s ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent.‖  
(People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 624.) 
i.  D.C. 
The prosecutor explained that he excused D.C. ―primarily‖ because of his 
answer to question 58(B), which pertained to bragging.  The prosecutor also gave 
 
34 
 
additional reasons:  He was troubled by D.C.‘s reaction to being ticketed for a 
vehicle registration violation and by his answer to question 55(J), in which he 
somewhat agreed with the proposition that the prosecutor should be held to a 
higher standard of proof than reasonable doubt.  Defendant contends the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons for discharging D.C. were pretexts for racial 
discrimination.8  We address his contentions regarding each of the prosecutor‘s 
reasons. 
As noted, D.C. checked the line ―Strongly disagree‖ for the statement in 
question 58(B):  ―If someone brags about doing something wrong, he should be 
punished — whether or not he actually did it.‖  He added in explanation:  
―Someone could be joking around[.]  [H]ow do you know if they are telling the 
truth.‖  The prosecutor explained he was concerned about this answer because he 
anticipated one line of the defense would be that defendant bragged about criminal 
activity he had not actually committed.  (This indeed proved to be the case.) 
Defendant contends this explanation was equally applicable to several 
White jurors whom the prosecutor did not challenge.  We disagree.  Although 12 
of the seated jurors and alternates checked the same line in response to the 
statement, only two of them, like D.C., offered an additional explanation:  Seated 
Jurors L.R. and M.A.S.  L.R. wrote:  ―bragging is just talking, not committing a 
                                              
8  
In his opening brief, defendant claims the prosecutor exercised his 
peremptory challenge against D.C. in part because he was a renter, but his reply 
brief does not mention this claim.  In any event, we agree with the Attorney 
General that, read in context, the prosecutor‘s reference to D.C.‘s status as a 
renter, along with his marital and parental statuses, were descriptive and not 
reasons for his challenge.  
 
35 
 
crime.‖9  M.A.S. wrote:  ―People say a lot of things that they often don‘t mean or 
to show off for others.‖ 
Because defendant did not raise the issue at trial, the prosecutor was not 
given the opportunity to explain his reasons for dismissing D.C. while later 
retaining L.R. and M.A.S.10  Under these circumstances, we have said that ―a 
reviewing court need not, indeed, must not turn a blind eye to reasons the record 
discloses for not challenging other jurors even if those other jurors are similar in 
some respects to excused jurors.‖  (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 365-
366.)  In conducting this inquiry, we bear in mind that comparative juror analysis 
is not simply an exercise in identifying any conceivable distinctions among 
prospective jurors.  ―A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim 
unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; 
potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 
U.S. at p. 247, fn. 6.)  Rather, because the ultimate question before us concerns the 
                                              
9  
Defendant contends all 12 of the jurors who checked the line ―Strongly 
disagree‖ to question 58(B) should be considered for purposes of comparative 
analysis.  But the prosecutor specifically referred to D.C.‘s written explanation:  
―He put down in response to that, in effect, that a bragger could simply be joking 
about something . . . .  And I don‘t like the answer in terms of a bragger could be 
joking.‖  It was the additional explanation, not the checked response, on which the 
prosecutor relied.  Only L.R. and M.A.S. gave comparable responses.  
10  
Because of the structure of the jury selection process in this case, the 
prosecutor would not have had occasion to directly compare D.C. with L.R. and 
M.A.S. when he exercised his challenge.  Jury selection began when a group of 12 
prospective jurors was seated in the jury box.  When each side exercised a 
challenge, other prospective jurors were called in random order to take the place of 
the excused juror.  D.C. was among the first 12 called to the jury box.  Although 
the prosecutor would likely have compared D.C. to other prospective jurors sitting 
in the box at the time, L.R. and M.A.S. were not called into the box until later in 
the process, and the prosecutor could not have known at the time he excused D.C. 
when, or whether, L.R. and M.A.S. would ever be considered for selection. 
 
36 
 
prosecutor‘s motivations in exercising the challenge in question, we must ask 
whether there were any material differences among the jurors — that is, 
differences, other than race, that we can reasonably infer motivated the 
prosecutor‘s pattern of challenges.  (Cf. id. at p. 247 [finding ―strong similarities 
as well as some differences‖ between a challenged African-American juror and 
White jurors, and concluding that the differences were not ―significant‖ in light of 
the record as a whole].)   
Here, although all three prospective jurors gave similar responses to 
question 58(B), their responses to question 55(J) — also cited by the prosecutor as 
a reason for striking D.C. — were notably different.  That question asked whether 
the prosecutor should be held to a higher standard of proof than beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  While L.R. answered ―Somewhat Disagree‖ and M.A.S. 
answered ―Strongly Disagree,‖ D.C. answered ―Somewhat Agree.‖  As the 
prosecutor made clear in explaining his challenges against both D.C. and R.A., the 
jurors‘ attitudes toward the reasonable doubt standard was an important 
consideration that informed his decisions about how to use his peremptories. 
The questionnaire also asked a series of questions regarding the prospective 
jurors‘ feelings about the death penalty.  Asked about his ―general feelings 
regarding the death penalty,‖ D.C. responded:  ―I feel it[‘]s fair according to the 
case in which it is involved.‖  In response to a question asking about feelings 
about the adage ―an eye for an eye,‖ D.C. responded:  ―It is not one that I live by.‖  
With respect to the adage ―thou shalt not kill,‖ D.C. responded:  ―It is an adage or 
commandment that I live by.‖  In response to the question concerning the 
circumstances, if any, in which he believed the death penalty is appropriate, D.C. 
responded:  ―First degree murder that was something horrible, maybe multiple 
murders when someone would kill several people for no reason but just doing it.‖ 
 
37 
 
By contrast, L.R. described her general feelings about the death penalty as 
follows:  ―In some cases, when the defendant is proved definitely guilty, I think it 
should happen.  I can‘t see a person sitting in jail for the rest of their lives, but 
only in extreme cases where there is no other way.‖  With respect to the adage ―an 
eye for an eye,‖ L.R. responded:  ―I don‘t believe in it.  But I do believe in 
punishment for people who cannot live in society without hurting others.‖  Asked 
about the adage ―thou shalt not kill,‖ L.R. answered, ―If there is no other answer, 
then I think we do society [and] the person a favor.‖  In response to the question 
concerning the circumstances, if any, in which she believed the death penalty is 
appropriate, L.R. responded:  ―If there is no chance of this person becoming a 
productive member of society.‖ 
Finally, M.A.S. described her general feelings about the death penalty as 
follows:  ―Necessary for extreme cases.‖  With regard to the adage ―an eye for an 
eye,‖ M.A.S. responded:  ―A barbaric concept.‖  With respect to the adage ―thou 
shall not kill,‖ M.A.S. responded:  ―The person who did the murder should have 
thought of that before committing the crime.‖  In response to the question 
concerning the circumstances, if any, in which she believed the death penalty is 
appropriate, M.A.S. responded:  ―Kidnapping, torture and rape — such as the 
Central Park case, Manson case, treason that endangers the country, murder 
depending upon the case.‖ 
While D.C.‘s responses to this series of questions revealed little about his 
attitude toward the death penalty, other than a general view that it is ―fair‖ in some 
cases, both L.R. and M.A.S. expressed their belief that the death penalty ―should 
happen‖ and is ―necessary‖ in certain cases.  D.C.‘s responses certainly did not 
indicate that he would be an unfavorable juror, and the prosecutor expressed no 
concern about these responses in explaining his reason for challenging D.C.  But 
the other jurors‘ expressions of affirmative support for the death penalty in certain 
 
38 
 
circumstances, the nature of which was further explored and clarified during voir 
dire, would have made them more attractive ―in the eyes of a prosecutor seeking a 
death sentence.‖  (Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 247.)  As the prosecutor 
explained with respect to his decision to challenge R.A.:  ―[Q]uite frankly, I would 
like people a little bit more . . . indicative one way or the other how they feel about 
[the death penalty,] rather than a question mark.‖ 
Finally, M.A.S.‘s questionnaire indicated she had close ties to a number of 
people employed in law enforcement and criminal justice administration.  Her 
father had served as the Fresno County District Attorney for 17 years, and her son 
had attended a Florida police academy and was awaiting an offer from the United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration.  She had longtime friends who were 
prosecutors and also listed judges among her friends.  In this respect, she and D.C. 
were not entirely dissimilar:  D.C.‘s father had served as a police officer.  But the 
nature and extent of M.A.S.‘s ties to law enforcement and criminal justice 
administration, which prompted defense counsel to express concern about possible 
pro-government bias during voir dire, would have differentiated M.A.S. from D.C. 
from the prosecutor‘s perspective as well. 
With respect to the prosecutor‘s second reason for striking D.C., the 
prosecutor explained:  ―There were answers in his questionnaire that talked about 
his father was a police officer back in the 60‘s.  However, he recalled and spoke of 
prejudice.  He mentioned the license tag and so on.‖  Defendant claims the 
prosecutor‘s statement is evidence of pretext because D.C. said ―nothing about 
prejudice in his questionnaire,‖ nor did he ― ‗recall[] and [speak] of prejudice‘ in 
his voir dire.‖  
Defendant is correct that D.C. did not speak of prejudice in either his 
questionnaire or at voir dire, but the prosecutor‘s mistaken recollection that he had 
done so does not establish that the prosecutor was acting with discriminatory 
 
39 
 
purpose.  The prosecutor was attempting to reconstruct the voir dire of a juror that 
had taken place more than two weeks earlier, in the midst of a voir dire process 
that had lasted almost a month, over the course of which 163 prospective jurors 
were questioned.  His brief, passing reference to prejudice was linked to D.C.‘s 
written response to the question on the jury questionnaire asking about 
unfavorable experiences with law enforcement, in which D.C. noted he had been 
cited for an expired registration only one day after the license plate tag had 
expired.  The prosecutor questioned D.C. about the incident and, while D.C. said 
he held no grudge against the officer who had cited him, evidently the prosecutor 
disbelieved that assurance.  
The prosecutor, unlike this court, not only heard D.C.‘s words, but heard 
his tone of voice and observed his body language as he denied bearing a grudge 
against the officer who had cited him.  ― ‗On appellate review, a voir dire answer 
sits on a page of transcript.  In the trial court, however, advocates and trial judges 
watch and listen as the answer is delivered.  Myriad subtle nuances may shape it, 
including attitude, attention, interest, body language, facial expression and eye 
contact.‘ ‖  (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 363.)  Even if the prosecutor‘s 
concern about the citation, considered in isolation, might not provide a compelling 
reason for a peremptory challenge, the prosecutor‘s mistaken reference to 
prejudice alone does not establish that the prosecutor‘s stated reasons were 
pretexts for discrimination.  (See People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 661 
[no Batson violation when the prosecutor excused a prospective juror for a 
factually erroneous but race-neutral reason]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
153, 189 [―a genuine ‗mistake‘ is a race-neutral reason‖].)   
The prosecutor‘s third reason for exercising a peremptory challenge against 
D.C. was his answer to question 55(J), which asked for his views on the statement:  
―I think that I would require that the prosecution prove its case not only beyond a 
 
40 
 
reasonable doubt, as the law requires, but beyond all possible doubt and to an 
absolute certainty before I would convict anyone of a serious crime.‖  Although 
the prosecutor recalled that D.C. was ―talking about strongly agreeing,‖ D.C. in 
fact responded that he ―somewhat agree[d]‖ with the statement.  Defendant 
contends that because two White jurors, D.R. and F.S., responded even more 
emphatically to the question, checking the ―Strongly Agree‖ line, this justification 
was also pretextual.  But neither D.R. nor F.S. gave a written explanation in 
answer to question 58(B) about bragging, as did D.C.  The prosecutor‘s challenge 
to D.C. was based primarily on that written explanation, and D.C.‘s views on the 
burden of proof merely provided an additional ground for concern.  Moreover, 
F.S., unlike D.C., gave questionnaire answers indicating strong support for the 
death penalty, stating that it was not imposed often enough on first degree 
murders, again rendering her a more attractive juror from the standpoint of a 
prosecutor seeking the death penalty. 
In our view, the differences between D.C. and the other jurors were 
significant, if not overwhelming, thus undermining defendant‘s assertion that the 
prosecutor‘s stated reasons for excusing D.C. were merely pretextual.  Moreover, 
this case did not involve a situation in which ―[r]acial identity between the 
defendant and excused person,‖ or between the victim and the majority of 
remaining jurors, raises heightened concerns about whether the prosecutor‘s 
challenge was racially motivated.  (See Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 416 
[―Racial identity between the defendant and the excused person might in some 
cases be the explanation for the prosecution‘s adoption of the forbidden 
stereotype, and if the alleged race bias takes this form, it may provide one of the 
easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive showing that 
wrongful discrimination has occurred.‖]; cf. People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
1302, 1326 [the fact that ―this case involves an African–American defendant 
 
41 
 
charged with killing ‗his White girlfriend‘s child‘ ‖ is ―obviously highly relevant‖ 
to the determination whether a prima facie case of discrimination existed], 
overruled on other grounds in Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162; 
Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281 [―the defendant need not be a member of the 
excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-
section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a 
member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these 
facts may also be called to the court‘s attention‖].)  Nor were there any other 
indications that the prosecutor‘s pattern of challenges might have been racially 
motivated.  In the end, because the prosecutor‘s stated reasons for challenging 
D.C. were both legitimate and credible, we uphold the trial court‘s ruling that the 
prosecutor was not motivated by discriminatory intent when he challenged D.C. 
ii.  R.A. 
According to defendant, the prosecutor offered five reasons for his 
challenge to R.A.  Defendant concedes that three of these — R.A.‘s lack of 
knowledge about his children, his insistence that he would apply an excessively 
high burden of proof on the prosecution, and his ambivalence on imposing the 
death penalty — were race neutral and supported by the record.  He argues, 
however, that the other two — R.A.‘s status as a renter and the fact he listed as his 
hobby that he was an amateur magician — were pretextual and masked 
discriminatory intent. 
When asked about R.A., the prosecutor prefaced his remarks by noting, 
―[R.A.] is a 59-year-old black male, divorced with two kids, he rents.  As I 
indicated, the other juror is a renter.‖  Defendant seizes upon the italicized phrase, 
which evidently refers to D.C., as proof that R.A.‘s renter status was advanced as a 
justification for the peremptory challenge.  But the prosecutor did not cite that as a 
 
42 
 
reason for his challenge to D.C.  Moreover, unlike his other reasons for 
challenging R.A., the prosecutor said nothing more about his renter status as a 
justification for the challenge.  Although his comment that R.A. was a renter was 
admittedly somewhat ambiguous, we construe it as descriptive, not as a 
justification for the challenge. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor‘s reliance on R.A.‘s interest in 
amateur magic as a reason to challenge him, while race neutral, ―had nothing at all 
to do with this case and [is] properly viewed as a pretext for discrimination.‖  We 
disagree.  ― ‗ ―[H]unches[,]‖ and even ―arbitrary‖ exclusion is permissible, so long 
as the reasons are not based on impermissible group bias‘ [citation].  The basis for 
a challenge may range from ‗the virtually certain to the highly speculative‘ 
[citation] and ‗even a ―trivial‖ reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.‘  
[Citation.]‖  (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1316; see, e.g., Purkett v. 
Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 769 [prospective juror challenged ―because he had 
long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard‖].)  The prosecutor‘s sleight-of-hand 
comment reveals some concern with a prospective juror who practiced illusion and 
deception as a pastime.  While certainly ―idiosyncratic‖ and even ―arbitrary‖ 
(People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613), the prosecutor‘s mention of his 
aversion to having an amateur magician on his jury does not establish that he acted 
with discriminatory intent, particularly in light of his other, concededly legitimate, 
reasons for exercising the challenge. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler 
motion.  
 
43 
 
2.  Excusal of Juror K.N. 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly discharged Prospective Juror 
K.N. after it concluded her difficulty in applying the death penalty would 
substantially impair her ability to serve as a juror.  The contention is without merit. 
― ‗Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 . . . , we consider 
whether the record fairly supports the trial court‘s determination that [a 
prospective juror‘s] views on the death penalty would have prevented or 
substantially impaired her performance as a juror.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 399.)  ―A trial court may excuse a 
prospective juror for cause if no reasonable possibility exists the prospective juror 
could consider imposing the death penalty.  [Citation.]  The trial court has broad 
discretion in making this determination.  [Citation.]  On appeal, we will uphold the 
trial court‘s ruling if the record ‗fairly support[s]‘ it, ‗accepting as binding the trial 
court‘s determination as to the prospective juror‘s true state of mind when the 
prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.  
[Citations.]‘  Prospective jurors often cannot give unmistakably clear answers as to 
their ability to impose the death penalty, and the trial court, aided by its 
assessment of demeanor, is in the best position to assess state of mind.‖  (People v. 
Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 60, fn. omitted.) 
Applying these principles, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s 
decision to excuse Prospective Juror K.N.  In her questionnaire, K.N. 
demonstrated her discomfort with imposing the death penalty, writing that such a 
decision and the ―the serious nature of this trial . . . [was] beyond what [she] 
wanted to deal with.‖  She expressed the same reservations during initial 
questioning by the court, saying she would have ―a real hard time with the second 
phase of the [trial] having to make that decision.‖  She acknowledged that 
intellectually she could consider both penalties, but commented:  ―It‘s not 
 
44 
 
something that I feel very comfortable with and it‘s something that I would have 
to live with the rest of my life.‖  She told the prosecutor, ―If I find one in my 
house, I don‘t kill a spider.  I catch them and take them outside.  I don‘t want to 
have anything to do with another person‘s death.‖  Her voice shook as she was 
being examined about the penalty phase and when she left the courtroom she 
slammed the door in apparent anger.  Three days later, she asked the trial court to 
excuse her, reporting that the prospect of serving on the jury had left her unable to 
sleep the night following her voir dire.  The court asked if her ―emotional state‖ 
would make it difficult for her to ―pay attention‖ to the trial.  She replied, ―Well, if 
Monday night was any indication, I probably slept about four hours, you know, 
[and] I probably will be extremely exhausted.‖  After noting her physical 
responses to voir dire — the shaky voice and sleeplessness — the court found that 
her emotional state would substantially impair her ability to serve as a juror, and 
that service on the jury ―would be detrimental to the mental and/or physical well-
being of the juror‖ and ―to a fair trial to both sides‖ because ―her emotional state 
would prevent her from hearing all the evidence and giving the proceedings the 
proper attention required.‖  She was excused. 
K.N.‘s answers regarding her ability to vote for a death sentence expressed 
significant hesitancy.  Her reports of the emotional toll the mere prospect of 
serving on the jury was taking on her reasonably caused the trial court to have 
concerns about her ability to concentrate and to render a fair verdict.  Thus, the 
court acted well within its discretion in excusing her.   
 
45 
 
C.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Instructional Claims 
a.  Alleged Failure to Instruct on Assault as Lesser Included 
Offense to Robbery  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on 
assault (§ 240) as a lesser included offense to the robbery of Herbert Parr, charged 
as count four, which provided the predicate for the felony-murder special 
circumstance alleged in connection with Parr‘s murder.  Defendant theorizes that, 
under other instructions, the jury could have concluded he was too intoxicated to 
have formed the specific intent for robbery but found he had the general intent for 
assault.  
―We have applied two tests in determining whether an uncharged offense is 
necessarily included within a charged offense:  the ‗elements‘ test and the 
‗accusatory pleading‘ test.  Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of the 
greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter 
is necessarily included in the former.  Under the accusatory pleading test, if the 
facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the elements of the 
lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.‖  (People v. Reed 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227-1228.)  Here, defendant concedes that assault is not 
a lesser included offense of robbery under the statutory elements test, because a 
robbery can be committed by ―force or fear‖ (§ 211, italics added), and a robbery 
committed by fear does not involve the use of force, which is an element of the 
crime of assault.  (People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 99-100.)  But the 
accusatory pleading charged defendant with robbery by ―force and fear.‖  
According to defendant, this means that an element of force was necessary to the 
robbery conviction, and that assault was therefore a lesser included offense of the 
robbery under the accusatory pleading test. 
 
46 
 
Preliminarily, defense counsel stated at trial that, as a tactical decision, the 
only lesser included offense instructions he sought with respect to the robbery 
charge were regarding receiving stolen property.  Accordingly, the doctrine of 
invited error bars his claim.  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 905 
[― ‗[A] defendant may not invoke a trial court‘s failure to instruct on a lesser 
included offense as a basis on which to reverse a conviction when, for tactical 
reasons, the defendant persuades a trial court not to instruct on a lesser included 
offense supported by the evidence.‘ ‖].)  In any event, the claim is without merit, 
as explained below. 
In People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, as in this case, the accusatory 
pleading charged the defendant with robbery by force and fear.  Like defendant 
here, the defendant in Parson argued that, under the accusatory pleading test, the 
robbery ―necessarily included the lesser offense of assault‖ and that the trial court 
erred in not instructing on that offense.  (Id. at p. 349.)  Declining to address the 
Attorney General‘s argument that assault is not included within the crime of 
robbery, even when the pleading alleges a robbery by force and fear (see People 
v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203), we concluded that the trial court was not 
required to instruct on assault in any event because there was no substantial 
evidence that the defendant was guilty only of that offense, and not of the greater 
offense of robbery.  (Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 350.)  
The same reasoning applies here.  The only evidence regarding defendant‘s 
asserted intoxication was Brandi Hohman‘s testimony that at Laurel Beiling‘s 
house defendant used methamphetamine and defendant‘s testimony that he also 
consumed an unspecified amount of tequila and beer at Beiling‘s.  There was no 
evidence that defendant was or appeared to be intoxicated at any point before 
Parr‘s murder, particularly not to the extent that he might not have formed the 
intent to deprive Parr of his property.  There was evidence, however, that 
 
47 
 
defendant wanted Parr‘s motorcycle, was waiting for Parr at a party, allayed Parr‘s 
fear of him by acting in a friendly manner toward him after initially being hostile, 
invited Parr to Beiling‘s house, armed himself with Beiling‘s knife and, with Rex 
Sheffield, led Parr out to Beiling‘s backyard where he stabbed Parr to death and 
disposed of the body by putting it in his car trunk after making sure that Hohman 
had removed a potential witness — Yoshi — from Beiling‘s residence.  There was 
additional evidence that after the murder, defendant took Parr‘s motorcycle, 
dismantled it, and sold it for parts.  Thus, as in Parson, there was no evidence 
from which the jury could have concluded that defendant was so intoxicated that 
he lacked the intent to rob, and the trial court was not obligated to instruct on 
assault. 
b.  CALJIC No. 2.11.5  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by giving CALJIC No. 2.11.5, and 
asserts the error violated his Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights.  We reject 
the claim. 
As given here, CALJIC No. 2.11.5 stated:  ―There has been evidence in this 
case indicating that a person or persons other than defendant was or may have 
been involved in the crime for which defendant is on trial.  [¶]  There may be 
many reasons why such person or persons is not here on trial.  Therefore, do not 
discuss or give any consideration as to why the other person or persons is not 
being prosecuted in this trial or whether he or she has been or will be prosecuted.  
Your sole duty is to decide whether the People have proved the guilt of the 
defendant on trial.‖ 
Defendant contends this instruction was faulty because it prevented the jury 
from evaluating Brandi Hohman‘s credibility and because it undercut his third 
party culpability defense, particularly with respect to evidence that Connie Ramos 
 
48 
 
killed Sharley Ann German.  Because defendant objected to the instruction only 
on the latter ground at trial, the Attorney General asserts the initial argument is 
forfeited.  Defendant responds that he did object to the instruction, albeit not 
specifically as it applied to Hohman, and he argues that in any event no objection 
was required because the instruction affected his substantial rights.  (§ 1259 [―The 
appellate court may . . . review any instruction given, refused or modified, even 
though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights 
of the defendant were affected thereby.‖].)  Without deciding the forfeiture 
question, we address his claim on the merits.  (See People v. Champion (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6.) 
Brandi Hohman testified under a grant of immunity.  Defendant claims the 
instruction prevented the jury from considering that fact in assessing her 
credibility.  We rejected a similar claim in People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324 
(Price).  There, the defendant argued that the trial court should not have given 
CALJIC No. 2.11.5, contending the ―instruction erroneously told the jurors they 
could not discuss or consider the fact that prosecution witnesses had been granted 
immunity.‖  (Price, at p. 446.)  We observed that a challenged instruction cannot 
be read in isolation but must be ―considered in light of the entire charge.‖  (Ibid.)  
Reading CALJIC No. 2.11.5 in that context, we concluded that ―a reasonable juror 
would not have understood it as precluding the jury from considering the 
immunity granted to prosecution witnesses in assessing the credibility of those 
witnesses.‖  (Price, at p. 446.) 
Price explained:  ―The purpose of the challenged instruction is to 
discourage the jury from irrelevant speculation about the prosecution‘s reasons for 
not jointly prosecuting all those shown by the evidence to have participated in the 
perpetration of the charged offenses, and also to discourage speculation about the 
eventual fates of unjoined perpetrators.  [Citation.]  When the instruction is given 
 
49 
 
with the full panoply of witness credibility and accomplice instructions, as it was 
in this case, a reasonable juror will understand that although the separate 
prosecution or nonprosecution of coparticipants, and the reasons therefor, may not 
be considered in the issue of the charged defendant‘s guilt, a plea bargain or grant 
of immunity may be considered as evidence of interest or bias in assessing the 
credibility of prosecution witnesses.  [Citation.]  Although the instruction should 
have been clarified or omitted [citations], we cannot agree that giving it amounted 
to error in this case.‖  (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 446.)  We have applied Price‘s 
reasoning to reject similar challenges to CALJIC No. 2.11.5 in several other cases 
involving the testimony of an immunized witness.  (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 82, 148-149; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1055-1056; 
People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163; People v. Cain (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 1, 34-35.) 
As in those cases, defendant‘s jury was further instructed with CALJIC No. 
2.20, which listed the criteria for the assessment of witness credibility, including 
the existence of any ―bias, interest, or other motive‖ on the part of the witness.  
The jury was also instructed it could consider evidence of a witness‘s character for 
honesty.  (Defendant introduced evidence that Hohman was not truthful.)  
Significantly, because Hohman testified that defendant admitted killing the three 
victims, the jury was also instructed that ―[e]vidence of an oral confession [or oral 
admission] of the defendant should be viewed with caution.‖  (CALJIC No. 2.70 
(5th ed. 1988).)  Defendant notes that — unlike the cases cited above — no 
instructions were given on accomplice testimony.  Nevertheless, when we consider 
CALJIC 2.11.5 in conjunction with the other instructions that were given, we find 
that it is not reasonably likely that the jury construed the instruction as barring it 
from considering that Hohman had been given immunity when it evaluated her 
 
50 
 
testimony.  (See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [―reasonable 
likelihood‖ standard applies when evaluating ambiguous instructions].)   
Defendant‘s claim that instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11.5 
undercut his third party culpability defense is similarly meritless.  As noted, the 
purpose of the instruction is to prevent the jury from speculating as to why other 
participants are not on trial with the defendant or their eventual fates.  Nothing in 
the instruction prohibits a jury from considering evidence that such participants, 
and not the defendant, committed the charged crimes.   
c.  Alleged Failure to Instruct on Target Offense in Conspiracy 
Instruction 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to define the target 
offense in connection with its conspiracy instructions, specifically CALJIC No. 
6.11. 
Count two of the information charged defendant with conspiracy to murder 
Herbert Parr; count four charged him with the murder of Parr.  Count five charged 
defendant with conspiracy to murder Michael Robertson; count six charged him 
with the murder of Robertson.  Pursuant to CALJIC No. 6.10, the trial court 
instructed the jury that ―[a] conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two 
or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit the public offense of 
murder and with the further specific intent to commit such offense followed by an 
overt act committed in this state by one or more of the parties for the purpose of 
accomplishing the object of the agreement.  Conspiracy is a crime.‖   
The trial court further instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 6.11 
(1989 rev.) (5th ed. 1988):  ―A member of a conspiracy is not only guilty of the 
particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating 
committing, but is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any act 
of a co-conspirator to further the object of the conspiracy, even though such an act 
 
51 
 
was not intended as a part of the original plan and even though he was not present 
at the time of the commission of such act.  [¶]  You must determine whether the 
defendant is guilty as a member of a conspiracy to commit the crime originally 
contemplated, and if so, whether the crimes alleged in Counts four and six were a 
natural and probable consequence of the originally contemplated criminal 
objective of the conspiracy.‖   
During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note pertaining only to 
count two — the charge that defendant conspired to murder Parr — that read:  ―If 
the jury decided that there was a conspiracy to commit a crime other than murder 
and the natural result of that other crime was murder, is the Defendant guilty of 
conspiracy even though that other crime is not specified in the charges[?]  (The 
Information Document[.])  Reference:  Count #2.  The other crime would be 
assault.‖  The court responded:  ―No.  The defendant can only be convicted of 
crimes for which he has been charged in the information; or of those that are lesser 
offenses for which the court has instructed you.‖  As previously noted, the jury 
ultimately acquitted defendant of conspiring to murder Parr. 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to specify the ―crime 
originally contemplated‖ referred to in CALJIC No. 6.11 and that the jury‘s later 
question showed that the court‘s failure to do so allowed the jury to engage in 
―unguided speculation‖ regarding the nature of that crime.  He argues that the 
jury‘s question shows that it was willing to engage in such speculation not only on 
the conspiracy charge that was the subject of the jury‘s question, but also on the 
charges that defendant murdered Parr and Robertson.  
Preliminarily, the Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited the 
claim by not asking the trial court to specify a target crime for the jury.  As noted 
below, defendant relies on People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248 
(Prettyman), where we said the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on 
 
52 
 
target offenses in connection with aider and abettor liability.  (Id. at p. 266.)  If 
Prettyman applied here in the manner defendant claims, then the trial court would 
have had a similar sua sponte duty to identify a predicate offense when it 
instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 6.11, and defendant could not forfeit the claim 
by failing to ask the court to do so.  The claim, however, fails on its merits. 
In Prettyman, we held that when the prosecutor relies on the natural and 
probable consequence doctrine as to a defendant charged as an aider and abettor, 
the trial court must give an instruction ― ‗identify[ing] and describ[ing] the target 
crimes that the defendant might have assisted or encouraged.‘ ‖  (Prettyman, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 254.)  Defendant argues that the same principles should 
apply when, as here, a defendant is prosecuted as a conspirator rather than an aider 
and abettor. 
We rejected a similar argument in People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 82 
(Valdez).  In Valdez, the defendant was charged with murder but was not charged 
separately with conspiracy.  The trial court instructed the jury on conspiracy as a 
theory of liability for murder, and it defined ―conspiracy‖ as ― ‗an agreement 
between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit a public 
offense such as murder, and with the further specific intent to commit such 
offense.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 151.)  The jury convicted the defendant of murder.  On 
appeal, the defendant argued the italicized phrase was ambiguous as to the object 
of the conspiracy and ―impermissibly allowed the jury to convict him based on a 
‗generalized belief that [he] intended to assist and/or encourage unspecified 
nefarious conduct.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  Like defendant here, he relied on Prettyman.   
In Valdez, we rejected the defendant‘s analogy to Prettyman, explaining:  
―Even were defendant correct that Prettyman‘s holding applies to instructions on 
conspiracy — a question we do not answer— that holding would not aid him.  We 
stressed in Prettyman that a court‘s sua sponte duty to identify and describe target 
 
53 
 
crimes ‗is quite limited.‘  [Citation.]  It arises only when ‗uncharged target 
offenses form a part of the prosecution‘s theory of criminal liability and 
substantial evidence supports the theory.‘  [Citation.]  Moreover, even when the 
duty arises, the trial court ‗need not identify all potential target offenses supported 
by the evidence, but only those that the prosecution wishes the jury to consider.‘  
[Citation.]  In this case, the only target offense under the prosecution‘s theory of 
criminal liability was murder, and that was a charged offense.  The prosecution 
never argued any other target offense and the evidence overwhelmingly pointed 
only to that target offense.  On this record, the trial court‘s instruction sufficed.‖  
(Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 152.)  
Here, defendant was charged with two conspiracies to commit specific 
murders, as well as with the murders that were the objects of the alleged 
conspiracies.  He was not charged with any other crimes that he might not have 
contemplated, but might have been the natural and probable consequence of the 
crimes agreed to in the conspiracies.  As in Valdez, ―the only target offense under 
the prosecution‘s theory of criminal liability was murder, and that was a charged 
offense.‖  (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 152.)  Thus, Prettyman‘s requirement 
that the jury be instructed on the target crime or crimes in assessing aiding and 
abetting liability is inapplicable.  Defendant‘s related claim that the trial court was 
required to define the phrase ―originally contemplated criminal objective‖ in the 
instruction is even less compelling.  The jury was instructed that defendant was 
charged with conspiracy to commit murder.  There was no other criminal objective 
to which the language in CALJIC No. 6.11 could have referred.   
Lastly, defendant argues the jury‘s note shows it ―engaged in ‗unguided 
speculation‘ ‖ in connection with CALJIC No. 6.11 that may have led it to convict 
him of the charges that he murdered Parr and Robertson.  We disagree.  The note 
pertained only to the charge that defendant conspired to murder Parr — a charge 
 
54 
 
on which the jury ultimately found him not guilty — and gave no indication that 
the jury was attempting to apply the natural and probable consequences rule to the 
two murder charges.   
d.  Uncharged Acts Instruction 
Over defendant‘s objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to 
present evidence that defendant had assaulted Christopher Walsh and robbed him 
of his motorcycle.  Prior to trial, the prosecutor explained his theory of the 
relevance of the evidence.  ―[T]he People‘s position is that [it] is relevant . . . in 
terms of [defendant‘s] subsequent conduct with Mr. Parr.  When he wanted 
[Parr‘s] motorcycle, he had learned from Christopher Walsh . . . that if [you] leave 
a victim alive they can report it to the police, and [Parr] was subsequently killed 
when [his] motorcycle was taken.‖  Walsh was called and testified to the incident.   
In connection with Walsh‘s testimony, the jury was instructed with 
CALJIC No. 2.50 and CALJIC No. 2.50.1.  At the time of trial, CALJIC No. 2.50 
(5th ed. 1988) stated:  ―Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing 
that the defendant committed [a crime] [crimes] other than that for which [he] . . . 
is on trial.  [¶]  Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be 
considered by you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that 
[he] . . . has a disposition to commit crimes.  [¶]  Such evidence was received and 
may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to 
show:  [¶] . . . [¶]  [A motive for the commission of the crime charged;] [¶] . . . 
[The crime charged is part of a larger continuing plan, scheme or conspiracy;]  [¶]  
[The existence of a conspiracy].  [¶]  For the limited purpose for which you 
consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other 
evidence in the case.  [¶]  You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any 
other purpose.‖  (Italics added.) 
 
55 
 
At the time of trial, CALJIC No. 2.50.1 (5th ed. 1988) stated:  ―Within the 
meaning of the preceding instruction, such other crime or crimes purportedly 
committed by [a defendant] must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  
You must not consider such evidence for any purpose unless you are satisfied that 
[the] . . . defendant committed such other crime or crimes.  [¶]  The prosecution 
has the burden of proving these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.‖  
In his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the Walsh 
evidence showed that defendant had ―a common scheme or plan‖ of taking 
motorcycles by force, first from Walsh and then from Parr.  He also argued that, 
because Walsh had reported the crimes to police, defendant had learned from that 
experience he could not leave his victim — Parr — alive.  He explained:  ―I 
submit . . . that from this particular evidence, you can draw the legitimate 
conclusion that the Walsh situation, no doubt, was fresh on [defendant‘s] mind.  
[¶]  He knew what happened when he left a live victim with Christopher Walsh.  
Christopher Walsh is alive today, and because of the fact he‘s alive today, I 
submit, in [defendant‘s] mind, is one of the reasons Herbert Parr is not.‖   
Focusing on the italicized phrase quoted above from CALJIC No. 2.50, 
defendant contends that phrase led the jury to believe it could convict him of 
conspiracy to murder Michael Robertson simply by finding he had assaulted and 
robbed Christopher Walsh by a preponderance of the evidence.   
Preliminarily, we agree with the Attorney General that defendant has 
forfeited this claim by failing to ask the trial court to clarify the instruction of 
which he now complains.  (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024.)  As 
demonstrated below, all parties clearly understood that the uncharged crimes 
evidence, and therefore the instructions on that point, pertained solely to the Parr 
murder, not to the charges involving Robertson.  Had defendant wished, he could 
 
56 
 
have sought to make that explicit in the instructions, but he failed to seek such 
clarification.  Accordingly, the claim is forfeited.  It is also without merit. 
―The relevant inquiry [when instructional error is claimed] is whether, ‗in 
the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury was misled to defendant‘s prejudice.‘  [Citation.]  Also, 
‗ ― ‗we must assume that jurors are intelligent people and capable of understanding 
and correlating all jury instructions which are given.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Sattiewhite 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 475; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 [―A 
single jury instruction may not be judged in isolation, but must be viewed in the 
context of all instructions given.‖].)  
The trial court defined the elements of conspiracy for the jury and described 
the requirement that the prosecution prove defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  It also told the jury that whether an instruction applied depended on its 
factual findings and that it should disregard any inapplicable instructions.  As 
noted above, counsel and the court recognized that the other crimes evidence 
pertained solely to the prosecutor‘s claim that it showed a common plan with 
respect to the robberies of Walsh and Parr.  The prosecutor explicitly argued to the 
jury that this was its relevance.  At no time and nowhere in the record was any 
connection drawn between the Walsh incident and count five, which alleged 
conspiracy to murder Robertson.  Thus, there is not a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury applied CALJIC No. 2.50 in the manner that defendant now claims, and 
his contention must be rejected. 
e.  CALJIC No. 2.01 
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.01, the standard instruction guiding 
the jury‘s consideration of circumstantial evidence, was improperly given in this 
case because it did not also apply to direct evidence.  We have frequently rejected 
 
57 
 
this claim.  As we have explained:  ―[D]irect evidence, unlike circumstantial 
evidence, does not generate conflicting inferences.  ‗ ―Circumstantial evidence 
involves a two-step process—first, the parties present evidence and, second, the 
jury decides which reasonable inference or inferences, if any, to draw from the 
evidence—but direct evidence stands on its own.  So as to direct evidence no need 
ever arises to decide if an opposing inference suggests innocence.‖ ‘  [Citations.]‖  
(People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 298-299.)  
Defendant asserts his case is different because he presented evidence that 
he boasted about committing crimes he had not committed.  Therefore, he claims, 
his is ―the extremely rare case‖ where the direct evidence on which the 
prosecution relied — his confessions that he committed the crimes — was 
susceptible of a reasonable explanation that did not point to guilt.  He argues that 
―because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions so as 
to permit it to return a guilty verdict based on direct evidence even if that evidence 
was reconcilable with innocence,‖ his rights under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution were violated.  We disagree. 
Defendant seems to assume there was no other basis on which the jury 
could have credited his ―bragging‖ evidence except by application of CALJIC No. 
2.01.  This is inaccurate.  Whether the jury believed defendant confessed to the 
crimes was, fundamentally, a credibility question.  On that issue, the jury was 
instructed at length about how to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (Brandi 
Hohman and others) to whom defendant allegedly made the confessions as well as 
defendant‘s own testimony.  In addition to the general instruction about credibility 
assessment, the jury was specifically told to view evidence of defendant‘s 
confessions with caution.  ―We presume the jury understood and followed the 
instruction.‖  (People v. Homick, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 873.)  These instructions 
applied not only to the preliminary issue of whether defendant made the 
 
58 
 
statements at all but also whether, if he made them, they were true in light of the 
evidence that he was taking credit for something he had not done.  Under these 
instructions, the jury could have concluded either that defendant did not make the 
statements at all or, if he did, he was simply bragging and had not actually 
committed the crimes.  Thus, under the instructions given, the jury would have 
fully assessed whether, even if it believed defendant had made the statements, 
there was an innocent explanation for them, i.e., that he was a braggart.  
Essentially, then, the instructions given here authorized the jury to engage in the 
same analysis of the evidence that defendant contends it would have engaged in 
had CALJIC No. 2.01 been extended to its consideration of direct evidence.  
f.  Aiding and Abetting Instruction  
With respect to the special circumstance allegations, the trial court gave a 
modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80 (1990 rev.) (5th ed. 1988).  As relevant 
here, the court said:  ―If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder in the 
first degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following special 
circumstances are true or not true:  murder for financial gain, murder during the 
course of a robbery, or multiple murders.  [¶] . . . [¶]  If you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant in counts four or six was either the actual 
killer or a co-conspirator or an aider and abettor, but you are unable to decide 
which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant with 
intent to kill participated as a co-conspirator with or aided and abetted an actor in 
the commission of the murder in the first degree, in order to find the special 
circumstance to be true.‖  
Defendant notes that the instruction required the jury to determine whether 
he acted with the intent to kill only if it was ―unable to decide‖ whether he was the 
actual killer or an aider and abettor, but the instruction did not expressly tell the 
 
59 
 
jury what to do if it did decide he was an aider and abettor.  Thus, he argues, it 
permitted the jury to find the special circumstance true without finding that he 
acted with intent to kill.  That would be error because, at the time of the murders, 
the felony-murder special circumstance applied only to those aiders and abettors 
who acted with the intent to kill.  (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 
1147.)  
We rejected a similar claim in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 99 (Letner and Tobin).  We acknowledged the ambiguity of the instruction 
at issue, which like the instant one did not explicitly state the intent requirement 
for an aider and abettor, but we concluded the ambiguity did not rise to the level of 
a due process violation.  (Id. at pp. 181-182.)  ― ‗For ambiguous instructions, the 
test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and 
misapplied the instruction.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 182.)  Based on our review of the record, 
we found ―no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied the 
instruction.‖  (Ibid.)   
Here, as in Letner and Tobin, the prosecutor did not argue that the 
instruction permitted the jury to find the special circumstance true on the theory 
that defendant was a nonperpetrator who lacked the intent to kill; rather, he argued 
that whether or not defendant was the actual killer, he lured Herbert Parr to Laurel 
Beiling‘s house so that he could kill Parr and take his motorcycle.  The prosecutor 
did concede that it was unclear whether defendant, Rex Sheffield, or both of them 
stabbed Parr, noting that one of them might have held Parr while the other stabbed 
him.  But the prosecutor never suggested to the jury the possibility that Sheffield 
intended to kill Parr and defendant did not, but nonetheless assisted Sheffield in 
carrying out the crime.  Nor did defendant claim to be an accomplice who did not 
share the perpetrator‘s intent to kill; rather, he testified that he had nothing to do 
with the killing.  The jury convicted defendant of murdering Parr but acquitted 
 
60 
 
him of conspiring with Sheffield to commit the murder, suggesting that it was 
convinced that defendant was the killer but was unsure about the extent of 
Sheffield‘s participation in the offense. 
Strong evidence supported the prosecutor‘s argument that defendant carried 
out a preconceived plan to rob and kill Parr.  Defendant, who had already 
assaulted Christopher Walsh and robbed him of his motorcycle, told Brandi 
Hohman he wanted Parr‘s motorcycle.  Defendant met Parr at a party, allayed 
Parr‘s fears of him, and convinced Parr to go with him to Laurel Beiling‘s house 
and then into her backyard, where defendant was armed with Beiling‘s knife.  
There Parr was stabbed 18 times.  Defendant later arranged to transport and 
dismantle Parr‘s motorcycle, buried Parr‘s body, and told Beiling and Hohman he 
had killed Parr.  Thus, whether or not the jury believed that defendant was the 
actual killer, on this record it could not have convicted him of murder without also 
finding he harbored a specific intent to kill.  As a result, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the jury based its special circumstance finding on the erroneous 
view that it could do so as to an aider and abettor who lacked the intent to kill. 
2.  Evidentiary Issues 
a.  Exclusion of Evidence of Threats to Defense Investigator  
The defense employed Immendorf Investigations to investigate defendant‘s 
case.  The investigator who worked on the case was Robert Furlan.  Lonne Garey 
was a secretary at the firm.  Garey testified for the defense that she had received 
an anonymous ―scary‖ telephone call.  When the prosecutor objected, the defense 
made an offer of proof, explaining that the caller said:  ―[T]ell the guy in the 
Honda next to the BMW, the guy with the big nose, we saw him leave late in the 
Honda.  Tell him he better fucking get off it.  We are conveniently located in San 
Bruno.‖  
 
61 
 
In two Evidence Code section 402 hearings, at which both Garey and 
Furlan testified, Garey identified Furlan as the ―guy with the big nose,‖ and said 
he had been working on defendant‘s case when she received the call.  Furlan 
testified he drove a Honda and lived in San Bruno.  After he interviewed someone 
named ―Frank‖ about Brandi Hohman at a biker bar in Sunol, some patrons 
followed him outside and copied down his license plate number.  When he talked 
to Joseph Martinez, a Freedom Rider, Martinez referred to the length of his 
criminal record in what Furlan believed was an attempt to show ―how tough he 
was.‖  While Furlan was at Martinez‘s house, Rex Sheffield‘s wife Gail arrived 
with two ―large white male adults,‖ which made Furlan anxious.  Furlan 
acknowledged he had no proof that Martinez or any other Freedom Riders had 
made the threatening call.  According to the defense, the evidence of the 
threatening behavior supported its theory that the Freedom Riders were framing 
defendant for the murders, because it showed that the Freedom Riders did not 
want Furlan to investigate them. 
The trial court excluded the testimony, concluding it was irrelevant because 
―there‘s no connection at all between any threats that may have been made as to 
who made those threats.‖  Defendant argues that the ruling violated his right to 
present a defense and to a fair trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution. 
―A defendant has the general right to offer a defense through the testimony 
of his or her witnesses [citation], but a state court‘s application of ordinary rules of 
evidence . . . generally does not infringe upon this right [citations].‖  (People v. 
Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82, disapproved on another point in People 
v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)  ―[T]he Constitution leaves to [state 
trial court] judges . . . ‗wide latitude‘ to exclude evidence that is ‗repetitive . . . , 
only marginally relevant‘ or poses an undue risk of ‗harassment, prejudice, [or] 
 
62 
 
confusion of the issues.‘ ‖  (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 689-690.)  
Here, defendant was unable to connect the anonymous call or the threats to Robert 
Furlan to the Freedom Riders.  Even if the jury could have inferred such a 
connection, the evidence would not have lent any significant support to 
defendant‘s claim that the Freedom Riders were trying to frame him for the Parr 
and Robertson murders.  The evidence showed the Freedom Riders were engaged 
in any number of criminal activities including, for example, the sale of drugs.  
They would understandably have been reluctant to have defendant‘s investigator 
looking into their affairs.  Thus, the evidence was, if relevant at all, only 
marginally so and could have led to confusion of the issues.  Accordingly, ―[t]he 
excluded evidence in the present case was not so vital to the defense that due 
process principles required its admission.‖  (Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 82.) 
b.  Refusal to release Brandi Hohman’s Medical Records  
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his request for 
access to certain medical records of Brandi Hohman, which were generated in 
connection with a suicide attempt in September 1987.  The defense subpoenaed 
the records from the Santa Clara County Mental Health Administration after 
Hohman testified at the preliminary hearing that she had attempted suicide 
because she was afraid defendant might kill her.  Santa Clara County Counsel 
moved to quash the subpoena.  After an in camera review of the records, the trial 
court granted the motion to quash, explaining:  ―[T]hese materials are in no way 
essential to vindicate the defendant‘s right to cross-examine [Hohman.]  [¶]  
There‘s no reasonable probability that the protected psychotherapy records could 
materially or in any way assist the defense and . . . the records are of no 
evidentiary value to the defense in this case.‖ 
 
63 
 
Defendant requests that this court review the records, asserting that they 
were vital to the issue of Hohman‘s credibility.  ―Parties who challenge on appeal 
trial court orders withholding information as privileged or otherwise 
nondiscoverable ‗must do the best they can with the information they have, and 
the appellate court will fill the gap by objectively reviewing the whole record.‘  
[Citation.]‖  (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 493.)  We have reviewed the records and 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting disclosure of 
them.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 607 [no abuse of discretion where 
trial court withheld access to a witness‘s parole records].)  Even if the court‘s 
ruling was erroneous, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome 
given that (1) Hohman‘s fear of defendant was a tangential issue; (2) the 
impeachment value of the records pales in comparison to the assault defendant 
launched on her credibility through his own testimony and witnesses who 
described Hohman as promiscuous, a drug addict and a liar; and (3) the other 
evidence of defendant‘s guilt was strong. 
c.  Rebuttal Testimony of Glenn Johnson  
Glenn Johnson, a defense alibi witness, testified that he had picked up 
defendant from the San Francisco airport in late April or early May 1986, after 
Sharley Ann German was murdered.  On rebuttal, the prosecutor, who had already 
cross-examined Johnson, recalled him to the stand.  In response to the prosecutor‘s 
questions, Johnson acknowledged he had been arrested for driving under the 
influence several weeks before the date he claimed he picked up defendant from 
the airport, and that he had lived at a different address than the one he had stated in 
his earlier testimony.  Defense counsel objected that ―this has already been gone 
over on cross-examination.‖  The trial court overruled the objection.  Defendant 
now contends this ruling was an abuse of discretion. 
 
64 
 
Rebuttal evidence is ― ‗ ―evidence made necessary by the defendant‘s case 
in the sense that he has introduced new evidence or made assertions that were not 
implicit in his denial of guilt.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 336.)  
―The scope of rebuttal evidence is within the trial court‘s discretion, and on appeal 
its ruling will not be disturbed absent ‗ ―palpable abuse.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Wallace 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1088.)  Here, defendant presented evidence, including 
Johnson‘s testimony, that he was not in the state on the date Sharley Ann German 
was killed.  Evidence impeaching Johnson was permissible rebuttal because it 
could not have been presented in the prosecution‘s case-in-chief, as it only became 
relevant when the defense called Johnson as an alibi witness.  (See People 
v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 753-754.)  We are unaware of any case holding 
that otherwise proper rebuttal evidence becomes inadmissible if the prosecutor 
could also have introduced it during cross-examination of a defense witness.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in these circumstances.  
d.  Limitations on Cross-examination of Thomas M. 
Thomas M., Sharley Ann German‘s son, testified regarding his discovery of 
his mother‘s body.  He also acknowledged on direct examination that he had been 
convicted of a felony burglary.  On cross-examination, he testified he had been 
sentenced to probation, but when defense counsel asked him if he was still on 
probation, the prosecutor objected on relevance grounds.  The trial court sustained 
the objection.  
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it sustained the 
prosecutor‘s objection because Thomas‘s continuing probation status was relevant 
to his credibility.  Even if we assume that he is correct (see Davis v. Alaska (1974) 
415 U.S. 308), the error was harmless under any applicable standard.  Thomas‘s 
testimony was a minor part of the prosecution‘s case; moreover, the jury was 
 
65 
 
aware that he had been convicted of a felony and had been placed on probation.  It 
is inconceivable that the jury would have reached a different outcome if it had 
learned that he was on probation at the time of trial. 
3.  Denial of Mistrial Motion  
During his cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor sought to make 
the point that defendant, before testifying, knew what evidence would and would 
not be introduced against him.  In the latter category was the testimony of 
witnesses who had made themselves unavailable by asserting the right against 
self-incrimination.  The prosecutor asked, ―You also had the opportunity prior to 
your testimony to look at and consider which witnesses have made themselves 
unavailable to testify isn‘t that so?‖  Defendant replied:  ―I don‘t know what you 
mean.‖  The prosecutor explained, ―Well you know which witnesses have made 
themselves unavailable to be called into court; correct?‖  Defendant responded, 
―No.  I have no idea who was here and who‘s not here.  I don‘t know what you 
mean by ‗who‘s unavailable.‘ ‖  The prosecutor elaborated:  ―Which witnesses 
have been here to testify, which ones have made themselves unavailable; correct?‖  
Defendant responded, ―I‘m not sure what you mean.  You mean by pleading the 
fifth?‖  The prosecutor said, ―Yeah.‖  Defendant continued, ―I‘ve seen who was 
called in here and who pled the fifth and who didn‘t plead the fifth.‖  Defense 
counsel then objected.  The trial court sustained the objection, and instructed the 
jury to disregard the reference.  
Defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor ―elicited from the 
defendant on the stand that he was aware of the fact that several witnesses came 
here and took the Fifth Amendment.‖  The prosecutor replied that, in asking the 
question, he ―was expecting a yes or no answer in terms of that.‖  The trial court 
denied the motion for mistrial.   
 
66 
 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 
mistrial motion after the prosecutor elicited inadmissible evidence regarding 
witnesses invoking their Fifth Amendment rights.  While it is misconduct for a 
prosecutor to elicit inadmissible testimony, ―a prosecutor cannot be faulted for a 
witness‘s nonresponsive answer that the prosecutor neither solicited nor could 
have anticipated.‖  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1035.)  Whether or not 
the prosecutor‘s questions elicited defendant‘s testimony that witnesses had 
asserted the self-incrimination privilege, the court sustained the defense‘s 
objection to that testimony and admonished the jury to disregard it.  The revelation 
that unidentified witnesses had ―pled the fifth‖ was not so necessarily prejudicial 
that we should set aside the normal presumption that the jury followed the court‘s 
admonition.  (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441.)  Thus, even if the 
prosecutor‘s questions were improper, defendant was not prejudiced.  Under these 
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial 
motion. 
4.  Constitutionality of Felony-murder Special Circumstance  
Defendant contends the felony-murder special circumstance violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution because it permits imposition of the 
death penalty on the actual killer without a finding of intent to kill or a reckless 
indifference to human life.  We have previously rejected this claim.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 163-164 [the felony-murder special 
circumstance is constitutional even though it does not require that an actual killer 
act with intent to kill or reckless indifference to human life]; People v. Belmontes 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 794 [―The United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
felony murderers who personally killed may properly be subject to the death 
penalty in conformance with the Eighth Amendment . . . even where no intent to 
 
67 
 
kill is shown.‖], disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  Defendant provides no persuasive reason to revisit the 
issue. 
D.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Denial of Counsel’s Request to Withdraw for Conflict of Interest 
Defendant contends his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution were violated due to a conflict of interest 
arising from a threat allegedly made by defendant‘s wife to harm defense 
counsel‘s wife should defendant receive the death penalty.  The claim is without 
merit. 
a.  Background 
On August 20, 1991, just before the penalty phase, Defense Counsel James 
Campbell requested an in camera hearing to discuss a threat made by defendant‘s 
wife, Karen, against Campbell‘s wife.  According to Campbell, Karen told a 
member of the defense team that ―if I lose my husband then [Campbell] is going to 
lose his wife.‖  At two further in camera hearings, Campbell acknowledged that 
Karen‘s statement appeared to be an expression of frustration rather than a serious 
threat:  ―[I]t‘s my belief probably that this was probably not something that is 
serious or presents any real truth by Mrs. O‘Malley, but . . . I think a prudent 
person would have to at least give some pause for concern over.‖  He continued, 
―if it is just her in frustration . . . I would be very willing to write it off and dismiss 
it.‖  
The trial court asked Campbell if he thought the threat came from 
defendant.  Campbell said:  ―No.  Didn‘t appear that way.‖  But he observed ―that 
since this occurred I‘ve had no contact whatsoever with [defendant] and that‘s 
very unusual because he calls almost on a daily basis.‖  Campbell asked to 
 
68 
 
withdraw because ―[e]ven though I think this threat and the statement was not 
something that is of substance really, I think that the very fact of it being made . . . 
is something that does interfere with the effectiveness of myself in terms of now 
going forward in the penalty phase and literally arguing and advocating for his 
life.‖  The court asked defendant what he wanted.  Defendant replied, ―I would 
like to have him as my attorney still.‖  
The trial court denied Campbell‘s request to withdraw, explaining:  
(1) ―Mr. Campbell has always been ready on this case and extremely well-
prepared‖; (2) ―Mr. Campbell has become closely associated with Mr. O‘Malley 
and his family . . . .  There‘s no one more qualified to argue for Mr. O‘Malley‘s 
life than Mr. Campbell‖; (3) ―There‘s no evidence that the statement of 
Mrs. O‘Malley was true or viable or had any substance or was uttered out of 
anything but frustration, current mental state, in the light of the then existing 
circumstances [and], it appears Mr. Campbell put little, if any, stock in 
Mrs. O‘Malley‘s utterances‖; (4) ―There is no evidence that Mrs. O‘Malley‘s 
utterances can be attributed to Mr. O‘Malley or in any way connected to him‖; 
(5) ―Mr. Campbell, as an attorney, has an ethical duty to do as much for his client, 
whether it‘s Mr. O‘Malley or anyone else, as possible, and has a duty to put 
personal feelings and beliefs aside‖; (6) ―Mr. Campbell is under an obligation to 
bring forth the facts, as he has done so [and] notify the court of what has 
transpired, of his feelings in the matter, and . . . he has done so,‖ and; (7) 
―Mr. O‘Malley wishes to have Mr. Campbell remain as his attorney and . . . still 
has faith in Mr. Campbell and his abilities.  [¶]  The court further finds that 
Mr. O‘Malley is making an informed, reasonable and proper choice in wanting 
Mr. Campbell to remain as his counsel and still has faith in him despite any prior 
disagreements, and, therefore, based on this, the court denies the motion to 
withdraw as attorney of record.‖  
 
69 
 
b.  Discussion 
The Attorney General argues that defendant waived his right to complain 
about the trial court‘s denial of his attorney‘s request to withdraw when he told the 
trial court he would like his attorney to continue representing him.  Defendant 
responds that there was no waiver because he was not informed of the dangers and 
possible consequences of proceeding with conflicted representation or of his right 
to conflict-free representation.  (See generally People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
1115, 1136-1137.)  We need not decide whether defendant waived the claim, 
because we find no error. 
― ‗ ―The right to effective assistance of counsel, secured by the Sixth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution, includes the right to representation that is free from conflicts of 
interest.‖ ‘  [Citations.]  While the classic example of a conflict in criminal 
litigation is a lawyer‘s dual representation of codefendants, the constitutional 
principle is not narrowly confined to instances of this type.  [Citation.]  A conflict 
may also arise when an attorney‘s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are 
threatened by the attorney‘s own interests.  [Citation.]  [¶]  Under the federal 
Constitution, prejudice is presumed when counsel suffers from an actual conflict 
of interest.  [Citation.]  This presumption arises, however, ‗only if the defendant 
demonstrates that counsel ―actively represented conflicting interests‖ and that ―an 
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer‘s performance.‖ ‘  
[Citations.]  An actual conflict of interest means ‗a conflict that affected counsel‘s 
performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.‘  [Citation.]  
Under the federal precedents, which we have also applied to claims of conflict of 
interest under the California Constitution, a defendant is required to show that 
counsel performed deficiently and a reasonable probability exists that, but for 
 
70 
 
counsel‘s deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖  
(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 309-310.) 
―To determine whether counsel‘s performance was ‗adversely affected,‘ we 
have suggested that [Cuyler v.] Sullivan [(1980) 446 U.S. 335] requires an inquiry 
into whether counsel ‗pulled his punches,‘ i.e., whether counsel failed to represent 
defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there been no conflict.  [Citation.]  
In undertaking such an inquiry, we are . . . bound by the record.  But where a 
conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may not 
reflect such an omission.  We must therefore examine the record to determine 
(i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel 
who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a 
tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused 
any such omission.‖  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 948-949, disapproved 
on another point in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  
Here, the threat came not from defendant but his wife, and defense counsel 
did not take it seriously.  Defendant himself evidently perceived no conflict, as he 
indicated that he wished to continue with Campbell.  Defendant fails to show that 
counsel ―pulled his punches‖ out of concern for his wife‘s safety.   
Defendant relies on defense counsel‘s statements during the in camera 
hearings expressing doubt about his own ability to continue with the case, but he 
identifies no instance in which the alleged conflict actually affected counsel‘s 
performance.  To the contrary, defense counsel called numerous witnesses during 
the penalty trial to demonstrate that defendant‘s life was worth preserving.  
Accordingly, we reject defendant‘s claim. 
 
71 
 
2.  Denial of Defendant’s Request to Discharge His Retained Counsel  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his request to discharge 
retained counsel.  The court did not err. 
a.  Background 
As noted in the previous part, on September 11, 1991, the trial court denied 
defense counsel‘s request to be relieved based, in part, on defendant‘s desire that 
counsel continue to represent him.  The penalty phase trial began on the morning 
of September 24.  The jury was preinstructed regarding factors in aggravation and 
mitigation.  The prosecutor gave his opening statement.  He said that at the penalty 
phase he would call no witnesses, but would rely on defendant‘s prior felony 
conviction and the guilt phase evidence of the circumstances of the crime and 
defendant‘s other violent criminal activity.  After putting into evidence a certified 
copy of defendant‘s felony conviction, the prosecution rested.  The defense called 
its first witness (Lawrence Walton, a jail chaplain), who was examined by both 
sides before the lunch recess.   
When court reconvened, defense counsel informed the court that defendant 
wanted to make a statement.  Counsel said, ―I don‘t know if it really is a Marsden 
motion, but I think it‘s a quasi Marsden motion, at least approaches that.‖11  Out 
of ―an abundance of caution,‖ the trial court cleared the courtroom and invited 
defendant to speak.  
Defendant said he wanted to ―address . . . statements made by the Court‖ at 
the September 11 hearing when it denied counsel‘s request to withdraw, and 
defendant‘s ―response to a question asked . . . by the Court,‖ specifically, 
defendant‘s statement that he ―wanted to keep‖ defense counsel.  Defendant told 
                                              
11  
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. 
 
72 
 
the court he did ―not have confidence in‖ counsel, but was ―more scared of getting 
someone [he did] not know at all.‖  He complained that defense counsel had ―lost 
all credibility with the jury, but again, I am worried about who would be appointed 
in his place.‖  He brought up the denial of a pretrial request he had made for 
second counsel.  He asserted the court had been incorrect when it had 
characterized defense counsel as well-prepared and effective because trial counsel 
had ―ignored or not even read‖ reports and witness statements prepared by defense 
investigators.  He also alluded to ―numerous other issues and incidents‖ he would 
raise at ―a later date.‖  He asserted further the ―defense team‖ had ignored his 
―wishes and suggestions.‖  He complained that at times he was told ―how [things] 
were going to be handled, and then the opposite was done, or nothing done at all, 
which left the situation irrevocable with no . . . input from myself or others.‖  
Defendant expressed ―no hard feelings‖ toward defense counsel, adding, ―My only 
problem is how I was represented.‖ 
The trial court invited counsel to respond.  Counsel acknowledged there 
had been disputes between defendant and the defense team regarding ―how he 
wanted to present the case.‖  He said he explained to defendant his tactical 
decisions and, when defendant disagreed, he tried to put defendant‘s opposition on 
the record for purposes of appellate review.  He alluded to a disagreement he and 
defendant were having about defendant‘s wish to call certain penalty phase 
witnesses whom counsel feared would invite damaging rebuttal.  He asked 
defendant if he wanted to call those witnesses or to continue discussing the matter.  
Defendant replied, ―At this point, we are still discussing that . . . I may agree with 
you, but I don‘t know all the facts yet.‖  The court observed, ―It‘s obvious you two 
have not finished discussing this yet.  Is that correct Mr. O‘Malley?‖  Defendant 
replied, ―Correct.‖   
 
73 
 
The court stated:  ―[I]t would not appear that any disagreement that you 
may have had over trial tactics has caused a breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship that would substantially, if in any way, impair the defendant‘s right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  [¶]  It would not appear there has been a defense 
that wasn‘t presented or that [defense counsel] did not sufficiently consult with 
[defendant] and adequately investigate the facts and the law involved in this case 
. . . .  [¶]  Whether or not this is a real Marsden type situation or not, is hard to say 
at this point, but [defense counsel] is not going to be relieved at this point.‖   
b.  Discussion 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying a request to discharge 
his attorney because the court applied the wrong legal standard and the error 
requires automatic reversal of the penalty phase verdict.  Had defendant made 
such a request, we might agree, but, as we explain below, he did not.  The court 
therefore did not err in denying a request that was never made, regardless of what 
standard it purportedly applied. 
―The right to retained counsel of choice is — subject to certain limitations 
— guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  [Citations.]  
In California, this right ‗reflects not only a defendant‘s choice of a particular 
attorney, but also his decision to discharge an attorney whom he hired but no 
longer wishes to retain.‘  [Citations.]‖  (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 
310-311 (Verdugo).)  In People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975 (Ortiz), we held that 
with regard to discharging a retained attorney, a defendant need not demonstrate 
either that counsel ―is providing inadequate representation [citations], or that he 
and the attorney are embroiled in irreconcilable conflict [citation].‖  (Id. at p. 984.)  
That standard, rather, is applicable when a defendant seeks substitution of 
appointed counsel.  (Ibid.; see People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118.)  
 
74 
 
Consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a defendant may discharge 
retained counsel ―with or without cause.‖  (Ortiz, supra, at p. 983.) 
―The right to discharge a retained attorney is, however, not absolute.  
[Citation.]  The trial court has discretion to ‗deny such a motion if discharge will 
result in ―significant prejudice‖ to the defendant [citation], or if it is not timely, 
i.e., if it will result in ―disruption of the orderly processes of justice‖ [citations].‘ ‖  
(Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 311.)  In this context, while ―a defendant seeking 
to discharge his retained attorney is not required to demonstrate inadequate 
representation or an irreconcilable conflict, this does not mean that the trial court 
cannot properly consider the absence of such circumstances in deciding whether 
discharging counsel would result in disruption of the orderly processes of justice.‖  
(People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 513 (Maciel).) 
The question of which standard applies to a defendant‘s request to 
discharge counsel presupposes that such a request was made.  In this case, 
however, unlike Ortiz, Verdugo, and Maciel, defendant did not explicitly request 
that counsel be discharged.  Indeed, while he complained about counsel‘s 
representation, he also expressed concern about ―getting someone I do not know at 
all‖ and ―who would be appointed in his place.‖  These comments signify that 
defendant did not have a substitute attorney in mind, whether retained or 
appointed.  Moreover, his comments toward the end of the hearing showed he and 
counsel were still discussing defendant‘s wish to have certain witnesses testify at 
the penalty phase, indicating, as the trial court found, no irreconcilable breakdown 
of their relationship.  The tenor of defendant‘s comments can reasonably be 
construed as a clarification of his earlier statement to the court at the conflict of 
interest hearing that he wanted to proceed with defense counsel.  He explained that 
he had agreed to keep his lawyer not because he thought counsel was doing a good 
job but because he was more worried about who might replace him.  Additionally, 
 
75 
 
comments by defense counsel and the court itself indicate they were uncertain of 
what defendant wanted.  Trial counsel characterized his complaint as, at most, 
―quasi Marsden,‖ and the court cleared the courtroom out of ―an abundance of 
caution,‖ presumably in the event defendant did request that counsel be 
discharged.  Even when the court stated it would not ―relieve counsel at this 
point,‖ it prefaced that statement by remarking, ―[w]hether or not this is a real 
Marsden type situation or not, is hard to say at this point . . . .‖   
We have not previously considered whether a defendant with retained 
counsel may be found to have asserted the right to discharge the attorney without 
explicitly making such a request.  Some touchstones in our decisions are, however, 
helpful by analogy.  The right to discharge retained counsel flows from the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  As we observed in a different context, that right is 
personal to the defendant.  (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344 
[―The right to counsel is a personal right [citation], and a violation of that right 
cannot ordinarily be asserted vicariously.‖].)  Moreover, in the Marsden context, 
we require ―at least some clear indication by defendant that he wants a substitute 
attorney‖ before the trial court must conduct a hearing on such request.  (People v. 
Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8; see People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
884, 920 [trial court did not err in declining to conduct Marsden hearing at 
conclusion of guilt phase where ―[d]efendant did not clearly indicate he wanted 
substitute counsel appointed for the penalty phase‖].)  
Defendant contends that, even though he failed to explicitly ask the court to 
discharge his attorney, the trial court ―plainly understood [defendant‘s] comment 
as a request to discharge his attorney,‖ as indicated by its statement that counsel 
would not be relieved.  He relies on People v. Lara (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 139 
(Lara), in support of his argument.  
 
76 
 
In Lara, on the day set for trial, defense counsel told the trial court the 
defendant wished to speak about conflicts between the two of them.  When the 
prosecutor offered to step outside, the court told her to wait, explaining, ― ‗I am 
not sure it is a Marsden motion yet.‘ ‖  (Lara, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.)  
Defense counsel replied, ― ‗I have a feeling that is probably what it is.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  
The court cleared the courtroom and invited the defendant to speak.  The 
defendant complained that counsel had not interviewed witnesses and had not 
spoken to him in the preceding eight months.  Counsel responded that they 
disagreed about calling the defendant‘s accomplice to the stand.  The trial court 
characterized the dispute between the defendant and counsel as a ― ‗tactical 
difference‘ ‖ (id. at p. 148) that did not ― ‗rise to the level in the type of breakdown 
in the attorney-client relations that Marsden is looking at‘ ‖ (ibid.) and ruled that it 
was ― ‗going to deny your request in the Marsden [sic]‘ ‖ (ibid.).  When the 
prosecutor returned, the court stated the defendant‘s Marsden motion had been 
denied.  (Ibid.) 
On appeal, the defendant asserted the trial court had applied the wrong 
standard to his request to discharge his attorney, who had been retained rather than 
appointed.  The Attorney General argued that the defendant never requested that 
his attorney be discharged.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged it was ―a close 
question as to whether appellant wanted to discharge [counsel].‖  (Lara, supra, 86 
Cal.App.4th at p. 157.)  It concluded, however, that ―the trial court obviously 
interpreted appellant‘s complaints as sufficient to raise a Marsden motion,‖ and 
that its evaluation of those complaints strongly implied ―that it was willing to 
grant the supposed Marsden motion and discharge [the] attorney if the court found 
an irreconcilable conflict existed‖ between the defendant and counsel.  (Id. at 
p. 158.)  Under these circumstances, the reviewing court ―rel[ied] on the [trial] 
court‘s factual interpretation of the situation as involving a request by [the 
 
77 
 
defendant] to discharge his defense attorney and obtain a new attorney to represent 
him.‖  (Ibid.)  It held that the trial court, by applying the Marsden standard to a 
request to discharge retained counsel, had erred and the error required automatic 
reversal.  (Lara, supra, at pp. 165-166.) 
Lara is distinguishable because there, unlike the case before us, the trial 
court plainly understood the defendant to be bringing a Marsden motion to replace 
counsel.  Here, defendant‘s equivocal statements, combined with the uncertainty 
expressed by defense counsel and the court as to what he wanted, did not 
constitute a clear indication he wanted to discharge counsel.  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not erroneously deny a request to discharge counsel because there was 
no request to be ruled on.   
Moreover, unlike Lara, the court here did not indicate it was prepared to 
―grant the supposed Marsden motion‖ (Lara, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 158) had 
it found an irreconcilable conflict existed.  Its invocation of Marsden principles 
must be seen in context as an attempt to respond in some manner to defendant‘s 
stated concerns about his conflicts with his attorney and not a true Marsden ruling, 
since the court was doubtful it had been presented ―with a real Marsden type 
situation.‖  Had defendant clearly indicated he wanted to discharge his attorney, 
the trial court could have then assessed whether granting the request would 
prejudice him or disrupt the orderly process of justice.  The court likely would 
have been well within its discretion to deny such a request on the latter ground, 
given that it would have come in the midst of defendant‘s penalty phase case and 
without any substitute counsel at hand.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
court did not err when it said that counsel would not be relieved.  
 
78 
 
3.  Exclusion of Evidence of Manner of Execution  
During the penalty phase, defendant sought to ask his correctional expert, 
James Park, about his experience with executions.  The prosecutor asked to 
approach the bench, where defense counsel stated he intended to ask Park about 
the manner of executions.  The court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection.  
Defendant contends the ruling was error.  It was not. 
The parties at the penalty phase of a capital case may introduce evidence 
―relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence‖ (§ 190.3),  provided that such 
evidence pertains to the ―character or record of the individual offender or the 
circumstances of his particular offense‖ (People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 
860).  In Grant, we rejected the defendant‘s claim that evidence of the manner of 
execution was admissible under this statute, explaining:  ―Unlike mitigating 
evidence of a defendant‘s background and character, which may be introduced to 
elicit the sympathy or pity of the jury, accounts of the executions of others do not 
aid the jury in making an individualized assessment of the crucial issue whether 
the death penalty is appropriate for the particular defendant on trial.‖  (Ibid.)  We 
have consistently followed Grant on this point.  (See People v. Fudge (1994) 7 
Cal.4th 1075, 1124; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 644-645; People v. 
Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 138-139; People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 
962.)   
Defendant asks us to reconsider these decisions, arguing that they have 
been undermined by the United States Supreme Court‘s decisions in California v. 
Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 1009 (the federal Constitution permits the state to 
instruct juries about the Governor‘s power to commute a sentence of life without 
parole), Tennard v. Dretke (2004) 542 U.S. 274, 284 (under the Eighth 
Amendment, ― ‗ ―[r]elevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically 
to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could 
 
79 
 
reasonably deem to have mitigating value‖ ‘ ‖), and Smith v. Texas (2004) 543 U.S 
37, 44 (same).  That is incorrect.  As we have since explained, ―[I]t is not the law 
that jurors must be allowed to consider any evidence a defendant offers on the 
question whether the death penalty is morally appropriate.  Evidence is 
inadmissible if it does not pertain to a defendant‘s individual character and record, 
but pertains solely to the death penalty generally, such as how death is inflicted 
. . . .‖  (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 366; see also People v. Collins 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 233.) 
4.  Admission of Testimony About Statements by Defendant’s Father  
As part of its effort to rebut defense evidence that defendant‘s father had 
been abusive, the prosecution called Joseph Collamati, a Massachusetts police 
officer who had been acquainted with defendant and his father.  The prosecutor 
asked Collamati if defendant‘s father had told him about problems with 
defendant‘s behavior.  Following a defense objection, the prosecutor explained he 
was offering the statement under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to 
show the senior O‘Malley‘s state of mind.  The defense countered that his state of 
mind was not at issue.  The trial court overruled the objection, instructing the jury 
the evidence was limited to state of mind and ―not for the truth of the matter 
asserted.‖  Collamati testified that defendant‘s father had told him defendant was 
―running wild,‖ using drugs and alcohol, and that the senior O‘Malley had no 
control over him.  Collamati testified further that defendant‘s behavior upset his 
father to the point that ―a couple of times‖ he was ―almost in tears.‖ 
As relevant here, the state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay 
applies when the out-of-court statement is ―offered to prove the declarant‘s state of 
mind, emotion, or physical sensation . . . when it is itself an issue in the action.‖  
(Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).)  Defendant argues that his father‘s state of 
 
80 
 
mind was not at issue here, and that the trial court therefore erred in admitting 
Collamati‘s testimony.  We agree.   
Most of Collamati‘s testimony about the senior O‘Malley‘s statements did 
not even describe the latter‘s state of mind; rather, it described defendant‘s 
misbehavior.  Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant‘s behavior had 
some relevance to the question of whether the senior O‘Malley abused his son, the 
jury could have considered it only if it was admitted for its truth, and it was 
inadmissible for that purpose.  As for Collamati‘s testimony that the senior 
O‘Malley was upset by the misbehavior, it did describe the father‘s state of mind, 
and the Attorney General argues it was therefore admissible to rebut defendant‘s 
evidence that his father was abusive, apparently based on the theory that such 
parental concern is inconsistent with the abuse defendant reported.  We are not 
persuaded.  Abusive parents are often upset at the misbehavior of their children; 
indeed, that distress sometimes causes the parent to engage in the abusive conduct.  
Moreover, defendant described a long pattern of abuse by his father beginning 
when he was a child and not simply during his teenage years when, in his father‘s 
eyes, he began to go astray. 
Nonetheless, the erroneous admission of Collamati‘s testimony was 
harmless.  Evidence that defendant engaged in out-of-control behavior as a 
teenager and that his father found this behavior distressing was of little importance 
when compared to the vicious murders he was found to have committed.  Thus, it 
is not reasonably possible that, had it been excluded, the result of the penalty 
phase would have been altered.  
5.  Alleged Double Counting of Special Circumstances  
Defendant contends CALJIC No. 8.85, in combination with remarks by the 
prosecutor in his closing argument, improperly permitted the jury to double count 
 
81 
 
the financial gain and robbery special circumstances by also considering them as 
circumstances of the crime.  Assuming the claim is not forfeited by defendant‘s 
failure to request a clarifying instruction (see People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
619, 699), the claim is meritless.  As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly 
rejected the argument that the instruction inherently encourages such double 
counting.  (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 893; People v. Burney (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 203, 261; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 669; People v. Ayala 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 288-289.) 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor‘s argument encouraged double counting 
even if the trial court‘s instruction did not.  He has forfeited this claim by failing to 
raise it at trial.  Ordinarily, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable on 
appeal unless the defendant both objects to the misconduct and seeks an admonition 
from the trial court to the jury regarding the claimed misconduct.  (People v. 
Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275.)  Defendant did neither.   
In any event, ―the prosecutor did not urge the jury to double count the 
circumstances of the crime and the special circumstances.‖  (People v. Montes, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 893.)  True, he mentioned the facts underlying the special 
circumstance findings when he discussed the aggravating circumstances of the 
offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)), and he also asked the jury to consider the special 
circumstances themselves as circumstances in aggravation.  But he did not ask the 
jury to double count the facts underlying the special circumstances.  To the 
contrary, he reminded the jury that weighing the factors in mitigation and 
aggravation was ―not just a mere mechanical counting up of factors on each side 
of an imaginary scale,‖ and that it should ―assign whatever moral or sympathetic 
value you deem appropriate‖ to each factor.  ―In light of the prosecutor‘s remarks 
and the standard instructions given about the weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances given in this case, we find no reasonable likelihood the 
 
82 
 
jurors were misled or confused in the manner defendant suggests.‖  (People v. 
Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 669.) 
6.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed six instances of misconduct 
in his closing argument.  The claims are both forfeited and meritless. 
― ‗ ―A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade 
the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal 
Constitution when they infect the trial with such ‗ ―unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.‖ ‘  [Citations.]  Under state law, a 
prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions 
do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‖  [Citation.]  ―In order to preserve a 
claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an 
admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of 
misconduct preserved for review.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 1275.) 
Defendant failed to object to any of the statements he now asserts were 
misconduct, thus forfeiting each claim on appeal.12  As explained below, the 
claims are also without merit. 
                                              
12  
Defendant asks us to review his claims of prosecutorial misconduct under 
the rubric of ineffective of assistance of counsel, asserting there was no tactical 
reason for defense counsel not to have objected to these statements by the 
prosecutor.  Because we find either no misconduct, or, assuming misconduct, no 
prejudice, counsel‘s failure to object was not ineffective assistance, nor was 
defendant prejudiced by his failure to do so.  (See In re Champion (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 965, 1007-1008 [stating the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims].)   
 
83 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by urging the 
jury to double count certain evidence as both a circumstance of the crime and a 
special circumstance.  We rejected the claim in the previous section. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor appealed to the prejudices and passions 
of the jury by contrasting the murder of defendant‘s victims with the legal 
protections defendant had enjoyed during his trial at which his life was at stake.  
― ‗It is, of course, improper to make arguments to the jury that give it the 
impression that ―emotion may reign over reason,‖ and to present ―irrelevant 
information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury‘s attention from its 
proper role, or invites an irrational, purely subjective response.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1210.)  But the prosecutor‘s remarks did not 
appeal to the jury‘s passions or prejudice.  He made them while addressing a 
concern that ―[i]f it‘s wrong for the defendant to kill, why should the state have a 
right to take a life[.]‖  He argued, ―there‘s a big difference between [the] murders 
[defendant] perpetrated and imposing the death penalty after a fair trial with the 
protection of each and every one of the defendant‘s constitutional rights, as well as 
after a lengthy and exhaustive consideration by you of which penalty is 
appropriate.‖  These remarks were designed to assuage any doubt jurors might 
have that imposing the death penalty was the equivalent of committing murder, 
not to claim that defendant deserved the death penalty because, in contrast to his 
victims, he enjoyed the law‘s procedural protections.  Thus understood, the 
comments were not misconduct. 
Nor was it misconduct for the prosecutor to urge the jury that, 
notwithstanding its right to consider mercy toward defendant, it should show him 
no more mercy than he showed his victims.  (People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
at p. 230 [―It is not improper to urge the jury to show the defendant the same level 
of mercy he showed the victim.‖].)  
 
84 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor argued that the jury should reject 
sympathy and remorse because in the guilt phase defendant denied committing the 
murders, while in the penalty phase he presented mitigating evidence regarding his 
upbringing.  
A prosecutor may not cite a defendant‘s claim of innocence as evidence 
that the defendant lacks remorse.  (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 243-
244, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908 and 
Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th 99.)  Here, in the course of urging the jury to 
reject defendant‘s mitigating evidence that he suffered from fetal alcohol 
syndrome, the prosecutor argued:  ―What we have to do during the guilt phase of 
this trial, what we are dealing with here is blame.  We‘re dealing with the concept 
of blame.  In the guilt phase of the trial [defendant] took the stand and testified for 
13 days and whatever, and indicated, ‗I didn‘t do the Sharley Ann German 
killing,‘ indicated that Rex Sheffield did the other two.  Blame.  [¶]  Guilt phase, 
blaming Rex Sheffield.  Penalty phase, I submit, blame again, finger of blame on 
bad father, finger of blame on drinking mother, finger of blame on fetal alcohol 
syndrome.  All right.  There‘s no remorse there.  There‘s no accepting of 
responsibility for terrible crimes.  Not one but three.‖ 
As noted, defendant‘s failure to object to the remark forfeits his claim on 
appeal.  Assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecutor‘s argument was 
improper, it ―was brief and transitory‖ and ―did not impermissibly characterize 
defendant‘s lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.‖  (People v. Fierro, supra, 1 
Cal.4th at p. 244.)  Any impropriety was therefore harmless.   
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
asked the jury to return a death verdict to provide ―justice for the victims.‖  In 
context, the prosecutor argued:  ―What I am asking you to do is follow the law, 
consider the evidence, and render a just verdict.  What we‘re asking for is justice, 
 
85 
 
justice for the victims, justice in this case.  [¶]  I submit to you that the appropriate 
punishment is the death penalty and I hope that after you‘ve reviewed the evidence 
and the law and applied the moral weight to all of the factors that you will find 
that sympathy, mercy is not enough in this case to outweigh all of the other factors 
in aggravation.‖  (Italics added.) 
According to defendant, the italicized portion of the argument was 
impermissible because it was equivalent to the presentation of evidence that a 
defendant‘s victims believe death is the appropriate verdict, which is 
impermissible.  (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 97.)  We disagree.  
―The prosecutor has wide latitude to argue that, based on the evidence presented, 
the death penalty is the proper punishment commensurate with defendant‘s 
crime.‖  (People v. McKenzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1359, disapproved on other 
grounds in People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th 363.)  By asking for ―justice for the 
victims,‖ the prosecutor did not suggest that the victims personally believed the 
jury should return a death verdict; rather, he simply said that such a verdict would 
bring them justice.  We see nothing improper in this comment. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury‘s sense 
of patriotism when he argued ―that a free society requires of its citizens, of its 
jurors, vigilance, courage, the strength and resolve in making the hard decisions 
that you‘re going to have to make.‖  Contrary to defendant‘s argument, nothing in 
these remarks reminding the jurors of their weighty responsibility equated being a 
good citizen with returning a verdict of death in this case.  The claim is, in any 
event, unavailing.  (See People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 584 [prosecutor‘s 
argument that ― ‗[t]his is a case where society cries out for the death penalty‘ ‖ and 
the jurors were ― ‗the conscience of society‘ ‖ was not improper]; People v. 
Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1246 [prosecutor‘s argument that jurors were 
― ‗protectors of society from enemies within‘ ‖ was not improper].) 
 
86 
 
Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
arguing the jury could not consider any lingering doubt as to defendant‘s guilt in 
determining penalty when he told the jury:  ―You don‘t need to worry about 
executing an innocent man.‖  Once again, placed in context, the remark belies the 
meaning defendant ascribes to it.  The prosecutor was addressing a concern raised 
by some jurors during voir dire that they would not want to impose the death 
penalty ―unless [they] knew the person was truly guilty.‖  The prosecutor then 
noted, correctly, that ―Your guilty verdict showed that the evidence convinced you 
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the defendant . . . is guilty 
of these crimes.  He is not innocent at this point.  You don‘t need to worry about 
executing an innocent man.‖  Thus understood, there was nothing improper in the 
remark, which was no more than a reasonable commentary on the state of the 
evidence regarding defendant‘s guilt, and not a description of the legally 
permissible mitigating factors. 
7.  Constitutional Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Scheme  
To preserve them for future review, defendant briefly raises a number of 
constitutional challenges to California‘s death penalty scheme which, he 
acknowledges, we have previously and consistently rejected.  We do so again, 
concluding as follows: 
(1)  The use of defendant‘s age as a sentencing factor (§ 190.3, factor (i)) is 
not impermissibly vague under the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 313, 358.) 
(2)  ―The homicide and death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class 
of first degree murderers eligible for the death penalty.  The statutory scheme is 
not overbroad or arbitrary in this regard.‖  (People v. Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at p. 172.) 
 
87 
 
(3)  ―Section 190.3, factor (a) (the circumstances of the capital crime) is not 
so broad as to be applied in a wanton or freakish manner.  [Citation.]  Nor is factor 
(b) of the same statute (the defendant‘s other violent criminal activity) irrational or 
invalid insofar as it permits consideration of unadjudicated crimes.‖  (People v. 
Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 172.)  ―In particular, the jury need not make a 
unanimous finding under section 190.3, factor (b) . . . .‖  (People v. Lewis and 
Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1068.)  Nor were defendant‘s constitutional rights 
violated by the use of the same jury that convicted him of first degree murder to 
evaluate the evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes.  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 
4 Cal.4th 43, 76-77, overruled on other grounds in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 610.)  
(4)  The trial court did not violate defendant‘s constitutional rights by 
failing to instruct the jury it must unanimously agree he committed the 1979 
assault — introduced as a prior felony conviction under section 190.3, factor (c) 
— notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Ring v. Arizona 
(2002) 536 U.S. 584.  (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 304, 
overruled on other grounds in People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th 610.)  
Consideration by the jury of defendant‘s prior conviction did not place him twice 
in jeopardy for the same offense.  (People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 
134-135, judg. vacated on other grounds and cause remanded sub nom Bacigalupo 
v. California (1992) 506 U.S. 802, reaffd. (1998) 6 Cal.4th 457.) 
(5)  ―Neither the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires 
that jurors in a capital case be instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that . . . aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances . . . .  
Indeed, trial courts ‗should not instruct the jury regarding any burden of proof or 
persuasion at the penalty phase.‘  [Citation.]  ‗ ―Unlike the guilt determination, 
 
88 
 
‗the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual‘ [citation] 
and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.‖ ‘  [Citations.]‖  
(People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1215-1216.) 
(6)  Instructions in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 (given here) do not 
―violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to delete inapplicable 
sentencing factors, delineate between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or 
specify a burden of proof either as to aggravation (except for other crimes 
evidence) or the penalty decision.‖  (People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
p. 305.)  ―Use in the sentencing factors of such adjectives as ‗extreme‘ . . . and 
‗substantial‘ . . . does not create an improper barrier to consideration of mitigating 
evidence.‖  (People v. Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 173.)  
(7)  ―We have also repeatedly rejected defendant‘s claim that the death 
penalty statute violates international norms in general or, specifically, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  [Citations.]  Because 
defendant fails to explain why our precedents on this issue should no longer be 
followed, we reject this claim as well.‖  (People v. Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 881.)  
E.  New Trial Motion  
Defendant contends the trial court erred under state law in denying his 
motion for new trial (Pen. Code, § 1181) and that the denial also violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and his 
Eighth Amendment right to a reliable guilt phase proceeding.  We reject the claim. 
1.  Background 
As previously explained, the defense to the Sharley Ann German murder 
was that defendant was in Massachusetts on April 25, 1986, the day she was 
killed.  Not only did defendant and Karen Dolan testify to this effect, he called 
 
89 
 
three friends from Massachusetts (Robert Thompson, Mark Weber, and Karen 
Shaw), all of whom testified they saw defendant in Massachusetts at the end of 
April 1986.  Weber testified that defendant stayed overnight at his house the last 
weekend of April, while Thompson testified he gave defendant a ride to Logan 
Airport in Boston that weekend.  Glenn Johnson testified he picked up defendant 
from the San Francisco airport three or four weeks before Johnson‘s birthday, 
which falls on May 27. 
The prosecutor sought through cross-examination to create doubt about the 
accuracy of the defense witnesses‘ memories of when they saw defendant in April, 
and presented rebuttal evidence designed to undermine their testimony.  After 
establishing defendant‘s pattern of charging long distance calls he made while on 
the East Coast to his San Jose telephone number, the prosecution presented 
evidence that there were no such charges after April 10, 1986, 15 days before 
Sharley Ann was murdered.  Karen O‘Neal, who had been married to defendant‘s 
friend John Mercuri, testified that defendant threatened to kill her and members of 
her family if she laid claim to any marital assets during the divorce proceedings.  
She testified she called him in California on April 14, 1986, and told him she 
would sign over everything to Mercuri.  Her phone records were introduced to 
show the call was made on that date.  
Defendant brought a posttrial motion for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence relating to the killing of Sharley Ann.  (§ 1181, subd. (8).)  
Included in the motion was an affidavit by one Louis Lombardi, a friend of 
defendant‘s.  According to the motion, Lombardi had been prepared to testify that 
he and defendant were supposed to go to a San Francisco Giants baseball game on 
April 29, 1986, but defendant was out of town on that date.  Just before trial, 
Lombardi told defense counsel he was no longer sure of the date and believed that 
defendant had been with him at the game.  The defense then decided against 
 
90 
 
calling him to testify.  After trial, Lombardi recanted his statement that defendant 
was with him at the baseball game, stating he lied because he had not wanted to 
testify.  
At the hearing on the new trial motion, defense counsel represented that the 
defense had located a second witness, Richard Lillis, defendant‘s high school 
hockey coach, who was prepared to testify he saw defendant at a restaurant in 
Massachusetts on April 20, 1986, which was Lillis‘s birthday.  (Lillis did not 
submit a declaration in support of the motion.)  Finally, defense counsel 
represented that his investigator had uncovered evidence that tended to impeach 
Karen O‘Neal‘s testimony that she called defendant on April 14 and agreed not to 
seek any of the marital assets in her divorce with John Mercuri.  Counsel stated 
that on April 19, O‘Neal submitted a statement of assets and liabilities in the 
divorce proceeding.  He commented that it ―would seem strange if she was 
threatened on [April] 14th, she wanted to settle the case, she was setting forth all 
her assets in litigation posed just some days later.‖ 
The trial court denied the motion.  The court found ―the evidence 
overwhelming that at the time of the Sharley Ann German murder the defendant 
was not back east.  The credibility of Mr. Lombardi is extremely questionable 
based on him changing his stories.  The court does not find this to be newly 
discovered evidence, just an affirmation of one of Mr. Lombardi‘s versions of 
what his testimony may have been.‖  The court was skeptical that the other 
evidence — presumably Lillis‘s proposed testimony and the purported 
impeachment evidence relating to O‘Neal‘s testimony — constituted newly 
discovered evidence for purposes of the statute.  That aside, it concluded:  ―It‘s 
extremely doubtful whether or not that [evidence] would have in any way made 
any difference in the eventual verdict.  If they had testified, or Mr. Lombardi had 
testified, in accordance with the affidavits, then, everything considered, no 
 
91 
 
different result would have taken place, especially in light of the other evidence 
that was presented, especially the phone records.‖  
2.  Discussion 
― ‗To grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the 
evidence must make a different result probable on retrial.‘  [Citation.]  ‗[T]he trial 
court has broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion . . . ,‘ and its ‗ruling will 
be disturbed only for clear abuse of that discretion.‘  [Citation.]  In addition, ‗[w]e 
accept the trial court‘s credibility determinations and findings on questions of 
historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Verdugo, supra, 
50 Cal.4th at p. 308.) 
― ‗In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, 
the trial court considers the following factors:  ― ‗1.  That the evidence, and not 
merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2.  That the evidence be not 
cumulative merely; 3.  That it be such as to render a different result probable on a 
retrial of the cause; 4.  That the party could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5.  That these facts be shown by the 
best evidence of which the case admits.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Howard (2010) 51 
Cal.4th 15, 43.)  Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when, applying 
these factors, it denied defendant‘s new trial motion.   
We defer to the trial court‘s finding that, based on his affidavit, Lombardi 
would not have been a credible witness.  Not only had he twice changed his story 
of whether defendant had or had not accompanied him to a baseball game but, as 
the prosecutor observed at the hearing, he also would have been subject to 
impeachment by his failure to have testified about the baseball game at the 
preliminary hearing. 
 
92 
 
The defense‘s description of Lillis‘s proposed testimony was based entirely 
upon defense counsel‘s representation of what he would say, not on a declaration 
by Lillis himself.  This, surely, is not the ― ‗ ― ‗best evidence of which the case 
admits.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Howard, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 43.)  In any event, 
Lillis‘s testimony would have been, at most, cumulative to the testimony of 
Thompson, Weber, and Shaw, all of whom claimed to have seen and been with 
defendant in Massachusetts at the end of April 1986.  Defendant appears to be 
arguing that, unlike their testimony, Lillis‘s would have been unassailable because 
the date he remembered seeing defendant was his birthday.  But any testimony 
involving a witness‘s memory of events that occurred years earlier is susceptible 
to impeachment.  Lillis would have been no different on that score than 
defendant‘s other alibi witnesses who, after all, testified not just that they had 
casually seen him but that he had visited with them and even stayed at the home of 
one of them. 
Finally, we agree with the trial court that the evidence that would 
purportedly have impeached Karen O‘Neal‘s testimony hardly seems so 
significant that it would have made a different result probable on retrial, 
particularly in light of the telephone records showing that defendant did not charge 
any long distance calls to his San Jose telephone number within two weeks of 
Sharley Ann‘s murder.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court‘s denial of defendant‘s new trial motion. 
F.  Cumulative Error  
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of prejudice flowing from his 
allegations of error requires reversal.  As to most of his allegations, we have 
concluded there was no error.  In those instances in which we found or assumed 
error occurred, we have concluded any error was not prejudicial.  Even when 
 
93 
 
considered altogether, those actual or assumed errors did not deprive defendant of 
a fair trial.  
CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. O‘Malley 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S024046 
Date Filed: February 18, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: Hugh F. Mullin III 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Cliff Gardner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Lazuli Whitt for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Ronald A. Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, Glenn R. Pruden 
and Nanette Winaker, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Cliff Gardner 
Law Office of Cliff Gardner 
1448 San Pablo Avenue 
Berkeley, CA  94702 
(510) 524-1093 
 
Nanette Winaker 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5934