Title: Doe v. Chicago Board of Education

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96574-Agenda 21-September 2004.
JOHN DOE, a Minor, by his Legal Guardian, D. Jean Ortega-Piron,
Guardianship Adm'r of the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION 							et al. (The Chicago Board of Education, Appellant).
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case we must decide whether section 4-102 of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act)
(745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2000)), extending immunity to a local
government entity providing a police protection service, applies in the
case of a school board furnishing an attendant on a bus transporting
disabled students. We hold that it does not.
	The guardian of a disabled minor sought damages in tort against
the Chicago Board of Education (Board) and Laidlaw Transit, Inc., a
chartered bus company, for injuries the ward sustained as the result of
an assault by a mentally impaired fellow passenger while riding to
school on an unsupervised bus. The trial court allowed the Board's
motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)), finding that the
Board was immune from liability under section 4-102 of the Act. The
trial court also allowed the Board's motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), finding
that the complaint did not plead facts justifying its allegation of willful
and wanton conduct. Plaintiff appealed both findings pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).
	The appellate court reversed, holding that willful and wanton
conduct was adequately pleaded and that the Board was not immune
under section 4-102 of the Act. 339 Ill. App. 3d 848. We granted the
Board's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We also
granted leave to the City of Chicago, the Illinois Municipal League,
the Illinois Association of School Boards, and the Illinois Association
of School Administrators to file amicus curiae briefs. 155 Ill. 2d R.
345. We now affirm the appellate court.
BACKGROUND 
	The complaint alleged that plaintiff's ward, a mentally impaired
special education student at a school for maladjusted boys, was
sexually assaulted by another male student passenger on the bus taking
them to school. An attendant was employed by the Board to supervise
the children on the bus ride to and from school. On the day of the
assault, the attendant had called in sick and was not present on the
bus. Thus, the complaint alleges, the Board knew or should have
known that no attendant was present.
	The assailant had a deviant sexual history, had been declared a
sexually aggressive child and youth ward (SACY), and was under a
"Protective Plan" requiring that he never be left unsupervised among
other children. Hence, the complaint alleges that the Board knew or
should have known that supervision of the children on the bus was
required at all times. According to the complaint, the knowing failure
to provide an attendant under these circumstances was willful and
wanton conduct proximately resulting in injury to plaintiff's ward.
	In its section 2-619 motion, the Board claimed immunity from
liability because the conduct described in the complaint is the failure
to prevent the commission of a crime and, accordingly, is within the
police protection services immunity conferred by section 4-102 of the
Act. In its section 2-615 motion, the Board also claimed that the
allegations in the complaint are conclusory and inadequate to sustain
the charge of willful and wanton conduct. The trial court allowed both
motions and dismissed the complaint against the Board with prejudice.
The court then entered Rule 304(a) findings, and plaintiff appealed.
The action against the bus company remains pending in the trial court.
	The appellate court reversed, holding section 4-102 of the Act
inapplicable. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 856. The court distinguished its
holding in A.R. v. Chicago Board of Education, 311 Ill. App. 3d 29
(1999), where section 4-102 immunity was applied to defeat a
plaintiff's complaint under similar circumstances. The court noted that
the Code requires liberal construction of pleadings "with a view to
doing substantial justice between the parties." 735 ILCS 5/2-603
(West 2000). Although the complaint does contain allegations that the
Board failed to prevent a sexual assault, it also contains allegations
implicating willful and wanton conduct based on allowing the bus to
operate without supervision, knowing that the perpetrator was not to
be left unsupervised among other children. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 856.
	The court then held that section 3-108 of the Act (745 ILCS
10/3-108 (West 2000)), extending immunity for failure to supervise
an activity on public property, except in cases involving willful and
wanton conduct, controlled the situation described in plaintiff's
complaint. The court, relying on Doe v. Dimovski, 336 Ill. App. 3d
292 (2003), found that plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged willful
and wanton conduct, and reversed and remanded the case to the trial
court. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 858. We granted the Board's petition for
leave to appeal. (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
ANALYSIS
	In ruling on motions to dismiss pursuant to either section 2-615
or 2-619 of the Code, the trial court must interpret all pleadings in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. On appeal, our review
is de novo. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189
(1997).
	The Board submits that all of the allegations charging willful and
wanton conduct in plaintiff's complaint describe different ways the
Board could have, or should have, prevented a sexual assault. Hence,
it argues that section 4-102 of the Act is clearly implicated. Nearly
identical allegations were made by the plaintiff in A.R. v. Chicago
Board of Education, 311 Ill. App. 3d 29 (1999). The court in that
case held that section 4-102 of the Act applied and, the Board
contends, the same result should follow in this case. Conversely,
plaintiff contends that immunity does not apply because the Board was
not providing police protection services in furnishing a bus attendant.
	To resolve the central issue presented by this case, we must
construe section 4-102. In cases of statutory construction, our
primary goal is to determine the intent of the legislature. If we can
discern the legislative intent from the plain language of the statute
without resorting to other interpretive aids, we will do so, and we will
not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express
legislative intent. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89 (1996).
	Section 4-102 of the Act provides in relevant part:
			"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is
liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise
provide police protection service or, if police protection
service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police
protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of
crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to
identify or apprehend criminals." (Emphasis added.) 745
ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2000).
	The Board asserts that the crux of plaintiff's action is the Board's
alleged failure to prevent a criminal assault and that section 4-102
plainly covers liability arising from the failure to prevent crime. The
Board also suggests that the appellate court's invocation of the liberal
construction rule is disingenuous, as it promotes the interests of the
plaintiff over the Board's interest in asserting a statutory immunity.
	Nonetheless, the plain language of section 4-102 provides that
immunity for failure to prevent a crime attaches "if police protection
service is provided." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, section 4-102
immunity attaches only if providing a bus attendant constitutes
providing police protection service. We agree with plaintiff that the
Board recognized when it furnished an attendant that the safe
transportation of the students by bus required the presence of
someone to monitor the conduct of the students, rather than a police
officer or someone standing in the place of a police officer to enforce
the law. This is analogous to a classroom situation where a teacher
fails to supervise students adequately, resulting in a student being
injured. Our appellate court has allowed recovery in such cases. See,
e.g., Gammon v. Edwardsville Community Unit School District No.
7, 82 Ill. App. 3d 586 (1980); Jackson v. Chicago Board of
Education, 192 Ill. App. 3d 1093 (1989); Clay v. Chicago Board of
Education, 22 Ill. App. 3d 437 (1974). In none of those cases,
however, was section 4-102 immunity asserted as a defense.
	In opposition, the Board notes that the appellate court has held
the police protection services immunity applicable in a variety of
circumstances not directly involving police personnel, citing Lawson
v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628 (1996) (board's failure to use
a school's metal detectors daily); Hernandez v. Kirksey, 306 Ill. App.
3d 912 (1999) (city-employed school crossing guard instructed a child
to cross the street into the path of oncoming traffic); Goebig v. City
of Chicago, 188 Ill. App. 3d 614 (1989) (city-employed school
crossing guard absent from usual post, thus permitting student to
cross unguarded intersection); Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks
Manufacturing Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 945 (1998) (city personnel
improperly directing spectators at a fireworks display to stand in
harm's way); and Burley v. On The Waterfront, Inc., 228 Ill. App. 3d
412 (1992) (city failed to provide adequate lighting and security at a
public festival). While these cases did not involve services performed
by police personnel, they all relate to functions traditionally performed
by police, such as weapons detection, traffic control, and crowd
security and control.
	Most recently, the appellate court applied section 4-102
immunity when a Board-employed bus attendant failed to prevent or
intercede in a student-on-student sexual assault on a bus. A.R. v.
Chicago Board of Education, 311 Ill. App. 3d 29 (1999). Like the
case before us, the complaint in A.R. claimed that the Board failed to
provide adequate supervision on the bus and failed to protect
passengers from each other or from danger. The A.R. court held that
under the plain language of section 4-102, the Board was immunized
from liability because it was apparent that "plaintiffs sought to impose
liability on defendant for failure to provide police services so as to
prevent an assault upon A.R." A.R., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 34. According
to the Board, the holding in A.R. should control the result in the case
at bar.
	Factually, A.R. differs from the case before us principally
because, in A.R., an attendant was present and failed to prevent or
intercede in the assault. Here, the Board did not furnish an attendant
on the day of the assault. That distinction alone is not dispositive since
statutory immunity under section 4-102 would apply in either
situation if police protection services were provided.
	Legally, the A.R. court focused on the plaintiff's argument that
section 4-102 immunity applies only where a public entity is sworn
and charged with the duty of law enforcement. The court rejected that
argument and held that section 4-102 applies to all public entities as
defined in the Act. A.R., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 33-34. The A.R. court did
not consider the question of whether furnishing a bus attendant
constituted providing police protection services. As that is the
predicate for the attachment of immunity, we must focus on the
purpose of providing the attendant, rather than the conduct causing
the injury.
	 According to the allegations in the complaint, as a part of the
educational program, the Board transported students to and from
school and it employed a bus attendant to supervise the children in
accordance with its duty to protect plaintiff's ward. Thus, the
attendant functions like a teacher or a hall monitor whose very
presence may prevent unsafe activity or untoward behavior. For
instance, a teacher may intervene in a fight between students, but a
teacher does not act as a police officer apprehending an offender.
Rather, a teacher acts as a peacekeeper and a monitor of student
behavior. Further, there is no indication that the attendant was a
sworn police officer or had any authority to restrain or arrest a
passenger.
	Therefore, for the reasons discussed, we believe that
characterizing the bus attendant's function as a "police protection
service" would stretch the plain meaning of that language, and it
would not be consonant with the intention of the legislature. Hence,
we hold that under the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, the Board
was not providing a police protection service by furnishing a bus
attendant. Accordingly, section 4-102 immunity does not apply. To
the extent that the result we reach today is inconsistent with the
holding in A.R. v. Chicago Board of Education, that case is overruled.
	While it found that section 4-102 did not apply, the appellate
court held that section 3-108 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3-108 (West
2000)) controls. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 856. That section provides
immunity for injuries resulting from a failure to supervise an activity.
Only willful and wanton conduct is not protected by the immunity
conferred in section 3-108. To plead willful and wanton conduct, a
plaintiff must allege either a deliberate intention to harm or an utter
indifference to or conscious disregard for the welfare of the plaintiff.
Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 448
(1992).
	Here, the court rejected the Board's argument that the plaintiff
failed to allege that the Board had knowledge of the special needs of
the children on the bus, of the perpetrator's sexually aggressive
behavior, and of the need to have a bus attendant. The court also
rejected the Board's claim that the allegation of the Board's
awareness of the likelihood that male passengers were likely to
attempt sexual assaults on other passengers is conclusory. The court
reasoned that the allegation that the assailant had been declared a
sexually aggressive child and was under a protective plan requiring
that he never be left unsupervised among other children was clearly
sufficient to establish that the Board should have known of the special
needs of the children on the bus. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 857.
	In reviewing the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, we
accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonably drawn
inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Geise v. Phoenix
Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 510 (1994). While the court
must interpret the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
the failure to plead facts "cannot be aided by any principle of liberal
construction." Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consolidated
Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 119 (1995).
	The Board complains that the allegation that it was aware of the
likelihood that male passengers would commit sexual assaults on
others is unfounded speculation. According to the Board, plaintiff has
not pleaded facts regarding any prior sexual assaults and has not
stated a basis for charging the Board with knowledge of the assaults.
The appellate court found Doe v. Dimovski, 336 Ill. App. 3d 292
(2003), apposite. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 858. In that case, the complaint
alleged that the school board had knowledge of a teacher's prior
instances of sexual abuse. That knowledge was held sufficient to make
the likelihood of similar behavior with the student plaintiff reasonably
foreseeable. Dimovski, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 299.
	The appellate court here held that the complaint in this case was
similar to that in Dimovski, and that the Board's knowledge of the
special needs of the plaintiff's ward  and the dangerous propensities
of the assailant were adequately pleaded. 339 Ill. App. 3d at 858. We
agree with the appellate court. The complaint alleged the disabled
status of the plaintiff's ward, the fact of the assailant's SACY status,
and the requirements of his protective plan. These averments of fact
are sufficient to present jury questions as to the knowledge of the
Board and the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff's ward and, thus,
the issue of willful and wanton conduct. We hold, therefore, that the
trial court erred in granting the Board's section 2-615 motion to
dismiss the complaint.
CONCLUSION
	Under the facts of this case, section 4-102 immunity does not
apply because furnishing a bus attendant for the transportation of
special needs students to and from school was not providing a police
protection service. Plaintiff has adequately pleaded allegations of
willful and wanton conduct by the Board in its knowing failure to
provide a bus attendant when it should have known of the likelihood
of harm to plaintiff's ward. We therefore affirm the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.