Title: State ex rel. Clay v. Gee

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Clay v. Gee, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-48.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-48 
THE STATE EX REL. CLAY, APPELLANT, v. GEE, JUDGE, APPELLEE.1 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Clay v. Gee, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-48.] 
Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing complaint for writ of procedendo 
affirmed—Procedendo will not compel the performance of a duty that has 
already been performed. 
(No. 2013-0839—Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided January 16, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Miami County, No. 2013-CA-09. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying relief to 
appellant, James H. Clay. 
{¶ 2} On July 13, 2011, this court ruled that it was unconstitutional to 
apply sex-offender classifications under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act, R.C. Chapter 
2950 as amended by 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, to defendants convicted prior to 
                                                 
1 Throughout this litigation, this case has been incorrectly captioned State v. Clay. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
the effective date of that legislation.  State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-
Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, syllabus; see In re Bruce S., 134 Ohio St.3d 477, 
2012-Ohio-5696, 983 N.E.2d 350 (discussing the effective date of Ohio’s Adam 
Walsh Act).  Pursuant to Williams, Clay filed a motion in the Miami County 
Court of Common Pleas for reclassification of his sex-offender status. 
{¶ 3} On March 21, 2013, Clay filed a petition for a writ of procedendo 
in the Second District Court of Appeals to compel a ruling on his motion.  About 
one week later, Miami County Common Pleas Court Judge Christopher Gee 
issued a judgment entry granting the motion and reclassifying Clay’s sex-offender 
status. 
{¶ 4} Thereafter, the Second District Court of Appeals dismissed the 
petition for a writ of procedendo as moot. 
{¶ 5} We affirm the judgment because procedendo will not issue to 
compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed.  State ex rel. 
Fontanella v. Kontos, 117 Ohio St.3d 514, 2008-Ohio-1431, 885 N.E.2d 220, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 6} Clay argues that Judge Gee failed to perform his duty because the 
judge allegedly violated the law in the course of conducting the reclassification 
hearing.  However, procedendo will not issue to correct such an error, because 
Clay has an adequate remedy by way of appeal.  State ex rel. Lowe v. Callahan, 
136 Ohio St.3d 324, 2013-Ohio-3689, 995 N.E.2d 226, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Culgan v. 
Collier, 132 Ohio St.3d 394, 2012-Ohio-2916, 972 N.E.2d 579. 
{¶ 7} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
James H. Clay, pro se. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
Anthony E. Kendell, Miami County Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert E. 
Long III, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
________________________