Title: PEOPLE OF MI V IVORY L HERRON

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C 
hief Just ice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 3, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 114858  
IVORY L. HERRON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
This case requires that we determine whether defendant’s  
right to be free from double jeopardy was violated.  The  
issues presented are (1) whether defendant’s retrial for  
second-degree murder, after a jury in the first trial  
deadlocked 
on 
that 
count, 
was 
a 
constitutionally 
impermissible  
successive prosecution; (2) whether defendant’s conviction of  
involuntary 
manslaughter 
on 
retrial 
resulted 
in 
an  
unconstitutionally impermissible multiple punishment because  
 
he had previously been convicted of negligent homicide under  
prosecution for a separate count; and (3) whether defendant is  
entitled to a conviction of the lesser offense when multiple  
punishments have resulted from a retrial.  
We 
hold 
that 
defendant’s 
retrial 
for 
second-degree 
murder  
was permissible and did not violate the constitutional  
protection against successive prosecutions.  However, the  
retrial of the defendant resulted in multiple punishments for  
the same offense. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to a  
remedy for the multiple punishments violation. We hold that  
the constitutional violation should have been remedied by  
affirming defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter  
and vacating his conviction of negligent homicide.  
Additionally, 
we 
address 
whether 
the defendant’s  
conviction of involuntary manslaughter at the second trial,  
following his previous conviction of negligent homicide, was  
precluded by application of MCL 768.33, as proposed by Judge  
WHITE.  We conclude that MCL 768.33 does not apply to defendant  
because he was not subjected to a subsequent trial for  
different degrees of the same offense for which he was  
originally acquitted or convicted upon an indictment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals, reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence for  
involuntary manslaughter, and vacate his conviction and  
2  
 
sentence for negligent homicide.  
I  
The facts relevant to our decision in this case were  
sufficiently set forth in the unpublished decision of the  
Court of Appeals:  
On October 17, 1995, after drinking alcohol 
and ingesting a controlled substance, phencyclidine 
(PCP), defendant drove a U-Haul truck at an  
immoderate rate of speed and in an erratic manner 
on the streets of Grosse Pointe Woods.  He struck  
one car, causing it to spin around, then drove on, 
striking another vehicle head-on, killing the  
driver, Christina Comito.  These events occurred on  
a clear fall day at approximately 3:30 P.M., just as 
a nearby middle school was dismissing students for 
the day and traffic on the roads was heavy. Blood  
tests performed later on defendant revealed the 
presence OF PCP, but no alcohol.  
The prosecutor charged defendant with second­
degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549 [count I], 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of a combination of alcohol and a controlled  
substance thereby causing death (OUI causing death), 
MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4) [count II], and 
driving on a suspended or revoked license [count 
III].  The jury was permitted to consider, on count  
I, the lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter 
involving a motor vehicle, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, 
and negligent homicide, MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556, 
and on count II, negligent homicide was again given 
as a lesser included offense of OUI causing death.  
. . . Ultimately, the jury convicted defendant on 
count II of negligent homicide and on count III of  
operating a motor vehicle while his license was 
suspended or revoked,[1] but was unable to reach a  
verdict on count I. 
The trial court ordered a  
mistrial on that count.  The prosecutor retried 
defendant on the second-degree murder charge, with  
1 Count III is not at issue here.  
3  
 
the jury being instructed on the lesser offenses of 
involuntary manslaughter involving a motor vehicle 
and negligent homicide. 
The jury convicted  
defendant of involuntary manslaughter.  [Issued 
April 6, 1999 (Docket No. 198353), slip op at 1-2.]  
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that  
his retrial on the charge of second-degree murder, after being  
convicted of negligent homicide in his first trial, violated  
his constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  
Stating that “a fundamental error in the proceedings below  
. . . resulted in a violation of defendant’s constitutional  
right to be free from double jeopardy,” the Court of Appeals  
first determined that where the facts of a case support  
separate charges for murder, involuntary manslaughter, or OUI  
causing death, the charges must be brought in the alternative,  
and presented to the jury in that manner.  Id. at 2.  The  
Court then concluded that because “the defendant’s drunken  
driving ha[d] caused the death of one person, he [could] be  
convicted of only one of these offenses.” Id. (emphasis in  
the original).  The Court of Appeals further concluded that  
defendant’s conviction of both negligent homicide and  
involuntary manslaughter constituted multiple punishments for  
the same offense, given the statutorily created link between  
these two crimes,2 with negligent homicide being a necessarily  
2 See MCL 750.325.  
4  
 
included lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. Id.  
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that, when a  
defendant is convicted of both a greater and lesser offense of  
the same category, the general rule is to vacate the  
conviction of the lesser offense and affirm the conviction of  
the greater,3 it determined that, because the charges were  
improperly presented to the jury in the first trial,  
defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter in the  
second trial was “tainted and cannot stand.”  Id. at 3.  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s  
conviction for involuntary manslaughter and affirmed his  
conviction for negligent homicide. Id.4  
In concurring with the Court of Appeals majority, Judge  
WHITE relied on a statutory rather than constitutional ground,5  
essentially stating that because negligent homicide was a  
“different degree” of involuntary manslaughter, defendant’s  
conviction of negligent homicide precluded his subsequent  
conviction of involuntary manslaughter arising from the same  
vehicular death. Id. at 1.  
3 People v Harding, 443 Mich 693; 506 NW2d 482 (1993).  
4 
 The Court of Appeals also ordered resentencing on 
defendant’s 
negligent 
homicide 
conviction 
for 
reasons 
that 
are 
not relevant here.  
5  MCL 768.33.  
5  
 
 
II  
This appeal involves challenges based on constitutional  
double jeopardy principles.  A double jeopardy challenge  
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  See, e.g.,  
People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 520-21; 581 NW2d 219 (1998).  
US Const, Am V provides, in pertinent part  
No person . . . shall . . . be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb 
. . .  
This provision is applicable to the states through the  
Fourteenth Amendment.  Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 794; 89  
S Ct 2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969).  Further, Michigan Const  
1963, art 1, § 15 provides:  
No person shall be subject for the same  
offense to be twice put in jeopardy.  
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment  
protects 
against 
two 
general 
governmental 
abuses: 
(1) 
multiple  
prosecutions for the same offense after an acquittal or  
conviction; and(2) multiple punishments for the same offense.  
Ohio v Johnson, 467 US 493, 497; 104 S Ct 2536; 81 L Ed 2d 425  
(1984).  
“The principal thrust of double jeopardy protection by  
the very terms of our federal and state constitutional  
provision[s] is protection from repeated prosecutions for the  
same criminal offense arising out of the same conduct.” People  
6  
v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 705; 506 NW2d 482 (1993).  This  
includes protection from being prosecuted in a subsequent  
prosecution for a greater offense, following conviction in a  
previous trial for a lesser included offense.  Green v United  
States, 355 US 184, 190; 78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957);  
Price v Georgia, 398 US 323; 90 S Ct 1757; 26 L Ed 2d 300  
(1970). Additionally, the concept of multiple punishment in  
double 
jeopardy 
jurisprudence has as its purpose the avoidance  
of more than one punishment for the same offense arising out  
of a single prosecution.” Harding, supra at 705. I n  t h e   
present case, we are faced with challenges involving both  
defendant’s constitutional right to be free from multiple  
prosecutions and his right to be free from multiple  
punishments.  
A  
First, we conclude that there was no violation of  
defendant’s right to be free from multiple prosecutions when  
he was retried on the charge of second-degree murder in the  
second trial.6
 Successive-prosecution cases implicate the  
6 The Court of Appeals concluded that “defendant’s right 
against successive prosecutions for the same offense was  
implicated once the trial court accepted the first jury’s 
verdict of negligent homicide and the prosecutor was allowed 
to retry defendant on the higher charges.” Slip op at 2. 
However, the Court of Appeals holding erroneously failed to 
recognize that the second trial in this case was a retrial 
(continued...)  
7  
  
core values of the principles relating to double jeopardy.  
See Bartkus v Illinois (On Rehearing), 359 US 121, 151; 79 S  
Ct 676; 3 L Ed 2d 684 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Where  
successive prosecutions occur, double jeopardy principles  
protect a defendant’s interest in not having to twice run the  
gauntlet, in not being subjected to “embarrassment, expense  
and ordeal,” and in not being compelled “to live in a  
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,” with enhancement  
of the “possibility that even though innocent he may be found  
guilty.” 
Green v United States, supra at 187-88; see also  
United States v Wilson, 420 US 332, 343; 95 S Ct 1013; 43 L Ed  
2d 232 (1975).  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that  
certain situations are not amenable to strict application of  
the general principle that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a  
defendant from being tried twice for the same crime.  
6(...continued) 
after mistrial of the second-degree murder charge initially 
brought simultaneously with the OUI causing death charge. 
Jeopardy 
relating 
to 
the 
second-degree 
murder 
charge 
continued 
from the initial trial into the retrial.  The retrial did not  
involve a second prosecution for the OUI charge. 
Thus, as 
will be explained, the problem perceived by the Court of 
Appeals 
is 
actually 
a multiple punishments problem rather than 
a multiple prosecutions problem.  This case is similar to  
Harding, supra, in which this Court discussed the difficulty 
in analyzing a challenge arising when the punishment 
complained of is exacted from successive trials rather than 
from a single trial. See discussion below at 18-21.  
8  
 
 
Richardson v United States, 468 US 317, 323-324; 104 S Ct  
3081; 82 L Ed 2d 242 (1984).  In Richardson, the Supreme Court  
held 
that 
in 
those 
circumstances in which “manifest necessity”  
causes the termination of a criminal trial, the defendant’s  
right against being placed twice in jeopardy is not implicated  
with regard to the charges unsuccessfully completed.  In  
particular, the Supreme Court has long recognized that a  
jury’s inability to agree upon a verdict constitutes manifest  
necessity. Id.  
Michigan courts also recognize that where manifest  
necessity 
compels 
the termination of a proceeding, the state’s  
double jeopardy provisions do not bar retrial.  People v  
Thompson, 424 Mich 118, 123; 379 NW2d 49 (1985), quoting  
People v Anderson, 409 Mich 474, 483-84; 295 NW2d 482 (1980).  
Such 
manifest 
necessity, 
although 
elusive 
of 
precise  
definition, includes at least those instances in which a jury  
is unable to reach a verdict. Thompson, supra at 123.  
When a jury is unable to reach a verdict and a  
declaration of mistrial has been made by the court, the  
mistrial is not the equivalent of an acquittal.  There exists  
a long line of cases, starting with the opinion of Justice  
Story in United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 580; 6 L  
Ed 165 (1824), which hold that “a failure of the jury to agree  
on a verdict [is] an instance of ‘manifest necessity’ which  
9  
 
permits a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry  
the defendant, because ‘the ends of public justice would  
otherwise be defeated.’”  The Court in United States v  
Bordeaux, 121 F3d 1187, 1193 (CA 8, 1997) stated that  
[w]here a jury ha[s] not been silent as to a 
particular count, but where, on the contrary, a 
disagreement is formally entered on the record[,] 
[t]he effect of such entry justifies the discharge 
of the jury, and therefore a subsequent prosecution 
for the offence as to which the jury has disagreed 
and on account of which it has been regularly 
discharged, would not constitute second jeopardy.  
The present case falls within the scope of this exception  
to the general prohibition against successive prosecutions.  
Here, 
the 
jury 
in 
defendant’s first trial expressly deadlocked  
with regard to count I (second-degree murder), thus compelling  
the termination of an otherwise properly pursued criminal  
prosecution. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
defendant 
was 
neither  
acquitted nor convicted of this offense.  Richardson, supra at  
323-324; Thompson, supra at 123. Rather, the trial court’s  
declaration of a mistrial, regarding the second-degree murder  
charge, completely halted the proceedings that ultimately  
would have led to a verdict on this charge.  Johnson, supra at  
499-500. Where criminal proceedings against an accused have  
not run their full course, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not  
bar a second trial. Price v Georgia, supra at 326-27. Thus,  
because the prosecutor’s retrial of defendant on the charge of  
10  
second-degree murder was the result of a hung jury, we  
conclude that there was no violation of double jeopardy  
principles aimed at multiple prosecutions.  
Vacating 
defendant’s 
conviction 
for 
involuntary  
manslaughter, the Court of Appeals majority in this case  
determined that a “fundamental error in the proceedings below  
. 
. 
. 
has 
resulted 
in 
a 
violation 
of 
defendant’s  
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.” Slip  
op at 2. Apparently, this “fundamental error” occurred when  
the prosecutor chose to pursue convictions against defendant  
for both second-degree murder and 
OUI causing death.  
According to the Court majority, “where the facts support  
separate charges of murder, involuntary manslaughter, or OUI  
causing death, the charges must be brought in the alternative,  
and presented to the trier of fact as such.” Id. (emphasis  
added). We disagree to the extent where, as here, defendant  
was charged with second-degree murder and OUI causing death in  
the first trial, but was acquitted of the latter, and properly  
retried for second-degree murder in a subsequent trial.  
Thus, the Court of Appeals vacation of defendant’s  
conviction for involuntary manslaughter on this ground was in  
error.  
B  
Second, we conclude that defendant received multiple  
11  
punishments for the killing of the victim, Ms. Comito, in  
violation of his double jeopardy right to be free from  
multiple punishments, when he was convicted of, and sentenced  
for, negligent homicide and involuntary manslaughter.  
Under neither the federal nor the Michigan double  
jeopardy provisions does this Court instruct the Legislature  
regarding what conduct it can and cannot make separate crimes.  
People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 485; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). In  
Michigan, the penalty for involuntary manslaughter is  
codified,7 but the definition is left to the common law.  
People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 331; 28 NW 583 (1886). This  
Court has defined the common-law offense of involuntary  
manslaughter as “the killing of another without malice and  
unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting  
to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great  
bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in  
itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.”  
People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923); see  
7 The penalty for involuntary manslaughter is set forth 
in MCL 750.321:  
Any person who shall commit the crime of 
manslaughter shall be guilty of a felony punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison, not more than 
fifteen years or by fine of not more than seven 
thousand five hundred dollars, or both, at the 
discretion of the court.  
12  
also People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 477; 418 NW2d 861 (1988).  
The kind of negligence required for manslaughter is something  
more than ordinary or simple negligence, however, and is often  
described as “criminal negligence” or “gross negligence,”  
People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590 n 4; 218 NW2d 136 (1974).  
The negligent homicide statute, MCL 750.324 provides:  
Any person who, by the operation of any  
vehicle upon any highway or upon any other  
property, public or private, at an immoderate rate 
of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent 
manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause 
the death of another, shall be guilty of a  
misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison not more than 2 years or by a fine of 
not more than $2,000.00, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.  
Where two statutes prohibit violations of the same  
societal norm, albeit in a different manner, as a general  
principle it can be concluded that the Legislature did not  
intend multiple punishments.  Robideau, supra at 487. With  
regard to the statutes addressing the offenses of involuntary  
manslaughter and negligent homicide, it is reasonable to  
conclude that the causation of the death of another human  
being is the violation of a societal norm sought to be  
prohibited by the Legislature. These two crimes are part of  
a hierarchy of offenses in which statutes incorporate the  
elements of a base statute, but increase the penalty on the  
basis of the presence of increasingly aggravating conduct.  
13  
 
See id. at 487-88; see also People v Price, 214 Mich App 530,  
544; 543 NW2d 49 (1995).  In other words, the only difference  
between the two offenses is the level of conduct necessary to  
establish criminal culpability.  
That the involuntary manslaughter and negligent homicide  
statutes prohibit violations of essentially the same societal  
norm is further evidenced by MCL 750.325, which provides:  
The crime of negligent homicide shall be 
deemed to be included within every crime of  
manslaughter charged to have been committed in the 
operation of any vehicle, and in any case where a 
defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in 
the operation of any vehicle, if the jury shall 
find the defendant not guilty of the crime of 
manslaughter, it may render a verdict of guilty of 
negligent homicide.  
The hierarchal nature of these two offenses thus evidences a  
legislative prohibition against the imposition of dual  
convictions 
and 
punishments for violation of the societal norm  
sought to be protected by both the statute against involuntary  
manslaughter and the statute against negligent homicide.  See  
Robideau, supra at 487-88; People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392,  
407; 397 NW2d 783 (1986).  
In the present case, defendant was first convicted of  
negligent homicide, under a charge of OUI causing death.8  He  
8 As we have concluded today, such charging neither 
constituted overreaching by the prosecutor, nor resulted in a 
violation of defendant’s right to be free from multiple 
(continued...)  
14  
 
 
 
 
was retried on the second-degree murder charge, a charge on  
which the jury in the first trial had expressly deadlocked,  
and 
was 
convicted 
of 
involuntary manslaughter.  Defendant thus  
received multiple punishments for the killing of Ms. Comito,  
in violation of his double jeopardy right to be free from  
multiple punishments for the same offense.  See Robideau,  
supra at 487.  
In People v Harding, supra, the defendants were found  
guilty of armed robbery, assault with intent to murder, and  
8(...continued) 
punishments. However, a trial court is required to instruct 
the jury concerning the law applicable to the case and to 
present the case fully and fairly to the jury in an 
understandable manner. MCL 768.29. People v Mills, 450 Mich  
61, 80; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).  We recognize that the 
instructions articulated by the trial court at defendant’s 
first trial have served to  complicate the issues in the 
present case. 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on 
the offense of negligent homicide as a lesser included offense 
of both second-degree murder and OUI causing death.  
Defendant, however, arguably waived any potential claim 
of error resulting from the trial court’s instructions to the 
jury at his first trial.  Waiver has been defined as “the  
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” 
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763, n 7; 597 NW2d 130  
(1999).  “One who waives his rights under a rule may not then 
seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those 
rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.”  United  
States v Griffin, 84 F3d 912, 924 (CA 7, 1996). 
In the  
present case, defendant did not fail to object to the 
negligent homicide instruction as it related to the OUI  
causing death charge.  Rather, he both requested, and approved  
of, this instruction.  Defendant may not now harbor any claim 
of 
error 
regarding 
this instruction as an appellate parachute. 
See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).  
15  
 
 
possession of a firearm, arising out of a robbery during which  
the victim “was shot once in the heart and once in the  
abdomen, and then thrown headfirst into a sewer to die.” Id.  
at 696 (BRICKLEY, J.).  He survived the attack, but suffered  
from irreversible heart problems from that time until his  
death four years later. Id. at 696-697. The defendants were  
then prosecuted for felony murder and felony-firearm. Id. In  
a joint trial with separate juries, one defendant was  
convicted 
of 
felony 
murder and felony-firearm, while the other  
defendant was convicted of felony murder only. Id. at 698.  
The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that  
the prosecution and conviction of both defendants for felony  
murder was not precluded by double jeopardy.  The Court of  
Appeals reversed the second conviction and the sentence for  
felony-firearm, on the basis that it was precluded by double  
jeopardy protections. Id. at 698. The Court of Appeals also  
concluded, 
in 
light 
of the felony-murder conviction, that both  
defendants’ prior convictions and sentences for armed robbery  
and assault with intent to commit murder were violative of the  
protection against multiple punishments and should be vacated  
and set aside, the time having been served by them credited to  
the sentences imposed as a result of their earlier  
convictions. Id. at 699.  
This Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding  
16  
that it was not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause to  
charge, try, and convict these defendants of felony murder  
after prosecution for the other crimes arising out of the same  
conduct. Id. at 704-705. This Court went on to analyze the  
“constitutional implications” of the penalties imposed on the  
defendants for the previous crimes in light of the felony­
murder conviction.  Id. 
Reversing in part the Court of  
Appeals decision, this Court also held that since the felony­
murder conviction did not amount to a double jeopardy  
violation, it followed that the accompanying felony-firearm  
conviction was valid as well.  
Thus, in Harding, this Court had occasion to consider  
whether a multiple punishment problem that arises when  
punishments 
are 
exacted in successive trials should be treated  
in the same manner as when multiple punishments are exacted in  
a single trial.  The Court stated:  
We conclude that double jeopardy protection 
dictates that defendants not receive a form of  
multiple punishment that could not have been  
exacted 
had 
their 
felonious 
intentions 
been  
realized sooner and had they been prosecuted to the 
extent of their ultimate culpability in the first 
trial.  They were not placed in jeopardy twice by 
the second prosecution . . . ; rather, they were 
subjected to punishment for offenses arising out of 
a single transaction that could not have been 
exacted in a single proceeding. [Id. at 715-716.]  
In separate opinions, a majority of the Harding Court  
recognized that the same guiding principles apply in both  
17  
 
 
  
situations.9  
Harding also stated that, in cases in which no successive  
prosecutions problem arises, but in which a defendant has been  
punished doubly “for offenses arising out of a single  
transaction but that could not have been exacted in a single  
proceeding,” it is an appropriate remedy in a multiple  
punishment double jeopardy violation to affirm the conviction  
of the higher charge and to vacate the lower conviction. Id.  
at 716; see also Jones v Thomas, 491 US 376, 381-382; 109 S Ct  
2522; 105 L Ed 2d 322 (1989).  Likewise, we believe that  
Harding can be extended to cases, such as the instant one, in  
which the multiple punishments problem does not arise in the  
first trial because of the declaration of a mistrial.  Had the  
jury not deadlocked on the second-degree murder charge, but,  
instead 
had 
convicted 
the 
defendant 
of 
involuntary  
manslaughter, punishment could have been exacted in a single  
trial and the multiple punishment remedy would have been to  
9  
Thus, in cases involving the double jeopardy 
protection against double punishment, although we 
have not decided a case involving both successive 
prosecutions and multiple punishment as in Garrett  
[v United States, 471 US 773; 105 S Ct 2407; 85 L 
Ed 2d 764 (1985)], it is clear that we have 
interpreted the Michigan Constitution consistently 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court’s  
interpretation 
of 
the 
federal 
constitution–  
legislative intent controls. [Id. at 708 (opinion 
of BRICKLEY, J.).]  
18  
 
affirm the greater conviction.  This fact, coupled with the  
fact that the second trial was permissibly brought out of  
manifest necessity, supports the conclusion that, for  
constitutional 
purposes, 
defendant’s 
conviction 
for  
involuntary manslaughter should stand, and his conviction of  
negligent homicide should be vacated.  We therefore reverse  
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
decision, 
reinstate 
defendant’s  
conviction and sentence for involuntary manslaughter, and  
vacate his conviction and sentence for negligent homicide.  
III  
Apart from the constitutional issues of double jeopardy  
discussed above, however, we are also faced with the  
applicability of MCL 768.33 to the present case. Section 33  
provides:  
When a defendant shall be acquitted or  
convicted upon any indictment for an offense, 
consisting of different degrees, he shall not 
thereafter be tried or convicted for a different  
degree of the same offense; nor shall he be tried 
or convicted for any attempt to commit the offense 
charged in the indictment or to commit any degree 
of such offense.  
The application of this statute to the present case was first  
raised by Judge WHITE in her concurring Court of Appeals  
opinion.  
According 
to 
Judge 
WHITE, 
because 
the 
defendant 
should 
not  
have been tried for involuntary manslaughter after being  
19  
convicted of negligent homicide, the involuntary manslaughter  
conviction was improper.  Instead, Judge WHITE would have  
affirmed the defendant’s negligent homicide conviction and  
vacated 
his 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
conviction. 
 
Essentially,  
then, Judge WHITE’s opinion suggests that MCL 768.33 justifies  
departure from the generally accepted remedy for multiple  
punishments, see Harding, supra, and requires affirmance of  
the lesser conviction rather than the greater.  
While we acknowledge that MCL 768.33 may affect the  
prosecutor’s ability to retry a defendant for a crime in  
instances 
where 
the 
defendant has previously been convicted of  
a lesser-included offense of that crime, we hold that MCL  
768.33 is inapplicable to the facts of this case.  Thus, we  
believe that the appropriate remedy is to affirm the  
defendant’s 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
conviction 
and 
vacate 
his  
negligent homicide conviction.  
In reviewing questions of statutory construction, our  
purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's  
intent. People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250  
(1999).  “We begin by examining the plain language of the  
statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that  
the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed–no  
further judicial construction is required or permitted, and  
the statute must be enforced as written.”  Id. at 330. “We  
20  
 
 
 
must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary  
meaning . . . .” Id.  
The plain language of § 33 provides that a defendant  
shall not be tried or convicted for a different degree of the  
“same offense” for which he has been acquitted or convicted  
upon any indictment.  In the present case, the only acquittals  
or convictions the defendant received were upon an indictment  
for OUI causing death.10  He was not thereafter tried for a  
different degree of OUI causing death.  Therefore, he was not  
subsequently tried for a different degree of the same offense.  
Judge WHITE’s opinion implies that the defendant’s  
conviction of negligent homicide upon an indictment for OUI  
causing death barred subsequent trials (including a retrial)  
for any charges that would include negligent homicide as a  
lesser offense.11
 We respectfully disagree. 
The plain  
language of § 33 ties the “offense, consisting of different  
10 In association with the OUI causing death charge, the 
defendant was convicted of negligent homicide as a lesser­
included offense and was thereby implicitly acquitted of OUI  
causing death.  
11 We note that the complicated question arises partially 
from the fact that the jury was instructed that a homicide 
offense, negligent homicide, was also a lesser-included 
offense of OUI causing death.  Our opinion should not be read  
as holding that negligent homicide is a lesser-included 
offense of OUI causing death. 
Rather, we are merely 
addressing the issues as they pertain to the prosecution of 
the defendant and the punishments he actually received.  
21  
 
 
 
  
degrees” to the indictment under which a defendant is  
convicted, not to the particular crime of which he is  
ultimately convicted.  This becomes apparent when the statute  
is read in its entirety.  In the first part of § 33, the  
phrase “for an offense, consisting of different degrees”  
immediately follows, and modifies, the word “indictment.”  
Moreover, the second half of the statute clearly refers to a  
subsequent trial or conviction regarding “the offense charged  
in the indictment.” MCL 768.33 (emphasis added).  
Further, in Michigan, a prosecution must be based on an  
information or an indictment.  MCR 6.112(B). 
The word  
“indictment” includes information, presentment, complaint,  
warrant and any other formal written accusation.  MCL 750.10;  
see also People v Grove, 455 Mich. 439, 459, n 24; 566 NW2d  
547 (1997). The term "indictment" is to be treated as also  
referring to charges made by the filing of an information.  
People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 588, n 1; 487 NW2d 698 (1992);  
see also MCL 767.2.  “Each count in an indictment is regarded  
as if it was a separate indictment.”  People v Vaughn, 409  
Mich 463, 465; 295 NW2d 354 (1980).  
In essence, defendant here was originally tried under  
three separate charges, or “indictments”: second-degree  
murder, OUI causing death, and driving on a suspended driver’s  
license. 
At his first trial, defendant was convicted of  
22  
 
negligent homicide. However, this conviction was based upon  
count II (OUI causing death) of a three-count information.  
Because the focus of § 33 is on the offense charged in  
the indictment, not on the offense for which a defendant is  
ultimately 
convicted, 
defendant 
herein 
could 
not 
thereafter 
be  
tried for a “different degree” of OUI causing death. At his  
second 
trial, 
defendant 
was 
convicted 
of 
involuntary  
manslaughter, as a result of being retried on the charge of  
second-degree murder, a charge upon which the jury in  
defendant’s first trial expressly deadlocked.  
The issue then becomes whether OUI causing death and  
second-degree murder or involuntary manslaughter constitute  
“different degrees” of the same offense.  We conclude that  
they clearly do not, and are thus persuaded that this lack of  
relationship serves to negate the application of § 33 under  
the circumstances of the present case.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
We conclude that it was appropriate for the prosecutor to  
retry defendant for second-degree murder in a subsequent  
trial, after the jury deadlocked on that count after the first  
trial.  The prosecutor’s retrial of defendant on the charge of  
second-degree 
murder was the result of manifest necessity, and  
therefore 
not 
in 
violation of double jeopardy principles aimed  
at multiple prosecutions.  
23  
 
 
 
 
We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence for involuntary  
manslaughter.
 
However, 
because 
defendant 
received  
inappropriate 
multiple 
punishments 
for 
involuntary  
manslaughter and negligent homicide, we vacate his conviction  
and sentence for negligent homicide.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, 
WEAVER, 
KELLY, 
TAYLOR, and YOUNG,  
JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
24