Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-774.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-774 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. VAN SICKLE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Van Sickle,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-774.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Practicing law while license under suspension — 
Neglecting entrusted legal matters — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2010-1863 — Submitted January 4, 2011 — Decided February 24, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-084. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Allan Van Sickle of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0013780, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.  In 
October 2009, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a five-count complaint 
charging respondent with multiple violations of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his practice of law 
while his license was under suspension for failure to register for the 2007 through 
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2009 biennium, his neglect of several client matters, and his failure to respond to 
the resulting disciplinary investigations. 
{¶ 2} After reviewing the parties’ stipulations of fact and misconduct, a 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline granted the 
parties’ joint motion to dismiss a number of alleged violations, dismissed sua 
sponte several stipulated violations that were not charged in the complaint, and 
recommended that respondent be suspended for two years with one year stayed on 
conditions.  The board accepted the panel’s findings and its recommended 
sanction, and no objections have been filed. 
{¶ 3} We find that respondent has committed misconduct.  Given the 
nature of respondent’s misconduct and the limited evidence regarding his 
treatment for depression, however, we conclude that a greater sanction is 
warranted.  Accordingly, we indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of 
law and condition any future petition for reinstatement on the submission of proof 
that respondent has participated in the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”), has obtained treatment for his depression and other diagnosed 
psychological conditions, has fulfilled all follow-up care and reporting 
requirements imposed by OLAP and his treating professionals, has made 
restitution to the clients discussed in count three, and has paid the costs of this 
proceeding.  Upon petitioning for reinstatement, respondent shall also submit 
testimony from a qualified mental-health professional to demonstrate that he is 
capable of returning to the competent, ethical, professional practice of law. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} The stipulated evidence demonstrates that from December 3, 2007, 
through October 28, 2008, respondent’s license was suspended for his failure to 
register for the 2007 through 2009 biennium.  See In re Attorney Registration 
Suspension of Van Sickle, 116 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-6463, 877 N.E.2d 
305.  But during that suspension, respondent sent a letter to his wife’s former 
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landlord identifying himself as a “Counselor and Attorney at Law” and stating 
that he was representing his wife in a security-deposit dispute.  The parties 
stipulated, and we agree, that this conduct, which forms the basis of count one of 
the complaint, violates Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing 
law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction). 
{¶ 5} With respect to count two, the parties stipulated that in August 
2006, a client retained respondent to prepare a will.  However, respondent failed 
to draft the will and failed to respond to the client’s telephone inquiries regarding 
the status of the matter or to another attorney’s requests that he return the client’s 
documents.  We find that this conduct violates DR 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a contract of employment for legal 
services) and DR 9-102(B)(4) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (both requiring a lawyer 
to promptly pay or deliver funds and property to which a client is entitled), as well 
as Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client) and 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter). 
{¶ 6} Count three arises from respondent’s conduct during his 
representation of a husband and wife in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Although the 
bankruptcy court had ordered him to prepare and file certain documents, he failed 
to do so.  Respondent did not access his files or his mail for three months after the 
locks to his office were changed, and he made no effort to have the post office 
forward his mail to another location.  Consequently, respondent failed to receive 
notice from the bankruptcy court of a scheduled hearing and a subsequent show-
cause order and failed to appear.  Although he was found in contempt of court, 
sanctioned, and ordered to return the fees he had received in the case, he failed to 
certify to the bankruptcy court that he had complied with its order.  Based upon 
these facts, the parties stipulated, and we agree, that with respect to count three, 
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respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 2-110(A)1 (prohibiting withdrawal from 
employment without taking steps to protect the client’s interests), 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his client), 7-
101(A)(2), and 9-102(B)(4). 
{¶ 7} In count four, the parties have stipulated that in June 2005, 
respondent entered an oral agreement to represent a man and his business partners 
regarding tax matters, the reorganization of certain business entities, and a 
possible bankruptcy.  However, respondent has not communicated with the clients 
since 2005 and has failed to complete all the work.  Although he did not return the 
client’s documents to them, he did deliver the entire file to relator in June 2007.  
The parties have stipulated, the panel and board have found, and we agree, that 
respondent’s conduct violated DR 7-101(A)(2) and 9-102(B)(4).  The panel, 
however, dismissed the parties’ stipulation that respondent’s conduct after 
February 1, 2007, violated several Rules of Professional Conduct because 
violations of those rules had not been charged in the complaint. 
{¶ 8} With respect to the fifth and final count of relator’s complaint, the 
parties have stipulated that respondent failed to submit a written response to any 
of the grievances arising from his conduct in counts one through four.  After he 
was subpoenaed, respondent did appear and testify at a June 2007 deposition, 
during which he agreed to provide relator with various documents and additional 
                                                 
1 Although the parties stipulate that respondent has violated DR 2-110(A), “withdrawing from a 
matter without authorization and to the prejudice of the client,”  they have not submitted any 
factual stipulation that the bankruptcy court’s rules require an attorney to obtain the court’s 
permission prior to withdrawal as required by DR 2-110(A)(1).  Therefore, we limit our finding to 
DR 2-110(A)(2). 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
information; however, he failed to do so.  And despite having been advised at the 
deposition of his obligation to cooperate with disciplinary authorities, and having 
expressed contrition for having failed to cooperate, respondent continued to 
ignore letters of inquiry regarding grievances that were filed after the deposition 
was held.  Therefore, we find that respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 
information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation) and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} In recommending a sanction, the panel and board considered the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  See Stark 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 
818, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 10} As aggravating factors, the panel and board found that respondent 
had a prior disciplinary record, had engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving 
multiple offenses, was initially uncooperative with the disciplinary process and 
was slow to produce requested materials, harmed several clients, and failed to 
make prompt restitution.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), (e), (h), and 
(i).  Mitigating factors recognized by the panel and board include the absence of a 
dishonest or selfish motive and respondent’s eventual full and free disclosure to 
the board and cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(b) and (d).  Although the panel and board also found as mitigating 
factors that respondent had been dealing with a number of significant stressors, 
including a divorce, financial problems, lack of health insurance, and a major 
depressive disorder, they refused to allow his mental disability as a mitigating 
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factor because respondent did not provide a prognosis from a qualified healthcare 
professional that he is able to return to the competent, ethical, professional 
practice of law.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 11} Citing respondent’s neglect of client matters, failure to cooperate 
in his investigation, and long-standing depression, relator recommended that 
respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.  Respondent 
argued in favor of a six-month suspension.  The panel and board, however, 
recommended that respondent be suspended for two years with the second year 
stayed on the conditions that he establish by clear and convincing evidence all the 
requirements for reinstatement under Gov.Bar R. V(10)(C) through (G), that he 
refrain from further violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, that he make 
restitution to the clients discussed in count three, and that he pay all costs assessed 
against him in this matter. 
{¶ 12} In making this recommendation, the panel expressed concern 
regarding respondent’s depression, which was first diagnosed in 2006, and its 
treatment.  Respondent submitted a report from Donald J. Tosi, Ph.D., diagnosing 
him with severe, single-episode, major depressive disorder and stating that the 
disorder was causally connected to his misconduct.  Dr. Tosi stated that he 
believes that respondent needs at least six to 12 months of psychological and 
psychiatric treatment to address his depression, but he did not state that he would 
be providing that treatment – indeed, his letterhead describes him as an 
independent psychological examiner and consultant rather than as a clinical 
psychologist.  Moreover, he does not offer any prognosis whether respondent will 
be able to return to the competent, ethical, professional practice of law at the 
completion of the recommended treatment. 
{¶ 13} Respondent had terminated treatment with two other mental-health 
professionals by 2008, and he met with Dr. Tosi just one-and-a-half months 
before his May 2010 disciplinary hearing.  Respondent testified that he stopped 
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meeting with his first mental-health professional when OLAP referred him to 
someone else.  When he “didn’t feel comfortable with [the second doctor],” he 
also stopped seeing him, but he did not seek a second referral from OLAP.  Thus, 
the timing and nature of Dr. Tosi’s involvement in this case led the panel to 
believe that he was a “hired gun” brought in to influence the panel to minimize 
respondent’s sanction. 
{¶ 14} We have consistently recognized that neglect of an entrusted legal 
matter coupled with a failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation 
warrants an indefinite suspension.  See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. 
Gottehrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-929, 924 N.E.2d 825, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoff, 124 Ohio St.3d 269, 2010-Ohio-136, 921 N.E.2d 
636, ¶ 10; and Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-764, 
904 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17.  We have also imposed indefinite suspensions on attorneys 
who suffered from mental illness or substance abuse but who failed to present 
sufficient evidence to establish that their condition qualified as a mitigating factor 
pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ridenbaugh, 122 Ohio St.3d 583, 2009-Ohio-4091, 914 N.E.2d 443; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wolanin, 121 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009-Ohio-1393, 904 
N.E.2d 879; and Disciplinary Counsel v. Young, 102 Ohio St.3d 113, 2004-Ohio-
1809, 807 N.E.2d 317.  This sanction serves to protect the public while leaving 
open the possibility that with proper rehabilitation, the sanctioned attorney might 
one day be able to resume the competent, ethical, professional practice of law. 
{¶ 15} In this case, respondent engaged in the practice of law while his 
license was under a registration suspension, neglected legal matters to the 
detriment of his clients, and failed initially to cooperate in the ensuing 
disciplinary investigations.  Although respondent eventually stipulated to his 
misconduct and corresponding ethical violations, the evidence demonstrates that 
he has suffered from major depression since 2006 and, despite having received 
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some treatment, that the depression is not under control.  Therefore, we conclude 
that an indefinite suspension is necessary to ensure that respondent receives 
appropriate treatment for his depression and that he is capable of resuming the 
competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice 
of law and condition any future petition for reinstatement on the submission of 
proof that respondent has participated in OLAP, has obtained treatment for his 
depression, has fulfilled all follow-up care and reporting requirements imposed by 
OLAP and his treating professionals, has made restitution to the clients discussed 
in count three, and has paid the costs of this proceeding.  Upon petitioning for 
reinstatement, respondent shall also be required to submit testimony from a 
qualified mental-health professional to demonstrate that he is capable of returning 
to the competent, ethical, professional practice of law.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would suspend the respondent for two years, with 
one year stayed. 
__________________ 
Jeffrey D. Fortkamp, Robert J. Morje, Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, 
and A. Alysha Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
James D. Gilbert, for respondent. 
______________________