Title: Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 12/12/13 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL           ) 
DISTRICT, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S199639 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
9th Cir. No. 10-55879 
MICHAEL GARCIA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In California, an individual with a disability who is between 18 and 22 
years of age and has not yet earned a regular high school diploma is entitled to 
continue to receive special education and related services, even while incarcerated 
in a county jail, so long as certain prerequisites have been satisfied.  (Ed. Code, 
§ 56040, subd. (b); see id., §§ 56000, 56026, subd. (c)(4); all unlabeled statutory 
references are to the Education Code.)  Like the other states that receive 
substantial federal funds for special education and related services, California‟s 
policies and procedures governing special education programs must conform to 
the requirements of the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(hereafter IDEA), and the federal regulations that implement and clarify its 
provisions.  (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.100-300.176 (2013).)  But 
Congress has left it to each state to determine which public entity within the state 
is responsible for providing special education and related services to its eligible 
pupils, including those incarcerated in county jail.   
 
2 
One of the provisions in California‟s special education scheme that 
designates the entity responsible for providing a special education program is 
section 56041.  We granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit to answer the following question of California law, as 
reformulated by this court:  Does California Education Code section 56041, which 
provides generally that for qualifying pupils between the ages of 18 and 22 years, 
the school district where the pupil‟s parent resides is responsible for providing 
special education and related services, affix responsibility for providing special 
education to a qualifying individual who is incarcerated in a county jail?  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5).)   
We answer that question “Yes.”  As we shall explain, although section 
56041 does not by its terms specifically address county jail inmates, the statutory 
language is broad enough to encompass special education programs for eligible 
county jail inmates between the ages of 18 and 22 years, and no other statute 
explicitly assigns responsibility for the provision of special education to such 
individuals.  Applying the terms of section 56041 to assign responsibility in this 
setting is consistent with the purposes of the statute and the special education 
scheme as a whole, and does not create absurd or unworkable results.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Michael Garcia was born in June 1990.  His mother has resided in the City 
of Bell, in Los Angeles County, from before Garcia‟s birth until the present time.  
Garcia first became eligible for special education services in the second grade, 
when he was identified as having specific learning deficiencies as well as speech 
and language impairment.  His “district of residence,” the Los Angeles Unified 
School District (L.A. Unified), provided the special education program in his early 
years.  (See § 48200; Union School District v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519, 
1525, fn. 1 [the compulsory education residency rule for children ages 6 through 
 
3 
18 also determines the local educational agency responsible for providing a special 
education program].)  When Garcia was 15 years old, he left L.A. Unified and 
enrolled in the Soledad Enrichment Action Charter School, chartered by the Los 
Angeles County Office of Education, which provided him with a special education 
program.  (See §§ 47640, 47641.)   
Thereafter, sometime before Garcia‟s 16th birthday, he was arrested on 
felony charges and held at the Barry J. Nidorf Juvenile Hall in Los Angeles 
County.  While Garcia was being detained in the juvenile facility, he was provided 
a special education program by the Los Angeles County Office of Education, 
which, by statute, is the entity responsible for providing general and special 
education in the county‟s juvenile court schools.  (See §§ 48645.2, 56150.)  Like 
L.A. Unified, the Los Angeles County Office of Education determined that Garcia 
was eligible for special education and related services due to his specific learning 
disability and speech and language impairment.  In June 2008, when Garcia turned 
18 years old, he was transferred from the juvenile facility to the Los Angeles 
County Jail to await trial.   
In December 2008, counsel from the Disability Rights Legal Center filed 
on behalf of Garcia and other similarly situated individuals a request for a due 
process hearing before the California Department of General Services, Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Special Education Division (OAH), alleging that Garcia 
and others like him were being denied a free appropriate public education 
(hereafter sometimes FAPE), as required by the IDEA, because there was no 
system for delivering special education services for eligible inmates in the Los 
Angeles County jail.  (See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.151-300.153; Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 3080, 3082, 4610.)  The request named as defendants the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Department, the County of Los Angeles, the Los 
Angeles County Office of Education, the California Department of Education, and 
 
4 
other educational and public entities and officials.  Because the OAH is not 
authorized to consider class actions, the OAH refiled the complaint as one by 
Garcia individually.  The OAH also removed three of the named defendants from 
the complaint because they were not proper parties to a special education due 
process hearing.  Notably, the initial complaint filed with the OAH did not name 
L.A. Unified as a defendant.   
Most of the claims in Garcia‟s complaint were dismissed in January 2009, 
either because they alleged injuries to a class or because the legal basis of the 
claim, for example, the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 et seq.), fell outside the OAH‟s jurisdiction.  Of the remaining claims, 
which alleged that the defendants had failed to provide Garcia with the FAPE to 
which he was entitled, the administrative law judge (ALJ) granted each 
defendant‟s motion to be dismissed as a party and dismissed the complaint in its 
entirety.  The ALJ noted there was no statute specifically allocating responsibility 
for providing a FAPE to an eligible individual who was incarcerated in a county 
jail.  Accordingly, the ALJ looked to what it characterized as the “more general” 
rule set forth in section 56041, which the ALJ understood to assign responsibility 
to the school district in which the parent of a qualified pupil between the ages of 
18 and 22 years resides.  (See post, at pp. 11-12.)  In concluding that section 
56041 applied, the ALJ noted that “it is not uncommon for a responsible district to 
administer a distant placement,” and expressed the view that any “difficulties in 
applying section 56041 in adult correctional facilities is a proper subject for the 
Legislature.”  (Garcia v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (OAH, Feb. 9, 
2009, No. 2009010064).)   
One month after the ALJ‟s decision, Garcia and others filed a class action 
in federal district court, alleging the same claims against the same parties named in 
the due process complaint.  (Garcia v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 
 
5 
case. No. 09-1513 VBF (CTx); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) [any party aggrieved 
by the findings or outcome of the due process hearing can bring a civil action in 
state or federal court].)  Three months later, in late May 2009, the district court 
dismissed the action without prejudice.  The district court concluded that plaintiffs 
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA because they 
did not file an amended complaint at the administrative level “naming proper 
parties against whom relief could be sought.”  (See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g), (i); 
Christopher S. ex rel. Rita S. v. Stanislaus County Office of Education (9th Cir. 
2004) 384 F.3d 1205, 1209 [a plaintiff generally must exhaust his or her 
administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal or state court under the 
IDEA].)  Dismissal also was warranted, the district court ruled, because plaintiffs 
failed to join L.A. Unified as a party to the class action.   
In June 2009, within days of the dismissal of the class action in federal 
court, Garcia filed a second due process complaint with the OAH, this time 
naming only L.A. Unified as a party and arguing that L.A. Unified was 
responsible for providing him with a special education program in county jail.  In 
November 2009, after a hearing, the OAH issued a decision reaffirming the ALJ‟s 
conclusion in the previous due process proceeding that section 56041 applied to 
designate the entity responsible for providing a special education program to 
Garcia.  It further concluded that, because Garcia‟s mother resides within L.A. 
Unified‟s boundaries, L.A. Unified was responsible for Garcia‟s special education 
while he was incarcerated in county jail.  (Student v. Los Angeles Unified School 
District (OAH, Nov. 16, 2009, No. 2009060442).)   
Pursuant to the November 2009 order by the OAH, L.A. Unified provided 
Garcia with a special education program in the Los Angeles County jail.  
Meanwhile, it filed in the federal district court a motion for relief from the OAH‟s 
decision.  In May 2010, the district court affirmed the OAH decision, finding in 
 
6 
relevant part that the OAH correctly determined section 56041 applies to allocate 
responsibility for providing special education and related services to Garcia in 
county jail and that, under that provision, L.A. Unified was responsible for 
providing such services.   
L.A. Unified appealed the district court‟s order.  While the appeal was 
pending, Garcia was transferred to state prison after pleading guilty to several 
charges in exchange for a sentence of 12 years.  Acknowledging that the issue 
presented in the appeal was moot because Garcia, although still under the age of 
22 years, was no longer incarcerated in county jail, the Ninth Circuit panel found 
nonetheless that the case presented an issue that was “capable of repetition yet 
[likely to evade] review” and that it therefore fell within an exception to the 
mootness doctrine.  (Los Angeles Unified School District v. Garcia (9th Cir. 2012) 
669 F.3d 956, 958, fn. 1 [order certifying question to California Supreme Court].)  
As the federal appellate court observed, “the failure to provide special education 
services to eligible inmates in county jails is ongoing, and eligible inmates will 
usually not be incarcerated in the jail long enough to bring a legal challenge.”  
(Ibid.)  However, the Ninth Circuit then ordered proceedings stayed pending this 
court‟s decision whether to accept or reject its request pursuant to rule 8.548 of the 
California Rules of Court that we decide a question of state law that would 
determine the outcome of the appeal.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit asked this 
court to decide:  “Does California Education Code § 56041 — which provides 
generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school 
district where the child‟s parent resides is responsible for special education 
services — apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails?”  (Los Angeles 
Unified School District v. Garcia, supra, at p. 958.)   
By order dated March 28, 2012, this court granted the Ninth Circuit‟s 
request and agreed to decide the proffered state law issue.  We have reformulated 
 
7 
the question as follows to conform to California law:  “Does California Education 
Code section 56041, which provides generally that for qualifying pupils between 
the ages of 18 and 22 years, the school district where the pupil‟s parent resides is 
responsible for providing special education and related services, affix 
responsibility for providing special education to a qualifying individual who is 
incarcerated in a county jail?”  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5).)   
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to California‟s constitutional and statutory commands, the state is 
obligated to provide a free public education (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5) to all 
children between the ages of 6 and 18 years who are not otherwise exempted from 
compulsory full-time or continuing education (§ 48200; see Cal. Const., art. IX, 
§§ 1, 3; §§ 48220-48232; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680-
681, 683; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1089-
1091.)  When a child or young adult under the age of 19 years has been identified 
as an individual with a qualifying disability and has not received a high school 
diploma or otherwise met prescribed educational goals, federal and state law 
additionally require that he or she have available a free appropriate public 
education until reaching the age of 22 years.  We discuss the relevant statutes 
below.   
A.  Statutory background 
Congress enacted the IDEA in order “to ensure that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs . . . .”  (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).)  The IDEA accomplishes that objective 
through partial federal funding.  Under the IDEA, a state is eligible to receive 
federal financial assistance for educating disabled students by having in place 
 
8 
policies and procedures that will ensure compliance with certain enumerated goals 
and procedures.  (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a); County of San Diego v. Calif. Special 
Educ. Hearing Office (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1458, 1461-1462.)1   
In 1980, California‟s lawmakers enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme 
that substantially restructured California‟s then-existing special education system.  
(§ 56000 et seq., added by Stats. 1980, ch. 797, § 9, p. 2411.)  The Legislature‟s 
intent was to “improve special education programs in California under the flexible 
program design of the Master Plan for Special Education” (§ 56000) and thereby 
enhance compliance with the federal funding requirements of the IDEA‟s 
predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Act, which was then the governing 
federal legislation (see Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates (1992) 
11 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1591).  Subsequent to statewide implementation of the 
Master Plan for Special Education (Master Plan) in 1980 and enactment of the 
IDEA in 1990, California‟s Legislature has continued to amend the special 
education statutes, refining the Master Plan and conforming California law to 
further changes in the federal requirements.  (See Legis. Analyst Rep., Overview 
of Special Education in California, Jan. 3, 2013, p. 7 
 [as of Dec. 12, 
2013].)   
One of the conditions for a state‟s receipt of federal funding under the IDEA 
is its assurance that a “free appropriate public education” is available to all 
                                              
1  
Although Congress intended to fund 40 percent of the additional costs 
incurred by a state to educate disabled students, the actual level of reimbursement 
has never met that goal and appears to be closer to 20 percent.  (California School 
Bds. Assn. v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514, fn. 4; see, e.g., IDEA 
Full Funding Act of 2000, Sen. No. 2341, 106th Cong., (1999-2000) § 2.)   
 
9 
qualified students residing in the state.  (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).)  A FAPE is 
“special education and related services,” provided at public expense, which meet 
the standards of the state‟s educational agency and conform to the student‟s 
individualized education program.  (20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).)  To comply with the 
IDEA, the responsible entity must evaluate the student, determine his or her 
eligibility for special education and services and, if the student is eligible, develop 
and implement an individualized educational program.  (20 U.S.C. § 1414.) 
Under the IDEA, “all children with disabilities residing in the State between 
the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive” are entitled to a FAPE.  (20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A).)  There are, however, certain limited exceptions to that 
entitlement.  For example, a state receiving federal funds is not obligated to 
provide a FAPE to a disabled student once the student has been awarded a regular 
high school diploma.  (34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i) (2013).)  In addition, the 
IDEA does not require the states to provide a FAPE to disabled students ages 18 
through 21 years “who, in the educational placement prior to their incarceration in 
an adult correctional facility — [¶]  (I) were not actually identified as being a child 
with a disability . . . ; or  [¶]  (II) did not have an individualized education program 
. . . .”  (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii).)   
In the present matter, there is no dispute that, under the IDEA and the 
California statutes that implement its policies, the individual on whose behalf this 
action was brought, Garcia, was entitled to continue to receive a FAPE while 
incarcerated in county jail:  He was under the age of 22 years, had not received a 
high school diploma or otherwise met prescribed goals, and, prior to his 
incarceration, he had been identified as a disabled student and had an 
individualized educational program.  (See §§ 56026, subd. (c)(4), 56040, subd. 
(b).)   
 
10 
Although the IDEA‟s requirements to obtain federal funding are 
substantial, it “ „leaves to the States the primary responsibility for developing and 
executing educational programs‟ ” for disabled students.  (Schaffer v. Weast 
(2005) 546 U.S. 49, 52, quoting Board of Ed. of Henrick Hudson Central School 
Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 183, 207.)  The IDEA 
likewise leaves it to the states to decide how they will allocate among the various 
state and local public agencies the responsibility for providing, and funding, 
special education programs in accordance with its provisions.  (See Manchester 
School Dist. v. Crisman (1st Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 1, 10 [“The IDEA nowhere 
purports to allocate financial liability among the multitude of school districts 
housed within the fifty states”]; see also J.S. v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. (W.D. Wash. 
2002) 220 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1191-1192 [the assignment of responsibility for 
providing a FAPE typically turns on the issue of residency, which is a matter of 
state law]; Linda W. v. Indiana Dept. of Education (N.D. Ind. 1996) 927 F.Supp. 
303, 307.)   
Of relevance here, federal rulemakers intentionally declined to designate 
the entity responsible for providing special education and related services to 
incarcerated individuals.  According to the federal Department of Education‟s 
analysis of comments to proposed changes in the regulations implementing the 
IDEA, “whether [such services to eligible incarcerated individuals] are provided 
directly by the State or through [a local educational agency] is a decision that is 
best left to States and [local educational agencies] to determine.”  (U.S. Dept. of 
Ed., Off. of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services, final Regs., Assistance 
to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for 
Children with Disabilities, Analysis of Comments and Changes, com. to 
§ 300.324(d), 71 Fed.Reg. 46540, 46686 (Aug. 14, 2006).)   
 
11 
The narrow question presented for our decision is whether one of the 
provisions in California‟s special education scheme that designates the entity 
responsible for providing a special education program, section 56041, affixes 
responsibility for making a special education program available to an eligible 
young adult between the ages of 18 and 22 years who is incarcerated in county 
jail.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that, under the current 
statutory scheme, the determination of which entity is responsible for providing 
special education and related services to a qualified county jail inmate between the 
ages of 18 and 22 years is governed by the terms of section 56041.   
B.  Section 56041 
As mentioned above, lawmakers have attempted to assure California‟s 
continued receipt of federal funding by enacting legislation to conform our state‟s 
special education policies and procedures to changes in the federal requirements.  
In 1992, the Legislature undertook one of several comprehensive revisions of the 
special education statutory scheme, amending several existing provisions and 
adding new ones.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 1360, § 1 et seq., pp. 6806-6838 [enacting 
Assem. Bill No. 2773 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.)].)  The measure addressed a number 
of major issues, including procedures for expulsion and suspension of special 
education pupils, alternative dispute resolution at the local level, and services to 
pupils with attention deficit hyperactivity disorders.  (See §§ 48911-48912, 
48915.5, 56138, 56339.)  The 1992 legislation also added section 56041, the 
statute at issue in the present case.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 1360, § 8, p. 6818.)  That 
provision, which reads the same today as at the time it was enacted, states as 
follows:   
“Except for those pupils meeting residency requirements for school 
attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204, and notwithstanding any 
 
12 
other provision of law, if it is determined by the individualized education program 
team that special education services are required beyond the pupil‟s 18th birthday, 
the district of residence responsible for providing special education and related 
services to pupils between the ages of 18 to 22 years, inclusive, shall be assigned 
as follows: 
“(a) For nonconserved pupils, the last district of residence in effect prior to 
the pupil‟s attaining the age of majority shall become and remain as the 
responsible local educational agency, as long as and until the parent or parents 
relocate to a new district of residence.  At that time, the new district of residence 
shall become the responsible local educational agency.   
“(b) For conserved pupils, the district of residence of the conservator shall 
attach and remain the responsible local educational agency, as long as and until the 
conservator relocates or a new one is appointed.  At that time, the new district of 
residence shall attach and become the responsible local educational agency.”  
(§ 56041.)   
The question presented to this court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
whether section 56041 applies to designate the entity responsible for providing 
special education to an eligible 18- to 22-year-old county jail inmate, is one 
involving statutory construction.  To answer that question, we are guided by the 
overarching principle that our task “ „is to determine the intent of the enacting 
body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best effectuates that intent.  
[Citation.]‟ ”  (City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 
718-719.)  We begin by examining the words of the statute because the 
“ „ “language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  
[Citation.]” ‟ ”  (Id. at p. 719.)  The statutory language is not read in isolation, 
however.  Rather, we consider its terms “in the context of the statutory framework 
as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the 
 
13 
various parts of the enactment.  If the language is clear, courts must generally 
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd 
consequences the Legislature did not intend.”  (Coalition of Concerned 
Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)   
As a general matter, section 56041, subdivision (a) (hereafter 56041(a)), 
assigns responsibility for providing special education and related services to 
“nonconserved pupils” between the ages of 18 to 22 years to the school district in 
which the pupil‟s parent or parents reside.  As previously mentioned, both the 
federal district court and the OAH relied upon the plain language of section 
56041(a) to conclude that, based on the location of Garcia‟s mother‟s residence at 
the time Garcia reached the age of 18 years and thereafter, L.A. Unified was 
responsible for providing a special education program to Garcia while he was 
incarcerated in county jail.   
Garcia urges this court to reach a similar conclusion.  As he points out, 
under sections 48200 and 48204, a school district is responsible for providing a 
free full-time public education or a free appropriate public education, as the case 
may be, to all students between the ages of six and 18 whose parent or legal 
guardian resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of the school district, unless 
one of the specified exceptions to the residency rule applies.  (See Union School 
District v. Smith, supra, 15 F.3d at p. 1525, fn. 1 [§ 48200 also determines the 
local educational agency responsible for providing a special education program].)  
According to Garcia, section 56041 constitutes a parallel rule of general 
applicability for disabled students between the ages of 18 and 22 years.   
Of the various statutes appearing in the Education Code that designate the 
entity responsible for providing special education services, section 56041 is the 
only provision that expressly refers to pupils between the ages of 18 and 22 years.  
By its terms, however, section 56041 does not purport to assign to the school 
 
14 
district in which the pupil‟s parent resides the responsibility for providing a special 
education program for every qualified pupil in California between the ages of 18 
and 22 years.  As set forth above, the introductory clause of section 56041 
explicitly excepts from the reach of the statute “those pupils meeting residency 
requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204.”  
That provision lists the exceptions to the general rule that children between the 
ages of six and 18 must attend school in the school district in which the residence 
of their parent or guardian is located.2  (See Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint 
                                              
2  
Section 48204, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that 
“[n]otwithstanding Section 48200, a pupil complies with the residency 
requirements for school attendance in a school district, if he or she is any of the 
following: 
 
“(1)(A)  A pupil placed within the boundaries of that school district in a 
regularly established licensed children's institution, or a licensed foster home, or a 
family home pursuant to a commitment or placement under Chapter 2 
(commencing with Section 200) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code. 
 
“(B)  An agency placing a pupil in a home or institution described in 
subparagraph (A) shall provide evidence to the school that the placement or 
commitment is pursuant to law. 
 
“(2)  A pupil who is a foster child who remains in his or her school of 
origin pursuant to subdivisions (d) and (e) of Section 48853.5. 
 
“(3)  A pupil for whom interdistrict attendance has been approved pursuant 
to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 46600) of Part 26. 
 
“(4)  A pupil whose residence is located within the boundaries of that 
school district and whose parent or legal guardian is relieved of responsibility, 
control, and authority through emancipation. 
 
“(5)  A pupil who lives in the home of a caregiving adult that is located 
within the boundaries of that school district. Execution of an affidavit under 
penalty of perjury pursuant to Part 1.5 (commencing with Section 6550) of 
Division 11 of the Family Code by the caregiving adult is a sufficient basis for a 
determination that the pupil lives in the home of the caregiver, unless the school 
district determines from actual facts that the pupil is not living in the home of the 
caregiver. 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
15 
Union High School Dist., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 57-58.)  In accordance 
with those exceptions, section 56041 does not apply when, for example, the 
eligible 18- to 22-year-old pupil, prior to reaching the age of majority, had been 
placed in a licensed children‟s institution or foster home by the juvenile court, or 
was residing in a state hospital.  (§ 48204, subds. (a)(1)(A), (6).)  In those 
instances, the responsibility for providing special education and related services 
lies with the school district in which the institution or home is located.   
Other, more specific provisions in the special education scheme carve out 
additional exceptions to the application of section 56041.  For example, the 
Legislature has assigned to the county board of education the responsibility for 
providing, or contracting with a local school district to provide, both general 
education and special education services to youth and young adults incarcerated in 
the juvenile detention facilities within its jurisdiction.  (§§ 48645.2, 56150; see 
Welf. & Inst. Code § 1731.5, subd. (a)(1), (2) [a court may commit to the Division 
of Juvenile Facilities any person convicted of one or more specified offenses who 
was younger than 21 years old at the time of apprehension].)  Similarly, the 
Legislature has assigned responsibility for providing special education to 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
“(6)  A pupil residing in a state hospital located within the boundaries of 
that school district.” 
 
We observe, and at oral argument the parties agreed, that when the 
Legislature incorporated section 48204‟s exceptions to the residency rule into 
section 56041, lawmakers clearly intended the reference to “emancipation” in 
section 48204, subdivision (a)(4), to mean emancipation of a minor.  (See also 
Fam. Code, § 7050, subd. (e)(15) [providing that an emancipated minor is 
considered an adult for purposes of “establish[ing] the minor‟s own residence].)   
 
16 
hospitalized students to the local educational agency that serves the geographic 
area where the hospital or medical facility is located.  (§ 56167, subd. (a).)   
The Legislature‟s designation of a single, local educational agency as the 
entity responsible for providing a FAPE to the qualified individuals placed in a 
juvenile detention facility or residing in other institutional settings arguably 
promotes the goals of consistent, orderly, efficient, and effective delivery of 
special education programs in those settings.  However, our review of the 
educational scheme reveals that the Legislature has not added a provision to the 
statutory scheme that specifically assigns responsibility for providing a FAPE to 
qualified individuals in the county jail setting and has not amended section 56041 
to create an exception to that effect.  Nor has counsel for either side pointed to a 
statute or case that assigns responsibility for providing special education in these 
circumstances.  Further, the language of other statutes such as section 48645.2, 
which assigns to the county board of education the responsibility for operating 
juvenile court schools, is not broad enough to fairly encompass responsibility for 
eligible individuals between the ages of 18 and 22 who are incarcerated in county 
jail.  Absent any indications of a contrary legislative intent in the language and 
structure of the special education statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude that 
when none of the statutory exceptions to section 56041 applies, the entity 
responsible for providing special education to an eligible young adult pupil while 
he or she is incarcerated in county jail is properly determined by the terms of 
section 56041.  As we have seen, under section 56041, the responsible entity is 
generally the district in which the inmate‟s parent resides.   
L.A. Unified argues that the language of section 56041 does not evince any 
intent to assign responsibility for providing special education to eligible county 
jail inmates because the statute does not expressly refer to county jails.  That 
section 56041 makes no specific reference to county jail inmates does not mean it 
 
17 
does not assign responsibility for providing special education services in that 
setting, however.  As demonstrated by this court‟s past decisions, we have not 
hesitated to construe statutory language to cover a subject that was not expressly 
mentioned in the provision in question, when doing so is consistent with the 
statute‟s purpose.  For example, in City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 
5 Cal.4th 47, we held that the procedural safeguards set forth in Evidence Code 
section 1045, which governs the disclosure of confidential police personnel files to 
criminal defendants, also applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 
notwithstanding that the statute did not expressly refer to delinquency matters.  
(City of San Jose, supra, at pp. 53-54; see also Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. 
Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 183 [the Legislature‟s 
failure to specifically prohibit certain activity under the unfair competition law 
does not prevent a court from determining that the activity is unfair under the 
act].)  Likewise here, the absence of an express reference to county jails does not 
preclude us from interpreting section 56041 to assign responsibility for providing 
special education to eligible 18- to 22-year-old individuals incarcerated in such 
facilities because such a construction is consistent with the overarching statutory 
purpose of satisfying the state‟s obligations under the IDEA by ensuring that a 
clearly designated educational agency is assigned responsibility for providing 
eligible individuals “the right to an appropriate educational opportunity to meet 
their unique needs.”  (§ 56000, subd. (a); see 20 U.S.C. §§1400(d)(1)(a), 1412(a).)   
L.A. Unified argues that the legislative history of section 56041 reflects a 
more limited purpose, namely, to maintain interdistrict funding obligations when a 
student who has been placed by one school district into a special education 
program located in another school district reaches the age of majority and would 
otherwise become the funding responsibility of a district that had no involvement 
in the placement decision.  In light of the broadly worded language of section 
 
18 
56041, we cannot agree with L.A. Unified‟s contention that the statute should be 
interpreted narrowly as applying to only the foregoing circumstances.   
Section 56041 has been described as a provision that “ensure[s] funding 
continuity.”  (Orange County Dept. of Educ. v. California Dept. of Educ. (9th Cir. 
2011) 668 F.3d 1052, 1059; see also Sierra Sands Unified School District v. 
Student (Special Ed. Hearing Off., Oct. 22, 2002, No. 2198-02) p. 2 [§ 56041 is a 
provision “to maintain funding responsibilities”]; Student v. Berkeley Unified 
School Dist. (Special Ed. Hearing Off., Nov. 6, 2003, No. 1989-03) [same].)  As 
previously discussed, the statute was enacted as part of an omnibus special 
education bill that expanded the scope of eligibility, made procedural changes, and 
conformed California law to federal statutes and regulations.  (Stats. 1992, 
ch. 1360, § 1 et seq., p. 6806 et seq.)  According to legislative materials associated 
with the measure, section 56041 was recommended by a representative of the 
special education local plan area (SELPA)3 of Santa Barbara County and 
“addresse[d] a problem for local educational agencies which are impacted by 
                                              
3  
With the implementation of California‟s Master Plan in 1980, each local 
educational agency was required to organize or join a local “special education 
services region” of “sufficient size and scope” to ensure the delivery of special 
education and related services to all qualified individuals within that geographic 
area.  (§§ 56000, 56140; see also § 56195.1, subd. (a); Stats. 1980, ch. 797, 
pp. 2411-2413, 2418-2419, 2420-2423.)  The SELPA can be a single district, or a 
group comprised of more than one district, one or more districts and a county 
office of education, or one or more county offices of education.  (§ 56140, 
subd. (d).)  With input from a community advisory committee that includes 
parents of students with disabilities, each SELPA is required to develop and 
submit to state officials a local plan setting out how its participating agency or 
agencies will implement and administer the special education programs to 
qualified students within the geographic area served by the plan.  (§§ 56001(f), 
56190, 56195.1; 56200; see generally, Legis. Analyst Rep., supra, Overview of 
Special Education in Cal.)   
 
19 
nonpublic, nonsectarian schools.”  (Sen. Com. on Ed., Rep. on Assem. Bill 
No. 2773 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.)  Our review of the legislative materials 
discloses no further details regarding the nature of that problem.  But according to 
a 2003 decision by the Special Education Hearing Office,4 relied upon by L.A. 
Unified to support its argument, the “problem” referred to in the foregoing 
legislative report concerned minor students with disabilities who resided in 
nonpublic, nonsectarian schools outside the jurisdiction of their local educational 
agency.  In the hearing officer‟s view, “[r]ather than automatically transferring the 
responsibility for the student‟s education to the district where the student is 
residing when he or she is or becomes an adult at age eighteen, Section 56041 
requires the educational agency that placed the student in the nonpublic or 
nonsectarian school to continue to be responsible for the student‟s education.”  
(Student v. Berkeley Unified School Dist. (Special Ed. Hearing Off., Nov. 6, 2003, 
No. 1989-03) p. 2.)5  The purpose of the statute, according to the hearing officer, 
                                              
4  
The Special Education Hearing Office was the predecessor of the OAH, 
which conducts the state administrative special education due process hearings 
that resolve complaints alleging failure to provide a FAPE or to otherwise comply 
with the IDEA.  (§§ 56500-56507; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 3082, 4600 et seq.; 
see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A), (f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.151-300.153 (2013).)   
5  
Countering L.A. Unified‟s assertion that section 56041 applies only in the 
narrow circumstances described by the Special Education Hearing Office‟s 
decision in Student v. Berkeley Unified School Dist., Garcia points out that a 
number of subsequent administrative hearing decisions have applied section 56041 
to assign responsibility to a school district that had not been involved in the adult 
pupil‟s individualized educational plan or placement prior to the pupil‟s having 
reached the age of majority.  (See Student v. Orange County Dept. of Education 
(OAH, Nov. 30, 2009, Nos. 2009090943, 2009100565) [consolidated with Orange 
County Dept. of Education v. Student]; Parent ex rel. Student v. California Dept. 
of Mental Health (OAH, Oct. 26, 2009, No. 2009050920); Orange County 
Department of Education v. Student (OAH, May 22, 2009, Nos. 2008120021, 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
20 
was “to protect certain school districts and SELPAs that have a large number of 
residential schools attended by adult special education students from other districts 
from becoming overwhelmed by the financial responsibility for the education of 
those adult students.”  (Ibid.)   
The materials described above support L.A. Unified‟s point that the 
impetus for the lawmakers‟ enactment of section 56041 was to solve a problem 
resulting from the placement of a minor pupil in a residential school located 
outside the geographical boundaries of the pupil‟s district of residence — that is, 
outside the district in which the parent resided.  We observe, however, that 
although lawmakers were presented with a specific and narrow problem, they did 
not limit the statute‟s application to only those situations in which a school district 
had placed the minor student in a residential school outside of its jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Instead, the statute is worded in broader terms.  It distinguishes only 
between conserved and nonconserved pupils and, as previously discussed, its only 
express limitations are the exceptions to the residency requirements for 
compulsory education generally.  (§ 56041, subd. (a) [“Except for those pupils 
meeting residency requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) 
of Section 48204 . . . .”].)   
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
2009020130) [consolidated with Student v. Orange County Department of 
Education]; Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District (OAH, Apr. 17, 2007, 
No. 2007010772).)   
 
The administrative hearing decisions cited by the parties have applied, or 
declined to apply, section 56041 to assign responsibility for providing special 
education to eligible 18- to 22-year-old pupils in settings other than a county jail 
or other adult correctional facility.  Because the factual scenarios presented by 
those decisions are not before us, we express no view regarding their reasoning or 
result.   
 
21 
For its part, amicus curiae California School Boards Association asserts that, 
notwithstanding the statute‟s admittedly broad terms, it is unlikely the Legislature 
intended for section 56041 to be used to assign responsibility for special education 
services for county jail inmates.  As the California School Boards Association 
points out, when the Legislature enacted section 56041 in 1992, California law did 
not explicitly require special education for county jail inmates between the ages of 
18 and 22, and it was not until 2004 that the Legislature amended section 56040, 
subdivision (b), to conform to the IDEA‟s amendments in this regard.  (See 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) [permitting states to forego providing a FAPE to an 
individual 18 through 21 years old who did not have an individualized education 
plan in place prior to his or her incarceration in an adult correctional facility].)  
The California School Boards Association argues that, given the statutes in 
existence in 1992, which included provisions permitting, but not requiring, county 
officials to establish general education classes in county jail facilities (§§ 1900, 
1906, 1907), the Legislature could not have intended section 56041 to include 
within its scope the responsibility for providing special education to eligible 
county jail inmates.   
We are persuaded that when the Legislature enacted section 56041, it did so 
to address a specific problem, and that lawmakers did not consider the statute‟s 
application to the setting at issue here.  At the same time, however, we agree with 
Garcia that the applicability of section 56041 is not necessarily limited by the 
Legislature‟s lack of contemplation, at the time of the statute‟s enactment, whether 
the provision applied to assign responsibility for providing special education in a 
county jail.  When, as here, the Legislature has chosen to address a specific 
problem by enacting a statute with general terms, the particular impetus for the 
enactment does not limit its scope.  (Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical 
Group (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 51; see Barr v. United States (1945) 324 U.S. 
 
22 
83, 90 [when lawmakers choose broad statutory language “it is unimportant that 
the particular application may not have been contemplated”].)   
Notwithstanding that a distinct and specific problem may have motivated the 
Legislature‟s enactment of section 56041, our construction of that statute as the 
provision that designates the entity responsible for providing special education to 
an eligible county jail inmate between the ages of 18 and 22 years is consistent 
with several of the apparent objectives of section 56041.  First, our interpretation 
of the statute follows the general state educational policy of assigning funding 
responsibility for a pupil‟s compulsory public education to the school district in 
which the pupil‟s parent resides.  Furthermore, and as the federal district court 
observed, this interpretation protects a local educational agency serving the 
geographic area in which a heavily populated county jail like the Los Angeles 
County jail is located from becoming overwhelmed by the financial responsibility 
for educating eligible young adult inmates whose parents reside in other districts.  
(See Los Angeles Unified School District v. Garcia, supra, 669 F.3d at p. 961.)   
Our construction of section 56041 likewise comports with the special 
education scheme generally.  As previously mentioned, a court interpreting a 
statute to best effectuate its intent does not view the provision in isolation, but 
rather “ „in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine 
its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.‟  
[Citation.]”  (Prospect Medical Group Inc. v. Northridge Medical Group (2009) 
45 Cal.4th 497, 506.)  Viewing the statute through that broader lens, we conclude 
that our construction furthers the overarching purpose of the statutory scheme as a 
whole, which, as already discussed, is to ensure that there is a clearly designated 
educational agency responsible for providing eligible individuals “the right to an 
appropriate educational opportunity to meet their unique needs.”  (§ 56000, 
subd. (a); cf. Prospect Medical Group Inc. v. Northridge Medical Group, supra, at 
 
23 
pp. 506-507 [looking to the Knox-Keene Act as a whole to conclude that one of its 
provisions, Health & Saf. Code, § 1379, applied to a situation that did not exist at 
the time of its enactment].)   
We further observe that although the special education framework includes 
specific provisions that render section 56041 inapplicable in institutional settings 
that are similar to county jails, there is no inconsistency between the existence of 
those statutes and applying the more general terms of section 56041 to designate 
responsibility for providing special education to an eligible 18 to 22 year old who 
is incarcerated in county jail.  With regard to institutional settings like juvenile 
court schools, the Legislature has specifically considered the unique characteristics 
of the particular educational environment and designated the entity responsible for 
providing special education in those facilities accordingly.  There is no indication 
that the Legislature has specifically considered the delivery of special education 
programs to eligible young adult inmates in county jail.  Unless and until the 
Legislature chooses to adopt a special rule to govern responsibility in that setting, 
there is nothing impermissible or incongruous about designating the entity 
responsible for special education programs in county jail in accordance with the 
more general terms of section 56041.   
As for the statutes cited by amicus curiae California School Boards 
Association that govern the delivery of general education programs in adult 
correctional facilities, we agree with Garcia that there are no inherent 
contradictions between the provisions.  As a matter of IDEA and state law policy, 
a FAPE typically is provided in an educational environment with nondisabled 
students.  (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); § 56040.1, subd. (a); see § 56000, subd. (c); 
see also San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State of California (1982) 131 
Cal.App.3d 54, 70 [the “mainstreaming policy” reflects a “basic goal of the Act to 
educate handicapped children in the „least restrictive environment‟ possible”].)  
 
24 
Under the Education Code, a county superintendent of schools, with the assent of 
the county‟s board of education and board of supervisors, may establish and 
maintain classes or schools for inmates in its county‟s jails and other correctional 
facilities.  (§§ 1900, 1905-1906.)  In addition, a county‟s board of supervisors is 
authorized to assign to any school district maintaining secondary schools the 
responsibility for operating such classes or schools in a county jail.  (§ 1907.)  
These statutes are not necessarily inconsistent with allocating responsibility for 
providing special education to an eligible county jail inmate to the school district 
in which the eligible inmate‟s parent resides; rather these statutes provide a 
structure within which the school district responsible for providing a special 
education program can work together with the entity operating a general education 
program in the same facility.   
L.A. Unified asserts finally that applying section 56041 to assign 
responsibility for providing special education programs to eligible county jail 
inmates would lead to absurd, unworkable results.  According to L.A. Unified, 
requiring the school district where an eligible inmate‟s parent resides to provide 
special education in the county jail where the inmate is incarcerated presents 
significant logistical concerns, especially for school districts that are 
geographically distant from the county jail.  L.A. Unified maintains that such 
districts would face uncertain staff and service obligations, and there could be 
delays in services and barriers to the quick resolution of disputes between the 
school district and the inmate.  L.A. Unified warns furthermore that jail 
administrators would face staffing and security issues in the event personnel from 
numerous school districts were to simultaneously converge on the jail facility to 
provide special education programs to their respective pupils.   
L.A. Unified is correct that under settled principles of statutory construction, 
a court is obligated to avoid a construction that would lead to impractical or 
 
25 
unworkable results.  (Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. 
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 290.)  We are not persuaded, however, that 
construing section 56041 to designate the entity responsible for providing special 
education to an eligible 18- to 22-year-old county jail inmate would result in 
unworkable or absurd consequences.  L.A. Unified‟s argument describing the 
various difficulties that could arise when many, perhaps distant, school districts 
are assigned responsibility for providing special education to eligible 18- to 22-
year-old pupils who are incarcerated in a single county jail raises valid, palpable 
concerns.  But none of the identified problems is insurmountable or renders the 
construction of section 56041 unworkable.  In this regard, we agree with Garcia 
that any potential difficulties arising from designating the school district in which 
the county jail inmate‟s parent resides as the entity responsible for providing 
special education and related services in a county jail may be overcome by the 
school district‟s ability to contract with another school district or agency to deliver 
the necessary services.  Local educational entities like school districts are 
statutorily authorized to enter into agreements with other public agencies to 
provide special education to an eligible pupil and routinely enter into such 
contracts.  (See § 56369.)  Our review of the special education scheme discloses 
furthermore that in a number of settings the Legislature has imposed on school 
districts the responsibility for funding special education programs for eligible 
pupils who reside within the geographic boundaries of another district or even 
another state.  (See §§ 56365, subds. (d)-(i) [assigning to the local educational 
agency the responsibility for funding the full amount of tuition for a pupil properly 
placed in a nonpublic, nonsectarian school, including schools located outside of 
the state], 56195.5, subd. (b) [authorizing a local educational agency to provide for 
the special education of individual pupils through programs maintained by other 
districts or counties].)   
 
26 
Amicus curiae California School Boards Association cautions that even 
were another school district or entity willing to contract with the school district in 
which the eligible county jail inmate‟s parent resides, there are no guarantees such 
an agreement would adequately discharge the responsible school district‟s 
obligations under our state law and the IDEA.  The California School Boards 
Association argues that because correctional institutions are penological rather 
than educational in nature, they present distinctive and significant program-
implementation issues that could impact the delivery of an inmate‟s special 
education program, placing school districts at risk of being held liable for the 
denial of a FAPE to a qualified individual.  The association‟s concerns do not 
render our interpretation of section 56041 unworkable, however.  When a school 
district contracts with certain entities, for example, with a nonpublic, nonsectarian 
school, to provide special education and related services that the school district 
cannot itself provide, the Legislature has ensured that such arrangements will 
comply with required policies and procedures by clarifying the necessary terms 
and respective duties to be set forth in master contracts between the school district 
and the other entity.  (See, e.g., § 56366, subd. (a) [required terms of agreements 
between local educational agencies and nonpublic, nonsectarian schools or 
agencies].)  Although there is no specific statutory provision setting forth the 
required terms of a contract between school districts and other entities for the 
provision of special education services in county jails, a school district is not 
without any guidance in this matter.  For example, many of the terms for 
agreements with nonpublic, nonsectarian schools mandated by section 56366, 
subdivision (a), could be imported into existing agreements for the general 
education of county jail inmates pursuant to sections 1900 through 1909.5.  (See 
also § 1259 [regarding agreements for educating inmates under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation].)  If any additional guidance or 
 
27 
clarification is needed, school districts are free to seek further action by the 
Legislature. 
CONCLUSION  
An individual with a qualifying disability who is between the ages of 18 
and 22 years and has met certain specified prerequisites is entitled to continue his 
or her special education program while incarcerated in a county jail.  Although the 
Legislature has expressly designated the entity responsible for providing special 
education and related services to eligible pupils residing in various institutional 
settings such as juvenile court schools, it has not adopted a similar narrow statute 
applicable to the county jail setting.  In the absence of such legislative action, we 
conclude for the reasons explained above that the assignment of responsibility for 
providing special education to eligible county jail inmates between the ages of 
18 and 22 years is governed by the terms of section 56041.   
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Los Angeles Unified School District v. Garcia 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S199639 
Date Filed: December 12 , 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Diane H. Pappas, Donald A. Erwin, Mampre R. Pomakian; Littler Mendelson, Barrett K. Green and Daniel 
Gonzalez for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Keith Bray, Elaine Yama-Garcia; Vu Vaccaro, Van T. Vu and Kourtney Vacaro for California School 
Boards Association and its Education Legal Alliance as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Alicia Fowler, Acting 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie Weng- Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Susan M. Carson, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Niromi W. Pfeiffer, Glenda N. Reager and Ismael A. Castro, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for the California Department of Education as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Disability Rights Legal Center, Paula D. Pearlman, Michelle Uzeta, Anna Rivera; Milbank, Tweed, Hadley 
& McCloy, Linda Dakin-Grimm, Daniel M. Perry, Delilah Vinzon and Hannah L. Cannom for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
Youth & Education Law Project, William S. Koski and Carly J. Munson for Children‟s Rights Clinic at 
Southwestern Law School, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights California, Learning Rights Law 
Center, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, Loyola Law School, Center for Juvenile Law and Policy and 
Public Counsel Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Barrett K. Green 
Littler Mendelson 
2049 Century Park East, 5th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90067-3107 
(310) 553-0308 
 
Julie Weng- Gutierrez 
Assistant Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-8203 
 
Delilah Vinzon 
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy 
601 Figueroa Street, 30th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 892-4000