Title: People v. Easley

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Opinion filed May 25, 2000.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Ike Easley, Jr., petitioned the circuit court of Livingston County 
for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 
5/122-1 (West 1998)). The circuit court dismissed defendant's petition without 
an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 
651(a). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with conspiring to murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 
38, pars. 8-2(c), 9-1(a)) and with murdering (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, 
pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)) the victim, Robert Taylor, who was a superintendent at 
the Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac). The State's theory of the case was as 
follows. Defendant was a member of a street gang. The gang blamed the prison 
administration for the death of Billy Jones, another gang member. Defendant 
murdered the victim to avenge Jones' death. People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 324-26 (1992). For a fuller understanding of the underlying facts, see 
also People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461 (1992); People v. 
Johnson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 887 (1993).
Prior to defendant's trial, the State dismissed the conspiracy charges. At 
the close of the evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, 
in that he intended to kill the victim. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 
9-1(a)(1). At the first stage of the death sentencing hearing, the same jury 
found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty because the victim was a 
correctional officer. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(2). At the 
close of the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, the jury concluded 
that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the 
death penalty. Accordingly, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death.
Defendant's sentence was stayed pending direct appeal to this court. Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). This court affirmed 
defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281 
(1992). The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ 
of certiorari. Easley v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 1082, 122 L. Ed. 2d 361, 113 S. Ct. 1055 (1993).
In July 1993 defendant filed in the circuit court a petition for 
post-conviction relief. In January 1997 defendant filed a second amended 
petition. On August 14, 1997, the circuit court, in the person of the same judge 
who presided at defendant's trial, granted the State's motion to dismiss the 
petition without an evidentiary hearing. We will discuss additional relevant 
facts in the context of the issues raised on appeal.
DISCUSSION
A proceeding brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) is not an 
appeal of a defendant's underlying judgment. Rather, it is a collateral attack 
on the judgment. The purpose of the proceeding is to resolve allegations that 
constitutional violations occurred at trial, when those allegations have not 
been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously. To be entitled to 
post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing a 
substantial deprivation of constitutional rights. Also, determinations of the 
reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are res judicata as to 
issues actually decided; issues that could have been presented on direct appeal 
but were not are deemed waived. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 
(1999); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377-78 (1997).
The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing as of right. Rather, the Act permits summary dismissal of a 
nonmeritorious petition. The allegations in the petition, supported where 
appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, must show a 
substantial violation of constitutional rights. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 
89; People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 259 (1989). For the purpose 
of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts 
in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits, in light of the original 
trial record, are to be taken as true. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 89; 
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-82 (1998). The circuit court's 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition is reviewed de novo. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 387-89.
On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional rights 
due to the: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct review; 
and (2) unreasonable disparity between his death sentence and the sentences of 
others involved in the murder.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant claims that he was denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
§8. Defendant contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
because trial counsel: (A) failed to seek a fitness hearing; (B) failed to 
object to the prosecution's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge to 
exclude an African-American venireperson from the jury; (C) failed to object to 
the State's introduction of evidence relating to street gangs and introduced 
such evidence as part of the defense; (D) failed to object to the State's 
introduction of other prejudicial evidence and improper cross-examination; and 
(E) failed to investigate and present evidence at the death sentencing 
hearing.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
satisfy the familiar Strickland test. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The 
test is composed of two prongs: deficiency and prejudice. Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; see People v. 
Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 245-46 (1995).
First, the defendant must prove that counsel made errors so serious, and that 
counsel's performance was so deficient, that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed by he sixth amendment. A court measures counsel's 
performance by an objective standard of competence under prevailing professional 
norms. To establish deficiency, the defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that the challenged action or inaction might have been the product 
of sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93; People v. 
Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 108-09 (1992).
Second, the defendant must establish prejudice. The defendant must prove that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The 
prejudice prong of Strickland entails more than an 
"outcome-determinative" test. The defendant must show that counsel's deficient 
performance rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable or fundamentally 
unfair. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 93; People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 458 (1995).
A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. 
Therefore, "failure to establish either proposition will be fatal to the claim." 
People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 487 (1996); accord People v. 
Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1995).
A. Fitness Hearing
Defendant claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
because his trial counsel failed to request a fitness hearing. The State 
initially responds that defendant waived this claim because he did not raise it 
on direct review. However, we defendant now presents evidence that did not 
appear on the face of the record and was not available to defense counsel on 
direct appeal. See People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 308-09 (1989).
The prosecution of a defendant who is not fit to stand trial violates due 
process. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1996); People v. 
Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d 421, 430 (1978). In Illinois, a defendant is presumed to 
be fit to stand trial, and will be considered unfit only if, because of the 
defendant's mental or physical condition, the defendant is unable to understand 
the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or her, or to assist in 
his or her defense. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-10, now codified at 
725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). A defendant is entitled to a fitness hearing only 
when a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness is raised. Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-11(a), now codified at 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 
1998); People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176 (1998).
Therefore, to establish that his trial counsel's alleged incompetency 
prejudiced him within the meaning of Strickland, defendant must show 
that facts existed at the time of his trial that would have raised a bona 
fide doubt of his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the 
proceedings and to assist in his defense. Defendant is entitled to relief on 
this post-conviction claim only if he shows that the trial court would have 
found a bona fide doubt of his fitness and ordered a fitness hearing if 
it had been appraised of the evidence now offered. See Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 193, citing People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512-13 
(1991); accord Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 
1996). Since defendant's post-conviction petition was dismissed without an 
evidentiary hearing, "[t]he critical inquiry is whether the facts presented in 
defendant's post-conviction petition raised a bona fide doubt of his 
fitness to stand trial." Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 193.
Relevant factors that a trial court may consider in assessing whether a 
bona fide doubt of fitness exists include a defendant's irrational 
behavior, the defendant's demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on 
the defendant's competence to stand trial. There are " 'no fixed or 
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to 
determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a 
wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.' " 
Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at 518, quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975).
In the present case, defendant contends that his trial counsel had ample 
evidence to have raised a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand 
trial. We disagree. None of defendant's evidence raise a bona fide 
doubt of his fitness.
Prior to trial, defendant's trial counsel arranged for a psychologist to 
evaluate defendant to develop possible mitigation evidence at the sentencing 
hearing. However, trial counsel failed to inform defendant of the evaluation. 
Defendant believed that the State had sent the psychologist and refused to 
cooperate. "Defendant's unwillingness to cooperate with counsel cannot be deemed 
equivalent with an inability to do so." People v. O'Neal, 62 Ill. App. 
3d 146, 149 (1978).
In an affidavit attached to his post-conviction petition, defendant averred 
as follows. If he knew that his trial counsel, rather than the State, sent the 
psychologist to examine him, he would have cooperated. Indeed, he actually asked 
trial counsel for "a physical examination and a brain scan" because he believed 
that something was "wrong with [his] brain." He experienced "a lot of 
headaches." He stated: "Sometimes when I get angry or upset, I kind of blank 
out-my mind goes blank; my nerves jump and I can't think clearly." When 
defendant read or spoke, he forgot everything that he was reading or 
thinking.
This evidence does not help defendant. Fitness speaks only to a person's 
ability to function within the context of a trial. It does not refer to sanity 
or competence in other areas. A defendant can be fit for trial although his or 
her mind may be otherwise unsound. Murphy, 72 Ill. 2d at 432-33; accord 
People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 79 (1997).
Also, defendant made several irrational statements during the course of the 
trial. For example, at a pretrial hearing, defendant made an outburst in which 
he complained of his prison clothing and requested to be absent during voir 
dire. The following colloquy occurred:
This colloquy shows that defendant understood the nature of the proceeding. 
The record shows that this outburst, along with another at the beginning of the 
second stage of the sentencing hearing, was based not on defendant's unfitness, 
but rather on his belief that the criminal justice system demeaned him, 
particularly by the courthouse searches. See, e.g., People v. 
Chatman, 36 Ill. 2d 305, 310 (1967) (hostile conduct attributable to belief 
that defendant was not receiving a fair trial).
Defendant also notes that the warden of his prison put defendant essentially 
on a "suicide watch" after his conviction in the guilt phase of this trial. 
However, the record shows that this was a policy of this particular warden. 
Indeed, the warden's action angered defendant; prior to the start of the penalty 
phase of this trial, he expressly stated that he had no intention of killing 
himself. In any event, a suicide attempt "does not by itself demonstrate that a 
defendant is unfit." Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 483.
Defendant points also to psychological examinations that post-conviction 
counsel procured six years subsequent to defendant's trial. These examinations 
indicate that defendant had long-standing mental problems at the time of trial 
that affected his ability to understand written and oral instructions. When 
under extreme stress, defendant suffered from thought and personality disorder, 
paranoia, and episodic breaks with reality. Affidavits from defendant's 
mitigation witnesses accord with this diagnosis.
Again, however, a defendant may be fit for trial although his or her mind may 
be otherwise unsound. The fact that a defendant suffers from mental disturbances 
or requires psychiatric treatment does not necessarily raise a bona 
fide doubt as to the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings and 
to assist counsel in the defense. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at 519; 
People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 336 (1976); People v. Bivins, 
97 Ill. App. 3d 386, 389 (1981).
We take as true defendant's allegations that he suffers from mental 
impairments. See Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 380-82. However, that does not 
necessarily mean that he was unfit for trial. The issue is not mental illness, 
but whether defendant could understand the proceedings against him and cooperate 
with counsel in his defense. If so, then, regardless of mental illness, 
defendant will be deemed fit to stand trial. See Eddmonds, 93 F.3d  at 
1314. We conclude that defendant's post-conviction petition does not raise a 
bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial. Thus, defendant's claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily fails. See Johnson, 
183 Ill. 2d  at 193; People v. Walker, 262 Ill. App. 3d 796, 803-04 
(1994). We uphold the circuit court's dismissal of this claim.
B. Batson Claim
Defendant next alleges that the State engaged in purposeful racial 
discrimination by using a peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American 
venireperson from the jury. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Defendant erroneously claims that he received 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel because counsel failed to include 
this issue in his post-trial motion. Such a failure cannot be considered 
constitutionally ineffective because it was not necessary for trial counsel to 
preserve the issue for appellate review. See People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 284-85 (1992). However, defendant also claims that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct review.
Batson established a three-step analysis to determine whether or not 
the State used its peremptory challenges to remove venirepersons on the basis of 
race. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the 
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. People 
v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 174 (1996); People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 425 (1993).
Second, if the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden 
then shifts to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for excluding 
each venireperson in question. A race-neutral explanation is one based upon 
something other than the race of the venireperson. In assessing an explanation, 
the trial court focuses on the facial validity of the prosecutor's 
explanation. The explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible. A 
legitimate reason is not a reason that makes sense, but rather is a reason that 
does not deny equal protection. Absent an inherent discriminatory intent in the 
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. 
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 174-75. Defense counsel then may rebut the 
prosecutor's reasons as being pretextual. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 
288.
Third, the trial court then weighs the evidence in light of the prima 
facie case, the prosecutor's reasons for challenging the venireperson, and 
any rebuttal by defense counsel. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 288. The 
court must determine whether the defendant has met his or her burden of proving 
purposeful discrimination. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 174.
Defendant alleges that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude 
72-year-old Willie Stegall from the jury solely because he is African-American. 
The exclusion of even one prospective juror on account of race is 
unconstitutional and requires reversal of a defendant's conviction. People 
v. Andrews, 155 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (1993).
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked Stegall whether any family 
members had ever received anything more severe than a parking ticket or had any 
other contacts with the police. Stegall answered that he did not know because 
his children had not lived with him for 20 years. After questioning from both 
sides, the prosecutor moved to excuse Stegall for cause. Two of Stegall's 
children had recently been convicted of drug-related offenses and had been 
placed on probation. The prosecutor believed that Stegall lied regarding whether 
anyone in his family had contact with the police. The trial court denied the 
motion. The court reasoned that Stegall did not know the details of his 
children's lives since they had left home years before.
The State then used a peremptory challenge to exclude Stegall. Defendant 
raised a Batson objection. The trial court then offered the State an 
opportunity to assert for the record that Stegall should have been excluded for 
cause. The prosecutor responded by volunteering three race-neutral reasons for 
exercising a peremptory challenge to exclude Stegall. The trial court never 
determined whether defendant established a Batson prima facie case. 
However, the court did find that the State had an adequate race-neutral reason 
for exercising the peremptory challenge. Thus, we need focus only on whether the 
State's reasons were neutral and valid. See Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 
289-90.
First, the prosecutor stated that he excluded Stegall because he lied about 
not knowing of his children's problems with the law. Defendant counters that 
this reason was pretextual. He notes that the trial court rejected this 
explanation in denying the State's motion to excuse Stegall for cause. Defendant 
further contends that the record does not confirm this explanation. However, the 
prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level that justifies a challenge 
for cause. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 177; Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  
at 291.
Defendant further suggests that the prosecutor should have asked Stegall 
supplemental questions regarding his children's problems with the law. However, 
the prosecutor's failure to pose additional questions does not lead to the 
conclusion that this reason was a mere pretext for racial discrimination. See 
People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 276 (1995).
Second, the prosecutor stated that he excluded Stegall because Stegall's 
neighborhood had experienced street gang activity. The court in Williams v. 
Chrans, 957 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1992), recognized the potential problem with 
this explanation:
However, it is settled that the disproportionate impact of a prosecutor's 
criteria for excluding venirepersons does not by itself compel a finding that 
his or her motives were discriminatory. "Unless the [prosecutor] adopted a 
criterion with the intent of causing the impact asserted, that impact itself 
does not violate the principle of race neutrality." Hernandez v. New 
York, 500 U.S. 352, 362, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 407, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1867 
(1991); accord Williams, 957 F.2d  at 490.
Illinois courts have allowed the State to exclude a venireperson if he or she 
lives in an area that has experienced gang activity. See, e.g., 
People v. Morales, 308 Ill. App. 3d 162, 172 (1999); People v. 
Nunn, 273 Ill. App. 3d 519, 525-26 (1995); People v. Williams, 252 
Ill. App. 3d 635, 644 (1993); accord Holder v. Wilborn, 60 F.3d 383, 
390 (7th Cir. 1995) (gang-area justification acceptable under Batson). 
It was the State's theory of the case that defendant, a gang member, killed the 
victim in retaliation against the prison administration for the death of a 
member of defendant's gang. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d  at 324-26. This reason, 
therefore, was especially relevant here. See United States v. Williams, 
936 F.2d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases upholding peremptory 
challenges based on geographical relationship between venireperson and case to 
be tried). This is a race-neutral reason for excluding Stegall.
Third, the prosecutor stated that he excluded Stegall because he vacillated 
on the topic of capital punishment, and hesitated when asked whether he could 
impose the death penalty. Demeanor constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason 
for exercising a peremptory challenge. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 178 
(collecting cases); Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d at 274-75; Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 433.
However, demeanor-based explanations must be closely scrutinized. A 
prosecutor's perception of a venireperson's demeanor is subjective and can be 
easily used as a pretext for discrimination. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d at 
274-75; Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 433. Defendant now contends that this 
proffered explanation is pretextual because the prosecutor accepted three white 
venirepersons to serve on the jury "who expressed a similar or lesser degree of 
tentative support for the death penalty."
We cannot accept this argument. In many cases a peremptory challenge is based 
on a combination of traits. There will be no single criterion that serves as the 
basis for the exclusion of a particular venireperson. Purposeful discrimination 
by the State is not automatically established by the mere coincidence that an 
excluded venireperson shared a characteristic with a juror who was not 
challenged. The excluded venireperson may possess an additional trait that 
caused the prosecutor to consider the venireperson unacceptable. Conversely, the 
juror who was not challenged may possess an additional trait that prompted the 
prosecutor to consider the juror acceptable. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d  at 
282-83 (and cases cited therein).
In this case, defendant argues that other, white venirepersons vacillated on 
the topic of the death penalty and expressed the same degree of hesitation as 
Stegall on whether they could impose it. Accepting this argument, this is the 
only trait that Stegall and the accepted jurors shared. Since Stegall was 
excluded based on a combination of factors, he was not similarly situated to 
these white jurors. Stegall possessed two additional undesirable traits that 
distinguished him from these other jurors. The prosecutor believed that Stegall 
lied about not knowing of his children's problems with the law, and that 
Stegall's neighborhood had experienced gang activity. These distinguishing 
characteristics were sufficient to explain the prosecutor's alleged 
inconsistency in accepting these other jurors, but excluding Stegall. See, 
e.g., Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 430-34; Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 293-96.
In sum, we find no inherent discriminatory intent in the State's explanation 
for excluding Stegall. Accordingly, we deem the State's reasons to be valid and 
race-neutral. This claim was properly dismissed by the circuit court.
C. Gang Evidence
Defendant next claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel: (1) failed to object to the State's introduction of 
evidence relating to street gangs, and (2) introduced such evidence as part of 
the defense. We note that the State contends that defendant has waived these 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he could have raised 
them on direct review. However, defendant also alleges that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct review these allegations 
of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. A criminal defendant is guaranteed the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel as of right, and a claim of 
ineffective assistance thereof is cognizable under the Act. The waiver rule 
should not bar consideration of an issue where the alleged waiver stems from 
incompetency of appellate counsel. People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 
531-32 (1995).
A court uses the Strickland analysis also to test the adequacy of 
appellate counsel. A defendant who contends that appellate counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance, e.g., by failing to argue an issue, must show 
that the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and that the 
decision prejudiced the defendant. Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief 
every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to 
refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, 
unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. Accordingly, unless 
the underlying issues are meritorious, defendant has suffered no prejudice from 
counsel's failure to raise them on appeal. People v. Childress, No. 
84566, slip op. at 4 (April 20, 2000); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 
435 (1999) (and cases cited therein).
1. Failure to Object
The State introduced evidence concerning defendant's membership in a street 
gang and that gang's involvement in the victim's murder. Defendant now argues 
that his appellate counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to argue 
that trial counsel should have objected to the State's introduction of this 
evidence. This issue is barred by operation of res judicata. A 
petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by rephrasing in constitutional 
terms issues which were previously addressed, such as ineffective assistance of 
counsel. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 277-78 (1992) (and cases 
cited therein). On direct review, this court held that although the admission of 
this gang-related evidence was improper, defendant suffered no prejudice 
therefrom. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d  at 323-33. Defendant cannot now argue 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel 
should have objected to what this court has previously concluded to be 
nonprejudicial. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 103.
2. Introduction by Defense
Defense witness Dennis Fox was a Pontiac inmate and a member of defendant's 
gang. Defendant's trial counsel elicited from Fox testimony that members of 
defendant's gang roamed at will in the vicinity of the murder, that they could 
kill anyone they wished, and that they would kill any eyewitness to a gang 
killing.
The State's evidence against defendant included two eyewitnesses to the 
murder. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d  at 292-93. The record shows that defense 
counsel presented several witnesses such as Fox who testified not only that the 
State's eyewitnesses were not where they testified they were, but further, that 
there could not have been any eyewitnesses. If there were, defendant's 
gang would have killed them.
Defendant now contends that appellate counsel should have argued that trial 
counsel's strategy was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial. As with 
defendant's failure to object to the State's introduction of gang evidence, this 
issue is res judicata (Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 277-78). 
Easley, 148 Ill. 2d  at 323-33. Defendant cannot now argue that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel 
improperly admitted evidence that this court has previously concluded to be 
nonprejudicial.
However, as evidence of prejudice from appellate counsel's conduct, defendant 
attached to his post-conviction petition affidavits of several jurors from 
defendant's trial. The jurors averred essentially that they felt uneasy about 
street gangs, and they feared gang retaliation. According to defendant, this 
evidence shows that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's introduction of 
gang-related evidence.
The jurors' affidavits cannot help defendant. "It is well established that a 
statement by a juror taken after the jury has rendered its verdict, has been 
polled in open court, and has been discharged will not be admitted to impeach a 
juror's verdict." People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 257 (1995) (and 
cases cited therein). "How or why the jury reached its decision collectively or 
how or why individual jurors considered the evidence are not matters of proper 
inquiry after the verdict has been reached." People v. Chatman, 52 Ill. 
App. 3d 631, 634-35 (1977). We do not consider the jurors' affidavits.
Defendant also attached to his post-conviction petition a report by John 
Hagedorn, who is a sociologist and an expert on street gangs. In his report, he 
conceded that the gang-related evidence may not have changed the outcome of the 
guilt phase of the trial. However, he opined that the gang-related evidence 
"exercised considerable influence on the jury in the penalty phase of the trial. 
In other words, if the gang issue had not been such a major focus of the trial, 
I believe the jury would have been substantially less likely to ask for the 
death penalty."
We disagree. We conclude that defendant fails the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test. On direct review, this court concluded:
We note that, in contrast to the guilt phase of the trial, the gang-related 
evidence was admissible at the penalty phase. See People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 47-48 (1996) (and cases cited therein).
Thus, in terms of the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, we 
conclude that there is no reasonable probability that, but for the introduction 
of gang evidence by defendant's trial counsel, the result of the guilt phase of 
the trial would have been different. Also, due to the aggravation evidence, 
which we will discuss later, this conclusion applies likewise to the penalty 
phase of the trial. Therefore, appellate counsel was not constitutionally 
deficient for failing to argue the issue. The circuit court properly dismissed 
this claim.
D. Failure to Object: Improper Cross-Examination
Defendant next claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel failed to object to: (1) a statement by a prison 
investigator that defendant invoked his right to remain silent after he had 
received Miranda warnings; (2) the prosecutor's improper elicitation of 
testimony, on cross-examination of a defense witness, that his aggravated 
battery conviction had been reduced from attempted murder; and (3) the 
prosecutor's insinuation, in cross-examining another defense witness, that the 
witness had changed his story, without evidentiary support. Defendant also 
alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on 
direct review these allegations of trial counsel's incompetence.
Defendant raised these instances of the prosecutor's allegedly improper 
cross-examination on direct review. This court held that defendant waived review 
of these issues, and that the prosecutor's conduct did not rise to the level of 
plain error. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d  at 321-23, 336. Since the actions 
complained of did not rise to the level of plain error, the failure of 
defendant's trial counsel to object thereto did not prejudice defendant under 
Strickland. See, e.g., People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 330-32 (1998); People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322-26 (1998). 
Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to preserve these issues 
for review; correspondingly, incompetence cannot be assigned to appellate 
counsel. The circuit court properly dismissed this claim.
Defendant also claims that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel's 
evidentiary errors deprived him of effective assistance of counsel at the guilt 
phase of the trial. Defendant contends that, but for these errors, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
The circuit court properly dismissed this claim. We have rejected each of these 
claims. Thus, there can be no cumulative effect. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  
at 103.
E. Death Sentencing Hearing
Defendant next claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing. He contends that his trial 
counsel failed to investigate and introduce mitigation evidence.
The State's aggravation evidence at the hearing focused on defendant's crime 
for which he was imprisoned and his prison conduct. The victim in that case, 
William Paschal, was the common law husband of defendant's sister Carolyn, now 
deceased. Defendant's family lived with Carolyn and Paschal. On January 21, 
1982, defendant broke into their apartment, found the unarmed Paschal in the 
living room, swore at him, and then shot him once in the chest. Defendant shot 
Paschal twice more as Paschal attempted to flee, once in the side and once in 
the back of the head. Two eyewitnesses, defendant's sister Lorraine and his 
brother Jerome, related these events to Chicago Police Detective Thomas Ptak. 
Lorraine and Jerome were then teenagers; defendant was then 19 years old. 
Defendant surrendered to police 10 days later. He was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
During his imprisonment for the murder of Paschal, in April 1983, Martin 
Yallaly, a supervisor at Menard Correctional Center, saw defendant and two other 
inmates assault an inmate. Yallaly saw that defendant was armed, but could not 
identify what type of weapon he had. Later, three deadly homemade weapons were 
found in the area of the assault.
In February 1984, a corrections officer at Menard searched defendant's cell 
for, inter alia, contraband and weapons. The officer found an 
eight-inch sharpened knife hidden in one of defendant's shoes.
In January 1986, defendant struck a corrections officer at Pontiac. 
Lieutenant Mark Pierson and two other officers were searching an inmate's cell. 
As defendant was walking by the cell, he stopped and asked Pierson what he was 
doing. Pierson ordered defendant to go to his cell. Defendant refused and 
attempted to enter the cell. Pierson grasped defendant's arm to lead defendant 
back to his own cell. Defendant then punched Pierson in the eye.
In November 1987, defendant was ordered to appear in court. He was taken from 
his cell to the admit building. Lieutenant Frank Ragusa, a corrections officer 
at Pontiac, took defendant to a room to be strip-searched. It was standard 
procedure for any inmate leaving the prison to be searched for contraband. 
Defendant was handcuffed to a chained belt around his waist. While Ragusa was 
undoing the handcuffs, defendant stated, "yeah, I got something," and punched 
Ragusa in the jaw.
From June 1982 through 1989, the Department of Corrections issued 154 
disciplinary reports to defendant while he was an inmate at Pontiac. Six of the 
reports were for assault-five assaults on prison staff and one on another 
inmate; 30 for insolence or threats; 52 for disobeying orders; 64 for 
unauthorized movement; three for gang activity; four for dangerous contraband; 
and two for drugs and paraphernalia. The aggravation evidence also included the 
evidence adduced at trial.
Defendant's trial counsel presented mitigation evidence pertaining to 
defendant's troubled social history, his psychological impairments, and the 
Paschal murder.
Defendant's mother, Ray Jean Easley, was 16 years old when defendant was 
born. According to defendant's mother, defendant "was born with a mental 
problem" and had been "a problem child" since birth. He avoided bathing and wet 
his bed as a teenager. He had a learning disorder that required his placement in 
special education classes at school.
Defendant's great-aunt, Emma Hubbard, began her relationship with defendant 
when he was about three years old. Her niece, defendant's mother, needed help in 
caring for defendant and his brothers and sisters. Hubbard then began asking 
defendant's mother to give defendant to her. Between the ages of 9 and 15, 
defendant lived with both his mother and Hubbard. During this time, he exhibited 
strange behavior. He would lower his head and scream for no apparent reason. 
Also, on more than one occasion, Hubbard gave defendant shoes that were a color 
he did not like. Defendant would not wear them and would walk outside without 
wearing any-even in snow. Defendant moved in with Hubbard at age 15.
In 1971, Norma Johnson, a Chicago board of education school psychologist, 
prepared a psychological report on defendant. She tested defendant, reviewed his 
school records, and interviewed him and his teachers. Her findings included the 
following. Defendant was eight years old and in the third grade. However, his 
reading skills were below kindergarten level and his math skills were at the 
first-grade level. Defendant and his family lived in a one-bedroom apartment. He 
and all of his siblings slept in the same bed. Defendant spent his time mainly 
in the apartment watching television. Fearful of their neighborhood, his mother 
did not allow him to play outside. He was poorly groomed and had an unpleasant 
body odor.
Johnson opined that defendant had low self-esteem. He was ill-equipped to 
handle the academic curriculum. Accordingly, defendant should be expected to 
experience ridicule from both students and teachers. Defendant behaved 
immaturely in class; he was "babyish" and "very playful." Since defendant could 
not receive positive attention based on his academic performance, he behaved in 
this fashion to gain attention in the only way he could. Further, the Chicago 
public school system at that time could not supply defendant with the additional 
resources he needed, e.g., tutors for his academic deficiencies and 
social workers for his low self-esteem.
Johnson further opined that defendant was "passively aggressive," 
i.e., "he did not act out overtly in an aggressive manner, but he may 
have had some feelings of anger or resentment that he expressed in annoying 
type[s] of ways, maybe doing irritating things, dawdling, some of the immature 
babyish behavior *** to get attention." According to Johnson, a 
passive-aggressive child usually does not physically act out his or her 
aggressive feelings. The condition does not commonly result in criminal 
activity. Although the Chicago board of education classified defendant as an 
educable mentally handicapped (EMH) pupil, Johnson disagreed with this 
conclusion.
Defendant's mother and his sister, Evelyn Easley, also testified for 
defendant regarding the Paschal murder. Paschal physically and mentally abused 
defendant's family. On one occasion, after Paschal beat Evelyn particularly 
harshly, defendant attempted to speak to Paschal. With cursing and violent 
threats, Paschal ordered defendant to leave his apartment.
However, Paschal and defendant's brother, Jerome, were close friends; they 
took illegal drugs together. Further, Jerome always hated defendant; Jerome 
would tell lies about defendant even when they were young children.
The night before his death, Paschal and defendant's mother had a loud and 
harsh verbal fight. Paschal even threatened defendant's mother with a butcher 
knife. Defendant went to the apartment the next night. He peaceably entered 
through the back door and spoke with Lorraine. He then went to the living room, 
where Paschal and Jerome were. Defendant told Paschal that he wanted to discuss 
Paschal's treatment of defendant's mother. Paschal jumped up cursing; defendant 
continued attempting to speak with him. Removing his wristwatch, Paschal said, 
"I told you *** not to come here, and I'm going to teach you something." He 
began to reach behind the living room television set; everyone, including 
defendant, knew that Paschal kept a pistol there. Defendant warned Paschal to 
stop, but Paschal continued to reach behind the television. Defendant shot 
Paschal once and then fled.
Jerome left the apartment and hailed a passing police car. He falsely accused 
defendant of violently breaking into the apartment and shooting Paschal without 
justification. According to Evelyn, the version of events to which Detective 
Ptak testified was a lie. Speaking to Evelyn and Lorraine alone, police officers 
ordered them to corroborate Jerome's version of events. If they did not, these 
officers threatened that Evelyn and Lorraine would live in a foster home and 
never see their mother again. Their statement to police was a result of this 
coercion.
In his closing argument at the sentencing hearing, defendant's trial counsel 
argued that defendant, as with most gang members, turned to a gang as a 
surrogate family. He sought from his gang the needful things that anyone seeks 
from his or her family. For defendant, one such need was protection while in 
prison. While not excusing gangs, defendant's trial counsel attempted to give 
the jury an understanding of them.
Defendant's trial counsel then discussed defendant's prison record. Counsel 
dismissed the 64 disciplinary reports for unauthorized movement. He observed 
that, in actuality, there are no rules in prison and that gangs control prisons 
in many aspects of daily life. He characterized the testimony of the corrections 
officers as inconsequential, half-truths, or outright lies.
Now, in this post-conviction proceeding, defendant contends that his trial 
counsel failed to investigate, prior to trial, mitigation evidence pertaining 
to: (1) an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and (2) other areas of 
mitigation. Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, in the context 
of a death sentencing hearing, a defendant must prove that there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent counsel's deficient conduct, the sentencer would have 
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not 
warrant death. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93-94; Foster, 168 Ill. 2d  at 489.
1. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance
"Under the Illinois murder statute, evidence that a defendant was acting 
under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the 
murder is one of the factors to be considered in mitigation, and may be a basis 
for imposing a sentence other than death." Foster, 168 Ill. 2d  at 490; 
see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c)(2). Defendant refers to a number 
of reports and affidavits attached to his post-conviction petition in support of 
this claim.
Several psychiatrists and neuropsychologists evaluated defendant pending 
disposition of his post-conviction petition in the circuit court. Dr. Bruce 
Perry, with Dr. Michael Gomez, found that defendant's severe, early-life 
physical and mental abuse and neglect resulted in post-traumatic stress 
disorder. They found that "[b]iologically there appears to be little 
contributing to Mr. Easley's current clinical presentation." However, 
defendant's severely abusive upbringing lacked the requisites for normal mental 
development. Drs. Jonathan Hess and Michael Gelbort, in separate evaluations, 
each found that defendant's behavior indicated neurocognitive dysfunction that 
correlates with brain injury. All three reports concluded that defendant's 
socially inappropriate behavior results from neurocognitive dysfunction.
Also, defendant himself asked his trial counsel for a "brain scan." Further, 
if counsel, prior to trial, had asked them, defendant's mother and great-aunt 
would have told counsel of defendant's behavior to which they testified at the 
sentencing hearing, which would have prompted counsel to further 
investigate.
A defendant is under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance when 
the defendant's emotional state at the time of the murder is at such a fragile 
point as to leave him or her with little to no emotional control. 
Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 206, quoting People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 534 (1989). Here, even assuming that the circumstances surrounding 
defendant's mental health or this murder would have prompted his trial counsel 
to explore this particular mitigation strategy, counsel's failure to do so did 
not prejudice defendant. The State's evidence shows that defendant acted in a 
rational and composed manner before, during, and after the murder. Also, since 
defendant attempted to avoid detection, he apparently appreciated the 
criminality of his acts. See Easley, 148 Ill. 2d  at 292-95. Given all 
of the evidence before the jury, we conclude that there was no reasonable 
probability that the additional evidence now offered by defendant would have 
caused the jury to find the existence of this statutory mitigating factor. See 
Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 99; People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 152 (1996).
Further, it must be remembered that proof of this or any other single 
mitigating factor will not always preclude imposition of the death penalty. 
Instead, the sentencer should carefully weigh all the aggravating and mitigating 
factors to reach a fair and just result, one which is based on the particular 
circumstances of the offense and the defendant. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 
99; People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 537-38 (1980).
We consider the aggravating evidence to be significant. This was defendant's 
second murder. While imprisoned, defendant has largely disregarded prison 
authority. He has attacked both his jailors and his fellow inmates. Now, his 
second victim was a prison supervisor. Defendant's crime was not one of anger or 
a quick burst of uncontrollable rage. Rather, it was a cold-blooded and 
calculated assassination of a Department of Corrections official who, as far as 
the record shows, never harmed or threatened defendant. In light of this 
aggravation evidence, we hold that, even if defendant had established the 
existence of this statutory mitigating factor, there is no reasonable 
probability that the jury would have imposed a sentence other than death. See 
Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 206; Foster, 168 Ill. 2d  at 490-92. 
The circuit court properly dismissed this claim.
2. Other Mitigation Evidence
Defendant next contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate prior to 
trial several other nonstatutory areas of mitigation. Counsel allegedly failed 
to assemble mitigation evidence from defendant's family and friends. This 
testimony would have gone essentially to defendant's disadvantaged and troubled 
childhood, emotional ties to his sisters and others, and good character.
Defendant also attaches to his post-conviction petition mitigation evidence 
specifically describing his relationship to his street gang. Defendant argues 
that "his membership in the gang, while not praiseworthy, reflected a pathetic 
need for family."
However, such evidence is not inherently mitigating. Stewart v. 
Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1996). The jury might have considered 
such testimony to be an aggravating factor. The jury could have regarded 
defendant's troubled life, with his criminal record and gang involvement in 
prison, as an indicator of defendant's future dangerousness. See 
Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d  at 467.
Defendant's trial counsel also allegedly failed to present evidence of 
defendant's poor academic record. However, such testimony from additional 
witnesses would have been merely cumulative to the testimony of school 
psychologist Norma Johnson, which the jury already heard. Further, evidence of 
educational disabilities is not inherently mitigating. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 203-04.
Defendant next faults his trial counsel for allegedly failing to investigate 
evidence of defendant's psychological and emotional problems. As with proof of 
educational disabilities, evidence of mental impairments as described in 
defendant's evidence is not inherently mitigating. See Holman v. 
Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1997). Proof of these mental 
deficiencies not only could have evoked compassion from the jury, but also could 
have demonstrated defendant's continued dangerousness. See Johnson, 183 
Ill. 2d at 203-04; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 406; People v. 
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 139-40 (1997).
Defendant next claims that "[d]espite his problems and deficits, [he] 
developed many positive qualities as he became a young adult and moved away from 
his parents' residence." Defendant faults his trial counsel for failing to 
present evidence of these positive aspects, specifically including defendant's 
work history and capacity for rehabilitation.
"[W]e must assess prejudice in a realistic manner based on the totality of 
the evidence. Accordingly, it is improper to focus solely on the potential 
mitigating evidence. As our cases illustrate, the nature and extent of the 
evidence in aggravation must also be considered." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  
at 538 (collecting cases). In this case, we have previously described the 
merciless and dangerous nature of the aggravation evidence. The failure of 
defendant's trial counsel to place more information from defendant's past onto 
the scale probably would not have tipped it in defendant's favor. See 
Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1322 (7th Cir. 1996).
Defendant next faults his trial counsel for failing to present additional 
details pertaining to the Paschal murder and defendant's guilty plea to that 
crime. This evidence pertains to the dispute between Paschal and defendant's 
mother, Paschal's provocation of defendant prior to and at the time of the 
murder, and the police coercion of defendant's sisters to give false statements. 
Defendant also presents evidence that: his attorney at the plea conference was 
at that time suspended from the practice of law, his attorney did not confer 
with him at the conference, and his guilty plea was not knowing and 
voluntary.
The proffered evidence pertaining to the Paschal murder is largely cumulative 
to that presented at the sentencing hearing. The evidence pertaining to 
defendant's guilty plea does not support his allegations. Defendant's exhibits 
attached to his post-conviction petition show as follows. Two attorneys 
filed appearances on defendant's behalf; they stood by defendant at, and 
participated in, the plea conference. Defendant does not now question the 
credentials of the second attorney. The report of proceedings shows that the 
circuit court very carefully and thoroughly questioned and admonished defendant 
to ascertain whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 402. 
During the court's questioning, defendant conferred with his counsel twice. His 
responses, with two attorneys present, show that his guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary and the circuit court so found. To the extent that defendant's 
proffered evidence presents new information, it probably would not have changed 
defendant's sentence. See Jackson v. Roth, 24 F.3d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir. 
1994).
Defendant faults his trial counsel also for failing to present mitigating 
aspects of defendant's prison record. Defendant now points to his many requests 
for education. He also notes that of his 154 prison disciplinary reports, only 
six were for assault and, of those six, four were received after he murdered the 
victim. To defendant, "[w]hile that is not commendable, it is hardly the unusual 
or threatening picture that the prosecution portrayed in aggravation." Defendant 
also points to an affidavit by Freddie Green, who was a corrections officer at 
defendant's prison. Green's affidavit included the following. Defendant warned 
Green of an attack on another guard, thereby preventing it. Also, defendant 
refused to carry out a gang-ordered "hit" on another inmate. As punishment, some 
members of defendant's gang were planning to "hit" defendant. Green had 
defendant moved to another cellhouse.
Favorable evidence of a defendant's conduct while incarcerated is potentially 
mitigating. People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 360 (1993). In this 
case, however, "[d]efendant's good conduct neither diminished the circumstances 
of the offense nor lessened his responsibility for its commission." 
Turner, 156 Ill. 2d  at 365. While this evidence may be viewed as 
mitigation, it probably would not have changed defendant's sentence. See 
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 140. Further, this evidence can support the 
inference that defendant, following gang orders, murdered the victim to regain 
favor with the gang. This evidence thereby indicates defendant's future 
dangerousness.
Defendant contends that the evidence submitted in his post-conviction 
petition is at least as mitigating as the evidence in cases that satisfied the 
prejudice prong of Strickland. Defendant relies on several cases in 
which trial counsel presented very little to no available mitigation evidence at 
the death sentencing hearing. E.g., People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 513 (1999) (counsel presented two mitigation witnesses whose combined 
testimony totaled 10 pages of transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (counsel did not present any mitigation witnesses); 
People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (only mitigation 
witness was defendant's wife); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 
176-77, 185 (1992) (only evidence presented was Department of Corrections 
psychological report prepared while defendant was imprisoned for prior offense); 
People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1989) (sole mitigation witness 
was police officer who testified that defendant expressed remorse when he was 
questioned about offenses).
In this case, however, defendant's trial counsel presented to the jury 
evidence or argument in several major areas of mitigation. The jury received a 
sense of defendant's: social history; mental and developmental profile; version 
of the circumstances surrounding the Paschal murder; gang membership as a 
substitute for family; and prison record as not being egregious, considering 
gang control of prisons.
True, defendant's trial counsel failed to present additional available 
evidence in the above-mentioned areas. However, considering the proffered 
evidence in light of the aggravating circumstances, we conclude that this 
additional evidence would probably not have avoided defendant's death sentence. 
See People v. Thomas, 164 Ill. 2d 410, 429-30 (1995). We hold that the 
performance of defendant's trial counsel met the constitutional minimum. See 
Jackson, 24 F.3d  at 1005.
As this court's opinion on direct review indicates, this was not a perfect 
trial. See People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281 (1992). However, a 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Likewise, ineffective 
assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation. 
Recognizing these axioms, Strickland requires only that a defendant 
receive a fair trial, i.e., a trial free of errors so egregious that 
they probably caused the conviction or the sentence. See Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 692-93, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Griffin, 
178 Ill. 2d  at 90-91.
In this case, defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death based 
not on any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather on overwhelming 
evidence. We uphold the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. Disparate Sentences
Defendant was one of four inmates who were charged with the victim's murder: 
defendant, Roosevelt Lucas, Michael Johnson, and David Carter. Defendant and 
Lucas "were originally codefendants in the State's prosecution of Taylor's 
murder, but their cases were severed before trial." Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  
at 469. Johnson and Carter were also tried separately. Defendant and Lucas each 
received a death sentence; Johnson and Carter each received a sentence of 
natural life imprisonment. Lastly, defendant claims that his death sentence was 
unreasonably disparate to the sentences of Johnson and Carter.
The controlling principles are settled. Comparative proportionality review in 
death penalty cases is not required by the United States Constitution and is not 
a feature of the Illinois death penalty statute. Nonetheless, this court has the 
constitutional duty to determine whether a death sentence has been imposed 
arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly severe, considering the circumstances 
of the offense and the character and rehabilitative prospects of the defendant. 
To guarantee the individualized sentencing that the eighth amendment requires, 
this court has compared a defendant's death sentence to the sentence of a 
codefendant or an accomplice. This court has focused on the nature of the 
offense, each individual's relative involvement, his character and background, 
and his criminal record and potential for rehabilitation. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 89; People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1994).
To decide this claim, we must understand the relationship between these 
defendants. Testimony at Johnson's trial revealed that:
Accord Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 473-74, 479-80.
Defendant now contends that Johnson and Carter "were more culpable" than he 
because it was their order to kill the victim. They "were the 
organizers and masterminds of the murder." If defendant had not carried out 
their order, "they would have found someone else to do it." Further, according 
to defendant, Johnson and Carter have more significant criminal histories and 
show less potential for rehabilitation than he.
We cannot accept this contention. Although Johnson and Carter issued the 
order to kill the victim, defendant nonetheless was the actual killer. Thus, a 
more severe sentence for defendant was justified. See Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 90; People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 303 (1995). Also, we view 
defendant's criminal history as not significantly less than that of Johnson and 
Carter. Further, that defendant and Lucas each received a death sentence 
"persuades us that defendant's sentence was neither arbitrary nor capricious." 
Byron, 164 Ill. 2d  at 303. We conclude that defendant's death sentence 
was not unreasonably disparate to Johnson's and Carter's sentences of natural 
life imprisonment. We uphold the circuit court's dismissal of this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Livingston 
County dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition is affirmed. The clerk of 
this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, November 22, 2000, 
as the date on which the sentence of death entered in the circuit court is to be 
imposed. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 
5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the 
mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms 
Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is now 
confined.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Easley's murder conviction should not be disturbed. In my view, 
however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand. For the reasons set 
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 
185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. 
VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2). Easley's sentence of death should therefore be vacated and he 
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, 
par. 9-1(j).