Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Wittbrod

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Wittbrod, 122 Ohio St.3d 394, 2009-Ohio-3549.] 
 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. WITTBROD. 
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Wittbrod, 122 Ohio St.3d 394, 2009-Ohio-3549.] 
Attorneys at law — Disciplinary violations — Stayed license suspension. 
(No. 2008-0723 ⎯ Submitted April 8, 2009 — Decided July 28, 2009.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 07-021. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Harry J. Wittbrod of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0066021, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we suspend respondent’s license to practice for six months but 
stay the suspension on conditions requiring him to continue with mental-health 
treatment, complete a one-year monitored probation, and receive training in law-
office management.  The recommendation is based on the board’s findings that 
respondent violated ethical standards by failing to advise a client that he lacked 
professional malpractice insurance and by attempting to exonerate himself from 
or limit his liability for malpractice.  We agree that respondent engaged in this 
professional misconduct and that a six-month conditionally stayed suspension of 
his license is appropriate. 
{¶ 3} Relator, Akron Bar Association, charged respondent in a six-count 
complaint with violations of the Disciplinary Rules of the former Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the current Rules of Professional Conduct.1  The 
                                                 
1. Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before 
and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility.   
 
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board initially considered the case on a consent-to-discipline agreement, filed 
pursuant to Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In that agreement, the parties stipulated to facts 
and misconduct and proposed a one-year suspension of respondent’s license, 
stayed on conditions of mental-health treatment and monitored probation.  The 
board accepted the agreement and recommended that we order a one-year 
suspension, all stayed on the agreed-upon conditions. 
{¶ 4} Upon review of the board’s certified report, we rejected the 
recommendation and returned the cause to the board “for further proceedings, 
including consideration of a more severe sanction.”  See Akron Bar Assn. v. 
Wittbrod, 118 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2008-Ohio-2411, 886 N.E.2d 869.  A panel of 
three board members heard the case and found that respondent had committed 
misconduct as charged in Counts III and IV but not in connection with the other 
four counts.  Having found fewer ethical infractions than those to which the 
parties had stipulated initially, the panel recommended a six-month suspension 
stayed on conditions requiring respondent to continue mental-health treatment, 
complete a one-year monitored probation, and receive training in law-office 
management.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct and 
recommendation. 
{¶ 5} Neither party has objected to the board’s report. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} Count III of relator’s amended complaint alleged that respondent 
violated DR 1-104(A) and (B) by failing to provide and then document that he 
had given notice to a client that he did not maintain professional liability 
insurance “in the amounts of at least one hundred thousand dollars per occurrence 
and three hundred thousand dollars in the aggregate.”  Count IV alleged a 
violation of DR 6-102, which with an exception not relevant here prohibited a 
January Term, 2009 
3 
lawyer from attempting to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to a client 
for malpractice.  Count IV further alleged a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(h)(2), 
which prohibits a lawyer from settling a claim for malpractice unless all of the 
following apply: 
{¶ 7} “(i)  the settlement is not unconscionable, inequitable, or unfair; 
{¶ 8} “(ii)  the client or former client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent legal counsel in connection therewith; 
{¶ 9} “(iii)  the client or former client gives informed consent.” 
Count III 
{¶ 10} During 2005 and 2006, respondent defended a client against an 
employee’s workers’ compensation claim.  Respondent did not advise the client 
that he lacked malpractice insurance as required by DR 1-104(A) and (B).  We 
therefore find clear and convincing evidence of this misconduct. 
Count IV 
{¶ 11} After the Industrial Commission allowed the employee’s claim for 
disability compensation, making respondent’s client responsible for payment, 
respondent miscalculated and missed a filing deadline for appealing the decision.  
In November 2006, the client sued respondent for malpractice, and in May 2007, 
respondent settled with the client for approximately $11,000, although he has 
since defaulted on installment payments due.  Respondent conceded that at some 
point during settlement negotiations in the malpractice case, either before or after 
the February 1, 2007 effective date of the Code of Professional Conduct, he 
proposed as a term of settlement the dismissal of the client’s grievance. 
{¶ 12} As the panel and board observed, DR 6-102 did not specifically 
prohibit a lawyer from negotiating with a client for the dismissal of a grievance 
pending before disciplinary authorities.  The rule instead focused on the 
prohibition against a lawyer’s negotiating with a client to limit malpractice 
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liability without necessary safeguards, now set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(h)(2)(i) 
through (iii), to avoid the risks associated with their adversarial interests.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner (1977), 77 Ohio St.3d 431, 432, 674 N.E.2d 
1369. 
{¶ 13} Even so, we recently accepted a stipulation to a violation of DR 6-
102, the former counterpart of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(h)(2), based on a lawyer’s 
attempt to obtain the dismissal of a pending grievance through negotiations with 
an unrepresented client.  In Akron Bar Assn. v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 
2008-Ohio-862, 883 N.E.2d 1046, ¶ 5-6, the parties stipulated to the DR 6-102 
violation, citing the lawyer’s offer to repay a $200 filing fee in return for the 
client’s dismissal of a then pending grievance.  Apparently, the stipulation 
resulted not only because the client was unrepresented but because the 
disciplinary investigation in process might have led to a malpractice claim.  In any 
event, the parties did not dispute the violation, and neither has respondent in this 
case.  We therefore accept the panel and board findings that respondent violated 
DR 6-102 or Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(h)(2).2 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} Having found the cited misconduct, the panel and board weighed 
the aggravating and mitigating factors in respondent’s case in recommending a 
sanction and documented the following: 
{¶ 15} “Respondent has no history of disciplinary violations.  There was 
no evidence of dishonesty or selfish motive or multiple offenses.  Respondent has 
returned the $200 filing fee [for the appeal] to the client.  The only other fees for 
the workers’ compensation case totaled $500.  No restitution is required.  Any 
                                                 
2. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Kates (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 69, 70-71, 676 N.E.2d 512, observed that 
“[d]isciplinary proceedings are not actions for malpractice,” however, and suggested that a 
lawyer’s attempt to derail a disciplinary investigation through negotiations to dismiss a grievance 
was more aptly charged as a violation of DR 1-102(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
circumventing a Disciplinary Rule through the actions of another).   
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5 
harm to the client has been rectified by the judgment, through a settlement 
agreement, for his malpractice claim.  Respondent’s default on the installment 
payments can be addressed through other enforcement or collection proceedings, 
not through this Board. 
{¶ 16} “Respondent displayed significant emotions at the hearing.  He has 
given up practicing law.  He described symptoms of depression and anxiety, 
including treatment dating back to 2002 by his family physician who prescribed 
antianxiety medications.  On the day before the hearing, he met with OLAP [the 
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program] and signed a contract relating to mental health 
issues.  He has been directed to see a psychiatrist and a new psychologist.  Shortly 
before the hearing, his attorney and others essentially staged an intervention at 
Respondent’s home office, to review his remaining active client files. 
{¶ 17} “Respondent presented no medical evidence regarding his mental 
health.  Further, he does not relate his mistake in missing the appeal deadline to 
his mental health.  He said that he has developed a ‘fear of clients, a distrust of 
clients’ over the past two years and that his emotional symptoms ‘started to build, 
especially after (the underlying client dispute).’  Based on Respondent’s 
testimony, the malpractice action (filed by an attorney who ‘had actually sued 
[him] previously’ and had ‘literally shaken [him] emotionally’) was a tipping 
point in causing an exacerbation of his mental health symptoms and causing him, 
essentially, to shut down and withdraw. 
{¶ 18} “After an initial delay in responding to Relator’s letters, 
Respondent has cooperated throughout this disciplinary matter.” 
{¶ 19} Relator proposed a two-year suspension with a one-year stay on 
conditions, including respondent’s compliance with his OLAP contract, 
completion of a one-year monitored probation, and completion of training in law-
office management in addition to the continuing legal education requirements of 
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Gov.Bar R. X.  Respondent asked only for a conditional stay of any suspension 
imposed.  The panel and board concluded: 
{¶ 20} “The violations established by this record do not justify an actual 
suspension.  But for Respondent’s acknowledged and unresolved mental health 
issues, this record would otherwise justify only a public reprimand.  However, for 
protection of the public and to permit Respondent the opportunity to address his 
issues through OLAP and appropriate medical providers, the panel recommends 
the sanction of a six month suspension, all stayed on the conditions that 
Respondent comply with the conditions of his OLAP contract, including any 
recommendations for medical treatment made by OLAP; that Respondent attend 
one or more CLE courses on law-office management; and that, should he resume 
the practice of law, his practice be monitored for one year by an attorney 
appointed by Relator.” 
{¶ 21} We accept this recommendation.  Respondent is suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio for six months, but the suspension is stayed on the 
conditions that he comply with the conditions of his OLAP contract, including 
any recommendations for medical treatment made by OLAP, that he attend one or 
more CLE courses on law-office management, and that his practice be monitored 
for one year by an attorney appointed by relator.  If respondent fails to comply 
with the terms of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the 
entire six-month suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Joseph S. Kodish and Kathryn A. Belfance, for relator. 
Mathew W. Oby, for respondent. 
______________________