Title: Medley v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILBUR MEDLEY, 
 
Defendant-Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
No.  315, 2021 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
Cr. ID No.  1903000471 
 
Submitted:  May 4, 2022 
Decided:  July 12, 2022 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, and Elliot M. Margules, Esquire, (argued), Office of 
Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant, Wilbur Medley.  
 
Brian L. Arban, Esquire, and  Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellee, State of Delaware.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
2 
 
 
The Appellant, Wilbur Medley, appeals from the Superior Court’s denial of 
his motion for sentence modification.  He raises two issues.  First, he contends that 
the Superior Court improperly delegated its sentencing authority to court 
administrative staff and Department of Correction (“DOC”) staff.  He claims DOC 
staff and Superior Court administrative staff amended his original sentence order to 
strip him of 563 days of credit time.  He further claims that the sentencing judge 
simply signed off on the amended order without knowledge of the reason for the 
amendment, or that at least there is nothing in the record that indicates that the 
sentencing judge was aware of the reason for the amendment.  His second contention 
is that the sentencing judge denied his right to be present with counsel for sentencing 
when the judge, sua sponte and without a hearing, issued the amended sentence.  For 
the reasons that follow, we reject Medley’s contentions and affirm the Superior 
Court’s denial of sentence modification.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In February 2019, a home on Vining Lane in Wilmington, Delaware was 
burglarized, resulting in the theft of three flat-screen televisions, keys, jewelry, and 
other property.  An investigation led by New Castle County Police Detective 
Christopher Phillips culminated in the execution of a search warrant of Medley’s 
vehicle, which contained a television stolen from the victim’s home.  Medley 
3 
 
confessed to committing the burglary with a man named “Billy.”1  Medley was 
indicted on charges of Burglary in the Second Degree, Conspiracy in the Second 
Degree, Theft, and Criminal Mischief.  
 
On June 22, 2021, Medley pled guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree 
pursuant to a plea agreement.  The State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining 
charges.  The State agreed to recommend a sentence of eight years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after two and one-half years for 18 months of Level III 
probation.  The Plea Agreement was silent as to credit time.  In his plea colloquy, 
Medley stated that he “freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty” to the charge, 
that he had not “been promised anything that is not stated in [his] written plea 
agreement,” and that no one “promised [him] what [his] sentence [would] be.”2  
During the colloquy, Medley confirmed that the Plea Agreement was accurate and 
he agreed to it knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The judge accepted the plea 
of guilty and proceeded to impose the recommended sentence.  While doing so, the 
judge asked the criminal case manager “Nick, what’s his effective date?”  The clerk 
responded, “We will make it effective today with 210 days of credit.”3  That was the 
first mention of credit time during the sentencing hearing.  The judge then sentenced 
Medley to the recommended sentence, giving credit for 210 days previously served.  
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A24. 
2 Id. at A55. 
3 Id. at A59. 
4 
 
Neither the State nor the defendant questioned the number of credit days during that 
court appearance.  
 
The next day, June 23, 2021, after the DOC had been provided with a copy of 
the sentence worksheet, a DOC correctional records senior technician contacted the 
New Castle County Prothonotary’s Office by email informing the Superior Court 
criminal case managers of the following: “The offender only earned 12 days credit 
time from 3/1/2019 to 3/13/2019.  Could the Court please clarify where the 
remaining credit time comes from?  The offender is currently committed on VOP’s 
from Kent County Superior Court and Sussex County Superior Court.”4  The chief 
deputy prothonotary brought the email to the attention of the criminal case manager 
who was present during Medley’s sentencing and asked him to review the DOC’s 
inquiry.   
 
Next, on June 25, 2021, before the Superior Court responded to DOC’s 
request, Medley’s defense counsel emailed the Superior Court criminal case 
manager claiming that Medley was entitled to 576 days of credit time for the 
following days:  3/19/2019 through 4/28/2021 (40 days); 6/9/19 through 11/9/2020 
(519 days); 6/16/21 through 6/22/21 (5 days); and 3/1/19 through 3/13/19 (12 days).5   
 
4 Id. at A73. 
5 There appear to be minor discrepancies in the counting of days.  For example, the number of 
days from 6/16/21 to 6/22/21 is actually 7 days, not 5.  The number of days from 3/1/19 to 
3/13/19 is actually 13 days, not 12.  These minor discrepancies do not bear on our decision in 
this case. 
5 
 
An amended sentence order was then prepared and signed by the judge that day, 
giving Medley 576 days of credit time instead of the original 210 days.  
 
On June 28, 2021, after receiving the amended sentence order, a DOC records 
staffer emailed the Superior Court’s chief deputy prothonotary and the 
prothonotary’s criminal managers as follows: “An amended [Automated Sentencing 
Order Program] order was just received changing the credit time from 210 days to 
576 credit days.  We can only account for credit from 3/1/19 – 3/13/19 which equals 
13 days credit.  Was that the court’s intention?”6  The court’s case manager 
responded with the dates used to calculate the 576 days, which aligned with those 
provided by defense counsel. 
 
The DOC records staffer then wrote back that their records showed that except 
for March 1 through March 13, 2019, Medley was being held on other, separate 
cases.  These other cases included three VOP cases and two new cases that were still 
not resolved.  The DOC employee further noted that DOC “thought that the offender 
could only earn time served on the particular case in question not while be held on 
other cases,”7 and apologized if that belief was incorrect.  The Superior Court 
criminal case manager responded that the Superior Court defers to the DOC in terms 
of where credit is applied.  The criminal case manager later indicated that the 
 
6 App. to Opening Br. at A72. 
7 Id. at A71. 
6 
 
database accessible by the Court only gave them “dates and not case numbers of 
counts,” 8 but that the DOC had “the specific information pertaining to custody status 
for each case/court.”9  The case manager submitted another amended order to the 
judge, and on June 29, 2021, the judge approved the amended order eliminating the 
576 days of credit time and giving Medley 13 days of credit time.  That is the 
amended sentence order at issue in this appeal. 
 
After the June 29, 2021 amended order was issued, the defendant filed a pro 
se motion and wrote letters to the court asking for the 576 days of credit time.  On 
or about September 17, 2021, Medley’s defense attorney filed a motion asking that 
the court modify Medley’s sentence to reflect 576 days of credit time.  By order 
dated September 23, 2021, the court denied the motions and reaffirmed its decision 
that Medley was entitled to only 13 days of credit time.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court generally reviews sentence modifications for abuse of discretion.10  
“Abuse of discretion occurs when, among other things, the trial judge has ‘ignored 
recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”11  Questions of law 
are reviewed de novo.12  However, if a defendant fails to fairly present a claim in the 
 
8 Id. at A69. 
9 Id. 
10 Longford-Myers v. State, 213 A.3d 556, 558 (Del. 2019). 
11 Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 925 A.2d 1281 (Del. 2007)).  
12 Downs v. State, 259 A.3d 1272 (Del. 2021). 
7 
 
trial court, it is waived on appeal absent a finding of plain error.13  “Under the plain 
error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”14  
Such review is “limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the 
record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which 
clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.”15 
DISCUSSION 
Medley first contends that the Superior Court judge improperly delegated his 
judicial authority to modify a sentence to DOC personnel and court administrative 
staff.  Medley contends that the only facts in the record as to the reasoning for the 
change of credit days from 210 days to 576 days to 13 days are the interpretation of 
the law by DOC and court administrative employees.   
This first contention must be rejected because the Superior Court’s docket in 
this case unambiguously shows that Medley was entitled to only 13 days of credit 
time on this case, from March 1, 2019, to March 13, 2019.  Any days served above 
13 days are not attributable to this case.  Under Delaware law, the sentencing judge 
has no obligation to credit a defendant with more time than the defendant has served 
 
13 Dickinson v. State, 2022 WL 12099, at *2 (Del. Jan. 12, 2022).  
14 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).  
15 Id. 
8 
 
on the specific case.  11 Del. C. § 3901 imposes certain mandates on the Superior 
Court in sentencing defendants, and Section 3901(c) provides that “any period of 
actual incarceration of a person awaiting trial, who thereafter before trial or sentence 
succeeds in securing provisional liberty on bail, shall be credited to the person in 
determining the termination date of sentence.”  A sentencing court may satisfy 
Section 3901 by either “backdating” the effective date of the sentence to the date of 
incarceration or by crediting the defendant with time served.16  Therefore, the 
sentencing judge’s orders in this case met Section 3901’s requirements, and the 
judge was not required to credit more time than the 13 days accrued for this offense.  
If Medley believes he has not been given credit time to which he is entitled in his 
other cases, he should file an appropriate motion in those cases. 
Medley’s second contention is that the sentencing judge denied him the right 
to be present with his counsel during sentencing when the judge amended his 
sentence order to change his credit time from 576 days to 13 days without a hearing.  
“It is well established that a defendant has a fundamental right to be present at the 
imposition of a final sentence following a criminal conviction.”17  This includes a 
resentencing that amends an original sentence.   
When defense counsel filed the motion on or about September 17, 2021, 
 
16 Dickinson v. State, 2022 WL 120997, at *2 (Del. Jan. 12, 2022); Beck v. State, 2019 WL 
2153313, at *1 (Del. May 15, 2019).   
17 Jones v. State, 672 A.2d 554, 555 (Del. 1996). 
9 
 
asking that the court modify Medley’s sentence to reflect 576 days of credit time, 
counsel did not request that the motion be heard in open court with the defendant 
present.  After the court issued its September 23, 2021 order denying the motion, 
defense counsel did not submit a request that the motion be reheard with the 
defendant present.  Since the issue now raised on appeal was not raised below, we 
believe it should be reviewed for plain error.  Under plain error review, the matter 
complained of must be an error which is so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
that the fairness and integrity of the preceding is jeopardized.  In this case, the only 
change to Medley’s sentence order was the correction of his credit time to the 13 
days, which the record shows beyond dispute to be the correct credit time.  The 
amended order did not alter the Level V term of two and one-half years and did not 
change any special condition of supervision.  Under these circumstances, we do not 
believe it can be said that the fairness and integrity of the proceeding was 
jeopardized.  For this reason, we are not inclined to order a remand for a new 
sentencing.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.