Title: Siquig v. Dellew Corporation

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

{++ NOT _FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
No. 26734

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT“By

    

SIMPLICIO B. SIQUIG, Plaintiff-Appellent,.

aaa

 

DELLEW CORPORATION, Defendant Appellee,

OnsHHY LZ SHY L002

and

JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE
PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, Defendants.

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(cIv. No. 03-21-0407)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 9.)

 

Plaintiff-Appellant Simplicio B. Siquig ("Siquig”)
appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit (“circuit court”)? filed July 9, 2004 in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Dellew Corp. ("Dellew”). The circuit court
granted summary judgment for Dellew on all claims, which
consisted of Siquig’s age discrimination claim and intentional
infliction of emotional distress ("ITED") claim.

On appeal, Siguig argues that the circuit court erred
by (1) applying an incorrect burden of proof for establishing his
prima facie case for his age discrimination claim brought under
Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") $§ 378-1 (Supp. 2002)
(definitions statute) and 378-2 (Supp. 1999);? (2) granting

‘he Honorable Sabrina &. Mexenna presided,

1 HRS $8 378-2 provides in pertinent part:

 

Te shall be an unlawful discriminatory practic

 

 

1 $0, Sexual orientation, age,
(eontinued.

 
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summary judgnent for Dellew on his age discrimination claim
because he had adduced evidence of pretextual reasons for his
termination; and (3) granting summary Judgnent for Dellew on his
pendant IZED claim inasmuch as summary judgment on his primary

(age discrimination) claim w.

 

inappropriate.
With respect to Siguig’s second argument (as to the age
discrimination claim), Siquig essentially argues that (1) Siquig
was terminated on the basis of prior warnings that were either
never given or could not have been given under the circumstances;
(2) Siquig was not on notice by Dellew that issuance of a
lawnmower (bearing black tape) to @ store patron violated any
work policy; (3) in any event, Dellew changed its rationale for
terminating Siguig (citing reasons other than the lawnmower
issuance) after Siguig filed his complaint; (4) Dellew vice
President Drucilla Lewis could not have terminated Siquig,
because Timoteo was the true terminating party; (5) certain
evidence by Dellew should have been excluded as “unauthenticated,
inadmissible hearsay”; (6) Markle, @ supervisor, sabotaged Siquig
by intercepting his unfinished post-working shift paperwork
instead of leaving it for the next shift’s workers to complete;
and (7) Markle and Timoteo, in a time period from December 2001

 

*(s,continuea)
Feligion, color, ancestry, disability, marital statue
of arrest and court record:

(A) For any enployer to refuse to hire or employ or
to bar or discharge fron enployzent, or otherwise to

Giecriminate against any Ineiviauel in compensation oF
in the terms, conditions, oF privileges of employment

 

 

fee also shoppe v, sa, Inc,, 94 Hawai'i, 368, 378-83, 14 P.34 1049,

shenpe v.Gucct bmerics, Inc.,
1058-60 (2000); Hac vw. Univ. Of Hawai, 102 Hawai'i 32, 103, 73 P.3¢ 46, 55
(2003)

2
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until mid-July 2002, made, inter alia, seven and two remarks
about Siquig’s age, respectively.

pon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we hold as follows:

(2) We first observe that Siquig’s points of error
violate Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (“HRAP”) Rule
28(b) (4) (44) and (444) (2004) due to Siquig’s failure to point
out “where in the record the alleged error occurred” and “where
in the record the alleged error was objected to or the manner in
which the alleged error was brought to the attention of the court
or agency.” As such, all of Siguig’s points of error may
properly be disregarded by this court. See e.a., HRAP Rule
26(b) (4). However, because of this court’s longstanding policy
of “affording litigants the opportunity to have their cases heard
on the merits, where possible[,]” we accordingly address the
merits of this appeal. See e.g., Moraan v. Planning Dep't,
County of Kevai, 104 Hewai'i 173, 180-81, 86 P.3d 982, 989-90
(2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) .

(2) As to Siquig’s first main argument, that the
circuit court should not have applied a preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof to an age discrimination claim in
establishing his prima facie c:

that both this court's caselaw and the United States Supreme

 

for age discrimination, we note

Court expressly apply the preponderance of the evidence standard
in this situation. See Shoppe v. Gucci America, inc., 94 Hawai'i
368, 378, 14 P.3d 1059, 1069 (2000); Tex. Dep't of Cnty, Affairs
Ww. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). Therefore, this

argument is without merit.
   

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(3) As to Siquig's second main argument (ie.,
Siguig’s seven subarguments comprising it), we hold as follows:
(a) Even assuming arquende that Siquig's assertions
that (1) his employee warning notice dated June 27, 2002

 

contained time discrepancies ané (2) a prior, purported May 18,
2002 oral warning from Dellew employee Markle was never given are
correct, the necessity of prior warnings in order to terminate
Dellew employees is irrelevant to the question of whether Siquig
suffered age discrimination. Per the plain language of Dellew’s
work policies, which Siquig received, employees engaging in
“{u}nsatisfactory or careless work,” “mistakes due to
carelessness,” or “failure to innediately report damage to. . .
company equipment” may be subject to “possible innediate
Gismissal.” Upon careful review, we hold that Siquig fails to
raise a genuine issue of material fact against the evidence in
the record that he had engaged in such proscribed conduct. Thus,
Siquig's first subargunent fails

(b) Siquig argues that one of Dellew’s rationales for
terminating him, relating to his issuance of @ Lawnmower to a
store customer, was pretextual because the item was in working
condition, the customer did not complain, and no Dellew policy
was violated in the transaction. However, Siquig, in his
deposition testimony below, admitted that something was “wrong”
with the lawnmower at the time he issued it, but that it was
“still repairable.” (Emphasis added.) As noted supra, Dellew’s
work policies specifically proscribed “failure to immediately
report damage to . . . company equipment” under express penalty
of “possible immediate dismissal.” Thus, even when viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to Siguig, we hold that Siquig
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has not a raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Dellew’'s reasons for terminating him were pretextual in this

 

respect. See Shoppe, 94 Hawai'i at 379, 14 P.3d at 106
o dic Assocs, of Hawai’ ye Hawai:
Ltd, 109 Hawai'i 185, 194, 124 P.34 930, 939 (2005). Thus, his
second subargument is without merit.

(c) Siguig argues, in the alternative, that Dellew

terminated Siguig based on pretext due to its advancement of six

 

new rationales for terminating him after the filing of his
complaint, all of which were inconsistent with Dellew’s pre-
Litigation reasons for terminating him. However, we observe that

five of these rationales are disputed by Siquig for the first

time on appeal. See Kemp v, State of Hawat't child Support
Enforcement Agency, 111 Hawai'i 367, 391, 141 P.3d 1024, 1038

(2006). Thus, of the eix challenged reasons advanced by Dellew
post-litigation as to why Siguig was terminated, only one -- that
Siguig “failed to input or properly enter data into [Dellew’s]
computerized inventory system” -- may be considered by this
court. In the June 27, 2002 warning note issued to Siquig, this
purportedly new, post-litigation reason for terminating him is
directly mentioned (and is also referenced in Siquig’s July 12,
2002 termination notice). Thus, Siguig’s third subargument is
without merit.

(d) As to the Siguig’s argument that Lewis was not the
decisionnaker in his termination, Dellew adduced evidence during
summary judgment proceedings that Lewis, its Vice President, was
the sole decisicnnaker in terminating Siquig. At orel argunent,
Siguig, in response to the circuit court's questioning, expressly

adnitted having no evidence to refute Dellew’s evidence. Thus,
 

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assuming arauende that the question of who terminated Siquig is

relevant to this api

 

1, Siquig’s fourth subargument must
nonetheless fail because he did not set forth “specific facts” to
counter Dellew’s submitted evidence. Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure ("HRC") Rule 56(e) (2000); see also Lee v. Puamana

sty. Ass'n, 109 Hawai'i 561, 567, 128 P.3d 874, 880 (2006)
(quoting French v. Hawal's Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hewai"i 462, 99
P.3d 1046 (2004)).

(e) Siguig aroues that certain exhibits appended to
Dellew’s motion for partial summary judgment as to the age
discrimination issue constituted “unauthenticated, inadmissible
hearsay” which should not have been considered by the circuit
court. However, this argument is not supported by a predicate
point of error preserving the evidentiary objection. We
therefore hold that Siquig’s fifth subargunent is waived. See
HRAP Rule 28(b) (4).

(£) Siquig argues that Markle would create paperwork
discrepancies for Siquig’s employment file by collecting his
unfinished paperwork at the end of his shift and making notations
on it, in alleged violation of the employee policy to simply
leave the paperwork for the next shift’s employees to complete.
However, the deposition transcript excerpt cited by Siguig as
support denotes only one incident involving one document. Thus,
Siguig’s apparent generalization that Markle sabotaged him by
continually intercepting his incomplete paperwork before the next
shift’s workers could address it is flawed. Further, even when
viewing the evidence of this single incident in the light most
favorable to Siquig, there remains, inter alia, express findings
from the State of Hawai'i Department of Labor and Industrial
 

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Relations’ Employment Security Appeals Referees’ Office (made
pursuant to an unemployment benefits appeals proceeding involving
Dellew and Siquig)? that Siquig “made too many errors in
recording the equipment loan transactions [from Dellew to its
customers].” As such, we hold that Siquig could not meet his
burden of persuasion to prove that Dellew’s reasons for
terminating him were “unworthy of credence” in this regard,‘ and
accordingly held that his sixth subargument is without merit.

(9) Finally, Sigquig asserts that “age based animus”
existed as evidenced by, inter alia, nine conments made to him
about his age (seven by Markle, two by Timoteo) from “about,
December 2001 until his termination on July 12, 2002[.]” Siquig
argues that Markle’s and Timoteo’s age-related statements

denonsteated that the reasons given by (Dellew) for treating
[siquig) aifferent than younger employees was [sic] his age ~

 

Sixty seven (67). [Dellew's] explanations for its actions
Jnscticns [sic] were false and inconsistent and not to be
believed, They were instead pretext for age discrimination, there

Ss no cther reasonable explenaticn.
However, these conclusory assertions do not demonstrate any nexus
between Markle’s and Timoteo’s alleged taunting and any
illegitimacy of Dellew’s stated reasons for terminating him
(dues, pretext).? Thus, Siquig’s seventh subargunent is without
merit.

(4) Upon careful review of the record, we hold that

Siquig's remaining arguments as to his age discrimination claim

 

> Siquig prevailed in this proceeding.

«see Sheope, 94 Hawes's st 379, 14 P.3d at 1060 (quoting Eurdine,
450 0,8. at 258) internal quotation marks omitted) -

+ siguig's allegations of Markle’s and Tincteo' s coments about his
lage would oppear in the abstract to be eppropriately directed to a claim of
age Giscrisinetion due to a hostile work environment. However, Siquig’s
Counsel specifically disavowed any hostile work environment claim during oral
argument on Dellew's motions for partial summary judgment.

 

7
 

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are waived because they are raised for the first time on appeal.
See Kemp, supra. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court
properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of Dellew as
to Siquig’s age discrimination claim.

(5) Because (a) Siquig has expressly noted that his
IIED claim is pendant with his age discrimination claim, (b)
Siguig does not advance independent argument as to why the
cireuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of
Dellew as to his ITED claim is inappropriate, and (c) we hold
that the circuit court properly granted partial summary judgment
in favor of Dellew as to Siquig's age discrimination claim, we
therefore hold that the circuit court properly granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Dellew as to his ITED claim.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the July 9, 2004 judgment of
the circuit court is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 27, 2007.

on the briefs:

Venetia K. Carpenter-Asui
for Plaintif£-Appellant

Simplicio B. Siguig .

Corianne M. Lau, and Me Ornsn
Peter Knapman, (of Alston

Hunt Floyd « Ing) for C
Defendant-Appelice Braet Oster orrenr
Dellew Corp.

Goon t, Dull