Title: Schutkowski v. Carey

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Schutkowski v. Carey1986 WY 177725 P.2d 1057Case Number: 85-101Decided: 09/30/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Barbara SCHUTKOWSKI, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Dwain CAREY and Robert D. 
Rodekohr, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Douglas J. 
Moench, Jr., of Cole and Moench, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Paul B. Godfrey 
and Julie Nye Tiedeken of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellee Robert D. 
Rodekohr.

George Zunker of 
Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & Davidson, Cheyennefor appellee Dwain 
Carey.

Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN* and CARDINE, JJ., and ROSE and ROONEY, JJ. 
(Retired).

* Reassigned to BROWN, J., July 18, 
1986.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Barbara 
Schutkowski, a sky diving student injured during her first jump, filed a 
negligence complaint against appellees Dwain Carey and Robert Rodekohr, her 
skydiving instructors.1 The district court, in a summary 
judgment for appellees, found that a "Release and Indemnity Agreement" signed by 
appellant excused the instructors from all liability for injury, including 
consequences arising from negligence. On appeal Ms. Schutkowski raises the 
following issues:

"1. Did the trial court 
err in determining that the contracting parties intended for the release to 
excuse appellees from liability caused by their 
negligence?

"2. Did error occur in 
failing to strictly construe the release as merely excusing liability for 
injuries that ordinarily and inevitably occur without 
fault?

"3. Did the trial court 
err in following the rationale of a minority view?"

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The basic facts are 
undisputed. Appellant employed appellees to teach her to sky dive. Before her 
first jump, she signed an agreement releasing appellees from all claims for 
personal injury resulting from parachuting and related activities. On July 1, 
1979, appellant made her first parachute jump, flying with instructor Carey and 
pilot Rodekohr. During a difficult landing some distance from the target Ms. 
Schutkowski suffered back, arm and leg injuries. She filed an action charging 
that Carey and Rodekohr were negligent in failing to warn her of the risks of 
parachuting, and failing to adequately instruct and direct her during sky diving 
procedures.

[¶4.]     In their answers to the 
complaint and subsequent motions for summary judgment, appellees contended that 
appellant's claims were barred by the liability release agreement. In this 
document Ms. Schutkowski acknowledged that for consideration and permission to 
participate in the course,

"* * * I Barbara 
Schutkowski of Cheyenne, Wy for myself, my heirs * * * do hereby fully and forever release and discharge 
the said Cheyenne Parachute Club and Bob Rodekohr, Cheyenne, Wyo, and their 
divisions, and their employees * * * and all persons whomsoever directly or 
indirectly liable, from any and all other claims and demands, actions, and 
causes of action, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, and any and all 
other claims of damages whatsoever both in law and in equity, on account of, or 
in any way resulting from, personal 
injuries, conscious suffering, death, or property damages sustained by me, 
arising out of aircraft flights, parachute jumps, or any other means of lift, 
ascent, or descent from an aircraft * * * on the ground or in flight, and 
meaning and intending to include herein all such personal injuries, conscious 
suffering, death or property damage resulting from or in any way connected with 
or arising out of instructions, training, and ground or air operations 
incidental thereto, and in consideration of the foregoing premises I * * * 
hereby expressly stipulate, covenant and agree to indemnify and hold forever 
harmless the said Cheyenne Parachute Club * * * from any and all actions * * * 
and any and all other claims for damages whatsoever which may hereafter arise * 
* * from my negligent, willful or wanton, or intentional act or actions. 
(Emphasis added.)

"The terms of this 
release and indemnification agreement are contractual and not a mere recital and 
contain the entire agreement between the parties hereto."

[¶5.]     The district court 
found that the agreement released appellees from liability for negligence. An 
order granting summary judgment for defendants was entered from which Ms. 
Schutkowski appeals.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶6.]     The standard of review 
for summary judgment appeals has been well established by this 
court.

"When reviewing a summary 
judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same information. Randolph v. 
Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 
702 P.2d 142 (1985); and Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 
(1983). A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the 
nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dudley v. East Ridge 
Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 (1985). Material fact has 
been defined as one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, Department of Wyoming v. 
Board of County Commissioners of the County of Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 
(1985). Upon examination of a summary judgment, we view the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving him all 
favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 (1980)." Garner v. Hickman, 
709 P.2d 407, 410 (1985).

[¶7.]     The litigants here 
agree on the essential facts and admit that the release was signed by appellee. 
However, they disagree on the interpretation of the contract. Interpretation and 
construction are questions of law for the court to decide. Amoco Production 
Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980). Therefore, issues 
concerning the validity of the exculpatory clause and the intent of the 
agreement were properly before the court on summary judgment. Product Research 
Associates v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company, 16 Cal. App. 3d 651, 94 
Cal.Rpt. 216 (1971); Jones v. Dressel, Colo., 623 P.2d 370 (1981); Ciofalo v. Vic 
Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 177 N.E.2d 925 
(1961).

EXCULPATORY 
CLAUSE

[¶8.]     Wyoming courts enforce 
exculpatory clauses releasing parties from liability for injury or damages 
resulting from negligence if the clause is not contrary to public policy. Kost 
v. First National Bank of Greybull, Wyo., 684 P.2d 819 (1984); Tate v. Mountain States 
Telegraph and Telephone Company, Wyo., 647 P.2d 58 (1982); Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979). Generally, specific 
agreements absolving participants and proprietors from negligence liability 
during hazardous recreational activities are enforceable, subject to willful 
misconduct limitations. Cain v. ClevelandParachuteTrainingCenter, 9 O.R.B. 28, 9 Ohio App.3d 27, 457 N.E.2d 1185 (1983). The 
Ohio court 
observed in Cain:

"A participant in 
recreational activity is free to contract with the proprietor of such activity 
so as to relieve the proprietor of responsibility for damages or injuries to the 
participant caused by the negligence of the proprietor, except when caused by 
willful or wanton misconduct. [Citations omitted.]" Id., 457 N.E.2d  at 
1187.

[¶9.]     In Jones v. Dressel, 
supra, the Colorado Supreme Court developed a four-part test to determine 
whether a negligence exculpatory clause is valid. Pennsylvania courts have also adopted standards which 
closely parallel those in the Colorado case. Liability Assurance Corporation 
v. Greenville Business Men's Association, 423 
Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966). In reaching its determination a court considers (1) whether a 
duty to the public exists; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether 
the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the 
parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Only exculpatory 
agreements meeting these requirements are enforceable. Jones v. Dressel, 
supra.

[¶10.]  Private recreational businesses generally 
do not qualify as services demanding a special duty to the public, nor are their 
services of a special, highly necessary nature. Jones v. Dressel, supra. The 
California Supreme Court, in Tunkl v. Regents 
of University of 
California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 
32 Cal.Rpt. 33, 36, 383 P.2d 441, 445-446, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963), described the 
elements of an agreement affecting the public interest:

"[The agreement] concerns 
a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party 
seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to 
the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of 
the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for 
any member of the public who seeks it * * *. As a result of the essential nature 
of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking 
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any 
member of the public who seeks his services. * *"

[¶11.]  The service provided by appellees was not 
a matter of practical necessity for any member of the public. It was not an 
essential service, so no decisive bargaining advantage existed. Further, no 
evidence suggests that appellant was unfairly pressured into signing the 
agreement or that she was deprived of an opportunity to understand its 
implications. The agreement meets the first three criteria for determining if 
the exculpatory clause is valid.

INTENT TO EXCUSE 
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE

[¶12.]  Finally, we must determine if the release 
clearly shows the intent to eliminate appellee's liability for negligent acts. 
Public policy disfavors clauses exculpating liability for negligence, and a 
court must closely scrutinize such clauses. Kansas City Power & Light 
Company v. United Telephone Company of Kansas, Inc., 458 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 
1972); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979); 
Atlas Mutual Insurance Company v. Moore Dry Kiln Company, 38 Or. App. 111, 589 P.2d 1134 (1979). The exculpatory clause must clearly and unequivocably 
demonstrate the parties' intent to eliminate liability for negligence.2 The question here is whether 
"negligence" or other specific words are required to clearly show intent. 

[¶13.]  Courts disagree on the specific language 
needed to show such intent. In some jurisdictions the word "negligence" or 
equally precise language is required in order to bar liability for negligent 
acts. Kansas City Power & Light Company v. United Telephone Company of 
Kansas, Inc., supra; Gross v. Sweet, supra; Boll v. Sharpe & Dohme, 281 App. 
Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1953). While these jurisdictions may reluctantly 
accept contracts absolving parties from liability for negligence, they insist on 
exacting, "unequivocal" language. Gross v. Sweet, supra; and Willard Van Dyke 
Products, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Company, 12 N.Y.2d 301, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337, 189 N.E.2d 693 (1963).

[¶14.]  Conversely, the absence of the word 
"negligence" is not fatal to an exculpatory clause in many courts if the terms 
of the contract clearly show intent to extinguish liability. Cain v. 
ClevelandParachuteTrainingCenter, supra; LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 
660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1019, 102 S. Ct. 1716, 72 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1982); Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wn. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981); Hewitt v. Miller, 11 Wn. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244 
(1974).3 The facts in Cain v. ClevelandParachuteTrainingCenter, supra, were very similar to the 
case before us. A sky diving student signed a liability release 
stating:

"`* * * I covenant for 
myself, my estate, executor, heirs, and assigns not to file suit or initiate any 
claim procedure in respect to any personal injuries, property damages, or losses 
I may experience or sustain arising directly or indirectly out of my activities 
hereunder.'" Id., at 1186.

The Ohio court, while 
narrowly construing the language of the exculpatory clause, found that it 
expressed an intent to limit liability for negligence even though the words used 
did not include "negligence."

[¶15.]  Jurisdictions which interpret exculpatory 
language based on the clear intent of the parties rather than specific 
"negligence" terminology better characterize Wyoming law. When interpreting a contract our 
primary concern is to determine the intent of the parties. Rouse v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74 
(1983); Busch Development, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65 (1982); 
Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, supra. The 
parties' intentions are determined by giving effect to all of the contract 
language. Sunburst Exploration, Inc. v. Jensen, Wyo., 
635 P.2d 822 (1981). We interpret the contract considering the meaning of the 
document as a whole. Kost v. First National Bank of Greybull, Wyo., 684 P.2d 819 (1984). Additionally, the 
court must consider the surrounding circumstances, the relationship of the 
parties, the nature of the subject matter and the apparent purpose in making the 
contract. Peters Grazing Association v. Legerski, Wyo., 544 P.2d 449 (1975), reh. denied 546 P.2d 189 (1976).

[¶16.]  Considering all of the language of the 
agreement in context, it is clear that the parties' intent was to release 
appellees from liability for negligence. The contract wording focuses particular 
attention on the unconditional nature of the exculpatory agreement. It 
specifically and repeatedly exempts appellants from any responsibility for 
potential consequences. See Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 96 (1983). By signing the release, Barbara Schutkowski 
voluntarily waived her potential claims against

"all persons whomsoever 
directly or indirectly liable, from any and all * * * claims and demands, 
actions and causes of action * * * and any and all other claims of damages whatsoever both in law and in equity," 
and "in any way resulting from, 
personal injuries * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶17.]  Common sense is one of the leading 
characteristics of contract interpretation and construction. Marathon Oil Co. v. 
Kleppe, 407 F. Supp. 1301 (D.Wyo. 1975), aff'd 556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977); 
and 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 243, p. 630 (1964). In construing this contract the 
nature of the service and the purpose of the release must be considered. Peters 
Grazing Association v. Legerski, supra. In Gross v. Sweet, 424 N YS.2d at 372, 
400 N.E.2d  at 313, a parachuting case similar to this one, the well-reasoned 
dissent contends:

"The activity on which 
plaintiff was about to embark under the tutelage of defendants was a hazardous 
one at best, but virtually the only claims that he might have had against them 
[the defendants] should he sustain personal injuries or property damage would be 
claims resulting from fault or negligence of defendants. The majority reads the 
agreement `merely as driving home the fact that the defendant was not to bear 
any responsibility for injuries that ordinarily and inevitably would occur, 
without any fault of the defendant, to those who participate in such a 
physically demanding sport.' [Citation omitted.] But of what significance or 
practical effect is such a release? It is difficult to conceive of any claim 
other than one predicated on negligence; personal injuries or property damage 
occasioned without negligence by one or both of the defendants would give rise 
to no cause of action at all. The release then, if construed as not including 
claims predicated on negligence, releases nothing and is meaningless and a 
nullity. * * * [A] requirement that there be included the word `negligence' or a 
description of the specific acts of misconduct pleaded in the complaint (as 
plaintiff would contend for) would be a reversion to the `semantic stereotypes,' 
which we have now abjured. [Citations.] * * *"

[¶18.]  In this case it is difficult to envision 
any claim other than one based on negligence that appellant might have had 
against appellees. If it was not the intent of the parties to release appellees 
from liability for negligent acts, we see little purpose in the Release and 
Indemnity Agreement.

[¶19.]  Adult private parties should not enter 
into a contract for hazardous recreational services lightly. The agreement 
language is unambiguous; it clearly shows that appellant intended to relinquish 
all liability claims she might accrue against appellees. We will enforce the 
exculpatory clause.

[¶20.]  The order granting summary judgment for 
appellees is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Steven D. Johnson was 
also joined as a defendant. Barbara Schutkowski's case against him was dismissed 
with prejudice on a motion by his estate on March 18, 
1985.

2 Cases involving this 
issue have used similar language to express the standard. See, e.g., Keystone 
Aeronautics Corporation v. R.J. Enstrom Corporation, 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) 
("greatest particularity"); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979) ("unmistakable language"); Boll v. Sharpe & Dohme, 281 
App. Div. 568, 121 N YS.2d 20 (1953) ("clear and explicit 
language").

3 These contract examples 
were accepted by the courts: Hewitt v. Miller, 11 Wn. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244, 248 
(1974) ("neither this class nor its owners * * * may be held liable in any way 
for any occurrence * * * I hereby personally assume all risks * * * I further 
release [all SCUBA agents] for any harm * * *."); Blide v. Rainier 
Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wn. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492, 493 (1981) ("I * * * hereby 
assume all [specified risks] and will hold [defendant] harmless from any and all 
liability, actions * * demands of every kind and nature whatsoever. * * *"); Lee 
v. Sun Valley Company, 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361, 362 (1984) ("* * * 
harmless for every and all claim which may arise from injury * * 
*.").

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.

[¶21.]  I must dissent from the disposition of 
this case in accordance with the majority opinion. While the holding of the 
majority opinion might appear appropriate to all in the context of an effort to 
learn the skill of "sky-diving" or parachuting, I submit that the result might 
not seem as appropriate in other contexts. In my judgment a different rule would 
fit more aptly into the overall policy of the State of Wyoming.

[¶22.]  In a case involving an indemnity 
agreement this court said:

"Generally, contracts 
exculpating one from the consequences of his own acts are looked upon with 
disfavor by the courts. Kansas City Power & Light Company v. United 
Telephone Company of Kansas, Inc., 458 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1972). Therefore, an 
agreement for indemnity is construed strictly against the indemnitee, 
particularly when the indemnitee was the drafter of the instrument. Allison 
Steel Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima, 22 Ariz. 
App. 76, 523 P.2d 803 (1974). If the indemnitee means to throw the loss upon the 
indemnitor for a fault in which he himself individually shares, he must express 
that purpose beyond any peradventure of doubt. Mostyn v. Delaware L. & W.R. 
Co., 160 F.2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1947). The test is whether the contract language 
specifically focuses attention on the fact that by the agreement the indemnitor 
was assuming liability for indemnitee's own negligence. Sweetman v. Strescon 
Industries, Inc., Del.Super., 389 A.2d 1319 (1978)." Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. 
Stag Industries, Inc., Wyo., 662 P.2d 96, 99 
(1983).

[¶23.]  In considering a settlement agreement 
which we held was required to clearly express the intent of the parties to 
release other tortfeasors we said:

"The thrust of the public 
policy announced in § 1-1-113(a)(ii) is to retain the liability of tortfeasors, 
thus abrogating the common-law release rule. Therefore the phrase `unless its 
terms so provide' should be narrowly construed. Beck v. Cianchetti, [1 
Ohio St.3d 
231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982)] supra. To permit discharge of noncontributing 
tortfeasors where a plaintiff has received only partial compensation, based upon 
broad, general language which does not identify the tortfeasors, effectively 
perpetuates the English rule in contravention of the legislature's intention, 
Beck v. Cianchetti, supra. The phrase `unless its terms so provide' (§ 
1-1-113(a)(i)) compels the releasor to name or otherwise specifically identify 
the released tortfeasors in order that the intent of the parties be fulfilled. 
Beck v. Cianchetti, supra. These resolutions are fortified, not only by Beck v. 
Cianchetti, but by other well-reasoned opinions. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
Sweat, [Alaska, 568 P.2d 916 (1977)] supra; Young v. State, [Alaska, 455 P.2d 889 (1969)] supra; Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, [101 Ill. 2d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984)] supra; Robertson v. McCarte, [13 
Mass. App. 441, 433 N.E.2d 1262 (1982)] supra; Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft 
Company, [Tex., 665 S.W.2d 414 (1984)] supra; McMillen v. Klingensmith, [Tex., 
467 S.W.2d 193 (1971)] supra.

"Such a rule will most 
nearly assure that courts will be able to identify the intention of the parties 
with certainty, and it will have the effect of eliminating the ambiguity factor 
which, without the rule, will forever plague release agreements in tort 
actions." Bjork v. Chrysler Corporation, Wyo., 702 P.2d 146, 162-163 
(1985).

[¶24.]  I would opt for the line of authority 
which requires that the word "negligence" be included in an exculpatory 
agreement such as this. See Jones v. Dressel, Colo., 623 P.2d 370 (1981); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 220 N YS.2d 962, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961); Boll v. Sharp & 
Dohme, 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1953). This requirement is most 
likely to alert the other party to the extent of the release which he is 
granting in the contract, which usually is prepared in advance. In many respects 
this simply would seem to be fair.

[¶25.]  As I indicated the result may well be 
deemed appropriate with respect to parachuting activities. I wonder how 
comfortable this court and others will feel with such a rule when it is invoked 
in favor of day care centers; youth activity organizations; health clubs; public 
or private schools; landlords; or any of a myriad of activities to which this 
concept logically can be extended. Because of my concern with the public policy 
implications of this holding by the court, which I submit may be rather 
far-reaching, I would vote to reverse the disposition by the trial court and 
require that if one is to be released from the consequences of his own 
negligence the release must say exactly that and use the word negligence 
specifically.