Title: State v. Campbell

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-1274 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 3 June 2014 
 
 
TEMPLETON PROPERTIES LP, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Watauga County 
No. 12 CVS 665 
TOWN OF BOONE, 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by respondent from order entered 7 August 2013 by 
Judge Shannon R. Joseph in Watauga County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 20 March 2014. 
 
The Brough Law Firm, by Michael B. Brough; and di Santi 
Watson Capua & Wilson, by Anthony S. di Santi and Chelsea 
B. Garrett, for Petitioner-appellee. 
 
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Anthony Fox and 
Benjamin R. Sullivan, for Respondent-appellant. 
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. 
 
 
The Town of Boone (“Boone”) appeals the superior court’s 7 
August 2013 order reversing a decision of the Town of Boone’s 
Board of Adjustment (“Board”) that denied Templeton Properties 
L.P.’s (“Templeton”) application for a zoning permit.  We 
reverse the superior court’s order.  
I. Facts & Procedural History 
This is the third time this Court has reviewed this case.  
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See Templeton Properties, L.P. v. Town of Boone, ___ N.C. App. 
___, ___, 724 S.E.2d 604, 605 (2012) (“Templeton II”); Templeton 
Properties LP v. Town of Boone, 198 N.C. App. 406, 681 S.E.2d 
566, 2009 WL 2180620 (2009) (unpublished) (“Templeton I”).   
The dispute centers around Templeton’s 2.9 acre lot (“the 
Parcel”) in Boone at 315 State Farm Road.  The Parcel is zoned 
for single-family residential use (“R-1”), but has historically 
been used as a church under a special use permit.  Templeton I, 
2009 WL 2180620 at *1.  The church is 2,250 square feet and is 
located between State Farm Road and VFW Drive in Boone, which 
provide routes of access to the Parcel.  Id.  The surrounding 
neighborhood is “composed of mostly single-family residences,” 
except for a non-residential VFW hall located near the Parcel.  
Id.  Under section 165 of Boone’s then-existing unified 
development ordinance (“UDO”), medical clinics over 10,000 
square feet were allowed in R-1 zoning with a valid special use 
permit.  Applications for special use permits may be denied by 
the Board upon showing of at least one of four reasons set forth 
in UDO § 69(c), namely that the development 
(1) Will materially endanger the public 
health or safety, or 
 
(2) Will substantially injure the value of 
adjoining or abutting property, or 
 
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(3) Will not be in harmony with the area in 
which it is to be located, or 
 
(4) Will not be in general conformity with 
the comprehensive plan, thoroughfare plan, 
or other plan officially adopted by the 
council. 
 
On 28 September 2006, Templeton submitted an application to 
Boone to obtain a special use permit to place a 13,050 square 
foot medical clinic on the Parcel.  Id.  The Board denied the 
application as incomplete.  Id.  Templeton modified its 
application and resubmitted it on 2 March 2007 to address the 
Board’s concerns, including decreasing the clinic’s size to 
10,010 square feet, the current proposed size of the clinic.  
Id.  
On 1 May 2007 the Board rejected Templeton’s application.  
Templeton II, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 724 S.E.2d at 606.  The 
Watauga County Superior Court granted a writ of certiorari and 
then entered an order on 7 July 2008 reversing the Board’s 
denial of Templeton’s application for the special use permit.  
Id.  Boone appealed to this Court and we remanded to the Board 
to issue reviewable findings of fact in Templeton I.  Id. at 
___, 724 S.E.2d at 606–07.   
On 2 September 2010, the Board met to make findings of fact 
relating to the special use permit after the remand.  Id.  After 
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taking testimony from residents and Templeton’s counsel, the 
Board made findings of fact and approved them via a written 
decision on 29 September 2010.  Id.  On 27 October 2010, 
Templeton appealed the Board’s decision to the superior court by 
petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted the same day.  
Id.  On 21 February 2011, the superior court affirmed the 
Board’s decision.  Id.  Templeton then appealed the superior 
court’s decision to this Court, resulting in Templeton II.  Id.  
This Court remanded in Templeton II and required the Board to 
“make reviewable findings of fact . . . based only upon the 
testimony and evidence presented at the hearings held on 5 April 
and 1 May 2007” due to defects in additional testimony taken by 
the Board after the first remand.  Id. at ___, 724 S.E.2d at 
614.  We adopt the remaining statements of fact and procedural 
history in Templeton I and Templeton II. 
On remand, the Board again denied Templeton’s application 
for a special use permit on 4 October 2012 via an identical 
order as we considered in Templeton II.  The Board made twenty-
one findings of fact relating to the proposed clinic’s lack of 
harmony within the order: 
3. Templeton’s proposed clinic would be 
10,010 square feet in size and would have 67 
parking 
spaces 
distributed 
among 
four 
different parking lots. 
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4. The clinic and its parking lots would 
have 23 light poles.  These light poles 
would produce a glow at night visible from 
neighborhood residents’ homes and yards.  
Further, some people in the surrounding 
neighborhood live on properties that are at 
a higher elevation than the Lot, and those 
people would look down on the well-lit 
clinic.  The shields that Templeton proposed 
for the poles’ light bulbs would not prevent 
light from bleeding into the neighborhood. 
 
5. 
Templeton 
plans 
for 
employees 
and 
patients to access the clinic from State 
Farm Road, and Templeton plans to add a 
left-turn lane from State Farm Road into the 
clinic.  
 
6. The clinic would have a large dumpster 
pad, though Templeton did not specify how 
many dumpsters would be on this pad. 
 
7. Templeton had not found a tenant for the 
clinic and did not know what kind of medical 
procedures would be performed there or what 
types of medical wastes might be produced.  
Templeton did acknowledge, however, that 
some wastes produced at the clinic could be 
hazardous. 
 
8. The only development currently on the Lot 
is a 2,250 square-foot church.  The church 
has few lights, and it generally has traffic 
only on weekends. 
 
9. 
The 
area 
surrounding 
the 
Lot 
is 
predominantly 
zoned 
R-1 
Single 
Family 
Residential.  The surrounding area has been 
almost uniformly zoned R-1 Single Family 
Residential since the Town first adopted 
zoning for the area in 1979.  
 
10. The area surrounding the Lot is a 
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residential 
neighborhood, 
one 
of 
[the] 
oldest in Boone.  It is more consistently 
residential, 
with 
fewer 
non-residential 
developments, 
than 
other 
residential 
neighborhoods 
in 
Town. 
 
The 
Lot’s 
surrounding area also has more preserved 
trees and vegetation than other areas in 
Boone. 
 
11. Next door to the Lot is a VFW hall.  
Although the VFW hall is non-residential, it 
is grandfathered because it was built before 
Boone adopted zoning in 1979. 
 
12. Except for the VFW hall, properties in 
the Lot’s surrounding area are almost all 
single-family homes. 
  
13. During the hearing, Templeton offered 
the 
results 
of 
a 
survey 
that 
it 
had 
conducted of development along a stretch of 
State Farm Road.  Some properties in this 
survey were non-residential. 
 
14. However, Templeton’s survey was not 
limited to the area where the clinic would 
be located.  Instead, Templeton’s survey 
extended almost a mile away from the Lot, 
into other areas of Town.  The survey also 
focused on properties fronting State Farm 
Road, which caused it to exclude many 
properties that, although not fronting on 
the road, were still part of the area where 
the clinic would be located. 
 
15. Templeton’s survey did not accurately 
reflect the character of the area in which 
the clinic would be located. 
 
16. The Lot’s surrounding area is separated 
from 
less 
residential 
parts 
of 
Boone, 
including 
those 
less 
residential 
parts 
covered in Templeton’s survey, by distance, 
topography, and the curves in State Farm 
-7- 
 
 
Road.  As a result, the Lot’s surrounding 
area is a distinct and separate residential 
neighborhood. 
 
17. Templeton’s appraiser, in describing the 
Lot’s surrounding area, also concluded that 
the only developments in the surrounding 
area were the VFW hall and single-family 
homes. 
 
18. The Lot’s surrounding area has no 
medical buildings, offices, or commercial 
developments. 
 
19. The clinic would introduce a busy 
commercial operation into an area that is 
overwhelmingly residential in character. 
 
20. At 10,010 square feet, the clinic would 
be much larger than the single family homes 
that predominate in the surrounding area. 
 
21. The clinic would produce far more 
traffic than other properties in the Lot’s 
surrounding area and would produce a level 
of traffic out-of-character for that area. 
 
22. No properties in the Lot’s surrounding 
area produce as much light as the clinic 
would produce.  The clinic’s lighting would 
not be in keeping with the type and level of 
lighting currently found in the surrounding 
area.   
 
23. Templeton’s proposed clinic would not be 
in harmony with the area in which it would 
be located. 
 
On 6 November 2012, Templeton appealed the denial of its 
application to the Watauga County Superior Court.  On 7 November 
2012, the superior court issued an ex parte writ of certiorari.  
-8- 
 
 
On 7 August 2013, the superior court entered an order reversing 
the Board’s denial of Templeton’s application.  In its third 
conclusion of law, the superior court found  
3. 
The 
Board’s 
determination 
that 
Petitioner’s proposed use is not in harmony 
with the area rests on an overly-restrictive 
application 
of 
the 
term 
“area,” 
which 
amounts 
to 
a 
misinterpretation 
of 
the 
applicable standard.  In this case, the 
relevant “area” within the meaning of the 
ordinance is not limited to the residences 
that lie north of the subject site and that 
do not front State Farm Road but includes 
similarly situated properties along State 
Farm Road that are in reasonable proximity 
to 
the 
subject 
site. 
 
The 
undisputed 
evidence in the record is that most of those 
properties 
are 
used 
for 
office, 
institutional, 
and 
commercial 
— 
not 
residential 
— 
purposes. 
Therefore, 
the 
Board’s conclusion that the proposed use is 
not in harmony with the area in which it is 
to be located is not supported by the 
evidence. 
 
Also, the Board’s findings on lack of 
harmony generally and impermissibly cite 
impacts that are inherent in the nature of 
the proposed use.  As matter of law, a board 
of adjustment cannot deny an application for 
lack of harmony on the basis that a use 
deemed 
conditionally 
permissible 
by 
the 
local legislative body would produce impacts 
common to all such uses — for to allow such 
a decision would be to empower the board to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
elected governing body. All of the Board’s 
findings in this case are of that nature, 
and as a matter of law do not support the 
Board’s conclusion that the proposed use 
would not be in harmony with the area in 
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which it is to be located. 
 
The superior court’s order also found that Finding of Fact 10 
was not supported by competent evidence.  
In its fourth conclusion of law, the superior court found 
the Board’s determination that Templeton’s proposed use would 
not be in conformity with the town’s comprehensive plan was 
based on “general policy statements in the comprehensive plan” 
and was not a sufficient basis to deny Templeton’s application.  
The superior court also found the Board erred in finding that 
the proposed use would materially endanger public safety, as 
“there was not competent, material and substantial evidence to 
support such a conclusion.”  Boone filed notice of appeal on 26 
August 2013 and a second notice of appeal on 5 September 2013 to 
correct the filing number listed on the initial notice of 
appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2013) (stating a right of appeal lies with 
this Court from the final judgment of a superior court “entered 
upon review of a decision of an administrative agency”).   
Boone first argues that the superior court erred by 
improperly acting as a fact-finder in its determination of the 
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“area” considered by the Board’s harmony analysis.  “[T]his 
Court examines the trial court’s order for error[s] of law by 
determining whether the superior court: (1) exercised the proper 
scope of review, and (2) correctly applied this scope of 
review.”  Turik v. Town of Surf City, 182 N.C. App. 427, 429, 
642 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2007) (second alteration in original) 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted) 
(quoting 
Tucker 
v. 
Mecklenburg Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 148 N.C. App. 52, 
55, 557 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2001)).   
Here, the superior court erred when it concluded as a 
matter of law that the Board considered the wrong “area” when 
assessing the clinic’s harmony with the adjacent community.  
This issue is more properly construed as a mixed question of 
fact and law.  See Farm Bureau v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, 366 
N.C. 505, 512, 742 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2013) (finding a trial court 
mislabeled a mixed question of fact and law as a finding of 
fact); Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Bessemer City Zoning Bd. 
of Adjustment, 202 N.C. App. 631, 636, 689 S.E.2d 880, 883 
(2010), rev’d on other grounds, 365 N.C. 152, 712 S.E.2d 868 
(2011).   
In Morris, this Court held (i) that interpretation of a 
term in a zoning ordinance was a question of law and (ii) that 
-11- 
 
 
determining whether the specific actions of a petitioner fit 
within that interpretation was a question of fact reviewable 
under the whole record test.  Morris, 202 N.C. App. at 636, 689 
S.E.2d at 883.  This Court relied on Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. 
Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Adjust., 132 N.C. App. 465, 513 S.E.2d 70 
(1999), which prescribed de novo review of a petitioner’s 
alleged error of law, but also provided deference to a board of 
adjustment’s interpretation of its own ordinance under that de 
novo review.  Id. at 470, 513 S.E.2d at 74.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this Court’s application of a deferential de novo 
standard, stating that “[u]nder de novo review a reviewing court 
considers the case anew and may freely substitute its own 
interpretation of an ordinance for a board of adjustment’s 
conclusions of law.”  Morris, 365 N.C. at 156, 712 S.E.2d at 
871.  The Supreme Court did not reverse this Court’s finding 
that interpreting “work” was properly considered a mixed 
question of law and fact.  Id. 
Thus, we review the superior court’s determination that the 
Board erred in its definition of “area” in two parts: (i) 
whether the Board’s interpretation of the ordinance’s use of 
“area” prescribed was an error of law under de novo review and 
-12- 
 
 
(ii) whether the specific findings of fact used to define the 
area were supported under the whole record test. 
 
Under de novo review, we examine the case with new eyes.  
“[D]e novo means fresh or anew; for a second time, and an appeal 
de novo is an appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial 
court’s record but reviews the evidence and law without 
deference to the trial court’s rulings.”  Parker v. Glosson, 182 
N.C. App. 229, 231, 641 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2007) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
“When utilizing the whole record test, . . . the reviewing 
court must examine all competent evidence (the whole record) in 
order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by 
substantial evidence.”  Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. 
Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 14, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  “The ‘whole record’ test does not 
allow the reviewing court to replace the Board’s judgment as 
between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court 
could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter 
been before it de novo.” Thompson v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977). 
III. Analysis 
A. Defining Area in the Ordinance 
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As discussed supra in Section II, the definition of “area” 
in the ordinance is a mixed question of law and fact subject to 
de novo review.  “[O]ne of the functions of a Board of 
Adjustment is to interpret local zoning ordinances.”  CG & T 
Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington, 105 N.C. App. 32, 39, 
411 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1992).  “[R]eviewing courts may make 
independent assessments of the underlying merits of board of 
adjustment 
ordinance 
interpretations. 
 
This 
proposition 
emphasizes the obvious corollary that courts consider, but are 
not bound by, the interpretations of administrative agencies and 
boards.”  Morris, 365 N.C. at 156, 712 S.E.2d at 871 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).   
In 
Morris, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
compared 
a 
board 
of 
adjustment’s interpretation of the term “work” to the actual 
ordinance: 
[W]e find the BOA’s interpretation of the 
term 
“work” 
unpersuasive. 
The 
ordinance 
provides that: 
 
“If the work described in any compliance or 
sign permit has not begun within six months 
from the date of issuance thereof, the 
permit shall expire.  Upon beginning a 
project, work must be diligently continued 
until completion with some progress being 
apparent 
every 
three 
months. 
If 
such 
continuance or work is not shown, the permit 
will expire.” 
 
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City 
of 
Bessemer 
City, 
N.C., 
Ordinance 
§ 155.207. 
 
Bessemer 
City’s 
zoning 
administrator 
testified 
at 
the 
BOA 
hearing 
that 
he 
interpreted 
the 
term 
“work” 
to 
mean 
“actually 
something 
moving 
on 
the 
ground . . . . 
[c]onstruction.” 
 
In 
his 
view, Fairway failed to commence “work” 
within the time period prescribed in the 
sign permit because he did not observe 
construction-like activities occurring on 
the property. He therefore concluded the 
sign was relocated without a valid sign 
permit. 
 
In contrast, Fairway argues the term “work” 
encompasses the broader range of activities 
necessary to complete the sign relocation. 
Fairway contends its negotiations with DOT 
and Dixon, as well as its acquisition of a 
county building permit, constitute “work” 
under the ordinance. We agree with Fairway 
that the term “work” has a broader meaning 
than mere visible evidence of construction. 
 
Id. at 156–57, 712 S.E.2d at 871.   
We consider the phrase “area” here and the Board’s 
interpretation of it.  The ordinance provides the Board with the 
ability to deny a special use permit if the application “[w]ill 
not be in harmony with the area in which it is located.”  A 
fact-specific inquiry is necessarily required to define “area” 
in this context, as each individual application for a special 
use permit will have different surrounding areas the Board will 
need to consider when determining whether the property would be 
-15- 
 
 
harmonious with its surroundings.  This scenario is much like 
our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase a “reasonable 
time”: 
If, from the admitted facts, the court can 
draw the conclusion as to whether the time 
is reasonable or unreasonable by applying to 
them a legal principle or a rule of law, 
then the question is one of law.  But if 
different inferences may be drawn, or the 
circumstances are numerous and complicated 
and such that a definite legal rule cannot 
be applied to them, then the matter should 
be submitted to the jury.  It is only when 
the 
facts 
are 
undisputed 
and 
different 
inferences cannot be reasonably drawn from 
them that the question ever becomes one of 
law. 
 
Claus-Shear Co. v. E. Lee Hard Ware House, 140 N.C. 552, 555, 53 
S.E. 433, 435 (1906).  Conversely, if the Board made a 
determination 
of 
what 
“area” 
generally 
meant 
within 
the 
ordinance and there was no disagreement about the area in 
question,1 a trial court’s de novo analysis of the Board’s 
conclusion of law, that being an interpretation of “area” within 
the ordinance, would be appropriate.   
Here, the Board used the term “area” as it related to 
specific findings of fact, which was the proper application 
under UDO § 69(d).  Finding of fact #13 considered Templeton’s 
                     
1 For example, if the Board made a finding that “area” 
categorically included all adjacent properties within the R-1 
zoning area. 
-16- 
 
 
offered survey, which included non-residential developments 
further down State Farm Road.  Finding of fact #14 noted that 
Templeton’s evidence “extended almost a mile away” from the 
Parcel and that Templeton’s survey excluded several properties 
fronting State Farm Road that the Board considered part of the 
“area.”  Finding of fact #16 stated that “distance, topography, 
and the curves in State Farm Road” separated the Parcel from the 
commercial properties cited by Templeton as being part of the 
“area.”  Finding of fact #17 noted that Templeton’s appraiser 
concluded “that the only developments in the surrounding area 
were the VFW hall and single-family homes.”  These findings, 
amongst others, are a proper contextual usage of “area” as laid 
forth in the ordinance and are inherently fact specific.  
Beyond reviewing the Board’s actions, this Court reviews 
whether the superior court correctly performed its several tasks 
in its reviewing capacity: 
[T]he task of a court reviewing a decision 
on an application for a conditional use 
permit made by a town board sitting as a 
quasi-judicial body includes: 
 
(1) Reviewing the record for errors in law, 
 
(2) Insuring that procedures specified by 
law in both statute and ordinance are 
followed, 
 
(3) Insuring that appropriate due process 
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rights 
of 
a 
petitioner 
are 
protected 
including 
the 
right 
to 
offer 
evidence, 
cross-examine 
witnesses, 
and 
inspect 
documents, 
 
(4) Insuring that decisions of town boards 
are supported by competent, material and 
substantial evidence in the whole record, 
and 
 
(5) 
Insuring 
that 
decisions 
are 
not 
arbitrary and capricious. 
 
Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Nags 
Head, 299 N.C. 620, 626, 265 S.E.2d 379, 383 (1980).   
“When the petitioner correctly contends that the agency’s 
decision was either unsupported by the evidence or arbitrary and 
capricious, the appropriate standard of review for the initial 
reviewing court is ‘whole record’ review.  If, however, 
petitioner properly alleges that the agency’s decision was based 
on error of law, de novo review is required.”  Tucker, 148 N.C. 
App. at 55, 557 S.E.2d at 634.  As such, the superior court 
conducts a de novo review under the first three tasks and a 
“whole record” review for the final two tasks. 
Here, the superior court improperly acted as a finder of 
fact on review and imposed its own view of what the bounded 
“area” should be, rather than reviewing whether the Board’s 
findings of fact concerning the area were supported by competent 
evidence and not arbitrary and capricious.  The superior court 
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held that the fact-specific definition of “area” as used by the 
Board should have included “similarly situated” properties that 
are “in reasonable proximity to the subject site.”  “In 
proceedings of this nature, the superior court is not the trier 
of fact.  Such is the function of the town board.”  Coastal 
Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc., 299 N.C. at 626, 265 S.E.2d at 
383.  If findings of fact about the “area” affected here were 
supported by evidence, they must stand even if conflicting 
evidence may have allowed the superior court to reach a 
different result under de novo review.  Tate Terrace Realty 
Investors, Inc. v. Currituck County, 127 N.C. App. 212, 218, 488 
S.E.2d 845, 849 (1997).  By improperly acting as a trier of 
fact, the superior court erred and we reverse its order. 
B. Rebuttal of a Presumed Legislative Finding 
Templeton also contends that because Boone’s R-1 zoning 
allowed construction of its clinic under a special use permit, 
Boone’s legislative determination that clinics are entitled to 
receive 
special 
use 
permits 
should 
have 
been 
enforced.  
Templeton 
cites 
a 
number 
of 
cases 
in 
support 
of 
this 
proposition.  See Woodhouse v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Nags Head, 299 
N.C. 211, 216, 261 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1980) (“Where an applicant 
for a conditional use permit produces competent, material, and 
-19- 
 
 
substantial evidence tending to establish the existence of the 
facts and conditions which the ordinance requires for the 
issuance of a special use permit, prima facie he is entitled to 
it.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Blair Investments, 
LLC v. Roanoke Rapids City Council, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 752 
S.E.2d 524, 527 (2013); Habitat for Humanity of Moore Cnty., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Pinebluff, 187 N.C. App. 764, 768, 653 
S.E.2d 886, 888 (2007); MCC Outdoor, LLC v. Franklinton Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 169 N.C. App. 809, 814, 610 S.E.2d 794, 797 (2005); 
Clark v. City of Asheboro, 136 N.C. App. 114, 122, 524 S.E.2d 
46, 52 (1999);  Vulcan Materials Co. v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs, 115 N.C. App. 319, 324, 444 S.E.2d 639, 643 
(1994) (“The inclusion of a use as a conditional use in a 
particular zoning district establishes a prima facie case that 
the permitted use is in harmony with the general zoning plan.”).   
Of the preceding cases, Templeton argues that Woodhouse 
uses a “legislative finding” rule and that Vulcan is a “less-
restrictive” formulation of the Woodhouse test.  We do not see 
conflict between the two cases, which both allow the presumption 
of granting the special use permit to be rebutted by the party 
opposing its issuance.  See Blair, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 752 
S.E.2d at 528–29 (citing Woodhouse and holding that after a 
-20- 
 
 
petitioner “makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to a 
special use permit, the burden of establishing that the approval 
of a conditional use permit would endanger the public health, 
safety, and welfare falls upon those who oppose the issuance of 
the permit” so long as denial is “based upon findings which are 
supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence 
appearing 
in 
the 
record” 
(citation 
and 
quotation 
marks 
omitted)). 
 
Thus, 
while 
showing 
that 
entitlement 
to 
a 
conditional or special use permit creates a prima facie case 
that a petitioner is entitled to a special use permit, the prima 
facie case may be rebutted by “competent, material, and 
substantial evidence [showing the] use contemplated is not in 
fact in harmony with the area in which it is to be located.”  
Vulcan, 115 N.C. App. at 324, 444 S.E.2d at 643 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted).   
Accordingly, we must consult the record to determine 
whether “competent, material, and substantial” evidence existed 
to support the Board’s harmony analysis.  Id. 
C. Findings of Fact Supporting Board’s Decision to Deny the 
Special Use Permit 
As noted supra in Section II, we now review whether the 
Board’s findings of fact were supported by competent evidence 
under the whole record test.  At the outset, we note that 
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[A] city council’s denial of a conditional 
use permit based solely upon the generalized 
objections 
and 
concerns 
of 
neighboring 
community 
members 
is 
impermissible. 
Speculative assertions, mere expression of 
opinion, and generalized fears “about the 
possible effects of granting a permit are 
insufficient to support the findings of a 
quasi-judicial body.” In other words, the 
denial of a conditional use permit may not 
be 
based 
on 
conclusions 
which 
are 
speculative, sentimental, personal, vague, 
or 
merely 
an 
excuse 
to 
prohibit 
the 
requested use.  
 
Blair, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 752 S.E.2d at 529 (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Were the Board’s findings concerning the 
area’s 
characteristics 
solely 
based 
on 
the 
testimony 
of 
individuals affected by development of the Parcel, denial of the 
permit on those grounds might be impermissible.  However, 
several findings of fact concern the nature of the Parcel and 
the surrounding area which buttress its decision: 
 Finding of fact #3 notes that there would be sixty-seven 
parking spaces at the clinic.  
 Finding of fact #4 describes the twenty-three light poles 
on the clinic’s grounds as well as issues with the 
shielding 
on 
the 
lights 
affecting 
the 
surrounding 
residents.  
 Finding of fact #5 describes Templeton’s proposed left-
turn lane to allow access from State Farm Road.  
-22- 
 
 
 Finding of fact #6 describes the clinic’s proposed “two 
large dumpster pads,” and that Templeton could not 
estimate how many containers would be placed on the pads.  
 Finding of fact #7 noted the uncertainty of the type of 
clinic that would locate at the facility.  
 Finding of fact #8 noted the size, limited weekend use, 
and lack of lighting by the current church structure on 
the Parcel.  
 Finding of fact #9 noted the historical tendency to zone 
the surrounding area as R-1.  
 Finding of fact #11 noted that the VFW Hall adjacent to 
the Parcel was grandfathered into existence because it 
was built before Boone adopted zoning. 
 Finding of fact #12 noted that the surrounding area was 
primarily comprised of single family homes. 
 Findings of fact #13, #14, and #15 found that Templeton’s 
survey was not limited to an area that accurately 
reflected the character of the area near the Parcel, 
extended close to a mile away from the Parcel, and 
excluded several properties not fronting State Farm Road. 
-23- 
 
 
 Finding of fact #16 finds that the Parcel is separated 
from the other non-residential parcels cited by Templeton 
by topography, distance, and road features.  
 Finding of fact #17 notes that Templeton’s appraiser 
described the Parcel’s surrounding area as the VFW hall 
and single family homes.  
 Findings of fact #18 and #19 note the lack of medical 
buildings, offices, or other commercial developments in 
the surrounding area and found that introducing the 
medical 
clinic 
would 
introduce 
a 
“busy 
commercial 
operation” into an “overwhelmingly residential” area. 
 Findings of fact #20, #21, and #22 note that the clinic 
would be “much larger” than the surrounding structures, 
would produce additional traffic, and would create more 
artificial light than other surrounding structures in the 
area.  
These findings were based on testimony, photographs of the area, 
drawings, topographic surveys, and other data compiled by the 
Board prior to its 4 May 2007 denial of Templeton’s application.  
The foregoing was ample evidence to support a finding that the 
proposed clinic was not harmonious with its surrounding area.  
Further, the superior court cited only finding of fact #10 as 
-24- 
 
 
not being supported by evidence in its order.  We disagree and 
hold that the six residents’ testimony of the area regarding its 
contents constituted competent evidence supporting finding of 
fact #10.2  Accordingly, there was competent evidence supporting 
the Board’s finding that the medical clinic would not be in 
harmony with its surrounding area pursuant to UDO § 69(c)(3) and 
the superior court erred in overturning the Board’s decision to 
deny the special use permit.   
Because we hold that the Board’s denial of Templeton’s 
special use permit was supported by competent evidence and 
proper under its harmony analysis, we do not address Boone’s 
remaining 
arguments 
concerning 
conformance 
with 
the 
comprehensive plan or to provide for the public’s safety. 
                     
2 The testimony included statements from Ben Shoemake who said 
the Parcel was surrounded by homes and that the commercial 
development cited by Templeton was further away from the 
neighborhood 
that 
he 
described 
as 
“much 
smaller.” 
 
Les 
Monkemeyer testified that the neighborhood has trees over a 
century old in the surrounding area.  Marc Kadyk, a thirty-year 
resident of the neighborhood, testified that the area is heavily 
wooded.  Thirty-four year neighborhood resident and Town Mayor 
Loretta Clawson testified that the area was overwhelmingly used 
as homes.  Thomas and Joan McLaughlin also testified that the 
neighborhood was residential in nature, that the area was 
heavily wooded, and that the commercial portion of State Farm 
Road to the southeast cited by Templeton was dissimilar because 
it did not have the same amount of vegetation. 
-25- 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the superior 
court is 
REVERSED. 
Judges STROUD and DILLON concur.