Title: Newberry v. Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Newberry v. Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County1996 WY 98919 P.2d 141Case Number: 95-199Decided: 07/08/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Joseph NEWBERRY,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF FREMONT COUNTY, Wyoming,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Fremont County, Nancy Guthrie, J.

David B. Hooper 
of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

Travis W. Moffat 
of Moffat & McKee, P.C., Lander, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The dispositive 
issue in this case is whether civil liability to Joseph Newberry (Newberry) on 
the part of Fremont County is controlled by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 through 120 (1988 and Supp. 1995), or by a document 
entitled "Statement of Willingness to Assume Financial Responsibility" furnished 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission by Fremont County. The document was 
furnished to comply with Title 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1983), part of the National 
Trails System Act. The apparent purpose of the pertinent part of this federal 
legislation is to provide for the utilization of existing railroad rights-of-way 
as trails in order to "bank" such rights-of-way rather than abandon them. 
Newberry was seriously injured when he drove his vehicle off a partially 
washed-out trestle on the railroad right-of-way for which Fremont County had 
assumed financial responsibility. The trial court entered summary judgment in 
favor of Fremont County on the premise of governmental immunity. We hold the 
liability of Fremont County is controlled by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
and, pursuant to the statute, Fremont County enjoys immunity. We affirm the 
order granting summary judgment entered in the trial court.

[¶2]      Newberry in his 
Appellant's Brief presents two issues for review:

1.         
Whether as a matter of law it was error for the District Court to grant 
summary judgment to Defendant, Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County, 
Wyoming (County).

2.         
Whether it was error for the District Court to grant summary judgment to 
Defendant County because of the existence of one or more genuine issues of 
material fact.

The Board of 
County Commissioners of Fremont County frames the issues in its Brief of 
Appellee as follows:

I.          
Did the Trial Court err when it concluded that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact in dispute, and FREMONT COUNTY is entitled to a Judgment 
as a matter of law as immunity was available to it under Section 1-39-120 of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act?

II.          
Can the granting of the Summary Judgment in favor of FREMONT COUNTY be 
sustained on other legal grounds appearing in the record, specifically the 
application of Wyoming's Recreational Use Act?

[¶3]      For many years, 
the Chicago & Northwest Railroad owned and operated a railroad line between 
Riverton and Bonneville in Fremont County, Wyoming. During the 1980s, operation 
of this line was discontinued, and the Chicago & Northwest Railroad sold it 
to Bad Water Line. Subsequently, Bad Water Line and Bonneville Transloaders, 
Inc. submitted a proposal to Fremont County, pursuant to which it had the "first 
option" to purchase the railroad line for one dollar. The rails and ties were 
removed from the line, but the trestles, bridges, and ballast remained in place. 
In 1991, Fremont County accepted a quitclaim deed from the owners of the Bad 
Water Line with the intent of including the right-of-way in the Wyoming Heritage 
Trail project. An inspection of the right-of-way from Riverton to Shoshoni was 
conducted in 1991 by the Fremont County Commissioners, who observed no damage to 
the trestle, which is the subject of this action.

[¶4]      The acquisition 
of the railroad right-of-way was accomplished pursuant to the National Trails 
System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 to -51, adopted by Congress in 1968. The act 
establishes a program that preserves a railroad right-of-way no longer being 
used as an operating railroad line to avoid abandonment and retain the 
right-of-way for possible use as an operational railroad line in the future. At 
the same time, the right-of-way is used as a recreational trail system. 16 
U.S.C. § 1247(d). In the vernacular, this feature of the act is known as the 
"Rails to Trails" program. The acquisition by Fremont County was designed to 
comply with the federal legislation.

[¶5]      In furtherance of 
this purpose, Fremont County executed a Statement of Willingness to Assume 
Financial Responsibility (Statement). That document was a part of an Interstate 
Commerce Commission proceeding identified as ICC Dkt. AB346 (Sub-no. 1X), 
entitled "Bad Water Line - Exemption - Shoshoni to Riverton, Wyoming," and 
states, in pertinent part:

STATEMENT OF 
WILLINGNESS

TO ASSUME 
FINANCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY

In order to establish 
interim trail use and rail banking under section 8(d) of the National Trails 
System Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29, Fremont County 
(Wyoming) is willing to assume full responsibility for management of, for any 
legal liability arising out of the transfer or use of (unless the user is immune 
from liability, in which case it need only indemnify the railroad against any 
potential liability), and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be 
levied or assessed against the right-of-way owned by Bad Water Line and operated 
by Bad Water Line. (Emphasis added.)

It is consistent 
with the language of the National Trails System Act which permits such a 
transfer to a public entity and provides for liability for transfer of 
rights-of-way in this language:

If a State, political 
subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full 
responsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for any legal liability 
arising out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all 
taxes that may be levied or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the 
[Interstate Commerce] Commission shall impose such terms and conditions as a 
requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent 
with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or discontinuance 
inconsistent or disruptive of such use.

16 U.S.C. § 
1247(d) (1983).

[¶6]      On the evening of 
July 14, 1993, Newberry, accompanied by a friend, went "coon" hunting. They 
decided to enter the trail and drive on it to Shoshoni. After dark, sometime 
after 10:00 p.m., Newberry drove onto the trestle that crossed Horse Thief 
Gulch. A section of the trestle was missing, and the trestle terminated in 
mid-air. Newberry drove onto the trestle without any knowledge of its condition. 
The van he was driving fell off the trestle dropping about twenty feet, and he 
sustained serious injuries.

[¶7]      Newberry 
proceeded with an action against Fremont County and the county sheriff, pursuant 
to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. In his complaint, Newberry alleged 
negligence in the operation and maintenance of the railroad right-of-way, which 
he alleged was a recreation area. The defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment asserting immunity from liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act. The district court, in an order entered July 5, 1995, ruled there were no 
genuine issues of material fact, and granted the motion for summary judgment 
filed by the sheriff and the motion for summary judgment filed by the Fremont 
County Commissioners. The thrust of the court's ruling was that immunity was 
available under WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120 (1988). The court also held that the 
immunity had not been waived by the Statement and, further, there had been no 
waiver of immunity by participating in the local government self-insurance 
program pursuant to WYO. STAT. § "1-42-103(vi)(C)" [§ 1-42-103(e)(vi)(C)] 
(1990). Newberry has appealed from the order granting summary judgment to 
Fremont County.

[¶8]      In this appeal, 
Newberry's stance is that Fremont County agreed to assume any legal liability 
arising out of the transfer or use of the right-of-way when it signed the 
Statement furnished to the Interstate Commerce Commission. He argues any state 
law to the contrary is preempted by the federal act in this Statement. 
Furthermore, Newberry contends Fremont County understood it was accepting title 
to a "recreation area" and immunity from liability was waived pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. § 1-39-106. He also seeks to avoid summary judgment by asserting there is 
a genuine issue of material fact whether the trestle is to be considered a 
"recreation area," foreclosing Fremont County from the defense of immunity or a 
"bridge," which would afford the defense of immunity, as the district court 
ruled.

[¶9]      In addressing the 
critical issue, Fremont County argues this action is controlled by the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. Fremont County's position is that the causative factor 
relates to the maintenance of a bridge, and it is entitled to immunity according 
to WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120. Fremont County points to the language in the Statement 
that acknowledges the potential of immunity of the user and then requires only 
indemnification of the railroad. Fremont County argues that, properly construed, 
the document does not waive immunity, nor does it preempt the provisions of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.

[¶10]   Our review of this summary judgment 
granted under WYO. R. CIV. P. 56(c) follows this standard:

Summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Sandstrom v. 
Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994).

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

We review the grant of 
summary judgment without according any deference to the district court's 
decisions on issues of law. Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995); 
Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1995). Summary judgment is not 
favored in negligence actions and is subject to more exacting scrutiny. Tidwell, 
at 1325 (citing MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990)). 
However, even in negligence actions, summary judgment may be appropriate, 
especially if a plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a duty on the part 
of a defendant. Tidwell, at 1325. We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if 
it can be sustained on any legal ground appearing in the record. Bidache [Inc. 
v. Martin, 899 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1995)], at 874 (citing Moncrief v. Louisiana Land 
& Exploration Co., 861 P.2d 516, 523 (Wyo. 1993)).

Duncan v. Town 
of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 550-551 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶11]   We do not reach the question of 
preemption by federal law in this case because the Statement does not, in fact, 
impose liability on Fremont County. The National Trails System Act requires the 
county to assume responsibility for legal liability for use of the right-of-way 
but, if immunity is available, Fremont County is required only to indemnify the 
railroad against potential liability. It is clear the Statement recognizes the 
possibility of immunity from liability and only requires Fremont County to 
assume responsibility for legal liability, whatever that liability might be. 
Fremont County's liability for negligence in this instance is not controlled by 
the requirements of the federal statute or the Statement Fremont County 
executed. 

[¶12]   In this regard, we note that the 
National Trails System Act authorizes transfer or conveyance to a qualified 
private organization as well as to a state or a political subdivision. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1247(d). If this transfer had been to a qualified private organization in 
Wyoming, the provisions of WYO. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to -106 (1990) would be the 
applicable law. In addressing the duty of the landowner, the statute 
provides:

Except as specifically 
recognized by or provided in W.S. 34-19-105, an owner of land owes no duty of 
care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational 
purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or 
activity on such premises to persons entering for recreational 
purposes.

WYO. STAT. § 
34-19-102.

Had a qualified 
private organization been the transferee of the railroad right-of-way, it would 
owe no duty to Newberry because of that Wyoming statute. Even, if a qualified 
private organization had signed a similar statement to that executed by Fremont 
County, the provisions of the state statute would control to prevent 
liability.

[¶13]   Fremont County endeavors to invoke 
WYO. STAT. § 34-19-102 as a defense by citing Smith v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1076 (D.Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976). While we 
recognize we can affirm the trial court on any proper legal ground, we are 
satisfied we need not address this argument in disposing of the 
case.

[¶14]   We agree with the trial court that 
disposition is controlled by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Our statutory 
provision clearly is one in which immunity is the rule and liability is the 
exception. Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 1994); Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 1985). See Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 
1983). The statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112.

WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-104 (1988).

The exception 
upon which Newberry relies is found in WYO. STAT. § 1-39-106, waiving immunity 
for recreation areas:

A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the 
scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, 
recreation area or public park. (Emphasis added.)

[¶15]   In ruling in favor of Fremont 
County, the trial court relied upon the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120 
(Supp. 1995):

(a) The liability 
imposed by W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for 
damages caused by:

(i) A defect in the plan 
or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or 
parking area;

(ii) The failure to 
construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, 
alley, sidewalk or parking area; or

(iii) The maintenance, 
including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, 
culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶16]   We addressed the interplay of these 
statutory provisions in DiVenere v. University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 275 
(Wyo. 1991):

The word "recreation" 
means, "1 a: the act of recreating or the state of being recreated: * * * 
diversion, play * * *. b: a means of getting diversion or entertainment * * *." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1899 (1971). More directly, as used 
in W.S. 1-39-106, in its adjectival form, "recreation" means: "equipped so as 
to provide diversions or amusements * * *." Id. If a statute employs a term 
which has a standard meaning, the term is presumably used in its ordinary and 
usual sense unless another sense is clearly intended. W.S. 8-1-103(a)(i). Here, 
the word "recreation" is used in its standard meaning; indeed, we know of no 
other meaning the word might have. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
will not resort to rules of statutory construction, and the words will be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We hold that War Memorial Stadium at the 
University of Wyoming is a recreation area as contemplated by W.S. 1-39-106. 
Sports facilities are recreation areas. * * * This includes football, * * *. 
(Emphasis added, citations omitted.)

We went on to 
hold that the ramp in Memorial Stadium at the University of Wyoming was not a 
sidewalk subject to the exclusions from waiver of immunity found in WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-120. The obvious logic of that opinion, however, is that WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-120 would have controlled if the ramp had been a sidewalk.

[¶17]   In WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2439 (1993), a trestle is described in this 
way:

A braced framework of 
timbers, piles, or steelwork usu. of considerable height for carrying a road or 
railroad over a depression * * *.

A bridge is 
defined in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 276 (1993) 
as:

A structure erected over 
a depression or an obstacle to travel (as a river, chasm, roadway, or railroad) 
carrying a continuous pathway or roadway (as for pedestrians, automobiles, or 
trains) * * *.

In City of 
Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993), we articulated our rule of 
statutory construction when the statute is clear and unambiguous, saying, "we 
will not resort to rules of statutory construction and the words of the statute 
will be given their plain and ordinary meaning."

[¶18]   This trestle on the railroad 
right-of-way is a bridge for purposes of the application of WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-120. That statute, we emphasize, provides, in pertinent part:

The liability imposed by 
W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include liability for damages caused 
by: * * * the failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, * * *; or the 
maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any 
bridge * * *.

[¶19]   Newberry vigorously argues there is 
a genuine issue of material fact whether the county was negligent in the 
maintenance of a recreation area that included a bridge or was negligent in the 
maintenance of a bridge. The question is one of law in light of DiVenere. We 
hold Newberry's accident was attributable to the failure to reconstruct the 
trestle or properly maintain it. Immunity exists in favor of Fremont County 
pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120. Even though the trestle was part of a 
recreation area, the waiver of immunity in WYO. STAT. § 1-39-106 is limited by 
WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120. The district court did not err in ruling on this question 
of law.

[¶20]   The order granting Fremont County's 
motion for summary judgment is affirmed.